***Warning*** - ​Avengers: Endgame spoilers are included in this post - if you have not yet seen the movie, and do not want certain scenes spoiled, please stop reading***

In Captain America: The Winter Soldier, the title character is in the Triskelion - the primary headquarters for SHIELD, an agency dedicated to world security - and is about to check up on Nick Fury when he goes into an elevator. In one of the more memorable scenes from the movie, Captain America sees a number of apparent SHIELD operatives join the elevator. Throughout the ride, Captain America becomes increasingly suspicious until it is revealed that all of these so-called friendly agents were deep cover operatives, working for HYDRA, an organization dedicated and devoted to global domination. A fierce battle in the elevator ensues and our hero emerges beaten, but victorious.

In Endgame, the Avengers return to that place and time, but this time, armed with the knowledge that the operatives in the elevator are HYDRA agents. As the HYDRA agents filter into the elevator, Captain America says "Hail HYDRA", and the agents, realizing that they are among an apparent deep-cover, sleeper agent Captain America, leave him alone to conduct his mission.

Intricacies of time travel aside, the movie scene raises an interesting question - what can/should be done when the enemy is within? When American service members are co-opted to serve interests are are ideologically opposed to the mission or purpose of the United States military, is the military equipped to meet those challenges? In the case of comic books or movies, this may be seen as brainwashing or in the current case, strategy with sleeper agents, but what if the discussion is removed from the silver screen and moved to the domestic and foreign installations that base and train American service members?

Does the idea of a co-opted service member seen farcical? Imagined? Make-believe? Last week, reports came out that an American service member was being investigated for suspected ties to a neo-Nazi organization. In this case, an Army medic is suspected of having those ties based, in part, on a selfie taken in a mirror where the photographed person is wearing an Army physical training shirt, appears to be giving a Nazi salute, and has an image apparently affiliated with Atomwaffen Division (the suspected Neo-Nazi group). Three weeks ago, Huffpost published an article discussing the arrest and/or investigation of multiple service members with alleged ties to neo-Nazi groups.

In 2018, Frontline and ProPublica examined Atomwaffen Division, chillingly concluding that the organization doesn't see itself as terrorists, but rather, members "see the United States as the ultimate terrorist." More dangerous, this organization has drawn from the United States military, establishing "hate camps, which offer military-style training. There is a clear appeal to service members, who are given top-tier training for their specific vocations, and who all receive general training in combat and counter-insurgency. Returning to popular culture, we see that ideologically-opposed organizations may go beyond creating separate training facilities, and may infiltrate training. Quantico had, as one of its major plot points that, trainees in an FBI class may have been/were double agents, and between news and popular culture, the real issue begins to emerge.

How does the military deal with an internal threat?

Any common understanding of threats to the military include foreign states or asymmetric combat with stateless groups. Bases/posts have fences and those fences provide physical security to the base, and those fences have entry points that allow guards to discriminate on who enters, generally permitting those with valid military identification to enter, and those not entitled to enter are refused entry. Trust is paramount in the military, and each warfighter is responsible for the execution of their part of the mission; that is, if your job is to look straight ahead, while you aren't looking to your left or right, you trust that the people who are assigned with those tasks accomplish them, just as you are charged with protecting their blind side. The very model, however, doesn't account for treason in the ranks. The group protects each other from external threats, but again, it doesn't account for internal threats.

Last week, I started to describe and discuss the Feres Doctrine, a doctrine that, at its heart, precludes service members from suing the Department of Defense - their employer - for a variety of civil issues.

Over the next few weeks, I will walk through the original rationale of that doctrine, beginning with that the relationship between the servicemember and the military is "distinctly federal in nature." But, what does that mean? The Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947), in discussing a United States Army Soldier who was injured by a motor truck, where the driver of that motor truck was negligent, said

"Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces. To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority." 332 U.S. 305-6.

What the Court said is that the nature of a service member to the U.S. Government is different than most other relationships. Everyday citizens have connections to the federal government; W2 forms and federal income taxes, to name a few, but the service member is different. The same connections that the citizen has to the federal government, the service member has, as well, but those connections go well beyond that. The service member's boss is the federal government. That same W2 that everyone receives has the Department of Defense as the employer for the service member. Beyond that, federal law controls the service member to a degree hardly imagined by individuals not affiliated with the military. Being late to work is actually a federal crime for the service member. What is a warning or a write-up anywhere else could carry a federal conviction and jail time for the service member.

