United
Nations

Distr.

GENERAL

S/1995/864

11 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

2. The present report is the eighth submitted under paragraph 8 of Security
Council resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, by which the Council requested
the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council every six
months on the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for ongoing
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant parts of
section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates the information
contained in the first seven reports (S/23801, S/24661, S/25620, S/26684,
S/1994/489, S/1994/1138 and Corr.1 and S/1995/284).

3. Further information concerning developments since the last report submitted under resolution 715 (1991) is contained in the report to the Security Council
of 20 June 1995 (S/1995/494), the ninth report provided in accordance with
paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991).

95-30615 (E) 141095 /...

*9530615*

Annex

Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The six months which have elapsed since the last report submitted to the
Security Council under paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991) have been among the
most eventful in the history of the Special Commission, both in respect of
relations with the Government of Iraq and of the progress made in obtaining
information regarding Iraq's programmes for production of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. While the
present report is submitted pursuant to resolution relating to ongoing
monitoring and verification, the Commission has repeatedly pointed out that a
full understanding of all aspects of Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass
destruction is essential to the planning and the operation of an effective
system of monitoring to ensure Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to
use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items proscribed to it under
paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 687 (1991), namely "(a) all chemical and
biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and
components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities
related thereto; (b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than
150 kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities".

2. While describing the developments which have taken place in the conduct and
strengthening of monitoring operations since April 1995, the present report
contains a detailed account of the new information obtained regarding Iraq's
prohibited programmes and its probable impact on the monitoring system. In the
period under review, Iraq has taken important decisions to acknowledge its
offensive biological weapons programme and documents are being obtained in all
areas. However, much of the new information contradicts earlier declarations by
Iraq and some assessments made by the Commission now must be revised. A more
enduring and coherent explanation of past activities must be provided by Iraq in
the new full, final and complete disclosures which it is to submit in all areas,
as described more fully elsewhere in this report.

3. The Commission's report in April 1995 (S/1995/284) contained, in its
paragraphs 3 and 4, a comprehensive description of the concept of operations
underlying the Commission's monitoring system. It is worth while, in the light
of developments in the last six months, to recall the sections in that
description which explain the importance of a full knowledge of Iraq's
prohibited programmes for the monitoring system and for confidence in its
effectiveness and comprehensiveness. These require:

"Possession by the Commission of a full picture of Iraq's past programmes
and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials
associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge
of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq, the
technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and the
supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the
programmes that it could not acquire indigenously. This information
provides the baseline data from which ongoing monitoring and verification
proceeds;

"Knowledge of the level of technology attained by Iraq, of the production
and acquisition methods it used and of the materials and equipment it had
available are all key to designing a system of monitoring that addresses
issues of concern and focuses monitoring effort where it would be most
effective and efficient. For example, within Iraq, the system should focus
more of its efforts on those technologies and production methods that Iraq
is known to have mastered than on technologies and methods that Iraq is
known not to have mastered, whereas, for the export/import monitoring
regime, the converse would be true, with effort focusing on those items
that Iraq would have to import in order to reactivate a proscribed weapons
programme. Clearly, knowing where to focus effort requires knowledge of
what Iraq would have achieved in its past programmes;

"Similarly, knowledge of the procurement methods and routes used by Iraq
for its past programmes is key to the design of an effective and efficient
export/import monitoring regime. This system should be designed to be
effective against the procurement routes and methods that Iraq is known to
have used in the past. Testing whether it is, is predicated on knowing
those routes and methods;

"Full accounting for the materials, items and equipment associated with the
past programmes is directly related to what assets should be monitored
under the system. Dual-purpose materials, items and equipment from the
past programmes must be monitored, along with other dual-purpose
capabilities available to Iraq. Uncertainties relating to the accuracy or
completeness of this accounting will consequently lead to uncertainties as
to whether the ongoing monitoring and verification system is indeed
monitoring all the materials, items and equipment which should be
monitored". (ibid., para. 3 (a))

4. Under Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (1991), Iraq is obliged
to provide the above information, which the Commission then verifies through its
inspection, monitoring and analysis activities. Iraq is required to update its
declarations on its dual-purpose activities and capabilities every six months.

5. The description in the present report of the new information received from
Iraq in the period under review is intended to assist in assessing the extent to
which such information, together with that previously obtained, contributes to
meeting the criteria set out above. This, in turn, will bear upon the
assessment of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the monitoring system
and the extent to which it may have to be further modified and augmented to take
account of recent developments. Because of the challenges to the monitoring
system implied in the new revelations, this report contains, under each separate
weapons heading, a detailed description of the operations of the newly designed
monitoring system.

6. The present report, after summarizing relations with Iraq in the period
under review, contains chapters on the various areas of responsibility of the
Special Commission, namely those relating to missiles with a range greater than
150 kilometres and to chemical and biological weapons. Further chapters cover
the Commission's support and other responsibilities in the nuclear area; other
activities, such as those in relation to the export/import mechanism; and
finance, organization and air support. The final chapter contains the
conclusion of the Commission on the developments which have occurred in the last
six months.

II. RELATIONS WITH IRAQ: DEVELOPMENTS: VISITS

BY THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN TO IRAQ

A. Summary of the Executive Chairman's visits

7. During the period under review, the Executive Chairman has paid five visits
to Baghdad to maintain contact with the most senior levels of the Iraqi
Government and to seek to expedite the work of the Commission, particularly in
relation to Iraq's prohibited programmes, by pressing the Government to follow a
policy of complete and frank disclosure. This was specially important in
respect of Iraq's biological weapons programme, which the Commission's experts
had determined to be of very significant proportions, despite Iraq's constant
denials that it had done anything more than limited research.

8. The Executive Chairman's visits took place as follows: 29 May to 1 June,
30 June to 2 July, 4 to 6 August, 17 to 20 August and 29 September to
1 October 1995. Two visits were also paid to Baghdad by the Deputy Executive
Chairman, from 14 to 17 May and 17 to 20 September 1995, to address issues
relating to Iraq's prohibited programmes. Information on those visits, from
April to 1 June 1995, will be found in the Commission's June 1995 report
(S/1995/494, paras. 4-10).

B. Cooperation, ultimatum and disclosures

9. The visits listed above illustrate the rocky road of cooperation between
Iraq and the Commission in the period under review, where indications that Iraq
was contemplating ceasing such cooperation culminated in an ultimatum, early in
August 1995, that such cooperation would cease if, by 31 August 1995, no
progress was made in the Security Council in the direction of easing or lifting
the sanctions and the oil embargo. However, the ultimatum was withdrawn
following the departure of General Hussein Kamel Hassan from Baghdad and his
receipt of asylum in Jordan. The General had, among a large number of important
responsibilities, been in charge, over considerable periods of time, of Iraq's
programmes in the areas now proscribed to it. Since his departure, the Deputy
Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, has stated that Iraq has adopted a new policy of
complete cooperation and transparency with the Commission and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without any time-limit.

10. In the first of the Executive Chairman's visits, at the end of May 1995,
the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq sounded a warning that, if no prospect
appeared for reintegrating Iraq into the international community through the
easing or lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo, it would be difficult for
Iraq to justify the expense and the effort involved in cooperation with the
Commission and IAEA. Iraq required statements from the Commission that the
chemical weapons and missile files were closed and the monitoring system was
operational, and from IAEA that the nuclear file was closed. If Iraq received
such assurances and thus judged the prospects for reintegration to be positive,
it would, in late June, address the one outstanding issue of significance, the
biological issue. In response, and subsequently in his June 1995 report to the
Security Council (S/1995/494), the Chairman stated that the bulk of what was
required to implement paragraphs 8 to 10 of Security Council resolution 687
(1991) with regard to chemical weapons and missiles had been achieved. However,
in view of Iraq's late and incomplete declarations, a longer period had been
needed to identify all aspects of Iraq's programmes than might otherwise have
been required. Furthermore, the major area of Iraq's biological weapons
programme remained non-disclosed. Monitoring was operational in all areas.
Those uncertainties which remained in the missile and chemical areas needed to
be resolved and in order to do so the Commission would continue to use its
rights under the relevant Security Council resolutions and the exchange of
letters of 7 and 14 May 1991 on the facilities, privileges and immunities of the
Commission in Iraq.

11. Upon the Executive Chairman's arrival in Baghdad on 30 June 1995, Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that his Government had reviewed carefully the
Commission's report of June 1995. While it had found the report to contain both
negative and positive elements, it had concluded that the positive elements were
such that Iraq would now address the issue of its biological weapons programme.
The following day, on 1 July 1995, Iraq made a brief oral presentation in the
course of which it acknowledged an offensive biological weapons programme,
including the production of a number of biological agents, but denied the
weaponization of such agents. The Chairman welcomed this disclosure but
expressed the view that it needed to be augmented, particularly as regards
weaponization, and had to be presented to the Commission in the form of a full,
final and complete disclosure as required by Security Council resolution
707 (1991). A fuller account of this and subsequent disclosures relating to
Iraq's biological weapons programme will be found in chapter V of the present
report.

12. Iraq's decision to disclose its offensive biological weapons programme
appeared to indicate that it was moving away from its warning of
non-cooperation, expressed by Mr. Tariq Aziz during the Executive Chairman's
preceding visit to Baghdad. However, this situation was abruptly reversed in
the course of July 1995. On 17 July, President Saddam Hussein made a speech in
Baghdad in which he indicated that his Government would cease cooperation with
the Security Council if there were no progress in the Council towards the
lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo. No deadline was given by the
President for such progress. However, a few days later, in Cairo, the Foreign
Minister of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf, made a speech in which he stated
that 31 August 1995 was the deadline.

