Janith A. Davis, deputy disciplinary administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, disciplinary
administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for petitioner.

George W. Swisher, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original contested proceeding in discipline filed by the
Disciplinary
Administrator against Respondent, George W. Swisher, an attorney admitted to the practice of
law
in Kansas on October 4, 1991, albeit Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 2
years on March 8, 2002, and has not requested reinstatement. See In re Swisher, 273
Kan. 143, 41
P.3d 847 (2002). The Respondent's last registration address filed with the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts of Kansas is in Oskaloosa, Kansas.

The proceedings against Respondent were instigated following a report from another
attorney and involved the Respondent's actions in attempting to assist a friend who was
experiencing some financial difficulties during the period in which Respondent was suspended
from
the practice of law. The formal complaint, filed June 25, 2007, specifically charged Respondent
with having violated the following sections of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC):
KRPC 1.1 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 384) (competence); KRPC 1.7 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
440) (conflict of interest); KRPC 1.16(a) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 487) (declining or terminating
representation); and KRPC 5.5 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 539) (unauthorized practice of law).

An assigned panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted a hearing
March 1, 2007, at which Respondent appeared pro se. The Disciplinary Administrator presented
the testimony of the reporting attorney, the Respondent, and the friend that Respondent attempted
to assist. The panel issued a final hearing report which contained its factual findings, conclusions
of
law, and recommendations for discipline.

FACTUAL FINDINGS:

Following is a recitation of the relevant portions of the panel's factual findings with certain
personal information redacted:

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"The Hearing Panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing evidence:

. . . .

"2. On March 8, 2002, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended the Respondent's
license to practice law for a period of two years for having violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC
1.4, KRPC 1.16, KRPC 3.2, KRPC 8.4(a), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g). In its
opinion, the Court imposed the requirement that the Respondent apply for reinstatement and
undergo a hearing pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219. To date, the Respondent has not sought the
reinstatement of his law license and his license remains suspended.

"3. [J.P.] and the Respondent have been friends for many years. Prior to his
suspension, the Respondent provided [J.P.] with representation. Following his suspension, the
Respondent informed [J.P.] that his license to practice law had been [suspended].

"4. [J.P.] began having financial difficulties. Even though she knew that the
Respondent's license to practice law had been suspended, [J.P.] sought assistance from the
Respondent regarding her financial difficulties. [J.P.] owned her home in Oskaloosa, Kansas, and
had some amount of equity in the house. She wanted to sell her house and use the equity to pay
her creditors. For some reason, [J.P.] was unable to determine the precise amount she owed on
the
mortgage.

"5. The Respondent paid to have her house appraised and the value of the
house was
determined to be $114,000. Because the home needed certain repairs completed, the Respondent
offered to purchase the house for $104,000. The Respondent promised [J.P.] that if he purchased
the home, fixed it up, and realized a profit on a subsequent sale, that he would share the profit
with her. However, when the Respondent attempted to obtain a loan to purchase the home, he
was
unable to do so because foreclosure proceedings were pending.

"6. Without consulting with a licensed attorney, [J.P.] decided to file for the
protections of the bankruptcy laws. And, because the bankruptcy laws were about to change, time
was an important factor for [J.P.]. Even though, the Respondent had no experience in practice of
bankruptcy law, the Respondent advised [J.P.] regarding bankruptcy law and assisted [J.P.] in
completing the bankruptcy filing document. Specifically, the Respondent advised [J.P.] to file
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7.

"7. On October 14, 2005, [J.P.] filed the petition. The Respondent signed the
petition as a non-attorney petition preparer, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110. According to the
certification, the Respondent received a fee for preparing the petition. However, the Respondent
did not receive a fee.

"8. At the time [J.P.] was preparing to file for bankruptcy protections, she
resided in
her home in Oskaloosa. As a result, she could have exempted the real property under the
'homestead' provision, allowing her to retain the equity in the home.

"9. The Respondent advised [J.P.], however, not to exempt her home because
it was
his understanding that the home would become an asset of the estate and any profit from the sale
of the home would go toward [J.P.]'s debts in the bankruptcy case. However, based upon the
Respondent's advice, she did not exempt her home. As a result, [J.P.]'s home became the property
of the bankruptcy trustee. In the event the bankruptcy trustee was able to sell the home, the
trustee
could have used the equity to pay debts that would normally have been discharged in the
bankruptcy.

