from the it-would-appear-there's-some-appetite dept

Another day, another proposal for patent reform in Congress, once again targeting patent trolls (in part). Already this year, we've seen Rep. DeFazio push for fee shifting to make trolls pay legal expenses for bogus lawsuits, Rep. Deutch introduce a bill to force patent trolls to stop hiding anonymously behind shell companies, Senator Schumer seek to make it easier to quickly dump bad patents and Senator Cornyn put a bunch of these ideas together in a bigger anti-troll bill. Most of these have been introduced in the last month or so. We can now add a new proposal from Rep. Bob Goodlatte, head of the House Judiciary Committee, who has released a patent "discussion draft" that includes a number of issues it's trying to fix.

Goodlatte's proposal, like many of the others, has some good things in it, but is pretty weak overall, trying to skirt around the overall troll problems. The bill would certainly be a step in the right direction, but hardly a decisive one. Like Deutch's bill, this one would make it harder for trolls to hide behind shells, and then would do a bunch of things to try to decrease the costs for those who are sued. This would definitely be helpful, because it's the cost of fighting back, even if a company is sure it doesn't infringe, that leads many companies to just pay up to settle. The general estimate we hear is at least $1 million for just the district court case.

The good news is that it is increasingly clear that massive patent reform is back on the table, even with the last comprehensive patent reform bill, the America Invents Act, passing less than two years ago. At the time, we pointed out that the bill did nothing to deal with the troll problem, and it seems clear that many in Congress recognize patent trolling is a problem that needs to be dealt with quickly. Having five bills introduced -- four within the last few weeks -- and many by prominent members of Congress who have the ability to push a bill through, suggests that there really is an appetite in Congress to take on the trolling issue.

The bad news is that the existing proposals could go much, much further, and don't. There's nothing like an independent invention defense (or independent development as evidence of obviousness), or any effort to seek out peer review of patent proposals -- both of which would cut down on many bad patent trolling shakedowns. Furthermore, having watched the messy debate over the America Invents Act, which went on for about seven years (possibly more, depending on how you count), we saw some good ideas in initial drafts watered down more and more year after year, until the final AIA was effectively useless. If we're already starting with relatively weak proposals, once they go through the ringer and the pharmaceutical companies (mainly) strip out the parts they don't like, we may be in for another toothless bill. Hopefully, this is a sequel with a twist ending, and something real and effective can actually become law.

from the uh,-nice-try dept

You may recall that back in April we wrote about CBS threatening to sue Aereo if it launched in Boston, as announced. We quoted CBS's Dana McClintock, exec VP of communications, who said on Twitter:

We will sue, and stealing our signal will be found to be illegal in Boston, just as it will be everywhere else.

Seems like a pretty clear and definitive statement. CBS CEO Les Moonves said something similar in a conference call:

If they put up another signal, we'll sue them again.

Aereo then did exactly what it should: it sued first, seeking a declaratory judgment that its service was legal and that it could launch in other markets without fear of expensive lawsuits from CBS. This is what the whole declaratory judgment setup is for. Exactly cases like this where one party threatens another in an effort to scare them off by the threat of expensive court battles.

However, CBS now, hilariously, is trying to claim that when it made those statements, it didn't really mean it would sue Aereo, so there's no controversy and the case should be dismissed. Let me just repeat this one for you. CBS is claiming that when two of its top execs said "We will sue" and "we'll sue them again," it didn't actually mean that it would sue. Wow. That's a special sort of chutzpah.

Instead, CBS claims that Aereo should sit pretty and wait to be sued:

"If the threat of litigation is as imminent as Aereo claims, it will have every opportunity to defend its actions if and when it launches in other cities and if it is sued in those jurisdictions."

Um, that's the whole freaking point of declaratory judgment actions, to avoid having to sit and wait to be sued, so that a company can get on with its business. CBS seems to be admitting here that it's threatening Aereo just to mess with its business plans. How nice.

