On May 18th, 1989, Chinese television viewers witnessed a
scene that no one could have imagined seeing on state-run
television one month earlier. The news broadcast showed the
General Secretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, and the
Prime Minister Li Peng, accompanied by other "leading comrades,"
Qiao Shi, Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen, visiting defiant students at a
Beijing hospital. The students were being treated after fainting
as a result of their hunger strike at Tiananmen Square.

After zooming in on the Party Secretary and Prime Minister
hovering over a few patient--demonstrators, the broadcast jumped
to a new scene showing Qiao Shi, Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen talking
with a hospitalized student. The student said: "We must
reestablish the Party's prestige among the people. If the
Communist Party has hope, China will have hope. Right now, some
people think there is no hope. They all feel that the country has
no hope. The Communist Party has no hope."

I watched the news broadcast in the company of a few Chinese
friends, who grinned and cheered upon hearing the student's
comments. The student continued: "Therefore, I think that, like
the United States, we should restore the people's confidence that
the state can do a good job. Do you agree?" Hu Qili and the other
leaders nodded their heads and said: "We fully agree with you."
(1)

The mood in my friend's apartment was exuberant, very similar to
the atmosphere which prevailed all over the capital. On street
corners, in shops and in factories, people were talking about the
hunger strikers and about the sympathy and support that hundreds
of thousands of citizens from all walks of life had expressed for
them. Time and again, while bicycling or strolling along the
streets of Beijing, I heard people speak with admiration of the
students, who were openly challenging the authorities. Ordinary
people were quick to seize the chance to vent their frustration
about the ills of society affecting their everyday lives, most
noticeably inflation and corruption.

My friends proudly showed me a copy of that day's People's Daily
(Renmin Ribao), the official mouthpiece of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party - the 'Pravda' of China. A report
with details of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's much
awaited historical visit had been pushed down into the lower
corner of the front page, while coverage of the hunger strike and
demonstrations - six page--one articles with photographs -
dominated the top part. "Save the Students, Save the Children,"
pleaded one headline. I had already seen the official
English-speaking China Daily, with its conspicuous front page
bold text headline: "A million march in support of students."

Though the footage of Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng visiting the hunger
strikers in the hospital was not the first time that the student
demonstrators were on the air, I shook my head in amazement. What
could Chinese viewers be thinking when they heard the country's
leaders listening to a 20-year old telling them that "the
Communist Party has no hope?" For 40 years there hasn't been any
other hope in China except for the Communist Party, at least
according to every officially sanctioned media report.

Already on April 30th, when the government gave in to the
students' demands and ordered the mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong,
to meet with student representatives in a televised session, I
had watched in utter disbelief while the students demanded to
know his income. They also challenged him about the mistakes made
with regard to the education system. (2) Never in the 40-year
history of the People's Republic of China had government
officials been publicly humiliated in such a way in front of
millions of television viewers.

Since the founding of the People's Republic the media has been
controlled by the state. News coverage is intended not so much to
open minds as to shape them. People have been taught that
whatever the newspapers print, and whatever the evening news
broadcaster says, is in accordance with the 'official party
line.' When the state-run media started to openly report on the
student movement in the spring of 1989, it was interpreted by
ordinary people to signify that the students had the authorities'
approval.

The Chinese pro-democracy movement of 1989, and particularly the
images of the students occupying the heart of Beijing, Tiananmen
Square, caught the attention of millions of people around the
world thanks to the presence of the Western television cameras.
Western journalists were present in unusually large numbers
because of the Gorbachev visit and they were unquestionably
instrumental in making the Beijing Spring of '89 a major
international story.

But what about the Chinese media? How did the Chinese press corps
cover the pro-democracy movement and what effect did they have on
the events themselves?

Press freedom was one of the students' demands from the very
start of the movement. The students were enraged when their
activities during the mourning of the ousted Communist Party
General Secretary Hu Yaobang were not reported by the Chinese
press. American media reports, both television and print, made
note of this demand for freedom of the press. But how many
American, or Western, viewers and readers, realized that the
actions of the Chinese press constituted an essential part of the
drama at Tiananmen Square?

The Chinese journalists' role during the Beijing Spring of '89
was two-fold. They became participants in the movement when they
joined the demonstrations as the first non-student group. On May
4th, about 200 journalists marched for the first time carrying
banners with texts saying: "Don't force us to spread rumours, "
"Our pens cannot write what we want to write" and "News must
report the truth." (3) By taking part in the demonstrations the
journalists encouraged other educated groups of society to become
active. If the journalists had not taken to the streets, it is
highly unlikely that so many prominent intellectuals would have
dared to step forward and show their support for the students'
demands.

Secondly, for approximately two weeks in May, Chinese newspapers,
radio and television carried stories about the demonstrations and
activities related to the pro-democracy movement. People in tens
of cities around the country marched to show their support for
the students because they perceived the movement to be officially
sanctioned. The media helped to mobilize the urban population in
a way which would not have been possible if the press had not
reported on the students' actions. Uncensored coverage all over
China reached its peak in the days prior to May 20th, when
martial law was declared in parts of Beijing.

Why was the press unleashed? Or rather, how was it possible that
the press rid itself of its chains?
In order to answer these questions and understand the immense
impact that the journalists had on the events during the Beijing
Spring of '89, it is useful to first review the role of the press
in China, in particular during the reform era of 'open door
policy,' launched by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978. Though the
Chinese media covered an increasingly wide range of subjects
during the past decade, it was not permitted to carry stories
which contradicted with the 'official line.' During the
pro-democracy movement in 1989, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang let
it be known that he differed with the more conservative leaders
on the question of the student movement. After that, for about a
month, there was not just one 'official line,' but two. The
journalists chose to abide by the one spelled out by Zhao Ziyang.
Next, it is necessary to examine the two roles of the Chinese
press corps - the journalists as reporters and the journalists as
participants. Lastly, I will elaborate on the overall impact of
the Chinese media on the events themselves. The journalists'
actions were crucial in helping to transform the student movement
into a mass protest.

The Media of the '80's:Increasing Openness

When I moved to China in 1987, I very soon realized that no
amount of background reading and research about the People's
Republic would have properly prepared me for the extraordinary
degree of openness and diversity which I encountered wherever I
turned in urban Chinese society. During the first months I was
amazed when reading the China Daily, when listening to the radio,
watching the television and speaking to people.

Newspapers published reports of party officials indicted for
embezzlement and profiteering. Letters to the editor described
the unfair treatment by party members of ordinary people. In
general, many commentaries and editorials, both in the newspapers
and on television, touched upon the failings of society, and were
frank and to the point.

There were subjects (like the situation in Tibet) which were not
reported and yes, newspapers ran long-winded commentaries with
ideological liturgy. But for someone used to the performance of
the press in the other Communist superpower, before the days of
Gorbachev's glasnost, the Chinese press seemed remarkably
vigorous and daring. Deng Xiaoping's decision to drastically
reform the economy and open up the country to foreign trade led
to a general easing of control in all sectors of society.

I also was taken aback at how well-informed urban residents were
about what was happening elsewhere in the world. This was, to a
large extent, due to the ever-widening range of subjects which
the Chinese press itself was covering and to the increasingly
lively contact with foreigners. But the immense flow of
information was also a result of the popularity of Voice of
America and BBC broadcasts in both Chinese and English -
especially among young people - and partly because many Chinese
were regularly seeing the so-called "for internal use only"
Reference News publications. The Chinese propaganda apparatus has
many layers. Anyone, including foreigners, may purchase or
subscribe to a wide selection of newspapers and publications,
from dailies like Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Jingji Ribao
(Economic Daily) and the only English language daily China Daily
to ladies', youth and sports magazines. In addition, there are
numerous publications, some of them merely Xeroxed pamphlets,
which are produced for restricted consumption. They contain
direct translations from foreign newspapers and broadcasts as
well as uncensored articles written by Chinese journalists about
sensitive issues.

