I
wish to acknowledge the help of the following officers and agencies who
aided materially in compiling this report: Colonel J.C.
Gillespie, M.C.; Colonel H.W. Glattly, M.C.; Lt. Colonel R. McK.
Williams, M.C.; Lt. Colonel E. C. Jacobs, M.C.; Major W. N. Donovan,
M.C.; and the Liaison and Research Branch, American Prisoner of War
Information Bureau. Appreciation is also expressed for the
assistance given by the Operations Service, Office of the Surgeon
General and especially to Mrs. E. C. Kimball and Miss L. Jergeson who
assisted in the Technical preparation of the manuscript.

As the head of the U.S. Army Medical Department in the Philippines
at the outbreak of the War with Japan, I feel it is my duty and
responsibility to make a report to higher authority on the activities
of the Medical Department during the period of my responsibility.

This
is necessarily a narrative report, largely from memory, assisted by
Medical officers who held key positions in the Medical organization
during the brief initial campaign in the Philippines.

Several
other officers who held important positions and who would have been
selected to assist in this report died either during the War or during
captivity and their records were captured or destroyed. Some records
were recovered on the recapture of the Philippines and I feel confident
that a prolonged study and evaluation of the data from these sources
should and will eventually be made. I believe a record of achievement
was made by our group to which we can all look back with pride and
confidence that our contribution to the war effort under the most
trying circumstances measured up to the best traditions of the Medical
Department.

I wish to give a balanced credit of achievement to
the entire Medical Department both during the Philippine Campaign and
including the prisoner of war phase. The Japanese authorities
selected certain medical personnel for medical work at the various
camps arbitrarily at times. It was a matter taken entirely out
of
the hands of the senior Medical officers present and just as in other
matters of camp administration, the senior line officers had no rank
and found themselves doing farm work assigned to them by squad leaders,
their juniors in rank, just so the senior Medical officers were given
no prerogatives or authority in accordance with their rank.

I
know of no group of Medical officers who ever lived through such a
trying experience as that capable group of medical prisoners of war
trying to practiced medicine under the supervision of ignorant Japanese
soldiers in most cases, with practically no medical supplies and
equipment -- and they themselves often suffering from the same
debilitating ailments they were attempting, often unsuccessfully, to
treat in their fellow prisoners of war.

I feel confident that
very soon there should be available for publication in our various
medical journals articles by these Medical offices filled with
firsthand knowledge obtained from the real "crucible of
experience." These doctors practiced medicine under the most
difficult circumstances possible and observations made, especially in
the deficiency diseases, should be of permanent value. Malaria, the
dysenteries, and deficiency diseases were our main problems, both
during and following the siege of Bataan and Corregidor.

The following activities are covered in the report:

(1) General Review of the Entire Period
(2) The Medical Field Service, Philippine Campaign
(3) The Regimental Medical Detachments, Luzon
(4) Hospitalization
(5) The Philippine Medical Depot
(6) The Medical Service on Corregidor
(7) The Medical Service, Mountain province
(8) The Medical Service, Visayas - Mindanao Force
(9) The Activities of the Dental Corps
(10) The Activities of the Veterinary Corps
(11) The Activities of the Army Nurse Corps
(12) Medical Activities, Japanese Prisoner of War Camps
(13) Medical Activities with the Guerrillas
(14) A Tribute to Medical Department Personnel

Three periods are covered in my personal report, giving a general
review of the whole medical picture:

1. Pre-war period -- to 8 December 1941
2. War period -- 8 December 1941 to 6 May 1942
3. Prisoner of War period

Officers
who held key positions during the War have given invaluable aid in
preparing this report which, while far from complete, is as accurate as
can be presented at this time.

Much of the work discussed was
performed by individuals now dead or by those from whom no detailed
report is as yet available. It is the sincere desire of each officer
participating in the preparation of this report to give full credit to
whomever due, and when it is possible to prepare a more complete
report, it is hoped that more detailed recognition may be distributed
to the lower levels of responsibility, so apt to be obscured in the
preparation of official reports, and where so much credit is due.

The
data now available are so incomplete that a detailed report involving
statistics and other factual data would be not only dry but of little
value or actually misleading. Therefore a short narrative report was
decided upon as being the most appropriate at the present time.

2. GENERAL
REVIEW

A. Pre-war Period.

Prior
to the appointment of General MacArthur as Commander of the U.S. Forces
in the Far East, General Grunert, the Department Commander, had been
vigorously revising the War Plan of the Philippine Department and
insofar as the Medical Department was concerned, the plans carried over
with the USAFFE were largely those of the Department modified to meet
the War Needs.

All War plans for years have envisioned the
possibility that unless strong reinforcements were received, just what
actually happened would occur, an invasion of the Philippines by a
superior force, withdrawal of our forces, loss of Manila, and a final
stand on Bataan and Corregidor.

The induction of Philippine Army
troops into the USAFFE, and the possibility of a prolonged period of
resistance to invading forces made necessary a modification of War
plans which resulted in the development of a large reserve of hospital
beds in Manila. Of the four General Hospitals available, the plan was
to place one at Limay in Bataan, one at the Medical Hospital Center,
Manila, one at Cebu and to hold one in reserve in the Medical Supply
Depot in Manila.

Actually one General Hospital was issued to the
Manila Hospital Center, a part of one was stored and used at Limay on
Bataan, the other two remained in Manila Depot and as such as possible
of selected materials moved to Bataan upon the evacuation of Manila.

The
Medical Supply Depot did a magnificent job in the evacuation of these
supplies by trucks and barges -- many barges were lost and the also the
last truck train was cut off in Manila and lost. The personnel,
however, managed to evade capture by the Japs and returned to Bataan,
where a large Medical supply Depot was set up in the vicinity of
General Hospital #2 sufficient to supply essential needs of the troops
on Bataan during the entire siege.

At the beginning of
hostilities the blockade of the Philippines and the impossibility of
obtaining any automatic replacement of medical supplies was expected.
Instructions were given to the Medical Supply Officer to requisition
all medical supplies and equipment in the Philippines beyond those
actually needed for civilian needs. Considerable quinine, rubber goods
and other critical items were obtained in Manila. A representative from
the Medial Depot was sent to Cebu with instructions to do the same in
the Visayan-Mindanao area and the Surgeon of that area was authorized
to make such purchases as were necessary.

The USAFFE was
organized in July 1941. No Surgeon for the USAFFE was ever appointed.
Colonel A. E. Schlanser, Medical Corps, was the Department Surgeon
responsible for the revision of the Medical Department War Plans. I
succeeded Colonel Schlanser as Department Surgeon in September 1941 and
continued in that capacity as Surgeon, Philippine Department under
General Grunert, General MacArthur and General Wainwright until the
fall of Corregidor. After my appointment as Department Surgeon, I
functioned in the dual capacity of Department Surgeon and USAFFE
Surgeon (informally) until December 10, 1941, two days after the War
began, when I was appointed Acting Surgeon, USAFFE. As Acting Surgeon,
I performed the dual duties of Surgeon, Philippine Department, and
Surgeon, USAFFE, until appointed Surgeon, U.S. Forces in the
Philippines, by General Wainwright on March 21, 1942. After the fall of
Bataan, I assumed the additional duty of Surgeon of Corregidor until
the surrender on May 6, 1942.

In the Medical Department, the
responsibility headed up in the Department Surgeon and by using a
Liaison office for contact with the appropriate Staff Department at
USAFFE Headquarters, the Medical Department plans developed in a
surprisingly satisfactory manner.

With the organization of the
USFFE and the induction of the Philippine Army with the USAFFE, a Field
Service School for Medical officers and men was established at Fort
McKinley and Fort Stotsenburg. A Philippine Army medical School was
opened at Camp Murphy in Manila and cadres of medical officers and
enlisted men, Philippine Army, were in training for key positions in
the hospitals of the Philippine Army. Officers and enlisted men,
Philippine Army, were also being trained in a special school for
medical supply officers at the Philippine Medical Supply Depot. The
Medical Department of the Army had the most effective cooperation and
assistance from the Medical Department of the Philippine Army in
perfecting plans to meet the needs of the combined forces.

The
training of tactical units of the Regular Army and Philippine Army
centered around the 12th Medical Regiment (PS).
With the doubling of
the Philippine Scouts and a consequent doubling of the personnel of the
12th Medical Regiment, an intensive program of training was started.
This training carried over with the training of the medical tactical
units of the nine Divisions of the Philippine Army and had a
far-reaching effect on the medical aspect of the entire Philippine
Campaign.

Medical Supplies and Equipment. Fortunately
timely request made upon The Surgeon General for medical equipment for
hospital and other medical equipment resulted in two General Hospitals
arriving in the Philippines a few weeks before the War began along with
five Station Hospitals of 250-bed capacity. Ninety regimental
dispensaries were being prepared for shipment or already on rout to
the Philippines when War began.

Hospitalization. At the
outbreak of the war, plans for the employment of existing Regular Army
Hospitals and the construction of Station Hospitals for the nine
Philippine Army divisions were being completed. Approximately $400,000
outlay had been approved by the USAFFE and was awaiting action of the
War Department. A total of approximately 6,000 hospital beds was
planned for the Philippines with approximately 5,000 beds in the Manila
area.

Had the warfare become stabilized even for a short period
this number of beds which was developed in the three weeks after the
outbreak of the War would not have been excessive. As the situation
developed, however, there was no period of stabilized warfare and only
by tremendous effort on the part of the medical personnel concerned was
sufficient equipment moved to Bataan to supply needs of the siege of
that peninsula.

Fortunately, in the Department War Plans,
provisions had been made for the location of one General Hospital on
Bataan. A Battalion Post had been constructed at Limay, Bataan, for the
housing of troops to guard the supplies stored on Bataan. In the plans
for the construction of this Post the Medical Department had made
special arrangements for utilities connections for an operating room,
laboratory, storage and other needed services. Hospital beds had been
supplied with other equipment and medical supplies, lending itself to a
ready conversion into a General Hospital. This Post became available to
the Medical Department at the outbreak of the war and was the initial
location of General Hospital #1 when Manila was evacuated.

For
administrative and training purposes the Philippine Army was divided
into (1) North Luzon Force (2) South Luzon Force (3) Visayan-Mindanao
Force. A medical officer was assigned to the headquarters of each force
who subsequently became the Corps Surgeon of the included forces. As
far as possible, a Regular Army Medical officer was assigned as medical
instructor at the headquarters of each Philippine Army Division.
Medical Supply.
Medical supply plans called for enlargement of the Medical Supply Depot
in Manila at a new location in the outskirts of the city, a point less
vulnerable to air attacks, and also the construction of sub depots at
Tarlac, Los Banos and Cebu. The sub depots had not progressed beyond
the planning state when War began.

B. War Period.

At the outbreak of the War on December 8, 1941, the Medical Department
personnel was as follows:

Fortunately,
for several months prior to the War, most of the Regular Army medical
officers at Sternberg General Hospital and the Station Hospitals had
been replaced by Reserve Officers and the Regular Officers made
available for assignment to and training with Regular Army and
Philippine Army tactical organizations for use in connection with the
training program in which the 12th Medical Battalion (PS) at Fort
McKinley figured so prominently.

The bombing of Clark Field on
December 8th and the vulnerability of the hospital at Fort Stotsenburg
located on the edge of the airfield made it untenable and plans were
immediately made for the evacuation of patients and the majority or the
Medical personnel to the Manila Hospital Center.

The bombing of
Nichols Field and the strafing of the McKinley area made advisable the
removal of personnel and patients from Fort McKinley Hospital to the
Manila Area.

On December 23, 1941, at a Staff conference at the
USAFFE headquarters, warning orders were received for the probably
evacuation of manila on the following day. The following morning orders
were received and late on the afternoon of December 24th the moves to
Bataan and Corregidor were begun.

General Hospital #1 was
established December 23, 1941 at Limay, Bataan. The
Philippine Medical
Depot began immediately the removal of medical supplies and equipment.
One section of Department Surgeon's Office was established at General
Hospital #1 on Bataan and another section at USAFFE headquarters on
Corregidor. Later one section of the office was located at the
Headquarters Services of Supply, on Bataan with an assistant in charge
and the major portion, including all records established in Malinta
Tunnel at USAFFE Headquarters on Corregidor. Early in January 1942, a
section of the office with an assistant was assigned with the advance
echelon of USAFFE on Bataan. Fortunately I was able to keep intact up
to that time most of the trained personnel of the Department Surgeon's
Office, who did invaluable service when I was, for most of the War, the
only Medical Officer available for duty in that office.

Upon the
reorganization of the Luzon Force, the following offices were
created: The Surgeon, Luzon Force, and Surgeon, Services of
Supply.

With the short intensive training given to the
Philippine Army medical troops, it was most gratifying to have
developed Philippine Army medical officers with an astounding grasp of
the details of medical military matters in such a short period of time.

The
same remark applies to the enlisted personnel. The majority of them
showed an intense concentrated interest in acquiring the detailed
knowledge of jobs to which they were assigned.

The delaying
action of our troops in the retreat down to Luzon and up from Logaspi
and the hesitancy of the Japs in occupying Manila, even when open to
them, gave us much needed time in evacuating medical installations and
supplies from Manila to Bataan and I recall the almost superhuman
activities of the personnel of the Manila Hospital Center and
Philippine Medical Depot in accomplishing their task of evacuating
personnel, patients and supplies from Manila to Bataan and Corregidor
between December 24, 1941 and January 1, 1942; and in performing the
enormous task ahead of them in literally hewing out in the jungle of
Bataan a future home for the location and operating of General Hospital
#1, General Hospital #2 and the Medical Supply Depot.

General
Hospital #2 was established at a previously selected site at
km. post
162.5 and the medical Supply Depot was located at short distance from
General Hospital #1 and #2 at km. post 163.

The 1st and 2nd
Corps were pouring down into the peninsula preceded by a vanguard of
refugee civilians who added much to the problems of sanitation,
evacuation and hospitalization.

The story of the development of
General Hospital #2 to a total of 7,000 patients, entirely in the open
with the exception of certain facilities, is covered in this report by
the Commanding Officer of that hospital during the last months on
Bataan.

General Hospital #1 originally located at Limay became
untenable as a hospital as the Japs advanced down the peninsula, and
that hospital was moved to Little Baguio on January
26, 1942.

About
February 15th the pressure on the General Hospitals became so acute
that plans were made for the establishment of a convalescent hospital
in the Visayas and a tentative location was selected in the vicinity of
Iloilo. A nucleus of personnel was selected and brought to Corregidor
and prepared for shipment to Iloilo to establish this hospital. The
plan of establishing this convalescent camp never was fully executed,
however, as the Jap blockade became more acute. The ship which
transported the first group of fifty convalescents to Iloilo was sunk
by Jap submarines on its return trip from the southern Island. The
situation was becoming more serious and no hope remained for relieving
the congestion of patients accumulating on Bataan and Corregidor.

With
the approaching end of the dry season it was necessary to plan for the
removal of General Hospital #2 (about 3,000 beds at that time) out of
the jungle to some higher point, also affording shelter of some kind.

This
presented no little problem to the Army Engineers, who made a survey
with the Commanding Officer of Hospital #2 of the various possible
locations. The location selected by the former Chief Engineer, then in
Australia, proved to be impossible to develop with the materials at
hand and in the time available for construction. The site occupied by
the empty Ordnance warehouses adjacent to General Hospital #1 at Little
Baguio appeared to be the most practical location although obviously
not entirely satisfactory, because of its former use for storage of
Ordnance supplies. (For lack of a better alternative, it was finally
selected as the best solution of the problem.)

The military
situation on Bataan was rapidly becoming worse. The troops were cut to
half rationing on January 5, 1942, and were cut to one-third ration in
March 1942. Bread was no longer available.

Malnutrition and malaria and effect on combat efficiency.
At the time of the fall of Bataan there were approximately 24,000
patients in the hospitals and clearing stations on Bataan.
The shortage
of quinine had necessitated the limitation of its use for treatment
purposes. Malaria, sub clinical in most of the troops on Bataan,
superimposed upon a general condition of malnutrition, reduced the
combat efficiency to such a point that further resistance was becoming
impossible.

Anticipating the fall of Bataan and the need for
additional medical supplies on Corregidor, the Medical Supply Depot on
Bataan was directed to ship to Corregidor certain critical items of
supply to be stored partly in the Malinta Tunnel and partly in medical
dumps scattered over Corregidor. A considerable quantity of medical
supplies was still stored in the basement of the old Fort Mills
Hospital, partially destroyed by shelling and bombing, and unused for
hospitalization since the move to Malinta Tunnel
after the first
bombing of Corregidor on December 29th.

On April 8th, when the
fall of Bataan appeared imminent, recommendation was made to the
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, that all
nurses and Medical personnel on Bataan be evacuated to Corregidor on
the morning of April 9th. After several anxious hours they all arrived
safely at Corregidor. Having watched the blowing up of the ammunition
dump on Bataan located between General Hospital #2 and Mariveles, the
point of departure for Corregidor, and the delay in the arrival of the
nurses early in the morning, made all of us apprehensive for fear that
the nurses had been caught in a traffic jam near the point where the
ammunition dump was blown up. The arrival of the Bataan personnel,
including many of the sick, increased our problem in the already
overcrowded Malinta Tunnel.

The Hospital Section of Malinta
Tunnel, incomplete at the beginning of the War, was soon made usable
and while originally planned to accommodate about 300 patients, at one
time was accommodating not only all the patients and medical personnel
of Corregidor but furnished quarters and messing facilities to the High
Commander and other officials of the Philippines.

Upon the fall
of Bataan, as the Surgeon of Corregidor, I took over direct control of
all medical activities on Corregidor, in addition to my other duties.

The
problem of immediately increasing the bed capacity in the limited space
available was difficult, but by double and triple-decking bunks of
patients and personnel in the Hospital Section, and by extending the
hospital area into the main tunnel and some of the main laterals of the
main tunnel, we managed to increase the patient capacity to about 1,000
beds. At no time were we without available beds, but at the time of the
surrender of Corregidor there were about twenty vacant beds in the
hospital.

Cooking and messing facilities at the tunnel hospital
provided for about 300 patients. With an increase to approximately
1,500 patients, personnel and attached individuals,
it was necessary to
provide additional cooking arrangements outside, near the tunnel
entrance. With the increasing intensity of the bombing and shelling
during the final days before the surrender, the preparation of this
additional food was not only uncertain but a hazardous undertaking on
the part of the kitchen force. The Japanese had very accurate range on
tunnel entrances.

Laundry. With the destruction of the
Quartermaster Laundry, the hospital was dependent entirely upon its own
resources for laundry. A number of washing machines had been purchased
in Manila for the Manila Hospital Center, and several were shipped to
Corregidor upon the evacuation of Manila. Unfortunately, all but two
were destroyed by bombing before they reached the tunnel hospital. The
constant shelling and bombing in the drying area outside the tunnel
made successful laundering practically impossible.

Water Supply.
Fortunately, an artesian well near the entrance to the tunnel was never
bombed and the hospital was never without a water supply. Often the
supply was scant and strict economy in the use of water was necessary
at all times.

Sewage Disposal. Frequent damage to sewage
disposal lines by bombing or shelling occurred but in very short time
repairs would be affected and there was never any long or serious
interruption.

Electrical Lighting. With the installation
of an auxiliary lighting plant for the hospital area we were never
without light except for brief periods.

It was remarkable that
in spite of the bombing and shelling over and around the island the
responsible authorities could always mange to effect some kind of
temporary repairs to keep the public utilities in operation.

Evacuation
of casualties from the aid stations throughout the Island of Corregidor
was effected under most difficult circumstances due to destruction of
roads and frequent shellfire. There were only two ambulances on
Corregidor. One was knocked out early in the War but in some mysterious
way the other ambulance and driver survived the entire War until the
last day of fighting when the ambulance became a casualty. The driver
has been decorated with a Distinguished Service Cross for his heroic
action and absolute indifference to the hazards of his calls for trips
to the various aid stations. Every form of transportation was pressed
into service and somehow all casualties would receive transportation of
some kind to the tunnel hospital.

There were surprisingly few casualties from air bombing except for when
a direct hit was made on air shelters.

During
the first artillery bombardment more casualties occurred but the troops
soon learned to protect themselves. In the end, however, in my opinion,
it was the artillery bombardment that softened Corregidor for the final
assault and capture.

The fate of the 1,000 patients, in the
event that the fighting continued within the tunnel, was a matter of
anxiety to all of us and I shudder to think of the orgy that would have
ensured had that fanatical horde actually reached the mouth of the
tunnel with flame throwers and machine guns during the final period.
After the surrender the Japs demand the evacuation of the tunnel in ten
minutes but were dissuaded from carrying out their demand. Fortunately
the surrender was effected without any casualties within the tunnel.

No
statistics were ever available as to the exact number of the killed and
wounded during the final assault and capture of Corregidor. Roughly, I
should say that the Japanese casualties in proportion were about ten to
one of our casualties. I hope that recovered documents will give a
reasonably accurate figure on this matter.

C: Prison Period.

For
two or three days after the surrender, the captured duty personnel was
being moved to the 92nd Garage Area. Members of the
various staffs were
being segregated and moved to various places.

The hospital
personnel and patients were undisturbed. We were not allowed to leave
the tunnel and all communication from the outside was cut off.

Finally
permission was granted to me to go to the Headquarters of the Jap
Forces and arrange for disposition of the dead in the tunnel and
shortly afterwards liaison was established with the Surgeon of the Jap
forces. With this officer the general situation was discussed -- the
matters of sanitation, the generally unsatisfactory conditions and the
potential danger of an epidemic of dysentery among the troops crowed in
the 92nd Garage Area.

I requested to use other campsites on the
Island to relieve overcrowding. He appeared to be anxious to do what he
could but was simply overwhelmed and unable to do anything definite
about it. Finally he became exasperated and made a remark that has
remained with me as a clue to the Japanese treatment of all prisoners
of war: "I realize" he said, "that these conditions don't suit you and
your people, but you must remember this -- you have been captured by a
nation whose standards in such matters are lower than yours."
Definitely lower as we found during our subsequent experience. So low,
in fact, that the matter of elemental sanitary arrangements and basic
human needs in our various camps were matters of utter indifference to
most of the responsible Japanese medical authorities.

After the
initial period of confusion on Corregidor, relatively satisfactory
relations were established with the Japanese authorities. The hospital
routine was allowed to continue. There was a lot of coming and going
and curious prowling around the hospital by Japanese officers and
enlisted men. The Japanese doctor in charge proved to be a courteous,
considerate individual and cooperated with me as he said
"50-50."
A couple of Jap soldiers were brought into the tunnel hospital and
operated upon by him with assistance of our operating surgeon. He gave
me a pass to go unmolested throughout the Island. The Jap Commander at
Corregidor visited the hospital, expressed great concern over
continuing to keep all the patients in that "hole in the
ground."
He cooperated with me fully in making arrangements to get patients and
personnel out into the sunshine that some had not seen for months. He
expressed the greatest solicitude over caring for the nurses and women
in the tunnel. He authorized and urged the speedy repair of the old
Fort Mills Hospital near Topside for use again.

In an inspection
of the old hospital by an American officer, Corps of Engineers, he
expressed his opinion that repair and use of the old building was not
only possible but that it could be made usable in a comparatively short
period.

A large part of the roof of the hospital had been
destroyed. Some parts of the roof were reparable, and the second floor
(concrete) was fairly intact and could be used as a roof for the first
floor. The kitchen and basement storeroom were in fair shape.

By
July 25th, 1,000 patients in the tunnel had been reduced to about 400.
The overhead personnel of the hospital had been reduced
proportionately. The Japanese supply officers issued to the hospital at
one time shortly after the surrender, rations for one month's supply.
This ration according to our analysis had a caloric content of about
2,000 calories per man per day.

The Japanese doctor requested
that he be furnished an analysis of food requirements for patients and
other suggestions for improvement.

During this period, among the
other Japs to visit the hospital and consult with me about the food
situation and ask for suggestions about improving our food supply, was
General Homma. He was courteous and apparently interested. This visit
was made just after the infamous Death March on Bataan ordered by
General Homma and during the period that our fellow prisoners of war at
O'Donnell and Cabanatuan
were dying at an alarming rate from
dysenteries, dietary deficiencies and general neglect of the elemental
human needs.

During the period between the fall of Corregidor
and the move from the tunnel to the old hospital on June 25th
and
during the period when the mortality rate was the highest among the
prisoners of war at other camps in the Philippines as a result of
neglect and apparent indifference on the part of the Japanese
authorities and in spite of a threatened epidemic of dysentery arising
in the 92nd Garage Area, the deaths among the prisoners of war on
Corregidor were only twenty-six and most of these were battle
casualties.

Fortunately during the last few days before the
surrender of a few essential medical supplies, including some
sulfathiazole and carbarsone had been brought in by air through
Mindanao.

There were medical supplies in the General Hospitals
and Medical Supply Depot on Bataan and in the abandoned hospital and
depot in Manila to meet all the requirements of our needs and more, but
either through indifference or premeditated plan our prisoners of war
at most other camps were almost totally lacking in the most necessary
medical supplies.

At Corregidor I was allowed to retain control
of all medical supplies. We had many more supplies than the Japanese
themselves. The Japanese doctor would request certain items from my
hospital (if I could spare them) and would meticulously sign a receipt
for every item furnished.

Either I or some of my assistants
would attend a conference in the office of the Japanese doctor daily,
at which time he would request detailed reports concerning the patients
and the hospital.

Various delegations visiting the hospital were
continually curious about the number of our casualties and expressed
surprise and incredulity at the relatively small number of our
casualties as compared to their admitted losses. I could never make
them believe that we were not, in some way, keeping back from them the
true figures of our losses and finally they accused us of throwing our
dead into the sea for disposition.

On June 25th, the movement
out of the tunnel into the marvelous atmosphere of the renovated old
hospital was completed. A holiday atmosphere prevailed all over the
place. We all had an "it's good to be alive" air about us. We had
obtained a piano from the Japanese from some source. We had secured a
radio. We were sending out parties throughout the Islands for green
stuff to eat.

We had a visit from the Surgeon General, Japanese
Army, and apparently as a result of his visit to the Philippines, it
was decided to move us. On July 2nd at 9:00 AM, I was called to the
office of the Japanese and told that he had just received orders for
our removal to Manila and that all patients and personnel, except the
nurses, would be loaded on a freighter in the harbor by 4:00 PM that
day; that no hospital beds would be moved as plenty were available
where we were going.

Accordingly between 9:00 AM and 4:00 PM we
loaded all the patients, personnel and supplies that we possibly could
handle. I was directed to remain in the hospital overnight and
accompany the nurses to the ship the following morning.

The
Japanese Commandant, during the short period in which we occupied the
old hospital, had given positive instructions that no Japanese soldier
or any visitors from off the Island would be allowed to enter my
hospital without his personal permission. He visited the hospital the
night before we left - presented the staff with a large iced cake of
which he was very proud, some small cakes and some beer.

During
this period at Corregidor, while many things came up that were
disagreeable and almost intolerable, yet in the main I got the
impression that back of it all there was an intention and effort on the
part of the Japanese to observe the decencies and general provisions of
international law outlined in the Geneva convention.

I arrived
in Manila on the morning of July 3rd, expecting to
reassemble patients,
our personnel and equipment and supplies in some appointed place in
Manila. Then much to my surprise and disappointment, upon arrival in
Manila, the nurses were sent to Santo Tomas. I
never saw or heard of
them again until after I was released this year. I was sent to Bilibid
Prison with no further connection with the patients. The
patients and
equipment were admitted to the Hospital Section of Bilibid -- then
being
run by the Navy medical Department.

After remaining at Bilibid
Prison for a week, I was sent to Tarlac to join
General Wainwright and
other senior officers for transfer a month later to Formosa in
accordance with what was apparently a studied policy of the Japanese to
provide for a separation of the senior officers from the lower ranks. I
never gave them credit for removing us from the Philippines as a result
of any solicitation among the higher-ups concerning our health and the
effect of long remaining in a tropical climate. Our later treatment at
our destination in Karenko proved that they had no special concern over
our physical welfare. At Bilibid and later at Tarlac where I remained
for one month, I learned for the first time of the horrible experiences
of the Death March and prison camps O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. Many of
the Tarlac group were survivors of those horrible conditions and it was
a feeling of guilt almost that my experiences up that time had been so
relatively humane.

Our trip to Formosa, while crowded in the
double decker quarters in the hold of a troopship, was not unbearable.
The food was better than it had been at Tarlac and our treatment en
route to Manila, while in Manila and on board ship was not so bad.

We
arrived in Takao Harbor on August 14th -- transshipped to an
inter-island
boat and finally arrived at our destination at Karenko
on the east
coast of Formosa on August 17th 1942.

We were exhibited to an
enormous crowed of natives in our long hot march to our camp, subjected
to a rigorous shakedown inspection on our arrival, but we at first
considered our accommodations and general arrangement for our care, to
be an improvement over our conditions in the camp that we had left in
the Philippines. Karenko is just on the edge of the temperate zone and
the climate in the main is delightful most of the year.

The
story of Karenko is too well known to need repeating here but insofar
as treatment is concerned it was the low point for our group.

We were not only told, but shown by our treatment, that we had no
rank. We
were worked on the farm -- marched out and back by armed guards. We
were
subjected to every possible indignity. We were beaten and disciplined
for the last infraction of petty regulations. We were starved by what
would appear to have been a deliberate aim on the part of the Japanese
authorities to keep our physical condition down below a certain
physiological level.

We were fed propaganda papers freely during
this period, filled with the wildest, unrestrained and imaginative
reports of Jap victories and allied defeats. Our navy was being sunk
regularly. Exact figures were given about once a month and written
carefully on a blackboard for our perusal. A corresponding report
showed relatively slight Jap losses.

Still with all this
physical and mental punishment, the spirit of the group remained as a
whole unbroken. The majority of the group lost from fifty to
seventy-five pounds in weight. Some individuals halved their weight.
Practically everyone had a nutritional disorder of some kind.
Nutritional edema was the rule.

As a relief to this impossible
situation and what appeared to be a deliberate starvation policy, some
British Red Cross supplies in fairly liberal quantity arrived. As an
additional tantalizing gesture the supplies were brought into the camp
and stored for a long period before the details of method of issue
could be worked out by the Japanese authority. The final issuance of
these supplies spread out over a period of several weeks actually saved
the lives of many of our group and never afterwards were we so
hopelessly underfed over any such extended a period. At subsequent
periods we had occasional times when the "heat was turned on" with its
accompanying starvation diet but not over such a long and seemingly
never-ending period.

The feeding of prisoners of war was somehow
involved in an overall directive from the highest Jap authorities
concerning the production of food and its relation to work. At all
camps there appeared the same farming idea, the raising of pigs,
chickens, rabbits and even bee culture was considered. At one of our
camps there seemed to be some kind of recognition on their part, that
the laws of War forbade the working of certain ranks on projects
requiring manual labor, etc. Still this other directive required
everyone to work. With a typical oriental mentality, they attempted to
evade meeting the issue squarely by using every artifice at their
command to comply with both directives. They evolved the ingenious
expedient of "enforced volunteering" for farm work of the majority of
our group. This continued in the development of two farm projects, one
at Karenko and the other at our second camp in Formosa, Shirakawa,
from
neither of which farms did we ever derive any substantial returns. We
moved away from the first farm before any produce had matured. At the
second place, Shirakawa, the working condition there apparently had
percolated through to some higher responsible authorities. We had a
visit from the Senior Camp Commandant of Formosa and an attempt on his
part to have us sign an agreement that we had volunteered for the farm
work we had already been required to do -- this the group almost
unanimously refused to do with the result that the pressure was applied
in real force. We were cut off from all farm produce, with a general
reduction in our food; we were awakened several times nightly for roll
call; amusements of all kinds were restricted to Saturday afternoons
and Sundays. They allowed no naps in the afternoon; neither were we
allowed to lie on our bunks or even sit on bunks or to take a nap in
any position during the daytime.

Several officers were placed in
the guardhouse on rice and water diet for four to ten days for petty
infractions of regulations. We were in constant fear of "bopping" by
several fanatical underlings who were apparently encouraged in their
sadistic impulses by the camp authorities.

This condition of
affairs continued over a long period, during which time the Japanese
propaganda papers ceased to arrive and good rumors began to trickle
into camp, when suddenly on October 1, 1944, all
the general officers
in camp received emergency orders to leave the camp by air for a colder
climate. Shortly after their departure, we received underground rumors
of our air attack on Manila. On October 9th, all of the colonels were
hurriedly moved by train to northern Formosa to Keolung, the harbor of
Taihoku, and there loaded onto a large Japanese liner and packed like
sardines in the hold of the ship and, just as we were about ready to
sail two days later, we noticed a sudden unloading of all the other
passengers on board including many Japanese wounded and civilian
refugees. Soon afterward we had the mixed emotion of seeing and hearing
our own aircraft in action for the first time in two and one-half years.

Luckily,
our ship, the largest in the harbor, was not bombed but after a delay
of two weeks we finally sailed and arrived safely in Japan five days
later. I understand that this same ship was bombed on the next trip and
sunk off Subic Bay with the loss of many prisoners of war aboard.

After
two weeks at Beppu, a Japanese Hot Springs resort
in Northern Kyushu,
our part was moved across to Fusan [Pusan], Korean, and on to Central
Manchuria, about 150 miles north of Mukden and spent the
winter of
1944-1945.

An attempt by the local Jap Commandant at "enforced
volunteering" for work failed completely. We were getting underground
news in the form of a Japanese newspaper translated by a Japanese
language officer. We knew the progress of events. This paper gave the
full news to the local populace. The extent of the news would indicate
that the news given to the people was defeatist propaganda building up
the people towards a final surrender of Japan.

We were not
surprised therefore when the end came. Actually some of our group (of
which I was one) were more optimistic than those "in the know" on the
outside had reason to be.

Addenda. In the Bataan and
Corregidor siege, shell shock (battle fatigue) presented no serious
problem. There was no possible retreat from reality. On the rock there
was no room for such cases in the tunnel, so arrangements were made to
send a few cases to Bataan.

Among the troops brought over to
Corregidor at the fall of Bataan, a high incidence of malaria soon
developed among those individuals who had previously kept their
infections subclinical during the time that quinine was available for
repressive use. After the discontinuance of quinine an alarming number
of cases developed on Corregidor. This was quickly brought under
control by treatment of infected cases and repressive doses of quinine
to all the troops from Bataan. Undoubtedly the same thing happened to
the Bataan troops forced to march out of Bataan and in the absence of
sufficient quinine for treatment and repressive use, malaria
superimposed upon the general malnutrition, must have accounted for a
large percentage of deaths on and following the march from Bataan.
There was considerable quinine available in our medical installations
captured on Bataan which the Japanese would not make available. Every
effort was made by our captive medical personnel to persuade the
Japanese authority to obtain and use these supplies among our neglected
dying comrades to no avail.

My medical supply officers was sent
to Manila for the purpose of assisting the Japanese medical authorities
in searching through and obtaining for them the necessary supplies from
our captured depots. I was never able to see and discuss with him the
success of his effort in getting these supplies out to our captured
troops.

In the light of the subsequent treatment of all
prisoners of war, including Medical Department personnel, Chaplains and
Red Cross workers themselves, I recognize now as naive my unsuccessful
attempt to obtain contact with the head of American Red Cross in Manila
with the idea of obtaining through him some kind of credit for
obtaining some relief supplies.

When my supply officer went to
Manila to assist the Japanese in the distribution of medical supplies,
I had hoped that he would be able to make contact with the Red Cross
Representative.

While the overall characteristics of the
Japanese may be outward politeness and inward cunning and deceit, still
I gained the impression of sincerity in my dealing with the Japanese
doctors on Corregidor. My disillusionment was complete, however, from
the time I entered Bilibid Prison until my arrival at Mukden
in the
spring of 1945.

3. THE
MEDICAL FIELD SERVICE, PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN.

World
War II was a global war involving activities in almost every corner of
the world under almost every conceivable condition of climate and
terrain; a war characterized by the introduction of many new weapons
and by tactical extremes varying from a bull-dog-like hold onto a tiny
bit of land to vast movements of almost unbelievable speed and extent.
In a war of such protean character, the Medical Department of the U.S.
Army was faced with many a situation for which no adequate precedent
existed to serve as a guide in solving the medical problems which
arose. Such solutions often involved marked modification of the
accepted dogma of medical tactics. Such deviations from standard
routine give added interest to the medical history of this War and it
is because of this that the chronicle of the Philippine Campaign finds
justification; that along with tragic fact that about 40% of
the
Medical Department personnel who participated in this opening
phase of
World War II did not survive to witness the final defeat of Japan.

The
subject matter relating to the field medical service of the Philippine
Campaign can very conveniently be divided into three phases:
a
pre-war period of preparation; the initial stages of the campaign,
including the withdrawal of the American forces to Bataan; and the
Bataan Campaign. This section of the general report will be confined to
those military operations which took place on the Island of Luzon and
will not touch upon the medical service of the harbor defenses of
manila Bay or the relatively minor events which occurred in the
Southern Islands. These will be covered in separate sections of the
general report.

A. Pre-war Period of
Preparation.

Prior
to 1941, the U.S. forces in the Philippines consisted of the Philippine
Division, the 31st Infantry (American)
and the Coast Artillery units
garrisoning the Harbor Defenses to Manila Bay. The Philippine Division
at this time consisted of 4,000 highly trained native troops. There is
a general agreement among those officers who have served with this unit
that no finer soldiers ever wore the American uniform. They were well
disciplined, their spirit de corps was of the highest quality and their
noncommissioned officers were men of long service, carefully selected
for their reliability, their administrative ability, and their
qualities of leadership. Intense loyalty characterizes the Philippine
Scout. In no element of the Philippine Division were these qualities
more highly developed than in the 12th Medial Regiment (PS). Although
it numbered but two hundred members prior to 1941, yet in a broad sense
the history of the field medical service of the Philippine campaign is
largely that of the activities and influence of this small Regular Army
medical unit. In many respects this organization is unique in the
annals of the medical military history of the United States for it is
doubtful if any unit of similar size has ever contributed so much to
the medical service of a major campaign.

The defense forces of
the Philippine Commonwealth consisted of one skeletonized regular
division, the Philippine Army, and a police force known as the
Philippine Constabulary. The Philippine Army was a conscript army, the
personnel of which had received a five-months course of basic training
within the past five years prior to the War. After this period of
training, they were placed on a reserve status and assigned to one of
the ten small divisions into which the Philippine Army was organized.
Certain of the noncommissioned offices had participated in two or more
such training periods. The commissioned personnel consisted of
relatively untrained reserve officers. A few of the officers had seen
service in the Philippine Constabulary. The Philippine Army Division is
a small triangular division and as such contains a medical battalion
and the usual attached medical personnel. (In the Philippine Army the
medical detachments to infantry regiments were called medical
companies.)

During the year prior to the onset of the War, the 12th Medical
Regiment (PS) was engaged in the following activities:

(1) War Plans.
The officers and men of this medical unit participated in all maneuvers
and reconnaissances of the Philippine Division (PS) with a view towards
perfecting the medical sections of war plans relating to the defense of
the Philippines. A final period of intensive reconnaissance work
occurred in the period from November 1940 to February 1941. At this
time medical installations for the two major defense positions in
Bataan
we relocated, as were sites for rear-area
general hospitals. The value of such detailed planning prior to war is
too self-evident to require comment.

(2) Recruit Training.
In January 1941, authorization was obtained to increase the Philippine
Division from 4,000 to 8,000 Scouts. The 12th Medical Regiment doubled
its organizational strength at this time. An intensive training program
was inaugurated and so successfully carried through that by December
1941 this increment consisted of thoroughly trained medical soldiers,
both technically and spiritually prepared for active service.

(3) Medical Detachments.
Prior to August 1941, only those units of the Philippine division
stationed at Fort Stotsenburg where provided with authorized medical
detachments. All other units were dependent upon personnel from the
12th Medical Regiments (PS). The seriousness of this gap in the medical
service of the Philippine Division was brought to the attention of the
Commanding General, who in May 1941 gave authorization to select and
train cadres for all units stationed at Fort William McKinley. This
training was carried out by personnel of the 12th Medical Regiment,
these cadres later becoming the nuclei around which the medical
detachments of these organizations were formed. Personnel to fill the
key noncommissioned officer positions in these newly formed detachments
was furnished by the 12th Medical Regiment.

(4) To augment the
medical service to the 45th and 57th Infantry (PS) their regimental
bands were trained in first-aid work and litter bearing during the
summer of 1941.

(5) Philippine Army Training School.
Acting under instructions from the Surgeon, H.P.D., the 12th Medical
Regiment operated a training school for the officers and
noncommissioned officers of all Philippine Army medical units from
September 1, 1941 to December 1, 1941. The subject matter embraced all
phases of division medical service and included elaborate field
exercises. The value of this training course which was attended by some
1,300 officers and noncommissioned officers from all ten Philippine
Army divisions and completed just one week before the opening of
hostilities was immense. For the majority of the
Philippine Army medical officers and non-commissioned officers, this
three-months' training school was their only serious, comprehensive
training prior to the War. The impress of the 12th Medical Regiment,
its spirit and morale, was left upon every medical unit of the
Philippine
Army. It is to be regretted that after these officers rejoined their
recently mobilized organizations, no opportunity was afforded for unit
training prior to the War. The first tactical participation of these
Philippine Army medical units occurred under grim real battle
conditions after the invasion of the Philippine Islands.

