Defendants
Gabriele and Rolland Jost appeal the Lamoille Superior Court=s judgment in favor of
plaintiffs Marie and Nicholas DeNoia on their claim that the Josts interfered
with their use of an easement and parking lot serving the DeNoias= dry cleaning business. We
affirm.

The parties
own adjoining properties bordering Portland Street in Morrisville. A common
driveway separates the properties and connects to a large parking lot in the
rear, which the Josts own. The rear parking lot is bordered by the Lamoille
Grain Company (LGC). LGC has an easement over the Portland Street driveway so
large tractor-trailers may come and go from the company=s property, which is located along Railroad
Street.

The parties= properties once shared
common owners: Philip and Barbara Surgen. The Surgens operated a dry cleaning
business on the property until 1983. In 1983, the Surgens sold dry cleaning
equipment and what is now the DeNoias=
parcel to J.C. Cook, Inc., a business owned by John and Raylene Cook. The
purchase and sales agreement required the Surgens to cooperate with the Cooks
in securing any approvals, licenses, or permits that would allow the Cooks to
continue using the property in the same manner as the Surgens had used it. The
Surgens also promised the Cooks that they could install a drive-through window
along the side of the building facing the common driveway and that they could
use the rear parking lot for customer parking and access to the building=s back doors.

The
relationship between the Surgens and the Cooks deteriorated after the Cooks
complained of defects in the equipment they purchased from the Surgens.
Litigation ensued. The Surgens sued the Cooks, claiming that they owed rent
for use of the common driveway and rear parking lot. The Cooks sued the
Surgens, alleging breach of warranty and interference with their use of the
parking lot and driveway. The Cooks prevailed, and, in 1986, they sold the
property to the DeNoias.

Since buying
the property in 1986, the DeNoias have operated a dry cleaning business.
Patrons of the DeNoias=
business have used the common driveway and rear parking lot just as customers
of the Cooks and Surgens had done before. In 1989, a dispute arose over the
use of the common driveway after the Surgens placed steel posts to prevent
access to the rear parking area. The DeNoias sued because the posts prevented
convenient access to their business. In 1990, the Surgens and the DeNoias
settled the case. The settlement acknowledged the common right of way and
established its dimensions as eighty-four feet long by thirteen feet wide. The
thirteen-foot width is comprised of a five-foot strip of land on the Surgens= property (now owned by the
Josts) and an eight-foot wide strip on the DeNoias= parcel. The parties also agreed that neither
party would interfere with the other=s
use of the common driveway, but that the DeNoias could designate a handicap
parking space Aadjacent
to the present primary customer entrance to the DeNoia Dry Cleaners business.@ The settlement provided
that the easement would run with the land.

In 1995, the
Surgens sold the neighboring property to the Josts. Some time after the Josts
opened their business on the property, they placed a no-parking sign near the
designated handicap spot serving the DeNoias=
business. The sign=s
location created some confusion about where the DeNoias= customers could park and interfered with use
of the DeNoias=
handicap parking space. The DeNoias sued. They claimed that, in addition to
the no-parking sign=s
interference with their easement rights, the Josts blocked access to the back
doors of the dry cleaning business by piling snow against the DeNoias= building in the winter.
The Josts contended that the DeNoias had no right to use their property to
access the back doors of the DeNoias=
building because doing so would impermissibly extend the easement created by
the Surgen/DeNoia settlement. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of
the DeNoias, issued a permanent injunction, and ordered the Josts to pay the
DeNoias= attorney=s fees. This appeal
followed.

On appeal, the
Josts argue that: (1) the trial court erroneously relied on prior litigation to
find that the DeNoias have an easement to access the back doors of their
building, so that there was no basis for an injunction; (2) contrary to the
trial court=s
findings, the no-parking sign the Josts erected did not interfere with the
DeNoias= use of the
common driveway; and (3) it was error for the court to award the DeNoias= attorney=s fees. We will affirm the
court=s findings if
credible evidence in the record supports them, even though there may be
inconsistencies or contrary evidence in the record. Gilbert v. Davis,
144 Vt. 459, 461 (1984). The legal conclusions will stand on appeal if
supported by the findings. Bull v. Pinkham Eng=g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450,
454 (2000).

The Josts
first contend that prior litigation did not settle the DeNoias= right to use the Jost
property to access the rear doors of the DeNoias=
building. Therefore, according to the Josts, there were no grounds to enjoin
them from blocking access to the back doors of the DeNoia building. We
disagree. Consistent with the trial court=s
findings and conclusions, the evidence at trial established that the Surgens
granted the Cooks, the DeNoias=
predecessors, an easement to use the common driveway and rear parking lot in
the same manner as the Surgens had used them in the past. The court found that
in the past Aall
owners of the property had free and unrestricted use of the rear parking lot
for moving persons and equipment in and out of the building through [the] rear
door.@ The Josts= argument fails to address
these findings or the evidence in support of them. Rather, the Josts assert
that the settlement between the Surgens and the DeNoias somehow trumped the
easement rights created when the Surgens sold the property to the Cooks. The
argument has no merit, and the court did not err by issuing the permanent
injunction.

The Josts next
argue that the trial court erroneously found that the Josts= no-parking sign interfered
with the ability of the DeNoias=
customers to use the common driveway. Again we find no basis to overturn the
court=s ruling. The
parking sign, although located entirely on the Josts= property, impeded traffic traveling into the
rear parking lot and out of the Railroad Street exit. Moreover, the court
found that the sign confused the DeNoias=
customers and deterred them from parking on the DeNoias= property as they were entitled to do. We
discern no error because the evidence supports the trial court=s findings.

Finally, the
Josts argue that the court should not have awarded the DeNoias attorney=s fees. In general, parties
involved in litigation in Vermont=s
courts must pay their own attorney=s
fees. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woods, 2003 VT 33, & 18, 175 Vt. 212. The
superior court possesses inherent power, however, to award fees in exceptional
cases Abased on the
bad-faith conduct of litigants.@Agency of Natural Res. v. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 174 Vt.
498, 501 (2002) (mem.); see also Woods, 2003 VT 33, & 18 (explaining that
exception to American Rule requires finding of bad faith or outrageous
conduct). Exceptional cases include those where the party seeking fees was Aforced to seek judicial
assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right that should have
been freely enjoyed without judicial intervention.@Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co.,
174 Vt. at 501. Despite the Josts=
contention otherwise, the court here explained why the DeNoias were entitled to
attorney=s fees. In
particular, the court found that the Josts were aware of the prior litigation
over use of the common driveway and rear parking lot. The court explained that
the Josts= actions
forced the DeNoias to bring this case to court even though the parties= rights regarding the use
of the common driveway and rear parking lot were clear. Moreover, the court
found that the Josts acted spitefully by permitting snow to be piled up against
the DeNoias= rear
exit, something that had not been a problem in the past. Under those facts,
the court=s award of
attorney=s fees to the
DeNoias was within its discretion, and no error appears.