Pakistan's military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, believes he is a much misunderstood man. His 1999 coup was provoked by prime minister Nawaz Sharif's attempt to sack him as army chief. But once installed as "chief executive", Gen Musharraf quickly convinced himself that he had acted in the nation's best interest.

The hostile reaction of many in the west, Britain and the US included, seemed to him unfair. He was motivated, he said, by a desire to build a new, corruption-free Pakistan, not by personal ambition. Democratic institutions would be restored in time. When, last June, Gen Musharraf abruptly declared himself president, without the inconvenience of an election, the national interest was again cited in justification. A summit with India was in the offing. It was important to bolster the status of Pakistan's leader in these crucial talks.

Now, in trying to explain his sudden embrace of America and its "war on terrorism", Gen Musharraf falls back on the same old explanation. The nation was in grave peril, he said. If it made the wrong choice, its very survival was at risk. Gen Musharraf's solution? "My fellow countrymen, you should trust me."

The confusion of national and personal interest is not uncommon among dictators, however urbane. But the numerous other conflicts and contradictions inherent to Gen Musharraf's position run uniquely deep.

Since seizing power he has played a double game over Afghanistan, sustaining and assisting the Taliban, while claiming to have no influence with them. He has talked peace over Kashmir, but continued to support anti-Indian insurgents. He has sought renewed economic aid and investment from the west, while rejecting its concerns about his nuclear arsenal. He has complained about Delhi's machinations, including its burgeoning US alliance, while pursuing a proliferating missile and arms collaboration with China. He promised to restore democracy - but has not yet delivered. And he has repeatedly said he will curb fundamentalist extremists - but has not done so yet.

Addressing an Islamabad conference of the faithful last summer, Gen Musharraf passionately voiced his belief that Pakistan could become an economic giant. But he also bemoaned its present poverty and divisions. "We are riven into sects, we are prey to regionalism and ethnicity... and what about mutual tolerance? It exists nowhere. Instead, we are killing each other wearing masks." Islam was glorious and forward-looking, he said. "But how does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists... and [suspects] we want to spread that violence and terror abroad." He went on: "Some say we are a failed state. It hurts badly." And yet Pakistan's 140m people, if united, could achieve true greatness.

The likelihood of that vision ever being realised now depends on how the biggest contradiction of all is, or is not, resolved in the coming months. In one sense, Gen Musharraf had no choice but to throw in his lot with the US. Its bribes were as irresistible as they were reckless - blind-eyed debt relief, abundant aid, even tea and sympathy over Kashmir. Its wrath, had it been rebuffed, was potentially catastrophic. But in another sense, by giving the importunate Americans a base from which to kill his "brothers", he has overturned much that he seemed to stand for as chief guardian of a proud though impecunious, independent Islamic nation. Most politicians could not long survive such confounding contrariness. Can a soldier? Gen Musharraf may be among the first casualties when the empire strikes back.