What you are allowed to read depends on who you are. The higher
your position the easier your access to more confidential and
controversial material. However, in reality, the general
breakdown of control during the 1980's led to a situation where
information not meant for the public eye has had a way of finding
itself to many, unintended readers. (4)

Thanks to the success of economic reforms, radios and television
sets are no longer unobtainable commodities. According to
official 1988 statistics, the number of television sets owned by
Chinese grew 38-fold from 1978 to 1987 and numbered 143 million.
(5) During the two years I lived in China (1987-89), the national
television news used footage from Western news agencies
regularly. It was particularly surprising that violent scenes of
clashes between demonstrators and police in South Korea and Burma
were allowed to be aired.

Despite the increasing boldness of the official Chinese media - a
reflection of the growing openness of Chinese society as a whole
during the 1990's - it still was not free to cover what it would,
as it would. Though journalists from Western countries,
especially the United States, Canada, Great Britain and
Australia, were invited as 'foreign experts' to teach
profes-sional techniques at the various schools of journalism,
students also received ample instruction about the restraints of
journalism in China.

When I gave a lecture about the press in Finland at the China
School of journalism in May, 1987, the Dean, Zhou Lifang, spoke
at length about the social responsibility that Chinese
journalists must shoulder despite the development of society and
the reform policy.

"All of us are trying to build a modern socialist society
together," Dean Zhou said. "We have a common goal, and therefore,
a Chinese journalist must always contemplate what kind of
consequences his writing will have. If critical reporting results
in something positive, that's fine. In fact, investigative
reporting is encouraged, as you can see from our newspapers. But
revealing information which might have a negative effect on
society is useless, maybe even harmful."
For example, a story about an official being punished for taking
bribes was considered positive because it served as a warning for
others. On the other hand, coverage of demonstrators protesting
the unfair treatment of Tibetans in Lhasa might lead to social
disorder elsewhere and would therefore have a negative effect on
society.

Dean Zhou, who was formerly the London correspondent for the
Xinhua News Agency, took me to the video room of the China School
of Journalism. One of the tapes on file was an American broadcast
showing a VOA reporter being interviewed about the news blackout
in China during the 1986-87 student demonstrations. Chinese
journalists were well aware of what was going on, but they were
not allowed to report on the students' protests. "The authorities
in charge of propaganda felt that publicizing the students'
activities would not have a positive effect on society," Dean
Zhou said with a faint smile.

Obligatory reading for every journalism student is a long
detailed speech "On the Party's Journalism Work," given by former
Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. It was the death announcement of Hu
Yaobang on April 15th which triggered the 1989 pro-democracy
movement. Hu Yaobang started off by saying: "The party's
journalism is the party's mouthpiece, and naturally it is the
mouthpiece of the people's government, which is led by the
party." Later, comparing the differences between journalism in
China and capitalist countries, he reminded his listeners: "In
our socialist motherland, the interests of the party and the
government are identical with those of the people and the party's
newspapers are the people's newspapers."

Hu Yaobang also spelled out to what extent Chinese journalists,
faced with the new challenges of reform policy, should "expose
and criticize the unhealthy trends of society:" "Our newspapers
should give 80 percent of their space to reporting good things
and achievements and give the remaining 20 percent of their space
to criticizing the seamy side of things and to exposing our
shortcomings." (6)

Jing Jun, a former Chinese journalist who worked at China Daily
for five years as National News Editor, described the intricacies
of Party control of the press in his paper "The Working Press in
China." He cited an example from 1984, when the government was
about to launch its urban reforms. The man in charge of
propaganda for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Hu
Qili, delivered a speech at the headquarters of the Xinhua News
Agency. Hu Qili outlined five ways in which the agency should
"agitate" for the Party's policies in its reporting, when the
reforms were officially declared.

The Chinese government not only controls the press -- it makes
full use of it. As Jing Jun pointed out, criticism is not rare,
but it is strictly used to attack deviations from Party policy.
(7)
Yang Yulin, a Chinese political scientist who used to work for
one of the country's most liberal research institutes, described
the Chinese press of the 1980's in the following way: "When the
reformers in the Party had the upper hand, the press portrayed
their more broad-minded views and especially the younger
generation pushed the limits of what is acceptable. When the
conservatives were in control of the Party's policies, the press
was forced to accept a stricter approach, which was less tolerant
of diverse opinions." (8)

The system of controlling the press is complex. Basically, all
journalists must bear in mind the Party's policies, though, as
many journalists have reminded me, it is not always altogether
clear what the policy on a certain issue is. An official
interviewed for a story may demand to see the text before it goes
into print or before it is aired. The editor in charge of putting
a story into the newspaper may overrule a story after it has been
written. A serious mistake can mean the end of a career. A
critical phone call from the Propaganda Department of the Party's
(CCP) Central Committee, which is in charge of the day-to-day
work of checking the press, ensures that a similar story is not
published again.

The Xinhua News Agency and the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao),
both directly controlled by the Party's Central Committee, set
the tone. By reporting on an issue, and by outlining the correct
interpretation of policies, they give the green light to other
media organizations to follow suit.
Xinhua News Agency is the most promi-nent of all the media
organizations, a notch above the others. Previously, Xinhua had
exclusive rights to cover top-level political meetings. In the
1980's the leading newspapers managed gradually to introduce
healthy competition, thanks to the growing degree of
professionalism, But Xinhua is still the flagship -- -though a
newspaper carrying a Xinhua story might write their own headline
or cut the story for lack of space, it would still not add to or
revise the text.

While
Xinhua News Agency is the authority when it comes to news, the
People's Daily sets the editorial agenda. Wu Guoguang, who
formerly worked on the editorial staff of People's Daily, says
that a certain degree of antagonism exists between the People's
Daily and the Party's Propaganda Department. "Mao Zedong used to
write the most important editorials of the People's Daily
himself, and the newspaper has always had very close ties
directly with the very top leaders. Because of the special
relation-ship between the newspaper and the country's leaders, it
does not like the idea of taking orders from the Party's
Propaganda Department."

It was interesting to hear from Wu Guoguang, a Nieman fellow at
Harvard University from 1989-1990, that as Party Secretary, Hu
Yaobang personally gave instructions for impor-tant articles or
editorials concerning policy and ideology. He also checked the
finished product. When Zhao Ziyang became Party Secretary in
1987, he did not personally participate in the editorial work,
but delegated the job to Hu Qili, another reform-minded member of
the Standing Committee. (9)

In practice, censorship is implemented with the help of specific
guidelines, which are drawn up by a working group of the Party's
Central Committee Propaganda Department. Five or six people make
up the working group, which meets weekly, usually on Monday
morning, They decide which issues should be touched upon during
the coming week and on which themes the commentary pieces should
focus. In the spring of 1989 the working group was led by Hu
Qili.

For example, the working group might decide that a speech to be
given by a senior leader should be prominently displayed or a
state visit by a foreign dignitary should receive special
attention. After this meeting, the editors-in-chief of the major
national newspapers are called to the Propaganda Department
headquarters, where they are briefed on the following week's news
and editorial policies. The editors-in-chief, in turn, hold
similar meetings for their own editors, so that by Tuesday word
has passed from the very top -- -the Party's Central Committee
Propaganda Department -- right down to the journalists in charge
of running the everyday routines of the newspaper.

Television and radio are administratively controlled by the
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, which in turn is under
the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. According to
Feng Xiaoming, who worked for the English language news
department at China Central Television, CCTV, from 1985 to August
of 1989, Minister Ai Zhisheng would usually personally show up at
the CCTV newsroom and preview the 7 p.m. Chinese news broadcast.
He was known by the nickname 'Director of News.' Because neither
the minister nor his aides spoke English, the English language
news broadcast, aired 6 nights a week after 10 p.m., would be
explained to him in Chinese. "But for the most part, he was only
told headlines, not details, and therefore the English language
news broadcasts enjoyed a bit more freedom than the Chinese
news." (10)

In retrospect, it seems a bit ironic that Hu Yaobang, who was
revered in the spring of 1989 by the students as a symbol of
liberal thought, was the man behind the previously mentioned key
speech, which clearly defines the boundaries of Chinese
journalism and emphasizes the sense of social responsibility that
Chinese journalists should adhere to.

