The battle's done, and we kind of won, so we sound our victory cheer: where do we go from here?
... a blog by Marc Lynch

December 08, 2006

An Allawi return?

Leaving aside Baker-Hamilton for a moment, I want to throw this out for discussion: in the not so distant future, we may be looking at the return of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. This isn't my recommendation or my preference, just an attempt to piece together threads that I've been following for a while.

Here's why: The Maliki government clearly has lost the confidence of the Bush administration, and of everyone else. It has also lost its Parliamentary majority, as long as the Sadr bloc continues to suspend its participation. Most of the Washington buzz as an alternative has been, oddly, about Abd al-Aziz Hakim (SCIRI). This is very odd indeed, since Hakim has played a key role in driving the Sunni-Shia bloodbath, and evidently primarily wants to see even more of said blood to be shed; his party is a key part of the sectarianization of the Iraqi state; and his party is very close to Iran. Now, if the US wanted to pursue the Baker-Hamilton recommended dialogue with Iran, then this could be very useful (rumor is that Hakim did in fact bring some communications from Iran with him on this trip, though that's just a rumor). But Bush evidently does not want to go that route, for better of for worse. If Bush's preference is continued confrontation with Iran and Iraqi national reconciliation of some sort, then Hakim is the worst possible choice.

But if not Hakim, then who? Well, Salah Mutlaq, a key secular Sunni leader, has been saying that a new nationalist alliance
is in the works, bringing together his Iraqi National Dialogue Front,
Muqtadar Sadr's organization, and the al-Wifaq movement headed by Allawi (who
recently returned from London to Amman), in a
"nationalist" (wataniya) front. The Front would crystallize around a demand to end the
American occupation, create a non-sectarian transitional government, hold new elections, and - implicitly - combat Iranian influence (Mutlaq said that the front would be open to all Iraqi factions
except for SCIRI and the Dawa Party because of their
too-close ties to Iran).

But why Allawi? Well, as a secular Shia ex-Baathist, he's
well-positioned to figurehead such a coalition - any of the Sunni
leaders, or Sadr, would probably be too much for the Americans to
swallow. At the same time, in his 'memoir' published in al-Sharq al-Awsat,
and in numerous interviews since, he has tried to burnish his
nationalist credentials against the United States, blaming Bremer for
all that went wrong and distancing himself from the most controversial
decisions made under his watch. Sure, his administration was
spectacularly corrupt, but those memories might pale in comparison to
the bloodbath on the streets of Baghdad. He seems to want the job - he's back in the region, and showing up on Arab TV more and more often. I recently saw him do a long interview on al-Arabiya
(in a segment which ran under the title of 'national reconciliation'),
suggesting that he is as acceptable to the Saudis now as he was back
when he was in power, and he's always had good relations with Jordan.
He's happy to be tough on Iran, unlike any of the Shia parties. And
his line of a tough military approach combined with anti-sectarianism might
play better now than before. Not through elections, of course - he
isn't going to become Prime Minister by winning new elections. But
does the United States really care about democracy in Iraq anymore? A governmental crisis leading to Maliki's ouster, followed by intense negotiations among the Parliamentary blocs would do the trick.

How would the US feel about 'national reconciliation' coming on an anti-occupation platform? Well, I guess that depends on how badly the US wants to achieve that reconciliation... and get out. US Ambassador Khalilzad has been working hard for months trying to
find ways to split the Sunni insurgency and bring parts of it into the
political system, and Baker-Hamilton was full of Sunni-friendly suggestions to achieve national reconciliation. Such a government would likely satisfy the Arab governments on which the US seems to most depend these days, the 'axis of pro-American dictators' (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) which has expressed increasing concern for the Iraqi Sunnis and hostility towards Iran and the alleged 'Shia crescent'.

It's interesting to note here two things. First, a leader of the Baathist part of the insurgency, "Abu Mohammed", said in an interview the other day
denounced the current government and the American presence, while
suggesting that a "legitimate" Iraqi government would have no problems
talking with the US in the future. (He also "described what he
called 'a big difference' between Saddam loyalists and the
insurgency's al-Qaida-linked elements: 'Our program is to liberate
Iraq ... We are fighting the Americans because
they have occupied Iraq, while al-Qaida has a different program. They
want to kill the Americans in Washington and anywhere in the world.'") Second, yesterday the Iraqi Islamist State released an internet declaration denouncing Association of Muslim Scholars head Harith al-Dhari for his contacts with 'agents of Satan' like King Abdullah of Jordan and Hosni Mubarak and appealed for Dhari to come back to his senses. Both of those snippets suggest at least some element of concern (or hope) that this might work. Should such a nationalist anti-US and anti-Iran front incorporating the Sadrists emerge, would
the US want to be siding primarily with the Iranian backed
parties (SCIRI and Dawa)?

