Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:

1. Some form of truth telling2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens3. Compensation programs and trials for some4. Public peace events

Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.

America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.

Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.

Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could lose power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

Thursday, July 30, 2009

In June 2009 Lydia Khalil issued a report, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” for the Brookings Institution. In it, she went over some of the major issues confronting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), one of which was Kirkuk. In the years immediately following the 2003 U.S. invasion, the Kurds were in the ascendancy in Iraq, and set up a legal framework to annex Kirkuk. Both the 2004 Transitional Administration Law and the 2005 Constitution included procedures to add the area to the KRG. The problem is that neither of these was followed through with, and now the central government in Baghdad is stronger and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is asserting his power in the country. The Kurds have not adapted well to this new situation, and instead of adjusting their position accordingly, have clung to their old one and gone on the attack against Maliki. This may have painted the Kurds into a corner, as time is not on their side, and they may end up losing their dream of adding Kirkuk if they do not modify their approach.

The Kurdish leadership calls Kirkuk their Jerusalem, and after the U.S. invasion they set up a process to annex it by legal means. In the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds were able to add Article 140. It called for normalization, a census, and a referendum on the fate of Kirkuk by December 31, 2007. That deadline was extended to June 30, 2008, but that too came and passed and no new date for a referendum has been established. For all intense and purposes 140 is dead because no one else in parliament supports it, but the Kurds. All sides eventually agreed to abandon the article and defer the issue to the United Nations, but the Kurds still talk about implementing 140. On July 15, 2009 for example, KRG President Massoud Barzani said that Kirkuk was a Kurdish city and part of Kurdistan, and that Article 140 would never be disregarded.

At the same time, since 2003 the KRG has been working to create facts on the ground to support their claim to Kirkuk. They set up their own strategy to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policy, where he removed Kurds and Turkmen from Tamim province, home to Kirkuk, and replaced them with Arabs. Immediately after the U.S. invasion the Kurdish peshmerga militia began forcibly removing Arabs from the area. Later a formal process was created where the KRG would pay Arabs to leave the Kirkuk area. Around 8,000, mostly Shiites originally from southern Iraq, have taken up the offer. At the same time, the KRG moved in thousands of Kurds into the area offering money and aid, while intimidated others threatening to take away their jobs and support if they didn’t. The KRG has also changed the borders of Tamim to include more Kurdish towns from neighboring Kurdistan, and changed many signs and schools in the Kirkuk to be in Kurdish instead of Arabic. This altered the demographics and culture of Tamim to ensure that in any referendum Kirkuk would be annexed.

This policy has been ill received by the other groups in Tamim, and caused deep resentment against Kurdish aspirations on Kirkuk. During the 2003 invasion the Kurds swept south into Tamim and took over the top administrative and security duties there. After the 2005 elections, the Kurdish parties were victorious and refused to give the deputy governorship or council presidency to either the Arabs or Turkmen in the province. As a result, by November 2006, the Arabs began boycotting the provincial council. This deadlock was only broken in December 2007 when the Kurds gave 1/3 of the seats on the provincial council to the Arabs, and added an Arab deputy governor in a U.S. brokered deal. This concession did not heal the divisions however, and the Arabs and Turkmen eventually demanded that the provincial council seats be divided into rough thirds with 32% for the Kurds, 32% for the Arabs, 32% for the Turkmen, and the remaining seats for the Christians. The Provincial Powers Act passed in early 2008, and the Provincial Election law also called for power sharing in Tamim, but were never followed through with. Today, the Arabs and Turkmen of Tamim are set against Kurdish annexation. Many Turkmen are in favor of making Tamim an autonomous region, while Arabs want it to be a regular province under the control of Baghdad. Rather than allying with local groups, the Kurds have alienated many of them, and turned others into their political enemies.

With Article 140 deadlocked in Baghdad, and increasing opposition from non-Kurds at the provincial level, the KRG has turned to obstinacy. The Kurds are afraid that if they make any concessions they will lose Kirkuk, and therefore refuse to budge on any of their major demands. The Kurdish Alliance in parliament has also held up major legislation to protest against Article 140 not being implemented. In the KRG, the Kurdish leadership has pushed the issue so much that they are afraid of losing public support if they make any compromises. This stance has only added to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country, because the more the Kurds refuse to make concessions the more opposition they garner. The Kurdish leadership has thus boxed themselves in. They may just continue with their current policy even if it fails, just to save face, and thus keep the status of Kirkuk in limbo.

