The motive forces: Some critical thoughts on the NDR - Christopher Malikane

Transformation of arts and culture and the "new person" - Morakabe
'Raks' Seakhoa

Introduction

The struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist and equal education system has always
been an important component of the struggle for a South Africa that belongs
to all. In contrast to the discrimination and inequality of Bantu Education,
the Freedom Charter offered a vision of free and compulsory schooling of high
quality for all children, with higher education and technical training made
available to all on the basis of merit through the provision of state financial
assistance.

The RDP document adopted in 1993 by the Alliance, committed the democratic
state to develop an integrated system of education and training that provides
equal opportunities to all irrespective of race, colour, sex, class, language,
age, religion, geographical location and political or other opinion. It must
also address the development of knowledge and skills that can be used to produce
high-quality goods and services in such a way as to enable us to develop our
cultures, our society and our economy. (Clause 3.3.1)

Eight years since the democratic breakthrough of 1994, important advances have
been made. Yet, in 1999 Education Minister Kader Asmal observed: "the public
believes that we have a crisis on our hands. Our people have a right to education
that the state is not upholding. After five years of democratic reconstruction
and development, the people are entitled to a better education service and they
must have it."

This Umrabulo feature on Education and Training deals with two pillars of Education
transformation in our country - schooling and higher education transformation.
Both these areas are fundamental to our human resource development strategy
and are faced with many challenges.

The 2001 Matric results heralded a significant turn-around following a few
years of truly dismal results. This was only possible through targeted strategies
by the Department of Education and with the cooperation of all stakeholders
in education. Umrabulo interviewed Gauteng MEC for Education, Ignatius Jacobs,
to find out what they have done to turn around public schooling to register
the improvements in their 2001 Matric results.

The recent release of the National Working Group report on changing the regional
and national landscape of higher education institutions is the culmination of
a long policy process in higher education. However, as our feature will indicate,
many systemic problems have yet to be addressed to make this sector truly representative,
effective and serving our national developmental interests.

Overview of education transformation, 1994-1995

The Constitution of South Africa (Section 29, 1996) states "everyone has
the right to basic education, including adult basic education". This frames
the developments in the education system and is a key indicator against which
the system will ultimately be evaluated. This article outlines the key developments
within the education system since 1994, and points to some of the achievement.
It further highlights some of the priorities that lie ahead in the realisation
of our goals.

Systemic changes

Pivotal to the transformation of the education system was the dismantling of
the old divided and fragmented system and establishing one national and nine
provincial departments. This required changes in structure, systems, procedures
as well as the culture and approach of the departments so as to attain the goal
of a quality, efficient, accountable and effective public service. However,
while there has been considerable progress in this area there is still considerable
work to be done to build a shared vision, new values and attitudes, as well
as the creation of capacity and an ethos that can drive the achievement of these
organisational goals.

The Education Policy processA central plank of the transformation process has
been the fundamental transformation of policy and legislation pertaining to
all aspects of the education system. Key policies and legislation include:

The Ministry's first White Paper, Education and Training in a Democratic
South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System (Feb, 1995), which outlined
the vision for the new system;

The National Education Policy Act (NEPA, 1996), which served to formalise
the role of the Minister of Education as well as the relationship between
National and the Provinces;

The South Africa Schools Act (SASA, 1996), which made schooling compulsory
for children between the ages of 7-14.

The School Funding Norms, which is an important component of ensuring redress;

The Further Education and Training Act (1998) and associated documents,
which spell out the vision and programme for the FET band and the role of
FET institutions;

The Higher Education Act (1997), which makes provision for a unified and
nationally planned system of higher education;

The Adult Basic Education and Training Act (2000), which provides a framework
for the development of the ABET system;

The South African Qualifications Act (SAQA, 1995), that provides for the
development of the National Qualifications Framework, which is central to
the vision of an integrated education and training system that facilitates
lifelong learning;

Curriculum 2005 that sets out an approach to education that emphasizes
learners, through an outcome-based system, and integrates the development
of values of nation building and democracy;

Finally, legislation that regulates the responsibilities and competencies
of professional teachers (specifically the Employment of Educators Act (1998))
and provides a governance structure - the South African Council of Educators
(SACE).

From frameworks to action (1998-2000)

These policy and legislative changes brought about significant achievements
in the system. However there remain considerable challenges pertaining to implementation.

Some issues that are of particular concern include:

Addressing racism, violence and other manifestations of anti-social values;

The need for skilled and capable personnel, as well as the importance of
transforming bureaucratic and hierarchical management practices;

The imperative for improvements in the material conditions of education
and the quality of education practice;

The continuing low levels of literacy and education - the 1996 Census reveals
that 19.3% of South Africans aged 20 years or more have no formal education
and only 24% have some or have completed primary education. The Minister of
Education highlighted the concerns relating to the education system and stated
that:

"The public believes that we have a crisis on our hands. Our people
have a right to education that the state is not upholding. They have put their
confidence in the democratic process, and returned their government with an
overwhelming mandate. After five years of democratic reconstruction and development,
the people are entitled to a better education service and they must have it"
(Minister Asmal, August 1999).

Meeting the challenges through working together: Tirisano

In this context a plan known as Tirisano was developed in January 2000. This
plan attempts to mobilise all players to work towards a common vision. The nine
priorities of Tirisano are:

We must make our provincial systems work by making co-operative government
work.

We must break the back of illiteracy among adults and youths in five years.

Schools must become centres of community life.

We must end conditions of physical degradation in South African schools.

We must develop the professional quality of our teaching force.

We must ensure the success of active learning through outcomes-based education.

We must create a vibrant further education and training system to equip
youth and adults to meet the social and economic needs of the 21st century.

We must implement a rational, seamless higher education system that grasps
the intellectual and professional challenges facing South Africans in the
21st century.

We must deal urgently and purposefully with the HIV/AIDS emergency in and
through the education and training system.

The nine priorities are divided into five programmatic areas. These are HIV/AIDS,
school effectiveness and teacher professionalism, the fight against illiteracy,
further education and training and higher education, and organisational effectiveness
of the national and provincial systems. Subsequent to the development of the
plan, three additional areas were also highlighted; these are early childhood
development, education for learners with special needs and gender equity. Initiatives
are now underway in each of these areas.

A number of processes have begun as part of Tirisano to address the myriad
of challenges facing education. However the education reconstruction project
is far from complete and there are still a number of areas that require concerted
attention.

Addressing the challenges in the education system

Central to addressing the challenges within the education system are the pillars
of co-operative governance and budgetary processes.

Co-operative governance: This pillar highlights the need for
cooperation between the different tiers of government as well as the involvement
of stakeholders in policy development. While there are a number of issues that
arise in these processes such as capacity questions and questions of representation,
this form of governance remains a priority and there is a process to ensure
that this evolves so as to become increasingly more effective.

The Medium Term Expenditure Framework: This process has allowed
the majority of provinces to reflect positive changes in their allocations,
however the poorest provinces still have inadequate allocations for non-personnel
expenditure. To try and address some of these problems, there have been a number
of changes to improve the efficiency of the system. Some of these changes relate
to admissions policy, age-grade norms and assessment. These interventions aim
to reduce repetition and improve flow-through rates. The success of these interventions
will be explored more fully in the next section.

An exploration of the success of these interventions

There are a number of broad areas that have been prioritised, and in which
it is appropriate to locate discussions pertaining to the achievements within
the system. These are access, equity and redress, capacity, quality and HIV/AIDS.
While all of these areas are inter-related, there is an artificial attempt to
separate them so as to allow for some evaluation of success.

Access, equity and redress: These priorities have been immensely
complex during the process of implementation. Some achievements have been that
spending patterns have moved towards racial equity and ensuring redress - in
part through funds made available through the RDP. Further, the MTEF has facilitated
the development of a coherent redress and poverty targeting strategy. This strategy
involves the introduction of a number of central mechanisms for achieving equity.
This includes the introduction of an equitable shares formulae to guide provincial
allocations, as well as the National Norms and Standards Document which provides
a framework for allocating non-personnel recurrent costs on the basis of needs.
Addressing educator:learner ratios are also seen as an important measure to
reduce inequities.

The School Register of Needs (SRN) reflects an improvement in infrastructural
inequities, and there is a grant to support innovation and school design. Despite
these achievements, there are still real concerns regarding the equity of learning
conditions, and intra-provincial inequalities remain a serious problem.

A key factor when considering equity and redress is that of access and success
in the system. As discussed previously, there are still a number of concerns
such as slow progression, and high failure and repeater rates. Changes that
have been introduced in FET are intended to address the different needs in the
system, and to be more responsive through focused vocational and academic programmes.
As part of this response, there will be an emphasis on programmes of national
need such as science, mathematics and technology. This is seen as a critical
intervention so as ensure that the system is both more manageable and effective.
This intervention is also supported by the allocation of additional funds for
adult literacy and skills development. The NQF, while there may be certain implementation
delays, is also seen as an important vehicle for facilitating access and lifelong
learning.

Access to early childhood programmes is a concern, and an important intervention
includes a grant to allow for the implementation of the pre-school reception
year in the urban and rural nodal development points.

Further, issues of equity, redress and access continue to be a feature of debate
about higher education in South Africa. The three-year planning framework provides
a mechanism for addressing some of these concerns, and this is supported by
the allocation of block grants and earmarked funding. This includes funding
for NSFAS as well as institutional redress and development.

These different parts of the system come together as part of the HRD strategy
that was jointly launched by the Ministry of Education and Labour. The strategy,
a Human Resource Development Strategy for South Africa: A Nation at Work for
a Better Life for All focuses on early childhood development, general school
education, adult literacy and skills development as a basis for improving the
foundations for life. This takes into account the devastating impact of the
Matric system and the poor pass rates. The FET strategy is seen as critical
in addressing this problem. The strategy also focuses on the development of
high-quality skills.

Capacity: This remains a real concern both in terms of individual and institutional
capacity, as well as a real obstacle to meeting transformation priorities. To
address this there is a conditional grant of R280 million per year in support
of financial management and education quality.

The Review of Curriculum 2005 pointed to the lack of capacity to implement
this programme. A commitment of more than R1 billion per year to supporting
learner materials is an important intervention to address some of the capacity
questions that were raised by the review.

Further, there is the recognition of the need to reshape the manner in which
schools and provincial departments are managed, and the manner in which their
responsibilities are defined. This includes the need for a common vision and
understanding across the different stakeholders and role players.

Quality: There is also a concern about the quality of learning
and the difficulty of curricular interventions in the context of schools that
are not functioning effectively on a systemic level. Critically, these include
the need to build quality assurance and accountability into the system, in addition
to the interventions raised above; there is also agreement about the need to
focus on assessment. Part of this includes a strategy for assessing learners'
achievements at Grades 3, 6, and 9 for the award of a GETC.Within the FET band,
there will be a focus on both classroom-based as well as externally-based assessment.
The proposed GENFETQA and the HEQC are bodies that will assist to facilitate
the quality movement in South Africa and should enhance the credibility of the
system. The DoE has also fine-tuned its focus on quality indicators and performance
assessment tools.

Impact of HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS is likely to impact on the education system in
a myriad of ways. Firstly in terms of the impact on teachers, who may be ill,
absent or dying or have family members that are ill. Secondly, it may impact
on demand for education and the ability of parents to pay for this education.
There is a commitment to funding programmes that grapple with HIV/AIDS, and
key interventions identified include programmes that develop awareness, information
and advocacy, building HIV/AIDS into the curriculum and planning for HIV/AIDS
and the education system.

Priorities for 2002/2003 During the Parliamentary briefings in February 2002,
the Ministers of Education and Labour outlined priorities and plans for the
2002/2003 budget year to take further the implementation of the human resource
development strategy. They identified the role of education in the development
and utilisation of human resources at three levels: -

Improving the foundations for human resource development: This include prioritising
the provision of early childhood education to especially the poor; provision
of opportunities for adult learners, including basic literacy and numeracy and
ABET that leads to a General Education and Training Certificate and the provision
of high standard general education for all learners, including those with special
educational needs.

After the approval of the Early Childhood Development (ECD) and Inclusive Education
Programmes White papers by Cabinet in 2001, the following fully-funded programmes
in each area will start this year: -

Identifying 4 500 ECD sites in nodal areas, which will be supported with
training and materials;

Conversion of 30 special schools into Special Needs Resource centres which
will serve a wider community; and

Conversion of 30 primary schools into "full service" schools which
will be able to accommodate learners with special needs.

In General Education, the DoE has prioritised Mathematics and Science teaching
and the inculcation of values and the teaching of history in school, with
the following programmes: -

Bursaries to 300 teachers to attend two-year, university based programmes
in Maths and Science; in addition to the R90 million that will be spent this
year on upgrading 10 000 unqualified teachers.

The national symbols (the flag and anthem in particular) will be actively
promoted in schools this year, in support of the 'Proudly South Africa' campaign
to build patriotism.

Promoting the centrality of history in nation building, with a national
Conference on Improving History Teaching to be held in September this year.

A refined National Curriculum Statement for General Education (grades 0-9)
will be announced this year, which will give direction and support to educators.
This statement will only be implemented in 2004, to ensure that teachers are
properly trained and that teaching and learning materials are produced and
distributed

Expanding and improving the provision of Further Education and Training (FET)
for youth and adults: The transformation of technical colleges by April to establish
50 high quality FET institutions that will offer relevant outcomes based programmes.
This should build a link between general education and lifelong learning, providing
opportunities for people to be trained for work, continuing vocational training
or for higher education.

The alignment of higher education to national human resource priorities: Higher
education has responsibility for the development of high-level skills, and institutional
re-organisation will be necessary to achieve this goal. This will be done through
programme related funding and dedicated measures to support students into scarce
skills areas. Some of the R800 million per year National Student Financial Aids
Scheme (NSFAS) funds will also be dedicated for particular programmes, similar
to the ring-fencing of R30 million for teacher education bursaries.

Conclusion

A single, equitable system of quality education within a system of lifelong
learning has been a central priority for the government. The process of building
this new system has been complex and many of the problems of the past still
need to be addressed. Racism is still a part of our society and the education
system must take up these challenges and ensure that it is building and promoting
those values that are consistent with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution
- these include equity, tolerance, openness and social honour.

The manifold demand for resources continues to be a challenge, and there is
a need for budgets that prioritise redress and equity. This requires effective
government spending and an approach that is co-operative across government and
is complimented by innovative partnerships with NGOs. The task is large, but
there has been significant progress and learning and these should assist in
paving the way towards the attainment of the vision and goals that we have set.

Key information about the higher education system in South
Africa

The higher education polity process

The higher education terrain has been immensely contested as part of the overall
struggle against apartheid and against apartheid education in particular. Since
the days of the Separate University Education Act, through to the struggles
led by structures such as SASO, AZASO/ SANSCO, NUSAS, UDUSA and others, the
transformation of higher education to meet the goals of a non-racial, non-sexist
and democratic South Africa have been on the agenda of the national liberation
movement.

With the possibility of a negotiated settlement on the horizon towards the
late 1980s, the National Education Co-coordinating Committee initiated a research
and policy programme into education transformation in a democratic South Africa,
known as the NEPI process. This formed the basis of the inputs and discussions
on higher education transformation during the process to draft the Reconstruction
and Development Programme in 1993. The RDP document thus contained the following
clauses on Higher Education: -

3.3.13.1 The higher education system represents a major resource of national
development and contributes to the worldwide advance of knowledge. But, its
present structure and capacity are seriously distorted by the apartheid inheritance,
its governance systems are outmoded, and its funding arrangements have led to
serious crises for both the students and institutions themselves.

3.3.13.2 In order to address these structural problems with the seriousness
they deserve, the new democratic government will consult all significant stakeholders
with a view to appointing a representative and expert higher education commission
to investigate and report urgently on the role of the higher education sector
in national reconstruction and development; the structure of the system; access/selection
and exclusion; the role of open learning and distance education; institutional
governance and the governance of the system as a whole.

In 1994, the ANC published a document titled "A Policy Framework for Education
and Training." This document sought to further set out the framework for
higher education in a democratic society. It provided the following approach
to the transformation of higher education:

Key Principles of a transformed Higher Education system in South Africa:
The National Government will have central responsibility for the provision of
higher education; redressing the historical imbalances will be a priority; the
higher education system and individual institutions will be required to be effective
and have clearly defined objectives linking to sustainable national development;
and democratic values of representation, accountability, transparency, freedom
of association and academic freedom will underpin the higher education system.

Institutional landscape of Higher Education: There will be a
single national system of higher education consisting of two sectors. The division
of universities into graduate and research institutions on one side and teaching
universities on the other will not be supported and in the longer term, the
development of multi-campus institutions will be supported.

Provision: Higher education will be expanded in line with national
development needs and plans in particular in relation to human resource development;
priority will be given to balance the mix of outputs between the different levels
and programmes in higher education; the Funding Formula for Higher Education
will be reviewed and restructured to meet the aims of expanding the system,
redressing institutional inequalities and increasing the intake of disadvantaged
students; higher education qualifications represent a social and individual
benefit, and therefore costs will have to be shared by the state and individuals;
a new policy on student finance will support the access of disadvantaged students
to higher education and the mechanism for funding will include the bursaries
scholarships and a national loan scheme.

Access: Access of disadvantaged students to higher education
will be increased to ensure that it is reflective of the country's demographics.
Admissions criteria and procedures will need to change to facilitate the increased
access of disadvantaged students.

Governance: Institutional governance will provide for the effective
representation of all stakeholders in the higher education sector. A commission
will be appointed with the task of reviewing structures and resourcing of the
entire sector and making recommendations regarding the specific role of the
sector in national development and reconstruction.

Implementation and policy process since 1994

The then Minister of Education, Professor Bengu appointed a National Commission
on Higher Education (NCHE) in February 1995 as outlined in the RDP, as a first
step to kick-start the process of transformation of higher education in the
country. Its terms of reference included the following:

What the shape of institutions should be in terms of the type of institutions;

What the size of the higher education sector should be;

How to ensure the maintenance of academic and other standards whilst at
the same time expanding educational excellence;

How the higher education should be funded and how as a matter of priority
a national bursary and loan scheme could be established with particular reference
to sustainability of funding and management; and

How the higher education system should be governed, including the role of
government authorities and the role of advisory and other statutory bodies.

Recommendations arising from the NCHE Process (1996)

The Commission in its work looked at various documents and policy proposals
including the Constitution of the country. The proposal for a transformed higher
education system was informed by the guiding principles of equity, democratisation,
development, quality, academic freedom/institutional autonomy; effectiveness
and efficiency.

The central features of the higher education system as proposed by the NCHE
were increased participation by a diverse range of constituencies; increased
co-operation and partnerships between higher education and other social sectors
and institutions; responsiveness to social and economic needs and a single co-coordinated
system, with co-operative governance and goal-directed funding forming the core
of the transformation framework.

Parliament in 1997 adopted the White Paper 3, A programme of the Transformation
of Higher Education. The White Paper was a culmination of an extensive process
of consultation that was initiated with the establishment of the NCHE and the
release of the Green Paper on Higher Education in December 1996 for public comment.

Policy framework as outlined in the White Paper on the Transformation of Higher
Education (1997)

The White Paper outlines the framework for change, with the central focus
that the HE system must be planned, governed and funded as a single national
co-coordinated system.

Like in the NCHE report, the key principles of such a single national system,
according to the White Paper include equity and redress; democratisation; development;
quality; effectiveness and efficiency and academic freedom. It also added the
principle of public accountability.

A Higher Education Act based on the policy framework outlined in the
White paper was adopted in 1997. The Act established the legal basis of single
national higher education system and replaced the Universities Act, Tertiary
Education Act and the Technikons Act. It also provides the framework for the
establishment of the Council on Higher Education, for institutional transformation.

In January 2000, the Minister of Education, Professor Asmal requested the Council
on Higher Education (CHE) to provide him with concrete proposals on the shape
and size of a single, co-coordinated higher education system, derived from the
set of general principles which served as guidelines for restructuring of higher
education at institutional level during the first five years.A Task Team was
established by the CHE and it used the Education White Paper 3 as its point
of departure as well as the goals and principles advanced in the document as
its guiding principles. The task team presented its report in 2000 (Towards
a New Higher Education landscape: Meeting the equity, quality and social development
imperatives of South Africa in the 21st Century, better known as the Size and
Shape report) and it was released for public debate.

Key Proposals of the CHE Size and Shape Report (2000)

The report proposed a single higher education system that would consist of
the following types of institutions:

"Bedrock institutions" whose main focus will be the provision
of quality undergraduate programmes; limited postgraduate programmes up to
masters level and a research programme related to curriculum, learning and
teaching with a view to application.

Institutions whose orientation and focus will be on the provision of quality
undergraduate programmes; comprehensive post-graduate teaching and research
programmes up to the doctoral level and with extensive research capabilities
(basic, applied strategic and developmental) across a broad range of areas.

Institutions whose orientation and focus will be on the provision of quality
undergraduate programmes; extensive postgraduate teaching and research programmes
up to the masters level; selective postgraduate teaching and research programmes
up to doctoral level and with select areas of research (basic, applied, strategic
and development).

A single institution focusing on distance education; and

Private Higher Education institutions.

The 'Size and Shape report' sparked heated public debates, especially
from historically disadvantaged universities (HDUs), with its proposals of essentially
a two-tier system of 'bedrock institutions' and others that provide high quality
research and postgraduate programmes. In addition to entrenching the apartheid
divisions of the past, it was argued that the division of the system based on
undergraduate and research/post-graduate programmes did not make educational
sense in a developing country like ours.

Following public inputs to the Ministry on this report, the Cabinet adopted
the National Plan on Higher Education in March 2001. The National Plan
outlines the framework and mechanisms for implementing and realising the policy
goals of the White Paper. It recognises the strengths and weaknesses of the
system and is based on a developmental approach, intended to guide institutions
towards meeting the goals of a single integrated higher education system. It
moves away from the 'Size and shape' approach of a system based on the division
between bedrock/undergraduate and research/post graduate institutions, towards
an integrated system based on programme focus. The National Plan therefore provides
a unique opportunity to establish a higher education system that can meet the
challenges and grasp the opportunities presented to us by the contemporary world.

Key Proposals of the National Plan on Higher Education (March 2001)

A single integrated higher education system: The National Plan (NPHE) establishes
indicative targets for the size and shape of the higher education system, including
overall growth and participation rates. It proposes that the participation rates
in higher education should be increased from 15% to 20% in the long term. The
proposed rates will address both the imperative for equity as well as changing
human resource and labour needs. In addressing the problems of low graduation
rates the NPHE proposes that academic development programmes should be funded
as an integral part of the new funding formula. It also envisaged a review of
the role and efficacy of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS).

It further proposes the recruitment of mature and disabled students as one
of the priorities as well recruiting students from the SADC region as part of
the SADC Protocol on Education.

The NPHE proposes to shift the balance in enrolments over the next five to
ten years between humanities, business and commerce and science, engineering
and technology from the current ration of 49%: 26%: 25% to 40%: 30%: 30% respectively.

All institutions will be expected to establish equity targets with emphasis
on the programmes in which black and women students are under-represented and
to develop strategies to ensure equity outcomes. Redress for HBI's will be linked
to the agreed missions and programme profiles, including developmental strategies
to build capacity, in particular, administrative, management governance and
academic structures.

Institutional Restructuring: The NPHE proposes the establishment
of a single dedicated distance education institution to address the opportunities
presented by distance education by increasing access both locally and in the
rest of Africa. This will enable economies of scale and ensure that advantage
is taken of the rapid changes in information and technology.

The Plan proposes to merge the University of South Africa and Technikon SA
and to incorporate the distance education of Vista University into the merged
institution. A Working Group will be established to facilitate the merger.

The NPHE proposes that the institutional landscape of higher education must
be restructured to create new institutional and organisational forms to address
the racial fragmentation of the system. This will be achieved through:

Institutional collaboration at the regional and national level in programme
development delivery and rationalisation, in particular of small and costly
programmes, which cannot be sustained across all institutions;

Investigation into the feasibility of more rational arrangement for the
consolidation of higher education through reducing, where appropriate, the
number of institutions, but not the number of delivery sites on a regional
basis;

The establishment of a National Working Group to undertake the investigation
on the principle and goals of transformation of higher education as outlined
in the White Paper.

The establishment of National Institutes for Higher Education in Mpumalanga
and Northern Cape in order to facilitate access to HE.

The unbundling of Vista University and the incorporation of its constituent
parts into the appropriate institutions within the region.

National Working Group Report (December 2001)

The Minister established the NWG in April 2001 to advise him on restructuring
the institutional landscape of HE. Its terms of reference were based on the
principles of the National Plan on Higher Education. The NWG has released its
report and recommendations to the Minister and the report has also been released
for public comment.

Key problems facing higher education in South Africa

A number of conditions and developments within higher education represent fundamental
challenges to the system and major obstacles to the achievement of policy goals.
The higher education system and individual institutions manifest two different
though connected kinds of problems and weaknesses. These can be characterised
as 'structural problems' (fundamental, long-standing, contextual) and 'conjunctural
problems' (immediate, contextual).

Structural problems include:

The geographical location of institutions that was based on ideological
and political considerations, rather than rational and coherent planning.
For example, the so-called 'bush campuses' got their names because they were
mainly located in rural Bantustan areas and were supposed to be for different
ethnic and racial groups.

The continued and even increasing fragmentation of the system. The higher
education system still does not function in the coordinated manner envisaged
in the White Paper, nor has the existing planning instruments and institutions
produced meaningful collaboration amongst institutions. Many of the features
of apartheid fragmentation continue within the system and between institutions.
Public universities and technikons appear to compete with each other as market
competitors, rather than operate as part of a unified and coordinated higher
education system.

There are major inefficiencies with regards student throughput rates, graduation
rates, student dropouts, student repetition and the retention of failing students,
and unit costs across the system. South African universities and technikons
produced about 75 000 graduates and diplomats in 1998 on a head count enrolment
base of 600 000 students. 25% of new undergraduate students drop out of universities
or technikons by the end of their first year of study.

There are skewed patterns of distribution of students in the various fields
of study - Science, Engineering and Technology (SET), Business and Commerce,
and the Humanities and Education.

The distribution of students in the various levels and fields of study -SET,
Business and Commerce, and Humanities and Education - and at certain institutions
is skewed in terms of race and gender.

Academic and administrative staff also display poor patterns of race and
gender representation and distribution.

Most institutions have extremely low research outputs and even the institutions
that demonstrate a higher ratio of research outputs relative to other institutions
have uneven levels of outputs. In 1998, about 65% of all publications recognised
for subsidy purposes were produced by only six of the 21 universities. These
same six institutions also produce close to 70% of South Africa's total masters
and doctoral graduates.

Conjunctural problems in the higher education system.

The decline in student enrollment within the public education sector. The
serious decline in retention rates of student from the first to later years
has also compounded this problem. As a result, the overall participation rate
in higher education for the age group 20-24 years stood at 15% in 1999.

The inability of several institutions to continue to fund their activities
because of the relationship between enrollments and funding, as well as their
inability to attract other sources of funding. The inability of many poor
students to pay fees, as well as the institutions lack of capacity to collect
fees, have resulted in increases in student debt. This is a problem that affects
mainly, but not exclusively historically disadvantaged institutions (HDIs).

The increase in private higher education institutions, mainly in the form
of international, small single-purpose providers. These institutions are presently
inadequately regulated in terms of registration, accreditation and quality
assurance.

The current higher education information systems are sorely inadequate,
especially in relation to information on finance matters.

The problems and weaknesses of the higher education are extensive and varied.
They will not disappear on their own or be overcome by the institutions on their
own. They must be confronted at a national level and addressed with vigour.

[SOURCE: Towards a new Higher education landscape: Meeting the equity, quality
and social development imperatives of South Africa in the 21st century, 2000]

Participation in higher education

The period 1994-1997 was characterised by a high level of optimism, which flowed
from expectations that the pressure of access to the higher education system
would continue in a post-apartheid South Africa. It was taken as given that
student enrolments in universities as well as technikons would increase rapidly
throughout the rest of the decade.

The evidence available in time supported the belief that student enrolments
in South Africa were on a steep upward trajectory. Figure 1 shows that by 1994
the headcount enrolment for the university plus technikons sectors had reached
a total of more than 600 000, an increase of nearly 206 000 (or 52%) over the
total for 1990. The increase in 1997 compared with the enrolment figure in 1993
was 127 000 (or 27%). The average annual increase in headcount enrolments between
1990 and 1997 was 4%.

