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Thursday, April 25, 2013

UN Secretary-General On Conflicts In Africa

UN Secretary-General On Conflicts In Africa:
Addressing The Root Causes

By UNIC, Ghana

'Love is a law.'

By: Dedenyo Akadjah

I am pleased to address the Security Council on the important subject of
preventing armed conflicts and addressing their root causes.

Although we are focused today on Africa, there are universal lessons in
conflict prevention that apply everywhere around the world.

Conflicts breed where there is poor governance, human rights abuses and
grievances over the unequal distribution of resources, wealth and power.
Tensions simmer where people are excluded, marginalized and denied meaningful
participation in the political and social life of their countries. Unrest
flourishes where people are poor, jobless and without hope.

To prevent conflicts, we must strengthen democracy, build stronger, more
resilient, accountable State institutions, ensure adequate checks and balances,
promote the rule of law and work to establish effective democratic control over
the armed forces.

Too often, national pride and the self-interest of political actors and
spoilers conspire to undermine prevention efforts.

Issues related to poor governance and the unfulfilled promise of democracy
often lead to conflict. Good governance will be the focus of my report on the
causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable
development in Africa.

Excellencies,

This year, more than 20 African countries hold elections.

The relatively peaceful elections in Kenya were an example of how electoral
disagreements can be handled through the legal process without recourse to
violence.

In other cases, elections can be a source of instability. The parties may
use elections to continue the competition to divide the spoils of war.

That is why it is so important for mediation efforts to ensure that peace
agreements are not just pacts between political elites that address the
immediate political problem – they must also deal with the underlying causes of
conflict and allow all stakeholders to participate.

It is also not enough to reach agreements – they must be fully implemented,
monitored and enforced.

This is clear in the case of the Central African Republic. The violation of
the Libreville Agreements by parties contributed to the resumption of conflict
and, eventually, the unconstitutional change of Government.

The challenges are particularly acute when states are fragile and armed
movements operate with impunity across porous borders – often with support from
neighbouring states.

Whether in the Horn of Africa or the Great Lakes, the continent is still
afflicted by interconnected instabilities spreading from one territory to its
neighbours.

That contagion has many vectors: economic despair, arms flows, massive
population displacements, proxy conflicts triggered by relationships of
mistrust, and regional rivalries.

In our increasingly interconnected world, regional action to prevent or
address conflicts is all the more important.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, national authorities, regional
leaders and the international community are coming together to not only deal
with the manifestations of violence, but also address its underlying root
causes.

I am grateful to the Security Council for endorsing the approach of leaders
of the region. Their Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and
the region emphasizes the need to address the structural causes fuelling
instability in the DRC and commits regional actors to shared responsibilities.
The Council's new mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC is intended
to contribute to efforts for the implementation of the Framework, including
through the deployment of an Intervention Brigade to deal with the problem of
armed groups.

In South Sudan, decades of political and economic marginalization resulted
in organized military and political resistance. The United Nations is committed
to helping this young country – even if we have paid a heavy price. I was
outraged by the attack last week that killed a dozen people, including five
brave peacekeepers. I thank [the] Council for joining me in strongly condemning
that appalling ambush and calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.

Since the independence of South Sudan, Juba and Khartoum have made slow but
steady progress toward the resolution of post-secession issues, including
agreements on border security arrangements, economic relations and oil. But
potential sources of conflict remain, including in particular the unresolved
status of the Abyei Area.

The conflict in Somalia has multiple, complex causes, including competition
for resources and power, a repressive State and the colonial legacy. The crisis
is exacerbated by politicized clan identity, easy access to weapons, the
presence of a large number of unemployed youth, and a culture of impunity
sanctioning the use of violence.

The Federal Government of Somalia has entered a new era of peacebuilding
and statebuilding. But it faces daunting challenges to restore confidence in the
State and the conditions necessary for peace and stability.

I am also concerned about the situation in the Sahel, where countries have
faced decades of complex challenges of poverty, the effects of climate change,
frequent food crises, rapid population growth, poor governance, corruption, the
risk of violent extremism, illicit trafficking and terrorist-related security
threats.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that States of the region have
limited capacity to deliver basic social services and protect human rights.

When State authority and security institutions erode, it becomes more
difficult to manage borders. In Mali, this has paved the way for transnational
criminal organizations and terrorist networks to disrupt regional stability and
compromise territorial integrity.

Severe drought and food insecurity in many countries in the Sahel region,
including in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, have also created conditions for
instability and undermined stabilization efforts.

The United Nations is at a critical juncture in its engagement in
Guinea-Bissau. Following the military coup last year, the United Nations has
continued to promote inclusive dialogue among national actors towards the
restoration of constitutional order.

In all of our efforts across Africa, the United Nations benefits from
reinvigorated regional organizations. They are playing a stronger and strategic
role as key partners.

The prompt reaction of the Economic Community of Central African States to
the crisis in the CAR showed an increased willingness to formulate joint
responses to common problems.

The United Nations is working to strengthen the Southern African
Development Community's conflict prevention and early warning architecture. We
are pursuing our ten-year capacity-building partnership with the African Union.
We are strengthening our close relationship with ECOWAS on peacebuilding and
crisis prevention in West Africa. We are engaging with the African Union, SADC
and the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region in the search for
peace in eastern DRC. And we are partnering with IGAD on the urgent challenge to
bring stability to Somalia.

Above all, it is critical to ensure that the affected communities own and
lead conflict prevention initiatives.

Our support for national governments should focus on building the active
engagement of community organizations, the private sector, civil society, women
and youth in decision making. Their activities can help stabilize communities.

Prevention also demands that we address the culture of impunity surrounding
sexual violence. As my Special Representative on this issue has rightly said,
sexual violence affects more than isolated individuals – it is an assault on the
peace and security of entire communities.

That is why I place such high priority on addressing this destabilizing and
dehumanizing crime. I count on the Council to continue giving priority to
preventing and addressing sexual violence in conflict.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I thank the Security Council for its engagement in
the committed efforts of the United Nations to address the root causes of
conflict in Africa.

Through our comprehensive approach, strong partnerships and principled
action, we can usher in a new era of lasting stability for the continent and its
people.

Thank you.

Sudan and South Sudan Agree on a Number of Banking Issues

The joint technical meetings between the
delegations of the central banks of Sudan and South Sudan produced a number of
important and practical meetings contributing to the realization of economic
stability in Sudan and South Sudan.
The two delegations decided to continue
their meetings in the South Sudan's capital of Juba on April 25.
The
agreements between the central banks of both countries reached in Khartoum
affirm the intent of the leadership of both countries to implement the
cooperation agreements signed in Addis Ababa to serve the populations of Sudan
and South Sudan.
Following the talks in Khartoum, the deputy governor of the
central bank of South Sudan John Door said the joint committee has agreed on
important issues and formed committees to study and review the issues that are
in need of review.
He said: "It was agreed that commercial accounts be opened
in both countries and encourage commercial banks to open mutual accounts to
facilitate international trade, border trade, and commercial transfers."
He
also said that some of the agreements that have been reached deal with assets
and labor compensation and it was also agreed that the Central Bank of Sudan
(CBOS) will supply technical support to the Central Bank of South Sudan.
He
pointed out that subcommittees were formed to study subjects related to monetary
and banking policies, exchange rate, banking monitoring policies, and the right
of commercial banks to open branches in both countries.
These committees, he
confirmed, will start their work as of today, Sunday and will continue their
meetings regularly until they report back to the joint committee on its second
meeting in Juba on April 25.
Door affirmed that the two countries will go on
reaching agreements to implement and fulfill what was agreed upon in Addis Ababa
and pointed out the positive economic effect the agreements will have on the
economies of both countries. He added: "Opening accounts will help provide funds
and foreign currency and facilitate transfers between individuals and
institutions. We will implement what we agreed upon instantly."