So far, the U.N.’s paper has received mixed reviews. The Kurds and Baghdad have gone along with the plan so far, and in June 2009 began quiet meetings mediated by the U.N. and the U.S. Publicly however, the Kurdish leadership is insisting that Article 140 be implemented, even though all groups have agreed to abandon it. This is part of electioneering for the July 25 Kurdish elections. Turkmen in the province support the fourth idea of giving Tamim autonomy. Local Arabs however have rejected the plans claiming that they are biased towards the Kurds. Because there are such deep-seated divisions and distrust amongst these various groups it will take a Herculean effort to overcome them and come to some sort of grand compromise. The U.S. is asking the different parties to give the process a chance, but if Washington doesn’t put its full weight and influence behind them, it’s unlikely that the U.N. alone will be able to do the job. It’s important that Washington does this sooner rather than later because its influence is dramatically decreasing with the withdrawal of its forces.

The 2008 Provincial Election Law’s Article 23 created a committee to come up with a power sharing deal in Tamim province amongst other things before voting could happen there. Ideas on how to divide up positions amongst the different groups in the province was the only area where the group made some headway. Politicians in Kirkuk actually agreed on a formula for dividing up the top positions in the province. This would lead to a Kurd being governor, an Arab deputy governor, and a Turkmen chair of the provincial council. Less was achieved on the lower positions. There was general consensus of divvying up jobs roughly by thirds with 32% for Kurds, 32% for Arabs, 32% for Turkmen, and 4% for Christians, but the problem was how to actually achieve this throughout the province. While the Kurds hold most of the top positions in Tamim, the Arabs and Turkmen dominate the lower levels, and did not want any of their group to lose jobs. Of the roughly 60,000 government officials in Tamim, 56% are Arabs, 22% are Turkmen, 18% are Kurds, and 4% are Christians. The Arabs and Turkmen were only willing to give up their positions when the current occupants retired, which of course would take a generation or two to achieve, a naturally dead end argument. The Kurds on the other hand were willing to concede some of their high level jobs in return for a fare share in the rest of the province’s government. They wanted Baghdad to assure this agreement, but with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki playing the Kurdish card to gain nationalist credentials in the rest of the country that never happened. The idea of power sharing has not moved forward since.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Chapter 5 of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” report on the American effort to rebuild Iraq highlights the first turning point in the war. The previous chapters went through the uncoordinated planning and faulty thinking that occurred in Washington before the invasion. Chapter 5 covers the U.S. invasion and its immediate consequences. The chaos that ensued would ensure a long-term U.S. occupation of Iraq.

On March 17, 2003 President George Bush issued an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay to leave Iraq within 48 hours. On March 20 the bombing began, and the next day Coalition ground forces crossed the border into Iraq. Most of the Iraqi military disappeared, but Saddam’s Fedayeen militia began attacks in the south. U.S. General John Abizaid, deputy commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM), looked at reports on how the war was going and predicted in April that the U.S. would end up fighting an insurgency in the country. American forces were concentrated on getting to Baghdad as quick as possible to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. That meant large cities, and northern and western Iraq were left to themselves for weeks, a situation which would have a negative impact on security later on.

Pre-war planning had been split between military and civilian authorities with little to no coordination. That continued during and immediately after the invasion. Members of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and military engineers moved behind combat forces to assess the situation in Iraq independent of each other. The first place the USAID teams went to was the port of Umm Qasr in Basra on March 27. They found the facilities in poor condition, but were still able to have a British ship dock there the next day to delivery humanitarian supplies. The engineers found the power system and infrastructure falling apart across Iraq. In Baghdad for example, the communication and water system were knocked out shortly after the bombing began, and on April 4, the power died in most of the city. Before the war, planners in Washington believed that after the invasion, the country would still be running, and that reconstruction costs would be minimal, and mostly paid for by Iraqi oil revenues. The assessments of the USAID and engineering teams found that it might cost up to $35 billion to rebuild Iraq. USAID and Retired General Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), had raised this concern before, but were met with deaf ears by administration officials.

