In mid-July 2003, the White House
selectively released some details of a October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. At this
point in the war, we had already had the Mission
Accomplished speech, but it was becoming painfully obvious that
the war was far from over. Also, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
rationale was starting to evaporate: neither the UN weapons
inspectors nor our forces had managed to find anything. Therefore,
Bush II was starting to move on to
new rationales.

This document has been released in at least three other versions (two of which are available on this web site and many other places):

The real original Unredacted
Top Secret Edition (September-October 2002)

The conclusions of the
publically-released "Unclassified" version generally
supported the WMD rationale— however, the blanked-out sections
admitted that the evidence for the conclusions was weak.

The unidentified White House official
who gave the Background Briefing on July 18, 2003 admits that maybe
Sadaam wasn't building a nuclear bomb, but he (or she) tries to stick
to the rest of the story. (The nuclear bomb is what the "Plamegate"
scandal was about: the CIA's Valerie Plame and her husband Joseph
Wilson debunked the story that Iraq was buying uranium from the
obscure African nation of Niger.)

Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked,
it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR
alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)

We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD
efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts.
Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive
efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific
information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its
chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested
more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies,
Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly
increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual
earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled, from $580
million in 1998 to about $3 billion this year.

Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological
weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has
expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover
of civilian production.

Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with
its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological
and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.

Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have
nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains
intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started
reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM
inspectors departed--December 1998.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon
depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material.

If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from
abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a
year.

Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably
would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to
inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to
produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the
necessary equipment and expertise.

Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal
interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's attempts to
acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine
tools--provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a
uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.
(DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway
but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)

Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its
cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect
nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway.

All agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges
based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be
capable of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly
enriched uranium per year.

In a much less likely scenario, Baghdad could make
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it
obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other
materials and technological expertise necessary to build
production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.

We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of
mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX; its capability probably is
more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX
production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

An array of clandestine reporting reveals that
Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals
and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production hidden
within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

Although we have little specific information on
Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric
tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents--much of it
added in the last year.

The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW
bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that they
possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited
number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with extended
ranges.

We judge that all key aspects--R&D, production, and
weaponization--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that
most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the
Gulf war.

We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW
agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety
of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles,
aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's
offensive BW program.

Baghdad probably has developed genetically
engineered BW agents.

Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant,
and concealed BW agent production capability.

Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing
bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection
and are highly survivable. Within three to six months [Corrected
per Errata sheet issued in October 2002] these units probably could
produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in
the years prior to the Gulf war.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several
development programs, including for a UAV probably intended to
deliver biological warfare agent.

Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that
Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant
SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100
SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km
range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variant beyond 150
km--perhaps as far as 300 km.

Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, U.S.
forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the
United States, the U.S. Homeland.

An Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to
procure commercially available route planning software and an
associated topographic database that would be able to support
targeting of the United States, according to analysis of special
intelligence.

The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is
developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms
for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of
Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance,
although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.

Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile
capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building
specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines more
powerful than those in its current missile force.

We have low confidence in our ability to assess when
Saddam would use WMD.

Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) preemptively against U.S. forces, friends, and allies
in the region in an attempt to disrupt U.S. war preparations and
undermine the political will of the Coalition.

Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into
Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic
options for stalling the US advance.

He probably would use CBW when be perceived he
irretrievably had lost control of the military and security
situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that
point.

We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use
chemical weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.

Saddam historically has maintained tight control
over the use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency
instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific circumstances.

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the
United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would
provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.

Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against
the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the
survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for
revenge. Such attacks--more likely with biological than chemical
agents--probably would be carried out by special forces or
intelligence operatives.

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has
been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied
interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes
action against Iraq. The US probably would be the primary means by
which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US
Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that
Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.

Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only
an organization such as al-Qa'ida--with worldwide reach and extensive
terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death
struggle against the United States--could perpetrate the type of
terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

In such circumstances, he might decide that the
extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a
CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to
exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
(INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and
that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at
least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear
weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do
not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently
pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and
comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be
doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to
support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad
has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear
weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an
effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to
project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not
now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when
Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.

In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is
central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes
in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR
accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to
acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used
for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments
advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for
that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are
intended for another purpose, most likely the production of
artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the
way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of
attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are
among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead
INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's
nuclear weapon program.

Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This
Estimate

High Confidence:

Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its
chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to
UN resolutions.

Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once
it acquires sufficient weapons-grad fissile material

Moderate Confidence:

Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient
material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to
2009. (See INR alternative view, page 84).

Low Confidence

When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.

Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks
against the US Homeland.

Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or
biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.

[NIE page 24]

[...]

Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains approximately
two-and-a-half tons of 2.5 percent enriched uranium oxide, which
the IAEA permits. This low-enriched material could be used as
feed material to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear
weapons. The use of enriched feed material also would reduce the
initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad would need by about
half. Iraq could divert this material -- the IAEA inspects it
only once a year -- and enrich it to weapons grade before a
subsequent inspection discovered it was missing. The IAEA last
inspected this material in late January 2002.

Iraq has about 500 metric tons of yellowcake1
and low enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually
by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium
ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time
Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.

A foreign government service reported that as of early
2001, Niger planned to send several tons of "pure uranium"
(probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq
reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal,
which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know
the status of this arrangement.

Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from
Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex A

Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes

(This excerpt from a longer view includes INR's position
on the African uranium issue)

INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum
Tubes

Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are,
by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases
are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line
whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some
efforts involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment
-- including a variety of machine tools -- and are troubling
because they would help establish the infrastructure for a
renewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well
before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linked to a
nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural
uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
HOLDS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ,
AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 18, 2003

SPEAKER: SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Today I do want to walk
through a document today that we have released, as well as take any
other questions you have about the speech-making process here in the
White House. I know that there's been a lot of questions about the
developments of the State of the Union address; about what the
President has been talking about; again what the President reiterated
yesterday and has on many occasions about the clear and compelling
case that he outlined not only before the United Nations Security
Council, which resulted in the Security Council passing Resolution
1441, but also the information in the case that was provided to the
United States Congress, which they used to cast their vote; as well
as the information which the President shared to the American public,
as well as the world in the State of the Union address.

What you have here today is the key
judgments from the National Intelligence Estimate. The National
Intelligence Estimate is the work product of about six intelligence
agencies that pulled together all the information -- this is a
particular one with regards to the weapons of mass destruction
program of Saddam Hussein, as you see. It is titled "Iraq's
Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction." And in
this document it is the key judgments they have made about the WMD
program. Also included in that, in the back that I will talk about is
the specific sections of the uranium acquisition.

The NIE, itself, is about a 90-page document based upon thousands
and thousands of pages of intelligence from a wide spectrum of
capabilities that our government has -- whether it be human
intelligence, technical intelligence, foreign intelligence. All those
different data points are crystallized -- not all can be included in
one document -- but are crystallized in the National Intelligence
Estimate, and then summarized in the key judgments.

And as you can see here, at the very first, as it says in the
Intelligence Estimate, "We judge that Iraq has continued it
weapons of mass destruction programs, in defiance of U.N. resolutions
and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons, as
well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions. If left
unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this
decade." It also cites in there, "See INR alternative view
at the end of the key judgments." Again, INR is one of six
agencies that participate in this process. And the NIE process allows
for footnotes and for dissents on any particular aspect if they so
choose.

It goes on to say, "We judge that we are seeing only a
portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and
deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf War starkly demonstrate
the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack
specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's said WMD
programs."

