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Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Alawites For Assad: Why The Syrian Sect Backs The Regime

The Alawites stand by Assad out of a historic fear of Sunni
persecution. Although some Alawites are breaking ranks, most face a dilemma: by
continuing to support the regime, they may invite the very Sunni revenge that
they dread.

Since
the start of the revolt in Syria, the country’s Alawites have been instrumental
in maintaining President Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power. A sect of Shia Islam,
the Alawites comprise roughly 13 percent of the population and form the bulk of
Syria’s key military units, intelligence services, and ultra-loyalist militias,
called shabiha (“ghosts” in Arabic). As the uprising in Syria drags on, there
are signs that some Alawites are beginning to move away from the regime. But most
continue to fight for Assad -- largely out of fear that the Sunni community
will seek revenge for past and present atrocities not only against him but also
against Alawites as a group. This sense of vulnerability feeding Alawite
loyalty is rooted in the sect’s history.

The
Alawites split from Shia Islam in ninth-century Iraq over their belief in the
divinity of the fourth Islamic caliph, Ali bin Abi Talib, a position branded as
heresy by the Sunnis and extremist by most Shias. The community began as a
small collection of believers, and over the following centuries it suffered
almost constant discrimination and several massacres at the hands of Sunni
Muslims. In 1305, for example, following a clerical fatwa, Sunni Mamluks wiped
out the Alawite community of the Kisrawan (modern Lebanon). As late as the
mid-nineteenth century, in retaliation for the rebellion of an Alawite sheikh,
the Ottomans ruthlessly persecuted the Alawites, burning villages and farms
across what little territory they held.

Despite
this long-standing persecution, the Alawites fought to integrate into modern
Syria. In 1936, as the French mandate waned, Alawite religious leaders
convinced their anxious followers to incorporate themselves into the new,
overwhelmingly Sunni, Syrian state. Over the next several decades, Alawites
moved away from the mountains to pursue educational and employment
opportunities in the cities. Between 1943 and 1957, Alawite migration tripled
the population of Hama, and between 1957 and 1979 it quadrupled the size of
Latakia.

Many
Alawites also joined the military. Since Ottoman times, Sunni Arabs had largely
spurned army careers, but Alawites welcomed the opportunity for stable income.
By 1963, they made up 65 percent of noncommissioned officers in the Syrian
army. The rise of Alawites in Syrian society throughout the 1960s was assisted
by political infighting among the Sunnis and the Baath Party coup of 1963,
which united working-class Alawites and Sunnis under one banner.

Although
Sunnis initially tolerated the growing clout of the Alawite community,
resentment resurfaced when Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite and the father of the
current president, seized power in 1970. When he proposed a new constitution
three years later that mandated a secular state and allowed the presidency to
be awarded to a non-Muslim, Sunnis protested across the country. In early 1976,
with religious tensions flaring, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood launched its
uprising against what it called the “heretic” Alawite regime. The Alawites,
harboring their long-standing fear of rejection and persecution by the Sunni
community, rallied around Assad. The two sides hardened for battle, and over
the next six years Assad relied on his sect to beat back the Brotherhood
revolt.

In
February 1982, the struggle reached its climax in Sunni-dominated Hama. Seeking
to end the rebellion, Assad massacred the Sunni population of the city, killing
as many as 20,000 residents. Alawites blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the
disaster, largely convinced that Sunnis had and would always reject their
efforts to integrate. Even liberal Alawites, who criticized Assad’s
aggressiveness at the outset of the revolt, remained silent in the aftermath of
the Hama massacre. They had been transformed from victims into perpetrators.

Since
the Hama slaughter of 1982, the Alawites have consolidated their control of the
country. According to the Syria scholar Radwan Ziadeh, they comprise the vast
majority of Syria’s roughly 700,000 security and intelligence personnel and
military officer core. In fact, they constitute so much of the country’s
security apparatus that Syrians are said to often put on an Alawite accent when
apprehended by intelligence officers in the hope of receiving better treatment.

