The territories of the former Soviet Union have experienced
several interethnic conflicts, particularly in Sumgait, Fergana,
Noviy Uzgen (Kazakhstan), and Tuva. The bloody war in
Nagorno-Karabakh is still going on. Here, I shall focus on the
Osh conflict in the summer of 1990, which involved the large
Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups of Central Asia. This conflict
shares several common features with conflicts elsewhere, but
differs also. Furthermore, as elsewhere, in this "Turkic
self-genocide" the ethno-territorial interests of the people
were aroused. This tragedy was prompted by the difficult
socioeconomic conditions and under-utilized labour resources in
the region. The conflict is also connected with the struggle for
access to power. A certain part of the population was seeking
power and "greater liberty."

As we shall see below, this conflict was characterized by the
cruel forms which it took: murder, rape, arson, and massacre.
This report is based on statistical material, periodicals,
research, observations, and analysis of our own sociological
observations. Nearly 2,000 people Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian - of
the towns Osh, Uzgen, Jalal-Abad, and Kara-Suu, where the tragic
events happened, were interviewed in a survey carried out in May
1992.

The population of the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan is composed of
Kyrgyz people (54.6%), Uzbeks (27.1%), Russians (about 10%),
Tajiks (1.5%), Ukrainians (1.3%), and many others.1
The polytechnic population has increased through immigration from
other republics, particularly neighbouring Uzbekistan, at the
expense of natural increase in the native population.

In Uzgen, the main conflict took place on 5-7 June 1990, with
sporadic outbursts of criminality on other days as well. Both
sides committed arson, killed horses, and plundered shops and
offices. They were armed with smaller guns, pistols, sticks, and
rods. Murders in Uzgen, Osh, and other regions were committed by
strangulation with wire or rope; torture and beating; assault and
battery using axes, stones, and other hard objects; and guns.
There were cases when the victim was burnt, to make
identification impossible. Rape was characteristic of both sides,
as were various forms of humiliation and torture, such as
parading women naked in the street.

It is still early to draw any final conclusions as to the
results and lessons of these bloody events. We may only sum up
the number of victims and the material damage caused to the
inhabitants of the region and the state, and venture some
preliminary remarks. During this "self-genocide,"
according to official data, more than 300 people were killed,
including about two dozen people who could not be identified.
Three dozen disappeared. The material damage, according to
preliminary data, runs to about 100 million roubles.

A number of different economic, social, and political factors
can be adduced as reasons for the ethnic conflict in the Osh
region. In economic terms, Kyrgyzstan had been developing
one-sidedly, serving as a source of raw materials for
industrially developed regions of the Soviet Union. In the
region, industry developed at a slower pace in small towns where
the mining and processing branches of industry were predominantly
under Union control. The population had been mainly engaged in
agriculture with its hard manual labour, cultivating tobacco and
cotton and breeding sheep and cattle. By the late 1980s, the
Soviet Federation of Trade Unions calculated that more than 80
per cent of the population had incomes lower than the living wage
and were on the verge of poverty.2

The Osh region, where over half of the population of the
republic lives, has been lagging behind the average level for the
republic in most respects. Among those interviewed, 57 per cent
pointed to the backwardness of the economy in the region, low
wages, and low living standards as the main causes of the tragic
events in Osh. All those interviewed, whether Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, or
Russians, mentioned these as the main causes of this Turkic
"self-annihilation." To be more precise, 51.9 per cent
of the Kyrgyz respondents identified these as the main causes, as
did 57.3 per cent of the Uzbeks and 75.1 per cent of the
Russians.

The existing economic structure, weak socio-cultural
structures, and a high birth rate among the native population,
led to a situation in which nearly 150,000 people in the republic
(or every sixth inhabitant) were engaged in industry, of whom
three-quarters were young people.3 This social group
is the main destabilizing force in the republic. The bulk of the
crowds committing excesses were youths. Thus, 78.7 per cent of
those interviewed said that young men aged 20-29 took the most
active part in the conflict. This was also confirmed by the
militia.

The advent of a market economy undoubtedly brings
unemployment, especially among young men. This could
significantly aggravate the situation in the future. The
population of the Osh region is expected to number three million
in 18-20 years, making Osh, especially the areas near the Fergana
Valley, the most densely populated area not only in the republic
and in Central Asia, but in the former Soviet Union. The
population is by and large concentrated in the plains -
conveniently for agriculture and industry - in areas near the
Fergana Valley in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Here, the density of
the population requires changes in the economic structure. The
republic needs to build plants and factories to process raw
materials.

