S. Hrg. 104-156
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
30-DAY REPORT
Y 4, IN 8/19: S, HRG. 104-156
Director of Central Intelligence 30...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 30-DAY REPORT
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1995
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93-388 WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047626-7
S. Hrg. 104-156
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
30-DAY REPORT
Y 4, IN 8/19: S, HRG. 104-156
Director of Central Intelligence 30...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 30-DAY REPORT
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1995
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93_388 WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing OtTice
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office. Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047626-7
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JOHN KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
Charles Battaglia, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
ai)
CONTENTS
Hearing held in Washington, DC: Page
Wednesday, June 21, 1995 1
Statement of :
Cohen, Hon. William S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine 15
Deutch, Hon. John M., Director of Central Intelligence 2
Glenn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 21
Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 26
Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska 13
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana 20
Robb, Hon. Charles S., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia 24
Shelby, Hon. Richard C, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama 23
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania 1
Testimony of:
Deutch, Hon. John M., Director of Central Intelligence 6
Supplemental materials, letters, articles, etc.:
New York Times, article dated May 21, 1995 17
Seattle Post Intelligencer, article dated June 15, 1995 18
Boston Globe, article dated June 16, 1995 18
(III)
DCrS 30-DAY REPORT
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1995
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen
Specter (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Specter, Lugar, Shelby, Inhofe, Cohen, Kerrey
of Nebraska, Glenn, Bryan, Graham of Florida and Robb.
Also present: Charles Battaglia, staff director; Chris Straub, mi-
nority staff director; Suzanne Spaulding, chief counsel; and Kath-
leen McGhee, chief clerk.
Chairman Specter. The hearing of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee will commence. We have been delayed slightly. The vote on
Dr. Foster was delayed this morning and we have just finished a
vote in the Senate, so we will proceed at this time with the first
public report from the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr.
John Deutch.
We appreciate your coming in, Mr. Deutch, at a very early stage.
Your confirmation occurred on May 3, so it is an early report, but
the Committee felt it important to have some public comment on
your progress to date. The Committee knows of your very extended
activities because of matters which have come to our attention, but
in light of the public concern over the reorganization and recon-
stitution of the Central Intelligence Agency, we thought it very use-
ful to have your report at this time.
You have taken over at a time of real problems within the Agen-
cy, as all have recognized in the wake of the Aldrich Ames issue.
You have moved with dispatch to proceed on personnel changes.
When we concluded the hearings, we asked that you report on a
number of specific items which I think it worthwhile to review
briefly at this time to set the parameters for today's hearing.
First, to report on any needed changes to the DCI authorities.
Second, on improving the Intelligence Community's fulfillment of
its obligations to keep Congress fully and currently informed.
Third, the need for reorganization within the Intelligence Com-
munity.
Fourth, proposed changes in personnel.
Fifth, the proposal for how to achieve downsizing in a way that
creates headroom, weeds out poor performers and leaves the Intel-
ligence Community with an appropriate mix of required skills.
(1)
Next, intelligence reassessment of the possibility that U.S. forces
were exposed to chemical or biological agents during Desert Storm,
if in fact there is any basis for that.
Next, actions taken in response to the events in Guatemala.
And finally, improving coordination with law enforcement.
And now I am delighted to yield to our distinguished Vice Chair-
man, Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening re-
marks, I look forward to the testimony.
Chairman Specter. The floor is yours, Mr. Deutch.
Director Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to be here to respond to the eight issues that the
Committee raised at my confirmation hearing and that you have
just summarized once again.
With your permission, what I would like to do is to submit my
prepared statement for the record and briefly summarize the high-
lights.
Chairman Specter. It will be made a part of the record and we
appreciate the summary so that we have the maximum time for
dialogue.
[The prepared statement of Director Deutch follows:]
Statement of Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you today to report on a number of issues that you
asked me to pursue subsequent to my confirmation.
I want to begin by stating that my general assessment of my first six weeks as
DCI is positive. I beheve we are well along in the process of installing the new lead-
ership team for the Intelligence Community and CIA. I have also spent a good deal
of time in the last month or so to begin the process of improving morale and meet-
ing with as many people as possible in CIA and in the Intelligence Community.
These meetings have helped me determine and put into place a series of actions to
address important outstanding issues.
At my confirmation hearing, Mr. Chairman, you enumerated a list of key issues
in your closing remarks, and asked that I report back to you in 30 days or so. With
your concurrence, I would now propose simply to go down the list of topics and give
you a status report on what I have learned, what I have decided, and what I am
continuing to study.
DCI authorities
The first issue you raised is the question of any needed changes to DCI authori-
ties. This is, as you know, a complex topic — and one that engages the equities of
a number of Executive Branch departments. To sort through these equities and to
frame my study of this issue, I have settled on three questions that I believe encom-
pass the significant points.
The first question centers on whether the DCI has sufficient budget authorities
to assure the preparation and execution of an effective national intelligence pro-
gram. In this regard, I have been struck by the relative lack of executive authority
that the DCI has over the elements of the Intelligence Community and the budget
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).
Existing statutes give the DCI the authority to develop and approve the budgets
that make up the NFIP. In practice, though, the DCI shares these authorities with
the Secretaries of the Departments that host intelligence programs. The DCI, in
consequence, has great influence over the composition and execution of the NFIP,
but little direct authority, except for the CIA Program and the Community Manage-
ment Account. This is due in part to an inevitable tension between vesting authority
in "line" managers of the various agencies as opposed to vesting authority in func-
tional management of intelligence that cuts across Departments and disciplines. On
this question, I would note, though, that the present process works fairly well with
the Department of Defense, but not well with respect to other agencies that are part
of the NFIP.
The second question in my analysis concerns the degree to which the DCI should
have line authority over the NFIP's program managers. Among these managers, the
DCI at present appoints only the Executive Director for CIA and the Executive Di-
rector for Intelligence Community Affairs (the DCI has a voice, but not appointment
authority, for certain other positions). The fact is that most NFIP program man-
agers wear dual organizational hats and report through dual chains of command.
This situation is in some respects analogous to the budget relationship I just dis-
cussed.
The final question I have formulated is somewhat narrower and focuses on the
issue of whether the DCI should have expanded authority to reprogram NFIP funds
within and between programs. Current authorities enable such transfers, but only
with approvals from the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional over-
sight committees, and, notably, the Departments that are affected.
I am confident that my understanding of the authorities issue — as reflected in
these three questions — is relatively complete. I am not prepared as yet, however, to
recommend solutions or options to pursue. I will say that I believe that arguable
options range from maintenance of the status quo through significant changes in ex-
isting authorities — with several middle avenues also possible. On the question of
budget authorities, for example, a solution could range from keeping existing ar-
rangements intact to requesting the creation of a separately appropriated intel-
ligence budget. Options between these extremes might include ideas such as fencing
the intelligence budget within the Defense appropriation.
I would note here that my experience as Deputy Secretary of Defense tells me
that there are strong arguments against certain steps at the outer boundaries of
change. For that reason, I do not advocate them now. I would want to consider very
carefully the effects that any new budget arrangements would have on intelligence
consumers — creation of a separate budget, for example, would place such consumers
at a considerable distance from intelligence resource decisions, thereby decreasing
their voice in intelligence investment strategies. I do think, though, that my analy-
sis does illustrate that the authority of the DCI over intelligence is limited.
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
I turn now to the second issue you asked me to address, which involves improve-
ments in the Intelligence Community's fulfillment of its obligations to keep Congress
fully and currently informed. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by reiterating the com-
mitment on this point that I made to the Congress in my confirmation hearing —
a commitment echoed by George Tenet in his own confirmation hearing last week.
Notification issues go to the heart of our relationship with the Congress and intel-
ligence satisfaction of this obligation must be seen as a fundamental requirement.
Both the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and I want to be sure that this
matter routinely receives management attention at the highest level.
There is no question in my mind that notification problems, as evidenced by the
Guatemala case, demand such attention. It is clear to me that whatever action I
take must affect both institutional understanding — culture or mindset, if you will —
and institutional procedures. I have asked for, and will shortly receive, rec-
ommendations on steps to address shortcomings in both areas. I should say here
that thinking on this problem has been greatly aided by work set in motion earlier
this spring by Admiral Studeman in his capacity as Acting DCI.
On the basis of that work, I will issue a specific policy statement that underscores
accountability and I will then follow that up with changes in education, training,
and procedures. Those changes will certainly include a requirement for written reg-
ulations and instructions illustrated by example — was well as a clearly delineated
process to identify notification issues. It is also evident to me that requirements for
much better documentation — and far more easily retrievable records — will have to
be a part of the solution to this problem.
I will act on the recommendations that reach my desk expeditiously. I do not
mean to indicate, though, that nothing is being done pending my decisions. I can
report, in fact, that improvement is already occurring. For the last two to three
months, CIA has been carrying out an expanded notification process that has pro-
vided substantial information to the oversight committees through the staff direc-
tors. I believe this process has been valuable and has certainly given us a founda-
tion on which to build. In sum, what's needed here is to establish procedures to fol-
low the rules, not to change the rules.
REORGANIZATION
The third issue you asked me to address is the need for reorganization within the
Intelligence Community. Again, this is an area where I have begun to lay out my
views, and have not reached final conclusions about what Community reorganiza-
tion may be desirable. Nonetheless, I have taken initial steps that will lead to long
term change that I believe will improve the performance and efficiency of the Com-
munity. I discussed some of my views with you during my confirmation hearings —
particularly my intention to unify the management of imagery efforts and move to-
wards integrating the management of Defense and intelligence space programs.
On the issue of imagery, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense I have set-
tled on terms of reference for a study that will determine the most effective way
to manage imagery collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and distribution. A
steering group for this study — led by Admiral Bill Owens, Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Keith Hall, my Executive Director for the Intelligence
Community — has just begun its work and will provide material for decisions later
this year that I will make in concert with the Secretary of Defense.
On the issue of integrating management of the Defense and Intelligence space
programs, the Secretary of Defense and I will soon sign a directive establishing a
Joint Space Management Board. The Board will be composed of Senior officials from
the Defense and Intelligence Communities. It will be charged with coordinating the
direction of military and intelligence space system acquisition efforts.
In addition to these steps, I am putting into place, as Co-chairman of the Security
Policy Board, interagency working groups to examine questions related to "informa-
tion warfare." I wish to better understand, for example, any organizational implica-
tions of measures needed to ensure the security of commercial and governmental
telecommunications and computer networks.
I would also note that there are several external reviews underway that bear on
intelligence mission, structure, and organization. We will cooperate with these ef-
forts, including, for example, the work that this Committee is undertaking to exam-
ine the critical issues facing intelligence. We are also responding to IC 21 — the simi-
lar inquiry being conducted by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelhgence in
the House. Finally on this point, we are continuing to stay in touch with the work
of the Aspin Commission.
Mr. Chairman, I would pause here to note once again my sadness at the death
of Chairman Aspin and to regret that the Commission can no longer benefit from
his insights. I am convinced, though, that the Commission's report will prove to be
a fitting memorial to Mr. Aspin and I will ensure that we continue to cooperate with
its inquiries — I have made this a particular responsibility of Admiral Blair, the As-
sociate DCI for Military Support. I expect, Mr. Chairman that our work with the
Aspin Commission, as well as the various Congressional efforts, will lead to signifi-
cant additional thinking and recommendations on organizational issues.
CHANGES IN PERSONNEL
The fourth issue you asked me to address concerns changes in personnel. My re-
marks on this point will be brief as I know that you are already aware of the senior
appointments I made in my first days in office. Most of the changes I expected to
make are now complete and, as I said at the beginning, I think the new team is
functioning smoothly. With respect to additional changes that are forthcoming, I ex-
pect to appoint new Deputy Directors for Operations and Intelligence in the near
future and a new Deputy for Science and Technology later in the year. I am not
yet ready to announce these appointments, but I will say that I am pleased by the
efforts of the search committee I asked to identify candidates for the DDO slot. I
have spoken frequently with John McMahon, who is chairing this effort, and I ex-
pect the group to wrap up its work shortly. I will also say that what I have learned
about counterintelligence in the course of my first month at the Agency has led me
to conclude that greater managerial focus is needed in this area, and I will be back
to report to you in short order on changes I propose to make.
PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Personnel concerns are also the focus of the fifth issue you asked me to report
on — specifically, the issue of how to manage personnel matters in this downsizing
era in a way that leaves the Intelligence Community with the resources necessary
to accomplish its mission.
In commenting on this issue, I would like to say that I believe that strengthening
the personnel system in the Intelligence Community, and in CIA in particular, is
perhaps the single most important action that can be taken to strengthen US intel-
ligence capability in the long run. In strengthening this system, it is also vitally im-
portant that we ensure that the workplace permits every individual to advance ac-
cording to performance without regard to gender or race. I have invested — and will
continue to invest — a great deal of my time and effort in this area.
We need a modern personnel system focused on recruiting and retaining the most
qualified individuals. This system must include all aspects of the personnel develop-
ment process — from recruitment through professional development through retire-
ment. It is also clear to me that downsizing will continue and we will need to make
adjustments to our personnel policies to enable a system that will provide the mix
of skills and head room required to accomplish the intelligence mission.
To deal with such issues at CIA, I have established a Human Resources Oversight
Council that is chaired by Nora Slatkin, the Agency's Executive Director. This
group, which also includes the Agency's senior managers, will oversee, integrate,
and direct human resources planning, policies, and practices. I have given the Coun-
cil a broad charter, but I anticipate in the near term that its work will focus on
six key areas:
Personnel Planning. — Emphasizing how the Agency will reconcile workforce needs
with changes in mission, structure, and organization.
The Skills Mix. — Focusing on a better understanding of the skills mix equation,
which is quite complex and is directly related to the Agency's substantive missions.
"Glass Ceiling" Issues. — Overseeing efforts to expand and implement measures
that will remove barriers to career advancement for women and minorities.
Performance Management. — Implementing changes in the areas of performance
appraisal, compensation and promotion, training, screening, monitoring, and inter-
vention.
Career Development. — Overseeing the design and implementation of assignment
and selection processes that emphasize employee development in the context of fair-
ness and equity.
Accountability. — Evaluating and implementing measures to ensure that managers
are accountable for human resource decisions.
CIA, of course, is but one element of the Intelligence Community. Each of the
Community's organizations faces similar issues of planning and personnel manage-
ment. A Community task force led by Christopher Jehn, former Assistant Secretary
of Defense, has been examining the matter of personnel reform since early spring,
and is now finalizing its recommendations. These recommendations will address key
elements of personnel and performance management and career development in the
context of a revised human resource system — a system that applies common prac-
tices and policies — Community-wide where possible.
I look forward to receiving the task force's report and studying its recommenda-
tions. I expect that its work, together with the ongoing effort of CIA's Human Re-
sources Council, will provide the basis for decisions that will increase personnel ac-
countability at all levels of management and give us the tools and better under-
standing necessary to deal with skills and other problems.
chemical/biological agent exposure in desert storm
The sixth issue you asked me to address concerns a reassessment of the possibil-
ity that US forces were exposed to chemical or biological agents during Desert
Storm.
Since my confirmation hearings, both CIA and the Defense Department have con-
tinued their separate inquiries into this matter. To date, nothing has surfaced in
CIA's independent review to change the view that there was no standard chemical
or biological weapons use. However, CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
is continuing to focus on intelligence data relevant to whether troops were exposed
to chemical or biological weapons. Again, my understanding is that, to date, CIA has
found no intelligence evidence of low-level exposure that is deemed convincing. On
this point, I should also note that the Defense Department has been very coopera-
tive with the Agency's analytic efforts. We are continuing those efforts, Mr. Chair-
man, and I remain aware that on this matter the absence of evidence cannot be ac-
cepted absolutely.
Although I have nothing new to report on this subject, I do want to say that we
continue to look for information that will shed light on the cause of Gulf War ill-
nesses that are afflicting some veterans of that conflict. I would also note that I wel-
come the establishment of an independent external advisory panel announced by the
President to examine all aspects of the efforts the government is making to treat
those individuals who are ill, and to examine all possible causes of their affliction.
GUATEMALA
The seventh issue you asked me to discuss involves actions taken in response to
events in Guatemala. We have been seized by the issues raised by Guatemala and
its implications, Mr. Chairman, but I ask that you allow me to defer a complete re-
port pending completion of the review being carried out by CIA's Inspector General,
a report that I do not expect to receive for four to six weeks. In particular, I do not
wish to reach conclusions or consider possible disciplinary action until I have stud-
ied the IG's report, which I am assured will be complete and thorough.
On the Guatemala case in general, I will say that I am especially concerned by
the four following allegations:
Complicity in human rights abuses.
Payment to assets implicated in human rights abuses.
Actions in violation of government policy.
Failure to notify Congress of significant developments.
I will review these allegations in the light of CIA's IG report and in the light of
similar reports being prepared by other elements of the Intelligence Community. In
determining what transpired and what remedial action is warranted, I also expect
to consider findings in the inquiry being conducted by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (that I commissioned when I was Deputy Secretary) as well as the in-
quiry being conducted by the Intelligence Oversight Board.
There are two broad areas on which I believe I can comment briefly. The first is
the general issue of Congressional notification, and I have already discussed — ear-
lier in this statement — steps to improve notification procedures and practices. The
second area concerns the question of human rights abuses and guidelines for dealing
with potential problems. Here, I can say that our policy is to carefully review and
monitor operational relationships for potential human rights abuses and examine
each on a case-by-case basis. We have undertaken a comprehensive review of exist-
ing guidelines that deal with assets who raise issues involving human rights. I have
asked for new guidelines that offer clear guidance on this subject beyond previous
directives. I will provide a copy of these guidelines to the Committee as soon as they
are issued.
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
The final issue on which you asked for a report is the question of improving intel-
ligence coordination with law enforcement.
To begin, I want to say that, as I indicated in my confirmation hearing, I consider
this an extremely important issue and I am committed to improving coordination
in the areas of international terrorism, dings, and crime. To that end, I have met
with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and the Director of the
FBI to discuss efforts underway to enhance cooperation between the Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Communities. I will meet with the Attorney General monthly
to continue that cooperation. In addition, several other steps are ongoing to improve
coordination with law enforcement organizations. These include:
Biweekly meetings between the Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence.
The recent establishment of a Law Enforcement-Intelligence Board, which will
meet bimonthly.
The creation of two working groups — the Joint Intelligence Community-Law En-
forcement Working Group, and the Special Task Force on Overseas Coordination —
to seek solutions to problems that impair coordination between the two commu-
nities.
I have also asked my General Counsel to serve as the focal point within the Intel-
ligence Community on cooperation with law enforcement and, in particular, to as-
sume responsibility for coordinating policy on this matter among the DCI's Crime
and Narcotics Center, the Counterterrorist Center, the Nonproliferation Center, and
the Counterintelligence Center.
I believe that these efforts will provide the mechanisms needed to address issues
as they arise. I also believe that their combined effect will be a clearer understand-
ing of the Intelligence Community's role and responsibilities with respect to law en-
forcement.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal statement on the issues you asked me
to address. I thank you for your time and I would be pleased to answer your ques-
tions.
STATEMENT OF JOHN DEUTCH, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying that my own personal assessment of the
results of the approximately 40 days that I have served as Director
of Central Intelligence is quite positive. I believe we are well along
in the process of installing a new leadership team in the Intel-
ligence Community and in the Central Intelligence Agency. I have
made considerable effort to meet with as many people in the com-
munity as possible, especially in the CIA. And I have taken a
sounding on morale and things which can be done to improve mo-
rale of the dedicated, loyal and effective workforce that make up
our Intelligence Community.
In addition, the series of meetings that I have held has helped
me put in place a series of actions to address important outstand-
ing issues which confront the CIA and the Intelligence Community,
some of which I will be reporting on to you here today.
Let me first of all start with your first question, DCI authorities.
I have been struck by the relative lack of executive authority that
the Director of Central Intelligence has over elements of the Intel-
ligence Community budget and the National Foreign Intelligence
budget, other than that of the CIA.
In part, this is due to an inevitable tension between vesting au-
thority in line managers of the various agencies that are respon-
sible for program execution and vesting authority in the functional
management of the Director of Central Intelligence who has re-
sponsibilities that cut across departments and different depart-
mental responsibilities.
I am not prepared here today to give you recommendations about
how the authorities of the DCI might be strengthened, but I no-
ticed some options. More authority for the Director over the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Budget is a possibility. The present
process works fairly well with the Department of Defense, but not
at all with respect to other agencies that are part of the NFIP pro-
gram.
Number two. Another possibility is to increase the authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence to evaluate and appoint prin-
cipal National Foreign Intelligence Program managers, such as the
head of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery
Office, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency.
Third, greater authority for the director to transfer funds and
personnel between National Foreign Intelligence Programs. The Di-
rector of Central Intelligence could be given greater authority, sub-
ject to 0MB and Congressional approval, but remove the require-
ment for agency concurrence to move personnel and funds between
National Foreign Intelligence accounts.
There are strong arguments against each one of these proposals.
I know from my own experience as Deputy Secretary of Defense the
arguments against each of these steps, and that is why I do not ad-
vocate them now. But I do want to illustrate to the Committee the
range of authority that the Director of Central Intelligence does
and does not have over execution and executive authority for the
intelligence programs of the country.
Perhaps the most important of the questions that I have been
asked to address concerns the actions that have been taken to keep
Congress fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.
In my confirmation hearings and the confirmation hearings of
George Tenet, nominee to be Deputy Director of Central Intel-
ligence, we both committed to keeping Congress fully and currently
8
informed on all intelligence matters. We have several actions un-
derway to assure that this will happen.
First, we intend to issue a Director of Central Intelligence Policy
Statement describing Agency notification obligation in simple and
comprehensive terms to our entire field operation so that they
know what their obligations are. Prior — many, many prior instruc-
tions have been issued to the field in the past. We believe that it
is timely to have one simple comprehensive document which pro-
vides information and guidelines to the field.
We are preparing written procedures to describe the process that
should be followed to identify and forward notification matters, so
in addition to the general statement of obligations, there will be
procedures to be followed when an item comes up for notification.
Third, we intend to document in each case those instances where
notification has been made so a full and complete record is avail-
able.
I have asked the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to be
the principal focus for assuring that this notification process works
well with Congress. Currently that responsibility is in Admiral
Studeman's hands, and should George Tenet be confirmed by the
Senate, I will ask him to pay particular attention and give priority
to this important area.
What I believe needs to be done here is to establish procedures
and follow the rules. I don't see that there is a need for brand new
rules. It is that the rules must be understood and procedures must
be put into place to assure that the rules are followed.
Let me next return to your third issue, Mr. Chairman, the need
for reorganization within the Intelligence Community.
I have not reached final conclusions about the extent of reorga-
nization within the Intelligence Community that may be desirable.
However, I have put into place a number of study activities that
will lead to organizational change that will improve both the per-
formance and the efficiency of the Intelligence Community.
First, we have established a terms of reference for a study to de-
sign a new National Imagery Agency. This study will be co-chaired
by Keith Hall, the Executive Director of the Community Manage-
ment Staff, and Admiral Bill Owens, the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The study terms of reference are available to
the Committee for their comment and observation, but we have un-
derway a study to — involving all elements of the community that
have an interest in the National Imagery Agency to assure that
this new agency will be designed so as to provide the customer
with needed imagery intelligence in the most efficient way possible
at the lowest possible cost.
Second, Bill Perry and I, I expect, will shortly sign a directive es-
tablishing a Joint Space Management Board, to assure that there
is coordinated direction of both military and intelligence space sys-
tem acquisition efforts.
