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Category Archives: Injunction

In house lawyers, even patent lawyers, can jump to a competitor, as long as they don’t violate duties owed to their former employer/client. Furthermore, patent lawyers are free to conduct for their new employer infringement analyses of patents they wrote for their former employer. That is the holding in a 2016 Massachusetts case, Gillette Co. v. Provost. The court wrote: “It is perfectly lawful for Gillette’s former patent attorney to help a competitor avoid infringing Gillette patents, so long as he does not disclose or use any confidential information obtained from Gillette.”

The lawyer in question worked for a number of years as an in-house patent attorney for Gillette. He then took a job as General Counsel at ShaveLogic (Dollar Shave Club), where his job responsibilities included helping ShaveLogic design around patents he had prosecuted while at Gillette. Gillette sought an injunction preventing him from doing that work on the basis that the lawyer had breached the fiduciary duty a lawyer owes a former client under Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a second client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the second client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client

The court held that the design-around work did not violate the rule because Gillette could not show that it involved misuse of Gillette’s confidential information; the wrong Rule 1.9 is designed to prevent. Patents are pubic documents, and opining on whether a particular product infringes a patent requires nothing more than comparing that product to the public patent. Confidential information could not help. The court explained that if the in-house lawyer’s new job had involved assessing the validity of patents he prosecuted at Gillette, the result might have been different. In that circumstance the lawyer might have confidential information concerning prior art or inventor behavior that would aid his analysis.

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You’d better. If you don’t you’re going to screw it up. Earlier this year, Convolve lost a trade secrets case against Seagate and Compaq because the personnel involved either didn’t know or forgot what was in the NDA. The NDA required that in order to trigger any obligation of confidentiality, disclosed information must be: “(1) marked as confidential at the time of disclosure; or (2) unmarked, but treated as confidential at the time of disclosure, and later designated confidential in a written memorandum summarizing and identifying the confidential information.” Why they included the second provision is beyond me. In this post I wrote that it is important to have a bright line test concerning what is confidential because you don’t want to litigate whether about whether the information was appropriately identified. What does it mean for information to be treated as confidential at the time of the disclosure? Who is going to remember to send a memorandum and why would one want such a memorandum describing the confidential information to exist?

In any event, sure enough Convolve disclosed unmarked information in meetings and failed to follow-up with a written memorandum, and then sued based on alleged misuse of that information. Convolve lost summary judgment. Convolve tried to argue that, notwithstanding the words in the written contract, everyone knew the information at issue was confidential and marking wasn’t necessary. The Federal Circuit would have none of it. The court wrote: “the NDAs do not appear to be reasonably susceptible to the interpretation Convolve urges. Convolve’s assertion that the parties understood that all oral and visual disclosures were under the purview of the NDAs absent a written follow-up memorandum so stating is contrary to the terms of the NDAs. Thus, Convolve’s interpretation is unreasonable and would render paragraph 7 of the NDA a dead letter.”

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Notwithstanding a series of cases that seemed to tip the scales against enjoining infringers from continuing to infringe, the patentee’s right to enjoin infringing conduct remains not only alive and well, but presumptive. That is the teaching of the Federal Circuit in the recent case of Edwards Lifesciences v. Corevalve.

In eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court reminded us that injunctions in patent cases were not to be granted automatically, but rather subject to principles of equity. Several subsequent cases seemed to further tilt the pendulum toward the infringer, notably ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, in which the Federal Circuit vacated a permanent injunction after a jury verdict of infringement.

In Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit seems to have righted the ship. The Court explained:

A patentee’s right to exclude is a fundamental tenet of patent law. The innovation incentive of the patent is grounded on the market exclusivity whereby the inventor profits from his invention. Absent adverse equitable considerations, the winner of a judgment of validity and infringement may normally expect to regain the exclusivity that was lost with the infringement…The Court in eBay did not hold that there is a presumption against exclusivity on successful infringement litigation. The Court did not cancel 35 U.S.C. §154, which states that “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,” nor did the Court overrule Article I section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Court held that equitable aspects should always be considered, stating: “We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. Statutory and historical as well as commercial considerations impinge on every equitable determination. Precedent illustrates the variety of equitable considerations, and responsive equitable remedy in patent cases: for example, the grant of a royalty-bearing license instead of imposing an injunction in situations where the patentee would experience no competitive injury, or where there is an overriding public interest in continued provision of the infringing product.

