from the isn't-that-a-problem? dept

A few weeks back, we wrote about a proposal by Rep. Jerry Nadler, which we referred to as the RIAA Bailout Act of 2012 because it sought to change the nature of satellite radio royalties to put them on par with the absolutely ridiculous and unsustainable royalty levels for internet radio. In case you don't know, there are basically three very different tiers for the royalties that need to be paid to musicians (separate from songwriters) for broadcasting the tracks on which those musicians played. If it's played on the radio, the stations have to pay nothing to the musicians, as Congress long ago decided that radio play was the equivalent of advertising (a viewpoint that is pretty accurate, given the decades of payola that have shown that radio play is so valuable that labels will pay stations and djs to get their songs played). Then there are the satellite radio guys (basically Sirius XM at this point). They pay a rate that they already think is too high and pass those rates directly on to consumers. In preparation for a new rate-making process, they're already seeking out legal ways to get away from having to pay statutory rates.

But what the satellite guys have to pay completely pales in comparison to what internet streaming companies like Pandora have to pay. There, the rates are so crazy that it's become clear that Pandora has little likelihood of ever being profitable unless something drastically changes. Matt Schruers, over at Project DisCo, has an absolutely fascinating look back at why these rates are so bad, and it comes down to this simple, but positively scary point:

When the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, it was so taken over by regulatory capture by a few key industries, that they explicitly put into the Copyright Act that it should be used to stop disruptive innovation from challenging legacy businesses. I've read the Copyright Act many times, but have to admit that I'd never quite noticed this line from 17 USC 801(b)(1)(D), which explicitly states that the role of the Copyright Royalty Judges on the Copyright Royalty Board that sets the rates for internet radio are there:

To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.

Yeah. Their job is to set rates that basically kill off disruptive innovation in favor of "prevailing industry practices." As Schruers notes, this goes against absolutely everything we understand about the importance of disruptive innovation in driving forward the economy:

That’s right: employees of the U.S. Government who dictate price inputs for entire industries are statutorily charged to resist change. While the CRT / CARP / CRB has always had other statutory guidance as well, for example, maximizing availability of works, affording copyright owners a “fair return” and users a “fair income under existing economic conditions”, Congress enshrined this explicit rule that no one be permitted to upset the existing players’ apple cart. There is no pretext here, no cynical appeal to some higher objective that justifies minimizing disruption of the prevailing industry — change is inherently bad. The statute gives no consideration of whether a better business model might come along, and in fact affirmatively discourages any — not only because the statute aims to minimize any “disruptive impact”, but also because this license was limited solely to “pre-existing” services by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998. New arrivals were out of luck.

How the hell did something so explicitly corrupt and so clearly a form of crony capitalism get directly into the Copyright Act? Take a wild guess:

So how did this “minimize disruption” language wind up in the Copyright Act of 1976, given that it so clearly violated the First Rule of Defending the Status Quo? The “minimize disruption” requirement is a vestige of a copyright legislative process that stretched over many years, starting in the 1960s, at a time when fewer people appreciated copyright and fewer still understood the contours of the legal system that created those rights. Much of the initial drafting of the ‘76 Act was by the Copyright Office, which chaired a series of meetings with prominent industry copyright lawyers throughout the 1960s.

Counsel for publishers, the recording industry, broadcasters, were well represented in these discussions. The future, as the saying goes, had no lobbyist. It is not surprising, therefore, that the multi-factor test that determines the rates paid by services like satellite radio under the Copyright Act’s statutory licenses would reflect the perspectives of the existing parties to the arrangement. The standard from the ‘76 Act remains today (although at the time, the statute was focused on regulating “coin-operated phonorecord players”.)

And... believe it or not, that's not even the end of the story! That part of the Copyright Act is the part that impacts the satellite guys. But the streaming internet folks? For them it's even worse, as the statute takes things even further to create even more incentives to further kill off these new innovations -- by basically saying that a "proper" license is one with which a "willing seller" is happy. In other words, it sets the statutory rates almost entirely based on the interests of... the existing, entrenched players.

