Tag Archives: Portal-To-Portal Act

Plaintiffs, employees who installed fire protection services (sprinklers) on behalf of their employer, filed this lawsuit claiming that Defendant failed to pay them for all of their compensable work time. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant improperly failed to start their work day each day when they were required to come to Defendant’s facility to pick up expensive tools necessary for their work and load Defendant’s trucks. Similarly, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to properly pay them for time spent when they were required to return such tools (and work vehicles) to Defendant’s facility at the end of each work day. The Defendant argued that such time was precluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act, and in any event was de minimus such that it was not compensable time. The court held that the facts could support a finding that such time was “integral and indispensable” to their work, thus making it potentially compensable. As such, it denied Defendant’s motion.

Rejecting Defendant’s contentions, the court reasoned:

“The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs “have never been instructed or directed to come to the [warehouse] before the start of the workday or at the end of the workday to pick up or drop off tools,” so loading of equipment at the warehouse cannot be an integral and indispensable part of their jobs. Defs.’ Mot. 7. The Plaintiffs contend that loading the equipment was integral because the equipment was necessary to installing sprinkler systems, and the Defendants required that they pick up the equipment at the warehouse. Pl.’s Opp’n 2–4.

An activity is “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s principal activities if it is “(1) necessary to the principal work performed and (2) done for the benefit of the employer.” Perez, 601 F.Supp.2d at 676 (citing Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 399 F.3d 894, 902–03 (9th Cir.2003)).

The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiffs’ principal work was sprinkler system installation. See Defs.’ Mot. 6; Pls.’ Opp’n 2. Phillips’s affidavit is that the equipment he loaded and unloaded included items “necessary” to installing the sprinkler systems, such as the sprinkler heads, and because this equipment was expensive, Fire Protection “did not want [it] delivered directly to the job site” and “required [employees] to pick the[ ] [equipment] up at the warehouse, sign for [it], and account for [it].” Phillips Aff. ¶ 9.

From the evidence in Phillips’s affidavit, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Phillips needed the equipment loaded at the warehouse to complete his job (the first part of the “integral and indispensable” inquiry).From his testimony that Fire Protection did not want expensive items delivered directly to the job sites, and required that the pipefitters pick up and sign for the equipment, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the loading and unloading was “done for the benefit of the employer.” It is genuinely disputed whether Fire Protection required the plaintiffs to load and unload equipment, and whether the loading and unloading was “integral” to their “principal activity” requiring compensation under the FLSA.”

Rejecting Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs were not entitled to be paid for travel time, the court explained:

“The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ “voluntary carpooling” while “transporting tools, equipment and supplies” is not compensable under the FLSA. Defs.’ Reply 4. The Plaintiffs contend that because their workday started with loading the trucks at the warehouse, they must be compensated for all subsequent travel time within the workday. Pls.’ Opp’n 3–5.

The Portal–to–Portal Act did not change the “continuous workday” rule that “any walking, riding, or traveling time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and before the end of the employee’s last principal activity … is covered by the FLSA.” Epps, 2011 WL 1566004, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applicable regulations provide that:

Time spent by an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during the workday must be counted as hours worked. Where an employee is required to report to a meeting place … to pick up and to carry tools, the travel from the designated place to the work place is part of the day’s work, and must be counted as hours worked regardless of contract, custom, or practice. 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.

As discussed above, Phillips’s affidavit that Fire Protection required him to report to the warehouse to load and sign out expensive equipment Fire Protection did not want delivered directly to the job site creates a genuine dispute whether the loading and unloading was a principal activity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, it also creates a genuine dispute about whether travel from the warehouse to the job site and the return to the warehouse at the end of the day are “part of the day’s work” requiring compensation under the FLSA.The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ FLSA unpaid wages claim will be denied.”

The issues discussed in this case are far from unique in the work world. However, many employers continue to violate the law, assuming that they need only pay employees for time spent at customer work sites, where the employer is profiting from the employees’ work. This case serves as a reminder that this is a misconception of the law.

Before the Court was Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. This was the second such Motion, because the Court had denied the prior application with leave to further establish the factual record. Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to be paid for certain time spent training in Defendants’ CRT Apprentice program outside of their regular workweek. The Court disagreed, granting Defendants’ Motion. As discussed below, the Court reasoned that since the primary benefit of the training was to the Plaintiffs, such time spent training was not compensable under the FLSA or Portal-to-Portal Act.

