Africa Great Lakes Democracy Watch

Welcome toAfrica Great Lakes Democracy Watch Blog.Our objective is to promote the institutions of democracy,social justice,Human Rights,Peace, Freedom ofExpression, and Respect to humanity in Rwanda,Uganda,DR Congo, Burundi,Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya,Ethiopia, and Somalia. We strongly believe that Africa will develop if only our presidents stop being rulers of men and become leaders of citizens. We support Breaking the Silence Campaign for DR Congo since we believe the democracy in Rwanda means peace inDRC. Follow this link to learn more about the origin of the war in both Rwanda and DR Congo:http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library

After
the overthrow of Mobutu of Zaire and naming it Democratic Republic of
Congo, Paul Kagame was convinced that his Government will have the
biggest access of Congo’s wealth and the right to do whatever he wished
without any hindrance.
Kagame made Desire Kabila the new president of the DRC, convincing
himself that he would use him to control and grab all he laid his hands
on in the Congo. At that time Kagame has deployed the DRC with most of
his senior trusted officers to control not only the wealthy country but
also President Kabila. Kagame’s own right hand man Gen James Kabarebe
headed the Congolese army.
President Desire Kabila got a bit sceptical of Kagame’s long time goals and sought advice from his senior officers (Congolese).This
came following an incident where Kagame had confiscated arms,
ammunitions and vehicles Kabila’s government had purchased through the
Rwanda army. These logistics included artillery pieces such Ballistic
Missiles (BM), Heavy and Light Anti-Aircraft pieces, General Purpose
Machine Guns (GPMG),
48 Nissan Patrol 4×4 Trucks and 80 Land Rovers Jeeps. Kagame decided to
only dispatch a half of these logistics to Congo keeping the rest for
himself.
This caused a lot of anger, distrust and chaos to Kabila and his
government. In return Kabila ordered the Rwandan forces under their most
senior Commander General James Kabarebe to leave the country.
He was made to leave the country without taking even the car he was
travelling in to the airport, something that annoyed the whole army.
On their arrival at Kanombe International Airport, we drove his
excellence Paul Kagame to meet with them. This force was immediately
ordered to go to Camp GP (Presidential Guard Barracks) and wait for more
orders as they remain on standby. He seemed physically angered and
disappointed at that time.
After twenty four hours we went to Camp GP with Paul Kagame to brief the
forces why they should immediately go back to the Congo to fight
Kabila, the man they had just installed in power.
Surprisingly everyone supported the idea because at that time all
soldiers seemed to believe that they would keep their loot on return
from the DRC. These included gems and American Dollars the currency
Congo used.
Desire Kabila on the other hand had solicited for troops from Zimbabwe
and Angola to take over deployments after the departure of the Rwandese
forces.
When Kagame’s forces attacked Congo this second time, they could not believe how massively Kabila had deployed.
Our forces sustained big losses and casualties this time around. The
first Congo war was a bit easier because Kagame negotiated with
President Chiluba of Zambia to offer our troops the quickest route to
Kinshasa.
When Kagame attempted to ask for the second attack route to oust Kabila
on this second time, President Chiluba declined, reminding Kagame that:
‘’I thought Mobutu was a bad man and a dictator what about Kabila you
came with to visit me, why fight him now’’.
This Second Congo War (also known as the Great War of Africa) began in
August 1998 in the DRC, and officially ended in July 2003 when the
transitional government took power.
The deadliest war in modern African history, it directly involved eight
African nations, as well as about 25 armed groups. Surprisingly
President Paul Kagame created more than 8 armed groups to destabilise
the region for his own interests. By 2008, the war had claimed lives of
over 5.4 million people, mostly from diseases and starvation, making
the Second Congo War the deadliest conflict worldwide since the world
war. Millions more were displaced from their homes or sought refuge in
neighbouring countries. This was all caused by Kagame’s idea of wanting
to make himself the richest man on the globe.
Despite a formal end to the war in July 2003 and an agreement by the
former belligerents to create a government of national unity, 1,000
people died daily in 2004 from easily preventable cases of malnutrition
and disease. The war and the conflicts afterwards were driven by, among
other things, the trade in minerals.
The first Congo war began in 1996 as Rwanda grew increasingly concerned
about members of Interahamwe militias and former Rwanda Government
Forces who were carrying out cross-border raids from Zaire (currently
known as the Democratic Republic of Congo) and thought to be planning an
invasion.
The militias, mostly Hutu, were entrenched in refugee camps in eastern
Zaire, where many had fled to escape the Tutsi-dominated RPF in the
aftermath of the Rwanda Genocide.
Kagame’s government of Rwanda protested this violation of their
territorial integrity and began to give arms to the ethnically Tutsi
Banyamulenge of eastern Zaire. It was evident that the insurgents were
so weak to attack a country like Rwanda, they had fled to the forests of
Congo to try and find a living for their families.
Most of them however had joined Kagame’s forces but he kept on lying to
the world that he was fighting the Hutu militia when they had actually
joined his own army after what he calls voluntary repatriation.
When Kabila finally gained control over the capital in May 1997, he
faced substantial obstacles to governing the country, which he renamed
‘the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (DRC). Beyond political jostling
among various groups to gain power and an enormous external debt, his
foreign backers proved unwilling to leave when asked. The conspicuous
Rwandan presence in the capital also ranked many Congolese, who were
beginning to see Kabila as a pawn of foreign powers.

Tensions reached new heights on 14 July 1998, when Kabila dismissed his
Rwandan chief of staff James Kabarebe and replaced him with a native
Congolese, Celestin Kifwa. Although the move chilled what was already a
troubled relationship with Rwanda, he softened the blow by making
Kabarebe the military advisor to his successor.

Two weeks later, Kabila abandoned such diplomatic steps. He thanked
Rwanda for its help and ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan military forces
to leave the country. Within 24 hours Rwandan military advisors living
in Kinshasa were unceremoniously flown out. The people most alarmed by
this order were the Banyamulenge of eastern Congo. Their tensions with
neighbouring ethnic groups had been a contributing factor in the genesis
of the first Congo war and they were also used by Rwanda to affect
events across the border in the DRC.
This was all triggered by Kagame’s long arm of theft of Minerals,
Ammunitions, Money and Vehicles. Not only civilians and younger soldiers
died but also the commanders such as General Masasu, Colonel Wilson
Rutaisire, Major Ikondere and in the end Desire Kabila himself

Laurent Nkunda in Prison
and others. According to his excellence Paul Kagame our aim was to
fight the hutu militias who were threatening to come back and kill the
innocent civilians, however we crossed the border and headed to
Kinshasha, but the so called militias were hiding in the forests of
Katanga region and equatorial. After the international community
pressure the Rwandese soldiers withdrew and we haven’t seen any militias
attack Rwanda, so what else do we need to question the cause of the war
that swiped a millions of lives?
Noble Marara
Edited by Rwema Francis

In
this Opinion piece, PhD candidate Jennifer Melvin argues that Rwanda’s
national unity and reconciliation programme promotes two differing but
inter-related political images at the domestic and international levels.
She analyses how these images are constructed and disseminated to the
national population and international community of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), donors and foreign investors. Jennifer argues that
the current Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) government successfully
manipulates national reconciliation to bolster political support,
silence opposition and promote development that is primarily uneven. She
urges the Commonwealth to look beyond the appearance of unity, and
reconciliation to consider the detrimental consequences of government
programming upon democracy and human rights in Rwanda.

The
political images disseminated by the RPF government may be attractive
to domestic and international audiences, but they mask many of the
violations and inequalities that blemish the Commonwealth’s newest
member.

The RPF’s stated commitment to the promotion of unity
and reconciliation obscures issues of impunity, restricted freedom of
press and accusations of genocide ideology against political opponents.
The promotion of uneven development is equally concealed by the
government’s high standards of technocratic governance and the
projection of the nation as a stable and prosperous place to invest. If
the Commonwealth is indeed committed to the values of democracy,
freedom and equal rights, it ought to look beyond the veneer of unity
and reconciliation to consider the ways in which government programming
infringes upon human rights and democracy.

The
political images disseminated by the RPF government may be attractive
to domestic and international audiences, but they mask many of the
violations and inequalities that blemish the Commonwealth’s newest
member.

Monday, March 19, 2012

By Associated Press, Updated: Monday, March 19, 7:18 AM

JOHANNESBURG — A South African
police detective said Monday a Rwandan businessman offered police a $1
million bribe to free him after his arrest on suspicion of bankrolling
an assassination attempt against an exiled dissident Rwandan general.The trial of those accused of trying to kill Rwandan Lt. Gen. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa in a June 2010 attempted shooting has exposed a growing web of financial and political intrigue involving Rwanda and South Africa.

Leonard Kanye of the Johannesburg Organized Crimes unit
testified in court on Monday that he arrested Rwandan suspect Pascal
Kanyandekwe at the Johannesburg airport soon after the shooting attempt.
He
said the Rwandan offered the money while handcuffed in the back of a
police car. His seized baggage contained two passports and photographs
of two of five other suspects on trial for the attempted killing.
All six men have pleaded innocent.
The trial resumed Monday for two weeks of testimony after a lengthy series of hearings.Kanye said Kanyandekwe arrived at the Johannesburg airport on July 2, 2010 from
Rwanda. A police officer sent to the airport to find him called his
mobile number and claimed to be a driver sent to pick him up.
In
the unmarked police car, he was formally arrested and read his rights.
Kanyandekwe became edgy and “said we mustn’t arrest him. He would give
us $1 million” if he was taken instead to the Johannesburg district of
Kyalami, said Kanye, a 17-year veteran of the police service.
Prosecutor
Shaun Abrahams said the contents of the Rwandan’s luggage included a
key “almost identical” to one recovered from another arrested Rwandan
suspect, Amani Uriwani, an out-of-work truck driver allegedly recruited
for his contacts with other Rwandans and African immigrants in South
Africa.Kayandekwe, 30, says he was setting up businesses in South Africa.
But
Kanye said his two passports, one identifying him as a national of
Belgium, Rwanda’s former colonial ruler, and the other as a Rwandan,
showed he came to South Africa for the first time just before the
attempted shooting. He entered South Africa twice after the shooting and
again flew from Rwanda to Johannesburg on the day of his arrest.
Photographs
of his alleged accomplices in his luggage showed they were printed by a
digital photo store in Burundi’s capital of Bujumbura.The
Rwandan government has denied involvement in the assassination attempt
outside the Johannesburg home of Nyamwasa, a former Rwandan military
chief who has become a sharp critic of Rwandan President Paul Kagame
since coming to South Africa in 2010.
But Rwandans in exile have accused Kagame of using his agents to hunt down his external foes.Nyamwasa
and dissident leaders accuse Kagame of crushing opponents and trampling
on democracy after helping to end the genocide that left 500,000 people dead in 1994. Kagame was re-elected in 2010, months after Nyamwasa was shot.
Last
year, Nyamwasa was among four former Kagame aides in exile in South
Africa and the United States who were convicted in their absence by a
Rwandan military court for disturbing public order, sectarianism,
criminal conspiracy and threatening state security.
South African
prosecutors have said key witnesses in the politically and
diplomatically sensitive trial have sought police protection in South
Africa because they fear Rwanda’s government.
Testimony in the
South African trial has hinted that shadowy figures were determined to
kill Nyamwasa, trying more than once and offering large amounts of cash
to draw in conspirators.
After Nyamwasa survived the shooting,
prosecutors said the people pursuing him plotted to kill him in his
South African hospital bed. But that case was dropped on lack of
evidence.
Police in Britain last year warned some Rwandans living
there that their lives were in danger after they criticized the
government of the east African nation.
In Sweden, fears were also
raised for the safety of a small community of Rwandans, some of whom run
blogs and online newspapers that are critical of Kagame.
Kayandekwe,
who has appeared in the Johannesburg court dressed in impeccable
business suits, has hired top South African attorneys but has twice been
refused bail.
His co-accused, two Rwandans and three Tanzanians,
have appeared in T-shirts and cotton smocks and have not applied to be
freed on bail since their arrests.Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Prepared statements:
The Honorable Thomas Pickering
The Honorable J. Brian Wood
Mr. James Woods
Dr. Jennifer Leaning
Dr. Marina Ottaway
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New
York, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey
The Honorable Cynthia McKinney, a Representative in Congress from Georgia
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey
Additional material submitted for the record:

Responses to questions submitted to the Department of State
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 1997
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:27 a.m., in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(chairman of the Committee), presiding.
Mr. HAMILTON [PRESIDING]. The Committee will come to order.
Let me welcome Under Secretary Pickering and Administrator Atwood to the
hearing on the Democratic Republic of Congo: Its Problems and its
Prospects. That is the first panel. They will be followed by a second
panel a little later on.
Mr. Secretary, Mr. Administrator, we are delighted to have you with
us, and you may proceed. My understanding is you have to leave at what
time?
Mr. PICKERING. At ten to twelve.
Chairman GILMAN. Ten to twelve?
Mr. PICKERING. To eleven. Excuse me, ten to eleven.
Chairman GILMAN. Ten to eleven. So we will go ahead with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. PICKERING. Thanks, Congressman Hamilton, very much. I
was almost going to slip into saying Mr. Chairman. It is difficult not
to say that from this particular vantage point. But it is a pleasure to
be here. Thank you very much for inviting me to come.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman is taking quite a risk putting me up here.
[Laughter.]
Mr. PICKERING. We do not know anything about palace coups in the executive branch.
Chairman GILMAN. All right.
Mr. PICKERING. It is a pleasure to be here to speak to you
about developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and about
our policy toward this important African nation.
Let me begin by thanking the Committee for their understanding of my
time constraints. In recognition of that, I want to make a few brief
opening remarks, and would ask that my full written testimony be
submitted for the record.
Congressman Hamilton and Members of the Committee, our policy is to
encourage the Democratic Republic of the Congo to live up to its name in
all of its respects. That is, to encourage it to permit the democratic
expression of its peoples' will, to urge it to respect and defend the
human rights of all of its residents, and to advocate that the
government undertake the economic reforms necessary to ensure its
citizens benefit from the Congo's wealth of mineral and natural
resources. These same resources make Congo a potential source of growth
for the continent and a valued trade and investment partner for the
United States.
In pursuing these objectives, we are working closely with the United
Nations, the international financial institutions, and with other
concerned nations to advance our policy. We are heartened by the
leadership which other African nations have shown in mediating the
departure of President Mobutu and in counseling the current government.
Our policy of promoting a democratic and prosperous Congo addresses
regional objectives as well.
As you know, the Congo's neighbors include many nations which have
been in the headlines in the last months, including Rwanda, Burundi,
Angola, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Republic of Congo next
door.

As
the third largest country in the region, bordering on a total of nine
other nations, the Congo can play either a positive or negative role in
preventing future conflicts and humanitarian crises of the sort that has
required costly international assistance in recent years. We have
witnessed dramatic changes in the Congo over the past year. The rebel
movement backed by regional governments ousted President Mobutu after 32
years in power. Because of our interests in the Congo, the United
States pursued an active policy of diplomatic engagement throughout the
recent crisis, and we intend to continue that policy now.
Following the start of the rebellion, we were the first Western
Government to set up contact with the Alliance of Democratic Forces in
October 1996, and used these links to press for humanitarian access to
refugee populations. Throughout the conflict we were directly involved
in mediation efforts between the Mobutu Government and the ADFL. Members
of Congress, including distinguished Members of this Committee, played
an important role in creating conditions for a soft landing when power
changed hands in Kinshasa.
Events moved quickly during this period, but we preserved good
relations with all sides, and ensured that we were in a position to work
with the new Congolese leadership. We have made a conscious decision to
continue this approach. This is the time when the new leadership will
be making fundamental choices regarding the course of the post-Mobutu
era, and we do not intend to stand aloof, but to remain engaged with
them in this process.
With this in mind, we are considering a modest assistance program
which AID Administrator Brian Atwood will describe for you shortly. We
are also working closely with other donors and international financial
institutions to develop a concerted approach. We have also made clear to
the new government that our future relationship will depend on its
progress in democratic reform, its respect for human rights, for public
accountability and for free market economics. I personally underscored
these points to Foreign Minister Karaha during our meeting last week.
The new government has been in power less than 2 months, and it is too
soon to reach definitive conclusions.

