Let op hierdie ná 1994 gevonde realisme: “The uncomfortable truth has to be faced that the Afrikaner Nationalists were quite correct in their designation of their opponent: they pointed to the disasters wrought by African nationalists elsewhere and argued that if the ANC was allowed to come to power in South Africa, the results would be the same. For obvious reasons a large section of international opinion found it convenient to accept the ANC claims of exceptionalism. Nobody [?] today would argue that apartheid was ever justifiable, but it is a bitter truth for liberals in South Africa today (myself included) that in this respect, at least, their National Party opponents have been vindicated” (101). “The ANC has been in power for a quarter of a century and its policies have resulted in failure on almost every front” (116).

“Every possible sort of manipulation and vote-buying was possible in the election of delegates to the ANC conference” (6). Ook tydens die konferensie kan afgevaardigdes geïntimideer en stemme gekoop word. “Undeniably many votes were bought and many more were rigged” (52). Dit is amper ‘n wonderwerk dat Ramaphosa met 179 stemme gewen het; des te meer omdat Nomvula Mokonyane, “one of his [Zuma’s] strongest supporters, was made head of elections for the conference” (53). “Ramaphosa has no control over Luthuli House, the ANC’s headquarters office, and also is at the mercy of shifting majorities at the party’s NEC [National Executive Committee] meetings” (185).

Oor die ANC se wapenskandaal skryf Johnson: “There were recurrent reports that he [Thabo Mbeki] received $20 million. It is highly probable that a considerable cast of lesser characters received pay-offs and that the deal also paid for the ANC’s election campaign in 1999, thus solving a major problem for Mbeki” (22). “There is little doubt that the vast amounts of money spent by government departments and SOEs [state-owned enterprises] in ‘wasteful and irregular expenditure’, noted every year by auditors, played a considerable role in funding the party, as well as filling many other private pockets” (23). “The ANC leadership had no objection to corruption in itself, only to its political consequences” (28). Korrupsie is ‘n endemiese probleem in ANC-geledere (28). “As much as R100 billion may have been stolen through state capture by the Guptas and others” (87). Sylvia Lucas, wat in 2014 die premier van die Noord-Kaap geword het, staan bekend as “‘the Fast Food Premier’, spending R53 000 on fast food in her first ten weeks in office” (47).

“Effectively South Africa is now run for the benefit of a smaller minority than it was under white rule” (90). Johnson noem die nuwe swart opperklas ‘n “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (82). “In 1998/99 there were 1.17 million civil servants. By 2014 there were 2.161 million – 455 701 at national level, another 1 118 748 in the nine provincial administrations, 311 361 in local government and 275 851 in other government organisations (though not including SOEs). This was ludicrous overstaffing and featherbedding … by 2018 there were well over 2.2 million civil servants, earning average salaries of R338 000 per annum [R28 000+ per month]… ‘the largest gravy train ever seen in Africa'” (123-124). “Civil-service salaries take up no less than 35 per cent of the national budget, and year after year such workers enjoy inflation-plus increases, even when the economy is not growing” (90). Dit gebeur ook in die res van swart Afrika.

Hierbenewens is daar ook ‘n tradisionele opperklas wat buitensporig baie staatsgeld inpalm: “By 2010 there were no fewer than 13 kings or queens in South Africa’s strange republic. In that year, it was decided to reduce the number to seven, but the pressure to increase that number again would be insistent” (92). Die ANC betuig graag lippediens aan die nuwe demokratiese Suid-Afrika, asof die regering (altyd) doen wat die meerderheid kiesers verlang. In werklikheid is die ANC “a naturally authoritarian movement” (94). Die land sit opgeskeep met “a Soviet-style democratic centralism. The party continued to view its electoral rivals not as opponents but as ‘enemies'” (95).

“The real reason why, despite all the ANC’s averrals [assertions of truth], African nationalism in South Africa has taken an almost exactly similar course as it did in the rest of the continent is that once in power it is driven by the same politically dominant class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Moreover, the explosive factor that drives them far off course is also the same, the almost irresistible (and apparently bottomless) appetite of that class for primary accumulation. The fundamental problem, of course, is that a bureaucratic bourgeoisie is not productive in the way that a commercial and industrial (or even agricultural) middle class is. Because it does not itself generate wealth, it is inevitably parasitic and can achieve its goals only through patronage and corruption” (106). Hierdie geneigdheid tot parasitering verduidelik deels waarom die Ramaphosa-ANC so entoesiasties oor die onteiening van blankes se eiendom sonder vergoeding is. ‘n Ander rede is doodgewone wraaksugtigheid.

“In the quarter-century that followed the ANC’s accession to power, the black middle class grew at great speed. Primarily it was composed of the overpaid workers of the massively overstaffed public sector, particularly its affluent upper ranks, but increasingly a black business class came into existence, usually feeding off state and other public-sector contracts and the preferential procurement laws applied to both public and private entities” (108). Dit is dus nie primêr bv inisiatief, kundigheid en toewyding wat swart sakelui laat slaag en hulle welvarend maak nie, maar blatante ANC-bevoordeling; dus rassediskriminasie ten koste van veral blankes en Asiate.