It seems axiomatic that a federal military member is "distinctly federal", but there are important caveats, and especially when considering the Feres Doctrine.

Any good 1L (first-year law school student) will tell you that tort law is distinctly state in nature. A tort is a civil wrong - the law of slips and falls, the law of car accidents, and the law of medical malpractice - broadly stated, a person breaches a duty owed to an individual (for e.g., not keeping the sidewalk free of ice after a storm), the the victim suffers harm that is directly caused by that breach. More importantly for us, tort law is governed by state law. That is, Alabama can make a decision about whether to set limits on recovery in medical malpractice cases, or Wyoming can set rules that govern how long an injured party has to sue, and all the states alphabetically in between them can set their own rules regarding tort law. These laws are often times governed by the unique perspectives and culture of those states - states with divergent histories may view the same issue very differently, and states can pass laws that are responsive to those specific beliefs or cultures.

The Federal Tort Claims Act - the act that service members try to sue the Department of Defense with - requires that people who sue the federal government use the law of the state that they were injured in! That is, a military doctor who injures a military plaintiff on a military base will be subject to the law of the state that they are in. The "distinctly federal" nature of the relationship between the service member and the federal government is weakened by the fact that notwithstanding all of the above being true, federal law doesn't govern the law of the case - it is state law, meaning that on the only point that matters, on the law that governs the case and its outcome, it isn't federal law at all.

Two main concerns have come from this. First, one issue addressed in Feres was that there would be unfairness to the soldier in his/her recovery since two states may have wildly different laws that govern the amount of damages for the same negligent act. Second, and this developed a bit after Feres, was that different results would affect the military's need for uniformity in its governing standards. Put another way, if Soldier 2 hears that Soldier 1 received $50,000 for an injury and Soldier 2 received $25,000 for the same injury, Soldier 2 feels cheapened in an important way, reducing the cohesion in the ranks, and, therefore, reducing military readiness. Justice Scalia, in the dissent of United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) makes both of these points, further elaborating that presently, the civilian can recover against Doctor X, but the military member can't, for what might be the same negligent act.

In the coming weeks, I'll walk through the remaining arguments in support of the Feres Doctrine, and assess current discussions in Congress about whether to remove this bar to service member recovery.

Today, before Congress, an Army Ranger testified about his Stage 4 cancer that went undiagnosed by his military physicians, the wife of a service member who died due to a tube being improperly inserted during an operation testified about that procedure, and a former Air Force JAG officer testified about years long pain incurred from wearing body armor in Iraq.

​What do they all have in common? They are legally barred from suing the Department of Defense for damages.

What is the Feres Doctrine? The Feres Doctrine originates from United States v. Feres (1950), which itself was a consolidation of three separate plaintiffs in three separate cases: Feres, Jefferson, and Griggs. The executrix of Feres filed a lawsuit against the United States on behalf of he son that died in a barracks fire in Pine Camp, NY (present-day Fort Drum). It was alleged that the government should have known of a defective heating plant, which caused the fire, and that there was an inadequate fire watch, both of which led to the death of her son. In Jefferson, the plaintiff was required to go under an abdominal operation. Several months later, in the course of another operation, a 30 inch by 18-inch towel marked “Medical Department U.S. Army” was discovered and removed. The plaintiff alleged that the towel was negligently left by the Army. In the third case that was consolidated, the widow of Griggs alleged that he received negligent medical treatment from Army surgeons, which was the proximate cause of his death. In each case, each claimant sustained injury on active duty, which was a result of the negligent actions of others.

​In Feres, the Court used a three-prong analysis to come to the conclusion that actions by servicemembers against the government in cases where the claimant suffered injury through negligent action could not succeed. The Court first found that the relationship between the Government and the members of the armed forces is “distinctly federal in nature.” Second, the Court found that there were generous statutory “no-fault” compensation schemes in place for injuries to servicemembers. Finally, the Court found that the crux of good order and discipline in the military would be compromised if soldiers could maintain suits for injuries suffered from negligent orders or acts committed in the course of military duty.

