Monday, November 30, 2009

In this blog entry I postulated a duplicated United 175 at Logan Airport that took off at 8:23 besides the official one departing at 8:14. Moreover, the 8:23 flight was apparently tracked by United Airlines as Flight 175 while the FAA tracked the 8:14 flight, as I have shown here.

For obvious reasons, tracking two different planes with the same call sign is an absurdity in the world of air traffic controllers. It would inevitably lead to confusion and raise the danger of accidents.

It is therefore reasonable to establish the working hypothesis that the clandestine United 175 (take-off 8:23) identified itself to the controllers with a different flight number. Unfortunately, this hypothesis, if true, looks hard to verify.

This being said, I spotted a possible candidate. On 9/11, Mark Randol was manager of the Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) in Washington, DC, a subdivision of the FAA. He reported to the Commission:

By 9:25 AM, Marcus Arroyo (Regional manager) called to report several hijackings, including AAL #77, UAL #175 and UAL #177, and he made it clear that this was a terrorist act. Randol then immediately tasked his staff to find out everything they could about the flights. Randol remembers that the whole day was hectic. By 9:45 AM, they had identified that AAL #77 had departed from Dulles, but they could not confirm whether it had been hijacked, while they discovered that UAL #177 was being held at the gate in Boston.

1) Why was it reported hijacked?2) Why was it reported "held at the gate" if its departure was only in the evening?

Misinformation #1 alone could be dismissed as a transmission error induced by the confusion that day, but putting it together with misinformation #2 creates the impression that the existence of the plane posing as "United 177" was being smothered up.

Most remarkably, the hijacking of United 177 was reported at 9:25, two minutes after Ed Ballinger, United flight dispatcher, sent the last message to "his" Flight 175 while it was over Pittsburgh. It is therefore legitimate to specify the above working hypothesis: The plane that was tracked by United Airlines as Flight 175 was tracked by the FAA as United Flight 177.

As I've shown in the last blog entry, the ACARS radio messages sent from United Airlines dispatchers to Flight 93 are clear evidence that the plane was over Fort Wayne, Indiana and later Champaign, Illinois when it received its last messages. This doesn't mean that the "official" Flight 93 which turned around over Cleveland didn't exist; there is plenty of FAA material showing that it did exist. Hence the conclusion that United Airlines tracked a different Flight 93 than the FAA is inevitable - a case for duplicated planes and 9/11 being an Operation Northwoods-like maneuver.

Likewise, United dispatchers sent ACARS messages to Flight 175 locating it near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania just when the South Tower was hit (by whatever plane) and near Pittsburgh 20 minutes later. Hence the Flight 175 that was tracked by United Airlines was not identical to the plane that hit the South Tower.

Before featuring the ACARS messages in particular, I'd like to repeat why it's possible to deduce the approximate position of a plane by means of the transmitting ground station that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's). A map of the RGS's of the relevant part of the United States is here:

Now to the ACARS messages. They have generously been scanned and published by Mike Williams of 911myths.com:

I have transcribed them and added brief comments. The crucial informations are highlighted in red. The last three letters in the fourth line denote the active RGS, and the last line denotes the date and time which is given in zulu format (09111259 = September 11th, 8:59 EDT).

At 8:59, United aircraft maintenance employee Jerry Tsen sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 via the radio ground station MDT (Harrisburg), indicating that the plane was near Harrisburg, not New York.

At 9:03, United flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 when it was still in the vicinity of Harrisburg - exactly when another plane (later believed to be Flight 175) crashed into the WTC South Tower:

The existence of the "official" Flight 175 is undoubtedly substantiated by FAA documents (ATC/pilot transcripts etc.) So like Flight 93, United Airlines tracked a different Flight 175 than the FAA. Another case of plane duplication. And for Flight 175 there is strong additional evidence that the plane was duplicated from start:

- the impossible phone call out of United 175: Peter Hanson, who was aboard the plane, called his father Lee Hanson at 9:00:03 through a satellite-based GTE airphone. The call lasted 192 seconds, hence ending at 9:03:15, 4 seconds after a plane later believed to be Flight 175 hit the South Tower (9:03:11, according to seismic data). With the detection of a second Flight 175, the phone call suddenly makes sense.