How about the direct statements from the execs? Eh, what's a little public threat of lawsuits between execs and the press? Certainly not a serious threat, right? Concerning the McClintock statement, they claim that his statement was only referencing Boston, so it's not like it really matters.

Mr. McClintock's "threat" clearly is contained to Boston; his only reference to other locations is the vague assertion that Aereo “will be found to be illegal" "everywhere else" – hardly a concrete promise that any of the named defendants intends to sue Aereo in some other location.

Er, actually, yes, read the quote again. It's a pretty clear statement that Aereo will be sued "everywhere." How about the Moonves quote?

One simply cannot read what Mr. Moonves actually said and say with any certainty – much less with the level of concreteness necessary to sustain a declaratory judgment action – that CBS announced an intention to sue Aereo in any city other than Boston.

Um, again, Moonves's quote is pretty clear that they will sue anywhere Aereo shows up. He said "if they put up another signal, we'll sue them again."

from the ugh dept

For many years we've pointed out that the self-promoting Alki David seems to get engaged in a variety of ridiculous lawsuits partly as a publicity stunt to build up his own brand. Nearly everything he does seems to be focused on the publicity value of it -- such as renaming his online TV streaming service from FilmOn, as it was known, to AereoKiller and BarryDriller to mock Barry Diller's Aereo. And, unfortunately, in this case those stupid publicity stunts may lead to some really bad case law. As many people know, despite David claiming that his service (whatever name you want to call it) was no different than Aereo, it is different. Aereo carefully followed various court rulings that indicated how to set up such a service that doesn't infringe -- and so far it's won the lawsuits filed against it by the TV networks.

"AereoKiller," on the other hand, has been losing badly, such that the service is currently barred in most of the western US. Now the networks figure they might as well go in for the kill and have sued David's AereoKiller yet again, this time in the DC Circuit, to try to get a similar ruling on the east coast. The networks could have sued Aereo itself -- as they've been threatening -- but it seems clear they realize that the case against David is much stronger (perhaps, in part, because David himself seems like a goofball who doesn't take any of this seriously, but also because of the company's own actions).

But, of course, bad cases make bad law, and the AereoKiller case is a bad case. There are a bunch of issues related to the whole thing, and it seems quite likely David will lose -- but that precedent will now be available to be used against Aereo itself (and a variety of other innovative services). The end result could be a disaster, and the TV broadcasters know it, because that's exactly what they want.

from the hard-to-count-what-we've-lost dept

Last fall, law professor Michael Carrier came out with a really wonderful paper, called Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story. He interviewed dozens of people involved in the internet world and the music world, to look at what the impact was of the legal case against Napster, leading to the shutdown of the original service (the name and a few related assets were later sold off to another company). The stories (again, coming from a variety of different perspectives) helps fill in a key part of the story that many of us have heard, but which has never really been written about: what an astounding chill that episode cast over the innovation space when it came to music. Entrepreneurs and investors realized that they, too, were likely to get sued, and focused their efforts elsewhere. The record labels, on the other hand, got the wrong idea, and became totally convinced that a legal strategy was the way to stem the tide of innovation.

The Wisconsin Law Review, which published Carrier's paper, asked a few people to write responses to Carrier's paper, and they recently published the different responses, including one from a lawyer at the RIAA, one from another law professor... and one from me. This post will be about my paper -- and I'll talk about the other papers in a later post. My piece is entitled When You Let Incumbents Veto Innovation, You Get Less Innovation. It builds on Carrier's piece, to note that the stories he heard fit quite well with a number of other stories that we've seen over the past fifteen years, and the way in which the industry has repeatedly fought innovation via lawsuits.

