Friday, 14 December 2012

India’s Ocean?

A helicopter from INS Shivalik lands on PLA Navy warship, Ma'anshaan during exercises in June 2011

by Ajai Shukla

CSCAP Regional Security Outlook

Dec 2012

On the 13th
of June, four warships from the Indian Navy’s Visakhapatnam-based Eastern Fleet
sailed into Shanghai, China on a four-day port visit. The four vessels --- INS
Rana, Shivalik, Karmukh and Shakti --- had participated in JIMEX-12
(Japan-India Maritime Exercise - 2012), the inaugural bilateral maritime
exercise, and were now patrolling the South China Sea.

The same day, another
Indian warship, INS Savitri, docked in Port Victoria, Seychelles. The Savitri
had come to participate in Seychelles’ National Day celebrations and then spend
two months patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Seychelles and
Mauritius, along with two Indian Navy Dornier aircraft stationed in those
island nations at their request.

Meanwhile, near the
Gulf of Aden, an Indian guided missile frigate, INS Tabar, was engaged in
convoy escort and anti-piracy patrols, coordinating with Japanese and Chinese
warships under a joint mechanism called SHADE (Shared Awareness and
De-confliction). Simultaneously, India’s Mumbai-based Western Fleet was sending
a four-warship patrol to East Africa, the Red Sea and the Western Mediterranean[1].

As this busy naval
calendar might suggest, India is fast emerging as the regional power that
polices the Indian Ocean. Said India’s Defence Minister, AK Antony, to his
admirals last May, “India’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean and the
professional capability of our navy bestows upon us a natural ability to play a
leading role in ensuring peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region…. The
security of maritime activity through the sea-lanes in Indian Ocean is of
crucial importance for the economic prosperity of our nation and that of the
world[2].”

Even as an increasingly
muscular Indian Navy raises its profile in the Indian Ocean, it keeps a studied
distance from any confrontation in the western Pacific. In January, President
Barack Obama’s “rebalance to the Asia Pacific region” singled out India as a
key US partner in Asia[3].
In the bilateral dialogue between Washington and New Delhi, there is pressure
for India to enhance its role. But India’s strategic calculus remains centred
on the patch of water that it regards as its bailiwick: the northern Indian
Ocean.

Indian maritime
policymakers have declared they would resist being drawn into the emerging
US-China rivalry in the Western Pacific, South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. In
August, India’s then naval chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, declared that,
“notwithstanding major policy statements from the US, from our perspective the
primary area of interest to us is from the Malacca Strait to the
(Persian/Arabian) Gulf in the west and to the Cape of Good Hope in the south…
The Pacific and the South China Sea are of concern to us, but activation in
those areas is not on the cards.”[4]

Restricting itself to
the Indian Ocean might seem like strategic under-reach for South Asia’s most
powerful country, but even this is a new dawn for Indian policymakers. For
decades India’s leaders have remained continental in outlook, fixing their gaze
on the disputed land borders in the north despite having experienced
colonization from the sea. A recent naval chief has publicly lamented “a
national psyche of sea blindness.”[5]
Only in the new century has relative weakness in the north, where a resurgent
China looms large over the Himalayan frontiers, imposed a new maritime
awareness on New Delhi policymakers, forcing them to look towards the oceanic
south where India holds better cards than China. There the peninsular dagger of
India’s Deccan Plateau thrusts a thousand miles into the Indian Ocean,
dominating the International Shipping Lanes, or ISLs, the trade superhighways
on which 100,000 vessels a year carry hydrocarbons and manufactured goods to
and from the economic powerhouses of Southeast and East Asia.

Indian navy cadets practising drill

Enhancing India’s
advantages are the strategically priceless island chains of Lakshdweep and
Andaman & Nicobar, which straddle the ISLs, the former in the Arabian Sea and
the latter at the mouth of the Malacca Strait. Port Blair, the capital of the
Andaman & Nicobar Islands, is now home to a full-fledged tri-service
command with a fighter base and a growing complement of naval, air and ground
assets. In July India opened a naval air base, INS Baaz, at the very mouth of
the Malacca Strait. This will eventually have a 10,000-foot-long runway for
fighter operations, providing effective control over the Malacca Strait.