However the data of 2000 shows that there has been a decrease in student enrolments.
There are various reasons that could be linked to this such as the impact of
Private education in the higher education system and the decrease of pass rate
in the schooling system at Matric level. The figure shows that the decrease
in 2000 compared to the period 1997 was 3000 (or 0.5%).

The increase in headcount also generated expectations in the higher education
system that government funding would grow in future years, particularly because
government funds had been allocated to institutions on the basis of formulae
which were driven primarily by student enrolment.

Enrolments by race group and gender

The enrolment data available suggests that the public higher education system
has moved, in broad overall terms, towards the equity goals set by the 1997
White Paper. This can be seen in figures 2 and 3, which show the percentage
of black students and women in the headcount enrolment totals, which follow.

The averages show that by 2000, 73% of students in the public higher education
system were black and 52% were female, compared with proportions of 52% of black
students and 43% for female students in 1993. This shows that the public higher
education system has made substantial moves during the 1990's towards the achievement
of race and gender equity.

But taken overall, this achievement hides major inequities, which persist in
the sector. Black and female students remain underrepresented in post-graduate
programmes, as well as in all programmes in business and management, and in
science, engineering and technology.

A further equity problem, which remains hidden in the changing racial patterns,
is that of decline in participation rates in South Africa's higher education
system. Changes in the racial distribution of student enrolments are not the
result of a major increase in the rate of participation among those who were
previously excluded from the higher education system. They stem primarily from
a sharp decline in the enrolment of white students in the public higher education
system. White enrolments fell from a total of 215 000 in 1995 to 164 000 in
2000, a decline of 41000 (or 19%) over this period. Nevertheless it must be
stressed that the growth in African student enrolments did have a positive effect
on this group's overall participation rate.

Report of the National Working Group on Higher Education December
2001

Mission and brief of the National Working Group (NWG).

The National Working Group, under the chairpersonship of Saki Macozoma,
was established by the Minister of Education in March 2001 to advise on the
restructuring of the institutional land-scape of Higher education, as outlined
in the National Plan on Higher Education (March 2001).

The terms of NWG was to make recommendations on appropriate arrangements
for the consolidation of the provision of higher education on a regional basis,
through new organisational and institutional forms, including reducing the
numbers of higher education institutions.

The NWG completed its work in December 2001, when it handed over its report
to the Minister of Education. The recommendations contained in the report
were arrived at based on consideration and investigations, which included:

Relevant policy documents

Outcomes of previous investigations

Data on recent and current trends in the higher education system

Guiding principles, performance indicators and linked benchmarks

Meetings with various higher education constituencies

Written submissions on institutional mergers and collaboration; and

International experiences.

The Ministry of Education is considering the report, has released it for
public debate and inputs and will make recommendations to Cabinet.

General recommendations

Regional collaboration: should not be left to the free will of institutions,
but be enforced through incentives and sanctions outlined in the National
Plan on Higher Education.

Universities and Technikons: should continue to operate as institutions
with distinct programmes and mission foci.

Comprehensive institutions: in some circumstances, the NWG recommended
the merger of a university and technikon to establish a comprehensive institution,
guarding against institutional drift.

College sector: Agricultural and nursing colleges should be integrated
as part of the higher education sector; in a number of cases the NWG recommended
that these colleges form an integrated part of merger proposals.

Distance education: Strict regulation of programmes offered by residential
institutions, without jeopardizing programmes of high quality and that meet
regional or national needs.

Satellite campuses: should be regulated to stop their unplanned proliferation.

Regional recommendations

Eastern Cape

A comprehensive higher education institution (offering both university and
technikon programmes) in Port Elizabeth, through the merger of University
of Port Elizabeth and PE Technikon and the incorporation
of the PE Vista campus.

One unitary university with its base in East London, through the merger
of Fort Hare, Rhodes and the Medical school of UNITRA,
with a focus on information, communication and technology programmes. The
Fort Hare campus of the merged university should diminish its academic programmes,
developing a core of those programmes in which it is strong.

A unitary technikon with primary campuses in East London and Umtata, as
well as campuses elsewhere in the province, through the merger of Border
Technikon and Eastern Cape Technikon. The location of
the other campuses and the future of the present Butterworth campus to be
determined by the Education department. The infrastructure of UNITRA
should form the core of the Umtata campus, through the discontinuation of
its remaining academic programmes, with provision being made for registered
students to complete their studies.

Free State

The University of Free State to remain as an independent
and separate institution, incorporating the Vista Bloemfontein campus

Technikon Free State to remain as an independent and separate
institution, incorporating the Vista Welkom campus..

Consideration should be given to merging the nursing and agricultural
colleges of the province with either the University of Free
State or Free State Technikon.

Gauteng

RAU, Wits and University of Pretoria to be maintained
as separate and independent institutions. All three universities should give
attention to issues of equity and access, and to serious regional collaboration
with a view to rationalization and strengthening of programmes through co-ordination
and consolidation. At a minimum, these should include the disciplines of medicine,
dentistry, business and management, engineering and the performing and creative
arts.

The Vista Mamelodi campus should be incorporated into the
University of Pretoria.. The three technikons in the Tshwane metro, namely
Technikon Northern Gauteng, Technikon North-West and Technikon
Pretoria should merge into one unitary institution with two sites,
one at the current Northern Gauteng site and the second at the current Technikon
Pretoria site. The feasibility of using the Technikon North-West facility
for different purposes, e.g. further education, while its students and staff
are accommodated in the new merged technikon, should be explored.

Technikon Witwatersrand should be maintained as a separate
and independent institution. It should give priority to regional cooperation,
especially with regards its school of engineering with other schools in the
region.

Vaal Triangle Technikon should be retained as a separate and
independent institution and the facilities of Vista Sebokeng campus be allocated
to it to allow for further growth. The students and staff of Vista Sebokeng
should be incorporated into the Vaal Triangle campus of the unitary North
West university (a merger between Potchefstroom University and University
of the North West).

RAU, Wits and Technikon Witwatersrand should
jointly propose to the Ministry how to utilise the Vista East Rand
and Soweto campuses, to facilitate access of students to higher
education.. The distance education programmes at Pretoria University and Pretoria
Technikon should be reviewed and where appropriate discontinued.

KwaZulu Natal

The merger of ML Sultan Technikon and Technikon Natal
should be brought to a speedy conclusion. Mangosuthu Technikon
should be merged with this new technikon. The Umlazi Campus
of the University of Zululand should be used by the new merged technikon.

Merging the University of Durban Westville (UDW) and University
of Natal into a unitary institution, with rationalisation of programmes
across the three campuses.

The University of Zululand (Ongoye) should refocus its mission,
becoming a comprehensive rural institution, offering technikon type programmes
as well as limited relevant university type programmes. Its future growth
should be in the technikon type programmes, with major involvement in the
Richards Bay area.. No other publicly funded HE institution should operate
in the province, except the merged national distance education institution.

Limpopo

The University of the North (Turfloop), University of Venda
and Medunsa should be merged into one unitary institution. All
colleges of agriculture and nursing in the province
should be merged with this unitary institution. The new institution should
also offer technikon type programmes and qualification, focusing on the needs
of the region, concentrating different types of strengths in different campuses.
Medunsa should continue to offer its current range of programmes in the health
sciences, but rationalise its science programmes by building synergy with
the other two campuses. Its faculty of Dentistry should be retained, focusing
on the needs of the northern parts of the country. The Education ministry
should over the medium to long-term investigates and makes decisions on the
relocation of Medunsa's programmes and infrastructure to the Northern Province.

North West

Merging Potchefstroom University and the University
of the North-West into one unitary multi-campus institution. The new
institution should refocus the mission of the North-West campus by introducing
more technikon type programmes to meet the needs of the province. As part
of this merger, the Vaal Triangle campus should be retained
and its telematic programmes regulated within the provisions of the new government
policy in this regard. The nursing and agricultural colleges
in the province should be merged into this new institution. The students and
staff (but not the facilities) of the Sebokeng campus should
be incorporated into the new institution.

Western Cape

The University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University and the
Cape Technikon should be retained as separate, independent
institutions, giving priority to issues of equity, regional collaboration,
programme rationalisation and the development of an enabling environment to
ensure that all can pursue their studies unhampered by social and cultural
impediments. UCT and Stellenbosch should establish a single platform for the
teaching of the health sciences and performing and creative arts as a matter
of urgency; with close cooperation between their medical schools. Further
areas of the consolidation of programmes already identified by the regional
consortium should be explored with the DoE. Stellenbosch should pay particular
attention to the enrollment and support of significant numbers of contact
African and non-Afrikaans speaking students.

Peninsula Technikon and the University of the Western Cape
should merge to form one unitary comprehensive institution, with both technikon
and university style programmes. The Western Cape College of Nursing
should be merged with this new institution. The dentistry schools of UWC and
Stellenbosch should be merged and be located in the new comprehensive institution

Building confidence in the public school system

Interview with Ignatius Jacobs, MEC for Education, Gauteng
Province

Umrabulo spoke to cde Ignatius Jacobs to find out what the province has done
to improve its Matric results in 2001.

Cde Jacobs: We all agree that we need a well-educated and skilled population
to build a winning nation, and that education and training should be amongst
the key drivers to achieve this goal. The Gauteng Department of Education (GDE)
through its 2001/2002 Budget sought to give further impetus to the achievement
of the goals of strengthening the culture of learning and teaching through Tirisano;
increasing our Matric pass rate and improving the quality of education by focusing
on the development of previously disadvantaged urban and rural schools. Furthermore,
by utilising the Norms and Standards of School Funding Policy, we are at work
to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources.

Concretely, the GDE prioritised schools for attention from amongst the close
to 2 500 public schools in Gauteng. These included the 79-odd schools in the
province that were totally dysfunctional (obtaining 0-20% Matric pass rate)
and about 110 schools that were poor performers in terms of their Matric Results
(under 40% Matric pass rate). We created Education Action Zones (EAZs) around
these schools, putting in place the following strategies to improve the quality
of education: -

Targeted interventions with learners and educators;

Fostering community and parental involvement in schools;

Addressing issues of school governance and management;

A turn-around programme for each school, focusing on the basics such as
the schools physical environment (toilets, windows, gardens, water, etc),
discipline and safety, sports, arts and culture and maximising the times spent
on learning and teaching.

The Secondary Schools Intervention Programme, which we started implementing
in 2000, offers additional academic support to learners through the provision
of additional learning materials, audio-visual support material and additional
tuition by experts. The GDE also targeted farm and rural schools, paying attention
to issues such as improving the capacity of multi-grade teachers, relations
with farmers where we have public schools on private land and the provision
of rural transport.

Umrabulo: What has been the impact of these strategies?

Cde Jacobs: Apart from improving our pass rate (see Table 1), we have
strengthened the culture of learning and teaching, we are beginning to see the
dividends of our focus on urban and rural disadvantaged schools and we are putting
in place measures to address the issues of equity.

Table 1 Gauteng matric pass rate (%)

1998

1999

2000

2001

55.5

57

67

73

Umrabulo: We often read about township schools being empty and the flux
to former Model C schools.

Cde Jacobs: Ninety percent of African learners are still in township
and ex-HOR and ex-HOD schools. Improving the quality of public education is
therefore about improving the quality of education in these schools. They remain
the schools that bear the brunt of the apartheid education legacy, with continued
barriers to learning, which include limited curriculum offering, inadequate
teaching and learning resources and a host of other constraints.

It is for this reason that government has prioritised the improvement of the
quality of learning and teaching, ensuring that learners in township schools
have access to key subjects such as mathematics, science, technology and the
economic sciences and improving the performance of black learners at Grade 12
level. In terms of the Norms and Standards of Schools Funding Policy, we spent
much more than before on previously disadvantaged schools.

Subject choice is an important equity issue. For example, because former Model
C schools offer a much greater subject choice, they have more teachers and the
teacher: learner ratio is therefore also smaller than in disadvantaged schools.

Umrabulo: The national education ministry has introduced the School
Registry of Needs as a tool to measure progress to address the legacy of apartheid
in education. What progress has been made in Gauteng in this regard?

Cde Jacobs: Well, the figures speak for themselves (Table 3). For the
period 1996 - 2001 the school maintenance and expansion of infrastructure have
cost R150.3 million and consisted of approximately 3 700 projects of varying
scope, targeting disadvantaged schools. The School Registry of Needs (1996 and
2000) indicates the progress we have made in addressing the backlogs.

Amongst the unique challenges faced by Gauteng is the high level of migration
to the province, which impacts on learner:educator:classroom ratios. The GDE
has a special fund to address this problem, aimed at building extra classrooms
and new schools, especially in new and expanding informal settlements in the
province.

Table 2 Size of Gauteng sector (July 2000)

Number of Learners

Public

Independent Subsidised

Independent Non-subsidised

TOTAL

In Pre-primary institutions

9 347

In Schools

1 346

100 977

16 544

1 554 495

Grade 0/Pre-primary

964

5 153

1 253

21 368

Grades 1-7(primary)

14 602

53 298

8 878

955 123

Grade 8-12(secondary)

892 947

41 778

6 325

572 014

(secondary)

523 911

In Special Schools(1999)

26 779

-

-

26 779

In Technical Colleges(1999)

42 459

-

-

42 459

Number of Institutions

Public

Independent Subsidised

Independent Non-subsidised

TOTAL

Pre-primary institutions

94

Schools

1 905

287

78

2 270

Primary

1 303

83

21

1 407

Secondary

462

57

15

534

Combined

140

147

42

329

Special Schools

98

2

4

104

Technical Colleges

33

-

-

33

Number of Educators

Public

Independent Subsidised

Independent Non-subsidised

TOTAL

Pre-primary institutions

379

Schools

43 254

5 879

927

50 060

Primary

25 606

1 245

129

25 989

Secondary

15 922

961

162

17 045

Combined

2 726

3 664

636

7 026

Special Schools

2 101

-

-

2 101

Technical Colleges

1 955

-

-

1 955

Table 3 : Gauteng School Registry of Needs

Description

1996 SRN

2000 SRN

Learner: Educator ratio

27:1

29:1

Learner: Classroom ratio

34:1

33:1

Classroom shortages

24%

26%

Conditions of school buildings

Good(no.)

1 089

664

Minor repairs

813

1 157

Poor

103

276

Very poor

20

36

Schools with no access to computers

620

16

Schools without media centers

56

48

Schools with no telephone

326

94

Schools with no water on site

5%

2%

Schools without water facilities

37%

35%

Schools without power source (any)

13%

7%

Schools without toilets

13%

1.10%

Umrabulo: We often talk about education as the development of human
capital mainly in respect of the economy, but what about its role in social
development and nation building?

Cde Jacobs: I've said during our 2001 Budget vote that education should
give birth to a new generation of intellectual, social, political and economic
human capital of a free nation and to the success of the African Renaissance.

To achieve this, Gauteng has a conscious programme to promote social education,
within the context of a broad human resource development strategy, including:
-

Establishing an internal communication system to improve learners, parents
and educators access to information and services;.

Excursions to various social education institutions, such as museums, cultural
and arts centres, libraries, scientific exhibition halls, memorial halls,
theatres, zoos, botanical gardens and so forth, to raise consciousness about
our cultural heritage;. Promoting the use of educational radio, television
and print media;

Education in the Arts by raising sponsorships for literary and artistic
awards, drama contests, exhibitions and art education programmes and activities
for learners. This is a joint programme coordinated by the provincial social
cluster.

Working with the private sector and NGOs to establish a Science Education
Centre in Gauteng.

Gauteng is in the unique position that all 11 official languages are spoken
in the province, in addition to other European languages such as Portuguese,
Greek, etc. All 11 languages are therefore being taught in schools, but mainly
in township schools. Former Model C schools still offer mainly English and Afrikaans
as first languages. One of the priorities for the coming years will be to ensure
the phasing in of at least one African first language in all these schools.

An important project to develop all our official languages in schools is a
short story competition in African languages sponsored by Iwisa Maize Meal.
The project is piloted in primary schools in Atteridgeville, Tshwane metro,
with the winning stories published and distributed for use in schools across
the province and royalties paid to the teachers. Furthermore, given the changing
complexion of the learner population of former Model C schools, the province
developed a specific approach aimed at learner integration, building non-racialism
and multi-culturalism and addressing the representivity of the teacher corps
at these schools.

Because our young people are our future, the department is also promoting a
social plan focusing on extra-curricular activities with an emphasis on youth
development, sport and culture. For example, an earmarked amount (R2 million)
was set aside in the 2001/2002 Budget to promote youth culture through the strengthening
and transformation of music centres. This programme also includes strengthening
school sports programmes with a focus on athletics and the provision of equipment
and facilities (R12 million) and promoting basketball and baseball through partnership
with the relevant National Sports Associations (R1.5 million).

The department also promotes youth development and leadership, school safety
and an environment education programme (R4 million).

Umrabulo: Young people remain amongst the high-risk groups for HIV/AIDS
infection. What programmes are in place to deal with this issue?

Cde Jacobs: Surveys done amongst youth and learners in the province
indicate that between 90 and 95% of youth are aware of HIV/AIDS, how it is transmitted
and about prevention. The challenge is however to change young people's sexual
behaviour. The programmes of the GDE include advocacy campaigns, focusing around
World Aids Day, Life Skills week in schools, Valentine's Day and the distribution
of First Aid Kits to all schools. It has a life skills programme as part of
the curriculum in schools, focusing on prevention, living with and managing
HIV/AIDS. It is developing learner, parent and educator support materials to
promote awareness of all aspects of the disease.

Umrabulo: The Blue IQ programme of the provincial government seeks to
build Gauteng as a centre of industrial innovation and development. What contribution
does the education system make towards this programme and the broader objectives
of the African renaissance?

Cde Jacobs: The contribution of education is mainly to develop the human
resources that can be at the forefront of this programme of innovation. The
GDE has introduced the concept of Schools for Focused Learning to not only address
the imbalances of the past, but to promote the notion of the African renaissance.
Schools for Focused Learning will therefore provide highly specialised education
in the critical areas of mathematics, technology, science, business, commerce,
management studies, language and communication. Learners in these programmes
will be predominantly from the disadvantaged communities.

We have also allocated R500 million over the next three years to the Gauteng
Online.com. The objective of Gauteng Online.com is to develop information technology
infrastructure in schools in the province, targeting at least 25 computers per
school with Internet connectivity and with all learners and educators having
an e-mail address by the end of the three-year project.

The department will also ensure the development of appropriate software and
educational materials to ensure that all learners are computer literate. The
Gauteng Online.com was launched last year as part of the National Youth Day
celebrations at Ikaneng Primary School in Soweto.

Meeting the challenge of sexual abuse at schools

By Kader Asmal

Last week I visited schools in Tsakane, and I was horrified to learn that two
students - young girls - had been viciously beaten with sjamboks by rampaging
youths, and were hurt so badly that they had to be taken to hospital for stitches
to the head. This is not sexual violence, but it is violence, and this sort
of violence undoubtedly provides the basis for ongoing sexual violence. The
reason is simple. If nobody is prepared to speak out and take action against
the thugs who did this despicable thing, which took place in broad daylight,
at school, and in the presence of learners and teachers, then what fear do these
thugs have when committing sexual violence in a dark, isolated place.

I was amazed that so little importance had been given to this attack. The
report from my officials indicated two learners had been injured, but that does
not capture the horror of the sjambok attack, which must bring back memories
of the worst kind of oppression under apartheid. The schools had not reported
the incident to the police, or laid charges. It is as if this is normal, and
accepted, especially in poor, black communities. And if we do not rise up about
one form of violence, other forms will rise up and find a place in society.
We must stop this thing where it starts - at the first sign of disrespect, abuse
or violence. We cannot tolerate one form of abuse while trying to stop other
forms - these things are indivisible. The silence that characterised these sjambok
attacks is the same as the silence that has surrounded matters of sexual harassment
and sexual violence for many years.

The reasons for this violence are complex and need to be examined if we are
to deal with this matter head on. However, in South Africa, the legacy of violence
that underpinned the apartheid state has exacerbated this problem. Patriarchal
violence was sanctioned and legitimated by the state and religious institutions
and this, combined with culturally endorsed violence towards women and girls,
led to extremely high levels of violence in our country. The violent repression
of political opposition by the apartheid state has meant that many of our people
view force as the only mechanism to deal with the problems that they may encounter.
This legacy is highlighted in the haunting words of a 14-year-old girl, who
argued that:

"In our ... community, it is part of traditional culture to beat a
woman and force her to have sex. My brother sometimes beats his girlfriend and
then feels so bad about it afterwards. If I talk to him he gets back to his
senses and sees that it is wrong, but later he will carry on and do the same
thing to her again..."

We must therefore not be misled into believing that sexual abuse is a sudden
phenomenon, or that South Africa is alone in dealing with the challenges that
we face in this regard. In the recent global report of the International Tribunal
for Children's Rights released last year, it was noted that despite the universal
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, all indications
are that violence against children is on the rise.

Nevertheless, while we may not be alone in our fight against this scourge,
the fact is one act of abuse against a South African child is one too many.
And although reliable data on the extent of sexual abuse in our schools is hard
to find, there is compelling evidence, such as highlighted in the comprehensive
study by the Medical Research Council on the rape of girls in South Africa,
to indicate that both the nature and levels of abuse require immediate and urgent
action from us. The time for further inquiries into this matter must come to
end, we cannot afford to sit back and allow this ab use to continue.

Indeed, parents from all walks of life - white and black, rich and poor -have
come to me to tell some terrible stories about what has happened to themselves
and their children. They have been silent for too long, and I fear we have failed
these children. Our children look to us for protection and it is our collective
responsibility to protect their right to innocence. We know the perpetrators,
and they live among us.

As Phylicia Oppelt, Sunday Times journalist argued in her recent column: "...
we as a society have to accept the portion of responsibility too. We live with
these monsters and harbour them in our communities without censure. Too many
men and women still believe that women ask for it; that women who wear short
skirts and tight-fitting blouses must want to be raped..."

Let us therefore isolate them so that their lives become uncomfortable. It
is reported that up to 54% of rapists are not found, and yet most rape is committed
by people known to the victim. Someone must be hiding these rapists, and in
so doing, sending a message that this thing is okay.

It is sometimes argued that there is no common understanding of what constitutes
harassment, or of the devastation that it causes to victims, and that this confusion
is why it continues. Chairperson, with respect, I think that this view is rubbish,
and provides an apology for such behaviour. We are all agreed that sexual harassment
and violence against our children (or anyone else) is completely unacceptable.
You do not need a dictionary definition to know these things are wrong. You
do not need a degree in psychology to know that the impact of this abuse means
that the victim's self-esteem plummets, their school performance is affected,
some drop out of school and for many, their social and personal development
is also retarded. These children fail to fulfill their ambitions and the overwhelming
majority of these are girls.

Some adults go further and claim they have genuine and acceptable relationships
with these children! Often it starts with small and seemingly innocent favours
- a girl goes to the tuckshop to buy lunch for a teacher, for example, and brings
it to the staffroom, full of subservience. Through this, a power relationship
is established, which is but a step away from a climate in which rape and abuse
will flourish. Pupils are not the servants of teachers, and favours should not
be asked or given.

When any abuse comes to light, there must be no attempt to resolve the matter
behind closed doors, offering some form of compensation to make the problem
disappear. Abuse and harassment is not a private matter, to be bartered over
and hidden from public view. Perpetrators must feel the full might of a public
prosecution.

I recently received a study commissioned by UNICEF, and conducted by the HSRC,
entitled: A Study of School Responses to Violence and Harassment of Girls (November
2001). Although the study covers only eight schools, the depth and quality of
the data is impressive, and the schools are of all types. So although we must
not generalise, we should also accept that they have captured a picture of what
is happening in at least some of our schools. It is not a happy picture, although
there are vast signs of hope in the values of many of our soon-to-be citizens.
Let me share with you some of the findings: Firstly it found that beating and
bullying is the most common form of violence against girls, and it starts in
the first grade, supporting my earlier contention about the indivisibility of
violence. Second is that overt sexual harassment becomes common from Grade 5,
although girls at primary school are more at risk in the community than at school.

Girls at high school are found to be equally at risk at school, and relationships
with teachers are common. All girls are at risk of rape and sexual harassment
going to and from school. Sadly, girls are also at risk in their own homes where
they experience abuse and high levels of physical violence, as well as sexual
harassment and rape.

The responses of schools to situations of abuse were found to be varied. Some
showed zero tolerance, with set disciplinary procedures and structures, and
strong links with Social Development offices and the SAPS Child Protection Unit.
They must be commended. Other schools used verbal reprimands, random corporal
punishment and parental summonses, while some, sadly, showed no response at
all. The underlying problems identified in the report included a lack of openness,
ambiguous attitudes towards violence against girls, and the lack of clear definitions
and preventative procedures. I must say I am tempted by the offer made by an
NGO to conduct surveys in schools to anonymously identify abusers, but I do
not want a witch-hunt, which this could create.

The report then assists by identifying a number of areas for intervention,
and I am glad to say that they are highly consistent with the work already being
done by the Department. These include the need to facilitate individual change
by building a culture of respect for one another; the importance of improving
school and community responses, the necessity of developing clear policies as
well as the promotion of awareness and knowledge about the problem amongst all
role-players.

As you will see in our submission and as I recently reported to the NCOP Hearings
on this matter, the Department has responded to all of these recommendations.
Firstly, through the revised school curriculum, which includes an awareness
of sexuality as a life skill, we aim to develop in our children the values which
will ensure that abuse is not a problem in future. They must have the confidence
to insist on respect from others, and the humility to show respect for the integrity
of others.

For our teachers, the South African Council for Educators has a training programme
on Ethics and Values in Education, run by the University of Natal, and which
hundreds of teachers have been attending in their own time over weekends.

To improve school and community responses to the abuse of girls, we have taken
a number of measures. We amended the Employment of Educators Act to dismiss
any teacher having a sexual relationship with a learner. A teacher who sexually
abuses learners should not be in the classroom, and the Council for Educators
has powers to ensure that such a teacher is deregistered. I have requested provincial
education MECs to pay particular attention to the prosecution of offenders,
and ask also that teacher unions report to parliament on disciplinary steps
taken against their members. I have also met with the South African Council
of Educators to discuss a more vigorous approach to stopping the sexual misbehaviour
of teachers.

In order to help school principals, my Department has produced a very practical
guide for schools on Managing Sexual Harassment and Gender-based Violence, which
is accompanied by a training programme. And last year, together with the South
African Police Service, we compiled a workbook for schools called Signposts
to Safe Schools. In recognition of the need to free the full potential of our
girls, we are finalising a teacher's manual on Gender Equity in Education. Together
with the above manuals and guides, this will help to create schools that are
friendly to girls. The values of the Constitution cannot be nurtured in young
South Africans in an environment where those in authority are contradicting
them.

In conclusion, while we have taken a number of important steps in dealing with
the problem, what remains clear is that much more still needs to be done. One
area to which we need to give consideration, is the development of comprehensive
child-care legislation as part of a broader national drive to ensure that the
perpetrators are brought to book. However, legislation in itself is not enough.
We must change attitudes if we are to cherish all our children. And this can
only happen when we teach our children through precept, and more importantly
through example, to respect and value others regardless of race, gender, class
or creed.

*Address by Minister of Education Kader Asmal at the Parliamentary Public Hearings,
11 March 2002.

By-elections in 2001: a statistical review

By Michael Sachs

By-elections can provide crucial indicators of the attitude and disposition
of the electorate towards democracy and political parties in general, and towards
the incumbent party in particular. They are real life experiments; polls of
political opinion at ward level. In some instances the outcome of by-elections
can have political implications far beyond the ward in which they take place.

Seventy-nine by-elections were held in South Africa in the course of 2001.
The distribution of by-elections by province is given in table 1.

Table 1: By-elections 2001 per province

Province

Number of By-elections

KwaZulu-Natal

27

Eastern Cape

12

Gauteng

9

Mpumalanga

9

Western Cape

8

North West

7

Northern Cape

3

Free State

2

Limpopo

2

National

79

Chart 1 shows the reasons that precipitated ward by-elections. By-elections
are called wherever a vacancy appears in a ward council seat. This may arise
because the councillor has passed away, resigned or been expelled from his or
her party. Of the seventy nine by-elections in 2001, 34 were precipitated by
a councillor's resignation from his or her post, 33 resulted from the death
of a councillor and 12 were the result of the expulsion of a councillor either
from the party or the council concerned.

