1.
What is your opinion regarding information
theory and modern ICTs such as the Internet and mobile technologies?
Does
ubiquitous information-gathering capability affect information theory?

It
was modern information technology and
particularly computer devices that gave rise in the late forties of the
last
century to the so-called information theory. Claude Shannon's problem
was in
fact, as stated in the title of his famous paper, "a mathematical
theory
of communication" (Shannon 1948). The
concept of information within this theory of communication has little
to do
with the everyday meaning of this word, i.e., with 'knowledge
communicated'. What
is being communicated between a sender and a receiver is not
information but
are messages. Nevertheless Shannon
speaks
about "transmitting information." In my opinion a comprehensive
theory of information must deal also with the semantic and pragmatic
aspects of
message communication which are excluded in Shannon's
theory.

If
we use the framework of systems theory
and second-order cybernetics, we cannot say that there is something
like
"ubiquitous information-gathering capability" just because
information is not something out there that can be gathered but the
result of a
selection within a system on the basis of a meaning offer, i.e., of a
message. What
becomes ubiquitous is then the possibility of sending and receiving
messages. On
the basis of an interpretation process the meaning of a message becomes
information for a given system. This corresponds to the categories used
by the
sociologist Niklas Luhmann when he states that there is a difference
between a
meaning offer or announcement ("Mitteilung"), a selection process
("Information"), and an understanding process
("Verstehen"), their unity being called communication
("Kommunikation") (Luhmann 1984). The crucial question is the
possibility of making a difference between the meaning offer and the
selection
process. When we read a text, for instance, we can take our time in
order to
think about what possibilities of interpretation can be considered.
This is
more difficult in the case of a face-to-face dialogue or even of modern
real-time media, because we have little time to reflect on what is
being said,
as analysed for instance by thinkers like Paul Virilio. 'Ubiquitous
information-gathering capability' does not mean to gather something
called
information which is already there but the possibility of making all
the time
and everywhere a difference between a meaning offer and an
interpretation
process. Information technology affects indeed information theory as
far as we
have to think about what kind of communication processes are taking
place and
what dimensions are lost or won.

2.
What is your opinion on the
philosophical relationship between power and information? Is
information
Machiavellian?

Let
me try to give first a few historical
references about the concept of power following some of the hints given
in the
article "Macht" of the "Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie" (Röttgers 1980). The concept of power is derived in
the
Western tradition from Greek dynamis
(Latin potentia) meaning the capability or potentiality of
becoming. Within
Plato's philosophy this concept is used in a political sense. Platon
criticises
the sophists because in their view power was not subjected to or
legitimated by
reason. The sophist Gorgias considered the power of words -- and, we
could add,
the power of the selection from a meaning offer, i.e., the power of
information
-- as a kind of pure force (bía). For Plato tyrants are
paradoxically
powerless because they do not achieve what they really want, namely the
good. In
the Roman tradition there is a difference between power related to a
public
position (potestas) and the recognition of one's authority (auctoritas).
In Italian Renaissance Machiavelli does not look for a metaphysic
foundation of
power because the question of power is something that must be stated
with
regard to each particular case. This kind of casuistic or Machiavellian
power
philosophy is closely related to the thinking of Francis Bacon for whom
"human knowledge and human power meet in one." Bacon stresses the
importance of human dominance over nature through empirical based
knowledge,
and thus of science and information, as a necessary condition for
political
power. Kant makes a difference between power ("Macht") and
force ("Gewalt"). Force is the kind of power needed to overcome
another power. In both cases we deal with the idea of overcoming and
subordination. Force ("Gewalt") is a necessary condition for the
establishment of a legitimate power that can protect freedom and law.
Law and
freedom without force means anarchy, law and force without freedom
means
despotism, force without freedom and law means a barbarian situation,
and
finally force with freedom and law means a republican state. Hannah
Arendt
distinguishes between force ("Gewalt") as related to means and ends
from power ("Macht") as a situation of institutional dependence. In
other words, not only the question of technological means and their
force is
decisive for social order but also the question of power, i.e., of
legitimisation. Michel Foucault explores the question of "bio-power"
as related to specific institutions such as hospitals and jails.

