France has been struck by an unprecedented three terror attacks in the last 18 months. In what’s called Operation Sentinelle, 13,000 French military personnel now patrol streets and protect key sites across the country, assisting police and other security agencies. “The fact that the armed forces are visible,” said French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian at a Brookings event on July 20, “help to reassure the French people that they are safe both at home and abroad.”

Do the challenges facing France today mean that it should reduce its engagement overseas, focusing instead on security at home? Le Drian doesn’t think so, and I agree. In a new book titled "Who is the Enemy?," he particularly emphasizes the multifaceted ISIS threat. As he said at Brookings:

"Every war [has] two enemies…[Today’s] war [with ISIS] also sets in place two concepts of the “enemy” that are radically different: From a strategic point of view, we are dealing with a proto-state; at the heart of this entity, there is a terrorist army."

It only further complicates matters, of course, that France faces ISIS threats on several fronts: in Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and also on its own territory. This, Le Drian stressed, means “we must seek coherence in our military action.” It also helps explain why France remains one of the most active countries in the fight against the so-called Islamic State, as well as other extremist groups in the Middle East and in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013 and 2014, France intervened in Mali in order to prevent jihadi groups from taking over the country. The French military also has a presence in Djibouti, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, as well as in the Pacific (in French Polynesia and New Caledonia)—not to mention Syria, where France uses the Mediterranean Sea-based Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to strike ISIS targets.

France is not a warmongering country—rather, it is responding to the fact that overseas threats come to it. Although it remains unclear to what extent the Nice attacker had connections with foreign terrorist networks, it has been established that the November 2015 Paris attacks were planned and orchestrated from Syria. This, among other considerations, has prompted France to engage further in Iraq and Syria. The rationale, as Minister Le Drian explained, is:

“[T]rading our peace by reducing our military involvement doesn’t make sense. The more we let ISIS consolidate its presence on the Middle East, the more it will gather resources, attract fighters, and plan more attacks against us.”

Team player

French policy isn’t just about ensuring its own security—rather, its many contributions are integrated within global efforts, including U.S.-led ones. As Le Drian said at Brookings: “I am convinced that the French-American relationship is stronger and better than ever.” France is a prominent participant of the 66-member international coalition against ISIS, and in that capacity participated in the first joint meeting of that group’s foreign and defense ministers in Washington this month.

France remains a key member of the joint military operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, which has damaged or destroyed over 26,0000 ISIS-related targets since August 2014. The Charles de Gaulle carrier—with 26 aircrafts on board—has been an essential part of that coalition mission. Following specific instructions from U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and his counterpart in Paris, Minister Le Drian, French and U.S. intelligence agencies cooperate closely in intelligence-sharing. And just last week, President François Hollande announced that France will soon be supplying artillery to Iraq to support its fight against ISIS. Beyond the Iraq-Syria theater, France is cooperating with the United States and other partners in Libya, another country that is both a victim and source of extremist threats.

The French Defense Ministry’s efforts to double-down on protecting French citizens within France, therefore, has not reduced its overseas role. Particularly now that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union, France’s military role has never been so important. France—along with Germany, which recently suggested it would raise its defense spending significantly—should continue to play a leading role as one the top defense actors in the West.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 25 Jul 2016 12:50:00 -0400Philippe Le Corre
France has been struck by an unprecedented three terror attacks in the last 18 months. In what's called Operation Sentinelle, 13,000 French military personnel now patrol streets and protect key sites across the country, assisting police and other security agencies. “The fact that the armed forces are visible,” said French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian at a Brookings event on July 20, “help to reassure the French people that they are safe both at home and abroad.”
Do the challenges facing France today mean that it should reduce its engagement overseas, focusing instead on security at home? Le Drian doesn't think so, and I agree. In a new book titled "Who is the Enemy?," he particularly emphasizes the multifaceted ISIS threat. As he said at Brookings: "Every war [has] two enemies…[Today's] war [with ISIS] also sets in place two concepts of the “enemy” that are radically different: From a strategic point of view, we are dealing with a proto-state; at the heart of this entity, there is a terrorist army."
It only further complicates matters, of course, that France faces ISIS threats on several fronts: in Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and also on its own territory. This, Le Drian stressed, means “we must seek coherence in our military action.” It also helps explain why France remains one of the most active countries in the fight against the so-called Islamic State, as well as other extremist groups in the Middle East and in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013 and 2014, France intervened in Mali in order to prevent jihadi groups from taking over the country. The French military also has a presence in Djibouti, Lebanon, Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, as well as in the Pacific (in French Polynesia and New Caledonia)—not to mention Syria, where France uses the Mediterranean Sea-based Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to strike ISIS targets.
France is not a warmongering country—rather, it is responding to the fact that overseas threats come to it. Although it remains unclear to what extent the Nice attacker had connections with foreign terrorist networks, it has been established that the November 2015 Paris attacks were planned and orchestrated from Syria. This, among other considerations, has prompted France to engage further in Iraq and Syria. The rationale, as Minister Le Drian explained, is: “[T]rading our peace by reducing our military involvement doesn't make sense. The more we let ISIS consolidate its presence on the Middle East, the more it will gather resources, attract fighters, and plan more attacks against us.”
Team player
French policy isn't just about ensuring its own security—rather, its many contributions are integrated within global efforts, including U.S.-led ones. As Le Drian said at Brookings: “I am convinced that the French-American relationship is stronger and better than ever.” France is a prominent participant of the 66-member international coalition against ISIS, and in that capacity participated in the first joint meeting of that group's foreign and defense ministers in Washington this month.
France remains a key member of the joint military operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, which has damaged or destroyed over 26,0000 ISIS-related targets since August 2014. The Charles de Gaulle carrier—with 26 aircrafts on board—has been an essential part of that coalition mission. Following specific instructions from U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and his counterpart in Paris, Minister Le Drian, French and U.S. intelligence agencies cooperate closely in intelligence-sharing. And just last week, President François Hollande announced that France will soon be supplying artillery to Iraq to support its fight against ISIS. Beyond the Iraq-Syria theater, France is cooperating with the United States and other partners in Libya, ...
France has been struck by an unprecedented three terror attacks in the last 18 months. In what's called Operation Sentinelle, 13,000 French military personnel now patrol streets and protect key sites across the country, assisting police and other ...

France has been struck by an unprecedented three terror attacks in the last 18 months. In what’s called Operation Sentinelle, 13,000 French military personnel now patrol streets and protect key sites across the country, assisting police and other security agencies. “The fact that the armed forces are visible,” said French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian at a Brookings event on July 20, “help to reassure the French people that they are safe both at home and abroad.”

Do the challenges facing France today mean that it should reduce its engagement overseas, focusing instead on security at home? Le Drian doesn’t think so, and I agree. In a new book titled "Who is the Enemy?," he particularly emphasizes the multifaceted ISIS threat. As he said at Brookings:

"Every war [has] two enemies…[Today’s] war [with ISIS] also sets in place two concepts of the “enemy” that are radically different: From a strategic point of view, we are dealing with a proto-state; at the heart of this entity, there is a terrorist army."

It only further complicates matters, of course, that France faces ISIS threats on several fronts: in Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and also on its own territory. This, Le Drian stressed, means “we must seek coherence in our military action.” It also helps explain why France remains one of the most active countries in the fight against the so-called Islamic State, as well as other extremist groups in the Middle East and in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013 and 2014, France intervened in Mali in order to prevent jihadi groups from taking over the country. The French military also has a presence in Djibouti, Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, as well as in the Pacific (in French Polynesia and New Caledonia)—not to mention Syria, where France uses the Mediterranean Sea-based Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to strike ISIS targets.

France is not a warmongering country—rather, it is responding to the fact that overseas threats come to it. Although it remains unclear to what extent the Nice attacker had connections with foreign terrorist networks, it has been established that the November 2015 Paris attacks were planned and orchestrated from Syria. This, among other considerations, has prompted France to engage further in Iraq and Syria. The rationale, as Minister Le Drian explained, is:

“[T]rading our peace by reducing our military involvement doesn’t make sense. The more we let ISIS consolidate its presence on the Middle East, the more it will gather resources, attract fighters, and plan more attacks against us.”

Team player

French policy isn’t just about ensuring its own security—rather, its many contributions are integrated within global efforts, including U.S.-led ones. As Le Drian said at Brookings: “I am convinced that the French-American relationship is stronger and better than ever.” France is a prominent participant of the 66-member international coalition against ISIS, and in that capacity participated in the first joint meeting of that group’s foreign and defense ministers in Washington this month.

France remains a key member of the joint military operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, which has damaged or destroyed over 26,0000 ISIS-related targets since August 2014. The Charles de Gaulle carrier—with 26 aircrafts on board—has been an essential part of that coalition mission. Following specific instructions from U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and his counterpart in Paris, Minister Le Drian, French and U.S. intelligence agencies cooperate closely in intelligence-sharing. And just last week, President François Hollande announced that France will soon be supplying artillery to Iraq to support its fight against ISIS. Beyond the Iraq-Syria theater, France is cooperating with the United States and other partners in Libya, another country that is both a victim and source of extremist threats.

