Narendra Modi pushed Mahinda Rajapaksa to deliver on his promises to devolve wide powers to the country’s Tamil-majority regions.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi pushed Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa hard, asking for him to deliver on his promises to devolve wide powers to the country’s Tamil-majority regions — a formula called ‘Thirteen-Plus’ that was promised during diplomatic negotiations with former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in 2010.

“Early and full implementation of the 13th Amendment and going beyond would contribute to this process,” Foreign Secretary Sujata Singh quoted Mr. Modi as telling the Sri Lankan President.

‘Thirteen-Plus’ has never been precisely defined, but the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution which created provincial councils and made both Tamil and Sinhala official languages.

India’s decision to abstain from voting on the U.S.-sponsored resolution at the UNHRC against alleged war crimes by Sri Lanka was taken at the “political” level for the welfare of the Tamils in that country, the External Affairs Ministry said on Friday.

“Any decision relating to foreign policy is a political decision, is it not? And no official will take a decision without taking a political sign off,” Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh told PTI.

Ms. Singh was replying to a question about Finance Minister P. Chidambaram’s remarks last week that the decision of abstention could have been taken by officials in the External Affairs Ministry.

Expressing unhappiness, Mr. Chidambaram had further said, “Twenty three countries had supported it and we also should have supported even if it was a watered down one.”

The Foreign Secretary said India abstained from voting on the resolution as it was “extremely intrusive” and that New Delhi has always been against any country-specific resolution in UNHRC.

“The last two resolutions called upon Sri Lankan government to look into the issue and to work toward reconciliation. This year the resolution was extremely intrusive. It proposed an international mechanism, an open ended international mechanism, and in our mind we do not want such an intrusive mechanism,” she said.

The Foreign Secretary said the decision to abstain was “based on our analysis” of the issue.

This is for the first time that India abstained from voting on the resolution — ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’.

“It’s not just showing solidarity with the Tamils in Sri Lanka for the sake of showing solidarity. We have to be able to get results on the ground and we have to show to Tamils in Sri Lanka that we are able to help them.

“You know the biggest housing project in the world is being implemented over there (by India),” she said. (The Hindu)India’s decision to abstain from voting on the U.S.-sponsored resolution at the UNHRC against alleged war crimes by Sri Lanka was taken at the “political” level for the welfare of the Tamils in that country, the External Affairs Ministry said on Friday.

“Any decision relating to foreign policy is a political decision, is it not? And no official will take a decision without taking a political sign off,” Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh told PTI.

Ms. Singh was replying to a question about Finance Minister P. Chidambaram’s remarks last week that the decision of abstention could have been taken by officials in the External Affairs Ministry.

Expressing unhappiness, Mr. Chidambaram had further said, “Twenty three countries had supported it and we also should have supported even if it was a watered down one.”

The Foreign Secretary said India abstained from voting on the resolution as it was “extremely intrusive” and that New Delhi has always been against any country-specific resolution in UNHRC.

“The last two resolutions called upon Sri Lankan government to look into the issue and to work toward reconciliation. This year the resolution was extremely intrusive. It proposed an international mechanism, an open ended international mechanism, and in our mind we do not want such an intrusive mechanism,” she said.

The Foreign Secretary said the decision to abstain was “based on our analysis” of the issue.

This is for the first time that India abstained from voting on the resolution — ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’.

“It’s not just showing solidarity with the Tamils in Sri Lanka for the sake of showing solidarity. We have to be able to get results on the ground and we have to show to Tamils in Sri Lanka that we are able to help them.

“You know the biggest housing project in the world is being implemented over there (by India),” she said. (The Hindu)

SUMMARY

India is okay with the majority and substantive part of the text of the draft resolution UNHRC.

India will vote in favour of the resolution on Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Council, the UPA government is learnt to have decided in possibly its last major foreign policy decision. The vote is expected on March 28 in Geneva.

This is the third time when Delhi has decided to vote in favour of the resolution, and sources said the decision has been taken in view of “diplomatic” as well as “political” considerations in mind.