(6) Reorganization of Philippine Division.
In August 1941, the Philippine Division reorganized as a triangular
division the 12th Medical Regiment now becoming the 12th
Medical
Battalion with Companies A, B and C Collecting and Company D
Clearing.
One collecting company was attached to each of the three combat teams
of the Division. This arrangement continued throughout the campaign.
The medical units of the Philippine Division took the field on December
8, 1941, with approximately two-thirds of their T/O strength in respect
to both officers and enlisted men. Only the key positions were held by
Regular Army officers, the balance being made up of recently arrived
reserve officers. The reorganized 12th Medical Battalion functioned
smoothly and efficiently throughout the entire campaign. In Bataan it
became a medical task force.

Equipment and Supply.

(1) Medical Units of Philippine Division.
These units took the field on December 8, 1941, with largely improvised
equipment made up of old, revamped, 1917-type medical chests. In the
spring of 1941 request had been made for entirely new-type equipment
for medical battalions and medical detachments. Every effort was made
by the Philippine Department Surgeon to procure this equipment but no
large shipments were received prior to the onset of hostilities.

(2) Philippine Army Medical Units.
These units were practically complete in organic equipment according to
their T/O. This consisted almost exclusively of simple medical field
chests and included no tentage. Practically no reserve of medical
supplies was carried by the Philippine Army and consequently these
units were entirely dependent upon the Philippine Department Medical
Supply Depot for replacement of items of all classes of medical supply
during the campaign. The most serious deficiency in the organization
and equipment of the Philippine Army medical Battalions was the absence
of a laboratory section in the Clearing Company. The microscope was not
an item of equipment which meant that in Bataan these medical units
were seriously handicapped in their efforts to control and treat
intestinal infections and malaria.

(3) Transport.
On December 8, 1941, medical units of the Philippine Division were
equipped with only about 25% of their organic transportation. This
deficit was made up by the use of civilian taxis, trucks and buses. The
Philippine Army was entirely dependent upon such vehicles.

B. Withdrawal to Bataan.
(December 8, 1941 to January 7, 1942.)

The
defense force of Luzon on December 8, 1941, consisted of the Philippine
Division (PS) and nine partially mobilized Philippine Army divisions
whose strength varied from 4,000 to 6,000 each. Two forces were
organized, a "North" and a "South" Luzon Force, whose mission it was to
meet and defeat the enemy at the beaches. The Philippine Division was
placed in a reserve position in Bataan. During the month of December,
1941, the enemy made a series of landings on both north and south
Luzon, driving the defense forces back toward Manila. This phase of the
campaign consisted of a series of delaying actions. In many respects
this opening phase of the War can be looked upon as a period of
intensive training for these medical units. Very few battle casualties
were sustained in the course of the withdrawal. The sick and wounded
who were unfit to accompany their units to Bataan were left in civilian
medical facilities for care and treatment. Relatively few cases where
evacuated to the General Hospital Center in Manila.

As soon as
it became certain that a Bataan campaign was inevitable, every effort
was made to evacuate medical supplies from all sources to Bataan. In
late December, 1941, a surgical hospital was established at Limay,
Bataan and a general hospital was set up on a site near the Real River
about two kilometers west of Cabcaben. (See map #3)
Both installations were ready to receive patients on January 7, 1942.

C. Bataan Campaign (January
7, 1942 to April 9, 1942)

On
January 7, 1942, the American forces completed their withdrawal to the
Bataan peninsula and established themselves along a defense line
running roughly from Abucay to Moron. (See map #3)
The enemy
held the base of the peninsula and controlled the water approaches by
reason of his sea and air power. No additional supplies in sizable
quantities could now be obtained. Self-sufficiency was imposed upon the
defense forces from this date. Consumption without replenishment became
the distinguishing feather of this campaign. A defeat due to attrition
alone became inevitable.

Existing War plans had called for a
force of some 30,000 men for the defense of Bataan and had stressed the
necessity of evacuating all civilians from the area in the event of
war. On January 7, 1942, the American force in Bataan consisted of
78,000 military and 6,000 civilian employees
(used largely as
laborers). This amounted to a total of 84,000 men, or a force almost
three times as large as that called for in War plans. In addition there
were between 25,000 and 30,000 civilians in Bataan who were largely
dependent upon the defense force for food and medical supplies. Both of
these classes of supply were totally inadequate for a population of
11,000. This civilian population imposed an extra burden upon the
Medical Department which assumed responsibility for their care and
treatment. The small staff of Filipino Doctors and Nurses from the
provincial hospital at Balanga Bataan, were of great assistance in
caring for these people.

A most serious situation existed in the
matter of supply because of the fact that many units of the Philippine
Army had reached Bataan with an inadequate supply of organizational and
individual equipment. These troops had not received proper training in
property responsibility and the importance of conservation of supplies.
A considerable quantity of their property was abandoned during their
withdrawal to Bataan. Many of these troops in combat positions had only
the scanty clothing worn by them during the withdrawal. A large
percentage were without shoes, raincoats, blankets, and shelter halves.
The Philippine Army was not equipped with individual mosquito bars.
Moreover, there was little or no tentage. Inasmuch as the defense line
in many places ran through mountainous terrain, where the nights were
quite cool, considerable hardship resulted. These shortages were of
vital import in reference to the incidence of malaria, hookworm and
respiratory diseases. Reserve stocks of these items which might have
made up of such deficiencies did not exist. Stringent rationing of all
classes of supply was put into effect, the most serious restrictions
being placed on food. All troops on Bataan were placed on half rations
on January 7, 1942. Further reductions were made periodically in order
to prolong the period of defense.

The medical service of the
Bataan Campaign will be considered in three phases, corresponding to
the two major defense positions occupied and the final drive of the
Japanese terminating in the capitulation of the American forces.

(1) First Defense Position. (January
7 - 26, 1942) (See map #3)
Inasmuch as lines of communication determine hospitalization and
evacuation plans, consideration must here be given to the existing road
and trail network of Bataan on January 7, 1942. (See map #3)
Hugging the eastern shoreline of Bataan, an all-weather two-way road
known as the "East Road" runs from Lyac Junction to Mariveles. From
Cabcabin north this road follows a fairly level course along the bay
shore. The road from Mariveles to Moron is known as the "West
Road." It is an extremely tortuous road cut through dense
jungle
into the steep sides of the main mountain mass of Bataan. In many
sections it is open to one-way traffic only. The work of widening,
straightening, and surfacing this road was under way when the war
began. The only connecting link between the "East" and "West" roads is
the Pilar-Bagac road which crosses the peninsula through a low saddle
between the north and south mountain masses. This is an all-weather,
two-way road. Except for a few old logging roads in an extreme state of
disrepair, no other roads existed in lower Bataan at the onset of the
campaign. On the east side from Orion north there is an agricultural
area extending inland toward the mountains for several kilometers. A
number of narrow secondary roads penetrated this area. This is the only
section of Bataan of any size that is under cultivation. Jungle
conditions characterize all other areas. A number of trails, mostly
heavily overgrown, penetrate the jungle. The jungle is practically
impassable, except for these trails. The flora is largely tropical
timber with an undergrowth of small shrubs densely matted together by
the intertwining vines.

The first Battle of Bataan was fought along the general line of
Abucay-Mt. Natib-Moron. (See map #3)
From the eastern shore west to the Abucay hacienda the line passed
through level, open country consisting largely of rice fields. From
this point west the terrain is very mountainous with jungle conditions
obtaining.

In view of the location of the two general hospitals
along the "East" road, the line of evacuation for both corps was down
the "East" road, using the Pilar-Bagac road for cross communication.

The
heaviest fighting occurred on the right of II Corps in the areas of the
57th Infantry (PS) and the 41st Division (PA). An old church with
massive stone walls in Abucay proved ideal for a combined regimental
aid and collecting station for the 57th Combat Team. A similarly
constructed church and the Provincial Hospital at Balanga were utilized
by the 41st Medial Battalion (PA). The collecting companies operated
forward ambulance service direct to the various regimental aid stations
as far inland as the hacienda. Inasmuch as these routes were frequently
under heavy artillery fire and were also exposed to aerial bombardment,
the work of the ambulance drivers was especially worth of commendation.

Every
effort was made during this engagement to keep all division medical
installations in a state of high mobility by rapid evacuation since it
was considered likely that a withdrawal to the reserve battle position
might become necessary at any time. With this in mind, all but the very
minor cases were evacuated by the collecting companies direct to the
general hospitals. A system of Army evacuation was not in effect at
this time. Because of the short distances involved, this arrangement
was entirely
satisfactory.

The
enemy made two serious break-throughs of this initial battle
position. On January 205h, they penetrated the area of the
51st
Division (PA). During the precipitate retreat that followed
the
medical companies (medical detachments) lost a large portion of their
equipment when they were deserted by their line troops. On
January 24th the Japanese infiltrated behind the position of the 1st
Division (PA) and established themselves on the road south of Moron,
thus cutting the only line of communication of this division.
The
only avenue of withdrawal lay along the beach and conditions were such
that very little equipment could be carried out of this
route.
During the nights of January 24th and 25th there was an organized
withdrawal to the reserve battle position.

(2)Second
Defense Position.(January 26 to April 2 1942)
(See
map
#4). The new defense position ran roughly parallel
to and
slightly below the Pilar-Bagac road. An entirely different
situation now existed in regard to evacuation. The
Pilar-Bagac
road, the only highway connecting the "East" and "West" roads, was now
denied to us and could no longer serve as a channel of
evacuation. Traffic was now limited to the coastal highways.

South
of the Pilar-Bagac road, Bataan is roughly a gigantic volcanic cone,
the sides of which rise abruptly from the shoreline to form Mt.
Mariveles. The slopes of this cone are ribbed with deep
ravines
formed by rapidly flowing mountain streams, the natural habitat of the
malarial mosquitoes. The entire area is clothed with a dense
luxuriant tropical growth which offers unlimited cover. To
traverse the country in an east-west direction along the new position
was a slow and arduous process of clambering in and out of these deep
ravines which in this section radiated like the ribs of a fan from the
summit of Mariveles Mountain towards the Pilar-Bagac road. A
few
old, overgrown mountain trails existed in this area. These
were
the sole means of access to the major portion of the defense line.

In
I Corps there existed an old logging road. (Trail #17)
running
roughly along the regimental reserve line which was available for the
services of evacuation and supply after repairs had been
affected. Three clearing stations we located along this
channel.
The area was within easy artillery range and was frequently shelled,
but fortunately these medical installations received no direct hits.

In
II Corps, by January 26th, the Engineers had broken a crude road along
trail #2 (See map #4) as far as the San Vicente
River. Beyond
this no means of communication existed save by foot trails which at
this time were in a state of extreme disrepair. The 41st
Division
(PA), 21st Division (PA) and the 33d Combat Team (PA) occupied this
inaccessible area extending from the San Vicente to the Pantingan
River. It was obvious that the medical installations serving
these units must be self-sufficient, and that no evacuation would be
possible for a considerable period of time. One American
officer
and one NCO of the 12th Medical Battalion (PS) were assigned to each of
these three Philippine Army medical battalions to assist them in
setting up their division medical installations with only such
equipment as could be hand packed into this area over difficult
mountain trails. After three days of arduous trail work all
units
were in position. The clearing companies of the 41st and 21st
Medical Battalions (PA) constructed from jungle materials 400-bed field
hospitals. A 150-bed installation was set up for the 33d
Combat
Team. The Filipino soldier displayed unbelievable ingenuity
and
skill in the construction of these clearing stations. After
the
dense undergrowth had been cleared away, bamboo frames were erected, on
which patients were placed. These were covered in order to
give
protection from the weather. No tentage was
available.
Cover was so perfect that low-flying planes were unable to detect the
presence of these field hospitals and one could pass within a few yards
of them in the jungle without being aware of their presence.
All
necessary medical and surgical procedures were carried out in these
jungle hospitals. Cases were quickly returned to a duty
status.
Time lost from illness and injury was reduced to a minimum.
The
21st Clearing Station operated for three weeks before evacuation became
possible over newly constructed roads, the 41st Clearing was without
evacuation for six weeks and the 33d Clearing for a period of two
months. An excellent description of the type and quality of
medical work performed by these organizations is contained in the
following letter of appreciation which is quoted in full:

HEADQUARTERS SUB-SECTOR "D,"
II CORPS
In the Field
March 5, 1942

SUBJECT: Appreciation
TO: Surgeons

21ST Division (PA)
41st Division (PA)
33d Combat Team (PA)

1.
Please convey to your officers and men my sincere and deep appreciation
of the splendid medical service provided your respective units during
the trying circumstances incident to the occupation and organization of
this sub-sector. The extreme difficulties attending the
establishment, operation and supply of your medical installations in
the absence of any means of transportation except foot and pack trails
is fully appreciated and understood by me. Your officers and
men
are deserving of the highest praise and commendation for the speed and
efficiency with which the wounded have been evacuated by hand litter
over difficult trails and under fire from almost inaccessible areas of
the Out Post Line. The work of the medical personnel
accompanying
patrols has been an exhibition of the highest courage and a major
morale factor in the operation of these patrols. It is
extremely
gratifying to me to know that when circumstances prevented evacuation
of your casualties to Rear Echelon medical installations, a condition
which characterized this sub-sector for several weeks after its
occupation, you have shown the capacity to be self-sufficient within
your area and from your meager and improvised equipment have been able
to provide the essentials of medical and surgical care to your
patients. The continuation of this policy of treating all but
the
more seriously wounded and ill, now that evacuation is possible, is
very commendable in reducing the number of duty days lost. The absence
of epidemics within your units is a direct index of the efficiency of
your medical inspectors.

2. I take great pleasure in
extending to you and your medical personnel this expression of
appreciation of your splendid performance in keeping with the highest
quality of medical tradition.

Maxon S. Lough
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Commanding

There
is no intent here to single out any particular medical unit for special
mention. Mention has been made of these three Philippine Army
medical units only as an illustration of the character of medical work
that typified all organizations in Bataan. The efficiency
with
which these recently mobilized and relatively untrained Philippine Army
medical units functioned is a tribute to the
courage, fortitude and ability of the Filipino. Improvisation
was
a necessity and was exercised with a high degree of originality and
invention. A bare minimum of medical and surgical equipment
was
available. There were serious shortages in all classes of
supplies; food, clothing, blankets, and medical supplies.

The
work of the medical companies in evacuating to the battalion aid
stations and evacuation from the collecting companies to the clearing
stations was a most arduous procedure which involved hand carrying up
and down steep and narrow trails. The work of these units is
especially noteworthy when cognizance is taken of the act that during
the campaign the ration varied from 2,000 to 1,000 calories per
day. All personnel suffered great loss of weight with serious
muscle wasting. Attempts were made to utilize the carabao and
the
native ponies for evacuation purposes but both animals were found to be
unsuitable. Medical personnel accompanied all patrols
operating
beyond the Outpost Line of Resistance. The type of medical
service furnished was no small factor in the maintenance of high morale
among the combat troops. The Red Cross emblem was not
displayed
over any division medical installation.

The following typical
report was rendered by the Surgeon of the 21st Division (PA) regarding
the operation of a division medical service in Bataan. Of the
three organizations mentioned above, this unit was most favorably
situated as far as accessibility was concerned.

United States Army Forces in
the Far East
Headquarters, 21st Medical Battalion (PA)

In the Field

March 14, 1942

SUBJECT: Medical Service of the 21st Division (PA)
from Jan. 26, 1942 to March 1, 1942

TO: Surgeon, Sub-sector "D," II Corps. In the Field

In
compliance with the letter from that office, dated March 6, 1942, the
following report on the medical service of the 21st Division (PA)
during the period from Jan. 26, 1942 to March 1, 1942 is hereby
submitted.

1. The Clearing and Collecting Companies of
the 21st Medical Battalion arrived at the area assigned to them on Mt.
Samat by hiking up the mountain on newly opened trails, each man
carrying his meager personal baggage and as much medical
equipment as he could carry on his shoulders or on opened
litter.
Because of the difficulties of transporting everything by man carry,
all non-essential equipment were left at Lama where the Headquarters
Company was left to watch them. After locating good sites and
establishing our stations, the problem that confronted us was the
transportation of casualties from the Collecting Stations to the
Clearing Station. As the only means of communication was by
foot
trails, there was no alternative but to carry them by litter.
Fortunately, the 21st Infantry was held in reserve and the "A"
Collecting Company did not have to function as such. This
company
was then utilized to carry the casualties from the "B" and "C"
Collecting Stations to the Clearing Station. Another problem
was
the impossibility of evacuation from the Clearing Station because of
its inaccessibility to ambulance.

On March 5, the 21st
Infantry was assigned a sector at our front. The "A"
Collecting
Company had to move and establish a Collecting Station at the rear of
this regiment. This station is now very far from the other
Collecting Stations and the Clearing Station.

To solve the
problem of evacuating the casualties from the "B" and "C" Collecting
Stations after the "A" Collecting Company had moved, one platoon of the
Clearing Company established an advance Clearing Station near these
Collecting stations to take care of casualties right there without
having to evacuate them to the main Clearing Station. Only
serious cases and those requiring elaborate treatment are so
evacuated.

Evacuation within the division has been an
arduous task, both from the standpoint of human energy and time
required. Litter routes are long and tedious, going up and
down
hills, along trails rendered difficult by big stones and obstructing
vines. All available men of the Collecting Companies are
utilized
as litter bearers. Some men of the Headquarters Company and
the
Clearing Company are attached to the Collecting Companies to increase
the personnel of the latter. It takes about three hours from
the
time a casualty is tagged to the time he arrives at the Collecting
stations and around one hour from the Collecting Stations to the
Clearing Station. Undoubtedly this difficulty will be
considerably increased during the rainy season when the trails become
muddy and slippery.

Because of the difficulty of evacuation,
it has been our policy to retain as many cases as possible not only at
the Clearing but also at the Collecting Stations, evacuating only those
cases requiring medical and surgical attention obtainable only at the
rear. This policy has been
made possible by the relative inactivity at the front.

2.
Supplies. Medical installations are short
of
litters and
blankets. Woolen blankets are especially needed for
casualties
who are more or less in a condition of shock. The latter
condition is usually associated with severe hemorrhage.
Casualties in this condition are not fit for immediate evacuation and
much good can be done to tide them over a critical period if they are
given hypodermoclysis or venoclysis. Many lives would have
been
saved if these were available on time. The Clearing Station
should have the apparatus and solutions for this purpose in sufficient
quantity. Hemostatic drugs are also suggested.
Surgical
equipment is incomplete; there is no adequate sterilizer and many
instruments are lacking. The necessity for adequate surgical
equipment in the field cannot be overemphasized especially in view of
the difficulty of evacuation to the rear.

* * * * * * * * * *

8. Special Problems in Sanitation and Epidemiology:
Many
cases are brought to the medical stations with fevers of
an
obscure origin. The difficulty of diagnosing these fevers
without
the aid of a microscope is obvious. It is essential that a
microscope be obtained for use in the Clearing Station.

The
most important problem of sanitation for the present is the control of
flies. All sanitary measures for the prevention of the
breeding
and multiplication of flies have been recommended to unit commanders
who are doing their best to enforce them. All unit trench
latrines, considered to be the most important source of flies, appear
to be properly covered but it is still believed that they continue to
be sources because it is difficult to prevent flies form laying their
eggs and the larvae can succeed in coming out because of their
remarkable penetrating power. The use of disinfectants and
larvicides is essential in order to eliminate latrines as sources of
flies. The supply of disinfectants has been very inadequate
and
larvicides, such as crude oil, are not obtainable.

The most
important problem of epidemiology for the present is the control of
malaria. Due to the limited supply of quinine, this drug is not
available for prophylactic use.

The number of intestinal and respiratory infections have been
relatively few but with the rainy days ahead the increase
of these cases is expected. Chances of pollution of sources
of
drinking water will be greater. Wetting and chilling of the
troops cannot always be avoided. The strict observance of
proper
mess sanitation is an important preventive measure against the spread
of intestinal diseases. The troops at the front cannot
sterilize
their individual mess equipment because of the impracticability of
boiling water right there. There seems to be no possible way of doing
this except bringing this equipment to the battalion kitchen where they
can be sterilized. Adequate shelter from the rain, sufficient
clothing to keep the body, especially the feet, warm will have to be
provided to offset the tendency to respiratory diseases due to weather
conditions.

Some units are not provided with such equipment
and supplies as Lyster bags, boilers, and soap which are indispensable
to the observance of field sanitation.

Division Surgeon.

The above is illustrative of the problems that faced these relatively
untrained Philippine Army medical organizations.

About
March 1 certain conditions arose which made it necessary to adopt a
policy in conflict with the recognized principles of division medical
service. The shortage of motor fuel became so acute that
normal
evacuation procedures had to be abandoned. In addition the
sharp
increase in the malarial rate, in the dysenteries and nutritional
edemas was such that the limited facilities of General Hospitals 1 and
2 made it necessary to limit evacuation in general to two types of
case: those requiring a type of treatment not available in
division medical installations and those whose return to a duty status
was either doubtful or a matter of prolonged hospitalization.
Thus due to the fuel shortage, the limited rear-area hospitalization
facilities, and in certain instances inaccessibility imposed upon the
division medial units, it became necessary to hold and hospitalize
cases in forward division areas. The clearing station of each
medical battalion became a hospital caring for three hundred or more
patients. As the volume of patients increased in early march
because of a steady rise in the malarial rate, dysentery, and
conditions incident to a starvation diet, it became necessary to
utilize the collecting companies for hospitalization
purposes.
These units set up 100 to 150-bed installations close to the front
lines. By the end of March even these additional facilities
became inadequate and it was necessary for the medical companies
(medical detachments) to hold and treat minor cases in battalion and
regimental aid Stations.

By
April 1 all facilities for the care of patients in Bataan were strained
to their absolute limit to provide oven the semblance of
hospitalization for the enormous sick rate. The 91st Clearing Company
had expanded to 900 beds and was located about 4,000 yards behind the
front line. Trees in and about this hospital were stripped of limbs by
passing shells. The 11th Clearing Company was handling over 600
patients. In direct violation of all standard medical tactics, all
division medical units were immobilized as result of this forward
hospitalization policy. This policy was forced on the medical service
by reason of the conditions enumerated above. The perfect cover
provided by the tropical jungle flora and the static type of defensive
military operations made this policy feasible. However a field medical
service of this character, with thousands of patients in the forward
areas, made it most essential to keep in intimate touch with the
tactical situation at all points of the front in order that immediate
and massive evacuation might be effected on very short notice.

Late
in January a system of Army evacuation was put into effect whereby
division unite ware relieved of the responsibility of transporting
cases to the general hospitals. As was stated, every effort was made to
keep the number of patients evacuated to minimum. Those cases
considered proper patients for a general hospital were collected at
certain clearing stations or, in some instances, at a relay station
which served two or more clearing companies. Prompt and efficient
evacuation was provided by this army medical service.

Medical Supply.
Medical supplies were drawn directly from the Department Medical Supply
Depot located at km. post 163 on the "East" road by the
division
medical supply officers. As a result of the loss of organizational
equipment by several units early in the campaign, an acute shortage of
medical chests existed. Numerous drug shortages developed during the
course of the campaign, the most serious of which were the
antimalarials. Severe restrictions were placed upon the issue of these
drugs. A maximum of eight grams of quinine was allowed per case of
malaria. Unit surgeons were required to keep an accurate check of the
number of cases in their areas. Every effort was made to prevent
hoarding by unit supply officers. Several small shipments of` quinine
and at-brine were received by )nears of air transport from Cebu. By
this means sufficient antimalarials were procured so that prior to
capitulation no cases were denied treatment. Unit medical supply
officers were urged to salvage dressings and bandages and to practice
extreme
economy in the use of all types of medical supply.

Luzon
Force. On March 11, 1942, Luzon Force was
constituted, and
the
office of the Surgeon, Luzon Force, was organized March 16th.
All
medical units in Bataan were included in this Force except General
Hospitals 1 and 2, the Philippine Army General Hospital, and the
medical Supply Depot. These medical installations remained
under
the direct control of the Surgeon, U.S. Forces in the
Philippines. In the short period of its existence, the office
of
the Surgeon, Luzon Force, in addition to its routine Army medical
functions, concerned itself principally with the following three
problems:

a. Plans for evacuation on very
short notice
of the 7,000 patients located in forward medical division
installations: In the event of a break in the defense line,
relatively large field hospitals were in danger of being overrun by the
enemy. To avoid such a contingency was vitally important because of the
character of the enemy, who in a victorious drive would be apt to
slaughter both medical personnel and patients. Such tragedies occurred
in the Malayan Campaign when forward medical installations were overrun
by Japanese troops. As a precautionary measure the 12th Medical
Battalion (PS) was transferred from II Corps to Luzon Force to be
available as a medical task force in an emergency.
Arrangements
were made with the Motor Transport and Traffic Control Officers of
Luzon Force for the assembly of large convoys of buses and for
"right-of-way" priorities over motor highways.

b. Shortage of
Medical Supplies: Close contact was maintained with the
Medical
Supply Depot regarding remaining stocks of drugs and supplies with a
view towards allocating them where most needed. Quinine was
rationed as stated above. It was possible to smuggle in one
or
two small shipments of drugs from Manila through secret agents of
G-2. A native bark prevalent in Bataan was found which
contained
the quinine alkaloid. Plans were completed for the gathering,
drying, and powdering of this bark and for its use as an infusion in
the treatment of malaria, when quinine became exhausted.

c.
Decline in the Combat Efficiency of Luzon Force: In the latter part of
March the Commanding General of Luzon Force was informed of the fact
that the combat efficiency of Luzon Force was fast approaching the zero
point as a result of malnutrition, malaria, and intestinal infections;
that the
tremendous noneffective rate, plus the
inability of those on a duty status to undergo any long-sustained
physical effort would preclude any successful defense against a
determined attack. The factors responsible for the physical
deterioration of our forces are briefly discussed below:

(1)
Malnutrition: With the advent of the half-ration on January
7th,
the troops in Bataan were subjected to the ill effects of a diet that
was deficient both qualitatively and quantitatively. The
ration
averaged about 2,000 calories per day during January, 1,500 calories
during February, and only about 1,000 calories during the month of
March. The operation of a defense in a mountainous jungle
terrain
which required hand carrying of supplies over difficult trails and the
preparation of positions required a high energy output per man that can
be conservatively estimated at not less than 4,000 calories per
day. This large caloric deficit resulted in rapid depletion
of
fat reserves and by March 1st serious muscle wasting was evident in a
large percentage of the command, with attendant weakness, loss of
endurance, and nutritional edema. Since the principal
component
of the ration for the Philippine Army troops was milled rice, there was
a serious shortage of both protein and vitamins. No fruit was available
and the issue of canned vegetables and milk was negligible.
All
livestock on Bataan, including horses and ponies, we slaughtered and
issued. Clinical or incipient beriberi was not only universal
by
April 1st but in combination with malnutrition and nutritional edema
was the cause of the hospitalization of thousands of cases.
On
April 9th, the date of the capitulation, there was in Bataan only
enough food to make one issue of a half-ration.

(2)
Malaria: Malaria soon became the primary cause of admission
to
clearing stations and its incidence rose steadily until be March 1st it
reached 500 cases per day. By April1st the rate was
approaching
1,000 cases per day and the shortage of quinine was so acute that the
issue of the drug was based on an allowance of but eight grams per
case. As a result of the inadequate diet, convalescence from the
disease was greatly prolonged.

(3) Intestinal infections:
As would be expected in an army composed of untrained troops, there was
considerable laxness in the observance of the elementary rules of field
sanitation. Carelessness in
the disposal of excreta was common in front-line areas. There
was
much promiscuous drinking of unboiled water from streams and
pools. Mess gear was not properly washed and
sterilized.
The result was a rather high incidence of diarrheas and
dysenteries. A serious shortage of drugs for the treatment of
these conditions existed. Hookworm infestation was present in
a
large percentage of native troops because of their habit of going
barefoot.

(4) Fatigue: an important factor which
operated to reduce the combat efficiency of front-line divisions was
that of fatigue. The majority of front-line troops received
no
period of relief or rest in a rear area during the entire
campaign. While within regiments there was a rotation of
battalions holding the Outpost Line of Resistance, yet even those
troops in the regimental reserve line were subject to daily artillery
and serial bombardment. The fatigue resulting from constant
nervous tension definitely decreased the ability of these troops to
ensure a heavy bombardment such as that which ushered in the final
drive of the enemy.

(3) Final Period of Bataan Campaign.
(April 2d to April
9th) On April 2, 1942, the enemy launched a heavy attack
against the left of
II Corps, the immediate objective being Mt. Samat. The attack developed
rapidly, with the result that three clearing stations crowded with
patients were in danger of being overrun by the enemy. On the
night of April 2/3, convoys of about seventy-five buses each, operating
under personnel of the 12th Medical Battalion (PS), began the
evacuation of all medical installations in II Corps, priority being
based on the tactical situation. This massive evacuation was
completed on the night of April 5/6. The difficulties
encountered
by the personnel operating these convoys can be appreciated only by one
who has seen the total chaos that existed in forward areas during this
period. Roads were congested beyond description. In
one
instance a convoy was caught directly between enemy and friendly
infantry fire.

The enlisted personnel of the 12th Medical
Battalion were largely responsible for the success of this mass
movement of patients. Although the margin of safety was in
some
instances very narrow, no medical installation was captured by the
enemy prior to the capitulation on April 9th. A similar mass
evacuation was effected in I Corps during the nights of April 5th, 6th
and 7th. More than 7,000 patients were transported to
rear-area
medical installations during the
period April 2d to 7th. The burden of initially receiving and
messing this large body of patients fell largely on the personnel of
General Hospital Number 2, who are deserving of the highest praise for
the efficient manner in which they accomplished their task.
To
increase the bed capacity of this jungle hospital from 2,500 beds to
6,000 in a space of six days is an accomplishment unique in our
military medical history. General Hospital Number 1 initially
received patients during this period of mass evacuation, but after
being more severely bombed was considered unfit for the reception of
patients. After the second bombing, bed patients from General
Hospital Number 1 were transferred to General Hospital Number
2.
To relieve the congestion at this hospital, all rear-area medical units
were required to accept patients. A convalescent camp capable
of
caring for 3,500 patients was organized on April 7th. At the
time
of the surrender, on the morning of April 9th, there were some 12,000
patients in the service area. During the night of April 8th,
surplus medical personnel and all women nurses were transferred to Fort
Mills, Corregidor. The principal determining factor regarding
the
actual time of surrender was the situation of General Hospital Number
2, which with 6,000 patients lay directly in the path of the advancing
enemy. On the morning of April 9th, the front was less than
four
miles from this hospital.

The capitulation of Luzon Force
represents in many respects a defeat due to disease and starvation
rather than to military conditions. Malnutrition, malaria,
and
intestinal infections had reduced the combat efficiency of our forces
more than 75%. The Bataan Campaign can best be described as a
campaign of attrition, a campaign in which consumption without
replenishment was the rule. The physical fitness of our
troops
was so seriously impaired by March 1st that it became a determining
factor in tactical operations. From that date onward the
physical
deterioration of our forces was so rapid that by April 2d a successful
defensive stand was no longer possible.

4. THE REGIMENTAL
MEDICAL DETACHMENTS, LUZON.

This
report will deal primarily with conditions, as they actually existed
within the 45th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts,
during the Bataan
Campaign. It should be understood that conditions in this
particular unit, unsatisfactory as they were, to not give a composite
picture of the difficulties and hardships encountered by the medical
units involved in this campaign. The 45th Infantry (PS) was a
well-organized and well-trained portion of the Regular Army of the
United States prior to the outbreak of war, except for the fact that
the Philippine division had never been
authorized a medial Detachment by the War Department. To
offset
this deficiency, however, a group of soldiers furnished by the various
companies of the organization had been given special training in
Medical Department activities for a period of several months prior to
the outbreak of war. Although they were not allowed to transfer to the
Medical Department, they were loaned by the Company Commanders to the
Regimental Surgeon to help carry on the Medical Department service
throughout the war in Bataan. Two men from each company had
been
given this special training and, in addition, members of the Regimental
Band had been given some training in first aid and stretcher
bearing. None of these had ever been given training for
organized
Medical Detachment work in the field.

The officer strength of
the Medical Detachment consisted of the Regimental Surgeon and one
assistant prior to the outbreak of war. These officers were
in
the midst of training these combat soldiers loaned by the Regiment for
use by the Medical Department when the outbreak of war
occurred.
One Battalion of the 45th Infantry had been on beach defense duty in
Bataan for some time prior to December 8th.

It was not
until December 26th that the author of this report took over the duties
of Regimental Surgeon for the 45th Infantry. On this same
date a
full complement of eight Medical officers and one Dental officer were
finally attached to this Regiment for duty. There were
immediately assigned two Medical officers to each Battalion, and the
Regimental Surgeon with one assistant and one Dental officer remained
with the Regimental Headquarters. Even at this late date we
still
had only about one-third of the enlisted personnel that was required to
operate a satisfactory medical service for the Regiment and this matter
was taken up with the Regimental Commander, who cooperated in helping
round up men from the Band from the Military Police detachment to serve
as litter bearers and help out with the necessary routine around the
aid stations. Many of these men assigned to us at this time
had
been given absolutely no previous training in Medical work, but as time
went on most of them proved to be of great help to us in carrying out
our duties in the evacuation of wounded. Without them we
would
not have had enough men to form a litter squad for the various
Battalion Aid Stations.

The men who had been furnished by the
companies for training were, in general, left with their respective
units as company aid men. From all reports reaching me, from
their unit commanders, as well as from casualty reports, these men did
a job that lent credit to the Medical Department even though they were
still carried officially as combat troops.

In
addition to this improvised Regimental Medical Detachment, the 45th
Infantry (PS) was set up as a combat team with its own supporting and
service units attached. Consequent to this arrangement
Company A
(Collecting) of the 12th medical Battalion was attached to and served
directly under the Command of the Commanding Officer, 45th Infantry
throughout the Bataan Campaign. It is my opinion that having
this
company of highly trained medical personnel constantly available helped
more than any other single factor to enable us to render efficient
medical service to our combat units in the field.

This Company
had been given complete and thorough training in field operations for
years prior to the beginning of hostilities and its function in the
field under combat conditions reflected the thoroughness of its
training. The equipment was old and not complete in many
respects, but where facilities were lacking improvisations were made
and the work of evacuating and caring for the wounded went on without
complaint.

Immediately after the declaration of War, the
Philippine division, excepting the 26th Cavalry, was ordered to Bataan,
to defend the beaches along the West Coast and to organize and develop
its sector of the second defensive position along the Pilar-Bagac road.
The Regiment was divided from the beginning, with one battalion located
at the South end of the peninsula to the west of Mariveles and with the
Regimental Headquarters and two battalions occupying the area in the
vicinity of Bagac along the west central portion of the peninsula, a
distance between the two of some thirty kilometers. Thus it
became necessary from the very beginning to divide our limited medical
personnel into separate functional units to take care of these widely
separated portions of our combat force. In addition to the
battalion section of the Medical Detachment, a section of the
collecting Company also had to be detached to furnish medical care and
temporary hospitalization for that unit as well as ambulance service
for evacuating any seriously ill or wounded. I mention this
only
because it is a condition that developed in practically every combat
situation in which the 45th Infantry (PS) was engaged throughout the
Bataan Campaign. Had we had adequate personnel and equipment
it
would have resulted in nothing more than a temporary inconvenience, but
with supplies and equipment so limited it sometimes taxed our
facilities as well as personnel.

Around the 15th of January,
1942, the 45th Combat Team was ordered into the Abucay-Natib-Moron line
occupying a position near the Abucay Hacienda in the II Corps area. It
was here that our Regimental Medical Detachment had its first
opportunity to prove its worth under combat conditions. The Japanese
Army had made a penetration in our line and the 31st and 45th Infantry
Regiments had been thrown into the line at this point in an effort to
stop this break-through and reestablish our line along our prepared
defense position. As a result, the fighting was heavy and casualties
relatively high from the beginning of this first encounter
with the Japs.

The
terrain was such that our battalion aid station trucks had to be left
along the line of departure and all medical supplies had to be hand
carried on litters from that point forward. Battalion
surgeons
were advised to establish their aid stations in the vicinity of their
respective Battalion Headquarters in order that the Regimental Surgeon
could keep in telephonic communication through our headquarters line
and could send supplies and ambulances forward to collecting points
along the Abucay Hacienda road. This arrangement proved to be
a
great convenience because both Battalion and regimental Headquarters
gave us full cooperation in the use of their line and as a result
supplies were forwarded by every available means: litter
squads
going in to carry out the wounded, ration details going in with food,
and by ambulance to collecting points along the road where they would
be picked by details from the Battalion sections. In addition to this
arrangement for forward communications, the collecting company was
established with its forward section in the vicinity of the Regimental
Service Company and arrangements were made for the use of its line from
Regimental Headquarters to keep in contact with our ambulance
section. One ambulance was kept at all times at the
regimental
aid station and when a call from one of the forward units came in for
an ambulance this ambulance would be sent forward immediately to the
designated point and the next ambulance from the rear would be held at
Headquarters to be dispatched to the next unit sending in a
call.
In this way our limited ambulance equipment was made to cover the load
required of it in a satisfactory manner.

Although I am not
able to give a first-hand account of the conditions under which the
battalion Medical officers and men had to work during this engagement,
I am of the opinion, from information that reached me, that never in
the history of warfare have men of the medical profession been required
to carry out their duties under more trying and disheartening
circumstances. In some instances the terrain was such that
wounded men on stretchers would have to be lowered from the steep cliff
of a deep ravine by ropes improvised form vines cut from the jungle and
then carried by litter back to the only road that penetrate the
area. At no time during this encounter were they able to
secure
themselves from the constant bursting artillery and the smaller charges
of the Japanese knee mortar as well as the constant harassing of the
low-flying dive bombers, yet they carried on to the satisfaction of
all.

The rear section of the collecting company was
established in an old church in Balanga throughout the first Battle of
Bataan and remained in operation until the main body of our combat
troops had been withdrawn to their second defense position along the
Pilar-Bagac road leaving only a "shell" to hold back the enemy until
their new position could be occupied. This withdrawal
occurred on
the night of January 25/26 and it was
during this final hour that Jap artillery opened up the building in
which the collecting company was housed. This shelling
resulted
in quote a few casualties among the patients still in the station and a
Medical officer of Company A was wounded by a fragment of the shell
which killed the patient whom he was attending.

The morning of
January 26th found the 45th Infantry in its new position on our second
defense line in I Corps. After an all night forced march of
some
twenty-five kilometers, one company from each battalion of the 45th,
along with medical personnel, was left to form the "shell" or covering
force for our withdrawal.

On the morning of January 27th, the
45th Infantry was ordered to bivouac in the vicinity of the Saysain
River, to be held in corps reserve, but by afternoon of the same day
the 3d Battalion was ordered to move south to Anyasan Point where the
Japs had effected a landing and were threatening our lines of
communication in the left flank. This move again necessitated
splitting up our medical installation to cover the fighting in that
area. The following day the 2d Battalion was ordered to the
adjoining sector known as Quinauan Point and that afternoon the
Regimental Headquarters and 1st Battalion were ordered back into action
in the Tuol River sector of the main defense line some twenty-five
kilometers in the opposite direction. Thus the combat units
for
which we were responsible were fighting on two widely separated fronts
and with all three battalions committed at the same time. In
addition the attached artillery and engineering units, for which we
were responsible also, were scattered all along the trail between the
two infantry fronts.

I mention this tactical situation only to
give some idea of the distances involved in our effort to render
medical service to our command. These distances had to be
covered
by ambulances operating over winding, narrow trails that had been
carved through the jungles of Bataan by our corps of
engineers.

The
chief obstacle to be overcome in this second situation was the one of
evacuation from our various aid stations, back to the collecting
station or to one of the general hospitals, as the seriousness of the
cases warranted.

To accomplish this mission with our limited
facilities, the base section of the collecting station was established
along the main west road a distance of about five kilometers to the
north of Quinauan and Anyasan Points and was expanded by improvising
beds from bamboo strips taken from the jungle to accommodate most of
our sick and minor wounded for definitive treatment. One
section
of ambulances operated between this station and the two battalions
engaged at Anyasan and Quinauan Points, taking only the seriously
wounded back to one of the general hospitals and bringing sick and
minor wounded to the collecting station for treatment.

The
other section of ambulances operated forward from the collecting
station a distance of some twenty to twenty-five kilometers to the
Regimental aid station and the aid station of the 1st
Battalion.
These ambulances were kept in constant cooperation forward.
As
soon as each ambulance reached the station and unloaded it would return
immediately to the regimental aid station, where it would be held until
a full load of wounded accumulated and it would then be released to go
back and unload, with instructions to return without waiting for a
call. It was only by using every available means of moving
the
sick and minor injuries back that e were able to cope with the
evacuation load from this sector.

