Search This Blog

Suit for partition basing of settlement deed- suit decreed for A and D - dismissed in respect of other items - third party suit for partition basing of sale agreement followed by sale deed was dismissed as already property was given under settlement deed - suit for cancellation of compromise was allowed as the original owner hold no interest to compromise - in appeal the single judge allowed the appeal and also allowed the cross objection in respect of BC schedule properties - dismissed appeal of third party and also appeal on cancellation suit - LPA - only covers B schedule propriety covered under settlement deed Ex. A 9 and sale agreement and sale deed Ex. A 91, 93 and held that original owner holds 1/4th share , she validly settle the same infavour of her nephew - though the sale agreement is valid one , the sale deed is not valid as she has no right to execute the sale deed and hence their lordships allow both the appeals and hold that a) the appellant derived valid legal rights to the extent of 1/4th share in the plaint B schedule properties in O.S.No.230 of 1970 under Ex.A.9, and b) the transfer of that very property in favour of the 3rd respondent through Ex.B.92 is contrary to law. = Grandhi Surya Prakasam .. Appellant Tammana Gundayya and others.. Respondents = published in judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10519

Suit for partition basing of settlement deed- suit decreed for A and D - dismissed in respect of other items - third party suit for partition basing of sale agreement followed by sale deed was dismissed as already property was given under settlement deed - suit for cancellation of compromise was allowed as the original owner hold no interest to compromise - in appeal the single judge allowed the appeal and also allowed the cross objection in respect of BC schedule properties - dismissed appeal of third party and also appeal on cancellation suit - LPA - only covers B schedule propriety covered under settlement deed Ex. A 9 and sale agreement and sale deed Ex. A 91, 93 and held that original owner holds 1/4th share , she validly settle the same infavour of her nephew - though the sale agreement is valid one , the sale deed is not valid as she has no right to execute the sale deed and hence their lordships allow both the appeals and hold that a) the appellant derived valid legal rights to the extent of 1/4th share in theplaint B schedule properties in O.S.No.230 of 1970 under Ex.A.9, and b) the transfer of that very property in favour of the 3rd respondent throughEx.B.92 is contrary to law. =

Through a common judgment,dated 31.10.1979, the trial Court (a) passed a preliminary decree in O.S.No.230of 1970 in favour of the appellant in respect of the plaint A and D scheduleproperties, and as regards plaint B and C schedule properties, the trial Courtheld that Venkata Ramanamma, who executed Ex.A.9, Settlement Deed, held just a life interest in respect of 1/8th share, and she has no right to execute thatDeed of Settlement,(b) dismissed O.S.No.173 of 1969, taking the view that onceVenkata Ramanamma executed Ex.A.9, Settlement Deed, on 07.04.1967, she has no right to execute Ex.B.92, Sale Deed dated 26.08.1968, in respect of plaint Bschedule properties in favour of M. Subbalakshmi, the 3rd respondent, that too,without participation of the beneficiay under the settlement i.e., theappellant, and (c) decreed O.S.No.297 of 1969, setting aside the compromisedecree, dated 03.11.1969, passed in O.S.No.173 of 1969. =

