"Sharp, quirky, and occasionally nettlesome", Walking the Berkshires is my personal blog, an eclectic weaving of human narrative, natural history, and other personal passions with the Berkshire and Litchfield Hills as both its backdrop and point of departure. I am interested in how land and people, past and present manifest in the broader landscape and social fabric of our communities. The opinions I express here are mine alone. Never had ads, never will.

September 10, 2009

Photo credit: Portrait of Hannah Caldwell from the museum of the 1st Presbyterian Church, Elizabeth, NJ.

"Let us remember...in order to add vigour to our genius, and force to our descending swords, that we are avenging the cause of virgin innocence" said a student at the College of New Jersey (now Princeton). The death of Mrs. Caldwell, wife of Rev. James Caldwell, reportedly at the hands of the Royalist army during Knyphausen's Raid, sparked outrage throughout Revolutionary America. As discussed in the previous post, the circumstances of her death may never be precisely known, but the accusation that it was a deliberate murder did more to harm the British cause than even the muskets of the patriot forces.

It was the custom in those times to publish letters anonymously or with a pseudonym, but there was one loyalist who wrote an account of Mrs. Caldwell's death for newspaper publication under his own name. Ebenezer Foster was a former Justice of the peace from Woodbridge, New Jersey and among the Tory 'refugees" who crossed over from Staten Island in the wake of Knyphausen's invasion force. Approaching the parsonage in Connecticut Farms, he writes:

"I soon saw a group of soldiers in and about said House, and on my nearer approach, heard some of them mention, (rather piteously), a woman's being shot in the house, as soon as the crowd dispersed, I entered the house and not without difficulty , found her laying on her back on a bed that stood in a small, dark, back bedroom, (for I don't recollect that it had any window) tho' it had two doors that opened into other apartments. She was to appearance death, and had a cloth carelessly thrown over her face, which I did not remove but left her, expecting the troops would soon march, when her friends might take care of her..

...[I] did not return in less than three hours, when some person who was near Mr. Caldwell's house, told me the woman was stripped, and thrown off the bed, but that a British officer's coming in, had prevented the soldiers from carrying off her cloaths: On entering the house I found her laying on her face on the floor beside the bed, and most of what cloaths had been pulled off by her side. I concluded that she had been taken off the bed that the bedding might be taken from under her..."

Foster's account is intriguing as much for what he confirms in the patriot claims about her death as what he contradicts. Regardless of how she died, there is no doubt that her corpse was mistreated and her personal effects plundered along with the house. Foster is scrupulous not to identify any specific unit with this shabby looting, implying that it happened sometime between when the British advanced beyond Connecticut Farms and when they returned. He claimed that he and another loyalist made a close inspection to determine the cause of Mrs. Caldwell's death:

"We found that on account of a pantry that was building on the back side of the house, a small spot of covering had been pulled off opposite to the bed whereon the Lady sat, the only ball we could discover that had touched the house was the one that killed her: It appeared to have come from a northern direction (in the course of the Rebel fire) and passed between the joints of the plastered wall, it seemed to have passed so far above the bed as to have hit her above the girdle and its passing through her left breast, I account for by supposing her to have been in a stooping posture..."

There is no mention of broken glass such as reportedly cut the face of young Abigail Lennington as she watched the soldier shoot through the window: no confirmation that there was even a window at all. Mr. Foster's reputation as "a Gentleman of great integrity" as well as a very loyal subject was cited in the newspaper account to give weight to his evidence, but whether or not it is factual reporting on his part the court of public opinion was already convinced that the killing had been deliberate. Furthermore, the outrages perpetrated in the burning of the village and looting of its houses were there for all to see, right down to the roads strewn with he stuffing of feather beds.

And what of the claim that the shot came from the American lines to the north? That is an odd direction. Maxwell's men were initially arrayed along a ravine running roughly southwest to northeast and facing a royalist advance from the southeast. The patriots then withdrew to the northwest along a road toward Springfield as their left flank was turned by another royalist column that advanced from the east or northeast of their position. Shots "from the north" could therefore have come from either side.

Samuel Steele Smith's out of print Winter at Morristown 1779-1780: The Darkest Hour (1979) includes several surprises for students of Knyphausen's Raid in the form of material not generally encountered elsewhere. Sometimes, as with the complete order of battle that appears in the Appendices, the information is indispensable. At least once, Smith confuses the actions of one unit with another (but we will address that matter in due course). Smith dispenses with the killing of Mrs Caldwell in a single line as he describes the melee at Connecticut Farms, but later returns to it when addressing how news of her death spread throughout the countryside. He then includes this startling paragraph:

"Some years later, there was an admission. A New Jersey militiaman, Private Frazee Craig, of Captain Amos Morse's Company, of Colonel Jaques Essex County Regiments, testified that he was 'at the Farms [Connecticut Farms] when Mrs. Caldwell was shot by one of Capt. [John] Craig's men', also of Col. Jaquesregiment. The shooting by an American, if indeed, he did it, surely was accidental."

Smith's source is supposedly testimony given by Craig while applying for a veteran's pension in the early 1830s before Judge Lewis Condit. I have read a subsequent publication of the Condit testimony that includes an account from Craig, but while discussing Connecticut Farms it makes no mention of Mrs. Caldwell. Assuming he did make such a statement, what are we to make of it? It was certainly not a welcome revision to the conventional narrative. When Elizabeth native Capt. William C. deHart, an aide to Winfield Scott who returned from Mexico sick and dying, attempted to make an impartial investigation into the evidence surrounding Mrs. Caldwell's death, he was pilloried for his efforts by his fellow townsmen.

In the end, whatever the cause of her homicide, Mrs. Caldwell's death became a symbol of what was at stake in America's fight for independence. A year later, her husband was shot by a sentry, and their nine children - "baptised in blood" - were fostered out, including their eldest son whose education in France was sponsored by Lafayette.

Rev Caldwell's statue, at right, may be seen on Walnut St. in Philadelphia.

September 09, 2009

This is the latest installment in a series of posts I began more than a year ago on Knyphausen's Raid into New Jersey in 1780.

The American Revolution was fought as often with the pen as with the sword. Sometimes what was written was quite literally worth battalions to the Patriot cause. Thomas Paine's American Crisis stiffened revolutionary resolve in the face of a series of military reverses in 1776. The murder of Jenny McCrea by two of Burgoyne's native allies the following year brought out the militia in unprecedented numbers to confront the British at Saratoga. It did not matter that the unfortunate Miss McRea was the fiancee of a loyalist officer; what was done to her could have been done to any American woman and that was good enough for the patriot press and its readership.

Another incident occurred in 1780 that became as notorious in patriot memory as the death of McCrea. This tragedy, occurring on June 7th at Connecticut Farms (now Union), New Jersey during Knyphausen's Raid, was kept alive for many months afterward in the press as a symbol of royalist barbarity, Once again, an American woman was killed, but this time she was not only a staunch patriot but also the minister's wife. Her name was Hannah (Ogden) Caldwell - a very distant relative of mine - and responsibility for her death was laid squarely on the British. It is not altogether clear that this was the case, but there was little doubt in the minds of the revolutionaries at the time - or indeed of their descendants and subsequent chroniclers - that she was deliberately and foully murdered by the royalist invaders.