The French Defense Ministry’s efforts to double-down on protecting French citizens within France, therefore, has not reduced its overseas role. Particularly now that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union, France’s military role has never been so important. France—along with Germany, which recently suggested it would raise its defense spending significantly—should continue to play a leading role as one the top defense actors in the West.

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
Wed, 20 Jul 2016 15:30:00 -0400
Event Information
July 20, 2016
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 A conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian
On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America's strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.
On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France's defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l'ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.
Event Information
July 20, 2016
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 A conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian
On July 20 and 21, defense ...

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/07/18-france-national-counterterrorism-center-riedel?rssid=france{2427BC82-ABF2-463C-960F-3F28AAA6931D}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/166463514/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~France-needs-its-own-National-Counterterrorism-CenterFrance needs its own National Counterterrorism Center

Editors’ Note: The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing, writes Bruce Riedel. The French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center is a smart idea that Paris should implement. This post was originally published by The National Interest.

The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing. There is no simple or single answer to this danger, but the French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a smart idea which Paris should implement.

The NCTC was created after the September 11, 2001 attack on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Initially the Bush administration and the American intelligence establishment were opposed to creating a new agency but the Commission report made it a political necessity. At first called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, it became NCTC in 2004.

The Center services as the focal point for all terrorist threat reporting and assessment. All the various intelligence and security agencies including CIA, NSA, FBI, the Defense agencies and state and local police services share information with the Center, which has representatives from many of them at its headquarters. By bringing all the data to one central service it is more likely that analysts will connect data points together, famously "connect the dots" and assess threats.

The Director of NCTC is responsible for the national threat assessment. When the President convenes an interagency terrorist threat meeting it is the Director who presents the assessment. John Brennan was the first director of the Center.

It also oversees the development of information technologies that are used to share data on threats. This helps make the databases of different intelligence and law-enforcement agencies interact better and share information. This tries to avoid the problem of stovepipes in intelligence collection and analysis that have damaged assessment in the past.

If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted.

If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted. A center integrating all terrorist reports would have focused attention much earlier on the arrival of known al-Qaida operatives in the United States in time for the FBI and local police to surveil them, see their contacts and take action.

It is obviously not foolproof. NCTC did not detect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called underwear bomber, who almost blew a plane on Christmas Day in 2009 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. Nor did it prevent the attacks in California and Florida this year. No security service can prevent all terrorist plots, especially so-called lone-wolf plots that are very difficult to detect in advance. But a dedicated center for integrating all threat information improves the odds.

France has excellent intelligence and security services. I've worked with them in my career over several decades. They are professional—world leaders in their business. But like all intelligence communities there are inherent weaknesses in information infrastructure and sharing. The Nice attacker from Tunisia apparently was known to the police but not to the intelligence community. Perhaps he would have been more likely to be monitored if he was in a broader database.

The French parliament set up an investigation of their security infrastructure after the deadly attacks in Paris last year. Their report was released just before Nice. It's top recommendation is to create a French NCTC. It's a good idea.

Indeed, other European states should consider doing the same thing. And the European Union might want to establish a European version, integrating data across the EU.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 18 Jul 2016 12:45:00 -0400Bruce Riedel
Editors’ Note: The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing, writes Bruce Riedel. The French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center is a smart idea that Paris should implement. This post was originally published by The National Interest.
The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing. There is no simple or single answer to this danger, but the French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a smart idea which Paris should implement.
The NCTC was created after the September 11, 2001 attack on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Initially the Bush administration and the American intelligence establishment were opposed to creating a new agency but the Commission report made it a political necessity. At first called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, it became NCTC in 2004.
The Center services as the focal point for all terrorist threat reporting and assessment. All the various intelligence and security agencies including CIA, NSA, FBI, the Defense agencies and state and local police services share information with the Center, which has representatives from many of them at its headquarters. By bringing all the data to one central service it is more likely that analysts will connect data points together, famously "connect the dots" and assess threats.
The Director of NCTC is responsible for the national threat assessment. When the President convenes an interagency terrorist threat meeting it is the Director who presents the assessment. John Brennan was the first director of the Center.
It also oversees the development of information technologies that are used to share data on threats. This helps make the databases of different intelligence and law-enforcement agencies interact better and share information. This tries to avoid the problem of stovepipes in intelligence collection and analysis that have damaged assessment in the past.
If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted.
If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted. A center integrating all terrorist reports would have focused attention much earlier on the arrival of known al-Qaida operatives in the United States in time for the FBI and local police to surveil them, see their contacts and take action.
It is obviously not foolproof. NCTC did not detect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called underwear bomber, who almost blew a plane on Christmas Day in 2009 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. Nor did it prevent the attacks in California and Florida this year. No security service can prevent all terrorist plots, especially so-called lone-wolf plots that are very difficult to detect in advance. But a dedicated center for integrating all threat information improves the odds.
France has excellent intelligence and security services. I've worked with them in my career over several decades. They are professional—world leaders in their business. But like all intelligence communities there are inherent weaknesses in information infrastructure and sharing. The Nice attacker from Tunisia apparently was known to the police but not to the intelligence community. Perhaps he would have been more likely to be monitored if he was in a broader database.
The French parliament set up an investigation of their security infrastructure after the deadly attacks in Paris last year. Their report was released just before Nice. It's top recommendation is to create a French NCTC. It's a good idea.
Indeed, other European states should consider doing the same thing. And the European Union might want to establish a European version, integrating data across the EU.
Authors
- Bruce Riedel
Publication: The National InterestEditors’ Note: The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing, writes Bruce Riedel. The French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center is a ...

Editors’ Note: The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing, writes Bruce Riedel. The French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center is a smart idea that Paris should implement. This post was originally published by The National Interest.

The horrific attack in Nice last week underscores the acute terrorist threat France is facing. There is no simple or single answer to this danger, but the French parliamentary recommendation to create a French version of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a smart idea which Paris should implement.

The NCTC was created after the September 11, 2001 attack on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Initially the Bush administration and the American intelligence establishment were opposed to creating a new agency but the Commission report made it a political necessity. At first called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, it became NCTC in 2004.

The Center services as the focal point for all terrorist threat reporting and assessment. All the various intelligence and security agencies including CIA, NSA, FBI, the Defense agencies and state and local police services share information with the Center, which has representatives from many of them at its headquarters. By bringing all the data to one central service it is more likely that analysts will connect data points together, famously "connect the dots" and assess threats.

The Director of NCTC is responsible for the national threat assessment. When the President convenes an interagency terrorist threat meeting it is the Director who presents the assessment. John Brennan was the first director of the Center.

It also oversees the development of information technologies that are used to share data on threats. This helps make the databases of different intelligence and law-enforcement agencies interact better and share information. This tries to avoid the problem of stovepipes in intelligence collection and analysis that have damaged assessment in the past.

If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted.

If there was an NCTC before 9/11 there is a reasonable chance the plot would have been thwarted. A center integrating all terrorist reports would have focused attention much earlier on the arrival of known al-Qaida operatives in the United States in time for the FBI and local police to surveil them, see their contacts and take action.

It is obviously not foolproof. NCTC did not detect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called underwear bomber, who almost blew a plane on Christmas Day in 2009 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. Nor did it prevent the attacks in California and Florida this year. No security service can prevent all terrorist plots, especially so-called lone-wolf plots that are very difficult to detect in advance. But a dedicated center for integrating all threat information improves the odds.

France has excellent intelligence and security services. I've worked with them in my career over several decades. They are professional—world leaders in their business. But like all intelligence communities there are inherent weaknesses in information infrastructure and sharing. The Nice attacker from Tunisia apparently was known to the police but not to the intelligence community. Perhaps he would have been more likely to be monitored if he was in a broader database.

The French parliament set up an investigation of their security infrastructure after the deadly attacks in Paris last year. Their report was released just before Nice. It's top recommendation is to create a French NCTC. It's a good idea.

Indeed, other European states should consider doing the same thing. And the European Union might want to establish a European version, integrating data across the EU.

Editors’ Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, and ISIS may in turn exploit Muslims’ resulting shame and anger. This post originally appeared on Slate.

We’ll learn more in the days to come, but we already knew Europe—and France in particular—has a terrorism problem and that it may go from bad to worse in the near future. Ironically, one of the reasons for the increased attacks is the military successes the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters are scoring against ISIS’s core in Iraq and Syria and the setbacks suffered by ISIS’s key provinces such as that in Libya. ISIS, which had long trumpeted its success in establishing the now-shrinking caliphate, needs victories to compensate for these major losses. Earlier this month, CIA Director John Brennan warned, “As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”

Running down people with a truck is a new form of violence for ISIS, though ISIS propaganda has called for supporters to kill by “ramming” people, al-Qaida’s Yemen branch recommended it in the past to “mow down the enemies of Allah,” and in 2008 a Palestinian used a bulldozer to kill three Israelis. But this is the fourth major terror attack in Europe in the past eight months: ISIS-directed terrorists killed 130 people in November in Paris; in March suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, and just two weeks ago three men believed to be tied to ISIS killed more than 40 at the Istanbul airport.

The attacks will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, fostering daily humiliations and furthering Muslim communities’ sense that they are suspect and under siege. ISIS will exploit the resulting shame and anger, increasing the risk of future attacks.