1) "Whether the appellant derived any title under Ex.A.9?2) Whether Exs.B.91 and 92 can be treated as legal, and whether they had theeffect of conveying title to the property mentioned therein, in favour of the3rd respondent?" =POINT NO.1: Though the litigation started for partition of quite large extents of propertiesmentioned in plaint A, B, C and D schedules, the controversy, as of now, is onlyin relation to plaint B schedule properties.The total extent mentioned thereinis Acs.18.00 and the plaintiff claimed 1/4th share therein. It has already beenmentioned that the trial Court took the view that Venkata Ramanamma held just alife estate, to the extent of 1/8th share in that property, and that she did nothave any right to convey any valid title in respect of the said property, toothers and, accordingly, rejected the claim of the appellant.On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Single Judge tookthe view that Venkata Ramanamma held 1/4th absolute share in the plaint Bschedule properties. That finding is not challenged by any of the respondentsherein. The said issue having assumed finality, it needs to be seen, as towhether there was any valid conveyance of the plaint B schedule property infavour of the appellant.Ex.A.9 is the document, through which, Venkata Ramanamma conferred absolute rights in favour of the appellant, not only in relation to plaint B scheduleproperties, but also in respect of plaint A, C and D schedule properties.This document was held proved, as required under law. The contention advanced by thecontesting parties that it is vitiated on account of certain factors, wasrepelled by the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge.Once Ex.A.9 isheld as proved, the inescapable conclusion is that the appellant derived titlein respect of 1/4th share held by Venkata Ramanamma in plaint B schedule properties. The point is, accordingly, answered.POINT NO.2: This point is inter-related to the first one. Had there not been any furtherdevelopments, subsequent to Ex.A.9, the matter would have ended there. The 3rdrespondent claimed rightsvis--vis the plaint B schedule properties, under Ex.B.92,dated 26.08.1968. It is important to mention that this document came intoexistence more than one year after Ex.A.9 was executed in favour of theappellant. Obviously, to sustain the transaction covered by Ex.B.92, the 3rdrespondent took the plea that it was preceded by Ex.B.91, an agreement of sale,dated 26.11.1966. This document, if taken as true, would be anterior to Ex.A.9,in point of time.The appellant made strenuous efforts to demonstrate that Ex.B.91 was broughtinto existence, and the Advocate of Venkata Ramanamma, who was impleaded as defendant in 230 of 1970, was instrumental in bringing about it. While thetrial Court accepted that contention, this Court has set aside the same. In ourview, the role, said to have been played by the 4th defendant in O.S.No.230 of1970, hardly matters. The legality or otherwise of Ex.B.91 does not depend uponthe nature of advice tendered by the Advocate or his proximity to the parties tothe transaction. It has to be decided on its own merits, with reference to therelevant provisions of law.Ex.B.91 is the Agreement of Sale, in relation to the plaint B scheduleproperties. The attack to this document by the appellant is that thetransaction itself is tainted by undue influence and misuse of fiduciaryrelationship. This ground, at the most, could have been raised by the person,who executed the document. A third party cannot take the plea of undueinfluence, as long as the person, who executed the document, did not have anysuch grievance. No effort was made to establish that the signature on Ex.B.91is not that of Venkata Ramanamma. Therefore, Ex.B.91 has to be taken as proved and valid.Now, comes the question, as to whether Ex.B.92, which is executed on the strength of Ex.B.91, is legal and valid. If no substantial developments haveintervened Exs.B.91 and B.92, no illegality can be said to have crept into thetransaction. It has already been mentioned that Venkata Ramanamma executed Ex.A.9 on 07.04.1967, settling her properties in plaint A, B, C and D scheduleproperties, conferring absolute upon the appellant. With that, she ceases tohave any right to convey those very properties, or at least, the plaint Bschedule properties in favour of third parties. The position in law thatobtains, under the circumstances would be that Ex.B.91, Agreement of Sale, doesnot by itself become untenable or illegal, but it becomes enforceable notagainst the original executant, but against the person, who derived title fromthe executant under Ex.A.9. In this process, had she been so advised, the 3rdrespondent ought to have taken steps to get the Sale Deed executed by theappellant herein, who derived title under Ex.A.9. However, ignoring theappellant, she obtained a Sale Deed from Venkata Ramanamma under Ex.B.92. Since Venkata Ramanamma divested herself of the rights vis--vis the plaint B scheduleproperties through Ex.A.9, she has no right or entitlement to execute Ex.B.92.The learned Single Judge did not deal with this aspect in detail, but has simplyupheld Ex.B.92. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Single, in thisregard, cannot be sustained.One inconsistency has crept into the common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. While answering point No.5, which was in relation to the validityof compromise decree in O.S.No.173 of 1969, the learned Single Judge held thatthe compromise decree cannot be sustained in law. However, obviously, onaccount of the complicated nature of the facts, a different result was indicatedat the end. It has already been mentioned that O.S.No.297 of 1969 was filed bythe 1st respondent, with a prayer to set aside the compromise decree inO.S.No.173 of 1969 and the trial Court decreed O.S.No.297 of 1969. Aggrieved bythe decree in O.S.No.297 of 1969, the 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi filedA.S.No.1251 of 1980. In view of the finding on point No.5, A.S.No.1251 of 1980ought to have been dismissed. However, obviously, by mistake, it was observedthat the said appeal is allowed. This aspect needs to be corrected.The point is, accordingly, answered.For the foregoing reasons, we allow both the appeals and hold thata) the appellant derived valid legal rights to the extent of 1/4th share in theplaint B schedule properties inO.S.No.230 of 1970 under Ex.A.9, and b) the transfer of that very property in favour of the 3rd respondent throughEx.B.92 is contrary to law.There shall be no order as to costs.

