Fate
of this appeal hinges on the answer which we ultimately give to the short
question "whether the appeals pending in the Court of the District Judge
under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, were liable to be transferred to
the Administrative Tribunals under Section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985 for disposal on merits or the jurisdiction of the Authority under
Section 15 and that of the District Judge under Section 17 of the Payment of
Wages Act to hear and decide Claim Cases and Appeals, respectively remain
undisturbed." The appellant was an employee of the respondent. On November 23, 1987 he filed an application under
Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of an amount of Rs.48,274.50
P. on the allegations, inter-alia, that the respondent had illegally withheld
and had also made unauthorised deductions from his wages progressively over a
considerable period of time. This application was registered as Case No.407 of
1987, notice whereof was issued to the respondent, who after putting in
appearance, absented on a number of dates and ultimately the Authority passed
an order that the case would proceed ex-parte against him. The respondent filed
an application for setting aside that order but the application was rejected by
order dated June 23, 1988 against which the respondent filed an appeal under
Section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act on July 15, 1988 before the District
Judge during the pendency of which the Tribunal was constituted and
consequently, in view of the provisions contained in Section 29 of the Act, the
appeal was transferred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its order dated
August 31, 1990, rejected the appeal.

In the
meantime, appellant's main application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages
Act was allowed by order dated July 20, 1988 for a sum of Rs. 43,092.50 p.
against which the respondent filed an appeal under Section 17(1) of the Payment
of Wages Act in the Court of the District Judge, Chandigarh, which was also
transferred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal by its judgment and order dated
July 4, 1994 allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 20th July, 1988
passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.

It is
this order which is Challenged before us on the grounds, inter alia, that the
appeal pending in the Court of the District Judge under Section 17 of the
Payment of Wages Act could not have been legally transferred to the Tribunal
under Section 29 of the Act and the Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to
dispose it of on merits.

Administrative
Tribunals have been constituted under the Act made by the Parliament under
Articles 323 A of the Constitution for providing an exclusive machinery for the
adjudication or trial of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitments,
as also conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and
posts, so as to cut down the time spent by public servants in litigation in ordinery
courts and to provide them relief at the hands of persons hearing and deciding
service litigation exclusively.

The vires
of the Act has already been upheld by this Court in S.P. Sampath vs. Union of
India & Ors. (AIR 1987 SC 386) with the finding that with effect from the
date on which the Tribunals were constituted, the jurisdiction of the High
Court in entertaining the Writ Petitions in service matters came to an end.
Whether the above view is correct or not and whether the abrogation of the High
Court' jurisdiction in entertaining writs in service matters under Art.226 of
the Constitution amounts to a destruction of the basic character of the
Constitution are questions which have since been referred to the Constitution
Bench hose answer is still awaited.

In
S.P. Sampath's case (supra), it was held that Tribunal was a substitute for the
High Court. In order to confer exclusive jurisdiction in service matters on the
Tribunal, it has been provided in Section 14 of the Act that the Tribunal shall
exercise, on and from the appointed day (1.11.85) all the jurisdiction, powers
and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts except the
Supreme Court in respect of cases pertaining to recruitment and matters
concerning recruitment to All India services as also disputes relating to
"service matters".

(defined
in Section 3(q)).

Section
19 to 21 of the Act, read together, indicate that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal can be invoked by a "person aggrieved" by making an
application against an "order" made by the Government or a local of
other authority etc. subject to the condition that all other remedies, if
available, under the service rules have been availed of by him and that too
within the period of limitation indicated in Section 21 in which the starting
point of limitation as also the period which would commence from that point have
been specified.

Section
14 which confers, or, we may be permitted to say, transfers jurisdiction of all
the regular Court including High Courts all over the country to the Tribubal in
respect of "service matters", provides, in its relevant part, as
under:- "14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central
Administrative Tribunal- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed
day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before
that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to –

(a) recruitment,
and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India Service or to any civil
service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence
services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian:

(b)
all service matters concerning- (i) a member of any All-India Service; or (ii)
a person [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in
clause (c)] appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under
the Union; or (iii) a civilian [not being a member of an All-India Service or a
person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any defence services or a post
connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or
civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any
local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India or of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled
by the Government;

(c)...................................."