At the conclusion of
these two battles around the 12th of February, 1942, our collecting
station resembled a good size field hospital with most of our patients
then suffering from malaria, dysentery, and various minor injuries,
these being treated entirely within our own unit, and only the serious
cases being evacuated to the general hospitals.

At the
conclusion of these two battles the 45th Infantry was again ordered
into bivouac and placed in Army Reserve. This time the entire
regiment was bivouacked on Bobo Point.

During the heat of
battle at Quinauan Point one of he key noncommissioned officers
developed a severe toothache and word was sent that the Regimental
dentist was badly needed in that sector. This necessitated
sending him a distance of some twenty to thirty kilometers from the
Tuol River sector down to Quinauan Point to do an extraction and since
the commanding Officer felt that he could not get along without this
man the dentist was sent down and the extraction
accomplished.
However, after this battle was over and the regiment went into bivouac,
it was recommended that a dental survey be carried out in the field and
all suspicious looking teeth extracted before we were ordered back into
the battle. This was done and the Regimental dentist actually
did
ninety-four extractions in one day in the field. Needless to
say,
we had no further trouble with key men being out of action on account
of toothaches. Although circumstances did not afford much
opportunity for the men to get dental treatment during actual combat,
the Regimental Dental Officer became one of the busiest offices in the
regiment as soon as we went into bivouac. I do not mean to
say
that he did not keep busy during combat conditions, but at that time
was doing other medical tasks, not primarily dental.

During the
Battles of Tuol River and Quinauan and Anyasan Points, the ration which
had been less than one-half the regular field ration since January 7,
1942, was reduced more drastically than anyone had realized and men of
the 45th were already beginning to show physical signs of
deficiency. At one time during the Battle of Tuol
River the rice ration reached an all-time low of seven ounces of rice
per man per day. This condition prevailed for only a few
days,
when it was raised again to nine ounces per man per day. The
only
other item of the diet which was received in significant quantities was
salmon. By the end of February, the diet consisted almost
entirely of rice. During March the diet averaged about one
can of
salmon for fourteen men and nine ounces of rice per man per
day.
There were a few other items but the quantity was insignificant, for
example, one can of evaporated milk for twenty to thirty men per day.

After
the Battles of Quinauan and Anyasan Points and of the Tuol River
sector, the 45th Infantry went into Corps reserve on Bobo Point, where
it remained during the remainder of February and the early part of
March. This bivouac area was so situated that it did not
necessitate moving the base section of the collecting company and
during this period it served the regiment more as a hospital than as a
collecting company. By this time gasoline was rationed so
severely that only a few gallons per day was authorized for medical
purposes for the regiment. Consequently most of our sick were
treated within our own unit installations. Quinine for
prophylactic use had been discontinued and consequently malaria became
rife. Most of the places suitable for the bivouacking of
troops
had been previously occupied by other units less well disciplined in
the employment of field sanitation methods with the result that the
area into which we moved was thoroughly contaminated. Flies
were
swarming everywhere and breeding faster than could be copped with and
streams had been polluted with human feces. In spite of every
effort to control flies and exercise every due precaution, such as
boiling all drinking water and having a Medical officer personally
inspect the mess line at every meal and supervise the sterilizing of
mess equipment after each feeding, dysentery became
prevalent.
Few men in the outfit escaped without some form of acute enteric
infection. Most of these now had to be treated either at the
battalion aid stations or evacuated no further to the rear than our own
collecting station. Sulfa drugs were running short and only
the
most serious cases could be treated with sulfa drugs, the milder ones
being treated only by nonspecific remedies.

While in this
bivouac, orders we issued for all troops to be given injections of a
mixed vaccine for cholera and dysentery which was a product of the
Philippine Department of Public Health. This order was
carried
out throughout the regiment, but its effectiveness in reducing the
incidence of dysentery was not perceptibly demonstrated.

Around
the 10th of March the 45th Infantry was ordered back toward the second
general defense line and bivouacked near the junction of trails 9 and
17 where it remained until the final days of the war on
Bataan.
Except for the constant harassing effect of low-flying dive-bombers and
an occasional flurry of artillery we had no
further combat until the final push.

During
this last period one bomb was dropped in the collecting station, which
had been set up for only a few hours. This resulted in the
death
of only two patients and a few minor injuries.

At the end of
March deficiency disease had become so prevalent that a physical
inspection was ordered for all troops in the 45th Infantry with a view
to be finding out what percent of this unit was actually showing
physical signs of deficiency disease. When the final report
was
in, it was disclosed an alarming high of over 18% of the command to be
exhibiting physical signs and over 50% complaining of symptoms
definitely pointed to deficiency disease. Nutritional edema
was
the first and most prevalent physical sign and night blindness one of
the commonest complaints.

The diet during the last month in
Bataan had averaged less than 1,000 calories per day and consisted
chiefly of polished rice. The Regimental Headquarters mess
received one can of salmon for fourteen officers per day and an
occasional cup of sugar but never in sufficient quantities to be of any
significance in figuring the caloric value of the diet. Men
were
becoming so weak from starvation that they could hardly carry the packs,
and in our last move I saw more scouts fall out of the line of march
than I had ever seen fall out on any march before.

During
the final days in Bataan orders were given to remove all patients in I
Corps back to or beyond km. post 208 along the west road.
Complying with this order necessitated moving all patients then sick in
the aid stations, collecting stations, and in several of the Philippine
Army clearing stations, which had been set up and operating as regular
field hospitals for many weeks. The total number of patients
moved in this last maneuver is not known but from the left sub sector
alone it is estimated that around 600 to 800 patients had to be
evacuated. Convoys of large passenger buses were sent up from
Army motor pools to accomplish this move and every available piece of
transportation with our own units was put into operation.
Patients that would, under normal field conditions, have been handled
as litter patients were required to make this long, all-night move as
sitting patients in regular passenger sues. The difficulties
encountered in this mass movement of patients can be appreciated only
by one who is familiar with the trails of Bataan and knows something of
obstacles to be overcome in operating a convoy of large buses under
blackout conditions. The problem of turning the convoy alone
becomes one of almost insurmountable difficulty.

To give an accurate word picture of conditions as they actually existed
at the time immediately preceding the surrender our
forces on Bataan would tax the descriptive powers of a rhetorical
genius, but in simple language almost every man on Bataan was
suffering, not only from the effects of prolonged starvation, but also
from one of both of the acute infections that plagued us through the
campaign, viz, dysentery and malaria. I have seen men brought
into the battalion aid stations and die of an overwhelming infection of
dysentery or of cerebral malaria before they could be tagged and
classified for evacuation. Of the supposedly well men in the
field, all were thin and weak from starvation. Many were
swollen
with nutritional edema; a large percentage were pale and anemic from
repeated attacks of malaria or dysentery. In addition every
man
was sick in spirit as our last ray of hope for reinforcement faded with
the final order of surrender.

The following is an account of one of the Battalion Surgeons with a
Philippine Scout Regiment in Bataan.

Our
battalion medical detachment consisted of two Medical officers and
twenty-six enlisted men. These men were Philippine Scouts and
had
been well trained for their duties in the field. They had
pride
of organization so typical of all the scouts and their discipline and
morale were of the highest type. Our unit was assigned to beach defense
in the area from Agloloma to Mariveles, Bataan, from 10 December 1941
until 15 January 1942.

The medical aspects during this period were not unusual. Medical
supplies conforming to the tables of
supply for the battalion medical detachment were issued and preparation
for combat were completed.

On 14 January 1942 we moved to a
bivouac area on the Pilar-Bagac road. On the 195h we moved
over
the back road up to the Abucay Hacienda road and were immediately
committed to combat. The Japanese were attacking by units
without
a formed lien and on the first day of our attack we were able to push
through to our main line of defense. Casualties occurred
sporadically day and night through this period and were
heavy. We
remained on the Abucay Hacienda position, man line of resistance, until
27 January. Our food situation in this position was
desperate, as
we were completely cut off from our sources of supplies by Jap
infiltration. An accumulated group of patients were
immobilized in
the aid station unable to be evacuated. The situation was relieved when
one-half hour before our unit moved to a new position, food and litter
bearers arrived. The wounded were immediately loaded and sent
back to the hospital. This evacuation of wounded was
eventually
completed and constitutes one of he outstanding minor feats performed
by medical personnel during the campaign on Bataan. It
involved a
trip of five miles of this small litter caravan without escort, over
the most impassable type of terrain. The group left at 3:00
PM
and arrived at the ambulances, five miles back, at 1:30 AM. When
I saw them leave I felt they had a slim chance to get through alive,
but the only alternative was to leave them, with medical attendants, to
be captured. The chance of completing the trip was deemed
more
promising than the alternative.

At 3:00 PM on 27 January, our
unit took up a new position on the same Abucay Hacienda line. That
night the withdrawal of our forces from this line was effected and we
took up a new position near Bagac at km. post5 220. That
night we
bivouacked at km. post 218, and early the next morning orders were
received to leave immediately for the Agloloma area to combat Jap
troops which had landed from the sea on the left flank of the Bataan
position. Our battalion formed the north flank of the
encircling
pocket around the Jap forces. We were attacked in continual
combat from 29 January until 15 February, when the area was cleared of
Japs. During this period our casualties were heavy.
Jap
machine gun nests were well dug in and it required hand-to-hand
fighting to eliminate them.

Evacuation of the wounded was
effected rapidly and the time lag from the time the wound was incurred
until the patient was in a general hospital averaged only two or three
hours.

Sanitation was difficult to keep under control.
All water was chlorinated; slit trench latrines were used. It
was
impossible to use mosquito bars. Deficiency disease, malaria, and
dysentery were beginning to appear in increasing numbers.

After
leaving this area our unit was placed in reserve and reorganization was
effected. The regiment had been in continuous battle for one
month and the personnel had been severely depleted.

Battle casualties accounted for the majority of the ineffectives, but
disease was becoming an increasingly important element.

On
April 5th our unit was ordered to move east on Trail 8, but the
Japanese had broken through so thoroughly east of Mt. Sarnat that a
union with the II Corps could not be effected.

I estimate that
in Bataan, from 14 January - 9 April 1941, two-thirds of the original
personnel were either killed or were casualties separated from the
unit. The replacements taken from the Philippine Army were in
even worse physical shape than the remnants of the unit.

By
the time of the surrender, due to excess combat, starvation, deficiency
disease, malaria, dysentery, and battle casualties, the unit was unfit
for combat.

5. HOSPITALIZATION
IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The
problem of hospitalization in the Philippines in the event of war with
Japan had been given consideration for many years in the war plans
drafted to meet such a contingency. As the major military
effort
had been expected in Luzon, plans were formulated for the development
of a hospital center in Manila and expansion of various station
hospitals. With Sternberg General Hospital as the basic unit,
it
was planned initially to develop sufficient annexes to handle from
3,000 to 5,000 patients and to expand further as the exigency of the
military situation demanded. Accordingly a number of schools
and
colleges in Manila were tentatively selected for conversion into
hospitals. Expansion of Sternberg Hospital was begun in the
late
summer of 1941 as U.S. Troops in the Philippines increased, and the
Philippine army was inducted into the service of the United
States. The normal peacetime capacity of Sternberg was
increased
from 450 to 800 beds by November 15, 1941. Conversion of
Estado
Mayor Barracks on nearby Arroceres Street was in progress when war
began. In June 1941, work begun on the old Station Hospital
building at Fort William McKinley. For a number of years, it
had
been used as a dispensary and for the treatment of a few minor medical
cases, all other patients being treated at Sternberg. This building was
reconditioned and a 250-bed station hospital established with adequate
medical and surgical staffs. However most equipment was
obsolete
as other areas were higher on the priority lists at that time and it
could not be obtained in the Philippine Islands. At Fort
Stotsenburg the 350 bed Station Hospital was fairly well equipped
according to prewar standards and it had averaged a daily patient
census of 175. A 750-bed addition was under construction when
war
began. At Fort Mills, Corregidor, expansion of facilities was
carried out in late 1941, mostly by alteration and renovation of
existing structures. Until 1941 no steps were taken to
provide
fixed medical installations on Bataan. Reconnaissance of that
area was made repeatedly that year and the buildings of a small post at
Limay, normally used for the housing of Philippine Scouts training in
Bataan, were earmarked for use as a hospital. In the fall of
1941
the equipment of one general hospital was stored in a warehouse
adjacent to this post.

A. Manila Hospital Center,
December 8th to 31st, 1941.

On
December 8, 1941, development of the Manila Hospital Center was
begun. To Sternberg General Hospital was assigned the mission
of
receiving and treating all casualties until such time as annexes could
be prepared to take over part of the burden. On December 12,
1941, an order was issued constituting the Center. Its
composition is as listed below:

The functioning of this Center, naturally, is divided into the
reception and treatment of casualties and the development, equipping
and staffing of the various annexes.

The full impact and brunt
of the terrific problem so abruptly thrust upon the Medical Department
was borne almost wholly by Sternberg Hospital. There were
thirty-five Medical Department officers, thirty-seven nurses and 224
Medical Department enlisted men on duty at Sternberg when War
began. On December 8th, the discharge of all non-urgent
military
and civilian cases and beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration was
accomplished to provide maximum space for expected
casualties. On
the afternoon of December 8th, two medical officers, four nurses and
forth enlisted men were detached and sent to the Station at Fort
Stotsenburg to assist in the care of casualties incurred in the air
raid on Clark field at 12:00 noon that date. A brief resume
of
the care of gas casualties was given to the remaining personnel of
Sternberg that afternoon. The organization of twenty surgical
teams and the issuing of additional supplies also was
accomplished. Construction of slit trenches in the grounds of
the
hospital for the protection of patients and personnel were begun, and
rapidly completed in a few days. Blackout precautions which
had
been developed some months earlier were strictly observed.
All
personnel were placed on twenty-four hour duty status and many of the
medical officers arranged to sleep in the hospital to facilitate care
for the sick and wounded. A hospital mess was opened for all
officer duty personnel.

The problem of
adequate personnel of all categories was most urgent. A cadre
of
some seventy-five Filipino Medical Corps and Dental Corps officers that
were undergoing special instruction at Camp Murphy by American Medical
Corps officers were assigned en masse to the control of the Manila
Hospital Center. These officers were utilized at Sternberg
and at
the various annexes as they were organized. Certain of the
Dental
Corps officers were assigned as motor pool control officers, assistant
supply and mess officers, etc. A large number of civilians, both male
and female, registered for any type of work available and a great
number of these were employed throughout the Center. Certain
civilian missionary physicians were attached to the Center as described
in the history of Annex "D". Four U.S. Public Health Offices offered
their services and were sent to Corregidor about December 25,
1941. The greater part of the medical personnel from the
station
Hospital at Fort William McKinley were amalgamated with Sternberg on
December 13th and similar personnel from the Station Hospital, Fort
Stotsenburg, were amalgamated December 24th and transferred shortly
thereafter to Bataan.

Influx of casualties began during the
early morning hours of December 9th. As the days passed and
the
bombing raids increased in severity, a steady flow of wounded arrived
from Iba, Clark field, Stotsenburg, Nichols Field, Cavite Naval Base,
Manila, and later from the Luzon fronts. The surgical teams
were
extremely busy. Effort was made to provide rest periods but
when
the influx of patients was particularly heavy all surgeons were
occupied as long as two to three days without rest. Nurses
and
corpsmen similarly shared the burden without complaint.
Professional care of the patients was continued on a high plain of
efficiency, although he personnel was hampered by fatigue from overwork
and strain. The casualties were difficult to cope with as
they
were comprised of severe complicated fractures, burns, crushing and
tearing injuries, perforations of viscera, skull and brain
injuries. Due to the blackout and inevitable speeding of
traffic
in Manila and elsewhere, the accident rate rose sharply and a large
number of severe traffic casualties burdened our overtaxed surgical
staff.

Tension and strain was at a maximum during these early
days. Air raid sirens wailed day and night. An
attempt was
made to keep the most serious cases on the lower floors and the less
serious cases seek protection in the slit trenches during the
raids. Due to our proximity to Philippine Army Headquarters
which
was directly across the street, it was felt that our area might be
bombed at any time. This feeling was intensified as flights
of
Japanese bombers flew at will over our heads at low altitude releasing
their bombs on the port areas and walled city. Our buildings
shook violently with each burst of bomb and caused extreme anxiety to
unfortunates unable to be moved to the slit trenches. During
these
trying hours the nurses, medical officers and civilians assigned to the
wards reassured the wounded and by their calm and cheerful attitude
comforted them.

No proper statistical record of the sick and
wounded for this period is available. Records were maintained
on
all casualties admitted to Sternberg Hospital and when patients were
transferred the records accompanied them to the various annexes. Due to
the tremendous volume of work and shortage of personnel the records
were necessarily brief. When transfer to Bataan was ordered
all
records were sent by boat to Corregidor. Unfortunately this
ship
was sunk by Japanese dive-bombers and all records were lost.
It
is believed that approximately 2,000 military and civilian patients ere
admitted during the first three weeks of the War. This does
not
include a number of casualties admitted to civilian hospitals in Manila
and to various provincial Philippine hospitals. Many were
returned to duty and the balance were transferred to Bataan or
evacuated to Australia. Some 80 patients from Manila were
transferred to Hospitals Number 1 and Number 2 in Bataan, a few days
after these hospitals were established. Late on the evening
of
December 31st, 1941, approximately 225 seriously injured American and
Philippine patients were evacuated from Manila on the Mactan which
eventually reached Australia safely. All remaining ambulant
military patients were transferred to Bataan the same night.

The
organization of the Manila Hospital Center was carried out against
almost insurmountable difficulties. Our first project was the
absorption of the Naval Hospital from Canacao. The Commanding Officer
felt that the proximity of his hospital to the Cavite Naval Base placed
it in great danger. On December 9, 1941, the 154 patients
were
transferred to Sternberg General Hospital, the majority of them being
placed in Annex "B" (Estado Mayor Barracks). The medical and
nursing staff were merged with the Sternberg staff and assigned to
appropriate duties. A portion of medical supplies and beds
from
Canacao were moved to Sternberg. On December 11th the naval
Hospital Commander secured the Philippine Union College at Balintawak,
a suburb of Manila, about eight miles distant. Ina few days
when
facilities were developed there he transported the above mentioned
patients from Annex "B".

A brief history of each Annex will now
be given and they will be considered alphabetically. Certain
annexes were partially developed while others functioned actively. It
is to be remembered that the administration of Sternberg Hospital was
carried out simultaneously with the planning and operations necessary
to develop and expand the various annexes. Hence the
administrative personnel had a double burden which became more
difficult to bear as the days passed. Duty hours were from
eighteen to twenty hours a day.

Annex
"A." The Jai Alai building was a modern reinforced
concrete
building at 204 Taft Avenue. It contained dining room, bars,
dance floor and a large concrete court on which Jai Alai was
played. it was selected for a general surgical center and was
completely equipped with supplies and some 250 beds were placed on the
Jai Alai court. To augment the water supply a deep well was
dug. It was planned to relieve the overtaxed surgical
pavilion at
Sternberg and after initial operating procedures were performed to
transfer the patients to appropriate annexes. A section of
this
building was arranged to house the Headquarters Section of the Medical
Center. Distribution of necessary equipment, beds, medical
supplies, food, line, etc., to all annexes was performed by the medical
supply section of Sternberg Hospital in cooperation with the personnel
of the Medical Depot. This annex did not actually
function.
Just as preparations were completed on December 22nd, orders were
received to discontinue expansion in Manila and move medical facilities
to Bataan.

Annex "B." The barracks of Estado Mayor on
Arroceres
Street, adjacent to Quezon Bridge, were utilized primarily for handling
convalescent and venereal case. Time was insufficient to
permit
extensive renovation of these barracks. Most of the buildings
were old and dilapidated and were located too close to the Quezon
Bridge, which was considered to be a military objective that the enemy
might attack. All overflow convalescents from Sternberg, the
majority of Canacao Naval Hospital group and most of the patients from
Station Hospital, Fort William McKinley, were housed here. In
the
latter group were some 100 venereal cases. This annex was
closed
about December 25th and patients ere transported to Bataan.

Annex
"C." This annex was developed primarily to handle medical
cases.
It consisted of a thee-story building with a center court. On
December 16th, it was assigned ten Filipino doctors, twenty Filipino
enlisted men, forty-two normal school girls as attendants, one matron,
six American enlisted men, four Filipino civilian cooks, two Filipino
civilian chauffeurs, a number of American and Filipino nurses and two
surgical teams, headed by American medical officers who were assigned
for duty here when not engaged in surgery at Sternberg Hospital. The
first floor contained the kitchen, dining room, headquarters, pharmacy,
medical supply rooms and a ward for bed-ridden cases. The
second
floor housed three wards for ambulatory cases and a small laboratory
while the third floor housed the personnel. By December 25th some
seventy-five medical cases were being cared for. On that date
all
equipment and supplies were removed and with the military personnel
were
sent to Bataan while patients were returned to Sternberg Hospital for
alter evacuation to Bataan.

Annex "D." Within a day or two after the
outbreak of War, the entire
nursing staff, permanent medical staff of four or five Filipino
physicians, all equipment and supplies of St. Paul's hospital in the
walled city were offered to the Medical Department, U.S.
army.
Due to its location near the port area, its transfer to a safer area
was considered mandatory. Accordingly this hospital was moved
to
the Filipino Woman's University where alterations were promptly
made. The bed capacity was approximately 500. In
addition
to an Army staff of medical officers and nurses, three transient
missionary physicians were assigned. This annex functioned
actively as much of the overflow of Sternberg Hospital was transferred
there. On December 28th, it was decided to remove all
patients
from Sternberg Hospital because of the repeated bombing of the nearby
walled city. Moreover, as most military medial personnel had
been
transferred to Bataan and Corregidor by that time, it was felt that
care of these casualties could be more effectively carried out by using
the nursing and civilian medial group now attached to Annex
"D."
As a result of this transfer, the census in Annex "D" rose to about
600. After the closure of Sternberg all casualties received
from
the North Luzon front were now handled at Annex "D" and "E."

Annex
"E." The development of this annex began about
December
9th. Some 450 beds were provided and nursing and surgical
staffs
assigned. This unit was operating satisfactorily and had
approximately 200 patients when orders were received on December 22nd
for evacuation of Manila. Like all annexes it had been
stocked
with linen, food, drugs, medical equipment, dental and laboratory
supplies. The Commanding Officer, Manila Hospital Center, now
decided to relinquish this hospital to Naval Medical control. On
December 26th, the 150 naval patients from the Philippine Union College
at Balintawak were moved to this more favorably located and thoroughly
stocked and equipped institution. The few remaining naval
patients in Sternberg Hospital were transferred to this annex on
December 28th. The German Sisters that operated this school
were
very cooperative and rendered outstanding service to our nurses in the
care of the sick and wounded, during the period when this institution
was under Army medical control.

Annex "F." This was
essentially a non-functioning unit. The majority of medical
personnel and all patients were transferred from Fort William McKinley
to Annex "B" on December 13, 1941. It was decided not to use
Station Hospital, Fort William McKinley, except as a last resort
because of a concern of possible bombing by the enemy. As
previously stated, the personnel were amalgamated with those of
Sternberg General Hospital and were eventually sent to Bataan about
December 25, 1941.

Annex "G." This unit was developed
for medical and surgical cases. Approximately seventy-five
patients were under treatment when its closure was ordered on December
22nd. The Sisters of this Convent rendered valuable
assistance to
our nurses and the medical staff. There was no significant
evens during the short period
of its existence.

Annex
"H." The development of this annex began December
15th. The
building was of reinforced concrete and three stories high.
Space
was ample for wards, messing, operating rooms, utilities, laboratory
and X-ray. Some 1,100 desks and platforms had to be removed
before necessary alterations could be made. This was
accomplished
and some 700 beds were in place by December 20th. All
constructions was complete except for some plumbing. The
students
and faculty of this school actively participated in the labor required
and gave valuable assistance to the Medical Department and
Quartermaster Corps men assigned to the task. On December
21st
orders were issued to suspend work on this unit. No patients
were
handled at this annex. Personnel were sent to Bataan about
December 25th.

The rapid advance of Japanese forces, from
Legaspi and Lingayon, toward Manila soon demonstrated that the concept
of stabilized warfare was erroneous and that we should have no need for
a Medical Center in Manila. Unfortunately it meant that only
a
very limited time remained to transfer our equipment and supplies to
Bataan and Corregidor. On December 22nd the first cadre of
Medical Corps officers, nurses and enlisted men left by truck convoy
for Limay and Bataan. On December 25th the majority of the
remaining military personnel were transferred by boat to Bataan to
establish General Hospital Number 2. All Army nurses
remaining
were transferred to Corregidor December 29th. Civilian nurses
attached to the Medical Center were ordered to remain in
Manila.
A few Medical Department officers and men remained in Manila to effect
the final evacuation of patients. This was accomplished
December
31st, 1941, the most serious cases being transferred to Australia on
the Mactan and the balance transferred to Bataan on the Bohol.

This
report would not be complete unless mention were made of the superior
performance of duty by all personnel -- morale was high and cooperation
and teamwork at its best. There was no complaining nor
shirking.
Officers, men, nurses and civilians worked at top speed, taking only
the absolute minimum of rest. The personnel of the medical
supply
section of Sternberg Hospital and the Medical Depot, port Area,
performed magnificently in the task of supplying the Hospital
Center. They labored day and night collecting and
transporting
beds, mattresses, linen, food, drugs, equipment and various supplies of
all kinds. The Commanding Officer of the Medical Depot
promptly
"froze" all civilian medical supplies in Manila and then purchased and
delivered to the Center great quantities which supplemented materially
our own supplies. Later this same group functioned
brilliantly in
transporting vast quantities of material to Bataan and Corregidor
during the period December 22nd to December great quantities which
supplemented materially our own supplies. Later this same
group
functioned brilliantly in transporting vast quantities of material to
Bataan and Corregidor during the period December 22nd to December 31st,
1941.

Hospitalization on Bataan - December4 22, 1941 - June
25, 1942. Hospitalization
facilities on Bataan consisted of: (a) General Hospital
Number 1,
Limay, Bataan (transferred to Little Baguio), km. post 169 on January
25, 1942; (2) General Hospital Number 2, Cabcabin, km. post 162.5; (3)
Philippine Army General Hospital, Base Camp, km. post 171.
This
report does not deal with hospitalization in clearing companies in
forward divisional areas which was necessary on a very large scale
during the later part of the campaign.
General Hospital Number 1 - December 23, 1941 to June 29, 1942.
General
Hospital Number 1 was organized per verbal orders of the Commanding
General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, on December 23rd,
1941. On this date the hospital was opened at Camp Limay,
Bataan. The greater part of the equipment and supplies for a
1000
bed general hospital had been stored at this camp some months
previously in accordance with War plans. Additional supplies including
some food stores, were trucked from the Station Hospital, Fort William
McKinley, and the disbanding Manila Hospital Center by Personnel of
Hospital Number 1 between December 23, 1941, and January 1st, 1942,
when Manila fell to the Japanese.

The buildings at Camp Limay
consisted of sixteen wooden buildings with roofs of nipa, measuring
approximately twenty-five by seventy-five feet in size, fifteen of
which were used as wards and one as officers' quarters. There
were six buildings of the same construction, measuring approximately
eighteen by twenty-seven feet in size, which served to house the
Department Surgeon's Branch Office, Hospital Headquarters, minor
surgery, dental clinic, laboratory, receiving office and pharmacy,
Quartermaster's Office and Registrar's Office. One large
building
about twice the size of the ward buildings was used as a nurses'
quarters at one end and the officers' mess at the other. One
large building was used as the main operating pavilion. There
were ten buildings, varying in size, which were used as mess halls,
bakery, latrines and general laundry. There were four large
galvanized iron buildings, measuring approximately eighty by one
hundred feet, that were used as convalescent ward, medical supply,
storage warehouse, and drying room for the hospital laundry.

The
camp water supply was pumped from a deep artesian well into a settling
reservoir and then into a large water tower of about five thousand
gallons capacity. All water used in the camp was chlorinated
before placing in coolers for use. The entire camp was wired
for
electricity, which was furnished by the hospital's owned 50 Kilowatt
generator driven by a Diesel motor.

The camp was well laid out
and was generally located just east of the Barrio of Limay on a fairly
level area, bordered on the East by manila Bay, on the West by the main
highway to Manila, on the North by the Limay River and on the South by
a large farm.

The greater part of the
personnel of General Hospital Number 1 arrived at Camp Limay from the
Manila Hospital Center and Station Hospitals at Fort William McKinley
and Fort Stotsenburg in December 23, 1941. This was
supplemented
by a few more officers, nurses and enlisted men who arrived in the next
few days.

During the first week, most of the time was spent
breaking out equipment and supplies and in organizing the hospital.
However, the hospital was ready to receive patients on the 25th and did
receive eight patients, two of which were operated on the 25th, and
some bombing casualties on the 26th and 27th. On the 28th,
the
first frontline casualties, 212 were received.

Although the
hospital was organized as a 1,000-bed general hospital and functioned
as such, its chief function while at Camp Limay was as a surgical
hospital, there being very few medical cases admitted. The
surgery of the hospital was well equipped and had eight operating
tables and one orthopedic table which were manned day and night when
necessary by twelve operating teams, consisting of surgeons, nurses and
corpsmen who worked together as a team. From December 26,
1941,
until January 25, 1942, when the hospital moved to Little Baguio, more
than 1,200 battle casualties requiring major surgery were treated at
General Hospital Number 1. On January 16, 1942, 182 major
surgical operations were performed in twenty-four hours.

Since
the capacity of the hospital was only 1,000 beds, it was necessary to
transfer many cases after a few days hospitalization to General
Hospital Number 2, located near Cabcaben, Bataan. The
evacuation
was very ably handled by personnel attached to General Hospital Number
1.

During the entire period, General Hospital Number 1
was locate at Camp Limay, enemy planes flew over the hospital nearly
every hour of the day. However, the hospital was not bombed or its work
interfered with in any way. This was probably due to the fact
that the hospital was so well marked. Three of the black
roofs of
the large warehouses were painted with large white crosses.
On
the East, South and West side of the hospital were three large red
crosses, approximately forty-five feet in diameter, made of sheets and
red cloth. On January 3, 1942, the Barrio of Limay was bombed
about 100 yards from the hospital and scattered shrapnel did fall into
the hospital. There were no casualties or property damage within the
hospital area itself. About the middle of January 1942, it
became
apparent from the tactical situation that the hospital must be moved
further to the rear or come under enemy artillery fire. A new
site for the hospital was selected at Little Baguio where the buildings
of an Engineer camp existed. On January 23rd, a contingent of
officers, nurses and men were transferred to Little Baguio to open up
the new hospital. On January 25th, the remaining personnel
and
equipment were moved. All of the patients, numbering 750,
were
transferred from General Hospital Number 1 to General Hospital Number
2, on the 23rd, 24th and 25th of January.

The hospital at
Little Baguio was located in the semi-permanent campsite used by the
14th Engineers (PS) before the War. There were three large
wooden
buildings, roofed with galvanized iron, one of which was used as an
officers' quarters, one was used as a nurses' quarters and officers'
mess, and one was used as the main operating pavilion. One
smaller building was used as hospital headquarters. There
were
two large open garages, measuring approximately thirty by 120 foot in
size, and running parallel to each other and about fifty feet
apart. These were made into six wards. There were
three
galvanized iron warehouses of different sizes, one of which was used
for medical supplies, one a s detachment mess hall and one as the
laboratory and pharmacy. One smaller garage was used as a
patients' mess and one semi-permanent galvanized iron and bamboo
building was used as a barracks for the detachment, medical
Department. As the influx of casualties increased, the
hospital
was expanded by additional construction. Initially it was
provided with 250 beds. Later one large ward with triple
decker
beds to accommodate 750 patients was constructed to the rear of the
nurses' quarters. The open space between the two garages was
covered and by using triple decker beds, 450 more patients could be
housed. A prisoner of war ward for Japanese prisoners was
constructed and at the time of the capitulation there were thirty-four
in this ward. By the first of April the hospital was able to
care
for approximately 2,500 patients and on the morning of April 7, 1942,
there were 1,840 actually in the hospital and about 450 awaiting
admission. The latter were mainly cases of malaria and
dysentery
that had just arrived from clearing stations.

On March 30,
1942, at 10:17 AM, the hospital was bombed by two-motored bombers of
the Japanese Army which had been engaged in the past five days in heavy
area bombing in the Communications Zone. Both incendiary and
demolition bombs were used, several striking directly in the hospital
area. As a result of this bombing there were
twenty-three
killed and seventy-eight injured -- of these, ten were Medical
Department personnel. The officers' quarters, officers' mess,
hospital headquarters and main operating room were struck by many
fragments. On April 7, 1942, at 10:15 AM, the hospital was
again
bombed. This raid seemed to be intentional and directed
against
the hospital. At least ten bombs, weighing 500 pounds each,
fell
in the hospital grounds. There were seventy-three killed and
117
injured; sixteen of the latter died within forth-eight hours.
Property damage was very heavy. Ward 5 was completely
demolished. The
roofs of the main wards were all warped and out of place. In
fact, most of the buildings were warped and out of line, or riddled
with shrapnel. On the whole the function of the hospital was
completely disrupted. On April 9th, the hospital was captured
by
he Japanese army.

After capitulation, hospital personnel and
patients remained in the same location and during the following month
repaired and rebuilt the hospital. On May 11th, about 600
patients were transferred from General Hospital Number 2 to Hospital
Number 1 and the Medical Department personnel of that hospital
bivouacked in the nearby Ordnance Department area just north of the
hospital to await transportation to the Prisoner of War Camp at
Cabanatuan. On June the 29th,
Hospital Number 1 was
transferred
to Camp O'Donnell to establish a prison hospital
for the Filipino
prisoners of war held in captivity at that camp.

The personnel
of the hospital varied somewhat according to the hospital
census.
In January there were thirty-three officers of the Medical Department,
twenty-nine American nurses and twenty-one Filipino nurses.
There
were approximately 250 men in the Medical Detachment.

General
Hospital Number 2. A cadre of Medical Department officers,
nurses and
enlisted men departed from Sternberg General Hospital, Manila, December
25, 1941, for Bataan by boat to establish a hospital. They arrived at
Lamao, Bataan, the afternoon of December 26th, having first docked at
Corregidor without debarking. At Lamao they were subjected to
Japanese aerial attacks, but fortunately no casualties were
sustained. The first night was spent at km. post 142.5, "E"
Road,
with a clearing company of the 12th Medical Regiment. On
December
28, 1941, the group was transported to km. post 162.5, "E" Road, to the
Medical Supply Depot. On this date, development of the
hospital
area began.

The site of the hospital had been selected
originally by the Department Surgeon who had made a reconnaissance of
this area several months previously. The location selected
was
along the south bank of the Real River and the initial development
began at km. post 162-5. This placed the hospital about two kilometers
west of Cabcaben and about the same distance from the Cabcaben
Airfield. The valley of the River was narrow but sufficient
space
existed along the river for approximately one mile. The area
was
virgin, unoccupied and undeveloped. The soil was a sandy loam
and
drained well. A fine growth of tall trees, bushes, creepers
and
bamboo clumps afforded cover from aerial view. There were no
roads but a few footpaths and carabao trails crossed the area.

On
December 28th, a location was selected for one mess, one ward,
operating room and headquarters. Unfortunately there was
nothing
to work with, not even as much as a hammer or saw. There was
no transportation, no messing facilities for the personnel and no
food. There were no roads into the area and no utility
service of
any kind. The three most important tasks at hand were first,
to
construct a road into the hospital area; second, to secure tools and
transportation; and third to establish a mess.

The Engineers
were contacted and they came at once. On December 29th,
grading
of the road began. One bulldozer accomplished the task of
preparing the road in two days. By December 30th, ambulances
could bring patients to the hospital with ease over the one-way
road. The weather was excellent. If it had rained
the road
would have been impassable. The hospital mess opened for
operation on December 29th, with equipment borrowed from the Philippine
Medical Depot. Food was loaned to it by the Medical
Depot.
Throughout the operation of the hospital only two meals per day were
served. Breakfast was served at 8:30 AM and dinner at 4:30
PM.
This was due to inadequate supplies, mess equipment and
personnel. Doctors and enlisted men were assigned the actual
tasks of labor necessary to establish the utilities and
wards. At
this time and throughout the period when the hospital was in existence
extremely valuable aid and assistance was received from a Filipino who
was the leader of a nearby community and a farmer by
occupation.
He was a rare judge of humanity and all the other Filipinos accepted
him as their leader. he was able to supply extra help for any
type of skilled or unskilled labor needed. He always secured
what
was wanted. If a man did not work he promptly fired
him. He
rarely discharged a woman because he stated that they worked harder,
had more endurance and were more dependable than the Filipino men. This
man suffered great personal losses during the War.

To secure
additional supplies, the medical supply officer made a trip to Manila
and collected four truckloads of supplies which were largely surgical.
He immediately returned to Manila on December 29th, securing additional
supplies, medicine, tools and food. On December 28th, a
Dental
officer, accompanied by five drivers, went to Manila and returned with
three additional trucks loaded with subsistence supplies. On
December 29th, a Medical officer went to Stotsenburg on a trip that
involved considerable danger to himself. He returned with a
field
sterilizer which proved to be invaluable and was the only practicable
type for such a hospital as was developed. If he had delayed
one
day it is probable that the Japanese would have captured
him. The movement of supplies by truck was impeded by the
marked
congestion of the only road which exited leading into Bataan from
Manila. The main body of the Fil-American forces was moving
into
position in Bataan and the road was congested with traffic; in
addition, Japanese aerial activity constantly threatened the safety of
those engaged in the task.

The
first ward was opened on January 1st. A few civilian bomb
casualties were received on that date. At this time there was
no
graves registration service but it was soon established.

On
January 3rd, 1942, the first major operation was performed on an
officer who had a shrapnel wound of the left chest and abdomen with a
laceration of the liver. This patient recovered.
The fact
that within six days' time, this small group of doctors, nurses and
enlisted men had cut a hospital from the jungles so that major surgery
could be performed, indicated that everyone was
working. On
December 28th, 1941, an area had been designated as General Hospital
Number 2 and by January 5th roads had been built, mess opened up, and
supplies and transportation established, a light plant put in
operation, a ward opened up, operating room opened up and a major
operation successfully performed. Headquarters and quarters
for
all personnel had been established. On December 28th, there
was
not an aspirin, saw or axe but January 5th, 1942, a hospital was in
operation capable of doing anything except certain laboratory
work. From this time on it was question of expansion and
improvement. Some new installations were made but the main
problem was that of growth for the ever increasing load of
patients. This hospital group had but one thing in mind and
that
objective was that whenever a patient or patients, without regard to
number, were to be admitted there must be a bed for him, something to
eat and professional attention available. To this end all worked and
since it was never known how many patients were to be received it was
endeavored to keep on hand a few hundred beds. At no time was
there a shortage except on the morning of capitulation, when during the
night between 1,500 and 2,000 patients were received. There
were
not enough beds to go around but professional attention and some
nourishment were available.

The Engineer Corps. provided a water
purification plant. To place it at a convenient central
location
it was necessary to divert about half the River through a new
channel. A dam of large loose stones and brush was
constructed
which provided the hospital with more than enough water for all our
needs. By the diversion of the water an island was formed and
on
this the nurses were quartered. On December 30th, the plant
was
put in operation. It was a high pressure, chlorination type with 4,000
gallon capacity. It supplied all the water needed for
drinking
purposes for the hospital and worked perfectly. The water was
hauled in a truck to all the wards and emptied into lister bags, the
hauling requiring the services of a three-man crew, working at least
sixteen hours a day.

The first operating room was located near
the center of the area near the road. It consisted of a
hospital
ward tent on a frame four feet high on the sides. The floor
was
made of split bamboo. There was no available lumber for
flooring. With Filipino aid an excellent job of splitting the
bamboo was done so the floor was reasonably
smooth and easy to wash. However, the heavy operating room
furniture was too much for it and there was considerable wavering and
some breaking of the strips. This floor was replaced by a
good
wooden floor about a month later. The surgical tents were
occupied and began functioning on January 2d. A light plant
had
been installed on December 30th and the surgical tent wired and
camouflaged so surgery could be performed at night. The
inadequacy of this tent could be seen by the time it was
started.
Only about two operating tables could be installed in it. So
a
second pavilion was stared on January 2d. it was better
planned
having six feet high walls, a substantial floor and covered with black
paper. This would accommodate four operating tables and was a great
improvement over the first one which was converted into a dental
clinic. It was completed about January 10th. These
surgical
tents were constructed as rapidly as possible as an emergency
project. When conditions warranted and material could be
secured
a surgical setup was constructed in a new location. The first location
was selected because it was accessible for incoming vehicles but as the
hospital developed this location proved to be too accessible.
There was much traffic, dust and noise. The third location
was
selected near the west end of the hospital area beneath several large
trees which gave perfect concealment. it was off the road and
only operating room traffic was allowed. This pavilion was
twenty
by sixty feet with galvanized roof and covered with black
paper.
The windows had black-out paper shutters for night work. There was room
for eight operating tables, four of which were being used a great part
of the time. There were ample lights and an abundance of
surgical
instruments and supplies. A store room was attached to one
end
and a dark room for X-ray development at the other. A large
field
sterilizer on the outside was highly efficient and supplied all the
necessary sterilization except for a medium sized electrical sterilizer
in the operating room. A portable X-ray with its own power
plant
was located just outside the operating room. Three large
wards were near the operating room, accommodating more than
600
patients. The operating room personnel were quartered just
across
the River from the operating room. This surgical setup was
ample
and complete and served the hospital well. The location was
ideal
and in order to make it available a 100 yard road and a heavy duty
bridge had to be constructed. There were five complete
operating
reams and much splendid work was done here. During the latter
part of February and most of March not a great many new cases were
received and this period was used for corrective operative procedure as
re-amputations and removal of foreign bodies. This operating
setup was about 1,200 yards from the hospital headquarters and the
original surgical tents. A small tent fifty yards from the main
operating room pavilion was completely equipped for operating on gas
gangrene cases and they were largely treated by muscle incision and
antitoxin. There were but two deaths reported from this
cause. A large tent covered by a large Quartermaster Corps
tarpaulin was erected for the care of these patients
and it separated them from other patients. There was never
more
than six such cases in the hospital at one time. This was
evidently due to extensive careful debirdement of wounds as early as
possible and packing same with sulfa powder or Vaseline. The
death rate was low. While no specific statistical data are available,
it is known that there was a total of only 303 deaths from all causes
among more than 15,000 admissions to the hospital.

