Religion and Legitimacy:Amazigh Challenges to the Central Government in Morocco in the 16th- 19th Centuries

One of the most striking features of the Moroccan political system has, and continues to be, the interaction between religion and politics.From the King whose legitimacy rests in his role as Commander of the Faithful to the local marabout who serves as an arbiter in tribal politics, political legitimacy and action in Morocco is deeply entwined with religious belief and practice.This paper will focus on the appropriation of religious institutions as a tool for challenging the central government by Morocco’s Amazigh populations.It shall endeavor to explain the social and political context which made this action possible and then outline specific key instances where Amazigh populations used religious institutions as a vehicle for achieving political objectives.

For Morocco’s rural, Berber speaking populations, religion has consistently played a key role in ordering social, political, and economic life.In these Amazigh societies saints, also called murabitin or igurramen, helped to maintain a level of political stability in what is conventionally understood to be an inherently anarchic tribal system of social ordering.These men (and occasional women), are defined by Ernest Gellner in his seminal work, Saints of the Atlas, as:

“one who is descended from the Prophet…and is thus a sharif, is visibly a recipient of divine blessing, baraka, mediates between men and God and arbitrates between men and men, dispenses blessing, possesses magical powers, is a good and pious man, observes Koranic precepts…is uncalculatingly generous and hospitable and rich, does not fight or engage in feuds…[2]”

While certain parts of this description are not terribly helpful to this analysis, it is important to note that these saints do derive their legitimacy from religious grounds.As Gellner states, the saint possesses a sort of divine blessing, or baraka.Baraka, however, is not a static personal characteristic or attribute.The saint has the ability to transmit this baraka to others.This phenomenon places saints in a position where they are uniquely suited to serve as an intermediary between God and the people of their community, passing divine blessing along to their clients.The possession and ability to transmit baraka, personal characteristics, such as generosity and hospitality, and the neutrality lent to their position by the inability of saints to engage in feuding, are all factors that helped saints rise to occupy positions of political importance within their communities.It is also necessary to briefly touch on the issue of descent from the Prophet Mohammed, or being a sharif.This lineage could act as a powerful source of legitimacy for saints, but being a sharif was not strictly necessary to qualify a person as a saint.This issue will be explored in greater depth later in this analysis.

Once a person achieved the status of saint, they could fulfill a number of roles within their society, some of them decidedly political.One action consistently associated with saints is that of arbitration.Because of their inherent neutrality, saints were seen as a occupying a position whereby they could serve as intermediaries and help the disputing parties come to a mutually beneficial resolution.On a more specific level, Gellner describes the activities of the saints in the village of Zaouia Ahansal.In this community the local marabouts also supervised the elections of chiefs from amongst the lay tribes, provided a type of political continuity as tribal offices did not have permanent occupants, and played an important role in the main legal decision procedure of trial by oath.

These saints could also serve as leaders if more than one tribe needed to band together against outside aggression, a trait that will play a large role in this analysis. Morocco’s political system throughout much of the 15th and 16th centuries lent itself extraordinarily well to the proliferation of these local saint leaders.The central authority of the Sultanate was not nearly as well ordered or strong as it had been during the previous centuries, under the rule of the Almoravid and Almohad Dynasties.The Marinid Dynasty was in definite decline and under serious threat from Spanish and Portuguese invaders looking to Morocco to expand their commercial interests.When the Marinid Dynasty finally collapsed, the Wattasids that succeeded them were unable to keep the same level of centralized control over the country.The Wattasids ruled with a more tribally oriented strategy.The Wattasid Sultan was not an absolute ruler by any stretch of the imagination.He was much more like a patron and protector of the tribes that supported him, gaining their allegiance through marriage and the granting of land use rights.

In practicing politics this way, the Wattasid Dynasty established the foundation for the political system that would define Morocco until the advent of the protectorate period.This system is that of the bled-makhzen and the bled-siba.In this system the Sultanate was not the absolute center of power and legitimacy in the country.Instead it was one of many competing centers of power in the Moroccan political field.Tribes who swore allegiance to the Sultan, paid taxes, and/or provided troops for the Sultan’s armed forces were considered to be part of the makhzen.Tribes that refused to pay taxes and recognize the administrative authority of the Sultan made up the siba.These tribes could still recognize the religious authority held by the Sultan as the Commander of the Faithful, but remained outside the central government as they would not submit to the Sultan’s fiscal authority.

Every new Sultan would have to renegotiate alliances with tribal leaders once he came into power, regardless of the relationships these same tribes held with his predecessor.Then, once these relationships were reconstructed, there was no real guarantee that the tribes would stay within the makhzen fold for the Sultan’s full reign.A good example is the case of Massa, a city in the Sous region of Morocco.In the year 1835 Massa rebelled against the Sultan after an attempt to dramatically raise the annual taxes paid.The people of Massa won a decisive victory against the forces that the Sultan Moulay Abd al-Rahman sent to collect the taxes owed, with the end result being that for the short term, at least, Massa no longer had to pay taxes.

This situation of outside threats from Christian European powers and lack of strong central authority created an environment where local saints and religious brotherhoods were able to flourish.For this reason, the period in Moroccan history from the 15th century to the 17th century has been termed by some as the “Maraboutic Crisis”.As mentioned earlier, local saints had the ability to draw together people from various tribes in times of trouble.Throughout this era, the Sultanate was unable to face the threat of Portuguese and Spanish invasion on their own, and the local murabitin were the ones to organize the resistance movements needed to push the Europeans back.Men who distinguished themselves in the jihad against the Christian forces also sometimes gained the standing needed to become a marabout after successful campaigns.

In addition to local saints, trans-tribal religious brotherhoods, or zawiya-s also began to expand their political role during this period.While not exclusive to Berber speaking areas, these brotherhoods certainly did include a number of Amazigh peoples in their membership.Sufism gained prominence in the Moroccan religious scene from the 13th century onwards, and increasing numbers of Sufi shaykh-s began creating their own religious practice and establishing zawiya-s through the collection of members.Some of these brotherhoods, such as the Nasiriyya based out of southern Morocco, were primarily concerned with economic interests.These types of brotherhoods generally maintained, if not friendly, neutral relationships with the central governing power and did not try to mobilize their substantial membership for the purposes of directly challenging the rule of the Sultanate.They limited their political activities to arbitration in economic issues such as water disputes.Other zawiya-s did take on more political roles and in some cases acted as arbiters between the makhzen and other local political or economic groups.These zawiya-s tended to be conceived as more of a threat to the makhzen powers, as they had the potential to become dissident and challenge the central government.

Zawiya-s or murabitin were seen especially threatening to the Sultanate because of the fact that they drew their source of legitimacy from a primarily religious base.When the Sa’adi Dynasty rose to power in the 16th century, one of their greatest claims for legitimacy in ruling was their status as sharif-s or descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.Although conventional history shows that the Sa’adians were actually members of a Berber tribe, their claim to the Sultanate on the basis of religious lineage was strong enough to assist them in winning the throne.This success, in turn, ushered in a new trend of Arab lineage as a justification for ruling power.This tradition has continued though Morocco’s current rulers, the ‘Alawi Dynasty who derive much of their legitimacy from their status as sharif-s.In fact, the King in today’s monarchy is still considered to command a substantial amount of Baraka, resulting from his sharif-ian heritage, which helps legitimate his claim to the position of Commander of the Faithful.

This emphasis on religion as a source of legitimacy provided something of a conundrum for the makhzen powers in their dealings with saints and zawiya-s.No small number of saints or shaykh-s claimed sharif-ian descent of their own.All of these actors, regardless of their status as Amazigh or sharif claimed the same legitimacy on the basis of possession of divine grace, or Baraka.Thus, it was difficult for the Sultan to attack the ideological basis for marabout-ism, even though saints and zawiya-s could potentially command the influence, political legitimacy, and sheer numbers necessary to present a serious challenge to the ruling power.As such, tensions remained high between the makhzen and popular religious institutions, particularly those considered powerful enough to serve as a viable threat.

So, to briefly summarize, by the ascension of the Sa’adian Dynasty to the Sultanate in the 16th century, the political system in Morocco was one based on the interaction between the bled-makhzen and the bled-siba, in which the central governing body drew its legitimacy from the fundamentally Arab concept of descent from the Prophet Mohammed.The weak control of the central state apparatus as personified by the makhzen, as well as the influx of Christian European invaders created a situation that lent itself well to the proliferation of trans-tribal religious brotherhoods and local saints who already held political power according to the social traditions of Morocco’s Amazigh population.It is in this political environment, which defined the rule of the Sa’adian Dynasty and the sharif-ian ‘Alawite Dynasty that succeeded them that Morocco’s Amazigh populations began turning to these traditional religious institutions as tools to challenge the makhzen authority.The remainder of the paper will focus on two specific instances where this phenomenon occurred, namely the rise and fall of the Dila Zawiya in the 17th century and the so called “Berber Revolts” of the 19th century.

The Dila Zawiya was founded in the 16th century by a shaykh named Abu Bakr ibn Mohammed.The Dila Zawiya quickly rose to prominence, in part, because of their vast pool of human resources.The Dila initially enjoyed the support of the Sanhaja Berbers of the Middle Atlas and gained more followers as it spread beyond the Middle Atlas region.As the zawiya grew it began to expand its economic interests far beyond the homelands of the Sanhaja.At the pinnacle of their economic power, the Dila controlled important commercial such as Salé, Fez, and Tetuan, as well as the rich agricultural grounds of the Sais plain and the Gharb.It was under the leadership of Mohammed al-Hajj in the period of 1640- 1660 that the Dila Zawiya achieved the height of their political and economic power.

