Publikationen

This study analyzes the consequences of workers’ participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified gift-exchange game with firms specifying contract alternatives and workers deciding about the finally implemented alternative. The experimental data reveals that workers with participation rights are more sensitive to differences in wage offers: Low wage offers trigger negative reciprocity which dominates the positive incentive effects from high wage offers. On average, participation in the wage setting process leads to a decline in effort exertion.

This experiment tests for a causal relationship between the meaning of work and employees’ motivation to perform well. The study builds on an existing employer-employee relationship, adding realism to the ongoing research of task meaning. Owing to an unexpected project cancelation, we are able to study how varying the information provided about the meaning of previously conducted work—without the use of deception, but still maintaining a high level of control—affects subsequent performance. We observe a strong decline in exerted effort when we inform workers about the meaninglessness of a job already done. Our data also suggests that providing a supplemental alternative meaning perfectly compensates for this negative performance effect. Individual characteristics such as reciprocal inclinations and trust prompt different reactions. The data also shows that the meaning of work affects workers’ emotions, but we cannot establish a clear relationship between emotional responses and performance.

It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase acceptance, especially of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture in a three-person power-totake experiment. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder’s endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, responders can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to themselves. We modify the game by letting the responder participate in takers’ transfer decisions and consider the effect of low/high levels of participation on the destruction rate. We find that participation matters, but only under special conditions: Responders with participation rights destroy significantly less only if they (1) have reciprocal inclinations, and (2) are confronted with highly unfavorable outcomes. Thus, in line with standard economic modeling and leading classes of behavioral theories, our data suggest that procedural effects of decision making are mostly negligible.

The tendency to underestimate others’ relative performance compared to one’s own is widespread among individuals in all work environments. We examine the relationship between, and the driving forces behind, individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender-specific link: Overconfident men hold more optimistic beliefs about coworkers’ cooperativeness than men who lack confidence, and are accordingly significantly more cooperative, whereas overconfidence, beliefs, and cooperativeness are not correlated in women.

The question of whether lawyers and managers behave selfishly or fairly has inspired discussion for a long time. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we investigate this question empirically and provide first evidence. Our results suggest that law students and business students behave reciprocally, but the degree of reciprocity is higher for lawyers. Surprisingly, it is not university education that makes business students more selfish: candidates seem to undergo a self-selection process before they begin their studies.

By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the conjecture of Pareto improvements, since labor costs grow even faster. Admittedly, the performance change is remarkable given that a considerable pay increase has no effect at all. Surprisingly, the data suggests that explicitly denying parts of the workforce this choice boosts performance, too. Additional experimental and survey data provides important insights into employees’ underlying motivations.

Incentive schemes not only influence the effort provision of workers, but might also induce sorting. As drivers of self-selection, the literature mainly focuses on measures of productivity; however, other variables, such as preferences, beliefs and personality, also play a role. With this paper, we contribute to the literature on drivers of self-selection by analyzing the role of perceived wage risks as potential influences on the sorting decision. To this end, we study a sorting decision between two variable compensation systems, where both options carry wage risks. Specifically, we look at sorting between individual piece rates and team piece rates. Using experimental data, we find evidence for both risk diversification considerations and free-riding concerns (i.e., risk of teaming-up with low-productive teammates) as drivers of self-selection. However, our data does not support the concern of our experimental subjects that others actually reduce their effort when working under team compensation, as compared to individual-based compensation.

We use a power-to-resist game to find out the effects of individuals‘ judgments about a proposer‘s selection procedure on the willingness to offer resistance against proposed outcomes. In the experiment, one individual is selected on the grounds of a particular procedure. This individual is allowed to propose how to allocate a pie among five group members: herself and four responders. After that each responder in the group can decide whether to offer costly resistance against the proposed allocation. Resistance is modeled as a threshold public good. If resistance is successful, the proposer receives nothing. If resistance is unsuccessful, the pie is distributed according to the proposer‘s decision. We find that resistance increases with (a) the size of the proposal, with (b) subjectively perceived unfairness of the selection procedure of the proposer‘s role, and with (c) the individual procedural preferences being unsatisfied. Surprisingly, resistance is not affected by the fact whether or not the group‘s majority vote on the selection procedure is respected. We check for robustness of our results and find that results are stable over two countries. The presented evidence suggests that procedural effects over and above outcomes are relevant in strategic interaction.