Section
29 provides for the transfer of all pending cases to the Tribunal while Section
29A provides for the filing of appeals in such cases as were decided either
before or after the establishment of Tribunals on 1.11.85 before the Tribunal
instead of the regular appellate forum.

Section
29 and 29A are reproduced below:

"29.
Transfer of pending cases-(1) Every suit or other proceeding pending before any
court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a
Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon
it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment,
within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that dated
to such Tribunal:

Provided
that nothing in this sub- section shall apply to any appeal pending as
aforesaid before a High Court.

(2)
Every suit or other proceeding pending before a court or other authority
immediately before the dated with effect from which jurisdiction is conferred
on a Tribunal in relation to any local or other authority or corporation [or
society], being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it si based is
such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the said dated, within the
jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such
Tribunal:

Provided
that nothing in this sub- section shall apply to any appeal pending as
aforesaid before a High Court.

(3)
Where immediately before the date of establishment of a Joint Administrative
Tribunal any one or more of the States for which it is established, has or have
a State Tribunal or State Tribunals, all cases pending before such State
Tribunal or State Tribunals immediately before the said date together with the
records thereof shall stand transferred on that dated to such Joint
Administrative Tribunal.

(4)
Where any suit, appeal of other proceeding stands transferred from any court of
other authority to a Tribunal under sub-section (1) sub-section (2),- (a) the
court or other authority shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward
the records of such suit, appeal or other proceeding to the Tribunal; and (b)
the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit,
appeal or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case
of an application under Section 19 from the stage which was reached before such
transfer of from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal deem fit.

(5)
Where any case stands transferred to a Joint Administrative Tribunal under
sub-section (3), the Joint Administrative Tribunal may proceed to deal with
such case from the stage which was reached before it stood so transferred.

(6)
Every case pending before a Tribunal immediately before the commencement of the
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987, being a case the cause of
action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen
after such commencement, within the jurisdiction of any court, shall, together
with the records thereof, stand transferred on such commencement to such court.

(7)
Where any case stands transferred to a court under sub-section (6), that court may
proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before it stood
so transferred." "29-A. Provision for filing of certain appeals -
Where any decree or order has been made or passed by any court (other than a
high Court) in any suit or proceeding before the establishment of a Tribunal,
being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that
it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the
jurisdiction of such Tribunal, and no appeal has been preferred against such
decree or order before such establishment and the time for preferring such
appeal under any law for the time being in force had not expired before such
establishment, such appeal shall lie - (a) to the Central Administrative Tribunal,
within ninety days from the date on which the Administrative Tribunals
(Amendment) Bill, 1986 receives the assent of the President, or within ninety
days from the date of receipt of the copy of such decree or order, whichever is
later, or (b) to any other Tribunal, within ninety days from its establishment
or within ninety days from the date of receipt of the copy of such decree of
order, whichever is later." It is then provided by Section 33 that the Act
shall have overriding effect.

Transfer
of jurisdiction of regular Courts to another Court or Tribunal has never been
liked by litigants and Elloe R.D.C. ( 1956 A.C. 736) who observed that:- "
Any one bred in the tradition of the law, is likely to regard with little
sympathy legislative provisions for ousting the jurisdiction of the Court,
whether in order that the subject may be deprived altogether of remedy or in
order that his grievance may be remitted to some other Tribunal." Since
the matter involved in this case relates to the ouster of jurisdiction of all
regular Courts, including the High Court, we shall adopt a rule of
interpretation which is most appropriately applicable to the circumstances of
the present case and the only Rule which can be most suitably applied is the
rule of construction of giving ordinary meaning to the various expressions used
in the legislation and to construe various Sections of the enactment as a
whole, each provision, [in the words of Lord Wright in light, if need be, on
the rest. This rule has since been (AIR 1959 SC 1012) in which Subba Rao, J.(as
he then was) speaking for the Court said:- " The cardinal rule of
construction of the provisions of a section with a proviso is to apply the
broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must
be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.

