Subcommittee To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. IIRUSKA, Nebraska

JOHN J. McCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York

NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire

J. G. SOURWINE, Counsel

BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

AUGUST 27, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Watch Hill, R.I.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:40 p.m., at the home
of Arthur Gardner, Watch Hill, R.I., Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Senator DODD. Let the record show this is a hearing taking place at
the home of Mr. Arthur Gardner, Watch Hill, R.I.

I should say to you, Mr. Gardner, that the purpose of our inquiry is
to help us to determine whether or not there is any need for remedial legislation.

We of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee
are under a mandate from the U.S. Senate to concern ourselves with this
type of problem.

Now, Mr. Gardner, I will have to ask you to stand and be sworn.

Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will
give at this hearing will he the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so he1p you God?

Mr. GARDNER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR GARDNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF BUNDY TUBING
CO.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, would you state your full name, your address,
and your business and profession ?

Mr. GARDNER. Arthur Gardner. My business is chairman of the board of
Bundy Tubing Co., which is in Detroit, but I live in Washington.

Senator DODD. What is your legal address?

Mr. GARDNER. You want the home address or the office?

Senator DOD. Your legal address, where you have your residence.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, that is 2111 30th Street, NW.

Senator Dodd. Washington, D.C.?

Mr. GARDNER. D.C.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, have you held any positions with the U.S.
Government?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator Dodd. Would you tell us what they have been, please?

Mr. GARDNER. The first was-you mean-now, let me get this straight. I
was in the Army in World War I. Is that interesting?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. And then in World War II, I went to the War Production
Board as a dollar-a-year man. After I left that, I was assistant to the
Secretary, of the Treasury, John Snyder. And then 1 was appointed Ambassador.

Senator DODD. When were you appointed Ambassador?

Mr. GARDNER. 1953.

Senator DODD. 1953?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. You were in World War II, I believe, Mr. Gardner.

Mr. GARDNER. That is right. Well, I was in this particular position,
the War Production Board, because they thought I was too old to be in the
thing I knew most about, which is the Tank Corps.

Senator DODD. Am I right in understanding that you held the rank of
major in the U.S. Army?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I would have been-I was captain. And then the war
ended.

Senator DODD. Did you serve in the Army close to General Eisenhower?

Mr. GARDNER. No; I used to go up to Gettysburg, where he was then Major
Eisenhower, in command of the camp at Gettysburg.

Senator DODD. I see. Now, Mr. Gardner, you say you were appointed, as
we know, Ambassador to Cuba, in 1953. Would you tell us briefly but concisely
and adequately, what were the economic conditions in Cuba when you went
there, in 1953?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, they had started to boom. And during the course of
the time that I was there the economy rose tremendously. The building boom
was sensational. If you had been in Havana 10 years earlier, as I had,
and then saw it the day I left, you wouldn't recognize the city.

It was due to circumstances. But I think that the real reason for it
was the feeling of definite security that the Cubans themselves had, politically
perhaps not, but financially, yes. And they felt that the time had finally
come when they could begin investing money in Cuba, rather than putting
their money, as they had in previous years, in banks in Switzerland and
New York. When I left there, it was astonishing to see the improvement,
and so far as I was concerned in the entire time I was there I never heard
anybody use the word "Gringo," or say "get out of- Yanqui get out," or
anything like that.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as referring to Cuba
as the show window of Latin America.

Mr. GARDNER. I believe that.

Senator DODD. Would you tell us what you mean by that?

Mr. GARDNER. Because the relationship was so close between Cuba and
the United States, we having obtained their independence for them, and
basically we have always given them that preferential on sugar. It made
the country feel that the bond between us was stronger than anybody else.
In addition to the fact that it was only 90 miles from Key West. And I
think that the majority of Cubans felt that this was the one place that
they could look to for comfort and support. So that in my opinion, the
other countries of the Caribbean, in fact almost all of Latin America,
always expected to see us treating Cuba and working with Cuba closer than
anybody else. And that is the reason I coined the expression, which has
been used a great deal.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, you have said in a newspaper interview that
the United States was "just 2 years late" in acknowledging that Cuba under
Castro is more of a police state than it was under Batista. Will you explain
this for us, and perhaps expand on it, if you can?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, during the time that I was there, the last year,
Castro had landed, and was hiding in the hills. And there had been an endless
number of shipments of arms and other things to Castro, which could only
come from the United States. Every once in a while we were able to catch
such a shipment, and stop it. But we were not very active about it. And
one factor which I think was one of the most serious was that the former
President, named Prio, was living in Miami. I don't know whether you know
this or not, but he was arrested, convicted, and paid a fine of $5,000
for gunrunning. And he was also indicted a second time. And yet no action
was ever taken on it. My personal reason for thinking t was serious was
that man many times Batista would send for me and ask me why this was.
I don't know whether I have gotten off the track there, but that is my
answer. The 2 years were 2 years of gradually making Batista feel we were
pulling the rug out from under him.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. Gardner, when did you first have doubt about Castro, do you remember?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I saw a manifesto that he had printed in Mexico,
which stated his principles, what he was going to do. He was going to take
over the American industries, he was going to nationalize everything. I
mean I don't remember the words of this particular manifesto. I have a
copy of it in Washington. That, to me, meant only one thing, that this
man was a radical. I couldn't tell you how much of a radical.

Senator DODD. Did you once see a picture of Castro with a telescopic
rifle, boasting that he could kill a man at a thousand-

Mr. GARDNER. I heard somebody tell me that. I never saw a photograph
of it.

Senator DODD. That had some influence on your judgment of him?

Mr. GARDNER. Very definitely.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as saying that Washington,
"pulled the rug out" from under Batista. Is this a correct quote, and,
if so, what did you mean by that?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, I think it is a correct quote, I mean that Batista
had always leaned toward the United States. I don't think we ever had a
better friend. It was regrettable, like all South Americans, that he was
known-although I had no absolute knowledge of it-to be getting a cut, I
think is the word for it, in almost all the, things that were done. But,
on the other hand, he was doing an amazing job, and 1 will give you a specific
example.

Former presidents had built roads, and they put cement on the sand,
and he made them put rock ballast in. The other people were doing it because
each year they could build a new road, and get their cut. But everything
we did, from the time I went there, I think encouraged Batista. Then just
at the end he began to get extremely worried about this development. He
had made rather insignificant efforts to send troops down to get Castro,
but fighting in the mountains was not what the Cuban troops were ever taught.
So that when we talk about pulling out the rug, I mean there are a
number of factors that occurred repeatedly which showed that the State
Department did not want to have anything to do with Batista.

Senator DODD. Well, would you say that these things that occurred also
showed that the State Department was anxious to replace Batista with Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. I think they were.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as saying that while
you were Ambassador to Cuba in 1953 to 1957, you fought all the time, with
the State Department over whether Castro merited the support or friendship
of the United States. Would you explain this for us, and then perhaps
more fully develop it, if you can?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, it wasn't a question of my officially writing

letters, but in my conversations, in my everyday contact with the State
Department, I always stressed this point-that I felt that Batista had proved
a great friend to this country, and his administration had proved a great
ability to develop the country itself, and develop the friendship with
us. And I feel it very strongly, that the State Department was influenced,
first, by those stories by Herbert Matthews, and then it became kind of
a fetish with them. I mean I don't care about it myself, although most
ambassadors are asked to come and be debriefed, but they never asked me.
So the only time I ever was able to get into the State Department was making
special appointments, and that was only done after-maybe a year after I
had actually resigned.

Senator DODD. Would it he accurate to say, Mr. Gardner, that you felt
that you, were to some extent ignored?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. When would you say that this-

Mr. GARDNER. I think I was-

Senator DODD. Let me complete my question, please. When would you say
you first had the feeling that you were being ignored or overlooked?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, right away, when I got back. It is rather petty,
and I would like not to have it go-can I hold this up and tell you and
see whether you think it is of any importance?

Senator DODD. Well, why don't we suspend, go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I think just that I wasn't asked to be debriefed
is about as conclusive as anything, because if I in my business-

Senator DODD. Is it fair to say, Mr. Gardner, that the way that you
were treated on the occasion of your visit to the State Department made
you feel that you were being ignored and overlooked and circumvented?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, that is right.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, are you able to tell us who particularly
you talked with in the State Department at this particular time?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I went to see Secretary Murphy, who has now resigned.

Senator DODD. Robert Murphy?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. Anyone else?

Mr. GARDNER. I had one conversation with Christian Herter, in which
I recommended that in order to help him, and help the Cuban picture, and
also help the Latin American desk, as they call it, that he should get
somebody with the practical know-how, somebody with experience. I mentioned
three or four men. One of them was the vice president of the American Foreign
Power. He spent his whole life in countries in Latin America. I mean, I
mentioned the names of people. And he said, "Well, that sounds very interesting."
But he never called me in to do anything about it.

Senator DODD. Besides Robert Murphy, and Christian Herter-

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I talked to Loy Henderson.

Senator DODD. Mr. Rubottom?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, I talked to Rubottom. But he was not at all interested.

Senator DODD. You mean by that he was not interested in your views in
the situation?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. He is a nice chap, and means well, and I have nothing
but high regard for him personally, but I think he was entirely off on
the wrong track, and it has been proved. Without putting it down, let me
just explain what I mean.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator DODD. Did you discuss this situation-by this situation mean
the Castro-Batista situation, with Robert Murphy?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. And what did you find his reaction to be?

Mr. GARDNER. I found he was so badly advised. We had a pleasant talk,
but got nowhere. He had an idea that Batista was a gorilla.

Senator DODD. Did he think favorably of Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. No. But he felt so strongly against Batista, that anybody
would have been better, I imagine, is the way he would put it.

Senator DODD. I see. During these conversations with these several persons
whom you have named, did you, from time to time, tell any one of them,
or all of them, that Castro talked and acted like a Communist, and should
not be supported by the United States?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. But the purpose of these conversations always seemed
to be was whether Castro carried a Communist card or not. We all knew-I
think everybody knew-that, his brother, Raul, was a Communist. But they
seemed to argue about it as if that was important.

Senator DODD. You mean the technicality of party membership was made
a matter of importance rather than his general attitude?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, that is right.

Senator DODD. I understand.

Mr. Gardner, can you tell us again specifically, if you remember, did
you say this to Mr. Murphy, and to Mr. Rubottom, and to Mr. Herter, or
to anyone else?

Mr. GARDNER. No, I didn't say it to Herter.

Senator DODD. Did you say it to Rubottom?

Mr. GARDNER. In a nice way-yes, I said it to Rubottom. And I talked
to Loy about it. And Murphy, I did talk to him about it. I don't remember
the, conversation, but that was my reason for going to see him.

Senator DODD. But you generally did discuss this matter?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, that is right.

Senator DODD. And you gave him this warning?

Mr. GARDNER. That, is right.

Senator DODD. And you felt, I take it, from your testimony, that you
got, no interest, no encouragement?

Mr. GARDNER. No.

Senator DODD. And no reaction which would indicate that these men agreed
with you?

Mr. GARDNER. Nothing but a negative.

Senator DODD. You have been quoted, Mr. Gardner, as referring to,
"Castro worship" in the State Department in 1957. What did you mean
by this?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, did you read the article that, Matthews wrote, after
he went up in the hills and saw him?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. He wrote a Richard Harding Davis type of article, and he
made Castro appear to he a Robin Hood, a savior for the country.

Senator DODD. Yes. But Mr. Herbert Matthews wasn't in the State Department.

Mr. GARDNER. No, but he was actually-he briefed Earl Smith-

Senator DODD. Your successor as Ambassador to Cuba was briefed by Herbert
Matthews?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, that is right.

Senator DODD. Well, before we get into that, let me ask you if you know
of anything else, or anyone else in the State Department, at that, time--that
is in 1957-which made you feel that there was a cult of Castro worship,
as you have put it.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, that may not he the right word, Senator. I meant
by that that they built him up to being the Robin Hood or the savior of
the country.

Senator DODD. Now, who do you mean by "they"?

Mr. GARDNER. I mean the people in the State Department, and I think
90 percent of the people in this country thought, that Castro was-

Senator DODD. I know. But we are trying to get here, a record that we
can pin down, in which we can pin down our information. When you say, "they,"
are you referring again to the Messrs. Murphy and Rubottom, Henderson,
Herter, or who are you referring to?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, now, Herter wasn't a party. I never told Herter anything,
but made the suggestion about men that could he1p him.

Senator DODD. I see.