13. The Executive Chairman arrived in Baghdad for the third of his visits in
the period under review on 4 August 1995. Iraq delivered to him what it stated
to be its full, final and complete disclosure of its biological weapons
programme, still denying that any of the agents produced had been weaponized.
In a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, on 5 August, the
latter stressed to the Chairman that Iraq would cease cooperation with the
Security Council and the Commission if there were no progress, by
31 August 1995, towards lifting sanctions and the oil embargo. The Deputy Prime
Minister asked the Chairman to convey this information to the Security Council
upon his return to United Nations Headquarters. The Chairman reached New York
on 7 August, and immediately thereafter received a message from Mr. Tariq Aziz,
through the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, that the
deadline was serious and that the Chairman should inform the Council
accordingly. The Chairman did so, in an oral briefing to the Council on
10 August.

14. Three days previously, on 7 August 1995, General Hussein Kamel Hassan had
left Baghdad, arriving in Amman the following day. On 13 August, the Executive
Chairman received a letter from General Amer Rashid al-Ubeidi, Minister of Oil
and former Director of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC),
inviting him to return to Baghdad. In the letter, it was stated that the
Government had ascertained that General Hussein Kamel Hassan had been
responsible for hiding important information on Iraq's prohibited programmes
from the Commission and IAEA by ordering the Iraqi technical personnel not to
disclose such information and also not to inform Mr. Tariq Aziz or General Amer
of these instructions. An identical letter was addressed to the Director
General of IAEA. In a message to the Chairman on 14 August, Mr. Tariq Aziz
stated that the deadline was no longer in effect.

15. The Executive Chairman and the Leader of the IAEA Action Team, in response
to the invitations from Iraq, arrived in Baghdad on 17 August 1995. On the
evening of that day, a plenary meeting was held with an Iraqi delegation led by
the Deputy Prime Minister, and including the Foreign Minister, Mr. Al-Sahaf, the
Minister of Oil, General Amer, the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry,
Dr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi, and other senior officials. Mr. Tariq Aziz made an initial
statement in the course of which he repeated that General Hussein Kamel Hassan
had, unbeknown to the senior levels of the Iraqi leadership, hidden information
on the prohibited programmes which Iraq would now disclose to the Commission and
IAEA. Iraq had decided on a policy of cooperation and full transparency with
the Commission and IAEA, without imposing any time-limit, and also of
cooperation and good-neighbourliness with the States of the region and elsewhere
and of economic development in Iraq itself. Following on the plenary meeting,
in a meeting devoted to Iraq's biological weapons programme, Iraq for the first
time disclosed a much more extensive programme than that contained in its full,
final and complete disclosure of early August 1995, admitting weaponization
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Gulf war, including the filling of
biological warfare agents into 166 bombs and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads.

16. In the course of the following two days, Iraq made further disclosures in
regard to other prohibited programmes, including indigenous production of
Scud-type missile engines, assembled from both imported and locally produced
parts, and the testing of such engines. The significance of this, and its
consequences for Iraq's previous statements regarding unilateral destruction of
proscribed materials, is discussed in paragraphs 21, 22 and 44 below.

17. On 20 August 1995, at the conclusion of the Executive Chairman's visit, a
considerable cache of documents and other materials was located and taken
possession of by the Commission, as described in paragraphs 24 to 27 below.

18. The Executive Chairman returned to New York through Jordan, thus affording
the opportunity to meet General Hussein Kamel Hassan and to discuss with him
Iraq's programmes in the proscribed fields. Useful information was obtained.

19. Both during and after the Executive Chairman's mid-August visit to Baghdad,
expert teams in all areas of the Special Commission's responsibility held
discussions with their Iraqi counterparts. The missile and biological teams
obtained much valuable information, indicating programmes larger or more
advanced in every dimension than previously declared. In the chemical field,
after being confronted with evidence found by the chemical team in the new
documentation, Iraq acknowledged a much larger and more advanced programme than
hitherto admitted for the production and storage of the chemical warfare
agent VX. In this regard, the Deputy Executive Chairman visited Baghdad from 17
to 20 September 1995, in the course of which he pointed out to Iraqi officials,
at senior levels, the gravity of the clear deception of Iraq in its spring 1995
declarations to the Commission concerning the VX nerve agent in particular.
This had been reported to the Security Council in June 1995 and the intentional
deception would have to be underscored in the current report.

20. On 29 September 1995, the Executive Chairman arrived in Baghdad, for his
last visit in the period under review, to assess with the Iraqi authorities the
situation resulting from the recent disclosures, following on the departure of
General Hussein Kamel Hassan. The Chairman expressed the view, in the various
meetings which he held, that it was in Iraq's best interests to provide
everything now, rather than to drag out the uncovering of information which
would have an increasingly negative impact. Iraq undertook to do its best, and
the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, pledged his Government's cooperation
and full openness with regard to the implementation of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

C. Some consequences of recent disclosures

1. Unilateral destruction by Iraq

21. Iraq's decision in 1991 to undertake, in violation of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), the unilateral destruction of various elements of its
prohibited programmes has had the most severe consequences in delaying, and in
rendering much more complicated, any determination by the Commission that it has
a complete picture of those programmes and has accounted for all the significant
components thereof. This destruction has been stated by Iraq to cover all three
areas of proscribed missiles and chemical and biological programmes. Unilateral
destruction of weapons, equipment and materials, including agent and precursors,
has made verification, particularly of the quantities involved, extremely
difficult. The Commission has thus pressed for any documentation Iraq may have
relating to such destruction, including the orders to carry it out and field
reports on how those orders were executed.

22. The picture is further complicated by certain recent disclosures which show
that Iraq has used alleged unilateral destruction to cover up elements of its
prohibited programmes which it wished to keep concealed. Possibly the most
important example of this, uncovered to date, relates to the missile field.
Iraq declared in 1992 that it had unilaterally destroyed 89 Scud/Al Hussein
missiles. Recent analysis by the Commission's experts, and admissions by Iraq,
now reveal that only 83 missiles were so destroyed in 1991. The figure was
inflated by Iraq to 89, in order to conceal its indigenous production of engines
for Scud-type missiles, as reported in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the present
report. This example will require the Commission to take a new look at all
Iraq's declarations on unilateral destruction and for it to press for
documentation and any other means of verification of such declarations.

2. Documentation

23. The Commission has, on every available occasion, stressed to Iraq that the
handing over of documentation relating to its prohibited programmes is the best
and quickest means for the Commission to verify Iraq's declarations relating to
the programmes. Iraq, however, has sought to maintain that, some time in 1991,
it issued an order to destroy all documentation on those programmes. The
Commission's attempts to obtain evidence of such an order, and to ascertain
precisely when it was issued, have been unsuccessful. The Commission has
remained sceptical that any such wholesale destruction ever took place. It has
so told Iraq on numerous occasions. It was not conceivable that all evidence
would be destroyed of major and very costly scientific research and engineering
undertakings, representing billions of dollars in investment and countless man-hours of work.

24. On 20 August 1995, at the conclusion of the Executive Chairman's visit to
Baghdad (17-20 August), the Chairman, in a public statement, complained that,
while very significant new information had been provided, not a single document,
which could help in verifying that information, had been handed over. Shortly
after that statement was made, and while the Chairman's team was preparing for
departure to the Habbaniyah airfield, General Amer Rashid al-Ubeidi contacted
the Chairman and requested that, on his way to the airfield, he visit a farm
which the General stated to have belonged to General Hussein Kamel Hassan, where
items of great interest to the Commission could be found. On arrival at the
farm, in addition to a number of shipping containers with miscellaneous
equipment in them, the Chairman and his team found, in a locked chicken house,
numerous metal and wooden boxes which were packed with documentation, together
with microfiches, computer diskettes, videotapes, photographs and prohibited
hardware components. Orders were immediately issued to the Commission's
personnel, who had been brought to the site, to secure this material and
transfer it to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

25. Examination of the contents of the boxes at the Centre revealed well over
half a million pages of documentation. While most of this related to the
nuclear area, a large amount concerned the chemical, biological and missile
areas. This documentation has now been inventoried and is being arranged, after
scanning, on a priority basis for examination. The initial assessment of the
Commission is that the bulk of the material in the missile, chemical and
biological fields comes from a number of the sites where Iraq's proscribed
programmes had been carried out. The amount of material varies from area to
area, being more comprehensive in certain areas than in others. However,
documentation from the Headquarters of the Military Industrialization
Corporation (MIC) is not included, nor are the relevant archives of the Ministry
of Defence. From recent statements made by senior Iraqi officials, the
Ministry's records are still intact and detailed.

26. Since the discovery of the documents, Iraq has admitted to the Commission's
personnel that, in the summer of 1991, orders were issued by a "high authority"
to the directors of the sites involved in Iraq's proscribed programmes to
protect "important documents" - which was understood to relate to the technology
of production - by packing them, in a very brief period of time, and delivering
them on demand to representatives from the special security organizations. This
delivery is said to have taken place without written orders or the provision of
receipts by the representatives of those organizations when they collected the
packed documents. Iraq's original claim that all documentation was destroyed is
thus patently false.

27. The Commission doubts that the materials obtained are all those which were
gathered under the protection order issued in 1991. More such documentation
must still exist, particularly in certain significant areas such as production
records, Iraq's procurement networks and sources of supply. Also, the relevant
MIC headquarters documentation and archives of the Ministry of Defence are
missing. These are materials which must be handed over if the Commission is to
be able to undertake a speedy and thorough verification of Iraq's declarations
regarding its prohibited programmes. The Commission, nevertheless, acknowledges
that the materials already obtained, together with the admission that the
relevant documentation was not all destroyed, is one of the most significant
breakthroughs in the four years of its operations in Iraq, and will provide an
invaluable source of verification material. What has been started should be
completed by handing over the missing documentation identified above.