Hu Yaobang's speech, which he delivered as Party Secretary to the
CPC Central Committee in February 1985, was a response opposing
the suggestions put forward by leading Chinese editors and
publishing officials, They had held a symposium in Shanghai in
December 1984 to discuss the contents of a formal press law. They
proposed that the same kind of responsibility system, which had
been devised for enterprise managers, should be introduced for
editors-in-chief, and that articles would no longer have to be
submitted to Party officials before publication.

"When Chinese journalists demanded press freedom, they were not
asking for independent newspapers or private radio stations,"
former China Daily news editor Jing Jun stressed when I
interviewed him in May 1990. "They were not even thinking of news
organizations which would stand on their own feet economically or
be independent of the Party administratively. They simply wanted
to do away with censorship. They wanted the right to report on
events factually." (11)
The Chinese students' rallying cry for 'democracy' did not mean
democracy in the way it is known in the West. Nor was 'press
freedom' defined in the same manner by Chinese journalists as by
their Western counterparts.

Media Coverage,Part 1: Pushing the Limits

When a few thousand students, mostly from the prominent Beijing
University, marched to Tiananmen Square in the early hours of
April 18th and laid their wreaths under the Monument of the
People's Heroes to mourn the death of Hu Yaobang, it was neither
surprising nor unusual that the newspapers and television
broadcasts made no mention of either the march or the protest
sit-in thereafter. Hu Yaobang had, after all, lost his job and
his chances to become Deng Xiaoping's successor following the
student demonstrations of 1986-87. The official Party obituary
made no mention of why he was removed from his post or of the
'campaign against bourgeois liberalization,' which followed his
dismissal.

According to Seth Faison, the Beijing correspondent for the
English language Hong Kong daily South China Morning Post, two
reporters from People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) confronted their
editor-in-chief, Tan Wenrui, with an article about the April 18th
march late that same evening, in the hope that he would approve
it for publication. The young reporters' efforts were to no
avail. In spite of his reputation as an editor in favor of
reforming the press, Tan Wenrui was not ready to risk his 39-year
career as a Party journalist. (12)

It was no secret that the government did not want to encourage or
support any actions of dissent. Since the news of Hu Yaobang's
death spread through Beijing, the university campuses had been
abuzz with activities which had the air of protest and defiance
to them. "The one who shouldn't die died, while those who should
die still live on," proclaimed one of the many hundred dazibaos,
a Chinese large-character poster, which ordinary citizens have
traditionally used to voice their concerns. There was no doubt
that "the ones who should die" were Deng Xiaoping and the other
octogenarian leaders who wielded power behind the scenes.

To everyone's great surprise the newspaper which was the first to
break ranks was Science & Technology Daily (Keji Ribao). Its
April 19th issue ran a news story with a factual account of the
scene at Tiananmen Square, accompanied by a photo showing
students, some with clenched fists. The article was naturally, as
Seth Faison notes, merely a "tiny leak in the dike of official
control," but it did not go unnoticed. (13) Though it has a
limited circulation and had not previously covered politically
related stories, Keji Ribao is a national newspaper and it set an
example for others to have the courage to follow suit.

From the start, the media succeeded in discreetly portraying the
general respect which was felt for Hu Yaobang and disapproval
about his ousting. Muted criticism of the present leadership was
evident in headlines like "Hu mourned as great man," "Poland ends
7-year ban on Solidarity" and "110 Soviet party heads quit
posts," or, in quotes run by Xinhua News Agency, that Hu Yaobang
"did a lot for the country's reform and his respect of
intellectuals and education set a good example to all Chinese
leaders."

On April 20th, the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) ran a long
article about its reporter's visit to the Soviet Union, where the
"oppressive atmosphere that had long weighed people's minds has
been replaced by an open, relaxed and free atmosphere. People
have freely discussed various problems in political, economic and
social life without any fear." (14)

China Daily published a dynamic photo depicting solemn students,
sporting dark head-bands, with their arms raised in front of a
6-meter high portrait of Hu Yaobang on the front page of its
April 20th issue. Beside this eye-catching photo was the Xinhua
News Agency's official version of a clash which had taken place
between security guards and demonstrators just after midnight on
April 19th. The incident occurred outside the gates of
Zhongnanhai, a sealed-off area where most Chinese top leaders
live and work.

Jeanne Moore, an American journalist who was working as an
English language 'polisher' at China Daily at the time, was on
hand when this militant-looking photo was chosen for
publica-tion. "No one on duty that evening felt good about having
to run the Xinhua version of the Zhongnanhai incident. At the
evening news conference someone remarked that we should have a
picture of the day's events for the front page. No one had been
officially assigned to cover the Square. The photo editor
suddenly disappeared and came back in an instant with this
remarkable photograph. Everyone marveled about what a good shot
it was. None of the news editors on hand wanted to be the one to
forbid its use, and so the picture went in the paper."

Jeanne Moore remembers that the breakdown in control was a
gradual process. Bit by bit the editors in charge of routine news
decisions became more daring. "But the fact that there were
always reporters on hand, ready to report what they had been out
on their own accord witnessing, or photographs, like in the April
20th example, available without anyone having officially been
told to take them, was significant. There was a tremendous force
among the members of the staff, who were trying to put as much
pressure as possible on the editors to cover the ongoing news
story." (15)

Many Chinese journalists were among the onlookers during the
night of April 21st, when more than 100,000 students marched in
organ-ized fashion through the city in order to reach Tiananmen
Square before it was closed off for the official services
commemorating Hu Yaobang. They sang the 'lnternationale' and
carried banners with texts "Long live democracy" and "Down with
corruption." While the leaders of the country attended the
memorial service inside the Great Hall of the People on April
22nd, three students -- in a scene rich with symbolism -- knelt
on the steps outside with a scrolled petition listing their
demands raised above their heads. Crowds of students standing in
Tiananmen Square chanted: "Li Peng, Come out! " He didn't. The
frustrated students returned to their campuses.

The students' disappointment turned to anger when they discovered
that their protest and their demands were not reported by the
Chinese media, with one exception. Once again it was Science
& Technology Daily (Keji Ribao) which broke with tradition
and pub-lished a factual account of the events, inside and
outside the Great Hall of the People. Its article stated that
about 100,000 students gathered at Tiananmen Square "to protest
the Party's treatment of Hu Yaobang and... (to demand) a quicker
pace for democratization." After a stormy meeting, the younger
members of the staff finally persuaded editor-in-chief Lin Zexin
to run the story. When authorities stopped the normal
distribution of the newspaper by mail, the journalists themselves
carried bundles of the April 24th edition to post offices around
Beijing. (16)

Also the Shanghai-based weekly World Economic Herald (Shijie
Jingji Daobao) refused to submit to silence. Bearing in mind the
Herald's reputation as China's most liberal and forthright
newspaper since its founding in 1980, its clash with authorities
was to be expected. Editor-in-chief Qin Benli was a veteran
communist journalist, who advocated publicly that without
political reform China's economic reforms could not succeed. He
had managed to weather a series of storms and confrontations with
propaganda officials because of his close ties with Party
Secretary Zhao Ziyang. Survival in China's thunderous political
climate is doomed without a highly placed ally.
The head of the Party's propaganda department in Shanghai, Chen
Zhili, telephoned Qin Benli on April 21st and asked to see the
final page proofs of issue no. 439, due out on April 23rd. Though
she had never asked to see the proofs before, Chen Zhili said she
was curious to know the contents of an issue with six pages
dedicated to Hu Yaobang. According to Kate Wright, who wrote a
detailed article about the World Economic Herald case for the
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Chen Zhili told the
newspaper staff that she "thought there would be little problem
with any of these things." However, she did ask Qin Benli to
change a specific passage written by the reform-minded political
scientist Yan Jiaqi.

In the controversial paragraphs, Yan Jiaqi referred directly to
the student protests on April 18th ("Yesterday, at Tiananmen
Square, I saw our police and soldiers really at one with the
people.") and advised the Party to make a fair assessment of the
late Hu Yaobang. "If a correct appraisal is not made, problems
may still arise... If it (the Party) selflessly recognizes its
errors I feel China has prospects. If not, the old disastrous
road lies ahead."

