Sri Lanka is a small island. The distance
from Colombo to Jaffna is barely 250 miles or even less as the crow flies. But
it is not unusual for goings on in those now distant parts to reach the pages
of the Colombo press, and perhaps the rulers of this land through Reuter International.
So the Island of 4th January broke the news of the massacre in the Jaffna Lagoon
of the night of Saturday 2nd January, quoting a Reuter report filed from Colombo
on the 3rd, headlined:

Nine Civilians Killed in Naval Attack

"Nine civilians were killed on Saturday
night when navy patrol craft attacked a flotilla of boats trying to cross Jaffna
lagoon where travel is banned, residents said today. Sixteen boats each carrying
about 20 people were attacked as they tried to cross the lagoon from Jaffna
to the mainland, they said.

"People panicked and started screaming
and shouting," he said after he reached Vavuniya. "I saw rounds of
tracer fly past my boat and hit the water. The Jaffna lagoon, the scene of frequent
fire fights between the navy and the Tamil rebels has been declared a no-go
zone by the military where people can be shot on sight.

The resident said the firing continued for
about 30 minutes."Only six boats in the flotilla reached the mainland.
The rest turned back", he added. . .

The Island of 5th January (Tuesday)
carried the following item filed by Shamindra Ferdinando, referring to the same
incident headlined,

"The dinghies operated by Sea Tigers
were moving in a convoy when the Navy patrol boats had swooped down on them.
However some of the dinghies had escaped carrying the wounded persons.

"The Navy boats operating from Nagathevanthurai
radar-naval station had confronted the boats while they were moving towards
the peninsula the sources indicated . . ."

"According to the Joint Operations Command
(JOC) the navy's in shore patrol craft operating from Nagathivanthurai were
successful in controlling Sea Tiger activities in the Jaffna lagoon. "All
boats trying to break the government imposed ban will be dealt with", an
officer said"

It appeared from the hard attitude above
that the government and its forces had made up their minds that anyone using
the Jaffna lagoon was a Tiger crossing in a Tiger boat. Not so, it seems, according
to a Daily News front page report of 6th January headlined.

Tiger morale declining day by day Nearly 3000 Tigers killed in 1992 By Daryll de Silva.

"A Senior military source yesterday
told the Daily News: "They (the Tigers) are now being frowned upon by the
very people they claim to be fighting for. It is the people's pressure that
will ultimately be their downfall. . . . the Tigers are not allowing any traffic
to move up and down through the Elephant Pass Road, although the security forces
have repeatedly assured the civilians of Jaffna. .

"This he said, left the civilians with
no option but the use of `no go' Jaffna lagoon Kilaly Point crossing, at great
risk to their lives, as the area is heavily patrolled by the navy."

"Most of those moving to the mainland
on the Kilaly crossing were deserters, They are in such poor shape that they
are risking their lives to come South. . ."

Now what have we here? Are civilians Tiger
deserters, or is it that Tiger deserters with Tiger passes are crossing the
lagoon in Tiger boats? Some were getting their act mixed up.[Top]

This supplements that given in 1.4 of this
report. See also 5.1 of Report No9. Shortly after the outbreak of war
in June 199O the northern railroad was stripped by the Tigers and even road
traffic through Elephant Pass, which was under army control, ceased.The Tigers
imposed a pass system to stem the civilian exodus and travel to the South became
a hazardous affair involving extortionate sums, with civilians subject to occasional
attacks from the air.

Following the LTTE's failed attempt to overrun
Elephant Pass in July 1991, the army gradually expanded its control over surrounding
areas. It then prohibited civilian traffic through other routes and wanted civilians
to travel along the main road through Elephant Pass as during the previous bout
of war ending in July 1987. To reinforce the ban and cut off the peninsula,
the army subsequently took control of the alternative ferry crossing at Puneryn.
The Tigers cited military reasons for themselves banning civilian traffic through
Elephant Pass. They claimed that the army would advance behind the civilians
into Jaffna. Whether this fear was genuine is questionable. The forces are known
to have used civilian cover, particularly in the East, to move about in areas
where resistance was likely to be light and sporadic. [See 1.2 and 4.11 of Briefing No. 1 & Ch. 6 of this report] But when commencing advances in
areas where heavy resistance was to be expected and much publicity would be
focused, there was a standard established pattern. This was to declare curfew
and advance behind armoured vehicles after heavy pounding from land - based
artillery and from the air. This has been the pattern for operations in Jaffna
since 1987. Civilian cover was used in Kayts in August 199O, but much after
the initial advance and when little resistance was expected.

