Petitioner replied that, under the terms of ORS 237.600(1) (2001), the DRO
can, in fact, alter the terms of the fund. That statute provides, in part:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, payment of any * * *
death benefit * * * under any public employer retirement plan * * * that
would otherwise be made to a person entitled to benefits under the plan
shall be paid, in whole or in part, to an alternate payee if and to the extent
expressly provided for in the terms of any court decree of annulment or
dissolution of marriage or of separation, or the terms of any court order or
court-approved property settlement agreement incident to any court decree
of annulment or dissolution of marriage or of separation. Notwithstanding
any other provisions of this section, the total value of benefits payable to a
member and to an alternate payee under this section may not be greater than
the value of the benefits the member would otherwise be eligible to
receive."

Petitioner noted that the statute authorizes a court in a dissolution proceeding to order a
benefit that would "otherwise be made to a person entitled to benefits under the plan" be
paid to an "alternate payee." According to petitioner, she is the person who otherwise--that is, if not for the divorce two years earlier--would have been entitled to the benefits,
and the DRO specifically identified her as an "alternate payee."

Respondent rejoined that petitioner's reliance on ORS 237.600(1) cannot be
reconciled with the wording of the statute in at least two respects. First, respondent
observed, under petitioner's reading of the statute, she is both the person "otherwise
entitled to benefits under the plan" and, at the same time, the "alternate payee." That,
respondent suggested, makes no sense. Second, respondent argued, even if that were not
the case, petitioner's reading of the plan would be flatly contradicted by the balance of the
statute, which provides that in no event may the designation of an alternate payee increase
the amount of benefits that the fund is required to pay. In this case, respondent noted, the
designation of her as an alternate payee requires the fund to pay benefits to her that it
would not otherwise be obligated to pay.

The trial court agreed with respondent. The court explained that

"the text of [] ORS 237.600, afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, [is]
clear. The statute was intended to facilitate a process by which a myriad of
benefits that would, in the normal operation of a benefits plan, be made to
an individual, i.e., a payee, to instead be paid to another individual, i.e., an
alternate payee. Petitioner's textual interpretation is strained at best, in that
nothing in the language of the statute evidences legislative intent to alter the
Fund in a manner that would obligate payment of death benefits to a
'surviving spouse' where no such obligation would otherwise exist."

The court entered a general judgment affirming the board's decision to deny petitioner's
application for death benefits under section 5-308 of the fund.

On appeal, petitioner essentially renews her argument that she should be
considered a "surviving spouse." She does not contest that she is not a "surviving spouse"
within the meaning of section 5-308 of the fund. She contends that the DRO has the
effect of making her the surviving spouse by virtue of ORS 237.600(1), which provides
that a dissolution court can order benefits that otherwise would be paid to a person
entitled to receive them under the fund to be paid to an "alternate payee." Respondent
likewise essentially reprises its argument that we cannot give ORS 237.600(1) that effect
without doing violence to the wording of the statute and the manifest intentions of the
legislature that enacted it.

Thus framed, the parties' dispute poses a question of statutory construction,
which we answer by application of familiar principles set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). We attempt to ascertain the
meaning of the statute most likely intended by the legislature by examining the text in
context and, if necessary, legislative history and other aids to construction. Id.

In this case, textual analysis of the statute is dispositive. As the trial court
correctly observed, petitioner's proposed reading of ORS 237.600(1) simply cannot be
reconciled with its wording.

Pared to essentials, the statute provides that payment of a death benefit
under a public employer retirement plan "that would otherwise be made to a person
entitled to benefits under the plan" must be paid to an "alternate payee" if a dissolution
court so orders. In ordinary parlance, a "payee" is "the person to whom money is to be or
has been paid." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1659 (unabridged ed 2002). An
"alternate" is "a choice between two or among more than two objects or courses * * * one
that takes the place of another : one that alternates with another * * * an extra person
appointed to take the place of another." Id. at 63. Accordingly, an "alternate payee" is a
substitute for the original payee--the person "otherwise" entitled to benefits under the
plan. That wording makes clear that the subject of the statute is the transfer or
assignment of an existing right to receive benefits. Thus, the statute refers to the fact that
there first is a person who is entitled to benefits under the plan, that is, a payee. Then, if a
dissolution court so orders, payment may be directed to a different person, an alternate
payee.

Petitioner nevertheless argues that the dissolution court had authority under
ORS 237.600(1) to designate her the "alternate payee" of death benefits following
Woodward's death. She contends that each of the statute's requirements is satisfied.
According to petitioner, there exists a person "otherwise" entitled to benefits under the
plan--that person being herself. Petitioner reasons that "otherwise," as used in this
context, means "in the absence of [the] divorce" two years earlier. And, she argues, the
DRO plainly designated her the "alternate payee" of those benefits.

There are three problems, however, with that argument and with that
proposed construction of the statute. First, to accept petitioner's argument would mean
that the legislature intended that, in the case of death benefits at least, the person
"otherwise" entitled to benefits (that is, the former spouse) and the "alternate payee" be
one and the same person. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the plain meaning of
the words of the statute refutes that construction. Moreover, if the former spouse is
already entitled to benefits under the plan, there would be no point in authorizing a
dissolution court to authorize benefits to be paid to the same person as an "alternate
payee."

Second, nothing in the text of the statute suggests that the term "otherwise"
refers to a prior dissolution of marriage, particularly one that occurred years before the
member's death. To the contrary, the phrasing of the statute more naturally suggests that
the term "otherwise" refers to the circumstance that would exist in the absence of the trial
court's entry of an order designating the alternate payee.

Third, petitioner's proposed construction runs afoul of the provision of ORS
237.600(1) that requires that the order designating the alternate payee not increase the
value of benefits beyond the level of benefits that the member otherwise would be eligible
to receive. In this case, it is undisputed that, in the absence of the DRO and its
designation of petitioner as an alternate payee, the fund would not be obligated to pay
death benefits to petitioner because she does not qualify as a "surviving spouse" under the
terms of the fund. But, at least as petitioner would have it, the DRO would have the
effect of obligating the fund to pay petitioner benefits that, but for that DRO, would not
exist. To read ORS 237.600(1) as giving the dissolution court authority to create benefits
where there were none is directly contrary to the limitation expressed in the statute.

Affirmed.

1. Under section 5-308 of the fund, a dependent minor child continues to receive
death benefits only until age 18, while a surviving spouse continues to receive them for the
balance of his or her life.