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Career Captain Electrocuted at the Scene of a Residential Structure Fire - California

Death in the Line of Duty...A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

F2005-07 Date Released: May 24, 2006

SUMMARY

On February 13, 2005, a 36-year-old male career Captain (the victim) was electrocuted
while working at the scene of a three alarm residential structure fire. The
Captain was checking on one of his crew members when he walked under a tree
and came in contact with a 12kva power line.
The line had burned through early in the fire with one section landing on the
ground to the south and the other lodged in a tree near the northwest corner
of the fire building. It is believed the victim knew of the downed power line
that had fallen to the south. However, it appeared to witnesses that he was
unaware of the power line that was hanging in the tree, and possibly did not
see the caution tape or hear the warning of a fire fighter who was in the vicinity.
He walked directly into the power line and collapsed to the ground. A nearby
fire fighter used an ax handle to secure and hold the power line off of the
victim while fire fighters pulled him away from the line to a safe area. Advanced
life support was administered immediately by emergency medical personnel who
were at the scene. The victim was transported to a local hospital where he was
pronounced dead.

NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences,
fire departments should:

establish, implement, and enforce standard operating procedures/guidelines
(SOPs/SOGs) that address the safety of fire fighters when working near downed
power lines

ensure that fire fighters maintain a safe distance from energized electrical
hazards, such as downed power lines, until the conductor is de-energized

ensure that fire fighters are aware of the hazard when working around energized
electrical conductors and provide barriers or alerting techniques, which are
effective and distinguishable under the conditions, to prevent fire fighters
from entering an identified danger zone

ensure that fire fighter training includes procedures for recognizing and
dealing safely with electrical hazards on the fireground

ensure that all fireground safety broadcasts are acknowledged and repeated

ensure that team continuity is maintained on the fireground during fire
suppression operations

Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have
specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire
departments:

ensure that a personnel accountability system is in place and that it includes
provisions for, and training on, personnel accountability reporting (PAR)
procedures

ensure that a clearly marked and monitored collapse zone is established
once a defensive fire fighting strategy has been called and a structure has
been identified at risk of collapsing

Voltage is the fundamental force or pressure that causes electricity to flow
through a conductor and is measured in volts. A kilovolt (kv) is a unit of electrical
potential equal to 1000 volts.1

INTRODUCTION

On February 13, 2005, a 36-year-old male Captain (the victim) was electrocuted
after coming into contact with an energized 12kv power line that had burned
through and fallen into a tree during a residential structure fire. On February
14, 2005, the United States Fire Administration (USFA) notified the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this fatality. On March
14, 2005, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist and the Senior Investigator
for the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program investigated
the incident. The NIOSH team met with the Chief, Assistant Chief, Captain, Department
Safety Officer, and fire fighters who were present at the incident scene. The
investigators reviewed the department’s standard operating guidelines
(SOGs), fire department and police photographs, incident reports, dispatch transcripts,
training records of the victim, the medical examiner’s report, and information
from the investigation conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF). The incident site was visited and photographed.

Department
The career department is staffed by approximately 250 uniformed fire fighters,
many of whom hold Emergency Medical Technician or Paramedic credentials. There
are 16 fire stations that serve a population of approximately 210,000 in an
area of about 100 square miles.

Training and Experience
The State where the incident occurred requires all fire fighters to successfully
complete National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Fighter levels I and
II. The department conducts ten weeks of training that is followed by 18 months
of in-service probation. In addition to fulfilling state and department requirements,
the victim had completed hundreds of hours of training, including over 360 hours
of specialized training the year prior to the incident. The courses he successfully
completed included arson investigation, hazardous materials, apparatus/engine
operator, fire command, rescue systems and wildland fire fighting. The victim
was a certified Fire Officer, Fire Instructor, and Paramedic.

The 36-year-old victim had served as a fire fighter for 16 years and had been
with this department for the previous six years. He was promoted to Captain
two months prior to his death. He had received numerous awards and commendations
for his actions at emergency scenes.

o County Command notified IC2 that the power company estimated time of arrival
(ETA) was 20 minutes

0315 hours,

FF1 (from the victim’s crew) went to E10 to turn on telescoping
lights to illuminate operations in Branch 1

0322 hours,

Victim left Branch 2 to go to Branch 1 and check on FF1

0325 hours,

Victim traveled eastward up the driveway on A side of Branch 1 and made
contact with the downed power line

~0345 hours, power company arrived

~0405 hours, electric power was disconnected

Weather
At the time of the incident there was minimal cloud cover with no precipitation.
The ambient air temperature was approximately 47° with humidity at 94% and
a wind speed of zero.