I've never been an advocate of Allawi's, I doubt he could really deliver on what I just outlined above, and I'm certainly not advocating his return. His performance when in office doesn't exactly inspire confidence. And the prospects of such a cross-sectarian coalition emerging and holding together in the face of a spiraling civil war seem dim. But in comparison to most of the other scenarios on offer, this one seems plausible enough to at least merit some discussion. So, discuss!

UPDATE: judging by comments, I seem to have framed this poorly, or at least misleadingly. As I say in the comment thread, I don't think that Allawi would
actually solve any problems. He'd likely be unpopular, fail to bridge
the gaps, etc... My point was just that at a time when everything else
is failing, an idea like this is likely to emerge whether it's a good one or a bad one,. I *have* heard some people floating the idea, and Allawi himself seems to be angling for it and peddling the "it's the right time for a strong national leader" line. Better to get it discussed now rather than let it percolate, if it's as bad an ideas readers think...

LAST UPDATE before I leave town: by consensus of my readers, Allawi isn't coming back. Someone better give him a call in Amman and let him know... and I'll pass on this report, about how the not-coming-back and not-relevant Allawi was playing a central role in mediating US talks with the Sunni insurgency. From today's Times (London):

Brushing aside the results of Iraq’s democratic elections, the
insurgents proposed that an emergency government be formed under
Allawi’s leadership. Non-sectarian politicians should be appointed to
the crucial ministries of defence and the interior, they urged, because
they would be responsible for rebuilding a strong national army and
security service. Under this proposal, the newly elected Iraqi
government would, in effect, have been sidelined.

Comments

Dear AA,

Salih al-Mutlak is quite liberal with his announcements. So I'd advise a cautionary approach towards this "National Salvation Front".

From the make-up outlined in Aswat al-Iraq, the group comprises the sidelined factions, but can by no means be called "national". The Sadrist Movement may control Sadr City and have sympathizers in the South but nobody knows just how much popular support it really has, and they may very well use this as leverage against Da'wa/SCIRI within the UIA. Mutlak's own group and that of Mishan al-Jabburi are marginal even within the Sunni Arab population. Iyad Allawi's list has tanked in both elections in 2005. "Tribal elements of Central and Southern Iraq" is too vague a description for anyone to know who that is and what they bring to the table. Ditto for the "Arab Shiite Movement". The various representatives of (unspecified) Turkmen, Yazidi, and Christian movements might very well use this new gathering to pressure the central gov't to be more malleable towards those groups' demands regarding the amending of the Iraqi constitution. Also, the main Christian groups in the North have just stated that they'll demand self-governance for Christian areas in northern Iraq and a future annexation of these areas to the Kurdistan Region. The Fadhila Party (Al-Ya'qubi) is fighting with SCIRI for control in parts of southern Iraq, and particularly Basra, and I would judge their participation in this new political bloc against that background and don't give much about their willingness to keep Iraq united. And "Kurdish movements that oppose separation" is simply laughable. PUK & KDP have, between them, over 90% of the vote in the Kurdistan Region, and the vast majority of Kurds in Iraq aim for independence.

So ... in the end it looks like a rather heterogenous assembly of forces whose main (if not only) point of agreement is their opposition to the current Da'wa/KDP/PUK/SCIRI alliance.

As for Allawi, I find it hard to believe that Iraqis will forgive him for the battles of Najaf and Fallujah, undertaken during his time as Prime Minister and having received his strong endorsement.

The idea of Allawi as figurehead seems fantastical. They main characteristic of such an individual is that he's innocuous enough to facilitate consensus among conflicting parties: "innocuous" can hardly apply to the former head of Bremer's pet parliament. This speculation reminds me of the "buzz" (in Washington) a year or two ago that Chalabi was about to resucitate himself as an 'anti-American' populist. My guess is that it's being pushed by the same crowd. The vote count for Allawi's slate was no accident.

Actually I think the temptation for someone like Allawi, if not the man himself, will certainly surface and seem quite plausible - or another Abd al-Karim Al-Qasem if you will. This is what regimes like the Jordanians and Saudis have wanted all along. I agree with others that it is actually less likely than it appears in today's Iraq.

