Graphic Communications International Union, Local 577-M (hereinafter referred to
as
the
Union) and S & M Rotogravure Service, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)
requested that
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission assign Raleigh Jones, an arbitrator on its
staff, to
hear and decide a dispute concerning the suspension and discharge of Steve Brycki. Hearing
was held
on January 19 and 25, 1999, in Brookfield, Wisconsin, at which time the parties presented
such
testimony, exhibits and other evidence as was relevant to the grievance. The hearing was
transcribed.
After the hearing, the parties filed briefs and reply briefs, whereupon the record was closed
on April
7, 1999. Having considered the evidence, the arguments of the parties, the applicable
provisions of
the contract, and the record as a whole, the arbitrator makes the following Award.

5881

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To maximize the ability of the parties we serve to utilize the Internet and
computer
software to research decisions and arbitration awards issued by the Commission and its staff,
footnote text is found in the body of this decision.

ISSUES

The parties stipulated to the following issues:

1. Was the three-day disciplinary layoff of Steve
Brycki on October 17, 1997 for just cause? If
not, what is the appropriate remedy?

2. Was the discharge of Steve
Brycki on June 26, 1998 for just cause? If not, what is the
appropriate remedy?

11.1 An employee
may be laid off, for an extended period of time, subject to recall as stated below. No
employee may be disciplined or discharged except for just cause. Before the discharge of a
shop delegate, officer, or
member of the Executive Board of the Local, the Employer must notify the Union of its
intention and shall give the
Union a reasonable opportunity to confer with the Employer and to call in the International
for this purpose. It shall
be the responsibility of the Union to notify the Employer employing such official as
described above. In the event of
a discharge of an employee, the Employer shall, no later than the second working day,
furnish reason for such
discharge in writing to the Union.

FACTS

The Company supplies electronically engraved cylinders to the packaging industry.
The
Union is the exclusive bargaining representative for some of the Company's employes. The
position
of floor helper is excluded from the bargaining unit. Grievant Steve Brycki, a 22-year
employe of the
Company, was in the bargaining unit. This grievance concerns Brycki's suspension and
subsequent
discharge.

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Brycki often talked about his personal life at work. Specifically, he boasted to his
co-workers about his
drinking exploits, domestic disputes, bar fights and jail time. George Strobl was one
employe who heard many of
Brycki's war stories.

Both the suspension and the subsequent discharge emanate from an incident which
occurred October 15, 1997.

Brycki worked the first shift that day. After the shift ended, he and another first shift
employe, floor helper
Wayne Weber, went to Brycki's house. At 4:45 p.m., the two men went to a bar, where
they stayed for about the next
five hours. During that period, each man consumed between four and six beers.

Around 9:30 p.m., the two men decided to return to the Company to get Brycki's
truck from the Company's
parking lot. There is no work rule which prohibits employes from returning to the
Company's premises after their shift
ends. Other employes have done so.

When Brycki and Weber returned to the Company's facility at 9:45 p.m., both went
inside to use the restroom.
While they were inside the plant, Brycki saw second shift superintendent George Strobl and
had an extended verbal
exchange with him. Before the content of their verbal exchange is reviewed, the following
background is pertinent
for context.

Although Strobl is a foreman, he is in the bargaining unit. He is not empowered to
hire, fire or discipline
employes. Strobl and Brycki have known each other for many years. Their relationship is
not easy to categorize. At
times, the two men have been friends, with Strobl doing favors for Brycki and getting/selling
him various items. At
other times, there have been hard feelings between the two men. When the latter occurred,
their language toward each
other was earthy and profane. The following incident illustrates both of the foregoing.

In early October, 1997, Brycki asked Strobl to get him some leather pieces for a
longbow he (Brycki) was
working on. Strobl indicated he would do this favor for Brycki. The leather pieces in
question turned out to be difficult
to find, but Strobl eventually found them and purchased them. After doing so, he brought
the leather pieces into work,
along with the receipt, and gave them to Brycki expecting to be reimbursed for same.
Brycki however refused to accept
the leather pieces or pay Strobl for them because Brycki thought the pieces cost too much.
This upset Strobl who
thought Brycki should reimburse him for the leather pieces. Thereafter, Strobl would not let
the matter fade away, but
raised it repeatedly with Brycki. When he did, Brycki would say "fuck you", to which
Strobl would respond in kind.
Their mutual swearing at each other was heard by several employes.

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The focus now shifts back to the verbal exchange which occurred on October 15,
1997. When Strobl saw
Brycki and Weber in the building about 9:50 p.m., he asked them what they were doing
there, to which one of them
replied "we came to check on you." Brycki and Weber then went into a work area in the
plating department where
they sat on cylinders and engaged in boisterous banter. After watching and listening to them
for awhile, Strobl
concluded that the two men were intoxicated. He based this conclusion on their slurred
speech, their glazed eyes and
their general appearance. Additionally, Strobl had seen Brycki intoxicated once before.
Strobl then told the two men
that he thought "it would be a good idea if they left", to which Brycki responded "fuck you;
I don't have to leave; you
can't make me leave." Strobl then said "I think you should leave" whereupon Brycki
repeated the same comments he
had previously made. Strobl then told the two men "you drunks should get the fuck out of
here." Strobl's comments
did not cause Brycki and Weber to move; they stayed where they were in the plating
department. Strobl then told the
two men that if they did not leave (the premises), he (Strobl) would call his supervisor and
report it. Brycki responded
to this by again repeating the same comments he had previously made to Strobl (i.e. "fuck
you. . . "). Strobl then went
into his office which was nearby and called Tony Alioto at home. Alioto is the engraving
superintendent and is
Strobl's immediate supervisor. Alioto is in the bargaining unit. When Alioto got on the
phone, Strobl told him that
Brycki was in the building; that he (Strobl) thought Brycki was intoxicated; that he had told
Brycki to leave; and that
Brycki refused to leave the building. Brycki then went into Strobl's office and talked to
Alioto on the phone, while
Strobl left his office. Alioto told Brycki to quit arguing with Strobl and leave the building,
to which Brycki responded
with unspecified loud profane replies. Both Strobl and Alioto then heard a loud clunk which
turned out to be the phone
receiver being slammed by Brycki on the desk. Brycki then walked out of Strobl's office
and said something to him.
What Brycki said is disputed.

Strobl testified Brycki said: "Fuck you; I don't have to leave; Come on, I'll take you
outside and beat the shit
out of you." Alioto, who was still on the phone line, testified he heard Brycki make this
statement/threat to Strobl.
Alan Carlsen, who was standing nearby, also testified he heard Brycki make this
statement/threat to Strobl. Wayne
Weber and Jim Kotlewski testified that Brycki did not threaten Strobl.

Strobl then walked into his office, picked up the phone, and talked with Alioto some
more. Alioto told Strobl
that if Brycki did not leave the premises, he should call the police. This ended the phone
call. After Strobl hung up
the phone, he yelled at Brycki "get out of here you drunk and take that little fag out of
here." Strobl meant the phrase
"little fag" to refer to Weber, who was still with Brycki. Weber had previously had some
unspecified run-ins with
Strobl, after which Weber had "mooned" Strobl. Brycki and Weber then left the building.

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After Brycki and Weber left the building, they went out to the parking lot and
smoked
cigarettes. While they were in the parking lot smoking, they were joined by two other
employes:
Carlsen and Kotlewski. Both are floor persons. Either Brycki or Weber told Carlsen they
had been
out drinking that evening. Carlsen testified that while he was there, Brycki urinated in a
cigarette
ashtray which is near a building entrance, and on the building wall. Weber and Kotlewski
testified
at the hearing they were with Brycki the entire time he (Brycki) was outside, and he (Brycki)
did not
urinate outside.

Brycki and Weber then went back inside the building. Once inside, Brycki searched
for and located Strobl.
After finding him, Brycki immediately resumed taunting Strobl. Strobl responded to
Brycki's taunting by saying "leave
the building or I'll call the police." Strobl repeated this phrase to Brycki five to ten times
(five times according to
Weber and eight to ten times according to Strobl).

Brycki and Weber left the building a second time about 10:10 p.m.

The second shift ended at 10:15 p.m. When it ended, Strobl and two other employes
left the building together
to walk to their cars because they did not know if Brycki was still in the parking lot. He
was not.

The next day, October 16, 1997, Company Vice-President Peter Gross learned about
the previous night's
incident from Carmen Alioto, the brother of Tony, who is also a supervisor at the Company.
Carmen Alioto is Brycki's
supervisor.