Discussing the facts pertinent to its inquiry the Court explained:

“Plaintiffs are current or former apprentices in a Baltimore City Fire Department (BCFD) three-year Firefighter/Paramedic Apprenticeship Program. Plaintiffs allege that as part of their apprenticeship they were required to attend class and perform on-the-job practical training on an ambulance and in the hospital without compensation in violation of the FLSA.

It is undisputed that one of the duties of a Firefighter/Paramedic is to provide emergency medical care, including Advanced Life Support. In order to provide Advanced Life Support, Maryland state law requires licensure as a Cardiac Rescue Technician (CRT). Md.Code Regs. 30.01.01.20. State law designates the State Emergency Medical Services Board (EMS Board) to approve CRT courses, conduct examinations, and issue CRT licenses. Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 13-516(a)(2) [a portion of the facts is excluded here]…

The Fire Department required remedial training for apprentices when they failed the required national registry EMT test or any of the exams during the CRT-I course. In addition, if students failed the National Registry exam three times, the National Registry required the students to take a 48 hour review before it would allow them to re-take the exam.

The Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems issued regulations governing the content of ALS education programs. Md.Code Regs. 30.04.02.01 et seq. In addition to classroom training, ALS students must also complete a supervised clinical experience, which includes the practice of skills within clinical education facilities, and a supervised field internship, which includes the practice of skills while functioning in a prehospital ALS environment. Id. 30.04.02.05. During the clinical and field training, the MIEMSS regulations require that the student is supervised by clinical and field preceptors. Id. 30.04.02.06. In the field portion of the training, the ratio of students to preceptors must be one to one. Id. 30.04.02.06(F)(2).

Upon entering the fire academy, the apprentices signed an Apprenticeship Agreement in which they agreed to the terms of the Apprenticeship Standards filed with the Maryland Apprenticeship and Training Council. The Standards include a requirement that apprentices will complete a minimum of 144 hours per year of related instruction and that these hours will not be considered as hours worked when given outside regular working hours. In addition to the CRT-I course, apprentices were required to undergo enhanced training, including courses in pump operations, aerial operations, hazmat tech, arson awareness/sprinkler, and rescue technician.

During the second portion of the apprentices’ training, they worked an eight day cycle, with 4 days on and 4 days off. Training to obtain their CRT licensure was sometimes scheduled on the apprentices’ days off. Apprentices were not compensated during the off-duty training times. Plaintiffs contend that they should have been compensated for this off-duty training time under the FLSA.”

Discussing the relevant law and concluding that Plaintiffs’ after-hours training was not compensable under the FLSA, the Court stated:

“Plaintiffs allege that the City violated this provision by refusing to pay them overtime for the hours spent in training outside their regular workweek.

Cases analyzing whether training mandated by employers or potential employers should be compensable as hours worked include cases in which the potential employer requires the completion of training before an individual may be hired and cases in which the individual is an apprentice or already an employee and required to complete training as part of the apprenticeship or as an agreed upon condition to hiring. The seminal cases relating to training and the FLSA are the companion cases, Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) and Walling v. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry., 330 U.S. 158 (1947). In Portland Terminal, the defendant railroad had required the completion of a course of practical training before individuals could be hired as prospective yard brakemen. 330 U.S. at 149. The course involved a progressive increase in the trainees’ ability to act as a brakeman beginning with observing routine activities through gradually conducting the actual work of a brakeman under close scrutiny. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the activities of the trainee did not displace any of the regular employees, who were required to supervise any actual work done by the trainees, and did not expedite the company business, but may at times have impeded it. Id. at 149-50. Once certified as competent, the individuals who completed the training comprised a pool of qualified workmen available to the railroad when needed. Id. at 150. The Supreme Court focused on whether the trainees were to be considered employees and thus protected by the FLSA. Id. The FLSA defines employ as “to suffer or permit to work.” Id. at 152; 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Despite the broad definition, the Supreme Court held that it could not “be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction.” Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152. The Court compared the training at issue to courses in railroading in a public or private vocational school, in which “it could not be reasonably suggested that [the students] were employees of the railroad merely because the school’s graduates would constitute a labor pool for the railroad.” Id. at 152-53. Thus, the Court held that when the railroads received no “immediate advantage” from the work done by the trainees, the trainees were not employees under the FLSA. Id. at 153.