Mobility among the native population is relatively low. The
policy guidelines that dictate that all school graduates are
required to work on the farms are ill-suited. Such a call leads
in some places to a surplus of labour resources, thus
complicating the situation. It is necessary to enroll village
women, especially young women, to work in industry and to
stimulate their involvement in society.

The housing problem became one of the most important factors
in the tragic events in Osh. Statistically, 47 per cent of the
Kyrgyz, 49 per cent of the Russians, and 48.3 per cent of the
Uzbeks surveyed thought that one of the main causes of the
tragedy was the housing shortage. In Osh region nearly 60.000
families, or every sixth family, was on the waiting list for
housing.4 In ethnic terms, the bulk of these still
waiting were young native men. For years they have been waiting
for dwellings and plots of land, while living in hostels. Among
their actions, they formed the informal organization Osh Aimagi.

It was a criminal error for the authorities to give plots of
land for housing on the kolkhoz (collective farm) named after
Lenin, without the prior consent of its leaders. The bulk of the
population in this district is Uzbek. The situation changed
radically after opposition to this move developed into
interethnic conflict.

One of the causes of the 1990 tragedy was the collusion of the
nomenklatura, the militia, and the business sector, who
forgot about the elementary social conditions of workers and
thought only of personal gain. As President Akaev put it, in the
South social and property differentiation was taking place
between poor and rich, those who had power and those who did not.
When the situation erupted into violence, the corrupt leaders had
no control.5 Indeed, they themselves brought on the
conflict. Of those interviewed, 43.7 per cent said that the
mafia's activity was one of the main reasons for the Osh tragedy
(by "mafia" we mean the criminal collusion of business
people and the authorities of the district, the city, and the
regions.

This problem is closely connected with that of training of
national cadres. Especially during the post-war period, it was
thought in the former Soviet Union that a precondition for a
correct national policy was the training and representation in
the organs of power of all the ethnic groups living in the
country or in the republic. This was often done to the detriment
of the professions, business, and other sectors. It was assumed
that any excessive clustering of representatives of one ethnic
group in a particular sphere of public life or power would cause
discontent among another ethnic group.

In 1990 Kyrgyz constituted 66.6 per cent in the executive
committee of the Osh Regional Soviet of People's Deputies,
Russians 13.7 per cent, and Uzbeks 5.8 per cent.6 At
the same time, however, Uzbeks constituted 71.4 per cent of all
those working in the trade system of Osh. These disproportion's
were also characteristic of the militia. Ethnic disproportion in
the training of cadres caused discontent among Kyrgyz and Uzbeks
alike.

At the same time, these people, working in the service sector
nomenklatura, lived in peace and friendship for a long time.
Uzbeks in the service sector fed and served the party workers,
the workers of Soviets, and militia workers "at the highest
level." The latter provided the workers in the trade sector
with success in collecting their capital. Such "mutual
aid" among the corrupt upper strata of a region, a city, the
militia, and in the service sector guaranteed a smooth social and
inter-ethnic facade for a long time.

But this could not go on forever. At the same time the
majority of the population - Kyrgyz and Uzbeks - was living in
misery and poverty. With greater democratization of the society,
activity among the people was growing. People with "trade
capital" who had amassed fortunes lacked only power and
independence. To gain these, they raised the question of
"Uzbek" autonomy within Osh region. They were the
inspirers in 1989 of the Adalat Union, consisting of
nationalistic Uzbeks, including those favouring separation.

These events coincided with the removal of the Osh Regional
Executive Committee leaders. The new leadership began by
dismissing Kyrgyz with close ties to the regional commercial
mafia, thus causing discontent among the latter. Removed from
power, the representatives of the mafia turned to the people for
support, inflaming nationalist and separatist sentiments. More
than one-third of those interviewed stressed that one of the
causes of the Osh tragedy were mistakes in the selection of the
cadres.

