The Gaza War Was Pointless. Here’s How to Make Sure It Never Happens Again.

In the wake of Israel’s recent assault, however, Fatah’s advantage has diminished. Hamas’ military wing has been able to show that it can inflict casualties on an invading Israeli force while still firing off hundreds of rockets. And despite the Israeli government’s apparent expectation otherwise, Hamas, thanks to its “resistance model,” is now more popular than the more conciliatory Fatah even in the West Bank, notes the Ramallah-based journalist Dalia Hatuqa.

“The result” of the Gaza assault, writes Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, “is that after thousands of rockets fell on half of the country, an unprecedented shutdown of Ben-Gurion Airport, serious economic, diplomatic, and public-relations damage, and a heavy toll of more than 60 soldiers and civilians killed, Israel is exactly where it was before.”

Former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, who spent his career in the Israeli intelligence service worrying about terrorist attacks from groups like Hamas, agrees. He told Germany’s Der Spiegel: “Israel should have been more sophisticated in the way it reacted. We should have supported the Palestinians because we want to make peace with everybody, not with just two-thirds or half of the Palestinians.”

The blockade policy also should have been second-guessed earlier, and harder. Yes, preventing Hamas and other extremist groups from obtaining materials to construct weapons is an entirely justifiable and necessary goal—but the blockade was unnecessarily broad, punishing all Gazans for the crimes of Hamas and preventing any sustainable economic development. It also spurred the proliferation of a network of smuggling tunnels along Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, helping Hamas develop expertise in tunnel construction that it then used in the creation of its network of attack tunnels in the north, near Israel.

While it’s important to avoid the perception that Hamas is being rewarded for its provocations, continuing to squeeze Gaza to deny Hamas a “victory” would be short-sighted. Efforts to argue otherwise should be vigorously second-guessed. In fact, easing the blockade was a condition of the 2012 cease-fire, one that was never implemented by Israel, even though Hamas largely met its commitment to suppress rocket fire. This previous commitment should not now be retooled into a “concession.” At the same time, care should be taken to see that the benefits of ending the blockade accrue primarily to Gaza’s civilian population, not to Hamas.

Finally, if efforts to strengthen the PA in Gaza do move forward (and this is a big “if”), it’s important to stress that the PA cannot simply be empowered in Gaza as a security subcontractor for Israel, a perception that has continued to weaken Abbas and profit Hamas over the past years. To create a genuinely positive dynamic, Israel must meet Palestinian security cooperation with genuine steps toward sovereignty, security, economic development and eventually statehood. Netanyahu has shown little interest in these things. But the time for second-guessing is now—not when the next round of pointless fighting breaks out.