The Siege Is Only Eight Weeks Old

Published: October 1, 1990

Hardly a day passes without some worthy expert clamoring for decisive action, diplomatic or military, in the Persian Gulf. But there's no such impatience reflected in public opinion polls or among leaders of the United Nations coalition against Iraq. In terms of politics and policy, the purveyors of impatience are missing the point.

Negotiate? It is far too early to offer face-saving formulas to Saddam Hussein. He has proffered none himself and he shows no signs of looking for a face-saving exit from Kuwait. Anything the coalition puts on the table now the Iraqi dictator will pocket, as a mark of weakness.

Attack? It's also dangerously premature to beat the drums for war. There is no consensus now for fighting. If the United States or the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were to act alone, it would destroy the unity so essential to bearing the responsibility for bloodshed, should that day come.

The idea of a global embargo on trade with Iraq while building up allied military power means waiting patiently for the squeeze to work. And the U.N. strategy seems to be working. Already, Iraqis are beginning to feel some pain. And already, Saddam Hussein lashes back with wild threats.

Some foreign policy commentators see that desperation and fear its consequences. They fear he is on the verge of starting a devastating war and want to head it off with a peace plan that would permit him to save face. President Mitterrand of France has given voice to this approach. Speaking to the U.N. last week, he said that if Iraq quit Kuwait, ''everything might be possible,'' including an international conference to adjudicate the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

This approach would defuse the current crisis and damage Saddam Hussein's reputation. But it also would transform him from an aggressor into a new Saladin, protector of Palestine from the infidels. In this mantle, he could become more dangerous. Now in particular, with Arab countries willing to fight brother Arabs, it is important for the U.S. and other nations to stress their commitment to beginning Israeli-Palestinian talks. But linking that to the gulf crisis would be foolish in the extreme.

Such diplomatic traps drive some policy experts in another direction. Instead of diplomacy, they would counter Mr. Hussein's threat of war with a pre-emptive attack. They worry about Iraq striking first and destroying oil fields and using all its chemical weapons.

There's a good deal of military sense to this approach, but it ignores the nasty political consequences. Few, if any, nations are now ready to join in pre-emptive war. Even if the U.S. attacked successfully, the wrath of the Arab world eventually would fall entirely on Americans.

Yet the possibility of an Iraqi strike is high enough to require immediate consultations among the allies on whether, when and how to use force. U.S. forces ought not be left to improvise alone if lightning should strike.

All of which points to one conclusion: There is no diplomatic or military course preferable to the present strategy. Support for it is growing, not eroding, and there's a growing consensus for using force if the embargo fails. Meanwhile, it is not failing; the strategy for squeezing Iraq seems to be working. And it's only eight weeks old.