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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 COLOMBO 000688
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-22-13
TAGS: PGOVPTERKPAOEAIDCENOJALTTE
SUBJECT: Tigers announce they are suspending peace
talks; GSL, most observers see move as tactical
Refs: Colombo 685, and previous (Notal)
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b, d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a press release dated April 21, the
Tamil Tigers suspended their participation in the peace
talks and said they will not attend the June donors
conference. The GSL has not yet reacted in public to
the statement (short of a very brief letter to the
Tigers taking note of their statement). Minister
Moragoda told us that he thought the move was tactical,
"shock therapy" by the Tigers, as he put it. Other
observers agree with this perspective. While the Tigers
are always hard to read, we tend to agree that they
still see the peace process as a going concern. A
suggested press statement for Washington's immediate
review is contained in Para 10. END SUMMARY.
---------------
Tiger Statement
---------------
¶2. (U) In a long press release dated April 21, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suspended its
participation in peace talks with the Sri Lankan
government and said the group will not attend the June
donors conference in Tokyo. (Note: Per the statement,
the seventh round of GSL-LTTE talks, which had been set
to take place in Thailand from April 29 - May 2, is now
off.) The press release came in the form of a letter
from the LTTE's London-based spokesman and senior
negotiator Anton Balasingham to Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe. (Note: The text of the statement, as
carried by pro-LTTE websites, is contained in Para 11.)
¶3. (U) The statement begins by tipping its hat to the
peace process, noting that the prior rounds of talks and
other interactions among the LTTE, government, and
Norwegian government facilitators had "fostered trust
and confidence." After this brief introduction, the
statement hits it stride when it makes the following
three major complaints about the peace process:
-- April 14 Seminar: The statement asserts that the GSL
and the Norwegian facilitators should have ensured the
LTTE's participation in all meetings on international
assistance issues. Instead, the GSL and GoN allowed
Washington to be the venue of the April 14 seminar on
Sri Lanka despite being "fully aware of the fact that
the United States has legal constraints in inviting
representatives of a proscribed organization" to the
U.S. The statement goes on to claim that the LTTE's
"exclusion" from the conference "has seriously eroded
the confidence of our people in the peace process."
(Note: The LTTE could not attend the seminar because
the group is on our Foreign Terrorist Organization,
"FTO," list. This part of the statement is the only
place where the U.S. is mentioned.)
-- Ceasefire Accord Implementation: In its second key
section, the statement asserts that the government has
not done enough to implement the February 2002 ceasefire
accord (a.k.a., "the Ceasefire Memorandum of
Understanding"). The LTTE asserts that "tens of
thousands of government troops continue to occupy our
towns, cities and residential areas, suffocating the
freedom of mobility of our people." The statement goes
on to claim that the GSL's "repeated assurances that the
resettlement of displaced people would be expedited have
proven futile." (Note: About 300,000 displaced persons
have, in fact, returned to their homes in the north and
east since the peace process began. About 500,000
people remain displaced.) A specific reference is made
to Jaffna District, where the LTTE has long complained
that the GSL has not done enough to reduce the size of
its "high security zones."
-- Focus of Assistance: The third major section
involves a long, rambling, vague claim that the
government should not be asking for international
assistance for all of Sri Lanka, but only for the war-
torn north and east. According to the LTTE, "(T)he
poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a
self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous
policies of past governments in dealing with the Tamil
national conflict...This approach grossly understates
the severity of the problems faced by the people in the
northeast."
¶4. (U) Briefly reciting these complaints, the statement
wraps up by saying:
"Under these circumstances, the LTTE leadership has
decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations
for the time being. We will not be attending the donor
conference in Japan in June. While we regret that we
are compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to
reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political
solution to the ethnic question."
------------
GSL Reaction
------------
¶5. (C) The government has not yet issued an official
public reaction to the LTTE statement. (Note: Late
April 22, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe sent a very
brief letter to the LTTE's Balasingham stating that the
GSL had taken note of the Tigers' concerns and planned
to respond to them in full. A copy of this letter is
being faxed to SA/INS.) In an April 22 conversation,
Minister Milinda Moragoda, who had just returned from
Europe, told the Ambassador that he thought the LTTE's
announcement was basically tactical in nature, "a way to
regain control of the agenda by the Tigers," as he put
it. It was positive that the Tigers had made clear they
were not pulling out of the talks on a permanent basis
and had not pulled out of the ceasefire accord, for
example. On this point, Moragoda related he had met J.
Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil of Australian nationality,
on his plane trip back from Europe. Moragoda said
Maheswaran had told him he (Maheswaran) still intended
to participate (as a LTTE representative) in ceasefire-
related meetings. (Note: The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission has also told us that the LTTE has given no
indication that it intends to cancel its participation
in ceasefire-related meetings, including in the Sub-
Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs in the North and the East, "SIHRN.")