This review uses ward level demographic and political data to analyse all 79
by-elections held during 2001. We begin by considering the patterns of voter
turnout in comparison with turnout in the same wards in past elections. We then
consider voting patterns in three categories of wards, defined by their demographic
characteristics: African rural wards, African urban wards and minority wards.
Finally, the overall participation and performance of the ANC is summarised
and conclusions from our analysis highlighted.

Voter turnout in by-elections

On average 33% of registered voters cast their ballots in the 79 by-elections.
Average turnout in the same wards in the December 2000 elections was 48% and
in the 1999 General Election it was 86%.

Chart 2 shows the average turnout in by-elections in each province compared
with average turnout (in the same wards) in the General Election in June 1999
and the municipal elections in December 2000. It can be seen that, in general,
turnout in by-elections is very low.

In an attempt to increase turnout the IEC agreed to hold some of the by-elections
on a Saturday (as opposed to the normal Wednesday). However, on average, those
by-elections that were held on a Wednesday had a slightly higher turnout (33%)
compared with those that were held on a Saturday (32%).

In only six of the by-elections did turnout exceed 50% of registered voters.
These are listed in table 2.

Ward Name

Province

Turnout

1. Victoria West, 3

Northern Cape

67%

2. Idutywa, 17

Eastern Cape

61%

3. Worcester, 1

Western Cape

57%

4. Carletonville, 2

Gauteng

53%

5. Breede River, 3

Western Cape

50%

6. Port St Johns, 6

Eastern Cape

50%

It is notable that of these six wards:

All are sparsely populated rural or peri-urban areas.. All were highly contested
by-elections. The party in control of the ward changed hands in two cases:
(i) Victoria West, where the ANC won the ward from the DA, and ii) Breede
River, 3 where the DA won the ward from the ANC.

In the top three, the ANC mobilised more voters (i.e. substantially increased
its vote) compared with the December 2000 elections. In Port St. Johns the
UDM substantially increased its vote, while in Breede River, 3, the DA substantially
increased its vote.. Several are racially mixed, with large Coloured populations..
Most had a relatively high turnout in 2000.

Table 3 lists the five wards with the lowest turnouts. With respect to these
low turnout wards the following can be noted:. All are located in metropolitan
areas. The relevant wards in Johannesburg and East Rand are urban African wards
(i.e. with high population density and an African population in excess of 99%).
All are strong ANC supporting areas, with the exception of Cape Town, 71, where
the ANC did not contest against the DA.. There was little contestation in any
of these wards.. In general, the decline in voter turnout, compared with December
2000, was spread evenly between the ANC and opposition parties. In other words
voter apathy affected opposition parties as much as the ANC.

Ward Name

Province

Turnout

Johannesburg, 1

Gauteng

9%

Durban, 17

KwaZulu-Natal

14%

East Rand Metro, 14

Gauteng

16%

East Rand Metro, 13

Gauteng

16%

Cape Town, 71

Western Cape

17%

To some extent low turnout in by-elections and high levels of voter apathy
are to be expected. It should be remembered that both the December 2000 and
June 1999 elections were held throughout the country on a single day. The ANC
(and to a lesser extent other political parties) invested considerable resources
in voter education and mobilisation prior to and on these days.

Further, the media spotlight that was focussed on the electoral process is
likely to have generated more voter interest than can be expected in by-elections,
which went largely unnoticed in the media.

Nevertheless, even given the absence of focussed mobilisation and an intense
media spotlight, the very low level of voter participation in by-elections is
worrisome. ANC structures need to consider to what extent this has resulted
from organisational weaknesses and lack of prioritisation of election campaigns
at the level of the ward and, perhaps more importantly, at regional, provincial
and national levels. Noting the above, we can conclude the following in respect
of voter turnout in by-elections: a) Voters regard municipal elections as less
important than general elections, and by-elections are regarded as the least
important b) Voter apathy (i.e. non-participation) tends to be more pronounced
in urban areas. c) Voter turnout is higher where elections are contested (i.e.
voters tend to be more apathetic where they are confident that one party or
another will definitely win). d) Holding by-elections on a weekday as opposed
to a weekend has no impact on turnout. e) The level of organisation and the
human, material and financial resources devoted to by-elections by political
parties can be decisive in affecting turnout.

African rural wards

Twenty-three of the 2001 by-elections were held in sparsely populated rural
areas with a predominantly African population (i.e. in excess of 90%). These
wards are poorest and most marginalised in the country, with average annual
household income of around R7,500. They are also characterised by a relatively
high proportion of women. Of the 23 African rural wards where by-elections were
held, 11 were in rural KwaZulu Natal, where IFP support averaged 81%. The ANC
contested all but two (Ulundi wards 4 and 19).

These by-elections were characterised by:

A two-horse race between the IFP and the ANC, with no other parties registering
to participate;

Stability of party support, with the ANC appealing to around one fifth
(20%) of voters and the IFP gaining the support of the rest;

Average to relatively low voter turnout (between 18-43%);

The decline in turnout compared to December 2000 was spread evenly between
ANC and IFP supporters.

The ANC also fought ten by-elections in rural Eastern Cape. The UDM was the
main opposition in all, with the exception of Elundini [Mount Fletcher] ward
16, where an independent forced the UDM into third place. The elections in these
wards were characterised by:

A two-horse race between the ANC and UDM.

Relatively higher voter turnout (ranging between 28-67%).

Overall stability of party support between the two parties with the ANC
retaining between 69-94% of the votes, with an average of 83% and UDM support
ranging from 6-27% with an average of 14%.

UDM generally failing to match its support in the 2000 municipal elections.
In most cases the decline in the number of people who voted for the UDM is
greater than the decline in the number who voted for the ANC. Port St. Johns
was the only ward in this category where the UDM increased its vote in absolute
terms.

By-elections were also held in African rural wards in North West (Mogwase)
and Limpopo Province (Giyani). The ANC retained a massive majority in both these
wards (91% and 87% respectively) despite contestation from the UDM, UCDP, ACDP
and PAC.

It is clear that the ANC continues to command an overwhelming majority (i.e.
in excess of two thirds) in African rural wards. Most contestation in these
wards takes the form of a two-horse race between the ANC and parties with strong
links to traditional leadership and former Bantustan bureaucracies (i.e. IFP,
UDM, UCDP) and/or other conservative forces (e.g. ACDP).

Furthermore, the DA has made no impact whatsoever on African rural wards. Where
the PAC stood, they made small but significant gains in support in African rural
areas.

African urban wards

Eighteen by-elections were held in African township areas. These tend to have
a higher average household income (with average for the group as a whole being
R13,100 per annum), better socio-economic indicators and a higher proportion
of men than the rural wards considered above. In these areas the ANC faced opposition
from a broader range of forces, including the DA, the PAC, AZAPO, UDM and independent
candidates. In general the fall in voter turnout (compared with December 2000)
is highest in this category. This reflects large falls in the turnout of ANC
voters in particular. Falls in turnout of ANC voters were generally larger than
falls in the turnout of opposition voters. The largest falls in the turnout
of ANC voters were recorded in informal settlements.

Examples are:

Palestine in Johannesburg where only 1,133 people voted for the ANC in the
by-election compared to 5,383 in December 2000 and 14,124 in 1999.

Ward 13, East Rand, which is largely an informal settlement in Katlehong.
Only 1,860 voted for the ANC in the by-election compared to 5,174 in 2000).

In Phillippi, Cape Town Ward 34, only 2,305 voted for the ANC compared to
5,266 in 2000.

Nevertheless, there was generally no increase in the number of votes for opposition
forces. In all but a few of the African township wards opposition voters also
declined relative to December 2000. However, these declines were generally less
significant than those experienced by the ANC. There were as well, the following
exceptions where the opposition increased its vote:

In Carletonville ward 4, the DA mobilised 129 votes compared with only 45
DA votes cast in December 2000, an increase of 84 votes.

In Westonaria, ward 15, AZAPO increased its vote from 97 in December 2000,
to 146 in the 2001 by-election.

In Zeerust, ward 10, the UCDP increased its vote from 399 in December 2000
to 460 in the by-election.

All in all the falls in turnout compared with December 2000 were by far the
greatest in urban African wards. Given that these wards tend to be more contested
than rural wards, the decline in turnout of ANC supporters, especially in informal
settlements is worrying. However, to place the matters in perspective, we should
bear in mind that the ANC remains overwhelmingly dominant. If we exclude two
of these wards in Durban where the IFP is dominant, the ANC averaged 81% (ranging
between 61% and 95%) of the vote in African township by-elections.

It should also be noted that with the single exception of Carletonville ward
4, there is no evidence from by-election results to suggest growth in support
of the DA in urban African townships. The Carletonville ward in question, is
perhaps distinguished by its very close proximity to the adjacent white area,
where the DA commands an overwhelming majority.

"Minority wards"

Here we define 'minority wards' as those with an African population constituting
less than 50% (i.e. wards with a large minority population). In these areas,
population density varies from very rural areas to urban township and suburb
environments. Household income is higher than the national average in all but
a couple of these wards. By-elections were held in 16 wards of this nature in
2001.

In the majority of minority wards the DA is the major opposition to the ANC
and the contest is essentially a two-horse race. However, the ACDP and other
small parties and independents stand as a 'third force' in some cases. A large
number of these wards are marginal for both the ANC and the DA and victory or
defeats are often determined by the efficacy of mobilisation. Given the demographic
and political diversity of these minority wards, rather than aggregating and
averaging the data, we here provide two examples by way of illustration: Sentrale
Karoo [Victoria West] Ward 3 was a stunning victory for the ANC. In this multi-ethnic
rural ward in which coloured voters constitute 66% of voters, the ANC and the
DA are evenly balanced as can be seen from the 1999 results in table 4. Due
to re-demarcation of the ward, the number of registered voters was drastically
reduced before the December 2000 elections. Nevertheless, this appears not to
have affected the overall balance between the two parties as reflected in the
5 December 2000 results.

The ANC got 46% of the vote in the general election in 1999, and 44% in the
municipal election in 2000. However, the ANC increased the number of voters
it mobilised from 544 in December 2000 to 775 on 21 November 2001. Although
the DA won 51% of the vote in 1999 and 56% in 2000, they failed to mobilise
their voters to the by-election. It is also likely that some voters switched
from the DA to the ANC.

By-elections
21 November 2001

Municipal Elections
5 December 2000

General Elections
2 June 1999

ANC

775 Votes
70%

544 Votes
44%

2,642 Votes
46%

DA

339 Votes
30%

696 Votes
56%

2,952 Votes
51%

% Poll

67%

94%

88%

In Johannesburg Ward 93, the ANC was defeated by our own failure to mobilise
core voters. This ward (close to Rabie Ridge, Midrand) is composed of disparate
communities including informal and formal areas. It is 37% African and 55% white
and has a huge number of registered voters (17,760). Despite the majority of
white voters, the ANC managed to win the ward in the general election of 1999.
However, the ward was lost in both 2000 and 2001. In the context of a very low
turnout, the DA experienced a 45% drop in the turnout of its supporters. However
the ANC, with a smaller drop in turnout failed to win the ward.

By-elections
21 November

Municipal elections
5 December 2000

General Elections
2 June 1999

General Elections
2 June 1999

ANC

1,793 Votes
47%

3,237 Votes
45%

7,178 Votes
50%

DA

1,937 Votes
51%

3,729 Votes
52%

6,125 Votes
43%

% Poll

21%

43%

90%

We can conclude that, given that the outcome of by-elections in minority wards
are usually determined by the relative turnout of supporters, the ANC stands
to gain victories in these wards where we are able to properly mobilise our
supporters. Conversely, we can also lose control of such wards if we take our
organisational gains for granted.

Performance of the ANC in 2001

Our analysis of the relative turnout of supporters in various by-elections
shows that in most cases winning by-elections is not about persuading swinging
voters to change their minds. Rather by-elections are won and lost on the ability
of parties to persuade their core supporters to turn out for the election, in
the context of widespread voter apathy.

Table 6 provides a breakdown of contestation by political parties and independents
of by-elections in 2001. Clearly, the ANC continues to be the only party with
the organisational capacity and/or political intent to contest elections in
all geographic areas and among all sections of the population. All other parties
were highly selective about the elections they chose to contest, whereas the
ANC contested all but six of the by-elections.

Party

Contested

Won

Lost

ANC

73

50

23

IFP

37

18

19

DA

27

8

19

UDM

22

1

21

Independents

17

1

16

PAC

16

0

16

Other

15

1

14

ACDP

12

0

12

AZAPO

6

0

6

UCDP

5

0

5

In all the wards where the ANC stood it was contested by other parties, with
the single exception of Highlands [Belfast] ward 4 in Mpumalanga. Of the other
72 elections (where the ANC contested with other parties) 50 were won and 23
lost by the ANC. The ANC's overall percentage of the vote increased in 34, declined
in 36 and remained the same in two.

Of the 50 by-elections that the ANC won, four were wards that the ANC had lost
on 5 December 2000. These were:

Sentrale Karoo [Victoria West] Ward 3, in the Western Cape: The DA had beaten
the ANC in this ward in December 2000 and in June 1999. However, the ANC secured
70% of the vote in the by-election held on 21 November 2001 (see table 4).

Newcastle, Ward 28, in KwaZulu Natal where the IFP had won 52% of the vote
in December 2000, but which the ANC won with a whopping 67% compared to the
IFP's 28% in the by-election on 25 April 2001.

Mandeni Ward 12, also in KwaZulu Natal where the IFP had received 70% of
the vote in December 2000, and was reduced to 35% in the July 14 by election.
The ANC beat the IFP by just three votes. Most of the IFP decline was due
to the growth of Ubumbano lwesizwe Independent Residents Association, which
took 31% of the vote.

Breede Valley [Worcestor] Ward 1, in the Western Cape. The ANC increased
its percentage of the vote from 21% in December 2000 to 51% in the by-election
on 15 September. This was mainly at the expense of the DA, whose overall vote
declined by more than half. Several independent candidates and a local party
stood in the election, which may have contributed to the sapping of the DA's
strength.

Of the 23 by-elections the ANC lost, two had been won by the ANC in the December
2000 municipal elections:

Nokeng tsa Taemane [Cullinan] Ward 5 in Gauteng was the ANC's only real
strategic defeat during 2001. In this ward, where the white population accounts
for 42% of the total, the DA defeated the ANC in the context of somewhat low
voter turnout (39%) and poor organisational effort on the part of our own
structures. Whereas the ANC maintained the same number of voters compared
to December 2000, the DA mobilised effectively and doubled its vote. This
brought the ANC's percentage down from 49% in 2000 to 44% in the by-election
and increased the DA's share from 33% to 56%. The ANC's loss of the ward had
the effect of swinging the balance of power in the whole municipality, thereby
handing over the Nokeng tsa Taemane Council to the DA. No doubt our structures
in Gauteng have engaged in much soul-searching following this painful defeat.

Breede River/Winelands, ward 3 in the Western Cape. The ANC had received
67% of the vote in 1999 in this ward, and 50% in 2000. Part of this drop may
be attributable to the large reduction in the number of registered voters
for this ward (from 4,304 in 1999 to 2,436 in 2000). The ANC experienced a
further decline in 2001, achieving only 34% of the vote during the by-election
on 15 September. Contributing to this decline was the emergence of a civic
association (which achieved 5% of the vote) and the ACDP (which got 16%).
The DA won the ward with a minority of votes (44%).

Of the six by-elections that the ANC chose not to participate in:. Three
were held in the IFP heartland in northern KwaZulu Natal (two in Ulundi and
one in Nongoma). No party except the IFP contested these three wards, although
the ANC did contest a number of other wards in Northern Kwa-Zulu Natal, increasing
its percentage in a number.

One was in an IFP stronghold (Mandeni, ward 5), where an independent residents
association (Ubambano LweSizwe) challenged and beat the IFP.

Two were in the Western Cape:

Cape Town, ward 71 where the DA scored 91% of the vote in December 2000,
and

Overstrand [Hermanus] ward 9, where the DA scored 76% in December 2000.

Conclusion

The outcome of by-elections 2001, taken together, shows that:

The ANC continues to be the only party with organisational capacity and
political intent to contest democratic elections among all sections of the
population and across all geographic areas.

The ANC retains overwhelmingly dominant support. In broad terms the ANC
retains the trust and confidence of the electorate even at mid-term and, from
the results of by-elections, there is no evidence to suggest declining or
increasing support for the ANC.

Our support continues to be most solid in those areas where the poorest
of the poor reside, particularly in African rural wards. Both voter turnout
and ANC performance were particularly good in these areas. In some of these
areas, turnout in by-elections during 2001 has been greater than in the local
government elections on 5th December 2000, and the percentage of the vote
received by the ANC has actually increased.

While our support remains overwhelmingly dominant in urban African areas,
we should view with concern the low levels of voter turnout in urban townships,
particularly in informal settlements.

Defining "free and fair" elections - the jury is
out

By Dren Nupen

It is now generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence
of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.... Africa
undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, which core components
include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of "several political
parties and workers' unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically
organised to enable the populace choose their leaders freely". New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Abuja October 2001

Introduction

To understand what "free and fair" elections are and the determinants
required to deem an election "free and fair" it is necessary firstly
to familiarise oneself with the discourse underpinning this subject. There is
an extensive body of knowledge that deals with elections and democracy, as well
as defining the criteria used in assessing whether an election is :

free and fair - and variations thereof such as substantially free and fair,

credible,. legitimate,. demonstrates the will of the people,

acceptable;

successful etc.

These pronouncements are generally predicated on predetermined criteria to
assess whether an election has succeeded or failed. An analysis of the legislative
framework of the elections, as well as the social and political conditions in
which the elections took place, and its impact on the democratisation process
needs to be reported. This does not mean that observers are entitled to make
a judgement of the political processes of that country - it merely suggests
that any assessments and observations of the electoral process needs to be contextualised
in terms of how they impact on the democratisation process and should not be
limited to the technicalities of the process alone. There are no absolute standards
by which to measure the "freeness and fairness" of an election. Some
aspects of the process may be without question, whereas others could be fundamentally
flawed. The decision as to whether such an election is successful and credible
or "free and fair" depends on how the observer mission assesses the
overall conditions in which the elections took place, and whether the predetermined
criteria used to define what constitutes "free and fair" or "successful"
elections - for a specific phase of the process i.e. the pre-, during or post-
election periods - have been met.

In southern Africa, elections are conducted in the midst of challenging social,
political and economic conditions such as poverty, conflict and HIV/Aids. The
historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid give the region unique characteristics
that militate against the wholesale importation of developed countries' electoral
models and practices. In this context it is essential to seek a uniquely southern
African dimension to electoral processes so that regional needs can be properly
accounted for.

The electoral authorities in the region have varied electoral experiences -almost
all countries in SADC have now held multiparty elections - but do not always
have the full range of required resource at their disposal. The electoral authorities
however share a determination to consistently improve the electoral processes
within their countries, often under very difficult circumstances. One of the
objectives of the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC countries' and electoral
management bodies in SADC countries) is to ensure that the best international
practice in electoral processes is successfully synthesised with regional southern
African conditions in order to provide the best possible basis for effective,
free and fair elections and electoral practices. They have therefore embarked
upon developing a set of regional electoral norms and standards to be used as
the benchmark for SADC electoral best practice. This has been done in partnership
with two other regional institutions.

The importance of developing such a set of SADC Norms and Standards for elections
is that they offer a comprehensive benchmark for electoral systems, and ways
to improve practice. The purpose of the development of such explicit and practical
guidelines and practices is to help implement principles more effectively in
national arrangements. Clearer norms and standards offer a framework for informed
discussion as well as offering a powerful, indigenous benchmark for assessing
electoral integrity. It also provides national, regional and international observer
missions with a set of objective criteria by which to assess and evaluate elections
in SADC countries.

The fundamental benefit from a "successful" and "free and fair"
election is that it creates legitimate, representative government. At a minimum,
this reflects an election in which all major players compete equally and accept
the outcomes of the process. To conduct a "successful" and "free
and fair" election some fundamental preconditions need to be in place:.
firstly minimal social, political and human rights conditions must be in place
in order to provide an environment in which an election can take place. All
stakeholders participating in the elections must agree on these;. secondly,
the body entrusted with the running of the elections must be perceived as independent,
impartial and free from pressure from any of the political parties, in particular
the ruling party;. thirdly, the electoral process itself must, in its design
and implementation, reflect best practice principles which are accepted by all
the relevant stakeholders engaged in the electoral process. The definition of
best practice will differ from country to country but basic principles for the
management, supervision and conduct of the electoral process can be developed
in each individual country and generalised as a regional approach. Securing
these fundamental conditions requires the development of a reasonable degree
of consensus between the three critical stakeholders in the electoral process
i.e. the electoral management bodies (EMBs), political parties and key institutions
of civil society. Where such consensus does not exist, the credibility and legitimacy
of the electoral process and its outcomes - the governments that are formed,
will be questioned and ultimately undermined.

Contexualising the criteria of free and fair elections

International observers have been involved in tracking, monitoring and observing
electoral processes for many years. In Africa these missions were put in place
under the auspices of the UN to assess and observe the "fairness and freeness"
of the votes of the first independence elections. In latter years the UN not
only supervised and observed elections but their functions were extended to
include a peacekeeping role - as seen in the Namibia 1989 referendum and in
Mozambique in 1994.

Over the last couple of decades there has been an increase in the number of
observer missions despatched to various parts of the globe to observe and monitor
elections and referenda. With this increased activity in election observation
there has also been a demand for a more thorough and scientific approach to
election observation, and for the development of a set of clearly defined criteria
to evaluate the electoral process. These criteria have until recently been debated
primarily at a theoretical and conceptual level, and have to some extent created
difficulties in their translation into practical checklists. There have been
disputes and disagreements about what should be included in the "checklist",
and developing countries have noted their concerns that the criteria for "free
and fair" are too stringent - as the social and economic problems of the
some of these countries have a direct impact on their ability to deliver elections
according to these criteria. Concerns have also been noted about the methodology
used to measure whether elections have been conducted in a "free and fair"
manner, and the process of consolidating the final evaluation statements of
the various missions into a single coherent pronouncement of the election has
also been noted as problematic. Elklit and Svensson propose that there are two
ways of resolving this dilemma:

Firstly, they suggest that one approach could be to investigate the "various
phases of the...(electoral) ...process...( ie. the legislative framework,
the demarcation process, voter registration, access to the media, campaigning
etc)...and then to assess whether the conditions within each area either hinders
or promotes the freedom and fairness of the election..."

The second approach that they propose and support is where the investigation
of the electoral process is predicated on an "examination of the relationship
between elections and democratic development." This, they maintain, "provides
the basis for defining the concepts of "free and fair", as "this
approach takes into consideration the pre-election processes and the nature
of the institutional arrangements required to conduct such elections. This
option considers whether political freedoms as well as the human rights conditions
are in place, not only immediately prior to the elections, but that they form
an intrinsic part of the democratic culture of the society. It therefore is
not a functional evaluation of the mechanics and techniques of voting, but
takes into account broader issues related to the process of democratic transition
and democratic consolidation.

When evaluating and assessing the efficacy of the electoral process it must
be borne in mind that while an obvious and central component of democratic life
is elections, they may take many forms and they by no means exhaust the category
of democratic politics. Elections are not the only prerequisite for democracy
- they form one of several critical aspects in the constellation of the institutional
requirements for democracy, and while the periodic holding of elections is a
necessary precondition for the establishment and consolidation of representative
democracy, elections by themselves do not guarantee a successful transition
to, and endorsement of democracy. In some instances elections can be an obstacle
to that transition as was seen in Angola and Ethiopia in 1992. "The successful
conduct of elections are themselves dependent on a series of other conditions
which form the body of the democratic process, and whose realisation is in large
part the essence of the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and
the process of democratic consolidation."

Moreover, the conduct of quality elections and the required framework for such
elections is one of several critical institutional preconditions that need to
be in place before democracy can be seen to be in place. This is one reason
why it is important to engage in the process of developing and refining the
electoral process, and also understanding what is needed in order to have "free
and fair" elections - as an integral part of the process of progressing
towards a consolidated democracy.

According to Dahl "...free and fair elections are the culmination of the
process, not the beginning." The presupposition is therefore that until
and unless most of the fundamental rights and freedoms have been firmly rooted
in the society it is not possible to hold "free and fair" elections.
In societies experiencing deep-rooted conflict and where individual and collective
rights have been severely undermined, it cannot be assumed that because an election
has been held that democracy automatically is in place or that there has been
a successful transition to democracy.

Having established that elections are merely a moment in the democratic process
and not an end in themselves, the criteria for evaluating elections needs to
be clearly defined and articulated. The evaluation tools also need to be sufficiently
flexible to take account of the varying contexts in which elections are held.

"Defining free and fair"

The phrase "free and fair" should not be viewed as a fixed set of
criteria by which to evaluate and assess elections - there is no formalised
standard and the complexity and variability of the electoral process makes it
very difficult to have any fixed point from which to assess the process. In
some instances election observers may choose not to use "free and fair"
as their criteria, but at the same time they may find that it is being used
by other missions - in the same contexts - who may have less knowledge and sensitivity
to the criteria than they do. The findings of these missions may to a lesser
or greater extent be the same, but the use of different terminology (based on
which criteria they choose for evaluating the elections) when pronouncing on
the elections, may create confusion amongst the electorate and dissension between
the various observer missions.

This does not mean that it is essential that all missions have to use the same
criteria for evaluating and assessing an electoral process. What, however, is
needed is clear terms of reference for each respective mission as well as a
well-defined set of criteria against which the elections will be assessed. If
during the course and scope of its duties the mission finds that there is no
clear indication that the process was conducted according to internationally
accepted standards, it should refer to its evaluation criteria and the broader
context in which the process is taking place. In arriving at a conclusion, the
mission should consider whether the course of events reflects the preferences
of the electorate. This is the critical issue of any observation mission - one
which will either endorse or undermine the credibility of the mission and which
will have, in the final analysis, an impact on the post-election politics and
the way in which the international community responds to that country beyond
the elections.

What then are "free and fair" elections? In order for elections either
to be accepted or rejected it is necessary to clearly define what the criteria
for "free and fair" elections are. According to Dahl freedom
contrasts with coercion - it implies the right to make choices,
whereas coercion implies the absence of choice. Fairness on the
other hand implies impartiality - an even application of rules
and equal opportunities for those involved in the process. The opposite of fairness
would then refer to the unequal treatment of equals where some
groups, individuals and communities are given an unreasonable advantage over
others.

When applied to an electoral context, the concept of freeness
will refer to the ability of voters to participate in the electoral process
without coercion or restriction, and this freedom according to Dahl provides
for the "rules of the game". Fairness, on the other
hand, refers to groups and individuals having equal access to all opportunities
available to them in order to contest the elections. Elklit and Svensson note
that the issue of "freedom must be given priority, because it is a precondition
for democracy and for elections as a means to that end. Without rules granting
formal political freedoms, the question of the fair application of the rules
is meaningless, and the question of equality of resources, irrelevant".

Table 1 outlines indicators against which the "freeness and fairness"
of the various phases of an election, namely the pre-, during and post- election
phases can be evaluated. These indicators reflect not only the basic preconditions
that are required for a successful and legitimate election -one that will be
accepted by the majority of the citizens of the country -but also demonstrates
why it is critical for observer missions to observe the crucial pre-election
period and in fact, invest more time and resources on this phase of the electoral
process than on the polling day(s).

Table 1: Key elements in an acceptable electoral process

"FREE"

"FAIR"

Before Polling Day

Freedom of speech

Freedom of assembly

Freedom of association

Freedom from fear in connection with the elections

Equal and universal suffrage

A transparent electoral process

An election act and a system for seat allocatin which grants no special
privileges to any party, group or person

The pre-election period in many ways determines the rest of the electoral process.
Up until recently, observer missions have spent a great deal of resources on
observing the polling and the counting processes. However, because the stage
for the process is set in the pre-election period, observer missions have come
to realise that their resources and time are more profitably spent in this pre-phase
of the process. Issues such as access to the media by political parties; rallies
and public meetings, the party campaigns, the voter registration process and
the verification by the parties and the electorate of the voters roll, the putting
in place of the election timetable, mechanisms to promote and encourage women
and young people to participate in the process, etc should all be evaluated
in terms of the criteria set out for a "free and fair" process. In
addition the activities taking place in the pre-election period also provides
critical indicators as to whether the legislative framework formally allows
for an environment conducive to meaningful contestation - i.e. a level playing
field, and high levels of representivity, inclusivity and participation.

