Tsingtao Campaign
by Colin Denis (cdenis@goldengate.net)

Japan in the Great War: Diplomacy & Internal Politics

Japan fought a minor and obscure campaign in World War I, yet the war
deeply influenced Japanese politics. She entered the war as an Allied
state, becoming a democratic constitutional monarchy. She left the war in
clear danger of military dictatorship, alienated from her allies,
sympathetic to her ex-enemies. Why? Domestic politics dominated the entire
campaign. The Japanese army conceived of the war as an elaborate attack on
its internal political foes, and it routed them.

The Meiji Emperor of Japan died in 1912. Japan had come a long way in
his 45-year reign. The country now counted itself a great power, with a
navy ranked 4th in the world. Japan even had a colonial empire (Taiwan and
Korea, and some small islands) and "interests" in China. Japanese colonial
rule, while stern, had not yet assumed the brutal manner adopted in 1919.
Despite a small industrial base, the prewar economy flourished. Japanese
diplomacy centered on an alliance with Britain, in which each pledged to
aid the other should they become embroiled with 2 great powers. Each side
insisted on an exception. Britain would in no case fight the USA, and Japan
would not enter a purely European war. In 1904, the alliance allowed Japan
to attack Russia, secure that the intervention of Russia's ally, France,
would trigger British involvement. In the event, France wisely stayed
neutral.

The new emperor, taking the name of Taisho, proved to be feeble-minded.
Political factions soon realized that he would and could not exert the
centralizing influence the Meiji Emperor had. As the elder statesmen of the
Meiji Restoration retired to make way for younger men, high politics
changed. The Meiji leaders, having risked their lives to overthrow the
Shogun, had worked together. Their successors, without this bond, and under
no Imperial pressure, could only consult the written Constitution. Loosely
based on the German Imperial Constitution, this document allowed the
resignation of any minister to force a new election, a prescription for
parliamentary paralysis. The Army and Navy, guaranteed Cabinet seats,
increasingly resorted to threatened resignations to force particular
policies upon reluctant governments.

Japanese society faced new pressures. Trade unions, parliamentary
opposition, a political middle class, journalism and public opinion forced
liberalization, known as "Taisho democracy". The military grudgingly
accepted fiscal retrenchment after the Russo-Japanese War, because the Navy
put faith in the British alliance, while the army felt its prestige too low
to resist.

The army had not come out of the Russo-Japanese war well. It had won
some great victories, particularly at Mukden and Port Arthur, but they had
been terribly bloody. Army calculations seemed to have been unfoundedly
optimistic. The navy, by contrast, appeared to have fought brilliantly, and
claimed to have actually won the war at Tsushima. The 2 services, largely
recruited from rival Satsuma and Choshu clans, competed openly. Civilian
governments used this against them.

From about 1910, Japan's post-war fiscal pinch eased, and military
budgets grew. The navy demanded more money to finance its dreadnought arms
race. The army, too, wished to modernize, but found civilians and sailors
alike reluctant to spend.

When World War I broke out in Europe, the British at first assumed that
Japan would remain neutral. The Admiralty, parrying German cruiser
depredations on British trade, convinced a reluctant Foreign Office to ask
Japan for help. Diplomats feared complications in China, as the US and
Australia both opposed Japanese expansion.

Initially, all Japanese factions prepared to sit out the war. Nobody
could be sure who would win. The actual British request for help changed
everything. Civilians knew that their tentative control over the military
hinged on the British alliance. The British connection charmed the navy by
emphasizing the "navalist" analogy between the 2 island empires (Britain,
after all, made do with a small elite army). The weight of the Royal Navy
reduced pressure for arms expenditures. Weakening the alliance - the
inevitable result of a refusal - would weaken the civilian position. The
navy, in turn, pressed to learn more from operational combat against modern
foes, and from working together with the British. The Japanese naval staff
never doubted that Britain would win. Eliminating the German base at
Tsingtao would turn the Yellow Sea into a Japanese lake. The army, in turn,
saw a chance to recoup lost prestige, and perhaps force some increase in
expenditure. The British request therefore changed Japanese opinion
remarkably quickly. A Japanese ultimatum to Germany followed within the
week (15 August). Japan declared war on 23 August.

Paradoxically, the political effects of the Tsingtao campaign reversed
the verdict of military success. Germany lost her colony. This eliminated
absurd contention between her and the Far Eastern states, allaying their
suspicions of ulterior German motives. Moreover, fighting against heroic
odds raised German military prestige. As a result, Nationalist China turned
to Germany for military advisers and models. The Japanese army strengthened
its German connection, confirmed in the wisdom of its choice of tutor. In
influence, intelligence co-operation and prestige, Germany won.

Britain found her role diminished. The British had retained a superb
harbor at Weiheiwei as undeveloped war anchorage for their mobile China
Squadron. The lease, initially a reaction to the Russian base at Port
Arthur, ran as long as any foreign power had bases in North China. Japan
had returned Port Arthur to China in 1906, and agreed to give back
Tsingtao in 1920 - it actually returned to (nominal) Chinese authority in 1922.
This ended the British lease. Japan had plenty of bases in Korea, Taiwan
and the Home Islands. The nearest British base became Hong Kong. Japan
clearly dominated these waters. What is more, with the German menace gone,
tensions between Japan and Britain grew, as did Chinese resentment of the
British colonial presence. Diplomatically, the British lost ground.

China had started the war as neutral, but generally favorable to the
Allies. With Germany gone, Japan pressed hard while Britain fought in
Europe. Nationalist Chinese diplomats understood that Japan had become
China's most dangerous enemy, and that declining British influence opposed
Japanese expansion.