The
true principle undoubtedly is that the sound interpretation and meaning of the
statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken
and construed together, is to prevail." Mills Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1543) Gajendragadkar,
J. (as he then was) observed:- "The first rule of construction which is
elementary , is that the words used in the section must be given their plain
grammatical meaning. Since we are dealing with two sub-sections of S.76, it is
necessary that the said two sub- section must be construed as a whole
"each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest." Reverting
back to Section 14, we may immediately notice the striking feature that this
Section begins with the words "Save as otherwise expressly provided in
this Act" which constitute an extremely significant expression as they
purport to construed a "Saving Clause". This expression has also been
used in the opening part of Sub-section (3) of Section 14.

What
is intended to be saved is indicated in Section 28 which, incidentally, also
purports to exclude the jurisdiction of almost all the Courts in service
matters.

Section
14 and Section 28 have, therefore, to be read together to find out the real intent
of the legislature as to the extent of jurisdiction retained or excluded.

The
jurisdiction which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal is the
jurisdiction of a the Courts except the Supreme Court which is expressly
excluded.

The
"matters" in respect of which this "jurisdiction" is to be
exercised are also indicated in this Section. That is why it is provided in
Section 19 that any person aggrieved by an "order" (defined in the
Explanation appended to Sub-section (1) of that Section) pertaining to any
"matter" within the "jurisdiction" of the Tribunal may
approach the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.

While
Section 19 operates "subject to other provisions of the Act", the
field of operation of Section 14 is limited by the use of the words "save
as otherwise espressly provided in this Act". These words control and
regulate whole of the Section not only in respect of "jurisdiction"
but also the "matters" specified therein. This constitutes the
original jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

The
appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is indicated in Section 29 and 29A of
the Act. While all appeals pending in various Courts, except those pending in
the high Court on the date from which Tribunal became functional stand
transferred to the Tribunal by the force of the Act, the appeals in all cases
which were decided prior to the establishment of Tribunals, are required to be
filed before the Tribunal, if they had not already been filed provided the
cause of action on which the case was based is cognizable by the Tribunal.

The
appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is extremely limited and was conferred
on the Tribunal so that the judgment, if any passed, for example, by a Munsif
or Civil or Subordinate Judge in a Civil Suit relating to a service matter
(decided before the establishment of the tribunal) may be challenged before the
Tribunal notwithstanding that the judgment passed in that suit is not covered
by the word "order" defined in the explanation appended to
sub-section (i) of Section 14. Except the appeals, which are transferred to the
Tribunal or the appeals which may be filed before the Trubunal in the above
circumstances, no other appeals would lie before the Tribunal.

The
"Saving Clause" or the "Saving Phrase" (not in the sense of
"Repeals and Savings") divides "jurisdiction" into two
classes, namely, "jurisdiction" which is transferred to and vested in
the Tribunal and "jurisdiction" which is not so transferred and is,
on the contrary, saved. When the jurisdiction thus became exercisable by the
Tribunal, it was provided by Section 28 that no court shall exercise the
jurisdiction, powers and authority on and from the date from which such
jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable by a Tribunal. It,
however, excepts- (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the
time being in force.

It is,
therefore, apparent that in spite of Section 14 of the Act, the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Courts or other Authorities, under the
Industrial Disputes Acts or Authority created under any other Corresponding Law
remains unaffected. The original, or for that matter, the Appellate Authority
under the Payment of Wages Act is neither an Industrial Tribunal nor a Labour
Court nor are they "Authorities" under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 but if the Payment of Wages Act is ultimately found to be a
"Corresponding Law", the jurisdiction of the Authorities under the
Payment of Wages Act would also be saved.

Let us
take up this exercise.

Payment
of Wages Act, 1936 is an Act to regulate the payment of wages to certain
classes of person employed in an industry. The Act was amended from time to
time and was ultimately amended in 1982 by Act 38 of 1982 with the following
objects and reasons:- "The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 regulates the
payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry. It was
enacted to ensure that the wages payable to employees covered by the Act are
dispersed by the employers within the prescribed time limit and that no
deductions other than those authorised by law are made by the employers. The
Act applies proprio vigore to the payment of wages to persons employed in any factory
or to persons employed in railway by a railway administration either directly
or through a sub-contractor. Further, the State Government are empowered to
extend the provision of the Act to cover persons employed in any industrial
establishment or any class or group of Industrial establishments as defined in
the Act. The wage limit for the applicability of the Act is Rs. 1,000 per mensem.
it is proposed to amend the Act with a view to extending its protection to a
larger number of persons and making the provisions of the Act more effective
and beneficial." While the Act, to begin with, was applicable to
industrial establishments so as to ensure payment of wages to workmen or
persons employed in an industry at regular intervels without any unauthorised
deduction, the amendments introduced by Act 38 of 1982 widened the scope of the
original Act as many "other establishments" could be brought within
its purview on a Gazette Notification issued either by the Central Government
or the State Government.

