This article is published as part ofFridays With MUNPlanet and its series dedicated to world politics and the United Nations. It is based
on research by Jason Ralph and Jess
Gifkins which was published in the European Journal of International Relations titled ‘The
Purpose of United Nations Security Council Practice: Contesting competence
claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect’. The
article was awarded 'Best Article in EJIR for 2017' by the European International Studies Association and is available Open
Access.

The United Nations Security Council has
its own unusual language and ‘penholder’ is one such term. It
refers to the state that takes the lead on drafting decisions for a particular
conflict or thematic area. For example, the UK is penholder for the conflict in
Yemen, and the US is penholder on counter-terrorism. Penholding is a powerful
role, as the state that leads the drafting gets to set the terms of debate via both
interpreting the situation and framing the response. Germany’s
Ambassador to the United States outlined the importance of this role; “The one who
leads, the one who presents the text, who stakes out a position early in the
day, is the one who more or less determines the game”.

The concept of penholders is relatively
recent, beginning in 2008, but has come to shape the way the Council operates. Initially,
‘penholding’ was a division of labour – a way to manage the increased workload
of the Council – but over time,it has come to mean ‘political ownership’ of an
issue. This can lead to situations where if the penholder does not write a
draft then no one writes a draft. Penholders are resistant to attempts to
encroach on their perceived ownership of an issue, even though this is a
self-appointed role.

The exclusionary nature of this
practice becomes evident when we consider who the penholders are. In 2017 there are 39 conflicts and thematic
areas with penholders, the vast majority of which are held by the UK, the US
and France (known as the Western permanent three, or P3) either individually or
together. Penholding currently refers to continuous political ownership. These two points together mean that
the P3 have established a stranglehold for themselves on the political power
inherent in their penholding roles. Elected members haveexpressed much frustration at their
marginalisation from penholding.

Penholding is an example of the rich,
informal social environment that structures decision-making in
the UN Security Council. An interesting aspect of this arrangement is that
there is nothing inevitable or unalterable about it. Indeed, in recent years
elected members of the Council have begun to challenge the dominance of
permanent members in drafting. A research project by Jason Ralph and myself investigated the practice of penholding and
demonstrated how changes in penholding can overcome deadlocks, as happened in
the humanitarian track of the Syrian conflict.

Penholding on Syria is complex, with
negotiations split into a political track, a chemical weapons track, an
accountability track and a humanitarian track. While permanent members have
dominated negotiations for the first three tracks, a revolving group of elected
members have taken over penholding for the humanitarian track. Initially, in
2014 this group was Australia, Luxembourg and Jordan. Elected members taking
over penholding on as sensitive an issue as the Syrian conflict was seen as ‘crazy’ and as ‘a hostile act’ by one of the
Security Council diplomats we interviewed.

However, elected members were able to
bring fresh creativity to the negotiations, and focused on the needs on the
ground in Syria, rather than on ‘point scoring’. They were able to pass a
series of resolutions, Resolution 2139, which demanded that parties allow
humanitarian access; and Resolution 2165, which authorised the delivery of
humanitarian aid without the consent of the Syrian government. As such, the
change of penholder enabled decisions that would likely not have occurred
without the leadership of elected members.

To date, a group of elected members
have managed to maintain penholdership of the Syrian humanitarian track, but
have faced considerable resistance. When Australia and Luxembourg finished their
two-year terms on the Security Council the permanent members attempted to
reassert control. Quick maneuvering by Spain and New Zealand, and the continuity of Jordan, enabled elected
members to continue penholding on the humanitarian track, and the current group
of elected members who are penholders for the Syrian humanitarian track are Egypt, Japan and Sweden.

Cracks began to emerge on the
penholder system in the Syrian negotiations, which emboldened elected members
who have begun to challenge the system in other areas. Elected members have
since taken on penholding for resolutions on
Israel-Palestine and on responding to attacks on healthcare workers. There has
also been a recent increase in co-penholding between permanent
and elected members.

