This book is a new look at one of the most influential presidential addresses ever delivered, and explores how each of Roosevelt’s freedoms evolved over time, for Americans and for the wider world. ...
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This book is a new look at one of the most influential presidential addresses ever delivered, and explores how each of Roosevelt’s freedoms evolved over time, for Americans and for the wider world. It examines the ways in which the word “freedom” has been used by Americans and others, across decades and the political spectrum, and notes that the acceptance of the freedoms has been far from universal—even within the United States. Freedom from want, especially, has provoked clashes between those in favor of an expanded welfare state and proponents of limited government from the 1940s to the present day. Freedom of religion and freedom of speech each sound universally popular at first glance, until put to the test in an increasingly multicultural society. True freedom from fear proved unattainable, though American policymakers learned during the Cold War in particular that manipulating their public’s sense of fear helped make difficult polices easier for the electorate to accept. In short, not only did “freedom” evolve as a concept over time, but its pursuit also transformed American society. This book brings to light a new portrait of who Americans were in 1941 and who they have become today in their own eyes—and in the eyes of the entire world.Less

The Four Freedoms : Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Evolution of an American Idea

Published in print: 2015-12-01

This book is a new look at one of the most influential presidential addresses ever delivered, and explores how each of Roosevelt’s freedoms evolved over time, for Americans and for the wider world. It examines the ways in which the word “freedom” has been used by Americans and others, across decades and the political spectrum, and notes that the acceptance of the freedoms has been far from universal—even within the United States. Freedom from want, especially, has provoked clashes between those in favor of an expanded welfare state and proponents of limited government from the 1940s to the present day. Freedom of religion and freedom of speech each sound universally popular at first glance, until put to the test in an increasingly multicultural society. True freedom from fear proved unattainable, though American policymakers learned during the Cold War in particular that manipulating their public’s sense of fear helped make difficult polices easier for the electorate to accept. In short, not only did “freedom” evolve as a concept over time, but its pursuit also transformed American society. This book brings to light a new portrait of who Americans were in 1941 and who they have become today in their own eyes—and in the eyes of the entire world.

FDR knew about fear firsthand. Polio left him paralyzed, with a near paralyzing fear of the consequences of his disability. He knew fear could be a useful political and rhetorical tool as well. ...
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FDR knew about fear firsthand. Polio left him paralyzed, with a near paralyzing fear of the consequences of his disability. He knew fear could be a useful political and rhetorical tool as well. Roosevelt’s ordeal sharpened his appreciation of the political utility of fear. While shapeless fear was paralyzing, he knew that focused fear, the kind he experienced after contracting polio, could mobilize action. He put this knowledge to good use. Roosevelt as president underscored dangers, indeed exaggerating them, in order to drive Americans to combat the Depression and the dictators. Cold War presidents would similarly manipulate fear in order to get Americans to accept their national security agendas. Freedom from fear, then, was more than merely one of Roosevelt’s four aims outlined in 1941; it underlay his entire call to arms in response to the growing Nazi threat, a tactic employed, repeatedly, by American presidents ever since.Less

Freedom from Fear

Frank Costigliola

Published in print: 2015-12-01

FDR knew about fear firsthand. Polio left him paralyzed, with a near paralyzing fear of the consequences of his disability. He knew fear could be a useful political and rhetorical tool as well. Roosevelt’s ordeal sharpened his appreciation of the political utility of fear. While shapeless fear was paralyzing, he knew that focused fear, the kind he experienced after contracting polio, could mobilize action. He put this knowledge to good use. Roosevelt as president underscored dangers, indeed exaggerating them, in order to drive Americans to combat the Depression and the dictators. Cold War presidents would similarly manipulate fear in order to get Americans to accept their national security agendas. Freedom from fear, then, was more than merely one of Roosevelt’s four aims outlined in 1941; it underlay his entire call to arms in response to the growing Nazi threat, a tactic employed, repeatedly, by American presidents ever since.

The final chapter recapitulates and summarizes the core argument that structural insecurities, Bolshevik ideology, and a flawed information gathering system combined to make foreign and domestic ...
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The final chapter recapitulates and summarizes the core argument that structural insecurities, Bolshevik ideology, and a flawed information gathering system combined to make foreign and domestic threats to the revolution look much graver than they actually were. The epilogue then explores the legacy of Stalin’s fears. Neither Stalin nor his successors ever worked out the flaws in the information-gathering systems. Indeed, the Cold War and the growing dissident movement sustained their conspiratorial worldview and it seems likely that the contemporary Russian leadership, led by a career-political policeman is for that similarly inclined to exaggerate the threat posed by the ‘west’ and its ‘agents’.Less

Conclusion

James Harris

Published in print: 2016-02-01

The final chapter recapitulates and summarizes the core argument that structural insecurities, Bolshevik ideology, and a flawed information gathering system combined to make foreign and domestic threats to the revolution look much graver than they actually were. The epilogue then explores the legacy of Stalin’s fears. Neither Stalin nor his successors ever worked out the flaws in the information-gathering systems. Indeed, the Cold War and the growing dissident movement sustained their conspiratorial worldview and it seems likely that the contemporary Russian leadership, led by a career-political policeman is for that similarly inclined to exaggerate the threat posed by the ‘west’ and its ‘agents’.