William McKinley - The treaty of paris

The close of hostilities brought the United States to a critical juncture
in international affairs, and along with that development came some
important personnel changes in the Department of State. William R. Day
cheerfully resigned as secretary—it was an assignment he had
accepted with reluctance—and became chairman of the American peace
commission that went to Paris to work out the treaty with Spain. To take
Day's place, McKinley named John Hay, the brilliant ambassador to
Great Britain and a man of long experience in international affairs. Hay
was to exercise a profound influence on the shaping of American foreign
policy in the twentieth century, but for the moment McKinley and the
nation were preoccupied with the treaty negotiations in Paris.

On 16 September the commissioners met with McKinley in the White House and
received their instructions. The president reiterated his opposition to
the annexation of Cuba and his insistence upon acquiring Puerto Rico. The
final disposition of the Philippines presented a more difficult problem.
Filipinos under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo had, like the Cubans,
revolted against Spanish authority and welcomed American assistance in
their effort to win independence. Yet McKinley had doubts about the wisdom
of independence for the islands. For one thing, many Americans had caught
a vision of commercial possibilities in the Orient, and an American
outpost in the Philippines might well serve the interests of trade. For
another thing, the United States was not alone in its enthusiasm for
expansion in the Far East. Germany, in particular, appeared ready for a
colonization effort if the United States withdrew.

Characteristically, McKinley reviewed the alternatives for American policy
in the Philippines and rejected all but one. Returning the islands to
Spain was out of the question. The Spanish had already demonstrated their
administrative incompetence, and the American people would oppose such a
move. To grant independence without provision for defense of the islands
would be tantamount to turning them over to Germany or some other
imperialist nation. Taking only one island or establishing an American
protectorate would mean accepting responsibilities without power. By such
reasoning, McKinley concluded that the only course was to take the
Philippines, improve conditions of life for the Filipinos, and eventually
grant them independence when they had achieved viability as a nation.

In the end, the American negotiators in Paris followed McKinley's
wishes. Signed on 10 December 1898, the treaty provided that Cuba should
become independent and that Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines should
be ceded to the United States. To placate the Spanish, whose pride had
been wounded, the United States agreed to a payment of $20 million for the
newly acquired territory. The terms of the Treaty of Paris did not meet
universal approval in the United States, but to enthusiasts and critics
alike, they marked the path of empire that McKinley had apparently chosen
to follow. The acquisition of the Philippines, along with the annexation
of Hawaii and, later, of Wake Island and American Samoa, provided coaling
stations and bases that could prove useful for the commercial and
missionary penetration of Asia. The proponents of empire also found Puerto
Rico an admirable possession from which to defend a proposed isthmian
canal, should it be completed.

Submission of the treaty to the Senate rekindled old debates over the
nature of the Republic and the advisability of territorial expansion. In
the discussion of ratification, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led the fight
for the treaty, while his colleague from Massachusetts, Senator George F.
Hoar, rallied the opposition. A lively debate also took place outside the
Senate chamber as expansionists confronted anti-imperialists on a wide
range of issues. Opponents of the treaty argued that it was both immoral
and unconstitutional for the United States to impose American rule on an
alien people without their consent. Expansionists countered with moral
arguments of their own, contending that the United States had a duty to
uplift and educate backward populations in order that they might properly
appreciate the blessings of liberty. Expansionists also believed that by
fulfilling the American destiny in the Pacific, they would assure the
economic well-being of the American people at home. Yet neither American
manufacturers nor American workers unanimously favored expansion. Andrew
Carnegie thought, for example, that acquisition of the Philippines would
threaten the peace and security that were necessary for foreign trade. And
Samuel Gompers feared that imperial expansion would open the way for cheap
contract labor to enter the United States and drive down the wages of
American workers.

On 6 February 1899 the debate in the Senate came to an end, and senators
passed the treaty by a vote of fifty-seven to twenty-seven, one vote more
than the necessary two-thirds. Except for Hoar and Senator Eugene Hale of
Maine, Republicans voted with the majority; although twenty-two Democrats
voted no, ten voted for the treaty. Willam Jennings Bryan, front-runner
for the Democratic nomination in 1900 and an anti-imperialist, had urged
that the treaty be approved in order to end the war and ease the way for
Philippine independence. His influence over Democratic senators was
important in securing ratification. Yet it was McKinley who had framed the
debate so as to make ratification appear to be the only logical
alternative. In December he had asked the crucial question: "If,
following the clear precepts of duty, territory falls to us, and the
welfare of an alien people requires our guidance and protection, who will
shrink from the responsibility, grave though it may be?"