INVESTIGATION

On February 13, 2005, at 0220 hours a career department was dispatched to a
reported structure fire. At 0226 hours Engine 6 arrived on the scene and staged
in the road on side D of the fire building (Diagram 1).
The Captain on-board assumed Incident Command (IC1) and reported to dispatch
that approximately 70 – 80% of the second floor was on fire with smoke
and flames visible through the roof. At 0229 hours he declared the fire defensive.

It was reported to fire fighters that a large number of oriental artifacts
were stored in the building located on side C of the main fire building. A decision
was made to protect this building as the primary exposure while attempting to
extinguish flames in the main fire building. The scene was divided into two
branches with Branch 1 being the main fire building, and Branch 2 the storage
building located on side C. Fire fighters were assigned to Branch 1 to extinguish
flames in the main fire building and Branch 2 personnel were told to concentrate
large volumes of water onto the fire providing a water curtain in the breezeway
to prevent fire spread to the storage building (Photo 1).
At 0227 hours, Rescue 3 (R3) manned by an officer and three fire fighters, arrived
on the scene and staged near the northwest side of the roadway intersection
in front of the structure. Fire fighters from R3 established a water supply
to E6 and assisted the E6 fire fighter in pulling two 1 ¾” pre-connected
hose lines up the driveway on side A.

At 0228 hours, IC1 called for a second alarm and requested dispatch to call
the power company. He stated “We need (the utility company), the fire
is endangering the power line above” (Photo 2).
At this point, it appears there was some confusion with the communication as
the request was not acknowledged, and when dispatch called for a repeat the
IC gave an “all clear”. Because of the miscommunication, it is believed
that County Command was unaware of the imminent danger created by the fire-impinged
power lines and did not relay a sense of urgency to the power company. The call
to the electric company was processed as a routine function of the second alarm
protocol. At approximately 0228 hours, the officer from R3 reported that he
heard an arcing sound and saw a bright flash of light above him as he walked
under the tree where the downed power line ultimately lodged. A fire fighter
who was standing near the front of E6 also reported hearing the sound of arcing
electrical wires at about the same time.

The crew from R3 was using two 1¾” pre-connects from E6 to direct
a hose stream from the driveway on side A of Branch 1. A wooden privacy fence,
approximately eight feet high, surrounded the property. Fire fighters on side
A determined that the fence left them with no means of quick egress if the structure
collapsed, so they used an ax to cut an escape hole through the fence. The R3
officer and IC1 met in the driveway on side A and decided to re-deploy one of
the 1¾” hose lines to side C of Branch 2 for exposure protection.
As they proceeded west out of the driveway, several fire fighters reported that
they felt a sensation indicating that they may have made brief contact with
the downed wire as they passed under the tree where it had lodged. Proceeding
south up the secondary road, the fire fighters established a position on a hillside
near the C/D corner of Branch 2. As the crew of R3 arrived at the C/D corner
of Branch 2, a member of the R3 crew took note of the southern end of the downed
12kv power line, nearly tripping over it. Based on the behavior of the wire,
he assumed it was not energized.

At 0229 hours, E10 with the victim and two fire fighters (FF1 and FF2) arrived
on the scene. The victim assigned FF1 from his crew to back up a fire fighter
from E6 who was operating a handline near the A/B corner of Branch 1. The victim,
FF2, and the crew from E8 advanced a 3” leader line and deployed two 100’,
1½” bundles to Branch 2. At 0231 hours, E8 with three firefighters
arrived and were instructed to assist E10 on the B side for exposure protection.
It is believed that during this activity, the victim saw the downed power line
lying near side C of Branch 2 and went to E6 to request lights to illuminate
the hazard. He asked the driver/operator of E6 if the wires were hot. The driver
reported having seen the wires arcing and pointed to the utility company truck
at the corner of the property near the intersection of the main and secondary
roads. (It was later determined that the truck they saw was attending to the
natural gas supply line). The victim returned to Branch 2 and placed flash lights
around the downed power line on side C. He continued onto the B side of Branch
1 where he advanced one of the 1½” lines into the fire building
through a door on side B of Branch 1.

