In this in-depth article, which is a kind of 2015/16 preview, I will look to answer some of the following questions:

• Can you buy too many players in a short space of time? Can a team be too ‘new’? Is player turnover too high at Anfield right now?

• Liverpool appear to have bought very well, but can a team be too young?

• What is the unique connection between each of Liverpool’s five best Premier League seasons? – and how does it relate to 2015/16?

• Are Liverpool outsiders for the title? Or is even the top four too high a bar to set? Much was spoken about ‘par’ last season, but what should par be for this season? – has it changed? And why does it remain a fair guide?

Along the way I will introduce some interactive graphics, to highlight the points I’m making. (Note: some coffee may be required for the journey.)

Part One: LFC’s Curious Case of Net Spends and New Players

Something odd happened in Liverpool’s five best Premier League seasons – those campaigns where they either challenged for the title, finished as runners-up, and/or posted a points total of 80 or greater.

It also seems to coincide with what Damien Comolli told Talksport recently, about the pitfalls of adding too many new players at once – but more on that particular aspect later. It all led me to analyse the approaching season from a perspective that I doubt anyone else will take, as I explain some precedents that seem to limit what the Reds can achieve, but also some which show what might just be possible.

The five seasons (Vivaldi’s long-lost work)

The five seasons in which I noted a surprising – but perhaps explainable – pattern were: 1996/97, when Roy Evans’ Reds famously finished 4th in a two-horse race (in mid-April 1997, after 33 games, his side were 2nd, just three points behind Man United, with a virtually identical goal difference); 2001/02, when Gérard Houllier’s side finished 2nd with 80 points; 2005/06, when Rafa Benítez’s side finished 3rd with 82 points; 2008/09, when the Spaniard’s side challenged for the title and finished 2nd, with just two defeats and 86 points; and 2013/14, when Brendan Rodgers’ side won 26 of 38 games in finishing 2nd with 84 points – taking the title down to the last game, and finishing the closest to the Champions (two points) that the club has managed in the past 25 years.

In all five seasons – in both the summers leading up to the campaigns, and during the seasons (or during the transfer window, once that was introduced) – Liverpool didn’t spend very much money in net terms. And that struck me as particularly odd.

Adding to the reams of work by others, I have proved – in association with Graeme Riley, and our extensive Transfer Price Index – that money plays a big part in success (we proved it with transfer fees and inflation, others have proved it with wage bill data). check out Vice Sports this coming week for a piece I’ve written on the subject, and see the graphic below for just one quick example:

So why should this weird quirk appear with Liverpool’s spending?

I can think of two reasons that help explain it: the first is that net spend is unreliable, as I’ve been saying for some time now; and the other, which I will come to, is more intriguing, particularly given the club’s current approach to transfers – as hinted at by Comolli.

In addition to this, there are a few other precedents that Liverpool will have to overturn to challenge for the title in 2015/16 – if that’s what fans want or expect.

But first, here are some graphics – created by Robert Radburn with our TPI data – to show the seasons in question. The top one is interactive, whereas those that follow are screenshots. On the interactive graphs, you should be able to select any team, to make comparisons.

Quirks

For five years now I’ve been arguing that net spend is not a good indicator of league fortunes – it’s better than gross spend, which is hugely misleading, but net spend still relies on what can (or cannot) be sold, and often has arbitrary cut-off points. The cost of the team – the £XI as we call it on this site (that’s all 38 XIs of a club’s league season with inflation taken into account) – is far more telling; as is its wage bill (although no model is perfect).

However, net spend is interesting in terms of whether or not it gives a boost. In some ways a positive net spend can be seen like a shot in the arm, but it still depends on what resources were present to start with – a shot in the arm isn’t going to stir a corpse. A £50m net spend isn’t going to turn a preexisting £5m squad into title challengers, although it should make that team considerably better – if not ten times better (it doesn’t work like that, with the law of diminishing returns); but a £50m net spend by the reigning champions might be enough to keep them ticking over. Then again, the reigning champions might not even need to spend that much, if they’re in such good shape, and don’t have a lot of older players to replace.

So whatever the total of Liverpool’s net spend in any of these seasons, it was never going to tell the whole story – the £XI gives a clearer picture. Net spends often fluctuate wildly from season to season, whereas the £XI increases and decreases much less dramatically.

Still, it’s fascinating that these five seasons in particular show a really low net spend for Liverpool. There’s also the issue of how many of the brand new players made it into the team on a regular basis.

Dead precedents

While precedents don’t determine what happens in the future, they do show how success was achieved in the past. And until people break the usual patterns – and do so more than to simply be the exception to the rule – then it seems logical to suggest those patterns hold some meaning. After all, we’re not talking about random factors that have nothing to do with football, like the colour of the players’ hair or what their first name is. We’re talking about a lot of collective wisdom, not nonsensical coincidences, that have gone into them ending up at the best clubs.

Bolt stands at a statuesque 6ft 5in – which can, according to which expert you listen to, be a help or a hindrance. On the one hand his long legs help propel him to the front of the field; on the other, a shorter sprinter is able to move from a crouched position to upright quicker – and so can be faster off the blocks. Bolt’s start technique has caused him problems, though he says he has been working hard on improving it. Bolt’s height allows him to hold speed for longer and decelerate at a slower rate than a shorter sprinter. And his lean frame also helps, according to Professor Alan Nevill from the University of Wolverhampton, which carried out a study looking into the evolving body type of sprinters. “The sprinters with the leaner, more linear body shapes are gaining advantage towards the second part of the race,” he said. “They can keep up with the more powerful, bulky runners who get the explosive starts and then have a longer stride after about 40m to 50 metres. I believe the longer stride is showing benefit in the latter part of the race.”

At 6’5”, Bolt seems too tall to be a sprinter, but it’s also fair to conclude that someone who stands 7-feet tall would surely be too awkwardly proportioned to be as quick. Equally, someone who is only 5’6” would have a far shorter stride, and surely be too slow over that kind of distance. Until these parameters are broken, I’d say that there is an optimum height for being a sprinter – so the ten fastest men in the world probably average around 6’2”, with Bolt an outlier. (The 100m world record holders since 1977 range from 5’9” to 6’5”, with the most recent Bolt, at 6’5”, and Asafa Powell, at 6’3”. Justin Gatlin is 6’1”, and it’s 13 years since someone under 6’ held the record.)

However, this doesn’t mean that anyone over 5’6”, and under 7-foot – or who averages 6’2” – is therefore able to win the Olympic gold. It just means that someone of mere average height probably won’t be the quickest man in the world, and that anyone below average stands little or no chance. The fastest runners’ height is not a mere coincidence in their success.

Equally, spending billions on wages in and of itself won’t make you a great team unless you spend that money wisely. Teams with high squad costs and big wage bills still occasionally falter; but equally, the successful Premier League teams in the past 11 seasons have all had high squad costs and big wage bills (because there’s three of them, and all three rarely falter at once). Until someone eschews money and achieves Premier League success based purely on coaching or youth development, or with an analytics tool that helps them bamboozle the rest by finding hitherto undiscovered world-class players, then the precedents will hold some water.

A lot of collective wisdom goes into how much players cost and how much they get paid, so it’s not like – to use an example I was quoted – anyone is going to pay Adam Bogdan £5m a week. Anyone who did that could not have been working in football for long, and would not continue to work in football for long.

That was an extreme example that was created by someone to show that paying higher wages can be meaningless. And of course, giving more money to average players isn’t going to make them better, just as spending billions on average players won’t make your team better. Success is based on the collection of a lot of coveted and highly-rated players – to whom large wages are awarded based on past performances and future potential; along with the procurement of the top managers, who want to work with the best players (and the best players demand to be paid the best wages, and so on).

With this is mind I thought I’d look back at some of Liverpool’s experiences, to add to the observations on the five seasons covered earlier.

Concerns

In terms of Liverpool’s upcoming season there are two areas of concern, based on the precedent of their spending in the past two summers. This does not relate to the specific players the club has bought, who, to me, seem to tick a lot of different boxes. It relates to two other issues: age, and team longevity.

For Liverpool to excel, the team will have to disprove past rules.

The first is average age. Using the modern era for the purposes of practicality in data collection (and the fact that it’s the “scientific age” of the sport), there have been 23 seasons in the Premier League period, each containing 20-22 teams. So that’s 466 “teams” (with a single team being all league XIs of one club in one season).

Of those 466 teams, just 4% have been as young as I anticipate Liverpool’s 2015/16 team being – and that’s if the Reds’ best players are available often enough.

Liverpool’s probable best XI for the coming campaign – Mignolet, Moreno, Sakho, Skrtel, Clyne, Milner, Henderson, Coutino, Firmino, Sturridge and Benteke – average out at exactly 25. The highest position in the Premier League that any team with an average age that low (or lower) has finished is 3rd (Leeds 2000, Newcastle 2003 and Arsenal 2008).

What’s telling is that the 12 players Rodgers has competing for seven places on the bench (or who might usurp members of the XI, depending on issues of tactics, form and fitness) are actually younger. Unless Kolo Toure gets a game – and that’s unlikely – then Lucas, at 28, is the oldest player to step in. (I’m assuming that Jose Enrique, like Rickie Lambert up until the weekend, is an outcast – just waiting to be sold – along with Balotelli and Borini).

Aside from Lallana, who Rodgers likes to select (but Firmino may edge out), the players who are perhaps closest to forcing their way into the XI, as things stand, are Can (21), Ibe (18) and Origi (20); although Joe Gomez, aged 18, was one of the stars of preseason.

They would all bring down the average age to something bordering on ‘experimental’. The same would apply if adding Lazar Markovic (21), although due to the number of attacking-midfielders-who-can-also-play-wide he looks a fair way down the pecking order right now.

If Lovren replaces Sakho – something I’m not keen on (but looks likely – then the average age increases by a fraction; but if he replaces Skrtel then it decreases by a greater amount. Lucas is younger than Milner (as is Joe Allen, who is the same age as Henderson), and Ings, like Origi, is younger than Benteke and Sturridge.

It’s not unthinkable that the Reds could field a team that would average an insanely low 23 years of age (Mignolet, Gomez, Sakho, Skrtel, Clyne, Henderson, Coutinho, Can, Benteke, Ibe and Firmino), and yet in terms of talent you’d probably have no objection to it being selected. The youngest XI in the modern era – when averaged across the course of all 38 games – is precisely 24 (Paul Lambert’s Villa in 2012/13, and David O’Leary’s Leeds United twelve years earlier).

The great question is then whether a team with an average age below anything seen in two-and-a-half decades of top-flight football (and maybe much further back, if ever seen at all) could overcome what generally seems to hold young sides back: naivety, and the obvious lack of experience, which can be most obvious when the going gets tough. Perhaps a club like Ajax in Holland could thrive in such circumstances, but in a financial super-league like England there’s a more brutal reality.

Are Liverpool fans prepared for another year experiencing “an exciting young team” ? Both Leeds and Arsenal – the two best performers since 1992 with teams aged under 25 – had their best players cherrypicked by richer clubs, although in Leeds’ case it was their own financial stupidity that caused the exodus (including Harry Kewell to Liverpool in 2003 and one James Milner to Newcastle in 2004). They messed up a promising project by overspending on signings (and goldfish); their young homegrown stars (Kewell, Milner, Smith, Hart, McPhail, Carson, et al) were not the problem. It’s hard to know whether that team could have been kept together, had the club been better run, and what they might have achieved. But it yet again comes back to all clubs being vulnerable to wealthier rivals.