The forces appear to have had tacitly accepted
that the civilians had little choice. After July 1991 civilians continued to
use the land route through Kompaddi, an open space about 2 1/2 miles east of
Elephant Pass, using boats for the flooded stretches when the rains came from
October. People travelled within sight of army sentries, occasionally shelled,
but for the most part ignored.

This continued for about an year, both civilian
traffic and essential food supplies travelling by this route, until further
consolidation of the army's position in the Elephant Pass area put a stop to
this. The forces increased their insistence that civilians must use the Elephant
Pass route (highway A-9). With Puneryn cut off the Tigers responded by allowing
the civilians to travel only through the 20 mile sea-route from Kilaly - a new
course not known to living memory. Ordinary civilians made the crossing at 8
knots in slow boats while Tiger boats fitted with several outboard motors did
the crossing at about 30 knots or more. Whether the army or the Tigers had greater
need for civilian cover in this instance would be a topic for an interesting
debate among military strategists.

It was clear that ordinary civilians had
a problem. Once more civilians continued to travel, occasionally shelled from
Puneryn and Elephant Pass and sometimes attacked by naval craft, where civilians
were killed. [See Chapter 1 of this report]. But there was no concerted
attempt to go all out and kill civilians, at least until December 1992. The
intention, from a purely military angle, seemed to be to apply pressure on the
civilians to use Elephant Pass.

Even before the present massacre there had
been a regular toll on civilians.But this was consistently played down by the
Tigers. Little publicity was given to civilian casualties resulting from naval
action in the lagoon. Bodies were regularly discovered on the shores by local
villagers and buried. The news of these diffused slowly by word of mouth. It
is also significant that following the recent massacre, while Tamil political
figures in Colombo and the press were reporting the number dead at about 4O
or more, the LTTE office in London gave a figure of 14. This is contrary to
the normal Tiger practice of multiplying several fold casualties from airforce
bombing. Clearly the Tigers were trying not to scare people from using the lagoon,
resulting in greater pressure on then to allow the use of Elephant Pass.

The plight of the civilians remained largely
unaddressed in a balanced and effective manner. Given the necessity to travel,
the civilians had no choice, except to take the course that involved the least
risk as they saw it. In October 1992, the BBC correspondent raised with the
LTTE spokesman Yogi the question of civilians using Elephant Pass. Yogi responded
that this would be agreeable to the LTTE provided that the government gave an
assurance that it would not use Elephant Pass for a military advance into Jaffna.
The military command gave such a verbal assurance. But the matter dropped and
nothing happened with regard to enforcing such an agreement. It was widely remarked
by the people that Yogi went off the international air waves for a long time.

Something serious and big was waiting to
happen. The first moves towards this began in mid-December. The army began issuing
hand bills to travellers through Vavuniya not to use the Kilaly crossing. The
Tigers announced through the press in Jaffna that they would offer protection
to people using the Kilaly crossing.Many passengers came to understand later that the
Tiger offer of protection amounted to giving fast rides to passengers in their
boats for a payment of a sum of Rs. 1500/-. For the vast majority who could
not afford it, it was to be the slow boat at Rs. 200/-. Which announcement came
first is probably unimportant. From the point of view of the forces it had become
a prestige battle. From the Tigers' point of view it was a propaganda gambit.
They had neither before nor after demonstrated a will or the capacity to protect
civilian traffic in the Jaffna lagoon. Though the navy claims to have destroyed
a number of Tiger boats variously ranging from 60 to many more, it is doubtful
if even a couple of them were Tiger boats rather than civilian sitting ducks
travelling at 8 knots. Both needed to make their point at the people's expense.

