THOSE PRESENT WERE

Notes on Meeting with the President in Austin, Texas,
December 6, 1966 with Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary McNamara reported that
agreement had been reached between the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretary, and Members of the Joint Chiefs on all but five major issues: the
ABM defense system; advance strategic
bomber; advanced ICBM; the Army force
structure; and the appropriate number of nuclear fleet escort ships.

The latest Defense budget figures for submission to the President were these:

The President asked if the Joint Chiefs confirmed Secretary McNamara’s statement. The Chairman so
stated, and Admiral David [Page 460]McDonald added that in his
experience the Secretary and the Chiefs have never been “so close together,”
except on the five specified issues.

General Wheeler then stated the case
for the deployment of an ABM system. He said
two new facts had to be taken into account: (1) the USSR was deploying an ABM
system around Moscow, and they were deploying a system widely throughout the
USSR which might have ABM capabilities; (2) they were installing at
an accelerated rate hardened ICBM’s, the
S-11, a city buster. By 1971 they might
have between 800–1100 ICBM’s.

We do not know the objective of Soviet nuclear policy: whether it is parity
with the U.S. or superiority. But, taken together, their new program could
reduce our assured destruction capability; complicate our targeting; reduce
confidence in our ability to penetrate; reduce our first-strike capability;
and improve the Soviet capability to pursue aims short of nuclear war.

The Chairman then quoted from Secretary McNamara’s paper3 the latter’s key judgment:

“After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded we
should not initiate ABM deployment
at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

“1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its
offensive nuclear force with the result that:

a.

The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not
be further decreased.

b.

The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in
the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any
meaningful sense.

The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear
attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is
understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces
so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and
surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on
them (e.g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of
approximately [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]). We have such power today. We must maintain
it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential
changes in theirs.”

General Wheeler expressed disagreement
with this judgment. He said we cannot predict confidently how the Soviet
Union would react to counter our deployment of an ABM system. The costs would constitute an important diversion
of resources. The development of multiple warheads would reduce the
kilotonnage of their nuclear payloads; they would face grave uncertainties
in targeting against our ABM’s. He said
deterrence was not only technology, it was a state of mind. Our having [Page 461]an ABM system would increase our deterrence capability no matter
what they did.

On the other hand, a lack of a deployed ABM
might increase the possibilities of war by accident; create an imbalance or
a sense of imbalance between the U.S. and USSR; suggest that we are interested only in the offense;
suggest also that the U.S. was not willing to pay to maintain its present
nuclear superiority.

We would be denying to many of our own people a chance to survive a nuclear
exchange: 30–50 million lives might be saved by Nike-X.

Therefore, the JCS recommends to the
President that we initiate deployment of the Nike-X system in order to
maintain the present overall favorable nuclear balance and give to us some
or all of the following advantages:

—damage limiting capability;

—the imposition of new uncertainties should the Soviets
contemplate initiating nuclear war;

—to demonstrate that we are not first-strike minded;

—and to maintain the kind of favorable power environment which
helped us during the Cuba missile crisis.

Specifically the JCS recommends that we
immediately decide to develop Option A to protect 25 U.S. cities. The cost
in Fiscal 1968 would be $800 million; for the period Fiscal 67–76, $10
billion.

The President asked if there was any difference between the JCS and Secretary McNamara concerning the costs. Secretary McNamara said “No.”

The President then asked if our position would be better if the Soviet Union
did not react to our deployment. The Secretary agreed that our position
would be better; but that it was “inconceivable” that the Soviet Union would
not react to counter our deployment of an ABM system.

The President then asked what determined the difference in judgment between
the Secretary and the JCS.

Secretary McNamara replied that the
difference lay less in rational calculation than in the inherently emotional
nature of the issue. It was extremely hard to make the case for a policy
which appeared to be denying protection to our people, when the Soviet Union
was willing to employ large resources to protect its people. He said he was
fully aware that if the President decided against deploying an ABM system he would face a most difficult time
politically and psychologically. Why, then, does he recommend against?

First, the Soviet Union has been wrong in its nuclear defense policy
for a decade. They have systematically spent 2 or 3 times what we have
on defense. It has not been worth it. Their defenses are not worth [Page 462]a damn. We still can impose
unacceptable losses on them even after a first strike. Because they are
making an error in deploying ABM’s is no
reason we should also make that error.

Second, we must be clear why it would be an error for us. If we go
ahead with the $10 billion ABM program
and they did not [2 lines of source text not
declassified]. Therefore, they would have to do something about
it. Their security would depend on their doing something about it. They
would have to bring back their assured damage capability to something
like 80 million U.S. fatalities under their planning case, which is [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. As they did so, we could not hold to our initial $10
million [billion?] ABM system. We would have to expand in response to what
they did, both our ABM and our offensive
systems.

Secretary McNamara concluded that we
would be launching ourselves and the Soviet Union into two decades of
escalatory action in the nuclear field in which the costs on each side would
prove to be of the order of $31–40 billion. We would each end up no better
off than we are at present.

Secretary McNamara then said there
are certain rational roles for a limited ABM
system, in particular these four:

—to protect our offensive force, notably our Minutemen;

—to protect in the time frame 1975–85 against a ChiComICBM capability;

—to protect against an accidental firing of a single
missile;

—to protect against a small blackmail Soviet attack.