However,
we are particularly troubled by credible reports of massacres and other
serious human rights abuses ascribed to ADFL forces during and
immediately after the rebellion. We take these reports seriously, and we
have stressed to the government, including in my meeting with Foreign
Minister Karaha, that it must take immediate steps to curtail these
abuses, permit a full investigation of any charges, and bring to justice
those responsible. I heard from the Foreign Minister that that was the
intention of his government.
In that regard, we welcome U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's
decision to send a U.N. human rights investigation team to the Congo.
During his visit to the United States, Foreign Minister Karaha, as I
noted, pledged his government's full cooperation with the investigators.
We regret that the previous team mandated by the U.N. Human Rights
Commission was not permitted entry. But in our view, the immediate
priority is for an impartial investigation to get to the bottom of these
very serious human rights charges. President Kabila promised to permit
such an investigation and we intend to hold him to his word.
Members of the Committee, we will continue to watch developments in
the Congo closely, focusing on the areas of concern which I have
outlined. This is an important historical moment as the Congolese people
begin to define the post-Mobutu era. We have an interest in seeing a
successful transition leading to a stable, prosperous and democratic
Congo. We hope to work with the new Congolese leaders to that end, but
we have made clear that our willingness and ability to do so will be
significantly enhanced if they take positive steps, particularly in
democratic reforms and respect for human rights.
I know that Members of the Committee share these concerns, and we will want to consult with you closely as we proceed ahead.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the appendix.]
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I
think because of your time constraints we will direct a few questions
to you before you have to leave, and then we will proceed with the
testimony of Administrator Atwood.
There is much debate and concern about where President Kabila
intends to take the Congo. I guess there is a sense here of wanting to
support him because he overthrew Mobutu, and we all wanted to get rid of
him. On the other hand, you emphasize in your statement that the new
government has a mixed record. So I gather our policy is for the time
being to give Mr. Kabila the benefit of the doubt, offer him $10
million, which we all recognize is a very modest sum of money in the
circumstances, and to wait and see.
You say he has a mixed record. What has he done positively and what has he done negatively at this point?
Mr. PICKERING. The mixed record, I think, is important to
keep in mind because it serves as a backdrop for the careful policy that
we are pursuing which, as you carefully noted, mixes encouragement with
what I would call benchmarks and baselines that we would like to see
met.
Some of the developments which are encouraging are the fact that he
has publicly announced a calendar for constitutional reform, and
committed himself to have national elections by April 1999. The Cabinet
and regional Governorships include political figures drawn from groups
other than the Alliance of Democratic Forces. Some local and regional
leaders have been chosen in ad hoc grass roots electoral formats. The
government has endorsed free market economic policies. It is cooperating
in its initial contacts with the international financial institutions.
Private print media and Congolese nongovernmental organizations seem to
be active. The new security forces are better disciplined and less
corrupt than their predecessors. That was not a high standard to beat as
we all know, but nevertheless that is a positive step.
Mr. HAMILTON. Is he establishing order in the country?
Mr. PICKERING. He has established order in Kinshasa after an
initial period of difficulty. I think it is much less clear to us that
order has been established elsewhere but it is interesting that in a
number of the regions Governors have been appointed and appear to be
functioning that do not come from his own group, but indeed from groups
which are in opposition or not part of his own group, but which are
popular locally.

If you would like, I would be glad to cover some of the negative aspects.
Mr. HAMILTON. I would like you to do that.
Mr. PICKERING. Yes. The new government has——
Mr. HAMILTON. Give me the number one negative aspect; give them in some priority here. What is your deepest concern about this?
Mr. PICKERING. The deepest concern is obviously the life and
health of refugees, with the second deepest concern being to get a full
investigative report on the part of the United Nations of what has
happened, and, well, the basis of that report to do all that we can to
preserve the life and health of all the residents of the Congo.
Mr. HAMILTON. He has banned political activity, hasn't he?
Mr. PICKERING. He has, but political activity which at least
he justifies as being banned because it has led or may lead to violence,
and so it is not an absolute ban but a ban related, at least in his
perception, to violent actions.
There have been, as you know, disturbing reports of summary
executions by government security forces even in Kinshasa. Those were
more current at the time when the so-called soft landing took place.
Mr. HAMILTON. Human rights remains a matter of very grave concern, is that correct, in general?
Mr. PICKERING. It is, and we have recent reports both from
humanitarian organizations and from other sources that their access in
key areas of Eastern Congo has been limited or is being limited as we
speak.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Pickering, thank you so much for being with us.
I have a request that is unrelated to matters that are germane to
this morning's hearing, and I would like very much, if at all possible,
information with reference to any meetings that you have with people
from Kenya. I read a report that you were to meet with officials from
Kenya. I know that that is going to be an area that we are going to have
to be concerned with at some point in the future. And to the extent
that you can provide me, not yourself, Mr. Pickering, but a staffer to
give me some briefing within the parameters allowed, I would appreciate
it, with reference to what transpires with Kenya.

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, Congressman Hastings. Thank you.
I had a very useful meeting with a permanent Secretary of the Kenyan
Foreign Ministry yesterday. I was reassured that the government intends
to try to deal with the emerging and very difficult situation in which
we have seen so much violence in a helpful way. We will, of course, want
to see the actions, and I would be delighted to put somebody in touch
with you——
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.
Mr. PICKERING [continuing]. to try to give you briefing on that meeting.
Mr. HASTINGS. All right. More germane to this morning's
hearings, I am curious, when we talk in terms of democratic reform and
respect for human rights obviously that is correctly the policy of the
United States and will continue to be.
But when I hear your testimony this morning regarding the U.N.
investigation, which I agree should go forward, I am curious as to what
time period insofar as the parameters that investigation should include.
And I do not mean to mince words. The fact of the matter is that if it
begins in 1996–97, and that period should be investigated, it would
overturn certain things that I think we all are aware of. But if it were
1992 to 1997, or 1982 to 1997, then the United States stands in a
somewhat culpable position of at least wanting to say that we
participated in some of these activities.
So when are we going to be fair-minded and take that into
consideration? No excuse for Kabila. No excuse for the massacres that we
believe are going on now, but they did not just start is what I am
getting at.
Mr. PICKERING. I understand, Mr. Hastings, that President
Kabila and Secretary General Kofi Annan are working on a starting date
in 1993, and they have our full support for this.

Mr. HASTINGS.
All right. The other thing I would be interested to know is your views
of the present day, meaning the last month, the role of the French. We
tend to not want to talk about the manipulation of France in Africa, the
continent, No. 1; and specifically in the area of concern of this
hearing.
What role are they playing? Are they financing anybody? Is Tesha
Kedhi connected to the French to the extent that I think he is? Or is
all of what I am hearing that the French are just satisfied that
everything is going honky-dory. I rather suspect that they are not.
Mr. PICKERING. I rather agree with you that they are not. On
the other hand, I have seen no evidence that I can point to, Congressman
Hastings, that would give me a feeling that they are in this particular
stage anything but isolated; that the new government for its own
reasons but in large measure I believe connected with the very open
French continuing support of President Mobutu, if you could phrase it
this way, until the last days of his presence, has taken umbrage at that
and made quite clear that it is distancing itself from France.
Mr. HASTINGS. One final statement, and not a question. And
that is that if we are going to want to assure that democracy takes
root, then we have to take into consideration that these people are
starting from ground zero.
That said, then USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, and a
number of the related NGO programs are going to have to at some point be
on the ground and be funded and hire the people therein the Democratic
Republic of Congo that can assist in informing the public what an
election is before we start demanding so much in the way of elections
and the reforms that are attendant thereto. And I just offer that as a
statement.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman GILMAN [PRESIDING]. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank you.
I am pleased we had a Republican conference, but I regret that the
Republicans are just winding up now and are on their way over, and I
know your time is limited, Mr. Secretary, so we will try to be brief,
and I will save my opening statement until after you leave.

Mr.
Secretary, in the past few years has our nation provided any military
assistance to the Government of Rwanda that may have assisted them
directly or indirectly in their efforts to help Kabila's alliance
overthrow the Mobutu regime?
Mr. PICKERING. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that that is a
question with a lot of sub-clauses and qualifiers, and so let me explain
my understanding of what we have done and we will, of course, try to
provide you a fuller report to follow up my response.
We have over the last 3 years provided the Government of Rwanda and
its military forces with very selective training to promote their
consciousness of the laws of war, proper behavior with respect to
civilian populations and a proper respect for humanitarian affairs.
If we have been successful in that training, that training has
reduced rather than increased the possibility that Rwandan forces which
may have been engaged in Congo had misbehaved. Certainly in no way do I
believe that that training could have increased their possibility or
propensity to commit any outrageous acts, if indeed it is clear from the
U.N. investigative report that they did so participate as charges now
show, but I would be very happy to ask the Defense Department to provide
you a fuller report on the details of that training so that you have
that.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, the United Nations last week released their report
documenting over 100 possible incidents of human rights atrocities in
Eastern Congo.
How will this report affect our relations with Congo and the Government of Rwanda?
Mr. PICKERING. We believe that that report is only a
precursor to the fuller report that we expect from the special mission
that Secretary General Kofi Annan has told us he intends to send, and
that President Kabila has assured us he will receive, to give a very
broad look at what happened; that that report was done in a very short
period of time, and therefore, in our view, needs to be amplified and
fully reviewed by a team which can spend more time on the ground, visit
more locations.

We
believe that that report is indicative of the deep concerns that we
have; that indeed a number of these atrocities took place, and we would
like to see the U.N. team that the Secretary General is sending move as
soon as possible and complete its report covering the broad range of all
of the period for which there is concern and report back to us after
which time we will certainly take that completely into account in our
policies.
Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Secretary, I have one last question of you.
Mr. Secretary, last week former Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Chet Crocker, testified before a Senate subcommittee in
which he said, referring to U.S. policy toward the Congo, and I quote,
''Despite our rhetoric, there is no transitional framework to guide the
Congo back to the road of constitutional legitimacy, no accountability
of the excesses of the Alliance, no agreed international framework for
engagement in getting this region back to its feet.''
Can you give us your reaction to this?
Mr. PICKERING. Yes. I have great respect for Chet and am a
great admirer of his achievements, and I think there are pieces of his
comment that I would say yes indeed are true, and that we are working to
try to remedy, including the need for full accountability on the human
rights atrocities, and the need through our consultations with both
neighboring States and other States interested in the future of the
Congo, to develop the kind of international framework which we could all
believe would set the sort of standards that we ourselves have set, and
the benchmarks that we ourselves have set for performance on the part
of the Kabila Government to continue to warrant our continued backing
and support, and, in addition, the sort of assistance program we would
like to see develop step by step to encourage and support that.
This, I think, is part of what we have been engaged in over the last
couple of months. The fact that we have not produced an instant
international consortium or an instant U.N. investigation is troubling
to me, but does not at this stage, I think, totally defeat our
determination and purpose to make this happen.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, again, Mr. Secretary, we thank you. We know your time has run, and we appreciate your patience in waiting for us.
Mr. PICKERING. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
kindness and consideration in excusing me at this point, and I look
forward to being back with you whenever I can.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, before the Secretary leaves can
we submit questions for the record to the Secretary because we have not
had the opportunity to ask questions?
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, we will be submitting some questions. We welcome your early response.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. I yielded too late because I had a series of questions that I wanted to ask Mr. Pickering.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, if the gentleman would pause a moment, allow me to just put my opening statement on the record.
We appreciate Mr. Atwood being with us, the Administrator to the
Agency for International Development, and as well as Secretary
Pickering. And the focus of our hearing is on the problems and prospects
of the Republic of Congo. We have heard numerous reports of human
rights atrocities in Eastern Congo committed against innocent refugees,
often women and children, and I am sure that we will hear another such
report today from Dr. Jennifer Leaning of the Physicians for Human
Rights, and we welcome her here.
These reports have been greatly distressing. They need to be
investigated as quickly and as thoroughly as possible. Those guilty of
atrocities have to be brought to justice and should be punished. The
governments in the region, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Rwanda, need to cooperate more fully with the planned U.N.
investigation.

Now,
with relation to Congo's prospects, a change of government in Congo
presents the world with an historic opportunity of an entire region of
the African continent, Central Africa, that has been plagued by war and
chaos for decades now has a greater potential for peaceful development
than ever before. The old kleptocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko has
been swept away and a new government has now come to Kinshasa. It is one
with problems certainly, but also one that has indicated a willingness
to adopt reforms and make the hard decisions that are going to be
necessary to turn Congo around, and that is good news for the people of
the Congo, and the nine countries that are its neighbors.
Four years ago the Clinton Administration responded to another
historic change in South Africa with strong engagement and significant
foreign assistance. A bi-national commission, also known as the
Gore-Mbeki Commission, was created. The President announced a 3-year
$600-million development program for South Africa. A Southern Africa
Enterprise Fund was created, expanded USIA, OPIC and Peace Corps
programs were established, and that is the level of engagement that
should be under consideration now with regard to Congo.
As of yet we have seen none of that. The Administration has
announced an assistance program of only $10 million for the year. This
is a paltry amount, and I hope the Administration has plans for a more
significant program to meet the opportunity that faces us in Central
Africa. Even if the Kabila Administration is not the one that ultimately
leads the Congo into a new era, we are going to have to be prepared to
take advantage of it at this opening. This Administration was able to
respond to an opportunity in South Africa, and I hope that it is able to
do so in Congo.
And I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I suppose I would just at this time, since Mr. Pickering is not
here, and I did want to ask some questions, I guess we ought to yield
back to Mr. Atwood who has not testified yet, and I will start my round
of questions there. But I do want to——

Chairman GILMAN. Well, Mr. Payne, if you would yield, why do we not permit Mr. Atwood to make his opening statement.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes, that is exactly——
Chairman GILMAN. And then we will proceed.
Mr. PAYNE. I was listening to your statement about Mr.
Crocker's assessment of the new government, and I wish he were here to
testify because I would have asked him about the Mobutu policy that was
under his leadership, and how that compares to 2 months with the new
government, and also maybe even talk about the Liberian elections in
1985 that he certified as fair and free and constructive engagement in
South Africa that was a total failure. But I will not do that since he
is not here.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Atwood, I understand your wife is traveling and you are the sole
parent this week for young Michelle. I want you to know that in the
future we can make any day that you testify ''Bring Your Daughter to
Work Day.''
[Laugher.]
Chairman GILMAN. Michelle is more than welcome at any
International Relations Committee function. We are, after all, strong
supporters of the child survival program.
We welcome your testimony. Mr. Atwood.
STATEMENT OF J. BRIAN ATWOOD, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am always impressed by the intelligence that you receive in the
morning when you come to work. I try to read my intelligence reports as
well, but thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here and to talk
about this, and I am going to summarize my testimony very briefly, and
describe our assistance programs.

But
I would like to begin by indirectly at least addressing Mr. Payne's
question because obviously as we look at this country in transition what
we are also looking at is the legacy that was left by the Mobutu
regime. And with respect to that, as we look at the development
prospects for this country in transition, we have to look at some of the
rather desperate indicators of human suffering that affect this
country. Let me give you some examples.
This is a country that today has a per capita income of $120.00. It
was close to $2,000 when Mobutu took office. Six percent of the
population has access to sanitation. Less than 50 percent of its
children are immunized against tuberculosis, polio and measles, and this
country has some of the highest infant mortality and lowest life
expectancy rates in the world. It is also a country that over many years
has been corrupted to the core. I believe that there is still a very
strong civil society. This is a country that I have often cited as one
of those that today we would not be providing foreign aid to if it had
the same type of government as Mobutu. But we did it for a variety of
reasons. We did it to help people at the lowest level of society for
humanitarian reasons, and we did it for cold war reasons. And today we
do not have the cold war, and we therefore would not be making
development investments in a country such as that.
But today what we have is an opportunity for this country, an
opportunity with a new government, and I must say that what this country
in transition is attempting to do is to overcome not only the recent
civil war and the violence, but they are attempting also to overcome the
legacy of the Mobutu regime.
Now, we have all been deeply disturbed by the reports of the
killings, the lack of humanitarian access and the repression of
opposition voices. Bringing a lasting transformation to this country now
called the Democratic Republic of Congo will take a sea change in that
nation's political culture.
One of our greatest concerns in the Congo today continues to be the
human rights situation, and I am hopeful that the United Nations will be
able to begin its investigation into alleged human rights abuses
expeditiously. The progress of such an investigation will, of course,
affect the structure and the depth of our assistance plans for the
Congo. And I can assure you that we will not turn a blind eye to abuses
by any party.

The
Congo does have tremendous economic potential. It is a linchpin of
regional security and could prove to be a stabilizing force in a region
that had endured many internal conflicts and hosts huge numbers of
refugees and displaced persons. Similarly, the Congo's efforts to
address sweeping concerns, such as rapid population growth,
environmental degradation and the spread of infectious diseases, will
ultimately have ramifications that go far beyond its national borders.
You recall only about a year ago there was an epidemic of a disease
called ebola that occurred in this country, and it alarmed many
Americans. That is only one of many infectious diseases that could
affect Americans in the long run, and therefore we have to treat these
problems at the source.
By any standard the Congo is at a turning point. The Clinton
Administration believes that we must maximize the opportunities we face
in the Democratic Republic of Congo while remaining clear-eyed about the
tremendous obstacles we face. To not engage is to risk losing the
opportunity to make a lasting difference. We are planning for the
allocation, as you have heard, of approximately $10 million during
fiscal 1997. One could call that a paltry amount, as the Chairman has
indicated, or one could say that we are adopting a cautious approach.
And I might say that when we find $10 million in our fiscal 1997
resources, we are finding it from other countries mostly in Africa, to
address these problems. So our hope is that the benchmarks we have set
for the government and for the transition will be met and that we will
be able to come forward in fiscal 1998 with a more robust program.
Now, our assistance is directly contingent upon the policies and
actions of this government. The choice is a simple one. If this
government acts responsibly and as a good partner, we will support their
efforts with direct and targeted assistance. If the government rejects
the notion of open markets and open government, it will do so without
the assistance of the United States.

