Southern Discomfort: Majorities despise minorities, and the hatred is
often mutual

By Panayote Elias Dimitras, War Report,
January/February 1997

We are distributing three articles by our spokesperson published in War Report or in - The War Report
et al. co-sponsored special English issue of the Albanian newspaper, Koha Jone.

In the 1990s, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia led to an explosion of
interest in the Balkan region. Moreover, as Romania was thought to be the
only Balkan country that had not rid itself of communism, it too caught
world attention. Books, seminars, missions, research programmes and support
to NGOs proliferated for these countries; much of that was directly or
indirectly related to the minority problems which triggered the Yugoslav
wars and brought Romanian-Hungarian relations to a dangerous impasse.

But there was little concern from outside for the southern half of the
peninsula, which was generally perceived as stable, notwithstanding some
apparent problems. This lack of interest reflected the fact that the Balkan
south-Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, and European Turkey-remained
misunderstood outside, and sometimes even within, the region. The general
impression was that these countries either lacked significant minorities or,
where minorities existed, they were treated in a satisfactory way. Such
groups as Albanians in Macedonia and Turks in Bulgaria, for example, were
seen to be participating directly in, or giving crucial indirect support to,
the governments.

Apart from the minorities themselves, only a few genuine (i.e., not
government-manipulated) NGOs were aware of the far more complex situation of
minorities in the southern Balkans. Thanks to the work of NGOs, the real and
unfortunately more disturbing news has slowly come to international
attention. At times, governments have aided this process through
ill-conceived actions that made some minority problems, if not the
minorities themselves, known beyond their borders. Such was the effect of
the trials of Greek minority leaders in Albania and of Macedonian minority
leaders in Greece.

Hidden Minorities. More than a score of minorities are present in the
region. There are ethno-national minorities (i.e., those who identify with
the dominant nation of an adjacent nation state), like the more or less
officially admitted and by now widely known Greeks in Albania and European
Turkey, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, and Albanians in Macedonia. There are
also ethno-linguistic minorities, those with a distinct identity but no
affiliation to a cross-border "mother nations", such as the Roma (Gypsies)
everywhere, the Aromanians (Vlachs) in all countries but Turkey, and the
Arvanites (Albanian-speakers) in Greece. Finally, there are religious
minorities: a multitude of historically rooted or recently established
non-Orthodox Christian communities in Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia; and
non-Sunni Muslim communities in Albania and Turkey.

However, a problem probably unique to the area is the presence of "hidden
minorities". In some cases, the state vehemently denies their existence:
Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece; and Bulgarians in Macedonia, for
example. In Bulgaria, admitting the presence of Macedonians would challenge
the national myth that no separate Macedonian nation exists anywhere, let
alone in Bulgaria's own territory. In Macedonia, the presence of Bulgarians
is considered incompatible with the notion that Macedonians "cannot" be
Bulgarians. In Greece, former Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis admitted
that the recent acrimonious dispute with Macedonia was motivated mainly by
Greece's fear of the "emergence of a second minority problem, in [the Greek
region of] Western Macedonia."

Then there are minorities whose existence is recognised only within
territorial limits: this applies to Greeks and Macedonians in Albania, whose
existence the state recognises only in the south. As a result, official
censuses underestimate their actual numbers, while the rights the state
grants to minorities, especially in education, can be enjoyed only in
southern Albania.

Sometimes, a minority is acknowledged but with a name different from the one
it wishes to use. In Greece, there are no Turks but only Muslims.
Conversely, in Turkey there are no Greeks (Ynanli) but only Christian
Orthodox (Rum). In Bulgaria, Pomaks are usually referred to as Bulgarian
Muslims. In that way, states pretend to accept the minorities' existence but
define them as religious rather than ethnic.

Finally, decades of repression and assimilation have instilled in other
minorities feelings of inferiority which have seriously weakened the
assertion of their identity. Even if a scurpulously fair census could be
carried out in the region-in itself a virtual impossibility-of the half a
million Aromanians, fewer than 10 per cent would declare their ethnic
identity; the same goes for many of the more than 1 million Roma; and for
the nearly quarter-million Arvanites in Greece. In addition, most religious
minorities, but also some ethnic ones, seem to loathe the term "minority"
fearing that it automatically diminishes their social status and opportunities.

Intolerance and the National Consensus. History may help explain why
minorities throughout the Balkans have suffered so much. Until the borders
of Balkan states became final, after World War II, ethno-national minorities
were perceived, sometimes with justification, as "Trojan horses" of their
"mother nations", and vehicles of irredentism. Moreover, the construction of
solid national identities almost always followed the creation of the states,
and turned out to be much more complicated. The resulting emphasis on
national homogeneity and conformity made "otherness" undesirable even for
supposedly non-threatening religious minorities or the Roma. Minorities that
were not cleansed or expelled in the 150 years of Balkan nationalist wars
were doomed to oppression.

Today, however, history cannot and should not be accepted as an excuse for
intolerance towards minorities. When all Balkan countries dream of joining
the multicultural entity that is the European Union, their societies, and
more precisely their dominant nations, should be more open and more
confident in accepting "otherness" as a potential wealth rather than a
necessary evil.

