Friday, February 25, 2011

General Zia and DGISI Akhtar Abdur Rahman had very cordial relations with CIA director William Casey. To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. According to one close associate of Akhtar, ‘They (Casey and Akhtar) worked together in harmony, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust’. The most interesting remarks about the death of CIA Director, William Casey were made by Brigadier Yusuf. He states that, “It was a great blow to the Jehad when Casey died”. He did not elaborate whether by this definition one should count Casey as Shaheed (warrior who dies in battle in the cause of Islam). It will quite be amusing for Americans to know that one of their former CIA director is actually a martyr of Islam. In fifty-five years, we have come full circle, and in 2002, a retired Major General laments about the US and gives a long list of grievances. He states, “Discarding General Ziaul Haq when no more needed must never be forgotten. The treatment meted out to Pakistan after the victory in Afghanistan in late eighties cannot be forgiven ... REFERENCE: Silent Soldier: The Man Behind The Afghan Jehad, Mohammad Yousaf(Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993, Tenth Edition), p.80 and p. 81 as quoted in Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Pakistan's ISI spy agency is ready to split with the CIA because of frustration over what it calls heavy-handed pressure and its anger over what it believes is a covert U.S. operation involving hundreds of contract spies, according to a document obtained by The Associated Press and interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials. Such a move could seriously damage the U.S war effort in Afghanistan, limit a program targeting al-Qaida insurgents along the Pakistan frontier, and restrict Washington's access to information in the nuclear-armed country. According to a statement drafted by the ISI, supported by interviews with officials, an already-fragile relationship between the two agencies collapsed following the shooting death of two Pakistanis by Raymond Davis, a U.S. contracted spy who is in jail in Pakistan facing possible multiple murder charges. "Post-incident conduct of the CIA has virtually put the partnership into question," said a media statement prepared by the ISI but never released. A copy was obtained this week by the AP. The statement accused the CIA of using pressure tactics to free Davis. "It is hard to predict if the relationship will ever reach the level at which it was prior to the Davis episode," the statement said. "The onus of not stalling this relationship between the two agencies now squarely lies on the CIA." The ISI fears there are hundreds of CIA contracted spies operating in Pakistan without the knowledge of either the Pakistan government or the intelligence agency, a senior Pakistani intelligence official told the AP in an interview. He spoke only on condition he not be identified on grounds that exposure would compromise his security. REFERENCE: Pakistan's intelligence ready to split with CIA By KATHY GANNON and ADAM GOLDMAN The Associated Press Thursday, February 24, 2011; 7:40 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/24/AR2011022402139.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/24/AR2011022402139_2.html

Now, we come to the second generation of officers who were in key decision-making positions during 80s. Former Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General (Retd) Hameed Gul’s anti-American rhetoric in post-retirement phase makes headlines off and on in national news media. It is interesting that when he was DGISI, US ambassador attended the meetings of Afghan Cell of Benazir government. In fact the major decision of Jalalabad offensive in 1989 was made in one of those fateful meetings. To date there has been no evidence (no statement by any other participants of those meetings or by General Hameed Gul himself) that Mr. Gul made any objection to the presence of US ambassador in these meetings, which had wide ranging impact on national security. It is probable that Mr. Gul was at that time a top contender for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) race, therefore he didn’t wanted to be on the wrong side of the civil government. When he was sacked, then he found the gospel truth that US was not sincere. Another example is of former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, Brigadier (Retd) Muhammad Yusuf. For five long years, he was a major participant in a joint CIA-ISI venture of unprecedented scale in Afghanistan. During this time period, he worked with several different level US officials and visited CIA headquarters in Langley. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, ‘Relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained’, ‘I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff’, ‘I never visited the US embassy’ and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows his uncomfortability of being seen as close with the Americans. REFERENCE: Bear Trap p. 91 Yousaf, Muhammad and Atkins, as quoted in Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm

Hamid Gul, a retired general, accuses Mr Sharif of having presided over an administration which had failed to deliver the goods. "Sharif turned out to be a great destroyer of national institutions," he told the BBC. "Look at what he did to the judiciary. "He stripped them of power, put a set of judges against the chief justice, did the same to the press. "He gagged the parliament and finally he wanted to do the same to the army." REFERENCE: World: South Asia Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted Wednesday, October 13, 1999 Published at 23:20 GMT 00:20 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/473297.stm

Only an American General and a Retired Pakistani General i.e. Hamid Gul could have supported a Military Coup:)

WASHINGTON, Sept 29: "If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If Musharraf fails, hardliners could take over, or fundamentalists, or chaos. We can't let Musharraf fail." This remark is attributed to Gen Anthony C. Zinni, who retired as head of the US central command last month, in the second of a series of articles by The Washington Post examining the political and diplomatic clout of regional commanders-in-chief of the US armed forces. In the first instalment published in Thursday's issue (and reported in Dawn on Friday), it was stated that it was Gen Zinni whom Gen Musharraf had first contacted when the latter had received a "stern protest" from the US administration after his coup ousting Nawaz Sharif. In the same article, Gen Zinni had also claimed that he had persuaded the Clinton administration to keep the diplomatic door to Pakistan open rather than clamp it shut as advocated by others. The instalment published on Friday is largely confined to Gen Zinni's preoccupations with the Central Asian Republics. It says a US team will train 300 Kyrgyztanis in counter-terrorism by next year to confront the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan whose fighters had last year swept into Kyrgyzstan on their way to Uzbekistan. Gen Zinni implies that the US could endanger moderate Iranian president Mohammad Khatemi's efforts at reform by too soon showing an inclination towards backing the moderates. REFERENCE: US can't let Musharraf fail: Zinni DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 2000 Issue:06/ http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/sep30.html#usca

