Great article (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001492_pf.html)in the Washington Post about the rescue of Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell in Afghanistan.

The blood in his eyes almost blinded him, but the Navy Seal could hear, clattering above the trees in northeast Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/related-topics.html/Afghanistan?tid=informline), rescue helicopters.

Hey, he pleaded silently. I'm right here.

Marcus Luttrell, a fierce, 6-foot-5 rancher's son from Texas (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/related-topics.html/Texas?tid=informline), lay in the dirt. His face was shredded, his nose broken, three vertebrae cracked from tumbling down a ravine. A Taliban (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/related-topics.html/The+Taliban?tid=informline) rocket-propelled grenade had ripped off his pants and riddled him with shrapnel.

As the helicopters approached, Luttrell, a petty officer first class, turned on his radio. Dirt clogged his throat, leaving him unable to speak. He could hear a pilot: "If you're out there, show yourself."

It was June 2005. The United States (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/related-topics.html/United+States?tid=informline) had just suffered its worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001. Taliban forces had attacked Luttrell's four-man team on a remote ridge shortly after 1 p.m. on June 28. By day's end, 19 Americans had died. Now U.S. aircraft scoured the hills for survivors.

There would be only one. Luttrell's ordeal -- described in exclusive interviews with him and 14 men who helped save him -- is among the more remarkable accounts to emerge from Afghanistan. It has been a dim and distant war, where after 5 1/2 years about 26,000 U.S. troops remain locked in conflict.

Out of that darkness comes this spark of a story. It is a tale of moral choices and of prejudices transcended. It is also a reminder of how challenging it is to be a smart soldier, and how hard it is to be a good man ...

Culpeper

06-12-2007, 12:43 AM

At 1:20 p.m., about an hour after the Seals released the Afghans, dozens of Taliban members overwhelmed them. The civilians he had spared, Luttrell believed, had betrayed them. At the end of a two-hour firefight, only he remained alive. He has written about it in a book going on sale tomorrow, "Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10."

I remember when this battle hit the news.

JeffC

06-16-2007, 09:46 PM

I just finished reading Marcus Luttrell's book "Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0316067598/104-3075668-4435162?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0316067598)". It's outstanding, heart-breaking, and inspiring. He also raises an important issue regarding Rules of Engagement, and how worrying about the possible ramifications of breaking ROE may have contributed to the single greatest loss of life in Navy SEAL history.

Please read it and pass it along, if you haven't done so already.

Bill Moore

06-17-2007, 02:06 AM

Jeff your comment could be interpreted as you're advocating shooting unarmed civilians. I haven't seen the AAR on this incident and have no inside knowledge, but in general we can run missions pretty much when we want (weather dependent obviously) to nab or a kill a bad guy, which means you generally have the option of aborting the mission if you have been comprised, because you can come back another day. The article stated that these men thought they may have been compromised, yet they agreed to accept the risk and drive on with the mission anyway. I don't think shooting unharmed civilians was an option to begin with, and either did they. They had two options apparently, one was to drive on with the mission, and the other was to abort. As they suspected in (according to the article), the civilians they released reported their location to the Taliban, thus the ensuing fire fight. I don't question their judgment for a minute (I would if they shot unharmed civilians for a target of moderate importance), unfortunately the situation took a turn for the worst, and we lost several brave men that day.

JeffC

06-17-2007, 05:11 AM

Jeff your comment could be interpreted as you're advocating shooting unarmed civilians. I haven't seen the AAR on this incident and have no inside knowledge, but in general we can run missions pretty much when we want (weather dependent obviously) to nab or a kill a bad guy, which means you generally have the option of aborting the mission if you have been comprised, because you can come back another day. The article stated that these men thought they may have been compromised, yet they agreed to accept the risk and drive on with the mission anyway. I don't think shooting unharmed civilians was an option to begin with, and either did they. They had two options apparently, one was to drive on with the mission, and the other was to abort. As they suspected in (according to the article), the civilians they released reported their location to the Taliban, thus the ensuing fire fight. I don't question their judgment for a minute (I would if they shot unharmed civilians for a target of moderate importance), unfortunately the situation took a turn for the worst, and we lost several brave men that day.

--- If you read the book, you'll see that the circumstances surrounding the mission, which had been attempted multiple times in the past, and which involved tracking a very high profile target, made the decision about what to do with the goat herders a bit more complex then just re-scheduling it for another day. In fact, even if they aborted the mission and headed for an extraction point, they'd still be exposed by the goat herders, and tracked by the Taliban. A fight was inevitable if they let them live.

Further, they were not of one mind regarding killing them. One team member favored it, one abstained, one opposed it, and Luttrell couldn't make up his mind, although eventually he says that he was swayed not by his military training but by his religious upbringing to let them live. Today, he believes that he made the wrong decision, and should have killed them.

Two Taliban sympathizers versus 19 dead SEALs. What would you have done?

Tom Odom

06-17-2007, 12:21 PM

Two Taliban sympathizers versus 19 dead SEALs. What would you have done?

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

Ironhorse

06-17-2007, 12:36 PM

Tom, well said, I just went to refill my coffee as I struggle with the same fatally flawed argument.

I have not read the book and have little but passing news info on the events. My comment is on the structure and process of the argument.

It is extraordinarly easy to slip into wargaming actions based on the clarity of hindsight. And as a Monday morning QB who was actually in the game on Sunday, Luttrell will be exposed to many emotions and may feel he has the blood of his compadres on his hands. 2 sympathizers for 19 of "us" - sure, easy math, war is full of tough choices, should'a would'a could'a didn't.

But it doesn't work that way. Time flows in the other direction. If one uses foresight instead of hindsight to QB this thing on the prior Friday afternoon instead of Monday morning, and starts using that calculus against every potential threat who might pose a risk --- that generates atrocities, not good military decisions.

From the thumbnail I've got, sounds like "didn't" was the right call. People still die when the right calls are made. It's war. Can't start doing the wrong thing just because of that. Then war truly would be hell.

SWJED

06-17-2007, 12:49 PM

If one uses foresight instead of hindsight to QB this thing on the prior Friday afternoon instead of Monday morning, and starts using that calculus against every potential threat who might pose a risk --- that generates atrocities, not good military decisions.

Could not agree more...

Steve Blair

06-17-2007, 12:52 PM

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

Not only that....

How do you KNOW they were sympathizers? Maybe the Taliban had family members as hostages, or had the capability to grab said family members. We are, after all, dealing with an enemy that has done this sort of thing before and wouldn't hesitate to do it again. If you're that goatherd, are you going to risk your son, daughter, or wife to help some palefaces that you'll never see again and who can't really protect you in any case? Doubtful.

Sometimes pushing on isn't the right answer. If you're blown, you abort and live to track another day. What you don't do is hand the enemy a IO victory by shooting goatherds or by pushing on when you know (or strongly suspect) you're blown and risk the lives of your people without good cause. The balance shifts somewhat if the target is high priority, but that still shouldn't justify handing the bad guys a free press opportunity by killing bystanders.

Americans are indoctrinated by sports and other scenarios to want to avoid anything less than a clear (and hopefully crushing) victory. Sometimes we forget that surviving can be a victory all its own and that restraint and patience are also a component of long term victory.

JeffC

06-17-2007, 01:50 PM

Tom, well said, I just went to refill my coffee as I struggle with the same fatally flawed argument.

I have not read the book and have little but passing news info on the events. My comment is on the structure and process of the argument.

--- Not a good idea. You don't know all the elements of the argument without reading the book. The point of my post isn't to present an argument; it's to encourage reading the book, and then perhaps you'll be compelled to think about whether the current ROE needs to be re-visited.

JeffC

06-17-2007, 02:01 PM

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

Ironhorse

06-17-2007, 02:03 PM

Sure, OK, Jeff. I'll clarify that I did not mean YOUR argument. You have nothing in there but balanced posts that present exactly what you say your intent is -- look at this for some chin scratching material on sticky situations that come with the territory and will make you think.

I totally get your point. Do you get mine?

Not at all trying to draw you out on this, but it will be a while before I can crack those 400pp. If you've got more to say (or anyone else?), I'd love to hear the Exec Summary. If not, I'll get to it at some point myself :).

-----------
Edited one hour later to add:
JeffC's post #8 in this thread is what I was responding to with this post. His #9 was not up when I started writing this. And that one starts to do the math in a way that is at least disconcerting.

JeffC

06-17-2007, 02:18 PM

Sure, OK, Jeff. I'll clarify that I did not mean YOUR argument. You have nothing in there but balanced posts that present exactly what you say your intent is -- look at this for some chin scratching material on sticky situations that come with the territory and will make you think.

I totally get your point. Do you get mine?

Not at all trying to draw you out on this, but it will be a while before I can crack those 400pp. If you've got more to say (or anyone else?), I'd love to hear the Exec Summary. If not, I'll get to it at some point myself :).

I do understand your point. Rules of Engagement are there for a reason, and should be implemented and abided by. On the other hand, changing circumstances may require that ROE by revisited or modified.

As far as the book is concerned, nothing short of reading it does it justice. I read it in 10 hours without a problem. It moves fast, especially the second half, which is where you can pick it up from if you want to skip the INDOC and BUD/S training.

Sargent

06-17-2007, 02:45 PM

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

It doesn't matter. It's a slippery slope, so there's a reason you stay firmly at the top, a good few steps away from the edge.

And take a look at your logic: the Taliban are killing folks who won't join (or who work against them), so we need to start killing folks who work for the Taliban so we can defeat them.

mmx1

06-17-2007, 02:57 PM

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

JeffC

06-17-2007, 03:27 PM

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

--- First, an article on what happened doesn't do it justice. Read the book, or don't read the book, but don't imagine that you know what happened without reading the only existing record of what happened (i.e., Luttrell's account).

--- Second, in this particular case, they were clearly Taliban supporters. Revealing the existence and position of this SEAL team makes them the equivalent of spies in that information served as a weapon.

--- Finally, the example you present in your last paragraph isn't remotely equivalent to what happened in those mountains. You're welcome to your opinion of what's right and what's wrong, of course, but without at least taking the trouble to understand Luttrrell's experience and perspective is, in my opinion, the wrong way to go about it.

Ironhorse

06-17-2007, 03:38 PM

Concur, Sargent & mmx1. Very well said, mmx1.

There's a difference between
a) the Law of War
b) the ROE for a specific theater, situation, or mission profile
c) the decisions that individuals make within the context of both those -- blindly abiding by them, heinously violating, or just applying them in thier infinitely sticky imperfection.

I'm not sure which one of these we're talking about here. Maybe it will all be clear to me after I read the book. If so, I'll bottle it and be rich.

I would note that there's a path of moderation which might claim a reasonable middle ground, though a bit Buck Rogers-y. Some form of self-limiting detention mechanism, e.g. a timed self-releasing gag & handcuff, or even a good solid dose of anesthesia, might stay within the high ground of the Law of War (a), be feasible within or with reasonable mods to acceptable ROE (b), and could give the operators the flexibility they need to accomplish their important mission while reducing some of the dilemna (c).

But even that won't eliminate the dilemnas, just move them around a bit.

"Shepherd gnawed to death by wolves while sleeping off SEAL's injection, leaves 8 fatherless."

At least that's more reasonable bad luck interpretation of collateral damage (with some military necessity and proportionality), than an "OK to blast 'em, if you think its really important" footnote in the ROE. That's not collateral damage, that's Sargent's slippery slope in full effect.

William F. Owen

04-30-2008, 09:05 AM

I am reading this book at the moment, and just read the discussion about killing the goat herders. I was pretty troubled that this even became a discussion, so consulted SWJ and found this thread.

I have no wish to second guess the men on the ground at the time, but I was both horrified and intrigued that they even discussed killing un-armed civilians, in those circumstances.

...but I have no problem with shooting some one with a cell phone who is correcting mortar fire, detonating an IED or using a TV camera as a cover for the same. As fare as I can see, it's all about the nature of the intent.

I have to say this issue vexes me to some great degree, so opinions would be very welcome.

tequila

04-30-2008, 09:33 AM

Again, don't want to second-guess the guys on the ground. But I've read the book as well and Luttrell does not at all make clear that the SEALs know for sure the Afghans (including a 14-year-old boy) were Taliban supporters. He only reports that the Afghans were not friendly to the SEALs, to which I would ask you - would you be friendly to a bunch of heavily armed foreigners who appeared on your land pointing weapons at you?

The book also points out that killing the Afghans would hardly assist that much in avoiding discovery, as the Afghans were accompanied by their flock of livestock who would certainly wander all over the place without herders and be instantly conspicuous, as well as instigate a search by the villagers for their missing men. Strangely the SEALs were not carrying zipties or 550 cord to simply detain the herders, which would have had roughly the same value as killing them as far as concealment was concerned.

IIRC, the SEALs did not attempt to continue w/the mission, since it was blown anyway, but tried to evac and establish comms. The Taliban ran them to ground before they could do so.

Abu Buckwheat

04-30-2008, 11:23 AM

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed. Did it happen outside of the sight of higher headquarters, yes. Did it happen when overzealous officers took orders as authorization from higher headquarters. Yes. However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war." Hitler told the German Army before Operation Barbarossa that the German army had to abandon its usual adherence to chivalry and the laws of war. We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game. In the first Gulf War several SOF OPs on key lines of communication were compromised by kids with goats or kids playing. We cannot get into the killing civilians game.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals. Its being run too much like the Indian Wars where the indiginous population are considered non-humans. There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Worst yet, there is also a visceral dis-respect of the enemy G's knowledge of his own game on his own home court. In this case the Gs adhered to Sun Tsu's "If you know the enemy and know yourself ..."

Before the first Gulf War General Schwarzkopf sent a message out to all unit ordering the ban on the use of Death Cards, which I had seen MANY guys carrying, all ready to play Colonel Kilgore. Schwarzkopf said we cannot debase ourselves and act like our enemies.

Should they have let the HVT get away and abort? Only they could make that call. However, I see it this way -we are the greatest goddamn combat power in the world ... we CAN re-sked missions without committing war crimes and we WILL get our target.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

Rank amateur

04-30-2008, 12:29 PM

I agree 100%. It'll be much easier for the military to recalibrate if the country does, but I think the country is looking at it as a political/values issues as opposed to what's the most effective way to fight the GWOT.

marct

04-30-2008, 01:21 PM

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed....However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war."....We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game.

This has been a concern of mine for quite a while now in more than just a purely military setting. I must admit that one of the reasons why I dislike Feith so much is because, IMO, he embodies the ideology of the ends justify the means without regard to what those means do to the people and their social system. As with many theologians, both "secular" and "sacred", he appears to live in an illusory world which, because it is "true", requires that everyone must accept it and, if they do not, be made to accept it "for their own good". In this way, he is similar to UBL and other brands of fanatics.

Abu, you mentioned "honour" and "chivalry" and they are important in this respect - they are lodged inside individuals. This is something that fanatic ideologues cannot accept - for them, "truth" must be given from a central system - it cannot be contained within individuals and serve as a source of opposition to that central system. This is all about a fight between types of power: "power within" and "power over" as Miriam Seimos would say.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals....There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Leaving aside the actual efficacy of it, and I agree it is about as useful as sending a package of Twinkies to a famine zone, there are other, more important issues. The "War on Terror" has done more than "damage" the US military's "image as professionals" - it appears to have damaged, at least in some cases, your self-image; in theological terms, your souls. It has done so by putting you in what Bateson called a "double bind"; a situation where you are squeezed between two conflicting and contradictory positions. Pulled apart a bit further, think of the "debate" over waterboarding with some ideologues saying that it is not torture while knowing that it is. The "solution" being offered to this double bind by certain ideologues - "it's not torture, just a necessary tool in the War on Terror" - is not a solution that can be accepted while retaining honour.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

While I agree, I would go further that saying it is about ROL - I would say I is about basic philosophy in the original meaning of that word; it is about "knowing yourself". Institutional "recalibration" is a good start to that; even St. Paul managed to realize that one when he noted that "I had not known sin but by the law" (Romans 7:7), but that is only the start - it is still basing individual ethics, "honour" as it were, on some system external to the individual which is amenable to manipulation by ideologues. Honour (and ethics) must be internal even if they are shaped by external (actually inter-personal) systems. If they don't live within you, then you are "just following orders" - a "defense" that I doubt will be accepted by any sane court or deity.

Marc

ps. Yes, Wayne, I am a radical immanentalist :D

Entropy

04-30-2008, 03:17 PM

Well, I have read Luttrell's book, was in Afghanistan at the time, played a very small role in his recovery and have read most of the AAR's, etc. That said, the events that day cannot be singly traced to the decision to let the goatherders go - there were other factors at play which I won't get into. The point being, it wasn't ultimately a simplistic question of "kill the civilians, save the Americans" vs "let the civilians go, let the Americans die." What happened with Operation Redwing was a wake-up call to many and served as the catalyst for a variety of changes at various levels of command. And so I agree completely with the others in here who warn of monday morning QB'ing that one decision and the danger of what amounts to murdering unarmed civilians. Besides the legal and ethical considerations, there are practical ones as well including ramifications. For example, would the friendly villagers have taken Luttrell in, protected him, and contacted US forces for him had he killed the civilians? Probably not.

