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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000275
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA AND PM/WRA
ACCRA ALSO FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D,ELIA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PINSASECCASCSOCIPGOVPINRSGGAPU
SUBJECT: DETERIORATION IN THE CASAMANCE
REF: A. 06 DAKAR 3016
¶B. 06 DAKAR 2597
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the Casamance,
initially somewhat successful, has proved unable to thwart
rebel activity. Violence, while still largely concentrated
in a northern triangle bordering on The Gambia, is becoming
increasingly significant in the key city of Bignona, and
rebel forces in the south, once seen as moderates, have twice
confronted Senegalese troops working with Moroccan deminers.
The death of Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor has further
diminished the influence of the rebel political wing over its
maquisards, and assassination of an elected leader has left
the Government with even fewer means of applying leverage.
While most Casamancais appear to want peace, the Government
lacks a coherent strategy to achieve it, and U.S. support has
not yet been able to move the process forward faster than
President Wade is prepared to move ahead. END SUMMARY.
GAUGING THE DECLINE
-------------------
¶2. (C) In recent weeks, the Ambassador, DCM, EmbOffs and
PADCO representative Yinka Oyinlola have met with most of the
government and Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance
(MFDC) officials involved in the Casamance peace process.
When the Ambassador saw Mbaye Jacques Diop, the President of
the Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs,
he confidently predicted that peace talks would resume in
early 2007. On January 24, Minister of Interior Ousmane Ngom
told the Ambassador that the peace process &has been more
difficult than expected.8
¶3. (C) On January 8, DCM, AGATT, AIDOff, and PADCO
representative met with Minister of Agriculture Farba
Senghor, the new &Mr. Casamance,8 and informed him of U.S.
efforts to support the Casamance peace process. Minister
Senghor, a Serere, had clearly been in contact with many MFDC
and Casamance leaders since President Wade asked him to
assist in the peace process in November. Senghor said the
MFDC armed factions (Atika, Kassolol and the Movement for the
Liberation of the Casamance People) are more united than they
have been in some time. He stressed, however, that we should
not infer that increased banditry in the Casamance and the
attacks on deminers or on late Ziguinchor Regional Council
President Oumar Lamine Badji were coordinated.
THE FRAGILITY OF PEACE
----------------------
¶4. (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the northern
Casamance initially seemed successful, though the policy
decision to apply force was criticized by some. Having
removed hard-line Salif Sadio,s Atika or MLPC faction of the
MFDC from its Bissau-Guinean bases and driven it into Gambian
refuge, the military appeared then to have limited Sadio's
capacity to mount significant attacks in the northern part of
the region as well. As of our last visit to The Casamance in
late October, we found that while Sadio retained the capacity
for small-scale attacks and banditry, there was reason to
hope that violence would decrease (Ref B).
¶5. (C) In a January 22 trip to Ziguinchor and Bignona,
however, visiting AF/W Desk Officer Dorsey Lockhart and
Embassy Officers found what Regional Governor Leopold Wade
described as "a delicate period, in which we don't know the
real causes of renewed violence and can't judge their
significance for the peace process." Casamancais have been
jolted by a sequence of violence, including:
-- banditry that peaked in December and may have been driven
by the confluence of three important holidays;
-- the New Year's Eve assassination of Ziguinchor Regional
Council President Oumar Lamine Badji. The case is still
being investigated: the alleged perpetrator is said to be an
MFDC member, but even Wade has said "the theory should not be
given precedence," that it was ordered by the MFDC or related
to the peace process. There are suspicions the crime was
political.
-- armed attacks on Senegalese deminers who were supporting
500 Moroccan deminers who departed Senegal last week: three
Senegalese deminers were injured by a mine near Bignona on
December 19, two Senegalese soldiers were killed and a dozen
DAKAR 00000275 002 OF 004
wounded in an ambush on a truck convoy north of Bignona on
December 20, and there were armed attacks on January 18 and
25 in the south of the region by the until recently moderate
armed faction headed by Caesar Badiatte.