You can read the whole paper at the link above (or, if you prefer there's a pdf version). I talk about the nature of innovation -- and how it involves an awful lot of trial and error to get it right. The more trials, the faster what works becomes clear, and the faster improvement you get. But the industry's early success against Napster made that nearly impossible, and massively slowed down innovation in the sector. Yes, a few players kept trying, but it developed much more slowly than other internet-related industries. And you can see why directly in the Carrier paper, where entrepreneurs point out that it's just not worth doing something in the music space, because if you want to actually do what the technology enables, the kinds of things that are cool and useful and which consumers would really like... you'll get sued.

Take that away and you get less trial and error, and slower innovation (and less interesting innovation). Look where we are today, fifteen years later. We've basically reinvented radio and put it online. We're barely getting past that stage. You can read the whole paper for more on that, but I did want to highlight one key section in the paper: which is how the content industry always completely downplays the importance of the technology and services. Any time there's a successful new service -- whether it's iTunes or Netflix or Spotify or Pandora or YouTube -- you'll find stories about the incumbents trying to denigrate and mock it, or even outright kill it. They talk about how those services are "nothing without our content," and they get angry if any of those services make any money.

This is ridiculous. Yes, the content is important, but if it was just the content, then those services never would have become successful in the first place. The reason those services are successful was because they actually innovated and provided convenience, access, ease of use and other nice features that were missing before. Too many copyright maximalists simply can't bring themselves to admit that you need both the content and the services working together. When you trash those services, and attack them or try to saddle them with ridiculously high fees, you break down what works, and you actually drive more people to infringing alternatives. Here's a snippet from my discussion on this point (with footnotes removed):

Throughout all of this, a unique pattern emerged. The labels would always massively overvalue their own content, while simultaneously undervaluing the various innovative services. Phrases along the lines, “without our music, they’d be nothing” were heard frequently in arguing why it was all about the content. The truth, however, is that it was the combination of the two that were important. Yes, the services needed the music to work, but so too did the labels need these new services to adapt to a changing marketplace.
This should have been obvious from the fact that people would flock to these new services, yet failed to show up to the record labels’ own attempts to innovate or provide something new. However, as soon as any service showed any kind of promise, even if “licensed,” the labels would seek to kill the golden goose by claiming that the rates were unfair, and the innovators were making money unfairly off the backs of the copyright holders (by which they meant the labels, not the musicians, of course).

Take, for example, the brief heyday of music video games like Guitar Hero and Rock Band. For a year or two, the recording industry fell head over heels in love with these games, because people were playing them quite a bit, and they were (briefly) willing to pay a slight premium to get access to music from well-known bands and musicians. Rather than build on that, the industry did two things: it focused all of its attention on those kinds of games, absolutely flooding the market and making people get sick of the game genre, and demanded much higher royalties.

The viewpoint seemed to be that there could be almost no benefits for the innovators. Nearly all of the benefits had to accrue to the labels, or it would be seen as a problem. In fact, the one exception that got through was iTunes, and that was quickly seen as a “problem” by the labels, even as it was dragging them, kicking and screaming, into the marketplace for digital music. The view is one of an extreme zero-sum world, where if someone else is benefiting, it must mean that the labels were losing out. They didn't even hide this view of the world. Doug Morris, then head of Universal Music (now head of Sony Music) explained to a Wired reporter that investing in new innovations that weren’t paying money upfront meant that “someone, somewhere is taking advantage of you.” As laid out in the article, Morris was uninterested in technology, and didn’t even know how to hire a competent technology person, so his focus was on making sure everyone paid up immediately. Anyone making money in the music world without first paying a massive cut were dubbed “thieves.”

I find this tragic. If the entertainment industry had recognized early on that the tech industry wasn't an enemy, but a provider of wonderful new tools and services that helped to expand their market, we'd be much further along. Getting these things right takes time and experimentation, but the legacy players refuse to accept that. They want a perfect solution that fully replaces their old business 100% (or more) without any disruption -- and they want to accrue all of the benefits, without any going to the actual innovators. That, of course, doesn't help anyone, least of all the actual content creators.