The decaying Sa’adian Dynasty was not best pleased with the amount of political power that Mohammed al-Hajj was beginning to amass, and felt particularly threatened by his efforts to raise a regular army. When confronted by the central government, al-Hajj, realizing the political weakness of the Sa’adian Dynasty professed his respect for the Sultan’s status as a sharif but refused to recognize their right to rule on the basis of their failure to establish a stable government. He used the position of the zawiya as the strongest political actor in the region to unify the Sanhaja Berbers and in 1638 the Dila forces defeated the army of the Sa’adian Sultan in the battle of Abu Aqaba. Instead of pursuing a total victory over the Sa’adian forces, al-Hajj backed down out of respect for the Sultan’s religious authority, thus giving up the best chance that the zawiya ever had of challenging the state authority.

Although the economic power of the Dila continued to expand throughout the next two decades, the military and moral base of the zawiya remained strongly tied to its Sanhaja Berber origins.This alienated the Arab tribes that came under Dila control, and ultimately weakened their political power. By the 1660s the zawiya was experiencing a decline in its political and economic power after the loss of important cities, such as Fez and Salé.

At this point, Moulay Rachid of the ‘Alawi family from the region of Tafilalt decided to step into the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Sa’adian Dynasty and establish himself as ruler of Morocco.In 1668 he met the Dila forces and achieved a decisive military victory against the zawiya.Rachid then razed the zawiya to the ground, effectively destroyed their political base, and continued to unify Morocco under his new dynasty.

The Dila Zawiya holds an important place in Morocco’s Amazigh history as it represents a time when a largely Amazigh based institution was almost able to gain control of the Moroccan central government.Unfortunately the Dila Zawiya relied too heavily on their Sanhaja origins and was not able to overcome the status held by the Sa’adian Sultan as a sharif, even while the dynasty was clearly in the midst of collapse.Instead it was another family claiming descent from the Prophet that was able to step into the power vacuum and establish control after the Sa’adians.

The second instance of Amazigh peoples appropriating religious institutions as a means of achieving political goals that will be examined in this analysis took place in the 19th century under the rule of the ‘Alawi Sultan Moualy Sliman.Moulay Sliman, under the influence of Moroccan pilgrims and ambassadors returning from ecca, decided to embrace the Wahhabite doctrine of Islam. This particular brand of Islamic ideology calls for a return to pure Islamic principles and is opposed to institutions such as saint worship.In the ensuing years Moulay Sliman began a campaign against orocco’s traditional religious institutions of saints and brotherhoods.

Needless to say this did not go over terrifically well with the Amazigh tribes who still relied heavily on their local murabitin for political and social stability or the murabatin themselves who saw this as threat to their authority.In 1818 Boubker Amhaoush, a marabout from the Middle Atlas and the zawiya of Ayt Sid ‘Ali gathered the Ayt Oumalou and the tribes of Ayt Seghoushen n-Sidi ‘Ali and Marmousha to defend their institution of saint worship from the threat put to their zawiya by Moulay Sliman.Several other tribes, the Idrassen and the Gerwan, who had been co-opted into the imperial army, defected as they were unable to fight against the marabout.It is interesting to note briefly that Amhaoush’s zawiya was established in area once controlled by the Dila.It is even possible to say that given the geographic proximity of the Dila Zawiya and the seat of Amhaoush’s rebellion, Amhaoush considered himself to be the spiritual heir of the Dila and viewed his actions as following in the Zawiya’s erstwhile footsteps.

The culmination of this rebellion was a battle near the village of Lenda, a locality that, once again, can claim a close proximity to the original site of the Dila Zawiya.In the battle of Lenda Moulay Sliman was captured and many of his close companions, including his son were killed.Strangely enough, the Sultan’s status as a sherif was enough to guarantee him gentle treatment at the hands of the Amhaoush supporters and was released a few days later in respect to his role as Morocco’s primary religious leader.

The Amazigh forces rose again, however in 1820, and this time Amhaoush was aided by two powerful zawiya-s, the Derkawiya and the Wazzaniya, who had been formerly allied with the makhzen but cut off ties due to Moulay Sliman’s hostility towards religious brotherhoods.This insurrection attempted to place a new Sultan on the throne, but ultimately failed due to the capture of the Derkawi shaykh. The brotherhood members refused to do anything that could endanger their leader’s life, and as such Moulay Sliman held onto the man as his bargaining chip until his death.This story ends rather anti climactically with the death of Moulay Sliman.His successor, Moulay Abderahman freed the sheikh and backed down from the Wahhabite doctrines, thus reestablishing the status quo.

A clear historical continuum can be seen between the events surrounding the Dila Zawiya in the mid 1600s and the rebellions of Amhaoush in the early 1800s.In both cases, religious institutions with a primarily Amazigh base, and origins in the very same geographic location, rose up to challenge the authority of the central government.In the case of Dila, a political opportunity to step in and fill the power vacuum left by the weakening Sa’adian Dynasty was presented, and the Dila tried to take advantage.In the case of Amhaoush, the Sultan’s new policy of adherence Wahhabite doctrine presented a serious threat to the traditional institution of saint worship in Morocco, and the marabout was not about to let the Sultan take away his position of political and social authority.In both cases the Amazigh groups almost met with success.The Dila actually managed to defeat the Sa’adian military forces and Amhaoush had the Sultan Moulay Sliman as a prisoner for a few days.Why then were these two attempts at seizing control from the central government unsuccessful?

The answer to this question lies in the issue of political legitimacy and descent from the Prophet.After the Sa’adian Dynasty used the fundamentally Arab idea of tracing their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed as a source of political legitimacy, it became next to impossible for anyone not claiming this same lineage to challenge the central governing power.Although the Dila Zawiya was stronger than the decaying Sa’adian Dynasty and the forces of Boubker Amhaoush actually managed to capture the Sultan himself at the battle of Lenda, neither group was able to overcome the respect and authority inherent in their opponents’ position as a sharif.

Thus, given these historical instances, it is possible to say that even though Amazigh peoples were able to rise to positions of great political and economic power through the use of traditional religious institutions, in the new political system achieved through the success of the Sa’adian Dynasty, it became almost impossible for any Amazigh group to make a successful challenge to the central government because of their lack of sharif-ian lineage.

Gutelius, David P. V., “The Path is Easy and the Benefits Large: The Nasiriyya, Social Networks, and Economic Change in Morocco,” The Journal of African History 43, no. 1 (2002): 27-49.

Hagopian, Elaine C, “The Status and Role of the Marabout in Pre-Protectorate Morocco,” Ethnology 3, no.1 (Jan 1964): 42-52. Mojueta, B.A., “Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth Century during the Interregnum,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 3 (Aug 1981): 347-360.

Waterbury, John. Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, A Study in Segmented Politics

N.B. For technical reasons, the end-notes originally accompanying this piece have not been included. I am greatly indebted to Miss Catherine Manhardt, one of 15 US students attending my Amazigh History & Culture lectures in Rabat, spring of 2010, to have accepted that I include her final paper here.

By way of a preamble, suffice it to say that, today, in the Moroccan Middle Atlas cultural ensemble (2), among Amazigh militants and Berber peasantry, both of them fully aware of a recent heroic past, Tazizaout lives on as an exceedingly strong symbol. As a symbol of defiance, desperate courage and hopeless sacrifice in defence of one’s home turf.

Tazizaout is a remote, rugged, cedar-clad ridge some 9,000 feet high, snowbound in winter, situated in the Imilchil region, east of Kasba Tadla.(3) It is irrevocably linked to the last stand made there by local marabout Sidi Lmekki in the summer of 1932, when, at the head of a thousand fighting men from Ayt Sokhman, Ayt Hadiddou and other tribes, he fought off two converging French army columns, until after a month-long siege, he was compelled to surrender. Last of a line of charismatic holy men (igurramn) who had dominated power politics in the area for upwards of a century, Sidi Lmekki has been since discredited in the local collective psyche for, not only capitulating, but eventually hobnobbing with the invader, to the point of being appointed qayd of the Ayt Sokhman in 1935.

The legend grows

Interestingly, the Tazizaout Berber epic went through a process exemplifying a reversal of the normal “orality to literacy” process. The first version, a colonial episode known prosaically in French as l’affaire du Tazigzaout, or, to strike a more heroic note, l’épopée du Tazigzaout, emerged in two stages:

1/ in the form of somewhat fragmented, sometimes personal, late-1930s accounts by junior French army cadres,(4) written for an esoteric audience; 2/ late-1940s/early 1950s semi-official descriptions featuring in senior French officers’ memoirs;(5) also a novel aimed at a broader reader-ship, LaLégende du Goumier Saïd, a chapter of which is devoted to Le Jour du Tazigzaout (6). More than anything else this effectively set the seal of romanticism on the epic.

The sum total of these written accounts thus constitutes the epic in its initial form, as seen through French eyes. An epic destined to be de- and eventually, re-constructed as and when oral accounts by Atlas Berbers (Imazighen) became available as a result of field-work by foreign and Moroccan researchers in the 1975-2005 period.