While India is okay with the majority and substantive part of the text of the draft resolution UNHRC 25 which has been circulated in Geneva — accessed by The Indian Express — negotiators are working on softening the language of paragraph 8 of the resolution, which calls for the need for an “independent and credible international investigation” and “investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes”.

Sources said New Delhi has been quite favourable to the UNHRC resolution — moved by the US, the UK, Montenegro, Macedonia and Mauritius — as it highlights many of India’s concerns.

New Delhi is particularly pleased with the inclusion of the “13th amendment” in the resolution. Paragraph 6 of the motion says, “…encourages the Government of Sri Lanka to provide the Northern Provincial Council and its Chief Minister with the resources and authority necessary to govern, as required by the 13th Amendment of Sri Lanka’s constitution”.

India has been urging the Mahinda Rajapaksa government for the past five years — since the war against LTTE came to an end — that it was imperative for Sri Lanka to implement the 13th amendment to their constitution, which calls for devolution of powers to the provinces.

In fact, once Sri Lanka said it was willing to go beyond the 13th amendment, New Delhi latched on to that formulation and has been insisting on 13th amendment plus.

The draft resolution also talks about attacks on minorities in Sri Lanka, another area of growing concern in New Delhi. Paragraph 4 of the draft resolution says, “..urges the Government of Sri Lanka to investigate all attacks, by individuals and groups, on temples, mosques, and churches and to take steps to prevent future attacks; and calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to investigate and hold accountable perpetrators of attacks on places of worship, journalists, human rights defenders, members of religious minority groups, and other members of civil society.”

India’s boycott of a summit in Sri Lanka suggests New Delhi is eyeing a more values-based approach to foreign policy, one that will be greatly influenced by regional Indian parties.

One of the most high-profile debates over rising powers’ support for democracy and human rights abroad concerns India’s role in Sri Lanka. The controversies surrounding the two countries’ relations recently reached new heights when India’s prime minister decided to boycott the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), a biennial summit for the states of the Commonwealth of Nations that was hosted by Sri Lanka in November 2013. India’s decision to send its external affairs minister instead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to this summit sparked a heated debate about New Delhi’s current and future foreign policy trajectory and its willingness to shoulder bigger global responsibilities, such as supporting democracy and human rights at the international level.

Those most critical of the decision argued that Singh’s boycott represented a short-sighted concession to increasingly influential regional parties in India that were encouraging New Delhi to refuse Sri Lanka’s invitation. To these critics, the regional parties’ ability to affect foreign policy at the federal level as they did in the lead-up to the CHOGM endangers the country’s regional and strategic security interests, let alone its ambition to support values such as democracy.

Others, however, saw India’s decision as proof of a larger foreign policy shift the country has undergone in the past several years. According to this view, India’s move in Sri Lanka was not merely about the influence of regional Indian parties on the federal government but also about New Delhi taking on bigger responsibilities in line with India’s status as a rising power.

Others, however, saw India’s decision as proof of a larger foreign policy shift the country has undergone in the past several years. According to this view, India’s move in Sri Lanka was not merely about the influence of regional Indian parties on the federal government but also about New Delhi taking on bigger responsibilities in line with India’s status as a rising power.

Whichever claim proves true, the CHOGM episode offers fascinating insight into the state of play of democracy support in one of the most turbulent regions of the world. It suggests that New Delhi may be grappling with a new, more values-based approach to foreign policy, one that will be significantly influenced by India’s regional states.

CHOGM PROTESTS: INDIAN OPPOSITION TO SRI LANKA

The CHOGM episode illustrates the difficulties of navigating foreign policy choices in a highly decentralized democracy with strong regional parties. The southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu saw intense, sustained protests against the idea of India attending the CHOGM in Sri Lanka, making New Delhi’s decision of whether to participate in the meeting a highly controversial domestic issue with clear implications for India’s foreign policy choices.

Those pushing for the boycott objected primarily to Sri Lanka’s history of human rights violations, especially during the country’s nearly three-decades-long civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE is a militant secessionist organization fighting for an independent state for Tamils, an ethnic group found primarily in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. This independent state, referred to as Tamil Eelam, or “homeland,” would be located in northeast Sri Lanka.