European nations face several types of terror threats from ISIS. The first is the unprecedented number of fighters—more than 5,000—that Europe has exported to Iraq and Syria to fight under the banners of ISIS and other jihadi groups. More than 900 of them (including 200 women) have come from France. More than 130 are dead, and almost 250 have returned; the rest are believed to still be in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks, which were coordinated and practiced, illustrate the danger such fighters can pose: Time in the battle zone allows them to gain fighting skills, become indoctrinated, and develop a network to exploit for future attacks. In addition, ISIS leaders can direct their operations to achieve maximal effect. As the so-called caliphate shrinks, more of these fighters may try to return. More than 1,000 other Frenchmen are believed to be radicalized but have not gone to Iraq and Syria, and this represents another overlapping danger. In the past many might have tried to go to Syria, but now, perhaps acting on directions from ISIS leaders with whom they are communicating or perhaps mixing with returned foreign fighters, these individuals might strike directly at France or other countries.

The last category are true “lone wolves”—those inspired by ISIS or other jihadi ideologies but with no direct operational connection to a group (the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando appear to fall into this category). Two years ago ISIS propaganda emphasized coming to the “caliphate” to help it consolidate and expand. Earlier this year, however, its spokesman and external operations leader Muhammad al-Adnani declared, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us and more effective and more damaging to them.”

France, as we’ve seen, is particularly vulnerable. As my Brookings colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have recently argued, French political culture is a counterterrorism problem. They found that “four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).” Part of the problem are the large numbers of unemployed urban youth, a fertile field for radical recruiting. But part of it is also France’s aggressive secularization programs, which prohibit girls from wearing the veil in school and are considered by many Muslims to be a deliberate attack on their religion. Muslims’ trust in the government and security services is low. Add such a sense of humiliation to a surging far-right political movement that constantly blasts Muslim immigrants and citizens, and the conditions for radicalization are strong.

The United States is less vulnerable by comparison. Fewer than 300 Americans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria. Part of this is because of an aggressive and effective law enforcement and intelligence effort to disrupt volunteers. But part of it is because the American Muslim community is far better integrated than its French counterpart and regularly cooperates with law enforcement. U.S. politics are becoming more poisonous toward Muslims, but—we can hope—that anti-Muslim sentiment in America may have peaked, and recent polls suggest positive attitudes toward Muslims are increasing.

Continued military and intelligence operations against the ISIS core by U.S.-led coalition forces and their local partners are necessary, but they will take time to bear fruit and in the end still don’t solve the terrorism problem. Stopping an attack like the one in Nice is exceptionally difficult. The attacker chose a “soft” (undefended) target and showed that one sick person can kill many with the right combination of determination and luck. Unfortunately, the most likely reaction after the Nice attack is also the worst one: more vitriol and hostility toward French and European Muslims, furthering a cycle that makes it harder for European security services to gain the cooperation of local communities and easier for ISIS to gain recruits and score victories.

Authors

]]>
Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:50:00 -0400Daniel L. Byman
Editors' Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, and ISIS may in turn exploit Muslims' resulting shame and anger. This post originally appeared on Slate.
At least 84 people are dead in Nice, France, after a truck deliberately plowed for over a mile through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day; ISIS or one of its supporters is believed to be linked to the attack. As we reel in horror from yet another instance of terrorist carnage, news reports are trickling in, giving us a sense of the attack, its victims, and those behind the killings.
We'll learn more in the days to come, but we already knew Europe—and France in particular—has a terrorism problem and that it may go from bad to worse in the near future. Ironically, one of the reasons for the increased attacks is the military successes the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters are scoring against ISIS's core in Iraq and Syria and the setbacks suffered by ISIS's key provinces such as that in Libya. ISIS, which had long trumpeted its success in establishing the now-shrinking caliphate, needs victories to compensate for these major losses. Earlier this month, CIA Director John Brennan warned, “As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”
Running down people with a truck is a new form of violence for ISIS, though ISIS propaganda has called for supporters to kill by “ramming” people, al-Qaida's Yemen branch recommended it in the past to “mow down the enemies of Allah,” and in 2008 a Palestinian used a bulldozer to kill three Israelis. But this is the fourth major terror attack in Europe in the past eight months: ISIS-directed terrorists killed 130 people in November in Paris; in March suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, and just two weeks ago three men believed to be tied to ISIS killed more than 40 at the Istanbul airport.
The attacks will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, fostering daily humiliations and furthering Muslim communities' sense that they are suspect and under siege. ISIS will exploit the resulting shame and anger, increasing the risk of future attacks.
European nations face several types of terror threats from ISIS. The first is the unprecedented number of fighters—more than 5,000—that Europe has exported to Iraq and Syria to fight under the banners of ISIS and other jihadi groups. More than 900 of them (including 200 women) have come from France. More than 130 are dead, and almost 250 have returned; the rest are believed to still be in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks, which were coordinated and practiced, illustrate the danger such fighters can pose: Time in the battle zone allows them to gain fighting skills, become indoctrinated, and develop a network to exploit for future attacks. In addition, ISIS leaders can direct their operations to achieve maximal effect. As the so-called caliphate shrinks, more of these fighters may try to return. More than 1,000 other Frenchmen are believed to be radicalized but have not gone to Iraq and Syria, and this represents another overlapping danger. In the past many might have tried to go to Syria, but now, perhaps acting on directions from ISIS leaders with whom they are communicating or perhaps mixing with returned foreign fighters, these individuals might strike directly at France or other countries.
The last category are true “lone wolves”—those ...
Editors' Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster ...

Editors’ Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, and ISIS may in turn exploit Muslims’ resulting shame and anger. This post originally appeared on Slate.

We’ll learn more in the days to come, but we already knew Europe—and France in particular—has a terrorism problem and that it may go from bad to worse in the near future. Ironically, one of the reasons for the increased attacks is the military successes the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters are scoring against ISIS’s core in Iraq and Syria and the setbacks suffered by ISIS’s key provinces such as that in Libya. ISIS, which had long trumpeted its success in establishing the now-shrinking caliphate, needs victories to compensate for these major losses. Earlier this month, CIA Director John Brennan warned, “As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”

Running down people with a truck is a new form of violence for ISIS, though ISIS propaganda has called for supporters to kill by “ramming” people, al-Qaida’s Yemen branch recommended it in the past to “mow down the enemies of Allah,” and in 2008 a Palestinian used a bulldozer to kill three Israelis. But this is the fourth major terror attack in Europe in the past eight months: ISIS-directed terrorists killed 130 people in November in Paris; in March suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, and just two weeks ago three men believed to be tied to ISIS killed more than 40 at the Istanbul airport.

The attacks will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, fostering daily humiliations and furthering Muslim communities’ sense that they are suspect and under siege. ISIS will exploit the resulting shame and anger, increasing the risk of future attacks.

European nations face several types of terror threats from ISIS. The first is the unprecedented number of fighters—more than 5,000—that Europe has exported to Iraq and Syria to fight under the banners of ISIS and other jihadi groups. More than 900 of them (including 200 women) have come from France. More than 130 are dead, and almost 250 have returned; the rest are believed to still be in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks, which were coordinated and practiced, illustrate the danger such fighters can pose: Time in the battle zone allows them to gain fighting skills, become indoctrinated, and develop a network to exploit for future attacks. In addition, ISIS leaders can direct their operations to achieve maximal effect. As the so-called caliphate shrinks, more of these fighters may try to return. More than 1,000 other Frenchmen are believed to be radicalized but have not gone to Iraq and Syria, and this represents another overlapping danger. In the past many might have tried to go to Syria, but now, perhaps acting on directions from ISIS leaders with whom they are communicating or perhaps mixing with returned foreign fighters, these individuals might strike directly at France or other countries.

The last category are true “lone wolves”—those inspired by ISIS or other jihadi ideologies but with no direct operational connection to a group (the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando appear to fall into this category). Two years ago ISIS propaganda emphasized coming to the “caliphate” to help it consolidate and expand. Earlier this year, however, its spokesman and external operations leader Muhammad al-Adnani declared, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us and more effective and more damaging to them.”

France, as we’ve seen, is particularly vulnerable. As my Brookings colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have recently argued, French political culture is a counterterrorism problem. They found that “four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).” Part of the problem are the large numbers of unemployed urban youth, a fertile field for radical recruiting. But part of it is also France’s aggressive secularization programs, which prohibit girls from wearing the veil in school and are considered by many Muslims to be a deliberate attack on their religion. Muslims’ trust in the government and security services is low. Add such a sense of humiliation to a surging far-right political movement that constantly blasts Muslim immigrants and citizens, and the conditions for radicalization are strong.

The United States is less vulnerable by comparison. Fewer than 300 Americans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria. Part of this is because of an aggressive and effective law enforcement and intelligence effort to disrupt volunteers. But part of it is because the American Muslim community is far better integrated than its French counterpart and regularly cooperates with law enforcement. U.S. politics are becoming more poisonous toward Muslims, but—we can hope—that anti-Muslim sentiment in America may have peaked, and recent polls suggest positive attitudes toward Muslims are increasing.