This is as it should be. The most fundamental of intellectual property rights, like other property rights, is the right to exclude. It is only in un-ordinary circumstances that the patentee’s right yield to some other equitable consideration. What remains questionable in my mind is whether such circumstances should include a case like ActiveVideo v. Verizon. By refusing the injunction and imposing a license fee, doesn’t the court substitute its wisdom as to the appropriate fee for that of the parties, who would likely negotiate a license if the injunction were granted?

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Even if you win your patent infringement case, you still may not get an injunction prohibiting ongoing infringement. In a case decided last month by the Federal Circuit, ActiveVideo v. Verizon, a jury found that Verizon infringed ActiveVideo’s method patents pertaining to video-on-demand technology, but the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred by imposing a permanent injunction prohibiting Verizon from future infringement. This is a stark example of the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Ebay v. MercExchange that injunctions should not automatically issue in patent infringement cases, and worthy of analysis. Also worthy of scrutiny is what Federal Circuit wrote concerning the appropriate royalty Verizon should be required to pay for future use.

I. Injunction

There are four elements courts must consider when deciding whether to impose an injunction after liability has been established: (1) whether the harm to the patent owner is irreparable; (2) whether the harm is compensable with money damages; (3) the balance of the hardships on each of the parties depending on whether the court issues the injunction; and (4) the public interest.

A. Irreparable Harm/Efficacy of Money Damages

The Court determined that the injury suffered by ActiveVideo as a result of Verizon’s infringement would be compensable by money damages, and would not be irreparable. The following chart depicting the manner in which the court weighed facts pertaining to irreparable injury.

License non-exclusive – ActiveVideo could maintain its existing license to Cablevision and also license Verzion

Loss of market share by ActiveVideo’s licensee Cablevision – the Federal Circuit held that if Verizon takes a customer away from ActiveVideo’s licensee Cablevision, the only harm ActiveVideo suffers is loss of a license fee from Verizon

Ease of quantifying a license fee – Cablevision paid ActiveVideo 17 cents a month per subscriber, Verizon could be required to pay monthly per subscriber also

Loss of business opportunity or brand recognition could constitute irreparable injury, but neither was proven

Verizon is able to pay the license fee – the Federal Circuit distinguished the Bosch v. Pylon Mfg. case, in which the Federal Circuit held that the fact that the defendant might not be able to pay a license fee contributed to irreparable injury

No evidence of damage to ActiveVideo’s brand name because Cablevision markets its service using the “io” name, not the Activevision name, so retail customers are unlikely to associate Activision with the service

Verizon’s service increases demand for VOD overall and therefore increases opportunities for ActiveVideo

No evidence of price erosion

ActiveVideo sought to broadly license its patents, including to Verizon

ActiveVideo wiling to extend sunset licensing period

B. Balance of Hardships

The Federal Circuit held that the balance of hardships favored the infringer. It analyzed the factors as follows.

Factors Favoring Patent Owner

Factors Favoring Infringer

Non-factors

Sunset licensing fee alone would generate, in one month, 70% of what patent owner earned in its entire 23 year history

Patent owner’s small size

Patent owner would only suffer if not compensated

C. Public Interest

The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the public interest in enforcing the patent owner’s right to exclude outweighed the interest the infringer’s customers may have in maintaining their access to entertainment. But the court held that the public interest factor could not outweigh the other two, explaining:

If the general public interest in upholding patent rights alone was sufficient to mandate injunctive relief when none of the other three factors support injunctive relief, then we would be back to the general rule that a patentee should always receive an injunction against infringement. But the Supreme Court rejected the idea that there is a general rule that courts should issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94. We vacate the grant of a permanent injunction in this case and remand for the district court to consider an appropriate ongoing royalty rate for future infringement by Verizon.

II. Sunset Royalties

A sunset royalty is, as its name implies, a royalty an infringer must pay while it phases out its infringing product. The district court imposed a sunset royalty far greater than the amount paid by ActiveMedia’s licensee, Cablevision. The Federal Circuit upheld the higher royalty amount, explaining:

The district court accepted ActiveVideo’s expert testimony that Verizon received an incremental profit of $6.86 per FiOS-TV subscriber per month. The court analyzed the respective bargaining positions of the parties post-verdict, and concluded that “it would have been reasonable for the parties to make an agreement whereby Verizon would receive 60% of the profits and ActiveVideo would receive 40% of the profits.” This results in the $2.74 per subscriber per month royalty. The district court rejected Verizon’s suggestion that it should pay the same rate as Cablevision. The district court found that after the patent is held not invalid and infringed by Verizon, ActiveVideo is in a much better bargaining position with Verizon than it was with Cablevision in 2009. Based on the fact that Verizon may be able to design around, but does not know precisely how effective such a design around might be, the court discounted the profit split from the 50/50 to 60/40 (in favor of Verizon).