Third, as co-chairman of the Security Policy Board, I am putting
into place interagency working groups to examine the important
area of information warfare. For example, to determine the meas-
ures that are needed to assure the security of both our commercial
and governmental telecommunications and computer network sys-
tems.
Fourth. Through Admiral Denny Blair, we are staying in close
touch with the work of the Aspin Commission and its work taking
place to review the needs for roles and missions in the Intelligence
Community in the future.
The fourth issue, Mr. Chairman, concerns personnel changes. I
have reported to the Committee about the major personnel actions
that I intended to make in both the Central Intelligence Agency
and in the Intelligence Community. Most of these changes are al-
ready in place, and I believe the new team is functioning smoothly
and in an effective manner.
As you know, I asked an external group be established to provide
advice to me under the chairmanship of John McMahon to advise
me on the selection of a new Deputy Director for Operations. This
committee, chaired by John McMahon, includes Nora Slatkin, the
Executive Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Lilley, Norbert Gar-
rett and Brent Scowcroft. They are close to the end of their delib-
erations, and I hope to make an announcement about a new Dep-
uty Director for Operations in the near future, including some
changes in the organization of the Deputy Directorate of Oper-
ations to assure it is more accountable and effective in the future.
The positions of Deputy Director for Intelligence and Deputy Di-
rector for Science and Technology will be filled as soon as possible,
but I would expect it no later than the next 60 days.
Fifth, I would like to make a few comments as you have asked
about changes to the community personnel system.
Strengthening the personnel system in the CIA and in the Intel-
ligence Community, in particular — Central Intelligence Agency in
particular — is perhaps the single most important action that can be
undertaken to strengthen the US intelligence capability in the long
run. If I have been struck by one matter since I became Director
of Central Intelligence, it is the need to put into place a modern
personnel system which is focused on recruiting and retaining the
most qualified individuals for a career of public service in the intel-
ligence field. This new system must include all aspects of personnel
development, from recruitment, through professional development,
through assignment and promotion, all the way through to a retire-
ment system.
While downsizing will continue, and we need to make adjust-
ments to our personnel policies to permit a system that will provide
for the mix in skills and the headroom required to accomplish the
Intelligence Community mission in the future, I believe that the
creation of a modern, effective personnel system is of critical impor-
tance for the community.
I have also asked the Executive Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Nora Slatkin, to chair a new Human Resources
Oversight Council, which includes membership of the leaders of all
the directorates to give direction to all aspects of the CIA personnel
system. An especially important responsibility of this council will
be to assure that the CIA workplace permits every individual to ad-
vance according to performance without regard to gender or race.
The sixth issue you asked me to comment on, Mr. Chairman,
concerned the possibility of whether US forces were exposed to
chemical or biological agents during Desert Storm. I have nothing
new to report on this subject. We continue to look for information
10
that will shed light on the cause of Gulf War illness that is afflict-
ing some veterans of the Gulf V/ar.
I note and welcome the establishment of an independent external
advisory panel announced by the President to examine all aspects
of the effort that has been underway to treat those individuals who
are ill from their service in the Gulf, and to examine all possible
causes for this affliction.
The seventh issue concerns the actions we have taken in re-
sponse to events in Guatemala. Let me say that we are seized by
the various aspects of this issue and the questions involving CIA
in Guatemala. I am awaiting the report of CIA Inspector General
Fred Hitz on Guatemala, which the IG, the Inspector General,
assures me will be complete by the middle of next month before
reaching any conclusions or taking disciplinary action.
I am especially concerned, in my review of this matter, with the
following four allegations:
One. Knowledge and reporting on human rights abuses, whether
that was handled in a proper manner.
Second. Imperfect evaluation of agent performance and conduct.
Whether there was any imperfect evaluation of agent performance
or conduct.
Third. Whether any actions taken by the CIA were in violation
of government policy.
And fourth, whether there were failures to notify Congress of sig-
nificant developments as they occurred in Guatemala.
I will await reaching final conclusions on this matter until I have
the Inspector General's report available, which, as I mentioned,
should be in the middle of next month.
At the same time, I will review the Inspector General reports
from other aspects of the Community: the National Security Agen-
cy, the Army, the Department of State, and the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the review that I commissioned when I was Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense, as well as the independent oversight
board of the President which is undertaking, as you know, under
the chairmanship of Tony Harrington, a review of this entire mat-
ter.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the final issue you asked me to address
is improving cooperation with law enforcement. I believe that this
is an important and continuing subject. I am committed to improv-
ing coordination with the law enforcement community in the areas
of international terrorism, drugs, and crime. Each one of these
areas involved complex matters of Agency jurisdiction, and ways of
designing effective programs and coordinating mechanisms.
I have met with Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI, Deputy Attor-
ney General Jamie Gorelick, and Attorney General Janet Reno, to
discuss how to proceed on these matters. We, Janet Reno and my-
self, intend to build on the Memorandum of Understanding that
was signed between the Community and the Attorney General, de-
scribing how we intend to do our coordinating activities. There is
a set of bi-weekly meetings which is taking place, co-chaired by the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Attorney
General, which will examine issues on an orderly basis, one by one,
and resolve them as needed.
11
There will be established a law enforcement intelligence working
group to do the staff work necessary to prepare these issues for res-
olution.
I believe that these groups will provide the mechanism to ad-
dress issues as they arise. Janet Reno and I intend to deal — to
meet monthly to deal with any matters that cannot be resolved.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the first 40 days or
so of my tour as Director of Central Intelligence has proceeded sat-
isfactorily. This Committee, both corporately and individual Mem-
bers, have been of tremendous help to me in these early days, and
I want to thank Members for their support and for their interest.
I continue to believe that we will make significant progress to
strengthen the Intelligence Community of this nation.
Thank you very much for your attention, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. Director Deutch.
If you would stand now, we would like to put you under oath be-
fore we begin the questions.
Will you stand please.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give here will
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Director Deutch. I do.
Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much.
Director Deutch, with respect to the incident involving Captain
O'Grady, the information received was to the effect that the Intel-
ligence Community had provided information about the presence of
missiles with the capability to down Captain O'Grady's plane, but
that such information had not in fact been transmitted to Captain
O'Grady.
Can you shed any light on precisely what happened in that situa-
tion?
Director DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, we have a careful study under-
way which Bill Perry and I have asked be undertaken by both the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Intelligence Community. We expect
that a thorough reporting on the facts on all aspects of the intel-
ligence and operational parts of the F-16 mission will be available
by the end of this month.
My own view, having reviewed the preliminary assessments of
the precise conduct of all the different systems involved in detect-
ing the SA-6 radar and providing information to the pilot, the so
to speak, the ultimate customer, is that when this is all looked at
we will not find anything which could be called an intelligence fail-
ure in here. But we will find ways that matters could have gone
better. That is what always happens in the unfortunate event that
an airplane is shot down.
Chairman Specter. Well, Mr. Deutch, what is so complicated
about it? Did Captain O'Grady know that there were missiles in
the vicinity which could down his plane?
Director Deutch. I am not sure what Captain O'Grady knew.
The point I want to make is, it is a tremendously complicated mat-
ter to find a mobile missile system which sets its radar up and
searches only for a couple of minutes before it fires its missiles at
an airplane. So it is a tremendously complicated matter. There are
many different systems which are looking to detect the radar and
12
then there is the process of reporting it from national or tactical
collection assets back through the air operations center and getting
it into the cockpit so that the pilot can take appropriate action.
I
Chairman Specter. Well, is it complicated to make a factual de-
termination of what happened
Director Deutch. It's not complicated
Chairman Specter [continuing]. With Captain O'Grady, as to
whether he should have known about the missile threat?
Director Deutch. No, it's not at all complicated. I think, though,
that reconstructing, with precision and with accuracy, all the dif-
ferent matters that took place in those key 45 or so minutes while
his airplane was up over southern Bosnia, and then eventually shot
down, I think requires careful and prudent going through the
record and establishing it so that the facts were all known and ver-
ifiable.
I am quite confident that when that comes down, when those
facts are known, that we will see that while it was unfortunate
that an interceptor was allowed to destroy a US airplane and bring
down the pilot and put that pilot at risk, that the operational and
intelligence matters were not negligent or did not involve any seri-
ous breach.
Of course it is always possible to imagine other circumstances
where the pilot could have avoided being shot down, but that is al-
ways the case in matters where you go in harm's way.
Chairman Specter. When do you expect to have the final report
so that the Committee will know what in fact did happen?
Director Deutch. End of June, sir. That is when General Shall
has promised it to Secretary Perry and myself.
Chairman Specter. Mr. Deutch, the case involving Aldrich
Ames, of course, is a matter which continues to overhang the
Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence operations generally.
What can you tell us, if anything, as to what has been accom-
plished during your tenure to date to prevent the recurrence of the
Ames situation?
Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, I have devoted considerable
time to this particular matter. As you know there is a damage as-
sessment being carried out by the community, not just the CIA, the
community, on all adverse aspects that occurred as a result of the
espionage carried out by Ames. I believe that that assessment will
be carried out, will be completed towards the end of the summer,
late August. As I have mentioned to you, sir, I intend to bring that
to you. It will be a very, very complete and authoritative damage
assessment. It will be accompanied by specific steps that I believe
are necessary to put in place to assure that these events are not —
that kind of damage is not sustained to the country in the future.
Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Deutch, since your confirmation hearing,
there was a determination on June 9th by a Judge in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, approving
a settlement reached by the Central Intelligence Agency with a
number of women in a class action suit. Among other things, the
judge found that there were significant legal issues that may have
jeopardized the plaintiffs prospects for success in the case. But the
settlement was in fact made.
13
And my question to you is what impact has that Htigation had
on the practices within the Central IntelHgence Agency and did
that Htigation indicate to you a real problem within the Agency on
sex discrimination?
Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, the Agency will absolutely
abide by the — that agreement which was entered into — which was
entered by the judge. We think that is an agreement that we will
fulfill in all of its respects.
My own view is that the issues of fairness in the workplace, lack
of sexual harassment, opportunity for women and others to ad-
vance according to their accomplishments, is a major challenge for
the Agency, and we will be putting into place, myself, George Tenet
if he is confirmed, Nora Slatkin, managerial procedures will assure
and I believe will go beyond the requirements of that agreement in
order to assure that there is opportunity for women who are per-
forming for advancement in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Chairman Specter. Well, Mr. Deutch, I am not going to proceed,
because the light went on in the middle of your answer, but I want
to return to that. I don't think you have really dealt with the sub-
stance of my question as to whether that suit indicated the exist-
ence of sexual discrimination and what, if anything, have you
learned about it.
Director Deutch. If I just may say, my information here comes
from my own observation rather than from a study of the suit. I
believe that there is significant progress that can be made for the
opportunities for women in the Central Intelligence Agency. That
comes from my own observation, not based on the suit, sir.
Chairman Specter. Well, I will come back to the suit in the sec-
ond round, if we get that far.
The Director has a commitment at the White House at 4:30 and
must leave at 4:15, so we will limit the opening round to five min-
utes.
Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Deutch, I appreciate and I agree with the high priority that
you're placing on personnel changes as well as personnel policies,
from the impact that high personnel costs have on our R&D capac-
ity all the way to the counterintelligence problems posed by an un-
happy employee, through just the normal execution of the missions
that we lay before men and women who sign up for us. I mean, I
appreciate the attention that you place on that.
My own experience on the Committee thus far has taken me to
visit a number of locations, remote to Washington. I am impressed
by the quality of people that are out there in the field. And I am
interested to know if you have got an evaluation of the kinds of
people that you're looking for? What qualities do people need to
possess in order to be candidates for hiring and what is there about
our current personnel system that appears to be good? I mean,
there must be something in our personnel system that is working
to attract these kinds of individuals. And I am curious as to wheth-
er or not you have identified some things that need to be retained
in the current personnel system in order to be able to continue to
do that.
