This four part essay shows both northern and southern dissatisfaction with "the
Great Compromise"

The first is taken from the third essay of "BRUTUS."

The second: from the speeches of Rawlins Lowndes to the South Carolina
ratifying convention on January 16, 17, and 18, 1788.

The third: from the sixth essay by "CATO."

The fourth: from an essay by "A GEORGIAN," appearing in The
Gazette of the State of Georgia on November 15, 1787.

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States, which may be included in this Union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of
free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." What a
strange and unnecessary accumulation of words are here used to conceal from the
public eye what might have been expressed in the following concise manner:
Representatives are to be proportioned among the States respectively, according
to the number of freemen and slaves inhabiting them, counting five slaves for
three freemen.

"In a free State," says the celebrated Montesquieu, "every
man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own
government, therefore the legislature should reside in the whole body of the
people, or their representatives." But it has never been alleged that those
who are not free agents can, upon any rational principle, have anything to do in
government, either by themselves or others. If they have no share in
government, why is the number of members in the assembly to be increased on
their account? Is it because in some of the States, a considerable part of the
property of the inhabitants consists in a number of their fellow-men, who are
held in bondage, in defiance of every idea of benevolence, justice and religion,
and contrary to all the principles of liberty which have been publicly avowed in
the late Glorious Revolution? If this be a just ground for representation, the
horses in some of the States, and the oxen in others, ought to be
represented-for a great share of property in some of them consists in these
animals; and they have as much control over their own actions as these poor
unhappy creatures, who are intended to be described in the above recited clause,
by the words, "all other persons." By this mode of apportionment, the
representatives of the different parts of the Union will be extremely unequal;
in some of the Southern States the slaves are nearly equal in number to the free
men; and for all these slaves they will be entitled to a proportionate share in
the legislature; this will give them an unreasonable weight in the government,
which can derive no additional strength, protection, nor defense from the
slaves, but the contrary. Why, then, should they be represented? What adds to
the evil is, that these States are to be permitted to continue the inhuman
traffic of importing slaves until the year 1808-and for every cargo of these
unhappy people which unfeeling, unprincipled, barbarous and avaricious wretches
may tear from their country, friends and tender connections, and bring into
those States, they are to be rewarded by having an increase of members in the
General Assembly....

BRUTUS

. . . . six of the Eastern States formed a majority in the
House of Representatives. In the enumeration he passed Rhode Island, and
included Pennsylvania. Now, was it consonant with reason, with wisdom, with
policy, to suppose, in a legislature where a majority of persons sat whose
interests were greatly different from ours, that we had the smallest chance of
receiving adequate advantages? Certainly not. He believed the gentlemen that
went from this state, to represent us in Convention, possessed as much
integrity, and stood as high in point of character, as any gentlemen that could
have been selected; and he also believed that they had done every thing in their
power to procure for us a proportionate share in this new government; but the
very little they had gained proved what we may expect in future-that the
interest of the Northern States would so predominate as to divest us of any
pretensions to the title of a republic. In the first place, what cause was
there for jealousy of our importing Negroes? Why confine us to twenty years, or
rather why limit us at all? For his part, he thought this trade could be
justified on the principles of religion, humanity, and justice; for certainly to
translate a set of human beings from a bad country to a better, was fulfilling
every part of these principles. But they don't like our slaves, because they
have none themselves, and therefore want to exclude us from this great
advantage. Why should the Southern States allow of this, without the consent of
nine states? . . .

We had a law prohibiting the importation of Negroes for three
years, a law he greatly approved of; but there was no reason offered why the
Southern States might not find it necessary to alter their conduct, and open
their ports.

Without Negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the
most contemptible in the Union; and he cited an expression that fell from
General Pinckney on a former debate, that whilst there remained one acre of
swampland in South Carolina, he should raise his voice against restricting the
importation of Negroes. Even in granting the importation for twenty years, care
had been taken to make us pay for this indulgence, each negro being liable, on
importation, to pay a duty not exceeding ten dollars; and, in addition to this,
they were liable to a capitation tax. Negroes were our wealth, our only natural
resource; yet behold how our kind friends in the north were determined soon to
tie up our hands, and drain us of what we had! The Eastern States drew their
means of subsistence, in a great measure, from their shipping; and, on that
head, they had been particularly careful not to allow of any burdens: they were
not to pay tonnage or duties; no, not even the form of clearing out: all ports
were free and open to them! Why, then, call this a reciprocal bargain, which
took all from one party, to bestow it on the other!

Major [Pierce] BUTLER observed, that they were to pay five per
cent impost.

This, Mr. LOWNDES proved, must fall upon the consumer. They
are to be the carriers; and, we being the consumers, therefore all expenses
would fall upon us. A great number of gentlemen were captivated with this new
Constitution, because those who were in debt would be compelled to pay; others
pleased themselves with the reflection that no more confiscation laws would be
passed; but those were small advantages, in proportion to the evils that might
be apprehended from the laws that might be passed by Congress, whenever there
was a majority of representatives from the Eastern States, who were governed by
prejudices and ideas extremely different from ours. . . .

Great stress was laid on the admirable checks which guarded us,
under the new Constitution, from the encroachments of tyranny; but too many
checks in a political machine must produce the same mischief as in a mechanical
one-that of throwing all into confusion. But supposing we considered ourselves
so much aggrieved as to reduce us to the necessity of insisting on redress, what
probability had we of relief? Very little indeed. In the revolving on
misfortune, some little gleams of comfort resulted from a hope of being able to
resort to an impartial tribunal for redress; but pray what reason was there for
expectancy that, in Congress, the interest of five Southern States would be
considered in a preferable point of view to the nine Eastern ones?

.... the mode of legislation in the infancy of free communities
was by the collective body, and this consisted of free persons, or those whose
age admitted them to the right of mankind and citizenship, whose sex made them
capable of protecting the state, and whose birth may be denominated Free Born;
and no traces can be found that ever women, children, and slaves, or those who
were not sui juris, in the early days of legislation, met with the free members
of the community to deliberate on public measures; hence is derived this maxim
in free governments, that representation ought to bear a proportion to the
number of free inhabitants in a community; this principle your own state
constitution, and others, have observed in the establishment of a future census,
in order to apportion the representatives, and to increase or diminish the
representation to the ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. But,
what aid can the community derive from the assistance women, infants and slaves,
in their deliberation, or in their defense? What motives, therefore, could the
convention have in departing from just and rational principle of representation,
which is the governing prince of this state and of all America?

CATO

Article 1, section 2. This section mentions that, within three
years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, an
enumeration shall take place, the number of representatives not to exceed one
member for every 30,000. This article I believe to be inadmissable. First, it
affords to small a representation, (supposing 48 at the highest calculation) and
especially in the southern states, their climate, soil, and produce, . . . not
being capable of that population as in the northern states. Would it not
therefore be better to increase the number of representatives, say one member
for every 20,000 for the states north of Virginia, and one for every 15,000
south of the said state, itself included? Or, secondly, divide the states into
districts which shall choose the representatives, by which every part of a state
will have an equal chance, without being liable to parties or factions? Should
it be said it will increase the expense, it will be money well laid out, and the
more so if we retain the paying them out of our own bands. And, supposing the
voting in the house of representatives was continued as heretofore by states,
would it not be more equal still? At any rate I would strenuously recommend to
vote by states, and not individually, as it will be accommodating the idea of
equality, which should ever be observed in a republican form of government. Or,
thirdly, if it was in proportion to the quotas of the states, as rated in
taxation, then the number of members would increase with the proportion of tax,
and at that rate there would always be an equality in the quota of tax as well
as representation; for what chance of equality according to the constitution in
question, can a state have that has only one or two votes, when others have
eight or ten, (for it is evident that each representative, as well as senator,
is meant to have a vote, as it mentions no other mode but in choosing the
president), and as it is generally allowed that the United States are divided
into two natural divisions, the northern as far as Virginia, the latter included
forms the southern? This produces a wide difference in climate, soil, customs,
manners of living, and the produce of the land, as well as trade, also in
population, to which it is well observed the latter is not so favorable as the
former, and never can nor will be, nature itself being the great obstacle. And
when taxation is in agitation, as also many other points, it must produce
differences in sentiments; and, in such dispute, how is it likely to be decided?
According to the mode of voting, the number of members north of Virginia the
first three years is 42, and the southern, Virginia included, 23....

Is human nature above self interest? If the northern states do
not horde the southern in taxation, it would appear then really that they are
more disinterested men than we know of.