"10. During the pendency of the bankruptcy petition, the Respondent prepared a
contract to purchase [J.P.]'s home for $110,000. [J.P.] took the contract to the bankruptcy trustee
for approval. However, the contract post-dated the bankruptcy petition, so [J.P.] did not have
authority to enter into a contract for the sale of the house.

"11. After the bankruptcy was filed, [J.P.] learned that her wages were being
garnished. When [J.P.] informed the Respondent about the garnishment, he suggested that [J.P.]
consult with an attorney who practices in the area of bankruptcy law. The Respondent suggested
that [J.P.] consult with Jerry Harper.

"12. On January 20, 2006, [J.P.] met with Mr. Harper. Mr. Harper informed
[J.P.]
that she need not have filed the bankruptcy. He reasoned that there was sufficient equity in the
house to pay all of the creditors. He told her that if she did not desire to remain in the house in
Oskaloosa, she could have sold the house and used the equity to pay off all of her creditors. He
also informed her that she should have exempted her house to avoid losing the equity in the home.
Finally, he told her that because she had now moved from the home, she could not amend the
petition to claim the exemption, as residence in the home was a requirement for the exemption.

"13. After meeting with [J.P.], Mr. Harper wrote to the Respondent and told
him that
he had violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Harper suggested that the
Respondent report his conduct. Because the Respondent did not self-report the misconduct within
a couple of weeks, Mr. Harper forwarded a letter of complaint to the Disciplinary Administrator's
office."

In his brief, Respondent purports to challenge some of the panel's factual findings, but
specifically "does not object with the findings of law as presented in the final report."

The court's role in a disciplinary proceeding is to consider the evidence, the findings of the
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties to determine whether violations of the Kansas
Rules of Professional Conduct have occurred, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 190, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007); In re
Landrith, 280 Kan. 619,
636, 124 P.3d 467 (2005); see also Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 304)
(misconduct to be established by clear and convincing evidence). Moreover, this court

"view[s] the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations made by the
disciplinary
panel as advisory only, but we give the final hearing report the same dignity as a special verdict by
a jury or the findings of a trial court. Thus the disciplinary panel's report will be adopted where
amply sustained by the evidence, but not where it is against the clear weight of the evidence."
Comfort, 284 Kan. at 190.

First, Respondent points out that the panel's reference to the location of his friend's home
was inaccurate. The Disciplinary Administrator agrees that the house is actually located in
McLouth, rather than Oskaloosa. However, as Respondent acknowledges, the location of the
dwelling is not material to the issues presented, and we will simply note the error.

Next, Respondent disputes that portion of the panel's finding in paragraph 6 which states
that he advised his friend to file bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7. Respondent contends that he
merely gave his friend general information about the effect of a Chapter 13 proceeding versus a
Chapter 7 proceeding, which he characterized in his brief as "there is a plan that a person can
make
payments into the Court and repay their debts and a plan that wipes out a persons
[sic] debts."
Respondent asserts that his friend could have garnered the same information from television
commercials.

J.P.'s testimony before the panel clearly established that, in selecting the type of
bankruptcy
proceeding and the exemptions to claim, she was relying on the information which Respondent
provided her, regardless of how general or technically inaccurate that information might have
been.
J.P. said that Respondent knew what she was trying to do, she trusted him, and she believed
"whatever he said was better." At the hearing, J.P. could not recall under which chapter her
bankruptcy had been filed. She clearly perceived that Respondent was recommending the type of
proceeding reflected in the forms which the Respondent prepared. Notwithstanding the
Respondent's apparent subjective belief that he was not explicitly giving legal advice, the evidence
before the panel supports its findings.

Respondent also quibbles with the panel's finding that J.P. was living in the McLouth
house
at the time of the bankruptcy filing. He contends that she was spending most nights in Kansas City
at the time. Curiously, in completing the bankruptcy forms, Respondent listed the McLouth house
as the debtor's residence and explained in Form 7, Statement of Financial Affairs, that the debtor
was "moving right now [sic] should be moved within 2 weeks."

Respondent also insists that he did not counsel against the claiming of a homestead
exemption on the McLouth residence, but rather he simply advised J.P. that she would need to be
truthful with the bankruptcy trustee about her living arrangements. Nevertheless, the evidence
elicited from J.P. and the reporting attorney supports a finding that J.P. possessed no meaningful
understanding of the concept of a homestead exemption and that she relied on Respondent to fill
out the bankruptcy schedules in a manner that would be in her best interests.