Then there is the sheer newness of this Liverpool team; and indeed, pretty much the entire squad.

It makes sense to see if this Liverpool side can mature together, but before it gets to reach “peak” age there will be further exits. The hope, for fans, is that enough of the better players remain, as they approach or hit their mid-20s, and that there is an average time spent at the club greater than the current figure of just two years.

It’s all so new

Going back to the five aforementioned seasons when the net spend was low, it’s interesting to note that most of those new players who did arrive failed to make it into the top appearance lists.

In 1996/97, neither of the two new signings – Patrick Berger and Bjorn Tore Kvarme – were in the top 10 for the club’s appearance makers. In 2001/02, just two of the new signings – John Arne Riise and Jerzy Dudek – were regulars. In 2005/06, only Pepe Reina was a stalwart, with Peter Crouch and Momo Sissoko ranking 10th and 12th respectively for overall appearances. (Daniel Agger, who arrived in January, was eased in, with just four games.) In 2008/09, only Albert Riera, from a handful of new arrivals, played more than half of the games (28 of 55). And in 2013/14, only Simon Mignolet (2nd) ranked in the top 12 appearance makers.

Now, a lot of these new players – across all five seasons – simply weren’t up to the required standard, or never quite adjusted to their role (or the expectations that come with the shirt). Others suffered injuries, or were only ever intended as squad players, there to provide insurance that was never really called upon.

An obvious response is: had these signings been better, then the Reds might have won the title in one or two of the given seasons.

Well, yes – but it’s always easy to say that. My argument is always that bad recruitment spells happen, and no one gets close to the magical 100% success rate; some years your signings work out, and some they don’t, and it’s not always obvious or predictable – before we add the wisdom of hindsight – as to who will succeed and who will fail. (For example, Chelsea buying Shevchenko and Torres: world-class, supposed peak-years’ players, one of whom had Premier League experience; or the “top, top” players United signed last summer, in Di Maria and Falcao, who were little better than Lallana and Lambert but cost a hell of a lot more.)

And people can always look back and say “if our transfers had been better” or “if our finishing had been better” or “if our defending had been better” – as if these things are easy to get right in unison. There’s usually somewhere that you fall short, and it’s never as simple to retrospectively correct that, and assume everything else stays the same. Any time you adjust anything in football there is a knock-on effect.

However, did the absence of new players actually help in those ‘successful’ seasons? It’s hard to say for sure, but could there be some type of correlation? Other seasons saw a greater number of successful brand new signings going into the XI, and yet these were the five best league campaigns. Why?

For example, 2007/08 is not remembered as an amazing season. Liverpool finished 4th, albeit with a fairly healthy 76 points (although they did better in the Champions League, where they reached the semi-finals). Nothing was won, but six of the top 11 appearance makers were signed in 2007, albeit two of them in the January, therefore six months before that campaign started. Still, that’s four of the summer signings, three of whom – Torres, Babel and Benayoun – were in the club’s top seven for games played that season. Liverpool were to become a better side a year later; ‘only’ making the quarter-finals of the Champions League but posting what remains the club’s best Premier League points tally – 86 – as the Reds improved by two league positions and ten points. Those 2007 signings played a fairly key role in finishing 2nd; the 2008 signings did not.

What’s also interesting is that Liverpool’s spending in the 12-24 months before these five ‘peak’ seasons was relatively high, as was the turnover of players.

For instance, in Houllier’s case the big spending came in 1999/00, with the treble of 2001 based largely on that earlier spending, and the 2nd-placed finish coming in 2002, still mostly with the 1999/00 buys at its core (Hamann, Henchoz, Hyypia and Heskey … Perhaps Liverpool should just sign players with a surnames beginning with H? This is of course a joke, lest anyone try and use this kind of silly argument.)

These four ‘H’s worked in tandem with three youth graduates – Carragher, Owen and Gerrard. For a few seasons, these seven were key first-XI players; and between 1999 and 2002 they were mostly under 25, and all under 28.

My sense here is that it takes time to bear the fruits of a big net spend; particularly if there is a high turnover of players. Many of the new signings of 1999 settled quickly – Hyypia was clearly a star from the start – but the team wasn’t as good in 2000 as it was in 2001 and 2002.

“I thought it was a huge risk last year after selling Suarez and bringing in, I think, nine. Now they have decided to change a lot again and totally rebuild. That is always a massive, massive risk. They have bought in players who have got talent, but they are going to compete against some very settled teams. Arsenal, [Manchester] United, [Manchester] City and Chelsea are making some very subtle adjustments to their squad and Liverpool are changing everything every year. I’m not convinced it is the right approach. It is too much in two off-seasons.”

The data seems to back this up, although there is one very notable precedent that suggests Comolli could be wrong; albeit a precedent (which I will come to) provided by a club in a very different situation.

Massive risk?

Many individuals – younger and older, foreign and homegrown – take time to settle; but equally, unless there’s some uncanny clairvoyance, a newly-assembled side won’t have the understanding of one that’s in its second or third season together. A wonderful new signing might provide some impetus, and add some freshness to what might otherwise be in danger of growing old or stale – but could keeping the core of a side together be a more crucial route to success? Are Liverpool taking a “massive, massive risk”, or will bringing in better players than already at the club – if that’s what the 2015 signings are – pan out for the best?

A high net spend involving young players may mean that the rewards are delayed, as potential can take time to blossom into top-level consistency. And yet I’ve no doubt that, on the whole, buying players aged 18-25 is a better use of resources than going for the perceived ‘finished product’ (not least because no matter how many ‘finished product’ signings I analyse, there’s no clearer success rate, beyond a very small increase; but with the added risk of overpriced fees, overly large wages and reduced sell-on options).

The catch-22 becomes that if you aren’t winning things it becomes harder to keep the core of an emerging side together, and that it’s harder to win things if you have no more than the core of an emerging side.

Cups (a very brief detour)

Of course, each season is different – and finding five similar patterns relating to spending and integrating new players does not mean that this will be the only reason why the Reds performed better in those seasons than in others.

In those five seasons Liverpool also played relatively little European football (compared with what the club was used to at the time), and not as much cup football in general. Only one of the five seasons resulted in a trophy, 2006’s FA Cup; indeed, it was the only cup final in these five seasons – whereas in the ten seasons either side of these five (so the one preceding and succeeding each) saw the Reds reach an astonishing ten cup finals.

Again, this suggests that unless you have a mega-squad, balancing the cups and the league is a near-impossible feat.

As noted earlier, the most likely Liverpool XI this season averages precisely 25 years of age and has just 2.1 full seasons at the club. So not only is it young, but it’s newly assembled.

It’s hard to think of a young side assembled in such a short space of time that has gone on to be successful – although there is one interesting precedent.

That precedent aside, there have been young sides where a clutch of homegrown players have come through the ranks over two or three seasons – although Man United’s mid-‘90s side was mixed with longstanding older pros like Cantona, Bruce, Pallister, Irwin and Schmeichel. But these situations – as also seen at Barcelona in recent times – often suggest that some harmony and synchronicity has been developed together in youth teams.

The successful Arsenal sides between 1998-2004 were built on a core of long-serving players; from the famous defence (mostly in place for a decade) and the likes of Ian Wright and Ray Parlour in 1998, to players like Vieira and Bergkamp, who were the elder statesmen by the time Wenger won what remains his final title in 2004. Chelsea’s champions of 2010 – the oldest to do so since the league was rebranded (average age just under 29) – had so many players still around from the 2005 and 2006 triumphs.

Blackburn assembled their side – one of the youngest champions of the past two and a half decades (25.5) over a slightly longer period of time than seen at Chelsea and City, not least because they were starting in a lower division; with an average of 2.5 full seasons at the club before the famous 1994/95 season began.

There have been youngish sides assembled in double-quick time, but these – Chelsea and Man City – were playthings of two of the richest men in the world, with unparalleled short-term investment (even greater, relatively speaking, than seen at Ewood Park two decades ago). Chelsea and Man City were buying large numbers of elite and often established talent, and discarding the many who didn’t make the grade (often also big names), no matter what they had cost. Liverpool don’t have that kind of money.

(As another quick aside here, someone took me to task on Twitter saying that Liverpool are surely richer now than the club was under David Moores in the mid-‘90s, not least because of the TV deal money, and the fact that the club are now in the top 10 of world football finance. I pointed out that in relative terms, the Reds were very rich 20 years ago – they broke the British transfer record in 1991 and 1995, and started the Premier League era with the 2nd-costliest side in the league, behind only Manchester United. And yet last season Liverpool had the 5th-costliest £XI, the 5th-highest wage-bill and were the country’s 5th wealthiest club in the Deloitte Football Money League rankings. It’s one thing to be the 9th-wealthiest club in the world; it’s another to be behind four other clubs in your own country. Liverpool are “richer” than Juventus, but Juventus are the richest Italian club, and that is in part why they win their league and guarantee continual Champions League qualification.)

Between 2003 and 2005 Chelsea bought no fewer than 18 senior players who each cost between £12m-£60m in today’s money – amounting to an astonishing £671m after TPI inflation. Remember, this was over a decade ago, and even without inflation it came to £209m in a 24-month period – and that’s when players on average cost only a third of what they do now. Half of the 18 were either flops or unremarkable, but the other half helped win those coveted league titles.

The 2005 vintage remain the Premier League era’s youngest champions, at 25.2 – but with the likes of Arjen Robben and Petr Cech – they were full of higher-end purchases than Liverpool are now making. And they still had a core of players in their mid-20s – Lampard, Terry, Gallas and Guðjohnsen – who had four or more years at the club. Even so, it was largely a brand-new project: the eleven top appearance makers for them that season averaged just 1.8 full years at the club at the start of the campaign. (By contrast, Mourinho’s recent title-winning squad had an average of over three seasons at the club before the start of the campaign.)

Man City’s 2012 title was achieved with an average age of 25.7 – so still pretty young, and in the ballpark of both Blackburn and Chelsea’s initial breakthroughs. And they had an average of 2.1 full seasons at the club – exactly the same as Liverpool’s current (mostly likely) strongest XI. In City’s case, the defence – where understanding is arguably more important than the improvisation of attacking – was actually fairly well established: an average of four full seasons between Hart, Zabaleta, Richards and Kompany, with Gael Clichy the one regular new addition.

City’s route to the top took a bit longer than Chelsea’s, as they weren’t already in the Champions League. Between 2008 and 2014, and with inflation added, City spent one billion pounds on transfers (or almost £700m without inflation). In that time they spent £406m on duds, rejects and underwhelmers (£300m without inflation. And in fairness, a couple of these duds still remain at the club and may turn their fortunes around). They spent £440m in today’s money in what turned out to be fairly successful or very successful purchases (£288m in uninflated money; the uninflated amount being cheaper on account of the successful buys mostly taking place between 2008-2011 – which makes them slightly more expensive in 2015 money, on account of the market conditions during the time of purchase). They also spent £130m (£100m uninflated) on players who did little better or worse than okay.

City’s successful buys averaged 24.5 years of age, and the flops averaged 24.8 years of age – much the same. And yet the mediocre bunch averaged 26.9. The success rates – roughly 50-50 – fit in with my “Tomkins’ Law” theory of transfers, but as with Chelsea a decade earlier, success was in part due to the way City could write off a high number of expensive duds without it limiting the amount of expensive new players they could gamble on (although FFP has slowed this, and Chelsea have also learnt to live within their means).