At approximately the same time, a fire fighter from E11 was walking eastward
up the driveway on side A of Branch 1. He reported seeing an electrical arc
from the downed wire that was hanging in a tree located on the south side of
the driveway. The fire fighter returned to the Branch 1 Director and called
attention to the wire before retrieving a hose bundle off of E11. While returning
to Branch 1 with the hose bundle, the E11 fire fighter felt a slight electrical
shock as he passed under the tree where the power line was hanging, but did
not report the incident. At 0243 hours, the IC made a second request for the
electric utility company. County Command broadcast that the utility company
had been notified and they would get an estimated time of arrival. The E9 crew
met the victim on the B side of Branch 1. The Officer from E9 advised him that
he would be relieved by the E9 crew.

At 0253 hours, the Safety Officer, who had been attending to another structure
fire, arrived on the scene. The Branch 1 Director discussed the hazards of the
downed power line with the Safety Officer and they considered their options
for alerting personnel to the danger. A decision was made to place yellow caution
tape around the area under the tree where the wire was located. Later, the Branch
1 Director made an effort to further reduce the hazard by using a pike pole
to re-position the wire so it would not be hanging in the path of personnel
working in Branch 1. The Branch 1 Director reported feeling no electrical shock,
nor witnessed arcing during this action. The attempt to re-position the wire
was unsuccessful.

At 0304 hours, the Operations Officer made a request for personnel accountability
reports (PAR) from all Branch 1 and 2 personnel. There is no record of response
to the PAR given via radio communication. At 0309 hours, the Operations Officer
(OPS2) requested that County Command sound an alert tone and announce that the
fire had been declared a defensive operation for a second time. The tone and
information was broadcast. OPS2 then assigned fire fighters from Truck 5 into
Branch 1 to force open the doors on side A. The Branch 1 Director met with the
crew, advised them of the downed power line, and led them up the driveway directing
them to stay to the right to avoid contact with the line. All crew members complied
and reported seeing the power line as they passed the tree. The crew completed
the forcible entry assignment and took up positions supporting hose lines that
were already in place in Branch 1. At 0310 hours, County Command notified the
IC that the electric company’s ETA was 20 minutes. At approximately 0315
hours, the victim met with the officer from E2. They discussed the strategy
for Branch 2 and agreed to continue efforts to confine the fire to the Branch
1 structure while protecting the artifacts in the exposure building in Branch
2. The victim directed the crew of E2 to place their line at the B/C corner
of Branch 2 and to direct the hose stream onto the roof of Branch 1. At the
same time FF1, who was working in the area, realized that smoke was beginning
to bank down and visibility was rapidly deteriorating. He decided to go to E10
and turn on the telescoping lights to better illuminate the operations in Branch
1.

At approximately 0322 hours, the victim was seen walking west along side C
of Branch 2. He stopped briefly when a fire fighter who was operating from atop
the C/D corner of the exposure building asked him where he was going. The victim
replied that he was going to check on his fire fighter and then proceeded to
turn the corner and head north, down the secondary road toward Branch 1. As
the victim turned the corner into the driveway on the A side of Branch 1, he
was briefly visible to the Branch 1 Director who was standing near the rear
of E6. After turning the corner into the driveway, he proceeded east toward
the location where fire fighters were operating in Branch 1. As the victim came
into view, one of the fire fighters saw that he was walking directly toward
the tree where the downed power line was hanging. He shouted to the victim to
“watch out for the wire.” However, the victim made no indication
that he heard the warning or saw the caution tape, and walked directly into
the power line. He collapsed onto the driveway and the wire landed on top of
him (Photo 3). The Branch 1 Director witnessed the incident
while standing near the tailboard of E6 and immediately broadcast that there
was a fire fighter down. A fire fighter, who was working in the area, retrieved
a flat head ax that had been placed near the privacy fence and attempted to
pull the wire off of the victim by wrapping it around the head of the ax. The
first attempt failed and the wire slipped off of the ax and landed back onto
the victim. He wrapped the wire a second time and was able to hold the wire
off long enough for fire fighters to pull the victim to safety behind E6. Advanced
life support was administered immediately by on-site emergency medical personnel.
However, attempts to revive the victim were unsuccessful and he was transported
to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Cause of Death

The Medical Examiner’s report listed electrocution as the official cause
of death.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should establish, implement, and enforce
standard operating procedures/guidelines (SOPs/SOGs) that address the safety
of fire fighters when working near downed power lines.