93-388 - 95 - 2
14
Director Deutch. Thank you very much, Senator. That is a very
cogent observation.
This morning I had the opportunity to walk by the Bosnian Task
Force, that is, the interagency group of people who have been in
place for four years on a schedule that varies from 20 to 24 hours
a day and rotating duty, to keep policymakers informed of all
events that are known in Bosnia. Their capability and their dedica-
tion is just outstanding, and I was there not only to say thank you
on behalf of their production of really quality intelligence analysis
and information for policymakers — it doesn't make the policy
choices easier. It does make it more secure that we have the kind
of information in the hands of the policymakers that are needed,
and also to tell them that they were actually working too hard.
They are absolutely qualified, absolutely dedicated, come from all
different possible backgrounds. The Intelligence Community is still
finding tremendously qualified recruits, and the people who enter
into the community are dedicated, capable, and very knowledge-
able.
Our challenge is to provide a human resources structure which
maximizes the potential of those individuals and assures that they
are having the most professionally fulfilling and personally ade-
quate life in what is a really challenging profession for them.
But I couldn't appreciate your remark more, sir, about their mo-
rale in the field is high, and their commitment.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate this is a brief moment to
discuss this sort of thing. I know Senator Glenn has a long stand-
ing interest in it and I pledge to you my interest and willingness
to work with you to make sure these personnel issues are ad-
dressed.
What's your initial sensing of R&D in intelligence?
Director Deutch. Well, throughout the whole community, as you
know, there are significant differences between the National Secu-
rity Agency
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you have a sense of the adequacy
after 37 days?
Director Deutch. Quite frankly, I would say the status, the level
of our technology and our ability to exploit it is not one of the main
issues that I am concerned with. We do need to keep the funding
to keep the programs in place that we have for the development of
next generation systems, but generally speaking, technology is
high.
I would like to exploit technology better in the backend process
of intelligence, that is, in the analysis and distribution of signals
intelligence and imagery — we can do more there — but generally
speaking, the technology is high.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Have you seen the CDC report, prelimi-
nary report on research results showing significant higher inci-
dence of physical problems with Gulf War veterans?
Director Deutch. I have not.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Have you seen that report?
Director Deutch. No, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I would appreciate you looking at the re-
port and commenting as to whether or not you believe that neces-
sitates any kind of follow up. I mean, it is a preliminary report and
15
it seems to indicate substantially higher incidences of a variety of
physical problems. All I have done thus far is seen a summary of
that report. I have not
Director Deutch. I will take a look at it, Senator.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Are you satisfied that our — that the In-
telligence Community is playing an appropriate role in
counternarcotics efforts?
Director Deutch. I think that what we are doing in
counternarcotics is spectacularly successful on the supply side. I
think the recent and publicly noted arrest of one of the Call Cartel
leaders in Colombia was due to cooperation between the Agency
and DEA and Colombian authorities.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You disagree with those who are sug-
gesting that DEA and Customs can handle this and that we should
not be assisting
Director Deutch. Well, I'm only involved with foreign intel-
ligence aspects of this. And I would say that our challenge — we can
do more, we will do more, and one of the matters that I have made
very clear to Attorney General Reno is all that she or Louis Freeh
or Constantine, the head of the DEA, have to do is to tell us what
their foreign intelligence requirements are, and we will try and do
better and devote more resources more intelligently to satisfying
the foreign intelligence aspect of this mission. That's what we do.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. If I can just pin you down on one point
though. Some people have suggested that DEA and Customs and
FBI — I'm talking about foreign now — that they should be only en-
gaged in the intelligence effort and the Intelligence Community
should be pulled out of that counternarcotics effort.
Director Deutch. I would — my general reaction to that would be
negative. I would not think that would be a smart use of United
States assets, investments.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you, Senator Kerrey.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, can you tell us whether or not foreign governments
have their intelligence services engaged in industrial espionage in
the United States?
Director Deutch. Senator, that's a question that I would only
wish to address in a closed session, sir.
Senator COHEN. Well, as you know, last year we passed an
amendment to the Authorization Bill that requires a report of the
extent to which foreign governments engage in industrial espionage
here. That report was due in April and it's two months overdue at
this point. Do you expect to have the full report before the Commit-
tee soon?
Director Deutch. Next week.
Senator COHEN. Next week?
And are you prepared to discuss it in a closed session prior to
next week?
Director DEUTCH. I am prepared to discuss it in a closed session
next week.
Senator COHEN. All right.
16
The second question I have is can you tell us whether or not Ser-
bia has been supporting the Bosnian Serbs or the Krajina Serbs?
Director Deutch. That is another question that I would have to
address with you in closed session, sir.
Senator Cohen. You've got information one way or the other on
that?
Director Deutch. I would answer that question in closed session,
too, sir.
Senator Cohen. So you can't tell us whether you have informa-
tion that either supports or disagrees with that?
Director Deutch. I can tell you, but only in closed session.
Senator COHEN. I guess we'll have to stick around for the closed
session. [General laughter.l
Am I correct in interpreting your response to Senator Specter
that while the investigation has yet to be completed, it is your pre-
liminary assessment that there was no intelligence failure as far as
the shootdown of the F-16 over Bosnia?
Director Deutch. That's correct, sir.
Senator COHEN. Are you aware of the — by the way, with respect
to the foreign governments using their services to conduct indus-
trial espionage, I have a couple of articles, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to submit for the record, that appeared in the New York
Times.
Chairman Specter. They will be made a part of the record as
requested, without objection.
[Copies of the articles referred to follow:]
17
Engineer Says
He Stole Secrets
Of Chip Makers
By CALVIN SIMS
BUENOS AIRES. May 21 — In a bizarre
tale of industrial espionage, an Argentine
engineer says he stole a wide range of
technical secrets from two leading com-
puter chip makers In the United States and
provided the information to China. Cuba
and Iran.
The technical information, he said, in-
cluded computer chip designs and step-by-
step instructions on how to manufacture
the 386, 486 and Pentium chips that power
most of the personal computers in use
today.
The engineer. Bill Gaede. said in an
interview that he had taken the informa-
tion from Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
from 1983 to 1993 and from the Intel Corpo-
ration in 1993 and 1994, when he worked for
the companies. He said he was Initially
motivated by a love of communism but
that later he stole for personal gain.
Mr Gaede said the data he provided to
Cuban representatives was passed to the
Soviet Union and East Germany in the last
years of the cold war He also said that at
one point he had turned himself in to
Federal authonties and cooperated with
an mvestigation by the F.B.I.
Much of the detail that Mr. Gaede pro-
vides Is corroborated, but his account of
his Involvement with foreign governments
and the FBI. could not be confirmed
Spokesman for the FBI. would say only
that the bureau would have no comment on
Mr. Gaede's story. Other law-enforcement
officials said they were aware of Mr,
Gaede and his activities but that he had
not been a Government Informant
Becauw none of the nations cited by Mr.
Gaede (pronouncad GAY-dee) have so-
phisticated chip-making operations,
the stolen data would not damage
the American companies any time
soon. But experts said the informa-
tion might reduce the time needed to
become competitive.
If nothing else. Mr. Gaede's tale of
high-tech robbery raises questions
about the vulnerability of corpora-
tions to industrial espionage and
theft and how adequate their safe-
guards are. Although Mr, Gaede
lacked a valid visa to work In the
United States, he obtained highly
sensitive Jobs at the nation's two
leading semiconductor makers.
Mr. Gaede, 42, said he had decided
to go public because his telephone
was being upped here, he Is being
followed and he Is afraid of being
hurt No charges have been filed
against him and he Is not a fugitive.
At Advanced Micro Devices in
Sunnyvale. Calif,, Peter Costner.
chief of security, said Mr. Gaede had
stolen a "a significant amount of
Intellectual property" and given it to
Cuba, which In turn passed the Infor-
mation on to the Soviet Union and
East Germany. Advanced Micro of-
ficials said they had not pressed
charges against Mr. Gaede, who left
the company voluntarily, because
they have no corroborating evidence
to prove that he stole the intellectual
property. "He certainly was In a
position to do It. and we believe what
he says Is true," said Charles Mal-
loy, a company spokesman.
At Intel. John Thompson, a spokes-
man, confirmed that Mr. Gaede had
worked for the company but de-
clined to describe the circum-
stances of his departure. "We are
not commenting at all on this Issue,"
Mr, Thompson said. Mr. Gaede pro-
vided a copy of a letter to him on
Intel stationery, dated May 31. 1994.
saying his employment had been ter-
minated "due to your refusal to co-
operate in a reasonable security in-
vestigation." Intel decllifed to com-
ment on the letter.
Mr, Gaede provided The New
York Times with dates. Umes and
places he says he met with Cuban
representatives In Mexico, as well as
what he says are tape recordings of.
conversations with F.B.I. agcQta and
a list of the agents he says he spoke
with. The F.B.I., provided wjlb (tut
list, declined to comraei^fr 00
Technical expertas -'•<'*'^
competitors, partlc
and China, might be^
chip designs and manufacturing
techniques that Intel and A.M.D.
spent billions of dollars developing to
begin producing chips, narrowing
the technological lead of the United
States. "The Chinese and Iranians
are having a field day and are learn-
ing a lot about American manufac-
turing." Mr. Gaede said.
The experts said the benefits to
foreign competitors would not be ev-
ident for many years because the
technology of the semiconductor In-
dustry advances so rapidly that de-
signs and manufacturing techniques
quickly become outmoded.
Mr, Gaede. who had been working
for Intel In Chandler. Ariz., said he
returned to Argentina in September,
after Intel uncovered the theft and
dismissed him. He said he had used a
computer Intel had given him to
allow him to work from his home to
get access to the company's data
base. Using his video camera, he
would then tape chip specifications
from the computer screen.
"The technique allowed me to
work undetected, store greater
amounts of Information In a smaller
medium and make copies quicker
for Interested parties." he said.
Michael Slater, publisher of
MIcroprtKtessor Report, an Industry
newsletter, said In a telephone Inter-
view that he found that part of Mr.
Gaede's story difficult to believe,
because he doubted that Intel would
allow an employee access to propria*
tary Information about Its lateit
chips through a home computer mo-
dem. "It sounds fishy to me becauM
I suspect that Intel's security la a lot
tighter than that" Mr. Slater said.
Mr. Gaede said he had Joined the
Communist Party in Buenos Aires In
1673 and in the mld-70's was part of
"a subversive cell" that opposed Ar-
gentina's repressive mlllury re-
gime. He and his wife. Vlera. entered
the United States with tourist visas
in 1977, he said, and stayed 16 years.
The couple settled in Rochelle, 111.,
he said, where he worked with Illegal
aliens who taught him how to obtain
false papers. He got a Job at the
Dukane Corporation, a communica-
tions equipment maker In St
Charles. III., while his wife obtained
working papers using Mr. Gaede's
mother's Social Security number.
Mr. Gaede had lived In the United
Sutes from 1958 to 1965.
In .1979, Mr. Gaede and his wife
moved to California, he said, where
he began work for Advanced Micro
Devices and took courses at Foothill
■ College In Los Altos Hills.
J " In 1 986, we moved to Austin, Tex.,
r>vhere I continued to work as an
- engineer at Advanced Micro De-
vices," Mr. Gaede said In a written
A chip'Ond-dagger
plot that could give
fledgling foreigners
a head start.
account he provided to The Times.
"I completed my BA. In computer
systems at Southwest Texas Sute In
San Marcos and became an expert In
computer systems," In July 1993, he
said, he was "promoted from senior
engineer to facilitator, wtkere I was
in charge of a whofe shffl of opera-
tors, maintenance lecfas and engi-
ne continued: "After the Cubans
recruited me as an industrial spy In
the mid-80's, I began to transfer
A M D specs, designs. 'Blue Books,"
masks, wafers and even small meas-
uring devices" to Cuba.