¶6. (C) Beyond these high-profile events, we found concern
about a generalized climate of uncertainty. The Military
Zone Commander, Colonel Sow, stressed to us that he was
successful in keeping Ziguinchor and major routes open and
safe. Human rights activist Emile Dieme and developmental
worker Abdoulaye Diallo, in contrast, told us army troops in
the region's second city, Bignona, declined to patrol at
night, and that the city was completely open to rebel
activity after dark. They said Salif Sadio had recently
appointed younger fighters to replace older commanders whom
Dakar had targeted as possibly open to compromise, and that
he had redeployed into relatively remote forest areas for
safe refuge.
ABBE'S DEATH LEAVES LEADERSHIP VACUUM
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) We called separately on Catholic Bishop Maixent Coly
and Bertrand Diamacoune to deliver our condolences on the
recent death of the aged MFDC leader, Father Diamacoune. The
Bishop reminded us that the Catholic Church had not agreed
with the Abbe on regional independence. Bertrand told us the
MFDC would now adopt a collegial leadership rather than
replace his brother with a single individual. Others doubt
the feasibility of any leadership containing four or five
competitors, including:
-- Bertrand himself, a master politician known for his
appreciation of government generosity but who apparently has
little or no support among the MFDC maquisards;
-- Ansoumana Badji, who was once enlisted and failed as the
GOS' liaison with the maquisards and is seen as a
Dakar-sponsored interloper;
-- Jean Marie Francois Biagui, once the Abbe's most trusted
deputy, retains the image of a young Parisian civil servant,
though he did adopt a much more radical tone with us than he
has ever done before;
-- Separate from the first three, who form something of an
alliance of convenience, is the Paris exile Nkrumah Sane, who
has benefited in recent days after the incident with
deminers, when Caesar Badiatte defended him as the Abbe's
legitimate successor; and
-- A dark horse, Abdoulaye Diedhiou, who despite or because
of his fascist thug persona has managed to maintain links
with both the diplomatic community and the maquisards. He is
in The Gambia, by various accounts either taking refuge or
seeking the release from jail of another moderate leader,
Magne Dieme, who has been imprisoned by the Gambian
Government.
WHO CAN MEDIATE THIS CONFLICT?
------------------------------
¶8. (C) None of President Wade's designated negotiators, most
recently Agriculture Minister and Senegalese Democratic Party
(PDS) apparatchik Senghor, has succeeded in establishing any
personal influence in the Casamance. Bignona Mayor and
ex-Minister of Defense Youba Sambou, believes the "Cadres
Casamancais," a group of Casamance "executives" encouraged by
Wade, and especially Cadres member Badji before his
assassination, have been filling this gap to a limited
degree. Sambou told Desk Officer Lockhart, though, that
there is an "absence of clarity on the government's points of
negotiation ... no precise mandate to carry out these
negotiations and no roadmap (balisage) for proceeding." He
said "negotiators have failed because working with the MFDC
requires a sophisticated and deep knowledge of ethnic Diola
sociology. The 'northerners' never talk to those with real
power."
¶9. (C) The Government must, Sambou insists, do several
things to achieve peace. First, Wade must abandon the notion
that he can "force capitulation ... that shows he just
doesn't understand the Jola." Wade and the Army must
understand that operations such as the Moroccan-assisted
demining are forcing moderates such as Caesar Badiatte to
seek new accords with hardliner Sadio; future demining
operations must be undertaken if at all only after
consultations with the MFDC. Third, the best way to lower
tensions is by building road infrastructure such as a new
road to Cape Skirring or a ring road around Bignona.
DAKAR 00000275 003 OF 004
Finally, Wade must turn to a Casamancais as mediator and
negotiator, including especially Ziguinchor Mayor Robert
Sagna, or Sambou himself.
THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT
-----------------------
¶10. (C) Two days after MFDC President Diamacoune,s death in
Paris on January 14, DCM, DATT and PADCO representative met
with Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CHOD) Major General
Abdoulaye Fall. We brought Fall up to date on U.S. efforts
to promote peace, urged the Government to seize the
opportunity presented by Diamacoune,s passing, and sought
Fall,s views. Fall was frank with us in acknowledging that
the GOS lacks a coherent Casamance strategy and that
President Wade has a proclivity for assigning a new &Mr.