The seal of Union County, New Jersey depicts the traditional version of her death at the hands of a red-coated soldier. It is notoriously difficult to separate fact from fiction in the fog of war, and especially complicated with this conflict, when what was recorded - and by whom - may be just as significant as the gaps in the historic record (and there are many).

Hannah (Ogden) Caldwell was third cousin to my ancestor Aaron Ogden and his brother Matthias, both of whom fought at Connecticut Farms on the day she was killed. She was the wife of James Caldwell, the Presbyterian minister in Elizabeth Town. Reverend Caldwell was chaplain in my ancestor Elias Dayton's Third New Jersey Continental Regiment in its 1st establishment, and subsequently served as a Deputy Quartermaster General.

We tend to overlook that the Revolution was in many ways a religious war as well as a civil one. The evangelical "Great Awakening" of the previous generation challenged traditional church hierarchies and helped establish the underpinning of many of the democratic principles of the Revolution. The Congregationalists of New England, the Presbyterians of the Middle Colonies and the Methodists and Baptists of the Tidewater and back county were particularly affected by this revival and many of their congregations strongly supported the patriot cause. George III, on the other hand, was the "Defender of the Faith" for the Episcopal church, while the Dutch Reformed church split into factions in reaction to the Great Awakening that foreshadowed where the loyalties of their parishioners would lie in the Revolution.

The foremost patriots in Elizabeth Town, and hence in New Jersey, were members of Reverend Caldwell's Congregation. His parish house was burned by Tory raiders. In January, 1780, the church was burned as well by a raiding party from loyalist Staten Island guided by fellow townsman Cornelius Hatfield, whose own father was a noted parishoner.Caldwell subsequently moved his family to Connecticut Farms, a settlement 4 miles outside the town center, and continued his ministry while also helping to acquire supplies for Washington's encampment in the Highlands at Morristown. There are accounts that he preached with loaded pistols before him, and with good reason. One of the loyalists who burned the church in Elizabeth Town later expressed his regret that "the black-coated rebel, Caldwell, was not then in his pulpit."

As a prominent patriot, Reverend Caldwell was certainly a ripe target for kidnapping, if not worse, by loyalist 'refugees". But even he considered his family safe from deliberate attack. As it turned out, they were in great peril at Connecticut Farms, but whether from a stray bullet or intentional murder is an open question.

On the morning of Knyphausen's initial advance on Connecticut Farms, Hannah Caldwell was at home with several of her youngest children, an unrelated girl named Abigail Lennington who may have been a housemaid, and a nurse named Constance Benward. Her other children had been bundled off in a commissary wagon and her husband had encouraged her to follow, but she insisted that she would stay to protect their property. It was her misfortune that the battle developed near her home and the patriot defenders held off the royalists for several hours before they were pushed back through the little village. She had lowered some of her valuables down the well and filled her pockets with other precious items, then sat on her bed near the window to wait out the battle, saying "Don't worry, baby will be our protection. They will respect a mother."

At some time during the ebb and flow of the battle that day, someone shot Mrs. Caldwell. Abigail Lennington and one of the servants subsequently gave testimony before a magistrate as to what occurred. Numerous histories have referenced that testimony, although I have not yet had the opportunity to go to the source. According to these accounts, Lennington was near the window when she saw a soldier come toward the house, raise his rifle, and fire through the window. Two balls struck Mrs. Caldwell in the breast, killing her instantly, while broken glass cut Abigail's face. Sometimes in these histories the soldier is described as "a shot squatty soldier in a red coat."

Reportedly the British entered the house and rifled the clothes of the dead woman to get at her valuables. The body was removed while the house was plundered and then most of the buildings in Connecticut Farms were burned (the parsonage among them, despite this account to the contrary). It is difficult to know precisely what happened from contemporary writing filled with hyperbole. There was such outrage, in fact, that the royalists in New York felt obliged to file their own accounts in rebuttal. Rivington's Royal Gazette ran one such refutation by an anonymous British officer:

"Whilst the troops were advancing to Connecticut Farms, the rebels fired out of the houses, agreeable to their usual practice, from which circumstance, Mrs. Caldwell had the misfortune to be shot my a random ball. What heightened the singularity of this unhappy Lady's fate, is, that upon Enquiry it appears, beyond a Doubt, that the shot was fired by the rebels themselves, as it entered the side of the House from their direction, and lodged in the Wall nearest the Troops then advancing."

The argument over what happened to Mrs Caldwell raged long after the smoke had cleared from the burning village. More than anything else, her death inflamed the revolutionary arbor of the defenders of New Jersey, who readily believed her killing was intentional.

July 18, 2008

The Hessian and Anspach Jaegers in Knyphausen's invasion force were elite troops. With their short barreled rifles and green jackets faced with red, Jaeger detachments fought as skirmishers and assault troops throughout the war from Long Island to Yorktown. There were nearly 300 of them with Knyphausen, along with a mounted Jaeger unit, but the rest were in South Carolina with Sir Henry Clinton's army. Most of these exceptional riflemen in Knyphausen's ranks crossed over from Staten Island to New Jersey with the Third Division under Major General Tryon, but soon were moved up the line to the head of the column to lead the advance.

After Brigadier General Thomas Stirling was shot down by the first Continental picket he met on the road to Elizabethtown, command of the lead division went to Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm von Wurmb of the Leib Musketeer Regiment - not to be confused with Lt.Col. Ludwig Johann Adolph von Wurmb who lead the Jaegers. Col. Friedrich von Wurmb ordered the Jaegers to lead the advance, with the light companies of the 37th and 38th Regiments of Foot his only other skirmishers. It took several hours for the nearly 6,000 soldiers of Knyphausen's force to cross over the Sound to Elizabethtown, and unit cohesion broke down further as divisions were broken up to fit into the transport barges. Whatever advantage a rapid nighttime advance into the interior might have gained the Royalists melted away in the dawn of a clear June morning.

Opposing Knyphausen were the four depleted regiments of William Maxwell's New Jersey Brigade. All told there were about 800 men in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th New Jersey Continentals, and they were not all in one place. Colonel Elias Dayton's 3rd New Jersey and Spenser's 4th (additional) Continental Regiment were in the vicinity of Springfield, 7 miles from Elizabethtown, with just the 12-man picket under Ensign Moses Ogden of the 4th New Jersey posted at the crossroads below Elizabethtown on the road from the landing where they subsequently encountered and fired on General Stirling. Maxwell kept the 1st New Jersey under Col. Matthias Ogden and the 2nd under Col. Israel Shreve at Bound Brook. These regiments were not posted any closer because raids from Loyalist-held Staten Island had increased in the previous months and there was great danger of being overrun. The strategy was to respond to any landing in force by raising the militia and contesting the roads to the west, toward Hobart Gap if that were the enemy's objective, and beyond that the Continental encampment at Morristown.As readers of this blog have heard before, Matthias Ogden and Elias Dayton are ancestors of mine (Ogden collaterally), as were two other men, Brigade Major Aaron Ogden (also a Captain in the 1st New Jersey), and Jonathan Dayton, Captain in his father's 3rd Regiment as well as a staff officer. Colonel Oliver Spenser of the 4th was married to an Ogden sister, and various cousins and more distant relations, such as Ensign Ogden, also served. The New Jersey regiments drew their men wherever they could be found, but their officers were from the elite of the State, and most of these were Elizabethtown men, now the first line of defense for their homes and families with the Royalists at the door.