Badreldin Mahmoud

He went on to say that the agreements will
realize financial stability in Sudan and South Sudan in such a way as may
contribute to the development process, minimize inflation, and stabilize
exchange rates.
There are 20 banks in South Sudan, he added, 16 national ones
and 4 foreign ones. The transactions between the two countries will be conducted
in a way to be agreed upon later through a formula which will also be agreed
upon later, but for the time being, transactions will be conducted in US
Dollars.
For his part, deputy governor of the CBOS and head of the Sudanese
delegation to the meetings Badr Aldin Mahmoud said the two parties have agreed
on a methodology for the operation of the joint committee and determined the
constants with which to run the meetings, form subcommittees, and report what is
agreed upon, they also determined the topics of importance to both parties
pertaining to joint cooperation between the central banks in both
countries.
He said: "We started practically putting what we agreed upon in
effect regarding the opening of accounts and transactions between the two
central banks. Instant orders will be issued to commercial banks for transfers
and swapping account key information considering that they are handled through
the (switch) system. We also started achieving breakthroughs regarding some of
the outstanding issues from the past period pertinent to the separation of
assets and handing over documents and asset values to South Sudan to enable them
to keep correct accords."
He added that they also agreed on resolving the
issue of labor compensation and to supply technical support to the Central Bank
of South Sudan in the areas needed.
Regarding the way in which Sudanese banks
can operate in South Sudan; Mahmoud said a problem arose pertaining to Islamic
banking system Sudanese banks use and added: "We have discussed the issue and
presented suggestions for the committees to study including operating through
outlets. A suggestion was discussed stating that Sudanese banks can function
based on the participation principle common in the Islamic and traditional
banking sectors in financing operations and the other banking operations;
leaving the issue of interest rate in financing and investment operations as the
only obstacle, but it can be solved through joint formulas or double
outlets."
He pointed out that there are some South Sudanese banks operating
in Sudan such as Ivory Bank and Sudanese banks operating in South Sudan such the
Bank of Khartoum, Qatar Bank, and Abu Dhabi Bank.
He affirmed that
cooperation between the two countries will have positive effects on the
economies of both countries in what regards minimizing inflation, stabilizing
exchange rates, activating commercial exchange, swapping benefits, and
facilitating the movement of capital.
Regarding Sudan's foreign debt; he
clarified that there is an agreement to deal with them where Sudan pays debt
installments for two years while the two parties seek to cancel these debts with
creditors and in case they are not wiped out the two countries will divide the
debts between them according to known basis.
He said the two parties have
agreed to preserve the rights of commercial banks and the rights of individuals
in commercial banks and agreed on payment system from a technical point of
view.
He also affirmed that the two delegations agreed on having joint
foreign correspondents to handle the transactions regarding foreign commercial
processes; especially facilitating the collection of Sudan's oil revenues and
such.
He pointed out that there are issues of special nature for which a
separate body of four members was formed to look into them; saying that there
are issues where the two countries will need the cooperation of international
institutions and the International Monetary Fund.

Khartoum, March 31- The joint technical meetings between the delegations of
the central banks of Sudan and South Sudan produced a number of important and
practical meetings contributing to the realization of economic stability in
Sudan and South Sudan.

The two delegations decided to continue their meetings in the South Sudan's
capital of Juba on April 25.

The agreements between the central banks of both countries reached in
Khartoum affirm the intent of the leadership of both countries to implement the
cooperation agreements signed in Addis Ababa to serve the populations of Sudan
and South Sudan.

Following the talks in Khartoum, the deputy governor of the central bank of
South Sudan John Door said the joint committee has agreed on important issues
and formed committees to study and review the issues that are in need of
review.

He said: "It was agreed that commercial accounts be opened in both
countries and encourage commercial banks to open mutual accounts to facilitate
international trade, border trade, and commercial transfers."

He also said that some of the agreements that have been reached deal with
assets and labor compensation and it was also agreed that the Central Bank of
Sudan (CBOS) will supply technical support to the Central Bank of South
Sudan.

He pointed out that subcommittees were formed to study subjects related to
monetary and banking policies, exchange rate, banking monitoring policies, and
the right of commercial banks to open branches in both countries.

These committees, he confirmed, will start their work as of today, Sunday
and will continue their meetings regularly until they report back to the joint
committee on its second meeting in Juba on April 25.

Door affirmed that the two countries will go on reaching agreements to
implement and fulfill what was agreed upon in Addis Ababa and pointed out the
positive economic effect the agreements will have on the economies of both
countries. He added: "Opening accounts will help provide funds and foreign
currency and facilitate transfers between individuals and institutions. We will
implement what we agreed upon instantly."

He went on to say that the
agreements will realize financial stability in Sudan and South Sudan in such a
way as may contribute to the development process, minimize inflation, and
stabilize exchange rates.

There are 20 banks in South Sudan, he added, 16 national ones and 4 foreign
ones. The transactions between the two countries will be conducted in a way to
be agreed upon later through a formula which will also be agreed upon later, but
for the time being, transactions will be conducted in US Dollars.

For his part, deputy governor of the CBOS and head of the Sudanese
delegation to the meetings Badr Aldin Mahmoud said the two parties have agreed
on a methodology for the operation of the joint committee and determined the
constants with which to run the meetings, form subcommittees, and report what is
agreed upon, they also determined the topics of importance to both parties
pertaining to joint cooperation between the central banks in both
countries.

He said: "We started practically putting what we agreed upon in effect
regarding the opening of accounts and transactions between the two central
banks. Instant orders will be issued to commercial banks for transfers and
swapping account key information considering that they are handled through the
(switch) system. We also started achieving breakthroughs regarding some of the
outstanding issues from the past period pertinent to the separation of assets
and handing over documents and asset values to South Sudan to enable them to
keep correct accords."

He added that they also agreed on resolving the issue of labor compensation
and to supply technical support to the Central Bank of South Sudan in the areas
needed.

Regarding the way in which Sudanese banks can operate in South Sudan;
Mahmoud said a problem arose pertaining to Islamic banking system Sudanese banks
use and added: "We have discussed the issue and presented suggestions for the
committees to study including operating through outlets.

A suggestion was discussed stating that Sudanese banks can function based
on the participation principle common in the Islamic and traditional banking
sectors in financing operations and the other banking operations; leaving the
issue of interest rate in financing and investment operations as the only
obstacle, but it can be solved through joint formulas or double outlets."

He pointed out that there are some South Sudanese banks operating in Sudan
such as Ivory Bank and Sudanese banks operating in South Sudan such the Bank of
Khartoum, Qatar Bank, and Abu Dhabi Bank.

He affirmed that cooperation between the two countries will have positive
effects on the economies of both countries in what regards minimizing inflation,
stabilizing exchange rates, activating commercial exchange, swapping benefits,
and facilitating the movement of capital.

Regarding Sudan's foreign debt; he clarified that there is an agreement to
deal with them where Sudan pays debt installments for two years while the two
parties seek to cancel these debts with creditors and in case they are not wiped
out the two countries will divide the debts between them according to known
basis.

He said the two parties have agreed to preserve the rights of commercial
banks and the rights of individuals in commercial banks and agreed on payment
system from a technical point of view.
He also affirmed that the two
delegations agreed on having joint foreign correspondents to handle the
transactions regarding foreign commercial processes; especially facilitating the
collection of Sudan's oil revenues and such.

He pointed out that there are issues of special nature for which a separate
body of four members was formed to look into them; saying that there are issues
where the two countries will need the cooperation of international institutions
and the International Monetary Fund.

The meeting is expected to enable the two presidents to agree on the best
means and ways of overcoming the challenges encountered in the implementation of
the agreements concluded on Sept.27, 2012 under the auspices of African Union
High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) chaired by former president Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa.

With the summit meeting, the two presidents are expected to find solutions
to the pending issues of the Abyei Area and the border.

Pagan Amum, Chief Negotiator of South Sudan told reporters late on Friday
that the two leaders are in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to discuss and resolve
outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan.

He said they would meet Friday’s night and would continue the talks on
Saturday.