Problems with unity of command even occurred within the ORHA itself. Faced with the dire state of Iraq’s infrastructure, Garner ordered the USAID to begin working on services instead of humanitarian issues. USAID refused, which led to a bureaucratic battle that reached all the way up to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over who the USAID should answer to. Eventually Garner had to call Powell himself to get the agency to follow his orders.

Garner faced problems even getting into Iraq himself. General Tommy Franks, head of CENTCOM, was following the military’s plan for Iraq. That saw the U.S. overthrowing the government, securing any WMD, and then turning over Iraq to a civilian authority in six to eight weeks, at which time rebuilding would begin. Garner wanted access to Iraq immediately. Garner flew to Qatar to meet with General Franks where he argued that there was a power vacuum in Iraq that needed to be filled by the ORHA. General Franks reluctantly gave in.

The first place Garner’s staff went to was Basra. There they didn’t have a communication system at first, lacked security because there were too few Coalition troops in the city, and reported the first cases of looting on April 2. The chaos that was being unleashed would setback the work on Basra’s Umm Qasr port for weeks, and lead to skyrocketing costs, a foreshadowing of the overall reconstruction effort in Iraq.

The looting and chaos would quickly spread to the rest of the country. On April 7 looting began in Baghdad. Gunfire, robberies, and murders were reported across the city. All of Iraq’s ministries were stripped, and then burned. The exception was the Oil Ministry, which was protected by U.S. troops. That was because the Defense Department had been tasked with running the oil industry in pre-war planning, and issued orders to protect the building during the invasion. Some ministries even continued to be attacked when the U.S. occupied them. The Health Ministry’s offices for example were burned two or three more times after the Americans re-opened it. Iraq’s three main banks, Rafidain, Rasheed, and the Central Bank had their money and safety deposit boxes taken. Iraqis also began going after the petroleum industry, which lasted for ten weeks from March to May 2003, and caused $943 million in damages. Organized gangs and insurgents would eventually take over the robbing and killing. Some neighborhoods in Baghdad, especially Shiite ones, set up militias for protection. This spread to other areas like Amarah in Maysan where Shiite militias took over the city in the absence of Iraqi administrators and Coalition troops. The U.S. ground forces commander General David McKiernan said there weren’t enough troops to maintain security. He was also constrained by the fact that the invasion plan called for soldiers to continue to push north looking for MWD, leaving Baghdad, and much of southern and western Iraq with no Coalition presence. The result was more instability.

This had four major effects upon the U.S. and Iraq. First, it raised the costs of reconstruction by billions. On April 16, Congress appropriated $2.475 billion for rebuilding Iraq. The U.S. would end up spending $50 billion. Second, the lack of security meant Iraqi weapon depots were looted, which helped arm the insurgency and Shiite militias who would go on to destabilize the country after the invasion. Third, the collapse of the Iraqi government and the poor state of Iraq’s infrastructure after decades of war and sanctions meant that the Americans could not get services up and running, which cost them public support. Finally, the situation on the ground in Iraq would eventually mean the White House would give up its strategy of a quick departure.

Despite these setbacks, the U.S. military and leadership acted as if everything was going according to plan. On April 16 General Franks gave his “Freedom Message” saying that the U.S. would only be in Iraq temporarily, and that an American civilian authority known as the Coalition Provisional Authority would soon take over from the military. On April 21, Rumsfeld, taking the advice of General Franks, cancelled the deployment of 50,000 additional troops to Iraq, and began thinking of withdrawal. General McKiernan and Garner were shocked as they both wanted more troops to handle security.

At the same time, Garner was carrying on with his own policies as well. On April 15 he and Presidential Envoy to the Iraqi opposition Zalmay Khalilzad put together a meeting of over 100 indigenous Iraqi leaders in Nassiriya to discuss forming an interim Iraqi government that would take over from the Americans. On April 22, Garner flew to Kurdistan to consult with the Kurdish leaders on this plan as well, while Secretary Powell sent Khalizad and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to meet with Iraqis in the south. This culminated in a meeting on April 28 in Baghdad that included 250 domestic and exile leaders. They agreed to form an Iraqi government over the next four weeks.