If, as has been argued above, the pre-election period has been the focus of
attention and the provisions, outlined below, have been substantially adhered
to then there would not be the necessity to scrutinise as closely the polling
and counting procedures and provisions, except where there is evidence of rigging,
fraud, intimidation and violations of the electoral law.

Pre Election Issues:

that the legislative framework which sets out the rules of the electoral
game are agreed upon and understood by the electorate and those contesting
the elections. The laws and regulations have remained in place and have not
be changed or amended before or during the process:

1.1. that the electoral system is appropriately structured to be inclusive
and representative;

that an independent and impartial electoral authority is in place to manage
the process and has the trust of the political parties and the electorate.
That it has sufficient funding to fulfil its task efficiently and professionally;

that the process of demarcation of constituencies and polling districts
is transparent and being undertaken by an independent authority and has not
been involved in gerrymandering the constituencies and districts;

that an impartial and accurate voter information programme is provided throughout
the country, with an campaign starting some time before the elections to include
the process of voter registration;

that the voter registration process and the verification of the register
is understood by the electorate and campaigns are undertaken to encourage
voters to register;

that the parties have access to voters and are able to hold public meetings
and rallies without interference or intimidation, as well as nominating candidates
of their choice, according to the party's constitution;

that an election campaign can be conducted by all parties in a "level
playing field "where there is:

7.1 equal access to the media by all;

7.2 public funding for political parties with effective accountability
structures as an additional means of contributing to a "level playing
field" among parties contesting the elections;

7.3 the incumbent may not use government resources for campaign purposes.

There are no perfect elections and the criteria outlined in Table 1 for "Free
and Fair" elections are at times difficult to meet, especially in the developing
world. There may be aspects of some of the criteria that can be achieved, while
others may be unattainable. Does this then mean that the election is not "free
and fair" or at least not "acceptable" - and if so what would
be the political and economic consequences of such a statement on the country
holding the elections? Would a less stringent criteria focusing only on polling
day(s) provide the necessary results and be as credible? Do statements such
as the "will of the people", "substantially free and fair",
and "a credible and legitimate process" provide the rigour that is
expected of observers or does it merely indicate that the observers were not
able to observe the entire electoral process and are therefore providing only
a limited assessment of what they came across. These statements never seem to
be enough. There is pressure on observer missions to "tell it like it is"
i.e. that the election is either "free and fair" or not. Anything
else is perceived to be a compromise of international standards.

There are however other alternatives to the criteria of "free and fair",
one being the characterisation of an election as "successful". This
is a somewhat different approach and is believed by some to be more appropriate
for emerging democracies than the universal standards that make up the criteria
for "free and fair". This approach focuses on the outcomes of the
election rather than on the integrity of the election administration on election
day, and the issues relating to the pre-election period. Although acknowledging
the importance of the pre-election period the proponents of this view maintain
that an election that is merely procedurally "free and fair" may not
set the stage for democratic politics. In essence then, all elections are to
some extent similar in how they are administered, but their political and economic
contexts will vary greatly, as well as how the electorate view and participate
in the process.

Electoral norms and standards for SADC countries

As has been mentioned previously some developing countries are of the view
that the criteria for "free and fair" are too restrictive and not
flexible enough, given the political and economic conditions and the level of
democratic development of these countries. The variations in the pronouncements
by election observers of elections held in SADC countries, as recently experienced
in Zambia 2001 and Zimbabwe 2002 has confirmed a view that has been around for
some time now, that SADC countries should develop their own norms and standards
for electoral practice and behaviour. These norms and standards would build
on and integrate international best practice principles and standards, but would
ensure that they incorporate and reflect the realities of the conditions of
the SADC countries. This does not mean that there are different rules and standards
for Africa - it is merely a recognition that African elections will never reflect
the realities of the north and should therefore not be penalised for their inability
to do so. The importance of the norms and standards for elections is that they
offer a more comprehensive benchmark for electoral systems, and ways to improve
practice. The purpose of the development of such explicit and practical guidelines
and practices is to help implement principles more effectively in national arrangements.
Clearer norms and standards offer a framework for informed discussion and debate
on how electoral arrangements can best meet the democratic principles agreed
by SADC. They also offer a powerful, indigenous benchmark for assessing electoral
integrity.

The development of this approach, in contrast to a reliance on generalised
terms such as "free and fair" offers a more sophisticated and rigorous
instrument to guide and measure progress, and provides a tool for evaluation
to assist SADC countries to deepen democratic practice.

The norms and standards electoral practice is still in its infancy as a tool
but draws strength from being solidly based on the founding political and constitutional
values of the region. They draw on the declarations and instruments of SADC
countries. These include, for example, the SADC Treaty, which affirms the commitment
to democracy, the Harare Declaration (1991); and other declarations relevant
to the development of democratic practices such as the Declaration on Gender
and Development signed by SADC Heads of State (1997), as well as the Windhoek
Declaration on the Freedom of the Media (1991).

More important, the norms and standards have already proved their relevance
in the cauldron of practical politics by making a significant debut in the Zimbabwe
elections. Thus, for example, one of the most widely quoted statements on the
Zimbabwe elections was that of the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADCPF) that "the
climate of insecurity obtaining in Zimbabwe since the 2000 parliamentary elections
was such that the electoral process could not be said to adequately comply with
the norms and standards for elections in the SADC region." Other observer
groups referred to the SADC Norms and Standards - including the ZESN, the largest
and most influential civil society network monitoring the election. From within
the international community, the US Government stated that the "electoral
process, from start to finish, ignored the norms and standards which govern
elections throughout the Southern African Development Community (SADC)".
This demonstrates that the electoral norms and standards for SADC countries
have earned a place in the future development of the political life of the region.

On the other hand the principal African government statements, including that
of the SADC Ministerial Group and the OAU, referred to the more limited period
of the election days themselves, and then declared the result valid by being
either substantially "free and fair" or reflecting the "will
of the people".

The experiences of the Zimbabwe election is set to catalyse a fundamental debate
within the region on electoral practice and its relationship to democracy development.

*Dren Nupen is from the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA).

Transforming the youth and child justice system

By Anne Skelton

"The Government will, as a matter of urgency, attend to the tragic
and complex question of children and juveniles in detention and prison. The
basic principle from which we will proceed from now onwards is that we must
rescue the children of the nation and ensure that the system of criminal justice
must be the very last resort in the case of juvenile offenders".

These words were spoken by the former president, Nelson Mandela, in his opening
address to the first democratically elected parliament in South Africa in 1994.
The impetus for this important commitment by the ANC-led government was the
history of the suffering of children in South Africa's police cells and prisons.
In the 1970s and 1980s many of these children had been political detainees,
subject to arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, sometimes to torture.
By the late 1980s the political detentions had stopped, but many children continued
to be swept up into the criminal justice system because of "ordinary"
crimes, the majority of which were non-violent crimes, mostly theft. Non-governmental
organisations and human rights lawyers did what they could during the apartheid
years; there were detainee's parents committees and free legal representation
during the years of intense political activity, and later there was a concerted
campaign by a group of non-governmental organisations to have children released
from prisons and police and to call for reform to the way in which the criminal
justice system dealt with children. In the early 1990s a strong child rights
movement began to develop in South Africa, giving a firm theoretical framework
for the efforts at reform. All of this must have been ringing in Nelson Mandela's
ears as he made his first promises of action.

Where are we now ?

Now, in 2002, into the second term of office of the new government, South Africa
needs to appraise whether the promises have been kept. On the face of it, the
picture is disappointing. There are over 2000 children (under the age of 18
years) in prison awaiting trial, some of whom have been there for over a year.
Since 1994, 12 children have died whilst in state custody, either awaiting trial
or serving sentences - some committed suicide, whilst others were killed by
cell-mates.

What has happened since 1994 ?

However, although few children have experienced the advantages yet, a great
deal has been happening in South Africa regarding the transformation of the
way in which children are dealt with by the criminal justice system. The Ratification
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child by the South African government
in 1995 set the scene for broad-reaching policy and legislative change. The
new South African Constitution embodies a section protecting children's rights,
which includes the statement that children have the right not to be detained
except as a measure of last resort and then for the shortest appropriate period
of time, separate from adults and in conditions which take account of their
age. One of the earliest cases to come before the newly constituted Constitutional
Court led to the court striking down corporal punishment (until then used as
a sentence for children by South African courts) as being cruel, inhumane and
degrading treatment.

The government did act with urgency, as Nelson Mandela had promised they would,
on the issue of children in prison. In this regard, however, the country experienced
that the practice of proceeding with too much haste can create problems of its
own. An amendment to an existing law, which was intended to entirely outlaw
the imprisonment of children during the awaiting trial phase, led to chaos when
it was suddenly promulgated. Inadequate consultation between the relevant government
departments as well as a lack of alternative residential facilities for children
caused the application of the new law to be fraught with practical problems.
So serious were the consequences of this that within a year the government had
to amend the law again, this time allowing children charged with certain offences
to be detained in prison awaiting trial. The debacle also had some positive
results, however. It led directly to the setting up of a structure called the
"Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk" (IMC) which
became an important agency for policy making in the field of child and youth
care, including the management of children who come into conflict with the law.
The IMC, chaired by Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, set up a number of pilot
projects to try out new policy recommendations they had made, and some of these
were important incubators for the development of new ways of dealing with children.
Of particular relevance to children accused of crimes were projects which dealt
with the management of children immediately following arrest. One very successful
project has developed: a "one stop child justice centre" to which
children accused of crimes can be brought by a police officer and assessed by
a probation officer. On the same premises (which is not at a criminal court
building) there is a resident magistrate and a small courtroom. The staff at
the centre have developed a strong inter-disciplinary model of working with
the children who they receive. This model has been so successful that other
provinces have imitated it and it is set to become a vehicle for the implementation
of a proposed new legal system.

Law reform

In 1997 a project committee under the auspices of the South African Law Commission
began its investigation into Juvenile Justice. The project committee was appointed
by the then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, to look into the situation in
the country regarding juvenile crime and to draft comprehensive legislation
to deal with this issue. The committee was made up of a number of experts from
civil society who had both practical and theoretical knowledge about the way
in which children are processed through the criminal justice system. The process
of law reform has been a consultative one. In 1997, the Commission published
an issue paper, setting out the problems in the current system and making broad
recommendations for change. After an intensive period of consultation the committee
set to work on writing a draft Bill which was entitled the "Child Justice
Bill". This was accompanied by a Discussion Paper which set out in great
detail the rationale for the recommendations put forward. This was again followed
by energetic consultation with police, prosecutors, magistrates, judges, NGOs
and academics. There was also a specially designed consultation process undertaken
with children themselves. The final report of the Commission's Committee on
Juvenile Justice was handed to the Minister of Justice in August 2000. The draft
Bill accompanying the report, called the Child Justice Bill, was then scrutinised
by the Directorate Parliamentary Legislation, and was approved by Cabinet in
November 2001. The Child Justice Bill is due to be introduced into parliament
during the first half of 2002.

The draft Bill begins with a set of principles which frame the paradigm in
which the new system will operate. The objectives of the legislation are to-

promote the procedural rights of children who are subject to the provisions
of this Act

promote ubuntu in the child justice system through:-

fostering of children's sense of dignity and worth;

reinforcing children's respect for human rights and the fundamental
freedoms of others by holding children accountable for their actions
and safe-guarding victims' interests and the interests of the community;

supporting reconciliation by means of a restorative justice response;
and

involving parents, families, victims and communities in child justice
processes in order to encourage the reintegration of children who are
subject to the provisions of this Act; and c) promote co-operation between
all government departments, other organisations and agencies involved
in implementing an effective child justice system.

The proposed new system places a great deal of emphasis on the first 48 hours
after the child is apprehended. A number of alternatives to arrest are provided
(such as taking a child home and giving a written notice to appear at a subsequent
proceeding) and the police officer is enjoined to use one of the alternatives
to arrest in all petty offences unless particular reasons exist for not doing
so. Where arrest is used it is to be done in a manner which promotes the dignity
and well-being of the child. Due to the history of policing in South Africa,
as well as a current lack of trained personnel, the Commission has decided not
to include a provision for a specialised unit with the police force to deal
with arrested children. Instead, the system aims to get the children out of
police hands as soon as possible, either into the care of their parents or to
a probation officer who will undertake an assessment of the child. An individual
assessment of each child is an innovation created by the proposed system. The
primary purposes of the assessment are to establish the prospects of diversion
of the case, and to formulate recommendations regarding release of the child
into the care of his or her family or placement of the child into an appropriate
residential facility. The probation officer's assessment report must be given
to the magistrate presiding over the next step of the system, the preliminary
inquiry. Also an innovation, the preliminary inquiry must take place within
48 hours of the child being apprehended. It is chaired by a magistrate but is
very much a "round table" conference, with everyone, including the
child, being encouraged to participate. The main objective of the preliminary
inquiry is to establish whether the matter can be diverted. After a discussion
about the matter, a decision to divert will be made, with the prosecution having
the final say in this regard. Other decisions regarding release or placement
of the child are also dealt with at the preliminary inquiry. Diversion is a
central feature of the new system, and the draft Bill sets out a range of diversion
options, listed in three levels depending on the intensiveness of the programme.
Any case may be considered for diversion. One of the diversion options is a
family group conference. Those children who are not diverted (either because
they indicate that they intend to plead not guilty to the charge, or because
the particular circumstances surrounding the child or the case make diversion
inappropriate) will proceed to plea and trial in the Child Justice Court. The
envisaged Child Justice Court is not a completely specialised or separate court.
In urban areas, where there are sufficient cases to warrant it, full time Child
Justice Courts with specially selected and trained personnel will be set aside.
In rural areas, the court will simply "constitute" itself as a child
justice court, following the procedures set out in the legislation. The aim
is that the majority of children will be tried in the Child Justice Court (which
will operate at District level). However, cases involving murder and rape, or
other exceptional circumstances may be referred to the Regional Court or even
the High Court. However, it must be stressed that even when this occurs the
child is not to be tried as an adult. The superior courts are bound by the special
provision for children set out in the draft Child Justice Bill. The Bill includes
a wide range of sentencing options, including non-residential or community-based
sentences, sentencing involving restorative justice concepts such as restitution
and compensation to the victim, and finally, sentences involving a residential
element. The Draft Bill makes it clear that imprisonment should only be used
as a measure of last resort and then for the shortest possible period of time.
The use of imprisonment is further limited by an age limit and a list of offences
for which children may be imprisoned. Legal representation will be provided
for at state expense where a child is deprived of his or her liberty or where
the alleged offence is such that he or she is likely to get a sentence involving
loss of liberty. The expungement of records is provided for in a unique system
whereby the magistrate in the child justice court or other court hearing the
matter must, at the time of determining the sentence, also make a decision whether
or not the criminal record should be expunged, and if he or she so decides,
to set the date on which the record will fall away, and the date should not
be less than three months and not more than five years from the date on which
sentence is passed. Certain very serious offences are, however, excluded from
the possibility of expungement. Finally, the Bill provides for a monitoring
structure to oversee the efficient running of the new system.

Although the Draft Bill is largely procedural it does contain some important
substantive law provisions. The most notable of these is the issue of the minimum
age of criminal capacity. The current law is based on the old Roman Law concept
of doli incapax, and rests on two legal presumptions. Children below the age
of seven years are irrebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity. Children
who have attained the age of seven years but have not yet turned 14 years of
age are also presumed to lack criminal capacity, but this presumption can be
rebutted - if the state can prove that the child appreciates the difference
between right and wrong, and can act in accordance with that knowledge. This
law has been found not to be an effective protection for children, the presumption
being far too easy to rebut, and the courts having focused on the first leg
of the inquiry (the child's ability to understand the difference between right
and wrong) with scant regard for the importance of the second leg (that the
child must be able to act in accordance with that appreciation). After much
intensive debate the Commission is proposing that the minimum age should be
raised from 7 to 10 years of age. The presumption of lack of criminal capacity
of a child who has attained the age of 10 years but has not yet reached the
age of 14 years should remain in place, with increased protection for this group
of children in the form of a higher requirement of proof that the presumption
can be rebutted. The State will be required to provide proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the child understood the difference between right and wrong at the
time of the commission of the alleged offence. Evidence of the intellectual,
emotional, psychological and social development of the child must be provided,
and must be supported by a report from a person qualified in child development
or child psychology, who must personally testify before the court as to the
content and findings of the report. A "child" is a person under the
age of 18 years and this accords with the Constitutional definition of a child
in South Africa.

Progress made in practice:

Children in prison awaiting trial

In addition to the law development work that has been going on, the government
and civil society have been doing much to improve the current situation of children
in the criminal justice system, and to plan properly to smooth the way for effective
implementation of the new system. The Directorate: Children and Youth Affairs
in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has been leading
an inter-sectoral process to deal with the problem of children awaiting trial
in prison.

After 1996, the number of children awaiting trial in prison began to go up.
During 2000 it became apparent that the numbers of children awaiting trial in
prison had been steadily rising, and in April they had reached an all-time high
of 2716. An inter-sectoral team was set up to gather information and make recommendations
for specific intervention. The team was led by the Department of Justice and
was made up of representatives from the departments of Justice, The NDPP's office,
Social Development, Correctional Services, Safety and Security. Following on
the recommendations of the inter-sectoral team, an Inter-sectoral Protocol for
the Management of Children Awaiting Trial was launched at a special session
of parliament to mark the International Day of the Child, 1 June, in 2001. Minister
of Justice, Penuell Maduna, said in his speech that "Although a new law
to deal with child offenders is in the pipe-line, legislation on its own will
never solve these problems which are systemic. It is thus necessary to develop
a sustainable model for monitoring and intervention." The objectives of
the interim protocol are to ensure:

effective inter-sectoral management of children who are charged with offences
and who may need to be placed in a residential facility to await trial

appropriate placement of each child based on an individual assessment

correct use of the different residential options available

the flow of information between the residential facilities and the courts

that managers of facilities are assisted to keep the numbers in facilities
manageable

that communities are made safer through appropriate placement of children,
effective management of facilities and minimisation of abscondment. that the
situation of children in custody is effectively monitored. that appropriate
procedures are established to facilitate the implementation of the proposed
new legislation, once it has been passed by parliament.

Following on the investigation, the numbers were reduced during the year 2000
from 2716 children awaiting trial in prison to below 2000 children. Inter-sectoral
monitoring and management of the issue during 2001 saw the figure remain constant
at around the 2000 children mark. However, figures for the last three months
of 2001 show a disturbing upward trend, with 2260 children in prison awaiting
trial in December 2001.

The four provinces which have struggled most with the issue of children in
prison awaiting trial are Gauteng, Kwa Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape and Western
Cape. Since June 2000, however, both Gauteng and the Western Cape have managed
to turn things around, reflecting a drop on numbers of imprisoned children.
Eastern Cape and Kwa Zulu Natal continue to struggle, with Durban showing an
alarming upward trend. There has been considerable support and intervention
in the city, including the setting of two additional dedicated courts to deal
with the backlogs in juvenile cases, but the intake of new cases is rising,
and despite efforts on the ground, the picture is not really improving. In March
2002 the number of children in Westville prison alone is hovering around the
700 mark - almost one third of the national total. A reality facing Durban is
the fact that it is the fastest growing city in the country, with very high
levels of poverty. Children living at the edge of over-stretched families, are
going to the streets to see what they can find. This is reflected in the high
intake of new cases, which appears to be growing on a monthly basis.

Programmes to support the child justice system

The success of the draft Child Justice Bill will depend to a great extent on
the broad availability of programmes for diversion and appropriate community-based
sentences for children. At the present time programmes for diversion and appropriate
sentencing are offered mainly by way of agreements between the prosecuting authorities
and non-governmental organisations, with probation officers playing a brokering
role. During 2000 approximately 15000 children were diverted to recognised programmes.
If the Bill is to be successfully implemented it may be necessary to provide
programme placements for a further 12 000 children.

The Child Justice Project (located in the Department of Justice) has set about
the task of enhancing the capacity and use of programmes for diversion and appropriate
sentencing for children in the following ways:. Through building strategic partnerships
with relevant government and non-government organisations offering services
in this field.. Through identifying and developing a data-base of programmes
which are used for diversion/sentencing or have the potential of being so used..
Through hosting a national forum in June 2001 to build partnerships between
government and civil society.. Through holding provincial workshops with government
and civil society role-players to plan effectively for programmes to support
diversion and alternative sentencing.

Planning for effective implementation of child justice system

The Child Justice Bill is due for enactment during 2002. The Directorate: Children
and Youth Affairs (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development), mindful
of the importance of proper planning with regard to legislation, has embarked
on a carefully developed process to ensure that the Bill is properly supported
as it is considered by Cabinet, debated by parliament and thereafter effectively
implemented. This support is focused on implementation planning and budgeting.
The Directorate is assisted in this regard by the Child Justice Project, a United
Nations technical assistance project for the government of South Africa, the
objective of which is to assist with capacity development for the implementation
of the new Child Justice system.

When the Bill was placed before Cabinet it was accompanied by an implementation
strategy framework. This document provided a gap analysis, and an indication
of what each of the relevant government departments will need to do between
now and when the Bill is put into operation in order to allow for smooth implementation.

This planning process has now gone an exciting step further. The departments,
assisted by an economist, have embarked on a detailed implementation strategy
and budget, linked to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

A spreadsheet has been prepared that includes a look at current budgetary allocations
relating to children being taken through the criminal justice process, and then
at new activities required by the Child Justice Bill. Budgets to cover these
new activities are then set out under the rubrics of"reprioritised funds"
and "new funds" with columns reflecting the first three years of the
life of the new system. This allows for a phased approach to allocations for
new requirements, although there are obviously certain fundamentals that are
required for the system to work, and these will need to be available from the
initial date of implementation. The spread sheet will be very useful in demonstrating
to parliament and the public as a whole that the implementation planning has
been carefully integrated with the budgeting process - that government has a
clear, detailed plan for implementation, and the necessary funds to do it.

This process is something of a first. For one thing, it is unusual because
it is an inter-sectoral effort related to budgeting, and secondly because it
is happening so early in the process of law making. All too often in the past
legislation has been passed and only then does everyone start thinking about
how to implement it and whether the money is available to do so.

Conclusion

President Thabo Mbeki, in a speech made to launch the "Children's Promise"
in 1999 spoke of a collection of quotations from the townships which was published
during the height of Apartheid. The publication was called "Two dogs and
freedom", and its title came from a quotation from a child living in a
township who said; "When I grow up I want to live in a house with a garden
and have a wife and two children, a boy and a girl, and two dogs and freedom".
President Mbeki uses this story to make the important point that although South
Africa's children are now politically "free" they remain imprisoned
- some literally - by their poverty. And so it must be said that reform of the
criminal justice system cannot, of itself, create social justice for children.
South Africa's efforts for a new child justice system will have to be supported
by broad-reaching improvement in the social and economic lives of all its citizens
if real change in the lives of children is to be seen.

Note:

Civil society organisations came together and formed the Child Justice Alliance,
to promote informed debate about child justice issues as the Child Justice Bill
goes through parliament.

Is South Africa the weakest link in the "imperialist chain"?

By Langa Zitha

The notion of the weakest

The failure of a socialist revolution in the developed world has compelled
historical Marxism to rethink its understanding of the likely course of the
transition to an alternative society. Lenin, who like many other leading socialists,
regarded the well-organised and socially present German working class as the
vanguard of the socialist revolution, reviewed this thesis substituting in its
place the Russian socio-economic formation with its combined and uneven characteristics.

Lenin conceived the notion of the weakest link in the imperialist chain. Examining
the Russia of his time, he recognised both its economic backwardness but also
that this was combined with the most organised, most militant working class
and peasant movement. The demands of these movements, Lenin anticipated, could
not be contained or resolved within the logic of an underdeveloped capitalist
and semi-feudal Russia.

In this article I want to re-engage with the notion of the weakest link. The
concept of the weakest link is used in this instance not in the original instance
as an acute configuration of social contradictions on the eve of a mass uprising.
It is consciously and specifically used to indicate the probability of an advance
to a post-capitalist society, in a democratic terrain, through democratic means.

Initially, the weakest link was conceived in relation to the struggle for and
the construction of a socialist alternative. Lenin had parted company with many
of his contemporaries precisely about the possibility of a transition to socialism
in Russia. Today, with a century of attempts to build 'socialism' behind us,
re-examination of some of Lenin's assertions is in order. I wish also to raise
the question whether this conception of the weakest link is applicable to South
Africa. Samir Amin (1990) argued, in relation to the semi-peripheral countries,
that the organic development of capitalism envisaged in the development theory
of 'catching up' is doubly impossible. Underdevelopment, he argued, by definition
implies the inability of creating an organic and developed capitalism. But under-development
is equally an impediment to the construction of a socialist society in semi-peripheral
situations.

Assuming that Amin is correct, the concept of a weakest link today would be
applicable to self-conscious revolutionary attempts, which are neither explicitly
socialist nor capitalist. The logic of these revolutions however compels them
to adopt fundamental social change of an anti-capitalist character.

The anti-capitalist character the revolution assumes is in response to the
polarisation within 'actually existing capitalism'. Amin further asserts that
it is no longer useful to understand capitalism in the old way, as defined in
the classics, as principally a contradiction between capital and the working
class over the extraction of surplus value.

He says: "There are two ways of looking at the dominant social reality
of our world (capitalism). The first stresses the fundamental relationship,
which defines the capitalist mode of production at its most abstract level,
and, from there, focuses on the allegedly fundamental class struggle between
the proletariat, in the narrowest sense of the term, and the bourgeoisie.The second stresses the other dimension of capitalist reality; its unequal
development worldwide, and hence focuses its analysis on the consequences that
polarisation involves at every level, thus defining other issues in the political
and social struggles that occupy the front of the historical stage.."

In this article, I opt for the second way of seeing what I as a result call
"actually existing capitalism".

Amin would thus argue that "anti-systemic" forces and movements are
those that call into question this inequality and refuse to submit to its consequences.
Though the struggle is immediately directed against an eminent feature of capitalist
expansion that its constituency socially rejects, this places it in direct conflict
with a feature intrinsic to capitalism as it actually operates today.

These challenges to the capitalist order by revolts in its periphery oblige
us to seriously rethink the "socialist transition" to the abolition
of classes. Regrettably the Marxist tradition remains trapped by its initial
vision of a "workers revolution" which would occur in an environment
of advanced productive forces. Development would thus make the transition to
socialism itself quite short.

All the revolutions of our time (Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam)
are ill-advisedly referred to as "socialist". The term is applicable
to the intentions of the actors who had indeed set themselves that goal - creating
a socialist alternative. But these revolutions were in reality complex anti-capitalist
revolutions because they occurred in backward regions. They could not open up
the path of "socialist construction" consistent with the criteria
associated with classical Marxism, precisely because of their under-development.

My second line of argument is built around the observation that the unequal
development eminent in capitalist expansion has placed on the agenda a new type
of revolution, conducted by the peoples of the periphery. The anti-capitalist
character of such revolutions resides in the reality that they are revolts against
actually existing capitalist development, which these peoples find intolerable.
But that does not mean that therefore these revolutions simply have a socialist
character. By the force of circumstance, they have a complex nature. They are
the expression of specific and new contradictions, which Marx could not have
imagined. The real content of such post-capitalist regimes is a popular national
reconstruction in which "...the three tendencies, socialism, capitalism,
and statism combine and conflict..." (Amin, 1990; pp 98-101).

Both the bourgeois revolution (regarded as opening the way to organic capitalist
development) and the socialist revolution are impossible in the countries of
capitalism's periphery. The revolt against peripheralisation cannot resolve
this dilemma. At best it is a popular national revolution with an anti-capitalist
character, because it seeks to break out of the eminent logic of actually existing
capitalism.