Section
2 contains definition of various terms, namely, "Employed person",
"Employer", "Factory", "Industrial or other
establishments", "Railway Administration" and "wages"
etc. Almost all these terms are also defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. In
order to understand whether payment of Wages Act is part of the legislative
scheme governing Industrial Law, we would, by way of illustration concentrate
on "Wages" and its recovery from the employer through judicial
process. The definition of "Wages" in Section 2(vi) is an exhaustive
definition which is in very wide terms. Its relevant portion is quoted below:-
"2(vi). "Wages" means all remuneration (whether by way of
salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of
being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied,
were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or
of work done in such employment, and includes-

(a) any
remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order
of a Court;

(b) any
remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of overtime
work or holidays or any leave period;

(c) any
additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a
bonus or by any other name);

(d) any
sum which by reason of termination of employment of the person employed is
payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment of
such sum, whether with of without deductions but does not provide for the time
within the payment is to be made;

(e) any
sum to which the person employed is entitled under any scheme framed under any
law for the time being in force;

but
does not include - (1).........................

(2).........................

(3).........................

(4).........................

(5).........................

(6).........................

Under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the term "Wages" has been defined
in Section 2(rr) as under:- "2(rr). "Wages" means all
remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the
terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a
workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and
includes- (i) such allowances (including dearness allowance [20] as the workman
is for the time being entitled to;

(ii)
the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical
attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of foodgrains
or other articles;

(iii) any
travelling concession;

(iv) any
commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both;

but
does not include- (a).....................................

(b).....................................

(c).....................................

If the
"Wages" are not paid within the prescribed time limit or deductions,
other than those authorised by law, are made by the employers, the employee can
recover it under the Payment of Wages Act for which an elaborate machinery has
been provided in Section 15 relevant portion of which is quoted below:-
"15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of
wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims:- (1) The State Government
may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint [a presiding officer of
any Labour Court of Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the state or]
any Commissioner for Workmen's compensation or other officer with experience as
a Judge of a Civil Court of as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to
hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions
from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages [of persons employed or paid
in that areal], including all matters incidental to such claims:

Provided
that where the State Government considers it necessary so to authority for any
specified area and may, by general or special order, provide for the
distribution or allocation of work to be performed by them under this Act.

(2)
Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from
the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such
person himself, or any; legal practitioner or any official of a registered
trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any inspector under
this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority
appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction
under sub-section (3):

Provided
that every such application shall be presented within [twelve months] from the
date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which
the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be:

Provided
further that any application may be admitted after the said period of [twelve
months] when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause
for not making the application within such period.

(3)
When any application under sub- section (2) is entertained, the authority shall
hear the applicant and the employer of other persons responsible for the
payment of wages under Section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard,
and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may, without
prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable
under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the amount
deducted, or the payment of the payment of such compensation as the authority
may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case
and [not exceeding twenty-five rupees in the latter, and even if the amount
deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the disposal of the application,
direct the payment of such compensation, as the authority may think fit, not
exceeding twenty-five rupees]:

(a) a
bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed
person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional
circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages
was unable, thought exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or
(c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment.

(4)
.................................

(4-A)
...............................

(4-B)
...............................

(5)
................................."

Before
proceeding further, we may point out that there have been many local amendments
made almost by all the States in the Act but for purposes of the question under
our consideration, will refer to the text of the Central Act which is the
parent Act.