Gross then interviewed Strobl and Alioto about the previous night's incident. Both
told Gross that Brycki had
refused to leave the plant after Strobl told him to do so, and that Brycki had threatened to
beat Strobl. Gross told both
men to prepare a written statement about it, which both did that same day. Strobl's
statement says in pertinent part
that after he told Brycki to leave, Brycki threatened him saying "come outside and he would
take care of me, etc."
Alioto's statement says in pertinent part that Brycki threatened Strobl, but did not identify
what the threat was. Several
weeks later, Alioto wrote up another written statement which says in pertinent part that
Brycki's threat to Strobl was
as follows: "Why don't you punch out (time clock) and go outside so I can beat the crap out
of you?"

That same day (October 16), Company President Paul Peterson interviewed Rollie
Noltise, an employe who
was referenced in Strobl's written statement. Noltise told Peterson that it looked to him like
Weber and Brycki had
been drinking, but he knew nothing else about the incident. Peterson also talked to employe
Bob Lewinski, who told
Peterson he heard loud voices the night of October 15, but nothing specific. Peterson also
interviewed employe Alan
Carlsen. Carlsen told Peterson that Weber and Brycki were drunk; that Strobl had asked
them to leave the premises;
that they had refused to do so; and that Strobl and Brycki had argued loudly.

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The next day, October 17, 1997, Gross and Peterson held a meeting with Weber
about the events which
occurred the evening of October 15. When Weber was asked what happened, he replied that
he and Brycki came into
the building that night and that Strobl told them to leave. Peterson asked Weber if he and
Brycki had been drinking,
and Weber admitted that they had. Weber was then shown a copy of Strobl's written
statement. After he reviewed
it, Weber told Gross and Peterson that Strobl's statement was accurate. Peterson then asked
Weber if he would sign
it, and he responded in the affirmative. Weber then wrote: "I read the above statement and
is all correct in what
happened" and signed his name. At the end of this five-minute meeting, Peterson suspended
Weber for one day for
his involvement in the October 15 incident.

After talking to Weber and giving him a one-day suspension, Gross and Peterson
called Brycki into the
Company's offices that same afternoon. At the start of the meeting, Brycki asked for Donn
Koglin to be present during
the interview. Koglin was the union steward at the time and Brycki was a former steward.
Peterson denied the request.
In doing so, he told Brycki that Koglin was not in the plant because he had gone home for
the rest of the day. When
Peterson denied Brycki's request for Koglin to be present, he (Peterson) was unaware of
Brycki's right to union
representation under the Weingarten decision. After Peterson refused Brycki's request to
have Koglin present,
Peterson asked Brycki for his account of what happened the evening of October 15. Brycki
responded by going into
detail about the leather incident which had occurred with Strobl earlier in the month.
Peterson viewed the leather
matter as unrelated to the events of October 15, and kept trying to get Brycki to focus on just
the events of October 15.
Brycki would not do so. During the meeting, Peterson asked Brycki if he was drunk that
night, to which Brycki
responded that he had had a few beers, but was not drunk. Peterson also asked Brycki if he
had stayed in the plant after
being asked by Strobl to leave, but Brycki would not reply. This meeting lasted about 10 to
15 minutes. Peterson did
not get any new information from Brycki during this interview. At the end of the meeting,
Peterson suspended Brycki
for three days for his involvement in the October 15 incident. The suspension letter read as
follows:

October 17, 1997

TO: Steve Brycki

FROM: Paul Peterson

RE: Disciplinary Action

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An incident that occurred Wednesday night October 15, 1997 has
been brought to my attention by our second shift
superintendent George Strobl and our engraving superintendent Tony Alioto.

The specifics of the incident are detailed in
the attached written statements from the two superintendents involved.

One of the basic responsibilities of any
company is to provide and maintain a safe working environment for all
of it's employees. The threatening nature of your misconduct, your apparent intoxicated
state and total disregard of
company authority while on company premises has prompted me to take disciplinary action.

The severity of this situation, coupled with
previous warnings for behavioral related problems, (reference attached
copies of written reprimands of 1-13-94 and 9-25-96) has caused the company to take the
following action:

1. Effective 10-17-97,
you are suspended from work without pay, until Thursday, 10-23-97 when you are to report
for work at 7:30 a.m. Thursday, first shift.

2. Effective 10-17-97,
you will not be allowed on the company's premises on your non working hours
(except for arrival and departure of your shift of work) without written permission from
company
management.

Any future misconduct, including being
found on company premises on non working hours, will be considered
just cause for immediate dismissal.

cc: Local 577-M

Mr. Chris Yatchek

Four documents were attached to this letter: 1) Strobl's written
account of the incident; 2) Alioto's written account
of the incident; 3) a written reprimand dated September 25, 1996 dealing with attendance;
and 4) a written reprimand
dated January 13, 1994 dealing with horseplay.

Brycki subsequently grieved his suspension. After the grievance was filed, union
steward
Koglin advised Brycki to obtain written statements from co-workers concerning the events of
October 15. Brycki did so. Over the course of the next week, he obtained written

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statements from four co-workers. The employes' statements, and how they were
obtained, will now be reviewed.

On October 16, Brycki called Al Carlsen and asked him if he would write up a
statement about the October
15 incident. Carlsen said he would. The two men then agreed to meet at a certain bar
where Carlsen was to write up
his statement. There was a miscommunication between them concerning when this was to
happen: Carlsen showed
up at the bar that night (October 16), while Brycki showed up at the bar the next night
(October 17). Since they went
to the bar on different nights, they missed each other. On October 18, Pam Brycki, Steve's
wife, looked up Carlsen's
phone number in the phone book and called the number. Carlsen was not at home, but his
brother was, and he gave
her directions to their house. Both Steve and Pam Brycki then drove over to Carlsen's house
about 3:30 p.m. They
arrived at Carlsen's house at the same time Carlsen did. Steve Brycki then asked Carlsen if
he could go write up his
statement, to which Carlsen replied in the affirmative. Carlsen then got into the truck being
driven by Pam Brycki and
the three of them rode together to a nearby bar.

At the bar, they talked and drank beer. The Bryckis had two beers each and Carlsen
had three. The Bryckis
paid for the beer.

Carlson and Pam Brycki were the only witnesses who testified about what happened
at the bar, and their
recollections about what Steve Brycki said differ.

Carlsen testified that Steve Brycki told him that writing a statement on his behalf
would be a good way to get
into the union and show the union members. Carlsen was interested in getting a union
(bargaining unit) position and
he took this statement as a promise to get him a union (bargaining unit) position. Carlsen
initially testified that Brycki
then promised to pay or "take care of" the Union's $100 initiation fee, but later he recanted
that and said Brycki never
promised to pay it (i.e. the $100 initiation fee).

Pam Brycki testified that her husband made no threats or inducements to get Carlsen
to write his statement.
She specifically disputed Carlsen's testimony that her husband promised to get him into the
Union and pay the Union's
$100 initiation fee. She testified that she was the one who raised the matter of Carlsen's
being included in the
bargaining unit, and if the Union's $100 initiation fee was mentioned at all, it would have
been by her.

After the discussion just referenced was finished, Carlson began to write up his
statement.
As he did so, Steve Brycki sat next to him and looked over his shoulder as he wrote. As
Carlsen
wrote his statement, Brycki suggested several changes. One change, which both Carlsen and
Pam
Brycki agree on, was to start the statement by recounting the leather incident; namely, that
Strobl was
upset with Brycki for that and that Strobl verbally harassed

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Brycki for failing to pay for the leather. Another change, which both Carlsen and Pam
Brycki agree on, was to identify
Weber as the recipient of Strobl's "fag" remark. Carlsen testified that another change was to
add the comment that
Strobl "has a bug up his ass." Carlsen incorporated all three suggestions into his draft. The
rough draft was then
shown to Pam Brycki who reviewed it. Carlsen then rewrote his statement on a separate
piece of paper. His original
draft statement was destroyed. Carlsen testified that when they left the bar, Steve Brycki
told him not to tell anybody
about it.

Carlsen's one-page statement says in pertinent part: 1) that Strobl was upset with
Brycki over the leather
incident; 2) that on October 15, Strobl told Brycki "you drunks get the fuck out of here". .
.[and] "take that fag with
you"; 3) that Brycki left the plant after talking on the phone with Tony Alioto; 4) that there
were "no threats made.
. . to George [Strobl] from Steve [Brycki]"; and 5) that Strobl "has a bug up his ass."