The practice of penholding does not
need to be exclusionary. If it were simply a division of labour, there could be
a system of rotation or mechanisms to ensure that all Council members took part
in penholding. In fact, more equitable penholder practices are a one of the few
areas of Security Council reform that are both desirable and feasible.

Penholding can seem like odd ‘UN
speak’, but the concept gets to the crux of questions on power and legitimacy.
This informal and self-appointed practice determines which
states get to shape responses to some of the most pressing issues in
international peace and security. In the article, we argue that ‘competent
practices’ need to be about more than diplomats achieving their desired goals,
and should take into account both the effects that decisions have on the ground
and the effects that the process of decision-making has on working
relationships in the Council. As such, the activism shown by elected members on
the Syrian humanitarian track represents a positive move towards more inclusive
Security Council practices.

The
article that this blog
draws from also makes a broader critique of the current separation between
practice theory and normative theory within the discipline of International
Relations and poses a standard of ‘R2P competence’ to assess practices within
the UN Security Council. ‘R2P competent’ practices aim to protect people from
the crimes outlined under R2P and use decision-making practices that build and
sustain a collective approach within the Security Council.

Jess Gifkins is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Manchester and Honorary Research Fellow at the
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, at the University of
Queensland. She researches the practice and process of decision-making within the United Nations system. She has published articles in the European Journal of International Relations,Cooperation and Conflict,Global Responsibility to Protect, the Australian Journal of International Affairs, and Critical Military Studies, on the United Nations, the responsibility to protect, and international responses to crises in Darfur, Libya and Syria. ​She tweets @JessGifkins.

____________________________________________________________________

Cover Image: UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata21 March 1973, via Flickr, The Security Council tonight concluded a series of meetings in Panama City -- the first ever held in Latin America by the Council-- after adopting a resolution urging measures by States to impede the activities of “those enterprises which deliberately attempt to coerce Latin America countries”. A general view of the Council as it voted to adopt the draft resolution (document S/10932/Rev.2) which was sponsored jointly by Guinea, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

DISCUSSION: What are your views on the practice of penholding and distribution of power within the UN Security Council? Join in and leave your comments below.

This article is published as part ofFridays With MUNPlanet and its series dedicated to world politics and the United Nations. It is based
on research by Jason Ralph and Jess
Gifkins which was published in the European Journal of International Relations titled ‘The
Purpose of United Nations Security Council Practice: Contesting competence
claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect’. The
article was awarded 'Best Article in EJIR for 2017' by the European International Studies Association and is available Open
Access.

The United Nations Security Council has
its own unusual language and ‘penholder’ is one such term. It
refers to the state that takes the lead on drafting decisions for a particular
conflict or thematic area. For example, the UK is penholder for the conflict in
Yemen, and the US is penholder on counter-terrorism. Penholding is a powerful
role, as the state that leads the drafting gets to set the terms of debate via both
interpreting the situation and framing the response. Germany’s
Ambassador to the United States outlined the importance of this role; “The one who
leads, the one who presents the text, who stakes out a position early in the
day, is the one who more or less determines the game”.

The concept of penholders is relatively
recent, beginning in 2008, but has come to shape the way the Council operates. Initially,
‘penholding’ was a division of labour – a way to manage the increased workload
of the Council – but over time,it has come to mean ‘political ownership’ of an
issue. This can lead to situations where if the penholder does not write a
draft then no one writes a draft. Penholders are resistant to attempts to
encroach on their perceived ownership of an issue, even though this is a
self-appointed role.

The exclusionary nature of this
practice becomes evident when we consider who the penholders are. In 2017 there are 39 conflicts and thematic
areas with penholders, the vast majority of which are held by the UK, the US
and France (known as the Western permanent three, or P3) either individually or
together. Penholding currently refers to continuous political ownership. These two points together mean that
the P3 have established a stranglehold for themselves on the political power
inherent in their penholding roles. Elected members haveexpressed much frustration at their
marginalisation from penholding.

