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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, March 3, 2009:
Disaster Recovery:
Past Experiences Offer Recovery Lessons for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav
and Future Disasters:
Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director:
Strategic Issues:
GAO-09-437T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-437T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recovery from major disasters is a complex undertaking that involves
the combined efforts of federal, state, and local government in order
to succeed. While the federal government provides a significant amount
of financial and technical assistance for recovery, state and local
jurisdictions work closely with federal agencies to secure and make use
of those resources. This testimony describes lessons and insights that
GAO has identified from review of past disasters, which may be useful
to inform recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, as
well as disasters yet to come.
These lessons come from two reports GAO recently released last fall on
disaster recovery. The first draws on the experiences of communities
that have recovered from previous major disasters in order to help
inform recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as
well as the 2008 Midwest floods. The second examines the implementation
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Public Assistance
grant program and identifies several actions that the Department of
Homeland Security can take to improve operations of that program. These
include improving information sharing and enhancing continuity and
communication. Commenting on a draft of that report, the department
generally agreed with our recommendations. In doing this work, GAO
interviewed federal, state, and local officials involved in recovery
and reviewed relevant documents, data, and laws.
What GAO Found:
Lessons from past disasters provide a potentially valuable source of
information for all levels of government as they seek to meet the many
challenges of recovering from a major disaster. For affected state and
local jurisdictions, good practices to consider include the following:
* Creating a clear, implementable, and timely recovery plan can provide
communities with a road map for the recovery process. Just 2 months
after the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, the city created a recovery
plan with these elements.
* Providing financial and technical capacity facilitates jurisdictions’
ability to implement federal disaster programs. For example, loans and
technical assistance provided after past disasters helped communities
better navigate the wide range of federal disaster programs.
* Implementing business recovery strategies to minimize business
relocations helps small businesses adapt to postdisaster market
conditions. For example, to encourage businesses to remain in the city
Grand Forks after the 1997 flood, the city forgave loans for businesses
that stayed in the city.
* Adopting a comprehensive approach toward combating fraud, waste, and
abuse protects both disaster victims from contractor fraud and public
funds from fraudulent applicants. Controls to combat such activities
before, during, and after a disaster can deter such activities,
including instances of contractor fraud.
On the federal level, experiences with FEMA’s Public Assistance grant
program after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes illustrated a variety of
challenges in the day-to-day operation of the program that could be
faced again by Gulf Coast states recovering from Hurricanes Ike and
Gustav or other disasters in the future. These include the following:
* Challenges using program flexibilities to respond to the postdisaster
needs of grant applicants and determining project scope. For example,
applicants reported needing additional flexibility when rebuilding to
address significant population changes after the storm.
* Challenges in sharing information among federal, state, and local
officials during project development that at times slowed the process.
For example, some applicants in Louisiana told us of the need to
repeatedly resubmit key project documents because of the lack of an
effective system to share such documentation.
Opportunities exist for the federal government to further refine FEMA’s
Public Assistance grant program to better address these and other
challenges as recovery continues on the Gulf Coast and in advance of
future disasters.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-437T] or key
components. For more information, contact Stanley J. Czerwinski at
(202) 512-6806 or czerwinskis@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Recovery from major disasters is a complex undertaking that involves
the combined efforts of all levels of government in order to succeed.
While the federal government provides a significant amount of financial
and technical assistance for recovery, state and local jurisdictions
work closely with federal agencies to secure and make use of those
resources. With this in mind and as requested, my testimony today
describes a number of lessons and insights that we have identified from
our work on past disasters that may be useful to inform the actions of
federal, state, and local government as they work to meet the
challenging process of recovering after Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as
well as other disasters yet to come.
My statement is primarily based on two recently released reports that
are part of a body of work GAO has developed regarding disaster
recovery.[Footnote 1] In September 2008, we identified lessons from the
experiences of communities that have recovered from previous major
disasters in order to help inform recovery efforts in the wake of
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as well as the 2008 Midwest floods.[Footnote
2] This past December, we examined the implementation of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance grant program
after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes[Footnote 3] and identified several
actions that the Department of Homeland Security can take to improve
the operations of the program.[Footnote 4] In commenting on a draft of
that report, the department generally agreed with our recommendations.
We conducted our reviews in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Past Disasters Offer Recovery Insights for State and Local Governments:
While the federal government provides significant financial assistance
after major disasters, state and local governments play the lead role
in disaster recovery. Experiences from past disasters can provide
states and local communities with potential good practices to consider.