First, editor-in-chief Qin Benli refused to delete the requested
text, assuring Chen Zhili that he would take full responsibility.
When Chen Zhili turned to Shanghai Party boss Jiang Zemin
(presently leader of the country), Qin Benli was forced to give
in. By this time some 160,000 copies of the original version had
already been printed and several hundred of them hastily
distributed. Following a few days of heated tug-of-war, Jiang
Zemin announced on April 26th that Qin Benli had been dismissed
and that a working group representing the Party's propaganda
department had been ap-pointed to oversee the Herald's
operations. (17)

Afterwards, there was some speculation that had Party Secretary
Zhao Ziyang been in the country, Qin Benli might have been able
to keep his job. But Zhao Ziyang was on a state visit to North
Korea - a circumstance which unquestionably had an effect on the
events taking place in Beijing.
On April 24th, Li Peng hurriedly called a Central Committee
Politburo meeting to be held in the absence of Zhao Ziyang.
According to a report delivered by Mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong,
on June 30th, Deng Xiaoping made a speech after this meeting
expressing "his full agreement and support" of the decision to
publish an editorial condemning the student activities. China's
paramount leader supposedly also gave his blessing to the
decision to use whatever force necessary to "put down the
turmoil." (18)

Deng Xiaoping has often been described as a genuine revolutionary
who has fought for 70 years to establish a stable political
system. He was not willing to see his work go down the drain
because of demands made by a bunch of 20-year-old kids. In their
book Crisis at Tiananmen, Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson quite
rightly point out that the older leaders of China sincerely
believe that independent student organizations are not simply a
threat to their power, but a "crack at the foundation of
social-ism as they understand it... The kind of socialism in
which they were educated only rein-forced the traditional Chinese
view that the state must control all facets of society ... The
real tragedy involved here is not that Deng Xiaoping and his
allies were clinging to power, but that they ultimately believe
that their actions were fully justified."

There have also been reports that Deng Xiaoping had access to a
very limited amount of information. The hardliners wanted to use
the student demonstrations as a pretext to get rid of the more
liberal Zhao Ziyang - they made sure that Deng Xiaoping was given
the impression that the students were truly about to throw the
country into havoc. (19)

After the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) published its harsh
editorial
on April 26th,
calling for a firm stand against disorder and accusing the
students of creating 'national turmoil' -- in Chinese terms, an
offense punishable by death -- it was generally taken for granted
that the students had heard the voice of the 'emperor' and had
been frightened into lying low for a while, at least until May
4th. The 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement would
provide a new official pretext to rally publicly.

The students' historic 10-hour march on April 27th, just one day
after the stern editorial, was finally covered by major Chinese
media organizations. The Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service in
Chinese reported: "Carry-ing streamers and shouting slogans, tens
of thousands of students from some schools of higher education in
Beijing paraded in the streets today." The story later described
the slogans as "Support the CPC (Communist Party), Eradicate
Corruption, Down with Official Profiteers," to emphasize the
students' loyalty towards the government. (20)

Though the media coverage on the April 27th march was minimal,
with few details, and echoed the authorities' demand that
students resume classes, it was apparent to any sophisticated
reader that a severe breakdown in public obedience had occurred.
The students marched defiantly despite the previous day's
warning. As Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson write: "...the Party was
confronting an entirely new situation in which society was
escaping the control of the state. Put more bluntly, people were
asking to take control of their own lives." (21)

Media Coverage,Part 2: Straightforward Reporting

Starting from April 28th, stories about the students' protest
activities appeared in all major newspapers as well as TV and
radio broadcasts. Step by step, the pieces were based on factual
reporting and listed the students' demands. A major breakthrough
was the televised 'dialogue' between student representatives and
State Council officials on April 29th, the first one of its kind
in the history of the People's Republic, followed by a second one
with Mayor Chen Xitong on April 30th.

The announcer of the 'National News Hookup' program featuring the
meetings started off by explaining that the government officials
had a "candid conversation with the students on the issue of
punishing official profiteers, clean government, educational
development, how to view the current student strike, and other
questions. They voiced their determination to relay the students'
suggestions to the responsible comrades concerned accurately."

On May 3rd, Beijing Television Service aired the entire press
conference which focused on the students' demands and was held by
State Council spokesman Yuan Mu for both Chinese and foreign
journalists. That day's issue of People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)
printed the Xinhua News Agency's story about student
demonstrations in Shanghai, making note of some of the banner
texts, for example: "We Want Democracy and Freedom." The momentum
of the media surged in pace with the movement's.

May 4th has often proved to be a milestone in Chinese history.
The May Fourth Movement of 1919 is honored in China as the first
time students initiated a mass movement not only to protest
against government policies, but also to spread new ideas.
Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic it was
declared National Youth Day.

The students' demonstrations on May 4th drew hundreds of
thousands of onlookers, who cheered and marveled at the jubilant,
but non-violent atmosphere. For the first time journal-ists
joined the marchers under their own ban-ners demanding "Support
the World Economic Herald" and "Reinstate Qin Benli." Television
and newspaper reports of the day consisted of straightforward
coverage with the use of pictures portraying the unbelievable
scenes.

Equally -- if not more -- significant as the May 4th
demonstrations was the speech made that same evening by Party
Secretary Zhao Ziyang at the annual meeting of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). The Xinhua News Agency's story citing
Zhao Ziyang saying that the recent demonstrations did not
indicate political instability was a clear sign to even the less
informed reader. Zhao Ziyang wanted to distance himself from the
April 26th editorial which had accused the students of
instigating turmoil. He wanted to make public his split with the
conservatives in the Party.
In a speech on May 24th, China's President, General Yang
Shangkun, suggested that everyone go back and read very carefully
Zhao Ziyang's speech at the ADB meeting. "Comrade Zhao Ziyang's
speech was a turning point," Yang Shangkun admitted. "It revealed
all the differences of members of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo in front of the students." (22)

Yang Shangkun was telling the truth. Every experienced editor
knew what Zhao Ziyang's speech implied and by May 5th, it was
clear which side they favored. Zhao Ziyang's words were splashed
over the front pages of all the major newspapers. His speech was
broadcast on radio and television for three days.

In the week that followed, newspapers and Xinhua News Agency ran
favorable commentaries, made by people from different parts of
society, about Zhao Ziyang' s speech and his attitude towards the
student movement. Mayor Chen Xitong, who in his report of June
30th reviewed the events leading up to the "counter-revolutionary
rebellion," said that the China Broadcasting Station, CCTV,
People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) and other newspapers were
encouraged to do so by Zhao Ziyang's close aide Bao Tong. (23)
The mayor accused Zhao Ziyang and his followers of manipulating
the media. But it is also apparent that Zhao Ziyang's stance was
in accordance with the aspirations of the students and the press
corps.

By bringing the disagreements among the top leaders out into the
open, Zhao Ziyang provided the media with a chance to show their
support for the student movement by reporting on it and the
students' demands. All the Chinese journalists I have spoken to
admit that the press corps was not merely attempting to do their
job in the professional sense and cover the news, though this was
their primary aim. They were also aware that the movement would
benefit from publicity. The editors-in-chief knew they could
cover up by saying that they were only publicizing the views of
the Party General Secretary. (24)

Politburo member Hu Qili reportedly visited eight major media
organizations, evidently on May 6th, to relay a message from Zhao
Ziyang: "There is no big risk in opening up a bit by reporting on
the demonstrations and increasing the openness of news." (25)

The split in the top leadership affected all layers of the
government, including the ones intended to control the media. "By
the time the newspapers were publishing stories on the student
movement, something was deadly wrong," (former China Daily news
editor Jing Jun analyzed the situation). "The central government
was in disarray. The work group was not getting its guidelines
from the top leaders and therefore, instructions were not being
passed down to the newspapers in the standard, institutionalized
way."