Speaking to the press at Sheraton Hotel, Amum said the two presidents would
meet and discuss final status of Abyei and the border.

The chief negotiator said they would go to international arbitration if
they fail with this summit meeting to resolve the outstanding issues between the
two countries.

Amum also recalled that the AU Peace and Security Council said on the Dec.
14th 2012 that the two leaders would hold the summit to agree on pending
issues.

AU announced in a statement that it looks forward to the outcome of the
meeting between the leaders.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of AU Commission, expressed hope that
the meeting would enable the two Presidents to agree on the best means and ways
of overcoming the challenges encountered in the implementation of the landmark
Agreements in September last year.

The Outstanding Issues Between the Two Sudans: a Way
to Peace or Conflict

Friday 29 June 2012

By Prof. al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin

June 23, 2012 - The civil war between the North and South in the Sudan,
which started in August 1955 before the independence of the country, was the
longest in the history of Africa. The reasons behind the war are complex and
intermingled between external and internal factors. The closed district policy
of the British administration in the Sudan laid the foundation of separating the
two regions for three decades, the missionary propaganda inflamed the feelings
of southerners against the Muslim Arabs of the North, the long military rule in
Khartoum adopted the course of military solution to the southern problem, and
the weak democratic governments did not have the time or the political will to
give the South an acceptable federal system. General al-Bashir, like Nimeiri
before him, was compelled to accept a political solution with the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) based on a
semi-independent federalism and right for self-determination. The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) reached between the two parties, the National Congress
Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A), in January 2005 under the auspices of the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was a result of long
negotiations that dragged on for more than three years in Kenya. The outstanding
issues came to the political arena in Sudan as a result of southern Sudan
referendum and its consequence, the birth of the Republic of South Sudan.

The CPA

The detailed Agreement is divided into six chapters: Machakos Protocol,
Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Abyei Conflict, Southern Kordofan & Blue
Nile, and Security Arrangements. The Machakos Protocol which was signed in July
2002, set the following basic principles: self-determination to the people of
South Sudan through a referendum, right of legislations based on Sharia for the
North, the border of North-South is that of January 1956 as incorporated in the
Declaration of Principles adopted by the IGAD, and an interim period of six
years before the referendum. The Power Sharing gave the South a semi-independent
rule, the allocation of seats in the national assembly before the elections was
divided as follows: 52% of the seats to the NCP, 28% to the SPLM, 14% to other
northern parties, 6% to other southern parties. In the national executive the
incumbent president shall continue while the chairman of the SPLM becomes the
first vice-president. The offices of the national executive will be divided in
the same ratio as that of the national assembly. In the legislature of southern
Sudan, the SPLM shall be represented by 70%, the NCP by 15% and other southern
political forces by 15%; the executive in the South shall be divided in the same
way as that of the legislature. The state legislatures (15 in the North and 10
in the South) shall be comprised as follows: the NCP is to hold 70% in the
northern states and 10% in the South, the SPLM will take 70% in the southern
states and 10% in the North, the other political forces in the North and South
shall divide the remaining 20% among themselves. The state executive in the
North and in the South shall be divided among the political parties in the same
way as the state legislature.

However, the arrangement for Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is
different; for Abyei its executive council is shared by the two parties to the
CPA and appointed by the presidency, which is comprised of the president and his
two deputies. In the case of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the legislature and
the executive is divided only between the two partners, 55% for NCP and 45% for
SPLM. The three regions were given some form of self-autonomy and promised
financial assistance enabling them to reconstruct their damaged infrastructure,
as war affected zones. A special commission is established to define the
boundaries of the disputed Abyei which was transferred by the British
administration to Kordofan in 1905, it is called Abyei Boundaries Commission
(ABC). Another commission is to be formed by the presidency to conduct a
referendum among the residents of Abyei to decide whether they want to retain
their special status in the North or be part of Bahr el Ghazal in the South. The
two other northern states were granted the right for “popular consultation” to
give their opinions, through the elected legislative assemblies, on their status
as agreed in the CPA and how it is implemented in the interim period.

The wealth sharing is as follows:
1. The net
oil revenue extracted from wells in southern Sudan (75% of Sudan oil is located
in southern Sudan) shall be divided equally between the government of southern
Sudan (GoSS) and the national government (50% to each), after giving out 2% to
the region in which the oil is produced.
2. The
national government, the government in the South and state governments are
entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes as listed in the CPA.
The security arrangements allowed the two armies,
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA, to continue as separate forces, the first
will be deployed in the North and the second in the South. That was a big
concession to the SPLM, which allowed it later to go smoothly for secession. A
Joint Integrated Units (39000 soldiers) will be formed from SAF and SPLA and be
stationed in the South, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum. A Joint
Defense Board (JDB) under the supervision of the presidency shall command the
integrated units. The provisions and principles governing the ceasefire,
disengagement and redeployment are written in meticulous details.
The international community hailed the agreement as a
model of peaceful resolution to the longest conflict in Africa, the signing
ceremony was witnessed and signed by the presidents of Kenya and Uganda, and
senior representatives from Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom,
United States of America, African Union, European Union, IGAD partners, Arab
League and United Nations. It was an impressive occasion that took place in the
national stadium of Nairobi on the 9th of January, 2005.

Implementation of the CPA

The real challenge to the CPA was its implementation in a serious and
honest way, that maintain the spirit of cooperation which marked the long
negotiating process that led to the conclusion of the agreement. The challenge
proved to be difficult and sensitive because of the following obstacles: the
lack of trust between the two partners specially after the sudden demise of John
Garang de Mabior the chairman of SPLM/A, the economic difficulties which faced
the government of Sudan after the loss of half of the oil revenue coming from
the South, in addition to the failure of the international community to fulfill
its financial promises to the government. The American sanctions against the
North put more pressure on the economy; the support given by each government to
opposition groups against the other eroded the trust between the two partners.
The limited clashes between the armies of both governments in Abyei and Malakal,
showed a growing hostility between the two parties which incited small extreme
groups within both governments to advocate confrontation. The relationship
between the two partners during the interim period was mostly tense, suspicious
and quarrelsome. The issues of Abyei boundary, its referendum commission, the
delimitation of border between North and South, the population census, the
actual oil revenue, the referendum laws for the South and Abyei etc.. were all
questions of disagreement and dispute between the NCP and the SPLM which under
frustration withdrew for some months from the Government of National Unity
(GoNU) and parliament. As a matter of fact the SPLM acted during the interim
period as an opposition party to the NCP rather than a partner, allying itself
most of the time with the opposition parties in the North. However, the major
steps in the CPA were completed although late than envisioned in the agreement:
the power sharing in the federal and regional governments, the withdrawal of SAF
from the South, a partial withdrawal of SPLA from the North, the equal sharing
of the southern oil revenue, the passing of the referendum laws, the mid-term
election and the implementation of the referendum on self-determination for the
South and the acceptance of its harsh secession outcome. However, some important
issues which should have been dealt with during the interim period were not
settled, they were shifted to after the referendum. The postponement of settling
important issues like Abyei, oil, the North-South border and nationality, caused
many problems to individual citizens in the other state, pastoralists,
cross-border traders and economic difficulties to both governments which
threaten peace and security in the country. The GoSS insisted on having the
referendum of the South on time at any cost, the western powers supported that
position and put much pressure on Khartoum to accept the demand irrespective of
its serious consequences. The crisis between the two parties at present is a
logical outcome of the hurried way, the implementation of the CPA was
completed.

A strong criticism is directed by many political observers and analysts to
the CPA, that it was a convenient settlement between two armed groups who were
fed up with fighting, those who hoped for real change in the governance of the
whole country were disappointed. Many sympathizers and supporters of the SPLM in
the North were frustrated that the liberation movement, which called for a ‘new
Sudan’ and promised to work for the unity of the country, easily opted for
secession. The SPLM leadership did not show much interest in the affairs of the
North nor in the system of good governance. The First Vice-President, Salva Kiir
Mayardit, was absent from his office in the Republican Palace in Khartoum most
of the time. The objectives of ‘democratic transformation’, ‘the bill of
rights’, the freedom of expression and association, all enshrined in the CPA and
in the transitional constitution were not respected by either government in its
domain. The whole exercise of the CPA looked like a division of power between
the two armed groups, the NCP continued its grip on the North while the SPLM
took its share of power in the South.