It has recently been claimed that women’s social preferences are easier to manipulate than men’s. We tested for gender differences in responsiveness to a homo economicus prime in a gift-exchange experiment with 113 participants. We observed gender differences in the direction of prime-to-behavior effects. For men, we found that primed participants behaved more selfishly than non-primed men as expected. However and surprisingly, for women we observed that participants primed toward selfishness behaved less selfishly than non-primed women. To explain this counterintuitive result, we suggest that prime-to-behavior effects are sensitive to individuals’ associations with the prime. We surveyed 452 students to test whether the homo economicus prime activated systematically different associations among men and women. We found strong evidence that women have significantly less positive associations with the homo economicus concept than men, pointing to a likely reason for the observed contrast effect among women.

In the context of social dilemmas, previous research has shown that human cooperation is mainly based on the social norm of conditional cooperation. While in most cases individuals behave according to such a norm, deviant behavior is no exception. Recent research further suggests that heterogeneity in social behavior might be associated with varying genetic predispositions. In this study, we investigated the relationship between individuals' behavior in a public goods experiment and the promoter-region functional repeat polymorphism in the monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA). In a dynamic setting of increasing information about others' contributions, we analyzed differences in two main components of conditional cooperation, namely the players' own contribution and their beliefs regarding the contribution of other players. We showed that there is a significant association between individuals' behavior in a repeated public goods game and MAOA. Our results suggest that male carriers of the low activity alleles cooperate significantly less than those carrying the high activity alleles given a situation where subjects had to rely on their innate beliefs about others' contributions. With increasing information about the others' cooperativeness, the genetic effect diminishes. Furthermore, significant opposing effects for female subjects carrying two low activity alleles were observed.

Forschungsprojekte

In our project, we want to examine the immediate and the long-term effects of low monetary incentives ("micro-incentives") and how to optimize their usage. The goal is to help people to make healthier choices and to reach their personal goals more easily, which could lead to positive effects for the society. Recent research has shown mixed results for the use of monetary incentives to motivate people towards choosing a healthier behavior and accomplishing their personal goals. In this regard, first studies presented results, which showed that it is possible to increase gym visits among college students by paying them. However, other studies show limited effects of incentives on quitting smoking or reaching weight goals. The research of human decision making shows a large gap between planning and ongoing decisions. When people try to plan a certain behavior or actions, they tend to exhibit high sensitivity towards the failure of steps towards such actions or behavior/low probability events. The underweighting of those rare events indicates a dependency on just a few past observations. For example, people plan to start a physical activity that promotes their health and is fun at the same time. However, even a few failures in trying to achieve those important goals, leads to no realization. If individuals are particularly sensitive to rare events in planning their decisions, then it should be possible to develop a binding tool based on repeated bets which they would like to use to implement their original plan. We have translated these theoretical considerations into a concrete incentive mechanism. Now we would like to evaluate the potential of repeated bets against oneself in an intervention study under natural conditions. This mechanism can be used to promote any activity where people want to reach a goal but since fail the realization of those goals (Using stairway instead of an elevator, visiting the gym, drinking less alcohol or just eating more vegetables). We assume that repeated low-value betting is, compared with other forms of incentives, the most effective (monetary) incentive tool. Ideally, it can support itself, even during long-term periods, while reliably delivering the desired positive behavioral changes.

