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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000864
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDED ADDRESSEES
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR ALLEN
EUCOM FOR AMBASSADOR YATES
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016
TAGS: MARRPRELNG
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF NIGER (GON) CANCELS MILITARY
EXERCISES POTENTIALLY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR
Classified By:
CLASSIFIED BY BERNADETTE M. ALLEN, AMBASSADOR, REASONS: 1.4 (A) & (D)
¶1. (S/NF). Summary. Without any prior warning or earlier
indications of concern from GON military or civilian
officials, GON President Mamadou Tandja cancelled a planned
August 15-30, 2006, military exercise on the eve preceding
the anticipated arrival of a JCET. To obtain clarity on the
reason for the last minute cancellation, Embassy DATT Lt Col
Hughes and I met with GON Minister of Defense Hassane Souley
on August 14. I also reached by phone GON Minister of
Foreign Affairs Aichatou Mindaoudou in Paris (on medical
leave for an ulcer) on the night of August 14 to discuss the
matter and, subsequently, met with her (unaccompanied) in
Niamey on the morning of August 16. FM Mindaoudou stressed
that President Tandja is adamant about the GON not going
forward with the previously planned exercise at this time,
due to the "environmental context", specifically recent
events in neighboring Mali. In the separate meetings with
the DefMin and FM, both expressed GON concern about the
visual of 80 parachutists in a region so near the Mali
border and the possible misinterpretationo of the exercise by
agitators in the region (creating an unwanted magnet effect).
Moreover, Mindaoudou noted (stating that she was doing so in
confidence) that Libya exerts pressure as it relates to
Niger's military cooperation and that Tandja expressed
concern about possible support coming from sources in Libya
to agitators if the exercise were to occur at this time.
(Note: Libyan Ambassador to Niger Alboukhari Salem HODA is
the dean of the diplomatic corps. During my courtesy call on
him, I learned that he is not a career diplomat, rather a
personal friend of Libyan leader Khaddafi on a political
appointment as Ambassador to Niger. End note.) Mindaoudou
stated that the cancellation of this exercise is an anomaly,
that there remains interest in conducting such an exercise in
the long term, but the GON does not see a possibility of
conducting such an exercise before the end of the fiscal
year. Further, she emphasized that the GON is still a
partner in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), values its
partnership with the USG and very much wants to continue the
outstanding cooperation it has with the USG on military
matters and in other domains. (Comment: While no GON
official has stated the recent crisis in the Middle East had
an effect on the GON's actions, Embassy believes the crisis
may have played a role in Tandja's thinking. Local Lebanese
restaurants around town have been posting graphic photographs
of the situation in Lebanon and local Islamic leaders have
held peaceful demonstrations/vigils of support for the
Lebanese people, while condemning the actions of Israel.
Moreover, GON Prime Minister Hama Amadou, in response to a
Lebanon-related foreign policy question he received during a
press conference on a range of issues (primarily with a
domestic focus), made a point of stating that the GON has no
diplomatic relations with Israel and that the GON wanted a
cessation of the violence. End comment.) In sum, having
U.S. boots on the ground clearly is too uncomfortable for the
GON at this time, though Embassy notes that the GON was
similarly uncomfortable with another exercise earlier this
year, causing a change of venue. Additionally, though
neither the DefMin nor FM indicated a long term postponement
of military exercises and suggested that activities could
resume at a later date, discontented working level contacts
in the Defense Ministry informed Embassy DATT that they do
not expect to be able to conduct any "boots-related"
exercises for the remainder of the calendar year. Embassy
will take advantage of Admiral McCraven's imminent visit to
further discuss with senior GON officials the possible
timeframe for resumption of military exercises in Niger. End
summary.
¶2. (SBU) Embassy DATT and I met with DefMin Souley (together
with GON Col. Garba) concerning the scheduled August 15-30
JCET exercise, as well as the overall mil-to-mil
relationship. I expressed USG disappointment that the
exercise was cancelled at the last minute, noting the
planning time and the tremendous amount of human and material
resources that would be lost as a result. I emphasized to
Souley that we consider the GON a strong partner in the GWOT,
that we believed that the planned exercise would have been
extremely beneficial to both partners. Further, I stated
that we needed clarity (without the sugar coating) as to why
the exercise had been cancelled, that we need to know whether
we can count on partners to follow through with proposed
activities. I stressed that EUCOM cannot risk planning
exercises under a cloud of uncertainty and that a lack of
confidence in the partner could lead to resources and
training activities being diverted to more certain partners.
NIAMEY 00000864 002 OF 003
I added that the USG hoped this was not an indication of the
GON moving in a new direction.
¶3. (SBU) DefMin Souley assured me that the GON is not moving
in another direction, that the GON remains a partner in the
GWOT, as peace and stability is important for the region and
the world. He indicated that the &environmental context8
caused the GON to cancel the exercise, as the GON is
concerned that agitators in neighboring countries (most
notably in Mali) might misread the exercise as a threatening
operation and result in Niger receiving unwanted attention.