The Bush administration’s planning for Iraq had always been haphazard and disconnected. At any one time before the invasion there were at least two different organizations working on a strategy for post-war Iraq, with little to no knowledge of each other. The White House also often interfered with the effort causing more problems. When the invasion started the U.S. military and the civilian OHRA both thought they would be in charge of post-war Iraq. They worked independently, which didn’t help when the country fell into chaos. That instability led the administration to panic, and abandon its early plan to withdraw from Iraq quickly in favor of a long-term occupation under the CPA. The effects of that decision are still being felt today.

SOURCES

Packer, George, Assassins’ Gate, 2005

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Elisabeth Bumiller,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Ricks, Tom, Fiasco, 2006

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Monday, July 27, 2009

On July 25, 2009 the residents of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) voted on a new regional parliament and president. While there are real challengers this time in the legislature, the election is unlikely to break the hold the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani have over the region. The two parties have ruled Kurdistan since it gained its autonomy after the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, the two once bitter enemies have united to maintain their power.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of Massoud, was the most prominent leader of the Kurdish independence movement. He formed the Mahabad Republic, a Kurdish state, in 1945, which was later crushed. He fled to Russia afterwards, while his son Massoud went to Iraq. In 1946 Mustafa formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and returned to Iraq in 1958, and started fighting against the government with the support of Iran. In the 1960s Jalal Talabani left the KDP, and formed his own Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

In 1979 Mustafa died and Massoud assumed control of the KDP. He launched his own insurgency against the Iraqi government during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time, the Barzanis and the KDP were based out of Iran, and he and Talabani fought on the Iranian side during the war with Iraq. After the Gulf War Kurdistan gained its autonomy with the help of the United States, and Barzani and Talabani assumed leadership of the region.

In 2006 the KDP and PUK signed a unification agreement to bring together the two separate administrations. While many officers have been brought together, some of the most important ones, the Finance Ministry, the peshmerga, and the asayesh security forces, have not. There are many members of the old guard in both parties and their peshmerga who are still bitter over the civil war. The militias are also loyal to their political leaders, and not the Kurdish government or Baghdad. The two sides also have different cultures within their administrations, as well as divergent laws, especially on foreign investment, and have not agreed upon how to split revenues. The two Finance Ministries have also made long-term commitments and investments, which have to be completed before the budgets can be unified. These are all reasons why these institutions remain separate.

What the two parties have agreed upon is to maintain their power over the region. The unification agreement gives specific posts in the KRG only to PUK and KDP members for example. The two parties also have extensive patronage systems. For instance, it’s recently been reported that after a four-year hiring freeze the regional government has hired 2,500 new employees just as campaigning started for the Kurdish parliament. Many believe this is a political move to gain more voters in the election. Top positions throughout Kurdistan are also reserved for party members. University presidents, university councils, deans, heads of departments, and scholarships are all connected to the political parties.

Corruption and nepotism are also common complaints about the PUK and KDP. Business deals usually require a high level party official to be completed. The Barzani and Talabani clans have extensive business deals throughout the region, and the latter are said to be worth $2 billion. Family members are also found throughout the government. Massoud’s son Masrour, who is currently the party’s security chief, is going to be the next KDP leader, while his cousin Nechervan is the KRG Prime Minister.

Despite this development in the electorate, little is likely to change after the July 25 balloting. More seats will likely go to new parties in the Kurdish parliament, but Massoud Barzani is expected to be re-elected KRG president. The administration will still be run by the PUK and KDP. Their grip on education, business, government finances, and security will remain in place as well. The upcoming vote is an important step for the Kurdish region because a real opposition might be forming, but until the PUK and KDP loosen their hold on power, the status quo is likely to be preserved.

SOURCES

Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009

Anderson, Liam, “Internationalizing Iraq’s Constitutional Dilemma,” will appear in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009

Sunday, July 26, 2009

A recent Gallup poll of 1,018 Americans in July 2009 shows that while a majority of Americans think that things are going well in Iraq, about the same amount think that going to war was a mistake. From July 10-12, Gallop conducted a telephone poll of 1,018 Americans. They asked about their perceptions of the Iraq and Afghan invasions, and how they thought things were going now in both conflicts. 56% said things were going well in Iraq, while 58% said the war itself was a mistake.

