MR. FLEISCHER: The President this morning is receiving a briefing
at the National Hospital. There is a representative of the press in
there, we arranged for a print pooler to be in there. And then there
will be a demonstration of the laboratory equipment that the President
will see, focused on important health care issues here in Nigeria.
Then the President will have his meeting with the President of Nigeria
to talk about U.S.-Nigerian bilateral relations. I anticipate regional
issues involving regional conflicts will arise, as well.

We will try to have a background briefer give you a readout after
the meeting. I'm not sure of the logistics on that one yet, but we'll
do our best to get that done. It may involve logistics -- dropping
tape -- but we're going to move quickly and try to get that done.

Q You brief the pool, then, you're thinking?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think that's the only way to do it, because there
won't be an opportunity to get the backgrounder to the filing center.

Then the President will make remarks in a speech at the Leon
Sullivan Summit, and then return to the White House.

Q Does the President anticipate asking Nigeria to take even
more of a role in solving the Liberian crisis, or does he anticipate
making any sort of announcement about what the U.S. role in that might
be?

MR. FLEISCHER: Nobody should be on the lookout for an announcement
today. It will be a topic that is discussed. The United States has
worked closely with Nigeria to resolve regional conflicts throughout
Africa. Nigeria has received considerable training in its peacekeeping
efforts, and its military has received considerable training from the
United States. They have abilities, and we have worked with Nigeria to
help them to put those abilities to good use.

Q Ari, what's the President's reaction to Mr. Tenet's statement
-- a rather long one -- what was his reaction?

MR. FLEISCHER: The President is pleased that the Director of
Central Intelligence acknowledged what needed to be acknowledged, which
was the circumstances surrounding the State of the Union speech. The
President said that line because it was based on information from the
intelligence community and the speech was vetted.

Q Does the President still have confidence in Director Tenet?

MR. FLEISCHER: Yes. President Bush has confidence in Director
Tenet and President Bush has confidence in the CIA.

Q Ari, the President often speaks of accountability. Does he
feel accountability is achieved in this circumstance? Or how do you
address that issue?

MR. FLEISCHER: Let me explain to you the President's thinking on
this. A greater, more important truth is being lost in the flap over
whether or not Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. The greater truth
is that nobody, but nobody, denies that Saddam Hussein was seeking
nuclear weapons. He was pursuing numerous ways to obtain nuclear
weapons. The United States never said that he had nuclear weapons. We
have said that he was pursuing them. It should surprise nobody that
Saddam Hussein was seeking to acquire the means to produce from a
variety of sources and a variety of ways.

He had previously obtained yellow cake from Africa. In fact, in
one of the least known parts of this story, which is now, for the first
time, public -- and you find this in Director Tenet's statement last
night -- the official that -- lower-level official sent from the CIA to
Niger to look into whether or not Saddam Hussein had sought yellow cake
from Niger, Wilson, he -- and Director Tenet's statement last night
states the same former official, Wilson, also said that in June 1999 a
businessman approached him and insisted that the former official,
Wilson, meet an Iraqi delegation to discuss expanding commercial
relations between Iraq and Niger. The former official interpreted the
overture as an attempt to discuss uranium sales.

This is in Wilson's report back to the CIA. Wilson's own report,
the very man who was on television saying Niger denies it, who never
said anything about forged documents, reports himself that officials in
Niger said that Iraq was seeking to contact officials in Niger about
sales.

What did the President say in the State of the Union? He said:
according to British reports, Iraq is seeking uranium from Africa. And
the intelligence cited two other countries, in addition to Niger.

So, again, the larger truth, was Saddam Hussein a threat, in part
because he was seeking nuclear weapons, in addition to what we know and
have said about chemical and biological.

Now, if you ask, how is the President approaching this, what's the
President's approach, the President sees this as much ado, that it's
beside the point of the central threat that Saddam Hussein presented.

Q But doesn't that make it all the more important that some
accountability be achieved that this flap over one fact can obscure his
larger message?

MR. FLEISCHER: The President's larger message has not been
obscured. The American people continue to agree that Saddam Hussein
was a threat and --

Q You just said it was being obscured. You said there's a
larger truth here that's being missed.

MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, but the larger truth -- the larger truth being
missed this week, but it's not been missed by the country on a
longer-term basis.