There's so much innovation and opportunity available in the music space -- it's just sad that we've only made baby steps since Napster, when we should be leaps and bounds further along.

from the do-the-math dept

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We've talked a lot about the tax on innovation that patent trolls create, which is well-known inside startup circles but often misunderstood by the broader public, thanks to the pro-innovation rhetoric of high-profile trolls like Intellectual Ventures. The conversation is getting more attention lately, especially with the recent news of Senator Schumer's patent reform bill which specifically aims to fight the patent troll problem, and this interview with an anonymous developer from a tech startup offers some perspective from someone who is directly affected by the issue.

from the shameful dept

We've talked many times about how patents are often used as weapons to kill innovative startups that threaten legacy players. Ryan alerts us to a perfect example of this in practice. 1-800-CONTACTS, the giant online contact lens/glasses space, is trying to kill off an upstart innovative competitor called Ditto. And, no, this is not a case of Ditto copying something that 1-800-CONTACTS invented. The details are astounding. First of all, Ditto's main innovation is doing something that 1-800-CONTACTS does not do (though it has since announced plans to introduce something similar), which is to let buyers of glasses take a quick webcam video of their face, and then be able to see what they would look like in various pairs of glasses. That's pretty cool. The 15 person startup got some funding for this... and then promptly got sued by the bigger company. And 1-800-CONTACTS' actions in this case show that it set out, deliberately, to kill off this innovative startup:

It appears that 1-800-CONTACTS' CEO went onto Ditto's website the very day it launched, presumably to investigate the upstart competitor's new technology. Having seen Ditto's product, 1-800-CONTACTS then went out and purchased a patent from a defunct company that claims to cover selling eyeglasses over a network using a 3D model of a user's face.

But here's the thing: 1-800-CONTACTS does not appear at all interested in licensing the patent to Ditto. Rather, it seems determined to put Ditto out of business. Period. So it's suing Ditto in federal court in Utah, hundreds of miles from Ditto's headquarters in California.

Yes, you read that right. First, the CEO went and saw the site, then sought out and bought a patent that could be used against the company (in this case, US Patent 7,016,824), then brought suit in a very inconvenient jurisdiction and, finally, isn't even entertaining the idea of licensing the patent. And, of course, the patent itself seems highly dubious in quality. Ditto thinks it would win the lawsuit, but spending what little money it has on litigation will almost certainly kill the company anyway. Even if it wins, it will likely lose by using up its money not on innovating, not on delivering a great service to people who want it, but on fighting a bully.

The EFF is asking for help in finding prior art for this patent, via StackExchange's prior art section, in the hopes that the patent can be invalidated quickly. In the meantime, though, shame on 1-800-CONTACTS for being an anti-innovation legal bully. Of course, this isn't the first time we've written about 1-800-CONTACTS doing dubious things against competitors. In the past, it's sued competitors for keyword ads, despite having lost similar cases and despite buying keywords on competitors itself. It seems that the company is willing to use the legal system to crack down on competition whenever it can, which makes it seem like a company worth avoiding when looking for any kind of corrective lens solutions.

from the the-deck-is-stacked dept

"Justice prevails" is often declared when a court case ends, honoring a system that produces the right result. Right, however, is not always just. The judicial system needs to address the exorbitant costs that accompany litigation, or a situation can happen when a company is sued by a deeper pocket plaintiff, wins the case, but has to shut down because the cost of litigation has exhausted its financial capital.

Last month, in a unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, once again, a judgment
in favor of Veoh Networks in a widely followed copyright case brought six years ago by
Universal Music Group. Veoh, the court held, was entitled to rely on the safe harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and was not liable for copyright infringement for user-uploaded videos that Universal alleged contained their copyrights, an important precedent that benefits YouTube and others. Veoh, the company I joined during the early stages of the digital video revolution in 2006, which pioneered long form viewing on user generated content sites, and was the first site to offer premium content from major networks like ABC and CBS, is not around anymore to capitalize on its victory. Three years ago, a few months after Veoh's win at the district court, its leadership surveyed the war torn company, wounded from a litigation battle designed to inflict the very damage the lawsuit had wrought, wondered, at what price victory and decided to sell the assets and closed the doors. Universal Music lost the case, but achieved victory, shutting down an innovative company that threatened their static business model.

