A very interesting new development in the China-North Korea intrigue happened last week: Xi Jinping began to use North Korea as a negotiating card against the United States in the trade war. In the previous four summits between Xi and Kim Jong-un, Kim used China as leverage in nuclear negotiations with the United States. This time, China, the bigger partner in the Pyongyang-Beijing socialist camp, used North Korea in its dealings with Washington. This is an important paradigm shift in China's regional strategy. First, Xi's visit to North Korea was not about denuclearization, but about the United States. China timed the visit one week before Xi's expected meeting with Trump at the G20 summit in Japan. Xi wanted to secure negotiating leverage with Trump, by highlighting the notion that China is indispensable to steering the North Korea nuclear issue and Washington needs China's help. North Korea's denuclearization is a foreign policy priority for the Trump administration. On the surface, it was a shrewd move because, immediately after China's announcement of the visit, Trump called Xi. It was the first phone conversation Xi had with Trump this year. Xi clearly got Trump's attention with the visit. But it is not clear whether Washington appreciates Xi's move. The abrupt timing of Xi's visit could be seen as opportunistic. The Trump administration has already lined up its North Korean diplomacy schedule this month. After the G20 summit, Trump will visit South Korea to discuss the North Korean issue anyway. The U.S. government's special representative on North Korea, Stephen Biegun, is in Seoul this week to prepare for the possible resumption of negotiations. China's move, in this sense, could be seen as disruptive. It is particularly the case if Xi's Pyongyang visit had not been pre-coordinated with Washington. Since the Singapore summit last year, one signature policy of the Trump administration in dealing with North Korea is the following: we don't need an intermediary. Washington's displeasure manifested in its blacklisting of additional Chinese tech firms, just days ahead of a high-stakes summit between Trump and Xi.

Second, Xi's trip to North Korea was a great diversion tactic, shifting the international and domestic attention away from Hong Kong. The suspension of legislation, under massive civic protests, to extradite suspects to China was the biggest political reversal of Xi Jinping's years in power.Third, and most importantly, Xi's using "the North Korea card" in the U.S.-China trade war indicates that, from now on, the North Korea issue may become an area of competition, not cooperation, between Washington and Beijing. In the past, China had a "two-track" approach, separating the North Korea issue from the trade war with the U.S. But as the severity of the trade war deepens and as the both sides increasingly see the trade war as part of the bigger competition for global leadership, China may be starting to link the two to bolster its status. For years, the U.S. and China have used the North Korea nuclear issue to rationalize their need for cooperation, emphasize their common ground on Asia-Pacific security. It has also served as a good reason for the two sides to meet. North Korea's denuclearization is one subject they agree upon, while they disagree in almost all the other areas, including the South China Sea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, human rights, religious freedom, Huawei, and cybersecurity. During the Cold War, broadly speaking, the U.S. and China had one area of conflict: Taiwan. During Xi's first term, there were two areas of conflict: Taiwan and the South China Sea. Now, during Xi's second term, we are beginning to see three areas of conflict: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea. Taken together, the current circumstances of deepening structural rivalry will drive the United States and China to treat the North Korea issue as part of their regional strategic gains or losses in their geopolitical chess game. In other words, the North Korea issue is becoming a sub-structure within the bigger U.S.-China competition structure. Inevitably, this eerily reminds one of the Cold War era. For Seoul, it means that the North Korea issue will become a much more complex and intricate challenge than before. Surely, this is an uncommon time for South Korea. It needs uncommon wisdom.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.