United States: D.C. Circuit Delivers A Major Setback To The CFPB

On October 11, the D.C. Circuit issued a major decision holding
the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
unconstitutional and sharply limiting the CFPB's enforcement
powers. The decision granted a sweeping victory to PHH Corporation
and its affiliates (PHH) in their appeal of an administrative
decision by CFPB Director Richard Cordray, which found that
PHH's captive reinsurance arrangements violated the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and imposed disgorgement of over
$109 million. The D.C. Circuit vacated Director Cordray's
decision and remanded the matter to the CFPB for additional
proceedings. Judge Kavanaugh authored the opinion, and was joined
by Senior Judge Randolph. Judge Henderson dissented from the
majority's decision on the constitutional issue, but joined the
majority's resolution of the RESPA issues.

Key takeaways:

The decision is a significant
constitutional ruling, but the court's limited remedy means
that the CFPB will likely continue functioning as before.

The decision is a major setback for
the CFPB's aggressive RESPA enforcement program, in which it
has sought enormous disgorgement amounts from companies engaged in
captive reinsurance arrangements.

The decision also roundly rejects the
CFPB's claim that its administrative actions are not subject to
any statute of limitations, undercutting the Bureau's
aggressive approach to statute of limitations issues.

Background

The case involved captive reinsurance arrangements, in which a
mortgage lender refers borrowers to a mortgage insurer, and in
return, the mortgage insurer buys reinsurance from a mortgage
reinsurer affiliated with the lender. Such arrangements were common
in the mortgage insurance industry as far back as 1997, when the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) recognized that
they were permissible under RESPA as long as the amount paid by the
mortgage insurer for the reinsurance did not exceed the reasonable
market value of the reinsurance. In 2011, enforcement authority
under RESPA was transferred to the CFPB, which did not issue any
contrary regulations or guidance.

Nevertheless, in 2014, the CFPB brought an administrative
enforcement action against PHH, a mortgage lender, relating to
PHH's use of captive mortgage reinsurance arrangements. The
CFPB alleged that the arrangements amounted to an illegal kickback
scheme in violation of RESPA. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
ruled in favor of the CFPB and ordered PHH to pay $6.5 million as
disgorgement. The ALJ's ruling was appealed to Director
Cordray, who issued a much broader ruling against PHH, imposing
additional injunctive relief and dramatically increasing the
disgorgement amount to $109 million.

PHH filed a petition for review of the director's decision
in the D.C. Circuit. PHH made a number of arguments on appeal.
First, and most significantly, PHH argued that the CFPB's
structure—featuring a single director who is not removable at
will by the President—was unconstitutional. Second, PHH
argued that the CFPB incorrectly interpreted RESPA to effectively
prohibit captive reinsurance arrangements, and that the CFPB
violated its due process rights by applying this novel
interpretation retroactively. Third, the court was presented with
the issue of whether the CFPB's administrative action was
subject to the statute of limitations in RESPA.

CFPB Held Unconstitutional

The court's holding that the CFPB's structure is
unconstitutional has rightly attracted significant media
attention.1 It represents a major ruling not only for
the CFPB, but also for the development of broader
separation-of-powers principles. Judge Kavanaugh's opinion
engages in an extensive analysis of those principles in concluding
that the Constitution prohibits vesting the authority of an
executive agency in a single person who is not removable at-will by
the President.

The opinion carefully reviews the history of independent
agencies—reaching back to the 1887 Interstate Commerce
Commission—and concludes that the "CFPB is the first of
its kind and a historical anomaly."2 Unlike the
CFPB, which is run by a single director, other independent agencies
exercising substantial authority have all been multi-member
commissions or boards. The court cited only a single agency that is
structured in a manner similar to the CFPB: the 2008 Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) (on which the court also cast
doubt).3 The court also distinguished the Social
Security Administration and the Office of Special
Counsel—also independent agencies headed by a single
director— from the CFPB because neither agency has the
"authority to enforce laws against private citizens, and does
not have power to impose fines and penalties on private
citizens."4

In describing the historical practice of structuring independent
agencies as multi-member commissions or boards, the court's
opinion explains that multi-member agencies typically pass
constitutional muster because a multi-member structure helps to
prevent arbitrary decision making, is less likely to be captured or
unduly influenced by interest groups, and tends to be more
deliberative.5 By contrast, the concentration of power
in the hands of one individual is more prone to abuse of power and
arbitrary decisions. The court stated that "the Director of
the CFPB is the single most powerful official in the entire U.S.
Government, other than the President," and concluded that this
concentration of power without sufficient control by the President
is not constitutionally permissible.6

The court's analysis can be seen, in part, as an extension
of the Supreme Court's recent skepticism regarding
congressional constraints on Presidential control of Executive
officers.