In this project we contribute to the question how to motivate young citizens to accept responsibility for older citizens and to offer help reliably and on a regular basis. In a field experiment a repeated betting commitment deivce and further micro monetary incentives/commitment devices were randomly assigned to student peer tutors who support the learning process of over 50 year old participants of a 10-week smartphone course. We measure the impact of the different motivation instruments on the interaction intensity between student mentors and senior mentees and older participants changes in smartphone competences.

Excessive alcohol consumption imposes large costs to society. Already a one-time drinking episode can increase the probability of a variety of harmful events, ranging from serious physical injuries or traffic accidents to vandalism. Nevertheless, alcohol consumption is socially desirable in many situations and previous studies show that individuals even feel pressured to adapt their alcohol consumption to the perceived social drinking norm of their peers. In order to design effective interventions to overcome peer pressure to drink, a crucial first step is to align interventions to a general prevention approach. Should the intervention aim to correct misperceptions of one's own and group-related alcohol consumption, strengthen the individual to resist peer pressure or reduce peer pressure of the whole group? Motivated by a theoretical economic framework of social interactions, we conducted a series of field experiments with endogenously formed peer groups in night club settings (student party, discotheque and bar) to test the effectiveness of these three general prevention approaches. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study aiming to mitigate peer pressure and influence perceived drinking norms while groups actively consume alcohol.

So far 414 subjects participated via 144 groups in our experiment in which each member of a peer group answered a short questionnaire, estimated their own and their peer group’s current alcohol level, performed a cognitive and a motor skill test and conducted a breath alcohol test on arrival and before leaving. Immediately after the first alcohol measurement we randomly assigned each group to one of four conditions to assess how their actual alcohol level and the accuracy of the alcohol level estimates change over time.

To demonstrate that individuals adapt their drinking behaviour to the average group alcohol level and thus feel peer pressure, we supplied some groups with feedback about their members alcohol level rank and their own rank while other groups randomly did not receive such a feedback. In line with our predictions, we find evidence that individuals with initially high alcohol levels within their groups reduce the growth of their alcohol levels. To examine whether it is effective to strengthen a group member to resist peer pressure or focus on reducing peer pressure at the group level, we introduce a bonus payment to a randomly selected peer that is below the average of its peers at the end. Either a single group member was selected immediately after the first alcohol measurement (ex-ante selection), or the entire group was informed that a random group member is selected after the last alcohol measurement (ex-post selection). We find suggestive evidence that ex-ante and ex-post selected individuals with high initial alcohol levels reduce their growth of alcohol level.

Preliminary results suggest that peer pressure to drink exist since individuals above (below) the average might feel pressured to reduce (increase) their consumption. Both ex-ante and ex-post incentives indicate a preventive effect on groups and individuals that arrive highly alcoholised.

In case of massive migration inflows, the integration of immigrants requires not only the provision of public services but also the contribution of the host country’s society. Given that only a limited number of individuals is willing to engage actively but most people are homines reciprocans, we examine the idea that the population’s willingness to support refugees increases as a reciprocal response to refugees’ contributions to society in the form of volunteer activities. By implementing a treatment intervention within a nationwide survey in Germany (N=1637) on the European migrant crisis beginning in 2015, we find that the willingness to support newcomers personally and financially indeed rises significantly. Importantly, this result also holds for a subgroup which is vital for the overall integration process: those who have not been in contact to refugees before. To observe not only a change in stated preferences but also in actual behavior, we conducted two additional experiments on a smaller scale ―which both confirm our findings.

Although several recruiting campaigns have been initiated to attract more men for early education to supply the increasing demand for childcare, the proportion of men remains low. We conducted two field experiments to test for gender-based discrimination in the childcare market.

In experiment 1, we sent applications for 626 private childcare jobs throughout Germany and investigate whether men benefit from an apprenticeship, parent recommendations or own parenthood. Applications by men, independent of occupational benefits, received significantly fewer responses, fewer positive messages and fewer opportunities to get in contact with parents than female counterparts without any occupational information. Our data suggest that parents seem to have a distinct preference for female helpers and the anticipation thereof by prospective male child care workers may constitute a major obstacle for self-selection into private childcare markets.