Japan lost by far the most. Despite propaganda, the Tsingtao campaign
aroused little domestic enthusiasm. Nonetheless, its internal effects
worked out as the army hoped. The civilian government felt forced to pursue
a policy of active imperialism to justify the risk of intervention. Japan
presented her "21 demands" to China in 1915. The Chinese, with some Allied
help, rather skillfully evaded them. Japan then began to delve deeply in
the mainland's affairs. Japanese agents advised all sides among the
fighting warlords and Nationalists. Japan's need for a large army to defend
her interests seemed clear. Military assumption of the prerogatives of
local knowledge and initiative further relaxed already slack reins of
control. Indeed, central army command in Tokyo often itself had no idea
what the Kwantung Army was up to, so tangled were its machinations. Most of
all, Japanese army experts appeared to have been confirmed in the validity
of their political-military calculations. They never again hesitated to
agitate against naval or civilian priorities. Hadn't they gotten it just
right? Japan drifted into its Siberian campaign against Bolshevism as
tensions with the USA grew. Stating that Korea had become a vital
springboard for operations in Northern China,the army took control of the
administration of Korea from a confused civilian government on the
defensive. Ferocious repression of Korean politics followed. In 1921, the
British, uncomfortable with increasing rivalry between Japan and the USA,
ended their alliance with Japan. The Japanese Army blamed the navy for
having put national survival in the hands of such an unreliable ally. At
the same time, Japanese diplomats at the Washington Naval Conference agreed
to limit their navy to only 60% of the strength of the American Navy. The
Japanese Navy, uneasy, demanded more funds. Civilians, profoundly
associated with diplomacy rather than arms build-up, lost leverage. A
premature army coup d'etat in 1922 collapsed, but this only briefly
postponed Japan's slide into fascism.

Japan in the Great War: the Japanese army in 1914

Japan initially modeled her army on the French, but disastrous early
maneuvers led to German advisers replacing French ones. Army structure
therefore resembled the French, while doctrine followed German ideas. The
staff considered Russia as the likely enemy, training and planning for a
renewed Russo-Japanese War.

The standing army of 1/4 million men boasted 19 infantry divisions, 4
cavalry brigades, 3 field artillery brigades, 6 heavy artillery regiments
and a signals "brigade" (not intended to operate as a unit, but to detach
sections for service). The army could not afford to train the whole
population. Each year, about 120,000 men entered the ranks, chosen by lot
out of an annual conscript "class" of 550,000. Fully mobilized, Japan could
field 1 1/2 million men.

Each infantry division consisted of a logistics "battalion", an
engineering battalion (of 3 companies), a field artillery regiment (6
batteries of 6 guns), a cavalry regiment (of 3 squadrons), and 2 infantry
brigades of two 3-battalion regiments. Some divisions also had mountain
artillery battalions (2 batteries of 4 guns). Divisions attached signals
and sanitary units separately. After mobilization, a reserve infantry
brigade followed each infantry division into action. Reserves took
refresher training. They therefore mobilized late, but did not differ in
any other way from regulars.

Japanese soldiers suffered from cheap, inferior weapons. The Arisaka
rifle jammed frequently. Field artillery only shot at short range with poor
accuracy, as did even the brand new Model 3 field howitzer. Coastal defense
batteries, some captured from Russia in 1905 or China in 1895, provided a
variety of heavy guns.

Japanese assault tactics developed against Russia stressed initial rapid
maneuver followed by careful artillery preparation, small arms fire
concentration and a decisive bayonet charge. Japanese troops on the
defensive dug in swiftly, deeply and well.

Japan in the Great War: the Japanese Navy

Japan modeled her navy on the British in construction, doctrine and
tactics. Naval officers even issued bridge commands in English until the
1930s. Japanese ships so resembled British counterparts as to confuse
Allied naval fliers in World War II.

The British feared German cruiser raids on their merchant shipping, and
planned to run the Germans down by destroying their bases and
communications. The Allies allocated German bases North of the Equator to
Japan, and bases South of it to the British Empire. A New Zealand force
escorted by British, French and Australian warships seized German Samoa on
28 August. A landing party from a lone British warship seized the remote
guano-mining island of Nauru. The scattered Germans could offer no
resistance. In September, the Australian Navy landed a force on the
Bismarck Islands. After a short skirmish, they secured the surrender of
German New Guinea and the Bismarck, Admiralty and Solomon Islands.

Meanwhile, Japanese forces bloodlessly occupied the Palau, Caroline,
Marshall and Marianas Islands, taking the bases at Yap, Ponape and Jaluit.
Japanese surveys revealed the potential fleet base of Truk, which the
Germans had overlooked. The Navy searched for the fleeing Germans with
First and Second South Seas Squadrons of powerful fast battle cruisers and
light cruisers.

Naturally, attention focused on Tsingtao. A small squadron of elderly
ships (First Squadron) protected the expedition's LOC and base at Hakko-ho,
on the Western Korean coast. Third Squadron (cruisers and gunboats)
patrolled the shipping lanes South of Shanghai. Second Squadron (old
battleships and cruisers) blockaded Tsingtao, transported, escorted and
supported the expedition.

After Tsingtao fell, the Navy continued to patrol the whole Pacific,
widening its reach as the British pulled ever more ships to Europe.
Japanese cruisers strengthened Allied troop convoy escorts and hunted for
German corsairs. Landing parties from a cruiser helped the British suppress
a mutiny in the Indian battalion garrisoning Singapore. Two cruisers even
joined British forces patrolling shipping lanes off Capetown.

During the war, the Japanese Navy grew, despite losing a dreadnought
and a new armored cruiser to accidental magazine explosions. Japan gained 4
dreadnoughts, 2 battle cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 28 destroyers (counting
1 British-built and another the Italians bought), 7 submarines and dozens
of small ASW and minesweeping vessels. The similarity of Japanese and
British design tempted the Royal Navy. The Japanese refused to diminish
their own strength, turning down British requests to buy or lease battle
cruisers. The Navy did not so highly value several obsolete Russian prizes
taken in 1905. Twice refusing suggestions that Japan form these ships into
a squadron and send them to reinforce the Russian Fleet in the Baltic, the
Japanese Navy eventually agreed to sell the old ships to Russia.

