Hancock and Sharp fail to make relevant
distinctions in "The Death Penalty and Christianity: A Conceptual
Paradox" (Perspectives, 46:1, pp. 61-65). This failure, along with
the suppression of relevant biblical passages, produces paradoxˇand worse.

When they say that the "Supreme Court
has not ruled on whether the death penalty is right or wrong for society"
(p. 61), they seem to assume that government should establish morality, though
they deny this later (p. 64). The state can only determine what is legal. We
hope that it will not try to force its citizens to acts they deem immoral. But
this expectation is nowhere guaranteed. The United States has been sensitive to
this, for example in providing noncombatant and alternative service for
conscientious objectors. But no government can accede to the principle
implicitly espoused by many minorities: Let my conscience be your guide. It
seems to me that something like this underlies the authors' claim that
"states have failed to address the moral issues" (p. 62). Do they
tacitly hold that those who have not reached their conclusion have not
considered the matter?

They approvingly cite a couple authors who
think that executions promote social problems (p. 62). They are correct that the
criminal mind is warped. See, for example, Tony Parker and Robert Allerton, The
Courage of His Convictions (Norton, 1962). Some will, as noted, twist
everything to support their actions. Others care nothing for consequences.
However, the threat of penalties does have an effect on the majority of human
beings. I recall one converted robber who said that, during his entire criminal
career, he never loaded his gun for fear of the gas chamber. I think everyone
has noted how much driving improves when a police car is present.

The authors might have noted the failure of
deterrence when penalties are neither swift nor sure. In the first place, a
judicial system ought to strive for truth and justice. Granted, this is never
guaranteed when human beings are involved. Mistakes will sometimes be made even
by the well-intentioned. But this cannot nullify the attempt. Second, the
proverbial "justice delayed is justice denied" is accurate. In
contrast to these principles, courts in the United States depend more on
procedure and obfuscation, with endless appeals and reversals on technicalities.
The best criminal defense lawyers are those who can turn their mastery of
sophistry and legal technicalities into acquittals, reversals, reduced charges
or lesser sentences. Justice and truth are often hard to find in the legal
morass.

The authors misguide when they quote
scripture (p. 63). The source of "Thou shalt not kill" (Exodus 20:13;
Deuteronomy 5:17) also commands that mediums, blasphemers, murderers, idolaters,
adulterers, homosexuals, rebellious sons, harlots and those engaged in human
sacrifice be put to death (Exodus 21:12, 15-17; 22:18; Leviticus 19:20; 20:2,
10-13, 27; 24:10-17, 21; Numbers 35:16-21, 30f; Deuteronomy 13:5-11; 17:2-7;
21:18-21; 22:20-24; see also Exodus 21:29; 22:19; 31:14f; 35:2; Leviticus 20:9,
15f; Numbers 1:51; 3:10, 38; 15:32-36; 18:7). The authors' view forces one of
two conclusions. Either God is too confused to give consistent commands, or some
megalomaniac claimed divine authority for his contradictions. The truth is
different. The Sixth Commandment prohibits murder, the unlawful taking of
human life. There is no contradiction between forbidding murder and commanding
that criminals be executed. A malefactor may legally forfeit his life.
"Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis
9:6) seems reasonably clear.

If I deny the divine authority of scripture,
I can join the critics in denouncing capital punishment as immoral. But, if God
is the revealer of the Law, executions are moral, for He is the ultimate source
of right and wrong. Do Hancock and Sharp know better than God? Or are they
merely claiming greater moral insight than what they hold to be the purely human
enactments of ancient Israel? Lying about the Sixth Commandment surely
demonstrates their ethical superiority.

When they turn to the New Testament, they
try to make what is commanded to the individual Christian the principle for
secular government. I am ordered not to retaliate against one who would defraud
me. Indeed, when one sues me for my suit, I am to let him have my overcoat also
(Matthew 5:40). Does this mean that the IRS must not prosecute those who cheat
on their income tax? that the defense contractors who overcharged shall be given
larger bonuses? A single moment of reasoning would have prevented such a
nonsensical transfer of personal principles to public policy.

Does God's judgment on murderers (p. 63)
preclude judgment in this life? Paul noted that the ruler bears a sword as God's
servant to punish evildoers (Romans 13:4). Only incredible feats of twisted
eisegesis can make a sword into a mere instrument of admonition and have Paul
refuting Genesis 9:6. Further, the declaration of Genesis 9:6 immediately
follows God's declaration that he will require an accounting (v. 5). It can
hardly be more clearly stated. God's future judgment on murderers is compatible
with their divinely commanded execution. This flatly contradicts the inference
Hancock and Sharp make.

The reference to throwing the first stone
(p. 63) also misleads. In the first place, what the mob was doing runs counter
to the Law (see Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 22:22). Second, Jesus called them
to strict obedience, whereupon they slunk off. Third, in strict obedience to the
Law, Jesus exonerated the accused woman (see Deuteronomy 17:6f; 19:15). Finally,
John 7:53-8:11 is probably not authentic, for it is not found in the most
ancient texts. This passage seems a favorite of those who would try to deny the
relevance of the Law to modern life. But the attempt fails. Even if it were
somewhat successful relative to the Mosaic enactments, it can hardly be counted
on to dismiss the Noahic Covenant of Genesis 9. This latter was confirmed by the
early church (compare Acts 15:19f, 29 with Genesis 9:4).

The authors perversely accuse Christians of
forcing their faith into the current mold and thereby approving capital
punishment. Reality is the opposite. The authors are trying to compel biblical
faith to fit their Procrustean bed. They amputate Scripture to match their
covert sentimentalism and rejection of standards. They even twist the fact that
a minority will not be deterred into a claim that deterrence should be abandoned
(p. 62). In this they take a novel tack. Propagandists usually belabor a straw
man, whereas they have made it their authority. Consequently, their paper has
neither empirical nor theological relevance. A full acceptance of the Bible
requires the belief that God authorizes capital punishment.

These last statements do not solve the
problems of jurisprudence, federal or state. Punishment, especially capital
punishment, should be applied fairly. But it is not always even-handed. Racism
sometimes biases sentences. So does fear of riots. The answer is not a quota
system. That fewer women than men are charged and tried, and that a still
smaller ratio are sentenced to death, does not statistically demonstrate sexism.
The numbers primarily reflect the fact that males are more likely to engage in
crime, especially violent crime. Cultural, economic and religious factors are
similarly relevant. They all should be faced squarely, with no fudging for
political correctness. I understand the fear that certain facts, if they are
scientifically demonstrated, may be misused. But I am persuaded that ignorance
has a far greater potential for mischief. I recall reading that the Nazis
suppressed a report that the "master-race Aryans" and despised Jews
reacted identically to noxious stimuli, and imprisoned the scientist whose
results were ideologically wrong. I know that the great plant geneticist,
Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov, died in prison because his plants did not follow the
official Marxist line. Ideologues, not honest citizens, fear truth and exposure.
Only ideologues must misrepresent and suppress the truth.