Such people's movements are thus likely to be the principal determinants of
the evolution of the world system toward the transcending of capitalism in both
dimensions, by gradually pushing back the effects of world polarisation peculiar
to capitalism on the one hand, while encouraging (equally not without contradiction)
the social forces that aspire to abolish capitalist exploitation on the other.

The watchword here is gradual. It is a long transition not because we want
it to be long, but due to circumstances it is proper for it to be so. We have
to see it as a long process because of the challenge of the development of the
forces of production. Socialism was understood by Marx as a transformation of
a developed capitalist society. Because of the level of development of the forces
of production, it would be possible to share the abundant wealth.

This is not the case in the Third World, including in our own country. There
are specific features of capitalist relations, primarily competition and innovation
that enhances the process of the development of the forces of production. In
an underdeveloped socio-economic formation it is advisable to draw on this element,
not as the sole factor but nonetheless as a fundamental element. If this is
a necessary undertaking, there is therefore a need for predictability, so that
individuals who have rolled out their capital can have the necessary horizons
to recoup their returns. A short transition militates against this.

Strands withing the national popular project

The role and place of the capitalist, statist and socialist elements in the
national popular project presents specific challenges whose resolution, by definition
excludes short cuts. Let us take the capitalist element. A popular project as
defined above is a major challenge to all the forces that are involved. It involves
both co-operation and conflict. Each of the actors has to redefine their relationship
to each other. In general, capital, including its black section, would find
it relatively easy to drive its project of accumulation, but would have to deal
with a state that is not solely subject to its interest.

Similarly, with the statist tendency there would be a need to elaborate its
role. Should the state be reduced or should it be expanded? Which areas should
it be involved in and in what form? Which relationship with other tendencies
should it elaborate?

The socialist tendency too would have to rethink the elaboration of its project.
Firstly how do you elaborate the socialist political economy in relation to
other classes? What is the content of that political economy today? Is it the
shorter working week? Is it co-operatives? Is it the basic income grant? Is
it joint ventures between workers and their managers? Is it elaborating economic
networks, relations and ventures that are self providing - and therefore promote
an exit from the capitalist framework - a radical version of sustainable livelihoods?
How do you knit together these relationships? How can you elaborate a project
of this nature, which is complex and difficult and yet approach it as solvable
in the shortest possible time?

We have to see the transition as long, because we have to stabilise the economy.
The challenge of building a dynamic economy, by definition demands stability.
Whilst there are many views on the matter, it is difficult to ignore the criticism
that the Chinese Communists have leveled at the Cultural Revolution. The same
can be said about the land invasions in Zimbabwe. Stability is critical in order
to be able to plan, to interrogate the interrelations of the various elements
of the economy, in order to tease out the most appropriate strategy for accumulation.
Stability though should not be seen as counter-posed to transformation. If genuine
transformation is to take place, not from above but from and with the people,
it has to proceed in a pace and rhythm that is not very far from them. Brazil's
Porto Allegre experiment of popular budgeting was debated for ten years before
it was implemented. The radical decentralisation project in India's Kerala province,
which was implemented in 1996, was first mooted in 1957. This does not mean
that we should prolong things for the sake of prolonging them, but the longer
horizon is always more useful if the project itself is to have popular moorings.

For socialism to be sustainable, it has to emerge and to develop as a way of
life, a culture and a civilisation. A civilisation by definition is an evolution
of practices, attitudes and ways of being. Whilst force cannot be discounted
in political affairs, socialism as a lived reality cannot and should not be
solely a product of force, particularly to those who stand to benefit from it.
With 1994 having fundamentally redefined the framework of political relations,
there is a space to pursue as an element socialist inspired projects and cultures
of cooperation and solidarity.

People cannot be dragged into these relations. At most, vanguards should mobilise
them. But for these socialist relations to be enduring, the people themselves
should organise themselves in these ways. They should see these relations as
the most natural way of solving their daily life problems. Such an understanding
and mutation by definition cannot be imposed. It can be argued for and people
can be persuaded, but it has to be their lived experience and that by definition
involves time. Civilisations take time. If socialism is a new civilisation,
time is its ally.

The socialist project, which the socialist tendency has to elaborate as an
element within a multi-class popular project, is an experiment. It is an historical
attempt. It has not existed before, despite attempts that honestly claimed its
name. An experiment can succeed or fail. Or there may be many failures in the
development of what may end up a successful experiment. You cannot approach
an experiment as something that is closed. You should be open-ended. Rushing
an experiment that involves millions of lives is gross irresponsibility. Again
it is better to undertake the project with resources of patience - thus the
objective necessity of a long transition to socialism.

If the transition to socialism has to be seen as a long transition, is our
slogan 'SOCIALISM IS THE FUTURE, BUILD IT NOW' misplaced? No it is not. Precisely
because the project objectively has to be long, in the meantime people will
suffer from the problems generated by capitalism. This violence of the dominant
reality of capitalism calls for socialist measures. Secondly, we want socialism
because we hold the opinion that its measures hold the most appropriate solution
to the problems of capitalism. But reality is not ready for society's total
overhaul in a socialist direction. We have to build elements of socialism now,
both as a necessary response to capitalist violence, but also as the building
blocks to the alternative society. This project cannot just be about contemplation,
propaganda and political education, important as these may be. Primarily it
has to be about immersion in socialist activity, distilling lessons from this
practice, which will be valuable when the conditions for generalised socialist
advance mature. Thus we are correct when we say as the SACP, in preparation
for such a future, build socialism now!

Some may argue that the advent of the micro-electronic revolution can minimise
the length of the transition. This can come about as a result of the fact that
such technologies in their various forms, as biotechnology, flexible micro-electronic
products, satellites etc, can be easily applied in rural settings, and be deployed
in activities for self-production. Indeed there is some truth in that. However
the developed North presently monopolises the development of these technologies.
Very few developing countries if any have the capital goods industry (machine
making machines) to produce the micro electronic machines. More critical is
the fact that the application of such technologies to radical projects still
has to be tested, though there is already pioneering work in this regard in
certain progressive circles in the United States. Secondly, access to such technologies
implies a generalised environment of wealth creation (so as to broaden revenues),
which is best pursued in a multi-class project. In the same vein, the access
to those technologies and their deployment for popular use will be contested
by other classes. The education and training for the application and maintenance
of these technologies, the infrastructure necessary to roll them out, will demand
money and time. More fundamentally, the 35 % unemployment in South Africa -
an expression of its historical enclave and colonial status - cannot be resolved
in a short time, even with the deployment of the most advanced technologies.
Thus again the importance of maintaining the strategic perspective of the necessity
of the long transition to socialism.

I have sought consciously to elaborate the strategic implications and meaning
of embracing Amin's reflection on the lesson of 20th century 's radical projects.
How relevant are Amin's conclusions to us, as South African revolutionaries?
Can they be of any assistance to us in understanding the attempts at 'socialist
construction'? Do they assist us in rethinking our own project?

Is South Africa the weakest link in the imperalist chain ?

Having defined the anti-capitalist character of the popular revolutions of
the Third World we can pose the question: is South Africa indeed the weakest
link in the imperialist chain? For a country and a society to be regarded as
the weakest link it should exhibit characteristics that not only indicate the
competence of the popular classes to challenge the logic of polarisation, but
also the capacity of winning such a contest. It implies that over and above
the potential of the popular classes, there must also be the possibility of
victory. I would contend that this is the case in South Africa. To illustrate
this let us contrast South Africa with other Third World countries facing similar
challenges.

South Africa and progressive movements in the third world

South Africa shares the violence of actually existing capitalism with the rest
of the Third World. More than 35% of the economically active population is unemployed.
South Africa also has very high levels of poverty and the illiteracy rate is
higher than 50%. South Africa's democratic victory in 1994 was the only victory
the Left scored in the Third World in the recent past. If one links this to
the achievements of the anti-apartheid movement globally, South Africa occupies
a unique position in global geopolitics. This uniqueness gives South Africa
a measure of maneuverability, which Chile and the Nicaraguans did not have.
But we should guard against this favorable position generating illusions about
what is possible.

Though the ANC's strategic framework of a national democratic revolution emphasized
the social dimension of liberation, particularly as captured in the popular
Freedom Charter, the ANC's ascendancy to power has principally been about democratisation.
Of course, it has been democratisation that has been underpinned by a number
of progressive social measures.

Over the past seven years, South Africa has witnessed the consolidation of
representative democracy expressed through the following institutions: representative
democratic politics, with a vocal if rightwing opposition; an independent judiciary
with an effective and active Constitutional court; various constitutional commissions
on gender, fiscal and human rights, all geared to strengthening democracy and
a culture of the rule of law. These procedural democratic mechanisms on their
own are a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the consolidation
of democracy. However, popular forces to keep the government in check as well
as to sustain a perspective of radical change for the long haul are also increasingly
using this procedural democratic framework. In this regard the South African
project seems to be laying genuine foundations for its popular defence from
its very inception. East European and existing 'socialism' failed to address
this and this partially accounts for the reversals that have occurred and might
well be threats to the struggle for 'socialism' in Cuba, China and Vietnam.

A second important feature that could strengthen South Africa's status as the
weakest link is the relative development of the South African economy. While
the industrial economy was historically built on mining, a considerable manufacturing
sector, which is quite efficient and globally competitive, has evolved. At present
it contributes more to the gross domestic product (GDP) than mining. South Africa
also has quite a developed, if racially skewed, management cadre. Though there
is a shortage of highly skilled workers, policies are in place to address this
deficit. Whether it is conceived as eminently anti- capitalist or as part of
a long global transition to socialism, in the medium term, there is every possibility
that these strengths can be used to enhance the transformative project in South
Africa.

The relative development of the South African economy presents novel prospects
for transformation that might have existed only in Chile. The surplus generated
by the urban classes could thus become the engine for the transformation of
the rural areas. To attain this, the democratic government must acquire the
necessary strategic coherence. The challenges of transformation, given that
there are no great prospects for job creation in the urban centres, will increasingly
force us to look at rural development. We have not yet fully embraced accelerated
land reform, though agrarian reform is increasingly emerging as the way to go.
But even with regard to the latter, much work still needs to be done.

In its perverse way, South Africa does reflect the interconnection between
the developed world and the Third World. Indeed the consumption patterns of
the white minority together with the black middle class and elite correspond
with those of their northern counterparts.

This northern dimension is not entirely negative. It was precisely this relationship
that brought the traditions of working class struggle, trade unions and political
parties, including the Communist Party, to South Africa. Since its birth, the
SACP has emerged as a formidable actor in the South African political drama.

Some might be tempted to view South Africa as a possible mediator between the
north and the south. That would be a dangerous illusion. South Africa is part
of the South. It does however appear that this relationship holds out a number
of positive possibilities. Because of this relationship with the north - particularly
Britain and Europe - the South African working class was in a position to score
certain victories that placed it in a relative strong position even under apartheid.
For example, we have a system of pension funds, which is quite exceptional in
the Third World. Consequently, a considerable body of wealth, running into billions
of rands, objectively belongs to the workers. The challenge is to transform
this objective resource into a subjective capability that can be deployed to
reinforce an alternative accumulation logic.

South Africa has also drawn on the European experience of corporatism. Beginning
during the last years of apartheid, the trade union movement strove for the
establishment of institutions of social dialogue as perfected by Scandinavian
social democratic movements. But in our case, the establishment of these institutions
has not resulted in the elaboration of a consensus that subordinates everything
to the rhythms of capital. Indeed some commentators have insisted that these
institutions must be located within a context of an 'anti-capitalist' strategy.
Conceptually these institutions are different to the European ones. Their composition
takes into account our peripheral situation and allows for the participation
of social actors beyond the capital, labour and government nexus, e.g. representatives
of community organisations, NGOs and rural movements. Despite this, the community
chamber is struggling to make an impact. Similarly the corporatist structure
has not been given the social weight that it has in Scandinavia. The practice
over the past seven years has been complicated by attempts to nurture corporatism,
whilst simultaneously asserting the unambiguous role of the democratic government.

Of course the question has to be posed, how appropriate are these institutions
in the context of a nascent popular revolution in the third world?

Though consultation of key social forces is critical, the marshalling of its
forces should be the principle emphasis of the national democratic movement.
Can one marshall and consult at the same time? However to the extent that it
is important to hear first hand the views of the various social forces from
the very onset, corporatism provides the movement with a sounding board. These
corporatist structures have assisted in making breakthroughs in the auto industry,
transforming an industry that was in crisis five years ago, into one of the
best performing ones. We will have to see more such successful initiatives before
we draw up a proper balance sheet of these initiatives.

This north-south intersection has increased awareness and sensitivity among
the advanced and critical sections of our society to the debates and reform
strategies in the north. Presently the leading trade union federation, Cosatu,
is spearheading a campaign for a comprehensive overhaul of the national health
system. If implemented, this will be major advance for all the working people
as its effect would be the consolidation of all health-related expenditure and
costs in a single insurance system. In this regard we are drawing on, whilst
adapting, from the best of European system. While none of this has yet been
finalised, this seems to be the direction that the health ministry is steering.
In a similar vein, there is emerging a coalition of forces seeking to overhaul
our social security system. In the past the system catered mainly for the aged,
the disabled, single mothers and workers for the first six months of unemployment.
This social security system is totally inadequate in a context of more than
35% unemployment. Forces ranging from within the ANC, the SACP, Cosatu, the
NGO coalition, churches, all support the implementation of an unconditional
solidarity income grant for all citizens. This grant will, of course, be much
smaller than any enjoyed by working people in developed economies.

Earlier, under innovative minister of labour, Tito Mboweni, the government
even considered exploring the shortening of the working week, as a way of drawing
more workers into employment. As originally conceived a shortened working week
would have led to a reduction in workers' earnings. Unfortunately, no one has
yet responded to this idea and its implications. However it indicates a willingness
on the part of the popular movement in South Africa to draw on the radical traditions
of the northern working classes. Such reforms in our context will constitute
a revolutionary change, as they will result in a fundamental change in people's
lives. The revolutionary character of these reforms will be further strengthened
by the coincidence of these advanced reforms with the massive contradictions
of a Third world society.

The tripartite alliance - ANC, COSATU and the SACP - is the ultimate guarantor
that South Africa indeed becomes the weakest link in the imperialist chain.
Quite remarkably, this alliance has survived more than eighty years. It is the
only instance, other than the Vietnamese, where a Communist party has successfully
implemented the Comintern line of working with nationalism with the intention
of radicalising it. The Alliance has evolved to embrace a Marxist culture and
methods of analysis by the entire liberation movement. But as our recent history
attests, the three tendencies that animate third world revolutions are alive
within the Alliance, hence the pattern of conflict combined with cooperation
that has characterised Alliance politics over the past 10 years. Because of
our history, our rootedness amongst the people, the unique traditions of engagement
in the Congress movement, it is my view that the Alliance will be the bedrock
and the guarantor of the elaboration of a 'national popular reconstruction'.

Obstacles to the weakening of the weakest link

It would be absolutely wrong to present this project as achievable without
problems. I have identified its essential features above. There are real obstacles
both inside the revolutionary movement and beyond. More importantly there are
vested interests that will be threatened by the measures proposed. A racially
based ruling class, which has benefited from a racially based system, is not
likely to co-operate to attain these changes without stiff resistance.

This dilemma is more acute when we consider that we view the urban-based classes
as the vanguard, leading the rest. Our economic structure, semi developed though
it is, is comparatively weak in terms of global competitiveness and productivity.
Furthermore, should the need arise to recompose the class basis of the accumulation
path, without disturbing the essential character of the economy, such changes
will need the synergy and co-operation between the state and private sector.
In the light of our racial past how probable is the positive resolution of these
questions? We nonetheless must find ways of stimulating cooperation between
the democratic state and big capital.

In addressing these questions we have to be self-conscious about the overall
thrust of our development path. But this is one of our greatest areas of weakness.

There has been a healthy presence of international capital on our shores for
the past century. This international factor did not inhibit the consolidation
of a dominant national capital. What has to be considered, and has not been
addressed with the seriousness it deserves, is our strategy for dealing with
international capital. We have been firm with regard to our progressive labour
market laws. We are even firmer in our dealings with our own domestic capital,
as evidenced by the intention to nationalise mining rights. But are these evidence
of a particular disposition or are they aspects of a conscious plan?

The forces of change

There are also serious problems amongst the revolutionary forces for change.
There is a fundamental tension between the professed vocation of the Alliance
- a working class biased society - and the manner in which the ANC government
is pursuing that objective. Ironically it is the bodies that should be the organised
expression of the working class within the alliance - viz, COSATU and the SACP
- who are experiencing the greatest difficulties with day-to-day ANC government
policies.

I would submit that this is an expression of an untheorised transition. The
ANC, like all genuine national liberation movements of the twentieth century,
was affected by the fall of Eastern European socialism. However, unlike its
Communist party ally, there has been no open and public exchange about the implications
of these momentous developments for the ANC. I emphasize public debate, because
despite the absence of a public debate, there appears to be a clear line that
informs the daily practice of the ANC. In the main it is a progressive line
with a pronounced bias towards the poor. The danger however is that the line
is not the outcome of broad popular participation. As a result, we as the ANC,
have been shy to clearly pronounce and act out the class character of the society
that we are building despite its pro-poor orientation.

It is important that we raise these questions because being pro-poor does not
necessarily mean that your programme envisages the poor as the ruling class.
Similarly whilst preserving the pro-poor orientation of the movement today,
we need to interrogate the relationship between being pro-poor and being pro-working
class. Major sections of the working class are not the poorest of the poor,
but the advantages they have over poorest of the poor are: organisational infrastructure,
the ideology and working class tradition of struggle that can enable the working
class to lead society. The working class, not the poor, has the capacity to
lead society.

I am raising these questions fully aware of the fact that there have been three
major conferences of the ANC since its unbanning in 1990. But despite these
and the numerous discussions that have ensued, there has not been serious debate
within the ANC about the implications of the fall of East European socialism.

There are however very hard questions that we have to confront, particularly
as Communists in the ANC. The involvement and co-operation over more that 80
years of Communists with and in the ANC was aimed at giving and maintaining
a working class orientation in the ANC. If we have come to understand that third
world revolutions are not about the immediate creation of a working class-led
society - socialism, but are about popular reconstruction in which the capitalist,
statist and socialist tendencies operate, what are the implications of this
insight for the ANC? Does this mean that the ANC should abandon its pro-working
class bias in favor of the three tendencies? Is this what is objectively happening?
Does this not amount to working class forces handing over the ANC to other class
forces? Or is it possible to emphasize the working class bias of the ANC whilst
simultaneously accommodating an unfettered expression of the other tendencies?
Does not the anti-capitalist character of this revolution draw its inspiration
and sustenance from the initial working class bias? Is this working class bias
not the ultimate guarantor that these struggles do indeed become part of the
overall long global transition to socialism? I think to the extent that a fully
conscious popular reconstruction is yet to be developed, to that extent Third
world movements with a working class bias are still the most appropriate vehicles
through which to pursue these objectives. Another challenge has to be resolved.
That is the unique handling of the class and national question in the South
African revolution. The South African Communist Party, drawing on its African
heritage was able to hegemonise Marxist politics in the entire liberation movement.
Unlike the normal contestation in the Euro-centric environment, these fundamental
questions are resolved in a convivial setting, mainly informal. The watchwords
in these interactions are trust. In the neo-liberal environment of today, it
is debatable whether the trust, which enabled the hegemony of working class
ideas to germinate in the Congress movement, is still possible today. But one
thing is clear, without the re establishment of this trust, there will be no
popular reconstruction, only compradorisation.

Conclusion

To conclude, indeed South Africa appears to be the weakest link in the imperialist
chain. This is a result of the massive movement that the people of South Africa
have developed in the struggle against apartheid. This movement together with
the huge social problems that the society faces, in the context of its the radical
traditions, positively disposes it to catalyze a project that can open up sustainable
radical possibilities for the third world. However to successfully achieve this
there are fundamental challenges that the movement has to confront. These challenges
include a fundamental rethink of the very character of the revolution itself.

References

Amin, S The Social Movements in the Periphery: An end to National Liberation
in Transforming the Revolution, Amin, S; Arrighi, G; Frank, G; Wallerstein,
I (editors) Monthly Review, New York, 1990.

* Langa Zitha is an ANC Member of Parliament, SACP Central Committee Member
and Coordinator of the Third World Forum (SA)

Morals for Africa?

Cedric Mayson interrogates the call for a Moral Regeneration
Movement

The euphoria that engulfed us after the democratic elections of 1994 was rooted
in the marvelous experience of liberation. The storms of oppression had yielded
to sunshine on the rainbow people, and the nation was being transformed. In
many ways, it was. The 'dark days of apartheid' receded, and because we are
very good at producing children, most of today's population cannot remember
those days anyway.

But before long the headlines took on different dimensions. The media became
dominated by horror stories and people began to ask what has gone wrong? Why
isn't it working?

Several causes of the moral collapse can be found. We must interrogate the
past, the present, the opposition, and ourselves - and design a route from liberation
to transformation.

Interrogating the past

The legacy of colonialism and apartheid

It is not acceptable to continually lambast the apartheid regime but it is
a simple fact that many events and attitudes of today are rooted in that past.
When people complain: 'I don't know what the young people of today are coming
to', they must be reminded that the youth of today are becoming what the young
people of yesterday made them. "Crime is in part an overdue debt that the
country must pay for ignoring for decades the conditions that breed lawlessness".1

Many citizens have still not reconstructed themselves from the immoral attitudes
embodied in the old regime, nor seen the need to. Whites thought themselves
superior, blacks were taught to think themselves inferior, and although the
Group Areas Act has gone, the minds of millions still inhabit racist cultural
ghettos.

Christian National Education and Bantu Education inhibited us all, and we still
carry that burden. It is hard to throw off false teaching that denigrates others,
weakens foundational learning skills on which to build everything else we need
to know, the failure to possess a love of books and knowledge for their own
sake, and the indoctrination that education is about getting more money instead
of getting more life. False theological and sociological teaching promoted beliefs
that cultural and racial differences were signs of inherent goodness or badness,
intelligence or stupidity. African spirituality was rejected and with it the
holistic approach to life, the communal awareness of ubuntu, respect for the
unknown, and the expectation that ordinary human beings could be endowed with
a strong spirit. These treasures of basic human relationships which had motivated
so many African people were denigrated by the 'imported' religions. But these
too were frequently warped as religions competed for the power of their institutions
and lost the power of their inspiration.

Violence was accepted as necessary and widely practiced by the State, and many
citizens. It was to liberate us from this that the people put the ANC into power
in 1994, and huge advances have been made. But many of the moral problems remain.

Interrogating the present

What's the Problem?

Take pen and pencil. Sit in a kraal on the round hills of Kwazulu Natal or
in the white and gold glory of the Cabinet Room in Tuynhuis, Cape Town; drink
beer from a recycled oil can in a kraal in the Eastern Cape or Venda; or fancy
imported coffees in a mall in any of our great cities; kneel in a mosque or
cathedral, put your hat on the back of your head in synagogue or pull it over
your eyes on the beach ... wherever you go people will be talking about the
same problems which seem to have accompanied democratic freedom. Some say we
have failed to enforce justice. The Police, Courts, and Prisons are ineffective
and out of hand, over-worked and under-paid, over-crowded and under-resourced,
corrupted by negligent, incompetent, unmotivated people.

Some blame it on the media, who use their freedom to chain us to a western
culture of immorality and crime, who in the name of revealing wrong actually
promote it, who are controlled by owners and advertisers whose self-centred
motives debase society. Some blame it on the government, which has the power
to chase out criminals, get rid of disease and poverty, and establish a liberated
society for everybody, but doesn't. A realistic analysis must go deeper than
this.

Worshipping the goldent calf

Christians, Muslims and Jews in South Africa all recount the ancient story
of the people of Moses who reminted their ornaments into a statue of gold and
then knelt down and worshipped it: "Here is your god, who brought you out
of captivity!" Are we still there? Many give money a supreme value and
worship it. Getting money is accepted as the main purpose of education, jobs,
position, and life. How you get it is of secondary consideration, justifying
cheating, lying, taking bribes, stealing, or jumping the queues for the perks.
After all, we say, everyone does it.

Organised crime is a good business that gives you money, cars, houses, guns,
girl friends, fancy schools, and the prestige of being wealthy whether you live
in Houghton, Mamelodi, or Mitchells Plain. Wisdom means don't get caught.

Being a criminal is just another way of making money like being a politician,
a tycoon or a pop star. Respectable and disreputable people have the same motivation:
to get on, to make the grade, to be in the money, and to hell with everyone
else. When money becomes more important than people a society is on the slippery
slope of social disintegration where many cannot tell wrong from right, which
has doomed every empire from the Roman to the US.

The challenge is to the morality of our economic structures, not merely our
personal attitudes. It is our system which pours wealth into the control of
a minority and condemns half our population to abject poverty from which they
cannot extricate themselves. The GINI factor which measures the disparity of
wealth between rich and poor is the highest in the world in South Africa, and
is always a recipe for crime, corruption and social failure. People who drive
past an 'informal settlement' shantytown bemoaning the housing shortage, but
do not relate it to the mansions being erected in the fancy suburbs next door
are sunk deep in immorality. 'No bread?' said Marie Antoinette of the poor.
'Well, let them eat cake."

Money is not wrong, and plenty of wealthy people have a care for others. It
is the love of money that is the root of evil, because those who worship the
golden calf are fluffing up a fallacy.

Worshipping me

Whether moral systems are secular and rooted in political and sociological
theory or find their roots in religion all of them reject self-centredness.
They put concern for the community first: loving your neighbour, sharing, ubuntu.
Both the Freedom Charter and our new Constitution give assurance and hope to
individual persons, but do it in terms of a transformed society not rewards
or pleas for individual goodness.

A major cause of moral breakdown today is the emphasis on individuality, the
self-centredness of everything from advertising to family relationships, from
going into politics to going to heaven. The sense of community has been swept
aside by the notion that the only thing that matters is progress for me.

Such self-centredness extends to my group, my race, my family, my religion,
my culture, my politics and denigrates everyone else. Religion-gone-wrong can
be just as bad when it emphasises personal salvation for life after death and
ignores the support of hell on earth. Accepting self-centredness means you must
also accept a society of division, antagonism, murder, rape, corruption and
crime

Violence

People are not naturally violent: humanity has survived and prospered because
we are cooperative and supportive. But when we worship money, or individual
and group self-centredness, our feelings for others degenerate and brutality
becomes quite reasonable - whether it is focused on hitting children, raping
women, mugging the weak, or killing commies, wogs, nazis, viets, arabs, jews,
pakkies, niggers, kaffirs, white scum or terrorists. They cease to be real people,
so it is no crime, no problem.

The non-violence culture is a precious heritage of the South African struggle
which has been driven out of us by western values and we need to recover it
with very specfic programmes. Self-interest can be highly productive when people's
interest is committed to change society.

The media

Interrogating the present insists we must examine the role of the media. During
the years of the struggle a number of newspapers went under - notably the Rand
Daily Mail - because their stories were not popular with enough readers. A major
problem today is that the media depends for its profit on a society pervaded
by anti-social preferences, whose owners uphold oppressive economic structures,
and whose advertisers will only pay for space if they approve of what surrounds
it. Is it feasible for editors to produce positive, progressive, socially transforming
media when business managers must fund it from an immoral environment?

Can there be an alternative media? In the struggle we did it ourselves with
secret duplicators. Should religions club together to produce something more
than parish magazines? Can we promote a wider circulation for alternatives which
are here but not known? Is internet viable when most cannot afford computers?
Does government, as the public broadcaster, have a responsibility to promote
a moral media portraying positive alternatives to the current way of life, with
little support from advertising?

Interrogating the opposition - the "OOF"

Oppressive Opposition Forces (OOF) are seldom defeated: they regroup. They
change their name and their slogans to suit their analyst's latest fads, but
their aim has not changed. The only policy of many OOF is to get their hands
on the rands, which is threatened by the ANC's commitment to the poor.

The OOF are subtle manipulators who employ clever psychological techniques
to destabilise and undermine the National Democratic Revolution. It was no mistake
that a last act of the oppressive regime ensured that all the new MPs would
have wealth which moved them into a different category from the poor.