The dental
laboratory occupied the original surgery and was prepared to do any
type of dental work. A considerable amount of maxillo-facial
surgery was accomplished by this group.

Upon arrival in Bataan
there were no supplies. However, the Philippine Medical Depot
had
moved to Bataan prior to the arrival of the hospital group. This
organization had a large quantity of supplies and it gave the hospital
wholehearted support and untiring efforts to supply us. To
this
organization and its Commanding Officer, the hospital gives credit and
praise for their efforts. While its stock was large the
hospital
requirements proved, in many instances, to be larger and many articles
were needed which the Depot did not have so that many supplies had to
be obtained elsewhere, largely through the Depot, but in some instances
independently. The initial subsistence was provide by the
Depot. As previously stated, trucks from the Depot on
December
28th went to Manila and more food was obtained. Other
subsistence
was picked up at various food dumps until an issue Quartermaster dump
was established and after January 6th, all subsistence was obtained
from this source, except bread which was obtained from the
Quartermaster bakery at km. post 164, until the supply of flour was
exhausted, and carabao meat which was obtained from the Veterinary
slaughterhouse near Lamao. Much of the operating room supply and
surgical equipment was brought from Manila on December 28th and 30th,
as well as the supply of utilities. Many carpenter tools also
were brought. From the Medical Depot was obtained 7,000
blankets
and an equal number of sheets, 3,500 beds and mattresses, pajamas,
pillows, medicine, etc., in quantities great enough for needs
generally. However, a few items were more difficult to
secure;
for example, lister bags were a rare item and it was necessary that
each ward have one. There seemed to be none
available. The
hospital had two or three -- the Depot and Quartermaster Corps had
none. Tow or three were found at Cabcaben. The Navy
provided six or eight; a few more were obtained from Corregidor, so
that by the time a ward was opened there generally was a lister bag
available. Another item there was difficulty in securing was
stoves for cooking. the messes were of necessity very large
so
that equipment had to be of such type as would turn out a large volume
of food. The new type gasoline field range was found to be
inadequate. Finally for five messes there were eight stoves
including thee old type field ranges. This was supplemented
by
various devices such as oil drums, galvanized iron cans, which also
were very scarce, etc. The hotel type ranges were obtained
from
Corregidor -- many more could have been used.

Hospital
furniture proved to be a problem. Eight electric
refrigerators
were received. There were about thirty Quartermaster Corps
and
medical Department mess and serving tables. There was no
other
furniture. There was, however, a large grove of bamboo around
the
hospital area and Filipino workers were able to make almost anything
that was needed. Some lumber was obtained and many things
constructed from it, but bamboo was the mainstay for
furniture.
Some of the Equipment made from bamboo included mess and dining tables,
medicine cabinets and nurses' desks, beds, desk trays, brooms, fly
swatters, laundry baskets, waste baskets, serving spoons, urinal
troughs, storage cabinets, benches, linen closets, ward offices, floor
mats, etc. Beds made of bamboo and mattress covers filled
with
rice straw were surprisingly comfortable. In the beginning
various articles of bamboo were made indiscriminately all over the
hospital area but later on an area was set aside as a furniture shop
and all articles were made here and distributed throughout the
hospital. Filipinos specially qualified for furniture
construction were assigned to the job. At a later date considerable
second-hand furniture was purchased for our use from
Cabcaben.
Included in this were a sewing machine, mess ware, chairs, desks,
cabinets, mirrors and a bicycle. Much of this furniture was
not
used because it was in need of repair. Two of the sewing
machines
were in constant use in repairing linens and operating room supplies.

The
lighting system for the hospital at first was the 10-kilowatt generator
which was installed near the operating tent. Later a 50-
kilowatt
generator was installed and proved very satisfactory. It
supplied
power for the iceboxes, lights for operating rooms and power for a
medium sized sterilizer, lights for headquarters and dental clinic tent
and two radios. Two radios were used only when the power was
on
to hear the Voice of Freedom at 12:30 PM and KGEI at 8:00 PM daily.

The
first mess opened for breakfast, December 29th, 1941. At this
time there were no patients and all personnel at this mess.
The
organization at first was poor and so was the service. However, this
smoothed out rather rapidly and by January 1st was going
well.
However, there was one factor connected with the messing which was
never corrected as long as we were in Bataan. The hospital
was
trying to remain camouflaged and when 300 to 400 people line up for
mess it is difficult to conceal them. When this number
increased
to 1,000 or more concealment was almost impossible and we always feared
strafing by the enemy. Since no fires were allowed at night,
the
line-up for all meals was of necessity in the daylight.
Fortunately the mess line was never strafed.

Mess
No. 1 soon became overcrowded and Mess No. 2 was opened on January
5th. The duty and patient officers and nurses were served at
this
Mess, it being located between the hospital headquarters and the
officers' ward. The detachment continued to eat in Mess No. 1
all
during the War. Generally Mess No. 2 was too crowded and Mess
No.
3 was opened in the upper area of the camp. On January 27th,
Mess
No. 4 was opened, this mess being utilized to serve the duty officers
and nurses, which up to this time had messed with the patients.

Messing
equipment was one type of supply that there never was enough
of.
When it became evident that a new mess would need to be opened,
equipment was secured with difficulty, generally coming from
Corregidor. As a rule, when a mess opened the messes already
established were robbed of part of their equipment, most of which was
never replaced. There was also a shortage of Mess Sergeants
and
cooks. Mess No. 3 was rather typical of the messes.
It had
for a Mess Sergeant a Private who was a trained X-ray technician at
Sternberg and a good solider. he had some experience as a
cook
and had executive ability. He was made Mess Sergeant because
no
one seemed better qualified to do it. The equipment for
cooking
was one large and one small hotel type range, supplemented by two oil
drums for cooking rice. He had approximately twenty-five men
helping him. This mess fed as many as 2,000 patients twice
daily. The lineup fro this mess resembled a regimental payday
assembly. the dining area of this mess, like all others, was
bamboo benches or wooden benches beneath the trees. This
constituted no particular discomfort. There was one Mess
Officer
for all of the various messes. Food for bed patients was
carried
to the wards and served by the nurses.

In March many patients
were being admitted that showed evidence of food deficiency
diseases. Beginning about March 2nd, 1½ rations was
provided
for each patient. Food consisted of an inferior grade of
rice,
supplemented with carabao, horse and mule meat. Some bread
was
available until about the middle of March. There was no
butter
and fresh vegetables were unavailable. A few mongo and
garbanzo
beans were received from Cebu in March. On a few occasions
canned
fruit was served. Some weevily cracked wheat and oatmeal was
available during March. For part of the time small amounts of
diluted canned milk and sugar were served. Coffee or tea
supplies
soon were consumed. Occasionally canned salmon and sardines were issued
from the Quartermaster dump. Special diets including soups,
fruit
juices and milk were prepared for the seriously ill. With the
increased ration and the assistance of the dietician the food situation
on the whole was improved during March as compared with February, but
the ration was monotonous and unpalatable. After April 9th,
our
fruit juices, canned milk and meat were no more. The diet
from
April 9th to May 13th was largely rice and by this time there were many
cases of leg and facial edema and the diagnosis of
deficiency diseases was commonly made.

Mess
No. 5 in ward 19 deserved special mention. By February 15th,
it
was evident that there would be a large number of permanently disabled
patients. A special ward was developed for this
group.
Bamboo beds, seven by fourteen feet, were built in rows up and down the
hillside after the brush had been cleared. They accommodated
seven or eight Filipinos. 167 of these beds provided space
for
1,000 disabled patients. All personnel in this mess were
detailed
from the patient group and were Filipino Scouts. They
cooperated
splendidly and constantly maintained the most efficient ward in the
hospital. The equipment supplied them was little more than an
icebox, a large stove, hotel type, and one blanket for each man and
several oil drums.

A description of some of the various
installations and equipment is necessary to get a clear picture of the
hospital and its problems. From the beginning it was the
intention of the hospital administration to camouflage the hospital. As
was previously stated, the hospital area was covered with bamboo, vines
and trees. This enabled everything to be put under cover
except
the roads and many paths that were soon made within the area.
Within a fortnight the open areas were crisscrossed in every direction
with paths that showed plainly from the air. Later it was
learned
that all of the Bataan flatlands were marked much in the same manner as
in the hospital. The hospital area was checked from the air by American
pilots and nothing was found visible except roads and paths.
It
was believed that the Japanese would respect the hospital, so
camouflage became less important. In the middle of January
1942,
a large white cross was placed in the field at the East end of the
hospital area. At a later date a new one was constructed of
metal
to the South and a third one of sheets and was located to the
West. These crosses were plainly visible from the air and
they
were kept in good condition at all times. The enemy did not bomb
dangerously close to the hospital at any time, although many Army
installations were located closer to the hospital than was desirous and
bombing of thee areas was very unpleasant and disconcerting to the
hospital staff and patients. With the display of crosses, the
attempt to camouflage did not cease.

The wards were without
buildings. A convenient and suitable area was selected, the
underbrush was cut away being careful not to destroy the vines and
brush which afforded cover. But it was difficult to prevent
considerable destruction of protective creepers and vines.
This
underbrush was very heavy, tough and resistant to the efforts of man to
remove it but it did yield to the constant attacks of Filipinos and
their bolos. The size of a ward was generally limited by the
amount of terrain and cover. An area was selected that would
usually accommodate about 200 patients but there was considerable
variation, some being as small as
100 and some containing 700 beds. On April 7th, fourteen
wards
had an average of 200 patients, one had 300, one 500, and one with 100
beds. they were really hospitals within a hospital group and
each
ward would contain a variety of patients, several having more patients
than Sternberg had before the War. This unusual condition
resulted from the fact that we were putting up beds for men who were
already sick or wounded and who were being treated in front
line
installations until bed space could be provided in the rear
area.
The average ward contained a medicine cabinet, a ward office, a storage
place, a lister bag, a dressing tent and from one to four tents for
patients. The patient tents were for the more serious
cases. There was a total of nineteen wards with No. 13
omitted. The ward personnel was from one to three doctors,
tow to
four nurses and two to four enlisted men. In the latter days
two
civilians were assigned to each ward so that from three to eleven ward
personnel were caring for from 200 to 700 sick and wounded.

The
number of patients increased rapidly and it was necessary to open up
new wards to accommodate them. By January 1st, three wards
were
prepared for occupancy. There were 177 patients including the
152
from Sternberg which arrived that date. On January 17th,
there
were ten wards ready with a capacity of about 1,500 patients.
At
this time there were 1,000 patients occupying part of seven
wards. On January 25th, there were 2,160 patients in the
hospital
with fourteen wards occupied and on February 5th, 2,411 patients. On or
about January 20th, the construction crew began to feel that they were
far enough ahead with beds to have a safe margin. There were
probably about 500 beds unoccupied. A period for a much
needed
relaxation seemed to be in the offing, but to the great surprise and
disappointment of all, just after dinner on January 23rd, while
enjoying the cool of the day, word was received that all patients from
Hospital Number 1 would be sent to us during the night. The evacuation
of Hospital Number 1 had become mandatory as the Fil-American main line
of resistance was being withdrawn to the Bagac-Orion line and this
placed Limay within the range of Japanese artillery. A score
of
privates worked all night long and managed to keep abreast of the
incoming patients but the next day there were few empty beds and 682
patients had been received in the last twenty-four hours.

Originally,
patients were received at the surgical tent where an arrangement was
prepared for the temporary housing of them. Here they were
examined and those who did not need surgery were transferred to the
various wards. This plan was cumbersome but worked very well
when
there were twenty-five to fifty patients daily but when patients were
admitted in larger numbers this system was more than
cumbersome.
In addition it created too much confusion, activity, noise and dust in
the operating area. It was decided to move the operating and
receiving activities to new and more appropriate locations.
The
surgical arrangement has been described previously.

It
was decided to open a receiving ward at a site selected near the road
entry to the hospital. The site was convenient and well
covered.
This was opened on January 25th. The ward had 150
costs. It
also had a receiving station which was equipped to do minor surgery and
dressing. It was lighted for night work, equipped with an
icebox
and served hot drinks. Most of the patients were received at
night and those who did not need immediate surgery were kept in the
receiving ward during the night and then sent to the proper wards in
the morning. The receiving officer was kept advised of the
number
of empty bed s in each ward and therefore knew which wards to send the
patients to. Patients who required immediate surgery were
sent to
the operating area where both waiting and operating facilities were
available. During the day the receiving ward was cleared of
all
patients and ready for the reception of more patients at
night.
On some days it was cleared form two to four times.

A new
one-way road was constructed into the receiving ward and it was well
marked with signs and arrows but it was not possible to keep forbidden
traffic out of the area so a guard was posted. In addition to the two
Medical officers, two or three nurses and five enlisted men were
assigned here. This receiving ward operated in a highly
efficient
manner from its inception. Its location on the opposite side
of
the hospital from the operating room permitted the operating room to
escape all the noise and crowding which is an undesirable but necessary
part of a receiving ward of this size.

The hospital motor pool
was located on the main hospital road in the general vicinity of the
receiving ward. Vehicles were hidden from aerial view under trees and
bamboo clumps. The vehicles consisted of two passenger cars,
three trucks used for hauling supplies, several ambulances, a huge
gasoline truck which was used for a road sprinkler and a few
nondescript vehicles. A permanent staff of chauffeurs and
mechanics were constantly on duty. Gasoline, oil and grease
were
secured through the medical depot from the main Quartermaster Motor
Pool. Extensive repairs on the vehicles were effected at the
latter place. Immediately upon our capture by the Japanese
Army,
all vehicles, equipment, oil and gasoline were commandeered by the
Japanese Army. During the last month of the campaign our gasoline
allowance had been reduced to fifteen gallons daily for he use of all
vehicles, including the amount necessary for the operation of the
generator and water purification unit. Although strict
economy
was enforced, this amount was insufficient. Fortunately a
reserve
of several hundred gallons had been set aside when the hospital was
first organized and this was sufficient to tide us over the period when
the issues were inadequate. A portion of this gasoline was
hidden
from the Japanese and it later was used in transferring our bed cases
to General Hospital Number 1 at Little Baguio.

The
records department of the hospital grew out of a state of confusion
into an orderly institution. This office, like the receiving
office, was transferred from the original operating tent area to a site
adjacent to the receiving ward and on the same date. Here
were
assigned a staff of typists. The location of the Registrar's
office was correct since it obtained the records as the
patients were
admitted and in a short time the office was organized and the records
in good order. The fact that these fine records were lost
does
not, in any way, detract from the excellent work performed by the
staff.

When patients were received they were divested of all
government property and given hospital clothing. This was in accordance
with instructions from higher authority and caused a few arguments
especially in the early part of the War. Many patients were
loath
to give up their equipment. All this equipment was collected
and
daily turned over to the Quartermaster or Ordnance Officer.
When
patients were discharged they were taken to the Casual Center where
they were equipped again and taken to their respective
organization. The Casual Center would return our hospital
convalescent clothes to us. the establishment of a Casual
Center
facilitated the disposition of those marked duty.

From about
February 15th to the 10th of March, the hospital population remained
fairly constant. This period provided an opportunity to
improve
the area and to settle personnel in some degree of comfort. Up to
February 1st, no one had an opportunity to take the leaves from around
his bunk or adjust his living conditions. Personal comfort
and
needs had been entirely ignored for the simple reason that there was no
opportunity to indulge in such trivialities. All personnel
slept
in beds beneath the trees with their scant personal belongings placed
beneath or hung on trees nearby. This was no hardship. During this time
several people provided themselves with some type of chair.
Beds
were made more comfortable. Electric wires were put up to the
officers' and nurses' area for radio installations and some officers
improved the cover over their beds.

A need for some way to wash
hospital linen developed almost immediately. With the large
number of operations and dressings which soiled bed linen, a large
amount of soiled linen, convalescent clothes, clothes and towels
accumulated almost overnight. There were two wives of Marine
enlisted men who had been sent to the hospital from Corregidor and
they, seeing the need for laundry service, volunteered their services
for this purpose. This was the beginning of the hospital
laundry.
The offered to work without pay for a few days they were the hospital's
sole dependence for clean laundry except for a few articles which the
operating room personnel found time to wash. In the meantime
laundry needs became more pressing.

Twelve
Chinese from Corregidor reported to the hospital on January 9th and
volunteered to do any kind of work without compensation.
Immediately they were employed to do laundry. An area
one-half
kilometer below the hospital was selected. Several oil drums
were
installed for boiling, brush was cleared away beneath good cover, and
several hundred feet of wire strung up for clotheslines and the laundry
began. These men turned out a large amount of laundry daily
and
it dried rapidly.

On January 24th there were forty-three
offices, including two Chaplains, seven Dental offices, four MAC
officers, one Infantry officer and one Red Cross worker and there were
1,205 patients at the hospital. From time to time officers
were
assigned to the hospital. In addition there were about
eighteen
Filipino Army Medical Officers assigned to Hospital Number 2.
On
April 6th, 1942, there were approximately forty-seven American and
twenty Filipino officers. The Surgeon's morning report on
April
7th showed 5,129 patients. The original twenty nurses were
augmented from time to time by American Army, civilian and Filipino
nurses so that on April 6th there were approximately fifty-three
American and thirty Filipino nurses. The original medical
detachment was increased form time to time and later included members
of the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Army.
Approximately
250 enlisted men were on duty. The civilian employees
(Filipinos)
began working on December 29th and continued until April 9th,
1942. As many as 200 were employed at a time. Their
foreman
has previously been referred to. Their work consisted of
laundry
work, kitchen police, clearing brush, building furniture, making roads,
paths and bridges and ward work. One seamstress was employed in the
operating room and there were several barbers. The Filipinos
were
at first employed from the population of the Barrio. Later a
refugee camp was established near the hospital. It was called the
Hospital Work Camp and rations were drawn for this group by
the hospital
administration. Some 840 people lived in this camp. There
were no
disorders in this camp and it was a considerable help in enabling the
hospital to function.

Picture, if you can, a hospital of from
3,000 to 5,000 patients with a maximum of sixty-seven officers,
eighty-three nurses, 250 enlisted men and 200 civilian employees and it
will be readily understood that many problems were involved.
This
personnel performed practically all the hospital functions, including
professional and administrative, including medical supply, securing of
rations and fuel, laundries, messing, road and bridge building,
hospital and furniture construction and all hospital
utilities.
Of the 600 people employed in the hospital 280 Filipinos were employed
in construction and laundry work, functions that a hospital is not
ordinarily concerned with, requiring more than 25% of the hospital
employees. Fuel for the messes and laundries was obtained
locally. None was provide for the hospital. Wood
and
charcoal were used. Charcoal was more satisfactory
and
was used for the hospital. It was obtained about one and
one-half
kilometers away and hauled in from forty to sixty sacks at a
time. It produced much heat and made little smoke that could
be
observed by the enemy. Sufficient charcoal could not be
obtained
and was supplemented by wood. Considerable dead bamboo was in
the
hospital area and all of this was used. It could not be used
alone because it created too much smoke and was short-lived, so our
main fuel supply was wood which was cut some distance from the hospital
and hauled in by truck. Trees within the hospital area could
not
be used for this purpose because of the destruction of shade and
cover. A constant wood detail was kept busy. After the
capitulation we were confined to the hospital area and had to use
whatever was available for fuel, as lumber, furniture, etc.

The
sanitation of Hospital Number 2 was a serious problem. When
4,000
to 8,000 people live in one small community in which there is no sewer
system, a problem is encountered which is very difficult, especially
when you are dealing with people, many of whom have no personal or
general interest or knowledge of sanitation as applied to
groups.
As previously stated, the original sanitary installation was the open
pit latrine which is everything except a sanitary device. The
soil was that of a sandy loam and naturally would be well suited for
latrine drainage but here the water level was high and when the
latrines were over four feet deep, water came in. There was,
in
the beginning, nothing to spray them with so that the only means of
treatment was by throwing in leaves and burning them which was quite
unsatisfactory. soon flies became numerous.
Beginning in
February, the open pit began to be replaced by a box latrine provided
by the Engineers. On March 2nd, an officer was transferred to
the
hospital and made sanitary officer with no other duties. The
improvement which he brought was almost magical. Very shortly the fly
problems was under control. The open latrines were all
covered
with boxes provided by the Engineers or constructed in the hospital and
diarrhea among the hospital personnel reduced from a moderately high
rate to almost nothing. This satisfactory condition prevailed
until after capitulation when circumstances beyond our control again
appeared, resulting in the appearance of many flies which persisted
until the hospital was abandoned.

A Graves Registration
Officer reported to the hospital for duty on January 2nd, 1942, and a
cemetery was established on the hill southeast of the
hospital.
Other officers joined him later on. This service moved to
their
own location in early March. The cemetery was well planned
and
beautified and, at the time of the capitulation, in excellent shape but
during the Corregidor phase the cemetery was struck with some shells
and extreme damage was done. After the capitulation of Bataan
the
original cemetery was out of bounds for the hospital and there was no
Graves Registration Service. A new cemetery was established
within the hospital and seventy-two people were buried in this
area. It was well marked and was in good condition on May
13th,
1942.

Religious services were under the
direction of Protestant and Catholic chaplains. A cleared
space
with bamboo benches served for the Protestant services. This
was
located on the south side of the hospital road in line with the rear
medical supply tent. As they patients (Filipino) were
predominantly Catholic, a much larger chapel was constructed by the
catholic Chaplain. It was located to the south of the main
hospital road between wards 5 and 7. Using patient labor, a
large
area was cleared and surrounded by a bamboo fence. A small
bamboo
chapel was constructed for special religious use. Adjacent to
it
was a raised platform and alter. Services were rendered daily
and
were well attended. On two occasions programs were held in
the
area consisting of songs, recitations, dances, etc. Patient
personnel and Filipinos from nearby refugee camp actively participated
and these programs and religious services added considerably to the
morale of the group. Chaplains visited wards daily comforting
patients and administrating the last rites when indicated.

The
Red Cross maintained an office just off the north side of the main
hospital road near ward 8. Although their facilities for aid
to
the sick were extremely limited, they worked hard in securing and
distributing comfort articles to the patients. A news sheet
was
published which was received with great interest by the
patients.
Regular programs were held when practicable.

For the first
time in our history, during the War in Bataan, women nurses were
utilized so near the front lines. Hospital Number 1 was seven
kilometers from the front lines. Nurses were on duty at this hospital
until January 23rd when the hospital was evacuated. Hospital
Number 2 was only two kilometers from Cabcaben and Cabcaben Airfield
and four kilometers from Bataan Airfield, all enemy objectives so that
Hospital Number 2 witnessed numerous bombings and some
dogfights.
Enemy planes bombing Corregidor were clearly visible from Hospital
Number 2 as well as the Antiaircraft fire from Corregidor, so Hospital
Number 2 was very close to the front lines and other enemy objectives.

Under
the guidance of the Chief Nurse, the nurses at Hospital Number 2 did
excellent and heroic work during the Battle of Bataan. In
general
their morale was on a par with the offices', their bravery was
exemplary and an impression of fear was rarely manifested.
There
was notable harmony among the group. The Filipino nurses also
performed their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. The
comfort of the nurses was similar to that of the officers, but there
were no complaints. When on April 8th, 1942, the end of
Bataan
was obviously near at hand and it was decide by higher authority to
transfer the nurses to Corregidor, they went with considerable
reluctance. The Chief Nurse expressed a very strong desire to
remain at her post of duty and expressed her intentions to do so as
long as any other nurse was left on Bataan. They all left
together about 9:00 PM on April 8th, arriving at Corregidor on the
afternoon of April 9th, after a harassing experience. Barring
the
necessary prolonged trip due to congestion of traffic and demolition of
the Ordnance Warehouses, no untoward incidents occurred en route and
all of them arrived safely at Corregidor. There were several
cases of dysentery and malaria among the nurses and two of them were
injured when bombs struck Hospital Number 1. There were no
injuries at Hospital Number 2 among the nurses, although several slugs
of shrapnel fell in their quarters.

During March the hospital
census rose to 3,000 daily. The incidence of malaria
throughout
the command had increased to an alarming degree. Personnel of
the
hospital were developing clinical malaria although all were regularly
taking quinine prophylaxis. Unfortunately the hospital area
in
the Real Valley was located in a region where malaria was
endemic. It was believed in these cases that the inadequate
diet
with repeated attacks of diarrhea, chronic exhaustion and nerve strain
were combining to lower the resistance of individuals so that clinical
malaria became evident even though individuals were taking ten to
fifteen grains of quinine a day. To present this urgent
problem
to the attention of the Department Surgeon, the Commanding Officer of
General Hospital Number 2 submitted a letter on March 10th, 1942, to
the Surgeon. (See Tab #1)

A main concern during the latter part
of March 1942, was to provide additional bed space. The
hospital
area was quite congested with 3,000 patients and further expansion of
the hospital area was impracticable due to the nature of he
terrain. Moreover, hospital personnel was inadequate in
numbers
to properly care for the patients. As the rainy season was expected in
May, plans were drawn for a hospital in a new location. The
necessity for this had been foreseen in February 1942, and there had
been considerable discussion with the USAFFE Staff. A
tentative
site adjacent to Sisiman Bay, about km. post 169, had been set aside as
a hospital reservation and some clearing and road installations had
been begun. (A letter was directed to the Surgeon of the
service
Command outlining the urgency of this matter. (See
Tab #2)

Subsequent
to the forwarding of the above-mentioned letter, the Engineer Corps,
USAFFE, recommended that the original site was impractical due to the
inability to obtain adequate water supply and they recommended that
hospital facilities be developed in the unused bodega (warehouse) area,
km. post 168, where water connections and existing roads could be
utilized. The proximity of this location to the Ordnance
Department area ruled against it as a desirable location but no other
choice was possible. Construction began the latter part of
March
but the heavy bombing of this area prevented further progress and the
project was abandoned. Further expansion of General Hospital
Number 2 was now carried out by the securing of additional beds from
Corregidor and increasing the size of the various wards.

Early
in April, 1942, conditions in General Hospital Number 2 became somewhat
chaotic. This was brought about by Japanese attack on our
front
lines which caused a breakthrough in the vicinity of Mount
Samat.
At that time several thousand soldiers were under treatment in the
clearing companies of the various divisions. Lack of space in
the
General Hospital had precluded their transfer. By now it was
mandatory that they be moved to avoid being infiltrated by Japanese
infantry. The hospital census on the morning of April 4th was
3,256; it reached 3,510 on the 5th; 3,920 on the 6th; 4,500 on the 7th;
6,000 on the 8th; and 7,000 on the 9th. To make some pretense
of
accommodating these men, mattresses were placed on the ground, thereby
doubling our bed capacity. Hundreds, however, were forced to
lie
on blankets on the ground. The majority of these new case
were
medical cases, chiefly malaria, dysentery, malnutrition and
exhaustion. A number of battle casualties, however, were
received
each day, including the 8th. The burden of receiving and
handling
some 5,000 additional patients, needless to say, was tremendous burden
on the administrative and professional staffs. The
preparation
and distribution of food for these men was just one of the many
problems.

On the morning of April 9th, 1942, it was obvious
that the capture of our hospital would occur in a few hours.
There was considerable aerial activity by the Japanese over lower
Bataan with almost constant bombing of the roads and airfield in our
general vicinity. Patients and personnel spent much time in foxholes
and dugouts trying to avoid the bomb fragments and machine gun bullets
which were falling in our area. About 11:00 AM we were
notified
that surrender negotiations were under way. About 3:00 PM we were
advised that all units of the Luzon forces had been ordered to
surrender. All available Red Cross guidons were raised and
one or
two white sheets were placed on poles. About 5:00 PM a small
group of Japanese infantry came into the central hospital
area.
The only inquiry of note was where pure water could be
obtained.
That evening about 8:00 PM, a group consisting of two Japanese officers
and about twenty enlisted men returned to the hospital headquarters and
summoned the Commanding Officer of the hospital. A lengthy
interview resulted with the issuing of strict orders by the Japanese to
the effect that we were now prisoners of war and subject to all
Japanese rules and regulations and that failure to comply with their
orders would result in the death sentence. These specific
orders
included (a) maintenance of strict blackout (2) prohibition of the use
of the Real River except that a limited amount of water could be dipped
out of it (3) restriction of all personnel to the natural boundaries of
the area and (4) all hospital property was to be considered under the
control of the Japanese Army which could requisition
any item that it might desire. A guard was posted throughout
the
hospital area and a password was issued for the use of the ward
doctors.

On April 10th, the Japanese instructed all Filipinos
to leave the hospital. Apparently the Filipino patients were
under the impression that they were now free and would be permitted to
return to their homes. By the evening of April 10th, many hundreds of
these patients were trudging out of the hospital area toward the East
road. In this group were many patients suffering from
malaria,
dysentery, diarrhea, malnutrition and large numbers convalescing from
various types of wounds. Some wearing casts and extensive
bandages were observed among the group departing. Mingling
with
our patients were hundreds of civilian refugees, including old men,
women and children. They were all heavily burdened with assorted
bundles, bags, tin cans, etc. For several days there was a constant
procession of these people coming down out of the hills and proceeding
toward the East road on their way out of Bataan. Only a few of these
people carried food and water. In a few days the East road
was
littered with bodies of hundreds of these people who died from
exhaustion, lack of food, the natural courses of their diseases, and
atrocities committed by the Japanese. Included in the group who were
forced to march were all the Filipino doctors and dentists and our
attached civilian Filipino and Chinese laborers.

On the same
day the hospital was visited by a Japanese Colonel commanding the
forces in the eastern sector of Bataan. He made a brief
inspection of the hospital and spoke very good English. While
he
was engaged in conversation with the Commanding officer of the
hospital, some of the Japanese batteries opened fire in
Corregidor. Addressing the hospital commander he said, "Why
don't
they surrender over there -- many of those poor fellows are dying --
all
we desire is peace." After calling for a glass of "ice water"
which was furnished him from our intact frigidaires, he departed and
was seen no more. Hardly a day passed without visits by two
or
more Japanese officers who exhibited great curiosity at our hospital
arrangements. Each one carried one or more cameras and spent
much
of their time taking pictures.

Throughout the 10th and for
several succeeding days, Japanese troops with complete war gear marched
through the hospital in the general direction of Mariveles or other
places in lower Bataan. They appeared tired, but all were in
excellent physical condition and their state of nutrition and muscular
development was in marked contrast to the pale and emaciated bodies of
our personnel and sick. A number of horses and Siberian
ponies
loaded with gear were noted in their columns. Occasionally
these
troops were halted in our hospital
area for a rest period. They defecated at will wherever they
camped. Hundreds of them walked through the wards, messes,
operating rooms, medical supply and collected watches, pocket books,
rings, sunglasses and food. The mess and medical supply tents
were promptly looted. They seemed to be particularly fond of
our
limited supply of fruit juices and milk. Our few remaining
cases
of sardines promptly disappeared. Their mechanics found our
generators a convenient source of supply for items which they may or
may not have needed, and every shortly stripped them so that our
electrical system ceased to function. Moreover, wires were
cut in
several places. Within thirty-six hours all of the vehicles
had
been confiscated as well as ll other motor pool supplies. To
drive and serve these vehicles a number of our Medical Department
enlisted men were commandeered. At the first opportunity, the
action of the Japanese Army in confiscating food, vehicles and men was
protested to Major Sekiguchi who was the second ranking medical officer
of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. he stated that all
property in our possession was to be considered as Japanese property
and that nothing must be refused that the Japanese Army desired, if so
the punishment would be severe. When this officer was advised
of
the urgency of retaining milk and fruit juices, he stated that the
Japanese Army was honorable and would not remove it from hospital
control. When he was then informed that several truckloads of food had
been removed under direction of Japanese officers, he stated that if
food had been taken a receipt would have been given. He
stated
that inasmuch as we did not have a receipt, it was quite obvious that
the Japanese Army had not taken it. During this conversation
Major Sekiguchi became very angry and directed that the matter not be
discussed again. It was then requested that the Japanese Army
furnish "Keep Out" signs to prevent the further loss of our medial and
surgical equipment and personal property of patients. A
number of
these signs were eventually prepared and posted as directed but that
apparently carried little weight with the Japanese soldiers because the
signs were invariably disregarded, and the hospital continued to suffer
from the depredations of the Japanese enlisted men. As a result of
wholesale looting on the part of the Japanese, our diet was now limited
solely to rice, except for a small quantity of milk and fruit
juices which we were able to retain for the use of the most seriously
ill. To support our urgent requests to the Japanese for food
the
nutritional condition of our patients and personnel was brought to
their attention in the form of the attached report. (See
Tab
#3)
No action was taken by the Japanese to alleviate our food shortage.

The
sharp drop in our patient census from approximately 7,000 to 1,500
permitted us to contract our wards so that all remaining patients were
now placed in the central part of the hospital area. It was
quite
urgent to evacuate the medical wards which were located in the
direction of Cabcaben. The Japanese Army had set up artillery
completely
around our hospital area and a number of their troops were quartered
within the hospital area. The fire of these Japanese
batteries
continued at intervals both day and night. The returning fire from
Corregidor was placed in such a manner to avoid direct hits in the
hospital area. However, the shells from Corregidor burst co
close
to us that we were subjected to a daily spray of fragments. On one
occasion the nose of a fourteen-inch shell landed in our receiving
ward, other fragments truck hospital headquarters and the adjacent
dental clinic. Due to the fact that we were protected by a
dense
growth of bamboo clumps and very tall trees and because we were able to
use dugouts and foxholes, our personnel were able to escape injury at
least most of the time. After a couple weeks of constant
exposure
to shell fragments it is probable that headquarters on Corregidor
believed that the hospital had been moved. On April 22nd a
number
of shells landed directly one of our wards and mess halls.
About
twenty men were killed or injured. On other occasions shells
burst and duds landed without injury to anyone. The hospital
commander repeatedly made protests to Major Sekiguchi. His
reply
was that the Japanese Army was engaged in the prosecution of the War
and until Corregidor fell no action would be taken to move the patients
or personnel of General Hospital Number 2.

Shortly after
capitulation, Major Sekiguchi ordered the collection of medical stores
and supplies located at the nearby medical depot and removal to the
medical supply area of General Hospital Number 2. This was a
formidable task as he directed that the supplies be carried by our
men. These men were in a weakened physical condition due to
prolonged under-nutrition and fatigue from four months of continuous
effort without rest or relief. He was finally prevailed upon
to
authorize the use of a broken-down truck which mechanics were able to
repair. After two weeks' work, all remaining supplies from
the
medical depot were concentrated in our area and covered with canvas.

Early
in May our guards informed us that Corregidor would soon be
captured. In fact they were specific, stating that it would
occur
on May 5th or 6th. One of the guards spoke a little bit of
English and he was asked by what method the Japanese would capture
Corregidor. He indicated by sketches that landing barges
containing men and tanks supported by heavy artillery fire and by a
blanket of planes overhead, would effect a landing on
Corregidor.
Surprisingly, during the night of May 5th to 6th a tremendous Japanese
artillery barrage, followed later by the sound of small arms fire,
convinced the group that the final attack was being launched.
By
the afternoon of May 6th it was evident to us that Corregidor had
fallen, but the Japanese continued to fire their artillery at
Corregidor as late as the evening of May 6th.

A
few days after the fall of Corregidor, the Commanding Officer of
General Hospital Number 2 was directed to move all serious cases to
General Hospital Number 1 at Little Baguio. Having
anticipated
that such a movement would eventually be made, he had completed the
servicing and renovation of twelve commercial buses that had been used
as sleeping quarters for the Army nurses. Using these
vehicles
and gasoline which had been concealed from the Japanese Army with
approval of the Japanese medical officer, approximately 600 bed cases
were moved on May 11th to General Hospital Number 1. At the
same
time about five truck loads of the most valuable medical supplies
remaining at Hospital Number 2 were also transported to Hospital Number
1 and tuned over to its Commanding Officer. These supplies
included 350,000 5-grain quinine tablets; 100,000 sulfa tablets; blood
plasma; dressings; and many other items too numerous to
mention.
These supplies were transported without the knowledge or permission of
the Japanese medical officers. Major Sekiguchi had instructed
the
Commanding Officer of General hospital Number 2 that all medical
supplies and equipment should be left at Hospital Number 2 and should
not be removed. It was felt that these supplies were destined
for
the use of the Japanese Army. The supplies mentioned above
were
eventually transported to prisoners of war at Camp O'Donnell where the
undoubtedly were used to save hundreds of lives.
700
ambulant recovered patients remained at General hospital Number 2 area
and were transported by the Japanese to Manila on May 26th.
From
there they were sent in a few days to the Prisoner of War Camp at
Cabanatuan. The majority of the
Medical Department personnel
of
General Hospital Number 2 were transferred by Japanese order to the
vicinity of Hospital Number 1. After a period of ten days
they
were transported to Bilibid Prison, Manila, and a
few days thereafter
were sent to Cabanatuan Number 1. General
Hospital Number 2
ceased to exist on May 12th, 1942.

Philippine Army General
Hospital. Upon withdrawal of the Philippine Army
into Bataan
during the latter part of December 1941 and early January 1942, the
Surgeon, Philippine Army, planned the establishment of a general
hospital in the rear area of Bataan. he decided to place it
conveniently near the Philippine Army Headquarters which was located on
the West road opposite km. post 180. The site selected was
in a
ravine about one-fourth kilometer from BASE CAMP, km. post 171,
Cabcaben-Mariveles road. The available space for expansion
was
limited due to the rugged nature of the terrain.

Materials for
hospital construction were limited. Wooden floors were
provided
for hospital tentage. A number of tents were established for
wards, surgery, etc. Bamboo platforms were constructed to
supplement the limited number of iron beds and cots. A small
surgical pavilion and first-aid dressing room were provided but most of
the facilities were planned for the handling of medical cases or minor
wounds.

The personnel assigned to
this hospital was exclusively Filipino and included doctors, dentists
and corpsmen. There were no female nurses in attendance.

The
functioning of this hospital was limited to the handling of cases
arising in rear area Philippine Army units. It was not
planned to
serve front line organizations which were serviced by General Hospital
Number 1 and Number 2. Comparatively few patients were under
treatment. The census seldom rose above 100 until the last
week
of the campaign, when removal of patients from the forward clearing
companies required its fullest use. Some 250 patients were
under
treatment at the time of capitulation.

During the latter
part of March and early in April, a number of bombing raids occurred in
the immediate vicinity of the hospital.

After capitulation it
was impossible to determine what happened at this hospital when the
Japanese troops penetrated that area. About five weeks after
the
fall of Bataan some American medical Department personnel visited the
area and found it to be completely wrecked with about fifteen dead
Filipinos in the ruins of the hospital.

Summary and
Conclusion. An Attempt has been made to outline the
important
problems of hospitalization in Luzon and their solution during the
defense of the Philippines. In brief, it may be stated that with
grossly inadequate personnel, a large hospital center was organized in
Manila which functioned briefly and was then disbanded when the
evacuation of Manila was ordered on December 22nd, 1941. The
development of this project was further complicated by the necessity of
treatment and disposition of some two thousand casualties.
Coincident with the construction of the hospital center, the
organizing, staffing and servicing of two large general hospitals
located in the jungle and mountainous terrain of Bataan was
begun. These hospitals were far removed from adequate
transportation facilities. Space for some of these hospitals
was
literally hacked out of the jungle. Some twenty thousand
patients
were treated in a period of slightly over three months.
Moreover,
the entire project was organized, developed and administered in the
face of enemy action by personnel who were unable to secure
rest or
relaxation and who suffered the debilitating effects of malnutrition
and various tropical diseases.

There were mistakes, errors of
judgment and fruitless effort but on the whole the main objective of
the Medical Department was accomplished. Life was saved and
suffering relieved on a large scale.

In conclusion, one must
pay tribute to the loyalty to the sick shown by all personnel of the
Medical Department, both American and Filipino, and to their splendid
cooperation, devotion to duty and Herculean efforts which made possible
a superlative accomplishment
in the face of almost insurmountable difficulties.

