I have no objection to going forward with exploratory
approaches looking toward possible five year MAP
programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions
described in the Secretary of State's 16 January
memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP
levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the
prospect for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me
premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military
aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how
tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both
governments that they should prepare austere minimum five
year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a
better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a
final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire
that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect
of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to
India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange
diversions from development to defense to a reasonable
level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive
defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another
purpose.

2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be
appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with
respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence
facilities.

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no
irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken
by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on
Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend
on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for
optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we
should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed
the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of
the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.