Disregarding the ACARS messages, the recordings of GTE phone calls, and the statement of US Airways pilot Steven Miller who observed United 175 taking off from Boston just before himself, is not an option.

The alternative explanation is straightforward and yields a consistent flight path: United 175, tail number N612UA, took off from Boston at 8:23. Peter Hanson talked with his father from 9:00 to 9:03 when the plane was in the skies over Harrisburg. It continued to fly westbound und was near Pittsburgh when it received its last message at 9:23. It is not clear yet what happened to this United 175 afterwards.

It is clear, however, that the "official" United 175 tracked by the FAA was a different plane. The research will continue.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

ACARS (Aircraft Conditioning and Reporting System) is the basic radio-based tool for communication between an aircraft and its company. On 9/11, United Airlines flight dispatchers sent several ACARS text messages to the planes they were responsible for, including Flight 93 and Flight 175.

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter of United Airlines was interviewed by the FBI to help them with the interpretation of the ACARS messages. The full FBI report is appended at the end of this article and can also be looked here (scroll down to the very last interview):

The actual content of the messages is already known and hardly interesting ("beware cockpit intrusion" etc.), but what makes them toxic for the official story is the plane's approximate position that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's).

Now these position informations reveal shocking news: Winter explicitly confirms that United 93 received the last ACARS messages when it was near Fort Wayne (Indiana) and, some minutes later, near Champaign (Illinois):

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

Not all of the messages enumerated by Winter are listed in the file, but messages #16-#19 are, together with the time when they were received. So it's possible to establish a rough flight path for United 93:

9:22 PIT (Pittsburgh)

9:32 CAK (Canton/Akron)

9:36 CLE (Cleveland)

9:47 TOL (Toledo)

9:51 FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)

10:10 CMI (Champaign, IL)

After Champaign, no message was received by United 93 anymore.

The authenticity of the ACARS messages is beyond doubt. The proper interpretation has been delivered by Michael J. Winter and confirmed by David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, United Airlines. The flight path is consistent with the speed of a commercial airliner (keeping in mind that the plane is up to 70 miles away from the respective radio station), and the tail number of the plane that received the messages was N591UA: United 93.

Does that mean that the official flight path, with United 93 making a U turn over Cleveland, is faked? No, not at all. The U turn is confirmed multiple times by air traffic control radio messages and personal statements from Cleveland Center controllers. I will take a closer look at these sources and their relation to the RADES radar data in forthcoming blog entries. I can already promise that this checkup will further damage the credibility of the RADES files.

In my past research, I have uncovered the duplication of several planes involved in 9/11, but the case of Flight 93 over Illinois is the strongest one due to the authentic power of the ACARS messages. The Flight 93 that was tracked by United Airlines was a different plane than the Flight 93 that was tracked by the FAA.

In my previous blog entry, I already have presented evidence that Flight 93 was duplicated right from the start. Also note the same dichotomy at Logan Airport: According to ACARS, Flight 175 took off at 8:28. According to the FAA, Flight 175 took off at 8:43.

A pattern emerges.

Appendix - FBI summary of the interview with Michael J. Winter

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter was interviewed at United Airlines UAL, World Headquarters, 1200 E. Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, IL. The interviewing Agent indentified himself to Mr. Winter and told him, the interview concerned UAL flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and the communications between UAL flight 93 and the flight dispatchers. Mr. Winter voluntarily provided the following information regarding these communications.

In reviewing the Sanitized Time and Text of ACARS messages as provided by the FBI, Mr. Winter said Meassage #1 was from the aircraft to UAL Dispatch. Message #2 was to the aircraft from UAL Dispatch at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, NY and Message #3 was to the aircraft from UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #4 was from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #5, listed as unreadable, was engine data advisory information. Message #6 was from UAL flight dispatcher A.D. "Sandy " ROGERS to the aircraft and Message #7 was from UAL flight dispatcher ROBERT BRITTAIN to the aircraft.