The
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben
has recently considered the question of power (potenza, potere)
within the context of political violence (violenza) relating
both
perspectives, the one by Hannah Arendt and the one by Michel Foucault
(Agamben
2002). He interprets the present situation as one in which the
political power
of parliamentary democracies has changed into a permanent "state of
emergency" (Carl Schmitt), the paradigm of such a situation being the
"camp" in which human beings such as refugees are kept in their pure
physical existence at the same time inside and outside the geographic
and legal
limits of national states.

In
my opinion the question of information
and power should be stated today within this context of the crisis of
modern
democratic states facing digital globalisation. Information is thus a
kind of
force that cannot be controlled by legal state regulations alone but
that can
be also seen as a danger for national security. This is a paradoxical
outcome
of the ideal proclaimed by the Enlightenment with regard to censorship
free
societies. Some human beings have "informational existence" while
others remain excluded from it in what we are used to call the digital
divide. A
way of dealing with this problem are international regulations such as
the ones
being discussed at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).
It is
evident that digital information can be used and is being used for
political
violence and millions of people suffer from all kinds of digital
attacks such
as viruses and daily (sexual) spam. We could call this last
situation
sarcastically as the penis enlargement syndrome.

3.
Could you explain the
solution of your "trilemma" with some examples?

(On
"Capurro's trilemma" see: W.
Hofkirchner Ed.: The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information.
Proceedings
of the Second International Conference on the Foundations of
Information
Science, Gordon and Breach Publ. 1999, pp. 9-30. A short version was
published
in: World Futures 1997, Vol 49. Online
available).

One
apparent solution of the trilemma is
to say that we do not need anything like a common information concept
for all
fields. We operate with different concepts defining them in different
fields,
which is what we do for instance when we use the concept of force in
physics or
in everyday life or in politics (Capurro/Hjørland 2003). This
solution was
proposed by the philosopher Peter Janich (see Capurro 1998)
when he states that it is possible to solve this
kind of semantic problems with adequate definitions, i.e., restricting
the
meaning of a concept to a specific field (Janich 1998). But the problem
is then
that Janich does not admit at all the use of the information concept
outside
the human sphere. He admits this use only as an analogy. And here we
are facing
the trilemma once again, i.e., the question of using this concept
analogically,
equivocally or univocally.

Another
solution is the idea of emergent
qualities and thus of different but evolutionary connected concepts as
suggested by Wolfgang Hofkirchner which is similar but not identical to
my
Wittgensteinian suggestion of connecting different information concepts
according to their "family resemblances" within a network allowing
different kinds of relations some of them analogical, some equivocal,
some
univocal. This means nothing less than
creating a double-bind connection or a hermeneutic circle between
univocal
scientific terms and natural language. This is the path suggested by
the
physicist Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker when he relates
information to language
(Weizsäcker 1974). This means not only the question of translating
the language
of science into everyday language but, more basically, the question on
how
everyday words can be seen as a source of scientific concepts, giving
rise for
instance to different kinds of metaphors and analogies. There is a
productive
tension between the semantic polyvalence of words and univocal
concept
definitions within the framework of scientific theories. This question
concerns
also the difference between Western languages, which are more
concept-oriented,
and Eastern-languages, which are more word- or even silence-oriented.
This was
the matter of Heidegger's "Dialogue with a Japanese" (Heidegger
1975).

4.
Why are the "technologies of
the self" called "technologies"? Is your concept of it the same
as Foucault's?

I
believe that Foucault had in mind the
old and ambivalent Greek concept of techne that is of the
knowledge how
things are being produced (poiesis). There is a classic
discussion on
this between Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle being the one who, on the
one hand,
made the distinction between techne and phronesis which
is the
word he uses for ethical knowledge, i.e., for the kind of knowledge
which is
specific human and related to the moulding of our character and actions
(praxis),
while techne refers to the knowledge need for the production of
material
things or poiesis. But, on the other hand, Aristotle also uses
the word techne
with regard to the moral as well as to the political sphere. Foucault
speaks
about four kinds of technologies, namely the first one concerning the
production of material things, the second one concerning the production
of
signs, the third one concerning the production of power and finally the
one
regarding the operations of the individuals with themselves and with
others
that he calls "technologies" but also "practices" of the
self.

