Question XI.
Whether or no he be more principally a king who is a king by birth, or
he who is a king by the free election and suffrages of the people.
Assert. 1. — Without detaining the reader, I desire liberty to assert
that, where God establisheth a kingdom by birth, that government. hic et
nunc, is best; and because God principally distributeth crowns, when God
establisheth the royal line of David to reign, he is not principally a
king who cometh nearest and most immediately to the fountain of royalty,
which is God's immediate will; but God established, hic et nunc, for
typical reasons (with reverence of the learned) a king by birth.
Assert. 2. — But to speak of them, ex natur a rei, and according to the
first mould and pattern of a king by law, a king by election is more
principally king (magis univoce et per se) than an hereditary prince.
(1.) Because in hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen by the
free suffrages of the people, for that cause ultimate, the hereditary
prince cometh to the throne, because his first rather, and in him the
whole line of the family, was chosen to the crown, and propter quod
unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. (2.) The first king ordained by
God's positive law, must be the measure of all kings, and more
principally the king than he who is such by derivation. But the first
king is a king by election, not by birth, Deut. xvii. 15, Thou shalt in
any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one
from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set over thee. (3.) The law saith.
Surrogatum fruitur privilegiis ejus, in cujus locum surrogatur, he who
is substituted in the place of another, enjoyeth the privileges of him
in whose place he succeedeth. But the hereditary king hath royal
privileges from him who is chosen king.. Solomon hath the royal
privileges of David his father, and is therefore king by birth, because
his father David was king by election; and this I say, not because I
think sole birth is a just title to the crown, but because it designeth
him who indeed virtually was chosen, when the first king of the race was
chosen. (4.) Because there is no dominion of either royalty, or any
other way by nature, no more than an eagle is born king of eagles, a
lion king of lions; neither is a man by nature born king of men; and,
therefore, he who is made king by suffrages of the people, must be more
principally king than he who hath no tide but the womb of his mother.
Dr Ferne is so far with us, to father royalty upon the people's free
election as on the formal cause, that he saith,[1] If to design the
person and to procure limitation of the power, in the exercise of it, be
to give the power, we grant the power is from the people; but (saith he)
you will have the power originally from themselves, in another sense,
for you say, they reserve power to depose and displace the magistrate;
sometimes they make the monarchy supreme, and then they divest
themselves of all power, and keep none to themselves; but, before
established government, they have no politic power whereby they may lay
a command on others, but only a natural power of private resistance,
which, they cannot use against the magistrate.
Ans. — But to take off those by the way. 1. If the king may choose A. B.
an ambassador, and limit him in his power, and say, Do this, and say
this to the foreign state you go to, but no more, half a wit will say
the ling createth the ambassador, and the ambassador's power is
originally from the king; and we prove the power of the lion is
originally from God, and of the sea and the fire is originally from God,
because God limiteth the lion in the exercises of its power, that it
shall not devour Daniel, and limiteth the sea, as Jeremiah saith, when
as he will have its proud waves to come thither and no farther, and will
have the fire to burn those who threw the three children into the fiery
furnace, and yet not to burn the three children; for this is as if Dr
Ferne said, The power of the king of six degrees, rather than his power
of five, is from the people, therefore the power of the king is not from
the people; yea, the contrary is true. 2. That the people can make a
king supreme, that is, absolute, and so resign nature's birthright, that
is, a power to defend themselves, is not lawful, for if the people have
not absolute power to destroy themselves, they cannot resign such a
power to their prince. 3. It is false that a community, before they be
established with formal rulers, have no politic power; for consider them
as men only, and not as associated, they have indeed no politic power:
but before magistrates be established, they may convene and associate
themselves in a body, and appoint magistrates; and this they cannot do
if they had no politic power at all. 4. They have virtually a power to
lay on commandments, in that they have power to appoint to themselves
rulers, who may lay commandments on others. 5. A community hath not
formally power to punish themselves, for to punish, is to inflict malum
disconveniens natures, an evil contrary to nature; but, in appointing
rulers and in agreeing to laws, they consent they shall be punished by
another, upon supposition of transgression, as the child willingly going
to school submitteth himself in that to school discipline, if he shall
fail against any school law; and by all this it is clear, a king by
election is principally a king. Barclay then faileth, who saith,[2] No
man denieth but succession to a crown by birth is agreeable to nature.
It is not against nature, but it is no more natural than for a lion to
be born a king of lions.
Obj. — Most of the best divines approve an hereditary monarch, rather
than a monarch by election.
Ans. — So do I in some cases. In respect of empire simply, it is not
better; in respect of empire now, under man's fall in sin, I grant it to
be better in some respects. So Salust in Jugurth. Natura mortalium
imperij avida. Tacitus, Hist. 2. Minore discrimine princeps sumitur,
quam queritu, there is less danger to accept of a prince at hand, than
to seek one afar off. In a kingdom to be constituted, election is
better; in a constituted kingdom, birth seemeth less evil. In respect of
liberty, election is more convenient; in respect of safety and peace,
birth is safer and the nearest way to the well. See Bodin, de Rep. lib.
6, c. iv.; Thol. de Rep. lib. 7, c iv.
[1] Dr Ferne, part 3, sect. 3, p. 14.
[2] Barcla. cont. Monarchom.. c. 2, p. 56.