In the meantime, knowledge about the Tazizaout epic remained sketchy. From 1932 to 1939 it was perceived as an heroic episode in the annals of the Armée d’Afrique, as the French colonial army was called. It was a text-book example of how firm persuasion, coupled with vigorous use of recently-recruited Berber levies, captained by high-minded young Frenchmen, with aircraft and artillery to support them, could subdue unruly mountain tribes for their own benefit. The fact that they were thus introduced at one fell swoop to the rule of law and so-called modern society came as a convincing contribution to the empire-building mystique.

Although the siege of Tazizaout eventually receded from most French minds, being totally eclipsed by the all-encompassing horrors of the Second World War, together with events linked to decolonisation, it survived in the guise of popular, or regimental sub-culture, whenever be-meddalled veterans from the Goums, Tirailleurs and Foreign legion got together “for old times’ sake”. Thus enshrined in writing, Tazizaout continued for many a year to occupy pride of place in the battle records of various French units.(7) But that was not really where it belonged. It was time for the epic to come home, as it were.

In Morocco, response to the epic was far more complex. It remained muted as long as the Protectorate lasted; even though ballads (timdyazin) were devoted to the event, they tended to be recited in a confidential manner, such material being perceived as subversive by the colonial authorities.(8) Even with the coming of home rule in 1956, an oddity such as Tazizaout, highlighting as it did desperate resistance by die-hard, marabout-led tribesmen from the back of beyond, was an unpleasant reminder that al-fitna al babariyya (‘Berber anarchy’; the bane of Islamic Spain(9) and an old Makhzan nightmare) might still be lurking up in those hills. Significantly, it also failed to fit in with the post-independence Moroccan vulgate and its emphasis on nation-building, the Arabic language, orthodox Islam, strong spiritual links to Saudi Arabia, and active sympathy with the Palestinian cause. For ideological reasons, the heroic contribution to national resistance by Imazighen from the mountains and deserts was wilfully ignored, down-played, or declared irrelevant, official-speak studiously maintaining that the urban-inspired Istiqlal movement alone had played a meaningful role in achieving independence. A version that endured until well into the 1980s. Early in that decade, however, Moroccan press magnate Moulay Ahmed Alaoui finally reversed the trend through a series of newspaper articles devoted to the great resistance period battles in which Imazighen had distinguished themselves: Lehri, Tarda (wi n-iwaliwn) and Bou Gafr (Jbel Saghro).(10) Yet, to the best of the present writer’s knowledge, the siege of Tazizaout was kept under wraps, linked as it was to the politically incorrect geste of the Imhiouach marabouts, long-time Makhzan adversaries and killers of two princes.(11)

Meanwhile, among Atlas villagers still recovering from the double trauma of French military conquest and imposition of full Makhzan rule, at the time of independence (1956), the hallowed memory of Tazizaout, and of all the heroes(12) who had fought and perished there, was carefully preserved and cherished. This would take the form of an annual three-day August pilgrimage (ziyart), when, summoned by one of Sidi Lmekki’s descendants, former fighters and/or their next of kin would congregate at the foot of a sacred cedar for commemoration, prayer, and sacrifice.(13) In fact, on a par with a visit to Mecca, a ziyart to Tazizaout is seen today as a poor man’s h’ajj. So much for the bare bones of the legend.

Wooden tomb of Tazizaout martyr, Aug. 2005 (photo: M. Peyron)

Reconstruction of the epic

Tazizaout, in its reconstructed Moroccan Berber form, naturally draws heavily on the region’s living memory. Unsurprisingly, the recollections of surviving veterans tend to include quotes from period poets Taougrat n-Oult-‘Isa and Taoukhettalt, women both, who emerge as undisputed oral archival sources. Oft-quoted Taougrat, the subject of a book by Native Affairs officer Reyniers,(14) and a cult figure in her own right, actually died near Tounfit around 1930, but her repertoire remains relevant as it covers the decade of events leading up to Tazizaout. Taoukhettalt, an influential and by local standards wealthy woman, had, shortly before 1932, seen all of her seven sons happily married on the same day in a collective wedding ceremony, or tameġra. Before the net was drawn round Tazizaout at the end of July, 1932, she saw to it that her sons joined other resistance fighters in Sidi Lmekki’s mountain stronghold, also supplying much of her livestock, including all her camels, to feed the imžuhad. In the subsequent fighting, she lost all seven sons and her herds were decimated. To add insult to injury, Sidi Lmekki, whom she had backed to the hilt, treacherously surrendered, rendering vain not only her sacrifice, but that of countless other imžuhad and their entire families. The mindless slaughter, followed by the marabout’s final betrayal, became the favourite themes of the very engagé verse which is attributed to her in the aftermath of Tazizaout.

Much of this oral production was diligently, almost confidentially, collected in the 1930s and 1940s by a French priest and life-long friend of the Imazighen – Lqbab-based Father Peyriguère.(15) Little of this material filtered through to the world of academia, however, until the 1970s, when Jeanine Drouin’s thesis on Middle Atlas hagiography, published by the Sorbonne in book form,(16) was seen to contain fragments of the Peyriguère corpus.

After the early 1980s, thanks to the welcome, albeit snail-slow process of the Berber cultural renaissance in Morocco, there occurred a revival of local interest in Tazizaout. Subsequent to the setting up of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) in Rabat (2001), officially sanctioned field-work was conducted in February 2004 by IRCAM researchers Mustapha el-Qadery and Houssa Yakobi.

In August 2005, Houssa Yakobi accompanied the present writer to Tazizaout. Together, they conducted video interviews of five veterans from surrounding villages, investigated a large cemetery at the eastern end of the mountain and carefully combed the rocky, bushy terrain.Some evidence of previous fighting was still visible: caved-in fox-holes and rifle-pits, bones and even a skull protruding from the dry, eroded, stream-banks of Aqqa n-Ouchlou. Sufficient information was gleaned, both from oral sources and on-the-spot observations, to whet their appetite for a further visit in the spring of 2006 (of which more in a separate paper).

De- and re-construction of the Tazizaout epic

By that time, enough data had been gathered to confront the classic French account of l’affaire du Tazigzaout, as contained in Guillaume’s landmark work describing pacification operations in the central Atlas,(18) with the Amazigh version of the battle obtained from local oral sources. A task rendered arduous by the bombast and inconsistencies of the former and a propensity for hyperbole in the latter. After a description running to well over twenty pages, general Guillaume has the reader wondering whether he actually set foot in the area; there are discrepancies between text and photographs, while the validity of numerous place-names that senior officer employs is questioned by local observers.(19) In fact ignorance of this kind accounts for a blatant example of toponymic confusion concerning two key features: Tawjjaâout hill, which is simplistically itemised as crête n°1, while Amalou n-Tezra becomes crête n°2. Even then, Guillaume’s text and pictures continue blithely to contradict each other. Be that as it may, for comparative purposes, thirteen items common to or contrasting with either account are enumerated below to enable the reader to draw his/her own conclusions.

Comparison between L’affaire du Tazigzaout (French version,

or F.V.) and ti n dzizawt (Moroccan Berber version, orM.B.V.)

(20 & 21)

1/F.V. Enemy described as rebelles, insoumis, or dissidents.

M.B.V. Imazighen refr to own fighters as imžuhad (mujahideen) or izmawn (lions).

M.B.V. French mule-guns actually on Agerd n-Oulghoum (disagreement over place-names).(23)

5/ F.V. As they dine in state in mess-tent on Lakes Plateau on August 18, 1932, wine-drinking French generals De Loustal and Dubuisson discuss tactical deployment of front-line troops.(24)

M.B.V. While Sidi Lmekki samples a pomegranate,(25) his firebrand brothers Lmortada and Mhand Lemhdi exhort imžuhad “to defend every inch of territory between Tafza and Tazra.”

6/ F.V. Systematic three-week-long artillery and aerial bombardment.

M.B.V. The imžuhad keep their heads down; onomatopoetic comments on noise made by different calibre guns; myth of corpse (decapitated by artillery shell) chasing its own head.(26)

7/F.V. Pre-sited machine-guns on crête n° 2 trained on water-holes.

M.B.V. Women often killed or wounded by machine-gun fire from Amalou n-Tezra while fetching water at night from springs along Asif n-Ougheddou: “their blood was mingled with water” (šarr idammen nsent d waman)!

8/ F.V. Heroic pro-French, tribal auxiliaries (Zaïan) suffer such heavy losses as they capture strategic hill (crête n° 1), that they have to be replaced and sent to the rear.

M.B.V. “The Roumi forced their way into our foxholesand dragged us out by force”.

12/F.V. Heroic Berber dissidents surrender to chivalrous French officers, who, impressed by courage of their adversaries, treat them decently.

M.B.V. French-led native auxiliaries beat up and rob surrendering Amazigh tribesmen, who are chided for cowardice by women of Tazra as they perform ‘dance of disaster’ (ah’idus n wiha) at foot of Achlou ravine.

13/ F.V. Sidi Lmekki capitulates on September 13, 1932; in 1935, appointed qayd over Ayt Sokhman.

