In this article, I set off to explore the question "What is belief?" from a first-person
perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition - starting
with Edmund Husserl's concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the
presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert
Dreyfus' explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus' own admission) he does not truly take a
decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this
new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.

KEY WORDS

belief, representation, phenomenology, enaction

CLASSIFICATION

APA:

2340, 2380

JEL:

D83, D84, Z19

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Last modified: 20 June 2016.