Discussion: SOPs/SOGs provide specific information and instructions on how
a task or assignment is to be accomplished and are usually tactical in nature.
SOPs/SOGs are developed so all members of a department will perform the same
function with uniformity on the fire scene. Properly implemented SOPs/SOGs ensure
that all resources are used in a coordinated effort to ensure fire fighter safety,
stabilize the incident, rescue victims, and conserve property. Operational procedures
that are standardized, clearly written, and enforced, establish accountability
and increase command and control effectiveness. Duplication of efforts and uncoordinated
operations will be lessened because all positions are assigned and covered.
Fire fighters will understand their duties and require a minimum of supervision
when they are trained on, and follow, established SOPs/SOGs.2

The Firefighters Handbook3 lists the following
guidelines for developing standard operating procedures/guidelines:

All SOPs/SOGs should include a subject, date, purpose and scope.

SOPs/SOGs should address the who, what, when, where, and how of a topic.

Fire fighter safety should be the first consideration for all procedures.

SOPs/SOGs should be brief, clear, and concise.

Lengthy SOPs/SOGs should be broken down into smaller sections.

SOPs/SOGs should be reviewed often, at least every three years.

Some topics that may be included in a Standard Operating Procedure/Guideline
for dealing with electricity at an incident scene include:

Fire fighters should keep a minimum distance from a
downed power line until the line is de-energized, and always function under
the premise that a line is hot.

The Incident Commander should convey, and continually
re-evaluate, strategic decisions related to fireground electrical hazards
to all personnel on the scene.

Procedures should be developed for isolating personnel
from the energized conductor. Examples include, protective shields, mechanical
/ human barriers, or alerting techniques that are distinguishable and effective
under the conditions.

All fire fighters should be made aware of the increased
danger involving downed power lines when working in areas of dense smoke.

All fire fighters should be made aware of the hazards
of applying a solid-stream water application around energized electrical conductors.

All fire fighters should be repeatedly trained in safety-related
practices for working around electrical energy.4

Fire department personnel should never be permitted
to move or cut electrical wires under any circumstances.

Fire fighters should locate and isolate downed electrical
wires and wait for utility company personnel to disconnect the power to those
wires.5

The department in this incident had written standard operating guidelines,
and following the incident implemented a detailed SOG for dealing with electrical
hazards on the fireground.

Recommendation #2 : Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters maintain
a safe distance from energized electrical hazards, such as downed power lines,
until the conductor is de-energized.

Discussion: Chapter 10 of IFSTA Fireground Support Operations, 1st
edition,5 states that in most cases involving
downed electrical wires, fire fighters should do nothing more than establish
a perimeter and deny entry to all except utility company personnel. However,
in some cases it is necessary for fire fighters to do some basic hazard assessment
in order to decide where the perimeter should be established. Denying unauthorized
entry into an emergency scene while waiting for utility company personnel to
arrive is a very important and a potentially lifesaving action. In some incidents
involving downed electrical wires, establishing and controlling the perimeter
is relatively easy, but there are times when circumstances make the task very
complicated. For example, if a single strand power line has been severed, as
happened in this case when flames burned through the line, it can be relatively
easy to see where the break is and where the perimeter should be established
to isolate the hazard. On the other hand, if an energized electrical wire falls
across a metal fence (chain link, barbed wire, etc.) the entire length of the
fence can become energized. If the fence is enclosing a large institutional,
industrial, or agricultural property, it may be miles in length, and anyone
who touches the fence may complete the circuit to ground and suffer a severe
electrical shock, or even electrocution. Similarly, if innocuous looking telephone
wires or cable TV lines are down, even though these are normally low-voltage
wires, they may be energized with the full electrical potential of power lines
if, at any point, they are in direct contact with those lines.