At
this juncture we remain cautiously optimistic and are actively
exploring ways of harnassing the positive forces within the government
and the country. Our overall strategy for the Congo is built around
three principal activities delivered at both the national and regional
level. One, supporting a transition to democracy and free markets; two,
providing immediate tangible benefits to the people of the Congo through
activities such as meeting urgent health needs, in particular, children
that have never received immunizations; and, three, continuing our
support for needed humanitarian assistance.
We are committed to democratic reform, respect for human rights, and
free markets, and President Kabila has committed his government to a
transition to a democracy culminating in national elections in 1999. We
plan to do everything in our power to help him get there, whether it
means helping him to draft a constitution and promulgate it within the
society, helping people to understand its requirements, or whether it is
to help them with the election process in making sure that people
understand the choices that are before them.
We also recognize the importance of restoring integrity to the
justice sector, and are exploring ways to promote the rule of law.
Our initial engagement with officials in the new government has been
and will continue to be cautious, but there are some very positive
signs. The people at the regional level, in particular the regional
Governors, local officials seem to be committed to overturning the
corruption of the Mobutu era. They seem to be taking a new approach, and
we want to encourage that.
State corruption, hyper-inflation and overall dismal management of
the economy during the last decade of the Mobutu regime prevented the
emergence of a strong formal private sector in the Congo. If the new
government implements effective fiscal and monetary policies, then an
early result should be the renewal of a strong formal private sector
with both local and international private investment contributing to
economic growth, and I cannot overestimate the potential of this country
in terms of its natural resources, in terms of its potential to
generate hydroelectric power, et cetera. This is not a country that will
need a long-term foreign aid program. What it needs, I think, at this
juncture is transitional assistance. And then if we can move into a
longer-term program, what we need to find is the catalytic approach to
help them generate the wealth and create the capital inside the country
to solve their own problems.

Our
strategy primarily focuses on key transition issues. Our proposed
intervention in the health sector can support these efforts. Again, if
we can help through NGO's working with but not through the government to
immunize children to give the people of this country a feeling, that
they have not had for a long time, that the government indeed does care
for them and for their children. We have been working with both UNICEF
and the Center for Disease Control in this regard, and the World Health
Organization, and hope to be able to put together a good program.
The other part of this, of course, is our humanitarian assistance.
We have provided something like $10.7 million this year of emergency
food and disaster assistance of various types. We will continue that so
long as that type of assistance is necessary, and I believe with, again,
the strong support of the American people who always support these
kinds of humanitarian efforts.
Now, our strategy: we will use regional centers in three key
regions: the North Kivu area, the Katanga Province, and the Kasai area.
Grant disbursements will likely begin in September for these regional
projects. Activities would finance micro-projects such as repairing
schools and water systems, small infrastructure rehabilitation, and
technical assistance to regional authorities. The idea here is to help
at the regional level, to create both reconciliation within the society
if there are ethnic differences; to try to get some degree of economic
activities started, again in these potentially rich areas, whether it is
in the agriculture area or whatever; and to help create a civil
society—I should say recreate that civil society. We believe that the
potential is there and that this is the exact type of directed
assistance that could help this country through its transition.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that we are also working with other
donors. This may seem a small amount of money, $10 million. In terms of
the transitional needs we think we are targetting at exactly what those
needs are, but we are working with other organizations, such as the
World Bank, that has already had a team in Kinshasa talking to the
government about how it would structure its economic policies. UNDP is
prepared to send another team again to advise the government on economic
policies. We do not feel that we have a need right now to work directly
through the government and, of course, there are several prohibitions
on the books that would prohibit us from doing that unless, of course,
we waive those prohibitions.

We
are prepared to move forward with some waivers after consulting with
Congress. We would obviously notify Congress under congressional
notification procedures and would hope that you would endorse the
benchmarks that we have set. We want to see this government abiding by
international human rights standards. We want to see them allowing the
United Nations to investigate these reports of atrocities. We want to
move this process along. We want this government to succeed, but not at
any cost.
This government is going to have to gain control of the countryside.
This civilian government is going to have to gain control over its
security forces. They are going to have to cooperate with the
international community. We want them to be our partner and, of course,
we want them to succeed.
So, I think our assistance program is a good one. We had a team out
there for 5 weeks going all over the country trying to decide what would
make the most important impact in a short period of time. We have had,
of course, Ambassador Richardson's visit to Kinshasa as well. I think
this is a well prepared transition program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Atwood appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Atwood.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much for that very comprehensive
report, and I really appreciate the time and the thorough look that your
agency is doing at this time.
I would just like to just say also in this whole area I think that I
support a U.N. investigation in the Congo. I think that the Congo
itself should have an investigation. They should have sort of a
reconciliation kind of situation like you have in South Africa. I think
you would have 32 years to talk about.

I
listen to people when they comment about the Democratic Republic of
Congo and you would think that the comparison of what is happening in
this first 2 months when they compare it to the former government, I get
lost because the former government that I knew about was a government
that was fraught with fraud and corruption, and killings, and brutality
also, while I have not seen that in the government that has been
established yet at this time. And it seems like there is a lot of
revision going on in history because you would think that Mr. Mobutu was
a democratic leader.
When I heard the statement that Mr. Crocker made that there are not
instruments to move this back to democracy or into democracy, I missed a
word, I was wondering when was the democracy. I just have a question
with these very strict standards in a country that is less than 2 months
old.
First of all, I think there should be investigations. I think that
any wrongdoings should be accounted for and if possible, those people
who did any wrongdoings should be brought to justice. That is just
clear. I think that is what everyone wants, and therefore the chips need
to fall where they may. But I think that it needs to go back to 1993.
I have heard more outcry about—even before an investigation has
happened—about Eastern Zaire than I heard about the 500,000 to one
million people that we killed in Rwanda when the United Nations withdrew
rather than to go in to help; when it was a call for just having a
protective corridor to keep people, women and children, out of the way
of the militia that went around killing. We asked that that radio
station, Milles Colline, be silenced because when the problem started,
as you know, after the Arusha Accords had been agreed to, it was not a
Hutu/Tutsi problem. It was those in power who happened to be primarily
Hutus but some Rwandans, some Tutsis. It was not an ethnic situation
initially, but people used it therefore into becoming an ethnic strife.
And so I think that we need to start there, and we need to look at
the way that the world just would not respond until people had to come
out of Uganda to save the other million from being exterminated.

So
I would like to see an investigation—I would like to know what happened
in the camps for the last 2 or 3 years. I would like to know about the
Congolese who were killed by Mobutu during that time. I would like to
know about the Congolese who were killed by the Interahamwe when they
went into Eastern Zaire. I would like to know about why could the
refugees not return until the Alliance opened the pathway. There are a
lot of questions that need to be answered.
I think that we need to find out what happened in the eastern part
of the Congo. But by the same token, I think that we need to have a full
investigation, and I think we need to then try to bring those people
who must be held accountable to justice, and then move on with trying to
develop this country.
I listened to the points that the Assistant Secretary, Ambassador
Pickering mentioned, and the positive things that have happened so far I
think have been very positive with the government there. They have got
multi-parties in their Cabinet. As you know, I went with Mr. Campbell in
January. We met with the Alliance Forces, including Mr. Kabila, and
some of his Cabinet people. We went back a month or two ago, the day
before he was installed as President. We have talked to and met with
many of his Cabinet people. And so what I think is that we need to see
if we can get the truth, and then take action on the truth of what
happened, and then move forward to see if we can actually move this
country toward a democratic society.
I think that 1999 is ambitious. I hope that we have the resources to
put in to see that an election in 1999 can be pulled off because it
seems very ambitious to me, but that is the date that he called for, and
that is the date that we should shoot for, but there needs to be a
tremendous amount of support, and I certainly support the plan that you
seem to have outlined for immunization and other kinds of humanitarian
efforts.
I really do not have any questions to you. I would have liked to ask
questions to the previous speaker, but my time seems to have expired,
so I will yield.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Smith has joined us and would like to do an opening statement, and then I will recognize Mr. Campbell.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think other
Members on our side of the aisle had the same problem that we had an
election in our conference that just concluded, and I do regret that it
precluded my being here to hear Mr. Pickering. And I do have a number of
questions for him as well and which I guess we will have to submit for
the record.
But I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I agree with
Mr. Payne that there was a great deal that Congress needs to know about
the terrible situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Frankly,
there is also a lot the Administration needs to know, and a lot that the
Administration needs to explain. So I am disappointed that the Under
Secretary did not stay long enough for many of us who would have liked
to ask questions of him, and again we will have to submit those
questions for the record.
On December 4 of last year, the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights, which I chair, held a hearing on refugees
in Eastern Zaire and Rwanda. At that hearing Mr. Hamilton told the
Administration witness, and I quote, ''You acknowledge that we have got a
humanitarian crisis there. What is holding up a firm, strong response
to that crisis?''
Tragically, the distinguished gentleman from Indiana's question is
just as relevant today as it was when he asked it, and it still has not
been answered satisfactorily.
At the December hearing I myself stressed three important
humanitarian concerns. First, refugees in what was then Eastern Zaire
were dying and the forces of Kabila were not allowing international
relief organizations to have access to them. I noted that the United
States had been the strongest international backer of the Rwandan
Government, which was closely allied with the Kabila forces. I therefore
urged that we use our considerable leverage to secure immediate
humanitarian access to the refugee populations in Eastern Zaire.

Assistant
Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley assured me, and did so on the record,
that the access issue should be firmed up in 2 or 3 days. It never
happened. Thousands and thousands of people reportedly have died since
then, and many thousands apparently are still dying.
Second, refugees were still being sent back to places where they
might be in danger of persecution. At the hearing I asked what steps
were being taken to protect true refugees in Eastern Zaire, innocent
people, noncombatants who did not want to return to Rwanda out of a
reasonable fear for their personal safety. Not only have I not received a
satisfactory answer to that query, I understand that the UNHCR cannot
even adequately monitor the safety of many of the refugees who
voluntarily returned to Rwanda, much less the thousands still dispersed
throughout Eastern Congo.
Yet, the international community continues to send Rwandans back
with insufficient attention to whether the return is genuinely voluntary
or even as to whether it is safe. I am even informed that the U.S.
military personnel have conducted psy-ops in Eastern Congo as part of an
effort to convince Rwandan refugees to return home into what is
effectively a war zone.
Third and most serious of all, there were already reports in
December that innocent people were being massacred by the
Tutsi-dominated rebel forces in Eastern Zaire, perhaps in revenge for
the earlier massacres by the Hutus in Rwanda. I urged the Administration
both at the hearing and in a personal letter to President Clinton a
week later to use our close ties to the Government of Rwanda and our
contacts with the Zairian rebels to insist that all attacks on civilians
cease immediately and without exception.
Assistant Secretary Oakley admitted that we too have heard these
stories of the massacres in Zairian territory, but in an excuse that we
have heard countless times since Ambassador Richard Begosian stated, and
I quote, ''We have not been able to confirm whether those allegations
are true.'' This excuse of imperfect intelligence has been used by the
Administration for far too long to deflect scrutiny of our allies, the
Rwandan Government, and the allies of our allies, the new Government of
the Congo.

Lately
it has reached absurd proportions. The Administration has avoided
acknowledging the Rwandan military presence in the Congo, although
Rwandan Defense Minister Paul Kagame has boasted about it in The
Washington Post. The Administration cannot hide behind a claim that it
lacked certainty to justify its inaction over the past several months.
Reports of civilian massacres require some response other than a shrug. I
want to know, and I know others want to know, what the U.S. Government
knew about the civilian massacres by Kabila's forces, and by the Rwandan
troops, and when we knew it.
Most important of all, when we were put on notice that the massacres
might be happening, what did we do to investigate? What did we do to
stop the killing?
The State Department and the Defense Department were aware of
alleged massacres committed by the rebel forces in Zaire at least as
early as our hearing last December. More recent information directly
implicates the Government of Rwanda in grotesque human rights
violations. According to the revelations in The Washington Post last
week, not only were Rwandan troops involved in military actions in the
former Zaire; the Rwandan Government planned in November 1996 action on
the Mugunga refugee camp near Goma in an attempt to provoke the
so-called voluntary repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees.
In addition, such violations apparently continue to this day.
According to the Red Cross, two to three thousand civilians have been
killed during the last 3 months as a result of the Rwandan army's
counter-insurgency campaign. The killing of refugees in Eastern Congo
also continues.
I also want to know what forms of U.S. assistance have been provided
to the Government of Rwanda, and directly or indirectly, to the rebel
forces that now control Congo, and why such assistance has not been
explicitly conditioned on respect for basic human rights.
In December I asked the Administration whether we were providing any
military assistance to the Rwandan Government and was assured that
there was ''No substantial military assistance but only a small IMET
program in Rwanda that deals almost exclusively with what you might call
the human rights end of the spectrum as distinction from purely
military operations.''

Vincent
Kern, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, even went
so far as to call it ''the softer, kinder, gentler side of military
training.'' Against this background I am extremely troubled by reports
that according to the embassy personnel in Kigali, our military
assistance to Rwanda has included special forces and counter-insurgency
training. I do not believe that I was given nor were others given a
full, honest answer to the question raised last December, and I would
like one now.
We cannot hope to build a lasting peace in the Great Lakes region of
Africa so long as the perpetuation of ethnic violence is allowed to go
unpunished. We must do everything we can to insist that the governments
with whom we are allied and to whom we provide assistance respect
fundamental human rights. At the very least the United States must not
subsidize murderers of innocent men, women, and children.
Again, I look forward to the testimony and hopefully, Mr. Chairman,
this will provide some valuable insights and will clear up these
unanswered questions that I and others have.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would like to recognize now the Ranking Member of our Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would ask in the interest of time unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part of the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez appears in the appendix.]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Administrator, I would have, along with my
colleague, Mr. Payne, had a series of questions for the Assistant
Secretary, and I know some of them are not necessarily with your
purview, but I think that there are some that are, and particularly, I
want to focus on the Eastern Congo.

My
understanding from press and the human rights reports that continue to
proliferate about the fate of Rwandan refugees in the Eastern Congo are
serious. And in the context of your purview, AID agencies have reported
that they have been denied access to refugees, and that they have been
used as bait to lure refugees out from the forest. Dr. Leaning of the
Physicians for Human Rights written testimony says in part that,
''International humanitarian organizations and their local staffs are at
grave risk,'' referring to Rwanda and also the Congo, ''and have found
access to affected populations severely restricted, constant attacks on
those that attempt to minister to, continual threats, blockades,
harassment of staff, themselves; have forced them to curtail their
life-saving activities; and the field operation of one international
humanitarian organization that publicly reported on human rights
violations subsequently distanced itself from its headquarters report in
order to continue working in Eastern Congo.'' Her testimony goes on to
then say, ''We are alarmed at what appears to be a refusal on the part
of the U.S. officials to acknowledge the presence of Rwandan army
soldiers in Congo,'' and then goes on to talk about the role of U.S.
trainers and advisers in a counter-insurgency campaign.
My question is, what is it that we are facing in the context of
Eastern Zaire, of getting humanitarian assistance? Earlier you referred
to your reading of intelligence, are your reports such that they confirm
or deny what this Committee will hear later and what we have read in
various press reports?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Menendez, we face an extremely serious
situation in Eastern Congo, and many of the reports that you have heard,
I believe, are accurate. There are areas of Eastern Congo that are not
accessible by humanitarian organizations or by our DART team, our
Disaster Assistance Response team, by the UNHCR. They have been put out
of bounds.
I think we need, obviously, to understand what is going on in this
region, but to understand it is not to excuse the kinds of activities
that are being reported. No one can endorse this kind of thing, and we
need desperately to get a full-fledged investigation of all that is
going on so that we can hold people accountable.

However,
in the process of attempting to understand this one has to also
understand that there continue to be reports of ex-FAR and Interahamwe
units that are active in Eastern Congo. They are being sought by, in
some cases, Rwandan troops or by Kabila's troops. In the process of
seeking them I don't believe they have been discriminating between
innocent civilian refugees and ex-FAR and Interahamwe, and this is a
serious problem.
Not only do we not excuse these kinds of violations, but we publicly
criticize them, as I am now. We are doing everything in our power to
bring some degree of peace and stability to this region.
We had a very effective DART operation in this region, helping the
UNHCR to repatriate Rwandan citizens. For the most part, with the
exception of the northwestern part of Rwanda, those people have been
treated well in Rwanda, but there are, in the northwestern part of
Rwanda, also reports of Hutu extremists who are killing humanitarian
workers and Tutsis as well, and the situation has not stabilized. It is
obviously the responsibility of the Rwandan Government to bring about
peace and reconciliation and stability within its own borders, and we
are encouraging them on a daily basis to do it.
There are also reports of groups of people who may never have been
part of the Rwandan military who are apparently seeking revenge and
retribution in both Rwanda and in the Eastern Congo. This is a fact. It
is a situation that borders on anarchy.
As Secretary Pickering mentioned, Kabila seems to have control of
his government in Kinshasa and certainly in some regions. Lubumbashi is
one I would cite. He is well in control there and the civilians seem to
be in control. There is some obvious concern about the lack of control
over security forces that are under him, and we remind him that it is
the responsibility of a sovereign government to bring his forces under
control and to assure that foreign forces are not using his territory to
seek revenge.
It is a very complicated situation. The government has been in power
for only 2 months. We are obviously trying to do what we can to enable
him to exercise the control that he should over his country. It is a
very, very fragile transition, and certainly the reports of atrocities
cannot all be inaccurate.