Sometime in the week after October 17 (the date is not specified in the record),
Brycki called Weber and asked
him if he would write up a statement about the October 15 incident. Weber said that he
would. Weber and Brycki then
met at a nearby bowling alley and Weber wrote a one-page handwritten statement. They
each had one beer while
Weber was writing the statement. This statement says in pertinent part: 1) that he and
Brycki had five beers that night
before going back to the plant but "were not drunk"; 2) that Strobl told them: "get out you
drunks and take that little
fucking fag too"; and 3) that Brycki never threatened Strobl.

On October 19, Brycki called Jim Kotlewski and asked him if he would write up a
"vague" statement about
the October 15 incident. Kotlewski said that he would. The record does not indicate where
this statement was written
and whether Brycki was with Kotlewski when he (Kotlewski) wrote his statement.
Kotlewski's one-page handwritten
statement says in pertinent part: 1) that neither Brycki nor Weber was intoxicated; 2) that he
did not witness Brycki
make any threats towards Strobl; and 3) that Strobl told Brycki "get the fuck out of here and
take that fag with you."

On October 19, Brycki wrote up his own statement about the October 15 incident.
The three-page handwritten
statement begins by recounting the leather incident with Strobl and that Strobl was angry with
him (Brycki) afterwards
and verbally harassed him for failing to pay for the leather. With regard to the October 15
incident, the statement says
in pertinent part: 1) that before he returned to the plant, he and Weber had four to five beers
over a five and one-half
hour period; 2) that when he walked into the plant he said "hi" to Strobl who responded by
saying "get the fuck out
of here you fucking drunks, and take that fucking fag with you"; 3) that he left the plant
after Tony Alioto told him
to leave in a phone call; and 4) that he denies threatening Strobl.

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On November 18, Steve Uhrman prepared a written statement at Brycki's request.
The record does not
indicate where this statement was written or whether Brycki was with Uhrman when he
(Uhrman) wrote his statement.
Uhrman's two-page handwritten statement does not deal with the October 15 incident at all.
Instead, it deals
exclusively with the leather incident which occurred in early October, 1997. The statement
says in pertinent part that
Strobl was upset over Brycki's failure to pay him for the leather pieces he bought for Brycki.

After Brycki's suspension grievance was filed, union representatives attempted
without
success for months to set up a meeting with Peterson to discuss same. Peterson
acknowledged at the
hearing that union representatives "tried like the dickens" to set up a meeting with him, but
he was
unavailable for months because he was immersed in pressing business matters. After
numerous
attempts by the Union to schedule such a meeting, one was eventually scheduled in March,
1998 ­
five months after the grievance was filed.

The grievance meeting was held March 24, 1998. At this meeting, Union officials
gave
Company officials the written statements Brycki had obtained from Carlsen, Weber,
Kotlewski and
Uhrman, plus Brycki's own written statement concerning the events of October 15,
1997.

During the meeting, several employes were called in and questioned. Weber was one
of them.
He was asked whether the written statement he had given to Brycki was true, and he replied
that it
was. An unidentified Company official told Weber that his written statement was
inconsistent with
what he had previously told Company officials, and asked why. Weber did not respond.

Carlsen was then called into the meeting. He was asked whether the written
statement he had
given to Brycki was true, and he replied that it was. Carlsen was also asked whether he was
intimidated or threatened by Brycki. Several witnesses (Alioto, Kotlewski and Koglin)
testified that
Carlsen answered this question by stating that he was not threatened by Brycki, by that he
did feel
threatened by Strobl. Other witnesses and Carlsen himself did not remember him (i.e.
Carlsen)
making this statement about feeling threatened by Strobl. Carlsen was also asked whether he
heard
Brycki threaten Strobl on October 15, to which he (Carlsen) replied in the negative. Carlsen
then left
the meeting.

Tony Alioto left the grievance meeting while it was still in progress. As he was
walking out
of the building to go to an appointment, he saw Carlsen and briefly spoke with him. Alioto
told
Carlsen that he was flabbergasted that Carlsen didn't hear Brycki make any threats to Strobl
that
night. He then asked Carlsen if he (Carlsen) was telling the truth. Carlsen replied that he
couldn't
tell the truth at the meeting because Brycki was in the room,

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and he was intimidated by Brycki. Alioto responded by telling Carlsen that he should
go back to the
(ongoing grievance) meeting and tell them that. Carlsen did not return to the grievance
meeting.

An hour after the grievance meeting ended, Strobl called Carlsen into his office.
Strobl began
by telling Carlsen that was said would "stay in the room". Strobl then told Carlsen that he
couldn't
believe that Carlsen felt threatened by him. Strobl then told Carlsen that it struck him as
unusual that
his and Brycki's statements both contain the following identical phrase: "take that fag with
you,
which was Wayne Weber." Carlsen responded to this by telling Strobl that Brycki had taken
him to
a bar and made him write up a false statement. The meeting ended with Strobl telling
Carlsen to tell
his story to Peter Gross.

Either Alioto or Strobl or both told Gross what Carlsen had told him/them following
the
grievance meeting. The next day, March 25, Gross approached Carlsen at work and asked
him about
the October 15 incident and the written statement he had supplied concerning same. With
regard to
the October 15 incident, Carlsen told Gross that that night, Brycki urinated in the parking
lot. With
regard to his written statement, Carlsen told Gross that Brycki had made him write up a false
statement. Gross responded by telling Carlsen to write up a second statement. Carlsen
subsequently
did. That written statement will be reviewed later.

Shortly thereafter, Gross approached Weber at work and asked him if Brycki had
urinated in
the parking lot on the evening of October 15. Weber replied in the affirmative.

On April 3, 1998, Union Representative Gene Holt wrote Petersen and inquired
whether he
(Petersen) had changed his position concerning Brycki's suspension. On April 7, Petersen
responded
in writing that "we have reviewed the material presented at our last meeting, and stand by
our
decision regarding the disciplinary action taken as a result of the October 15, 1997 incident."

On either April 16 or 17, 1998, Carlsen drafted a second written statement. He put
both dates
on this statement. He wrote this statement at his home. No one was with him when he
wrote it. The
first page of this handwritten statement addressed what happened the night of October 15,
1997. It
says in pertinent part: 1) that when Brycki and Weber came into the plant that night, Strobl
asked him
[Brycki] to leave; 2) that Brycki refused to do so and started to argue with Strobl; 3) that
Strobl then
called Tony Alioto; 4) that Brycki then told Strobl "to punch out so he can beat the shit out
of him";
5) that Carlsen then went outside with them [Brycki and Weber] for a cigarette; 6) that while
outside,
Brycki told him that they had been drinking before they came back to the plant; 7) that
Carlsen saw
Brycki "piss on the building and on Bob's car"; 8) that Brycki then came back inside the
building and
argued more with Strobl; and 9) that Brycki then went outside again and left the premises.
The
second page

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of this statement addressed what happened after Brycki asked him to write up a
statement. It says
in pertinent part: 1) that Brycki called him and asked him to write up a statement for him; 2)
that
Brycki later came to his house without permission and took him to a bar; 3) that at the bar
they had
a few drinks; 4) that Brycki told him "if I write a statement I could get in the Union"; 5) that
Brycki
told him that after he [Carlsen] wrote up his statement, "he [Brycki] would send me some
forms to
fill out and it would cost me $100.00 to get in"; 6) that after he wrote the statement, he
never got any
of the forms about joining the union; 7) that at the [March 24, 1998] grievance meeting, he
said that
his [October 18, 1997] written statement was the truth; 8) that when he said that, "he felt a
little
nervous with Steve in there so I didn't want to say much"; 9) that later "I had a nice talk
with George
and I told him that the statement I wrote for Steve was not the truth"; and 10) that "this
statement
I wrote is what really happened". Carlsen testified that no one in management threatened
him to
make this statement, or told him what to say in it.

After Carlsen wrote this statement, nothing pertinent to this case happened for two
months.

Around June 15, 1998, Petersen told Union President Chris Yatchak that he
had gotten some
additional facts about the October 15, 1997 incident and subsequent events and that he
wanted to
interview Brycki about them. A meeting was subsequently arranged for that purpose.