For the future, the authorities should try to use the existing
structures to serve the interests of the people, instead of
destroying or dismantling them. Time is needed for the transition
of people from one historical occupation to another. Excessive
"percentomania" in the placing of national cadres in
the public structures of power, without taking into account their
professional qualities, damages the national economy. It is
necessary to rise above the difficulties of narrow national
psychology and interests. However, some local authorities have
taken the wrong path in the forming of cadres. Thus, in the
Kara-Suu district, after the tragic events, the authorities began
mechanically changing the national composition of the militia,
recruiting young Uzbeks without paying any attention to their
moral, political, or physical training. Although young Uzbeks
were reluctant to work in the militia, the local authorities
promised them all kinds of possible and impossible social
guarantees in order to bring the ethnic composition of militia
into conformity with the ethnic structure of the district.

The socio-cultural aspects of the Osh region are weakly
developed, compared to other regions of the republic. Strictly
speaking, there is no effective system of medical care in the
South. Kyrgyzstan ranks lowest among the former Soviet republics
in the number of its doctors. As a result, infant mortality is
very high in the Osh region; in fact, it is the highest in the
republic.

The republic, especially the rural areas of the Osh region,
needs far more educational and cultural institutions. For
example, only 25 per cent of children in the Osh region attend
kindergarten; in the rural areas only 16 per cent.7
The number of schools constitutes only 65 per cent of what is
actually needed. Furthermore, the south of Kyrgyzstan lags far
behind the rest of the republic in the number of cinemas, clubs,
theatres, museums, and libraries. As for everyday repairs and
other services, the Osh region ranks lowest in the republic.
Every second respondent expressed dissatisfaction with the work
of the service institutions. All these factors lead to social
tension and discontent among the population.

National concord depends by and large on the culture of
relations among nations and groups. Inter-ethnic conflicts
usually take place when general culture is low, and the
traditions, interests, languages, and customs of some nations are
neglected in favour of others. Thus, 20.7 per cent of respondents
said that the cause of the tragedy was the low cultural level of
the population: 16.3 per cent of Kyrgyz and 20.1 per cent of
Uzbeks mentioned the low cultural level as the cause of the
inter-ethnic conflict, whereas 40.3 per cent of the Russian
respondents pointed to this factor.

From the middle to the late 1980s, there was considerable
growth in political activity and national self-consciousness
among all the peoples of Kyrgyzstan, and indeed the whole Union.
A gradual liberation from totalitarianism in the republic, as
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, was marked by the active
growth of informal public unions: national movements, national
and cultural centres, associations, societies, and the like. The
"National Democratic Front of Kyrgyzstan," consisting
of Kyrgyz, and Adalat, consisting exclusively of Uzbeks, appeared
in the Osh region in 1989. Later, Osh Aimagi, which was
exclusively Kyrgyz, emerged. In these two informal groups,
nationalistic Osh Aimagi and separatist Adalat objectives took
shape.

Osh Aimagi undertook mainly the social tasks, such as getting
plots of land for individual housing for the Kyrgyz. It demanded
the territory of the Lenin kolkhoz of the Kara-Suu district,
planning to create a Kyrgyz village there. In this kolkhoz,
however, the bulk of the population was Uzbek. Discontent among
the kolkhoz inhabitants swiftly became inter-ethnic opposition.

Representatives of the Adalat group submitted 20 claims,
including Uzbek autonomy in the Osh region and recognition of the
Uzbek language. More than one-third (35 per cent) of the Kyrgyz
respondents considered the Uzbek aspiration for autonomy in the
Osh region to be the cause of the Osh conflict.

In fact, such demands for autonomy were raised not only by
separatist groups like Adalat. In the late 1980s the awakening of
the national consciousness was characteristic of the greater part
of the Uzbek population in the Osh region. The idea of national
separatism also was typical of educated, well-to-do Uzbeks in
high posts and Uzbek aksakals (elders), who were held in high
respect. They were the inspirers and sponsors of Adalat, but at
the same time they preferred to keep in the background, as we
will see below. In March 1990, a petition signed by 23 Uzbek
inhabitants of Jalal-Abad town including 16 communists, two
Heroes of Socialist Labour, and one Hero of the Soviet Union -
was sent to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and of the Kyrgyz
SSR, where the creation of the autonomous republic was declared.8
Such declarations also appeared in Uzbekistan, for example in the
Tashkent Institute of Microbiology.

These claims put forward by various leaders of the informal
unions became a principal cause of the Osh tragedy. If only the
regional party committee, the regional executive committee, and
the leaders of the Central Committee of the republic had acted
more resolutely, this tragedy could have been prevented. The
party leaders in the republic and in the Osh region did not
change their approach, nor display any resourcefulness in this
matter, but worked in an old command-administrative style. They
either prohibited informal movements or gave them free rein.