Finally, Respondent asserts that J.P. has suffered no actual damage or injury, but rather
that
she is in the same position as she was prior to the bankruptcy filing. That contention is clearly
controverted by the evidence elicited from the reporting attorney, who is experienced in the area
of
bankruptcy. In a letter to J.P., the reporting attorney explained that the course of action taken
would unnecessarily cost her that portion of the equity in her home that would be paid in trustee's
fees and in satisfying unsecured creditors, which appeared to be as much as $20,000.

In summary, we find that the panel's factual findings are, in all relevant respects, supported
by clear and convincing evidence.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

From its factual findings, the hearing panel reached the following legal conclusions:

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"1. The Deputy Disciplinary Administrator alleged that the Respondent
violated
KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.16(a), and KRPC 5.5. However, this case is not about whether
the
Respondent did a competent job representing his client and whether he engaged in a conflict of
interest with his client, it is about whether the Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. It is dangerous territory for the Hearing Panel to suggest that the inquiry into cases like this
one extends beyond the issue of whether or not a suspended lawyer practiced law when he was
prohibited from doing so. Thus, the Hearing Panel considers only whether the Respondent
violated
KRPC 5.5.(1)

"2. KRPC 5.5(a) prohibits attorneys from engaging in the unauthorized
practice of
law. Throughout the time the Respondent was providing advice to [J.P.] regarding her financial
problems, the proposed sale of her home, and the bankruptcy filing, the Respondent's license to
practice law was suspended. So, during that time period, from 2003 to the present, the
Respondent
was not authorized to provide [J.P.] or anyone else with legal advice.

"3. In this case, just like in In re Arthur, 15 B.R. 541[, 546]
(1981), 'we are not
confronted with the mere preparation of a petition.' Here, as in Arthur, the
Respondent provided
'advice and counseling on the relative advantages of filing a petition for liquidation under Chapter
7 versus filing a petition for an adjustment of debts under Chapter 13.' In addition, the
Respondent, like Arthur, provided advice regarding which exemptions to claim.

"4. The Respondent's advice about which chapter to file in bankruptcy and the
Respondent's advice not to exempt her house amounts to legal advice. Arthur, 15
B.R. at 746; In
re Webster, 120 B.R. 111 (1990). Thus, the Respondent violated KRPC 5.5(a) by engaging
in the
unauthorized practice of law."

"'"As the term is generally understood, the 'practice' of law is the doing or performing of
services
in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in
conformity to the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be depending in a court." State ex rel. v.
Perkins, 138 Kan.
899, 907-08, 28 P.2d 765 (1934) (quoting Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E.
836).'" In re
Juhnke, 273 Kan. 162, 166, 41 P.3d 855 (2002).

As the hearing panel noted, in the specific area of bankruptcy law, providing advice and
counsel on "the relative advantages of filing a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7, versus
filing
a petition for the rearrangement of debts under Chapter 13" amounts to the practice of law
because
the advice requires the use of legal judgment requiring legal knowledge, skill, and ability beyond
those possessed by a layman. Matter of Arthur, 15 Bankr. 541, 547 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981). The
Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court also found that advice and counseling concerning exemptions,
dischargeability, and automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code constitutes the practice of
law. 15 Bankr. at 547. See also In re Glad, 98 Bankr. 976, 978 (D. Cal. 1989)
(finding layperson
who interviewed and solicited information from debtor with regard to financial status, advised
debtor to file Chapter 11, and assisted debtor in preparation of the bankruptcy schedules provided
legal services and thereby engaged in the practice of law under California law); In re
Bush, 275
Bankr. 69, 78-79 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (noting that bankruptcy petition preparers may type
forms and can properly perform essentially no other service); In re Robinson, 162
Bankr. 319,
325-26 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993) (finding that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law
under the standards of Kansas law by providing legal assistance to debtors in preparing their
bankruptcy petitions, schedules, and applications to pay their filing fees in installments; the
defendant's acknowledgment that he is not an attorney and statements in the bankruptcy
questionnaire instructions that debtors are filing pro se because the agency does not give legal
advice does not negate the facts established by the evidence); In re Skobinsky, 167
Bankr. 45, 50-51 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that bankruptcy petition preparer engaged in the
unlawful practice of
law where the preparer discussed various chapters with his customers, instructed them on how to
fill out the forms, filed forms with the clerk on his customers' behalf, and instructed debtors not to
fill out the exemptions schedules based upon his erroneous interpretation of the applicable
bankruptcy law); In re Webster, 120 Bankr. 111, 113 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990)
(finding that a
layperson who advised and counseled pro se debtor with respect to completion of bankruptcy
petition, statement of affairs, and schedules, including which exemptions debtor should claim was
exercising legal judgment and thereby engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); In re
Herren,
138 Bankr. 989, 995 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1992) (finding that "[a]dvising of available exemptions
from
which to [choose], defining terms in the schedules, directing what property is appropriately listed
in various areas, summarizing and reformulating the information solicited from clients, advising
clients regarding responsibility to list all debts and the option of voluntary repayment and similar
actions, all require exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay
persons").

