U.S. intelligence and the Shah 1957-1979 : a case study of asymmetric intelligence
liaison

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Author

Cherry, Philip Jason.

Description

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2010.; Includes bibliographical
references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. This paper tests the hypothesis that
asymmetric intelligence liaison is damaging to the competitive advantage of the state that
appears to be getting the most out of the arrangement. This is one facet of Jennifer Sims's
theory of intelligence liaison and is based on the logic that while one state may be
benefiting in the short term from such an association, in the long term this situation
represents either institutionalized intelligence dependency or a miscalculation on the part of
the superordinate state of the true costs of the liaison. The hypothesis was tested using the
U.S. - Iranian intelligence relationship from 1957 to 1979 as a case study. I found that the
relationship was allowed to devolve from a relatively equal partnership to a situation where
the U.S. was largely dependent on the Shah for its collection against the Soviet Union, and
therefore asymmetric. Both actors responded as predicted by the theory, but without success
from the U.S. perspective. This suggests several refinements to the theory, including the
necessity of determining the value of liaison for a particular partner the target of the
intelligence relationship in calculations of symmetry, and also the danger presented by
uniquely valuable collection assets to such calculations.