The confession of the leaders of the republic that they did
little to keep ahead of events is really striking. The former
First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, the Chairman of
the Supreme Soviet, A. Masaliev, admitted in an interview with
Pravda that the conflict was quite unexpected.9

Sometimes criminal errors were committed. The decision of the
leaders of the Osh region to allot fertile lands of the Lenin
kolkhoz for housing for the Kyrgyz youth was one such blunder.
This is reflected in the fact that 6.9 per cent of the Kyrgyz,
18.1 per cent of the Uzbeks, and 16.7 per cent of the Russian
respondents said that the actions of the local authorities and
the party organization caused the Osh conflict. Furthermore, 12.5
per cent of the Kyrgyz, 34.8 per cent of the Uzbeks, and 28.9 per
cent of the Russians stressed that the conflict began with the
allocation of plots of land for housing. According to 53.4 per
cent of those interviewed, the local authorities knew about the
coming conflict and failed to take adequate measures to prevent
it. This was confirmed by the report of the head of the regional
KGB, Colonel A. Mameev.10

Between January and June 1990 the leadership of the Osh region
KGB delivered nine reports to the regional committee and to the
regional executive committee about the potentially explosive
situation between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. These reports also contained
concrete recommendations. But neither the reports nor the
recommendations were given any serious attention.

The "rumour syndrome" played a major part in the
inter-ethnic conflict. In answer to the question "What was
the cause of the fight between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks?", 43.4 per
cent of respondents said that it was the allocation of plots of
land. However, 39.4 per cent of those interviewed answered that
they began to fight after hearing that '`our folk are being
beaten and killed." But actually, there were no murders and
conflicts in those places. Lack of objective information, weakly
developed mass media, the low level of education among both
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, and the inexperience of the militia aggravated
the situation.

The reports of the KGB pointed out the great role of trade and
service workers in the inter-ethnic conflict. As mentioned above,
the disproportions in the cadre arrangement and in trade and
commerce were one cause of the tragedy. Of those interviewed 40.9
per cent said that trade and service workers were neutral in the
conflict, 15.2 per cent thought that they were leaders and that
they instigated the conflict, whereas 25.4 per cent answered that
they only sponsored the actions.

Our ethno-sociological investigations confirmed the report of
the KGB, according to which the opposing sides, especially
Uzbeks, had long been preparing for this conflict. The Uzbeks had
probably begun preparations in February 1990. Some of the Uzbek
population in Osh began to drive out Kyrgyz tenants from their
lodgings, prompted by the threats of Uzbek extremists to set fire
to their houses if they did not expel their Kyrgyz tenants. The
result was the appearance of some 1.5 thousand young Kyrgyz men
in Osh who joined Osh Aimagi.

Of those interviewed, 63.9 per cent thought that the
confrontations were premeditated, 24.6 per cent did not respond,
and 8.7 per cent said that they did not think the violence was
premeditated. More than a quarter of those interviewed answered
that the Uzbeks had been preparing for the violence, 17.6 per
cent that the Kyrgyz had been preparing, and 15.5 per cent that
both sides had been doing so.

What was the attitude of other peoples toward this conflict?
Besides Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Russians, there are Ukrainians,
Tatars, Turks from Meskhetia, and others living in southern
Kyrgyzstan. Of those surveyed, 59.6 per cent replied that other
peoples were neutral observers and 21.3 per cent that they tried
to conciliate two fraternal nations; only 2.4 per cent replied
that the others sided with the Uzbeks, and 6.1 per cent that they
took the Kyrgyz part.

To normalize the situation enormous forces were drawn in: the
armed forces of the Soviet Army militia and KGB from other union
republics. Three quarters of those interviewed answered that the
Soviet Army normalized the situation, 38.6 per cent that it was
the militia that did so.

All are anxious about the problem of averting inter-ethnic
conflicts in the future. Solutions to economic and social
problems are also of interest to people. Nearly two-thirds (64%)
of those interviewed answered the question "what measures
should be taken to prevent national conflicts?" by saying
that "it is necessary to improve living conditions";
then came such factors as "strengthening of friendship
between nations" (48.7%), "the correct arrangement of
cadres" (38.4%), and "improving the work of the
militia" (38.6%).

For that reason, we may conclude that solving socio-economic
problems will help bring about a normal state of inter-ethnic
relations in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.