M.B.V. Break-out operations by determined fighters in direction of Ayt Hadiddou country (“where true Muslims are still to be found!”); also towards Hamdoun/Baddou citadel to continue the fight till summer 1933; their former leader (Sidi Lmekki) is satirised in verse.(28)

Conclusion

Typically, as in any situation of this kind, the two accounts are poles apart. Everything hinges on whether the protagonists/observers are on the Moroccan Berber or French colonial side, each obviously representing totally different thought patterns. Apart from disagreement over place-names, differences in attitudes to warfare, and variations in terminology used to describe a specific event, any re-construction will entail radical change, making it even harder to see the wood for the trees. Strengthened by the knowledge that they are defending their home-land, Imazighen tend to demonise the French. Contrastingly, the latter seek solace in the certitudes of the age and the noble, mission civilisatrice with which they feel invested, not to mention the lingering threat of German re-armament that requires swift redeployment of troops to Europe. Consequently, in an attempt to obtain a quick fix, they find themselves trapped into bombarding éléments dissidents, whereas they should be leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to talk the tribesmen into surrendering. A disappointing result at variance with their politique de la main tendue, la conquête des cœurs, and other period clichés in keeping with the above-stated mission civilisatrice.

NOTES

(1) The transliteration of Amazigh words that figure in this paper is a simplified version of the one normally used by Berber scholars. Thus Tazigzaout or Tazizaout in French/English becomes tazizawt in Berber (henceforth Ber.).

(2) The Middle Atlas proper, considered jointly with the eastern High Atlas, constitutes a tamaziġt-speaking cultural ensemble

(3)The toponym Tazizawt refers to the green colour (azizaw, azegzaw, in Ber.) of this forest-draped mountain when seen from a distance. Another suggestion is that the name derives from the green-coloured turbans worn by adepts of the Derkaoui sect (tariqa darqawiyya), to which the Imhiouach marabouts belonged, and with whom the mountain is inevitably associated (Conversation with Houssa Yakobi, May 21, 2006).

(6) J. Peyré, La Légende du Goumier Saïd, (Paris: Flammarion 1950) pp.103-108. Considered inspiring stuff for future decision-makers in a France that failed to realise it was in full colonial decline, this was a book any boarding-school pupil might expect to receive as an end-of-term prize

(7) These veterans’ associations carried on for a surprisingly long time – well after the French withdrawal from North Africa at the end of the Algerian war (1962), in fact.

(9) For example, a revolt by Berber soldiery in Cordoba contributed to the XIth century downfall of the Umayyad dynasty; cf. R. Pennell, Morocco: from Empire to Independence (Oxford 2003) p.37.

(10) These appeared in serial form in Alaoui’s evening paper, Maroc-Soir.

(11) The first one was Moulay Sliman’s son Moulay Brahim, who lost his life during a disastrous confrontation with a coalition of Amazigh tribesmen under Boubker Amhaouch at Lenda (1819); the second, was Moulay Srou, a son of Moulay Sliman, killed near Aghbala in the mid-1880s in an ambush allegedly mounted at the instigation of Sidi ‘Ali Amhaouch (Sidi Lmekki’s father).

(12) Generally described as imžuhad, (< mužahidin, Ar.), ‘fighters of the faith’, or izmawn, ‘lions’.

(13) Known as idgel n tzizawt, the cedar in question is claimed by locals to have almost withered away during the colonial period, only to regain vitality with the coming of independence. It is now a truly impressive tree, and a conspicuous landmark visible for miles around, which accounts for its other name: idgel amažžyal (‘tall cedar’).

(17) Yakobi published some of his findings in an article : “Trous de mémoire lors de l’enregistrement de témoins oculaires de la bataille de Tazizaout” in the April 2005 Sites de Mémoire et Tradion orale amazighe conference proceedings, (M. Peyron ed.), Ifrane: AUI Press, 2007.

(18) Gen. A. Guillaume, op. cit.

(19) For example, confusion between Tazra and Tafza (A. Guillaume, op. cit., p.363) – an easily committed pronunciation error as noticed in the field by this writer during his August 2005 visit; also, a cliff described as Tazra n-Ismekh is labelled Tanra n-Ismekh on a photograph (A. Guillaume, op. cit., p.377). On the same document, crête n°1 is depicted in a somewhat haphazard manner. And yet, Guillaume, at the time a Commandant on De Loustal’s staff, was seen by a French journalist at Tassent, a mere ten miles west of Tazizaout; cf. H. Clérisse, Du Grand Nord à l’Atlas (Paris: Tallandier 1933) p.202. So he must have had some knowledge of the area.

(20) Account chiefly based on A. Guillaume, op. cit., generally considered to be the most exhaustive from the French angle, together with some input from J. Saulay, op. cit.

(21) Based on both eye-witness accounts by veterans of the Tounfit-Aghbala region; backed up by second-hand information gleaned from less elderly relatives and neighbours.

(22) Moroccan deserters from French units (Tirailleurs, Spahis, etc.) with experience of trench warfare (1914-18) had shown their imžuhad brethren how to minimise the effects of artillery bombardment by burrowing into the ground, even digging fox-holes between the roots of giant cedars.

(23) The present 100M ordnance survey map (IGN 1971-72) of the area is literally riddled with errors of this kind.

(24) This is no exaggeration. British news reporter Ward Price writes: “…on the Moroccan front (…) the heure del’apéritif never failed to produce an appropriate bottle which was offered with unfailing hospitality to the visiting stranger.” He goes on to enthuse about “the amenities of the Headquarters’ Mess, where apéritifs, two kinds of wine and liqueurs were the regular accompaniment of the evening meal.” Cf. G. Ward Price, In Morocco withthe Legion (London: Jarrolds 1934) pp.152-153.

(25) In the beleaguered citadel of Tazizawt with imžuhad down to survival rations, only someone with access to the outside world could possibly afford a luxury such as this, the implication being that Sidi Lmekki (denounced subsequently by poets as the arch-traitor) was already in touch with the enemy.

(26) That the informant should have described this event in such a manner may be interpreted as a case of long delayed post-traumatic shock (conversation with H. Yakobi, May 21, 2006).

(27) This event occurred on September 7-8, 1932 (A. Guillaume, op. cit. p.385). A further, interesting case of toponymic confusion; stream-bed between Tazra and Tafza, referred to as Aqqa n-Zebzbat by Guillaume, is now called Aqqa n-Ouidammen (‘ravine of blood’) by the locals, in memory of the massacre that took place there in 1932.

Rebels with a Cause: An Examination of the Historical and Cultural Reasons for Berber Resistance to French Colonization

INTRODUCTION:

The Berbers are the original inhabitants of Morocco, with some Rifian tribes having roots that trace back to the end of the 8th century. When Morocco became a protectorate of France and Spain in 1912, it was in areas that were Berber speaking that resistance to colonization was the strongest. Berber resistance to colonization, beginning in 1913 and lasting until 1933, spanned from the Rif Mountains as far South as the Anti-Atlas. With the submission of the Ait Atta, Ait Murghad and Ait Hadiddu tribes in 1933, any significant Berber resistance to colonization ended (Hart, ASR, 21-22).

At first glance, the strong Berber resistance to colonization seems nonsensical. What chance did autonomous, semi-nomadic tribes, armed only with their rifles, have against a modern European enemy, backed by unlimited resources and manpower? However, upon further examination of the subject, a number of reasons become evident, which serve to illustrate why the Berbers felt they had a real, “fighting” chance of preventing colonization. It also becomes clear that it was never a question of whether or not to resist, but that it was a matter of a people defending a homeland that meant everything to them. This paper will discuss the historical and cultural reasons that serve to shed light on why the Berbers put up such a strong fight against colonization, and why the Berbers did in fact have, a “fighting” chance.

A HISTORY OF RESISTANCE AND AUTONOMY

Rebelling against an entity that threatened the status quo was not a new phenomenon amongst the Berbers. The relationship between the Berbers and the Makhzen, or central government, had historically been a delicate one, which was easily disturbed. This meant that if the Berbers sensed any attempt by the Makhzen to undermine their autonomy and lifestyle, they would demonstrate their dismay by attacking the current capital city, or through some other form of rebellion, as the following examples demonstrate. The Berbers operated within a tribal system, with each tribe reporting to a chief. The idea of being subjected to an omnipotent Sultan was always regarded with suspicion by the Berbers. Therefore, the Berbers were not scared to challenge decisions made by the Sultanate that displeased them, and were usually successful in doing so.

In the 1630’s, the Dilaiya zawiya represented a large threat to the Saadian Sultanate, defeating the Sultan when he sent an army to attack Dila after the marabouts challenged his ability to orchestrate and effective government, and for a time were a powerful sultanate themselves (Chiapuris,ASR,126-127). Also, the tribes inhabiting the surrounding mountains of the Alawite capital of Fes during the 17th century inflicted many defeats on the Makhzen army, which were always an embarrassment to the Sultan, and forced Fassi merchants to be on constant alert (Peyron, ASR, 38). In the early 1800’s Moulay Sliam tried to enforce a Wahhabite interpretation of Islam that threatened the Berbers’ “maraboutic” practices. In response, a number of Middle Atlas tribes, rallied by the Ait Sidi Ali zawiya united aginst Moulay Sliman. At the battle of Lenda, the sultan was taken captive, but later released. This united Berber front then forced the Sultan into a position of negotiation by placing
Meknes under siege. (Chiapuris,ASR, 128-130).

These events illustrate a Berber tradition of rebelling against threats to their autonomy and way of life. The Berbers questioned the authority of their leader, the Sultan, on a regular basis. So naturally they would be in furious opposition to the invasion of their land by a foreign European power, with whom in their eyes, they had no link or commonality on any cultural or religious level.