In the first year and 3 months of the war, Americans perceived things as going well and the invasion worthwhile. In mid-2003 only 27% said the war was a mistake, and the public was almost evenly divided on their perceptions on how things were going with 52% saying things were good, and 47% seeing things going badly. From early 2004 to mid 2008 however, perceptions of Iraq turned negative peaking at 71% saying things were bad in January 2007. The same thing happened with opinions on whether the invasion was a mistake, going from 38% saying yes in mid-2004, to peaking at 63% saying yes in April 2008. Americans have continued to think badly of the invasion from then to the present day, despite a better view of the on-going conflict.

When broken down by political views, a majority of Republicans still think the war was worthwhile, while a majority of Democrats and Independents disagree. Only 26% of Republicans think the war was a mistake, while 59% of Independents and 78% of Democrats have the opposite view. This partisan difference is obviously due to the fact that a Republican administration initiated the war.

While Gallup thinks the more positive view of events in Iraq today are linked to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities that only occurred in June 2009 when opinion changed for the positive back in mid-2008. A more likely cause is the drop in violence and the dramatic decline in reporting about the war that began in 2007. That still has not reversed the generally negative view of the invasion. Unless there is a dramatic reversal of events, these views will probably persist until 2011 when combat troops are due to depart Iraq. Americans will think that the country has improved, but that the Bush Administration should’ve never invaded in the first place.

An oil analyst told Reuters that the Oil Ministry will eventually come up with a payment plan, but can’t right now because of the political divisions between Baghdad and Kurdistan. That seems unlikely. The problems between the Kurds and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are increasing, and will continue to as the January 2010 parliamentary elections near. Maliki has stood by his Oil Minister who has condemned the independent oil deals signed by the KRG. The current situation also favors Baghdad as it is getting the profits from the Kurdish exports with no costs. If something isn’t eventually worked out it could undermine the Kurds’ independent oil strategy, which would be fine by Maliki. In the meantime compensating these companies looks to be a political football with no clear resolution in sight.

Iranian officials began traveling to Iraq shortly after the provincial vote. On February 11, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki came to Baghdad to mediate between the estranged Dawa Party and SIIC. On March 2 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council came to Iraq for five days. He was followed by the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani who came at the end of that month.

Domestic Iraqi politics also played into this Iranian policy. In early 2009 the Supreme Council and their allies in parliament were threatening a no confidence vote against Maliki. The Prime Minister was forced to reach out to them to stop this from happening. Their price was for Maliki to rejoin the United Alliance. This appealed to Maliki, because if he was given the leadership position in the list it could help his chances of maintaining his office. The SIIC was also hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power after their loses in the provincial councils. There is still a lot of mistrust between the two, but mutual ambition appears to be bringing them back together with ample pressure from Tehran.

Most of the negotiations for the revival of the Alliance occurred in Hakim’s Tehran hospital where he is undergoing cancer treatment. On May 14 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Hakim. Six days later Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Reform Trend and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari came to Hakim’s hospital. Hakim also met with Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization. At the end of the month Maliki flew to Tehran to consul with Hakim. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki was present. Maliki then met with Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who also pressured him on the United Alliance.

These moves have apparently paid off for Iran for now. On June 19, al-Hayat reported that Maliki and the SIIC had agreed to revive the United Iraqi Alliance. It would now be called the Coalition of the State of Law, and the Prime Minister would be its leader. Sadr’s meeting with Hakim this month, almost completes the original line-up of the Alliance. If these parties do run together it would be a big victory for Iran’s policy, and a step backwards for Iraq. In the 2009 vote, Iraqi nationalism made a revival. The re-birth of the United Alliance would be a return to the sectarian politics of the past. Early reports that the new election law will also maintain the 2005 closed list system where voters only get to vote for lists and not individual candidates is another sign that the major parties are more interested in maintaining their positions rather than advancing the country’s interests. The leading Shiite parties also do not seem to have any problems with playing along with Iran, as long as it helps them win.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

On July 10, 2009 the U.S. released five Iranian operatives that had been in custody for two and a half years. They were let go under the Status of Forces Agreement, which says all prisoners held by the U.S. must be freed or turned over to the Iraqis by 2011. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested that the Iranians be released, and he met with them before they were turned over to the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. The Iranians were originally rounded up as part of an American plan to break-up Tehran’s lethal support of Shiite militias that missed Iran’s main goal in Iraq.

