On 28 October 1950, orders came from I Corps to saddle up the rest of the
division and move north. The Korean war seemed to be nearing a conclusion. The
North Korean forces were being squeezed into a shrinking perimeter along the
Yalu and the borders of Red China and Manchuria. By now, more than 135,000 Red
troops had been captured and the North Korean Army was nearly destroyed.

By 29 October, the 8th Cavalry Regiment along with elements of the 99th Field
Artillery and "B" Company, 70th Tank Battalion had advanced north from
Pyongyang to Sukchon, Sinanju and to the vicinity of Unsan, with the mission
of relieving ROK elements of the I Corps in the area. Later that day, the 8th
Cavalry received orders to attack all the way to the Yalu River.

On the morning of 30 October, the 5th Cavalry Regiment, under the command of
Lt. Col. Harold K. Johnson, arrived at Yongsan-dong. The mission of the 5th
Cavalry was to protect the rear of the 8th Cavalry, which had continued on
north to Unsan where it was to relieve part of the ROK 1st Division. The 1st
Battalion, 8th Cavalry, under the command of Maj. John Millikin, Jr., arrived
at Unsan that afternoon. In conferring with KMAG (United States Army Advisory
Group, Korea) officers attached to the ROK 12th Regiment, Millikin and his
company commanders learned that the ROK line, about 8,000 yards north of
Unsan, was under attack and being pushed back.

On 31 October, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 8th Cavalry, relieved the ROK 12th
Regiment. But on the right an enemy attack during the night had driven back
the ROK 2nd Battalion more than a mile. Its commander wanted his troops to
regain the lost ground before they were relieved. Millikin's 1st Battalion,
however, moved into a defensive position behind the ROK 2nd Battalion line
north of Unsan. That afternoon, General Milburn, US I Corps commander, visited
the 8th Cavalry regimental command post and was advised that everything was
all right.

By 01 November, the 8th Cavalry Regiment had advanced to within 50 miles of
the Chinese border and the three battalions had moved up to relieve portions
of the ROK 1st Division. The arrival of the US 8th Cavalry Regiment at Unsan
had set in motion a redeployment of the ROK 1st Division. Upon being relieved
west of Unsan, the ROK 11th Regiment had shifted southeast to establish
contact with the ROK 8th Division on the corps boundary. The ROK 12th Regiment
moved to a rest and reserve assembly area at Ipsok south of the Kuryong River,
six air miles from Unsan. Still engaged in the battle at Unsan, the ROK 15th
Regiment was desperately trying to hold its position across the Samt'an River
east of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. In short, the US 8th Cavalry was to the
north, west, and south of Unsan; the ROK 1st Division to the northeast, east,
and southeast of it.

Later in the morning of 01 November, patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions,
8th Cavalry, clashed with soldiers clearly identified as the Red Chinese CCF
(Chinese Communist Forces). Contact with the CCF had begun increasing that
afternoon, starting in the sector of the 1st Battalion, north of Unsan, then
spreading west into the sector covered by the 2nd Battalion. By 1200 hours 01
November, the Chinese had cut and blocked the main road six air miles south of
Unsan with sufficient strength to turn back two rifle companies which had been
strongly supported by air strikes during daylight hours. The CCF had set the
stage for an attack that night against the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the ROK
15th Regiment. The CCF attack north of Unsan had gained strength in the
afternoon of 01 November against the ROK 15th Regiment on the east, and
gradually it extended west into the zone of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The
first probing attacks there, accompanied by mortar barrages, came at 1700
hours against the right flank units, Companies "A" and "B", 1st Battalion.
There was also something new in the enemy fire support-rockets fired from
trucks.

When dusk fell that evening enemy soldiers were on three sides of the 8th
Cavalry - the north, west, and south. Only the ground to the east, held by the
ROK 15th Regiment, was not in Chinese possession. As the battle grew, the
attack of the CCF, well planned and executed in strength, broke through the
ROK 15th Regiment. Following the issue of warning alerts of an impending
withdrawal and armed with the most recent intelligence data, Col. Holmes,
Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, issued a final order for the 8th Cavalry
Regiment to withdraw at 2400 hours. Soon afterwards, at about 0100 hours 02
November, the CCF cut the withdrawal route of the 1st and 2nd Battalion.

The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry had expanded its basic ammunition as well as
the reserve which had been sent down from the regiment. "A" Company had
engaged in "hand-to-hand" combat on both flanks. The 1st Battalion Commanding
Officer, Major Millikin requested additional issues of ammunition. Receiving
the division withdrawal order at midnight, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions,
8th Cavalry in heavy contact, the Regimental Commander, Col Palmer ordered a
withdrawal to the south. The plan was for the 3rd Battalion to cover the
withdrawal. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry, along with "A" Company, 70th Tank
Battalion was ordered north to cover the planned withdrawal of the 8th
Cavalry. In addition, the 7th Cavalry was called from Chinnampo to assist in
the withdrawal.

The entire rear areas were swarming with the CCF. With heavy close-in
fighting, the conveys of the 8th Cavalry RCP (Regimental Command Post) along
with the 1st and 2nd Battalions managed withdraw under fire and to break
through the CCF lines. Mostly, they were in scattered groups or individuals.
Many of the groups were lost as well as critical equipment needed to support
the withdraw.

By 0200 hours, 02 November, the Chinese had blocked the last remaining road
for a possible retreat overland. South of Unsan, the 3rd Battalion, commanded
by Major Ormond, had dug in just north of the Nammyon River. By dawn, the
entire regiment was completely surrounded. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion were
trapped by the Chinese. They formed into two islands of resistance. All day
long fighter aircraft and bombers pounded the enemy positions. The battalion
took heavy losses in its officers and enlisted men. The Commanding Officer,
Major Ormond, was badly wounded and the staff were all wounded or missing in
action.

The troopers used the daylight respite gained from the air cover
to dig an elaborate series of trenches and retrieve rations and ammunition
from the vehicles that had escaped destruction. A L-5 plane flew over and
dropped a mail bag of morphine and bandages. At duck, a helicopter also
appeared and hovered momentarily a few feet above the 3rd Battalion, intending
to land and evacuate the more seriously wounded, but enemy fire hit it and it
departed without landing. The battalion group was able to communicate with the
pilot of a Mosquito plane overhead who said a relief column was on its way

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Cavalry attempted a break through from
the south, but the CCF on "Eagle Hill" could not be overtaken. The 5th
Cavalry, after receiving 350 casualties, pulled back.

Just after dark, a plane drops a message to the 3rd Battalion with orders that
they are to begin an orderly withdrawal. The withdrawal route indicated was
the only one possible - east from the road fork south of Unsan, across the
Kuryong River, and then by the main supply route of the ROK 1st Division to
Ipsok and Yongbyon. Major Millikin, 1st Battalion Commanding Officer,
telephoned Colonel William Walton, 2nd Battalion Commanding Officer, that he
would try to hold Unsan until the 2nd Battalion cleared the road junction
south of it. Then he would withdraw. The 3rd Battalion, south of Unsan, was to
bring up the regimental rear.

After examining all the options, the remaining men of the 3rd Battalion,
decided to stand and fight even though they faced a full division of the CCF.
The night brought a heavy bombardment of 120mm mortar fire and a mass attack
of the CCF. Over a thousand enemy died outside the perimeter. With their own
ammunition nearly spent, during the lull that followed, the men searched the
battlefield around the perimeter to retrieve weapons and ammunition from the
enemy dead.

On the morning of 03 November a three man patrol went to the former battalion
command post dugout and discovered that during the night the Chinese had taken
out some of the wounded. That day there was no air support. Remaining rations
were given to the wounded. Enemy fire kept everyone under cover. The night of
03 November was a repetition of the preceding one, another barrage followed by
a mass attack, with the Chinese working closer all the time. With their own
ammunition was almost gone, after each enemy attack had been driven back, men
would crawl out and retrieve weapons and ammunition from the enemy dead.

The morning of 04 November disclosed that there were about 200 men left able
to fight. Casualties had risen to about 250 men. A discussion of the situation brought
the decision that those still physically able to make the attempt should try
to escape. The remaining forces of the battalion broke up into small groups
and escape under the cover of darkness. Some were successful and many were
not. Most of those men were either killed or captured that day, apparently
in the vicinity of Yongbyon.

On 05 November, the Eighth Army announced that "as a result of an ambush" the
1st Cavalry Division would receive all the new replacements until further
notice. In the next twelve days, The Eighth Army assigned 22 officers and 616
enlisted men as replacements to the 1st Cavalry Division. Nearly all of them
went to the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

This event would be the most painful chapter in the proud history of the 1st
Cavalry Division. At approximately 1600 hours on the afternoon of 06 November,
the action of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, as an organized force came to an
end. It died gallantly. At first, more than 1,000 men of the 8th Cavalry
Regiment were missing in action, but as the days passed, some of them returned
to friendly lines along the Ch'ongch'on. Eventually the estimate was revised
to a count of more than 600 officers and men were lost at Unsan, most of them
from the 3rd Battalion.

The heroic 3rd Battalion commander, Major Ormond, was among the wounded
captured by the CCF in the perimeter beside the Kuryong. He subsequently died
of his wounds and, according to some reports of surviving prisoners, was
buried beside the road about five miles north of Unsan. Of his immediate
staff, the battalion S-2 and S-4 also lost their lives in the Unsan action.
About ten officers and somewhat less than 200 enlisted men of the 3rd
Battalion escaped to rejoin the regiment. There were a few others who escaped
later, some from captivity, and were given the status of recovered allied
personnel.

Two weeks after the Unsan action, tank patrols were still bringing in men
wounded at Unsan and fortunate enough to have been sheltered and cared for
by friendly Koreans. On 22 November, the Chinese themselves, in a propaganda
move, turned free 27 men who had been prisoners for two weeks or longer, 19 of
them captured from the 8th Cavalry Regiment at Unsan.

For its actions, the 3rd Battalion was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation,
comparable to the Medal of Honor given to individuals for Valor above and
Beyond the Call of Duty, along with the Republic of Korean Presidential Unit
Citation and the Chryssoun Aristion Andrias (Bravery Gold Medal of Greece).

In order to execute their battle plan, the Chinese and the nearly beaten
North Korean forces had a trio of powerful allies located half way around the
world. Three Britons, two working in the British Embassy in Washington, DC and
a third heading the American Department in London, were Soviet agents. The
three spies; H.A.R. "Kim" Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, had access
to communications between MacArthur and the Pentagon because Great Britain had
sent its Commonwealth Brigade to be part of the UN military forces in Korea.
Copies of communications relative to military planning of UN military
organizations was sent directly to Moscow and relayed to Peking.