The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif ineligible for electoral participation.

As a result, Shahbaz Sharif is no longer chief minister of Punjab. The court decision is effectively a coup by the Peoples Party-led center against the government of the largest province, Punjab.

Sharif legal and political associates state they do not recognize the authority of the Supreme Court, which is led by a judge appointed by former President Pervez Musharraf after he sacked Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and declared emergency rule.

Fire has ceased in Swat, but the war in Punjab, and perhaps even Islamabad, begins.

Politically, the Sharifs and their faction of the Muslim League (PML-N) — Pakistan’s second largest party — are isolated. Their major allies are those outside of parliament: the lawyers, Jamaat-e Islami, and Tehreek-e Insaaf.

And Pakistan effectively has a national unity government — sans the PML-N. The PPP-led coalition consists of the Awami National Party (ANP), Fazlur Rehman’s faction of the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI-F), and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Despite Shahbaz’s last ditch attempts toward rapproachment with the MQM, neither it nor any of the other coalition members will abandon the PPP. The ANP is focused on its government in the North-West Frontier Province. The MQM is uninterested in joining the opposition. And Fazlur Rehman and family are content with their Pajeros and farm houses. The fractured and discredited Muslim League – Quaid (PML-Q) could also join the central government. Shujaat Hussain, the head of the PML-Q, expressed his support for the court’s decision.

The PML-N is a few seats short of a majority in the Punjab Assembly. The PPP is positioned to form a government with the PML-Q there.

Zardari is politically secure. The Pakistani president has Musharraf-era constitutional powers (the hyperpresidency), a docile (though occassionally rebellious) prime minister, a healthy coalition in the center, a share in all provincial governments, a pliant Supreme Court, an army stuck in the barracks, and support of major Western governments. An influx of foreign aid could bolster his hold on power. Also, the PPP will likely be the largest party in the Senate after elections in March. Zardari — if he makes the right deals — could get a constitutional amendment passed that would fall short of restoring the presidency to its original nominal status. In short, Zardari could have his cake and eat it too.

However, there is a huge disparity between the Zardari’s political security and popular opinion toward him. Simply put, Zardari is hated inside Pakistan, particularly in Punjab. This has always been the case, except for the burst of sympathy after his wife’s murder. Public goodwill toward Zardari dissipated by the following summer when he violated a series of popular agreements with Nawaz. Subsequently, Zardari made a power grab and took the presidency.

Public opinion polls commissioned by the International Republican Institute indicate that Zardari — after a month as president — was as unpopular as Musharraf at his nadir. But it took Musharraf eight years to reach that point. Those polls also indicate Nawaz is Pakistan’s most popular politician.

So the big question are: How long can the contradictions between Zardari’s political strength and massive unpopularity last? And can Pakistan achieve political stability with its second largest party shut out of the corridors of power? We’ll get the first test in early March, when the PML-N and the lawyers go on their Long March.

The Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) made major gains in today’s by-elections. It won ten additional seats in the Punjab Provincial Assembly.

Two belong to Shahbaz Sharif. He’ll have to give up one of them; the results of both could even be nullified.

Still, the PML-N is now better placed to control Punjab without the support of the People’s Party (PPP). All it needs is to gain close to a dozen defectors from the Muslim League – Quaid (PML-Q). PML-Q forward bloc members in the Punjab Assembly have displayed a greater propensity to side with the PML-N than their equivalents in the National Assembly, who have merely distanced themselves from the Chaudhries of Gujrat and the convenient fall guy, Shaukat Aziz.

The first shot of a war between the PML-N and PPP could very well be fired in Punjab, control of which is of immense importance to both parties.

It could have very well have been fired with the appointment of Salmaan Taseer, who serves as the PPP and Musharraf’s check on the PML-N. Earlier this year, Zardari said he would move to Lahore. This never materialized, much like the Murree Accord’s promises. But it signaled his intent to re-build the PPP in Punjab. This month, Taseer announced that Bilawal Bhutto Zardari would tour the province this summer. The teenager–in effect, a socialist-feudal sajjda nashin–would be gracefully politicized and beatified (in life) through a soft induction in the Seraiki belt.

In short, the battle for Punjab is, in many senses, the battle for Pakistan. The PPP needs to consolidate its position in southern Punjab and push up north. The PML-N dominates urban centers in the province’s north and center, but could use some expansion southward. The party could become overly insular in Punjab; it would be wise to use its increasingly comfortable position in Punjab as an opportunity to expand into Pakistan’s other provinces. And that requires not only reaching out to non-Punjabis through national issues (sovereignty, peace, and the rule of law), but also through appreciating their provincial concerns — particularly in respect to provincial autonomy and resource sharing.

Nawaz Sharif’s chief ministership of Punjab during Benazir Bhutto’s first term as prime minister paved the way for his first stint as PM. Shahbaz Sharif’s objective is to run Punjab well and help that serve as one source of leverage catapulting the PML-N to power nationally. The PML-N’s gains in Punjab have put it forward on that path. But if it, like the PML-Q, embraces ethnic chauvinism (in this case, Punjabi), it will win Punjab and lose Pakistan. That, in reality, is a loss for everyone as it will push Pakistan further along the path of fragmentation.

At a broader level, Pakistan’s socio-political stability is dependent on the PPP and PML(N) partnering on core issues yet at the same time competing against one another not only in Punjab, but also elsewhere in the country — from Khyber to Karachi, Balochistan to Bahawalpur.

In March, the Pakistan government dropped its last court case against Asif Zardari. Tomorrow, a Supreme Court panel will review the Pervez Musharraf-initiated law requiring elected officials to have a bachelor’s degree. They are expected to rule it unconstitutional.

Zardari, who likely does not have a bachelor’s degree, will be the greatest beneficiary of such a ruling. All legal roadblocks to his parliamentary return will soon be gone, paving his way for a run in June’s by-elections. If elected to the parliament, Zardari could replace Yousaf Raza Gillani as prime minister. Zardari has till Monday to submit his nomination papers for the National Assembly elections, so we’ll be saved from a prolonged discussion of: “Will he run or not?”

Meanwhile, there’s no indication the government has made any accommodations for the Sharif brothers, who are presently banned from elected office due to previous convictions. But they will submit their forms anyway. By next week, we’ll see what Zardari’s political plans are and whether the Sharifs have come to an understanding with Musharraf and/or “the establishment.”

Pakistan’s election commission announced the schedule for by-elections for the national and provincial assemblies. The polls will be held on June 3rd.

Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif are expected to run, respectively, for a seat in the national and Punjab provincial assembly. They registered for the 2007-8 elections, but their papers were rejected due to previous convictions.

With the same courts, election commission, and legal barriers in place, one can expect an identical decision this time. Yet, their electoral rejection would seem to say that the ‘new republic’ differs little from the ‘ancien regime’. It would also complicate ties between the PPP and PML-N.

Will the Sharifs have to make some compromises in order to return to elected office? Will they have to accept the minus one formula (which restores all judges except Iftikhar Chaudhry), provide Asif Zardari assurances that the National Reconciliation Ordinance will go unmolested, or agree to keep a somewhat defanged Musharraf in power?

It’s not clear. But it is reasonable to assume that such matters have already been discussed, though not necessarily finalized, in talks between the PML-N and PPP. Still, time is running out for the Sharifs. The election commission will accept nomination papers from tomorrow till April 21. The papers will be scrutinized from April 22-28. Appeals will be accepted till May 2. Final decisions will be announced on May 9.

Both Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif plan on running in the by-elections this May. It appears that Asif Zardari will not, but this is by no means certain.

All three face potential roadblocks to election. For Zardari, there is the graduation requirement. A Musharraf-era constitutional amendment requires elected officials to hold a bachelors degree. That Zardari really holds an undergraduate degree is under question. However, this issue could be moot if Zardari’s proposed judicial reform package repeals the degree requirement or he decides not to run for a National Assembly seat.

The Sharifs are also barred from politics due to a previous conviction post-Musharraf’s 1999 coup. The National Reconciliation Ordiance benefited the late Ms. Bhutto, Zardari, as well as a host of Musharraf’s allies (including some bankers and Muttahida Qaumi Movement figures), but does does not apply to the Sharifs. The Election Commission rejected their nomination papers for the recent elections. Preventing them from doing so would require further compromise between the PPP and PML-N, or even the PML-N and Pervez Musharraf.

It’s unclear whether Shahbaz’s statement has his brother’s endorsement, though this is highly likely. It could be that Shahbaz is playing good cop, while Nawaz plays bad cop. Additionally, Shahbaz is seen as more conciliatory than his older brother, which would provide Nawaz with some cover (i.e. creating the impression that his brother talked him down from the ledge). A less likely alternative is that Musharraf could be successfully playing one Sharif brother off of the other by offering Shahbaz, not Nawaz, a major position in the national unity government (perhaps prime minister).

Shahbaz has extended his stay in London, where he’ll meet with retired Brigadier Niaz Ahmed (they met in Islamabad over a week ago) and could meet with Pervez Musharraf, who has begun a four nation tour of Europe.

Zardari and Malik Qayyum Meet in Dubai
National reconciliation talks must, apparently, occur outside of Pakistan, and so Attorney General Malik Qayyum met with Asif Ali Zardari in Dubai on Saturday. Both left Pakistan in a curiously furtive fashion. The PPP has publicly remained open to dealing with Musharraf after the elections and strongly resist the idea of a national reconciliation government prior to the elections, as they’d delay the polls.

It’s a positive development if Musharraf is negotiating with both the Sharifs and Zardari in earnest. If he’s playing them off of each other, then Musharraf is playing with fire.

Opposition Tours the U.S.
Several opposition figures are on a tour of the United States. Sherry Rehman and Javaid Laghari, both of the People’s Party, will be speaking at the Brookings Institution tomorrow. Imran Khan will be on a multi-city tour, speaking at organizations such as Amnesty International and CSIS and in Pakistani community events, which seem to be fund raisers for his Tehreek-e Insaaf Party.

Fazlur Rahman: Saudi Challo
Maulana Fazlur Rahman was noticeably absent from the public since the news reporting serious threats against him. And he’s done what he seems to do often in challenging moments, go to Saudi Arabia.

Geo Back
Earlier last week, Talat Hussain returned to AAJ television to host his weeknightly public affairs program. In his first show back on air, Talat said he’s back with no strings attached. But it seems as if the show (Live with Talat) is now taped, not live (in accordance with the new media control rules). There is also little mention of the judiciary issue. Nonetheless, the show remains engaging and informative.

GEO News also returned to the air waves today sans their most popular political talk show hosts, Hamid Mir and Shahid Masood. Kashif Abbasi, another prominent television journalist, remains off of ARY One World.

Pakistan continues along a mixed, though largely negative trajectory as the spate of urban suicide bombing continues and insurgents make bold moves in South Waziristan, while the army strengthens its control over Swat and leaders flinch toward national reconciliation. The army’s immediate workload increases, but Gen. Ashfaq Kayani takes clear steps to depoliticize the institution. In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, efforts toward dividing and containing the Taliban continue. Election campaigning proceeds, though in a less spirited fashion prior to Benazir Bhutto’s assassination.

Terrorist Strikes Shi’a Gathering in Peshawar A teenage suicide bomber clad in black struck an imambargah, a site for ritualistic mourning for Shi’a Muslims, in Peshawar today, the seventh day of the month of Muharram. This month is significant for all Muslims, but it holds a particular importance for the Shi’a. Their commemoration crescendos on the tenth day, Ash’ura, as they mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. Ash’ura falls on Sunday; the army, local police, and private mosque security squads are under high alert. However, that will not preclude attacks such as today’s from occurring. The bomber that struck the imambargah today detonated his device after being stopped by police, killing ten individuals. Targeting the Shi’a is a major point of convergence for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and various southern Punjabi Sunni militant groups.

In a marked contrast to the government’s military success in Swat, it continues to struggle in South Waziristan. This week, two forts were taken over by insurgents, who had little trouble combating the undertrained and ill-equipped paramilitary Frontier Corps. Their Wednesday night attack on a fort, which they held and then withdrew from, was made by a group of 200-1,000 men, overwhelming the 40 FC troops stationed there.

This large scale attack by neo-Taliban affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud is the first of its kind as guerrilla tactics are normally used. If this marks a strategic shift for Mehsud, it is both an alarming development for Pakistan’s military as well as a potential source of opportunity. Its success in Swat was partially precipitated by the overstretching of Maulana Fazlullah’s forces, though Fazlullah’s group is vastly smaller and less sophisticated and armed than Mehsud’s. And so if Mehsud’s forces press toward Pakistani military installations in large numbers, they provide an opportunity to be eliminated in larger numbers of them in a short amount of time with an aerial assault. That is why Mehsud group did not hold on to the fort in Wednesday night’s attack.

