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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security,
Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
June 2011:
Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions:
Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major
Programs:
GAO-11-404:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-404, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Quality is key to success in U.S. space and missile defense programs,
but quality problems exist that have endangered entire missions along
with less-visible problems leading to unnecessary repair, scrap,
rework, and stoppage; long delays; and millions in cost growth. For
space and missile defense acquisitions, GAO was asked to examine
quality problems related to parts and manufacturing processes and
materials across DOD and NASA. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which
parts quality problems affect those agencies’ space and missile
defense programs; (2) causes of any problems; and (3) initiatives to
prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. To accomplish
this, GAO reviewed all 21 systems with mature designs and projected
high costs: 5 DOD satellite systems, 4 DOD missile defense systems,
and 12 NASA systems. GAO reviewed existing and planned efforts for
preventing, detecting, and mitigating parts quality problems. Further,
GAO reviewed regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and
several studies, and interviewed senior headquarters and contractor
officials.
What GAO Found:
Parts quality problems affected all 21 programs GAO reviewed at the
Department of Defense (DOD) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). In some cases they contributed to significant
cost overruns and schedule delays. In most cases, problems were
associated with electronic versus mechanical parts or materials (see
figure). In several cases, parts problems discovered late in the
development cycle had more significant cost and schedule consequences.
For example, one problem cost a program at least $250 million and
about a 2-year launch delay.
Figure: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed
Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Electronic parts: 64.7%;
Materials: 20.6%;
Mechanical parts: 14.7%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
[End of figure]
The causes of parts quality problems GAO identified were poor
workmanship, undocumented and untested manufacturing processes, poor
control of those processes and materials and failure to prevent
contamination, poor part design, design complexity, and an inattention
to manufacturing risks. Ineffective supplier management also resulted
in concerns about whether subcontractors and contractors met program
requirements.
Most programs GAO reviewed began before the agencies adopted new
policies related to parts quality problems, and newer post-policy
programs were not mature enough for parts problems to be apparent.
Agencies and industry are now collecting and sharing information about
potential problems, and developing guidance and criteria for testing
parts, managing subcontractors, and mitigating problems, but it is too
early to determine how much such collaborations have reduced parts
quality problems since such data have not been historically collected.
New efforts are collecting data on anomalies, but no mechanism exists
to use those data to assess improvements. Significant barriers hinder
efforts to address parts quality problems, such as broader acquisition
management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in the
national security space community, the government's decreasing
influence on the electronic parts market, and an increase in
counterfeiting of electronic parts. Given this, success will likely be
limited without continued assessments of what works well and must be
done.
What GAO Recommends:
DOD and NASA should implement a mechanism for periodic assessment of
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile
defense programs with periodic reporting to Congress. DOD partially
agreed with the recommendation and NASA agreed. DOD agreed to annually
address all quality issues, to include parts quality.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-404] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Parts Quality Problems Are Widespread and in Some Cases Have Had a
Significant Effect on Cost, Schedule, and Performance:
Parts Quality Problems Were Caused by Poor Manufacturing Controls,
Design, and Supplier Management:
Agency and Industry Efforts to Address Parts Quality Problems Face
Significant Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Description of DOD Satellite Systems, MDA Systems, and
NASA Systems:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Policies to Prevent and Detect Parts Quality Problems at DOD
and NASA:
Table 2: Typical Roles of Government and Prime Contractors in Ensuring
Parts Quality:
Table 3: Cost and Schedule Effect of Parts Quality Problems at DOD and
NASA:
Table 4: Key Differences in Program Framework between GPS IIF and GPS
III:
Table 5: Examples of Organizations and Their Collaborative Efforts and
Outcomes for Addressing Parts Quality:
Figures:
Figure 1: Description of Hardware Levels That Result in a Finished
Satellite or Missile System:
Figure 2: Definitions of Materials, Process, and Parts Used in
Satellite and Missile Manufacturing:
Figure 3: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed
and Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials:
Figure 4: Examples of Quality Problems with Electronic Parts and
Manufacturing Materials That Affected Three or More Programs:
Figure 5: Summary of Typical Key Testing Practices to Identify Parts
Quality Problems:
Figure 6: Example of a Capacitor with Tin Whiskers:
Abbreviations:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
CDR: Critical Design Review:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
LSI: Lead System Integrator:
MAP: Mission Assurance Provisions:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
SIBC: Space Industrial Base Council:
TSPR: Total System Performance Responsibility:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 24, 2011:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Tierney:
The Department of Defense (DOD) space and missile defense systems play
a vital role in protecting national and homeland security, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space systems
provide global weather forecasting and all government space
organizations facilitate important scientific research.[Footnote 1]
Because of these systems' complexity, the environments they operate
in, and the high degree of accuracy and precision needed for their
operation, quality is paramount to their success. Yet in recent years,
many space and missile defense programs, which rely on many of the
same contractors, have struggled with quality problems. For example,
the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency communications
satellite was launched on August 14, 2010, but has yet to reach its
intended orbit because of a blockage in a propellant line that was
most likely caused by a small piece of cloth inadvertently left in the
line during the manufacturing process. In 2009, a major test for the
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
missile system was not completed because of a design and quality
problem affecting the target. While these two cases were widely
reported by the media, other space and missile defense programs have
struggled with less-visible quality problems that have resulted in
unnecessary repair, scrap, and rework, and in some cases, a complete
halt in large-scale programs, months of delay, and millions of dollars
in cost growth. Often, such problems have arisen at the tail end of
problematic, long-term development efforts, creating a great deal of
frustration for program and government officials. Moreover, while
attention has increased in recent years on problems related to
counterfeit parts, we have reported that problems affecting major
missile defense and space programs have generally been the result of
other issues, such as design instability and technology maturity.
[Footnote 2]
In view of the cost and importance of space and missile defense
acquisitions, you asked that we examine parts quality problems
affecting satellites and missile defense systems across DOD and NASA.
Our review of parts quality problems includes problems with the
materials and processes used in manufacturing. Parts are the basic
elements of a system; their manufacturing must be dependable if a
system's hardware is to be reliable. Moreover, given the span of
agencies and systems we were examining, our focus on parts enabled
consistent analysis of problems, causal factors, and improvement
efforts. At the same time, however, our scope excluded quality
problems that arose during assembly and integration of larger
subsystems, assemblies, and components, unless such problems were tied
to a specific part. Figure 1 depicts the focus of our review and
figure 2 defines materials, process, and parts.
Figure 1: Description of Hardware Levels That Result in a Finished
Satellite or Missile System[Footnote 3]:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Primary focus of GAO review:
Material:
Process:
Piece part:
Component:
Complete functional unit, such as a control electronics assembly, an
antenna, a battery, or a power cord unit.
Assembly:
Functional group of parts, such as a hinge assembly, an antenna feed,
or a deployment boom.
Subsystem:
All of the components and assemblies that constitute a satellite or
missile subsystem, such as a bus or instrument.
Satellite or missile:
Complete vehicle.
Sources: GAO analysis of satellite development literature (data);
ArtExplosion (images).
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Definitions of Materials, Process, and Parts Used in
Satellite and Missile Manufacturing:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Materials:
A metallic or nonmetallic element, alloy, mixture, or compound used in
a manufacturing operation, which becomes either a temporary or a
permanent portion of the manufactured item (i.e., gold, tantalum,
silicon, polymer, etc.).
Process:
An operation, treatment, or procedure used during a step in the
manufacture of a material, part, or assembly (i.e., brazing, plating,
metal machining, vapor deposition, etc.).
Parts:
One piece or two or more pieces joined together that are not normally
subjected to disassembly without destruction or impairment of their
designed use (i.e., capacitor, transistor, memory chip, screw, optical
lens, etc.).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA documents.
[End of figure]
Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts
quality problems are affecting DOD and NASA space and missile defense
programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to
prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems.
To determine the extent to which parts quality problems affected a
program's cost, schedule and performance, we identified 21 DOD and
NASA major acquisitions[Footnote 4] that had completed their critical
design reviews (CDR) as of October 2009.[Footnote 5] This universe of
21 programs includes 9 DOD systems (4 Air Force, 1 Navy,[Footnote 6]
and 4 MDA) and 12 NASA systems. We asked officials from all 21
programs to identify the most significant parts quality problems that
had affected their programs, as well as the associated cost and
schedule impacts, causes, and contributing factors. A quality problem
is the degree to which the product attributes, such as capability,
performance, or reliability, did not meet the needs of the customer or
mission, as specified through the requirements definition and
allocation process.
From the 21 systems examined, we selected 2 from DOD (1 Air Force and
1 MDA program) and 1 from NASA with known quality problems, as
identified in previous GAO reports,[Footnote 7] for further review to
gain greater insight into the root causes of the parts quality
problems. We are unable to make generalizable or projectable
statements about parts quality problems related to space and missile
programs beyond this stated scope. We reviewed regulations,
directives, instructions, and policies to determine how DOD, the Air
Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts quality. We interviewed
senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters officials, as well as system
program and contractor officials from the Air Force, MDA, and NASA,
about their knowledge of parts problems on their programs. We also
reviewed several studies on parts quality from the Aerospace
Corporation[Footnote 8] and met with officials to discuss their
findings. To identify the extent to which parts problems are common
across DOD, MDA, and NASA, we collected and reviewed failure review
board reports, advisory notices, and cost and schedule analysis
reports on parts problems affecting the 21 identified systems and
interviewed program officials. To identify initiatives planned and
practices used by DOD, MDA, and NASA to prevent and detect parts
quality problems, we interviewed program officials at DOD, the Air
Force, MDA, and NASA responsible for systems engineering and quality
and obtained, reviewed, and discussed their parts quality policies and
factors contributing to parts problems. For more on our scope and
methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD and NASA build costly, complex systems that serve a variety of
national security and science, technology, and space exploration
missions. Within DOD, the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center
is responsible for acquiring most of DOD's space systems; however, the
Navy is also acquiring a replacement satellite communication system.
MDA, also within DOD, is responsible for developing, testing, and
fielding an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system
(BMDS) to defend against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all
phases of flight.[Footnote 9] The major projects that NASA undertakes
range from highly complex and sophisticated space transportation
vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites equipped with advanced
sensors to study the Earth. Requirements for government space systems
can be more demanding than those of the commercial satellite and
consumer electronics industry. For instance, DOD typically has more
demanding standards for radiation-hardened parts, such as
microelectronics, which are designed and fabricated with the specific
goal of enduring the harshest space radiation environments, including
nuclear events. Companies typically need to create separate production
lines and in some cases special facilities. In the overall electronics
market, military and NASA business is considered a niche market.
Moreover, over time, government space and missile systems have
increased in complexity, partly as a result of advances in
commercially driven electronics technology and subsequent obsolescence
of mature high-reliability parts. Systems are using more and
increasingly complex parts, requiring more stringent design
verification and qualification practices. In addition, acquiring
qualified parts from a limited supplier base has become more difficult
as suppliers focus on commercial markets at the expense of the
government space market--which requires stricter controls and proven
reliability.
Further, because DOD and NASA's space systems cannot usually be
repaired once they are deployed, an exacting attention to parts
quality is required to ensure that they can operate continuously and
reliably for years at a time through the harsh environmental
conditions of space. Similarly, ballistic missiles that travel through
space after their boost phase to reach their intended targets are
important for national security and also require reliable and
dependable parts. These requirements drive designs that depend on
reliable parts, materials and processes that have passed CDRs, been
fully tested, and demonstrated long life and tolerance to the harsh
environmental conditions of space.
