There is “economy” in Marx; there is
“economy” in Mach. But is it indeed
“unquestionable” that there is even a shadow of
resemblance between the two?

Avenarius’ work, Philosophie als Denken der Welt
gemäss dem Prinzip des Kleinsten Kraftmasses (1876), as
we have seen, applies this “principle” in such a
way that in the name of “economy of thought”
sensation alone is declared to exist. Both causality and
“substance” (a word which the professorial
gentlemen, “for the sake of importance,” prefer to
the clearer and more exact word: matter) are declared
“eliminated” on the same plea of economy. Thus we
get sensation without matter and thought without brain. This
utter nonsense is an attempt to smuggle in subjective
idealism under a new guise. That such precisely is
the character of this basic work on the celebrated
“economy of thought” is, as
we have seen,
generally acknowledged in philosophical
literature. That our Machians did not notice the subjective
idealism under the “new” flag is a fact belonging
to the realm of curiosities.

In the Analysis of Sensations (Russ. trans., p. 49),
Mach refers incidentally to his work of 1872 on this
question. And this work, as we have seen, propounds the
standpoint of pure subjectivism and reduces the world to
sensations. Thus, both the fundamental works which introduce
this famous “principle” into philosophy expound
idealism! What is the reason for this? The reason is that if the
principle of economy of thought is really made “the
basis of the theory of knowledge,” it can lead to
nothing but subjective idealism. That it is more
“economical” to “think” that only I
and my sensations exist is unquestionable, provided we want to
introduce such an absurd conception into epistemology.

Is it “more economical” to “think” of
the atom as indivisible, or as composed of positive and negative
electrons? Is it “more economical” to think of the
Russian bourgeois revolution as being conducted by the liberals
or as being conducted against the liberals? One has only to put
the question in order to see the absurdity, the subjectivism of
applying the category of “the economy of thought”
here. Human thought is “economical” only
when it correctly reflects objective truth, and the
criterion of this correctness is practice, experiment and
industry. Only by denying objective reality, that is, by denying
the foundations of Marxism, can one seriously speak of
economy of thought in the theory of knowledge.

If we turn to Mach’s later works, we shall find in them an
interpretation of the celebrated principle which
frequently amounts to its complete denial. For instance, in the
Wärmelehre Mach returns to his favourite idea of
“the economical nature” of science (2nd German ed.,
p. 366). But there he adds that we engage in an activity not for
the sake of the activity (p. 366; repeated on p. 391):
“the purpose of scientific activity is to present the
fullest . . . most tranquil . . . picture possible of the
world” (p. 366). If this is the case, the
“principle of economy” is banished not only from
the basis of epistemology, but virtually from epistemology
generally. When one says that the purpose of science is to
present a the picture of the world (tranquillity is entirely
beside the point here), one is repeating the materialist point
of view. When one says this, one is admitting the objective
reality of the world in relation to our knowledge, of the model
in relation to the picture. To talk of economy of
thought in such a connection is merely to use a clumsy
and ridiculously pretentious word in place of the word
“correctness.” Mach is muddled here, as usua], and
the Machians behold the muddle and worship it!

InKnowledge and Error, in the chapter entitled
“Illustrations of Methods of Investigation,” we
read the following:

“The ‘complete and simplest description’
(Kirchhoff, 1874), the ‘economical presentation of the
factual’ (Mach, 1872), the ‘concordance of thinking
and being and the mutual concordance of the processes of
thought’ (Grassmann, 1844)—all these, with slight
variations, express one and the same thought.”

Is this not a model of confusion? “Economy of
thought,” from which Mach in 1872 inferred that
sensations alone exist (a point of view which he
himself subsequently was obliged to acknowledge an idealist
one), is declared to be equivalent to the purely
materialist dictum of the mathematician Grassmann regarding the
necessity of co-ordinating thinking and being,
equivalent to the simplest description (of an
objective reality, the existence of which it never
occurred to Kirchhoff to doubtl).

Such an application of the principle of “economy
of thought” is but an example of Mach’s curious
philosophical waverings. And if such curiosities and lapses are
eliminated, the idealist character of “the principle of
the economy of thought” becomes unquestionable. For
example, the Kantian Hönigswald, controverting the
philosophy of Mach, greets his “principle of
economy” as an approach to the “Kantian
circle of ideas” (Dr. Richard Hönigswald, Zur
Kritik der Machschen Philosophie [A Critique of
Mach’s Philosophy], Berlin, 1903, S. 27). And, in
truth, if we do not recognise the objective reality given us in
our sensations, whence are we to derive the “principle of
economy” if not from the subject? Sensations, of
course, do not contain any “economy.” Hence,
thought gives us something which is not contained in sensations!
Hence, the
“principle of economy” is not taken from
experience (i.e.., sensations), but precedes all
experience and, like a Kantian category, constitutes a logical
condition of experience. Hönigswald quotes the following
passage from the Analysis of Sensations: “We can
from our bodily and spiritual stability infer the stability, the
uniqueness of determination and the uniformity of the processes
of nature” (Russ. trans., p. 281). And, indeed, the
subjective-idealist character of such propositions and the
kinship of Mach to Petzoldt, who has gone to the length of
apriorism, are beyond all shadow of doubt.