If you go back through all the other successful teams – especially those that didn’t inject unprecedented sums into the squad – then I’m pretty sure you won’t find a lower average age than Liverpool’s likely XI this season, nor a shorter period of time spent at the club. So as I said, this is experimental. As explained, there are some precedents, but they were achieved with a higher number of elite-level buys who were far more expensive than what the Reds have acquired.

Having said that, Liverpool (presumably?) aren’t looking to win the league this season. If breaking back into the top four is the aim, then there have been eight occasions where a team averaging 24-25 years of age has finished 3rd or 4th. So it’s possible – but of the 92 top four places since 1992, just 8.7% have been occupied by a team this young; and of the 46 top two spaces, it’s 0%. Of course, theoretically, if you had a team comprised of the world’s best XI 23-year-olds you could expect do better; but this is an unlikely scenario for any club.

But all this is based on Liverpool being able to field what I believe to be an approximate best XI. And this almost never happens.

Where Liverpool would almost certainly break new ground is – where this could get very interesting – is if Martin Skrtel gets injured. Then, Jordan Henderson, with just four full seasons, then becomes the longest serving player in the starting XI. Let that sink in for a minute.

Unless Lucas Leiva comes into the side, it will likely average around just 1.5 full seasons at the club; and with Lovren presumably replacing Skrtel (if/when the oldest first XI player is injured) alongside Sakho, there’s a very real chance that the average age of the side could be below 23.

Indeed, I managed to pick an XI with eight full internationals, plus Can, Gomez and Ibe, that averaged just 22.4 – which seems utterly insane. Given that players can often play U21 football up to the age of 23, this is essentially an U21 side.

Part Two: closer to the Title Zone

Liverpool’s probable strongest XI projects them closer to what I termed the Title Zone: the minimum cost of every champions’ £XI (the average cost of all 38 XIs in a season, adjusted for inflation) from 2004/05 to 2014/15.

While the Title Zone doesn’t say that this amount is definitely required for a team to succeed, it’s a pretty strong precedent.

Inflation actually means that the Title Zone – which was £210m in 2014 money – has now risen to £236m. This is because 2014 money is less than 2015 money, given that prices have sharply risen once again. If you bought a player for £20m in 2011, in terms of the transfer fee paid he is essentially now a £35m player; as that’s what the equivalent cost would be to buy him this summer. So in 2015 money, the cheapest title-winning £XI since 2004 is £236m (the most expensive is over £100m more than that).

Even so, Liverpool should move a little nearer to the Title Zone than they were last season – assuming that the best players stay fit. This is based on the team containing Firmino, Benteke, Henderson and Sakho, all of whom cost over £20m in 2015 money (not least because two of them were bought with 2015 money; even the slowest readers out there should pick that up). Add Sturridge (£19.5m) and you can see the quality that money has bought.

The average cost of Liverpool’s XI last season (the £XI), in 2014 money, was £142m. That same £XI in 2015 money now equates to £159m, but obviously the other 19 clubs’ £XI rise by the same factor (although players bought in 2014/15 do not yet have inflation applied; 2015 money is calculated at the end of the 2014/15 season, and this summer’s deals will contribute to 2016 money).

What I believe is Liverpool’s strongest XI now costs £190m, after inflation. So even though the Title Zone threshold has risen by 12.3% with inflation, the cost of Liverpool’s best XI has increased by 19.5%. Obviously where problems arise is if those better players get replaced in the XI by cheaper squad players; so by May, Liverpool’s £XI could still theoretically register around £160m. Or if things get really bad, even lower. (Remember, the £XI is not the best XI, but the average cost of all 38 XIs.)

Of course, add Lovren (£20m) instead of Skrtel (£12.6m), and the team arguably gets worse, but costlier. The most expensive theoretical XI I could concoct – with everyone in their correct positions – from Liverpool’s current squad is £233m; so still not quite in the Title Zone.

This shows the downside of suggesting every player is worth what is paid; obviously a lot of players are not, and any club’s most expensive signings will still probably have a 50-50 hit/fail rate. (Eight of the 16 most expensive Premier League-era signings, when adjusted for inflation, were clear flops.) But as noted earlier, the fees are built on logic and assessment, and are (mostly) not arbitrary amounts plucked from thin air. And players can also be worth more than was paid for them, not just less. So some balancing-out occurs.

Excessive Hit Rates and Excessive Flop Rates

The £XI, as a predictive tool, works fairly well on account of this balancing out – particularly when it’s across a large number of expensive signings. It can occasionally be horribly wayward, in terms of what a club ends up thinking a large number of players are worth; so, for example, when the Blackburn team assembled by Roy Hodgson got relegated in 1999, shortly after he was fired, it remains the costliest £XI to suffer that fate. It was a horrible misjudgement. While Hodgson did very well at Fulham and West Brom, his time at bigger clubs (as Blackburn were back then) was fairly disastrous.

In today’s money, signings like Kevin Davies (£28.3m), Christian Dailly (£20.7m), Sebastian Perez (£11.7m) and Nathan Blake (£16.6m) – £77m on four 1998 arrivals – helped do nothing more than root Rovers to the foot of the table. And although Brian Kidd improved them in the second half of that season (better points per game, raising them one league position in the process), the further £70m (TPI) he spent on Ashley Ward, Matt Jansen, Jason McAteer, Lee Carsley and Keith Gillespie, to try and buy Rovers’ way out of trouble, just meant that £150m in 2015 money was very unwisely invested. In hindsight, those players as a collective weren’t even worth half of what was paid.

However, in the new millennium there is usually a much greater wisdom at work at the richest clubs; indeed, it was seen at Blackburn 20 years ago, before Hodgson arrived. For all Kenny Dalglish’s perceived faults as a modern-day manager, he bought some exceptional talent between 1985 and 1995. In today’s money, the collective of Alan Shearer, Chris Sutton, Tim Flowers, David Batty, Henning Berg, Tim Sherwood, Stuart Ripley and Graeme Le Saux – bought between 1992 and 1994 – cost virtually the same as what Rovers paid in that single ill-fated season under Hodgson and Kidd, and helped them to the title.

And whereas the £150m Kenny Dalglish spent on the eight big successes on way to winning the title was turned into £200m with sell-on fees (win the title, make £50m profit when selling the players), the £147m spent by Hodgson and Kidd recouped a horrific £29m, for a loss of £118m. (Dalglish also signed a few flops between 1991 and 1995, although they only cost around £30m combined.)

Dalglish’s Blackburn bucked the 50-50 success/failure transfer rule, but it was an era of fewer squad players, who now “fail” by definition of being barely used. Dalglish’s best Liverpool side – 1987/88 – also bucked the trend, in terms of an incredible hit rate; something that the Scot could not maintain later in his first tenure (albeit directly after Hillsborough).

However, 1987/88 also touches on the issue of whether a number of new players disrupt the flow. Interestingly, the spending that had a near 100% success rate – Aldridge, Barnes, Beardsley and Houghton – was split between January, June, July and October; with Nigel Spackman – only a short-term success – arriving in February 1987. So Aldridge was already settled (if not really scoring) by the time Barnes and Beardsley arrived in the summer, and Houghton was added 16 games into the famous 1987/88 season; five key players in that campaign (Spackman played 27 times in the league), but each phased into the club at different times during the calendar year.

The biggest clubs now have all kinds of experts to identify and procure elite players. And although they still often end up with the same circa 50% success/50% fail rate from shelling out big fees, they fill their teams with the top-class buys that come off, and aren’t bankrupted by the 50% that don’t. They keep Drogba and write off Shevchenko and Torres and Wright-Phillips; they keep Rooney and write off Veron and Anderson and Di Maria; they keep Silva and write off Robinho and Jo and Jovetic; and so on. (Even so, the collective wisdom means that they are not having to choose between keeping Kevin Davies and Nathan Blake.)

On average, an £XI will be roughly half of what the club’s squad costs in current money. In other words, most seasons will result in a club not using half of its expenditure in the starting XI. (My TPI co-creator, Graeme Riley, wrote about Wastage here: on average over the past 23 season, only 52% of all club’s squad costs have been reflected in their £XIs; for the past dozen champions it’s been 55% utilised, 45% “wastage”.)

Of course, it also depends on those more expensive sides being managed in the correct way; put a monkey in charge and you’ll get chaos (and some bananas). But the richest clubs tend to make sure they have the world’s elite bosses; and when they don’t, as seen with United and David Moyes, they can fall below expectations.

Spending sprees

Since 2010 Liverpool have spent approximately £550m in today’s prices on over 50 players. But they’ve also recouped over £300m in 2015 money in the past five years; which means that (as was the case under Rafa Benítez), the squad was never expensive enough at any one point to be able to select a consistently expensive XI. (And obviously none of the current squad have been sold; that’s over £300m in expenditure.) It’s a continual process of selling in order to try and improve, or selling because the players were unsettled by bigger and/or richer clubs (Mascherano, Torres, Suarez, and now Sterling).

Before the outcasts like Borini and Balotelli are sold (assuming that they can be), Liverpool’s current squad costs £384m in 2015 money, and, bar some unexpected signings, is likely to drop below £350m by the end of the window, once the deadwood is cast adrift.

The Rich Three have squads that cost in excess of £600m. The law of averages suggests that picking a strong £236m side from that is easier than doing so from one costing £350m.

So for Liverpool to be title winners – if people think it’s possible – they’d have to essentially find that 70% of the money spent on current squad costs work out exceptionally well; but for City, United or Chelsea to do so, they’d only need have less than 40% to field an £XI that costs £236m – the Title Zone starting point since 2004.

They have far greater insurance policies, and these kick in during periods of fatigue, injury and suspension. If Liverpool could get 70% of their signings (or 70% of the money they invest) spot-on, it would be breaking all general precedents. However, as shown with Dalglish at Liverpool (first time around) and Blackburn, the laws can be broken on a short-term basis.

But if Liverpool did just that – and hit a 70% success rate – it would still theoretically put them at a disadvantage over the Rich Three if those rivals only got 50% of their investment spot-on.

Does the Title Zone hold water?

Of course, most people could theoretically assemble a title-winning side of purchases that cost under the ‘magic’ £236m that has been required to win the league in the past 11 seasons. For ‘just’ £200m I could assemble, in theory, the XI of Hart, Zabaleta, Kompany, Cahill, Ivanovic, Schneiderlin, Fabregas, Coutinho, Silva, Sturridge and Costa, based on those players’ Premier League performances in the last two years. With a decent manager that lot could probably win the league.

But what are the odds of buying eleven players that good? If doing so with just eleven signings – with just £200m to spend – I’d say 0.1%, at a random guess. And if you took those eleven players to a new club, which automatically changed the dynamics involved, some would suddenly struggle, while others may get serious injuries.

You’d probably need to sign 30 or 40 players to end up with that level of team for that kind of budget, and even then I think it’s highly unlikely. Every successful Premier League team since Wenger’s Invincibles has had to throw in a greater number of £30m-£80m buys (in 2015 money) to bolster the side and boost their odds. Only four players in my mythical side cost more than £20m, and none more than £36m (Silva). No one unearths such a high number of cheap future superstars at such a success rate – or if they do, it’s a freakish outlier.

