Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missile
System and Contingency Planning for Cuba

1. In your memorandum of 21 September 1962,11. See
vol. X, Document 434. you noted an
apparent lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson with respect to aircraft losses that might occur in
attacking an SA-2 site. You further requested
assurance as to the currency of contingency planning for Cuba.

2. I have discussed with General LeMay
and Admiral Anderson their estimate
of aircraft losses in attacking SA-2 missile
sites. Admiral Anderson agrees with
General LeMay's point that no losses
would be suffered from the SA-2 missile since
the attacking aircraft would fly below the effective minimum altitude of the
SA-2. General LeMay shares Admiral Anderson's estimate that attacking aircraft might suffer
some loss to antiaircraft artillery defenses of the SA-2 site. The National Intelligence Estimate22. Reference is to SNIE
85-3-62; ibid., Document 433. credits
the SA-2 missile system with a minimum
effective altitude of 3000 feet due to inherent radar limitations.

3. If antiaircraft artillery is employed in direct support of the missile
site, losses may be expected. World War II and Korean experience, updated to
reflect current antiaircraft artillery capabilities against modern aircraft,
indicates that low level attack forces would incur some combat losses from
antiaircraft artillery fire; however, numbers cannot be predicted
accurately. There are currently no known antiaircraft artillery defenses of
SA-2 sites in Cuba. Attack plans can be
amended to take the antiaircraft weapons under fire during the attack if
reconnaissance shows such defenses and if analysis shows such fire
suppression necessary. Korean experience proved that such fire suppression
was unnecessary when surprise could be achieved.

4. In my opinion and that of the Joint Chiefs, it is not necessary to build a
model of an SA-2 site for training purposes.
However, the aircraft revetment of the type found at Santa Clara and
Camaguey is a more difficult target than the SA-2 site. Therefore, the Air Force has found it desirable to
reproduce that type aircraft revetment to aid in the selection of weapons,
method of delivery and to assist in training crews. The target was completed at Nellis AFB, Nevada, on 30 September 1962, at an
approximate cost of $28,000. Initial tests indicate that the GAM 83, 20 mm
cannon, and napalm is the most effective weapons mix against aircraft in
such revetments.

5. I have taken steps to insure that our contingency plans for Cuba are kept
up to date.

3 On October
5 General C.V. Clifton, the
President's military aide, sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara in which he indicated that
the President had “read with interest”McNamara's October 4 memorandum dealing with the SA-2 missile system in Cuba. Clifton noted: “He commented that he
was sure you had had an opportunity to tell General Taylor of the contents of the
memorandum.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries
Series, Cuba, General, 10/1-10/14/62)