Michael Krepon 1 : "India, Pakistan, and the Ballistic Missile Threat"
Pacing
* A slow motion competition, not an "arms race" in the traditional sense
* Macro reasons for restraint
o systemic inertia in India, the "pro-active" state
+ adaptation, not innovation, the Indian "way"
+ new policy departures very difficult in any area
o Pakistan, the re-active state, is better off not going first
+ widely shared by political, military elites
+ debates over whether to follow India's "lead"
o political constraints
+ coalition governments in India
o fiscal constraints
+ hard times in Pakistan
+ competing priorities in India, non-military & military
+ economic growth widely viewed as top priority
o level-headed military leaders, not adventurers in recent years
* Missiles have been political message-senders, not deadly instruments
o controlled firing across LoC by small arms, artillery, not
missiles
o neither country can afford war, but neither is ready for
reconciliation
o flight tests partly substitute for the former & undermine the
latter
* INDIA's military and defense establishment not in good shape
o slow motion R&D, flight testing programs
o indigenous defense production difficulties
o military leadership kept at arms length by civilian leadership,
bureaucracy
o poor connectivity between designers & military users
o questionable design decisions (e.g., a liquid-fueled SRBM on
Indian roads)
o questionable performance (accuracy?)
o low production rates and quantities: why?
+ cost?
+ recognition of deficiencies?
+ acceptance by military?
+ recognition of limited utility?
o systemic reform extremely difficult
o brain drain to private sector: money, prestige, relief from
Indian bureaucracy
* daunting political, economic as well as technical constraints
* crossing nuclear thresholds requires surmounting big hurdles
o external political costs are high; are domestic political
benefits higher?
o 25 years since PNE, now add CTBT and quest for Security Council
seat
* Reactive PAKISTAN manages with help from friends:
o foreign help necessary to compete with India
o external support yields leap-frogging rather than incrementalism
* daunting political, economic as well as technical constraints
* how able is Pakistan to produce indigenously?
o absorption of foreign assistance remains difficult
o easier to assert Pakistan's capabilities than to question them at
home
o if A.Q. Khan can't deliver, would military, political leaders
know?
* systemic reform extremely difficult
* crossing thresholds requires surmounting big hurdles
o external political costs are high; are domestic political
benefits higher?
* light testing of M-11s can result in the sanctioning of major
benefactor
Bottom Line:
* India still the pace-setter, but the pace is slow
* Nonetheless, both countries creeping toward troubling thresholds
o visible missile deployments
o slow motion MRBM phase next
Interactions
* Proliferation usually from publicly recognized threats--but not here
* China does not acknowledge a strategic or missile threat from India
o Joint Working Group discussions: a non-issue
* Don't expect China to over-react to resumed Agni tests (compare to
TMD)
o basing issues
o warhead issues
o deployment issues
* Most Indian strategists have lately become studiously indifferent to
Pakistan
o "an unavoidable irritant" - Adm. K.K. Nayyar
* What will change studious indifference?
o Indian (then Pakistani) nuclear testing
o Pakistani flight testing of MRBM
o Indian basing preparations for Agni in northeast
Motivations
INDIA:
* status
o only threshold state not satisfied with bomb in basement
o a seat at the "high table," but chastened after CTBT/UNSC vote
* deterrence
o vs. China
o vs. United States
Indian MRBMs would "threaten such basic western interests" as
access "to Third World raw materials or the capabilities of
Western powers to police international seas and intervene in
regional conflicts..."
-Brahma Chellaney
India "will face a nuclear threat from Pakistan and China...It is
evident that the USA is neither in a position nor is overly
inclined to thwart Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. In these
circumstances, it will be foolish for India to remain a
non-nuclear-weapon state."
-Afsir Karim
* bureaucratic push/institutional self-interest
o Abdul Kalam, DRDO, AEC
PAKISTAN:
* deterrence vs. India
* compensation for loss of strategic allies (U.S., China, too?)
* status
"Even the possession of a few nuclear weapons will provide
Pakistan...with a strategic equalizer against the conventional
superiority of India... [Without nuclear weapons,] "we will loose
total relevance not only on the subcontinent but also to the
United States and the rest of the world"
-Agha Shahi
* bureaucratic push/institutional self-interest
-A.Q. Khan
Missile Programs
* Missiles for deterrence, but requirements of deterrence not well
defined
o "hawks" equate deterrence to deployed missiles and exercising the
option
o "doves" equate deterrence with non-deployment, keeping option
open
o little public appreciation of complexities, dangers
* missile flight tests in South Asia serve political and symbolic, not
military, purposes
o modest flight test programs
+ only fourteen Prithvi tests reported over ten years
+ from first flight test to end of "user trials" = six years
+ only three "technology demonstrations" of Agni so far
* India's purposes:
o demonstration as a regional power
o demonstration of technical prowess
o demonstration of threshold status
o demonstration of a government's commitment to national security
o calling card to China
o rattling the US cage
o deflating more ambitious and dangerous proposals
* Pakistan's purposes:
o demonstration of independence from Indian hegemony
o demonstration of technical prowess
o demonstration of threshold status
o demonstration of a government's commitment to national security
o deflation of more ambitious and dangerous proposals
* India's down-side risks of MRBM flight tests:
o heightens the nuclear issue
o complicates bilateral ties with many neighbors
* 24 countries within range of Agni
o will it advance India's prospects for Security Council seat?
o what happens if China does react?