Continued military and intelligence operations against the ISIS core by U.S.-led coalition forces and their local partners are necessary, but they will take time to bear fruit and in the end still don’t solve the terrorism problem. Stopping an attack like the one in Nice is exceptionally difficult. The attacker chose a “soft” (undefended) target and showed that one sick person can kill many with the right combination of determination and luck. Unfortunately, the most likely reaction after the Nice attack is also the worst one: more vitriol and hostility toward French and European Muslims, furthering a cycle that makes it harder for European security services to gain the cooperation of local communities and easier for ISIS to gain recruits and score victories.

The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.

From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new.

This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.

Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):

Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen.

We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfirisin New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally.

Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem.

Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks).

Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the broader Muslim world, with Muslims as the primary victims—from Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen and Somalia to South Asia. French domestic policies have no bearing on these, of course.

There is no doubt that good work by counterterrorism and intelligence forces is crucial to preventing future attacks. France has done well in this regard—though it surely can do better, and it is surely trying to get better. There is also no doubt that promoting social cohesion in a broad sense is a worthy goal. But I would hesitate, personally, to attribute any apparent trend line in major attacks in the West to a particular policy of a country like France—especially when the latter is in fact doing much to seek to build bridges, as a matter of national policy, with Muslims at home and abroad.

There is much more to do in promoting social cohesion, to be sure, even here in America (though our own problems probably center more on race than on religion at the moment). But the Nice attacker almost assuredly didn’t attack because his estranged wife couldn’t wear a veil in the manner and/or places she wanted. At a moment like this in particular, I disagree with insinuations to the contrary.

Authors

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Fri, 15 Jul 2016 15:05:00 -0400Michael E. O'Hanlon
The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.
From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new.
This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.
Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):
- Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen. - We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfiris in New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally. - Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem. - Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks). - Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the ...
The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more ...

The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.

From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new.

This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.

Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):

Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen.

We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfirisin New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally.

Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem.

Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks).

Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the broader Muslim world, with Muslims as the primary victims—from Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen and Somalia to South Asia. French domestic policies have no bearing on these, of course.

There is no doubt that good work by counterterrorism and intelligence forces is crucial to preventing future attacks. France has done well in this regard—though it surely can do better, and it is surely trying to get better. There is also no doubt that promoting social cohesion in a broad sense is a worthy goal. But I would hesitate, personally, to attribute any apparent trend line in major attacks in the West to a particular policy of a country like France—especially when the latter is in fact doing much to seek to build bridges, as a matter of national policy, with Muslims at home and abroad.

There is much more to do in promoting social cohesion, to be sure, even here in America (though our own problems probably center more on race than on religion at the moment). But the Nice attacker almost assuredly didn’t attack because his estranged wife couldn’t wear a veil in the manner and/or places she wanted. At a moment like this in particular, I disagree with insinuations to the contrary.

The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.

I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.

Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.

Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."

Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.

In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.

Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.

Difficult To Prevent

Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.

One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.

Authors

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Fri, 15 Jul 2016 15:40:00 -0400Daniel L. Byman
The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.
I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.
Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.
This deadliness is not new – Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, largely acting alone, killed 168 people when they bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 – but it suggests the potential lethality of lone wolves.
A Weaker Islamic State
The Islamic State is putting more emphasis on lone wolves out of desperation.
In the past, it urged its sympathizers to go to Syria to help the fledgling state defend itself and expand. However, the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters hitting hard at the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. Other major areas of operations, like the Islamic State's "province" in Libya, are also under siege. The self-proclaimed state is short of funds, and the number of foreign recruits is declining.
Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."
A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."
Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.
In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.
Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.
Difficult To Prevent
Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.
One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.
Even though he was never arrested, Mateen came to the FBI's attention because a local Muslim found him worrisome. In France in particular, however, relations between the Muslim community and the government are often poisonous, and a terrorist ...
The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group.

The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.

I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.

Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.

Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."

Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.

In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.

Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.

Difficult To Prevent

Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.

One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/30-brexit-is-france-next-lecorre?rssid=france{A32AE6CC-912A-4126-8187-D6D12A3DE198}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/162270036/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~The-Brexit-contagion-could-consume-the-French-elite-nextThe Brexit contagion could consume the French elite next

Editor's Note: After the U.K.'s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror and ask itself if it will rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU or if it will follow the U.K. and become a gravedigger of the European project. Philippe Le Corre writes that the latter is more likely. This piece was originally posted by Financial Times.

After the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror, and ask whether it still wishes to belong to the community of nations initiated by two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, half a century ago. Will France rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU? Or will it follow the UK and become a gravedigger of the European project? The latter is more likely.

France faces a harsh and divisive campaign leading up to the presidential election in May 2017. After the vote for Brexit, it is hard to imagine that the main candidates will not make Europe one of their main priorities. Meanwhile, the Pew Research Center has recently provided striking new data on what the French think. Pew’s report shows that 61 per cent of French people hold unfavorable views of the EU, against 38 per cent who view it favourably. Sixty per cent of those surveyed said they wished that the French government would focus on the country’s own problems, as opposed to “helping other countries” (36 per cent). Fifty-two percent said France should pursue its own national interests rather than take allies into account (43 per cent).

The main question for the French political elite is the following: should it open the Pandora’s box of a referendum on France’s continued membership of the EU ?

With the exception of two candidates of the extreme right and far left, Marine Le Pen of the National Front and the former Socialist minister Jean-Luc Mélenchon, none of the politicians aspiring to be elected president in 2017 — the current occupant of the Elysée Palace, François Hollande, his centre-right predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy and centrist ex-prime minister Alain Juppé — anticipated the shocking outcome of the British referendum. Of mainstream politicians, only Bruno Le Maire, the so-called “third man” of the centre-right Les Républicains and a former minister for Europe, has called for a referendum on redefining the European project. (In an interview on June 27, Mr Juppé said it would be “irresponsible” to hold such a plebiscite in the near future.)

Writing in Le Monde in May, Mr Le Maire said: “Europe does not make us dream anymore.” France needs to “heal the wounds” of the 2005 referendum in which 55 per cent of voters rejected the proposed European constitution.

Many commentators regard that referendum as a key moment in recent French and European history. One recalls Jacques Chirac, then president, looking at a loss when confronted with young and middle-aged job seekers during a live television programme. Deep misgivings about France’s future in Europe were already gathering.

As Mr Le Maire said, the French people do not dream about Europe anymore. There is deep scepticism about the whole European project. And were they given the opportunity in a referendum, voters could well administer the kind of treatment to their elites that their counterparts in Britain have just dished out to theirs. Although France is not an insular country, it faces an uncertain future. As has happened in the UK, “Europe” has become the scapegoat for those who feel they have not benefited from globalisation.

The Pew survey says that 66 per cent of French people think that the EU has failed them economically. The financial crisis of 2008 has left terrible scars. Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment rose by two percentage points. It is around 10 per cent today. The age groups most affected are the young (those between 18 and 25) and the over 50s. It is likely that they would vote for “Frexit” in a referendum.

Populists are rejoicing. The National Front presents itself as a viable alternative to mainstream parties. Ms Le Pen has already called for a British-style referendum. The far-left Front de Gauche (FG), which has close ties to the trade union that has led strikes against labour market reforms, will push for exiting the EU.

One of FG leaders, Mr Mélenchon has announced that he will run for president next year on a Eurosceptic platform. He said that Brexit is “first and foremost the failure of the German government, of capitalism, and of successive subservient French governments”.

Politicians in these far right and far left parties have no more government experience than the triumphant leaders of the Brexit camp, Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson. But unless mainstream politicians can find remedies for France’s malaise, voters may well give the populists a chance. It is time for French elites to take action. If they do not, they risk suffering the same fate as David Cameron.

Authors

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Thu, 30 Jun 2016 15:00:00 -0400Philippe Le Corre
Editor's Note: After the U.K.'s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror and ask itself if it will rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU or if it will follow the U.K. and become a gravedigger of the European project. Philippe Le Corre writes that the latter is more likely. This piece was originally posted by Financial Times.
After the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror, and ask whether it still wishes to belong to the community of nations initiated by two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, half a century ago. Will France rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU? Or will it follow the UK and become a gravedigger of the European project? The latter is more likely.
France faces a harsh and divisive campaign leading up to the presidential election in May 2017. After the vote for Brexit, it is hard to imagine that the main candidates will not make Europe one of their main priorities. Meanwhile, the Pew Research Center has recently provided striking new data on what the French think. Pew’s report shows that 61 per cent of French people hold unfavorable views of the EU, against 38 per cent who view it favourably. Sixty per cent of those surveyed said they wished that the French government would focus on the country’s own problems, as opposed to “helping other countries” (36 per cent). Fifty-two percent said France should pursue its own national interests rather than take allies into account (43 per cent).
The main question for the French political elite is the following: should it open the Pandora’s box of a referendum on France’s continued membership of the EU ?
With the exception of two candidates of the extreme right and far left, Marine Le Pen of the National Front and the former Socialist minister Jean-Luc Mélenchon, none of the politicians aspiring to be elected president in 2017 — the current occupant of the Elysée Palace, François Hollande, his centre-right predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy and centrist ex-prime minister Alain Juppé — anticipated the shocking outcome of the British referendum. Of mainstream politicians, only Bruno Le Maire, the so-called “third man” of the centre-right Les Républicains and a former minister for Europe, has called for a referendum on redefining the European project. (In an interview on June 27, Mr Juppé said it would be “irresponsible” to hold such a plebiscite in the near future.)
Writing in Le Monde in May, Mr Le Maire said: “Europe does not make us dream anymore.” France needs to “heal the wounds” of the 2005 referendum in which 55 per cent of voters rejected the proposed European constitution.
Many commentators regard that referendum as a key moment in recent French and European history. One recalls Jacques Chirac, then president, looking at a loss when confronted with young and middle-aged job seekers during a live television programme. Deep misgivings about France’s future in Europe were already gathering.
As Mr Le Maire said, the French people do not dream about Europe anymore. There is deep scepticism about the whole European project. And were they given the opportunity in a referendum, voters could well administer the kind of treatment to their elites that their counterparts in Britain have just dished out to theirs. Although France is not an insular country, it faces an uncertain future. As has happened in the UK, “Europe” has become the scapegoat for those who feel they have not benefited from globalisation.
The Pew survey says that 66 per cent of French people think that the EU has failed them economically. The financial crisis of 2008 has left terrible scars. Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment rose ...
Editor's Note: After the U.K.'s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror and ask itself if it will rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU or if it ...