As noted, Respondent did not object to the panel's "findings of law as presented in the
final
report." We concur and adopt the panel's conclusion that Respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

Additionally, we find some guidance from In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. 546, 834
P.2d 1356
(1992), which discussed whether a suspended attorney could be employed as a law clerk. There,
this court noted that "[t]he suspended attorney remains a member of the Kansas Bar, subject to
the
provisions of the MRPC," and that the suspended attorney is subject to discipline if he or she
"engages in the unauthorized practice of law or in unethical professional conduct."
(Emphasis
added.) 251 Kan. at 553. In other words, a suspended attorney remains subject to each and every
rule of professional conduct during the period of suspension, not just the prohibition in KRPC
5.5(a) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 539). A suspension is not a free pass to ignore one's professional
responsibilities.

The current case highlights that principle. If Respondent had possessed the requisite legal
knowledge and skill to expertly guide J.P. through her financial difficulties, he would have
nevertheless been in violation of KRPC 5.5(a) for practicing law while he was not authorized to
do
so. On the other hand, if Respondent had been duly authorized to practice law, he would have
nevertheless been subject to the KRPC mandate that he provide competent counsel. The
suspension did not absolve Respondent of his competence obligation, and the panel was presented
with separate inquiries which were not mutually exclusive. Therefore, we will proceed to consider
the other allegations.

Competence

As the panel's footnote indicates, the evidence clearly established that Respondent did not
give J.P. good advice. The reporting attorney's letter to J.P. explains that, not only were the filed
bankruptcy schedules disadvantageous to J.P., but the choice to pursue bankruptcy was
ill-advised.
Indeed, when asked whether he disputed the reporting attorney's claims, Respondent admitted
that
he did not possess sufficient bankruptcy knowledge to know whether the analysis in the letter was
correct.

One perceives that Respondent did not feel constrained by his lack of bankruptcy
knowledge and experience because he was simply helping a friend without charging a fee.
However, the friend knew that Respondent was an attorney, albeit she also knew that he was
currently suspended. The friend clearly relied on Respondent to know what he was doing. In the
context of attorney-client privilege, we have said that an attorney-client relationship "is
sufficiently
established when it is shown that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received
in
matters pertinent to the profession. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold
Corp., 266
Kan. 1047, 1053, 975 P.2d 231 (1999)." State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan.
355, 374, 22
P.3d 124 (2001). Notwithstanding that Respondent may have lacked any pecuniary motive, he
had
an obligation to provide competent advice when J.P. sought his assistance. In the alternative,
Respondent could have referred J.P. to competent counsel, which he was subsequently to do after
the harm had been done.

In short, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support our finding that
Respondent violated KRPC 1.1 by failing to provide competent representation.

Conflict of Interest

At the time of the alleged violation, KRPC 1.7(b) (2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 412) read as
follows:

"(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:

"(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and

"(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients
in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved."

The Disciplinary Administrator points out that Respondent prepared a contract to
purchase
J.P.'s home for $110,000 when the home was listed in the bankruptcy petition for a value of
$130,000. Moreover, the reporting attorney testified that J.P. said someone had expressed an
interest in buying her home for $140,000. The Disciplinary Administrator argues that the scenario
establishes a conflict because Respondent was fully aware of J.P.'s situation, the hearing panel
found that J.P. was vulnerable, and Respondent did not advise J.P. to have the contract reviewed
by an independent attorney.