And that's why Pandora may never be profitable if nothing changes. Because we've actually built into copyright law that disruptive innovation is bad and should be minimized at the interests of the legacy players.

from the sirius-charges dept

Well, well. Last fall, we discussed how Sirius XM was aiming to cut out SoundExchange and try to do deals directly with labels for performance rights. There's some history here. SoundExchange was set up and spun out of the RIAA specifically to collect performance royalties from Sirius XM and emerging internet streaming offerings. Radio doesn't pay performance rights to musicians (they just pay mechanicals to songwriters/publishers), and while the RIAA has wanted that to change for years, it used the "newness" of satellite and the internet to suddenly claim that this extra tax must be paid there, and then set up SoundExchange to collect it. The "rate" was a statutory rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), which involved a huge fight, with SoundExchange basically demanding a significant cut of everyone's revenue. The CRB eventually agreed to a sliding rate starting at 6% and moving up to 8% over time -- much, much lower than what SoundExchange wanted (there was an even more intense fight over internet rates, but that is a separate issue).

Even with this "lower" rate, Sirius XM provides a huge chunk of SoundExchange's revenue -- around $200 million last year alone. Realizing that the deal that set up SoundExchange noted that it was "nonexclusive," Sirius sought to cut SoundExchange out of the loop and go direct to labels. Obviously, Sirius's goal is to pay less in royalties, and that led some to wonder why a label would want to do it, since the royalty rate would be lower. Except, it's a little more complex than that.

Sirius notes that in cutting out the middleman, you avoid SoundExchange's (hefty) administrative fee, as well as its notoriously opaque payment process which has left many labels scratching their heads. SoundExchange provides little information as to why artists get paid what they're paid, leaving open significant concerns that the money is not being accounted for properly. Similarly, SoundExchange has been notorious for having "difficulty" finding artists -- though I will say that they've definitely been improving a lot on that front, and really have made a huge effort to reach out to artists. Still, there certainly could be benefits for labels to go direct. Cutting out the middleman, having more relevant and accurate data, as well as more timely payments could certainly be worth it. In fact, Jeff Price at TuneCore explained how indie artists who were their own labels would almost certainly benefit by going direct.

However, the wider industry flipped out and closed ranks, with SoundExchange, the RIAA and A2IM (like the RIAA but for indie labels) all urging labels not to have anything to do with direct deals. Sirius XM looked at all of this and saw a clear antitrust violation as it certainly feels like the entire industry colluding against it. To that end, it has sued SoundExchange and A2IM for antitrust violations -- and even gone so far as to ask for SoundExchange to be "dissolved and unwound." While the actions of other music industry trade groups -- including the RIAA, NARAS, AFRTA and AFM -- are mentioned in the lawsuit, they are not listed as defendants (yet). The focus is very much on SoundExchange and A2IM, whose boss, Rich Bengloff, sits on the board of SoundExchange (along with a bunch of RIAA folks).

In the filing (embedded below), Sirius reports on multiple attempts it made to sign deals with indie labels, in which it was repeatedly rebuffed with claims about how Rich or A2IM had urged them not to do direct deals.

For example, Sirius XM's direct license outreach to independent label Bandit
Records was short-circuited when a representative of Bandit Records told Sirius XM that
"[w]e're members of A21M and Merlin. I think that prevents a direct license." Upon
information and belief, one or both Defendants communicated with Bandit Records (or through
its representative Merlin Network) and pressured them to refuse a direct license.

O. Sirius XM's effort to engage in direct license discussions with independent label
Unitedlnterests was similarly derailed when, on August 30, 2011, a representative of
Unitedlnterests wrote: "I heard that XM was making these requests. I will look at the license,
but will also confer with A2IM and other indies." Upon information and belief,
UnitedInterests pursued those discussions and therefore agreed with A2IM and/or other record
companies not to enter into a direct license.

Sirius XM's approach to independent label CA Management was stopped in its
tracks when, on October 27, 2011, a representative of CA Management told Sirius XM that he
was "getting mixed reviews about the best way to handle" the direct license offer. Several weeks
later, on November 15, 2011, he told Sirius XM that "the RIAA has asked everyone to hold off."
CA Management never entered into a direct license with Sirius XM because, upon
information and belief, after CA Management communicated with RIAA, it agreed to participate
in the industry boycott.