¶6. (C) In making the statement, Moragoda said the LTTE
seemed to be using "shock therapy" because it felt a bit
cornered, as many of the easy steps regarding the peace
process had already been taken, leaving only tough
decisions. In addition to being upset about the
April 14 seminar, Moragoda remarked that he thought the
group was also disturbed by political happenings in the
south, including a possible linkup between the
Opposition People's Alliance (PA) and the radical, anti-
peace process Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Noting
that he had met with Norwegian envoy Solheim while in
Europe, Moragoda said he and other GSL officials
involved with peace process issues planned to meet with
the Prime Minister late April 22 to formulate next
steps. Ambassador Wills commented that the government
would be wise to be restrained in what it says, but it
should be firm with the LTTE. Moragoda said he agreed
with that posture, and based on an earlier conversation,
he thought the PM was on board for that sort of
approach. He confided that he had spoken with G.L.
Peiris, the GSL's chief negotiator, who seemed a bit
"frazzled" by the LTTE's announcement, however.
(Note: Peiris is also the government's chief
spokesman.)
¶7. (U) (((Note: Shortly after her return from an
official visit to Bangladesh, President Kumaratunga
issued a statement critical of the LTTE's announcement.
The president's statement called the LTTE's rationale
for pulling out of the talks "feeble" and called for the
group to reconsider its decision. In a rare joint
meeting of the two political adversaries, the president
and the Prime Minister are scheduled to discuss the
situation on
April 22.)))
--------------
Other Reaction
--------------
¶8. (C) Most observers we have spoken to agree with
Moragoda that the Tigers' statement was tactical in
nature and not an indication that the group plans to end
the peace process. Comments we have picked up included
the following:
-- N. Raviraj, a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP who
has expressed concerns about the LTTE in the past,
commented that he had "full confidence" that the current
problems could be worked out. He said he believed that
the Tigers' non-invitation to the April 14 seminar was
the "spark" that led to the LTTE's releasing the
statement, but he thought the group could be convinced
to re-enter the talks.
-- Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil MP with very close
LTTE links, told us that Tiger officials had recently
assured him that the group would not scrap the ceasefire
accord. He was also confident that if the Norwegians
took part in "shuttle diplomacy" they could get the LTTE
to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. He said
he thought the LTTE truly was angered over the Sri
Lankan military's continuing large-scale presence in
Jaffna, as well as its "exclusion" from the April 14
conference in the U.S. Notwithstanding the hard
feelings, he predicted that these issues could be
"overcome," allowing the peace process to move forward.
-- M.L.A.M. Hizbullah, a National Unity Alliance MP and
a Muslim, said he was convinced that the suspension of
talks would have little long-term impact on the peace
process. He said the GSL should respond to the LTTE in
good faith with proposals re the security zones in
Jaffna and in other areas to assuage LTTE concerns. He
also expressed doubts that the LTTE would not, in the
end, attend the donors conference in Tokyo, as "it was
in their interest to be there."
-- Taking a somewhat different tack, V. Thevaraj, the
editor of a Tamil-language daily newspaper, expressed
some concern over what he described as "deep anger"
within the LTTE. He stated that some in the LTTE
remained furious over the deaths of 11 of its sea cadre
in a confrontation with the Sri Lankan navy off the
northeast coast in March (see Reftels). The LTTE's
statement, he averred, was an effort by its leadership
to appease Tiger hard-liners, who remained bitter over
this incident.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (C) While the Tigers are always hard to read, we
tend to agree that that their statement seems basically
tactical in nature and that they still see the peace
process as a going concern. It was positive, for
example, that the group did not permanently pull out of
the peace talks; nor, based on what we are hearing, is
it ending cooperation on ceasefire-related matters. Our
guess is that Moragoda is right and that the group is
trying to regain control of the agenda via some "shock
therapy." The LTTE's decision, as it happens, also
appears to fit into its seeming long-term desire to slow
down the pace of the peace process. (Note: Some
observers say, for example, that the LTTE wants to wait
until arch-foe President Kumaratunga's term ends in late
2005 before it agrees to a negotiated settlement.) In
issuing the statement, however, the LTTE is exposing
itself to a lot of flak that it is undermining the peace
track. We think that pressure on the group to remain a
part of the process will not only come from the south,
but also from many Tamils, who know that a return to war
would be devastating for their community. END COMMENT.
---------------------
Draft Press Statement
---------------------
¶10. (C) Attached below is a draft press statement for
Washington's immediate review. We would like
Washington's clearance by April 23 morning (local), so
that the statement can be issued that day. We have
received many press inquiries and would like to get a
U.S. statement out right away. As an alternative to the
attached statement, Washington may wish to consider
issuance of a "minimalist" statement that simply regrets
the LTTE's decision, and urges it to reconsider, so as
not to endanger the gains made by the peace process. We
think it is important to be up-front and direct with the
LTTE about its action, which is why we recommend the
attached statement. Either way, we would appreciate
Washington's guidance ASAP.
