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But you realize the forum over the last ten years has decided small is enough and banished any nay-sayers.

And still maintains that.

Interestingly the forum, ahead of curve as always, decided that Indian nukes do not exceed 20kt because of a liar scientist and now banishes anyone who might dispute that. The forum thrives on its wisdom and deep insight into Indian nuclear bomb designs.

But you realize the forum over the last ten years has decided small is enough and banished any nay-sayers.

And still maintains that.

Interestingly the forum, ahead of curve as always, decided that Indian nukes do not exceed 20kt because of a liar scientist and now banishes anyone who might dispute that. The forum thrives on its wisdom and deep insight into Indian nuclear bomb designs.

The forum relies on the wisdom of former members, expert in designing missiles and warheads using Microsoft Paint, who have never seen a real weapon but are somehow experts in design and fiercely critical of actual scientists have spent their careers designing weapons for India. They dismiss the actual weaponeers out of hand, declaring them liars, and trumpet the claims of foreign non proliferation ayatollahs as evidence.

Nuclear scientist Dr A Gopalakrishnan agrees that the 1998 thermonuclear test was a 'fizzle' and wants India to conduct a nuclear test again.I fully agree with K Santhanam that the single thermonuclear device we tested in 1998 did not produce anywhere near the expected design yield. I know this reliably, from multiple knowledgeable sources.

According to them, only 15 to 20 percent of the intended release of fusion energy was actually achieved. However, what happened is neither unusual nor was it a 'scientific failure' on the part of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre/Defence Research and Development Organisation scientists.

All nations which have perfected fusion bombs have carried out several development tests, and no country has hit it perfect in their first test! Dr R Chidambaram and A P J Abdul Kalam should know this well, that they alone are not super-scientists!But, as a nuclear engineer myself, I am appalled that a scientist of Dr Chidambaram's stature could claim that this solitary test was perfect and, for further fine-tuning of the design, we do not need any more tests, rather we could rely solely on computer simulations!The establishment of a validated computer simulation model requires a reasonably large body of data to be obtained from a minimum set of well-structured tests, in each of which certain critical parameters are systematically altered. This is true not only for nuclear tests, but even for pharmaceutical or material development tests, etc. No extrapolation or improvement of the current faulty design can be done without more weapon tests.Dr Chidambaram is an enormously gifted high-pressure physicist who was associated for years as a member of the weapons team led by Dr P K Iyengar. Dr Iyengar is truly considered to be the father of the Indian thermonuclear weapons development. Soon after the 1998 tests, Dr Iyengar himself has come out with scientific details to show that the thermonuclear device of 1998 did not function at all as per design or as expected.

I submit that Dr P.K. Iyengar who is truly considered father of our Thermo nuclear program is in agreement with Arun_S, Sanku that it was a fizzled warhead.

One of the points that may support a move to also possess MT weapons is the fact that most nuclear assessments and treaties take into account only the number of weapons and not the total capacity. So increasing the capacity from kilotonnes to Megatonnes is less likely than to increase the total numbers by 12 fold. So 100 4 MT nukes = less noise than 1200 150 kt nukes and fewer chances of Chinese arms race that will draw huge pressure from US and Russia.

The NoKo situation shows that nukes don't become better deterrents with increasing size. As shiv says, a dispersed bunch of an unknown number of small (10-20kt) class nukes is a surefire deterrent to genocide. But what REALLY matters is operational versatility and flexibility. Look at the US, supergiant with supergiant aircraft carriers etc etc, floundering against a ragged bunch of terrorists! Or India, unable to stop Pakistani artillery firing across the LOC. A variety of options, and a reputation for using them, is a much better deterrent.

Manish_Sharma wrote:I submit that Dr P.K. Iyengar who is truly considered father of our Thermo nuclear program is in agreement with Arun_S, Sanku that it was a fizzled warhead.

This is exactly why the forum has correctly identified the liar and has correctly recognized that our nukes are only 20 kt max.

We have to manage with what we have. Experimentation by our scientists may fail again given that 50% of our scientists are liars and the father of our nuclear bomb achieved a 8-12 kt yield. We must stick to facts. It's about hard numbers,not notional fancies. That is also part of forum wisdom and learning from earlier forum stalwarts. We are sure of 8-12 kt and maybe 20 kt which the non liars allowed. Forum expertise on these matters cannot be allowed to step beyond what some scientists have said

It is possible to do genocide even with 20 kt. No lies there and full forum expertise backing that..