The runway at INS Baaz, the new Indian naval base near Malacca

In New Delhi’s
traditionally restrained strategic perspective, the Indian Ocean is not
regarded as a potential naval battlefield on which vital national issues would
be decided. Instead, it is seen as an Indian economic lifeline that must be
safeguarded; and as a key vulnerability of potential enemies, notably China,
who could be garrotted through a blockade of shipping if hostilities elsewhere
were playing out adversely[6].

Even as this
contingency figures centrally in Indian naval planning, defence ministry (MoD)
planners pooh-pooh the US notion that India would be a natural partner for
America in any superpower confrontation in the Indo-Pacific[7].
“Rivalry with China is not pre-ordained, nor will we be drawn into someone
else’s battles,” a top MoD planner explained[8].
“Any walk down a path of naval confrontation with China will be driven
exclusively by our own interests. The Sino-India dynamic is entirely different
from the Sino-US one. We have to think dispassionately about the rivalries and
differences here.”

Such caution has not
held back Defence Minister Antony from voicing Indian concern at China’s
assertiveness over the island territories that it claims in the waters off its
coast. At the Shangri La Dialogue in June, Antony declared: “(M)aritime
freedoms cannot be the exclusive prerogative of a few. Large parts of the
common seas cannot be declared exclusive to any one country or group…. (T)he
fullness of maritime freedoms can be realized only when all states, big and
small, are willing to abide by universally agreed laws and principles.”

Antony also strongly
backed the emerging Asian security architecture, including the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting – Plus (ADMM Plus); and
consultative mechanisms like the IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim – Association for
Regional Cooperation); and IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium), an
Indian-sponsored forum that convenes biennially, bringing together 35 naval
chiefs from around the Indian Ocean rim. In New Delhi’s perspective the East
Asia Summit and the ADMM Plus, despite their non-assertiveness, are important
forums where China can be periodically held to account[9].

The Antony MoD’s
wariness of China is fully matched by its suspicion of the US[10].
But there is little restraint in the ministry of external affairs’ (MEA’s)
enthusiasm over the US-India maritime relationship. Senior MEA diplomats
conclude from the increasingly sophisticated US-India joint naval exercises
that, “Common maritime interests allow US-India political convergence to play
out in the political-military realm. Most of the political-military dialogue[11]
between Washington and New Delhi centres on the Indian Ocean Region, and on the
US intentions there.”

Given that the
maritime-oriented US Pacific Command (PACOM) is responsible for the Indian and
Indian Ocean geographies[12],
it is unsurprising that naval exercises constitute the bulk of the joint
military training between the US and India. It also follows logically that the
US Navy, of the four American services, backs the military relationship with
India most enthusiastically.

* * * *

On 3rd April
1989, the cover of Time magazine featured the Indian-built frigate, INS
Godavari, with a cover story entitled, “Superpower India.” This was the end of
the 1970s and 1980s, a golden era for the Indian Navy, when the Soviet Union
provided it with a stream of missile boats (e.g. the Osa class, and later the
larger Nanuchkas and Tarantuls, reclassified as the Vijaydurg and Veer class),
frigates and destroyers (e.g. the Rajput class), all at “friendship prices.”
With New Delhi offering little clarity about the nature and purpose of India’s
naval build up; alarm bells were sounding from Indonesia to Australia. But
India’s economic crisis of 1991, and the resulting cuts in defence spending,
led to what the navy still calls “the lost decade”. No warships were ordered
during this period, leading to a shortfall that will take decades to make up.

