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Edited By Keith Allan and Kasia M. Jaszczolt

This book "fills the unquestionable need for a comprehensive and up-to-date handbook on the fast-developing field of pragmatics" and "includes contributions from many of the principal figures in a wide variety of fields of pragmatic research as well as some up-and-coming pragmatists."

Ishikawa's book is a revised version of his Ph.D. dissertation at theUniversity of Tokyo. It addresses the subject of reference and outlines avariety of Situation Semantics (i.e. a non-model-theoretic semantics; seeBarwise & Perry 1983) which aims to account for Donnellan's distinctionbetween attributive and referential uses of NPs (see Donnellan 1966, 1968),abandonning the view according to which this distinction amounts to thedistinction between general and singular propositions and renouncing thestrong realism of Situation Semantics in favour of an epistemic and"cognitive" approach to reference.

Preface

In defiance of model-theoretic semantics which accounts for naturallanguage meaning in terms of links between utterances and external reality,the aim of Ishikawa's monograph is to outline and defend an alternativeaccount in terms of change in a cognitive agent's information state. Onthis view, reference amounts to the ability of an agent to link charactersthrough different frames of individuation.

1. Introduction

Model-theoretic semantics sees meaning as a bridge between language andreality, reality being conceived in set-theoretic terms as individuals,properties and relations between individuals and being expressed through amathematically formulated model. Semantics in this perspective isessentially truth-conditional and everything which is not belongs topragmatics. This view of meaning strongly implies a link between languageuse and real individuals in the world through reference seen as introducingthese individuals into the propositions expressed. According to Ishikawa,however, this view of reference is flawed in as much as it has more to dowith ontology (a philosophical and metaphysical concern) than withcognition, information states and the communicative potential of languagewhich he views as central to reference. He proposes to outline analternative, non model-theoretic approach to reference, centered onDonnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of NPs,which would also account, in a compositional way, for attitude reports.Ishilawa then proceeds with the examination of different variations onmodels, purporting to show that failure of this or that version ofmodel-semantics is not enough to justify discarding the very notion of amodel-theoretic approach to meaning. Rather one should show that thedivision of labor between semantics and pragmatics is inefficient and thatmodel-theoretic interpretation is not relevant to natural languagesemantics. Finally, he argues that model-theoretic interpretation is notequivalent to meaning, resting his case on the interpretation of deictics,ambiguous proper names and concluding that meaning is not so much contentas a way to reach content.

2. The Referential/Attributive Distinction

Ishikawa begins his discussion of the distinction by outlining the(different) distinction between general or quantified propositions (noindividual in the proposition) and singular propositions (individual(s) inthe proposition), based on the Russell-Strawson discussion of definitedescriptions. He then describes Donnellan's distinction between attributiveand referential uses as a challenge to the descriptions of definitedescriptions of both Russell and Strawson, Russell's analysis failing toaccount for the referential use, while Strawson's fails to account for theattributive use. He notes that, though Donnellan is not entirely expliciton whether his distinction is semantic or pragmatic in nature, there seemsto be a general agreement on equating the attributive use of definitedescriptions with general propositions, while the referential use wouldcorrespond to singular propositions. Under these terms theattributive/referential distinction would amount to the fact that a givenNP is used referentially if a) its descriptive content is not part of whatis asserted, b) it introduces a real individual in the proposition ; it isused attributively otherwise. He then examines several attempts to derivethe distinction through either pragmatic means (a gricean approach in termsof word meaning and speaker's meaning) or semantic means (a scopal approachwhich, however, leads to the postulation of a covert operator or asituation-semantics approach in terms of convergence or divergence betweenthe described situation and the resource situation). All of these howeverdo not detract from the description of the referential/attributivedistinction in terms of singular/general propositions.