General Hameed Gul Exposed

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=st7NcKQkibU&feature=related

Same General Hamid Gul in 2010 on Mr. Nawaz Sharif

Mian Mohd Nawaz Sharif was Investment By ISI Said Hameed Gul on JawabDeh Special Report

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRyWA5LD0LM&feature=related

WASHINGTON, March 1: A key US general on Tuesday pleaded for the need for a continuous dialogue with Pakistan saying isolating the country would be counter-productive to long-term US regional interests. Gen Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief of US central command forces, who has visited Pakistan several times, told a Senate committee he was in constant touch with Gen Pervez Musharraf since he assumed power on Oct 12. His strong plea to the Congress to keep Pakistan engaged in some sort of a dialogue came during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the US defence budget, at the Capitol Hill on Tuesday. Gen Zinni said after the Oct 12 coup in Pakistan "the dynamics of our relations with Pakistan had changed dramatically." "While a return to a democratically-elected government remains an important US strategic interest, the reality of an interim period of military and technocratic rule in Pakistan seems inevitable," Zinni said.

Jawab Deh - 7th March 2010 - Hamid Gull - Must Watch - Part 1

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZhehbH2lhQ&feature=related

He continued: "Because of the historic importance of the military as a source of stability within the country, I believe that isolating Pakistan's influential military establishment is, and will continue to be, counter-productive to our long-term interests in the region." The general emphasised that if US isolates the professional military, "we deny ourselves access to the most powerful institution in Pakistani society." He said that may hamper our non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts and stressed that in the larger strategic sense Pakistan could play a stabilising role in the region. His statement also comes at a crucial time when the Clinton Administration is in the middle of taking a decision whether the president should stop over in Pakistan during his forthcoming South Asia tour.

Jawab Deh - 7th March 2010 - Hamid Gull - Must Watch - Part 2

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nxnGfZp5Hc&feature=related

The top US general recalled that Pakistani participation in numerous military programmes had been restricted by the 1990 sanctions. "As a result we are rapidly losing contact with a generation of Pakistani military officers who are now serving in key leadership positions." Gen Zinni said given the strong role played by the armed forces in Pakistani society, "losing this contact weakens our influence with many of their key military leaders and government policy-makers." He then recalled his personal acquaintance with Gen Musharraf saying "I know the general well and have spoken to him on several occasions since his assumption of power." "I believe that our strategic interests in South Asia, and beyond, will be best served by a policy of patient military-to- military engagement, as it effects difficult, internal reforms in Pakistan." REFERENCE: US to suffer if Pakistan isolated: General DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 4 March 2000 Issue : 06/10 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/mar04.html#usto

Jawab Deh - 7th March 2010 - Hamid Gull - Must Watch - Part 3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1s45v_JYDE&feature=related

But in the anguish which this event has triggered there is a strong element of naivete. Nawaz Sharif, unarguably the hero of this drama, may have tripped over himself. But then, to be honest, would it have been realistic to expect a different performance from him? Throughout this crisis he was himself, true to his basic instincts. The impulsiveness and shortsightedness which characterized this operation; the total absence of institutional consultation; the panic and wild mood swings when it became clear that the army had bitten off more than it could chew; the lesson in adult literacy at the hands of General Zinni; the dash to Washington dictated by the need to procure a fig-leaf to cover Pakistan's blunder; the first family's photo session with Clinton the morning after the debacle; and, crowning everything, the prime minister's shopping in New York on his way home from Washington - these were things entirely in character. But if Nawaz Sharif is not to be blamed for what he is - indeed if anyone is to expiate for his sins it is the nation which gave him his 'heavy mandate' - the army command cannot shirk its share of the responsibility for the Kargil disaster. No one forced it to undertake this venture for which the planning and preparations must have gone on for a long time. Did it not weigh the pros and cons with the care that was necessary? Did it have to be instructed by a General Zinni into the risks Pakistan was incurring by persisting with this venture?

Jawab Deh - 7th March 2010 - Hamid Gull - Must Watch - Part 4.wmv

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HozlremjP9A&feature=related

The army's avowed raison d'etre for looming large in national life is that it is the only organized force in the country, the guardian of its external and internal stability. But if most people in Pakistan happily go along with this claim and think it right for the defence forces to get the lion's share of national resources, they also expect from the armed forces a high standard of conduct and a commensurate sense of responsibility. Small wonder then that when politicians make a mess of things, well-meaning Pakistanis look to the army for deliverance. Mistaken as this belief is, because the army's share in worsening national problems is no less than that of the political elite, the fact remains that it is there. How cruel the shock then when the army command (not the army as a whole) is seen as being an equal party to the nation's humiliation. At least in Chakwal, the heart of the so-called martial belt from where the army gets its recruits, the feeling against the Washington climbdown runs deep.

