As Seoul and Washington stopped talking about dialogue with Pyongyang, some security experts are talking about the worst-case scenario: a nuclear war that could breakout on the Korean peninsula. North Korea continues advancing its nuclear and missile programs, while some call for Seoul's own nuclear armament.

Discussions of a nuclear war are taking place at a time when the Obama administration is distracted from its foreign policy in an election year, and the Park government is crippled by a defeat in recent parliamentary elections. Both administrations are resorting to the dubious efficacy of sanctions on North Korea, hoping that pressure would somehow lead to denuclearization.

Unlike during the Cold War, when a nuclear war was considered unthinkable and the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) effectively reined in decision makers from going to nuclear war, the possibility of fighting a nuclear war has become a serious topic for discussion.

In the past two weeks, three research organizations released their respective updated assessment of Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal, discussing the conditions for its use, its inherent threats to the security of South Korea and the United States, and the option of a military solution.

David Albright, founder of The Institute of Science and International Security, released a well-documented report on June 16, estimating that Pyongyang now has 13 to 21 nuclear weapons. Prior to the publication of this report, a widely accepted estimate was 10 to 16 bombs. In April 2015, Chinese experts said the North had close to 20 bombs, while Washington experts said at the end of 2015 that the North could have 20 to 100 by 2020.

On May 24, Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), a geopolitical intelligence advisory firm in Austin, Texas, published a five-part article on how to eliminate the growing nuclear program militarily, short of using U.S. nuclear weapons. The Stratfor report suggests that the United States would have no military option left, if it waits for North Korea to perfect related technologies that the North claims it has. There is no scientific evidence yet proving that the North has a full, battle ready nuclear capability.

Like many other research organizations, Stratfor believes the North Koreans are nearing the completion of nuclear and missile technologies _ from miniaturization for putting a nuclear warhead atop a missile, to diversifying nuclear fissile materials from plutonium to uranium and tritium to produce hydrogen and thermal weapons, and completing an ICBM with atmosphere-reentry durability and target accuracy to strike the continental United States, beyond the ranges of Japan and Guam.

Stratfor favors a "minimal strike", targeting only the nuclear facilities to force the North to denuclearize. This contradicts the weight of its own argument that such a "minimal strike" can escalate into a comprehensive strike. Identification of known targets on the Yongbyun nuclear complex is pretty well known. However, there is no way to target hidden nuclear bombs and delivery systems, whose locations are not identifiable with current intelligence gathering devices.

Stratfor projects the types of weapons and how much of them would be required to take out the North Korean nuclear production infrastructure, as well as sites of delivery systems. According to this conceptual plan, the mission of a minimal strike would require 10 B-2 bombers and 24 F-22 tactical fighters, equipped with special ammunition such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and 600 cruise missiles that can be launched from surface ships and submarines.

A minimal strike is very likely to escalate to a comprehensive campaign. On June 15, Pyongyang immediately responded to the Stratfor reports, vowing to "bolster up its nuclear deterrent … to foil any slightest provocation with … merciless counter action." Pyongyang should understand that Stratfor is not a government research arm and it does not necessarily reflect the views of American military planners.

Yet, it is conceivable that a U.S. strike on the North Korean nuclear infrastructure would immediately trigger a violent response with nuclear weapons from the North. The Stratfor report offers a mechanical calculation of what it would take to eliminate a North Korean nuclear capability but it certainly is not an attractive option for political decision makers, who would ultimately have to approve such a plan. It does not even discuss potential damage to life and property that it would cause.

On June 13, Garth McLennan published a sobering article "Needle in a Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight a Nuclear War" on 38 North, a website forum on North Korean issues run by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. The author argues, "… it can no longer be assumed that nuclear weapons will never be used" and "topics of discussion related to nuclear weapons should extend beyond proliferation…"

North Korea has said it would use its nukes only "when its sovereignty is threatened by invasive forces with nuclear weapons." McLennan warns, this "should hardly be taken as gospel" ― there is no clear definition of ambiguous terms as "sovereignty" and "hostile." He also talks about the inherent usability of nuclear weapons by the North.

It is not inconceivable that the North Korean war planners would almost certainly respond with nuclear weapons to any U.S. initiated, limited or comprehensive, strike, as suggested by Stratfor. If the North would mix a few nuclear warheads with conventional missile and artillery systems for a counterattack, there is no way, even with deployment of the THAAD system, to defend the South.

Most major wars fought during the last century were triggered by wrong decisions, miscalculation, and misunderstanding. Few wars justify the victims and damage they have inflicted. Nobody wants war. There still is time and opportunity for all sides to prevent a nuclear war, and work for a peaceful resolution of differences. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.