Q So this is just another press problem? The President has
often thought we go overboard. Is that the case here? Is the larger
truth being obscured just by the media?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I'm not saying that, because there was a
vetting issue on the speech, and that's a governmental issue. But I'm
saying that this governmental issue needs to be put into a larger
perspective, now that everybody has had one week's worth of chance to
analyze this.

So, no, I can't say this is about the press. But I can say there
is an important bigger picture here. And that bigger picture remains
just as valid for the American people today as it was the day the
President gave the State of the Union address.

Q On February 5th, Colin Powell did not have enough confidence
in that statement to include it in his presentation to the U.N. There
was some vetting that was done between the President's speech and Mr.
Powell's presentation to the U.N. Why then, if that -- if at that
point we knew, you knew, or the administration knew that the
information was not good, why then was that very scary accusation
allowed to stand through the through the war? I mean, we didn't get
this corrected until after the war.

MR. FLEISCHER: It was corrected in March, when the part about
yellow cake from Niger was looked into by the IAEA and that's when they
reported it was based on forged documents.

But we still do not know whether or not Iraq was seeking uranium
from Africa. According to the intelligence, there were two other
nations that were cited for where Iraq may have been seeking or was
seeking uranium.

So what we have said is it should not have risen to the level of a
presidential speech. People cannot conclude that the information was
necessarily false. After all, why would it surprise anybody that
Saddam Hussein was seeking uranium. The more uranium you have, the
fewer centrifuges you need to produce a nuclear weapon. So that, in
and of itself, should not surprise anybody.

What is the issue here, in the President's judgment, is whether
that information should have risen to his level and his giving the
speech. And the administration, I think, to be fair to the
administration, we did acknowledge that. We were the ones who were
forthright and direct about it.

Q Well, after the IAEA brought up the forged documents. But on
February -- if it wasn't substantiable enough to be presented in Mr.
Powell's presentation, surely by then the White House realized that it
wasn't substantiable enough to be put in the State of the Union. Why
no public comment after February 5th? Why wait a month until the IAEA
challenged the forged documents?

MR. FLEISCHER: Because this is the nature of intelligence
information. This intelligence information was included in the NIE; it
was part of the information that was being discussed widely in
intelligence circles. There was a consensus agreement that supported
the NIE with the footnoted objection from the State Department.

Q Does the President consider the matter closed now? With the
President -- with Director Tenet's letter, does the President consider
the matter closed?

MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, the President has moved on. And I think,
frankly, much of the country has moved on, as well.

Q This is the last day of the President's historic trip to
Africa. Has this overshadowed what he has hoped to accomplish?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think you have to ask the American people
that. I think that if you look at America's newspapers and America's
TV shows, there has been ample reporting on both. I am not in a
position to gauge which report the American people pay the most
attention to. I think people probably pay attention to both. But
again, I think when people hear about the trip to Africa and the focus
on AIDS, the impression people have is we are, indeed, a compassionate
nation, our tax dollars are going to a good purpose.

When people hear about the flap over whether or not Iraq did,
indeed, seek uranium from Africa, the American people say, we didn't go
to war because Iraq may or may not have been seeking uranium from
Africa; we went to war because Saddam Hussein was a threat because of
chemical and biological weapons and also because he was pursuing
nuclear weapons, whether he did or did not seek uranium from Africa.
So I think the American people have it in pretty good perspective.

Q Ari, did Dr. Rice ask Director Tenet to put out the
statement, or did anybody else from the White House ask him to put out
the statement?

MR. FLEISCHER: Discussions with Director Tenet about the statement
have been going on for days, have been worked out previously. It's
appropriate for the CIA to speak out.

Q Did he bring up the notion of addressing a statement, or did
the White House ask him to?

MR. FLEISCHER: It was mutual. The discussion was, the CIA needs
to explain what its role was in this. And the best way for any entity
in the government to explain its role is to issue a statement.

Q Why, if he was going to if it has been talked about for
several days, did Dr. Rice come out and brief yesterday? Why not just
wait for Tenet to put out his announcement? I mean, was there any
reluctance on the CIA to put out a statement?

MR. FLEISCHER: Dr. Rice was always scheduled to brief yesterday,
just as Secretary Powell was scheduled to brief at the filing center
the night before. So we actually, literally the day before the trip
or the week before the trip -- sit down. She was scheduled to brief on
the flight to Nigeria. It was moved up to the morning flight. It was
easier to do it that way, frankly, and to disseminate whatever she
said.