In 1918 Congress sought to protect the standard of living of
women and minor workers in the District of Columbia by
authorizing a board to set minimum wages for such workers. A
hospital and a woman hotel worker sought and obtained injunctions against the enforcement of the act by Adkins and
other board members. Adkins appealed.

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered
the opinion of the court.

The question presented for determination by these appeals is the constitutionality of the Act of September
19, 1918, providing for the fixing of
minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia. . . .

. . . It is declared that the purposes
of the act are "to protect the women
and minors of the District from conditions detrimental to their health and
morals, resulting from wages which are
inadequate to maintain decent standards
of living; and the act in each of its
provisions and in its entirety shall be
interpreted to effectuate these purposes." . . .

The judicial duty of passing upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress
is one of great gravity and delicacy. The
statute here in question has successfully borne the scrutiny of the legislative branch of the government, which,
by enacting it, has affirmed its validity;
and that determination must be given
great weight. This court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has
steadily adhered to the rule that every
possible presumption is in favor of the
validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt. But if by
clear and indubitable demonstration a
statute be opposed to the Constitution
we have no choice but to say so. The
Constitution, by its own terms, is the
supreme law of the land, emanating
from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty under our form of
government. A congressional statute, on
the other hand, is the act of an agency
of this sovereign authority, and if it conflict with the Constitution must fall;
for that which is not supreme must yield
to that which is. . . .

The statute now under consideration
is attacked upon the ground that it
authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract
included within the guaranties of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the right to contract about
one's affairs is a part of the liberty of
the individual protected by this clause is
settled by the decisions of this Court
and is no longer open to question. . . .
Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties
have an equal right to obtain from each
other the best terms they can as the
result of private bargaining. . . .

There is of course, no such thing as
absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to a great variety of restraints. But
freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the
general rule and restraint the exception;

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