This meeting was held June 24, 1998. Those present at that meeting were Peterson,
Gross,
Brycki, Yatchak and Koglin. In this meeting, Brycki was asked about two dozen questions.
These
were yes/no questions. The pertinent questions and answers are as follows. Brycki was
asked if he
still stood by his written statement concerning the events of October 15, 1997. He responded
in the
affirmative. Brycki was also asked whether he had urinated on the building, on a car, or on
Bob's
car. He responded in the negative. Brycki was also asked whether he had threatened
Carlsen,
Kotlewski or Weber. He responded in the negative. Brycki was also asked whether he had
promised
Carlsen, Kotlewski or Weber anything for their statements. He responded in the negative.
Brycki
was also asked if he offered to get Carlsen a union job. He responded in the negative.
There was
little discussion of any of Brycki's answers. For the most part, various accusations were
made against
him, and he denied them. After Brycki had responded to the Company's questions,
Company officials
provided Union officials with a copy of Carlsen's second statement (i.e. the one dated
April 16 and
17, 1998). This was the first time Union officials had seen this statement. An unnamed
union official
asked if Carlsen had been coerced by anyone from the Company into giving the second
statement,
and Peterson answered in the negative. The Company then produced a document entitled
"Last
Chance Agreement". This document provided that Brycki would continue to have
employment with
the Company but only under certain conditions. Brycki was given the choice of signing this
document
or being terminated. Brycki refused to sign the

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document. Company officials then indicated that they felt Brycki had lied when he
responded to the
questions which had just been asked of him, and that, coupled with the reasons listed in the
Last
Chance Agreement (i.e. the urination and the threat to another employe), were dischargeable
offenses.
The meeting ended with Brycki being suspended and being told that unless he agreed to the
Last
Chance Agreement, he would be terminated. When Brycki and the Union rejected the terms
of the
Last Chance Agreement, the discharge took effect.

On June 26, 1998, Gross wrote Yatchak a letter which provides in pertinent part:

At our last meeting on Wednesday, June 24, 1998 and for reasons
as outlined in the "Last Chance
Agreement" (copy enclosed) and alternately for not telling the truth, Steven Brycki is to be
considered suspended until 3:00 PM July 1, 1998 as agreed to or unless he or the Union
responds to
the offer of a "Last Chance Agreement". If there is no response from Mr. Brycki or the
Union within
this time frame, S&M will consider Mr. Brycki's employment terminated for each of
the above
reasons.

Paragraph 2 of the Last Chance Agreement referenced above states as follows:

Further investigation has revealed that Brycki committed another
offense on October 15, 1997
for which he has not yet been disciplined, and has further revealed that Brycki improperly
induced
an employee to give a false statement to S&M in connection with the events of October
15, 1997.

. . .

Brycki's suspension and discharge were ultimately appealed to arbitration.

Brycki did not testify at the hearing.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

Union

The Union's position is that the Company did not have just cause to suspend and later
discharge the grievant. In its view, the record evidence does not support the charges made
against
Brycki. It also asserts that the Company failed to provide Brycki with basic due process.

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The Union makes the following arguments with regard to the suspension. First, with
regard
to the merits, it notes at the outset that Brycki's conduct was not, in its words, "laudatory".
Specifically, it acknowledges that he came back to the shop that night after he had been
drinking beer;
that he then had an argument with Strobl wherein he used obscenities; and that he originally
refused
to leave the premises after Strobl had told him to leave.

That said, the Union avers that Brycki did not threaten Strobl that night as he is
charged with
doing. To support this premise, it cites the following: first, the testimony of Weber and
Kotlewski
that Brycki did not threaten Strobl and second, Brycki's denial in his written statement that
he
threatened Strobl. In the Union's view, the foregoing should be sufficient to refute this
charge against
Brycki.

The Union essentially argues in the alternative that even if Brycki threatened Strobl
that night,
Brycki nevertheless has some valid defenses which should excuse his actions. The Union's
first
defense is that Brycki did not violate any Company work rule by returning to the plant that
night.
The Union's second defense is that the incident was "to a large extent" Strobl's fault because
Strobl
"precipitated the encounter by his belligerent attitude and crude remarks." The Union's third
defense
is that the Company bears the responsibility for the October 15, 1997 incident because of its
lax
practices (specifically that the Company tolerated other employes having arguments and using
obscenities at the plant). As the Union sees it, Brycki should not be made the scapegoat for
an
incident which would not have occurred but for Strobl's ineptness and hostility.

Next, the Union raises several due process arguments which it believes should result
in the
suspension being overturned.

The first is that the Company violated Brycki's Weingarten rights when they
interviewed
him on October 17, 1997 without a union representative being present. The Union notes that
at that
meeting, Brycki specifically asked for union steward Koglin to be present, and that request
was flat
out denied. The Union avers that the suspension should be set aside on that basis alone.

The Union's second due process argument is that the Company failed to fulfill its
obligation
to conduct an adequate investigation before it assessed punishment. According to the Union,
the
Company's investigation of the October 15 incident was a sham and unfair from its outset
because
the Company made little effort to check with employe witnesses and simply took the word of
Company supervisors Strobl and Alioto.

Attention is now turned to the grievant's discharge. The Union avers that all three
charges
against the grievant are rubbish which are not supported by credible record evidence.

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First, with regard to the charge that Brycki improperly induced Carlson's written
statement,
the Union notes that this charge is based on the testimony of just one witness ­
Carlsen. According
to the Union, Carlsen demonstrated at the hearing that he has no regard for the truth, and is
incapable
of telling same. It asserts there are numerous inconsistencies in Carlsen's testimony on this
point and
that he changed his story several times. Aside from that, the Union contends that Carlsen's
testimony
was rebutted by Pam Brycki who testified that Steve Brycki did not threaten Carlsen, did not
induce
Carlsen to give a false statement, and did not promise to get Carlsen into the union or pay
his union
initiation fee. The Union characterizes Pam Brycki as a reliable and credible witness.

Second, with regard to the urinating charge, the Union notes that the only evidence
supplied
at the hearing to support this charge again came from Carlsen. The Union calls his
credibility
"nonexistent" and "worthless" and characterizes the charge itself as "purely a figment of
Carlsen's
imagination." Aside from that, the Union contends that Carlsen's allegation was rebutted by
two
witnesses, Kotlewski and Weber, whom it characterizes as reliable, credible and disinterested
witnesses. It also notes that Brycki denied the (urinating) charge when he was interrogated
by
Peterson on June 24, 1998.

Third, the Union contends that the Company has failed to sustain its burden of
proving that
Brycki lied about charges one and two. In its view, this charge stems solely from the fact
that Brycki
denied charges one and two at the June 24, 1998 disciplinary interview. The Union argues
that
denying an accusation, as Brycki did, does not constitute "lying" so as to subject him to
discharge.

Next, the Union raises several due process arguments which it believes should result
in the
discharge being overturned.

The first is that the Company failed to conduct an adequate investigation before it
fired
Brycki. According to the Union, the Company simply took Carlsen's statements (arguably
coerced
by Strobl) at face value, did not attempt to interview other eyewitnesses, and rejected
Brycki's denial
out of hand.

The Union's second due process argument concerns the timing of the grievant's
discharge.
The Union notes in this regard that Brycki continued to work at his job for eight months
after his
suspension without any problems (namely, from October, 1997 through June, 1998), at
which point
he had one meeting with management and was fired. The Union asks rhetorically that if
Brycki's
October, 1997 actions were so serious, why wouldn't the Company have put him on notice
as soon
as it learned of the new allegations on March 24, 1998? In the Union's view, it makes no
sense that
the Company would wait another three months to act (while doing no investigation) and then
on June
24, 1998 demand that Brycki either had to sign the Last Chance Agreement or be summarily
dismissed. The Union believes these facts demonstrate a lack of basic fairness toward
Brycki.

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The Union's third due process argument is that the concept of double jeopardy
applies
here
and precludes the Company from using the (alleged) urination incident as a basis for
discharging the
grievant. The Union asserts that if the grievant in fact urinated in the Company parking lot
on
October 15, 1997, a diligent investigation would have uncovered it. The Union maintains
that the
Company supposedly made a thorough investigation of the October 15, 1997 incident and
decided
a three-day disciplinary layoff was proper punishment. The Union contends that the
Company should
not now be able to rely on the urination which allegedly took place on October 15, 1997 as a
basis
to discharge the grievant.

Finally, the Union comments on the fact that the grievant did not testify at the
hearing. As
the Union sees it, Brycki's decision to not testify in this case should not be held against him
and no
adverse inference should be drawn from it. To support this premise, the Union cites several
arbitrators who did not apply an adverse inference when the grievant failed to testify.

In sum, the Union submits that the Company did not prove the grievant committed
the
offenses he was charged with committing. The Union therefore requests that both the
suspension and
the discharge be overturned, the grievant reinstated, and a make whole remedy issued.