And I should add, the boots and lathis of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, even when they were rudely woken up at 6AM by news of chinese intruders, became a much greater deterrent than all the might of the Pee All See's thermonuclear missiles.

shiv wrote:.......Experimentation by our scientists may fail again given that 50% of our scientists are liars and the father of our nuclear bomb achieved a 8-12 kt yield.

We test more designs this time, so more chances of success.

I have already written to Modi ji that we need to test at least 5 different designs.

I have also written to him that an 800 kt chinese warhead hitting our relatively tiny Delhi and Mumbai will obliterate them.

While huge Beijing and Shanghai hit by our piddly warheads will allow them to dust off and get up to recover.Shanghai total area = 6,340 km²Mumbai total area = 603.4 km²

Beijing total area = 16,808 km²Delhi total area = 1,484 km²

We must stick to facts. It's about hard numbers,not notional fancies.

Rightly OR Wrongly my fight over the years has been with the fact that BRF decides whether more testing is needed Or not under the limited frame of "Deterrence" any arguments put forth regarding POST NUCLEAR WAR becomes OFF TOPIC.

The manthan that whether we test or no whether we need more sophisticated and bigger warhead can't be only through the lense of "Deterrence".

The more I think moving out of frame of Deterrence towards Post Nuke Exchange scenario, the more I am convinced that we need big numbers, bigger warheads.

Nine years back I had started new Thread on lines of "Post Nuclear War: Sending enemy to stone age instead of bronze age" But it was locked.

I have over the years read about the failure of the TN warhead. But an always confused abut the utility of higher yield of the warheads. On account of Indian nuke doctrine. It speaks of credible nuke detrrent. But that implies that India will react with nukes in the event of nuke attack. But it doesn't spell out the precise contour of the nature of the attacks. Due to deliberate vagueness of the wording.

The assertion of making civilisation continuity impossible for the attacker post a nuke attack on india is vague as it is not specified as to how many nukes will TSP or for that matter PRC impossible to continue as civilisations.

In light of the same, can we really define what will be a minimum size of indian nuke arsonal. Along with yealds of the warheads.

Manish_Sharma wrote:We test more designs this time, so more chances of success.

I have already written to Modi ji

You should also ask him which scientists can be trusted. It would be very bad if he has a liar as his advisor. We can consult forum experts on that and then send Modiji the consensus. Because if incompetent liars do the testing again we will be screwed more. Its a pity the best scientists could not go above 12 kt. But we have to accept our limitations

Manish_Sharma wrote:Nine years back I had started new Thread on lines of "Post Nuclear War: Sending enemy to stone age instead of bronze age" But it was locked.

Well if you have something to say please start the thread again. In fact I started a thread about post nuclear war scenario with "real nuclear powers" like North Korea and USA rather than pretenders like India The thread is - "Geopolitical bla bla" Please post you thoughts there about "post nuclear war scenario" when megaton weapons are used. I feel it will be easier to talk freely if Koreans are killed than Indians. So feel free.

Pratyush wrote:I have over the years read about the failure of the TN warhead. But an always confused abut the utility of higher yield of the warheads. On account of Indian nuke doctrine. It speaks of credible nuke detrrent. But that implies that India will react with nukes in the event of nuke attack. But it doesn't spell out the precise contour of the nature of the attacks. Due to deliberate vagueness of the wording.

The assertion of making civilisation continuity impossible for the attacker post a nuke attack on india is vague as it is not specified as to how many nukes will TSP or for that matter PRC impossible to continue as civilisations.

In light of the same, can we really define what will be a minimum size of indian nuke arsonal. Along with yealds of the warheads.

Not really .. no minimum size since one of your adversaries is continent sized and has a good underground network of silos .. the name is "Deterrence " and it can be had only by hard power NOT assumptions .

Pratyush wrote:I have over the years read about the failure of the TN warhead. But an always confused abut the utility of higher yield of the warheads.

Despite the self proclaimed great expertise on this forum, no amount of discussion can replace reading of reams of material on how nuclear weapons developed and what role was played by the concept of megaton and multimegaton weapons based on accuracy and mode of delivery and destructive potential and how these concepts underwent some modification as the years rolled by.

This forum is possibly the worst place to learn because we already know and knew within days of our 1998 tests about design, yield and utility.

Would like to propose an alternate model to target China during a nuclear war. Targeting specific cities will mean people just work around those areas so the impact is more short term. What can be done for a longer term impact?

Approach: Coastline first instead of City first. Use surface detonation instead of airburst. Use a combination of neutron Salted and fission/fusion.Reasoning: Convert China medium term to landlocked to prevent working around the blast sites in cities. In this scenario, new cities will still have the problems of water, goods/people movement in large numbers etc.

