– Date and time of departure
11 August 1944, 0300 Hours
– Place of departure
Blida Airport, Algeria, North Africa
– Dropp’ing zone
Aude Area of France near Axat (90.0-58.0)

CONDITION’S OF DROP

GROUND
The ground was poorly selected and was for equipment only. The mountains were so high on either side of the dropping zone that the plane could not come down very low and as a result the men all landed on the left mountain top, which was partly covered with trees in places where the rock formations permitted. There men were injured.

AIR
The plane ride was excellent. None of the men became air sick and several of the men slept the entire trip.

FLYING
The flying was good except for the fact that we were too high for a good drop.

RECEPTION
The reception was the wrong one, and it was twelve miles from the place the section was supposed to drop. The Maquis were supposed to receive equipment at the place we landed and the plane bringing their equipment was not over five minutes behind our plane. There were two trucks and two cars ready to haul the containers up into the mountains near SALVEZINES (Coordinates 97.5-53.5 Map of FRANCE-Sheet 105). The Maquis were very excited about the unexpected American’s arrival and it was some time before we could get them started to work.

NAME OF SIGNAL PLAN
“ Platinium”

CHROLOGICAL HISTORY

(NOTE: —The coordinates were taken from the Map of FRANCE 10 S and 10 R.) (1: 100,000).

11 AUGUST
The section worked that morning until noon loading the containers with the help of the Maquis, and moving to the hiding place up in the mountains. The wounded men were placed in beds in the village of SALVEZINES, which was well protected by the Maquis, a given medical attention by a civilian doctor who was working with the Maquis. Two of the men soon recovered and rejoined the section. It was then discovered that another man had broken ribs from the jump. T/5 Strauss continued to work despite his condition throughout the operation.

12-13 AUGUST
This day was spent in breaking open the containers and cleaning the weapons; while the Officers and Non Commissioned Officers made reconnaissance of the area. That night, a railroad bridge (90.9-58.0) was destroyed on the line between CARCASSONNE and RIVESALTES in such a manner as to leave the bridge standing, but in such shape as to be impossible to repair unless it was first torn down and a new bridge built. The bridge had been in continual use by (German supply trains.

14 AUGUST
This day was spent teaching the Maquis how to fire the 1903 model U.S. Army rifle, light machine guns and other weapons. That night the section destroyed three stone arch bridges, which completely cut the Route National 117 and one by-pass. The bridges’ were located al (05.8-50.0) (0-1.4-58.2) and (15.0-57.3).

In order to safely use available transportation on this road, telephone communication was established along the road by Maquis who lived in the towns and villages. They reported into our Command Post in the village every half hour by telephone, and kept us informed of enemy activities.

15-16 AUGUST
This day was spent in strengthening the defense around the small village of SALVEZINES. The roads were mined and the machine guns were placed in the most strategic positions. That afternoon, our Maquis brought in nine enemy soldiers whom they captured in a soap factory in St. Paul (13.4-56.8). We obtained as much information as possible from the prisoners and tried to send this information back to Headquarters, but our radio was not in operating condition and we were without communication throughout the entire operation.
By this time our Maquis forces had increased from 40 to 250 men with arms. There were plenty of other men who begged to join forces with the Americans and had to be refused because of lack of arms.

17 AUGUST
Our forces moved into QUILLAN (87.2-63.9) and plans were made to attack an enemy food warehouse at COU1ZA (92.5-71.4).