From the outset of the case, Universal Music Group made sure Veoh would suffer financially. They issued many discovery requests, doing their best to make sure Veoh spent money to defend itself. Savvy plaintiffs know how to exert pressure by exploiting our judicial system's liberal rules regarding discovery. In this regard, advances in technology have not produced economic efficiencies. Millions of documents and casual conversations are stored on computers, readily accessible. These petabytes of data need to be prepared and reviewed by lawyers before being produced in response to a discovery request. The lawyers' bill increases very rapidly when an army of attorneys is reviewing all this data. Because the bulk of documents and discovery often lie with the defendant, plaintiffs can inflict maximum financial pain on a defendant, while producing relatively few documents themselves. This tilted playing field gives plaintiffs an unfair advantage. In the Veoh case, legal fees on discovery alone were enormous, exacerbated by the magistrate's decisions to compel the company at its own cost to store every single video on our system, and to even produce Skype conversations. Who suffers? The defendant. Recourse? None.

The company quickly recognized the economics of litigation and the lack of upside to being a defendant and offered to settle. However, Veoh never had meaningful settlement discussions; Veoh did not have the cash to pay the amount Universal was seeking. The company was left with no choice but to litigate, and spend money.

To counter the ticking clock and register, Veoh hoped for a quick resolution to lift the dark cloud Universal had placed on the company that handcuffed it from raising the additional funds the company needed to grow. The case, however, was not resolved in the district court for over two years and is now approaching the six-year anniversary.

Defendants need an option other than to just play defense and wait. It was well documented in the case that Universal never even sent Veoh any takedown notice for their content and was similarly undisputed that every time Veoh received a takedown notice from every other content owner, that Veoh took the content down. Universal could have achieved its goal of having its alleged content removed from Veoh's website by merely sending the company a letter. Our judicial system gave Universal the right to sue. Shouldn't Veoh have any rights or recourse, especially when a mere letter could have avoided an entire litigation?

Unfortunately, the only option available to Veoh was to file a motion to recover fees after it won the case, even though this avenue was too little too late; the mortal damage was already inflicted. Six years of combative litigation cannot be undone entirely by recovering legal fees. Yet, the standard for recovering fees is very high and Veoh was not successful. Despite its favorable decision on the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit denied awarding Veoh its fees, instead remanding to the District Court to consider awarding Veoh its much lower court costs. The Ninth Circuit's ruling on this point only further weakens an already poor option for innocent companies.

Our judicial system needs a solution to rectify the devastation that unfounded litigation causes companies ultimately proven innocent. Courts need to be sensitive to the new entrant and pay respect to the scales of justice when a deep pocket plaintiff goes after a financially weaker opponent. Instituting "loser pays" into the concept of commercial litigation in appropriate situations improves the chances for defendants, and could reduce meritless litigation. While this concept has been debated for decades, another standard needs to be introduced, one that holds plaintiffs and their lawyers equally accountable. Plaintiffs' lawyers should be compelled to pay any 'loser pays' fee along with their clients.
In a world where plaintiffs' lawyers share in multi-billion dollar settlements, it seems only fair that if they lose a case they should pay. This will force lawyers to think twice about the merits of their clients' case, as opposed to what strong-armed litigation tactic they can use to extract a settlement. If lawyers are held accountable for their - and their client's - actions in a manner never before applied, we will see what everyone wants: a precipitous drop in the number of cases in our judicial system. We can even adopt a three strikes policy and ban law firms and their clients for twelve months if they are found guilty of such abusive behavior on more than two occasions. How refreshing that would be.