The evidence elicited by the Disciplinary Administrator did not clearly and convincingly
establish a conflict of interest within the purview of the rule. The Disciplinary Administrator's
suggestion that Respondent took advantage of J.P.'s vulnerability for personal gain is negated by
the panel's finding of the mitigating factor that there was no selfish or dishonest motive in this
case.
Further, the panel's factual finding about the nature of the arrangement, whereby Respondent
would purchase the property, fix it up for resale, and share any profit with J.P., indicates that the
contract was in furtherance of Respondent's attempts to assist J.P. extinguish her debts,
i.e.,
Respondent reasonably believed that his representation would not be adversely affected by the
contract. Granted, an attorney who enters into a business arrangement with a client must be
vigilant in complying with the specific rules governing such an arrangement. Here, Respondent
should have explained the implications of the potential conflict and should have urged J.P. to
obtain independent counsel on the sale contract. Nevertheless, on the record before us, we decline
to find that Respondent violated KRPC 1.7(b).

Declining Representation

Under KRPC 1.16(a), "a lawyer shall not represent a client . . . if: (1) the representation
will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." 2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
487. By that definition, it would appear that, in most if not all instances, the unauthorized practice
of law necessarily begets a violation of KRPC 1.16(a). We can appreciate the panel's reluctance to
stack on multiple violations for essentially the same conduct. Nevertheless, the evidence clearly
establishes that Respondent should have declined to provide J.P. with advice and assistance that
called for the exercise of legal judgment. The record supports a violation of KRPC 1.16(a).

APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE

In recommending indefinite suspension, the final hearing report recited:

"In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel considered the
factors
outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered are the duty
violated,
the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

"Duty Violated. The Respondent violated his duty to the legal
profession to comply with
his suspension.

"Mental State. The Respondent negligently violated his duty.

"Injury. As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent
caused actual harm
to [J.P.].

"Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are
any considerations
or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its
recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following aggravating
factors present:

"Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The Respondent has been previously
disciplined on three
occasions. On January 9, 2001, the Disciplinary Administrator informally admonished the
Respondent for having violated KRPC 1.4(a). Then, on March 8, 2002, the Kansas Supreme
Court
suspended the Respondent from the practice of law for having violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3,
KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, KRPC 3.2, KRPC 8.4(a), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g).
Finally, in 2003, the Disciplinary Administrator informally admonished the Respondent for
having violated KRPC 1.1 and KRPC 1.3.

"Vulnerability of Victim. [J.P.] was vulnerable to the Respondent's
misconduct because
she was a friend.

"Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a
reduction
in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the
Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances present:

"Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. Dishonesty and selfishness
were not
motivating factors in this case.

"The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by the Respondent's
Cooperation During the Hearing and the Respondent's Acknowledgment of the
Transgressions.
The Respondent fully cooperated in the disciplinary process as exhibited by his complete
acknowledgment of the misconduct.

"Remorse. At the hearing on the Formal Complaint, the Respondent
expressed genuine
remorse.

"In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly examined
and
considered the remaining ABA Standards. In this case, it does not appear that any of the
Standards are particularly on point. The following Standards, however, do offer some assistance:

'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct
that is
a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a
client, the public, or the legal system.' Standard 7.2.

'Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary
order and
such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or
the profession; or

(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and
intentionally or
knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a
client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.' Standard 8.1.

'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for the
same or
similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.' Standard 8.2."

The Deputy Disciplinary Administrator agrees with the recommendation of the hearing
panel to indefinitely suspend the Respondent. However, we are not constrained by the
recommendations of either the panel or the Disciplinary Administrator as to the sanction to be
imposed; such recommendations are advisory only. Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2007 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 317). In this instance, the recommendations appear to be entirely appropriate. Respondent
was suffering under a sanction of suspension at the time of the current violations, and his
testimony
before the panel displayed a failure to fully appreciate the duty which he owes to his profession
and
to the public.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that George W. Swisher be and he is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the date of this opinion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that George W. Swisher shall comply with Supreme Court
Rule 218 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 337) and, if respondent seeks reinstatement, that he shall
comply with Supreme Court Rule 219 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350); that he shall demonstrate
that he knows, understands, and is willing to comply with the Kansas Supreme Court rules; and
that he is competent to engage in the active and continuous practice of law in this state.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports
and that respondent pay the costs of these proceedings.

1. "However, by no means does the Hearing Panel wish this note to
somehow mean that the
Respondent provided good advice to [J.P.]. The evidence is clearly to the contrary.