Mr. GARDNER. The other men-I mean I always found completely deaf to
anything I had to say about it.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, it has been said that there was a plot, by
the Castro forces to kidnap you. Do you know anything about this, and if
you do could you tell us about it?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sure. The last 3 months, somebody in-I don't know
whether it was FBI or not, but that is what they said down there-I mean
that was conversation-told our security people at the Embassy that he had
this plot to kidnap and hold for some sort of a ransom, such as recognition
of Castro, all top officers, and me particularly, on the top floor of the
chancellery. The place is right on the Malecon. And then if attention wasn't
paid to this, they were going to drop off one man after the other, from
the balcony. I thought it was perfectly ridiculous. But the State Department,
the Security Department, insisted upon my having a Marine sleep next to
me every night, and go wherever we went. And we were followed whenever
we went out on any kind of a trip, to go to dinner, or do anything, by
a police car, with four policemen with tommyguns. It was perfectly ridiculous.
They had devices to listen whether I was breathing in there. It was a comedy
of the world, but you couldn't he1p it. They thought it was serious.

Senator DODD. This is approximately when, what year?

Mr. GARDNER. This is in 1957.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, we have talked about Mr. Roy R. Rubottom,
Jr., who, by the way, was replaced as Assistant Secretary of State for
Latin American Affairs on July 30, and who, incidentally, is scheduled
to go to Argentina as our Ambassador.

Mr. GARDNER. I understand that he has just been approved, which is astonishing
to me.

Senator DODD. I don't know he has been.

Mr. GARDNER. It was in the paper.

Senator DODD. I think it was committee approval. I don't think-

Mr. GARDNER. I think that is the, most remarkable thing I ever heard.

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Gardner, if you know, can you tell us anything
about Rubottom's background, or what competence he has or had for the positions
which he has occupied in the State Department?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I understand that he left the Navy, and was a third
secretary, or something of the sort, in Madrid. For a very short time,
he was in one of the Latin American countries. And then he came to Washington,
and was assistant-or I don't know what particular rank he had-in the Latin
American Department. Why they put him in, I will never know. In the first
place, he was in the process of learning Spanish. In the second place,
I felt he had absolutely no background of experience.

Senator DODD. When you say he was in the process of learning Spanish,
you mean while he was Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs?

Mr. GARDNER. I think he probably started before. But during the time
he was, he did learn it.

Senator DODD. Yes. Was he a protege of Dr. Milton Eisenhower?

Mr. GARDNER. That I never knew. I have read it in the paper. I can't
understand it if he is.

Senator DODD. While you were the Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Rubottom was
the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, was he not?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, just the last year. I think it was just the last year.

Senator DODD. And prior to last year, do you remember what his job was
in the State Department?

Mr. GARDNER. He was an assistant of some sort in the Latin American
Division.

Senator DODD. Do you know what his attitude was toward Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, he was a funny fellow. We talked with him. He came
down to stay in Cuba with us. And both my wife and I had long, long talks
with him. And we would ask him questions, whether he didn't agree with
us, and he would never answer. So I don't know.

Senator DODD. Do you know, Mr. Gardner, whether or not it was Mr. Rubottom
who was principally responsible for arranging Castro's visit to the United
States in April of 1958?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't know who did that. I think he must have given his
consent to it.

Senator DODD. Certainly he was the Under Secretary, or Assistant Secretary
for Latin American Affairs.

Mr. GARDNER. That is right. He must have.

Senator DODD. Is it fair to assume that he certainly favored the visit?

Mr. GARDNER. Oh, well, he favored Castro. There is no question about
it.

Senator DODD. I see. You remember, Mr. Gardner, that the State Department
announced publiely that Castro would be welcomed as a distinguished leader,
and would he given an official security guard if necessary, even though
his visit was unofficial. Do you remember this?

Mr. GARDNER. Very well.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, did you protest this announcement at the
time?

Mr. GARDNER. No, except to my friends. I didn't go to the Department.

Senator DODD. I take it because by that time you were rather discouraged.

Mr. GARDNER. I was worn out.

Senator DODD. By your efforts to get some kind of attention in the State
Department.

Mr. GARDNER. It got so bad that my wife got worried because I couldn't
sleep nights worrying about the picture as it developed.

Senator DODD. Do yon know a Mr. Thomas Mann, who is scheduled to replace
Mr. Rubottom?

Mr. GARDNER. I have never met him.

Senator DODD. So you do not know his attitude with respect to Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. No.

Senator DODD. I think it was reported that you have stated on at least
one occasion that in your opinion the U.S. Government needs a strong man
with a thorough understanding of Latin American affairs in the State Department.

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. Well, is it fair to say that this means you do not think
we have such now?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I don't know anybody in there that really knows-I
know two men-one of them is now Ambassador to Costa Rica, and the other
is the present Ambassador to Mexico.

Senator DODD. Robert Hill-

Mr. GARDNER. Both those men.

Senator DODD. And the Ambassador to Costa Rica?

Mr. GARDNER. His name is Whitetower.

Senator DODD. Do you know Wieland?

Mr. GARDNER. He was in the Embassy for a very short time.

Senator DODD. He was in your Embassy?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, for a very short time.

Senator DODD. What was his job?

Mr. GARDNER. I think he was in the economics section, but I am not certain.
But I mean-I can tell you-I was very glad to see him go.

Senator DODD. How long was he there, sir?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, as I remember, it was only a month or 6 weeks.

Senator DODD. And was this in 1957?

Mr. GARDNER. I cant be certain of that. I know, for instance, his record,
because a man named William Pawley, who was Ambassador to Brazil, had him
down there, and got him out. He felt that he was much too-leaning much
too far to the left.

Senator DODD. Do you know what position he had occupied in the State
Department before his assignment to your office?

Mr. GARDNER. No, I never knew anything about him.

Senator DODD. And you don't know what has become of him since?

Mr. GARDNER. No. I think he is one of Rubottom's assistants. I know
he is, as a matter of fact.

Senator DODD. He is still, as far as you know?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. In your opinion, did he play any part in Castro's rise
to power in Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. I think he had a strong influence on Rubottom. But I haven't
any way to prove it.

Senator DODD. I see.

Mr. GARDNER. Just because I know the way he thinks.

Senator DODD. I see. Is it true, or do you know, that shipments of military
equipment to Batista were stopped on the New York docks?

Mr. GARDNER. That is true. A shipment, I only knew of one.

Senator DODD. A shipment. Is it also true that these shipments were
ordered under a mutual aid pact?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. And that Batista had paid cash for them at that time?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I can't guarantee he paid cash, but I know he had
the cash to pay for them. And I know that the mutual aid pact, which
represented a contract which we made with many Latin American countries,
enabled us to dispose of second hand military equipment, tanks, guns, and
everything else, which we could never use. And that in return for it, that
we set up in each of the countries that signed this pact an Army, an Air
Force, and a Navy commission, let's call it-I mean men there to train them
and get them to use it.

Senator DODD. Do you know who stopped those shipments, or that shipment,
rather?

Mr. GARDNER. Only the common gossip, that Rubottom was the only man
who could have stopped it.

Senator DODD. Do you know of any-do you have any information concerning
the shipment of arms and ammunition from the United States to Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, those are, things that I mentioned. I said they were
being sent down surreptitiously almost every night. I don't believe that
the Russians sent them stuff in a submarine. But I knew these shipments
were being made.

Senator DODD. No. My question rather was, do you know whether arms were
shipped to Castro from the United States?

Mr. GARDNER. That is what I think-from up and down the Keys, all of
Florida, they were, riddled with these expeditions.

Senator DODD. From the United States?

Mr. GARDNER. From the United States.

Senator DODD. So, of course, such shipments were illegal?

Mr. GARDNER. Illegal. And that was the reason they indicted, as I told
you, this fellow Prio. And he paid a fine of $5,000.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you know, do you have any idea why the
United States allowed Castro to get arms from the United States, and would
not allow Batista to have arms to preserve his government?

Mr. GARDNER. All I can tell you is that the consensus among my friends,
Cuban and otherwise, is that Castro made a howl about Batista getting these
arms to kill Cubans. I mean it was a lopsided idea. Castro didn't mind
getting them to kill other Cubans, but he didn't want Batista. But he had
the airways, and he was able to tell people that. He screamed about it.

Senator DODD. Did you ever have any indication prior to Batista's flight
from Cuba on December 31, 1958, that the State Department or State Department
officials knew that this was going to happen?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think they knew.

Senator DODD. You don't think they knew? Or at least you had no indication?

Mr. GARDNER. I had no way of knowing. It wouldn't make any difference,
but I know that people from the, United States went down to see Batista
for New Year's, close friends, and came back to this country, and they
had no idea of when Batista was leaving, or if he was leaving.

Senator DODD. You have been quoted as saying, Mr. Gardner, that you
didn't know why the United States withheld from Batista help and support
in his effort to carry out a normal election program, when it could have
been given with such superior results from the American and the Cuban points
of view.

I think you have also said Washington just didn't seem to have the slightest,
comprehension of the situation.

Could you tell us perhaps in more detail what you, meant by that?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I used the expression before that Batista felt the
rug had been pulled out, and that in having a proper election, and with
a proper candidate, which is what we had all hoped he would have, that
he had lost all interest, and apparently at that stage was to leave. I
mean he figured there wasn't any hope for him.

Senator DODD. There was an election in Cuba shortly before Castro's
takeover-Marquez Sterling-

Mr. GARDNER. No, he wasn't the candidate. lf he had been the candidate,
the story would have been different.

Senator DODD. I See. I thought Marquez Sterling was elected.

Mr. GARDNER. No.

Senator DODD. Who was?

Mr. GARDNER. I can't remember his name. He was a dummy and a figurehead
and had no prestige whatever. Marquez Sterling had real prestige in Cuba.
And I think he is a man of outstanding character. That was a great blow
to all of us who loved Cuba.

Senator DODD. It has been said that Batista sent a regiment of troops
to put down the Castro rebellion. Do you know, have you any idea, why the
Batista government was incapable, on the surface, so it seems, of suppressing
this rebellion, of a handful, relatively, of Castro rebels?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. There are many reasons.

No. 1, his troops are not trained for mountain fighting. That
is No. 1. No. 2 is that it is like a rabbit running under a cover, or through
a field. I mean you can get up in an airplane, and you could not see them,
or what they were doing. So his air force could never spot them. And then
I think that, thirdly, the troops got so discouraged by the position
we had taken about not giving them arms and so on that they just didn't
want to fight. And when that regiment went down, and the colonel was
supposed to be the toughest colonel they had, he didn't want to fight,
because he took all the money that was supposed to feed the soldiers, and
they had to bring them back. It was general demoralization, that they felt
that Batista was finished.

Senator DODD. Was this largely because it was known or felt that the
United States had abandoned Batista and supported Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. And this was rather common knowledge in the military and
other circles in Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right; everybody. There are a great many Cubans,
I understand, who paid large sums to Castro, thinking that he was going
to make the country over. And now they are the worst disappointed people
in the world, of course.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you know about the incident of the killings
at the Haitian Embassy?

Mr. GARDNER. Very well.

Senator DODD Would you tell us about that, please?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, there, is a code among Latin American countries,
that if you want to, seek asylum, all you have to do is to go to an embassy,
and the embassy is required-it didn't apply to the United States, but it
applies to other countries-that the embassy will take the, man in and protect
him. There were in the Haitian Embassy our own people knew it-maybe 8 or
10 of these 26 of July Movement people, and they were there for a long
time. And then somebody got word to the police that they had been armed,
which is against the code. And the chief of the police, who was a very
tough fellow, and a very courageous man, got a group of his men and went
up to the embassy, knocked on the door. He found out that the embassy employees
were all out. And he said in a loud voice that he had come to arrest these
men, because they had broken the code. He was shot right at the door, just
killed like a dog. And the police went in and found the men all armed,
and promptly killed them. They called it a slaughter. There really wasn't
any slaughter. It is what, any police would have done. They would shoot
through the mattress, if the man was under the mattress. And they got them
all. It made a good deal of a shambles of the place.

I never understood this, but Batista not very long afterward had the
whole building refurnished and put in fine shape again. That was one of
the things that I talked particularly to Murphy about and he didn't believe
me. He didn't believe this would happen. Half the people don't know that
Batista had Castro in jail, and let him out, just out of kindness.

Senator DODD. Sometime-

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, previously.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you feel that your expressed attitude
with regard to Castro had a part in bringing about your replacement as
our Ambassador to Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. Senator, I don't know. I only know that I was very anxious
to stay. I felt that if I had stayed it was encouraging to the Batista
regime, which was through. They had until January. And when they had an
election, I felt sure they would have as fair an election as they could
have, and I think Marquez Sterling would have been the president. But they
didn't seem to think that was necessary.

Senator DODD. In any event, you wanted to stay?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. And it was not-

Mr. GARDNER. It was a great sacrifice to me, because my wife, who had
ulcers, couldn't be with me.

Senator DODD. But you were willing to stay and continue your work?

Mr. GARDNER. I wanted to stay.