There are more, similar, examples in the filing. There's also a discussion of some indie labels who did sign on, but then backed out, claiming pressure from A2IM. From the filing:

Defendants' unlawful efforts have also extended to extracting agreements from
labels that have already signed direct licenses to attempt to back out of them. By way of
example. on November 28. 2011. Sirius XM entered into a direct license with Paracadute, TMB
Productions, Michael Doughtv. and Michael Viola. On February 9, 2012, Paracadute and TMB
Productions requested that they be released from the deal. Surprised by this request, Sirius XM's
agent asked Darren Paltrowitz, the person with whom they had negotiated the deal, for an
explanation. Mr. Paltrowitz's, response was an e-mail with talking points strikingly similar to the
Defendants' press release, which Mr. Paltrowitz indicated were supplied by the bands' business
manager. That business manager is Perry Resnick, an artist manager with RZO LLC, and a longtime member of the SoundExchange Board. After further discussions, on February 22, 2012,
Mr. Paltrowitz wrote that he "relayed [Sirius XM's] feedback to RZO, and they -- per
conversations with A2IM and other folks beyond SoundExehange -- stand their ground about
wanting us to opt out" of the direct license. That same day. Mr. Paltrowity cut and pasted an email
he received from Mr. Resinick that stated: "I know for a fact that Rich Bengloff, the head of
A2IM ... is against this. Rich and I have had this exact conversation, and are both in
agreement that SoundExchange is the better way to go."

Of course, there are a few reasons why SoundExchange and its board members would be so against this. As noted earlier, they still think that the royalty rates should be much higher, and have indicated multiple times that in the next round of ratesetting at the CRB, they are going to push for royalty rates double to triple of what Sirius XM is already paying. That's certainly part of why Sirius would like to cut them out of the picture. But, as some have noted, doing direct deals outside of SoundExchange doesn't just let Sirius avoid whatever crazy rates the judges at the CRB choose out of thin air, but it allows them to argue that the actual market rate is lower. You see... the way the CRB works is that it's supposed to try to set a statutory rate that is effectively what the market would choose on its own. Historically, since there were no market-based deals, it had nothing concrete to base its decision on, other than what SoundExchange or Sirius told the judges. However, if Sirius is able to cut direct deals (and do them at an even lower rate) then when the CRB hearing comes around, Sirius now has empirical evidence of a lower market rate. That's a pretty big deal.

Honestly, I'm not sure either side in this fight comes out looking good. It's really just a fight about who pays how much, and who gets a cut. This is the kind of messy thing that happens when a clueless Congress decides that a clueless judicial board should magically "set rates" based on nothing in particular. Sirius XM is hardly an angel in this fight, but based on some of the quotes in the filing, there may be something of a case here -- though proving full on antitrust violations are not easy.

The real issue, it seems, is that groups like A2IM are supposed to represent the industry, but are not supposed to be a central point of collusion for the industry, driving policy decisions back to the labels. That's coordinated effort among competitors that could very well cross the line. The close-knit nature of the SoundExchange board makes all of this even more complicated (and again raises serious questions why Congress ever allowed SoundExchange to be birthed from the RIAA, rather than being truly independent in the first place). I can't image a court would actually dissolve SoundExchange, but if it turns out that this lawsuit has legs, things could get very, very messy in the industry (and it certainly could shake up A2IM in a big way as well). This is one worth paying attention to.

from the but-of-course dept

Not quite sure how I missed this earlier (update: oops, turns out we didn't miss it -- so consider this an encore presentation), but Bret alerts us to the news that with the ever increasing royalty rates pushed by the RIAA in the form of its "spin-off" Sound Exchange, and codified by the Copyright Royalty Board (for whom I still do not understand how anyone can justify its existence), that Sirius XM has simply added a $2 RIAA tax to everyone's monthly bills to help pay for the new performance royalties. Yup, because the RIAA and its members haven't been able to come up with a business model that works, they get the courts to tax you for listening to your satellite radio (on top of what you already pay and what they already pay to songwriters and publishers) and that gets passed on to you. Just imagine what will happen if the RIAA gets its wish and gets to add a similar tax to terrestrial radio stations as well. If you thought radio was chock full of commercials before...

from the disparity dept

Beginning at the end of July, Sirius XM satellite radio subscribers will see an extra charge of about $2 per month on their bill, as the company will begin passing along the music royalty rates it must pay to subscribers. We've written a lot about music royalties and licenses, particularly about how they serve to stifle the very innovation the music industry needs to survive, in favor of upfront demands for cash -- money which seems to have a hard time making its way to artists. This news from Sirius XM not only is likely to raise the hackles of its subscribers, but also raises some questions about the royalty system, and how it affects consumers.