This has been a key part of the concern the President has outlined
on many occasions, that the denial and deception of the regime has
always been a concern to our government, to many governments, because
of lack of cooperation with inspectors, the throwing out of
inspectors in 1998, and the thwarting of the job the inspectors had
done, so eloquently presented by Secretary Powell. It has always been
a concern of the United States government and other governments, as
well.

As you go through these bullet points, you see if you go down
toward the bottom part of page five, it says, "Although we
assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons, or sufficient
material to make any" -- it's really page one, but it's page
five because that's what it was in the NIE -- I apologize -- "he
remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad
started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM
inspectors departed, December 1998."

As we go through, at the top of the next page, this is a summary,
not entirely inclusive because there's a 90-page report that follows
this, but these are some of the key bullets that underline the
reconstitution of the nuclear program.

"The Department of Energy here agrees that the reconstitution
of the nuclear program is underway, but assesses that the tubes
probably are not part of the program," as we said and as
Secretary Powell pointed out during his presentation to the U.N.
Security Council. He said that there was a discussion about the
aluminum tubes both with the IAEA, as well as within our own
government -- both the INR, the State Department intelligence bureau,
as well as the Department of Energy, both felt -- had different
technical beliefs about the use of aluminum tubes. But the consensus,
including the CIA, stated as it reads in this document.

"Iraq's efforts to reestablish and enhance its cadre of
weapons personnel, as well as activities at several suspect nuclear
sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway. All agencies
agreed that about 25,000 centrifuges based on tubes of the size Iraq
is trying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two
weapons worth of highly-enriched uranium per year."

And as President Bush said last night, as we stated many times
before, the history on this is very important, that in 1991, after
the Gulf War, IAEA and others had no conclusive evidence of a nuclear
weapons program being as far along as they ultimately learned through
defectors and through others that came forward in the wake of the
Gulf War. That underestimation was only revealed through those
efforts postwar. And that's a very important construct to remember,
and it's a very important construct for policymakers to consider when
they make judgments on policy.

And that's exactly -- this document, as well as reams of other
information that may not be included in this document, but have been
shared with the intelligence communities, with the intelligence
committees in the Congress; many of this information is also in other
forms, in various formats -- in the U.N. Security Council, in other
foreign governments' own intelligence-based reporting. And that's why
you've had a history of actions being taken by several of these
bodies, whether it be the more than dozen resolutions passed by the
U.N. Security Council demanding Saddam Hussein to come forward with
his weapons program; whether it be the prior administration in 1998,
and the subsequent vote in the 1998 Congress that resulted in air
strikes being committed by that administration; or by the reams of
information and the totality and compelling case that was provided
before the United States Congress that they used in making their vote
known and cast this past fall; and obviously, the information the
President has shared with the public.

It is a clear, it is a compelling case that, as the President has
stated time and time again, after the events of September 11th, that
this war on terror will be aggressively pursued, that policymakers in
this administration will not put the security of the American people
at risk by putting our hopes and desires in the hands of dictators
and madmen who have weapons of mass destruction and ties to terror.
And that's why he has aggressively pursued this war, as eloquently
put by Prime Minister Blair, as well as President Bush yesterday,
both in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, and many other parts of the
world as we fight al Qaeda.

And this information is a critical aspect of the decision-making
process that policymakers have to make. These are analytical
judgments made by analysts in various agencies. And policymakers take
this information and then they have to make judgments based on
policy. The President has been very forthright in that, in talking
about the policy judgments our country is required to make in a
post-9/11 world. And we will continue to pursue those policies to
make America safer.

As you see in here, as I've said, stated, the footnotes have been
provided by an alternative view -- and I'll read for you, state INR
alternative view of Iraq's nuclear program. "The Assistant
Secretary of State for INR believes that Saddam continues to want
nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is
pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear
weapon- related capabilities.

The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a
compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would
consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire
nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers available
evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive
evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute
its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such
an effort began soon after the departure of U.N. inspectors, or to
project a time line for completion of activities it does not now see
happening. And as a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could
acquire a nuclear device or weapon."

And again, it goes into the much publicly known aluminum tube
case. And as you can see below that, based on this information that
they have, they make judgment levels, high confidence, moderate
confidence, low confidence, as you talk about the various parts of
the key judgments that are outlined before it. And I think it's
important on the INR dissent -- like I said, it was one of six
agencies, and based upon the history that we learned in 1991,
policymakers have to take that in consideration when they make
judgments.

But I will cite -- I will go to the Cincinnati speech where the
President addressed this very specific issue. In the Cincinnati
speech that's been talked about, earlier in the fall when it was
delivered, he said, "Many people have asked how close Saddam
Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know
exactly. And that's the problem. Before the Gulf War, the best
intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to ten years away from
developing a nuclear weapon. After the war, international inspectors
learned that the regime has been much closer, the regime in Iraq
would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. The
inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons
program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing
several different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb."

He goes on to talk about some of the things that are in the NIE.
He says, "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings
with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls the "nuclear
mujahideen," his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs
reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at a site that had been
part of its nuclear program in the past, and that it's attempted to
purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and equipment needed for gas
centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."

He goes on to say, "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce,
buy or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger
than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a
year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be
crossed. Saddam would be in a position to blackmail anyone he opposes
-- who opposes his aggression. He'd be in a position to dominate the
Middle East. He'd be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam
Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to
terrorists."

That is, I think, as he said -- he goes on to say, "Some
citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do
we want to confront it now. And there's a reason. We've experienced
the horrors of September the 11th. We have seen those that hate
America, willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent
people. Our enemies would be no less willing; in fact, they would be
eager to use a biological or chemical or nuclear weapon."

Back to the NIE. As we said, in addition to the key judgments that
were provided, if you will flip to page 24, as stated at the bottom
-- and again, this is an excerpt from a broader part of the body of
the NIE. We felt this was important to provide as a --

QUESTION: We don't have page 24.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm sorry. If you'll go
-- it looks like a blank paper, but there's a little box at the
bottom that says "uranium acquisition." Now, this is taken
from an excerpt of the overall highly classified nuclear chapter of
the 90-page NIE. There is a process, obviously, to maintain the
information that is classified. All this information has been
provided to the United States Congress many, many months ago when
this was produced. But there are many sources and methods and
intelligence capabilities that are still very sensitive, and that's
why the entire NIE could not be declassified.

But right here is a little bit of a history about the question of
uranium acquisition. And as you can see, Iraq retains approximately
two-and-a-half tons of 2.5 percent enriched uranium oxide, which the
IAEA permits. This low-enrichment material could be used as feed
material to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear weapons.

You can read on about this. There's a little more of the history.
"Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellow cake and low- enriched
uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq
has also been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellow
cake. Acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to
produce nuclear weapons.

"A foreign government source reported as early as 2001, Niger
planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium,' probably yellow cake
to Iraq." As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still
working on arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500
tons of yellow cake. We do not know the status of this arrangement.
Reports indicate Iraq also has sent uranium ore from Somalia, and
possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We cannot confirm
whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellow cake
from these sources. Reports suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic
mining and milling of uranium to foreign acquisition.

What we also concluded -- what you see there, it says "Annex
A." When I said the page that I just read from was page 25 of
the NIE. This is page -- the Annex A is page 84 of the NIE. And it
says, "Iraq's attempts to acquire aluminum tubes." This is
where, in the Annex is where footnotes are provided. And this is
where the State Department provided the aluminum explanation. But we
thought it important to also include it here because, at the very end
of that explanation it raises the Africa issue, as you can see in the
very final sentence there before you.