Company

The Company's position is that it had just cause to suspend the grievant in October,
1997 and
to discharge him in June, 1998. In its view, it has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy its
burden
of proving that the discipline imposed was warranted. It also asserts that any procedural
defects are
not sufficient grounds for overturning the suspension and discharge.

The Company makes the following arguments with regard to the suspension. First, it
starts
by reviewing these facts: that night, Brycki came into the shop "stoked up" after a night of
drinking,
walked into a work area, started an argument with working foreman Strobl, refused to leave,
threw
the telephone down after foreman Alioto told him to leave, threatened to beat Strobl up, left
the
building, and then re-entered the building and argued with Strobl some more.

As the Company sees it, the Union concedes that Brycki did all these things with the
exception of threatening to beat Strobl up. The Company contends that Brycki, in fact, did
so. To
support this premise, it cites Strobl's testimony to that effect and Alioto's testimony that he
overheard
Brycki threaten Strobl. The Company submits that the testimony of Weber and Kotlewski
that Brycki
did not threaten to beat Strobl up should not be credited.

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Next, the Company argues that none of the Union's defenses for Brycki's conduct
have merit.
First, with regard to the Union's contention that Brycki did not violate a Company rule by
returning
to work, the Company avers that it does not matter if a Company rule was in place regarding
returning to work upon completion of an employe's shift because Brycki was not suspended
merely
because he returned to the plant. Rather, he was suspended because, upon his return, he
refused to
leave the plant, caused unsafe work conditions, and threatened a supervisor. Second, with
regard to
the Union's contention that this incident was "precipitated" by Strobl, the Company asserts
that there
is nobody to blame for this matter but Brycki. The Company opines that it was Brycki's
comments
and his refusal to leave the plant that turned what may have been a non-event into something
much
bigger. Third, with regard to the Union's contention that nobody in management took the
incident
seriously, the Company contends this contention is not only ridiculous, but also contrary to
the
testimony of all Company officials. Fourth, with regard to the Union's contention that the
Company
bears the responsibility for the incident because of alleged lax practices in the plant, the
Company
maintains that still does not excuse Brycki's conduct on October 15, 1997.

Next, the Company responds to the Union's due process arguments on the
suspension.

First, with regard to the Union's claim that the Company violated Brycki's
Weingarten
rights, the Company believes that even if there was a Weingarten problem with the October
17,
1997, meeting, that should not affect the Company's subsequent disciplinary action. This
argument
is based on the premise that Brycki was not prejudiced by the Company's action. The
Company notes
in this regard that Brycki did not answer the questions posed to him by Peterson and thus
revealed
no new information regarding what had occurred that night. The Company also alleges that
any
Weingarten problem was rectified later when the parties held their June, 1998 meeting,
which the
Company characterizes as a due process meeting. The Company argues in the alternative
that if the
arbitrator finds the Company's denial of the grievant's Weingarten rights did result in
prejudice to
the grievant, the appropriate remedy is an order requiring the Company to cease and desist,
or at
most, backpay for the wages he missed during his three-day suspension.

Second, with regard to the sufficiency of the Company's investigation, the Company
asserts
it conducted a thorough investigation prior to assessing punishment. To support this
premise, it notes
that it interviewed six people and gave Brycki the opportunity to provide his version of the
events
of the evening of October 15, 1997. In the Company's view, this is all that was required.

The Company makes the following arguments with regard to the discharge. It starts
by
reviewing these facts. Following the grievance meeting on Brycki's suspension, Carlsen told
Gross
that the statement he had supplied was false and had been induced by Brycki. Carlsen also
told Gross
that on October 15, 1997, Brycki had urinated in the parking lot. Weber later corroborated
Carlsen's
statement about the urination. The Company believed both of

The Company contends it proved that Brycki improperly induced other witnesses to
provide
false statements so he could avoid discipline. The support this premise, it notes that Brycki
obtained
statements at bars from Weber and Carlsen, and avers that he told them what to put in their
statements.

The Company notes that just two people testified about what happened when Brycki
obtained
the statement from Carlsen: Carlsen and Pam Brycki. The Company argues that Carlsen's
testimony
should be given more weight than Pam Brycki's testimony because she has a direct interest in
seeing
her husband prevail, while Carlsen is a disinterested witness who has no outcome in this
case. While
the Company characterizes Carlsen as an "easily led witness", it nonetheless asserts he was
still
credible.

The Company also contends it proved that Brycki urinated in the Company parking
lot on
October 15, 1997. To support this premise, it cites Carlsen's testimony to that effect. The
Company
notes that while Weber and Kotlewski testified to the contrary (namely, that Brycki did not
urinate
outside), the Company calls the arbitrator's attention to the fact that they were not with
Brycki during
every moment he was outside.

Finally, the Company argues it proved that Brycki lied about both of the above
because he
denied committing these acts at the June, 1998 disciplinary interview. The Company
maintains that
lying constitutes just cause for discharge.

Next, the Company responds to the Union's due process arguments on the discharge.

First, it contends that the Company's investigation was adequate and the Union's
contention
to the contrary has no basis. It avers that it conducted a fair and thorough investigation prior
to
assessing punishment. To support this premise, it notes that it interviewed both Carlsen and
Brycki
about the charges and, after doing so, believed Carlsen.

Second, with regard to the timing of the discharge, the Company asserts it needed
time to
figure out how to deal with the new allegations. Even if this delay is considered a
procedural defect,
the Company believes it is not grounds for reversing a discharge.

Third, the Company contends the Union's double jeopardy argument should also fail.
The
Company points out that double jeopardy occurs when a person is given multiple
punishments for the
same offense. The Company asserts that here, though, Brycki is not being

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punished for the same offenses, but rather for a separate incident (namely, urinating in
the parking
lot) which also occurred on October 15, 1997, and for later events (namely, inducing false
statements
from coworkers and lying about it).

Finally, the Company calls attention to the fact that Brycki did not testify at the
hearing. The
Company submits that Brycki's failure to take the stand in his own defense strongly suggests
that if
he had done so and told the truth, he would have admitted he induced Carlsen to make a
false
statement, urinated in the parking lot, and lied about the foregoing. The Company believes
that
Brycki's failure to testify not only weakens his case, but also should give rise to a negative
inference,
namely, that Brycki had something to lose by testifying.

In sum, the Company claims it has given Brycki many opportunities to deal with his
"alcohol
problem", but it had no choice but to discharge him for his "final offenses". The Company
therefore
contends that both grievances should be denied and the discipline upheld.

DISCUSSION

Section 11.1 of the parties' labor agreement contains what is commonly known as a
"just
cause" provision. It provides that the Company will not discipline or discharge an employe
without
just cause. What happened here is that the grievant was suspended and subsequently
discharged by
the Company. Given this disciplinary action, the obvious question to be answered here is
whether
the Company had just cause for doing so.

As is normally the case, the term "just cause" is not defined in the parties' labor
agreement.
While the term is undefined, a widely understood and applied analytical framework has been
developed over the years through the common law of labor arbitration. That analytical
framework
consists of two basic elements: the first is whether the employer proved the employe's
misconduct,
and the second, assuming this showing of wrongdoing is made, is whether the employer
established
that the discipline which it imposed was justified under all the relevant facts and
circumstances. The
relevant facts and circumstances which are usually considered are the notions of progressive
discipline, due process protections, and disparate treatment.

In the discussion which follows, I will address the suspension first and then the
discharge.

The Suspension

As just noted, the first part of a just cause analysis requires that the Company prove
the
grievant's misconduct. In the context of this case, there are two separate sub-parts to making

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this call: 1) did Brycki do what he is charged with doing on October 15, 1997 (namely,
refusing to
leave the plant after being told to do so and threatening Strobl); and 2) assuming he did, does
the
grievant have any valid defenses for his conduct. In the discussion which follows, those
points will
be addressed in the order just listed.

The first point obviously turns on the facts involved. I begin by reviewing the
following
undisputed facts. After a night of drinking beer, Brycki and Weber returned to the plant to
pick up
Brycki's vehicle and go to the bathroom. While they were there, they went into a work
area. Strobl,
believing that the two men were intoxicated, first asked them to leave and later told them to
leave.
Brycki refused to do so. An argument then ensued between the two men wherein both used
obscenities to the other. Since Brycki would not leave the plant, Strobl called Tony Alioto
and told
him what was happening. Alioto then talked to Brycki on the phone and told him to quit
arguing with
Strobl and to leave the building. Brycki then slammed the phone down and walked away.
As he was
doing so, he (Brycki) said something to Strobl. What he said is disputed.

