Syrıa Crısıs ın Turkısh Foreıgn Polıcy

Since the AKP came to power in late 2002, its foreign policy has been based on what Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s top foreign policy adviser and now foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, calls ‘‘strategic depth’’ and ‘‘zero-problems with neighbors.’’ Davutoglu’s main argument is that Turkey is a great power that has neglected partly because of its obsession with the West its historic and cultural ties as well as its diplomatic, economic, and political relations with its immediate strategic hinterland in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eurasia. These factors help to define the Neo-Ottoman tendencies of the AKP. In this Neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more soft power political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural influence in formerly Ottoman territories such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans, as well as in other regions where Turkey has strategic and national interests.
A more concrete and tangible aspect of Turkish activism and sense of grandeur in former Ottoman lands is economic. Turkey’s growing economy, its export capacity, and its entrepreneurial private sector are important drivers of Neo-Ottomanism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
The second dimension of Neo-Ottomanism is its emphasis on multiculturalism. This is most visible in its rejection of assimilation-oriented nationalism, a trademark of the Kemalist camp. Since Neo-Ottomanism is at peace with the imperial and multinational legacy of the country, it opens the door to a less ethnic and more multicultural conceptualization of Turkish citizenship.
The third aspect of Neo-Ottomanism is its goal of not just reaching out to the Islamic world but embracing it as much as the West. Secularist critics of the AKP government maintain that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East betrays the republic’s Western vocation and orientation.
In 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called Turkey ‘‘an excellent model, a 99 percent Muslim country that has great importance as an alternative to radical Islam,’’ and President Bush stated that Turkey ‘‘provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy.’’
Where Neo-Ottomanism favors an ambitious regional policy in the Middle East and beyond, Kemalism opts for modesty, caution, and non-involvement in the Arab world. According to Kemalists, the AKP’s Neo-Ottomanism promotes a domestic agenda of Islamization and a foreign policy of aimless adventurism. Where Neo-Ottomanism favors multiculturalism and a more moderate version of secularism, Kemalism prefers militantly secularist measures against political Islam and assimilationist policies vis-a`-vis Kurdish ethnic identity. Where Neo-Ottomanism favors pursuing EU membership and good relations with Washington, Kemalism is actually increasingly resentful of the European Union and the United States.
Kemalist foreign policy thus puts a high Premium on maintaining the status quo and confronting the threat of Kurdish separatism. Despite the important differences between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism described above, both share a strong sense of patriotism and attachment to the Turkish nation-state. Neo-Ottomanism represents a more pragmatic and liberal mindset than Kemalism, but it has successfully internalized the Kemalist paradigm of Turkish nationalism.
The Syrian crisis was one of the decisive test of the policy initiated by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after election in 2002. The raging crisis in neighboring Syria has pushed Ankara into a policy black hole, (escaping from which) will require more than “soft power”. After a 10-year honeymoon, Turkish-Syrian relations are back to square one.
The 2011 pro-democracy wave sweeping the Arab world presented challenges and opportunities for Ankara. After stumbling out of the block, Turkey moved to play a leadership role in the ongoing turmoil and presented itself as an example of a successful Muslim democracy. Most Turks are proud that their country is referred to as a model for democratizing Arab states. The outbreak of conflict between Arab governments and their populations made the ‘‘zero problems’’ policy no longer tenable: Ankara had to take sides. In fact, as things stand today, instead of a ‘‘zero problems’’ situation, Turkey seems to be facing ‘‘zero neighbors without problems.’’ The problem with Turkey’s “zero problem with neighbors” mantra was that it was tested against an authoritarian regime. Equally important, its aim was to better the relations with the regime rather than aiming at the population.
In this context we can say the above:
1. Abandonment of the Policy: To adjust to the new realities, Ankara also radically shifted its approach to neighboring regimes. The “zero problems with neighbors” approach, a policy designed to have zero problems with regimes that had plenty of problems with their own populations, was upended with the onset of the Arab reforms.
2. Radical Foreign Policy Shift: The abandonment of the “zero problems with neighbors” policy signaled a clear departure from established practices in Turkish diplomacy. Traditionally, Turkey has been very cautious with regard to its relationship with its own neighbors. Ankara has shied away from criticizing the behavior of these regimes, so much so that when the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul, visited Tehran in 2009 at the peak of the oppression of the Green Movement, he managed to leave the country without addressing human rights violations.
Conected with the Syrian crisis, the common policy among Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq concerning the Kurdish issue is that they are all opposed to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region due to fears that this could have a domino effect in the region. Hence, it is obvious to say that there is collaboration among these four states on this issue. However, this collaboration does not seem to apply to their approaches to the PKK in the wake of the Arab Spring.
With maximum caution, the following principles of Turkish foreign policy in the coming months may be predicted:
1. The Middle East policy of Turkey covers the entire combination of directions, both as bilateral relations and relations on key national security issues: ethnic, confessional, sub-regional, economic, territorial, and cultural-historical. So, the the Turkish strategy on the Syrian crisis and the relations with Israel, Iran and Iraq constitute the elements of this Assembly.
2. Balance between the interests of the strategic partners, regional safety and democracy.
3. Maximum efforts and cooperation on the eradication of open and unsolved problems with neighboring countries on the basis of a proactive and anti-crisis foreign policy.

NOTESAuthors are directly responsible for the choice and presentation of data contained in the articles, of their authenticity and originality, as well as their own opinions. The wording and presentation of the text is not always the opinion of the GeoPolitica Magazine and are not binding in any way editorial responsibility.

Reproduction in whole or in part of any written or illustrative material in this publication is prohibited without a written permission from the publisher.

Editors assume no responsibility for the content of material submitted by sponsors.