First, the royalty rate for Sirius XM was set by the CRB at 6.5% of gross revenues for 2009, increasing by half a percent per year over the following three years. So why, then, is Sirius XM charging a $1.98 fee -- or 15.2% -- on its $12.95 monthly subscription fee? That seems like much more than "passing along" the royalty rate. As part of the governmental approval for the merger of Sirius and XM, certain conditions were placed on the company, including a three-year price freeze. The company has gotten around this before by separating out services, like online listening, that used to be included in the general subscription fee, then requiring an additional charge for them. Now it looks to be getting a boost by "recovering" a significantly higher percentage of its subscription fees than it must pay out in royalties. The FCC's merger conditions allow the company to pass the royalty fee on to consumers -- but why would they let the company pass on a fee almost three times as high as the actual royalty rate? Mobile phone companies have used similar "fees" to pad their revenues for some time, and the FCC apparently doesn't mind that, either.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, this situation highlights the disparity in how the music royalty rates are applied. Terrestrial radio broadcasters, unlike satellite broadcasters, don't have to pay musicians (or, rather, their labels) royalties. Satellite radio was presumably, an easier target for the likes of the RIAA, given its relative lack of lobbying strength, so the industry cartel defined it as an "interactive" service -- industry-speak for "pay us more money." It's hard to see how satellite radio is really any different than terrestrial radio, except for a different business model, albeit one with the same end, so it's also hard to understand why the two should be treated differently from a royalty perspective. The RIAA and its cronies have been working to change this -- by trying to force terrestrial broadcasters to pay up as well. They call radio "a kind of piracy", again ignoring the fact that radio, whether it's satellite or terrestrial, promotes their products. The National Association of Broadcasters, which represents traditional broadcasters, likely doesn't really mind the fact that Sirius XM has to pay royalties, given its well-documented disdain for the company. But by standing idly by while Sirius XM gets hit with the royalty mandate, it weakens its own argument against its members having to pay royalties. The equitable solution here isn't really to force terrestrial broadcasters to pay up, to level the proverbial playing field. It's to eliminate the royalties that are hamstringing new services and promoting music. Sooner or later, the industry will figure this out -- but at this point, it looks like that realization will come only after it's run itself into the ground.

from the cracks-in-the-crystal-ball dept

It's no secret that Sirius XM's business has been hurting. Its recent brush with bankruptcy merely highlighted the huge obstacles the company faced from the beginning: massive capital outlay on satellite infrastructure, and huge spending to attract subscribers. But one key issue for the company that many people didn't foresee was the rise in popularity of internet radio, podcasts, and portable music players. Included in that group was Martine Rothblatt, Sirius' founder, who now says competition from those media, spurred on by growth in mobile networks, have doomed satellite radio (via Paid Content). Sirius XM CEO Mel Karmazin, of course, disagrees, saying the company has enough unique content to succeed. But what happens when streaming services become even more pervasive, more portable, and available to a wider audience? Sirius XM's exclusivity to certain types of content in locales like automobiles will slip, and being tied to its proprietary hardware and subscription model could become a liability. The company is growing its efforts in this area, such as with its recently announced iPhone app, but more fully embracing online radio would seem to be a brighter strategy.

from the kill-two-birds dept

In discussing the troubled satellite radio business, we noted that two of the major difficulties faced by the industry were the huge capital costs required to build and maintain the business, combined with the rise of (somewhat unexpected) competition in the form of internet radio and internet downloads combined with portable MP3 players like the iPod. Over at Slate, Farhad Manjoo has a suggestion that would solve both of those issues: Sirius XM should ditch the satellites and become a web only broadcaster. It's an interesting idea, but it seems unlikely (even though they offer online streams currently). Sirius XM still remains so car focused, it still thinks that being in automobiles is a competitive advantage. However, as Manjoo points out, it's actually damaging the company, because it's had to pay large sums to automakers to get the devices installed in cars. Instead, if it went to an internet-only solution, and cut the subscription prices, it could reach a much larger audience, much more easily and cheaply. Build mobile apps, and people can use their phones to listen to content. Add downloadable podcasts of popular shows, and anyone with a portable device can time shift. It's so reasonable that it'll never happen.

from the possibly,-but-it-had-help dept

Back in 1999, when plans for satellite radio were first talked about, I thought it was destined to fail. I had two reasons for why: I didn't think there really was that much demand and having just closely watched the disaster known as Iridium, I was intimately familiar with the massive and business-strangling capital costs associated with running a satellite-based business. It just seemed so capital intensive that any underestimate in terms of demand would kill you. And, in fact, Sirius has a pretty long history of being on the verge of failure.

