Obama has come under domestic pressure to respond more forcefully to the disputed presidential election there. He says he does not want to give Iranian authorities grounds to claim that the protests are the result of U.S. meddling. In a statement Saturday, Obama called on the Iranian government to “stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people” and said the “United States stands with all who seek to exercise those rights."

Cordesman writes:

The situation would be different if the United States or any outside power had a magic wand, or if any of the lies regarding foreign interference being told by [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei and [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad were true. The fact is, however, that the United States cannot suddenly intervene in Iran, American political rhetoric is not going to change Iranian facts on the ground, and there is no clear opposition outside Iran worth backing.

Read the full commentary below.

--Alexandra Zavis in Los Angeles

“What’s Next With Iran?”

WASHINGTON, June 22, 2009 – The Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS) Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Anthony
H. Cordesman has written a new commentary, “What’s Next With Iran?”

Please find the full commentary below:

It is hard to counsel patience, particularly in a climate of
artificial deadlines, instant media, and steadily larger gaggles of
squawking heads. So far, however, President Obama has shown the right
degree of restraint, while laying the groundwork to react as the
outcome of events in Iran become clear enough to decide on the best
policy.

The situation would be different if the United States or any outside
power had a magic wand, or if any of the lies regarding foreign
interference being told by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad were true. The fact
is, however, that the United States cannot suddenly intervene in Iran,
American political rhetoric is not going to change Iranian facts on the
ground, and there is no clear opposition outside Iran worth backing.

It is one thing to do everything possible to support a successful
change in power if a new and more pragmatic government does emerge out
of Iran’s turmoil. It is quite another to put Iran’s people and
internal opposition at risk by rushing out to either encourage them to
take risks out of the belief outside help will come or to delegitimize
their efforts because this plays well in American domestic politics.

A Time for Transparency and Truth

So what can the United States, the West, and outside powers do to
help? One key action is to take a public stance of continued restraint.
Let Khamenei and Ahmadinejad further discredit themselves with false
claims and xenophobic nonsense. Wait to take open action until it is
clear what kind of official action can really make a difference.

What can be done more quietly, however, is to encourage the world’s
media and Internet services to provide the most realistic and detailed
coverage possible, and to fight every Iranian effort to close off Iran
and suppress the facts on the ground. In some ways, this is best done
by encouraging other governments to encourage their media. The best and
most objective U.S. coverage will always be suspect until U.S.-Iranian
relations put an end to decades of official mistrust.

At the same time, this is the moment to provide background briefings
on any special intelligence insight into the legitimacy of the vote; to
explain how undemocratic Iranian “democracy” really is; and to provide
the facts on Iran’s economy that its leadership downplays or ignores
and data on its efforts at arrests and repression.

This is not a time for rhetoric and propaganda, but it is a time for
transparency and truth. The United States should do everything it can
to help the world’s media understand the facts, both now and in the
weeks and months to come. It is also a time to trust the media to use
that data and supplement it on its own. The United States should not
try to manage information operations; it should seek to provide
information.

If Iran’s Leadership Does Change

If the turmoil in Iran does produce a major change in the
leadership, the United States should be prepared to react immediately.
It should go beyond a call for dialogue. It should offer immediate
positive benefits and not focus on the issues that have divided Iran
and the United States.

Both nations have a clear and immediate interest in focused
cooperation in dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq in ways that help them
achieve stability and independence and defeat the kind of religious
extremism that is a common threat to the Iran, the United States, every
Arab state, and all of Iran’s other neighbors. A sudden, “grand
bargain” seems likely to be impossible, but real progress may be an
option in more limited areas.

The United States should immediately and formally recognize the
importance of the change in regime, state that Iranian affairs are a
matter for Iran, and call for relations based on full recognition of
Iran’s right to security. The United States should offer to ease or
lift economic sanctions, particularly those that put more pressure on
Iran’s people than its regime. It should not ease sanctions that affect
Iran’s arms and nuclear imports, and should resist any such efforts by
other countries. It should, however, make it clear that it recognizes
Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power and nuclear enrichment as long
as this occurs under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspection and the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It
should also encourage the Gulf states, including Iraq, to hold a
security dialogue with Iran.

What it should not do is underreact to a real shift in the regime
simply because it will be so difficult to characterize the new
leadership, and because that leadership will inevitably be drawn from
within elements of Iran’s current power structure. It is one thing to
wait in mid-crisis and another to let uncertainty turn into paralysis
once a key turning point has actually occurred. Moreover, making such
offers has minimal risk. It takes time to implement them. If Iran takes
real advantage of such openings, then everyone wins—including all of
Iran’s neighbors. If Iran’s new leader games or ignores such U.S.
actions, the United States will have ample time to react, and Iran’s
neighbors will see that it was not the United States that failed Iran,
but rather Iran’s new neighbors.