While Colombo quelled the LTTE rebellion by military means in 2009, the Sri Lankan government’s victory was accomplished at great cost, both human and material. Thousands of civilians lost their lives in the crossfire and in the excesses committed by the Sri Lankan armed forces. The army’s mass-scale violations attracted global condemnations and led international agencies such as the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) to call for independent investigations into the atrocities.

After denying Colombo the opportunity to host the CHOGM in 2011 due to international concerns over wartime atrocities, Commonwealth leaders agreed to let Sri Lanka host the meeting in 2013 and to take over its chairmanship for the next three years. At a time when Colombo was facing growing international isolation due to its negative postwar trajectory—the Sri Lankan government, led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, has so far failed to deliver on the promises of national reconciliation and transitional justice it has made over the years—the CHOGM was seen as an opportunity for the island nation to restore its global standing. As a result, the summit, which is normally considered inconsequential and attracts little international attention, became a media-saturated event in Sri Lanka.

The meeting itself, however, acquired a heightened degree of controversy primarily because of protests in India’s Tamil Nadu. The growing perception in India that the Sri Lankan government does not seriously intend to facilitate reconciliation and address past human rights violations against the country’s Tamil minority created a fertile ground for an upsurge in anti–Sri Lankan sentiments—particularly in Tamil Nadu, long a staunch supporter of the Tamil cause. Sensational media coverage, such as video footage of the Sri Lanka Army’s wanton killing of the twelve-year-old son of a slain LTTE chief in February 2013, triggered further outrage and resentment. Politicians, activists, students, youth groups, media, and other civil society organizations from Tamil Nadu as well as members of the global Tamil diaspora mobilized street protests, organized conferences, and launched high-profile social media campaigns to demand an Indian boycott of the summit. These anti-CHOGM protests generated enough heat to send panic waves through the Sri Lankan leadership—so much so that a nervous Rajapaksa scurried to send emissaries to world capitals to deliver personal invitations to the meeting.

THE TAMIL FACTOR

In Tamil Nadu, anti–Sri Lankan protests are nothing new. For the last several years, and particularly since the end of the bloody Sri Lankan civil war, the Indian state has been beset by anti–Sri Lankan demonstrations, many of them demanding that New Delhi support UNHRC resolutions calling for an independent international probe into Sri Lanka’s human rights violations during the war.1 However, these protests never matched the intensity of those seen in the run-up to the CHOGM. The anti-CHOGM demonstrations were also unique in their duration—they continued for several months with unprecedented fervor.

During this period, “Boycott CHOGM” became the battle cry of all political parties in Tamil Nadu. Leading the charge was the state’s chief minister, Jayalalithaa Jayaram, who in fact had been opposed to the LTTE but nevertheless saw an opportunity to stand up for the Sri Lankan Tamil’s cause. In an unprecedented move, the Tamil Nadu state assembly in October 2013 adopted a resolution asking the Indian federal government to boycott the summit entirely. The resolution, introduced by Jayalalithaa herself, received overwhelming support from all political parties, including from Jayalalithaa’s political archrivals in the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party—a rare moment of bipartisanship in Tamil Nadu politics.

For the DMK, the main opposition party in Tamil Nadu and long a supporter of the creation of a Tamil state in Sri Lanka, the resolution afforded an opportunity to demonstrate its solidarity with a cause that it has been behind for decades. The DMK formally pulled out of India’s ruling United Progressive Alliance government in March 2013 because New Delhi refused to add amendments to a UNHRC resolution against Sri Lanka that would have subjected Colombo to an international investigation into the alleged killing of Tamil civilians in 2009.2 A year before leaving the government, sensing the anti–Sri Lankan mood in Tamil Nadu, Muthuvel Karunanidhi, the head of the DMK, had revived the party’s old policy instrument, the Tamil Eelam Supporters Organization. This body remains one of the strongest organizations supporting the LTTE and the cause of creating a homeland.

Unlike many previous protests, the popular mobilization against the CHOGM summit received widespread support from civil society in Tamil Nadu. Hundreds of organizations, such as trade unions, civic associations, and countless student and youth groups, many of which are normally apolitical, played a crucial role in steering the course of the movement. These organizations astutely used social media outlets such as YouTube and Facebook to generate maximum support for the Tamil cause.3

THE DEBATE IN NEW DELHI
The CHOGM episode also had strong ripple effects in New Delhi. The issue brought about a clear polarization within the cabinet of the ruling United Progressive Alliance.