Elias Dayton had been in Elizabethtown on the 6th of June as Knyphausen was preparing for his nighttime crossing, and it was he who posted Ensign Ogden's picket and moved the 3rd NJ and Spencer's 4th to Jelf's Hill, commanding the Stone Bridge leading to the heart of Elizabethtown. From there, he heard the pickets fire and subsequently ordered his son to write a letter to General Washington apprising him of the invasion:

"I am directed by Colo. Dayton to inform your excellency that the enemy landed this night at 12 o'Clock, from the best intelligence four or five thousand men & twelve field pieces, & it is his conjecture that they intend to penetrate into the country. I am your excellys most hum Servt.

- Joha. Dayton, Capt."

Aaron Ogden recorded the part that he personally played early that morning in his Autobiography, published many years after his death by a descendant:

"Major Ogden lying on the ground in his blanket, in his tent, heard this firing and immediately volunteered his services to General Maxwell to ascertain the cause of it; and rode as fast as his horse could carry him, to the other two regiments of the Brigade whom he found paraded on the hill near the rear of Elizabeth Town river, and there received information from General [then Colonel] Dayton that the enemy were out in force, that Morris Town was the place of their destination, and that he was momentarily expecting their advance.

GeneralDayton and Major Ogden concluded that it would be advisable for the whole brigade to form a junction at Connecticut farms, being about an equal distance from each of the separate parts of the brigade. This was done accordingly,and the whole brigade before the advance of the enemy so far, was posted behind a ravine near Wade Tan yard."

Notably, Ogden gave a more concise report of the day's events to his father in a letter written the week after the battle, in which he makes no mention of his own heroics. William Maxwell, in a letter to New Jersey's Governor Livingston, states that it was his decision to concentrate the Brigade at Connecticut Farms, a few miles down the road toward Springfield, In any case, decisions were made by officers in the field to concentrate and deploy all the available Continental forces - the Jersey Brigade and Maj. Gibbs with Washington's Lifeguard who had been rushed down from Morristown- to best advantage on the road toward Springfield.

By now the alarm was out to raise the militia. Great beacons on Newark Mountain and other high points were lit, and the alarm gun at Hobart Gap - Old Sow - crashed out its warning. The militia in the Revolution were always a wild card. When they mustered in force they could be decisive in making the countryside hot for marching columns. When they did not, there were only the thin blue - and brown and homespun - lines of the Continentals to stand and fire. In 1776, Washington retreated through the Jerseys with little support from the militia; after Trenton and Princeton, the militia came out in swarms and were decisive during the Forage War of 1777 that forced the Royalists to abandon nearly all the territory they had gained just months before. The great question in June, 1780, was whether the militia would rally and fight. The Loyalist boosters of Knyphausen's invasion believed they would not, and that instead New Jersey's Tory citizens would rally to the standard of the King. Until this question was decided, the Continentals were largely on their own.

Largely, but not entirely. Colonel Sylvanus Seely turned out with the Eastern Regiment of the Morris County Militia, and others marched to the sound of the guns from far and near. There were short bursts of firing from local militia at various points as the lead division marched through Elizabethtown toward Connecticut Farms that morning. The son of Elizabethtown Mayor William Crane was bayoneted to death in a skirmish along the Galloping Hill Road. Captain Nathaniel FitzRandolph of Woodbridge, twice a P.O.W. imprisoned under frightful conditions, mustered his Middlesex militia company. Two weeks later, he would be mortally wounded at Springfield after Knyphausen's second advance. His gravestone in Woodbridge bears the marks of musket balls, apparently the result of British soldiers taking target practice.

"‑ on tuesday night the 7th [6th] of June between 11 & 12 oClock the Enemy Landed at Elizabethtown point, Our Piquets fired upon them Which Alarmed Camp. Immediately a Light Horseman Arived from Colo.Dayton who Commanded that they were Landed in force, We Immediately Caled in all Guards about Camp, and Marched towards Elizabethtown and fell in about 2 miles above the town upon the Connecticut farm Road but thought it prudent to Retire a Little up the same being joined by the third Regt. from town, halted at the farms Meeting house, Leaveing Capt.Bowman with his Company [2nd New Jersey Regiment] at a fork of the Road, half a mile below. ‑ on the Enemys Appearance which was a little before sunrise Capt. Bowman fired upon their advance party, and Retired over a small bridge where was but a Narrow pass he being there joined by five Piquet Guards ‑ Disputed the pass for two hours and an half, ‑ some part of the time very near sometimes one party Giveing way, sometimes the other, ‑ at Length a Large Reinforcement from the Enemy Come up and our people Expending thirty Rounds a man, was Obliged to Give way, Covered by the third Jersey Regt. and part of the other three, ‑ however the Combat was Renewed very Briskly, but Obliged to Give way slowly untill we Arived at Springfield Bridge, Where the Militia had Gathered with a peace of Cannon, this pass was so well Defended that the Enemy Gave way although there Numbers was 4 or six to one, and two peaces of Cannon in front was playd upon us Occationally, but Did no Execution ‑ by this time it was past two oClock in the Afternoon the men Got fresh Carthrages and the Militia Came in very fast. ‑ we Crossed the bridge with all Our fource and made a furious Attact, and Drove them some way when their second Line Came up, so much superior to Our fource that we was obliged to Retreat again, which was Done in pretty Good order, though through a shower of Musket shot, we Crossed the bridge and after an hours Dispute maintained our Ground, towards sunset the Enemy Drew of & all Encamped back of Connecticut farms Meetinghouse. in the Evening General Washington Arived with the Army."

The men defending Connecticut farms faced the tip of the Royalist spear, fighting the Jaegers and elements of the 1st Division on their own and even driving them with the bayonet - the Jaegers had none themselves but only hunting swords. This resistance surprised the invaders, who thought they would be able to brush off the defenders and so the Jaegers were squandered in a frontal assault rather as the expert skirmishers and marksmen they were. Knyphausen was unable to deploy even a significant portion of his full force, strung out on the road from the landing point. The cavalry were not a factor, nor was his train of artillery. Until the second division came up with the British Guards, as well as the Garrison Regiment von Bünau, the 1st Division bore the brunt of the fighting. The Jaegers and Leib Regiments exhausted their ammunition.