A Maquis force was placed in the hills covering all the roads to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing or withdrawing the garrison of 250 men. Lieutenant SWANK with four (4) Americans and eighteen (18) Maquis were sent to aid the Maquis force north of the town near ALET (87.2-(63.9) by destroying a bridge. Lieutenant SWANK, who was an Engineer Officer, decided that after looking the situation over, the best way lo block the road was by blasting rock from a cliff near the road. He was warned by the local Maquis that the enemy was comming forward from COUIZA, but he hurriedly placed the demolition, fused it, and retreated to cover.
Later, he and Sergeant GALLEY went back along the road to determine the extent of damage and found that it was not enough to halt the enemy force rapidly approaching them. Lieutenant SWANK knew his small force of twelve (12) men (Several of the Maquis had disappeared in the meantime) could not hold back a force of 250 enemy troops armed with machine guns and mortars. He ordered the men to withdraw into the hills in order to escape while he and Sergeant GALLEY delayed the enemy advance by covering up their withdrawal with automatic weapons fire.
During this action Lieutenant SWANK was hit four times by enemy machine gun fire before he fell to the ground. Even after he was hit, he made an, effort to draw his pistol and continue the fight as long as there was a spark of life left in his body. His action was so brave that it won the praise of the enemy officers who made this statement: «We have never seen a man fight as hard as this officer against overwhelming odds “.
I his remark was made to the civilians of COUIZA. Lieutenant SWANK fought even after be could no longer stand on his feel until a German Officer emptied his pistol into his throat, the bullets coming out behind his right ear.

Sergeant GALLEY saw Lieutenant SWANK fall and thought him dead, but he continued to fight on alone until his right hand was shattered so badly by an explosive bullet, that he could no longer use his weapons. He also received a bullet wound in the left foot before withdrawing up the hillside under the protecting fire of the other men who had been organized by T/5 FRICKEY . They picked good positions behind rocks and took up the fight.

The enemy was turned back with the loss of nineteen (19) killed and twenty four (24) wounded, against the loss of one American and two Maquis killed and two Americans and two Maquis wounded.

After it became dark the men made their way back to QUILLAN to rejoin the other men of the section. T/5 VEILLEUX became separated from the other men and wandered around looking for them until the next morning. He was fired on by three of the enemy and seeing that it was hopeless to light under those circumstances, he fell to the ground and rolled over into a ditch as if he were dead. When the three men approa ched his position and came out into the open, he calmly proceeded to take good aim and not heeding the enemy’s fire, he was able to kill all three of them without injury to himself.

18 AUGUST
This day was spent in burying Lieutenant SWANK and taking care of the wounded. The people of the town expressed their deepest sympathy by preparing a funeral service which could not be excelled in any small American town. There was not enough space on the lagest truck in the town for all The flowers. The funeral riles were also held for the two Maquis who were killed in the same action, and Lieutenant SWANK’s body was given the place of honor. The service was held in the church and a military burial given by the Maquis afterward.

19 AUGUST
We were to attack the warehouse on this day, but the enemy had heard rumors that there were 500 American Parachutists in QUILLAN and when we arrived the men who had been left guarding the warehouse had surrendered without damaging the warehouse. Most of the garrison, all except 20 men had placed hostages on their trucks and broken through our Maquis guard. There was enough food in the ware­ house to feed a million men for a period of 10 days. This food was used by the Maquis and distributed to the population of the near-by towns and villages. The section moved to LIMOUX and stayed for three days during which reconnaissance was made while the men were able to wash clothes and rest up a bit. During the three days a Jedburg team under the command of a British Captain Sell asked if we would help them wreck a troop train leaving CARCASSONNE toward NARBONNE . The section with 30 Maquis went to a point east of CARCASSONNE and found the tunnel (06.0-01.3). We were too late to wreck the train so we destroyed four sections of rail and the enemy was unable to repair it in time to use it for their retreat.

23 AUGUST
Our Maquis guard on the outskirts of LIMOUX was attacked by a band of 32 Germans who were trying to escape to Spain and thought they could easily break through the Maquis Guard. The Americans were the first to re-inforce the guard, and by excellent flanking action surrounded the enemy and forced them to surrender after a half hour battle. S/Sgt SAMPSON was in charge of the flanking action and did an exceptionally good job.
He was doing the work of an Officer after Lieutenant SWANK’s death and his ability to lead men was clearly demonstrated in this action. After this date we continued to spread out to the north, laying ambushes and encouraging the resistance forces to fight all the scat­ tered bands of the enemy who might be wandering around the country trying to cross the Spanish frontier. We realized that there was no more work for us to do after about a week of this type of operating.
Finally, we started east to the Allied Forces who had pushed north past us. We met the French Army at MONTPELLIER and American Forces at AVIGNON where Sergeant GALLEY and Sergeant ARMENTOR were placed in an American hospital. The section continued on to GRENOBLE, to report to headquarters.