My
view on this matter was to look for the
connection between technologies of self and technologies of sign
production
such as modern information technology. My question is to explore in
which way
we use such technologies in order to produce or model or, remembering
the Latin
origin of the word 'information', namely informatio, in-form
ourselves,
as individuals and as a society, as we have been doing this for
instance with
printing technology and with writing. But information technology is not
just a
mean to an end or a mere instrument but in a more basic sense we are or
exist
online. This is the reason, I believe, why information ethics cannot
take only
the instrumental perspective. If this diagnosis of modern information
technology as a digital ontology -- in the Heideggerian sense of this
term --
is right, then we are dealing with a projection ("Entwurf") of Being
and not just with the production of digital beings that pervades, for
better or
for worse, our existence, similarly as, for instance, in the case of
modern
physics, to which Heidegger refers in "Being and Time." The basic
ethical question is then how do we model our lives within and beyond
this
digital horizon.

5.
Although you
criticise "modern" thought, you are not a "postmodern"
philosopher but a "hermeneutic" philosopher who deals with multiple
realities made in private and public life world. Do you agree?

I
am indeed not a postmodern philosopher
in the sense of pertaining to a historical epoch of philosophy that
took place
in Western thinking particularly during the seventies and eighties of
the last
century and that was mostly an eclectic movement. But in a more general
sense
we could say that all present thinking is postmodern as far as it does
not
simply and purely rely on the presuppositions of modern philosophy. The
question about conscience as a firm basis for thinking as established
for
instance by Descartes or Husserl is being radically questioned by brain
scientists as well as by some leading philosophers. I basically agree
with
Gianni Vattimo with regard to the hermeneutic or "weak" nature of
human understanding. Hermeneutic thinking opens the possibility of a
dialogue
with the tradition or, better, with traditions and orders of values
beyond the
wrong alternative between eclecticism or fundamentalism. The true
alternative
being the one between solipsistic and dialogical thinking.

I
would say that a dialogue is not only a
question-answer exchange but a message-message exchange. Questions are
a
possibility of message content, but not every message is a question.
According
to Hans-Georg Gadamer, every statement can be seen as an answer and the
hermeneutic problem is to explore what was the question that gave rise
to this
answer. In other words, hermeneutic brings a dialogical and dynamic
perspective
into the world of static texts. This presupposes not only the exchange
of
messages but the very fact that a message is indeed accepted by the
receiver as
relevant and vice versa. The analysis of these conditions of message
announcement and transmission is what angeletics deals with. The effect
of
message announcement and transmission is what hermeneutics calls the
tradition
but taking at the same time for granted this very phenomenon of
bringing a
message and dealing only with its interpretation. Within and between
traditions
we may indeed ask questions or look for the questions behind the
statements. But
not every message is embedded within such a question-answer structure.
More
basically: every statement can be considered as an announcement, but
not
necessarily as an answer to a question. In fact, most of the messages
we
receive everyday are not questions that require an answer but just
announcements that as far as they are seen as relevant by the receiver
may lead
to another message. Take for instance a message telling you that you
have won
ten million Yen in the lottery and that you are kindly requested to
pick up
your money or another message from your girlfriend telling you that she
cannot
be with you during the weekend. In case you consider these messages as
relevant
to you, you may like to answer them or not without considering them as
a
question. In case you reply sending a message, this one is then not an
answer
to a question but a message that may be again relevant to the lottery
or to
your girlfriend and who may send you again another message and so on.
In other
words, answering a message is not the same as answering a question. We
may say
that the message-message structure is the essence of communication.