BTW, Luttrell's target, Mullah Ismail, aka Mullah Ahmad Shah, was killed in Pakistan about two weeks ago when he tried to run a Pakistani Police checkpoint in the NWFP after kidnapping some poor Afghan refugee.

Eden

04-30-2008, 03:39 PM

I read Luttrell's book before I discovered this thread, and my reaction to the incident being discussed was a little bit different. Like most of you, it disturbed me that US soldiers could be so cold-bloodedly discussing murder of non-combatants; to me it is clearly a no-brainer that you abort at that point, and that killing is simply not on your options list. But that is not what disturbed me most. Two other things bothered me long after I put the book down.

1. Luttrell is brutally honest about his thought processes. As he reflects on his internal struggle, he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team. Part of his burden of guilt rests on his not having followed his military training. Clearly this superbly trained warrior, a true elite member of the US armed forces, has either:
a. completely misunderstood whatever training he has received on this subject, or
b. has been trained in a way that undermines our common understanding of the law of war and its effect on military operations.

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice. It would have been fine, even wise, to ask their opinion, but to put it to a vote was wrong. It was a form of morale cowardice, and I do not say that lightly of a fallen soldier who displayed such formidable physical courage. He shifted a terrible moral burden from his own shoulders to those of his subordinates, a burden that still haunts Luttrell by his own admission.

I encourage all to read the book - you can't fully grasp the incident unless you have all the background - and I hope this incident will be used as a case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices.

Ken White

04-30-2008, 04:28 PM

if applied to a conventional unit, for some SOF missions one simply has to apply a different standard and Luttrell's quandry is but one example of many where there are differences in approach and training that must be applied.

Is it morally acceptable to shoot an innocent (if he is in fact 'innocent') shepherd, perhaps a child? Dunno. Is it moral to NOT shoot said child if his life being spared results in losing four or six or ten of your own people? Dunno the answer to that, either. METT-TC applies and I suggest that each person has to make their own decision when they are actually in such a situation. That creates a quandry and there is no 'right' answer.

You cite Luttrell's military training being abrogated and I agree -- if applied to conventional forces. In SOF operations of many kinds different rules apply; have to apply -- that's part of why they are called 'special operations.' You may disagree that such operations are conducted or that such organizations can have different rules. That is your prerogative but it doesn't change reality. Such organizations do exist, such operations are conducted, the rules ARE different and such quandries are a part of them.

You also condemn "his Lieutenant" for abdicating his leadership role. In most SOF units that line is not and absolutely cannot be as distinct as it is in a conventional unit. That, too is reality.

All the above factors are some of the many reasons there's a disconnect between the 'big Army' and SOF. You mention the incident as a "...case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices." Good idea. Part of that case study could be used to educate the conventional force on some of the very knotty problems faced by their SOF brethren that conventional units rarely if ever face. We have not done that at all well.

jcustis

04-30-2008, 10:25 PM

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice. It would have been fine, even wise, to ask their opinion, but to put it to a vote was wrong. It was a form of morale cowardice, and I do not say that lightly of a fallen soldier who displayed such formidable physical courage. He shifted a terrible moral burden from his own shoulders to those of his subordinates, a burden that still haunts Luttrell by his own admission.

There are others out there in the board/forum thread realm (whom I presume are the veteran SOF members they claim to be) who have damned Murphy for his actions, despite the resulting MoH citation. Bottom line, you aren't alone in this.

Ken White

04-30-2008, 10:42 PM

.................

Ranger94

04-30-2008, 11:58 PM

From the accounts that I have read, Lt. Michael P Murphy, displayed the type of physical courage that deserves our respect and honor. I am humbled each time I read his story.http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/10/navy_seal_moh_071011w/

I have not read Lettrell's book. I am completely hung up on one point of the mission. During the planning stage, was compromise by a non-combatant covered?

My head spins when I think of a Long Range Surveillance team leader (and this is how the Seal team was functioning) debating with his team on how to act given a common situation that must ALWAYS be accounted for PRIOR to movement.

Compromise on a RECON mission is a contingency plan/immediate action drill not a debate. Input from the team on how to handle this situation should have come during the planning phase.

If it was considered during the planning phase, I doubt very much, the Op-Order said "shoot the unarmed civilian and continue to observe"

I think the comments on training have been the most productive in this thread.

In the NBC interview and in the book, Luttrell describes a discussion by the four SEALs and then a vote to let the herders go. That account, said Daniel Murphy, a former Suffolk County prosecutor and now a law clerk in State Supreme Court in Riverhead, is a far cry from what he said Marcus told the Murphy family not long after the death of their son.

"That directly contradicts what he told [Murphy's mother] Maureen, myself and Michael's brother John in my kitchen," said Murphy, who watched Luttrell on television but said he hasn't read the book. "He said that Michael was adamant that the civilians were going to be released, that he wasn't going to kill innocent people ... Michael wouldn't put that up for committee. People who knew Michael know that he was decisive and that he makes decisions."

Luttrell suggests that he sugar-coated the story later in a visit to Long Island, where he met Murphy's mother Maureen. She asked, he writes, "He didn't suffer, did he? Please tell me he didn't suffer."

Kiwigrunt

05-01-2008, 01:39 AM

My head spins when I think of a Long Range Surveillance team leader (and this is how the Seal team was functioning) debating with his team on how to act given a common situation that must ALWAYS be accounted for PRIOR to movement.

Compromise on a RECON mission is a contingency plan/immediate action drill not a debate. Input from the team on how to handle this situation should have come during the planning phase.
Fully agree.
Indeed, Bravo Two Zero went through the same thing in '91 and everyone knows the story. Should be discussed under 'actions on'.
'Higher command' should take responsibility for troops on the ground not knowing how to react to 'unexpected' situations like these, especialy where those situations are to be so clearly expected.

Ken White

05-01-2008, 04:38 AM

I agree with Ranger 94 to an extent but disagree that the Team was functioning in the LRS mode. Regardless, the action if a compromise or potential compromise occurred should've been part of mission planning and probably was. We do not know many things including the depth of that planning and the specific actions and the terrain and situation at the time during the mission; best laid plans and all that. Thus, I submit we cannot judge.

Obviously at first blush shooting civilians is not a good thing but situation dependent, we cannot say 'never.' Some missions may be too important and not be able to be rescheduled. In this case it would appear, and I agree with several, that the mission could be aborted (as it was) and rescheduled, so it was a bad idea if it was ever seriously considered. Was the shooting of the civilians ever seriously considered? We don't know really that, either.

I also submit that we cannot judge Murphy. Did he ask for a 'vote' (not a good thing) or did he simply solicit opinions about possible actions from the other more experienced Team members (a good thing). We don't know; we weren't there. We only have Luttrel's version and given that he apparently told the Murphys one thing for whatever reason and told another thing in the book his tale is at least mildly suspect to be after the fact-itis. Combat recall is dicey at best.

Much the same is perhaps true of Bravo Two Zero and 'Andy McNab.' There are others who dispute his version. Anyone who was not actually present in such operations is rarely going to get a clear unjaundiced view of what occurred. Thus, I'm inclined to believe judgmental calls on the rights and wrongs by all us bystanders (to include unit staff types involved but not in the field at the time and emphatically including higher echelon staffs) are probably going to miss many salient points, are generally unhelpful and should be avoided. YMMV.

Entropy who was peripherally involved says that there were many factors not made public (and I'm sure that's true) and that lessons were learned, absorbed and new TTP implemented as a result (and I'm equally sure that occurred) -- that's the important thing.

William F. Owen

05-01-2008, 05:06 AM

Is it moral to NOT shoot said child if his life being spared results in losing four or six or ten of your own people?

I think the point here is context is critical, but guidance does have to be absolute when dealing with such an area. You never kill unarmed and/or innocent civilians and you must be prepared to risk own lives in order to stick by that. (- an area where I and some of the IDF part company on the ethical implications. No IDF commander cannot put the lives of his soldiers first.)

...but there are clearly situations where civilians may be killed because they are trying to kill you or aid others that will. It is their intent and actions that should seal (no pun!) their fate.