Mr Gaede said he sold some infor-
mation directly to China and Iran for
large sums, though he would not say
how much. He also said he had regu-
larly traveled to Mexico to hand
information to Cuban represenatlves
and was invited to Cuba to visit Fidel
Castro
The visits to the island, however,
served to destroy what little was left
of my socialist dreams," he said.
At that pomt. Mr. Gaede said, he
turned himself In to the Central In-
telligence Agency, which put him in
^ touch with the F.B.I., which encour-
aged him to malnuin his conucts
I
with Cuban agents. Mr. Gaede gavet
The Times lengthy, detailed ac>
counts of his meetings with various
F.B.I, agents, whom he named
Mr, Gaede said he resigned from
Advanced Micro In 1993 after he
realized that the company would
eventually detect his theft
Later that year, he Joined Intel'
and again began stealing technical
Information, which he sold to China
and Iran. He said he was being paid
by the two countries to show them
how to use the Information In their
semiconductor Industries. "I did
what I thought I had to do to survive
in this world, and I don't feel bad
selling this stuff to the Chinese or the
Iranians," Mr, Gaede said.
Advanced Micro confirmed that .
Mr Gaede had worked there 14
years, beginning In 1979, and had
been considered an exemplary em-
ployee. It learned that Mr. Gaede
was an industrial spy only after he
and his wife, who also had worked
for the company, did not show up for
work for several weeks.
Colleagues asked the company t
investigate. When Investigators ar-
rived at the Gaede home, they found
two cars In the driveway and what
appeared to be people sleeping In the
bedroom. The investigators discov-
ered, however, that the beds con-
tained stuffing, and they learned that
the Gaedes had taken a renul car i
the airport for a flight to Mexico.
Asked how Mr. Gaede could be
hired and promoted without any-
one's checking his background and
determining that he was an Illegal
alien, Mr Malloy of Advanced Micro
said, "He Joined the company before
these safeguards were put in place,
and he was a good employee and we
had no reason to suspect him."
He added, "In the 16 years since
Gaede Joined the company, A.M.D.
has taken extraordinary steps to do
belter background checks,"
Mr. Gaede said he met with an
Intel security investigator. Steve
Lund, on May 14 in Buenos Aires to
discuss his case, and he provided
The Times with a photograph of him-
self and another man. whom he said
was Mr. Lund, sltung in a res
rant Intel declined to comment on
whether Mr. Lund had flown to Bue-
nos Aires, or to say whether the man
in the photograph was Mr Lund
Mr, Gaede said he began acquir-
ing Intel data after realizing that the
FBI, "was not going to let me
the hook for my dealings with Cuba
nor were they going to prosecute
me; they Just wanted lo use me,"
The trade secrets were a securi-
ty blanket" Mr Gaede said, that
allowed him to return lo Argentina
and still make a living.
Mr. Gaede said that his wife and
two of their three children still live in
the United States in an undisclosed
location. His 16-year-old son lives
with him In Buenos Aires
-I'm Just afraid now," Mr Gaede
said, "that the FB I or the Argen-
tine Intelligence service might try lo
do something lo me because of the
way they keep harassing me,"
T-lt- -- -4-.'-
18
MONDAY, June 19, 199b
elMS Stllllt Poil-lnlilliiin
Tlw Air font tnotpon pluu, Iti
winbffwB hiKkjd oul kndad hw^ on
io u uua ixd ruBwvj lomawtwri In
CaHnTAnMnci iflv in ughl-boir
n«hi from m* YiUn* Tnionf Ca-
ter in cHunJ Wutiiaguo mn.
T)M C-IX) luml (kivly tack Io
Ua had of ihc ilnuip uu) Idlid la
nfma « tb« imr cup nmp cuiu
torn. Hm. moiaun ind ilu shiua
former Ranger tells of raid
to destroy terrorist camp
of thi four turtoenp so.
itao Fan Uwi* tUacr iquad m a
Dtntan disiMd down. piUwd tot ■
■eas bulk m i wcun «ir.
Tlu Rutfui •«n ma br thiw
mntar men in dvilm aoihat who
pnpered Ihen for • omiMl aalpi-
loani tlai ihi Ptniifsa lui n«v«
publidr •cksowtedfU.
Ths (I (he tcDOUTU of one ex*
lUnvv of the nonen lo icauo/ •
lenonit uimlai cmm; in tiw liu
lummer of 19tS. The itulanon wu
Ufikid to tjte ilaytot of lix Ametldi^
in B Sitwlot wtelo earlier. Other
■ourcee ilio heve ooofifmeO the cxii-
» of thii rajd.
The eoldier wa coe of e huui-
picked (rata oTRinien frem the Fen
[ewli-boea 2st Roger BetnUoo ei-
■ignedtotla mloloa
3ecncT wu the owrhdinA £aHDr
the ll-nao unit prepared Ac the
opereilon, he iejd. The men w«r»
iepemed frxn the benelioc for weeU
end *ve eliowed to kl tneir beir
iniw otn eamth to enee the iUnaen'
teU-teJe ihort beimuti.
"Ii'i eU 'neod to know.'" the
eoidler leld, rc^nlnf to e aecuitiy
policy In wW* peniapeiui ere pven
only enough informenoD to ellow
theis to cerrr out their leeiL
' *Ve didnt etk. The aaif thiot we
wtf* told wii thei this ouifii hid
(been Invohied) ifaloB the United
Sioo. Ther didn't {ive ui herd
InformaiioQ.
'Ail of ue wtri ojnous where we
were lom^" the Ren^r md. ba lu
one e\xr told them. "We eU hed
compeMee, end we heeded loinh for e
nod loot wfule.*
Ai the much eimnp, the Renien
wete e>vcn e brufiag by the trirae
aviUeoe. "We didn't knirw wben tiiey
ceme rrem. but they weient pen of
the ectual lesenlt teem,' the loldier
leia
The fir* orter to the Reaftn «u
to nnp to the lim theo lo ieiect new
ciothlnt fnxo e pile of "eenlUied*
meienei. he Mjd. The lecond oi^er
WW IP turn m their Amny-^wed
weeponl end to Kica ftnm i ceebe of
■ ■ei itt nflee ixkd other Uffit weejionl
lojved of rem or innsnie, eetfi
>old«r wie (iven e bn^ purple cloth
to wear ee an idenlifyin( gterker 'I
"ed mine around my beed lo a
lifmeiel" the aoldkr leld.
—H wia fetUr anitfeifcnnni.
They mit Theie'e e iti0LWfi^-
naely 73 B 15 psaBaeL Tben are
IS be no eermoce," be aid. Tbe
Bldiea enn loU ooly Ihel their
taifal wm e tmUary eDcenpfneoL
Tbef wen 001 fl«ea the UaiSliy of the
fuertfUe fbRe nor the tieaa lor the
nid. They blew oolr ih> ther wue ai
a bat 'i iie wh e re in Cenml Amen-
a* fu ftom eny -'■■«'—< ent
T)m aJ^lea didel make the em-
■aoion between ttaeii mvan asd the
Sea Salndoc mack tuull aflacwinl
beeaid. _ ^
Ouvm Oa 2* boon beltn the
OKk. ila ioUieii naed, dened ead
■■•flnd their eafinni. and waned.
At atou ] ajn. on the day
fbUowfat ihor arrtnl in Cemral
AmeiicB, e (lent CH-S] uen^nn
taelieapiar a pti e eml at the airstrip.
Eaoorad by the ihiw enrtUaoe, the
uoaptJiiobcA in end bnoed fbr a
henvwtng, Idw^IxkI HlfB to the
tarfei. The piioi and oo^Qot wore
nifht-fliion (oola.
The toldar lael be witched the
SEATTLE POST -
INTELLIGENCER
June 15, 1995
dart jungle naXag paa a they Hew
fbr neertr thiea hooo.
The Bkt wa i<K gnwliif Ughi
wiaa the iteaaen got a Ovw^DlauB
witniag aooua tligta daA
Suddenly they wen bsucnog over
e ckering tn tbe jungle, and the
belicopttr pike wa ordering them oat
The Reagen ueed e techniqta
oaJled faauupi ag* to diaemberk. A
thidc ina ie attached to en overhead
Smn Juat ouieide the teer fbaelage
door aiaj dropped toward tbe pound
a the helicopter hooen. Inaiaed of
comrolllng deecent uftng a nppeUing
hanaa, vldlen dacend on the rapa
by amply holdloi on wth their handa
and ileling. Thick leeiber Hone pro-
loa them ^m fncnoD buma
"Fajtropin* ttappcnj k felt, it'i
;u« thon cf I fiee &11," the loldKr
aid. *We dropped 90 reel nghi mio
the roidtUa of the compotred." which
coToaied of ana exude huu sinouod.
ed by e bejbad-edn Ibooe.
Six camp 0ienis enn ewaka a
the Rengen iljd down the topee, ai^
Sinfiie arupced immidleiely. the ml-
dier aeid. On the graund. the Res^n
fbnned late nell flee teefla, with
aab teem •""^^ e pie alMiad
i;oL The aqued poured on e high
yotawM of iuotue to ptevcm e
It fit piesy baity for e while, but
we didnl lave eay re^oc nai a lii ee,'
tia BOkUer aeid. When the aboodag
■opped aboot U minaia laar then
wen O bodia Biewa ibioi^ the
antji, nchi^age d^ean — '^'"^
One of the thrw dvilien nahed
aroutid die cmp pthentig pepen
■nrf ^oQimeas and ^"^^^ tfaeat into
a laiga pouch. A iraup of Raagea
mflrrtert aU of the enemy weapooi
and ei^laatva into a pile end blew
aiverriad e gitaly laek thai beapoke
Da |nalligmr»^theniig pan of the
mteeloa Eech of tta fucmlle maa
wa carefully fiagatpraeed.
The [fUigetytlatingJ pada unn
leim' the aeldier aaid. "nrou Jsai p«
the whole bead on It. We dU right
baada only."
The riidiag Ifanw taft the mined
piemlle cemp on t6oL lor eoou ttnee
milee. The CK-S3 beboopter teamed
and Bok the loldleia beck lo their
baa cainpL AAcr 41 boun of debrief-
ing and "chilling out" at the hea
camp, the Rangan got backontlaC.
130 and leoinad to Yakuna.
BOSTON GLOBE
June 16, 1995
Pg. 13
US reportedly killed 83 guerrillas
in El Salvador in '85 retaliation
SEATTLE - US •
(\o< kjlled 83 leftist ^emlla£ ii
Salvador in l^io m a secret nud
ned out m retaliation for the m:
ere of SL\ .\niencans. the Seattle
Po5t-lntelliBencer reported yester
day
The nud. earned out by 11 Rang
ers from Foil Leuis near Tacoma
«'*s kept secret because the Reagan
administration feared backlash at
home and embarrassmeni for the
SiKadoran government, the news-
paper quoted sources as sa>nng,
.^.iked about the story at a ne«s
bnefiny yesteiiby. Ken Bacon, chief
checked this allegation uith the US
Southern Command in Panama, »ith
the Special Operations Command in
Fonda. \ve find no infurmation to
substantiate the report.""
The newspaper said it based its
rrport on accounts from a former
Ringrr wfio took part, a former
Amiv special operatjons officer and
a former jrovernmeni official in-
volved in e5;tablislung the military
ability to counter terronsts.
The raid apparently was in re-
sponse to a June 19. 1985. attack in
uhich as many as 10 gunmen
sprayed two sidewalk cafes in San
Salvadoh killing four ofT-duty US
Marines and two US cmlians.
.Meus reports at the Ume sajd the
mxssacre was commiUed by the Ur-
ban Guerrillas-Mardoqueo Cruz.
That group was afTiliated with the
Revolutionary Party of Central
Amencan Workers, a splinter faction
of the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front, which was battling
the Salvadoran govemmenL
The Rangers were flown from
Washington state to a Central
American runway where they were
briefed by three people in civilian
Clothes, the former Ranger said.