Fewer litigations will reduce the dockets of federal and state courts, reducing the need for our government to increase the number of judges and court staff, thereby saving taxpayers' money. Plaintiffs will pay more attention to increasing defendant's legal fees lest they lose. Legal fees and costs will decline, which will lead to a downward pressure on insurance premiums. Most importantly, productivity will increase. Companies will spend
previously allocated monies to litigation on research, development, hiring, and expansion of operations.

Veoh encountered a plaintiff set on its destruction. They were unable to defeat Veoh in the world of technology or in the world of business. With those avenues closed, Universal sued. The judicial system provided Universal with what it could not achieve on a level business playing field. Veoh won the case but is not around to continue to grow. That is wrong. UMG and its lawyers should be required to pay for the damage they have done. Strike one to a plaintiff and its lawyers. Fairness in our judicial systems dictates such an outcome.

Joshua Metzger is an Internet consultant. He was SVP Corporate Development & General Counsel for Veoh Network and before that was chief legal officer for Overture Services, which was acquired by Yahoo!.

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

In the wake of the Great Recession, many young adults are still having a hard time finding jobs. The recent unemployment rates for young adults (age 20 to 24) is about 13%, which is much higher than the rest of the adult population. Even worse, it seems like young workers (even college graduates) are increasingly taking low-wage jobs. Perhaps it's time for our youth to consider taking a chance and going into business for themselves. Here are a few links that might help convince them to take the plunge.

from the time-to-fix-the-problem dept

Most people used to think that patent trolls tended to focus on bigger companies -- those with huge bank accounts who'd rather pay the troll off than deal with a lawsuit. But over the last few years, we've been hearing more and more stories about startups hit by patent trolls, who are taking advantage of the fact that a patent lawsuit -- win or lose -- would almost certainly kill the company. One common tactic? Wait until a startup announces a round of fundraising and then pounce -- knowing that the company (a) has some money and (b) has little time to deal with a lawsuit. Finally, this issue is getting some attention. Crain's recently had a piece on patent trolls going "downmarket" after startups, which has some quotes from startup execs (many who want to remain anonymous to avoid further attacks). One of whom is actually fighting the troll:

"I have more lawyers than I have employees," said the entrepreneur, who asked to remain anonymous for fear he would be the target of even more lawsuits.

That entrepreneur noted that he's stopped paying himself a salary, and his legal bills ($50,000 per month) were rivaling his overall payroll of $63,000 per month. But he's fighting the troll on principle.

But, of course, even if he wins, he's not going to get that money back:

Young companies that are looking for venture capital are most likely to settle, so goes the conventional wisdom, because they have limited cash and worry that a lawsuit will scare off investors. It's cheap to bring a lawsuit, but expensive—$2.5 million on average—to defend against one. Not surprisingly, the majority of patent suits are settled out of court.

"The system is so stacked against me," said the e-commerce entrepreneur. "To prove I'm right, it will cost me more money than I have raised in my company's existence. If I win, I don't get the money back, and if I lose, I owe triple damages."

This is part of the reason why the SHIELD Act would be a useful step. While there are still many, many problems with patent trolling, at least it would make it possible to go after trolls for legal fees when the trolls lose.

from the we've-got-it-all-wrong dept

Even though I was never a big Google Reader user, its death has got me thinking about online services quite a bit lately -- and really reminded me that we've done the cloud wrong. Rather than build true cloud computing, we've built a bunch of lockboxes.

The cloud was supposed to free us, not lock us in

"Cloud computing" went by a variety of other terms in the past before this marketing term stuck, but the key part of it was that it was supposed to free us of worrying about the location of our data. Rather than having to have things stored locally, the data could be anywhere, and we could access it via any machine or device. That sort of happened, and there definitely are benefits to data being stored in the cloud, rather than locally. But... what came with today's "cloud" was a totally different kind of lock: a lock to the service.