* Pakistan's down-side risks of MRBM flight tests:
o sanctions
o will it harm ties with China, US?
o strengthening the hand of Indian hawks
o will it work?
* "Visible" deployments invite a host of complications
o technical
o operational
o political
o financial
"Those who protest against the Government's apparent capitulation
to Washington [regarding the Prithvi] have no clear understanding
of the complexities of missile deployment... The peacetime
deployment of the Prithvi--or Agni for that matter - in forward
areas is certainly not required. In fact, it will be
counter-productive...It will be inimical to national interest and
bordering on the unpatriotic."
-K. Sundarji
Relationship to WMD
* Short-range ballistic missiles (Prithvi, Hatf I, ???)
o Pakistani commentators inflate threat of "nuclear-capable"
Prithvi
* but not taken seriously by political, military leaders
* concern: disabling conventional attacks, not nuclear strikes
* Even missile advocates in South Asia downplay military utility of SRBM
nukes
o for India, contaminating a sacred common watershed
o fallout across international border
o for Pakistan, killing co-religionists
o "gentlemanly" wars
* Medium-range ballistic missiles (Agni, M-11, "Ghauri")
o general presumption: if deployed, nuclear warheads
"The Agni's deployment would possess little strategic logic
unless it is equipped with nuclear warheads."
o P.R. Chari
o multiple technical challenges
+ solid propellant
+ long flight test series
+ mating warhead with delivery vehicle
+ domestic production, quality control
o multiple thresholds would have to be crossed
+ if deployed, shift from political symbolism to "real"
deterrence
+ "exercising" the option?
+ for India, forward basing vis-a-vis China
+ for Pakistan, more sanctions
+ nuclear testing?
o weaponization without testing may be possible
+ would Pakistan or India face greater difficulties?
o deployment, weaponization would produce serious regional tensions
o facilitates Indian targeting vs. Pakistan, China
o Pakistan places India in "equal jeopardy"
o China counter-moves vis-a-vis India?
* Open literature silent on CW, BW warheads
o complicated by CWC declarations, BWC ratifications
o would CW, BW warheads enhance status, deterrence?
o incomplete, untrue declarations vs. operationalizing falsehoods
Bottom Line:
* Political rhetoric, but operational conservatism by political,
military leaders
* Mating nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles a serious concern
o but would entail great risks, costs
* Mating BW, CW warheads to ballistic missiles would be more surprising
Suppliers
* India proudly trumpets indigenous production
o but press reports of foreign help, especially via SLV program
* Pakistan's subterranean help well-documented
o Europe
o China
o North Korea
Implications for Regional Security
* Violence across Line of Control has been manageable, but growing
* Indo-Pak reconciliation not advancing
o no current bilateral mechanism to discuss, resolve grievances
o no multilateral forum, either
o CBMs in place clearly insufficient
* Particular concerns about crisis management
o public posturing & domestic politics in both countries
o short time-lines for decision
o How good are C3I in the subcontinent?
* Pakistan overstating threats for US assurances, mediation
o missile movements during political crises a real problem
* "Creeping" missile deployment a serious concern in this context
o storage reported at Sargoda, Jullundar
o time lines even shorter
o poisoning the well for rapprochement, empowering hawks
Threats to the United States
* If proliferation thresholds breached here, other regions may follow
o but, thresholds maintained during BJP government = higher
thresholds
* MRBM threats slight to US forces, nationals from this region
o acts of terror a much more significant concern
* But SRBMs, MRBMs in this region will hurt US non-proliferation goals
elsewhere
* An Indian ICBM?
o occasional reference to "Surya"
o drawing on SLV program
o costs would be great; for what purpose?
Performance by the US Intelligence Community
* Technical collection impressive, judging by press leaks
o newspaper readers know of missile movements before Indian PM
* Nuclear and missile-related facilities, test sites appear to be
well-covered
* Non-technical assessments raise questions of overstatement
o South Asia has distinct political and military culture
* Are we judging by the wrong standards?
"The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most
probable prospect for future use of WMD, including nuclear
weapons."
-1993 assessment by DCI James Woolsey
* Capabilities vs. intentions
o the 1990 crisis
* Important test case
* Was intelligence from technical collection solid in this instance?
* Does overstatement matter? Better to be safe than sorry?
"It was the most dangerous nuclear situation we have ever faced
since I've been in the U.S. government. It may be as close as
we've come to a nuclear exchange. It was far more frightening
than the Cuban missile crisis."
-Deputy Director Richard J. Kerr as told by Seymour M. Hersh
New challenges
o new test sites?
o do we understand adequately how decisions are made?
o understanding changing political conditions, impact on missile
programs
Bottom line:
* US intelligence community appears to know much about missiles in South
Asia
* If anything, threats appear to have been overstated, not understated
* The key: combining technical information with an understanding of
political culture
Near Term Issues
* Will threshold of no "visible" SRBM deployments hold?
* Implications of Strategic Defense Review, new NSC in India?
* Will India (and Pakistan) declare themselves to be nuclear-weapon
states?
* What will follow from resumed Indian and new Pakistani MRBM tests?
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1. Dr. Michael Krepon is the President and co-Founder of the Henry L.
Stimson Center, a non-profit educational corporation specializing in arms
control and international security issues. Author or co-editor of seven
books and numerous articles. Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and
the Arms Control Association.