The offensive against Iran’s Qods Force began the month before. In December 2006, the U.S. arrested Iranian General Mohsen Chirazi and Colonel Abu Amad Davari. They were arrested in the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s (SIIC) compound in Baghdad. The two had invitations to be in Iraq from Pres. Talabani. Chirazi was the number three man in the Qods Force, and the highest Iranian captured by the U.S. Both were released a week later after protests by Iraqi officials.

Again, it was no surprise that Iranians were found at this location. The Supreme Council was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and recognized Ayatollah Khomeini as their leader. The SIIC’s militia the Badr Brigade was an official arm of the Qods Force, and fought on the Iranian side during the war like the two Kurdish parties. In fact, Chirazi and Davari were at the SIIC compound to meet the leader of the Badr Brigade when the Americans arrested them.

When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 it was seen as a great threat and opportunity by Tehran. They sent in their operatives and friendly Iraqi parties to shape the facts on the ground to their advantage. The SIIC had been able to win over the Americans before the war, and became the main Shiite party they supported. The Qods Force helped put together the United Iraqi Alliance, which won the most seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and broke the deadlock to put Nouri al-Maliki into office in 2006. This was all to ensure Shiite rule in Iraq, and maximize Iranian influence. At the same time, the Qods Force began funneling money and weapons to any and all Shiite militias that would fight the Americans to hold them down in Iraq so that they wouldn’t attack Iran, and hopefully eventually make them leave. The arrest of the Iranians was aimed at that military effort. While the U.S. was successful in arresting some Qods Force members and the militias they supported, it’s questionable whether these had any real effect upon Iran’s support for Shiite militants. That didn’t really seem to change until Maliki’s crackdown in Basra in March 2008. More importantly, the U.S. never addressed Tehran’s political policy, and in fact supported the SIIC, the most pro-Iranian Shiite party, and helped integrate their Badr Brigade into the Iraqi security forces. In forging this strategy, the Bush administration got caught up on the security situation, and ignored Iran’s main goal, to ensure that Iraq never became a rival again by putting their allies in power. While the Americans were understandably mad at having to release these five Qods Force operatives, it was another sign of their misinterpretation of Iran’s true motives and goals in Iraq.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Roggio, Bill, “Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07- “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07- “Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case?” Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07- “US releases Iranian Qods Force agents,” Long War Journal, 7/9/09

Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,” Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07

Sanger, David, “Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,” New York Times, 1/15/07

The move caused consternation in Baghdad and Washington. 50 members of Iraq’s parliament immediately signed a statement rejecting the Kurdish constitution. They claim that it is unconstitutional. Some claimed that it was the first move towards secession by the Kurds. On July 2 Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Iraq where he said that the new constitution was not helping the increasing divide between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill went to talk with the Kurds shortly afterwards, followed by a visit by Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, to Kirkuk. All three U.S. officials said that Iraqis needed to negotiate and resolve these disputes themselves, and that the Americans would help if needed. The problem is that the U.S. has stood on the sidelines waiting for the U.N. to make progress on the issue, when the international body cannot really do anything without a strong U.S. role. At the same time the differences between Baghdad and Kurdistan have increased. The proposed Kurdish constitution then just added fuel to the fire.

The constitution has also caused protests within Kurdistan. The biggest problem is that it gives new powers to the regional president. The president would be allowed to dissolve the Kurdish parliament, gives the office executive power, command over the peshmerga, the ability to pass and veto laws, and remove any ministers. Opposition parties claim that the document is an attempt to preserve the power of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that have ruled the autonomous region since 1991. In this year’s vote they are facing serious challengers for the first time. Incumbent Kurdish President Massoud Barzani of the KDP however, is expected to be re-elected. The belief is that if the KDP and PUK loose power to these new parties in parliament they will have a new trump card in the expanded powers of the president. In response, several social organizations in Sulaymaniya began a campaign against the new constitution in June 2009, and some of the opposition parties are talking about joining behind one candidate to oppose Barzani in the election.

This delay is only holding off the inevitable. Annexing Kirkuk and other disputed areas is widely popular in Kurdistan. Many Kurds have not even heard or read the constitution either, and will probably be unaware of the changes that it will make in the power of the president before the vote. That means the constitution will likely be passed. If it does it will ensure the continued rule of the PUK-KDP alliance no matter what the outcome of the Kurdistan parliamentary vote is, and add to the growing Arab-Kurdish divide within the country. It also shows the obstinacy of the Kurdish ruling parties to not budge on either domestic Kurdish issues, or national ones.