The OOF endorse the globalised economy over which we have little control. Everything
from the value of the rand to the price of sugar is decided overseas, the exchange
of goods is moved from cash to cards to make us dependent upon debts, and it
is not only the poor who recognise that globalisation has joined slavery and
colonialism as a major crime against humanity. But the OOF, dependent on western
values, don't want to see it. The OOF move the struggle on to their own ground:
the Cold War was lost when it became a battle for capital instead of a battle
for justice. The policies of the ANC are good, so the OOF do not attack them,
but distort them, and concentrate on personal attacks to undermine our leadership.

The OOF have studied the skilful use of the entertainment industry and right
wing fundamentalist religion in the US and Europe to promote oppressive indoctrination.
They will be defeated by confrontation on ideological grounds.

Interrogating ourselves

Many revolutions which started with a great commitment to justice and freedom
seem to have suffered a subsequent period of distraction. Decay is not inevitable
but a danger. Many revolutions - political, social or religious - lost the high
moral ground and had to work through the recovery of values and vision with
the OOF barking at their heels. It happened to the French, American, Russian,
Latin American, and Uhuru-anti-colonial revolutions. The quest for liberty,
equality and fraternity, was right and just and did not produce the blood bath
of the guillotine: but it happened. Rebelling against the British Empire and
the Tsars did not produce Vietnam and the Gulags: but it happened. The winds
of change which blew the fresh sweet breath of freedom and justice through Africa
did not themselves produce monsters like Amin and Mobuto: but it happened.

The great religious revolutions of the Reformation, the Evangelical Revival,
and Liberation Theology transformed spiritual and social life but were sometimes
diverted into extremes of fundamentalist folly. The resurgence of conservative
values so blunted their vision and weakened their influence, that millions today
find religion irrelevant. Is our South African revolution under assault from
similar destructive influences? Are the slogans of the struggle losing their
potency? In the past the ANC survived because it had the courage to face problems
which had arisen, and today it faces the influences which feed fat cats and
factions.

When people obtain possessions and power they can develop different priorities.
The focus moves. from a social struggle to a personal struggle. from community
to individual. from commitment to entitlement. from a vision of a new world
to the quest for power in that world. from seeking collective transformation
to seeking personal advancement.

The quest for power and possessions is a legitimate part of the struggle against
oppression and need not embarrass us. It goes wrong when it becomes a personal
obsession - and the OOF constantly seek to tempt us all into the trap.

The new struggle to recover our ideological roots

From its commencement the liberation movement was a collective moral force.
It was based on the inner reserves of our people which are still there, and
can be recovered. Our strength is that the majority of our people are committed
to the common good of all. The people are the source of pressure for change.
Experience shows that the vision and strength of the people can be mobilised
to change society.

Our roots are in the metro cities, municipalities and neighbourhoods where
people live. Our focus must water these roots by facilitating activities in
each province, metro and municipality to built partnerships of commitment.

Our aim must be to revitalise a movement for regeneration within existing organisations
(not to start a separate institution for moral upliftment.)

From our roots come:

a dominant vision of a new country and a new world, in which the OOF are
confronted, and we establish our own priorities in our own neighbourhoods

a commitment beyond ourselves to a new Africa, with the political and economic
transformation envisaged in the African Union and NEPAD.

a collective solidarity to tackle the Problem of the Rich so that generosity
replaces greed, service replaces the lust for power, transparency replaces
corruption, and the people re-establish a collective moral force.

All the power of good we need is at our fingertips. We can be spiritual giants,
not mimicking western role models. Africa can stand strong in a globalised world,
and use its inherent strength for all its people.

The acceptance and enactment of high value systems within our society, are
vital to ensure the happiness of our people, the prosperity of our business,
the success of our politics, and the transformation of our nation: Our task
is to meet together to design and develop a programme...

empowering people to make their own ethical decisions.

embracing a common code of ethics and behaviour.

improving relations amongst the inhabitants of our land.

building racial harmony.

promoting economic justice for all citizens.

eradicating corruption and unethical practices.

establishing a crime free society.

producing a responsible youth, sensitive and responsive to the challenges

encouraging the rejuvenation of shared values in the family.

developing a new patriotism.

This is why the Moral Regeneration Movement has been brought into being, and
is being launched on 18 April 2002.

The moral regeneration movements

Themes in ANC history

Human Rights and the ANC

The struggle for fundamental human rights for all South Africans has been prominent
in the ninety-year history of the African National Congress. The organisation
was the first in the country to develop a bill of rights, and was the foremost
proponent of equal rights for all South Africans over several decades, laying
the basis for the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the country's democratic
constitution.

In May 1923, the annual convention of the ANC adopted the African Bill of Rights,
and urged "the great European races of the Union to take the whole question
into consideration". The bill asserted that human rights should be universal,
that all South Africans had a god-given right to ownership of land, that there
should be equality before the law and equal political rights, and that all should
be able to have an equal share in government.

The convention declared: "That the Bantu inhabitants of the Union have,
as human beings, the indisputable right to a place of abode in the land of their
fathers. That all Africans have, as the sons of this soil, the God-given right
to unrestricted ownership of land in this, the land of their birth."

Though couched in the respectful language of the time, the meaning of the declaration
is clear: - the African people are a full, integral and central part of South
African society, entitled to all the rights and freedoms of citizens anywhere
in the world.

The ANC leadership saw that the salvation of the South African people depended
upon embracing rather than rejecting democratic notions. These were not abstract
propositions. They responded to the acute oppression felt by the majority of
South Africans and became the basis for campaigns in the decades to come.

The principles contained in the 1923 Bill of Rights were not new, having been
expressed right from the formation of the ANC. The concept of rights had already
become part of the political discourse of the time. Addressing the ANC's founding
congress in 1912, Pixley ka Isaka Seme told "Chiefs of royal blood and
gentlemen of our race" that the congress had been called to form a national
union "for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights
and privileges". In a petition directed to members of the British parliament
and public in 1914, the ANC objected to provisions of the 1913 Land Act, which
"interfere with rights the Natives have exercised for generations".

In his address to the ANC congress in 1921, the then President, Rev Z.R. Mahabane,
challenged the colonial status of the African people in terms of which they
were treated not as adult citizens with full rights, but as children to be spoken
for and controlled. "The poor black man is consequently reduced to a position
of utter voicelessness and votelessness, hopelessness, powerlessness, helplessness,
defencelessness, homelessness, landlessness, a condition of deepest humiliation
and absolute dependency," he said. >From the earliest decades of the
ANC's existence, the plight of South Africa's African, coloured and Indian people
was described in terms of the basic human rights, which they were denied. In
characterising the situation of South Africa's majority in this way, the leadership
of the organisation placed the issue of human rights at the heart of the resolution
of "the native question".

The place of human rights within a future dispensation in South Africa was
given further content in the 1943 document, 'Africans' Claims in South Africa'.
The document arose from a decision of the ANC congress in December 1942, where
its President, Dr AB Xuma, was asked to appoint a committee to study the Atlantic
Charter, proclaimed by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill as a statement of the peace aims of the Allies.
Xuma's committee was to draft a bill of rights to be presented to the peace
conference at the end of the war.

An Atlantic Charter Committee, consisting of prominent African professionals
and intellectuals of varied political views, was convened under Prof ZK Matthews.
The committee's report was unanimously adopted by the ANC annual conference
on 16 December 1943. Following its adoption, Dr Xuma requested an interview
with Prime Minister Jan Smuts to discuss it, but received a reply that Smuts
was "not prepared to discuss proposals which are wildly impracticable".

The document was notable for its language, which is non-racial and non-sexist.
It envisaged full citizenship rights for all men and women of all races in South
Africa. Rather than an abstract statement of rights, the African Claims document
dealt concretely with all the forms of oppression felt by the majority in South
Africa. In particular it called for the repeal of all discriminatory and restrictive
laws.

It demonstrated clearly the interconnection between political and economic
oppression in South Africa, particularly in so far as disenfranchisement, lack
of freedom and dispossession from the land were intertwined.

The centrality of the right to education and the right to health as fundamental
human rights is underlined. The 1943 Bill of Rights laid the foundation of the
struggles for the next decade. Its broad approach coincided with a broadening
of the base of the ANC, the establishment of an alliance with the Natal and
Transvaal Indian Congresses and the beginning of mass campaigning.

In 1955 the ANC produced its third major 'Bill of Rights' document, the Freedom
Charter. Adopted by the Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955, this document
became the beacon for millions of South Africans uniting them in a common struggle
for dignity, equality and social justice.

It was the foundation of the prosecution's case in the notorious treason trail
1956-1961, and circulated in the underground and in exile. The Freedom Charter
became the foundation of the non-racial vision, which now finds expression in
the new South African constitution.

The Freedom Charter developed many of the themes of the 1943 Africans' Claims
document in a context in which the ANC emerged as the leading force of a broadly
based anti-apartheid movement which included men and women of all races, beliefs,
backgrounds and cultures. It anticipated by a decade the two great international
conventions on human rights adopted by the United Nations, namely the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.

In keeping with the nature of oppression in South Africa and the actual yearnings
for freedom of the people denied their human rights, the Freedom Charter stressed
the indivisibility of political, social and economic rights. The Freedom Charters
made human rights popular. It was central to the development of popular struggle
around human rights.

In 1987, the ANC National Executive Committee formally accepted the need for
South Africa to have a justiciable Bill of Rights enshrining universally accepted
fundamental rights and freedoms. This was an effective answer to those who were
insisting on racial group rights as the foundation of constitutional development.
The ANC was able to draw on half a century of campaigning for human rights as
the foundation for its claim for equal citizenship in a united country.

As the country entered the negotiations phase, the ANC's constitutional committee
pioneered the debate on the role and functioning of a constitutional court.
In a landmark conference held early in 1991, the first serious proposals were
made on the composition, role and functioning of a constitutional court in South
Africa. The ANC also pioneered the call for the establishment of a human rights
commission to work in liaison with the courts and the legislature in defending
and promoting human rights.

Both the interim constitution, adopted in 1993, and the final constitution,
adopted in 1996, drew heavily on this long tradition. The Bill of Rights in
the Constitution is testimony to the commitment of the South African people
to freedom, equality and justice.

It took the ANC almost 90 years before the rights it espoused at its formation
could be enshrined in the highest law of the land. The decade towards the ANC's
centenary and the years beyond must see the movement work to ensure that all
South Africans can exercise these hard-won rights.

* This is one of a series of articles appearing in Umrabulo this year examining
key themes in the 90-year history of the ANC.

Umkhonto Remembered - Part Two Umkhonto we Sizwe: Within Living Memory

By Makhanda Senzangakhona, Edwin Mabitse, Uriel Abrahamse and
George Molebatsi

The Luthuli Detachment: Zipra and Umkhonto Alliance

In 1965, the white settler regime in Rhodesia led by Ian Douglas Smith declared
Unilateral Independence (UDI). J.B. Vorster, then Prime Minister of South Africa,
was selling "détente" to independent Southern African countries,
among them Malawi and Zambia, in a clear attempt to undercut the efforts of
the Liberation Movement from support. Thus was born the unholy alliance between
the Smith/Caetano and Vorster regimes.

The armies of the unholy alliance posed a challenge; they stood in the way
of MK and Zipra reaching home. Moreover, they sought to frustrate and defeat
the goal of total liberation of the Southern part of the continent. This was
not to be. Thus was born the Luthuli Detachment, named in honour of ANC President,
Albert Luthuli, who passed away in the same year, 1967.

The central objective of the contingent of MK that crossed the Zambezi from
Zambia to Zimbabwe during the campaign, was to work their way towards South
Africa, in order to commence operations on home turf. The battles that ensued
from the encounters and clashes with the Rhodesian armies and apartheid reinforcements
have gone down as among the first and fiercest between the regime/s and armed
liberation combatants. The objective of the campaigns were not completely fulfilled,
yet, they had tested the psychological armour of the regimes in the area. The
legacy of Wankie and Spolilo imparted to future generations of fighters, heroes
of the mettle and calibre of Ntate Mashego, Flags Boshielo, Chris Hani, Ralph
Nqungwana and many more. In the aftermath of the battles, some MK cadres managed
to retreat and others were arrested only to join colleagues on Robben Island.

History would be incomplete without the mention of the sacrifices and courage
of the likes of James Masimini who insisted that his comrades retreat while
he covered the enemy approach. This is incidentally reminiscent of the example
of one Alexander Matrosov, a Soviet Red Army hero of WWII who covered enemy
machine-gun fire with his chest during one battle against a rampant Nazi unit.
James Masimini, fought like a lion until his body was riddled by enemy bullets.
Such heroism and self-sacrifice is rare at any time.

Umngwenya immortalised MK in the campaigns and lived true to the words of O
R Tambo when he declared that MK would provide the cutting edge to the political
struggles of the people.

The June 16 Detachment

The victory of the liberation forces led by Frelimo and the MPLA of Mozambique
and Angola respectively in 1975/6 had far-reaching implications for the struggles
of the people of Southern Africa and South Africa, in particular. These developments
altered forever, the geo-politics of the region in favour of the revolutionary
forces.

In response, the apartheid regime rushed to reinforce its occupation forces
already deployed in Namibia and Angola. The regime invaded Angola, confident
of launching in Luanda. History has recorded the demise of that attack and the
rout of the advancing columns just 12 kilometres at the entrance to Luanda,
along the road known as Quifangondo or Nshila-wa lufu (Road of Death) in the
Angolan dialects.

Coupled to the fateful but heroic deeds of the student militants of 1976,
the apartheid regime found itself caught in battles not only in Namibia and
Angola. It had to reckon with the rising militancy of students and workers'
strikes as well as the activism of formations like SASO and others that have
refused to die albeit the constraints imposed on their mobilisation mission.

This period also witnessed a trickle of the first cadres released from prison
after many years of incarceration following Sharpeville and the illegalisation
of the activities of the liberation movement. Soweto exploded in 1976 and the
uprising spread contagiously countrywide. In fact, the system of Bantu Education
had provided the spark that ignited the volcano of resentment. The apartheid
regime took fright. It sought to extinguish the fires and quell the rising tide
in the manner reminiscent of the 60s.

However, the immediate response was the exodus of thousands of young people,
who left the country in search of the liberation movement, some through Lesotho,
Botswana, Swaziland and others through Mozambique. This unique generation of
mostly youth and students were destined to add a glorious chapter in the war
of liberation. They complemented MK ranks at a very crucial stage in the history
of the People's Army. Like their predecessors they emulated the Spirit of Volunteerism
and a veritable disdain for death, taking the struggle to new and higher levels
of mobilisation and military effort. The contingents of young men and women
who arrived in Temeke, Tanzania, at a safe house known as Mkhumbane, in the
environs of Dar-es-Salaam in 1976, were not only determined but also impatient
to get back home. They fell under the command and mentorship of Ntate Mashego.
He undertook the housekeeping management including their physical preparations,
a curtain-raiser for the eventual military training. He led them on day-break
road work or jogging and the residents of Temeke, who had come to enjoy the
morning routine, cheered by the roadside. The contingents were all known to
the locals as ordinary students.

The residents of Mkhumbane were not only impatient; they were also angry and
dying to lay their hands on weapons of war, more especially what they fondly
dubbed Alfred Khuzwayo (AK 47), and get back to South Africa for the big battles.
Then they could not understand why political education was so important, when
everybody knew the oppression that needed to be fought back home. Despite his
experiences with the First South African Native Military Corps during WW II,
and combat in Wankie and Spolilo, Ntate Mashego found himself with a unique
challenge.

As far as they were concerned, the June 16 militants saw no reason why the
road back to South Africa should be difficult. After all, they had crossed the
perilous and treacherous borders unarmed. What danger could be there with arms
in hand!

Temeke proved to be the dress rehearsal of an enduring legacy in political
and revolutionary initiation. Political Training and other subjects were introduced
within the prevailing conditions. Comrade Mark Shope taught them Trade Unionism
and the History of the Labour Movement in SA and Politics in general. Comrade
Elias Mahlase (Banda), inducted them into Military Tactics while several leaders,
among them Duma Nokwe, Joe Slovo and Mzwai Piliso took turns to hold discussions
with them.

Notwithstanding everything, the clamour for guns could not be extinguished.
Mashego soon realised that after their routines in the morning, the recruits
were very diligent with their morning meals. It was a stratagem that permitted
them enough time to sneak outside and admire the passing armed units of the
Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force (TPDF) on their morning exercises.

The Movement had not reckoned with the flood of recruits that would follow
in the wake of June 16. Though better prepared than in 1961, the swell that
followed was unprecedented. However, the solution was near; it came from the
MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola who offered rear-bases for MK training.

The plane that touched Gabela, a small town near Porto Amboim and Gambalu,
in Huambo Province on the 7th of September 1976 carried the President of the
newly-born Republic of Angola, Agostinho Neto. On board with him were a group
of twenty-one June 16 militants, the first to set foot on Angolan soil to establish
MK. Gabela had earlier served as the seat of the short-lived Unita government
leading up to Independence. It was here where the ill-fated " Zulu Column"
of the apartheid war machinery met its demise against the onslaught of BM 21
multiple rocket-launcher, nicknamed "Katusha", before retreating to
the South with Unita. Angola, in 1976 was still a battle zone and a country
at war.

Gabela, though not yet the camp for MK, still enabled the advance contingent
of the people's army to extend fraternal relationships with the fighters from
the African Islands of Sao Tomé and Principe. In particular, it laid
the founding stone of relationships with FAPLA. Hence this group of MK trainees
came to be known as the FAPLA/Mkhonto. The contingents that succeeded those
already in Gabela into Angola were housed at an engineering installation in
the capital Luanda. The installation, hereafter referred to only as Engineering,
was formerly utilised as workshops during Portuguese colonial lordship. It was
a huge complex where FAPLA, Cuban internationalists and the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU) fighters were quartered.

Engineering taught MK the local diet of funji, a traditional porridge made
from the tubers of the cassava and introduced them to pao (bread) procured from
the local loja-do-povo (people's stores). It inducted the June 16 militants
in the subjects of Orientation in the terrain, Topography, the Theory of Fire-Arms
and Engineering.

In particular, it provided them a hint of military logic, to know that a military
engineering formula does not have to be mathematically correct to blow a target.
What mattered was the job to be done based on the concrete experiences of "sappers-military"
engineers who have tested the mixtures in real battles in other popular wars.

Soon, Politics became the article in their revolutionary vocabulary and Francis
Meli, the Commissar, was there to see to it that everybody was steeped in the
knowledge. Comrade Commander Machel, who was later replaced by Julius Mokoena
was there too to ensure that military practice transformed the general enthusiasm
into a purposeful direction. The biggest thrill to the troops at the base was
always provided by the opportunity to practice March and Drill.

The drill sessions were conducted in OAU-supplied uniforms that came in colours
of brown, yellow and green. These they had dubbed " Savimbis" because
UNITA had used them too during the war for independence.

Just as was the case at Gabela, the troops at Engineering also eagerly awaited
the journey to the South of Angola, where a proper military facility for MK
was being prepared. But the long wait at Engineering was not without its positive
effects. The cultural life of the contingents was coloured with song, poetry
and dances of the people of South Africa. In the words of Peter Seeiso (Scandal):
"we sang before eating, during work and at formation". Though it was
not until the settling in Nova Katengue that this aspect of their life bloomed,
the Zulu expression "Fak' iNgoma" would become a catchphrase in no
time.

The role and place of women began to assert itself at that point in time. Generally,
they received no special treatment and earned none and justified the saying:
"We fight side-by-side with our men." The men reciprocated by fondly
referring to them as 'Mzana'. The much-awaited journey to the anticipated military
camp in the South of Angola was long in coming. It would not come until some
sections of the contingents at Engineering found themselves at Funda, opening
another camp. Funda was located not far from the cross-roads town of Caxito.
The terrain, previously a game reserve, abounded in wild game: warthog, buffalo,
python and antelope and scores of other species, the noisiest of which were
the baboons on the neighbouring mountain range. Funda was the home of Angolan
peasant villagers and SWAPO, then undergoing their military paces under the
instruction of Cape Verdian Officers. The MK contingent to Funda were addressed
by both Presidents Tambo and Nujoma on arrival and exhorted to learn their lessons
and vindicate the sacrifice, trust, and friendship bestowed upon them by the
People's Republic of Angola.

Funda provided to MK the first taste of the hardship and demands of training.
They made friends with thirst, fatigue, less sleep and with the swarm of mosquitoes.
In time, the fighters learned from the local peasants that the smoke from palm-leaves
were a very effective repellent of mosquitoes.

One lesson that Funda imparted to the fighters, recalls Mghobozi, is the status
of "orders" in military life: "perform first and clarify later!"
This did not make sense to the fighters who were still apt to engage orders
and not less ridicule the Instructor. One day the Cape Verdian forgot his temper.
"He told us," recollects Zizi, "you think you are clever. SWAPO
comrades are behaved; they take orders and perform. What about you - you question
everything? If you want your independence, go get it from the OAU. We (Cape
Verdians) got ours through this compaliot (rifle)!"

The Funda group also learned their lessons and in time they acclimatised and
found joy in the midst of the challenges. The greatest gift by Funda to this
contingent was the indissoluble bonds they forged with combatants of SWAPO.
Hence the informal solidarity of SWAPO/Mkhonto, forged in the steaming heat
and sweat, malaria and the unforgiving terrain.

Together they scored a victory once when they captured a scout sent by Holden
Roberto's FNLA to spy on the camp for possible attack. Subsequently, they tracked
the bandits to a nearby village and in the ensuing engagement, they succeeded
in freeing several women. It transpired that the women had been abducted from
their villages in the South and made to cross three provinces, on foot, in the
company of their abductors.

These MK fighters relate how Funda introduced them to a python meal. They flatly
refused to partake of it. At that stage, a snake was a snake to them and not
a treat for one's stomach. Condensed milk taken with biscuits was often the
only meal. The hardship of struggle was rearing its head. Malaria claimed its
first victim at Funda for this group of fighters. SWAPO/Mkhonto would only be
reunited with their colleagues in Benguela several months later.

The bulk of fighters that had remained behind at Engineering eventually made
it to Benguela in the South. The journey, undertaken in a column of thirteen
buses and a medley of trucks was long and nerve-racking. The guns of war had
not completely died down in the countryside where Unita and FNLA still harboured
ambitions to wrest power from the MPLA. The fleet of buses, with its thirsty
and starving passengers reached Benguela as the hour struck five in the afternoon.
Everybody then thought that they had finally arrived.

Benguela is one of 17 provinces, including the capital of the People's Republic
of Angola. It is situated on the South-West of the country and like the port
cities of Luanda and Namibe it offers an outlet to the Atlantic ocean through
the port city of Lobito. The latter is one of the only three major ports in
the country. It is in Benguela where the much-spoken about Benguela rail-line
that connects the economies of Angola, Zaire and Zambia starts. This rail-line
became the favourite sitting target of the destabilisation campaigns of Unita
in subsequent years.

The landscape in Benguela was bare and naked of foliage; the earth was baked
khaki, and at places yellow as sulphur, a hue that occupied the eyes with a
burning ferocity. Water was scarce while the soil was oily. Its grains and granules
stuck on the human body. The monotony of the desolate landscape was only broken
by the blue waters of the Atlantic Ocean spreading away in the distance to the
west. The place could have been the Karoo or the Kalahari that many had only
read about in the subject of Geography and spied in the Atlas maps.

Quite a few refused to believe their ears on being informed that this was to
be their camp; when they had wished that Benguela should be only a transit point.
It turned out to be just that. Novo Catengue, the real camp was still in the
future and said to be under construction. Benguela was to be their camp in the
meantime.

The place, formerly a farm of sorts, boasted one double-story building, a care-taker's
quarters and an unroofed structure that had not known complete construction.
Mzana (women) were allotted the former caretaker's den while men set up home
in what was previously the poultry pen. Several days they reconciled themselves
to the fetid stench of accumulated chicken droppings and piss and the ferocity
of chicken-fleas that made a festival of the arrivals, in their sleep and daily
effort of turning the place into home. The year was 1977, the year in which
the assassins of Smith murdered Jason Ziyababa Moyo, second vice-President of
ZAPU, in Zambia. Several migwenya, including Mzwai Piliso, were seen very depressed
because of their long association with these fighters since the days of Kongwa
in Tanzania.

Benguela turned out to be a true induction ground of the expectation of military
life and its vicissitudes. It prepared the fighters to face hardship. A notorious
lesson in tenacity was provided by the flies. The flies competed with the fighters
for every morsel and drop of milk on the way to the mouth. Word has it that
it was not until Baba Mavimbela, a Kongwa and Robben Island graduate, initiated
a campaign of cleanliness that they earned reprieve from the flies. Until his
intervention, the fighters were in the habit of discarding their empty-tin cans
around.

Training was demanding; it exposed the chatter-boxes for what they were and
distinguished those with strong constitutions from the malingerers, those who
faked all kinds of excuses to escape the grueling routine and repertoire of
military life. Those frail by nature would be forgiven and find accommodation
in the maxim: " we go by the pace of the slowest" when learning, however,
" not by the pace of the laziest". Some comrades rarely ran out of
ruses to avoid training, but their number was miniscule. Their "chronic"
ailments and distressing screams of pain were legendary and never failed to
arouse sympathy amongst the more sensitive in the detachment.

In Benguela, they underwent a complete, but non-graduating course, seeing Nova
Katengue was still in the distance. The entire instructorate were MK veterans
steeped in the military theory and combat preparedness stretching as far back
as the Kongwa and Wankie/ Spolilo days. For political instruction they boasted
stalwarts in the form of Francis Meli, Mark Shope and Jack Simons. These are
among the men who are credited with breaking through the fighters' negative
attitude of emphasizing the gun over politics. They taught the fighters that
without politics, they are not soldiers, but mere mercenaries! The first generation
of MK instructors were as theoretically grounded, as they were action oriented.
It is Mark Shope who is remembered for teaching that: politics equals the bread,
the bed and breath people breathe. "He taught us," Veli recalls, "
that every child is entitled to a pint of milk, a slice of bread, an egg a day
as a right, and not as a privilege." Simons further reminded the fighters
that they should not forget to reproduce themselves in the act of executing
the revolution. It was still Mark Shope who in his frank lectures left fighters
seething. He openly taught that the struggle to liberate South Africa could
take years to accomplish, " It could be 10, 20 or 50 years from today,"
he said in answer to a fighter's question. This was hard to swallow for the
fighters who expected to pick up guns and head home.

The combatants then could not understand why the ANC and MK could not do what
the Katangese from the DRC province of Katanga, under General Bomba were doing
- advancing by about fifty kilometers per day on Mobutu's Zaire and army, threatening
to overwhelm Shava Province. Mobutu was saved by the intervention of French
airborne troops. These daring exploits fired the fighters' imagination. They
failed to realise that South Africa was not Zaire and the Apartheid war machinery
was not in the league of Mobuto's army.

Malaria continued to be a major hazard even here. It was not uncommon to hear
a report at Reveille announcing that close on 100 fighters lay sick in their
beds. At the time, part of the problem was that some comrades shunned taking
the prescribed prophylactic tablets. Chloroquine, with its bad taste and somewhat
irritating side effects instigated a fair amount of truancy. It was not until
cerebral malaria struck and they witnessed a fighter's senses take leave of
him that its seriousness was brought home to everybody. The much-awaited day
arrived; the rumour about the impending move to Nova Katengue, indeed, came
true. Convoy trucks showed up to ferry them to the destination. They had been
joined, for some time then, by FAPLA/Mkhonto from Gabela, and SWAPO/Mkhonto
from Funda. The streams had, at last, merged.

Nova Katengue is situated in the mountainous and hilly region of Benguela,
a mere stone's throw from the Benguela rail-line. It was dressed in elephantine
savanna, a habitat of snakes and wild game attesting to the area's previous
role as a game reserve. The climate was mild and friendly save the winters,
due to the proximity to the Cold Benguela current which could be as biting.

Katengue, by comparison to Benguela, was an oasis endowed with a stream, a
host of buildings and clutter of machinery ranging from the Caterpillar earthmoving
systems, drilling monsters and compressors. It turned out that the place had
been a quarry and construction site in the past. The Portuguese sabotaged much
of the machinery on their retreat from the advancing tide of MPLA forces, at
the close of the war. MK fighters, in turn inherited much of the equipment,
but the majority were not in working order. They came in handy, notwithstanding
the labours of repair, in the task of constructing the camp.

