By letter dated February 4, 2003, your staff requested that
for Braidwood Unit 1, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with the actions required
in Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System
- Operating," Condition A, for one train of emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) inoperable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Your letter documented information
previously discussed with the NRC in a telephone conference which occurred
on February 2, 2003, at approximately 11:00 a.m. (All times
discussed in this letter refer to Central Standard Time).

Your staff stated that on January 26, 2003, at 10:00 p.m.,
Braidwood was not in compliance with the LCO for TS 3.5.2, "Emergency
Core Cooling - Operating," when the Unit 1 B (1B) residual heat removal
(RHR) pump was made inoperable for planned work. As a result, the plant
was in TS LCO 3.5.2, Condition A, which required the equipment be restored
to operable within 7 days or to place the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby)
within the 6 hours, and Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) within 12 hours.

In accordance with TS 3.5.2, the plant would be required to restore the
1B RHR pump to operable by 10:00 p.m. on February 2, or be in
Mode 3 by 4:00 a.m. on February 3, and Mode 4 by 10:00 a.m.
on February 3. Your staff requested that a Notice of Enforcement
Discretion (NOED) be granted pursuant to the NRC's policy regarding exercise
of discretion for an operating facility, set out in Section VII.C of the
"General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, and be effective to extend the completion times in LCO 3.5.2
by an additional 20 hours to avoid a plant shutdown that would impose
an unnecessary plant transient. This letter documents our telephone conversation
on February 2, 2003, when we orally granted this NOED at 12:50 p.m.
At the time of the telephone conference, the Braidwood Unit 1 was operating
in Mode 1 (Power Operation). We understand that you restored the 1B RHR
pump to an operable status and exited from TS 3.5.2 and from this NOED
on February 3, 2003, at 3:37 a.m.

Your staff requested enforcement discretion after encountering unforseen
difficulties during the planned work window on the 1B RHR pump. The planned
work window for the 1B RHR pump included numerous routine surveillance
and preventative maintenance activities. However, the primary activity
was the inspection of the pump internals and the replacement of the stuffing
box extension, which was pursued as follow-up actions from a previous
2B RHR pump repair. The work window was originally scheduled for 4 days
and 17 hours; however, the following unanticipated delays occurred:

to address and repair an out-of-round condition identified with
the pump casing that precluded the replacement of the stuffing box
extension;

8.0 hours

to address a personnel safety issue regarding performing work under
a suspended load;

6.0 hours

to address and repair an out-of-tolerance condition with the concentricity
of the motor support assembly;

34.0 hours

to address and repair an out-of-tolerance condition identified with
the impeller runout values.

Based on the time used to address these unforseen issues coupled with
the time required to complete the remaining operability testing, your
staff determined that allowed completion time for restoring the ECCS train
to operable would be exceeded. After evaluating the safety significance
and potential consequences, your staff requested this NOED of a one time
20-hour extension to the TS completion time to allow the 1B ECCS train
to be returned to operable and avoid cycling the unit through a thermal
transient associated with a plant shutdown. Your staff determined that
the risk associated with continued operations with the 1B RHR inoperable
for up to an additional 48 hours past the 7 days allowed by TS was less
than the risk associated with a plant shutdown. Also, your staff determined
that there were additional non-quantifiable risk savings achieved by:
(1) avoiding the shutdown risk associated with the 1B RHR pump unavailability
and the risk associated with power escalation; and (2) taking certain
compensatory measures. As for compensatory measures, during the time the
1B RHR pump was inoperable, your staff committed to the following: (1)
protect the 1A train of ECCS and other key safety equipment; (2) perform
specific Auxiliary Building floodwatch walkdowns once a shift; (3) monitor
weather conditions and re-evaluate risk if severe weather threatens the
offsite power lines; (4) perform no production risk activities on Unit
1; (5) maintain the 1B auxiliary feedwater pump diesel oil day tank level
at greater than 80%; (6) provide a Heightened Level of Awareness briefing
at the start of each shift while this NOED is in effect; (7) evaluate
surveillance and other work activities to be performed on the unit and
reschedule activities that have the potential to adversely affect the
unit status; (8) perform no work activities in the switchyard; and (9)
terminate the extension allowed by this NOED if at any time it becomes
apparent that completion of the work on the 1B RHR pump will be significantly
delayed or if other significant problems are identified with the pump.
The Resident Inspector staff verified that these compensatory measures
were properly implemented while this NOED was in effect.

The NRC reviewed your written request for enforcement discretion dated
February 4, 2003, and verified consistency between your oral
and written requests. The NRC determined that the risk of continued operation
with your compensatory measures for the additional 20 hour period of the
NOED would not result in an increased risk over shutting down Unit 1 with
the 1B RHR pump inoperable. The basis of our decision was that there was
no net increase in risk associated with extending the allowed outage time
for TS 3.5.2 by 20 hours. Based on this qualitative evaluation, the NRC
accepted your staff's safety rationale.

Based on the above considerations, the NRC staff concluded that Criterion
B.2.1.1.a and the applicable criteria in Section C.4 to NRC Manual Chapter
9900, "Technical Guidance, Operations - Notices of Enforcement Discretion,"
were met. Criterion B.2.1.1.a states that for an operating plant,
the NOED is intended to avoid unnecessary transients as a result of compliance
with the license condition and, thus, minimize potential safety consequences
and operational risks.

On the basis of the NRC staff's evaluation of your request, we concluded
that granting of this NOED is consistent with the Enforcement Policy and
staff guidance, and had no adverse impact on public health and safety.
Therefore, we exercised discretion at 12:50 p.m. on February 2, 2003,
not to enforce compliance with TS 3.5.2 for entry into Mode 3 by 4:00 a.m.
on February 3, 2003, until 12:00 a.m. on February 4, 2003.
The additional requirements of TS 3.5.2 for entry into Mode 4 was
also extended by 20 hours to 6:00 a.m. on February 4, 2003.
We understand that you restored the 1B RHR pump to an operable status
and exited from TS 3.5.2 and from this NOED on February 3, 2003,
at 3:37 a.m.

As stated in the Enforcement Policy, action may be taken, to the extent
that violations were involved, for the root cause that led to the noncompliance
for which this NOED was necessary.