Jawab Deh - 7th March 2010 - Hamid Gull - Must Watch - Part 5

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tIIn-6Y4kM&feature=related

The failure of leadership is thus total. By shooting itself in the foot, the army command has diminished its ability to look the civilian leadership in the eye. Accordingly, just when the nation stood the most in need of consultative government, the trend of the last two years towards concentrating power in the prime minister's person is set to become more pronounced. In that case, who or what will temper the fatal simplicities of the heavy mandate? The prime minister has reduced his own party to a cipher. Other political parties live in press statements alone. In the distance the muffled roll of fundamentalist drums is getting louder. The outlook for the country is grim. ref: Abdication of leadership Ayaz Amir DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 17 July 1999 Issue : 05/29 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/17jul99.html#abdi

Where was this present wisdom above when we were [RAED PAKISTAN and Saudi Arabia] playing footsie with the US CIA and the same Bush/Cheney Cabal who basically were the backbone in Ronald Reagan Administration [US Afghan Jihad Admistration from 1979-1989]. You are wrong above on Bin Laden as well because Bin Laden was hired by Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud in the late 70s to do the dirty work of Afghan Jihad read: Introduction of Prince Turki al-Faisal by Giuseppe Anzera: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GH19Ak01.html

CIA Director William Casey makes a secret visit to Pakistan to plan a strategy to defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Casey is flown to secret training camps near the Afghan border where he watches trainees fire weapons and make bombs. According to the Washington Post, “During the visit, Casey startled his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they take the Afghan war into enemy territory—into the Soviet Union itself. Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet Union’s predominantly Muslim southern republics.” The Pakistanis agree to the plan and soon the CIA begins sending subversive literature and thousands of Korans to Soviet republics such as Uzbekistan. Mohammad Yousaf, a Pakistani general who attended the meeting, will later say that Casey said, “We can do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union.” [Washington Post, 7/19/1992] This will eventually evolve into CIA and ISI sponsored Afghan attacks inside the Soviet Union (see 1984-March 1985 and 1985-1987).

NBC News later reports that CIA Director William Casey secretly meets with the head of the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) from 1984 until 1986, shortly before Casey’s death. The NBC report, quoting unnamed BCCI sources, will claim that Casey met with BCCI head Agha Hasan Abedi every few months in a luxury suite at the Madison Hotel in Washington. The two men allegedly discussed the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages transactions and CIA weapons shipments to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. The CIA denies all the allegations. [Associated Press, 2/21/1992] But books by Time magazine and Wall Street Journal reporters will corroborate that Casey repeatedly met with Abedi. [Scott, 2007, pp. 116] Casey also meets with Asaf Ali, a BCCI-connected arms dealer, in Washington, DC, and in Pakistan. On one occasion, Casey has a meeting in Washington with Abedi, Ali, and Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 308] COURTESY: http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=william_casey

Ronald Reagan in the mid-1980s, when the CIA was backing the Mujahideen warriors in Afghanistan, likened them to our “founding fathers,” meaning George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and others. Reagan made no distinctions in his declaration among the fundamentalists, apparently lumping together many torturers and rapists among the Mujahideen along with radical fundamentalists like bin Laden. I didn’t agree with Reagan characterization of the Mujahideen then, and I certainly disagree today with praising those who carried out the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The following statement is based on lectures I delivered at five universities in New England and New York as the U.S. war unfolded in Afghanistan. In preparing the statement I am particularly indebted to a paper by Michael Klare, “Asking Why” and an article by Stephen Zunes, “U.S. Policy Toward Political Islam,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 12, 2001. Understanding the First War of the Twenty-First Century By Roger Burbach http://www.publiceye.org/frontpage/911/burbach.html

Steve Coll ends his important book on Afghanistan -- Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 10 September 2001--by quoting Afghan President Hamid Karzai: "What an unlucky country." Americans might find this a convenient way to ignore what their government did in Afghanistan between 1979 and the present, but luck had nothing to do with it. Brutal, incompetent, secret operations of the U.S. Central intelligence Agency, frequently manipulated by the military intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, caused the catastrophic devastation of this poor country. On the evidence contained in Coll's book Ghost Wars, neither the Americans nor their victims in numerous Muslim and Third World countries will ever know peace until the Central Intelligence Agency has been abolished.

It should by now be generally accepted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 was deliberately provoked by the United States. In his memoir published in 1996, the former CIA director Robert Gates made it clear that the American intelligence services began to aid the mujahidin guerrillas not after the Soviet invasion, but six months before it. In an interview two years later with Le Nouvel Observateur, President Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proudly confirmed Gates's assertion. "According to the official version of history," Brzezinski said, "CIA aid to the mujahidin began during 1980, that's to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. But the reality, kept secret until now, is completely different: on 3 July 1979 President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And on the same day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention. "

Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: 'We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.'

Nouvel Observateur: "And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?" Brzezinski: "What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?"

Even though the demise of the Soviet Union owes more to Mikhail Gorbachev than to Afghanistan' s partisans, Brzezinski certainly helped produce "agitated Muslims," and the consequences have been obvious ever since. Carter, Brzezinski and their successors in the Reagan and first Bush administrations, including Gates, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Colin Powell, all bear some responsibility for the 1.8 million Afghan casualties, 2.6 million refugees, and 10 million unexploded land-mines that followed from their decisions. They must also share the blame for the blowback that struck New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. After all, al-Qaida was an organization they helped create and arm.