These practices are creating a recovery plan; building state and local
capacity to use federal disaster assistance programs; supporting
business recovery; and combating fraud, waste, and abuse of government
programs. Because each disaster is distinctive and the resources and
capacities of every community differ, each jurisdiction will need to
consider whether and how to apply these insights to its own specific
circumstances.
Create a Clear, Implementable, and Timely Recovery Plan:
A recovery plan can provide state and local governments with a valuable
tool to document and communicate recovery goals, decisions, and
priorities--in effect, they can provide a roadmap for the recovery
process. Just as important, the very process of developing these plans
provides an opportunity for recovering jurisdictions to involve the
community in identifying recovery goals and priorities. In our review
of recovery plans created after past disasters, we have identified
certain characteristics that facilitated the recovery process.
Identify clear goals for recovery. A plan containing clear goals can
provide direction and specific objectives for a recovering community to
focus on and strive for. Clear goals can also help state and local
governments prioritize projects, allocate resources, and establish a
basis for subsequent evaluations about the recovery. After the 1995
earthquake in Kobe, Japan, jurisdictions identified specific recovery
goals in their plans, such as the rebuilding of all damaged housing
units in 3 years and removing all temporary housing within 5 years.
These goals were critical for helping to coordinate the wide range of
participants involved in recovery. Additionally, these goals allowed
the government to communicate its recovery progress with the public.
Each month, information on progress made toward achieving those goals
was provided to the public online and to the media at press
conferences. Finally, these goals provided a basis for evaluations
conducted by local governments, which enabled policymakers to measure
the region's progress toward recovery, identify needed changes to
existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters.
Include detailed information to facilitate implementation. Including
detailed implementation information in recovery plans can help
communities realize recovery goals. Implementable recovery plans
specify objectives and tasks, clarify roles and responsibilities, and
identify potential funding sources. Accordingly, the recovery plan
created by the City of Grand Forks, North Dakota, after the 1997 Red
River flood contained these elements. First, the plan outlined broad
recovery goals, which were linked to a number of objectives and tasks
that would help to realize those broad goals. The plan also identified
a target completion date for each task so the city could better manage
related activities. Second, Grand Fork's plan assigned personnel to
each task to carry out that activity. By clarifying the roles and
responsibilities for those who would be involved in accomplishing
specific tasks, the plan provided detailed information to facilitate
implementation. Third, the Grand Forks plan identified funding sources
for each recovery task. It also included a financing matrix, which
presented various funding sources for each task along with target
completion dates. A city evaluation found that these plan
characteristics allowed the city to conceive and formulate projects in
collaboration with the city council and other governmental
representatives. It also helped Grand Forks meet its recovery goals as
well as adhere to federal and state disaster assistance funding laws
and regulations.
Establish plans in a timely manner. The prompt completion of recovery
plans help to facilitate the ensuing recovery process by providing a
clear framework early on. Creating plans in a timely manner can be a
challenge after disasters, as was the case in New Orleans after the
2005 hurricanes. However, jurisdictions affected by the Kobe earthquake
devised a strategy to ensure that recovery plans were finalized
promptly after the 1995 earthquake. These local jurisdictions had a
relatively short amount of time in which to submit proposals for the
national budget that would be considered for the coming year. Facing
this deadline, officials developed a two-phase planning strategy.
First, they completed a plan within 2 months of the earthquake that
identified broad recovery goals to provide a basis for budget requests.
Second, six months after the earthquake, local Japanese officials
collaborated with citizens to develop more detailed recovery plans.
This two-phase planning process enabled the jurisdictions to meet their
tight national budget submission deadline while allowing additional
time for communities to develop specific recovery strategies.
Build State and Local Capacity for Implementing Federal Disaster
Programs:
Given the lead role that state and local governments play in disaster
recovery, their ability to act effectively directly affects recovery
after a major disaster. While the federal government plays a key
supporting role by providing financial assistance through a range of
programs, state and local governments may need certain capacities--such
as having financial resources and technical know-how--to effectively
take advantage of that assistance.
Enhance financial capacity. The widespread destruction caused by major
disasters can impose significant financial burdens on the state and
local governments, such as creating unbudgeted expenses while at the
same time decimating the local tax base. In addition, federal disaster
programs often require state and local governments to match a portion
of the assistance they receive. In the past, affected jurisdictions
have used loans from a variety of sources to enhance local financial
capacity. For example, after the 1997 Red River flood, the Bank of
North Dakota provided a line of credit of over $44 million to the City
of Grand Forks. The city used this loan to meet FEMA matching
requirements, provide cash flow for the city government's operating
expenses, and fund recovery projects that commenced before the arrival
of financial assistance.