He stated that I could get a more thorough explanation from
the FonMin upon her return to the country, and reiterated the
GON is not moving in a new direction. Souley asked about the
possibility of delaying the exercise a bit and my discussing
possible alternative time frames with the FM. He also asked
whether the USG could propose annually a plan of activities
for GON review. He spoke of other GON military needs (such
as repair of its C-130). He also suggested that a signed
annual agreement would be binding on the GON and would be
consistent with what the GON does with other partners
(notably France and Morocco), as opposed to dealing with
military packages piece meal.
¶4. (SBU) DATT noted that the Embassy had proposed via
diplomatic note that an annual plan be developed and that
until today's meeting, the GON had not expressed any interest
in such a course of action. He pointed out that the Embassy
does provide a list of proposed activities with as much lead
time as possible and would prefer to work from an annual or
longer duration plan of activities.
¶5. (C) In reply to the DefMin's question about the
possibility of delaying the exercise to a later period, the
DATT and I indicated that the window to conduct the exercise
was extremely short, noting the end of fiscal year and
contractual obligations. We stated that we understood
contractual obligations must be completed before COB
Wednesday, August 16, but that DATT and I would check with
the relevant parties whether a few days delay were possible.
In response to the DefMin,s expressed interests in more
bilateral mil-to-mil cooperation and other assistance (such
as the repair of the C-130), I reminded him that Article 98
remains an obstacle. DATT added that we have managed the
current level of cooperation under the OEF-TS
counterterrorism umbrella, that with an Article 98 a wider
range of cooperation would be possible. I closed by noting
that it would be useful for both governments to formally
outline its respective interests, so that we could compare
notes and see what interests we have in common and what is
doable, given the constraints of Article 98 and the OEF-TS
program parameters. DefMin agreed and suggested that I raise
that matter in my discussion with the FonMin.
¶6. (S/NF) I reached GON Foreign Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou
(in Paris) by phone on the night of August 14, noting USG
disappointment in the GON decision to cancel the exercise.
Mindaoudou asked me when the exercise was to take place.
(Note: That information had been sent by diplomatic note to
the Min. of Defense (MOD) through the Min. of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) months ago. End note.) I informed the FonMin that the
team was to arrive this week and that I understood that we
had a short window to proceed with the exercise due to end of
fiscal year obligations, that Wednesday, Aug 16 is the
critical date. She asked whether I could look into the
possibility of delaying the exercise a few days, that she
would have a better sense of things upon return to Niamey. I
agreed to her request and we agreed to meet Wednesday, Aug 16
at 9:00am at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that point,
Embassy remained optimistic that the exercise could possibly
move forward, only slightly delayed.
¶7. (S/NF) In my meeting with FM Mindaoudou this morning
(August 16), she informed me that it was President Tandja who
called off the exercise due his concerns about the recent
events in Mali and concerns that the exercise might attract
the wrong kind of attention from agitators in the area. She
said the President was particularly nervous about the timing
of the exercise so close to the recent attacks on the
military base in Kidal and that he was feeling some pressure
from Libya. (Comment: Although President Tandja is the
President of ECOWAS, Embassy has not seen him use the power
of that position to influence matters in the region. End
comment.) Mindaoudou indicated that the GON remains
interested in this type of exercise, but at a later period
down the road. I reminded the FM that this exercise had been
programmed some time ago, reiterated the points I made with
NIAMEY 00000864 003 OF 003
the DefMin on August 14 about the extensive preparation time
and tremendous amount of human and material resources that
has been expended to date for the exercise. I stressed that
if there were no possibility to conduct the exercise this
fiscal year, it would weigh heavily on USG decision making
for future GON training requests. I added that I hoped this
was not an indication that the GON was going in another
direction in the GWOT. I also raised the possibility of
including the MFA in informational meetings on the various
military activities/programs that might be feasible for the
GON, and Mindaoudou responded that her military liaison
officer would be available for such meetings.
¶8. (S) The FM (as was the case with the DefMin) also
emphasized that President Tandja wanted it made clear that
the GON is still a partner in the GWOT and very much wants to
continue the outstanding relationship and cooperation it has
with the USG. She also noted that President Tandja is aware
the Nigerien military is extremely unhappy about the
President,s decision to call off the exercise, but that
Tandja is adamant that the current timing is not good. She
reiterated a hope that the exercise could be revived at some
point at a later date, possibly next fiscal year.
¶9. (S/NF) At both the DefMin and FM meetings, we discussed
Admiral McCraven,s imminent visit next week, as well as the
opportunity the Admiral's visit presents to discuss the
US-Nigerien mil-to-mil relationship. I reiterated that it
would be useful for the MFA to be represented in some of the
military meetings, to ensure there is no breakdown in
communication. The FM indicated that her military liaison
officer will prepared to attend meetings to which he is
invited. She also informed me that she will be in town for
the next ten days and available as needed.
¶10. (U) In sum, there appears to be no possibility for the
proposed exercise to go forward this fiscal year, and
potentially for the remainder of the calendar year. Admiral
McCraven,s imminent visit next week is indeed timely and
will be useful in our dialogue with the Nigeriens on military
matters.
ALLEN