UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIASAN JOSE DIVISIONAPPLE, INC., a California corporation,Plaintiff,v.SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., AKorean corporation; SAMSUNGELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., a New York corporation; SAMSUNGTELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC,a Delaware limited liability company,Defendants.))))))))))))))Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHKORDER DENYING DAMAGESENHANCEMENTSIn this patent case, a jury found that a range of Samsung products infringe several of Apple’s design and utility patents, and that several Samsung products dilute Apple’s trade dress.Apple now seeks damages enhancements under two sources of authority: the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.§ 284, and the Lanham Act, 15 US.C. § 1117(a).

See

Apple’s motion for a permanent injunctionand for damages enhancements (“Mot.”), ECF No. 1982.Though § 284 permits the Court to increase the damages “up to three times the amountfound or assessed,” such an award is only appropriate where infringement was willful.

See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.

, 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012).This Court has already found that the objective willfulness inquiry is not satisfied.

See

Order onApple’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 2219; Order on Samsung’s motion for

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judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 2220. Accordingly, there can be no damages enhancementunder the Patent Act, and the Court need not consider Apple’s arguments that other factors favorenhancement under the Patent Act.This leaves the question of Lanham Act enhancements. The Court must first decidewhether, when the jury awarded damages for a given product that both infringes patents and dilutestrade dress, without specifying which portion of the damages is for which injury, the award can beincreased under the authority of the Lanham Act. If this is possible, the Court must then determinewhether such enhancements are warranted here.

I.

Mixed Award

The Lanham Act permits a court to “enter judgment, according to the circumstances of thecase, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times suchamount.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). This type of enhancement is intended only to compensate aplaintiff for additional losses not compensated by the existing award, not to punish a defendant.

Id.

All six products that the jury found to dilute trade dress were also found to infringe design patents.The jury returned its award, however, by product, rather than by claim. Thus, for each product thatdilutes Apple’s trade dress, the jury returned a single damages number that also incorporates designpatent infringement damages. This is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s direction that in cases of more than one infringement per product, plaintiffs are entitled to recover only once for eachinfringing sale.

Samsung’s opposition toApple’s motion for a permanent injunction and damages enhancement (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 2054,at 23 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 289). Samsung is correct that an award of infringers’ profits for designpatent infringement, as authorized by § 289, is not subject to enhancement. However, there are twoproblems with Samsung’s argument that § 289 forbids enhancement of the combined award. First,the Court cannot determine whether the jury made its award pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 284, the

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general patent damages provision, which does not contain the prohibition on enhancement, orwhether, instead, its award constituted the special infringer’s profits award authorized for designpatent infringement by § 289. Second, it does not follow that an award made for multiple types of infringement cannot be enhanced simply because the award might have been made in part pursuantto § 289. The parties cite, and the Court is aware of, no case considering whether an award madefor both design patent infringement and trade dress dilution may be enhanced under the LanhamAct’s enhancement provisions.As an initial matter, Samsung’s attempts to show that the jury’s award must haveconstituted infringer’s profits are unavailing. The Court will not speculate as to how, precisely, the jury calculated its damages award. The Court does, however, find it reasonable to assume that anaward made for a product found to infringe multiple separate rights was intended to compensateApple for losses stemming from all of the violations the jury found for that product. It would beillogical to suggest that the jury found that a particular product both infringed a design patent anddiluted trade dress, but awarded damages only for the design patent, while declining to compensateApple for its acknowledged trade dress losses. Further, under Federal Circuit precedent, an awardmade for a given product does not necessarily correspond to one specific intellectual property right,but rather to one sale of the infringing product, even if that product infringed multiple rights.

SeeCatalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc.

, 295 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an awardof infringer’s profits made on a finding of design patent infringement also compensated theplaintiff for infringement of a utility patent by the same product). Thus, the award need not bedirected to one injury or the other, but rather could be for both simultaneously.Instead, the Court proceeds on the reasonable assumption that the award for each of the sixproducts found to dilute trade dress was made pursuant to both the Patent Act and to the LanhamAct. Whether the patent damages were awarded under § 284 or § 289, the Court cannot determine.However, because the Court determines, as discussed below, that in neither case would the awardprevent an enhancement under the Lanham Act, this uncertainty is of no moment.As the jury may have made its award in part pursuant to § 289, the question is whether §289’s prohibition on enhancements could trump the Lanham Act’s authorization of enhancements.