Strobl testified Brycki said: "Fuck you; I don't have to leave; Come on, I'll take you
outside
and beat the shit out of you." Alioto, who was still on the phone line, testified he overheard
Brycki
make this statement/threat to Strobl. Brycki did not testify, but in his written statement he
denied
threatening Strobl. Weber and Kotlewski testified that Brycki did not threaten Strobl.

Obviously, this testimony conflicts and cannot be reconciled. After weighing this
conflicting
testimony, I credit Strobl's account for the following reasons. First and foremost, Strobl's
account
was corroborated by Alioto who was still on the phone and overheard what Brycki said to
Strobl.
Alioto's testimony was consistent with Strobl's that Brycki threatened to "beat the shit" out
of Strobl.
Even if Strobl is considered an interested witness because of his conflict with Brycki over the
leather
matter, that is not the case with Alioto. He (Alioto) is a disinterested witness. Insofar as the
record
shows, there is no basis for Alioto to fabricate his account of what Brycki said to Strobl on
October
15, 1997. Second, a close reading of the record reveals that Weber and Kotlewski may not
have
heard what Brycki said to Strobl after he (Brycki) slammed the phone down and walked
away. The
following shows this. Weber testified that after Brycki threw the phone down, he (Weber)
walked
out of the building. If Weber was in the process of walking out of the building or was out of
the
building when Brycki made his statement to Strobl, it stands to reason that he would not have
heard
what Brycki said to Strobl. Kotlewski testified that he was about 20 feet away from Brycki
when
Brycki talked on the phone with Alioto and could not hear what Brycki said to Alioto in the
phone
call. If Kotlewski could not hear what Brycki said to Alioto in the phone call, it logically
follows that
he probably could not hear what Brycki said to Strobl afterwards either.

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Given the foregoing, it is concluded that notwithstanding Brycki's assertion in his
written statement
to the contrary, Brycki did indeed threaten to beat Strobl on October 15, 1997.
1/

1/ In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned
did not rely on the testimony of Alan Carlsen.

It follows from this finding that Brycki did what he is charged
with doing (namely,
refusing to leave the plant after Strobl told him to do so and threatening to beat Strobl).
Refusing
to do what a supervisor directs and threatening to beat a supervisor both constitute
inappropriate
workplace conduct which no employer can be expected to tolerate.

Having so found, the focus now turns to the second point
referenced above (namely, does
the grievant have any valid defenses for his conduct). The Union asserts that he does and
that
they (i.e. the defenses) should excuse or justify his actions.

The Union's first defense is that Brycki did not violate any rule
by returning to the plant
that night. While that is true, this argument misses the mark because Brycki was not
suspended
for returning to the plant; he was suspended for other reasons.

The Union's second defense is that the incident was "to a large
extent" Strobl's fault
because Strobl "precipitated the encounter by his belligerent attitude and crude remarks."
The
problem with this contention is that the record evidence shows otherwise. It was Brycki, not
Strobl, who started the angry verbal exchange. It was also Brycki who first used obscenities.
It
was also Brycki who was told to leave and who refused to do so. Finally, it was Brycki who
threatened Strobl, not vice-versa. In my view, the foregoing facts establish that Brycki bears
responsibility for the incident. The fact that Strobl was angry with Brycki before the incident
occurred because of the leather incident does not change this result or somehow turn Brycki
into
an innocent victim.

The Union's third defense is that the Company bears the
responsibility for the incident
which occurred on October 15, 1997. I disagree. As has just been noted, Brycki bears the
responsibility for the incident. The fact that other employes have had arguments and used
obscenities at the plant proves nothing because Brycki was not disciplined for arguing with
Strobl
or using obscenities.

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Having found that none of the Union's defenses excuse the
grievant's actions on October
15, 1997, it is held that the grievant committed misconduct on that date by refusing to leave
the
plant after being told to do so and threatening to beat Strobl. This conduct clearly crossed
the
line of appropriate workplace conduct. As a result, it warranted discipline.

The second part of a just cause analysis requires that the
Employer establish that the
penalty imposed was appropriate under the relevant facts and circumstances. In reviewing
the
appropriateness of discipline under a just cause standard, arbitrators generally consider the
notions of due process, progressive discipline and disparate treatment. The undersigned will
do
likewise in reviewing the appropriateness of the grievant's suspension. These matters will be
addressed in the order just listed.

Due Process Considerations

The Union raises several due process arguments which it
believes should result in the
suspension being overturned.

First, it contends that the Company violated Brycki's
Weingarten rights when they
interviewed him on October 17, 1997. It is undisputed that at the start of that investigatory
interview, Brycki asked for (Union Steward) Koglin to be present. The Company
acknowledges
that in doing so, Brycki was attempting to invoke his Weingarten rights. Under Weingarten,
a represented employe is entitled, on request, to have a union representative present at
meetings
or interviews with the employer whenever the meeting or interview is one that the employe
reasonably believes may lead to discipline or discharge. That did not happen here because
Peterson denied Brycki's request for Koglin to be present. Since an employer's refusal to
honor
a proper request for union representation would be an unfair labor practice under Section
8(a)(1)
of the NLRA, many arbitrators, relying on Weingarten, find such a refusal to be a
procedural
due process violation even if the right is not specified in the collective bargaining agreement.
The undersigned finds likewise.

Having so found, the next question is what remedy, if any,
should be imposed herein for
the Company's failure to allow a union steward/representative to be present at Brycki's
disciplinary interview. Arbitrators have taken a number of different approaches when faced
with
this situation. Some arbitrators have penalized the employer for failing to comply with
Weingarten by nullifying the disciplinary action outright, or reducing it, regardless of
whether
the employe was prejudiced by the employer's failure to comply with Weingarten. Other
arbitrators have not nullified or reduced the disciplinary action because it was not established
that
the employe was irreversibly prejudiced by the employer's failure to comply with
Weingarten.
In this case, I have decided to apply the latter approach because Brycki did not make any
incriminating statements in the investigatory interview. Said another way, he did not give
the
Company any ammunition to use against him in this interview. The

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following shows this. In the interview, Brycki kept wanting to tell
Peterson about the leather
incident, while Peterson wanted to hear about the facts involved in the October 15 incident.
For
the most part, Brycki side-stepped Peterson's questions and did not answer them. Whether it
was
by design or not, Brycki revealed little information to Peterson about what happened that
night.
As a result, Peterson did not gain any new information from Brycki during this interview that
he
did not already know from other interviewees. That being the case, Brycki clearly was not
prejudiced by the Company's failure to grant Brycki's request to have a union representative
attend that disciplinary interview. As a result, the Company's failure to comply with
Weingarten at that disciplinary interview does not warrant nullifying or reducing Brycki's
suspension.

The Union's second due process argument is that the Company's
investigation of the
October 15 incident was a sham and unfair because the Company made little effort to check
with
employe witnesses and simply took the word of Company supervisors. I conclude the record
evidence shows otherwise. My discussion on this point begins with a review of the following
pertinent facts. Peterson and Gross started their investigation the next day
(October 16, 1997).
That day, they interviewed supervisors Strobl and Alioto and requested written statements
from
both of them, which were supplied that same day. In those interviews, Peterson and Gross
learned that Strobl was an witness to the entire incident and that Alioto heard part of it while
he
was on the phone. The same day, Peterson interviewed three employes who were possible
witnesses: Rollie Notheis, Bob Lewinski and Al Carlsen. In these interviews, it was learned
that
Carlsen saw more than Notheis or Lewinski did. After interviewing these employes,
Peterson and
Gross next interviewed Weber. In his interview, Weber told management officials that
Strobl's
account of the incident was correct, and he signed a statement to that effect. Peterson and
Gross
then interviewed Brycki. At the interview, Brycki was given an opportunity to tell his side
of the
story. He essentially declined to do so. At that point, Peterson concluded that he had the
essential facts of the incident from witnesses Strobl, Alioto and Carlsen, and he suspended
Brycki.
When Peterson made this decision, none of the seven people who had been interviewed,
including
Weber and Brycki, disputed Strobl's account of the incident. This meant that on the date
Brycki
was suspended (October 17, 1997), Strobl's account of the incident, particularly that Brycki
threatened him, was undisputed. 2/ In my view, nothing in the foregoing facts
establishes

2/ This subsequently changed when several
employes, including Brycki, Weber and Carlsen
signed statements indicating that Brycki did not threaten Strobl on October 15, 1997.
However,
the Company did not learn that Strobl's account of the incident (particularly that Brycki
threatened to beat him) was disputed until the March 24, 1998 grievance meeting. Since this
was
five months after Brycki's suspension, this portion

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of the discussion is
limited to what the Company knew from its investigation as of the date it
suspended Brycki (October 17, 1997). What happened thereafter will be addressed in the
Discharge section of this Award.

that the Company's investigation up to October 17, 1997 was
botched, flawed or a sham. It
therefore was sufficient to pass muster.

