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For one, Subandrio had been in constant touch with Peking for many months, and, for another, D hani had been sent there by Sukarno in mid-Sep- tember to arrange for scheduled arms shipments. Although the Chinese said nothing officially about the abortive coup until eighteen days after it took place-when they protested an attack on the office of the Chinese commercial attaché in Djakarta and followed this with a propaganda barrage against atrocities allegedly committed by the military-it was later determined that Chinese officials in Peking knew about the coup attempt within six hours aft- er it occurred, and, furthermore, had a list of all the generals who were to ha ve been murdered, incl uding Nasution. In any analysis of these events, much depends on the degree of credence giv- en to an alleged "confession" signed in Central Java on November 23rd by Aidit, who had been captured the day before and was, according to reliable reports, killed soon after he signed the document in question; because of Ai- dit's closeness to Sukarno, there was ample reason for the Army not to want him made a martyr by any sort of pub- lic trial in Djakarta. Although the con- fession is generally treated with skepti- cism, mainly because it seems too pat and serves the interests of the Army too readIly, a number of points in it seem valid. For example, Ai- dit corroborated that 1970 had been the original P .K.I. target date, and said that be- cause "details of this plan leaked out" a decision was hastily made "to carry out a O bI " coup as soon as pOSSI e. Early in August, Aidit con- firmed, he had stopped off in Peking "and discussed the health of PresIdent Sukarno with the Communist Chinese leaders." When he got back to D Ja- karta, in the middle of the month, he saId, he talked over the detaj]s of the coup with Supardjo, Untung, and two members of the Politburo, Njoto and Lukman. Aidit's confessIon concludes, "The coup d' état failed because it was premature and also because there were not a few-even among the top P.K.I. officials-who were opposed to It. . . . The second reason for the failure was the lack of support of Communist Chi- na and international Communism, on which we had placed hopes." Aidit might have added a third reason, which he actually alluded to only oblIquely: /"- . : ... -;.--:..... - , f;SI\ '... t..... '= . L, If'" " . I I .. I" ,þ I .1('. .'. \ t,. :if!.,. . 't... ...../'*'.1 Sukarno's failure to give all-out support. Whatever role Sukarno played in the uprising, he clearly demonstrated a feeling of responsibility, even of con- cern, for those who had been involved in it, and he continued afterward to defend its proclaimed revolutionary goals. In the confusion immediately following the clash, he remained aloof, and went as far as to chastise the P .K.I., though gently. In a remark to Njoto, who, of the three top Com- m unIst leaders, was probably closest to him personally, he described the bun- gled coup as "childish," by which he apparently meant that the P .K.I. had acted too precipitately-an ironic criti- cism, since it WdS he who had, in ef- fect, forced the Part} 's hand. Later, however, his old bravado returned, and this made it impossible either for his friends to save him or for his foes to let him down easily in the interest of preserving national unity. If his inten- tion was to show that he had "known everything and known nothing," as one analyst has put it, his behavior soon helied this, and led inevitab]y not only to his dismissal as P residen t but also to the tarnishing of his historical record. T HE Communists' troubles gre\\ worse on the morning of Oc- tober 2nd. Although it was already ap- parent that the coup had failed, that day's Issue of the Communist news- paper H arzan Rakyat carried an ed- itorial hailing the September 30th Movement and a car- toon depicting it as a vast fist smashing the face of an In- donesian general who was wearing dollar sIgns for epau- lettes and a cap stamped with the initials "C.I.A." The paper descrIbed what had happened as "an internal Army affair," and said that Çt..t... "the support and sympathy of the people are certainly on the sIde of the September 30th Move- ment." Upon the appearance of the editorial, the paper was banned, under the martial-law decree that had been announced the previous day by General Suharto. On October 5th, the Party had second thoughts, and, in an announcement sent to cor- respondents, repeated the theme of the coup's having been an interna] Army matter but added that the P .K.I. members who had been listed on the Revolutionary Council "were not notified dnd had not given their I " approva . So far, Sukarno had not publicly de-