Katengue is synonymous with MK as it is with the Cuban Internationalists. They
were the military advisors; they provided succour (logistics) in the lean season
and manned the defense at a critical juncture in the life of the detachment.
Initially, the companeros, as the Cubans were fondly called, were skeptical
about the working habits of South African youths. " At first, to them [Cubans]"
recalls Daku, "we were youth, worse still just students. We surprised them!
They were unaware that among us were several 'bush' mechanics, carpenters, bricklayers
and electricians. Veli was one among us. They wanted to do the work alone; then
they discovered that we knew - we were not only good, some of us, were better.
From then, we had earned their trust."

The electricity generator became operational, the water pump too, and an electrified
stage became the shrine of culture and camp festival. In no time the camp was
up and fully functional. It was in recognition of this feat of creativity, innovation
and industriousness of its members that Katengue earned the honour of "
University of MK" bestowed by President O. R. on the graduation occasion
of the June 16 Detachment.

The ANC and MK have weathered many ploys and conspiracies over the years. One
of these was the perfidious plan by one Nito Alves, former Minister of the Interior
of the PRA during the first administration under President Agustinho Neto. He
almost got away with a bus-load of MK fighters during the transit at Engineering.

He would have succeeded, given the heightened expectation of the journey to
the South, had those responsible for the combatants at Engineering not refused
to allow their protégés to board the buses that were sent to fetch
them unannounced and with no clear destination. The story unraveled after the
foiled coup attempt hatched by Alves and his co-conspirators. As Minister, Alves,
had detailed inside information about the refugee locations, and unhindered
access to them. This aborted machination would pale into insignificance in the
light of what lay in store for MK.

During 1977, circa May, 12 cadres of MK stood before the racist judge in the
Pretoria High Court on charges of recruiting, transporting and receiving fighters
of MK from military training and bringing arms and ammunition for sabotage purposes
in the country. Most prominent amongst them was the late assassinated leader
of the ANC and former Robben Island inmate, Joe Gqabi. Within weeks, a renegade
named Mthembu, who stood witness against the twelve, perished under a hail of
bullets. He is known to have also acknowledged standing witness against Mandela
during the Rivonia Trial.

Three days before the second commemoration of June 16, the apartheid authorities
were shocked into contact with armed MK fighters in down-town Johannesburg.
This was the famed Solomon Mahlangu incident. (Mahlangu was arrested and later
condemned by the regime to hang - a sentence that provoked immense international
outrage but was nevertheless carried out with impunity on 6 April 1979).

In a separate incident, a security police major and a constable were wounded
in the fierce gun-battle with another fighter in Dobsonville. Before the year
was over, the police had admitted the occurrence of more than thirty sabotage
and meeting engagements. Reference here is being made to the battle of Mochaneng
in Rustenburg with MK guerrillas.

Official pronouncements were quoted as saying that there was an estimated four-thousand
blacks, mostly ANC, currently undergoing military training. The regime passed
the Defence Amendment Act of 1977 which extended military training for white
male South Africans from one to two years, provided for media censorship and
for the commandeering of goods and equipments. Not long thereafter, the regime
legalised cross-border raids; it arrogated itself the right to pursue any terrorist
base threatening the security of the Republic. In so doing, the regime defined
the countries South of the Sahara, as its terrain of battle.

Katengue had a fair share of its light moments and humor - even with hunger
pangs. Three are particular and concern the train, the hare and macaco (monkey).
The Benguela passenger train turned out to be a distraction during classes.
As it passed by the camp, the train and its passengers attracted the attention
of the trainees. In the end, the instructors relented and permitted the fighters
to enjoy the spectacle. The hare provided sport to the physical and tactics
classes. In the midst of serious training, a hare would dart out of the long
elephant grass and the trainees would get into a frenzy and give chase, much
to the chagrin of their superior, turning the whole situation into some carnival
mood. Only later could the mood be restored to learning.

How the macaco turned into a delicacy is no less a hilarious and amusing episode.
Hunger and nutrition deficiency were frequent companions of the detachment.
This was particularly so when the goods train failed to arrive with provisions
for the camp. " Do you eat a monkey?" Daku recalls being asked by
a Cuban colleague. " Never," he swore, " I eat no monkeys!"
" Do you know what you just ate now?" " Yes, meat!" "What
meat?" " Any meat, but no monkey," he barked emphatically. "
You've eaten a monkey today". Realising as it were that the shortage of
meat somewhat affected the morale, the Cuban had shot a monkey away from camp
and hid the head. Afterwards, he produced the tell-tale head to the astonishment
and subsequent amusement of many around. For years Daku would vouch that there
was nothing monkeyish about that meat! On the contrary, it tasted like any meat,
if not more delicious. He concedes, of course, that the absence of meat for
some time could be responsible for accentuating the taste.

The history and experiences of Novo Catengue deserves many books, but the story
would be incomplete without the narration of three particular episodes namely:
Black September, The Graduation of the June 16 Detachment and the aerial bombardment
by the South African Airforce of those days.

Black September: It happened in the early hours of one evening when
the Detachment were busy with various aspects of the night programme including
political discussions. "It was a horrible and terrible night," recalls
Refiloe, commonly known as M'Ref. "I had never witnessed anything like
it in my entire life!

We were busy playing draughts when we saw Lastborn suddenly flop on the ground
and writhing in pain like someone being attacked by an army of ants. At first
we thought it was another diarrhea outbreak since we still had lots of flies
around the kitchen although these did not compare to what we saw in Benguela.
We continued to play leisurely, but Lastborn did not stop crying. Someone amongst
us accused him of being spoilt."

"We were in political discussion," remembers Scandal, " when
someone requested to go to the toilet. He went out. Then another one, and another
and another! The Platoon Commissar thought the requests were another ruse to
dodge the political discussions. Soon the place was in commotion, with many
in convulsions. The epidemic laid hold of the camp. Units that were in the terrain
that night were recalled and discussions cancelled.

The way to the medical point and toilet was a flurry of movement. Everywhere
people were ferrying someone. Others were vomiting while others unable to reach
the toilets relieved themselves along the way or just where they stood. Many
of the comrades were too weak to stand up."

"I will never forget the picture of Comrade Christina More that night,"
recollects Abbey. "She carried empty milk tins from one person to another.
She literally undressed many comrades who could not make it to the toilets and
wiped them as would a mother of children in nappies. She was like a mother,
a sister and comrade never to be forgotten. "I have never seen so many
people relieving themselves simultaneously in all my life," adds Abbey
with a haunted look, "the whole camp resembled a huge toilet and stank
like one!"

Upon reading the situation, the Cubans, reinforced by several Armoured Personnel
Carriers (APCs), sealed the camp from any possible attack as the doctors got
to work, treating the personnel affected. People were dehydrated; bodies lay
limp everywhere or in coma. The entire camp had been poisoned. It emerged much
later that the poisoning had occurred in the kitchen where someone had tampered
with the evening meal of beans and rice. Fortunately, no life was lost.

In the wake of Black September, the routine of rotating platoons for cooking
duty was discontinued. A permanent kitchen platoon was selected, ensuring that
they were screened beforehand. The full facts and the hand behind the poisoning
would unravel years later and lead, among other developments, to the formal
establishment of the Security Department (Mbokhodo), and the establishment of
Camp 32, derogatively referred to as Number 4 or Quatro in Portuguese after
the infamous Johannesburg Fort prison.

After Black September life returned to normal. Everybody was now focused on
the course that was coming to an end. It was an end that would see them emerge
as fully-fledged soldiers. Graduation day was, indeed, a grand occasion.
It was importantly graced by President O R Tambo and a host of fraternal representatives
and other well-wishers. The detachment filed past, salute high and proud in
grand fashion. A number of soldiers who had acquitted themselves well during
the course became recipients of the coveted honour of being commended as among
the best MK soldiers.

"I'm a soldier of the South African revolution serving in MK", they
took the oath holding the Spear of the Nation with the President, " ...I
solemnly swear to my country and allies that I dedicate my life to place power
in the hands of the people; to destroy racism, oppression, exploitation and
colonial domination in all its forms; to defend the victories of the people's
revolution. I am ready and prepared at all times...And if need be I am prepared
to lay down my life for the cause of our revolution. I make this solemn oath
knowing fully that should I violate it, I shall be guilty of betraying the cause
of my people and will be liable to severe penalty including death. A tooth for
a tooth, an eye for an eye, a life for a life. Amandla!"

The Detachment had graduated and proudly earned themselves a first: to be known
as the June 16 Detachment, an honour bestowed upon them by the President in
recognition of the valiant courage of the youth of South Africa. Their training
tasks fulfilled, the Detachment focused on the dream to return home. Their mood
then, is best summed up in the words of one of their poets who wrote:

The FrontlineWhere manhood and consciousness is testedThe only place to bury persecutions and burdens of agesThe only place to declare names immortalTrust me brother you will not be alone thereFrontlineWhere bullets will graze on man and grassWhere man will make his own lightning and thunderWhere the enemy will fall and never riseBrother truly my shadow will be next to yours.

The graduate detachment was succeeded by a second one in 1978 that later came
to be known as the Moncada Detachment in honour of the Cuban Internationalists.
Moncada celebrates the Cuban National Day. Though belonging to the June 16 collective
proper, Moncada was made of elements that were only able to arrive in Katengue
at the close of the first course. They succeeded the first intake of graduates
as the latter left for various missions at home and abroad.

Several members of the graduating detachment left behind were selected to undergo
an advanced specialised training, ironically in Benguela once again. Disappointment
at being left behind, some among them, numbering 17 did not share the sentiment
nor saw the necessity of specialised training. They had been to Benguela, some
as far as Gabela, and expected only to go home after the main course. They refused
to undertake further training. The Group of 17, were pardoned for their defiance
of military orders, but were ultimately sent to Quibaxe, a new training centre
to the north.

Subsequently, some members of this group, reinforced with elements that had
returned from further training in the Soviet Union and the then German Democratic
Republic were tasked to set up another camp known as Fazenda. Fazenda literally
means a small farm holding, which it originally was during the colonial era.
It lies across Rio Dande. Fazenda in later years hosted the Survival Course
that was intended to prepare those chosen for the rigorous demands of surviving
underground within enemy-held territory. Cadres selected for membership of the
Special Operations Units falling under the famed Barney Molokoane also undertook
some of their sessions at Fazenda. (Originally, when the Special Operations
unit was formed, it came under the direction of comrade Joe Slovo, but was commanded
by Motso "Obadi" Mokgabudi and subsequently by Rashid Patel following
the demise of Obadi during the Matola, Mozambique, raid by the SADF). The conditions
at Fazenda were rugged and unkind. Perhaps it was this, among other factors,
which made inhabitants of Fazenda to at times feel that they were being dumped
and that they could not be trusted by the army. Their perceptions were reinforced
in this regard by the fact that the initial membership included some members
of the group of 17, as well as the fact that before the introduction of the
Survival Course life in Fazenda was taken up mainly by political classes.

Life in Nova Katengue in the South continued apace. Upon graduation, members
of the Moncada Detachment commenced various special courses including Anti-Aircraft
and Politics. Out of the Politics course, was born the crop of cadres destined
to set up the first Politics and Commissariat Departments. This was decisive
in that, for the first time, the conditions had been laid for the replacement
of Cuban advisors considering the fact that there was already in existence a
large contingent of other qualified military experts who had been trained mostly
in the Eastern Bloc. Indeed, when the majority of Umgwenya left for other missions
in later years, MK had acquired the capacity for self-training, a capacity provided
by the June 16 Detachments elements.

The attack on Katengue

The assault on Katengue by the apartheid military forces contributed and precipitated
the relocation of MK training activities from the South to the North of the
country. The year was 1979, a year during which the ANC announced a three-year
programme of armed propaganda and mass-mobilisation. The programme was ushered
by the designation of 1979 as the Year of Isandlhwana-The year of the Spear
in celebration of the Centenary of the Battle of Isandlhwana of 1879.

The announcement came on the heels of what is now known in the annals of liberation
history as the Battle of Mochaneng, when, a small unit of MK got into a meeting
engagement with the SADF in Rustenburg in the Western Transvaal. The battle
lasted for four hours. Several SADF soldiers were wiped out by MK during that
battle.

The MK cadres, who had lost only one member, retreated for more than 200 kilometres
before reaching the border into Botswana. According to sources, in an unguarded
moment, an SADF officer suggested that one MK soldier was the equivalent of
ten SADF soldiers in battle. Press reports in South Africa then also divulged
that since 1960, the banning of the Liberation Movement, state expenditure on
defence had multiplied from the initial figure of R44 million to over R1500
million. The enemy was preparing to launch a Total Onslaught, which meant that
the regime had acknowledged to itself the need to fight the war in the diplomatic,
political, cultural, economic, military, psychological and intelligence spheres
for the very first time.

Word of the impending attack on Katengue had been circulating for some time.
It was further strengthened by the attack, the previous year, on the SWAPO refugee
camp at Cassinga, Southern Angola, where the apartheid military machine massacred
children and old women in their hundreds. The outrage subsequently came to be
known as the Cassinga Massacre. In the circumstances, Katengue took measures
against the possible eventuality despite not knowing the form it would take.

After receiving intelligence reports about the preparation to attack Katengue,
the routine of the camp was changed. Every day the detachment emptied camp in
the morning hours before dawn and retreated to sanctuary into the mountains.
They left behind only sentries manning the defence and the anti-aircraft gunners
securing the air-space.

The enemy planes arrived on the 14 March 1979. The attack was, apparently,
synchronised with a radio broadcast by Radio South Africa as though in an act
of mockery on Africa. Just as the announcer's voice came on the air: "
Good Morning Africa, this is Radio RSA" the planes were there!

"They were four," recalled Sipho, otherwise known as Chapeu, one
of the survivors. "We were standing sentry under the bridge where we had
been since 04h00 in the morning after leaving camp. When we saw them that morning,
they were still far and appeared no different from birds. We argued, with others
saying they were birds. No birds, they are planes. No, birds! We took them for
birds."

The outposts on the perimeters of the camp had spied them too and radioed the
guard house. The latter, cautious not to give rise to a false alarm, queried
the alarm. Then the Canberras were on the camp in no time. "They came from
the South," recalls Jackson Soni, known by everybody as Killer. "The
Canberras led the way, they held security, while the mirages came behind with
their loads. They came above the wedge in the mountains like they were falling
from the sky". They swooped down upon the workshop and when they lifted,
hundreds of many kilograms heavy of bombs were raining down. The workshop went
up in flames together with its dump of fuel. The store of two hundred litre
drums buried underneath the workshop exploded into an inferno, the likes seen
only on movie screens. A cloud of soot and smoke hung upon the camp. Then the
bombs rained on the parade ground, HQ and the stage. Nomkhosi Mini, known by
all as Mary, and daughter of Vuyisile Mini, was caught in the house where she
had apparently returned to fetch something. She ran out amidst exploding loads
and shrapnel and made it just in time into a dug-out.

One cadre had remained sleeping in the dwelling when others retreated. He awoke
to the havoc of bombardment and came out. He was running in the open, heedless
to Mary's screams calling him to the dug-out. The planes bore down on him its
machineguns ploughing a trench on his prints. He was not lucky and bought it
with his life. A Cuban comrade lost his life too. Another comrade was spliced
by a big splinter from a 300-pounder bomb and died on the spot.

High in the mountains two anti-aircrafts guns were coughing and stuttering
fire; one defender armed with a SAM-7 (Strella) experienced problems and wasted
precious minutes before rejoining the defence to repulse the birds of death.
The fighters on the ZGU anti-aircraft guns fought until one of the planes was
hit. It was seen reeling and spinning in the sky until it disappeared to its
grave in the depth of the Atlantic Ocean in the West.

The cadre who shot the plane, Petrus Mashego or Shoes to everybody, would later
be sentenced to death by the apartheid regime, after successful infiltration
and operations in the country. Several years later his sentence was commuted
and he was sent to the Island. After the attack, the detachment came down from
the hills. Katengue had been leveled to the ground and everything they had known
lay in heaps of rubble. The camp resembled a city visited by ruins, a city whose
age could have been mistaken for centuries. Some missiles lay unexploded on
the ground. Later, the enemy claimed to have destroyed a "Cuban Missile
site" based in the South of Angola.

It was clear that the enemy planes had intended to catch the detachment that
morning at parade. They seemed precise about the coordinates of the camp and
the time the detachment were massed. Another Kassinga had been avoided. However,
the true facts regarding the exact source of enemy knowledge would again only
be known years later. After the bombardment, Katengue could be of no more use
to the detachments and the army moved North.

This was the year of the Orlando Police Station attack inside the country and
the arrest of James Mcedisi Mange, whose exploits and manipulation of arms forced
the enemy officers to concede being outclassed. He was sentenced to death in
a Pietermaritzburg Court, but vowed, " Never on our Knees". His comrades
outside were inspired by his stand of " No surrender" and vowed, "
Woe betides Pietermaritzburg, should the blood of James Mange flow, it will
drown both man and animal. Wa u thinta Umkhonto!" Katengue was no more;
it would live in the spirit and blows of MK to be visited on the regime. In
the cultural sphere, Katengue had bequeathed a beacon, the Amandla Cultural
Ensemble, which was destined to be the cultural ambassador of the struggling
people of SA throughout the world. Amandla made its first appearance on the
world stage at the World Youth Festival in Cuba in 1979.

*PART 3, which focuses on Umkhonto we Sizwe during the 1980s until its incorporation
into the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) in 1994, will be published
in the next edition of UMRABULO.

Debate

Introduction

On 8 January 2002, the ANC celebrated 90 years of existence on the soil of
South Africa, 90 tough years of struggle and sacrifice, years of renewal, pride,
revolutionary practice and illuminating glory. In the previous few years, at
least since the April democratic breakthrough in 1994, the ANC has been bedevilled
by something foreign to its nature, mission and practice. The enemy within has
grown to threaten the life of the entire body. A phenomenon called factions
grew into strong force that threatened structures of the ANC in a number of
regions and provinces. While cabals may have existed in one form or another
during its history, this new phenomenon was frightening.

In the run-up to the 1996 provincial conferences there were problems in a number
of provinces including Free State, Northern Province, North West, Gauteng and
Kwazulu Natal. Internal leadership wrangles were fuelled by the media, by allegations
of this or that misdemeanour against comrades and others by factions fighting
for turf in the provinces. These frictions have since resulted in elected structures
of the ANC being dissolved and replaced with appointed interim leadership in
the Northern Province, Free State and Gauteng, while Mpumalanga needed national
intervention. On many occasions, factions were at the centre of these internal
leadership wrangles.

The causes of factionalism

Factionalism is caused by a number of factors including, amongst others, the
following: -

Stifling of political discussions: When political discussion is stifled
within structures of the movement, comrades will start to discuss issues of
the organisation outside these structures. The strength of the organisation
is in the expression and contest of honest views and ideas. The value of this
tradition in the ANC is that any position adopted, after all ideas and views
points have been expressed, can be regarded and becomes the approximation
of the correct and most appropriate view at a given point in time.

Inability and/or inexperience in understanding the responsibility of dual
membership: Today, both the ANC and the SACP are legal organisations. We have
many comrades who are members of both the ANC and the SACP, and many other
Alliance and MDM formations concurrently, who do not know what to do, what
not to do and when, under the circumstances of dual membership and multiple
mandates. In some instances you find a person behaving as if s/he is a representative
of the ANC in an SACP meeting and vice-versa, and labelling comrades for expressing
their honest views on an issue in that meeting. Some comrades will even go
out of the meeting to tell others who weren't in the meeting that "mangmang
is a rightwing or sell-out nowadays, s/he was saying this or that in this
or that meeting". They will mobilise for divisions within the movement
in this destructive and divisive manner and through rumour-mongering. In our
view, part of the problem in this regard has been that we have not adequately
dealt with the important question of how in practical terms the ANC provides
leadership to the Alliance after 1994.

Not expressing one's honest views in meetings of the organisation: Another
way in which factions emerge is when comrades do not express their views in
meetings, but speak outside the constitutional structures of the ANC. They
choose to express those views to the people who are not members of that structure
and in fact report to them on deliberations of the meeting and finally stick
to a mandate of outsiders, not a structural organ of the ANC. They are of
course making themselves accountable to a faction. This weakens the constitutional
structures of the movement and makes it very vulnerable. The ANC constitutional
structures are then paralysed by shackles of factions. They are held ransom
by all manners of rumour-mongers, tale-bearers, liars and turncoats.

Allegations of corruption and maladministration: In some provinces where
factions have had a field day, they arose partly because of unsubstantiated
allegations of corruption and maladministration against some comrades in government.
Such allegations included nepotism, favouritism and corruption. Some comrades
who were regarded as being in the good books of national leadership lost their
positions in leadership contests, because the leadership were said to be turning
a blind eye to these allegations. It is therefore necessary that we have mechanisms
in place to investigate and decisively dealing with corruption, both real
and alleged.

Rank opportunism and get-rich-quick careerism:

A major factor which overshadows everything else has of course been the
opening of new opportunities and possibilities as a consequence of the 1994
democratic breakthrough.

In a key discussion document around these issues the NWC has this to say:"Because
leadership in structures of the ANC affords opportunities to assume positions
of authority in government, some individuals then compete for ANC leadership
positions in order to get into government. Many view such positions in government
as a source of material riches for themselves. Thus resources, prestige
and authority of government positions become the driving force in competition
for leadership positions in the ANC.

Government positions also go hand-in-hand with possibility to issue contracts
to commercial companies. Some of these companies identify ANC members that
they can promote in ANC structures and into government, so that they can
get contracts by hook or by crook. This is done through media networks to
discredit other leaders, or even by buying membership cards to set-up branches
that are ANC only in name. Positions in government also mean the possibility
to appoint individuals in all kinds of capacities. As such, some members
make promises to friends, that once elected and ensconced in government,
they would return the favour. Cliques and factions then emerge within the
movement, around personal loyalties driven by corrupt intentions. Members
become voting fodder to serve individuals self interest". ('Through
the eye of a needle' - Umrabulo no. 11, June-July 2001). The document
has a frank appraisal of the leadership questions facing the movement and
should be welcomed.

Negative consequences of factionalism

We can talk at length about what causes factions and the fertile conditions
for the germination of factional tendencies. The phenomenon of factionalism
is essentially counter-revolutionary, because wherever and whenever it exists,
it continues to have dire consequences for the movement, wreaking havoc on its
structures, culture and strength. The negative consequences that resulted from
the phenomenon of factionalism include the following: -

Opening the movement up for attack by all manners of political scavengers.

Divisions at leadership level tend to permeate to lower structures, with
the consequent paralysis of the entire organisation.

Lack of consistent, cohesive and able leadership capable of giving political
guidance to the movement and its members and cadres, and the subsequent lack
of confidence by lower structures in the capacity of provincial leadership
to lead the movement.

Members of the leadership structures accountable to people outside those
organs.

Lower structures (regions, sub-regions, zones, branches, block committees)
seen as sphere of influence of the factions, which weakens the capacity of
the organisation to function as a united movement.

A tendency of defying decisions of the organisation, and without any action
being taken in such instances.

Conferences, particularly regional and provincial ones, characterised by
stiff leadership battles and divisions with little or no political discussion
or programme of action.

Creation of branches that are ANC in name only so that a conference is
composed of voting cattle. Buying bulk membership, even for dead people in
some instances, is one way in which voting fodder for conferences is manufactured.

Some comrades when they are defeated in the ANC go to form a branch of
SACP or SANCO, and will want to use that structure to fight those who defeated
him/her in the ANC. This becomes prevalent particularly in the run-up to conferences
or elections of MPs, MPLs and councillors.

Factions thrive in a situation where there are all manners of rumours about
comrades, and the level of mistrust and suspicion is high.

Some individuals mortgage the movement in pursuance of their own personal
agendas. They promise business-people tenders in exchange for this or that
favour. In turn business-people "help" them win positions in the
ANC.

Using positions of responsibility and authority (especially in government)
to dispense patronage and create a support base. As a result, unsuitable or
unqualified people then get appointed to positions or jobs as beneficiaries
of factions.

The case of you scratch my back, I will scratch yours, in the event of
provincial/regional conferences, where branch delegates are merely treated
as voting cattle and candidates are voted for on the basis of their faction
and not merit.

Reduced participation in the movement amid sharp increase in "paper
membership". In such circumstances, the ANC support in general declines
as a consequence of the intra-organisational leadership disputes.

Some of the problems we have encountered in the previous few years have obviously
been contributed to by of the work of the "enemy" - those forces that
we defeated in the 1994 elections. We should not under-estimate their ability
and intention to carry out the transformation of the ANC into a regressive,
corrupt, parliamentary political party, which has lost all its progressive revolutionary
content. Having failed to kill the ANC from outside, they would want to kill
the ANC by its own hand. These forces want to do to the ANC what they did to
other revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Algeria and Guinea Bissau.

Let us recap

Since 1996, the NEC has been forced to intervene in a number of provincial
leadership disputes. The Northern Province, Gauteng and the Free State were
the worst hit, followed by Mpumalanga, and the North West. In some instances,
factions were so entrenched that that they even glorified themselves with names
such as Mapogo and Mkhukhu in the Northern Province. This clearly cannot be
allowed.

Part of the reason why these problems were so concentrated in the Northern
Province is that it is one of the provinces with a rich history of resistance
and consistent support for the ANC. It has consistently given the ANC the biggest
majorities in all national, provincial and local elections.

To amplify this further, it is a province where the ANC, its leagues and Alliance
partners are the biggest of all in the country and as a consequence had the
biggest voting representation to National Conference, the highest decision-making
structure of the movement (see Table A). When all is said and done, the hand
of the enemy is as busy in the Northern Province as elsewhere, because it is
the home of the movement.

Province

ANC (1997)

Northern Province

430

KwaZulu Natal

408

Eastern Cape

391

Gauteng

372

Free State

320

Mpumalanga

251

North West

234

Western Cape

198

Northern Province

105

The agenda of our enemy includes amongst others weakening the ANC from within
by transforming it and demobilising its mass base. By the enemy we refer to
those forces that still want to cling to the exclusive benefits of minority
rule, which are fundamentally opposed to transformation. The ANC is the main
vehicle in the hands of the people of South Africa to carry through this mission
of transformation. The advance, the deepening and the defence of the national
democratic revolution is an immediate threat to them. The ANC is thus a threat
to them.

What is to be done?

The principal questions remains what must be done, not to play into the hands
of this agenda. There are many things that the movement has done in the past
few years to deal with this problem and focus the ANC on the task of transformation.
Amongst the things that need to be restated and re-emphasised are: -

The NWC discussion document (Through the eye of the needle) could prove
very effective as the basis for debate about leadership questions in the movement.

Emphasising the primacy of the ANC branch as a critical organ of the movement,
in which members participate without hindrance. This task includes building
branches that involve members in activities, raise their political consciousness
and are a dynamic link with the masses. The ANC branch is a place where members
must put to use their skill, energy, political insight and experience.

Strengthening and practising the principles of internal party democracy
within the ANC such as elected leadership, collective leadership, mandate,
accountability, recallability, report back, consultations, criticism and self-criticism
and democratic centralism.

While we must continue to tirelessly educate and politically nurture even
the most incorrigible within our movement, we need to also be seen to take
action against those who deliberately transgress ANC norms, rules and codes
of conduct.

The new membership system should go a long way in helping us to deal with
the erstwhile problems of ghost members, branches, delegates and votes. It
will immediately deal with multiple membership of one person in more than
one branch and graveyard branches. The realignment to one branch per ward
will also help a great deal in that the number of branches will be fixed and
cannot mushroom in the run-up to conferences.

Dealing quickly and decisively with allegations of corruption and corrupt
practices by members and leaders of the movement.

Implementing our cadreship development and deployment programmes as central
to the task of ensuring that the ANC remains a people's revolutionary movement
for transformation.

Taking seriously the induction of new members and structures of the movement
to the values, norms, practices, constitution, history and politics of the
ANC. This will help to ensure that other forces don't mislead members and
structures.

Above all, to deal with factions requires ongoing political work and putting
politics first in dealing with problems of the movement.

Conclusion

If we consistently apply ourselves to building the organisation by putting
into practice the above, the movement may in the long run be unshackled from
the paralysis of factions. Many of our comrades don't understand that leadership
is not only from the front but also from the back and that we need to deal with
trouble-makers, rumour-mongers and tale-bearers, politically.