A common error is establishing a safety perimeter that is too small.5
The recommended isolation distance is equal to one full span between the adjacent
poles or towers in all directions from a break in the wire, or the point of
contact with the ground (see Diagram 2). While the aforementioned
rule for perimeter placement can be used in most downed wire incidents, in other
situations such as following an explosion or structural collapse, it may be
necessary to more clearly define the hazard area. For example, if a downed wire
is obscured by building debris, smoke, or darkness, it may be necessary for
fire fighters to use various forms of technology to identify the hazard area.
There are several useful devices available to fire departments for this purpose.
Two of the most common are the alternating current detector and thermal
imaging camera.5

Alternating current detectors can detect unshielded AC current through
many solid objects. They are a battery-operated, handheld wand that is similar
in size and shape to a police officer’s baton. In the presence of an alternating
current, they emit an intermittent beep. The more rapid the detector beeps,
the closer the source of the current. The detection range (distance from the
source at which the wand detects the current) varies with the situation. In
general, the higher the voltage, the greater the range of detection will be.
Under ideal conditions, these devices may be able to detect AC current in a
single 120-volt line from as far as 15 feet away. However, if the conductor
is lying on wet soil, the range may be reduced to as little as one foot. With
higher potentials, such as those in distribution and transmission lines, the
detection range can increase to more than 500 feet.

Thermal imaging cameras can also be used to detect hidden wires. Electrical
current creates heat whenever it encounters resistance in a circuit. The heat
is created at the point of resistance but not throughout the circuit. This phenomenon
is seen in the operation of an electric hot plate or an electric space heater.
Resistance occurs when an un-insulated conductor (wire) is in contact with the
ground or there is a kink in, or damage to, a conductor whether insulated or
not. This resistance creates the heat that the thermal imaging cameras can detect.

Another important fact to remember when dealing with electric hazards on the
fireground is the danger of assuming that a power line is dead before the power
company verifies that it has been de-energized. Because power outages often
result from very temporary causes, such as a tree limb being blown against a
wire, most electrical distribution systems are programmed to automatically reenergize
a few seconds after the circuit breaker in the substation trips. If the breaker
trips again, many of these programs reenergize the system one more time before
remaining off line. Therefore, even if a handheld detector fails to activate
near a downed wire, it only means that the line is dead at that given moment,
but the line may not be completely or permanently de-energized. In addition,
when power from the normal utility source fails, some emergency generators may
start automatically. If these units are not disconnected from the system, the
power lines can be reenergized with as much as 240 volts from the generators.
Also, many overhead power lines are supplied from both directions; therefore,
a single line break can still be energized on both sides of the break.

Even though the electrical hazard in this incident was identified early in
the fire by the initial Incident Commander, because of the missed communication
the power company was not called until part of the second alarm protocol. Therefore
no sense of urgency was conveyed. Normal fire suppression activities continued
and the power company did not arrive to disconnect the electricity until approximately
20 minutes after the electrocution occurred.

Recommendation #3 : Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are aware
of the hazard when working around energized electrical conductors and provide
barriers or alerting techniques, which are effective and distinguishable under
the conditions, to prevent fire fighters from entering an identified danger
zone.

Discussion: In the case of downed power lines, establishing an effective barrier
that warns of the specific danger is equally as important as identifying and
locating the line.5 The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) requires that alerting techniques be used to warn
and protect employees from hazards which could cause injury due to electric
shock or burns. OSHA recommends that safety signs, symbols, or barricades, possibly
in conjunction with attendants, be used to provide sufficient warning to protect
employees from electrical hazards.6 Fire departments
should ensure that protective barriers (human or mechanical), or alerting techniques
that are distinguishable under the conditions, are in place to prevent entry
into an area where an electrical hazard has been identified.

In this incident, attempts were made to warn fire fighters of the downed power
line that was hanging in the tree near the driveway by placing yellow caution
tape around the area immediately under the tree, and relaying information on
the hazard by word-of-mouth. Interviews reveal that the gravity of the situation
was not completely understood as fire fighters were permitted to freely traverse
the driveway and continue fire suppression activities in proximity to the wire.
It also appears that the victim was aware of the downed power line that fell
near the C/D corner of Branch 2, and may have considered it the only electrical
hazard on the scene. It is believed that he did not see the yellow caution tape,
or hear the warning of the fellow fire fighter, before he came in contact with
the wire.

Recommendation #4 : Fire departments should ensure that fire fighter training
includes procedures for recognizing and dealing safely with electrical hazards
on the fireground.

Discussion: Fire fighters should be trained in recognizing electrical hazards
when entering an emergency scene. Training protocols should be established that
teach how to recognize electrical dangers and what measures to take to avoid
the hazard. This training should be conducted upon initial hire, and routinely
thereafter. Applicable safety protocols should be taught, and the training repeated
if necessary, until understood by all members. These safety rules and procedures
should be continually enforced by on-scene officers.5

In some areas, local utility companies have developed training programs and
will assist fire departments in a joint training effort. The department involved
in this fatality has enhanced their existing training program for responding
to emergencies that involve downed power lines or energized electrical equipment
to include lessons learned from this incident.