"Our parties of Continental troops and militia at the defile performed wonders. After stopping the advance of the enemy near three hours, they crossed over the defile and drove them to the tavern that was Jeremiah Smith's, but the enemy were at that time re-enforced with at least 1,500 men, and our people were driven in their turn over the defile, and obliged to quit it. I, with the whole brigade and militia, was formed to attack them, but it was tho't imprudent, as the ground was not advantageous, and the enemy very numerous. We retired slowly toward the heights toward Springfield, harassing them on their right and left, till they came with their advance to David Meehner's house, where they thought proper to halt. Shortly after the whole brigade, with the militia, advanced their right, left and front, with the greatest rapidity, and drove their advance to the main body. We were in our turn obliged to retire after the closest action I have seen this war. We were then pushed over the bridge at Springfield, where we posted some troops, and with the assistance of a field piece, commanded by the militia, the enemy were again driven back to their former station, and still further before night. Never did troops, either continental or militia, perform better than ours did."

For all these heroics, the aftermath of the brave stand at Connecticut Farms burned in the minds of Patriots throughout the land with far greater intensity. We'll discuss the reasons behind Knyphausen's halt and withdrawal, the fate of the village of Connecticut farms (now Union, New Jersey, and the martyrdom of the wife of a prominent Patriot minister - she who was also an Ogden relative - in a subsequent post in this series on Knyphausen's Raid.

Honored Sir, Wishing to relieve that anxiety in you, which must fill every breast in the present posture of affairs, I set down to give you as much satisfaction as is in my power.

On the night if the 6th Inst. the enemy landed at Elizth Town; it is supposed, with about 5,000 troops, including three hundred Dragoons & a large train of artillery - their advance reached Connecticut farms soon after Day break, where they were opposed by some small parties of the Jersey Brigade & a few militia - they did not pass the defile till after they had received reinforcements from Town - much scirmishing (sic) happened during the day, in which almost the whole of Brigade were at different times engaged assisted with a considerable body of militia, who on this occasion merit much praise & have, I think, acquired to themselves lasting honor.

Our loss in the Brigade is not very considerable, one Ensign killed, 3 [officers] wounded, 7 privates killed & 20 wounded, - from the dead found after their loss in killed, wounded & taken prisoners can not be less than two hundred - I speak within bounds in my opinion - the difference between our loss and theirs may perhaps appear incredible, but let it be considered that they were harassed by small parties on every side in such a manner that it was out of their power to make retaliation. That they were thoroughly sick of their situation appears evident from the silence & precipitancy of their retreat, which they performed under cover of night & a heavy shower of rain - it was not known in our camp untill (sic) the next morning. - Genl Hand, with two Battalions of Continental troops, fell on their rear a little below where Ebenezer Pine lives - he charged them with vigour, but superior forcesoon obliged him to retire - his loss was trifling.

Since that time nothing very material has happened - the advance of the enemy are as far up as the Town bridge the wooden bridge by Potters - their main body between the forks of the road & the ferries. - Our light parties do them very little injury in their present position. -

To develope (sic) the objective of the enemy in this excursion seems almost impossible - perhaps they may have been brought to believe that our small army would receive but little assistance from the militia - They may possibly suppose that our magazines of provisions are so small as not to be able to subsist a large body of men together but for a short time - I hope that such exertions will be made, as may disappoint our enemies in their expectations, and that hereafter our Continental regiments may be put into such a situation as may enable Genl Washington to make sufficient opposition without the aid of the militia, whose absence from their farms must be attended with bad consequence to agriculture on which our support depends. -

Had every State in the Union compleated (sic) their Battalions, which might have easily been done - this distress would not probably have come upon us. - On the weakness of our army our enemies build their hopes - they say that those few can not long hold together, - and that they must be more than men, who will fight, without pay, clothes or food. - A few vigorous exertions on our side might destroy these expectations, & make them wish to be at peace with us - what can more speedily bring our foes to terms, than our being prepared for war? - Oh! that every one would exert his power & influence to give vigour to our operations this campaign - & peace may again be established. I wish that matters of trifling importance might be dismissed & that a spirit of unanimity might prevail.

Dr. Wolsely [Ogden's brother-in-law] arrived in Sussex on Sunday last, his wife and Hannah [Ogden's younger sister] came with him, they are all in health. The Doctor proposes to stay about a week from this time, perhaps longer. Colo. Ogden [Ogden's elder brother Mathias, commander of the 1st New Jersey Continentals] has been ill, but is now fast recovering.

I am Sir, with much respect, your affectionate Son, Aar. Ogden."

Aaron Ogden, who in later years delighted in demonstrating his command of the classics, surely missed an opportunity in this letter to quote young King Harry at Agincourt -

He clearly was writing not only to inform his father of the state of affairs with the war in their very backyard, but also with an eye toward it being shared with people of influence in the government, for the utter failure to build up the ranks of Washington's depleted Continental batallions was a point of deep resentment among those who served. The fact that the militia performed well on this occasion was a relief, but Ogden is absolutely correct that the British, hessian and Loyalist advance during Knyphausen's Raid toward Springfield was checked and even thrown back for a time at Connecticut Farms by the 800 man Jersey Brigade and local men who fought on their very doorsteps. Ogden, as Brigade Major, was dispatched by his commander William Maxwell to stiffen the resolve of the militia, so he was able to see their quslity firsthand while his relatives and close friends fought neearby with their regiments. More on Connecticut Farms and its aftermath in a subsequent post.

June 23, 2008

The Royalists under Knyphausen had little more than a dozen miles to cover between their landing at Elizabethtown, New Jersey and Hobart's Gap which lead toward Washington's encampment and vulnerable supplies at Morristown. The invading army that June night in 1780 included a strong force of cavalry that was utterly squandered on the campaign.

The high mobility of the 17th Lancers, von Diemar's Black Hussars, the mounted Queens Rangers and the mounted German Jaegers could have been used to penetrate the countryside ahead of the marching columns and determine the enemy strength, and if they were not able - as was Buford at Gettysburg - to secure the high ground, at least they could screen the advance from attack by militia. Washington, in fact, was so greatly alarmed by the presence of so many enemy horsemen that he ordered the recall of "Lighthorse Harry" Lee and his troopers, on their way South, to help counter a cavalry threat that ultimately never materialized.

The Hessian commander was unable to get his horsemen across from Staten Island in time to be of any use on June 7th, when the head of the advancing column was blunted for hours at Connecticut Farms just a few miles northwest of Elizabethtown. Nor were they used effectively during the battle two weeks later at Springfield just a bit further up the road. Aside from a few ambuscades during the period when the British hunkered down between engagements at their beach-head below Elizabethtown, the mounted arm of Kyphausen's force contributed little to the outcome of the campaign.

Knyphausen also had a substantial advantage in artillery. After Maxwell's depleted brigade of New Jersey Continentals and assorted militia stood in the path of the Royalist advance at Connecticut Farms without artillery of their own - and held them off for more than three hours of ferocious fighting - they withdrew toward Springfield and the protection of an "old iron four-pound field piece" manned by New Jersey militia. Only two or three of the estimated 15-20 cannon Knyphausen brought over from Staten island were brought to bear at Connecticut Farms, and these were the "battalion guns" that traveled with the lead brigades rather than a concentrated force.

