from the collecting-crimes dept

You may recall that we have discussed the complete chaos that is copyright collection societies in Kenya over the past few years. At issue in Kenya is that the country has multiple collection societies, which are overseen by a government sanctioned body that can request to look at their books to make sure artists are being paid appropriately, and officially licenses the collection societies themselves. Some of those collection groups have apparently not felt the need to respond to requests for oversight, leading the government to pull or not renew their licenses. Instead of being the end of the story, a number of those collection societies continue to threaten people and collect royalties anyway, acting essentially as an illegal extortion outfit.

Kenya is not the only African nation going through this, it seems. Across the continent on the opposite coast, the Nigerian Copyright Commission has been going through similar issues, specifically with a collection group called COSON.

The Nigerian Copyright Commission has filed a criminal charge against the Copyright Society of Nigeria, its Chairman, Chief Tony Okoroji, and principal officers for carrying out the duties of a collecting society without the approval of the Nigerian Copyright Commission.

The NCC, in a statement signed by its Director-General, Afam Ezekude, and made available to our correspondent on Tuesday, said, “In Charge No FHC/L/338C/18, filed on October 8, 2018 at the Lagos Division of the Federal High Court, the accused persons were alleged to have performed the duties of a collecting Society by demanding and collecting royalties from Noah’s Ark of 9 Sowemimo Street, GRA, Ikeja, Lagos.”

The commission also accused COSON of carrying on the business of negotiating and granting licences on behalf of copyright owners without its approval, thereby committing an offence contrary to and punishable under sections 39 (4), (5) and (6) of the Copyright Act Cap C 28 Laws of the Federation of Nigerian 2004.

This is now becoming a trend, with collection societies in several African nations simply and rather brazenly carrying on the business of shaking down businesses for music licensing fees, even beyond the point of their being legally allowed to do so. Frankly, given the copyright collection industry, this is not a huge leap to take. These societies already have many of the hallmarks of extortion rings, with their undercover "patrons" at businesses and their threat letters that might as well begin with, "Nice business you have there. Be a shame if anything happened to it."

But what this really shows, more than anything else, is how many of these copyright collection groups are devoid of any interest in the law, in the artists they represent, or in acting with even a modicum of ethical standards. Instead, these are money-making operations, and that money-making doesn't stop just because the law says they have to.

from the watching-you,-watching-me dept

As we frequently note, most of the "smart" products you buy are anything but intelligent when it comes to your privacy and security. Whether it's your refrigerator leaking your gmail credentials or your new webcam being hacked in mere minutes for use in massive new DDoS attacks, the so-called "smart" home is actually often dumb as nails and potentially hazardous. So-called smart-televisions have been particularly problematic, whether that has involved companies failing to encrypt sensitive data, or removing features if you refuse to have your daily viewing habits measured and monetized.

Last year Vizio joined this not-so-distinguished club when it was discovered that the company's TVs had been spying on users for the last several years, starting back in 2014. Vizio's $2.2 million settlement with the FTC indicates that the company at no time thought it might be a good idea to inform customers this was happening. The snooping was part of a supposed "Smart Interactivity" feature deployed in 2014 that claimed to provide users with programming recommendations, but never actually did so. Its sole purpose was to hoover up your data and help Vizio sell it, without your express consent.

Vizio was also hit with a class action lawsuit over its actions, and the finishing touches on a settlement are just getting hashed out now. Lawyers representing consumers in the case state Vizio secretly tracked and sold the usage habits of around sixteen million Vizio owners for around three years. They're demanding a settlement of $17 million and a promise from Vizio that this won't ever happen again:

"Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Vizio will establish a $17 million settlement fund that will deliver money directly to consumers who bought Vizio Smart TVs that were subsequently connected to the Internet between February 1, 2014 and February 6, 2017. Vizio has also stopped tracking what is displayed on its Smart TVs unless a consumer consents to this tracking after receiving a prominent notification. And Vizio will delete the remaining contested viewing data in its possession."