Message #8 was to the aircraft from BALLINGER and Message #9, listed as unreadable, was the engine data advisory information. Message #10 was from UAL flight Dispatcher CHAD McCURDY to the aircraft. Except for Message #13, which was to the aircraft from UAL SAn Francisco Maintenance, DAVID PRICE, all of the other messages listed were from UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER.

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations RGS at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS ina downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

Message #1 was routed from the aircraft through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA PIT as designated in the line "DT DDL PIT...". Message #2, to the aircraft, was also routed through the RGS near Pittsburgh, A and was directed to the ACARS printer on the aircraft. The routing to the printer is designated by the letters "AGM" following "Smi=AGM" and "STX=AGM.."

Message #3 was a message to the aircraft from Chicago Dispatch CHIDD listed as a Command Respoinse MD type message. The CMD message, designated in the line "Smi=CMD Agy/Num=65535", was sent to the ACARS screen and utilized the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. In this type of message, the flight dispatcher can also activate an audible signal to alert the flight crew of the sent message but this was not done.

Message #4 was sent from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatch using the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. The designation "C4" appears just before the sentence "EWRSFO..." indicating the message was sent from the aircraft.

Message #5 was an engine data message which was sent automatically to UAL Chicago dispatch and a UAL maintenance computer. The information in the message as N41.20 W080.5" was the latitude and longitude of the aircraft when the date was sent.

Message #6 was a message to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH CAK and was sent to the ACARS screen. The designation for Akron/Canton, OH CAK appears in the line beginning "AN N591UA/GL CAK..."

Message #7 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was sent to the ACARS screen and was a CMD type message.

Message #8 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message ws a CMD message and also activated the audible signal. The audible signal designated as "BEL" in the line "QUCHIAKUA-1-BL>UA 93".

Message #9 was an engine data message. The latitude and longitude was also listed in the message as "N41.31 W081.06".

Message #10 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD and was sent to the ACARS screen omly. The RGS in this instance was near Cleveand, OH CLE from the line "AN N591UA/GL CLE...".

Messages #11 and #12 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Cleveland, OH. These messages also activated the audible signal in the aircraft.

Message #13 was sent to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco, CA line maintenance to the ACARS screen and also activated the audible signal. The RGS for this message was near Toledo, OH as designated "TOL" in the oine "AN N591UA/GL TOL...".

Messages #14 and #15 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Toledo, OH. The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.

Also present during part of this interview was David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, UAL WHQ.

Sunday, September 13, 2009

On 9/11, Anthony F. Mazza was working at Newark Airport as a fueler. One of the planes he provided with fuel was United 93. In the cockpit of the plane, he met a person who was apparently neither Leroy Homer, jr, the co-pilot, nor Jason Dahl, the pilot. On Oct. 19, 2001, he was interviewed by the FBI. Here's the FBI report:

Mazza has worked as a fueler for Ogden Aviation Services at Newark International Airport since 1973. Mazza fueled United Airlines flight 93 on September 11, 2001 prior to its departure and crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that everything seemed normal on the flight including the amount of fuel that was pumped into flight 93's tank.

Mazza stated that prior to the passengers boarding flight 93, he had completed fueling the plane and proceeded to the cockpit to inform the co-pilot of the completed task. This has been the standard operating procedure for United flights out of Newark for many years. Mazza entered the cockpit where he handed the fueling sheet to a young Caucasian male, well groomed, brown hair and a white shirt, who was sitting in the co-pilot's seat. The male responded to Mazza by saying thank you and taking the paper from him. Mazza then departed flight 93 prior to the passengers boarding. Mazza stated that this was approximately 30 minutes prior to the scheduled departure time.

Mazza was interviewed by FAA employee John Patani shortly after the crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that he reported that there was nothing unusual on the day of the flight and that the plane had been fueled without incident.

On Friday, October 12, 2001 Mazza saw a memorial for the crew of flight 93 and saw pictures of the co-pilot of flight 93. The picture was the actual co-pilot of flight 93, who was Leroy Homer.Mazza stated that he was certain that the co-pilot he spoke with was not Mr. Homer.