For the navy to make its point, it needed
to sink some boats it could lay its hands on (i.e the sitting ducks). For the
Tigers to make their point, they needed to fire on navy boats and make a break
for it. The worst was bound to happen sometime.[Top]

The night's crossing on Saturday 2nd January
started in the usual manner. Passengers had queued up and were taking their
turn in crossing by boats leaving at intervals carrying 15 to 20 passengers
each. The first four boats from Kilaly reached the mainland to the south without
incident. A naval gun boat fitted with cannon was in the lagoon at that time.
This boat could operate in an area in the centre of the lagoon where the water
was deep enough. But could not approach the shores. Whether the naval men saw
the first four boats is not known. Since movements were monitored by radar,
it is possible that these being slow boats, they were monitored and allowed
to pass. We next come to a crucial fact based on the testimony of one witness,
but on which most others are understandably reticent. Following the first four
boats, according to this witness was a fast boat with three outboard motors
of the kind used by Tigers. According to this witness the three or so persons
in the boat were not armed and were thought to be Tiger helpers rather than
Tigers.

Upon seeing the gun-boat, the fast boat made
a U-turn and sped away northwards. The gun-boat gave a chase. The fast boat
ran close to a group of passenger boats heading south and escaped northwards.
The gun-boat opened fire at these passenger boats from a distance and kept firing
for a long time - half an hour according to the Reuter report quoted above.Not
having received return fire at any stage, it was then clear that there were
no Tigers about the place. The gun-boat did not go any nearer, probably because
it was then near shallow water. The stricken passenger boats were then boarded
by naval men who came in smaller boats. According to the testimony of Sellathurai,
a survivor,(`Virakesari' of 5/1): "A navy boat suddenly appeared alongside
our boats and ordered us to stop. Then a torch beam was flashed on us, followed
by gun shots. Those in my boat screamed and fell to the ground. I did the same.
The other boats were similarly shot at.The boatmen jumped into the sea."

This happened between 7 & 8 p.m and the
lagoon water was rough. The navy men set about attacking the passengers at least
in one boat with knives irrespective of age and sex. The boats were then towed
away. One of the boats broke loose and the navy men left it drifting without
attempting to secure it. It was this boat that was brought to the mainland subsequently.In
the meantime some other boats had taken in passengers and were about to begin
the crossing. Suddenly an LTTE boat appeared and asked them not to cross. Sensing
that things were not safe and that there had been a tragedy, many of the women
began to cry. Several of the boatmen who had become aneasthetised to danger
in return for a small income, told the passengers that if only the Tigers let
them go, they would do so without any trouble.

These boat with casualities which came ashore
had about 4 survivors with cut injuries and about 9 corpses. A lady who had
lain against the prow of the boat had been missed by the attackers. The first
reports to emerge spoke of nine to fifteen or so dead. The figure later rose
to over 35 to include passengers from other boats who were either missing or
whose bodies were recovered. Among the first to be reported dead or missing
were Sellathurai, an employee of the Primary Courts, Mannar, Nalini, a lady
in her 20s, a school teacher in Killinochchi and Dr. Sathiaseelan, District
Medical Officer of Killinochchi.

We ascertained the following from a close
relative of Sellathurai (quoted above) who spoke to him. He and his wife Parameswary
were travelling to Colombo to meet two children living there and two others
coming from abroad. Parameswary was among those killed when the naval men opened
fire. Sellathurai lay injured. Naval men came into the boat. A naval man first
assaulted him and demanded money and jewellery. Sellathurai emptied his purse.
The naval man then ripped the gold chain around his dead wife's neck. Sellathurai
tried to unscrew her ear rings to give the naval man. An order rang out asking
the men to return quickly. The man immediately cut portions the dead woman's
ears with the rings and vanished. The boat was then tied for towing,but broke
loose. It was left behind. A little later a boat man who had earlier jumped
out, came into the boat. It was he who took the boat to the southern shore.
Five boats were said to have been taken by the navy.There was much evidence of the naval men's handiwwork.
Many of the bodies recovered were badly mutilated. Tharmaraja,the deceased director
of education had an eye gouged out. His thgh too had a deep cut. The corpse
of a lady which reached the shore was without its head. Of the five or so boats
towed away, the bodies of the dead were placed in one boat and the boat was
set on fire according to local reports. Many of the dead also had gaping wounds
suggesting that these were caused by cannon rather than small arms. A government
version of this incident broadcast over "Makkal Kural" for a Tamil
audience did speak about a fast boat which approached the gun-boat, did a U-turn
and ran into the passenger boats. But it also added that the fast boat had fired
at the navy, which was denied by civilian witnesses. several boats going north
reached their destination later in the night completely unaware that there had
been an incident. The wind and rough sea would have had the effect of muffling
gun shot noises.