What this actually means for consumers is a bit less impressive. Ars Technica took a closer look at the court filings in the case and found that consumers are likely to get all of somewhere between $13 and $31 for the inconvenience of being spied on without their permission. Lawyers will, unsurprisingly, get significantly more:

"When it’s all said and done, new court filings submitted on Thursday say each of those 16 million people will get a payout of somewhere between $13 and $31. By contrast, their lawyers will collectively earn a maximum payout of $5.6 million in fees."

On the plus side, insiders tell Ars Technica that the $17 million being doled out is more than Vizio made from selling this data, which usually isn't the case in other similar failures of trust (especially by cellular carriers, who'll often be fined millions for privacy violations that potentially netted them billions). And while Vizio's promises are good and all, many argue we need stronger public deterrents for companies that fail to respect user privacy, starting first and foremost with efforts to include privacy and security oversights in product reviews.

from the putting-'crime'-back-into-'crime-lab!' dept

Massachusetts prosecutors are seeing a bunch more Drug War wins turned into losses by drug lab misconduct. Annie Dookhan, a drug lab technician, falsified countless tests, ultimately resulting in the overturning of more than 20,000 convictions. Dookhan was valued for her productivity, but no one above her bothered to wonder why she was able to process samples so quickly. Turns out tests go much faster when you don't actually perform the tests.

If that were it, it would have been more than enough indication the nation's crime labs need more oversight and auditing. But it isn't. Another tech at another Massachusetts drug lab is erasing thousands of convictions. Chemist Sonja Farak, an 11-year veteran of the Amherst drug lab, apparently spent much of that time using the substances she was supposed to be testing, turning in falsified test results that landed people behind bars.

The Farak investigation uncovered the drug lab's lack of standards, which included more than allowing an employee to use drugs while on the clock for at least eight of the eleven years she was employed. There's no way of telling how many drug tests might be tainted, not just by employee malfeasance, but by a lack of best practices, like running blanks through testing equipment to ensure new tests weren't tainted by residue left behind by previous tests.

Expanding relief for a class of drug defendants whose cases crossed paths with a now-disgraced chemist, the highest court in Massachusetts agreed Thursday to throw out nearly a decade’s worth of meth convictions plus all cases from the chemist’s last four years on the job.

The state wants the bleeding to stop at 8,000 cases -- covering only those where Farak signed the drug certificate. But as the court points out in its order [PDF], this isn't just about Farak. It's about the drug lab that protected Farak and the prosecutors that protected the drug lab -- the latter of which included hiding evidence of misconduct from accused drug offenders.

The respondent Attorney General contests the petitioners' proposed remedy, as well as the result suggested by the district attorneys. The Attorney General proposes a different remedy. Based on Farak's admission that she began to tamper with other chemists' samples in the summer of 2012, the Attorney General contends that those defendants whose drug samples were tested between June, 2012, and Farak's arrest in January, 2013, should be offered the opportunity to obtain relief under the protocol established by this court in Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 316-317 (2017) (Bridgeman II).

We conclude that Farak's widespread evidence tampering has compromised the integrity of thousands of drug convictions apart from those that the Commonwealth has agreed should be vacated and dismissed. Her misconduct, compounded by prosecutorial misconduct, requires that this court exercise its superintendence authority and vacate and dismiss all criminal convictions tainted by governmental wrongdoing.

The AG's suggested fix is completely inadequate. The court's final decision covers far more than the limited one-year window of adjacent convictions the AG was willing to toss.

The class of "Farak defendants" includes all defendants who pleaded guilty to a drug charge, admitted to sufficient facts on a drug charge, or were found guilty of a drug charge, where (i) Farak signed the certificate of analysis; (ii) the conviction was based on methamphetamine and the drugs were tested during Farak's tenure at the Amherst lab; or (iii) the drugs were tested at the Amherst lab on or after January 1, 2009, and through January 18, 2013, regardless of who signed the certificate of analysis.

