This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting defendants'
motion for a directed verdict.

The record indicates that the action arose out of a
fall and the subsequent injury sustained by plaintiff
on September 3, 1975, while descending the steps in
front of her residence, which was a half of a double.
The defendants are plaintiff's landlord. The plaintiff
contends that the fall was caused by the negligence of
defendants in failing to repair the deteriorating step.
The plaintiff testified to using the step in question
ten to fifteen times a day and that the steps had been
in a deteriorated condition for six months prior to the
accident. The accident at issue took place during a
thunderstorm as plaintiff was leaving her home, barefoot
and wearing shorts and a top. Plaintiff testified that
when negotiating the step, she was not looking down
at the deteriorated step, but, "probably straight ahead."
(Tr-68.)

Besides the step in question, there were two other avenues
of egress for the plaintiff. One was a rear entrance to
plaintiff's apartment which she testified was too dark to
see; the other was the adjoining half double's front steps,
use of which appellant testified would have required crossing
"the muddy and the soupy grass" and which plaintiff thought
was improper since it was not her property.
(Tr-52.)

At the close of the plaintiff's argument in the Common
Pleas Court, the defendants made a motion for a directed
verdict, which was sustained. The court based its decision
on alternative grounds: 1) that the landlord did not owe
plaintiff a duty to repair, and 2) that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent or had assumed a known risk.

We shall first examine plaintiff's third assignment of error:

"The trial court erred in finding that the tenant of
residential premises, who uses defective steps leading from
her front door in a careful manner knowing that said
steps are defective, is charged with contributory negligence
as a matter of law."

The plaintiff contends that the testimony, when construed
most strongly in her favor, at least raises the factual
issue of her actions meeting the standard of ordinary care.
We cannot agree. Reasonable minds could not differ that a
person who knows of the deteriorated condition of a
step would not attempt to negotiate that step with
bare feet, in the middle of a thunderstorm, without
making sure she looked where she was stepping. Consequently,
the plaintiff's third assignment of error is overruled.

Our decision that plaintiff, as a matter of law, negligently
contributed to her injury bars her from recovery.
Fogle v. Shaffer
(1958), 167 Ohio St. 353.
As a result, even if the remaining assignments of error
are sustained, they are not prejudicial and are therefore
overruled.