6. THE PHILIPPINE
MEDICAL
DEPOT. (From December 8,
1941 to May 6, 1942)

Shortly
before the outbreak of hostilities, the organization of the Depot
consisted of: one Major, MAC, Commanding Officer; three
Lieutenants, MAC; five noncommissioned officers; one Private First
Class, American; one Private First Class, Filipino Scout; and about
thirty-five civilian employees. Just prior to hostilities one
general hospital (1000 beds) had been stored at Limay,
Bataan.
Two additional warehouses in Manila had been leased. One housed Class
VII supplies and in the other the equipment of an old 1000 bed general
hospital and one 750 bed evacuation hospital. A compound of
five
buildings had been leased at 92 Penderos Street, Santa Ana, Manila, and
equipment of all classes was transferred form the port area to these
buildings. These buildings were ideally adapted for use as
warehouses. Four buildings had two floors, the lower floor
being
concrete. The second floor of each building being connected
with
the other buildings by covered runways. This compound was
located
on the banks of the Pasig River, and it was planned to build a dock in
order that supplies could be received from the port area by barge.
About 4,000 collapsible hospital beds were stored at Fort William
McKinley.

The equipment of two new general hospitals began to
arrive in Manila about November 1941. A portion of this was
sent
to Estado Mayor for use in conjunction with Sternberg General Hospital.

On outbreak of hostilities all available hospital supplies in
Manila were purchased. Civilian personnel increased to about
235
but it was impossible to secure additional trained commissioned
personnel. Medicine and equipment was shipped to all points
of
Luzon and by water to other islands. A 100-bed hospital was
lost
on the S.S. Corregidor in Manila Bay when the ship struck a
mine.
On December 23rd, 1941, orders were received to evacuate Manila, and to
transfer all supplies and equipment. The evacuation was
carried
out rapidly. By nightfall of December 23rd, 1941, the first
convoy of thirty trucks left Manila. The following day the
last
convoy departed. At this time, there were 100 truckloads of
supplies en route. The Philippine Medical Supply Depot was
located at km. post 162-5 on the Bataan Mariveles Road. On
December 29t5h a sub depot was located at Orion, Bataan, to furnish
front line units with supplies. On January 4th, this
installation
was bombed and the personnel returned to the Philippine Depot with all
the supplies that could be salvaged. Convoys returned to
Manila
for supplies both day and night until January 1st, when the road
between Manila and Bataan was cut off by the Japanese.
Personnel
trapped in Manila abandoned their supplies and escaped to Corregidor by
boat.

The personnel of the Depot
transferred supplies from December 23rd to January 1st, 1942, and
worked with scarcely any rest. They went through many bombing
raids while performing their duty efficiently and with
dispatch.
Every vehicle that left Manila with supplies reached its
destination. The civilian drivers performed their duty
without
complaint. The morale of the organization was very high
during
the entire campaign.

General Hospital Number 2 began to function
late in December 1941 in Bataan. Supplies were furnished to
it
from the depot and as the census of the hospital rose to 5,000 early in
April the drain on the supplies was very heavy. The
Philippine
Army General Hospital was equipped and supplied, from the medical
Depot. Small shipments of supplies were flown from Cebu and
Iloilo but they were totally inadequate to meet the demands.
They
consisted of sulfa drugs, quinine and vitamins.

All available
quinine and sulfa drugs in Manila were purchased before the
city was
evacuated. Much time was spent by the Depot personnel in the
preparation of mixtures for the treatment of diarrhea and
dysentery. the demand for sulfa drugs and vitamin
preparations
was greater than the supply. Quinine for prophylaxis was
discontinued by March 1st, 1942, in order to conserve enough quinine
for the treatment of actual malaria.

On January 30th, 1942, a
sub depot was established on Corregidor where the bulk of surplus
supplies and equipment not needed in Bataan were sent. Only a
six
weeks' supply was maintained in Bataan. All supplies and
equipment in Corregidor and Bataan were stored under natural
shelter. Trenches were dug and covered in which were stored
drugs
in bottles and tins to safeguard them from shell and bomb fragments and
from strafing. All inflammable materials were buried in pits
as a
precautionary measure.

After the capitulation of Bataan three
shipments of medical supplies were received from the South, two by
plane and one by submarine. They consisted mainly of quinine,
sulfa drugs and vitamin preparations. Many critical supplies
in
the Depot on Corregidor were stored in the Malinta Tunnel but lack of
space prevented storage of all supplies. On April 22nd the
Depot
on Corregidor was destroyed by shell fire. The remaining
personnel of the Depot were attached to the Medical Department, Fort
Mills, and surrendered to the Japanese on May 6th.

7. THE MEDICAL
SERVICES ON CORREGIDOR.

The
Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay consisted of the following fortified
islands: Corregidor, Fort Hughes, Fort Drum, and Fort
Frank. These are located at the mouth of Manila Bay, about
thirty
miles from Manila. Corregidor, the largest and most important
of
the islands, lies between Bataan peninsula and Cavite province on the
mainland of Luzon, being about nine miles from the former and four
miles from Bataan at the nearest points. Corregidor is in the
shape of a pork chop with the widest portion facing the ocean and the
tail curving towards Cavite. It measures approximately five
miles
long by one and one-half miles wide at the widest point. It
is
heavily wooded and numerous roads connect the various artillery
batteries, which surround the periphery of the island. There
are
two elevations: Malinta Hill, about one-third of the way from
the
tip and a plateau occupying almost the whole seaward part of the island.

The
military personnel consisted chiefly of the 59th Coast Artillery, 60th
Coast Artillery, and the 91st Coast Artillery (PS), and the 92d Coast
Artillery (PS). In addition there were appropriate supporting
units of line and service elements. At the outbreak of the
War
there were about 8,000 Americans, 2,500 Philippine Scouts, and 2,500
civilian Filipinos. After Bataan fell about 1,000 additional
personnel came to Corregidor from Bataan.

The structures and
facilities assigned to the Medical Department consisted of one station
hospital of 200 beds. In addition a portion of the Malinta
tunnel
was earmarked for Medical Department uses.

The sanitation on
Corregidor prior to the War was excellent. Potable water was
obtained from deep wells. There were no Anopheles mosquitoes
and
malaria of Corregidor origin was unknown. The health of the
command at outbreak of War was superior.

The mission of the
Medical Department at outbreak of War was to provide for the medical
care of the sick and wounded, and to recommend suitable measures for
the prevention of sickness and injury. The above mission plus
all
the ramifications involved in carrying out this mission constituted the
responsibility and duty of the Medical Department on
Corregidor.

The
Medical Department on Corregidor after the outbreak of the War was
organized as follows: The Surgeon, Harbor Defense, who had
supervision over all Medical Department personnel on the fortified
islands
and in addition was Commander of the Station Hospital, Fort Mills,
Corregidor. For medical purposes, Corregidor was divided into
zones and a medical unit consisting of two (2) medical officers, plus
noncommissioned officers and Medical Department enlisted men, were
assigned to each zone and to each of the three small fortified
islands. It was the duty of the Surgeon for each zone to
provide
medical care for all the troops in his zone regardless of their
unit. He was also responsible for the sanitary conditions in
his
area. Each zone medical officer was assigned to a coast
artillery
regiment so he performed the dual functions of regimental Surgeon and
Zone or Area Surgeon. His duties involved holding daily sick
call, treating and supervising the evacuation of the sick and wounded
and making frequent sanitary inspections and reports. His
medical
supplies consisted of medical chests and litters similar to those for
the battalion aid station.

Hospitalization. The day of
the first bombing of Corregidor 29th of December 1941, the topside
hospital was directly hit several times, killing one medical officer
and injuring others of the personnel. From this date on the
hospital was untenable and the whole hospital installation was moved to
the Malinta tunnel. With the cooperation of the Engineer
Corps
this tunnel hospital was enlarged so that 1,000 patient beds became
available. This proved to be entirely adequate and there
never
was a time when there was a shortage of hospital beds. An
operating room was established and all surgery for Corregidor and the
fortified islands' casualties was done here.

Evacuation.
Since all the medical departments in the zones of Corregidor were
constantly exposed to enemy bombing and shelling it was impossible to
render any but emergency treatment to the sick and wounded.
Casualties were evacuated by ambulance to the tunnel hospital for
definitive treatment. Casualties from Forts Hughes, Drum, and
Frank were brought over by boat at night.

Professional Medical
Aspects. From the time of the outbreak of the War and
progressively
thereafter, proper sanitation became an increasingly more difficult
problem to cope with. The devastation caused by the bombs and
shells afforded ample mosquito and fly breeding facilities as well as
rat hide-outs. Unbelievable numbers of flies were present with the
constant danger of spread of enteric diseases. Bathing
facilities
for the men were inadequate or absent. However, by frequent
inspection and recommendations to the unit commanders, relative to the
sanitation problem, we were able to go through this period without the
outbreak of any epidemic of communicable diseases. The effectiveness of
the supervision was exemplified by the outbreak of communicable
diseases in epidemic proportions after the fall of the Philippines and
when the troops were without adequate medical supervision in the Jap
prison camps.

The evacuation
service on Corregidor can be exemplified by reciting a typical
case. During, or shortly after, a bombing or shelling, word
would
be received at the aid station by telephone or messenger that there
were casualties in a certain area. The medical officer and
the
litter squad then went to the casualties, having first left word to
send for the ambulance from the tunnel. Then necessary first
aid
measures were rendered and usually by the time these ere completed the
ambulance had arrived. From the time the wound was incurred
until
the patient was on the operating table in the tunnel was a matter of
minutes and rarely did the time take over one hour. This is
one
of the important reasons for the excellent results obtained with lack
of sepsis and absence of gas gangrene or tetanus cases.

The
types of case were those from bomb and shell fragments with no small
arms bullet wounds until the last day of the siege. There was
a
high proportion of killed outright to the total casualties.
The
remarkable protection afforded by any kind of shelter provided a
person's body was below the surface of the ground, was demonstrated
conclusively. Numerous instances of shells landing within a few feet of
individuals lying in a shallow ditch, perhaps only one foot deep, but
without damage involved, have been recorded. On the other
hand,
to be standing upright during a shelling invited disaster. These simple
facts were soon learned by all the occupants of Corregidor, with the
result that frequently after the most intensive bombing or shelling,
lasting perhaps hours, no casualties occurred. When one
considers
the number of daily bombing raids and intensity of shelling over such a
protracted period, it is amazing so few casualties occurred;
furthermore, only about 2,000 of the personnel were in the tunnel, the
remaining 11,000 were exposed to the shells with meager protection.

War
in Corregidor can be divided into three phases: (1) From the
outbreak of the War, December 8, 1941, to January 15, 1942; (2) From
January 16, 1942, to April 9, 1942; (3) from April 10, 1942 to May 6,
1942. The first phase and the time from December 8 to
December 29
was characterized by a feverish effort to perfect the medical
organization. Work begun on the tunnel and air raid shelters
was
completed with a minimum of delay. Then on the 29th of
December
to the 15th of January was characterized by heavy daily frequent
bombing. From the 15th of January until the 9th of April the
Jap
was apparently occupied in Bataan and it was a period of quiescence.
Beginning about the 10th of April and continuing through the final
assault on Corregidor, the 5th of may, the bombing increased in
intensity and about the 17th of April Jap batteries from Bataan opened
fire and from then on terrific shelling
occurred, thereafter and daily.

The
Tunnel Hospital. The tunnel hospital deserves a word of
description,
though its fame has been spread so that it is generally quite
familiar. It consisted of a series of concrete-lined tunnels
used
as wards which were offshoots of the main tunnel. Every
available
space was utilized and three-deck beds were used so that eventually
1,000 beds became available. Latrines, flushing type,
showers,
and running water were available. To conserve water certain
hours
were allotted for use of showers. The wards were organized
similarly to those in general hospital, with doctors, nurses, and
enlisted men assigned to each ward. Light was furnished
continuously by a neon-type fixture.

The zone surgeons had
several paramount problems at all times. First, an aid
station
had to be located and maintained. Any stations above ground
were
soon reduced and even those well protected had to be relocated
frequently due to combat changes. Second, continual pressure
had
to be maintained on their unit commanders to insist that sanitary
orders were carried out. Thirdly, casualties had to be
located,
treated, and evacuated to the Malinta tunnel hospital. Location,
particularly at night, was difficult and dangerous. The Japs
had
a habit of firing for some time, then after a brief rest period
resuming fire for a short while. This frequently caught the
zone
surgeon and evacuation personnel in vulnerable positions.

The
diseases that occurred on Corregidor can be divided into several
groups. Respiratory diseases led the list. These
were mild
and pneumonia was rate. Of the gastro-intestinal diseases,
diarrhea was the most common type. Because of the use of
canned
food and occasional storage of it overnight without refrigeration,
sporadic cases of diarrhea, the food-poisoning type, occurred.
Dysentery was rare. Practically all the cases of either
amoebic or
bacillary dysentery where from personnel who had been in
Bataan.
This never became the problem that it did in Bataan. Malaria
of
Corregidor origin was unknown prior to the War. Malaria on
Corregidor, except for those cases coming to Corregidor after the fall
of Bataan, was not significant. The vitamin deficiency
diseases
were just beginning to make their appearance at the time of the fall of
Corregidor. The first one noted was beriberi, both the wet
and
neuritic types. However, only a small fraction of the
personnel
showed evidence of suffering from vitamin deficiency of any
type.

Cases of
battle fatigue (shell shock) were few in number. Only a
handful of
patients (six or eight) were in the hospital with this
diagnosis.
The reasons for fewer cashes than might be expected have not received
universal agreement. One theory is that there was no haven of
retreat. There was no zone of the interior to which the
individual could be sent, and everyone knew that. Another
factor
may have been that there was no let up. Frequently an individual will
stand the first shock of War well, and then after a period of rest in a
situation away from the front, will experience difficulty on returning
to the front. Here the War was always with us and once the adjustment
was made, thee were no new adjustments to be made. Whatever
the
reason, the facts are that psychosis and neurosis cases were few in
number.

Generally speaking, the health of the command on
Corregidor was good. In no way were conditions comparable to
those existing on Bataan.

Corregidor: The 92d Garage
Area. When General Wainwright acceded to the demands of the
Jap
Commander and agreed to surrender Corregidor, approximately 8,000
American soldiers, sailors and marines and 5,000 Filipino troops and
civilians fell into enemy hands.

All of these prisoners, with
the exception of a few thousand injured or wounded who were lying in
the Malinta Tunnel Hospital, were interned in an area on Corregidor
known as the 92d Garage Area. This was a level,
concrete-floored
area, possibly 500 feet wide and 1,500 feet long, located between the
beach and the cliffs inshore on the southern portion of Corregidor,
facing Cavite Province. It was filled to overflowing with War
prisoners. The only building in the area was a garage that
had
been rendered uninhabitable by reason of enemy bombing and
shellfire. Officers and enlisted men alike were placed in
groups
of 1,000, with an American colonel in charge of each group.

Each
prisoner was given a number, which had to be painted on the back of his
shirt or trousers. In the scant two days that elapsed between
the
actual capitulation at noon, 6 May 1942, and the internment of the
prisoners in this area on May 8th, the Japanese robbed many prisoners
of their possessions, such as watches, fountain pens, rings, eye
glasses, wallets and money. All the prisoners, officers and
enlisted men alike, were required by Japanese order to salute Japanese
soldiers and officers if they were covered, and to bow from the waist
if they were uncovered. This rule was strictly enforced by
the
Japanese soldiers. The Filipino prisoners were kept separate
from
the Americans by an imaginary line.

Within
a few days after the surrender, the Japanese began calling on the
American prisoners for large labor details for such purposes as
cleaning up gun positions, completing the airfield, rebuilding roads,
gathering ammunition, and loading the remaining food stocks on Japanese
freighters for transport to Manila.

The prisoners joined
together in small groups and, with the aid of a few shelter halves and
other pieces of scrap material, made temporary shelters to protect
themselves from the burning sun and tropical storms.

For the
first three days no food was issued to the prisoners, and many of them
risked being shot by wandering outside of the area designated by
Japanese as a prison compound, in search of food and
clothing.
After three days the Japanese did issue a small allowance of rice for
each man. The only additional food they had was canned goods
which they were occasionally able to salvage or steal while out on work
details from the Japanese. Many of the prisoners were severely beaten
when they were caught tacking any of these supplies, and were told by
the Japanese that all such supplies now belonged to the Japanese
Government.

There was no water available for the first three
days, but finally, after many entreaties from American officers, the
Japanese permitted the Americans to install a one-fourth inch pipe as a
conduit from water reserves two miles distant from the area.
The
men had to stand in line from four to six hours each day to secure one
canteen of water. The Japanese enclosed the area with hastily
thrown up barbed wire fences and warned the Americans and Filipinos
that anyone leaving this area without a Japanese guard would be treated
as a criminal and shot.

Sanitary facilities were extremely
poor. Open latrines, dug in the middle of the area, drew
swarms
of flies and other disease-bearing insects. Many of the
prisoners
contracted dysentery during this period. A small dispensary
was
set up by captured American Medical Officers and men. With
the
very limited supply of medicines and drugs at their disposal these men
performed almost impossible feats during the following months in their
efforts to keep alive the thousands who were suffering from
prostration, dysentery, malaria, and malnutrition.

All of the
patients in the Malinta Tunnel Hospital who were able to walk were, by
order of the Japanese in command, forced to leave the hospital and join
their fellow prisoners in the 92d area.

Fort Drum. The
officers and enlisted men captured at Fort Drum were subjected to two
days of mistreatment after their surrender. They were herded
into
small areas, not allowed to lie down or sleep, and
forced to go without food and water. It is reported that this
incident was due to the fact that the Americans defending Fort Drum had
killed a high-ranking Japanese officer on Bataan when they dropped a
fourteen-inch shell amidst a large group of Japanese
soldiers.
This high-ranking officer allegedly killed was said to have had a
brother still in Manila, who ordered the ill-treatment of the group
captured in Fort Drum as a reprisal measure. For several
hours
after the capitulation of both Bataan and Corregidor the Japanese Air
Force continued to bombard remnants of the American forces, who had
been notified of the acceptance of unconditional surrender by the
Japanese, and who were attempting to lay down their arms and turn
themselves and their equipment over to the occupation forces.

Fort
Frank. The men of this garrison, after their capitulation,
were forced
to board a transport on which they were taken to Nasugbu, where for
several days they labored preparing the docks and other neighboring
facilities for the Japanese Army. They were given little or
no
food or water during this time, and were forced to work under the hot,
broiling sun. They were subjected to frequent beatings and
torture at the hands of their captors. After about two weeks
these prisoners were transported to the prison camp at Cabanatuan.

The
picture in Malinta hospital after the surrender of Corregidor was
somewhat better than in the Prison Camps. The hospital was
unmolested and allowed to continue its function. Arrangements
were made for assignment of medical officers and enlisted men of the
Medical Department to the main prison camp and they remained on
twenty-four hour duty there. About twice a day the sick were
carried by litter to the main hospital and as patients recovered they
were transferred from the hospital to the prison camp.

Difficulties
were encountered in contacting the Jap Commander, but after a week had
passed and with the aid of a Hawaiian-born Japanese interpreter,
contact was made with the Jap medical officer. This officer
took
an interest in the hospital and from then until we were removed from
Corregidor our needs were taken care of by the Japs in a fairly decent
manner. The first major project we attempted was to improve
the
sanitation at the main prison camp on Corregidor and to try to get the
Japs to move the prisoners to suitable quarters. This latter
was
finally done through the intercession of the Jap medical officer.

March
Through Manila. On May 24, 1942, the prisoners of
who were
interned in the 92d Garage Area were evacuated from Corregidor and
loaded into the holds of three vessels that were standing at the
dock. They spent the night on board crowded in such a manner
that
it was impossible to stand or move about. On the morning of
May
25th the transports pulled up anchor and sailed across Manila Bay
to the shore opposite Pasay. There all of the prisoners of
war
were made to embark into the Japanese landing barges, which then moved
in toward the beach. When the barges approached the shore the
prisoners were forced overboard in about four feet of water and obliged
to make their way as best they could to shore, where they were
assembled in columns of four.

From this point they were
marched to Bilibid Prison, a distance of about five miles, herded and
kept in line of march by mounted Japanese cavalrymen. Only in
exceptional cases were any of the groups allowed to a rest period
during this march. Many Filipino people along the road of
march
tried to deliver food, candy and cigarettes to the prisoners, but each
attempt was met with a slap or a beating of the hands of the Japanese
guards. This march through the main streets of Manila was
forced
upon the prisoners of war from Corregidor apparently in an attempt to
show the Filipino people that the Japanese people were a superior race
and the white men were inferior to them.

The prisoners arrived
in Bilibid during the afternoon of May 25th. There were now
about
12,000 prisoners here, in a place designed to accommodate 4,000 at the
most. Each day a large group of the prisoners was evacuated
to
Cabanatuan prison camp in northern Luzon, where they were later joined
by the surviving Americans from Camp O'Donnell.

There were
several reasons for the bad treatment accorded to these
prisoners. For one thing, there was the barrier of
language. Very few Americans had any knowledge of the
Japanese
language, and as a result they frequently brought down punishment on
their heads through unwitting and unintentional disobedience of orders
that they did not understand. In other cases the treatment
was
due to the policy of indifference exercised by the local Japanese
commander, and in many other instances, it was quite plainly a matter
of revenge.

Meanwhile with the cooperation of the American
Engineers remaining on Corregidor the topside hospital was renovated
and made suitable for habitation. Numerous shell holes had to
be
repaired and about eighteen unexploded shells removed. Then
on
June 25th all the patients, many of whom had been in the tunnel since
the early days of the War, were moved to the topside hospital. Here
conditions were perhaps the best that we experienced at any time as
prisoners. Food was adequate and there was considerable
latitude
in the movements allowed hospital prisoners. There
were
frequent inspections by Jap officers, medical and otherwise, and they
seemed to be trying to do what they could to relieve our
situation. Our request for contact with the Red Cross
representative in Manila was refused and it was later learned that he
was interned in Santo
Tomas. The Jap guards were not allowed in the hospital area
and
they had to obtain our permission to come inside. An
intensive
program of various activities was begun, including sport programs,
literature courses, and studies of many types, in order to try to
develop interests in the personnel on which they could concentrate on
in the long days which lay ahead. In general, our health at
this
time was fairly good. Sanitary conditions were well under
control
as the Engineers had repaired all the utilities on Corregidor, which
gave us running water and even electric lights. The food
consisted of rice and salmon with some vegetables and fruits two or
three times a week and meat about twice a week. We complained
about the food to the Jap Commander and after he had inspected our food
supply (which according tot heir standards was excellent) we were told
that any further complaints would result in our being placed on rice
only. In the light of later ration experiences, our food
during
this period was excellent.

Finally on July 2nd our Commanding
Officer was notified at 9:00 AM that we were to be moved to Manila and
to have all the patients loaded on the ship by 4:00 PM the same
day. By working hard all day the loading was completed at
1:00 AM
that night. The nurses and four officers stayed in the
hospital
that night and were loaded about 6:00 AM the following
morning.
We arrived in Manila about noon and those who could walk were marched
through the streets to Bilibid Prison. The bed patients were
taken by truck. Here we found the Navy medical personnel who had
remained in Manila when it was evacuated had established a hospital in
the old Bilibid Prison. All of our patients and equipment
were
turned over to them on this date (July 3, 1942).
Approximately
100 Army and Navy nurses, American and Filipino, were separated from
the prisoners and assigned to duty with the civilian internees at Santo
Tomas University in Manila.

Status Given to Prisoners of War
By Japanese. The Japanese Military in the
Philippine Islands,
as
elsewhere in the field, displayed little evidence of any sense of
responsibility for the lives and welfare of the prisoners under their
care. The survivors of Bataan and Corregidor were informed
that
they would be treated as "captives" until all the guerrilla units that
were operating in the islands had surrendered.

In August 1942,
it was announced by the Japanese Military that from that time on these
captives would have the official status of prisoners of war.
As a
matter of fact, though, this announcement made little change in the
conditions under which the prisoners lived. Camp commanders
and
their subordinate officers paid scant attention to their charges, being
for the most part content to leave the responsibility for their
supervision and care in the hands of privates and noncommissioned
officers. These men, many of them uneducated and uncouth, and
most of them brutal, gave the prisoners their orders, and made whatever
arrangements were put into
force for the prisoners welfare.

8. THE MEDICAL
SERVICE, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE.

Camp
John Hay, the second largest military reservation in area in the
Philippines, was located on the outskirts of the City of Baguio in the
Mountain Province, some 5,000 feet above sea level. The purpose of this
camp was principally to furnish relief from the severe tropic heat and
humidity to the military and naval personnel stationed in the
Philippines. The camp offered a place of rest and relaxation
in a
temperate climate within 200 miles of Manila. There were
excellent quarters and messes both for offices and for enlisted
men. A very fine golf course (eighteen holes), tennis courts,
Officers' Club and Enlisted Men's Club were available. The camp was
usually filled to capacity over the weekends, especially by the Air
Corps, who could fly from Nichols Field, manila or from Clark Field at
Fort Stotsenburg within an hour.

The Station Hospital, Camp
John Hay, was an excellently and completely equipped hospital
of
thirty-five beds. The purpose of the hospital was to take care of the
sick and wounded at Camp John Hay, which included the following
organizations: Camp Staff, one battalion of 43d Infantry
(PS),
American Detachments of Quartermaster, Signal Corps, Finance, the West
Point Prep School, and the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments
(PA).
Also included in the Medical Detachment's responsibility was the care
for the visiting personnel of other stations on detached Service on
sick leave and convalescent cases from other military or naval
hospitals in the Islands.

The staff of the hospital
consisted of one medical officer and two nurses. There were
fifteen enlisted personnel in the Medical Detachment (PS), a First
Sergeant, Supply Sergeant, Pharmacy Sergeant, Operating Room Corporal,
Laboratory and X-ray Corporal, Dental Corporal, and nine Privates First
Class and Privates for Ward Attendants.

The diet at the camp and
hospital messes was excellent because of abundance of fruits and
vegetables grown in the vicinity of Baguio.

The water used on the Post was obtained from mountain springs and was
always potable by test.

The sanitary conditions were excellent. Inspections of the
entire camp were made at least once a week.

Training of the Medical Detachment became intensive at Camp John Hay
about October 1st, 1941. Close order drill, first-aid to
wounded, evacuation of sick and wounded over mountain trails, and
aid-station training and maneuver were stressed.

War
came to Camp John Hay only a few hours after the bombing of Pearl
Harbor. At 8:19 AM, December 8th, 1941 (December 7th in U.S.
and
Hawaii) about 150 bombs (100 and 500 pounds) were dropped by seventeen
heavy Japanese bombers, making several direct hits on buildings and
barracks.

The Japanese apparently had two ideas in bombing
Camp John Hay: (1) to catch many unsuspecting officers relaxing in the
offices' quarters over the weekend, and (2) to divert the fighter
planes from Clark Field while they devastated it three hours
later. They were successful only in their second
plan. Most
officers were confined to their duty area by a general alert, and did
not visit John Hay during the weekend.

The first impression of
the camp personnel when they saw the high-flying bomber formation was
that they were glad our Air Corps was on the job. The
personnel
stood and watched.

Casualties were eleven enlisted men and
civilians killed and twenty-five more, including several officers
severely wounded. Every form of transportation was
pressed
into service, and within ten minutes all the wounded were in the
station hospital.

When the wounded arrived at the hospital,
the operating room was fortunately all set up for operation.
Operations were performed immediately in spite of electricity and water
shut-off due to the bombing. The two nurses and each of the
fifteen enlisted men of the Medical Detachment performed outstanding
service, in spite of constant strafing of the camp by an enemy
plane. Within three hours all of the patients had been
operated
on and evacuated to a civilian hospital (Notre Dame) where they would
be safe from further bombing of the camp.

The Japanese Army
landed on the beaches between Vigan and Damortis (less than twenty
miles from Baguio) as early as December 10th, 1941, but were
repulsed. Within the next week the Japanese landed in force,
and
drove the few regiments of Philippine Army from the beaches back into
the mountains. This action cut off the only two roads from
Baguio
to Manila.

A
company of the 43d Infantry (PS) with two medical aid men each, was
placed across each of the two roads to defend Baguio from the rapidly
advancing Japanese. Our wounded who were not captured by the
enemy, and who were able to get back up to Baguio by any available
transportation, were taken care of at our hospital. Minor
casualties were sent back to their troops. Serious cases were
immediately evacuated to the Notre Dame Hospital in Baguio.
These
case were taken care of by civilian doctors and hospital staff, who
made all of their facilities available to our wounded. Our
Army
staff visited the wounded several times daily.

Finally on
December 22nd, 1941, USAFFE ordered Camp John Hay evacuated.
We
immediately moved our new portable X-ray machine, all of our surgical
operating instruments, operating table, infra-red and ultra-violet
lamps, beds, and blankets to the Notre Dame Hospital for
safe-keeping. The wounded, about thirty in number, were left
under the care of the civilian doctors to be captured by the invading
Japanese.

As mountain trails (foot) were the only means of
trying to outflank the Japanese and get through to Bataan, it became
necessary to discard all equipment except what we could carry on our
backs. Only patients who were able to hike for five days over rugged
mountain trails were allowed to go. The two nurses were given
fatigue clothes and packs, and joined the column with same.

After
climbing steadily for twenty-four hours we reached a lumber camp, Lasud
sawmill, on the top of a mountain, where there were already some sixty
American women and children, wives of gold miners in the Baguio
area. We decided that the nurses should stay there with the
other
American evacuees, as the mountains were too rugged for them to attempt
to continue. Adequate food for a six months' stay was
obtained by
cable car from the Camp John Hay warehouses. It was felt that
if
the nurses were to be captured by the Japanese, they would be better
off with a large group than by themselves.

As it was going to be
a race to outflank the Japanese Army at San Jose, permission was
requested to go on ahead with the medical detachment, as we felt we
could move faster in small groups. The request was granted,
provided we would furnish information of the trails ahead and sent it
back by runners, which we agreed to do.

Our medical detachment
plus two attached American enlisted men who had been stranded in Baguio
by the previous action on the beaches, climbed over the mountains all
of the daylight hours to the limit of our tolerance. By
December
28th we had reached Balete Pass, which was on a road leading to Bataan,
and from where we obtained truck transportation.

The
next morning near San Jose, where we had hoped to outflank the
Japanese, we ran head-on into a column of Japanese tanks. We dismounted
and scattered into the adjacent jungles, under heavy machine-gun
fire. Three of the enlisted men stayed. We were
surrounded
by enemy units, but they had not discovered our exact location. Through
the kindness of loyal Filipinos (civilians) we were supplied with small
amounts of food, which they would bring to us under cover of darkness.

The
Supply Sergeant was dressed in civilian clothes and went back to the
road to observe movements of the enemy. On January 16th, 1942, he
contacted five men of our medical detachment, who had been separated by
the machine-gun fire, and brought them back. These men had
dressed themselves as civilians and hiked over 100 miles through
Japanese-held territory to Manila, where they went to Sternberg General
Hospital on January 6th, 1942, to find it occupied by Japanese
troops. After investigating and learning that they were cut
off
from Bataan, they returned the 100 miles on foot to report their
findings.

Being unable to feed them, they were sent back to Baguio to do G-2
work. They were told to contact the first American forces
coming into that area.

From
our place of observation in the mountains to the East of San Jose we
could hear the rumble and see the flashes of the artillery on Bataan
and Cavite. Having no further information we remained in that
vicinity for three months, feeling rather strongly that help would soon
arrive. We debated as to whether we should go to the East and
try
to make our way South by boat.

Finally in the last days of
March we ran into a small patrol of Filipino guerrillas from Jones,
Isabella, where they were attached to the newly formed 14th Infantry
(PA). By traveling at night along river basins (dry) and
mountain
trails we were able to get out of Japanese territory. After ten days on
foot, we had accomplished the 150 miles to Jones, Isabella, where we
reported to the acting Commanding Officer of the regiment.

9. THE MEDICAL
SERVICE, VISAYAS MINDANAO FORCE.

On
or about August 27, 1941, a group of six American officers arrived at
Cebu, Philippine Islands, and established headquarters there.
The
mission of this group was to organize, coordinate and supervise the
training of the troops of the Philippine Army then being mobilized and
trained in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. These were
specifically: The 61st Division (Panay); 71st Division
(Negros);
81st Division (Cebu-Bohol); 91st Division (Leyte-Samar); and the 101st
Division (Mindanao). (All designations herein refer to the Philippine
Army. Philippine Constabulary and U.S. Army designations will
be
particularized.)

At the outbreak of war,
this establishment became the Visayas-Mindanao Force, with headquarters
at Cebu, except that the 71st and 91st Divisions, ear-marked in the
original plan for assignment to the South Luzon Force, were sent (less
the 73d Infantry and 93d Infantry) into Luzon during December 1941, and
so lost to us.

Regiments bearing the numeral "1" as a part of
their numerical designations constituted the first wave of the
mobilization, and it was these regiments which were found already in
existence and under training, e.g., the 61st Infantry, the 71st Field
Artillery, etc. The second wave, regiments bearing the number "2",
e.g., 82d Infantry were called up very shortly before December 7th, and
the third wave, such as the 73d Infantry and the 93d Infantry were
mobilized immediately after. Thus, only the first increment
had
any preliminary training, and the others had to get their training as
best they could, under the confused conditions of the early days of the
war.

It is interesting to note that although each division had
an artillery regiment, these regiments all fought as
infantry. We
had exactly five guns, 2.95-inch mountain howitzers, with a total of
1,300 rounds of ammunition. It is understood that more guns
were
forwarded to us from Manila but the ship was sunk by enemy air
action. After the surrender the Japs demanded to know where
our
guns were, and it was difficult to convince them that our so-called
artillery regiments were in truth and fact nothing but infantry.

A
survey of the situation was made immediately after opening
headquarters. The troops were found quartered by battalions
in
permanent barracks scattered throughout the islands. The plan
was
to call up the regiments as units, give them company and battalion
training, and then assemble them in temporary camps for regimental and
divisional training. The permanent camps thus vacated were to
be
used for housing the successive increments, as the various regiments
were called up in turn. Actually, units were sent directly to
beach defense positions upon receipt of the news of Pearl Harbor.

The
medical service was being handled by the medical detachments of the
various units, with hospitalization being furnished by local hospitals
on a contract basis. There were quite a number of hospitals,
including two military, three or four civilian government, and various
missionary, industrial-company and individually-owned
institutions. The largest were the Southern Islands Hospital
at
Cebu, an efficient institution operated by the national government for
the benefit of the civilian population of the Visayas and Mindanao, and
the Zamboanga General Hospital, a very well-run missionary institution.

A noteworthy hospital, of which much more later, was that of
the North Negros Sugar Company at Manapla, Negros
Occidentale. It
was maintained by the Company primarily for the benefit of its
employees, but it also accepted private patients.

One
of the military institutions was the Station Hospital, Lahug Airfield,
Cebu. The first enemy air-raid on December 13t, 1941, wrecked
the
hangars. The field was then expanded, to give more area for
cover
and camouflage, and was served by improvised medical groups in
camouflaged locations, while the personnel of the hospital were
transformed into a semi-mobile unit and moved to a nunnery in the
outskirts of Cebu City. Later the unit was moved to a site in
the
hills west of the city, where it rendered excellent service during the
Japanese invasion, and the severe fighting which accompanied especially
the assault on Cebu City.

The other military hospital was the
Station Hospital at Camp Luna, Parang, serving the regular Philippine
Army personnel stationed at that camp. There was also a small
dispensary serving the garrison stationed at Zamboanga.

Even
before the outbreak of war, plans had been made to establish a medical
base at Cebu, utilizing the facilities and personnel of the Southern
Islands Hospital as a nucleus, and establishing another General
Hospital at Talisay, a couple of miles south of Cebu, where there is a
practically inexhaustible supply of excellent water. This was to have
been the region for definitive treatment. We were given to
understand that the equipment of one General Hospital would be
forwarded to us from Manila, but unfortunately, it was lost in the
sinking of the "Corregidor" in Manila Bay.

Evacuation was from
the first a problem to which no rally satisfactory solution was ever
found. For water transportation, we had to rely on the polled
tonnage of the F.M.F., transporting our patients as ordinary passengers
on ordinary unmarked ships carrying troops, ammunition and
supplies. There were no hospital ships; and if there had
been, it
is quite possible that they might have been taken from us, repainted,
and used for general service -- the need was that pressing.
Ultimately, of course, the V.M.F. had no ships.

For land
transportation, there were only a half dozen ambulances in the entire
Southern Islands. The 81st Division had, if memory serves,
two
regulation Philippine Army ambulances, and the 101st Division had
one. The Southern Islands Hospital had a civilian ambulance
suitable only for city work, which was left in Cebu, where indeed it
was needed. Information is that it was very useful during the
invasion. The North Negros Sugar Company had a good ambulance
which was taken to Impalutao, and formed the mainstay of our evacuation
there.

Personnel was perhaps our first problem. We had
authority to recruit and induct enlisted personnel, but not
commissioned. Theoretically, doctors, nurses, etc., were still required
to submit formal application, with proof of qualification, two
certificates of character, physical examination, etc. They
were
supposed to be commissioned in the
Philippine Army and called to active duty. Then upon
authority
from Headquarters, USAFFE (at Manila, but soon moved to Corregidor),
the proper officer inducted them into the service of the United States.

The dental service was most efficiently managed and equipment
was secured for every Dental officer recruited and assigned to
duty. This in itself was no small achievement, and the Dental
service rendered was equally satisfactory.

One duty, assigned
to the Force Surgeon at the outset, was to coordinate and supervise the
arrangements of the Red Cross for the evacuation and treatment of
civilian casualties in the event of air raids. The
arrangements
made were found to function satisfactorily when the anticipated raids
took place. However, civilian casualties were fewer than
expected, for the Japs did confine themselves to military objectives.

The
islands were combed for medical supplies. In Cebu there were
two
or three wholesale drug houses, where some supplies were
found.
Retail drugstores everywhere furnished some, but depressingly little in
the total. A large steamer, the John Lykes, was lying in
harbor
at Cebu on December 7th with a general cargo for Shanghai.
This
proved a gold mine to the Force, for many very useful articles were
found on her, varying from a large amount of food and medical supplies
to half a dozen motorcycles for the Shanghai Police Force.
Later
on, an additional and very welcome supply of several tens of thousands
of quinine tablets was found in the Koranadal Valley Project.
But
the most important source proved to be the hospital of the North Negros
Sugar Company, where the semi-annual requisition had just been
received. This store became the mainstay of our
supply. One
or two large consignments of quinine were also flown in, later on, from
Australia, but these were of no benefit to the V.M. Force, for they had
to be forwarded to Bataan, where the need for them was apparently even
greater than ours.

The enemy attack on Davao seemed at first to
indicate that our plan was basically sound, but as the War progressed
the Japanese Air Force demonstrated that it had complete mastery of the
air, and that water-borne inter-island communication and evacuation
would be denied to us, except occasionally, by stealth and under cover
of night. Ship after ship was bombed and sunk, until at the
last
we had none at all. If their Air Force missed anything, their
Navy completed the job. Toward the end we were isolated on
our
various islands.

Medical Department records constituted a
major problem. The organization of the Philippine Army routed
all
S&W records, together will all personnel records, through the
Office of the Adjutant
General. However, in December 1944, an order from
Headquarters,
USAFFE, directed that the U.S. Army procedure be adopted, as of January
1st, 1942. It was impossible to comply with this order at the
time. The order itself was not received until after that
date. The necessary forms, which differ somewhat from the
Philippine Army forms, were not available, and there was difficulty in
having them printed, the only printing office being a small one in
Cebu, already over-burdened with work. Transportation from
Cebu
to Mindanao was already becoming precarious, and one consignment of
these papers was lost on a ship sunk by enemy action.
Finally,
there was neither personnel, even untrained, nor equipment, in the
office of the Force Surgeon, to handle the records. However,
the
question becomes merely an academic one in view of the loss of all
records at the time of surrender.

In spite of all
difficulties, the medical service of the Visayas-Mindanao Force was
functioning, and, from the date of opening of the Force Hospital at
Impalutao, professional treatment of a standard equal to the best
metropolitan hospitals was furnished.

Our sanitation, while
far from perfect, was holding intestinal disease well below the
epidemic point, though the threat remained ever-present. True
dysentery, both amoebic and bacillary, was continually being found, but
never to a paralyzing extent. Malaria was more
serious. It
was present everywhere, with certain areas where it threatened to
prevent all military activity. There was one bad area in
southern
Lanao, extending south almost to Cotabato. There was another in
southern Agusan Valley, which handicapped severely the operations from
the north against Davao. But the worst region was the so-called Digos
front, where the 101st Division held for months the line of a small
stream running south from Mt. Apo. This stream was exactly
the
type of breeding ground suited to Anopheles Minimus, the Philippine
vector of malaria, and because it was under observation and fire by the
Japanese, malaria-control work was most difficult. As a result, surveys
showed that the battalions holding these lines were practically 100%
infected, while their non-effective rates at times mounted to slightly
over 50%. Finally the stream was cleared and straightened,
other
measures adopted, and the malaria rate began to show a drop. However,
about this time the Jap landing at Cotabato compelled the division to
withdraw.