In analyzing Portland Terminal, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that the general test used to determine if an employee is entitled to the protections of the Act is “whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor.” McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir.1989). In McLaughlin, the defendant owned a snack foods distribution business in which he required new hires to spend five days travelling an ordinary route with an experienced routeman as training before they were hired. 877 F.2d at 1208. The trainees loaded and unloaded the delivery truck, restocked stores with the defendants products, were given instruction on how to drive the trucks, were introduced to retailers, were taught basic snack food vending maintenance, and occasionally helped in preparing orders of goods with financial exchanges. Id. The court found that, unlike in Portland Terminal, the prospective employees were simply helping to service a route, and the instruction they received did not rise to the level that one would receive in a general, vocational course in outside salesmanship. Id. at 1210. Instead, the court found that the trainees were taught only simple, specific job functions related to the defendant’s business. Id. For those reasons, the court concluded that the trainees were entitled to be considered covered employees under the FLSA. Id. Compare Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that firefighter trainees were not employees because they obtained training comparable to a vocational school and the defendant was not immediately benefited by the trainees’ activities as their training activities were supervised and they did not assume the duties of career firefighters; the benefit to the defendant from the plaintiffs’ supervised training activities was de minimis ).

Where trainees are already employees, the Courts look also to the Portal-to-Portal Act, which provides that an employer need not pay an employee for activities that are “preliminary or postliminary” to the principal activity or activities the employee is employed to perform. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted the mandate of the Portal-to-Portal Act to mean “that activities performed either before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line, are compensable … if those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed.” Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).

The most oft-cited case applying the “preliminary or postliminary” test to training activities is Ballou v. General Electric Co. 433 F.2d 109 (1st Cir.1970). In Ballou, the First Circuit held that the classroom training required of the defendant’s apprentices taking place outside of working hours was neither integral nor indispensable to the apprentices’ principal activity, which was the work that took place during their regular 40 hour work-training week. Id. at 112. The court looked to Portland Terminal and found that if the defendant had not employed the appellants as workers, but provided only training programs that they were required to complete successfully before they could be employed as journeymen, the apprentices would be entitled to no compensation. Id. Thus, the court concluded that “the employer’s decision to hire its employees before the completion of training did not obligate it to compensate them for the time spent in their status as students after their hiring.” Bienkowski v. Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 141 (1st Cir.2002) (citing Ballou, 433 F.2d at 112).Accord Chao v. Tradesman Int’l, Inc., 310 F.3d 904, 910 (6th Cir.2002) (“Therefore, we agree with the First Circuit that the defendant employer should not be made liable for overtime pay for time its employees spend as students, rather than as workers…. We do not see why the employer should be penalized for allowing a potential employee to begin earning income while striving to meet certain prerequisites for the job when the employer could just as easily withhold employment until successful completion of all the job requirements.”).

In Bienkowski, the First Circuit applied its analysis in Ballou to facts similar to the facts found here. 285 F.3d at 141. In Bienkowski, the defendant hired the plaintiffs as probationary police officers with a requirement that they receive and retain certification as Massachusetts-registered EMTs within one year of their appointment. Id. at 139. At the time of hire, the plaintiffs signed a letter acknowledging the requirement. Id. The training, as required pursuant to Massachusetts statutes, regulations, and Department of Public Health standards, required approximately 110 hours of classroom work, as well as 10 hours of in-hospital evaluation time, practical exams, and written exams. Id. Although the plaintiffs could have taken the EMT courses at various locations throughout Massachusetts, they chose to take the course at Northeastern, where they were entitled to tuition reimbursement. Id. For the most part, the course requirements took place outside of the plaintiffs’ working hours. Id. at 140. Prior to receiving their certification, the plaintiffs were prohibited from performing EMT work, but following their certification, they regularly used their skills on the job. Id. The Court held that it would not hold the defendant “liable for overtime pay for time its employees spend as students, rather than as workers, simply because [the defendant] decided to hire its employees on a probationary basis until they complete the training required to hold the job on a permanent basis.” Id. at 141.

Defendants have articulated and Plaintiffs have not disagreed that the classes and on-the-job training required of the apprentices can be broken down into four categories: 1) initial classroom training to obtain CRT licensure; 2) classroom enhanced training; 3) clinical training with an ambulance medic team and in the hospital to obtain CRT licensure; and 4) mandatory repeat classroom training to obtain CRT licensure when a student has failed any of the required exams. Under either the “primary beneficiary” test of McLaughlin or the “integral and indispensable part of the principal activities” test of Steiner, the hours spent in all four categories of training are not compensable as hours worked under the FLSA.