What are the odds of getting a goalkeeper as good as Joe Hart? Maybe 10%; perhaps an elite Premier League club could buy one of the few comparable talents in world football (such as David De Gea, Petr Cech and Thibaut Courtois). But what about getting some as good as Hart for just £1.6m, which is what Hart cost in 2015 money, and is part of keeping my side at £200m? Maybe 1% at best.

After inflation, Courtois cost £13.8m, Cech £28m (to Chelsea, in his prime; or £13m to Arsenal aged 33) and De Gea £32.6m. So you’re instantly highly unlikely to be able to fashion an elite team for as cheap as the hypothetical one I listed, because no sooner do you start than you find filling the first position on a budget almost impossible.

How many centre-backs would you have to sign to end up with one as good as Kompany for the £8.1m he cost after inflation? Or even £30m? It’s almost a one-in-a-million buy; on a par with the equally cheap Sami Hyypia in 1999. City then threw £38m at the position with Lescott and £42m with Mangala, and couldn’t repeat the ‘lucky’ shot they had with the Belgian. If they could repeat it, they would; but it was a freakishly good bit of business.

Aside from players who’ve come through the system (like John Terry and Jonny Evans), the average price of a title-winning centre-back, in 2015 money, is more than Liverpool have ever paid for one.

You get the incredibly cheap buys like Kompany at one end of the spectrum – exceptions to the rule – and the other end contains Rio Ferdinand, £82m in 2015 money (think of how costly he was in 2002, at £30m), Carvalho at £60.5m, and Lescott at £38m. In the middle is someone like some-time centre-back Ivanovic, at £17.5m. These seven ‘purchased’ centre-backs who helped win their clubs the title in recent years (as regulars in the position) cost £32m on average.

Again, this is just one position. What about the average cost of the recent title-winning strikers? – Rooney, van Persie, Tevez (at City), Drogba (when bought in 2004), Costa and Aguero average out £56m apiece. These are the successful ones their clubs kept to win those trophies, but they still spent similar amounts on players who had a similar pedigree but didn’t prove as successful (Torres, Adebayor by City, Dzeko, Robinho, Shevchenko), all of whom ended up as squad players or were sold for big losses.

The average price of that ‘failure/squad player’ quintet in 2015 money? Also £56m. So these clubs are often paying £56m for hits as well as paying £56m for duds.

And what are the odds of my hypothetical team staying fit for all 38 games? I’d say zero percent, especially with some of those eleven being injury-prone, and given that no team has stayed fit for a whole season in the modern era. So then, unless you have a rare crop of homegrown talent (think United and Liverpool in the ‘90s), the squad players need to be of a sufficient quality, and then we’re back where we started, in terms of what they cost.

Again, it all comes down to odds and probability. We all know that in the Rich Three squads, as well as Liverpool’s and Arsenal’s, there are players where the investment – such as with Lovren at Liverpool – currently falls below what has been hoped for, and so that’s £20m spent on a player who, if everyone is fit, probably doesn’t play (although this is a new season and Rodgers seems prepared to give him another try; something I’m very uneasy about, whilst accepting that centre-backs are usually at their best between 25-33, and plenty of players come good in their second season).

In a sense, Liverpool can only afford fewer such buys – because a greater proportion of the money spent has to go into the XI in order to compete. Richer clubs can afford more Lovrens without denting the first XI.

And yet the Rich Three are also spending bigger individual sums than Liverpool; and the more you pay for a player, the greater the chances of success (but the difference tends to be increased odds of just 10-20%; you may get a 50-60% success rate with the mega-buys, rather than 30-50% at the lower end of the market).

Players like Rooney, Aguero and Hazard are more expensive, after inflation, than anyone Liverpool have bought in the Premier League era; as are 16 other signings (weirdly, two of which were made by Newcastle: Shearer and Owen).

With the addition of Sterling, City currently have eight players who cost over £34m in today’s money; Chelsea have three (but several who cost just below); Man United have four including Di Maria, who looks set to leave (with seven more who cost in excess of £28m); Arsenal have two; Liverpool have none.

Even with inflation, the £32.5m the Reds have paid for Benteke makes him the squad’s most expensive Premier League player. (Liverpool have signed eight others since 1992 who cost more, but they were all sold at some point; Carroll, who cost £50.5m, was the most expensive, with Cissé and Heskey ranked 2nd and 3rd.)

Following on from Benteke, and again accounting for inflation, Firmino is the current squad’s 2nd-costliest player in 2015 money, with Henderson, at £27.6m, third. Chelsea have seven players more expensive than Henderson in 2015 money, City have nine, and United have twelve.

While this is just a guide, it’s important to note, once again, that Chelsea and Manchester City broke from also-rans to title winners not by simply employing better managers with clever tactics and advanced fitness methods, but by investing heavily in players (something Alex Ferguson also did between 1988 and 1992, which probably coincided with his best success rate). All this investment in players predated the title wins – so in this case, the egg came before the chicken. (And the same was true of Arsenal’s title successes under Wenger, before they went from having the costliest £XI in 1998 and 2002 to one always outside the top three.)

Obviously now it’s more of a virtuous cycle for City and Chelsea: success on the pitch is providing them with new financial rewards. But they only entered the Title Zone with immense investment.

Damned If You Do…

Whatever way you approach your transfer policy – buy for now, buy for later – if you have richer competitors who can unsettle and steal away your players, there’s probably a ceiling to what you can achieve; again, something I’ve spent a lot of time illustrating over the years. (And the greater the number of richer competitors, the worse your odds of ultimate success, on account of the need for a greater number of rivals to have bad seasons. As brilliant as Atletico Madrid were two seasons ago, both Real Madrid and Barcelona had uncharacteristically poor league points returns, approximately 10 points down on the average of the previous past five seasons; and normal service was resumed in 2014/15.)

If your players (and team) does really well, like Suarez and Liverpool in 2013/14, you can still lose that player; and if the players (and team) does poorly, like Sterling and Liverpool in the final third of 2014/15, you can still lose that player. If you aren’t super-rich, or über-glamorous, you can always lose the player, particularly in the age of player-power and agents who make Bebe Glazer look like an angel.

On both occasions – Suarez and Sterling – a richer club with recent league titles and consistent Champions League qualification lured away key performers. Despite Liverpool playing hardball, the club knew that it was essentially powerless to stop these exits. (The danger with banishing want-away stars to the reserves – as much as I’d like to see it done – is that instead of sending a message of strength, it could be interpreted by existing players – and potential future players – as an unfair tactic, given that, funnily enough, players see things from a player’s point of view. Liverpool played hardball, but ultimately they didn’t strong-arm the player into submission. And obviously, £49m to reinvest can make more sense than no money and, with him banished, no player.)

Conclusion

I’ve written extensively this summer, elsewhere on this site, about the individuals Liverpool have signed and what they can offer, so I didn’t want to go over that again; other than to reiterate that I like the different options the wide range of signings potentially offer. I think that Brendan Rodgers now has more options, and that Benteke, in particular, can mix skill and pace with brute force.

It all means that Liverpool are left with a new, young squad, full of what seems like great potential, but which has come at the cost of selling two of its best players in the past 12 months (along with losing Steven Gerrard, no less! – albeit after his legs had inevitably gone.)

However, if enough of what amounts to £124m for just two players is reinvested wisely – and it’s highly unlikely that it all could be, no matter what the transfer approach (and we already know that some of it hasn’t) – then the Reds can still thrive within relative terms. (I know the £124m didn’t come in one lump sum, but the point remains.)

If, from that £124m, Emre Can and Divock Origi – bought last summer for c.£10m each – develop into world-class talents within the next year or two, and Nathaniel Clyne continues to progress into an outstanding right-back, and Roberto Firmino translates his Hoffenheim form into a red shirt, then that will still be only half of the £124m received for those two players Liverpool would have ideally kept but were essentially forced to sell. It’s not unthinkable that those four could be real difference makers; big delivers.

Add one more successful signing out of that money – say Lazar Markovic or Adam Lallana, if they improve, or Christian Benteke if he fulfils his potential – and then, even if you wrote off £40m of the £124m, it could theoretically make for a better side than keeping Suarez and Sterling would have done. It would mean outstripping the Tomkins’ Law success rate, but it can happen.

Selling your best player doesn’t have to lead to decline; sometimes it does, of course, but at others it helps spread the talent wider across the XI and the squad, to make for an overall improvement. Again, to return to the 1987/88 exemplar, Ian Rush’s departure should have been a hammer blow, and yet it was turned to the club’s advantage. The same was true ten years earlier, when Kevin Keegan left, and Kenny Dalglish replaced him.

Perhaps the problem Liverpool had last season was that six or seven of the new players were either simply not good enough (bad judgement calls) or still acclimatising/adjusting/developing. This meant that, overall, no single position was actually improved; and that, indeed, the loss of one outstanding player in a pivotal position (such as centre-forward), was in this instance more harmful than buying various options – at least for the short-term of one season (these players are still at Liverpool and can yet improve; indeed, some almost certainly will).

But let’s add here that last season was more complicated than that: Daniel Sturridge’s injury; Steven Gerrard’s decline and departure, and the carry-over of the whole slip-gate nonsense; the psychological blow of losing Suarez and, indeed, the league title; so many players at the World Cup; Raheem Sterling’s escalating disenchantment and its unhelpful public airing; the steep increase in the number of cup games; the young average age of the XI most weeks; the spell where Mignolet got so bad that Brad Jones became no.1; the mixed tactical experiments; and the fact that wherever Mario Balotelli goes the team soon falls apart, which, as much as I wanted him to succeed, gets harder and harder to put down to coincidence.

The new signings either suffered because of these other issues, or they added to (or created) many of the issues themselves, either by their lack of talent and/or suitability, or just by being one more new component in an unfamiliar side getting to know each other. (And in fairness to Brendan Rodgers here, he started the season by gently blooding the new buys two or three at a time, before injuries meant they all ended up thrown in together. In the early game at Spurs everything looked perfect, but then it fell apart.)

A year on, maybe it’s time for at least half of these signings to push on (some will simply push off). Some – such as Adam Lallana, Lazar Markovic and Dejan Lovren – will feel a bit less burdened by their price tags, especially as more expensive players – Firmino and Benteke – have arrived (although that of course simply transfers the pressure to them). Some, like Can, Origi and Markovic, will be a year older, which makes a lot of difference when so young. (Moreno is already slightly older, but the same applies.) In Origi’s case, simply being in Liverpool will be an upgrade on what he offered the club last season, which, due to the loan agreement, was nothing.

Some – particularly Lallana – will hope to have fewer niggling injuries (the same is true of Sakho, two years in). And the ‘homegrown’ teens who broke through last season – particularly Jordon Ibe – can easily become twice as effective within a very short space of time. And perhaps the prodigious talents of Sheyi Ojo and Pedro Chirivella – and/or one or two others – will turn them into handy squad players, if they aren’t loaned out for vital experience.

Not all of these positive outcomes will transpire, of course, but some should, and that might be enough to help improve the team; just as youngsters coming through during Graeme Souness’ tumultuous tenure were only sufficiently matured by the time Roy Evans was in charge, and were then part of a team that then challenged for the title in 1997. If Liverpool’s new summer signings settle quickly, as they did in 2007 or 1999, then the team could improve radically – although it may be the season after, as happened in those cases, when the team started to really purr.

The downside of the current project succeeding is that there will probably be just one shot at it. Then the next group of vultures will be circling. If he excels, Firmino will be on Real Madrid’s radar; if not him, then Coutinho. But we should enjoy these players while we have them, and hope that – somehow – it all comes together just how we’d wish.

