Gave evidence on August 26 on the processes behind the dossier. The 45-minute claim came from a report issued on August 30 2002 by the secret intelligence service (SIS) using information from a reliable single in the Iraqi military. He said his committee judged it consistent with "established JIC judgments on the command, control and logistical arrangements and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces" and included it in a September 5 2002 assessment.

He admitted Alastair Campbell had asked if the language could be tightened but said he had "overall charge and responsibility" for the dossier. James Dingemans, senior QC to the inquiry, took him through decisions made over changes in the wording in the drafts - from saying Iraq "may be able to deploy" chemical and biological weapons in 45 minutes to that they "could be deployed" within that time frame. But Mr Scarlett told the inquiry that the officers who drafted it had "no recollection of any particular reason" for the change and though there was "normal" discussion about the wording was not aware of any concern about the way in which the claim was being expressed.

He suggested that David Kelly, who Andrew Gilligan had implied believed the intelligence related to missile warheads, had probably not seen the original intelligence report and "was in a state of genuine confusion about what [it] actually said" since it referred to battlefield mortar shells or small calibre weaponry. Mr Scarlett also maintained that the "proper security-style interview" he had recommended for Dr Kelly meant only a "thorough and forensic" questioning.

Key exchange

James Dingemans, senior QC to the inquiry: Were you told what the allegations [in Andrew Gilligan's May 29 report on the dossier] were?

Scarlett: Yes, I was. I was told that there had been a reference to ... the inclusion in it of the 45 minutes point, that that had been inserted at the behest of No 10, against the wishes of the intelligence community, even though the government knew it to be wrong.

Dingemans: And was that allegation true?

Scarlett: It was completely untrue.

Dingemans: And how did you feel about it?

Scarlett: Well, I was a bit surprised to start with; but I knew instantly that it was completely untrue. There was nobody in a better position than I was to know that and I said so.

Stage two

Recalled to appear before the inquiry on September 23 and questioned again on who was in charge of the dossier. He said he welcomed advice from Downing Street advisers, including Mr Campbell, on how to describe the intelligence but insisted that he had control. He said he made many of the changes - such as changing the title from Iraq's Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction to the harder Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - himself and dismissed documents presented to the inquiry that hinted at dissent among intelligence officials over the dossier.

A lastminute email from Jonathan Powell, the Downing Street chief of staff, pointing out "a bit of a problem" with a reference to Saddam Hussein using WMDs if he believed his regime was under threat was, however, presented to Mr Scarlett by Andrew Caldecott QC, the BBC's counsel. The JIC chair denied its subsequent removal was to avoid the suggestion that Iraq would only use WMDs in self-defence, insisting that his staff followed Mr Powell's advice since there was no clear intelligence whether they were defining Saddam's weapons threat as an offensive or defensive capability.

Key quote

When we looked at it again, we also realised two things: first of all, that there was no standing JIC assessment which made it clear whether we were defining Saddam's threat, if you like, as defensive or [chemical weapons] posture as defensive or offensive.

More to the point, there was recent reporting, in addition, which was not reflected here, but which was quite clear reporting, which placed his attachment to [chemical and biological weapons] and the importance that he placed on it very much in the context of his perception of his regional position, his plans to acquire and maintain regional influence and, as one report, and maybe more, put it: dominate his neighbours.

In other words, the recent intelligence was more complex than that phrase implied. Bearing those points in mind, we concluded that this was not right, the way this was phrased; and therefore we took that out. That is what I did.

Since the hearingsMr Scarlett has, unsurprisingly, made no public appearances since the inquiry, although he was the (unnamed) target of a public rebuke from a former head of the JIC, Sir Roderic Braithwaite, who accused the JIC (along with MI5 and MI6) of having "stepped outside its traditional role" in making the case for war. "It entered the prime minister's magic circle. It was engulfed in the atmosphere of excitement which surrounds decision-making in a crisis".

Lord Hutton's verdict "I am satisfied that Mr Scarlett did not accept drafting suggestions emanating from 10 Downing Street unless they were in keeping with the intelligence available to the JIC and he rejected any suggestions which he considered were not supported by such intelligence. This is demonstrated by his minute to Mr Campbell dated 18 September 2002 in reply to Mr Campbell's minute of 17 September.

It is clear from Mr Scarlett's minute that whilst he accepted some of Mr Campbell's suggestions he rejected others where the intelligence did not support a strengthening of the language ...I am also satisfied that the dossier was published with the full approval of the JIC as was stated in evidence by Mr Scarlett, Sir Richard Dearlove (the chief of SIS), Sir David Omand, Air Marshall Sir Joseph French (the chief of Defence Intelligence) and Mr Anthony Cragg (the deputy chief of Defence Intelligence)."