Nevertheless, the CPA brought a long-waited peace in the country and had in
its first few years many defenders. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission
(AEC), established by the CPA to monitor the implementation, said in its final
report: “ It has been a unique experiment in peace-building, of unprecedented
scale and complexity. Some of the outcomes could not have been clearly foreseen
when the Agreement was drafted. Lessons can and should be learnt from the
problems that arose. But the overall achievement of the CPA as described in this
and earlier AEC reports remain something that Sudanese, north and south, can
view with pride – not least the act of self-determination, promptly accepted by
all, which has brought a new member into the community of nations.” Although the
government of Sudan was disappointed at the outcome of the referendum, President
al-Bashir attended the celebration ceremony of the independence of the Republic
of South Sudan on the 9th of July 2011 in Juba, and addressed the crowd, saying
that the will of the people of the South has to be respected and promised full
cooperation with the new state.

The Outstanding Issues

The Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009, passed by the National Assembly on
31st December 2009, stated under article (67) some substantive issues that would
be negotiated by the two parties to the CPA, and witnessed by the organizations
and countries signatories to the CPA. They were left over from the interim
period, during which they should have been negotiated and settled. It is
possible that the GoSS wanted to discuss these issues as an independent country
instead of a junior partner to the hawkish Inqaz regime. The issues are the
following:
a) Nationality;
b) Currency;
c) Public
service;
d) Position of Joint Integrated Units,
national security and intelligence;
e)
International agreements and covenants;
f) Assets
and debts;
g) Oil fields, production, transport and
export of oil;
h) Contracts and environment in oil
fields;
i) Water;
j)
Property;
k) Any other issues to be agreed upon by
the two parties.

There are other issues which are part of the CPA but were not settled
before the secession and thus have to be negotiated later: Abyei question, the
North-South border, security arrangements, and popular consultation in the Blue
Nile and Southern Kordofan states.

The first meeting between the two parties (NCP & SPLM) to discuss the
outstanding issues took place in Mekelle of Ethiopia from 21st to 22nd June
2010. It was a successful meeting, the two parties signed a MoU containing the
following points: that the negotiations will be conducted by a joint team of six
members from each party. The African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP)
chaired by Thabo Mbeki shall be the facilitator, supported by IGAD, the UN and
IGAD partners. The negotiations shall be supported by a full time joint
technical secretariat of six members that coordinate and liaise with AEC which
will provide administrative support. The parties agreed to cluster the
negotiations into four working groups to address the issues as follows:
citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; international
treaties and legal issues. The substantive negotiations on these issues should
commence on 19th July in Juba. It was a promising start for a difficult and
complex job.

Another important meeting was convened later, in November 2010 by AUHIP in
Khartoum, for the two parties (NCP& SPLM) to negotiate a framework document
relating to the implementation of the various outstanding issues. The parties
committed themselves to work for the successful conduct of the southern Sudan
referendum and pledged to respect its outcome. They agreed to continue
negotiating the future of Abyei at the highest level; to hold the popular
consultation in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and respect its outcome; to
demarcate immediately the North-South border; to maintain ‘soft border’ allowing
peoples movement, economic activity and social interaction. They accepted that
decisions taken on citizenship will not adversely affect the rights and
well-being of ordinary people. In this context, the two parties agreed to adopt
the policy of the free movement of people, goods and services, monetary and
fiscal policy, the management of oil and water resources. On the question of
security, the parties undertook that neither would take any action, or support
any group that would undermine the security of the other. They recognized that
each post-secession state would conduct its foreign policy mindful of the need
to achieve the objective of two viable states which, would cooperate for mutual
benefit. The Panel was greatly encouraged by the determination of the parties to
address the challenges ahead through peaceful negotiations. However, things did
not go as smooth as agreed upon, especially after the result of the referendum
showed that the overwhelming majority of southerners wanted secession from the
old Sudan.

1. Obstacles on the way: an important change in the attitude of the
government of Sudan came after secession became a reality on the 9th of July
2011, it drew harsh criticism from the northern opposition and political
analysts to the government’s handling of the CPA and its consequences. The
agreement which the government considered as its greatest achievement in the
political history of the Sudan turned to be its worst liability in the eyes of
the Sudanese political elite. It resulted not only in the loss of one-third of
the country, but also of about 40% of the government annual revenue and almost
90% of its foreign currency that used to come from the oil extracted in southern
Sudan. The government reacted in an emotional way by dismissing the southern
members of parliament after the declaration of the result of the referendum;
even workers, civil servants, soldiers and army officers from southern Sudan
were summarily sacked from their jobs before the end of the interim period. The
joint integrated units were dissolved untimely before the 9th of July, which
partly contributed to the eruption of conflict in southern Kordofan. Strong
statements by government officials and media campaign against the presence of
southerners in the North created fear among numerous southerners who no longer
felt secure, could not find means of transport to the South and could not keep
their jobs in the North. The armed forces invaded the whole of Abyei region in
May 2011 after one of their withdrawing units was attacked by the army of the
South, despite the fact that the unit was accompanied by UN officials and using
UN cars. It was an example of undisciplined soldiers deciding the course of
engagement on their own, which caused real damage to the precarious relationship
between the two countries. The flare up of conflict between Sudan Armed Forces
and the SPLA-North in southern Kordofan in early June 2011, and later in
September in Blue Nile was a serious development that worsened the relationship
between the GoS and the GoSS to a new low level. The GoS accused GoSS by
encouraging and supporting the rebellion in the two states. The southern army
should not have been in the North long time ago, and the northern units in that
army should have been disarmed and demobilized. Lack of progress on the oil
issue, led the GoSS to close the oil fields in the South in February 2011
accusing the government of Sudan by ‘stealing’ two shipments of its oil. The
government defended its action by saying that it did not receive any payment for
its facilities and transport of oil since the secession on 9th July; thus what
it seized is what it deserves for its services in the last seven months.
However, the quick attack on Heglig by southern soldiers in the last week of
March 2012, and later on 10th April by several SPLA divisions planned on the
highest military command was the most serious violation of the CPA. It could
have led to an outright war between the two countries, thanks to the
international community which intervened quickly condemning the aggression and
putting pressure on the GoSS to withdraw its troops, which it did. The Sudan
Armed Forces felt humiliated, thus attacked the withdrawing army to avenge its
early defeat. As a consequence of Heglig attack, Sudan closed its border with
the South preventing all forms of trade and transport. The serious event led to
the intervention of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU),
on a complaint from Khartoum, which adopted, on 24th of April 2012, a
comprehensive decision on the situation between the Republic of Sudan and the
Republic of South Sudan. Later, the UN Security Council passed a detailed
Resolution 2046 (2012) on 5th May supporting the PSCAU decision on the matter.
The Heglig event may be a blessing in disguise!

2. The contents of the PSCAU decision: The Council condemns the violations
of human rights of non-combatants, the damage of oil installations, the
inflammatory statements from both sides and the threat of hostile action. It
reaffirms its commitment to respect the territorial integrity of Sudan and South
Sudan and the inviolability of their border as existed at the time on
independence on 1 January 1956; taking into account the disputed areas as agreed
in the deliberations of the Technical ad hoc Boundary Committee. It expressed
deep concern at the failure of the parties to implement agreements that they
have freely entered into, particularly the Temporary Arrangements for the
Administration and Security of Abyei (20/6/2011), the Joint Political and
Security Mechanism (JPSM) (29/6/2011), the Border Monitoring Support Mission
(30/7/2011), and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Non-Aggression and
Cooperation (10/2/2012). Then the Council adopted a roadmap in order to ease the
current tension and facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession
relations. It included: the immediate cessation of all hostilities within 48
hours; the unconditional withdrawal of all armed forces to their side of the
border; the activation within a week of all border security mechanisms agreed
upon; cessation of harbouring or supporting rebel groups against the other
state; cessation of hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements in the media;
the two governments must take full responsibility for the protection of each
other’s nationals; implementation of pending aspects of Abyei agreement namely
the redeployment, within two weeks, of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces
out of Abyei; the two parties should unconditionally resume negotiations within
two weeks, under the auspices of the AUHIP, to reach agreement on: oil, status
of nationals in the other country, border disputes, and status of Abyei. The
negotiations should be concluded within three months, otherwise the High Panel
should submit a comprehensive report on the status of negotiations, which
includes detailed proposals on all outstanding issues, to be endorsed as final
and binding solutions to the post-secession relations. The Council sought the
endorsement of the UN Security Council of the same, which it did on the 5th of
May. The Council urged the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North to reach a
political negotiated solution on the basis of the Framework Agreement on
Political Partnership between the NCP and SPLM-N, and Political and Security
Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states (28/6/2011). Both parties
should extend full cooperation to the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD to reach a
settlement. It requested the government to permit humanitarian access to the
affected population in the two areas.
The two
governments accepted the PSC decision and started acting upon it: they withdrew
their armed forces from Abyei, and accepted the invitation of AUHIP to a meeting
in Addis Ababa on 29th of May to start the negotiations.

3. Resolved issues: Some of those outstanding issues were resolved as de
facto situation or by a common understanding after the secession on 9th July:
public service, position of the joint integrated units and property. Each
government acted on its own right to decide the future of workers from the other
state within its public service. The majority of those were working in the
North, mainly in the army and police. The government sacked all of them, the
majority got their pensions and after service claims. The joint units in the
South and in Khartoum were easily dissolved before the end of the interim
period, the only problem was that of the northerners from southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile who were part of the SPLA, and who waged a rebellion in the two states
against the government. This problem still exists and shall surely be discussed
in Addis Ababa negotiations as decided by the PSCAU and UNSC. The question of
property was left to concerned individuals who owned plots of land or houses in
the other state; most of the southerners in the North sold their property in a
private way while the northerners in the South were not in a hurry to do that.
The three issues were not a topic in the rounds of negotiation after
secession.
On the currency issue, the two parties
agreed before the secession to use the old currency in the new state of South
Sudan for a period of six to nine months, then it would be gradually exchanged
in agreement between the two central banks of both countries. However, each
country was secretly printing a new currency of its own before the fixed period
is over. The Central Bank of Sudan introduced the new currency earlier than
South Sudan, leaving the old currency in the South without value. At present
each country is using its own new currency, but the store of old currency in the
South has to be compensated in one way or another. It was an example of mistrust
and lack of commitment on behalf of the two governments to honour their
agreements.
The issue of international agreements
and covenants was not important, the two parties agreed that the predecessor
state (Sudan) should continue bearing the entity of the old Sudan with all its
international and regional agreements. The successor state (South Sudan) will
make its own new international and regional treaties.

On the assets and debts, the two parties accepted the geographical
principle of dividing the assets according to their location in the country
where they exist, what is in the North will go to the North and what is in the
South will go to the South. The foreign assets shall go to the predecessor state
which will also bear the responsibility for the foreign debt (about 40 billion
US dollar). It was based on the understanding that the international creditors
will write off all possible debts; the two parties shall work together to
convince the creditors to forgo their debts on the old Sudan. Otherwise the
parties shall share the debts and assets in foreign countries according to the
recognized international standards.

4. Partially resolved issues: Those include nationality, North-South border
and security arrangements.
At the beginning, the
government of the North was strict about giving its nationality or residential
concession to the hundreds of thousands of southerners living in the North,
while the government of the South was ready to do that to a far less number of
northerners in the South. The two parties agreed to give nine months, after
secession, to the nationals of the other country to leave or regularize their
stay according to the laws of the country where they want to stay. The period
expired on the 8th of April 2012, but besides some strong statements in the
media the government of Khartoum did not attempt to enforce the decision against
the over-staying southerners. The government of the South never threatened to
push northerners out, they were only asked to get a residential permit which is
easily given against 100 US dollars. Eventually a breakthrough was reached in
the negotiations at Addis Ababa on the 13th March 2012. The parties agreed to
allow the nationals of the other state to enjoy the freedoms of residence,
movement, economic activity, and ownership of property. A joint high level
committee would be established to oversee the adoption and implementation of the
agreed measures relating to the status and treatment of the nationals of each
state in the territory of the other state. The two states shall negotiate an
agreement to elaborate the four freedoms mentioned above.
On the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary
between the two states, a joint technical committee was established since the
beginning of the interim period to draw the border between North and South as
left by the colonial administration on the 1st January 1956. The process should
have been finished before the referendum of the South took place, but it dragged
on till the secession. The joint committee agreed to about 70% of the border
between the two countries, which consequently the presidency affirmed. According
to the committee only four regions were disputed: 1. Jodah or Dabat al-Fukhar, a
rich mechanized agricultural land between Upper Nile and White Nile; 2. Megenis
Mountains between Upper Nile and South Kordofan; 3. Kaka town which lies between
Upper Nile and South Kordofan, a small piece of land but strategically important
for its access to the Nile and to oil producing areas; 4. Kafia Kinji, a rich
area between South Darfur and Western Bahr al-Ghazal. The delegation of the GoSS
asked JPSM by the end of 2010 to add a fifth area to the disputed ones, Safaha
grazing area which extends 14 kilometers south of Bahr al-Arab, it lies between
South Darfur and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, the presidency accepted the inclusion
of the new area. In the late negotiations of 29th May in Addis, the South
delegation demanded the inclusion of five areas to the disputed regions, that
includes Heglig, Abyei and almost all the oil-producing fields in the North. It
came with a self-made map, including the claimed areas, asking that it should be
considered as the reference map; it was immediately rejected by the Sudanese
delegation. That was a non-starter position which practically led to the failure
of the first round of negotiations after the SC resolution 2046. The High Panel
tried a compromise by proposing a new map, but that was refused by the GoSS
delegation. It seems that the South delegation was seeking a bargaining position
against the North by increasing the number of disputed areas. The GoS accused
the GoSS of avoiding to settle the question of border before secession in order
to take the whole issue to international arbitration, which may rule in its
favour or seek a compromise settlement between the two countries. A complicating
factor to the issue of border is that the two parties, like all African
governments, accepted the territorial boundary as left by the British colonial
administration on the 1st January 1956, but the British left no map on that date
to show the exact border. Moreover, the British administrators used to shift
certain regions, for security or administrative reasons, from one province to
another irrespective of the ethnic group living in that area. This happened in
the cases of Abyei, Heglig, Kafia Kinji, Kaka and others. The GoSS claimed Abyei
not on the basis of its location in January 1956 but on the ethnicity of its
population in 1905, when it was transferred from Bahr al-Ghazal in the South to
Kordofan in the North. However, in the agreement between the two parties on the
demarcation of boundaries, in Addis Ababa on 13 March 2012, the parties affirmed
the definition of the agreed boundary in accordance with the physical
description and delimitation, and corresponding recommendations of the Technical
Committee for the 1/1/1956 border line demarcation between North and South
Sudan, which was affirmed by the presidency of the Republic of the Sudan prior
to the secession of southern Sudan. In the March meeting, the parties also
agreed to establish a Joint Demarcation Committee, a Joint Technical Team, a
Joint Border Commission in order to finalize the question of border between the
two countries. It is strange that in the first round of negotiations at Addis
Ababa (17/5/2012 to 7/6/2012) the border line created much disagreements between
the two delegations. I have the feeling that the real interest of GoSS is to
have Abyei at any cost, thus it might be hoping to swap the disputed areas for
Abyei. It is worth mentioning that all the borders of the old Sudan with its
eight neighbours have never been demarcated and most of them have not yet been
delimited since independence till today!