All of the classroom and practical training required to obtain the CRT license, the classroom enhanced training, and the repeat classroom training are no different than that found in Portland Terminal, Ballou, and Bienkowski. Plaintiffs are apprentices in an apprenticeship program approved by the Department of Labor and as part of that program were required to take the CRT Training, which required both classroom and clinical training. As the CRT license was required in order for Plaintiffs to conduct their duties as firefighters/paramedics, the City could have required the Plaintiffs to obtain the license before hiring them. In fact, similar training is provided at Baltimore City Community College and Community College of Baltimore County. Instead the city allowed Plaintiffs to obtain the license while they were concurrently employed by the city, and funded the training. Although the City ultimately benefitted from Plaintiffs obtaining the CRT license in that it then had a pool of employees certified to conduct ALS, Plaintiffs obtained a license fully transferrable to their employment with any other employer that required the ability to provide Advanced Life Support. Thus, as in Portland Terminal and unlike in McLaughlin, Plaintiffs were the primary beneficiaries of the training. Moreover, as Plaintiffs were not able to perform any of the ALS duties until they obtained their license, as in Bienkowski the training was not an integral and indispensable part of their paid work duties during the period of their training.

This Court’s holding is supported by Department of labor regulations interpreting the FLSA that exclude from the computation of “hours worked” the time spent in certain kinds of training. One such regulation is found at 29 C.F.R. § 553.226(b).

(b) While time spent in attending training required by an employer is normally considered compensable hours of work, following are situations where time spent by employees of State and local governments in required training is considered to be noncompensable:

(1) Attendance outside of regular working hours at specialized or follow-up training, which is required by law for certification of public and private sector employees within a particular governmental jurisdiction (e.g., certification of public and private emergency rescue workers), does not constitute compensable hours of work for public employees within that jurisdiction and subordinate jurisdictions.

(2) Attendance outside of regular working hours at specialized or follow-up training, which is required for certification of employees of a governmental jurisdiction by law of a higher level of government (e.g., where a State or county law imposes a training obligation on city employees), does not constitute compensable hours of work.

(3) Time spent in the training described in paragraphs (b)(1) or (2) of this section is not compensable, even if all or part of the costs of the training is borne by the employer.

A 1999 Department of Labor Opinion letter applies this regulation to facts identical to those found here.

Q.1. As a condition of employment, firefighters for County A must have current EMT (emergency medical training) certification. Although this certification is granted through the state, the state does not require the fire fighters have the certification. However, since City A requires it, the training is not “voluntary.” Under these circumstances, must the EMT training that is required to maintain this certification be counted as hours worked if the training takes place during non-working hours?

A.1. No. While time spent in attending training required by an employer is normally considered compensable hours of work, attendance outside of regular working hours at specialized or follow-up training which is required by law for certification of employees of a governmental jurisdiction, does not constitute hours of work under the FLSA. See Section 553.226 of Regulations, 29 CFR Part 553. Sept. 30, 1999, Dept. of Labor Op. Letter, 1999 WL 1788163.

In addition, the Department of Labor has issued a regulation as to apprenticeship training.

[T]ime spent in an organized program of related, supplemental instruction by employees working under bona fide apprenticeship programs may be excluded from working time if…. (b) such time does not involve productive work or the performance of the apprentice’s regular duties. If the above criteria are met the time spent in such related instruction shall not be counted as hours worked unless the written agreement specifically provides that it is hours worked. The mere payment or agreement to pay for time spent in related instruction does not constitute an agreement that it is hours worked. 29 C.F.R. § 785.32.

Plaintiffs do not contest that the initial CRT training and the enhanced training are not compensable under these regulations. They argue, however, that although the clinical training is a required component of the CRT-I course, it was compensable time because it was productive work and constituted performance of their regular duties. The undisputed evidence shows that a regular medic unit is staffed by two individuals, which could be two ALS providers or an ALS provider and a BLS provider. When Plaintiffs were assigned to a medic unit as part of their training, there was always an ALS provider and another BLS provider; the trainee would then be a third person on the team. Plaintiffs state in their opposition that “[i]n the experience of many Plaintiffs, under the guise of ‘training,’ only one person, the [ALS] preceptor-was paid. Therefore, a paid position on the medic unit was eliminated during the training, as the Defendants filled it with two unpaid apprentices.” Opp. at 8.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ statements in their opposition, however, neither of the provided affidavits establishes that unpaid trainees replaced a paid BLS provider. Moreover, they have not established that any benefit the City may have received from the trainee’s presence is anything more than de minimis or that it outweighed the benefit to the trainee in completing a required component of the CRT training. One affiant testified that the other BLS provider was paid and drove the ambulance while he, as the trainee, sat in the back of the ambulance. Stoakley Aff. ¶ 4. Notably, the second affiant said nothing regarding whether the other BLS provider was paid and said nothing about whether he ever drove the ambulance while he was on a training run. Bonovich Aff. ¶ 4. Thus, Plaintiffs have provided no reason to believe that when they were conducting training runs they were not able to work with the ALS provider in a training capacity for the entire period.