Strengthen technical capacity. State and local governments face the
challenge of implementing the wide range of federal disaster programs.
Some of these federal programs require a certain amount of technical
know-how to navigate. For example, FEMA's Public Assistance grant
program has complicated paperwork requirements and multistage
application processes that can place considerable demands on
applicants. To strengthen their technical capacity to implement this
program after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA and Mississippi
state officials used federal funding to obtain an online accounting
system that tracked and facilitated the sharing of operational
documents. In doing so, FEMA and the state reduced the burden on
applicants of meeting Public Assistance grant program requirements,
gained immediate access to key documents that helped officials make
project approvals, and relieved the documentation and resulting human
capital responsibilities that applicants faced during project
development.
Implement Strategies for Business Recovery:
Business recovery is a key element of a community's recovery after a
major disaster. Small businesses are vital to a community's economic
health, yet are especially vulnerable to disasters because they often
lack resources to sustain financial loss and have less capacity to
withstand market changes. Federal, state, and local governments have
developed strategies to facilitate business recovery, including several
targeted at small businesses.
Provide technical assistance to help businesses adapt to postdisaster
market conditions. Major disasters can change communities in ways that
require businesses to adapt. The ability of business owners to
recognize change and adapt to the postdisaster market for goods and
services can help those firms attain long-term viability after a
disaster. Recognizing this after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, Los
Angeles officials assisted neighborhood businesses in adapting to short-
and long-term changes, using a combination of federal, state, and local
funds. Specifically, a local nonprofit provided direct technical
assistance to affected businesses such as counseling them on how to
obtain government assistance and providing strategies for how to adapt
to the changed business environment. This information was disseminated
through door-to-door canvassing in affected areas to reach out to
business owners and conferences to teach owners how to market their
businesses given the changed demographics.
Create strategies to minimize business relocation and the loss of
customer base. Widespread business relocations after a disaster can
hinder recovery. Local governments have devised strategies to retain
businesses after past disasters. For example, after the Red River
flood, the City of Grand Forks used the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's Community Development Block Grant funds to provide $1.75
million in loans to businesses. A feature of this program was that it
forgave 40 percent of the loan principle of businesses that were still
operating in the community for 3 years. According to a local official,
over 70 percent of businesses that received this loan stayed in Grand
Forks for 3 years. Another local strategy taken to minimize business
relocation was implemented after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. The
City of Santa Cruz constructed large aluminum and fabric pavilions
where local businesses that suffered damage relocated. City officials
stated that these pavilions helped to mitigate the impact of the
earthquake on small businesses by enabling them to continue operations
and thereby maintain their customer base.
Adopt a Comprehensive Approach to Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse:
A persistent challenge facing government at all levels is the risk of
fraud, waste, and abuse of funds targeted for disaster assistance. The
influx of financial assistance available after a major disaster
provides increased opportunities for such activities. Both disaster
victims and public funds are at risk. We identified two actions that
state and local governments can take after major disasters to combat
the issue of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Create credentialing program to minimize instances of contractor fraud.
Many disaster victims hire contractors to repair or rebuild their homes
using government assistance. Residents are potential targets for fraud
by unscrupulous contractors. To help protect its residents from
contractor fraud after the 1997 Red River flood, the City of Grand
Forks established a required credentialing program for contractors.
This included a "one-stop shop" that served as a mandatory
clearinghouse for contractors that wanted to do business with
recovering residents. State and local officials staffing the
clearinghouse carried out a variety of functions, including checking
that contractors had appropriate licenses and insurance and did not
have criminal records. After passing these checks and completing all
the required applications, contractors were issued photo identification
cards that they were required to carry at all times while working
within city limits. In about 2 months, the city issued approximately
500 new contractor licenses and 2,000 contractor identification cards
through the one-stop shop. During that same period, officials arrested
more than 20 individuals who had outstanding warrants. In an effort to
minimize instances of contractor fraud after the 2008 Midwest floods,
the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa created a similar contractor
certification program modeled after Grand Forks' program.
Create comprehensive state framework to minimize fraud, waste, and
abuse of federal programs. The need to quickly provide assistance to
victims puts assistance payments at risk to fraudulent applicants who
try to obtain benefits they are not entitled to. Our prior work on
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) payments and the
Department of Homeland Security's purchase card program showed
significant instances of fraud, waste, and abuse in the wake of the
2005 hurricanes. We previously estimated improper and potentially
fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be
approximately $1 billion of the first $6 billion provided.