It is impossible this is the only state where this sort of misconduct has occurred. Testing drug samples is like any other job -- people will cut corners. But it also offers something for those with drug problems and those seeking to personally profit from their employment. Something other jobs don't offer: unfettered access to controlled substances. People will be people and drugs will disappear and results will be faked. The problem is this employee misconduct costs people their freedom. And from what's been observed in two major cases in Massachusetts, the entities overseeing these labs don't care about the collateral damage until a court forces them to.

from the getting-something-right dept

A few weeks ago, we wrote about the 9th Circuit overturning the district court's ruling in a copyright case questioning whether the song "Stairway to Heaven" had infringed on the song "Taurus" by Spirit. We were less than pleased with this result, as we felt the original ruling was correct. Copyright lawyer Rick Sanders disagreed with part of our analysis and made some really great points in a two part blog post series, which he's graciously allowed us to repost in slightly edited form here. Part II will be published tomorrow.

I'm pleased to report that, far from taking this opportunity to further screw up copyright law, as Techdirt fears, the panel of judges is attempting to improve copyright law by replacing the Ninth Circuit's (very bad) framework for copyright infringement with a much better one. Indeed, the "Stairway to Heaven" opinion may be seen as a rebuke to the "Blurred Lines" opinion. The pity is that Led Zeppelin must bear this burden by having to do the trial all over again.

Two Legal Frameworks for Copyright Infringement

Generally, there are two leading legal frameworks for determining when someone has infringed copyright:

Plaintiff must prove (a) defendant's access to the copyrighted work, plus (b) "substantial similarity" between the two works. This framework is used by the majority of courts, so we'll call it the "Majority Framework." It is also a bad framework.

Plaintiff must prove (a) "copying" and (b) "unlawful appropriation." To prove "copying," the plaintiff must prove (1) access and (2) "probative similarity." "Unlawful appropriation" is pretty much the same thing as "substantial similarity," but the different term is used to avoid confusion with "probative similarity" (and is also more accurate). This framework is preferred by scholars and is used by one half of the Second Circuit, so we'll call this the "Preferred Framework."

Both of these frameworks grapple with the same thing: to infringe copyright in a work, the defendant must both copy the work and take enough of the work that, well, um, it's too much. But the key is that copying is something that must be proved. In theory, if a magical monkey banged out Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets without ever have looked at a copy of Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, that would not be copyright infringement. It would just be unbelievably unlikely. The need to prove copying is actually a fairly important limitation on copyright law. We shouldn't lose sight of it.

Imagine that you saw me with a book and that I was writing something down on a pad of paper while obviously reading the book. Have you proved that I have "copied" the book? You certainly have proved access: there I am, with the book in hand! But, you haven't. You need one piece of evidence. You need to see what I am writing. It's possible that I'm multitasking, perhaps writing a shopping list as I read. It would take just a glance to figure that out, though, right?

Now imagine that you didn't see me with the book. No one did. And yet my notebook is word for word the same as the book. Do you need any evidence of access? Maybe just the slightest bit, like I live in the same city as a bookstore or library that has a copy of the book. (This is sometimes known as "striking similarity.")

Does this make intuitive sense? If so, congratulations! You understand the "inverse-ratio" rule, at least when correctly applied to "copying." The more access, less probative similarity is needed to prove copying. More probative similarity, less access needed.

Proving copying is only step one of a two-step process, so let me hit you with another hypothetical. Let's say that I was seen with the book at some point, and my notebook contains an extensive data table that is exactly the same as a data table in the book (but in my handwriting). There is nothing else in my notebook related to the book. The data table is otherwise unremarkable. Have you proven infringement? No! You have proven copying. I had access to the book, and the data table is too much of a coincidence to explain away. Clearly, I copied the data table. But not all copying is infringement. What I took isn't protectable because it's just facts. You haven't proven the "unlawful appropriation" (AKA "substantial similarity") element.

This hypothetical shows the difference between the two kinds of similarity: probative and substantial. (See, this is why we should re-name "substantial similarity" as "unlawful appropriation.") You can use unprotectable elements to establish probative similarity. You can't use unprotectable elements to establish substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation. Hopefully, this makes intuitive sense to you. With probative similarity, we're just trying to prove copying, so we're just looking for coincidences that, in light of the amount of access, we can't explain away. Substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation is limited to protectable expression.