3. Rationale for Iraq's biological and chemical weapons

28. Iraq's intentions with regard to the operational use of its biological and
chemical weapons have been subject to conflicting presentations by the Iraqi
authorities in the period under review. On the one side, it was explained that
the biological and chemical weapons were seen by Iraq as a useful means to
counter a numerically superior force; on the other, they were presented as a
means of last resort for retaliation in the case of a nuclear attack on Baghdad.
Certain documentation supports the contention that Iraq was actively planning
and had actually deployed its chemical weapons in a pattern corresponding to
strategic and offensive use through surprise attack against perceived enemies.
The known pattern of deployment of long-range missiles (Al Hussein) supports
this contention. Iraq stated, during visits of both the Chairman and the Deputy
Chairman, that authority to launch biological and chemical warheads was
pre-delegated in the event that Baghdad was hit by nuclear weapons during the
Gulf war. This pre-delegation does not exclude the alternative use of such a
capability and therefore does not constitute proof of only intentions concerning
second use. It is evident that the Commission must have a complete
understanding of the concept behind each stage of the development of all
proscribed weapons systems, together with their intended and actual deployment
plans.

III. MISSILE ACTIVITIES

A. The monitoring system

29. Pursuant to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, approved by
the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991), the Commission has established a
multi-layered monitoring system in the missile area. The system is designed to
cover essential elements of Iraq's missile and related research, development,
testing and manufacturing facilities and non-proscribed missiles with ranges
less than 150 kilometres as defined by the plan. The system is designed to
compensate the limitations of one layer of the system with the strengths of
other layers. The current monitoring system includes, inter alia:

30. On-site monitoring inspections. Such inspections are carried out without
advance notice by a resident expert team based at the Commission's Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). These inspections include
verification of Iraq's declarations under the plan, review of related facility
documentation, inspection of items produced and production techniques, and
inspection of all areas and buildings at each facility. Currently, over 30
different facilities are inspected on a routine basis, with the frequency of
visits dependent on the nature of activities at the specific sites.

31. Continuous sensor monitoring. This is directed at critical areas of
missile-related activities and dual-purpose machines. On-site cameras are
connected to and can be viewed remotely from the BMVC. Furthermore, the BMVC
staff collect videotapes from the monitored facilities every 30 days, or more
frequently if required, for detailed analysis. Tamper-proof tags and labels are
used to positively identify important equipment at the facilities to assist in
the monitoring of their use, movement or disposal. Currently, over 120 pieces
of missile related equipment carry UNSCOM tags and labels. The Commission
regularly reviews the need to upgrade, replace or add additional sensors to
improve its missile monitoring.

32. Special inspections. Special inspection teams are tasked to address
specific issues, for example assessing non-proscribed ongoing missile research
and development activities. These teams are staffed by highly qualified experts
in specific fields who advise the Commission of potential modifications to the
monitoring regime.

33. Compliance inspections. Such inspection teams are used to verify
information available to the Commission on Iraq's activities. These teams are
also used to determine if new facilities should be included in the monitoring
regime.

34. Aerial surveillance. The Commission uses both helicopter and high-level
surveillance assets to monitor activities and the infrastructure of relevant
facilities throughout Iraq.

35. After completion of the baseline process for each site being monitored, the
Commission began operating the ongoing monitoring and verification system for
Iraq's missile and related facilities on 17 August 1994. Since that time, the
Commission has performed over 450 inspections at a variety of missile facilities
and has installed over 40 video cameras at 16 facilities monitored for missile
production-related activities. Iraq has continued to provide the support
requested by the Commission in the conduct of these inspections, including,
inter alia, access to production, quality control and inventory records; access
to buildings, facilities or equipment located at the sites; installation of
cameras and tags; and the provision of technical experts to explain designs,
tests and production activities to the monitoring and inspection teams.

36. During the reporting period, the Commission conducted the second annual
verification of Iraq's non-proscribed operational missiles as defined by
Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), i.e. missiles with
ranges less than 150 kilometres that are designed for use, or capable of being
modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than
50 kilometres. The Commission uses tags to confirm that all such missiles are
identified in Iraq and to ensure that these missile systems are not modified to
ranges prohibited by the Security Council. The Commission has established
modalities pursuant to which Iraq is required to present 10 per cent of its
missiles, three times per year, to the Commission for its verification. The
Commission selects the missiles for Iraq to present and the timing of these
inspections. In accordance with the established procedures, Iraq submitted the
requested number of missiles for verification by the inspection team during the
second annual verification. No modifications of these missiles were detected.

37. The Commission has recently obtained information that Iraq has resumed its
acquisition efforts in support of its missile facilities. Iraq placed a number
of orders, both directly and indirectly (through middlemen and front companies),
for the purchase of equipment, technologies, supplies and material for both
missile- and non-missile-related activities at these facilities. Iraq explained
that many of these efforts were in direct support of its Ababil-100 programme
for indigenous development and production of surface-to-surface missiles with
ranges between 100 and 150 kilometres. During the period since the last report
in April 1995, Iraq has acknowledged these procurement activities, including the
actual import, without notifications to the United Nations Sanctions Committee
established under Security Council resolution 661 (1990), of equipment and
materials. In most cases, Iraq has wrongly asserted that such equipment and
materials were purchased within Iraq.

B. Destruction of proscribed items

38. In April 1995, the Commission completed an investigation of Iraq's
acquisition and use of equipment for Project 1728 (production of liquid-propellant rocket engines) prior to the Gulf war. On 21 April, the Commission
sent a letter to Iraq outlining measures that needed to be taken for the
disposal of this equipment, including the destruction of five key pieces of
production and testing equipment purchased specifically for proscribed missile
activities. Iraq was also informed that all work must cease on equipment
requiring destruction. The personnel in the facilities where this equipment was
located apparently disregarded these instructions and continued to operate the
machinery to produce parts for current missile programmes. The Commission
detected the continued operation of this equipment, in contravention of the
Commission's instructions, through several elements of its monitoring system,
primarily the monitoring cameras. Iraq also tried to delay the destruction of
the equipment. The relevant developments were reported by the Executive
Chairman to the Security Council on 2 July 1995. Shortly thereafter, Iraq
agreed to comply with the Commission's decision and the destruction of the
equipment was completed by the end of July 1995.

C. Proscribed programme

39. During the period since the report in April 1995, the Commission has
continued its investigations of Iraq's proscribed former missile activities.
These investigations concentrated on the unresolved issues mainly connected with
Iraq's past research and development activities. The Commission sought
additional data from Iraq and its explanations concerning work on a number of
undeclared missile designs or components, missile fuels and the connections
between the missile programme and other proscribed activities. These issues
were addressed during the rounds of high-level talks from May until early
August 1995 and additionally by the inspection team UNSCOM 122/BM 33. At that
time, Iraq provided some answers to the Commission's requests, but mainly
limited its admissions to cases where the Commission had evidence of Iraq's
activities. However, in the majority of cases in the period prior to
mid-August 1995, Iraq tried to mislead the Commission by withholding information
or by attributing the case on which information was requested to some other
activity. Thus, Iraq specifically denied the existence of any biological
warheads, test activity with chemical warheads, any work on advanced liquid-propellant missile systems, using new materials for missile airframes (like
aluminium), and missile fuels (like UDMH). Iraq also continued, in the period
indicated, to falsify its accounting of missiles, warheads and supporting/
auxiliary equipment.

40. During the Executive Chairman's visit to Baghdad from 17 to 20 August 1995,
following on the events described in paragraph 14 above, Iraq, in
contradistinction to its attitude prior to that time, disclosed substantial new
information related to its proscribed missile programme. Iraq acknowledged for
the first time work on advanced rocket engines, including those with increased
thrust or using UDMH fuel. Iraq also admitted to the production of proscribed
rocket engines made of indigenously produced or imported parts and without
cannibalization of the imported Soviet-made Scud engines. Iraq further admitted
that the number and the purpose of static and flight tests of proscribed
missiles had previously been misrepresented.

41. As described in paragraphs 24 to 27 above, the Commission obtained boxes
with documents and materials including, in addition to written documentation,
videotapes, films, microfiches and computer diskettes related to missile
activities. Some prohibited missile components were also found in the boxes.
Apparently these documents had at one time belonged to projects that were
engaged in activities such as project 144 (modification and production of
missile systems), the Karama project (production of missile guidance and control
systems), project 1728 (production of liquid-propellant rocket engines) and
Badr-2000 (two-stage solid-propellant missile). The Iraqi representatives who
had worked on these projects explained that they had been ordered to prepare a
selection of the most important documents and to hand them over to the special
security organizations. In the view of the Commission, the boxes obtained by it
do not contain the full record of proscribed missile activities or a complete
set of documentation which could be expected to be found at such facilities.
The Commission intends to exploit fully available documents in the verification
process, while continuing to press for the handing over of all the relevant
documents.

42. During the Executive Chairman's visit to Baghdad from 29 September to
1 October, and the UNSCOM 123/BM 34 inspection (27 September-1 October), the
Iraqi authorities provided additional information on previously undisclosed
activities. It appeared that Iraq considered this to be critical and essential
information on its prohibited activities and it was therefore withheld from the
Commission for more than four years. At the end of September 1995, the
Commission obtained new information on Iraq's testing activity, including both
static and flight testing of Scud variant missile systems; several new designs
of longer-range missile systems; development and testing of new liquid-
propellant engine designs; development and successful testing of a warhead
separation system; an indigenous design of a 600 mm diameter supergun system;
and three separate flight tests of chemical warheads. Some of the previously
undisclosed designs included missiles that could reach targets at ranges of up
to 3,000 kilometres. The Commission also obtained information of a special
missile under design for delivery of a nuclear explosive device. Since these
and previous declarations substantially change the scope of Iraq's missile
programme, the Commission has requested, and Iraq has agreed to provide, a new
full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD) for its proscribed missile
activities.