Begin text:
We regret the decisions by the LTTE to suspend its
participation in the Sri Lankan peace talks and not to
attend the Tokyo donor's conference scheduled for June.
We reviewed carefully the ostensible reasons for these
decisions cited in Mr. Balasingham's letter to the Prime
Minister dated April 21. We do not find them
convincing. A well-intentioned party that truly wants a
peaceful, political settlement to Sri Lanka's conflict
could deal with such grievances at the negotiating
table. We call on the Tigers to reconsider and to
return to the negotiating track. We also call on the
LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka to honor the terms
of the ceasefire even while the talks are suspended.
In the meantime, this interregnum in the talks could
prove useful by giving both parties the opportunity to
recommit themselves to negotiations. We have long
supported the MOU even though we have also acknowledged
it has not been implemented perfectly. Blame for this
does not fall exclusively on the side of the Government
of Sri Lanka, however, as the LTTE's statement suggests.
The Tigers, too, bear heavy responsibility for numerous
breaches of the MOU. While the talks are suspended, we
urge the LTTE to reflect carefully on its own
transgressions. Assassinations of opponents,
intimidation of Muslims, taxation without
representation, aggressive Sea Tiger behavior and
continued child recruitment do not build trust in the
LTTE's intentions.
We continue to believe that the way out of Sri Lanka's
ethnic conflict is through negotiations facilitated by
the Government of Norway. In this regard, we remain
willing to do whatever we can to assist Sri Lanka as it
tries to bring an end to this ugly war.
End text.
----------------------
Text of LTTE Statement
----------------------
¶11. (U) The following is the text of the LTTE
statement made by LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham and
issued late April 21:
Begin text.
Dear Prime Minister,
In accordance with the decision of our leadership I am
advised to bring to your urgent attention the deep
displeasure and dismay felt by our organization on some
critical issues relating to the on-going peace process.
You are well aware that the Ceasefire Agreement that has
been in force for more than one year and the six rounds
of peace negotiations between the principal parties has
been successful, irrespective of the occurrence of some
violent incidents that endangered the peace process.
The stability of the ceasefire and the progress of the
peace talks, you will certainly appreciate, are the
positive outcome of the sincere and firm determination
of the parties to seek a permanent resolution to the
ethnic conflict through peaceful means. The cordial
inter-relationship, frank and open discussions and the
able and wise guidance of the facilitators fostered
trust and confidence between the negotiators and helped
to advance the talks on substantial levels. The
negotiating teams were able to form important sub-
committees on the basis of equal and joint partnership.
During the early negotiating sessions it was agreed that
the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE should work
together and approach the international community in
partnership. The Oslo Donor Conference held on 25
November 2002 turned out to be an ideal forum for such
joint endeavor.
The LTTE has acted sincerely and in good faith extending
its full cooperation to the government of Sri Lanka to
seek international assistance to restore normalcy and to
rehabilitate the war affected people of the northeast.
The LTTE to date has joined hands with the government
and participated in the preparation of joint appeals and
programs. In spite of our goodwill and trust, your
government has opted to marginalize our organization in
approaching the international community for economic
assistance. We refer to the exclusion of the LTTE from
the crucial international donor conference held in
Washington on 14 April 2003 in preparation for the major
donor conference to be held in Japan in June. We view
the exclusion of the LTTE, the principle partner to
peace and the authentic representatives of the Tamil
people from discussions on critical matters affecting
the economic and social welfare of the Tamil nation, as
a grave breach of good faith. Your government, as well
as our facilitator Norway, are fully aware of the fact
that the United States has legal constraints to invite
representatives of a proscribed organization to their
country. In these circumstances an appropriate venue
could have been selected to facilitate the LTTE to
participate in this important preparatory aid
conference. But the failure on the part of your
government to do so gives cause for suspicion that this
omission was deliberate. The exclusion of the LTTE from
this conference has severely eroded the confidence of
our people.
As you are aware, considerable optimism and hopes were
raised among the people when your government, shortly
after assuming power, entered into a ceasefire agreement
with our organization, bringing to an end twenty years
of savage and bloody conflict. Expectations were
further raised when both sides began direct negotiations
with Norwegian facilitation. In particular, there was a
justifiable expectation that the peace process would
address the urgent and immediate existential problems
facing the people of the north and east, particularly
the million people who are internally displaced by the
conflict and are languishing in welfare centers and
refugee camps.
As such, the Ceasefire Agreement included crucial
conditions of restoring normalcy which required the
vacation, by occupying Sri Lankan troops, of Tamil
homes, schools, places of worship and public buildings.