Today, even with an
all-time high share of 18 per cent of India’s $36 billion defence budget[13],
the Indian Navy is struggling to reach its planned force level of 160 vessels,
including 90 capital warships.[14]
These include the escorts and logistic backup for two aircraft carrier battle
groups that New Delhi planners want “fully operational and combat worthy” at
all times[15]. Towards
this end, three aircraft carriers are on the anvil: the much-delayed, 44,000
tonne INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov, built in Russia) that
was due to join the fleet next year, but has encountered potentially serious
engine problems during ongoing pre-delivery sea trials in the Barents Sea; the
40,000 tonne INS Vikrant, India’s first indigenously designed and built
aircraft carrier that was to enter service in 2015 but is running three years
behind schedule; and another 65,000 tonne vessel that will follow the Vikrant.
Meanwhile the navy flogs its lone aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, which
celebrated its silver anniversary in the Indian Navy in May after having
earlier served 25 years in the Royal Navy.

INS Vikramaditya has encountered an engine problem that will delay its delivery to India until late 2013

Like India’s aircraft
carriers, the smaller warships are running late too. A report from the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), the national auditor, reveals that the
Indian Navy today has just 61, 44 and 20 per cent respectively of the frigates,
destroyers and corvettes that it has projected as its minimum requirement[16].

India’s newest warship,
INS Sahyadri, a limited-stealth, 5,600-tonne, guided missile frigate of the
Shivalik-class that was commissioned in July, takes the overall tally of
vessels to 134, twenty-six short of its projected requirement. Alarmingly for
naval planners who hope to boost these numbers, the CAG report notes: “the 5
vessels that will be inducted each year will barely suffice to replace warships
that are decommissioned after completing their 30-40 year service lives.”

Not everyone subscribes
to the warnings that the Indian Navy’s fleet is dangerously short of warships.
Analysts, especially air power votaries, point to the significantly greater
firepower that a new generation of indigenously built warships carry, arguing
that this more than compensates for any shortfall in numbers. Measured tonne
for tonne, Indian-built warships are amongst the most heavily armed vessels
afloat. The seven 6,800-tonne destroyers being built under Project 15A and 15B,
the first of which could be commissioned next year, will each carry sixteen
Brahmos-2 surface-to-surface supersonic cruise missiles; the new (still
unnamed) Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (LR-SAM), an anti-missile system
that India and Israel are jointly developing; a 130-millimetre super-rapid gun
mount (SRGM); four 30-millimetre AK-630 rapid fire guns for close air defence;
and a full suite of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment, including the
latest, India-developed HUMSA-NG bow mounted sonar. Each destroyer will embark
two helicopters, kitted out for ASW missions.

Either way, India’s
growing ability to design and build warships is likely to drive its emergence
as a credible maritime force. Of 18 major warships that joined the fleet over
the last two decades, 12 were designed and built in three MoD-owned shipyards
in India: Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL); Garden Reach Shipbuilders &
Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE); and Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL). Last year the MoD bought
a fourth shipyard, Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL), which could be central to
India’s submarine building programme.

These shipyards,
however, do not have the capacity to build warships at the rate that the navy
requires. So great are the infrastructure shortfalls that Cochin Shipyard Ltd
(CSL), a non-defence shipyard owned by the Ministry of Shipping, has been
contracted to build the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. No defence shipyard has a
slipway or dry dock large enough for an aircraft carrier, nor the modular
shipbuilding facilities needed for such a vessel. To overcome this, MDL and
GRSE have partnered private shipbuilders, which have recently put up excellent
shipyards but lack experience in building larger warships. This will utilize
private sector capacities, while also building them as constructors in their
own right.

The new modular shipyard at Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai

In July, MDL announced
a joint venture company (JV) for building surface warships with Pipavav Defence
& Offshore Engineering Company Ltd (PDOECL), which has a world-class
shipyard near Bhavnagar, Gujarat, on the Arabian Sea. Another JV for building
submarines was announced with Larsen & Toubro, which has played a central
role in building India’s first nuclear ballistic missile submarine, INS
Arihant; and which will soon inaugurate a spanking new shipyard at Katupally,
near Chennai. GRSE is also implementing its own tie-ups.