This may seem high, and while it is likely true that Verizon would not have agreed to that amount prior to litigation, Verizon has been adjudicated to infringe and the patent has been held not invalid after a substantial challenge by Verizon. See Paice [LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.], 504 F.3d at 1317 (Rader, J., concurring) (“[P]re-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties’ legal relationship and other factors.”); Amado [v. Microsoft], 517 F.3d at 1362 (“Prior to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as the validity of the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that uncertainty. Once a judgment of validity and infringement has been entered, however, the calculus is markedly different because different economic factors are involved.”). The district court is correct; there has been a substantial shift in the bargaining position of the parties. See Amado, 517 F.3d at 1362 (“There is a fundamental difference, however, between a reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement and damages for post-verdict infringement.”). We reject Verizon’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that the jury verdict placed ActiveVideo in a stronger bargaining position.

III. Future Royalties

Because the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction, it now becomes necessary for the district court to fix a royalty for the infringer to pay going forward. The court offered the following comparison of sunset and ongoing royalties, and guidance for the district court on remand:

We held in Amado that an assessment of prospective damages for ongoing infringement should “take into account the change in the parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in economic circumstances, resulting from the determination of liability.” Amado, 517 F.3d at 1362. And, although Amado dealt with the imposition of royalty damages while an injunction was stayed during appeal, this holding applies with equal force in the ongoing royalty context. Though we vacate the district court’s injunction, we see no error in its post-verdict royalty calculation. The district court, on remand, should determine an appropriate ongoing royalty, an inquiry that is much the same as its sunset royalty analysis. The district court may wish to consider on remand additional evidence of changes in the parties’ bargaining positions and other economic circumstances that may be of value in determining an appropriate ongoing royalty. See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315 (“Upon remand, the court may take additional evidence if necessary to account for any additional economic factors arising out of the imposition of an ongoing royalty.”). Indeed, ActiveVideo’s bargaining position is even stronger after this appeal. We leave the procedural aspects of how to proceed on the issue of prospective damages to the discretion of the district court.

The Federal Circuit further explained that some of the Amado factors considered by the district court in its sunset royalty analysis might not be appropriate to consider when calculating an ongoing royalty. Those might include the defendant’s likelihood of success on appeal, the ability of the defendant to immediately comply with the injunction, and the evidence and arguments found material to granting the permanent injunction.

IV. Effect on Apple v. Samsung

The Federal Circuit’s teachings in the ActiveVideo case are likely to have significant influence on Judge Koh’s upcoming decision on Apple’s request for an injunction prohibiting future sales of infringing smartphones in the Apple v. Samsung case. In the fist instance, she is likely to be guided by the ActiveVideo opinion in determining whether to impose the injunction Apple wants. If she decides not to impose the injunction, then she will likely refer to it if she needs to impose an ongoing royalty.

The potential loss of good will and customers by plaintiff, and possible damage to its reputation, as a result of defendants’ alleged infringement of plaintiff’s marks is not easily quantifiable or remediable by damages, and supports a finding of irreparable harm.

This is more evidence that concerns that the Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange rejecting the presumption of irreparable harm in patent cases would raise the bar to obtaining injunctions in all IP cases, were overblown. Potential loss of good will and customers and possible damage to reputation are likely to be present in the majority of trademark infringement cases.

The court in the Mrs. United States case went on to give the following useful summary of the state of the presumption of irreparable harm law in IP cases.

It is unclear whether a court may presume irreparable harm upon a finding of likelihood of success on a trademark claim. The Supreme Court has held that such a presumption is improper in patent or copyright cases, see eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (noting that Court’s ruling with respect to patent cases “is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act”); see also Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“under eBay, a presumption of irreparable harm is equally improper in a case based on copyright infringement as it is in a case based on patent infringement”); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82 (“After eBay, … courts must not simply presume irreparable harm”) (copyright case). To date, however, no consensus has emerged as to whether that holding applies to trademark infringement cases as well. See Peoples Federal Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 9 n.11 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding it unnecessary, and declining, to decide issue); Southern Co. v. Dauben Inc., 324 Fed.Appx. 309, 318 n.13 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); North American Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008) (same). At least some district judges from within this circuit have applied eBay to trademark cases, however. See, e.g., Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2011 WL 6181452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Although prior to Salinger, courts in this circuit presumed irreparable injury in trademark cases where a likelihood of confusion was shown, post-Salinger, this presumption is no longer applicable”); Tecnimed SRL v. Kidz–Med, Inc., 763 F.Supp.2d 395, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying Salinger to a trademark claim), aff’d, 462 Fed.Appx. 31 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit has not yet spoken directly on this question, though it has suggested that the presumption may still have some force in trademark cases; see Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting presumption in trademark cases, without referencing eBay or Salinger, but finding that even without benefit of presumption, plaintiff had shown irreparable injury).