With the news of Sirius XM preparing for bankruptcy, it's worth revisiting those original thoughts. While I'd love to claim credit for calling this a decade ago -- I think my reasoning turned out to be wrong. I vastly underestimated the number of folks willing to sign up for satellite radio (though, I think I was correct in recognizing that the number of subscribers would need to be massive and that would be difficult to achieve). And, while the capital expenditure costs were large, it seems like they, by themselves, may have been imaginable. What I hadn't fully expected, was the massive expenses the companies (now company) would ring up trying to lock up "talent" to drive subscriber numbers up. Also, I didn't expect ridiculous regulatory restrictions. The 18 months it took federal regulators to approve the merger between XM and Sirius, combined with the ridiculous restrictions that were put on the combined company significantly contributed to satellite radio's troubles. And, finally, additional competition in the form of internet radio and podcasts/portable media really have put pressure on satellite radio -- none of which I foresaw at the time.

While the company is clearly looking to restructure and keep going, you have to wonder if it even makes sense at this point. With those alternatives increasingly becoming popular in the market, it's difficult to see how satellite radio can possibly provide enough excess value to pay for the increased capital costs compared to the competition. Even if the company restructures and comes out of bankruptcy, who's willing to bet it will have to through this whole process again in a few years?

from the let-us-tag-along! dept

Well, the terrestrial radio companies failed to stop the XM-Sirius merger from a happening with a rather ridiculous campaign against the merger, but that doesn't mean they can't continue to try to cause problems. The latest is that they've convinced Representative Ed Markey to introduce legislation requiring all satellite radio devices to include the ability to play HD Radio (terrestrial radio's attempt to provide a better quality product to compete with satellite). The FCC had just begun investigating whether or not such an HD Radio mandate made sense, but apparently Markey can't wait and is pushing to have the mandate pushed through as law before the FCC can study the issue. Is it worth mentioning that the NAB, the lobbying arm of the terrestrial radio stations (and the group that resorted to all sorts of questionable actions in trying to prevent the Sirius-XM merger), is one of Markey's biggest campaign contributors? Oh, and that XM CEO Mel Karmazin contributed to Markey's campaign back in 2001 (when Karmazin worked for Viacom), but apparently hasn't contributed more recently? Feel free to express your thoughts on the bill with this voting widget (if you're reading in RSS, click through to see it):

from the and-next...-we-want-you-to-clean-our-offices-with-just-a-feather! dept

The 18-month saga of XM and Sirius trying to merger just keeps getting more and more ridiculous. Yesterday, we pointed to all of the silly hoops the FCC was trying to make the companies go through, that often had absolutely nothing to do with antitrust issues, and today comes the news that the FCC has fined the companies nearly $20 million for technical violations as some sort of precursor to merger approval. What do these technical violations have to do with the antitrust questions the FCC is supposed to be deciding? Absolutely nothing. Instead, it appears that the FCC is simply using its position as the decider over whether or not the merger goes through to get whatever licks in that it can against the two satellite radio companies, knowing that they'll have to obey quietly. Its like hazing. Because XM and Sirius need the approval of the FCC, it can just do anything it wants to them, such as adding bizarre requirements or even asking them to hand over $20 million.

from the what-took-so-long? dept

It's not clear exactly what Kevin Marin and the FCC have been doing over the last year and a half since XM and Sirius announced plans to merge. The Justice Department gave its approval of the deal back in March. That had already taken over a year, and then everyone turned to the FCC to get its approval. From the length of time it took, perhaps the FCC had just figured that the DoJ wasn't going to approve the merger, and had to scramble to figure out the details before granting (or not) its own approval. FCC boss Kevin Martin has now sent around to the other commissioners his recommended concessions to approve the merger, and it includes things like a temporary ban on raising prices (for a few years) as well as requirements for some channels to be turned over to noncommercial and minority programming. While XM and Sirius eagerly agreed to these concessions (after all this time, they just want the damn thing to be over), other commissioners may try to impose additional requirements as well -- so this might not be over just yet.