The FBI report ends here and leaves the reader to itself with the question: who was the "male" in the co-pilot's seat, if not Leroy Homer? Jason Dahl, the pilot? Given Mazza's report, this only "regular" explanation seems to be highly unlikely. After seeing the memorial, Mazza obviously took the initiative to contact the FBI. Had he identified Dahl - whose picture he certainly saw, too - as the "male", he would not have felt compelled to call the FBI.

When interviewing Mazza, the FBI surely asked him about this possibility and probably showed ihm photos of Dahl again. In any case, the absence of Dahl in the report makes clear that he was not the "male" either. And Dahl was 43, not really a young man like the "male" as described by Mazza.

Jere Longman ("Among the heroes") describes meticulously the United Airlines routine pre-flight procedures. Before the passengers board a plane, it has to be checked, of course. Basically the captain looks after the cockpit instruments along a pre-flight checklist while the first officer checks the plane outside (tires etc.). The fact that Mazza met neither Dahl nor Homer is even more disturbing than the presence of the "male".This looks like another case of plane duplication. It is already known that according to United Airlines ACARS messages, Flight 93 took off at 8:28, other than the official take-off time 8:42. We have to accustom ourselves to two different "Flight 93" taking off from Newark Airport.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

According to 9/11 Commission staffer Miles Kara, the NEADS tapes transcripts were accomplished by Alderson Reporting, a "professional transcribing organization", based on the audio files provided to them by the Department of Defense.

I myself have already transcribed parts of the tapeshere. But comparing the very first sample - Channel 21, 1:10:30 - to the "professional" version has produced an unsettling insight: the official transcripts, however professional they are supposed to be, are sketchy, misleading, and not to be trusted.

9:41:05 Another one. (Inaudible) I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:11 As before is one missing. Start a search. (Inaudible) range out of 53

9:41:35 A 288 for 92 miles search only. 92 miles? 288 miles for 92 search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97. Yup.Yup. What did I do -9:42:23 The two real close together. Here we go you see. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'emAs I've learned, transcribing noisy radio transmissions is not an easy job to do, and I never would condemn someone for a petty misinterpretation. But the official transcript omits significant and clearly understandable information:

- another one is reported going from Boston to Las Vegas

- A search is started (start a search)

- A position information is reported as 280 for 97

I'm not talking of odds and ends here. The omissions are crucial for the Delta 89 case, as I will show in a coming blog entry.

Request for the reader: Don't believe me blindly. Please check the audio file for yourself to verify these omissions!

This part on Channel 21 is the first one where I checked the veracity of an official NEADS transcript, but this example shows that there is the need to review all other channels, too.The official NEADS tapes transcripts are not to be trusted.

Thursday, July 23, 2009

Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defense commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.

In the official story, Delta 89 doesn't exist. Better to say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89 was in fact Delta 1989, i.e. a case of sloppy communication.

This, however, is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan and flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the NORAD tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually look over the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on their displays.

To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with Delta 1989, I will go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on them. But before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough understanding how NEADS radar works - it's quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer explains in her book "Touching History" (p.32):

Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country....Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds.

So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar, however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag. Lynn Spencer (p. 25/26):

Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.

Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the original audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time):

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up.

90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm. NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989: that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.

(Channel 4)

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

In striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta 89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case:

- the different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.

- "we have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.

- "Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as a different plane.Bottom line: Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast, Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet.

(Channel 21)

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two really close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to him

To understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again (p. 32):

To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a grueling process. (...) The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder.

The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta 89, described by Lynn Spencer as a grueling process. But in contrast to American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect twoplanes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code, which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7" indicates that it's not the ID code of an usual civilian airliner - they never begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600, or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar screens and signals a hijacking.

(Channel 4)

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations)) .

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:

The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44. In between, there is no order to change the direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis Center at 9:43 like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS).Back to NEADS:

(Channel 4)

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

(Channel 21)

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

At 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.

Now it's time to sum up the data:

Call sign.................Delta 1989.......................Delta 89

Flight plan..............Boston-Los Angeles.........Boston-Las Vegas

Squawk code..........1304.................................7112

Direction at 9:43......westbound......................southwest/southbound

Transponder............continously working..........turned off at 9:44

Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":

Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a specific airport, and he was maneuvering to turn into the airport to land.

Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft reflected in Commision staff's recording was one that was search only or one that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking code 1304.

The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane, is simply omitted in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.

The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.

The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a foreign intruder playing games with the air defense, the plane's known attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated hijacking as part of a military exercise:

- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.

- The behavior of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game. To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military exercises are often termed "war games".

- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a "real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.

- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises - "7112" seems to have been one of them:

Delta 89 fulfills all conditions for an "exercise faker aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.

So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon. Lynn Spencer notes: "Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios, including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek asylum". (p.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important at all?

Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a "doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41. Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the wargame designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first indication that the ongoing exercises interfered with regular civilian air traffic.

In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.

Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence seems to have been covered up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 - a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:

- Both planes were reportedly a 767- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked- Both planes were covered up by Delta 1989

These coincidences allow the formulation of the working hypothesis that Delta 89 and the Cleveland mystery plane are identical. Confirmation pending.

Saturday, July 04, 2009

Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? I have posed this question repeatedly, but there is still no satisfying answer, to put it mildly. Here's Lynn Spencer's version ("Touching History", p. 167):

In the distraction of the emergency ((with regard to United 93)), the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.

News travels fast. Soon, word on the FAA's open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles, and the flight is added to the list of suspect aircraft.

Now an ACARS message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "Land immediately in Cleveland." They've already passed Cleveland, but Captain Werener types in a quick "ok." He won't put up a fight, he just wants to get the plane on the ground.

After a couple of minutes, another message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology."

Dunlap and Werner look at each other quizzically. What the hell is that about? There's such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with Dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.

Flustered, the captain does his best to figure out what "correct phraseology" Dispatch is looking for. He carefully types a response: "Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland."

Dunlap is starting to really worry now. They think something is going to happen to this plane, he thinks to himself. They're trying to figure out if we're still in control!

Meanwhile, the captain calls up the Center controller to request an immediate diversion to Cleveland, and then starts inputting the new destination into the flight computer. Dunlap rolls the 767 into a 30-degree bank back toward the airport and pulls out his approach charts.

The Cleveland Center controllers are not happy that Delta 1989, which was out of radio contact for several minutes, has now made a turn toward the large city. They didn't initiate the diversion and they don't know that Delta Dispatch has done so. An abrupt change of course for a transcontintental B767 out of Boston raises further suspicion, and a supervisor announces the new development on the FAA teleconference.

To sum up this passage:

First, Delta 1989 misses the transfer to the next sector because of the turmoil caused by UA 93. At this time (about 9:40) this must be the hand-off from Lorain sector to Bluffton sector, the super-high sector of Cleveland Center which is adjacent to (west of) Lorain sector. As a result, Delta 1989 is not in radio contact with Bluffton sector for several minutes.

Then, the Delta 1989 pilots get a message from Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland immediately.

Then, the captain of Delta 1989 requests an immediate diversion to Cleveland, being back on the frequency.

At last, Cleveland Center, surprised by the request and unaware that Delta Airlines has ordered the captain to do so, gets suspicious of the flight.

This "Lynn Spencer version" of the diversion of Delta 1989 is completely wrong in terms of chronology and facts and easily disproven by the best imaginable source: the radio transmissions between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989.

9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

With this transcript at hand, it is easy to show up Ms. Spencer's grave errors:

1 - Delta 1989 does not miss the hand-off to the new frequency. It affirms the Lorain controller's request to change the frequency to 110.32, which is Bluffton sector.

2 - The message of Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland arrives before Delta 1989 shifts to the new sector, not afterwards.

3 - The controllers of Cleveland Center are well aware that it was Delta Airlines who ordered the pilots to land in Cleveland - simply because the pilot told them.

Unfortunately, the source for the misinformation in Spencer's book is not clear. It is absolutely clear, however, that Delta Airlines' diversion order was well known among controllers and not the reason they surmised it to be a hijacking. Therefore, we can also throw another account onto the dustbin of history:

The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain's request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency?

Controllers don't know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland. They continue to send messages to Werner. In code, they ask him if all is OK. Yes, he responds time and again. He doesn't know why they're so worried.

