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Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book deals with the rule-following character of thought. The second discusses the many factors to which choice is rationally responsive -and by reference to which choice can be explained - consistently with being under the control of thought. The third examines the implications of this multiple sensitivity for the normative regulation of social affairs. Thus the volume covers a large swathe of territory, ranging from metaphysics tophilosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation. The connections that Pettit makes between these areas are original and illuminating.Each part of the book develops a key theme. The first is that thought succeeds in following rules - and overcomes Wittgenstein's rule-following problem - so far as it is response-dependent; it is a sort of enterprise that is accessible only to creatures like us for whom certain responses areprimitive and shared. The second is that while human choice may be sensitive to discursive reasons, as we would expect in a thinking subject, it can at the same time be subject to the control - the virtual control, in the model developed here - of rational self-interest. And the third is that therational interest of agents in achieving esteem in the eyes of others, and in avoiding disesteem, exercises a virtual form of control that can explain the emergence of norms and various other aspects of social life.

About The Author

Philip Pettit teaches political theory and philosophy at Princeton, where he is Professor of Politics. He moved to Princeton in 2002 from the Australian National University.

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Table of Contents

Rules and ThoughtsI.0. My Claims about ThoughtI.1. The Reality of Rule-followingI.2. Realism and Response-dependenceI.3. Noumenalism and Response-dependenceI.4. Defining and Defending Social HolismI.5. A Theory of Normal and Ideal ConditionsReasons and ChoiceII.0. My Claims about ChoiceII.1. Three Aspects of Rational ExplanationII.2. Decision Theory and Folk PsychologyII.3. The Virtual Reality of Homo EconomicusII.4. Functional Explanation and Virtual SelectionII.5. The Capacity to Have Done OtherwiseNorms and RegulationIII.0. My Claims about RegulationIII.1. Rational Choice Regulation: Two StrategiesIII.2. Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice PerspectivesIII.3. The Cunning of TrustIII.4. Enfranchising SilenceIII.5. Instituting a Research Ethic: Chilling And Cautionary Tales