So we felt that this information could help give context to the
issue at hand. And what it also -- what I'd like to do is take a few
moments to talk about the questions that have been coming regarding
the speech, itself, and how the President has -- you heard him last
night delivering -- about delivering the speech, and about the
overall compelling and comprehensive case. But I want to walk you
through a little more of the process in which the State of the Union
is drafted.

To start off, I would say that speechwriters don't go off and just
write a speech on their own. They gather facts. They base their
speeches on facts; they gather that information in facts. And then
they write drafts of the speech, and then the speech is shared with
the appropriate personnel in the various divisions of the White
House. If you're talking about education, obviously, the people who
are in charge of education policy will look at the speech. If you
look at the issue of Iraq, the people who deal with policy regarding
specific elements of Iraq deal with that. Other members, both
internally and externally, of the administration review the entire
speech.

But what they do is they get -- they pull together information
they have, and then they go and write the drafts of the speech, and
then those speeches -- they are not told -- they are given general
strategic guidance of what we are trying to attempt in the speech.
And you can read the speech and understand what our objectives were
in that speech. It was very clear as the President delivered it, both
on the domestic side and on the international side.

And then, as it goes through the process, it is -- through the
drafting process, it's changed for stylistic reasons, for reasons of
tone, for reasons of fact, for reasons of -- all kinds of different
reasons. And that process is followed very carefully.

In this case, as the speech process went forward, one of the fact
judgments -- or many of the fact judgments that the speechwriters
used were based on the NIE. As you can see as you read the key
judgments and as you read other documents or other speeches, that
it's very similar or familiar case points that are made. And that
information is shared with the speechwriters so they can do it. They
are not told, this must go in, this must not, at the very early
stage. They're just given a bunch of information; they go write the
speech, and then the drafting process really begins then.

And in this case, on the issue at hand, the President's goal was
to, obviously, demonstrate to the public and to educate the public --
or do the continuing education of the public about the comprehensive
case against Saddam Hussein, the threat that he poses to the American
people, to the region, the Middle East region and to the world, and
the reasons why it was important that we enforce the demands of the
United Nations Resolution 1441. And in so doing, the speech was
drafted.

Now, I will say most of this, a lot of this will sound familiar,
like I said about the specific points of the case. And what I want to
do here is kind of walk you through a stylistic change that was made,
in large part to make the speech more credible. And the way that
happened was that in the middle of the drafting process, there was
the construct of the speech.

And the construct went this way: We know that Saddam Hussein had
materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum
toxin. We know that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as
much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. We know that
Saddam Hussein had about 30,000 munitions capable of delivering
chemical agents. We know that Iraq in the late 1990s had several
mobile biological weapon labs. We know that Saddam Hussein had an
advanced nuclear weapons program, and had a design for a workable
nuclear program and was pursuing at least five different methods of
enriching uranium for a bomb. We also know that he has recently
sought to buy uranium in Africa and has attempted to purchase high-
strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He
clearly has much to hide.

So in those -- one, two -- six paragraphs, or sentences used, we
made a lot of assertions. We said that we know these things. In going
through the speech -- and this was the day before the speech -- we
decided that it would be much more credible if we could explain to
the public how we knew it -- not just assert it, but to fully
disclose as much as possible how we knew this information.

So now you go to the speech as delivered, which I think is
important to understand. In the way he delivered it that night, it
says, "The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein
had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of
anthrax, enough doses to kill several million people. The United
Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to
produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin. Out intelligence
officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce
as much 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agents. U.S.
intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000
munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. From three Iraqi
defectors, we know that in Iraq in the late 1990s had several mobile
biological weapons labs. The International Atomic Energy Agency
confirmed in the '90s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear
weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon, was
working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

So what you see here in a little larger context, what happened
here, as we went from one draft to the next, we thought it would be
much more credible, much more explanatory to the American people to
explain how we knew these things. So when we did that, when we came
to the conclusion that would be a much more effective way and more
credible way of informing the public about the case, we asked the
speechwriters to go fill in the sources. And we did in each one of
those cases.

And in the case on the subject at hand, as you can see here, you
have the United Nations is cited. We prefer, obviously, public
citations where we could. We cited the United Nations on several of
those. We cited Iraqi defectors where we could. The International
Atomic Energy Agency is one that we cited.

And in the case on the issue at hand, with uranium from Africa,
the question was two pieces of information we had. We had the NIE,
which I've just described to you and the document that that provides,
which is a highly-classified document. Or we have the British
document that was already made public.

Given the choice, based on the discussions of the speechwriters
and the fact-checkers, we cited the British document. And that
British document was inserted in the speech and then that information
was then a part of a series of things -- it was not just this that
had to be cleared by the CIA, it was all of these things that we were
changing to verify from the CIA. And that's exactly what happened.

There's been a lot of reports about it. The person in charge of
the WMD program is Bob Joseph. Bob Joseph is responsible for that
section of fact-checking. He did what his job requires him to do on
any speech, and that is to verify it with the CIA. That conversation
took place. And they went through all the series of these -- this
information, probably other information. I'm not here to say this is
a conclusive conversation, but they did talk about these things, and
it was cleared to use the British as a citation.

And that's -- it came back. There was never a follow-up discussion
with the principals or with anybody or any flags raised about the
underlying intelligence. That is how the process worked. That is how
the information and how the speech was crafted. And as we've said all
along, that information that we know today is different from
information we knew then. And the process that was followed is
outlined to you right there. I can assure you that every member of
this administration who is involved with speechwriting is going to
redouble their efforts to make sure that we give the best quality
product to the President of the United States. He deserves nothing
less.

And with that, I'm more than happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: Is there going to be a transcript of this? Where
is the steno?

STAFF: They're typing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll start right up here.

QUESTION: Is it not true that this information was included
in a speech that he delivered in Cincinnati, and that George Tenet
called Steve Hadley to personally ask him to take it out of the
speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I appreciate that question.

QUESTION: -- it was taken out of the speech, and not
delivered in Cincinnati, and then the same information, tweaked a
little bit to include some British references, appeared in the State
of the Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I appreciate the
opportunity to address that question. As might have been cited in
some newspapers today, there was not a draft of the State of the
Union that included specific amounts, which is a critical distinction
between this speech and the Cincinnati speech. Every -- there were
three different lines that were changed. I told you the fundamental
reason why it was changed. Very early in the draft, in the drafting
process, when it was still with the speechwriters, it said, he has
not explained his efforts to procure uranium in Africa or
high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for uranium enrichment. That
then changed to what I described earlier, "We also know that he
has recently sought to procure uranium in Africa."

And that was just -- that's speechwriters writing a speech, they
came up with a new construct to try to make the argument: we know, we
know, we know, as I said. So that's why that change was made. And
then it ultimately went -- as we said, we wanted to then go from, we
know, to saying how we know. And that's how we went to the British
government.

But what it said in Cincinnati was, over 500 tons of uranium,
which is very specific to a specific intelligence report, foreign-
based, single-sourced intelligence source. And that's why the CIA
raised the question, that said, we don't want to cite specifics here
because it's based on a single source. That's why that information
was shared with the NSC, and was immediately removed. As we've said
all along, any time that that happens, we follow their request.

And that's why -- it's a critical distinction between the two,
because as you can see, there's a body of evidence -- and there's
even more evidence with the British government, as the Prime Minister
said yesterday -- there is a body of evidence talking about Africa.
But there's a very specific instance with regards to Niger. And
that's the difference that's been outlined for you. And that's why
there was not the same type of concerns, in my opinion, that was
raised here.

