OPINION | Russia’s Growing Military Power and Iran's Reaction

Assistant Professor of Political Science & Expert on Central Asia and
Caucasus Affairs

Payam Noor University, Iran

Image Attribute: Jan. 20, 2015
photo Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, second left, and Iran's Defense
Minister Hossein Dehghan, second right, sign an agreement to expand military
ties in Tehran Iran. Sergei Shoigu, in remarks carried by Russian news
agencies, said Moscow wants to develop a "long-term and multifaceted"
military relationship with Iran. He said that the new agreement includes
expanded counter-terrorism cooperation, exchanges of military personnel for
training purposes and an understanding for each country's navy to more
frequently use the other's ports. (AP Photo/ Vadim Savitsky, Russian Defense
Ministry Press Service)

Despite a host
of financial problems that are facing the Russian Federation now, which have
been made even worse by Western sanctions against the country, Moscow still
allocates a large part of its annual budget to military affairs, because in
view of its regional, international and financial policies, it has to continue
bolstering its military sector. This comes at a time that the historical
country of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in view of the history of
Iran-Russia battles in the 18th century, continues to maintain a cautious
distance from Russia while at the same time, avoiding resistance against Russia
in a subtle and calculated manner, trying not to interfere in those issues that
are considered as vital by Russia. The most important example to the point was
the two wars in Chechnya in the 1990s. This policy has been governing Iran's
other approaches to Russia as well.

Of course,
Russians themselves do not see Iran in a similar light and what is usual among
Russian politicians and analysts is often expressed with such phrases as: “Iran
is ready to throw itself in the West’s arms in the first possible opportunity,”
and “financially speaking, Iran is part of the Western economy while in
political, strategic, military and security terms, it is critically and
historically dependent on the West.” These approaches are indicative of the
historical approach taken by Russians to all foreigners, especially Iran, in
which one can see streaks of conspiracy theory; the Marxist economic theory,
which stresses the existence of a global capitalist system; and the history of
rivalries between Britain and Russia in Iran. Since Iran is trying to promote
and meet its national interests through an independent approach, Russians, for
example, in the case of sanctions imposed by the European Union against their
country, accused Iran of trying to take advantage of this situation. They also
maintain that Iran is trying not only to push Russia into the arena as the main
adversary of the West, but also wants to change this notion that the Iranian
government and the Islamic fundamentalism are archenemies of the West by giving
that position to Russia following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by
Moscow.

But how does
Iran look at this issue? What functional variables are there in Iranians’
approach to Russia? It must be noted that during the past three centuries that
Iran has been undergoing the process of modernity, it has had its biggest
battles against Russia (from 1813 to 1828) and the best parts of the Iranian
territory have been detached from the mainland by Russia through those battles.
Iran has been also suffering from colonialistic rivalries of Russia on its
soil. Therefore, Iran still looks at Caucasus with a nostalgic eye and, at the
same time, the theory that has underlain all Iranian approaches to Russia is
that the Iranian policy is not willing to make the hibernating Russian bear
show a sudden reaction and is especially sensitive about domestic and foreign
policies as well as transregional attitude and military and financial might of
Russia. The potential and active threats that Iran senses from its neighboring
countries, especially in the Middle East and Russia, form the bedrock of the
viewpoint of Iranian politicians. Therefore, although Russia is a major economic
partner for Iran and Iranians are largely inclined toward Russia in
international equations and take sides with it, they remain impartial toward
domestic issues of Russia.

On the whole,
Iran is countering potential threats from Russia in its own special way, which
has its roots in the country’s hard-earned experiences. At the same time, it is
seriously trying to avoid any direct faceoff with this hibernating bear and
does not want to provide grounds for Russia to show direct reaction to Iran.
Following the conclusion of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the West
over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities, Iran will have an opportunity
to stay out of the way of harm that comes from the West and bolster its
domestic strength, while at the same time, provide necessary grounds for the
country’s economic prosperity by entering the world’s free markets. The
political context of the agreement removes Iran from the list of the West’s
enemies as a result of which, Russia and the West will shift their rivalries to
issues other than Iran.

Of course, there
is a paradox here, because the legacy of the Islamic Revolution and internal
tensions among political factions in Iran will add to the complexity of Iran's
policymaking process. For example, Iran's belief in bolstering its power beyond
its borders, especially by offering support for Shia people, and the strong
anti-West reactions shown by the country and a large part of Iran's foreign
policy approaches, which have their root inside the country, increase overall
complexity of the Islamic Republic’s policymaking process, which at times,
makes it difficult to understand for foreigners. Knowing domestic roots of
these policies will help those parties that look at Iran's foreign policy from
outside to see how these policies are both justifiable and inevitable.