As was discussed in the hearing today, what this case functionally means is that military members can't sue for ordinary negligence - a car accident on base involving two vehicles both driven by military members that kills one of the members or a barracks building being negligently constructed and falling on an active duty sevicemember being prime examples. Further, the application of the Feres Doctrine means that active duty servicemembers can't sue the Department of Defense, meaning that a military hospital worker who threw acid on a military officer can be criminally charged, but the victim of the attack can't sue the Defense Department for her injuries.

​Over the next few weeks, I will discuss each of these original rationale, and rationale added and discussed by the subsequent cases to offer insight on this powerful doctrine and analyze current attempts to alter its force and effect.

Is kneeling during the national anthem disrespectful to the American flag, and by extension, to the U.S. military? That’s the charge Donald Trump recently leveled at NFL players who began “taking a knee,” to use the athletes’ language, to protest police brutality against people of color.

But underneath that charge is an unexamined assumption that veterans and service members would not share the athletes’ views – and are white.

The rest of this post, which examines demographics in the military in comparison to civilian society, in addition to the attitudes and beliefs of racial/ethnic harassment by those service members is available on the Monkey Cage section of the Washington Post.

What would happen if the President of the United States were to order a strike on an enemy target? What if the command is to mobilize National Guardsmen to respond to flooding after a hurricane? Most people would, I think, agree that those orders would be lawful exercises of presidential power, and I think that the law would support those orders. What if, instead, the orders that were given by the President were to do something patently illegal? There would certainly be an impetus to obey that order if you were the recipient of that order, but obedience to orders is generally at the peril of the one following them, and ultimately, something obviously illegal would likely not be obeyed. In these clearly defined black and white examples, there is not much room for uncertainty. Foreign policy and domestic security are clearly within the President's authority. Illegal acts are illegal. What about orders and commands that aren't clearly legal or illegal?

Setting aside for the moment the agency of the military, one of the founding pieces of literature in the field of civil-military relations discussed the role of military in society, and amongst many other astute observations and analysis, identified military officers as "conservative." Huntington was referring to the conservative realism of the military, praising the highest virtue of military men as obedience. In the politically charged modern environment, the natural inclination is to assume that "conservative" has a partisan definition.

The simple question that these points intersect at is whether the military is - or should be - a political tool of the Commander in Chief. That is, can the military be ordered to vote in a certain manner or compelled, or asked, to reach out to their member of Congress? Is an allusion to the Forever 9/11 Bill during the commencement speech at the United States Coast Guard Academy? Is this the President discussing relevant affairs to a new generation of Coast Guard officers and their families, or a call to advocacy for those same officers and families? What aboutspeaking to Sailors and families at the commissioning of the USS Gerald R. Ford, was President Trump discussing health care reform as part of a national policy debate, or was he issuing an implicit order to each individual who was sworn to obey the President of the United States that his vision for health care is the proper one and instructing them to get involved to achieve that end? What if the language of the speech specifically calls for advocacy? In that same speech to the families and Sailors at the commissioning ceremony of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the President said "I don't mind getting a little hand, so call that congressman and call that senator and make sure you get it. And, by the way, you can call those senators to make sure you get health care."

While it can be easily stated that the President has a right to free speech, and as the President, he has the right and responsibility to discuss matters of public discourse that affect the national interest, the question is not related to that right. Rather, this is the intersection of the military having a legal right to speak, and legal obligation to obey the President, a sense of agency to influence and affect policy, and a public confidence in them. If the military were to be an agent of the President and call their representatives, do they lose the confidence that the public has in them and simultaneously reinforce the image that they are a partisan institution? What if, instead, the military does not heed the President's call, meaning that one of the core tenets of the military - discerning and following Commander's intent - is weakened? Does a situation emerge wherein military leaders will have to parse words from the President as to what is an order and what is only discussion? Politicization of the military is a dangerous, difficult issue that is ripe with issues involving the intersection of rights, and its not one that will soon be answered.

Also occurring last week were the violent protests in Charlottesville, Virginia, on and around the campus of the University of Virginia. One of the results of those protests and clashes was that a woman, Heather Heyer, was seemingly struck, in cold blood, by a gentleman, who was later identified as James Alex Fields, using his vehicle as a weapon.