Similarly, the time spent by the trainees in the hospital was also a required component of the CRT training. Plaintiffs’ affidavits confirm that all of the Plaintiffs’ activities in the hospital were supervised. They have not shown, however, that their activities were part of their regular duties or any more productive than the supervised work done by trainees in Portland Terminal. Thus, the clinical training does not constitute compensable hours worked under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act.

Plaintiffs also argue that the duplicative classroom training, required when Plaintiffs did not pass certain examinations required for the EMT-I certification, is compensable as hours worked because it was neither a part of the approved apprenticeship program nor a legal requirement. While the apprentice standards may have simply required the CRT-I course, it is logical to conclude that the apprentices were expected to successfully complete the course and obtain their CRT license. If an apprentice fails the course and must repeat it in order to satisfy the requirements to obtain the CRT license, it is hard to imagine how this is any different than the initial requirement to attend the course. Moreover, it seems perverse logic to say that the initial training is not compensable, but if an apprentice fails the training, it then becomes compensable. Finally, the Court sees no immediate benefit to the Defendants from Plaintiffs taking remedial courses since it delayed the time that Plaintiffs could conduct ALS duties. Thus, the Court sees no difference in the initial requirement to attend the CRT course and the requirement to take duplicative training when the student fails the required exams.”

Having determined that the training time at issue was not compensable, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs brought this action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”) and violations of New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) seeking additional compensation for certain activities that occurred before and after their scheduled work shifts and workdays. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Wackenhut violated the FLSA and the NYLL by failing to pay them for time spent arming up and checking through security and arming down at the Ginna facility. The case was before the Court on the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Granting Defendant’s motion and denying Plaintiff’s motion, the Court discussed the nature of Plaintiffs’ uncompensated activities deeming them to be preliminary and post-liminary and thus non-compensable.

The Court discussed the nature of the time in dispute:

“B. Arming Up and Reporting to Post Prior to March 1, 2006

The guards report to work in uniform, which consists of blue pants, a blue shirt, boots, a hat, jacket and other equipment. The guards are free to wear their uniforms home and return to work in uniform on their next scheduled workday. Before March 1, 2006 guards were permitted to leave Ginna with most of the equipment issued by Wackenhut, including their gun belts, radio pouches and bandoliers. The only equipment that guards were required to leave on site was their service revolver, which was kept in the armory, and a handheld radio, which was stored in a nearby charging unit. Plaintiffs contend that service revolvers and handheld radios were stored in various locations on the Ginna facility at different relevant time periods.

There is no dispute that the arming up and arming down process prior to March 1, 2006 took place in the room in which the armory was located. According to Wackenhut, after clearing security, the guards were able to go directly to the room in which their weapons and radios were stored to retrieve them before reporting to their assigned post. Plaintiffs claim that upon clearing security, the guards were required to first report to the locker room to obtain ammunition, gun belts, radio pouches and bandoliers, before obtaining their firearms and radios in the armory.

The process of arming up began with a guard identifying the serial number of his or her weapon and would then retrieve the weapon in a clearing barrel from a supervisor in the armory. The guard would then follow a series of instructions from the supervisor concerning the process of loading and holstering his or her weapon. The arming up process was complete when the guard holstered the weapon. The deposition testimony of several plaintiffs confirm that it took thirty seconds to less than a minute from the time when a security guard identified the serial number on his weapon to the time the weapon was holstered. The arming down process was essentially the same process in reverse and was completed in the same amount of time. After retrieving their weapon, guards obtained a handheld radio at a location in the same area as the armory, at which time each signed a log to identify which radio they took. It is undisputed that the arming up and arming down process was routine, relatively effortless and could be completed in a short time frame.