The Virakesari of 5/1 said: 14 bodies recovered
were brought to the Killinochchi Hospital. Six of the bodies belonged to women.
Among the dead was A. Tharmarajah (51) from Nunavil, Regional Director
of Education Killinochchi. Of the 14 bodies, only 9 have so far been identified.
They are mostly persons from Jaffna past their middle age. The names of the
bodies identified were released by K. Ponnampalam, Government Agent, Killinochchi.
These are: S.Subramaniam (57), retired police driver; S.Balasubramaniam (40),
bakery owner; S. Parameswary (52) and her daughter T. Nalini(20), teacher, D-5
Killinochchi; Gopalapillai (40), Tea Boutique owner, Pooneryn; Mdm A. Arulamma
(36); V. Sellathurai;(28), Mannar Courts.

The Virakesari report added: "Five boats
proceeding South to the mainland were affected during the incident. . . . Those
travelling in the lagoon the following (Sunday) morning reported seeing floating
corpses. large numbers of ordinary people scoured both shores of the lagoon
for more bodies." Despite the fear travel resumed two days later. As
the `Virakesari' of 6th January indicated, the people had become so alienated
from the forces, that they had come to believe that the Tigers were their protectors,
in Jaffna lagoon at least. There are also reasons for the high incidence of
government officers among the victims. It was the Christmas - New Year season.
Government leaks to thee Colombo press, highly publicised speeches by the president
and reports of Minister Hameed's talks with the LTTE in Europe had all given
the impression that an unofficial ceasefire prevailed in the North and that
peace was imminent. Thus many government servants and students who needed to
cross the lagoon for a quick visit to their families had assumed that this was
the best time.

The Virakesari of 9th January reported that
a further 11 bodies were recoved in the last few days bringing the total to
25. These have not been identified. The Vavuniya Police had said that Rohinidevi
Nadarajah who was taken to Anuradhapura hospital had died. There are several aspects of the navy's conduct
that are indefensible. The first is the gun-boat firing its cannon towards civilian
boats continuously for a considerable time without apparently a single
return shot being fired. The second, the frightning spectre of naval personel
dominated by indiscipline, greed and a concomitant readiness to kill and rob.[Top]

The `Virakesari' of 6/1 and the Island of
7/1 reported that two Tamil MPs Navaratnam & Premachandran had protested
about the incident to the president and had called on him to institute an independent
inquiry. There was in the coming few days no direct, response from the president.
But oblique government responses appeared in the front pages of the Daily News
of 6/1 and 7/1 although the government controlled paper had not recorded themassacre. The first filed by Lankapuwath headlined
`Main highway to Jaffna open since July `91', quoted a JOC spokesman: "The
security forces had done their duty by the public of Jaffna by clearing and
reopening the main A-9 highway and safe passage was ensured to the public by
the security forces. However, the public were being prevented from using
the highway by the LTTE who were more interested in extorting money by forcing
the public to use their transport in No-Go-Zones and also by preventing the
transport of ample stocks of food and other essential items. . . ."

The second was a print out of what was broadcast
the previous day. This seemed to suggest that Jaffna lagoon had only now been
declared a prohibited zone. It read: "The Jaffna lagoon has been declared
a prohibited zone under section 5 (Chapter 40) of the Public Security Ordinance,
under which no person will be permitted to ply or use any vessel, other than
a vessel belonging to the Sri Lanka Navy or any vessel authorised in that behalf
by the competent authority.