MDL and GRSE are also
completing major modernisation programmes, installing the modular workshops,
slipways and Goliath cranes that support modular shipbuilding. This is expected
to cut down the build time of a frigate from the current 96 months to just 60
months; and the build time of a destroyer from the current 120 months to 72
months. This follows heavy criticism, most recently by the CAG, which has noted
that “The lead ship in all projects is delivered or expected to be delivered
after a delay ranging from four to five years from the original delivery date.”[17]

INS Teg, the first of three Project 11356 Russian warships, has been delivered to India

The mobilization of
Indian warship building yards is long overdue, given the volume of navy orders.
Already, 46 naval vessels are under construction: three in Russia (two Project
11356 or Teg-class frigates, and the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya) and 43
in India. These include three 6,800-tonne destroyers being built by MDL under
Project 15A (INS Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai); four similar destroyers under
Project 15B; and six Scorpene submarines. Meanwhile GRSE is building four
anti-submarine warfare corvettes; and eight upgraded landing craft for
deployment in the Andaman Islands. Meanwhile, GSL is building four offshore
patrol vessels (OPVs); while private shipyards are constructing five more OPVs;
two cadet training ships; and six new catamaran-hulled survey vessels.

Besides these, the MoD
has sanctioned another 49 vessels for the navy[18].
These include: seven guided missile frigates under Project 17A, to be built
simultaneously by MDL and GRSE; six AIP-equipped submarines under Project
75(I); four fast attack craft (FAC) at GRSE; eight mine hunter vessels (two
will be built in South Korea by Kangnam Corp, with six more built by GSL after
technology transfer). A private shipyard will build another cadet training
ship, and shipbuilders are being identified for four Landing Platform Docks
(LPDs) and 16 shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships. The navy is
evaluating options for a Deep Submergence and Rescue vessel (DSRV). Contracting
will begin “in the coming months” for one survey training vessel and two diving
support vessels.

If lack of numbers in
the surface fleet is worrisome, the shortfall in the submarine fleet amounts to
a critical operational weakness. Down to just 14 operational submarines (ten
Russian Kilo-class submarines, known by their Indian nomenclature, the
Sindhughosh-class; and four German HDW Type 209 submarines, called the
Shishumar-class), about eight are operational at any given time. The navy’s ability to shut down crucial waterways, therefore, hinges
mainly on the INS Chakra, the 12,700 tonne Akula II
class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) that joined India’s eastern fleet in
April, on a 10-year lease from Russia. New Delhi and Moscow are negotiating a
lease for a second SSN for India.

The INS Chakra at its commissioning in Apr 2012

Meanwhile, the six
Scorpene submarines that MDL is constructing will be delivered incrementally
between 2015 and 2018. Only the last two Scorpenes will be built with MESMA Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems ab initio; the first four will be retrofitted with AIP later.

A long-running technology
debate continues to delay six more submarines that the navy’s “30-Year
Submarine Construction Plan” of 1999 envisages building under Project 75(I).
While all sides agree on the need for AIP, an argument ensued over which
procurement model the navy should follow. One camp argued for ambitious
specifications, with vendors tasked to deliver those. The contending view was
to choose between proven designs that were on offer. The first view was
discredited by Australia’s experience with the Collins-class submarines; but
argument continues over the kind of AIP --- Sterling engine or fuel cells ---
the navy should opt for.

The Indian Navy is
acutely aware of its inferiority in numbers to the People’s Liberation Army
(Navy), or PLA(N), which operates some 50 conventional submarines and nine
SSNs. Even the submarine wing of the otherwise moribund Pakistan Navy already
has three AIP-equipped Agusta 90B submarines and is set to buy another six
conventional submarines from China.

The picture is rosier
in New Delhi’s quest for maritime domain awareness (MDA). For decades, the navy
has relied on an outdated Soviet-era fleet of five IL-38 and eight Tu-142
aircraft. In early 2013, the first of eight Boeing P8I multi-mission maritime
aircraft (MMA) will enter service, with the order likely to be increased by
another four aircraft. The navy also plans to induct eight Medium Range
Maritime Reconnaissance (MRMR) aircraft, and strengthen its MDA capability with
additional Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)[19].
Naval strategists argue, however, that India’s 7,500-kilometre coastline; its
2.2 million square kilometre EEZ; and the need to monitor the ISLs, demands a
land-based surveillance network, like the Jindalee Operational Radar Network
(JORN) in Australia. That notion, however, is yet to translate into a
procurement or development order.