43. New Iraqi disclosures, including production of indigenous rocket engines,
have a severe impact on the Commission's accounting of proscribed weapons and
equipment used in the missile programmes prohibited by Security Council
resolution 687 (1991). So far Iraq has failed to provide conclusive evidence on
the quantity of engines produced by Iraq. Thus, the Commission has no firm
basis for establishing at this time a reliable accounting of Iraq's proscribed
missiles.

44. Another serious complicating factor in establishing a new accounting of
proscribed weapons and items in Iraq is associated with unilateral destruction
allegedly carried out by Iraq in the summer of 1991 to which reference has
already been made in paragraphs 21 and 22 above. The destruction of large
quantities and varieties of proscribed items carried out at that time was
disclosed by Iraq to the Commission only in March 1992. However, the Commission
has come to the conclusion that this March declaration and Iraq's original FFCD
of May 1992 had been intentionally falsified to cover activities that Iraq
intended to withhold from the Commission at that time. For example, Iraq
declared that 89 proscribed operational missiles were destroyed in summer 1991,
although only 83 such missiles were actually destroyed. In this case, the
inflated number seems to have been put forward by Iraq to cover undeclared
static and flight test activities and its efforts to produce its own missiles.
Iraq later presented an incorrect accounting of missile warheads - both imported
and indigenously produced - to hide its projects involving unconventional and
separating warheads. Iraq presented false figures on the quantity of destroyed
imported missile components and other items. Iraq has agreed to provide a new
declaration on the material balance of proscribed weapons and other prohibited
items, in the new FFCD, to correct these and other false or misleading
disclosures. Until it verifies Iraq's new declaration, the Commission will not
be able to provide a definite accounting of weapons (missiles, launchers and
supporting/auxiliary equipment) as well as equipment and materials used in the
proscribed missile programme of Iraq.

45. As may be seen from the above, during much of the reporting period, Iraq
has continued to withhold information related to its proscribed missile
programme. For the most part, Iraq has provided new data only when there were
clear indications that the Commission possessed information from other sources.
However, after the Executive Chairman's visit in mid-August, Iraq volunteered
some important new information and in several cases supported these disclosures
with additional documents. Nevertheless, based on the totality of the
information available to it, the Commission believes that Iraq has not yet
disclosed fully and completely its proscribed missile activities. The
information to be included in the forthcoming FFCD will be crucial for the
Commission's verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations. For this
reason, Iraq needs to provide accurate and substantiated data, including
documentary evidence to support its statements, and to make suggestions for
speedy and effective verification.

46. The Commission intends to continue its intensive inspection and
investigation missions under resolution 687 (1991), including application of new
verification methods, in order to obtain a full and complete picture of Iraq's
proscribed missile activities. Iraq's cooperation, including the provision of
accurate information and supporting documentation, access to personnel involved
in the relevant activities and support of the Commission's inspection and
monitoring efforts will be required, on a continuous basis, in order to enable
the Commission to achieve this objective in a speedy and efficient manner.

IV. CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES

A. The monitoring system

47. During the period under review, four additional baseline inspections were
completed in the chemical area. Monitoring and verification protocols were
prepared for one research institute and three chemical storage and production
sites. These activities were conducted by the chemical monitoring team
stationed at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The Commission has
thus completed baseline inspections of 62 chemical sites and 18 universities,
colleges and research institutes. Over 200 monitoring inspections have been
undertaken by the chemical monitoring team to date. Some site protocols will be
re-evaluated in the light of recent findings that sites outside of the Muthanna
State Establishment were also involved in Iraq's chemical weapons programme, a
fact which has been denied until very recently. It is anticipated that
information from the documents obtained on 20 August 1995 will lead to
inspections at newly identified sites not yet visited.

48. During monitoring inspections in June and July 1995, the chemical
monitoring team detected the unauthorized movement and use of four major items
of tagged equipment at two sites under monitoring. Iraq was immediately
instructed to replace the equipment in its original position. This was done.
The seriousness of this unauthorized activity and the attendant considerations
of possible destruction of the equipment was underlined to Iraq at the highest
level.

49. In addition to the monitoring tools and modalities described in paragraphs
30 to 34 of the chapter on missile activities in the present report, the
Commission's chemical monitoring apparatus also includes 19 air samplers
installed at 6 chemical production sites in Iraq. From 2 to 11 July 1995, a
technical support team performed a retrofit of these samplers and reviewed their
locations in order to optimize their use. As a result, several samplers were
moved and some added or removed from sites. The upgraded samplers are now
better equipped to withstand difficult conditions, such as humidity and chemical
extremes.

50. Ten sampling pumps and supporting calibration equipment have been provided
to the chemical monitoring team. This gives the team the capability to take air
samples at any location in Iraq. An infrared spectrometer and a melting-point
determination apparatus are currently under procurement to enlarge the range of
samples which can be analysed.

51. A reverse osmosis water purification system and a complete air filtration
system for the chemical fume hood has been installed in the chemical laboratory
at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. These will enhance the
health and safety of personnel working in the laboratory. To ensure the health
and safety of monitoring personnel in the field, protective equipment has also
been procured, including HEPA filters, a variety of respirators and pressed air
suits.

B. Proscribed programme

52. The new information obtained by the Commission in August and September 1995
clearly shows that Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure presented on
25 March 1995, the attachment of 27 March 1995 and the addenda to the
attachment, received on 29 May 1995, are incorrect and incomplete. The new
information was gathered initially from material obtained in Iraq on
20 August 1995 and subsequently admitted by Iraq during the course of technical
talks undertaken by the UNSCOM 124/CW 25 inspection team. The material includes
documents, videotapes, microfiches and microfilm records and computer discs
spanning a large part of Iraq's chemical weapons programme.

53. In response to the Commission's statements that the March 1995 FFCD was no
longer adequate, on 7 October 1995, Iraq provided the Commission with a number
of revised chapters. The revised chapters, however, cover only those areas
already raised by UNSCOM 124/CW 25 as examples of shortcomings in the existing
FFCD. The March 1995 FFCD omitted information on major militarily significant
chemical weapons capabilities, such as additional types of warfare agents,
advanced agent and precursor production, stabilization and storage technologies,
new types and numbers of munitions and field trials and additional sites
involved in the programme.

54. During the technical talks held in Baghdad in September 1995, it became
clear that Iraq was continuing to withhold important information on the extent
and technical depth of its chemical weapons programme. Iraq officially stated
that the March 1995 FFCD was complete and accurate and that there was no
additional information available. Only belatedly did it admit shortcomings in
its latest FFCD.

55. Of greatest concern are new revelations concerning the timing, extent and
success of Iraq's programme for the production of the nerve agent VX. In the
March 1995 Iraqi FFCD and its amendments, it was asserted that the VX programme
existed only from April 1987 to September 1988, conducted only laboratory-scale
production and had been abandoned because of poor agent quality and instability.

56. Based on the new findings, it is now clear that the VX programme began
at least as early as May 1985 and continued without interruption until
December 1990. The Commission has concluded that VX was produced on an
industrial scale. Precursor and agent storage and stabilization problems were
solved. Furthermore, one of Iraq's documents on this subject, dated
1989, proposes "the creation of strategic storage of the substance
(VX - hydrochloride, one step from conversion into VX) so it can be used at any
time if needed".

57. Significant in this context is Iraq's admission, in September 1995, of the
production in 1990 of 65 tonnes of choline, a chemical used exclusively for the
production of VX. This amount would be sufficient for the production of
approximately 90 tonnes of VX. Furthermore, Iraq had, inter alia, over 200 tons
each of the precursors phosphorous pentasulphide and di-isopropylamine. These
quantities would be sufficient to produce more than 400 tonnes of VX. At
present, there is no conclusive evidence to support Iraq's claims concerning the
complete disposal of these two precursors and the choline.

58. Iraq's recent declarations concerning the weaponization of biological
agents has rendered invalid the current material balance for chemical munitions
and the quantities of weaponized chemical agents. This derives from the fact
that the munitions, including missile warheads, declared as being used for
biological agents had previously been declared as used for chemical weapons
purposes.

59. Iraq has also admitted the development of prototypes of binary sarin-filled
artillery shells, 122 mm rockets and aerial bombs. However, the new
documentation shows production in quantities well beyond prototype levels. Iraq
has also admitted three flight tests of long-range missiles with chemical
warheads, including one, in April 1990, with sarin.

60. Iraq admitted that it had received significant assistance from abroad.
This support included, at a minimum, the provision of munitions specifically
designed for chemical weapons fill, technical support for the development of a
VX precursor manufacturing process and the provision of technical personnel
directly to the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE).

61. The recently obtained documentation contains significant information on
procurement and financing for MSE. These records indicate that at least
$100 million in procurement remains undeclared. This finding contradicts Iraqi
statements that all MSE procurement had been declared.

62. The new information on Iraq's proscribed chemical weapons programme will
require appropriate follow-up action, including technical analysis of the
documents and expert seminars. The documentation shows Iraq's efforts to
produce indigenously key precursors for chemical weapons, for example, the
synthesis of cyclohexanol (a GF precursor) from phenol and the synthesis of
di-isopropylamine (a VX precursor) from ammonia and acetone. In the light of
this, certain proposals by Iraq to construct new facilities with dual-use
capabilities will have to be considered very carefully by the Commission and the
monitoring system adjusted accordingly.

63. The new information invalidates material balances provided in the
March 1995 FFCD and subsequent amendments. At the present time also the
Commission cannot exclude the potential existence of stocks of VX, its direct
precursors and undeclared munitions in Iraq. In these circumstances, the
Commission is requiring a new full, final and complete disclosure from Iraq
which will give a coherent and true account of its chemical weapons programme.

V. BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

A. The monitoring system

64. Monitoring in the biological area began in full on 4 April 1995, preceded
by a four-month interim monitoring phase. The scope of activities and sites to
be encompassed by the monitoring needs to be broad because of the inherent
dual-use nature of biological technology and the ease with which civilian
facilities can be converted for biological weapons purposes. The Commission has
been compelled to cast a wider net in the biological field because of Iraq's
incomplete disclosure of the full extent of its past biological warfare
activities. In actively seeking to establish an understanding of such a
programme, the Commission has had to rely less on Iraq's openness and more on
its own findings.

65. Currently, 79 sites throughout Iraq are included in the biological
monitoring and verification regime. These sites are comprised of:

(a) Five sites currently known to have played a significant role in Iraq's
past biological weapons programme;

(b) Five vaccine or pharmaceutical facilities;

(c) Thirty-five research and university sites which have significant
technology or equipment;

66. The monitoring concept that has been implemented by the Commission
includes: equipment inventory at all sites where dual-purpose equipment is
located; notifications by Iraq of transfer, modification and acquisition of such
equipment; placement of cameras at selected sites to observe change in activity
or use of equipment; routine inspections of sites by a Baghdad-based monitoring
team, primarily on a no-notice basis, and on a variable frequency; and
identification of factors related to "break-out" scenarios at sites and of their
possible role in proscribed activities. These monitoring activities from the
Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre are reinforced by special inspections
where investigations by most experienced specialists are desired. Key aspects
of the baseline process, including identification of additional sites of
interest and their capability, identification of undeclared dual-use equipment,
assessment of their present and future use, are also ongoing activities that are
incorporated into the monitoring process.

67. During the reporting period since 10 April 1995, over 150 inspections or
visits to different sites have been made by the biological monitoring team,
including over 20 inspections of the Al Hakam facility. At three sites,
including Al Hakam, video monitoring, using a total of 22 cameras, supplement
the other monitoring efforts. Both realtime images and recorded videotapes are
analysed and the information is incorporated into the monitoring process.

B. Proscribed programme

68. While ongoing monitoring concentrates mainly on dual-use biological
capabilities in Iraq, an efficient and effective monitoring is not possible
without a full understanding of Iraq's proscribed biological activities. In its
report to the Security Council last April (S/1995/284), the Commission stated
that "it has come to the conclusion that Iraq has not provided a full and
comprehensive disclosure of its past military biological programme or accounted
for items and materials for that programme".

69. Up to the middle of the reporting period, Iraq continued to deny having
ever had any offensive biological weapons programme or activities. It should be
recalled that, in March 1995, Iraq officially submitted a new full, final and
complete disclosure in the biological area which, like its original FFCD in
May 1992, and other declarations since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991),
adhered to the position that Iraq had had only a very small defensive biological
research programme conducted by 10 people from 1985 until the autumn of 1990.
The March 1995 FFCD was so contrary to the information in the Commission's
possession that the Commission saw no merit in initiating verification of the
document. Essentially a stalemate developed between Iraq and the Commission.
The Commission continued to collect information related to Iraq's biological
weapons programme while, in parallel, trying to persuade Iraq, through a
dialogue, to present a true declaration covering its biological weapons
activities.

70. In April and May 1995, Iraq continued to display an uncooperative attitude.
During the Executive Chairman's visit to Iraq (29 May-1 June), Iraq refused even
to meet with the biological experts accompanying the Chairman. The stalemate
continued through June, but with promises from Iraq of information about its
biological weapons programme to be provided only in late June or early July, if
Iraq at that time concluded that there were indications that progress was being
made towards the reintegration of Iraq into the international community (see
para. 10 above).

71. On 1 July 1995, during the Executive Chairman's visit to Iraq (see para. 11
above), Iraq did provide an oral overview of its past programme, admitting for
the first time that it indeed had had an offensive biological weapons programme
from April 1986 to September 1990. But while acknowledging an offensive
programme that included the production of large quantities of two warfare agents
at the Al Hakam facility, the overview, nevertheless, firmly denied
weaponization of these or any other biological warfare agents. During technical
discussions that followed this oral presentation, the Commission's experts
indicated that several major issues related to Iraq's biological weapons
programme - for example weaponization, earlier initiation date of the programme,
larger involvement of Iraq's other establishments, and the material balance of
supplies and agents - were still outstanding and urged Iraq to address those
issues in a new FFCD that Iraq undertook to submit to the Commission.

72. In the second half of July, Iraq prepared a draft FFCD and the UNSCOM
121/BW 26 team was sent to Iraq to review the draft together with Iraqi
personnel in order to assist them in the preparation of a document that would be
amenable to speedy and effective verification.

73. The July draft declaration contained many areas in which Iraq's disclosures
were inconsistent with the Commission's information or where information was
missing or unclear. These deficiencies followed a pattern: they appeared to be
designed to deny information that would either provide evidence of weaponization
or reveal military connections with the biological weapons programme. There was
also a strong suspicion that Iraq's new accounts of agent production and complex
growth media consumption were manipulated to provide what Iraq hoped would pass
as a credible accounting for the missing media, as previously described by the
Commission in its April 1995 report (S/1995/284, paras. 62-69). The
UNSCOM 121/BW 26 team strongly advised Iraq not to submit a deficient
declaration.

74. Nevertheless, on 4 August 1995, Iraq officially submitted its FFCD to the
Executive Chairman. This new FFCD was consistent with Iraq's oral presentation
of 1 July and the July draft and ignored the Commission's suggestions. Because
of the acknowledgement that Iraq's programme was offensive in nature, it was
considered a breakthrough in the stalemate that had existed between the
Commission and Iraq. The Commission initiated verification efforts, including
analysis by the Commission's and visiting experts of various portions of Iraq's
declaration; inquiries with States concerning supplier information; detailed
assessment of the new FFCD and correlation with information available to the
Commission.

75. On 17 August 1995, after the events described in paragraph 14 above, Iraq
informed the Executive Chairman that the full, final and complete disclosure of
4 August should not be considered valid. Iraq then presented to the Chairman a
vastly different account of Iraq's past biological warfare programme that
included weaponization, additional agents and additional sites involved in the
programme. Iraq undertook to submit to the Commission a new FFCD. During this
visit, some documents were obtained which related to the proscribed
biological weapons programme. On 22 August 1995, a biological expert team
(UNSCOM 125/BW 27) visited Baghdad in order to collect detailed information and
clarifications on the revelations which had been presented during the Chairman's
visit. A summation of the most recent revelations of Iraq's biological weapons
programme follows. It should be stressed that it is solely based on
declarations made by Iraq since mid-August, which remain subject to
verification. At this time, therefore, the Commission can give no assurances as
to the correctness and comprehensiveness of that information:

(a) Iraq stated that, in 1974, the Government had adopted a policy to
acquire biological weapons. In 1975, a research and development biological
weapons programme was established under the Al Hazen Ibn Al Haytham Institute at
a site located in Al Salman. The work was poorly directed. Coupled with a lack
of appropriate facilities and equipment, it was said the Institute achieved
little and it closed in 1978;

(b) The failure of the Al Hazen Institute was claimed to be a severe
setback for the programme and the following years are alleged to be devoid of
any biological weapons-related activity. In the early period of the Iran/Iraq
war (perhaps in 1982 or 1983), a prominent Iraqi microbiologist wrote a report
expressing his concerns on scientific developments relating to biological
warfare agents and suggesting that research in this subject be commenced in
Iraq. It is still uncertain whether this report was followed up, but in 1985
the Muthanna State Establishment, Iraq's main facility for chemical weapons
research and development, production and weaponization, recommended the
commencement of a biological weapons programme. In May or June 1985, Muthanna
sought and obtained endorsement from the Ministry of Defence for this programme.
It was anticipated that the biological weapons research would be production-oriented and thus, in addition to laboratory-scale equipment, a pilot plant in
the form of one 150-litre fermenter was purchased by Muthanna. Throughout 1985,
personnel were recruited by Muthanna and by the end of the year, a staff of 10
was working on biological weapons research;

(c) Initial work at Muthanna was said to focus on literature studies,
until April 1986, when bacterial strains were received from overseas. Research
then concentrated on the characterization of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and
Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) to establish pathogenicity, growth and
sporulation conditions, and their storage parameters. (Anthrax is an acute
bacterial disease of animals and humans that can be incurred by ingestion or
inhalation of the bacterial spores or through skin lesions. It produces an
infection resulting in death in days to weeks after exposure. Botulinum toxin
produces an acute muscular paralysis resulting in death of animals or humans.)
As claimed by Iraq, there was no production of agents and the imported
fermenters at Muthanna were not used. However, Muthanna was still looking ahead
to biological warfare agent production and wrote a report to the Ministry of
Defence recommending that the former single-cell protein plant at Taji be taken
over by Muthanna for the production of botulinum toxin. The Ministry of Defence
agreed but, in early 1987, before the plan could be implemented, the proposal
went into abeyance for a short time owing to administrative reasons;

(d) In May 1987, the biological weapons programme was transferred from
Muthanna to Al Salman. The reason for this was said to be that the biological
work interfered with the (presumably higher-priority) chemical weapons programme
at Muthanna. At Al Salman, the biological weapons group administratively came
under the Forensic Research Department of the Technical Research Centre (TRC) of
the Military Industrialization Corporation. After a slow beginning, it appeared
that the biological weapons programme flourished at Al Salman. Equipment,
including the fermenters, was transferred from Muthanna, new equipment was
acquired, and new staff joined the biological weapons group to bring the
workforce up to about 18. The research at Al Salman shifted to issues related
more to the application of the agents as biological weapons. The effects on
larger animals, including sheep, donkeys, monkeys and dogs, were studied within
the laboratory and inhalation chamber, as well as in the field. Initial weapons
field trials were conducted in early 1988. Studies of scale-up production were
initiated on botulinum toxin and anthrax;