Artillery played a much greater role at Springfield on June 23rd, but even here it took six of Knyphausen's guns to silence a single six pounder that held up the British advance. The Continentals never managed to get a battery of guns in place and the militia actually lost some of theirs when the Royalists emerged from their defenses at Elizabethtown for their second drive inland.

Thus the bulk of the fighting fell to just a few battalions out of the entire Royalist force, and to a thin blue line of Continental regiments and swarming groups of militia. Given the total number of troops available to Knyphausen (on paper, at least), it is remarkable that the casualties were not much greater on the patriot side. But merely having the resources under his command did not assure that they could be effectively deployed, and Knyphausen in his only independent command did not prove to be an aggressive commander. We'll see how these factors played out when we examine the fight at Connecticut Farms in detail in the next post in this series.

June 22, 2008

There is only one full length history of Knyphausen's Raid and the engagements at Connecticut Farms and Springfield, New Jersey, and it has long been out of print. Time and again during my research of these events for this series of posts, it became clear that I needed to find this book, and yesterday Interlibrary Loan delivered a much anticipated copy of Thomas Fleming's 1973 account: The Forgotten Victory; The Battle for New Jersey - 1780. In 1975, Fleming condensed this book into a 33 page booklet - #8 in the New Jersey's Revolutionary Experience Series entitled The Battle of Springfield - and I'm sorry to say that this abridged work, also out of print, is the better history of the two, for in its brevity it makes fewer errors.

Fleming is an engaging writer, a novelist and author of historical fiction as well as several excellent histories. He has gone particulalry deep in the American Revolutionary period, and for this early work he clearly did a great deal of research on an important and neglected campaign of the war. He benefited from access to a wide range of documentary sources and there is plenty of fresh information available in both The Forgotten Victory and The Battle of Springfield, much of which with appropriate citation to aid the historian. Nonetheless there are nagging errors that taken individually seem nit-picky but in aggregate make one start to question the veracity of more essential points in the narrative.

Some of these errors are those only one with a vested interest in esoteric details might catch. Such, however, is the nature of the interested genealogist, and this campaign involved many of my ancestral kin.

On pg. 99 and again on pg 155, Fleming identifies Ensign Moses Ogden as the nephew of Major Aaron Ogden, who happens to be my Gr-gr-gr-great grandfather. According to The Ogden Family Elizabethtown Branch by William Ogden Wheeler (1907) pg. 85, Moses Ogden was in fact a 1st cousin. Unfortunately, Fleming actually references this work as his source for Ogden's lineage, but ended up getting it wrong more than once in print.

On page 247, Fleming describes the spectacle of the Royalists on the march to Springfield on June 23rd, making reference to "the Foot Guards gleaming in white lace. Even the sergeants wore epaulets on their right shoulders. Their drummers and fifers were in white coats lined with blue, and they wore white fur caps." While that is they way they would have looked in the garrison uniforms back in England, the Service Brigade of Guards that fought in America wore a stripped down campaign dress from the moment of their arrival in 1776 when their commander, Brigadier General Edward Mathew, made radical alterations to their uniforms, removing the lace and epaulets and cutting down their hat brims and coat lengths. They were still elite soldiers, but not the bandbox battalions described by Fleming. His source for this description was accurate for the Guards in general, but not as they appeared in America.

On page 239, Fleming notes that General Nathaniel Greene had a personal bond with Col. Israel Angell's 2nd Rhode Island Regiment but gives no further explanation for it. In fact this it quite true, for the Rhode Islander Greene had fought with these men in the defense of Fort Mercer during the Philadelphia campaign two years before, an event described by Fleming as an example of the fighting quality of the 2nd Rhode Island Continentals without ever making the connection back to Greene.

On page 244, Fleming describes Springfield's "thirty-odd houses" at the time of the battle and states; "The present-day town of Springfield is only a fraction of the colonial town's size." This would be news indeed to the present-day residents of Springfield, New Jersey, population 14,429 in the 2000 census, which may have grown in the past 35 years since Fleming wrote his book but not from a mere handful of houses in the 1970s as would have had to have been the case for Fleming's statement to be accurate. He probably meant to say the 1780-era village of Springfield was only a fraction of the present town's size: better editing should have caught this transposition.

The documentation of this campaign is full of confusing and misleading primary and secondary source material, and it is very difficult to sort out precise troop movements, let alone casualties. As often as he provides footnotes in his account, Fleming's narrative reads more like one of his novels, and I found myself wanting more documented details and less dramatization. In one of the most griping episodes in the story, the brave, forlorn stand of a lone cannon served by a doomed handful of continental artillerymen, Fleming introduces a 13-year-old boy who remains unidentified and is part of Springfield legend. He volunteers to bring water to those manning the gun who are cut down one by one. In the end, he joins Angell's men and fires on the converging British, wounding one "to his ecstatic delight." Whether this character actually was ecstatic or not is a matter of conjecture, as he was reported killed very soon thereafter by a cannonball. In a novel, ascribing emotions to characters is an appropriate devise. In a work of history it is laden with assumption, and this is not the only case when Fleming falls back on the novelist's art.

There are further details that might clutter up the narrative but would have been very useful if included in an appendix. Often Fleming describes unnamed regiments when it would have been a simple matter to identify them. He says that five were left behind in Elizabethtown before the second advance on Springfield but nowhere in his book offers an order of battle. Given that he was well aware that his was to be the first comprehensive historical treatment of the campaign, it is regrettable that Fleming did not provide the details of particular interest to historians. It is still a fine popular account and a good read if you are looking to get the flavor of the events. It has two excellent maps and plenty of engaging anecdotes, but as history it falls short as the first and last word on the subject.

June 19, 2008

[Map: George Buchel, from Thomas Fleming (1975) The Battle of Springfield. Click to enlarge]

At the core, even the set piece battles of the American Revolution were often a matter of limited engagements. Only a portion of Gates' and Burgoyne's men, for instance, clashed at Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights during the climax of the Saratoga campaign. Neither side could afford to lose their armies in pitched battles.

Just as significantly, the organization of these armies, especially on the Royalist side, worked against unit cohesion. Brigades were created and reshuffled as needed, and battalions routinely broken up for detached service. A force of the size that Knyphausen brought over against New Jersey from New York in June of 1780 was really a small army, yet in neither of the principal engagements of the brief campaign was he able to concentrate his forces, the initial grouping and command structure went by the boards early on, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by just a few units.

Knyphausen used all but three of the infantry regiments he had available in New York on his invasion of New Jersey. There are some inconsistencies among the various sources as to the precise strength and composition of his army. Contemporary reports estimated between 5000 and 6000 men. The most complete order of battle I have been able to discover in any of the histories of the campaign is presented in Winter at Morristown, 1779-1780: The Darkest Hour by Samuel Steele Smith (1979), which is both out of print and incredibly hard to locate. It is possible to get snippet views of the text through Google Books, however, and from what I could tease out and compare with other sources I believe I have a complete picture.