TalkBack w/ Wajahat Khan & Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul Ep10 Pt1

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1PCeSiMjAo

Charles Nesbitt Wilson (born June 1, 1933), is a former United States naval officer and former Democratic United States Representative from the 2nd congressional district in Texas. He is best known for leading Congress into supporting the largest-ever CIA covert operation, which supplied the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan after the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan took over during the Afghan Civil War and asked the Soviet Union to help suppress resistance from Mujahideen. In the 1980s, Charles Wilson, a colorful and powerful Democrat from the East Texas Bible Belt, was a member of a Congressional appropriations sub-committee. From that position of power he funneled billions of dollars in secret funding to the CIA, which used the money to purchase weapons to help the mujahideen drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. In those days, the mujahideen were viewed by the US as "freedom fighters" and were so-named by then-president Ronald Reagan, who praised them for "defending principles of independence and freedom that form the basis of global security and stability".

TalkBack w/ Wajahat Khan & Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul Ep10 Pt2

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OArBvjFRa40&feature=related

In that Cold War environment, chasing the Russians out of the country trumped all other considerations. Among the weapons funded by Congress were hundreds of Stinger missile systems that mujahideen forces used to counter the Russians' lethal Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships. And there were also tens of thousands of automatic weapons, antitank guns, and satellite intelligence maps. According to author George Crile, Wilson even brought his own belly dancer from Texas to Cairo to entertain the Egyptian defense minister, who was secretly supplying the mujahideen with millions of rounds of ammunition for the AK-47s the CIA was smuggling into Afghanistan. From a few million dollars in the early 1980s, support for the resistance grew to about $750 million a year by the end of the decade. Decisions were made in secret by Wilson and other lawmakers on the appropriations committee.

“Charlie Wilson’s War by George Crile during the so-called Afghan Jihad following things did happen;

“He told Zia about his experience the previous year when the Israelis had shown him the vast stores of Soviet weapons they had captured from the PLO in Lebanon. The weapons were perfect for the Mujahideen, he told Zia. If Wilson could convince the CIA to buy them, would Zia have any problems passing them on to the Afghans? Zia, ever the pragmatist, smiled on the proposal, adding, “Just don’t put any Stars of David on the boxes” {Page 131-132}.

TalkBack w/ Wajahat Khan & Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul Ep10 Pt3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s2OPdhpV8Ao&feature=related

“There were frightening posters and official briefings from the moment the soldiers got off the transport planes at Bagram Air Base, whispers about what had happened to their colleagues. They all knew about the fanatic Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s practice of leaving armless and legless Soviet soldiers on the road. {Page 288-489}.

“Hart {Station Chief of CIA in Pakistan in Afghan War days} himself, however, was deeply suspicious, even angered by Massoud’s refusal to move on the Salang Highway. He passed on his doubts to Langley, along with the ISI’s crude joke about the unmanly nature of Massoud’s Tajik: “When a Pashtun wants to make love to a woman, his first choice is always a Tajik man.” {Page 199}.

TalkBack w/ Wajahat Khan & Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul Ep10 Pt4

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fme186thbXQ&feature=related

“In London, Avrakotos asked for a personal meeting with MI6 {British Intelligence}’s Massoud expert. He turned out to be a young, blond SAS guerilla-warfare expert with the peculiar nickname of Awk, a name said to vaguely resemble the grunting noise he would make on maneuvers. Awk had just returned from three months inside the war zone. It was about a two-week journey in those days, walking north from the Pakistan border through Nuristan and the Hindu Kush to reach Massoud’s valley. Awk had gone in with two other SAS commandos. Their report had astonished Avrakotos. “There was one passage in there that really got me,” remembers Avrakotos. “This guy was sleeping with a couple of his buddies and he said he awoke one night and heard horrible groans. He didn’t get up but was able to put on his night-vision goggles and saw a group of Massoud’s guy literally cornholing a Russian prisoner.” {Page 199}.

“At MI6 headquarters Awk told Avrakotos that watching that man die had made him finally understand the Afghans, ancient code: “Honours, hospitality, and revenge.” Raping an infidel was not the atrocity it would be in the West; it was simply revenge. {Page 199}.

“To begin with, anyone defecting to the Dushman {enemy} would have to be a crook, a thief, or someone who wanted to get corn holed everyday, because nine out of ten prisoners were dead within twenty-four hours and they were always turned into concubines by the mujahideen. {Page 332}.

TalkBack w/ Wajahat Khan & Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul Ep10 Pt5

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w2aar_XUMlA&feature=related

“At one point Avrakotos {CIA officer responsible for Afghan Jihad} arrived for one of these White House sessions armed with five huge photographic blowups. Before unveiling them he explained that they would provide a useful understanding of the kind of experience a Soviet soldier could expect to have should he surrender the mujahideen. One of them showed two Russians sergeants being used as concubines. Another had a Russian hanging from the turret of a tank with a vital part of his anatomy removed.” {Page 333}.

“The CIA found itself in the preposterous position of having to pony up $ 50, 000 to bribe the Afghans to deliver two live ones {Russian Prisoners}. “These two guys were basket cases,” says Avrakotos. “One had been ****ed so many times he didn’t know what was going on” {Page 333}.

“She was Zia’s most trusted American adviser, as per Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, She absolutely had his ear, it was terrible,” “Zia would leave cabinet meetings just to take Joanne’s calls. “There was no affair with Zia,” Wilson recalls, but it’s impossible to deal with Joanne and not deal with her on sexual basis. No matter who you are, you take those phone calls.” {Page 67-68}.

