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November 19, 2007

A glance northwards

I haven't blogged much about Georgia.

Well, recent events have been kinda disappointing. Like a lot of people, I had high hopes for Saakashvili. Not so much because he was "pro-Western" -- that's a pretty meaningless metric, especially around here -- but because he seemed like the kind of leader who pushes my particular buttons: a sane, pragmatic, energetic problem-solver.

In retrospect, there were warning signs. He rehabilitated Zviad Gamsakhurdia, for starters. (If you don't know who Gamsakhurdia was, good for you. He was Georgia's first leader after independence, and was probably the most thoroughly incompetent leader of any post-Soviet republic.) His reforms were mostly good, but they were all top-down; the Caucasus is stony soil for participatory democracy and stakeholder input. And he was all too willing to play the nationalism card and whip up foreign threats to support his rule.

Anyhow: I ran across a good short summary of recent events in Georgia, from the always worthwhile Transitions Online:

So, we could have reasonably concluded – even before they called out
the riot police – that Saakashvili and the political elite clustered
around him [were not] democrats. Should we be surprised? On
the contrary: Saakashvili has always made it absolutely clear that he
sees himself as a nation-builder first, and democrat second.

True enough! Most of us just weren't paying attention.

And the nation-building so far has been impressive. Large-scale
corruption, especially in the police, is down; despite disgruntlement,
most people when asked say they haven't given a bribe in the past year;
educational reform has clamped down on pervasive graft in higher
education... and
competitively appointed secondary-school directors; public-private
partnerships have been forged to revitalize the collapsed medical
system; and despite Russia's embargo, the economy will grow at least 10
percent this year, the country's credit ratings have improved, and
foreign direct investment is at 2 billion euros annually.

In a Caucasian context, these are astounding accomplishments. Making a serious dent in corruption and graft around here is, well, really hard. Even starting to fix the schools and the medical system is awesome. And 2 billion euros is something like 15% of Georgia's GDP.

Along the way many have lost out, both those we might pity and those we
should not. Among the former are fired police workers; fired civil
servants in a massive government downsizing; street vendors who were
asked to professionalize their activities; an older generation that has
been slow to adjust to the need for new skills; and the majority of
people in the provinces. In time-honored post-Soviet fashion, the
government preferred to condescendingly muscle reforms onto the people,
rather than explain their validity.

Among the latter group of disgruntled, however, are also the very
well-connected and influential bosses of academia, who lost thousands
in income from university entry-exam bribes; the criminal networks that
have flourished through all levels of society and had penetrated deep
within state institutions (especially the police, the military, and the
penal system); oligarchs such as Badri Patarkatsishvili, who is
currently the chief bankroller of the opposition; and the very
influential (and conservative) Orthodox Church, which has seen its
political role wane under Saakashvili.

It's worth noting here that Georgians are pretty religious. More than Armenians, I think. The Orthodox Church there is at least as strong as in Russia (though, of course, it's not Russian! It's Georgian!) and plays a similar role... you might call it "reactionary", except that in a Georgian context that doesn't make much sense. "Conservative" doesn't seems strong enough, though. Anyway.

The net result was that those massed on the streets earlier this month
and orchestrating the demonstrations from behind the scenes were a
rather eclectic bunch... In
fact, the opposition did not articulate economic or social demands, but
focused the call on early elections and removing the government from
office.

None of that should excuse the unexplainable use of force to stamp out
the demonstrations (unexplainable partly because the protests seemed to
be petering out on their own). But the current story is far more
complicated than the easy one that the Rose Revolution offered up: the
masses rising up to crush a corrupt regime and propel the state into
Europe.

This time around we have a self-styled democrat not attuned to the fine
points of democracy; a state-builder obsessed with bulldozing through
reforms; and parts of society with legitimate grievances and others
only bitter over the loss of illicit proceeds. All in all it’s a
particularly convoluted tale that should make the heads of foreign
commentators and diplomats spin as they try and come up with their own
prescriptions to get Georgia back on track toward a consolidated
democracy.

Is anyone trying to come up with prescriptions? The US and Europe are cautiously pro-Saakashvili; Russia hates his guts (though he's a convenient whipping boy).

AFAIK nobody is really engaging with political change in Georgia. Though of course I don't live there, and am probably missing a lot.

Comments

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Maybe the place has gotten lucky and wound up with its own version of Lee Kwan Yew. Hey. It happens. Sometimes authoritarian systems get lucky. Mostly not, of course. But sometimes. Well, at least once. Or so it appears. What the hell do I actually know about Singapore?

Anyway, I'd've been more partial to the guy if he liked to yell "Forever until victory!"

Why does Russia hate him, anyway? And what's up with Abkhazia and South Ossetia? I'm not tracking with that.

Abkhazia used to be a major area for Russians to vacation. A lot of important types have dachas there, from what Lyuda has told me. They'd rather it was under Russian Control (TM). There's more with Revanchist, paranoid and Chechen related agendas from what I can tell too.

