Gerald Fox’s 2008 Letter – First posted in 2012.

“It is interesting how TransLink has used this cunning method of manipulating analysis to justify SkyTrain in corridor after corridor, and has thus succeeded in keeping its proprietary rail system expanding.”

Today, in 2015, construction of the Evergreen Line is under way, yet saga continues with moving guideways and sinkholes causing much disruption. So, it’s time to enter the Way-back machine and once again look at TransLink’s business case for the Evergreen Line.

In, 2008 Gerald Fox, a well known American transit and transportation expert shredded TransLinkai??i??s Evergreen Line business case and found it grossly biased in favour for SkyTrain.

In other jurisdictions such comments would lead to legal action or an inquiry, but not in BC, where TransLinkai??i??s deliberate manipulating of certain facts may have lead to a police investigation of TransLink and its bureaucrats!

I would like to remind Surrey’s new mayor, a one Ms. Hepner, that the very same TransLink bureaucrats are now planning for LRT in Surrey are the very same anti-LRTAi??~ pro-SkyTrain bureaucrats that worked on the Evergreen Line and it is for certain the very same pro-SkyTrain arguments are still being made for Surrey!

Nothing less than an audit of TransLink, West coast Mountain Bus and SkyTrain including the Canada line, by BCai??i??s Auditor General, will clear the air. Both the provincial government and TransLink are deathly afraid of this happening as they continue to steamroll one SkyTrain or light-metro project after another on the BC taxpayer.

The following is the Gerald Fox letter of 2008ai??i??ai??i??ai??i??ai??i??ai??i??..

Update: The auditor General did indeed audit the Evergreen Line and found LRT was more expensive to build and carried fewer people. So sad to see such incompetence in the AG’s department, especially we know that LRT has a higher capacity than SkyTrian and the cost to construct LRT cn be one tenth of that of SkyTrain. So bloody embarrassing!

From: A North-American Rail Expert

Subject: Comments on the Evergreen Line ai???Business Caseai???

Date: February 6, 2008

Greetings:

The Evergreen Line Report made me curious as to how TransLink could justify continuing to expand SkyTrain, when the rest of the world is building LRT. So I went back and read the alleged ai???Business Caseai??? (BC) report in a little more detail. I found several instances where the analysis had made assumptions that were inaccurate, or had been manipulated to make the case for SkyTrain. If the underlying assumptions are inaccurate, the conclusions may be so too. Specifically:

Capacity. A combination of train size and headway. For instance, TriMetai??i??s new ai???Type 4ai??? Low floor LRVs, arriving later this year, have a rated capacity of 232 per car, or 464 for a 2- car train. (Of course one must also be sure to use the same standee density when comparing car capacity. I donai??i??t know if that was done here). In Portland we operate a frequency of 3 minutes downtown in the peak hour, giving a one way peak hour capacity of 9,280. By next year we will have two routes through downtown, which will eventually load both ways, giving a theoretical peak hour rail capacity of 37,000 into or out of downtown. Of course we also run a lot of buses.

The new Seattle LRT system which opens next year, is designed for 4-car trains, and thus have a peak hour capacity of 18,560. (but doesnai??i??t need this yet, and so shares the tunnel with buses). The Business Case analysis assumes a capacity of 4,080 for LRT, on the Evergreen Line which it states is not enough, and compares it to SkyTrain capacity of 10400.!

Speed. The analysis states the maximum LRT speed is 60 kph. (which would be correct for the street sections) But most LRVs are actually designed for 90 kph. On the Evergreen Line, LRT could operate at up to 90 where conditions permit, such as in the tunnels, and on protected ROW. Most LRT systems pre-empt most intersections, and so experience little delay at grade crossings. (Our policy is that the trains stop only at stations, and seldom experience traffic delays. It seems to work fine, and has little effect on traffic.) There is another element of speed, which is station access time. At-grade stations have less access time. This was overlooked in the analysis.

Also, on the NW alignment, the SkyTrain proposal uses a different, faster, less-costly alignment to LRT proposal. And has 8 rather than 12 stations. If LRT was compared on the alignment now proposed for SkyTrain, it would go faster, and cost less than the Business Case report states!

Cost. Here again, there seems to be some hidden biases. As mentioned above, on the NW Corridor, LRT is costed on a different alignment, with more stations. The cost difference between LRT and SkyTrain presented in the Business Case report is therefore misleading. If they were compared on identical alignments, with the same number of stations, and designed to optimize each mode, the cost advantage of LRT would be far greater. I also suspect that the basic LRT design has been rendered more costly by requirements for tunnels and general design that would not be found on more cost-sensitive LRT projects.

Then there are the car costs. Last time I looked, the cost per unit of capacity was far higher for SkyTrain. Also,it takes about 2 SkyTrain cars to match the capacity of one LRV. And the grade-separated SkyTrain stations are far most costly and complex than LRT stations. Comparing 8 SkyTrain stations with 12 LRT stations also helps blur the distinction.

Ridership. Is a function of many factors. The Business Case report would have you believe that type of rail mode alone, makes a difference (It does in the bus vs rail comparison, according to the latest US federal guidelines). But, on the Evergreen Line, I doubt it. What makes a difference is speed, frequency (but not so much when headways get to 5 minutes), station spacing and amenity etc. Since the speed, frequency and capacity assumptions used in the Business Case are clearly inaccurate, the ridership estimates cannot be correct either. There would be some advantage if SkyTrain could avoid a transfer. If the connecting system has capacity for the extra trains. But the case is way overstated.

And nowhere is it addressed whether the Evergreen Line, at the extremity of the system, has the demand for so much capacity and, if it does, what that would mean on the rest of the system if feeds into?

Innuedos about safety, and traffic impacts, seem to be a big issue for SkyTrain proponents, but are solved by the numerous systems that operate new LRT systems (i.e., they canai??i??t be as bad as the SkyTrain folk would like you to believe).

Iai??i??ve no desire to get drawn into the Vancouver transit wars, and, anyway, most of the rest of the world has moved on. To be fair, there are clear advantages in keeping with one kind of rail technology, and in through-routing service at Lougheed. But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.

It is interesting how TransLink has used this cunning method of manipulating analysis to justify SkyTrain in corridor after corridor, and has thus succeeded in keeping its proprietary rail system expanding. In the US, all new transit projects that seek federal support are now subjected to scrutiny by a panel of transit peers, selected and monitored by the federal government, to ensure that projects are analysed honestly, and the taxpayersai??i?? interests are protected. No SkyTrain project has ever passed this scrutiny in the US.

Victoria

But the BIG DEAL for Victoria is: If the Business Case analysis were corrected to fix at least some of the errors outlined above, the COST INCREASE from using SkyTrain on the Evergreen Line will be comparable to the TOTALCOST of a modest starter line in Victoria. This needs to come to the attention of the Province. Victoria really does deserve better. Please share these thoughts as you feel appropriate.

[...] for TransLink’s Business Cases for transit projects, they are a joke, the Evergreen Line’s business case was easily shredded by transit expert Gerald Fox and the business case for the Canada Line allowed a subway to be built with just more than half [...]