I may have framed all this poorly - I don't think that Allawi would actually solve any problems, he'd likely be unpopular, fail to bridge the gaps, etc... My point was just that at a time when everything else is failing, an idea like this is likely to emerge (and the man does seem to be angling for it). And I *have* heard some people of the Jordanian/Saudi officialish variety float the idea, though I couldn't say with what success. So I thought it interesting to think about it now.

It's not just that he can't solve problems. He can't get the job... short of an american coups. Which also isn't going to happen.

The opinions of the saudi's et al aren't relevant to the Iraqis, and they don't want the guy. So, again, short america litterally tearing down the political edifice it build and naming allawi supreme leader, there is no chance of this happening.

Have you seen this report in the Sunday Times? I think it is relevant. My guess is that Allawi is behind the leak of this information, perhaps hoping to pressure the US to resume talks with the Sunni insurgents through him, rather than talking seriously with Iran as ISG urges.

A lot of weird positioning going on right now. A few days ago there was a CS Monitor report that said, inter alia, that smaller parties were forming an anti-Dawa, anti-SCIRI coalition.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1207/p01s04-woiq.html

>>>This week, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a secular politician accused by rivals of links to the insurgency, announced a broad alliance he is calling the National Salvation Front. The bloc aims to unite opposition parties against Mr. Maliki and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who met with the Bush administration in Washington on Monday....

The AMS is also part of the National Salvation Front, the initiative announced by Mr. Mutlaq.

The bloc includes Shiite and Sunni parties that are united in their call for regional and international dialogues on solving the Iraq "catastrophe." The only parties not participating are Maliki's Dawa Party, the country's two main Kurdish parties, and Hakim's SCIRI. It also includes the Fadhila Party led by Ayatollah Samir Yacoubi, a strong Shiite party that rivals SCIRI's power in southern Iraq.

"It is like a shadow government," Mustafa al-Hiti, a member of parliament with Mutlaq's party, says of the new front. "There must be change."<<<

Now today there is an AP report saying that al Hakim is organizing an anti-Maliki, anti-Sadr coalition.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061210/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_politics

>>>"The failure of the government has forced us into this in the hope that it can provide a solution," said Omar Abdul-Sattar, a lawmaker from al-Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party. "The new alliance will form the new government."

The groups engaged in talks have yet to agree on a leader, said lawmaker Hameed Maalah, a senior official of al-Hakim's Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI.

One likely candidate for prime minister, however, was said to be Iraq's other vice president, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite who was al-Hakim's choice for the prime minister's job before al-Maliki emerged as a compromise candidate and won.<<<

'Byzantine' doesn't begin to describe the political situation in Iraq.

And then there's the bottomless pit of George Bush's strategy shop. This report from ABC suggests that if the goal in Iraq is shifted to training/advising the Iraqi army, that won't mean any troop drawdowns or redeployments. That's not going to please the Sunnis.

Re: Salih al-Mutlak (why do people keep writing the name with a "q"?) - I've given a short comment about precisely that group above (first comment in this thread). I forgot to add that the Fadhila Party of Al-Ya'qubi (in addition to being SCIRI's main competitor in the Deep South) is one of Muqtada's main rivals. They both (Fadhila & Muqtada) claim to be the rightful heirs of Muqtada's father. It's similar to the Ba'th split into a Syrian and an Iraqi branch back in the day.

As for the 2nd story, that looks like the current coalition (Kurds+UIA) want to replace the no-longer-reliable Muqtada al-Sadr with some Sunni groups in order to retain parliamentary majority. Wouldn't be surprised if that happened.

On Allawi, dear AA, that story is almost a year old. And I would like to get more info on just which insurgent groups would accept him as head of government. 1920 Brigades are ex-Ba'th and the other 2 mentioned (Ansar al-Sunna & National Islamic Resistance) are Sunni Muslim concerned about Kurds & Shi'a. For them to suggest to ignore any elections & put Allawi on the throne doesn't look like they understand what can & what can't be done in contemporary Iraq.

My good man. We may end up with a lot of things. This has moved well beyond our control because of the strategic moustrap we are in. We do not have the politcal capitol to do anything, either. That was spent on this war. The greater regional consequences are huge, and there is not a damn thing we can do about it. Take a look at what is going on in Palestine, Lebbanon....you name it. It is going to take decadesfor us to recover from the mess this administation has made, if we ever recover fully at all.
The thing that I strikes me the most are the debates going on about "a way foreward" and a policy that "can effect change". This one has gotten away from us, we do not have the power to do anything to effect the outcome. We can shotgun predictions, but in the end, this thing plays out in a way that is beyond our control. "You break it,you own it"..... hell, we broke it, AND NOW IT OWNS US.
Sorry for the lousy spelling...
Great site... by the way.