73. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, September 11, 1964, 8:15 p.m.

1825. Following based on uncleared memorandum of Waller call on Secretary today. Subject
to review and FYI only.

Waller delivered to Secretary
message stating in effect that PMMenzies had said it would be
calamity if British took action against Indonesia involving Australia on
which US had not been consulted in advance, and therefore suggesting
that US propose “combined military contingency consultations” to
British, “believing as we do that proposal would not be rejected.”

Waller stated that Australians
had been talking very directly with British in London to ascertain what
action they might have in mind in reference Malaysia, and that it seemed
urgently necessary there be ways to find out and share British thinking,
both with US and Australia, as well as New Zealand. At later point he
made clear that American suggestion to British would be to “share our
thinking” and did not envisage actual joint military planning.2

Secretary responded he saw no real danger, in light Indonesian actions
and attitudes expressed in SC debate,
that there would be any sharp public difference in attitude between US
and other nations involved. However, he did think there could be grave
difficulty if UK started something on
assumption US would step in. We could not accept residual responsibility
in situation where others had taken action on basis of limited
liability. He had therefore been glad to see that British were taking
reinforcing steps in Far East, and, although he would not say so
publicly, we in fact approved withdrawal of some UK troops from NATO for this purpose.

Waller responded that ANZUS Treaty in fact did commit US to
measure of residual liability where Australian and New Zealand forces
were involved.

Secretary answered this was not what he meant by residual
responsibility—our respective obligations under ANZUS Treaty were the same [Page 156]and we had need to consider under
treaty just what Australians had done to carry out their obligations. As
an example of what he meant by “residual” responsibility, Secretary
cited Dutch attempt have us commit our forces in West New Guinea dispute
even though Dutch themselves were not prepared send additional forces.
He also alluded to Congo case, where Spaak's effort enlist participation
of six Common Market nations had met with “colossal indifference.” He
said US simply could not accept such situations where others did not
take strong measures to carry out their share of responsibility. He said
this was his main point and that it must be clearly understood by
Australians and others.

Secretary then noted that conflict with Indonesia could become major
shooting war, and that we for our part, once serious shooting started in
such case, would consider it necessary to make substantial deployments
and possibly even mobilization. Waller thought it unlikely Indonesian situation would
reach point of major conflict, but did believe it possible that more
“acts of folly” on Indonesian side could lead to degree escalation that
would involve Australians and thus bring into question US
involvement.

Secretary then referred to message just received from London that Peck of
British FonOff was proposing early conference between US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, and that
Peck had specifically suggested Bundy's visit to
London next week might be appropriate occasion for this.
Bundy noted his schedule would bring him to
London Friday, 18th, but might conceivably be advanced to Thurs, 17th,
and this might be good timing. He threw out suggestion any such talks
should be held only on basis no publicity whatever and in lowest
possible key.3 We were in
fact in position where British had primary action responsibility and we
in US were being more nearly informed than consulted, although
Australians were perhaps nearer to being consulted than informed and—as
Waller noted—had clear
obligation consult us before any action involving their forces.
Bundy noted danger that any publicized
consultation might both have undesirable effect on Sukarno and, perhaps even more
serious, appear to bind participants to whatever British might then
decide to do, whether or not others had in fact agreed to it.

Secretary noted that apart from any such specific consultation, there was
continuing problem of obtaining adequate information on British thinking
about additional military moves. He said we had in mind assigning
appropriate Embassy officer in London to this function and that this
might be worked out at same time, or perhaps even prior to any actual
meeting.

It was left that US side would consider further just how to take up
Australian suggestion, but that we recognized need for machinery that
would give us clear understanding of British thinking but that would not
involve actual participation in anything like joint military
planning.

Request addressee comments.

Rusk

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDON–MALAYSIA. Secret; Exdis.
Drafted and cleared by William
Bundy. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington and
repeated to CINCPAC.↩

In telegram 1837 to London, September 12, the
Department reported to the Embassy that the British Embassy had
informed the Department that the British Far East command had
produced a tentative list of seven potential targets for retaliation
based on four criteria. Those criteria were that the target must be
related to the Indonesia attack, must be militarily useful, would
produce minimum casualties, and be least likely to produce
escalation. (Ibid.)↩

In telegram 1909 to London,
September 15, the Department indicated that “any identifiable
four-power meeting” by Bundy during his London
visit would inevitably lead to distorted leaks and would associate
the United States with subsequent British action. Instead
Bundy should meet with British Foreign
Office officials and then have a “quiet drink” with Australian and
New Zealand representatives. (Ibid.) Reports of
Bundy's meetings in London are in telegrams
1308 and 1309 from London, both September 18, and memoranda of
conversation are in airgram A–721 from London, September 24. (Ibid.)
See also Document 77.↩