3. Scenarios for Definite Descriptions

In this chapter, Ishikawa combines the description of Donnellan'sdistinction in terms of general/singular propositions with Russell'sprinciple which is an epistemic requirement on singular propositions makingthe knowledge of which individual the proposition is about necessary to itsunderstanding. His aim is to show through scenarios that this combinationdoes not yield a convincing analysis of the referential/attributivedistinction. To do this he describes four scenarios involving mainly theinvestigation by Holmes and Watson of Smith's murder, complete with thedefinite description "Smith's murderer", with revision of beliefs, etc. Forreason of space, I refer the reader to Ishikawa's text. From thesescenarios and their analysis, Ishikawa draws what he calls " lessons " :first, knowing who does not imply a referential use ; second, hearer'signorance does not imply attributive use ; third, speaker's ignorance doesnot imply attributive use. Other lessons concern tests of the distinction :inclusion of " whoever it is " or of " must " do not imply attributive use.

4. Further Scenarios

Ishikawa proposes to reject the combination of the singular/generalpropositions distinction with Russell's principle and to keep only thesingular/general distinction. He puts it to the test with furtherscenarios, implying not only definite descriptions but proper names. Thisleads him to the conclusion not only that the singular/general distinctionfails to account for the referential/attributive distinction, but also thatthe direct reference account of proper names should be rejected in ananalysis of natural language meaning.