Mr. MENENDEZ.
Let me say briefly, because I know my time has run, that I agree with
Mr. Payne that we have high expectations in a very short period of time.
But the one thing that we clearly must insist upon is the protection of
lives of individuals. The question becomes who is in control of the
Eastern Congo and how do you get the troops that helped you win, under
control? How do you say to them, thank you, but it is time to move on?
It seems to me that unless we focus our attention on that, not only
will we find the wrongs of the past, but we will continue to live the
wrongs of the present, and that is part of the focus that we have got to
have here.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Atwood, it is a pleasure to have you here today.
On the immediate humanitarian needs, I am very concerned, $10
million is nothing, of the children needing immunization, potential
starvation. I am going to just stop my question right here and, and I
have one other line of inquiry but I would most like to use my 5 minutes
telling me are we and are the world doing enough on the humanitarian
side regarding starvation and risk of disease in the Congo? Let us just
deal with that for a moment, put the political situation for a moment to
one side.
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Campbell, I believe we are where we can do
this work. There are, as I mentioned, three areas in the Eastern Congo
that are out of bounds at this point. There seems to be military
activity going on there, or they are simply keeping humanitarian workers
out of those regions. But I want to make it clear that our contribution
is part of a coordinated international contribution to the humanitarian
problem. Both through the World Food Program and UNICEF and other
organizations we are providing emergency assistance and food.
We are also, in terms of this immunization program that we are
talking about, going to be working with the World Health Organization
and UNICEF, and with other bilateral donors who are going to be
contributing along with the Government of Congo to try to immunize the
many children that are not immunized.

So
while it is small, this $10 million, we are at the end of a fiscal
year, and we have got to move money around in order to respond. I
believe that we are responding in the right way, and we are at the table
with other international humanitarian agencies handling the problem.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me ask a topical point. The appropriations
bill for foreign OPS will be on the floor tomorrow. It is the right of
any Member to try to move from one category of funds to another.
You know the Committee mark, the appropriations mark, the
Subcommittee's mark. Is there an area that needs to be increased and
perhaps could be taken from another? Maybe that is too difficult a
question. How about an area that could be increased for the purpose of
this crisis and people who are in need in the Congo? Is there an area in
the Appropriations Committee mark that should be increased?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Campbell, I am not going to get myself into
trouble by answering your question directly. But I can say that in the
fiscal 1998 bill there are adequate resources to move this $10 million
program up considerably if the Government of the Congo responds on these
benchmarks that we have set for them, which I think are reasonable.
So I am not going to complicate Mr. Callahan's problem tomorrow in
getting this bill passed. If it does pass, it does have adequate
resources, we believe, to respond to the situation.
Mr. CAMPBELL. OK. And the preconditions, I have read your
testimony but I regret I was also at the Republican conference. I do not
regret I was at the conference, but I regret that I missed your
statement.
[Laughter.]
I would not like to have a political task get in the way of helping starving people.

Mr. ATWOOD. Right.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Because they are not at fault.
Mr. ATWOOD. No.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Would you kindly, and with my apologies, repeat for me what your three preconditions are?
Mr. ATWOOD. Well, first is cooperation with the U.N. investigation; respect for human rights; and progress toward democracy and elections.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, suppose the new government does not cooperate. There are still starving children who might need help.
Mr. ATWOOD. I want to specify that the $10 million that we
have identified as transitional assistance, which will not be going
through the government but rather will be going through in some cases
regional centers, in other cases through NGO's and international
organizations, is considered different. Although there are humanitarian
aspects of it, it is considered different than the humanitarian relief
that we provide as a matter of course no matter what the political
considerations.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And as to the additional money that may be
possible to switch within the Callahan mark, in your judgment, in the
Administration's judgment, does such a switch depend upon the political
preconditions being met?
Mr. ATWOOD. If it is development assistance, it does depend
on the political conditions being met. But there are adequate funds for
humanitarian relief, emergency food and medicine, et cetera.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks. Last, just in the second that I have
left on the development side, which is your agency, do you think the
Africa Development Fund is in a position to assist Congo at this time,
and if not, do you expect it to be in the near future, the fund part?

Mr. ATWOOD.
We have requested additional resources for Africa this year, and as I
understand it, the mark does gives us what we have asked for in that
regard, although it does not designate it for Africa per se. It is a
development assistance account across the board.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am sorry. With the Chairman's indulgence, my question was the Africa Development Fund, which is at $25 million.
Mr. ATWOOD. Oh.
Mr. CAMPBELL. The Administration's request is $50 million. My
question was does any of that additional $25 million have opportunity
to be beneficially spent in the Congo?
Mr. ATWOOD. They could, but I do not know what exactly their plans are. I will have to get that for the record for you, Mr. Campbell.
[Mr. Atwood's reply was submitted following the hearing.]

The African Development Fund provides development finance on
concessional terms to the 39 poorest African nations. The President's
request of $50 million will continue support for programs designed to
reduce poverty and stabilize economies in these 39 countries. However,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) does not qualify for fund
assistance due to the country's large arrears situation. As part of the
Fund's restructuring program in 1996, a rigorous new sanctions policy
was adopted to address the problem of arrears. Under this policy, loans
are suspended once a country has been in arrears for 30 days. As the
largest debtor to the Bank Group, owing $459.96 million and $22.6
million to the Fund, the DROC is ineligible for additional lending until
it clears its outstanding arrears. Since our annual meeting in May, we
have begun working with the DROC, in cooperation with the World Bank and
IMF, to ensure that it is on track to become eligible for new lending
as soon as possible.

Mr. CAMPBELL. But you stand by the Administration's request for $50 million rather than $25 million for the Africa Development Fund?
Mr. ATWOOD. Yes, if that is the Administration's request. I stand by it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Administrator for the work that you do, not just in Africa but all over
the world, helping the people who are in need.
I have a question that goes to the depth of our relationship with the people of the new Democratic Republic of Congo.
Is not the relationship of the United States deeper than just the
one report that will be done by the U.N. investigative team? And is it
that our relationship with the government will be contingent upon the
content of that report?
Mr. ATWOOD. Ms. McKinney, you clearly are an expert on this country, and I know you have been there recently, and we have discussed that.
The first step in this process is making sure that there can be a
comprehensive report. In my view, that if this report is done from 1993
on and it is comprehensive, it will probably show individuals and groups
and possibly foreign forces as culpable for some of the atrocities—my
guess, personally.
It will also, I hope, show all of the mitigating factors. We talk
about the Rwandan military going into this region. Nobody likes the
reports that we read. They certainly should be held accountable if
indeed some of these reports are accurate. Nonetheless, this is a
country that did experience genocide a few years ago, and there are many
people who are bound to seek retribution for what happened. Many people
in Rwanda do not believe the international community was very
sympathetic, even after the genocide. They criticize the international
tribunal for not doing enough, for example, to bring people to justice.
And I question again, as I did in the case of Mr. Kabila, whether all of
these forces are 24 hours a day under the control that they ought to
be; whether they are exercising the discipline. That was part of the
reason for our expanded IMET program, to try to make sure people
understood how they should conduct themselves. But many of the people in
the Rwandan military had suffered the killings of their entire
families. One cannot imagine sitting here what it was like to experience
this genocide. That is, I think, a mitigating factor, but it does not
excuse genocide in retribution for genocide, and we must stop this cycle
of violence and that is why I think we have every obligation to hold
everyone to the highest international standards on these matters.

Ms. MCKINNEY. I certainly would agree with you, Mr. Administrator, and we certainly want the cycle of violence to stop.
Does the United States itself intend to, or expect to be included in
this U.N. report inasmuch as the plot to assassinate Patrice Lulumba
began with the United States and the imposition of Mobutu on to the
people of Congo was something that was done by the Government of the
United States? Does it not at least seem that we should not have the
arrogance with which we speak sometimes about democracy and what other
people have done? When are we going to include ourselves in some of the
culpability?
Mr. ATWOOD. Ms. McKinney, you know a lot of things happened
during the cold war. I believe that the United States in its authorship
and its leadership in the drawing up of the human rights covenants of
the U.N. charter and its own constitution, as it eventually was amended I
might add, stands for the highest principles, human rights principles,
civil rights principles, and we must hold ourselves accountable for any
problems that we have created in that regard.
But I think we pursue these investigations with all due humility,
and that this is something that the international community is
undertaking, not just the United States.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you again, sir, and I am sorry, I apologize as with all the Republicans, for not being here at the beginning.
Just in your past experience and in my past experience money that
flows to especially new governments that are not very stable, and I
guess we are talking about $25 million, is the money itself that is
available through your organization if they meet the standards that we
request, is that money going to be automatically dealt through the
government itself, NGO's? I just have more trust in NGO's than I do in
governments. Excuse me.

Mr. ATWOOD.
No, the initial $10 million would be administered by private or
international organizations; mainly through three regional centers that
we hope to set up, working with local officials and with NGO's, and the
immunization program that would be working through and with UNICEF and
the World Health Organization.
We do not plan at this juncture to send any of the money through the
government. However, if the benchmarks are met, we clearly would
consult up here first and then would proceed to work with the government
at some stage. Again, all moving toward what we want to see
accomplished here—a democratic government that respects human rights and
works toward a market economy.
Mr. BALLENGER. This may be a little bit out in left field,
but if the billions of dollars that Mobutu had secreted all over the
world are—I do not know, in Switzerland, other governments have seized
the money that he had stolen.
Is there any likelihood that that money could come back and assist,
or is that third government—I am completely lacking in knowledge on this
whole thing. Is that money going to come—if it is sent back, does it go
to the government? How does it work, if you know?
Mr. ATWOOD. Well, it is a complicated question, and believe
me, there are studies underway to determine whether or not it is
possible under international law to gain access to that money. It is
something that I think that the current Government of the Congo needs to
focus on. If indeed this money was obtained illegally, then they have
the right, the sovereign right to take up this issue as occurred, for
example, after Marcos left the Philippines, and I assume that something
like that may occur.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Again, I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for missing as much as I did.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Ballenger. You were not alone in being missing as a result of the Republican conference.

Mr. Davis. Mr. Capps.
Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize that I missed the testimony, but not because of a Republican conference.
We had a delegation from the Congo here last week, and I have to say
that I have almost been preoccupied in thinking about the testimony
that they gave us because it seemed to run in two directions
simultaneously. That is, there were on the part of we who were
interrogating them, there was great concern for human rights abuses, as
there should be, but on their part the testimony that I heard that I
think they stressed was they do not even have telephones in the Congo.
They do not have roads. We are talking about human rights. We are
talking about the need for democracy, for democratic elections. They do
not even have a government actually. I mean, it is so sort of embryonic,
so fragile, and I do not know quite what to do with that.
I read your papers with great interest, and it is an excellent
paper, and I see in the end of it of what our choice is. There is a
fragile government. They have widespread health problems. There have
been cycles of violence. There has been political oppression in the
past, and yet the humanitarian concerns are real and are vivid. I think
we are prepared to move ahead with those so long as, as you put it, the
government does not back pedal on its promises.
I think I would like to hear one more time, what are those promises,
and what do they have to do to maintain their part of this sort of
covenant to us so that we can do what any sort of collective humane
consciousness would say that we ought to be doing?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Capps, they are obviously preoccupied with
trying to consolidate their power and begin the process of governing.
They have some very impressive ministers. We have been impressed by some
of the ministers, but it is not exactly a deep bench, if you will. And
there is a lot of talk by the World Bank and others of getting some of
the Congolese ex-patriots back to help them, and others to help them.
The South African Government is very concerned, and that should give you
an indication of how important this country is.

South
Africa sees the success of the Congo as being important to their own
economy and to all of Southern Africa. I mentioned perhaps before you
came in the room that Congo has enough water power, hydro-power, to
provide electricity to all of Southern Africa if that can be done on the
basis of the private sector. There could be considerable profit there.
This is a potentially rich country.
But their promises relate to their respect for human rights. Many of
the people in this government were critical of Mobutu for years for
violations of human rights, and so therefore we believe that most of
them are sincere about this.
The other question is whether they will cooperate with the United
Nations in investigating these atrocities. Again, we want to hold them
to their word on that. They have promised elections in 2 years. Again,
as Mr. Payne indicated, that is an ambitious timeframe in light of the
fragility of the current transition, and we hope that we can help them
with that. They obviously want to promulgate a constitution as well.
These are the kinds of things that we will try to help them with as long
as they keep moving in that direction.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Atwood, the Africa Subcommittee has spent considerable
time looking at the situation in Congo. This May I led a congressional
delegation to Africa, and Mr. Menendez and Mr. Hastings on this
Committee were with me at the time. During our trip the delegation met
with Congo President, Laurent Kabila. We also visited Kinshasa, and met
with the President's representative, his special envoy to the Great
Lakes region, and Mr. Howard Wolpe, who is with us today (former Africa
Subcommittee chairman). I just wanted to acknowledge his presence, and
thank him for his good work.
Mr. Kabila was very gracious in our meeting, and he said what we
wanted to hear. Still, his government is just getting established. We
have no idea what its capacity is to take advantage of help we provide.
The country that Mr. Kabila inherited from the Mobutu regime is in dire
financial straits with very limited infrastructure. I will just mention
that we met with the Minister of Infrastructure and he said none of the
phones work, and the post office is nonexistent. That is the legacy they
have been left by the Mobutu regime.

Moreover,
of course, the persistent reports of his government's intolerance of
democratic political activity are troubling. Any complicity in the
massacres of refugees by his government would certainly adversely affect
our support for the Congo Government.
As we have all heard, there are serious questions about the
complicity of President Kabila's military forces in the massacres of
Rwandan refugees. One U.N. report lays the blame for the killings
squarely at ADFL's door, but a more comprehensive investigation lies
ahead.
I would suggest that we continue our current course of dialog with
the Kabila Government to determine what its short-term and long-term
goals are and how they intend to achieve those goals. It should become
evident soon whether they are moving in the right direction toward a
transparent government, with an open market and multi-party democracy or
whether we have another disaster developing in this Central African
giant.
And I would ask you, Administrator Atwood, how much confidence do
you place in the reconstruction proposals submitted by the Kabila
Government given its lack of size and experience, and the tremendous
challenges it faces?
Mr. ATWOOD. Let me answer the question this way. We do not
have specific proposals for reconstruction yet. This is a government
that is still forming and attempting to seek advice as to how to
proceed. We have had a lot of discussions with the Finance Minister who
has also met with the World Bank. We believe that he is asking the right
questions and certainly their intent is to create a market economy.
They understand the great wealth that their country has potentially,
and they need to find a way to an economic system that works to exploit
that wealth.
They understand also the tremendous humanitarian problem they have
in their country, and they want to show, again through the health
ministry, to the people of the country that they care about their
children, in particular, but about the health problems the country
faces.

So
I think that, at least with respect to those kinds of things, the
Minister of Mines is a very impressive fellow. The ministers spent a lot
of time in the United States, and I think therefore that they have got
the core of a government that really knows what it wants, but at this
stage is in the process of seeking advice from the international
community, and we want to make sure that they get that advice.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Minister Wolpe.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thanks.
Mr. Atwood, are there any provisions for policing, for creating of a police department?
As you know, their military, or armies cannot—and should not serve
as police, and I think that was one of the considerations when the
banning of demonstrations were originally called. There is no police.
There is no security. Do we have any plans to have a police department?
And second, what about the judiciary? Those things have to go hand
in hand if you are going to move to a civil society. Do we have any
plans to deal with trying to build a local and a Federal judiciary
through AID?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Payne, when Ambassador Richardson was there
we had discussions with them about their justice system, and about their
police system. We do not have any specific plans at this point, but,
again, this is an area that we know is urgent for them to establish
these institutions. They need a rule of law society. They know it. We
have seen actually the guidance that their regional officials have been
receiving. They clearly want to establish that kind of a society, at
least most of the civilians that are in the lead.
So this is an area of assistance as we have seen in places like
Haiti, that is really essential if the transition is going to succeed.
But we have not made any decisions about whether we would be helpful in
this area or whether it would be another bilateral donor or the United
Nations or whatever. We clearly know, however, this is an area that they
must address and address soon.