The response to the attacker was nearly universally visceral with leaders of both parties, most analysts, and most mainstream citizens denouncing the attack and the pro-Nazi ideals that he and the larger movement stood for. One of the most prominent divergences from that nearly uniform response was made by the President, who made several statements oscillating between placing blame on both sides and denouncing Nazism and white supremacy movements by calling them repugnant. These statements, and the timing of them, received a substantial amount of negative response, drawing criticism from a number of analysts and others.

One of the more curious responses was interesting not for what was said, but for who said it. Shortly after the protests and attack on Saturday, the Chief of Naval Operations - the most senior officer assigned in the Department of the Navy and the Deputy to the Secretary of the Navy - quickly tweeted the below response even before the President's response.

​A few days later, and after the President's response, a series of senior military officials publicly responded with the following tweets by, respectively, GEN Neller, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, GEN Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Goldfein, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and GEN Lengyel, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

No place for racial hatred or extremism in @USMC. Our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment frame the way Marines live and act.

In quick succession, the Service Chiefs articulated their condemnation of racism, extremism, and hatred. While these statements are consistent with the laws and regulations governing the military, wherein each of the services has a means of separating from the Service individuals who espouse racist or extremist ideas, the more curious fact is not what was said, so much as who​ said it.

It is the military leaders, who took an oath to support and defend the Constitution, and to obey all lawful orders from their commanders that spoke before and after the Commander-in-Chief did. Now, each of the leaders that spoke were clear to note that they were not involving themselves in domestic politics, but that they were aiming their comments at those currently in their respective service and to the public, which comprises potential future recruits. However, the effect of outspokenness is clear - there was a message sent that was separate from obsequiousness and blind obedience. Certainly, no rational analysis can consider tweets as a harbinger of military revolt, but the responses after Charlottesville by military leaders stand for the clear proposition that there is separation between the Executive and the leaders of the military; that the military has its own morality, code, and sense of professionalism that is independent from the Commander-in-Chief, regardless of party.

Each of the last two posts in this discussion (GEN (ret) Kelly taking over as White House Chief of Staff and an examination of potential ideological co-opting in the West Wing) had a connection to current events, demonstrating that the need for a robust discussion of civil-military relations is as needed now as it was during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. This pattern of connection to current events continues here. This week, Chelsea Handler (formerly of, inter alia, Chelsea Lately and Girls Behaving Badly) tweeted "To all the generals surrounding our idiot-in-chief...the longer U wait to remove him, the longer UR name will appear negatively in history." One of the most interesting aspects of this statement is that is implicitly assumes that the Generals have the agency to act autonomously.

That is, the casual assumption of the military is that its enlisted and officers are "Yes Men" when faced with authority. From the recruit who is just entering the armed services who is given standing orders to obey authority of drill instructors, to the servicemember who is told to execute Commander's intent - what the Commander of a particular unit wants - and to accomplish that intent, to senior leaders depicted with the President in the Situation Room in multiple television shows and movies who loyally call subordinates to execute an order that the President gives, the common understanding is that dissent in the military is almost anathema. And, for the important reasons, there are expectations that orders, once given, are obeyed. The military presumes that orders are lawful (see, for e.g., United States v. Kisala, 64 M.J. 50 (2006) (holding that fundamental to an effective armed force is the obligation of obedience to lawful orders and that because an order is presumed to be lawful, a subordinate disobeys an order at his own peril, though a servicemember may challenge the lawfulness of an order at the time it is given or in later disciplinary proceedings). However, this is not to say that the Generals have no say or pushback to the President.

Returning to Ms. Handler's tweet, we see that there is some level of awareness that the Generals aren't just "Yes Men" who blindly obey the current President's orders. If it is argued that they should revolt, then that means that they could revolt. In last week's post, I briefly discussed that civil-military relations exists on a broad spectrum between complete acquiescence to the Executive and revolt to overthrow the Executive, and there are an infinite number of positions between those two poles. That the military exists somewhere between complete, unflinching loyalty to the President and revolt means that the military has room to maneuver and position itself contrary to a position from the Executive.