The fear of an Islamic threat has been the driving force behind most Western countries’ foreign policies toward Pakistan in recent years. The possibility that violent Islamists will kill President Pervez Musharraf, throw Pakistan into turmoil, take over the country and its nuclear weapons, and escalate regional terrorism has dominated the psychological and political landscape. Such fears have usually led to support of the Pakistani military as the only institution able to contain the danger. But the Islamist threat is neither as great nor as autonomous as many assume. True, Pakistan has experienced more than its share of religious violence, both sectarian and jihadi. But serious law-and-order problems do not mean the fate of the state is at stake. No Islamic organization has ever been in a position to politically or militarily challenge the role of the one and only center of power in Pakistan: the army. On the contrary, the Pakistani Army has used Islamic organizations for its purposes, both at home and abroad. Islamist organizations balance the power of rival mainstream political parties, preserving the army’s role as national arbiter. The army has nurtured and sometimes deployed violent Islamists in Afghanistan (with U.S. support at first), Kashmir, and other hot spots on the subcontinent.

Although the army’s control is solid, the situation is not without risks: a few of the militants have turned against the army because of Pakistan’s “betrayal” of the Taliban and cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and in the “war on terror.” Moreover, the infrastructure that supports regional sectarian ism and Kashmir-Afghan jihadi activities can be hijacked for international terrorism, as demonstrated by the July 2005 London bomb blasts. The risk of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, triggered by attacks similar to the ones carried out by the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba in Delhi after the October 2005 earthquake, cannot be dismissed either.

Yet evidence is scant that these organizations pose an uncontrollable threat. Also, a Pakistan headed by an Islamist party would not necessarily be unstable. In fact, in the existing power setup, politico-religious organizations have often been used to channel popular resentment in a socially and politically acceptable way, preventing unrest. What the West perceives as a threat to the regime in Pakistan are manifestations of the Pakistani Army’s tactics to maintain political control. The army uses its need for modernist order to justify its continued claim on power and, with The risk of an Islamist takeover in Pakistan is a myth invented by the Pakistani military to consolidate its hold on power.

In fact, religious political parties and militant organizations are manipulated by the Pakistani Army to achieve its own objectives, domestically and abroad.The army, not the Islamists, is the real source of insecurity on the subcontinent. Sustainable security and stability in the region will be achieved only through the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The West should actively promote the demilitarization of Pakistan’s political life through a mix of political pressure and capacity building. Enlarging the pool of elites and creating alternative centers of power will be essential for developing a working democracy in Pakistan.

ISLAMABAD: US President George W. Bush’s 26-hour visit to Pakistan was marked by a thick veil of secrecy and security. Throughout his stay a tense calm prevailed in the capital with the country’s entire security apparatus, civilian and military, mobilised in top gear. Added to this was the battalion of American security personnel that created their own sophisticated security web at all sensitive points from Chaklala airbase to the Aiwan-i-Sadr to the US embassy. For the Pakistani media it was a long wait for Bush’s arrival at Chaklala that looked more like a US military base with Americans all over the place. Their large presence made Pakistani citizens feel like aliens. We were even frisked for security clearance by Americans in the open air. Also, one saw a shocking display of what one had hitherto heard of branded as American arrogance and insolence. Chewing-gum-chomping US security men barged in and out of the arrival lounge, as if walking into their private workspace. Even the daunting American sniffer dogs, with high-ranking titles like Sergeant and Major, specially flown in from Washington, felt quite at home. The usually all-pervasive Pakistani military men at the airbase were pushed into the backseat by the US security team headed by a highly-charged man called Mark.

Terse exchanges were also witnessed between the US security head and Pakistani military officers present there. On seeing a 35-member Pakistani media team arrive in a coaster at the airbase, four hours ahead of Bush’s arrival, Mark told the ISPR officer accompanying them: “I don’t need this bunch of people.” It was only after a little argument that the team was ‘allowed’ in. Later, he was furious because apparently at the main gate he had been held back by some Pakistani guard. Getting down from his car in a huff he said in a raised and threatening tone: “This is bullshit, I’ll talk to the general.” Probably his reference was to ISPR chief Maj-Gen Shaukat Sultan. The ISPR officers on duty were visibly irked by the high-handed American attitude and one of them had a showdown with Mark earlier in the day and had told him not to dictate terms but that had no effect. Amid all the security salsa with hi-tech American gadgetry, a s****y BMW outside the airbase terminal suddenly alarmed the American secret service agents when it started billowing smoke. The BMW was part of the elaborate US president’s Washington-imported cavalcade that had just lined up in the parking lot. It later transpired that the car radiator had heated up.

President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush commuted in Cobra and Black Hawk gunship helicopters during their brief stay in the capital. Land and aerial security cover were provided by heavily-armed vehicles and choppers that also included Chinooks. US secret service men and women were visible at entry points and on rooftops during the Musharraf-Bush summit at the Aiwan-i-Sadr. They looked rather suspiciously at every person and vehicle entering the premises. Helicopters hovered above the presidency while Mr Bush was there. Even as the two leaders emerged from their summit meeting and walked towards the majestic courtyard of the Aiwan-i-Sadr, there was a feeling perhaps their body language did not emanate the kind of cordiality witnessed at their two earlier summit meetings, at the White House in February 2002 and at Camp David in June 2003. As expected the questions from the American media were on war on terror and democracy while those from the Pakistani media focussed Kashmir, civilian nuclear technology and beef in the strategic relations.