We didn't know where they
came from, but they weren't part of
the actjal assault team," he said. "It
*aa really straightforward. They
siid There s a target, approximate-
l;- ") to So personnel There are to
3
A hebcopter took them to the
rebels' remote training camp, where
the soldier? dropped do«Ti a repe
into a compound of nine crude huts
surrounded by a barbed-wire fence,
the former Ranger said Gunfire
enipted immediately, he said
"It got pretty hairy for a *hile.
but we didn't have any major casual
ties," he said.
After less than 15 minutes, th*
camp was strewn with S3 bodies, in
eluding a dozen women ciad in iht
same uniforms as the male gueml
las, he said
The three civilians. *ho Kid ac
companied the Rangers, gatherei
documents and supervised the sol
diers as they fingerprinted th
corpses, he said
On July 31. 1985. Defense Secrt
tary Caspar W Weinberger said Lh
Salvadoran govemmenL "^tith ol
assistance, has taken care of - in on
way or another, uken prisoner c
killed a number of tne peop-
who participated" in the San Saiv
dor atuck.
19
Senator Cohen, Are you familiar with the story about a former
Ranger who allegedly was part of an Army Ranger team that went
into El Salvador in 1985 and attacked a guerrilla encampment al-
legedly resulting in the death of some 85 Salvadorans?
Director Deutch. I am not.
Senator COHEN. You have not seen any of the reporting?
Director Deutch. No, sir.
Senator Cohen. All right.
Well, I am going to give you copies of several articles that ap-
peared that indicated that this individual claimed to be part of an
11 man unit that was dropped in by helicopter to take out some
85 individuals. I think that we need to have some examination of
this as to whether or not it would have been a paramilitary oper-
ation, if it in fact occurred, or something under the aegis of the
Agency, and if so, whether a report would have been required to
have been filed pursuant to the covert action notification require-
ment.
Director DEUTCH. If you will provide me with the information,
Senator, I will be glad to look into it and report back to you and
the Committee.
Senator Cohen. All right.
Can you tell us what the CIA policy is regarding background
briefings for members of the press? How many do you give, who
gives them?
Director Deutch. I think generally speaking we are — we have,
for some period of time the Agency has tried, and I certainly would
encourage the sensible background briefings to the press for major
international events, especially when this country is involved in an
international meeting or something. So I would think that there
are reasonable background briefings that should be presented to
the press, not as a way of introducing specific points of view, but
essentially help the press fulfill their job.
Senator Cohen. Yes. My understanding is that the CIA does
about, I think about 200 briefings per year, DIA about 100, and my
understanding also is that obviously these are at the unclassified
level. The DIA briefings are approved by President's appointees in
OSD. Does that sound right?
Director Deutch. I don't — I — that would surprise me a bit about
DIA. But I would think the 200 and 100 would not be unreasonable
over a whole year period.
Senator Cohen. Okay.
Final question. The House Intelligence Bill includes a provision
to waive the 2% penalty for early retirement for NSA employees in
order to accelerate their attrition rate, avoiding the necessity of
RIFs. What is your view of the House proposal?
Director Deutch. I believe I am for it, sir. [General laughter.]
Senator Cohen. Is there a reason why you turned around to look
at the first echelon behind you?
Director Deutch. I won't — but I think — I am quite sure I am for
it, sir. I may get in trouble for having said that; that's what both-
ers me.
Senator Cohen. We'll take it up in a classified session. [General
laughter.]
20
Director Deutch. No, no, no, no. This is a question about — ^but
I am quite sure I am for it, sir.
Senator COHEN. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Senator Cohen.
Senator Lugar.
Senator LuGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch, at the time of your confirmation hearing I com-
mented that the scope of your presentation was very impressive in
trying to build confidence in the Intelligence Community and in
lajdng out a plan of action to guide your activities as DCI. I really
commend you, as others have, on the answers to the eight ques-
tions we presented to you for this hearing.
Your answer to the eighth question leads me to ask you to think
through with us the issue of intelligence coordination with law en-
forcement activities in a broader context.
There are many who believe that the narcotics problem and the
terrorism problem, when combined with the proliferation difficul-
ties occasioned by the residue of nuclear, biological, chemical weap-
ons, after the end of the Cold War, are problems for which our gov-
ernment is not well prepared to deal. On occasion we have defined
the drug problem as a law enforcement problem, as a problem of
crime in our cities, or with state authorities, or even the FBI. Obvi-
ously working the narcotics issue through the Upper Huallaga Val-
ley in Peru is a foreign problem. We coordinate what is occurring
abroad with law enforcement at home, but some would say, and I
tend to agree, that we are not organized in a sufficient fashion to
meet the literal armies of people who are arrayed against govern-
ments in the narcotics war.
That may be true increasingly with terrorism as well; nation
states are not necessarily the perpetrators of these deeds, but rath-
er small sects of people with religious and political agendas. Some
may be domestic, some may be foreign in origin, we don't know
which groups may strike or with what materials. And increasingly
those materials are more dangerous and disastrous.
Now the coordination you have described here today is very en-
couraging. But have you ever tried to think through the overall
problem. If we were really serious about a war on drugs, in a com-
prehensive way — internationally, domestic, locally, how would we
organize our government for that fight? Or increasingly, if we are
serious about acts of terrorism that might take out a good number
of American buildings and people and involve extraordinarily dan-
gerous and volatile material, how do we organize to fight that men-
ace? It just occurs to me that the demarcation lines between law
enforcement and intelligence, between domestic and foreign activi-
ties, between vigilance on behalf of and defense of civil liberties for
Americans, between the roles of the military and police forces in
combatting these problems, may not be appropriate given the enor-
mity of these dilemmas.
Director Deutch. Well, Senator, I think that that is a tremen-
dously astute observation. If I was to lay down for you the real
things that bothered me conceptually since I have been Director of
CentrEil Intelligence, the first one I'd mention is this personnel sys-
tem. The second one is the boundary line on how to think about
law enforcement and foreign intelligence, and I might add, diplo-
21
macy as well, because there is a very important role in these for-
eign activities of the Department of State that has traditionally
been the authority who was responsible for coordinating all of or
foreign activities in a foreign country. And I do have some initial
views about it.
First of all, I don't believe that we can find a single organization
system that will optimize for addressing the drug problem or opti-
mize for addressing the terrorism problem or the still considerable
problem of countries which have inimical interests to the United
States. So we have to develop greater flexibility to use pieces of
each one of our departments to address questions in a problem
solving, directed way, in order to get the best out of the assets that
we have.
I Eilso want to say that technology has something to do with this,
because the distinction, the historical distinction between domestic
and foreign is just going away, it is just disappearing before your
own eyes. So I believe that all of these push for reassessment.
But we should never confuse the difference between who the cus-
tomer is here and who the performer is. I am a performer of foreign
intelligence for a customer. The customer that I work for is either
the Attorney General, or the head of the FBI or the head of the
Drug Enforcement Agency, who needs to have foreign intelligence
for a purpose that they are going to have in law enforcement or
something else. And I really in this way want to distinguish be-
tween saying we have to do a better job of organizing the customer
to say what they need and organizing performers to do the work
that is required. It is a very complicated subject, much more com-
plicated than when we talk about imagery or SIGNIT or things like
that. This is one of the key intelligence issues for the future. Not
many of the others that are discussed much more extensively.
And I thank you for the question, it's a very good one. I hope I
haven't gone on too long about this.
Senator LUGAR. Are you working — you are working on it?
Director Deutch. Yes, I am; yes, I am.
Senator LuGAR. And will share with us the evolution of your
planning?
Director Deutch. Absolutely, sir.
Senator LuGAR. I thank you.
Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Bryan.
Senator Glenn.
Senator Glenn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
We have talked before about the greater importance of HUMINT,
human intelligence, because some of the problems we face inter-
nationally these days involve terrorists, religious groups, and eth-
nic groups that that aren't easily surveilled by satellites. Which
means then that we have a greater personnel problem than we've
had in the past in recruiting people for that purpose. That's tough
and it takes years to develop human assets — it's not like just put-
ting up a new satellite and getting your answers a week or so later.
Do these human assets come under NFIP, National Foreign In-
telligence Program?
Director DEUTCH. They do.
Senator GLENN. Okay.
22
Well then, that gives me a lot of concern, because on page one
of your statement, you addressed three questions with regard to
NFIP in particular. First was that you don't have adequate control
over the budget on the NFIP programs. You have little direct au-
thority over NFIP directly. The present process works fairly well
within the Department of Defense but not with respect to other
agencies that are part of NFIP.
Another is on the issue of whether the DCI should have ex-
panded authority to reprogram NFIP funds within the program.
This would indicate that maybe the DCI does not have the author-
ity you should have to manage what I think is going to be one of
the major thrusts in the whole intelligence effort for the coming
years. Am I wrong to be so concerned or are you concerned, too?
Director Deutch. Well, if I had not been concerned, I wouldn't
have written it. But let me give you two points that should make
you feel better. The first is that with respect to the CIA human in-
telligence function, I do have complete authority and executive con-
trol, because it's in CIA and CIA is part of the NFIP program. But
other human intelligence activities, for example, those run by the
Department of Defense, I do it really at the sufferance of the Sec-
retary of Defense, or if I may say, the Deputy Secretary.
Senator Glenn. Would you say you are one among equals, then,
rather than the one running the program, is that correct?
Director Deutch. No. They control the purse strings.
Now while I say that, I want to say that having been Deputy
Secretary of Defense I can promptly give you the answers, the ar-
guments why that's a good way of doing it. They have responsibil-
ity for these agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army
and the Navy and the Air Force. So there is a reason why matters
are as they are, and I can defend them eloquently having been on
the other side of the fence as Deputy Secretary.
The point I want to make is, you cannot look to a Director of
Central Intelligence as being an executive with executive manage-
ment control over these programs. There are certain other depart-
ments which have NFIP dollars that don't even bother to check in
with me, or any Director of Central Intelligence.
Senator Glenn. Well, I know you say in a subsequent paragraph,
"I am not prepared as yet, however, to recommend solutions or op-
tions to pursue." But I would think this is something we ought to
get ironed out pretty quick as to the increasing importance of
HUMINT, whether we have direct enough control, and who's going
to control. Is it going to be run by a committee or is it going to be
somebody really in tight control? Because we're not going to have
unlimited resources, and this is going to be one of the most impor-
tant parts of the budget.
Director Deutch. That's correct, and it's a similar question can
be said about international terrorism, drugs, and the like. And
these are issues that are of concern to me and that is why I have
put them out. But I am not prepared to say you ought to do it a
different way, because I know the argument on the side of the
agency that is responsible for
Senator Glenn. Okay.
Back to the Gulf War syndrome. I was talking with some of the
veterans from the war the other day, and they said they are con-
23
vinced it all came from the shots they got before they went, it
wasn't something they got over there. Has anybody looked into
that?
Director Deutch. There were different kinds of medication given
to those veterans. Incidentally, I must say, Mr. Chairman, I have
to be — this is not a DCI responsibility, I am going back now to my
other world — there were different medications given and in each
one of those cases, pjrridostigmine being one of the principal can-
didates, there are medical studies under way to determine whether
there is any possibility of these being side effects or in combination
with other matters having led to the Gulf War illnesses.
Senator Glenn. From the shots there were given before?
Director Deutch. That's correct, yes sir.
Senator Glenn. Okay, thank you. My time is almost up.
Let me ask one more question here.
Maybe you can't answer this in open session, but I'll ask it any-
way. Can you give us any information on the press reports that the
M-11 missile or technology is being given to Iran by the People's
Republic of China?
Director Deutch. Can't do it in open session. Senator.
Senator Glenn. Okay thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Senator Glenn.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Deutch, we're glad to have you here. As you said, you would
come back, and we all appreciate your candor and your
insightfullness.
You mentioned changes in personnel in your opening statement.
You said, "most of the changes," and I am quoting you here in the
record, "are now complete." And as I said at the beginning, I think
the new team is functioning smoothly and so forth.