To assuage thoughts that dissidence is only a product of the current state of American politics or of the current Commander-in-Chief, a brief trip into history offers insight. The year is 2006. The United States is deeply involved with the planning and execution of combat missions in Iraq. The Secretary of Defense is Donald Rumsfeld, and there is significant discord with how the war is being planned. Normally, such discord may come from the media or American citizens, but in this instance, it came from recently retired Generals (it is important to note that there are legal distinctions between being on active duty and being retired in terms of freedom of speech/expression and requirement to obey superiors). So significant were the protestations of these senior leaders that the situation was termed "The Revolt of the Generals". Publicly and privately, there was dissent of the leadership and policy taken by the Secretary of Defense - a civilian who has oversight and command over the military - by the very individuals who were, until very recently, in charge of planning and executing said policy. It was in this same timeframe that Thomas Ricks envisioned the deliberate evasion of orders by military leaders due, partially, to a perception that many in the military disapproved of the use of military force by then-President Clinton.

With the "Revolt of the Generals", military revolt of the President didn't happen, and it won't happen today. But, the fact that it is discussed, both then and now, suggests that there is a tacit awareness that the military isn't comprised of Generals who are "Yes Men" and that military leaders have the capacity to shape Executive opinions and policy in a number of ways.

Last week, I began the start of a discussion that seeks to examine the role of the military in its governance (Intro and Part 1 available through links) by examining the military precision and order that is so ubiquitously known being brought into the White House in the form of GEN (ret) Kelly being named the White House Chief of Staff and the action that he took almost immediately upon starting that position.

While there was an impromptu beginning to this discussion last week with the appointment of GEN (ret) Kelly and the rapid departure of Anthony Scaramucci, the questions of who controls the military and how they do it are important ones. That is, the military, for its Generals and Admirals, rank-and-file officers, and enlisted members, the military is run by a civilian. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution clearly names the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. Many Presidents have experience in the military, whether they were professional soldiers or citizen-soldiers, who interrupted their civilian lives to serve. However, regardless of prior experience, arguably and somewhat bluntly, the constitutional function of the President of the United States is to command and control the military, understanding how it fits into a larger picture, and the function of the military is to execute the missions assigned to it. Framed another way, the President serves as the boss of multiple companies, and the military serves as the employees of one company. While the grouping of the military as "employees" will be examined in a future post, for now, it is a workable analogy. In this analogy, it can be easily seen that the boss will have one perspective on the organization, and the employees, another. It's not that the employees in this organization aren't capable - in fact, they are very skilled at their jobs - but that, the solution to a problem may come from another of the boss' companies, or a mentality only obtained by being the boss. Returning from the analogy, a foreign policy solution could use "soft" power instead of "hard" power, or the experience of seeing the problem as the President instead of a military leader. The Commander-in-Chief's obligation is to independently control the military, and that requires a mindset that is open to alternative possibilities and more importantly, is able to lead.

This obligation immediately brings to mind a simple question - what if it is not met? Civil-military relations isn't a binary state with the two positions being "fine" and "revolt." At the extremes, an Executive that has been completely ideologically assimilated by the military is dangerous because the military would effectively control the executive. At the polar opposite position, a military that has no representation in leadership and is completely opposed to its leaders can revolt. In between those extremes is a massive gray area in which anything but the extremes is workable. So, what if there is is some overlap between the Commander-in-Chief and military leaders? Short of those extremes, it is not the end of the world, but where on that spectrum the interactions between the President and the military fall is important to study and understand.

These questions are especially important when viewed in context of the current administration. The President has nominated, and the Senate has confirmed, a respectable number of current or former military generals as advisors, specifically, GEN (ret) Kelly as Homeland Security Secretary, GEN (ret) Mattis as Defense Secretary, and LTG H. R. McMaster as National Security Advisor. Any of those posts being helmed by individuals with significant prior military experience is not newsworthy by itself, but in tandem with other developments, it raises the question of the ideological overlap between the Executive and the military.