Mr. PAYNE.
OK, just very briefly, when I was in Kinshasa maybe several years ago, I
visited the so-called health facilities which were absolutely
horrendous. With UNICEF or with any of the health agencies, either the
World Health Organization or even some of the voluntary groups, the
Medicine Without Walls, the Belgium Group, and some of the other
organizations, is there any comprehensive plan, because there is no,
there is absolutely no health system in that country?
We went to facilities where mothers just die of AIDS with their
children. I mean, they just let them go into a warehouse so they would
not be on the street, and would sort of administer some very basic water
and things, milk for the child.
Is there any comprehensive plan that you are thinking about at least trying to start a national health system there?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Payne, we have been very impressed by the
Health Minister, and he is in the process of trying to develop a
comprehensive plan. We think that through this immunization program that
we can recreate some of the institutions that existed when, at least
with the civil society within the NGO community before the health system
was basically ruined during the Mobutu regime. And a lot of those
people had been recipients of aid previously. And so therefore there is
the core of a system that can be resurrected.
We will make a contribution toward resurrecting the health system,
but there is not a comprehensive plan. There is one in the works,
however.
Mr. PAYNE. I will conclude by saying that I too have been
impressed by a number of the ministers that I have met and several of
the new ministers there. As a matter of fact, the Minister of Finance
seemed to be really a competent person, a professor from the University
of Kentucky. His only concern was about Kentucky—at that time Kentucky
lost the NCAA championship, but we talked about that.
But thank you again, Mr. Atwood, for your testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I understanding Acting Assistant Secretary Twaddell will be willing
to answer some questions. If he would come to the microphone, and
identify himself for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Would you please for the record state your name and title, Mr. Twaddell.
Mr. TWADDELL. Thank you very much. My name is Bill Twaddell. I am the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being willing to
answer some questions, and additional questions will be submitted for
the record.
I would just like to ask you, Defense Minister General Kagame gave
many public warnings that he was prepared to take the matter of the
camps into his own hands.
Can you tell us what message the United States conveyed in response
to this threat? And did the United States at any time attempt to
dissuade the Government of Rwanda from attacking the refugee camps or
otherwise engaging in military operations in Zaire?
Mr. TWADDELL. Approximately a year ago, there was growing
concern not only in the sub-region of Central Africa but among many of
the care providers that were dealing with the refugee camps in the Kivus
abutting not only Rwanda, but Burundi as well as Uganda, concerning the
refugee camps and the fact that they were used as staging points for
attacks into those three neighboring States.
I make the comment that this was of concern to those countries as
well as to the international community because there was a mixture of
the former genocidists, the ex-FAR, the former armed forces of Rwanda,
as well as the Interahamwe, in these camps, as well as clearly a greater
number of legitimate refugees.

The
camps were organized in ways that permitted the ex-FAR and the
Interahamwe to perpetuate their control over these populations, in some
ways using them as a shield, in some ways using them as a means of their
own continuation and the ability to attack.
We were concerned with this. We were stymied. We were, I think,
frankly, without a very clear way in which to proceed. The intermixing
of legitimate refugees and those who still bore arms and still had this
dreadful legacy of genocide on their record posed very, very serious
humanitarian and legal dilemmas for us.
We urged Mr. Kagame, as we urged those in the UNHCR in Geneva, as
well as others dealing with them, to try to find ways in which to
resolve this situation.
The events that precipitated what has since been called the
rebellion may have had their origins to some degree in those refugee
camps. They also certainly had their origins in the situation in the
Eastern Kivus where Tutsis of longstanding residence in Zaire were being
challenged on their nationality. In some cases told directly by the
then Zairian authorities that they were going to be dispossessed of
their nationality. And it was that spark that initiated the rebellion in
South Kivus.
At that point there, I would not say was a concerted or a massive or
an orchestrated uprising of those interested in the stability and the
instability as seen from those three capitals to the east with the
situation, but the confrontation was initiated in South Kivus by the
Bauyamelenge against the forces of the then Mobutu regime. And as we all
know, and is history over the last eight or 9 months spread very
rapidly to North Kivus, throughout the Kivus and then in a westerly
direction.
Mr. SMITH. Did General Kagame respond to us in writing, or
verbally? What was the response when we raised these issues, and who
raised them, and where and when?
Mr. TWADDELL. Oh, I think in a number of contacts it was
raised verbally. I am not sure it was ever raised in writing. But it was
acknowledged that there was a severe problem there that was upsetting
to us as well as to obviously those neighboring countries.

At no point did he indicate that he was going to take up arms and attack frontally directly the refugee camps.
Mr. SMITH. Did any of our people have an inkling that that
was a possibility because those issues were raised by our Subcommittee
and by many in the international community last year who stated that
this was a possibility, maybe even a probability, and was perhaps even
going on at the time?
Mr. TWADDELL. I am going back roughly a year ago, which is
when I think Defense Minister Kagame was here in Washington. And at that
point, as I say, I do not believe anyone was confronted or raised the
issue with Kagame, or had Kagame come to us, let me put it that way, and
say that he was going to go in guns blazing and clear out those camps.
We registered our concern. We said that this should be dealt with in a way that addressed the legitimate humanitarian needs.
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Smith, I had a meeting with Kagame maybe a
year and a half ago or so when he and his President expressed grave
concern about the camps and that they were being used to attack his
country; that there were cross-border incursions and people were being
killed and the like.
As I left that meeting, obviously they were making an appeal to the
United States, but also to the international community to do something
about these camps.
We began working at that point, as did the UNHCR, on whether or not
we could move these camps away from the borders. We had, I think, at one
point three plans. The United States had a plan, the European Union had
a plan, the UNHCR had a plan. This was just before the Bauyamelenge
uprising when the problem took care of itself, obviously, and at that
point we were talking about putting military force, a peacekeeping force
in there to try to keep the peace in Eastern Zaire.
I left, frankly, that meeting with Kagame with the impression,
although he never said it, that if the international community does not
do something about this problem ... Do not forget, these camps were put
very close to the border. They usually have a guideline that they are 40
miles at least away from a border such as this. But with a million
people coming out in 3 days, there was not a lot of alternative here,
and so they were established in the Goma area. So this was clearly a
security concern for the Government of Rwanda.

I
think if the international community, my personal view, had acted a
little more aggressively and had gotten our collective act together, it
is not just us but the entire international community, we might have
been able to avoid what has occurred.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I would just like to remind the administrator and Mr. Twaddell and
those others who are here to speak on behalf of the U.S. Government, to
people around the world, that the cold war really is no excuse for what
we did to the people of that area. And I noticed when you even uttered
your response, you lowered your head.
We really do not have much moral standing here, and we need to
rehabilitate ourselves in the eyes of the people of that region, and we
need to rehabilitate ourselves for our own good. One way we can do that
is by acknowledging that we do not know everything, and that our way is
not always the best way and it is not always the appropriate way.
As an African-American who has struggled since the day I was sworn
in to retain my ability to represent people in the State of Georgia, the
rights of minorities are on the line in this country. I think it is
appropriate that we fight to protect the notion of democracy and to
protect the rights of minorities around the world, but we also need to
acknowledge that we do not have all the answers.
If we would do that for a change rather than assuming the position
that we do have the answers, I think it would go a long way in elevating
our moral standard. That is my comment.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentlelady for her statement.
I would like to recognize that we have a former Member who is here
with us, Howard Wolpe, now special envoy at the Department of State, and
we welcome you back to our Committee once again, Howard. We hope one
day you might want to come back and join us on this side of the table.

[Laughter.]
I see you are shaking your head no.
[Laughter.]
I regret that I have another hearing that I have to go to, and I am
going to ask one of our senior Members, Mr. Smith, if he would be kind
enough to assume the chair.
Before that I would like to thank our panelists, and particularly
Mr. Atwood, Mr. Pickering, Mr. Twaddell. I know we have another panel of
James Woods and Dr. Leaning and Dr. Marina Ottaway. I particularly want
to welcome Dr. Ottaway who represents part of the family from my own
constituency, and we welcome Dr. Ottaway here along with our other
panelists. We welcome all of you for giving your time.
Just one question that I have and then I have to be on my way and turn the gavel over to Mr. Smith.
Mr. Twaddell, have you read the Physicians Human Rights report?
Mr. TWADDELL. I regret that I have not read the full one. I saw a couple of paragraphs that were cited.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, I hope after you read it that we welcome having a written reaction from you with regard to it.
Mr. Campbell, did you have a comment?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I did if you do not mind. I just have one quick
further before we lose the panel, and that was regarding whether a
waiver of the Brooke Amendment might be needed.
If we are dealing with the question of forgiveness of debt, and I
know the IMF is involved in this as well, will the Administration be
coming forward with a request that you can enlighten us on regarding a
waiver of the Brooke Amendment?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Campbell, if we want to channel any of these
funds through the government, we would have to have a waiver of the
Brooke Amendment, that is right. There are arrears that are very
significant.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And do you have an intention to do so at present?
Mr. ATWOOD. Not at present. We are working primarily with NGO's and regional——
Mr. CAMPBELL. And last, when Congressman Payne and I were
speaking with the Finance Minister he spoke then of an imminent meeting
with IMF. I wonder if you have any information you could share with us
about how the negotiations between the new Government of Congo and IMF
are going.
Mr. ATWOOD. I do not have an updated report. I have simply a
report from a World Bank official, Mr. Madavo, that basically said that
they were listening more than talking or negotiating with them at that
stage.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I will pause. You appear to be getting some advice. I would be happy to pause for you.
Mr. ATWOOD. I am told that the IMF is going in in a few days, so they have not yet been engaged in that of——
Mr. CAMPBELL. And there is no agreement yet with World Bank either?
Mr. ATWOOD. No.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. I just needed to have that
information for my own sake, and I am sure for others, but just speaking
on my own behalf. That would be essential and I urge you to do all we
can to get the IMF understanding quickly. I think it would give some
assurance to what we might do here.
Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Just to my colleague, Mr. Campbell. We had report
language put in asking that we be on un-Brooked in the House Committee
here, so that is going through. It has to be concurred by the Senate,
but I did have an amendment that we be on un-Brooked. It has not yet
been completed because the Senate will have to approve it, and then the
entire bill.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would my colleague yield?
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Pardon me. Is that in report language or is that in the bill?
Mr. PAYNE. It is actually in the bill.
Mr. CAMPBELL. In the appropriation bill or the authorizing?
Mr. PAYNE. The authorizing bill.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Oh, great. Good work. Thanks.
Mr. PAYNE. All right.
Mr. SMITH. Just some additional questions and some of the
other Members might have some followups. I was wondering, Mr. Twaddell,
if you could just tell us, you mentioned earlier some of the oral
statements that have been made to General Kagame.
Could you reconstruct for the Committee, either now or perhaps when
you go back to the office, when and where those conveyances of our
feelings were made to the Defense Minister and to the Rwandan
Government?
Mr. TWADDELL. I would prefer to do that, obviously, with the access to the full record.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears in the appendix on page 124.]
Mr. SMITH. Could you also provide the Committee all available
information dating back to October 1996 about the involvement of the
RPA in the Zaire/Congo conflict? In particular, the Committee would like
to be informed on how many Rwandan soldiers remain on Congolese soil
and the role that they are playing with regard to attacks upon Rwandan
refugees, Zairian civilians, as well as restrictions on access that they
are imposing on nongovernmental organizations.

Mr. TWADDELL. I would be happy to take that question as well.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears in the appendix on page 126.]
Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that.
I read through, and I know you have read it as well, and we all saw
it in The Post recently, the testimony by Dr. Jennifer Leaning of
Physicians for Human Rights, who will be testifying in a moment. There
are a number of principal findings, and I will not go through them all,
but I would just like to ask you to ascertain whether you believe these
to be accurate or inaccurate.
The first principal finding is that the killing of Rwandan refugees
in Congo continues, with Rwandan soldiers often identified as
perpetrators. Rwandan soldiers are also implicated in the killing of
Congolese villagers in Eastern Congo.
Is that accurate or inaccurate?
Mr. TWADDELL. I do not have any specific particular
information to confirm that. I think it would fit in with certain
patterns that we fear may be true.
Mr. SMITH. There is another finding that the civil war in
Western—could you get back to us with a further elaboration of whether
or not you think that is an accurate assessment?
Mr. TWADDELL. I would be happy to.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears in the appendix on page 129.]
The civil war in Western Rwanda has had catastrophic consequences
for human rights as well, with at least two to three thousand civilians
killed by Rwandan army's counter-insurgency campaign in the last 3
months alone.
Is that accurate or inaccurate?

Mr. TWADDELL.
I have seen reports in Western, this is referring to Western Congo
about Menongo, that I think these are press reports that would tend to
substantiate that.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears in the appendix on page 131.]
Mr. SMITH. What has been our response to the counter-insurgency campaign?
Mr. TWADDELL. Excuse me? To the counter——
Mr. SMITH. To the Rwandan counter-insurgency campaign, what have we conveyed to the Rwandan——
Mr. TWADDELL. I would like to back up. I was referring to
accounts that related to alliance forces in Western Zaire that were,
according to the press, related to Rwandans or Tutsis that took place in
Mondaca about 2 or 3 months ago. And with regard to those, we have
raised with the Government in Kinshasa our deep distress if they are
substantiated, if these press reports are substantiated.
Mr. SMITH. What is being done to substantiate them? What kind of investigation?
Mr. TWADDELL. Well, this is the——
Mr. SMITH. Besides the potential U.N. investigation?
Mr. TWADDELL. Obviously, the United Nations and the
investigative team is key. Mondaca is quite remote. It is up along the
border with Central African Republic and Congo, Brazzaville. It is in
the deep bush.
Mr. SMITH. One of their findings is that the United States is
providing counter-insurgency training to the Rwandan army which is
engaged in carrying out atrocities in the region. They published the
serious question that needs to be asked as to whether the United States
is therefore implicated in these atrocities.

Mr. TWADDELL. We are not engaged in any counter-insurgency instruction to the armed forces of Rwanda.
Mr. SMITH. Is there any implication of our complicity directly or indirectly as a result, as a consequence of our training?
Mr. TWADDELL. Our complicity?
Mr. SMITH. Yes.
Mr. TWADDELL. No, I would say not. As Under Secretary
Pickering said, the thrust of our military training over the last 3
years since the RPA came into being has been in those areas that we
think go directly to concerns about the comportment of soldiers, and
those are areas of military justice, the rules of war according to
international convention, and the role of the army in democratic
society. These are the sum and total of the courses that our military is
engaged in.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears on page 133.]
Mr. SMITH. Dr. Leaning points out, on page 5 of her testimony
that, ''In our discussion,'' and that is her site team, which included
herself, ''at the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda we were alarmed by a remarkable
lack of concern over reports of human rights violations in Western
Rwanda and Eastern Congo. Incredibly,'' she goes on to say, ''the Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali defied the team to
produce evidence of serious violations of human rights in Burundi or
Congo.''
Is that your perspective as well?
Mr. TWADDELL. I was not present at the encounter that she is
describing. I would say that our staff in Kigali, as our staff elsewhere
in the region, has taken all allegations and documentation of human
rights violations extremely seriously. We have been aggressive at that
mission as well as elsewhere in pursuing those.

Mr. SMITH.
I would ask you, if you could, to follow up both with the Physicians
and the Deputy Chief of Mission to ascertain whether or not that is the
mindset.
We had our hearing last December because we got a flood of reports
from human rights and refugee organizations who were concerned first
that this very thing was going to happen and was happening. And second,
in terms of the Rwandan complicity in killing people in camps, they were
convinced that we were not doing what we could do to negotiate, in
their view, access to the refugees, this very vulnerable population;
that there was a blasé mindset on the part of some of our embassy
personnel, just, you know, show us, and that somehow we were raising a
red flag where none really existed.
And again when we had our hearing, the very things that have
happened were raised, and Mr. Payne raised the identical questions that I
raised at that hearing in terms of those issues, and we kept getting
assured that we would have access in a couple of days. And those couple
of days never materialized, unfortunately.
Mr. TWADDELL. Access to the refugee population throughout
this very difficult period was our primary objective. We pushed on that
theme wherever we thought it could have some positive impact, and that
was certainly in those capitals as well as the United Nations in New
York and Geneva.
With regard, again, to a blasé attitude, it does not describe what I
know to be the attitude of my colleagues in the land in which they have
conducted their professional duties in those posts.
[Mr. Twaddell's answer was supplied following the hearing and appears on page 161.]
Mr. SMITH. One of the findings of the physicians report is
that repatriation of Rwandan refugees by UNHCR from Congo to Western
Rwanda is tantamount to sending them back to a war zone.

Again,
we raised that very question last December out of concern that there
was no real process in place to ascertain whether or not these people
had a credible fear of being returned into a situation that put them and
their families at risk. And now this report suggests that that is
exactly what has happened.
Mr. TWADDELL. The repatriation of something on the order of
seven or eight hundred thousand citizens from eastern Zaire back to
Rwanda has taken place with remarkable efficiency, and I would say with
unfortunate, but very regrettable, a minimum of the feared atrocities
carried out against those returning refugees.
I would defer to my colleague, the AID Administrator, who knows the situation of the programs in Rwanda.
Mr. ATWOOD. I would only say that on the question of whether
or not this was voluntary repatriation, according to UNHCR they made it
clear that this was not a forced repatriation.
[Mr. Atwood's reply was submitted following the hearing.]

UNHCR felt that due to civil strife in eastern Zaire (now Congo), it
was safer for refugees to return to Rwanda than to remain in place.
Many individuals, of course, were very sick and given safe haven and
time to recover before they were evacuated from Eastern Congo.

And I understand the concern about forced repatriation, but
according to UNHCR, whom we depend on to do these things and they care
deeply about this whole issue of volunteerism, this was not a forced
repatriation.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Atwood, were the options discussed with the
potential returnees as to what they might opt for? I mean, were they
told what else was out there?
Mr. ATWOOD. Well, I think I would ask to provide for the
record what procedures the UNHCR used in this repatriation. I think that
is a good question.