A
perusal of Section 15(1) would indicate that the State Government has to
constitute an "authority" by appointing either the Presiding Officer
of a Labour court of Industrial Tribunal or any commissioner for Workmen's
Compensation or a Judge of a Civil Court or Stipendiary Magistrate to hear and
decide all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment
of wages including all matters incidental thereto. If an employee does not get
his wages in time and its payment is delayed or deductions are made from the
wages unauthorisedly, he may either personally or through a legal practitioner
or any official of a registered Trade Union or any Inspector appointed under
the Act, may, apply to the "Authority" constituted under the Act and
the latter namely, the "Authority", after hearing the employer or any
other person responsible for payment of wages, may direct the refund of the
amount deducted or payment of delayed wages, as the case may be, together with
compensation as indicated in Sub- section(3) of Section 15 without prejudice to
the penalty to which the employer or the other person may be liable under the
Act. The amount so awarded is recoverable as fine imposed by a Magistrate as
indicated in Sub-section (5) of Section 15.

Under
section 33 C of the Industrial Disputes Act, there is an altogether different
machinery provided for recovery of wages etc. It provides as under:- "33C.
Recovery of money due from an employer- (1) Where any money is due to a workman
from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of
[Chapter V A or Chapter V B], the workman himself or any other person authorised
by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman,
his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery,
make an application to the appropriate Government of the recovery of the money
due to him, and if the appropriate government is satisfied that any money is so
due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall
proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:

Provided
that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on
which the money became due to the workman from the employer:

Provided
further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the
said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the
applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said
period.

(2)
Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any
benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any
question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such
benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that
may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified
in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding
three months].

[Provided
that where the presiding oifficer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or
expedient so to do he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such
period by such further period as he may think fit.] (3) For the purposes of
computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks
fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be
necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall
determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other
circumstances of the case.

(4)
The decision of the Labour
Court shall be
forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner
provided for in sub-section (1).

(5)
Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him
any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then,
subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for
the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any
number of such workmen." Under Sub-section (i) of Section 33 C the amount
for the recovery of which proceedings may be initiated by a workman, may also
consist of the amount due under a settlement or an award. This may be compared
with the definition of "wages" as contained in Section 2(vi) of the
Payment of Wages Act, which also includes "remuneration payable under any
Award or Settlement". It is obvious that if any part of this amount is
withheld or its payment is unreasonably delayed, the employee can recover it
under the Payment of Wages Act. (1969 (2) Labour Law Journal 651), this Court
while affirming the decision of the Mysore High Court, since reported in
1968(1) Labour Law Journal 779, laid down that questions relating to payment of
minimum wages to the employee at the agreed rate or any amount for overtime
work or for work on off-days can be considered and decided not only under the
Payment of wages Act but also under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial disputes
Act 1947, and that jurisdiction of the Labour court under Section 33C (2) is
not in the Payment of Wages Act.

This
decision has been cited only as an effort to indicated that claim for wages can
be entertained not only under the payment of Wages Act bu also under section
33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Thus,
the character and function of the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes
Act as also the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act are similar in purpose
and both are designed to produce the same result particularly as some of the
provisions under both the Act prescribe the same thing to be done.

The
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 are,
therefore, "Corresponding Law" qua each other particularly as both
are part of the same social legislative canopy made by the Parliament for
immediate amelioration of workmen's plight resulting from non-payment, or
delayed payment or, for that matter, short payment of their wages.

The
word "corresponding" is defined in Shorter Oxford Dictionary as
"answering to in character and function;

Ministry
of Transport (1972 NZLR 539) in which it has been observed as under:- We read
"corresponding" in s.20A as including a new section dealing with the
same subject matter as the old one, in a manner or with a result not so far
different from the old as to strain the accepted meaning of the word
"corresponding" as given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary -
"answering to in character and function; similar to". The new
[section] answers to the old one... in character and function; it is similar in
purpose, prescribes the same thing to be done, and is designed to produce the
same result. We hold it to be a "corresponding section".[See Words
& Phrases 3rd Edition Vol.1] Our conclusion, therefore, is irresistible
that the "Authority", constituted under section 15 and the Appellate
Authority under Section 17 of the Payment of wages Act, fall within the
exception indicated in Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunal Act and this
Act, namely, Payment of Wages Act, is positively covered by the connotation
"Corresponding Law" used in that section. consequently, the
jurisdiction of the Authority to entertain and decide claim cases under Section
15 of the Payment of Wags Act is not affected by the establishment of the
Administrative Tribunals.