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XI: Eleven Years of Analysis & Hair-Loss Following Liverpool FC is out now on Kindle.

The limited edition printed copies were available to TTT subscribers only. However, the book is now on general release via Amazon’s various worldwide stores.

Click the link below to buy the book from the co.uk store, but it’s on all the other qualifying stores across the globe. Or scroll down for more information on the book.

“XI” brings together what I feel is my best writing on Liverpool Football Club, covering a period of incredible highs and desperate lows. This anthology mixes my best internet articles with key chapters from my early books, which appear here for the first time in digital format.

It’s all present: being in Istanbul and Athens for the two Champions League Finals; the ownership wrangles, sackings, and returning heroes; spending exclusive time with Rafa Benítez and John W Henry; and witnessing a team lurch from becoming Champions of Europe and challenging for the title to appearing a million miles from winning anything.

Other News

Plus, some site news for TTT subscribers.

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W/c Monday July 27th 2015.

Welcome to our weekly round-up, a diary of news and events on the site, matters relating to LFC and the world of football generally.

The Week in Football – Liverpool FC:

Monday:

James Milner admits the lure of playing in central midfield was a big factor behind his move to Liverpool from Manchester City. (LiverpoolFC.com)

“This move was a selfish move for me,” said Milner. “Obviously playing at City and playing in different positions – the team will always come first, that’s the way I believe it should be, no matter where you are. “But I think the move to come to Liverpool and take that mantle on myself was more of a selfish move and hopefully I can do well and contribute to success at Liverpool. “I’d like to think you will see the best of me now I am in the central role.

The letter Bill Shankly wrote to tender his resignation as Liverpool manager in 1974 has been posted on Twitter by ex-Liverpool striker John Aldridge. He tweeted: ”This is Shanks’ last letter before his resignation was accepted. Liverpool FC’s greatest employee. Still adore Shanks.”

Tuesday:

Danny Ings believes his movement can help Liverpool’s attacking midfielders do damage next season. (LiverpoolFC.com)

“What I’ve found was really effective, even at Championship level, was making runs constantly in behind.

“As soon as a defender switches off that run in behind is so effective.

“As long as there’s someone stretching the pitch and you’ve got your creative players behind you in that space – and you’ve got players at this football club to feed those runs – you can be an effective team.

“It’s certainly something I’m looking forward to.”

Ings also insisted there is still a place for a player like him in the modern game even if he is, as Fowler suggested, part of ‘a dying breed’.

“I think with the way the game is going, it’s full of creative players now, players who want to be on the ball all the time,” he added.

“[But] I really do think, even if I don’t touch the ball as much as those guys if I’m still stretching the game it’s still as effective.

“It can all get too crunched and if you don’t create space for those players in behind you then it’s hard to create opportunities.

“I’ll always work on my game and stretching in behind.”

Mark Lawrenson fears the Reds could be “undercooked” for the new campaign because of facing a lack of quality opposition in pre-season. (Liverpool Echo)

That’s it Lawro, get behind your team.

A 650-tonne roof truss has been lifted on to Anfield’s Main Stand as part of work to expand Liverpool’s home ground. (BBC Merseyside News)

The structure was fixed on to towers by two of the UK’s largest cranes and took eight hours to be put in place.

Work is under way to increase Anfield’s capacity from about 45,500 to 59,000. The Main Stand will feature a new third tier, adding 8,300 seats.

The Anfield Road Stand will then be expanded to add a further 4,800 seats.

The £100m work is expected to be completed in time for the 2016-17 season.

Ian Ayre, the club’s chief executive, said:

“This is an historic milestone in Anfield’s history as the stadium transformation continues to take shape.

“This is a redevelopment that gives us a fantastic opportunity to ensure that all the rich history and traditions that make this stadium so special can continue for many years to come.”

The rest of this round-up is for Subscribers only.

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When FSG acquired Liverpool FC in 2010, they made a commitment to build a sustainable future. Unlike Hicks and Gillett, or the Glazers at United, they would not take any money the club made out of the club. They would grow revenues so that the club would become self-sustaining. They made no commitment on the stadium, instead preferring to look at options and make an informed decision that best suited the long term needs of the club and the city.

One of the biggest myths that circulate around FSG’s acquisition of Liverpool is that they got the club ‘on the cheap’. But they paid the market price for the club at a specific moment in time. Yes there was huge potential for growth, but for that to happen there needed to be a great deal of hard work and investment. The club was only a bargain in 2010 in retrospect because of the work that has gone into building it since.

One of the biggest criticisms of our owners has been how they have managed the football operation. There is a lack of transparency around the decision-making and structure at the club and that creates a narrative of weak leadership.

FSG have a preferred MO of collective knowledge to inform decision-making – rather than any one individual having total influence or control.

Within FSG there has been a transfer of power, with Mike Gordon now taking a lead role in the strategic development and day to day leadership of the club, working closely with Ian Ayre, Tom Werner and Billy Hogan. John Henry will no doubt be involved in the big decisions, but seems content to keep a lower profile in the overall running of the club.

One of the big questions that are often asked of FSG is what is the long term plan? What is the exit strategy? There are continual rumours about FSG completing the redevelopment of the stadium and putting the club up for sale. But from an FSG perspective, that would make little sense.

Increase in value

FSG were always going to make their money out of Liverpool by increasing its value. They inherited a complete mess; the club’s finances were in disarray with a wage bill that was swallowing up over 70% of total revenue. It is only in the past 12 months, after four years of prudent management, that the club’s finances are finally starting to recover.

One of the biggest issues FSG faced on acquisition was the stadium question. After a thorough review of options, they made the decision to proceed with redevelopment; an option that all previous owners had written off as being too difficult.

After years of politics, planning and broken promises, a redeveloped Anfield is now actually happening. A new main stand that will lift overall capacity to close to 55,000 and will narrow the revenue gap to our rivals (albeit with a large corporate offering).

The latest Forbes valuation of Liverpool (as of May 2015) is circa £630m ($982m). With a redeveloped main stand that valuation is likely to rise closer to £700-800m in the next 2-3 years. FSG’s total investment in Liverpool to date is probably circa £440m (£300m acquisition cost, £40m intercompany loan, £100m main stand redevelopment loan).

In a recent interview Mike Gordon has suggested that FSG are actively looking for a naming rights partner for the new main stand, or there was even a possibility of outright investment.

Investment

With a valuation of £700m, FSG could seek an investment of £300m and still retain 57% ownership and control of the club. That would enable them to see a return on investment from the initial acquisition cost. The stadium redevelopment loan is likely to be paid back separately by the increased revenue generated – in a similar model to how the Emirates was paid for. Once that loan is repaid, that revenue becomes pure profit for the club.

This would effectively mean that the growth in value under FSG has meant that they have been able to recoup some of the upfront investment they have made and retain control of the club – and in parallel retain the promise they kept at the outset to reinvest the profit the club makes back into the club. In fact, once redevelopment is paid for, it is likely the club could be in the region of £100m a year plus better off under FSG.

The investment scenario is probably far more likely than FSG seeking (and finding) an individual buyer who would (or could) spend £700m on what would probably be a vanity purchase.

Why would FSG want Liverpool FC long term?

One of the drivers behind FSG’s acquisition of Liverpool was that there was scope to increase its value – and one of the other drivers was the club’s global standing.

FSG are a sports investment business – they have multiple commercial interests, but they only have one asset that gives them a global reach into markets and territories across the world. That asset is Liverpool Football Club.

The commercial partnerships that FSG develop with Liverpool can cut across a wide portfolio of investments. FSG own NESN – an American sports TV channel. They recognise the value of the television rights to football.

They also recognise that the US is finally starting to join the ‘soccer’ revolution. They have been pushing Liverpool in big US cities like New York and Boston (where they also link in with the Red Sox when on tour). They will have seen the club’s appeal in the Far East and Australia.

The lucrative summer tours are a mechanism for FSG to look globally. There are economies of scale to be had with sponsors and commercial partners by having multiple interests – selling Liverpool would weaken that position.

It is completely in FSG’s strategic interests to retain control and ownership of Liverpool Football Club. The ownership of Liverpool is a gateway to big ticket commercial opportunities that they would not be able to pursue otherwise.

I’d be surprised if FSG look at Liverpool as a stand-alone asset, there are huge interdependencies on the markets they can penetrate through the club. Owning Liverpool opens up opportunities for the Red Sox – that has to be a factor in any thinking on exit strategy.

So what is the exit strategy?

FSG are unlikely to be around forever, but I think that they will be at Liverpool for the long term. Although FFP is looking unlikely to have the teeth it needs to be effective, Liverpool’s commercial growth with a redeveloped Anfield will give it a competitive framework to operate in. FSG may not be able to provide the riches of a Mansour or an Abramovic, but in time they’ll provide a sustainability model that gets much closer to Arsenal and United.

In the long term our ownership model may become similar to a club like Arsenal, where we have multiple investors but FSG retain the controlling shares.

What does this mean for Liverpool FC?

If FSG do stay in control at Liverpool for the long term, it will probably be a good thing. The reason for this is that they will continue growing our revenue and capability to compete year on year – and in a sustainability model, that means we will continue getting closer to our rivals in terms of resources.

Although FSG have been at Liverpool for almost five years, it has taken a huge amount of time to transform the club from top to bottom. Although there have been mistakes made, and FSG are by no means perfect, if you compare every aspect of the club today versus where it was five years ago, the transformation is there for all to see.

There are things they need to do better; fan engagement remains a huge challenge – the supporters committee is the right mechanism, but it needs more teeth.

On the pitch, there are big improvements needed. Under FSG we have sold players very smartly, but it has been a mixed bag on buying. On paper we have a young, talented squad and much will depend on whether or not Brendan Rodgers can repay the faith shown in him by the owners.

Our top 5 record transfers of all time have come under FSG (not accounting for TPI). Although our net spend is heavily influenced by the sales of Suarez and Sterling, there has been significant investment in the playing squad.

The final part of the transformation at the club is the translation to sustained on-pitch competitiveness and success. It is the hardest part, but from an FSG perspective, the expectation has to be that the foundations are there and it is time to deliver.

All part of the plan?

There is always going to be criticism of owners unless you are winning everything. It comes with the territory. But when you look through the chess game FSG have played since acquiring Liverpool, it has been skilfully executed. There are many moving parts that all have interdependencies on one another – and within five years, the chess pieces are almost exactly where they would want them.

Supporters will only care about that if it translates to on-pitch success, and rightly so.

FSG have multiple options on what they can do with Liverpool – and a full sale may be what they decide to do. The ownership of Liverpool carries a weight of huge expectation, and I am sure FSG are more comfortable pulling strings in the background than having the profile and interest they generate at Liverpool.

But from an FSG perspective, ‘releasing some equity’ can give them a return on investment and let them retain control of one of the most popular football clubs in the world, giving them a global reach they would lose if they were to sell.

How disappointed you are depends on your initial expectation of your team’s chances for the season to come.

So for example, Southampton would not feel too aggrieved not to win the title, but might feel pangs of sadness if they miss the top four this season, as that is what they are probably aiming for after last season.

Conversely, Arsenal are finally ready, twelve years after their last bout, to have a real crack at the title and will feel incredibly let down come May if they fall well short. If they take the title to the wire but still miss out, the disappointment will not dissipate as they have set their sights on winning it this year.

So, different strokes for different folks.

