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TAGS: PGOVPRELROSUBJECT: DNI NEGROPONTE MEETING WITH OPPOSITION PSD PRESIDENT MIRCEA GEOANA
Classified By: Amb. Nicholas Taubman for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: At a meeting with DNI Negroponte and the
Ambassador, opposition PSD head Mircea Geoana evinced concern
about a posssible post-EU accession malaise in Romanian
politics, with weak and divided governance for the next
several years. Geoana was skeptical about prospects for
early elections and favored creation of a "grand coalition"
of leading moderate parties on the German model. On
attitudes towards the U.S., Geoana said some "rebalancing"
between Romania's "transatlanticist" and "European"
orientations might take place, but geopolitics assured that
Romania's fundamentally transatlanticist orientation was
"safe" for at least two more generations. Geoana argued for a
regional solution to the Kosovo issue, noting that the
international community could move relatively fast on Kosovar
independence if it was linked to a renewed commitment to the
Balkan region as a whole. With EU entry for many Balkan
nations unlikely, NATO had to pick up the slack as default
"mentor" in the region. Geoana argued that Romania was
wasting an opportunity to work with new Eastern European
members of the EU in creating a new "Vilnius Group"
encompassing the Baltics to the Black Sea. On intelligence
matters, Geoana encouraged new links between Romanian
parliamentary committees overseeing the intelligence
community and their US counterparts. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Opposition PSD President Mircea Geoana met with
Director of National Intelligence Negroponte and Ambassador
Taubman October 29. Geoana prefaced the meeting by comparing
Romania's political scene to an ice skating competition;
Romania had performed superbly in the obligatory routines
needed for acceptance into all of the right clubs--WTO, NATO,
and now the European Union--but it was uncertain whether it
could do as well in the "freestyle" segment now that the
constraints of candidacy were lifted. He said Romanian
politics exemplified the lack of an overall strategic vision
among Romania's political leaders as well as a vicious
political culture that stressed the "total demolition" of
one's political enemies.
¶3. (C) Geoana was skeptical about prospects for early
elections, noting that elections for the European Parliament
would likely occur in May 2007, with municipal elections in
June 2008 and a Presidential election taking place in 2009.
President Basescu was alone in pushing for early elections,
hoping to capitalize on his current high popularity ratings.
Basescu also feared that a weak PD showing in future
municipal elections could erode his prospects in the
Presidential contest. Geoana opined that a reshuffle among
coalition partners was possible depending on how long Prime
Minister Tariceanu survived. Tariceanu was weakened, but
still fighting for his political life. Geoana warned that if
Tariceanu goes, Romania could return to the "piranha
politics" of the 1990s, with Basescu installing a more
compliant puppet as Prime Minister.
¶4. (C) Regarding future coalition combinations, Geoana said
that anything was possible, including continuation of the
PD/PNL alliance; a strong PD combined with satellite parties;
a PD/PSD alliance, or even a PSD/PNL government. Two likely
options included a "new majority" centered around Basescu, or
some sort of "grand coalition" akin to Germany. The latter
option (which he preferred) would use as a pretext the need
for mainstream Romanian parties to collectively meet the
challenges of EU membership. A PD/PNL merger was unlikely
given the liberals' pride in their 100-year history and
traditions. Geoana anticipated that the next two and half
years could prove an extraordinarily "unconstructive" time
for Romanian politics, with political paralysis and loss of
momentum after the January 1 EU accession. Romania risked
following in Poland's footsteps in mismanaging the first few
years after EU entry, providing an opening for extremist and
populist voices to dominate Romanian politics in the future.
¶5. (C) On attitudes towards the United States, Geoana said
that Romania was currently so pro-American that one had to
anticipate a future rebalancing between its
"transatlanticist" and "European" orientations. Geography
would never allow Romania to "relax" and hence the current
security construction with the United States was safe for at
least two more generations. He added that the U.S. shouldn't
take Romania's future pro-US orientation for granted or
assume that it would be automatic. Geoana added that while he
didn't like the President, he had to admit that Basecsu was
"solid" with regards to his transatlanticist inclinations.
Geoana also noted the need to develop new institutions to
anchor US-Romanian ties after USAID pulled out. These might
include the Black Sea Trust Fund, the Aspen Institute, even
the Harvard Club.He added that it was not a question of USG
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funding, since there was now a huge network of influential
Romanians who knew and loved the United States, including
many corporate leaders.¶6. (C) On Kosovo, Geoana said that Kosovar independence must
be linked to a "package" of measures for the Balkan region as
a whole. Bringing Croatia into the EU and NATO without
accounting for the rest of the Balkans was the wrong
strategy. With the right "package", the international
community could move relatively fast in terms of fostering
Kosovo's independence, but changing the status quo in Kosovo
must be backed by a renewed commitment to the Balkan region
on the part of NATO and the EU. Geoana was doubtful that
Macedonia or Alabania were capable of qualifying for EU
accession, thus handing NATO the default role of "mentor" to
these states. Geoana argued for a strategy other than just
"punishing" the Serbs, noting that the Serbian military
understood what had to be done, but the Serbian public was
still "intoxicated" with the idea of retaining Kosovo.
Geoana added that the upcoming German EU Presidency was an
opportunity for the United States to work closely with
Chancellor Merkel on Kosovo. The relative weakness or lame
duck status of other European leaders gave Merkel the
opportunity to demonstrate that she could be a "global
leader" on this and other issues. Geoana suggested that with
the right preparation, Merkel would be receptive to working
in tandem with President Bush on a renewed Kosovo strategy as
part of Germany's bid for a successful EU presidency.
¶7. (C) Comparing Russia to "an athlete on steroids" Geoana
said that he saw both Ukraine and Moldova slowly bending to
growing Russian pressure, with Georgia increasingly isolated
through Russian energy politics and other "booby traps" from
Moscow. Geoana also accused President Basescu of harboring
plans to trade Moldovan unification with Romania for tacit
acquiescence to allowing Transnistria to become a Russian-run
"Kaliningrad" to the east. Geoana said Romania was wasting an
opportunity to work with new Eastern European members of the
EU in creating a "new European neighborhood policy" from the
Baltics to the Black Sea, acting as a Vilnius Group writ
large that could influence EU policy towards the East.
¶8. (C) On intelligence matters, Geoana said that the PSD had
agreed to Senator Maior becoming the head of Romania's
internal service. He said that it was "refreshing" to see a
new generation take over the intelligence services given the
need to remove the taint of the Ceaucescu-era Securitate, but
both Maior and SRI Director Saftoiu were inexperienced and
"needed help." He said that he was trying to institute a
"new rule" in Romanian politics that the domestic
intelligence directorship always go to an opposition
politician, adding that this was a "precondition" for sending
"one of our best young guys" for the post. Geoana also
encouraged the DNI to promote contacts between Romanian
parliamentary committees overseeing intelligence matters with
their counterparts in the United States, as this would be an
investment in a more democratic Romania and a better
respected intelligence service.
¶9. (C) Comment: Mircea Geoana's views carrry some weight as
he is the heir presumptive in any future coalition government
involving the PSD. His views on many issues--including his
fundamentally transatlanticist orientation, his comments on
Kosovo, and remarks on the desirability of creating an
Eastern European bloc within the EU--track closely with those
shared by many of his ruling coalition counterparts,
underscoring that what separates the PSD from the ruling PD
and PNL are frequently matters involving personalities,
parties, and political nuance, not ideology or policy.
Geoana's skepticism regarding the likelihood of early
elections, on the other hand, reflects the fact that the
PSD's prospects are not encouraging if President Basescu
succeeds in getting an early election contest. End Comment.
Taubman

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