Wednesday, April 10, 2013

KIM JONG-UN: CHINESE CONCERNS & CAUTION

B.RAMAN

As Kim
Jong-Un of North Korea, who completes one year as First Secretary of the
Workers’ Party of Korea on April 11,2013,uses North Korea’s power of escalatory
rhetoric to threaten the region with the danger of a nuclear war if its demands
are not met, there is increasing nervousness not only among North Korea’s
perceived adversaries such as the US, South Korea and Japan, but also in its
traditional friend next door, namely, China.

2. Does Kim realise the implications of the threats
which he has been holding out against his adversaries? Does he realise that if
he carries out his threats or if he loses control of the situation under the
irrational force of his rhetoric, he would be seriously endangering not only
the national interests and security of his own country, but alsothose of North Korea’s traditional friends
such as China?

3. Even Fidel Castro, in a recent column for a
Cuban paper for which he writes now and then, has pointed out the likely
dangers to North Korea’s traditional friends if the situation in the Korean
peninsula gets out of control. He has not named the traditional friends of
North Korea, but it is apparent he was having in mind China and Russia.

4. The Government and Party-controlled media in
China has been increasingly---initially indirectly, now directly--- reflecting
the concerns in China over the developing situation in the Korean peninsula in
the wake of the recent North Korean nuclear and missile tests and the new sanctions
sought to be imposed against it under pressure from the US.

5. The Chinese concerns are reflected very clearly
in two commentaries carried by the ‘People’s Daily” and the “Global Times”,
both run by the Communist Party of China, on April 11, coinciding with the
first anniversary of Kim Jong-Un’s leadership
of the Party

6. The “People’s Daily” commentary, explaining
China’s policy of not allowing trouble-making at its doorstep, said: “ Not allowing troublemaking at the
doorsteps of China means to stop the vicious circle of tension on the
peninsula, to prevent any party from stirring up trouble, to oppose creating
tension on purpose, and to say no to render the use of force to resolve the
problem. Words and deeds that intensify the tensions on the Korean Peninsula
should be condemned and opposed. Not allowing troublemaking at the doorsteps of
China is not China's "Monroe Doctrine". China does not seek spheres
of influence. China intends to maintain regional peace and stability on the Peninsula,
and determine its own position and actions in accordance with the Peninsula
situation on its own merits. At present, it is not without hope to maintain
peace and stability on the peninsula.”

7. The “Global Times” was even more explicit in
cautioning North Korea. It said:

“Since the transition of Pyongyang's leadership,
the outside world has been speculating over the future direction of the regime.
North Korea is sure to change, because its current situation is unsustainable
and is placing huge pressure on the country. Escaping this pressure fits the
North's interests and would allow the country to meet external expectations.

“During the past year, the nuclear issue has
remained at the centre of the North's domestic and foreign policies. The new
leadership has shown its resolve, which is to develop nuclear technologies,
rather than solve the nuclear crisis. The regime has taken an extreme path.

“Pyongyang should clearly understand that it does
not have the capability to dominate the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Its
nuclear capacity to some extent makes it feel secure, but at the same time it
worsens its international strategic environment. Pyongyang should drop its
illusions that it can make the world stay silent over its desire for nuclear
arms through its hard-line stance and deceptions.

“The international community will never permit
North Korea to have the legal status of a nuclear country, because it would
lead to more devastating consequences. A number of Asian countries have
acquired nuclear weapons, but none of them use them in the manner North Korea
envisions.

“The North Korean regime has to face up to the
difficulties in returning to the international community if it refuses to give
up its nuclear ambitions. Even if the US and South Korea make concessions, the
North still confronts problems such as sanctions and economic obstacles.
Concrete moves are needed to solve the current dilemma that the North faces.

“China respects North Korea, but it also holds the
responsibility of preserving peace in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang's nuclear issue
concerns China's national interests. We hope that the North Korean regime can
stay rational and pay attention to the interests of the whole region as its
bottom line. We also hope that its moves will not pose threats to the peace and
stability of China's north-eastern area.

“North Korea has more difficulties in opening
itself up to the world. The stances of South Korea, Japan and the US are partly
the reason. Regardless of the situation, we believe the North still has a
chance and we regret that it has become mired in this crisis. We hope the
crisis is only temporary.”

8.A perusal of the recent comments in the Chinese
media indicates that Chinese observers feel there is need for fresh thinking on
the question of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capability. It seems to be
their view that after all that has happened recently the question of a
negotiated de-nuclearisation of North Korea is no longer a viable option. A
more practical option could be to work for a freezing of North Korea’s
capability at the present level in return for a Chinese offer of its nuclear
umbrella to North Korea to calm its fears regarding the US nuclear umbrella for
South Korea and Japan.

9. Will such an offer work? The US may not accept
any attempt to legitimise North Korea’s present capability as that could create
problems in relation to Iran. Moreover, the present North Korean leadership
seems determined not to accept any externally imposed constraints on its
nuclear and missile capabilities.

10. How to calm the North Korean leadership and
de-escalate the situation? The Chinese do not seem to have an answer. They seem
to know so little about the mind-set of Kim Jong-Un and his advisers. He has
not visited China since assuming office. He had visited China along with his
father, but as the ruler of North Korea after the death of his father Kim
Jong-Il, he and his advisers have not maintained the same level of contacts
with the party and PLA leadership of China as during the days of his father.

11. China is no longer an important and reliable
window on North Korea as it used to be in the past. It is as confused by the
policies and unpredictability of Kim Jong-Un and his advisers as the US and
South Korea. As Kim, who had done his schooling in Switzerland, took over as
the supreme leader in December 2011 after the death of his father, there was a
fond expectation that his exposure to the West as a student might make him
amenable to a policy of gradually opening up his country to the outside world.

12. This has not happened. Is it because he himself
is not inclined to pursuing a policy of opening-up or because he is unable to
overcome opposition from the old guards in the Army and the Party to any policy
change. One has not so far seen in the Party and the Army a new generation
wanting to experiment with new policies in the economic field.

13. In the face of a dearth of information regarding
the new post-December 2011 leadership in North Korea, China has been finding
the recent developments as unnerving as the rest of the international
community. Apart from articulating its concerns and caution and expressing its
hope that things will not reach a point of no return, China has been finding
its ability to influence the developments in a constructive direction limited. (11-4-13)