Mr. SMITH. Do you know whether or not individuals were apprised of that information?
Mr. ATWOOD. Well, I mean, the question——
Mr. SMITH. Were there interviews?
Mr. ATWOOD. I am sure that in some cases they were. I do not
know that in all cases they were. I mean, there was obviously a desire
to get people out of this war zone and back into what we consider to be a
safe area, and for the most part was.
Now, obviously there have been some killings in Northwest Rwanda
that have caused the Rwandan military to respond to try to bring about
security in that region, and that has been a problematic area of Rwanda.
But the rest of Rwanda we believe that people have been treated very
well. There was an effort to treat them well in Northwest Rwanda as
well.
Mr. SMITH. What assurances has the United States requested
and received that the military aid and training as provided to Rwanda
were not used in Congo?
Mr. TWADDELL. I would come back to the point that these were
classroom training sessions on those issues of comportment,
professionalism, the attitude of the military toward the civilian
government. I would hope that translates into events in Congo in a
positive way. If, in fact, the Rwandans were present on the ground in
serious numbers, and did play a significant role in the events of the
so-called rebellion, I would hope that, although that was not our wish
or what we would have approved, that the behavior of the individual and
collective soldiers of Rwanda would have been a mitigating factor in any
kinds of concerns of human rights and other things.
Mr. SMITH. Has the United States asked the Rwandan army to pull out of the Democratic Republic of Congo?
Mr. TWADDELL. We have indeed.
Mr. SMITH. And what has been the response?

Mr. TWADDELL.
Well, until a week ago the response was that the incursions had been on
a very limited basis along that border. As we all know, the Washington
Post interview with Vice President Kagame last week suggested that 600
Rwandan soldiers were present in the rebellion from its early days.
We have repeatedly told Mr. Kagame, as well as the leaders in other
neighboring countries who had forces on the ground in former Zaire, that
it was not in their interests and not in the interest of the region
that they be present on the ground.
Mr. SMITH. I thank you both for your testimony, and the
Committee does have further questions it would like to ask, but I do
appreciate your testimony, and the rest of the Committee does as well.
Thank you.
I would like to invite our second panel of witnesses to the table, and in the order that they will present their testimony.
Mr. James Woods is vice president of a consulting firm, Cohen &
Woods International, specializing in African affairs. He currently is
also senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, African Studies Program. From 1960 to 1994, he served in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and from 1979 was the Secretary's
primary advisor on crises in programs in sub-Saharan Africa. He retired
in 1994 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.
Dr. Jennifer Leaning is an assistant professor at Harvard Medical
School, and is before us today in her capacity as consultant for
Physicians for Human Rights. She is also co-director of the Program on
Human Security at Harvard Center for Population Development Studies. She
is editor-in-chief of Medicine and Global Survival, a quarterly
publication that addresses issues of war, disaster and the environment
from the perspective of public health. She is a member of numerous
distinguished boards. Dr. Leaning received her medical degree from the
University of Chicago.

Dr.
Marian Ottaway is adjunct professor in the African Studies Program at
the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University. She also has been working recently on problems of democratic
transformations in African countries, and particularly those emerging
from conflict.
Mr. Woods, if you could begin your testimony.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Smith, before Mr. Woods begins I would like
to ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be submitted for the
record.
Mr. SMITH. Without objection your opening statement will be made a part of the record.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the appendix.]
STATEMENT OF JAMES L. WOODS, VICE PRESIDENT, COHEN & WOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Mr. WOODS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify on a subject which is both so important and
so timely and where perhaps there is a chance of actually having some
impact on a situation which is very fluid in a policy which is so fluid
as to be transparent, frankly.
I have submitted a brief written statement of four pages, which I
ask be included in the record, but I will make some other points in my
verbal statement. In fact, I modified my thoughts a good bit. This has
been a very interesting hearing, and I think probably the witnesses are
getting as much or more out of it than the representatives.
My plea, as you will see in the points, is for a bit of strategic
coherence and a bit of perspective. I would think we ought to be
thinking a little more about the fact that this operation has removed
the Mobutu regime and created a new opportunity, and that we are getting
entirely bogged down too much in—not trivia, but in issues which are
only a part of the problem and only a part of the opportunity, if we can
correct them. Let me be more specific.

First
of all, this crisis in Central Africa and how it plays out is a
terribly important issue. It is important not only to Central Africa,
but to all of Africa. This thing will ripple out if it does not get
fixed. There is a lot of discussion about the increasing odds of a
brighter future for Africa. But if we are to live to see that, each of
Africa's major regions needs an anchor, it needs an engine of stability
and development.
Southern Africa has South Africa to play that role, and we are
working actively to support them. The new Democratic Republic of Congo
will play that role, or perhaps it will fail to play that role, in
Central Africa. If we want to stop the spread of the bloody disorder
which is still ongoing and set the stage for renewed growth in Central
Africa, we need to help this new government get on the right path.
Second, we need to get both focus and balance, and I think more
realism into our expectations and demands for this new government. This
is an utterly inexperienced government with mostly utterly inexperienced
ministers. It is extremely thin in personnel resources, and it has
almost no money to work with. Its writ does not run wide and deep in the
country. We talk about Mr. Kabila's army, Mr. Kabila's control. Mr.
Kabila had no army and I think he barely has one at this point. He is
trying to build one. I do not think he has any effective control over
large parts of the country, certainly not the east.
The immediate concerns of this new government and its priorities
therefore do not match our own. Its priorities are focused on survival
and security. So far the international community, in my opinion, has not
been very helpful. It has instead focused on what are very real abuses
and very real failures, and in increasing demands for correction. I
think this approach is unfair, lacking in balance, unrealistic, and will
get bad results.
I say, cut Mr. Kabila and his ministers some slack. Engage, try to
work with them for a reasonable period. I would say 6 months is a
reasonable test period. In this I would emphasize we would be following
the lead of most of Congo's neighbors, led by South Africa. They have
opted for a policy of vigorous engagement and practical assistance
within their means. I suggest that we seriously consider for once
following the African lead.

Third,
if we are going to engage, let us stop talking and start acting. I find
the aid offers to date woefully short of adequacy, and also packaged in
a way that will inspire little enthusiasm with the new Government of
Congo. But even so, AID is ready to start a limited engagement which is
apparently more than DOD feels that it can do, apparently because of
some legal constraints which were referred to earlier in the hearing.
I think it is time, whether it is AID or DOD, to stop the endless
process of planning and the endless monitoring of the DROC's obviously
political failure, and get on with a program of useful assistance. In
the case of AID, I think that should include a true development
component, which I so far find entirely lacking in the AID presentation;
and, yes, I do find that $10 million offer pathetic, not because AID
has made it but because it shows the lack of seriousness of the United
States, and for that matter the international community, in really doing
anything about this crisis.
On the military side, I would suggest an immediate expansion of our
defense attache office, which is now one person, and give them an
airplane so they and our ambassador, and for that matter Mr. Kabila, can
get around the country and find out what is going on. Second, work with
the Congress to lift the sanctions which prevent a resumption of
military aid. I am not advocating grant material assistance other than
humanitarian, but I would re-start IMET, and I would emphasize Expanded
IMET, which is a program which is focused on democratization training,
how to behave like a soldier, professionalization and so on, which they
desperately need.
And, third, I think the European Command would be willing if tasked
to send down some technical advisors to try to help structure the new
armed forces so that we are in on the ground floor.
My fourth and final point, I suggest a sober reappraisal of our own
actual influence or leverage in this affair. It is not, in my opinion,
very great. Mr. Payne earlier referred to one part of the problem, which
I had not really thought about, which is the legacy of the cold war.
Now, he and I are on opposite ends of the political spectrum in terms of
our evaluation of the value of that period, but I agree it had
tremendous residual consequences, and I think we have some
responsibility to face up to them. So I hope we would find a point of
convergence so that we could work out a program—I do not see it as a
process of atonement, but let us have some responsibility for
thirty-some years of basically helping ruin the country of Zaire and
make its people miserable in order to get the cooperation of Mr. Mobutu.
And we do not seem to be facing up to that.

But
it is part of the legacy that we bring to the table and part of the
reason why we are not, believe it or not, exercising great leverage and
influence over this new government, or for that matter, over some of its
friends next door.
Our diplomacy during Mr. Kabila's march to Kinshasa, I think, was
short of brilliant, if the intent was to have a warm working
relationship at the end of it. We kept asking him to stop and negotiate,
and I am firmly convinced, had he followed our advice that he would
still be sitting down in Lubumbashi.
So I am extremely pleased that he ignored our advice and went on to
take over the country. Since he did take over the country we have held
back. We have sent teams. We have had endless discussions. We have
talked endlessly about assistance, but we have not done anything. We
have levied a great barrage of criticism, and I am going to hear more of
it here shortly, and I think all of this essentially is justified.
There are some really horrible things going on, particularly in Eastern
Zaire.
I do not see any prospect from what I have heard and read from the
government, or for that matter, the Europeans, of any serious assistance
in the future.
The international community utterly failed to deal with the genocide
in 1994. The last time I testified I was still serving and, you know, I
had the miserable experience of sitting beside George Moose at the
Africa Subcommittee hearing where he could not be brought to say,
because he was under instructions, the ''G'' word. ''Well, we are not
really sure there is a genocide, perhaps there is some bad stuff going
on but, you know, who is to say what it is.'' We could not deal with the
genocide. We could not deal with the camps. We, the international
community, we were then given basically, I think, an ultimatum by
Kagame, ''You fix it or I will fix it.'' And now we have the
consequences of all of those years of failure and frustration.
So let us be a little modest as we lay our demands on the new
government and its neighbors. I think we can make a substantial
difference over time, but at the margin of things. We are not, to be
frank, a major player in the region anymore. And as I said earlier, I
think we would be better served to adapt our policies and follow the
lead of the neighbors, and in particular, South Africa.

In
conclusion, I have to agree with Chet Crocker, there seems to be no
strategic framework or coherence in our policy approach to Central
Africa. We need to have such a framework and we need to narrow our focus
and rank our priorities. And I think most of all we need to engage and
do it now rather than 6 months from now, and try to work for
improvements from within the system and not simply sit about as a
carping outsider, hoping that things will work out with our advice but
without our help and practical assistance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Woods, thank you for your insights and your suggestions, and the information you provided.
Dr. Leaning.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER LEANING, CONSULTANT, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Dr. LEANING. Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here. I
will move swiftly through my remarks since some of them have already
been addressed or introduced in the morning session today.
I have just returned from a 2-week mission to the region with two
colleagues from Physicians for Human Rights, who are here with us today.
The PHR is an organization of health professionals, scientists and
concerned citizens that brings the knowledge and skills of the medical
and forensic sciences to the protection and promotion of human rights.
I participated in this mission not as a consultant but as a
volunteer. I am a past board member of PHR, and I now serve on PHR's
international advisory committee. And in addition to the points you made
in my brief CV, I am also a practicing emergency physician and
attending at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston and Harvard Medical
School.

During
our 2-week stay in Rwanda as well as Congo, we engaged in extensive
interviews with international human rights teams, humanitarian groups,
local human rights activists, U.N., U.S. and European Government
officials, as well as military representatives, and witnesses and
victims of gross abuses of human rights.
We spent a significant portion of our time in Rwanda since we were
told at the outset that it would be useful to obtain Rwandan military
permission to enter the Congo in view of the fact that we had a human
rights ambit, and because we had to travel through Northwest Rwanda to
enter the Congo in Goma. So we had traveled this area that is under
discussion today.
In so doing we learned a great deal about human rights in Western
Rwanda, which relate directly to the human rights situation in Congo,
and accordingly, my remarks today will address both countries and the
recommendations are crafted for both. A full draft of our remarks and
recommendations has been submitted to the record and I think been made
available to the Committee Members.
I would like to begin by noting that PHR has been deeply concerned
about atrocities in this region since the onset of the Rwanda genocide
in 1994; in fact, before that, because as many of you know this has been
an area fraught with bloodshed and criminality and atrocity for many
years. But PHR is on record and ably on record as having called for
action against the genocide as it was unfolding, and also, in 1994, we
were early among the groups calling for an international tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for contributing to the slaughter and
leading the slaughter of an estimated 800,000 Rwandan Tutus and moderate
Hutus by the Rwandan army, the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe.
Now, I would like to talk first in terms of our findings about what
we saw in Eastern Congo. We have received reliable reports from many
sources that the Rwandan military, here we are talking about Rwandan
military, not forces under Kabila, but Rwandan military under Rwandan
command and control, who have committed and are continuing to commit
widespread atrocities against civilian populations in Eastern Congo. And
I would like to emphasize the fact that history is crucial, but what is
also crucial is that right now people are getting killed day by day by
Rwandan forces in Eastern Congo.

Reports
of robberies, rape and attacks in addition to killings are being
committed now by English and Knyarwandan-speaking soldiers who are
numerous and who are active and marauding in North and South Kivu. The
rationale for this, it is reported that these soldiers are exacting a
bounty from the area before returning to Rwanda. They are being summoned
back to Rwanda to participate in the civil war that is in the west.
There are curfews in local towns. It is an extremely insecure
environment in Eastern Congo. We have received reports and from eye
witnesses of killings of unarmed Rwandan Hutu refugees who are in the
North Kivu area, as well as in South Kivu, but also local Congolese,
primarily Hutu, but local Congolese who are noncombatants, who are
villagers, who live in Eastern Congo, and who are being attacked by
soldiers identified as Rwandan military.
They arrive even in midday, slaughter men, women and children,
charge all of them are Interahamwe, and then fade into the hills.
We have interviewed staff from the humanitarian organizations and
from local human rights groups, both of them spoke with great tension,
with great desire for anonymity. We had to approach them circuitously.
We spoke with them informally over and under a noise barrier and behind
guarded walls. There is a high level of tension and constraint among all
humanitarian aid agencies and local human rights groups in North Kivu,
and there is a sense that any attempt now to surface some of the human
rights issues that they are witnessing because they are on the ground
will sharply curtail their capacity to deliver humanitarian relief in
that area. And they, rightfully, are trying to get the goods to the
people, and here I am talking about the local villagers as well as the
refugees.
But the constraint, the chill that is there is a security crisis and
the fear of reprisal, not so much from Kabila's Government, as from the
Rwandan soldiers that are active in the area.
That is the Eastern Congo, and I can talk more if people are
interested about some of the situations that we saw when we witnessed
people, talked to those who had been in the villages and had been
attacked. We had some very important and thoughtful first-person
testimony from people who in fact as we talked to them and examined them
had evidence of the wounds and injuries.

I
might point out that the refugees who are attacked usually do not
survive because they are attacked too deep in the forest, although there
are some surviving witnesses to these attacks, but there are many
surviving witnesses to the attacks on the villages because villages are
big, there are at least scores to hundreds of people. When the soldiers
arrive some die, many flee in the forest and live to tell the tale. The
point is they are afraid to tell the tale.
Now, I would like to talk to some of the events that are going on in
Western Rwanda. The civil war in the Congo, which was precipitated by
the Rwandan troops entering the country to break up the large Hutu
refugee camps last fall, which we have talked about in some detail
already today, is now largely over. Kabila is in power and is the head
of the State of the Congo.
But that war has now spilled back into Rwanda, and that war has
intensified in Western Rwanda since early 1997. Large numbers of ex-FAR
and Interahamwe have returned with the refugees in a period that was
initially, yes, a voluntary repatriation. The fall of last year,
November, when the camps were disrupted, up to six to seven thousand
people swarmed across the border in a lightning fashion, and withion a
1-week period, and the international community was delighted to see so
many people released from the Interahamwe actually dying to get home.
The irony is that they are dying now that they are home because most
of these repatriated into Western Rwanda. Remember the Zairian refugees
coming from Rwanda were coming from the west. If they had lived in the
eastern part, they would have gone into Tanzania; south, they would have
gone into Burundi. These are inhabitants of Western Rwanda. Most of
them are refugees in Eastern Congo who went back voluntarily last fall.
Their fate now in the civil war is a matter of high concern to us.
But more recently, in the last 3 or 4 months, the repatriation of
the remaining refugees who are hiding in the forest in Eastern Congo is
not so clearly a voluntary repatriation back to Western Rwanda. The
UNHCR is sending them back there, but acknowledges that although they
would like to call this a voluntary repatriation, they are calling it an
emergency evacuation from Eastern Congo, because the situation there is
unstable, the marauding soldiers, some of whom, if not many of whom,
are Rwandan soldiers, are threatening the security and lives of the
refugees in Eastern Congo.