MASTERS OF WARFARE AND TERRAIN

The Berbers of this period were warriors through and through. Feuding and raiding came first, then tending to herds and crops (Hart, ASR, 35). It has been said that with their knowledge of the terrain, agility, and stamina, “one Berber fighter was equal to at least two Frenchmen” (Michael Peyron). In addition, the Berbers had the advantage of guerilla warfare being their native style of fighting. This guerilla fighting style held a two-fold advantage for the Berbers. Besides being their native fighting style, it was the style of fighting most appropriate for mountainous terrain. This therefore made it an effective way for the Berbers’ small fighting force to take the French by surprise. The French made themselves easy targets to ambush by marching in columns on open roads and announcing their presence.However, it seems they were aware of the flaws with this tactic, as they had the habit of putting native Moroccan soldiers on the front lines (Maghraoui).

The Berbers also had the confidence of previous success against the European force of Spain in the Melilla war of 1893.Beginning in October, the war at first went in Spain’s favor, as the Rifian fighters were out-gunned. However when a Mosque was targeted, fighters came from all over the region, with infantry numbers reaching 20,000. Finally, after a year of Rifian fighters holding on, and Spain pulling out all the stops, bringing in a huge number of reinforcement and naval forces, and performing cruel night search parties that were brutal to any rebels found,peace was negotiated with the Sultan in 1894 (Rodriquez-Gonzalez). The second conflict between the Spanish and the Rifians, that inspired Berber confidence in their ability to challenge colonization, began in 1908 when the Rifians attacked a Spanish mine. The outcome was similar, with the Spanish suffering 2000 casualties, and being forced to call in 42,000 troops in November of 1909 to quell the small Rifian forces, which were finally subdued in the next six months (Thomas).

Despite not being ultimate victories for the Berbers, these two conflicts in Melilla served to inspire confidence in the Berbers. The Berbers learned from the Battles of Melilla that they could pose a real threat to European powers, and inflict heavy losses on their larger, better armed fighting forces. Later, when the time came to resist French colonization, the Berbers had these two events as reminders that they could put up a successful and effective defense against French occupation.

The skillful Berber rebel leaders demonstrate the Berbers’ keen aptitude for warfare. The Berber Resistance included a number of key leaders, who led their tribesman with tenacity and passion. The archetype Berber leader was Abd Al-Krim El-Khattabi, who led the Rif Rebellion during the 1920’s (Hart,ASR, 21). He knew how to keep his troops’ morale up. For example he allowed them to farm and harvest their crops and he never sent too many men to the front lines at one time. This helped maintain a sense of normalcy in the village, and therefore kept the men’s morale high. Abd El Krim was a master of respecting and working within the tribal system, which allowed him to successfully recruit other tribes to fight with him against colonization. His Rebellion encompassed two separate wars, in which Abd El Krim and his troops put up such a fight that France had to call in 300,000 well trained soldiers to finally regain Spanish Morocco in 1926. Despite ultimately being defeated, Abd El Krim’s valiant resistance served as an inspiration to later rebels (Brace).

In the Middle Atlas, there was Moha Ou Hammou Zayani, most famous for his the confederation of tribes he created called the Zaian. In November of 1914, Moha Ou Hammou defeated the French outside the city of Khenifra at the Battle of El Herri, where the invaders suffered a high number of casualties. However, the French retaliated the next day, and the rebels retreated to the hills. However, it was under Moha ou Hammou’s strong leadership, or more accurately the fear that he instilled in his men, that these Rebels held out until 1920 (O’Connor, ASR, 149-152).

The strength and commitment of the rebels and their leaders is well illustrated by some of the direst events of Berber resistance to colonization. Two of these events were the Battle of Tazizawt and the Battle of Mount Baddou. The Battle of Tazizawt took place in the Middle Atlas in 1932. One important character in this battle was Taoukhettalt, a rare female Berber leader, who sacrificed everything in the name of fighting against the French and defending the Berber homeland. The conditions during this battle were intolerable, yet the Berber combatants held out for a month. Taoukhettalt sent her 7 sons to Sidi Lmekki’s mountain stronghold so they would continue fighting, and gave all her camels to the cause to provide food. Women risked artillery fire to fetch water at night, so that the rebel forces could hold out in the mountains longer. This example also illustrates the strength and fortitude that Berber women posses (The Battle of Tazizawt, Peyron).

In another of the final battles of Berber resistance, the diehards at the Battle of Mount Baddou held out for a fortnight in the face of certain defeat before surrendering. Resolve was strong leading up to this last conflict, because of the excessive bloodshed and lack of resolution at Ayt Ya’qoub in 1929 (Peyron, ASR, 154). The leader of the rebels was Ou-Skounti. He inspired fear in deserters, which is a contributing factor to the long duration of this final stand. He was committed to defending

Mount Baddou against the “infidels.” The Ayt Morghad had been autonomous since the time of the Romans, why should they give that up without a fight? Besides, aerial bombing had done little damage. However, because of being surrounded, with access to water entirely blocked off, they were forced to surrender in the face of starvation and dehydration (ASR, Price, 154-160).

The examples of these rebel leaders and these two final battles give insight into what motivated the Berbers the most: the defense of their sacred land and the preservation of their autonomy. They knew no other lifestyle, and they certainly did not know how to give up without a fight. In addition, the Berbers were led by exceptional individuals, who were able to unite typically unorganized Berber tribes into menacing fighting forces, and sometimes used fear to maintain discipline and loyalty.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND

Land was hugely important to the Berbers for a variety of reason. The first reason is because of lineage ties to the land. Traditional Moroccan society is tribal, kinship-based and patri-lineal. As a result of the strong emphasis placed on lineage, and the careful efforts to keep ancestral lines clear, most Berbers could trace their lineage back at least four generations (Bourdieu et al.,ASR, 25). Land was also the tool that enabled their survival, as it provided grazing lands for their livestock, and produced the crops that the Berbers cultivated. Many Berbers were, and still are, semi, or fully nomadic. These tribes follow the same migratory patterns every year, and have been doing so for centuries. The division of this communal land was linked to the organization of tribes and clans as well. Land is also important because it is attached to traditions and culture. For these reasons, to the Berbers, the loss of land equaled the loss of autonomy, identity, and traditions.

This land was quite literally sacred to the Berbers, as many marabouts’ tombs could be found across the countryside and throughout Berber lands. In addition, there are a number of myths about sacred livestock belonging to the prophet traveling through Berber territories. In fact, Ou-Skounti, the famous resistance leader at the Battle of Ayt Baddou was know to proclaim regularly that “Allah would never allow infidels to set foot upon the holy Baddou mountain, sanctified as it had been by the passage of the Prophet’s mule” (Price, ASR, 155). This illustrates the belief that the land itself was sacred, and therefore protected by Allah. In addition, it shows a connection between Berber resistance and the belief that the war they were waging was sacred and supported by Allah. The notion of a Holy War was seen when the marabout Sidi Ali Amhaouch announced a Holy War from the Dades Valley as far as the desert beyond the anti-Atlas Mountains. This was in response to news of the outbreak of the Great War in Europe. This was seen as an opportunity to capitalize on a weakened French force, who would be busy managing the war in Europe (O’Connor,ASR, 149).

The high importance of land to Berbers, and the reality that they were in fact defending their homeland gave the Berbers yet another advantage over the French. The larger part of fighting forces used by the French in Morocco during this period was composed of soldiers from the French Foreign Legion. The French Foreign Legion was made up of soldiers who were serving to have prison sentences forgiven, or who were just trying to start over. Other soldiers came from Senegal, Sudan, and even Morocco. None of these soldiers were very much invested in the fighting; they were simply obliged to fight. On the other hand, the Berbers were fighting to defend everything that was important to them; their land, identity, and autonomy. In the words of Taougrat oult ‘Aissa: “Better for me to wear an ill-fitting cloak among Muslims than to become a mule-driver among Christians” (Reyniers, 46)! Meaning, they had nothing to lose by fighting, because if they didn’t fight, they risked losing all things sacred, among which was their Muslim identity.

FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN AND THE INFIDEL

When colonizing forces came to Morocco, the Berbers never had a choice. If they didn’t resist colonization, they had no idea what the outcome would be. Would they have to give up their land and their rifles? What would these European infidels do with their women and children, and would they still be allowed to practice their religion? To the Berbers, the coming of the French to Morocco was seen as doomsday. Berber poetry of the time expressed the fear of evil times and tidings to come (Peyron, Amazigh Poetry, 111). Inspired by their passion for their homeland, and the idea that it was a Holy War that Allah was in favor of, they had no choice but to resist.

The fear of the unknown was a large motivating factor in resisting occupation. For the Berber man, his rifle was his manhood, and a symbol of status and prestige (Price,ASR, 159). When forced to give up their rifles in surrender, one Berber stated,

… Our guns’ve been confiscated, O Berbers, for all of you,

The sound of steel is silent, and honour is gone,

You now react to an alien form of logic… (Peyron, Amazigh Poetry, 115).

This short poem shows that for the Berber man, to give up his gun, was to also give away his honor and self-worth. Therefore if colonial forces were allowed to come in, he risked having to give up that prized possession.

The Europeans represented everything that was foreign. The French were not Muslim and they were city dwellers. Traditionally, mountainous people look down on city-dwellers, and think of them as choosing to live in polluted areas with bad water sources. The Berbers were also suspicious of Europeans because they had an entirely different legal system. Different Berber tribes had very detailed customary law (izerf) that was heavily based in Berber cultural practices. This legal code covered every situation from hosting a guest to punishing a murderer (Hart, ASR, 178-185).