"Any person who contravenes the provisions
of this regulation will be guilty of an offence. These regulations will be cited
as the Emergency (Establishment of a Prohibited Zone) Regulations No. 1 of 1992
. . . . A certificate under the hand of the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy
(Competent Authority appointed by the president), to the effect that any area
specified in such certificate is within the Prohibited Zone shall be admissible
in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. .
. "

These attempts at a response lightly skirt
the serious issues. The Jaffna highway is by no means cleared and reopened by
the security forces in the sense of their being able to offer reasonable protection
and right of passage to those who use it. If people travelling on it are stopped
at gun-point a few hundred yards up or down the road from Elephant Pass, there
is nothing the security forces would do about it, except perhaps fire some shells.

The second about the prohibited zone is a
very euphemistic representation of a harsh reality. It suggests that someone
using the prohibited zone will be committing an offence like trespassing on
private property. The offender will when caught be taken to court and the naval
commander's certificate will be produced as proof of an offence.

Firstly what is the effect of it? The prohibition
against the use of Jaffna lagoon has been in force for a long time whether given
legal sanction through gazette notification or not. Would the government state
publicly that government servants, corporation employees, university staff and
employees will not receive promotions and scholarships because the Tigers prevent
them from travelling to Colombo through Elephant Pass for appropriate examinations
and interviews? Will it pay teachers who cannot report for work for the same
reason, or find university places in the South for students so prevented from
attending the University of Jaffna? We know from experience that for practical
reasons and reasons of bad publicity the government will not take up such positions.
Indeed, letters for official functions, conferences, interviews and examinations
have been sent as if people could travel without hindrance! Is it then responsible
for the government to issue the navy commander with a certificate to enforce
the prohibition and close its eyes to the consequences?

Secondly one must look at the pitiable traditions
in which the law of the land and its enforcement have evolved. One positive
aspect of the statement of the emergency regulation above is that it indicates
limits of action the navy could resort to in enforcing it. Implicitly it implies
that the navy could open fire only in self defence. Otherwise it could
only stop boats, question people and discretionarily treat them as offenders
to be produced in court. Firing on unarmed boats it totally ruled out.

Indeed for navy men to behave like parang
wielding pirates of the South China Sea or of the archipelagi of the East Indies
is unthinkable. The navy has shown that the spirit of the Kumudini boat massacre
of 1985 is very much alive. The action is also reminiscent of the days in 1987,
shortly before the Indian army arrived, when government servants in government
helicopters used to shoot at government servants on bicycles and vans reporting
for work via Kopay Veli (Open Land).

Here we have the sight of the nation going
to pieces by the government not facing up to its responsibilities towards the
people and their basic needs.[Top]

In the 5Os and 6Os the imposition of curfew
did not mean that curfew breakers were meant to be shot. The forces were first
meant to ascertain whether there was a threat to security. If not there would
have been no meaning in the issue of curfew passes. People did get shot without
justification. But those with urgent needs, such as one to see a doctor, could
often talk their way through. The principle of the state being responsible for
the basic welfare of people was acknowledged. Care was taken to give people
notice and time to stock up and attend to essential chores. In the treatment
of the people of the North today, all these obligations are being violated.
Over the years the armed forces have been given the freedom to act without reference
to the basic needs of people. The armed forces have been given the freedom to
interfere with anything from the transport of essential goods and medicines.
Its only effect has been to make lots of people rich without bringing peace
any nearer. With the build up of cynicism all round, it has become a war with
widespread corruption in the forces accompained by a mistaken sense of pride.
Press reports of corruption in sections of the forces have been persistent.

During the phase of the war ending in July
1987 a quantity of basic goods to be distributed through co-operative societies
was regularly passed. Today, it is charged by very responsible persons that
such societies with the least capacity to bribe are the most harassed by authorities
in Colombo, while private traders function smoothly. The Vavuniya check point
has been notorious. At times when passes were not issued in Colombo for large
quantities of kerosene to the North, lorry loads had been allowed through, while
people carrying small quantities with permits of authority coming immediately
behind had been sorely harassed.

