The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: what’s in it for Africa?

The
huge Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum recently concluded in Beijing. 37
heads of state attended, along with droves of policy advisors and numerous
thinktanks and research institutes, including IDS where I work. Monica Mutsvanga, Minister of Information, Publicity
and Broadcasting Services, attended on behalf of the Zimbabwe government. By
all accounts it was a lavish affair, with grand speeches and big commitments totalling $64 billion. But what to make
of it all from an African perspective?

As
discussed on this blog several times before (see here, here and here), while Chinese engagements with Africa can
be framed in terms of ‘new imperialism’ or part of a benign process of ‘mutual
learning’, in practice a more nuanced perspective is needed. African states
have agency in the process of negotiation, and the Chinese always adopt an
incremental and adaptive approach to policy, in Africa as in China. There is no
single top-down plan to be forced on unwilling recipients.

As
our studies of Chinese (and Brazilian) investments in African agriculture (in
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe – reported in an open access World Development issue)
showed, what emerges varies from country to country, project to project,
depending on how negotiations play out. And this very much depends on which
Chinese state owned company, from which province in China, is involved, and how
African states and officials negotiate. Sometimes the outcomes are disastrous –
inappropriate technologies and failed projects – but sometimes positive
dynamics unfold. No surprises here: Chinese engagements are very similar to aid
from Denmark, the UK or the US, just more focused on productive infrastructure
and perhaps more honest and straightforward.

Beyond
the BRI rhetoric

At the BRI Forum there was grand talk
of mutual benefit, inclusive approaches and green and sustainable development.
Just as with western aid, forget the rhetoric, and look at the practice.
Chinese geopolitical and commercial ambitions are clear. The BRI is certainly about regional, even global, political
influence, especially through trade. With coal mines and power stations
being opened under its banner, forget the green credentials for now. As a
strategic player, who plays the (often very) long game, the benefits to China
of all the roads, ports and other infrastructure being built are obvious.

This does not mean though that such
investments are disadvantageous to host countries and regions, just because
China benefits too. The TAZARA railway built between Tanzania and Zambia in the
early 1970s still provides an important trade link, assisting economic
integration. New investments may too – but only if designed in the right way,
and subject to careful deliberation and negotiation at a local level. Being too
eager (or desperate) to receive Chinese investment could be dangerous.

Minister
Mutsvanga’s speech in Beijing had a hint of this. Repeating the ED ‘mantra’
(her term) that Zimbabwe is ‘open for business’, she continued:

Zimbabwe has fertile soils and a
favourable climate for farming and agro-industry. It is a treasure trove of
much desired mineral wealth. Zimbabwe has gold, diamonds, emeralds and other
precious stones. There is the diverse energy offering of hydroelectric power,
thermal and coking coal, methane gas. For new and green energy there is,
platinum, lithium, uranium and abundant solar. Base metals galore include
chrome, nickel, vanadium, tin, rare earths and scores of others.

This
sounds more than being open for bilateral negotiations around mutually
beneficial investment; more an invitation to a resource grab. The Chinese are
not immune to this, as the sorry tale of diamond mining in Marange shows. But it needn’t be
this way: being open for business doesn’t mean open for any business on any terms.

Waving
the flag, the state-run newspapers in Zimbabwe hailed the minister’s visit, and the prospects for
Zimbabwe. But the list of supposed BRI projects – such as the new parliament –
were planned long before, and nothing to do with building a corridor for trade.
To link with the BRI hype in Beijing, the Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe opened
a BRI art exchange exhibition, demonstrating how the two
countries were connected. Cultural exchange is certainly a good thing, but
Minister Mutsvanga, I think, was looking for more.

Corridors
for development?

So
what might a corridor development look like that has wider benefits for
development, and is not simply a route to facilitating extractivism? A recent study carried out along the eastern
seaboard of Africa – in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique – has looked at four
very different corridors, all notionally connected to the BRI – LAPSSET,
SAGCOT, Nacala and Beira. All involve major port and road/rail developments,
linked to a variety of energy and agricultural investments of varying scales
(see the earlier blog on Mozambique).

Our research contrasted corridors
constructed as ‘tunnels’, conducting valuable resources out of a country and
importing goods to metropolitan centres, and ‘networks’, that allow linkages to
rural hinterlands and a dynamic of development associated with the investments.
Each of our case studies showed elements of both at play.

Corridors,
as Euclides Gonsalves explains for Mozambique, are about
‘acts of demonstration’, linking political ambitions to local development. The
grand, stylised performances at the BRI Forum in Beijing also play out in
villages and project sites in African rural areas. Enlisting and enrolling
actors, and material artefacts (grain siloes, extension centres, new roads and
so on), are part of the game. Enacting corridors has political and material effects,
as some people are included and some excluded, and certain political interests
are promoted. The net benefits may be positive, but the performative aspect is
key, he argues.

Many
corridors are about constructing imaginaries, and creating an economy of expectations, Ngala Chome argues for LAPSSET in Kenya. The corridor
has been long planned, and while port facilities are being built in Lamu, many
follow-on investments have not yet materialised. Anticipation, expectation and
speculation create a new political economy around prospective corridor sites,
as we see in the pastoral rangelands of Isiolo where the pipeline and road is expected
to traverse. As our work under the PASTRES project shows,
pastoralists in these areas complain this has resulted in a massive growth in
speculative land deals.

A
struggle over development and its directions is unleashed by corridor
developments. Everyone has been crying out for investment, but when it comes,
the terms of incorporation are inevitably uneven. As Emmanuel Sulle shows for the sugar and rice
plantations in the SAGCOT corridor area of Tanzania, processes of displacement
and disenfranchisement unfold. And this is even with ‘inclusive’ business
models, such as outgrower schemes, heavily promoted by agricultural investors
across the corridors.

Policy appraisal must include political economy
analysis to explore the potential winners and losers. External
capital/infrastructure investment mobilises local interests, including local
capital and the state, creating new patterns of differentiation. This means
appraisal must go beyond the standard economic assessment to a wider social and
political analysis.

The design of a corridor – and the associated
business models promoting agricultural investment – make a big difference.
Opportunities for a more networked organisation, avoiding the limitations of a
‘tunnel’ design, need to be explored, especially around the design of transport
infrastructure that can benefit local economies.

Terms of inclusion and exclusion in corridors are
mediated through a range of local institutional and political processes. For
example, land speculation and the revitalisation of older conflicts over
resources may occur as a result of corridor development. Benefits may be
unevenly shared in already unequal societies, with women and poorer households
missing out.

Processes for negotiating corridor outcomes require
the mobilisation of less empowered actors – including women and poorer people –
and their organisation around clear guidelines – such as those within the FAO
Voluntary Guidelines on land tenure – that ensure terms of incorporation into
corridor investments are not disadvantageous.

Support for legal literacy and advocacy, as well as
the organisation of disadvantaged groups, will help people to be able to
articulate demands. This requires building on local organisations and networks
to help counter the power of appropriation of local elites in alliance with the
state and investment capital.

All these are relevant for any
investor, and for any corridor-style investment. I hope Minister Mutsvanga and
the BRI planners take note, and avoid the rush to invest and take a more
patient, deliberate approach that creates networks not tunnels.

About Future Agricultures

The Future Agricultures Consortium is an Africa-based alliance of research organisations seeking to provide timely, high-quality and independent information and advice to improve agricultural policy and practice in Africa.