In connection with “the principle of the economy of
thought,” the idealist Wundt very aptly characterised
Mach as “Kant turned inside out” (Systematische
Philosophie, Leipzig, 1907, S. 128). Kant has a
priori and experience, Mach has experience and a
priori, for Mach’s principle of the econ omy of
thought is essentially apriorism (p. 130). The con nection
(Verknüpfung) is either in things, as an
“objective law of nature [and this Mach emphatically
rejects], or else it is a subjective principle of
description” (p. 130). The principle of economy with Mach
is subjective and kommt wie aus der Pistole
geschossen—appears nobody knows whence—as a
teleological principle which may have a diversity of meanings
(p. 131). As you see, experts in philosophical terminology are
not as naïve as our Machians, who are blindly prepared to
believe that a “new” term can eliminate the
contrast between subjectivism and objectivism, between idealism
and materialism.

Finally, let us turn to the English philosopher James Ward, who
without circumlocution calls himself a spiritualist monist. He
does not controvert Mach, but, as we shall see later, utilises
the entire Machian trend in physics in his fight against
materialism. And he definitely declares that with Mach
“the criterion of simplicity . . . is in the main
subjective, not objective” (Naturalism and
Agnosticism, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 82).

That the principle of the economy of thought as the basis of
epistemology pleased the German Kantians and English
spiritualists will not seem strange after all that has been said
above. That people who are desirous of being Marxists should
link the political economy of the materialist Marx
with the
epistemological economy of Mach is simply ludicrous.

It would be appropriate here to say a few words about “the
unity of the world.” On this question Mr. P. Yushkevich
strikingly exemplifies—for the thousandth time
perhaps—the abysmal confusion created by our
Machians. Engels, in his Anti-Dühring, replies to
Dühring, who had deduced the unity of the world from the
unity of thought, as follows: “The real unity of the world
consists in its materiality, and this is proved not by a few
juggling phrases, but by a long and protracted development of
philosophy and natural science”
(p. 31).[1]
Mr. Yushkevich cites this passage and retorts: “First of
all it is not clear what is meant here by the assertion that
‘the unity of the world consists in its
materiality’” (op. cit., p. 52).

Charming, is it not? This individual undertakes publicly to
prate about the philosophy of Marxism, and then declares that
the most elementary propositions of materialism are “not
clear” to him! Engels showed, using Dühring as an
example, that any philosophy that claims to be consistent can
deduce the unity of the world either from thought—in which
case it is helpless against spiritualism and fideism
(Anti-Dühring, p. 30), and its arguments
inevitably become mere phrase-juggling—or from the
objective reality which exists outside us, which in the theory
of knowledge has long gone under the name of matter, and which
is studied by natural science. It is useless to speak seriously
to an individual to whom such a thing is “not
clear,” for he says it is “not clear” in
order fraudulently to evade giving a genuine answer to
Engels’ clear materialist proposition. And, doing so, he
talks pure Dühringian nonsense about “the cardinal
postulate of the fundamental homogeneity and connection of
being” (Yushkevich, op. cit., p. 51),
about postulates being “propositions” of which
“it would not be exact to say that they have been deduced
from expericnce, since scientific experience is possible only
because they are made the basis of investigation”
(ibid.). This is nothing but twaddle, for if this
individual had the slightest respect for the printed word he
would detect the idealist character in general, and the
Kantian character in particular of the idea that there
can be postulates which are not taken from experience
and
without which experience is impossible. A jumble of words culled
from diverse books and coupled with the obvious errors of the
materialist Dietzgen—such is the “philosophy”
of Mr. Yushkevich and his like.

Let us rather examine the argument for the unity of the world
expounded by a serious empirio-criticist, Joseph
Petzoldt. Section 29, Vol. II, of his Introduction is
termed: “The Tendency to a Uniform (einheitlich)
Conception of the Realm of Knowledge; the Postulate of the
Unique Determination of All That Happens.” And here are a
few samples of his line of reasoning: “. . . Only in
unity can one find that natural end beyond which no
thought can go and in which, consequently, thought, if it takes
into consideration all the facts of the given sphere, can reach
quiescence” (p. 79). “. . . It is beyond doubt that
nature does not always respond to the demand for unity,
but it is equally beyond doubt that in many cases it already
satisfies the demand for quiescence and it must be
held, in accordance with all our previous investigations, that
nature in all probability will satisfy this demand in the future
in all cases. Hence, it would be more correct to describe the
actual soul behaviour as a striving for states of stability
rather than as a striving for unity. . . . The principle of the
states of stability goes farther and
deeper. . . . Haeckel’s proposal to put the kingdom of the
protista alongside the plant and animal kingdom is an untenable
solution for it creates two new difficulties in place of the
former one difficulty: while formerly the boundary between the
plants and animals was doubtful, now it becomes impossible to
demarcate the protista from both plants and
animals. . . . Obviously, such a state is not final
(endgültig). Such ambiguity of concepts
must in one way or another be eliminated, if only, should there
be no other means, by an agreement between the specialists, or
by a majority vote” (pp. 80-81).

Enough, I think? It is evident that the ernpirio-criticist
Petzoldt is not one whit better than Dühring. But
we must be fair even to an adversary; Petzoldt at least has
sufficient scientific integrity to reject materialism as a
philosophical trend unflinchingly and decisively in all
his works. At least, he does not humiliate himself to the extent
of posing as a materialist and declaring that the most
elementary distinction between the fundamental philosophical
trends is “not clear.”