(e) The earlier proposal for the acquisition of a biological weapons
production site was revived and the former single-cell protein plant at Taji was
taken over by TRC in mid-1987. The plant was said to be in a run-down condition
and it was not until early in 1988 that it was made operational. With a
workforce of eight people, and using one 450-litre fermenter, production of
botulinum toxin commenced in February or March 1988 and continued until
September/October of that year. Production of botulinum toxin also was carried
out at Al Salman in flasks or laboratory fermenters;

(f) Initial production fermentation studies with anthrax at Al Salman used
7- and 14-litre laboratory-scale fermenters at the end of 1988. From the
beginning of 1989, the 150-litre fermenter transferred from Muthanna was used to
produce Bacillus subtilis, a simulant for anthrax as a biological warfare agent.
After five or six runs of producing subtilis, anthrax production began at
Al Salman around March 1989. About 15 or 16 production runs were performed,
producing up to 1,500 litres of anthrax, which was concentrated to 150 litres.
Additional production with the laboratory fermenters was also accomplished;

(g) Towards the end of 1987, a report on the success of biological weapons
work by TRC was submitted to MIC. This resulted in a decision to enter the
full-scale production phase for a biological weapons programme;

(h) In March 1988, a new site for biological weapons production was
selected at a location now known as Al Hakam. The project was given the
designator "324". The design philosophy for the Al Hakam plant was taken from
the chemical weapons research and production facility at Muthanna: the
buildings were to be well separated, research areas were segregated from
production areas and the architectural features of Muthanna buildings copied
where appropriate. The plan for the new facility at Al Hakam envisaged research
and development, production and storage of biological warfare agents, but not
munitions filling. Construction of the production buildings at the northern end
of the Al Hakam site was largely complete by September 1988 after which work
commenced on erection of the laboratory buildings;

(i) In 1988, a search for production equipment for the biological weapons
programme was conducted in Iraq. Two 1,850-litre and seven 1,480-litre
fermenters from the Veterinary Research Laboratories were transferred to
Al Hakam in November 1988. The 450-litre fermenter line at Taji, which was at
the time used in the production of botulinum toxin, was also earmarked for
transfer to Al Hakam and was relocated there in October 1988. From mid-1988,
large fermenters were also sought from abroad, but after Iraq completed a
contract for a 5,000-litre fermenter, an export licence was not granted;

(j) At Al Hakam, production of botulinum toxin for weapons purposes began
in April 1989 and anthrax in May 1989. Initially much of the fermentation
capacity for anthrax was used for the production of anthrax simulant for weapons
field trials. Production of anthrax itself, it is claimed, began in earnest in
1990. In total, about 6,000 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin and
8,425 litres of anthrax were produced at Al Hakam during 1990;

(k) From the early period of the biological weapons programme at
Al Salman, there was interest in other potential biological warfare agents
beyond anthrax and botulinum toxin. It became the policy to expand the
biological weapons programme into these other fields. Thus, from the design
phase of Al Hakam as a biological weapons research, production and storage
facility, there were plans for such diversification, including facilities to
work on viruses and laboratory space for genetic engineering studies;

(l) In April 1988, in addition to anthrax and botulinum toxin, a new
agent, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), was added to the bacterial
research work at Al Salman. (Clostridium perfringens produces a condition known
as gas gangrene, so named because of the production of gaseous rotting of flesh,
common in war casualties requiring amputation of limbs.) In August 1989, work
on perfringens was transferred from Al Salman to Al Hakam;

(m) In May 1988, studies were said to be initiated at Al Salman on
aflatoxin. (Aflatoxin is a toxin commonly associated with fungal-contaminated
food grains and is known for its induction of liver cancers. It is generally
considered to be non-lethal in humans but of serious medical concern because of
its carcinogenic activity.) Later research was also done on trichothecene
mycotoxins such as T-2 and DAS. (Tricothecene mycotoxins produce nausea,
vomiting, diarrhoea and skin irritation and, unlike most microbial toxins, can
be absorbed through the skin.) Research was conducted into the toxic effects of
aflatoxins as biological warfare agents and their effect when combined with
other chemicals. Aflatoxin was produced by the growth of the fungus aspergillus
in 5-litre flasks at Al Salman;

(n) In 1989, it was decided to move aflatoxin production for biological
weapons purposes to a facility at Fudaliyah. The facility was used for
aflatoxin production in flasks from April/May 1990 to December 1990. A total of
about 1,850 litres of toxin in solution was declared as having been produced at
Fudaliyah;

(o) Another fungal agent examined by Iraq for its biological weapons
potential was wheat cover smut. (Wheat cover smut produces a black growth on
wheat and other cereal grains; contaminated grain cannot be used as foodstuff.)
After small production at Al Salman, larger-scale production was carried out
near Mosul in 1987 and 1988 and considerable quantities of contaminated grain
were harvested. The idea was said not to have been further developed; however,
it was only sometime in 1990 that the contaminated grain was destroyed by
burning at the Fudaliyah site;

(p) Another toxin worked for weapons application was ricin. (Ricin is a
protein toxin derived from castor bean plants that is highly lethal to humans
and animals. When inhaled, ricin produces a severe diffuse breakdown of lung
tissue resulting in a haemorrhagic pneumonia and death.) It appears that work
started in 1988 at Al Salman. The first samples of ricin were supplied from the
Sammarra drug factory and after some initial toxicological tests in conjunction
with Muthanna, the quantity required for a weapons test was determined. Ten
litres of concentrated ricin were prepared. A weapons trial was conducted with
the assistance of Muthanna using artillery shells. The test was considered to
be a failure. The project was said to have been abandoned after this;

(q) Work on virus for biological weapons purposes started at Al Salman in
July 1990. Shortly thereafter, a decision was taken to acquire the Foot and
Mouth Disease facility at Daura and it was taken over for biological weapons
purposes, in addition to the continued production of vaccines. It was decided
that the Daura plant within the biological weapons programme would include
facilities for bacteriology, virology and genetic engineering. Three viral
agents for the biological weapons programme were obtained from within Iraq:
haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, a rotavirus and camel pox virus.
(Haemorrhagic conjunctivitis is an acute disease that causes extreme pain and
temporary blindness. Rotavirus causes acute diarrhoea that could lead to
dehydration and death. Camel pox causes fever and skin rash in camels;
infection of humans is rare.) It was stated that very little work had been done
on these viruses and none had been produced in quantity;

(r) Early in 1988, efforts began in the weaponization of biological
warfare agents and some of the senior scientists involved in the biological
weapons programme at TRC were sent to Iraq's munitions factories to familiarize
themselves with this aspect. At about the same time, TRC first discussed with
the Muthanna State Establishment weaponization of biological warfare agents and
it was agreed that, because of Muthanna's experience in the weaponization of
chemical agents, the Establishment would also provide the necessary assistance
for the selection of weapons types for warfare agents and the conduct of field
trials;

(s) The first field trials of biological weapons were said to have been
conducted in March 1988 at Muthanna's weapons test range, Muhammadiyat. Two
tests were done on the same day, one using the anthrax simulant, Bacillus
subtilis, and the other using botulinum toxin. The munitions chosen for the
tests were aerial bombs positioned on adjacent stands. The effects were
observed on test animals (for botulinum toxin) or on Petri dishes (for
subtilis). The first tests of both agents were considered failures. The agents
in both cases did not spread far enough. Later in March, the second field trial
with the same weapons systems was said to have been conducted and it was
considered successful;

(t) No further weapons field trials were claimed to have been carried out
for the next 18 months. In November 1989, further weaponization trials for
anthrax (again using subtilis), botulinum toxin and aflatoxin were conducted,
this time using 122 mm rockets, again at Muhammadiyat. These tests were also
considered a success. Live firings of filled 122 mm rockets with the same
agents were carried out in May 1990. Trials of R400 aerial bombs with Bacillus
subtilis were first conducted in mid-August 1990. Final R400 trials using
subtilis, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin followed in late August 1990;

(u) After 2 August 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's
biological weapons programme was drastically intensified: the emphasis was
shifted to production and later to weaponization of produced biological warfare
agents. The foot and mouth disease plant at Daura was converted to biological
weapons production. The six vaccine fermenters with ancillary equipment at the
plant were used for production of botulinum toxin from November 1990 until
15 January 1991, by which time about 5,400 litres of concentrated toxin had been
produced. It was decided that there was an additional requirement for anthrax
production and the fermenters at Al Hakam that had been previously used for the
production of botulinum toxin there were modified to meet the requirements for
increased anthrax production. Production of perfringens for biological weapons
purposes also began at Al Hakam in August 1990 using the 150-litre fermenter
which had been relocated from Al Salman. A total of 340 litres of concentrated
perfringens was produced;

(v) In December 1990, a programme was initiated to develop an additional
delivery means, a biological weapons spray tank based on a modified aircraft
drop tank. The concept was that tanks would be fitted either to a piloted
fighter or to a remotely piloted aircraft to spray up to 2,000 litres of anthrax
over a target. The field trials for both the spray tank and the remotely
piloted vehicle were conducted in January 1991. The test was considered a
failure and no further effort towards further development was said to have been
made. Nevertheless, three additional drop tanks were modified and stored, ready
for use. They are said to have been destroyed in July 1991. The prototype
spray tank used for trials was claimed to have been destroyed during the Gulf
war bombing;

(w) Weaponization of biological warfare agents began on a large scale in
December 1990 at Muthanna. As declared, the R400 bombs were selected as the
appropriate munition for aerial delivery and 100 were filled with botulinum
toxin, 50 with anthrax and 16 with aflatoxin. In addition, 25 Al Hussein
warheads, which had been produced in a special production run since August 1990,
were filled with botulinum toxin (13), anthrax (10) and aflatoxin (2). These
weapons were then deployed in early January 1991 at four locations, where they
remained throughout the war;

(x) In summary, Iraq has declared the production of at least 19,000 litres
of concentrated botulinum toxin (nearly 10,000 litres were filled into
munitions), 8,500 litres of concentrated anthrax (some 6,500 litres were filled
into munitions) and 2,200 litres of concentrated aflatoxin (1,580 litres were
filled into munitions);

(y) Iraq declared that it had decided to destroy biological munitions and
the remaining biological warfare bulk agent after the Gulf war. An order for
destruction was claimed to have been given orally, and no Iraqi representative
seems to be able to recall an exact date for the order or the dates of
destruction operations. The order was said to have been given some time in May
or June 1991. All filled biological bombs were relocated to one airfield and
deactivation chemicals added to agent fill. The bombs were then explosively
destroyed and burnt, and the remains buried. A similar disposal technique was
used for the missile warheads at a separate site. In late August 1995, Iraq
showed to an UNSCOM team a location which it claimed to be a warhead destruction
site. However, later on, Iraq changed its story and was unable to identify with
any degree of certainty the exact location of warheads destruction operations;

(z) Of the bacterial bulk agent stored at Al Hakam, Iraq stated that a
similar deactivation procedure had been adopted. The detoxified liquid was
emptied into the facility's septic tank and eventually dumped at the site.
About 8,000 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin, over 2,000 litres of
concentrated anthrax, 340 litres of concentrated perfringens and an unspecified
quantity of aflatoxin, according to Iraq's declaration, were destroyed at
Al Hakam.