According to a cadre working for the Information Department of
the CCP Propaganda Department, two weeks passed in the beginning
of May without the Department receiving a single phone call from
the Central Committee, which in normal times routinely relayed
instructions. TV news anchor Feng Xiaoming remembered that Ai
Zhisheng, the Minister of Film, Radio & Television, did not
show up for his daily preview of the 7 o'clock news broadcast
between May 15th and May 19th.
The beginning of the hunger strike at Tiananmen Square on May
13th marked a resurgence for the student movement and the start
of in unprecedented period in the history of both the People's
Republic and the Chinese Communist press. The hunger strike hit a
nerve among ordinary citizens, which in turn led to a spontaneous
outpouring of sympathy and support for the students.
Anyone in China over the age of thirty remembers a time when most
urban residents hardly had enough to eat and there was widespread
famine in the countryside. The meaning of food in the Chinese
culture is portrayed in the common greeting: "Ni chi fan le ma?"
which literally means, "Have you eaten?" though it is meant to
express the same as the American phrase, "Hello, how are you?"
And just as English-speakers respond, "Fine, thank you," Chinese
answer "Chi fan le, " or "I have eaten," regardless of whether
they have or not.

With the top leadership paralyzed, and with Hu Qili's remarks
regarding Zhao Ziyang's views to fall back on, the media was free
to report on the events taking place not only in Beijing, but in
cities all over China. Translations of articles and broadcasts
published by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)
alone would fill a thick book. Media reports from all corners of
the kingdom described demonstrations in support of the fasting
and fainting students in Tiananmen Square and activities related
to the movement.

Chinese television broadcast moving images of suffering students,
stretched out on the ground in suffocating heat or in the pouring
rain, determined not to give in. Xinhua News Agency's domestic
service ran scores of stories about the support pouring in from
the most unexpected sectors of society during the week-long
hunger strike. It also noted that workers had joined the ranks of
marching supporters.

When I phoned the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MoFERT) to arrange
to meet a section chief related to my research work, the
reception-ist apologized, "Sorry - he's out marching." Government
officials, representatives from the People's Liberation Army,
distinguished members of various Party-led organizations all
joined the "more than one million people from all works of life,"
who were trying to urge and pressure the leadership into
submitting to the students' demand for an "open and equal
dialogue."

The openness of the media coverage reached its climax on May
18th, when Prime Minister Li Peng met with students in a dialogue
televised nationwide. The impertinent behavior of the student
representatives, especially the brash conduct of Wu'er Kaixi, who
criticized the Prime Minister for being late and told him off for
quibbling with him, made a lasting imprint on the minds of
hundreds of millions of viewers across the country. The
government's decision to agree to such a meeting was surprising
enough, but to give in to the students' demand that it be
televised made the concession all the more astonishing.

During the dialogue the student representatives set two
conditions for ending the hunger strike. First, the April 26th
editorial was to be rescinded. In other words, their movement
should be officially acknowledged as a democratic, patriotic
movement which was not creating turmoil. Secondly, televised
dialogues should be held between the decision makers and genuine
leaders of the students, i.e., the unofficial students'
organization. Li Peng, who at times seemed at odds about how to
talk without a prepared agenda to the unruly students, did not
agree to either one. (26)

On May 20th he declared martial law in parts of Beijing.

The Chinese journalists' short-lived period of openness would
gradually come to an end. To speak of China's "three days of
press freedom," which quite a few writers have done, is hasty and
inaccurate. (27) China has yet to experience press freedom.

In the first place, Chinese newspapers were not free to report on
any subject without limitations. They did not publish articles
which, for example, quoted people calling for the overthrow of
the Communist one-party system of rule, or who demanded that
Tibet be granted independence. They reported on the movement
which basically was intent on reforming the Communist Party from
within. On the other hand, the period during which the media
carried stories of the students' protests was longer than the
three days often cited. It was closer to three weeks.

Balanced, objective news stories and analysis were also scarce.
There was no doubt that the journalists' sympathy was on the side
of the students. The students repeatedly defined their demands as
modest, but what would they have entailed in reality? A negation
of the April 26th editorial was equivalent to asking Deng
Xiaoping to write a self-criticism publicly. And to recognize the
unofficial student organization would have been interpreted as
giving permission to other groups in society, most notably the
workers, to organize themselves independently. The government's
dilemma was acute. Also, Chinese journalists did not dare
speculate on the intense power struggle going on among the top
leadership.

Media Coverage,Part 3: The Party's Mouthpiece

Even after martial law was declared, hardliners in the government
did not regain control of the media immediately. As late as May
24th newspapers published stories and photos of citizens setting
up roadblocks along main routes in the outskirts of Beijing to
prevent the troops from entering the center of the capital.

Even though the director and editor-in-chief of People's Daily
(Renmin Ribao), Qian Liren and Tan Wenrui, were removed from
their posts, and a 'work team' loyal to the conservatives in the
Party took over, the staff managed to publicize the protests for
a few days. On May 23rd, the front page carried two photos, one
of the students continuing their sit-in at Tiananmen Square, and
the other of a child offering a popsicle to a soldier sitting in
a blocked military truck. A day earlier, a front page story and
headline cited a Hungarian leader saying that Stalinist tactics
of violence should not be used to suppress the people.

A group of students visited the famous retired marshals Xu
Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen to ask for their support. According to
the Beijing Domestic Service Radio broadcast, the students spoke
of their fear that the troops were going to use violence against
them. The marshals assured the students that "the army comrades
are, under no circumstances, willing to see a bloody incident."
In the days following the declaration of martial law, the media
carried several reports citing prominent Party members warning
against the use of force.

On May 23rd, television viewers were shown shots of the mass
demonstration with about one million people demonstrating against
martial law. The slogan "Down with Li Peng" could be faintly
heard in the background. Xinhua News Agency's English Service
wire story mentioned that "most of the slogans were directed
against the chief leader of the State Council." Li Peng's name
was not mentioned.

An increasing number of articles quoted prominent members of
society, who praised or endorsed the decision to declare martial
law and appealed to the students to return to their campuses to
ensure the stability of the country. But the peaceful situation
and "normal order" in all parts of Beijing were also getting a
lot of media attention, which was clearly intended to undermine
the government's attempts to create an image of disorder. Reports
mentioning the continuing sit-in at Tiananmen Square were still
being published as late as May 30th, even in People's Daily
(Renmin Ribao). (28)
By the time the statue "Goddess of Democracy" was erected on May
30th, it was evident that forces loyal to Prime Minister Li Peng
had regained control of the press. All media reports emphasized
the government's disdain for the statue.

On May 29th, Beijing Radio Service broadcast a circular issued by
the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television. It stressed "that
radio and television services are the mouthpieces of the party,
government, and people, and that state radio and television
stations must ... publicize the brilliant decision of the party
Central Committee on ending the turmoil ... and educate the
masses to conscientiously safeguard the situation of stability
and unity."

'Stability' and 'unity'- these two words were used time after
time to justify the "quelling of the counter-revolutionary
rebellion" in Beijing. The Chinese media coverage of the events
of June 3rd and 4th is well-known. It reflects the one-sided
government version of a revolt, led by a handful of people, and
of heroic soldiers risking and sacrificing their lives to ensure
the stability and unity of the nation. (29)

Do the citizens of Beijing believe what the government has told
them about the 'incident?' My answer is wholeheartedly, no.

The tens of thousands who were on the streets that night saw with
their own eyes, how outraged civilians at major intersections
along the main boulevard tried to prevent the soldiers from
reaching Tiananmen Square. The people, who at first refused to
believe that the People's Army would fire at its own citizens,
had only sticks and stones and 'Molotov cocktails' at their
disposal. The soldiers were equipped with machine-guns and
armoured PC-vehicles. The severity of the situation was clear
even to those witnessing the chaos from a safe distance.
Rickshaws raced up the sidestreets transporting the bloodied
bodies of the wounded and dead to hospitals and morgues.

But do people in other cities, not to speak of the countryside,
believe that "a small handful of thugs and ruffians were trying
to overthrow the government?" That is a question which is much
more difficult to answer accurately. People in China have grown
accustomed to continuous changes in policy and they are wary of
ferocious political campaigns. They know that the official
version of the "counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing," the
one the media is putting out, is what they are supposed to think.
And they have learned that believing --- at least saying one
believes -- in the official Party line is a way to stay out of
trouble.