Let's return to the "inverse-ratio" rule. Can you see why it's appropriate in the context of copying, when we're weighing access against probative similarity? And why it's inappropriate if you are instead weighing access against substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation? In fact, it's perverse. Imagine if you and I both took the same material from an unpublished manuscript, and that the case for substantial similarity is kind of borderline. I am found with a copy of the manuscript on my computer. You, however, have no connection with the manuscript except that you are the manuscript editor's niece's best friend (and the niece visited the editor at least once while in possession of the manuscript). We both took the same thing, but under the misapplication of the inverse-ratio rule, I'm an infringer, and you are not. That's stupid. Considering that most courts do not correctly handle the distinction between copying and substantial similarity, you can see how the inverse-ratio rule has gotten a bad rap.

Which of these two frameworks does the Ninth Circuit use? Neither, of course. This is the Ninth Circuit we're talking about. Its framework looks like a combination of two. On the one hand, it follows the Majority Framework by requiring proof of access (instead of copying) and "substantial similarity." But then is splits the inquiry into "substantial similarity" into two tests, both of which must be proven: the "extrinsic test" and the "intrinsic test." The extrinsic test is meant to be "objective." The jury is permitted to consider both protectable and non-protectable elements, to dissect the elements and compare those, and to consider expert opinion. You know what that is? Probative similarity, but here's it's pressed into the service of substantial similarity and has been separated from the inquiry into access.

The intrinsic test is just the normal test for "substantial similarity"/"unlawful appropriation" that every other court uses. Calling it a "test" is overstating it: it's more like the jury's gut instinct, based on the "total concept and feel" of the works. Sorry, but no one has come up with a better way of formulating the test, or how "total concept and feel" works when both protectable and non-protectable elements have been taken. To be fair to the Ninth Circuit, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence was innovative at the time and served as an important stepping stone to the preferred legal framework. Alas, the way precedent works, the Ninth Circuit has been stuck at this half-way point for decades. It should go without saying that the application of the "inverse-square" rule to the Ninth Circuit's framework can be ugly.

But that's what makes the court's opinion in the "Stairway to Heaven" case so exciting. The court straight up endorses the Preferred Framework, even using the preferred terminology:

Whether Defendants copied protected expression contains two separate and distinct components: "copying" and "unlawful appropriation." A plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that a defendant copied his work, as independent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement. In cases such as this one where there is no direct evidence of copying, the plaintiff can attempt to prove it circumstantially by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the two works share similarities probative of copying. When a high degree of access is shown, a lower amount of similarity is needed to prove copying. To prove copying, the similarities between the two works need not be extensive, and they need not involve protected elements of the plaintiff's work. They just need to be similarities one would not expect to arise if the two works had been created independently.

It then tackles the plaintiffs' argument about the missing "inverse-ratio" rule. I'll bet the plaintiffs were wanting an "inverse-ratio" instruction that told the jury to weigh access against substantial similarity. If so, the Ninth Circuit had some bad news for it: the "inverse-ratio" applies only to copying, not to substantial similarity.

This [inverse ratio] rule assists only in proving copying, not in proving unlawful appropriation. Even if a plaintiff proves that a defendant copied his work, the plaintiff must still show that the copying amounts to unlawful appropriation. The showing of substantial similarity necessary to prove unlawful appropriation does not vary with the degree of access the plaintiff has shown.

The court then went on to suggest strongly to the trial court that an "inverse ratio" rule might be a really good idea, in a case where there's proof of access.

But what about that intrinsic-extrinsic distinction? Surely, it's no longer relevant, right? Well, I guess the Ninth Circuit wasn't quite prepared to get that radical. With a little hocus-pocus, it sort of re-purposed the distinction in the service of substantial similarity/unlawful appropriation. Now, instead of being objective and subjective, it's about making sure you have both evidence of appropriation of protected elements and that gut-feeling. OK, whatever—that might actually be an improvement, since its one way to reconcile "total concept and feel" with a need to filter out non-protectable elements.