In the face of the terrible dilemma faced by the President, Secretary
McNamara is inclined to
recommend, as a fallback from his judgment against the ABM system, a limited system with these four
capabilities. On the basis of that system we could explore whether the
Soviet Union was willing to negotiate a freeze acceptable to us.

The President then asked, “Is there any middle ground in this debate?”
Secretary McNamara said that the
emotionalism attaching to the ABM issue made
middle ground hard to find.

The President asked what would the view be in the Congress?

Secretary McNamara said about 25% of
the Congress—the Liberals—would oppose the ABM. Senators Russell, Stennis, etc., would strongly favor it,
and they would have about 40% of the Congress with them. The balance of 35%
would remain in the middle and be subject to persuasion. The President asked
who might be on that middle ground. Secretary McNamara replied Senators like Kuchel and Javits.

He pointed out further that the Congress had been interesting itself in this
matter for a long time. Last year they voted $165 million for [Page 463]ABM’s, and when he inquired what they had in
mind, they didn’t know; they merely wanted to move in that direction.

The President asked again, “What is a middle alternative?”

Secretary McNamara pointed out that
we did not have to make a final decision one way or the other right now. For
example, we had important technical problems to overcome with respect to the
warheads for the Olympia ABM. We had to
install at Kwajalein a quite revolutionary system for ′69 tests of the
ABM. It is quite risky in fact to start
building [a] plant for the ABM system before
those tests are complete. In short, there are technical reasons to go
slow.

With these unsolved technical problems as a background, we could move forward
with a limited system to get the four objectives Secretary McNamara had earlier stated. As for the
fifth objective—population protection—we would not be able to walk away from
that forever, but we would have some time to see if anything could be worked
out with the Soviet Union to avoid the interacting escalation in the nuclear
arms race that was otherwise inevitable.

Deputy Secretary Vance then added that
he did not believe we could stand for long with Posture A, which promised to
protect 25 cities. Under pressure from other cities and regions, the
Congress would go for a full program. It would be wiser to face from the
beginning that if we started down the road to population protection, it is
really Posture B that we were undertaking—a $20 billion rather than a $10
billion program.

General Wheeler said that, given the
lead time, we ought to begin to build factories now for certain of the
components about which we are technically sure. We do not have that
capability and it should not be delayed.

Secretary McNamara came back again to
the point that a decision not to deploy would create emotional and political
problems in the country, and that a decision to deploy merely to protect
offensive forces would face the same emotional problem. There would be a
strong impulse to protect people, not missiles. As for the factories, he
said the components are complex; there are many parts to be tested.

Our experience is that the system will prove more expensive than we presently
calculated.

General Johnson said the critical
question was U.S. casualties. An ABM system
would cut our casualties in a nuclear exchange. Secretary McNamara replied that he completely
disagreed because the USSR would react to
re-establish its assured damage capability.

General Johnson said that there were
constraints on their ability if they did react. Secretary McNamara replied that both an Air Force
[Page 464]study and an NIE had indicated that the Soviet Union could
not afford not to react.4

The President wondered if the best opportunity for agreement among us would
not be a decision to move ahead on a limited basis and to see what we can
negotiate with the Soviet Union. Admiral McDonald said the Soviet Union was now moving ahead both
with ABM’s and to increase its offensive
nuclear force. Secretary McNamara
said that their defensive effort was wasted.

General McConnell said that their
defensive effort was not wholly wasted. They had imposed heavy additional
costs on the U.S. to assure our continued penetration ability.

Secretary McNamara said we have
over-reacted. We have more than insured that we can still maintain our
assured damage capability. The Soviet ABM’s
have not saved Soviet lives.

General McConnell said he can’t
forget that we are dealing with the descendants of Genghis Khan. They only
understand force.

Secretary McNamara agreed and said
that is why, at whatever cost, we must maintain our assured second-strike
damage capability. Deputy Secretary Vance added that that is why we have gone ahead with
Poseidon and other means to assure our ability to penetrate an ABM system.

Secretary McNamara asked if the
JCS would wish to express any views if
there were a press conference. The members of the JCS replied that none of them desired to meet the press.

The subject then turned to the second item in which there was disagreement;
that is, the advanced strategic bomber (AMSA).5

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 200, Defense Programs and Operations,
Draft Memoranda to the President, 1968–72, Tab 8, Box 71. Top Secret;
Eyes Only for the President. Drafted on December 10; no other drafting
information appears on the notes.↩

In a telephone conversation with President Johnson on December 23,
McNamara reported
among other things that the final defense budget figures were
very close to what he had earlier given the President. They
were: FY 1967 Supplemental
(NOA) $12.9 billion, Overall
FY 1967 Supplemental (NOA) $74.466 billion, FY 67 expenditures $67.950 billion,
and FY 68 expenditures $73.1
billion. He added that he could still squeeze out $200–300
million from the FY 68 figures if
required. The President replied, “That’s wonderful; that’s
wonderful.” McNamara
concluded, “That’s how we stand and you can consider this
final.” In response to the President’s questions, he said the
budget figures included the anti-missile missile but excluded
the pay increase and what McNamara called “the construction stimulants.”
(Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, December 23, 1:01
p.m., Tape F6612.03, Side B; this transcript prepared
specifically for this Foreign Relations
volume)↩