One measure adopted was to furnish every man with a
small mosquito bar fitting over the head and neck, to protect him both
while sleeping and while on sentry-duty in the foxholes and other posts
along the front line. These mosquito bars were manufactured
by
the Force Quartermaster Service, using civilian labor, and by the Red
Cross, using volunteer Filipino ladies. The material was any
thin
cotton goods that could be obtained, and varied from rather
satisfactory cheese cloth to some fairly heavy stuff.

An
order was issued that quinine would not be used for prophylaxis, but
would be reserved for treatment only. This was done because a
survey of the supply available showed that it was sufficient for
prophylaxis for the entire V.M.F. for a period of no more than a week.
Medical officers were instructed to conserve the drug, and to
discontinue its use as soon as the patient was able to return to duty,
making no attempt to obtain complete blood sterilization.

The
Japanese landing on the north shore in the Cagayan sector, quickly
followed by the landing at Cotabato, with their rapid advance both
northward and eastward from that city, showed that the end was not far
off. Plans were made to move the nucleus of the Impalutao
hospital to a location in a forest near Lake Pinamaloy, about fifty to
seventy-five kilometers south of Malaybalay and thence eastward into
the unknown, unmapped hill country, with a view to supporting a
last-ditch defense, and possibly even a guerrilla-type war, but were
rendered useless by the order to surrender. The Visayas-Mindanao Force
surrendered on May 10th, 1942.

After surrender, the remnants
of the Force, to a total of about 6,000, we concentrated near
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in what had been the Divisional Camp of the 101st
Division. Three dispensaries were set up, one for the
American
troops, one for the 101st Division, and one for the 102d Division, plus
a few elements from the 81st Division, Lanao, and the Agusan Valley
Force. The hospital at Impalutao continued to function as an
independent or semi-independent command. The distance between
was
about twenty-three kilometers and the Japs limited transportation, even
by ambulance, and discouraged inter-communication.

The
emphasis in the Malaybalay camp was placed on sanitation, as dysentery
and diarrhea showed a tendency to increase. The Japanese
separated Filipinos and Americans, and finally interdicted all
communication between them. This was the situation when the
senior officers, from the rank of colonel up, with a few orderlies,
were sent on September 6th, 1942, to Manila, and later to Formosa and
Manchuria.

10. THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE DENTAL CORPS.

A
detailed description of activities of Dental officers stationed at
various posts and stations in the Philippines will not be attempted in
this report.

Dental officers served in a variety of
capacities, both administratively and professionally. In the
Medical Center in Manila and the General Hospitals on Bataan and
Corregidor, Dental surgeons played a prominent part in the work of
operating teams dealing with wounds of the had and neck.
Excellent results were obtained, particularly in wounds involving the
maxillofacial regions where Dental
surgeons were chiefly responsible for the proper reparative procedures.
Moreover, all usual standard dental procedures were performed in the
hospitals in the rear areas as well as in the advanced installations
toward the front. Dental surgeons served in a capacity such
as
brigade surgeons, collecting company commanders, ward surgeons, motor
pool officers, evacuation, control and supply officers and in other
capacities. In some prisoner-of-war camps, limited dental
equipment was available and Dental surgeons rendered extremely valuable
services to the prisoners of war. Unfortunately, in many
camps
they were not provided with material nor permitted to practice their
profession. In consideration of the varied functions
performed by
the Dental Corps, it is a s source of great pleasure to the Surgeon of
the Forces in the Philippines to acknowledge in this brief report the
superior performance of duty by this group.

11. THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE VETERINARY CORPS.

No
attempt will be made to give a detailed account of the varied duties
performed by the officers and men of veterinary personnel in the
procurement, slaughter and distribution of fresh meat to the troops in
the field will be considered.

The limited supply of
rations available on Bataan and Corregidor made mandatory the
augmenting of the meager resources of the Army. To accomplish
this a survey of all possible food sources in Bataan was made and it
was discovered that the availability of carabao and to a much lesser
extent, horses, mules and hogs, would provide a substantial addition to
basic rations. This project was handled exclusively by
personnel
of the Veterinary Corps.

Early in January and continuing until
April 8th, 1942, somewhat over 2,800 carabao and approximately 600
other animals were procured, slaughter and distributed to the Army. In
some instances, by the use of civilian laborers, carabao found in front
of our advanced elements were successfully herded through the lines and
eventually brought to the field abattoir.

These abattoirs
consisted of bridges or platforms built across swiftly flowing mountain
streams. To prevent contamination of the stream all inedible
offal and refuse was buried in deep pits. The availability of
ample fresh water permitted thorough cleansing of the killing floor so
that a maximum degree of sanitation was maintained.
Immediately
upon completion of butchering, carcasses were transported by truck to
Cabcaben and thence to cold storage plant on Corregidor.
Other
deliveries were made direct to the various Quartermaster dumps where
front-line organizations called to collect he portions assigned to
them. At least 100 carcasses were stored in the refrigeration
plant of the submarine tender Canopis, which was stationed in Mariveles
Harbor. Some 300 quarters of meat were lost on Corregidor as
a result of the bombing of the cold storage plant. In
addition to
the slaughter of animals, previously described, front-line units on
their own initiative secured and slaughtered approximately 1,200
carabao.

As a result of these activities some two million pounds
of fresh meat were delivered to troops in the field and 3/4 million
pounds of edible offal were delivered to refugee camps in
Bataan.
Needless to say, the augmentation of the basic diet of rice by fresh
meat served to stimulate the morale of the troops on Bataan and
Corregidor and assisted materially in sustaining their endurance to
resist the enemy for a few additional weeks.

Shortly before
the close of the Philippine Campaign, plans had been set in operation
to tap the resources of Manila Bay, which teem with fish.
Unfortunately, the final Japanese drive was successful before any great
quantity of fish could be secured.

Veterinary personnel, both
officers and men, of the American and Philippine Armies rendered
invaluable service in varied capacities during the campaign and
throughout the long period of incarceration in the various prison
camps. Veterinary officers commanded line troops at the
front. They carried on all their normal functions, such as
the
care and evacuation of animals, the operations of a veterinary
hospital, inspection of food and also served in the capacity of medical
inspectors, mess officers, supply officers, etc. They
suffered a
high casualty rate. Over 40% of the veterinary officers in
the
Philippines at the outbreak of the War lost their lives. The loyalty
and performance of duty by the members of the Veterinary service,
Philippine Army, was similarly on a high plane and they likewise
suffered heavy losses. The Surgeon, Philippine Department,
takes
great pride in the outstanding accomplishments of this group, officers
and men, who lived up to the highest traditions of the Medical
Department of the United States Army.

12. ARMY
NURSE CORPS ACTIVITIES.

It
is not intended at this time to prepare a detailed statistical report
on nursing activities, but rather to acknowledge briefly the splendid
contributions of the Nurse Corps of the armed services during the
defense of the Philippines and the long period of imprisonment
following the capitulation of our forces.

With the abrupt
outbreak of War in the Far East, our Nurse Corps found itself in the
unique situation of being at the battlefront attending casualties on
the first day of the War. The record of devotion to duty and
results obtained amply show that its adjustment to a most difficult
situation was superb.

A recapitulation of the splendid services rendered in Manila, in the
jungles of Bataan, on Corregidor, and during the long period of
imprisonment, is not necessary as they are already well
known to the people of the United States.

Suffice
it to say that the members of the Army Nurse Corps exemplified its
highest ideals and traditions in a manner that shall always be
remembered by our citizens with great pride.

13. MEDICAL
ACTIVITIES, JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS.

The
purpose of this report is not to give an account of the personnel
experiences of the writer but rather to present a general picture of
the conditions that existed in the various prison camps in which he was
interned during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands and
until the time of the final capitulation of Japan, August 15,
1945. Every effort will be made to make this report as
impersonal as possible, but it is not intended that the reader should
get the impression that any part thereof is based on hearsay. Only
circumstances encountered at the various camps and places at which the
writer was personally present will be described.

The following
is an outline showing the different places and times as accurately as
can be remembered that the writer was present at each.

A. The March from Bataan --
April 9, 1942 to April 20, 1942B. Camp O'Donnell -- April 20, 1942 to June
1, 1942C. Camp #3 Cabanatuan -- June 7, 1942 to
October 31, 1942D. Camp #1 Cabanatuan -- October 31, 1942 to
October 19, 1944E. Bilibid Prison -- October 19, 1944 to
December 13, 1944F. The Death Cruise from Manila to Japan --
December 13, 1944 to January
30, 1945G. ShirakawaH. Fukuoka Camp #1, Japan -- January 31,
1945 to April 25, 1945I. Jinsen, Korea -- April 27, 1945 to
September 8, 1945

A.
The March from Bataan.

To grasp the impact with which this
ordeal
struck at the defeated and demoralized remnants of the Fil-American
Army of Bataan, it is necessary first to consider the extremely poor
physical state of the average man participating in this
march. As
has been pointed out by various others reporting on the final
pre-surrender phase of Bataan, our defeat was primarily one of
attrition. True enough, we were struck by an overwhelming
superiority of military force in the final Japanese drive, but it was
common knowledge to everyone, from the front-line private to the
highest commander in Bataan, that we were doomed to collapse as a
military force within only a few days even without the final blow by
which we were so completely and thoroughly crushed. Almost
every
man on Bataan was not only then and weak from starvation, but was or
had been further depleted physically from the effects of malaria
and dysentery or common diarrhea. In addition to these
supposedly
well men, literally thousands of the sick from the various front-line
medical installations, were thrown into this line of march, including
the Philippine Army clearing stations. Many thousands of sick from
General Hospital Number 2 were also forced to hobble from their sick
beds and fall into this seemingly never-ending line of march.

Second,
some idea should be given of the thoroughness with which the Japanese
went about their planned procedure of disorganizing and further
demoralizing this already defeated army. As far as could be determined
by the writer, every semblance of command and organization was wiped
out from the beginning. The Commanding General of my sector
after
being kicked in the face and beaten by a Japanese noncom spent his
first night as a Japanese prisoner sitting in the jungles of Bataan
with his hands bound so tightly behind him that he narrowly escaped
losing them from gangrene. Every other officer of his staff
spent
the same night under identical circumstances. The results of
this
complete disorganization may seem insignificant in a report of this
nature but as a matter of fact, it proved later to have a far more
damaging effect than could possibly have been imagined by anyone who
did not have the misfortune to witness the spectacle of this
disorganized and beaten army being herded like cattle down the route of
march, by Japanese sentries who jabbered their commands in a language
that was entirely foreign and who enforced them all too frequently with
the butt of a rifle, a bayonet, a bullet, or a club.

A third
factor was the utter lack of, and refusal on the part of the Japanese
to provide, any facilities for treating the sick or to provide for
their transportation when they became too weak to carry on the march
and staggered from the line to a fate that only those that followed can
confirm. However, from the evidence left by those who had
marched
ahead, it placed no strain upon the imagination to form one's own
conclusion.

The first general concentration of all the
scattered units from Bataan took place at Balanga along the south bunk
of the Pantingan River. Units from all over the Bataan
Peninsula
poured into this concentration area for days after the
capitulation. No effort was made by the Japanese to keep the
various units intact for administrative control. They were
merely
herded into this general area and surrounded by a cordon of armed Jap
guards. No facilities were established for messing the
prisoners,
thus corralled, and no food was anywhere in evidence.
Likewise,
there was no attempt being made on the part of the Japanese to make any
provision for the care of the sick. Men were dying all over
the
area without so much as an expression of concern by the
Japanese. It appeared that we were on our own so far as food
and
medical care was concerned but we were restricted to a given area and
were not permitted to venture forth in search of either medicine or
food. It finally developed that a group
of Medical officers did set up a makeshift aid station where
individuals, who had brought on their persons small portions of drugs,
could turn them in to the doctors who would in turn dispense them to
the sick. The amounts were trivial compared to the magnitude
of
our needs, but it was the only course open to our Medical officers to
render any medical service to our sick.

No provisions for
sanitary disposal of human waste were made and with literally tens of
thousands of men occupying for a few days and passing through this
limited area, it became in short order a quagmire of filth and
corruption. The dead were not buried and were, apparently
purposefully, left to decompose and serve as breeding places for
maggots right before the very eyes of those who were to follow. The
feeling of horror and revulsion experienced by the writer upon
witnessing this first demonstration of mass mistreatment and the
general apathy on the part of the Japanese authorities toward it
exceeds the power of expression.

It was from Balanga
that details were formed and fed into the line of march which kept the
road north to San Fernando packed with stumbling, staggering, sick and
exhausted human beings for the next ten days. Some groups
were
forced to make the entire march in a single nonstop ordeal except for
an occasional ten to fifteen minute halt. Other groups, as
did my
own, made overnight stops at Orani and Lubao. Conditions at
these
two camps will be described in a subsequent paragraph, but first the
process of getting work details out of Balanga will be described.

The
Japanese guards would come into the concentration area at Balanga and
without rhyme or reason round up a large group, drive them out onto the
sandy beach of the river, and leave them standing in he burning sun
from six to eight hours prior to starting them on the march. During
this time they would order each man to place all his personal
belongings by his side on the ground and then Japanese soldiers would
pass down the line between each two rows of prisoners and take whatever
items truck their fancy. In this manner practically every
watch,
fountain pen, and piece of jewelry was systematically stolen, as well
as any currency that the individual might have in his possession. By
the time that each group was allowed to start on the next leg of the
march, many would already be falling out from the exhausting effect of
merely standing for several hours unprotected form the sun.
Only
a trickle of water was running from an artesian well in this area and
many men started out with no water in their canteens and many had been
relieved of their canteens by Jap soldiers before reaching this
concentration area. It was in this state of almost complete
exhaustion that each successive group would start out and as a result
many would be staggering and falling from exhaustion before the column
was even under way. Had the Japs furnished transportation or
made
any effort to assist us in taking care of our sick, hundreds of men who
fell out from exhaustion and sickness and whose bodies were still
strewn along the road when the march was
completed could have been saved.

The
camp at Orani was a fenced area, much smaller than the original one at
Balanga. Men were marched into this area at the end of the
day in
close formation. When the area was filled to capacity with
standing men, the order was given to stop for the night. This
time there was not sufficient room even to stretch out on the
ground. Again there was no food and no medicine and no
sanitary
facilities and again the same failure to dispose of the dead from
preceding groups. There was no water available in this
compound
but in passing by an artesian well on the street the following morning
many of the men were able at least to partially fill their canteens.

The
next leg of the march started from Orani at sunup and ended at Lubao
that night at about 10:30. Several halts were made en route
that
day and these were always on long open stretches of the road where
there was no opportunity for protection from the sun. On two
occasions halts were made in the vicinity of artesian wells and
although water was plentiful, halts would not last long enough for more
than a small percent of the column to obtain water. Several
officers in my group were without canteens and had been cooperatively
carrying a five-gallon bucket picked up in Balanga. We were
able
on both these occasions to get this filled and in turn were able to
fill canteens for quite a few others, but this indeed did not offer
much relief in proportion to the need for water. As a result,
men
were falling out all along the way to add to the already outrageous
number of dead that lined the road.

By the time the
column reached Lyac Junction, men were becoming desperate because of
thirst and hunger and during a halt in this vicinity, many men left the
road and started across an open area toward a field of sugar cane and
in spite of rifle fire from the Jap sentries at the rear of the column,
proceeded to break down stalks of sugar cane and return with them to
the column.

It was a common sight from that point on to see
men walking along stripping the bark from a stalk of sugar cane with
their teeth and chewing the pulp to extract its sustaining juice -- a
primitive way of obtaining both food and water, and although it may
sound far-fetched to the inexperienced, there is no doubt in the mind
of this writer that this simple expedient save the lives of many men in
that day's march.

The compound at Lubao was an empty sugar
warehouse which was surrounded by a small fenced-in area.
Inside
this compound there was a large artesian well and for the first time
men were allowed to line up and wait their turn until everyone had
obtained water. This line ran continuously day and night for
the
four days that we were held
in this compound. There were still no provisions for feeding
and
no medicines available through the Japanese. The only food
that
men in this compound received was what they had been able to procure
from native Filipinos who took their chances with the Jap guards along
the route of march to toss an occasional man a "handout."

The
next day, the Japanese, through an American interpreter, ordered
everyone who had a personal supply of medicine to turn it in to another
improvised aid station then being operated by another group of American
medical officers. The same situation resulted that had been
experienced at Balanga -- only a handful of drugs for the thousands of
sick who needed treatment.

The sanitary condition of this
compound was the worst yet encountered. Excretions from men
suffering from dysentery literally covered the area. Corpses
of
several dead had been thrown along the fence that enclosed the area and
were in an advanced state of decomposition. However, most of
the
dead from this compound were carried across the road and thrown in a
field of cogon grass.

Many men had become too ill to stand in
line for water at this stop. One of the few things that we as
Medical officers were able to do for our sick was to get them water
from the well in the five-gallon bucket and fill their canteens for
them.

On our last morning at Lubao a few boxes of cooked rice
were brought into the compound and those who were fortunate enough to
be3 served before the supply was exhausted were given a small cupful of
cooked rice before starting on the final leg of the march which ended
at San Fernando, Pampanga. The column was again formed on the
road and given the usual several hours of sun treatment and official
"shake-down" before proceeding. This day ended at sundown
when we
finally were marched into the grounds of what had once functioned as a
cockfighting arena. Casualties were heavy during this day's
march
and to give some idea of what a narrow margin separated those that were
able to make it from those who were not, I cite the following
example: A Lt. Colonel of Infantry who was with me in Lubao
came
with some adhesive tape and had me tape some blisters on his
feet. he appeared in a much better state of nutrition than
the
average and was apparently not acutely ill at the time. I
became
separated from him in the column of march that day and it was the last
time I ever saw him. He never reached San Fernando and I was
told
by others who knew him, who were behind me in the line of march, that
they had seen his body lying along the side of the road only a few
kilometers short of San Fernando. Perhaps a drink of water,
some
salt, and a bite of rice would have saved his life, but such were our
conquerors that these simple mercies were not provided.

At
San Fernando the first semblance of any organized effort on the part of
the Japanese to provide food in any quantity was seen. Here they had
set up a battery of large cauldrons and were furnishing a limited
quantity of rice which was cooked and served twice a day.
Each
man here received a copy of cooked rice night and morning. There was
also a spigot one-half inch in diameter where men were able to form in
a continuous line to fill canteens with water. This compound
must
have had an average daily population of some 6,000 to 10,000 men.

The
usual aid station without medical supplies was set up in the cockpit
and although they gave us no medicines, the Japs, for some reason,
allowed the Philippine Red Cross to make a sort of limeade and send
several buckets full of it into the camp for our seriously
ill.
It was a small gesture, but the first thing that had happened that gave
any hope that maybe once we reached our final destination things might
be better.

Sanitation in this compound was also somewhat
improved. Large slit trenches had been dug for use as
latrines
and although they were teeming with maggots and flies were swarming
everywhere, at least it tended to lessen the amount of surface
contamination of the ground upon which men had to sleep.
Moreover, the dead here were buried.

A Jap sentry on perimeter
guard duty at this stop was operating a racket by cutting sugar cane
from an adjoining field and selling it at P2.00 a stalk to anyone who
had been smart enough to get this far without losing the currency in a
shakedown. he would have had a flourishing business had more
of
us had any money.

The following is a summary of the different types of atrocities that
were actually witnessed by the writer during this march:

(1) Kicking with a heavily booted foot on the
head and in the face.
(2) Beatings with heavy club (one fatality seen).
(3)
Tying hands behind back for a period of fifteen hours with rope so
tight that circulation was almost completely cut off (large group).
(4) Killing by bayonet
(5) Killing by shooting with a rifle
(6) Jabbings by bayonet inflicting wounds not fatal.
(7) Shooting with rifle causing wounds not immediately fatal.
(8) Refusal to provide water, food and medicine, which resulted in an
unknown number of deaths.

In
closing this report covering the march from Bataan, I would like to pay
tribute to the loyalty of the majority of the Filipinos encountered
along the route of march. They were ready and anxious to help
out
in whatever small way they could, but the order of the day seemed to be
that they were not to approach the road as the column was passing
by. Some did so, apparently at some risk to their own
personal
safety. Others would stand at a safe distance and through
sugar
cakes and packages of cooked rice and even some packages containing
fried chicken into the column as it passed. Only a gesture
but
one that conveyed a feeling of loyalty that is undoubtedly fixed in the
mind of almost every man who made the march.

B.
Camp O'Donnell -- The First Permanent Camp.

This camp, which is
located some six miles to the west of Capis, in the province of Tarlac,
was in the process of being constructed when the War started.
Many of the buildings in the main camp and most of the hospital
buildings had not been completed at the outbreak of war.
Roofs
had not been finished and water pipes had not been connected.
There were no plumbing fixtures in the buildings and septic tanks were
only partially constructed and were not in operation. The
buildings in the main camp were constructed of native materials with
sawali walls and nipa roofs. Floors were of strip bamboo, as
is
customary in the native barracks, and were double-decked, with only a
passageway down the center to allow for entrance into the different
bays. The hospital buildings were of native lumber with
floors
and walls of wood but with roofs made from cogon grass. The
camp
was situated in rather barren country, except for a heavy growth of
cogon grass, and was some two or three kilometers east of the King
River.

Into this camp came the entire army from Bataan.
The exact figures were never made known to me but it is estimated that
there were around 10,000 to 12,000 Americans and some 50,000 Filipinos
originally concentrated in this camp. It was divided into an
American section and a Filipino section. From that time on,
we
had no contact with the Filipinos.

By the time that I
arrived at this camp steps had already been taken by the senior
American Medical officer present to set up a hospital in the American
section and all medical personnel who were still able to work were
placed on duty there as fast as they arrived in camp. The
hospital served mainly as a place to segregate the more seriously ill
from those who were still able to wait upon themselves.
Hundreds
of cases of malaria and dysentery remained scattered throughout the
camp, for many who had had a glimpse
of conditions that existed around the hospital area preferred to take
their chances on the outside rather than run the risk of the added
exposure that results from this concentration of sick in the hospital
area. Men were horrified to see conditions that existed in
what
was promptly dubbed "St. Peter's Ward." It was the ward where
the
dysentery cases were moved after all hope for their recovery was
lost. I shall not attempt a description of this ward.

At
the beginning, the hospital consisted of three buildings with wooden
floors and two other buildings in which the flooring had not been
laid. Within a few days the Engineer Corps secured enough
scrap
lumber to put flooring in the other two buildings and these constituted
the hospital for the American section of camp throughout our
imprisonment there.

At no time was any equipment furnished for
the care of the sick. We had five empty buildings without
beds or
even blankets to put down upon the floor. Consequently,
patients
were simply placed in rows along the wall upon the bare
floor.
Many of the more severe dysentery cases had soiled their clothing so
badly that they simply took it off and abandoned it, preferring to lie
nude upon the bare floor than continue to wear their filthy
clothing. No facilities for washing clothing or for bathing
patients were available. No water for any purpose except drinking was
available in camp. Water for cooking the rice had to be
carried
from the river in five-gallon buckets. Floors of the wards
could
not be mopped for lack of water. With only two or three small
spigots for the entire American section, it became a major problem to
provide water for the patients that were too weak to stand in line.

The
mess for the hospital area was located in a building similar to the
barracks building except that it had a dirt floor. The
building
was not screened and the only facilities furnished for operating the
mess were two large cauldrons for cooking the rice and some old rusty
steel drums with one end cut out for storing the cooked rice until
feeding time. Several cookings were always required to
provide
sufficient rice for the number being fed from each mess.
There
were no covers for these containers and the Japanese refused even to
let us use the empty rice sacks to make covers for these containers.

The
food consisted of polished rice (about 300 grams per day) and a thin
green soup made from some native plant which looked very much like sea
weed. Occasionally gourds would be substituted for greens in
the
soup and towards the end of our stay at this camp we were receiving a
small amount of camotes and mongo beans. On two or three
occasions, carabao were slaughtered by our own Veterinary personnel,
but the quantity of meat received was insignificant. If the individual
found a piece of meat one cm. square in his soup he
considered his luck better than average.

The
medicines furnished by the Japanese at this camp consisted of a mere
handful of quinine and some miscellaneous patent medicines commonly
seen on the drug shelves of the native botica. When prorated to the
ward surgeons, the quinine would not have averaged more than five
grains for each patient than suffering from malaria. This brought up
the question of how to use this precious, life-saving drug for the
greatest good. It was finally distributed to each of the ward
surgeons based upon the number of malaria patients for which he was
responsible for and the actual decision on its use, from that point on,
was left up to him. It was the opinion of most of the Medical
officers present that the drug should be given to selected cases, or
case chosen by lottery, in sufficient doses to bring about a remission,
rather than waste the drug by giving each individual a single
non-effective dose. This latter procedure was followed by
most of
the ward surgeons. The only drug ever furnished for dysentery at Camp
O'Donnell was a few tubes of anti-dysenteric serum. The
effect of
its use was a moot question, but it was used until the supply was
exhausted. In addition to the medicines furnished by the
Japanese, a few drugs were smuggled into camp by details working on the
outside but they were, in general, given only to patients specified by
the donor.

Word finally got around camp that a tea made from the
leaf of the guava tree was used effectively by the natives in treating
dysentery and permission was granted by the Japanese for us to send out
details daily to pick these leaves. the tea was made in
fifty-gallon steel drums and was served to anyone desiring to try
it. So far as could be determined by the ward surgeons, its
use
had no effect upon the course of the dysentery. It probably
was
worthwhile from the standpoint of psychotherapy.

Sanitation in
this camp was bad from the beginning. Pit latrines served as
excellent breeding places for flies. The blue-bottle fly of
the
Philippines is a terrific breeder and within a short time flies were so
prevalent that it became a physical impossibility to prevent food
contamination in the mess hall and even after food was served the
individual, it was necessary for him to keep one hand in motion over
the mess kit to prevent flies from lighting upon it. There
were
no facilities for the proper washing and sterilizing of mess
kits. Consequently, dysentery remained a serious menace
throughout.

Personal hygiene was non existent at
O'Donnell during our entire period there -- no water for bathing or for
washing hands and face, no soap, no razors, no toothbrushes, no tooth
powder. Only those who violated Japanese regulations in
taking
water for unauthorized uses
had even so much as a sponge bath during those six weeks.
Patients in the dysentery ward became incontinent and soiled themselves
and their surroundings. There was no water, no disinfectant,
not
even a mop with which to clean the floor and as a result, the
unconscious and seriously ill were, to put it bluntly, simply wallowing
in their own filth. The average American, I have found, is pretty
crafty when placed on his own resources, but trying to find an adequate
substitute for water in keeping himself clean seemed to exceed his
ability to improvise. It was indeed an unhygienic sight to behold.

The
morbidity at this camp was extremely high. Almost every man
in
camp was suffering from a deficiency disease. Nutritional
edema
was common and pellagra was just beginning to make its first
appearance. Edema was severe and in many cases generalized.
It
was not uncommon to see a patient whose feet and legs were so swollen
that he could scarcely walk and in the severe cases, the scrotum was so
large he could not button his clothing. Many of these
progressed
so far that the serious cavities became filled with free fluid before
the patient died. Malaria and dysentery were still taking
their
daily toll of about twenty-five to thirty Americans and several hundred
Filipinos. Diphtheria broke out and accounted for quite a few
deaths at this camp but did its greatest damage when carried over into
#1 Camp at Cabanatuan, where it resulted in 123 deaths before the Japs
would bring antidiphtheritic serum into camp. The total
mortality
from all causes at O'Donnell during the less than two months that this
group of American prisoners was held there was between 1,500 and
1,600. The exact figures well be available when all recovered
documents are released.

`In the Filipino section of camp they
were burying from 300 to 500 men a day when the American section was
moved out. I learned later from some of the American Medical
officers who remained at O'Donnell until that camp was finally closed
that a total of some 27,000 Filipinos were buried there.

The
Americans in this camp, except for about 600 of the most seriously ill
patients in the hospital, were moved to Camp #1 at Cabanatuan, June 1st
and 2nd. Two or three weeks prior to this the hospital
buildings
had become filled to capacity and patients were being placed on the
ground beneath the two main ward buildings. Almost as many patients
were on the outside as were in the two main wards, but fortunately the
rains did not start until a short time before we were moved.

C.
Camp #3, Cabanatuan.

The American prisoners who were still
able
to walk from O'Donnell to Capas were moved by train (100 men to a
boxcar) from Capas to Cabanatuan, June 1 and 2, 1942. This
trip
lasted from sunup until sundown and because of the extreme heat and
absolute lack of ventilation, was most exhausting. Those who
were
not able to walk to Capas were moved the following day by
truck.
The writer came with the first contingent by train and on June 2nd
arrived at Camp #1 where he spent only five days before being
transferred as Camp Surgeon to Camp #3. He was later moved
back
to Camp #1 after #3 was closed but conditions at #1 will not be
discussed until a later part of this report.

Camp #3 was
another of the Philippine Army camps constructed of the same materials
as Camp O'Donnell and similar in every respect except that there were
no hospital buildings. It was here that most of the prisoners
captured on Corregidor had been concentrated and therefore there were a
large number of Navy and Marine personnel in addition to the Army
personnel that were captured on Corregidor.

It was striking to
see the difference in the physical state of these men as compared to
those who had come up from Bataan. The former were in much
better
state of nutrition and most of them had not had malaria prior to coming
to this camp. They had, however, been subjected to such
unsanitary conditions after the capitulation that dysentery became
prevalent among them and many developed tropical ulcers on the
legs. Among them were some who had come from Bataan and in
addition several hundred from O'Donnell were finally moved up from Camp
#1. Disregarding these last two groups, however, the general physical
condition of the 6,000 men at this camp was considerably better than
that of those at O'Donnell.

About June 7, 1942, a group of
American Medical offices were sent from Camp #1 to Camp#3 to establish
a dispensary service for this camp. When we arrived we found
only
one American Medical officer there and he was without any facilities
for treating the sick. Three small shacks had been designated as an
isolation hospital, but medicines and supplies were entirely lacking.

The
Japanese doctor at this camp was consulted immediately about medical
supplies, equipment and special food for the sick. He spoke
good
English and seemed to be a much higher type than any Jap previously
encountered. He promised to see what he could do. In the
meantime
we went ahead organizing a medical service for the different groups and
held a sick call for the purpose of making up a list of the number of
cases of each disease present in camp. After a few days this
list
was presented to him and he in turn gave us our first issue of medical
supplies for the camp, viz., a pound of cotton, six tablets of picric
acid, a bottle of 100 coryza tablets, and eight-ounce bottle of what
looked like an aqueous solution of mercurochrome and a small amount of
boric-acid powder. With this we were expected to render
whatever
medical treatment would be required in a camp of 6,000 men.

By
this time the camp had been organized into three groups for
administrative control. Two Medical officers were assigned to
operate a dispensary for each group and three others were assigned to
the isolation hospital. One Veterinary officer was assigned
to
each group for sanitary inspection, one Medical officer was kept as my
adjutant at Headquarters, and two Dental offices were assigned to
Headquarters dispensary. With this organizational setup, it
was
only a matter of getting supplies to afford the camp a decent medical
service. There were no provisions for doing surgery at this
camp,
nor had there been at Camp O'Donnell, but surgery was not then a
pressing problem. Our main worry was how to get food and
medicines for treating malaria and dysentery. A daily
interview
was held with the Japanese doctor and he was kept constantly informed
of our needs and of the number of sick in camp by disease
classification, but it was not until around the 1st of August that we
were able to get quinine and other needed drugs through his office.

In
the meantime drugs were smuggled into camp through details working on
the outside. One man who drove a truck for the Jap
Quartermaster
frequently made trips to Manila and through him we were able on one
occasion to contact the Philippine Red Cross in Manila from whom we
received a bottle of 5,000 sulfanilamide tablets, 3,000 five-grain
tablets of quinine, 100 ampules of emetine, one bolt of gauze (100
yards), and a small amount of some proprietary dysentery
remedy.
This was smuggled in and delivered to my shack that night after dark.
It was by this means that we were able to keep our malaria death rate
so low at Camp #3. Until we finally received an adequate
supply
of quinine from the Japs, no attempt was made to give curative
treatment but in order to stretch our quinine and make it go as far as
possible, only three or four days' treatment would be given -- enough
to
stop the chills and fever and keep the patient alive.

A
campaign was started immediately to control fly breeding and a
propaganda campaign inducing men to kill flies and thereby better their
chances of survival was inaugurated. Posters and sketches
demonstrating how dysentery was spread by flies were put up in
conspicuous places throughout the camp. Talks by the Medical
officers to group assemblies were given on the dangers of dysentery and
how to combat its spread. Eventually a system of rewarding
men
who turned in a tin can full of dead flies was worked out. At
this time the Japs had started giving an extra heavy ration for men
going out on work details. This additional ration consisted
of a
flour biscuit for every man who did heavy labor. Through the Jap doctor
we were able to get this extra biscuit ration for each man turning in a
milk can full of dead flies. The result was
amazing. I have
burned up to as many as two rice sacks full of dead flies in a single
day's catch. By using every device possible we were able to
control dysentery somewhat better than we had been able to at Camp
O'Donnell.

Tropical ulcers became
so numerous that some method of treating them had to be worked out and
after trying many different types of home-made ointments, we finally
decided that one made by crushing tablets of sulfanilamide and
incorporating this powder in a base of oleomargarine afforded the most
satisfactory results. Many of these ulcers ultimately
required
skin grafting before they would heal.

The ration at Camp #3
consisted of polished rice (about 500 grams), with the usual green soup
daily and a meat meal of one carabao for 6,000 men, about once a
week. This varied considerably toward the last of October
when we
were given a few meals of Brahma beef taken by the Japs from a herd
that ran wild near the camp.

About a month after we started
our campaign for extra food for the seriously ill, the Japanese doctor
authorized me to send a medical officer and two men with a truck to the
market in Cabanatuan to buy food for those among the sick who had money
to pay for it. This truck went to market twice a week and
although many men who needed extra food did not have the money with
which to purchase it, the underground soon started brining money into
camp and in the end much good was accomplished for the camp as a
whole. About a month later authority was granted to purchase
extra food for the entire camp and the special medical
purchases
were cut off.

In spite of the extra food purchases outside the
camp, the diet still remained grossly inadequate and by September
hundreds of cases of pellagra and beriberi appeared, followed shortly
by xerophthalmia and nutritional amblyopia. Corneal
ulcerations
and failing vision became commonplace and by the end of October when
the camp was closed and consolidated with Camp #1 the nutritional state
of this group was only slightly above that seen among those still
surviving from the Bataan group.

Most of the malaria encountered
at Camp #3 was of the estivo-autumnal variety, and although it may be
true that this is the most fulminating and dangerous type of malarial
infection, it was considered fortunate because of the circumstances
under which we were working that we had this type rather than the
tertian variety to deal with. Because of the extremely
limited
supply of quinine, we could not have treated repeated recurrences and
it seemed to us that the chances for recurrences from the tertian
strain were much greater than the E.A. strain and that it required more
quinine to bring about a remission of the tertian strain than it did
for E.A.

The sanitation at this camp was much better than at
any place previously encountered. Box-type latrines were
provided
and there was an adequate supply of water in the camp to provide for
moderately good personal hygiene. Details were taken daily to
the river for bathing and there
was a liberal allowance of soap for bathing and washing
clothing.
One area of the camp was situated on low ground and became a quagmire
during the rainy season, but we were soon able to dig our way out of
the mud and establish fairly good drainage.

The barracks at
this camp were built prior to the war to accommodate forty enlisted men
of the Philippine Army. In these same buildings the Japanese
required us to house from 100 to 120 men. This was not due to
a
shortage of buildings but to a general policy laid down by the Japanese
authorities. There were always empty buildings in camp.

The
hospital consisted of only thee small buildings about fourteen feet
square and was not equipped with beds or bunks. Patients had
to
lie on the bare floor but were given a blanket for padding.
There
was water for mopping the floors but it was difficult to accommodate
the patients in the limited space while floors were allowed to
dry. There was no place to do even emergency surgery, since
it
was contemplated that all surgical cases would be transferred by truck
to Camp #1 for operation. This system worked fairly well but
during a period when the river bridge between the two camps was out, we
were unable to transfer a patient who was suffering from a large
abdominal abscess and were forced to drain it under very crude surgical
conditions. The patient died. One other case, an
acute
appendicitis, subsided without operation.

Diphtheria was not a
serious problem at this camp. Only a few cases occurred and
those
after serum became available. No deaths from diphtheria
occurred.

Morbidity was high towards the closing days of this camp
because of deficiency diseases, dysentery and malaria, but the total of
deaths from all causes was only sixty-nine over a period of five
months, a figure which may seem high to one who has not worked under
such circumstances as we were forced to work under, but a figure which
caused us to feel not only thankful but even proud.

The only
indictment against the Japanese doctor at this camp is in connection
with the delay in issuing much-needed quinine for a period of ten days
after it was known to be available in camp. Although he
accomplished little and was slow in getting results, it is my opinion
that he was making some effort, but was meeting opposition from higher
Japanese authority. I cite the following in support of this
belief: When beriberi became such a serious problem and this
doctor insisted that he could not get brewers' yeast nor vitamin
concentrates for us, it was suggested that he allow us to build some
wooden vats and grow our own yeast. This authority was
granted
and he furnished us with a culture of brewers' yeast from the San
Miguel brewery in Manila and
by using a culture media of boiled rice we set about growing brewers'
yeast. Although we were never able to produce it in
sufficient
quantities to be of any great value in curing or preventing beriberi it
was at least a sympathetic gesture on his part. A measure of
this
yeast culture was served to every man as he came through the feeding
line to draw his rice. Many of them seemed to like it as a condiment
over the rice and approved of it regardless of its value as a
therapeutic agent.

There is a great deal more that should be
written about conditions at this camp but this is not intended to be a
detailed account. It is intended simply to give an impression
of
conditions that existed. All prisoners were moved out and the
amp
was closed October 31, 1943.

D. Camp #1 Cabanatuan.

The medical cadre of 250 officers and men which arrived at Cabanatuan
June 1st, 1942, had previously been engaged in the operation of General
Hospital Number 2 in Bataan. A brief summary of some of their
problems and activities during the developmental state of Camp #1 will
be briefly described.

Prison Camp #1 was under construction in
1941 as a cantonment for the training of a Philippine Army Division and
it had not been completed when war began. The barracks were
built
of bamboo and had sawali walls and cogan grass roofs. There
were
no doors. Each barracks had two tiers of ten bays with split
bamboo floors. Each bay normally was planned to house two
Filipino soldiers so the capacity of each barracks was forty
men.
From 100 to 120 American prisoners of war were crowded into these
barracks. Small quarters built for four Filipino officers housed from
fifteen to nineteen American offices and to as many as twenty-two
enlisted men.

The camp was located on a treeless plain, a
portion of which had been a former rice paddy. The ground
sloped
appreciably with the result that about one-third of the camp was
literally a bog during the rain season, with the collection of water
two to three feet deep in places, making access to barracks almost
impossible. These conditions existed in the hospital area of the camp
to a greater degree than in the main portions of the camp.
Most
of the buildings were in a run-down and dilapidated condition from lack
of upkeep and because of the fact that much of the material had been
removed prior to occupancy by prisoners of war.

During June
1942, the census of the camp rose steadily, reaching about 6,000 by
July 1st. All American prisoners of war at Camp O'Donnell,
except
about 600 in semi-moribund condition, were moved to Cabanatuan during
the first two weeks of June. The remainder of the prisoners were those
captured on Corregidor.

No provisions had
been made for the care of the sick. All prisoners, almost
without
exception, were in need of food and medicine. The most extreme
cases were placed in the hospital area of the camp and they usually
averaged a daily census of 2,500. No medical supplies or
equipment were provided by the Japanese until July 26, 1942. At least
3,500 of the prisoners were desperately in need of quinine and some
2,000 were suffering from dysentery. All were suffering from
malnutrition and avitaminosis. Approximately 5,000 were in
need
of medication for disorders of the skin, such as tropical blisters and
ulcers. Approximately 3,000 showed a severe degree of edema
of
the legs. Almost everyone was infested with body lice.

A
summary of the general operation of the medical facilities of this camp
will be given and special problems relating to diseases of sanitation
will be discussed. The following topics will be
considered:
(1) operation of the hospital area (2) dispensary medical service (3)
medical supplies (4) sanitation (5) morbidity and mortality of
principal diseases.

On June 2d, 1942, a group of 250 prisoners
which had arrived from Camp O'Donnell were housed in barracks at the
western part of the camp. In this section of the camp there
were
thirty-one barracks in addition to mess halls and officers'
quarters. This area was approximately 500 yards distant from
the
main portion of the camp, being separated by some open fields upon
which were placed scattered buildings utilized by the Japanese.