Even in the seating arrangement there was a clear division, with the American media on one side and the Pakistani media on the other. Both in front of their respective leaders and both well controlled. There was a telling statement by a senior American journalist who covers the White House and was in the media team accompanying the US president: “There is no such thing as independent media in the US any more, particularly after 9/11. It is now all corporate driven and any one who challenges the US administration’s national security policies, his or her patriotism is challenged by the White House.” An interesting observation made by him was that the White House had tried to project Mr Bush’s visit to Pakistan as an assurance to Americans of his resolve to fight terrorism, that as commander-in-chief of America he was braving the high-risk ‘terrorist zones’ so he could engage with leaders there to strengthen US national security. The subtext of Mr Bush’s remarks at the press stakeout made that amply clear.

Yet another intriguing comment by this candid journalist was that the US media was being fed by some members of the Bush administration that if free and fair elections were held in Pakistan, there would be a danger of fundamentalists taking over the reins of power. His hunch was that this was perhaps an attempt by the White House to justify the Bush-Musharraf relationship. All took a sigh of relief when Air Force One flew off with Mr Bush and his delegation late on Saturday night at around 11pm. Life was finally back to normal. REFERENCE: Covering the Bush visit By Qudssia Akhlaque http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/08/fea.htm#1

As I left my office this evening I saw with apprehension three sinister dark helicopter gunships patrolling low over Islamabad. I wondered who they were protecting. Then I realised that a murderer, in fact a mass murderer, will be in town tomorrow. But the helicopters were not there to protect the people of Islamabad from this murderer but they were there to protect the murderer from the wrath of the people of the world. Tomorrow the most hated man in the world will be in town and will be welcomed by our President. Mush and Bush make a fine pair. Before Bush left Washington he said that he would ask Musharraf to close down terrorist camps in Pakistan. I wonder if our general will ask Bush to close down the biggest terror camp of them all, Guantanomo, where the terrorists are the US Army personnel who perform torture on the inmates. But why should he? He is after all implicated in these crimes against humanity. He and his Foreign Minister proudly proclaim that they are in the frontlines of the war against terror and that they have handed over more than 700 suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists to the US which incarcerates them illegally without trial and without recourse to any legal system in Guantanomo.

By their own words they admit that they have done illegal actions; midnight arrests of Pakistanis and foreigners and bundling into secret CIA flights without due process of law in front of Pakistani courts. So how can they protest? They are themselves complicit in these crimes against humanity, let alone the violation of the Pakistani constitution and Pakistani laws. But when did violation of the constitution or the law ever matter to the various generals who have run the country? Why should our good general protest about people illegally locked away in far Guantanomo? We have our own mini-Guantanomos right here in our own backyard. We have our own illegalities. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan hundreds of Pakistanis have disappeared in the last few years. They have been picked up by intelligence agencies and never heard of again. Are they being tortured? Are they dead? No answers are forthcoming. In the name of fighting Al-Qaeda Pakistani villages have been bombed not only by the Pakistan army but by the US and many Pakistani civilians, including women and children, have been killed. Tomorrow there will be in Islamabad a man whose hands are covered in the blood of the innocents massacred in Afghanistan, in Rafah, Jenin, Jabaliya, Gaza, Najaf, Fallujah, Samarrah, etc. The killing in Iraq continues. Not content with creating chaos in Iraq with a daily death toll of more than a hundred, Bush is now intent on attacking Iran. He is not only a murderer but a pyrotechnician. Nero does not hold a candle to him Nero was content to see Rome burn but this madman wants to see the whole of the Middle East burn.

Arundhati Roy in an excellent article in the Guardian today (1 March) said that Bush is not welcome in India. Equally he is not welcome in Pakistan. If it wasn't for the complete security blockade of Islamabad and if there was democracy (that so much abused concept) and freedom of assembly in Pakistan, Bush would be welcomed by demonstrations against his policies in the US and worldwide. There is no country in the world, outside the United States, where he can move freely and where he will not face demonstrations. However much his security detail and his ever-obliging hosts try to shield him, he knows that he is an unwelcome guest wherever he goes. REFERENCE: Faheem Hussain is a Pakistani physicist. He can be reached at: hussainf@ictp.it http://www.countercurrents.org/

ISLAMABAD: While Pakistan might have benefited from hardcore actionable intelligence provided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI in countering terrorism, one possible negative aspect has been the creation of a vast network of CIA and FBI agents – mostly Pakistanis. Though intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and the US multiplied extensively after 9/11 and was aimed at the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many in Pakistan fear the network for these foreign agencies within Pakistan was also being used for other tasks, some probably falling into the definition of interference in our internal affairs.

Top authorities in Pakistan are said to be in knowledge of this phenomenal spread in the American spy agencies’ network as the country's intelligence agencies have already reported this matter and even identified a number of those on the payroll of the US agencies.

Besides others, a large number of retired Army officers, including ex-brigadiers, are presently working here as American spies. An official of an intelligence agency, however, explained that spy agencies of different countries had their worldwide networks and they handled spy matters according to their resources and needs because importance of spying had increased tremendously after 9/11.

Because of the alleged presence of al-Qaeda-Taliban in Pakistan, the interest of the foreign intelligence agencies here has gone up. The official added that the US had the largest intelligence network in the world and Pakistan was also benefiting from this because through this network the CIA and FBI shared intelligence with Pakistan and gave important information to nab terrorists.