Technically, I should have no problem (never having had to do it) in dropping some 14-year-old girl, with pig-tails, who is driving an SUV full or armed men, attempting to retrieve a weapon, carrying mortar bombs, or spotting the fall of shot for mortars. She is clearly "hostile."

(Will the BBC show the bullet ridden body to the world? Yes. That's my CoC's problem, and part of the "Information Ops," effort to deal with.)

I submit that the test would reside in the realms of an action being "clearly hostile."

Having said all that, the Luttrell book (and the book on Operations Anaconda) leaves me asking a whole raft of questions about how the operation was planned and how SEAL's are trained, but that's something different.

As was shown with the Bravo-Two-Zero, and The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, it may be naive to believe that the written account is entirely accurate.

- and now seeing Ken's post I broadly concur.

Abu Buckwheat

05-01-2008, 01:35 PM

There are others out there in the board/forum thread realm (whom I presume are the veteran SOF members they claim to be) who have damned Murphy for his actions, despite the resulting MoH citation. Bottom line, you aren't alone in this.

I agree with Bill. We can't give any ground to anyone judging Lt. Murphy. The team guys have a different way about decision making it depending on the unit. I am not a team guy but I have trained ALLOT of them in prisoner handling and interrogation in the field. They have a weird "I'm-the-Surfer-in-charge-but-we-decide-this-together-based-on-all-of-our-experience" thing going on inside the platoons. If anything the Chief Petty Officers have equal authority but its their way of doing business and what makes them special. So Monday morning QB'ing Lt. Murphy or the platoon's discussion is not particularly fair. It has happened many times before and its going to happen again. God bless them all but its beside the point.

The discussion is about what guys are presuming they can do if they get compromised by civilians. The issue at hand is that the military needs to re-institutionalize honor and chivalry in arms. This "our enemy has no rules so we should have none" stuff is out of line and getting out of hand. The Army's seven core values (which all other services embody) seem to be modified for this fight so that that Honor and Integrity are not applicable in this "different" war.

The "Hard Deck" as we call it in the Navy is this: We NEVER intentionally kill civilians or captives. This is what Zip-ties are for and I don't believe for a minute no one in that section had 550 cord or zip ties or a dump pouch to use as a hood. That’s not SOP even for super light Alpine style LR Special Reconnaissance missions ... now there are many "unless’s" to be considered like shooting in Self Defense, planting munitions or anything that makes a Sheppard change from non-combatant to combatant ... and spies, recon et al are considered combatants but you had better have proof ... and lots of it. Saying a guy is a look out and shooting him means we will have lots of dead and a trail of hostility that will defeat the ultimate mission.

So as far as COIN goes this is right up there with AC-130s blasting 50-100 person weddings. We need to ensure that the ROE defaults to supporting the strategic objectives of the COIN mission. Failing that gets you Iraq-style atrocities. Look what Marine SOF did on thier first mission in J-Bad two years ago ... they got IED'd and shot every damn civilian for over a mile ... then then got kicked out of Afghanistan. The indiginous people are the mission. Remember it. Dig it. Right on.

We need to re-establish the hard moral deck here.

Ken White

05-01-2008, 03:34 PM

...So as far as COIN goes this is right up there with AC-130s blasting 50-100 person weddings...

We need to re-establish the hard moral deck here.Unfortunately, all war is not COIN. If I haven't learned anything else in the last 75 years, I've learned to avoid saying never...

Abu Buckwheat

05-01-2008, 04:21 PM

Unfortunately, all war is not COIN. If I haven't learned anything else in the last 75 years, I've learned to avoid saying never...

By God Ken, even as I wrote it I thought "One should never say never ..." Good advice. :D

Ken White

05-01-2008, 04:35 PM

"We are too zoon oldt und too late schmart." And I'm a living example of that... :D

I agree with you, got be careful on the judging -- but we have to train people to do the right thing to the maximum extent possible. Thankfully, we mostly do a good job of that. Hard deck is good, just gotta allow for the occasional and hopefully very rare hatch (being careful not to trip over the coaming...). ;)

Entropy

05-02-2008, 01:13 AM

Entropy who was peripherally involved says that there were many factors not made public (and I'm sure that's true) and that lessons were learned, absorbed and new TTP implemented as a result (and I'm equally sure that occurred) -- that's the important thing.

Ken is a wise man. The tragedy, as it seems is too often the case, is that good people have to die as a catalyst for such change.

Also, on the subject of books, it's important to keep in mind that some details will be left out because of security reasons and Luttrell's is no different.

Finally, on the goatherders, to me it doesn't matter if they were combatants or civilians - once "captured" and placed under the control of Lt. Murphy and his men, they are legally noncombatants and cannot be summarily killed. To do so would be a war crime if I'm understanding my LOAC correctly.

kehenry1

05-02-2008, 02:31 AM

The "solution" being offered to this double bind by certain ideologues - "it's not torture, just a necessary tool in the War on Terror" - is not a solution that can be accepted while retaining honour.

How much history and how much myth are codes of chivalry and honor? and, would you consider certain acts as practiced in the past, considered within honorable and chivalric codes, to be honorable and chivalric today?

I am not, by any means, supporting torture nor am I discarding the idea that we must act and appear more honorable and humane than the enemy. Particularly in COIN. Nor even advocating a regression to some form of total war on the population.

But, I would challenge you all directly to point to a historical victory that was won through and honorable or chivalric act. I don't mean the last act where a leader accepts the parole or sword of another with honor and chivalry, but that the battle or war itself was predicated on such acts. I think we could name a few defeats or really horrific death tolls that occurred because an act of "chivalry" where the survivor of such an encounter returned to destroy the offerer.

They say that "war is hell" for a reason.

Historically, chivalry has been discarded out of necessity and honor conferred to the winner. Chivalry has often been limited to a small group or class. Everyone else being fair game. So, let us not confuse our modern ideas of chivalry and honor in military groups or individuals with history or actual war.

Having said that, I would point to something I wrote a few years ago (pardon the self linkage) re: chivalry today and the art of war. (http://themiddleground.blogspot.com/2005/10/chivalry-today-and-art-of-war.html) Quoting Shay:

This brings us back to my earlier line of reasoning. It is not enough to ask, “Can our warriors still get the job done if they do not have a code?” We must also consider the related question: “What will getting the job done do to our warriors if they do not have a code?” Accepting certain constraints as a moral duty, even when it is inconvenient or inefficient to do so, allows warriors to hold onto their humanity while experiencing the horror of war — and, when the war is over, to return home and reintegrate into the society they so ably defended. Fighters who cannot say, “this far but no farther,” who have no lines they will not cross and no atrocities from which they will shrink, may be effective. They may complete their missions, but they will do so at the loss of their humanity.[snip]

Therein, I believe, lies the question that must bother Luttrel. In the end, the two concepts of chivalry actually collide. The first part that demands we treat our brothers in arms with honor, defend them, bring them home, etc and to do no harm to others who also fall within the code.

Which one was the most important to have followed? Which one is the most cruel? Which one the most damaging?

Luttrel doesn't know and that is why he still wrestles with it today.

I would say, as others have, it is all good and well to talk in ideological terms here, even so far as intimating the lack of honor or chivalry in various others, but I would guess that each person would be tested under different circumstances and would come to the same dilemma in the end, which ever he or she chose, finding themselves wanting.

William F. Owen

05-02-2008, 07:33 AM

They say that "war is hell" for a reason.

Historically, chivalry has been discarded out of necessity and honor conferred to the winner. Chivalry has often been limited to a small group or class. Everyone else being fair game. So, let us not confuse our modern ideas of chivalry and honor in military groups or individuals with history or actual war.

Exactly right, and I concur with the majority of your observations on this, but this is CvC area of total war and war as it really is.

We are all suffering (and the UK as well, witness recent events of abuse) from a failure to install a sense of right and wrong in terms of behaviour.

The reason is an inability to articulate this in the context of modern operations, and effective military behaviour, because our military cultures are rested on wars on national survival, where your people count more than the others, and the beleif that modern operations require absolute behaviours devoid of judgement. Thank, WW1, WW2, and prospective Nuclear War for all of this.

I think the members of this board could write a workable code of behaviour in about 30 seconds. What is patently lacking is the courage of armies to implement and enforce it.

Tom Odom

05-02-2008, 12:36 PM

Originally Posted by kehenry1 But, I would challenge you all directly to point to a historical victory that was won through and honorable or chivalric act. I don't mean the last act where a leader accepts the parole or sword of another with honor and chivalry, but that the battle or war itself was predicated on such acts. I think we could name a few defeats or really horrific death tolls that occurred because an act of "chivalry" where the survivor of such an encounter returned to destroy the offerer.