We have reliable testimony of a regular run
of banned items to the North from the Puttalam lagoon area to the LTTE controlled
coast further north with naval complicity. The run needs to be accomplished
between times of naval patrols from Talai-Mannar, given in advance. Those in
the Wanni intimately familiar with the network of corruption and vested interests
surrounding this war despair of its ever coming to an end. Corruption is a means
by which basic human needs triumph over the harshest restrictions. But at very
great cost to the moral fabric of the nation and the well-being of ordinary
people. Malaria, para-typhoid and malnutrition have become endemic among people
of the North. A generation of infants in the North is growing up permanently
impaired.

When there is widespread corruption a wrong
sense of pride takes over. While allowing banned goods through some channels,
there is also an accompanying need for the forces to shoot up civilians and
boats transporting innocuous civilian goods in the Jaffna lagoon to prove that
a great job is being done in fighting the war. Press statements by the forces
unashamedly speak of the cargo of several boats captured or sunk as consisting
of stuff like rice bags and bicycles. That is the level at which military success
is being measured.

A large part of the blame for this state
of affairs should be placed on the government. Had the government politically
identified itself with the well-being of the Tamil people, there would have
been no major war in the first place. When political paralysis leads to thinking
that the basic needs of the people, guaranteed by international conventions,
can be interfered with for military reasons, things are bound to deteriorate.
Once an ill-advised decision is taken to make it illegal for people to do what
they normally ought to do in the routine course of life, a military force vested
with enforcing it cannot be expected to sit around simply watching people get
about their lives .

If the ban on travel in the Jaffna lagoon
were to be lifted it would militarily make little difference to the government.
The Tigers will use it with or without a ban, as they did in 1987. It is not
food for the Tigers that comes through the lagoon. It is a piece of old wisdom
that bad laws which allow ordinary people no alternative but to break them,
only bring the law into disrepute and lead to corruption. The ban on travel
in the Jaffna lagoon must be lifted. Though appearing to be a military loss,
it will be an enormous political gain. Particularly when nearly all press commentators
are saying that the military mission of the government is an impossible one,
there is a greater practical need to make political gestures to the Tamil people.
[Top]

We have said elsewhere in this report that
given the paralysis in the government, there was a duty which fell on other
international and civilian organisations to represent the interests of the people.
THe people of Jaffna could rightly and legitimately appeal to the government,
but they are unable to question the arbitrary actions of the Tigers. This gap
should have been filled by others outside, raising matters such as the Elephant
Pass affair with the Tigers. Sadly most statements and observations talked about
the government forces shooting at civilians in the Jaffna lagoon without asking
why the Tigers forced them to endure this. Clearly the interests of the people
are not being represented. When asked why the Tigers make them travel in this
manner, the usual answer is `We cannot speak'. It is one thing for leading international
figures, such as church men to promote the Tigers as sole representatives of
the Tamil people. If so they should be able to talk to them and influence them
to act in the interests of the people. If not leadership becomes a totally vacuous
and a merely verbal concept.

Army spokesman on the Jaffna Lagoon

Reporting on the Cabinet news conference
of the previous day, the Island of 8th January reported as follows: "The
military is prepared to consider opening the Jaffna lagoon which has been declared
a `prohibited zone' for civilian traffic to and from the Jaffna peninsula
during daylight under strict naval surveillance, military spokesman Brigadier
Anil Angamana announced yesterday."

Purely as a gesture, this announcement is
welcome. Whether it will bear fruit or not depends on whether there is also
the will to give considerable priority to the needs of civilians.

More inexcusably the military spokesman still
continued to deny having received confirmation of the civilian deaths, although
the list was issued by the senior-most government officer of the district. Also
there is the ICRC reporting directly to the president in addition to Reuter.
The government it seems had no contact with the government agent of Killinochchi.
But the spokesman when asked about the District Education Officer killed in
the incident said, "I heard that he was executed by the LTTE". The
government's response in such instances continues to be silly and counter-productive.

It transpired in the Cabinet news conference
that the government had no defensible position on the Kilaly issue, except to
repeat an umpteen times that the A-9 through Elephant Pass was the normal authorised
route to Jaffna. It was as though its being blocked by some other force that
could not be dislodged was not a fact to be taken cognizance of. In its blundering
manner the government was trying to limit the damage by pretending that the
navy's action was purely a military matter. That it was an act of blatant piracy
was something the government did not have the character to face up to.[Top]