This doubt and mistrust of Europeans was evident when the Berbers eventually surrendered. At the moment of surrender Berbers were reluctant to part with their weapons, and asked when they would be able to have their rifles back. This short poem demonstrates feelings of doubt towards surrender:-

“Should I change my mind, would go and steal a Chassepot rifle,

Then hold out at the pass till the bitter end” (Roux & Peyron, 63).

Just after surrendering, this Berber had doubts and was ready to once again take up arms against the French. French officers observed the Berber rebels behaving anxiously and sullenly, as they were unsure what was going to happen to them next (Price,ASR, 159). Accounts after the surrender of the Battle of Baddou mention that the Berbers expressed no regret for their actions. In addition, they were reluctant to give information about their wounded and dead. When asked why they had rebelled against the Europeans, they simply said that they were defending their land.

CONCLUSION

From the outset, Berber resistance to colonization seems rather foolhardy; however, upon further examination of the circumstances, it becomes evident that it was the only option. Historically, the Berbers were characterized by revolt and resistance to the Moroccan sultanate. Therefore, when the new threat was a foreign European power that represented tyranny and an uncertain future, naturally they were not going to take occupation lying down.Even Tourguillal hill in the Tadla region exclaimed:-

This expressed a widespread attitude amongst the Berbers that resistance, and the consequent hardships that accompanied it, was better than being under control of the French at all costs.

In addition, the Berbers felt they had a real chance of stopping colonization, and rightfully so. In the two Rif wars of 1893 and 1909, the Berbers proved difficult opponents to a much larger, better equipped Spanish fighting force. The Berbers fought with such tenacity that the Sultan was called in to end the First Rif War by means of a truce, and in the Second Rif War, the French became involved to eventually quell the Berbers. The Berbers did not choose to resist French colonization on a whim; they were defending life as they knew it. They were fighting in defense of the land of their forefathers, a sacred land, as it was the final resting place of Marabouts, and had provided passage for sacred animals belonging to the Prophet. They were fighting in defense of their identity, which was based on their faith, Islam, and their independence. This independence was founded on their semi-nomadic lifestyle, and an autonomy that most Berbers had maintained since at least the 8th century, and in the case of the Ayt Morghad, since the time of the Romans. The Berber men were fighting to defend their status and self-worth, which was based on their possession of a rifle, which they were sure to lose if they came under French occupation. Motivated and organized by strong, fearless leaders, the Berbers were fighting, as they had for centuries, to maintain their status quo and life as they knew it. Not resisting colonization for these Berbers represented a sure end to their lifestyle, and so it was never a question.

Works Cited

Brace, Richard M. Rev. of “Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion”. The American Historical Review June 1969: 1678-679. JSTOR. 21 Apr. 2010. Keyword: Rebels in the Rif.

The Barghawata reigned over Tamesna, the coastal plain home to modern day Casablanca and Rabat, from the early eighth until the mid twelfth century. They ruled a fiercely independent kingdom for four centuries. Not only did they enjoy freedom from outside political interference and Arab domination, one of their kings, Yunus (ruled 842-884), attempted to assert Berber cultural and religious autonomy by introducing a Berberized version of Islam. While this new Islam only lasted as orthodoxy in their kingdom for less than a century, its mere existence, complete with a new prophet and sacred text, is a testament to the Barghawata’s determination to remain separate from the Arab conquerors, both politically and culturally.Of the various Berber kingdoms of North Africa, the Barghawata were especially predisposed to leading a cultural rebellion in the form of Berberized Islam; their political and economic independence from the surrounding Arab-ruled areas brought them into constant contact with Arabs who sought to conquer them.In addition, the Umayyad caliphate treated non-Arab Muslims very poorly, furthering Berber resentment of the Arabs.The time that Barghawata Islam appeared, the ninth century, was a turbulent time when Berbers were wresting back control of their land from the Arabs.The Barghawata religion sought to distinguish Berbers from the conquering Arabs, but did not consider itself a new faith altogether; this suggests that the people of the Barghawata kingdom (or, rather, its king) embraced Islam, but rejected a perceived ethnic Arab slant to the faith as it was practiced in ninth century Morocco.

The Barghawata kingdom was founded by Tarif in the early eighth century. Tarif and his descendants were most likely Sufrite Khariji Muslims; some sources even posit that they promoted an extremely orthodox version of Khariji Islam.[1] The Barghawata ruled a territory stretching from Safi in the south and Salé in the north, with the Atlantic Ocean as its eastern border and the territory of the Haha people as its western border.[2] Tarif was succeeded by his son, Salih Ibn Tarif (b. 729/730-d. 793). He was considered an extremely pious and just ruler, as was his son Elias (ruled 793-842). Salih’s grandson, Yunus, took the throne after Elias’s death in 842. In the same year, he announced that his grandfather had received a new revelation from God—a Quran written in the Berber language—and introduced these revelations as a new form of Islam. The religion remained the faith of the Barghawata kingdom until 912.[3]

Some speculate that Yunus fabricated the new religion and its Quran in its entirety, then retroactively made his grandfather its prophet to take advantage of Salih’s lofty reputation and untarnished legacy. Slightly more forgivingly, one source posits that the Berber Quran might have evolved from Salih’s commentary on the Arabic Quran (an early example of the lmazghi tradition—Berber language commentary on the Quran, written in the Arabic script).[4]If we accept Yunus as the mastermind behind Barghawata Islam, it is important to note that he went on a pilgrimage to the East in 816, and some scholars speculate that he found the inspiration to create a new, Berberized Islam after visiting the Arab world.[5]

The largest difference between Barghawata Islam and Muslim Orthodoxy is their sacred texts. The Barghawata had a Berber language Quran with eighty suras, which followers believed was the direct word of God as He had revealed it to Salih Ibn Tarif. As a result, Salih was considered the final and greatest prophet of Islam. The Barghawata still believed that Muhammad was a prophet, but simply the prophet of the Arabs.Salih Ibn Tarif was the prophet of the Berbers,[6] or waryawari, “the one after whom none other would come”[7].

Barghawata Islam differed vastly from “Arab” Islam in ritual. Many Muslim practices were maintained, but somehow adjusted. Instead of fasting during the month of Ramadan, they fasted during Rajab; they assembled for collective prayer on Thursday, not Friday, and prayed an additional five times at night. Their prayers occurred at no set time, and there was no call to prayer. Men could take as many wives as they pleased.[8] In addition to modified Muslim practices, we also see hints of Judaism and paganism in their religious practice, such as their taboo surrounding eating eggs and chickens, and the belief that the saliva of the prophet contained baraka, or, roughly translated, blessedness.[9]

This new Barghawata religion is wildly different from Muslim orthodoxy, but it still clearly considers itself a form of Islam. Firstly, Salih’s position as prophet is partially justified by the mention of a Salih in the Arabic Quran in the Surat al-Tahrim:

If ye both turn repentant unto God—for your hearts have swerved!—but if ye back each other up against him, verily God, He is the sovereign; and Gabriel and the righteous of the believers (salih al-mu’minin), and the angels after that will back him up.[10]

Here, “salih” is among those most protected by God; this was used as proof that Salih Ibn Tarif’s prophethood was foretold in the Quran of the Arabs, thus making Barghawata Islam more credible.[11] In contrast, a typical Muslim would not go hunting for Muhammad’s legitimacy in the Bible or Torah. This is our first indication that, while the Barghawata wanted to make a clean break with Islam as it was practiced by the Arabs, they did not seek to abandon Islam altogether. Muhammad is also an important figure in the Berber Quran, appearing the in the very first sura, entitled the Sura of Job:

In the name of Allah who has sent this book to mankind. Allah has made plain His reports therein. They have said that Satan (Iblis) had a knowledge of destiny. Allah forbid it. Satan has not the power to know as Allah knows. Enquire of anything which will master tongues in what they say. Allah alone is the One who commands the utterances of men’s tongues. He does so by His will for the tongue which He has sent with the truth for mankind. The truth has become straight and steadfast and well established. Behold Muhammad!…when he was alive all those who were his Companions were upright until his decease. Then men became corrupt. He is a liar who says that the truth is sound and correct, yet there is no messenger of Allah…[12]

This first sura affirms that God has revealed truths to mankind, and one instance of this was Muhammad’s revelations in Arabia. The Berber Quran uses Muhammad, not Salih, as an example of a human who knew God’s truth and lived piously. Favoring Muhammad in this case is proof that the Arab prophet and his religious tradition would continue to be an integral part of this Berberized Islam, and that this was certainly not an unrelated religion.

In addition to these nods to the Arab Muslim tradition in Barghawata Islam, El-Bekri and others emphasize another reason that a Berber Quran could be an acceptable part of Muslim practice.As stated in the first Barghawata sura, Iskander explains, “the truth could not be preserved without a Prophet whom they [the Berbers] could recognize.” This, he explains, blends well with the Muslim belief that God sent messages to earth in many different vernaculars so that all peoples could learn the truth.In light of this belief, the Barghawata’s Berber Quran seems necessary and more legitimate; they had finally received God’s word in their language, and could now worship properly, having been delivered from ignorance.[14]

We have seen how the Barghawata’s new Islam was a break with orthodoxy, yet did not strive to be a completely new religion. However, this does not explain why this particular Berber kingdom, at this particular point in history, decided to introduce a radically different version of Islam.