In 1917, the U-boat crisis prompted the Royal Navy to request "a
division" (4 to 6) of Japanese destroyers to help in the Mediterranean. The
Army strongly opposed again sending Japanese forces into active combat
against Germany. Why further antagonize the Germans, who might win the war?
The Navy wanted to learn modern ASW techniques in practice. Japan sent an
officer to "report" on whether Germany could win. The naval-civilian
alliance dealt the army faction one of its last political defeats by
choosing an admiral rather than a general as observer. This choice
predetermined the response. Japan deployed 1 old light cruiser and 8 new
destroyers to Malta in April, 1917. Further requests for help brought out
an old armored cruiser and 4 brand-new large destroyers. The ships served
efficiently in convoys and ASW sweeps.

In April 1918, the Navy landed 500 sailors to protect Allied interests
in Vladivostok. The Army reinforced them in August with an infantry
division, forerunner of a force of 70,000 men who would occupy Eastern
Siberia until 1922. By war's end, the RAF had begun to help Japan modernize
its naval air arm. The rapid chill in relations between Japan and the US,
and their resulting naval arms race, quickly alienated the British.

Japan in the Great War: the siege of Tsingtao

The siege of Tsingtao marks the military collision of 2 policies
pursued entirely for internal political purposes. Like a shadow play, the
actual siege merely reflected other concerns more important to the
combatants. Germany founded its Chinese colony as part of Tirpitz's
propaganda campaign to build a German battle fleet. Tirpitz could not
confess to a reluctant Reichstag that he intended to challenge the Royal
Navy. He found himself hard-pressed to explain how a large German fleet
would harm France or Russia in a war. He found allies in the colonial
lobby, arguing that German economic prosperity demanded a large colonial
empire. Unfortunately, this lobby, including the Kaiser himself, favored
cruisers over battleships. Tirpitz won them over by proposing a great fleet
base in the Pacific. A cruiser squadron would hold the base against all
comers when war broke out, awaiting relief by the battle fleet. This
disingenuous argument underlay Germany's China policy for 17 years!

Using the murder of some missionaries as a pretext, German sailors
landed at Tsingtao in 1897, hoisting the German flag. A small fishing
village sat on an island guarding a sheltered deep-water bay. Recognizing
its potential, China had begun to build a small base a few years before,
but the work languished for lack of funds. During the Sino-Japanese War,
Japanese troops had moved in, and the Japanese Navy had taken up the work
of building a naval base. Displeased at the speed of Chinese collapse,
three European powers decided to take some "compensation" before Japan got
it all. A joint ultimatum by Russia, France and Germany shocked the
Japanese into giving the area back to China. Russia then seized Port
Arthur, France took some territory in the far South of China, and Germany
took Tsingtao. Britain then took Weiheiwei to "watch" Port Arthur and
Tsingtao.

The colony thus started out under naval administration, to support the
cruiser squadron and its base. Massive German investment built a
first-class port, modern communication facilities, a railway, coal mines, a
prosperous town. By 1913, Tsingtao's commerce exceeded that of all other
ports in China save for Shanghai, Hong Kong and Canton. Undersea cables ran
to Shanghai and to Chufu. The radio station could reach as far as one on
Yap Island (Palaus), a link in an imperial radio chain.

Beyond the protectorate lay Shantung, a wealthy but isolated province.
Awful roads joined walled Chinese villages of about 200 stone houses. Far
across the peninsula, a tiny British garrison held Weiheiwei as an
undeveloped war anchorage.

The Boxer Rising led Germany to fortify the base against land assault.
What use was a great fleet base if it fell from the land side? The natural
line of defense lay along the boundary of the protectorate, from the
Kaiserstuhl to the Litsuner Heights. These very rough mountains reached as
high as 400 meters and plunged down into the sea abruptly, with just a few
passes. The Germans estimated that they needed a full infantry corps to
hold this line firmly. Tirpitz forbade such extravagant expenditure away
from his battle fleet. After all, he argued, who might attack by land? Only
the Chinese could arrive this way, and Tsingtao did not need a corps to
hold off ill-armed, poorly disciplined hordes. German experience with the
Boxers seemed to confirm his assertions. The second line lay along 10 miles
of steep hills from Prinz Heinrich Hill to Kuschan. Tirpitz vetoed this
line as well, since it would have absorbed a division. The final line of
defense lay along the inner hills, from Iltis to Bismarck to Moltke. The
hills rose from 80 to 200 meters high over the town. The Germans dug in
here.

Tsingtao's seaward defenses consisted of 4 batteries, searchlights and
mines. To the land ward, the German Navy built 5 redoubts. Each had
positions for field guns, machine-guns, its own kitchen, bakery, power
generator, ammunition magazines and sleeping quarters for about 200 men. In
front of each lay a wall and a ditch, heavily wired, marked for range. Two
hill batteries supported these redoubts.

Governor Meyer-Waldeck, a naval officer, understood his duty as support
of the East Asia Cruiser Squadron. When war broke out, he summoned all
German forces in China to Tsingtao. Gunboats Luchs and Jaguar made
breathtaking escapes from under the noses of watching Allied warships,
arriving in early August, as did destroyer S90. The crew of river gunboat
Tsingtau scuttled her, and proceeded to Tsingtao overland. The crews of
river gunboats Otter and Vaterland "sold" them to a German merchant in
Nanking. China promptly interned the ships but the men made it to Tsingtao
overland. From all over China, German reservists poured in. They took staff
and logistics jobs, swelled gun crews, releasing trained seamen to join the
cruiser squadron as prize crews and extra stokers. Some even joined new
garrison units. Iltis, Tiger and Luchs each gave up some men and guns to
arm corsairs, and landed some more to swell the garrison. The mail liner
Prinz Eitel Friedrich arrived, picked up guns and left to raid shipping as
an armed merchant corsair. Light cruiser Emden left to join the Cruiser
Squadron, but returned almost immediately with the captured Russian liner
Rjasan. The prize took over all the guns and crew of refitting gunboat
Cormoran, leaving the old gunboat a floating hulk. This liner, too, became
a corsair, taking the name Cormoran. Emden, too, promptly left, followed by
a stream of 8 ships in a fortnight, carrying 19,000 tons of coal and
supplies to the Cruiser Squadron. Most of these ships got through.

