The Karzai-Obama declaration in January, the Cameron-Karzai-Zardari Chequers summit in February and the Kerry-Karzai-Kayani meeting in Brussels in April have all focused on getting the Taliban back to the negotiating table – from which they walked away in March last year. In the end, the formula was quite simple. The Taliban declared they they would not want anyone else to use the soil of Afghanistan to hurt another country. For the moment, the US team seems happy to read this as code for "we shall not let international terrorists back in."

The important item in this list is the one where they say they will talk to "Afghans". Since January of this year, President Karzai has demanded that the Taliban office should only go ahead if the Taliban agree to move quickly to negotiating with his representatives. The Taliban have now provided themselves with a political cover to meet with the Kabul government team – under the anodyne heading of "Afghans". In principle, the Taliban can start by meeting a US delegation, agree some confidence building measures, firm up the commitment to cut ties with al-Qaida, and then get round to talking with the Afghan government and address a political settlement and end hostilities.

Of course, no one should expect things to go so smoothly.

The Taliban have explicitly made their announcement in the name of the Islamic Emirate, which is how they referred to their pre-2001 government. To all Afghans, that sounds like a bid for restoration of Taliban rule.

It remains to be seen whether the Taliban just use their office to project the image of a government in waiting or whether in the dialogue they pursue a compromise with non-Taliban Afghans. Despite the widespread desire for peace, many residents of Kabul are for the moment highly sceptical of Taliban intentions.

But the Taliban will face dilemmas of their own. Hardliners in the movement still think that they should fight on and try to grab power once Nato leaves in 2014. Fighters, who have not been consulted at all in this process, wonder why they should make sacrifices while the leadership seems to be cutting a deal with the enemy.

Moreover, the Taliban's claims to be fighting to end foreign occupation become less credible (to Afghans) as Nato continues its handover of security and prepares to leave. For the moment, the Taliban leadership expects to be able to talk and fight. But they will find it increasingly difficult to justify and thus sustain the fighting part of that strategy.

There should be little surprise at the way in which President Karzai promptly disassociated himself from the process, despite seeming to have endorsed the opening of the office. It is easy to see why he would object to the vagueness of the Taliban commitment to talk to the government, the inflammatory use of the Emirate label and the Taliban's insistence on fighting on while talking. He also does not trust a process outside his control.