本稿の目的は,中国の「影の銀行」と一般的な意味でのシャドー・バンキングとの違いについて検討し,この問題における中国の構造的特質を探り出すことである。近年,金融抑圧が長期にわたって続いてきた中国では,銀行のユニバーサルバンク化改革が行われ,金融機関は業種別金融規制制度の欠陥を利用し,利潤を追求している。その結果,銀行理財商品や銀行と信託会社の「協力」による資金プール,企業間における委託貸付け,手形割引制度の悪用による資金調達,インターバンク市場を利用した資金調達といった金融手段が急増し,中国のシャドー・バンキング・システムが形成された。このことから明らかなように,中国のシャドー・バンキング・システムは,金融機関による金融自由化の立ち遅れに起因する金融業余剰利潤の囲い込みにほかならない。これは単なる金融的事象ではなく,地方財政が長期的に疲弊化しているにもかかわらず,経済成長至上主義の下で資金需要が膨張した状況での財政事象でもある。以上から,中国のシャドー・バンキングは中国国内における独特の経済・政治的要因によって形成されたものであり,資本取引がまだ自由化されていない現状において,その崩壊による日本経済への影響は限定的と予測される。This paper examines the unique characteristics of the Chinese shadow banking system, identifies its structural characteristics, and emphasizes its impact on the Japanese economy. In recent years, after three decades of financial repression, the Chinese government has been rapidly promoting the universalization of traditional banking. The Chinese shadow banking system ("Yingzi Yinhang" in Chinese) emerged as most domestic financial institutions took advantage of shortcomings in the existing financial regulation, where a banking institution was supervised as per its industrial sector categorization. For example, banks could provide diversified financial products and services, all named as "wealth management products" that were effectively unconstrained by financial regulation. The banks and trust companies would cooperate to create a new pool of funds. Companies are financially supporting each other, directly and secretly, instead of going through formal financial institutions. Further, companies are willing to help other companies, with whom they have a good relationship, to cash discounted bills and create an interbank financial market as well. This study indicates that the Chinese shadow banking system is an example of pooling the surplus profits of banking institutions, which is a function of the slow pace of deregulation. Furthermore,in China, local government finances have long been under significant pressure. Without strengthening their financial base, these local governments would be unable to fulfill the expanded capital needs. Hence, the problem of the Chinese shadow banking system is considered a result of outdated financial policy, rather than a market phenomenon found in countries with a sound financial system. As the Chinese shadow banking system was formed domestically by unique economic and political factors, its influence on the Japanese economy in the event of a future collapse will be limited, as capital transactions have not yet been liberalized in China.