Now, aren't you going to have to get into the depth, into the
structure of the Central Intelligence Agency when dealing in per-
sonnel changes? I assume you were referring to changes at the top
that you work with to give leadership in certain areas.
Director Deutch. That's exactly right sir. I think that there was
a concern that a new Director would come in and, as happens
sometimes in the past with other Directors, would fire, terminate,
hundreds of people. That is not my way of doing things and not
what I intended to do.
Senator Shelby. Probably would not be wise. You have got to do
it in a systematic, knowledgeable way, haven't you?
Director DEUTCH. I think the approach that I am trying to take
is there have been a few changes, they have been announced,
maybe one more. But what is really important is to go through the
hard work of putting in place a personnel system that will, in or-
derly fashion, evaluate, promote and assign people according to
their performance and according to the needs of the country. And
that is not going to happen in a day or two. It is a long process.
Senator Shelby. But it is important that that does happen,
though.
Director Deutch. I believe that if there is anything that I can
accomplish as Director of Central Intelligence, it is carrying out
that task.
24
Senator Shelby. And perhaps focusing in new directions, looking
at the 21st Century and our needs of intelhgence as they change.
Director Deutch. The issue of priorities and how we allocate our
intelligence capabilities to different areas is a second question. But
unless you have the people, unless you have the motivated people
who are properly harnessed and properly developed throughout
their careers, you are not going to be as effective in the second part
of that unless you have the right personnel system.
Senator Shelby. Dr. Deutch, I want to get into something else.
On June the 20th I wrote you a letter. The inquiry dealt with the
killing, the murdering in 1985 of four Marine embassy guards and
two American businessmen in San Salvador. I understand that sev-
eral weeks ago CBS aired a segment that said that the leader of
the assassination squad, the murder squad, is now living in San
Francisco, that he was on television — I haven't seen this program —
and I was asking in the letter and I will ask you publicly now, to
furnish any information that you might have, the CIA dealing with
this Gilberto Asario — I'll give you a copy of this in a few minutes —
and his entry into the United States. Does the Intelligence Commu-
nity have any information regarding this man, who, I understand,
said he planned the killing of these unarmed Marines and two
American businessmen in 1985, and if he is in fact living in the
United States, how did he get in the US, when did he get in, did
the Intelligence Committee have anything to do with bringing him
into the US, and can you dig up any information that would be
helpful to this community and this country regarding his presence
here. I think it's very important.
There've been some allegations made by some of the surviving
family members, including the mother of one of the Marines from
my home state of Alabama, that the CIA knew about this and
helped him get into the US. I don't know that at all. I am not say-
ing you, but when we let, under some kind of a program, immigra-
tion or otherwise, a known murderer, who admits on television that
he did, in fact, kill four Marines, legally in the United States,
something is wrong with out immigration policy and something is
wrong with our Justice Department not to seize this man and to
prosecute him.
Director Deutch. Senator, I will look into the matter. I do not
know the case.
Senator Shelby. I know you don't.
Director Deutch. And I will report back to you as soon as we
have a
Senator SHELBY. Do you think this is an important matter?
Director Deutch. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. I do, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Shelby.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think as the Director has recognized the questions from Senator
Cohen and Senator Shelby related to the same series of events,
they have been widely publicized in the regular press, and I think
that some of the information might be available.
25
I recognize the difficulty in pursuing questions that would be bet-
ter handled in closed session. Some of the things I wanted to ask,
I think particularly in view of your earlier responses I will save
until such time as we have that type of an opportunity.
One of the questions, though, that is appropriate I think for open
session, has to do with personnel policies, not at the levels that you
were suggesting a few moments ago when you talked about some
of the changes you made, but for people who are career personnel
in the intelligence field, particularly for those who might be mem-
bers of the Directorate of Operations, and in terms of the pro-
motion policies, if you will. In the military and the Foreign Service
there is an up or out policy that is pretty widely used to make sure
that you continue to turn over and that we make additional career
advancement opportunities available and there is also some special
retirement benefit that is available to those who do not happen to
be promoted at a particular time.
The intelligence service, obviously, has some special difficulties.
Indeed the people involved would not even be permitted to tell a
future employer what they did, much less describe anything that
related to it. And it might be quite difficult in several other areas.
I wonder if you could comment on that particular element of per-
sonnel policy, whether or not any attempt is being made to utilize
an up or out policy and if so, are there any special applications or
special concessions that might have to be made for intelligence per-
sonnel given the very specialized nature of their work.
Director Deutch. Senator, you make the case very well. All orga-
nizations, as they become — as people spend a greater deal of time
and get to higher seniority, will get to a situation where the funnel
gets smaller and individuals have got to leave the system and a
method has to be found for dealing with them fairly and in con-
fidence with the very special circumstances in which they work.
And I am not familiar with whether specific provisions exist today
for that purpose, but I will say to you that it is very much on our
mind as we move towards a, what I would call a more effective and
focused personnel system, to look at techniques for fairly develop-
ing a sequence of progression of promotions and thereby some peo-
ple who would not get promoted, and giving those who want to exit
the system the kind of reasonable retirement support, if you like,
and pay support, so that they can go on to alternative careers con-
sistent with the fact that they have served in the intelligence serv-
ice. Separation from an intelligence service is something which has
to be done carefully and with a knowledge of the specific — the very
special requirements of what that career service has been.
So the kind of issue that you raise is precisely the sort of ele-
ments that have to be part of a more comprehensive personnel sys-
tem that I was advocating in my earlier remarks here today, sir.
Senator ROBB. Thank you.
Let me just ask one other general question. When George
Tenet — and I think he met with every Member of the Committee
individually and had a very good confirmation hearing, as you
could probably realize simply from the unanimous vote for this ap-
proval here a few minutes ago — he seemed to be a little bit cau-
tious in projecting a complete turn around for some of the chal-
lenges that the Agency and the Intelligence Community in general
26
face in the near term. He spoke in terms of several years to com-
pletely reposition — I don't remember the precise words — so that we
would be in position to provide all of the kinds of intelligence that
we believe that we are going to need in the end of this Century and
the beginning of the 21st Century.
Do you have some sense of a time line as to when you would be
able to say that under new management, if you will, and cognizant
of the difficulties that the Agency has encountered in recent years
in each of the areas that have been discussed as part of your con-
firmation process, and the questions to date, when we could say
that we are — when we expect to be as sufficiently changed or modi-
fied so that we are operating with an effective new team that is
fully capable?
Director Deutch. I think years is the right time scale for things
like putting in a personnel system that will work with the con-
fidence of all the people who are involved. So I do not think that
some of these subjects — working out, for example, the issue with
respect to law enforcement is going to be done in weeks or months,
but it is going to take a great deal of time. Very important issues,
putting in a planning system that assures that resources are allo-
cated to intelligence priorities, is not something that can be done
overnight. It can be started this year. But some of these are tasks
that are going to take something on the order years, not on the
order of weeks of months.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Dr. Deutch.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Robb.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome.
John, a few days ago I was listening to National Public Radio
and I heard you from, I believe, Amherst, in your reunion, and you
were commenting during the segment of the program that I heard,
about some of the culture that you had experienced in the Defense
Department and its degree of professionalism and its heavy com-
mitment to maintaining the growth of its personnel. And you went
on to observe that you felt that it was because of that that the De-
fense Department was able, culturally, to make a relatively smooth
transition from a Cold War to a post-Cold War mentality. I hope
I have properly
Director Deutch. The uniformed military.
Senator Graham of Florida. The uniformed military.
One of the concerns that many of us have had has been the issue
of the culture of the Intelligence Community. In areas such as the
Aldrich Ames case and Guatemala, there seemed to be a culture of,
you know, close ranks around a difficult situation, and a reticence
to disclose and to deal with issues that were unpleasant.
I wonder if you could comment about some of the transferability
of the experience of the uniformed personnel and what that has
meant in terms of the adaptability of the military to new conditions
to dealing with the cultural circumstances within the Intelligence
Community.
27
Director Deutch. Senator, first of all, I would like to go back to
the comment- -the question and the answer that I gave to Senator
Kerrey earlier.
In addition to problems, there is a remarkable degree of com-
petence and dedication of individuals in this organization. I men-
tioned individuals working in the Bosnian Task Force which they
have been doing for four years, they've been doing it a system of
20 hours a day, with incredibly high performance and I might say,
tremendously high morale. So I have found no — no unwillingness
to share with me the operations of the Agency. There's been tre-
mendous forthcoming about the most awkward kinds of problems
that exist. There has not been what I had heard, that, you know,
it would be hard to get the Directorate of Operations people to talk
to you. They love talking to you.
So I think the problem is not a culture which says we're not
going to tell you what's going on. What the problem is, is to put
into place, through hard work and long time, a new approach to
what has been a system which, in the personnel area, why there
have been some modifications, obviously needs some — needs some
major readjustment in the planning area with respect to resource
allocation.
So the point I would like to make is when we talk about chang-
ing the culture, I don't think that this is a set of people who are
either unmotivated or not capable of, resistant to talking about
what they are doing. They are very open. What is important is to
put into place those mechanisms, and it takes time in a large orga-
nization to do that, a new personnel system which over time will
allow the employees themselves, these dedicated professionals, to
be empowered to change the culture themselves and adapt to new
circumstances.
So the important point is that putting in a new personnel system
that goes from recruiting all the way through to retirement, if it
is done right, will allow professionals to adapt to changes as they
are called upon and it will lead to the change in culture that we
are seeking.
Senator Graham of Florida. I would like to ask a second area of
concern which also relates to some of the changes that have oc-
curred in the last half dozen or so years. And that is the relation-
ship between public information and clandestine information. We
now have much greater access to and capability of processing pub-
licly available information.
To what degree is that going to affect the priorities for clandes-
tine information? As clandestine information, it would seem to me,
becomes more a filling in smaller blanks as we are able to fill in
the larger picture with properly processed information that is avail-
able to the general public.
Director Deutch. I think you are exactly right. There is an ex-
plosion of public information and also with the techniques to ana-
lyze it. And so the collection problem and the analyst's problem is
to use clandestinely collected information selectively. You don't
have to cover everything if you can read it in the newspaper in
some foreign capital. Ajnd it is much easier to deal with open
sources, open reporting, and I think that we are doing much bet-
ter — the community is doing much better — of analysts understand-
28
ing and of the requirements system being cognizant of selective in-
formation that is needed of a clandestine nature and making use
of open source material.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Director Deutch, on a second round, I would like to inquire on
some broader issues of interest.
The recent events in Russia raise many material questions as to
the military strength, the capability of Russia, and how we assess
the future as to our defense budget, which we are looking at, and
an evaluation of Russian leadership as well as materiel capability.
I would be interested in your assessment, to the extent you can
give it in an open session, as to what light, if any, the recent events
in Russia, the hostage taking and the concession by the Russian
national government, what implications there are or indicators
there are of basic Russian military strength.
Director Deutch. I am not sure that I can provide any signifi-
cant new information here, except to say that both the political de-
velopments in Russia and states of the Former Soviet Union, and
the military strength of Russia and it performance, its potential for
its capabilities, remain a very high priority for both our collection
and our analysis.
Chairman SPECTER. Were you surprised by the recent events
which suggest real weakness in the Russian military establish-
ment?
Director Deutch. I was not surprised by it, no, sir.
Chairman Specter. Since you testified last, there have been a
series of reports publicly disclosed about US negotiations with
North Korea on the so-called Statement of Agreed Principles. We
talked a bit about whether it really is an Executive agreement or
whether it really is a treaty which requires ratification by the Sen-
ate. It appears that those discussions are now more on track.
Are you able to comment as to the security issue as to what is
happening with North Korea or whether the window of lack of in-
spection raises any significant security problem for the United
States?
Director Deutch. Well, let me first of all say that the community
has an estimate which I think I signed out yesterday on just this
subject, and I will make sure that you get a copy of it, which gives
our best judgment on this issue of developments in North Korea.