Editor's Note: After the U.K.'s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror and ask itself if it will rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU or if it will follow the U.K. and become a gravedigger of the European project. Philippe Le Corre writes that the latter is more likely. This piece was originally posted by Financial Times.

After the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU, France is now being forced to look at itself in a mirror, and ask whether it still wishes to belong to the community of nations initiated by two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, half a century ago. Will France rally around the European ideal and forge an alliance with Germany to save the EU? Or will it follow the UK and become a gravedigger of the European project? The latter is more likely.

France faces a harsh and divisive campaign leading up to the presidential election in May 2017. After the vote for Brexit, it is hard to imagine that the main candidates will not make Europe one of their main priorities. Meanwhile, the Pew Research Center has recently provided striking new data on what the French think. Pew’s report shows that 61 per cent of French people hold unfavorable views of the EU, against 38 per cent who view it favourably. Sixty per cent of those surveyed said they wished that the French government would focus on the country’s own problems, as opposed to “helping other countries” (36 per cent). Fifty-two percent said France should pursue its own national interests rather than take allies into account (43 per cent).

The main question for the French political elite is the following: should it open the Pandora’s box of a referendum on France’s continued membership of the EU ?

With the exception of two candidates of the extreme right and far left, Marine Le Pen of the National Front and the former Socialist minister Jean-Luc Mélenchon, none of the politicians aspiring to be elected president in 2017 — the current occupant of the Elysée Palace, François Hollande, his centre-right predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy and centrist ex-prime minister Alain Juppé — anticipated the shocking outcome of the British referendum. Of mainstream politicians, only Bruno Le Maire, the so-called “third man” of the centre-right Les Républicains and a former minister for Europe, has called for a referendum on redefining the European project. (In an interview on June 27, Mr Juppé said it would be “irresponsible” to hold such a plebiscite in the near future.)

Writing in Le Monde in May, Mr Le Maire said: “Europe does not make us dream anymore.” France needs to “heal the wounds” of the 2005 referendum in which 55 per cent of voters rejected the proposed European constitution.

Many commentators regard that referendum as a key moment in recent French and European history. One recalls Jacques Chirac, then president, looking at a loss when confronted with young and middle-aged job seekers during a live television programme. Deep misgivings about France’s future in Europe were already gathering.

As Mr Le Maire said, the French people do not dream about Europe anymore. There is deep scepticism about the whole European project. And were they given the opportunity in a referendum, voters could well administer the kind of treatment to their elites that their counterparts in Britain have just dished out to theirs. Although France is not an insular country, it faces an uncertain future. As has happened in the UK, “Europe” has become the scapegoat for those who feel they have not benefited from globalisation.

The Pew survey says that 66 per cent of French people think that the EU has failed them economically. The financial crisis of 2008 has left terrible scars. Between 2007 and 2009, unemployment rose by two percentage points. It is around 10 per cent today. The age groups most affected are the young (those between 18 and 25) and the over 50s. It is likely that they would vote for “Frexit” in a referendum.

Populists are rejoicing. The National Front presents itself as a viable alternative to mainstream parties. Ms Le Pen has already called for a British-style referendum. The far-left Front de Gauche (FG), which has close ties to the trade union that has led strikes against labour market reforms, will push for exiting the EU.

One of FG leaders, Mr Mélenchon has announced that he will run for president next year on a Eurosceptic platform. He said that Brexit is “first and foremost the failure of the German government, of capitalism, and of successive subservient French governments”.

Politicians in these far right and far left parties have no more government experience than the triumphant leaders of the Brexit camp, Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson. But unless mainstream politicians can find remedies for France’s malaise, voters may well give the populists a chance. It is time for French elites to take action. If they do not, they risk suffering the same fate as David Cameron.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/28-brexit-us-new-bff-lecorre?rssid=france{D627BB36-7271-4E84-82EA-8D6A87958090}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/161735532/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~After-Brexit-US-will-need-a-new-BFFAfter Brexit, U.S. will need a new "BFF"

Editor's Note: In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. Philippe Le Corre writes that while close relations will remain with London on the business side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs when it comes to diplomacy. This piece was originally posted by CNBC.

In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. On one hand, the U.K. has been America's closest ally for decades; they share countless cultural, social and linguistic links. London hosts hundreds of European headquarters for American companies. In financial services, London is tied in many ways to Wall Street. And the U.K. is still the U.S.'s second trading partner in Europe (after Germany).

But what happens now, with a semi-detached U.K. facing yet another Scottish referendum and a possible backlash in Ireland?

Across the channel stands a unified European market with 450 million consumers, a single currency for 19 countries (out of the 27 remaining EU members) and a fairly regulated trading block with which the U.S. is engaged and intends to engage even more through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership which is currently being negotiated. Now, the shots will be called from Berlin, Paris and Brussels. Ironically for such a proponent of free trade and free markets, London will no longer have a voice.

Between the U.S. and the "new U.K.", everything will need to be reinvented.

First, on the business side, close relations will remain with London, the world's most international financial center after Wall Street; it is also somewhat ironic that London, a great cosmopolitan capital, voted on June 23 (as the only constituency in England) to remain within the EU but will soon become the capital of a pro-exit, fairly isolated country.

As for investments, chances are that U.S. corporations will look closely at opportunities on both sides of the English Channel, as currency fluctuations and market size will often make a difference. For those large companies with an existing Eurozone presence, it may not be much of a problem as they will be able to split between their operations. As for new investment projects, it will be an entirely different matter as businesses will rightly wait to see the result of U.K.-EU negotiations in the next couple of years. Whether the U.K. will be in a Norway-style economic situation or a Serbia, a fairly isolated European country which does not even belong to European economic space, time will tell as London will try – amid a great deal of uncertainty- to impose of its future relations with the EU.

Second, on the diplomatic side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs: both Germany and France are strong U.S. allies when it comes to economics, international affairs and security.

Germany is Europe's strongest country with a highly respected leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and France is NATO's top European contributor, a strong U.S. ally in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and in counter-terrorism. In such an international security environment, having strong partners will matter a lot to Washington, and it may very well accept the Franco-German axis as its new top interlocutor across the Atlantic.

Politically, the U.K. is facing a tough few months with long, tedious EU negotiations and a new government by October after David Cameron's announcement that he will step down as prime minister and leader of the Conservative Party.

As for his potential successor, former London Mayor Boris Johnson, it is an understatement to say he has not had a warm relationship with President Obama, having suggested in a newspaper article that Obama's pro-remain attitude might be based on his "part-Kenyan" heritage and ancestral dislike of the British empire.

There will be attempts to reconnect the dots between Washington and London, but the acrimony is running high on the U.S. side, including in the diplomatic and military establishments. As U.K. defense spending had dropped below the two per cent required NATO target last year, both former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power expressed their deep concerns about the 30,000 job cuts in the British military.

The U.K.-U.S. partnership under David Cameron has been a disappointment, leading to questions about the U.K.'s international role.

Hence my prediction that Germany and France, together or separately, will take over the "special relationship" and that the transatlantic alliance will be rebuilt on that basis, with Great Britain as a relatively junior member.

On a worldwide basis, it will play a similar role as Australia, New Zealand or Canada, also strong U.S. allies but with limited operational capacities. The redefinition of the international order under a different and more collaborative arrangement with new partners is not only a possibility, it is a reality.

