TPM security cracked wide open

The Trusted Platform Module is perhaps a little less trustworth today, following Christopher Tarnovsky's discovery of a physical attack vector.

The previously unassailable Trusted Platform Module - designed to provide cryptographic security to data held on servers and PCs - has been cracked by a California-based hacker.

According to a report in the New Zealand Herald - via Hack a Day - security consultant Christopher Tarnovsky has worked out a way to convince the TPM chip to give up its closely-held secrets.

Revealed at the 2010 Black Hat conference, the hack isn't exactly straightforward: it relies on having both physical access to a TPM-secured machine, and on having a great deal of experience with the physical hacking of semiconductors - something Tarnovsky has in spades.

The process is similar to the way Tarnovsky has cracked other security chips in the past: starting by soaking the chip in acid to dissolve the plastic casing, Tarnovsky then carefully removes the RF-protective mesh to get at the wiring at the heart of the chip. Once exposed, a logic probe with an extremely small needle allows him to find the relevant communication channel - and from there set up a digital eavesdrop.

While it's hardly straightforward, the 'wiretap' allows Tarnovsky to read the instructions used to actually perform the cryptography within the chip - and thus reverse them, allowing for a full bypass of the security the Trusted Platform Module was designed to provide.

Tarnovsky's work involved the Infineon-manufactured TPM chips, one of the most popular models on the market - with modified versions finding their way into set top boxes, Microsoft's Xbox 360 console, and certain smartphones - but the hacker claims that his techniques can be applied to any model of TPM chip with similar success.

For its part, the Trusted Computing Group - behind the Trusted Platform Module - downplays the seriousness of the attack, stating that it is "exceedingly difficult to replicate in a real-world environment" and states that it "never claimed that a physical attack - given enough time, specialised equipment, know-how and money - was impossible."

One thing is for certain: with the Black Hat conference's founder - and member of the US Department of Homeland Security's advisory council - Jeff Moss describing the attack as "amazing" and akin to prying open the lock on Pandora's Box, there's likely to be a lot of security professionals experiencing a few sleepless nights once the Tarnovsky's presentation is released to the public.

Are you surprised to see the 'uncrackable' TPM laid bare in this manner, or is it such a ridiculous method of attack that no-one need worry? Share your thoughts over in the forums.

Having cracked one chip, does that mean he has cracked the entire TPM system, or just that particular model of chip, or just that individual chip? If the latter, not much to worry about; if the entire platform is now compromised, however, it's time to retire it.

Not to sound too negative but, you guys could have done a little research on something as big as this is instead of adding to the sensationalism of it. A little more research would have revealed some more specifics, like that he had to use an electron microscope to pull this hack off.

I thought this was just assumed since the inception of the TPM chip. When i first learned about it, i was told that it could be cracked with physical access to the chip. This same concept applies with encryption. Your stuff might be safe from digital access but a cold boot attack can retrieve encryption keys. We are putting so much focus of the digital aspects of security that we forget about physical access. Put the freakn thing a steel valut and for the love of God man lock the door. Problem solved.

I'm not sure why this is really news. Yes, obviously, if you're going to go to the lengths of etching the casing off the thing and firing a logic analyser at it, then yes, you can find out what it does and how it does so.

I'm sure this was indeed assumed since the inception of the TPM chip. All systems like this, from DVD to Blu-Ray to whatever else, where you need to let the person decode the content, are ultimately open to compromise because you must give the user both the encoded material and the means to decode it. The people who design these systems know this. What they're interested in is keeping the amount of compromises down to a bare minimum.

What's important is that this only really has to be done once in order to produce devices you could either piggyback on top of a compatible device, or produce a replacement device, and circumvent the entire floor show. And it has now been done once.

Originally Posted by Neophyte4LifeI thought this was just assumed since the inception of the TPM chip. When i first learned about it, i was told that it could be cracked with physical access to the chip. This same concept applies with encryption. Your stuff might be safe from digital access but a cold boot attack can retrieve encryption keys. We are putting so much focus of the digital aspects of security that we forget about physical access. Put the freakn thing a steel valut and for the love of God man lock the door. Problem solved.

do you know safes can be cracked (in america for example they all have those stupied flat keys like you get on padlocks and you just get a bump key (done a key to nearly every home in america)(this is just a guess as i have never been to america and have never seen one, only ever heard about it

Originally Posted by shanky887614do you know safes can be cracked (in america for example they all have those stupied flat keys like you get on padlocks and you just get a bump key (done a key to nearly every home in america)(this is just a guess as i have never been to america and have never seen one, only ever heard about it

Hire gordan freeman, master chief, and nomad in conjunction with the safe. Now it is fool proof.