Upon completion of the arming up process and retrieval of the handheld radio, guards then reported to their first assigned post. Based on the deposition testimony, it takes less than thirty seconds to walk from the armory, which is currently located in the guard house, to many of the posts. The remaining posts can be reached by a person walking at a normal pace in one to five minutes. Plaintiffs claim that the amount of time to arm up and arm down depends upon various factors. Further, plaintiffs submitted four affidavits in opposition to Wackenhut’s summary judgment motion alleging that it took them between eight minutes to fifteen minutes to complete pre-shift activities prior to March 1, 2006. However, these alleged time ranges are not consistent with the deposition testimony of various plaintiffs deposed by defendant.

In addition, the affidavits provided by the four guards demonstrate that they included in the time estimates time that they claim they spent engaging in activities that are separate and distinct from arming up and arming down. For instance, the four guards included in the time estimates in their affidavits the time they claim they spent walking from the room in which the armory was located to their assigned posts. Moreover, they included in their estimates the time they allegedly spent engaging in certain activities that occurred before the arming up process started, such as time allegedly spent on occasionally having to wait for the arming up process to begin. They also included in their estimates the time that they allegedly spent on occasionally addressing radio issues or difficulties. These alleged radio issues happen infrequently and take a matter of seconds to address e.g. dealing with radio traffic at the BRAVO alarm station would take no more than five seconds to address.

According to defendant, security guards were not asked to perform any work before the start of their regularly-scheduled shifts. Before March 1, 2006, guards were compensated for all work time beginning with the start of their scheduled shift but guards were not required to arrive on site at any specified time prior to their scheduled shift to be considered on time. Plaintiffs contend that they were required to report to their post 15 minutes before the start of their shift but were not compensated until their shift actually started. Wackenhut argues that plaintiffs did not have to arrive at the site at any particular time prior to the start of their shift to be on time. In fact, prior to March 1, 2006, defendant was aware of many occasions on which guards completed the security clearance process just a minute or two before the start of their scheduled shift and were able to retrieve their weapon and radio and report to their post on time. These guards were not disciplined and were considered to be in compliance with Wackenhut’s policies and expectations.

C. Pre-Shift Briefings That Began in February 2006

On or about February 26, 2006, Wackenhut implemented a pre-shift briefing process for all guards at the Ginna facility. During these briefings, guards are advised about various issues relevant to their position including any incidents that may have occurred in previous shifts, developments in the industry, and/or changes in any policies or procedures by Wackenhut. The pre-shift briefing is held in the Security Building. Guards are able to go directly to the briefing room once they complete the security clearance process in the same building. Since the implementation of these pre-shift briefings, guards report to the briefing room fifteen minutes before the start of their scheduled shifts. For instance, a guard assigned to the 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. shift must report, in uniform, to the briefing room by 6:15 a.m. At the conclusion of the pre-shift briefing, the security guards report to the armory to retrieve their weapons and then proceeded to their first assigned post. Since on or about February 26, 2006, guards have been compensated from the start of the pre-shift briefings, which occur before the arming up process begins. They continue to be paid through the remainder of the day until the arming down process is completed at the end of their shifts.

Plaintiffs argue that the time spent from the beginning of the pre-shift briefing until the commencement of their scheduled shifts are not calculated towards overtime. Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ assertions are inconsistent with the plaintiffs’ deposition testimony and the terms of the written policy issued at the same time that the shift briefings were implemented. According to defendant, the Wackenhut employee manual for the February 2006 time period provided that guards would be compensated for time spent during the shift briefing and de-gunning process. In addition, the policy stated that this time would be compensated at the guards’ normal base rate for time under forty hours in a week and at the guards’ overtime rate for time over forty hours in a week.”

The Court then determined that Plaintiffs were, as a matter of law, not entitled to be compensated for such activities:

“This case falls under the purview of the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act, in which Congress provided that employers would not be liable to provide compensation for activities which are “preliminary to or postliminary to” the principal activity or activities which employees are employed to perform. See29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). Applying the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Supreme Court has determined that activities performed before or after an employee’s regular work shift are compensable if they are “an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workman are employed.” See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). Moreover, in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir.2007), the Second Circuit articulated a distinction between the terms “indispensable” and “integral.” While “indispensable” means only “necessary,” the term “integral” adds the requirement that the activity be “essential to completeness … organically linked … [or] composed of constituent parts making a whole.” See id. at 592. Therefore, unless an activity is essential to complete the employee’s task, it is excluded from compensation under the Act. See id.; see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40-41 (2005) (unless an activity is both integral and indispensable to performing the job, it is not a principal activity of the job).