Emphasis on "Might"

The fight's not over. When a Circuit court takes up an appeal, it assigns a panel of three of its judges. In theory, a panel can't overrule an earlier panel—for that to happen, you need the entire court, or in the 9th Circuit a larger panel of judges, (called "en banc") to take up the case, which is rare (but not unheard of). Right now, later panels have the option of picking which framework they want to use: follow "Blurred Lines'" traditional Ninth Circuit framework, or adopt "Stairway to Heaven's" newfangled Preferred Framework. Obviously, parties are going to pick the one that works best for them. We might end up with an internally-split circuit (which is essentially the current situation with the Second Circuit). Of course, the Supreme Court to step in and fix it, but let's be serious. Indeed, it is almost scandalous that, for decades, there have been multiple frameworks for a concept CENTRAL to copyright law, and the Supreme Court has never expressed interest in the subject.

Now, as it happens, the court's discussion of the "inverse-ratio" rule, and its related description of the Preferred Framework, is not what caused the court to vacate the jury verdict and send the case back down for a second trial. I'll explain the twin brain farts that caused that disaster in a subsequent post.

from the moral-panics-are-the-worst dept

For quite some time we've highlighted the horrible laws being pushed by aggressively misrepresenting the size of the problem of sex trafficking -- and especially sex trafficking of children. This is not to say that it never happens. Nor is it to suggest that the crime of sex trafficking, especially of minors, is not horrific and hugely problematic. But we shouldn't overreact to false information. A year ago, we looked at some of the numbers being presented in favor of passing FOSTA, and found they were almost entirely bullshit. This included Rep. Ann Wagner's (who is the leading pusher of bad laws around "sex trafficking") claim child sex trafficking alone was a $9.5 billion industry. As we noted, this number came from a bizarre nonsensical extrapolation of a very misleading and confused report by ICE that covered issues of smuggling (not just sex trafficking). Other stats -- such as the supposed number of kids "lured" into sex trafficking -- showed even more extrapolation, while police were finding very, very few actual cases of this happening.

Wow. That would be a pretty astoundingly successful police operation, and certainly gives weight to the idea that so many kids are lured into sex trafficking rings and then disappear and go missing. Except... details matter. And deep in the NY Post story they actually admit that out of the 123 missing kids only three were "identified as possible sex trafficking victims." So, uh, why does the headline suggest that all 123 kids are sex trafficking victims when it's not clear if any are, and clear that the vast majority are not?

What's more, all but four of the "missing children" were not actually missing. In the remaining cases, minors were listed in a police database as missing but had since been found or returned home on their own. "Many were (homeschooled)," Lt. Michael Shaw told The Detroit News. "Some were runaways as well."

Indeed, if you look at the report, it notes that all of the kids outside of those four "were found safe with their parents or guardians."

So, remember, the headline screamed that 123 missing children were found in a sex trafficking "operation." Now it seems that most of them were "found" at home with their parents, and only three of them might have been victims of sex trafficking. These seem like important details, especially when you have election officials like Rep. Ann Wagner pushing a vast surveillance bill on the basis of the problem of sex trafficking. Pushing bogus information like over a hundred missing kids being engaged in sex trafficking only helps build that narrative -- one that appears to actually be much, much more limited than the media or lying politicians will let you know about.

from the good-deals-on-cool-stuff dept

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from the nice-work,-jackasses dept

It's no secret the printer business relies on hefty ink refill markups. The printers are disposable, often cheaper than the ink they come packaged with. But customers aren't usually willing to toss out a printer when it runs out of ink, even if refilling it costs more than replacing it.

And good for them! I mean, at least in an environmental sense. Let's not toss a bunch more non-decomposables into the nearest landfill the moment they refuse do anything until their inkwells are filled. But this does nothing for consumers, forcing them to become unwilling adherents to the sunk cost fallacy, especially after they've paid for a couple of ink refills.

Printer companies know their system is ripoff. They know their customers know it's a ripoff. That's why they engage in shady tactics to ensure this steady stream of revenue doesn't dry up. For years, third parties have offered compatible ink refills. And for years, printer companies have been lying to customers to lock these competitors out of the market.

A couple of years back, HP pushed out a firmware update that made it impossible to use third-party refills. It didn't tell customers the update would do this. It just sent out the DRMbomb and triggered it remotely, saying things about "security" and "protecting customers," even as it eliminated their refill options.

