The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to
make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of
the time limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon,
that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an
urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of
Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory,
inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice
before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending
the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the
Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr
von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but
that in his opinion all these démarches were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be
delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the
Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into war.
Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "exécution" in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not
weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the
rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.
The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while
declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until
she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me," what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

THE Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the démarche which M.
Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to
undertake the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to
that of Russia at Vienna with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on
Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Gillliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied
that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but
that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any
step at Vienna.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an
extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was
leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the
Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the démarche which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the
Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy
coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with
documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, was not consonant
with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia: it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been deIivered and received full in the face by Servia.

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required of them; they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press
law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other
Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda;
they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an
explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could
accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly
relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that it the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the
Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the
declaration of March 31, 1909.

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are
collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people
has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing
patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the Siegessaül, the Austrian and then the Italian
Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note, reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.

Your telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia
expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his démarche. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded to the ultinlatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

CHAPTER IV.
FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
(JULY 25, 1914), TO THE DECLARATION
OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERVIA (JULY 28, 1914).

No. 50.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting.Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.
Paris, Judy 26, 1914.

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows: -- refusal of Austria to grant the
extension of the time limit asked for by Russia, -- departure of the Austrian Minister from
Belgrade after receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient although it
reached the limit of any possible concession -- order for mobilisation given in Servia whose
Government retired to Kragoujewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian
Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday,
without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di
San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday make any reply to the suggestion of the
Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a
confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna
people still soothe themselves with the illuslon that Russia " will not hold firm." It must not be
forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been
consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for British
mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the
Emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against
Austria was considered; this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if Austria
were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia, and not till after notice had been given by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left
to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes
clear that it is both politicallv and morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed.

In London the German démarche was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express
himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir
Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve
immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers
will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is
unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a démarche at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagouv pretends not to believe that the Austrian action
could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the démarche of his
Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia; he does not
regret it, this démarche having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Getmany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

A TELEGRAPH from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them
that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is
proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after
to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the
situation, the full gravity of which he recognizes. From the general drift of his remarks, I have
carried away the impression that the Italian Government would he willing, in case of war, to
keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent
peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we
could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated
definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead AustIia to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious
business.

" M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British
Government."

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say
that they hope to see the British Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.
Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 54.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 26,1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek
means to bring about a peaceful solution. " Up to the last moment," he declared to me, " I
shall show myself ready to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come to a "frank and loyal
explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum,
article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. " The intention
which inspired this document," he said, " is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the
protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to
which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum,
modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh on the changes to be introduced
into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-oflicial interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the
advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure
and likely to succeed.

M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in the same sense to M.Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable
for mobilization, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the
advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.
While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de
Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the
démarche to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expectinmg, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirseky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localizing the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government although surprised and perhaps
regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to
commence military action.

DUMAINE.

NO. 56.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreig Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.
Paris, July 26, 1914.

The summary of the Sevian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay.
Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two
small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the
determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Ambassador thinks that
there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not
ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised,
to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersbrrgh; the Secretary of
State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the
Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government
would hot have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them
beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in
the grave step taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to
an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, " has
declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandizement nor any attack on
the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and
to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany
feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that Franec will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburgh."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act
which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in
seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her
side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to
avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the
position taken up by Germany " that the question concerned only Austria and Servia," I told
him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other Powers
less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect,
and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at
St. Petersburgh alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful
intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 57.
Note for the Minister.
Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von
Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the Direction Politique, to ask that in order to
avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public
opinion, such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before, and in order to define exactly
the sense of this démarches of the German Govermnent, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following
terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: " During the afternoon
the " German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the
course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarité pacifique), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, every thing is
settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into
conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised
and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no
modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press"
were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating
illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions
which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him
in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their
respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it
did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-
German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that
Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to
raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on
the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the
past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a
position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences
of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise
mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary test of the Austrian note!
What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest
upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note1 and had only approved it after its delivery; she
thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous
and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the
Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it
was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the
effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance at Vienna, by England in a
friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea
of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St.
Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente,
would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that
Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it
appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

---1: Cf. No. 21, p. 153. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

Cf. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page 74, in which Sir M. de
Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states :--

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have Private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

The whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to sea, The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany. German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off
their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that yearning has been given to persons
owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of
the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning
has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

No. 61.
M . Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister f or Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council)and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.
Paris, July 27, 1914.

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic: -- On
Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves
between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that
"Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of
another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences; " the
second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of
the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Servia to
yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at the
impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does
not harbour, 'since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" -- the
third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded, as one might
almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions to
insist on Germany's peaceful intentions. and on her warm desire to co-operate in the
maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase
of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Servia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Servia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Prussia, France, and England, bane by their urgent advice
induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is
alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained
satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.
It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put
forward; by. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the
appeal of Servia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has
formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome: the French,
German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward
Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this
conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir
A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself
favourable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all
probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her
goodwill by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support
his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 62.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna.
Paris, July 27,1914.