The JournalistsJoin the Demonstrators

Already months before Hu Yaobang's death, the 70th anniversary of
the May Fourth Movement had been targeted by a handful of student
activists as the start of a new student move-ment. According to
Shen Tong, a biology major at Beijing University and one of the
many student leaders, small informal 'democracy groups' were set
up during the winter of 1988-89 to discuss strategy and ways to
promote political reform.

"My group, which was called the Olympic Institute, contacted
people from many different parts of society, especially of course
intellectu-als, in order to establish a network of
relation-ships," Shen Tong explained in an interview in April
1990. "I think I was one of the few who realized the importance
of getting the journalists involved in our movement. Already in
June 1989 I met with some of the journalists at, for example,
Renmin Ribao, Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily), Zhongguo Qingnian
Ribao (China Youth Journal), Keji Ribao, Beijing Ribao (Beijing
Daily) and Guangming Ribao."

Shen Tong said that the student activists were well aware of the
shortcomings of the 1986-87 movement. "We were too isolated. Not
even the intellectuals stood up to endorse our cause. All of us
knew that without freedom of the press we would not be able to
arouse interest and support for our ideas. That's why it was one
of our major demands from the beginning." (30)

I remember pricking up my ears on a street corner near the
Beijing Library, where I was watching groups of singing students
march by on April 27th. I recognized the tune of "Frére
Jacques", and after a moment or two I burst into laughter when I
managed to decipher the words: "People's Daily, People's Daily,
very strange, very strange. Always printing lies, always printing
lies. Very strange, very strange."

Also among the journalists, especially the younger ones who had
been educated after the Cultural Revolution in an environment
which promoted competitive standards in education, there were
people advocating that the press be permitted to report on news
stories factually. As mentioned earlier, the suggestions put
forward by leading editors in late 1984 were too much for Hu
Yaobang to swallow, but the struggle for professionalism was not
abandoned.

"There is too much interference," wrote Mo Ru in a blatantly
critical article about journalistic work and the rules of
journalism, published in Zhongguo Jizhe (Journalist of China), a
month before Hu Yaobang's death. "Newspapers carry a lot of
reports that are not news, while genuine news reports that the
readers like to see are pushed aside." (31)

The decision on the part of the journalists to take to the
streets and demonstrate on their own behalf for 'freedom of the
press' was made in a meeting on May 3rd at the Lu Xun Museum in
Beijing. "Ever since Hu Yaobang's death and the escalating
activities of the students, many journalists had met informally
in private homes to contemplate action," Zhang Dandan of the
Jingji Zhoukan (Economic Weekly) recalled in an interview in May
1990. "We have all read a lot about the work of Western
journalists and their role as 'watchdog' in society. We felt the
time was ripe to fight for that right ourselves. We were terribly
excited and moved by the students' brave actions." (32)
Zhang Dandan was among the approximately 200 journalists who
demonstrated on May 4th. They were the first non-student group to
publicly rally on behalf of the students, though they also had
their own agenda. Their banners were prepared by Shen Tong and
two other students, who, in the pre-dawn hours of May 4th, took
them to the gates of Xinhua News Agency.

After that day, the columns of protesting journalists became a
common sight whenever the students were on the move. As Canadian
journalists Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon write in their book,
Tiananmen Square, "the students and the media thrived on a
symbiotic relationship." (33) During the hunger strike, the
different media organizations marched under their own banners,
and even the older editors could be seen chanting, "We want to be
able to tell the truth."

On May 9th, a petition requesting a 'dialogue' on freedom of the
press was delivered to the All-China Journalists' Association. It
was signed by 1,013 journalists from 30 news units. In that same
day's issue of Worker's Daily (Gongren Ribao), an article
vehemently defended the citizens' right to know what was going on
from the domestic press.

The government did not take long to succumb to the journalists'
demand for a 'dialogue.' On May 11th, the Politburo member in
charge of propaganda, Hu Qili, and the head of the CCP Central
Committee Propaganda Department, Wang Rezhi, went to the office
of the China Youth Journal (Zhongguo Qingnian Ribao) to meet with
members of the media. The Xinhua News Agency reported that
officials maintained that "it is high time to carry out press
reform, which is an important part of political reform." The wire
story did not carry any quotes. According to the Hong Kong media,
one of the journalists, Li Datong, exclaimed in his presentation
that "We feel profound shame!" and added, "Journalism means
recording the facts."

To understand the effect the journalists' participation in the
demonstrations had on the movement as a whole, one has to
appreciate the special characteristics of Chinese society.
Throughout history, university students have been a distinct
group apart from the rest of society. On the one hand, they are
looked upon as 'children', who sometimes do not know better, but
on the other hand, they are also privileged members of the
community, who have the right to have pure and idealistic views.
Not only the students were elated when they discovered that they
were 'no longer alone', thanks to the journalists' protest march
on May 4th. Other intellectuals also felt inspired and encouraged
that responsible adults who had families to support -- people
whom any educated city-dweller could, at least to a certain
extent, relate to -- had summoned enough courage to speak out
about their frustrations.

Once the journalists, even members of the Party's mouthpiece
People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), got away with their public show of
discontent, the most determined members of other intellectual
groups pushed ahead with plans to join in and show their support
for the students' movement. The journalists' march served as a
catalyst. As Andrew Walder, Professor of Sociology at Harvard
University, agreed in an interview for this research, "The
Chinese journalists were absolutely central in stoking the fire."

The Impact of theMedia on the Events

Andrew Walder is one of the few American academics who has
studied the role of the Chinese media during the Beijing Spring
of '89. In an article published in Problems of Communism, Walder
describes two new developments that distinguished this movement
from previous ones and led to an unprecedented popular rebellion.

First, he points to the widespread support which the students
received from people in all fields of urban society. "Second, and
perhaps more important, the party split internally over its
response to the student movement, which prevented effective
repression early on, and which eventually led to key elements of
the capital's party apparatus and, most crucially, the mass media
to support openly certain student demands. The combination of
mass support and party fragmentation led rapidly to a massive,
nonviolent rebellion that echoed in scores of cities throughout
China ..." (34)

While the journalists' participation in the demonstrations had an
effect on the educated parts of society -- in Chinese terms, the
intellectuals -- it hardly caught the attention of the workers.
The media coverage is what mobilized the 'man on the street.'
When the newspapers and television started to report on the
protests by the students, without branding them troublemakers, it
was interpreted as something offi-cially sanctioned. Political
scientist Jing Yulin summarized, "it was like giving people the
green light, showing them that it was as good as permissible,
certainly risk-averse, to support the students."

It was hard to ignore television shots showing wailing mothers
begging their offspring at Tiananmen Square not to starve
themselves to death, or small children carrying signs: "Don't let
our big sisters and brothers die!" Even those who were not the
slightest bit interested in politics felt touched. The public
relations value of the hunger strike was enormous. "The reportage
helped to magnify public sympathy and involvement, and for a
pivotal period, made it appear that the demonstrations might
succeed in toppling the hard-line leadership," Andrew Walder
asserted.

In the West, the shock which the general public experienced after
watching the gory events of June 4th on television has been
widely publicized. Few envisioned that the authorities would use
brutal force to crush the movement. The underlying forces which
led to the reactions of the Chinese public have received less
attention. Would the unimaginably stubborn resistance which the
army encountered on the night between June 3rd and 4th have been
so persistent had it not been for reports by the Chinese media
citing high-ranking people saying that violence should not be
used against the students? Might these reports not have egged the
people on, giving them the illusion that they might somehow come
out of the struggle victoriously? Neither the Western nor the
Chinese press seemed to believe that Mao's famous expression
about power coming from the barrel of the gun still held true.

Li Lu, whose official title during the movement was 'deputy
commander of the hunger strike committee,' did not hesitate when
asked about the impact of the Chinese media: "It was extremely
important - it brought the movement onto a national scale.
According to the government reports, protests spread to at least
81 cities. In addition, because of the media's impact, the
student movement became a people's movement." Li Lu is a physics
and economics major from Nanjing University. He arrived in
Beijing on April 27th and stayed at the Square until the students
marched out in the early hours of June 4th. (35)

Xiang
Xiaoji, who led the students' dialogue delegation together with
Shen Tong, agreed that the Chinese media was instrumental in
changing the nature of the movement. "Initially, the students had
no intention of mobilizing the city dwellers. We wanted to limit
the movement to students. The workers' demands were too rash and
we knew that endorsing them would lead to trouble. Also, the
students did not have enough experience to organize the workers.
But, as a result of the Chinese media, the masses' attention was
aroused."