Senator DODD. But you were not allowed to do so?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. And in any event, this followed your attitude as expressed
to high officials of the State Department with respect to Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. Now, Mr. Gardner, you were succeeded as Ambassador to
Cuba by Earl Smith?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD . I understand Mr. Smith was an investment broker. I don't
know, and I wonder if you can tell us, what experience he had, other than
this.

Mr. GARDNER. None.

Senator DODD. Did you have any diplomatic experience at all?

Mr. GARDNER. No.

Senator DODD. Do you know what arrangements were made for briefing Mr.
Smith with regard to taking over this important position as Ambassador
to Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I imagine he spent, as I did, nearly a month going
through all the departments that had any bearing on Cuba, and studying
and working with them. I imagine he did that. But as I told you, the fantastic
thing was that he was asked to talk to Herbert Matthews.

Senator DODD. Herbert L. Matthews, of the New York Times?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. And he did talk to him?

Mr. GARDNER. He did.

Senator DODD. And that is where, he got a lot of his briefing?

Mr. GARDNER. I imagine that is.

Senator DODD. Do you know, Mr. Gardner, what position Mr. Smith took
with respect to Castro after he replaced you as the Ambassador to Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I think Earl made a very unfortunate start.

Senator DODD. A very-

Mr. GARDNER. Unfortunate start. I wouldn't, and I didn't think he would,
ever go down near where Castro was, which is the Santiago de Cuba, it is
right down in the foothills of the mountains. But he did go down. And they
put on a professional parade for him-the women all in black, supposedly
the widows and so on of Castro people that had been killed or murdered,
or whatever they talked about. And, unfortunately, the police, in order
to break up the meeting, used a hose on them. The result was that he, Smith,
said that in his country nothing like that would ever happen, we never
treat them that way, an oratorical speech on the subject. And the Cuban
Government became infuriated-that is the Congress and Batista, and they
wanted to have him declared persona non grata, which very fortunately they
didn't do. But I think Earl Smith had a hard time, because later on I know
that he appreciated that Batista was really dong a job for the country,
and that it was unfortunate that he made this trip.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you regard Herbert L. Matthews as an expert
on Latin American affairs?

Mr. GARDNER. I do not.

Senator DODD. Or Cuban affairs?

Mr. GARDNER. Any affairs. I think his history, if you look it up-I am
sure you know of it-I mean in Spain-is indicative of his character.

Senator DODD. What part, if any, do you think Herbert L. Matthews played
in bringing Castro to power?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think he did anything, physically. But his articles
were such that he created a biased situation against Batista.

Senator DODD. And pro-Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. Pro-Castro, very strongly.

Senator DODD. Did Herbert Matthews ever contact you while you were the
Ambassador in Cuba about-

Mr. GARDNER. I made every effort, and saw him a good many times, tried
to get his friendship, because he and a man named Dubois, who worked for
a Chicago paper-both of them were considered by us to be radicals. And
I even arranged meetings for him. And I made it possible actually for
Herbert Matthews to go down and have this interview, because he asked
me.

Senator DODD. Yes. I wanted to ask you, about that. He did ask for
assistance in arranging an interview with Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. He did.

Senator DODD. And this was arranged?

Mr. GARDNER Yes.

Senator DODD. How did you arrange it?

Mr. GARDNER. Only under the condition that when he came back he would
tell me his reactions.

Senator DODD. Yes. But how could you arrange a meeting with Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I mean in those days Batista, was all for the
U.S. Ambassador, no matter who he would have been. And he was very loath
to do it, but he said, "All right, if you think it won't do any harm, it
is all right," and he let him go down.

Senator DODD. This would indicate to be that Batista knew where Castro
was, all right.

Mr. GARDNER. Oh, they all knew where he was. But they couldn't put their
finger on him. He was moving every night.

Senator DODD. But certainly they knew how to get in touch with him if
they wanted to.

Mr. GARDNER. There isn't any doubt about that. But I think Batista was
afraid he would make a martyr of him if he dragged him out.

Senator DODD. How soon after Castro landed in Cuba did Herbert Matthews
seek an opportunity to see Castro?

Senator DODD. And I think you started to say that you agreed to help
him - or help arrange for him - to see Castro. But you made him promise
that he would come back and see you and tell you-

Mr. GARDNER. Tell me.

Senator DODD (continuing). About his meeting with Castro.

Mr. GARDNER. Senator to be perfectly clear about this, the only thing
I could do was help him, so that he would have a pass to go down the island,
so that he could make this trip.

Senator DODD. I understand-whatever it was that he thought you could
do, he wanted you to do it to help him get there?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right.

Senator DODD. And in return for this he promised he would come back
and tell you about this conversation with Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. That is right. And to this day I never have seen him.

Senator DODD. He never did return and never did tell you?

Mr. GARDNER. No. It was a big shock to me, as a matter of fact.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you feel that Matthews' accounts of his
visit to Castro, as he wrote it up, had considerable influence on the American
people with respect to favoring Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think there is any question about it. I think almost
all the newspapers in this country became sort of hypnotized by the thing.

Senator DODD. Do you know, Mr. Gardner, that there was abundant information
available about Castro's background at that time?

Mr. GARDNER. Oh, certainly.

Senator DODD. It was well known that he had been in Colombia, and of
his associations and his activities. You know this to be a fact?

Mr. GARDNER. Absolutely.

Senator DODD. And Matthews was well aware of this?

Mr. GARDNER. They all knew he was a professional rabblerouser.

Senator DODD. And a revolutionary?

Mr. GARDNER. A revolutionary-it was his business.

Senator DODD. Do you think that Matthews' stories about Castro affected
the State Department's thinking about Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. I can't think of any other possible cause for their thinking
what they thought.

Senator DODD. You think his articles did have-

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, they did have a great effect.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. I think the answer we brought up a minute ago is that he
was briefing Smith.

Senator DODD. Well, to put it baldly, Mr. Gardner, do you think: of
Matthews as a partisan of Castro?

Mr. GARDNER. No. I think his visit to Castro was a very unfortunate
thing. But I basically think that Herbert Matthews is one of these people,
the do-gooder type, who the minute you mention the word-anybody as a dictator-is
out to try to break him.

Senator DODD. Is this true of Communist dictators, or just other than
Communists?

Mr. GARDNER. I think it is only other than Communist. He has been a
foreign correspondent throughout Latin America, and so it was the natural
place for him to start in his-

Senator DODD. But as far as you know his opposition to dictators is
limited to non-Communist dictators?

Mr. GARDNER. I have never heard him say anything about Russia.

Senator DODD. Or about the Communist tyranny or dictatorship?

Mr. GARDNER. No.

Senator DODD. In your own mind, Mr. Gardner, do you consider Castro
a Communist tool, or do you think he is an important Communist himself?

Mr. GARDNER. I think he is a tool.

Senator DODD. Would you agree that insofar as the security and welfare
of the United States is concerned, it doesn't make too much difference-it
is not important whether he is a tool-

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think it makes any difference. The conditions that
he has brought about are so hideous, that I wouldn't care what he was.

Senator DODD. Now, referring again to Mr. Herbert L. Matthews, and Ambassador
Smith, do you know that after Castro established his headquarters in the,
Oriente Province, Herbert Matthews saw Ambassador Smith and persuaded Mr.
Smith to visit Santiago de Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think he did.

Senator DODD. You don't think he did?

Mr. GARDNER. I think Earl Smith is a very determined, self-opinionated
lad. And he just made up his mind that he would like to make the trip down
there.

Senator DODD. I see. And you think he did this on his own?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. I know that two of the most important people in the
Embassy were there when I left-urged him not to do it.

Senator DODD. Yes, so you told us. He had, of course, been briefed by
Mr. Herbert Matthews.

Mr. GARDNER. I know. And that may have had some bearing. But I don't
think Herbert Matthews told him he ought to go down there.

Senator DODD. I see. Do you now or did you know a Mr. Earl J. Williamson,
political officer of the State Department?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Senator DODD. Do you know if he had anything to do with the Cuban situation?

Mr. GARDNER. Not any that I remember. I mean he was-he would get information.
I don't remember just exactly what his job was.

Senator DODD. Did you know-

Mr. GARDNER. Wasn't he a legal aid?

Senator DODD. Well-

Mr. GARDNER. I don't know. I think that is what he called it.

Senator D0DD. Do you or did you know Park F. Wollam, American consul
at Santiago de Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. No, I never saw him.

Senator DODD. Do you know Mr. Kirkpatrick, of the CIA?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes. He came down a couple of times to Cuba.

Senator DODD. Do you know of any activities by which he-in which he
engaged in Cuba in connection with the Castro rise to power?

Mr. GARDNER. NO.

Senator DODD. You do not. What can you tell us, Mr. Gardner, if anything,
about Russian and Communist Chinese, influence in Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, there is a large Chinese colony there. At the time
that I was there they were minding their own business, shopkeepers and
so on. We did know that there were some Communists there. There was one
particular instance. The radio station CMQ, was the biggest chain radio
station there. And they had a known Communist as leader of the orchestra.
And I tried very hard, and had many rows and fights with the chap who heads
this organization, and his answer to me was that the orchestra had never
been easier to handle, and he was making money out of it. That was his
position. And the net was that we were able to persuade two or three of
the higher advertisers not to use his orchestra. But that is about the
story. So far as I know, there wasn't anything.

Senator DODD. Mr. Gardner, do you believe that the U.S. Guantanamo Base
is safe from. Cuban aggression?

Mr. GARDNER. I do.

Senator DODD. You think it is safe?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think he would dream of touching it.

Senator DODD. You made a suggestion, sir, that the United States operate
a Spanish-language radio station at Key West, or in that area, to acquaint
Cubans, better acquaint Cubans, with the position of the United States,
and the attitude of the United States. Do you know why this has not been
done?

Mr. GARDNER. I haven't any idea. I have been talking and talking about
it.

Senator DODD. This would not be a very huge task.

Mr. GARDNER. No, they have got plenty of equipment.

Senator DODD. Who has the authority to do this, Mr. Gardner, if you
know?

Mr. Gardner shakes head.)

Mr. GARDNER. I want to make very clear to you. I don't know that it
should be run by the United States. I think it really ought to be done
as a private thing. Shortwave, would be no good, because it is amazing
the number of people that have radio sets in Cuba. And if Castro were to
make a statement that nobody was to listen to the, station, every Cuban
would listen. I know them.

Senator DODD. Well, sir, I don't want to detain you longer. I know you
have not been feeling well.

Is there anything more you can tell us about the part America or Americans
played in helping to bring Castro to power in Cuba?

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think very many Americans-I think the man, this
Prio, made this statement to a man who was formerly Cuban Ambassador to
the United States, who asked to go over and find out what his attitude
was. We had failed to get anybody to move against him. You can get information,
if you want to from Immigration or any one of the organizations why they
didn't do it. But none of them would do it.

Senator DODD. Finally, sir, Mr. Gardner, what would be your recommendations
as to how the United States--what our policy should be, what we should
do with respect to Cuba and the Castro government?

Mr. GARDNER. I mentioned to you the radio station. If the United
States took a strong position against Castro, I think you would find, without
any doubt, that the Cubans themselves would perform what has got to he
performed sooner or later-we have got to get rid of Castro.

Senator DODD. Well, don't you think by now already the Russian and Chinese
influence there is making it more difficult for the Cuban people to get
rid of Castro.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I say I don't agree with a lot of people. I don't
think they are enough indoctrinated.

These young people, it is waving a flag, and they are told what to do.
It is hurrah, boys, it is a great show. He promised to give them land and
then he doesn't give them the land.

Senator DODD. What do you think we ought to do? He is confiscating our
property. He is causing trouble. He has created an espionage beachhead
in the hemisphere.

Mr. GARDNER. I think we ought to morally support any movement of
Cubans that is willing to take the job on. And I don't think there is any
question that there are such people. I think we can't do it ourselves,
because you know we can't send Marines down. That would be the most terrible
thing in the world. But we can, under cover, support and let them know
that we want to have a change.

Senator DODD. Well, all right.

For the record, I should like to say that I appreciate your helpfulness
and frankness, and I am sure that the committee will as well. Many people
are troubled about this Cuban situation. You are a respected man, a former
Ambassador to that country. And it is, I think, valuable to the committee
and to the Senate of the United States to have your views.

Mr. GARDNER. Any time. As soon as I get settled here, I will come and
be glad to talk to you or anybody else about it.

Senator DODD. I would like to have it appear on the record that we held
this hearing at your home, at your invitation. I wouldn't want to have
it appear that we barged in on you.

Mr. GARDNER. No, certainly.

Senator DODD. And I came up because you were not feeling well, and it
would be difficult for you to travel to Washington.

Mr. GARDNER. That is fine.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the executive session was adjourned.)

