Quite frankly, I thought that Obama was well aware that this conflict has
been a
snare and a delusion, perhaps a pool of quicksand for every U.S. president
since Jimmy Carter at least. Since Carter ostensibly brokered what has turned
out to the Egyptian-Israeli "cold peace" – an absence of conflict
for 30 years, which is no mean feat in that part of the world – in 1978, every
president has had Camp
David envy. Each has made at
least a cursory effort to broker an Israeli-Palestinian accord and have
an accomplishment for the history books. And every president has failed, some
looking more desperate and ridiculous than others.

So I thought Obama just might be too smart to invest much of his own personal
capital in this effort, especially early in his presidency when there has been
insufficient time to lay the
proper groundwork. Send the overrated George Mitchell to call meetings
and dither and send Hillary in a few times a year to make it look as if the
U.S. is putting
real effort into it, but don’t put the personal Obama stamp on it unless,
against all odds, the parties get to the verge of a breakthrough. That way
you get credit for trying but minimal blame when, as most predict, the effort
comes up short of a viable agreement again.

Perhaps Obama does have in mind something like that scenario except that he
figures he can gain more credit by being more active than his predecessors
at the beginning of their terms, then step away from personal involvement but
be ready to step back in and claim credit if something resembling an agreement
does happen to develop. It is at least a possibility that sheer war-weariness
will eventually be enough to permit the Israelis and Palestinians to agree
to a modus vivendi that would at least reduce the amount of energy being
wasted on hostility and fear so that it could be directed toward something
more constructive, like figuring out how to make the desert economically fruitful.
Perhaps a reincarnation of the Hong Kong of old, where two cultures, the Chinese
and the English, coexisted in mutual wariness yet found ways to cooperate in
the pursuit of profit?

I can dream, can’t I?

Unfortunately, the
geopolitical barriers to a two-state solution, the outcome to which almost
all interested parties claim to be committed, are rather formidable, and they
would be even if the Israelis and Palestinians had polities that could produce
a firm consensus on which interests are unshakable and which are negotiable
in dealing with the other polity. But at this point neither group has a polity
capable of producing a long-term negotiating strategy or the ability to enforce
concessions on their own side.

The Palestinian
disunity problem is right out in the open, of course, with Hamas having
won elections and been exiled to
de facto control of Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority tenuously controls
a West Bank sprinkled with Israeli settlements, and is politically divided
to boot. The Israelis are little
better off in that regard. Their political system is inclusive of all kinds
of religious and political beliefs and ideologies – which would arguably be
a benefit in a country mostly at peace – which typically leads to fragile coalition
governments beholden to some micro-party to stay in power and thus
unable to negotiate coherently.

Even if the two sides could overcome all these difficulties, and even if a
substantial number of
Israeli settlements were dismantled
and turned over to Palestinians on favorable terms, any resulting Palestinian
state would be dependent on Israel economically, for access to water and secure
trading routes. In terms of security, the Israelis are almost sure
to insist that a Palestinian entity have no standing military (which might
be used against Israel) but only an internal police force. How likely is it
that Palestinians would develop confidence that the Israeli government would
not abuse the power that geography and relative military capabilities give
it? One thinks more in terms of decades or centuries than months or years.

Then there is the little matter that the surrounding Arab states, however
they may say in public that they are committed to a two-state solution, are
in no great hurry to see such an outcome. Jordan is ruled by Hashemites,
but its population is majority Palestinian. Memories are longer in the Middle
East than most Westerners, who have already forgotten who won the American
Idol competition, understand. Jordanians – at least the ruling class –
have not forgotten the Black
September uprisings of 1970, engineered by Fatah,
the ancestor of whatever it is that Mahmoud Abbas is the titular head of these
days.

On the other side, Egypt is well aware that Hamas
is a descendant of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is still outlawed in Egypt but
politically active enough that the Mubarak government feels some heat.
It’s not eager to see their progeny gain legitimized, internationally recognized
power right next door.

The Saudis might not feel directly threatened by the rise of a Palestinian
state, but they are still in no hurry to see the status quo, under which they
are the most influential power among Sunnis, upset
in ways that might diminish their effective power. The ruling family has
taken firm action against potentially violent al-Qaeda-like movements, but
it also feels vulnerable to restiveness that could express itself through less
violent but ultimately more effective channels to loosen the family’s grip
on absolute power.

The current interest of the neighboring Arab states, then, is to pay lip service
to a Palestinian state while seeing little or no progress in that direction.
Little or no progress on this issue is not all that difficult to achieve.

One might like to stretch one’s sense of the possible to imagine factors in
addition to war-weariness that could contribute to an ultimate resolution of
this dispute over territory and resources. If new generations sick of the disruptions
were to arise, Israelis and Palestinians might be reminded that they have the
virtue of familiarity. Over the years both sides have been fully aware of which
proposals the other side was certain to reject, which they then demanded,
thus assuring no progress and self-righteousness all around. It takes a certain
familiarity to be able to push one another’s buttons so unerringly. If that
familiarity were used to find ways to cooperate rather than to prolong confrontation,
it might lead to arrangements that could overcome the geographic/geopolitical
factors that make a truly independent and viable Palestinian state so unlikely.

What seems certain is that neither the United States nor any other outside
power will be able to develop
a framework for peace on its own that both Palestinians and Israelis will
be able or willing to accept. The U.S. might serve a useful purpose by being
available to put the final touches on an agreement and have an impressive ceremony
in the White House, but sheer will and expertise in the mechanics of negotiating
will not do it. I think that even though he is not directly experienced in
foreign affairs, Barack Obama is smart enough to figure a good bit of this
out. That’s why I’m surprised to see him so directly involved in activities
(like denouncing
West Bank Israeli settlements, which every U.S. president has officially
opposed since 1967 or so) that are interpreted as direct personal involvement
in the chimerical peace process. Unless he pulls back soon – and other issues
might force that – he seems to be setting himself up to be perceived as an
overly ambitious and pitiful failure.

16693 Responseshttp%3A%2F%2Foriginal.antiwar.com%2Fbock%2F2009%2F06%2F07%2Fa-snare-and-a-delusion%2FA+Snare+and+a+Delusion2009-06-08+04%3A00%3A46Alan+Bockhttp%3A%2F%2Foriginal.antiwar.com%2F%3Fp%3D1669 to “A Snare and a Delusion”

A good discription of Obama–piltering actor :^(
Jimmie Carter tried to bring peace to the middle-east and after one term was dropped. The money lenders brought interest rates over 20% (just prior to the election) ,.We got Reagan,Cheny,Rumesfeld , Bush and Clinton ,all Israel Firsters. O'bama is toast-ready for the dust bin :^(