Authors

]]>
Tue, 28 Jun 2016 10:00:00 -0400Philippe Le Corre
Editor's Note: In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. Philippe Le Corre writes that while close relations will remain with London on the business side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs when it comes to diplomacy. This piece was originally posted by CNBC.
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. On one hand, the U.K. has been America's closest ally for decades; they share countless cultural, social and linguistic links. London hosts hundreds of European headquarters for American companies. In financial services, London is tied in many ways to Wall Street. And the U.K. is still the U.S.'s second trading partner in Europe (after Germany).
But what happens now, with a semi-detached U.K. facing yet another Scottish referendum and a possible backlash in Ireland?
Across the channel stands a unified European market with 450 million consumers, a single currency for 19 countries (out of the 27 remaining EU members) and a fairly regulated trading block with which the U.S. is engaged and intends to engage even more through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership which is currently being negotiated. Now, the shots will be called from Berlin, Paris and Brussels. Ironically for such a proponent of free trade and free markets, London will no longer have a voice.
Between the U.S. and the "new U.K.", everything will need to be reinvented.
First, on the business side, close relations will remain with London, the world's most international financial center after Wall Street; it is also somewhat ironic that London, a great cosmopolitan capital, voted on June 23 (as the only constituency in England) to remain within the EU but will soon become the capital of a pro-exit, fairly isolated country.
As for investments, chances are that U.S. corporations will look closely at opportunities on both sides of the English Channel, as currency fluctuations and market size will often make a difference. For those large companies with an existing Eurozone presence, it may not be much of a problem as they will be able to split between their operations. As for new investment projects, it will be an entirely different matter as businesses will rightly wait to see the result of U.K.-EU negotiations in the next couple of years. Whether the U.K. will be in a Norway-style economic situation or a Serbia, a fairly isolated European country which does not even belong to European economic space, time will tell as London will try – amid a great deal of uncertainty- to impose of its future relations with the EU.
Second, on the diplomatic side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs: both Germany and France are strong U.S. allies when it comes to economics, international affairs and security.
Germany is Europe's strongest country with a highly respected leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and France is NATO's top European contributor, a strong U.S. ally in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and in counter-terrorism. In such an international security environment, having strong partners will matter a lot to Washington, and it may very well accept the Franco-German axis as its new top interlocutor across the Atlantic.
Politically, the U.K. is facing a tough few months with long, tedious EU negotiations and a new government by October after David Cameron's announcement that he will step down as prime minister and leader of the Conservative Party.
As for his potential successor, former London Mayor Boris Johnson, it is an understatement to say he has not had a warm relationship with President Obama, having suggested in a ...
Editor's Note: In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. Philippe Le Corre writes that while close relations will remain with ...

Editor's Note: In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. Philippe Le Corre writes that while close relations will remain with London on the business side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs when it comes to diplomacy. This piece was originally posted by CNBC.

In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the U.K., President Barack Obama and his immediate successor will face a tough dilemma when it comes to Europe. On one hand, the U.K. has been America's closest ally for decades; they share countless cultural, social and linguistic links. London hosts hundreds of European headquarters for American companies. In financial services, London is tied in many ways to Wall Street. And the U.K. is still the U.S.'s second trading partner in Europe (after Germany).

But what happens now, with a semi-detached U.K. facing yet another Scottish referendum and a possible backlash in Ireland?

Across the channel stands a unified European market with 450 million consumers, a single currency for 19 countries (out of the 27 remaining EU members) and a fairly regulated trading block with which the U.S. is engaged and intends to engage even more through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership which is currently being negotiated. Now, the shots will be called from Berlin, Paris and Brussels. Ironically for such a proponent of free trade and free markets, London will no longer have a voice.

Between the U.S. and the "new U.K.", everything will need to be reinvented.

First, on the business side, close relations will remain with London, the world's most international financial center after Wall Street; it is also somewhat ironic that London, a great cosmopolitan capital, voted on June 23 (as the only constituency in England) to remain within the EU but will soon become the capital of a pro-exit, fairly isolated country.

As for investments, chances are that U.S. corporations will look closely at opportunities on both sides of the English Channel, as currency fluctuations and market size will often make a difference. For those large companies with an existing Eurozone presence, it may not be much of a problem as they will be able to split between their operations. As for new investment projects, it will be an entirely different matter as businesses will rightly wait to see the result of U.K.-EU negotiations in the next couple of years. Whether the U.K. will be in a Norway-style economic situation or a Serbia, a fairly isolated European country which does not even belong to European economic space, time will tell as London will try – amid a great deal of uncertainty- to impose of its future relations with the EU.

Second, on the diplomatic side, the U.S. administration will surely be split between its historical relationship with the U.K. and the current state of affairs: both Germany and France are strong U.S. allies when it comes to economics, international affairs and security.

Germany is Europe's strongest country with a highly respected leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and France is NATO's top European contributor, a strong U.S. ally in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and in counter-terrorism. In such an international security environment, having strong partners will matter a lot to Washington, and it may very well accept the Franco-German axis as its new top interlocutor across the Atlantic.

Politically, the U.K. is facing a tough few months with long, tedious EU negotiations and a new government by October after David Cameron's announcement that he will step down as prime minister and leader of the Conservative Party.

As for his potential successor, former London Mayor Boris Johnson, it is an understatement to say he has not had a warm relationship with President Obama, having suggested in a newspaper article that Obama's pro-remain attitude might be based on his "part-Kenyan" heritage and ancestral dislike of the British empire.

There will be attempts to reconnect the dots between Washington and London, but the acrimony is running high on the U.S. side, including in the diplomatic and military establishments. As U.K. defense spending had dropped below the two per cent required NATO target last year, both former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power expressed their deep concerns about the 30,000 job cuts in the British military.

The U.K.-U.S. partnership under David Cameron has been a disappointment, leading to questions about the U.K.'s international role.

Hence my prediction that Germany and France, together or separately, will take over the "special relationship" and that the transatlantic alliance will be rebuilt on that basis, with Great Britain as a relatively junior member.

On a worldwide basis, it will play a similar role as Australia, New Zealand or Canada, also strong U.S. allies but with limited operational capacities. The redefinition of the international order under a different and more collaborative arrangement with new partners is not only a possibility, it is a reality.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/28-brexit-sea-of-troubles-alcaro?rssid=france{95FDA34D-A68F-44B9-9482-537AD2EEDFF6}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/161770940/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~Brexit-ushers-in-a-sea-of-troublesBrexit ushers in a sea of troubles

And thus, it happened, Brexit is a reality. For the first time in history, a European Union member state has decided to leave the EU. And what a member state it is. The U.K. is the EU’s second-largest economy, its main military power (along with France), a country with a global foreign policy outlook, and a pro-active approach to international crises and challenges.

The composite coalition that championed Brexit, including the openly xenophobic U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) as well as staunch free marketeers from the Conservative Party, understandably celebrates a result probably unachievable just a few years ago. So do the other parties in Europe that have made opposition to immigration, European integration, and globalization the centerpiece of their political agenda, such as the National Front in France, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the Northern League in Italy. Rightly emphasizing the similarities with his views on these issues, the Republican contender for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump, has hailed Brexit as a “good thing.”

The rest of the world—and of the U.K.—is stunned, as The New York Times headline read on the day after the U.K. referendum. Politicians, experts, and ordinary citizens wonder about the effects of Brexit for the U.K., Europe, and the world. These are legitimate concerns. To put it bluntly, Brexit is a severe blow to the U.K., to the EU, and to the international liberal order. Worse still, it might trigger a chain reaction that could turn it into a full-blown catastrophe.

A more divided country

In just one night, the U.K. has plunged into a grave constitutional crisis. The dramatic fall of the pound vis-à-vis the dollar—it reached its lowest point in 30 years—has caused the British gross domestic product to slip below France’s in two hours. It may be that the grim predictions of the U.K. Treasury—which has warned about a U.K. going into a recession already this year – are exaggerated. Yet there is little doubt that the next prime minister—David Cameron has already announced he will resign in the next few months—will have to cope with volatile markets and a more fragile and vulnerable economy. And this is going to be just one of the excruciatingly difficult tasks he or she will be confronted with.

The Conservative Party still holds an absolute majority in Parliament, so it is from its ranks that the next prime minister will come out. Pundits are betting on a leading figure of the pro-Brexit fraction, but that is not a given. The party is divided and bitter between its pro- and anti-Brexit camps, a wound that a centrist might perhaps have a better chance to heal.

Mending intra-party fences will just be the start, however. The EU referendum has torn apart the country. It has highlighted painful splits between the older generation (overwhelmingly in favor of Brexit) and the younger one (massively against); between the province and urban centers (London, Manchester, and Liverpool all voted to stay in the EU); and between English and Welsh (who voted for Brexit) and Northern Irish and Scots (who voted against).

This latter split is likely to have political consequences. The Scottish National Party, which unsuccessfully ran a pro-independence campaign in 2014, has announced that the possibility of holding a second referendum is on the table. And Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, has called for a vote on Northern Ireland’s reunification with Ireland. Post-Brexit, the U.K. faces the prospects not only of a diminished international role and economy, but territory too.

A weaker EU

The EU will also suffer from Brexit. The leaders of the other 27 member states have to now decide how they want to handle the divorce with London. As the British economy is deeply integrated with the EU’s, imposing hard terms on the U.K.—for instance, excluding it altogether from the European single market—is counterproductive. At the same time, EU leaders want to prevent that too generous terms might invite emulations from other countries. Indeed, the risk of contagion has never been so high.

Next fall, Italy may find itself in a political crisis if voters reject a constitutional reform on whose success the pro-EU Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has pinned his political career. Mistrust of Italy’s ability to run the economy will spread across markets, raising the specter of yet another eurozone crisis. This will only give Euroskeptic movements more credibility. In spring 2017, the Netherlands and France will hold national elections, while German voters will go to the polls in early fall. Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, leaders of the National Front and the PVV respectively, are polling ahead of pro-EU forces. Both have both promised an EU referendum if elected. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is weary and might be unable to secure a fourth mandate. If she goes, the next chancellor is very likely to be less pro-EU and tougher on immigration. Europe’s re-nationalization would then be a real prospect.