Progressive Discipline and Disparate
Treatment

The record indicates that the grievant has previously received several
written warnings for
other misconduct. These prior warnings specifically put him on notice that further
misconduct
would lead to further disciplinary action including suspension. The next step in the normal
progressive disciplinary sequence is for warnings to be followed by a suspension. Since that
is
exactly what happened here, the Company followed progressive discipline.

Finally, it does not appear that Brycki was subjected to disparate
treatment by being
suspended. There is nothing in the record indicating that other employes engaged in
behavior
similar to Brycki's behavior and were not disciplined for it. While Weber was disciplined
less
severely than Brycki (i.e. Weber was suspended for one day and Brycki for three), there is a
reasonable basis for this, namely that Weber's misconduct was less serious than Brycki's. It
was
Brycki who specifically refused to leave the building after being told to do so and who
threatened
to beat Strobl. Weber did neither. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the
Company
to assess different discipline on them.

Given the foregoing, it is held that Brycki's suspension was neither
disproportionate to his
offense nor an abuse of management discretion, but was reasonably related to the seriousness
of his
proven misconduct. The Company therefore had just cause to suspend him for three
days.

The Discharge

Attention is now turned to the grievant's discharge. The Company
discharged the grievant
for 1) improperly inducing an employe to give a false statement about the events of October
15,
1997; 2) urinating in the Company parking lot; and 3) lying about both of the foregoing.
The
second charge deals with conduct which allegedly occurred on October 15, 1997, while the
other
two charges involve conduct which occurred subsequent to that date. These charges will be
addressed in the order just listed.

As previously noted, the first element of a just cause determination
turns on whether the
grievant committed these offenses as charged. Obviously, this depends on the facts. The
Company
contends that Brycki did, in fact, commit these offenses. Brycki disputes this. Though

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he did not testify at the hearing, he denied committing these offenses at the
June 24, 1998,
investigatory interview.

Attention is focused first on the charge that Brycki improperly induced
an employe to give
a false (written) statement about the events of October 15, 1997. My discussion begins with
the
following prefatory comments. Following his suspension, Brycki asked several of his
co-workers
for written statements about the October 15 incident, which they subsequently supplied.
There is
nothing improper about obtaining such statements. They have become common in labor
relations.
In this case, not only did various Union witnesses supply written statements, but so did
Company
witnesses Strobl and Alioto.

There is nothing problematic about Strobl's and Alioto's statements.
The following shows
this. They were asked to write up a statement and, insofar as the record shows, they did so
without
anyone from management looking over their shoulder and guiding them, or telling them what
to
include in their statement. Also, they did not write up their statement while drinking beer in
a bar.
Simply put, there is no reason whatsoever to suspect the validity of their statements or how
they were
obtained.

That is not the case though with the statements which Brycki obtained
from Carlsen, Weber
and Kotlewski. Their statements are troublesome and problematic for the following reasons.
First,
with regard to Carlsen's statement, Brycki was with Carlsen when he (Carlsen) wrote it.
This took
place in a bar and Carlsen had three beers (which the Bryckis paid for) while he wrote his
statement.
As he did so, Brycki made several suggestions about content which Carlsen incorporated into
his
statement. 3/ Second, with regard to Weber's statement, Brycki

3/ The substance of what was just
characterized as Brycki's "suggestions about content" will
be addressed later in the Discussion.

was
also with him when he (Weber) wrote up his statement. They were also drinking beer at the
time.
Third, with regard to Kotlewski's statement, Brycki told him (Kotlewski) to write up a
"vague"
statement. In my view, the foregoing facts raise legitimate concerns about the validity of
these three
statements and how they were obtained. Certainly it would have been better, in hindsight, if
Brycki
had not been with Carlsen and Weber when they wrote up their statements, if they had not
written
them up while drinking beer in bar, and if Brycki had not said anything whatsoever to any
of them
about what they should or should not include in their statement.

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When the Company fired Brycki, it could have contended that he
improperly induced several
employes to make false statements about the October 15, 1997 incident. However, as will be
shown,
it did not do that. Instead, the Company decided to limit the charge of improperly inducing
a false
statement to just one employe (as opposed to several employes). The following sentence
from the
discharge letter/second paragraph of the Last Chance Agreement shows this: ". . .Brycki
improperly
induced an employe to give a false statement to S & M in connection with
the events of October 15,
1997." (Emphasis added). Although the discharge letter/Last Chance Agreement does not
identify
who that employe is, it is clear from the record that the Company was referring to Carlsen.
In their
brief, the Company contends that Brycki also improperly induced Weber and (maybe)
Kotlewski into
making false statements about the October 15, 1997 incident. When the Company wrote the
grievant's discharge letter, it could have contended that Brycki improperly induced all three
employes (i.e. Carlsen, Weber and Kotlewski) into making false statements because it
obviously was
aware of their written statements and it considered all three to be false. It did not do so.
Such was
its right. Having done so though, it cannot expand the reason for the grievant's discharge to
now
also include inducing false statements from Weber and Kotlewski. Accordingly then,
Weber's and
Kotlewski's statements will not be used as a basis for reviewing the grievant's discharge.
This
rationale also applies to Brycki's own statement. Accordingly, Brycki's statement will not be
reviewed either.

Having so found, the focus turns to Carlsen's statement. My
discussion begins with a
preliminary comment concerning how it was obtained. The record indicates that Pam and
Steve
Brycki showed up at Carlsen's house unannounced and asked him if he would go to a bar
with them
to write up his statement. Carlsen, who had gone to the bar two days earlier looking for
Brycki to
do just that, agreed to go with them. In my view, nothing about the foregoing establishes
that
Carlsen was forced, coerced, or threatened to go to the bar with the Bryckis. Rather, he
went of his
own free will. Furthermore, he knew why he was going ­ namely, to write up his
statement about
the October 15 incident and presumably have a beer while doing so.

When the three of them got to the bar, they had a beer or two and
talked. I have decided to
characterize what they talked about first as "the union discussion".

The Company contends that what happened during "the union
discussion" was that Brycki
promised to get Carlsen a union job and pay the Union's $100 initiation fee, and that these
(two)
promises induced Carlsen to write up his (subsequent) statement. I certainly agree that if
Brycki
did promise to get Carlsen a union (bargaining unit) position, and pay the Union's $100
initiation
fee, then those promises would constitute an improper inducement to get Carlsen to write his
statement.

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After reviewing the record testimony however, I am not persuaded that
Brycki made those
promises. My analysis begins with some comments concerning what happened prior to "the
union
discussion" at the bar. As previously noted, when Carlsen got in the Bryckis' truck on
October 18,
he knew exactly why he was going to the bar with them ­ namely, to write up a
statement on Brycki's
behalf about the October 15 incident. That was the same reason he went to the bar by
himself on
October 16 and waited for Brycki. Insofar as the record shows, Carlsen did not extract any
kind of
promise from Brycki before he went to the bar with him on October 18. That being so, I am
convinced that Carlsen had decided to write up a statement for Brycki, and a favorable
statement
to boot, even before "the union discussion" occurred in the bar. That said, this still leaves
the
question of whether Brycki promised to get Carlsen a union job and pay the Union's $100
initiation
fee. With regard to Brycki's alleged promise to get Carlsen a union job, there is absolutely
no
evidence that Brycki said to Carlsen "I promise to get you into the Union or a bargaining
unit
position in exchange for your (favorable) statement." Thus, Brycki never explicitly tied one
to the
other. While Brycki did tell Carlsen that writing a statement on his behalf would be a good
way to
get into the union and show the Union members, I do not interpret that statement as a
promise that
Brycki would somehow get Carlsen into the Union or get him a union (bargaining unit)
position.
In my view, that statement was little more than puffing. With regard to Brycki's alleged
promise
to pay the Union's $100 initiation fee, Carlsen's own testimony on this point was internally
inconsistent. He initially testified that Brycki promised to pay or "take care of" the $100
initiation
fee, but later he recanted that and said Brycki never promised to pay it (i.e. the $100
initiation fee).
This inconsistency from the very person making the charge precludes a finding that Brycki
promised
to pay Carlsen the $100 initiation fee in exchange for his statement. Based on the foregoing,
it is
concluded that Brycki did not promise to get Carlsen a union (bargaining unit) job and pay
the
Union's $100 initiation fee in exchange for a favorable (written) statement.

