Warren A. Trest has written a good book about a great airman. Harry C. Aderholt is one
of the legends of Air Force special operations, and Trest tells us why. Air Commando
One follows Aderholts career from the early days when Air Force special
operations dropped Korean agents behind communist lines in 1950 to the evacuation of our
Hmong allies from Laos as the communists triumphed throughout the region in 1975. Aderholt
participated in a breathtaking number of secret air wars and was usually in
command. His achievements under extraordinarily difficult conditions and byzantine command
and security arrangements are truly awe inspiring. The psychologist will be disappointed
that the book does not provide greater insight into Aderholts family life; the
historian will be disappointed that the book provides only Aderholts part of the
operations described rather than a more complete picture of the operations as a whole; and
the skeptic will be concerned that not enough bad things are said about Aderholt. But
those people within the special operations community will appreciate the very personal
perspective the book provides on covert and clandestine operations and the early days of
the Air Force Special Air Warfare Center. Aderholt had the career we all hoped we would
have, and his subordinates say the sorts of things about him that we wish our subordinates
would say about us. This is just the sort of inspirational book young Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC) officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) should read and
reread.

This book, however, is more than just a collection of hair-raising flying stories and
examples of good leadership. Trest also tries to address the traditional conflict between
the Big Blue Air Force and the Air Force special operations community. Trest
does this mainly through Aderholts conflict with Gen William W. Momyer in Vietnam.
In Trests view, their conflict centered on the issue of centralized control of
airpower. Unfortunately, Trest pursues the argument only as far as Aderholt and Momyer did
and does not get as deeply into this issue as he might. For example, Trest supports
Aderholts view that sometimes centralized control decreases the effectiveness of
airpower (absolutely true), but he neglects the fact that bureaucratically
centralized control enhances the power and prestige of the Air Force and helps make more
airmen generals. Even if centralized command were marginally worse from a
combat-effectiveness standpoint (and in Vietnam it often was) and even if it did not mesh
so nicely with General Momyers comments, its decisive bureaucratic advantages would
have made it almost irresistible. Aderholt never had a chance on this one.

When Momyer took command of Tactical Air Command (TAC), all of Air Force special ops
came under his purview, and things did not go well for special operators generally and
Aderholt in particular. Unfortunately, Trest (and probably Aderholt) once again does not
think deeply enough about why the Air Force hierarchy was so hostile to special
operations. A little consideration would point out that, as a rule, special operations are
low-cost, high-risk, and high-reward operations. However, institutions like the military
services are extremely risk-averse and measure their value by their bud-gets. In this
calculus, low cost is bad, and high risk is horrendous. Worse yet, the high rewards of
successful special operations often do not go to the services. If the Khamba tribesmen to
whom Aderholt airlifted supplies had won some sort of autonomy for Tibet, it would have
been great for Tibet and perhaps the CIA, but what would it have done for the Air Force?
Aderholt didnt ask, but TAC commanders did, and they often felt that finding
high-tech, high-cost solutions to obvious challenges (like shooting down enemy planes)
made a lot more sense than finding better ways to secretly support the CIA, the Khamba, or
some other shadowy weirdos. Even the least thoughtful members of Aderholts units
should have realized that if their operations required carrying false ID cards that did
not link them to the US Air Force and required them to paint over all the Air Force
markings on their aircraft, then the Air Force was probably not gaining much from the
operation. If Heinie realized this, Trest does not tell us.

Although institutional support for special operations forces has increased dramatically
over the past decade, institutional outlooks have not always kept up, and the sorts of
constraints and risk aversion Aderholt complains about will be very familiar to the
current generation of AFSOC leaders. It is important to note, however, that while Aderholt
(and special operations) developed some powerful enemies within the Air Force, he (and
special operations) also had many powerful friends. Aderholt did eventually make brigadier
general, and many good men dont. This was a testament to his enormous talent but
also showed more open-mindedness in the Air Force leadership than some give it credit for.
The junior officers and NCOs who read this book should remember that doing the right thing
may make them some enemies, but it will also make them some friendsand in important
ways, Aderholts enemies helped him. Although he may not have appreciated it at the
time, the slowness of his promotions made him unusually mature and experienced for his
grade and helped ensure his success at every level. His real talent was for personal
leadership, and lower rank gave him the chance to demonstrate this in a number of smaller
units. He might not have done well commanding a numbered air force and certainly was not
suited to life on the Air Staff. His relatively low rank also opened assignment
possibilities for him that would not have been available if he had been promoted faster.
Junior officers need to be reminded that low rank also has its privileges and
opportunities, if they follow Aderholts example and take full advantage of them.

Tom SearleMaxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University.
They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense,
the United States Air Force or the Air University.