Shifts in Government Oversight and Management of Parts:
There have been dramatic shifts in how parts for space and missile
defense systems have been acquired and overseen. For about three
decades, until the 1990s, government space and missile development
based its quality requirements on a military standard known as MIL-Q-
9858A. This standard required contractors to establish a quality
program with documented procedures and processes that are subject to
approval by government representatives throughout all areas of
contract performance. Quality is theoretically ensured by requiring
both the contractor and the government to monitor and inspect
products. MIL-Q-9858A and other standards--collectively known as
military specifications--were used by DOD and NASA to specify the
manufacturing processes, materials, and testing needed to ensure that
parts would meet quality and reliability standards needed to perform
in and through space.[Footnote 10] In the 1990s, concerns about cost
and the need to introduce more innovation brought about acquisition
reform efforts that loosened a complex and often rigid acquisition
process and shifted key decision-making responsibility--including
management and oversight for parts, materials, and processes--to
contractors. This period, however, was marked by continued problematic
acquisitions that ultimately resulted in sharp increases in cost,
schedule, and quality problems.
For DOD, acquisition reform for space systems was referred to as Total
System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). Under TSPR, program
managers' oversight was reduced and key decision-making
responsibilities were shifted onto the contractor. In May 2003, a
report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board Joint Task Force stated that the TSPR policy marginalized the
government program management role and replaced traditional government
"oversight" with "insight." In 2006, a retired senior official
responsible for testing in DOD stated that "TSPR relieved development
contractors of many reporting requirements, including cost and
technical progress, and built a firewall around the contractor,
preventing government sponsors from properly overseeing expenditure of
taxpayer dollars."[Footnote 11] We found that TSPR reduced government
oversight and led to major reductions in various government
capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering
staff.[Footnote 12] MDA chose to pursue the Lead Systems Integrator
(LSI) approach as part of its acquisition reform effort. The LSI
approach used a single contractor responsible for developing and
integrating a system of systems within a given budget and schedule. We
found in 2007 that a proposal to use an LSI approach on any new
program should be seen as a risk at the outset, not because it is
conceptually flawed, but because it indicates that the government may
be pursuing a solution that it does not have the capacity to manage.
[Footnote 13]
Within NASA, a similar approach called "faster, better, cheaper" was
intended to help reduce mission costs, improve efficiency, and
increase scientific results by conducting more and smaller missions in
less time.[Footnote 14] The approach was intended to stimulate
innovative development and application of technology, streamline
policies and practices, and energize and challenge a workforce to
successfully undertake new missions in an era of diminishing
resources. We found that while NASA had many successes, failures of
two Mars probes revealed limits to this approach, particularly in
terms of NASA's ability to learn from past mistakes.[Footnote 15]
As DOD and NASA moved from military specifications and standards, so
did suppliers. According to an Aerospace Corporation study, both prime
contractors and the government space market lost insight and
traceability into parts as suppliers moved from having to meet
military specifications and standards to an environment where the
prime contractor would ensure that the process used by the supplier
would yield a quality part. During this time, downsizing and tight
budgets also eroded core skills, giving the government less insight,
with fewer people to track problems and less oversight into
manufacturing details.[Footnote 16]
As DOD and NASA experienced considerable cost, schedule, and
performance problems with major systems in the late 1990s and early
2000s, independent government-sponsored reviews concluded that the
government ceded too much control to contractors during acquisition
reform. As a result, in the mid-to late 2000s, DOD and NASA reached
broad consensus that the government needed to return to a lifecycle
mission assurance approach aimed at ensuring mission success.[Footnote
17] For example, MDA issued its Mission Assurance Provisions (MAP) for
acquisition of mission and safety critical hardware and software in
October 2006. The MAP is to assist in improving MDA's acquisition
activities through the effective application of critical best
practices for quality safety and mission assurance. In December 2008,
DOD updated its acquisition process which includes government
involvement in the full range of requirements, design, manufacture,
test, operations, and readiness reviews.
Also in the last decade, DOD and NASA have developed policies and
procedures aimed at preventing parts quality problems.[Footnote 18]
For example, policies at each agency set standards to require the
contractor to establish control plans related to parts, materials, and
processes. Policies at the Air Force, MDA, and the NASA component we
reviewed also establish minimum quality and reliability requirements
for electronic parts--such as capacitors, resistors, connectors,
fuses, and filters--and set standards to require the contractor to
select materials and processes to ensure that the parts will perform
as intended in the environment where they will function, considering
the effects of, for example, static electricity, extreme temperature
fluctuations, solar radiation, and corrosion. In addition, DOD and
NASA have developed plans and policies related to counterfeit parts
control that set standards to require contractors to take certain
steps to prevent and detect counterfeit parts and materials.[Footnote
19] Table 1 identifies the major policies related to parts quality at
DOD and NASA.
Table 1: Policies to Prevent and Detect Parts Quality Problems at DOD
and NASA:
Agency: DOD--Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center;
Policy: DOD Instruction 63-106, Specifications and Standards
Instruction;
Issue date: October 2009;
Policy: DOD Standard SMC-S-009, Parts, Materials and Processes Control
Program for Space and Launch Vehicles Standard[A];
Issue date: January 2009.
Agency: DOD--Missile Defense Agency;
Policy: Assurance Provisions;
Issue date: October 2006;
Policy: Parts, Materials, and Processes Mission Assurance Plan;
Issue date: March 2008.
Agency: NASA;
Policy: NASA Policy Directive 8790.2C, NASA Parts Policy;
Issue date: November 2008;
Policy: Goddard Space Flight Center, EEE-INST-002, Instructions for
Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical Parts Selection,
Screening, Qualification and Derating[B];
Issue date: May 2003.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
[A] The Navy's Mobile User Objective System is supported by this
standard.
[B] Although this policy is a NASA/Goddard-specific policy, all of the
NASA systems we reviewed followed this policy.
[End of table]
Government policies generally require various activities related to
the selection and testing of parts, materials, and processes. It is
the prime contractor's responsibility to determine how the
requirements will be managed and implemented, including the selection
and management of subcontractors and suppliers. In addition, it is the
government's responsibility to provide sufficient oversight to ensure
that parts quality controls and procedures are in place and rigorously
followed. Finally, DOD and NASA have quality and mission assurance
personnel staff on their programs to conduct on-site audits at
contractor facilities. Table 2 illustrates the typical roles of the
government and the prime contractor in ensuring parts quality.
Table 2: Typical Roles of Government and Prime Contractors in Ensuring
Parts Quality:
Government: Defines requirements for parts, materials, and processes
and may require the prime contractor to conduct various activities
related to the following:
* Selection of parts, materials, and processes;
* Selection of suppliers;
* Testing (screening, qualification, and inspection);
Ensure that parts, materials, and process controls and procedures are
in place and rigorously followed;
Conduct quality assurance audit functions and supplier surveillance.
Prime contractor: Defines and documents how parts, materials, and
process activities will be managed and implemented:
* Ensures that requirements are met through thorough, complete, and
traceable documentation and verification;
* Ensures that all discrepancies/nonconformances are reported and
resolutions are customer approved;
* Establishes and/or follows a parts, materials, and processes control
board that includes subcontractors to coordinate the program's parts,
materials, and process controls program;
* Is responsible for flow-down and implementation of requirements to
all subcontractors, sub-tiers, and suppliers.
Source: GAO analysis of the Aerospace Corporation's Mission Assurance
Guidebook.
[End of table]
DOD and NASA also have their own oversight activities that contribute
to system quality. DOD has on-site quality specialists within the
Defense Contract Management Agency and the military services, MDA has
its Mission Assurance program, and NASA has its Quality Assurance
program. Each activity aims to identify quality problems and ensure
the on-time, on-cost delivery of quality products to the government
through oversight of manufacturing and through supplier management
activities, selected manufacturing activities, and final product
inspections prior to acceptance. Likewise, prime contractors employ
quality assurance specialists and engineers to assess the quality and
reliability of both the parts they receive from suppliers and the
overall weapon system. In addition, DOD and NASA have access to one or
more of the following databases used to report deficient parts: the
Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP), the Joint
Deficiency Reporting System (JDRS), and the Government Industry Data
Exchange Program (GIDEP). Through these systems, the government and
industry participants share information on deficient parts.[Footnote
20]
Parts Quality Problems Are Widespread and in Some Cases Have Had a
Significant Effect on Cost, Schedule, and Performance:
Parts quality problems reported by each program affected all 21
programs we reviewed at DOD and NASA and in some cases contributed to
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system
reliability and availability. In most cases, problems were associated
with electronics parts, versus mechanical parts or materials.
Moreover, in several cases, parts problems were discovered late in the
development cycle and, as such, tended to have more significant cost
and schedule consequences.
Table 3 identifies the cost and schedule effects of parts quality
problems for the 21 programs we reviewed. The costs in this table are
the cumulative costs of all the parts quality problems that the
programs identified as most significant as of August 2010 and do not
necessarily reflect cost increases to the program's total costs. In
some cases, program officials told us that they do not track the cost
effects of parts quality problems or that it was too early to
determine the effect. The schedule effect is the cumulative total of
months it took to resolve a problem. Unless the problems affected a
schedule milestone such as launch date, the total number of months may
reflect problems that were concurrent and may not necessarily reflect
delays to the program's schedule.
Table 3: Cost and Schedule Effect of Parts Quality Problems at DOD and
NASA:
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Advanced Extremely High Frequency
Satellites;
Cost: $250 million[B];
Schedule: 24 month launch delay[C].
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Global Positioning System Block IIF;
Cost: $0.2 million;
Schedule: Not reported.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Space-Based Infrared System;
Cost: Not reported;
Schedule: Not reported.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Air Force: Space-Based Space Surveillance;
Cost: $3.3 million;
Schedule: 1 month.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Navy: Mobile User Objective System;
Cost: Not reported;
Schedule: 18 months.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense;
Cost: $1.9 million;
Schedule: No impact.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense;
Cost: $19 million;
Schedule: 25 months.
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Space Tracking and
Surveillance System;
Cost: $7.8 million;
Schedule: 5 months[D].
Agency/system[A]: DOD--Missile Defense Agency: Targets and
Countermeasures;
Cost: $0.9 million;
Schedule: 1-2 weeks impact or no impact.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Aquarius;
Cost: $0.1 million;
Schedule: 1 month.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Global Precipitation Measurement Mission;
Cost: $0.3 million;
Schedule: 16 months.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Glory;
Cost: $72.2 million;
Schedule: 20-month launch delay.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory;
Cost: $0.4 million;
Schedule: 1 month.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: James Webb Space Telescope;
Cost: $5 million;
Schedule: 6 months.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Juno;
Cost: $4.5 million;
Schedule: 13 months.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Landsat Data Continuity Mission;
Cost: $5 million;
Schedule: 25 months.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Magnetospheric Multiscale;
Cost: Not reported;
Schedule: Not reported.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Mars Science Laboratory;
Cost: $10.5 million;
Schedule: 26 months.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project;
Cost: $105.2 million;
Schedule: 27-month launch delay.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Radiation Belt Storm Probes;
Cost: Not reported;
Schedule: Not reported.
Agency/system[A]: NASA: Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System;
Cost: Not reported;
Schedule: 3 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
Note: "Not reported" can mean that there was no effect or that the
effect was unknown. The cost and schedule effects do not necessarily
reflect increases to the program's total cost or schedule.