The first flight of the Boeing P8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft at the Boeing facility in Seattle, USA

Security outlook

Occupied for now with
consolidating its naval fleet, bases and doctrines, New Delhi is inclined to
remain aloof from the unfolding confrontation in the Asia-Pacific. India has noted
the lack of clarity in the evolving strategic matrix. While Beijing’s new
belligerence over its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea
and the Sea of Japan has created an “alliance of the alarmed”, New Delhi sees
that as a fragile coalition with serious internal fault lines. Nor is there
great belief in American steadfastness; India’s faith in US resolve was badly
shaken by President Barack Obama’s controversial “G-2 condominium” proposal to
Beijing in 2009, which India bitterly regarded as the ceding of Asian
overlordship to China.

In the circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that New Delhi is hedging its bets. The Indian Navy,
while regularly patrolling waters claimed by China, and strengthening
partnerships with littoral states --- especially Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,
Singapore and Indonesia --- is also keeping the door conspicuously open for
China. This is not lost on Beijing. After the Sept 2012 visit to India by Liang
Guanglie, China’s defence minister, a Xinhua commentary (which China’s Ministry
of National Defense posted on its website) revealed that New Delhi and Beijing
had discussed the US rebalancing to Asia. In a conspicuous departure from the
cut-and-dried tone normally used in matters relating to India, the commentary
noted: “As the world geo-political situation goes through a massive change, the
coming together of the two largest countries that also have the strength of
their economies could tilt balances.”[20]

Could China, worried by
the growing confrontation with the US on its eastern flank, be looking at
clearing its western flank through a border agreement with India? If there is a
game-changer in the offing, it could be such a Chinese decision. In the absence
of a border settlement, New Delhi will continue to hedge, strengthening its
naval power in the Indian Ocean while avoiding provocation in the waters beyond
the Malacca Strait.

In the medium term
(2012-2022), the Indian Navy will accumulate the resources --- three aircraft
carrier battle groups; coastal air bases and forward air bases in the island
chains of Lakshadweep and Andaman & Nicobar; and a mix of conventional and
nuclear-powered attack submarines --- that would be needed for imposing sea
control over selected waters, while pursuing a sea denial strategy at multiple
choke points on the International Shipping Lanes in the Indian Ocean. Networked
through a constellation of satellites that will be launched over the coming
decade, the Indian Navy would emerge as the predominant naval power in the
northern Indian Ocean.

The southern Indian
Ocean is another matter. New Delhi has evaluated, but appears currently
disinclined towards building and operating overseas naval bases, especially in
the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and the East African seaboard. Indian naval
planners worry that the PLA(N) has already decided to have a significant
presence in the Indian Ocean. Vice Admiral Anup Singh, who until recently
headed the Eastern Naval Command, notes that the PLA(N) sends a task force of
three warships --- a destroyer, a frigate and a logistics vessel --- to the
Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrols, while the Indian Navy makes do with just
one.

But a sustained PLA(N)
presence in the Indian Ocean would require base support, as well as aircraft
carriers on station. China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (formerly the Varyag, built in Ukraine), is not being immediately
followed up with a second vessel.[21]
Nor has China moved towards setting up naval bases, which could perhaps be
negotiated with Pakistan (Gwadar), and Sri Lanka (Hambantota). New Delhi
believes that China’s supply to Pakistan of F-22 frigates, submarines and
conceivably more equipment to come, is directed at creating local capabilities
without the provocation of establishing a base.

For now, the Indian
Navy’s growing muscularity has not evoked objections, not even from Beijing.
Meanwhile, most littoral states have welcomed India’s growing control over the
northern Indian Ocean, especially given the insecurity that piracy has bred.
New Delhi, therefore, arguing that it is acting in the regional interest, is
likely to remain an independent actor, eschewing overt alliances and
maintaining a cooperative rather than a confrontational relationship with both
China and the US.

