What The U.s. Should Do

August 30, 1991|By Christopher Layne.

The old Soviet empire is disintegrating as Byelorussia and the economically vital Ukraine join the Baltics in breaking free from Moscow`s control. But while the collapse of the old order`s coercive mechanisms is cause for rejoicing, the Soviet Union`s splintering is fraught with danger for the international system.

The possibility of Soviet collapse raises the specter of civil war fueled by ethnic tensions and boundary disputes among the Soviet Union`s republics. Concern about the disposition and control of Soviet nuclear weapons is compounded by concern that independence-seeking republics may eventually feel compelled to build their own military forces and acquire their own nuclear weapons.

Moreover, there is no guarantee that turmoil could be confined to the Soviet Union. Widespread violence within the Soviet Union almost certainly would cause a stampede of refugees into East Central Europe and Germany.

How should the U.S. respond to this volatile situation? By offering a new ``grand bargain`` that, unlike the Harvard plan linking aid to democratic and free market reform, ties direct U.S. economic help to concrete Soviet steps to address America`s geopolitical concerns about the consequences of a Soviet breakup.

What the U.S. should insist on is that the center and the republics enter into a clear, binding arrangement, either in a revised Union Treaty or some new set of agreements. The new arrangement must delineate the following:

The powers of the center and the republics in foreign affairs and defense; command and control authority for Soviet nuclear weapons; the combined troop strength of the center, republics remaining with the union and independent republics (total forces must not exceed the ceiling imposed on the Soviet Union by the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement); and, finally, reasonable procedures for the orderly and relatively swift independence of republics that wish to leave the Soviet Union.

American diplomatic recognition of independent republics should be linked to their compliance with these procedures, ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and acknowledgment of their existing borders.

In conjunction with its allies, Washington should be prepared to give direct economic assistance to the Soviet Union once the center and republics implement appropriate institutional arrangements.

To slow down the pace of Soviet disintegration and encourage the republics to refrain from secession, the West should give more help to entities that subscribe to the new center-republic institutional arrangements than to those that opt out of the union.

Fearing that it would simply be a waste of money, Washington so far has declined to extend direct economic assistance to the Soviet Union. That policy must change, for two reasons.

First, if the U.S. falls out of step with Germany and Europe on this issue, Washington`s diplomatic influence will erode and, with it, America`s ability to influence the evolution of Europe`s post-Cold War political and security structures.

Second, although there may be good economic arguments for holding back on assistance until market reforms are in place, there are even stronger geopolitical reasons for going ahead with aid once the Soviets have given us the assurances we seek.

Western aid can help repatriate ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union who wish to return to their homeland republics, thereby ameliorating some consequences of the nationalities problem. And Western assistance can help construct the infrastructure-telecommunications, transportation networks, efficient distribution systems-that are needed before a market economy can succeed.

Finally, Western aid can help cushion the Soviet people from the hardships that will accompany market reforms. A cold, hungry, discontented and displaced population would be a breeding ground for a popularly supported anti-Western authoritarian government, not for democracy.

Even if it failed to save the Soviet economy or lead to a free market economy, a direct aid program would be successful if it did nothing more than help the Soviet Union decline gradually rather than collapse suddenly.

A new policy like that outlined here could help stabilize the Soviet Union or at least slow destabilization. But there are no guarantees, and chaos is a possibility. Still, Washington can take steps to hedge against the consequences of Soviet instability.

The U.S. should quickly press for a follow-on to the recently concluded START agreement. The aim should be to eliminate Soviet and U.S. first-strike strategic nuclear forces, which would decrease the odds that internal upheaval in the Soviet Union could trigger an inadvertent nuclear war.