Additionally, FEMA provided nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to
individuals who registered and received assistance twice by using the
same Social Security numbers and addresses.[Footnote 5] Because of the
role state governments play in distributing and allocating this federal
assistance, these known vulnerabilities call for states to establish
effective controls to minimize opportunities for individual to defraud
the government. We have previously testified on the need for fraud
prevention controls, fraud detection, monitoring adherence to controls
throughout the entire program life, collection of improper payments,
and aggressive prosecution of individuals committing fraud.[Footnote 6]
Without the creation of such a fraud protection framework--especially
the adoption of fraud prevention controls--federal programs can end up
losing millions or potentially billions of dollars to fraud, waste, and
abuse.
Challenges with FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program After the 2005
Gulf Coast Hurricanes Provide Potential Lessons:
The Public Assistance grant program, administered by FEMA, is one of
two key programs the federal government has used to provide federal
rebuilding assistance to Gulf Coast states after the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. Under this program the federal government provides funds on
a project-by-project basis. We have previously reported that federal,
state, and local officials reported experiencing a wide range of
operational challenges, many of which were magnified because of the
large number of rebuilding projects following the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. Today, I would like to focus on two broad challenges we
identified in that report--those associated with developing Public
Assistance projects and those involving information sharing.
Challenges Experienced in Developing Public Assistance Projects:
In our recent review of the Public Assistance grant program, we
identified several challenges involving the process of developing
projects that at times contributed to delays and increased costs,
particularly for many large permanent work projects. These included
using program flexibilities to rebuild to the postdisaster needs of
grant applicants and determining the scope of projects.
Limitations in using Public Assistance to rebuild to the postdisaster
needs of grant applicants. Localities experienced difficulties using
the Public Assistance grant program to rebuild in a way that met their
postdisaster needs and conditions. This is because the program
typically provides funds to restore buildings, equipment, or
infrastructure back to the way they were before the disaster.[Footnote
7] For example when a community that was in the process of making
infrastructure upgrades prior to the storms wanted to rebuild according
to its updated plans, it experienced challenges using the program.
Prior to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, local officials in St. Bernard
Parish were beginning the process of consolidating the jurisdiction's
seven separate wastewater and sewer treatment plants into a single
facility in order to meet EPA compliance rules, among other things. The
parish had already begun construction of the consolidated facilities
and had issued a $50 million bond to fund the project. However, the
storms flooded the entire sewer system and destroyed equipment in all
seven treatment plants. When parish officials applied for Public
Assistance funding to repair the facilities, they sought to structure
the project to accomplish their previous construction goals rather than
building a system that they planned to decommission. These officials
reported experiencing challenges obtaining agreement from FEMA to build
their project as a consolidated wastewater treatment plant instead of
seven separate facilities. This challenge, along with other challenges
in obtaining agreement on the scope and cost of the project, led to
over 2 years of delays in starting rebuilding. During that time, heavy
trucks were used to pump and haul sewage as an interim measure,
resulting in a considerable cost as well as damage to the parish's
roads. According to St. Bernard Parish officials, the temporary
measures have cost the federal government more than $60 million. These
officials estimated that had they been able to move ahead with their
original plans, it would have taken about 1½ years for the new
consolidated facility to become operational. However, more than 2 years
after the project was proposed, rebuilding had not yet begun.
Local governments in the Gulf Coast also needed flexibility in
rebuilding to address postdisaster needs when the population of their
neighborhoods changed significantly from pre-Katrina levels.
Consequently, it was important for their rebuilding projects to take
into account new conditions. For example, in light of postdisaster
population changes, Louisiana's Recovery School District sought
flexibility in the size and location of the schools to be rebuilt.
However, they experienced challenges with using the Public Assistance
grant program to do this because the program is designed to restore
infrastructure back to the condition, location, and function that
existed before the disaster. FEMA and school district officials
ultimately were able to work together to resolve their differences by
moving toward a more flexible approach to rebuilding.
Difficulties in accurately determining scope of projects. Federal,
state, and local officials also experienced challenges with developing
the scope of work of Gulf Coast recovery projects. During the process
of developing the scope of Gulf Coast projects, officials had
difficulty determining which damage was disaster related and therefore
potentially eligible for coverage under the program. For example, in
St. Bernard Parish, roughly 2 years passed before FEMA and parish field
inspection teams completed identification of eligible damage to
approximately 2,500 blocks of local streets. The parish had no records
to document the condition of its streets prior to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes, so according to state officials, FEMA conducted inspections
of each street in an attempt to distinguish predisaster damage from
what was caused directly as a result of the hurricanes. In contrast,
nearby Jefferson Parish did not encounter similar challenges with
distinguishing predisaster damage from damage directly related to the
hurricanes. This is because the parish maintained a road repair-
management information system (including a road-maintenance plan) prior
to the disaster that enabled the parish to identify preexisting road
conditions to FEMA officials, thereby helping to expedite its road-
repair projects.