​Concerning ideological assimilation of the Executive by military leadership, we know that the current White House Chief of Staff is set upon placing military discipline on the West Wing. Additionally, we know that LTG McMaster is currently on active duty in his post as National Security Advisor. Beyond that, highlighting the desire to have some separation between the Executive and military leadership, GEN (ret) Mattis had to secure a waiver from Congress to be confirmed to his current post. Why is that? Sixty-five years ago, Congress passed legislation which stated that it was "the sense" of lawmakers that "no additional appointments of military men to [the Office of Secretary of Defense] shall be approved after Secretary Marshall. In 2008, Congress reduced the original ten-year bar on transitioning from military service to the Secretary of Defense to seven years. Secretary Mattis, at the time of his confirmation, had only been retired from the military for three years, forcing him to secure a waiver from Congress. At the time of the confirmation hearings, civilian control of the military was discussed, but, GEN (ret) Mattis was overwhelmingly confirmed by the Senate.

Finally, in addition to a number of senior military leaders who were recently in that post, or currently in the military, President Trump is believed to be deferential to his Generals. This anticipated deference, with the number of Generals at senior levels of government raise the questions of who is leading the military and can the overseer separate itself from those that it is to oversee?

Let's assume that you are twenty years old, and you choose to serve your country by enlisting in the United States Marine Corps. Shortly after arriving at Basic Training, you're given information through a fire hose, and just as you begin to comprehend one piece, five more pieces of information are given to you, and you're expected to know that information, as well. One of the first pieces of information that you'll receive in this indoctrination period is the "General Orders to a Sentry." Comprising eleven commands in all, these general orders comprise what a sentry must know to manage/handle a situation that occurs on duty.

1. To take charge of this post and all government property in view.2. To walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on the alert and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.3. To report all violations of orders I am instructed to enforce.4. To repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.5. To quit my post only when properly relieved.6. To receive, obey, and pass on to the sentry who relieves me, all orders from the Commanding Officer, Command Duty Officer, Officer of the Deck, and Officers and Petty Officers of the watch only..7. To talk to no one except in the line of duty.8. To give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.9. To call the Officer of the Deck in any case not covered by instructions.10. To salute all officers and all colors and standards not cased.11. To be especially watchful at night and during the time for challenging, to challenge all persons on or near my post, and to allow no one to pass without proper authority.

These eleven orders, once given, become part of the enlistee's required knowledge, and the enlistee can be tested on it at any time and is expected to provide a correct response when challenged on any one or several orders by a drill instructor.

As nothing in the military is a standalone piece of knowledge, these orders integrate into the lives of the Sailor, Coast Guardsman, or Marine. During basic training, each enlistee will be a sentry by watching their barracks to ensure that it does not catch fire and is not intruded upon. In the fleet, they will man a watch on a ship or on a fenceline to ensure that both are operating as they should with no intrusions or issues, and if there is anything out of the ordinary, they will use the general orders to resolve it.

Is someone approaching a space that you are guarding? You are the guardian of that space (1). You are present and watch them coming (2). They should be challenged to see who they are (11). If they don't belong there, they should be told to leave, and if an issue persists, report it (3). Regardless of whether they are there properly, there should be no chit-chat, and all interaction should be as professional as possible (7). Record the interaction (2). At the end of your shift, inform the relief what orders are issued, and any special information that they need to know (6), and then, and only then, leave your post only when properly relieved by your replacement (5).

Going back to that assumption that you joined the military, this would be what you would do every time you had a shift, yes, but also any time you assumed a leadership role. Could General Order #1 be inferred to mean that you have a responsibility to ensure no fraud of governmental resources within your control occurs under your watch? Sure. And that if you see any fraud that you are to report it? Absolutely. The General Orders of a Sentry become part of your ethos after enough repetition and practice with them.

Now, let's imagine that you advance through enlisted ranks, and that you commission as an officer. You've been put in charge of people and assets all of your career, and now you're in charge of planning and execution of plans using those assets. You have continued to succeed, and you are promoted again. You're promoted to higher headquarters staff, where you plan with units full of people and their assets. Missions are thought of at this level and tasked to subordinate units for execution. For those subordinates, you set the example, and you continue to take charge of what you have been entrusted with and care for it. After a long and storied career, full of successes both individual and unit, you've reached the pinnacle of your career. You are a General Officer. You've promoted and you now have command. Command over a geographic region, the mission of your service in that region, and, inter alia, the people in that work for you in that region. The General Order to take charge of all government property in view still applies to you and you are now the standard bearer for your people.