I can point many apps to data stored locally

I wrote something related to this a few years ago, concerning music in the cloud. If I have a bunch of MP3s stored locally, I can point any number of music apps at my music folder, and they can all play that music. As long as the data is not in a proprietary format, I can find the app that works best for me and the data is separate from the app. Even when you have proprietary formats like Microsoft's .doc, other apps can often make use of them as well -- so, for example, I can get by with Libre Office, and I don't lose access to all of my old Microsoft Word docs.

This is really useful, because it helps us avoid vendor lock-in in many cases. Even when, say, Microsoft or Apple dominates the market. It's still possible to come in and be compatible. The competition then focuses on building better services, rather than reinventing the data model. That's much more useful to consumers, because the innovation is focused on making their lives better, rather than reinventing the wheel.

Today's cloud brings us back to walled gardens

For the most part, today, however, "cloud" applications bundle the storage and the service as one, and the two are linked inseparably. You check your data into a new cloud service, but the application layer and the data are both held by the same company. Yes, you can often transfer data from one service to the other -- such as Google's "data liberation front" effort, which is fantastic (and goes beyond many other companies' efforts), but just the fact that data needs to be liberated suggests we're taking the wrong approach altogether. Rather than having to "export" all of your feeds from Google Reader and then waiting patiently for 50,000 other people who are trying to upload them to the few small Reader competitors out there, why shouldn't we have each had an OPML file stored somewhere that we control, and that we could easily point any reader application, whether its local or "in the cloud." And, yes, there are some services that attempt to do this, but it's not where the whole "cloud" space has gone.

Separate and liberate the data from the infrastructure

What the cloud should be about is both freeing us from being locked to local data, and also freeing us from having that data locked to a particular service. I should be able to keep my data in one spot and then access it via a variety of cloud clients -- and the clients and the data shouldn't necessarily be directly connected or held by the same party. If I don't want to listen to my music via one app, I can just connect a different app to my personal data cloud and off we go. If Google Reader shuts down, no problem, just point a different app at my RSS data. No extraction, no uploading. Just go.

There are, of course, plenty of players around which sort of do this. DropBox, Box, Amazon's S3 and even Google Drive are setting themselves up as personal data clouds, and there are a growing number of apps that run across them. Projects like the Locker Project are thinking about how we store personal data separated from apps as well. And I know there are a bunch of other projects either around today or quickly approaching release, that also seek to do something in this space.

But, for the most part, all of the stories that people talk about concerning "cloud" computing almost always involve services that tie together the app and the data and all you're really doing is trading the former limitations of local data for the limitations of a single service provider controlling your data. Many service providers want this, of course. It's a form of lock-in. Plus, having some sort of access to your data and your usage can enable them to do other things, such as more accurately data mine you and your usage.

But, as users, we really should be pushing more towards embracing the apps that separate the app from the data and that let you point their "cloud" app at any particular place you store your "cloud" data. Some of this may involve standardizing certain data formats, but that makes sense anyway, as, once again, that's an area where there are tremendous benefits to not reinventing the wheel, so that the innovation and competition can focus on the service level. While some vendors may fear losing lock-in, if they truly believe in their own ability to provide great services, it shouldn't be a problem. At the same time, they should also realize that embracing this kind of world means that it's easier for others to jump in and test their services as well.

The death of Google Reader raised a lot of issues around trust, and while you could "export" the data, that process is still messy and archaic when you think about it. The future of cloud computing should be much more focused on separating the data from the service. That would remove the fear that many are now talking about concerning adopting new cloud services that might not last very long. If the data is stored elsewhere, and entirely in the control of the user, then you don't need to trust the service provider nearly as much, but can dip in and test out different apps operating on the same data, and switch with ease.

If we're going to see the real promise of "the cloud" take place, that's where things need to head. We should be increasingly skeptical of "cloud" apps that also control the data.