TOKYO — When Junichiro Koizumi steps down next week, there will be no mistaking the restively nationalistic society Japan's next prime minister will inherit. But Koizumi will leave behind a question, too - one no leader can duck any longer: How is Japan to articulate its rising pride and assertiveness?

More specifically, how will Shinzo Abe, Koizumi's heir-apparent, navigate two disparate streams: a public mostly eager to live as a "normal" nation, and small, aggressively nationalistic constituencies that retain influence within the governing Liberal Democratic Party?

It is not difficult to discern the nationalistic impulse here today. It is found in comics and movies, in an enthusiasm for World Cup soccer, in an indignation over North Korean missiles and, far from least, in Japan's anxiety over China's emerging influence.

But if it is everywhere evident it is not much discussed. For six decades after Japan's surrender, when expressions of nationalism were instantly deemed the preserve of nostalgic extremists, such feelings have remained furtive.

On the one hand, there is a clear grasp among the Japanese that the postwar era is over and they are at last "post-postwar," no longer tethered to the heavy stones that held them during the decades after the surrender. Responsibility, yes, most Japanese will say when pressed; guilt, no - it is a thing of the past. Comparisons with Germany are both obvious and accurate.

On the other hand, the thought of declaring foursquare sovereignty in international affairs and a simple pride in "Japaneseness" continues to induce a poignant, almost palpable inner turmoil. What is perfectly ordinary to the French, the Brazilians and everyone else under the sun remains, in the Japanese psyche, beyond a line they dare to cross only in the most tentative fashion.

"The endeavor today is to find the genuine identity of this country," said Koichi Kato, a longtime member of the Japanese Parliament. "For decades we thought this lay in economic achievement-in catching up to America. But we've done that now. We're affluent. So for the past 20 years we've been soul- searching-looking for something we should aspire to next."

The country Abe is likely to lead, Kato added, is one that is only midway through this project. "And the result of our failure so far is a certain psychological chaos and instability," he said.

Koizumi's five years in office have been a reliable reflection of this national confusion. He will hand Abe a foreign policy that is something of a mess - inconsistent, indirect, half articulated and half hidden, the stuff of gesture as opposed to substance.

A professed nationalist himself, Koizumi has sought to ride both of the streams flowing through Japanese opinion: He has been eager to express the public's emerging aspirations while also seeking to satisfy the extreme right - a small but influential constituency that, bearing no responsibility for foreign relations, thinks provocative posturing is just the thing for a proud prime minister's repertoire.

The most visible manifestation of Koizumi's nationalism has been his commitment to visiting Yasukuni Shrine, the war memorial not far from the Imperial Palace here. Given the diplomatic damage his visits have done in the region, this will almost certainly stand as the most expensive mistake of his five years in office.

The prime minister was probably correct in surmising that some new statement of patriotism was appropriate on his watch. It is questionable whether the public wanted a line drawn in the sand, and it is altogether doubtful they were willing to pay so high a price for one.

More broadly, Koizumi has paid little attention to Southeast Asia while letting spats in Japan's immediate neighborhood run on, with no apparent effort to resolve them.

Straining ties between Tokyo and Beijing are the Yasukuni visits, arguments over history textbooks, a confrontation over disputed islands and a planned visit to Tokyo by Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan's former president. With the South Koreans, the list is strikingly similar: the shrine, history books and islands.

In effect, Koizumi has reprised an old pattern in Japanese foreign relations: Facing Asia he has sought to be tough and unflinching, the man in command; facing the West he has been something else.

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While few Japanese of any political persuasion argue for a disruption of relations with the United States, Koizumi's performance with the Americans is viewed widely here as almost obsequious. This may seem odd for a prime minister so committed elsewhere to assertiveness, but it has been common practice among Koizumi's predecessors, including many who were nationalistic in outlook.

"The security treaty between Japan and the United States is perfectly natural," said Yukio Hatoyama, secretary- general of the opposition Democratic Party. "But it is surely time for a more equal partnership. Koizumi's way of doing America's bidding has been an unfortunate aspect of his foreign policy."

This view, though widely held, may be slightly harsh. Tokyo has often tilted closer to Beijing and Seoul than to Washington on North Korea, notably when Koizumi flew to Pyongyang for a one- day summit with Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, in September 2002.

He has also encouraged debate on revising the "no-war" constitution, which was written by the Americans and handed to the Japanese 60 years ago. As a step toward what is known here as healthy nationalism, this was probably the most significant decision of Koizumi's career.

In both cases Koizumi risked riling the United States and did not. It is at least arguable that there has been some calculation behind the prime minister's stance toward Washington.

A little more than a week before he is expected to be elected president of the Liberal Democrats and succeed Koizumi, Abe's calculations remain the subject of much speculation. He shares Koizumi's conservatism and nationalism; many analysts believe he will opt for assuaging right-wing opinion rather than taking leadership on diplomatic questions.

"There are realists and populists in these matters, and Abe is a populist," said Eisuke Sakakibara, a former government official and now head of a research institute at Waseda University. "He's likely to be tough on Korea and China and not much concerned with the rest of Asia."

Neither is Abe expected to evince much independence or innovation in Tokyo's relations with Washington - at least not overtly. "If Abe is elected we're talking about policy continuity," Sakakibara added.

But Abe's record is more nuanced than Koizumi's, and he appears to be purposely circumspect when nationalism and sensitive diplomacy intersect. While he is known for his tough views toward Asia, he earned this reputation by speaking out forcefully when North Korea admitted several years ago to abducting Japanese citizens.

"He took a firm stance on an issue involving people's security," said Tsuneo Watanabe, a foreign policy expert at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute. "This is the essence of Abe's appeal. He actually doesn't say much about China, and I doubt he has hawkish views toward anybody, especially the Chinese."

Abe also has two opportunities Koizumi did not enjoy, policy analysts say. He can guard his high reputation among conservatives and nationalists by striking the required poses while naming a foreign minister capable of talking to Beijing and Seoul at a productive level - a realist, in Sakakibara's terminology.

Equally, Koizumi's brand of nationalism has been influenced by traditional sources of support that are in decline. His promise to visit Yasukuni appears partly to have reflected an effort to win the backing of the Association of Bereaved Families, a group representing those with enshrined relatives.

This association is now losing its previous prominence, as even the children of the war dead are aging. Several weeks ago the association's head, a senior Liberal Democrat, spoke in favor of removing controversial war criminals from the shrine - an important signal that the association is aware of the damage the shrine has done Japan.

Abe may thus be less beholden to elements representing an older, somewhat archaic kind of nationalism in the Japanese context. If so, a product of that tradition may prove more responsive to a newer and more vibrant stream in Japanese thinking.