1. Summary—The CIA Tibetan Activity consists
of political action, propaganda, and paramilitary activity. The purpose of
the program at this stage is to keep the political concept of an autonomous
Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and
to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments
inside Communist China.

2. Problem—To explain Agency expenditures in support of the Tibetan
program.

3. Background and Objectives—At a 13 December 1963 meeting “The Special Group
approved the continuation of CIA controlled
Tibetan Operations [1 line of source text not
declassified].” Previous operations had gone to support isolated
Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet and to the creation of a paramilitary
force on the Nepal/Tibet border of approximately 2,000 men, 800 of whom were
armed by [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] airdrop in January
1961. In 1963, as a result of the [2 lines of source text
not declassified] and as a result of the cited Special Group
meeting, the Agency began a more broadly based political program with the
exiled Tibetans. This included bringing 133 Tibetans to the United States
for training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques;
continuing the support subsidy to the Dalai Lama's entourage at Dharmsala,
India; continuing support to the Nepal based Tibetan guerrillas; the
reassignment of a part of the unarmed guerrillas to India for further
training; and the [6 lines of source text not
declassified]. Operational plans call for the establishment of
approximately 20 singleton resident agents in Tibet [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] two road watch teams
in Tibet to report possible Chinese Communist build-ups, and six border
watch communications teams [1 line of source text not
declassified]. The [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] will stay in direct touch with Dharmsala and
will conduct political correspondence with Tibetan refugee groups [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to
create an increased Tibetan national political consciousness among these
refugees. The [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] was established in October 1963, and the
communications center serving it, [1 line of source text
not declassified] is presently being built with a completion date
scheduled in February 1964.

One of the most serious problems facing the Tibetans is a lack of trained
officials equipped with linguistic and administrative abilities. The Agency
is undertaking the education of some 20 selected Tibetan junior officers to
meet this need. A United States advisory committee composed of prominent
United States citizens has been established to sponsor the education of
these Tibetans. Cornell University has tentatively agreed to provide
facilities for their education.

The Agency is supporting the establishment of Tibet Houses in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Geneva, and New York City. The Tibet Houses are intended to serve as
unofficial representation for the Dalai Lama to maintain the concept of a
separate Tibetan political identity. The Tibet House in New York City will
work closely with Tibetan supporters in the United Nations, particularly the
Malayan, Irish, and Thai delegations.

The cost of the Tibetan Program for FY 1964
can be summarized in approximate figures as follows:

4. Coordination—This Tibetan operational program has been coordinated with
the Department of State for a number of years. Specific operational activity
has been coordinated with the Department of Defense and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as
necessary.

5. Recommendations—Barring sudden developments inside Communist China and
Tibet, expenses for this long-range, politically-oriented Tibet program are not expected to exceed
this amount in the foreseeable future. In fact, there are a number of
probable economics, [1–1/2 lines of source text not
declassified] for example. Nonetheless, this program will continue
to require fairly large expenditures over a long period of time to keep the
possibility of a non-Communist government alive to the Tibetan people. We
recommend continuance of this program.

1Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 112,
February 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting
information. Memoranda for the record by Peter Jessup of February 14 and 24 state that the paper
was considered at a Special Group meeting on February 13 and approved by
the Special Group on February 20. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Box 1, 303 Committee
Meetings (1964))