Penholding is an example of the rich,
informal social environment that structures decision-making in
the UN Security Council. An interesting aspect of this arrangement is that
there is nothing inevitable or unalterable about it. Indeed, in recent years
elected members of the Council have begun to challenge the dominance of
permanent members in drafting. A research project by Jason Ralph and myself investigated the practice of penholding and
demonstrated how changes in penholding can overcome deadlocks, as happened in
the humanitarian track of the Syrian conflict.

Penholding on Syria is complex, with
negotiations split into a political track, a chemical weapons track, an
accountability track and a humanitarian track. While permanent members have
dominated negotiations for the first three tracks, a revolving group of elected
members have taken over penholding for the humanitarian track. Initially, in
2014 this group was Australia, Luxembourg and Jordan. Elected members taking
over penholding on as sensitive an issue as the Syrian conflict was seen as ‘crazy’ and as ‘a hostile act’ by one of the
Security Council diplomats we interviewed.

However, elected members were able to
bring fresh creativity to the negotiations, and focused on the needs on the
ground in Syria, rather than on ‘point scoring’. They were able to pass a
series of resolutions, Resolution 2139, which demanded that parties allow
humanitarian access; and Resolution 2165, which authorised the delivery of
humanitarian aid without the consent of the Syrian government. As such, the
change of penholder enabled decisions that would likely not have occurred
without the leadership of elected members.

To date, a group of elected members
have managed to maintain penholdership of the Syrian humanitarian track, but
have faced considerable resistance. When Australia and Luxembourg finished their
two-year terms on the Security Council the permanent members attempted to
reassert control. Quick maneuvering by Spain and New Zealand, and the continuity of Jordan, enabled elected
members to continue penholding on the humanitarian track, and the current group
of elected members who are penholders for the Syrian humanitarian track are Egypt, Japan and Sweden.

Cracks began to emerge on the
penholder system in the Syrian negotiations, which emboldened elected members
who have begun to challenge the system in other areas. Elected members have
since taken on penholding for resolutions on
Israel-Palestine and on responding to attacks on healthcare workers. There has
also been a recent increase in co-penholding between permanent
and elected members.

The practice of penholding does not
need to be exclusionary. If it were simply a division of labour, there could be
a system of rotation or mechanisms to ensure that all Council members took part
in penholding. In fact, more equitable penholder practices are a one of the few
areas of Security Council reform that are both desirable and feasible.

Penholding can seem like odd ‘UN
speak’, but the concept gets to the crux of questions on power and legitimacy.
This informal and self-appointed practice determines which
states get to shape responses to some of the most pressing issues in
international peace and security. In the article, we argue that ‘competent
practices’ need to be about more than diplomats achieving their desired goals,
and should take into account both the effects that decisions have on the ground
and the effects that the process of decision-making has on working
relationships in the Council. As such, the activism shown by elected members on
the Syrian humanitarian track represents a positive move towards more inclusive
Security Council practices.

The
article that this blog
draws from also makes a broader critique of the current separation between
practice theory and normative theory within the discipline of International
Relations and poses a standard of ‘R2P competence’ to assess practices within
the UN Security Council. ‘R2P competent’ practices aim to protect people from
the crimes outlined under R2P and use decision-making practices that build and
sustain a collective approach within the Security Council.

Jess Gifkins is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Manchester and Honorary Research Fellow at the
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, at the University of
Queensland. She researches the practice and process of decision-making within the United Nations system. She has published articles in the European Journal of International Relations,Cooperation and Conflict,Global Responsibility to Protect, the Australian Journal of International Affairs, and Critical Military Studies, on the United Nations, the responsibility to protect, and international responses to crises in Darfur, Libya and Syria. ​She tweets @JessGifkins.

____________________________________________________________________

Cover Image: UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata21 March 1973, via Flickr, The Security Council tonight concluded a series of meetings in Panama City -- the first ever held in Latin America by the Council-- after adopting a resolution urging measures by States to impede the activities of “those enterprises which deliberately attempt to coerce Latin America countries”. A general view of the Council as it voted to adopt the draft resolution (document S/10932/Rev.2) which was sponsored jointly by Guinea, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

DISCUSSION: What are your views on the practice of penholding and distribution of power within the UN Security Council? Join in and leave your comments below.