Austro-Hungarian armored cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth entered harbor
bewildered by conflicting orders. Vienna alternately commanded the ship to
support the Germans, to intern herself, to fight the British, not to
antagonize Japan. Leaving Tsingtao and then returning, her crew wound up
dispersed, with 100 men interned and 300 trapped in Tsingtao with the ship.
The latter simply joined the Germans.

After the first weeks of war, Meyer-Waldeck decided that no more ships
would make it through the tightening Allied net. He prepared the town for
siege, hoping that victory in Europe would ward off the overwhelming forces
gathering against him. The Germans laid naval and land mines, wired in
their positions, cleared fields of fire.

The Germans had plenty of supplies, but would have to be careful with
ammunition (the annual ammunition resupply was to have arrived in
September). Nonetheless, the reserves of the Cruiser Squadron lay open to
them, so they only ran short at the very end. Engineers used small caliber
naval shells to make hundreds of land mines and explosive charges.

Some German officers favored a raid on Weiheiwei, but Meyer-Waldeck
decided to husband his men. No large force could make it over the poor
Chinese roads; a small one could not win. Any landing near Tsingtao might
cut them off. Troops trained, scouted, waited. The staff debated. Would the
Japanese attempt a swift assault or a protracted siege? Spy scares and
absurd rumors circulated. A Chinese warlord was bringing 80,000 troops to
their rescue. The USA had forbidden Japan from attacking. The German fleet
had decisively defeated the British fleet, and was already on its way.

The siege of Tsingtao differed radically from other Japanese military
campaigns. In its careful attention to political impact, awkward diplomatic
strains with allies, lavish use of logistics and scrupulous minimization of
casualties, it more closely resembled the Gulf War than battles in the
Russo-Japanese War or World War II. Yet it led to futile bloodletting
undertaken by the Japanese Army in World War II.

From the planning stage, the Japanese Army Staff pulled out all the
stops. They would show the precision and care of the army. Logistics and
firepower flowed abundantly, so as to keep bloodshed low. The nation would
admire the perfection of Japanese military technique, expunging memories of
bloodbaths versus Russia in 1905.

The staff chose Lieutenant-General Mitsuomi Kamio, an officer
distinguished rather by caution than brilliance, charging him to risk no
reverse. He had to win a showpiece victory. He could ask for anything he
needed.

Kamio considered landing near Tsingtao. What if the Germans attacked the
beachhead early on? They might disrupt the disembarkation, causing
precisely the kind of embarrassment he had to avoid at all costs. He saw no
reason to run any risk. He decided to land his infantry division on the far
(Northern) side of the peninsula, and march them overland to Tsingtao. Once
he had captured the nearby beaches, he would land his unwieldy siege
artillery.

The campaign opened, naturally enough, with a naval skirmish. To cover
Lauting's mine laying off of Tsingtao, S90 patrolled farther out from shore
than usual. British China Squadron, stretched thin to escort convoys and
patrol shipping lanes, could not spare enough ships to blockade Tsingtao.
Detachments did, however, sweep by from time to time, capturing some supply
ships. On 22d August, one such sweep of 3 destroyers caught S90. Old
British "River" class destroyer Kennet raced in to engage the even older
and slower S90. The more lightly-armed German ship fled, scoring 2 damaging
hits on Kennet. Nonetheless, the end loomed as Kennet neared. Desperate,
S90 veered inshore of a coastal island, over uncharted water marked as
"shallow". Kennet disengaged when Tsingtao's coastal batteries joined in.
Bold seamanship and superior handling had won the Germans a handy little
victory.

On 27 August, Vice-Admiral Sadakichi Kato's Second Squadron began
blockading Tsingtao. British naval intelligence suspected that the East
Asia Cruiser Squadron had already left, but the Japanese Navy took no
chances. A modern battle fleet of 2 dreadnoughts, 1 battle cruiser and 2
new pre-dreadnought battleships reinforced Second Squadron, prepared to
engage the whole German Cruiser Squadron. The fleet seized 3 small coastal
islands as observation points, and began careful minesweeping.

On 30 August, the weather broke. Tsingtao, "Riviera of the East",
boasted of mild dry autumns. The fall of 1914 turned out to be the wettest
on record then or since as unseasonable typhoons drenched the whole
peninsula. That night, the storm drove Japanese destroyer Shirotaye aground
on a coastal island. The crew escaped, but Jaguar, herself guarded by
coastal batteries, came out of harbor and destroyed her.

On September 2d, the Japanese started landing at Lungkou, on the
peninsula's North coast. Four naval infantry companies, supported by an
Army machine-gun company itself reinforced by sailors, rowed ashore. They
fanned out over the beach, finding no Germans. An engineering battalion
came next, building a floating pier and 2 stone quays in 24 hours. A
cavalry regiment followed, and then an infantry regiment, which reclaimed
its detached machine-gun company. By now, the freak weather had flooded the
beach. A nightmarish scene unfolded in a chaos of mud, surf, rain, wind and
noise. Animals floundered as they pulled at mired carts, unloaded crates
floated out to sea and sank, hysterical beach masters cursed weary
soldiers. Kamio stopped further unloading, and ordered the troops already
ashore to advance inland at all costs. One incredulous Japanese engineer
watched a small brook rise 2 meters in an hour, as it swept away his
pontoon bridge. By the next day, it had risen 9 meters, becoming
unbridgeable. The Japanese stuck fast. Ahead of them, flash floods flushed
entire villages away. Thousands of peasants died in Shantung's worst
disaster in living memory. Chinese officials had protested the Japanese
landing as a violation of Chinese neutrality, but offered no real
opposition; local authorities gladly accepted Japanese help in the crisis.

A brief break in the downpour allowed the landed force to straighten
itself out, and the bedraggled cavalry began advancing on 7 September,
laboriously followed by infantry. No rations could come up, so the troops
lived off the country. Terraced farms survived the weather pretty well, so
the Japanese found food rotting in market towns stranded by washed-out
roads. Nonetheless, the troops went on half-rations as they marched ahead.