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

AUGUST 30, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

Senator DODD. Mr. Ambassador, will you rise and raise your right hand?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing the truth, so help you.
God?

Mr. SOURWINE. You were special assistant in the Office of Price Management,
the War Production Board, in 1941 and 1942?

Mr. SMITH. Office of Production Management.

Mr. SOURWINE. Office of Production Management?

Mr. SMITH. Which is the predecessor of the War Production Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. You were appointed Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary to Cuba, June 3, 1957?

Mr. SMITH. Confirmed by the Senate in May 1957.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you served until when, sir?

Mr. SMITH. Until January 20, 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, when you were appointed Ambassador to Cuba,
were you briefed on the job?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who gave you this briefing?

Mr. SMITH. I spent 6 weeks in Washington, approximately 4 days of each
week, visiting various agencies and being briefed by the State, Department
and those whom the State Department designated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any particular individual or individuals who, had a primary
part in this briefing?

Mr. SMITH. The answer is, in the period of 6 weeks I was briefed by
numbers of people in the usual course as every Ambassador is briefed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a briefing
on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Matthews of the New
York Times?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who gave you these instructions?

Mr. SMITH. William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division and Mexico.
At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Division, Central American
Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he brief you on the Cuban situation?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you give us the highlights of what he told you?

Mr. SMITH. Are you going into a special line of this, because I have
prepared a statement that I would like to read to the committee, if I may
have the opportunity. It is a brief statement.

Senator DODD. You. certainly may, but I think it is better for our record
if we proceed with our questions, and then if you want to make any statement,
of course you will have full opportunity to do so.

Mr. SMITH. Would you mind repeating the last question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if you could give us the highlights of what Matthews
told you.

Mr. SMITH. We talked for 2 1/2 hours on the Cuban situation, a complete
review o£ his feelings regarding Cuba, Batista, Castro, the situation
in Cuba, and what he thought would happen.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did he think would happen?

Mr. SMITH. He did not believe that the Batista government could last,
and that the fall of the Batista government would come relatively soon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically what did he say about Castro?

Mr. SMITH. In February 1957 Herbert L. Matthews wrote three articles
on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front page of the New York Times,
in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and portrayed him as a political Robin
Hood, and I would say that he repeated those views to me in our conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he, sir, call your attention to those articles

Mr. SMITH. No; he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Departinent call your attention to them?

Mr. SMITH. I don't believe anybody called attention to them. At that
time I recall that I was going to be Ambassador to Cuba, and I read them
with great interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Matthews tell you about Batista?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Matthews had a very poor view of Batista, considered
him a rightist ruthless dictator whom he believed to be corrupt. Mr. Matthews
informed me that he had very knowledgeable views of Cuba and Latin American
nations, and had seen the same things take place in Spain. He believed
that it would be in the best interest of Cuba and the best interest of
the world in general when Batista was removed from office.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was true that Batista's government was corrupt, wasn't
it?

Mr. SMITH. It is true that Batista's government was corrupt. Batista
was the power behind the Government in Cuba off and on for 25 years. The
year 1957 was the best economic year that Cuba had ever had.

However, the Batista regime was disintegrating from within. It was
becoming more corrupt, and as a result, was losing strength. The Castro
forces themselves never won a military victory. The best military victory
they ever won was through capturing Cuban guardhouses and military skirmishes,
but they never actually won a military victory.

The Batista government was overthrown because of the corruption,
disintegration from within, and because of the United States and the various
agencies of the United States who directly and indirectly aided the overthrow
of the Batista government and brought into power Fidel Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were those, agencies, Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Government agencies-may I say something off the
record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator DODD. Let it appear on the record that Ambassador Smith at this
point has a statement which he feels will answer more completely some of
the questions already asked, and questions which may be asked later on.

Mr. SMITH. Shall I proceed?

Senator DODD. You may resume

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as I am not
aware of the line of questioning which your committee will follow today,
I have prepared the following brief statement:

First let me say that to date I have made no public statement reagarding
my experiences in Cuba because I did not feel that, as a former Ambassador,
it was my function to say anything which might be interpreted as critical
of the administration which I had served. I have only the greatest respect
and admiration for President Eisenhower, whose integrity is beyond question.

However, the establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba involves the
defense and safety of this country and as you asked me to testify before
you, I do so, recognizing that the welfare of the United States must transcend
personal desires and reticence.

From personal experience I have learned that many very influential sources
in the United States are dedicated to the overthrow of all dictatorships.
They are as opposed to anti-Communist rightest dictators, who are friendly
to the United States, as to the Communist dictators whom thev regard as
progressive. They adopt a doctrinaire attitude toward this question which
is so impractical that they ultimately unwittingly defeat themselves. If
dictatorship versus democracy were the only question that faced us, it
would not be difficult to make a decision. However, as we are in the midst
of a struggle for survival, other considerations are pertinent.

If the policy of the United States is to bring about the overthrow of
dictators in the hope that democracy will follow, then I believe that the
United States must be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to
preserve law and order and revent chaos during that interim period of transition.
If free and open elections are to be held, when a dictator is overthrown,
a provisional government must be formed and such government needs outside
support to maintain law and order. To do otherwise leaves a vacuum for
the Communists to gain control. Such a vacuum did not oceur in Cuba while
I was the U.S. Ambassador there. Instead, a group was ready to seize power
-- a Communist group.

If we are to intervene sufficiently to bring about the overthrow of
dictatorships, then we should intervene to whatever extent is required
to fulfill our purpose. 0therwise, in my opinion, we must wait for the
normal self-development of a people and not assist revolution. And we must
be prepared to receive the criticism of supporting friendly governments
recognized by the United States, although they have been labeled dictatorships.
To make my point more clear, let me say that, we helped to overthrow
the Batista dictatorship which was pro-American only to install the Castro
dictatorship which is pro-Russian.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, the pending question before you read your statement
was: What agencies of the U.S. Government had a hand in bringing pressure
to overthrow the Batista government, and how did they do it?

Mr. SMITH. Well, the agencies, certain influential people, influential
sources in the State Department, lower down echelons in the CIA. I would
say representatives of the majority of the U.S. Government agencies which
have anything to do with the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, when you talked with Matthews to get the briefing
before you went to Cuba, was he introduced to you as having any authority
from the State Department or as being connected with the State Department
in any way?

Mr. SMITH Let me go back. You asked me a short while ago who arranged
the meeting with Mr. Matthews.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you said Mr. Wieland.

Mr. SMITH. I said Wilham Wieland, but Wilham Wieland also had to
haye the approval of Roy Rubottom, who was then Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs. Now, to go back to this question,
as I understood it, you said -- would you mind repeating that again?

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if, when you. were, sent to Mr. Matthews for this
briefing, he was introduced to you as having any official connection with
the State Department or any authority from the Department?

Mr. SMITH. Oh, no. I knew who he was, and they obviously knew I knew
who he was, but I believe, that they thought it would be a good idea for
me to get the viewpoint of Herbert Matthews, and also I think that Herbert
Matthews is the leading Latin American editorial writer for the New York
Times. Obviously the State Department would like to have the support of
the New York Times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Matthews was not, as far as you know then, a consultant
for the State Department or otherwise connected with the Department?

Mr. SMITH. I do not believe that he was ever a consultant or ever employed
by the State Department. I believe there was a close connection, though,
between the Latin American desk and Herbert Matthews.

Mr. SOURWINE. And, by "the Latin American desk" whom do you mean?

Mr. SMITH. I would say the Latin American desk would go from the Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs right down to the man who
presides over the Cuban desk.

Mr. SOURWINE. And who was that?

Mr. SMITH The individual who presided over the Cuban desk in himself
is not important, I don't think, in what you are trving to arrive at.

I would say that Mr. Wieland and all those who had anything to do
with Cuba had a close connection with Herbert Matthews.

I will go, further than that. I will say that when I was Ambassador,
that I was thoroughly aware of this, and sometimes made the remark in my
own Embassy that Mr. Matthews was more famihar with the State Department
thinking regarding Cuba than I was.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Smith, when were you Ambassador?

Mr. SMITH I was confirmed by the Senate in May 1957, and was in Cuba
until January 20, 1959.

Senator EASTLAND. You, were then Ambassador when Castro came to power.

Mr. SMITH. Castro landed on the shores of South Oriente in December
I956, and he was still considered an outlaw in the hills, I will say, until
just about the time when I arrived in Cuba, so I was in Cuba during the
last year and a half of Batista's regime, during that whole period of time-

Senator EASTLAND. You were there when Batista fled?

Mr. SMITH. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Smith, we have had hearings, a great many, in
Miami, with prominent Cubans, and there is a thread that runs through the
whole thing that people connected with some Government agency went to Cuba
and called on the chiefs of the armed forces and told them. that we would
not recognize the government of the President-elect, and that we would
not back him, and that because of that the chiefs of the armed forces told
Batista to leave the country, and they set up a government in which they
attempted to make a deal with Castro. That is accurate, isn't it, Tom?

Senator DODD. I would say so, yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That thread runs through the whole series of hearings.
Do you know anything about that?

Mr. SMITH. Well, it is going to take a little while to answer that,
because it is not as simple as that, Senator Eastland. You are talking
now about Rivero Aguero who was elected November 3, 1958, as President
of Cuba.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just read, if I may, something that I wrote here that
I may publish and may not -- this is part of it -- which will answer part
of your question. I will have to go back over it step by step, because
what you have heard, Senator Eastland, is partly true and partly untrue.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I have been asked many times what part if any the United
States played in Castro and Communist rise to power in Cuba. The U.S. Goverrunent
agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power.

Three front-page articles in the New York Times in early 1957, written
by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro to world
stature and world recognition. Until that time, Castro bad been just another
bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba, with a handful of followers who
had terrorized the campesinos, that is the peasants, throughout the countryside.

Fidel Castro landed on the south coast of Oriente in December of 1956
from Mexico with an expeditionary force of 81 men. Intercepted by Cuban
gunboats and patrol planes, Castro and a handiul of stragglers managed
to ensconce themselves in the rugged 8,000-foot Sierra Maestra Range.

After the Matthews articles which followed an exclusive interview by
the Times editorial writer in Castro's mountain hideout and which likened
him to Abraham Lincoln, he was able to get followers and funds in Cuba
and in the United States. From that time on arms, money, and soldiers of
fortune abounded. Much of the American press began to picture Castro as
a political Robin Hood.

Also because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, American
people assumed Castro must, on the other hand, represent liberty and democracy.
The crusader role which the press and radio bestowed on the bearded rebel
blinded the people to the leftwing political philosophy with which even
at that time he was already on record.

His speeches as a student leader, his interviews as an exile while in
Mexico, Costa Rica, and elsewhere clearly outlined a Marxist trend of political
thought.

The official U.S. attitude toward Castro could not help but be influenced
by the pro-Castro press and radio; certain Members of Congress picked up
the torch for him.

From there, to get back to your question, there were a number of times,
number of oceasions when I was asked as the Ambassador if we would help
the church in its efforts to establish a bridge between Castro and Batista,
or if we, in any way, would support a national unity government. Such government
would act as a provisional government in Cuba to maintain law and order
while elections were being held.

The United States would never agree to support or would never permit
me to negotiate, because it would be considered as intervening in the internal
affairs of Cuba.

Batista made three big mistakes. The last big mistake he made was
when he did not hold honest elections, which he had promised me on numerous
and many oceasions that he would have. Rivero Aguero, the former Prime
Minister of Cuba, was elected, I believe it was November 8, 1958, to succeed
Batista. It is true, in reply to your question, Senator, that the U.S.
Government instructed me through the State Department to say that we would
not give aid and support to the Rivero Aguero government when installed
because we did not feel that he could maintain effective control of the
country. As far as the disintegration of the armed forees around the
Batista government, the answer to your last question is that this negative
action helped shatter the morale of the existing government. The responsibility
for the deterioration in the morale of the army, navy, and Cuban Air Force
dates back to many other forms of direct and indirect -- I use the word
"intervention" advisedly.

Primarily I would say that when we refused to sell arms to the Cuban
Government and also by what I termed intervening by innuendo (which was
persuading other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba) that these
actions had a moral, psychological effect upon the Cuban armed forces which
was demoralizing to the nth degree.

The reverse, it built up the morale of the revolutionary forces.
Obviously when we refused to sell arms to a friendly government, the existing
government, the people of Cuba and the armed forces knew that the United
States no longer would support Batista's government.

It is also true, and I believe that I can confirm. the story now because
the following story was reported by associates of Batista. Further, I was
asked by the press last winter to comment on whether we had told Batista
to leave the country. At that time I refused to answer the question and
referred all comments to the State Department.