QUESTION: But if the information was so flawed that it was
prudent to remove it from the Cincinnati speech --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I need to correct you
there. I did not say at that time that it was flawed. That was later
known by the forged document. It was a single source on a foreign
government. And what Director Tenet has said is that in those
instances he'd be more comfortable for the President not to cite a
single source. It's not because it was flawed, and that's a critical
difference. So the reason there was because it was a single source,
not because it was flawed.

QUESTION: Wouldn't it have made sense, if Mr. Tenet felt
that way about it when you included it in the State of the Union, to
come back and say, Mr. Tenet, is this acceptable now in this form?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was a process
that was followed.

QUESTION: He didn't see it, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that's what he's
acknowledged.

QUESTION: Two questions. When was it clear that the Niger
documents were forged? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well,
my understanding is that the documents were provided to the
headquarters at CIA in February. That's when it was shared with the
IAEA and that's when it was disclosed. When you read it publicly was
the first time many people here in the White House were aware of the
forged documents.

QUESTION: That was the first time many people here in the
White House --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak for everybody
on the White House complex, but if you're asking did people know
about the forged documents before the State of the Union in the White
House, the answer to the question is, no.

QUESTION: Second question. The information about Africa did
not rise to the level of a key judgment, it is not listed as one. The
NIE is not meant to come out of the President's mouth -- at best, key
judgments are. So why was the information, if it did not rise to the
level of a key judgment, why was the information put in the
President's speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you made an assertion
inside your question, where you're saying that the President is not
supposed to cite the NIE. There are ways in which the President can
assert the NIE if it's cleared through the process.

QUESTION: But the other things the President asserts are
key judgments. The Africa stuff, the uranium stuff did not rise to
that level.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The NIE is a 90-page
document. All those documents provide facts. The key judgments are
not -- do not include everything in the 90 pages, or it wouldn't be
key judgments, it would be the report, itself. And in this case,
there were very specific data points provided in writing in the NIE
that were included. That's why it was included in the speech by the
speechwriters. There was not anybody specifically saying, put this in
there; it was included based on a body of information that was
provided. And then is the fact-checking progress that clears whether
information like that could be used or not.

There are many points, there are central points to the
reconstitution of the nuclear program -- those are outlined in the
key points. But that doesn't mean that other elements of the case of
why they believe it was reconstituting were not accurate.

QUESTION: I don't think you've addressed the question --
let me try a different way. Name me another assertion the President
made that failed to rise to the level of a key judgment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't do that here today.
I will be happy to look for that, but I'm not here -- I don't have
the NIE and every speech the President has given memorized.

QUESTION: I'm just talking about in this specific case. In
the case of the State of the Union address from the '02 NIE, can you
show me another assertion the President made that didn't rise to the
level of a key judgment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not capable of
memorizing the whole NIE here today for you, Wendell. But I'm more
than happy to look into that for you.

QUESTION: The administration has acknowledged a mistake was
made. Can you tell me precisely what the mistake was? Was the mistake
based on the facts of the judgment? Or was the mistake simply the
fact that we included British intelligence in the State of the Union
speech? What was the error that was made, so I'm clear?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that -- what we've
said, of course, if we had the benefit of hindsight and we know today
what we knew then, it's a combination of the forged documents; it's
an element of the overall case on reconstitution. But, obviously, if
you're writing a speech, at the juncture we were in when we were
talking, why would you put something that was not core to your
central argument if there was -- if you knew there was forged
document and a critic could hold that up, you wouldn't put that in a
speech. It wouldn't make sense to put that in a speech.

There's other information and there's -- obviously, as this has
been reported and as Director Tenet has told in his statement, that
they had concerns that were given to the British the year prior; that
information was not shared with the White House. Those types of
judgments that -- where the process where he said broke down, did not
rise -- but the important part is that, you're right, the overall
case is one that has yet to be determined. As Prime Minister Blair
said last night, he's very convinced of his case.

But when you're talking about a presidential address and you're
talking about -- knowing that there are going to be critics of what
the President's policy decision will be, is that they would attempt
to use any discredited information to try to bring down the entire
case -- of course, we would not put information in the President's
speech that we knowingly knew that was suspect or that was
deliberately forged. That just doesn't make sense from a standpoint
of constructing the speech for the President.

QUESTION: The White House, itself, knew about some of those
forged documents related to this case prior to the speech, didn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we did not.

QUESTION: Did not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

QUESTION: The motive for laying off on the British
intelligence, this claim that he was trying to get uranium in Africa,
was, according to you, to provide a public source for that claim
which you were trying to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where we could.

QUESTION: -- where you could. In doing so -- two things --
didn't you first lead the American public to believe that our
government was certain of that claim? And you left out this rich
disagreement -- "extremely dubious," the State Department
says -- so that the President left out something that our government
was still arguing about, and left the impression, by laying it off on
the public source British intelligence, that the American government
was foursquare behind that. Isn't that misleading people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all. Because as I've
said, as I've stated here in the NIE that there was information that
was similar to what the British government was reporting. The
specific cases as outlined in the NIE reflect that three different
countries in Africa, that he was seeking it. It did not say that a
transaction had taken place, that it had been completed, but this
information was this type of ingredients were being sought by the
Iraqis.

And the British government is a very respected intelligence
agency; that information they had, as I said, was public. We thought
it was important that the public be able to, when possible, that we
could share with them public documents that would illuminate the case
and show why we made certain judgments. The U.N. was cited and
various -- the IAEA, when possible, we could do that.

But the information, itself, if there were overall concerns about
the general statement of seeking uranium in Africa, the fact-checkers
and the way that process worked -- but we have to rely upon the
documents we have at the time and the clearance process that was in
place. And that's what we did.

QUESTION: But there were overall concerns about significant
--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To take that question,
Terry, there are six -- the way the NIE works is that there are six
agencies -- and there's a lot of other agencies that funnel through
that, like, all the services have their agencies -- that work to put
together this document. And in this they make a conclusion. Yes,
there is a footnote. I'm not sure -- if you use that as your test, as
your standard, then any decision the President has made, he has to
disclose every dissent: the President today put forward a $20 billion
tax cut. I'm here to tell you today that one of my advisors thought
it should only be $18 billion. That's not the way it works.

But the question of the matter is, the question of the matter is,
as you go through this information and as you look at the overall
underlying case about reconstituting nuclear program, the President
made that judgment. The policymakers who have to look at this
information made the judgment. We had misplaced predictions -- I
almost said "misunderestimate" -- we underestimated the
nuclear program in 1991. Policymakers have to look at information,
particularly in a post-9/11 world, and make policy judgments. That's
what the President did. That's what the President took, obviously,
responsibility for last night. He makes the decisions based on when
to commit troops. It's a clear and compelling case in what he based
that upon.

And as you see in here, that many of the agencies in the analysis
-- because the NIE, at the end of the day, they allow a footnote
process, but they put in the document, in black and white, what the
majority of the agencies believe.

Tamara -- everybody is going to get three questions?

QUESTION: Dealing with the tubes thing fits into this. His
judgment, as the chief policymaker, based on his perception of the
threat, in his State of the Union speech was to leave out for the
American people the dissent on getting uranium from Africa and on the
use of the aluminum tubes, and stand up there and present the most
alarming case possible about Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Isn't
that what he did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you saw, Secretary
Powell went into a lot of detail about the aluminum tubes in his
presentation to the U.N. Security Council, which was pivotal to the
vote that they may or may not have been casting. I think we were very
forthright. The public dialogue that was taking place on the issue of
aluminum tubes was very clear.

