from the one-of-the-many-problems-with-emotionally-charged-laws dept

Nova Scotia's supremely awful cyberbullying law is finally receiving a much-needed tweak, but it took a trip to the Supreme Court to do it. (As noted by a commenter below, the Supreme Court is just Nova Scotia's first level of trial court, rather than the province's highest court.) The law's original wording was so broad it had the potential to "make bullies of us all," as MacLean's Jessie Brown put it when the law went into effect.

The law -- hastily pushed through the legislative system in response to a cyberbullying victim's suicide -- contained this passage, which was open-ended enough to criminalize all sorts of previously-protected speech:

…any electronic communication through the use of technology including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably [to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any way.

This definition of cyberbullying captures a wide range of communication, from the truly insidious statements calculated to cause fear and intimidation to statements that are simply embarrassing or somehow harmful to the recipient’s emotional well-being. The definition contains no requirement to show motive or intent, nor does it require that the communication be false or misleading. On a plain reading of it, true statements could be considered cyberbullying so long as they are repeated and are distressing or harmful to someone’s self-esteem. Moreover, and as it includes those who “assist” in such communications, the definition is also arguably broad enough to include those who publish the electronic communication, such as web hosts or internet service providers (ISPs).

Safeguards that are typically seen in defamation and harassment laws are completely missing from Nova Scotia's cyberbullying law -- which would explain why a person who felt himself a victim of defamation or harassment might take the easier route and use the badly-written cyberbullying law to shut down his "bully," instead. And that's true, even though much of what was said had not risen to the level of defamation, and much of what was contested occurred before the law went into effect.

The court examined the law and the protective order issued by a lower court justice of the peace and found both wanting. As for the law's wording itself, the Supreme Court found it too inclusive to be anywhere near reasonable and, in fact, a threat to normally protected speech. While the law is in place to address cyberbullying, the definition is vague enough to cover far more than internet communications. This has the potential to stymie news reporting through traditional channels, as well as cover "communications" never intended to be included in the cyberbullying law.

Both the ordinary meaning of “electronic” and the inclusive definition capture uses of electricity for communication that were common long before cyberspace (1984). Here are a few examples from the old days: cylinder phonograph records (1877); disc gramophone records (1894) including 78s (1898), long plays (1948), singles (1949), and extended plays (1952); studio cast recordings (1943 or before); broadcasting by way of commercial radio (1920s), commercial television (1928), walkie-talkie (1940), and citizens’ band (1948), and, of course; telegraph (1834) and telephone (1876), including fax (1964). All of these are within the definition of “electronic”, at least when it is read literally.

The Supreme Court continues, providing examples of how this badly-written law could be twisted to cover nearly every form of communication imaginable, so long as the communication itself causes "fear, intimidation or distress."

The first thing to note in the definition of cyberbullying is the disconnect between the ordinary meaning of the word and the literal definition. One who communicates electronically, whether it be by text message or telephone, and says something reasonably expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, or distress is a cyberbully.

The next thing to note is the absence of conditions or qualifications ordinarily part of the meaning of bullying. Truth does not appear to matter. Motive does not appear to matter. Repetition or continuation might (“repeated or with continuing effect”) or might not (“typically”) matter. A neighbour who calls to warn that smoke is coming from your upstairs windows causes fear. A lawyer who sends a demand letter by fax or e-mail causes intimidation. I expect Bob Dylan caused humiliation to P. F. Sloan when he released “Positively 4th Street”, just as a local on-line newspaper causes humiliation when it reports that someone has been charged with a vile offence. Each is a cyberbully, according to the literal meaning of the definitions, no matter the good intentions of the neighbour, the just demand of the lawyer, or the truthfulness of Mr. Dylan or the newspaper.

As the court sees it, the law demands the inclusion of a motivation -- malice -- and yet, its hurried passage failed to include this key element. Adding in that factor goes against the lower court's finding justice of the peace's decision and nullifies the issued protective order.

The evidence does not malice as required, according to my interpretation, for a finding of cyberbullying after August 6, 2013. Firstly, the events after that date, except for the mikemacdonald1975@hushmail.com e-mail, are relatively mild. Secondly, the full correspondence between Mr. Baha’i and Mr. Fraser about removal, which Justice of the Peace Gass did not see, shows efforts by Mr. Baha’i, an unanswered request for suggestions, and statements of Mr. Fraser’s assessment of Mr. Baha’i’s liabilities closing the discussion. This correspondence is inconsistent with malice on Mr. Baha’i’s part.

[...]

