Section 28

28. Many as are the objections to this theory, we pass
on for fear
of the ridicule we might incur by arguing against a position
itself so
manifestly ridiculous. We may be content with pointing out that it
assigns the primacy to the Non-existent and treats it as the very
summit of Existence: in short, it places the last thing first. The
reason for this procedure lies in the acceptance of sense-perception
as a trustworthy guide to first-principles and to all other entities.

This philosophy began by identifying the Real with body; then,
viewing with apprehension the transmutations of bodies, decided that
Reality was that which is permanent beneath the superficial changes-
which is much as if one regarded space as having more title
to Reality
than the bodies within it, on the principle that space does
not perish
with them. They found a permanent in space, but it was a
fault to take
mere permanence as in itself a sufficient definition of the Real;
the right method would have been to consider what properties must
characterize Reality, by the presence of which properties it has
also that of unfailing permanence. Thus if a shadow had permanence,
accompanying an object through every change, that would not make it
more real than the object itself. The sensible universe, as
including the Substrate and a multitude of attributes, will thus
have more claim to be Reality entire than has any one of its
component
entities (such as Matter): and if the sensible were in very truth
the whole of Reality, Matter, the mere base and not the total, could
not be that whole.

Most surprising of all is that, while they make sense-perception
their guarantee of everything, they hold that the Real cannot be
grasped by sensation;- for they have no right to assign to
Matter even
so much as resistance, since resistance is a quality. If however
they profess to grasp Reality by Intellect, is it not a strange
Intellect which ranks Matter above itself, giving Reality to Matter
and not to itself? And as their "Intellect" has, thus, no
Real-Existence, how can it be trustworthy when it speaks of things
higher than itself, things to which it has no affinity whatever?

But an adequate treatment of this entity [Matter] and of
substrates will be found elsewhere.