One for a specific:

North Africa 1942 with regard to the Vichy French after limited combat between US and French forces

In general terms, I would offer that any conflict resolution based on reconciliation has elements of honor and chivalry built into it. That was true on the frontier wars of the United States and elsewhere. Tribal conflicts in the past often used ritualized combat as a limitation. The concept of blood feud and blood money draws on similar themes.

In my personal experience, I saw it take place in Rwanda between former Rwandan military whose government and fellow soldiers committed genocide and former rebels who won the war militarily and stopped the genocide. Acceptance of the idea that while accountability for genocide could and should be 100%, universal punishment was in the end self-defeating was and is very much a moral as well as practical position.

On the latter, moral positions and chivalry are in that sense quite practical. such terms are defined culturally; honor to an Arab sheikh is quite different than honor to one of us. Yet we have used a combination of self-interest, money, and honor as means to leverage greater accomodation between us and former insurgents.

I would agree with Malcom Nance about the moral hard deck; if you don't set it some folks will feel for the ground. But I would add that there are military and political benefits to setting that hard deck that are in the end imminently practical.

War is indeed hell. War without moral limits is absolute hell. Everyone does face their own test; group codes and morals frame those tests. When there are no limits, human beings are far worse than any animal.

Tom

Steve Blair

05-02-2008, 01:24 PM

I've never been overly comfortable with the term "chivalry" being used to describe conflicts...if for no other reason than the term itself carries too much mythology and revisionist connotations to be worthwhile (by that I mean that it was used by later generations to define and describe an ideal way of conflict that may never have actually existed). Chivalry could also be very class-distinctive and applied to a certain group or limited groups. Tom's quite right to point out tribal conflicts as containing elements of what we might consider a code of conduct (Marc's more qualified to discuss the fuzzy side than I am, though....), and he's also right in pointing out that those codes vary greatly depending on the culture. To draw on his frontier example, ritualized torture was a common part of many tribal conflicts (the degree varying depending on the tribe in question)...something that was horrifying to the white newcomers. But there were also cases where attacks might be broken off and conflicts ended by an act of bravery (honorable conduct) on the part of one or more warriors.

During the Civil War, Grant was known for his honorable conduct toward his opponents in the Western theater. He had the reputation of demanding unconditional surrender, but on the whole his terms were usually honorable. What tripped his switch (I think) was the growing realization that what he considered honorable conduct (to include sparing certain production facilities) was viewed as weakness by his opponents. This has always been one of the interesting points for me (probably because of my Frontier Army research): the intersection of competing codes of honor and/or conduct. I think it's those collision points that make war even more hellish.

kehenry1

05-02-2008, 09:02 PM

if for no other reason than the term itself carries too much mythology and revisionist connotations to be worthwhile (by that I mean that it was used by later generations to define and describe an ideal way of conflict that may never have actually existed). Chivalry could also be very class-distinctive and applied to a certain group or limited groups.

That is where I was going. I was thinking about various wars in western history. Beginning somewhere back in the days when chivalry and honor were supposed to be born. For instance, Edward I taking Bruce's wife and daughter, placing them in a cage and hanging them over the wall of his castle. For months if I recall the story correctly. Or the horrific death of Edward II. Or Simon de Montfort and his son being hacked to pieces after surrendering. Or Richard I ordering the massacre of people outside of Acre. Or Henry V cutting off the hands and feet of the resisters.

I could go on. But, if we look at Frontier Warfare, I would say that history points to the subjugation of the native population through very unchivalric acts. The western troops being known to ride into camps and kill everyone and everything. Driving the population before them. we now look askance and question such behaviors based on our modern concept of honor and chivalry, but then these acts were considered proper against a "barbarous" enemy.

Which is reflected in our modern dilemma regarding terrorists or "unlawful combatants" against the Geneva Conventions and Law of Land Warfare. We long ago placed such people outside of the "rules" and treated them as such. Today, we question that practice or its practicality, but only due to the type of war we are waging and our very modern ideas of "civilization". Particularly in a war where "lawfare" weighs heavily against "warfare".

Can you imagine the furor had we summarily executed Khalid Sheihk Mohammed? Even after his participation in 9/11 and various other terrorist acts killing hundreds and thousands? Do we now or in the future ever designate someone outside of these boundaries and protections?

Someone brings up WWII so I think that is another good place to reference, even if it is "total war". It is the question of when we deem whole populations outside of the protections of any code. Was fire bombing Dresden an act of chivalry, honor or necessity? Some would justify it by saying it was part of the strategy to break the will of the people and the ability of the enemy to manufacture the equipment for war. In the end, some say it may have shortened the war and saved tens of thousands of lives, even hundreds of thousands. The same thing we say about Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

We killed millions to save how many?

Does a war for survival make certain acts more acceptable and less considerate of such niceties as chivalry and honor?

Which brings me to the point about Luttrel's unit's decision and the fact that there was a decision to be made at all. If we would kill millions to save hundreds of thousands, if they had killed two to save four, is it only a difference because, paraphrasing Stalin, one is a tragedy and millions a statistic?

Abu Buckwheat

05-03-2008, 11:19 AM

Can you imagine the furor had we summarily executed Khalid Sheihk Mohammed? Even after his participation in 9/11 and various other terrorist acts killing hundreds and thousands? Do we now or in the future ever designate someone outside of these boundaries and protections?

In a word... No.

KSM was a combatant and Operations Officer at AQ Central. Executing him as an unlawful combatant, criminal or brigand on the battlefield would have been acceptable in the Geneva Convention ... unless I am mistaken they can be shot or hung. However once captured the rules apply. We could have interrogated him, tried him and executed him in less than a year but we decided we knew so little about AQ that we had to throw away any semblance of honor and resort to torture.

I reread the book yesterday and before I fly out the the sandbox today i will get a more detailed reponse up. :)

jcustis

05-04-2008, 09:52 PM

I've had the book in my queue for some time, and finally cracked it open this weekend. I'm about 100+ pages in, and to be honest, already pissed off.

I understand that this book is written for a specific audience, but I'm having a tough time coming to grips with the fact that one of our supposedly best-trained special ops warriors would write such ignorant babble about our ROE, where it originates, and the purported "fear" it creates in every young servicemember. Give me a break...

After I read that particular passage, I skipped ahead and read up on the communal "decision" about the compromise. Seems Luttrell (remember, in my opinion) was setting this issue up throughout the whole first part of the book, with the repetition about mortal danger, fanatic jihadists, and "fighting for each other".

If this is Luttrell's true point of view, then I sense some sort of disconnect between a SEAL's "high level of training" and the application of that training. I'll be up front that I have my prejudices, as I have watched team members shooting in live fire (with horrible marksmanship), watched small unit leaders brief a poor MEU-level mission plan, and knew the same embarked element to be compromised twice due to poor fieldcraft. I don't drink the Kool-Aid I guess, even though I wouldn't dare mess with a SEAL in the water.

Does the book (please don't drop a spoiler) at least get better further along?

Ken White

05-04-2008, 10:40 PM

on about all counts plus a little. Pinnipeds should probably stay real close to large bodies of water, they can really dangerous there; too far away, not so much -- though ya gotta give 'em credit for testicular fortitude if not super competence ashore...

Jim Rodgers

05-04-2008, 11:39 PM

I'm about 100+ pages in, and to be honest, already pissed off....

I understand that this book is written for a specific audience, but I'm having a tough time coming to grips with the fact that one of our supposedly best-trained special ops warriors would write such ignorant babble about our ROE, where it originates, and the purported "fear" it creates in every young servicemember. Give me a break...

Seems Luttrell (remember, in my opinion) was setting this issue up throughout the whole first part of the book, with the repetition about mortal danger, fanatic jihadists, and "fighting for each other"....

If this is Luttrell's true point of view, ...

I haven't read the book, nor will I. I have relatively little to add to the previous comments, and the big issues that have been raised have been addressed by others better than I could, but just to put one more perspective out there -

Luttrell's co-author, Patrick Robinson, is a bit out there. I read a few of his books back when I was spending a lot of time stuck at airports (anyone who travels much in the US has probably seen his stuff on display), and as time went by, they went from moderately entertraining, Clancy'ish thrillers focused on SEAL and sub ops, to sort of a combination of war porn and right wing blog posts.