That skepticism found perhaps its greatest expression in the
late Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v.
Olsen,7 which in time came to be widely praised and
which the PHH opinion cites extensively. A similar
wariness of limits on Presidential control of Executive officers
informed the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,8 which held unconstitutional a structure
that insulated agency heads from Presidential control with two
levels of for-cause removal protection. Judge Kavanaugh wrote a
stinging dissent in the Free Enterprise Fund case in the
D.C. Circuit, and was vindicated when the Supreme Court ultimately
adopted his position in part.9 The opinion in
PHH reflects the further advance of Judge Kavanaugh's
views on the importance of Presidential control over officials who
exercise Executive power.

Despite the sweep of the court's constitutional holding, the
court applied a limited constitutional remedy: Rather than
invalidate the CFPB altogether, as argued by PHH, the court held
that the proper remedy was to sever the for-cause removal provision
from the Dodd-Frank Act. As a practical matter, this means that the
"CFPB . . . will continue to operate and to perform its many
duties, but will do so as an executive agency akin to other
executive agencies headed by a single person, such as the
Department of Justice and the Department of the
Treasury."10 This is the same limited remedy that
was applied by the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund.
As in that case, the court's remedy vindicates Presidential
control over the agency while allowing the agency to continue to
function.

The court declined to resolve an important final issue:
"the legal ramifications" of its constitutional holding
"for past CFPB rules or for past agency enforcement
actions."11 Although the court's holding would
seem to cast doubt on every action undertaken by the CFPB to date,
as a practical matter, there are indications that the CFPB's
prior actions will be treated as valid. For one, the court stated
that "this is not an uncommon situation" and that,
"[w]ithout major tumult," other agencies found to have
constitutional defects have "subsequently worked through the
resulting issues regarding the legality of past rules and of past
or current enforcement actions."12 The court cited
two recent cases in which challenges to the past decisions of
unconstitutionally constituted multi-member boards were denied on
the basis that reconstituted boards had ratified the challenged
decisions.13 Moreover, in similar circumstances, courts
have been wary of inviting "the chaos that would result from
multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by
every official whose claim to office could be open to
question[.]"14 Although the issue is not
straightforward, it would not be surprising if courts were to adopt
a similar approach here.

RESPA Liability Issues

Beyond the constitutional issue, and perhaps of greater
practical import, the PHH decision imposes significant
limits on the CFPB's aggressive RESPA enforcement program. The
CFPB's action against PHH had sought to impose a new
interpretation of RESPA that would essentially prohibit captive
reinsurance arrangements and to require massive disgorgement of
reinsurance premiums. The court threw all of this out.

Section 8(a) of RESPA prohibits the payment or receipt of
"any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any
agreement or understanding . . . that business incident to or a
part of a real estate settlement service . . . shall be referred to
any person."15 This broad restriction is qualified
by Section 8(c), which includes a number of safe harbors and
exceptions. Among them is an exception stating that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed as prohibiting . . . the payment
to any person of a bona fide salary or compensation or other
payment for goods or facilities actually furnished or for services
actually performed."16 This provision had been
consistently interpreted to allow for captive reinsurance
arrangements as long as the mortgage insurer paid no more than
reasonable market value for the reinsurance. In 1997, for example,
HUD—previously responsible for enforcing RESPA—issued
an interpretive letter stating that these arrangements are
permissible as long as the reinsurance services were actually
furnished or performed and the bona fide compensation does not
exceed the value of such services.17 This interpretation
is reflected in regulations originally promulgated by HUD and
subsequently adopted by CFPB regulation.18

Despite this longstanding interpretation of RESPA, Director
Cordray interpreted the term "bona fide" to require that
the payment not be "tied in any way to a referral of
business."19 Director Cordray flatly rejected the
1997 HUD Letter as valid guidance and concluded that it was not
binding.20 His decision relied on this novel
interpretation to find that PHH violated RESPA each time it
received a reinsurance payment from a captive
insurer.21

The D.C. Circuit rejected the Bureau's new interpretation of
RESPA on two grounds. First, it rejected the Bureau's view that
a mortgage insurer's payment for reinsurance is not "bona
fide" if it is part of a tying arrangement. The opinion does
not regard this issue as "a close call," explaining that
"[a] payment for a service pursuant to a tying arrangement
does not make the payment any less bona fide, so long as the
payment for the service reflects reasonable market value[,]"
and that "[a] bona fide payment means a payment of reasonable
market value."22 The CFPB's interpretation, the
court wrote, "flouts not only the text of the statute but also
decades of carefully and repeatedly considered official government
interpretations."23 HUD's "longstanding
interpretation" of RESPA is therefore the correct one: Section
8 allows captive reinsurance arrangements as long as the amount
paid by the mortgage insurer for the reinsurance does not exceed
the reasonable market value of the reinsurance.