On the one hand, the Ministry of External Affairs strongly supported the prime minister attending the CHOGM. An internal ministry circular cautioned that by staying away from the summit, India would suffer both strategically and politically and would lose standing in a geopolitically crucial region.4

On the other hand, several powerful ministers hailing from Tamil Nadu voiced their concern about the prime minister’s participation at a time when their state was witnessing widespread protests over the issue.5 The then imminent parliamentary elections seem to have played a role in influencing these ministers’ opinions, pushing them to capitalize on the anti–Sri Lankan sentiments in their electorate. The CHOGM resulted in a revival of sympathy for the suffering of Tamils in Sri Lanka among all political parties in Tamil Nadu, including the pro-center Bharatiya Janata Party, and their collective voice pressured the central government.

For many foreign policy experts, India’s CHOGM boycott was an example of the Indian federal government losing its autonomy over foreign policy decisions.6 The episode further strengthened the perception that New Delhi’s foreign policy is increasingly influenced by powerful regional actors.

For critics of India’s decision, refusing to attend the summit failed to achieve any positive foreign policy goals, neither isolating Colombo nor coercing the incumbent Sri Lankan government into improving its treatment of the Tamil minority. Despite India’s absence, the CHOGM was attended by most major Commonwealth democracies, notably the UK and Australia. Instead, the summit highlighted India’s isolation in the region. Thus, for most analysts, the decision to boycott the CHOGM not only called into question the federal government’s foreign policy autonomy but also raised doubts about its ability to take up human rights and democracy concerns in its foreign relations.

Other experts contend that the CHOGM boycott was driven by more than domestic pressures and that New Delhi retains autonomy in its foreign policy. They point to the fact that if India’s stance on the CHOGM were only about appeasing Tamil Nadu in light of the approaching general election, it would be impossible to explain India’s stout defense of Colombo in 2009, when Sri Lanka was facing severe global condemnation and the Indian government was dealing with sustained protests in Tamil Nadu over the alleged genocide of the Sri Lankan Tamil. India at the time was also in the middle of a general election, with the government in New Delhi dependent on the DMK for its political survival. Yet, much to the discomfort of the DMK, the federal government defended Sri Lanka and its wartime human rights record at the UNHRC.

In a similar and possibly even more vivid display of its autonomy in foreign policy, the Indian federal government changed its traditional stance of noninterference in Sri Lanka by voting in favor of U.S.-sponsored UNHRC resolutions in 2012 and 2013 that called on Colombo to investigate alleged human rights abuses carried out during the civil war.

These experts argue that, contrary to the widely held belief that Indian foreign policy is coming under the heavy shadow of regional realpolitik and losing its autonomous space, the country’s core foreign policy is in fact undergoing a subtle shift toward embracing new values and principles. India’s rising international profile has spurred the realization among political elites that the country can no longer remain a bystander to democracy and human rights issues while it claims a seat at the table with other international powers.

The fact that consolidated democracies have increasingly collaborated with India and recognized the country as a significant international player with the potential to bring about positive changes elsewhere has further accelerated this shift.7 Since 2005, India has repeatedly voted against Iran in the UN over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program, a development that can be seen as the product of this new collaboration with established democracies.

SRI LANKA’S DEMOCRACY DEFICIT

With regard to Sri Lanka, the core issues at stake are democracy and human rights. The island nation suffers from a considerable democracy deficit. Many of Sri Lanka’s problems, past and present, are related to democratic shortcomings and a lack of respect for human rights, particularly minority rights. Postwar triumphalism coupled with a resounding electoral victory in 2010 have led the Rajapaksa government to stall national reconciliation efforts involving genuine power sharing with the aggrieved Tamil population and obstruct any serious reckoning for its wartime human rights abuses.8

As a result of growing international pressure and the UN decision to appoint a committee charged with investigating war crimes, the Sri Lankan government set up a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission to look into alleged wartime abuses and prepare a report outlining potential remedies. But rather than showing genuine commitment to addressing the findings of this commission, a belligerent Colombo has so far delayed the implementation of its recommendations. In addition, even routine demands of the Tamil National Alliance, a coalition of Tamil political parties, on issues of demilitarization and resettlement are frequently dubbed by Sri Lankan government officials as “illegitimate” ambitions of the LTTE.