Stage 0:1. Use counterforce instead of counter value to limit the responses. If not enough nukes then proceed to stage 1 directly

Stage 11. Target coastline first (and land bordering Burma and NK).2. Use surface detonation instead of Air burst so that ground contamination is higher

Stage 2:1. Target cities (X nos)2. Target industrial areas

Stage 3:1. Use mainly neutron salted bombs mainly for western (bordering China with Tibet) and northern China(bordering inner Mongolia with China proper) boundaries as blast impact is wasted here 2. Target near river areas/cultivation areas in the interiors using neutron salted

Using some simple calculations.

For 150kt(100kt is also fine) assume longer lasting radiation impact of 50 km to 100 km. Core destruction is around 10 km but radiation will be more.

So stage 1 will needSo around 6000km/50km = 120 100 kt nukes

Stage 2 will needChoose 50 of favorite cities (would spread out instead of targeting completely few cities ) so that support systems are stretched. If city is completely destroyed there is not much for the enemy to doChose another 50 of their vital industries like aircraft/research/large metal works etc

So stage 2 will need another 100

Stage 3:3000km/50 km = 60 nukes + survival areas = 60 so 120 nukes

So in total will need 120 + 100 + 120 = 340 nukes for medium term impact on the civilization. Counter force will need much more.

Human ingenuity for a determined race is expected to come out of any problems but the above approach will move the recovery bar from 50 to 100 years.Some bypass solutions for the impacted country by the above approach are - Develop a massive aircraft industry - Ask a large part of population to move to other countries

Of course we hope that all this is not needed. But if they threaten Indian civilization through Pak nukes then no point being squeamish about it.

We can argue about what the 'truth' about Indian nuclear weapons is, as in how many, what yield etc. or we can argue about what it should be, in our respective humble, and frequently, profoundly misinformed opinions.

I think, the truth about the existing state of Indian nukes is pretty much unknowable to almost all lay people. There are conflicting stories from people who should know the true state, so depending on what opinion a poster holds, they pick a 'credible source' to hang on to that opinion and bash others, and others sources using that. This is completely useless in informing one self or others. At best, one might say, that the Indian deterrent is not in a shape that convinces all stake holders that its in good shape. Having said that, if one continues to argue this line, 'Santanam is an ass.. or RC is an ass.. ADR is an ass', we will end up in mutual recrimination and bans and a shut down of this very important discussion.

If one argues, what the Indian deterrent should be, then one is on more solid footing, as there are numerous open source studies on the subject, a lot of historical data and open source accounts of the first weaponeers on how they went about it and what difficulties they faced.

Perhaps some people **really** want this discussion to be shut down and jump to arguing about what the Indian deterrent is and start brandishing respectable names so as to validate their completely uninformed opinions. What ever their motives, this is a disservice to all.

THEY'LLbe the size of a tea-cup and weigh less than a kilogram each. They won't cost much. They'll be easily compatible on delivery systems like small missiles and artillery systems. And they'll yield the equivalent of 1 to 10 tons of TNT. But that's not where Fourth Generation Nuclear (FGN) weapons make their real killing. Their biggest attraction is: they're based on atomic and nuclear processes not restricted even under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Herein lies the contradiction in global non-proliferation regimes. While current generation N-weapons are 1,000,000 times more powerful than conventional ones, FGN weapons are only 1,000 times more potent. So, while unleashing the power of the atom and revolutionising conventional warfare,they still won't be "weapons of mass destruction". And so, won't contradict any international law. Says Andre Gsponer, nuclear physicist at the Independent Scientific Research Institute, Geneva: "FGN weapons will fill the gap that exists today between conventional and nuclear weapons."

At the cutting edge of this technology today are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, the UK, Russia, China, France), Germany and Japan. But analysts say the danger of FGN weapons—given their low cost and small size, factors that allow R&D to proceed in greater secrecy—is that more and more countries could well jump onto the bandwagon.

"The signing of the CTBT and the implementation of politically-correct programmes might well herald the 'Golden Age' of thermonuclear weapons proliferation," comments Jean-Pierre Hurni, who co-authored a technical report on FGN weapons with Gsponer last year. As of now, no one's stopping the construction of what are called large Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) simulation facilities, he says. The upshot? "We'll soon witness the emergence of a number of virtual thermonuclear weapons states as well as the diffusion of FGN weapons."

"It's amazing how the perception has come about that research on more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons has stopped," says Suren Erkman, director, Institute for Communication and Analysis of Science and Technology, Geneva. "Many political analysts believe the Star Wars programme has stopped. If anything, it has accelerated. Under new names (like GPALS: Global Protection Against Limited Strike), its public visibility has momentarily decreased, but the science and technology behind directed energy weapons is still active."