In relation to the properties held by one
Smt. Venkata Ramanamma, three suits were filed before the Court of the I
Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. Out of the decrees passed therein,three appeals were filed. A learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of theappeals, and four LPAs have arisen, out of the common judgment. These two LPAs have survived the compromise of the two other LPAs.

For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as arrayed in
L.P.A.No.218 of 1993.

The facts, in brief, are as under:

Smt. Venkata Ramanamma was possessed of fairly vast extents of properties. Herself and her husband, Gundaiah (Senior), have adopted a person, whose name is also Gundaiah (Junior), the 1st respondent herein.The appellant in these LPAsi.e., Grandhi Surya Prakasam, is the brother's son of Venkata Ramanamma.Stating that Venkata Ramanamma executed Settlement Deed, Ex.A.9,on 07.04.1967, settling upon him, the properties mentioned as plaint A, B, C and D schedules,in absolute terms, the appellant filed O.S.No.230 of 1970 for partition andseparate possession of the same. By the time the suit was filed, VenkataRamanamma was no more.
Before that suit came to be filed, certain developments
have taken place.

It has already been mentioned that Ex.A.9 is said to have been executed on07.04.1967. The 3rd respondent herein filed O.S.No.173 of 1969 against VenkataRamanamma, the 1st respondent herein, and a tenant, for the relief of partitionof the plaint schedule properties. According to her, Venkata Ramanamma executed Agreement of Sale, on 26.11.1966, Ex.B.91, in respect of the properties shownin the schedule therein, and that it was followed by Sale Deed,dated 26.08.1968, Ex.B.92. On this basis, she prayed for partition.

A compromise decree was passed in O.S.No.173 of 1969 on 03.11.1969, as between the 3rd respondent, on one hand, and Venkata Ramanamma and the 1st respondent, on the other hand. The tenant was set ex parte. However, on an applicationfiled by the tenant, the ex parte decree, to the extent it concerns hisinterests, was set aside, and the suit was restored to file.

The 1st respondent i.e,, Junior Gundaiah, was a minor, when the compromise decree was passed in O.S.No.173 of 1969. After he attained the age of majority,he filed O.S.No.297 of 1969 in the same Court, with a prayer to set aside thecompromise decree.

All the three suits were clubbed and heard together. Through a common judgment,dated 31.10.1979, the trial Court (a) passed a preliminary decree in O.S.No.230of 1970 in favour of the appellant in respect of the plaint A and D scheduleproperties, and as regards plaint B and C schedule properties, the trial Courtheld that Venkata Ramanamma, who executed Ex.A.9, Settlement Deed, held just a life interest in respect of 1/8th share, and she has no right to execute thatDeed of Settlement,(b) dismissed O.S.No.173 of 1969, taking the view that onceVenkata Ramanamma executed Ex.A.9, Settlement Deed, on 07.04.1967, she has no right to execute Ex.B.92, Sale Deed dated 26.08.1968, in respect of plaint Bschedule properties in favour of M. Subbalakshmi, the 3rd respondent, that too,without participation of the beneficiay under the settlement i.e., theappellant, and (c) decreed O.S.No.297 of 1969, setting aside the compromisedecree, dated 03.11.1969, passed in O.S.No.173 of 1969.

