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the greater gain, and it is probably cheaper to society to pay this figure
for the organization of commerce than dabble in amateurish schemes.
The experience of co-operation—both its successes and its failures seem
to point in this direction in this country. (6)

Government interference in finance has broken down whenever it has
done serious violence to sound economical principles. At present it does
not do so. It needlessly coins some metal. This is in England
unaccompanied with the gross error of buying and hoarding increasing
quantities of a metal whose production has been greatly cheapened of late.
Apart from the silver folly of your government the residual evils of
government coinage are infinitesimal, and they are not commercial. They
are confined to the loss arising from carrying on a productive or distributive
process by government under monopoly rather than by free individuals
in combination or separately under the economic control of competition.
Here they end. It is pure fancy unsupported as yet by evidence
or true analogy that they interfere with the movements of the
metal, or materially coerce the markets into using an inferior commodity
as its most reliable and most fluent investment, (7) There is not the
slightest use for the purposes of this argument in comparing a law en-
forcing the use of golden drinking-vessels with any laws connected with
the use of gold as currency. A true analogy would be found in studying
the effect of monetizing iron by law. Such a law would not demonetize
gold unless it were much more tyrannical in its mode of prescribing iron
as a legal tender than our present law is in prescribing gold. (8) All
government income, borrowings, taxes, postage, school pence, court fees,
all government outlay in wages, war material, grants to localities,
payment of interest upon debt and all accounts, court verdicts, official
valuations, bankrupt statements, and so on, would be in terms of iron. But
I should be free to promise future delivery, or acceptance of gold, or to
sell my services or my products for gold as I now am to promise to give
or take iron at an agreed time and place or to hire myself for iron or for
board and lodging or any other mode of recompense I can get any one
to agree upon. (9) Now it is quite likely the first effect of this would be
to raise the price of iron and thereby lower the value of gold in comparison
with iron, coal, and other economic components of the value of iron.
It is also quite likely it would stimulate the production of iron. But both
of these effects would combine to maintain a larger stock of iron hanging
as a buffer between producer and consumer. This would steady value,
but it would also in time counteract the first temporary effects of the
supposed monetization of iron, and neither price nor production would
continue to be excessive—with the sole exception of the small increase of
consumption from wear and tear of coins. It would not in all probability
displace gold as the money in the market, because government, instead
of doing as it now does, registering, and taking praise for the best
monetary substance, would attempt to monetize an ill-adapted commodity, a
task beyond its strength, and would sustain defeat as it has often done
when debasement or other anti-economic schemes were undertaken.

If as you assert the main utility of gold consists in the fact that it is
used for currency, then your general position is impregnable. But that
this is not sound is somewhat implied by Greene, who recognizes gold
and silver as merchandise. "Specie is merchandise having its value
determined, as such, by supply and demand." The words "as such" may
simply imply "therefore" or may imply an idea on Greene's part that
the value of specie as money was otherwise determined. But what

evidence have we that the very frequent resale of gold—called its monetary