Tuesday, June 02, 2009

This is a transcript of all NEADS radio messages related to Delta 89 between 9:39 a.m and 9:46 a.m. Channels 4 and 21 are the most important ones, Channels 7, 2 and 3 give additional information. I have put all the channels in a chronological order at the end ("Channels omni") together with the radio talk between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989). Extern callers, like Colin Scoggins and Indianapolis Center, are shown in italic. The times should be accurate within +-5 seconds. I skipped repetitions and redundant utterances (like "oops" etc). Everyone is invited to check the audio tapes and verify the transcript here:

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:42:18 Do you have a possible destination of that Delta eight-nine? It's headed to Las Vegas. Okay.

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas.Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything?He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.9:44:02 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

Channel 21

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

Channel 7

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on thatif you want to get someone up

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:45:20 Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack

Channel 2

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

Channel 3

9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

9:41:00Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now 9:41:05Good! Pick it up! Find it! 9:41:05Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one9:41:13Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:30As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53 9:41:35288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:42That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)9:41:46I have a 280 for 97

9:41:55southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine9:41:58I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em9:42:43Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:43:04I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West.I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center)We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35(Indianapolis Center)Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas.Okay, cause when I sow him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

On Nov. 6, 2001, FBI special agent Joan-Marie Turchiano sent a fax to FAA investigator Douglas Gould. The fax consisted of three pages (the page number is in the upper right corner).

Page 1 is the cover sheet with general information.

Page 2 is missing, for whatever reason.

On Page 3, we jump right into an eyewitness statement:

that if the Cessna's transponder was turned off then he would believe that this Cessna was involved in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

#########s advised that he was informed by other tenants in the apartment building that they also observed this Cessna. ########### advised that he will contact ############## with witness contact information.

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

"AAT-200" is a special investigation agency inside the FAA and deals with aircraft accidents, emergency cases, near mid-air collisions, and other irregular incidents. As soon as an accident occurs, the involved controllers are obligated to submit a report to AAT-200:

The information flow is: local FAA facility -> Regional Operations Center (ROC) -> Washington Operations Center (WOC) -> AAT-200. Example: if an accident occurs in the skies over Ohio, Cleveland Center controllers (responsible for Ohio) send their reports to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center where it is passed on to the WOC and finally the AAT-200.

On 9/11/2001 at 7:30 p.m. AAT-200 updated a request list from the facilities involved in the attacks:

The list addresses FAA en-route centers (identifiable by the affix "Center") and airports. In the latter cases, the affix "airport" is obviously seen as redundant and omitted (Washington National = Washington National Airport).

I have highlighted the most interesting entry. "Cleveland" stands for Cleveland Hopkins Airport (as distinct from Cleveland Center). This means that controllers at Hopkins had reported an incident (emergency landing or the like) involving United 1898. They reported it to AAT-200 via the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (AGL). And AAT-200 was still waiting for voice and CRD data.

However, the BTS database ( http://www.bts.gov ) reveals that United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898 on 9/11. In plane language: There was no United 1898. So what airliner was being reported by the controllers of Cleveland Hopkins?

In the light of Cleveland mayor Michael White's famous news conference and ample additional evidence that an airliner with unknown identity made an emergency landing at Hopkins "United 1898" looks like an excellent candidate for this mystery plane:

Interestingly, Delta 1989, the plane that also landed at Hopkins and apparently functioned as a cover-up for the mysterious emergency landing, was not reported by Cleveland Airport, but Cleveland Center. This means that Delta 1989 was not seen as an emergency case by airport controllers and therefore not reported to AAT-200. The reason why it was reported by en-route controllers remains to be investigated.

More interestingly, the flight numbers of the two airliners - 1989 and 1898 - are very similar and easy to confound, a curiosity amplifying the impression that Delta 1989 was used as camouflage to send the other plane into oblivion.

Most interestingly, the airline of the mysterious plane seems to be United. The controllers were maybe not able to check if the flight number 1898 was operational , but they were certainly able to recognize the United markings.

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.

Combining this newspaper report with the AAT-200 paper results in the conclusion that a United Boeing 767 from Boston landed in emergency at Cleveland Hopkins.

The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably.