August 2012 Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Newsletter

Striking the Right Balance - What is the right balance of irregular warfare and traditional warfare within DOD? Albeit an extremely difficult question to answer during a time of pending budget cuts and downsizing, the Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center, in direct coordination with other stakeholders to include the Joint Staff, Army Staff, and Sister Services is addressing this question and many like it head on. In this context, what do we mean by striking the right balance? It is about placing the appropriate degree of emphasis on irregular warfare. There are those who have served in the Army of the 1960’s through the 1990’s and saw firsthand the abrupt and near total abandonment of IW doctrine, training, and education. Now there is the current generation of Soldiers who have never experienced an Army at peace. There is a consensus among the most senior and junior members of our Army that the lessons learned in past conflicts must not be relearned by future generations. I’m convinced though, that senior Army and Joint service leaders are sincere in their efforts to retain the experiences and lessons of the recent past through the institutionalization of IW in our Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Material, Personnel and Facilities.

MG Peter Bayer, who as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, stated during his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: “We believe the future operational environment demands irregular warfare competency. To do this, we must optimize the balance between soldier, structure, readiness, and modernization, and continue to focus on the professional military education of our leaders and soldiers.” (See also video of the testimony here). *

The hard question is: In a resourced constrained environment, how does the Army institutionalize IW capabilities IN doctrine, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities? What do you think? Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

About the Author

Dave Dilegge is a retired USMCR Intelligence and Counterintelligence / HUMINT officer. He is also a former USMC civilian intelligence analyst and worked several years in the private sector. He served with the 1st Marine Division during Operation Desert Storm. In 1999 he was the recipient of the National Military Intelligence Association’s Colonel Donald G. Cook Award for his work in supporting USMC and DoD urban operations analysis, wargaming and experimentation. He is currently a Director at the Small Wars Foundation and is Editor-in-Chief of Small Wars Journal. His son David is an Infantry Sergeant currently serving in the Army's 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized).