“With Friends Like These…”

Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

Map of the Districts of Azad Kashmir

Courtesy of The Creative Unit, Karachi

Frequently
Used Abbreviations

All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (MC)

All Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Party (AJKPP)

All-Parties Hurriyet Conference (APAC)

All Parties Nationalist Alliance (APNA)

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), Azad Kashmir

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami (AJK-JI)

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Pakistan People's Party (AJKPPP)

Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD)

Jammu and Kashmir National Students'
Federation (JKNSF)

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LT)

Line of Control (LoC)

Nongovernmental organization (NGO)

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

Pakistan Military Intelligence (MI)

People's League (PL)

Special Communications Organization (SCO)

United Jihad Council (UJC)

United Kingdom (U.K.)

United Nations (U.N.)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

I. Summary

Pakistan says they are our friends and India is our enemy. I agree India is our enemy, but with friends like these, who needs enemies?

-Mir Afzal Suleri,
Muzaffarabad resident

The massive earthquake that
struck on October 8, 2005, wreaking death and destruction on Kashmir, instantly
conflated Kashmir's long-running man-made crisis with a natural one. The poor
response of the Pakistani government and military to the earthquake, and the
attendant further loss of life, served to highlight that even natural disasters
in Kashmir have a strong human component.

Major cities and thousands of
villages in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK, Azad Kashmir), including the capital
Muzaffarabad, were reduced to rubble. The devastation was immense-at least eighty-eight
thousand people died, more than one hundred thousand were injured, and more
thantwo million were left homeless. The United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) estimated that seventeen thousand children were among the dead.

Kashmir is one of the most heavily militarized regions of the
world, and those buried under the rubble and their relatives who tried
frantically to dig them out with their bare hands would have been justified in
thinking that help would arrive rapidly. It was fair to hope that the armies
massed on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) separating Azad Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir state, ostensibly to protect the Kashmiri population, would move quickly
to save Kashmiri lives from a natural threat. But as time passed and the sound
of life beneath the rubble began to grow silent, it became painfully and
brutally clear that the hope was misplaced. In the aftermath of the disaster,
the Indian and Pakistani militaries simply did not make the saving of Kashmiri
lives a top priority. As India and Pakistan engaged in diplomatic
one-upmanship-making and refusing offers of help based on political opportunism
rather than humanitarian concerns-the death toll mounted.

In the first seventy-two hours after the earthquake,
thousands of Pakistani troops stationed in Azad Kashmir prioritized the
evacuation of their own personnel over providing relief to desperate civilians.
The international media began converging on Muzaffarabad within twenty-four
hours of the earthquake and fanned out to other towns in Azad Kashmir shortly
thereafter. They filmed Pakistani troops standing by and refusing to help
because they had "no orders" to do so as locals attempted to dig out those
still alive, sending a chilling message of indifference from Islamabad. Having
filmed the refusal, journalists switched off their cameras and joined the
rescue effort themselves; in one instance they shamed the soldiers into
helping. But unlike the death and destruction, the media were not everywhere.
The death toll continued to mount.

Many Kashmiris told Human Rights Watch that prior to the
earthquake, the Pakistani military kept a close watch on the population to
ensure political compliance and control; this was facilitated by the placement
of military installations frequently in close proximity to populated areas. In
the context of a military presence that was more abuser than protector, and
domineering Pakistani political control, the failure of the authorities to
respond quickly and more humanely to the aftereffects of the earthquake in Azad
Kashmir came as little surprise. That failure generated massive public
resentment against the Pakistani state, and it highlighted the need for an
examination of the conduct of Pakistani authority in Azad Kashmir. This report
on the state of human rights in Azad Kashmir shows longstanding restrictions on
fundamental freedoms, as well as politically motivated mistreatment of persons
supporting an independent Kashmir.

The earthquake put the international spotlight on Azad
Kashmir for the first time. Previously, attention had been almost wholly on Jammu and Kashmir state in India, which since 1989 has endured a brutal insurgency and
counterinsurgency. Human rights abuses by the Indian security forces and
separatist forces in Jammu and Kashmir have been relatively well documented and
often condemned. But the world knows little about Azad Kashmir, other than that
the territory has been used by Pakistan-backed militant groups as a staging
ground for attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.[1]

Aid organizations and donors that wanted to learn about Azad
Kashmir after the earthquake so that they could respond in a useful and
informed manner quickly discovered that there was virtually no published
information. This is because prior to the earthquake, Azad Kashmir was one of
the most closed territories in the world. While Jammu and Kashmir state had
known considerable tourist traffic prior to the beginning of the insurgency
there, the areas of Kashmir on the other side of the LoC had seen little
external interest or presence after the end of the British colonial era in 1947-a
situation used by Pakistan to exercise absolute control over the territory.

Information, particularly about
the human rights situation, governance, the rule of law, and the institutions
that hold real power in Azad Kashmir is more important than ever as the
territory rebuilds and, by necessity, opens up to the international community
in the aftermath of the earthquake. In the coming years, international
engagement with the territory is likely to be intense. For that engagement to
be effective and beneficial to the people of Azad Kashmir, it is essential that
international actors approach the territory with an awareness of its particular
history and its fraught, often tense and unhappy relationship with the
Pakistani state in general and the Pakistani military in particular.

Azad Kashmir is a legal anomaly.
According to United Nations (U.N.) resolutions dating back to 1948, Azad
Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a
"local authority" with responsibility over the area assigned to it under a 1949
ceasefire agreement with India. It has remained in this state of legal limbo
since that time. In practice, the Pakistani government in Islamabad, the
Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence services (Inter-Services
Intelligence, ISI) control all aspects of political life in Azad Kashmir-though
"Azad" means "free," the residents of Azad Kashmir are anything but. Azad
Kashmir is a land of strict curbs on political pluralism, freedom of
expression, and freedom of association; a muzzled press; banned books;
arbitrary arrest and detention and torture at the hands of the Pakistani
military and the police; and discrimination against refugees from Jammu and
Kashmir state. Singled out are Kashmiri nationalists who do not support the
idea of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Anyone who wants to take part in
public life has to sign a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan, while anyone who
publicly supports or works for an independent Kashmir is persecuted. For those expressing
independent or unpopular political views, there is a pervasive fear of
Pakistani military and intelligence services-and of militant organizations
acting at their behest or independently.

Human Rights
Watch has previously reported that torture is routinely used in Pakistan, and that acts of torture by military agencies primarily serve the purpose of
"punishing" errant politicians, political activists and journalists. Azad
Kashmir is no exception. Though torture is not commonplace, it is threatened
often, and-when perpetrated by the military-is carried out with impunity. Human
Rights Watch knows of no cases in which members of military and paramilitary
security and intelligence agencies have been prosecuted or even disciplined for
acts of torture or mistreatment. This report documents incidents of torture by
the ISI, and by Azad Kashmir police acting at the ISI's and the army's behest.

Tight controls on freedom of expression have been a hallmark
of the Pakistani government's policy in Azad Kashmir and are also documented in
this report. This control is highly selective. Pakistani-backed militant
organizations promoting the incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir state into Pakistan have had free rein- particularly from 1989 when the insurgency began to 2001-to propagate
views and disseminate literature; by contrast, groups promoting an independent Kashmir find promoting their views sharply curtailed. But frequent official repression of
freedom of expression and assembly is not limited to controls and censorship
specific to Kashmiri nationalists, journalists and election cycles. This
repression can also be violent and very publicly so. For example, Pakistani
police used lahtis (canes) and rifle butts to break up a peaceful
demonstration in Muzaffarabad on November 11, 2005, by approximately two
hundred earthquake survivors protesting eviction from their makeshift camp.
Several protestors, including children, were injured as a result of police
efforts to break up the demonstration.

Since 1994, when the ISI organized
thirteen militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir state into the
Muttahida [United] Jihad Council, army-backed militant organizations have
shared, with the Pakistani military through the ISI, real decision-making
authority and the management of the "Kashmir struggle." Even mainstream
political parties allowed representation by Pakistan in the Azad Kashmir
Legislative Assembly are largely sidelined. As the government-backed militant
groups gained strength and dominance, Kashmiri nationalist militants left the
movement or were sidelined and eventually began to be persecuted by the
authorities and their proxies. Soon after Pakistan began supporting the
U.S.-led "global war on terror" in 2001, the United Jihad Council ceased to
operate publicly. Several groups simply changed their names and now operate
independently or through clandestine underground networks. The Pakistani
intelligence apparatus retains close associations with these groups.

Virtually all independent commentators, journalists, as well
as former and serving militants, Pakistani military officers and
Pakistan-backed Azad Kashmir politicians speaking off-the-record told Human
Rights Watch that there was continuing militant infiltration from Azad Kashmir
into Jammu and Kashmir state, but were not willing to be quoted for fear of
reprisal from the ISI. Most of those interviewed were of the view that though
the level of infiltration had decreased substantially since 2004 (a brief spike
in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake notwithstanding), there have been
no indications that the Pakistani military or militant groups had decided to
abandon infiltration as policy.

It was thus no accident that
militant groups were the first on the scene dispensing relief goods and other
aid after the earthquake. Nor was it a sign of their great organizational
prowess. As the Pakistani military prioritized the rescue of its own personnel,
it probably sought the assistance of its closest allies in Azad Kashmir, the
militant groups. These groups, which had undoubtedly suffered the loss of
personnel and infrastructure themselves in the earthquake, won much local
appreciation for their rescue and relief efforts. This public relations coup
could not have been possible without logistical support from sections of the
Pakistani military's intelligence apparatus. For example, one of the first
groups to set up operations was the Jamaat-ud-Dawa -the Lashkar-e-Toiba group
operating under a new name. In January 2002 the Pakistani government had banned
the LT as a terrorist group. However, in the aftermath of the earthquake,
President Pervez Musharraf went out of his way to praise its relief work and
brushed off calls to restrict its operations. The Pakistani military apparently
saw the earthquake as an opportunity to craft a new image for the militant
groups rather than as an opportunity to disband them.

This report also documents discrimination against Kashmiri
refugees and former militants from India, most of whom are secular nationalists
and culturally and linguistically distinct from the peoples of Azad Kashmir.
The last major episode involving these former militants took place on April 7,
2005, when Pakistani security forces prevented them from greeting the inaugural
bus service between Srinagar (the Jammu and Kashmir state capital) and
Muzaffarabad and arrested, jailed and beat them. A primary motive for the
discrimination would appear to be that many of these people do not share the
vision of a unified Kashmir under Pakistani control.

Successive Pakistani governments
have asserted that Kashmir's political future must be determined in accordance
with the wishes of the people. But the reality of Azad Kashmir prior to the
earthquake was life dominated by governmental restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
As the international community supports the task of reconstruction, it must
insist on a new respect by Pakistan for the human rights of the people of Azad
Kashmir. No viable solution to the Kashmir issue can exclude the exercise of
fundamental civil and political rights for the people of Azad Kashmir in an
environment free of coercion and fear.

Key recommendations

The October 2005 earthquake brought into focus the dominant
role of the Pakistani army in the governance of Azad Kashmir and the almost
complete absence of any independent civil society in the territory. While
Pakistani civil society's immediate, rapid mobilization in the aftermath of the
earthquake is commendable, the Pakistani military's blundering and ineffective
response to the humanitarian disaster was indicative of more than just the
military's different priorities in the region. It also highlighted its
inability to assume the role of civil society that, as a matter of security
policy, it has prevented from taking root. The army must greatly reduce its
political role in Azad Kashmir in order to make way for genuinely civilian
governmental institutions that respect basic rights.

The post-earthquake situation provides the international
community with a unique opportunity to engage with Azad Kashmir's population,
government officials, civil society, and the Pakistani military to improve the
state of civil and political rights in the territory. Reconstruction in Azad
Kashmir, for which the international community has pledged U.S.$6.5 billion,
can only be successful if central to the process is the creation of an open,
empowered, rights-respecting society.

Specifically, Human Rights Watch makes the following key
recommendations (a full set of recommendations is given at the end of this
report):

To
the Pakistani government

Release all individuals
imprisoned or detained and withdraw immediately all criminal cases against
anyone, including Kashmiri nationalists, for the peaceful expression of
their political views, including that Azad Kashmir should be
independent.

End the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention, other
forms of harassment, and torture and other ill-treatment of persons
exercising their right to freedom of expression, including those who
peacefully oppose Kashmir's accession to Pakistan or demand greater
autonomy for the territory.

Repeal constitutional curbs on
freedom of association, expression and assembly in Azad Kashmir so that
the constitution and Azad Kashmir law are consistent with international
human rights standards.

Prosecute to the full extent of the law and in accordance
with international standards those members of the armed forces, its
intelligence agencies, government officials and police personnel
implicated in serious violations of human rights, including arbitrary
arrests and torture.

Respect press freedom and allow full independent coverage
of both past and ongoing events in Azad Kashmir. Remove formal and
informal prohibitions on news gathering and reporting by the Azad Kashmir
and Pakistani media, and accord all journalists full freedom of movement.
End the practice of banning books and literature.

Ensure that human rights organizations have freedom of
movement throughout Azad Kashmir and allow them to carry out
investigations and fact-finding missions free from intimidation and
interference by military authorities.

To
Azad Kashmir-based militant groups

Cease threatening civilians who do not cooperate with or
support the activities of militant groups.

Publicly denounce abuses committed by any militant group
in Jammu and Kashmir state and call for accountability for such abuses on
both sides of the Line of Control.

To
donors and other international actors

Ensure greater civilian
oversight of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Aid
should be handled through a process that involves the Azad Kashmir
government, as well as local, national and international NGOs, civil
society groups (particularly those working in the field), and the affected
population.

Ensure the continuing distribution
of reconstruction aid without regard to political affiliation. In
particular, there should be no discrimination against Kashmiri
nationalists who do not support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan or refugees who have entered Azad Kashmir from Jammu and Kashmir state since 1991.

Use every available opportunity to press for an end to
impunity for perpetrators of serious human rights abuses, including
members of the military, intelligence agencies, police and militant
groups. Urge respect for international due process and fair trial
standards and press for impartial inquiries into, and accountability for,
cases of arbitrary detention and torture and other ill-treatment in
detention.

II. Background

Social and demographic facts

Azad Jammu and Kashmir is 5,134
square miles (13,297 square kilometers) in area. The total population was
2,973,000 according to the population census of 1998, and was estimated to be
3,271,000 in 2002, of whom 87.5 percent live in rural areas and 12.5 percent
are urban. The population density is 246 persons per square kilometer. The
literacy rate was reported as 55 percent in the 1998 census and was estimated
to be 60 percent in 2002, which is higher than in Pakistan.[2]
The territory also enjoys a very high primary school enrollment rate for both
boys and girls, at over 90 percent.[3]

Culture and ethnicity

The people of Azad Kashmir are almost entirely Muslim.
However, Islam or its sects are not the principal arbiters of identity in Azad
Kashmir. The people of Azad Kashmir comprise not only diverse tribal clans (biradari)
but are culturally and linguistically markedly different from the Kashmiris of
the central valley of Jammu and Kashmir state in India. Cultural practice in
Azad Kashmir has more in common with the Punjab than with the Kashmir valley.

The territory is far from ethnically homogenous. The biradari
is the overriding determinant of identity and power relationships within the
Azad Kashmiri socio-political landscape. While the Gujjars, numbering close to
eight hundred thousand, are possibly the largest such group, historically the
two most influential biradaris have been the Sudhans from the southeast
(concentrated in Bagh district and Rawalakot subdivision of Poonch district)
and the Rajputs who are spread out across the territory. Sudhans and Rajputs
number, respectively, a little over and a little under half a million. Almost
all of Azad Kashmir's politicians and leaders come from one of these two
groups.[4]

Azad Kashmir is also home to approximately three hundred
thousand Mirpuri Jats hailing from the southern part of the territory. Though
the Mirpuris are the closest geographical and cultural relatives of the
Potohari Punjabis, in recent decades they have chosen to define themselves
increasingly as Kashmiris. Mirpuris have migrated to the United Kingdom (U.K.)
in large numbers and constitute the overwhelming "Kashmiri presence" in that
country.

The Mirpuri Jats have gained in
influence in Azad Kashmir in recent decades largely through the clout that
major remittances from Britain have bought them. Mirpuri economic clout has
paid political dividends, helping propel barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry to
power as the first Mirpuri leader of Azad Kashmir in 1996. Kashmir expert
Alexander Evans writes:

The Mirpuri Jats, looked down upon by Rajputs and Sudhans,
gained power in the 1990s largely because of their wealth.… Valley Kashmiris
view Mirpuris with much the same condescension as their Punjabi counterparts,
but they also consider Mirpuris part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. They remain Kashmir state subjects – even if not ethnically Kashmiri as
Valley Kashmiris would understand it.… [O]n the Pakistani side, the south-east
(Sudhan heartland) and south (Mirpur) dominate, while the north (both
Muzaffarabad and the Neelum) is less influential.… But Rajputs and Sudhans
remain important brokers in local politics – not least as Gujjars tend to
follow the lead of local Rajput and Sudhan leaders.[5]

There are also a number of other small tribes and
sub-tribes.

Administration

Formally, Azad Kashmir has a parliamentary form of
government. The president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir is the constitutional head
of the state, while the prime minister, supported by a council of ministers, is
the chief executive. Azad Kashmir has its own Supreme Court, High Court, and
Legislative Assembly comprising forty-nine members, of whom forty-one are
directly elected and eight are indirectly elected-the latter comprise a member
each from the technocrats, scholars, and overseas Kashmiris, and five women.[6]
Under the current constitutional dispensation, twelve of the forty-eight seats
in the Legislative Assembly are reserved for Kashmiri refugees from Indian
Jammu and Kashmir settled across Pakistan. Azad Kashmir also has a multi-tiered
system of local governance.[7]

Azad Kashmir maintains a dual
judicial system. Judicial officers in districts, high courts and the Supreme
Court include Islamic judges dispensing Sharia law. These judges (who do not
require a law degree) deal with criminal cases involving Sharia law. Other
criminal cases and civil cases are dealt with by regular judges and
magistrates.

All key administrative offices are manned by Pakistani
officials. These include the office of the chief secretary (the principal
bureaucrat), the inspector-general of police, the accountant-general and the
finance secretary. (Pakistani political control in Azad Kashmir is discussed in
detail in Chapter III, below.)

The Pakistan-India dispute over Kashmir

In 1947, the British
decolonization plan for India required the partition of the subcontinent into
two successor states, India and Pakistan. However, the partition plan was
applicable only to the eleven provinces of "British India"-areas directly under
British sovereignty as of June 3, 1947. In addition, the Indian subcontinent
comprised some 562 "princely states" of varying size that enjoyed defense
agreements with the paramount power and remained under the nominal control of
their hereditary rulers.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir
was an example of the latter. The territory comprising it had been sold by the
East India Company to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a sum of 7,500,000 rupees in
1846 in an agreement titled The Treaty of Amritsar. Between 1846 and 1947 Kashmir remained under the direct though nominal control of Gulab Singh and his successors
as their hereditary possession.

As British withdrawal from India became imminent, the
princely states were given the choice to either resume their independent status
or join Muslim-majority Pakistan or Hindu-majority India. Most of the decisions
by the ruling princes were made based on geography or religious majority.
However, Kashmir was a problem because it was a Muslim-majority state ruled by
a Hindu prince. The British left it for future negotiations when the Maharaja
of Kashmir failed to decide whether to accede to either India or Pakistan.[8]

The conflict in Kashmir has its origins in the state's
accession to India in 1947.

Maharaja Hari Singh, the then ruler of Kashmir, signed a
standstill agreement with Pakistan but took no decision on the state's
accession. A month after the end of British rule on the subcontinent, Kashmir
was invaded by Kashmiri Sudhan tribesmen encouraged by Pakistan.[9]
Unable to defend his state, the Maharaja of Kashmir sought India's assistance, and on October 26, 1947, signed an Instrument of Accession,[10]
paving the way for Indian soldiers to come to his assistance.[11]
The first war between India and Pakistan had begun.

In January 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru, then prime minister of India, requested that the U.N. play a role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.[12]
The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution on August 13, 1948, calling for
the immediate cessation of hostilities by India and Pakistan as well as a truce
agreement so that both Indian and Pakistani forces could withdraw from the
state of Jammu and Kashmir. It also recognized the right of the Kashmiri people
to determine the future status of Kashmir.

After a ceasefire was called, a third of the Kashmiri state
remained under Pakistani control.[13]
The rest became India's Jammu and Kashmir state.[14] Kashmir was divided by a Line of Control. The contour of this line changed slightly after
later wars, but has remained more or less the de facto border between Pakistan and India in Kashmir.

Through mutual agreement India and Pakistan successfully lobbied for an amendment to the 1948 U.N. resolution, and the U.N.
passed another resolution on January 5, 1949, in which the Kashmiri people were
only given the right to accede either to India or Pakistan; there was no
mention of their having a right to become an independent nation.

In January 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed to supervise the ceasefire between
India and Pakistan.[15]
UNMOGIP's functions were to investigate complaints of ceasefire violations and
submit finding to each party and to the U.N. secretary-general.[16]
Under the terms of the ceasefire, it was decided that both armies would
withdraw and a plebiscite would be held in Kashmir to give Kashmiris the right
to self-determination.[17]

The primary argument for the continuing debate over the
ownership of Kashmir is that India did not hold the promised plebiscite. In
fact, neither side has adhered to the U.N. resolution of August 13, 1948:[18]
while India chose not to hold the plebiscite, Pakistan also failed to withdraw
its troops from Kashmir as was required under the resolution.[19]
Instead, India cites the 1952 elected Constituent Assembly of Jammu and
Kashmir, which voted in favor of confirming accession to India.[20]
New Delhi also says that since Kashmiris have voted in successive national
elections in India, there is no need for a plebiscite. The 1948-49 U.N.
resolutions can no longer be applied, according to India, because of changes in
the original territory, with some parts "having been handed over to China by Pakistan and demographic changes having been effected in Azad Kashmir and the Northern
Areas."[21]

India's argument for the legitimacy of its claim to all of
Kashmir, including the portion administered by Pakistan, is based on the
Instrument of Accession. Similar instruments determined the distribution of all
princely states in the 1947 partition; questioning the accession of Kashmir
would (the argument goes) imply unraveling the constitutional and legal basis
for the creation of India and Pakistan.[22]

Pakistan, however, has always
questioned the legality of Kashmir's accession and said that India had agreed to the U.N. resolutions calling for self-determination after the Instrument of
Accession had been signed. India also overruled the same exercise of powers by
the Muslim ruler of the Hindu-majority state of Hyderabad-the largest and
richest of the princely states-arguing that the people's right of
self-determination was paramount when the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to declare
independence for his state. Hyderabad was forced into the Indian Union through
"police action" in 1948.[23]
Similarly, the Muslim rulers of the Hindu-majority states of Junagadh and
Manavadar signed instruments of accession to Pakistan but were overruled by the
Indian government, which seized the states on grounds of geographical
contiguity and religious majority.[24]

Pakistan asserts that India cannot argue self-determination and the will of the majority in other instances and ride
roughshod over the same principle in Kashmir. Hence, in contrast to India, which considers the part of Kashmir under its control to be part of the Indian Union, Pakistan does not exercise formal sovereignty over the portion of Kashmir it controls. Rather, the
territory is theoretically self-governed through its own interim constitution
pending a plebiscite to determine the status of the historical state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Above all, both Islamabad and New Delhi see Kashmir as legitimizing the competing political frameworks that led to the
partition of India. Islamabad believes that Muslim-majority Kashmir will choose
to be part of Pakistan and it will justify, once again, the ideological basis
for the 1947 partition that was predicated on the assumption that Muslims and
Hindus were separate nations.[25]
India, for that same reason, is unwilling to let go of Kashmir: a Muslim majority
state is proof that India is secular.

Since the British left the subcontinent almost sixty years
ago, India and Pakistan have fought two wars specifically over Kashmir, in 1947-48 and in 1965.[26]
In 1971, a third war between the two countries led to the secession of East
Pakistan, which became independent as Bangladesh. That truncation of Pakistan further exacerbated the distrust between the two countries and drives Islamabad's policy on
Kashmir.[27]
Since India had helped in dividing Pakistan, it became a priority for Islamabad to ensure unity through an anti-Indian Islamic ideology.[28]

The role of militant groups

The situation in Azad Kashmir
transformed rapidly as the situation in Jammu and Kashmir state worsened and a
stream of refugees began to cross into the territory from 1989 onwards. The
government of Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir authorities welcomed these refugees
at the time with some fanfare; for Pakistan, the propaganda value of hosting
the refugees was immense. For one, their arrival underlined the seriousness of
the situation in Jammu and Kashmir state and thereby bolstered Pakistan's stance that Indian control over Kashmir was not only illegitimate under international law
but also despised by those living under it. Certainly, many of those who
crossed over were fleeing persecution. Others were Kashmiri nationalists who
had taken up arms against the Indian state.

The militants who crossed over
to Azad Kashmir in the 1989-91 period were strikingly different from those who
have spearheaded the insurgency against the Indian state from the mid 1990s
onwards. The 1989-91 militants were overwhelmingly Kashmiris from the central
valley, many from Srinagar. Even if they joined Islamist organizations such as
Hizbul-Mujahedin, they remained essentially secular nationalists seeking the
independence of Kashmir. Kashmiri-speaking, they were also culturally and
linguistically distinct from the peoples of Azad Kashmir. Most had little or no
idea of what Azad Kashmir was beyond a vague awareness that it was "Azad"
(free) under Pakistani control and would be the logical base to take on the
Indian state. They viewed Pakistan, which was eager to offer support, much more
favorably than India. Thus, in the early years of the Kashmiri rebellion
against Indian control, the indigenous Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
remained the engine of the Kashmiri nationalist movement and in control of
it.

The situation had transformed dramatically by 1994 when the ISI
organized thirteen groups operating in Kashmir into the Muttahida [United]
Jihad Council. Apart from the Hizbul-Mujahedin the other members included the
Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin and Al-Jihad. By early 1999, there were
only four or five member groups of the United Jihad Council that were considered
effective, including the LT, Hizbul-Mujahedin, Al Badr and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin.

As the ISI-backed militant
groups gained strength and dominance, Kashmiri nationalist militants left the
JKLF-led nationalist movement or were sidelined and eventually began to be
persecuted by the authorities and their proxies. Hanif Haidry, a native of Srinagar, told Human Rights Watch,

I joined the Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul-Mujahedin faction in
1987 at the age of twenty-five and disassociated from it in 1991 as I felt that
it had become violent. I then went back to Jammu and Kashmir state and tried to
settle down. But because there was persecution, I returned to the
Pakistani-controlled side. My family in [Jammu and Kashmir state] is constantly
interrogated by RAW [Research and Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence body] and others too…. I have two daughters and one son-all in Srinagar. And while my family is harassed by the Indians there, I am mistreated by the
Pakistanis here.

I totally blame the religious parties for turning our
indigenous national struggle into a violent one. This happened in the late 80s
and early 90s when money started to roll in and people like us-who genuinely
wanted independence-were used by these religious parties which were supported
by the Pakistanis. But I equally blame the Indian government.

We wanted independence and felt
that Muslims on this side would be more sympathetic to our cause and therefore
we came here-it is true that at the time we were intoxicated by the concept of
Islamic jihad. Initially when we started with Hizbul-Mujahedin, our idea was to
develop a Kashmiri freedom movement which would also involve Hindu Pandits of
Jammu. However once the ISI became involved the movement took on a new face
and lost its initial purpose. It gave many political players an opportunity to
initiate their own militant organizations. That was when I decided to leave the
movement. I now have nowhere to go. Life is hell in Pakistan and would be harsh
in Srinagar. Here, I am regularly harassed by the ISI, often threatened with
arrest and torture, and also by my former comrades in the jihadi organizations.
I would rather be in my place of birth with my family and suffer there rather
than in an unwelcoming foreign land where I have no rights, no respect and no
hope for the future.[29]

Thorough the 1990s, Azad Kashmir was increasingly dotted
with militant camps operating under the supervision of the Pakistani army. Only
when Pakistan began supporting the U.S.-led "global war on terror" in 2001 did
the United Jihad Council cease to operate publicly. Several groups have simply
changed their names and operate independently or through clandestine
underground networks.[30]
And there are many reports indicating that the Pakistani intelligence apparatus
retains direct association with operations by these groups.

Though militant camps in Azad Kashmir proper have become non-operational
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the consequent peace process with
India, militant infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir state was ongoing through
the October 8, 2005 earthquake (though markedly reduced), and continues at the
reduced rate to date. Immediately prior to the earthquake and in the months
following it, Human Rights Watch was repeatedly told by independent analysts,
members of militant groups, and Pakistan-backed Azad Kashmir politicians and
members of the Pakistani military speaking off-the-record, that infiltration is
not only ongoing but its cessation is non-negotiable in the absence of a final
settlement of the Kashmir dispute. (Most of these commentators are not willing
to be named for fear of reprisal from the ISI.)

A Muzaffarabad journalist, who only agreed to speak to Human
Rights Watch on condition of anonymity and on the bank of the Neelum river that
runs through Muzaffarabad to ensure he was not overheard, explained his views
on the general situation in Azad Kashmir:

Everybody here has reason to
hate the militants. They have taken over our lives and hold them hostage.
Meanwhile, Kashmiri nationalists including the All-Parties Hurriyet Conference
[an umbrella organization for Kashmiri nationalist groups] across the LoC are
deeply resentful of how the ISI has warped and damaged the Kashmir movement.
And only fools believe that the ISI has decided to end the jihad. Every day you
hear stories of infiltration. I know a group went across last week. They have
moved the camps but not gone out of business. Everybody abhors India of course but nobody loves the jihadis either. We are caught between a rock and a
hard place – unable to overthrow the Indian yoke there and at the mercy of
Pakistani jihadis and the dreaded ISI here. But the problem is, we are all
compromised. If the ISI call me and ask me whether I spoke to you, I will
probably tell them everything. That is the price to be paid to live in peace if
not in dignity.[31]

Pakistani military installations
have often been placed in close proximity to highly populated civilian areas,
ostensibly because of a lack of space. However, many Kashmiris told Human
Rights Watch that the Pakistani military used the bases to keep a close watch
on the population to ensure political compliance and control. Instead of
helping to protect the population, the military uses its close proximity to the
civilian population to commit abuses. Given this context, the total collapse of
Azad Kashmir's governmental structures in the aftermath of the October 8
earthquake came as no surprise. Akbar Zaidi, a noted Pakistani academic,
explained this collapse:

While there is… quasi-civilian Government,
real power still rests with the President and the military institutions
supporting him. The response to [the] earthquake… needs to be seen in this
light.… The military is… a key constituent of the government…. [I]t was
therefore the force expected to react immediately by providing relief and help,
particularly medical support… The quake's aftermath has exposed a
much-trumpeted "success" story of Musharraf's regime, the local government
system called "District Government", to be just as flimsy, apolitical and
dysfunctional as many had felt it was. This system and its elected bodies are
part of the rubble along with the entire physical infra-structure of the area…
The state's reaction to the devastating earthquake has revealed that despite
the continued global appreciation for its role in the war on terror, the
military rules an alienated society and fails to respond to local needs in time
of crisis. Its obsession with its notion of "security" continues to undermine
real human security in Pakistan.[32]

Similarly, it was no accident
that militant groups were the first on the scene dispensing relief goods and
aid in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Nor was it a sign of any
great organizational prowess. As the Pakistani military prioritized the rescue
of its own personnel, it apparently sought the assistance of its closest allies
in Azad Kashmir, the militant groups. Jan McGirk, Southeast Asia correspondent
for the U.K. daily newspaper The Independent, reported on the inadequate
military response and the public reaction to it:

Nearly a quarter of a million troops were
already stationed in the area, to enforce a tentative ceasefire with Pakistan's nuclear-armed neighbor, India, over claims to the disputed territory. After living under
the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf for six years, the
victims expected a disciplined and professional relief effort to alleviate
their suffering… It took days before the army would reach any stricken
areas beyond the towns; while it dallied, tens of thousands of loved ones were
smothered under the rubble and the injuries of survivors went septic. Without
any shelter, vulnerable infants and elders contracted pneumonia when
intermittent downpours soaked their bedding. In grief, people could only cling
to one another for body heat as hail pelted down and thunderclaps heralded more
aftershocks. Villagers grumbled that the army must be tending to its own
casualties first and had abandoned its hapless civilians to the elements.[33]

These groups had suffered the loss of infrastructure and
personnel themselves in the earthquake, as McGirk noted:

[R]eports that the quake killed a hundred
militants in training camps established near the Line of Control… have been
circulating; the government has never acknowledged that such camps exist, even
though India has since 1989 accused Pakistan of arming and supporting Islamic
guerrillas and demanded the camps' closure…[34]

The militant groups won much
appreciation for their rescue and relief efforts in the second week of October
2005.[35]
This public relations coup could not have been possible without logistical
support from sections of Pakistan's intelligence apparatus. For example, the
Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the renamed "welfare" wing of the LT, was in possession of and
distributing weatherized tents within two days of the earthquake. The only
source of weatherized tents in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was
the Pakistani army.

The post-earthquake role of militant organizations
underlines the continuity of the military-militant relationship in Azad
Kashmir. Pakistan's two-track policy on the militant groups operating in Jammu
and Kashmir state-assurances of roll-back for international consumption but
only a scale-down and lower visibility in the theatre of operations-appears to
be continuing. The Pakistani military apparently saw the earthquake as an
opportunity to craft a new image for the militant groups rather than as an
opportunity to disband them.

The politics of water

A continuing source of political
tension between Kashmiris and Pakistan is over the Mangla Dam project, which
affects the waters of the Jhelum and Poonch rivers before they flow into Punjab
in Pakistan. Particularly affected is the relatively well-off Mirpuri
community in Azad Kashmir (see above), which has increasingly felt a sense of
discrimination and economic exploitation by Pakistan because of the project.
In a 1991 article, Roger Ballard of the U.K.'s Manchester University explained
why:

To Pakistan Mangla is a vital asset which brings many
benefits… Mangla is thus critical to the success of the Pakistani economy as a
whole. Yet despite the great benefits which Mangla has brought to everyone in Pakistan proper, those unfortunate enough to live immediately upstream of the dam have had…
to bear the brunt of its environmental costs.[36]

The debate around the Mangla
Dam, though beyond the scope of this report, is notable because of the central
role it has played in shaping the Mirpuri disconnect from Pakistan. Pakistan argues that the construction of the Mangla Dam is a consequence of the 1961 Indus Basin treaty between India and Pakistan with the World Bank acting as guarantor. The Azad
Kashmiris, particularly the Mirpuris, argue that water is a Kashmiri natural
resource commandeered by the Pakistani state to the disadvantage of Kashmiris.
This is a key issue fueling calls for Kashmiri independence. The acrimony over
the dam continues in Mirpur as the dam is currently being raised.

Chaudhry Arif, the convener of the Mangla Dam Action
Committee, a protest group formed to demand better compensation for those
affected by the Mangla Dam, told Human Rights Watch,

Water is our natural resource. Arabs have oil, the Baloch
have minerals. Kashmir has water. All of Pakistan uses our water. In the
process, there remain acute water shortages in Mirpur from where we can see the
dam feeding the palatial homes of Islamabad. Meanwhile, water-borne disease is
on the rise in Mirpur and other parts of Kashmir due to scarce water here. We
have been uprooted from our homes, not paid adequate compensation and denied
royalty while Pakistan and India steal our natural wealth. This is the worst
kind of exploitation and colonization.[37]

III. Constitutional Structure of Azad Kashmir and Its Relationship to Pakistan

Government of Azad Kashmir, by the Pakistanis, for Pakistan.

-Former
president of Azad Kashmir (name withheld)

Azad Kashmir has its own
constitution, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974, and
a locally chosen parliamentary form of government, as described above (see
Chapter II, Background: Administration). The constitution allows for many of
the structures that comprise a self-governing state, including a legislative
assembly elected through periodic elections, a prime minister who commands the
majority in the assembly, an indirectly elected president, an independent
judiciary, and local government institutions.

But these provisions are hollow. Under Section 56 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (which was drafted by the Federal
Ministries of Law and Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad), the Pakistani government
can dismiss any elected government in Azad Kashmir irrespective of the support
it may enjoy in the AJK Legislative Assembly. The Interim Constitution Act
provides for two executive forums-the Azad Kashmir Government in Muzaffarabad
and the Azad Kashmir Council in Islamabad.

The latter body, presided over
by the prime minister of Pakistan, exercises paramount authority over the AJK
Legislative Assembly, which cannot challenge decisions of the council. The council
is under the numerical control of the federal government in Islamabad, as in
addition to the Pakistani prime minister it comprises six other federal
ministers, the minister of Kashmir affairs as the ex-officio member, the prime
minister of Azad Kashmir, and six Azad Kashmir members elected by the
Legislative Assembly.[38]
The interim constitution act lists fifty-two subjects-virtually everything of
any importance-that are under the jurisdiction of the Azad Kashmir Council,
which has been described as the "supra power" by the Azad Kashmir High Court.
Its decisions are final and not subject to judicial review.

Thus, Azad Kashmir remains for all intents and purposes
under Pakistan's strict control, exercising no real sovereignty of its own.
From the outset, the institutional set up in the territory was designed to
ensure Pakistan's control of the area's affairs. According to the United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)[39]
resolutions, Azad Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a "local authority" with responsibility over the area assigned
to it under the ceasefire agreement.[40]
The "local authority" or provisional government of Azad Kashmir as established
in October 1947 handed over to Pakistan under the Karachi Agreement of April
28, 1949, matters related to defense, foreign affairs, negotiations with the
UNCIP and coordination of all affairs relating to Gilgit and Baltistan
(strategically important territories that now comprise Pakistan's "Northern
Areas" but are claimed by India as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir).
A former president of Azad Kashmir (who preferred not to be named in this
report) described the situation as "[g]overnment of Azad Kashmir, by the
Pakistanis, for Pakistan." He also pointed to the striking continuity of the
"old princely system" under British rule because of Islamabad's "viceroy" role
generally and the maintenance of the traditional biradarisystem
locally.[41]

The constitution of Azad Kashmir poses major impediments
towards genuine democracy as it bars all those parties and individuals from
participating in the political process who do not support the idea of Kashmir's
accession to Pakistan and hence precludes all those who are in favor of
Kashmiri independence. To fail to support, or fail to appear to support
Kashmir's accession to Pakistan means to invite the ire of Pakistan's abusive intelligence agencies and its military. It also entails inviting political persecution,
such as ineligibility to contest elections or to seek employment with any
government institution, or the curtailing of basic freedom of expression.
(These issues are explored in more detail in Chapters IV and V, below.)

Interference and control by Islamabad in Azad
Kashmir politics

Because of the mandate of the AJK Legislative Assembly and
its particular division of power with Pakistan, the elected political leaders
of Azad Kashmir essentially remain titular heads of the territory while the
real power resides in Islamabad. This requires a compliant Azad Kashmir
administration, and explains the repeated changes in Azad Kashmir's leadership
at Pakistan's will. And in common with previous such exercises, the most recent
election to the Legislative Assembly, in July 2006, was greeted with widespread
charges of poll rigging by all opposition political parties and independent
analysts (see Chapter V, below).[42]
Another instrument of exercising control is through assigning virtually all
major civil and police administrative posts to Pakistani civil and military
officials who are "on deputation" from Islamabad. The Azad Kashmir government
is also totally dependent on the federal government of Pakistan for its finances.

Power in Azad Kashmir is exercised primarily through the
Pakistani army's General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, just outside Islamabad, and its corps commander based in the hill station of Murree, two hours by road
from Muzaffarabad. It is widely understood in Pakistan and privately admitted
by virtually all politicians from Azad Kashmir that the corps commander in
Murree is known to summon the Azad Kashmir prime minister, president and other
government officials regularly to outline the military's views on all political
and governance issues in the territory.

During the rule of Pakistan's first military leader, Ayub Khan (1958-68), President K.H. Khurshid of Azad
Kashmir was forced to resign by a mid-level police official and later jailed in
Palandari and Dalai Camp. During Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's
government (1972-77), another president of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Qayyum, was
suddenly arrested by a mid-level official of the Federal Security Forces in
Muzaffarabad and subsequently dismissed. During General Zia-ul-Haq's government
(1977-88), Brig. Hayat Khan was appointed administrator of Azad Kashmir, a post
he held for seven years. When a civilian government was reestablished in Pakistan in 1988, Benazir Bhutto's swearing in as prime minister was shortly followed by
the installation of an elected government of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
in Azad Kashmir. When Bhutto was sacked by the president in 1990, Azad Kashmir
Prime Minister Mumtaz Rathore was "escorted" to Islamabad in a helicopter and
made to sign a letter of resignation.
When Nawaz Sharif became prime minister of Pakistan in 1990, Sardar Qayyum once
again rose to power as prime minister of Azad Kashmir, the nominee of the
Pakistani army. During Bhutto's next stint in power (1993-96), she cautiously
chose not to dismiss Sardar Qayyum, but elections in 1996 brought her Pakistan
People's Party to government again in the territory, as expected, and Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry became prime minister.

Following General Musharraf's 1999 coup, Sardar Muhammad
Anwar Khan took the oath of office on August 25, 2001, as president of Azad
Kashmir. Sardar Anwar had been nominated by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference (MC, the ruling party in the AJK Legislative Assembly, backed by
Musharraf) on July 29, 2001, in a decision evidently reached in Islamabad, as at the time of his nomination the members of the assembly had little or no
idea who Anwar was.[43]
Prior to this appointment, he had served in the Pakistani army for thirty-five
years and was an army major-general at the time of his appointment, retiring
from the army just four days before his election as president on August 1,
2001.[44]
Controversially, his retirement was under an ordinance issued by Musharraf that
waived the restriction on government servants accepting any political post
before they had been retired for a minimum of two years.[45]
Anwar's term of office ended following Legislative Assembly elections held in
Azad Kashmir on July 11, 2006. On July 27, AJK Muslim Conference candidate
Raja Zulqarnain Khan was elected president of Azad Kashmir for a five-year
term.[46]

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, a veteran of Pakistan-sponsored
politics, served as prime minister of Azad Kashmir from July 2001 to July 25,
2006, when he was succeeded by Musharraf nominee and Muslim Conference
president Sardar Attique Ahmad Khan.[47]

Regarding Azad Kashmir's political party landscape, since the early 1990s real
decision-making authority and the management of the "Kashmir struggle" has
rested firmly with the Pakistani military through the ISI and ISI-backed
militant organizations (see above, Chapter II, Background: The role of militant
groups), and the mainstream political parties allowed representation by
Pakistan in the AJK Legislative Assembly have not figured among the principal
political actors in Azad Kashmir. However, they have benefited from the perks,
privileges and funds for purposes of patronage and generating public support.

Sardar Karamdad Khan, a Muzaffarabad-based lawyer, summed up
for Human Rights Watch the dispensation of power in the territory:

The Pakistani bureaucracy is the real administrative power,
the ISI and the Pakistan army exercise coercive power. And under the
constitution, the elected representatives are subservient to the Kashmir
Council controlled by Pakistan. High Court and Supreme Court Judges can only be
appointed by approval of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. The
Minister of Kashmir Affairs can dismiss the PM, as can the Chief
Secretary-another Islamabad appointee. Under Article 56, the President of
Pakistan can dissolve the Legislative Assembly. Surely, this is a truly unique
form of self-rule.[48]

IV. Restrictions on Freedom of Expression

Tight controls on freedom of expression have been a hallmark
of the Pakistani government's policy in Azad Kashmir. This control is highly
selective. Militant organizations have had free rein-particularly between 1991
and 2001-to propagate their views and disseminate literature. However, those
supportive of independence for a united Kashmir, or otherwise critical of the
Pakistani government, have faced continual repression.

Loyalty oath

No person in Azad Kashmir can be appointed to any
government job, including the judiciary, unless he or she expresses loyalty to
the concept of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. The oath of office for the
president, prime minister, speaker, member of the legislative assembly or the
Azad Kashmir Council also incorporates the following statement: "I will remain
loyal to the country and the cause of accession of the state of Jammu &
Kashmir to Pakistan."[49]
(The consequences of not taking the oath for persons seeking political office
are discussed below, in Chapter V.)

Print media and publishing

The Pakistani government has
long limited dissemination of news in Azad Kashmir. There is no locally-based
news agency. Azad Kashmir only has one daily newspaper and so people largely
rely on local editions of Pakistani newspapers for news and information. The
laws governing publications provide a partial explanation for this barren information
landscape: in order to publish within the territory, newspapers and periodicals
need to be granted permission by the Kashmir Council and the Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. These bodies are unlikely to grant permission to
any proposed publication likely to be sympathetic to any discourse on Kashmir and its affairs other than that sanctioned by the Pakistani government. In any
case, the publisher would have to sign the declaration of support to accession
to Pakistan mentioned above. Technically, the same rules apply to the
publication of books.

Human Rights Watch spoke
extensively to working journalists and writers in the major towns of Azad
Kashmir. Members of the press complained of the intrusive and coercive policies
of the Azad Kashmir government but particularly of the ISI and the Pakistani
military. Almost every journalist interviewed described incidents of coercion,
intimidation, threats and occasional violence against the media by the
military, its intelligence agencies, and militant groups.

Consequently, self-censorship
has been as endemic as coercion. It is indicative of the climate of fear that
pervades Azad Kashmir that while journalists were forthcoming in describing
incidents off-the-record, virtually all interviewed by Human Rights Watch
requested not to be quoted, even anonymously. Their rationale was that Azad
Kashmir was a relatively small territory and they would be easily identifiable
through the specifics of the incident described. One journalist explained his
reasons to Human Rights Watch in these words:

You will go away. We have to live and work here. Our
families live here. The ISI is very powerful. It is also very unforgiving. The
officer who presided over my beating is still serving. Even if he was not, he
would inform his successor of the "disciplinary action" taken against me and to
keep an eye on me. If they don't want to be blamed themselves, they will
instruct one of the jihadi groups to teach me a lesson. I know freedom of
expression is important but not important enough to die for. At least not to
me. Sometimes they just summon you for no reason at all. On some flimsy excuse.
Someone with a similar name writes something unrelated to Kashmir in some part
of Pakistan but the army or the jihadis decide it is you. They also force you
to create and kill news according to what suits them. Things are bad. You have
heard how bad from many of us. Just don't mention my name, that's all.[50]

Waheed Kiyani, a local journalist working for the Reuters
news agency, was arbitrarily arrested by the ISI on July 10, 2003, as he was
returning from the city of Rawalakot after covering a political meeting. For
security reasons, Kiyani was unwilling to talk to Human Rights Watch. However,
Human Rights Watch interviewed others including the organizers of the meeting
who described what happened. Arif Shahid, chairman of the All Parties
Nationalist Alliance (APNA, a conglomerate of nationalist Kashmiri parties) and
JKLF secretary general, told us:

On July 10, 2003, we held a
conference titled 'Kashmir Unity Conference' at Khaigala where AJK and Gilgit
Baltistan leadership was present. About three hundred delegates attended. We
offered a form to all delegates. The form gave the options of independence,
joining Pakistan or joining India. The answer was two for India, two for Pakistan and the rest for independence.

Only one international
journalist was present-the Reuters correspondent Waheed Kiyani. As soon as he
stepped out [of the meeting], he was followed by the ISI and he was arrested at
Rawalakot. He told me that they kept him blindfolded and his camera/photos were
confiscated and he was taken to the ISI headquarters and torture cell near
Rawalakot.

We went to Rawalpindi in Pakistan and informed Reuters.
Kiyani was released two days later, on July 12. On the same day we attended a
seminar in Muzaffarabad. Kiyani covered the event. He was called on stage by
General Anwar, the AJK President who told him in full public view to 'forget it
and be grateful you are alive,' and 'offer thanksgiving prayers.'

In this atmosphere of shameless open coercion, it is no
surprise that Kiyani wants to put the incident behind him and is hesitant to
talk about it now. This is the reality of press freedoms in AJK. And of course,
the rest house where the delegates of the conference were staying was also
raided on the same day, July 10. The owner ran away from the scene. The rest
house was empty as we had finished and left according to schedule. [51]

The Azad Kashmir government regularly bans books that it
considers to be prejudicial to the "ideology of the state's accession to Pakistan."[52]
This includes all books that propagate or discuss the Kashmiri nationalist
discourse with its emphasis on independence for a united Kashmir. Arif Shahid,
quoted above, is himself the author of four books banned by the
authorities.

Muhammad Saeed Asad, a self-described Kashmiri nationalist,
is the author of numerous books on Kashmiri affairs, and is employed as a
social welfare officer in the Azad Kashmir Ministry of Social Welfare and
Women's Development when he is not under suspension for writing books to which
the government objects. In 2002, he was suspended for writing a book on the
Mangla Dam (see above) that questioned Pakistan's right to water sources
originating in Kashmir. Pakistan has banned three books written by Saeed Asad
for being "anti-state and an attempt to promote nationalist feelings amongst
Kashmiris."[53]
These include Shaur-e-Farda, banned in 1996, which comprises letters
written by Maqbool Butt to his friends and relatives over a span of two decades
(Maqbool Butt, founder of the JKLF, is a central figure in the Kashmiri
nationalist movement.)[54]
Saeed Asad's book on the Mangla Dam controversy was banned on November 21,
2002, and a book on the Northern Areas (in the grip of unrest due to lack of
rights and, as noted above, claimed by Kashmiri nationalists and India as part
of Kashmir),[55]
was banned in June 2004. He told Human Rights Watch:

Please use my name. We are ready to struggle, I am a man of
words and so I will remain in the public domain. My books have been banned
because they talk of Kashmiri rights and Kashmiri nationalism. I am a Kashmiri
nationalist and why should I not be allowed to call myself such?

I was suspended from my government job for writing on the
Mangla Dam issue. The ISI called me upon publication of the book. It was a
major in the ISI. He verified that I had compiled the book and had not been
forced into writing it.

The book represented the views of Kashmiris on Mangla and
indicates that Pakistan was exploiting Kashmir for its own gains. Two weeks
after publication, I had a three-hour-long meeting with Pakistan's Military Intelligence. They told me that this was a sensitive matter and I should not
have written about it. 'The public does not know why you have brought this into
the public domain,' the officer said. I replied that people had a right to know
what Mangla Dam was and who derived advantages from it. It was my national
duty, as a Kashmiri, to bring this out. 'This is precisely your crime,' the
officer said. The meeting had majors from GHQ Rawalpindi and officers from
Military Intelligence. 'You should avoid writing such books. We are placing you
under surveillance' one said. But, I made it clear to them that I would keep on
writing and they could keep on banning my work.

They keep giving me trouble by stopping pay raises,
suspending me from the job periodically and posting me from district to
district in order to make life difficult. But, I am determined to keep on
writing and to keep on working.

The government of Pakistan is willing to fund books and
propaganda to the tune of millions of dollars to propagate its own views and
stance. Why can't we exert our individual efforts to disagree? They brook no
dissent and want total and complete control. The Pakistan government just wants
to suppress the Kashmiris. I have been repeatedly offered advancement if I
support Pakistan. Endless youth in Kashmir who have masters and professional
degrees are unemployed because the government knows they are pro-independence.

This is how the Pakistanis, our so-called friends, treat
us. We are at war with India so they persecute us. We are not at war here but
they persecute us anyway. Would you like to have such friends? Would you want
to live under such rule? No you would not. So why should we?[56]

The October 8, 2005 earthquake resulted in a considerable
weakening of the Pakistani government's ability to curb freedom of expression
and information in the territory. The influx of international and Pakistani
media into the territory in the aftermath of the earthquake was unprecedented.
However, for freedom of expression to take root in Azad Kashmir, the external
media presence must be systematized into permanent structures such as news bureaus
and regional offices.

Electronic media and telecommunications

As with the print media, prior to the earthquake the only
radio station allowed to operate in the territory was the Azad Kashmir Radio, a
subsidiary of the state-controlled Radio Pakistan. Typically, state-run radio
and television news programs present news according to priorities of state
protocol rather than newsworthiness-that is, a news bulletin will begin with
the engagements and observations of the president of Pakistan and make its way
down the official pecking order to the local level. The influx of and
consequent competition from satellite channels has, as yet, not resulted in a
change in the news culture of state-controlled media. Subsequent to the
earthquake, the government allowed a private FM radio station to broadcast in
the territory as long as the broadcast is limited to entertainment.

(In November 2005, Pakistan's government-run electronic
media regulatory authority, PEMRA, stopped three local (Pakistani) partners of
the BBC from broadcasting two daily thirty-minute "earthquake specials"
produced by the BBC's Urdu service. PEMRA officials, accompanied by dozens of
armed policemen, seized equipment from one of the local partners' Karachi offices and ordered two satellite television partners to stop running news content
from the BBC. Pakistan's information minister declined to comment on the
incident when approached by the BBC. Though the "earthquake specials" resumed
after an outcry by international organizations, including Human Rights Watch,
the government of Pakistan appears unwilling to tolerate critical reporting of
events in Azad Kashmir not just in the territory, but across Pakistan.[57])

Before the earthquake, telephone landlines were limited and
strictly monitored in Azad Kashmir and only a limited mobile telephone service
was operational. All telecommunications stations were controlled by the Special
Communications Organization (SCO), which is a functional unit of the Pakistani
army. Subsequent to the earthquake, the Pakistani government allowed private
Pakistani mobile phone companies to operate in Azad Kashmir-but only after it
was pointed out that the loss of life could have been lessened and the rescue
effort made easier, particularly in the major cities, had victims buried under
rubble been able to use mobile phones as they did in Islamabad and
quake-affected areas in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.[58]

Public protest

Official repression of freedom of expression is not limited
to controls and censorship specific to Kashmiri nationalists and journalists.
Pakistani police used lahtis (canes) and rifle butts to break up a
peaceful demonstration in Muzaffarabad on November 11, 2005, by approximately
two hundred earthquake survivors protesting eviction from their makeshift camp.
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that police arrived early at the Jalalabad Garden camp that day and told the quake victims that they had to leave by sunset.
Several protestors, including children, were injured as a result of police
efforts to break up the demonstration. A Muzaffarabad journalist told Human
Rights Watch that when he asked a senior administration official to order the
police to stop the violence, the official responded, "What else do you expect
the police to do? We can hardly tolerate this sort of behavior from these
people. If they don't behave they will get beaten of course."

V. Restrictions on the Right to Participate in Elections and Related Abuses

No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir
shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial
or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan.

Successive Pakistani governments have asserted that Kashmir's political future must be determined in accordance with the wishes of its people.
Yet its own constitutional provisions preclude all political choices to
Kashmiris except to support its accession to Pakistan. Shamshad Hussain Khan,
an Azad Kashmir Supreme Court lawyer, summed up the situation arising from the
constitutional framework:

The document referred to as the
constitution of Azad Kashmir is a sham. It's a biased document. These laws and
practices are in contradiction to the pledges made by the government to the
international community and the U.N. On the one hand, the Pakistan government says that U.N. Security Council resolutions must apply. On the other, the
constitution prohibits it. We have been and are being persecuted-through
arbitrary arrests, torture, curbs on movement, and by being barred from seeking
higher education or employment-for simply demanding a third or even a second
option for Kashmir. The stance and the legislation are simply irreconcilable.[59]

As noted in Chapter III, the
constitution of Azad Kashmir was drafted by the Pakistani government, as
opposed to being framed by the elected representatives of Azad Kashmir
themselves. It spells out fundamental rights, but inserts a crucial caveat: "No
person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to
propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to,
the ideology of the state's accession to Pakistan."[60]
Thus, the constitution poses major impediments towards genuine democracy as it
bars all those parties and individuals from participating in the political
process that do not support the idea of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.

To guard against the possibility of circumventing the
constitutional bar, the Azad Kashmir electoral law expands on the theme. A
person shall stand disqualified for running for elective office if "[h]e is
propagating any opinion or acting in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of
Pakistan, the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan or the sovereignty,
integrity of Pakistan or security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan, or
morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence
of the Judiciary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan, or who defames or brings
into ridicule the Judiciary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan, or the Armed
Forces of Pakistan."[61]

As a result, political groups such as the JKLF and the APNA that
do not support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan are barred from contesting
elections. When their members have attempted to field candidates, as they did
in the 2001 and 2006 elections to the AJK Legislative Assembly, the authorities
have sought to suppress them, including in 2001 through the use of arbitrary
arrest often accompanied by ill-treatment.[62]

The 2001 elections

The APNA and JKLF decided to attempt to participate in the
2001 elections and fielded thirty-two candidates, each of whom refused to
support accession to Pakistan. Sardar Mohammad Sagheer Khan, secretary general
of the JKLF (Amanullah Khan Group), who has been on Pakistan's exit control
list since 1992, described his experience to Human Rights Watch:

During the scrutiny [in 2001], I asked the returning
officer why my basic rights were being violated. There were twenty to thirty
policemen in the returning officer's chambers. The police immediately arrested
me and hundreds of our workers outside were tear gassed and baton charged. The
ISI had seen that we had public support during the nomination filing process
earlier, as I had been accompanied by over a thousand supporters. I was
arrested, beaten with batons-I received head injuries, I was bleeding and my
left arm was dislocated during the beating.

I was then thrown into the police van alone and half an
hour later, I was taken to Rawalakot police station where I was beaten with
batons, abused and humiliated. My other colleagues joined me about thirty-five
to forty minutes later.

Three nights later, we were shifted to Kotli Jail. We were
classed as common criminals in jail and kept alongside criminals. We were not
criminals and we were kept with them purely to humiliate us. A mentally
unbalanced person was also placed in my cell along with a mass murderer. But we
managed to maintain the peace despite the best attempts of the police to create
a violent situation. The problem was that we were not allowed any family
visits. On the direct intervention of influential friends, one or two people
were allowed a brief meeting with relatives.

When we were released, we were met by crowds all over.
After that we tried to launch a mass contact movement but Rawalakot was placed
under unofficial curfew and our meetings were not allowed. The district Poonch
and district Kotli administrations were placed on high alert and kept under
tight surveillance to prevent us from mobilizing. In the run up to the
elections, at least eight hundred people were arrested across Azad Jammu and Kashmir. [63]

Sardar Naseem Iqbal is an Azad Kashmir Supreme Court lawyer
and former secretary general of APNA. His party allegiance lies with the JKLF
(Rauf Kashmiri Group). Iqbal told Human Rights Watch that APNA decided in May
2001 to file nominations from across Azad Kashmir and for refugee seats. He
was a candidate in Poonch. His and his colleagues' nomination papers were
promptly rejected for being in violation of the Azad Kashmir election laws and
constitution. Sardar Naseem told Human Rights Watch what followed the rejection
of his nomination papers:

The nomination was rejected on June 7. The same day, we
were called for discussions by the Poonch deputy commissioner, Dr. Mehmoodul
Hassan, at his office in Rawalakot. [Five colleagues] and I went. When we got
there, a major from the ISI was present. I don't remember his name. He said, 'Just
wait outside my office.' When we emerged from the office, we were surrounded by
police. Around one hundred police officers. Our supporters were demonstrating
in other parts of the city and the police was spread all over. The deputy
commissioner ordered our arrest. As soon as he said this, the police started
baton charging us. We did not resist arrest and raised our hands, but they
continued to beat us, regardless. They threw us in the nehr [stream].
[Name withheld] sustained more serious injuries than the others.

They took us to Rawalakot police station. One of our
colleagues and fellow candidates from JKLF (Amanullah Khan Group) had already
been arrested and taken there. We were locked up for three days and not even
presented before a judicial magistrate. No one was allowed to meet us for three
days. We were cut off from the outside world. In the station the police were
pressured by the ISI. The police know us. I am a lawyer-they may have arrested
us, but they would not have held us incommunicado without ISI pressure.

During the time we were in the police station, our
colleagues who demonstrated outside the police station for our release would
also be arrested. We were then shifted to District Kotli Jail four hours away.
This was on June 11 at 1 a.m. By the time we were moved to the jail, around
twenty-five of us had been arrested. We were kept in jail for one month. For
one month there was no paperwork. Others were released a month later, but six
to eight of us remained in jail and were served with 'extension of remand'
under the Maintenance of Public Order act for another
fifteen days. Once the election was over on July 5, the case was withdrawn but
only after they told us to deposit bail bonds and we refused.

I don't understand this. Even under their own laws, we may
not be able to contest elections. But we surely are allowed to vote. But
clearly, the government did not allow us to be part of the political process in
any way. Is this not discriminatory? Is this not a gross violation of our
rights? Do we have any rights at all?[64]

Two days before the nominations closed, the ISI began its
surveillance of us. My young nephews returning from school on June 4 were
asked, 'Where does your uncle sleep?' I know the ISI was wanting to arrest or
kidnap me, so I stayed away from home.

I was arrested on June 7 when the Deputy Commissioner
Poonch Dr. Mehmoodul Hassan, lured us to his office in Rawalakot. Naseem Iqbal
has described what happened. We did not resist arrest but that did not prevent
them from baton charging us and beating us up. That should indicate the
attitude of the authorities. They arrested me though I was not even a candidate
in the election. I was just the secretary general of the Alliance. The details
are irrelevant. There was no reason to arrest me. This is commonplace. Mohammad
Abid, my apolitical relative, brought me a change of clothes to the police
station. He was also arrested.[65]

I filed my nomination papers on June 1, 2001. On June 7,
the papers were rejected because I had not signed the declaration supporting
accession to Pakistan. The matter could have ended there. But the army was
tense about our mobilizing public opinion against the election and engaging in
political activity. On July 4, one day prior to the July 5 elections, we were
all arrested. All JKLF candidates across Azad Kashmir and senior office bearers
were arrested because we announced a boycott of the election.

On July 4 at 2:30 a.m. the local authorities headed by SHO
[Station House Officer] Zahid Mirza entered my house. They jumped over the
walls and into my house. They said, 'We will tell you the reason for your
arrest at the police station.' About fifty police officers from the City Police
Station Muzaffarabad were present.

I was taken to the police station and taken to the lockup
and handcuffed. We are political activists but we were put in the same cells as
common criminals. Once there, I discovered that there were seven other JKLF
members present. In the morning, we were told by the police that the arrests
had been made on orders of the GOC [corps commander in] Murree and the question
of bail did not arise!

They said no FIR [First Information Report] would be filed
and no arrest warrants were needed as the general had ordered the arrests. In
the morning we were shifted to Muzaffarabad Central Jail along with criminals.
We were released five days later. Even now, we are constantly under
surveillance. They keep asking my neighbors what I am up to. Why? I am not a
criminal.[66]

On July 3, 2001, at 4 a.m., police vans and one ISI car
came to my house. The police were in uniforms and the ISI in plainclothes. They
surrounded the house and knocked on the door. There were about forty personnel
in all. My mother was saying her fajr [early morning] prayers behind the
door. She opened the door, and they pushed her, causing her to fall and injure
her hand. Then they asked for me. She said I was present and asked them to wait
a minute or so in order for the women of the house to remove themselves, but
they ignored her. My mother came and woke me up, and the police came and
dragged me out, hitting me with rifle butts and kicking me. They bundled me
barefoot and clad in only my nightclothes into the van. They were abusing and
swearing at me. They took me to City Thana [police station] in
Muzaffarabad. They locked me up with various dangerous criminals. They told me
that this was an order from their superiors. I was there for four or five
hours. Then, I was handcuffed along with others and taken to Muzaffarabad Jail
where I was locked up. I was released a month later without charge.[67]

Mir Afzal Suleri, a Kashmiri nationalist, also described his
experience in the run-up to the 2001 election:

They raided my house but I was not present. I was arrested
on July 4 from Upper Adda [Main Chowk] of Muzaffarabad. Police and army
intelligence arrested me because I was leading fifty to a hundred protestors
against the crackdown on the JKLF and other nationalist parties. Our protest
was raided by the police and baton charged. I was arrested and taken to the
City Thana, from where I was taken to the Central Jail. I was also
released after five days. They arrested me the first time for chalking
pro-independence slogans on walls in 1999. It is really strange. And they keep
re-arresting me under the wall-chalking charge whenever it suits them. But of
course, the jihadi groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish and others can write whatever
they want. No one ever arrests them. They [Pakistan] say they are our friends
and India is our enemy. I agree India is our enemy but with friends like these
who needs enemies?[68]

The 2006 elections

About sixty pro-independence
candidates belonging to the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, the All Parties
Nationalist Alliance and some smaller groups filed nomination papers for the
July 11, 2006 elections. All were barred from the contest by election
authorities.

The elections that ensued resulted in the Islamabad backed-Muslim Conference
maintaining power with an absolute majority of thirty-one members in a house of
forty-nine, despite the incumbents and their backers in Islamabad having
suffered tremendous political damage due to their mishandling of the
post-earthquake situation. The elections were widely regarded as rigged to
favor Islamabad-backed candidates: this view was shared by all opposition
political parties including the pro-Pakistan opposition, and by independent
observers and analysts. Demanding an impartial probe into alleged rigging and
manipulation in these elections, former Pakistan-backed AJK Prime Minister
Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry said,

Despite rigging, manipulation, use of force and violence
and a carrot and stick policy, the ruling party secured far fewer votes than
the Opposition parties who take the identical stance that these were bogus
elections… We demand the establishment of a powerful investigation authority
that should comprise human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and
international observers.[69]

Pakistan's national opposition echoed these claims. Chief of
the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, argued that the results of
the "rigged" election in Azad Kashmir highlighted "what was to come in the
general elections to be held under President Pervez Musharraf next year
[2007]."[70]
Pakistan's highly regarded daily newspaper Dawn summed up the 2006
elections as follows:

To no one's surprise, the ruling Muslim Conference (MC) has
emerged as the largest party in Tuesday's elections in Azad Kashmir. Given the
widespread charges of poll rigging and the fact that the party is known to
enjoy the favours of the establishment in Islamabad, the results would have
been easily predicted… Even more questionable was Islamabad's long established
practice of disqualifying parties - two of them this time - which do not uphold
Kashmir's 'accession' to Pakistan. This approach has been challenged by
international human rights groups.… Whatever might be said about Azad Kashmir's
politics, it is no secret that it is closely intertwined with the political ups
and downs in Islamabad. It is no coincidence that the party in power in
Muzaffarabad enjoys the blessings of the rulers in Islamabad… In the present
situation, the challenge for Islamabad is to ensure an effective and stable
coalition government in Azad Kashmir - while enacting the charade of an
"independent" political process there. How much it helps the intra-Kashmir
peace process is not very clear.[71]

Rigging of elections in Azad
Kashmir generally follows the same pattern as in Pakistan. It generally occurs
in two stages. Pre-poll rigging involves ensuring-through transfers and
postings-that bureaucrats, election administrators and law enforcement officers
sympathetic to government-backed parties are in place in positions of authority
well before a campaign gets underway. These officials are expected to put
hurdles in the way of opposition parties' campaigning, such as denying them
permission to hold rallies. On election day, these officials often instruct
transport workers not to take opposition supporters to polling stations. Often
polling stations in opposition strongholds are moved at the last minute and
voter lists disappear, leaving voters unable to cast ballots. More traditional
forms of poll rigging such as ballot-stuffing also take place when polling
closes and ballots are taken away by government officials for counting.

All of the above constituted some of the allegations leveled
about the conduct of the 2006 Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections. Most
crucially, through the above mechanisms, the government of Pakistan ensures that the twelve refugee seats that are voted for in Pakistani cities invariably are
held by government-backed candidates. While it is often difficult to prove
allegations of large-scale rigging, to date no party in Azad Kashmir that does
not enjoy the backing of Islamabad has won an election, regardless of its
apparent popularity or the evident unpopularity of the government-backed party
that emerges as the winner.

Though the July 2006 elections were unrepresentative because
of the ban on those refusing to support accession to Pakistan and there were
widespread claims of poll rigging, physical abuses against candidates and their
supporters were not in evidence. While there were threats of violence, which
had to be taken seriously by recipients, there were few allegations of unlawful
arrests, mistreatment and torture that have been previously used as part of
government efforts to ensure election results to its liking. The
post-earthquake international presence in Azad Kashmir acted as a deterrent to
the use of violence usually employed by Pakistani authorities in dealing with
the opposition. Amanullah Khan, leader of a faction of the JKLF that attempted
to field over thirty candidates in the election, explained to Human Rights
Watch,

Though we were still banned from taking part in the
election, this time we have not been beaten and illegally detained. We were
[candidates] threatened with beatings and arrests by the local administration
but when the time came, the threats did not materialize into action. The
reasons are quite evident. Post-earthquake Kashmir is less repressive than
before simply because the organizational wherewithal for traditional levels of
repression is still not in place. Also there are appearances to be maintained
in front of donors and international actors engaged in relief and reconstruction.
The fear is that the international community will leave and Pakistan will completely re-erect its control mechanisms. And Azad Kashmir will return to worse from
bad. This is bad but what happened to us in 2001 was much worse and unless the
world decides to remain engaged, we may return to the harassment, beatings and
torture of the past. We were let off this time because they knew the world was
watching. But what if the world moves on?[72]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that
"everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives," and "has the right to equal access
to public service."[73]
In its General Comment on participation in public affairs and the right to
vote, the Human Rights Committee stated,

Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such
as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded
by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or
descent, or by reason of political affiliation [emphasis added].[74]

VI. Torture and Other Forms of Mistreatment

Security force personnel continued to torture persons in
custody throughout the country. Human rights organizations reported that
methods included beating; burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the
feet, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging
upside down, and forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters.

-U.S. State Department's 2005
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on Pakistan[75]

Human Rights Watch and others have long
reported on the routine use of torture by the authorities in Pakistan, both in common criminal cases and against alleged political opponents. Politically
motivated torture is typically used to compel politicians, political activists
and journalists critical of the government to change their views or at least
silence them.[76]

Documenting torture, particularly that perpetrated by the
Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies, can be particularly
challenging in Azad Kashmir. However, Azad Kashmir is no exception to the
pattern of torture and mistreatment by Pakistani authorities documented in the
rest of the country. Civilian law enforcement and the military and its
intelligence agencies commit torture and other mistreatment with impunity. Most
incidents of politically motivated torture recorded by Human Rights Watch
involved the ISI, or the police acting on the military's behalf.

Very few of those who allege torture accuse the Azad Kashmir
government of being responsible. To the contrary, some individuals reported
ineffectual attempts by local politicians and the bureaucracy to intercede to
bring the torture to an end. In one incident, the victims also described
attempts by the then prime minister to intercede with the army on their behalf.

Given the climate of fear that pervades the territory, only
a fraction of those who described experiences of torture or ill-treatment to
Human Rights Watch were willing to place them on the record. Only politically
active Kashmiri nationalists and 1991 refugees from Jammu and Kashmir state
were willing to be quoted.

Human Rights Watch has learned
that there are large numbers of Kashmiri detainees being held for long periods
by the Pakistani military in secret detention facilities in Azad Kashmir and in
Pakistan. Human Rights Watch interviewed two groups, comprising dozens of
individuals, who allege that they had been severely tortured, illegally
detained for several years, and then released in designated clusters under
continuing surveillance and told they were not allowed to return home or to
their communities. Many of these men are or were militants, while others have
no apparent connection to militant groups.

Human Rights Watch was only able to interview these
individuals in secret under cover of darkness in the secluded and difficult to
access residential camps where they were sent upon their release from illegal
and secret detention facilities. The names and other specifics of the
individuals who spoke to us have been withheld or altered in the testimony
provided below in order to protect their identities and to prevent their
further persecution by Pakistani security agencies.

One man, Adeel, explained to Human Rights Watch what
happened to him and his militant friends:

I am from the Indian side [name
of town withheld]. I am as religious as any other Kashmiri person. I joined a
religious militant group [name withheld] in the 1990s not because I believed in
a religious struggle but because it was the most effective platform to fight
for the freedom of Kashmiris from the racist violent bastards that call
themselves Indians. My sisters were sixteen and seventeen. The [Indian] army
came looking for the men of our family. They did not find us so they raped and
killed my younger sister. They took away the older one. Probably they raped and
killed her too but we never found the body so who knows? They killed our men.
They raped our women. They usurped our rights and they still do. We thought
Pakistanis would help us. We were wrong. So much has happened since that all
this seems like many nightmares ago.

I crossed over to the Pakistani side with others in my
group. Shahid here [name changed] and I have known each other since then. I did
many operations from here into my part of Kashmir. I have killed Indian police
and I am proud of that. I would still kill Rashtriya Rifles [Indian army]
bastards if I could. But over a few months I noticed that we were ordered to
attack our own people [fellow militants] in order to claim unofficial
compensation from the Pakistani government that would be pocketed by our
so-called leaders and Pakistani soldiers. Still I carried on. The cause was too
important. But then we had to go on an operation where we killed our own people
in order to keep the anger alive, we were told by the ISI. My anger came from
the killing and rape of my family, my people. It was and is alive. It made no
sense to me to try and keep it alive by killing my own people. I had an
argument with my commander.

When we returned to this side [Azad Kashmir], we were
summoned for debriefing by the ISI. Five of us had raised objections. Shahid
and Wahid [names changed] are here with me; you can see. They are also from the
real Kashmir. Two others, Sameer and Kaleem [names changed] are dead-they died
not in a freedom operation but most probably as the result of the 'love'
provided by the ISI.[77]

Shahidexplained what happened next:

The 'debriefing' was more of a violent interrogation. About
six or seven soldiers led by a major ran the proceedings, which lasted for
about five days. The soldiers kept changing and 'worked' us in shifts. They
started by making us do push-ups and sit-ups for hours, then beat us with rods
and belts when we collapsed in exhaustion. They kept saying that we must admit
that we had become 'double agents,' that we had crossed over to the Indian side
because we were 'Hindu lovers,' that we were 'shameless bastards who wanted to
be raped by the rapists of our sisters and mothers.' Initially, I and the
others argued, told them they were wrong and what they were doing was wrong.
But when you are beaten and bloodied, barely conscious, nothing really matters
beyond a point. They decided to make a particular example of Sameer [name
changed] who was the most vocal of us. In front of us, he was stripped naked
and chillies were shoved up his rectum. He screamed and screamed and the more
he screamed the more they beat him with batons and belts, kicked him, punched him.
They would beat him unconscious, bring him back and then beat him unconscious
again. He did not die in front of us. But it has been eight years and we never
saw him again after those five days together so I think he is dead. He has to
be. After what they did to him, it would be better for him too.

After the five days of what they called debriefing, we were
locked together in the interrogation cells. These are small windowless rooms.
They are unventilated and they stink. We were given daal [lentils] and roti
[bread] to eat once a day and two glasses of water. Once a day we were taken
one by one to the latrine at the end of the corridor. We were told that if we
wanted to piss or shit at any other time, we could do it in the cell and live
with it. I am ashamed to admit that we did that. The cell was cleaned once a
month. This is when we were taken out for exercise, which consisted of being
made to run by laughing soldiers. When we could not run, we would be kicked and
laughed at by the soldiers.

During this period, we were summoned by a senior army
commander only once. He told us that we were traitors to the Kashmir cause and
would spend the rest of our lives in the cells. 'Even your families will forget
you existed,' he said. There were the three of us in that one cell. There were
others in other cells. The cells were in a row and there must have been about
ten I think. We spent seven years in there. Then I don't know what happened.
The three of us and these four others were released and settled in this camp
here. We were told that we were not to move from the camp or speak to anyone or
we will be killed. Some of our former militant colleagues are in charge of
getting food across to us. We are not allowed to move from here and we are told
we are under surveillance all the time. Wahid [name changed], as you can see,
is not really sane, poor fellow. Maybe Adeel [name changed] and I are mad too.
We must be to tell you all this.[78]

Such treatment by Pakistani security forces is not limited
to errant former militants from Jammu and Kashmir state. Zamir, a resident of
Azad Kashmir, described his experience:

I am a believer in the Kashmir cause. The liberation of Kashmir is a sacred duty for every Kashmiri. But what are we liberating Kashmir for? For
the Kashmiris I think. Not for Pakistan. And that is all I said. But I guess I
said it to the wrong person and at the wrong time. I belonged to a large
militant organization-a very rich militant organization and one that made a lot
of money from the ISI as well. When you are closely involved and your comrades
start dying for no reason and there is money to be claimed for each corpse, you
can add things up gradually. I felt that some of the boys we had trained for
operations in occupied Kashmir had died in very mysterious circumstances. There
were rumors that they had been killed at point-blank range by their own
comrades. That they had been killed before they had crossed over [to the Indian
side] and it had been said that they had become martyrs [shaheed] at the
hands of Indian troops. And worst, the compensation that was the due of their
families had not reached them or in some cases less than half the money had got
to the families. Had our boys been martyred in an operation? Had they been
killed for the price of their corpses? These were some of the questions I
raised.

Because I raised these
questions, I spent five years in a cell. I was kept there by the ISI, the army.
Overnight, our allies turned into our tormentors. I was beaten every day for a
month. Once a week for a few months. And once a month or so after that. I was
always beaten by intelligence or army people. And my sin, as they told me
themselves, was that I was a traitor. That I had questioned the jihad and I had
tried to damage the cause.

How was I beaten? Initially the beatings were more severe.
I was hung upside down, beaten with a stick, kicked and punched and threatened
with death. For hours at a time. Then over the months the frequency and intensity
of the beatings became less severe. I was just kept in the cell and let out to
use the toilet etc. They kept telling me that my sin was grave and my
punishment was that I spend the rest of my days in the detention center. Then I
was let go with these people. My family know I have been released. They know
where I am. But they have not been to see me. I don't want them to either. My
children are five years older. I want them to keep growing and not see me in
this state.[79]

Shakir, another Azad Kashmir resident who claims never to
have been involved in militancy, told Human Rights Watch,

I have never belonged to any militant organization. The
truth is that I was not really interested in the struggle. I supported it but
never felt the need to fight for it. I felt that it was the job of those under
occupation to liberate themselves. If we were good hosts to them that was good
enough. As my home was conveniently located, I played host to liberation
parties traveling across to the other side. They were accompanied often by our
army people who helped them. I grew to know many of these people. But one day
in the late 90s, a fight broke out between two members of a militant group and
their military minder. Before I knew it, one of the militants had been shot
dead in my house. We had to dispose of his body. After this incident, I told
the army people I did not want to perform this service anymore. They should
find some other house. But they responded by throwing my belongings and my
family, including the womenfolk, out of our house.

I was very angered by this and threatened to go public with
everything I knew if my home was not returned to me. Of course, as I told them
many times afterwards, I did not mean it. The army is very powerful. There is
nothing someone like me can do against it, even if it takes away my home. I
just said what I said in anger. But it was too late.

Three soldiers and one officer, a captain I think, took me
to their detention center. There, they tied me up and whipped me until my skin
tore and I was bleeding all over and then I passed out. They must have whipped
me for a few hours before I passed out. I don't really know. I woke up in a
dark cell. I kept calling for water but no one came. I passed out again.

When I woke up again, a soldier was there who gave me
water. He was kind to me and gave me daal and roti to eat. The
next day, I was brought out and I saw the soldiers with whom I had the
altercation. They saw me and kicked, punched and beat me again. Afterwards, I
was put in the cell. I was kept in the cell for three years. I was beaten only
occasionally after the first few months when I was beaten often.

I was released and brought here [name of place withheld]
and told that I was being watched and if I tried to leave I would be
re-arrested. I have not seen my family, have no news of them. They probably
think I am dead.[80]

Ilyas, who described himself as a former "clerk in the Azad
Kashmir government" would not tell Human Rights Watch what had led to his
detention and continued monitoring:

I am more lucky than the others you have met here as I was
released after only six months. I have now been living here for about a year
and I have been told that I may be allowed to leave in a few more months. I
cannot spoil that by allowing you to tell the details of why I was picked up.
Let us say, they felt I had become unreliable and may reveal information I
know. The suspicion was enough for me to be scarred for life. See, I have scars
all over my back from the whippings that went on for a month. The thing with
whipping is that you can withstand quite a lot the first time. But after that
when your wounds are raw, just one lash is enough to get you bleeding again and
screaming in agony. Perhaps I am weak. But I have learnt my lesson. I just want
to go home. And Inshallah I will and I will go with the blessings of my
jailers. That is my aim and what I pray for.[81]

Non-militant political actors frequently experience or are
threatened with torture and mistreatment. The experiences of various opposition
activists arbitrarily arrested and ill-treated ahead of the 2001 elections are
recounted above (see Chapter V). In another example, Aurangzeb Al-Maroof, who
is affiliated with the Jammu and Kashmir National Students' Federation (JKNSF),
described to Human Rights Watch his mistreatment by the ISI in mid-September
2003:

It was morning. My brother was driving and an ISI major on
a motorbike swore at him. There was an altercation. I do not know the details
as I was not there myself but I can assure you that my brother would not have
dared get physical with the man.

At 2:30 in the afternoon, eight to ten ISI personnel came
to my house in a Land Cruiser. They were armed and barged in, and started
breaking our household goods. They found me and blindfolded me. Then, they
started beating me with iron rods– they beat me and dragged me to the Land
Cruiser and continued beating me with iron rods. They took me someplace-I don't
know where-and continued beating me. They kept telling me, 'You are anti-Pakistan.
If you want money, tell us, but don't talk of independence.' After about three
hours, I lost consciousness. The next day [as I discovered later], they dumped
me at Neelum Bridge [in Muzaffarabad] where a rickshaw driver found me and took
me to CMH [military hospital].

I realized later that they only dumped me because our
political colleagues took out a protest demonstration-that was the only reason
they released me. I tried to lodge an FIR [First Information Report] but the
City Police Station refused to register the FIR. The deputy commissioner, Dr.
Mahmoodul Hassan said, 'find a compromise.' I refused. I said that I wanted to
know why I had been kidnapped and beaten by the Pakistan army like this. We
[JKNSF] demonstrated all over AJK, especially in Rawalakot. But the FIR was
never registered.

I do have my application to the police and they gave me a
number, but they refused to register an FIR, stating that 'they will pick you
up and you will never be seen again.' They [the ISI] use code names so we don't
exactly know who the people [perpetrators of the beating] are.[82]

A JKNSF activist who requested anonymity for fear of
reprisal described an incident involving the ruling Muslim Conference
apparently using the authorities to persecute their political opponents:

On July 25, 2005, the Muslim Conference held a rally [jalsa]
in Khowra area of Muzaffarabad. One of their boys was murdered in a firing
incident. They blamed us as we had formed a unit there. We think the government
itself is responsible for the firing in order to create tension to win votes.
We are not violent and we are in no position to engage in such activity. They
accused Raja Kashif (twenty-two years old), a JKNSF member, of the murder. Raja
Kashif fled. Consequently, the Muzaffarabad police arrested his father, his
brother and other JKNSF members-around ten or twelve. We were sent messages
that unless he surrendered and took the blame, they would all be tortured.

Raja Kashif gave himself up, because he did not want his
brother, father and friends tortured. As of now, nobody, including his father,
brother or other JKNSF members have been released. This sort of incident is
commonplace. It was reported in the newspapers.[83]

Torture is also routinely used to extract confessions in common
criminal cases in Azad Kashmir. Shahid Aziz, a laborer and resident of
Muzaffarabad, described his experience to Human Rights Watch:

I was arrested in January 2004 for stealing jewelry from a
house. This was a ridiculous charge as I was in Bagh at the time…. The police
came to my area and picked me up from the market. I was taken to the city
police station where three constables took me to the interrogation room. I was
there for seven hours-from about eight in the evening to three in the morning. During
this time, they punched me, kicked me and beat me with bamboo sticks. Finally,
because my family arrived, they let me go. I was bruised all over, my skin was
torn in many places and I had two broken teeth. I meet the policemen who did
this around the city from time to time. If they are in the mood, they remind me
of the night. They expect me to fear them. I do. I don't want this to happen
again.[84]

I was picked up by the police on March 19, 2005, at 6 p.m.
from my home in Muzaffarabad. When I asked the police why I was being taken,
they said I should wait to get to the thana [police station] to find
out. When we arrived there, they told me that I was a troublemaker who did not
show the police enough respect. I was really confused as I have always been
very respectful to the police and all other superiors. I asked them to explain
how I had been disrespectful. The policemen got very angry at this. They
started beating me. They used their fists and kicked me and beat me for at
least two hours until I fainted. Then they threw me outside the station where I
lay moaning until a stranger helped me get home. The strange thing is that I
have no idea why this happened. They never told me why. I don't dare ask them.
But I do know it can happen again.[85]

VII. Discrimination and Abuse Against Post-1989 Refugees

According to the Azad Kashmir Rehabilitation Department,
there are 29,932 registered refugees who crossed over from Jammu and Kashmir
state in India in 1989-91.[86]
Analysts suggest that there may be approximately another five thousand unregistered
individuals, some of whom are former militants. Some of the refugees live in communities
across Azad Kashmir, while others were housed, prior to the October 2005
earthquake, in refugee camps exclusively devoted to them (pre-earthquake
figures indicated that there were 2,720 refugees in Manakpayan camp and 1,508
in Ambore camp, two of the largest such camps; current figures are difficult to
ascertain).[87]

The refugees were fleeing heightened conflict in Jammu and Kashmir state and serious human rights abuses by Indian security forces. As noted
above (see Chapter II), the government of Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir
authorities welcomed these refugees at the time with some fanfare. But many
refugees have found life in Azad Kashmir to be difficult and are critical of
the Pakistani government and its policies in Kashmir. Most of the refugees are
secular nationalists and, as also noted above, culturally and linguistically
distinct from the peoples of Azad Kashmir . A primary motive for the
discrimination they report would appear to be that many of them do not share
the vision of a unified Kashmir under Pakistani control. Some have experienced
abuse including arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment for seeking to exercise
their rights.

Ghulam Ali Khan is from Kupwara district in Jammu and Kashmir state. He joined JKLF (Amanullah Khan group) when he was twenty-one years
old. He told Human Rights Watch,

When the JKLF broke into two
factions it had a devastating effect on the movement. I have two children and
came into Pakistan in 1994. I have only seen my children grow up in
photographs. The sad part is that our families in [Jammu and Kashmir state] are
constantly interrogated by intelligence agencies and once we go back, we too
will be viewed with suspicion as Pakistani agents.

We are not getting our basic rights as refugees. We are
persecuted all the time. We are beaten. And because we do not support Pakistan's policy of indiscriminate murder, we are regarded as traitors to Kashmir. We are dying of
hunger and lack of resources and the governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir
are responsible for this situation. We are ready to be handed over to the
[International Committee of the] Red Cross. The [United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR] has said that the Pakistan government has to
be willing. The Pakistan Institute of Policy Studies recommended that members
should be handed over to the U.N. or Red Cross. But they will not because of
ego. We need help.

We support the peace process. We are the greatest
supporters of the peace process. And why would we not be? We are the real
divided families. Those who were divided in 1947 are dead and gone. We have
parents, children, wives, brothers and sisters on the other side. There can be
no peace without taking us into account.[88]

On February 16, 2005, India and Pakistan announced an agreement
to start a bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar from April 7, 2005.[89]
The refugees hailed the agreement and began to make preparations to welcome the
first bus. In March, they succeeded in accessing the Indian media through
Munizae Jahangir, a Pakistani journalist who freelances for the New Delhi-based
NDTV.[90]
They appeared on NDTV in a news segment in which they specified their
renunciation of militancy and appealed to the Indian authorities to grant them
safe passage back to Jammu and Kashmir state. The interviews were widely picked
up by the Indian media.[91]

However, it soon became apparent to the refugees, as it did
to their relatives in Jammu and Kashmir state, that the bus service was limited
and appeared specifically not to be open to controversial persons or their
families.[92]
Zahid Butt, a refugee explained to Human Rights Watch,

It became clear very quickly that the bus service was not
open to Kashmiri nationalist refugees or their families-the real divided people
in Kashmir. This is an understanding between India and Pakistan. Why? If we cannot go, at least our families should be allowed to visit us. But even that
is not happening. We wanted to welcome the bus. But we were not even allowed to
do that. Instead, we were arrested, jailed and tortured.[93]

Jamil Mirza, formerly of the People's League (PL, a Jammu
and Kashmir-based nationalist political group), added,

The bus is only taking tourists and distant relatives. The
1990 refugees are not being sent to J&K. Go and check for yourself. It is
meant to be first come, first served. Yet how come those with form numbers 160
and 180 [their place in the queue] are not being allowed on while someone with
form number 15,000 will be given a ticket? We want to go home. We are with the
peace process and we support it. We want to go home.[94]

As the April 7 date for the first bus neared, the Jammu
Kashmir United Haqiqi [Real] Movement (a refugee and former militant umbrella
organization) stepped up preparations to welcome the bus. It published leaflets
(examples of which are in the possession of Human Rights Watch) welcoming the
bus, and began organizing a welcome procession comprising 1990 refugees.

Jamil Mirza described what happened on April 6, 2005:

We wanted to welcome those who
were arriving on April 7. On April 6, about eight of us were called for a
meeting by the Deputy Commissioner Raja Liaqat and the Deputy Superintendent of
Police Gulfaraz. They told us, 'You cannot welcome the bus.' We said we
support the bus. They said we will not give you permission: 'You will be our
guests,' they said. They took us to the city police station just a few hours
later-Kahori Police Station. Six of us were at the meeting, two were brought
from home. I was there. We were locked up there for two days

At about four o'clock in the
afternoon, two days later, we were shifted to Central Jail Muzaffarabad. We
discovered that another twenty were also arrested. We were separated though we
appealed to be kept together. We were divided into groups of eight and four.
The room I was in held around thirty people. It was a large jail room with
ventilation. But criminals were kept with us including murderers sentenced to
death.

On April 7, we went on a hunger strike as we left Kahori
Station. We made it clear that our strike was against the administration, not
the jail authorities. Why have we been locked up for hailing and supporting the
bus? We were held under 16 MPO [Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance].[95]

On April 10, at about 6 a.m.,
we were given breakfast. We refused. The jail authorities started beating us
with sticks and metal rods. About fourteen or fifteen people were beating each
person. All other criminal prisoners and the police present were included. The
jail superintendent, Raja Aftab, was standing at the sentry post directing the
prisoners to beat us. We were beaten badly. (It was pre-arranged between the
other prisoners and the police.) One person had an eye torn out. One had
several head injuries. Another had his hand broken. Everyone was bruised.

We were beaten for about two-and-a-half hours. This
happened in all three cells between 6 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. Then the jailer came
and said, 'If you don't eat, we will shove the food up your ass.' We agreed to
eat under duress, as those who refused to eat were beaten very severely.
Mohammad Ayub Butt refused to eat, so they cracked his spine.

Then they dipped the roti in water and gave it to
us. They forced us to sign a statement stating that what had occurred was a
fight between prisoners. We were told that if we told the truth, we would be
beaten some more and jailed. So we were released on April 16 at 6 p.m. No case
was registered.

Why did the Azad Kashmir government arrest us and beat us
up? We were only supporting the stated policy of the Pakistani government. Is
that not allowed? Or does Musharraf sitting in Islamabad not know what goes on
in Muzaffarabad?[96]

Independent journalists corroborated and
supported the claims of the refugees and former militants.[97]

Mohammad Ayub Butt is a native of Budham district of Jammu
and Kashmir state and now lives in Muzaffarabad. He is a former militant. He
told us:

Most militants like me-actually from Kashmir-have been
abandoned by their organizations, especially Hizbul-Mujahedin. But of course
money for militant activities is still rolling in from Pakistan and the ISI but it is used for corruption-to line the pockets of the jihadi leadership and
the corrupt ISI officers. The jihadi leadership has used the money meant for
jihad for their own personal benefits. Have you seen their mansions?

But if India and Pakistan think they can strike a peace and forget about us, they are mistaken. I was
injured while fighting Indian troops and now I find it hard to work. I face
constant threats from Hizbul-Mujahedin, from the ISI and I cannot go back to my
home. Is this fair? Musharraf says there will be peace with India. Peace in Kashmir. But where is the peace? You can see for yourself. All of Azad Kashmir knows
that the jihadis are still active. Does Musharraf not know? I urge both the
governments of India and Pakistan to resolve the issue of the 1990 refugees and
the 450 former militants among them. We want to go home. My real jihad would
have been to take care of my parents and bring up my kids. I am an uneducated
man and I did not know what jihad meant at the time.[98]

VIII. Detailed Recommendations

To
the Government of Pakistan

Release all individuals imprisoned or detained and
withdraw immediately all criminal cases against anyone, including Kashmiri
nationalists, for the peaceful expression of their political views,
including that Azad Kashmir should be independent.

End the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention, other
forms of harassment, and torture and other ill-treatment of persons
exercising their rights to freedom of expression, including those who
peacefully oppose Kashmir's accession to Pakistan or demand greater
autonomy for the territory.

Repeal constitutional curbs on freedom of association,
expression and assembly in Azad Kashmir so that the constitution and Azad
Kashmir law are consistent with international human rights standards.

Prosecute to the full extent of the law and in accordance
with international fair trial standards those members of the armed forces,
its intelligence agencies, government officials and police personnel
implicated in serious violations of human rights, including arbitrary
arrests and torture.

Respect press freedom and allow full independent coverage
of both past and ongoing events in Azad Kashmir. Remove formal and
informal prohibitions on news gathering and reporting by the Azad Kashmir
and Pakistani media, and accord all journalists full freedom of movement.

End the practice of banning books and literature.

Ensure that human rights organizations have freedom of
movement throughout Azad Kashmir and allow them to carry out
investigations and fact-finding missions free from intimidation or
interference by military authorities.

Ensure free and fair elections in Azad Kashmir. To this
end, repeal part 7(2) of the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitutional Act of
1974, which bars from seeking elective office any person or political
party in Azad Kashmir that seeks to "propagate against or take part in
activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's
accession to Pakistan," and remove chapter 3, 2(vii) of the Azad Jammu and
Kashmir Legislative Assembly Ordinance 1970, which bars from seeking
elective office anyone who "defames or brings into ridicule… the Armed
Forces of Pakistan."

Ensure that all members of the
armed forces, ISI personnel, and law enforcement personnel deployed in
Azad Kashmir, at every level, have received appropriate training in the
fundamental principles of human rights law.

Investigate allegations of human rights abuses by militant
groups based in Azad Kashmir and fully and fairly prosecute those
responsible.

Respect the due process rights of all persons detained or
accused of crimes. Hold all detainees only in officially recognized
places of detention. Inform all detainees immediately of the grounds
of arrest and any charges against them. Provide all detainees with
immediate and regular access to family members and lawyers.
Detainees must promptly be brought before a judge to review the legality
of their detention.

Make publicly available regularly updated figures on the
number of individuals arrested or charged with crimes in Azad Kashmir with
information on the nature of their alleged crimes and the places of their
detention.

Invite the U.N. special rapporteur on torture to visit
Azad Kashmir, conduct free and unfettered investigations, and make
appropriate recommendations.

To
Azad Kashmir-based militant groups

When participating in
hostilities, take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with
international humanitarian law, specifically common article 3 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law.

Cease threatening civilians who do not cooperate with or
support the activities of militant groups.

Publicly denounce abuses committed by any militant group
in Jammu and Kashmir state and call for accountability for such abuses on
both sides of the Line of Control.

Cease using anti-personnel landmines or otherwise
conducting attacks that do not discriminate between military objectives
and civilians.

Immediately end all recruitment of persons under the age
of eighteen and demobilize combatants under age eighteen. All adults
recruited before age eighteen must be given the option to leave.

Permit civil society organizations to undertake the full
range of protection activities including investigations of abuses
committed by militants.

To
donors and other international actors

Use every available opportunity to press for an end to
impunity for perpetrators of human rights abuses, including members of the
military, intelligence agencies, police and militant groups. Urge
respect for international due process and fair trial standards and press
for impartial inquiries into, and accountability for, cases of arbitrary
detention and torture and other ill-treatment in detention.

Bilateral donors and international lending agencies,
including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, should insist that
the government of Pakistan commit itself to providing training in human
rights law and norms to all law enforcement personnel, particularly its
military forces in Azad Kashmir.

Donors should provide assistance, through government
agencies and NGOs, to promote the administration of justice.

Ensure contracts for earthquake reconstruction are handled
through proper procurement procedures that allow bidding by private
agencies, and not just military entities.

Ensure independent auditing of relief funds and materials
to ensure transparency and accountability.

Ensure greater civilian oversight of relief,
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Aid should be handled through
a process that involves the Azad Kashmir government, as well as local,
national and international NGOs, and civil society groups, particularly
those working in the field.

Acknowledgements

This report was written by Ali Dayan Hasan, South Asia
researcher at Human Rights Watch, based on his research in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan conducted from 2004 to August 2006. Additional research was conducted by
telephone, email and in meetings with NGOs and officials in Islamabad, Washington D.C., London and elsewhere. Brad Adams, executive director of the Asia
Division and Ian Gorvin, consultant in the Program office, at Human Rights
Watch edited the report. Jim Ross, senior legal advisor, provided legal review.
South Asia researchers Meenakshi Ganguly and Asia advocacy director Veena
Siddharth reviewed and commented on the report. Andrea Cottom provided
production assistance along with Jonathan Cohen, Fitzroy Hepkins, Andrea
Holley, Jose Martinez and Jo-Anne Prud'homme. Ayesha Salma Karriapar and Hena
Khursheed provided research assistance.

Human Rights Watch would like to
thank the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and HRCP chairperson Asma
Jahangir for their generous assistance. Human Rights Watch would also like to
thank the following people and organizations: Teresita Schaffer, CSIS; Chris
Fair, United States Institute of Peace; Charu Lata Hogg, Chatham House; and
Najm-ul-Sahr Ata-ullah. We also thank the many journalists, government
officials, lawyers, diplomats and NGO workers who provided invaluable
assistance but would prefer to remain anonymous.

We also acknowledge with appreciation the support of
Cordaid.

Above all, we would like to
express our gratitude to the many Kashmiri men and women in Azad Kashmir who
spoke with us, recounting their personal experiences of hardship and violence,
often at great personal risk.

[1]Human
Rights Watch holds all governments to their obligations under international
human rights and humanitarian law. Accordingly, we do not seek to compare the
human rights situation in Azad Kashmir with that in Jammu and Kashmir state in India. Given the radically divergent histories, ethnicities and relationships with the
central authority on both sides of the LoC, any such comparative study would be
meaningless. Human Rights Watch has documented human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir, most recently in "'Everyone Lives in Fear': Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 18, no. 11(C), September 2006.

[2]Official
website of the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, "Facts and Figures"
section, [online]
http://www.ajk.gov.pk/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2256&Itemid=47
(retrieved August 30, 2006).

[3]The
website of the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, provides primary
school enrollment figures for Azad Kashmir at
http://www.moe.gov.pk/enrollment.htm (retrieved August 30, 2006).

[4]There
is a sound historical reason for the Sudhans' sharing in the political
dominance of Azad Kashmir: the first attempt to wrest control of Kashmir from
the Maharaja in 1947-48 and bring the state into Pakistan was Sudhan-inspired
and led. The slogan "Kashmir banega Pakistan" ("Kashmir shall become Pakistan") was first and foremost then a Sudhan statement of intent, co-opted by the
Pakistani state.

[6]
Official
website of the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, "List of Members
Legislative Assembly2006" section, [online]
http://www.ajk.gov.pk/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2618&Itemid=142
(retrieved August 30, 2006).

[9]Calling
for immediate assistance, Maharaja Hari Singh in a letter to Lord Mountbatten
of October 26, 1947, said that "a grave emergency" had arisen because the
Pakistan Government had "permitted steady and increasing strangulation of
supplies like food, salt and petrol" and allowed "desperadoes with modern
weapons" to infiltrate into Kashmir.

[11]The
Maharaja, however, insisted on a special deal under which Kashmir would have
its own constitution. Under the Instrument of Accession, Kashmir retained a
measure of autonomy, and clause 7 stated that "Nothing in this Instrument shall
be deemed to commit me [the Maharaja] in any way to acceptance of any future
constitution of India."

[13]In
1963, Pakistan handed over around 5,000 square kilometers in the Shaksgam Valley to China. Although the transfer was subject to a settlement on the Kashmir
issue between the two claimants, China has already built a military highway on
this territory and is unlikely to vacate it. The website of the Government of
Azad Jammu and Kashmir notes that the area of Azad Kashmir is 13,297 square
kilometers. See http://www.ajk.gov.pk/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=34&id=184&Itemid=144
(retrieved September 13, 2006).

[14]Jammu
and Kashmir state (which includes the Muslim-majority
Kashmir valley, Hindu-majority Jammu, and Buddhist-majority Ladakh) is 101,387
square kilometers. See http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm (retrieved July
21, 2005).

[15]United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, [online]
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html (retrieved June 1,
2004).

[17]The
U.N. resolutions said that a plebiscite would be held so that Kashmiris could
choose to accede to either India or Pakistan. Many Kashmiris advocate a third
option: they want the right of self-determination to not just be confined to
joining India or Pakistan, but to include becoming an independent state.

[23]The
Muslim Nizam refused to accede to the Indian Union, although it entirely
surrounded his territory, demanding the right as ruler of 18 million
(overwhelmingly Hindu) subjects to rule a separate state. The resulting
standoff ended with the state's occupation by Indian troops between September
13 and 17, 1948, and its incorporation as a state of India the next year.

[24]The
Nawab of Junagadh (a Muslim) decided that Junagadh should accede to Pakistan, which was just across the Arabian Sea. The unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led to a
cessation of all trade with India. The Nawab was forced to flee to Karachi with his family and established a provisional government. A plebiscite was held on
February 20, 1948, in which the electorate voted overwhelmingly to join the
Indian Union. India then assumed formal control over the entire state of
Junagadh. A "liberation army" (azad fauj) of twenty thousand men with armored
cars and modern weapons entered Junagadh and the state was secured. The
Government of Pakistan protested, saying that since the state had acceded to Pakistan on September 5, 1947, India's takeover was illegal.

[25]Apart
from religion, Pakistani scholars also explain that Kashmir is vital to the
country's economy because it is the source of most rivers flowing into Pakistan. Among the various disputes related to Kashmir between India and Pakistan is the
construction of dams in Jammu and Kashmir state, which will allow India control
over Pakistan's irrigation and water sources-see this chapter, section "The
Politics of Water," below.

[43]Human Rights Watch was
informed by five members of the ruling Muslim Conference on separate occasions
that they had never heard of Sardar Anwar until they were informed by Anwar
that Islamabad had nominated him for election by the Legislative Assembly. All
five requested anonymity.

[44]The
president's military career is not mentioned in his profile on the Government
of Azad Kashmir's official website.

[49]The
oath is based on Article7(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution
Act of 1974, and in addition to holding political office or being appointed to
a government job, the submission of a signed declaration to the same effect is
required in order to publish books or periodicals.

[53]The letter of suspension to
Saeed Asad is on file with Human Rights Watch.

[54]Maqbool
Butt is considered a hero by Kashmiri nationalists and the founder of the
movement for an independent Kashmir. He was disliked almost equally by India and Pakistan, and viewed as a terrorist by the former and a double agent by the latter. He was
hanged on February 11, 1984, in Tihar Jail, New Delhi, age forty-five, and
buried there.

[55]The
complex history of the Northern Areas (NA) is intricately linked to the Kashmir dispute. Since 1947-48, the NA have been administered by Pakistan although they are
not legally part of it as they find no mention in the constitution of Pakistan
and are neither a province of Pakistan nor an autonomous territory having a
constitutional status of its own like Azad Kashmir. Though Pakistan blames the constitutional limbo the NA is in on its unresolved dispute with India over Kashmir, it has chosen to separate the territory from Azad Kashmir. Both Kashmiri
nationalists and India disagree with Pakistani policy in this regard.

[74]Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, The Right to Participate in Public
Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), para. 15.

[76]"Torture
is routinely used in Pakistan… against political opponents.… [A]cts of torture
by military agencies primarily serve the purpose of 'punishing' an errant
politician, political activist or journalist. Torture by the military usually
takes place after the victim has been abducted; the purpose is to frighten the
victim into changing his political stance or loyalties or at the very least to
stop him from being critical of the military authorities. The victim is often
let go on the understanding that if he fails to behave, another further
abduction and mistreatment will follow. In this manner, the victim can be kept
in a state of fear often for several years." Human Rights Watch letter to
President Pervez Musharraf, October 10, 2003, [online]
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/10/pakistan10103-ltr.htm.

[95]Section
16 of the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) ordinance prohibits speech that
"causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm to the public," or which
"furthers or is likely to further any activity prejudicial to public
safety or the maintenance of public order."

[97]Pakistan's largest
circulation English-language newspaper, Dawn, wrote: "Affiliated with the Jammu
Kashmir United Real Movement, the detainees, some of whom had married here and
ran small shops to earn livelihood, were taken into custody on Wednesday
evening - a day ahead of the launching ceremony of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus
service - to avert what the officials claimed any law and order problem.
Nineteen of them were kept in the city police station here and the rest in the
nearby Kahori police station before being moved to the central jail on Friday.
The JKURM had publicly celebrated the Feb 16 announcement by India and Pakistan to start the bus service between the divided Kashmiri capitals. It also strongly
criticized those Kashmiri leaders who were opposed to the bus service. An
official, who requested anonymity, told Dawn that the JKURM members were been
arrested under 3 MPO (Maintenance of Public Order), after 'intelligence reports
suggested that they could block the smooth movement of the trans-Kashmir bus.'
However, a JKURM member showed a pamphlet to this correspondent issued by the
group wherein it had asked its members and other residents of the capital to
assemble near Domel at 10am on April 7 'to welcome the guests (arriving) from
Srinagar (through the bus service)'. 'We just wanted to welcome the guests from
Srinagar because we have publicly celebrated this historic development the
time it was announced,' he said. 'The officials had assured that they would
release them by Friday morning but instead of fulfilling their commitment they
shifted them to the prison,' he lamented…. Officials had hinted that the
detainees would be freed only after they 'provide a guarantee in writing that
they would not create any problem in future'." "Five former Kashmiri fighters
wounded," Dawn (Karachi), April 10, 2005, [online] http://www.dawn.com/2005/04/10/top19.htm
(retrieved August 24, 2006).