A less cohesive West

A fractured and divided EU would be a much less relevant international actor. The Europeans’ influence on global governance, international institutions, and multilateral negotiations would shrink. The United States would see Europe as a problem rather than a partner, and the cohesion of the West, as much as its leadership capacity, would dwindle. The notion that rules, institutions, and norms should govern international relations would lose in credibility, while the one that emphasizes power would gain. The functionality of the Western-promoted liberal order would be at risk.

Well-respected experts have good reasons to argue that we should not despair about Brexit. They are right, the catastrophic scenario sketched above is not a given. Yet it’s not implausible either. Policymakers in the U.K., Europe, and elsewhere should consider their next steps being fully aware that Brexit’s effects might be felt farther away than the British Isles.

Authors

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Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:00:00 -0400Riccardo Alcaro
And thus, it happened, Brexit is a reality. For the first time in history, a European Union member state has decided to leave the EU. And what a member state it is. The U.K. is the EU’s second-largest economy, its main military power (along with France), a country with a global foreign policy outlook, and a pro-active approach to international crises and challenges.
The composite coalition that championed Brexit, including the openly xenophobic U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) as well as staunch free marketeers from the Conservative Party, understandably celebrates a result probably unachievable just a few years ago. So do the other parties in Europe that have made opposition to immigration, European integration, and globalization the centerpiece of their political agenda, such as the National Front in France, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the Northern League in Italy. Rightly emphasizing the similarities with his views on these issues, the Republican contender for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump, has hailed Brexit as a “good thing.”
The rest of the world—and of the U.K.—is stunned, as The New York Times headline read on the day after the U.K. referendum. Politicians, experts, and ordinary citizens wonder about the effects of Brexit for the U.K., Europe, and the world. These are legitimate concerns. To put it bluntly, Brexit is a severe blow to the U.K., to the EU, and to the international liberal order. Worse still, it might trigger a chain reaction that could turn it into a full-blown catastrophe.
A more divided country
In just one night, the U.K. has plunged into a grave constitutional crisis. The dramatic fall of the pound vis-à-vis the dollar—it reached its lowest point in 30 years—has caused the British gross domestic product to slip below France’s in two hours. It may be that the grim predictions of the U.K. Treasury—which has warned about a U.K. going into a recession already this year – are exaggerated. Yet there is little doubt that the next prime minister—David Cameron has already announced he will resign in the next few months—will have to cope with volatile markets and a more fragile and vulnerable economy. And this is going to be just one of the excruciatingly difficult tasks he or she will be confronted with.
The Conservative Party still holds an absolute majority in Parliament, so it is from its ranks that the next prime minister will come out. Pundits are betting on a leading figure of the pro-Brexit fraction, but that is not a given. The party is divided and bitter between its pro- and anti-Brexit camps, a wound that a centrist might perhaps have a better chance to heal.
Mending intra-party fences will just be the start, however. The EU referendum has torn apart the country. It has highlighted painful splits between the older generation (overwhelmingly in favor of Brexit) and the younger one (massively against); between the province and urban centers (London, Manchester, and Liverpool all voted to stay in the EU); and between English and Welsh (who voted for Brexit) and Northern Irish and Scots (who voted against).
This latter split is likely to have political consequences. The Scottish National Party, which unsuccessfully ran a pro-independence campaign in 2014, has announced that the possibility of holding a second referendum is on the table. And Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, has called for a vote on Northern Ireland’s reunification with Ireland. Post-Brexit, the U.K. faces the prospects not only of a diminished international role and economy, but territory too.
A weaker EU
The EU will also suffer from Brexit. The leaders of the other 27 member states have to now decide how they want to handle the divorce with London. As the British economy is deeply integrated with the EU’s, imposing hard terms on the U.K.—for instance, excluding it altogether from the European single ...
And thus, it happened, Brexit is a reality. For the first time in history, a European Union member state has decided to leave the EU. And what a member state it is. The U.K. is the EU’s second-largest economy, its main military power ...

And thus, it happened, Brexit is a reality. For the first time in history, a European Union member state has decided to leave the EU. And what a member state it is. The U.K. is the EU’s second-largest economy, its main military power (along with France), a country with a global foreign policy outlook, and a pro-active approach to international crises and challenges.

The composite coalition that championed Brexit, including the openly xenophobic U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) as well as staunch free marketeers from the Conservative Party, understandably celebrates a result probably unachievable just a few years ago. So do the other parties in Europe that have made opposition to immigration, European integration, and globalization the centerpiece of their political agenda, such as the National Front in France, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the Northern League in Italy. Rightly emphasizing the similarities with his views on these issues, the Republican contender for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump, has hailed Brexit as a “good thing.”

The rest of the world—and of the U.K.—is stunned, as The New York Times headline read on the day after the U.K. referendum. Politicians, experts, and ordinary citizens wonder about the effects of Brexit for the U.K., Europe, and the world. These are legitimate concerns. To put it bluntly, Brexit is a severe blow to the U.K., to the EU, and to the international liberal order. Worse still, it might trigger a chain reaction that could turn it into a full-blown catastrophe.

A more divided country

In just one night, the U.K. has plunged into a grave constitutional crisis. The dramatic fall of the pound vis-à-vis the dollar—it reached its lowest point in 30 years—has caused the British gross domestic product to slip below France’s in two hours. It may be that the grim predictions of the U.K. Treasury—which has warned about a U.K. going into a recession already this year – are exaggerated. Yet there is little doubt that the next prime minister—David Cameron has already announced he will resign in the next few months—will have to cope with volatile markets and a more fragile and vulnerable economy. And this is going to be just one of the excruciatingly difficult tasks he or she will be confronted with.

The Conservative Party still holds an absolute majority in Parliament, so it is from its ranks that the next prime minister will come out. Pundits are betting on a leading figure of the pro-Brexit fraction, but that is not a given. The party is divided and bitter between its pro- and anti-Brexit camps, a wound that a centrist might perhaps have a better chance to heal.

Mending intra-party fences will just be the start, however. The EU referendum has torn apart the country. It has highlighted painful splits between the older generation (overwhelmingly in favor of Brexit) and the younger one (massively against); between the province and urban centers (London, Manchester, and Liverpool all voted to stay in the EU); and between English and Welsh (who voted for Brexit) and Northern Irish and Scots (who voted against).

This latter split is likely to have political consequences. The Scottish National Party, which unsuccessfully ran a pro-independence campaign in 2014, has announced that the possibility of holding a second referendum is on the table. And Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, has called for a vote on Northern Ireland’s reunification with Ireland. Post-Brexit, the U.K. faces the prospects not only of a diminished international role and economy, but territory too.

A weaker EU

The EU will also suffer from Brexit. The leaders of the other 27 member states have to now decide how they want to handle the divorce with London. As the British economy is deeply integrated with the EU’s, imposing hard terms on the U.K.—for instance, excluding it altogether from the European single market—is counterproductive. At the same time, EU leaders want to prevent that too generous terms might invite emulations from other countries. Indeed, the risk of contagion has never been so high.

Next fall, Italy may find itself in a political crisis if voters reject a constitutional reform on whose success the pro-EU Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has pinned his political career. Mistrust of Italy’s ability to run the economy will spread across markets, raising the specter of yet another eurozone crisis. This will only give Euroskeptic movements more credibility. In spring 2017, the Netherlands and France will hold national elections, while German voters will go to the polls in early fall. Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, leaders of the National Front and the PVV respectively, are polling ahead of pro-EU forces. Both have both promised an EU referendum if elected. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is weary and might be unable to secure a fourth mandate. If she goes, the next chancellor is very likely to be less pro-EU and tougher on immigration. Europe’s re-nationalization would then be a real prospect.

A less cohesive West

A fractured and divided EU would be a much less relevant international actor. The Europeans’ influence on global governance, international institutions, and multilateral negotiations would shrink. The United States would see Europe as a problem rather than a partner, and the cohesion of the West, as much as its leadership capacity, would dwindle. The notion that rules, institutions, and norms should govern international relations would lose in credibility, while the one that emphasizes power would gain. The functionality of the Western-promoted liberal order would be at risk.

Well-respected experts have good reasons to argue that we should not despair about Brexit. They are right, the catastrophic scenario sketched above is not a given. Yet it’s not implausible either. Policymakers in the U.K., Europe, and elsewhere should consider their next steps being fully aware that Brexit’s effects might be felt farther away than the British Isles.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/05/11-french-pivot-to-asia-lecorre-ohanlon?rssid=france{2B3A659B-6533-4FB3-9A37-75834CCF1726}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/153824198/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~Frances-pivot-to-Asia-Its-more-than-just-submarinesFrance's pivot to Asia: It's more than just submarines

Editors’ Note: Since President François Hollande’s 2012 election, France has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region, write Philippe Le Corre and Michael O’Hanlon. This piece originally appeared on The National Interest.