[1]The Indian Navy Public
Relations Office (PRO) released the schedule of 13th June 2012 in an official
press release that day.

[2] Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) press
release on 8th May 2012, on the inauguration of the annual Naval
Commanders’ Conference.

[3]The new US strategy,
enunciated in the document, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense,” was announced on 5th January 2012.

[4]Admiral Nirmal Verma,
at a press conference in New Delhi on 7th Aug 2012.

[5]Admiral Nirmal Verma,
addressing the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on 25th
June 2012, in London, on the topic: “Metamorphosis of Matters Maritime: An
Indian Perspective.”

[6]While the potential
blockading of Chinese trade and energy supplies has never been explicitly
enunciated in any Indian public document, this is the unmistakeable sense that
is conveyed by multiple policymakers in variousinterviews with the author.

[7]The idea of the
Indo-Pacific, “a seamless stretch of ocean space linking the India and
Pacific”, was highlighted by Shyam Saran in “Mapping the Indo-Pacific”, Indian Express, 29th Oct 2011. Saran pointed out that
Hillary Clinton first spoke about the “Indo-Pacific” in a speech in Honolulu in
Oct 2010. In an article in Foreign Policy magazine in 2011, Clinton again wrote
about the need to “translate the growing connection between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans into an operational concept.”

[8]This was stated in an
off-the-record briefing to the author on 29th Aug 2012. This
corroborates similar views expressed earlier by multiple MoD officials.

[9]This was pointed out
by a senior MEA diplomat in an off-the-record interview on 6th Sept
2012.

[10]Defence Minister AK
Antony, rooted in the leftist politics of his home state, Kerala, tends to
ideologically distrust the US.

[11] Washington and New Delhi resumed their political-military dialogue
in April 2012, after a gap of six years, when Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs, Andrew Shapiro, visited New Delhi for a round of
talks.

[12] The jurisdiction of the Tampa-headquartered US Central Command
(CENTCOM) ends with Pakistan at the Pakistan-India border.

[13]Until 1981, the navy’s
share was consistently under 9 per cent; last year, it was 15 per cent.

[14] This can be gleaned from three recent documents: the Maritime
Capabilities Perspective Plan for 2012-27; the 12th Defence Plan;
and 12th Infrastructure Plan.

[18]Learning from the
1980s, the Indian Navy is transparent about its warship building programmes.
These figures, and those in the preceding paragraph, were announced by navy
chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, at a New Delhi press conference on 7th
Aug 2012.

“Rivalry with China is not pre-ordained, nor will we be drawn into someone else’s battles,” Whoever said this must be immediately fired from his post. Does this moron think that China, once the South-China sea dispute is settled, will not exert influence and control over Indian Ocean with bases in Sri-lanka, Burma, Bangladesh, Maldives? Why do Indians don't study history carefully and draw lessons. India has to proactively take sides, and not sit on the fence. Sitting on the fence can cause fatality by a stray bullet. I strongly advice Indian planners to not be hesitant and indecisive. We need to prepare with SUPREME CONFIDENCE that war will happen SOONER with CHINA than anticipated. CHINA will not wait for INDIA to grow strong, they will preempt just as they did in 1962! Why our strategic planners fail to realise this? Fire all those who hesitate, they are useless.

Col Shukla,A precise and incisive article about the Indian Navy, similar to other well researched articles about the mechanized forces, the promotion tussle in the IA and about the LCA step-motherly attitude of HAL.

I would like to read about your take on the fence sitter policy of our GOI, MOD where there is so much aversion to have a bilateral defense tie with the US.

Personally I feel it is about time that India joins other nation(s) who are being bullied by China which is a very resurgent military power. Whether China/USA rivalry will culminate into a major conflagration is moot but all indications are that China wants to be the sole super power in Asia. Towards this goal it is doing everything in its power to stifle the economic and military clout of India.

Under these circumstances wouldn't it be prudent to have a protective umbrella of a super power (USA) which would deter other belligerent nations such as China and Pakistan in their effort to curb India's progress?