On
June 3d the personnel of General Hospital Number 2 were designated by
Japanese Headquarters as the unit to operate the hospital
area.
Remaining medical personnel which had arrived at the camp later on were
designated as the dispensary medical group. On June 7th, the
hospital area was arbitrarily divided into a dysentery section and a
medical section, the former occupying the least desirable part of the
hospital area. One hundred and thirty-five Medical Department
enlisted men were placed in one barracks. The officers were
placed in groups of fifteen to nineteen in the small Filipino officers'
quarters and the balance of the enlisted men were crowded into similar
structures.

Such mess equipment as could be obtained was moved
to the hospital area. This consisted of a few iron cauldrons
and
five-gallon gasoline tins to hold the rice and soup. There
were a
few iron ladles and miscellaneous metal containers; otherwise there was
nothing available to prepare food for 2,500 people twice
daily.
The movement of the desperately ill to the hospital area was begun on
June 9th, 1942; 270 cases of severe dysentery were admitted to the
dysentery section on that date. On the succeeding days some
500
to 600 patients were admitted until every barracks in the hospital area
was completely packed with sick. The census then was 2,700
patients.

The condition of the
men from Camp O'Donnell was appalling and beggars
description.
These men were the survivors of the Death March and six weeks'
maltreatment at Camp O'Donnell. What few clothes they possess
were ragged and filthy. They had not shaved or bathed for
weeks. Hundreds of these men were bloated to twice their
normal
size because of the collection of edema fluid in the lower halves of
their bodies and they were utterly fatigued and walked with great
effort. They appeared more like men of eighty than boys in
their
early twenties. Many of them were stark naked. At
least one
fourth were without shows. For the care of this desperately
ill
group of men nothing was available. The buildings were
without
lights; not even a candle was provided. A few of these men
possessed blankets but the majority were without adequate
cover.
Some of the men had tied gunnysacks or rice sacks around their bodies
to provide a semblance of clothing. Only a limited amount of
water was available for drinking purposes. There was none to
wash
the body or to cleanse mess gear. There was no soap or toilet paper, no
brushes, brooms or cleaning rags. Moreover, almost every
patient
suffered from looseness of the bowels and many of them could not
control the movements. Patients were literally steeped in
their
excretions. Those in the lower tiers lay in puddles of urine
and
feces and were further contaminated by the same material dripping from
the tiers above. Even those who possessed some strength were unable to
walk to the latrines. Many would crawl a few yards from the
barracks and evacuate their bowels. Consequently the entire
area
was covered with feces and urine. The fly population was
uncountable. They were of the large green and blue variety, the typical
latrine fly. To keep them off the food was practically
impossible. The odor from the foul bodies of sick and dying
was
almost unbearable.

Each day an attempt was made to clear each
barracks of the dying. They were removed to "zero" ward, laid on the
bare floor entirely naked. These patients usually were profoundly
emaciated, in fact, little better than skeletons with a feeble spark of
life. Heroic corpsmen and doctors did what they could to alleviate the
indescribable conditions. They tied grass onto sticks and
attempted to cleanse the floors. They used the same method of
cleansing the body. Occasionally a big puddle of rainwater
would
provide enough water to wash the floor. At this time the use of the
regular water supply system was strictly forbidden by the
Japanese. The few laymen who saw these conditions were
utterly
horrified. Even the Japanese doctors would not enter these
wards
and the Japanese staff at Headquarters gave it a wide berth.

Approximately
a month after our arrival in the hospital area we were able to secure a
moderate amount of soap and toilet paper and we were given special
permission to use the water system for the purpose of cleansing the
"zero" ward. Immediately a striking improvement
was obtained in the appearance of that ward. On June 15,
1942,
two cases of diphtheria were diagnosed. Inspection of the
camp
revealed additional cases. The incidence of this disease rose
sharply. Within three months some 425 cases had been
hospitalized
and of those 123 died. For the first two months only vary
limited
quantities of antitoxin could be obtained. During the third
month
a fairly ample amount became available. These patients, by Japanese
order, were placed on the ground in small tents and they were isolated
from the remainder of the dysentery area. Many of these
patients
died from sudden cardiac failure, others strangled to death and the
remainder died from toxemia and starvation. Many of these cases were
complicated by malaria and dysentery, in addition to
starvation.
It was surprising to see how many early cases recovered when they
received as little as 2,000 units of antitoxin.

Japanese
administration of the hospital was centered in the office of the
Japanese Camp Commander. From him were issued orders
pertaining
to the roll call of patients to admissions, discharges, burials and all
other matters relative to hospital administration. The
Japanese
doctors appeared not to possess any authority. They appeared
to
be willing to alleviate conditions but apparently could not secure the
cooperation of the Japanese line officers. The Japanese would
not
permit any patient to be admitted after 5:00 PM. They
requested
that a list of admissions and discharges be prepared and sent to
Japanese Headquarters for approval. When approval was given and only
then, the admissions and discharges could be effected. This
was
obviously done in order that they could maintain an accurate count on
all prisoners. It resulted in seriously ill patients
remaining in
the barracks in a dying condition, and often death occurred before
authority for admission could be secured. Space would not
permit
a further account of the difficulties in attempting to operate the
medical service under the control of the Japanese. Only a
small
part of the difficulties have been covered in this report.

The
first dispensary service was organized on June 2, 1942. About the
middle of June, dispensaries were established in each of the three
groups of prisoners in the main camp area. A sufficient
number of
physicians and corpsmen were assigned. The amount of available
medicine was extremely limited. Up until July 26th, 1942, the
only sources of medicine was that brought by individuals, a small
amount provided by the Philippine Red Cross and small quantities found
in Bataan by working parties and brought back to Cabanatuan.
A
portion of this medicine was assigned to each dispensary.

Within
a day or two after the arrival of the medical cadre at Cabanatuan a
requisition was submitted to the Japanese Headquarters calling for the
equipment and supplies of a 1,000 bed general hospital. It was stated
in the requisition that there were considerable
medical supplies and equipment in Bataan at the site of General
Hospital Number 2. It was requested that at least twenty-five
truckloads of this material be brought to Cabanatuan at once.
An
urgent request was made for soap, creosol, toilet paper, clothing,
blankets, improved water supplies, electricity in the buildings, etc.
After a few of these requisitions were received, the Japanese Commander
directed that they be presented to the Japanese doctor for his
consideration, which was done. The senior Japanese Medical Officer in
the Philippine Islands visited Cabanatuan about July 10th, 1942, and
urgent representations were made to him. On July 26th, 1942,
300,000 three-grain quinine tablets (captured in Java) arrived with
four or five truckloads of miscellaneous medical supplies.
During
the succeeding thirty-day period, after quinine was issued for use,
there were 500 fewer deaths than in the preceding thirty-day period.

During
the first few weeks in camp little progress was made toward improving
the sanitation of the camp, but an active program was carried out in
July and August. A number of drainage ditches were dug where most
needed to draw off excess water. A group of 200 men
constructed a
raised pathway across the marshy land between the hospital and the main
camp area. Similar pathways were built where most needed
within
the hospital area. Although the condition of the men was such
that it was difficult to find enough men strong enough for the
necessary details, some progress was made in the digging of new
latrines. These were mostly of the uncovered type and
constituted
a sanitary menace. Several five-gallon tins of creosol were
provided for use in the dysentery area of the hospital during the month
of August. Issue of soap began about the first of July and
was
quite regular during the next two months. During the first
summer
men had to depend upon rainwater for bathing and clothes-washing
purposes. An attempt was made to cope with the prevalent
lousiness by steam sterilization of clothing. The lack of
fuel,
plus the amount of rainfall and the general wetness of everything,
hampered this effort very markedly. A moderate number of overalls and
shoes from captured American stores were distributed to prisoners in
July 1942. Included were a few hundred blankets; the amounts
provided, however, were quite inadequate. To augment the
water
supply wells were dug various places throughout the camp.
During
the month of August a general cleanup with particular attention to
waste, filth, discarded worn-out clothing, rubbish, etc., was
accomplished. Cutting of the grass was carried out, soakage pits were
dug for the disposal of liquid waste. If possible, waste was
burned, otherwise it was buried in a pit. Special effort was
made, particularly in messes, to kill as many flies as
possible.
By the end of the first three months an appreciable improvement had
been made in the general appearance and sanitation of the camp, but a
great deal more was required to make it livable. Only vast
stores
of food and medicine could have altered the results seen in the first
few months of the camp's history.

The
chief diseases encountered, as previously indicated, were malaria,
dysentery, diphtheria and starvation. There were, in round
numbers, 1,500 deaths in the first three months. With medical
supplies that were available in the Philippines, plus the abundant food
available in Luzon at that time, the Japanese High Command could have
markedly alleviated conditions in prisoner-of-war camps with
considerable saving of life. Unfortunately for the prisoners
of
war, high authority had directed that prisoners should be
given
extremely limited consideration. Consequently, the harsh
policy
resulted in an abnormal number of deaths. During June, 1942,
there were 498 deaths, divided as follows: dysentery, 317;
malaria, 128; diphtheria, 26; and miscellaneous, 27. During
July,
789 deaths occurred. During August the death rate was lowered
to
approximately 240. This marked reduction in the death rate
was
due largely to the quinine which had become available as well as to a
moderate improvement in the diet. The improved diet was due to the fact
that the Japanese issued twenty-four cases of evaporated milk each day
and this provided a fairly generous portion for all seriously ill
patients in the hospital. Moreover, Japanese Headquarters had
permitted the purchase of sugar and American canned goods.
Although the quantities received were entirely inadequate they
nevertheless contributed to the saving of life. As an
incentive
to the men on working parties, Japanese Headquarters authorized the
issuing of one small loaf of bread in addition to their regular
ration. Moreover, the rice ration was increased from about
390
grams to 500 grams daily. Mongo beans began to appear in our
soup
two or three times weekly. Small quantities of carabao and
pig
became available two to three times weekly. A liberal supply
of
Philippine cigarettes also tended to improve the morale of the
group. During the month of July, Japanese Headquarters
permitted
relaxation in the form of programs and music. A recreational officer
was appointed in each of the main groups of the camp.
However, at
no time were there sufficient quantities of critically needed drugs and
food supplies which would have reduced the appalling death rate to a
low level.

On October 31, 1942, the remaining prisoners from Camp #3 at Cabanatuan
were moved to Camp #1, and consolidated
therewith. By this time many large work details had been sent out from
both camps and the population remained around 6,000. The
exact
figure is not recalled but will be released when all recovered
documents become available. The death rate was then averaging
about 300 per month and these were mostly from starvation, dysentery
and deficiency diseases. Malaria at this time had been fairly
well controlled since we were receiving quinine in fairly adequate
quantities through Japanese issue.

Sanitation was still
deplorable, latrines filled with water as soon as they were dug and the
walls of the pits would cave in, leaving large openings for the free
ingress and egress of
flies. Maggots were crawling all over the area and could be
scooped from these latrine pits in bucketsful of almost pure
maggots. I have never seen anything to compare with the fly
situation that prevailed at this time. Dysentery was the rule
and
many deaths were occurring from amoebic as well as the bacillary
type. Deficiency disease had progressed to the point that
diarrhea was prevalent even among those who did not have specific
infections and the problem of disposing of our own waste was becoming
an ever-increasing one. Men were so weak that it was
difficult to
find enough healthy men for latrine digging details.

The diet
continued about the same until late in November when the Gripsholm came
through with its first cargo of Red Cross supplies. Each man
in
camp received approximately three small parcels and in addition there
was quite a large shipment in bulk -- corned beef, meat and vegetable
stew and sugar -- which was issued through the mess. Strangely
enough, as soon as these foods came in, the Japanese started buying
carabao and bringing them into camp for our veterinary detail to
slaughter and for the first time since we were taken prisoners, started
giving us a daily issue of meat. With this additional food
the
diet became adequate and men started gaining weight and our death rate
fell from 300 a month to three or four a month within a period of three
months.

A large supply of medicines and supplies came on the
Gripsholm. About every type of sickness now could be treated
adequately with the exception of amoebic dysentery. No
anti-amoebic
drugs came in this shipment, and the supply of vitamin concentrates was
limited but the diet was good enough that we were able to get along
fairly well without them. The most prevalent deficiency at
this
time was peripheral neuritis from beriberi, and although progress was
slow most of these cases began gradually to clear up after the diet
improved.

Sanitation improved with the beginning of the dry
season and early in 1943 the Engineer Corps devised and constructed a
series of septic tank-type latrines which provided a solution for our
greatest sanitary problem. The tank was simply a pit dug to a
depth of about six feet which was braced with a 2' x 2' and lined with
sawali to prevent it from caving in. The box was a regulation
type box latrine with a metal bottom attached at an angle so that it
would rain when flushed into the pit. This was made by
splitting
fifty-five-gallon metal drums into longitudinal halves and pounding
them out and fixing them, with the concave surface up, to the bottom of
the box. A half-barrel was attached at the upper end so that
it
could be filled with water and dumped into the metal trough for
flushing it. Wells were dug nearby to furnish water for
flushing
and a regular detail was assigned to flush each box not less than three
times daily. The pits were connected by metal pipes to the
main
drainage ditch which ran along the rear of the latrine line to carry
away the overflow. It was a crude
arrangement but when this project was completed it was the greatest
boon to sanitation experienced during my imprisonment at this
camp. Materials were difficult to obtain and most of them had
to
be purchased by the prisoners, but the effectiveness of this project in
controlling fly breeding was immediately demonstrated.

In
general, conditions continued good during 1943 but as the year
progressed the diet gradually dropped off. Red Cross foods
were
exhausted in about three months and gradually the number of animals
being slaughtered was reduced. The rice ration was cut
several
times and there was no longer any issue of mongo beans so that by the
end of the year we were getting practically nothing but rice and what
vegetables we could grow on the farm. In December, however,
another shipment of Red Cross supplies came in. This time
each
man received one large box containing four individual parcels but there
were no canned foods in bulk with this shipment.

The medical
supplies, however, contained more of the badly needed vitamin
concentrates and an adequate supply of carbarsone for treating amoebic
dysentery. This time the Japanese kept all medical stores at
Bilibid and would release them to us on monthly requisitions only. An
unsatisfactory setup but one that we were able to get by
with.
Dressing materials and adhesive tape were never released in sufficient
amounts but we were able to get by with what we received.

Some shoes and clothing came in with this shipment and most men
received at least one personal package from home.

Mail
also came in large quantities but most of it was still stored in the
Japanese area when I left camp in October 1944. Only fifty to 100
letters would be censored daily and consequently very few letters were
actually received by the average person.

This shipment of Red
Cross foods helped out a great deal but did not last as long as the
first shipment and as the year 1944 progressed the diet became
progressively worse. Rice was gradually reduced to around 300
grams per day and there was no longer any meat issue. A
salted
fish was substituted for meat and there was no fat for frying it so
that it was either boiled in the soup or was baked in the oven until
crisp enough to grind into a powder in a rice grinder and was served
one mess kit spoonful of the powder sprinkled over the rice.
Vegetables were grown in sufficient quantities on the prison farm to
have given an adequate feeding of greens and camotes but the ration was
weighed and remained the same regardless of how great the supply.

Weight
loss became marked and by the time evacuation of this camp took place
in October 1944 averaged around thirty to thirty-five pounds per
man. Only the hospital group was left at
Cabanatuan. All
others were removed from this camp by October 19th and were taken to
Bilibid prison from where they embarked on their voyage for Japan.

Mortality
at Cabanatuan was highest during the seven-month period June 1, 1942 to
January 1, 1943. Of the 2,700 deaths at this camp, 2,300
occurred
during this period. The greatest number of deaths for any
single
month was 789 for the month of July, 1942. The first marked
decrease in the death rate occurred following the issue of quinine July
26, 1942. From that point on, the total deaths averaged from
250
to 300 per month until after the arrival of Red Cross foods and medical
supplies in December, 1942. Following this there was a rapid
drop
to an average of three to four deaths per month which continued until
the time of my departure in October, 1944.

Work done by medical Department personnel was not limited to
professional care of the sick.

Beginning
in 1943, the Japanese Commanding Officer arbitrarily fixed the number
of Medical officers and men that could be used in medical work for the
camp and decreed that all other medical personnel would be made
available for the regular labor details in and around the
camp.
From that time on a large percentage of the medical officers and
enlisted men were employed in the following types of labor
details: (1) working as "coolies" barefooted on the prison
farm;
(2) as laborers with an axe on the wood-cutting detail; (3) as laborers
with pick and shovel on a detail engaged in improvising an airstrip
near the camp; (4) as carrying details, bearing heavily loaded litters
of raw vegetables grown in the prison garden, a distance of
approximately one mile into the prison supply building. Many other
types of work were participated in by medical Department personnel, but
this should serve to give an impression of the general kinds of work
required of them. It was a common sight to see Medical
officers
carrying a large container filled with feces from our own latrines to
the prison farm where it was used as fertilizer.

E.
Bilibid Prison.

The Bilibid Jap military prison camp played a
big
part in the medical organization of prisoners of war in the
Philippines. This hospital was administered by our navy
medical
group. They had been transferred from Santa Scholastica
Hospital,
a branch of the Manila Hospital Center, some time before the surrender
of Corregidor, so that they were a functioning unit when the surrender
occurred. Bilibid was the old Manila prison, which had been
condemned as unfit for human habitation back in 1923 and resulted in
the New Bilibid Prison being built prior to the outbreak of the War.

Bilibid
military prison camp was the headquarters for all Jap medical
activities in connection with the prisoners. It was here that many of
the sick prisoners were brought and her many of the details were made
up and sent out to work on various projects. All the medical
supplies were stored here and distributed to the work details, and to
Cabanatuan. It is not within the scope of this paper to cover
the
various medical activities of Bilibid. However, a paper on any phase of
the medical activities in prison camps would not be complete without at
least a mention of Bilibid.

The
theory under which the Japs worked in connection with the care of the
sick was that Bilibid was the main hospital to which all the seriously
sick were to be sent. Small medical detachments were sent out with each
work detail with a small supply of medicine. The medicines
were
issued monthly and until the Red Cross supplies arrived, consisted of
various Jap medicines, the names of which and the uses of which were
unknown to almost all the medical personnel. Red Cross
medicine
in large amounts arrived in December 1942 and about the same time in
1943. This was stored in Bilibid and so far as is known was
not
looted by the Japs. These medicines saved innumerable lives
and
the fact that Bilibid hospital was able to offer excellent treatment
should a person become sick added greatly to the morale of the
prisoners.

The main difficulty experienced was in getting the
medicines to the patient, or the patient to the hospital. The
Japs frequently refused to send medicine out of Bilibid to the work
details or several months would elapse, during which time the medical
officer was frantically trying to get requests for medicine acted
upon. It was just as difficult to get a patient from the work
detail to the hospital. The Jap idea of sickness did not
correspond in any way with ours. A person was not sick
according
to their standards unless he (1) couldn't work or (2) was in danger of
dying. They didn't want patients dying outside the hospital because
apparently they were censured whenever this happened. Also
they
followed up each case that was sent into the hospital. In
case
the patient had recovered in a week or so, the Medical officer who sent
him in was chided that he had faked the sickness, and the difficulties
in getting the next patient in were greatly increased.

The
food situation varied so much from detail to detail that it is
impossible to make a statement covering the situation. In
general
it was fairly good in and around Manila until the middle of
1943.
From then on it gradually fell off until the latter part of 1944 when
all but the extremely sick were moved to Japan. Along in
June,
July, and August, 1944, the food consisted of about 300 grams of rice
and 200 of corn per man per day, plus some greens. Meat,
rice,
and fats were almost nonexistent.

This report is based on
conditions that existed at Bilibid at the time specified and does not
necessarily give a general picture of conditions that existed prior to
or after the dates mentioned (October 19, 1944, to December 13, 1944).

Bilibid
prison is located in the city of Manila. The buildings are
all
permanent structures, some frame and some of reinforced concrete, and
the entire compound is enclosed by a wall of rock and plaster some
twelve to fourteen feet high.

On
October 1944, most of the prisoners from Camp #1 at Cabanatuan who were
not hospital patients were moved by truck to Bilibid prison, where they
were held while awaiting shipping facilities to take them to Japan.

The
majority of this large group of prisoners were housed during this time
in the old Bilibid Prison hospital building which was a reinforced
concrete structure and which had been stripped of all hospital
furniture and equipment. Only the bare concrete floors
remained
and it was on these floors that this group of prisoners slept without
bedding during their internment at Bilibid.

The hospital
section at Bilibid, however, was by far the best seen at any camp
visited by the writer. The wards where hospital patients were
kept were equipped with the Regular Army type GI beds or had suitable
bunks built in so that the patients did not have to lie upon the bare
floor. The buildings were all equipped with running water and
the
supply was adequate and potable. Latrines and shower baths
were
improvised outside the buildings but were connected with the city sewer
system and could be kept in a fairly satisfactory sanitary
condition. There was an incinerator for disposing of
combustible
garbage.

One building was set aside for storage of medical
supplies received through the American Red Cross and for use as a
dental clinic and an outpatient clinic for the entire prison.
The
dental clinic was well equipped with two Regular Army type dental units
and the outpatient clinic was equipped with electric instrument
sterilizers, an electric water sterilizing unit, dressing tables,
desks, chairs, etc. The Red Cross medical supplies were
adequate
and dressings, though limited, were fairly adequate.

The
ration during this entire period consisted of a canteen cup 3/4 full of
a watery lugao (boiled rice) twice daily. The dry weight of
rise
is not known, bit it could not have exceeded 300 grams per man per
day. The only other item of diet was the usual greens soup,
the
caloric value of which was, in my opinion, negligible. I do
not
recall receiving a meat meal during my stay at this camp, but it is
possible that some dried fish may have been, at times, included with
this soup. It was the poorest ration we had yet received and
the
weight loss at this time was becoming alarming. The
average loss among the group from Cabanatuan I would estimate of
fifteen to seventeen pounds per man during the six-weeks period here.

The
health except for starvation and deficiency diseases was better than
average. Dysentery was not prevalent and malaria was usually a
recurrence from an old infection. Quite a large number of amoebic
dysentery cases were present, but most of them had been given treatment
and were more the chronic type and not acutely ill. The
general
medical situation here was one due to prolonged starvation. Pellagra
and beriberi were common, but at this time vitamin concentrates were
available and were dispensed daily to any patient presenting signs of
these diseases. Although vitamin concentrates were a great help in
preventing some of the tragic results of deficiency diseases, they were
not a solution to the condition that existed here.
Starvation,
per se, without the added effect of deficiency disease, was fast
becoming a real threat.

The mortality rate during the period
involved was not as high as had been encountered elsewhere but there
were several deaths. One autopsy witnessed by the write
showed no
gross pathology that could be considered as a cause of death and the
opinion expressed by the operator at that time was that death had
resulted primarily from starvation.

F. The Death Cruise from
Manila to Japan.

On the afternoon of December 13, 1944, 1,619
officers and men many of whom had survived the death march and all of
whom had survived Japanese imprisonment from the surrender of Bataan
and Corregidor, were packed into the holds of the Japanese transport
Oryoku Maru and started on their way to Japan. There was no excuse for
moving these prisoners at this late date and the senior American
officer present had written a letter to the Japanese officer in charge
at Bilibid protesting the risks that would be involved, but the
Japanese reply was that there was no danger involved or they would not
consider moving us. Preparations for this move had been
underway
for some time. Most of the group had been moved from
Cabanatuan
to Bilibid some six weeks before and were issued wool clothing to be
used upon the arrival in a colder climate. Eighty cases of
American Red Cross medical supplies were set aside to be loaded on our
ship and six other cases were prepared especially for our use during
the voyage.

Having witnessed the bombing of Manila Bay area by
our own dive bombers for the preceding six weeks, it was with
considerable misgivings that we embarked from Pier #7. There
were
the hulls of three sunken ships alongside the pier and an estimated
forty-five other ships, wrecked and resting on the bottom of the bay,
the results of our
dive-bomber action. Pier #7 was almost completely destroyed
but
could still be used as a dock for loading and unload by hand
labor. All machinery and mechanical cranes had been
destroyed.

The
first night out was spent in getting through the minefields and out of
the bay and by eight o'clock the following morning we were under attack
by American planes. It was not a surprise but rather what we had
expected and feared. Men had been packed so tightly in the
holds
of the ship that there was not room to lie down or even sit down in
most cases. In the forward and after holds conditions were
most
crowded. The writer was in the second hold forward and fared
better than those who were in the other holds.

The
bombing raids came at frequent intervals during the 14th and the ship
spent most of the day zigzagging not far off the coast of
Bataan.
Several hits were sustained and there was considerable damage to the
superstructure of the ship and many casualties were incurred among the
prisoners in the hold from strafing and fragments of bombs, but no
direct hit was made in either hold during the first day's
raids.
Late in the afternoon, however, the ship had become so badly crippled
that she dropped anchor not far from shore where she remained until
almost dark that night. After the attacks had ceased she
again
got underway and pulled into Subic Bay and anchored, where all Japanese
nationals who had occupied the upper decks and all Japanese wounded
were removed. According to stories brought back into the hold
by
American doctors who had been called up on deck to help take care of
Japanese wounded, their casualties were several hundred.
There
was no effort made to remove the prisoners and it was during this
second night out that twenty-four Americans died of suffocation in the
hold of this ship. After the Japanese nationals and wounded
were
removed the ship again got underway and pulled out into the channel of
the bay and dropped anchor again. During this move the
Japanese
interpreter called won instructions into our hold and said that we
would betaken ashore at daybreak and that we could take only the
clothing we would be able to wear ashore and that we could not wear
shoes but would be allowed to carry them with us. With this
preparation made well before daybreak everyone settled down to wait for
the big moment when we would be going ashore. Many men
carried
emergency dressings and varying amounts of medicines that they had
accumulated through packages received from home. These they
were
digging out of their bundles and getting them cached away in their
clothing in preparation for smuggling them ashore.

Daylight
came
and everyone was ready and waiting to be taken ashore but no move was
made on the part of the Japanese until about two hours after daybreak,
when the first American planes appeared overhead. These did
not
attack us and were apparently reconnaissance planes. However,
as
soon as these planes disappeared, we were given instructions to send up
twenty-five men and to send the
wounded up first. This order was complied with and the first
load
of twenty-five men were in a small boat headed for shore when the first
bombers appeared for the attack that finally sank the ship.
The
small boat was destroyed killing most of its occupants but one or two
of them got safely ashore. This second wave of bombers came
in
after a brief interval and in this raid a bomb scored a direct hit in
the after hold, killing some 250 to 300 prisoners. After this
attack the interpreter again called into the hold and said everybody
out. All wounded in this hold had been removed just preceding
the
attack and although there were several new casualties since the raids
started, it is believe that they were all removed from this hold and
most of them were able to get ashore. When the prisoners came
on
deck the ship was burning furiously at the stern and ammunition was
beginning to explode. There were no lifeboats available and
the
ship was some 300 yards off shore, which made it necessary for most
men, in their already weakened condition, to strip off their clothing
before attempting to swim ashore. The writer barely made it with only
his dog tags to hinder him. By the time the first group of
swimmers reached the shore the planes were returning for a third raid
upon the ship and someone called out for everyone to wave his extended
arms in the fashion that airplanes wag their wings in expressing
recognition and everyone who had his feet on the sand did so.
The
emotion that swept through the crowd when the leader of that group of
planes returned our signal and led his bombers away without attacking
would be difficult to understand. He was the first free American with
whom we had been in communication for almost three years.

Most
of the not too seriously wounded got ashore or were brought ashore on
improvised rafts, but a total of approximately 300 were lost with the
ship. We were then taken to an open tennis court wounded and
sick
along with the well. Most of us had no clothing and had lost
our
blankets and personal belongings on the ship. The Japs,
disregarding this, kept us on that tennis court without food and
clothing day and night for a period of five days. The only
attempt at feeding was to issue a few bags of raw rice the last two
days and this amounted to only a mess kit spoonful per man twice
daily. Nothing was provided in the way of medical supplies,
but
as soon as we were ashore someone handed me a bottle of iodine that he
had been able to salvage and by the time that we were all settled on
the tennis court enough supplies had been collected to start another of
our now famous improvised aid stations. Wounds were dressed with
whatever materials could be provided by the patient or by his friends,
and one end of the tennis court was set aside as a hospital for the
wounded and it turned out to be the only hospital to which they were
ever taken. Ti given an impression of the conditions encountered here
the following example will suffice: An officer who had received a
moderately severe wound in the left shoulder developed a gangrene of
his arm, which had to be removed without
anesthesia and with only a pair of tissue scissors and a hemostat and a
razor blade for surgical equipment. the results were, of
course,
self-evident, but the patient wanted it removed.

Before
leaving the tennis court we were re-outfitted with clothing.
This
time, however, instead of equipping us with woolen uniforms and
blankets, we were given only a cotton undershirt and a pair of cotton
Japanese drawers. Men who had gotten ashore with their
clothing
on were indeed fortunate, for it was with this wardrobe of clothing
that we were to finish our voyage to Japan. There was much
speculation over this before we finally realized that our voyage was to
be continued. During our stay on the tennis court we had
quite a
number of dead to dispose of. They were buried in bomb
craters
made by American bombs dropped in the vicinity.

On the 20th of
December a convoy of Japanese trucks came and moved approximately half
of the group to San Fernando, Pampanga, and the following day returned
to pick up the remainder. We were kept in an old theater
building
there until December 24th. Here we received ten boxes of
American
Red Cross medical supplies which had been sent up from Bilibid Prison
in Manila by train. Upon receiving these supplies, a sick call was held
immediately and all of the wounded were dressed. This was the first
time that aseptic dressing had been available since the sinking on
December 15th. Many men were ill with acute dysentery by this
time and an effort was made to clear them up with sulfathiazole but
many cases either did not report for treatment or were treated
inadequately because many cases were observed when our journey was
resumed.

Limited facilities for cooking rice were provided at
the theater building and several small meals of cooked rice and seaweed
were prepared and served by our own personnel during the two days that
we were held in San Fernando, Pampanga. A majority of the
group
had lost their mess kits and it was a common sight to see men eating
rice from a dirty piece of paper, an old rag of clothing, or a piece of
tin or bamboo that had been picked up around the premises.
Their
only utensils were dirty fingers or a split section of bamboo.

On
the evening of December 23rd the Japanese interpreter came and told us
to be prepared to send a truckload of our most seriously wounded back
to Bilibid that night. This order was complied with and fifteen wounded
were loaded into a truck. They have never been heard of since
that night. I have checked personally with Medical officers
left
behind at Bilibid Prison and at Cabanatuan. What fate befell
them
remains to this date a mystery.

On the morning of December 24,
1944, we were marched to the depot at San Fernando, which had been
partially destroyed by bombing and while a dogfight was in progress
overhead between American and Japanese
planes, entrained for San Fernando, La Union. This time we
were
not restricted to 100 men per boxcar but were packed in so tightly that
up to 175 men rode in and on top of a single car. We were
cautioned not to make any attempt to escape but were told that those
riding on top might wave to American planes in the event we were
attacked. This trip proved to be an almost maddening
experience
because of lack of ventilation and water, but so far as I know no one
died of suffocation or thirst en route. Several died at San
Fernando the next day, probably as a direct result of this trip.

December
25th was spent in the schoolyard at San Fernando, La Union. A
dispensary was set up inside the building and the floor was immediately
turned into a hospital for the seriously ill. Our Red Cross
medical supplies were brought along in the train and were made
available to us during our stay at the schoolhouse but that night we
were moved down to the beach and did not have access to them from that
point on. Two nights were spent on this sandy beach and on the morning
of December 27th, we were loaded on landing barges from which Japanese
troops had just come ashore and taken to the two Japanese transports in
which we continued our voyage to Formosa.

Two small meals of
cooked rice were issued while at San Fernando, La Union, one at the
schoolhouse and one while on the beach. In addition another
spoonful of raw rice was issued on the evening of December 28th.

Water
was plentiful at San Fernando but we were allowed to carry only a few
bucketfuls from a sump nearby. Each man received about eight
mess
kit spoonfuls during the day at the beach. Many had been able
to
fill their canteens while at the school and this served to tide them
over.

For this leg of the voyage -- San Fernando, La Union to
Takao, Formosa -- we were divided into two groups. I was with the
smaller
group, 165 men in the hold of #2 ship in the convoy, and the larger
group occupied the hold of #1 ship in the convoy. There was
no
overcrowding in #2, but as the ship followed its course to the north,
the fall in temperature began to have its effect and by the time we
reached Formosa we were already miserable from the cold. This
voyage ended at Takao on New Year's Eve and was uneventful except for
an attack by submarines during our last night at sea. No hits
were made on either ship but there was considerable excitement and many
depth charges were dropped by our escorting vessels.

The same
crises developed during this voyage that always seemed to come up when
moved by the Japanese, viz., lack of water and food. If my
memory
serves me correctly, we were given our first drop of water by the
Japanese on this ship late in the afternoon of
December 30th and this amounted to not more than one-fourth of a
canteen cupful per man. The American interpreters aboard
begged
constantly for water, but were refused.

Three meals,
consisting of about one-third of a canteen cupful of rice per man, were
given during this voyage which lasted from the morning of the 27th to
the evening of the 31st of December, 1944. It was after we
were
tied up a the pier at Takao, on the morning of January 1, 1945, that we
received our first big meal, viz., four and one-half pieces of
terropan, the Japanese version of hardtack.

We remained in the
hold of this ship until about the 7th of January, when we were taken by
barge to the #1 ship, which was riding at anchor out in the
bay.
During this week while tied up at the pier we were still refused an
adequate supply of water and were given practically no food.
I
would estimate that the daily average water issue did not exceed three
ounces per man.

The number of deaths among this small group
was not high and as I recall did not exceed eight or ten deaths up to
the time we rejoined the others.

Conditions on this second
ship were much worse than we had encountered on the first.
The
hold we were placed in had been used for transporting animals and the
ammonia fumes coming up from the bilge were at times
stifling.
Flies were breeding by the millions and dysentery was again running
riot.

The food and water situation was somewhat better in that
rice was served regularly twice a day, one canteen cupful to four men,
and a cabbage soup was served with at least one of these meals
daily. The soup was not nutritious but did add to the fluid
intake and helped to make up for the scant water ration.

The
day after we joined this group 500 men were moved out of the lower
level of this hold and into a forward hold which had just been cleared
of coal. It was in this forward hold that a bomb was dropped
in
an attack by American dive-bombers on January 9, 1945.
Several
other bomb hits were made toward the stern of the ship and she was so
badly damaged that she could not be moved but did not sink.
Whether she was resting on the bottom I am unable to say, but at any
rate we were not removed from this ship until January 13, 1945.

The
casualties from this bombing were higher than they had been in the
bombing of the Oryoku Maru, but the number killed was approximately the
same. Of the 500 men in the forward hold almost exactly 50%
were
killed but the number of wounded in both holds was greater and the
nature of the wounds was, in general, most serious. Only
about twenty were killed in the second hold but many fractures of a
more serious nature resulted from falling "I"-beams and heavy timbers
from the hatch covers above. About fifty of these involved fractures of
the long bones and several fractured vertebrae. In addition
to
these more serious fractures, there were hundreds of minor injuries
from bomb fragments and steel splinters from the ship's hull and from
the bulkhead which separated the two holds.

The medical
problem created by this second bombing would have exceeded our capacity
to work had we been furnished with everything needed form the
standpoint of medical supply and equipment as it turned out we were
able to do very little.

In the first place many of the seriously
wounded were in the forward hold where the bomb struck. I had a glimpse
into that hold through an opening in the bulkhead where a fragment had
pierced it, and even that was in violation to Japanese
orders.
For two days the living and wounded in this hold were left with the
dead and mangled and in spite of every effort on the part of the
Americans in charge, were denied any help that we might have been able
to give them. The wounded in the second hold were given
whatever
treatment could be improvised; hemorrhages were controlled and wounds
were dressed with dirty undershirts taken from the dead.
Fractures were splinted where pieces of timber could be found to use as
splints, but many were only laid in as comfortable a spot as could be
found and their only treatment was to carry them food and water when it
became available. There was no morphine to ease their pain
and in
fact no medical supplies except what could be collected from
individuals.

On the second day after the bombing two Japanese
enlisted men of their Medical Department came aboard with some
dressings and although they would not go into the forward hold they did
come down into the second hold and ordered that all minor wounded line
up and come by for dressings. When they stopped operating,
the
line was still forming and they refused to do any work on our seriously
wounded. When they left the ship they sent down a few boards
for
splints, about a dozen roller bandages, a bottle of iodine, a bottle of
mercurochrome, three triangular bandages, and less than a pound of
cotton. These were to be our medical supplies for the rest of our
journey.

The next day a barge came alongside to remove the
dead. These were taken from both holds and were taken ashore
for
burial. I would estimate about 300 men were buried in
Formosa.

On
the 13th of January all remaining personnel were loaded on barges and
transferred to another ship. (This happened to be the same
ship
on which the smaller group had come up from San Fernando, La
Union.) The wounded were loaded by lowering a cargo net and
hoisting
them out of the hold onto the barge and then transferring to the deck
of the other ship. From that point on it was our problem to
get
them down into the hold. Again we were to carry our wounded
with
us until they died and had to be thrown overboard.

There were
left, roughly, a thousand men, including the wounded who started on
this third phase of the voyage. The entire group was placed
in a
small hold near the stern of the ship. Space was again a
problem. Double-deck sleeping bays had been installed leaving
the
hatch cover leading to the hold below as the only space in the hold.
This was set aside for the hospital section where most of the fracture
patients and many of the seriously ill were placed in order that they
could be cared for by Medical personnel more advantageously. These were
patients who were unable to get in and out of the sleeping bays and
food and water would have to be carried to them by the
corpsmen.
There was only a narrow passageway surrounding this hatch cover where
others could pass to reach the entrance to the sleeping bays and where
wooden buckets could be placed to serve as latrines. This
passage
also had to be used in getting food and water back to the sleeping bays
for there was not sufficient space to allow men to get out of these
bays once they were in them.

On the morning of January 14,
1945, this ship pulled out of Takao Harbor and headed on toward the
north. The route that it followed could not be determined but soon we
were far enough to the north that snow flurries were
encountered.
There was no heat in this hold and no blankets or extra clothing had
been provided and now in addition to our usual run of worries we were
faced with the problem of how to keep from freezing to death -- a
problem which a large number failed to solve.

The ration for
the rest of this journey was fixed at one canteen cupful of cooked rice
for four men twice a day and was methodically reduced to keep it at
that level as the daily dead were thrown overboard.

The water
ration averaged about one canteen cupful for eight men twice a day and
for several days of the voyage tasted so strongly of salt water that it
was almost impossible to drink it.

At the beginning of this
trip the Japanese interpreter announced that anyone caught stealing
from the ship's cargo would be severely punished and shot to
death. This must have been the most encouraging remark that
he
could have made to the prisoners on that ship, because it resulted in
an immediate search for a way to get into the hold below and within a
short time men could be seen eating sugar on the sly in almost every
bay. Not only did they steal sugar to eat but many of them
ripped
open sacks and dumped the sugar out and used the sacks for cover to
keep from freezing to death. Fortunately, the Japs were afraid to come
into the filth of this hold
and this violation was not discovered.

Sanitation
in this ship became the worst that had been encountered.
Latrine
buckets could be emptied only as the Japanese would authorize it and
this bore no relation to the time at which they became full;
consequently, everyone aboard who did not have dysentery in the
beginning either developed it right away or was immune to the
infection. No water was provided for personal hygiene and for
six
weeks men had to go without so much as washing their hands and
face. Salt water was requested for this purpose and was
refused.
Mess kits could not be washed and soiled clothing salvaged from the
dead could not be washed but was put on and worn by others in spite of
this, and so the filth increased as the trip progressed.

Morbidity
was almost 100% in addition to sickness from starvation, and disease
wounds that would under normal conditions have been trivial resulted in
infection and deep abscesses which had to be drained with only a razor
blade or a pair of tissue scissors for surgical equipment.
Dressings ran out and men broke into the life-preserver room and stole
life preservers for the kapok stuffing to use as surgical
dressings. To keep from freezing to death they stuffed kapok
into
the legs of the Japanese drawers they had on and those who had socks or
shoes stuffed them with kapok also. The hold became littered with feces
and kapok.

The mortality on this third and final ship was
highest. As our total decreased the deaths increased until by
the
time this ship reached Moji in Japan on January 30, 1945, less than 500
men were alive and of that number over 200 more were in such a
debilitated state that they died within the next few weeks.
Of
the total of 1,619 men who had left Manila, December 13, 1944, less
than 300 survived to see the end of the War.

G.
Shirakawa.

American military personnel arrived at this camp
in
June 1943. There were 150 officers and forty-three enlisted
men.
In October 1943 the majority of Americans were moved from Shirakawa to
the mainland of Japan.

Shirakawa is located in the
west-central part of the Island of Formosa near the town of
Kagi.
After Karenko was abandoned, Shirakawa was officially known as Taiwan
Camp No. 4.

The camp was located in a swamp bottom surrounded by
low hills. It was extremely hot and muggy during the summer
months, and the drainage was p0or. Sanitary conditions were
filthy. During the rainy season, the entire area was flooded,
and
water ran constantly under the floors of the barracks and
hospital. During the last rainy season, which lasted
forty-five days, three buildings could not
be used because of large leaks in the roofs.

There
were electric lights in all the buildings. There were no
screens
in the buildings nor were the buildings heated. During the
winter
months, the temperature reached forty degrees above zero.