It is also that, upon instructions, I spent 2 hours and 35 minutes
on December 17, 1958, with Batista, and I told him that the United States
or rather certain influential people in the United States believed that
he could no longer maintain effective control in Cuba, and that they believed
it would avoid a great deal of further bloodshed if he were to retire.

Senator EASTLAND. That was on instructions of the State Department?

Mr. SMITH. An ambassador never would have a conversation like that,
sir, unless it was on instructions of the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Senator DODD.W-hen you say the State Department, to be more exact, who?

Mr. SMITH. Pardon me, Senator?

Senator DODD. What human being in the Stafe Department, who in the State
Department?

Mr. SMITH. Well, an ambassador receives his orders by cable and it is
signed always by the Secretary of State. Whoever writes those cables I
couldn't answer, but I have a part here -

Senator EASTLAND. Your judgment is it was the Latin American desk, Mr.
Rubottom, wasn,t it?

Mr. SMITH. That brings up what I consider a very important point. I
believe that the policies are determined in the lower echelon, and by the
time the higher echelon receives them, policies have already been made,
and they have to live by them.

I would like to recommend that some higher authority, such as the National
Security Council of the United States, determine what our attitude toward
another nation should be. Then all the actions of the State Department
should be guided according to such policy as laid down by the National
Security Council. I am sure the decision of the National Security Council
would be arrived at from what is in the best interest of the United States.

If they believed it was in the best interest of the United States to
be friendly to another power and to give aid to that power, then our actions
along that line should be guided accordingly.

A decision such as prohibiting the sale of arms to a friendly nation
can have devastating effects upon the government in power.

We even did not fulfill our promise to deliver 15 training planes, which
had been bought and. paid for by the Batista government. In accordance
with instructions from the State Department I informed Batista that delivery
would be suspended, because, we feared some harm might come to the 47 kidnaped
Americans. The kidnaping by Raul Castro of 30 U.S. marines and sailors,
17 American citizens, and 3 Canadians occurred at this time.

After the kidnaped Americans were returned we still refused to deliver
these trainirig planes because we feared that bombs could be put on the
planes even though they were strictly for training purposes.

I reiterate that decisions such as these may determine whether a government
can remain in power.

Although they could buy arms and ammunition from other sources, the
psychological impact on the morale of the government was crippling. On
the other hand, it gave a great uplift to the morale of the rebels.

Senator EASTLAND. Let me ask you this question. As a matter of fact,
isn't it your judgment that the State Department of the United States is
primarily responsible for bringing Castro to power in Cuba?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir, I can't say that the State Department in itself
is primarily responsible.
The State Department played a large part in
bringing Castro to power. The press, other Government agencies, Members
of Congress are responsible.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you say that the American Government then, including
all of its agencies, was largely responsible for bringing Castro to power?

Mr. SMITH. The American Government, yes, sir, and the people in the
American Government.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH We refused to sell arms to a friendly government, and we persuaded
other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba.

Yet on the other hand revolutionary sympathizers were delivering arms,
bodies and ammunition daily from the United States. We were lax in enforcing
our neutrality laws.

Senator EASTLAND. To Castro.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir, to revolutionaries under Castro.

Senator EASTLAND. You had been warning the State Department that Castro
was a Marxist?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. And that Batista's government was a friendly government.
That is what had been your advice as to the State Department?

Mr. SMITH. Let me answer that this way, which will make it very clear.
When I went to Cuba, I left here with the definite feeling according to
my briefings which I had received, that the U.S. Government was too close
to the Batista regime, and that we were being accused of intervening in
the affairs of Cuba by trying to perpetuate the Batista dictatorship.

After I had been in Cuba for approximately 2 months, and had made a
study of Fidel Castro and the revolutionaries, it was perfectly obvious
to me as it would be to any other reasonable man that Castro was not the
answer; that if Castro came to power, it would not be in the best interests
of Cuba or in the best interests of the United States.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. SMITH. Because I feared he was a Marxist.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. SMITH Because of his statements.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right. Now in the light of that information
that he was a Marxist, that for him to come to power was not in the best
interest of our country, in the light of that information -

Mr. SMITH. I want to correct something I said if I may for the record.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. SMITH. When I said because he was a Marxist, he at that time gave
every indication of being a Marxist from the statements which had been
made in Mexico, Costa Rica, at Bogota (also he had been active in the FEU).
I did not have the proof at that time that he was. However, there was no
question that there was Communist infiltration and Communist control of
this movement.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, but your advices were that it was not in
the best interest of the United States for him to come to power, and in
spite of that then you say that the American Government is primarily responsible
for putting him in power?

Mr. SMITH. You are making the statement, sir. Are you asking a question?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I ask it in the form of a question.

Mr. SMITH. You made a very good statement, Senator Eastland. I don't
know how I can comment on that statement.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you agree with it?

Mr. SMITH. Would you repeat that, what Senator Eastland said, please?

Senator EASTLAND. I said that your advices were that it was not in the
best interest of the United States for Castro to come to power.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. And yet in spite of that, of your advices to our Government,
you say that our Government was primarily responsible in bringing Castro
to power.

Mr SMITH. That is absolutely correct.

Senator DODD. May I ask a question? Did you ever discuss Castro with
Mr. Rubottom?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, on numerous occasions.

Senator DODD. Can you tell us what his attitude was toward Castro?

Mr. SMITH. In all due justice to Roy Rubottom, I think that Roy Rubottom
was under terrific pressure from segments of the press, from certain Members
of Congress, from the avalanche of Castro sympathizers and revolutionary
sympathizers who daily descended upon the State Department, also their
official representative, Betancourt, and Rubottom may have taken the line
of least resistance.

Senator DODD. Did he ever tell you that he knew about Castro in Colombia?

Mr. SMITH. I don't believe we discussed what is known as "Bogotazo."

Senator DODD. Do you. know that he was in Bogota when Castro was?

Mr. SMITH. I did not know that.

Senator DODD. That is all I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire?

To go back just a little bit, you spoke of the 15 training planes which
were held up, and I understood you to say they were held up because this
Government feared that if they were sent, there might he some harm to the
kidnaped Americans?

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean by this that the Government of the United
States was yielding to blackmail?

Mr. SMITH. No, I do not think the U.S. Government was yielding to blackmail,
but I think the State Department did not want to take any action which
might help the Batista government and receive the protests of the revolutionaries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying then that this was simply an excuse which
was given?

Mr. SMITH. I believe the Department was happy to have a reason to justify
reversing their decision. What happened was this.

The Batista government paid for these planes. They were 15 training
planes which were allegedly to be used for the one and only purposes of
training a few pilots taking Air Force training in the United States.

I received instructions to tell Batista that we could make delivery
of those 15 planes. I recall this very clearly because I remember that
it was received with great pleasure by the Government of Cuba because they
felt that here was an indication that the United States was not going to
be too severe. Batista reported my message to his Cabinet.

Shortly thereafter, before the planes could be delivered, the kidnaping
of the Americans took place. I received instructions to notify the Batista
government that the 15 training planes could not be delivered because the
United States feared that bodily harm might come to the Americans who were
kidnaped.

I conveyed this information to the President of Cuba, informed him that
this was only a temporary suspension for the reasons outlined above. When
the kidnaped Americans were returned, I sent numerous telegrams urging
delivery of the training planes.

The subject was carried on for approximately 2 or 3 months, trying to
obtain these training planes for the Batista government; not that the training
planes themselves were so important. to the Batista government, but because
of the psychological effect it would have upon those associated with the
Government of Cuba.

However, the State Department refused to grant permission to have these
planes released from Fort Lauderdale, Fla., where they were based.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, whether there was any threat conveyed
to the State Department by or on behalf of Castro that if these planes
were sent, the kidnaped Americans would be harmed?

Mr. SMITH. I do not believe there was. To the best of my knowledge,
the Castro people -- I will correct that. I was about to say the Castro
people had no knowledge.

However, the, espionage system of the Castro people was so good that
I could not say they didn't have knowledge of anything of such importance,
hecause they seemed to know -- they knew nearly everything that was going
on. They had their sples planted in the Cuban Embassy, and they had the
very finest espionage system.

Senator DODD. By "the Cuban Embassy" you mean their Embassy here in
Washington?

Mr. SMITH. The Cuban Embassy in Washington. I warned Gonzalo Guell,
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Cuba, and I also warned President
Batista that there were spies in the Cuban Embassy in Washington. I received
this information from the State Department, from the Cuban desk in the
State Department.

We knew that the leakages were coming from the Cuban Embassy in Washington.
If you wish me to go, into details, I can tell you how the knew it.

However, the Cuban Government never took effective measures. First of
all I warned the Govermnent of Cuba when De La Campa was Cuban Ambassador,
later when Arroya became Ambassador I again warned him. I went even further.
I told Arroya it would be in his best interests if he removed evervbody
in the Cuban Embassy and obtained completely new personnel so as to be
awfully sure he had divested the Embassy of the spies.

However, no steps were taken. That is where, most of the leakages came
from.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think it would be interesting if you. could tell us
how the State Department knew that these leaks oceurred through the Embassy?

Mr. SMITH. In March 1957 1,950 Garand rifles were on the docks and prepared
to be delivered by boat to the Cuban Government. Cuban revolutionaries
and sympathizers in New York had information of this. They brought a great
deal of pressure to bear on the State Department to halt shipment.

The State Department issued an order canceling the shipment of these
1,950 Garand rifles -- it is not Garland -- G-a-r-a-n-d, canceling shipment.
This was the beginning of when we, suspended the shipment of arms to Cuba.

The reason that the Cuban desk of the State Department felt that the
leakages were coming out of the Cuban Embassy was that the revolutionary
sympathizers in New York and in Washington had the numbers on those rifles.
There were only two places that you could get the numbers of those rifles,
and that was from either our War Department or the Cuban Embassy.

Senator HRUSKA. When you say "numbers," do you mean serials?

Mr. SMITH. Numbers on the riles, the serial numbers on the rifles. The
Cuban Embassy had those serial numbers because they were advised of their
shipments. It later turned out that a secretary, I believe it was the secretary
to the Ambassador and also the sergeant who was in charge of the code room,
were Castro revolutionaries planted in the Cuban Embassy in Washington,
and they were the ones who were relaying this information to Castro.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Smith, you said that in justice to Mr. Rubottom
that he was under pressure in this country.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND But regardless of pressure, Mr. Rubottom knew that
Castro was a Marxist and was unfriendly to the United States.

Mr. SmrrH. I do not believe that Rubottom believed that Castro was a
Marxist, knew that he was a Marxist, and I do not believe that Rubottom
knew that Castro was unfriendly to the United States. I believe that Rubottom
was disillusioned as were many influential people in the United States.

Senator EASTLAND. But he had your advices as Ambassador to Cuba, the
man on the site?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I cannot unequivocally say that right from the beginning
I knew that Castro was a Marxist. When I first went over there, I was instructed,
not instructed but I was briefed, to the effect that we had been too close
to the Batista regime, and I went to Cuba thinking that Batista wore horns
and that Castro perhaps was O.K.

The Communists are too smart to infiltrate too openly at the, beginning
and disclose their hand. Many times when I was in Cuba I said that the
26th of July Movement, the revolutionary movement, was a Boy Scout movement
compared to the Communists, and that the Communists would apply the blotting
paper to the 26th of July Movement as they saw fit, and they did sop it
up as they saw fit.

Senator EASTLAND. You said you went there thinking Batista wore horns,
that we, were so close to him -- what was the rest of the answer, that
we were too close to him?

Mr. SMITH. I said that when I went to Cuba, I went over there with the
feeling which I had received from my briefings, and nothing specific but
the thought -

Senator EASTLAND. Wait just a minute now. You have answered the question.
That was from briefings, that your opinion was based on briefings and information
you had received through the State Department?

Mr. SMITH. I repeat, Senator, I said that nothing specific was said,
but I clearly received the impression from my briefings when I was in Washington
that we were too close to the Batista government, and when I went to Cuba,
I felt that I had three missions.

Two of the missions I planned on arrival in Cuba. The third I assumed
after I got over there.
Mission No.1 was to have the United States Embassy
assume an impartial stand, have it generally understood that the U.S. Embassy
took an impartial view in the political affairs of Cuba.

No. 2, to assist and do everything that I could to see that the press
censorship was lifted and that constitutional guarantees were again restored.
And, No. 3, was to do everything that I could-without intervening in any
way in the internal aiffairs of Cuba-to bring about, through Batista, free
and open elections.

I was successful in step 1. I was successful in step, 2. However,
the revolutionaries stepped up their terroristic activities and forced
Batista to again clamp on the press censorship and to again suspend constitutional
guarantees.