When we examine the Barghawata’s political independence and durability as a regime, it seems only natural that they would be the Berber kingdom to seek a cultural emancipation from the Arabs. They maintained an independent Berber regime for four centuries, starting less than one century after the Arab conquests. Their longevity can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, they had an advantageous geographical position. A huge portion of their border was along the Atlantic Ocean, and only one nearby kingdom, Al-Andalous, had a skilled navy. The Barghawata were friendly with Al-Andalous, meaning they were able to focus the bulk of their defenses on their land borders.[15] Since they spent so little energy protecting their oceanic border, the Barghawata could afford to maintain an unusually large army to defend their land frontiers. The topography of their land was complex, with countless winding river valleys, which made it difficult to navigate as an invading outsider; this discouraged neighboring kingdoms from invading.

We also cannot discount the importance of the Barghawata’s lines of communication, which made use of fire signals and local rivers, in allowing them to have the upper hand over an invading army. In addition, their strategically located territory had very fertile soil, permitting them to produce their own crops and minimize their material dependence on surrounding kingdoms. The benefits of their geography—along an ocean with no nearby threatening navies, complex topography, and fertile soil—permitted the Barghawata to thrive for four centuries as a politically and economically independent Berber kingdom.[16]

The Barghawata defied the historical convention that Berbers were merely foot soldiers in the service of the mighty Arabs; this Berberized Islam serves as proof that, for a time, the Barghawata also sought to defy the notion that Berbers merrily abandoned their savage heresies in favor of Arab Islamic Orthodoxy. In this context, it is significant that Yunus, the man who introduced this new Islam to the Barghawata, traveled to the Arab East. While the historical record is spotty on Yunus’s trip to the East (the only readily available information is that he traveled with four other Kharijis, visited Damascus, and became addicted to mind-altering substances[17]), we can surmise that he was confronted with an Islamic culture that was very different from his own in Morocco. And, being from a remote part of the Muslim world, his practice of the faith was probably mocked or perceived to be greatly flawed by those who inhabited the Muslim world’s epicenter. After being mocked for his difference, Yunus was encouraged to return home and further promote this difference. The emergence of ethnic identity has been explained in similar terms, in Gellner’s classic example of the Ruritanian who visits Megalomania. A Ruritanian from a small village goes to his capital city, Megalomania, looking for work, and is mocked for his various cultural differences, which he had never noticed before. Upon returning to his hometown, he is proud of his Ruritanian culture and preaches political emancipation from Megalomania’s rule.[18]

In this case, Yunus traveled from Morocco to the East, thinking himself a devout Muslim like any other. Upon arrival, he realizes that he is different from the Arabs around him, and is possibly mocked or looked down upon because of this difference or Berberness. Upon his return to Morocco he seeks to assert the Berbers’ ethnic difference from Arabs, and liberate them from Arab cultural domination, by modifying and Berberizing Islam.

The Barghawata’s unique historical attributes, such as long-lived political independence and Yunus’s trip to the East, made them an obvious breeding ground for the assertion of ethnic and religious difference. However, we must still explain why their new religion emerged when it did, in the mid-9th century. First, we must note the fundamental changes to the Berber universe with the first Arab invasions, carried out by the Umayyads in the seventh century. The caliphate, and therefore Islam, reached northwest Africa excepting Morocco (Ifriqiyya), by the mid seventh century; Morocco was also under Umayyad control by the early eighth century. The early Umayyad caliphate was tolerant of religious diversity, but had a demonstrated prejudice against non-Arab Muslims, called mawali.This angered Berber converts to Islam; one Berber leader in what is modern-day Algeria, named Kusayla, reportedly vented this frustration by leading Berbers and Byzantines in killing an Arab commander in 680.After this success, Kusayla continued on to Qayrawan and briefly became the regional political authority, but he was quickly chased out by the Arabs and ultimately defeated in 686.[19]This is one of several early examples of Berber resistance to the Arab invasion, setting a precedent for the rebellious actions of the Barghawata.

For a time after the initial Arab conquests, Berbers mainly lived under Arab rule. The first Arab rulers were the Umayyad Caliphate, whose capital was in faraway Damascus. Although many Berbers had converted to Islam and had aided the Arabs in their conquest of Al-Andalous, they continued to be mistreated by the caliphate, in some cases being taxed heavily or even taken as slaves. These inequities sparked a full-fledged Berber revolt in Ifriqiyyain 741.[20]However, in the centuries following the Arab conquests, Berber-controlled states began to reclaim their sovereignty and authority. The Abbasid caliphate, which took power in the mid eighth century, treated non-Arab Muslims much better than the Umayyads had, even ceding direct control of Morocco to the Idrisids.While the Idrisid dynasty was founded by Arabs, its sultan intermarried with Berbers and lived in Morocco, as opposed to in the Sham;[21] this undoubtedly led to an improvement in the treatment of Berbers in Morocco.In Ifriqiyya, there are also instances of Berbers gaining more autonomy from the Mashriq, such as the Hammadids. They were a Berber dynasty located in modern day Algeria, who declared their independence from the Fatimids and renounced Fatimid Shiite doctrine in 1014.[22] In the context of this Berber political renaissance, the Barghawata’s new religious tradition can be seen as a cultural rebellion from Arab domination, a logical compliment to their already successful political rebellion.

There are clear reasons as to why the 9th century Barghawatas, as opposed to any other Berber kingdom at any other time, chose to introduce a radically different form of Islam, but one question remains: why maintain any vestiges of Islam? Why not create an entirely new religion, which builds upon the previous monotheistic traditions like Islam builds on Christianity and Judaism? There is no single explanation for this. However, we can speculate that Yunus might have been concerned about the packaging of this new religion. We have already seen his attention to this matter in the (supposed) decision to make his revered grandfather the prophet of this new faith in an attempt to lend it credence. He was selling an extremely different, even blasphemous, version of Islam to his people, who probably considered themselves devout Muslims. Yunus must have perceived that his people would accept changes in their practice, so long as they remained Muslims in title. Even today, foreign Muslims would consider some Moroccan traditions, such as praying to a saint, to be heretical, yet Moroccan Muslims who visit saints would never consider it so. Thus, it is not so difficult to envision the Barghawata reciting Berber text as they pray—a vision that would scandalize an Arab Muslim—while still considering themselves good Muslims.

The introduction, then disappearance, of Barghawata Islam is an interesting historical phenomenon that contradicts our common perception of the post-Arab invasion Maghreb. We have been taught that the Berbers of North Africa welcomed the Arabs and their new religion with open arms. However, the Barghawata’s new Islam proves that this was not entirely so, and that some Berbers sought to free themselves from Arab imperialism. The Barghawata kingdom persisted for four centuries and was founded during the Arab invasions.This means they endured the bulk of early Arab cultural and political domination, repeatedly defending their territory from Arab incursion. Their political and economic self-reliance flies in the face of the perception that Berbers happily and passively served their Arab overlords. The Barghawata’s introduction of a Berberized Islam also indicates that Berbers did not quietly submit to Arab cultural norms; instead, they tried to modify an ethnically Arab religion to fit the Berber experience.Berberized Islam ultimately failed, but modern Moroccan deviations from Muslim orthodoxy, such as the cult of saints, remind us of the Berbers’ persisting determination to practice Islam in their own cultural context.

Works Cited

Abun-Nasr, Jamil M.A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

N.B. For technical reasons, the original end-notes have not been included in this version of the paper.

N.B. Miss Sarah Hawkins, one of 15 US students who attended my lectures on « Amazigh History and Culture » in Rabat during the spring of 2010, kindly gave permission for this paper to be included here.

As the traveller heads down through the cedars from the Zad Pass (Tizi Tebruri = ‘hailstone pass’), the wide-sky expanses of the Upper Moulouya unfold before him, backed by the lofty, snow-capped ‘Ayyachi-Ma’asker range, over 3700 metres high. As with many others who have gone before, there dawns on him the notion of imminent transition. Behind lie forested, well-watered, Mediterranean style highlands, while the gaunt, rugged ranges on the horizon represent the “last stop before the Sahara”, beyond which live none but tribesmen like the Ayt Hadiddou “who fear naught but God”.

‘Ayyachi dominates the upper Melwiya (photo: M. Peyron)

Our traveller is, in fact, contemplating one of the most important regions of inner Morocco, its dramatic scenery somehow equal to the epoch-shaping events it has witnessed throughout history. Not so much a highland sanctuary as a cultural cross-roads, a haven of “intellectual rurality”, famous for its wandering minstrels and local poets (imdyazn and ineššadn) who reflect the conscience, both religious and worldly, of the mountain Imazighen who inhabit the area.

Tounfit and Jbal Ma’asker with dusting of snow (photo: M. Peyron)

Among these the Ayt Yahya, a Tamazight-speaking tribal group, occupies the area between Midelt and Imilchil in the High Atlas. They may be conveniently classified as highland semi- transhumants, some living in village clusters (qşur or iġerman), some in dispersed villages. The Ayt Yahya brought to the shady (amalu) north slopes of the Atlas a social organisation and general pattern of existence evolved in the dry, pre-Saharan steppe, and which they eventually adapted to a colder, wetter environment featuring extensive winter snow-fall.

Izza ‘Athman village, Asif Wirin, March 1976 (photo: M. Peyron)

Qsar of Tagoudit, Ayt Yahya (photo: M. Peyron)

Hence the classic, mud-built qşar, or fortified hamlet survives chiefly in the arid, upland valleys south of ‘Ayyachi or Jbel Ma’asker, whereas in the well-wooded areas to the north, stronger-built houses cedar-planks and stone predominate in dispersed villages. Likewise, pastoralism remaining the chief activity, among the southern clans, transhumance is the name of the game. To the north, however, village-based grazing prevails.