5. The network theory

Chapter 5, which occupies the main part of the book, is where Ishikawaintroduces and describes his own theory of reference, the Network Theory.His point of departure is a divorce between a theory of linguistic meaning(his choice) and a theory of linguistic meaning as linked to non-linguisticfactors (model-theoretic semantics). The main problem which he sees himselfas having to account for is the fact that a given NP can be understood indifferent ways.Ishikawa begins by outlining a few basic tenets of his theory, among whichthe notion of an individual as a bundle of identifying properties indifferent frames. Referring is thus not reference to an outside individualbut reference to an internal bundle of properties which are believed to beproperties of the same outside individual. His system is based on thenotions of information state (which he sees as roughly equivalent to thenotion of belief state), facts (properties of individuals in differentsituations) and frame of individuation (a group of fact). In a given frameof individuation (or episode), the individuals individuated are roles(which are relative to episodes : one role-one episode). In his view,individuals are uniformities (bundles of roles) across episodes in a giveninformation state.The modelization of an agent's information state advocated by Ishikawa isdone in terms of Situation Theory, a given information state beingconsidered as a model, implying the relativity of truth to informationstates. There are five classes of propositions depending on whether theydescribe facts, episodes, links, existence or quantification.Fact-describing propositions imply situations (s) supporting relations,roles and polarities (i.e. truth-values). Episode-describing propositionsimply an episode (EP) grouping fact-describing propositions.Link-describing propositions imply a link (LINK) between roles, creatingequivalence classes (or nodes) and depending on the agent's belief that theroles all pertain to the same individual. Existence-describing propositionsimply predicating existence (EXISTS) of a set of roles (i.e. an individualexisting in external reality, according to the agent's belief), this set(or node) being obtained through LINK. Quantification-describingpropositions imply a quantificational relation (Q) and types whosesituations and individuals are roles. They are subject to the usualconstraints on quantification. Side by side with the formal description ofhis system, Ishikawa introduces a graphical representation (in standardboxological form, with links represented through nodes and lines betweenspecific roles).Ishikawa then outlines some differences (not trivial ones) between hisNetwork Theory and standard Situation semantics. The main one is thatwhereas Situation Semantics is realistic in that it implies realindividuals, Network Theory merely allows roles, that is perceptions ofindividuals relative to episodes, i.e. cognitive entities. Given thatIshikawa's theory is based on the idea of information states, it is naturalto analyze linguistic interpretation in terms of accommodation as a changeof information states (i.e. a change of models), which, in combination witha version of HPSG, yields a compositional semantics. Ishikawa gives a fewexamples of both lexical entries and semantic interpretations for definiteand indefinite NPs. He points out that given that roles are not equivalentto real individuals, the old familiarity/novelty distinction forindefinite/definite descriptions get a rather different analysis allowingto account both for the novelty of the information without necessarilyimplying the introduction of a new individual for indefinites, whiledefinite descriptions, though their descriptive content must be satisfiedby the role in the pre-update information state, can be linked to a rolewhich does not satisfy it in the post-update information state.Ishikawa then turns to the referential/attributive distinction and notesthat Network Theory shares with Mental Spaces Theory and SituationSemantics the advantage that the descriptive content of a definitedescription and the predicate which is applied to it need not be satisfiedin the same episode (situation or mental space). The difference amongscenarios (described in chapters 3 and 4) can be accounted for through thepresence, absence or change of links between roles in different episodes,thus accounting for the change of beliefs informally described or impliedby the scenarios, or through the addition of new information in a givenepisode, while the EXISTS predication, together with negation, can accountfor sentences such as " Smith was not murdered ". On the whole, thisamounts to a redescription of the referential/attributive distinction interms of the convergence or divergence between the descriptive content ofthe NP and the predicate : if they are predicated of the same role, thenthe definite description is used attributively ; otherwise, it is usedreferentially.Ishikawa finally deals with " knowing who " or the " particular individual" conception. He remarks that it can be accounted for through thenetwork-theoretic notions of nodes and links combined with the (intuitive)notion of trustworthiness. He notes that this is near to the causalanalysis of direct reference through a historical chain.He then turns to plugging what he calls " gaps " between network theory andconventional semantics, i.e. quantification and model-theoreticinterpretation. He begins with quantification, insisting that his mainconcern is to prevent scopal interaction between indexicals, proper namesand quantificational expressions. He gives a quantified example (" Everywoman likes John "), as well as the lexical entry for "every". His analysisof this example requires that every woman role in an episode r has a linkwith a role who likes John in episode s. Regarding model-theoreticinterpretations, Ishikawa remarks that some hard-core model-theoreticsemantics (which he thinks would be philosophers of language rather thanlinguists) could see Network Theory as comparable to DRT. This concern withoutward reality, according to Ishikawa, pertains more to metaphysics thanto linguistics. In his own terms (in bold characters in his book), "Semantics is not metaphysics " (95).6. Attitude ReportsAs Ishikawa points out in the introduction to this chapter, Network Theory,being constructed on " mental terms " (97), should give a straightforwardaccount of attitude reports (restricted here to belief reports, Ishikawa'sconviction being that his account of belief reports can be extended toother attitudes reports). According to him, belief reports are four waysambiguous, between speaker's description and reported speaker's descriptionand between attributive and referential readings, yielding innerreferential (reported speaker's description used in a referential way),inner attributive (reported speaker's description used in an attributiveway), outer referential (speaker's description used in a referential way)and outer attributive (speaker's description used in an attributive way).To deal with belief reports, Ishikawa introduces a "bel(a,k)" relation (inwhich a is a real individual and k a time point), which is recursive inthat it can itself include another belief episode "bel(x,k)".Unsurprisingly, belief is treated as construction and revision of linksbetween roles in different episodes. Ishikawa then turns to the TwinProblem, which is the opposite of Kripke's London problem (see Kripke1979). Here the agent believes, not, as does Pierre in Kripke's puzzle,that one individual is two individuals but that two actually differentindividuals are one and the same. Again, this is treated in terms of thepresence or absence of links between roles in episodes. Finally, Ishikawaexamines the necessity vs. possibility of identity through two examples, "Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great " and "Aristotle might not have been Aristotle ", which have been analyzed,notably by Kripke (1980), as being respectively true and necessarily false.In Ishikawa's theory, they come out respectively as true and false (notnecessarily false), given that the predicative relation can be revised andthat the equative relation implies LINK and that LINK is reflexive.7. Other ApplicationsIshikawa, in chapter 7, applies Network Theory to cleft and pseudo-cleftconstructions, to indices, to the binding of indices and attitudes, and tothe construction of a computational epistemology. This chapter is veryshort and does not give detailed analyses. Briefly, Ishikawa proposes toanalyze clefts in terms of different roles for the descriptive content ofthe NP and the relation described in the VP, while indices (from bindingtheory) could be seen as roles, and binding indices and attitudes woulddepend on a sophisticated analysis of the attitudinal verb. Oncomputational epistemology, Ishikawa suggests that roles linking could belanguage dependant. Network Theory, however, does not take into accountthese discrepancies and could be viewed as an epistemologic theory ofcognitive agents sharing the same temporal and cultural spaces and thusbuilding the same links. This could be extended to phonology, given thatsounds could be analyzed as roles and nodes.8. Concluding RemarksIn this final chapter, Ishikawa defends his analysis against Perry'srealism, against model-theoretic semantics, and against attitude-basedsemantics. His arguments against the first two have already been described.Against attitude-based semantics, he points out that roles in NetworkTheory are modes of identification in the sense of attitude-basedsemantics. He, rather surprisingly, ends his book with a (admittedlylimited) defense of realism, pointing out that Network Theory is a theoryof cognitive manipulation of information, but has no ontologicalimplication whatsoever.