QUESTION: Am I right in sort of understanding that you all
are saying that this uranium Africa statement or fact is not central
to the reconstitution efforts? And then, if so, then did the
speechwriters just get the whole NIE and say, pick what you want out
of it? Or were they given specific building blocks or data points or
talking points by the NSC or the CIA or State Department or somebody
else, one of which was this Africa uranium point to include?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They get their fact points
from various -- from prior speeches, from public documents, from
classified documents. It's a wide range of information. Again, this
was one data point that was --

QUESTION: From who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the NIE, as we said.

QUESTION: So it was just taken out of the NIE, it was not a
particular person or a particular --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was based on the NIE.

QUESTION: So can you tell us who pulled it out of the NIE?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot.

QUESTION: -- go back to the vetting process for a minute.
First of all, was the conversation that Bob Joseph had with the CIA
in that 24-hour window before the President delivered the speech the
only consultation that took place between the White House and the CIA
about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About that section?

QUESTION: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the only one I'm
aware of.

QUESTION: And during those discussions was there any
mention of the fact that the CIA the previous September had raised
concerns with the British government about their including the Africa
uranium thing in their public documents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not according to Bob
Joseph.

QUESTION: Director Tenet, in his statement on Friday night,
implied that -- or said pretty straightforwardly that some of the
language was changed, was the phrase that he used, presumably in
response to concerns raised by the CIA. Your account of this makes it
seem that you had made the changes based on your desire to make the
wording more credible and clear, and that, in fact, there was no
change made in response to the concerns raised by the CIA.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, the decision was, in
a series of assertions, we changed those assertions into citations of
sources. And in so doing, there was a decision made. We had a choice
between highly-classified material or the British document. The
choice was made, the British document. And that was signed off on by
the CIA.

QUESTION: But you made it prior to them -- in other words,
you didn't do it because they asked you to.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of -- this is
the way that we believe the process went forward, at least from how
this language was changed internally here in the White House.

QUESTION: So there were no changes made after you spoke to
the CIA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, my understanding is
that they cleared the British language. What is not -- the perception
is out there that there was a protracted negotiation, and that's just
not the case.

QUESTION: Can I ask -- just for the record, can we ask
about the protracted negotiation -- according to multiple sources,
what Foley said in his testimony is, Joseph had provided him with an
excerpt from a draft of the speech at which Foley detailed reports of
Iraq receiving 500 tons of uranium from Niger. Foley said he called
Joseph back, telling him the information was not solid enough and
could jeopardize sources. Joseph then mentioned the sources, and
said, the British had published an unclassified dossier and mentioned
reports of Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium. And then Foley tried to
discourage Joseph from referencing the report, because the CIA had
suggested to the British earlier that it wasn't right to do that. And
then they agreed that it would be technically accurate to cite the
British reports.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was a citation of a
classified briefing, given by interpretation of events by people who
participated in that briefing. As we said last night, and we'll say
today, that is not the recollection of the transpiring events,
because I just read to you that every draft of the speech did not
have the specific concerns.

Now, was the account that was being made there similar to the
issue earlier about Cincinnati? Very close, because that was the
talking about specific amounts that was used. I can say to you that
in every draft of the speech that we reviewed and that was written,
there was no specificity to the amount or the specific country.

QUESTION: The State of the Union speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Correct.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that, real quick? This
obviously has raised all kinds of questions, particularly from
Democrats, as we heard yesterday. And now Pat Roberts is saying that
perhaps he wants to talk to some White House officials to set the
record straight. Do you think that you're going to participate there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as we said all along
-- the CIA Director spent four-and-a-half hours testifying before the
Intelligence Committee. All the information, the NIE, all this
information has been provided to the intelligence committees a long
time ago. We will continue to work with committees, and make sure
they understand what we understand. But as you know, and as everybody
in this room knows, going back to the Tom Ridge days of testimony by
White House staff, that's something that we do not do. But we will
continue to work with committees and make sure they have the
information. I'm not going to, here, pose hypothetical questions
about who would or who wouldn't. We will obviously work, as we have
been, with the committees to attempt best we can to answer their
questions.

QUESTION: One of the assertions that was made at the time
and one of the reasons that you're coming under fire is because it
was perceived that the President was making his best case for a war
against Iraq by citing Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
In his comments yesterday and in yours today, there seems to be much
less emphasis on that and more on the global picture of ridding the
world of someone who was dangerous in the wake of 9/11, who might
conceivably do these things. Are you backing away from the WMD
stance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The title of the document
I've just given you, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction. As the President did last night and as we continue to
do, there's a compelling, comprehensive case of the WMD program. And
as the President said last night, time will prove that right.

QUESTION: Did you proceed with that, as Wolfowitz suggested
in a print interview not too long ago, because it was the best
argument you could make, the most effective in turning public
opinion, even though there were other reasons to desire war with
Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President laid out the
case which motivated his decisions, and that was a clear and
compelling case that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the American
people, a threat to the people in the region, a threat to his own
people. And that's what he based his decision on.

QUESTION: Were you the senior staffer involved in the
coordination for the preparation of the speech? In other words, were
you in charge of the speech operation here?

QUESTION: And what role, if any, did Karen Hughes play in
this? We know that she was involved --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: She plays an important role
in speechwriting process. She continues to be, thankfully, an advisor
to the President, and contributes on speeches and in other formats,
and she contributed heavily to the State of the Union address. So she
was very much involved, as well.

QUESTION: And who -- one more question. Who decided that
you were going to attribute these various bullet points? Was that you
or was that a collective staff decision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's what I was
saying. We don't make those decisions; that the speechwriters are
given these facts -- we don't sit there and say, use this, don't use
that.

QUESTION: You changed the wording from, we believe, to
attribution. Who said, change it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was a group
discussion. I'm not going to go into naming specific people, but it
was a group discussion.

QUESTION: Were you involved in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

QUESTION: When did the President read this NIE?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. The President
has been briefed on more than -- countless conversations with his
national -- with intelligence community about the contents of the
NIE. I don't think he sat down over a long weekend and read every
word of it. But he's familiar, intimately familiar with the case
because he based his decisions on the case that is both included in
this and information that probably was not included in this.

QUESTION: So this would have been read, presumably, by the
National Security Advisor, and then she would have briefed the
President on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, we have experts who
work for the National Security Advisor who would know this
information, who understand this information. He relies upon his
administration, the CIA, themselves, as well, to give their best
judgments. And that's what took place.

QUESTION: Can you square the one circle? Last week, the
National Security Advisor told us that neither she, nor the President
were aware of any concerns about the quality of the intelligence
underlying this allegation. Given that it is a footnote, it's one of
six opinions, but the fact that in this NIE there is expressed
concern that this is of dubious quality, how is it possible that the
National Security Advisor and the President would not have been aware
of those reservations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They did not read footnotes
in a 90-page document. I think that what's clear is that what the
President and what policymakers are looking at is the case for
reconstitution of the WMD program. In this case, the specific
reconstitution of a nuclear program. The President was briefed on
that on countless occasions about what he's attempting. He spoke
directly to it, that we can't take the chance that he's not further
along than we anticipated, much like it was a decade ago. The
National Security Advisor has people that does that.

But again, it gets back to the crux. The NIE does have footnotes.
But the NIE is still the standard in which is used to make judgments
-- not the footnotes, but what there was a majority opinion on.

QUESTION: Was the White House aware of the Wilson report
that basically debunked the -- was it Wilson?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Debunked what?

QUESTION: Yeah -- that came back and debunked -- a memo was
supposed to be circulated to the White House and various other
establishments in which he said that there was no evidence. I'm just
trying to figure out how there could be so much doubt about this
everywhere except the White House --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's important to
understand exactly what you're referring to. This was not a memo from
Wilson, it was an unidentified person in a summary cable, classified
cable that went out to many people. And within that cable was a
summary of a meeting that took place with a former Nigerian
government official. This is all in George Tenet's statement, as
well, much of it is. This was not aware -- my understanding was that
this conversation was not informed of the highest levels of the CIA.
It was not at the request of or in the knowledge of people here at
the White House.