Then I concentrated on trying to persuade Batista to hold free and open
elections. On numerous oceasions, Batista gave me his solemn word he
would hold honest elections. He not only said he would hold free and
open elections, but he also promised me that he would ask the world press
to witness these elections, that he would ask the United Nations to send
representatives to witness these elections, that he would ask the Organization
of American States to send representatives to witness these elections.
He failed in that promise.

I have reviewed the answers to these questions a little bit, sir, because
if I answer them yes or no, I am afraid it may give the wrong interpretation.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Smith, in that same field you have made several
references to pressure on Roy Rubottom. Could you tell us the source or
the nature of this pressure?

Mr. SMITH. The pressure on Roy Rubottom came from Members of Congress
who it is not necessary for me to name because you gentlemen know them.

Pressures on Roy Rubottom came from some sections of the press in
the United States. Pressure on Roy Rubottom came from the representatives
and sympathizers of the 26th of July Movement in the United States and
particularly those in Washington.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the name that you named as one of them who
is now President of-

Mr. SMITH. No, he is not. He has the same name. It is not the same man.
His name was Betancourt. He was the legal official representative, registered
and legally accepted of the Cuban revolutionaries in Washington.

Many of these people, who later became members of the first Cabinet
of Castro were asylees in the United States. They had close contacts with
members of the State Department.

To name a few: Urrutia, the first President of Cuba, Agramonte, the
first Foreign Minister of Cuba, the first Prime Minister of Cuba, Miro
Cardona. As a matter of fact, the first time that I met Cardona was after
Batista had left the country. It was about the 4th of January of 1959 in
the Presidential palace. He turned to me and said ' "I am a good f riend
of William Wieland, a very good friend of William Wieland."

Also, many other revolutionary sympathizers had access to the State
Department. These people brought continual pressure on the Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know at the same time the Latin American desk
was receiving advices from other Latin American countries of Castro's Communist
affiliation?

Mr. SMITH No, sir, I did not. They never told me that. No, sir, I did
not.

In my own Embassy there were certain ones of influence who were pro-26th
of July, pro-Castro, and anti-Batista.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they?

Mr. SMITH. Do I haye to answer that question, Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I think you have to. We are not going into it
unnecessarily.

Mr. SMITH. I don't want to harm anybody. That is the reason I asked.

I would say the Chief of the Political Section, John Topping, and
the Chief of the CIA Section. It was revealed that the No. 2 CIA rnan in
the embassy had given unwarranted and undue encouragement to the revolutionaries.
This came out in tke trials of naval officers after the Cienfuegos revolution
of September I957.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Castro ever win a battle?

Mr. SMITH. Castro never won a military victory. The best victories
that Castro ever won were raids upon Cuban guardhouses that are spread
out through the hinterland and small skirmishes with Government troops.

Senator EASTLAND. How did he come to power? First, why did Batista leave?

Mr. SMITH. Why did Batista leave?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. If the United States had been completely impartial, in my
opinion, Batista would not have had to leave Cuba until after the inauguration
of the president-elect (Rivero Aguero).

Senator EASTLAND. He didn't have to leave. He had not been defeated
by armed f orce.

Mr. SMITH. Let me put it to you this way: that there are a lot of reasons
for Batista's moving out. Batista had been in control off and on for 25
years. His government was disintegrating, at the end due to corruption,
due to the fact that he had been in power too long. Police brutality was
getting worse.

On the other hand there were three forces that kept Batista in power.
He had the support of the armed forces, he had support of the labor leaders.
Cuba enjoyed a good economy.

Nineteen hundred and fifty-seven was one of the best years in the
economic history of Cuba. The fact that the United States was no longer
supporting Batista had a devastating psychological effect, upon the armed
forces and upon the leaders of the labor movement. This went a long way
toward bringing about his downfall.

On the other hand, our actions in the United States were responsible
for the rise to power of Castro. Until certain portions of the American
press began to write derogatory articles against the Batista government,
the Castro revolution never got off first base.

Batista made the mistake of overemphasizing the importance of Prio,
who was residing in Florida, and underestimating the importance of Castro.
Prio was operating out of the United States, out of Florida, supplying
the revolutionaries with arms, ammunition, bodies and money.

Batista told me that when Prio left Cuba, Prio and Alameia [Aleman]
took $140 million out of Cuba. If we cut that estimate in half, they may
have shared $70 million. It is believed that Prio spent a great many millions
of dollars in the United States assisting the revolutionaries. This was
done right from our shores.

Senator EASTLAND. No effort was made to stop it?

Mr. SMITH. The Batista government complained continually about the
airlifts and airdrops of bodies and arms from the United States. I always
kept the State Department fully informed.

But we seemed to have great trouble in enforcing our neutrality laws.
I have sometimes wished that we had been half as diligent at that time
in enforcing our neutrality laws as we haye been lately.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Smith, you mentioned the time when the United States
through the press did these things and so on. Do you mean the United States
officially or the press as an institution?

Mr. SMITH. Certain elements of the American press I should say.

Senator HRUSKA. The American press.

Mr. SMITH. Well, let us say world press.

Senator HRUSKA. The world press, yes, the press in general

Mr. SMITH. Certain elements of the press in general.

Senator HRUSKA. Didn't they have access to the same information that
you and other people did with reference to the Marxist influences in Castro's
thinking and his actions?

Mr. SMITH. There are certain influential people in the United States
who are definitely antirightist dictators, but seem to look upon leftist
dictators as being progressive.

Now whether that is in answer to your question or not, sir, I don't
know. I do believe that too much concentration sometimes is placed upon
the removal of a dictator and not enough thought is given upon what will
take place afterward. I tried to cover that in the statement which I read
here before Senator Eastland came in.

Senator EASTLAND. You said that you wished that we had been as zealous

Mr. SMITH. Pardon me?

Senator EASTLAND. You said that you wished we had been as zealous in
enforcing our neutrality laws

Mr. SMITH. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. In dealing with Castro.

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. As we are at the present time.

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course when we enforce them now, we are in fact
aiding Castro, are we not?

Mr. SMITH. I would say that when Castro came to power, that we were
very diligent in enforcing our neutrality laws. We even moved people out
of Florida; people whom the United States thought might be active in any
counterrevolutionary movement.

However, when I was Ambassador to Cuba, we seemed to have great trouble
in enforcing our neutrality laws.

Senator EASTLAND. I know, but enforcing those laws now is an aid to
the present Government of Cuba, is it not?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Smith, moving into another area, what was the attitude
and what were the manifestations on the part of American investors in Cuba
in regard to Batista and Castro prior to the time that Castro actually
took charge?

Mr. SMITH. I would say that American business was for the Government
of Cuba, because the Government of Cuba gave normal protection to American
business.

Senator HRUSKA. What truth is there, to some representations that some
of the big business investments there, investors there, paid a part of
their taxes to Castro and a part of their taxes to Batista in the latter
time of Batista's administration?

Mr. SMITH All right, sir; I am glad you brought that question up.

The revolutionaries under Fidel Castro demanded tribute throughout
Cuba. By the fall or the late summer of 1958, they decided to also demand
tribute from American business and American property holders.

As soon as I heard this, I wrote a letter to every American business
in Cuba in which I clearly stated that Americans should not pay tribute,
and I asked them not to give any money to the revolutionaries, that we
were still doing business with a friendly government, and that as Americans
we had no right to pay money to active revolutionaries who were trying
to overthrow a friendly government by force.

This letter was approved by the State Department before it was sent
out. Every week I regularly had a meeting in my Embassy, of some of the
leading businessmen in Havana, and they assured me that the Americans were
not paying money.

However, toward. the closing days of the Batista regime, I believe
some Americans did pay protection money. They were paying taxes to the
Batista government and were also paying taxes to the Castro people.
I couldn't prove it. They wouldn't let me know.

It was unofficially reported that the revolutionaries demanded $500,000
from a large oil company. Otherwise, the rebels said, they would blow up
the refinery of this of company. The American officials of the company
refused to pay tribute. I give you this as an example of what took place.

Senator HRUSKA. To the extent that it might have gone on, that would
be testimony to the idea that Batista's hold and control and ability to
protect property was dissipating?

Mr. SMITH That is true.

Senator HRUSKA. His ability to protect was dissipating?

Mr. SMITE. Disappearing?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes, was disappearing.

Mr. SMITH. That, is correct; it was disappearing: toward the end, but
now you are speaking of the last 2 or 3 months ol Batista's regime.

In the middle of November I958-I do not recall exactly the date--I
went to the State Department and I informed Wieland and Rubottom that the
Batista qovernment was on its last legs.

They said, "Why do you say that now?" This was a complete reversal from
my previous position. My previous position had been that the Batista government
was surviving. For many months I had found it necessary to counteract the
slanted opinions of certain people who wanted to portray chaotic conditions
in Cuba and who wanted to give the impression that the Government of Cuba
would momentarily fall.

It was an uphill fight to keep reports factual.

In November, I virtually informed the Department that the Batista
government could not survive much longer. They said: "Why is it going to
go? Why do you say that?"

And I said, "Because, until now, the revolutionaries have been taking
amateurish acts in trying to destroy the economy"-the amateurish acts were
such things as burning the sugar cane, kidnaping the Argentine automobile
driver, hijacking airplanes, kidnapping Americans- "but now they are getting
professional advice."

They said, "What do you mean by 'professional advice?'"

I said, "Now they are learning how to destroy the economy by disrupting
the main arteries of transportation."

They have learned how to blow up the correct bridges, to bomb the
main highways so that commerce cannot move in Cuba.

And I said, "They obviously are receiving professional advice."

That was in November. By that time it was clearly obvious that the tide
had swung the other way.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were those individuals in the State Department?

Mr. SMITH. That were doing what, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. That were slanting the news that way; that were telling
falsehoods; that were pro-Castro.

Mr. SMITH. There were quite a few, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they?

Mr. SMITH. I repeat again, Do I have to mention names?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. We have reasons, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. You see my point: I do not want to get people in
trouble, either.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, I know that.

Mr. SMITH. Because I do not believe that they are dangerous. If I thought
they were dangerous, I would not hesitate.

Senator EASTLAND. I am not certain about that.

Mr. SMITH All right, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. We have sources of information.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

I believe Wieland, William Wieland, and that is as far as I would like
to go in the State Department. I had my own troubles in the Embassy, but
I corrected it in the Embassy by neyer allowing one single cable to go
out that did not have my signature.

I wrote practically every political cable that went out.

Senator EASTLAND. Who is William Wieland?

Mr. SMITH He is Director of the Caribbean Division and Director of
Mexican Affairs in charge of San Domingo, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico.

At that time he had all of Central America in addition to these.

In an embassy where I served as Ambassador at that time, when I first
went there, I saw the difference. Those in the economic field were pro-Batista
because they were dealing with American business. Those in the political
section and the intelligence section were pro-revolutionary. We could say
for humanitarian reasons, or whatever the reasons may be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, you spoke earlier of the No. 2 CIA man in your
mission having been caught giving aid and comfort to the Castro forces.

Would you tell us just what it was he did?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. In September I957, the Navy had an uprising at Cienfuegos,
Cuba. We in the American Embassy were familiar that a revolt of some type
wou.ld take place. That information came to us through the CIA, or some
other source in the Embassy.

If I may divert for a minute, that is the trouble with Cubans; they
talk too much. We did not know when it was going to to take place.

We finally heard that the revolt at Cienfuegos had been called off.
However, the Navy in Havana forgot to notify the Navy at Cienfuegos, and
they went on with the revolt while the Navy in Havana did not participate.

This revolt was squashed by the Batista government.

In the trial of the naval officers, it came out that the No. 2 man had
said that if the revolution was successful, that the United States wou.ld
recognize the revolutionaries.

I do not believe that the No. 2 man in the CIA intended to convoy that
thought. His story to me was that he had bcon called over to interview
some men believed to be doctors, hecause they were dressed in white coats,
and when they advised him of the revolt that was to take place, they wanted
to know what the position of the United States would be.

And he inadvertently intimated something to the effect of which I am
not quite sure, that the United States might give recognition.

As soon as the Embassy learned of this, I called a meeting of the Embassy
staff and laid down the law that the Ambassador, nor anyone, could give
word as to whom the United States would recognize; that there were only
two people in the United States that had that authority:

One was the Secretary of State and the other was the President of the
United States.

The information of what had taken place was brought to me by Batista.
Batista was very iridignarit. However, I explained what happened and told
him-Batista-that the CIA man had done this inadvertently and had not realized
what he was saying or to, whom he was talking.

Batista was cooperative and did not ask to have the man leave the country.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Smith, a little bit ago you made reference to the
press, certain segments of the press, certainly here in America or even
perhaps the world press, who are hostile to the rightist dictators but
rather are receptive to leftist dictators.

Mr. SMITH. I did not use the word "receptive."

Senator HRUSKA. Sympathetic?