[A] See appendix II for a description of the systems.
[B] Program officials identified eight parts quality problems that
they considered to be the most significant; however, they initially
reported that the costs associated with the problems were "unknown."
Officials later stated that one of the eight problems reported added
an additional cost of at least $250 million.
[C] Program officials did not identify any schedule effects with the
eight parts quality problems they reported. However, based on prior
GAO work, we determined that parts quality problems contributed to a 2-
year launch delay.
[D] According to program officials, parts quality problems contributed
to but were not the main cause of a 2-year launch delay as described
in GAO-09-326SP and GAO-06-391.
[End of table]
Programs Are Primarily Experiencing Quality Problems with Electronic
Parts:
The programs we reviewed are primarily experiencing quality problems
with electronic parts that are associated with electronic assemblies,
such as computers, communication systems, and guidance systems,
critical to the system operations. Based on our review of 21 programs,
64.7 percent of the parts quality problems were associated with
electronic parts, 14.7 percent with mechanical parts, and 20.6 percent
with materials used in manufacturing. In many cases, programs
experienced problems with the same parts and materials. Figure 3
identifies the distribution of quality problems across electronic
parts, mechanical parts, and materials.
Figure 3: Distribution of Quality Problems Found in Programs Reviewed
and Grouped by Electronic Parts, Mechanical Parts, and Materials:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Electronic parts: 64.7%;
Materials: 20.6%;
Mechanical parts: 14.7%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
[End of figure]
In many cases, programs experienced problems with the same parts and
materials. For electronic parts, seven programs reported problems with
capacitors, a part that is widely used in electronic circuits.
Multiple programs also reported problems with printed circuit boards,
which are used to support and connect electronic components. While
printed circuit boards range in complexity and capability, they are
used in virtually all but the simplest electronic devices. As with
problems with electronic parts, multiple programs also experienced
problems with the same materials. For example, five programs reported
problems with titanium that did not meet requirements. In addition,
two programs reported problems with four different parts manufactured
with pure tin, a material that is prohibited in space because it poses
a reliability risk to electronics.[Footnote 21] Figure 4 identifies
examples of quality problems with parts and materials that affected
three or more programs.
Figure 4: Examples of Quality Problems with Electronic Parts and
Manufacturing Materials That Affected Three or More Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph and associated data]
Problems that affected three or more programs:
Electronic parts:
Attenuator:
Number of programs affected: 3.
Attenuator is a part that reduces the strength of an alternating
signal.
Capacitor:
Number of programs affected: 7.
Capacitor is a part that, among other things, stores energy.
Connector:
Number of programs affected: 3.
Connector is a part that connects two or more types of wiring items.
Optocoupler:
Number of programs affected: 3.
Optocoupler is a part that transfers electrical signals using light
waves.
Oscillator:
Number of programs affected: 4.
Oscillator is a part that provides timing signals in digital and
analog circuits.
Printed wiring board:
Number of programs affected: 3.
Printed circuit board is a part used to support and provide connection
of an electronic circuit.
Resistor:
Number of programs affected: 4.
Resistor is a part that opposes the flow of current in an electrical
circuit.
Manufacturing materials:
Titanium:
Number of programs affected: 5.
Titanium is a strong, corrosion-resistant material frequently used in
jet engines, missiles, and spacecraft.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
[End of figure]
Parts Problems Discovered Late in Development Cycle Had More
Significant Consequences:
While parts quality problems affected all of the programs we reviewed,
problems found late in development--during final integration and
testing at the instrument and system level--had the most significant
effect on program cost and schedule. As shown in figure 5, part
screening, qualification, and testing typically occur during the final
design phase of spacecraft development. When parts problems are
discovered during this phase, they are sometimes more easily addressed
without major consequences to a development effort since fabrication
of the spacecraft has not yet begun or is just in the initial phases.
In several of the cases we reviewed, however, parts problems were
discovered during instrument and system-level testing, that is, after
assembly or integration of the instrument or spacecraft. As such, they
had more significant consequences as they required lengthy failure
analysis, disassembly, rework, and reassembly, sometimes resulting in
a launch delay.
Figure 5: Summary of Typical Key Testing Practices to Identify Parts
Quality Problems:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Concept development:
Preliminary design review;
Design and fabrication:
Parts problems found here are more easily addressed;
Parts testing:
* Part screening;
* Part qualification;
* Radiation testing;
Critical design review;
Point at which agencies seek to detect a part quality problem.
Assembly and test:
Parts problems found here have more significant consequences;
System-level testing:
* Acoustic testing;
* Vibration testing;
* Shock testing;
* Thermal testing.
Operations and support.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and NASA data.
[End of figure]
Our work identified a number of cases in which parts problems
identified late in development caused significant cost and schedule
issues.
* Parts quality problems found during system-level testing of the Air
Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program
contributed to a launch delay of almost 2 years and cost the program
at least $250 million. A power-regulating unit failed during system-
level thermal vacuum testing because of defective electronic parts
that had to be removed and replaced. This and other problems resulted
in extensive rework and required the satellite to undergo another
round of thermal vacuum testing. According to the program office, the
additional thermal vacuum testing alone cost about $250 million.
* At MDA, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System program
discovered problems with defective electronic parts in the Space-
Ground Link Subsystem during system-level testing and integration of
the satellite. By the time the problem was discovered, the
manufacturer no longer produced the part and an alternate contractor
had to be found to manufacture and test replacement parts. According
to officials, the problem cost about $7 million and was one of the
factors that contributed to a 17-month launch delay of two
demonstration satellites and delayed participation in the BMDS testing
we reported on in March 2009.[Footnote 22]
* At NASA, parts quality problems found late in development resulted
in a 20-month launch delay for the Glory program and cost $71.1
million. In August 2008, Glory's spacecraft computer failed to power
up during system-level testing. After a 6-month failure analysis, the
problem was attributed to a crack in the computer's printed circuit
board, an electronic part in the computer used to connect electronic
components. Because the printed circuit board could not be
manufactured reliably, the program had to procure and test an
alternate computer. The program minimized the long lead times expected
with the alternate computer by obtaining one that had already been
procured by NASA. However, according to contractor officials, design
changes were also required to accommodate the alternate computer. In
June 2010, after the computer problem had been resolved, the Glory
program also discovered problems with parts for the solar array drive
assembly that rendered one of the arrays unacceptable for flight and
resulted in an additional 3-month launch delay.[Footnote 23]
* Also at NASA, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System Preparatory Project experienced $105 million in cost
increases and 27 months of delay because of parts quality problems.
[Footnote 24] In one case, a key instrument developed by a NASA
partner failed during instrument-level testing because the instrument
frame fractured at several locations. According to the failure review
board, stresses exceeded the material capabilities of several brazed
joints--a method of joining metal parts together. According to
officials, the instrument's frame had to be reinforced, which delayed
instrument delivery and ultimately delayed the satellite's launch
date. In addition, officials stated that they lack confidence in how
the partner-provided satellite instruments will function on orbit
because of the systemic mission assurance and systems engineering
issues that contributed to the parts quality problems.
For some of the programs we reviewed, the costs associated with parts
quality problems were minimized because the problems were found early
and were resolved within the existing margins built into the program
schedule. For example, the Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS)
program discovered problems with electronic parts during part-level
testing and inspection. An investigation into the problem cost about
$50,000, but did not result in delivery delays. An independent review
team ultimately concluded that the parts could be used without a
performance or mission impact. At NASA, the Juno program discovered
during part-level qualification testing that an electronic part did
not meet performance requirements. The program obtained a suitable
replacement from another manufacturer; it cost the program $10,000 to
resolve the issue with no impact on program schedule.
In other cases, the costs of parts quality problems were amplified
because they were a leading cause of a schedule delay to a major
milestone, such as launch readiness. For example, of the $60.9 million
cost associated with problems with the Glory spacecraft computer found
during system-level testing, $11.6 million was spent to resolve the
issue, including personnel costs for troubleshooting, testing, and
oversight as well as design, fabrication, and testing of the new
computer. The majority of the cost--$49.3 million--was associated with
maintaining the contractor during the 15-month launch delay.
Similarly, problems with parts for Glory's solar array assembly cost
about $10.1 million, $2.7 million to resolve the problem and $7.4
million resulting from the additional 3-month schedule delay.
Similarly, program officials for NASA's National Polar-orbiting
Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project attributed the $105
million cost of its parts quality problems to the costs associated
with launch and schedule delays, an estimated $5 million a month.
In several cases, the programs were encountering other challenges that
obscured the problems caused by poor quality parts. For example, the
Air Force's Space-Based Infrared System High program reported that a
part with pure tin in the satellite telemetry unit was discovered
after the satellite was integrated. After an 11-month failure review
board, the defective part was replaced. The program did not quantify
the cost and schedule effect of the problem because the program was
encountering software development issues that were already resulting
in schedule delays. Similarly, NASA's Mars Science Laboratory program
experienced a failure associated with joints in the rover propulsion
system. According to officials, the welding process led to joint
embrittlement and the possibility of early failure. The project had to
test a new process, rebuild, and test the system, which cost about $4
million and resulted in a 1-year delay in completion. However, the
program's launch date had already been delayed 25 months because of
design issues with the rover actuator motors and avionics package--in
effect, buying time to resolve the problem with the propulsion system.
In Some Cases, Parts Quality Problems Affected System Reliability and
Availability:
In addition to the launch delays discussed above, parts quality
problems also resulted in reduced system reliability and availability
for several other programs we reviewed. For example, the Air Force's
GPS program found that an electronic part lacked qualification data to
prove the part's quality and reliability. As a result, the overall
reliability prediction for the space vehicle was decreased. At MDA,
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program discovered problems with an
electronic part in the telemetry unit needed to transmit flight test
data. The problem was found during final assembly and test operations
of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle resulting in the cancellation of a
major flight test. This increased risk to the program and the overall
BMDS capability, since the lack of adequate intercept data reduced
confidence that the system could perform as intended in a real-world
situation. Also, MDA's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program
recalled 16 missiles from the warfighter, including 7 from a foreign
partner, after the prime contractor discovered that the brackets used
to accommodate communications and power cabling were improperly
adhered to the Standard Missile 3 rocket motor. If not corrected, the
problem could have resulted in catastrophic mission failure.
The Costs of Parts Quality Problems Are Primarily Borne by the
Government:
Regardless of the cause of the parts quality problem, the government
typically bears the costs associated with resolving the issues and
associated schedule impact. In part, this is due to the use of cost-
reimbursement contracts. Because space and missile defense
acquisitions are complex and technically challenging, DOD and NASA
typically use cost-reimbursement contracts, whereby the government
pays the prime contractor's allowable costs to the extent prescribed
in the contract for the contractor's best efforts. Under cost-
reimbursement contracts, the government generally assumes the
financial risks associated with development, which may include the
costs associated with parts quality problems. Of the 21 programs we
reviewed, 20 use cost-reimbursement contracts. In addition, 17
programs use award and incentive fees to reduce the government's risk
and provide an incentive for excellence in such areas as quality,
timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. Award
and incentive fees enable the reduction of fee in the event that the
contractor's performance does not meet or exceed the requirements of
the contract.[Footnote 25] Aside from the use of award fees, senior
quality and acquisition oversight officials told us that incentives
for prime contractors to ensure quality are limited.
