This is not a question as to whether the traditional Thomist opinion on the De Auxiliis controversy is correct. [I'm convinced that it is, but that's not the purpose of this thread.]

I have seen people numerous times argue that the theory put forth by Bañez is not truly the thought of St. Thomas, but is a Bañezian innovation. [These people then refer to the De Auxiliis controversy as a conflict between the Bañezians and the Molinists, and they refuse to use the word "Thomist" to describe this position on the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace and its role in the carrying out of Divine Providence and in particular His eternal Predestination.]

Most recently, I've seen this view put forward by Dr. Feingold who argues that for St. Thomas, the distinction of operative and cooperative grace is the key distinction and the need for the sufficient/efficacious distinction falls away when one really understands the distinction between operative and cooperative grace. [The essay in question is in the volume Thomism and Predestination edited by Long, Nutt, and White.] I also see this argued in less scholarly contexts (such as facebook discussions).

To me, that argument seems to miss the point. St. Thomas is answering a different question when he gives the distinction between operative and cooperative grace than later Thomists were trying to answer when they formulated the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. The distinction of the later Thomists is certainly not explicit in those terms in St. Thomas's writing. However, it seems to follow rather clearly from what St. Thomas has to say in his doctrine of the divine will, the divine love, providence, and predestination, even if he doesn't use the "sufficient/efficacious" distinction in any sort of explicit manner (indeed the distinction seems to follow immediately upon the distinction of antecedent and consequent will in God provided in a quotation of St. John Damascene in the response to one of the objections in the question on the will of God). Nor does it seem to contradict St. Thomas's later treatment in the treatise on grace (but rather complements it - since the two distinctions are formulated to answer distinct questions).

My question then is: Am I off-base here? Is the Bañezian position in fact in contradiction to St. Thomas (or at least an innovation that does not follow from the principles of St. Thomas)?

_________________Formerly Known as Louis-Marie Flambeau and RaginCajunJoe

"Be of good heart ... you who are children of Mary. Remember that she accepts as her children all those who choose to be so. Rejoice! Why do you fear to be lost, when such a a Mother defends and protects you?" - St. Alphonsus Liguori

Scholars of Molina say the same thing. In fact, I believe Molina HIMSELF pointed this out to the Banezianists... that the principles of St. Thomas that they were using, were in answer to a completely different question.

It's been a long time since I briefly studied up on the doctrine of Grace, and I don't have the time now to try to bone up, but as I'm reading things, I'd say that (as you note) the efficacious/sufficient distinction cannot possibly be done away with by the proper understanding of the operative/cooperative distinction, because they're aimed at two wholly different things. Namely, the operative/cooperative distinction (as made by St. Thomas) has to do with cases where the intellect is, one might say, "successfully" (though that's a bad way to put it, of course) moved by God to a salutary act. The sufficient/efficacious distinction, however, applies to any actual grace offered, since not all graces are "successful." As I'm reading the operative/cooperative, that distinction would fall wholly within efficacious grace. Perhaps that's not quite accurate--as I say, it's been a long time and I was never really an expert. (I'm looking at Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's Grace, Chapter IV, Question III for the basics of cooperative/operative.)

As to the charge of Banezianism as far as sufficient/efficacious, does Feingold deal with the texts presented by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in, for example, Predestination pp 80-84? Where, by the way, the distinction falls under the heading of antecedent and consequent--as you note, the sufficient/efficacious distinction is straightforwardly implied by that distinction.

It's been a year since I've read the essay, but I don't think he discusses the relationship to the antecedent/consequent will distinction in the essay.

_________________Formerly Known as Louis-Marie Flambeau and RaginCajunJoe

"Be of good heart ... you who are children of Mary. Remember that she accepts as her children all those who choose to be so. Rejoice! Why do you fear to be lost, when such a a Mother defends and protects you?" - St. Alphonsus Liguori

My experience is that people making such charges ("banezianism," "wolffian rationalism," "manualism," or whatever) are typically just repeating what their professors told them. I doubt that's true in the case of Feingold.

_________________"Things tend, in fact, to go wrong; part of the blame lies on the teachers of philosophy, who today teach us how to argue instead of how to live, part on their students, who come to the teachers in the first place with a view to developing not their character but their intellect. The result has been the transformation of philosophy, the study of wisdom, into philology, the study of words." - Lucius Seneca, Letters from a Stoic.