Although this page contains some reliable info, India should first aim at militarily surpassing the imperial China at every level, before unduly comparing itself with US-military (arguably, the finest in the world in every respect).

Keeping aside all the grandiloquent humbugs and fibs of our corrupt leaders, tossed around with complacent gusto, I'm embarrassed to note that my beloved country with a bulky population of around 1.2 billion, can build neither a decent aircraft carrier nor even a nearly 4th generation fighter aircraft, when other countries such as US, China, UK, FRANCE, etc. have either already built or are trying to build fifth generation aircraft.

Furthermore, I'm wholly flabbergasted and stupefied to fathom the fact that even 6 decades after shamefully receiving our freedom like an unearned charity, pitifully given by our British masters succeeding decades of relentless snivelling, passivity and sanctimonious sycophancy (i.e. Gandhi-giri) we are still, for the most part, horrendously lagging behind all other nations that matter!

Wait a sec, why am I shocked now? Was this not inevitable as one of the prime ramifications of the age-old spinelessness of a meek, mendicant Nation based on masochistic and utterly suicidal farce of Gandhism predicated upon twisted idea of Non-violence?

1. India, if unencumbered with conflicts and wars, will topple China from its "largest trading Asian nation" position. All east-Asian countries prefer India to China because of India’s more transparent democracy and free-market. Once India reaches decent infrastructure levels (which India is in the process of building) and ceases its obsession with closed market economy (hopefully India will), these semi-assembled goods (laptop-parts, hardwares for automobiles) from East-Asia will be assembled in India and reach the west via India and not Communist China (a prospect that is more than likely with India's soaring rapport with East-Asian nations).

2. China’s governance and political system are so flawed that it incapacitates a nation from dealing effectively with economic catastrophes but the ultimate irony is that the flawed system is what makes the economic meltdown unavoidable. Unlike India, China cannot afford an economic slump because of their political structure; they already have too much going on. But that economic crisis is just around the corner. So for them the solution is to engage in a longlasting bloody-war that would buy the Chinese leaders just the right amount of time, resources and sympathy from the population.

3. China is building massive infrastructure (airports, roads, and railway networks including in areas bordering India, like Tibet) at a scorching pace where there is no existing need for these.

4. India is almost as deficient in infrastructure and military hardware today as it was 50 years ago, in comparison with China.

5. A number of security analysts and strategic affairs experts have already stated that a 1962-like war is waiting at the edge and we should be vigilant against the complacency of our damn idiotic leaders. A number of reports are in circulation, seeking to show how China is endeavouring to provoke a conflict and preparing to blindside Indian forces and snatch another piece of territory, for example, Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.

Mark my words,

CHINA WILL ATTACK SOME NATION(S) PROBABLY INDIA OR JAPAN OR BOTH. CHINA MUST cripple its competitors that's the only way to secure China's own position in Asia. CHINA WILL BE DISINTEGRATED (like USSR) IF IT DOESN'T ATTACK AND PRESSURIZE INDIA, JAPAN, Vietnam in the near future, before India takes its place as the most influencial Asian Power.

Dream on... its the first step... in bulding anything substantial... lest not just keep dreaming... do something substantial... before that let us make... the bulding blocks of this dream... like GCF... Avadi Chennai... Docks... HAL... bribe proof... not to hold us back... in realizing the dream... which they had become... uncompetitive... inefficient... unproductive... by the influnzing few at the top... and union leaders...

Nehru was right, army goofed up during 1962! It is not civilian govt role to be prepared on military front, the army has to maintain its readiness at all times for any likelihood. Even after all the verbal assurances by our Armed forces to civilians, I still wonder if Indians are really fully prepared for any military conflict at short notice with China. War's notification is not announced in advance, unlike ancient times. India has to be ready to take advantage of any opportune moment to strike China and take the fight into their territory. This is a big task, but the armed forces have the time NOW to prepare and reherse the show, not go begging for ammunition and guns at the last minute from govt.