The 1st respondent, Jr. Gundaiah, filed A.S.No.645 of 1980 before this Court,feeling aggrieved by the decree in O.S.No.230 of 1970 for partition of plaint Aand D schedule properties. According to him, Venkata Ramanamma did not have any right to execute Ex.A.9, Settlement Deed, in favour of the appellant. Theappellant herein filed cross-objections in that appeal, feeling aggrieved by thedismissal of the suit, in so far as it concerns plaint B and C scheduleproperties.The 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi, filed A.S.No.825 of 1980, feelingaggrieved by the dismissal of O.S.No.173 of 1969. The same lady filedA.S.No1251 of 1980, challenging the decree in O.S.No.297 of 1969.All the three appeals and the cross-objections were heard together, by thelearned Single Judge of this Court. Through a common judgment, dated14.08.1991, the learned Single Judge allowed A.S.Nos.825 and 1251 of 1980 and the cross-objections in A.S.No.645 of 1980, to the extent indicated in thatjudgment, and dismissed A.S.No.645 of 1980.

Feeling aggrieved by the decrees in A.S.Nos.645 and 825 of 1980, the 1st
respondent herein i.e., Jr. Gundaiah, filed LPA Nos.254 and 255 of 1992.
However, they have been compromised, as between the parties. In view of the
compromise said to have been arrived at, between the concerned parties, the 1st
respondent has not pursued the LPA Nos.254 and 255 of 1992, and they stood
dismissed.

The subject matter of these two appeals is the finding recorded by the learned
Single Judge vis--vis the plaint B schedule properties.

Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that havingreversed the finding of the trial Court in relation to the plaint B scheduleproperties, the learned Single Judge erroneously upheld the sale throughEx.B.92.
He contends that there was any amount of suspicion, if not illegality,
in respect of Ex.B.91, the alleged Agreement of Sale, in favour of the 3rd
respondent, and the role of the 4th defendant in O.S.No.230 of 1970 was, in
fact, adversely commented by the trial Court.
He contends that assuming that
Ex.B.91 is true and genuine, once it was followed by a valid transfer of
absolute title, in favour of the appellant, in relation to the plaint B schedule
properties, there was no basis or entitlement for Venkata Ramanamma to execute
Ex.B.92, Sale Deed.
Placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Division
Bench of this Court in Kondapalli Satyanarayana Vs. Kondapalli Mayullu andothers1, the learned counsel submits that at the most, the appellant can be saidto be the trustee vis--vis the property covered by Exs.A.9 and B.91, and avalid title could have accrued to the 3rd respondent, if only a suit forspecific performance was filed and a decree in that behalf was passed by acompetent Court.

Sri B. Jagannadha Sastry, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the
3rd respondent, on the other hand, submits that there was any amount of
uncertainity, as to the description of the properties between the plaint
schedule, on one hand, and Ex.A.9, on the other hand. He submits that the
learned Single Judge has disagreed with the trial Court, as regards the role
attributed to the Advocate of Venkata Ramanamma and with that, the entire attack
upon Exs.B.91 and 92 ceases to exist. The learned counsel further submits that
the settlement under Ex.A.9 was subject to several contingencies and Venkata
Ramanamma did not have the right to execute Ex.B.92, and that the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge in this behalf does not warrant any
interference.