Therefore,
UNHCR is doing everything it can to get them out, but its repatriating
back to what we consider a civil war in Western Rwanda, and what the
United Nations in Kigali, the Rwandan-based UNHCR has declared a red
zone, a high security zone, a no-go zone. No international personnel
travel into Western Rwanda because there is a war on.
We spoke on the record with the press officer from the ICRC in
Kigali, who was similarly outspoken for the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and he said that between two and three thousand people
have been killed, to the best information they have, in the last 3
months in West Rwanda. Two to three thousand civilians. He is making no
estimates about the military casualties.
We heard through humanitarian sources that there were large numbers
of Rwandan military casualties in the hospitals, but we could not gain
access to confirm that point. But on the civilians, when we pushed the
ICRC, he said, look, we have no access, we cannot go in there to count,
there is too incomplete data from areas, plus we cannot go in there
anyway, nobody is keeping listings. Our best hope is when this war is
over we can go back in and interview families and find out from those
who claim they have disappearances what the actual summation number is.
So, we are in a situation when we were in Kigali we went and spoke
to humanitarian organizations, we visited some transit camps and
detention centers. But when we spoke with U.S. Government
representatives, we got entire conflicting pictures; not just on whether
there was a war going on in Western Rwanda; it was denied by U.S.
officials as being of significance—it was confirmed as being a matter of
high importance and urgency by the U.N. humanitarian organizations and
local personnel—but also as to whether there were human rights abuses
being committed by Rwandan forces in Eastern Congo. Again, denied by the
U.S. representatives and affirmed when we got to the Congo, when we
talked to informed people on the ground.

Now, our report has principal findings in detail. I would like to go briefly, if I could, over four or five of those.
Do we have time for that? Thank you.
Our first principal finding is that the killing of Rwandan refugees
in the Congo continues, with Rwandan soldiers often identified as
perpetrators. Rwandan soldiers are also implicated in the killing of
Congolese villagers in Eastern Congo.
Our second finding is that in addition to the presence of Rwandan
soldiers engaging in serious human rights abuses in Eastern Congo, other
armed groups contribute to insecurity in the region. It is a welter,
none of these soldiers are identified, none of them wear uniforms that
you can tell rank, serial number or name on all of these, whether it is
Rwandan soldiers, Congolese soldiers or informal soldiers, all of this
is in violation of international law. But these groups are known to
include former Zairian armed forces, former Rwandan armed forces,
Interahamwe militia, Mai Mai Militia as well as armed civilian bandits,
of whom are in increasing number.
The civil war in Western Rwanda has had catastrophic consequences
for human rights. It is a matter of high irony that peoples' eyes glare
over when we have come back and talked about this, the two to three
thousand civilians who are being killed in Western Rwanda. They are so
used to hearing of hundreds of thousands of people being killed in
Rwanda, millions of people being killed in Rwanda. I mean, it starts to
sound like Carl Sagan and billions and billions and billions. The point
is these are individuals, and these are gross numbers when you consider
two to three thousand in 3 months against the baseline population of
Rwanda, although it is densely populated, is a relatively small number
of total population; somewhere in around six to eight million. This is a
lot of people, and each of them is an individual, and it is happening
right now.
Repatriation of the Rwandan refugees by the UNHCR from Congo to
Western Rwanda is tantamount to sending them back to a war zone.
Remember, these are Hutu. These are hold-out Hutus. So when they come
back the question for the Rwandan authorities is how come you did not
come back earlier. You must be guilty. So these guys are targeted when
they come back, and it is violating a fundamental principle of refugee
law, the principle of non-refoulement, which means you do not force
people back to an area where they will be in high jeopardy.

A
further finding we have is that nearly a quarter of the refugees who
have recently returned to Rwanda—this is not the voluntary guys coming
back in the fall, these are the ones who are now coming back under UNHCR
auspices by plane or by truck—nearly a quarter of these who recently
returned to Rwanda from Congo have been subsequently detained in the
squalid detention facilities, very crowded, minimum exercise capacities,
and minimal opportunities for due process.
Our final one—no, our next to last one is that the United States has
been and probably is still providing counter-insurgency training to the
Rwandan army. We have heard this through military sources, and the
Rwandan army, as I have just pointed out, is engaged in carrying out
atrocities in the regions of Western Rwanda and Congo. Serious questions
need to be asked about whether the United States is therefore
implicated in these atrocities.
And I might add that there is a point to be made that if we are
there teaching the troops principals of international humanitarian law,
and the outcome is as grim and as grizzly as we are finding, we are
either lousy teachers or we are not teaching the right thing, or we are
in fact allowing things to happen under our eyes, which casts shame upon
the Rwandan army, but also shame upon us.
International humanitarian organizations and their local staff are
at great risk in both Rwanda and Congo, and have found access to
effective populations severely restricted. Constant attacks, blockages
and harassment are commonplace. It is essential for us to acknowledge
that the humanitarian work that Administrator Atwood and others have
talked about as being so important is impossible to carry out in Western
Congo given the current security situation. This is a large group of
people at risk because there is a failure to act on the security issues,
not on the humanitarian issue. And we firmly support all humanitarian
aid that can go to Congo and Rwanda, despite the fact that there are
ongoing abuses of human rights. Our concern about conditioning of aid
relates to the conditioning of security and military aid.

Finally,
we want to emphasize that the health infrastructure of Congo has been
decimated by decades of neglect, referred to here as neglect,
commandeered and conditioned and organized by President Mobutu, but also
by years of warfare and the mass movement of refugees.
Rwanda, too, is in urgent need of extensive international assistance
to help rebuild its economy and infrastructure. And one of the points
that is known to many people here that was very, very clear to us, is
that the Rwandan Government is in a state of extremity now and dealing
with a civil war, massive numbers of returnees, and a major judicial
crisis with well over 100,000 in prison without the legal system to
engage in dossier production and due process support. The Rwandan
Government watches all the intimate humanitarian aid coming to the
refugee population with a certain amount of misgiving, if not hostility,
because they have suffered enormously. They need ongoing and augmented
humanitarian health aid to help them build their country.
Thank you for the time you have afforded me.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Leaning appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. Dr. Leaning, thank you for your fine work, and as
you heard earlier, I did ask a number of these questions of the
Administration, some of which will be answered when they go back and
research it, and we will get to questions momentarily. But I do thank
you for your testimony.
Dr. Ottaway.
STATEMENT OF MARINA OTTAWAY, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Ms. OTTAWAY. Thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify. Being the last speaker, I think I can forego a lot of what has
already been said and focus just on a few points that I would like to
make.

Let
me preface my remarks by saying that I am as concerned as all the other
witnesses today about the humanitarian situation which has developed in
the eastern part of the Congo, and that I do share the long-term goal
that has been expressed by the Administration to see the country turn
into a democratic country in respect to all of human rights.
That said, I am also very concerned about the realistic expectations
that are being placed on that government concerning how fast the
transformation take place, and how we can get from where we are now,
that is, a country which is totally devastated with a government with a
very low degree of capacity to perform anything to the point where we
want to be in the future.
There are, I think, four major obstacles to the transformation of
the Congo into a more democratic country, and most of the discussion
seems to focus on just one of those. The four points that I would like
to stress are, first of all, the attitude of President Kabila and some
members of his government themselves there is a real question about
their commitment to democracy, their commitment to human rights.
But there are other issues that are equally important to the transformation of Zaire in the direction that we all desire.
Second is the fact that that country does not have a government
capable of governing as a result, and does not have the infrastructure
to allow effective government to take place as a result of the legacy of
the Mobutu regime, of the devastation of the last 30 years.
Third, there is a real question about to what extent Kabila is a
free agent. What are the relations between Kabila and some of the
neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda?
And, finally, the fourth issue is the fact that this is a military
regime because of the way it has come to power; therefore it has to
change before we can talk about democracy.

I would like to talk briefly to each of the four points.
First of all, let me go back to the issue of Kabila and his
attitude. If you look at Kabila's past, if you look at his track record
so far, it is not very reassuring in terms of what we can expect in
terms of a commitment to democracy. I do not think we can prejudge the
case, but if you look in the last few years we have seen a number of
African leaders, including some to which the United States is very
close, now making a very interesting transformation, moving from what I
think was the typical position, the typical ideological stance of
African leaders during most of the sixties and the seventies to a very
different point of view.
The Prime Minister Meles in Ethiopia, President Issayas Affewerki in
Eritrea, President Museveni in Uganda were all individuals who at one
point in their life embraced very leftist ideologies who were very
committed to socialist transformation, and who did come to power through
the force of arms. They have changed their position remarkably in the
last few years. They have now become leaders with whom the United States
can work.
Let me add also along these lines that when the ANC leaders first
started returning from exile in 1990, there was a moment of
consternation on the part of the international community because most of
them were voicing those same ideas that really came from the 1960's and
1970's. What I am saying is that there has been a very quick learning
curve on the part of a lot of African leaders, and I think we should
give for the time being the benefit of the doubt that Kabila is capable
of the same learning.
To some extent, we do not have a choice at this point. There is no
ready-made substitute for Kabila. If Kabila fails in making this
transformation, the most likely outcome is not that he be replaced by
somebody who is more committed to democracy; the most likely outcome is
that the country is going to go through a much longer period of
instability, and therefore the violation of human rights and all the
problems that we are witnessing today are going to continue for a much
longer period of time.

Let
me turn to the issue of the very low capacity of that government and
the lack of infrastructure in the country. I do not think I need to add
very much to this. I think we all know the kind of conditions that the
Congo has inherited from the Mobutu regime. What I would like to stress
here is the fact that there is a relationship between these conditions,
this lack of government capacity, the lack of infrastructure and so on,
and the possibility that that country will make a democratic transition.
You cannot have rule of law if the government cannot be present in
many parts of the country, no matter what their intentions are. You
cannot have a good government if it does not have a budget because
internally there is no formal economic system that can be taxed, and
therefore it does not have a regular source of revenue. You are not
going to have a disciplined military if the military does not get paid
because there is no money in the budget to pay the military. So that in a
sense we cannot talk about democracy without also talking about
contributing to the reconstruction of that government.
The issue of the relationship between Kabila and the neighboring
countries remains one of grave concern. We have heard a lot about it
this morning. We just heard more about the presence of Rwandan forces in
Eastern Zaire today. I certainly cannot claim to have all the
information. I am not sure that anybody has all the information about
this. But I think we need to clarify what is going on. And if anything,
if that is possible at all, we need to support Mr. Kabila in an attempt
to essentially take more responsibility for what is going on in his
country, for separating himself as much as it is possible from the
countries that have provided support in the past. We do not really know
how much we can do at this point.
I am not trying to say that all the problems that are occurring in
Eastern Zaire are the responsibility of the Rwandan Government. All I am
pointing out is that we really do not understand sufficiently what the
relationship between those two groups are.
Defense Minister Kagame recently claimed a lot of credit for the
success of Kabila's forces in a statement released yesterday that I have
not seen in today's paper actually. Kabila has denied essentially the
statement made by Kagame, stating that The Washington Post misquoted
Kagame, and he is calling Kagame to account for the statement that he
has made. There are clearly tensions between the two. There is something
going on, and that is something which certainly is standing in the way
of greater transformation.

And,
finally, there is the problem of the military nature of the regime.
That is a difficult problem to solve. Kabila came to power through a
military campaign. I think there was probably no other way in which the
Mobutu regime was going to be pushed out of the way for the time being. I
do not think that is necessarily a black spot on Kabila's record. All I
am stressing is the transformation of military regimes into civilian
and therefore democratic regimes has been extremely difficult in all
African countries.
Countries that I mentioned earlier, like Ethiopia, Eritrea, to some
extent Uganda, are still struggling with that problem. Ghana has had two
multi-party elections so far, and it is still an open question to what
extent the power of President Yoweri is still based on the military
rather than being based on the fact that he has been elected. It is a
long process of transformation. It is going to take not much
reconstruction, but the construction of a professional military which
does not exist in the country at the present time before that regime can
turn into a civilian regime. To talk about a democratic transformation
without talking about what can be done to help Kabila solve those
problems is not very realistic.
The last point that I would like to make is that while the United
States can help in this process of transformation, and I would like to
add that if we want to help, we have to help the government and not just
the NGO sector because the main problem is the lack of government
capacity in that country, and we do not solve the problem of government
capacity by helping the NGO's, no matter how worthwhile the work that
the NGO's are doing, but one is not a replacement for the other one; it
is not a substitute for the other.
But in addition to trying to help, I think it is also important that
the United States tries to avoid doing damage in that situation. And I
am very concerned that one part of the U.S. position could be very
harmful to the future of the Congo, and that is the insistence that
elections be held within a period of 2 years.
I do believe that elections are extremely important, do not
misunderstand me. I do believe that that certainly has to happen at some
point in the future. I think it is very important that we look at the
record of those countries where the international community has pushed
for elections to be held very soon after the end of an armed conflict,
and the record is not good in those countries.

We
have just seen the collapse of the Cambodian Agreement very recently.
We have seen Angola returning to war literally within days after the
elections were held in 1992. We are now in 1997. That situation is no
closer to resolution than it was back at that point. We have seen some
cases of fairly successful elections held in those conditions. The one
in Mozambique is perhaps an example of that. But we also have to
remember that the international community put in enormous resources and
an enormous presence in that country in order for it to happen.
But I think before we push for elections, we have to ask two things.
One is what is the likely outcome of elections at this point; and, two,
how much support the international community is really willing to give
to those elections; how large an investment we are going to make. And I
would like to stress here that the cost of elections, of successful
election or elections that have a chance of being successful held 2
years from now, or even less than 2 years from now in the Congo would
require an enormous investment on the part of the international
community. And before, the elections in Cambodia have been estimated to
have cost about $2 billion.
I am not saying that that is necessarily the figure, but what is
certain is that it would be a very large figure. And unless we are
willing to put in that kind of investment the international community is
willing to do that, I think we better rethink our approach to the idea
of pushing for elections as soon as possible.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ottaway appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Ottaway.
Let me just being the first round and maybe the only round, depending on the Members' wishes of questions.
Dr. Leaning, in your statement you point out that in our discussions
at the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda that you were alarmed by the remarkable
lack of concern of reports of human rights violations in Western Rwanda
and Eastern Congo. And as you recall, earlier I asked the Acting
Assistant Secretary whether or not he concurred that that was their
viewpoint. And, you know, he kind of saw it differently.

It
has been my experience over the last 17 years traveling abroad
frequently on human rights missions that very often our point of contact
with the government in question takes a much more watered down,
moderate view about the offending dictatorship, whether it be Nicholae
Ceausescu in Romania, for so many years our people in Bucharest were
borderline apologists for his cruelty, to a recent trip to China. When I
talked to some of our top diplomats there, they were telling me there
was no need whatsoever for Radio Free Asia because everyone has a dish
now. And I said, no, everyone does not have a satellite dish, and CNN is
not available to the general population.
But there is this sense of concern about the point of contact, the
day-to-day interfaces with the government, in this case in Rwanda.
Could you elaborate on that without breaking any confidences? You
know, a discussion like that ought to be more public rather than less
because we are talking about very important issues, and we had received
insights, our Subcommittee, last December that the same kind of ''see no
evil, hear no evil, say no evil'' mentality was very much in evidence?
And some of the refugee community and human rights folks that were
talking to our Subcommittee were saying, ''They are not seeing it,'' or
''They are in denial. They are just refusing to recognize the gravity of
what Rwandan and others are doing, the soldiers, to the refugees.''
Could you perhaps elaborate on that?
Dr. LEANING. Well, there are human and political reasons why
what you have just observed as a general phenomenon, occurs. That is, if
you are spending time working closely with local leadership, you begin
to see the nuances, you begin to see the world their way. You interact
with them socially and in an administrative way many times a day, and it
becomes very hard not to share at least a part of their world view.
Politically, and we have referenced this many times both Members of
the Committee and people testifying, the fact that everything we are
talking about is in the shadow of a horrific genocide that occurred in
1994; that we back home have difficulty encompassing. I can tell you
people there also do.

You
sit in hotels by the edge of crystal blue swimming pools, and in the
spring of 1994 they were packed with bodies, and people who were there
shortly thereafter said the smell took over a year to go away, and they
still cannot scrub the blood stains from those swimming pools. And yet
hotels are full, you sit around them, people are having drinks. I found
it incomprehensible, but then I was not living there for very long
during this recent visit.
So I think coming to terms with that past is going to take
generations. And the Administration's political spin that is
fundamentally understandable is that everything that happens is in
retribution in the light of that genocide is on some level somewhat
excusable.
And our point as a human rights group is that you are in fact
serving the long-term, the longevity and the integrity of a government
to have them recognize that abuses upon their citizens, whatever the
past, will only continue to contaminate their own rule, their own
reputation, and sow tremendous hatred for the future.
A cycle is about to continue. The Rwandan Government is a minority
government. It has to live with millions of Hutus and it is going to
have to come to terms. That means there needs to be a judicial process,
full vetting and telling of the truth. It does not mean that
extrajudicial killings or military killings of civilians should be
countenanced. And it is our distinct impression, and Kathi Austin who is
a member of our team, received it on the record from the DCM, and if
you would like, you could call her to the floor now—she is here with
me—for her absolute verbatim statements from the DCM there, but it is
our distinct impression that they are actively downplaying any
information they get that would suggest that the Rwandan Government is
complicit in atrocities, actively downplaying any information that the
U.S. military may be involved, or supporting in any way. And I can tell
you firsthand that the humanitarian community in Kigali thinks that the
United States in its close relationship with the government is creating a
sense of contempt and jeopardy for the other humanitarian organizations
who try to practice there.