76. Iraq's biological weapons programme as described to the Commission embraced
a comprehensive range of agents and munitions. Agents under Iraq's biological
weapons programme included lethal agents, e.g. anthrax, botulinum toxin and
ricin, and incapacitating agents, e.g. aflatoxin, mycotoxins, haemorrhagic
conjunctivitis virus and rotavirus. The scope of biological warfare agents
worked on by Iraq encompassed both anti-personnel and anti-plant weapons. The
programme covered a whole variety of biological weapons delivery means, from
tactical weapons (e.g. 122 mm rockets and artillery shells), to strategic
weapons (e.g. aerial bombs and Al Hussein warheads filled with anthrax,
botulinum toxin and aflatoxin) and "economic" weapons, e.g. wheat cover smut.
Given the Iraqi claim that only five years had elapsed since its declared
inception in 1985, the achievements of Iraq's biological weapons programme were
remarkable.

77. The achievements included the production and actual weaponization of large
quantities of bacterial agents and aflatoxin and research on a variety of other
biological weapons agents. A special dedicated facility, Al Hakam, for
biological weapons research and development as well as large-scale production
was under construction, with most essential elements completed at the time of
the Gulf war and production and storage capabilities operational. A number of
other facilities and establishments in Iraq provided active support for the
biological weapons programme. The programme appears to have a degree of balance
suggesting a high level of management and planning that envisioned the inclusion
of all aspects of a biological weapons programme, from research to
weaponization. It is also reasonable to assume that, given that biological
weapons were considered as strategic weapons and were actually deployed,
detailed thought must have been given to the doctrine of operational use for
these weapons of mass destruction.

78. It appears that, until August 1990, the biological weapons programme had
been developing at a steady pace, continuing to expand and diversify. In
August 1990, a "crash" programme was launched and the imperatives of production
and weaponization took over.

79. The documentation on Iraq's biological weapons programme obtained by the
Commission in August 1995 appears to represent a fraction of all the documents
generated under the programme. For example, studies were described orally by
Iraq to the Commission that are not included in any of the documentation. Some
of the studies referred to in the documents differ significantly from those
described to the Commission. Information available to the Commission from other
sources does not correspond in important aspects to the information provided by
Iraq.

80. In spite of the substantial new disclosures made by Iraq since mid-August,
the Commission does not believe that Iraq has given a full and correct account
of its biological weapons programme. The Commission intends to continue its
intensive inspection, verification and analytical efforts with the objective of
presenting to the Security Council, as soon as possible, its assessments of
Iraq's compliance with the biological weapons-related provisions of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991). Success will depend on Iraq's cooperation with
these efforts and its complete openness, including provision to the Commission
of all documentation and of a truly full, final and complete disclosure of
Iraq's proscribed biological weapons programme.

VI. NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

81. The Director General of IAEA is reporting separately on the activities of
the UNSC 687 Action Team set up to implement paragraphs 12 and 13 of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) and the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and
verification approved under resolution 715 (1991) (S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1).

82. The Special Commission continues, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii)
of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), to
provide its assistance and cooperation to the IAEA Action Team through the
provision of special expertise and logistical, informational and other
operational support for the carrying out of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring
and verification. In accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution
687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 715 (1991), it designates sites for
inspection. In accordance with paragraph 3 (iii) of resolution 707 (1991), it
decides on requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or equipment
relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear activities.
Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of resolution
715 (1991), to perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field
with the Director General of IAEA, as may be necessary to coordinate activities
under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, including making use of
commonly available services and information to the fullest extent possible, in
order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources.

83. During the current reporting period, the Commission has reviewed and
concurred with a number of IAEA evaluations of Iraqi requests to relocate
materials and equipment within Iraq, participated with IAEA teams during routine
inspections, provided, through the German Government, fixed-wing (C-160) and
rotating-wing (CH-53G) aircraft for the transport of IAEA inspectors into Iraq
from Bahrain and between points within Iraq and provided the UNSC 687 Action
Team with working room and supporting facilities at the Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre.

84. Close coordination between IAEA and the Commission is already ongoing in
the management and control of machine tool movements within Iraq, and a better
integration between the IAEA and UNSCOM systems of survey has been implemented,
for example for machines located at the Nassr State Establishment, which are
under both missile and nuclear monitoring. Cross-disciplinary inspections have
been more frequent in order to increase the information flow and develop cross-
fertilization between the specialized teams. IAEA and the Commission also
cooperated in the initial assessment of the documents obtained in Iraq on
20 August 1995.

85. The Commission's nuclear experts will participate in certain inspections
decided by the Action Team during the coming months. Regular meetings are now
scheduled, alternatively in New York and Vienna, to exchange information from
all sources and to plan cross-disciplinary inspections. Commission experts
regularly visit Vienna to update the IAEA photo library. The Commission's
experts are continuing to participate in IAEA's negotiations with the Russian
Federation regarding the sale of the nuclear materials removed from Iraq and
reprocessed in Russia.

VII. OTHER ACTIVITIES

A. Export/import mechanism

86. As mentioned in the April 1995 report, the joint proposal prepared by the
Special Commission and IAEA for the export/import mechanism called for in
paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) was submitted to the
Sanctions Committee in February 1995. Upon receipt of the concurrence of that
Committee, it is to be transmitted to the Council for its approval.

87. In the course of the consideration of the proposal by the Sanctions
Committee, certain delegations requested information on the modalities which
would be followed by the Special Commission and IAEA when implementing the
mechanism in Iraq. On 17 July 1995, the Executive Chairman of the Commission
sent a letter to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee responding to this
request. In that letter, the Chairman pointed out that the Security Council had
on several occasions confirmed that the sole responsibility for carrying out
their mandates in Iraq rested with the Commission and IAEA. Nevertheless, the
Commission and IAEA had kept the Council fully informed of their activities and
their modus operandi. In keeping with that practice, it was useful to indicate
the general principles which would be followed in implementing the mechanism in
Iraq.

88. In his letter, the Executive Chairman explained that an office of
export/import specialists would be established in the Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre which would serve as an administrative clearing house for
communications from Iraq regarding the notification forms which it would be
required to submit. That office and the Centre would also implement inspections
within Iraq to ensure that the mechanism was being complied with. These
inspections would be as vigorous as necessary to ensure that no violations of
the export/import regime would occur. In this regard, the Commission and the
IAEA intended to rely on their full rights under the relevant Security Council
resolutions (including resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), the
plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1
and Corr.1), the privileges and immunities as set forth in the exchange of
letters between the United Nations and Iraq of 6 and 17 May 1991 and the
decision to be taken by the Security Council approving the mechanism.

89. The letter further stated that inspections under the mechanism would take
place not only at the declared end-user sites where notified items would be
tagged, as appropriate, and entered into the site protocols, but would also be
conducted anywhere else in Iraq, including points of entry into Iraq, where
there was reason to believe that notified items or dual-use items in respect of
which there should have been notification might be found. To ensure Iraqi
compliance the monitoring activities would be carried out in whatever ways
yielded the most effective results, whether by monitoring end-user sites, or
border crossings, or other locations.

90. The Executive Chairman proposed, when the Sanctions Committee was in a
position to forward the proposal for the mechanism to the Security Council, as
the tripartite proposal called for in paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), that
it should be accompanied, for purposes of information, by his letter setting out
in general terms the modalities which it was intended would be followed in
implementing the mechanism.

91. On 20 July 1995, the Sanctions Committee resumed consideration of the
Special Commission's and IAEA's joint proposal for the export/import mechanism,
together with the Executive Chairman's letter of 17 July. The Committee
approved the proposal and the suggestion of the Executive Chairman that its
transmission to the Council should be accompanied by the letter of 17 July.
Because of a request, formal transmission to the Council has been postponed.
Transmission is expected to take place as soon as all members indicate the
concurrence of their Governments.

92. In the meantime, the Special Commission has continued its efforts to
prepare for the implementation of the mechanism after its adoption by the
Security Council so as to be able to put it into effect as of such time as the
Council directs.

B. National implementation measures

93. There have been no new developments since the Commission's reports in April
and June 1995 regarding the national implementation measures which Iraq is
required to take under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The
Commission has continued to pursue the matter and to press for the adoption of
the necessary legislation. On each occasion that the matter has been raised,
the Iraqi representatives have stated that the legislation is with the Office of
the Presidency and that no problems were foreseen in its adoption. Assurances
that such adoption would be forthcoming in a matter of days or weeks have not
been fulfilled. The absence of this legislation, almost four years after the
adoption of resolution 715 (1991) approving the plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification, is of great concern to the Commission. There is no doubt that the
enactment of this legislation, inter alia, prohibiting Iraqi citizens from
engaging in activities proscribed by resolution 687 (1991), would be regarded as
an indication of Iraq's will to comply fully with the requirements of the
resolution.