Monday, July 20, 2009

In June 2009 the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released its latest report on the return of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced. The numbers show that the rate of return has gone up and down since the 2003 invasion, largely connected to the security situation within Iraq. Of Iraq's estimated 4.6 million refugees, roughly a third have returned so far. Many are going back to areas where their group is predominate, changing the demographics of the country. If current trends continue, fewer Iraqis will come back in 2009 compared to 2008, which poses the questions of what will be the plight of those that don't go back.

Iraq has faced three waves of displacement in recent history. First Saddam used the removal of populations against his domestic Shiite and Kurdish opponents. Over 1 million Iraqis lost their homes before 2003 as a result. The U.S. invasion and the subsequent fighting led to another 200,000 displaced from 2003-2005. The bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in 2006 led to over 1.6 million more. Another two million Iraqis have also become refugees during this time.

The UNHCR numbers show that immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003 Iraqis began coming home. In 2003 55,249 refugees came back, but no displaced did. 2004 saw the largest total returns to date with 291,997 displaced and refugees making the trip. With the insurgency and the sectarian war taking off the number of returns slowed down by 2007. In 2005 154,155 came back, followed by 170,235 in 2006, but then only 81,420 in 2007. With the improved security, returns jumped back up in 2008. Most of those, 195,890, have been internally displaced compared to only 25,370 refugees. In the first five months of 2009 this trend has continued, 64,450 displaced and 18,630 refugees, but with fewer people overall, 83,080 up to May 2009 compared to 221,260 total in 2008. Overall, 61% of those coming back since the invasion have been displaced Iraqis.

The UNHCR counts 1,057,576 as a rough estimate of the total number of returns since 2003. That would mean about 37% of Iraq's displaced and refugees have gone back. 501,581 came back before the Samarra bombing in 2006, 47.4% of the total, while 555,995, 52.6%, have returned afterwards.

Iraqi Returns

Time

Displaced – Individuals

Refugees – Individuals

Total

%

2003

0

55,249

55,429

5%

2004

98,000

193,997

291,997

28%

2005

98,000

56,155

154,155

15%

2006

150,000

20,235

170,235

16%

2007

36,000

45,420

81,420

8%

2008

195,890

25,370

221,260

21%

Jan. 09

6,390

1,130

7,520

Feb. 09

15,810

2,970

18,780

March 09

20,690

5,850

26,540

April 09

11,020

3,890

14,910

May 09

10,540

4,790

15,330

Total 09

64,450

18,630

83,080

8%

Total

642,340

61%

415,236

39%

1,057,576

100%

Most of the fighting and ethnic cleansing during the sectarian war occurred in Baghdad and Diyala with its mixed Sunni-Shiite populations. Those two provinces have seen the largest number of people coming back in 2009. Baghdad saw 51% of returns and Diyala 34%. The next province was Ninewa with only 3%. When broken down between refugees and displaced, however, a new pattern emerges. Baghdad still received the most refugees coming back with 55%, but Najaf was second with 11%, followed by Diyala with 7% and Karbala with 6%. The displaced have mostly gone back to Baghdad, 51% and Diyala 42%.

Refugees and Displaced Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province