“Despite the theory that this patriotic bourgeoisie was merely afforcing the principal driver, the working class, it was apparent from the first that the former group was granted an absolute supremacy over the latter. Thus, for example, the forced sale of white farms to black interests invariably led to the loss of large numbers of farmworker jobs as production collapsed on the farms taken over, but usually the bankable asset of the land ended up in the hands of the black elite” (108). “Almost 90 per cent of the farms thus transferred have failed because farming is a highly specialised, competitive and tough business. In fact, relatively few Africans want to be farmers: far more want urban land or land that they can develop or sell for cash. Land is simply a proxy issue for feelings of black dispossession and inequality, feelings that can never be assuaged by any mere legislative proposal” (118).

“An even more clear-cut case [than farms] was the mines, in which successive editions of a Mining Charter compelled higher and higher equity shares (30 per cent by 2018) for black investors. The result was to stifle the mining industry almost completely, and many thousands of mining jobs were lost. Clearly, these lost jobs mattered much less to the ANC than the help they were trying to give to would-be black capitalists” (108-109). Johnson verwys na die ANC se poging “to insert a new and parasitic upper social class – the owners of that 30 per cent equity share – into the existing social structure. In effect, the insertion of this new layer would destroy the profitability of the capital already invested in the mines” (109).

“By insisting on the primacy of the interests of this would-be black bourgeoisie, the ANC guarantees that South Africa will be unable to compete internationally – after all, where else in the world do governments insist that investors simply give away 30 per cent of their equity?” (109-110). “The black middle class is clearly still, in Marx’s terms, only a class for itself – a multitude of individual interests all pushing and manoeuvring for personal advantage” (112). “What was missing was any conception of a national or common good” (112). “It is almost as if the ANC is intent on throttling the economy. Mining and agriculture are, after all, the historic mainstays of the economy and the Mining Charter and EWC [expropriation without compensation] seem almost designed to bring both to a halt” (121).

Vergelyk dié hede met die goeie ou dae. “The group that the ANC and SACP misnamed as the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ [kapitaliste met buitelandse bande], ie the white business classes, really constituted far more of a ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’. Over many generations the white and Indian business classes had built thousands of productive and lasting businesses, a powerful and independent financial sector, highly successful retail chains that fed and clothed the population and a successful commercial agriculture sector that grew the country’s food. These were deeply rooted institutions that had invested massively in South Africa over the years and had also contributed philanthropically to many schemes and NGO’s with the aim of furthering the national future. They had of course done this for profit and their ranks included the normal number of scoundrels, but their overall achievement was not to be denied” (112).

“That old [white/Afrikaner] ruling class had many sins to its name [?] but over the 84 years since Union in 1910 it built a formidable infrastructure, a developed economy and a series of powerful and efficient institutions – the armed forces, Eskom, Transnet (including a large railway and port system), the civil service, a strong police force, a highly developed water distribution [and roads] system – and much else besides. It was able to do all this because it was a class for itself with a strong solidaristic consciousness of itself. This was crucial, for it ensured that individual or sectional interests within that ruling group were held in check and subordinated to a strong sense of a national interest” (122).

“The new [ANC] ruling elite is a merely bureaucratic bourgeoisie … This group has no settled relationship with the forces of production in the way that a class of farmers or industrialists might have. Instead, it is an artificial creation, existing only on the taxes paid by old productive businesses and the white middle classes, which it resents and despises (though also seeks to emulate). It is pumped up in size and income purely as a matter of political fiat and without any regard to function or utility. Inevitably it is opportunistic, with its members continually seeking to build business careers by means of illicit family companies to which they attempt to divert state procurement. All attempts to prevent such practices have failed and, indeed, they are endemic” (123). “The [black] elite wants power not in order to use it to achieve various policy goals but simply in order to possess it, to be in charge, to get rich and enjoy the perquisites of office” (182).

[* “The commitment made [by Cyril Ramaphosa] at the jobs summit in October 2018 that there would be no retrenchments at all anywhere in the public sector” (183).

** “Only 33 out of South Africa’s 257 municipalities got a clean audit in 2018” (209).]

“A key objective would be to make South Africa as internationally competitive as possible in order to maximise investment and job creation.* For a start, all taxes on investment would have to go. This would mean the abolition of BEE, of all rules governing racially directed procurement, of the Mining Charter and the various other industry charters, and also of affirmative action. This would doubtless produce some resistance, but once it became clear that these changes would vastly increase the number of jobs, that would soon fade away. South Africa needs to study such African success stories as Rwanda, Mauritius and Ethiopia – none of which allow any of these taxes on investment – and copy them” (164-165). “It would be pointed out that BEE and affirmative action were merely more recent varieties of social favouritism, akin to job reservation under apartheid, and that around the world most other countries had long since abandoned such practices. (The United States is a partial exception, but even there affirmative action is under attack almost everywhere.)” (165).