Second, the court ruled that the Bureau's reversal of prior
HUD guidance and retroactive application of its new interpretation
violates due process. Agencies are permitted to change their
interpretive position, the court explained, but they may not
retroactively apply a new interpretation to past conduct without
providing fair notice. Here, the Bureau's interpretation
represented a "complete about-face from the Federal
Government's longstanding prior interpretation" and
violated due process to the extent that it was applied
retroactively. Op. at 79.

The opinion reviewed Regulation X, the 1997 HUD Letter, and a
similar 2004 letter from HUD, and it concluded that the prevailing
interpretation of RESPA prior to the CFPB was that "[c]aptive
reinsurance arrangements were lawful under Section 8 so long as the
mortgage insurer paid no more than reasonable market value to the
reinsurer for reinsurance actually furnished."24
The CFPB argued that regulated entities had no reason to rely on
this guidance—a claim the Court found "deeply unsettling
in a Nation built on the Rule of Law."25 The court
rejected the CFPB's position, likening it to that of a police
officer ticketing an individual for jaywalking after the officer
just told the person it was permissible to cross the street, and
concluding that the "Due Process Clause does not countenance
the CFPB's gamesmanship."26

The court's due process ruling has the potential to have a
broader effect on the CFPB's enforcement program beyond RESPA.
The CFPB has at times taken aggressive or novel legal positions in
enforcement actions that are not always consistent with prevailing
industry understandings or regulatory interpretations. This
approach has sometimes been criticized by industry groups as
"regulation through enforcement," a charge that Director
Cordray has rejected.27 The PHH decision
suggests that the CFPB's approach faces limits: Where a party
can point to inconsistent prior regulatory guidance or
interpretations, due process considerations may prevent the Bureau
from applying its interpretation retroactively.28

Statute of Limitations

The decision is also significant in its rejection of the
CFPB's claim that it is not bound by any statute of limitations
period in administrative proceedings. The court ultimately held
that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all Bureau
RESPA actions, whether pursued in court or in an administrative
forum.

In his decision, Director Cordray ruled that the CFPB's
authority is not constrained by any limitations period when
bringing an administrative enforcement proceeding because the
provision of Dodd-Frank authorizing the CFPB to pursue
administrative enforcement does not contain an express limitations
period.29 This is in contrast, the CFPB argued, to the
provision of Dodd-Frank authorizing the CFPB to file suit in court,
which contains an express three-year limitations period from the
discovery date.30

The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument as "absurd."
Op. at 99. The court first pointed out that the CFPB's
authority to enforce the enumerated consumer protection laws is
limited where "such Federal law specifically limits the Bureau
from conducting a hearing or adjudication proceeding." Op. at
93 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a)(2)). Thus, under the plain
language of Dodd-Frank, to the extent that one of the enumerated
consumer protection laws contains an applicable limitations period,
this period would apply to the Bureau's administrative forum.
As for the RESPA statute of limitations, the court rejected the
argument that the term "actions" in RESPA does not apply
to administrative proceedings. The court pointed to various
provisions in Dodd-Frank where the term "action"
encompasses both administrative and court actions.

The PHH case is not the only time the CFPB has pushed
the envelope with regard to limitations periods. The Bureau has
sometimes taken aggressive positions on statute of limitations
issues during negotiations, which may increase its leverage in a
settlement.31 In its administrative enforcement
proceeding against Integrity Advance, the Bureau argued
successfully to the ALJ that it is not bound by the limitations
periods in the Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act.32 The CFPB has made other aggressive
limitations arguments—in several cases, for example, the
Bureau has argued that limitations periods only apply to private
suits, and not to government enforcement actions.33

Courts that have considered these arguments have generally
expressed skepticism at the idea that the CFPB is not bound by a
limitations period. In Hanna and ITT, for
example, courts rejected arguments that no limitations period
applied to Bureau enforcement actions.34 In this case,
the opinion notes the presumption that federal causes of action
have a limitations period, and expressed doubt that Congress sought
to allow the CFPB to circumvent statutory limitations periods in
all of the enumerated consumer protection laws simply by bringing
an administrative action.35 Indeed, the court described
the Bureau's argument on this point as "absurd" and
"alarming," particularly because the Bureau can impose
penalties and monetary relief in administrative
proceedings.36 The court's opinion questions whether
the Bureau could bring an administrative proceeding "100 years
after the allegedly unlawful conduct," and roundly rejects the
CFPB's argument that the public simply needs to "trust
us" to exercise prosecutorial discretion. Op. at 100. Although
we expect that the Bureau will continue to test the scope of the
limitations periods that apply to its actions, the PHH
decision will provide a strong precedent for defendants to argue in
favor of reasonable limits.