An ANC member must behave in an exemplary manner - honest, disciplined, loyal,
decisive, striving for self-improvement, lead by example and reinforce the confidence
of the people in the ANC. This includes transforming every person who joins
the ANC into a New Person, who is imbued with new ideas, values and ethos.

Part of this task is to practise what we preach. Justice and fairness must
not have eyes; we must always strive to be even-handed in handling affairs of
the movement. We must not be seen to be biased and taking sides particularly
in leadership disputes.

*Rudolph Phala is Secretary for Political Education, ANC Limpopo Province

Breathing life into the 'Tloga Tloga' debate

A response from the ANC Youth League, Limpopo Province

A Necessary Prelude The fundamental task of organisational leadership everywhere
and every time is nothing else but to unite the rank and file, including the
collective. The liet motif of the organisation is to serve as a condition for
the attainment of the victory of our own revolution, nothing less. It is important
that we do not indulge in activities that have the potential to harm endeavors
aimed at realising the objectives of the NDR project, thereby rolling back hard-won
gains.

In the spirit proclaimed by Chinese revolutionary, Mao Tsetung, to "let
a hundred flowers bloom, let a thousand schools of thought contend", this
paper will attempt to get to the bottom of factionalism, as a phenomenon that
has engulfed our movement, and the ANC in particular. It will assist in identifying
'flowers' and not countenance 'poisonous weeds'.

This matter has been subjected to vigorous debate by the ANC YL as the preparatory
political school of the ANC and by the ANC itself. The problem of factionalism
has tended not be to subjected to open and robust discussion and debate, by
the leadership and membership alike. Only recently, when structures were dissolved,
did it become topical within the movement. Unfortunately, the lower structures
of the movement are not adequately brought on board in this debate.

This paper comes just after an embargo was lifted on Cde Rudolph's Tloga Tloga
document, which attempted to identify the cause, form and content of factionalism.
This paper seeks to take forward this debate and to contribute to the contest
of ideas. It will attempt to debunk and demystify the basis upon which tloga
tloga bjalo ka seema argument is based.

Taking issue with the tloga tloga argument

Cde Rudolph paints the picture, by arguing that since 1994 the ANC has been
"bedeviled by something foreign, which has grown to threaten the life of
the entire body". The paper further states "the enemy we defeated
in 1994 wants to kill the ANC by its own hand". Who is the enemy, in this
context? Is it corrupters, factionalists or what? What about those in a position
to sanction corrective and punitive measure - using both internal party processes
and state processes? The paper contends that "by the enemy, we refer to
all those forces which had a minority rule, who are fundamentally opposed to
transformation". However, it falls short of demonstrating how this identification
of "the enemy" relates to the problems and challenges faced by the
democratic movement at the current conjuncture.

The paper correctly asserts that factions rear their ugly heads when "
discussions are stifled and suppressed" and therefore giving comrades no
room to express views and perhaps grievances; instead they speak to non-members
and outsiders. The real question is why comrades decide to remain mum and do
not feel free to express their views within the structures of the movement.

The paper opts to turn a blind eye rather than to address the suppression of
comrades in meetings, workshops, congresses and so on. This often takes the
form of exceeding the boundaries of democratic centralism. Debate is also suppressed
because those who are guilty of acts of corruption or other misdemeanors, fear
exposure or that it will open a can of worms too difficult to deal with.

As a solution, the paper suggests the banning of debates outside organisational
structures. This in itself would be anti-debate, because the very basis of Umrabulo
includes group discussions, study circles and indeed engagement between comrades
at any given opportunity as critical tools of imparting education and politics.

Notwithstanding the above, we should not allow the exchange of ideas and arguments
to be substituted with gossip, slander or character assassinations. As Leon
Trotsky said: "...rumours, personal speculation and simple gossip cannot
help but occupy an important place in petty bourgeois circles where people are
bound together not by party ties but by personal relationships and where no
habit has been acquired of a class approach to events".

There is indeed the tendency in our ranks for comrades to be far less interested
in the principle question facing our revolution - of bettering the lot of our
people's lives - than in who should be the chairperson, personal conflicts and
all sorts of wanton financial adventures for selfish personal gains.

Cde Rudolf in his paper calls on all comrades, including senior leadership
at provincial level and above, to be even-handed. "Justice must not have
eyes", he submits. However, it is near impossible to be referee and player
at the same time. The reality of the matter is that comrades within leadership
collectives, RECs, SECs and BECs and PECs in particular, are the very ones that
sacrifice the implementation of conference resolutions and decisions at the
altar of shielding one another. We are in fact expecting a person implicated
in a wrongdoing to form part of processes aimed at addressing such wrongdoing.

These processes then inevitably result in the stiffing of issues, silence on
the part of participants and one sidedness. Comrades thus execute and implement
the opposite of what the collective agreed upon and fail to root out maladministration,
corruption and all sorts of other acts of misconduct; fundamentally undermining
the foundations of our organisational policies.

To say that factions "arose partly because of allegations of corruption
and mal-administration against some comrades in government" sounds like
a superficial justification. Again the paper does not fully explain this aspect.
The truth is that there are some in our ranks who at this point are merely driven
by their eagerness to accumulate capital as quickly as possible. They are content
with their own fiefdoms and laagers. Given a modicum of experience in struggle,
factionalists are easily recognisable not only by their social traits but by
their approach to all questions.

The essence of tloga tloga - issues of leadership

A discussion that omits to give proper meaning to this treasured idiom will
be seriously flawed, particularly when it comes to issues of factionalism and
measures aimed at addressing it. In its original form, the idiom is called 'tloga
tloga kgale, modisi wa dikgomo o tloga natso sekeng'.

Because we are here not merely talking about members and structures as voting
cattle, we are thus saying that 'modisa wa dikgomo' who fails to lead them from
the onset will not now and in future, be able to marshal and command confidence
on the part of dikgomo to lead them. The cattle will either defy modisa through
kicking and horning, get into masemong a batho or as a last resort, disappear
into thin air and be lost.

The flip side of the coin is that some cattle will see things differently,
opting to comply unquestioning and blindly. Within this 'complying type' you'll
have some loafers and slackers, who are there to manipulate modisa and the rest
of mohlape. In organisational terms, it wouldn't be wrong to call them 'armchair
politicians'.

Modisa can utilise an assortments of ways and instruments to sway control and
stamp authority, whether lawful or unlawful. Amongst the 'kicking and horning
type', you'll find dikgomo tse dumelang gore modisa o di isa tseleng ye e seng
yona. They will insist on pursuing a route, which they think every cattle will
follow, because it has nothing to lose but its yoke. This route will see the
rest of dikgomo getting green grass, clean water, mohlagatse, a better shelter
and of course a better life for all.

Of course, the availability of 'greener pastures' will remain a central determining
factor regardless of the style of leadership provided by modisa. You will then
begin, bjalo ka Modisa, to categorise your herd of dikgomo into mohlape wa gago
bjalo ka 'diflowers' as complying type and the kicking and horning type will
be depicted as poisonous weeds. The problem is that 'modisa wa dikgomo' became
so indecisive and vacillated ka go palelwa go tswa natso sakeng. The idiom captures
a fundamental quality of leadership - in addition to honesty, discipline, accountability,
consultation, and ability to be above petty squabbles - namely the quality of
decisiveness. Flowing from this is the mala-fides and bona-fides of decisive
action. Decisiveness in leadership should be exercised with honesty and openness
and served to advance the cause of the poor, women, working class and all of
the motive forces. It should not erode the organic link between the organisation
and its social base, nor reduce the masses to being spectators.

A central task of revolutionary leadership is to initiate, invite, seek and
strive for the unity of the rank and file. The idiom is therefore a clarion
call to all badisa and leaders alike, to rise to the occasion and act decisively
at given moments and times so that dikgomo do not go astray.

The idiom further propagates honest study of concrete conditions by the leadership
collectives at a given point in time. What then happens when a diagnosis of
problems is made? Leadership, after merging and taking account of all ideas
and submissions, must decide on a way forward that will provide a guide to action.
Such action has to be at the right time and level of the organisation, before
a problem transcends to other levels, where it can become toxic to the lifeblood
of the organisation. Indecisiveness is harmful to a revolutionary collective,
it is a corrosive that eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy and
creates dissension because 'mistrust and suspicions' is rife, as Cde Rudolph
correctly asserts. How else does one explain the so-called apathy and disgruntlement
amongst young people when facing another round of elections?

What then is factionalism?

At one stage Cde Winnie Madikizela-Mandela asserted that it does not warrant
an Oxford Dictionary to define factionalism as a group, division, section or
a bloc of people within the main body who hold a different view, believes, ideologies
and so on. Most organisations and movement have some forms of tendencies or
factions - for example Sinn Fein and the IRA, Hammas and Islamic Jihad within
the PLO, Al'Qaeda within the Taliban and so forth. In Russia, you had the Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks within the RSDP before the Great October Revolution. Some tendencies
or factions within movements are entities that operate independently. Some express
a body or bodies of opinion within a movement such as references to radicals
and moderates, hawks and doves, democrats and conservatives and so on.

Through its evolutionary stages (before the bannings, in exile and underground),
the ANC has experienced these kinds of tendencies, most of which were fundamentally
ideological in form and content. The 1930 ANC National Congress saw Josiah Gumede
being ousted as the President as some 'conservatives' and 'chiefs' feared radicalisation
of the ANC and did not want to be ruled by a 'man who milks their cows'. The
PAC breakaway in 1959, the expulsion of Group of Eight led by Tennyson Makiwane
in 1975 and of course the Quattro mutiny are some stark examples. It is important
to reflect on these historically important incidents to fully grasp the tendency
of factionalism, as it exists currently within the body politic of ANC

The root cause of factionalism

Every new stage of development, every increase in the party ranks and the continuing
complications of the methods of struggle in every phase open up not only new
possibilities/opportunities but also new dangers for the ANC. Amongst the dangers
of the period after 1994, because we now have access to power and resources,
is the fact that the ANC is vulnerable to comrades becoming loose canons, regrouping
in factions and transgressing the ethics and norms of our revolution. Even those
trained in the most advanced revolutionary schools, often display a tendency
to free themselves from organisational discipline.

Cde Rudolph mentions a plethora of factors such as stifling of debate, misunderstandings
on the working of the Alliance, allegations of corruption and so forth that
contribute towards factionalism.While agreeing that these factors do play a
role in the emergence of factionalism, this paper firmly argues that factionalism
in the current phase is wholly and singularly caused by corruption. The primary
cause of factionalism in the South Africa liberation movement today is nothing
else but corruption and greed. All other factors mentioned emanate from this.

Corruption, divisions and factionalism complement each other. At the centre
of this is the unresolved question of ownership of the means of productions
and power relations. Hence the scramble for power, state resources and its resultant
consequences. There exist therefore situations at various parastatals, departments
as well as municipalities where comrades regard these structures as their own
fiefdoms. Party caucuses are for selected few, awarding of tenders and contracts
are fraught with irregularities and so on. Basic organisational policies, due
processes of law and, to some extent, constitutional provisions including the
ANC code of conduct, are flouted to pursue personal interests and undue enrichment.

The questions that really face us in dealing with this phenomenon are: Why
do we lack the clout and courage to act against these perpetrators and transgressors?
Why do we allow these corruptors to go on scot free? Why do we tolerate sloppy
investigations and further fail to implement recommended actions? And why do
we allow all of these to happen in the bright of daylight before our eyes as
activists, leadership, bureaucrats, and officials?

Our problem - individually and collectively - seems to be the guts to act.
As a result, corruption is perpetuated and the evil of factionalism thereby
preserved.

Cde Rudolf mentions a shopping list of measures needed to 'unshackle the movement
from the paralysis of factions'. While concurring with these measures, it is
important to open up and confront issues of governance if we are serious to
turn around this sordid state of affairs. This becomes necessary because factions
are embedded and stem from wrangling for control of state resources as a basis
to dispense patronage and mortgage the movement in pursuance of personal agendas.

Conclusion

The movement must consider, among others, some form of demobilisation and rehabilitation
of these factions. It must take into account that a lot has been invested in
some of these comrades and throwing them away will not serve as a sustainable
solution to the problem.

The ANC should therefore leave no stone unturned to deal with these tendencies,
lest it gradually drifts into a bureaucratic and managerialist parliamentary
party. Much worse, it may also lead to organisational degeneration and stagnation;
and marginalisation from its revolutionary trajectory. It will be to the delight
of those who have an interest in seeing the national democratic revolution fail.
The likes of Tambo, JB Marks, Hani, Slovo, Mzala, Maphanga, Nchabeleng, Bachana
Mokoena and others will look on us from their graves in utter disgust.

Reader's Forum

The Motive Forces - some critical thoughts on the NDR By Christopher
Malikane

The aim of this paper is to interrogate some critical issues regarding the
current phase of the NDR. The motivation for this paper is not only the tensions
that have recently characterised the relations within the Alliance, but also
a level of vagueness, or perhaps disagreement, on who constitute the motive
forces of the NDR. This disagreement is tied to a deeper problem of analysing
the principal contradiction that defines a particular phase in the unfolding
process of social change. The best way to approach this question is to state
upfront that this paper will not deal with the GEAR controversy, and its associated
sister controversy on the restructuring of state assets. However, this paper
will show how the manner in which current debates are framed, undermines the
very concept of a National Democratic Revolution, and actually fosters secondary
contradictions.

Principal and secondary contradictions in the South African social formation

In The Road to South African Freedom, the SACP argued that "as its immediate
task the SACP works for a united front of national liberation. It strives to
unite all sections and classes of the oppressed and democratic people for a
national democratic revolution to destroy White domination. The main content
of this Revolution will be the liberation of the African people."

This formulation of the main content of the national democratic revolution
became the hallmark of subsequent theoretical developments of the Congress movement.
Its further application is discernible in the historic 1969 Morogoro resolutions,
which actually formalised this conception of the NDR in the ANC.

To say that the revolution in South Africa is national democratic is to reach
a conclusion, which implies an analysis of the character of the socio-economic
formation. South Africa's social formation was characterised in the historical
papers of the movement as a colonialism of a special type (CST). Because the
concept of colonialism does not specify the nature of class relations it was
important to move beyond the form of the social formation to its content. Colonialism
of a special type was found to be perpetrated by a capitalist class. This class
came to be known as "white monopoly capital". The movement was also
clear that in general, capital couldn't exist without wage-labour. The African
working class formed the major material basis for capital's expansion. It was
thus critical that this class be mobilised for two reasons. It is strategically
located at the point of production and the majority of the African people belonged
to this class. Thus, the liberation of the African majority seemed to be doubly
determined. The subsequent theoretical development of raising the gender dimension
gave the movement a richer insight into the problems of the South African revolution.
However, there needed to be an understanding of the structural relationships
between the race, class and gender dimensions of this revolution.

Such an understanding is impossible without specifying the determinant and
dominant aspects of the South African social formation. The movement characterised
the principal contradiction in SA as between apartheid colonialism led by white
monopoly capital on one side, and national liberation led by the black working
class on the other side. The class aspect is determinant, and the national aspect
dominant. The gender dimension was found to be dominant in both the class and
national aspects because black women suffer the most oppression and exploitation.
Because of the colonial nature of oppression and exploitation, the revolution
assumes a national character hence it was called a national democratic revolution.
And so the principal contradiction in SA is the NDR because it involves a struggle
of opposites.

A critical look at the NDR shows that it is made up of compound aspects. Apartheid
colonialism was perpetrated not only by white monopoly capital, the struggle
for national liberation was not only waged by the black working class. The dominant
aspects of the principal contradiction are white monopoly capital and the black
working class. This concept of the "dominant aspects" of the principal
contradiction is different from the concept of the "principal aspect"
of the principal contradiction.

The concept of the "dominant aspects" of the principal contradiction
is crucial because it implies that there are subordinate aspects of the principal
contradiction. For example the petit-bourgeoisie, by virtue of its location
in the economic structure, cannot be the dominant aspect of the principal contradiction.
The dominant aspects are the classes that define the dominant mode of production
in a social formation. However, not all sections of these classes are in the
dominant aspects. This latter qualification is a reflection of the character
of the revolution.

Thus, secondary contradictions in the NDR are those involving the dominant
and non-dominant aspects in each of the poles of the principal contradiction.
This means that the contradictions between the black petit-bourgeoisie and the
black working class are secondary not only because the relations between these
two social categories do not define the mode of production, but also because
the colonial situation defines the national character of the revolution.

The contradictions between the black bourgeoisie and the black working class
are also secondary. The dominant contradiction, within the framework of the
national liberation struggle, is between the black working class and white monopoly
capital.

It is within this understanding that the Alliance maintains that the content
of the NDR is the liberation of black people in general, Africans in particular.
And that this liberation struggle is a function of a united front of classes,
each class having its own interests in the national liberation struggle. Among
these classes is an aspirant bourgeoisie, which stands to gain by the subsequent
dismantling of white monopoly of the economy. It is thus the basic, fundamental
premise of the theory of the NDR that the national factor dominates and the
class factor is determinant.

The question which then confronts us is how the liberation of the proletariat
can be compatible with the liberation of the aspirant bourgeoisie? Under what
conditions are these two classes in conflict with each other in terms of their
concept of national liberation?

These questions require a more critical appraisal of what a national liberation
in the context where the majority of the oppressed are dispossessed is, and
what this liberation implies in terms of the property-owning classes that are
stifled by white minority domination of industry.

The question of the principal strategic contradiction today

Some of the recent, and crucial papers in the movement make the NDR to consist
of principal and secondary contradictions. This does not only confuse issues,
it also leads to a "theoretical multiplication" of enemies of the
national liberation movement. To say that we are in a revolution is enough to
indicate the existence of at least one contradiction. But to go further and
say we are in a national democratic revolution implies that a dialectical analysis
has been carried out and the principal contradiction that defines our revolution
has been identified. To say that there is "a principal contradiction of
the NDR" implies that besides white monopoly capital, there is another
principal enemy of national liberation. Dialectics teaches us that in each and
every phase of development, one and only one contradiction becomes principal
and defines that phase. The SA revolution moves in phases, each phase defined
by the principal contradiction. The development of the principal contradiction
in itself has phases, which are defined by which aspect is dominant in the principal
contradiction. For an example in a context where white monopoly capital is on
the offensive, the black working class is on the retreat and vice versa. This
struggle of the dominant aspects defines the phases of the principal contradiction.
And so, today we need to define which dominant aspect of the principal contradiction
is on the offensive and which is on the defensive. On this basis we can go further
to inquire into the factors at play and how such factors can be debilitated
or enhanced.

The confusion about the nature of the current phase of the NDR also generates
apathy in mass democratic structures. Mobilising the masses to be always in
political action is not at all easy if the forces against transformation are
not represented by one section of society, i.e. if the dominant aspects of the
principal contradiction are not specified. What is even worse is when creating
the principal contradiction in the NDR encourages secondary contradictions in
the national liberation struggle.

As I have noted, creating a principal contradiction in a principal contradiction
leads to a multiplication of enemies. Some recent papers argue that the principal
contradiction of the NDR today is between those who want to stabilise capitalism
along neo-liberal lines, and those who want to see a thoroughgoing national
democratic transformation. Take the neo-liberal black petit-bourgeoisie, I doubt
whether we can call such a stratum the principal enemy. Or even more, take the
black bourgeoisie, I doubt whether we can call such a class the principal enemy
simply because of the colonial and neo-colonial character of the S.A. social
formation.

However, some papers have now begun to equate the black bourgeoisie with the
white one, sometimes to a point bordering on a denial of the existence of the
black bourgeoisie. And so a transformation of the principal contradiction has
been introduced - implying that we are no longer in a national democratic revolution.
This encourages secondary contradictions, and strengthens white monopoly capital's
grip over the country as the motive forces turn against each other. If the main
content of the NDR is the liberation of blacks in general, Africans in particular,
there is no basis for equating the black and white bourgeoisies. The two are
on opposite sides of the national democratic fence. To do so will be to encourage
secondary contradictions and to divert subordinate aspects from bolstering the
revolutionary dominant aspect.

The ANC may perhaps no longer be eager to mention officially that white monopoly
capital is the principal enemy because of the need to mobilise foreign and domestic
capital investments. Here, the imperatives of the ANC as a national liberation
movement conflict with its character as a leading political party in government.
This does not of course improve clarity of leadership.

On the other hand a critique of neo-liberalism in which the national democratic
approach does not dominate, blunts the clarity of the NDR and serves to encourage
secondary contradictions. The effects of these problems are now taking a toll
on the movement, especially because the concept of NDR has grown to become second
nature even to new recruits from other parties. No systematic attempt is made
to think through the current conditions of non-expropriation of white monopoly
capital as the basis of the contradictions in the motive forces.

What type of a bourgeoisie stands to gain in the NDR?

In the articulation of the economic principles of the NDR, it emerges clearly
that the national democratic state should be a state that places at the centre
of its responsibilities the interests of the working class. Not only because
this class is "at the point of production", but because the majority
of black people fall within this class. Thus advances and setbacks in the NDR
must principally be appraised from the standpoint of the black working class
because this class is one of the dominant aspects of the principal contradiction.
This is not to say that the movement must be indifferent to black bourgeois
advances and setbacks. The latter dynamics must be analysed from the standpoint
of whether white monopoly is gaining an upper hand or not in its conflict with
the black bourgeoisie. If white monopoly makes advances at the expense of any
black group, the NDR is automatically under attack- and the black working class
has to join in the fray against white capitalists.

This essentially means that our approach to the NDR must not be limited solely
to the dominant aspects of the principal contradiction. Under conditions where
the dominant aspects are in a stalemate or the black working class is under
attack, the movement must identify spaces to advance the NDR by exploiting the
subordinate aspects of the principal contradiction, not by unleashing secondary
contradictions. In this context, the black working class will have to take the
lead in influencing outcomes from these subordinate contradictions. This will
ensure the most democratic way of taking the subordinate contradictions to their
conclusion and also build momentum to affect the balance of forces in the dominant
contradiction.

For example, in the light of the fact that there is a neo-liberal attack on
the black working class, it would be a mistake for this class not to engage
in issues such as the merger between black and white businesses because the
structure of the private sector is also important even in the context of a nationalising
democratic state. This essentially means that the working class must not only
show interest in the debate over restructuring of state assets, it must also
show interests in the restructuring of the private sector. This is not on the
same plane as a call for an industrial policy, which by the way is important.
Rather the issue here is the working class should also equally question the
ownership patterns in the private sector, march against white monopoly of the
economy with the same if not more vigour as it would against privatisation and
the "neo-liberal" restructuring of state assets. This is important
because negative tendencies seek to elevate the private sector to lead the transformation
process.

Even the notion of private-public partnerships makes no sense if the private
sector is led by white monopoly capital on the one hand, and the public sector
is led by the black working class led movement. Such a partnership notion denies
the very NDR that we seek to advance because now the dominant aspects are thought
of as possibly becoming partners in social transformation.

There is thus no way the working class can thoroughly address the national
question without also making an imprint on the structuring of private capital.
This is crucial because even in a nationalising democratic transition, private
capital will interface with the state sector in varied ways. This is where the
concept of a "patriotic bourgeoisie" comes in. This concept has to
do with a bourgeoisie that is subordinate to "democratic dictatorship"
and carries out its activities in line with the regulations of the democratic
state. This political relation is what should actually characterise a mixed
economy whose mention is massively scattered in the movement's historical papers.

However under current conditions the state does not own, and it weakens its
ownership of certain monopolies. This casts great doubts on the class content
of this policy and it also raises serious questions about the relation of forces
within the motive forces. If we assume that the movement is working class led,
then it is possible to think about a bourgeoisie that is subject to the policies
of this movement, just as much as there is a concept of a private capitalist
sector that is subordinate to the "democratic dictatorship" of the
working class led democratic state. This then raises two questions.

The first question is whether the black bourgeoisie as it currently evolves
is capable of being subjected to the policies of a working class led movement.
Experience shows that the policies by which the private sector is deracialised
have been characterised by little or no influence of the working class, either
because the change in the balance of forces within the motive forces or the
working class has deemed it not part of its responsibility to enter the de-racialisation
debate, or the working class has strategically tied its hands to a state-led
approach in the context where it is not even at the leadership of the state.
The second question is whether the black bourgeoisie as it evolves is capable
of being subjected to working class power, thus enhancing the working class
in the struggle against white monopoly capital.

Experience shows that this is not the case. But does this then imply that the
black bourgeoisie is the enemy of national liberation in the same way as the
white bourgeoisie? If this is the case, then there has been a transformation
of the principal contradiction and it is definitely no longer the NDR.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown that it is erroneous to see the black bourgeoisie
as the enemy in the same light as the white bourgeoisie. The question of whether
the black bourgeoisie is part of the motive forces or not is one area of disagreement
in the movement. It is very much at the heart of the strategic orientation of
the national liberation movement. This question is also critical at a juncture
wherein a radical programme of democratic state ownership is under attack. The
movement cannot afford to be indifferent to the type of private sector that
must be created. The movement must also interrogate the subordinate aspects
of the principal contradiction and place the working class at the centre of
shaping the outcomes of these subordinate contradictions.

There is a need to distinguish between the principal contradiction and the
secondary contradictions. The principal contradiction defines the character
of the revolution, which in our case is the national democratic revolution.
There is a need to distinguish between the dominant and subordinate aspects
of the principal contradiction. The dominant aspects are composed of classes
that define the dominant mode of production. These distinctions make possible
the formulation of strategies based on a clear understanding of the current
tasks and challenges of the movement.

Lastly, the relevance of the NDR is based on the failure by the movement to
expropriate white capital. This situation may be rationalised by invoking the
objective balance of forces internationally and nationally, and yet this rationalisation
may in itself be a capitulationist subjective exercise. Whilst capitalism may
have a field day internationally, the national basis of white monopoly power
and its ability to "escape" expropriation needs to be interrogated.
If white monopolies are not expropriated, then the resolution of the economic
aspects of the national question fundamentally rests with the enemy. Indeed
under these conditions we should expect no miracles outside a neo-liberal set-up.

*Christopher Malikane is a SA Fulbright Scholar in the USA, completing a PhD
in Economics.

Transformation of arts and culture and the New Person

By Morakabe Raks Seakhoa

"...The arts belong to that phenomenon of human existence called culture.
Together with crafts, religion, customs and norms, and languages of the society,
they create a situation in which the soul can sing, and sing louder to restore
a social morality..." President Thabo Mbeki

It is always a difficulty to talk about the transformation of arts, culture
and creation of a new person without situating these within the real existing
environment. It also helps to take into account the historical background as
a pointer towards the likely panning out of these into the future. The above
quotation takes care of the need to define what arts and culture mean here.

It is a firmly held view of the writer that, without arts and culture, a society
is in a very poor state. Poorer still is that society if one of its quests is
the creation or development of a New Person.

To transform the arts and culture and create a New Person assume that the other
material basics must be in place. These are food, clothing and shelter, with
others deemed superfluous until and unless the first three have been satisfied.

Our society is still emerging from a terribly divided past, both in racial
and class terms. President Mbeki was recently quoted as having said our society
or nation is divided into the rich white and poor black parts. The late Joe
Slovo also spoke of our society suffering a colonialism of a special type: the
colonised and coloniser being within the same borders but everything else similar
to other classical colonialism.

If we accept these definitions of our society, then we must accept that, currently
and in the immediate past our cultures have also suffered these. This, notwithstanding
the fact that, because of our long history of living together, even though separately,
there are very strong core cultural values and practises we all share.

How then are we hoping to see transformation on these fronts? One of the answers
may be that a systematic, sustained and programmatic campaign needs to unfold.
The driving force will, of course be government, but with civil society intervening
and acting as agencies of delivery within and beyond the arts and culture fraternity.

It is with a measure of contentment that we witness our government already
tackling some of the issues, through legislation of acts and support institutions
both in funding and capacity building scenarios. To name a few, institutions
such as the Pan South African Languages Board (PANSALB), National Arts Council
(NAC), Business and Arts South Africa (BASA), Southern African Grant-makers
Association (SAGA), Arts & Culture Trust of the President (ACT) and so forth.

To conclude, we need to as a society, and government in particular tackle the
arts and culture with the same kind of focus and attention we give to other
aspects of transformation, such as houses and jobs. This will include affirmative
action in the arenas of funding and capacity building for the development of
arts and culture. The creation of the New Person will be the result of the above.