A Navy seaplane flew over Tsingtao on 5 September, shocking the Germans
who had not expected aircraft. The pilot reported the Austro-Hungarian
cruiser, 5 gunboats, a destroyer and several steamers. He had mistaken the
unarmed paid-off hulks of Cormoran, Tiger, Iltis and Luchs for active
warships, and had missed Lauting's conversion to a mine layer, but he
confirmed that the Cruiser Squadron had escaped.
Kato released his attached dreadnought, battle cruiser and new
pre-dreadnought battleships. The Navy redeployed, creating 2 fast squadrons
to hunt down the missing Germans and lending the British a powerful cruiser
as convoy escort and 2 cruisers to patrol against corsairs off Singapore.
In return, the British lent Kato Triumph, an old pre-dreadnought battleship
mobilized at Hong Kong.

British residents began to form volunteer self-defense forces, releasing
Army troops. The British Army gathered a small contribution to Kamio's
command. One Regular British infantry battalion would land with the
Japanese siege artillery, followed by 2 Indian infantry companies.

On 13 September, Japanese cavalry bumped into a German outpost at Tsimo,
on the edge of the protectorate. The astonished Germans fled after a short
skirmish. The Japanese took Kiautschou the next day, cutting the Shantung
railway.

Excellent German roads connected Tsingtao to these points, and
Meyer-Waldeck reinforced his mountain outposts along the extended outer
line, ignoring a diversionary bombardment by Japanese destroyers. He hoped
to delay the Japanese advance.

Meanwhile, Kamio decided to abort his Northern landing as the weather
thickened again. It might take many weeks to haul his whole division over
the muddy peninsula. He reasoned that the Germans could not risk being cut
off from Tsingtao by launching a beach attack while Japanese forces held
Tsimo. Taking a calculated risk, he ordered 24th infantry brigade,
splashing ashore just now, to reembark. The cavalry, engineers and 23rd
infantry brigade, already ashore, would march to Tsimo, abandoning the
bridgehead. Kamio ordered his troops to land near Tsingtao, in Lau Schan
Bay. A new base would keep his forces supplied. Kamio had correctly
understood the German situation, and extricated his force from an
unpleasant situation by improvising.

Japanese infantry arrived at Tsimo on 18 September, exhausted and
half-starved. It began closing up to the German mountain outposts. At dawn,
Japanese cruisers bombarded the (empty) beaches at Lau Schan, and 23rd
infantry brigade started landing. Secure in his possession of Tsimo, Kamio
ordered the troops to race into the mountains and contact his isolated
force. That evening, an infantry company seized the Hotung pass, driving
back a German outpost in a long skirmish. Another company made contact with
cavalry from Tsimo. Tsingtao was surrounded.

The next day, in steadily worsening weather, Japanese infantry seized
Mecklenburg House, a mountain spa, breaking through the outer defense line.
Kamio concluded that the Germans could risk no severe engagement, lest they
be cut off. He decided that they would not mount a determined defense until
within the city's fortifications. Once again, Kamio had correctly divined
German limitations. He ordered a swift advance through the mountains,
ignoring risks of defeat in detail. Japanese troops moved in small columns,
usually of company strength. German outposts, engaging one column, would
find others working around their flanks. Invariably, the Germans fell back.
British troops defending Singapore reacted the same way to these tactics 26
years later.

Kamio's skill at projecting German intentions derived from better
intelligence. Both sides recruited Chinese labor, and tried to organize
local coolies as spies. Some Japanese officers disguised as coolies even
worked on the German lines. The Japanese cavalry regiment moved to patrol
the far (inland) side of the harbor, making slipping in or out of Tsingtao
very hard. Chinese opinion somewhat favored the Japanese, a sentiment that
grew more pronounced as German defeat drew nigh. The German organization
began to unravel. The Chinese told the Germans what they wanted to hear:
tales of terrible conditions along the Allied LOC (true) and of staggering
Japanese losses (false). The Japanese got accurate reports, but they always
arrived days late. Only aircraft provided timely information. As in the
Russo-Japanese War, Japanese soldiers erected elaborate screens masking
roads and bridges to hide their movement. The lone German Taube (its
partner crashed in August) nullified their work.

As the Japanese took control of the passes one by one, they redeployed.
Engineers and support troops came ashore, building piers at Lau Schan and
an airfield at Tsimo. On 21 September, 3 Japanese Army airplanes began to
fly from Tsimo. Kamio told them to destroy the German airplane. They never
actually shot it down, but ceaseless buzzing, shooting (pistols, rifles and
1 mounted machine-gun) and bombing reduced the Germans to short forays over
the lines. Japanese Navy seaplanes systematically surveyed the German
positions.

Kamio received orders from the Army Staff, which had begun to realize
the political opportunities war in China offered. Taking the Shantung
Railway would deepen and secure Japanese interests throughout the province.
How could anyone protest Allied seizure of a German line? As part of his
troop reshuffle, Kamio occupied the whole rail line with a battalion. The
Army later sent him an extra infantry regiment to garrison it.

The Germans realized that Kamio was maneuvering past the mountain line
without a major battle. Determined not to let him have it all his own way,
Meyer-Waldeck ordered a counter-attack. Reasoning that the Mecklenburg
House breakthrough would focus Japanese attention there, the German staff
planned a raid on the Kletter Pass, near Tsimo. A German force of 130 men,
4 machine-guns and 2 field guns surprised and routed the Japanese outpost.
Neighboring Japanese officers kept calm. Nearby companies moved in to
support, and the Germans withdrew. They had won another minor victory,
given the foe a bloody nose, but no more. That same day, the British
contingent started landing at Lau Schan.

On 26 September, with his division firmly ashore, properly deployed and
a secure base, Kamio ordered a general advance. As before, his troops moved
in small groups. Skirmishes along the whole line gradually alerted the
German staff. At short notice, S90 and Jaguar came up on the harbor side,
bombarding the Japanese right. At night, the Germans fell back to their
second line, convinced that the enemy had lost dearly. In fact, the
mountain outposts had fallen, one by one, almost bloodlessly. The Allies
closed up to the German line over the next two days, as Kaiserin Elisabeth,
Jaguar and S90 again shelled the harbor flank. Kamio had assigned a field
battery to engage them. The ships destroyed an observation post and
silenced the battery. Impressed by the power of naval guns, Kamio asked
Kato to bombard the enemy land batteries to distract them from his advance.
Kato decided instead to bombard the sea batteries: typically poor
cooperation between the Japanese Army and Navy.