This does not mean ignoring Iran’s nuclear activities, hostility to
Israel, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, interference in
Iraq, ties to Syria and nonstate actors, and buildup of irregular
warfare capabilities, or temporarily taking them off the table. These
are issues the United States can discuss with Iran as soon as Iran is
ready. It does mean giving Iran’s new leadership time and immediate
reason to believe that it can actually deal with the United States.

Strategic patience is the prelude to real, lasting, and more serious
progress. So is the understanding that the United States may also not
get all it wants—particularly in terms of Iran’s nuclear and military
programs, and its actions toward its neighbors and Israel. The United
States may well have to settle for making things “better,” but this
will be far more productive than waiting for “perfect,” particularly if
the United States makes progress with Iran that is firmly grounded in
realism rather than in hope.

And if It Does Not...

Sadly, the most likely scenario is that the regime remains the same.
If so, the continued rule of Khamenei, and Ahmadinejad’s continued role
in the presidency, will mean that the United States, Iran’s neighbors,
and the world will face all of the problems with Iran they faced before
the election. If so, this will require a different kind of strategic
patience.

One thing that Obama administration should not do is return to the
illusion of trying to change the regime directly from the outside or
through some covert backing of opposition movements inside Iran. The
only outside exile movements that begin to have meaningful status are
centered on the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) (aka People’s Mujahedin of
Iran or PMOI), which is affiliated with the National Council of
Resistance of Iran. This is a movement with a long history of
terrorism, including the murder of U.S. officers and officials during
the time of the Shah. It served as a tool for Saddam Hussein, and now
is a cult centered on its leaders, the Rajavis. Like some Iraqi exile
groups in 2003, it has no real strength or credibility, and in spite of
its domestic political efforts, it is a movement that only the
stupidest and most irresponsible members of Congress and think tanks
could support.

What the Obama administration should do is keep up a constant effort
to expose the true nature of the regime, its repression, and its
failures. Once again, it will be far better to help the world’s media
provide truth and transparency independently than by trying to run a
propaganda effort or information operation. Such an effort should also
be continuing, as open as possible, and uncompromising. It should not
preclude dialogue with Iran’s existing regime. The United States gains
nothing from isolating Iran and loses a great deal in terms of a lack
of contact with Iran’s people. However, any dialogue should be narrowly
focused on areas of clear mutual interest, and the United States should
make no compromises over its truth and transparency efforts to obtain
short-term gains in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf.

If there is any effort that the United States should take directly
aimed at the regime, it is to encourage both Shi’ite and Sunni Islamic
scholars to come more directly with the legitimacy of the concept of a
“supreme leader.” What did Khomeini actually do, aside from creating
social repression and extending the Iran-Iraq War for four extra,
bloody years? How did a weak and inadequate religious scholar like
Khamenei come to be supreme leader? What does any of this do to advance
any aspect of Shi’ite and Islamic beliefs, and is the record to date
better than the tradition of “quietism” except when the regime commits
major abuses? These are not questions any non-Shi’ites or non-Muslims
can answer. They are questions that the actions of Iran’s supreme
leaders to date have given the entire world the right to ask.

More broadly, the United States should make it clear that it will
not compromise its key interests in the region. The United States
should work with its allies, key states like Russia and China, and the
other Gulf states to show that the security measures the United States
takes in the region are only intended to deal with the excesses of the
Iranian regime. There are positive actions the United States should
take. It should reevaluate its sanctions and legislation to make it
clear that it is doing everything possible to help the Iranian people
in spite of such a regime. It should show that there are real,
detailed, and major incentives available if the regime changes its
conduct. It should also make it clear that the United States will not
invade Iran or exercise any military options until it is clear to the
world that Iran actually has a nuclear force that is a major threat.

At the same time, the United States should prove to the region that
it is keeping a strong forward U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) presence
in the Gulf, and that it is working with the Gulf states to contain
Iran, and with the Arab states to check Iran’s influence in dealing
with Hezbollah and Hamas. It should show that it will support a secure
Israel while it seeks a full Arab-Israeli peace. It should offer the
region missile defenses and extended deterrence to counter the threats
and opportunism that come out of Iran’s regime. In doing so, it should
demonstrate that Iran’s existing leaders cannot “win” through any of
their actions; they can only escalate the level of containment and
risks to Iran. In doing so, the United States should also demonstrate
that it is constantly listening to the states in the region, and key
outside states, and is treating such efforts as a partnership and not
as policies it is seeking to impose.

There are no quick and easy answers to the present regime in Iran,
if it survives. This does not mean there are not effective answers if
the United States acts decisively and consistently over time.

###

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