The most interesting part of the Cavell thing is a discussion starting at 1:16:00 of "tact, morality, and the everyday" - interesting because I don't think "tact" elsewhere arises as a topic in Cavell's books, though it could easily have been made to.

I am sorry if anyone is annoyed if i continue to bring up stuff that isn't strictly "philosophy" but has anyone read any Anthony Wilden? I've just started "System and Structure" (1980 edition) and find it pretty amazing in its interweaving of Bateson, Lacan, and Marx.

I think it would be great if philosophy were more practical, but aside from kicking aside any religious figure ever trying to talk about ethics on current affairs shows or ethics committees (whatever they are) i don't know how it would be possible.

Haha, who would think that profs of ethics *would* behave any more ethically? I mean, maybe I'm tainted from being taught ethics by an amoralist, but man, the point is to question ethics, not to suddenly turn into a good Samaritan. Or maybe I'm just far too interested in meta-ethics.

Also, I'm not sure that that study can possibly be sound. I mean, how do you measure the morality of charitable donation? There are very compelling reasons to believe that (at least a large proportion of) charity is morally reprehensible in itself.

Real amoralists are probably few and far between though, I think the mainstream position even among moral skeptics or error theorists (including me) is that we still can & should treat each other decently.

xp reprehensible's a pretty strong word! study's just a bit of fun let's be cool, anyway.

it was a class on analytic ethics that comprehensively turned me to the dark side of continental mentalism. Dire debate after dire debate on consequentialism vs deontology wrt particular situations felt like a huge exercise in skirting the actual question of ethics, so in my dissatisfaction with the entire field I instead turned to the super concrete world of um thinking about the excessive infinite ethical relation to the other and such.

yeah, this i think and from that link imo the most interesting questions are

How should we act under empirical uncertainty – in particular should we follow expected utility even when it comes to tiny probabilities of huge amounts of value? (Relevant to extinction risk)

All other things being equal, should we prioritise the prevention of wrongs over the alleviation of naturally caused suffering? (Relevant to abortion, animal suffering)

Given that we aren’t ever going to be certain in answers to the above questions, how should we take into account uncertainty about these moral issues in our decision-making? (Relevant to: global poverty, abortion, animal suffering, extinction risk)

How about accepting that all theories are inadequate? I recently discovered Bernard Williams who "believes that ethical thinking cannot be systematised without intolerable distortions and losses, because to systematise is, inevitably, to streamline our ethical thinking in a reductionist style"

Suppose for example that I, an officer of a wrecked ship, take the hard decision to actively prevent further castaways from climbing onto my already dangerously overcrowded lifeboat. Afterwards, I am tormented when I remember how I smashed the spare oar repeatedly over the heads and hands of desperate, drowning people. Yet what I did certainly brought it about that as many people as possible were saved from the shipwreck, so that a utilitarian would say that I brought about the best consequences, and anyone might agree that I found the only practicable way of avoiding a dramatically worse outcome. Moreover, as a Kantian might point out, there was nothing unfair or malicious about what I did in using the minimum force necessary to repel further boarders: my aim, since I could not save every life, was to save those who by no choice of mine just happened to be in the lifeboat already; this was an aim that I properly had, given my role as a ship's officer; and it was absolutely not my intention to kill or (perhaps) even to injure anyone.

So what will typical advocates of the morality system have to say to me afterwards about my dreadful sense of regret? If they are—as perhaps they had better not be—totally consistent and totally honest with me, what they will have to say is simply “Don't give it a second thought; you did what morality required, so your deep anguish about it is irrational.” And that, surely, cannot be the right thing for anyone to say. My anguish is not irrational but entirely justified. Moreover, it is justified simply as an ex post facto response to what I did: it does not for instance depend for its propriety upon the suggestion—a characteristic one, for many modern moral theorists—that there is prospective value for the future in my being the kind of person who will have such reactions.

1) does anyone know if there's a "preferred" version of Hegel's Phenomenology? the top results on amazon all seem pretty old. im surprised there's not some new-ish edition with a sexy cover that will make me look cool when i read it.

2) i have been craving a big and ambitious intellectual history, confined mostly to western philosophy. any favorites? the bigger and more general the better. wacky overreaching thesis = still better.