The
Alawites’ loyalty to Assad today is hardly assured, however. Despite popular
notions of a rich, privileged Alawite class dominating Syria, the country’s
current regime provides little tangible benefit to most Alawite citizens. Rural
Alawites have struggled as a result of cuts in fuel subsidies and new laws
restricting the sale of tobacco -- their primary crop for centuries. Indeed,
since the provision of basic services by the first Assad in the 1970s and
1980s, most Alawite villages -- with the exception of Qardaha, the home of
Assad’s tribe, the Kalbiyya -- have developed little. Donkeys remain a common
form of transport for many, and motor vehicles are scarce, with dilapidated
minibuses offering the only way to commute to the cities for work.

Some
Alawites are explicitly breaking ranks. Last September, for example, three
prominent Alawite sheikhs, Mohib Nisafi, Yassin Hussein, and Mussa Mansour,
issued a joint statement declaring their “innocence from these atrocities
carried out by Bashar al-Assad and his aides, who belong to all religious
sects.” According to Monzer Makhouz, an Alawite member of the Syrian National
Council, a leading opposition group, Alawites are joining protests in the
coastal cities of the Alawite territory. And in recent weeks, evidence has
emerged of defections of Alawite soldiers and intelligence officers, seemingly
from less privileged Alawite tribes, who have described themselves as “Free
Alawites” and called for other Alawites to join them.

The
fall of Assad presents several possible scenarios for the Alawites. It could
launch a comprehensive reconciliation process, drive them back to their
mountain refuge in northwestern Syria, or lead to open conflict with the
Sunnis. No matter what, the Alawites face a dilemma. If Assad collapses, the
community will have to fend off the criticisms of supporting the regime for
this long. Sticking with Assad may increase the odds of an unforgiving Sunni
retribution, but it at least keeps the sectarian conflict at bay -- that is, as
long as Assad remains.

About Me

I graduated from the French University in Beirut (St Joseph) specialising in Political and Economic Sciences. I started my working life in 1973 as a reporter and journalist for the pan-Arab magazine “Al-Hawadess” in Lebanon later becoming its Washington, D.C. correspondent. I subsequently moved to London in 1979 joining “Al-Majallah” magazine as its Deputy Managing Editor. In 1984 joined “Assayad” magazine in London initially as its Managing Editor and later as Editor-in-Chief. Following this, in 1990 I joined “Al-Wasat” magazine (part of the Dar-Al-Hayat Group) in London as a Managing Editor. In 2011 I became the Editor-In-Chief of Miraat el-Khaleej (Gulf Mirror). In July 2012 I became the Chairman of The Board of Asswak Al-Arab Publishing Ltd in UK and the Editor In Chief of its first Publication "Asswak Al-Arab" Magazine (Arab Markets Magazine) (www.asswak-alarab.com).

I have already authored five books. The first “The Tears of the Horizon” is a love story. The second “The Winter of Discontent in The Gulf” (1991) focuses on the first Gulf war sparked by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. His third book is entitled “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Balfour Promise to Bush Declaration: The Complications and the Road to a Lasting Peace” (March 2008). The fourth book is titled “How Iran Plans to Fight America and Dominate the Middle East” (October 2008) And the fifth and the most recent is titled "JIHAD'S NEW HEARTLANDS: Why The West Has Failed To Contain Islamic Fundamentalism" (May 2011).

Furthermore, I wrote the memoirs of national security advisor to US President Ronald Reagan, Mr Robert McFarlane, serializing them in “Al-Wasat” magazine over 14 episodes in 1992.

Over the years, I have interviewed and met several world leaders such as American President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Margaret Thacher, Late King Hassan II of Morocco, Late King Hussein of Jordan,Tunisian President Zein El-Abedine Bin Ali, Lybian Leader Moammar Al-Quadhafi,President Amine Gemayel of Lebanon,late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Late Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, Haitian President Jean Claude Duvalier, Late United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan,Algerian President Shazli Bin Jdid, Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Siyagha and more...