Network Working Group M. Andrews
Internet-Draft ISC
Expires: March 29, 2014 September 25, 2013
Updating Parent Zones
draft-andrews-dnsop-update-parent-zones-00
Abstract
DNS UPDATE was developed to allow DNS zones to be updated.
There is a perception that UPDATE can not be used in conjuction with
the Registry, Registar, Registrant (RRR) model to update a zone.
This document explains how UPDATE can be used in the RRR model.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 29, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Andrews Expires March 29, 2014 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Updating Parent Zones September 2013
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Direct to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Indirect to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Andrews Expires March 29, 2014 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Updating Parent Zones September 2013
1. Introduction
UPDATE [RFC2136]is designed to update any zone in the DNS. This
includes updating delegating NS records, glue address records and DS
record.
While UPDATE is primarly designed to UPDATE a zone directly there in
no reason why UPDATE requests cannot be translated to the EPP
requests to perform the changes.
This would provide a uniform model to update parent zone regardless
of where they are in the DNS heirachy.
2. Translation
The Registrar would host a server that authenticates UPDATE requests
received directly or relayed by the Registry using TSIG [RFC2845],
then translate the actions in the UPDATE request into EPP transaction
requests. The results of those EPP transactions would be relayed to
the UPDATE client.
Requests that are not TSIG signed are rejected.
The translating server would handle a restricted subset of UPDATE
requests, possibly ignoring the prerequiste section. UPDATE requests
would be limited to those supported by EPP.
e.g. Add NS record. Delete all NS records. Add A record. Delete
AAAA record. Add DS record. Delete DS record.
The translating server may also override/ignore the TTL in the UPDATE
request.
3. Authentication
Authentication would be done using TSIG. TSIG was designed to be
uses in a environment where requests are relayed.
Authentication can be done down to the tuple. There
exist nameservers that already implement access contols down to this
level of granuality based on the presented TSIG.
This would allow nameservers to update their own address records as
they get renumbered without being able to update anything else.
This would DNSSEC key management software to update DS records
Andrews Expires March 29, 2014 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Updating Parent Zones September 2013
without being able to update anything else.
As Registrars do all the authentication and generate the signed
responses there is no need for the Registry to have access to the
private material using in TSIG. Registrars already handle shared
keys in these numbers with their web interfaces.
4. Direct to Registrar
The hardest part of Direct to Registrar is finding where to send the
UPDATE request. This would most probably just be advised to the
Registrant.
5. Indirect to Registrar
In the indirect model the Registry would host a UPDATE relay server
which would examine the first record of the UPDATE section and relay
the request to the Registrar of record for the owner name of that
record. The response would be relayed back.
The relay can use either TCP or UDP when forwarding UPDATE requests
as TSIG supports changes to the DNS id field when a request/response
is relayed.
This is consistent with how tools like nsupdate work out where to
send a UPDATE request. They look at the ownername of the first
record and use it to discover the containing zone.
6. Security Considerations
The UPDATE requests are all TSIG signed. This is a proven method for
securing UPDATE requests in the DNS.
7. Normative References
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, April 1997.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
Andrews Expires March 29, 2014 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Updating Parent Zones September 2013
Author's Address
M. Andrews
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
US
Email: marka@isc.org
Andrews Expires March 29, 2014 [Page 5]