2016-11-14T18:40:49Z06_01_Economideshttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/31462
Title: 06_01_Economides
Authors: Economides, Nicholas2012-02-09T21:03:16ZPatents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizationshttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/31461
Title: Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations
Authors: Rysman, Marc; Simcoe, Tim
Abstract: This paper measures the technological significance of voluntary standard
setting organizations (SSOs) by examining citations to patents disclosed
in the standard setting process. We find that SSO patents are cited far
more frequently than a set of control patents, and that SSO patents
receive citations for a much longer period of time. Furthermore, we find
a significant correlation between citation and the disclosure of a
patent to an SSO, which may imply a marginal impact of disclosure. These
results provide the first empirical look at patents disclosed to SSOs,
and show that these organizations not only select important
technologies, but may also play a role in establishing their significance.2012-02-09T21:00:49ZLinux vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation
Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platformshttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/31460
Title: Linux vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation
Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms
Authors: Economides, Nicholas; Katsamakas, Evangelos
Abstract: The chapter analyzes and compares the investment incentives of platform
and application developers for Linux and Windows. We find that the level
of investment in applications is larger when the operating system is
open source rather than proprietary. The comparison of the levels of
investment in the operating systems depends, among others, on reputation
effects and the number of developers. The chapter also develops a short
case study comparing Windows and Linux and identifies new directions for
open source software research.2012-02-09T20:56:05ZVertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court got
Trinko Wronghttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/31459
Title: Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court got
Trinko Wrong
Authors: Economides, Nicholas
Abstract: Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&amp;T, sued
Verizon for anti-competitively raising the costs of AT&amp;T, Verizon's
rival in the market for local telecommunications services. Pursuant to
the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, AT&amp;T was leasing
parts of the local telecommunications net- work (unbundled network
elements, &quot;UNEs&quot;) from Verizon at &quot;cost plus reasonable
profit&quot; prices. The Supreme Court held that Trinko's complaint
failed to state a claim under &sect; 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed
the complaint. I argue that the Court drew in- .correct inferences from
its AsPen Skiing decision. The Court also missed a key vertical
leveraging issue in Trinko. The opening of competition mandated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 challenged Verizon's traditional monopoly
in the local telecommu- nications services market. By raising the cost
and/or decreasing the quality of the service of rivals in the retailing
services market, Verizon aimed to preserve that monopoly. As a result of
these ef- forts, rivals suffered a disadvantage. Yet Verizon also caused
retail- ing rivals to lease a lower number of unbundled network elements
and thus incurred a revenue sacrifice. Therefore the actions ofVer- izon
in raising the costs of retailing telecommunications services ri- vals
are an indication of. liability according to the. &quot;sacrifice
principle&quot; proposed in the Government's brief in Trinko, according
to which a defendant is liable if its conduct &quot;involves a sacrifice
of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it
helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power,&quot; eventhough
the sacrifice principle defines a stringent condition for a finding of liability.2012-02-09T20:44:13Z