Meyer-Waldeck knew that he would soon have to abandon the second line
too, but he had an ace up his sleeve. Prinz Heinrich Hill towered over the
neighboring hills, offering an extremely difficult climb and excellent
observation for miles in all directions. German engineers prepared a small
outpost on its crest. Connected by telephone and heliograph to the heavy
land batteries, it would hold even if the Japanese took the rest of the
line. It would then direct fire onto the enemy from the rear. Sixty men
with machine-guns held the outpost, provisioned for a 2-month siege.

Foul weather intensified on the night of 27/28 September. Kamio's staff
chose a company from the 46th infantry regiment, reinforced by an
engineering platoon, to attempt the heroic task of climbing up in the dark
during a typhoon. The engineers cut steps, slung ropes, all in relative
silence, without light. They followed a fissure up the cliff. Baffled when
it forked, they detached an infantry platoon to try what seemed the less
likely route. Dawn broke to better weather. Exhausted and half-drowned, the
main force arrived at the crest. The surprised Germans reacted quickly,
pinning the attackers down on the actual lip. Hanging off vertically, the
Japanese shot erratically for hours at the Germans. The desperate Japanese
commander led a charge. The Germans mowed him down. His lieutenant
organized a second assault, dying in the withering German fire. Covered by
this fight, the detached platoon quietly hauled itself up onto the summit.
Lost, it had actually wound up on the German (Southwest) face of the hill,
3 hours late. The platoon caught the Germans in a crossfire. The German CO
decided to negotiate; he would surrender the peak if allowed to take his
men back to Tsingtao. To his indignation, the Japanese ignored his flag of
truce and seized him. The German force surrendered. At a cost of 24 killed,
the Japanese had killed 6 Germans, taken 54 prisoners and won the decisive
fight of the siege.

Shaken by the unexpected loss of their outpost and by a surprise mass
Allied naval bombardment, the Germans fell back from their second line.
Kaiserin Elisabeth, Jaguar and S90 supported, but suffered repeated hits
from field guns. The ships retreated.

Kamio closed his troops up to the German inner line and ordered a base
at Schatsykou Bay, closer to Tsingtao. The Navy cleared the area, losing 2
small mine sweepers. Engineers built a pier, a road and a narrow-gauge
railway for the final logistical buildup. The Lau Schan base would feed the
men while heavy siege artillery and ammunition arrived at Schatsykou Bay.
As the railway ran up a grade too steep for small locomotives, some 1,500
rail troops and 10,000 coolies pushed 1,200 cars up and down. When
complete, the railway would deliver 150 tons in 300 cars daily. A round
trip took 4 days. More rail troops built spur lines for supply depots. On
the road, coolies wheeled 800 Chinese carts. Each cart, pulled and pushed
by 2 men, carried 350 pounds. Engineers prepared concrete platforms for
siege guns and constructed a camouflaged observation post 900 feet up a
ridge of Prinz Heinrich Hill, served by 5 telephone lines and a radio set.
It looked over all Tsingtao.

Meyer-Waldeck decided to disrupt Allied preparations. His heavy land
batteries began shelling the Japanese rear. The Taube indicated general
targets, but enemy airplanes harassed too effectively to allow it to
correct gunfire. Anti-aircraft fire on a hoisted observation balloon so
rattled its observer that he refused to go up again. The next day, a
meteorological balloon went up as a decoy; AA fire destroyed it. The
batteries therefore fired blindly, sending over some 1500 shells daily. The
Germans wrongly convinced themselves that their fire seriously injured the
Allies. Wishing to compound the blow, German staff planned a night raid on
the enemy right flank. Late on 2 October, 3 German companies sortied. One
found only empty trenches, and withdrew. The others triggered furious fire,
and fled for their lives. The Japanese captured 6 prisoners and found 29
bodies. Wishful German thinking transformed this skirmish into a major
success. With their Chinese spy network in Japanese hands, German
intelligence officers could no longer distinguish reality from fantasy.
They believed that the arrival of 29th infantry brigade, actually entirely
routine, confirmed that they had inflicted grievous losses.

The Allies dug an initial trench 1 to 2 kilometers in front of the
fortified line. Kamio insisted on a textbook siege, complete with wavy
S-shaped trenches, saps and parallels. The British, who had finally caught
up with the advancing front line, found their Japanese allies irritating.
The German artillery always sought the British out, as soldiers who might
later fight against Germany in Europe. Kamio refused Japanese counter
battery support, because he wanted his siege guns to remain hidden until
the final bombardment. In the trenches, Kamio's soldiers could not tell
German from British, and blazed away at British patrols. Only the poor
Japanese marksmanship kept British casualties down. British soldiers took
to wearing the distinctive Japanese Army overcoats, which reduced, but did
not eliminate, incidents. Poor Japanese sanitary standards, varying scales
of provisions, differing staff routines, conflicting tactical doctrine,
British racial arrogance (many thought of their allies as coolies in
uniform): all contributed to prickly relations. The arrival late in October
of 2 Indian infantry companies to reinforce the British Regular contingent
only further complicated serious command friction. Interestingly, the Royal
Navy got along very well with the Japanese at the same time, as Triumph fit
seamlessly into Second Squadron.

Mass naval bombardments could swamp Tsingtao's defenses to cover
particular operations, but they could not accurately destroy coastal
batteries. Too many explosions confused gun layers; they could not plot
each ship's individual shot. Therefore, three blockading ships moved in
close to duel with the coastal batteries on 6 and 10 October. The German
batteries drove them off. Kato decided to press harder. On 14 October, he
brought up his whole fleet for a furious bombardment, and then sent four
ships in close. A heavy shell seriously injured Triumph, which retired
hastily as German gunners cheered. Support vessels repaired her in 24
hours.