Mr. SMITH. I said certain influential sources in the United States who
are strongly against dictatorships sometimes seem to feel that leftist
dictators are progressive.

Senator HRUSKA. Are progressive.

What is your observation or appraisal of the present attitude of those
people with reference to Castro?

Mr. SMITH. I note with interest that certain portions of the press who
strongly advocated Castro have not yet admitted their error.

Senator HRUSKA. Have some admitted?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir, I do not want to mention them. There is no point
in my being crucified by the press, too. But there are certain very important
groups who had a great deal to do with Castro's rise to power who I note
even today still speak-well, this I can't say definitely, but I was told
that a certain newspaper wrote an editorial saying it would be better to
have the fall of the Generalissimo Trujillo in San Domingo and take a chance
of having another bearded man as there is in Cuba than to Lave the present
dictator remain.

I note that such papers still do not admit the error of their ways.

Senator HRUSKA. It is of interest and it is of importance, as you can
appreciate, because, after all, this is a composite picture.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. You indicated that yourself: that there were Members
of Congress, there were the press.

Mr. SMITH That is right.

Senator HRUSKA. There were certain business interests.

Mr. SMITH. That is true.

Senator HRUSKA. There were certain people in the Government, State Department,
and elsewhere.

Mr. SMITH. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. He said more than that, Roman. He said the American
Government, he would say, through all of its branches.

Mr. SMITH. When I say the "American Government," obviously, we are talking
about the agencies which compose the American Government.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, but they were primarily responsible for
the rise of Castro.

Mr. SMITH. Without the United States, Castro would not be in power today.
I will put it as straight as that to you, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. But the responsibility for that is a composite thing?

Mr. SMITH. Is a composite, that is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. There may have been certain quarters in which there
were more virulent advocates than others, but, just the same, it is a composite
thing. Without that composite nature, very likely, the result which did
follow may not have happened.

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

In other words, I do not think it is fair to say that this individual
or that individual or that particular agency, in itself, per se, is responsible
for Castro coming to power. lt is the composite.

Senator EASTLAND. The composite of the U.S. Government, is that it,
and its branches?

Mr. SMITH Composite of those elements that formed the U.S. Government.

Senator EASTLAND. That formed the U.S. Government.

Mr. SMITH. I mentioned segments of the press, certain Members of Congress,
the CIA, the State Department. All of them took a hand in this, Senator.

Senator DODD. But in any composite picture, I think we all recognize
that there are some influences that are stronger than others. They are
never all the same.

Mr. SMITH. No. Some must share a greater part of the guilt than others

Senator DODD. And some can do more than others.

Mr. SMITH. And some are in a position to do much more.

Senator DODD. That is what I think we are driving at.

Senator EASTLAND. And the agencies of the U.S. Government could do,
of course, more than Members of Congress or the press or anyone else.

Mr. SMITH. That, is true. You have all sorts of agencies.

Senator DODD. Certainly, you can say it the other way. You can say that
without the U.S. Government, the other factors of the composite picture
could not do anything. If the Govermnent had stood firm and said, "We will
not assist Castro," the fact that there were many other elements of our
society who were sympathetic to him could not have brought it about; isn't
that true?

Senator HRUSKA. Conversely, if the other elements-and I take what we
would consider exterior elements; lets take business and the press-for
example, had the press, in its opinion-making power, been antagonistic
toward Castro, no amount of formal governmental action could have overcome
that massive factor.

Mr. SMITH. That is true.

Senator HRUSKA. The same thing is true with reference to implementing
Castro. If and when business located and having investments in Cuba would
either by blackmail or by so-called taxes support financially the Castro
movement, that was something which, likewise, would be very helpful to
those who in formal government circles would say, "Let us also help Castro."

Mr. SMITH Those who paid tribute at the end were doing. it for their
own self-protection because they felt that if they did not do it they were
going to lose their holdings.

Senator EASTLAND. As a matter of fact, now, wasn't it the impartiality
of the U.S. Govermnent that brought Castro to power?

Mr. SMITH. Wasn't it the impartiality?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, we are responsible for bringing Castro in power.
I do not care how you want to word it.

Senator DODD. Wouldn't you want to say the partiality?

Senator EASTLAND. I mean the partiality, certainly.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, let me explain to you that the United States, until
the advent of Castro, was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that, as
I said here a little while ago, the American Ambassador was the second
most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the President.

That is because of the reason of the position that the United States
played in Cuba. Now, today, his importance is not very great. I think there
is one point I would like to bring up, Senator, and that is the recognition
of Castro.

It has aIways been the policy of the U.S. Government not to be one of
the first or one of the last to recognize a friendly government. It has
always been the policy of the U.S. Government, before they recognized a
new Government, to be sure of the following. I do not place them in order
o£ their importance, but they are--

(a) If a government is Communist or too much infiltrated with communism.

(b) Whether a Govermnent will honor its international obligations.

(c) That the new Government can maintain law and order.

And we always hope that they have the support of the people.

In this case, I believe that we were very hasty in the recognition of
the Castro government.

Senator EASTLAND. How long?

Mr. SMITH. Batista left in the early morning hours of January 1, I959.
Several days later, a few days later, a very few days later, I was called
by telephone--Rubottom told me to come to the United States.

I said I could not do it right away because at that time I was in the
process of evacuating 2,000 American students and tourists. There was a
complete general strike in effect. I was primaxily interested in seeing
that no harm would come to any of these Americans stranded in Cuba.

I said I could not leave the country and occupy a seat on a plane as
long as an American was trying to get out, so they said, "All right, when
do you think you can come?"

I said I would come as soon as possible.

As soon as all the Americans had been evacuated, I flew to Washington.

We evacuated all the Americans in two or three days, the whole 2,000.

Then as soon as I arrived in Washington, they told me that we were going
to recognize the new Government and I was to rush back and do it.

I think it was approximately about 5 days-the 5th, or let's say around
the 6th, of January. At that time Castro had not even arrived in Havana.
Castro was still out in the eastern part of the islands, wending his way
toward Havana.

I am sorry that we did not take more pains in trying to insure that
Castro would honor his international obligations before we recognized him.

I think we were very hasty in our recognition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have a few points here that I think, for
the record, would be helpful. When you were appointed Ambassador and before
you took that post, did you consult with your predecessor, former Ambassador
Arthur Gardner?

Mr. SMITH. We had lunch together at the 1925 F Street Club, and I believe
that was the only time we met before I went down there.

Mr. SOURWINE- Did you have any instructions from the State Department
with regard to seeing Gardiner or not seeing him?

Mr. SMITH. I do not believe I was told anything one way or another.
I do not believe his name was mentioned in that regard.

Mr. SOURWINE. After Castro had established his headquarters in Oriente
Province, were you interviewed by Herbert Matthews in the New York Times?

Mr. SMITH. After Castro had what?

Mr. SOURWINE.. Had established his headquarters in Oriente Province.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. He was already in Oriente Province. Matthews wrote his
articles which appeared on the front pages of the New York Times in February
1957, and. my interview with Castro took place in the city of New York
in May or June of 1957. -

Mr. SOURWINE. I was asking if you had an interview with Matthews after-

Mr. SMITH. What did I say-Castro?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. SMITH Would you mind reading back what I said. I want to correct
that.

Senator DODD. You meant Matthews?

Mr. SMITH. Let me correct that.

Matthews' articles appeared in the New York Times in February 1957.
My interview with Matthews was in New York in May 1957.

Castro landed in the southern portion of Oriente in December 1956.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean after you were Ambassador, and while Castro was
still in Oriente Province, did you have another interview with Matthews?

Mr. SMITH. I saw Matthews a number of times when he came to Havana;
he would either come to my office at the chancery or he came to see me
at the residency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a specific occasion on which Matthews
suggested to you, or urged upon you, that you visit Santiago; that you
go by the heart of rebel territory?

Mr. SMITH. I do not believe that we ever had a conversation along those
lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, visit Santiago, Cuba?

Mr. SMITH. I visited Santiago de Cuba in the latter part of July 1957.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did something occur there about which you protested?

Mr. SMITH Yes, it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that?

Mr. SMITH. The rough handling of the women in the square of the city
of Santiago, the women who were known as the Mothers of Santiago.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, rough handling by the Batista forces?

Mr. SMITH. By the police.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you protest this by issuing a statement to the press?

Mr. SMITH. When I came out of the city hall, having received the keys
to the city, the police were then putting the firehoses and using the clubs
on the women and the press asked me for a statement.

I made the following statement:

"I regret that the people of Santiago are using my presence in Santiago
to protest against their Government."

Whereupon, the press said:

"In other words, are you going to condone these actions? Is this all
you have to say?"

The press demanded to know if the appointment of a new Ambassador didn't
mean a change in U.S. policies. Did the U.S. approve such violence or not?
Diplomatic doubletalk would not suffice.

I said that I would have a press conference later in the afternoon.
This was at approximately 12:00.

I went to a luncheon, had a meeting with the approximately six or seven
members of the embassy staff who aecompanied me to Santiago, and I issued
the following statement, to the best of my recollection:

I repeated what I had said above: that I was sorry that the people of
Santiago were using my presence to protest against their Government.

And then I added the sentence:

"And I abhor police brutality."

I also added another sentence:

That I had received a letter from the Mothers of Santiago-which I could
not answer but would read with careful consideration, something along those
lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. In doing this, were you acting upon instructions from
the State Department?

Mr. SMITH No. I went to Santiago with the approval of the State Department
and with the approval of the Batista government.

At that time I had been in Cuba approximately 2 weeks, and I felt that
sooner or later, that I would have to meet up with the issue, which had
us portrayed as being too close to Batista--when I say "issue," let me
explain that.

I would have to meet the issue, "the issue" being that we were considered
too close to the Batista government; and I was trying to accomplish step
No. 1-to have the U.S. Embassy considered as being impartial. lf I was
to carry out the Department's briefings to detach ourselves gradually from
our past overfriendliness with Batista, this was the time to do it.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you made that protest, did you consider it an intervention
in the internal affairs of Cuba?

Mr. smith. No, sir, I did not, and I explained that at great length
to Batista, and Batista agreed with me that he would have done the same
thing under all the circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequeiffly discuss that protest with Portuondo
Nunez?

Mr. SMITH. Did I subsequently discuss that protest? When I came to New
York or when I went to Washington and went through New York, to the best
of my recollection, it was shortly after that I stopped in at the United
Nations and had a talk with Senator Lodge and then I met Nunez Portuondo
at the Brook Club at 111East 54th Street, and we had about an hour's conference,
in which I tried to explain to him the reasons for my statement, and we
had a very friendly exchange of views.

Mr. SOURWINE. Former Ambassador Gardner has told this committee that
William Wieland had a strong influence on Mr. Rubottom. I take it
you agree with that?

Mr. SMITH That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, did you have anything to do with the arrangements
for Castro's visit to the United States in April of 1958, to address the
American Society of Newspaper Editors?

Mr. SMITH I most certainly did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever talk with Mr. Rubottom about this visit?

Mr. SMITH No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times have anything
to do with the arrangements for Castro's visit to the United States?

Mr. SMITH. I would not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express yourself to the Department regarding
the wisdom of this visit?

Mr. SMITH It took place before I became Ambassador. Therefore, it would
not be incumbent upon me to make any remarks.

Mr. SOURWINE. From. your testimony-

Senator EASTLAND. Before you became Ambassador?

Mr. SMITH It took place before I became Ambassador.

Senator DODD. Castro's visit?

Mr. SMITH Castro's visit.

Senator DODD. That cannot be so.

Mr. SMITH. After I was Ambassador. Castro's visit took place in the
spring of 1960.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. Correction on that. Castro's visit to the United States took
place several months after I was no longer Ambassador to Cuba.

Senator EASTLAND. He came here in April 1959.

Mr. SMITH. And I left Cuba January 20,1959.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. From your testimony, it would appear that prior to about
September or October of 1958, it was the policy of the United States to
furnish arms and other supplies to the Batista government; is that right?

Mr. SMITH. Prior to when?

Mr. SOURWINE. About September or October of I958.

Mr. SMITH. Would you mind reading that question again? I am sorry I
did not get that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to about September or October of 1958, it was the
policy of the United States to furnish arms and other supplies to the Batista
government?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir; that is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not correct?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you correct that, please?

Mr. SMITH. The policy of the U.S. Government to stop the shipment
of arms to Cuba ended in March of 1958--March of 1958.

Earlier in this testimony, I spoke about the Garand rifles, the 1950
Garand rifles. That was stopped, I believe, in March 1958. From that time
on, we no longer licensed the shipment of arms or permitted the shipment
of arms to Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE,. Former Ambassador Gardner told this committee that during
his last year as Ambassador to Cuba, there had been an endless number of
shipments of arms and other things to Castro from the United States.