Parts Quality Problems Were Caused by Poor Manufacturing Controls,
Design, and Supplier Management:
The parts quality problems we identified were directly attributed to
poor control of manufacturing processes and materials, poor design,
and lack of effective supplier management. Generally, prime contractor
activities to capture manufacturing knowledge should include
identifying critical characteristics of the product's design and then
the critical manufacturing processes and materials to achieve these
characteristics. Manufacturing processes and materials should be
documented, tested, and controlled prior to production. This includes
establishing criteria for workmanship, making work instructions
available, and preventing and removing foreign object debris in the
production process.
Poor workmanship was one of the causes of problems with electronic
parts.[Footnote 26] At DOD, poor workmanship during hand-soldering
operations caused a capacitor to fail during testing on the Navy's
Mobile User Objective System program. Poor soldering workmanship also
caused a power distribution unit to experience problems during vehicle-
level testing on MDA's Targets and Countermeasures program. According
to MDA officials, all units of the same design by the same
manufacturer had to be X-ray inspected and reworked, involving
extensive hardware disassembly. As a corrective action, soldering
technicians were provided with training to improve their soldering
operations and ability to perform better visual inspections after
soldering. Soldering workmanship problems also contributed to a
capacitor failure on NASA's Glory program. Analysis determined that
the manufacturer's soldering guidelines were not followed.
Programs also reported quality problems because of the use of
undocumented and untested manufacturing processes. For example, MDA's
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program reported that the brackets
used to accommodate communications and power cabling were improperly
bonded to Standard Missile 3 rocket motors, potentially leading to
mission failure. A failure review board determined that the
subcontractor had changed the bonding process to reduce high scrap
rates and that the new process was not tested and verified before it
was implemented. Similarly, NASA's Landsat Data Continuity Mission
program experienced problems with the spacecraft solar array because
of an undocumented manufacturing process. According to program
officials, the subcontractor did not have a documented process to
control the amount of adhesive used in manufacturing, and as a result,
too much adhesive was applied. If not corrected, the problem could
have resulted in solar array failure on orbit.
Poor control of manufacturing materials and the failure to prevent
contamination also caused quality problems. At MDA, the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense program reported a problem with defective titanium
tubing. The defective tubing was rejected in 2004 and was to be
returned to the supplier; however, because of poor control of
manufacturing materials, a portion of the material was not returned
and was inadvertently used to fabricate manifolds for two complete
Ground-Based Interceptor Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles. The vehicles
had already been processed and delivered to the prime contractor for
integration when the problem was discovered. Lack of adherence to
manufacturing controls to prevent contamination and foreign object
debris also caused parts quality problems. For example, at NASA, a
titanium propulsion tank for the Tracking Data and Relay Satellite
program failed acceptance testing because a steel chip was
inadvertently welded onto the tank. Following a 3-month investigation
into the root cause, the tank was scrapped and a replacement tank was
built.
Design Flaws Also Resulted in Parts Quality Problems:
In addition to problems stemming from poor control of manufacturing
processes and materials, many problems resulted from poor part design,
design complexity, and inattention to manufacturing risks. For
example, attenuators for the Navy's Mobile User Objective System
exhibited inconsistent performance because of their sensitivity to
temperature changes. Officials attributed the problem to poor design,
and the attenuators were subsequently redesigned. At NASA, design
problems also affected parts for the Mars Science Laboratory program.
According to program officials, several resistors failed after
assembly into printed circuit boards. A failure review board
determined that the tight design limits contributed to the problem.
Consequently, the parts had to be redesigned and replaced.
Programs also underestimated the complexity of parts design, which
created risks of latent design and workmanship defects. For example,
NASA's Glory project experienced problems with the state-of-the-art
printed circuit board for the spacecraft computer. According to
project officials, the board design was almost impossible to
manufacture with over 100 serial steps involved in the manufacturing
process. Furthermore, failure analysis found that the 27,000
connection points in the printed circuit board were vulnerable to
thermal stresses over time leading to intermittent failures. However,
the quality of those interconnections was difficult to detect through
standard testing protocols. This is inconsistent with commercial best
practices, which focus on simplified design characteristics as well as
use of mature and validated technology and manufacturing processes.
Supplier Management Contributed to Quality Problems:
Program officials at each agency also attributed parts quality
problems to the prime contractor's failure to ensure that its
subcontractors and suppliers met program requirements. According to
officials, in several cases, prime contractors were responsible for
flowing down all applicable program requirements to their
subcontractors and suppliers. Requirements flow-down from the prime
contractor to subcontractors and suppliers is particularly important
and challenging given the structure of the space and defense
industries, wherein prime contractors are subcontracting more work to
subcontractors.[Footnote 27] At MDA, the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense program experienced a failure with an electronics part
purchased from an unauthorized supplier. According to program
officials, the prime contractor flowed down the requirement that parts
only be purchased from authorized suppliers; however, the
subcontractor failed to execute the requirement and the prime
contractor did not verify compliance. Program officials for NASA's
Juno program attributed problems with a capacitor to the supplier's
failure to review the specification prohibiting the use of pure tin.
DOD's Space-Based Infrared System High program reported problems with
three different parts containing pure tin and attributed the problems
to poor requirements flow-down and poor supplier management. Figure 6
shows an example of tin whiskers on a capacitor, which can cause
catastrophic problems to space systems.
Figure 6: Example of a Capacitor with Tin Whiskers:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program.
[End of figure]
Agency and Industry Efforts to Address Parts Quality Problems Face
Significant Challenges:
DOD and NASA have instituted new policies to prevent and detect parts
quality problems, but most of the programs we reviewed were initiated
before these policies took effect. Moreover, newer programs that do
come under the policies have not reached the phases of development
where parts problems are typically discovered. In addition, agencies
and industry have been collaborating to share information about
potential problems, collecting data, and developing guidance and
criteria for activities such as testing parts, managing
subcontractors, and mitigating specific types of problems. We could
not determine the extent to which collaborative actions have resulted
in reduced instances of parts quality problems or ensured that they
are caught earlier in the development cycle. This is primarily because
data on the condition of parts quality in the space and missile
community governmentwide historically have not been collected. And
while there are new efforts to collect data on anomalies, there is no
mechanism to use these data to help assess the effectiveness of
improvement actions. Lastly, there are significant potential barriers
to success of efforts to address parts quality problems. They include
broader acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse
leadership in the national security space community, the government's
decreasing influence on the overall electronic parts market, and an
increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. In the face of such
challenges, it is likely that ongoing improvements will have limited
success without continued assessments to determine what is working
well and what more needs to be done.
Agencies Are Undertaking Efforts to Strengthen Parts Quality
Management:
As noted earlier in this report, the Air Force, MDA, and NASA have all
recently instituted or updated existing policies to prevent and detect
parts quality problems. At the Air Force and MDA, all of the programs
we reviewed were initiated before these recent policies aimed at
preventing and detecting parts quality problems took full effect. In
addition, it is too early to tell whether newer programs--such as a
new Air Force GPS development effort and the MDA's Precision Tracking
Space System--are benefiting from the newer policies because these
programs have not reached the design and fabrication phases where
parts problems are typically discovered. However, we have reported
that the Air Force is taking measures to prevent the problems
experienced on the GPS IIF program from recurring on the new GPS III
program. The Air Force has increased government oversight of its GPS
III development and Air Force officials are spending more time at the
contractor's site to ensure quality.[Footnote 28] The Air Force is
also following military standards for satellite quality for GPS III
development. At the time of our review, the program had not reported a
significant parts quality problem. Table 4 highlights the major
differences in the framework between the GPS IIF and GPS III programs.
Table 4: Key Differences in Program Framework between GPS IIF and GPS
III:
Requirements:
GPS IIF: Addition of requirements after contract award;
GPS III: Not allowing an adjustment to the program to meet increased
or accelerated requirements.
Development:
GPS IIF: Immature technologies;
GPS III: Incremental development, while ensuring technologies are
mature.
Oversight:
GPS IIF: Limited oversight of contractor, relaxed specifications and
inspections, and limited design reviews;
GPS III: More contractor oversight with government presence at
contractor facility; use of military standards; and multiple levels of
preliminary design reviews, with the contractor being held to military
standards and deliverables during each review.
Source: GAO analysis based on discussions with the GPS program office
officials and review of program documentation.
[End of table]
In addition to new policies focused on quality, agencies are also
becoming more focused on industrial base issues and supply chain
risks. For example, MDA has developed the supplier road map database
in an effort to gain greater visibility into the supply chain in order
to more effectively manage supply chain risks. In addition, according
to MDA officials, MDA has recently been auditing parts distributors in
order to rank them for risk in terms of counterfeit parts. NASA has
begun to assess industrial base risks and challenges during
acquisition strategy meetings and has established an agency Supply
Chain Management Team to focus attention on supply chain management
issues and to coordinate with other government agencies.
Agencies and industry also participate in a variety of collaborative
initiatives to address quality, in particular, parts quality. These
range from informal groups focused on identifying and sharing news
about emerging problems as quickly as possible, to partnerships that
conduct supplier assessments, to formal groups focused on identifying
ways industry and the government can work together to prevent and
mitigate problems. As shown in table 5, these groups have worked to
establish guidance, criteria, and standards that focus on parts
quality issues, and they have enhanced existing data collection tools
and created new databases focused on assessing anomalies.
Table 5: Examples of Organizations and Their Collaborative Efforts and
Outcomes for Addressing Parts Quality:
Organizations:
Government:
* Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center;
* Defense Contract Management Agency;
* International agencies;
* Missile Defense Agency;
* National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
* National Reconnaissance Office;
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command;
Industry:
* Prime contractors;
* Subcontractors;
Other:
* Aerospace Corporation.
Examples of collaborative efforts:
Councils and senior leader forums:
* Joint Mission Assurance Council;
* Mission Assurance Summit;
* Space Industrial Base Council;
* Space Quality Improvement Council;
* Space Supplier Council.
Government/industry technical committees:
* Government-Industry Fastener Working Group (GIFWG);
* NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG);
* Pb-free Electronics Risk Management (PERM) Consortium;
* SAE G-19 Technical Committee, Counterfeit Parts Avoidance;
* TechAmerica G-11 and G-12, Component Parts.
Working groups:
* Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop;
* National Security Space Advisory Forum;
* Space Industrial Base Working Groups;
* Space Parts Working Group.
Other activities:
* Joint supplier audits and assessments;
* Meetings between agencies to share parts issues and assist in
building quality assurance programs;
Examples of outcomes:
Communication among agencies, industry, and their leadership:
* Venues for senior agency leadership to discuss quality issues and
lessons learned;
* Venues to discuss specific areas of interest and concerns, for
example, problems with electronic parts and risk mitigation strategies;
* New memorandum of understanding to increase interagency cooperation;
Tools/actions:
* Guidelines for flight unit qualification;
* Mitigation plan for problems affecting batteries, solar cells and
arrays, and traveling wave tube amplifiers;
* Subcontractor management standards;
* Supplier assessments jointly conducted by Defense Contract
Management Agency, other agencies, and industry.
Data collection/sharing enhancements:
* Aerospace Corporation database of orbit and preflight anomalies;
* National Security Space Advisory Forum--Web-based alert system for
space system anomaly data and problem alerts; this supplements current
GIDEP reporting system.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, NASA and space industry efforts.