Knyphausen initially organized his force into 5 "divisions" of 2 - 4 infantry regiments each. 2 divisions included cavalry, and all but the 3rd included artillery. Each was commanded, at least on paper, by a Brigadier or Major General, but forces were detached and moved about almost from the start.

The 1st Division was lead by Brigadier General Thomas Stirling, the subject of an earlier post. This was the vanguard and made the first crossing in the evening of June 6th from Staten Island to Elizabethtown Point. Stirling established the beachhead with the light companies of the 37th and 38th regiments of foot, veterans of hard service (the 38th had been at Bunker Hill). The rest of these two regiments soon crossed over, along with the Hessian Leib ("du Corps") and Landgraf musketeer regiments. Stirling's division also had 2 six pounders.

The problem with having Stirling lead the van was that he only had these two light companies for skirmishers and no screen of cavalry. Soon after leading the advance up the darkened road to Elizabethtown he was felled by a picket guard lead by Ensign Moses Ogden of Spenser's (4th) New Jersey Regiment. During the delay that followed the Hessian and Anspach (dismounted) Jaegers were moved to the head of the column. They had been assigned to the Third Division under Major General William Tryon, the former Royal governor of New York and an old hand at leading raids into Connecticut. The Jaegers were not at full strength, with 280 of their number on detached service in the South and another on mounted service elsewhere in the column. The remaining 300 riflemen would be the tip of the spear in the actions to come and in the end suffered more than 1/3 casualties.

Tryon also seems to have had 40 loyalist pioneers under his command (possibly from the "Black Pioneers" comprised of escaped slaves). The core of his command was the elite Service Brigade of the British Foot Guards, made up of officers and men selected by draft from each of the 3 Guard Regiments in England. The Guards on American service were organized into two battalions of 5 companies each, including Grenadier and Light Companies. Only the 1st Grenadier Company was comprised of men who came from pre-existing flank companies of the Guards. Their commander had been Brigadier General Edward Mathew of the 2nd "Coldstream" Guards, but on this expedition for reasons I have not been able to determine he was apparently assigned the command of the 2nd Division which did not include the guards. Perhaps he was still suffering from the illness that compelled him to give up his command of Fort Knyphausen that April. One biography says he participated in the expedition as a volunteer which would indicate that he was a supernumerary.

In any event he was a senior officer and was given command of one of the largest Divisions with nearly 1,700 men. It included the 22nd and 57th regiments of foot, and also the 1st and 4th battalions of the New Jersey Loyalist volunteers under Brigadier General Cortland Skinner. According to Steele he had "some cavalry" and 2 six pounders, and he also had the single company of the 17th regiment of foot - 79 men - that had been formed from those of the battalion who had not been captured at Stony Point the previous winter by Anthony Wayne.

The 4th and 5th Divisions were lead by Hessian Generals Carl von Hackenberg and Friedrich von Lossberg. Von Hackenberg had the British 43rd regiment of foot, the Hessian Regiment Böse and the 1st Anspach Regiment (some sources say also the 2nd Bayreuth regiment but this unit appears to have remained in New York at the outset of the campaign). He also had 2 three-pounders. Von Lossberg had the Hessian Donop regiment, and I believe also the Garrison regiment von Bünau. The bulk of the cannons, from both the Royal an Hessian Artillery, was with the 5 Division, possibly including 2 six-pounders, 6 three-pounders, and 2 howitzers. It also had the bulk of the cavalry - elements of the 17th light dragoons, and the mounted Queen's Rangers, which included Captain Friederick de Diemar's "Black Hussars". This last unit was comprised of Germans - largely Brunswickers - who had escaped after the surrender of Burgoyne's army. Diemar has a Hanoveran and held a commission in the 60th Royal Americans.

If by now you are thoroughly confused as to who goes with whom, imagine the state of affairs on the ground, with multiple crossings made from Staten Island to the marshy Jersey Shore at night toward an enemy whose disposition was unclear and who got the ball rolling by shooting the Brigadier General leading the advance. There were delays while a swamp was bridged. There were delays while units were shifted position from command to command. In the end only two divisions marched through Elizabethtown on the road to Connecticut Farms on the morning of the 7th, with considerable gaps between them. We'll pick up the narrative of the fight that took place that day in a future post.
Postscript: 9/7/2009 - Having now procured the out of print Winter at Morristown, referenced above, I can give the full British Order of Battle for Connecticut Farms according to Appendix V, pgs. 62, 63:
First Division, Brig. Gen Thomas Stirling (w), Col. Friedrich Von Wurmb
37th Regt., 38th Regt., Leib Regt. [du Corps], Landgraft Rgt.
Second Division, Maj. Gen. Edward Matthew
17th Regt (one company), 22nd Regt., 57th Regt., Buneau Regt., 1st Batt. NJ Volunteers, 4th Batt. New jersey Volunteers, 2 six-pounders, "some cavalry"
Third Division, Maj. Gen. William Tryon
Dismounted Hessian and Anspach Jaegers, 1st and 2nd batt. Guards, pioneers
Fourth Division, Maj. gen. Carl Von Hackenberg
43rd. Regt., 1st Anspach-Bayreuth Regt., Bose Regt., 2 three-pounders
Fifth Division, Maj. Gen. Friedrich von Lossberg
Donop Regt., 17th Dragoons, Mounted Queen's Rangers, Von Diemar's Hussars, Royal Artillery, German Artillery, baggage.
Total in Knyphausen's force on June 7th, 1780 6,887

June 15, 2008

From the Patriot point of view, the way General Knyphausen conducted his invasion and subsequent withdrawal from New Jersey in June of 1780 made no sense. The Royalists had a force of nearly 6,000 that far outnumbered the local militia and the handful of depleted Continental regiments that opposed them. Knyphausen twice marched inland from his beachhead to fight two sharp engagements, only to withdraw his entire force each time - as the commander of the New Jersey Continentals, General William Maxwell, would later put it - "with their backsides to the Sound near Elizabethtown." Washington's letters throughout the crisis show that he struggled to find meaning in the retrograde movements of the enemy, writing to General Anthony Wayne after the enemy's second withdrawal that "It is certainly difficult if not impossible, to ascertain their views."

Participants on the Royalist side has questions of their own. Lt. Colonel Ludwig Johann Adolph von Wurmb, who commanded the Hessian and Anspach Jaeger Corps, later wrote;

"I regret from the depths of my heart that the great loss of the Jaegers took place to no greater purpose."

Indeed, if the objective of the campaign were merely a raid in force, its costs do not justify the result. A campaign of more than two weeks to burn two insignificant villages, followed by a retreat back to Staten Island, should not have taken the deployment of 16 British, German and Loyalist infantry battalions, not to mention a considerable cavalry force and artillery. It was only much later, when historians were able to study British and German accounts of these events, that Knyphausen's behavior, if not his leadership, becomes understandable. Far from being the result of a coherent strategy, Knyphausen's objective changed in the midst of battle, and the reason for it was more than just a remarkable intelligence failure that underestimated Patriot resolve and the capacity of the militia to put up an effective resistance. Factional intrigue within the Royalist High Command doomed the venture from the start.