There
is a sense of repression and taut political oversight of all
humanitarian work on behalf of the refugees or the local Hutu population
and of returning refugees. The Kigali Government is holding a very,
very tight hand, and it has edges.
Mr. SMITH. I would ask if your associate could come to the witness table, and relay that information.
Dr. LEANING. Please.
Mr. SMITH. Please identify yourself for the record.
Ms. AUSTIN. Kathi Austin, consultant to Physicians for Human Rights.
I would like to say that this was said by two U.S. Embassy
officials. I would not like to say it was the DCM for the record, the
information was not for attribution—but was on the record information.
Basically, what the embassy said, and again these are almost direct
quotes, that in both Eastern Congo and in Western Rwanda no cadavers had
been seen, and no wounds had been documented; that there were no
civilian refugees missing in the Eastern Congo; that the UNHCR, the AID
community, and the local Congolese population are being untruthful about
the situation because they have a vested interest in maintaining their
jobs and programs there, which would be justified by still having a
refugee population at large; that Kabila himself personally authorized
the repatriation process from the Congo at the end of March 1997 to the
U.S. Embassy in Kigali, and that it was the UNHCR which could provide no
acceptable reason for delay of the repatriation process.
It was also said that the UNHCR has been lying about the health and
capacity of refugees returning home; that the UNHCR has been untruthful
about the safety of refugees returning to certain areas of Rwanda,
even—and it was in their opinion, because the Rwandan Government has
said that it is safe for these refugees to return to these particular
areas; and that the refugees are not being screened upon return to
Rwanda.

Mr. SMITH. Not being screened?
Ms. AUSTIN. Not being screened.
Mr. SMITH. And what was the source when the U.S. Embassy
personnel were saying that they had not seen cadavers, had not seen
other evidence of atrocities, did they cite you a source for that?
Ms. AUSTIN. No, they said that there had been no
international reports, there had been no press reports, and that there
had been no witnesses to these events; that there had been no sightings
of cadavers. They were very dismissive of any press reports, of any
humanitarian aid agency reports. They said that in fact none of these
agencies had seen cadavers, and that they had not seen any evidence to
this effect.
Mr. SMITH. Did they indicate that they had undertaken any independent review with their own personnel?
Ms. AUSTIN. No. They did indicate that Kabila himself had
stated that he was launching an investigation earlier in the year into
these allegations, but said that they were not aware of what Kabila's
own internal investigation had led to.
Mr. SMITH. Did they indicate that they would give credence to
such an investigation rather than to some outside organization that
would have absolutely no——
Ms. AUSTIN. Well, they did in effect, they did say that they had advised Kabila not to allow a U.N. investigation team into Eastern Congo.
Mr. SMITH. Not to allow?
Ms. AUSTIN. Not to allow. That it was in his interest not to allow the——
Mr. SMITH. Can you cite who suggested that we should not allow an investigation——

Ms. AUSTIN. I would like to say it was two U.S. Embassy officials.
Mr. SMITH. OK. Perhaps maybe off the record if you would
provide us with the names, I would like to follow up on that because
where there is alleged wrongdoing, particularly on a massive scale, for
any U.S. personnel to suggest that an investigation should not be
vigorously undertaken is, I think, a very, very high—let us say it could
be a cause for a removal from a job, to say the least, because we
should not be in the business of coverup and whitewashing, and so I
would hope that we—did I get that right?
Ms. AUSTIN. That is correct.
Mr. SMITH. That they said there should not be an investigation?
Ms. AUSTIN. That is correct. PHR welcomes the opportunity to
work with both Congress and with the Administration in clarifying any of
these issues if they need to be clarified.
Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Let me just ask maybe, Dr. Leaning, you might want to respond to
this—and all of you may if you would like to—the characterization of the
U.S. military assistance to Rwanda as provided by the Acting Secretary
earlier, Mr. Twaddell, is that our view? I mean, you do ask the
question, ''The role of U.S. trainers and advisors in this extremely
abusive counter-insurgency campaign, what is it? We do not know.''
I do not think anyone on the Committee knows, but as you pointed
out, I think, in your testimony a moment ago, either they are very bad
trainers or something else is occurring here. If you could respond to
that. Did you agree with him? He just categorically said we are not
complicit.
Dr. LEANING. No, and could we do a two-part one again? That
is, if I could ask Kathi to come back because she was the one who had
the most direct interaction with the military people, as well as with
U.S. Embassy staff. But could I just respond slightly more broadly to
this? The United States is responsible, in our view, on acknowledging
the abuses that are taking place; to press Rwanda directly to do no
harm; and, to withdraw forces from the Congo; and to control and
professionalize its own staff in Western Rwanda; and if Kabila is
sincere about his rule of law throughout his country, recognizing that
his infrastructure and his capacity to exert that rule of law is
extraordinarily limited now, what we should be doing is urging him to
acknowledge that incapacity, and work with him to begin to provide the
supports to create a rule of law in Eastern Congo. It does him no good,
he is a minority Governor also, it does him no good to have the
atrocities committed in Eastern Congo, whether we are directly involved
with our own soldiers, or whether we are aiding Rwandan soldiers in
doing it, or whether the Rwandan soldiers are acting independently.
Kabila may need some help.

But could I ask Kathi to answer directly your question?
Ms. AUSTIN. I would like to say that I have been traveling to
Rwanda since August 1994, and have had considerable contact with U.S.
military personnel on the ground from 1994 and to the present day.
I first learned of U.S. counter-insurgency training in early 1996,
when U.S. military personnel distinctly told me that they were providing
counter-insurgency training, and that they were also assisting our
training in how to launch surgical strikes—those were the exact
words—into Eastern Congo.
I have not been able to independently verify that other than the
information provided me by U.S. military personnel in the region.
I have observed full-dress military personnel in Western Rwanda
since early 1995, and, again, these were the areas where the
counter-insurgency training was said to have taken place; and that sort
of mitigated against my belief that it was classroom training that was
being conducted. It was very clearly military exercises taking place on
the ground in Western Rwanda in the border regions as early as the
beginning of 1996.
Mr. SMITH. That seems not to sound like benign human rights
training. I think that is a cause for this Committee to follow up very
vigorously, so we would like to be in touch with you after the hearing
on that as well.
Ms. AUSTIN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. I would like to yield to my good friend, Mr. Payne of New Jersey.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I am sorry that I missed all
the testimony, but I think that once again I am very pleased that there
is a tremendous amount of interest in the Congo at this time, and what
happened in Eastern Congo. And I do too hope that we should get to the
bottom of it.

I
have traveled quite a bit in the region, and have been just interested
in the new interest, and, of course, we cannot go back to what happened
before continually. But if we had one-tenth the interest in what was
going on in Rwanda in 1993, perhaps the genocide would have stopped. I
wrote three letters to our ambassador to the United Nations, Ms.
Albright, pleading that the United States take some initiative. There
was zero, there was a request for 50 armored personnel vehicles to be
leased, which were not sent. The United Nations ran out, the United
States rushed in and took our people out, and people were just
continually killed by the minute, and no one was saying anything, very
much. We did not have this outcry until close to a million people were
killed. It is mind-boggling.
I do not know whether there is a big guilt complex going on and now
we are going to make sure that never again sort of thing. But it is
amazing how little interest there was in that genocide. And I finally
confronted the President of the United States himself about what is
wrong with our country's leadership in this region. It was just an
embarrassment. And now I turn around and we see all of this tremendous
amount of concern which should be, but I wonder, did I look at that
500,000 to a million people who were killed as something that did not
happen? I do not understand it. I did not have the refugee committee
organizations coming forth to hearings. It was like it did not happen.
It is just unbelievable.
And the way that this whole question—I think we definitely have to
get to what happened there and the allegations. There was not even
concern about the cross-border intrusions that the ex-FAR and the
Interahamwe were going into Rwanda even before the alliance came
together in October–November 1996. I mean, it was just—we just simply
looked the other way.
And I do think that we need to certainly get to the bottom of what
occurred there; what the Bauyamelenge people who were going to be
expelled, and the behavior of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.

The
government, and I did hear part of Ms. Ottaway's testimony, and I could
not agree more, if there is going to be any kind of progress in this
situation, and we talked about 2 years, you know, a couple of months
already gone on this 2-year election as you have indicated. In Angola a
couple of days after Savimbi lost he went back to the bush.
Do you feel that just in how we prevent these things, for example,
there has to be support for demilitarization. you are not going to have
big armies and then send them home and try to have elections, but these
things are not discussed.
Maybe all three of you know, Mr. Wood is very expert in this area,
if you had a plan that you would give to Mr. Kabila to say this is what
ought to be done, and I might just ask each of the three of you if you
might comment, what do you think are the most emerging needs if they are
ever going to have an inquiry, if there is going to be a government, if
they are going to pay their civil servants, if they are going to have a
police department, if they are going to have a military that is a
trained group rather than a group that was brought together, what are
some of the three or four key things that you think could be done to
assist in this occurring?
Ms. OTTAWAY. I will defer to Mr. Woods on the issue of the
military and what needs to be done there. But I would like to address
two areas. One is all the rebuilding of the government's capacity, this
is clearly a huge undertaking which calls for very close cooperation
among all members of the international community.
I think there is an interesting example of what should be done, and
it is what the South Africans are trying to do, which is providing a
team to work with the Ministry of finance to try and put together a
system essentially to revive the ministry. I think that kind of team
assigned to, you know, different countries taking on different
departments at different offices would be of tremendous help because the
government needs technical expertise. I mean, first of all, all the
ministers are extremely inexperienced, and second, there is no cadre of
senior civil servants any longer. So it is really starting from scratch.

The
other area where I think a lot needs to be done before we can seriously
talk about elections is in promoting negotiations among all the
different groups that exist in the country. One of the examples that is
always cited nowadays with successful transition is South Africa. They
negotiated for 4 years before they had an election, and they started
from a much better situation than the Congo has. I mean, there was a
government. There was an infrastructure, they had great advantages.
One step in the right direction was a meeting that took place in mid
to late June of NGO's in the country that outlined some of the steps
that need to be taken—there are two ideas that I think might be
worthwhile supporting. One was that of trying to set up a permanent
consultative mechanism between NGO's and the government in the Congo, to
try and work out some of the issues that they eventually will have to
be addressed. And the second one was to set up a series of local and
regional seminars, meetings, to try to diffuse ethnic conflict in those
areas where it has been instigated in the past.
These are very long-term steps. I mean, they do not bring us closer
to elections soon, but there is no point to get into elections unless
those issues can be tackled.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
Dr. LEANING. You are asking each of us, is that correct?
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Dr. LEANING. As a human rights group, we did not enter to
look at issues of longer-term development. But from the standpoint of
your question, I have two major points to say.
One is that we think there needs to be an end to the gross abuses of
human rights that are occurring in Eastern Congo. That to us is a very,
very high priority that Kabila should put at the head of his agenda.
Now, we are not saying democratic transformation. Elections are not
along the list of gross human rights abuses or paramount human rights
interventions at the moment. We are talking about much more basic
things, a stop to the killings and attacks on villagers. And we will
defer to those who know the political situation within the Congo far
better than certainly I do personally, to talk about the timing for
elections. But that is not part of our recommendations at the moment at
all, and we acknowledge the accuracy of both witnesses here in saying
that the infrastructure and the political capacities are pretty crushed
or undeveloped.

On
the other hand, there is a very strong civil society that still exists
and thrives within Congo, even Eastern Congo. And that is why we would
say as part of the abolition of gross human rights abuses, or at least a
cessation of gross human rights abuses, we would encourage steps to
shore up the civilian bureaucracy and the civilian rule of law in
Eastern Congo. Right now it is a military regime controlled by Rwanda,
and that needs to end. Kabila should have that as a very high order as
well.
And then, third, from the standpoint of the United States aid——
Mr. PAYNE. Are there Rwandan troops in there?
Dr. LEANING. Yes.
Mr. PAYNE. You say that it is affirmative that it is being controlled by Rwanda?
Dr. LEANING. Yes. Our best indications in a number of layers
of detail are that there are Rwandan troops in Eastern Congo, and that
the security and military and most basic issues around access to the
countryside are still mandated by the Rwandan military.
Mr. PAYNE. This is the first I have heard that, and I just left there, but OK.
Dr. LEANING. Now, the third thing that we would say is that a
wonderful way to rebuild a country and begin to heal some of the
lasting ethnic divides is to get people to work on a common project that
relates to a common ethic. And in health care and medicine that is one
of the ways that you can bring about a reconciliation in a really
fundamental way, more rapidly than many other ways. So we would suggest
that a priority be given to rebuilding the health system in Eastern
Congo. The people are there, the structures are there, the resources
have been devastated. So it is a fragile vessel, but one that actually
has a very, very rapid short-term potential if it were filled with the
right mix of resources.
And I know that USAID, with UNICEF, has been looking at this quite
closely, and I think they are on the right track in their current
thinking.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Woods.
Mr. WOODS. I think if I were giving Mr. Kabila a list of four
things he has to do, first he has to get his relationship with the
international community on a sound basis because he needs help. If he
does not get that help, the chances of survival are greatly diminished.
Part of that, he is going to have to show a serious effort to get these
abuses in the east and potentially other parts of the country under
control. I do not think he has that capability at the present time. But
over time perhaps he can assert it. He has to at least appear to be
making a credible effort.
Second, and I hope he understands this, he has got to broaden his
domestic political base. He has got to reach out to other groups, that
he seem not to be abusive, and, yes, I think he has to take the process
of folding civil or civic society into this process, and allow them to
make their own contribution to the process of a democratic transition.
I must make a little warning. If we push this idea of walking—the
international community walks a very narrow line between what will be
seen as gross interference in domestic political affairs and running the
country, and providing legitimate assistance for this private sector.
And they can close us down. Other countries in Africa have done that,
and these people are thin-skinned. So, yes, we need to work and build
these civil society structures, we need to work at the local level and
so on, help them to build it. But if we go in there with what appears to
be an attempt to create a parallel government, I think he will close us
down.
Third point, they need debt relief. They are $14 billion in the
hole. I mean, where did the money go? What have they got to show for it
other than a totally ruined country? And what is the international
community going to do about it? He needs debt relief and he needs some
credit so that he can have a bit of working funds to start reviving the
government.
And, fourth, I think he needs a technical plan to revive government
administrative structures and the private sector. When we asked Dr.
Karaha here last week what were his priorities, he said his first
priority was to figure out what his priorities were. They do not know.
They need help, and we can do that.

Let
me just go back to my initial point when I introduced my original
statement. If we do not get some coherence to the strategy for all of
this, none of this is going to work anyway. And there are all kinds of
good things that can be done in there—this is not a time just for peace
and rebuilding, because the war is not over. These people are still
fighting a war. There is still increasing ethnic disequilibrium. The
structures of this region are melting under the pressure of the security
problems. And the genies are out of the bottle. If we do not come up
with a strategy and work to get them back in the bottle, this whole
region is going to disintegrate. In the short run we can work around the
war, close our eyes to it, pretend it is not there. We can bail out.
But I do think we have to come up with a coherent policy and pursue it
over time, and fit a lot of contradictions within the framework of that
policy, because this is not a good situation, one that we like or find
easy to work with. We have to be realistic.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes, it looked like my time is up, but where do
you think the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and those armed Hutus are, and
where are they roaming around? Was all the engagement—if there were
killings, could it have been that there was conflict between the ex-FAR
and Interahamwe who did not want to go back, who were perpetrators of
the genocide, and maybe some engagement in war and fighting from those
who——
Mr. WOODS. I am sure there are armed clashes. Where are they?
They are still out in the bush being pursued. Some of them have made
their way probably as far as Uganda. Some are certainly over in the
Congo, Brazzaville. Others may have gotten as far as the CAR. And this
Hutu/Tutsis conflict is far from over, and it is stirring up more
serious potential conflicts within Zaire itself. And I do not think the
regional powers have a plan for dealing with this in a sensible manner,
frankly, because I do not think you can put it down at the point of a
gun. There has to be some process of reconciliation. And I do not think
the international community has a clue. So I am very worried about the
prospects. There are lots of good ideas of things we can do, but only if
this situation can be somewhat stabilized and kept somewhat stabilized.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do not intend to waive my questions. I do intend to make a
statement, however. I would like to thank you for inviting such
wonderful, thoughtful witnesses to come and educate us on the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in the Great Lakes region
generally.
It is patently obvious that the international community, the United
States, and the United Nations itself is even complicit in what is going
on. When Foreign Minister Karaha was here, he talked about this report
that the U.N. investigative team is producing as serving as sort of a
truth commission for the people of the region as to what has happened.
My only hope is that the international community and all those who
have been actors or non-actors as it were in the tragedy that has
unfolded will be understandable in their complicity and their
accountability for what has happened, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you for your statement, Ms. McKinney.
Well, I want to thank our panelists and forgive us for running back
and forth. We have had other hearings and we are about to have another
hearing in about 2 minutes in this hearing room.
Did any of the panelists with to make any closing statement? Dr. Ottaway.
Ms. OTTAWAY. No.
Mr. SMITH. Dr. Leaning. And Mr. Woods.
Mr. WOODS. I would just like to say something I said a few
minutes ago. I think we learned as much listening to the views of the
Congress about what the concerns are as you might have learned from us. I
think this kind of hearing has been very timely and very helpful.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, we appreciate your time, your patience, and your expertise.