It should be noted that the last book I read addressed a semi-coup by the US military due to the anemic response of the newly elected, radical left wing US President in the face of a threat. Said threat was a plot by a renegade SAS operator and his wife, a beautiful female radical Islamist named Shakira, to destroy the eastern seaboard of the US by launching cruise missles into a volcano in the Atlantic ocean. The science actually made more sense than the plot.

Perhaps more relevantly - in another of his books, SEALS kill a couple of civilians who stumble onto their hide site.

I'm a bit embarrassed to be admitting to reading this stuff, but in my defense, they didn't start out like that. I actually threw the last one away, and I NEVER throw books away.

None of this is a defense of Luttrell. He's a big boy, his name is on it, and he did the media tour thing. I just think that there are likely to be multiple agendas in that book. And that Patrick Robinson might not have been the best choice in ghost writers.

jcustis

05-04-2008, 11:48 PM

Well now, that was very illuminating. Sort of like the back story behind Shooter. Thanks for that.

William F. Owen

05-05-2008, 03:12 PM

Luttrell's co-author, Patrick Robinson, is a bit out there. I read a few of his books back when I was spending a lot of time stuck at airports (anyone who travels much in the US has probably seen his stuff on display), and as time went by, they went from moderately entertraining, Clancy'ish thrillers focused on SEAL and sub ops, to sort of a combination of war porn and right wing blog posts.

AhA! I knew I knew the name. Robinson and I have the same UK editor (- back when Random House published my novel! )

My guess is that Luttrell asked for him, but I am guessing, so who knows. Robinson has written creditable non-fiction.

MattC86

05-05-2008, 04:00 PM

Just wanted to echo what Jim Rodgers said about Robinson. He co-wrote Sandy Woodward's excellent account of commanding the Falklands task force in 1982 (One Hundred Days), and his first couple novels; Nimitz Class and Kilo Class were typical Clancy-like stuff.

But I picked up one of his books a year or so ago at a used book sale, and "war porn and right wing blog post" sums it up perfectly. He's gone completely nuts in his recent writing.

You throw in the co-author's perspective, plus always keeping in mind who the book was written for (Terror in the Mountains! Good Vs Evil! All that kind of crap), and while it doesn't change the facts of the book - I have not nor intend to read it - it can very much influence how the story is told. . .

Regards,

Matt

Abu Buckwheat

05-05-2008, 05:41 PM

I re-read the book last night on my flight OCONUS just so I could refresh my memory about what it was that made some of Lutrell's decisions and discussion points worry me. Now that I know about his crazy ghost writer, Patrick Robinson, it seems clear but still very worrisome. :rolleyes:

This worry led to my previous posts on the issue of recalibrating our sense of honor and perhaps the reeducation of our young warriors as to who we are morally and what we fight for… hell, even our OLD warriors appear to have a problem on this matter. I'll take up in another thread why the author and ghostwriter decided the ambush was actually the fault of American liberals and the media.

On page 167 he complained that the ROE in Afghanistan was that they “could not shoot, injure or kill civilians.” Surely his view was influenced by the trauma that ensued. He also asked what should he do about “the unarmed civilian who was a skilled spy for the illegal forces”, or “enemies “pretending to be civilians.” Again I am reminded of the MARSOC post-IED massacre in Jalalabad ‘if something bad happens to us, everyone nearby must be in on it, so therefore everyone gets shot.’ Its an attitude that does not serve us well.

To him, there were no innocent civilians in that part of Afghanistan. This belief reflects poorly on whatever training or intelligence he received about who he was fighting in relation to what we are trying to achieve. The mission is to destroy Talib/AQ, but not at the cost of alienating the province. There are plenty of real enemy to be killed in Afghanistan but by the reckoning in this book EVERYONE was that enemy … which is strange because his experience of [SPOILER ALERT] being taken in by sympathetic villagers, surrounded by Taliban, directly contradicts that. It was a great example of the more human aspects of the local human terrain.

The most stunning assertion in the whole book was his insistence that the “correct” military decision, when compromised by civilians, is to kill them. He states this no less than four times starting on page 202 “the military decision was clear” or “[not killing them] was military suicide” (pg 203), “the military decision was obvious” (pg 205), blames others for not executing them “when every codebook ever written had taught me otherwise.” My first question was “WTF!? What is he talking about?” I taught Geneva Convention at SERE and prisoner handling and interrogation to numerous SEAL platoons deploying to OEF and OIF. SEALs are often the best, most attentive students, especially officers and Chiefs –they are all pretty smart. This question of 'can you kill the prisoner once you’ve interrogated them?' always comes up in a tongue & cheek manner and the answer is always the same “Sorry. No. 5-Ss (silence, secure, segregate, speed, safeguard) or leave them” You can zip tie them, leave them and extract or continue mission.

Is there something going on we don’t know? :confused: Is the TV show “24” or movies like “Blackhawk Down” the 'military codebooks' that say shooting civilians is doctrinal? Or is it the crazy ghostwriter talking tough? I have read allot of books about special operations going back to Roger's Rangers and I cannot think of one where killing civilians was an objective critical to “military necessity” to meet the mission ... except for Captain Willard in Apocalypse Now! :rolleyes:

People get killed in crossfire and off-target effects, but what Lutrell discusses is the execution of civilians as a military policy and how he should have done it. Perhaps some have confused Mil-Porn books like Robinson's with actual Field Manuals? Or is this a matter of our soldiers talking themselves into what they would do in a rite of passage they think all “hard” soldiers get put into and convince themselves they are supposed to “do whatever it takes”? The latter belief is more popular than I’d like to think.

In the first Gulf War many SR missions deep in Iraq were performed and a quarter of them were compromised by the usual suspects - kids and goats, including the BRAVO 2-0 mission. In one, an SF ODA had a little girl walk right up and peered right into the hide. They grabbed her, rejected the thought of killing her, gave her candy to keep her quiet and called for an amazing extraction under intense fire.

“Lone Survivor” was a good read but he should have let Dick Couch ghost write it for him. My fear is that unless some high level SEAL like SOCCOM C.O. Admiral Eric Olsson resets the “moral hard deck” and forcefully points out that this concept is flat out wrong, not written or unwritten in any manual and that Lt. Murphy made the right choice.

If not, then this book will join that pantheon of mythological military “codebooks” where the reader, maybe new recruits, comes away swearing that he will not fail the test of what to do with three woodcutters. Standing orders to bring four zip ties, a half roll of duct tape and five tabs of 12 hour sleep medicine per operator wouldn’t hurt either. ;)

Lutrell is brave, tough and a Navy Cross awardee. I thank God he survived. However, the book’s contention, over and over, that you have to kill civilians may become another equally bad piece of mythology alongside my personal bugaboo, Jack Bauer.

jcustis

05-05-2008, 06:35 PM

Senior Chief,

Your words put my thoughts into a framework better than I think my own mind could, and that is exactly what I was trying to get at. I don't want to denigrate Luttrell's service or the mission, but I suppose it is the "mil-porn" effect that is giving me the problem.

People get killed in crossfire and off-target effects, but what Lutrell discusses is the execution of civilians as a military policy and how he should have done it. Perhaps some have confused Mil-Porn books like Robinson's with actual Field Manuals? Or is this a matter of our soldiers talking themselves into what they would do in a rite of passage they think all “hard” soldiers get put into and convince themselves they are supposed to “do whatever it takes”? The latter belief is more popular than I’d like to think.

This is the I'd rather be judged by 12 than carried by six mentality that crops us (especially over at the board you used to frequent a lot ;)) that drives me up the wall. I think you are on to something about this unwritten code or FM confusion among our young men. I've heard that tone from young and older though, enlisted and officer alike, and I am beginning to see that maybe Louie L'Amour books are the better choice for some of them.

selil

05-06-2008, 01:40 AM

I don't know... maybe we have a new concept for the military literary pantheon, "The Lutrrell effect" where blaming the yellow bellied liberals while not understanding the rules of engagement can be used to excuse mission excess blathering after the fact.

Rest in peace for all others who were lost to the fickle hand of fate there is no dishonor in service regardless of who wrote the book after the fact.

William F. Owen

05-06-2008, 05:56 AM

If not, then this book will join that pantheon of mythological military “codebooks” where the reader, maybe new recruits, comes away swearing that he will not fail the test of what to do with three woodcutters. Standing orders to bring four zip ties, a half roll of duct tape and five tabs of 12 hour sleep medicine per operator wouldn’t hurt either. ;)

Aye to all that. This actually speaks to the damage popular military accounts can do, if not balanced against facts, context, and solid training. What we get to read is what will sell, not the operational de-brief!

Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced today at a ceremony in Lake Ronkonkoma, N.Y., the name of the newest Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer will be Michael Murphy. Designated as DDG-112, the name honors Lt. Michael Murphy who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions during Operation Red Wing in Afghanistan on June 28, 2005.

Well God bless the Navy naming board for fianally showing some forethought. This makes me tear up a little and want a ship's ball cap and Chief's mess mug. *Sniff*

Tom Odom

05-08-2008, 12:16 PM

Well God bless the Navy naming board for fianally showing some forethought. This makes me tear up a little and want a ship's ball cap and Chief's mess mug. *Sniff*

I had the exact same reaction when I learned of the USS Higgins' commissioning. Still have the officer's ball cap and the commissioning brochure on my wall at home as well as a framed photo of DDG76 on my office wall.

God bless Lt Murphy and Col. Higgins,

Tom

Entropy

05-08-2008, 12:46 PM

I'm not sure how many Burke's there are left to build, but I would expect to see a USS Dunham and USS Monsoor as well.

bikewrench8541

05-12-2008, 02:49 AM

Luttrell had much praise for Lt Murphy as a friend, as well as a team leader. In addition it is Marcus' account of the firefight that is cited for Lt Murphy's MOH.

Entropy

05-16-2008, 01:42 AM

I had missed this before, but another book is coming out on the subject, and this one looks quite promising (http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/index.html).

Culpeper

05-16-2008, 02:06 AM

Jeff your comment could be interpreted as you're advocating shooting unarmed civilians. I haven't seen the AAR on this incident and have no inside knowledge, but in general we can run missions pretty much when we want (weather dependent obviously) to nab or a kill a bad guy, which means you generally have the option of aborting the mission if you have been comprised, because you can come back another day. The article stated that these men thought they may have been compromised, yet they agreed to accept the risk and drive on with the mission anyway. I don't think shooting unharmed civilians was an option to begin with, and either did they. They had two options apparently, one was to drive on with the mission, and the other was to abort. As they suspected in (according to the article), the civilians they released reported their location to the Taliban, thus the ensuing fire fight. I don't question their judgment for a minute (I would if they shot unharmed civilians for a target of moderate importance), unfortunately the situation took a turn for the worst, and we lost several brave men that day.

Even if they aborted, as suggested, they still would have had a mean fight on their hands. What's done is done. They morally did the right thing. Luttrell's vote was the deciding vote. They dealt with the rest like professionals. In a similar situation I wouldn't care if a SEAL team discussed this mission in determining what to do next. In fact, we would never hear about it. In fact, had they killed the natives we probably wouldn't be hearing about this mission as well. I don't recall in the book any talk about shooting the locals. It was going to be more personal. They were just up the mountain from the target. It has never been determined if the locals warned anyone of the SEALs. If they did then they were not innocent civilians. BTW, we bombed the crap out of France before D-Day killing thousands of innocent French civilians along with numerous French collaborators. What's the diff? Micro Macro. The SEAL team knew enough about the danger to discuss it and take to a vote. In hindsight, I don't understand that at all. Since when have SEALs not discussed the possibility of running into locals that may compromise their position and what are the options as a part of SEAL doctrine? With that in mind, it should never have been a matter of a democratic vote. Nevertheless, after that they did everything they could to survive according to the rules of engagement.

Ken White

05-16-2008, 03:32 AM

ask for opinions?

We don't know. Luttrell says vote in the book; he apparently told the Murphys something else...

We'll never know. Nor, really, do we need to.

Culpeper

05-17-2008, 04:43 AM

ask for opinions?

We don't know. Luttrell says vote in the book; he apparently told the Murphys something else...

We'll never know. Nor, really, do we need to.

You're right and I'll take it a step further and state we don't have a need to know. Actually, I think we know too much.

negotiator6

05-22-2008, 06:58 PM

Having done some travel along the Paki-Afgh border in 2003, I offer the following reference the lost of 3 SEALS that terrible day.

First, the SEAL team was equipped with an Iridium SAT phone..a company that went bankrupt in 1999 (try Google search to validate). The billion dollar investment went for a paltry sum of less than $100,000 at the bankruptcy hearing.

DOD had invested (as alleged) $300-400 million because DOD was the primary user of the Iridium SAT system and had the phones fully integrated into the DOD system.

The Iridium phones were totally un-reliabe. LT Murphy had an Iridium SAT phone which required inserting nearly 20 digits into the handset before one might..I repeat..might hear a ring tone. Hardly the kind of communication system required for 4 SEALS on a TS covert behind enemy lines mission. The background and complaints about the Iridium were wide spread-DOD knew...or should of known these phones were not operational in the field most of the time.

I used a Thuraya SAT phone which worked every time..with speed dialing in the event one did not have the time to make a concerted relaxed call to "somewhere". The Thuraya also had a built in GPS..allowing step one to get a long/lat, then place the call to provide the position and SITREP if required. ( I used a Thuraya in both Sudan and Afghanistan and never had a problem..)

In short, the Department of Defense and the leadership at Bagram AB who planned the insertion using the Iridium SAT phone as the primary means of communication were grossly negligent in providing LT Murphy and his team the best communication available.

Being shot in the back while attempting to insert up to 20 digits into a phone during a firefight was perhaps the last option for the team. Written articles and the book define the last moments..

But, again, ask just about anyone about the Iridium SAT system and most will tell the same story. The problem is....these SAT systems are still being used today!

If the mission were so dangerous..why did not the AF have a drone overhead providing real time feed on the SEALS. And...lastly, some of you may recall Operation Anaconda which commenced on 3 March 2002 launching from Gardez (I was there in March of 2003). A SEAL team was sent to secure a mountain top; but bad guys had already secured the top of the mountain with 12.7 mm plus fortified bunker system. The SEAL team retrograded down the mountain...the team commander tried to use his Iridium to contact Bagram AB, but could not..He ended up calling his base back at Norfolk..the duty officer, if I recall correctly. Again, where was the base line logic and coordination with such important missions as LT Murphy's mission and the SEAL mountaintop mission just prior to launching Operation Anaconda? One has to really question the organizational leadership on both operations.

I have some AAR photos of the hilltop eventually taken by the Rangers; if anyone who was there wishes several, please email me. Out here!

Distiller

05-23-2008, 04:34 AM

On killing those three civilians: Sheperds are usually alone for extended periods, but who knows? On that particular day they might have had their scheduled food supply, or one of them was just visiting and expected back soon. In any case disrupting their usual (unknown?) behavioral pattern might as well have alerted the villagers, so killing them wouldn't really have safed the situation any more.

The loss of the team is bad, but #### happens. I don't think that they could reasonably hope to remain undetected anyway. That a Chinook went down afterwards is a different story. Again shows not to pack too many people onto one vehicle!.

trident86

08-22-2008, 12:07 AM

1. he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team.

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice.

This is what happens when you let a civilian write your story. I can assure you neither SEALs nor any other US SOF are taught that deliberately killing unarmed civilians is an option. In fact, the contemplation of this in the training pipeline or on actual operations would ensure dismissal from the unit and the SOF community.

What IS emphasized is that SOF are held to a higher standard, and we are a much more surgical option because of our discretion and judgment on the battlefield.

Having served with Michael Murphy and personally watched his development as a junior SEAL officer, I can assure you that once again, something was lost in the translation between Marcus and the author. I cannot imagine Murph "abdicating his leadership" under ANY circumstances. More likely and in accordance with Marcus' debrief to our Team once he returned from his convalescent leave, Murph polled his guys when he ran out of easy answers in order to gather any information he might not have previously considered, and in turn make the best decision under the circumstances.

This is where we cross the line--where we judge the men on the ground based on the (now obvious) turn of events. The operation should no doubt be thoroughly analyzed with the intent of educating our younger troops and making better decisions (if that's even possible in this case) on the battlefield.

As pointed out by several others, this single decision was only one of many made by the team on the ground and the leadership in the forward headquarters at several levels that ultimately led to the failure of the mission.

Regarding the Iridium Sat phone--it was a back up means of communication, rather than the primary means as implied in the previous post. In my experience, cell phones are normally an administrative vice tactical form of communication.

VMI_Marine

08-22-2008, 01:36 AM

I understand that this book is written for a specific audience, but I'm having a tough time coming to grips with the fact that one of our supposedly best-trained special ops warriors would write such ignorant babble about our ROE, where it originates, and the purported "fear" it creates in every young servicemember. Give me a break...