If I could give you two summary remarks about it. We don't
know as much as we should to make fully informed judgments.
That won't be a surprise. And that it was
Chairman SPECTER. That's a pretty good generalized answer.
Director Deutch. No, no. It's also a statement of importance, it
seems to me. This is a society — let me leave aside the issue of the
nuclear weapons program where we are, in my mind, remarkably
ill informed and it is important for us as a country to be better in-
formed about what is going on there. But secondly, I would say to
you that North Korea remains one of the really tremendously
major security challenges for the country. That is the second point
I would leave with you.
Chairman Specter. Are you confident that we are on track about
being able to accurately assess that security threat?
29
Director Deutch. On the military security side, I am fairly con-
fident, yes, sir.
Chairman SPECTER. How about on the intelligence side?
Director Deutch. Well, I meant on intelligence on military mat-
ters, the answer is yes, sir.
Chairman Specter. My orange light is on, so I will ask only one
more question.
There have been some recent public disclosures about greater ca-
pability of Iraq on weapons of mass destruction, and my question
to you, to the extent you can comment publicly, what is going on
in Iraq at the present time with respect to their capability with
weapons of mass destruction and the reports we hear about inter-
nal dissension and Saddam Hussein again apparently successfully
quelling internal dissension.
Director Deutch. I cannot comment on these matters in public,
sir. It's because both I am not in a position either to reveal my wis-
dom or my ignorance on them, but
Chairman Specter. Is that an "I don't know?"
Director Deutch. No, no. I would be happy to discuss these mat-
ters with you.
Chairman Specter. Well, all right.
I raise those questions and I know that there is a limited amount
that can be commented upon, but there is enormous public interest
and concern about the three subjects that I just broached and I
broach them in a context fully understanding the limitations as to
what the Director of Central Intelligence can comment in public,
and perhaps it would be a good idea if we confer privately about
what might be said, because there is a great deal of public concern
about what is happening in Russia, what's happening in North
Korea, what's happening in Iraq, and many other places.
But when we're buffeted at all times by media reports which may
be accurate or may leave some points untouched, and the extent to
which there could be some comment by the CIA on those subjects,
I think it would be very good for the public to have whatever assur-
ances or information could be provided in an official way.
Director Deutch. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SPECTER. Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch, I was either impressively inattentive or sufficiently
bored that I, too, listened to the radio address at Amherst, and I
guess it was an honest mistake rather than a Freudian slip when
you said that your job was to produce secrets rather than to protect
them.
But there is a suspicion in the land that that is part of our busi-
ness, to protect and sometimes produce secrets. And I think that
comes, if I was to guess, comes as a consequence of the political
tendency of us — we elected politicians, to get drug along in the
dumb current of whatever it is at the moment that's of interest to
cameras or whatever is of interest at the moment to the media and
the American people as a consequence of that attention. And I
know that you understand that I feel very strongly that we have
to be very careful that if the threat is a negative editorial to a poli-
tician versus the threat of sending somebody in harm's way, that
to address a threat that in fact isn't a threat to the United States,
30
or at least isn't on our priorities, that we must have the strength
of character to resist and perhaps suffer the negative editorials as
a consequence.
What I am very impressed with, Director Deutch, is your willing-
ness early on in this window of infancy that you have as the Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, to take a clean slate ap-
proach, to say, I know this is the way it's always been done, but
we need to do it differently. I am very impressed with your dedica-
tion to that task.
And I am interested to know if you feel as if you have the liberty
to do and perform in a similar fashion when it comes to fundamen-
tal policy, where we may in fact be in a tunnel of no return, I
mean, where we may have made a political decision which is essen-
tially what the intelligence is all about. It is very easy for us with
Captain O'Grady to see what good intelligence both does for us and
may not do for us if it is missing. It is very impressive in a military
situation, the intelligence — I marvel at the kind of technology and
the human support for our warfighters in preparing them. But
when you are dealing with a political threat, such as the one Sen-
ator Lugar was referencing earlier, with narcotics, or the ones that
the Chairman was referencing earlier with Russian and North
Korea and Iraq, you are talking about a human judgment being
made by we policymakers, amd there is sometimes, it seems to me,
a tunnel that we get into.
And I am thinlang, for example, of Iran. I mean, I read the last
couple of days accounts that we basically got slam dunked at the
Gr-7. None of the G-7, our G— 7 colleagues are supporting our policy
in Iran. OPEC is going to stiff us on a policy in Iran. Shell is going
to pick up where Conoco left off. The question is, did it produce
anything.
I could just as easily use other examples where we politicians
make a decision and say this is the way we want to go and you
may, in your own intelligence evaluations, say geez, I hate to em-
barrass you. Senator Kerrey, but it isn't working. What you have
decided was a good decision based upon what we knew at the time,
but we are now looking at the impact of that decision and we don't
really see that it has accomplished what it is that you stated that
you're trying to accomplish.
Do you feel at liberty. Dr. Deutch, to bring to the attention of the
Commander in Chief or to this Committee, conclusions that might
be at odds with decisions that we have previously made?
Director Deutch. Very much so. I understand exactly the point
that you're making and one of the matters which I am quite com-
fortable on is that the top policymakers of the country, the Presi-
dent, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, have the opportunity to hear from me when I think the intel-
ligence estimates are, to the best of the ability of what we know
and the best of our judgment, what things work and don't work,
including some of the examples that you have mentioned, sir.
Vice Chairman KERREY. Well, let me give you a specific example.
I recently took a tour starting in Panama, to Colombia, Peru and
to Bolivia and one of the questions I had in that whole tour began
in Panama and ended in Panama and that was whether or not
SOUTHCOM's authority is sufficient to be able to control the entire
31
area. They do not appear to have, for example, control over the
Naval forces. And I am wondering, is that the kind of situation —
you may not be aware of that particular situation, but is that the
kind of situation where you would not feel any shyness in getting
involved if you decided that General McCaffrey needed the author-
ity to — and that authority needed to be modified, you wouldn't be
shy in making that recommendation.
Director Deutch. First of all, I guess I wouldn't be shy in that
case because I was Deputy Secretary of Defense and know it well.
But the fact of the matter is, that's not a good example. I don't
think the chief intelligence officer of this country should be talking
about General McCaffrey and how we do the AOR's between him
and USACOM and lots of other people, although I know the prob-
lem very well, but that's because I was Deputy Secretary of De-
fense and have a good deal of sympathy with General McCaffrey.
Where I do think that I have the responsibility that you men-
tioned is where I see some policy taking place in a foreign country,
whether it's our policy or someone else's policy, and the results are
going in a certain direction which are not what's intended, that has
to be brought to light. And it is not so to speak, talking about
the
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So if your intelligence causes you to con-
clude that our policy towards Cuba was wrong, you would not feel
shy in bringing the information to our attention that in spite of the
interest of Jorge Mas Canosa, you would not be shy in bringing us
an evaluation that perhaps we ought to change course. I am not
suggesting that that is the situation. I am just picking a very con-
troversial political issue to make the point.
Director Deutch. In that particular case, it wouldn't be that I
would say it's right or wrong, I would say that our intelligence tells
us that the policy that we have adopted is not leading to the re-
sults we intended it to have — slightly different point, but that's the
way I would express it, and have done so.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.
Senator Graham.
A vote has been started, so we do have a time limitation.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man. I am pleased that Senator Kerrey concluded with that last
question, because that is where I would like to start, and that is
to ask some questions about Cuba.
Mr. Deutch, what is your assessment of our intelligence capabili-
ties to understand what is happening inside Cuba and what those
events might mean in terms of US policy?
Director Deutch. If I could address this in a slightly oblique
way, let me just say that I think that we — that Cuba is a tremen-
dously important intelligence priority for a variety of reasons, £ind
that it needs more attention by the community, if I could answer
it a little bit elliptically in that way. Senator. You know better than
anyone else that there's many different ways we can use to gather
information about the developments in Cuba, and I have already
taken some steps to assure that we focus more effort on Cuba.
Senator Graham of Florida. You mentioned in some of your ear-
lier questions about the changed circumstances in the world are re-
32
quiring a reprioritization of the activities of the Intelligence Com-
munity and the types of resources that the community needs and
will apply to those new priorities. Is Cuba an example of such an
area?
Director Deutch. Yes, it is. And it follows, also, from the Presi-
dent's directive on what our intelligence priorities are as well. So
this isn't just one agency doing it, this is part of a reassessment
of what our priorities are generally, and Cuba is certainly higher
on the list.
Senator GRAHAM of Florida. If I could ask about three specific
Cuba related items.
One, the economy. There have been reports within the last few
days that the sugar crop in Cuba this year will be one of the lowest
in the last half century. There are reports about large numbers of
lay offs in the publicly owned enterprises. Are you able to comment
about what the community feels the impact of those and other eco-
nomic factors might be on the future, the stability of the govern-
ment of Cuba?
Director Deutch. I am not informed on the issue. I would have
to go back and inform myself. Senator. I will be happy to do that
and get back to you, sir.
Senator GRAHAM of Florida. The same answer may apply to the
next two questions.
The next one relates to Mr. Vesco. There was a lot of speculation
when Mr. Vesco was arrested that that might represent a change
in Cuban policy relative to harboring fugitives and extradition.
Now it appears as if the Cuban government is not going to extra-
dite Mr. Vesco, at least that is what CNN was told. Do you have
any assessment of what this series of actions relative to Vesco
means in terms of Cuban policy?
Director Deutch. I do not. Senator.
Senator Graham of Florida. And the third question relates to the
nuclear power plant in Cuba which has caused a considerable
amount
Director Deutch. Yes.
Senator Graham of Florida. Of concern and apprehension. What
are you able to say about that?
Director Deutch. Senator, the last time I looked, I don't think
there was any significant activity going on there. That is my cur-
rent impression. But I can get back to you on it if there is any
change in that.
Senator Graham of Florida. Finally, I understand tomorrow
there is going to be a report delivered to the Defense department
which the Defense Department had requested and funded on the
security status of Cuba, such as what is the capability of its cur-
rent military. I'd be interested if you could have that reviewed from
the perspective of your insights on Cuba and comment at an appro-
priate time and under appropriate circumstances as to what your
assessment is of the security capabilities of Cuba.
Director Deutch. I will be happy to do that. Senator.
Senator Graham of Florida. Good; fine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Mr. Deutch, we are very close to being out
of time on the vote, but I want to ask you one more question, and
33
we'll have to pick this up at a later time, and just about time for
you to have to go, too. And this is on Guatemala and I understand
that you are awaiting the Inspector General's report. But this ques-
tion relates to some action that perhaps should be taken in ad-
vance of the Inspector General's report. And one of the factors that
made the failure to inform Congress on the events in Guatemala
so troubling was that it involved the Congressionally directed semi-
annual human rights reports.
Now, other than the on-going development of guidelines for re-
cruitment of assets, what steps have you taken or do you intend
to take to emphasize to the Intelligence Community, particularly
the Directorate of Operations, the importance of the requirement
that our activities are fully consistent with protection of human
rights and that we don't sanction or become involved, directly or in-
directly, with any people who there is reason to believe are in-
volved in violating human rights. Because that is an issue which
requires action, if not yesterday, at least by this afternoon.
Director Deutch. We are carefully going through a procedure to
make sure that every station understands that they are there, es-
pecially in Latin America, working on improving human rights and
democratization in that area. So we try to make sure that that
message gets through as a high priority and I think there is some
success on that.
Chairman SPECTER. And you are pushing that message at the
present time.
Director Deutch. Yes, I think even some of our critics would
argue that in certain places we are a force in that direction today.
And it is a very important point and we should continue to be
pressed on it, sir.
Chairman Specter. Well, thank you very much. Director Deutch.
This has been very informative. We will be returning to some of
these questions again.
That concludes the hearing.
[Thereupon, at 4:01 o'clock p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
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