6. In addition, the Working Group recommends
that records of Council proceedings should be sent, within 10
days, to national parliaments[13].
Gisela Stuart told us that making use of such information would
be "quite a challenge" for national parliaments, although
the problems giving rise to the Group's recommendations did not
arise in the United Kingdom[14].
We accordingly support the provision in the proposed protocol
on national parliaments for the direct transmission of Council
Agendas and outcomes to national parliaments. The protocol should
make clear that this transmission must be prompt. Council
Agendas should be transmitted in advance and as soon as available,
to allow for effective national parliamentary scrutiny.

8. The Working Group and Gisela Stuart in her
evidence to our Committee acknowledged that the different systems
for national parliamentary scrutiny reflected different constitutional
relations between governments and national parliaments in various
Member States, and that it would not be appropriate to prescribe
at European level the best system[17].
In the UK the scrutiny system is based firmly, though not exclusively,
on documents, and it is normally a Government Explanatory Memorandum
which triggers consideration of a proposal. The Commons Committee's
main role is to assess the legal and political importance of each
document and to decide which should be debated, but not to concern
itself with the merits of documents[18].

9. Our system is similar to the Commons' but
with two important differences. First, the full Committee does
not examine every document (the Chairman conducts a sift) and
we do examine the merits of proposals[19].
Secondly we have Sub-Committees which examine sectoral policy
issues in the European context. While we do not argue that
there is any one model of scrutiny that can fit all national parliaments,
we have suggested that our system, of involving Members with expertise
in policy areas in the work of European scrutiny, could provide
a model from which a national parliament wishing to scrutinise
European legislation in depth and on the basis of genuine expertise
might be able to learn some lessons.[20].

10. We underline the constitutional importance
of national parliamentary scrutiny[21];
and we were pleased to hear Gisela Stuart say that "scrutiny
is a process by which at times you can challenge the outcome and
change decisions"[22].
We would wish to see the proposed protocol strengthened by more
direct reference to the importance of effective scrutiny.

11. The Convention's Working Group identified
a number of basic factors that have an impact on the effectiveness
of scrutiny including:

· The
timeliness, scope and quality of information;

· The
possibility for a national parliament to formulate its position
with regard to a proposal for an EU legislative measure or action;

· Regular
contacts and hearings with Ministers before and after Council
meetings;

· Active
involvement of sectoral/standing committees in the scrutiny process;

· Regular
contacts between national parliamentarians and MEPs;

· Availability
of support staff, including the possibility of a representative
office in Brussels.[23]

We agree that these are all important factors
and we are working to enhance our own activity in these areas.
The Cabinet Office's undertaking that it will press for the electronic
transmission of documents from Brussels is accordingly welcome[24].

12. In its final report, the Convention's Working
Group on Subsidiarity recommends greater direct involvement of
national parliaments in the scrutiny of the application of subsidiarity.
These proposals are dealt with in Part 3 below.

14. The Commons Committee has advocated a toughening
up of the scrutiny reserve by either incorporating it into EU
procedures or building in more time in the legislative procedure[25].
Peter Hain has told the House of Commons that the Government endorsed
the proposal that the scrutiny reserve be given a clearer status
in the Council's Rules of Procedure; and he looked for guidance
on how that should be carried through[26].
The Commons Committee intend normally to call a Minister to give
evidence when a scrutiny reserve has been overridden without good
cause[27].
We have recommended that, in those cases where a Minister overrides
a reserve, the Minster should come to Parliament and give an explanation
by way of Ministerial Statement. We have also recommended the
creation of a new procedure (which would be used exceptionally)
requiring a positive resolution of the House before the lifting
of a scrutiny reserve[28].
We have also urged the Convention to consider a revision of the
co-decision procedure to allow a greater opportunity for national
parliamentary scrutiny[29].

15. One great threat to the effectiveness of
the scrutiny reserve is the tendency of Ministers to make 'preliminary
agreements' or adopt 'general approaches' at Council before the
scrutiny reserve has been lifted. The National Parliaments Working
Group does not believe such agreements should be reached in the
six-week period between a legislative proposal being made public
and it being placed on a Council agenda for decision[30].
For Gisela Stuart, this would provide an opportunity for all national
parliaments to conduct effective and challenging scrutiny.[31]
There was a "common consensus" in the Convention that
such agreements should not happen.[32]

16. Our Committee has argued that the reserve
should be 'sacred' for the six weeks, and that the House's Scrutiny
Reserve Resolution be amended to make clear that the Government
should not participate in any form of agreement during that period[33].
We have pursued this matter in a previous report and in the House[34].
We continue to recommend that no form of agreement should be
reached in Council during the six week period allowed for parliamentary
scrutiny.

17. We note that the proposed protocol in effect
repeats the existing provisions in the Protocol annexed to the
Amsterdam Treaty. Although arrangements under this provision currently
work reasonably well, problems do continue to arise and we are
currently uncertain whether the six week period is meaningful
for all national parliaments. All national parliaments should
endeavour to operate a strong and effective scrutiny system. We
also recommend that the Treaty should formally recognise the status
of scrutiny reserves in the Council.

19. The Working Group believed that national
parliaments needed a greater exchange of information, both with
other parliaments and with MEPs[39].
This would help strengthen the link with citizens and improve
scrutiny of European proposals. Gisela Stuart too argued forcefully
for greater cooperation between national parliaments and the European
Parliament[40].
The Working Group suggested more ad hoc contact between
national parliamentarians and MEPs, to complement regular contacts[41].
The Commons has suggested joint meetings to scrutinise the Commission
and its annual programmes, officials and expert witnesses, and
to debate issues[42].
The first such meeting has been held. We have undertaken to ensure
that relevant UK MEPs have the opportunity to give evidence to
our inquiries[43].
We will be pursuing these recommendations in the coming months.
We welcome the proposed protocol's emphasis on joint working between
national parliaments and the European Parliament to improve inter-parliamentary
co-operation.

21. We have been arguing for some time that COSAC
needs to be reformed. We have called for COSAC to re-focus on
the primary question of how national parliamentary scrutiny is
conducted. Our Committee and the Commons Committee are at one
in pressing for COSAC's main role to be redefined. COSAC should
assist national parliamentarians to improve their scrutiny of
government activities in the EU, by sharing best practice and
information and acting as a strategic body on behalf of national
parliaments[47].
We are working in particularly close operation with our colleagues
in the Commons and with our Danish colleagues to reform COSAC
in order to achieve a better exchange of information between national
parliaments[48].
Recent attempts by COSAC to reform itself, however, are not
wholly encouraging. The possibility remains that a new structure
may need to be considered by the IGC in order to meet the objectives
which COSAC should, in our view, be achieving.