The information came back saying that a government official denied
a transaction with Iraq. It's not too surprising that somebody might
deny something like that. Secondly, in that document what it did say
was that the person that we later learned out to be Ambassador Wilson
said was that the person acknowledged that the meeting took place,
and that he thought the meeting was about yellow cake, which confirms
what is being said, which is "they're seeking." It didn't
say there was a transaction. We never said there was a transaction.
Said they were seeking it.

So if you get this one data point and you look at that, you can't
draw a conclusion that we were warned by Ambassador Wilson that this
was all dubious. It's just not accurate.

QUESTION: A couple technical questions. Can you just first
run down the six agencies that make up this? Do you know offhand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will. CIA; DIA; INR,
which is the State Department; the Department of Energy; the NSA; and
NIMA -- National Imagery and Mapping.

QUESTION: Second point of clarification. Back to the
October discussion over the specificity, where the CIA Director said
to drop the reference because of the specificity. Why at that time
was the whole reference scrubbed, instead of just the specificity?
Why at that time -- I mean, did the Director at that time suggest --
was he focusing only on the specific 500 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only speak to why he
decided to move it out. There could be a whole reasons of words, of
what we want to do, how much time and space -- there's a lot of
variables in there I just can't answer why there was not a different
variation provided there. He said this was too specific, and we
removed it for that reason.

QUESTION: My final question has to do then with all of this
stuff. I'm curious why this hasn't been validated, almost three
months since the United States has been occupying Iraq, given the
number of now senior former Iraqi officials we have in custody. Why
hasn't -- all these are pretty big allegations we've heard before now
seeing before us. Where's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President addressed
that last night. There is a team that's led by David Kay that is
doing a thorough investigation of the weapons program, Saddam
Hussein's. There are many people who do have to be interviewed. There
are, as he described, over seven miles worth of documents that must
be analyzed. And one thing we do know is that the regime was very
sophisticated over a decade of defying the entire world and hiding
from the entire world their weapons of mass destruction program. But
that does not take away the fact that the President doesn't believe
that it will be proved true in the days ahead.

QUESTION: In here, the British intelligence upon which the
16 words were based is just this one bullet point, or is there any
other British intelligence -- where it says, the foreign government
service reported -- is that the only --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they had additional
information.

QUESTION: They had additional --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

QUESTION: And Dr. Rice, also on Friday last week, suggested
that, in a conversation about the 16 words, said that there were two
accommodations made by the CIA, one about amount, and one about
countries. Is that now not true? Or was she talking about Cincinnati
--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think she was talking
about Cincinnati. And I think Ari went back and --

QUESTION: -- talking about Cincinnati.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ari went back and clarified
that for the record later, that in her mind she was thinking
Cincinnati. Because that is not the case for the State of the Union.
I think they have clarified that record.

QUESTION: Does the U.S. have any idea of who forged these
documents or what their motivation would be? What's the origin of
these documents that we've been referring to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that
question. I'd have to refer you to the Central Intelligence Agency. I
don't know the answer to that question, of why they -- the
motivations behind forgery.

QUESTION: Do we know who forged them? I mean, they must --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's being looked
at right now, but I do not know the answer to that question.

QUESTION: Two questions, if I may. The first about, you
keep calling this a footnote, by the way, and this paper does say
"annex." This is an annex, right, where the INR alternate
view is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

QUESTION: The words "highly dubious," that's the
State Department's intelligence arm saying "highly dubious."
Is the President comfortable about making assertions that the State
Department thinks are highly dubious?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President was
comfortable at the time, based on the information that was provided
in his speech. The President of the United States is not a
fact-checker.

QUESTION: No, the State Department is saying "highly
dubious." So he didn't know at that time when he was making the
speech that the State Department thought it was highly dubious?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The NIE took that into
consideration. The CIA processed -- the process that's followed by
all six intelligence agencies, and they came to that conclusion.

QUESTION: Do you know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that
question.

QUESTION: You don't know whether the President knew it was
highly dubious, or you do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe he would --

QUESTION: -- said, not at all. So this is the whole lead of
this whole briefing, this "highly dubious." Let's be
absolutely clear. Earlier I thought you were saying, no, we didn't
know --

QUESTION: You're telling me you don't know if -- you can't
tell us for certain whether the President knew that the words "highly
dubious" is what the State Department was calling the 16 words
he was about to say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not know that.

QUESTION: He didn't know there was any problem with it,
right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right, of course. If it's
in his speech -- obviously if he thinks in his speech and prepared
for delivery, that it's all obviously credible to use. That's
obvious.

QUESTION: The point is these words were here in the INR,
which -- and certainly somebody here at the White House knew about
what was in the INR, that's what you're working from. So why did the
President tell us the doubts only surfaced after his speech? That was
wrong, right? Or he misspoke?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't misspoke. The
doubts about the underlying evidence -- but that was a conclusion
made by the NIE. That's not to say that everything has to be
unanimous in a decision-making process. You're saying that the only
thing that could ever be cited is something that is unanimously
concluded, and that's not the case.

QUESTION: I didn't say that, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But that's what you're
asserting.

QUESTION: Well, actually, the words "highly dubious"
is a little different from, let's use 20 percent tax cut, or 18
percent. But what I'm getting at, when the President said doubts only
happened after the speech, he was obviously contradicting what we
have in front of us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was specifically
referring to the forged documents.

QUESTION: I believe the Italian government has confirmed, I
believe, that they first received these documents and then passed
them along. So just -- first question. Is the Foreign Government
Service referred to in the NIE the British government or the Italian
government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not in a position to be
able to confirm what they underlined. I would have to refer --

QUESTION: In answer to one of the questions before, you
spoke as though it were the British government.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he asked me, did they
have additional information that was provided in this body of text,
and the answer to that question, in my belief, is, yes, they did. But
I do not know if that's Italian --

QUESTION: -- whether this is the Italians or the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know -- I cannot
confirm the Italian reference.

QUESTION: Secondly, does the President have any concerns
about or asked for an explanation of why the U.S. intelligence
community was not able to tell him or the White House that these
documents were forged, and it wasn't until the IAEA --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the White House is --
and the administration is getting to the bottom of that, of the
documentation of the forged documents. And he will wait for the
conclusions of those.

QUESTION: There's no dispute now that the documents were
forged. It took the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not asked him that
specific question, so I don't know his thinking on that.

QUESTION: But has there been a request for an explanation
from the CIA? How come you don't get -- you, the CIA, don't get the
documents in headquarters until February, and how come you don't tell
us before --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I think those answers
are being found. I'm just saying that I don't know the President's
thoughts on it.

QUESTION: I'm still confused about what the mistake was.
Are you saying that the mistake was entirely in hindsight when you
discovered later the forged documents, or are you saying that there
was a mistake made in the process somewhere that allowed this
information to be released?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Director of
Intelligence has said that. And it's also that -- it's obviously also
in hindsight, as well, what we know about the forged documents.