The question of security was much complicated by the fact that the SPLA
included many units from southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, which fought under the
leadership of southern Sudan for many years till the signing of the CPA. It was
not easy to terminate that comrade relationship after secession, the GoS accused
the SPLA as still supporting and controlling the 9th and 10th army divisions
which started the mutiny in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The GoSS has also
its accusations against the government of Khartoum for supporting rebel army
generals against the elected government of the South. In a number of previous
agreements, since before secession, the parties promised not to threaten the
security of the other state. In the negotiations round of 7th November 2010,
facilitated by the AUHIP in Khartoum, the NCP and the SPLM undertook that
neither would take any action, or support any group, that would undermine the
security of the other. Instead, the North and the South would continue to
cooperate and share information that would enhance their capacity to deal with
internal and external threats as well as trans-border crime. The MoU between the
two parties reached, on 10 February 2012, on non-aggression and cooperation
affirmed similar statements. It clearly said that neither country will harbour,
arm or train militia or other entities against the other. This is why the PSCAU
, in its decision on 24th April 2012, expressed its deep concern at the failure
of the parties to implement agreements that they themselves have freely entered
into. It seems that the real problem is not to find the theoretical solution for
this or that issue, it is the political will to implement in an honest and
serious manner what the parties have agreed upon. That is a question of
political culture rather than a legal position towards a certain issue. It is
understandable that the GoS; being threatened in the regions of Darfur, Southern
Kordofan, Blue Nile and the border with the South, to insist on first discussing
the issue of security arrangements in the last Addis Ababa round. It was agreed
that each army should withdraw 10 km from the border within its territory, the
step has not been implemented because the borderline between the two countries
was not agreed upon.

5. Unresolved issues: They include: popular consultation, Abyei status, oil
and water.
The issue of popular consultation in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile was part of the CPA; the people of the two
states are supposed to give their opinion on the status granted to them in the
CPA and how it was implemented during the interim period. The consultation in
Southern Kordofan never took place because the state election was delayed till
May 2011, then the armed conflict started immediately in the next month. In the
Blue Nile, the process started but was not completed because the state joined
the conflict of Southern Kordofan in September of the same year. An attempt was
made to solve the conflict peacefully by the Framework Agreement on Political
Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N signed by the leaders of the two parties,
Nafi A. Nafi and Malik Agar, in Addis Ababa on 28th June 2011. However, the
leadership of the NCP was quick to reject the agreement allowing the conflict to
drag on till today. The other side sought to broaden the rebellion against the
government, by allying itself with another militia group ‘the Justice and Equity
Movement’ of Darfur under the name of Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The aim
of the new organization is to overthrow the NCP government by political and
military means. The decision of the PSCAU asked GoS and SPLM-N, in cooperation
with AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD, to reach a negotiated settlement for the two
states on the basis of the Framework Agreement mentioned before. The issue of
popular consultation became entangled with the questions of peace, security, the
North-South border, and the wider issue of good governance in all the Sudan.
The Abyei status remains to be the most difficult and
complicated issue, even reaching a temporary arrangement and implementing it
proved to be not possible. The inclusion of Abyei in the CPA was against the
principle of the border according to the January 1956 status; the American
senator John Danforth played an important role in trying to solve the impasse
between the two parties by authoring the problematic and vague protocol of Abyei
as it exists. The first dispute between the two parties was about the area of
Abyei which they took after much wrangling to the PCA in the Hague, the second
was about the person who is eligible to vote in the referendum to decide the
future of Abyei, whether to remain in the North or join the South as SPLM wants.
The SPLM defended the right of Dinka Ngok, being the original residents of the
region, to decide its future; the NCP argued that the protocol defined the
residents of Abyei Area as: “the members of Ngok Dinka community and other
Sudanese residing in the area”, and that allows the Misseriya nomads who live up
to 8 months in the region to take part in the voting. That was unacceptable to
the SPLM, because it simply means that the Misseriya who are the majority in the
area will surely keep it in the North. A number of proposals to solve the
problem were advanced by the American envoy and AUHIP, but none of them got the
approval of both parties. Two serious clashes took place in Abyei between SAF
and SPLA which led to the displacement of the majority of its population. The
AUPSC in its late decision asked for the implementation of the Agreement on
Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, in
particular the redeployment of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of
Abyei. The local administration will be formed from the two communities in the
region under the protection and supervision of the Ethiopian force introduced by
the United Nations (UNISFA).

The issue of oil in the South and the service facilities being in the North
should have been a factor to encourage both poor countries for closer economic
and interdependence relationship. The opposite happened, it became a dividing
factor because of the extreme demands proposed by each party, that eventually
led to the closure of the oil fields in the South pushing the two governments to
go around begging for foreign financial loans or assistance. A number of
proposals were put forward by the AUHIP to bridge the gap between the
exaggerated demand of GoS for its oil facilities and services and the poor offer
given by GoSS, none of them was accepted by both parties. It seems that, each
side wants to break the other thinking that it can not stand the pressure for
long. However, the deadlock cannot continue for a long time because both
governments are in desperate economic position. The World Bank analysis of the
economic and social impact of the shutdown of oil in the South (March 2012),
gives a bleak picture for the economic situation and its repercussions in South
Sudan.

The question of water is puzzling, it is mentioned in the Southern Sudan
Referendum Act as one of the outstanding issues to be negotiated by the two
parties. It has never come up in any of the many rounds of negotiations between
the GoS and GoSS since July 2010. It is GoSS which holds the leverage on the
question of water, because it is not in need of water at present but it has a
legal right to divide with Sudan its share in the Nile water which amounts to
18.5 bqm. It is likely that the government of the South wants to keep this card
under its sleeve to use it at the right moment. The Sudan can hardly afford
sharing this amount of water with the South, unless new sources of water is
developed like the Jonglei canal.

The Way to Peace

It is not in the interest of either party to go to an outright war because
of failure in resolving the outstanding issues; none of them is ready for that
eventuality from a military, economic or political point of view. They showed in
a number of cases that they do not wish to go to a full-fledged war, in the
cases of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Heglig. They may be aware, by now, that
none of them could win by military means to defeat the other and force him to
deliver what he wants. That does not mean they would not continue their
political brinkmanship which, may plunge them into small scale conflicts. As
pragmatists and self-centred politicians, the NCP and SPLM leaders know where to
stop the game before it endangered their fragile regimes. In order to follow the
way to peace, the two sides have to broaden their vision for a long term
strategic relationship because it is to their mutual benefit to do so. The
negotiations on the outstanding issues should be based on that strategic
outlook. The world community should help them to adopt such a broad and long
term vision. Despite the obvious differences between the two countries which
partly led to the painful secession, there are many common features between the
people of the two countries which make them closer to each other than to the
Africans in the south or the Arabs in the north. Besides the social and cultural
linkages, the two countries have vital areas of common interest: oil, Nile
waters, long tradition of cross-border trade and cattle grazing, and rich
agricultural land along the border. The systems of education, civil service,
judiciary, military, police, medical care etc.. are similar; the new-born
country in the South may benefit from the experience and technocrats in the
North in all these areas better than expatriates from other countries. Strange
enough, the two parties recognize this common interest which they mentioned in a
number of their agreements, but when they disagree on something they completely
forget about it and behave like enemies. It may be for internal politics, each
party needs a ‘common enemy’ in order to galvanize popular support behind its
ill-confidant government!
The resolutions of both
PSCAU and UNSC, under chapter 7, will put a tremendous pressure on both
governments to behave themselves and reach agreements on time. It is unlikely
that any of them would dare to oppose the two august bodies headlong; the quick
withdrawal from Heglig and the beginning of negotiations on time in Addis Ababa
prove this assumption. The AUHIP, as usual, was quick to take the lead and
facilitate the negotiations between the two parties in Addis Ababa. This time it
is armed with a comprehensive and detailed resolutions from the PSCAU and UNSC,
under chapter 7, which threatens “any or all of the parties have not complied
with the decisions set forth in this resolution, to take appropriate additional
measures under Article 41 of the Charter as necessary;”. The Sudan, before the
voting on the resolution, was hesitant to accept it, but after consulting with
Russian government found out that it would get no support in case it refuses the
resolution. The resolution was passed by consensus in the UNSC. In order to
prevent prolonging the process, the resolution gave fixed dates for the various
actions which are supposed to be implemented by the two parties, including the
conclusion of the negotiations on all issues within three months. In the event
these negotiations fail to result in an agreement, it asked the Secretary
General in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD, and the Chairman of
AU Commission to report within four months of the resolution, including detailed
proposals on all outstanding issues. That means, the UNSC is considering to
enforce its own solutions for the problem of Sudan and South Sudan. It may be a
good idea for the AUHIP to involve in the coming rounds of negotiations some
political forces other than the two ruling parties, some active civil society
organizations and neutral experts. One of the obvious shortcomings of the CPA,
it was a closed club for the NCP and the SPLM, and whenever they disagreed on
something they had to take it to a third party outside the country. Surely the
big powers have other concerns and problems to care about, than stuck themselves
to the North-South endless conflict. Involving other Sudanese and South Sudanese
would broaden the popular base of the agreement, give a better guarantee to the
fulfillment of what agreed upon, and assuring each party that its political
rivals would not exploit the unpopular parts of the agreement against it. The
approach to negotiate the issues should be in the form of a package deal rather
than on single issue basis. It is not necessary that all outstanding issues
should be solved at once, some of the sensitive and complicated ones, like Abyei
status or the disputed areas, may be postponed to a fixed time in the future.
Both parties should be given tangible incentives by the world community on the
conclusion of a peaceful settlement. The fixed dates give in the SC resolution
should not be taken literally as long as positive progress is achieved.