Xiang Xiaoji was a graduate student at the University of Politics
& Law in Beijing. "In the long run, maybe the articles which
were written during that spring will have a more lasting effect
than the student movement itself," he ventured. "People can keep
the newspapers." (36) That is exactly what has happened -- in
many a home which I visited during the autumn of 1989, I was
shown a cardboard box full of clippings from the May issues of
Chinese newspapers. "So that not even my children will ever
forget," a friend explained.

An American who was teaching English in a -- by Chinese standards
-- tiny city of 350,000 inhabitants in Anhui province, said
everyone was very aware of what was going on in Beijing. The
college students in the city staged their own demonstration in
support of the hunger strikers on May 18th.

"We would all gather around the television in the teachers'
dormitory and eat our meals in front of the television. The local
newspapers were also reporting on the student movement. Everyone
was very impressed when the local television station broadcast
the two-hour dialogue between students from Hefei Science and
Technology University and provincial leaders. The sincere way in
which the leaders responded was remarkable."

Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Company became the
primary sources of information once the Chinese media was
silenced. The American teacher, who asked not be identified
because of plans to return to China in the near future, said that
one could hear the blaring VOA broadcasts all along the city's
one and only main street. News of the bloody suppression reached
her college on June 5th. "My students, who were all extremely
upset, kept asking me, can we believe the VOA reports about the
massacre? When one of the students' brothers returned from
Beijing, verification of the killings spread in true Chinese
fashion, by word of mouth." (37)
Nicholas Kristof, Beijing correspondent for the New York Times,
felt that VOA and BBC had an "enormous impact," while the Chinese
media had "quite a bit of significance for the Chinese." He and
his wife Sheryl WuDunn received a Pulitzer award for their
reporting during the Beijing Spring of '89. Sandra Burton, Bureau
Chief in Beijing for Time, thought the Chinese media was "very
significant," while Time Beijing correspondent Jaime FlorCruz
added that the Chinese journalists' input was considerable "in
giving the movement a second wind."

In other interviews dealing with the effect the Chinese press had
on the movement, American journalists echoed the view that
because of Chinese media, the whole nation knew what was going on
in Beijing during May. David Holley, of the Los Angeles Times,
opined that this was one of the reasons the government had a much
harder time explaining the crushing of the movement, and "in
part, it is why China remains in such a near crisis situation
today." (38)

Going through the major American media organizations' coverage of
the events, one finds numerous references in both print and
television reports about the demand for 'freedom of the press'
and also references to the opening up of the Chinese media. The
World Economic Herald's (Shiji Jingji Dabao) case was described
in detail by major American publications. But only after June
4th, when the government had taken full control of the propaganda
apparatus, did American newspapers publish more in-depth analysis
of the role of the Chinese media during the actual movement."
(39)

While the drama was unfolding, the immense impact which the
Chinese newspaper, radio and television coverage was having on
the country, and on the events themselves, did not receive the
attention it deserved by the American media. American network
news broadcasts and morning shows did use footage obtained by
Chinese television (CCTV) and Wei Hua, the female anchor of CCTV
English News, became a familiar face to many Americans, thanks to
the airing of some of her reports from Tiananmen Square. But
American network reporters failed to elaborate on the fact -- to
the degree the situation warranted -- that the same dramatic
images which were being relayed to American living rooms were
also being seen by hundreds of millions of Chinese viewers.

Based on my own encounters and observations in China until late
November 1989, when I left Beijing, I agree with Nicholas
Kristof's assessment that China has changed in three fundamental
ways, despite the fact that the "democratic conflagration" of the
Beijing Spring has been extinguished on the surface. His piece
"Ominous Embers from the Fire of 1989" was published exactly one
year after the death of Hu Yaobang.

First, Kristof writes, "democracy is an issue on people's minds
in a way it never was before." Secondly, "the rulers and ruled
alike came to see that their discontent was much broader than
anyone realized." And thirdly, "the leadership, in handling the
protests the way it did, actually strengthened and expanded the
opposition. A new vitriol burns in those who were once merely
disdained." (40)
The Chinese media's ability to spread the news of the student-led
movement and its supporters has a direct bearing on all three of
these changes. The press mobilized the urban population all over
the country for nearly a month, and despite relentless attempts
to use the media to justify its actions following the crackdown,
the government has not succeeded in 'demobilization,' as far as
the spirit which the movement left behind is concerned.

As I prepared to leave China, one of my more politically active
friends assured me: "Our fists will remain clenched, though for
the time being they are hidden in our pockets." The disgust and
rage were naturally the most vehement among those who personally
witnessed the ruthless killings. But even in cities outside
Beijing, I sensed a deep-rooted longing for change, though an air
of hopelessness also prevailed.

In conclusion, I quote one of the first letters which I received
from China after having arrived in the United States. It is from
a teacher friend of mine, who enjoyed explaining old Chinese
sayings to me. Even in everyday conversation, Chinese often refer
to hundreds of well-known proverbs to express themselves --
understanding them is an important part of getting to know the
Chinese culture. My friend had been to Beijing and had heard
mention of Lu Xun Museum, the museum where the Chinese
journalists gathered and decided to join the demonstrations. Lu
Xun, who lived at the beginning of this century, is revered as
one of China's greatest writers.

"Visiting Lu Xun Museum made me think of you," my friend wrote.
"I think you should learn this saying by Lu Xun: 'Lies written in
ink can not conceal a truth written in blood'."

April 18 Few thousand students march from Beijing University to
Tiananmen Square. Later in the day about 10,000 students stage
sit-in in front of Great Hall of the People.

April 19 Keji Ribao (Science & Technology Daily) publishes
first account of April 18th march. Other newspapers do not.

April 22 Hu Yaobang's official memorial service in Great Hall of
People at Tiananmen Square. About 100,000 students gather
outside. Three students kneel on steps of Great Hall holding a
petition demanding a dialogue with the leaders.

April 24 Keji Ribao is only newspaper to publish factual account
of students' part in Hu Yaobang's memorial service. General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang leaves for state visit to North Korea.

April 25 Prime Minister Li Peng calls Politburo meeting in
absence of Zhao Ziyang. Decision is made to publish an editorial
condemning students and accusing them of creating turmoil.

April 27 In an unprecedented show of civil disobedience, hundreds
of thousands of students march to Tiananmen Square and demand a
'dialogue' with govern-ment.

April 28 Xinhua News Agency and major national newspapers run
articles about April 27th march. From this day until May 20th,
Chinese media gradually opens up and starts to run increasingly
detailed articles about movement and stu-dents' demands.

April 29 First televised dialogue between students and government
officials.

May 3 Televised press conference about student movement. State
Council official brands unofficial student organization illegal.

May 4 70th anniversary of May Fourth Movement. About 20,000
students march to Tiananmen Square. A few hundred journalists
join in as the first non-student group of demonstrators. They
demand the right to "tell the truth" and that fired
editor-in-chief in Shanghai be given back his job.

Zhao Ziyang makes important speech at Asian Developing Bank
meeting. Says student movement will not cause chaos in China.
Makes it clear that he does not agree with April 26 editorial.
During following week major media organizations print stories
with favorable commentaries about Zhao's speech.

May 6 Zhao Ziyang briefs leaders in charge of propaganda and says
there is "no risk for the press to open up a bit by reporting on
student demonstrations."

May 9 Petition with 1,013 signatures of journalists delivered to
government repre-sentatives. Journalists demand dialogue to
discuss press reform.

May 13 Beginning of hunger strike at Tiananmen Square. Students
demand that April 26th editorial be retracted and televised
dialogue with Party leaders be held.

During following week detailed reports of hunger strike published
in newspa-pers all over the country. National television airs
footage with dramatic shots from Tiananmen.