In Gorman, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time spent donning and doffing helmets, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots. The court conceded that such gear might have been indispensable to the employees’ work, in that it was required by the employer or by government regulations, but found that the donning and doffing of such gear was not integral to the employees’ work at Indian Point and accordingly, did not constitute “work time” for purposes of the FLSA. See Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594. Rather, the Court opined that “[t]he donning and doffing of generic protective gear is not rendered integral by being required by the employer or by government regulation.” See id. (citing Reich v. IPP. Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that donning and doffing safety glasses, a pair of ear plugs, a hard hat, and safety shoes “although essential to the job, and required by the employer, are pre-and postliminary activities”).

The Gorman court also contrasted the uncompensated wearing of generic safety gear with the complete changing and showering required by the employer in Steiner. It also contrasted the wearing of specialized gear required for employees who worked in the nuclear containment area, for which those employees were compensated. The court reasoned that procedures for wearing this specialized gear were integral to the act of working in the hazardous environment of the containment area. By contrast, the court found that “the donning and doffing of … generic protective gear [such as a helmet, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots] is not different in kind from ‘changing clothes and showering under normal conditions,’ which under Steiner are not covered by the FLSA.” See Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594. Further, the Gorman court observed that “donning and doffing” of the equipment at issue in that case were “ ‘relatively effortless,’ noncompensable, preliminary tasks.” Id. at 594 (citing Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 649 (2d Cir.1995). Accordingly, the Court held that these activities constituted non-compensable preliminary and postliminary tasks for which no pay was required under the FLSA.

Here, the record demonstrates that the arming up process was accomplished with minimal effort and the arming down was not difficult or time-consuming. See Reich, 45 F.3d at 651 (Second Circuit observed that Portal-to-Portal Act amendments exempt such “trivial, non-onerous aspects of preliminary preparation, maintenance and cleanup” from “work time” under the FLSA). There is no dispute that the arming up and arming down process was routine, relatively effortless and could be accomplished in a short period of time. The deposition testimony of plaintiffs confirm that the arming up process took approximately thirty seconds to less than a minute to complete. The arming down process was essentially the same process in reverse and was completed in the same amount of time. Upon completion of the arming up process and retrieval of the handheld radio, guards reported to their first assigned post. Based on the deposition testimony, it takes less than thirty seconds to walk from the armory, which is currently located in the guard house, to many of the posts. The remaining posts can be reached by a person walking at a normal pace in one to five minutes. Further, plaintiffs were not required to arrive on site at any particular time prior to their scheduled shift to be considered on time.

Plaintiffs attempt to establish a question of fact by providing four affidavits contending that it could take up to eight to fifteen minutes to complete the arming up and arming down process prior to March 1, 2006.For instance, in Stacy Janke’s affidavit submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he states that “the time required to … report to an assigned post, is approximately twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes.” See Janke Aff., ¶ 6. It is well settled, however, that plaintiffs “may not create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit in opposition to a summary judgment motion that, by omission or addition, contradicts the affiant’s previous deposition testimony.” See Hayes v. New York City Department of Corrections, 85 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted); see also Schratz v. Potter, 2008 WL 5340992 at *6 (W.D.N.Y.2008).

Indeed, “factual issues created solely by an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary judgment motion are not ‘genuine’ issues for trial.” See Hayes, 85 F.3d at 619. Though Stacy and other plaintiffs testified under oath at their deposition, they never claimed that it took twelve to fifteen minutes to complete the arming up or arming down process. Rather, Mr. Janke and other plaintiffs testified that the actual process of arming up could be completed in less than one minute. It is also undisputed that the arming down process involves the same procedure in reverse and was completed in the same time frame. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot rely on their contradictory affidavits to create an issue of fact on this point. Moreover, a further analysis of the four affidavits submitted by plaintiffs confirms that all four individuals included time in their pre-shift estimates that is not part of the arming up and arming down process. Rather, they included time allegedly spent walking, waiting in line and/or donning and doffing generic equipment or clothing that is distinct from arming up and arming down. None of the time allegedly spent engaging in any of those activities is compensable under Gorman and Second Circuit case law.