U.S. Special Forces’ counterinsurgency training of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps accelerates this year, but there’s no indication that any substantive progress will be achieved before the spring. In the interim, Pakistan could benefit by goading Mehsud into adopting more conventional and exposing tactics.

Tea with the TalibanAs the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan sat and drank chai with former Taliban leader and now Musa Qala governor Abdul Salaam, the strategy of dividing and containing (or incorporating) the Taliban continues in Pakistan. The federal government is exploiting the traditional and on-going rivalries between the Ahmedzai Wazirs and the Mehsuds in Southern Waziristan. It could be imposing a blockade of sorts on the Mehsuds, to the advantage of the Ahmedzais. Curbing the flow of drugs and other illicit contrabands will weaken the Mehsuds, but it’s unclear as to whether the Pakistani military is effectively declaring war on the Mehsud tribe or whether it’s trying to make them see Baitullah Mehsud as a source of their problems.

Eurotrip: The National Reconciliation Tour On Saturday, Muslim League-Nawaz President Shahbaz Sharif met in Islamabad with Niaz Ahmed, a retired military officer who serves as an intermediary between the Sharif brothers and Pervez Musharraf. The octogenarian retired brigadier was an army instructor to Pervez Musharraf and is well-respected by the Sharif brothers due to past favors. He reportedly presented Shahbaz, the younger Sharif, with an offer straight from Musharraf to take part in a national unity government before the elections and have a considerable role thereafter. The Sharifs were also requested to tone down their criticism of Musharraf.

Shahbaz reportedly replied that he’d have to have discuss any offer with his elder brother, Nawaz, who was nearby in the resort town of Murree. After being caught leaving Ahmed’s Islamabad home by spunky Pakistani journalists, Shahbaz described his meeting with Ahmed as a “courtesy call.” Coincidentally, he also met the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Ali Awadh Asseri. The Saudis have a keen interest in seeing the return of the Sharifs to power and have for years played a role in managing Sharif-Musharraf relations.

And in yet another coincidence, Shahbaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf, and Niaz Ahmed will all be in London this Friday. Shahbaz claims he’s going to London for medical treatment, but there’s no sign his hair plugs need re-alignment.

As of now, Nawaz Sharif, who is seen by some as less compromising than his brother, has continued his call for a national unity government without Pervez Musharraf. But he has called for a re-scheduling of elections so that new election commission could be formed, headed by deposed Supreme Court Justice Rana Baghwandas, enabling the participation of Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e Insaaf and the Jamaat-e Islami. The PPP strongly rejected Sharif’s proposal.

The elections delay serves the interest of all parties save the PPP, which will lose the sympathy vote as we get further away from Benazir Bhutto’s death. This brings up some significant questions in regard to the national reconciliation talk.

Is it an attempt by Musharraf to divide and control the opposition? Until now, the PML-N has been following the lead of the PPP. Is that changing? Does the PML-N share an interest with Musharraf in checking the PPP, particularly in Punjab? We’ll probably get a good sense this weekend as to the status of the Sharif-Musharraf talks.

Pakistan will likely see some form of a national unity government. But it remains to be seen as to whether it will be formed before or after the elections, with or without Pervez Musharraf, and all the parties, including the PML-Q.

But Army Has More DutiesWhile the army might be doing less politicking, its burden has now increased. It has now been tasked with defense of the country’s increasingly scarce wheat supplies. This is on top of its responsibilities in fighting insurgencies, defending Pakistan’s borders, and providing security for some of Pakistan’s major cities after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Aitzaz Ahsan’s Return to the PPP
The spirit of reconciliation is alive. Asif Zardari will reportedly promote Aitzaz Ahsan to People’s Party vice chairman. This is a move to push the PPP in Punjab. As I noted earlier, Zardari will be moving to Lahore to build up the party there. But this also marks a challenge to the PML-N and PML-Q, whose support base is almost exclusively in that province. Aitzaz was paid a visit by Attorney General Malik Qayyum, who reportedly offered an end to his house arrest if he hushed up about the judges issue.

The Travails of Maulana DieselIt hasn’t been a good week or so for Maulana Fazlur Rahman. He’s been staying indoors lately as a result of the reported assassination threats made against him. His party, the JUI-F, is facing some turbulence; it recently expelled 18 party members. Fazl tells BBC Urdu that a senior Punjab official replied to his request for security by stating, “No money, no security.”

Editor:

Arif Rafiq, a Washington, DC-based consultant on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. [About]