When Sir Henry Clinton, the British Commander in Chief in North America, sailed south with nearly half the New York garrison in the end of 1779, the focus of the war effort shifted to the southern colonies. As mention in the first post in this series, those Royalist leaders who remained in New York bridled at the thought that Clinton was keeping them inactive and in the dark while he was off winning laurels in the south. For his part, Clinton was notoriously silent about his intentions and overall strategy, confiding in a few close staff officers but not his commanders, let alone the Loyalist elite in New York who indeed wished to have him replaced, potentially by one of their own.

Lt. General Knyphausen was the senior officer left in New York and so by default was commander in Clinton's absence. Speaking no English, he was unwilling to launch a major campaign without orders from Clinton, much to the dismay of the New York Royalists, who even as late as May 28th were asking themselves if it were certain that Knyphausen "has a mind."

In fact, Clinton did have a plan for Knyphausen that resembled the course of action the reluctant Hessian general ultimately took in New Jersey, but it was to bring his Carolina Army north after reducing Charleston and to break the back of the Continental army in a two pronged advance on the patriot encampment in Morristown.

It was an excellent strategy. The continental battalions had suffered through the worst winter of the war and new recruits were lacking to fill their depleted ranks. The stores and artillery at Morristown were as vulnerable as Washington's army, which could not fight both Knyphausen and Clinton simultaneously. New Jersey might well be returned to royalist control.

But Clinton failed to let anyone in New York know his intentions. Knyphausen, too, was tired of garrison duty. When two regiments of the Connecticut line mutinied that May, it seemed to the Royalists in New York that Washington's army was on the verge of collapse. A plan finally took shape that would send a major force into New Jersey at Elizabethtown and march toward Hobart's Gap, the gateway through the Watchung Range to the Continental encampment and the supplies at Morristown. This, of course, was what Clinton had in mind for Knyphausen, but it was premature for Clinton's force was still in Charleston.

Astoundingly, there was still an eleventh hour opportunity to for Knyphausen to pull his punch, for by remarkable coincidence Clinton's A.D.C. Major William Crosbie, who was privy to his commander's plans, arrived from the South just as the invasion fleet was being readied. Thomas Fleming, whose research into the Springfield raid stands as the most authoritative to date, describes how Major Crosbie failed to stop the unauthorized invasion:

"Major Crosbie was nonplussed. He was on the stickiest wicket that any aide-de-camp ever encountered in the history of warfare. Sir henry had told him his real plans, but he had enjoined him to strictest secrecy. All Crosbie could do was give "hints" to those "to whom he should judge proper. This left Major Crosbie in an impossible position. He could not hope to screen out "proper" from "improper" hearers without making a host of powerful enemies. Since Sir Henry had a tendency to be jealous of almost everyone in the army above the rank of Colonel, its was easy for Crosbie to construe all of these assembled generals as improper. He has obviously intended to say nothing about Sir Henry's plan. Now he floundered and flapped and blurted out something vague. They had no reason to expect Sir Henry very soon, he said - or at least that is what everyone concluded from what he said. After more circumlocutions, everyone had the impression that Sir Henry was going to raid in the Chesapeake.

In that case, Knyphausen growled to [his aid] Beckwith, who was frantically translating all this, their invasion of New Jersey was strategically sound. It would pin down Washington's main army, leaving Sir Henry free to chew up what parts of Maryland and Virginia he chose. With elaborate courtesy, General von Knyphausen suggested that Major Crosbie join the invasion as a member of his staff. The agitated aide-de-camp mumbled his acceptance and before the night was over, found himself slogging through the marshes of Staten Island shore to board a New Jersey-bound flatboat."

- Thomas Fleming (1975) The Battle of Springfield, pgs 11,12

Crosbie, whose old battalion the 38th Regiment of foot was in the lead division of the Royalist force, would not find the courage to inform Knyphausen of the real state of affairs until well after battle had been joined the following day at Connecticut Farms. This changed everything, for with confirmation that Clinton was even now bringing his force back from the south, Knyphausen knew better than to proceed any further. Instead, he brought his force back to their beach head and hunkered down to wait for Clinton. No wonder the Patriots, let alone many of the Royalists, could make neither heads nor tails of it all!

June 10, 2008

The 1780 campaign season had arrived and the Royalists in occupied New York were restless and impatient. The Commander in Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton, had shifted the main theater of the war to the southern colonies the previous winter and laid siege to Charleston, South Carolina which surrendered on May 12th, 1780. In contrast, the main body of the continental army remained with Washington encamped in Morristown, New Jersey, from which it could shift to counter threats to the Hudson Highlands or New Jersey and Philadelphia.

Clinton had left Hessian Lieutenant General Wilhelm, Baron von Knyphausen in command in New York in his absence. Despite orders from Clinton to remain in place - though significantly without sharing with his subordinate his strategic reasons for doing so - Knyphausen was under increasing pressure from Clinton's detractors to use the garrison of 8,000 men offensively. Among these loyalist and crown leaders were Benjamin Franklin's son William, the exiled Tory governor of New Jersey; the Royal Chief Justice of New York William Smith; the Royal governor of New York General James Robinson and former royal governor General William Tryon.

Knyphausen was a widely respected division commander and studied the situation carefully. After the coldest winter of the century, New York was no longer under threat of invasion over ice and thought could therefore be given to offensive operations. Washington's force at Morristown was thought to be on the verge of mutiny after enduring intense hardship in its winter encampment, and many Royalist leaders still held out hope that New Jersey loyalists would take up arms and help win back the colony. A 1794 British report on The History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of the American War reveals how misplaced these assumptions about the coming campaign would prove to be:

"If the inhabitants were disposed to throw off the yoke of congress, the force sent to their assistance would enable them to do it: And if a mutinous disposition still prevailed amongst the soldiers of the American army, some advantage might probably be gained over general Washington. It soon however appeared that part of this intelligence was false, and the rest greatly magnified. Although the Inhabitants of the Jerseys had murmured in consequence of the depredations committed on them by the American soldiers in the time of their distress from want of provisions, they had never thought of deserting the American cause: On the contrary, they made the greatest exertions to relieve the necessities of those very men to whose depredations they were exposed; and it was principally owing to these exertions that the American army had not been actually disbanded. A mutinous disposition had also certainly discovered itself amongst the soldiers of the American army: But it arose from distress, and not disaffection...Under such circumstances the British commanders experienced a grievous disappointment: Instead of being received in the Jerseys as friends, the militia very generally turned out to oppose them."

From time to time over the coming weeks, we will examine this last major land campaign of the American Revolution in the northern colonies, including the engagements at Connecticut Farms and nearby Springfield New Jersey that took place in June 228 years ago. I'd roll this series out over several days, but experience has shown that except for hardcore history buffs it is best to leaven my offerings with other fare. I'm also waiting to see if the local inter-library loan will come through with a couple of key sources not available on line and currently out of print. I'll likely archive them together for those who wish to get the full, sequential effect.