CRITICAL EVALUATIONIshikawa's book should certainly be read by anyone interested in bothreference and attitudes. However, the putative reader should be warned thatthe book is difficult to follow for several reasons : first of all, it israther badly organized: with some information given toward the middle ofthe book when which would be more useful towards the beginning; second,it assumes in the reader a rather thorough knowledge of both situationsemantics, including its formal apparatus (no detailed information is givenabout Ishikawa's formalism and the reader is left to fend for him- orherself, returning to Barwise and Perry (1983) to get through the formalism- the same goes for the HPSG formalism); third, at the same time, the ideasdefended are fairly simple (the notions of roles, linking, etc.) and couldhave been very clearly explained without resorting to the unnecessaryobscurities which, from time to time, Ishikawa resorts to. Thus, the finalimpression is that this could have been a much better book had Ishikawaassimilated, for instance, the lesson of Situation Semantics (see Barwise &Perry 1983), which can be seen as a model of clarity and pedagogy, and hadhe relied less on his reader's complete and detailed knowledge of most offormal semantics for the past thirty to forty years. While I take it for granted that Ishikawa wanted to not only eschew model-theoretic semantics but also any type of semantics which hasany commitment to reality outside of language, it is a puzzle that he choseas his anchor Situation Semantics (which, as he himself acknowledges, is astrongly realistic - though not model-theoretic - approach.) What's more,it is disturbing that his main hypothesis seems to be that language as apart of cognition should be studied entirely apart from reality: in fact,the most interesting question about cognition, language and reality is howit is that cognition and language are so powerful tools for dealing withreality, a question by the way which Barwise and Perry (1983) address in asophisticated and detailed way and of which Ishikawa seems blessedlyunaware. Finally, it is hard to see why a semantics based on mentalrepresentations (which seems to be what Ishikawa has in mind) could notalso be used to relate linguistic use to reality through these mentalrepresentations, relying, for instance on Dretske's concept of informationand on the notion of covariation(see Dretske 1981, 1995). There does notseem to be any contradiction in such a program, however difficult it maybe, and it might be seen as a " more cognitive " approach to language usethan Network Theory with its rejection of external reality as irrelevant tocognition. In other words, a cognitive approach to semantics can hardlydeal only with linguistic phenomena.

Reviewer : Anne Reboul, Research Fellow at CNRS (National Center forScientific Research), France. Ph.D. in Linguistics, Ph.D. in Philosophy,currently working at The Institute of Cognitive Sciences in Lyon, in theLinguistics team. Has written quite a few papers in French and English.Author of Rh\233torique et stylistique de la fiction (1992, Nancy, PUN),co-author of Dictionnaire Encyclop\233dique de Pragmatique (1994, Paris, LeSeuil. English translation in preparation for Basil Blackwell, Oxford), ofLa Pragmatique ajourd'hui (1998, Paris, Le Seuil) and of Pragmatique dudiscours (1998, Paris, Armand Colin). Has been working on reference for thepast twelve years.