6.
What do you think
about a "message ethics"?

This
is indeed a very relevant question as
we live in a message society (Capurro 2003). Of course, every
human
society has been a message society but we live today in a society in
which
digital messages and messengers play a significant role not only in
politics
and economics, but also in everyday life. This is due particularly to
the
ongoing transformation of the 20th century society dominated mass media
with
their hierarchical one-to-many structure of message distribution and
consumption. This transformation which is due to the invention of the
internet
is still difficult to evaluate. The ideals proclaimed by the 'founding
fathers'
of the internet, such as free access to knowledge for everybody or
joyful
learning from each other have turned more and more into the opposite.
The ethic
of traditional mass media, the so-called media ethics, was and is still
concerned with such questions of centralised moral monitoring of
message
selection and distribution, i.e., with the problems faced by the
institutions
and actors, journalists in particular, of such an angeletic setting.
What makes
particularly difficult the question of ethics with regard to the
internet is
not only the variety of stake holders and, of course, of share holders,
but
also the question of how far the internet affects directly or
indirectly the
digital and material life of millions of people, i.e., either because
they have
the possibility of being online or because they have not such a
possibility. An
ethics of the message society should not be restricted to the realm of
the
digital, being some kind of 'angel-ethics' -- as far as angels have no
physical
and temporal existence, they are not concerned, at least in the same
manner as
we are, with the constraints of morality and the possibility of ethical
reflection -- or with the ethics of digital action alone, but it should
deal
with the impact of such action on the physical life of society.

7.
What is the
difference between angeletics and Régis
Debray's
"médiologie”?

According
to Marshall McLuhan's famous dictum,
"the medium is the message." It seems to me that we have done a lot
in order to explore what are media but that we have done little in
order to
answer the question 'what are messages?' In his "Cours de
médiologie
générale" Régis Debray points to the figure of the
mediator or the
"hommedium" such as "the scribe, the priest, the
intellectual." (Debray 1991). Debray is concerned with the study of the
medium or messenger that makes possible the transmission and
circulation of
symbols, and he is also interested in the analysis of how "beliefs and
myths" disseminate in early stages. He defines messages
("messages") as being a kind of statement ("énoncés")
having the characteristic of being "calling" ("vocatif"),
and "prescriptive" ("prescriptif"), and as having
"pragmatic valences" ("valences pragmatiques") (p. 41). The
reason why he is interested in the early stages of message
dissemination is
that at this moment the difference between cool statements and hot
messages, or
between science and ideology, is fuzzy (ibid.). His paradigmatic
example in
this regard is the development of early Christianity, a religion that
makes a
religion of the mediation itself ("la médiation faite religion")
(p.
92). Debray's
mediology is in fact a
secularised Christology: "la médiologie n'est qu'une
christologie à
retardement, réflechie dans la sphère profane." (p.
93). His analysis of Christian mediations or
"interfaces" deals with militant institutions such as Catholic orders,
holy texts, and God's people (p. 143-144). At the end of his book he
categorises three mediatic ages, namely the age of the "logos" or
"logosphère" fixing an oral tradition, the graphic period or
"graphosphère", and the electronic period or
"vidéosphère"
which he correlates with Comte's stages of human development (p. 387).

There
are indeed many similarities and
common insights between Debray's mediology -- not "medialogy," i.e.,
the study of mass media -- and my views on angeletics (Capurro 2003a).
This
concerns for instance his analysis of the dissemination of messages or
of
mediologic interfaces. But this is, I think, only one aspect of the
message
phenomenon, namely the question of the medium or messenger. The
analysis should
include not only messengers, but also messages (content, form,
production,
impact) and the process itself of announcing a message. In this regard
angeletics is closely related for instance to marketing, although
marketing
considers messages only within the horizon of economic profit. Such a
comprehensive angeletic analysis would be not primarily concerned with
the
construction of a system but with detailed and comparative case studies
as well
as with different evaluation methodologies with regard to the social
impact of
messages and messengers. Debray's studies on Christianity and his
Comtean
inspired system are indeed fascinating but too unique in order to deal
as a
foundation of a "general mediology" or even for a general angeletics,
i.e., they are biased with regard to the Western mediological tradition
although they are an important contribution to comparative angeletic
studies.

Finally
it can be said that an empirical
science called angeletics should be distinguished from a philosophic
angeletics
as well as from an angeletic philosophy. This is a similar distinction
as the
one made between hermeneutic as a methodology, philosophic hermeneutics
as
developed by Gadamer, and Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy. In my
opinion,
Heidegger's phenomenology is in fact an angeletic thinking (Heidegger
1975).

Capurro,
R., Fleissner, P., Hofkirchner,
W.: Is a Unified Theory of Information
Feasible? A Trialog
In: W.
Hofkirchner Ed.: The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information.
Proceedings
of the Second International Conference on the Foundations of
Information
Science, Gordon and Breach Publ. 1999, pp. 9-30. A
short version was
published in: World Futures 1997, Vol 49.