While these new weapons use either fusion or fission fuels as their main explosive charge, the yield generation mode in the fission process is the subcritical mode which is not forbidden under the CTBT. Sub-critical fission burns are not suitable for making high-yield weapons, but they do just fine for mini-nukes with 1 to 100 ton yields.

In other words, long-term technological dynamics are at work, quite independent of the diplomatic and political facade. After decades of making crude N-weapons, this is allowing some countries to envision sophisticated nukes.

For this type of explosive, the preferred technique is to use magnetic compression to increase the density of the fissile material and a very small amount of anti-matter to initiate the critical burn. While anti-matter and lasers will be used as igniters, the main charge could be deuterium-tritium pellets 0.5 cm in size and compressed by a factor of 1,000. Says Gsponer:"In the compression of pellets the world record is held by Japan. They achieved a density 600 times more than the initial density. "

Moreover, over the last 10 years, laser intensities have increased by over four orders of magnitude. Superlasers are said to be the biggest discovery in nuclear physics in the last 10 years. Even with increasing intensity, they're exceedingly compact and cost in the region of $1 million upwards. France-based BM Industries sold a superlaser to China last year for $1 million. A Russian superlaser facility has been set up in St Petersburg, funded by a western consortium that doesn't want to see Russian scientists escape with their capabilities to the 'unmanageable' Third World.

SINCE the '60s, the US has been consistent in its policy of 'not defining precisely what constitutes a nuclear explosion'. This has led to contradictions in the CTBT, which, on the one hand, "permits no yield from nuclear (fusion or fission) explosions—not one kiloton, not one kg, not one mg of yield, but zero yield". On the other hand, it allows micro-explosions with a yield of the order of 10 tons.

Says Gsponer: "The reason for not including micro-explosions in the scope of the NPT or CTBT as suggested by India comes largely from the unwillingness of the nuclear weapon states to accept restrictions in this area of research." Adds Erkman: "For the nuclear weapon states in the West, live detonations of second and third generations bombs are no longer of any use. They gained positive publicity for the so-called abstention but also shut the door down on others."

It's how the West banned the atmospheric tests of the '50s and '60s. They claimed it was because they didn't want radiation fall-outs in other countries. The real reasons were military. The particles travelled a long distance in air and they could reveal a lot of critical information about the design and mechanisms of the detonated device. They didn't want the 'enemy' to know that.

Also, the fact that sub-critical experiments were not prohibited by the CTBT was clear when the US conducted its first sub-critical test of the post-CTBT era in July '97. The first three negative reactions to this, within days, were from China, India and Indonesia. It took the European Parliament and 15 more countries seven months to call upon the US to refrain from such tests.

But a US state department report appended to President Bill Clinton's letter in September '97 expressly analyses "ICF and other similar experiments" as examples of CTBT-permitted activities "which, while not involving a nuclear explosion, may result in the release of nuclear energy".

Even the Germans, while signing the CTBT in '96, said "nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted or applied in a way as to prejudice or prevent research into and development of controlled thermonuclear fusion and its economic use".

What is interesting, however, is how military experts view the development.

At a conference on Molecular Nanotechnology in '95, Admiral David Jeremiah, former vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, US, said: "The battlefield of the future will be dominated by smart weapons that will allow us to reduce wholesale destruction and the tremendous expenditure of ordnance. The goal is finer precision, more selectivity, less need for mass."

Big nukes, he said, are "increasingly less useful to us" in military terms. He called them "political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations". By this strict battlefield logic, the slimming of nuke technology has "a greater potential to radically change the balance of power".

All this isn't red-hot news either. Back in '80, Freeman Dyson wrote in Disturbing the Universe: "A permanent test ban would be a dangerous illusion because future improvements in weapons technology would create irresistible pressure towards secret and open violations of any such ban. In other words, fission-free bombs are the wave of the future...any political arrangement which ignores or denies their birthright is doomed to failure."

A year later, the question of the link between ICF and pure-fusion weapons was raised by physicists W.A. Smit and P. Boskma. It also prompted '67 Nobel laureate Hans A. Bethe, head of the theoretical division of Los Alamos during World War II, to ask the US to ban "all physical experiments, no matter how small their yield, whose primary purpose is to design new types of N-weapons".