It was almost a test for the Court of the I Additional Subordinate Judge,
Kakinada, to handle the three suits. Highly complicated facts were taken note
of and common issues were framed as under:

"Issues:
1) Whether the plaint A schedule properties are the absolute properties of late
Tamana Venkata Ramanamma?

2) Whether late Tamana Venkata Ramanamma has 1/4th share in the plaint B,C and D
schedule properties with absolute rights or she got only 1/8th share with life
interest?

3) Whether the said Venkata Ramanamma purchased properties in her name with the
income of her husband Gundaiah's ancestral properties, and as such, those
properties form part of the joint family properties of Gundaiah and the first
defendant?

4) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 12.10.1957 by Gundaiah in favour of his
wife is true, valid and binding on the 1st defendant?

5) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1967 executed by late Venkata
Ramanamma is true, valid and binding on the defendants?

6) Whether the Sale Agreement dated 26.11.1966 and the registered Sale Deed
dated 26.08.1968 relied upon by the 3rd defendant as having been executed by
late Venkata Ramanamma in her favour are true, valid supported by consideration
and binding on the plaintiff?

7) Whether the 3rd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of
the Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1967 and the mistake in the survey numbers
mentioned therein?

8) Whether the 3rd defendant is a nominee for the 4th defendant as contended by
the plaintiff?

9) Whether the 4th defendant is not a necessary or proper party to the suit?

10) Whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary or proper party to the suit?

11) Whether Matoori Suryavathi is a necessary or proper party to the suit?

12) Whether the compromise decree and other proceedings in O.S.No.173 of 1969 on
the file of the Sub Court, Kakinada are valid and binding on the plaintiff?

13) Whether the Will dated 20.09.1969 and codicil dated 19.01.1970 set up by the
defendants 5 to 7 are true and valid and executed by late Venkata Ramanamma in a
sound and disposing state of mind?

14) Whether the suit, as framed, is for partial partition, and as such, not
maintainable?

15) Whether the suit is bad for multifariousness?

16) Whether the Lease Deed dated 16.01.1970 in respect of Item I of the plaint A
schedule set up by the defendants 8 to 11 is true, valid and binding on the
plaintiff?

17) Whether the plaintiff is entitled

a) for declaration of title to plaint A schedule property and 1/4th share in
plaint B,C and D schedule properties?
b) for recovery of possession of plaint A schedule property after ejecting the
defendants?
c) for partition of plaint B,C and D schedule properties into 4 equal shares and
recovery of one share?
d) For the profits claimed?

Additional issue framed as per order, dated 08.09.1978 on I.A.No.2748/78.

Whether the 15th defendant is a tenant of the plaint B schedule lands, and so,
whether this Court has no jurisdiction to evict the 15th defendant?

Additional issue framed as per order, dated 15.12.1978, on I.A.No.4103/78.

Having regard to the value of the property or the nature of contest between the
parties, voluminous evidence was adduced. On behalf of the appellant, P.Ws.1 to
10 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.60 were filed. On behalf of the contesting
defendants, D.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.111 were filed.

The amount of attention, that had to be paid by the trial Court, can be gauged
from the fact that a common judgment, running into 300 typed pages, was
rendered. By the time it reached this Court, the controversy got narrowed down.
Taking note of the same, this Court framed the following points, in the three
appeals and cross-objections before it:

2) Whether Venkata Ramanamma has got life estate or absolute estate in B and C
schedule properties under Ex.B.9 Will?

3) What share in B and C schedule properties was got by Venkata Ramanamma under
Ex.B.9 Will?

4) Whether Ex.B.91 Agreement of Sale dated 26.11.1966 and Ex.B.92 Sale Deed
dated 26.08.1968 even if true, are not valid and binding on the respondents in
A.S.Nos.825 and 1251 of 1980?

5) Whether the compromise decree in O.S.No.173 of 1969 is liable to be set
aside?

6) Whether Ex.A.9 Settlement Deed executed by Venkata Ramanamma in favour of the
plaintiff in O.S.No.230 of 1970 on 07.04.1967 is true and valid?