As with Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois the previous year, my Ogden and Dayton ancestors played prominent parts in this story, and their leadership and actions on this occasion were particularly decisive in resisting the Royalist advances literally on the thresholds of their own homes. A third cousin of Matthias and Aaron Ogden's became a celebrated female martyr for the cause, as galvanizing for the patriots at this stage of the war as had been the death of Jane McCrea in 1777 at the hands of Burgoyne's native allies. Knyphausen's Springfield Raid is passed over in many histories of this period, and the details of its two principal battles are often jumbled together. We will untangle this tale and explore its significance in subsequent posts.

June 09, 2008

Perhaps we Americans have a natural disdain for keeping track of our former British adversaries from the colonial era, or maybe there is less interest today in the United Kingdom in preserving the memory of those old defeats. I am otherwise at a loss as to why it is so difficult to find accurate information about a soldier of long service (1747-1801) who fought during the French and Indian War as a Captain in the Black Watch, was severely wounded at the head of his brigade during the American War of Independence, and left the British Army a full general. He doesn't rate a mention in Boatner's (1966) Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, and unless I decide to create an entry you won't find him in Wikipedia.

My interest in General Thomas Stirling came about during my research into two battles that took place in New Jersey in June of 1780. He was wounded at the very outset of this campaign - what is often referred to as Knyphausen's Springfield Raid - but there was evidently very little awareness of his ultimate fate on the part of contemporary Americans and subsequent historians. Some sources said the wound was mortal. Others that he died from complications a year later. Given that the Dictionary of National Biography. 63 vols. London, 1885-1901. Vol. LIV, pp. 383-384 declares that Sterling lived another 28 years after his injury, it seems high time that someone set the record straight.

On March 24, 1757 (another source says July 24th) he was commissioned a Captain in the 42nd Highland Regiment. One of Stirling's biographical references claims in 1755 he was a captain and lieutenant in the 48th Regiment of Foot and wounded with Braddock at Monongahela, which conflicts with his Dutch service and is not borne out by other available records, including a list of the officers of the 48th. He appears to have been at the Battle of Carillon under Abercrombie and the capture of Ticonderoga the following year with Amherst. He was at the surrender of Montreal in 1760, and wrote to his brother at home that he was "heartily tired of this country, as was every officer in it" and expressing his hope that "Long may Peace reign here...as surely god never intended any war should be carried on by any other besides the natives." It would be a very long time indeed before he would return to his home in Scotland.

It gets tricky to follow his movements during this period, as the 42nd had two battalions and the 2nd of these was sent to Martinique in 1759. Captain Stirling and the 42nd (now Royal) Highland regiment was actually sent to the Caribbean in 1762, and he was wounded at Martinique during this campaign and not in 1759 as others assume.

The two battalions were combined after the fall of Havana and remained in New York as part of the force selected to protect the colonies. Captain Stirling took part in the relief of Fort Pitt in the summer of 1763 during Pontiac's Rebellion and served against the Ohio Indians in 1764. He is specifically credited with leading a 100 man detachment down the Ohio to take possession of Fort Chartres in southern Illinois. It was an odyssey worthy of the likes of Robert Rogers or Benedict Arnold and I'd love to someday read the journals of the expedition, which reportedly describe such encounters as a "prodigious number" of pelicans that were initially mistaken for a regiment of the white-uniformed French, a personal battle that Captain Stirling had with a "monstrous" bear, and makeshift sails made from the regimental plaids. After overwintering at the Fort, they traveled downriver to New Orleans and sailed via Pensacola to New York and then marched to rejoin their regiment in Philadelphia.

Thomas Stirling remained with the 42nd Highlanders after they were posted to the Irish garrison, rising to Major and Lt. Colonel, which in the British army at that time served as the tactical commander of the regiment, with the Colonelcy going to a General officer. In 1776, he lead the 42nd back to America, arriving in August before New York. The battalion companies of the 42nd and two other highland regiments were organized into two temporary battalions under the overall command of Lt. Col. Stirling, who set about preparing his men for the realities of an American campaign and training them to fight in open order as light infantry, as this 1825 history recounts:

"From the moment of their landing, Colonel Stirling was indefatigable in drilling the men to the manner of fighting practiced in the former war with the Indians and French bushmen, which is so well calculated for a close, woody country. Colonel Stirling was well versed in this mode of warfare, and imparted it to the troops, first by training the non-commissioned officers himself, and then superintending the instruction of the soldiers. The highlanders made rapid progress n this discipline, being, in general, excellent marksmen, and requiring only to have their natural impetuosity restrained, which often lead them to disdain fighting in ambush."

Thomas Stirling lead his men at Long Island. Coincidentally, the American General William Alexander (1726-1786) of New Jersey, who also happened to be a claimant for the earldom of Stirling, was captured during this battle. Alexander was known to American contemporaries as Lord Stirling even though he was unable to secure the title and should not be confused with the subject of this essay.

Lt. Col. Thomas Stirling also took part in the attack and capture of Fort Washington later that fall and served in New Jersey that winter. The battalion companies of the 42nd were in reserve during the Battle of Brandywine and Stirling later led the 42nd and a detachment of the 10th to drive the enemy from Billingspoint ,and so was not present at the Battle of Germantown. He was often sent on foraging expeditions and raids with more than just his regiment under his command. In February 1779 he led a raid from Staten Island to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and reoccupied Stoney Point when it was abandoned by Anthony Wayne.

Clearly, this was a highly competent officer, well suited to service in America. In February of 1779 he was appointed aide-de-camp to the King and. In June, 1780, now a Brigadier General, he lead the first brigade in Knyphausen's invading force that crossed once again from Staten Island to Elizabethtown. At the very outset, it was his misfortune to be shot from his horse in the single volley fired at the British vanguard by a picket of twelve men under Ensign Moses Ogden of Spenser's New Jersey regiment, who had been posted in Elizabethtown by my ancestor Colonel Elias Dayton. Stirling's injury was considered severe and Knyphausen himself took command of the vanguard.

But how severe? Thayer's As We Were; The Story of Old Elizabethtown published by the New Jersey Historical Society in 1964 mistakenly states that the wound was mortal. Hatfield's History of Elizabeth, New Jersey (1868) to which Thayer's work owes a substantial debt, reports that the General was unhorsed, and his thigh fractured by the shot, and erroniously claims "he died of his wound, a year later". His injury, while serious, did not prevent him from seeing further service, however. One source states he was at Yorktown with Cornwallis, though it should be pointed out that this source also claims he was with Clinton during his 1780 Charleston, S.C. campaign, which was contemporaneous with his wounding in New Jersey. His old regiment the 42nd Highlanders did go south with Clinton, however. In May of 1782 he was made "colonel" of the 71st Highlanders, succeeded the deceased General Frasier. In 1801 he was a full general.

Here then, was the commander of a famous regiment, who saw hard service in the American War of Independence and left North America a Major General, and yet his story is little known and much remains to be clarified. It may be that his loss at the beginning of the 1780 invasion of New Jersey had significant implications for the way that the campaign would develop, and it is a shame his record is not better understood or documented. I was unable to find even a portrait of Thomas Stirling to use in this piece.