[I]n late 2016 or early 2017, Epson started sending deceptive updates to many of its printers. Just like HP, Epson disguised these updates as routine software improvements, when really they were poison pills, designed to downgrade printers so they could only work with Epson's expensive ink systems.

EFF found out about this thanks to an eagle-eyed supporter in Texas, and we've taken the step of alerting the Texas Attorney General's office about the many Texas statutes Epson's behavior may violate. If you're in another state and had a similar experience with your Epson printer, please get in touch.

The last touch is nice. This isn't just a warning about printer company tactics. It's an actual complaint, made to a government authority, about deceptive tactics being deployed by printer companies.

The problem is deeper than simply screwing customers out of cheaper ink options. Sending out feature-crippling firmware under the guise of "security updates" just teaches customers to distrust updates. And this is something consumers can't afford. The NSA-powered ransomware deployed by malicious hackers targeted unpatched hardware and software. When a company tells you it's making its product more secure, but is really doing nothing more than making your purchased product more worthless, it encourages customers to steer clear of recommended updates, even if those might patch vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminals and state-sponsored hackers.

Then there's the part the Texas AG might be more concerned with: the artificial restriction of competition through deceptively-portrayed firmware updates. There may be violations of actual laws at play here, both in the deception and the anti-competitive practices. Violating the customers' trust may result in reputational damage. An investigation into Epson's business practices -- as is encouraged by the EFF's letter [PDF] -- may result in the loss of something companies find far more valuable than the trust of their customers: actual money.

from the meet-the-new-boss dept

As hardware vendors and cellular carriers prepare deployment of fifth-generation wireless networks, you may have noticed that the hype has gotten a little out of control. Claims that 5G will magically revolutionize the broadband sector sound nice and all, but as we've noted repeatedly, 5G is really more of a modest evolution in existing networks, not some kind of revolutionary panacea that's going to change everything. Still, claims that 5G will somehow usher in amazing smart cities or somehow result in a four day work week for everyone (what?) get far more traction than they probably deserve.

Alongside the generalized hype, carriers are pushing another narrative: that 5G wireless is so incredible, it's going to fix all of the telecom sector's biggest problems by delivering a massive new wave of competition. This competition will be so amazing that net neutrality will apparently be made irrelevant. It's largely bunk originating with telecom industry marketing departments, dutifully swallowed and regurgitated by an unskeptical press.

The problem: 5G, like 4G before it, isn't going to be cheap. Companies like Verizon, AT&T, and CenturyLink still enjoy a monopoly over the backhaul and core transit lines that feed these networks, meaning they're going to do everything in their power to keep prices high along the chain. Protectionist blacklisting of cheap Chinese network hardware and the death of net neutrality isn't likely to help, and Wall Street is making it clear they want 5G priced at a premium to quickly recoup any investment cost:

"How might this look? Well, we could borrow from some other industries. One simple way would be a flat premium price, similar to the "tiers" of Netflix for a higher number of devices or 4K/Ultra HD. So, perhaps $10 per line for 5G, or $25 for a family plan. Another approach would be more akin to broadband, where there are pricing tiers for different levels of service performance. So if the base 4G LTE plan is $50 per month today, for an average 100 Mbps service, 5G packages could be sold in gradations of $10 for higher speeds (i.e. $60 for 300 Mbps, $70 for 500, $80 for 1 Gbps, and so on)."

Despite what you'll hear from carriers, 5G also isn't going to be particularly widely deployed for those living in second or third tier cities or rural markets. You know, the places already hit the hardest by the cable industry's growing monopoly over decent broadband speeds. If you stop for a moment and look beyond the 5G hype curtain, you'll see even Wall Street warning that promises of 5G as a competitive panacea (or a real challenger to cable's domination of speeds of 50 Mbps or above) are dramatically overstated. Analysts at Jefferies, for example, had this to say:

"We continue to believe the threat of 5G to wired broadband is overblown. We are skeptical on the economic viability for a deep rollout given the propagation characteristics of mmWave, and expect sign ups will be slow. Further, given the full footprint rollout of DOCSIS 3.1, and the ability to upgrade the HFC plant to 10 GB symmetrical speeds with little capital investment, we expect 5G's perceived speed advantage will be short lived.”