Next Steps in PHH

The PHH dispute is not over. The CFPB has 45 days from the date
of the judgment to seek rehearing by the en banc D.C.
Circuit. And given the significance of the decision, the CFPB is
likely to take that step. Even if the decision is not reheard
en banc, the CFPB could seek review by the Supreme Court,
where the panel's constitutional ruling could attract
significant interest. If Justice Scalia were still on the Court,
PHH could have reasonable confidence that the panel's decision
would survive Supreme Court review, but the decision's
prospects with the Court's current composition are less
clear.

14 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-81
(1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also id. at 180 (recognizing the "de facto officer
doctrine," which "confers validity upon acts performed by
a person acting under the color of official title even though it is
later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment
or election to office is deficient.").

28 The court did not address Director Cordray's
ruling that the amount of disgorgement is the entire amount of
premiums paid, with no offset for claims paid. Cordray Decision, at
33-35. The court states that the "disgorgement remedy is the
amount that was paid above reasonable market value," but it
does not address the issue of offsets. Op. at 79 n. 24. In her
concurrence, Judge Henderson concludes that the disgorgement
sanction must be reduced "by the amount the captive reinsurer
paid the insurers for their reinsurance claims." Henderson Op.
at 1.

31 For example, the application of the three-year
discovery rule in 12 U.S.C. § 5564(g)(1) is an issue in the
Bureau's enforcement action against Intercept Corporation. In
its motion to dismiss, Intercept stated that the Bureau "in
discussions" has "contended that a violation . . . is
'discovered' when Bureau Director Richard Cordray
personally concludes as much, apparently only after Bureau
enforcement staff has formally closed its inquiry and submitted a
recommendation to the Director." See Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
at 11, CFPB v. Intercept Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00144 (D. N.D.
Aug. 8, 2016), Doc. No. 19.

36 Op. at 99. For purposes of RESPA claims, one
significant issue left open by the court is whether the limitations
period is triggered by the origination of the loan or the receipt
of above-market premiums. Op. at 100.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general
guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought
about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

On Thursday, September 7, 2017, Department of Education Secretary DeVos announced that the Department will launch a notice-and-comment process to incorporate the "insights of all parties" in creating...

The Trump Administration believes that Obama-era guidance regarding sexual assault on college campuses created a "failed system" that was a "disservice to everyone involved," Department of Education Secretary...

The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank that a consumer can verbally revoke consent to be called on her cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing system "in the morning and during the work day."

This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).

Email Address

Company Name

Password

Confirm Password

Position

Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests

Accounting

Anti-trust

Commercial

Compliance

Consumer

Criminal

Employment

Energy

Environment

Family

Finance

Government

Healthcare

Immigration

Insolvency

Insurance

International

IP

Law Performance

Law Practice

Litigation

Media & IT

Privacy

Real Estate

Strategy

Tax

Technology

Transport

Wealth Mgt

Regions

Africa

Asia

Asia Pacific

Australasia

Canada

Caribbean

Europe

European Union

Latin America

Middle East

U.K.

United States

Worldwide Updates

Check to state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you
are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its
terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement
to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use
of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq
Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of www.mondaq.com

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to
read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may
not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative
works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the
Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms &
conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use
electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s
content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products
which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

Disclaimer

Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the
suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics
published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related
graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or
its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with
regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement.
In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any
special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting
from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence
or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or
performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include
technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added
to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make
improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described
herein at any time.

Registration

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally
identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for
three primary purposes:

To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.

To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a
colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third
parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information
providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their
articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and
services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out
by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and
services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to
view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our
users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can
customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware'
functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately.
This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to
our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting
articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for
registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate
sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the
pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us
(e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who
author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than
the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us
not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above
or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the
Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via
email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when
they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no
disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate
registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and
topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it.
Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page
and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their
personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

Cookies

A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an
identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information
about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they
use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the
Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to
personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information
specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and
cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function
unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are
disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the
information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned
about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to
expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option
as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example,
advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we
are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement,
and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not
linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or
its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other
sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read
the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement
applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or
contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and
the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information
requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name
and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age
level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes.
Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the
functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our
site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this
information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq,
but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to
request the removal of this information from our database.

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’
information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your
information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you
have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to
webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode),
or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way
to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can
usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will
post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information
we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it.
If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner
different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by
way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their
information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with
the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these
principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use
commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.