There is also a generalised use of irrigated patches, producing barley, buckwheat, maize, and wheat,while on nearby fruit-trees, cherries, apricots and a few walnuts are to be found. As to habits inherited from the Saharan region, use of the baggage-camel (alġum) and baggage-ox (ayugu), together with the institution of the communal bull, were reported in the Ayt Yahya area as late as the mid-1970s.

The Ayt Yahya tribal grouping was in the forefront of the SW-NE push by Senhaja Berber pastoralists that lasted from the 10th to the 19th century. In fact, one of their clans has remained to this day at Aghbalou n-Kerdous, on the south side of the High Atlas. The Ayt Yahya and their kindred groups, the Ayt Merghad, Ayt Hadiddou and Ayt Izdeg, with some Ayt ‘Ayyach, became fellow members of the Ayt Yafelman (lit. ‘the peaceful ones’), a confederation set up some time around 1650 to counter-balance expansion by an aggressive rival entity, the Ayt ‘Atta of Jbel Saghro.

Before listiεmar, as with many other Imazighen tribes, activities for which the Ayt Yahya were famous included raiding, sheep-rustling, plundering and/or “protecting” caravans along the triq aqdim between the Ziz valley and Tounfit. There existed a pattern of alliances (the leff system) by which each clan could call on the support of one, possibly two, friendly clans, if attacked by a rival group. The fighting that resulted would be limited in time, usually between fairly well-balanced groups, and was frequently interrupted by truces engineered by the saints (igurramn) of Sidi Yahya ou Youssef.

Tribesmen playing takkurt, Lmerri, Oct. 1982 (photo: M. Peyron)

Contrary to modern behavioural standards, intermittent raiding and clan warfare were perceived as making life more exciting and giving young men (iεerrimn) a healthy opportunity to prove their bravery. Without the use of bayonet, dagger or musket (“the voice of steel” as it was called), points of honour could not be properly settled. This was a very strong notion throughout tribal society. Not that warfare was by any means permanent or total; eradicating a rival clan made no sense; it was much wiser to allow it to survive so as not to cut off the source of supply that sensible raiding and plundering so easily guaranteed. This was a typical Heroic Age situation.

Prowess with weapons being second nature to these mountaineers, no wonder the Ayt Yahya fought hard against French forces which invaded their region between 1922 and 1932. Desperately tragic battles such as Ayt Yâqoub and Tazizaout saw highly manoeuvrable, lightly-equipped Berber fighters more than hold their own against well-armed French regular troops. In fact, man to man, the Berbers were usually superior to their opponents; against aeroplanes, machine-guns and mountain artillery, however, bravery was of no avail. Yet, they fought on to the last, distinguishing themselves in daring, single-handed operations, a lone rifleman occasionally succeeding in pinning down crack Foreign Legion troops with accurate fire from some hill-top.

The Ayt Yahya themselves consist of several clans. The southern Ayt Yahya clans, living on the sunny (assamer) slope of the main range, include the Ayt Sliman, Ayt Moussa ou ‘Atman, Ayt Fedouli, Ayt Hattab, Ichichaoun and Ayt ‘Ammar, the last-named clan being of ou-Hadiddou origin, but now incorporated into the Tounfit region. Chief among the northern Ayt Yahya are the Ayt ‘Ali ou-Brahim of Tounfit proper, the Imtchimen at the foot of ‘Ayyachi, the Ayt Hnini at the Moulouya source, the Ayt Bou ‘Arbi of the upper Anzegmir, and the Ayt Sidi Yahya ou Youssef. These clans all claim a Saharan origin, except for the Ayt Sidi Yahya ou Youssef, who are marabouts, or igurrramn, allegedly hailing from Moulay Idriss Zerhoun, one of their sub-clans retaining a dialect strongly reminiscent of that spoken in the Zerhoun.

Zawiya Sidi Yahya ou Youssef, Jan. 1974 (photo: M. Peyron)

While on the topic of maraboutism it should be mentioned that the Tounfit area was also under the influence of the neighbouring Imhiwach saints of Aghbala. As to the other clans, they include some elements from the Ayt Yoummour and Ayt Ihand that the Ayt Yahya absorbed when they arrived in the area in the late-18th century.

Typical taddart, Assaka village, January 1974 (photo: M. Peyron)

The 1970s proved the heyday of the “segmentary society”, a theory (challenged before the century was out) to describe tribal organisation, as devised by Evans-Pritchard after his study of the Sudanese Nuer, and described by Anglo-Saxon anthropologists as corresponding to the Berbers’ socio-political organisation. Basically, it was a case of “me against my brother; my brother and I against the rest of the world.” This made sense in a society where customary law izerf, vendetta, retribution and/or payment of blood money were the order of the day. The Ayt Yahya, arranged in sub-clans, clans, and inter-clan alliances carefully calculated to curb the excesses of intra-tribal warfare, could be seen as fitting fairly neatly into the segmentary pattern. Early reports by colonial observers, before the actual conquest of the area (1931-1932), described Yahya clans as regularly at each others’ throats. Faced with the threat of a common outside foe, as with the French, however, they tended to oppose a united front.

Hard-working Lmerri housewife, March 1983, (photo: M. Peyron)

To-day, however, tribal disunity prevails. Since independence, while overall group awareness remains outside the tribe in terms of recognizing Ayt Yahya, say, from Ayt Sokhman, tribal solidarity within has become eroded among the Ayt Yahya. An ou-Yahya will introduce himself as an ou-Sliman, or an ou-Fedouli, rather than as the member of an overall Yahya tribe. The more so as, technically and administratively, such an entity no longer exists. Thus have allegiances become strictly local, a tendency reinforced by the introduction, in the 1960s, of the local commune (žamaε qarawiya), an administrative unit that usually duplicates the ancient clans. Initially a rubber-stamp institution, it has been acquiring a certain measure of autonomy and power in recent years, as local assemblies have worked out a new, realistic relationship vis-à-vis the makhzan. All of which has tended to make nonsense of the segmentary theory, which is no longer valid stricto sensu, in the modern context. This being said, on the judiciary plane, I was told in Tounfit, in 1974, that while decisions were made according to Koranic Law (ššraε), they still contained a dash of izerf just for good measure.

Woman washing wool in Asif Tasfalalyt, Ayt Sliman (photo: M. Peyron)

Great were the changes experienced by tribesmen in the aftermath of foreign military conquest and subsequent independence. Now that peace prevails among the Ayt Yahya, life has, in a way, lost its salt, its bravado. The element of panache is gone. No longer may a man proudly sing one of those famous short poems (timawayin) such as:-

sassbu l-lkissan t-tadawt iyyis d-uhezz, uxribn bu šuk,

t-tadda yżill, unna tent-ismun ay-as-iwten i-ddunit ġr ixf!

Full happy is he who rides with his lady-friend on horse-back,

While rifle, tea-pot, tent pegs in the saddle-bag go clank-clank!

Ult-Sliman woman, Louggagh, Taaraart valley (photo: M. Peyron)

Nowadays, the sound of gun-shots no longer echoes back from the heights; except when musket-wielding horseman stage mock charges on days of powder-play, called tafrawt in Tamazight. If sheep-stealing is now officially frowned upon, it has been replaced by timber-rustling, the Ayt Hadiddou frequently leaving their treeless plateaux at night to come and cut down cedars in Ayt Yahya forests, despite opposition from armed Forest Guards. Poaching Barbary Sheep in the Jbel Fazaz game reserve near Tirghist is also a tempting proposition. But the fine (bruşşi) involved, if caught red-handed, will no doubt deter all but the lion-hearted. The element of risk, then, is till there, but remains a poor substitute for the real thing!

Thus must Yahya tribesmen now learn to become law-abiding Moroccan citizens. This involves channelling their energies into peaceful pursuits such as farming, harvesting, animal husbandry, or else working with road-repair gangs or woodcutters’ co-operatives.

At the threshing-post, Massou, summer 1989 (photo: M. Peyron)

Though such solutions may mean exiling oneself to the cities, or even going abroad, the ou-Yahya remains strongly attached to his native turf. One of my best friends in the area, aged 58, has, in his lifetime, only been to Casablanca once; twice to Meknes, and about half a dozen times to Midelt. Being without a TV set does not make him feel in any way deprived. If he goes to Tounfit for ssuq al-h’ad (‘Sunday market’), he can always enter a café and watch “Crocodile Dundee” or “The Halls of Montezuma” dubbed into German. So what?

Brother and sister from Assaka, spring 1982 (photo: M. Peyron)

Like other Imazighen, and despite changing times, the Ayt Yahya endeavour to retain the qualities which they upheld in the Heroic Age: approachability, adaptability, honour, hospitality, industry, solidarity and belief in God. While some remain at home to eke out a living, a minority have emigrated, either to Midelt or some other Moroccan city, or even abroad. As old habits die hard, others join the Army, as did their forbears under the French, and many have fought in the Western Sahara. Poetry alone, together with the ah’idus dance, ever a powerful sign of “Berberdom” (timuzġa), still provides some measure of release.

HART D.M., 1993, “Four centuries of history on the hoof: the North-west passage of the Berber sheep transhumants across the Moroccan Atlas1550-1912”, Journal of the Society forMoroccan Studies, n°3: 21-55.