Recommendation #5 : Fire departments should ensure that all fireground safety
broadcasts are acknowledged and repeated.

Discussion: Communication is one of the most important safety behaviors on
every emergency scene. At times it may be necessary to broadcast emergency traffic
over the radio. When an emergency communication is necessary, the person transmitting
the message should make the urgency clear to the dispatch center. Dispatch should
advise all other units to stand by, and tell the caller to proceed with the
emergency message. An emergency message that broadcasts details of a safety
hazard should be repeated several times.2

In this incident, a safety broadcast regarding the power lines was never made
and there was confusion as to the gravity of the situation. It is believed that
the victim and other fire fighters on the scene knew of the wire that was down
in Branch 2, but had no knowledge of the danger presented by the wire hanging
in the tree in Branch 1.

Recommendation #6 : Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained
on the fireground during fire suppression operations.

Discussion: Team continuity means knowing your team members, staying in contact
at all times, communicating needs and observations to the team leader, rotating
to rehabilitation, staging as a team, and watching out for your team members.2
Teams that enter a hazardous environment together should leave together to ensure
that team continuity is maintained. Fire fighters should always work and remain
in teams whenever they are operating in a hazardous environment.7

In this incident, the victim had assigned one of his crew members to assist
fire fighters in Branch 1 on side A while he and another crew member worked
in Branch 2. After approximately 50 minutes had passed the victim left his work
area in Branch 2 to check on his crew member. The victim was unfamiliar with
Branch 1 as he had spent his entire time on the scene working in Branch 2. There
is no indication that he had knowledge of the location of the downed power line
in Branch 1 and he was fatally injured when he came in contact with the wire
as he was looking for his crew member.

Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could
have specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators suggest that
fire departments implement these fireground safety recommendations.

Recommendation #7 : Fire departments should ensure that a personnel accountability
system is in place and that it includes provisions for, and training on, personnel
accountability reporting (PAR) procedures.

Discussion: A critically important facet of an accountability system is the
personnel accountability report (PAR). A PAR is an organized on-scene roll call
in which each supervisor reports the status of his crew when requested. The
use of an accountability system is required by NFPA 1500, Fire Department
Occupational Safety and Health Program,8
and NFPA 1561, Emergency Services Incident Management System.9
A properly operating Personnel Accountability System requires the following:

Development of a departmental SOP

Training all personnel

Strict enforcement during emergency incidents

In this incident, the Operations Officer called for a PAR at 0304 hours and
no responses were recorded. A positive response would have provided information
to the officers on the scene of the location, and possibly the condition, of
their crew members.

When a properly enforced accountability system is made part of the culture
of the department, fireground command and control is improved and fire fighter
safety is enhanced.2

Recommendation #8 : Fire departments should ensure that a clearly marked and
monitored collapse zone is established once a defensive fire fighting strategy
has been called and a structure has been identified at risk of collapsing.

Discussion: If at any time during a structure fire, size-up determines that
structural integrity is questionable, a collapse zone should be established.10
A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris
might land if the structure fails. This area should be equal to 1½ times
the height of the building. For example, if the wall were 20 feet high, the
collapse zone boundary should be established at least 30 feet away from the
wall.11

In this incident, fire fighters who were operating in Branch 1 were concerned
early on about a collapse because at approximately 0228 hours they cut a hole
in the privacy fence for a means of egress from the area. Many of the fire fighters
on the scene had been to a fire at the same location several years before and
discussed the structural integrity of the building. The fire was confined mostly
to the C/D corner area of Branch 1, and the structure was built on a sloping
hillside with side A being on the lower level. At 0229 hours the fire was originally
declared defensive. At 0309 hours it was broadcast as defensive for a second
time. Shortly thereafter, a truck crew was sent into Branch 1 for forcible entry
while other fire fighters remained in the area performing suppression activities.

If manual fire suppression activities are being conducted within the boundaries
of a collapse zone, the attack cannot be considered defensive. In this case,
the danger presented by the potential of a structure collapse and the presence
of the 12kv power line would have been eliminated by enforcement of an established
collapse zone.