Alleged proofs for the theological hypothesis have been examined.
Even if someone was convinced that none of the proofs we looked at
were valid, it would not follow that the theological hypothesis was
false--it might be that there is a valid proof we didn't consider--or
it might be that there is no proof possible, but that the hypothesis
is still true.

I. THE PROBLEM

The Argument from the problem of Evil is a reductio ad
absurdum argument by the skeptic to show that the theological
hypothesis, as traditionally understood, must be false. The argument
is simply this--if the world had been created by an all-loving God
(who therefore would not want evil), and who was all-powerful (and
thus could create whatever he wanted) there would be no evil. But in
fact there is evil; therefore the world couldn't have been created by
an all-loving, all-powerful God.

II.HICK'S GENERAL STRATEGY

Hick, a theologian, tries to answer this argument by showing that,
just as a loving human father (or even a compassionate human dentist)
must sometimes inflict pain for the greater good in the long run, so
the existence of some evil is essential to God's (ultimately good)
plan. Notice Hick must show that all evil which exists is in some way
essential--for to the extent that any evil is unnecessary, but still
permitted/caused by God, to that extent God is not good. (A father
who beats his children unnecessarily, only once in a while, is to
that extent not good.)

Hick's general ploy is to argue that there are two distinct kinds
of evil: (1) moral evil, and natural evil. Hick argues man had to be
given free will, if his choosing good was to be meaningful, and not
the action of a "mere puppet." It is argued that the natural evil of
this life, like a very thorough and unpleasant curriculum at a
school, is essential for the divine purposes of this life to be
achieved. Hick describes the purpose of this life as "a final stage
in soul-making."

I will to suggest some objections to Hick's position:

First, note Hick insists that God only permits evil, he does not
cause it. But anyone who for a moment took the First Cause argument
seriously, maintaines that God Caused Everything. He may not have
caused the evil directly, but he caused the conditions which
ultimately caused it--and he presumably knew infallibly (God knows
all!) that it would result in evil. (Note, for instance, the Aquinas
-Father Copleston argument that any event in this world is a
contingent event, and all contingent events must ultimately be
traceable to some non-contingent (necessary) Being, or event.) It
seems, then, that he "caused" the evil in at least the same sense
that someone who poisons the food he knows someone is about to eat,
"causes" their death--even though he does not force them to eat the
food.

III. MORAL EVIL:

What sense of "free will" does Hick have in mind? He says "we can
never provide a complete causal explanation of a free act." But many
human acts we CAN explain completely--Mayo ate breakfast because he
was hungry! Hick seems to be suggesting that a "free will" is not (as
a Compatibilist would say) a will which is free from compulsion, but
instead (as a Free Will-ist said) a will free from causation. But if
free acts are uncaused acts, they are chance, random, "come as a
gift." (See William James.) But (1) how could someone reasonably be
punished for what they do randomly, "by chance," or for no reason,
and again (2) how do you square this with the jist of the First Cause
argument, which is that the cause of everything, ultimately, is
God?

Hick describes the choice of good and evil as a kind of test which
man must undergo, and for God to tamper with the test, or to somehow
guarantee that everyone should choose good, would make the test a
fraud, BUT--must God "grade on quite such a high curve"? John Mackie
suggests that God might have, not guaranteed that everyone pass, but
nevertheless have created a world in which as a matter of fact
everyone just happens to pass. (For God knew infallibly who would
pass, and who wouldn't, before He created the world,) Would it, for
instance, prove that Mayo had made up a fraudulent test, if everyone
happened to pass? Must some fail if the test is to be fair? Surely a
test tests the teacher as well as the student--if the teacher is
sufficiently clear, and inspiring, it should be possible for him to
teach what is to be taught, to everyone. (Are unclear teachers
desirable, because managing to learn from them is "more virtuous"?
Why isn't the "word of God" spread in such an effective and
convincing way that everyone both hears and accepts it?)

A. CRITICISMS OF MORAL ARGUMENT

The testing circumstances of God's test seem very odd. The fact
that God knows infallibly who will pass, and who fail--this fact, it
seems to me, makes it a fraudulent test. If I gave a test, and knew
(infallibly) in advance exactly what grade everyone would get--THIS
test, it seems to me, would be fraudulent. One taking such a test
might ask "what's the use, it's already settled--AND KNOWN!) And
remember, God's foreknowledge is infallible. I am suggesting, in
other words, that even if God didn't cause the choices of man (which
he must have, if he caused everything) he still knows them in
advance, infallibly, and this seems just as damaging to the
legitimacy of the "test".

But another problem with the test remains--it seems more often
than not to be a test of the "William Tell" variety. (William Tell
was a Swiss folk hero who was required by the "bad guy" to shoot an
apple from his son's head with a bow and arrow.) That is, if one
party "flunks" the test, (e.g. violates God's commandments) it is not
always this sinner who suffers as a result, but often innocent
bystanders. (Indeed, tho sinner may later repent, and be forgiven!)
Imagine a teacher who lobbed a grenade at each student he caught
cheating, which then killed students around the cheater! Hitler
presumably violated God's commandment "Thou shalt not kill"--but
Hitler's "taking the test" was rather hard on a lot of Jews. In
short, it seems an all-knowing, all-powerful test designer could have
designed a test in which innocent bystanders were less liable to be
hurt. It is hardly an excuse for the evil the Jews suffered, that
Hitler had to be given a fair test, in which he could do right or
wrong--to them.

