It is an unacceptable to turn a blind eye to the problem of the illegal fishing in
Somali waters. International community has never had a particularly strong
interest in this topic. The first mandate of Operation ATALANTA did not include
anything about it. And the last mandate includes, inter alia, to monitor
fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. However, enforcement actions have
been given low priority, as a result, foreign fishing vessels are constantly
raiding Somalian natural resources.

In June 2014,
Somalian President outlined the Exclusive Economic Zone of Somalia in
accordance with the UNCLOS. That is, Somali authorities may license fishing
activities up to 200 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, and that each
vessel wishing to fish should pay for the license. This is indeed a necessary
step forward but not a sufficient enough to stamp out illegal, undeclared and
uncontrolled fishing. For only with adequate capabilities can Somali
authorities have sufficient means to monitor and protect its maritime domain-
which will effectively tackle the problem.

What can be
rightly pointed is that the lack of naval capabilities has been one of the
significant reasons that underpins the rise of the Somali piracy.

A few days ago,
Secure Fisheries, a program of the One Earth Future Foundation, launched its
report examining the extent of IUU
fishing by foreign vessels and their impact on the sustainability and
profitability of Somali fisheries. The number of foreign fleets fishing
illegally in the region has increased 20 times since 1981. As the report
estimates that foreign IUU vessels catch three times as many fish as the Somali fishing sector.

Foreign vessels
are primarily industrial in nature or purse seine vessels from Asian and European states
or smaller gill net vessels from neighboring countries such as Yemen and Iran.

According to
John Steed, Secure Fisheries Regional Manager for the Horn of Africa, “Illegal
fishing was the pretext used by criminal gangs to shift from protectionism to armed robbery and
piracy . And now the situation is back where it was, with large numbers of foreign vessels fishing in Somali
waters again - and there is a real danger of the whole piracy cycle starting
all over”.

However, in my
opinion, the end of the Somali piracy is a fact. No incident of hijacking has
occurred in which the pirates have obtained a ransom since May 2012. In 2011,
one in every three boats that were attacked, repelled the attackers due to the
presence of an armed team of private security personnel. In 2012, the same was
true for two out of every three attacks; and since 2013, in over 90% of cases.
The chance of being hijacked under these conditions is virtually
non-existent.

Figure 1.
Attacks with presence of armed guards and number of hijackings

Nowadays, Somali
pirates are even unlucky. Last March, they hijacked an Iranian fishing vessel
without an armed security team onboard. Although the vessel was captive for
five months, it managed to escape with all the crew members unhurt. The captain
cut his anchors and motored out. It was an unprecedented fact. This incident
confirms that Somali pirates are not what they were in the past. For keeping a
ship hijacked is a very expensive operation as salaries to guards have to be
paid, hostages have to be fed, a negotiator has to be hired and others. In
fact, financing an operation to hijack a vessel is not cheap. It requires the
active involvement of investors prepared to risk their money. Who would invest
in a business in which three and a half years back no income could have been
obtained?

As pirates acted
off Somalia, local fishermen were benefited due to the fact that foreign
fishing vessels navigated further from the coastline fearing their attacks.
That is why the end of the Somali piracy is promoting, again, that foreign
fishing vessels sail closer to the coast of Somalia. And, again, illegal
fishing in Somalia is on a huge scale and it does not seem possible to stop it
with current level of action. An estimated $300 million worth of seafood is
stolen from Somalia each year. As the United Nations Statistics Division
reports, a GDP figure of $1.306 billion for 2012, illegal fishing represents
over 20 per cent of the total Somali GDP.

Therefore, I do
not believe that the presence of foreign fishing vessels in Somali waters could
involve a rise of piracy acts. Pirates may hijack an Iranian, Yemeni or Chinese
fishing vessel but they will not be paid a ransom by them. Their success depends on the presence of
armed security teams present in the merchant vessels. In my opinion, the
immediate need lies in addressing the issue of illegal fishing in Somalia, for
illegal fishing is another way of piracy. But it is irrespective of whether
Somali pirates will return or not. Events such as the Maersk Alabama hijacking
will not come back.

Author The Author:

Fernando Ibáñez
is a Ph.D in Conflicts, Security and Solidarity and Master in Global Security
and Defense by the University of Zaragoza (Spain). Degree in Politics and
Sociology by the Spanish National Distance Education University-UNED and Degree
in Teaching by the University of Zaragoza. He is Certificate in Terrorism
Studies by the University of St. Andrews (2010).

Since 2012 he is a lecturer in Master in
Security, Defense and Strategy in Madrid Open University. He is also a teacher
in Master in Intelligence and Counterintelligence operations and Director of
the Course “Modern Maritime Piracy: The Case of Somalia” in the International
Institute for Defence & Security (CISDE) in Seville (Spain). He is a member
of the Spanish Academic Community of Experts on Intelligence for Security and
Defence (ESPRINTEL) and of the Association of Spanish Graduates in Security and Defence (ADESYD).