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Yiyi Lu: Rebuilding the Communist Party

Yiyi Lu, an expert on Chinese civil society, discusses Xi Jinping‘s campaign to clean up the Communist Party. Ms. Lu is a research fellow at the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and an associate fellow at the U.K.-based Chatham House.. She is the author of “Non-Governmental Organisations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy” (Routledge 2008).

Yiyi Lu

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s effort to clean up politics in the country is generally known as an “anticorruption campaign.” In fact, he has a more ambitious agenda, as summarized in his “four comprehensives” strategic vision for China: “Comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society,” which will be achieved through “comprehensively deepening reform, comprehensively governing the nation according to law and comprehensively applying strict discipline in governing the Party.”

Anticorruption is best understood as part of “governing the Party strictly,” but not all of it. In addition to prosecuting corrupt officials—the so-called “striking tigers and flies,” the leadership has taken a number of actions to rectify the Party, including requiring Party members to attend “criticism and self-criticism” sessions to address problems such as hedonism and bureaucratism, and to maintain close contact with the grassroots, reject extravagance and reduce empty talk.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Party’s internal-control institution with the authority to investigate and punish members who are suspected of wrongdoing, has been greatly strengthened and made more powerful in the past few years. The CCDI’s director, Wang Qishan, has repeatedly stressed that Party discipline should be stricter than laws. In a speech in September, Wang said the current situation whereby Party members were either “good comrades” or “prisoners” must be changed. Ideally, in the majority of cases investigated by the CCDI, imposing minor disciplinary penalties would be sufficient. Cadres who are handed severe penalties or demoted should be a minority. Those who end up as prisoners should form an even smaller share. In other words, offenders should be stopped before they slip from minor disciplinary transgressions to more serious misdeeds.

In late October, the Party’s Central Committee released the revised Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations. Said to be the most stringent code of conduct for members in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, it lists in detail behavior and actions that are punishable. Disciplinary violations are divided into six categories ranging from breaches of political rules to “lifestyle” mistakes, such as extravagance and indecent conduct in public spaces.

Why is Xi Jinping so determined to tighten the leash on Party members? The answer would seem obvious once the extent of corruption, moral depravity and indiscipline among Party members is fully appreciated.

Although the heavily censored media in China cannot freely cover the failings and problems of the governing party and its cadres, as the anticorruption campaign leaves behind a trail of fallen tigers and flies, the media has had some leeway in reporting their sins, in the process offering a good glimpse of the extent of the Party’s rot and decay.

In one illuminating case, Yuan Ling, a former county Party Secretary convicted of taking over 40 million yuan ($6.3 million) of bribes, was once an upright cadre who had vowed to stay clean. First working at a university, where temptations were few, Yuan had managed to protect her integrity. However, after being assigned to a new post in a local government, she came under pressure to conform to the common practice of accepting red envelopes containing cash. Refusing red envelopes, as Yuan did initially, alienated her from her colleagues.

Yuan felt that she had to change, or she would never gain the trust and approval of her coworkers. Gradually, she became used to taking bribes. The cadre who had once jumped into her car to chase after somebody who left cash at her home to return it eventually turned into an unscrupulous money grubber who would even ask businessmen she knew only slightly for bribes.

In another case, an official named Zhu Jiachen illegally gained over four million yuan by asking his subordinates and colleagues to reimburse him for false expense receipts. Some of his more than 90 victims managed to get their own work units to reimburse the expenses, while the less resourceful ones used their own money. Many local cadres dreaded receiving invitations from Zhu for dinner or to see him in his office, as they knew Zhu would very likely give them receipts to take care of.

Once, Zhu invited a cadre who was eligible for promotion to his office and immediately presented him with receipts for more than 20,000 yuan. The cadre said he knew Zhu actually had no direct authority in deciding his promotion, but might be able to wreck it if offended. Therefore he chose to give Zhu the money from his own pockets.

In these two examples—and many more similar ones—what is most striking is not so much that individual officials were corrupt as the fact that in the local governments where they served, they were apparently surrounded by people who also participated in or at least acquiesced in corrupt activities.

What explains the disappointing ethical performance of Party members? In addition to years of high tolerance for corruption and lax discipline before Xi Jinping’s reign, there is also another factor: how the recruitment of Party members has changed. Unlike in the old revolutionary days when members might need to take on risky assignments and pass severe tests, these days becoming a Party member often doesn’t require any sacrifice or good deeds, while membership brings rewards such as an edge over nonmembers when applying for public-sector jobs. Therefore, it could be argued that opportunistic individuals who are more comfortable with the chasm between the rhetoric about the virtues and dedication of Party members and the reality are more likely to join the Party.

The leadership under Xi Jinping appears to have recognized this problem and set the new principle of “controlling the total number and raising the quality of Party members” shortly after taking office. As a result, in 2013, the Party admitted 825,000 fewer new members than in 2012, while the number of new members was further reduced by 351,000 in 2014.

By tightening up Party recruitment, imposing strict discipline and weeding out corrupt elements, Xi Jinping seems to be making an attempt to rebuild the Party in its ideal image—the collective of high-minded, morally exemplary individuals dedicated to serving the people. The problem is that, for decades, many have joined the Party for personal gain. So, will Xi Xinjing succeed in his endeavor? And, if he does succeed, will there still be enough candidates who wish to join the Party? It would probably take considerable faith in human nature to answer yes.