Having so found, the focus turns to whether Brycki, in the words of the
Last Chance
Agreement, "induced [Carlsen] to give a false statement to S & M in connection with
the events
of October 15, 1997." After "the union discussion" was finished, Carlsen wrote up his
statement.
As he did, Brycki looked over Carlsen's shoulder and made several suggestions about the
content
of what he (Carlsen) was writing and how it was worded. It has previously been noted that
Brycki
should not have done so and the fact that he did is troublesome and problematic. What
makes it
particularly troublesome and problematic is that Carlsen incorporated all of Brycki's
suggestions
into the statement. Obviously, Carlsen should have written up his statement on his own and
used
his own words without Brycki looking over his shoulder and making suggestions about
content. That
said, the question to be decided herein is whether Brycki had Carlsen write anything that was
false.
If he did, then Brycki induced a false statement. Attention is now turned to making that
call.

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The record indicates that Brycki induced Carlsen to make three changes
to his statement.
However, as the following analysis shows, none of the three were "false statements". The
first
change which Brycki suggested to Carlsen was that he start the statement by recounting the
leather
incident in detail, specifically that Strobl was upset with Brycki for that and that Strobl
verbally
harassed Brycki for failing to pay for the leather. That is not a false statement; it is an
accurate
statement. The second change which Brycki suggested to Carlsen was to identify Weber as
the
recipient of Strobl's "fag" remark. That too is not a false statement; it is an accurate
statement.
The third change which Brycki suggested to Carlsen was to add the comment that Strobl "has
a bug
up his ass". Since that statement is nothing more than a subjective opinion, the undersigned
declines to characterize it as either accurate or false.

When Carlsen's statement was finished, it provided in pertinent part: 1)
that Strobl was upset
with Brycki over the leather incident; 2) that on October 15, Strobl told Brycki "you drunks
get the
fuck out of here" . . .[and] "take that fag with you"; 3) that Brycki left the plant after talking
on the
phone with Tony Alioto; 4) that there were "no threats made. . .to George [Strobl] from
Steve
[Brycki]"; and 5) that Strobl "has a bug up his ass."

In the context of this case, the most important part of this statement is
what I have
characterized as point #4 (i.e. that there were "no threats made. . .to George from Steve").
This
sentence is hereinafter identified as point #4. The reason point #4 is so important is because
this
was the part which Carlsen changed in his second statement. Specifically, he went from
saying (in
his first statement) that Brycki did not threaten Strobl to saying (in his second statement) that
Brycki
did threaten Strobl. Since Brycki did indeed threaten to beat Strobl on October 15, 1997,
this means
that point #4 in Carlsen's (first) statement was a "false statement."

That being so, the question is who was the author/source of point #4.
If it was Brycki, then
he induced Carlsen to make a false statement.

The record will not support a finding that Brycki was the author/source
of this critical
sentence. The following shows why. As has already been noted, Carlsen testified that
Brycki was
the source of three points which he ultimately included in his statement (i.e. 1) that Strobl
was upset
with Brycki over the leather incident; 2) that Weber was the recipient of Strobl's "fag"
remark; and
3) that Strobl "has a bug up his ass.") Notable by its absence was testimony from Carlsen
that
Brycki was the author/source of point #4 dealing with threats. If Brycki was the
author/source of
point #4, Carlsen would have said so when he was directly asked about it at the hearing. He
did not.
4/ Since Carlsen did not identify Brycki as the author/source of point

4/ Transcript, p. 168.

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#4, it is held that the wording in point #4 came from Carlsen and was his
creation ­ not Brycki's.
Thus, while point #4 is indeed a false statement, Brycki was not the author/source of it
­ Carlsen
was.

Given the foregoing, it is concluded that Brycki did not induce Carlsen
to give a "false
statement" in connection with the events of October 15, 1997. As a result, that charge
against
Brycki has not been sustained.

Attention is now turned to the charge that Brycki urinated in the
Company parking lot on
October 15, 1997. My discussion begins with a review of the following background facts.
The day
after the March 24, 1998 grievance meeting was held on Brycki's suspension, Gross talked
to
Carlsen about the statement Carlsen had supplied in that meeting. In the course of that
discussion,
Carlsen told Gross that Brycki had urinated in the Company parking lot on the evening of
October
15, 1997. Shortly thereafter, Gross asked Weber if Brycki had urinated in the parking lot
on
October 15, 1997 and Weber replied in the affirmative. From the Company's perspective,
this was
a matter which it was unaware of when it suspended Brycki for his October 15, 1997
misconduct.

When Brycki had his disciplinary interview on June 24, 1998, he
denied urinating in the
Company parking lot on October 15, 1997.

At the hearing, just one witness testified that Brycki urinated in the
parking lot on
October 15, 1997. That witness was Carlsen. Carlsen's account was disputed by two
witnesses:
Weber and Kotlewski. Both testified they were with Brycki when he was in the parking lot
that night
and that he did not urinate in the parking lot.

Obviously, Carlsen's testimony on this point conflicts with Weber's and
Kotlewski's
testimony and cannot be reconciled. After weighing this conflicting testimony, I find that
Carlsen's
testimony does not carry more weight than that of the other two employes. My rationale
follows.
First, all three are disinterested witnesses in that none have anything to gain by their
testimony
herein. Second, all three are floor helpers who are excluded from the bargaining unit and
therefore
have no direct stake in the outcome of a unit member's discipline. Third, the veracity of all
three
witnesses has been called into question herein. Having found that Carlsen's testimony does
not
carry more weight than the others, I conclude that the Company has not met its burden of
proving
that Brycki urinated in the Company parking lot on the evening of October 15, 1997.
As a result,
that charge against Brycki has not been sustained either.

The third and final charge against Brycki is that he lied about charges
one and two (i.e.
inducing Carlsen to give a false statement in connection with the events of October 15, 1997
and
urinating in the Company parking lot on October 15, 1997). Having previously held that
charges

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one and two were not sustained, it logically follows that the third charge cannot
be sustained either
because it is essentially a derivative of charges one and two. 5/

5/ In so finding, I am well aware that I found
earlier in the Suspension section that Brycki
lied in his written statement when he said he did not threaten Strobl. Specifically, I found
that
he did threaten to beat Strobl. However, just because Brycki lied about that (i.e. threatening
to
beat Strobl) does not mean he also lied when he denied inducing Carlsen to give a false
statement
and urinating in the parking lot. Thus, the fact that Brycki lied about threatening Strobl
cannot
be bootstrapped to prove the third charge.

Since none of the three charges against Brycki have been sustained, the
Company failed to
prove that Brycki committed the misconduct he was charged with.

Inasmuch as the Company has not proven the first element of just
cause, it is unnecessary
to address the parties' arguments with respect to the second element of just cause
(particularly due
process considerations, the Company's investigation prior to discharge, the timing of the
grievant's
discharge, the notion of double jeopardy, and the grievant's failure to testify).

Accordingly, the grievant's discharge is overturned. The grievant is to
be reinstated with
no loss of seniority and with full backpay and benefits less any interim earnings.

In closing, it is noted that I am mindful of the Company's difficulties in
this troubling case:
faced with claims from Carlsen that Brycki had induced a false statement from him and
urinated in
the parking lot, the Company decided it believed Carlsen's allegations over Brycki's blanket
denial.
Had the Company proved that Brycki engaged in the alleged misconduct, the Company's
termination of Brycki would have been sustained. That has not happened because the
Company did
not prove Brycki's alleged misconduct. Thus, the discharge portion of this case turns on the
Company's burden of proof, and only stands for the proposition that there was insufficient
evidence
in this case to warrant finding that the grievant committed the misconduct he was charged
with.

In light of the above, it is my

AWARD

1. That the three-day disciplinary layoff of Steven Brycki on
October 17, 1997 was for
just cause. Therefore, that grievance is denied.

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2. That the discharge of Steven Brycki on June 26, 1998 was not
for just cause. The
Company therefore violated Section 11.1 of the collective bargaining agreement when it
discharged
him. In order to remedy this contractual violation, the Company is directed to reinstate
Brycki to
his former or substantially equivalent position with no loss of seniority and to make him
whole for
lost wages and benefits less any interim earnings. The undersigned will retain jurisdiction
for at
least thirty (30) days from the date of this Award solely for the purpose of resolving any
dispute with
respect to the remedy herein.