[End of table]
One example of the collaborative efforts is the Space Industrial Base
Council (SIBC)--a government-led initiative--which brings together
officials from agencies involved in space and missile defense to focus
on a range of issues affecting the space industrial base and has
sparked numerous working groups focused specifically on parts quality
and critical suppliers. These groups in turn have worked to develop
information-sharing mechanisms, share lessons learned and conduct
supplier assessments, soliciting industry's input as appropriate. For
instance, the SIBC established a critical technology working group to
explore supply chains and examine critical technologies to put in
place a process for strategic management of critical space systems'
technologies and capabilities under the Secretary of the Air Force and
the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. The working group
has developed and initiated a mitigation plan for batteries, solar
cells and arrays, and traveling wave tube amplifiers.[Footnote 29] In
addition, the Space Supplier Council was established under the SIBC to
focus on the concerns of second-tier and lower-tier suppliers, which
typically have to go through the prime contractors, and to promote
more dialogue between DOD, MDA, NASA, other space entities, and these
suppliers. Another council initiative was the creation of the National
Security Space Advisory Forum, a Web-based alert system developed for
sharing critical space system anomaly data and problem alerts, which
became operational in 2005.
Agency officials also cited other informal channels used to share
information regarding parts issues. For example, NASA officials stated
that after verifying a parts issue, they will share their internal
advisory notice with any other government space program that could
potentially be affected by the issue. According to several government
and contractor officials, the main reasons for delays in information
sharing were either the time it took to confirm a problem or concerns
with proprietary and liability issues. NASA officials stated that they
received advisories from MDA and had an informal network with MDA and
the Army Space and Missile Defense Command to share information about
parts problems. Officials at the Space and Missile Systems Center also
mentioned that they have informal channels for sharing part issues.
For example, an official in the systems engineering division at the
Space and Missile Systems Center stated that he has weekly meetings
with a NASA official to discuss parts issues.
In addition to the formal and informal collaborative efforts, the Air
Force's Space and Missile Systems Center, MDA, NASA, and the National
Reconnaissance Office signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in
February 2011 to encourage additional interagency cooperation in order
to strengthen mission assurance practices. The MOU calls on the
agencies to develop and share lessons learned and best practices to
ensure mission success through a framework of collaborative mission
assurance. Broad objectives of the framework are to develop core
mission assurance practices and tools; to foster a mission assurance
culture and world-class workforce; to develop clear and executable
mission assurance plans; to manage effective program execution; and to
ensure program health through independent, objective assessments.
Specific objectives include developing a robust mission assurance
infrastructure and guidelines for tailoring specifications and
standards for parts, materials, and processes and establishing
standard contractual language to ensure consistent specification of
core standards and deliverables.
In addition, each agency is asked to consider the health of the
industrial base in space systems acquisitions and participate in
mission assurance activities, such as the Space Supplier Council and
mission assurance summits. In signing the MOU, DOD, MDA, NASA, and the
National Reconnaissance Office acknowledged the complexity of such an
undertaking as it typically takes years to deliver a capability and
involves hundreds of industry partners building, integrating, and
testing hundreds of thousands of parts, all which have to work the
first time on orbit--a single mishap, undetected, can and has had
catastrophic results.
Although collaborative efforts are under way, we could not determine
the extent to which collaborative actions have resulted in reduced
instances of parts quality problems to date or ensured that they are
caught earlier in the development cycle. This is primarily because
data on the condition of parts quality in the space and missile
community governmentwide historically have not been collected. The
Aerospace Corporation has begun to collect data on on-orbit and
preflight anomalies in addition to the Web alert system established by
the Space Quality Improvement Council. In addition, there is no
mechanism in place to assess the progress of improvement actions using
these data or to track the condition of parts quality problems across
the space and missile defense sector to determine if improvements are
working or what additional actions need to be taken. Such a mechanism
is needed given the varied challenges facing improvement efforts.
Improvement Efforts Face Potential Barriers to Success:
There are significant potential barriers to the success of improvement
efforts, including broader acquisition management problems, diffuse
leadership in the national security space community, workforce gaps,
the government's decreasing influence on the overall electronic parts
market, and an increase in counterfeiting of electronic parts. Actions
are being taken to address some of these barriers, such as acquisition
management and diffuse leadership, but others reflect trends affecting
the aerospace industry that are unlikely to change in the near future
and may limit the extent to which parts problems can be prevented.
* Broader acquisition management problems: Both space and missile
defense programs have experienced acquisition problems--well beyond
parts quality management difficulties--during the past two decades
that have driven up costs by billions of dollars, stretched schedules
by years, and increased technical risks. These problems have resulted
in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning,
military communications, and weather monitoring, and have required all
the agencies in our review to cancel or pare back major programs. Our
reports have generally found that these problems include starting
efforts before requirements and technologies have been fully
understood and moving them forward into more complex phases of
development without sufficient knowledge about technology, design, and
other issues. Reduced oversight resulting from earlier acquisition
reform efforts and funding instability have also contributed to cost
growth and schedule delays. Agencies are attempting to address these
broader challenges as they are concurrently addressing parts quality
problems. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that
critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition
programs begin, requirements are defined early in the process and are
stable throughout, and system designs remain stable. In response to
our designation of NASA acquisition management as a high-risk area,
[Footnote 30] NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve the
effectiveness of its program/project management, and it is in the
process of implementing earned value management within certain
programs to help projects monitor the scheduled work done by NASA
contractors and employees.[Footnote 31] These and other actions have
the potential to strengthen the foundation for program and quality
management but they are relatively new and implementation is uneven
among the agencies involved with space and missile defense. For
instance, we have found that both NASA and MDA lack adequate
visibility into costs of programs. Our reports also continue to find
that cost and schedule estimates across all three agencies tend to be
optimistic.
* Diffuse leadership within the national security space community: We
have previously testified and reported that diffuse leadership within
the national security space community has a direct impact on the space
acquisition process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold
any one person or organization accountable for balancing needs against
wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved
with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they
need to be dedicated.[Footnote 32] In 2008, a congressionally
chartered commission (known as the Allard Commission) reported that
responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs were
scattered across the staffs of DOD organizations and the intelligence
community and that it appeared that "no one is in charge" of national
security space.[Footnote 33] The same year, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence reported similar concerns, focusing
specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would
involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary
of Defense.[Footnote 34] Prior studies, including those conducted by
the Defense Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization (Space
Commission),[Footnote 35] have identified similar problems, both for
space as a whole and for specific programs. Changes have been made
this past year to national space policies as well as organizational
and reporting structures within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Air Force to address these concerns and clarify
responsibilities, but it remains to be seen whether these changes will
resolve problems associated with diffuse leadership.
* Workforce gaps: Another potential barrier to success is a decline in
the number of quality assurance officials, which officials we spoke
with pointed to as a significant detriment. A senior quality official
at MDA stated that the quality assurance workforce was significantly
reduced as a result of acquisition reform. A senior DOD official
responsible for space acquisition oversight agreed, adding that the
government does not have the in-house knowledge or resources to
adequately conduct many quality control and quality assurance tasks.
NASA officials also noted the loss of parts specialists who provide
technical expertise to improve specifications and review change
requests. According to NASA officials, there is now a shortage of
qualified personnel with the requisite cross-disciplinary knowledge to
assess parts quality and reliability. Our prior work has also shown
that DOD's Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which provides
quality assurance oversight for many space acquisitions, was downsized
considerably during the 1990s.[Footnote 36] While capacity shortfalls
still exist, DCMA has implemented a strategic plan to address
workforce issues and improve quality assurance oversight. The shortage
in the government quality assurance workforce reflects a broader
decline in the numbers of scientists and engineers in the space
sector. The 2008 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
report mentioned above found that the space workforce is facing a
significant loss of talent and expertise because of pending
retirements, which is causing problems in smoothly transitioning to a
new space workforce. Similarly, in 2010 we reported that 30 percent of
the civilian manufacturing workforce was eligible for retirement, and
approximately 26 percent will become eligible for retirement over the
next 4 years.[Footnote 37] Similar findings were reported by the DOD
Cost Analysis Improvement Group in 2009.[Footnote 38]
* Industrial base consolidation: A series of mergers and
consolidations that took place primarily in the 1990s added risks to
parts quality--first, by shrinking the pool of suppliers available to
produce specialty parts; second, by reducing specialized expertise
within prime contractors; and third, by introducing cost-cutting
measures that de-emphasize quality assurance. We reported in 2007 that
the GPS IIF program, the Space-Based Infrared High Satellite System,
and the Wideband Global SATCOM system all encountered quality problems
that could be partially attributed to industry
consolidations.[Footnote 39] Specialized parts for the Wideband Global
SATCOM system, for example, became difficult to obtain after smaller
contractors that made these parts started to consolidate. For GPS,
consolidations led to a series of moves in facilities that resulted in
a loss of GPS technical expertise. In addition, during this period,
the contractor took additional cost-cutting measures that reduced
quality. Senior officials responsible for DOD space acquisition
oversight with whom we spoke with for this review stated that prime
space contractors have divested their traditional lines of expertise
in favor of acting in a broader "system integrator" role. Meanwhile,
smaller suppliers that attempted to fill gaps in expertise and
products created by consolidations have not had the experience and
knowledge needed to produce to the standards needed for government
space systems. For instance, officials from one program told us that
their suppliers were often unaware that their parts would be used in
space applications and did not understand or follow certain
requirements. Officials also mentioned that smaller suppliers
attempting to enter the government space market do not have access to
testing and other facilities needed to help build quality into their
parts. We recently reported that small businesses typically do not own
the appropriate testing facilities, such as thermal vacuum chambers,
that are used for testing spacecraft or parts under a simulated space
environment and instead must rely on government, university, or large
contractor testing facilities, which can be costly.[Footnote 40]
* Government's declining share of the overall electronic parts market:
DOD and NASA officials also stated that the government's declining
share of the overall electronic parts market has made it more
difficult to acquire qualified electronic parts. According to
officials, the government used to be the primary consumer of
microelectronics, but it now constitutes only a small percentage of
the market. As such, the government cannot easily demand unique
exceptions to commercial standards. An example of an exception is
DOD's standards for radiation-hardened parts, such as
microelectronics, which are designed and fabricated with the specific
goal of enduring the harshest space radiation environments, including
nuclear events. We reported in 2010 that to produce such parts,
companies would typically need to create separate production lines and
in some cases special facilities.[Footnote 41] Another example is that
government space programs often demand the use of a tin alloy (tin
mixed with lead) for parts rather than pure tin because of the risk
for growth of tin whiskers. According to officials, as a result of
European environmental regulations, commercial manufacturers have
largely moved away from the use of lead making it more difficult and
costly to procure tin alloy parts, and increasing the risk of parts
being made with pure tin. Similarly, officials noted concerns with the
increased use of lead-free solders used in electronic parts. Moreover,
officials told us that when programs do rely on commercial parts,
there tends to be a higher risk of lot-to-lot variation, obsolescence,
and a lack of part traceability.
* An increase in counterfeit electronic parts: Officials we spoke with
agreed that an increase in counterfeit electronics parts has made
efforts to address parts quality more difficult. "Counterfeit"
generally refers to instances in which the identity or pedigree of a
product is knowingly misrepresented by individuals or companies. A
2010 Department of Commerce study identified a growth in incidents of
counterfeit parts across the electronics industry from about 3,300 in
2005 to over 8,000 incidents in 2008.[Footnote 42] We reported in 2010
that DOD is limited in its ability to determine the extent to which
counterfeit parts exist in its supply chain because it does not have a
departmentwide definition of "counterfeit" and a consistent means to
identify instances of suspected counterfeit parts.[Footnote 43]
Moreover, DOD relies on existing procurement and quality control
practices to ensure the quality of the parts in its supply chain.
However, these practices are not designed to specifically address
counterfeit parts. Limitations in the areas of obtaining supplier
visibility, investigating part deficiencies, and reporting and
disposal may reduce DOD's ability to mitigate risks posed by
counterfeit parts. At the time of our review, DOD was only in the
early stages of addressing counterfeiting. We recommended and DOD
concurred that DOD leverage existing initiatives to establish
anticounterfeiting guidance and disseminate this guidance to all DOD
components and defense contractors.
Conclusions:
Space and missile systems must meet high standards for quality. The
2003 Defense Science Board put it best by noting that the "primary
reason is that the space environment is unforgiving. Thousands of good
engineering decisions can be undone by a single engineering flaw or
workmanship error, resulting in the catastrophe of major mission
failure. Options for correction are scant."[Footnote 44] The number of
parts problems identified in our review is relatively small when
compared to the overall number of parts used. But these problems have
been shown to have wide-ranging and significant consequences.
Moreover, while the government's reliance on space and missile systems
has increased dramatically, attention and oversight of parts quality
declined because of a variety of factors, including the implementation
of TSPR and similar policies, workforce gaps, and industry
consolidations. This condition has been recognized and numerous
efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the government's ability to
detect and prevent parts problems. But there is no mechanism in place
to periodically assess the condition of parts quality problems in
major space and missile defense programs and the impact and
effectiveness of corrective measures. Such a mechanism could help
ensure that attention and resources are focused in the right places
and provide assurance that progress is being made.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the
NASA Administrator. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of NASA direct appropriate agency executives to include
in efforts to implement the new MOU for increased mission assurance a
mechanism for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and reporting of
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile
defense programs. This should include the frequency such problems are
appearing in major programs, changes in frequency from previous years,
and the effectiveness of corrective measures. We further recommend
that reports of the periodic assessments be made available to Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this report to DOD and NASA for review and
comment. DOD and NASA provided written comments on a draft of this
report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes III and IV,
respectively. DOD and NASA also provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to include in its
efforts to implement the new MOU for increased mission assurance a
mechanism for a periodic, governmentwide assessment and reporting of
the condition of parts quality problems in major space and missile
defense programs, to include the frequency problems are appearing,
changes in frequency from previous years, and the effectiveness of
corrective measures. DOD responded that it would work with NASA to
determine the optimal governmentwide assessment and reporting
implementation to include all quality issues, of which parts,
materials, and processes would be one of the major focus areas. In
addition, DOD proposed an annual reporting period to ensure planned,
deliberate, and consistent assessments. We support DOD's willingness
to address all quality issues and to include parts, materials, and
processes as an important focus area in an annual report. Recent cases
of higher-level quality problems that did not fall within the scope of
our review include MDA's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile
system and the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency
communications satellite, which were mentioned earlier in our report.
It is our opinion that these cases occurred for reasons similar to
those we identified for parts, materials, and processes. We recognize
that quality issues can include a vast and complex universe of
problems. Therefore, the scope of our review and focus of our
recommendation was on parts, materials, and processes to enable
consistent reporting and analysis and to help direct corrective
actions. Should a broader quality focus be pursued, as DOD indicated,
it is important that DOD identify ways in which this consistency can
be facilitated among the agencies. In response to our second
recommendation, DOD stated that it had no objection to providing a
report to Congress, if Congress desired one. We believe that DOD
should proactively provide its proposed annual reports to Congress on
a routine basis, rather than waiting for any requests from Congress,
which could be inconsistent from year to year.
NASA also concurred with our recommendations. NASA stated that
enhanced cross-agency communication, coordination, and sharing of
parts quality information will help mitigate threats poses by
defective and nonconforming parts. Furthermore, NASA plans to engage
other U.S. space agencies to further develop and integrate agency
mechanisms for reporting, assessing, tracking, and trending common
parts quality problems, including validation of effective cross-agency
solutions.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and other interested parties. The report also will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
provided in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our specific objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which parts
quality problems are affecting Department of Defense (DOD) and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space and missile
defense programs; (2) the causes of these problems; and (3)
initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems.
To examine the extent to which parts quality problems are affecting
DOD (the Air Force, the Navy, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA))
and NASA cost, schedule, and performance of space and missile defense
programs, we reviewed all 21 space and missile programs--9 at DOD,
including 4 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 4 MDA systems, and 12 at NASA--that
were, as of October 2009, in development and projected to be high
cost, and had demonstrated through a critical design review (CDR)
[Footnote 45] that the maturity of the design was appropriate to
support proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration,
and test.[Footnote 46]
DOD space systems selected were major defense acquisition programs--
defined as those requiring an eventual total expenditure for research,
development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million or for
procurement of more than $2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant
dollars. All four MDA systems met these same dollar thresholds. NASA
programs selected had a life cycle cost exceeding $250 million. We
chose these programs based on their cost, stage in the acquisition
process--in development and post-CDR--and congressional interest. A
quality problem was defined to be the degree to which the product
attributes, such as capability, performance, or reliability, did not
meet the needs of the customer or mission, as specified through the
requirements definition and allocation process.
For each of the 21 systems we examined program documentation, such as
parts quality briefings, failure review board reports, advisory
notices, and cost and schedule analysis reports and held discussions
with quality officials from the program offices, including contractor
officials and Defense Contract Management Agency officials, where
appropriate. We specifically asked each program, at the time we
initiated our review, to provide us with the most recent list of the
top 5 to 10 parts, material or processes problems, as defined by that
program, affecting its program's cost, schedule, or performance. Based
on additional information gathered through documentation provided by
the programs and discussions with program officials, we reviewed each
part problem reported by each program to determine if there was a part
problem, rather than a material, process, component, or assembly level
problem. In addition, when possible we identified the impact that a
part, material, or process quality problem might have had on system
cost, schedule, and performance. We selected one system with known
quality problems, as previously reported in GAO reports, within the
Air Force (Space-Based Space Surveillance System), MDA (Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense), and NASA (Glory) for further review to gain
greater insight into the reporting and root causes of the parts
quality problems. Our findings are limited by the approach and data
collected. Therefore, we were unable to make generalizable or
projectable statements about space and missile programs beyond our
scope. We also have ongoing work through our annual DOD assessments of
selected weapon programs and NASA assessments of selected larger-scale
projects for many of these programs, which allowed us to build upon
our prior work efforts and existing DOD and NASA contacts. Programs
selected are described in appendix II and are listed below.
DOD--Air Force:
* Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites:
* Global Positioning System Block IIF:
* Space-Based Infrared System High Program:
* Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10:
DOD--Navy:
* Mobile User Objective System:
DOD--MDA:
* Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
* Ground-Based Midcourse Defense:
* Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
* Targets and Countermeasures:
NASA:
* Aquarius:
* Global Precipitation Measurement Mission:
* Glory:
* Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory:
* James Webb Space Telescope:
* Juno:
* Landsat Data Continuity Mission:
* Magnetospheric Multiscale:
* Mars Science Laboratory:
* National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
Preparatory Project:
* Radiation Belt Storm Probes:
* Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Replenishment:
DOD and NASA have access to one or more of the following databases
used to report deficient parts: the Product Data Reporting and
Evaluation Program, the Joint Deficiency Reporting System, and the
Government Industry Data Exchange Program. We did not use these
systems in our review because of the delay associated with obtaining
current information and because it was beyond the scope of the review
to assess the utility or effectiveness of these systems.
To determine the causes behind the parts quality problems, we asked
each program to provide an explanation of the root causes and
contributing factors that may have led to each part problem reported.
Based on the information we gathered, we grouped the root causes and
contributing factors for each part problem. We reviewed program
documentation, regulations, directives, instructions, and policies to
determine how the Air Force, MDA, and NASA define and address parts
quality. We interviewed senior DOD, MDA, and NASA headquarters
officials, as well as system program and contractor officials from the
Air Force, MDA, and NASA, about their knowledge of parts problems on
their programs. We reviewed several studies on quality and causes from
the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Department of
Commerce; and the Aerospace Corporation to gain a better understanding
of quality and challenges facing the development, acquisition, and
execution of space systems. We met with Aerospace Corporation
officials to discuss some of their reports and findings and the status
of their ongoing efforts to address parts quality. We relied on
previous GAO reports for the implementation status of planned program
management improvements.
To identify initiatives to prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality
problems, we asked each program what actions were being taken to
remedy the parts problems. Through these discussions and others held
with agency officials, we were able to obtain information on working
groups. We reviewed relevant materials provided to us by officials
from DOD, the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the Aerospace Corporation. We
interviewed program officials at the Air Force, MDA, NASA, and the
Aerospace Corporation responsible for quality initiatives to discuss
those initiatives that would pertain to parts quality and discuss the
implementation status of any efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to May 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Description of DOD Satellite Systems, MDA Systems, and
NASA Systems[Footnote 47]:
DOD Satellite Systems:
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and
tactical warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission
control segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications
are acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
* Program start: April 1999:
* Development start: September 2001:
* Design review: April 2003:
* First launch: August 2010:
* Total program cost: $12,919.6 in millions:
Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIF:
The Air Force's GPS includes satellites, a ground control system, and
user equipment. It conveys positioning, navigation, and timing
information to users worldwide. In 2000, Congress began funding the
modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF satellites. GPS IIF is a new
generation of GPS satellites that is intended to deliver all legacy
signals plus new capabilities, such as a new civil signal and better
accuracy.
* Program start: January 1999:
* Development start: February 2000:
* Production decision: July 2002:
* First satellite launch: May 2010:
* Total program cost as of March 2010: $7,282.1 in millions in fiscal
year 2010 dollars:
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity
and improve availability for small terminals. MUOS will replace the
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system currently in operation
and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a
network of satellites and an integrated ground network.
* Program start: September 2002:
* Development start: September 2004:
* Design review: March 2007:
* On-orbit capability: March 2012:
* Total program cost: $6,830.2 in millions:
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program:
The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to
replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range of missile
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
awareness missions. SBIRS High consists of four satellites in
geosynchronous earth orbit plus two replenishment satellites, two
sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit plus two
replenishment sensors, and fixed and mobile ground stations.
* Program start: February 1995:
* Development start: October 1996:
* Design review: August 2001:
* Satellite launch: May 2011:
* Total program cost: $15,938.5 in millions:
Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10:
The Air Force's SBSS Block 10 satellite is intended to provide a
follow-on capability to the Midcourse Space Experiment/Space Based
Visible sensor satellite, which ended its mission in July 2008. SBSS
will consist of a single satellite and associated command, control,
communications, and ground processing equipment. The SBSS satellite is
expected to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to collect
positional and characterization data on earth-orbiting objects of
potential interest to national security.
* Program start: February 2002:
* Development start: September 2003:
* Design review: November 2006:
* Satellite launch: September 2010:
* Total program cost as of March 2010: $873.2 in millions in fiscal
year 2010 dollars:
MDA Systems:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD):
MDA's Aegis BMD is a sea-based missile defense system being developed
in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against ballistic
missiles of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1
radar, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control
systems. It will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for
surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has
multiple versions in development or production: Blocks IA, IB, and IIA.
* Program start: October 1995:
* Transition to MDA: January 2002:
* Design review: May 2009:
* Total program cost as of March 2010: $9,232.5 in millions in fiscal
year 2010 dollars:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range
ballistic missile attacks during their midcourse phase. GMD consists
of an interceptor with a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill
vehicle, and a fire control system that formulates battle plans and
directs components integrated with Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BDMS) radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD critical
technologies, as well as the design of the Capability Enhanced II (CE-
II) configuration of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which
began emplacements in fiscal year 2009.