Pakistan allowed concessions to the US as part of intelligence cooperation in the controversial war on terror but some official sources are of the view that these concessions and their parameters were not being adhered to within the agreed limits. Foreign Office spokesman Muhammad Sadiq, when contacted, said he had no information of this sort. He said intelligence cooperation between Islamabad and Washington was a fact but doubted that the local agents could be hired. He, however, said if there was any interference in our matters by any foreign spying agencies, it was illegal and not allowed. Sadiq said the ISPR would be in a better position to respond to such questions. Director General ISPR and military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas, when asked about the feared massive expansion of local CIA and FBI agents in Pakistan after 9/11, said, "I don't think so." He added that the government would never allow the CIA or FBI to expand their network in Pakistan. "I deny this," the military spokesman said. A defence source, however, recently told this correspondent it was a routine operation of all agencies around the world to recruit agents for espionage in every country. He said CIA and FBI did not need to come to Pakistan and start recruiting their local agents here because they could do the same while sitting in Washington. "These things are neither cut and dried nor done in black and white but this always happens and cannot be denied," the source said

Caretaker Interior Minister Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz, when approached said the US influence was not only in Pakistan but also in almost every other country. He acknowledged that there was a feeling that the network of US intelligence agents had spread here but he had no proof with him to substantiate this. He, however, admitted that the US influence was there in all areas. The retired general, who has also been secretary defence for some years and left the job much after 9/11, said there was a standard rule that no foreign intelligence agent could subvert against the state. Elizabeth Colton, the Press Attache of the US embassy in Islamabad, told this correspondent, in response to a set of questions sent to her, that the Embassy could not discuss intelligence issues with the media. She said the Embassy had no comment on the questions sent to her which included one asking whether the Embassy or its legal section had any role in recruiting Pakistanis for CIA and FBI.

The Embassy was also asked whether they shared the concerns of some Pakistani authorities that the US intelligence agencies, which were given some concessions in the tribal belt of Pakistan, were crossing their limits and hurting the strategic interests of Pakistan. US National Intelligence Director Mike McConnel was quoted to have admitted recently that the US administration had already spent $50 billion during the current year on spying. A considerable chunk of this budget for spying is believed to have been spent on the US war on terror. Part of this money would have also travelled to Pakistan to pay off the CIA/FBI local agents, who are said to be paid well. Parts of the US media have been reporting on this subject and the most significant report was in The Washington Post in 2002 when the influential newspaper claimed that the United States had organised its own espionage network in Pakistan due to lack of cooperation from the ISI in locating the al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives.

"The FBI decided to set up a Spider Group, a band of former Pakistani Army officers and others, after it concluded that lack of cooperation from the ISI made it impossible to hunt down Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives in the tribal areas of the country.” Quoting a federal law-enforcement official in Washington, the newspaper reported that the US move marked an attempt by the FBI to develop "free flow of information" to US agents who previously had worked under some restriction with Pakistan's official Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The Spider Group, the report said, was also asked to recruit locals in Pakistan's tribal areas, where hundreds of wanted "terrorists" are allegedly holed up under the patronage of tribal chiefs. Members of the Spider Group include a mix of Muslim and Christian retired Army and intelligence officers and have been trained and equipped by the FBI.

Background interviews reveal that today the CIA's intelligence local network is far more extensive than that of the FBI. The sources said that during the initial years of War on Terror, the Americans were not satisfied with the intelligence gathering of local agencies in the tribal areas of Pakistan, so they launched their own agencies that had now developed a vast network in the country.

A source quoted an incident in which the CIA officials once distributed awards amongst Pakistani intelligence people in the headquarters of the agency in Langley, Virginia. "This is perhaps unprecedented," the source said.

A spymaster of one of the country's intelligence agency reported to the Interior Ministry that a provincial head of a private security agency, besides others, was spying for the CIA. The security agency was contacted and the said official was removed. It was also reported that a large number of private security agencies personnel were doing espionage work.

A retired lieutenant general confided to this correspondent on condition of not being named that during his career he had gone to the US twice for military related training, where he was openly offered to work for the US. "I was praised and offered that why don't I join them," he said, adding that once an official encouraged him to inform the US about the problems of Pakistan's defence without even talking to his seniors.

He said the same intelligence officials asked him to settle his children in the US for better life and education. "I was openly told that I should not be worried about their expenses," the retired general said.

Meanwhile, a local journalist Azaz Syed told this correspondent that quite a few years back, he approached the legal section of the US embassy in Islamabad, after reading an advertisement in an international publication for recruitment of FBI agents for South Asia. For the purpose of doing an investigative story, he offered his services for FBI. He said he offered his services to spy on Taliban in exchange for information from the US embassy but the diplomat interviewing him was not interested in Taliban but wanted info about civil bureaucracy. He was not ready to give any information either.

"I was told that I would get assignments relating to civil bureaucracy and in return would be paid well," Syed said, adding that later he did a story for an Urdu newspaper with which he was associated at that point of time.

The US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – the spy military plane – are yet another source of concern for many here. The UAVs were allowed to do espionage in tribal areas of Pakistan for "specific jobs" only but since the UAVs were not caught by radars, these spy planes crossed their limits a number of times.

Initially, the Pakistan Air Force objected to such US surveillance but the government decided otherwise because of US insistence that it was inevitable to track down the so-called al-Qaeda targets.

The sources revealed that the murdered top tribal leader resisting the US war on terror, Nek Muhammad, became the target of a UAV despite the peace deal he had signed with the then corps commander Lt Gen Safdar Hussain.