[* “In the period 2008-2018 South Africa lost 300 000 manufacturing jobs – nearly 15 per cent of the total” (198).]

Die afgelope 30 jaar het die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking verdubbel. Daar is groot werkloosheid, ‘n nypende tekort aan behuising en ook waterskaarste. Desnieteenstaande stroom inkommers die land grootliks ongehinderd binne. “In March 2018 South Africa signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which calls for the free movement of goods, capital and labour throughout the continent, a clear attempt to emulate the formula that has made the EU [European Union] a success. No one can doubt that freer trade and investment across borders would be beneficial, but for South Africa any agreement to a free movement of labour would constitute an almost suicidal triumph of ideology over common sense … if one does nothing, immigration control will be forced in the end through the explosion of xenophobic violence” (166-167).

“Why, for example, are SAA’s [South African Airways] costs per seat-kilometer 53 per cent higher than the average of their international competitors? Why does it cost several times as much to build a kilometer of motorway in South Africa as it does in the USA, despite higher American wages? Why are South African port charges and airport charges among the highest in the world? Why are South Africa’s educational levels among the worst in the world despite one of the highest proportions of GDP [gross domestic product] spent on education?” (209). Waar lê die fout? ‘n Aanduiding van waar die probleem gesoek moet word, kan dalk in ‘n stelling van Nelson Mandela gevind word. Hy het gesê: Suid-Afrika se grootste bate is sy inwoners. Die teenoorgestelde kan waar wees. Is baie Suid-Afrikaners (bv finansieel, maatskaplik) ‘n bate of ‘n las vir die land?

Wie betaal vir die gelag, eintlik ramp, genaamd die nuwe Suid-Afrika? “Only 13 per cent of the population pay income tax, which provides government with 38 per cent of all its revenue. And the wealthiest one per cent of the population pays 61 per cent of all income tax … 80 per cent of all income tax is paid by just three per cent of the population … taxes have increased 25 per cent since 1994, with South Africa now one of the world’s most highly taxed countries … In effect, all this heavy taxation in South Africa has a single purpose – the creation and maintenance of a large bureaucratic elite whose salary levels are 30 to 40 per cent above those for comparable jobs in the private sector … one finds that 36 per cent of all government revenue is spent on the public-service wage bill – a quite crazy figure. And another 17 per cent of the budget is spent on the social grants that essentially serve to keep the poorest from starving or rising in revolt” (204-205).

Wat doen Ramaphosa aan hierdie benarde situasie? Hy bak mooi broodjies wat nie met konstruktiewe aksies opgevolg word nie. “What he hopes to do is simply to talk up the economy – what Larry Summers, the former US treasury secretary, once called ‘the cheapest form of economic stimulus'” (211). “One has to ask such basic questions as to whether the ANC has ever been capable of a comprehensive South African patriotism. After all, what did all those decades of militant nationalist struggle amount to if, in practice, ANC leaders were willing to sell their country down the river at the bidding of a criminal family of Indian immigrants? It’s as if the whole ANC pursuit of power was really a journey powered by individual self-enrichment” (213).Wat kan gedoen word? Die beste skyn te wees om oor te begin. “It would be best to return to the status quo ante of 1994, that is to say, a GNU [government of national unity]” (215). Daarby moet nie net politici van die verskillende partye betrek word nie, maar ook “a few non-political businessmen and managers” (215).

Teen die einde van sy boek het Johnson verdere (hoewel gekwalifiseerde) komplimente vir Afrikaners in vergelyking met ANC-kamerade. “As one looks back, one realises that for most of the 20th century the white Afrikaners who constituted the ruling class enjoyed certain advantages. True, they were committed to white supremacy and, within that, to Afrikaner domination. But they felt a powerful patriotism towards their country, even if not to all its peoples, and their morale as a solidary group and their Calvinist morality exercised a strong limit on personal corruption. The net result was that they presided over a long period of successful national development in which not just Afrikaners but all the other groups shared: their numbers, per capita income, educational levels and life expectancy all increased. The sins and downside of Afrikaner rule are too well known to require re-enumeration but they nonetheless provide the only benchmark that there is. No Afrikaner leader feathered his nest in the way Jacob Zuma did. Already ANC rule has seen steep falls in African life expectancy (due to Mbeki’s Aids denialism) and the last five years have seen a steady fall in per capita income. Moreover, future economic development has already been blighted by the way the ANC has transformed Eskom from having a surplus of cheap electricity to dire shortages of very expensive electricity. The comparison is, indeed, so unflattering for the ANC as to make it clear that it cannot succeed on its own” (214); vandaar Johnson se voorstel dat die ANC-regering deur ‘n regering van nasionale eenheid vervang moet word.