And while you'll hear a lot of folks at the FCC and elsewhere hyping "fixed" 5G as a real competitive panacea (largely to justify carrier requests for broad, almost mindless deregulation), analysts are skeptical here, too:

"“By the end of 2020, 5G fixed wireless solutions remain niche despite deployments by more than 50 network operators worldwide,” the analysts at CCS Insights wrote in one of their predictions for 2019. “A slew of providers offers fixed wireless access as an alternative to fibre in high-density areas. They follow early launches of 5G networks in the US that take the same approach to providing broadband access in a fixed location. However, such services remain niche, representing only a tiny fraction of total 5G connections in the long term."

To be clear: 5G is going to eventually provide faster, lower latency, and more resilient networks, when it actually arrives at any real scale (think 2021 or later). But it's not going to fix all of the problems that have made U.S. broadband so terribly mediocre, including a lack of serious competition in less affluent markets, the monopoly over the business data services (BDS) market, or those protectionist laws in 21 states monopolies literally purchased in
a bid to hamper competition.

And if ISPs win their looming court case over net neutrality, the nickel-and-diming we're already seeing is going to seem downright quaint in a few years, as Wall Street pushes carriers to find new, "creative" ways to charge even more money for the same service.

from the gov't-getting-sick-of-whatever-justice-actually-remains-in-the-justice-syste dept

New York City's prosecutors just admitted they use the bail system to punish people for being accused of criminal acts. It's not there to serve its intended purpose: to ensure the return of charged individuals to court, where they're presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The bail system isn't supposed to keep people locked up. But that's the way it's been used for years. Prosecutors often ask for excessive bail amounts. Judges often grant them. The argument made for high bail amounts -- which ensure only the most well-to-do can remain free while awaiting trial -- is that arrested people are flight risks and/or more inherently dangerous than all the people the police haven't gotten around to arresting yet.

Statistical studies have continually shown that these concerns are exaggerated; the vast majority of people who are arrested and then make bail do not commit violent crimes while their cases are pending. In fact, according to a study by New York City's Criminal Justice Agency, only 3 percent of “at risk” defendants who make bail are even arrested (let alone convicted) for a violent crime while their initial cases are pending. Similarly, a recent study by the Vera Institute of Justice tracked more than fifty people who were released from court in New York City without having to pay their entire bail—only two were rearrested on a new violent felony charge over the following year.

There goes the "public safety" argument. High bails are supposedly needed because presumptively innocent people are inveterate criminals prone to committing crime after crime until their return to court.

And here comes the "public safety" argument, inadvertently highlighting prosecutors' bail-based bullshit. Grassroot groups, led by RFK Human Rights, are posting bail for hundreds of incarcerated suspects. Money has been raised to post bail for "every woman, sixteen- and seventeen- year-old" currently housed in a NYC jail. The parade of horribles is back and it shows the government isn't interested in allowing the bail system to, you know, work.

[W]hat the reaction to the Mass Bailout shows, in stark contrast, is that the DAs use bail money for very different purposes than it was designed for. They request these bails ostensibly to ensure the accused show up to court; yet now that they are actually being posted, the DAs are crying foul and warning that freeing the accused will endanger “public safety.” They are therefore admitting what so many in affected communities already know to be true: that money bail routinely—and illegally—is set too high for poor defendants to afford, solely for the improper purpose of keeping them in jail before trial.

This isn't just bad optics by the DAs. This is also illegal. The sole purpose of bail, according to New York law, is to ensure the return of the accused to court. It cannot be used to lock accused suspects up for "public safety" reasons. But this reaction by city prosecutors makes it clear they believe they can use the system the way the law says they can't. And this reaction -- as bad and as unlawful as it is -- will probably be replicated anywhere bail relief efforts/bail reforms are deployed.

This just drives the point home that one-half of the justice system gives zero fucks about justice, due process, or any other safeguards erected against government power over the years. All they want is to lock people up and keep them locked up, even if they've never received their day in court.