In '78, Gsponer was one of the first physicists to see the coming of the Star Wars and write a paper on it before Ronald Reagan formalised it. Now he's the first to alert us on how FGN weapons are mushrooming under nonproliferation umbrellas. Says he: "The CTBT is just an instrument legitimising possession and perfection of N-weapons by nuclear states. What you really have to know is what's going on how in the laboratories and what it's leading to."

Says Gsponer: "The reason for not including micro-explosions in the scope of the NPT or CTBT as suggested by India comes largely from the unwillingness of the nuclear weapon states to accept restrictions in this area of research." Adds Erkman: "For the nuclear weapon states in the West, live detonations of second and third generations bombs are no longer of any use. They gained positive publicity for the so-called abstention but also shut the door down on others."

This surely takes the cake! Why would poor India do that?

The main thrust however is

shiv wrote:Big nukes, he said, are "increasingly less useful to us" in military terms. He called them "political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations". By this strict battlefield logic, the slimming of nuke technology has "a greater potential to radically change the balance of power".

Big nukes, he said, are "increasingly less useful to us" in military terms. He called them "political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations". By this strict battlefield logic, the slimming of nuke technology has "a greater potential to radically change the balance of power".

In one argument you say, nukes will never be used, therefore why go for bigger yields. In the next post you suggest, that smaller yields are more useful militarily! So which is it? Are you planning to use them or not?

Also, why ignore the political dimension and political persuasive power of weapons with larger yields?

shiv wrote:Big nukes, he said, are "increasingly less useful to us" in military terms. He called them "political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations". By this strict battlefield logic, the slimming of nuke technology has "a greater potential to radically change the balance of power".

Lets compare two statements different by a few word

1. political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations2. political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations

Politico/Military people if they know their weapons and math or have been briefed properly will not be taken in by 1 MT yields when compared to say 8 x 125 Kt.

Nuclear weapons testing causes so much opprobrium, a HUGE truckload of sanctions and international breaking off of relations that non-P5 countries are scared of testing.

Now multiply that with X number to approach at the scenario, when actual use that kills millions will bring.Any nation, that is Non-P5 that uses N weapons, will face a very quick breaking off of trade, economic, political relations, and embargo almost immediately. The retaliation apart, the destruction and chaos from a retaliatory strike apart, the first user will find it very difficult to manage things internally as well as externally.

The situation is that we tested in 98' last time 19 years ago. While pakistan-china are jointly testing with North Korea since 2006 upto 3rd of September this year. 6 time in total, and the current test is Thermo nuclear. The enemy is racing far ahead, we need to make advancements.

Anyway we also need to test a couple of warheads which were mfrd. 20 years back, to study how our designs stand tests of time.

1. political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations2. political tools used by one nation of influence on the population of another, not tools we in the military need to carry out military operations

Politico/Military people if they know their weapons and math or have been briefed properly will not be taken in by 1 MT yields when compared to say 8 x 125 Kt.

Edited for clarity.

I specifically started the "geopoltical consequences of nuke war" thread hoping that some of these issues could be explored further.

It's like this - I believe that with the current crop of nuclear weapons nations have worked themselves into a stalemate. Will explain what I mean:

Nukes started off large (and by this I mean even 12 kiloton is large and "genocide" capable). They got even bigger in the hope that they would (for the US at least) mean total domination in all war for all time. That did not work. The USSR soon caught up and later China. There was then a scramble to prevent "others" from getting nukes so the self proclaimed "responsible" powers with nukes retained the capability. This plan has failed miserably. To summarize - everyone has a "deterrent" against everyone else.

Now if one nation is "deterred" from using its nukes because they can face horrendous retaliation that they do not want to face - the militaries are restricted from using nukes. Nukes then simply become a political tool and not a militarily usable one and this is as true for the US as it is for India.

It is precisely for this reason that there is a great attempt to make nuclear war "winnable by militaries" by enabling militaries (definitely USA, maybe Russia )to use nukes that do not carry a political burden. That political burden is fallout and the risk of massive incidental civilian casualties. So there appears to be a great deal of research quietly going on to have "small" nukes of the 0.1-0.2 kiloton or even 0.01 kiloton yields - delivered precisely to military targets with minimal fallout.

Nations like Pakistan and other new nuke nations are making their arsenal "invulnerable" by having nuke resistant bunkers. Ordinary bunker busters with 1-2000 kg TNT will not do the trick. But a nuclear bunker buster that penetrates 20 meters down and lets off a 0.1 kiloton blast equivalent to 100,000 kilograms of TNT will collapse underground bunkers. And the problem of using "megaton nukes" overground to develop "overpressures" to collapse underground bunkers and cause massive civilian casualties and subsequent fallout issues is eliminated. This is where nuclear weapons are going...