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Two recently-decided cases brought by Apple illustrate the necessity of identifying real harm to one’s business before filing a lawsuit in federal court. The court dismissed the first, Apple v Motorola, because Apple was unable to show that it had been damaged by the alleged patent infringement. In contrast, Apple achieved a tremendous victory in Apple v. Samsung. The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Samsung from selling its new Galaxy Nexus smartphone, because Apple was able to demonstrate that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm if Samsung was permitted to continue to infringe Apple’s patents.

Apple v. Motorola illustrates the types of claims a business should not pursue. At the end of that case, Apple was left with claims that Motorola had employed two features subject to its patents, the value of which Apple could not quantify. At bottom, the court’s reaction was “stop wasting everyone's time.” Finding that Apple would not be able to prove any money damages, and could not prove entitlement to an injunction, the court dismissed the case. The court gave the back of its hand to Apple’s claims that the court should issue a declaration that Motorola had infringed or award symbolic “nominative” damages. The court wrote: “You can’t go into federal court and say you had a contract with X and X broke it and you’re really annoyed even though you sustained no injury of any sort (in fact you made money because you re-contracted at a higher price) so please give me a judgment for $1 that I can pin on my wall.”

Apple v. Samsung, on the other hand, illustrates precisely the type of case a business should pursue. In that case Apple was able to show that, unless the court issued a preliminary injunction, Apple would be likely to lose not only phone sales, but immeasurable additional sales when purchasers of the Galaxy Nexus followed that purchase with purchases of other Android products and applications rather than the Apple products and applications they would be likely to purchase if they first purchased an iPhone. The size of the victory for Apple is reflected in the size of the bond the court required Apple to post: $95 million, the amount of profit Samsung asserted it would lose if it could not sell the Galaxy Nexus. It seems intuitive that Apple is correct that the smart phone is a “gateway” device that leads one to purchase additional products that use the same operating system as the phone. Therefore posting the $95 million bond (which is unlikely to be posted in cash, and which will be returned to Apple unless Samsung succeeds in overturning the injunction on appeal or otherwise proving that the court was wrong to grant the injunction) to knock out the Galaxy Nexus seems like it will be good business for Apple.

The take away for businesses should be that there is little utility in starting lawsuits out of spite. Although you may cause your adversary to incur legal fees and suffer disruption caused by litigation, you are bound to incur costs like that of your own, and to lose momentum when the strong action you trumpeted at the outset of the case turns into fodder for your adversary at the end. On the other hand, Apple v. Samsung teaches that despite the incessant protests of those who would curtail the protection given to IP owners, those who do suffer actual harm can still obtain not mere vindication, but effective relief in federal court.

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Irreparable injury cannot be presumed in Lanham Act false advertising cases. That was the ruling in Leatherman Tool v. Coast Cutlery, a case decided in October in the District of Oregon. In that case the court found that Leatherman made a preliminary showing that its competitor, Coast Cutlery, deliberately included in advertising literally false statements concerning the sharpness of its knife blades. The court did not issue a preliminary injunction, however, because it found Leatherman’s affidavits avowing concern that sales would be diverted were speculative, and insufficient to prove that Leatherman would be irreparably harmed by its competitor’s literally false advertising.

On the heels of cases within the past five years expressly ruling a presumption of irreparable harm does not apply in patent and copyright cases, a recent decision from the First Circuit in a trademark case and a one from the District of Arizona concerning another Lanham Act case, it is now seems likely, to the extent it was not after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ebay, that the days in which plaintiffs can count on a presumption of irreparable harm in an IP case of any type may be numbered.

The challenge now, for intellectual property owners, scrupulous advertisers and courts, is to prevent us from sliding into a culture of infringe now, pay later. Infringers will no doubt in every case assert that irreparable harm cannot be proven because the wrongdoing can be remedied by payment of damages, in the form of a license fee or, in the case of false advertisers and trademark infringers, payments for proven diverted sales. That leaves the plaintiff with a difficult task to prove otherwise, the danger the presumption of irreparable harm was designed to prevent. And so the battle lines are re-drawn.