Learned
counsel for the respondent then contended that since Clause (b) of Section 2
has been deleted by Act No.19 of 1986 and the Act has ben made applicable to
all persons employed in Industrial establishments and factories to whom the
Act, as originally enacted did not apply, and since the jurisdiction of all
Courts has come to be vested in the Tribunal, an appeal under Section 17 of the
Payment of Wages Act cannot be legally filed before a "Court" and,
therefore, the Tribunal was justified in the instant case to dispose of the
appeal on merits after receiving it on transfer under Section 29 from the court
of the District Judge. This contention, too, has no substance.

While
deleting Clause (b) from Section 2 so as to make the Act applicable to workmen
etc., the Parliament by the same Amending Act, namely, Act No.19 of 1986,
introduced Clauses (a) and (b) in Section 28 so as to preserve the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, the Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals and , as we have
already found, the Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act which we have
further found to be "Corresponding Law" within the meaning of Clause
(b) of Section 28.

it
appears strange that although Act has been applied to persons working in
factories etc., the jurisdiction to try their cases has not been given to the
Tribunal. This is, indeed, an incongruity. But then incongruity is the habit of
legislative drafting.

In
this connection, we may, refer again to Section 29 and 29A as under both the section,
the emphasis is on "cause of action". Under Section 29, an appeal
shall stand transferred to, and under Section 29A, an appeal can be filed
before, the Tribunal if the cause of action on which "suit or
proceedings" were initiated would have been cognisable by the Tribunal.
Since on the original cause of action, a claim under Section 15 of the Payment of
Wages Act could not have been made to the Tribunal, the appeal would not stand
transferred to nor can appeal contemplted under Section 17 of the Payment of
Wages Act be filed before it.

The
Appellate Authority is part of the Justice Delivery System constituted under
Section 17 of the Payment of Wage Act. Its jurisdiction will not be affected by
the establishment of Administrative Tribunals particularly as appeal has always
been treated to be a continuation of the original proceedings. Consequently, the
two tier judicial system, original as well as appellate, constituted under the
"Corresponding Law", like the Payment of Wages Act, are not affected
by the constitution of the Tribunals and the system shall continue to function
as before, with the result that if any case is decided under Section 15 of the
Payment of Wages Act, it will not be obligatory to file an appeal before the
Tribunal as required by Section 29A of the Act but the appeal shall lie under
section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act before the District Judge. The pending
appeals shall also, therefore, not stand transferred to the Tribunal under
Section 29 of the Act. If it were a mere matter under general or common law and
an appeal arising from a suit in a service matter decided by the Trial Court
and pending in the Court of the District Judge under Section 96 C.P.C. would
have ben the subject of controversy whether it would be transferred to the
Tribunal or not, our answer would have been an instant "eye" but the
matter involved before us is different as it relates to the exercise of special
jurisdiction by the District Judge under Payment of Wages Act, which is a
protected jurisdiction.

Any
other view will be destructive not only of the "Saving Clause" in the
opening part of Section 14 but also of the exceptions carved out in Section 28
together with the "cause of action" theory contained in Section 29
and 29A of the Act.

Learned
counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of the Chandigarh
Central Singla (1) [1989 (1) All India Services Law Journal 491 (CAT)] in which
it has been held that since the District Judge is a Court within the meaning of
Section 14(1) as also Section 28 of the Act, it is left with no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the appeals pending before it on and from the date on which the
Tribunals were established as jurisdiction, power and authority of all Courts
stood transferred to the Tribunal. This decision, in our opinion, is erroneous
and does not lay down the correct law. The Full Bench did not consider the
impact of the words Save as otherwise provided in the Act" used in Section
14 nor did it consider the significance of the words "Corresponding
Law" occurring in Section 28 of the Act.

We
wind up this discussion with the last words that though the Tribunal has ben
constituted as a substitute for the High Court under Article 323 A, the Labour
Courts and Industrial Tribunals etc. over which the High Court exercises
supervisory jurisdiction continue to function with the incongruous result that
though the High Court cannot quash their judgments, it must continue to
supervise their functioning. Let us await the decision of the Constitution
Bench.

For
the reasons set out above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and
order dated 04.07.94 passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh and
direct that the appeal papers shall be transmitted forthwith to the District
Judge, Chandigarh for disposal on merits.