Weapon Program:

Nuclear

​The List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely Pursuant to Executive Order 13599 (the E.O. 13599 List) was created to clarify that, regardless of their removal from the SDN List on January 16, 2016, persons that OFAC had previously identified as meeting the definition of the Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution still met those definitions and continued to be persons whose property and interests in property were blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR. On November 5, 2018, OFAC moved persons identified as meeting the definition of the terms “Government of Iran” or “Iranian financial institution” from the E.O. 13599 List to the SDN List as appropriate, and removed the E.O. 13599 List from its website. Many of the names that have been moved to the SDN list from the E.O. 13599 list retained the same unique identification numbers (UIDs) that they had while they were on the E.O. 13599 list. However, some 13599 names have been designated under additional authorities and have therefore received new UIDs when they were added back to the SDN list. Users of OFAC’s sanctions list data may wish to reference the following mapping table to see how these specific records were added back onto the SDN list.

Nuclear Timetable

This report provides an estimate of how soon Iran could have fueled a nuclear weapon before the implementation of the new nuclear agreement reached in 2015. It is phrased in the present tense from the standpoint of a reader looking forward from the autumn of 2015, shortly after the agreement was reached. The data below, which are based on reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, describe Iran’s uranium stockpile, its centrifuges, and the rate at which its nuclear capacity had grown.

As the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program approach the June 30 deadline for a final deal, a crucial issue remains unresolved: inspections.

The country’s supreme leader has proclaimed military sites strictly off-limits to inspectors, while the French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, has said such inspections are a key priority. If the ongoing talks hold to form, the United States will either concede the issue or seek a compromise solution. The latter may be possible; the former would be dangerous.