Casamance8 every few months while delegating very little
authority. Fall disagreed with Minister Senghor,s analysis
and stressed that the MFDC is very factionalized at present,
adding it would be easier to work with a unified movement.
Fall asserted that even as The Gambia detains key MFDC
Kassolol leaders, it says it is encouraging unity. Fall
alleged that President Yahya Jammeh is also providing arms.
As for recent attacks, with the exceptions of the ambushes of
deminers and with the possible exception of the Badji
assassination, the rebels have been committing economic
rather than political crimes.
¶11. (C) We went straight from the CHOD,s office to Gendarme
Commander Major General Abdoulaye Fall,s office. This
General Abdoulaye Fall used to be &Mr. Casamance,8 but he
was relieved of those duties when President Wade decided to
stop providing the MFDC with monetary payments in favor of
some food and medicine channeled through the Senegalese Red
Cross/Red Crescent and then nothing in recent months, except
provision of housing for a few MFDC leaders and very limited
funds for Father Diamacoune,s funeral. This Fall echoed the
other General Fall,s analysis. He said Diamacoune leaves no
obvious successor. His brother, Bertrand, lacks his stature;
after all his years in Paris, Nkrumah Sane is &French;8
former Secretary General Badji is &Portuguese8 after all
his time in Portugal; and current Secretary General
Jean-Marie Badji is not up to the task. Fall thought
demining at this juncture could be a mistake, but his greater
concern is the flow of arms through Guinea-Bissau. Both
General Falls fear that if President Joao Bernardo &Nino8
Vieira is not vigilant, his former party, the African Party
for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC),
could resume its historical support for the MFDC.
¶12. (C) Last but not least, we met with Brigadier General
Ibrahima Gabar Diop, President Wade's personal military
advisor and his intelligence chief. Diop, who graduated from
the U.S. Army War College and retired from the military on
January 25, agreed with our analysis that Father
Diamacoune,s death could lead to either a protracted
leadership battle or be an opportunity. Like every other GOS
leader with whom we have met, Diop insisted that most
Casamancais now want peace rather than independence. He said
that the CHOD has been following through on the President,s
desire to reestablish state authority and to end the MFDC,s
narcotics growing and trafficking. He also underscored that
The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau must be involved in the peace
process for it to succeed.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) The government's decision to reoccupy demilitarized
zones of the Casamance, after some initial success, has
failed to eliminate violence and in some cases may have
provoked it. The effort to demine some areas with Moroccan
assistance, undertaken without informing the MFDC in advance,
seems to be driving a moderate faction of the maquisards into
renewed communication with hardliners. The MFDC seems to
have free rein of Bignona city by night, when army troops
tend to hunker down, and the feeling of insecurity is
deepening.
¶14. (C) At the same time, leadership on Casamance issues is
in disarray at all levels. President Wade is accused of
having abandoned the peace process in favor of pushing for
rebel capitulation. Whether true or not, it is evident that
none of his series of chief advisors and negotiators has
achieved any real breakthrough. On the MFDC side, Abbe
Diamacoune's death has left the civilian wing leaderless, and
his would-be replacements are jockeying to replace him.
Whoever succeeds will exercise even less influence than the
Abbe over the several factions of MFDC maquisards. In the
absence of leadership, real negotiations or investment, there
DAKAR 00000275 004 OF 004
has been a rise in MFDC recruitment, banditry and general
disenchantment with the peace process.
¶15. (C) President Wade probably had a brief window of
opportunity some months ago, as hardliners were squeezed
geographically and moderates seemed open to negotiation. The
window was partially closed by the Abbe's death and by
moderate maquisards' reaction to Moroccan deminers. It is
also true, though, that Wade has been almost totally
concentrated on re-election, and therefore appeared focused
on achieving a military solution rather than on investing
political and economic efforts in the region. The result is
a return to violence and disarray approaching if not equal to
that which preceded the beginning of the peace process in
late 2003. END COMMENT.
¶16. (U) AF/W Desk Officer Lockhart did not have an
opportunity to clear this cable prior to her departure.
¶17. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
JACOBS