Mr. Self chose his forum. It is one in which Mr. Baha’i is entitled to disclosure and discovery, to fully test the many allegations. Unlike Cyber-safety Act proceedings, it is one in which the parties can find out who is behindmikemacdonald1975@hushmail.com, rather than speculate. It is also a forum in which serious risk of defamatory repetition could be controlled by interim injunction, without the ex parte one-sidedness of the Cyber-safety Act. Despite this, the cyber protection order prevents Mr. Baha’i from communicating with the very person who is suing him.

The evidence satisfies me that malicious repetition by Mr. Baha’i is unlikely. Unlike Justice of the Peace Gass on the ex parte application, I have a full picture of the attempts to satisfy Mr. Fraser’s demands on behalf of Mr. Self. Whether he can force Mr. Baha’i to expunge what is not in his control, and whether he can recover damages against Mr. Baha’i for third party reproductions, risk of repetition by Mr. Baha’i is not in issue. Also, unlike the justice, I take into account that the Cyber-safety Act was not law when Mr. Baha’i was active on the present subject.

Summing up, the Supreme Court finds Nova Scotia's cyberbullying law -- as written -- to be a threat to protected speech.

In my assessment, the damage caused by the cyber protection order to Mr. Baha’i’s constitutional right to free speech and to his property right to use his own equipment outweighs the potential harm to Mr. Self if Mr. Baha’i is able to communicate freely. Justice requires that the order be revoked.

This fixes one of the major holes in the law, and restores much-needed protections for uninvolved third-parties (social media platforms, ISPs) who can't, by definition, show malice by hosting or transmitting communications made illegal by this law.

Unfortunately, it doesn't address another of its major flaws -- the wholly ex parte accusation process, which can result in severe penalties for the accused (loss of internet connection or access to electronic devices, gag orders, etc.) without being allowed to present their side of the issue in court.

from the not-malice dept

MediaShift points out that the folks at the TV show Fox & Friends have been found not guilty of defamation, after they repeated quotes from a parody news article that they assumed were true (though, even they admitted that the quotes sounded as if they could be from a parody). Basically, it turns out they were just gullible, not defamatory -- mainly because there was no specific malicious intent in repeating the parody info. While the court admitted that the gullibility was negligent and distasteful, that didn't rise to the level of malicious. If anything, the reputation hurt most by this incident isn't that of the guy suing for defamation... but that of the hosts of Fox & Friends.

from the don't-be-a-jerk dept

There's been an increasing effort among some to make being a jerk online some sort of criminal activity, even though that almost certainly violates the First Amendment. The latest is an effort in West Virginia to create a new misdemeanor for posting false information about someone online, which could result in fines and jailtime. Now, as you probably already know, we already have laws against defamation -- though that's a civil issue, where the defamed party can take the defamer to court. In this case, the law would do two things: (1) make it a criminal issue, getting the government involved in determining who to prosecute and (2) lower the standard for what breaks the law. Specifically, defamation has required not just the spreading of false information, but that it be done with malicious intent, if you wanted any kind of punitive damages. Yet, this law in West Virginia has no such requirement, meaning that simply spreading false information, even if not for malicious intent, could get you brought up on criminal charges. That seems to go against the First Amendment, but since when has that ever stopped lawmakers from pushing bills?

from the um...-that's-not-good dept

Thanks to Jon, for pointing to us a very scary recent court ruling that appears to have done away with one of the most basic free speech rights: that truth is an absolute defense against libel. Apparently, a federal appeals court in Boston feels that there are exceptions to this rule, and that even the truth can be libelous. If that seems incredibly problematic, you're right.

The case involved the office supply company Staples, who had fired an employee for abusing the company's travel and expense reporting system. After letting the guy, Alan S. Noonan, go, the company sent an email to many employees letting them know why Noonan was fired: "A thorough investigation determined that Alan was not in compliance with our [travel and expenses] policies." Noonan sued for libel, but Staples pointed out that since it was entirely accurate, there was no case.

However, the appeals court noted a century old Massachusetts law that suggests that truth is a defense against libel except if the plaintiff can show "actual malice" by the defendant in publishing the statement. Even though an earlier ruling had ruled that particular law was unconstitutional, the appeals court said that earlier ruling didn't apply. Instead, it said that since Staples had never named an employee fired for similar reasons, there was "malice" in sending out the email it sent. This may only apply in Massachusetts and it's highly likely to eventually be overturned (either in a rehearing by the entire appeals court, or eventually the Supreme Court), but in the meantime, it represents a very troubling change in the commonly accepted understanding that true statements can't be found as libelous.