FEMA plans to incorporate some project development flexibilities into
its regular practices. For example, FEMA's Public Assistance
Catastrophic Disaster Recovery Concept Plan, finalized in May 2008,
recognizes the need for regulations to allow applicants to more easily
tailor projects to meet postdisaster needs. In September 2008, FEMA
officials informed us that policies to address this issue as well as a
range of other initiatives related to the plan are in development and
are expected to be complete by March 2009.
Challenges with, and Lessons for, Information Sharing:
Because the Public Assistance grant program is complex and requires
collaboration among federal, state, and local officials, effective
sharing of project information is especially important. We identified
challenges to sharing project information among intergovernmental
participants during project development. Federal, state, and local
officials involved in the program in Louisiana reported facing
challenges in effectively sharing critical operational information
about projects including documents used to support scope and cost
estimates, such as receipts, invoices, and facility assessments. For
example, some applicants in Louisiana told us of the need to repeatedly
resubmit key project documents because of the lack of an effective
system to share such documentation. This situation was made worse
because key federal and state officials responsible for reviewing and
approving documentation were not primarily located in the same place.
Although FEMA typically colocates with state grantees in order to
facilitate information sharing, FEMA and Louisiana state officials
conducted their work primarily from different cities--approximately 80
miles away.
In Mississippi, federal, state, and local officials adopted strategies
that helped to facilitate the sharing of project information. For
example, following the disaster, FEMA's Mississippi Transitional
Recovery Office and the state grantee were located in the same office
complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and officials from these agencies were
are also positioned together throughout the state. They told us that
this colocation had multiple benefits for information sharing and
exchange, including the timely sharing of critical documents and
facilitation of daily meetings on project-development issues. Further,
as previously mentioned, FEMA and Mississippi state officials used
Public Assistance funding to secure an online accounting system that
made operational documents associated with projects readily available
to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the state had immediate access to
key documents that helped them to make project approval decisions and
relieve the documentation and resulting human capital burdens that
applicants faced during project development.
To help the Department of Homeland Security improve the operation of
the Public Assistance grant program and build on some of the actions it
has taken, our December 2008 report contained a number of
recommendations, including that FEMA improve collaboration and
information sharing within the Public Assistance process by identifying
and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective
communication among federal, state, and local entities communicating
and tracking project information.[Footnote 8] In commenting on a draft
of our report, the department generally agreed with our recommendations
and noted that FEMA is making efforts to improve collaboration and
information sharing within the Public Assistance process.
Conclusions:
The insights and lessons gained from the recovery experiences of past
major disasters provide a potentially valuable source to all levels of
government as they seek to meet the many challenges and complexities of
recovering from a major disaster. While there is no one right way for
state and local jurisdictions to manage recovery, the practices I have
presented today provide a basic set of considerations and approaches
for communities recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as well as
disasters yet to come. For its part, the federal government has been an
active partner in disaster recovery, spending tens of billions of
dollars on efforts to recover from disasters over the last several
years. Our work on one key federal recovery program--FEMA's Public
Assistance grant program--has identified several specific actions that
can be taken to address the operational challenges that the program
faced in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes. Opportunities exist for the
federal government to take steps in the future to continue to refine
this program to better address these challenges that could be faced
again by Gulf Coast states recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav,
and in advance of future disasters.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at
this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For information about this testimony, please contact Stanley J.
Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or
czerwinskis@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. Major contributors to this testimony include Peter Del Toro,
Assistant Director; Shirley Hwang; and Latesha Love. Susan Etzel,
Christopher Harm, and Michael O'Neill also made key contributions.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See appendix I of GAO, Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer
Insights for Recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent
Natural Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008) for a partial listing of GAO
products on disaster recovery.
[2] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. For this
review, we examined recovery experiences following these six major
disaster events: (1) the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in northern
California; (2) Hurricane Andrew, which struck southern Florida in
1992; (3) the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles, California;
(4) the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan; (5) the 1997 Grand Forks/Red
River flood in North Dakota and Minnesota; and (6) the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes.
[3] For the purposes of this testimony, "2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes"
refers to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and is treated collectively as a
single disaster event.
[4] GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program
Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2008).
[5] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the
Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-418T] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2007).
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-418T].
[7] The program contains provisions--through the use of alternate or
improved projects--that allow some changes, but this typically results
in restrictions in funding.
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129].
[End of section]
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Public Affairs:
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(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
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Washington, D.C. 20548: