Parties Start Discussing Business Practices with COMESA’s CCC

As AAT reported recently — see “Growing Pains: From One-Trick Pony to Full-Fledged Enforcer?” — the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) has begun to move from being a pure merger-control administrator to becoming a full-fledged antitrust enforcer. The CCC issued a Notice calling on firms to notify the CCC of any agreements (both historic and forward-looking) that may be anti-competitive, for the purpose of having such agreements ‘authorised’ or ‘exempted’ under Article 20 of the COMESA Competition Regulations. (More details on that regime are in our June article, referenced above.)

Eveready products (sample)

AAT has now learned that several companies have taken the agency up on its Exemption proposal: Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd. observes that the CCC’s announced “leniency ‘window’ to incentivise firms to come forward and obtain an exemption” has closed at this point in time, although he expressed doubt that the relatively short one-month period was sufficient and will likely be extended. Says Stargard: “We are seeing several parties, both global & local companies, who are beginning to take the CCC’s non-merger enforcement seriously. These undertakings are considering to obtain advance clearance of their business practices under the Commission’s Notice procedure.” One such example, he adds, is Kenya’s financially embattled Eveready East Africa: it has reportedly sought CCC approval of its agreements with international manufacturers for the importation and distribution within the COMESA common market of their diverse products, ranging from batteries to fountain pens to Clorox-brand chemicals. The Commission has invited “general public and stakeholders” for comments according to its formal statement.

In light of these developments, Stargard advises that:

“multi-national firms operating within COMESA or jointly with a COMESA-based importer or other domestic business partner should consider engaging counsel to evaluate their practices, and if they may fall within Article 16 of the Regulations, consider approaching the CCC for an authorisation letter.”

CCC Seeks Information on “Potentially” Anti-Competitive Agreements

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.

Breaking News: The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) has issued a notice (the “Notice”) calling on firms to notify the CCC of any agreements (both historic and forward looking) that may be anti-competitive, for the purpose of having such agreements ‘authorised’ or ‘exempted’ in terms of Article 20 of the COMESA Competition Regulations (the “Regulations”).

In terms of Article 20 of the Regulations, agreements which are anticompetitive may be exempted by the CCC if such an ‘anticompetitive agreement’ contributes positively to the ‘public interest’ to the extent that the public interest benefit outweighs the anti-competitive effect.

In terms of the CCC’s notice 1/2013, the following agreements may well be considered to be in the public interest when evaluating whether an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice should be exempted:

Joint research and development ventures;

Specialisation agreements; and

Franchising agreements

As to the agreements or concerted practices which may be anti-competitive, the Notice refers specifically to the restrictive business practices listed in Article 16 of the Regulations which states that:

“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market:

all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which:

(a) may affect trade between Member States; and

(b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market.”

It should be noted that Article 16 is deliberately drafted broadly so as to prohibit conduct which has as its “object” the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Certain conduct, such as price fixing, fixing of trading terms or conditions, allocating suppliers or markets or collusive tendering may be considered as having as its ‘object’ the distortion or restriction of competition in the market. Accordingly, firms who have engaged in this type of conduct may be held liable in the absence of any evidence of an anti-competitive effect (whether actual or potential).

Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd., “[t]he CCC’s notice is a clear sign that the agency is gathering momentum in its efforts to detect and prosecute anticompetitive practices within the member states — and is going beyond its ‘one-trick pony’ status as a pure merger-control gatekeeper. We anticipate a more active role by the CCC in conduct investigations and presumptively also enforcement actions, as opposed to its previous rubber-stamping activity of approving transactions with a COMESA community dimension (and concomitant collection of vast filing fees).”

The web of MoU’s recently concluded, which have as their primary objectives the facilitation of information exchanges and cooperation between competition agencies, is certainly a significant stride made to assist the authorities, including the CCC, in detecting and prosecuting anticompetitive practices which may be taking place across the African continent.

A further indication of the CCC’s growing appetite and confidence to identify anticompetitive practices is that the CCC has announced that it is conducting a market enquiry into the grocery retail sector. This is the first market inquiry to be conducted by the CCC.

In terms of the CCC’s Notice, firms who have not yet notified the CCC of agreements which may be anticompetitive, have approximately one month to do so. In other words, the CC has offered a leniency ‘window’ to incentivise firms to come forward and obtain an exemption in respect of agreements already implemented which may be in contravention of Article 16 of the Regulations.

Like this:

Information-sharing, investigative assistance, and capacity-building at forefront of MoU

As reported by the Swaziland Observer, the Seychelles Competition Commission and COMESA’s Competition Commission have entered, on 20 April 2016, into a Memorandum of Understanding that aims to deepen the cooperation and coordination between the two agencies (as well as the Seychelles Fair Trading Commission). Republic of Seychelles has been a member of COMESA since its accession to the common market in 1997.

The MoU creates positions of “desk officers” in each agency to ensure that the institutions will cooperate on investigations and share relevant information to ensure enforcement. It also foresees policy coordination, technical assistance and capacity-building programs.

FTC Seychelles CEO Georges Tirant pointed out that the MoU merely formalises what has already been a day-to-day reality, with the aim of legislative harmonisation and ultimately regional integration. “I have a dream that all African member states should work together for a better Africa,” he said. COMESA Competition Commission Board Chairman Mattews Chikankheni said that it would “improve efficiency in day to day processes, remove entry barriers create an enabling ground for small businesses and medium enterprises which will enable economic growth, job creation and reduce poverty.”

CCC Chief Executive Officer George Lipimile emphasised the need to create jobs and “link industries,” as well as explain the agency’s mission: “We are going to work hard so that competition laws make sense to the people, because a law that does not benefit people is useless.”

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COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is a supra-national group of 19 sovereign African countries; it is the successor entity to the 1982 Preferential Trade Area Agreement among eastern and southern African nations. For starters, here is a map of COMESA’s member states, which are as follows: Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Notably absent from its membership is the largest economy of the region, namely South Africa. Likewise, Tanzania is no longer a member, having left the bloc in 2000.

What is the competition-law relevance of COMESA:

Headquartered in Lusaka (Zambia), the 19 year-old organisation has recently upped the ante for companies engaged in commercial activities within the borders of COMESA member states… It has created and activated the COMESA Competition Commission (the “CCC”).

The CCC, based in Lilongwe (Malawi), is tasked with supervising and enforcing competition-related matters within the bloc. In this function, it may be compared to the Directorate General Competition (“DG COMP”) of the European Union, as a supra-national enforcement authority, specialised in antitrust / competition-law matters. The CCC’s primary areas of responsibility are, unsurprisingly:

Cartel conduct and other horizontal and potentially also vertical agreements

Unilateral conduct (i.e., abuse of a dominant position in the market)

The COMESA Board of Commissioners is an appellate authority in relation to the CCC. Companies may also maintain actions against COMESA member states before the Court of Justice, provided they have fully exhausted their national-court remedies.