However, without real change in the spirit and political will of the two
parties it is not likely that they will reach a comprehensive settlement on the
various outstanding issues. The world community may use the present economic
crisis in both countries to press for a change of attitude, on a firm commitment
that it will help them solving their economic difficulties. The world community
may go a step further to encourage and support all forms of economic cooperation
between the two quarreling states. In the past, the financial promises of the
world community to the parties have not been honoured; it is time that the world
community show something in advance.

The Conclusion

The problem of North-South Sudan is not unique in Africa but it is more
complicated by internal and external factors, and a long history of
confrontation. The eventual peaceful solution in Sudan will be an example for
others as happened in the case of South Africa; if not it will have disastrous
consequences for most of its neighbours. The two parties alone cannot easily
solve their problems, as it was demonstrated since the beginning of negotiations
on the CPA. The international community has to be actively involved, but it has
to act in a fair and neutral way in order to achieve sustainable peace and
cooperation between the two new countries. The African Union and the AUHIP are
the best bodies to facilitate and lead the negotiation process till it
successfully concludes the desired settlement. There is a strong suspicion
within the NCP, shared by the majority of northerners, that the big western
powers are pro-South and against the North, the charge can easily be used to
mobilize people against western proposed solutions. The western governments
should be more sensitive to such accusations in dealing with North-South
relations. The economic crisis in the two countries is an opportunity for the
west to attract the two parties for positive cooperation, in return for economic
incentives. It may be a good idea to use close neighbours, like Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, to influence Sudan; Kenya and Uganda, to persuade South Sudan. The
resolutions of the PSCAU and UNSC should be used to the maximum in order to
reach a fair and peaceful settlement to all outstanding issues between the two
obstinate countries.

The References
1. Assessment & Evaluation
Commission, Final Report & others, 2009-2011.
2. The Agreements between the Republic of the Sudan
and the Republic of South Sudan on: Demarcation, Status of Nationals of the
Other State, March 2012.
3. AUHIP, reports,
statements and proposals.
4. The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and SPLM/A,
Nairobi, 9th January 2005.
5. Concordis
International, More than a Line: Sudan’s North-South border, September 2010.
6. The Government of Sudan, reports on the
negotiations, 2010-2012.
7. Joint Political and
Security Mechanism, Joint Decision for the Reduction of Tension between the
Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 4 April
2012.
8. Mahgoub M. Salih, ‘The Outstanding Issues
and the Future of North-South Relations, unpublished article (Arabic), March
2011.
9. Marcelo Giugale (director in the World
Bank), ‘Analysis of the Likely Economic and Social Impact of the Shutdown of Oil
in South Sudan, March 2012.
10. PSCAU, COMMUNIQUE’,
319th Ministerial Meeting, 24 April 2012.
11. The
Republic of South Sudan, Press Release, 1 April 2012.
12. The Republic of South Sudan, Presidential
Statement on the Current Crisis, 13 April 2012.
13.
UN Security Council, Resolution 2046 (2012) on Sudan & South Sudan, New
York, 5 May 2012.

Presented at the Sudanese Programme’s conference, Oxford University

Tayeb Zein al-Abidin is a professor of political science at the
University of Khartoum and a former chairman of the Sudanese Inter-Religious
Council.

Sudan, South Sudan reiterate commitment to resolve outstanding issues, not
to return to war

KHARTOUM, Oct. 8 (Xinhua) -- Sudan and South Sudan on
Saturday reiterated their commitment to resolve outstanding issues between them
and not to return to war again no matter what the reasons were.

Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir and President of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit on
Saturday held joint talks in Khartoum to reach solutions for the outstanding
issues between the two countries.

"We reiterate our commitment not to
return to the war square. We will work together to enhance peace and establish
good relations on bases of good neighborliness and mutual respect," said
al-Bashir in the talks, quoted by local media.

"Realization of security
and stability is associated with defusing the conflicts and preventing foreign
intervention in our affairs. We should depend on our self-abilities and work
together to establish a good relationship on bases of the historical ties
between our peoples," he added.

He went on saying that "if we lost unity,
at least we should win the peace. The international law abides us to observe the
good neighborliness. It is important that we work together to secure our borders
and make them flexible to facilitate the movement of the citizens and
commodities."

The Sudanese president further called on the experts from
the two countries to work out a formula for strategic cooperation in the field
of petroleum according to the international standards and in a manner that
achieves the interests of the two peoples.

South Sudan President Salva
Kiir Mayardit, for his part, said that "we are committed to no going back to war
again. This is a station that we left a long time ago since 2005 when the
Naivasha agreement was signed."

"Now if it happened that there are any
elements that are taking us back to that square, I think all of us should then
take such people as the enemies of our peoples," he added.

He reiterated
the importance of finding settlements for all the outstanding issues between the
two countries, saying that any mistake, even if slight, could lead to a
disaster.

Kiir arrived in Khartoum on Saturday in his first visit to
Sudan since the independence of South Sudan on July this year.

The two
countries are discussing outstanding issues between them including oil revenues
sharing, border demarcation and disputed Abyei issues.

Sudan and South
Sudan earlier agreed to open 10 passages on their joint border to facilitate the
movement of citizens after the border was closed before the declaration of South
Sudan independence.

Khartoum accused the newly born South Sudan of
supporting the rebels in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan areas which have
witnessed armed clashes between the Sudanese army and fighters of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement.

Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan

OSLO,
Norway, September 28, 2012/African Press Organization (APO)/ –
Sudan and South Sudan have signed agreements on important issues
relating to oil, nationality, security and borders.

“I am
very pleased that Sudan and South Sudan have now reached agreement on these
issues, which are important for both countries. I hope the agreements can be
implemented speedily. Norway will support this work. The African Union deserves
recognition for the way it has facilitated the negotiations,” said Foreign
Minister Espen Barth Eide.

The
agreements were signed by the two presidents on Thursday, and were the result of
several difficult rounds of negotiations in Addis Ababa, under the auspices of
the African Union.