However, the biggest challenge continues to be the long-promised devolution package that would see Colombo afford increased power and autonomy to provinces, including Tamil-majority areas. Billed the most critical part of a long-term solution to the Tamil issue, the devolution package—first introduced through the Thirteenth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which established provincial councils—has been reduced to a game of political football.9 Ultranationalist elements from the majority Sinhala ethnic group consider the proposal a remnant of Indian interference born out of the Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 in which India pledged to stop aiding LTTE insurgents and send in a peacekeeping force in return for Colombo agreeing to devolve power to the provinces. These nationalists see devolution as a ploy to keep alive Tamil separatist sentiments.

So far, the Indian government has opted for a cautious middle path. While it has repeatedly pushed Sri Lanka to honor its commitments on democracy and minority rights, it has also ensured that bilateral relations do not deteriorate too much. It is precisely for this reason that the Indian prime minister skipped the CHOGM summit but nevertheless sent the foreign minister. Thus, for many analysts, India’s response needs to be viewed beyond the prism of domestic politics and regional security concerns.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Notwithstanding the polarized debate, the CHOGM episode provides some useful barometers to gauge the likelihood of India embracing a more values-based foreign policy.

First, while the CHOGM decision offers no conclusive evidence of a radical shift in India’s international role, it certainly gives a strong hint about the country’s ambition to unshackle its foreign policy from New Delhi’s traditionally noninterventionist stance. This new approach coincides with India’s rising international profile and the growing realization among the country’s elites that New Delhi will have to shoulder greater responsibilities commensurate with its elevated status.

Second, while India’s current position on Sri Lanka (including the UNHRC votes) has to be viewed through the lens of human rights and democracy support, there are other factors driving the government’s policy. Behind India’s new stance is a careful assessment of its available choices. Domestically, a restive Tamil population represents a much bigger challenge than losing influence over the Sri Lankan government to China.

Finally, even as India signals its readiness to take on greater responsibility at the international level, the CHOGM episode demonstrates that this new approach will inevitably face significant pressure on the domestic front. Like in many other democracies, an increasing regionalization of foreign policy has become an inescapable reality in India, and there is little that any coalition government can do to reverse this trend.

Yet, as seen in the recent case of Iran, the federal government nevertheless retains enough room to shape a new Indian foreign policy architecture. The CHOGM episode offers a glimpse into the sort of struggles New Delhi may face in the coming years as it tries to reconcile this new foreign policy approach with its influential domestic constituency.

Niranjan Sahoo is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

The Northern Majlisul Ulama (NMU), submitted a petition and pleaded with the Indian High Commission in Colombo, to ensure that Muslims are treated in a manner similar to the Tamils in the process of resettling the internally displaced persons.

It was alleged that 56% of the construction work on houses for the displaced Tamils had been completed, while the percentage of similar work completed for the displaced Muslims remained stagnant at 15%.

The funds allocated by the Indian Government, are reportedly disbursed through the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society.The NMU called at the Indian Mission and submitted the petition to the First Secretary of the Indian High Commission, Justin Mohan, yesterday. The petition cites the crisis faced by the Muslims in the resettlement process in the North. The Leader of NMU, Moulavi S.H. Thahir, explained, “We were severely displaced during the war and the Indian Government stepped into assist us. Initially, the Muslims and Hindus were treated alike, but thereafter, the houses of the Hindus were completed, but the houses allotted to the Muslims remained incomplete.”