This pisses me off to no end - I have discussed this with Herschel Smith of the Captain's Journal on a couple of occasions before giving up on ever convincing him that the Theater ROE allows plenty of latitude for engaging enemy combatants; whether they are holding a weapon, a cell phone, or a shovel. Part of this stems from the problem of having JAG officers give ROE classes. The last ROE class I sat on was given by a JAG type, and the vignettes at the end were colossally bad, and in no way related to ANGLICO's mission of employing supporting arms. I gave my team another ROE class, using my own vignettes to illustrate the concepts. The rest I think stems from the exact sort of cultural influences that Abu Buckwheat and others have mentioned. The Haditha Marines are a great example - while I don't think their actions constitute war crimes, and I agree with the dismissal of charges, their method of clearing the houses was inappropriate to the situation, and caused unnecessary civilian casualties. We absolutely need to stress the idea of protecting civilians.

VMI_Marine

08-22-2008, 02:02 AM

I had missed this before, but another book is coming out on the subject, and this one looks quite promising (http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/index.html).

This may help clear up something else that I have noticed a lot - there are a lot of references to Operation Red Wings comprising only the SDV team's recce of the village. Luttrell says it in the book, IIRC. This is false. The team's mission was merely a part of Operation Red Wings, which was planned and conducted by 2d Battalion 3d Marines. There is an excellent Gazette article which gives more detail on the operation, and especially the enormous headaches created for 2/3's staff by NavSOF and the JSOTF. We still have not cracked the nut of integrating SOF and conventional operations.

jcustis

08-22-2008, 02:15 AM

The hilarious thing about the consumptionability (:D) of the book is that out of 733 Amazon reviews, 546 gave it 5 stars. :wry:

sapperfitz82

10-27-2008, 11:47 PM

I was around for Red Wings 2, not that that qualifies me at all to speak for Red Wings 1 (and not that that has ever kept my mouth shut either), but the book either leaves out a couple very key things or points out some flaws in this unit's SOPs.

Soft comp plans have been rehased in detail here (not a mention of them in the book), hard comp plans are completely missing. The authors make a big point of all this behind the lines stuff; no PDM's, no Claymores? Did they even have a plan for these contengincies?

Basic patrolling, never reoccupy. They went right back to a previous recce point. That's a pretty rookie mistake, or it speaks volumes to overconfidence.

On the locals. The immature nature of dealing with the locals is evident in most units. We have a real problem with this and the cultural sensitivity training is not helping. We need to develop our own character a great deal, as a profession.

Someone mentioned firebombing Dresden. The Army Air Corps and their Brit equivlent did an exhaustive study on the effects of strategic bombing during WWII. No positive correlation was found. In fact, war material production increased during that time. Pysche studies showed that there is not a corresponding factor of fear instilled in civilian population either. Pretty sure this translates to "killing civilians who support a war effort is an ineffective policy."

Oh, and as my guys were out there looking for him and his team and doing body recovery on the rest that tried to help them, I feel no remorse in saying that the piss poor planning and overconfidence of these guys led directly to their deaths. They did make a helluva a good fight, and I hope when its my time to go, I can be worthy of such a story.

The civilian who assisted Marcus is a fiction writer. I would take nothing away from Marcus, but I wonder how much of this book was written by the civilian "fiction writer" and how much was written by Marcus.
Victory Point by Ed Darak gives a much more "non fiction" sounding explanation of what happeded. I highly recommend that anyone taking part in this website read "Victory Point" by Darak.
Possibly anyone retreating downhill in a very steep rock ravine with no cover dominated by a minimum number of taliban/gangsters would have the crap shot out from under themselves, as much by twenty gangsters as by 200 gangsters.
I have much doubt about this civilian fiction writer and just how much he sat down with a Lone Survivor "after" the book was written by the civilian. Possibly no chance to edit "Lone Survivor" on Marcus part?
I have no doubts about a Navy SEAL's honesty, but I have many doubts about the "fiction writer".
Besides I tried reading his fiction and could not force myself to finish any of his books. He (the civilian) is a very crappy writer, to put it mildly
Semper Fidelis,
Tipy.

IntelTrooper

07-17-2009, 01:41 AM

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.
Uh, what?

Edited to Add: Nevermind, that was an extremely old post.

goesh

07-18-2009, 03:24 AM

This is a hell of a thing to have to think about. The senior man should have made the decision. The last thing to go before the collapse of an entrprise be it a combat patrol or a hot dog stand is discipline. Adrenaline, instincts and psychological stress makes a bad admixture that even good discipline can hold together for only so long. We all chose this path and we are haunted at times by making the right decisions and the wrong decisions and IMO only discipline keeps the score even. These men did no right or wrong, they died and 1 walked away from it. Let it be knowing we could have done no better or worse had we been there ourselves.

Ken White

07-18-2009, 03:44 AM

In most any SOF or SF units, if things get rough, leaders tend to ask what others think and to discuss the possibilities. Generally, no one has any problems saying exactly what they think -- and no one has any problems with what the boss decides after asking. That's what everyone then does, even if they had a different idea. Like any generalization, I'm sure there are exceptions but I've never seen one and I've seen a few confabs, even held a couple. It's not a breakdown in discipline. The contrary, in fact.

What happened out there we'll never know. We know what one guy might have said. Editors want to sell books, sometimes thing in books get modified to do that...

In the end, what really matters is that you're right:
These men did no right or wrong, they died and 1 walked away from it. Let it be knowing we could have done no better or worse had we been there ourselves.

carl

01-13-2011, 06:56 PM

There is an article in the current issue of Marine Corps Gazette by Ed Darack.
In it he states that Mr. Luttrell's book has a number of "inaccuracies" and some "misinformation.

I saw this first at Tom Ricks' blog and the link is there too along with comments.

jcustis

01-17-2011, 04:36 PM

Shocking...:wry:

I haven't seen it yet, but I've been waiting to hear the uproar about disparaging the memory of the dead.

davidbfpo

10-11-2013, 07:27 PM

From FP Situation Report:
The movie "Lone Survivor," about SEALS in Afghanistan, screened last night as the culmination of yesterday's "Hero Summit." It was dramatic, graphic and ultimately moving. It's the story of the four Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 10 in Afghanistan in 2005. The team went on a reconnaissance mission in July of that year in the mountains of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border to monitor al-Qaeda leader. Only one, Marcus Luttrell, returned alive after a brutal ordeal that is hard to comprehend but whose live was ultimately saved by an Afghan man with whom he remains in close touch. Luttrell wrote "Lone Survivor" with ghostwriter Patrick Robinson. Now it's a big movie, starring Mark Wahlberg.

carl

10-11-2013, 08:53 PM

Oh great. I hope I will be disappointed but I predict little contact with the unpleasant truth and an strong suggestion that murder is justified.

ganulv

10-12-2013, 12:06 PM

From FP Situation Report:

The movie "Lone Survivor," about SEALS in Afghanistan, screened last night as the culmination of yesterday's "Hero Summit." It was dramatic, graphic and ultimately moving. It's the story of the four Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 10 in Afghanistan in 2005. The team went on a reconnaissance mission in July of that year in the mountains of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border to monitor al-Qaeda leader. Only one, Marcus Luttrell, returned alive after a brutal ordeal that is hard to comprehend but whose live was ultimately saved by an Afghan man with whom he remains in close touch. Luttrell wrote "Lone Survivor" with ghostwriter Patrick Robinson. Now it's a big movie, starring Mark Wahlberg.
The trailer (http://youtu.be/yoLFk4JK_RM) has been out for a couple of months.

The director is responsible for The Kingdom (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0431197/), which I think is a tremendous film. He is also responsible for Battleship (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1440129/), which is considered one of the more laughable films in recent memory.

davidbfpo

02-07-2014, 12:57 PM

In an extended BBC News magazine article the film Last Survivor features alongside many others and is a good discussion:
Two new movies - The Patrol and Lone Survivor - are set against the backdrop of the Afghanistan War, but is it too soon for drama to reflect the realities of the conflict.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26030435

An apology, if you are looking for a review of the film the BBC article does not offer that; it is a far wider discussion on film and after scanning SWC this is a good home for it.

SWJ has a film review at:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/swj-film-review-lone-survivor

Fuchs

02-08-2014, 02:21 AM

The On Violence blog has covered the Lone survivor story, its inaccuracies et cetera for a long time, and often.

Latest post including a few links: http://www.onviolence.com/?e=774

They really, really focused on it A LOT (http://onviolence.com/?e=230).