Zabarella’s De Mente Agente, Chapter 10

Main topics covered: that one and the same intellect cannot be said to have both active and passive powers, the nature of intellectus in habitu, why Philopponus might have been tempted to attribute the capacity of knowing to the agent intellect, the platonism of Simplicius’ view, that Aquinas was mistaken in conflating the agent intellect with one of the two powers of the passive intellect

All these interpretations, whereby it is concluded that these two intellects are one substance, are false and can hardly agree with Aristotle’s principle claims at all. We will show this first against them all together and will afterward make their errors clear by considering what is proper to each individual case.

First, it is certain that Aristotle held that nothing can, simply speaking, without qualification, move itself, but that whatever is moved, is moved by another. We read him demonstrating this point demonstrated thoughout books 7 and 8 of the Physics and he showed the same to be impossible in the first book of the De Anima in the case of the soul itself, when he disproved the opinion of others who said that the soul moves itself.

Therefore, since it is a simple, unqualified form, the substance of the same human mind cannot be, at once, an agent and patient with respect to itself. Nor even is a rational or “logical” distinction sufficient, since if it were, we could say the same about any simple, unqualified thing, that it has an active faculty and a passive faculty, and therefore that it may act upon itself by reason of a diversity of powers. But this is absurd and should not be conceded to be Aristotle’s opinion. Therefore, it is in the same way absurd in the case of the intellect, which, since it is simple, cannot be at the same time complete and imcomplete, in a state of potentiality and in a state of actuality, act upon itself and direct itself from potency to act, from a state of perfection to one of imperfection.

Moreover, it is evident that in Contextus 17, Book 3, Aristotle discovered the agent intellect because of the nature of the passive intellect, and that it acts upon it (as we demonstrated earlier): therefore, they cannot be one and the same intellect in substance. The same thing can, in fact, have both an active and passive faculty with respect to diverse things, so that it is passive in relation to one thing and acts on another, but not with respect to itself, or so that, in other words, it acts on itself and is passive in relation to itself, unless it has [B], in itself, distinct substantial parts, to which these two contrary powers it may be attributed.

Besides, an examples drawn from Aristotle, found in contextus 17 and 18 of Book 3 of the De Anima demonstrate this same thing: for, in the whole of nature we see that an agent is always distinct in substance from the passive element and thus, [in* (the text appears to be corrupt here)] every art, the agent is is essentially distinct from the material, passive element. Aristotle, however, said that the agent intellect is related to the patient intellect in the way an art is related to its material; [C] therefore, he intended them to be distinct in susbtance. The example of light indicates the same thing: for, light is essentially distinct from color, to which it is joined, and from sight, on which it acts. Moreover, Aristotle thought that whatever role light plays in vision, the same is also played by the agent intellect in understanding. Therefore, he thought that it was essentially distinct both from the patient intellect and from its intelligible objects.

Furthermore, Aristotle used the same reasoning to prove the agent intellect, demonstrates this same point. For, it shows that an agent intellect is present by the fact that a passive intellect is present. Therefore, he concludes that they exist as two, not as one substance, since this is not indicated by that argument. Since, if Aristotle intended to show what they are contending, he would not prove that the existence of the agent intellect is shown by the fact that the passive intellect is present. Rather, he would only show that the same passive intellect, which he had spoken of earlier, has an active power, by reason of which it is furthermore called an agent. However, Aristotle did not say this and did not indicate it in any other way; rather, everything he says in that contextus indicates the contrary, as we have just shown.

Aristtotle’s words later in the same place and in Contexts 19 and 20 express the same idea: he says that an agent is more honorable than a passive element; that it is nothing other than that which is [F], namely, a pure quiddity and pure actuality, and indeed, being itself. But in context 5 he said that the passive intellect was nothing other than pure potency. How, therefore, are they essentially the same, if one of the two is pure actuality by its nature and essence, so that its is essentially one with its activity, while the other is pure potency? Moreover, he said that the agent intellect always understands [A 1024], while the patient does not always understand, which clearly indicated that these are two distinct substances: for, the same substance cannot be said to be at the same time in a state of understanding and of not understanding. Since, therefore, Aristotle never gave any indication that it might be the case that these two intellects were one substance, but, to the contrary, all his words indicate a substantial difference between the two and even his reasoning demonstrates this, all opinions are false and in vain [B], whereby it is in any way concluded that these two intellects are one and the same susbtance.