* Program start: February 1996:
* Design review: May 2006:
* Total program cost as of March 2010: $33,129.7 in millions in fiscal
year 2010 dollars:
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
MDA's STSS is designed to acquire and track threat ballistic missiles
in all stages of flight. The agency obtained the two demonstrator
satellites in 2002 from the Air Force SBIRS Low program that halted in
1999. MDA refurbished and launched the two STSS demonstrations
satellites on September 25, 2009. Over the next 2 years, the two
satellites will take part in a series of tests to demonstrate their
functionality and interoperability with the BMDS.
* Program start: 2002:
* Demonstration satellite launches: September 2009:
* Total program cost: Not available:
Targets and Countermeasures:
The Targets and Countermeasures program provides ballistic missiles to
serve as targets in the MDA flight test program. The targets program
involves multiple acquisitions--including a variety of existing and
new missiles and countermeasures.
* Program start: Multiple:
* Design review: Not applicable:
* Total program cost: Not applicable:
NASA Systems:
Aquarius:
Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency
of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales) to
investigate the links between the global water cycle, ocean
circulation, and the climate. It will measure global sea surface
salinity. The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the
processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the
global cycling of water and to understand how these variations
influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity
globally for 3 years, Aquarius will provide a new view of the ocean's
role in climate.
* Formulation start: December 2003:
* Design review: September 2006:
* Satellite launch: June 2011:
* Total project cost: $279.0 in millions:
Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission:
The GPM mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
project, seeks to improve the scientific understanding of the global
water cycle and the accuracy of precipitation forecasts. GPM is
composed of a core spacecraft carrying two main instruments: a dual-
frequency precipitation radar and a GPM microwave imager. GPM builds
on the work of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission and will
provide an opportunity to calibrate measurements of global
precipitation.
* Formulation start: July 2002:
* Design review: December 2009:
* Launch core spacecraft: July 2013:
* Total project cost: $928.9 in millions:
Glory:
The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute
to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two
principal science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of
aerosols and black carbon in the Earth's atmosphere and climate
systems and (2) collect data on solar irradiance. The satellite has
two main instruments --the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the
Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)--as well as two cloud cameras. The TIM
will allow NASA to have uninterrupted solar irradiance data by
bridging the gap between NASA's Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment
and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System. The Glory satellite failed to reach orbit when it was launched
on March 4, 2011.
* Formulation Start: September 2005:
* Design review: July 2006:
* Launch readiness date: February 2011:
* Total project cost: $424.1 in millions:
Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL):
The GRAIL mission will seek to determine the structure of the lunar
interior from crust to core, advance our understanding of the thermal
evolution of the moon, and extend our knowledge gained from the moon
to other terrestrial-type planets. GRAIL will achieve its science
objectives by placing twin spacecraft in a low altitude and nearly
circular polar orbit. The two spacecraft will perform high-precision
measurements between them. Analysis of changes in the spacecraft-to-
spacecraft data caused by gravitational differences will provide
direct and precise measurements of lunar gravity. GRAIL will
ultimately provide a global, high-accuracy, high-resolution gravity
map of the moon.
* Formulation start: December 2007:
* Design review: November 2009:
* Launch readiness date: September 2011:
* Total project cost: $496.2 in millions:
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST):
The JWST is a large, infrared-optimized space telescope that is
designed to find the first galaxies that formed in the early universe.
Its focus will include searching for first light, assembly of
galaxies, origins of stars and planetary systems, and origins of the
elements necessary for life. JWST's instruments will be designed to
work primarily in the infrared range of the electromagnetic spectrum,
with some capability in the visible range. JWST will have a large
mirror, 6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield the size of
a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade will not fit onto the
rocket fully open, so both will fold up and open once JWST is in outer
space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers (1
million miles) from the Earth.
* Formulation start: March 1999:
* Design review: March 2010:
* Launch readiness date: June 2014:
* Total project cost: $5,095.4 in millions:
Juno:
The Juno mission seeks to improve our understanding of the origin and
evolution of Jupiter. Juno plans to achieve its scientific objectives
by using a simple, solar-powered spacecraft to make global maps of the
gravity, magnetic fields, and atmospheric conditions of Jupiter from a
unique elliptical orbit. The spacecraft carries precise, highly
sensitive radiometers, magnetometers, and gravity science systems.
Juno is slated to make 32 orbits to sample Jupiter's full range of
latitudes and longitudes. From its polar perspective, Juno is designed
to combine local and remote sensing observations to explore the polar
magnetosphere and determine what drives Jupiter's auroras.
* Formulation start: July 2005:
* Design review: April 2009:
* Launch readiness date: August 2011:
* Total project cost: $1,107.0 in millions:
Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM):
The LDCM, a partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey,
seeks to extend the ability to detect and quantitatively characterize
changes on the global land surface at a scale where natural and man-
made causes of change can be detected and differentiated. It is the
successor mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat data series, begun in
1972, is the longest continuous record of changes in the Earth's
surface as seen from space. Landsat data are a resource for people who
work in agriculture, geology, forestry, regional planning, education,
mapping, and global change research.
* Formulation start: October 2003:
* Design review: May 2010:
* Launch readiness date: June 2013:
* Total project cost: $941.6 in millions:
Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS):
The MMS is made up of four identically instrumented spacecraft. The
mission will use the Earth's magnetosphere as a laboratory to study
the microphysics of magnetic reconnection, energetic particle
acceleration, and turbulence. Magnetic reconnection is the primary
process by which energy is transferred from solar wind to Earth's
magnetosphere and is the physical process determining the size of a
space weather storm. The spacecrafts will fly in a pyramid formation,
adjustable over a range of 10 to 400 kilometers, enabling them to
capture the three-dimensional structure of the reconnection sites they
encounter. The data from MMS will be used as a basis for predictive
models of space weather in support of exploration.
* Formulation start: May 2002:
* Design review: August 2010:
* Launch readiness date: March 2015:
* Total project cost: $1,082.7 in millions:
Mars Science Laboratory (MSL):
The MSL is part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP seeks
to understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable world. To
answer this question, the MSL project will investigate how geologic,
climatic, and other processes have worked to shape Mars and its
environment over time, as well as how they interact today. The MSL
will continue this systematic exploration by placing a mobile science
laboratory on the Mars surface to assess a local site as a potential
habitat for life, past or present. The MSL is considered one of NASA's
flagship projects and will be the most advanced rover yet sent to
explore the surface of Mars.
* Formulation start: November 2003:
* Design review: June 2007:
* Launch readiness date: November 2011:
* Total project cost: $2,476.3 in millions:
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP):
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
NPP is a joint mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The satellite will measure
ozone, atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, land and ocean
biological productivity, Earth radiation, and cloud and aerosol
properties. The NPP mission has two objectives. First, NPP will
provide a continuation of global weather observations following the
Earth Observing System missions Terra and Aqua. Second, NPP will
function as an operational satellite and will provide data until the
first NPOESS satellite launches.
* Formulation start: November 1998:
* Design review: August 2003:
* Launch readiness date: October 2011:
* Total project cost: $864.3 in millions:
Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP):
The RBSP mission will explore the sun's influence on the Earth and
near-Earth space by studying the planet's radiation belts at various
scales of space and time. This insight into the physical dynamics of
the Earth's radiation belts will provide scientists data with which to
predict changes in this little understood region of space.
Understanding the radiation belt environment has practical
applications in the areas of spacecraft system design, mission
planning, spacecraft operations, and astronaut safety. The two
spacecrafts will measure the particles, magnetic and electric fields,
and waves that fill geospace and provide new knowledge on the dynamics
and extremes of the radiation belts.
* Formulation start: September 2006:
* Design review: December 2009:
* Launch readiness date: May 2012:
* Total project cost: $685.9 in millions:
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) Replenishment:
The TDRS replenishment system consists of in-orbit communication
satellites stationed at geosynchronous altitude coupled with two
ground stations located in New Mexico and Guam. The satellite network
and ground stations provide mission services for near-Earth user
satellites and orbiting vehicles. TDRS K and L are the 11th and 12th
satellites, respectively, to be built for the TDRS replenishment
system and will contribute to the existing network by providing high
bandwidth digital voice, video, and mission payload data, as well as
health and safety data relay services to Earth-orbiting spacecraft,
such as the International Space Station.
* Formulation start: January 2007:
* Design review: February 2010:
* Launch readiness date for TDRS K: December 2012:
* Launch readiness date for TDRS L: December 2013:
* Total project cost: $434.1 in millions:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
June 13, 2011:
Ms. Cristina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GA0-11-404, "Space And Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic
Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major
Programs," dated May 6, 2011 (GAO Code 120864).
The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's recommendation. The
rationale for our position is included in the enclosure. I submitted
separately a list of technical and factual errors for your
consideration.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, David.Crim@osd.mil, 703-
697-5385.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated May 6, 2011:
GAO-11-404 (GAO Code 120864):
"Space And Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed To
Correct Parts Quality Problems In Major Programs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of NASA direct appropriate agency executives to include
in efforts to implement the new memorandum of understanding for
increased mission assurance a mechanism for a periodic, government-
wide assessment and reporting of the condition of parts quality
problems in major space and missile defense programs, including the
frequency such problems are appearing in major programs, change in
frequency from previous years, and the effectiveness of corrective
measures. The GAO further recommends that reports of the periodic
assessments be made available to the Congress. (See pages 40 through
41/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Partially Concur. DoD will work with NASA to determine
the optimal government-wide assessment and reporting implementation to
include all quality issues, of which Parts, Materials and Processes
would be one of the major focus areas. The DoD will propose the period
of reporting be annual to ensure planned, deliberate, and consistent
assessments. Subject to the approval of our partner in the memorandum
of understanding, the DoD has no objections to providing the report to
Congress, should Congress desire. The DoD will continue to work with
NASA and other US government space community stakeholders through the
Space Industrial Base Councils working groups to address concerns
about parts quality.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Headquarters:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
June 3, 2011:
Reply to Attention of Office of Safety and Mission Assurance:
Ms. Cristina Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates
the opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Space and Missile Defense
Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality
Problems in Major Programs." NASA considers parts quality to be a
vital component of mission success and greatly values the constructive
information and insights shared by GAO during the course of this
effort. We further appreciate the extreme professionalism demonstrated
by your review team and the continued open communications maintained
between GAO and NASA.
In the draft report, GAO provides one recommendation to the NASA
Administrator (see below). In addition to directly responding to the
GAO recommendation, our office provided clarification on key points
and corrections of errors in fact at the exit conference on May 18,
2011. NASA's response to this recommendation immediately follows.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA
direct appropriate agency executives to include in efforts to
implement the new memorandum of understanding for increased mission
assurance a mechanism for a periodic, government-wide assessment and
reporting of the condition of parts quality problems in major space
and missile defense programs, including the frequency such problems
are appearing in major programs, changes in frequency from previous
years, and the effectiveness of corrective measures. We further
recommend that reports of the periodic assessment be made available to
the Congress.