You testified these shipments continued during your term as Ambassador?

Mr. SMITH. The tempo increased.

Mr. SOURWINE. And they were not suspended or curtailed when we stopped
sending arms and supplies to Batista?

Mr. SMITH. The United States did stop and did apprehend certain individuals
from. time to time, but according to the statement of the revolutionaries
themselves, for about every one that the United States apprehended, nine
would get through.

It was about a 10-to-1 ratio.

So I want to make it clear in the testimony that not all shipments got
through. There was an effort made, and they did stop shipments.

Senator EASTLAND. It was not as effective as the effort now?

Mr. SMITH. That is correct, sir; nowhere near--nowhere near.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether any arms for Castro came from the
American base at Guantanamo?

Mr. SMITH. The revolutionaries did steal some arms out of Guantanamo
Base through the Cubans which are attached there. At Guantanamo Base
there are about 10,000 people, 2,500 marines and sailors, 2,500 American
dependents, and about 5,000 Cubans who work there. The Cubans would steal
arms and ammunition; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Former Ambassador Gardner expressed the opinion in testifying
before this committee that the State Department was anxious, in his words,
"to replace Batista with Castro."

Do you. agree with this?

Mr. SMITH. "Was anxious to replace"? No; I do not agree with that. I
think that the State Department did not believe that Batista should remain
in power. However, on the other hand, I am sure that those who are on
the fifth floor of the State Department did not think very highly of Castro.

Senator DODD. Who is on the fifth floor?

Mr. SMITH. The top, the top echelon. That is the mistake we made.
Decisions were made on the fourth floor.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right; that is what you have said, at the
lower echelons.

Mr. SMITH. And the people on the fifth floor, which is the top echelon,
did not think much of Castro.

Senator EASTLAND. But you have said they did not make the policies.

Mr. SMITH I said the policies were made on the fourth floor.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Now how did they feel toward Castro?

Mr. SMITH. That is another question.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, how did they feel? They were pro-Castro, were
they not?

Mr. SMITH. I think most of these things, in light of the events, are
self-evident.

Senator EASTLAND. That they were pro-Castro?

Mr. SMITH. The word "pro-Castro," Senator, is very strong. I think
that they were sympathetic to Castro.

Senator DODD. Do I understand correctly from what you tell us--let me
ut it two ways: (1) The fifth floor did not know what the fourth floor
was doing. Is that your position?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; he said-

Mr. SMITH. I say it this way: I think that the fifth floor was not
as interested in the affairs of Cuba, until late in 1958, as I had
hoped they would be.

I have learned from experience and observation that in our system
the actions by the lower echelon and those who are influential in the lower
echelon form our policy, and when those higher up act upon them, the policies
have already been determined by events.

That is the reason why a little earlier I said I would like, to make
a recommendation that, when something as important as our attitude toward
a friendly government arises, the National Security Council or some sych
body determine what is in the best interests of the United States. All
governmental department actions should be unified and guided according
to the policy laid down from above.

Senator EASTLAND. That means you had no confidence in the fourth floor,
then ?

Mr. SMITH. When you are an Ambassador, you have nothing to do with
policy. You follow your instructions.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand that.

Mr. SMITH. All you can do is recommend, and I recommended plenty. I
am not bashful, Senator. If you will subpoena records, you will see I recommended
plenty of them, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. lt means you had no confidence in the fourth floor,
doesn't it?

Mr. SMITH. At times there was disagreement between me and the fourth
floor of the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator DODD. Where did Rubottom-where was his office, fourth
or fifth floor?

Mr. SMITH. He is the top man on the fourth floor.

Senator DODD. He is the upper, upper middle?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir. He is the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs, and he sits on the fourth floor, and when you go
to the fifth floor, that is where the Secretary of State and the Under
Secretaries are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Former Ambassador Gardner told us there was no question-in
his words--"that Mr. Roy Rubottom, while he was in charge of Latin American
Affairs for the State Department, favored Castro."

Do you agree with this?

Mr. SMITH. Once I had made up my mind, which was obvious, that if Castro
succeeded to power, that it was not in the best interests of the United
States, and also not in the best interests of Cuba, I used every power
within my means to try to have the State Department cooperate with the
existing government and to adhere strlctly to a nonintervention policy.

I believe that Roy Rubottom, when I first went down to Cuba, would
like to have cooperated with the existing regime.

He was, I repeat, under terrific pressure by Members of Congress,
I repeat. He was called before a subcommittee such as this on a number
of oceasions, by the press, by all these various sources that I mentioned.
He told me once over the telephone. that--it was perfectly evident to him
now that as far as the sympathy of the United States was concerned, it
was no longer with Batista.

I think that is the best answer I can give you to the question.

Senator EASTLAND. Yet, he yielded to the pressure?

Mr. SMITH. He sure yielded, yes, sir; he said he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, did you have, or do you have, any reason to
believe that the State Department or State Department officials knew in
December 1958 that Castro was coming into power at the end of the year?

Mr. SMITH. The State Department knew that Batista was through in December
1958, and as soon as Batista was through, it was obvious that only one
person was going to come into power, and that was Fidel Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dulles had urged a Cuban diplomat
in December 1958 to leave Cuba immediately with his entire family and without
giving anyone any explanation?

Mr. SMITH. A Cuban diplomat?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. To leave?

Mr. SOURIVINE. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any warnings that were given anyone by
the State Department, or State Department officials, to get out before
Castro came in?

Mr. SMITH No; I do not thiiik we gave anybody any warnings to leave.
Thirty days. before Batista left, I sent a telegram to the State Department
reporting a meeting of the leading American businessmen and myself at the
Embassy, and I said that Batista probably would not survive beyond January
1.

We hit the date right on the nose-the day he left.

I further went on to say that we would either have to step in and support
a broadly based provisional government or Castro would take over and that
if Castro took over, the only ones that would benefit would be the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Smith, former Ambassador Gardner expressed the view
that Castro was a Communist tool rather than being himself an active Communist.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. SMITH Castro was a revolutionary and a terrorist.

From the time that he was a university student, he was a gun-toter.
I was informed by a diplomat that he had killed one nun and two priests
in Bogota during the uprising in 1948.

I checked very carefully into Mr. Castro's background shortly after
I was there and talked to people in Cuba who were anti-Batista but who
knew Castro well; I would rather not mention their names because I do not
want to get them into trouble. There were many.

There is no question that Castro was a revolutionary and a terrorist
but whether he started out as a Communist or not, I doubt. I believe that
the beginning of his 26th of July Movement was a leftist revolutionary
movement. There are many that exist in the world. But his brother Raul
was different; "Che" Guevara was different. Guevara was and is a Marxist.

I do not think there is any question or doubt about their Marxist theories.

But Fidel Castro did make a number of statements at Costa Rica and out
of Mexico which clearly showed his Marxist line of thinking. He was also
an active member, as a student, of the FEU (a radical group) .

I brought that to the attention on numerous occasions of various newspaper
people when they came down and asked them, when they visited Castro in
the hills, whether they would get Castro to repudiate any of those statements.
To the best of my knowledge, he never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any doubt in your mind that the Cuban Government,
under Castro, is a Communist government?

Mr. SMITH. Now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I would go further. I believe it is becoming a satellite.

Senator DODD. You mean a Communist satellite?

Mr. SMITH. A Communist satellite. I made a speech in Miami early last
winter in which I said that I believe that there would be a mutual security
pact formed between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. and the reasons for it were:

That there was no doubt that Fidel Castro was now close to the Soviets.
Otherwise, he would not have been as brazen in his attacks upon the United
States. It was perfectly obvious that he knew he could get support from
the Soviets.

The Russians for some time have been very piqued-the word "piqued" is
probably a mild word-with the fact that the United States has mutual security
pacts with Turkey and Iran, which are directly on the borders of Russia.

The Chinese, as you know, do not like our mutual security pact with
Formosa and are particularly indignant at our having the position we have
taken regarding the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

The logical thing for the Russians to do would be to move into Cuba
which they had already done, and to take over, which they would do by a
mutual security pact.

Then, when the United States objects, all they have to say is:

"We will get out of Cuba when you get out of Turkey."

Senator DODD. You are not suggesting-

Mr. SMITH. That is a speech I made in February.

Senator DODD. Yes, but you are not suggesting that the Communists will
cease and desist from their activities in Cuba and Central and South America,
or anywhere else, if we get out of these other places?

Mr. SMITH. Out of Turkey?

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. lt would mean a great deal to them if we got out of Turkey.
I am no expert on Turkey.

Senator DODD. You do not have to be an expert on Turkey, but you ought
to be a little bit of an expert on the Communists to know this would not
follow at all.

Every time we have retreated from one place, they have moved into new
areas.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I did not say what they would do.

Senator DODD. I know, but-

Mr. SMITH. That they would move into Cuba to retaliate with us.

Senator DODD. This is a statement being made all the time. It is not
very pertinent to our inquiry today, but I think it is doing great damage
in the sense it is confusing the American people.

People like you are telling the American people if we get out of Formosa,
or Quemoy and Matsu, and abandon our bases in Turkey and other places,
which we have there because of the aggressive conduct of the Communists,
that, therefore, the Communists would cease to be aggressive.

It is one of the most sinister and, I think, damaging things that is
being said and done. I am sorry to say that to you. but I must say so.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I did not say-

Senator DODD. I do not say it is intentional, but it is confusing our
people.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I did not say that what we were doing in Formosa
or in Turkey was not correct. I merely said that if you think through the
Russian point of view, it was logical to assume that they would into Cuba
as a retaliation for what we are doing to them. That is all I said.

Senator DODD. I do not want to argue the point.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just ono or two more questions, sir.

Do you, or did you, know General Tabernilla, the former chief of staff
of the Cuban Army?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Tabernilla has told this committee that just before
he resigned his post, he conferred with you.

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember this? Can you give us briefly the gist
of that conference?

Mr. SMITH. I believe it was the day after Christmas, December 26, 1958.
I received word from the military attaché that General Tabernilla,
who was in charge of all the Armed Forces of Cuba, and his son, Gen. Carlos
Tabernilla, who was in charge of the Air Force, and Gen. Del Rio Chaviano,
who had formerly been in charge of the forces in Oriente Province, wanted
to have an interview.

So it was arranged at the American Embassy.

They arrived in their police cars and they came into the Embassy residence.

General Tabernilla said he wished to talk with me alone and his son
and the other general went in the adjoining room.

At the time General Tabernilla said that the Cuban soldiers would
not fight any longer and that the Cuban Govermnent, per se, would not be
able to last.

He stated that the purpose of his visit to me was to save Cuba from
chaos, Castro, and communism.

He said he wanted to form a military junta comprised of himself,
I believe the names were General Cantillo, General Soa Quesada, Colonel
Casores, and an officer of the navy.

He said that they wanted to give Batista safe convoy out of the country,
wanted to know whether I would support such a junta.

I said that I would report the conversation to the State Department,
but that I was sure they would not give me a direct reply to give to him,
and I said that would be correct, because I added:

"If we answer you directly, it would be undermining General Batista,
and I can only do business with Batista hecause I am accredited to him."

General Tabernilla asked me what suggestions I had to make.

I said, "Have you mentioned this visit to me to Batista?

And he said, "No, I have not." He said, "I have not told him I was coming
to seo you, but I have discussed in general our future possibilities with
Batista."

I asked him what Batista said, and he replied, "He told me to come up
with a plan."

I told Tabernilla he should go back and talk it over with Batista and
that any suggestion coming from Batista, I would relate to the State Department.
Then we could continue our exchange of views.

If you wish me to go into more detail on this meeting, I would be very
glad to do it. That is generally in capsule form what took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this after you had seen Batista and advised him that
the American Government felt that his Government could not persist and
he had to get out?

Mr. SMITH. I saw Batista on December 17, 1958, and this conference you
are talking about took place December 26, 1958.

Mr. SOURWINE. So when you saw Tabernilla, you already had told Batista
he ought to get out?

Mr. SMITH. I did not tell Batista he ought to get out. I would not put
it so bluntly as that. I spent 2 hours and 35 minutes trying to tactfully
explain that the Department believed he had lost effective control. To
avoid further bloodshed, did he not think it might be in the best interests
of all concerned if he retired. This had to be done without giving the
impression that I was intervening.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just two more little matters.

One, do you think the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo is in any danger?

Mr. SMITH. I think five platoons of Marines could lick the rebels. How
couId the naval base at Guantanamo be in any danger?

Mr. SOURWINE. One more thing

What do you think of the proposal that a Spanish language radio station
he established at Key West or some similar point to acquaint the Cubans
with the U.S. position?

Mr. SMITH. I think that would he very helpful.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Smith, we certainly thank you. I would like to
have a little executive session.