But, and here is where it gets a bit mucky, there are four teams this season who genuinely harbour hopes of winning the title before a ball is kicked.

It’s like four kids, all standing around looking at one ice-cream, they can all taste it, they can all see it, but only one of ‘em is getting it. Now see the look on the other three’s faces then they get nothing. Sour.

The four teams with expectations of the title are Chelsea, Arsenal, Manchester City and Manchester United.

There are three additional teams with real designs on cracking the top four. Liverpool, Southampton and Tottenham Hotspur.

I also expect that Everton, who are far better than their disappointing showing last term, will ruffle a few feathers this time. Without European football hampering them, they will be better placed to attack those above them and although a top four shout is probably beyond them, if they can play with freedom, they might find themselves in the mix with ten or so games to go.

Now, below is a table of the likely top four challengers:

The ‘Club Expectation’ is where the owners/fans/players of a club hope they will finish.

The ‘Market Expectation’ is where punters think each team will finish, so is a more ‘head over heart’ view. This is taken from current B365 odds.

‘Perception Gap’ is the difference between how strong a club feels they are, and what I feel their strength is relative to their competition. This is subjective, and is only my opinion.

So, onto the teams:

Southampton, now shorn of another two quality players in Schneiderlin and Clyne, will need to be on point with their recruits again for the season to go swimmingly.

Problem is, it becomes more difficult with each window to buck the 50/50 nature of success with transfers. Last year Southampton were extraordinarily good in this department and if they can do so again will cause plenty of problems for the established order.

The key for the Saints is that they are enjoying their time in the upper echelons. Without the crippling pressure that a club like Liverpool has to make the top four, the league becomes far more enjoyable and the weight of the shirt starts to work in the opposite way.

In fact, they are benefiting from a positive perception gap, that is, the fans are expecting nothing and thus enjoying everything that is delivered to them.

Players like Lallana, Lambert and Lovren found it easy to play top 8 football for a club just happy to be there without expecting CL football. Once moved to a club the size of Liverpool, they mostly wilted as the expectations were ratcheted up several notches.

If Koeman’s settled Southampton get off to a good start, and their new signings click quickly, they will be a very difficult banana skin in everybody else’s pursuit of top four football.

My Saints Prediction – a good start, and a top four push will be attainable deep into the season.

The other issue is that there is an expectation to compete for top four, but this is problematic for a major reason: Tottenham have been very well run financially, but are none-the-less suffering from a similar problem to Liverpool. They have a squad worth over £300m, but this is only the 6th most expensive in the league.

Setting your ceiling at fourth creates a margin for error allowance which doesn’t exist. In the last five seasons we note that 70, 79, 73, 70 & 68 points have been required for 4th place (an average of 72 points needed). So if you are Daniel Levy you’d set a target of 72 points.

Problem is, setting that target means that any error or slight underperformance puts you in 5th at best on average. This means that you actually need to set a target of probably around 78 points to be safe.

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I’m trying not to get too excited. I know what it does, you see, this excitement. It tends to end in disappointment.”It’s going be our year this year/next year” has become a cliché amongst rival supporters, something to goad Liverpool supporters with for their lofty, unrealistic expectations at this time of year.

So let me be very clear at the outset: it is improbable and unlikely that Liverpool will win the Premier League title this season. That may be, even for me, a stretch too far.

But it’s not impossible; stranger things have happened. Why can’t Liverpool at least challenge? And then, if you’re going to challenge, ask yourself this: why can’t you go on from there to win it?

I can feel something, a notion that is almost tangible; something is growing within me and within us as a fan base. It’s not hope – not quite – it’s something more than that. It’s this maddening itch at the back of my mind, refusing to be quashed by pragmatic discourse or the realisation that we need one of the powerful current top four, all wealthier than us, to slip up just to let us have a crack at the CL qualifying places.

I’ve had this feeling once before – in the summer of 2013. That’s the truth but I don’t believe that it’s a form of clairvoyance; rather it’s a collection of synapses in my neural ganglia, firing about my brain, unquantifiable, the sum of which gives me this crazy, expectant sensation that we’re on the cusp of something special.

I’m not one of the hipsters; I’m not part of the ‘in crowd’. I don’t sit on the fence or wax lyrical about the massive hurdles in Liverpool’s way; the grim realities of modern football and its money-driven nature. The more knowledgeable one is – in any walk of life – the greater tendency for pessimism. But I refuse to bow to that. I’ve said it before, many times, I’m in it to win it. I’m not worried about billionaires visiting vast swathes of cash on spoilt players. That’s not my concern. What concerns me is one thing and one thing only: Liverpool Football Club winning the league.

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W/c Monday July 2oth 2015.

Welcome to our weekly round-up, a diary of news and events on the site, matters relating to LFC and the world of football generally.

The Week in Football – Liverpool FC:

Monday:

Raheem Sterling - sorry to start yet another week with those two words – says he must now make headlines for the right reasons after an acrimonious departure from Liverpool, but admits he would be “quite happy to lie down” on his sofa for the whole day. The 20-year-old insists, however, that he was ill when he missed training at Liverpool shortly before his £49m transfer.

Liverpool’s pre-season tour continued with a friendly against A-League side Adelaide United at the Adelaide Oval, with a 2-0 win courtesy of another Milner goal and a last kick of the match effort from Danny Ings.

Brendan Rodgers admitted Liverpool will depart Australia ‘with a heavy heart’ and can’t wait to return after playing in front of more than 50,000 fans for the second time in four days. (LiverpoolFC.com)

Rodgers said:

“It’s been an absolute pleasure to be in Australia. For some of our people and staff it’s their first time, but I was very lucky to come here for the first time when we were here two years ago.

“This trip has been equally as enjoyable. To have had over 100,000 supporters over the two games on the other side of the world tells you about the passion of the people here for the club.

“It’s been a great honour and I’d come back here as soon as we possibly could, for sure. We leave tomorrow with a heavy heart because when you play in front of those supporters, it means so much.

“It’s been very humbling how we’ve been received and hopefully we can come back.”

“We achieved our objectives tonight, firstly to develop our fitness,” said Rodgers. “I thought our pressing and intensity in the game was excellent.

“And we’re obviously still improving and looking to develop that tactical idea with a host of new players.

“Our performance was very good again against another very well-organised team that play excellent football and play with a good notion of the game. Our set-up was good and the players played very well.

Rodgers also said he expects Jordon Ibe to play an important role in Liverpool’s senior set up in 2015-16 – but stressed the 19-year-old still has plenty of development to do before he reaches his full potential. (LiverpoolFC.com)

“He’s still very young, he’s still 19 years of age, but I think you see the potential. It’s just [about] him continually working hard at his game; he’s still got a way to go for that consistency but I think everyone sees that potential.

“All our young players at the club know that if they demonstrate the right personality, they have a chance to play. Joe Gomez at 18 years of age has huge potential as well. It’s up to them. They know they’ll get a chance if they co-ordinate their game and work to the plan of the collective, then there’ll be a chance.

“Jordon is a very exciting talent and we’ll manage him individually, because it’s not the same for everyone. He’s his own player and we need to manage him and what’s best for him and the team.”

“… on his game he’s a handful. I’m delighted for him, he’s earned that move and if he can do what I think he can do, he’ll do great for them. He’s one of the best number nines that I’ve seen in a long time.”

“I thought he was a handful every time I saw him playing. I sent people to watch him as well who I thought I could rely on and they said the same.

“Then I saw him again and thought, ‘let’s try to get this big guy over’. He came in and he was excellent. He took to English football really well.

“That will be in his development as well, that he’s going to have to handle the expectancy level of winning [at Liverpool].

“When you speak to Christian, he has a great belief in himself to do well. He’s a top guy … and I need some tickets for Anfield so he’s my link for that.”

Jordon Ibe has spoken about his determination to impress during pre-season and show Brendan Rodgers he has the qualities to claim a regular place in the squad during 2015-16. (LiverpoolFC.com)

Former Liverpool defender John Arne Riise has gone to extreme lengths to ensure he does not forget his old club by having the club’s slogan ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone’ tattooed on his leg.

“Proud to show my new tattoo,” he wrote on Instagram. ”A tribute to the amazing club and fans of @liverpoolfc.”

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Before revealing the 100 most expensive players in the Premier League era – after our TPI inflation has been applied – please allow me to provide a brief explanation, for those who don’t want to click on the hyperlink. (Feel free to scroll to the end to see the list, although don’t then complain that it doesn’t make sense…)

The latest TV deal saw an increase of 70% on the previous payment agreement; meaning that, much like previous TV deals, there’s been a fairly hefty increase in the money clubs are receiving. And yet people still seem shocked by the inflation of transfer fees (and wages); or simply don’t seem to grasp the concept. Even comparing prices from 2012 against those of today is fairly pointless without inflation, such has been the size of the rise.

Since 1992 there has been an eleven-fold increase in the average price of a Premier League footballer. This increase was calculated by Graeme Riley for the Transfer Price Index we created, which we’ve been keeping track of since 2010.

However, in just the past two years there’s been an increase of 62% in the average price of a Premier League footballer; not far off the 70% rise in TV money – to show how the two go hand-in-hand. Our current prices are in “2015 money”, which is calculated from the spending of the 2014/15 season; it may well be that spending in the coming season sees a further dramatic rise, but that will be calculated to form 2016 money in a year’s time.

No matter how many times I explain it, there are always requests as to how it’s calculated, or people saying “an inflation calculator gave a different result”. Football inflation runs at a much higher rate than normal inflation (although football inflation did crash with the stock markets at the end of the last decade). Did your grocery bill go up by 62% in the past two years?

We use a model that is identical in methodology to the Retail Price Index (tracking the average cost of several items of produce), but we apply it to footballers, not milk, bread and coffee.

Yes, there are high outliers who perhaps drag the average up, but also free transfers to drag it down. It can be tweaked, twerked and twiddled, but we prefer to keep it as a simple calculation, onto which we put no fancy frills. Perhaps we could track the rate the richer clubs increase it by, but even relegated clubs are picking up over £60m in a single season.

For the purposes of practicality we stuck to English football in the Premier League era, as it was enough of a task finding all the data for that (and doubly hard to find accurate reporting of fees). We don’t take into account contract length at the time of a move, or any age adjustments, although the latter can be tracked; so we can work out what is a high fee for a 31-year-old, but whatever that fee is it goes into the pot the same as all the others. The same is true regardless of what position the players play (and aside from goalkeepers, players can change position, or be utility men, which makes it more complicated.) Also, we use the price reported in sterling, not Euros. If we were a full-time business we might delve into the data to a greater degree, but we’re doing this in addition to our day jobs (and in my case, to add another layer to TTT). We hope to do more with the data, when we get the chance.

With inflation, the top three purchases of the Premier League era work out at a fraction over £80m; which is in keeping with what top Premier League players have been sold for (Ronaldo, Bale and Suarez, although with inflation, Ronaldo is well over £100m; although that’s using our TPI inflation, not anything relating to Spanish football – although Graeme touched on that issue here.)

Before getting onto the Top 100 (as of 23rd July 2015), I just wanted to make a note on how people compare transfer fees. I read last week that Liverpool were prepared to pay £32.5m for Christian Benteke when Arturo Vidal was only going to cost “£28m”. And yet one is 24, and the other is 28.

If you don’t think age plays a part, think again. In the same way as driving a car off a forecourt sees it lose a large chunk of its value, then buying someone aged 28-30 is effectively throwing away a big percentage of the transfer fee. In addition to wages, which may be higher for players in their supposed prime, approximately 75% of the fee has to be written off. (All of this analysis excludes free transfers.)