Further, plaintiffs’ reliance on the decision in Maciel v. City of Los Angeles, 569 F.Supp2d 1038 (C.D.Calif.2008) is misplaced. The rationale employed by courts such as Bamonte v. City of Mesa, 2008 WL 1746168 (D.Ariz.2008) are more sound and have been adopted by many other courts and the Department of Labor as it pertains to the significance of an employee’s ability to leave work with required equipment. See Bamonte, 2008 WL 1746168 at *5 (observing that “a rule which categorically defines donning and doffing time as noncompensable when an employee has an opportunity to change at home is consistent with the Department of Labor’s “longstanding” interpretation of the FLSA.”) In Bamonte, the court held that time spent changing into and out of police uniforms and other equipment was not compensable because the police officers were allowed to go to the police station in uniform. See id. at *11-12. Here, the evidence reveals that plaintiffs were free to leave the site in their uniforms, with most of the equipment they were issued by Wackenhut, including the radio pouches, gun belts, and bandoliers which the four plaintiffs reference in their affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

As a matter of law, the activities for which plaintiffs seek compensation were preliminary and postliminary activities not subject to compensation under the FLSA. To the extent that they were otherwise compensable activities, they are de minimis in nature. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment.”

Revisiting an issue it has previously ruled on, the 2nd Circuit held that an employee’s required carrying of 20 pounds of materials each day to and from work, during his or her daily commute does not transform otherwise non-compensable travel time into compensable work hours.

“This case falls squarely under the previously decided Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.2008). In Singh, a group of inspectors with the Fire Alarm Inspection Unit of the New York Fire Department brought a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, demanding compensation for their commuting time because they were required by their employer to transport and protect inspection documents. Id. The collective weight of their materials was between 15 and 20 pounds. Id. at 365.

We analyzed the claim in two parts, looking first to whether plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for the entire commute and, if not, whether they were entitled to compensation for the additional commuting time that resulted from their transport of these materials. Id. at 366-67. For the first part of the analysis, we applied a “predominant benefit test,” asking whether the employer’s restrictions hindered the employees’ ability to use their commuting time as they otherwise would have. Id. at 369. We determined that the inspectors’ commute was not materially altered by their document transport responsibilities, and thus they were not entitled to compensation for the entire commute. Id. at 370. We then looked to the second part of the test to determine if the additional commuting time that resulted from the transport of the documents was compensable. Id. While noting that the additional time was time spent “necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the City” and thus was compensable, we looked to a three-part test to determine if such compensable time qualified as de minimis. Id. The three factors were: “(1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether the claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” Id. at 371. Under this test, we determined that the additional commuting time was de minimis as a matter of law. Id. Thus, none of the plaintiffs’ commuting time was compensable under the FLSA. Id. at 372.

The facts of the case before us are materially indistinguishable from Singh. Plaintiffs in this case, like Singh, are responsible for the transport of a 20-pound bag of equipment. This 20-pound bag, however, does not burden the plaintiffs to such a degree as to make the City the predominant beneficiary of their commute. Their responsibility is limited to transporting the bag; there are no other active work-related duties required during the commute. Transporting a bag in a car trunk, or at plaintiffs’ feet on a train or bus, allows them to use their commuting time as they wish. To the extent that the bag adds time to their commute, we find, just as in Singh, that such time is de minimis and non-compensable.”

This case was before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, based on its claims that certain activities that were the subject of Plaintiff’s “off-the-clock” claims were not compensable as a matter of law. In granting Defendant’s Motion, the Court addressed each of the the three types of activity in turn and found all three excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act as pre- and/or postliminary in nature and not compensable “work” activity.

Defendant DHL Express operates a mail sorting facility in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania, and employs about 400 sorters, yard jockeys, and others. Plaintiff is a mail worker and seeks to represent Mail Workers who have been employed by Defendant during the past three years. It was undisputed that Defendant has paid Plaintiff and prospective class members for the time that they engage in actual production activities. Pursuant to Defendant’s internal policy, Class Members are randomly selected on a daily basis to proceed through a security screening before clocking in and after clocking out. Class Members are not compensated for time spent waiting for the security screening process or for time spent clearing the security process. Class Members are also not compensated for the time it takes for them to walk from the entrance to the time clock at Defendant’s facility and the time it takes to walk from the time clock to the exit.

Plaintiff brought a two-count complaint, alleging violations of the FLSA and WPCL. Plaintiff alleged that failure to compensate Class Members for the following three activities was a violation of these statutes: (1) waiting in line to go through security screening before entering and exiting Defendant’s facility; (2) participating in the security screening itself; and (3) walking between the security screening area and time clocks where Mail Workers clock in and out. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages in the form of reimbursement for unpaid wages, costs and attorneys fees, and other equitable relief.

Citing to several cases, as well as the Portal-to-Portal Act itself, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.