7) To what relief?"

The result in the appeals has already been indicated.

Now, the points, that arise for consideration before us, are:

1) "Whether the appellant derived any title under Ex.A.9?2) Whether Exs.B.91 and 92 can be treated as legal, and whether they had theeffect of conveying title to the property mentioned therein, in favour of the3rd respondent?"

POINT NO.1: Though the litigation started for partition of quite large extents of propertiesmentioned in plaint A, B, C and D schedules, the controversy, as of now, is onlyin relation to plaint B schedule properties.The total extent mentioned thereinis Acs.18.00 and the plaintiff claimed 1/4th share therein. It has already beenmentioned that the trial Court took the view that Venkata Ramanamma held just alife estate, to the extent of 1/8th share in that property, and that she did nothave any right to convey any valid title in respect of the said property, toothers and, accordingly, rejected the claim of the appellant.

On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Single Judge tookthe view that Venkata Ramanamma held 1/4th absolute share in the plaint Bschedule properties. That finding is not challenged by any of the respondentsherein. The said issue having assumed finality, it needs to be seen, as towhether there was any valid conveyance of the plaint B schedule property infavour of the appellant.

Ex.A.9 is the document, through which, Venkata Ramanamma conferred absolute rights in favour of the appellant, not only in relation to plaint B scheduleproperties, but also in respect of plaint A, C and D schedule properties.Thisdocument was held proved, as required under law. The contention advanced by thecontesting parties that it is vitiated on account of certain factors, wasrepelled by the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge.Once Ex.A.9 isheld as proved, the inescapable conclusion is that the appellant derived titlein respect of 1/4th share held by Venkata Ramanamma in plaint B schedule properties.
The point is, accordingly, answered.

POINT NO.2: This point is inter-related to the first one. Had there not been any furtherdevelopments, subsequent to Ex.A.9, the matter would have ended there. The 3rdrespondent claimed rightsvis--vis the plaint B schedule properties, under Ex.B.92,dated 26.08.1968. It is important to mention that this document came intoexistence more than one year after Ex.A.9 was executed in favour of theappellant. Obviously, to sustain the transaction covered by Ex.B.92, the 3rdrespondent took the plea that it was preceded by Ex.B.91, an agreement of sale,dated 26.11.1966. This document, if taken as true, would be anterior to Ex.A.9,in point of time.

The appellant made strenuous efforts to demonstrate that Ex.B.91 was broughtinto existence, and the Advocate of Venkata Ramanamma, who was impleaded as defendant in 230 of 1970, was instrumental in bringing about it. While thetrial Court accepted that contention, this Court has set aside the same. In ourview, the role, said to have been played by the 4th defendant in O.S.No.230 of1970, hardly matters. The legality or otherwise of Ex.B.91 does not depend uponthe nature of advice tendered by the Advocate or his proximity to the parties tothe transaction. It has to be decided on its own merits, with reference to therelevant provisions of law.

Ex.B.91 is the Agreement of Sale, in relation to the plaint B scheduleproperties. The attack to this document by the appellant is that thetransaction itself is tainted by undue influence and misuse of fiduciaryrelationship. This ground, at the most, could have been raised by the person,who executed the document. A third party cannot take the plea of undueinfluence, as long as the person, who executed the document, did not have anysuch grievance. No effort was made to establish that the signature on Ex.B.91is not that of Venkata Ramanamma. Therefore, Ex.B.91 has to be taken as proved and valid.