Buy a younger player, and on average a loss will still be made after inflation is taken into account – but it will be far less damaging. For every £9m spent on players aged under 28, £6m will be recouped. In other words, only 35% gets “lost”, as opposed to the 75% that gets lost on players aged 28-30. Some clubs can afford to take this hit; others can’t.

Was Robin van Persie a wise investment by Man United? He played a key role in their last title (so you can say that it made sense) and yet, it seems, his decline played a role in United dropping to 7th and 4th. After inflation, the van Persie deal loses £33m in transfer fees alone, plus the massive wages (c.£40m) that he effectively only earned one year out of three. Someone like Gonzalo Higuaín was just 24 at the time, and may have been a wiser long-term investment – although United had also started struggling when buying younger players.

Of the top 30 most expensive 28-30-year-olds signed in the Premier League era – therefore what collective wisdom would have labelled “ready made” players – there are a whole host of flops and disappointments of various degrees: Shevchenko, Veron (Chelsea), Soldado, Ince (Liverpool), Berg (Man Utd), Fernandinho, Kolo Toure (Man City), Saunders (Villa), Bilic (Everton), Flo (Sunderland), Keane (Liverpool), Platt (Arsenal), Casiraghi, Samba (QPR) and Scales (Liverpool). These cost between £20m – £82m in today’s money. Not all were dreadful, but none justified the fee. Only seven of the 30 ‘peak years’ signings played over 100 Premier League games for the club they joined.

Anyway, enough of that. Here’s the list. (New signings in bold; up to 107 included to highlight Firmino.)

… our transfer business, that is. For this summer Symposium, we thought we’d ask our panel of chin-stroking ponderers – well the ones who didn’t send automated out of office and away on holiday type messages anyway – what they thought of the signings we’ve made and whether there might still be more to come. Here’s what they had to say:

Jon Rushton: I went into this summer hoping that we wouldn’t try to do too much in the transfer window. Last season suggests that one player can make a difference (in this case, Suarez) – whereas multiple additions can move a team back into transition. I was very much hoping that we’d focus on doing one thing well in the window, rather than trying to solve every problem in the squad. The priority in my opinion was clear – we scored roughly half as many goals compared to the previous season (whilst conceding roughly the same amount). That needs to improve.

Yes our chance creation also dropped – but I would argue that creating a chance does involve two things; a player kicking a ball into space, and another player running into that space in a way that threatens the goal. It is hard to create chances without the latter. Balotelli proved an unmitigated flop, Borini refused to move on, Lambert lost his legs and Sturridge spent the season in a constant state of optimistic recovery. There’s no doubting the creative ability of Henderson and Coutinho, and I believe that Lallana is a shrewd acquisition hobbled by his first spell of injuries in a long time.

So, in that context – we’ve probably done just a little more business than I would have liked to have seen. But, equally, that has been unavoidable due to circumstance. Gerrard had to go, in my opinion – and bringing in a replacement was therefore necessary. Milner strikers me as a superb pick-up – adding in some of the experience and character that we are losing, but also offering high quality in work-rate, defensive contribution, creation and goal threat. I also don’t think anyone would complain about Glen Johnson being allowed to run down his contract, and in Clyne we surely will have improved our first-choice right-sided full-back. Brad Jones departed, and so Adam Bogdan arrived. The world shrugged its shoulders. Factor in Ings (presumably for a departing Borini) and we seem deliberately and intelligently to have targeted players at the end of their contract to achieve value for money for this quartet of players. Smart – and something to consider in future windows.

With Sterling suddenly developing a weak immune system, an inflated sense of personal worth and a ludicrous market value, he was always likely to depart, and we’ve decisively brought in the very exciting Firmino. Again, probably a necessary piece of business under the circumstances, and having the not dissimilar Coutinho already in the team does take the pressure off Firmino in terms of needing to deliver immediately. Firmino is probably ahead of Sterling in terms of current ability, or at least finishing ability – and only time will tell if Firmino settles well or if Sterling goes on to become one of the best in the world (right now, he is one of the best of his age - and we have a lot of that).

So now we hit the meat of the window for me – have we bought well in terms of goals? In comes Divock Origi, a player of massive potential. Whilst Chelsea are happy to rely on veterans for their squad striker positions (Drogba, now followed by Falcao), I think Liverpool are correct to look to have players of potential as their third and fourth choice strikers (factoring in Ings as well). Perhaps they might prove more patchy over their first season or two, but they have the potential to go on and become something special in the long run. Everyone wants to see Liverpool targeting top talent before they become known to the world, and that involves both patience and risk-taking. Origi is very exciting and looked the real deal at the World Cup, playing with composure, but will probably take time to show his true worth.

And then that leaves the biggest deal of the lot – Christian Benteke. I was dead set against him at the start of the summer, but a whole host of conflicting and valid opinions have left me realising one simple truth: I’ve no idea. The definite positives in this window overall have been the smart and intelligent buying of certain players at very cheap value due to short contracts (Milner, Ings, etc), and then the willingness to pay some extra money quickly and decisively to secure number one targets in other areas. Including Benteke. It seems a lesson has been learnt. At his best, Benteke could be the next Didier Drogba – at his worst, he’s proven to be able to score a goal every other game for one of the least creative teams in the league. I’m approaching with cautious optimism. I’d love to see him succeed.

I think we’ve done more than enough business this window – time to see if it pays off and ship off some deadwood. As a whole, will these new acquisitions be enough to catapult the Reds back into the top four positions? I don’t know – but I am genuinely optimistic that we should be vastly improved compared to the stodgy football that we saw last season. We’ve got some massive games early in the season – bring them on, I say…

Chris Rowland: First, I have no qualms about any of the signings so far, there are compelling cases to be made for every one of them. Perhaps depressingly, I started by looking at the money. How much spent, how much recouped or likely to be recouped, therefore is there likely to be any left?

So we’ve forked out £32.5m for Benteke – no complaints about that, that’s at least what proven first-team-ready strikers cost these days, and he’s only 24 – £29m for Firmino, likely to be about £8m for Ings, £12.5m for Clyne, £3.5m for Gomez, Bogdan and Milner on frees. I make that £85.5 million one pound coins we’ve had to find from down the sides of our rather capacious sofa.

On the incoming side of the balance sheet, we’ve had £5m for Aspas and £4m for Coates. It’s likely we’re going to receive another £3m for Lambert this week, and feasibly another £15m-ish for Borini and Balotelli, maybe more. Balotelli is the thornier issue – a situation he won’t be entirely unfamiliar with – in terms of finding a buyer and deciding a fee. You could make a case for anything between 0 and £20m. Two Spaniards, Luis Alberto and Enrique may also pass through the fast revolving Anfield doors, a moment the latter would surely capture on Instagram. Alberto’s already out on loan, but If a deal were on the table …

Gerrard and Johnson have freed up lots of salary, and Jones a little bit. And then there’s Sterling – with a fee of £44m rising to £49m, with QPR set to receive 20%, that’s £35.2 + £4m for us.

So that’s a total of £62.2/£66.2m coming in, based on all those assumptions, which don’t look miles out. All of which would equate to a net spend of £25.3m/£21.3m, depending on which figure you take.

Now pre-window, I saw the figure of a net spend of £35m widely discussed, emanating from the ITK community -they know who they are, and so do we. So if they really are ITK, we could have another £10-£14m to play with. And if that proved to be true, I’d spend it on a left-back.

At the moment, at left-back the only cover we have for Moreno – and I’m not fully convinced by him – is Jose Enrique, and I’m at least equally unconvinced he’s long for this world at LFC. Flanagan can cover there too of course, but he’s not going to be available for a while as he recovers from another operation on his knee, and we’re not sure whether he’s going to be the same Jon Flanagan after this long out and this much surgery. At least at right-back Wisdom can cover for Clyne, as well as Gomez, whose pre-season friendly displays so far suggest he could be a viable option already, McLaughlin and the aforementioned Flanagan. If we opt to play with wing-backs, that’s a different set of calculations, of course.

I’m ruling out signing a Defensive Midfielder because (a) there’s not enough left for a decent one and (b) I don’t think one is identified as a requirement.

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From the above list, the first five names are perhaps the most likely starters for Liverpool this coming season. But it’s not unthinkable that two or three of the others could play, too. Certainly in times of certain injuries it could easily be seven or eight selected from this collective. On top of this, a few of Liverpool’s younger defensive (and central midfield) back-ups also stand below six-feet.

Half of the squad is arguably of below average height. That said, I don’t know the average height for footballers, although for UK men it’s 5’9 or 5’10”. Presumably it’s a fair bit higher for footballers, as height – up to a point – is an advantage (you get men who are 5’4”, yet how many play football?); and also, as people in developed countries continue to grow taller, younger men – in their 20s – will be taller than older generations, whose inclusion brings down the average height. (And of course, there’s the issue of shrinkage. But it was cold.)

Liverpool have two big, strong centre-backs in Martin Skrtel and Mamadou Sakho, with Dejan Lovren, for all his faults last season, a physically imposing type, if he remains third-choice. Hopefully Tiago Ilori – tall, super-quick, but slight – will usurp the ageing Kolo Toure, who has presumably been kept on to be a wise head in the dressing room (as one of a tiny number of 30-somethings in the squad). In the centre of midfield, Emre Can and Jordan Henderson – two big, strong young men – will be joined by James Milner, who is hardy, but far from tall. However, neither of the other two main options, Lucas and Allen, are what you’d term ‘big units’.

Now, there’s nothing wrong with smaller players; indeed, I wince at the youth football I experienced in the 1980s, where size seemed to be paramount, in an era where English football had the direct football of Watford and Wimbledon. And there’s no one better in the world than the minuscule Lionel Messi, just as there wasn’t 30 years ago, when Diego Maradona was the best around (although his strength was phenomenal). Equally, who wouldn’t want Javier Mascherano in their side? – you can be the one to tell him “Sorry, chief, you’re too small for me”.

But if your team has tall athletes who can also play with some panache, I’d guess the odds are stacked in your favour. Unless your smaller players are prodigious leapers (like Tim Cahill), then you can easily lose out on set-pieces, where roughly a third of all goals are scored.

While Manchester City won two of the past four titles on the back of immense spending, they also did so with the aforementioned Milner as part of side that also contained David Silva, Sergio Aguero, Pablo Zabaleta and Samir Nasri. And yet without the brute force of Vincent Kompany and Yaya Toure they usually seemed relatively meek, and far more beatable (although if any Man City fans think this conclusion is wrong, I’ll stand corrected; to an outsider it certainly looked that way).

I can only really think of the Barcelona of Pep Guardiola, with their twin exceptions of Pique and Busquets, as a club who fielded almost exclusively diminutive XIs and succeeded. But obviously they were the best technical team in the world; from another planet. Liverpool aren’t going to match that; they have some of the best technical players in the Premier League (Coutinho and Firmino in particular), but neither is (yet) in the ballpark of players like Messi, Iniesta and Xavi, and probably never will be. (Interestingly, Barca, having lost their way a little, got a bit more physical last season, including the addition of Luis Suarez, who, at just under 6 feet, is a bigger forward than Messi, Neymar and Pedro.)