Described, briefly, above, is the career of General John Kelly, USMC. General Kelly enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and ultimately rose to the rank of Sergeant. After a brief gap where he was discharged, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Marine Corps, and began his rise as an officer. After being assigned to Headquarters, Marine Corps, he commanded a rifle and weapons company. A few duty stations later, he then served as a Training Officer to incoming officers at Quantico, and as the Commanding Officer to a light armored reconnaissance battalion. Several years and duty stations later, he was the Special Assistant to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and then he took command of Task Force Tripoli in Iraq. After being promoted to General Officer, General Kelly served as commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and then Commander of Multi-National Force West in Iraq. After serving as the senior military assistant the Secretary of Defense, GEN Kelly served as the Commander of United States Southern Command.

The above biography is meant to examine the success that GEN Kelly had and some exposition on how he might problem solve, though each could never be adequately explained in a blog post. Ultimately, GEN (ret) Kelly was confirmed as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and on July 28, 2017, Sec. Kelly was tapped to be President Trump's Chief of Staff, and he began that role on July 31, 2017, three days later. Also on July 31, 2017, the White House Communications Director, Anthony Scaramucci, who had garnered fame by positioning himself as a vocal player in the Trump Administration who, inter alia, used expletives to media and spoke out against the then-White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus was removed from his role. Scaramucci had allegedly stated that he did not report to the Chief of Staff, but rather, that he reported directly to the President, usurping the authority of the Chief of Staff by undercutting his power and role. That is, if the Chief of Staff is meant to serve as a vet of all information to the President, in addition to being, as the name states, the Chief of the President's Staff, then it follows that the Chief of Staff should have cognizance and control over all White House staff. Scaramucci existing outside the control of the White House Chief of Staff made performing the full duties of the White House Chief of Staff by GEN (ret) Kelly impossible.

In the coming days, there are sure to be stories about sequences of events, and who had whose trust, but apart from that, is it that surprising that a retired, prior enlisted, four-star Marine Corps General who was in command of people, military weapons, and fulfilling the United States' military mission across the globe for over thirty years followed his military training and immediately took charge of his post as White House Chief of Staff? By recommending to President Trump that an individual (Scaramucci) that challenged a superior in the White House chain of command (Priebus) and whose existence served as a challenge to fully taking charge of the role that GEN (ret) Kelly now occupied, GEN (ret) Kelly fulfilled one of the most basic responsibilities that every Private, Lieutenant, and General has - to take control of his post.

What's left to see is if his presence creates a more disciplined West Wing, in line with his military training and experience. Early thoughts discuss ground rules that GEN (ret) Kelly has set forth to consolidate control and better manage the mission of being the White House Chief of Staff, including rules that he placed on members of the First Family.

In response to this line from Ghostbusters (1984), Dr. Peter Venkman says "What?", and Dr. Egon Spengler proceeds to tell him that "It would be bad." Clarification of this statement yields the description that one is to imagine all life as it is known stopping instantaneously and every molecule in the body exploding at the speed of light.​The field of civil-military relations arguably began on the day that the first army was created, but it has burgeoned as a field in the past sixty to seventy years. It is, quite axiomatically, how civilians and the military relate. Within that study, a number of research lines have developed, one of which, led by, amongst others, Professors Ackerman and Mazur, being whether Congress or the President can fully function in their Constitutionally mandated roles if they possess a military mindset. That is, what if a Congressman is a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, or if they served in Afghanistan? Are they more or less likely to vote with a military appropriations bill based on that personal experience? What about the executive? The President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief. What if, as was the case with President Eisenhower, he has significant military experience?

While the crossing of executive and military purpose isn't likely to cause total protonic reversal, as Dr. Stantz warns will happen if streams cross, it does pose an important question - can the Executive serve its constitutional mandate and function as the overseer of the military if there has been a taking over of the military and para-military institutions such as the Department of Defense (DoD) that are responsible for military oversight. Over the next few weeks, I'll examine ideological assimilation, its potential role in the current administration, and why it is significant.