Now, comes the question, as to whether Ex.B.92, which is executed on the strength of Ex.B.91, is legal and valid. If no substantial developments haveintervened Exs.B.91 and B.92, no illegality can be said to have crept into thetransaction. It has already been mentioned that Venkata Ramanamma executed Ex.A.9 on 07.04.1967, settling her properties in plaint A, B, C and D scheduleproperties, conferring absolute upon the appellant. With that, she ceases tohave any right to convey those very properties, or at least, the plaint Bschedule properties in favour of third parties. The position in law thatobtains, under the circumstances would be that Ex.B.91, Agreement of Sale, doesnot by itself become untenable or illegal, but it becomes enforceable notagainst the original executant, but against the person, who derived title fromthe executant under Ex.A.9. In this process, had she been so advised, the 3rdrespondent ought to have taken steps to get the Sale Deed executed by theappellant herein, who derived title under Ex.A.9. However, ignoring theappellant, she obtained a Sale Deed from Venkata Ramanamma under Ex.B.92. Since Venkata Ramanamma divested herself of the rights vis--vis the plaint B scheduleproperties through Ex.A.9, she has no right or entitlement to execute Ex.B.92.The learned Single Judge did not deal with this aspect in detail, but has simplyupheld Ex.B.92. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Single, in thisregard, cannot be sustained.

One inconsistency has crept into the common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. While answering point No.5, which was in relation to the validityof compromise decree in O.S.No.173 of 1969, the learned Single Judge held thatthe compromise decree cannot be sustained in law. However, obviously, onaccount of the complicated nature of the facts, a different result was indicatedat the end. It has already been mentioned that O.S.No.297 of 1969 was filed bythe 1st respondent, with a prayer to set aside the compromise decree inO.S.No.173 of 1969 and the trial Court decreed O.S.No.297 of 1969. Aggrieved bythe decree in O.S.No.297 of 1969, the 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi filedA.S.No.1251 of 1980. In view of the finding on point No.5, A.S.No.1251 of 1980ought to have been dismissed. However, obviously, by mistake, it was observedthat the said appeal is allowed. This aspect needs to be corrected.

The point is, accordingly, answered.For the foregoing reasons, we allow both the appeals and hold thata) the appellant derived valid legal rights to the extent of 1/4th share in theplaint B schedule properties inO.S.No.230 of 1970 under Ex.A.9, and b) the transfer of that very property in favour of the 3rd respondent throughEx.B.92 is contrary to law.There shall be no order as to costs.The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in both the appeals shall standdisposed of.

The Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Chandra Kumar Appeal Suit No.144 of 2012 Dated 9th August, 2012Judgment: The appellant filed this appeal challenging Order, dated27-01-2012, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, refusing to register the suit filed by him on the ground that the same is barred by limitation . The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance basing on agreement of sale, dated 13-11-2008. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale, the balance amount of Rs.4 lakhs out of the total sale price of Rs.9 lakhs was to be paid within two months from the date of expiry of the limitation of the said agreement of sale. The case of the appellant is that though he had been requesting the respondent to receive the balance sale consideration and register the sale deed in his favour, the respondent did not come forward; that therefore, he got issued a legal notice to the respondent on12-10-2011; that the respondent acknowled…

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable =in VadirajNaggappa Vernekar (deceased by L.Rs) v. Sharad Chand Prabhakar Gogate (supra), it is held as follows: "17. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness underOrder 18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the Court either on its own motion oron an application filed by any of the parties to the suit, but as indicatedhereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae in theevidence of the witness which has already been recorded but to clear anyambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination. Of course,if the evidence on re-examination of a witness has a bearing on the ultimatedecision of the suit, it is always within the discretion of the Trial Court topermit recall of such a witness for re-examination-in-chief with permis…

The 1st respondent herein filed O.S.No.101 of 2011 in the Court of III
Additional District Judge, Tirupati against the appellants and respondents 2 to
5 herein, for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule
property, a hotel at Srikalahasti, Chittoor District. He pleaded that the land
on which the hotel was constructed was owned by the appellants and respondents 2
and 3, and his wife by name Saroja, and all of them gave the property on lease
to M/s. Swarna Restaurant Private Limited, 4th respondent herein, under a
document …