Set-Pieces

I think it’s fair to say that the Premier League remains different from other major European leagues, as a fair proportion of teams still focus on physicality and set-pieces; other countries have long-ball teams of a kind, but I’m not sure the continentals ever produce anything like Tony Pulis’ Stoke. Two seasons ago Liverpool excelled when attacking with set-pieces (Martin Skrtel scored seven league goals, more than reliable-aerial-threat Sami Hyypia ever managed in a single campaign), but last season the Reds were poor at both ends. At times, certainly once Steven Gerrard lost his confidence, it felt like corners were just being flung into a certain area. Perhaps the drop in quality was also as a result of reduced training-ground time.

Before the start of 2014/15, Andrew Beasley warning Reds in TTT’s comments section to expect fewer set-piece goals; the usual season-on-season swing was about three either way in terms of such goals, and the league average was a +/- change of between three and five; whereas in 2013/14 the team produced a phenomenal swing of +13 – something that was hard to sustain. (Under David Moyes, Manchester United were the other outlier, with a swing of -12.)

My sense is that while no fan wants Liverpool to be a set-piece team – in that we wouldn’t want it to be the Reds’ primary aim – it’s also fairly futile to play great football and win lots of corners, only to see them headed clear because you can’t compete aerially; or to play great football and score two wonderful goals, just to concede three at the other end. And yet at times this perhaps typified Rodgers’ Liverpool: nice football, soft goals conceded.

The Reds’ new coach Gary McAllister took the best near-post corners I’ve ever seen; a real unique art in gently lofting the ball to an exact spot, from where any kind of flick caused mayhem. In Spain, Atletico Madrid challenged, and in 2013/14 eclipsed, the much bigger spenders in part by being an outstanding set-piece side. In Denmark, FC Midtjylland won their first ever title, with some thanks to a specialist set-piece coach. And even Man United’s main weapon last season, in amongst a team of superstars and with a Dutch manager schooled at Ajax and Barcelona, was often the head of Marouane Fellaini. (United have also added two further six-footers in midfield this summer.)

Ideally, your team plays good football, and then when it wins set-pieces (if it hasn’t scored from the good football itself, which is the primary aim) it turns that domination into goals. Two headers scored from corners in the first pre-season game perhaps hints at more to come, although come August the opposition will definitely be better, and probably bigger; while Sakho head a great header cleared off the line in the second friendly.

Daniel Sturridge is deceptively tall (in that I don’t think everyone realises he’s 6’2”, and scores with quite a lot of headers), and Divock Origi (6’1”) looks a powerful unit, with an excellent all-round game. But neither is a brute, capable of bullying defenders. They’re runners with and without the ball, who can work the channels, like other 6’1”+ strikers Liverpool have had in the past 20 years (Torres, Collymore); none are/were traditional target-men who play with their back to goal. Mario Balotelli is another with all the physical attributes, but if anything, often plays like a midfielder.

Torres was almost the complete package, but he was ‘only’ 6’1” – and though he could head the ball, being dominant in the air, or playing with his back to goal, weren’t his main strengths. The more traditional target-men the Reds have had – Crouch, Carroll, Lambert – have tended to lack pace and/or physicality. They could play with their back to goal, but couldn’t run in behind.

The only one to have it all – pace, strength and height – was Emile Heskey; and yet one season aside, he was not a goalscorer, and only occasionally made use of his incredible power. (Several people on Twitter told me that Heskey was slow! In his pomp he was one of the fastest players I’ve seen in the flesh – albeit over longer rather than the shorter distances that someone like Michael Owen thrived with.)

Add Benteke to a side containing Sakho, Skrtel, Henderson and Can, and there could be a really tall, physically strong spine, to compensate for a lack of height in both full-back positions, one central midfield position (if Milner is a regular) and perhaps both wide-midfield/winger positions too.

(As an aside here, although Clyne and Moreno appear to be the first-choice full-backs, the prodigious 18-year-old Joe Gomez, at 6’2”, offers an option on either flank. Like all young centre-backs – apart from the Slow Giants who can’t turn quickly he enough – he may spend the first half of his senior career at full-back, where mistakes are less costly and inexperience doesn’t hurt quite so much. These players tend to play centre-back at youth/reserve/international U21 level, but only full-back in their club’s first team – and then maybe, like Jamie Carragher, move back to the centre when they’re more commanding. Of all the youngsters who break into first teams, fewest seem to play centre-back. Someone like Raphael Varane is a rare exception to the rule.)

The option of Benteke would certainly allow Rodgers to pose different kinds of threats to opposition managers. He inherited Andy Carroll, but there were various issues there, and he bought Rickie Lambert, but Lambert’s lack of pace (allied to some nerves) stopped him being an effective Plan A, B or whatever was intended.

By contrast, Benteke genuinely reminds me of Didier Drogba, in that he has the pace to go with the height and the power. He also strikes a ball nicely, and like the Ivorian, can score a direct free-kick (which isn’t true of most big strikers).

Drogba at his best was on a different level to anything we’ve seen from Benteke yet, but the age of 24 Drogba was at unfashionable French club Guingamp, having recently cost a paltry £80,000 from 2nd-tier Le Mans. He quickly moved to Marseilles, where he suddenly looked like an absolute beast (including against Liverpool in Europe), and then, aged 26, moved to Chelsea. Given that Benteke already has 86 club goals, then he’s well ahead at the same stage of their respective careers. This doesn’t mean that Benteke is on the same pre-set trajectory, but it shows what’s possible, with one of this league’s best-ever all-round centre-forwards looking unremarkable at 23. (Just as it bodes well that Divock Origi has a better record in French football at 20 than Thierry Henry, it likewise doesn’t mean he automatically becomes as sublime.)

Benteke’s former Belgium manager Georges Leekens told This Is Anfield: “He can play with his back to goal, has great control and he’s very fast. He’s good in the air but is actually better suited to having the ball played on the floor.”

At 24, Benteke is probably at just the right age for a big striker; plenty left in the tank, but getting wiser with regard to utilising that physical advantage. Look at Peter Crouch’s goalscoring record (and the divisions he was playing in) prior to the age of 24 and after it, and it’s like night and day. He was never an elite scorer (except, weirdly, at international level), but he became effective as he reached his mid-20s. And unlike Benteke, he had no pace to call upon. Jan Koller only became effective around the age of 23, and despite scoring 55 goals for the Czech Republic, didn’t even make his international debut until the age of 26. Niall Quinn only became effective at the age of 24, more than doubling his previous season-best goal tally in 1990/91. Another 6’4” player, Olivier Giroud, didn’t play above the French second division until he was 24, and Arsenal moved for him aged 26, after his second top-tier season. While you get some smaller strikers who are also late bloomers, the bigger ones tend to take longer to thrive.

I hoped that Andy Carroll would take the same path, but injuries, and what (from the outside) look like unprofessional habits have stunted his development. He also had a record price tag, which was fairly ludicrous for a man with one international cap and one good Premier League season (£50.5m after TPI inflation – that’s how fast Premier League prices are rising, in no small part to a 70% hike in TV revenue). Unlike the Belgian, Carroll wasn’t the quickest, and seemed to want crosses at almost all costs, whereas Benteke is used to more variety in how he’s supplied.

Aside from his warrior mentality, Drogba was so good because he could also run in behind defences; if they dropped deep to give him less space, then he was able to win the ball in the air in the area. So just one player could confuse a defence as to the best line to hold. He was also excellent at letting the smaller, nippier players buzz around him. Aston Villa seemed a bit more like this under the more gung-ho Tim Sherwood, rather than the rigid Paul Lambert.

It was suggested to me that Mario Balotelli could also have provided this option to the Reds, but he had to be seriously cajoled into running behind teams – it just wasn’t his natural game; he has always preferred linking from deep, and doesn’t work well as a lone striker.

Perhaps Balotelli’s transfer would have looked different had Sturridge stayed fit – the pair promised so much in the early game at Spurs – but the Italian, like it or not, remains a sideshow. And by the end of last season the Reds had three sideshows: the Balotelli circus; the waning powers of Steven Gerrard and the constant attention to his imminent departure; and the weekly nonsense surrounding Raheem Sterling. When such distractions mount up it becomes unhelpful, and irrespective of the team suffering, the individual form of all three players wilted as a result. It just looked messy.

Also, the Italian – a fine natural talent, who I felt did quite well in fits and starts last season – apparently has zero intensity in his training. As such, I sense preparations for games would be undermined; we all know how hard it is to study in a class that contains disruptive pupils (although at times I was the latter), so I assume that this would have been little different. By contrast, you can imagine training being a whole different ballgame with Luis Suarez there. It doesn’t have to be deathly serious at Melwood, but the approach needs to be right.

Too many managers have felt Balotelli to be a rotten egg (or a bad apple, who possibly also rocks the applecart), and too many teams have lost intensity when accommodating him, for it to be ignored. He’s not a bad person – far from it, in fact – but he does appear to be a bad professional.

Another thing to note is that Liverpool have lost their best penalty taker (Gerrard), and the next two best ones, Lambert and Balotelli, are also likely to leave, or be peripheral at best. Benteke has scored six of his eight Premier League penalties, which is a fraction above the average of c.70%. While Benteke hasn’t boosted his tally with tons of penalties, he’s shown that he can at least take one. Jordan Henderson may take the role to start with, but if he misses a few it will need others to step up.

AddedBite

While I think some of the other purchases from 2014 will probably come good this season (it often happens in the second season), there seems to be a bit more bite and aggression about the purchases of 2015. Even Firmino is more of a street-fighter Latino (akin to Suarez and Tevez) than a delicate Brazilian flouncer.

Gomez, as noted, is a 6’2” 18-year-old. Milner, though not tall, is strong. Firmino is fairly tall, and certainly tough. Ings is short, but incredibly solid; the same is true of Clyne. And Origi, tall and fast, finally arrives.

But Benteke would be the most obvious physical ‘rock’.

With the right service (and that mostly means variety), and if the manager is eager to work with the player (which I assume to be the case), then purchasing Benteke makes a lot of sense. His mentality has been questioned at times, and that’s not something I can accurately assess, other than to note that he’s had a pretty consistent career in front of goal, not always in the easiest of circumstances.

Critically for me, he moved to a big league at the age of 21. That takes some doing, when some struggle to even leave their hometown. So that makes me less nervous about this move; but a fairly hefty (if not record-breaking) fee can weigh anyone down, and the pressure at Liverpool is different. And as I frequently note, a change of environment can destabilise a player – particularly those who thrive in a certain comfort zone (not a comfort zone relating to coasting, and not being challenged, but in terms of needing regular football, and/or reassurance, and/or certain teammates alongside them).

I’m not simply trying to justify the player because he’s joining Liverpool. When there were rumblings about him going to Man United my response was not “phew, dodged a bullet”, but “shit, he’ll be a real handful for them”.

Defences can be panicked by his mere presence, particularly if there are quick, skilful players running off from from left, right and deeper-centre. In theory it makes more sense than what we saw for parts of last season.

In a few of their early games up front together I thought Sterling and Coutinho combined (and pressed) very well, but after a while the team looked seriously deficient in physicality, and easily bullied; especially if Lallana and Markovic were in the mix, too. The skill was there from all four, but the street-smarts and the battling were not. Benteke doesn’t have the warrior-menace that Suarez provided, but he offers a different kind of intimidation.

It’s easy to cut and paste people into the past, as if hindsight solves everything, but if they’d had Benteke up front, my sense is that Liverpool would have won a lot more points in 2014/15.

If the deal goes through, I certainly hope that will be the case for 2015/16.