In experiment 2, we adjusted the design to the professional center-based childcare market and varied the applicants’ gender and apprenticeship (social assistant and educator). In line with previous findings showing a non-existence of minority discrimination in labor markets with excess demand, our (very preliminary) results based on 525 matched applications display no gender-based discrimination. The strikingly high response rates express employers’ high effort to challenge the skill shortage in the childcare market.

Although prosocial activities yield positive returns due to indirect reciprocity in form of public recognition, reputation and appreciation by others, the altruistic motivation behind the engagement may matter more than the actual activity itself. To empirically test if the active decision into a charitable engagement matters for positive indirect reciprocity, we conducted a natural field experiment measuring landlords’ behavior in the German Housing market with two real prosocial alternatives to regular employment, namely engaging in the public volunteering service (PVS) or engaging in a direct employment program (DEP). Although both alternatives contain very similar work settings, PVS is voluntarily and DEP is often advised by the employment agency. By creating four identical fictitious applicants who only differed in their occupation status, in fact job seeking, permanent employed, PVS, DEP and measuring the response behavior of landlords, we are able to empirically investigate employment status discrimination and test for differences if a prosocial engagement was self-chosen or advised.

Analyzing the results, we find clear occupational-driven effects. Applicants with a permanent employment get the most and most promising answer from landlords whereas job seekers the least ones. Compared to job seekers, PVS applicants receive on average 16.89 (p = 0.001) percentage points more responses of landlords whereas applicants doing prosocial activities as part of DEP receive on average 11.18 (p = 0.001) percentage points less responses from landlords. The effects stay statistically and economically the same for the response categories ‘further contact’ and ‘visitation opportunity’. Although both social activities are charitable and contain similar prospects, the results indicate that it matters for landlords’ recognition that the activity is self-chosen instead of advised. Furthermore, we find no significant difference between PVS and permanent employed applicants in visitation opportunities which indicates that unemployed individuals can avoid disadvantages thereof on the housing market by engaging in PVS activities compared to regular occupations.

In a second wave, we conducted another field experiment at the rental housing market that allows us to compare the response rates of self-chosen and advised selection within each prosocial alternative (PVS, DEP). In line with the first waves’ results we find significant better response outcomes for applicants that mentioned a voluntary participation in PVS respectively DEP compared to their counterparts that participate on advice.

The results do not only show job-related discrimination on the housing market and provide evidence for future labor market policies and anti-discrimination laws, they also show that the prosocial intention matters for indirect positive reciprocity in the field.

While the sharing economy is growing rapidly, research is lagging behind. As the meta-defining key factor, many scholars accredit trust as the currency of the sharing economy. In this paper, we test in the emerging ride-share market characterized by comparably high levels of risk and uncertainty about the provided service, for varying factors driving trust using a factorial design experiment (1875 completed surveys). We create car sharing ads and vary drivers’ gender, age, relationship status, driving safety and the number of passengers. By letting the participants rate driver’s purchase intention, maximum willingness to pay and trustworthiness we are able to shed causal light into mediating factors that drive perceived trustworthiness. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that females drivers are clearly favored compared to their male counterparts in the ride-sharing market. The effect is mainly driven by the higher rated trustworthiness of female drivers.

Although short-term or ‘episodic’ volunteers are a critical resource for non-profit organizations, little is known about how to properly motivate them. For a charity event, a non-profit organization asked volunteers to produce handmade greeting cards as selling goods. By running a field experiment, we study the effect of motivating these volunteers through (a) the opportunity to vote on the donation usage and (b) the prospect of individual performance feedback. We find an economically and statistically significant positive effect of both tools on the quantity of work done, while the quality is mostly unaffected. Moreover, we observe significant gender differences in responsiveness to the treatments. While prospect for feedback highly motivates men, women respond strongly to increased responsibility.