Despite the agreed timeframe for this evacuation of
troops, which has since passed, there has been no change
in the ground situation. We have repeatedly raised the
issue of continuing suffering of our people at every
round of talks with your government. Your negotiators'
repeated assurances that the resettlement of the
displaced people would be expedited have proven futile.
The negotiations have been successful in so far as
significant progress has been made in key areas, such as
the agreement to explore federalism on the basis of the
right to self-determination of our people. But this
progress has not been matched by any improvement in the
continuing hardships being faced by our people as a
result of your government's refusal to implement the
normalization aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement and
subsequent agreements reached at the talks. As a
result, considerable disillusionment has set in amongst
the Tamil people, and in particular the displaced, who
have lost all hope the peace process will alleviate
their immense suffering.
Through there is peace due to the silencing of the guns,
normalcy has not returned to Tamil areas. Tens of
thousands of government troops continue to occupy our
towns, cities and residential areas suffocating the
freedom of mobility or our people. Such a massive
military occupation of Tamil lands, particularly in
Jaffna - a densely populated district - during peace
times denying the right of our displaced people to
return to their homes, is unfair and unjust.
Your government, in international forums, continues to
place poverty as the common phenomenon affecting the
entire country. The Poverty Reduction Strategy forms
the essence of the document Regaining Sri Lanka' which
defines the macro-economic policy of your government.
Though poverty and poverty alleviation constitute the
centrality of the new economic vision of your government
as exemplified in `Regaining Sri Lanka' the document
fails to examine the causality of the phenomenon of
poverty, the effects of ethnic war and the unique
conditions of devastation prevailing in the northeast.
In our view, the conditions of reality prevailing in
Tamil areas are qualitatively different from southern
Sri Lanka. The Tamils faced the brunt of the brutal
war. Twenty years of intense and incessant war has
caused irreparable destruction to the infrastructure in
the northeast. This colossal destruction augmented by
continued displacement of the people and their inability
to pursue their livelihoods due to military restrictions
and activities have caused untold misery and extreme
poverty among the people of the northeast. Continued
displacement has also depleted all forms of savings of
these people disabling them from regaining their lives
on their own. The war-affected people need immediate
help to regain their dignity. They need restoration of
essential services to re-establish their lives.
Reconstruction of infrastructures such as roads,
hospitals, schools and houses are essential for them to
return to normal life.
The poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is
a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous
policies of the past governments (both the UNP and the
SLFP) in dealing with the Tamil national conflict. In
its fanatical drive to prosecute an unjust war against
the Tamil people, the Sinhala state wasted all national
wealth to a futile cause. The massive borrowings to
sustain an absurd policy of `war for peace' by the
former government caused huge international
indebtedness. The economic situation of the south has
been further worsened by the mismanagement of state
funds, bad governance and institutional corruption.
Therefore, the conditions prevailing in the south are
distinctly different from the northeast where the scale
and magnitude of the infra-structural destruction is
monumental and the poverty is acute. Ignoring this
distinctive reality, your government posits poverty as a
common phenomenon across the country and attempts to
seek a solution with a common approach. This approach
grossly under states the severity of the problems faced
by the people in the northeast.
The government's `Regaining Sri Lanka' document
completely lacks any form of identified goals for the
northeast. Statistics presented for substantiating the
policy totally ignore the northeast and solely
concentrate on southern Sri Lanka. However, this has
been promoted as the national strategy to the
international community to seek aid. It is evident from
this that the government lacks any comprehensive
strategy for serious development of the northeast. The
poverty reduction strategy fails to address the poverty
of the northeast as distinct from the rest. In seeking
international assistance your government disingenuously
speaks of reconstruction being needed in all areas,
thereby masking the total destruction of the
infrastructure of the northeast which has resulted from
the militarist policies of the past three decades.
As we pointed out above, the exclusion of the LTTE from
critical aid conference in Washington, the non-
implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in
the truce document, the continuous suffering and
hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of
internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala
military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian
settlements, the distortion and marginalization of the
extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the
Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies
and strategies of the government have seriously
undermined the confidence of the Tamil people and the
LTTE leadership in the negotiating process. Under these
circumstances the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend
its participation in the negotiations for the time
being. We will not be attending the donor conference in
Japan in June. While we regret that we were compelled
to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our
commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to
the ethnic question. We also urge the government of Sri
Lanka to restore confidence in the peace process amongst
the Tamil people by fully implementing, without further
delay, the normalization aspects of the ceasefire
agreement and permit the immediate resettlement of the
internally displaced people of the northeast. We also
request the government to re-evaluate its economic
development strategy to reconstruct the Tamil nation
destroyed by war.
End text.
¶12. (U) Minimize considered.
WILLS