The Labor Movement

The labor movement, although rich in history, has been criticized by
analysts for its inability to develop effective representation for the
Colombian worker. Scholars have variously described organized labor as
weak, nonradical, nonoppositional, and as virtually co-opted by the
national government. Although prominent at times, unions lacked the
strong adversarial presence characteristic of organized workers' groups
in other Latin American countries. Historically, Colombia's worker
groups formed unions to attain political goals but failed to coalesce
into enduring collective bargaining units. Nevertheless, the labor
movement did express itself clearly through strikes, sit-ins, and other
forms of work stoppage and contributed directly to the long-term
development of society by bringing workers into the political process.

The first workers' group was formed in 1857. Known as the Bogotá
Artisans Society (Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogotá), it represented a
reaction to liberal economic reforms bent on opening the Colombian
economy to free trade. It functioned primarily as a medium for local
artisans to vent their political displeasure over the new
competitiveness of the economy, rather than as a forum for grievances
concerning workers' rights.

Societies that followed in the nineteenth century were similarly
nonconfrontational and served as foci for achieving mutually beneficial
goals--such as establishing joint savings and insurance schemes--rather
than as means of presenting collective bargaining demands. Although some
attempts were made to improve wages and working conditions, a genuine
workers' movement did not emerge until the end of World War I.

The earliest episodes of violent confrontation between workers and
management centered on the foreign enclave industries of oil and banana
exportation. The most noted job action occurred at the United Fruit
Company's Santa Marta complex, where in November 1928 railroad, banana,
port, and field workers went on strike to force changes in wages, hours,
and nonwage compensation. This attempt to win resolution of grievances
unsuccessfully aired ten years earlier was marked by the violent deaths
of about 1,000 people, as the government intervened repressively on the
side of the United Fruit Company. The banana and oil industries elected
to retrench, however, rather than face continued worker unrest.
Colombia's labor issues thereafter were fought over more vigorously in
the domestically owned coffee industry and eventually in the urban
industrial sector.

In 1930 the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL) was elected for the
first time in decades. Its victory was directly associated with the
Conservative Party (Partido Conservador--PC) government's handling of
the United Fruit Company strike. This political transition was one of
the most important in Colombian history. It signaled the end of a
government policy designed to repress labor's efforts and the beginning
of the PL's pragmatic and conciliatory philosophy of selectively meeting
labor's demands to bring its political leadership, including members of
the Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia--PCC),
into the Liberal fold.

During the 1930s and early 1940s, coffee workers enjoyed numerous
small successes. They gained control over small parcels of land for
their own cultivation, improved labor contracts on large estates, and
received legal permission to organize. These victories were won through
both individual and collective efforts. The perceived successes of the
coffee workers, however, were a disincentive to their greater
participation in the national labor movement, which diminished the
long-term political power of the unions. Nonetheless, the urban work
force was determined to establish an institutionalized labor movement
and set about integrating some of the unions that had already formed.

The 1930s and 1940s saw the growth of unions nationwide; labor
supported the PL, which, in turn, created an environment conducive to
labor's participation in politics. Labor interests were partially
consolidated in 1935 with the creation of the Confederation of Colombian
Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Colombianos--CTC), which
represented the first successful attempt at uniting smaller unions from
various professions into a collective political organization. The CTC
was leftist by definition, but the reformist policies of the Liberal
government allowed for a lengthy and mutually beneficial relationship.
What labor failed to realize, however, was that by aligning itself with
a single political party, it would suffer the consequence of the
inevitable change of power.

The heyday of the labor movement was clearly over by the mid- 1940s.
Expressly anticommunist, postwar conservatism turned on the labor
movement, and the split and eventual fall of the PL in the 1946
elections eliminated labor's influence on national government. The
rising PC also provided a means to express the ruling class's growing
fear of what it perceived as an increasingly radical labor movement.
Soon, even the moderate middle sectors of society turned away from the
movement. The CTC's new impotence was made evident by a string of
unsuccessful strikes in the mid-1940s.

Taking advantage of the weakened state of the CTC, the Roman Catholic
Church established the Union of Colombian Workers (Unión de
Trabajadores Colombianos--UTC) in June 1946. It immediately attracted
many members--some from the ranks of the CTC and others from small
unions, particularly industry groups--that had not been enticed to join
the leftist CTC. Both industrialists and the Conservative government
supported the UTC, largely because it did not represent a threat to the
political and economic elite. The subsequent period of labor repression
and co-optation by the government served to eliminate radical elements
of the movement while taming the less militant segments. During the
period known as la violencia (1948-66), organized union labor
was effectively dead; it had no means of articulating its interests, and
the chaotic nature of society at that time delayed further coalition for
at least ten years.

The near anarchy that followed the 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán, a member of Congress who had long been a champion of the
disadvantaged, had a different although equally demoralizing effect on
rural workers. The plight of smallholder coffee farmers worsened
rapidly, and many of them fled the countryside in the face of widespread
violence. This served to consolidate landholdings in rural areas, as
well as drive large numbers of unskilled rural laborers into the hands
of the UTC. Collectively, labor emerged from the 1950s demoralized and
virtually without political power. The UTC, which at this point
commanded the majority of organized labor and the diminished rural
groups, had no political means of effecting even the slightest changes
and was without an advocate in national government.

After 1960 two more labor federations surfaced: the Trade Union
Confederation of Colombian Workers (Confederación Sindical de
Trabajadores de Colombia--CSTC), formally recognized by the government
in 1964, and the General Confederation of Workers (Confederación
General de Trabajadores--CGT), created in 1975. The CSTC, which was
aligned with the Colombian Communists, and the CGT, which was affiliated
with the Christian Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrática
Cristiano--PSDC), accounted for a combined total of 20 percent of the
unionized work force. Neither union had a strong political role,
however, under the National Front, which served to unify all significant
political interest groups within a shared two-party structure from 1958
to 1974. There was no apparent need to incorporate labor as a political
ally. Additionally, during the National Front period the CTC and UTC
faced numerous internal problems, which caused many individual unions to
withdraw from the larger federations.

Regardless of political setbacks, the labor movement was not totally
ineffective. Various groups engineered successful strikes in the 1970s
and 1980s. Bolstered by leftist leadership, the weakened status of the
CTC and the UTC, and the economic austerity measures of the government
of Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982-86), labor groups coalesced in 1986
in a fashion reminiscent of the 1930s. A majority of the independent
unions and those affiliated with the CSTC joined forces in September
1986 to form the United Workers Central Organization (Central Unitaria
de Trabajadores-- CUT). Analysts estimated that this body included 75
percent of the organized work force, the majority of whom were no longer
willing to accept an acquiescent platform. The CUT also emerged as a
major voice against organized violence and served as a catalyst for
uniting other labor elements. It was not, however, timid about
organizing strikes, and key industries reacted to CUT initiatives by
meeting many of its demands rather than face prolonged confrontation.

By the late 1980s, the confederated labor movement appeared to be
playing a larger role in representing workers' rights, as well as
focusing on major political issues. Although it seemed unlikely that a
collaborative effort similar to the one struck with the Liberal
administrations of the 1930s would again be possible, the CUT was
reshaping organized labor into a stronger bargaining movement.

The early months of 1988 were rife with strikes by workers in the
banana, banking, cement, public service, and other industries. The most
common demands centered on protection for union leaders, who were the
targets of right-wing assassins, and cost-of-living adjustments in
wages. Despite their growing hostility toward management, the CUT and
other union groups refrained from openly defiant stands against the
government. Nevertheless, observers believed that the extent to which
the government would tolerate a more active labor movement depended on
whether or not the unions seriously threatened the economic and
political interests of the elite, as well as the degree to which they
contributed to the persistent problem of organized violence in the
country.