A military force tasked with eliminating Kim Young One hiding in an underground bunker would be happy to have a nuclear shovel to do the job.

Technically - if researchers could find a way to compress just 200 grams of Pu (or Tritium or something) and produce a "small bang" - it could be tested and tested and tested and no one would ever find out. I bet it's happening even as I type this. Combine that will a "less than 10 meter accuracy" Prithvi and every Paki bunker will get 72 female bunkers

shiv wrote:Technically - if researchers could find a way to compress just 200 grams of Pu (or Tritium or something) and produce a "small bang" - it could be tested and tested and tested and no one would ever find out. I bet it's happening even as I type this. Combine that will a "less than 10 meter accuracy" Prithvi and every Paki bunker will get 72 female bunkers

This is definitely going on. It is very difficult to find out if someone carries out a even a 1kt test in remote place or underwater.

Put a 1kt warhead on a torpedo, take a sub 200-300 undersea somewhere in south Indian Ocean or Artic/ Antartic and fire. No will have a clue.

The Russians used a underground nuke to block a out of control gas extraction point. No one knew about it until Russian themselves declared it.

Pakistan, incidentally, tested a new 2,200-km range Ababeel ballistic missile, which carries a MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) payload, for the first time in January this year.

1. The hwasong-14 has a 6700 Km range. No indian missile has that claimed range2. NoKo's TN test is a ballpark 200+ KT test, which if their claims are true is missile deliverable.India's TN has not been field tested to that yield. Our scientists claim that their data from Shakti-2 allows them to extrapolate and increase yield upto 200KT. Again this claim IMHO falls short both in terms of the yield (a nebulous 'upto 200kt' vs a possible 200-400kt yield), and the fact that the NoKos have actually field tested to full yield vs a theoretical claim by indian scientists

Parity does not exist with Indias adversaries, and thereforce deterrence can not be assumed to be absolute

Pakistan will very soon acquire the same design and yield. They have everything - Pu reprocessing at Pindi and Chashma, a Lithium Deuteride plant in Khushab being built by the chinese, 4 uranium gas centrifuge sites including further expansion of the kahuta site. They will likely have a working TN before the end of this decade.

I understand Gagan. But I think what you and others say are valid if we are talking about fighting nuclear war. I do think that is something we have never discussed. This thread itself has focused on deterrence and is now 8 years old. IMO there is not much more that can be said about deterrence - but there is plenty to discuss about "breakdown of deterrence" . There is a difference. I tried to start that "geopolitics after nuke war" thread where I thought nuclear warfighting scenarios could be discussed without the overarching limit of what "deterrence" means.

I think the idea that India should test again and test to demonstrate and arsenal of X yield and Y effect on an adversary and the geopolitical consequences of that are also worth discussing. This thread is 8 years old and apart from some useful technical references posted on it it is now long in tooth.

Remember that all the nukes in the world did not deter NoKo from building nukes but everyone has been deterred from hitting NoKo. If other nations keepdoing this - sooner or later something will snap. I don't want to proliferate threads - so I requested admins to change the name of that "geopolitical bla bla" thread to "Nuclear war - breakdown of deterrence" where free rein can be given to imagining what we (or others) may develop or need to develop.

Of course, if worst comes to worst I will start that new thread. I am just waiting for some sign from admins about my request.

For long, the international literature on the nuclear dynamics in South Asia has disregarded the role of China. Indian scholars have consistently highlighted this lacuna in the past. Many experts continue to ignore the Chinese factor in their analyses and advance clichéd assessments and raise alarmist concerns about the nuclear situation in the region.

Lately, there has been a renewed debate in Western academic circles about India’s growing predilection for an offensive nuclear posture. This supposed shift in India’s position is often interpreted as a response to Pakistan’s acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons or even to India’s inability to deter Pakistan from employing cross-border terrorism. Whatever may be the reason that is attributed, analysts alleging such a shift in India’s nuclear posture warn about the consequent heightening of nuclear risks and recommend that India demonstrate responsible nuclear behaviour.

Frank O’Donnell’s recent article, ‘Reconsidering Minimum Deterrence in South Asia: India’s Responses to Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons’ published in Contemporary Security Policy (2017), falls in this category. It strives to place in perspective the Indian responses generated by the introduction of the Nasr missile by Pakistan. O’Donnell delineates two ‘official’ (military and the civilian policy-makers), along with three streams of ‘strategic elite’ responses’.

