In the case of
things which are found to occur in specifically different materials, as a
circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the
bronze or the stone, are no part of the essence of the circle, since it is
found apart from them. Of things which are not seen to exist apart, there is no
reason why the same may not be true, just as if all circles that had ever been
seen were of bronze; for none the less the bronze would be no part of the form;
but it is hard to eliminate it in thought. E.g. the form of man is always found
in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts of the
form and the formula? No, they are matter; but because man is not found also in
other matters we are unable to perform the abstraction.

In bringing this passage to my attention in
conversation, some have attempted to make the case that Aristotle was indeed a
functionalist, or at least that the case that I made against his having been a
functionalist, specifically against his having accepted the transportability
thesis (Green, 1998), is not nearly as clear as I claimed.This passage seen, however, when seen in its
full context, actually has little to offer the defender of Aristotle's putative
functionalism.In the very same chapter,
just two or three paragraphs later (depending on the translation one uses),
Aristotle continues his discussion as follows:

We have pointed
out, then, that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and why
this is so. And so to reduce all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the
matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular
things in a particular state. And the comparison which Socrates the younger
used to make in the case of "animal" is not sound; for it leads away
from the truth, and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his
parts, as the circle can without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for
an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without
reference to movement -- nor, therefore, without reference to the parts' being
in a certain state. For it is not a hand in any and every state that is a part
of man, but only when it can fulfil its work, and
therefore only when it is alive; if it is not alive it is not a part.

Thus it appears that although Aristotle
understood the argument that we now call "functionalist," he rejected
it nonetheless.What is not completely
clear (at least to me) is why he
rejected it. Where exactly is the line to be drawn between those cases in which
it is permissible to abstract the form from the matter, and those in which it
is not? Aristotle gives us two clear examples (the circle and man), but I do
not know that I could reliably make the distinction in all other cases. What is
clear, however, is that he did reject the argument, and this was the burden of
my original paper.

Reference

Green, Christopher D. (1998). The
thoroughly modern Aristotle: Was he really a functionalist? History of Psychology, 1, 8-20. (Also HTP Prints document
number 16)