C. Aerial surveillance

94. The aerial imagery provided by the Commission's high-altitude surveillance
aircraft (U-2) and the Baghdad-based aerial inspection team continues to be an
essential tool for the monitoring regime and for the investigation of new sites.
To date, over 600 missions have been undertaken by the aerial inspection team
and 269 missions by the U-2.

95. The establishment of the photographic development laboratory in the
Monitoring Centre in Baghdad has facilitated the swift processing and review of
the aerial photographic product. The capability to process photography at the
Centre has also proved a useful asset for ground inspection teams.

VIII. FINANCE, ORGANIZATION AND AIR SUPPORT

96. The financial situation of the Special Commission is more precarious than
ever. Funds, either from frozen Iraqi assets or provided as contributions to
the Commission, have been trickling into the escrow account established under
Security Council resolution 778 (1992) on a very irregular basis. While funding
has been secured for the remainder of 1995, funds have yet to be identified for
1996. The level of operational expenditures of the Commission from its
inception in May 1991 until the end of 1995 will have reached $100 million. The
operational budget of the Commission, under the current rate of activities, will
be around $20 million for the next year.

97. The above figures only reflect the operational budget of the Commission,
which has greatly benefited from the assistance of supporting Governments
through the direct provision of services, staff and equipment. Such Governments
may seek reimbursement when adequate funds are obtained from Iraq, which has
responsibility for all costs incurred under section C of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

98. The number of the Special Commission's experts in New York has been
increased over the last few months to cope with the growing workload. All
additional experts have been provided by Member States at their own cost.

99. The Commission is strengthening its communications system between New York
and Baghdad and is acquiring an improved voice and fax data system which will
enable the transmission of data in a highly secure manner.

100. The office space situation of the Commission in New York is becoming more
difficult. It will be impossible to accommodate, within the currently available
space, the additional documents obtained in August which are now arriving in New
York. A special request has been made for additional secure space for this
purpose.

101. The Commission has described the establishment, preparations and resources
of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre in earlier reports
(S/1994/1138 and S/1995/284). All the projects planned to renovate the Canal
Hotel facilities for the Centre, in part using Iraqi labour and materials, are
now completed. This effort has taken up much of the last year and could not
have been finished without the generous contributions of personnel, equipment
and materials from supporting States.

102. The field office in Bahrain continues to support the operations of the
Commission and the activities of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.
The Commission wishes to place on record its gratitude to the Government of
Bahrain for its great generosity and unstinting support in the establishment and
maintenance of the field office in Bahrain. This has constituted one of the
most important contributions to the work of the Commission and has considerably
expedited that work.

103. Recently, the Secretary-General noted the substantial contributions of air
support from the Government of Germany for the operations of the Special
Commission and IAEA in Iraq (A/50/1, para. 701). Indeed, without the C-160
transport aircraft and the CH-53G helicopters, the Commission would not have
accomplished its work and could not meet the requirements of the Security
Council in carrying out ongoing monitoring and verification and its other
responsibilities in Iraq.

104. The airlift support provided by Germany has been of the highest quality.
One measure of the success of this effort is that the helicopter unit recently
achieved 3,000 accident-free flying hours in Iraq under the difficult and
complex flight conditions existing there. The C-160 Transall aircraft has flown
over 10,000 passengers into and out of Iraq. Another measure is the outstanding
logistical support from the contributing Government to its forward-deployed
units in Bahrain and in Iraq. Air support will continue to be critical to
Commission and IAEA operations in Iraq.

105. Helicopter support in Iraq has been and will continue to be vital for the
independence of the operations of the Commission and IAEA. Indeed, with the
lifting of sanctions and the resumption of international trade, the requirement
for helicopter support will increase significantly. Helicopters will provide
efficient transportation for inspection teams to travel to border crossings and
points of entry. At the same time, the current requirements will remain for
low-altitude aerial inspection photography; medical evacuation; rapid, no-notice
movement of inspection teams; and airlift for vehicles. These many needs are
met with the CH-53G, which appears to be the most efficient aircraft currently
available for this purpose. The Commission remains profoundly grateful to the
Government of Germany for its unique and vital contribution in carrying out the
Security Council's mandate in Iraq under section C of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991).

IX. CONCLUSION

106. During the period under review and since the Special Commission's report in
June 1995, very important developments have taken place in all areas, and a
considerable amount of information has become available to the Commission
concerning Iraq's proscribed programmes. The Commission's preliminary analysis
of this information reveals that Iraq has been concealing proscribed activities
and that, consequently, some of the assessments in the Commission's earlier
reports have to be revised.

107. Iraq has been misleading the Commission by withholding information that,
before the Gulf war, it had secretly produced Scud-type missile engines and
carried out research and development on a variety of projects on missiles of
prohibited ranges. Furthermore, Iraq's efforts to conceal its biological
weapons programme, its chemical missile warhead flight tests and work on the
development of a missile for the delivery of a nuclear device led it to provide
incorrect information concerning certain of its missile activities. The new
revelations cast into doubt the veracity of Iraq's previous declarations in the
missile area, including the material balance for proscribed weapons and items.
Consequently, Iraq has agreed to provide a new declaration with a full, final
and complete disclosure in the missile area.

108. In the chemical weapons area, the Special Commission's investigations have
led to disclosure of activities aiming at the acquisition of a considerable
capability for the production of the advanced nerve agent VX. Whether Iraq
still keeps precursors in storage for immediate VX use has not been fully
clarified. The revelations also shed new light on the scope and ambition of
Iraq's chemical weapons programme. The Commission must adjust the direction of
some of its monitoring activities, especially to prevent Iraq from using its
chemical compounds, equipment and activities for secret acquisition of chemical
weapons. Further destruction of some Iraqi chemical assets has to be
contemplated. The Commission has requested Iraq to provide a new declaration
comprising a full, final and complete disclosure of its capabilities with regard
to chemical weapons.

109. The Special Commission has detected and identified a hitherto secret
offensive biological weapons programme in Iraq comprising a large-scale
production of biological warfare agents, the filling and deployment of missile
warheads and aerial bombs with agents, as well as biological weapons research
and development activities of considerable width and depth. As late as August
of this year, Iraq presented to the Commission a formal, but essentially false,
declaration on its biological weapons activities. Consequently, the Commission
has requested again and - Iraq has agreed to provide - a full, final and
complete disclosure of its biological weapons programme in the form of a new
declaration. Much remains to be verified with regard to these weapons, in
particular the destruction of munitions and bulk agents.

110. Given the new disclosures, the Special Commission is obliged to consider,
in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the
possible destruction of facilities and items which were used in the production
of biological weapons.

111. For the fulfilment of the Special Commission's tasks, it needs a complete
understanding of the concept behind each stage of the development of all
proscribed weapons. A special concern of the Commission in this respect is the
matter of the deployment of Iraq's proscribed missiles with non-conventional
warheads for strategic and offensive use.

112. The increased flow of data, whether originating in Iraq's new admissions or
in recently obtained documents and other types of documentation, has opened up
new possibilities for a solid and credible account of the proscribed weapons and
weapons capabilities. With these new developments, the prospects for the full
implementation of the weapons chapter of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)
have improved.

113. Further exploration and investigation are necessary to verify that Iraq's
new statements and the declarations in all the weapons areas requested by the
Commission are true representations of the facts. The large amount of
documentation obtained will be of use in this regard. The Special Commission
will concentrate its personnel and technical resources in order to achieve a
complete and reliable account as fast as possible.

114. The system for ongoing monitoring and verification is now in place and has
been tested for some time. It is as much in the interests of Iraq as of the
Commission that the ongoing monitoring and verification system functions without
any flaws. Even if the new revelations have led to adjustments, redirection and
augmentation of activities, the system has already proved to be robust and
fundamentally sound. Indeed, it was during the build-up of the monitoring
structures that the Commission's scientists and analysts were able to detect
Iraq's concealment of its hitherto secret biological weapons programme.
Likewise, as mentioned above, Iraqi efforts to circumvent the control
arrangements in the missile and chemical areas have been detected before any
serious damage has occurred. The Commission also detected undeclared efforts by
Iraq to establish a covert procurement network for activities under monitoring.

115. In this report, the Commission has outlined its concerns in all areas of
its responsibility. Questions can still be raised about the intentions of Iraq
as regards possible remnants of its proscribed programmes. In the coming
months, the Government of Iraq must present three new declarations comprising
full, final and complete disclosures of all its proscribed capabilities. Iraq
must at the same time hand over the weapons documentation still in its hands.
Access to and control of all relevant documentary evidence is necessary for the
Commission to be able quickly and effectively to verify Iraq's declarations and
ascertain that all Iraq's proscribed weapons capabilities have indeed been
disposed of. If the requested declarations and actions by Iraq fulfil the
requirements of the Security Council, a solid base will be laid for the full
implementation of all aspects of section C of Security Council resolution
687 (1991). With an effective and proven monitoring and verification system in
place, the Commission should be able to confirm that Iraq would have no
capability to project any threat with proscribed weapons against its neighbours.

116. A necessary prerequisite for a comprehensive solution is that Iraq
demonstrate a full openness and a manifest willingness to cooperate in all its
dealings with the Special Commission. Iraq's stated preparedness to provide
such cooperation is a hopeful sign. The true character of Iraq's expressed
political intent will soon be tested by the Commission in its inspections and
analytical activity. If Iraq were genuinely to translate its statements into
action, there would be a real hope for the completion of the task entrusted to
the Special Commission within a reasonable time-frame.