As President Roosevelt said, 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick.' In India's case, neither does the neighborhood listen, nor do we speak- loud or soft, nor do we carry an indigenous stick. India's diplomacy has been lead-footed to the point that it is unable to shrug off regional blackmail within SAARC. Even nations which would collectively be underwater if all if India flushed its toilets together, are able to cock a snook at us, and over-ride solemn agreements.It's time for a calibrated 'carrot and stick' approach, and if fellow SAARC nations think their tourism Rupees will come from Chinese honey-mooners, then they should be encouraged to do so and watch the result.

“ . . . India should first aim at militarily surpassing the imperial China at every level, before unduly comparing itself with US-military.”

Anonymous, there is nothing wrong with using the best in the world as a benchmark for success.

Anonymous said:

“Keeping aside all the grandiloquent humbugs and fibs of our corrupt leaders, tossed around with complacent gusto, I'm embarrassed to note that my beloved country with a bulky population of around 1.2 billion, can build neither a decent aircraft carrier nor even a nearly 4th generation fighter aircraft, when other countries such as US, China, UK, FRANCE, etc. have either already built or are trying to build fifth generation aircraft.”

Anonymous, you’re clueless. One thing you need to realize is that though the huge population is a potential asset, it is also a drag on the economy and development when a country does not have the wealth and infrastructure to support such a big population. However, despite the obstacle of being a poor country with such a big population, India has already built a fourth generation plus fighter aircraft, is building two aircraft carriers, and is building a fifth generation fighter. India has also operated and maintained an aircraft carrier for several years.

“Furthermore, I'm wholly flabbergasted and stupefied to fathom the fact that even 6 decades after shamefully receiving our freedom like an unearned charity, pitifully given by our British masters succeeding decades of relentless snivelling, passivity and sanctimonious sycophancy (i.e. Gandhi-giri) we are still, for the most part, horrendously lagging behind all other nations that matter!”

Anonymous, India did not “receive” its independence. It was not “given” by the British. India won its independence by uniting against British rule. The British had worked very hard at dividing India, and at convincing the Indian people and its allies that British rule was better for India than self rule. The British felt that they were morally superior. Ghandi knew that the British would not be able to remain in control of India without Indian support. Ghandi’s movement was about uniting Indians by demonstrating the immorality of British rule. Ghandi knew that the British would not stand a chance of retaining control of the subcontinent through force if enough Indians united against British rule, and he was right. The British did not “give” India its independence. India won its independence by uniting against British rule. The British losing India was the beginning of the end of British hegemony, and they knew it. However, the British have been successful, to a certain extent, in skewing Indian history. Anonymous, your comment is a great example of the British’s ability to manipulate Indian opinion about them. Regarding your comment about India being a good bit behind other nations, India has come a very long way since independence. Though India is still a good bit behind other nations after much improvement, this is merely a reflection of how dismal matters were when the British were thrown out.

“Wait a sec, why am I shocked now? Was this not inevitable as one of the prime ramifications of the age-old spinelessness of a meek, mendicant Nation based on masochistic and utterly suicidal farce of Gandhism predicated upon twisted idea of Non-violence?”

Anonymous, India is not spineless or meek. I don’t know where you’re getting your information. India has not lost a single war since Independence. Previous to then, Indians were the only people to have fought and defeated the world’s two greatest conquerors, Alexander the Great and the Mongolian Empire. Indians also fought and defeated several major Muslim invasions in 700 AD, after the Muslims had conquered the middle east and Persia and were conquering the caucuses, northern Africa, Spain and Portugal. So, if you knew history, you would not refer to “age-old spinelessness” of Indians, but would instead know that Indians excelled in martial affairs and have always prevailed when united. You would also know that Ghandi’s so called “twisted” idea of non-violence was brilliant, as it served to traverse the deep chasms dividing Indian society, which the British used to control India.

Shame on them, indeed. Things in India need to improve. But you don’t make things any better by misrepresenting Indian accomplishments and history. You can accept Indian greatness and how far India has come since independence, while also acknowledging India’s current shortcomings.