As usual with things Russian, it's as clear as mud and has so many layers to it even - or perhaps especially - the Russians under really understand what's going on.

-- I actually agree about Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew was and is an asshole, but so what? He lifted his country from the Third World to the First, without breaking too many heads in the process; the evil he did (and he did some real evil) has been vastly outweighed by the good. It's an awe-inspiring accomplishment.

Saakashvili would like to be Lee, I think, but he's been dealt a much harder hand. (And may not be as bright and competent to begin with, though that's hard to tell at this distance).

Abhkazia and South Ossetia are two very different things. Yeah, they're both separatist regions of Georgia that have found shelter in the ample bosom of Mother Russia. But South Ossetia is probably solvable with some patience and goodwill... qualities often in short supply around here, but still.

Abkhazia, OTOH, is a real tragedy; there is no solution that can possibly satisfy all parties, and any plausible outcome is going to leave a lot of innocent people screwed. The most likely outcome is the status quo, which is pretty bad.

I remember Gamsakhurdia very well. The most famous Mengrel in history, right after Beria.

... so, Noel, what _do_ you want to know of the situation in South Ossetia? The region has been de facto Russian territory, to the extent that some 90% of the locals still hold Russian citizenship. And they like it just fine. You do remember their petition for formal (re-)incorporation to the Russian Federation the last summer?

(The present-day Osset national identity has its roots in Finland. Seriously. Suitably enough, Heikki Talvitie used to be the EU special representative for South Caucasus.)

Jussi, I wouldn't push this "like it just fine" thing too far. The Ossetians mistrust the Georgians, but don't hate them; they like the Russians tolerably well, but the petition for incorporation is for mutual convenience, not because they think it's the only way they can survive.

There's a farcical element to the South Ossetia dispute. Frex, several hundred Ossetians were lured over to the Georgian side this year by a program that gave them heavily subsidized vacations on the Black Sea. Wossname, the leader of the South Ossetian state, made a long speech more or less anathematizing them.

That's why I think it could potentially be settled... if the Georgians make the Ossetians an offer that's good enough (and believable), they'll switch sides easily enough. It's not a conflict written in blood.

This is very different from Abkhazia, where passions run much higher and the bitterness goes deep. Abkhazia is not going back under Georgian rule, no matter how good the offer looks.

That post at fistful? I started a series on the frozen conflicts a while back. They're in ascending order of awfulness: Transnistria first, then Ossetia, then Abkhazia. Karabakh last, since it was the most violent and is still most likely to produce a new war. But I had to think about it, because Abkhazia was pretty awful too.

Mingrelians: yeah, Gamsakhurdia had that whole "must be more Georgian than the Georgians" thing. Like Kossuth the half-Slovak, among others. And that was in addition to the "great man's son" thing, which he also had in full measure. Just Georgia's bad fortune to get a leader who had Issues.

Jussi: what confuses me is Russia's endgame. What is Putin's goal? Annexation of the two territories? Well, he's got their virtual annexation, and he doesn't seem to be taking the obvious steps towards formalizing that status. This leaves me with two equally perplexing possibilities:

(1)Putin doesn't care about a final settlement, and I'd like to know what he gains from keeping things frozen;

(2)he believes that he is taking the correct steps towards ending the crises with a gain for Russia, in which case I'd like to know what that "gain" is ... because right now the situation seems to me to be producing neither:

(a) greater popularity at home;
(b) territorial aggrandizement;
(c) greater influence in other parts of the near abroad;
nor, (d) international brownie points. /Especially/ not (d), in fact.

So I'm missing something. Somewhere in there Putin must be getting (a), (b), or (c) from keeping the situation static, or he must be moving towards a solution in a mysterious way that he thinks will get him (a), (b), or (c).

Wasn't Gamsakhurdia pried out of the smoking ruin of his presidential palace twelve years ago? Thirteen? Damn, I know it was [one of the] coup d'état followed by fighting, and pause/posturing and then civil war again, and he died in mystery. '92? Must have been, because Shevardnadze was Georgian president by 1993. So, obviously, the current government, which exists in opposition to Shevardnadze, taking office by knocking him off bloodlessly, must be rehabbing Gamsakhurdia for national unity's [sticking it to Shevardnadze's] sake.

Oy. I don't want to think about the geopolitics of the Caucasus any longer.

In other news, Georgian wines like Tvishi or Kvanchkara are excellent (unlike, say, Old Scuppernong, or Kedem Malaga Extra Thick).

Well, I do! No, seriously --- I lack your knowledge, NYCHSMT. I am very confused about the geopolitics of the Caucasus.

I'd like to start with a village idiot question: why is there a geopolitics of the Caucasus? Pipelines? Schmipelines. (Or if that's the answer, it'd be nice to know why the E.U. or U.S. should worry.) There's no geopolitics of the Caribbean, because the U.S. (and Venezuela, if you stretch things) is the only power who counts and cares. So what're the interests in the Caucasus?

While there may be a convincing answer, this question is not as obvious as it seems when you're in Boston, Port-of-Spain, or Mexico City.