The result was that their alliance with the French was an alliance between parties with different
strategic interests.

between parties who could not cooperate to achieve a common goal, since they did not share
one.

The Three Fires were, nonetheless, linked to the French by a complex web of reciprocal
obligations

these obligations included the right to request military assistance from an ally.

Moreover, participation in war as allies of the French conferred positive benefits upon the Three
Fires.

These nations lived by a combination of hunting, fishing, and agriculture.

but adult males saw themselves as warriors.

War, for Amerindian men was an activity in which participants sought status and personal
fulfillment.

They could attain this status and fulfillment equally well from fighting a rival native group, like
the Dakota, or the British enemies of the French.

There was, however, one important difference between fighting on their own account and fighting
for the French.

War was expensive.

Its cost to Amerindians was measured both in terms of foregone production, since men who were
off fighting were not hunting and fishing, and the expenditure or destruction of ammunition, weapons,
clothing, and other equipment.

The French, however, paid the expenses of warriors fighting the British on their behalf.

They supplied and repaired weapons; provided food, munitions, and equipment; and cared for
the families of fighters.

The goods and services supplied by the French thus subsidized traditional military practices used
by warriors for recreation and prestige.

So, during the War of the Austrian Succession, when the French approached the Three Fires for
help, these communities were prepared to listen.

The Three Fires and the White River

This afternoon, I am going to very briefly outline two requests made by the French to the Three
Fires in the 1740s, and the Amerindian responses.

During the War of the Austrian Succession, the French faced the British on two fronts in the
interior of North America.

First, to the south of Lake Erie, there was the area in the vicinity of modern Cleveland known
to the French as the White River.

Here, over a period of several years, the French had become steadily more alarmed by the
presence of traders from Pennsylvania.

These traders had crossed the Appalachians and established a commercial sphere of influence
south of the Great Lakes.

the French first attempted to persuade the Amerindians of the White River, to expel the
Pennsylvanians

this proved unsuccessful, and in 1744, the French turned to the use of force.

They looked to their allies among the Three Fires living in the vicinity of Detroit to provide the
military power for this operation.

Both the governor general, at a conference in Montreal, and the commandant of Detroit, asked
the Three Fires to attack the Pennsylvanians on the White River.

In each case, the response of the Three Fires was a diplomatic expression of willingness to
cooperate with the French.

"I am," wrote the governor general, "persuaded that they will take action this winter ... against
the English establishments."

However, the tangible response of the Three Fires to this request was in fact very limited.

On 17 September, 1744, a single war party of thirty-five Ottawas from Detroit, left for the White
River.

They were expected, said the governor general, to seek out the Pennsylvania traders and "to
pillage them, destroy them, or make them prisoners."

In the event, however, the Ottawas made no attempt to interfere with the activities of the
Pennsylvanians.

Upon their arrival at the White River, they found that the local Amerindians were strongly
opposed to this venture.

Had the Ottawas taken unilateral action against the Pennsylvanians, they could easily have found
themselves involved in war with the Amerindians of the White River.

The Ottawas were apparently disinclined to take this risk simply to oblige the French.

No amount of personal fulfillment was worth the costs of incurring the enmity of close
neighbours.

By inviting the Three Fires to fight in the White River, the French had created a situation where
French and Amerindian interests diverged.

The Amerindians of Detroit wanted peace with their immediate neighbours.

The French wanted them to attack the Pennsylvanian trading partners of these neighbours.

Moreover, many Amerindians from the Detroit area themselves traded with British on the White
River or at Oswego, on Lake Ontario.

they had no particular objection to their presence in the west.

The French continued to attempt to persuade The Three Fires to attack the Pennsylvanians on
the White River, but without success.

the French did not manage to send an effective Amerindian expedition into the region south of
Lake Erie until 1752.

then, they made use of Ottawas from Michilimakinac, comfortably distant from the Amerindian
trading partners of the Pennsylvanians.

—French efforts to mobilize the Three Fires in the west in the 1740s were thus a complete
failure.

This did not, however, indicate any breakdown of the alliance between the French and the Three
Fires.

The Three Fires in Canada

For between 1745 and 1748, even as the Three Fires continued to refuse to fight on the White
River, contingents of Ojibwa, Ottawa, and Potawatomi warriors were travelling to Canada to fight
alongside the French.

—these fighters came in response to annual French requests to participate in the war on the
Canadian frontier.

the leader of the French delegation to the Three Fires in 1747 summed up their response to
these requests when he reported that:

"...all of the nations that he visited displayed considerable good will, and [agreed] with pleasure
to descend to Montreal."

In 1745, at least sixty Ojibwa and Ottawa warriors from Michilimakinac took part in preparations
for the defence of Quebec against an apprehended invasion after the fall of Louisbourg.

throughout the remainder of the war, fighters from the Three Fires were active on Canada's Lake
Champlain frontier.

in 1746, for example, at least seventy-nine Ojibwas, one hundred and eleven Ottawas, and sixty-
four Potawatomis participated in operations in this area.

they took part in patrols near French forts, scouting parties, and raids against the forts and
settlements of New York and New England.

So in each year of the War of the Austrian Succession after 1744, the Three Fires were active
participants in the war on the southern frontier of Canada.

Now just why were the Three Fires so willing to travel to Canada to fight, when they refused to
do so on the White River.

The answer appears to be that they could fight in Canada without risk or expense to
themselves.

They were willing to fight for the French for as long as doing so did not threaten their own
interests.

Fighting on the White River did threaten these interests.

fighting in Canada did not.

For the Three Fires, the British of New York and New England were ideal enemies.

They themselves had no particular quarrel with these colonies ...

... but the economic costs of participation in war against the British were borne by the
French.

Moreover, they could be reasonably certain that the British would not retaliate.

Not only were New York and New England comfortably distant from the Great Lakes, but the
British themselves sought the trade and alliance, not the enmity, of the nations of the Three Fires.

Conclusion

So what do these two incidents reveal about the military aspects of the Franco-Amerindian
alliance.

First of all, they demonstrate the effectiveness of this alliance in generating Amerindian military
support for French imperial goals.

In the course of the War of the Austrian Succession, the alliance mobilized annual contingents
of warriors willing to fight alongside the French.

These warriors stood by the French to defend Quebec against an expected British invasion, and
took part in French-sponsored raids into British territory.

Second, these incidents reveal something of the conditions under which this mobilization could
occur.

The French were able to mobilize a large and effective Amerindian force, but only if it were
directed against a target that was acceptable to their allies.

The French were the allies, not the masters, of their Amerindian partners, and issued invitations,
not orders to go to war.

Amerindian acceptance depended upon whether or not the proposed French course of action
accorded with their interests and their inclinations.

At times, they elected to comply with French requests.

But this seeming passivity stemmed not from subordination but indifference.

As long as their real concerns lay elsewhere, Amerindians were content to allow the French to
lead for as long as French objectives did not conflict with Amerindian goals.

They were thus quite willing to travel hundreds of kilometres to go to war on Canada's southern
frontier, but refused to allow the French to involve them in conflicts closer to home.

The ability of Amerindians to grant or refuse French requests to go to war gave them a veto over
French military action, insofar as this action depended upon their cooperation.

The French were thus able to mount a successful partisan campaign against New York and New
England, while Pennsylvania traders on the White River went about their business undisturbed.

In other words, military alliance with the French did not entail any loss of sovereignty or
independence for Amerindians.

Instead, it provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate the power that they wielded and
the influence they could exercise over the course of events in eighteenth century North America.