O’Donnell begins by analysing Pakistan’s launch of the ‘Nasr’ and its concept of the full-spectrum deterrence. However, he seems to give credence to Pakistan’s argument that it developed tactical nuclear weapons and conceived of the concept of full spectrum deterrence in response to India’s ‘new pro-active’ military approach in the form of the so-called ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Needless to assert that there is nothing called a Cold Start doctrine or a new ‘pro-active’ conventional war fighting approach. Each country has the right to retaliate when a war is waged against it, including a proxy war. This is certainly not a ‘new stage of regional nuclear competition’, as O’Donnell puts it.

O’Donnell has meticulously summarised the assessments of the three streams of non-governmental ‘strategic elite’ responses to the challenges and security risks Pakistan poses for India through its tactical nuclear weapons as well engagement in cross border terrorism. The three streams have been ‘labelled according to the degree of their emphasis on the minimum or maximalist logic in their policy recommendation’. The first two streams — ‘minimum deterrence with deepened conventional provocative strike planning’ and ‘minimum deterrence with new arms control commitments, make a strong case for continuing the minimum deterrence posture but differ in their approaches.

While the first stream places emphasis on improving nuclear readiness, those in the second stream argue for new arms control measures for nuclear de-escalation. The third stream of responses (‘adopting maximalist nuclear logic’) urges for an expanded role for nuclear weapons in Indian defence planning but without abandoning the posture of ‘credible minimum deterrence’. O’Donnell has also skilfully examined various policy options for India to deter an escalation instigated by Pakistan such as ensuring an ‘assured’ rather than ‘massive’ retaliation while retaining the minimum deterrence concept, advancement of new arms control initiatives, and a reformulation of the minimum deterrence concept to include ‘conventional and un-conventional approaches’.

O’Donnell is right in drawing the conclusion that no one is questioning the Indian nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence. However, his fear that India may have begun a policy shift, which is based on National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval’s omission of the term ‘minimum’ in remarks at an event in October 2014, is rather farfetched. In most likelihood, the omission may have been unintentional.

O’Donnell is also right in arguing that a more holistic view of the concept of minimum deterrence is required that categorically specifies India’s approach in conventional and sub-conventional domains. Pakistan has been projecting its nuclear weapons as those required for war fighting. It has not learnt lessons from the United States which has shifted its nuclear war-fighting doctrine to a deterrence doctrine in 2010. The ‘sole purpose’ doctrine that defines the US posture now indicates that the sole purpose of American nuclear weapons is merely to deter, not to initiate, a nuclear war. In fact, this nuclear war fighting posture of Pakistan pronounced through the Nasr is basically meant to provide a shield for its terror activities if India were at any point to try and take a corrective military measure.

His assessment of India’s commitment to the principles of restraint and responsibility in its defence practices remains inadequate. He also seems to postulate his assessment of India’s shift towards a proactive and offensive nuclear posture on rather obscure premises and mistaken assumptions. O’Donnell’s use of the phrase — ‘development of offensive conventional concepts’ for India’s conventional preparedness, is rather inappropriate and misleading.

So far, there is no official indication that India intends to keep its nuclear forces at a ‘higher readiness level’. Even the overwhelming view within the strategic community does not appear to favour this kind of readiness. India is a responsible nuclear weapons country. However, a responsible country cannot be irresponsible towards its citizens. It has to protect them. It has to stand up to nuclear blackmail. This requires appropriate preparedness. And this is what India, rather its strategic community, is discussing. O’Donnell acknowledges this reality when he writes that vis-à-vis Nasr, ‘... greater clarity and public assurance is needed from Indian nuclear policy makers ...’

India’s nuclear strategy builds on the principle of restraint, and despite being a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its policies have been greatly consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear-weapon states. India’s declared nuclear doctrine of 2003, which stands by principles such as credible minimum deterrence, No-First-Use (NFU), non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, remains a fundamental document till date. The Indian government has not shown any indication that it is attempting to deviate from these declared norms. India’s record when it comes to observable and measurable benchmarks of responsible nuclear behaviour is a largely positive one.

Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to expand the size of its nuclear arsenal, including with the Nasr platform. This expansion will take place notwithstanding India’s policy or posture. Pakistan’s aggressive military strategy combined with an expanding nuclear weapons arsenal should be a matter of deep concern for the whole world, not merely for India. Pakistan has refused to adopt the NFU policy, and takes undue advantage of its nuclear shield to support and sponsor terrorist attacks in India without any fear of retaliation.

Frank O’Donnell has also ignored the deep-rooted Sino-Pak nuclear axis that operates within the region. China has extensively assisted Pakistan in building nuclear delivery capabilities, often violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Pakistan’s medium range ballistic missiles Shaheen I and II also closely correspond to China’s ‘M’ series of ballistic missiles.