Yet another typhoon struck on 15 October. Violent weather washed out the
railway and undermined gun platforms, setting preparations back by days.
Flash floods drowned 25 Japanese soldiers. The Germans scuttled all
non-essential ships in harbor, landing the crews as infantry. The Allies
permitted them to evacuate non-combatants. Meyer-Waldeck wondered whether
the naval attacks and recent lull in the action might have distracted the
Allied fleet. He ordered a night sortie by S90. Late on 17 October, the
ancient German destroyer slipped slowly out of harbor. After some hours,
she detected a dark shadow. S90 fired a small torpedo. It hit old light
cruiser Takachiho, detonating the magazine with a tremendous explosion.
Searchlights flashed on, Allied ships started firing, German coastal
batteries joined in the confusion. S90, cut off, fled into the night.
Evading frantic Allied searches, she interned herself in a Chinese port
down the coast. In Tsingtao, only Jaguar and Kaiserin Elisabeth remained
afloat. Of 256 men aboard Takachiho that night, only 3 survived.

Meyer-Waldeck ordered another land sortie. Late on 22 October, 80
Germans crept up to the enemy lines. Alert sentries opened fire at once,
and the Germans fled.

On 25 October, all the Japanese siege artillery reported itself ready in
position. Planning the great bombardment, Kamio ordered that not one gun
open fire until every gun had its full supply of 1,200 shells. No gun would
reveal its position to the enemy until all did. He wanted each gun to fire
80 shells daily. Staff planned a 7-day bombardment, but he insisted on a
15-day ammunition supply. For the final attack, Japanese engineers formed
assault platoons equipped with rifle grenades and bamboo tubes filled with
explosives (like Bangalore torpedoes to clear barbed wire).

As the weather gradually cleared, Second Squadron began a slow,
systematic naval bombardment of Tsingtao's sea batteries. A few ships
cruised back and forth, firing at extreme range. On 29 October and again on
30 October, Kato brought up the whole fleet for mass bombardments. Triumph
took part, noting the tactics, later used by the British against Turkish
coastal guns at Gallipoli. Steadily, hit by hit, the German sea batteries
crumbled into dust.

On 31 October, the Taisho Emperor's birthday,the siege artillery of over
100 guns opened fire. Each battery had a primary and secondary target.
Kato's fleet swamped the eroding sea defenses. Prinz Heinrich Hill
observation post corrected shooting. The first day, the heavy artillery
destroyed Tsingtao's land batteries. At night, field guns laid down
shrapnel to prevent repairs. The Germans abandoned the shattered works. The
besiegers dug saps 300 meters forward that night, covered by continuous
fire.

The bombardment continued the next day as some siege guns shifted to the
oil tanks and docks while most made sure of the heavy land batteries. The
fleet again overwhelmed the collapsing sea batteries. The besiegers dug
their first forward assault line parallel that night, in textbook fashion.
A Japanese patrol cutting barbed wire outside a redoubt exchanged fire with
its garrison. The Germans believed they had repelled a major assault.
Meyer-Waldeck, thinking the end near, ordered Kaiserin Elisabeth and Jaguar
scuttled. Their crews landed to reinforce the garrison.

With Tsingtao's land batteries obviously in ruins, siege artillery fire
shifted to the redoubts and barbed wire covering them on 2 November. That
night, the besiegers dug saps another 300 meters forward. The next day,
some batteries obliterated the power station while most continued
flattening wire and smashing the redoubts. The Germans began to abandon the
redoubts as roofs caved in. That night, the besiegers dug their second
forward assault line parallel. At dawn on 4 November, a Japanese infantry
company reinforced by an engineering platoon attacked the water pumping
station. It fell easily, yielding 21 prisoners. The defenders now had to
make do with well water. Day after day, the fleet had pounded the sea
batteries to rubble while the siege guns crushed wire. That night, the
Allies dug saps another 300 meters forward. The British, in a difficult
section of the line (on a down slope exposing them to fire while a high
water table prevented digging), tried but failed to advance their saps
together with the Japanese. They lost 26 casualties (8 killed) to small
arms fire before they abandoned the effort, falling back to the second
assault parallel line. Naturally, more unpleasant Anglo-Japanese acrimony
ensued.

On 5 November, the fleet closed in to point-blank range, annihilating
Hui tschuen huk, the last sea battery. Meanwhile, the siege guns crushed
more wire and pulverized the abandoned redoubts. Tsingtao had no defenses
left, by land or sea. That night, the Japanese dug their final assault
parallel line. It ran from 100 to 1000 meters away from the German
trenches, depending on the sector. Rubble and dirt had filled in most of
the defending trenches anyway. The defenders cowered in scattered shell
holes.

Meyer-Waldeck saw the end near. On 6 November, he ordered the Taube to
fly to China with his final dispatches. The Chinese sent the dispatches on
to Germany. Now running out of targets, the siege artillery crushed such
odd bits of barbed wire or abandoned masonry as it could still find. The
fleet, with no targets left at all, joined in for moral effect, churning up
the dust of former sea batteries. Clearly, everyone was marking time,
awaiting the final assault that night. Kamio hesitated. A by-the-book
officer, Kamio wanted the British to close up the Allied assault line and
join the attack. He told the British to dig their approach saps and final
assault parallel tonight at all costs. Neighboring Japanese units ahead of
them would lay down small arms fire in support. The next night, he would
order the grand attack come what may. The British would join, advancing, if
need be, in the open. This command further exacerbated inter-Allied
tensions, the British commander protesting the useless exposure of his
elite force.