“The
two countries have now shown the world that they have chosen to work together to
resolve common problems. We support the goal of building two viable states that
will give hope for the future for all their people, and will continue to work
with both countries,” said Minister of International Development Heikki
Holmås.

Despite these agreements, a number of difficult issues remain to
be resolved. In Sudan, negotiations between the SPLM-N rebels in the states of
Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and the government in Khartoum have so far
hardly achieved anything. International humanitarian actors are not being given
access to rebel-controlled areas, where the humanitarian situation is critical.
In August, Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding with the Arab League, the
UN and the African Union on humanitarian access, but there is disagreement on
how this is to be implemented in practice.

“The
parties must find a solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
We urge Sudan and the SPLM-N to start direct negotiations on the basis of UN
Security Council resolution 2046, and request Sudan to grant immediate
humanitarian access to all areas in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states,”
said Mr Eide.

SOURCE

Norway
– Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Path Solutions Implements Complete Solution for Bank
of Khartoum in Unprecedented Record Time

July 13th, 2010
at 9:16 p.m.

Path Solutions,
a leading Kuwait-based banking systems provider, and Bank of Khartoum (“BOK”),
Sudan’s largest Islamic commercial and retail bank, today announced the
successful deployment of iMAL solution within an
extraordinary project timeframe of only 8 months, allowing BOK to have a very
fast ROI. With the iMAL Enterprise Islamic Banking &
Investment System, BOK will be able to enhance its service capabilities to
quickly roll out new Islamic products and services to its customers.
iMAL will also provide the bank with the advantage of
centralized operations and risk management, thus enhancing its competitive edge
and boosting profitability.

“Bank of Khartoum has put forth an aggressive
vision of growth and expansion in the local market and the neighboring African
countries. This is another distinguished milestone achieved in the
transformation of BOK,” stated Fadi Al Faqih, BOK General Manager. “Following
thorough due diligence, we’ve started a technology-driven transformation
initiative with Path Solutions’ iMAL at its heart. We
believe that iMAL solution will bolster our entire IT
infrastructure and contribute in upgrading business performance. The solution
will also allow us to launch new distinguished products and services to our
clients using the latest modern technologies.”

Commenting on the Go Live, Dr. Khalid Amir
Osman, PhD, Head of IT at BOK, said, “We were pleasantly surprised when both the
implementation time and the transfer of knowledge exceeded our initial
expectations.This project implementation is absolutely a world record in the
core banking implementations for banks of similar size. Path Solutions’ team
performed fabulously by achieving high level of efficiency and customer
satisfaction at once, and the project has been successfully delivered while
meeting all specified project requirements. We are confident that with
iMAL we will be moving into the next generation of
banking.”

As one of Africa’s leading and most
innovative banks, BOK commands great respect from the financial community. It is
also the commercial bank with the oldest continuous history in the country. BOK
has a network of 18 branches in the capital, 32 branches nationwide and 75 ATMs
across Sudan. The bank’s expansion plans take into account the need to have a
presence in all major industrial, agricultural and commercial centres, where its
corporate customers are located, as well as the need to build a strong retail
customer base for both deposits and loan products.

Said Naji Moukadam, President of Path
Solutions, “We are very pleased that BOK has placed its trust in our
AAOIFI-certified software solution, which we were able to deploy very quickly.
BOK has mobilized comprehensive resources who spared no effort to help achieve
this milestone. We highly value the tremendous contribution of BOK team to
ensuring a seamless transition to Sharia-based banking.”

According to Alain Abou Khalil, Path
Solutions’ VP Professional Services, iMAL solution was
implemented through a complex architecture of distributed and centralized
databases. SAFE was installed at 32 decentralized branches and 18 centralized
branches of BOK.

Abou Khalil explained, “The ease of use of
iMAL, our work methodology and our highly capable
Professional Services team allowed us to deliver outstanding results in a short
time span. In this respect, I am taking this opportunity to congratulate both
implementation teams for their tremendous efforts in completing this
distinguished achievement which stands as a great example of team work between
vendor and customer. We look forward to BOK’s continued success in
Sudan.”

April 27, 2009 (JUBA) – Ivory Bank, a pioneer banking institution in Sudan,
has moved its headquarters from Khartoum to its branch in Juba, an event marked
by a pledge of US$11 million in financing from the Government of Southern
Sudan.

Gabriel Changson Chang, chairman of the Board of Directors of the bank,
said he was satisfied with the operations of Ivory Bank, which he said is moving
beyond its debts into profit-making, and he appealed to the regional government
--- for which he is minister of information — to fully fulfil its pledge to pay
US$11 million to the bank beyond the six million already paid.

The bank, opened by southern economists in September 1994 in Khartoum to
serve the interests of southern Sudanese, plans to open several additional
branches across Southern Sudan, according to Chang’s remarks.

Unlike the Islamic system in northern Sudan, Ivory Bank is part of the
conventional banking system. It also operates a branch in Malakal, along with
the near-collapsing Nile Commercial Bank, which was established about six years
ago in 2003 in areas held by the SPLM/A insurgency.

Ivory Bank’s new headquarters was inaugurated in the regional capital,
Juba, on Monday by the Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Dr.
Riek Machar Teny.

In his inaugural remarks, the vice president said the current situation in
Southern Sudan posed a challenge to the bank to deliver services to the people
in the region. Although Ivory Bank has attracted many clients, its services are
rudimentary due to lack of trained staff further constrained by lack of new
technology.

But Machar pledged millions to assist the bank to take off with its new
policy, directing the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to immediately
transfer the balance of eleven million dollars to Ivory Bank.

With the opening of the latest electronic money transfer technology by
Ivory bank, people of the south should be able to reduce alleged financial
missteps while moving salaries and development funds to various units or states
in south Sudan.

Another boon from the bank would be reducing dependency on imported food by
facilitating movement of fruits, eggs, vegetable and pineapples from Western
Equatoria state, posited Machar. “For how long must we depend on imported food?”
he asked.

Elijah Malok Aleng, Governor of the Bank of Southern Sudan, appreciated the
repatriation of the bank headquarters to Southern Sudan, stressing that the
region needed the Southern Sudan-based commercial banks to improve their
services.

He further hailed Ivory Bank for its move toward profit-making after
noticing that between 2007 and 2008 there were a lot of unsettled debts. He
advised that at least eighty percent of borrowed amount be returned before
effecting any deals with future clients.

He also announced that the manager and his deputy are being rewarded with
two months’ gross pay while other staffs get one month gross pay as appreciation
for their demanding service.

Earlier, General Manger Ernest Woderif Marbaga described the inauguration
as “a milestone in history of banking in South Sudan.”

However, Marbaga observed that a sudden exodus of Islamic banks from the
south has negatively impacted innocent people because of overstretched meagre
resources and manpower.

Nevertheless, he emphasized that southerners have taken over dilapidated
structures and made provisions to hire new personnel to fill the vacuum left by
departing bank officials, particularly in Aweil, Bentiu, and Malakal

The general manager commented that banking is a highly professional
occupation that cannot be mastered overnight, hence it requires many years of
intensive training for personnel.

Michelle Obama Photo at Whitehouse

About Me

As Project Director for Confederation Council Foundation for Africa inc.,I Aim to provide platform open doors for development towards the emerging entrepreneurship agenda among New American Migrants. We provide sustainable settlement towards self-sufficiency. The Foundation under my leadership intends to fulfil Immigration Settlement Program and the Millenium Development Goals Strategic Plan of Action. Our Mission is to Network for start-up business, job creation for talented and skilled individuals, Business Investments Locally and Abroad. We involve simple Economic and Educational Networking and empowerment - partnering with Federal Government, the Civic Societies, Faith Based and Non-Profit project under One-Stop-Service plan. The purpose is to encourage more Women and Youth who are the engine of CHANGE towards achieving sustainable policy enactment & Socio/Economic DEMANDs in order to curtail growing influx of African migration which will eventually reduce unwarranted relocation and suffering of many people.