After his démarche of yesterday tending to an intervention by France at St.
Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to
the Direction Politique on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a
short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation; he even suggested
the following terms: " During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and
acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation, they examined the means which might
be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared
exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation; that,
however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation
at which the means employed to safeguard peace, had been examined, might be issued if I
approved it.

The note communicated was as follows: -- "The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colourless, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under
pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: " Note well the phrase in
an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere
expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows: -- "The
Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to "be declared to that of St.
Petersburgh, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own; tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence within Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French démarche at St.
Petersburgh would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German démarche at
Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that if as for its object, like his démarche itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France; finally, by
pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia
intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you
can put it to.

The German Ambassador and the Austo-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be
understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to
make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter
should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of
France.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 64.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully
to restraining the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the
Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe
that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that I once again Russia will not
intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of
Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into
the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would snake it clear that she was not merely aiming
at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to
crush a small state. " Then," he added, " a European question would arise, and war would
follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by
England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent
hostilities between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue.
Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia
mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the
same course also, and that then a confliet would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany
would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilizing only on the
Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorized me formally to communicate this limitation
to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers
which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack
at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna
could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he
does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and
Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal to the Powers,
and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of
Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your
Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and
Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of
solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria
and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the
mediation of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have
been stopped on the way.

However, the British proposal for intervention by the Four Powers intimated in my
preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 70.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London
Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal for common
action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburgh, to
stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London
examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.
I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British
Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his démarche in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to
give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh and Belgrade, instructions in the sense
asked for by the British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend
essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a démarche from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian
Government was particularly susceptible when the words " mediation," " intervention," "
conference " were used, and was more willing to admit " friendly advice " and "conversations."

I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same d‚émarche.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a new to
prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a
conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian
Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, formally assured me that he had not any previous knowledge of it.

He knew indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not
suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna,
as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would
fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way:" the Minister replied: " we were not
consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had
accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do,
being convinced that Austria still not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even
at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed
to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment
attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can
determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed
with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his
desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a
conference of the Powers that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of
which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Herr von
Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency. In fact, a
démarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many
modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh the
common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from
the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

I had a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the
démarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to
endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because
that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von.Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which
Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was
the co-operation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace;
that this co-operation could take effect through common démarches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe, that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in
common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria.
I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of
France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of
allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off
an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute "The
one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements
towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. " I have not yet had time," he said. " I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He
protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorreet. "You must then," I replied, " act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

" For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress. I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of
détente had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a
favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress
of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in
Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by
Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew
it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself
with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of
England.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum which
amounted to an indictment of Servia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found
themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and
guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to
that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and
Count Scézsen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the
crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's
requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain
points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished
for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for
the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a
grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was
impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézsen handed to me.

No. 75
Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.
Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the
Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian
Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has
given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and
limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian démarche, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are
without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the
Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in
Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of
the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to
Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.

No. 76.
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
On board the " La France," July 28, 1914.

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Servia to ask for and to the British démarches at Berlin, as well as your
telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which
you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has
provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides,
this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely
approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul
Cambon to inforn him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna
that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British government is making with a
view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested
Powers cannot, for the reasons given above be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. In
proposing to exert it also at Belgrade which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade,
Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the démarche by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers
and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 77.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."
Paris, July 28, 1914.

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris by the German representatives,
of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere
action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which consists in
action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at
Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh, and in a meeting at London of the German, French,
and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a
solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as
must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and
guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Scézsen has given no explanation as
to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilization dating from July
28 appears to be certain.

I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he
had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening
before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would
be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know
them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Herr von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a plan for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian
Government, the object might be attained by other means; the German Government are in a
good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of
conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that
Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He
accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up,
alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no
knowledge of the Austrian note; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria
must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are
aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in
London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by
Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who has
received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the
British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same
démarche; you will adapt your attitude to his.

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues.
The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has telegraphed that M.
Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian
business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, who has
sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Count Szapary had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought
about by direct discussion between St. Petersburgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for
congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.
When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of
a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution
for the present situation, the latter replied " that he had begun pourparlers with the Austrian
Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that however, he had not yet
received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If
direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself
ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a
favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would
be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to
hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the
friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von
Jagolw's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs
replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between
St. Petersburgh and Vienna. Sir E. Grey, has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to
suspend his démarche for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian
Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after
the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side
might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue
from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this
state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St.
Petersburgh enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for
asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day l gave my support to the démarche made by my British colleague with the
Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was
impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the
Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the
British suggestion to procure its realization. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which
might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were in progress, and that from now on he
expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over
with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of
Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to
them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a démarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British
Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of
their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic démarche at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any démarche at Vienna, Sir Edvrard Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how
diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our
engagements towards our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 82.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon.
The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to
me, " Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the
same impression of pessimism.

Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it
is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers as well as the
continuation of the direct discusslons between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.
It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of
Germany "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, inasmuch a dispute
between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most
disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in
order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she
supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been
thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERVIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav
propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian
intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to
develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial
questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the
question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and
for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The
German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal
assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and
that she will respect the integrity of Servia; in these circumstances the danger of-war can only
come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these
circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St.
I'etersburgh alone. This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna,
has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured
to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburgh; it has been also expounded
in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburgh
Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by
associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the requirements of the
Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action
must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to
be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands; that they
refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to
be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a
declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting
that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four
Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and
while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like
to keep St. Petersburgh in play with the illusion of an entente which might result from direct
conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet, whose desire
to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the
British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr
von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from
supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian
Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Servia,
under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that
no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern
Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in
the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 86.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.

I am now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand " with grounded arms " ready to take peaceful or warlike
action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden
intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues
share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to
me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defense of the
neutrality of the country.

I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manœuvres the non-commissioned officers
and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the
harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had
already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry
divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and
Budapest have already been transported Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called
together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to
meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a
general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is
certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

No. 91.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is
hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilization
which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilize will be despatched
to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.
In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the
four Powers in London; farther, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given
to the discussions, and grill support all British efforts in favour of peace

I asked the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a déetente, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed
towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply.
The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be
known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria
and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not
failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what
he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it
was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a
document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain
sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of
promises made to her, a supervision which Servia refused this, in the eyes of the Secretary of
State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Servia, as she wished to remain
independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International
Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for
instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among
other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of
controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply
of Servia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburgh to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think
that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors.
He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining
themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to
come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose
the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for
peace and of the efforts he was snaking to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia
was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would
be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply
of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain
direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such
conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very
difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps on the
Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.
Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all
attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburgh by MM. Sazonof
and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting
punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the confiict.

The following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador:

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the
Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of
stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to
receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no
way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication will be
made at St. Petersburgh.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen,
the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of
Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of
discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps
allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence
at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any
pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Glermany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to
London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Servia put
an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked
England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the
immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria
time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the
impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that
Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her.
The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting and considers that
England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to
exercising pressure on Vienna.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilization which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some materiel advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures. In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not
seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent British intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the
British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the
Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier have in
fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburgh for the maintenance of peace. I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Govermnent the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediatelv. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilization of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he
had little hope of a peaceful solution.

The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. By Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares
that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally
assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest
herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

No. 100.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.
The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilize.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by
the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that
eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilized.

The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the
Russian Government this very night to order the mobilization of the thirteen army corps which
are to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 101.
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and London.
Paris, July 30, 1914.

M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilize the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defense which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining.peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI

No. 102.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 30,1914.

M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilization should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military preeaution so that there shou.ld be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès, M.
Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the
decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same
impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor
William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation. He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 103.
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia:

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria."

M. Sazonof added: " The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my
mind. By intervening at St. Petersburgh while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is
only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before
Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am
going to make a new proposal to you in his name:

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."

Counts Pourtalès promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a
logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in
order to stop the conflict.

In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his emlntly, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great imporance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually
acceptable solutions.

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilization taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed that pourparlers should be resumed at-St. Petersburgh between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary; they had only been interrupted owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be autholised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which would be acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localizing the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilization arrived at Vienna.

DUMAlNE.

No. 105.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with
the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, a new Special edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from various causes (the declaration of Great
Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the
Tsar and William II) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilization should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilization, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilization may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the Lokal Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilization which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilization first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 106.
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.
Paris, July 30, 1914.

Please inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a
strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the
Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility
for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz heqn pushed up to the frontier,
but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such
as Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defenses (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction
of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday,
the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking
similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in
France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservist tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilization. None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are
forbidden to cross the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 107.
M. Jules-Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, July 30, 1914.

The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtalès
had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian
understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus
showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna

JULES CAMBON.

No. 108.
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, July 30,1914.

Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 109.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, July 30,1914.

In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him to draw up himself the formula; for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilization, and this might cause as a countermeasure complete Russian mobilization and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and " that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 110.
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, July 31, 1914.

At the beginning of our conversation to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it leas necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to
be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied. I Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a
meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in order to consider it. Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.