The Nasr platform, as O’Donnell has rightly mentioned, is still in ‘very early stages of deployment’. The Indian government has not issued any official response to its launch. When former Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) Shyam Saran addressed the issue of Nasr and India’s massive retaliation threat in a speech in 2013, he was only holding a consultative position. To ascertain the seriousness of the Nasr challenge based on certain views prevailing within Indian non-official circles and think tanks would be a serious mistake. Frank O’Donnel also argues that Nasr threatens India’s ability to deter Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. While Pakistan’s aggressive strategies raise serious concerns for India, and the rest of the world, its Nasr programme certainly is not a threat to India’s security and survival.

The suggestions that come from different quarters, including in the article of Frank O’Donnell, that India should replace the policy of massive retaliation with that of assured retaliation or flexible response, may fail to send the fitting signal to Pakistani aggressive posturing and terror acts and undermine the logic of credible minimum deterrence.

Frank O’Donnell’s proposal that India can take initiatives ‘unilaterally’ to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, like it did by signing the Hague Code of Conduct, may be inconceivable. India has done its best to launch a global campaign for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons countries do not appear very enthusiastic about it. O’Donnell’s alternative option for an India-Pakistan agreement for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons could be a non-starter considering Pakistan’s policies of first use.

The ‘proactive conventional concept’ that O’Donnell claims to have been adopted by India has no substantive basis. India’s security needs differ in a great deal from Pakistan’s, as India has to deal with a greater security challenge from China. Pakistan has a reactionary history of nuclear and missile development and it continues to challenge India’s security through proxy wars and state-sponsored terrorism. The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy —as Frank O’Donnell recommends, but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour. Regional stability is possible only if Pakistan starts to practice restraint, act responsibly, and include the principle of NFU in its nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said on Wednesday his country has developed short-range nuclear weapons to counter the 'Cold Start' doctrine adopted by the Indian Army.

Abbasi was also assertive of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals being safe and secure.

"We have a very robust and secure command-and-control system over our strategic nuclear assets. Time has proved that it's a process that is very secure. It's a process that has complete civilian oversight through the NCA," Abbasi said in response to a question at the Council on Foreign Relations, a top American think-tank.

The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) of Pakistan is the authority responsible for command, control and operational decisions regarding the country's nuclear arsenals.

"As far as tactical nuclear weapons (are concerned), we do not have any fielded tactical nuclear weapons. We have developed short-range nuclear weapons as a counter to the 'Cold Start' doctrine that India has developed. Again, those are in the same command-and-control authority that controls the other strategic weapons," he said.

Moderator David Sanger said Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.

"There's no nuclear arsenal in the world that is growing faster. And there's no nuclear arsenal in the world, other than North Korea's, that tends to worry American more, because they worry about the safety of the arsenal. They worry about the command and control of the arsenal," Sanger said.

Abbasi said that the command-and-control systems they have in place are as secure as anybody else's in the world.

"The last 20 years are testament to that," Abbasi said in response to another question.

"So let there be no doubt that any extremist element or somebody like that can gain control of fissile material or a nuclear weapon. There is just no possibility of that. And it's time-tested, and it's a very secure system that has been put in place," he said.

"Pakistan is a responsible global citizen, and we've shown a responsibility on the ground with this huge war on terror that we've been fighting for the last 15 years," Abbasi said.

The Pakistan premier sought to dispel the notion surrounding the country's alleged inability to handle its nuclear programmes properly.

"We do have nuclear capability. There's no doubt about that. And we know how to handle nuclear waste. We had a nuclear program in the early '60s, one of the first countries in Asia to have a nuclear program. So if we've managed it for over 50-odd years, I think we can continue to manage it," he said.

India has not defined its deterrent requirements in either quantitative or qualitative terms. Inferences are drawn from the text of its nuclear doctrine and based on the possible targets in the territories of its rivals and adversaries. While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile. Since India’s deterrent requirements will evolve with time, it behoves a country with limited resources to maintain as flexible a deterrent as possible. To this end, thermonuclear weapons, offering variable yields and light-weight warheads that use less fissile material, should be an essential component in India’s arsenal.

I posted just the conclusion and urge people to read the whole article for it is well laid out like a legal brief with evidences and quotes from scientists and former chiefs of services.

its not a journalist outpouring.

One suggestion I have is IA should release the fuze functioning of the next A5 flight test.

This is very much needed in light of the Paki PM Abbasi making irrelevant statements in New York about ping pong golas popping off in response to any Cold Start.