Another objection: Imagine a human father who, without forcing his
child, tempts it with a lollypop (which he knows infallibly the child
will not be able to resist)--or who even permits a friend to tempt
it--to run across the street without looking, just as a steam-roller
is coming. Suppose the father had previously told the child not to do
it. The father maintains the child is responsible, since the child
makes a "free choice." Such a father, it seems to me, could only be
written off as a sadist. BUT--I think the essential elements of the
sadism are present in the care of Moral Evil:

(2) God has told Man not to give in to temptation (at least he has
told some men) and this is supposed to excuse him, since men "choose
freely."

Suppose now that the human father did this to 5 of his children,
just to prove (to himself? to them? to whom? that 2 of them were
really virtuous. Surely if he knew and could predict infallibly in
advance, which would pass the test and which fail, then it seems the
glory which (according to Hick) could only legitimately be heaped
upon those who passed the test if they actually went through it, was
purchased at the price of the lives of the other children. This is an
all-loving father??

IV. NATURAL EVIL:

Hick suggests that, if the objective of this world were to make
man as comfortable as possible, then natural evil would be
unjustifiable. BUT the objective of this world is to provide man with
a test, challenges, etc, thus evil is necessary to "set the stage"
for a fair test. (An analogy I will use: a particular course at a
university is very unpleasant, but essential if the graduates are
really to come out the best possible.)

A. CRITICISMS OF THE ARGUMENT ABOUT
NATURAL EVIL.

A. Of such a "university," it would be naive, shortsighted and
wrong of the "curriculum committee" to strive to eliminate the
difficult course, simply on the grounds that it involved suffering.
But SURELY AS HUMAN BEINGS WE DO WANT TO TRY TO ELIMINATE NATURAL
SUFFERING. Hick suggests that natural suffering is essential. I am
suggesting this is complete outrageous--if anyone did seriously
believe suffering was essential, then he would resist any attempt to
eliminate it. But we all want to minimize human suffering. In fact,
many people, if pressed for a goal or "meaning" to life, might spell
it out in terms of trying to "make the world a better place"--of
trying, that is, to cut down on the amount of suffering our children
will have to undergo. But if Hick's argument is sound, the presence
of such evil must be essential to "God's plan."

B.But the theologian may answer, some souls may need to be exposed
to more suffering than others, if they are to achieve the status the
"school" is striving for.

1. But (as insisted above) some souls never DO make the
grade--Hick's argument about moral evil was that it is essential to a
fair test that some people should flunk it. So the greater suffering
of some persons cannot be justified by saying that each must suffer
however much is necessary for them to be able to pass the test.

2. If God could create some souls which can get by, "undergo the
proper test," with very little suffering, then it is quite unclear
why He couldn't see to it that all souls are this way. If some people
get souls which will need to suffer a lot, and others get souls which
need suffer only a little, it seems the soul-dispenser is unjust.

C. The believer may answer that although some men seem to suffer
more than others, in fact we all suffer the same amount. Even the
rich suffer, although over different issues, as much as the poor.

1. Isn't this outrageous? Granted, we all suffer some--isn't it
clear that some people make it through life with relatively little
suffering--no major crises, they grow up in a loving home, find
someone they love, marry and have children who love them. Others
suffer a great deal--to suggest that everyone suffers exactly the
same is to fly in the face of the facts. Isn't it self-evident that
those who are starving endure more suffering than those whose biggest
worry is a Phil 1001 final?

2. Again, if someone were convinced (as Hick suggests) that
everyone will be subjected to the same amount of physical
suffering--or that they must be, if their soul is to be properly
processed or tested,

a. It would be morally wrong, incompatible with God's plan, to try
to ease the suffering of another person. (And it would be futile,
since God would presumably see to it that any suffering someone is
able to prevent, will be replaced by other which will make up that
person's quota.")

b. It would be wrong to do this in the long run as well--to hope,
and work, for a world for our children in which they do not have to
endure as much suffering. This would be like removing the difficult
course from the curriculum, with the result that the graduates of
tomorrow wouldn't really "have it." What seems a favor is really
cheating them in the long run.

V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Two final
points:

(1) Look at nature--isn't it obvious that nature is neither "for"
nor "against" humans, but that it is neutral? Some of us have very
bad luck--some children inherit diseases which kill them before they
are rational--but not before they can suffer unspeakable pain. Others
have relatively pleasant, comfortable lives. And part of the meaning
of life, in Mayo's mind at least, has to do with making the world a
place in which there is as little suffering as possible.

(2) How, on Hick's hypothesis, do we explain the children

who die before they are even moral agents? (A related problem--how
do we explain those who aren't even Christians, who never make the
choices between good and evil, or are never even aware of such
choices, or of the tests which, according to Christianity, are
essential?