The
water supply was inadequate. There was a medium-size water
tank
located outside the stockade and a pipeline built of bamboo carried
water into this compound.

There was no specific place
designated to wash clothes. However, a special laundry,
consisting of a large iron cauldron, was set up to wash the clothes and
blankets of the hospital patients.

All officers and enlisted
men worked in the fields at this camp. All work was done
under
guard. Working conditions were bad because of the terrific
heat. All men worked in G-strings. Some of the
crops raised
here include sweet potatoes, corn, cabbage, beans, cauliflower, and a
plant used as a substitute for hemp. One work project was the
construction of a huge fishpond which was built by hand. The
pond
was never stocked with fish. This "useless" work was
instituted
to keep the prisoners in a state of physical exhaustion to prevent
escapes.

Disciplinary conditions were bad. The guards
would use clubs and rifle butts to keep the men working at full
speed. Beatings were daily occurrences. Roll-call
formations were held several times a night. All minor infractions of
rules and regulations resulted in slapping and beatings.

In June
1944, a directive was issued to the effect that all prisoners must work
to produce food and the prisoners were requested to volunteer to work.
When the men refused to work, the rations were reduced. In
June
1944, a Red Cross representative visited the camp, but the spokesmen
were not allowed to register any complaints or to present any problems.

A Japanese noncommissioned officer was in charge of the
hospital. He was a very poorly trained as a medical personnel
man. There was a very meager supply of medicine for use
here. The prisoners were inoculated a great many times with
Japanese vaccines. The Japanese gave the Americans an ample
supply of anti-malaria drugs for therapeutic purposes.

No one
was excused from work unless his temperature was above
normal.
The only medical equipment in possession of prisoner-of-war doctors was
one American-made sterilizer and stethoscope. The Japanese gave no
medical equipment to the prisoner-of-war doctors for their use.

In
1942, and again in 1944, a small amount of American Red Cross medical
supplies was issued to the hospital for American prisoners.
Mosquito nets were issued. Two deaths occurred in the camp due, in
part, to hard physical exertion on an inadequate diet, and working in
the sun. These conditions overstrained the heart.

Although
there was no real need for isolation, there was an isolation ward built
for tuberculosis patients with adequate space for ten beds.

One
letter of fifty words was allowed to be sent each month.
These
letters were typewritten by the Japanese and then mailed.
Incoming mail arrived in batches of several letters over a long period
of time. some officers received fifty letters at a
time.
Other officers received no mail at all.

During the time this camp was in operation only three Red Cross food
parcels were issued to each man.

Very
few articles of value were for sale at the P.X. A small
amount of
tea was sold. Tablets similar to the B1 vitamin pill was sold until the
Japanese discovered that the prisoners were using them to improve the
flavor of the rice. The sale of these tablets was then
stopped. Toothpaste, toothbrushes, shoe laces, mirrors,
hairbrushes, Japanese razors and razor blades, writing paper, pencils,
and playing cards were sold. A limited supply of food items
was
occasionally offered for sale, such as a type of small fish, canned
vegetables, flavoring syrup, ketchup and a type of sauce similar to the
American Worcestershire sauce.

There were religious services
held every Sunday, although no chaplain was present, until the British
group of prisoners arrived here from Hong Kong. Later another
chaplain arrived.

A volleyball net was put up, but the game
was not popular because of the amount of physical activity
required. There was some baseball equipment, but for the same
reason, the game was not popular here. Many good books
brought in
by the British were available.

From November 1944 on, the
Shirakawa camp was made into a hospital for all the prison camps on
Formosa. The organization consisted of seven medical officers
plus about forty enlisted men who ran the hospital, under the direction
of a Japanese sergeant of their medical department. The
quarters
there were old Jap army barracks which each housed about 100
men.
Water was not potable and it all had to be boiled and rationed
carefully. The food situation there was a great improvement
over
that which existed in the Philippines in 1944. Rice for
workers
in the amount of 6809 grams per man per day, and considerable amounts
of vegetables were issued daily.

A
rather limited supply of Red Cross medicine was available and the
doctors conferred frequently to go over the medicine situation
and revise the drugs which were available and the amounts in
which they
could be used. By careful planning, we still had Red Cross
medicines available when the camp was liberated.

The plan of the
Japs that patients would be brought from the various camps on the
island to the hospital was fine in theory, but did not work out
practically. Patients were allowed to become too ill and to move and
died in large numbers at the camps. Those who were brought
into
the camp were extremely ill and many died shortly after admission to
the camp. The total number of deaths in the camp though was
not
large compared to the numbers dying in the work camps.

The
Japs insisted that everyone work whose physical condition in any way
allowed. Thus there were several categories of
workers: (1)
those on full work; (2) those on light work; (3) those on work that did
not require standing. As a person was released from the
hospital
he was placed in the lightest work category and he was gradually moved
up to the full work category. The selection of the men was
left
up to the Medical officers, but anytime the number on light work became
too large, they were transferred to field work by the Jap in charge.

The
issue of food was graded according to the work category in which a
person was placed. Those in the hospital received the
smallest
issue, and those on field work the largest. This gave the men
an
incentive to get in the field work category, but seriously impeded the
recovery of those in the hospital.

Finally about August 15,
1945, the Japs began issuing us extra rice, sugar, meat, and various
articles of clothing. We knew then that the end was near and
on
August 22nd we were lined up and the Jap Commander announced the end of
the War. My first realization that the War was over came
August
28th when early in the morning I looked out of the window and saw three
American officers. They were under arms and looked like
giants. It was our first contact with civilization in
thirty-nine
months.

H. Fukuoka Camp #1.

The survivors of the death
cruise, having arrived at Moji, Japan, January
30th, remained aboard
ship until the morning of January 31st, at which time they were taken
on deck and given an issue of clothing consisting of a suit of cotton
underwear, a pair of woolen Jap Army breeches, a heavy canvas jacket
and a pair of tennis shoes. After the clothing issue was
made,
they were taken ashore to an old theater building. The seriously ill
were the last to be moved and with customary Japanese efficiency the
cargo net was lowered. This time boards were furnished to
make a
floor in the bottom of the net. A patient was loaded and the
attendants stood by waiting for him to be lifted out, but soon a Jap
sentry appeared with the usual "hurry up" and made them load the net
with three or four other patients before they would raise it.
In
this manner the hold was cleared of sick and the few remaining wounded
in short order. All were taken to the theater building, which was not
heated. Here most of that day was spent, while the Japanese
busied themselves dividing the prisoners into three groups, viz., a
hospital group and two groups of what they classed as well
men.
The writer in the meantime was kept busy signing his name to death
certificates in blank form to enable the Japanese officer in charge of
this move to account for his prisoners. Such was the physical
state of these prisoners upon arrival at Moji that several others died
during the time that was spent in this theater while the Japanese made
up their rosters. Finally, when everything was in order,
ambulances came to take the hospital group away and while this was in
progress the other "well" group was marched away, and then the group to
which I was attached was marched to the station, where it entrained for
Fukuoka Camp #1. We were met at the station in the town of
Casi
[Kashii] by some American prisoners from Wake Island who took us by truck to
Camp #1. An American, British or Australian Red Cross overcoat
was
issued to each man before entrucking. We arrived in camp well
after dark and were served a meal of cooked rice, soup, and a warm
drink of Japanese tea.

The camp at Fukuoka was new and some
buildings were still under construction. The framework of these
buildings was of native lumber and bamboo with tar-paper
roofs.
The outer walls were of ¼-inch lumber and were about three feet high
from the ground to the eaves. The ends were plastered with a
red
mud stuck on a lathing of split bamboo. The floors were sand
and
only and open passageway down the center from one end to the other
separated the sleeping bays that extended down each side of the
building. There was no heat and no furniture in the buildings
but
each man was issued six ersatz blankets to use in making his bed and
for cover, which was inadequate, but a better break than had been
expected.

Everyone was allowed to stay in bed for the first
week or ten days after our arrival at this camp until one day the
Japanese doctor came through and made a separate classification of
those who were able to be up and those who were not. From that time on
the "well" men were required to get up at 6:30 AM and as soon as
morning rice was served and the roll call taken, had to clear the
building and remain outside, except for thirty minutes at 10:00 AM and
one hour at noon, until 4:30 PM. It was a strange sight to
see
these ghosts of men out walking to avoid freezing to death. All were so
weak they could hardly creep and many could only huddle together
against the side of the building to keep warm. The
unconscious
and dying and those who could not get up under their own power were
allowed to remain in their bunks.

After a few days, a
representative from headquarters in Fukuoka came out to inspect and
inquire into our needs and I personally gave him a list of the medical
supplies that were needed and laid great stress upon the needs for
additional food, emphasizing that if any Red Cross parcels were
available they would do us the greatest good now in this, our most
crucial time. As a result, this inspection eventually netted
us
one small Red Cross package for each three men, and a smattering of
medical supplies, which were left under the control of the Japanese
doctor and which we were never able to get in sufficient quantity even
to approach meeting our needs.

After a few more days a
Japanese colonel came in to inspect the camp, and after his tour was
over word was sent for all Medical officers to report to him outside,
in the front of the building. This was done, and after making
a
short introductory speech he asked each Medical officer for his opinion
on what we needed most. The answers were unanimously food and
medicines. Specific types of food were requested, such as
meats,
milk, and butter, and again Red Cross parcels were requested.
His
reply was typically Japanese. He agreed that we needed
everything
that was requested, but stated that these things were scarce and very
difficult to obtain. Replying specifically to our request for Red Cross
parcels he said, "You are very hungry now and I am afraid if we give
you these parcels now, you will eat them too quickly and waste them and
they will do you no good." In reply to a request for more
blankets he countered with the statement that Japanese soldiers were
given only five blankets and that we were issued six. It was
useless to point out that these men had lost all their fatty tissues
and were sick men and therefore needed more bedding.

There
were some cases of Red Cross medicines seen in camp by men working in
the Japanese warehouses, but to get any drugs of either Japanese or
American origin prescriptions had to be made out and turned in to the
Japanese doctor for approval. He made these decisions
arbitrarily
without seeing the patients and without so much as consulting the
American doctor who submitted them. They were usually disapproved or
some worthless preparation substituted. Even when a
prescription
was approved, the dose was always reduced to a non-effective
amount. To get around this latter handicap we tried putting
in
for two patients when only one required the drug, but this proved to be
of little help. We could not seem to beat the system.

The
food ration at this camp consisted of a mixture of rice and "koreon" (a
small grain which looked much like milo maize or a cross between milo
maize and broom corn). The rice was of a type that seemed to
be
particularly hard to digest and the "broom corn seed" seemed to pass
through the human intestinal tact almost unaltered in its
appearance. The soup usually consisted of boiled "daikon" (a
large
white radish) and at the evening meal frequently contained a few grams
of dried fish. On several occasions a small squid was served
for
each two men. The amount of food received at this
camp
might have been sufficient to maintain weight at its present level had
it become a digestible type of grain, but certainly no one showed any
appreciable gain in weight. I was still holding my own at 117
pounds when we left the camp on April 25th and that weight included
considerable edema of the lower extremities. Some men at this
camp had weights recorded as low as eighty-seven pounds and
survived. The diet here was a salt-free diet except for the
natural salts contained in the food elements and the craving for salt
became almost unbearable, but the weather was cold and no disaster
resulted. The Japanese realizing this salt shortage asked the
Americans to submit plans for extracting salt from seawater but nothing
ever came of it. The following story is cited to illustrate
the
extreme craving for salt: while working on a manure-carrying
detail, some salt was discovered along the picket line where it had
been spilled while salting the animals. it was a coarse
granular
type of salt and was picked up with as little manure as possible, taken
back to camp where the crystals for salt were separated from the manure
and dissolved in boiling water. This was allowed to stand
until
the dirt settled out and the salt water was decanted off and sterilized
by boiling and then used as a liquid to season the rice.

Some
time in March the Japanese started issuing flour to bake bread for the
dysentery patients and this was issued in lieu of the rice and maize
ration, and although it was too late to benefit most of the serious
cases, who had already died, it did aid considerably in helping our
remaining dysentery patients to recover. Bone-marrow broth was served
to this group on three or four occasions, not frequently enough,
however, to be of any real value.

Water was plentiful but had
to be boiled before it was potable. This fact alone made it
impossible to get an adequate supply, because of the fuel
shortage. Consequently, men drank the water directly from the
well. It was an open shallow well about eight feet to the
water
level, and not twenty feet away was an open sump where feces and urine
were mixed in preparation for putting it on the vegetable garden.
Warning was given not to use this water un-boiled but little attention
was ever paid to that warning.

The
death rate at this camp was fairly high. The exact figures I
do
not recall but it was something like fifty-two deaths out of the group
of 192 men that came originally to Camp Number 1. These
figures
may not be exact but I am sure they are approximately correct.

On
April 25th the groups from the other two camps were brought to Fukuoka
and joined us in another cruise from Fukuoka, Japan, to Fusan in
Korea. The American officer who was with the hospital group
has
stated that of the 110 men who were sent to the hospital in Moji only
thirty had survived. No information on deaths was obtained
from
the other group and then the first group was separated from them upon
arrival in Fusan. They were sent to Manchuria and the first group was
sent to on to Jinsen in Korea. At the docks in Fukuoka an
American medical officer was called upon to see an officer who was in a
dying condition from pneumonia. The Japanese doctor there
gave
the Medical officer medicine for him and some morphine to ease his
pain. Before the officer died that night he was asked whether
he
had been forced to come on this move or had come by choice.
His
reply was that the Japs would not authorize him to remain in
Fukuoka. This is a typical instance of how men were moved
from
place to place when it was evident that they were in no condition to
survive the move. I do not recall ever making an overnight
move
from Bataan to Korea when some dead were not left somewhere along the
route.

The Japanese doctor who gave the medicine at the docks
in Fukuoka turned out to be the one from Mukden of whom so many good
things have been reported. Ironically enough he was not taken
prisoner by the American forces but was in the zone occupied by our
Allies.

I. Jinsen, Korea.

The camp at Jinsen was
reached April 27th, 1945, after an all-day trip by transport across the
Straits to Fusan, and a twenty-four hour train ride from Fusan to
Jinsen via Seoul. The crossing was uneventful and
accommodations
were good. The ship was a fast one and the hold was equipped
with
heavy straw mats for bunks. It was like riding a luxury liner
after our previous experiences. From Fusan the trip by train
was
in regular passenger coaches, with no overcrowding. Cooked
food
was served regularly throughout the trip and in much greater amounts
than was customary. It was served in individual packages
called
"Bento boxes" three times a day and consisted of cooked rice,
vegetables, and fish or meat. Water was adequate also and as
result we arrived at Jinsen in about as good physical state as we were
in when we left Fukuoka two days before.

The camp at Jinsen
was an officers' camp and the Japanese Commandant told us that officers
would not be required to work. Sufficient enlisted men were kept at
this camp to take care of such menial
tasks as are encountered in camp administration and a detachment of
Medical Corps men was retrained to help with the medical work of the
camp. One American medical officer was detailed to assist the
Japanese doctor in treating our sick and all other medical officers
were relieved from any medical duties. At this time, there
were
only 140 American prisoners left of our group.

The housing
accommodations here were the best encountered at any camp.
Buildings were permanent frame structures, with the usual tar-paper
roof and dirt floors, a passageway down the center, and wide sleeping
bays on either side extending the entire length of the building and
placed about two feet above the ground. Bays were covered
with
woven cane mats that afforded some padding on which to make down the
beds. Six blankets were issued for bedding and a cotton
uniform
was issued to each man. Red Cross overcoats which had been
issued
at Fukuoka were taken up before leaving that camp and no others were
issued here, but the worst of the cold weather was over and no real
suffering resulted from lack of heavy clothing.

Sanitation was
poor, but as good as that encountered at any other camp.
Latrines
were open pits and were placed not more than thirty feet from the side
of the barracks. Flies were not a problem at first but, as
the
weather grew warmer, began to plague us just as they had at all the
other camps. Most of us, however, now felt ourselves
relatively
immune after three years of almost constant exposure to bacillary
dysentery. Amoebic infection had become chronic in quite a
number
of cases but little trouble was encountered here from acute dysentery
of either type.

Personal hygiene would have been satisfactory
except for the fact that all of us had become infested with body lice
on board ship en route from Manila to Japan and we were never given an
opportunity to delouse ourselves at Fukuoka and consequently brought
our lice along with us to Jinsen. Everyone was heavily
infested
with lice. They allowed us to boil our clothing only one time at
Jinsen, and this did not prove to be adequate. Our lice were
back
with us within a few days. After the weather became warm, fleas invaded
the barracks to add to our discomfort, but it was a strange phenomenon
to note the lice decrease as the fleas increased. However,
there
still remained enough of both to make sleeping a fairly difficult and
frequently interrupted process. Bathing facilities were
satisfactory and there was a limited issue of soap, tooth powder and
razor blades.

The ration consisted of a mixture of polished
rice and barley (estimated at about 250 grams per man per day), which
was served at the morning and evening meals. A wheat-flour
bun
was served at the noon meal in lieu of the rice and barley mixture. The
bun contained a small amount of soya bean preparation. The
dry
weights of these ingredients were not revealed but I would estimate not
more than 150 grams went into the making of each bun. In
addition
to this, there was a soup of boiled vegetables with each meal, which
also contained a small amount of soya bean paste. The only
other
regular issue was ninety grams of soya bean fat per man every ten days
and one Red Cross parcel per man once each month. There was
an
occasional issue of from four to ten small boiled clams or a small
fish. The only meat issued here was that received in the Red
Cross parcels, viz., two cans of pork loaf and one can of corned
beef. There were other items in the parcels, such as raisins,
powdered milk, etc., but this was the only meat and constituted a
month's ration. All in all, however, this was the best ration
that had been received since about August 1944, and most men who were
not ill with dysentery did gain a few pounds after reaching this
camp. to further supplement this diet after the first week or
ten
days, although we were told that work was not required of officers, the
Japanese Commandant, through our American representative, agreed to
give an additional portion of rice for each two officers who would
volunteer to work. This offer was discussed in general
assembly
of all officers and it was the opinion of a majority of us that
although nothing would be gained over the extra energy expended in
doing the work required, it might be a good policy to cooperate and not
antagonize the commandant by refusing to work. It turned out
that
only a few of the extremely weak men in camp refused to
volunteer. The work consisted of growing a vegetable garden,
sewing button holes sewing buttons on Japanese civilian uniforms and in
pulling a bull cart loaded with garments to and from the factory where
they were made -- a distance of about three miles. The work
was
typical of the work commonly performed by "coolie" labor but was
participated in by all and without loss of a sense of humor and was
carried on up to the time of the surrender.

The following
incident is related to give an impression of the way the Japanese
reacted toward feeding their war prisoners. For six weeks
prior
to the surrender, the prison garden had been producing more vegetables
of all types, including Irish potatoes, than could have been eaten by a
small group imprisoned at Jinsen and although some thirty tons of Irish
potatoes had been harvested and placed in storage inside the compound,
there was little or no increase in the vegetable content of the
soup. Potatoes were rotting so fast in the storehouse that a
detail of men was kept busy daily sorting out the bad ones and
disposing of them. While this process was going on, one was
lucky
to find more than three or four small pieces of potato in his
soup. It is estimated that ten times as many potatoes rotted
daily as were prepared and served to the prisoners.

The
sickness at Jinsen varied little from what had been experienced
elsewhere. Most everyone had pellagra and nutritional
edema. Totany was common but only mild symptoms were
exhibited
such temporary spasms of the fingers and
toes. A considerable number had chronic amebiasis, but the
only
new disease to sweep through the camp was an acute fever somewhat
resembling dengue or severe influenza. It was never diagnosed
and
although there was some speculation as to whether it was a louse-borne
disease, no conclusion was ever agreed upon. There were no fatalities
from it, but the discomfort which resulted was severe, and no medicine
other than an occasional aspirin was provided for its
treatment.
The fever lasted over a period of about ten days to two weeks and was
characterized by severe headache and malaise and by a morning remission
of the fever, somewhat like that seen in typhoid fever.

The
Japanese doctor at this camp displayed an absolute lack of interest in
the medical problem faced by this group of prisoners and, on the
contrary, seemed to be possessed with a fiendish desire to abuse and
mistreat them. He was the most feared Jap in the camp and
rarely
did his turn as Officer of the Day go by without someone getting a
severe beating. The mortality at this camp was low -- only two
Americans were buried there after our arrival.

On the
day following the surrender, the Japanese authorities notified us that
the War was over and all work details were discontinued. We
were
asked to remain within the compound or to take a Japanese guard with us
if we desired to leave. Native merchants were permitted to
bring
foodstuffs into camp after the first three or four days, and soon we
were eating eggs and beef and fresh fruits of various kinds, as well as
all the Irish potatoes that we cared to eat. Weight gain was
almost unbelievable. I personally gained six kilos in six
days. Of course, must of this was due to fluid retention in
the
tissues as well as to filling up a GI tract that had been empty for
something over three and one-half years.

A few days later, the
B-29s came over and started dropping barrels of American canned foods,
cigarettes, chewing gum, candy, clothing and medical
supplies. It
was a thrilling day and almost ended in disaster when some of
the
barrels broke loose from their parachutes and came crashing down
through the roof tops. They couldn't have hit a safer spot
since
all the prisoners were outside watching the show. There was
one
casualty, a fractured femur, but no fatalities. When this
demonstration was over, someone was heard to remark: "They
are
killing us with kindness." I failed to hear anyone
criticizing
the procedure and when they returned next day everyone got outside the
compound and watched the show from a safer viewpoint.

Parachute
materials of red, white and blue were salvaged and that night a group
of our most expert needle men manufactured what is believed was the
first American flag to be raised in Korea after the surrender of
Japan. She was still flying from her bamboo flagpole inside
the prison compound when the Americans landed at
Jinsen September 8, 1945.

It is good to be free!

14. MEDICAL
ACTIVITIES WITH THE GUERRILLAS.

The
City of Baguio, Mountain province, was ordered evacuated December 22d
and 23rd, 1941. It was occupied by the Japanese Army on
December
27th. The withdrawing remnants of the Philippine Army, which
had
delayed the Japanese on the beaches and in the mountain passes, then
literally ran across the mountains to the vicinity of Balete
Pass. They had hoped to outflank the Japanese at San Jose and
dash to Bataan, where the main defending forces were assembling.

On
December 29th the Japanese seized San Jose early in the
morning,
and with it the last available road to Bataan. Only a few of
the
troops from the Mountain Province had been successful in getting
through to Bataan. The remaining troops, exhausted and hungry from
their long push through the mountains, were now entirely cut off from
the main forces, and also quote disorganized.

The remnants of
the 88th Field Artillery were organized into a battalion of
infantry. One company was left to occupy and guard Balete
Pass. The rest of the battalion was marched to Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya, where they established temporary bivouac. Japanese
aviators soon learned of this troop concentration and bombed
them. The Japanese infantry and cavalry quickly pushed north
through Balete Pass to Bayombong and then to Santiago. The
guerrilla forces continually harassed the Japanese, but were unable to
fight a head-on encounter because of lack of equipment, and because
they were greatly outnumbered.

The battalion headquarters were
moved to Jones, Isabella. In spite of steady reverses, new
members were continually joining the organization, until it reached a
total of 1,500 members. It was now composed of two battalions
of
infantry and one battalion of cavalry. One hundred local
horses
were turned over to the cavalry battalion on receipt by loyal
Filipinos.

A supply system was organized. Owners of rice
mills and farmers were very cooperative and supplied adequate food
regularly for USAFFE receipt. The local politicians were also
very cooperative in obtaining supplies of every description for the
regiment.

Communications were established. A two-way
radio was located and carried by hand over one hundred miles to
Jones. Daily contact was soon established with
Corregidor.
A relay telephone system was soon set up to all of the permanent
regimental outposts.

A medical
service was established with the former Surgeon of camp John Hay, as
Surgeon with four Philippine Army Medical officers and one Dental
officer as assistants. A dispensary was set up at the
Regimental
Headquarters. Two hospitals were organized in abandoned
school
houses in neighboring barrios, so they would be out of range in event
of bombing of the headquarters or barracks.

Two airstrips were
constructed in the vicinity of Jones by our troops, with the aid of
voluntary civilian labor. These were adequate to land small
planes. Small portable buildings were kept on the airstrips
to
conceal their purpose. They could be moved off in fifteen
minutes, when needed.

A detail of 100 men crossed the
rugged Sierra Madre Mountains to the east coast, and built a pier with
the aid of local labor in the harbor of Casiguran. This pier
was
adequate for the landing of a destroyer or submarine.

It was
believed that we had sufficient establishments to be the basis of an
initial landing in case of an invasion of friendly troops. We
could have given coverage and considerable support to such a landing.

Medical
supplies and equipment, including ammunition, were requested from
Corregidor, preferably by destroyer or submarine. We received
the
answer that it was impossible for a vessel to approach the east coast
at that time.

On two occasions a single P-40 from Bataan
dipped down over our airstrip and dropped a box of medicine by
parachutes. Some of the medicines and ammunition were lost by
breakage, but the morale of the regiment rose.

A picked group
of our troops were chosen to join picked groups of other guerrilla
organizations in a raid on the airport at Tuguegarao. The
raid
was carried out under cover of darkness. Two planes were
destroyed on the ground and over one hundred Japanese personnel killed.

Patrols containing about twenty-five selected troops were sent
to raid towns (barrios) in Japanese-held territory. One or
two of
the members of the patrol would enter the town as civilians.
They
would observe the movements of the Japanese troops in the town for
several days. Then on signal, the telephone wires were cut at both ends
of the town and the Japanese Detachment was promptly annihilated as it
marched down the road to breakfast.

When the Japanese troops withdrew from Cagayan Valley in late March
1942, one of our battalions pursued them as far as Balete
Pass, where they set up defense positions. Telephone
communications and courier service were quickly established with
headquarters at Jones.

With late radio news, which we were able
to pick up daily, we printed a small newspaper called the "Bataan
News." The Doolittle raid on Tokyo was the subject of many
hundreds of these newspapers, which were carried by our patrols into
many provinces in northern Luzon. We felt it was a great morale booster
for the civilian population, who were desperately looking for some sign
of Uncle Sam's activity.

Through our radio, we received
permission from President Quezon to print emergency money. We
turned the actual printing job over to the Treasurer of the province,
but it was kept under strict supervision. A certain amount of
the
money was turned over to the regiment, and was used to pay the soldiers
as well as to supply food, clothing, etc.

We had frequent
conferences with the Governors of the provinces, and Mayors of the
barrios to inform them as to our purpose. We helped them keep
order in their areas. They helped us get supplies and
equipment. When a mayor or governor became jittery, because
of
fear of what might happen to him when the Japanese came in, we had to
appoint a new officer in his place. We felt some satisfaction in
learning that the Japanese Army later accepted the mayors, governors
and provincial engineers that we had appointed.

As of April
1st, 1942, our regiment, which now had the new title of 14th Infantry,
Philippine Army, had control of the entire area between Tuguegarao and
Balote Pass, and between Kiangan and the East Coast.

Medical
activities with an organization of this kind were of necessity not the
best, and yet they were not as completely absent as might be
expected. We had been able to get some medicines
and
surgical instruments from local hospitals, but only after the Japanese
had raided them first, and they had been rather thorough. The
local doctors who had offices in the neighborhood dug into their
personal supplies. Many sympathetic Filipinos gave freely of
their medicine and time. Several Filipino women made bandages
for
us. The two boxes of medicine dropped from a plane from
Bataan
were of great value, but were soon used.

Antimalarial
medicines were quickly used up because of the prevalence of malaria in
the area. Under the guidance of the Filipino doctors of our
staff, considerable bark of a certain tree was obtained and boiled in
water. The resulting concoction, when given to active malaria
cases, would cause a cessation of active
symptoms of the disease for several weeks. Then we would have
to
repeat it. We did not dare give it to malaria cases when they
were not active, as we did not know what by-products might be contained
in the solution. We also had no method of determining the
strength of the potion, except by trying it on the malaria cases in
small amounts. A similar solution was made from the bark or fruit of
the guava tree. This would help the average case of diarrhea.

Hospitals
were established in abandoned schoolhouses in Minuri and Dibulwan, two
barrios near Jones. These hospitals would house a total of
100
patients. The majority of cases were malaria and
dysenteries. In spite of inadequate medicines and supplies,
we
kept our mortality rate very low.

Food was the best that
could be obtained in the locality. It was much better than
the
average Filipino was accustomed to in his home. It consisted
of a
great variety of fresh fruits and vegetables. Chicken, pork
and
eggs were obtained in sizable quantities. All food was boiled
or
baked.

Water was obtained from deep wells of barrios when
available. When not available, the soldiers were urged to
boil
water when it was to be used for drinking. We had no other
means
of sterilizing water. Fortunately, most Filipinos were
familiar
with crude sand filters. They would dig a small well near a
river
in the sand, and let it settle for several hours. It was much
more potable than ordinary river water.

Sanitation was crude of
necessity. When an organization remained longer than one day
in a
location, pit latrines were dug.

In spite of complete absence
of prophylaxis, we saw almost no venereal disease. The
average
Filipino in the provinces was very faithful to his wife and family.

The
patrols, who often went as far as 200 miles from our headquarters at
Jones, Isabella, were instructed to go to local doctors if they should
get sick or wounded during their mission. When possible, a
medical aid man was sent with the patrol. He carried small
amounts of medicine and bandages. Local civilians were very
good
to sock or wounded guerrillas. They would take them into
their
homes and take care of them until well, in spite of the severe threats
of the Japanese.

As loyal civilians were supplying the
regiment with food, clothing, transportation, oil, medicines, etc.,
every effort was made to take care of all the sick or wounded civilians
in the areas in which we operated. Our doctors traveled many
miles on horseback or foot daily to
give medical care to friendly civilians as well as the
troops.
Many times when the Japanese were close by, it was necessary to make
these long trips at night. Filipino "evacuation camps" were
visited daily to care for their sick. We found that the
medical
care of the civilians paid dividends in many ways and probably played a
part in the friendliness of the Filipinos toward the Americans on their
return to the Philippines. Many of these friendly civilians
enlisted or received commissions in the invading American
Army.
There was never any doubt in their minds as to which side they were on.

When Bataan fell, we received orders from Corregidor to cut our
regiment to 600. This was a great disappointment to the many
who
had to be sent home, and lowered the morale of the remaining
soldiers. With a few days, 3,000 Japanese troops massed at
San
Jose and started their push into the Cagayan Valley. Shortly
Corregidor fell. We realized that we were not equipped to
fight a
pitched battle. Our remaining mission would be purely one of
intelligence. We moved our radio into the mountains at
Pinippigan. It was necessary to disband great numbers of our
troops. They were sent to their homes with their rifles and
told
to hide them until they were notified again. The remaining
troops
scattered in small groups and went into the mountains, as the Japanese
Army took over the Cagayan Valley. Patrols (in civilian
clothing)
continued to keep us informed as to the movements of the Japanese.

Within
a few hours after the fall of Corregidor, we heard a radio broadcast
from Manila by General Wainwright ordering us to surrender.
We
held a conference and decided that General Wainwright, being a prisoner
of the enemy, had lost his command and his right to give us
orders. The acting commanding officer of the 14th Infantry
said
he was not going to surrender. he told the rest of the
regiment
that each member should decide for himself what he would do.
Everyone decided not to surrender. We knew that any
information
we could get concerning the enemy would be of immense value to the
returning American Army.

We were moving our headquarters to
Palangen, where Aquinaldo had held out for two years successfully
against the Americans during the Insurrection, when we were informed
that an American officer had arrived. He was flown by the
Japanese to Baguio from Manila, and then to Echague,
Isabella. he
was armed by Japanese permit, which he carried. There were no
Japanese with him. He told us that General Wainwright wanted
us
to surrender. The Japanese would annihilate the captured
American
prisoners from Bataan and Corregidor unless all of the forces in the
Philippines surrendered. He said there were thousands of sick
and
wounded in the prison camps and they were urgently in need of all
doctors. He left us no choice.

The
14th Infantry surrendered to the Japanese at Echague, Isabella, on June
20th, 1942. The members who were not present at the surrender
were
ordered to surrender by written order of the commanding officer, which
was published by the Japanese. Even then some of the members
refused to surrender and remained in the Sierra Madre Mountains to
contact Australia and keep it informed of conditions in the
Philippines.

14. TRIBUTE.

As Philippine Department
Surgeon and later as Surgeon, United States Forces in the Philippines,
I feel it is my privilege to commend the Medical Department personnel
for the work done during the period here reported. Never in
the
history of war has medical personnel been called upon to perform their
duties under such arduous circumstances and over such a protracted
period. One must consider the following facts:

A.
The War in the Philippines began December 8, 1941, and the bulk of the
prisoners of Japan were returned to military control in September 1945.

B. During this period, there was a
continuous and ever
increasing medical problem. Beginning with the war on Luzon,
and
continuing through Bataan and Corregidor, the conditions encountered
were as difficult as any throughout the whole global war.

C. Personnel replacements and
augmentation of
supplies ceased at the outbreak of the War.

D.
No Period of acclimation or conditioning to war was allowed.
On
December 7th, 1941, we were at peace; December 8th, 1941, we were at
war and in the front lines.

E. Then through the period of
prison life, lasting approximately forth months, under conditions
defying description, medical personnel carried on, limited only in
their endeavors by the character of their captors, the scarcity of
medical supplies, and the physical limitations of their own emaciated
bodies.

Reflecting on the above facts, it is with pardonable
pride that I recall the supreme effort put forth by all the Medical
Department personnel. Officers of the Medical Corps, Dental
Corps, Veterinary Corps, Medical Administrative Corps, Army Nurse
Corps, and enlisted men of the Medical Department all performed their
duties in a superior manner.

In the years to come this
group of medical personnel can look back with great comfort and pride
to the part they played during this grim period while upholding the
finest traditions of the Medical Department, United States Army.

1. I would like to point out a grave problem pertaining to
the Medical Department and the U.S.A.F.F.E.

2.
Malaria is rapidly increasing; some 350 cases were under treatment in
this hospital as of March 8th. The admission rate is
alarming,
some 26 patients arriving March 9th. Most of these are
medical
and a large proportion have malaria. We will need huge
increases
in the amount of quinine for treatment. For example, if a patient is
given the standard treatment of 2 grams daily for 5 days followed by
.650 grams daily for 6 weeks, each treatment case will require 37 grams
or 1¼ ounces.

3. It is suggested that quinine should be
provided for the Clearing Company personnel to treat cases and relieve
the pressure on the hospitals.

4. The facilities of
General Hospital No. 2, at present are over taxed and if we reach 3600
census, including the convalescent ward of 500, we will have reached
the extreme limit. It is further suggested that plans should
be
made for hospital No. 1, to handle a minimum of 2000
patients. A
survey of medical corps personnel of the entire far eastern command to
determine redistribution for duty will become imperative if the malaria
situation gets beyond control.

5. Quinine prophylaxis
having stopped we anticipate additional hundreds or even thousands of
cases. I believe 50% of personnel at this hospital have sub
clinical malaria and a material lowering of physical and mental
efficiency has resulted from this disease process.

6. We
are urgently in need of a tremendous stock of quinine for treatment and
prophylaxis. The General Staff should understand the extreme
gravity of the malarial problem and give priority to quinine above that
of any other critical item. If the malarial situation is
not brought under control the efficiency of the whole Army will be
greatly impaired; in fact it will be unable to perform its combat
functions. It is my candid and conservative opinion that if
we do
not secure a sufficient supply of quinine for our troops from front to
rear that all other supplies we may get, with the exception of rations,
will be of little or no value.

7. The ability of the Army to
maintain its position in the ensuing months will depend in part upon
the prompt securing of an adequate stock of quinine. It
should be
brought by air initially, then by submarine or boat.

Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps

1st Ind.

HQ
Philippine Department, Office of the Surgeon, March 11, 1942.
To
- The Commanding General, Philippine Department, In the Field.

1.
It is recommended that construction of a new site of General Hospital
No. 2 be pushed as rapidly as possible; that General Hospital No. 1 be
expanded to 1,000 beds. Bamboo beds to be made for this
expansion.

3. Every effort is being made through the Commanding
General USAFFE to get sufficient quinine on first priority by air both
for treatment and prophylaxis.

/s/ W.E. COOPER,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Surgeon.

710.

2nd Ind.

HFB/brb

HEADQUARTERS
SERVICE COMMAND, LUZON FORCE, USAFFE, In the Field, March 24 1942 --
To: CO, Hospital No. 2, In the Field

HFB

TAB #2

COPY

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL
HOSPITAL NO. 2,
In the Field.

March 14, 1942

In reply refer to:
632

Subject: Hospitalization
To: Surgeon, U.S.A.F.F.E., Fort Mills, P.I.

1.
On February 26, 1942 a General Hospital Reservation on Bataan, was
designated. Shortly thereafter plans for a 3000 bed hospital
of
semi-permanent construction were submitted to the Engineer,
U.S.A.F.F.E. by the Commanding Officer, General Hospital No.
2.
Inspection of the Hospital Reservation on March 13th showed that a
trail had been cut into the area, otherwise nothing had been
accomplished.

2. In approximately 6 weeks heavy rains
will fall in Bataan and thereafter the inclemency of the weather will
become progressively more marked. A sharp increase in common
respiratory diseases and pneumonia is expected. It is
estimated
that 5000 beds will be the minimum number required to care for the sick
and injured. It is suggested that the Clearing Companies
treat
1000-1500 cases in the forward areas and that Hospital No. 1 expand to
a capacity of 1000 or more.

3. The present location of General
Hospital No. 2, will be untenable in the rainy season. In
fact,
at present hundreds of patients have no shelter from the showers that
inevitably will come before the heavy rains. At the present
rate
of progress in providing additional and suitable facilities for the
sick it is believed that the transfer of patients and equipment will be
so delayed that considerable damage to property from rain will occur
and that the physical and mental condition of patients will be impaired
by the conditions imposed by excessive rain. The maintenance
of
messing, necessary movement of patients within the hospital area, the
distribution of drinking water, collection of garbage and disposal of
refuse, maintenance of the electrical system and many other necessary
activities will be greatly curtailed due the condition of the roads,
which in this area are of dirt.

4. It is recommended that the
Chief of Staff be acquainted with these manifold and urgent problems
incident to the proper care of the sick in order that much greater
impetus be given to hospital construction. As the situation
exists at this time it is obvious that the sick and injured cannot be
properly cared for during the approaching rainy season and great
hardship and suffering will be imposed on patients and
duty personnel charged with the task of their care.

5. Utilization of additional tunnel space on Corregidor to
the
fullest extent for sick and wounded is considered essential.
Utilization of hospital building and barracks suitably marked by a red
cross and reasonably removed from military objectives, on Corregidor,
may become imperative to lessen the burden on inadequate installations
in Bataan. Movement to the Southern Islands of patients unfit
for
duty should be accelerated if the tactical situation permits.

6.
The welfare and well being of several thousand patients will be
determined directly in a large measure by the action taken immediately
by higher authority to solve these pressing problems of hospitalization
of the sick.

Lieutenant Colonel, Medical
Corps, Commanding.

TAB #3

COPY

BATAAN GENERAL HOSPITAL
NUMBER TWOBataan, P.I.

In the Field,
May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: The Commanding Officer, General Hospital No. 2

The
following information concerning the nutritional condition of patients
at Bataan General Hospital No. 2 was obtained from reports submitted by
each of the ward surgeons on May 5, 1942. This may also be
taken
as an index of the nutritional status of the hospital personnel.

This
data was based entirely upon the clinical judgment of each of the ward
surgeons and the history as obtained from each patient. No
precise method of measurement of nutritional symptoms was used in
obtaining this information.

Evidences of
Nutritional Disturbances.

No. Patients

Percentage

Anemia, Secondary

768

61%

Weakness

1173

93%

Edema, dependant

89

7%

Paraesthesias

103

8%

Loss knee jerks

11

0.8%

Bleeding gums

18

1.5%

Subcutaneous petechiae

3

0.2%

Night blindness

23

2%

Malaria (since Jan. 1st)

817

65%

Common
diarrhea (since Jan. 1st)

508

40%

Dysentery,
unclassified (since Jan. 1st)

208

16%

Average loss of weight per patient

24.5
lbs.

Total number patients in hospital

1252

100%

One
important feature of nutritional disturbances not tabulated here was
emphasized by Lt. Col. J.W. Schwartz when he said that "wounds are now
taking twice as long to heal as they did in Manila and union has not
been demonstrated in any fracture whose cast has been removed since
April 1st."

The exceptionally poor nutritional state of all
patients and hospital personnel must be attributed to a lack of variety
of carbohydrates, fats, proteins, minerals and vitamins and to a marked
quantitative deficiency of proteins, minerals and vitamins.
Clinically the nutritive disturbances may be classified as a
combination of beriberi, scurvy, nutritional edema and anemia secondary
to dietary deficiencies. All of this is of course much
emphasized by the high incidence of malaria and gastro-intestinal
disturbances.

It
has proven difficult to emphasize the seriousness of the nutritional
state of the people at this hospital by means of statistics and
comment. The true picture can best be demonstrated by simple
inspection of any of the wards.