QUESTION: I know Tenet said it's his fault, but it's his
fault for not catching a mistake that someone else made? Is it
totally his fault, or is it the fault of someone here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think he was saying
-- because his is the agency that verifies intelligence claims, and
that's why he was --

QUESTION: -- but is he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But as I stated from the
outset, every person involved in this process on the way forward is
going to redouble their efforts to make sure something like this
doesn't happen again. Of course, that's going to be the case. But
this is not a point of trying to point fingers or blame. What we're
trying to do is to get to the bottom of this issue, to provide as
much information as we can. The CIA Director said, in this particular
case, that if he would have known that this information was there and
that there were the concerns that were shared with the British
government and those things, that based on all that, he would have
had the information pulled. Also in addition to that is the forged
documents. Of course, if we knew what we knew today then --

QUESTION: But go back to the Cincinnati document, which you
did see, and which you said was wrong, or enough in error that he
thought it shouldn't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not an error. See, we just
had the exact same conversation in the beginning of this. It was not
that it was in error.

QUESTION: But he was concerned enough about it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it was a single
source. He's saying the President shouldn't cite a single source.
That's very different than saying that it was flawed. It's not as if
he had the forged documents, going, this is based on forged
documents, we can't use it.

QUESTION: He said that if he had had a chance to see what
was in the State of the Union address, he would have said, don't say
it, Mr. President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. And I think that
that was based upon --

QUESTION: So it's his fault for someone not showing it to
him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he's saying, it's my
fault because he heads the agency that had to verify it.

QUESTION: -- and accept some responsibility.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we've said here all
along that each person involved in this process is going to redouble
their efforts to make sure this doesn't happen again.

QUESTION: Let me try again. What was the mistake that was
made? If you go back to the day before the State of the Union and
redo this, what would you have not done at that time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think that
Director Tenet has said that had he been more involved in the
process, had these things -- that there were concerns raised directly
from the CIA to the British government last fall about their concerns
about the claim, if those things had been expressed that they had
general concerns -- not just a specific concern about one report
about Niger, but had general concerns about that, which was in
writing in the NIE, which leads reasonable people throughout the
government to believe that this is the understanding of the
government, of the intelligence community -- but what they're saying
is, is that we should have been -- we should have disclosed more
information about that, so that information didn't rise to the level
of a presidential speech.

That's not to say that it's -- time might tell that that is
absolutely true, as Prime Minister Blair said last night. But what is
said, is that if there was this much consternation -- it was not
shared with the appropriate people, but if there was this much
disagreement about it, that needed to be, then in that case,
obviously we wouldn't put it in the speech that the President was
delivering.

QUESTION: Given what you just said, there are a lot of
people on the Hill, Democrats and some Republicans, who say that the
accounts that were given are a little different from what you're
saying, and that things were challenged, were pushed. Are you going
to make people involved available to the Intelligence Committee as
Chairman Roberts --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've just explained to you
the process that was followed. And we will work with the Intelligence
Committee, as we have in the past and as we always do. And if
Chairman Roberts continues to want to learn more information about
this, we're happy to share with him. But we've made our position
clear in the past about testimony, and we haven't changed our
position in that regard.

QUESTION: Is the amount of disagreement and the weakness of
the claim the reason it didn't rise to the level of a key judgment,
if I can ask?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hold on, Wendell.

QUESTION: Does sharing information mean that you will
provide all the back-and-forth --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking a
hypothetical. We're going to work with Chairman Roberts and the
requests he's had. And we will work to try to accommodate him. I
don't know what those requests are because he hasn't made him.

QUESTION: Isn't the amount of disagreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hold on, Wendell.

QUESTION: Given what Tony Blair was saying last night, he's
said on many occasions that he still believes that this information
is genuine, has the White House, has the President thought of asking
Blair or British intelligence what this information is and if, in
fact, he could say, well, actually we didn't make a mistake, anyway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he respects the
bilateral agreement that -- the bilateral agreements that the British
government has and how they develop their intelligence. Obviously,
they have their independent reporting on this. And as they said last
night, he stands by that. The President, as we've said, we chose that
for a State of the Union speech, because there was this information
or things that have come to light, that we wouldn't use it. But,
again, it doesn't take away from the fact that it may not be true.
You don't always put everything that is true in a presidential
speech. And looking back at that, obviously, that is what we said,
that if we knew what we knew today, we wouldn't have done it.

QUESTION: Isn't the reason this didn't rise to the level of
a key judgment because there was so much disagreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

QUESTION: -- and the sources were so weak?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to
that question. I didn't write the NIE judgment, nor was I involved in
the process. What I do know is that it is in the NIE, based on the
judgment of these agencies. There was a dissent. The dissent was
provided. But the majority of the agency, that they said, we --

QUESTION: Does the President want all of the facts -- I
mean, we're talking about a characterization of "highly
dubious." Does the President want all of the facts when he's
making these types of decisions? And again, this is important,
because of the items in the speech that you articulated, you've got
to remember, this debate over attacking Iraq went to imminence of the
threat, and the allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa
spoke more to the possible imminence than the other -- most of the
other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't --

QUESTION: The question is, does the President want all of
the information when he makes decisions to go to war, or is he going
to rely on summary documents and consensus documents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not a -- by far
am I not a nuclear chemist, but my understanding is that yellow cake
is at the front end of the process. It's not -- fissile material is
the part that really gets you to that point, but yellow cake is very
much in the first place. So I don't -- that was not, as I stated, in
the President's speech in Cincinnati. And again, I think it's very
important, because it does show that he says, well, we don't know
exactly, and that's the problem about how close he is to having one.
So I think he's been very forthright in that judgment.

QUESTION: When you talk about what the White House knew and
what the CIA was responsible for knowing, you keep referring to the
fact that this was a footnote, that the fact that the State
Department thought that this information was highly dubious was a
footnote on page 80, whatever --

QUESTION: Eighty-four.

QUESTION: Eighty-four, thank you -- that the President
didn't read and Condi Rice didn't read. And yet the very first
paragraph of the key judgments refers the reader to that alternative
view.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But mostly about -- if you
read the alternative view, it's about aluminum tubes, and then it's
literally the last sentence.

QUESTION: Wouldn't you think that if you were reading this
document that that would make you curious enough to check it out? I
just find it very hard to believe that nobody in the White House
said, wow, there's an alternative view, maybe I should go read that
and see what it says.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not saying that nobody
read the alternative view. I think the INR process has been very much
talked about. But that doesn't take away from what the judgment, the
general judgment by the IA -- I mean, about the NIE. You're right. As
I said --

QUESTION: -- it's like, let's talk about why this is highly
dubious, let's talk about whether this really belongs in a State of
the Union, the most important speech a President gives.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the process is one
that these are facts that are given in the NIE, and it's the process
that is relied upon to make sure that only facts and valid facts get
into a speech. And we've all talked about wanting to redouble our
efforts to make sure that process works better in the future.

QUESTION: Why isn't the President angrier? Why doesn't he
seem more angry that this happened, that he said something that now
the White House says he should not have said? Why shouldn't someone
be held accountable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look, the President
-- he had an explanation of what happened. He preferred that it not
happen, like all of us. There are many people who wish this had not
happened, no more than himself. But he accepts the explanation for
how it happened. He knows that every member of his team is going to
do their very best to make sure it doesn't happen again. Lashing out
in anger right now doesn't change history, it doesn't change what he
did. He's going to focus on the future. He knows they're not going to
make these types of mistakes in the future.

And what's really critical is that as he looks at this, and he
looks at this information, while preferred it not to happen, did it
change his key judgment? Did it change his judgment on the case, not
only broadly, but specifically on the nuclear reconstitution? And to
this day, it has not.

QUESTION: In your characterization of the Cincinnati speech
and the process by which that one line was removed, you quarreled
with the use of the term, "flawed," and you said that
Tenet's objection was that it was a specific, single source. But
wasn't the real problem there that Tenet didn't believe that source
was right and had already raised --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not my
understanding, that it was in citing a single source.

