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I'm not sure on the number but I know they were going to use every single variant of aircraft in their inventory tasked with kamikaze to use against the invasion fleet, specifically against troop carrying ships.

They still struggled to even get planes up to the altitudes the US strategic bombers flew on.

Since the Japanese home islands were effectively cut off by the Allied submarines (being unable to even effectively convoy in supplies) carburants were in short supply. 10 000 planes with not enough fuel doesn't matter all much. And even when there was fuel, the quality was a major issue. By the last stages of the war the Japanese were ordering school children out in the woods to fell pine trees and dig up their roots, from which they could extract a pitiful form of Erzatz carburant. While the US and UK flew their planes on 100 octane petrol.

XXI Bomber Command had shifted away from high altitude bombing to low in March '45, starting with the Tokyo Fire Bomb Raids. But even then the Japanese didn't have the power to contest it. The US Navy had already completely destroyed Japan's trained pilots at the Marianas Turkey Shoot. A chief justification for going to Kamikaze in the first place was the inefficiency of pilots due to lack of training. There was simply no way in summer/fall of '45 that the remaining Japanese aircraft, most of which weren't fighters (they counted everything that could fly) had a remote possibility of even putting a dent into a single bombing mission, let alone all of them.

Beware looking up wiki numbers. They don't tell the whole story. Those numbers included every single type of plane in the Japanese inventory that was capable of flight. They were not going to get good effects with them, outside of Kamikaze, especially when coupled with major trained pilot shortages.

XXI Bomber Command had shifted away from high altitude bombing to low in March '45, starting with the Tokyo Fire Bomb Raids. But even then the Japanese didn't have the power to contest it. The US Navy had already completely destroyed Japan's trained pilots at the Marianas Turkey Shoot. A chief justification for going to Kamikaze in the first place was the inefficiency of pilots due to lack of training. There was simply no way in summer/fall of '45 that the remaining Japanese aircraft, most of which weren't fighters (they counted everything that could fly) had a remote possibility of even putting a dent into a single bombing mission, let alone all of them.

Beware looking up wiki numbers. They don't tell the whole story. Those numbers included every single type of plane in the Japanese inventory that was capable of flight. They were not going to get good effects with them, outside of Kamikaze, especially when coupled with major trained pilot shortages.

Maybe not, but there was no reason to insist on unconditional surrender. There was no need to drop the bomb, get the Russians involved, or invade Japan. Just negotiate peace. I know that didn't work in 1918 with Germany. However, it was like with the Nazis where they intended to hang the leaders.

Sure, although in the end, the Soviets did invade the Kurils before the US troops landed in Japan. I don't know what the Japanese defences in Hokkaido were like, so I'm not sure how long it would have taken the Soviets to overrun them. Although the Japanese seemed to be taken by surprise at the Sovet invasion.

Right, but most of the experienced Japanese pilots were dead by this point, with the pilots mainly consisting of raw recruits. And Zeroes were already heavily outclassed by the bulk of the US aircraft.

The first bomb was justifiable. If the Allies had waited after that until the Soviets invaded, Japan would probably have surrendered, making the second bomb less justifiable.

HOWEVER...

Had the Soviets invaded without a second bomb, the Japanese may not have surrendered until Soviet troops actually landed on the home islands, which potentially could have led to a partition of Japan similar to Korea. This would most definitively have NOT been a good thing.

And what is the likelihood that the Soviets could have pulled off an invasion of the home islands? They struggled to take Salakhin and the Kuriles and likely only succeeded in doing so because the Americans had loaned them some ships. By August of 45 the IJN had been worn down significantly but would have been more than capable of taking on the USSR Navy. Just because something appears logical in theory doesn't mean it will pan out in practice. If things had came down to the point where the Soviets would have attempted taking the home islands I would have wished captain Alexei and his sailors good luck but I certainly would have had my doubts.

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