Against Simplicius

But if we wish to consider the aforesaid opinions one at a time, the opinion of Simplicius is the furthest removed from Aristotle. For, according to Simplicius it is not essential to the intellect that it be in a state of potency, but such a state pertains to it accidentally, that is, insofar as it arises in the body. Aristotle, however, intended that it should be essential to it, for he says that no other nature belongs to it besides pure potentiality. But if we follow Simplicius, the intellect is essentially pure actuality, but accidentally pure potentiality. Therefore, this view is contrary to the the opinion of Aristotle and is more a Platonic than a Peripatetic view. Therefore, we may conclude that it should not be ascribed either to Themistius nor to Averroes, for, in fact, they are not accustomed to use the teaching of the Platonists in the intepretation of Aristotle, as Simplicius widely does.

Another opinion of those [D], who said that the agent intellect was one and the same thing as the passive intellect, such that, having a disposition for first principles, or even a disposition for drawing a conclusion, as John Philopponus believed, is not Aristotle’s view: Aristotle clearly distinguished the intellect when it is disposed or capable of understanding from the agent intellect, since he speaks about each separately and considered the intellectregarded as capable of understanding in that same part of the De Anima which is concerned with the passive intellect. He also said that the intellect, when it has acquired a disposition or power to know, is not always actually understanding, but whenever it is, it is also in a state of potentiality, although the agent is always in a state of understanding.

Finally, if we consider everything which is said about the agent intellect in contexts 19 and 20, it is quite clear that this cannot be adapted to the agent intellect when it is disposed to understand, and in particular, that passage which said that the agent intellect is in its very essence, activity: for, when it is disposed to understand, since it is sometimes not actively understanding, it is not essentially its proper activity. [F] Aristotle says many other things in this part of the De Anima, by which this is shown to be the case, which, when located, I regard as evident in the text.

Nor do Aristotle’s words in Contextus 18, where he says that the agent intellect is a kind of disposition or power to act, support this view: for he does not mean any kind of disposition, nor the one that they have in mind, but one like light. But light [1025 A] is not the disposition or power to act of sight itself, nor is it the form of color received upon the eye, but is something external, which is present by an external principle, distinct both from vision and from its object; from the visual faculty and from its disposition or power of sight. Therefore, the agent intellect is the sort of disposition or power, that, being extrinsically present, produces in the passive intellect the power or disposition for knowledge, whereby the passive intellect itself is said to be disposed to know. For that reason, the agent intellect is not the sort of disposition whereby it might be called an intellect capable of knowing.

Also, the opinion of St. Thomas is not consistent with Aristotle’s text, and suffers from its own proper difficulties. For, since he recognized both a passive and an active power in the passive intellect, he lapsed into ambiguity, believeing the active power, which the passive intellet has, to be the agent intellect, which is hardly the case, since the agent intellect ought to act on the passive intellect. Therefore, if tit were the case that the passive intellect had this active power, one and the same thing would act upon itself, which should not at all be claimed.

We have, however, already said what the active power is that the passive intellect has: it is a judging or decisive power in relation to the received object, which should not be called the agent intellect, since it is not a power of acting in the passive intellect itself, but rather, on an object when it judges it. Therefore, Thomas did not go astray when he attributed active and passive powers to the passive intellect, which is to say, a power of recieving and an adjudicating power, for we in fact concede both of these. However, he was mistaken in this: he thought Aristotle called this active power the agent intellect. But we shall soon show St. Thomas had most nearly of all approached the mind of Aristotle, and not even in this matter, but to have merely gone astray in terminology alone.