QUESTION: But if he thought that source was correct, why
would there have been --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, because he said, for a
presidential speech, we ought to be -- the standard ought to be
higher than just relying upon one source. Oftentimes a lot of these
things that are embodied in this document are based on multiple
sources. And in this case, that was a single source being cited, and
he felt that that was not appropriate. And that's --

QUESTION: So he never felt that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak -- that's my
understanding of his explanation, that at that time, when it was
shared on the Cincinnati speech, it's because it was a single source.

QUESTION: What I still don't understand, though, is that if
the White House knew enough that it had to base this claim on British
intelligence, why isn't it also partly the White House's culpability,
because you must have -- even if you didn't know that a certain
document was a forgery, and so forth, you must have known that there
was some problem; otherwise we'd use good old USA intelligence.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keith, I don't agree with
your premise, because you say we had to rely upon the British
government's report. I walked you through -- we walked through this.
The reason --

QUESTION: You said, that's to make it credible. And you
said, to make it credible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we said, in the case --
when given a choice, if we can cite a public document, obviously we
prefer to cite a public document, because people could then go
analyze it. When you have a choice between a public document and a
highly- classified document, every time I'm going to chose the public
document.

QUESTION: On the question of the President -- he continues
to say that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his nuclear program. If
you throw out the uranium Africa link, if you throw out the aluminum
tubes, what evidence is left, and why does he continue to voice that
claim repeatedly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't thrown out the
aluminum tubes. And as they said here in the NIE, high-strength
aluminum tubes for centrifuges, as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire
magnets, high-speed balancing machines and machine tools are other
parts of that aspect, as well as the part that he was meeting with
and keeping alive his nuclear scientific team, recruiting new
scientists, meeting with them regularly. There's pictures of him
meeting with his nuclear mujahideen, as he called it. There's plenty
of evidence there that led these agencies to believe that he was
reconstituting his nuclear program.

QUESTION: Given the -- your regrets about the enriched
uranium are not just because of forged documents or because there is
a dispute within the government about the validity of the
information, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can refer to Director
Tenet's statement, and that's what he suggests.

QUESTION: That's why it probably shouldn't have been in the
speech. Why should the tubes be in there, given that there were two
elements of our own government, plus the international agency, that
said, this doesn't look like what the President said it is to us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's in the key findings of
the National Intelligence Estimate. And when you get all six
agencies, you take dissent into consideration, you note their
dissent, but there is a majority judgment that's made. It was made in
this case, and that's why it was relied upon.

QUESTION: But going back to the vetting of the speech. When
Mr. Joseph presented it to somebody who I guess we all know is Alan
Foley at the CIA --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that.

QUESTION: Was -- well, Mr. X.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or Mrs.

QUESTION: Did he present it and they said, fine, or was
there any negotiation at all or any objection raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no information about
the conversation between Mr. Wilson and the CIA. What I do know is
that the only information that was passed on to other agencies,
including the White House, was this summary cable, classified cable
that was provided. And I can walk you through the details of it
again, but it stated in that a former Nigerian government official
denied that there was a transaction, but in that he confirmed that
there was an actual meeting in which he believed the Iraqi delegation
was wanting to increase commercial possibilities, and his
interpretation of that meeting was that the seeking of yellow cake.
That's all I know, but I do not know about the conversation between
Ambassador Wilson --

QUESTION: -- Joseph and Mr. Foley and their recollection of
a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What does that have to do
with Wilson?

QUESTION: No, the question is, when the speech was
presented by the NSC to the CIA, did the CIA simply say, fine, or was
there some kind of discussion or negotiation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I got to that
earlier. I said, the recollection of Bob Joseph and others here is
that there was not a protracted negotiation over language, where they
were fighting over words, and saying, well, what about this, what
about that. That just simply didn't happen.

QUESTION: I'm not asking that. I'm asking, was there any
question raised or was it simply, it was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My understanding is that it
was approved.

QUESTION: It was simply he gave it, they checked it off.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My understanding was that
the British government line was changed based on the chronology I
gave you to that, because we wanted to cite a public source, and that
his specific recollection was that that was then approved, that there
was not a sharing of various language or anything like that.

QUESTION: So there was no -- I don't want to be painful
about it, but it's important. There was no objection raised by the
CIA about anything to do with that sentence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's my understanding.
Now, there was in Cincinnati, but not in the State of the Union
process.

QUESTION: Just to follow on that. The earlier drafts, which
you've quoted us, where the locution was, we know that, or, why
hasn't he explained that -- were those run by the CIA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know the answer to
that question. I'll have to find out for you.

QUESTION: So it's possible that the genesis for why --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that is not the -- no,
I told you the genesis of why it was changed. I told you the genesis.

QUESTION: And then, just on another subject. Just a week
later, after the State of the Union, Colin Powell went before the
U.N. and did not use the attempt to buy uranium in Africa. Is it fair
to say that his vetting process was more thorough and he had a higher
standard of credibility for the use of this intelligence in speaking
to the world than the President did in speaking to the American
people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

QUESTION: Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because I think he --
obviously, it was his division that put the footnote in there, so
it's -- INR is his division. I think that he would have persuasion
over it.

QUESTION: Just to clarify the Joseph-perhaps Foley-perhaps
not Foley conversation. They seem to have a very different
recollection of that conversation than the one you just told us,
including the draft language that they claim that they were presented
is different than the draft language you just read us. Is that just a
different recollection, and we have to leave it at that, or what is
your explanation for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't explain what he was
saying. I tried to give a theory from the sense that maybe he was
confusing it with the Cincinnati -- I don't know, but --

QUESTION: Not only Dr. Rice confused with Cincinnati, but
Alan Foley confused with the Cincinnati -- I mean, it's a pretty
specific thing to recall what language you had.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I read specifically
from the drafts of the State of the Union, so I can only go by fact.
And the fact, in black and white in the State of the Union address
and every formation I just gave to you. So that's the fact. And I
can't deny that.

QUESTION: He says that he had a draft that included
different language of the State of the Union. You're saying that that
draft never existed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Two more questions.

QUESTION: Is it possible that he was talking to -- that
Joseph was talking to Foley about the subject matter, but it hadn't
actually made it into the draft, a draft that would actually be
saved? Is that a possibility, that they were negotiating over this
specific --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to his recollection at
all, no.

QUESTION: Just to be clear. When the 16-word line first
made it into the speech in the form that you said, "he has not
explained," that was a speechwriter looking at the NIE and
deciding that that was something he or she wanted to include?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

QUESTION: And you're saying no senior White House officials
gave the speechwriters even any list, any idea of what they wanted to
be included from the NIE?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's my understanding,
that they were going through the -- all the information that was
available to them. There was not a prioritization or anything like
that. And that's how it originally appeared.

QUESTION: Was that an NSC speechwriter? Was that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into
details of specific people, but that's the process that was followed.

Thank you everyone, appreciate it.

QUESTION: What did the CIA know that would have allowed
them to say, don't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, say that again.

QUESTION: If the CIA had actually read the final draft --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right, which some did.

QUESTION: Yes, but apparently then the Director has fallen
on his sword and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Director didn't.

QUESTION: -- and said, I didn't. If he had read it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he said he didn't.

QUESTION: -- what would he have known that would have
caused him to say, better not use this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying, he has
explained it, that because of the concerns that they raised about --
to the British government as part of their claims is the reason why
he wouldn't.

QUESTION: But why the hell didn't the rest of you know it
then? You know, it begs --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bill, the process was
followed. And we rely upon that process. In the future, we're going
to make sure that process is better, because every single person is
going to redouble their efforts to make sure it's a good one.