Stanford Security Seminar

Cryptography Robust against Side Channel Attacks

Yael Tauman Kalai

Abstract:

Traditionally, cryptographers assume that the secret keys are totally
hidden from the adversary.
However, in reality there are various real-world physical attacks,
including, timing and power attacks, which allow an adversary to
(continually) leak information about the secret keys.
In addition, there are various attacks, including heat and EM radiation
attacks, which allow an adversary to (continually) tamper with the
secret keys.
Recently, there has been a large and growing body of work, which tries
to secure cryptographic systems against such, so called, side-channel
attacks.
In this talk, I will review some of these results, and focus on two
recent results, which show how to construct encryption and signature
schemes that are secure even against an adversary that continually leaks
(bounded) information about the secret key, and continually tampers with
the secret key.
These results are based on joint work with Zvika Brakerski, Jonathan
Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and on joint work with Bhavana Kanukurthi
and Amit Sahai.