Meanwhile, Kamio instructed his units to probe the German line for weak
points. One Japanese infantry company advanced up to Redoubt 4 before the
dazed garrison detected them. The Germans opened fire and then launched a
bayonet charge to push the enemy back. The Japanese withdrew. So purple a
report reached Meyer-Waldeck that he thought the redoubt had repulsed the
main assault. He ordered the reserve up to Redoubt 4. Another Japanese
infantry company probed Redoubt 3. The Germans fell back into the cracked
concrete bunker. A second company arrived, surrounding the bunker and
firing through loopholes and cracks. The garrison surrendered. A local
German reserve counter-attacked, overwhelming a Japanese flank outpost
before the main force crushed them. Japanese platoons spread out along the
trench line. Redoubt 2, struck without warning from flank and rear, fell
quickly. The attackers hit Redoubt 4 in the flank, but met the German
reserve just coming up. An intense fire fight erupted. The probing forces
requested reinforcements. More infantry companies arrived. After 3 hours, a
bayonet charge cleared the Germans out of Redoubt 4. On the flanks,
Redoubts 1 and 5 held out desperately. Elaborate Japanese communications
arrangements now paid off. Hearing that his probes had actually captured a
redoubt, Kamio ordered an immediate general assault.

Advancing through the hole in the German center, Japanese forces fanned
out. One infantry company charged up Iltis Hill. A searchlight lit up a
German lieutenant rallying his men with drawn sword as a Japanese captain
ran up, leading his men with sword out. Blinking, the 2 men stared at each
other. Then, in an incredible parody of feudal combat, the 2 officers
fought a fencing duel between their deployed troops. Samurai sword proved
much superior to ceremonial dress sword; the Japanese commander cut his
opponent down. The Germans surrendered. Another company climbing up
Bismarck Hill received the surrender of Germans disheartened by Japanese
cheering on Iltis Hill. Meyer-Waldeck surrendered, and his men marched out
of Redoubts 1 and 5. The morning of 7 November, ironically a fine clear
day, Japanese and British troops entered Tsingtao. Three days later, a
Japanese torpedo boat sank sweeping mines.

Japanese Army HQ made a point of showing that the Tsingtao campaign in
no way disturbed the routine Army maneuvers in November.

The Germans lost 493 casualties (199 dead), plus about 3,600 prisoners.
German intelligence reports estimated Allied losses as "at least 12,000
casualties", an absurd exaggeration still repeated in German documents. The
Japanese Army suffered 1,900 casualties (415 dead). The Navy lost light
cruiser Takachiho, destroyer Shirotaye, a torpedo boat and 2 small
minesweepers, with some 400 casualties (about 300 dead). Kamio deserves
credit; Japan paid a remarkably low price for seizing a major naval base.
The British lost 74 Army and 9 Navy casualties (13 Army and 3 Navy dead).

Japan gave Tsingtao back to China, but kept the Shantung Railway. Its
garrison became the nucleus of the infamous Kwantung Army. Kamio had no
stomach for the fascistic antics of his junior staff. He soon retired. His
staff formed cabals with some senior officers in Tokyo, aiming to embroil
Japan deeply in China and to subvert civilian government. Over the next
decade, they gradually succeeded in both aims.

Kamio's success reflected lavish use of logistics and overwhelming
firepower to spare bloodshed, rather like American operations against Iraq.
His junior staff drew exactly opposite conclusions; careful planning and
sheer will had defeated the Germans. They believed that the superiority of
the samurai race in focusing fanatically on victory rendered logistics,
odds and material irrelevant. By exerting mind over matter, disciplined
Japanese soldiers (reared in a properly disciplined society) would always
win. This view led Japan into an expanding series of catastrophic wars.

Today, China intends to build Tsingtao up into a major modern naval
base. Little now remains of German influence. The old brewery still
produces pre-war-style German beer, sold in Chinese restaurants as
"Tsingtao" beer.

When war broke out, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Nurnberg were cruising in
the Carolines. Leipzig was detached to Mexico, to defend German interests
during the revolution. Emden, Tiger, Iltis and Cormoran (refitting in dock)
were in Tsingtau. Vaterland and Otter were cruising on the upper Yangtze,
Jaguar on the lower Yangtze, Tsingtau on the West River (above Canton).
Luchs was at Shanghai, S90 at Chifu.

Emden left, as did her prize Rjasan (armed and manned from Cormoran's
hulk, then renamed Cormoran) and the armed merchant corsair Prinz Eitel
Friedrich (a prewar mail liner). Into harbor came the Austro-Hungarian
armored cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth and gunboats Jaguar and Luchs and
destroyer S90.

During the siege, the Germans used the Lauting (a mine layer converted
from pleasure steamer), Kaiserin Elisabeth, Jaguar and S90 extensively.

Some 750 naval gunners manned the various batteries of the base. Another
180 men held signaling, staff and logistical positions. About 100 Chinese
policemen kept internal order. The Third Sea Battalion of about 1,300 men
formed the actual garrison, consisting of 4 infantry companies (210 men
each), 1 cavalry company (140 men), 1 field artillery battery (133 men, six
7.7 cm. Krupp field guns), 1 engineering company (108 men) and 2
horse-drawn machine-gun companies (38 men and 6 machine-guns each). In
Tientsin and Peking, the East Asiatic Naval Detachment deployed 4 infantry
companies (100 men each), 1 machine-gun battalion (60 men and 14
machine-guns) and two artillery sections (three 8 cm. field guns and three
15 cm. howitzers). All these forces except the three 8 cm. field guns
reached Tsingtao.

Reservists added about 1,500 men to the garrison, swelling auxiliary
forces as well as adding 2 more infantry companies to the Third Sea
Battalion. Counting sailors, guns and machine-guns landed from ships, the
garrison disposed of about 4,000 men, 120 machine-guns and 90 guns.

The 6th and 12th infantry divisions detached 2 logistics battalions and
2 engineering battalions. A group of 3 Army airplanes (Farmans) and 2
railway battalions joined.

Later, 8th infantry regiment arrived to occupy the Shantung Railway.

The British deployed the 2d battalion of South Wales Borderers, later
reinforced by 2 infantry companies of the 36th Sikhs Regiment.

SourcesJork Artelt: Tsingtau: Deutsche Stadt und Festung in China 1897-1914Charles B. Burdick: The Japanese Siege of TsingtaoPaul G. Halpern: A Naval History of World War IConway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921Peter Young, editor: Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War IThe Times History of the War 1914 Illustrated volume II