_________________"Things tend, in fact, to go wrong; part of the blame lies on the teachers of philosophy, who today teach us how to argue instead of how to live, part on their students, who come to the teachers in the first place with a view to developing not their character but their intellect. The result has been the transformation of philosophy, the study of wisdom, into philology, the study of words." - Lucius Seneca, Letters from a Stoic.

Not in the same terminology, but in substance the distinction of sufficient and effiacious grace is in Augustine and Aquinas

Chapter 12 of On Correction and Grace by Augustine

Again the very assistances are distinguished. One is the assistance without which something is not done, and the other is the assistance by which something is done. ... But to be sure, the happiness which man does not have, when it is given, makes him continuously happy. For it is not only the assistance without which it does not happen, but also that by which it happens on account of what is given. Why is this assistance both that by which it happens and that without which it does not happen? Since both if happiness were given to man, he would be made continuously happy; and if it were never given, he will never be happy. But nourishments do not consequently make it that a man should live: but still without them he is not able to live. Therefore, to the first man, who, in that good by which he was made upright, received the ability {posse} not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to desert the good itself, was given the assistance of perseverance, not that by which it would be made that he would persevere, but that without which he would not be able to persevere by his free choice. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God by the grace of God such an assistance of perseverance is not given, but such that perseverance itself should be given to them; not only that they would be unable without this gift to persevere, but also that through this gift they would not be able to be except persevering.

Now Aquinas distinguishes God giving the faculty for some act from the act itself both in the natural order and in the order of grace repeatedly. It is not the same as operative versus cooperative grace, as the latter includes both the faculty and act.

And the same grace can be both operative and cooperative. Hence habitual grace is operative insofar as it heals the soul, and even prevenient to itself insofar as it is a habit that is the principle of other actions done by grace.

So habitual grace itself is also sufficient grace for certain actions. And that means one is truly able to do those acts. But those acts, not merely in the natural order (God is the cause of all acts), but also as graced acts are given by God, who moves the will. Other than the term sufficient, this is all clear in Aquinas. As is the fact that man is unable to call down upon himself divine grace, but is free to impede it or not impede it, and if he does not impede it (put up an act of contrary resistance) God will bestow the grace of action. (cf. Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 3 cap. 159)

I found Feingold to be straining at gnats here.

Aquinas doesn't clearly distinguish habitual and actual grace, and actually presents operative and cooperative as divisions of what we would call both. But that distinction seems wholly legitimate.

And that is the question, is there at least a logical difference in these names? Even Molinists would concede that, though the distinction for them would arise from the consent, and not the nature of the grace itself.

Feingold also seems to not treat the case where a grace can be both efficacious for one act (imperfect contrition) but sufficient for another (perfect contrition). Even in Thomism (or as he calls it Bañezianism) the distinction of sufficient and effiacious is not as hard ofa difference as some imagine, it is still distinguished in effect (effecting the ability or effecting the act)- the difference with Molinism is that the distinction is ex parte Dei, who both gives the faculty and moves the will.

Feingold also seems to not treat the case where a grace can be both efficacious for one act (imperfect contrition) but sufficient for another (perfect contrition). Even in Thomism (or as he calls it Bañezianism) the distinction of sufficient and effiacious is not as hard ofa difference as some imagine, it is still distinguished in effect (effecting the ability or effecting the act)- the difference with Molinism is that the distinction is ex parte Dei, who both gives the faculty and moves the will.

This was my major hangup with his essay. He didn't seem to understand that a grace could be efficacious for some effect but only merely sufficient for a greater effect.

However, as I said, I do accept the "Bañezian" viewpoint. My main concern was whether it is also Thomas's viewpoint (which is a substantially less important question, but it is nevertheless important). You addressed that sufficiently in your post for me, however. Thanks!

_________________Formerly Known as Louis-Marie Flambeau and RaginCajunJoe

"Be of good heart ... you who are children of Mary. Remember that she accepts as her children all those who choose to be so. Rejoice! Why do you fear to be lost, when such a a Mother defends and protects you?" - St. Alphonsus Liguori