He also said that when they had questioned the authorities concerned, they had responded by claiming that, there were insufficient funds to complete the project. Moulavi M.F.M. Farook, also elucidated that the project was to be conducted in three phases in Jaffna, Kilinochi, Vavuniya, Mannar and Puttalam, and only 15% of the work pertaining to the construction of the houses had been complete.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa will have much to worry about when the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council takes up the ‘report of the OHCHR on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’ on March 26. Despite the fact that the 47-member Council has 14 new members, including some known friends of Sri Lanka, such as China, Cuba, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, the draft resolution submitted by the United States is forceful as it incorporates several new aspects: it includes ‘Human Rights’ in its title, elaborates upon the attacks on minorities, dwells on the importance of transitional justice and reparation policy, and asks the Sri Lankan government to broaden the scope of its national action plan based on its reconciliation commission, the LLRC. Though the draft resolution, ‘Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’, stops short of using the phrase “international investigation into war crimes” – a fact that has disappointed the Tamil diaspora and pro-LTTE elements in Tamil Nadu – Sri Lanka has no reason to feel let off the hook. The resolution “welcomes the High Commissioner’s recommendations and conclusions on the need for an independent and credible international investigation,” and asks the High Commissioner to “assess the progress toward accountability and reconciliation, to monitor relevant national processes, and to investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka.”

In effect, this gives the High Commissioner many tools to carry out her work. These are new mandates, and move up from the oral update that was given in the last session. And, from “encouraging” Sri Lanka to cooperate with the High Commissioner, the draft resolution steps up the tone and “calls upon” Sri Lanka to do so. Thus boxed in, Mr. Rajapaksa’s meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Nay Pyi Taw on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit on March 4 gained significance. Dr. Singh, who has steadfastly refused to visit Sri Lanka since the 2008 SAARC summit — while he has met his Pakistani counterpart more often — once again brought up the most critical issue that affects the Tamils of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province: the Army’s brazen occupation of vast areas of civilian land. Dr. Singh asked Mr.Rajapaksa to pare the Army presence in the North. No doubt, the mellow mood in the Sri Lankan ruling establishment comes from the realisation that slowly but steadily the UN Human Rights Council, and, by implication, the international community, is becoming tougher on the issue. In the long run, there is no escape from a credible investigation that establishes accountability. And the question of the political rights of Tamils remains to be addressed with a measure of seriousness and urgency.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met with Sri Lanka’s President, Mahinda Rajapakse on the sidelines of a regional summit on Tuesday, hours after a five-nation coalition moved a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council, condemning the island nation’s human record during its war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, speaking to journalists on board the Prime Minister’s flight back to New Delhi, said Sri Lanka’s President had been “courteous, sensitive and forthcoming”.

Mr. Khurshid said Dr. Singh had used the meeting to underline the case of de-militarisation in the Jaffna peninsula. Sri Lanka says it has already scaled back troops from a war-time peak of 175,000, and promised that a further drawdown will take place as de-mining and reconstruction operations are completed.

President Rajapaksa, Mr. Khurshid said, in turn asked India to use its offices to persuade Tamil parties to engage with Parliament on devolution of powers to the Northern and Eastern provinces. Mr. Khursheed quoted Mr. Rajapakse as saying that Tamil engagement was critical to building a consensus among Sri Lankan political parties on devolution.

The 25-minute meeting was the first between the two leaders since 2012, when India first voted against Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Council, and comes against the backdrop of criticism by political parties in Tamil Nadu.

“I hope that both our friends and critics in Tamil Nadu will keep foremost in their minds the interests of the Tamils of the Northern Provinces”, Mr. Khurshid said. “When I went to the Northern Provinces, I did not hear a single voice calling on us not to engage with the Sri Lanka government”.

“Everyone in politics has the rights to promote their interests”, Mr. Khurshid added, “as long as they keep the national interest in mind. Today, India’s national interest is in engaging with Sri Lanka to protect the interests of the Tamils of the Northern Provinces.”

Dr. Singh and Mr. Rajapakse also discussed the arrests of fishermen who had transgressed the maritime border. Mr. Rajapakse, Mr. Khurshid said, argued that India’s trawlers were damaging the marine ecosystem, hurting the long-term sustainability of the fishing grounds off Sri Lanka. “He was at pains to emphasise that both sets of fishermen were ethnic Tamils”, Mr. Khurshid said, “and that that he was defending the interests of Tamils in Sri Lanka”.