Getting uncomfortable with the UAV activities, some Pakistani officials have expressed their concerns at the highest level. The Pakistan Army is trying to develop its own UAV but so far these planes are not up to the required international standards. Pakistan has also been trying to buy these UAVs but some international forces are creating impediments in such deals. Once Pakistan contacted South Africa to purchase these small aircraft but the price demanded was $10 million, which was far higher than the price of the equipment. The UAV intelligence capacity and its advantage of not being traced by radars, some believe, could pose serious threats to Pakistan's strategic interests. REFERENCE: Is cooperation with CIA-FBI posing a threat to Pak strategic interests? Monday, February 25, 2008 By Ansar Abbasihttp://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=98191&Cat=6&dt=2/25/2008

Nobody is living in denial but reality for Pakistanis is quite harsh and if somebody try to divulge something then the whole edifice of Two Nation Theory, Islamic Ideology, Ideological State, and even Islam comes in Danger [Remember Pakistan National Alliance of 9 Stars of 1977 - Islam Khatray Mein Hai]. A minor glimpse which you can never digest is as under:

THE VANISHED ARROGANCE OF THE GENERALS AFTER 9/11.

In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was told politely but firmly that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face US Military might if Osama Bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed specific American demands, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate. {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 32. {Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002}, p. 2.

General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the US demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assisstant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper”. It categorically asked Pakistan:

Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama Bin Laden.

Give blanket overflight and landing rights to US aircraft.

Give the US access to Pakistani Naval and Air Bases and to the border areas betweeen Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Turn over all the intelligence and immigration information.

Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.

Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Talibans, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda Network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.

Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 58-59. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002}

Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the US position, but he would respond to the US demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his General in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. {Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England.}.

More Explicit:

Common "civilians" in Pakistan can be picked up from anywhere without any cogent reason and can be detained for months [without producing them in the Court of Law] if not years without a trace and incommunicado too. You can slap, oust, try, imprison, torture, insult and discredit them through media trial and even hang the elected representatives of the people but when the real test comes those who are entrusted with the responsibility of defending the country always show you clay feet, read and lament.

The first thing they do after retirement is to join the Tableeghi Jamat. Whom you are trying to hoodwink? You cannot hoodwink Allah.

WASHINGTON : Richard Armitage, Daily Times can confirm, did not use the words attributed to him by President Pervez Musharraf in a CBS 60 Minutes interview, namely that unless Pakistan did American bidding, it will be bombed into the “stone age”. However, neither the President of Pakistan, nor Richard Armitage, who has denied using such language, nor President Bush who said he was “taken aback” when he learnt what had been said, is being untruthful. What actually happened was that after his meeting with Richard Armitage, Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed – who now wears a long, white beard and has reportedly gone Tableeghi – called Gen Musharraf from the Pakistan embassy in Washington. The conversation took place in Urdu and when the president asked him what the bottom line of the American message was, Gen Mahmood replied in Urdu that the Americans were intent on the removal of the Taliban regime and would not let Pakistan stand in their way and if Pakistan did not fall in line and cooperate, “wo hamari eent se eent baja dey gain” or words to that effect. That being so, President Musharraf’s recollection of the conversation with Gen Mahmood, who was then the director general of the ISI, is accurate, only he translated into English what he had been told in Urdu. It is time for Gen Mahmood to go on record and reproduce exactly the words in which he conveyed the Armitage message to Gen Musharraf on that September day five years ago. khalid hasan. REFERENCE: 'Wo eent se eent baja dein gay’, ISI DG told Musharraf Monday, September 25, 2006 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006/09/25/story_25-9-2006_pg1_4

ISLAMABAD: Former ISI chief General Mehmood has simply vanished from the media which is trying hard to get his comments on the Musharraf-Armitage controversy over the wording of the post-9/11 threat hurled at Islamabad by Washington to win its unconditional support for the so-called war on terror. Mehmood, who has already retired from the Army, is settled in Lahore but despite repeated attempts since Saturday last he is not available to offer his comments on the issue on which his statement really matters a lot. Every time the former ISI chief was approached at his Lahore residence telephone number, the home servant-cum-operator, who identified himself as Banaras Khan, gave the ready response, ‘General Saab is out of the city, he will Inshallah call you upon his return.’ On Saturday afternoon when initially contacted, Banaras said Mehmood would be back by the evening. However, later attempts the same evening and again on Monday and Tuesday, showed that Mehmood is still out of the city. Banaras has no answer when asked where exactly has the general gone. He also claims to have no contact number of Mehmood, who Banaras insists, doesn’t carry a cell phone after it was lost recently. President Musharraf in a recent interview with CBS News magazine show “60 Minutes,” charged that after 9/11 the then deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage told the then DG ISI General Mehmood to “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age”. According to a report, Mehmood, who had seen ups and downs with Musharraf in the post Oct 12, 1999 coup, has joined the Tableeghi Jamaat after he was relieved of his post-retirement assignment to head Fauji Fertilizer. Mehmood is amongst those few top generals (all retired now) including General Aziz, General Usmani and General Jamshed Gulzar, who had strongly opposed Musharraf’s siding with America in its attack on Afghanistan. REFERENCE: General Mehmood ‘vanishes’ Ansar Abbasi Wednesday, September 27, 2006 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=3286&Cat=13&dt=9/27/2006