Management's Response: NASA concurs with GAO's recommendation. We
fully agree that enhanced cross-agency communication, coordination,
and sharing of parts quality information will help mitigate threats
posed by defective and nonconforming parts. To this end, NASA will
engage other U.S. space agencies (Missile Defense Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and Air Force Space Command) to further develop
and integrate agency mechanisms for reporting, assessing, tracking,
and trending common parts quality problems, including the institution
and validation of effective cross-agency solutions. NASA currently
enjoys a positive collaborative relationship with these agencies
through a variety of ongoing venues such as the Joint Mission
Assurance Council, Space Quality Improvement Council, and Mission
Assurance Summits and will employ these venues for regular open
discussions concerning parts quality. These forums will be directly
supported by me, NASA's Chief Engineer, and our executive staff in
order to provide the strongest advocacy for aggressive, timely, and
effective resolution of parts quality problems of mutual interest to
United States space programs.
NASA looks forward to continued work with the GAO in order to measure
and improve our performance related to the procurement, installation,
and deployment of quality parts.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. If you
have any questions or require additional information, please contact
Kelly Kabiri at (202) 358-0590.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
[Illegible] for:
Bryan O'Connor:
Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, David B. Best, Assistant
Director; Maricela Cherveny; Heather L. Jensen; Angie Nichols-
Friedman; William K. Roberts; Roxanna T. Sun; Robert S. Swierczek; and
Alyssa B. Weir made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Best Practices Reports:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed
to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.:
February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology
Transition Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883]. Washington, D.C.: September
14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2005.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11,
2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best
Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-469T].
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137]. Washington, D.C.:
April 26, 2000.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116].
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.
Space Reports:
Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading
Capabilities Persist. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-636]. Washington, D.C.: September
15, 2010.
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to
Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate
Data. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558]. Washington,
D.C.: May 27, 2010.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but
Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T]. Washington, D.C.: March 10,
2010.
Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial
Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-648T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2009.
Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1039]. Washington, D.C.: September
26, 2008.
Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to
Guide Future DOD Space Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-431R]. Washington, D.C.: March 27,
2008.
Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best
Practices. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T].
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-391]. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-96]. Washington, D.C.: November 17,
2006.
Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better
Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-908]. Washington, D.C.: September
21, 2006.
Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions
and Keys to Achieving Them. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-626T]. Washington, D.C.: April 6,
2006.
Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment
Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-891T]. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD's New Space Systems
Acquisition Policy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-379R]. Washington, D.C.: January
29, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition
Management Policy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1073]. Washington, D.C.: September
15, 2003.
Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on
Satellite and Related Acquisitions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-825R]. Washington, D.C.: June 2,
2003.
Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but
Further Management Actions Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-379]. Washington, D.C.: April 18,
2003.
Missile Defense Reports:
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. Washington,
D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-676]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. Washington, D.C.:
September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.:
March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Within DOD, the Air Force is the Executive Agent for Space and
through its Space and Missile Systems Center is responsible for
acquiring most of DOD's space systems, while the Missile Defense
Agency is responsible for acquiring ballistic missile defense systems,
and some associated space systems.
[2] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010); Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to
Enhance Space Capabilities, but Persistent Challenges Remain in
Developing Space Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10,
2010); and, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency
and Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2011).
[3] James R. Wertz and Wiley J. Larson, Space Mission Analysis and
Design, El Segundo, Calif.: Microcosm Press, 2003.
[4] DOD defines major defense acquisition programs as those requiring
an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and
evaluation of more than $365 million or for procurement of more than
$2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. DOD Instruction
5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). The NASA projects selected were those with a
life cycle cost exceeding $250 million.
[5] DOD defines CDR as a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure
that a system can proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and test
and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, schedule,
risk, and other system constraints. Generally this review assesses the
system final design as captured in product specifications for each
configuration item in the system's product baseline, and ensures that
each configuration item in the product baseline has been captured in
the detailed design documentation. CDR is normally conducted during
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase and is intended to
assess whether the maturity of the design is appropriate to support
proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and
test. NASA's definition is similar to DOD's, and CDR typically occurs
during NASA's implementation phase. See the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook and DOD Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). NASA's
definition is similar to DOD's, and CDR typically occurs during NASA's
implementation phase. See NASA Interim Directive NM 7120-81 (2009).
[6] Although the Air Force is responsible for acquiring most of DOD's
space systems, the Navy is acquiring a replacement to its Ultra High
Frequency Follow-On satellite system called Mobile User Objective
System.
[7] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Also,
see GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010).
[8] The Aerospace Corporation is a federally funded research and
development center that provides systems engineering and technical
services to national security and civil space programs.
[9] The National Reconnaissance Office develops and operates overhead
reconnaissance satellite systems and conducts intelligence-related
activities for U.S. national security. The National Reconnaissance
Office was excluded from our review because of the sensitive nature of
its work.
[10] Specifications and standards evolved from the need to ensure
proper performance and maintainability of military equipment. The
proliferation of specifications and standards, numbered in the
thousands, was believed to impose unnecessary restrictions, increase
cost to contractors and hence the government, and impede the
incorporation of the latest technology. Secretary of Defense William
Perry issued a memorandum in 1994 that prohibited the use of most
defense standards without a waiver, and many defense standards were
canceled.
[11] Thomas Christie, "What Has 35 Years of Acquisition Reform
Accomplished?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 132,
no. 2 (2006).
[12] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use
of Best Practices, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19,
2007).
[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Role of Lead Systems Integrator on
Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-380] (Washington, D.C.: June 6,
2007).
[14] In 1992, the NASA Administrator initiated the "faster, better,
cheaper" philosophy as a way of managing programs and projects. The
goal was to shorten program development times, reduce cost, and
increase scientific return by flying more and smaller missions in less
time. To do this, the NASA Administrator challenged agency personnel
to do projects faster, better, and cheaper by streamlining practices
and becoming more efficient.
[15] GAO, NASA Management Challenges: Human Capital and Other Critical
Areas Need to be Addressed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-945T] (Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2002).
[16] B. Tosney and S. Pavlica, A Successful Strategy for Development
and Testing (El Segundo, Calif.: Aerospace Corporation, 2003).
[17] The Aerospace Corporation Mission Assurance Guide defines mission
assurance as the disciplined application of general systems
engineering, quality, and management principles toward the goal of
achieving mission success. Mission assurance uses independent
technical assessments as a cornerstone throughout the acquisition and
operations lifecycle. Mission success is defined as the achievement of
not only specified performance requirements but also the expectations
of the users and operators in terms of safety, operability,
suitability, and supportability. In contrast, acquisition success can
be defined in terms of performance, cost, and schedule.
[18] These policies alone do not bind the contractors--the contracts
themselves must link or incorporate these policies.
[19] GAO, Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing
Initiatives in Developing Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit
Parts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-389]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2010).
[20] PDREP is an automated information system managed by the Navy to
track quality, including part deficiencies. JDRS is an automated
information system that the Naval Air Systems Command developed for
reporting of part deficiencies for aeronautics. GIDEP is a Web-based
database that allows government and industry participants to share
information on deficient parts, including counterfeits. We did not use
these systems in our review because of the delay associated with
obtaining current information. We previously reported that a DOD
military standard required the use of GIDEP, but that the standard was
canceled during acquisition reform in 1996. We also cited concerns
related to delayed reporting and liability issues. See GAO-10-389.
[21] Electrically conductive crystalline structures of tin, or "tin
whiskers," can grow from surfaces where pure tin is used, potentially
causing short circuits and posing a serious reliability risk to
electronic assemblies. According to NASA's Electronic Parts and
Packaging Program, tin whisker-induced short circuits have resulted in
on-orbit failure of commercial satellites and have caused failures of
medical devices and consumer products. Alloys of tin and lead reduce
the propensity for whisker growth; however, the electronics industry
is largely moving away from the use of potentially hazardous
materials, such as lead.
[22] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[23] The Glory satellite launched on March 4, 2011, and failed to
reach orbit because of a problem with the satellite launch vehicle.
[24] The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Air Force. Three of the
five NPP contracts for instruments were issued by the Air Force's
Space and Missile Systems Center and managed jointly by the National
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System Integrated Program
Office. According to NASA NPP program officials, management of those
contracts is being transferred to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center.
[25] We have reported on agencies' use of cost-plus-award-fee
contracts, finding in some cases that award fees had been paid to
contractors regardless of acquisition outcomes. GAO, Federal
Contracting: Guidance on Award Fees Has Led to Better Practices but Is
Not Consistently Applied, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-630] (Washington, D.C. May 29,
2009).
[26] Workmanship is defined as the control of design features,
materials, and assembly processes to achieve the desired reliability
for subassembly interconnections, such as those for printed wiring
assemblies, and the use of inspection techniques and criteria to
ensure quality, according to NASA's Workmanship Standards Program.
[27] According to some DOD and industry experts, prime contractors are
subcontracting more work on the production of weapons systems and
concentrating instead on systems integration. Based on some estimates,
60 to 70 percent of work on defense contracts is now done by
subcontractors. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Additional Guidance
Needed to Improve Visibility into the Structure and Management of
Major Weapon System Subcontracts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-61R] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28,
2010).
[28] GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in
Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-325] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2009).
[29] Batteries identified were lithium-ion. A traveling wave tube
amplifier is employed as a microwave power amplifier and can have
application in both receiver and transmitter systems.
[30] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2007).
[31] GAO, Additional Cost Transparency and Design Criteria Needed for
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-364R] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 3, 2011).
[32] GAO, Space Acquisition: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities,
but Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-447T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 10, 2010).
[33] Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
National Security Space (Alexandria, Va.: July 2008).
[34] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
(Washington, D.C.: October 2008).
[35] Department of Defense, Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2001).
[36] GAO, DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian
Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military
Personnel and Sourcing Decisions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-475] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28,
2003).
[37] GAO, Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22,
2010).
[38] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement
Group, National Security Space Industrial Base Study 2008 Update
(Washington, D.C.: January 2009).
[39] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-96] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17,
2006).
[40] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing
Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-21]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2010).
[41] GAO, Briefing on Commercial and Department of Defense Space
System Requirements and Acquisition Practices, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-315R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14,
2010).
[42] Department of Commerce, Defense Industrial Base Assessment:
Counterfeit Electronics (Washington, D.C., January 2010).
[43] GAO, Defense Supplier Base: DOD Should Leverage Ongoing
Initiatives in Developing Its Program to Mitigate Risk of Counterfeit
Parts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-389]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2010).
[44] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board/Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of
National Security Space Programs, (Washington, D.C.: May 2003).
[45] DOD and MDA define CDR as a multidisciplined technical review to
ensure that a system can proceed into fabrication, demonstration, and
test and can meet stated performance requirements within cost,
schedule, risk, and other system constraints. Generally, this review
assesses the system's final design as captured in product
specifications for each configuration item in the system's product
baseline, and ensures that each configuration item in the product
baseline has been captured in the detailed design documentation. CDR
is normally conducted during the engineering and manufacturing
development phase. See the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and DOD
Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 2, 2008). NASA's definition is similar to
DOD's, and CDR typically occurs during NASA's implementation phase.
See NASA Interim Directive NM 7120-81 (2009).
[46] Since we started this review, two DOD space satellites and one
NASA satellite have been completed and launched. The Space Based
Surveillance System satellite launched on September 25, 2010; the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite launched on August 14,
2010; and the Glory satellite launched on March 4, 2011. The Glory
satellite failed to reach orbit because of a problem with the
satellite launch vehicle.
[47] Descriptions of DOD and NASA systems are based on the following
GAO reports: GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments
of Selected Weapon Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30,
2010); NASA: Assessments of Selected Larger-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-239SP] (Washington,
D.C: Mar. 3, 2011); and Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency and Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2011). All program costs are expressed in fiscal year 2011 dollars in
millions and are current as of March 2011 unless otherwise noted.
[End of section]
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