Jan. 09

Feb. 09

March 09

April 09

May 09

Total 09

%

Anbar

0

0

40

20

340

400

0%

Babil

210

190

460

400

290

1,550

2%

Baghdad

2,000

7,550

12,670

10,230

10,330

42,780

51%

Basra

340

130

450

120

80

1,120

1%

Dohuk

0

0

40

10

10

60

0%

Dhi Qar

20

30

180

100

20

350

0%

Diyala

3,420

9,040

10,120

2,650

2,980

28,210

34%

Irbil

20

20

50

0

60

150

0%

Karbala

90

80

240

280

380

1,070

1%

Maysan

70

40

70

100

80

360

0%

Muthanna

20

0

110

30

10

170

0%

Najaf

370

510

120

580

380

1,960

2%

Ninewa

590

680

1,150

30

30

2,480

3%

Qadisiyah

20

40

280

90

10

440

1%

Salahaddin

10

40

40

80

90

260

0%

Sulaymaniya

0

0

0

0

030

30

0%

Tamim

0

180

230

160

100

670

1%

Wasit

340

250

290

30

110

1,020

1%

TOTAL

7,520

18,780

26,540

14,910

15,330

83,080

100%

9%

23%

32%

18%

18%

100%

Refugee Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province

Jan. 09

Feb. 09

March 09

April 09

May 09

Total 09

%

Anbar

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Babil

110

160

250

290

120

930

5%

Baghdad

0

1,340

3,330

2,140

3,420

10,230

55%

Basra

220

90

140

90

50

590

3%

Dohuk

0

0

40

10

10

60

0%

Dhi Qar

10

30

180

100

20

340

2%

Diyala

120

400

760

70

0

1,350

7%

Irbil

20

20

30

0

50

120

1%

Karbala

90

80

240

270

360

1,040

6%

Maysan

60

30

60

90

60

300

2%

Muthanna

20

0

110

30

10

170

1%

Najaf

370

510

120

580

380

1,960

11%

Ninewa

0

0

0

0

20

20

0%

Qadisiyah

20

40

280

90

10

440

2%

Salahaddin

0

20

20

0

40

80

0%

Sulaymaniya

0

0

0

0

30

30

0%

Tamim

0

180

220

130

100

630

3%

Wasit

90

70

70

0

110

340

2%

TOTAL

1,130

2,970

5,850

3,890

4,790

18,630

100%

6%

16%

31%

21%

26%

100%

Displaced Returns By Province – Individuals 2009

Province

Jan. 09

Feb. 09

March 09

April 09

May 09

Total 09

%

Anbar

0

0

40

20

340

400

1%

Babil

100

30

210

110

170

620

1%

Baghdad

2,000

6,210

9,340

8,090

6,910

32,550

51%

Basra

120

40

310

30

30

530

1%

Dohuk

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Dhi Qar

10

0

0

0

0

10

0%

Diyala

3,300

8,640

9,360

2,580

2,980

26,860

42%

Irbil

0

0

020

0

10

30

0%

Karbala

0

0

0

10

20

30

0%

Maysan

10

10

10

10

20

60

0%

Muthanna

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Najaf

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Ninewa

590

680

1,150

30

10

2,460

4%

Qadisiyah

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Salahaddin

10

20

20

80

50

180

0%

Sulaymaniya

0

0

0

0

0

0

0%

Tamim

0

0

10

30

0

40

0%

Wasit

250

180

220

30

0

680

1%

TOTAL

6,390

15,810

20,690

11,020

10,540

64,450

100%

10%

24%

32%

17%

16%

100%

Within Baghdad, returning Iraqis have been unevenly distributed. The central district of Karkh has seen the most returns with 23,630. After that the western district of Kadamiya 5,450, and the northern district of Adhamiya, 5,320, were next. All three were battlefields in the sectarian war. Adhamiya was a mixed Sunni-Shiite area with a Sunni majority in northwestern Baghdad next to Sadr City. Karkh was in the middle with a largely mixed Sunni-Shiite population, and Kadamiya was a Shiite area in mostly Sunni western Baghdad. The Mahdi Army for example, tried to expand into all three areas. Abu Ghraib in contrast, which is located in the west by the Baghdad International Airport, just outside of the capital, was mostly known for insurgent activity, and has only had 330 returns this year as a result. On the one hand it's good to see that the areas in Baghdad province that had the most intense fighting are seeing the largest returns, at the same time most reports say that families are largely returning to areas where their sect is predominate adding to the segregation of the area.

Iraqis have been returning to the country since 2003. The numbers coming back have gone up and down depending upon the security situation. 2004 saw the largest amount of people coming back, but most of the conversation today is about those that lost their homes during the sectarian fighting after the 2006 Samarra bombing. 2008 saw a huge increase in returns, but if this year's trend continues, fewer will come back in 2009. There are two major concerns about this process. First, over three and a half million Iraqis are still displaced even with violence dramatically down. Some are worried that these Iraqis will become permanent refugees similar to the Palestinians. Second, many of central and northern Iraq's cities use to be made up of mixed neighborhoods. The sectarian war created segregated areas, which are now being solidified by the pattern of returns. Both of these will have dramatic effects upon Iraq's society if they are continued.

SOURCES

Bigio, Jamille and Scott, Jen, "Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions," Brookings Institution and University of Bern, June 2009

International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge," 2/7/08