Table 1. Feelings of Southern Balkan peoples for minorities

Sympathy

Indifference

Aversion

1. Feelings for Aromanians (Vlachs in the question) from:

Albanians of Albania

15

29

52

Albanians of Macedonia

11

30

44

Macedonians

22

32

44

2. Feelings for Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) from:

Bulgarians

22

42

15

3. Feelings for Jews from:

Albanians of Macedonia

2

8

91

Macedonians

7

20

60

Bulgarians

24

34

6

Greeks

15

21

57

4. Feelings for Western Thrace Muslims from:

Greeks

11

16

62

5. Feelings for Roma from:

Albanians of Albania

6

19

73

Albanians of Macedonia

12

22

65

Macedonians

12

28

59

Bulgarians

12

31

51

Greeks

20

21

55

Source: Surveys conducted by Opinion for the Lambrakis Research Foundation
(1,200 interviews 20/1-20/2/1993) in Greece; by Marketing Consult (1,161
interviews in Bulgaria) and BBSS (906 interviews in Albania, 1,002 in
Macedonia) for the Bulgarian International Center for Minority Studies and
Intercultural Relations in spring 1994. We are grateful to Antonina
Zhelyaskova and Krassimir Kanev for having made the results available to us.

Table 2. Opinion of minority group by majority group in Southern Balkan
countries

Favorable

Unfavorable

1. Opinion of Macedonians for:
Albanians

28

65

2. Opinion of Albanians for:
Greeks

47

49

3. Opinion of Bulgarians for:
Turks

52

39

Source: Surveys conducted for the USIA by the Albanian Independent Center of
Sociological Studies in Albania (1,000 interviews in July 1993); the Center
for the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria (1,090 interviews in April 1994);
BBSS in Macedonia (1,102 interviews in October 1993).

This is far from being the case. The data in the tables here indicates that
majorities despise minorities. Other surveys have shown that the hatred is
often mutual. The main reason is that the education system in these
countries (including the universities) is, with rare exceptions, at best
silent on the matter and at worst reproduce traditional negative
stereotypes, if not outright hatred. The same is true for the attitude
towards neighbouring peoples, who are almost always less popular than the
distant nations of Western or Eastern Europe. It is almost inevitable, then,
that most media constantly reproduce negative stereotypes and hate speech,
thus ensuring that intolerance is solidly rooted in the minds of the
majorities. Two comparative media monitoring projects in the region,
coordinated by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and by
the Bulgarian NGO ACCESS, have provided ample evidence since 1994. For
example, Serb and Macedonian newspapers frequently refer to Albanians as
"Shiptars", while Albanian papers call Serbs "Shkja". Both terms are
perceived as insulting by the peoples concerned. Macedonians have been
labelled "thieves" in the Bulgarian press, and "usurpers" and "heroin
smugglers" in Greece. Radio Skopje, on the other hand, has referred to
Greeks as "liars; dishonest merchants."

In this climate, minorities in the southern Balkans are easy targets for
official discrimination and popular intolerance, especially when the
countries they live in are in conflict with those of their "mother nation".
At the height of Greek-Albanian tensions in the mid-1990s, the Greek
minority in Albania was persecuted more than ever before in the past 50
years, while the Greek state used the large immigrant Albanian community
(technically not a minority) in Greece as a hostage to blackmail Tirana.
Tensions in Greek-Turkish relations or in Cyprus are regularly followed by
outbreaks of violence against Greeks in Turkey or Turks in Greece.

The sometimes hidden minorities in the Southern Balkans could not fight for
their rights in the Cold War period, when East-West conflict marginalised
their concerns in international fora. The post-Cold War era, fortunately,
has placed respect for human rights at the top of the agenda, even if there
is hardly a state in the continent fully committed to such principles. As a
result, minorities have become more vocal and demanding. If states and
dominant nations continue to treat them without the necessary respect for
their rights, there can be only one result: the exacerbation and consequent
rise of nationalism among, minorities, phenomena already present to some
degree in most cases. This will make it more difficult to solve the problems
and will eventually radicalise the reactions and demands of at least those
ethno-national minorities who feel they have the backing of their "mother
nations". It is obvious that this can only bring more instability to the region.

It is therefore imperative that all countries in the southern as well as the
northern Balkans come to grips with the danger and revise their minority
policies. A policy declaration to this effect was first proposed a year ago
by two Greek NGOs, the Greek Helsinki Monitor and the Minority Rights
Group-Greece. It was later adopted by other NGOs in the region, as well as
by the International Commission on the Balkans. It calls on states to
implement all human rights documents they have signed; to sign and ratify
all outstanding ones; and to adapt their legislation to conform to the
standards set forth in these documents. This means, first and foremost, to
recognise the right of individuals to define their identity and to belong to
whatever minority they wish. All religious communities should be equally
respected. Educational systems must abandon ethnocentrism and thoroughly
revise their curricula. Civil servants, especially teachers and judges,
should be trained to implement international principles on minority rights.
Special independent institutions (ombudsmen or commissions) are required to
oversee the application of these principles and also closely to monitor
media incitement to ethnic, racial or religious hatred. Such incitement has
contributed significantly to all Balkan conflicts.

Finally, intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the
European Union must introduce measures that will help Balkan countries to
apply human and minority rights principles. Credible and practical
international sanctions must be devised for states which persist in
violating these principles, thus putting regional seucrity at risk. The
minority problems in the Balkan south remain less acute than those which led
to war in the north. Should they reach the same level, however, the Yugoslav
conflict may go down in history not as Europe's last tragedy, but as a mild
dress-rehearsal for the conflicts that followed.