May 17 About one million march through Beijing in support of
students. Members of government organizations also join in.

May 18 Once again about a million people demonstrate.

In early morning, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng and other leaders visit
hospitalized students -- Chinese television covers visit. In the
afternoon, Li Peng meets with defiant students for about an hour
in a discussion broadcast live nationwide. [
Full transcript
of broadcast available.]

May 19 Zhao Ziyang visits Tiananmen Square. Chinese television
crew is present. Zhao apologizes for having come "too late" in
his last public appearance. [
Transcript
of visit available.] In the evening students decide to stop
hunger strike.

May 20 Martial law is declared in parts of Beijing. Media
organizations are gradually taken over by forces loyal to the
hardliners. Number of reports on students' activities decline.
However, reports of ongoing sit-in can still be found and
numerous articles are published citing prominent members pleading
for restraint.

More than 100,000 students continue their sit-in at Tiananmen
Square despite authorities' strict orders to leave. Hundreds of
thousands of citizens gather at major intersections all around
the capital to block the troops from marching to the Square.
Beijing becomes intoxicated with 'people power.' Pictures of
civilians lecturing soldiers and warning them not to hurt the
students shown on television.

May 30 Statue "Goddess of Democracy" is erected at Tiananmen
Square.
Media reports are critical in tone and warn that the country will
fall into chaos if the students do not leave the Square.

June 3 In early evening martial law troops begin to force their
way through the streets of Beijing towards Tiananmen Square,
firing indiscriminately at civilians. The troops are clearly
unprepared for the fierce resistance of civil-ians who try to
prevent the soldiers' passage.

June 4 As dawn breaks, martial law troops allow remaining
students to march out of Tiananmen Square.

The media is completely controlled by the 'hardliners' and
publishes reports describing the "quelling of a
counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Beijing.

2. Text of meeting provided by Foreign Broadcasting International
Service FBIS. Li, Chen Meets Students, Beijing Television Service
in Mandarin, from the "National News Hookup" program
(FBIS-CHI-89-083, 2 May 1989, p.9).

4. Between April 1987 and April 1988, I spoke with a number of
Chinese journalists about their work and Chinese media
organizations for my book about everyday life in China (Mureneva
muurii, Vuosi kiinalaisena), published in Finnish in October
1988.

7 "The Working Press in China" by Jing Jun, November 1985, pp.
8-13. Paper submitted to Harvard University, Dept. of Regional
Studies/East Asia.

8. Interview (May 1990) with political scientist Yang Yulin, who
is currently a research fellow at Harvard University. Until 1986
Yang Yulin worked as Director for the Dept. of International
Cooperation at the Economic System Reform Institute of China,
known to be one of Zhao Ziyang's think tanks.

9. Interview with Wu Guogang (May 1990). Wu Guogang worked on the
editorial staff of Renmin Ribao from 1983-1989. He was granted a
Nieman fellowship at Harvard University in 1989.

10. Interview with Feng Xiaoming (May 1990). Feng Xiaoming worked
for five years in the English language news department of the
China Central Television CCTV. During the Beijing Spring of '89
his position was news anchor of the English News Service. He was
awarded a Benton fellowship at University of Chicago in September
1989.

11. Interview with Jing Jun (May, 1990). Jing Jun worked for the
China Daily from 1981-1986. His last position was national news
editor. He is presently working towards his Ph.D. in social
anthropology at Harvard University.

12. Details of People's Daily reporters confronting Tan Wenrui
from chapter about the Chinese media written by Seth Faison,
Beijing correspondent of South China Morning Post, for an
upcoming book about the Beijing Spring of '89 to be published by
M.E. Sharpe, edited by Anthony Saich of International Institute
of Social History in Amsterdam.

13. Details concerning April 19th issue of Keji Ribao from
chapter written by Seth Faison, see endnote 12.

20. Xinhua, Domestic Service in Chinese, 27 April 1989
(FBIS-CHI-89-081, 28 April, p.14).
Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, all quotes from Chinese
newspapers, radio and television broad-casts taken from
translations provided by Foreign Broadcasting Information
Service, April 15th to June 15th, 1989.

21. Quote from Crisis at Tiananmen, p. 30.

22. Speech by Yang Shangkun at meeting of Central
Military Commission on May 24, 1990. Quote from translation
provided in Appendix One of Crisis at Tiananmen, p. 184.

24. One precaution taken by journalists was the use of the
anonymous byline: "By our staff reporters."
In addition to the Chinese journalists identified in my
discussion paper -- all of whom are currently living outside
China -- I have discussed the perform-ance of the Chinese press
during the pro-democracy movement with one elderly editor from
Renmin Ribao, two younger generation Xinhua reporters and one
middle-aged Jingji Ribao reporter. All four wished to remain
anonymous.

25. New York Times Magazine, "How the Hardliners Won,", Nov.
12,1989, by N. Kristof, p. 66.

26. Excerpts of the dialogue were published in all major Chinese
newspapers on May 19, 1989. Transla-tion of full text provided by
FBIS, 19 May 1989, pp. 14--21.

27. For example, well-known Chinese journalist Liu Binyan spoke
of the "three days of press freedom" in China at a conference
held at the Univ. of Minnesota in October 1989. Liu Binyan has
written his own version of the events in China in "Tell the
World, Liu Binyan, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989.

28. Renmin Ribao, 30 May 1989, p. 1. Text contains passage:
"However, there was no sign that the petitioning students at
Tiananmen Square would finish their sit-in and withdraw..," FBIS,
30 May 1989, p. 73 (FBIS-CHI-89-102).

29. There were a few Chinese journalists who suc-ceeded in
publicizing news of soldiers firing on civilians as late as June
4th. On page 1 of Renmin Ribao's June 4th issue, there is a news
report filed at 5 A.M. listing hospitals that had "been calling
our newspaper non-stop to report on the casualties of those
hospitalized since the middle of the night." In addition, Beijing
Radio's English service announcer read a news report, written by
the son of former Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, describing the
"tragic incident" and appealing "to all its listeners to join our
protest for the gross violation of human rights and the most
barbarous suppression of the people." According to TV news anchor
Feng Xiaoming, the announcer was not permitted to go abroad to
study, as previously planned. The son of the minister was still
in police custody when Feng Xiaoming left China in August 1989.

30. Interview with Shen Tong, currently a student at Brandeis
University (April 1990).

32. Interview with Chinese journalist Zhang Dandan (May 1990).
Zhang Dandan was a staff reporter of Jingji Zhoukan (Economic
Weekly) during the Beijing Spring of '89. She is currently living
in Canada.

34. Interview with Andrew Walder (May 1990). Quotes from Walder's
article "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of
1989," Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct. 1989, p. 30 and p. 38.

35. Interview with Li Lu (May, 1990). Li Lu is one of the student
leaders who escaped China after the crackdown and is studying at
Columbia University. He has written his own account of the
Beijing Spring in Moving the Mountain, published by Macmillan in
Great Britain, June 1990.

36. Interview with Xiang Xiaojie (April 1989). Xiang Xiaojie also
managed to escape from China (with his wife) and is currently
working on his Ph.D. at Columbia University. His 4-year old
daughter remains in the care of her grandparents in China.

37. The American referred to worked as an English teacher from
August, 1988 to June, 1989.

38. Interviews dealing with the role of the Chinese press
conducted by Amy Zegart on my behalf in Beijing in May 1990.

39. Data according to the National Newspaper Index. With the
exception of 4 articles dealing with the World Economic Herald
case (1 by the N.Y.Times April 27, 1 by Washington Post May 2 and
2 by Christian Science Monitor April 25 and April 28), no
separate articles reporting on the Chinese media performance were
published until May.

31. [sic] (L.A.Times, No 'Goddess' Shown on China TV). After the
crackdown on June 4th, the L.A.Times published 1 more article
(June 13) and the N.Y. Times 2 articles (June 12 and June 22),
which focused on the Chinese press and its role during the
Beijing Spring of '89. Of course, the Chinese media was touched
upon in general news stories during May by all of these
newspapers.

40. New York Times, "Ominous Embers From the Fire of 1989," April
15, 1990, p. 1, p. 8.