On April 26, France’s defense shipbuilding company DCNS secured a victory in winning, against Japan and Germany, a long-awaited $40 billion Australian submarine deal. It may not come as a surprise to anyone who has been following France’s growing interest in the Asia-Pacific for the past five years. Since President François Hollande’s 2012 election, the country has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region.

Visiting New Caledonia last weekend, Prime Minister Manuel Valls immediately decided on the spot to fly to Australia to celebrate the submarine news. Having been at odds in the 1990s over France’s decision to test its nuclear weapon capacities on an isolated Pacific island, Paris and Canberra have begun a close partnership over the last decade, culminating in the decision by Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in power since September 2015.

Unlike its Japanese competitor Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), DCNS promised to build the submarine main parts on Australian soil, creating 2,900 jobs in the Adelaide area. The French also secured support from U.S. defense contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, one of which will eventually build the twelve shortfin Barracuda submarines’ combat systems. Meanwhile, this unexpected victory, in light of the close strategic relationship between Australia and Japan, has shed light on France’s sustained ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Thanks to its overseas territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island, France has the world’s second-largest maritime domain. It is also part of QUAD, the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group that also includes the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and which coordinates security efforts in the Pacific, particularly in the maritime domain, by supporting island states to robustly and sustainably manage their natural resources, including fisheries.

France is also attempting to correct an excessive focus on China by developing new ties with India, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, which have all received a number of French ministerial visits. France’s overseas territories also include a presence in the southern part of the Indian Ocean, with the islands of Mayotte, Réunion and the Scattered Islands, and French Southern and Antarctic Territories, as well as the northwest region of the Indian Ocean through its permanent military presence in the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti. Altogether these presences encompass one million French citizens. This sets France apart from its fellow EU member states regarding defense and security in the Asia-Pacific, particularly as France is a top supplier of military equipment to several Asian countries including Singapore, Malaysia, India and Australia. Between 2008 and 2012, Asian nations accounted for 28 percent of French defense equipment sales, versus 12 percent during 1998–2002. (More broadly, 70 percent of European containerized merchandise trade transits through the Indian Ocean.)

Despite its unique position, France is also supportive of a joint European Union policy toward the region, especially when it comes to developments in the South China Sea. Last March, with support from Paris, Berlin, London and other members, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued a statement criticizing China’s actions:

“The EU is committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based upon the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This includes the maintenance of maritime safety, security, and cooperation, freedom of navigation and overflight. While not taking a position on claims to land territory and maritime space in the South China Sea, the EU urges all claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures.”

This does not mean that France is neglecting its “global partnership” with China. In 2014, the two countries celebrated fifty years of diplomatic relations; both governments conduct annual bilateral dialogues on international and security issues. But as a key EU state, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a significant contributor to the Asia-Pacific’s security, France has launched a multidimensional Asia policy.

All of this should be seen as welcome news by Washington. While there would have been advantages to any of the three worthy bids, a greater French role in the Asia-Pacific should be beneficial. At this crucial historical moment in China's rise and the region's broader blossoming, the United States needs a strong and engaged European partnership to encourage Beijing in the right direction and push back together when that does not occur. Acting in concert with some of the world's other major democracies can add further legitimacy to America's actions to uphold the international order in the Asia-Pacific. To be sure, Japan, South Korea and Australia are key U.S. partners here and will remain so. But each also has its own limitations (and in Japan's case, a great deal of historical baggage in dealing with China).

European states are already heavily involved in economic interactions with China. The submarine decision will help ensure a broader European role that includes a hard-headed perspective on security trends as well.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 11 May 2016 10:30:00 -0400Philippe Le Corre and Michael E. O'Hanlon
Editors' Note: Since President François Hollande's 2012 election, France has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region, write Philippe Le Corre and Michael O'Hanlon. This piece originally appeared on The National Interest.
On April 26, France's defense shipbuilding company DCNS secured a victory in winning, against Japan and Germany, a long-awaited $40 billion Australian submarine deal. It may not come as a surprise to anyone who has been following France's growing interest in the Asia-Pacific for the past five years. Since President François Hollande's 2012 election, the country has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region.
Visiting New Caledonia last weekend, Prime Minister Manuel Valls immediately decided on the spot to fly to Australia to celebrate the submarine news. Having been at odds in the 1990s over France's decision to test its nuclear weapon capacities on an isolated Pacific island, Paris and Canberra have begun a close partnership over the last decade, culminating in the decision by Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in power since September 2015.
Unlike its Japanese competitor Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), DCNS promised to build the submarine main parts on Australian soil, creating 2,900 jobs in the Adelaide area. The French also secured support from U.S. defense contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, one of which will eventually build the twelve shortfin Barracuda submarines' combat systems. Meanwhile, this unexpected victory, in light of the close strategic relationship between Australia and Japan, has shed light on France's sustained ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Thanks to its overseas territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island, France has the world's second-largest maritime domain. It is also part of QUAD, the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group that also includes the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and which coordinates security efforts in the Pacific, particularly in the maritime domain, by supporting island states to robustly and sustainably manage their natural resources, including fisheries.
France is also attempting to correct an excessive focus on China by developing new ties with India, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, which have all received a number of French ministerial visits. France's overseas territories also include a presence in the southern part of the Indian Ocean, with the islands of Mayotte, Réunion and the Scattered Islands, and French Southern and Antarctic Territories, as well as the northwest region of the Indian Ocean through its permanent military presence in the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti. Altogether these presences encompass one million French citizens. This sets France apart from its fellow EU member states regarding defense and security in the Asia-Pacific, particularly as France is a top supplier of military equipment to several Asian countries including Singapore, Malaysia, India and Australia. Between 2008 and 2012, Asian nations accounted for 28 percent of French defense equipment sales, versus 12 percent during 1998–2002. (More broadly, 70 percent of European containerized merchandise trade transits through the Indian Ocean.)
Despite its unique position, France is also supportive of a joint European Union policy toward the region, especially when it comes to developments in the South China Sea. Last March, with support from Paris, Berlin, London and other members, Federica Mogherini, the EU's High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued a statement criticizing China's actions:“The EU is committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based upon the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the United ...
Editors' Note: Since President François Hollande's 2012 election, France has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region, write Philippe Le Corre and Michael ...

Editors’ Note: Since President François Hollande’s 2012 election, France has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region, write Philippe Le Corre and Michael O’Hanlon. This piece originally appeared on The National Interest.

On April 26, France’s defense shipbuilding company DCNS secured a victory in winning, against Japan and Germany, a long-awaited $40 billion Australian submarine deal. It may not come as a surprise to anyone who has been following France’s growing interest in the Asia-Pacific for the past five years. Since President François Hollande’s 2012 election, the country has launched an Asia-wide initiative in an attempt to halt declining trade figures and improve its overall leverage with the region.

Visiting New Caledonia last weekend, Prime Minister Manuel Valls immediately decided on the spot to fly to Australia to celebrate the submarine news. Having been at odds in the 1990s over France’s decision to test its nuclear weapon capacities on an isolated Pacific island, Paris and Canberra have begun a close partnership over the last decade, culminating in the decision by Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in power since September 2015.

Unlike its Japanese competitor Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), DCNS promised to build the submarine main parts on Australian soil, creating 2,900 jobs in the Adelaide area. The French also secured support from U.S. defense contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, one of which will eventually build the twelve shortfin Barracuda submarines’ combat systems. Meanwhile, this unexpected victory, in light of the close strategic relationship between Australia and Japan, has shed light on France’s sustained ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Thanks to its overseas territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island, France has the world’s second-largest maritime domain. It is also part of QUAD, the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group that also includes the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and which coordinates security efforts in the Pacific, particularly in the maritime domain, by supporting island states to robustly and sustainably manage their natural resources, including fisheries.

France is also attempting to correct an excessive focus on China by developing new ties with India, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, which have all received a number of French ministerial visits. France’s overseas territories also include a presence in the southern part of the Indian Ocean, with the islands of Mayotte, Réunion and the Scattered Islands, and French Southern and Antarctic Territories, as well as the northwest region of the Indian Ocean through its permanent military presence in the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti. Altogether these presences encompass one million French citizens. This sets France apart from its fellow EU member states regarding defense and security in the Asia-Pacific, particularly as France is a top supplier of military equipment to several Asian countries including Singapore, Malaysia, India and Australia. Between 2008 and 2012, Asian nations accounted for 28 percent of French defense equipment sales, versus 12 percent during 1998–2002. (More broadly, 70 percent of European containerized merchandise trade transits through the Indian Ocean.)

Despite its unique position, France is also supportive of a joint European Union policy toward the region, especially when it comes to developments in the South China Sea. Last March, with support from Paris, Berlin, London and other members, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued a statement criticizing China’s actions:

“The EU is committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based upon the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This includes the maintenance of maritime safety, security, and cooperation, freedom of navigation and overflight. While not taking a position on claims to land territory and maritime space in the South China Sea, the EU urges all claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures.”

This does not mean that France is neglecting its “global partnership” with China. In 2014, the two countries celebrated fifty years of diplomatic relations; both governments conduct annual bilateral dialogues on international and security issues. But as a key EU state, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a significant contributor to the Asia-Pacific’s security, France has launched a multidimensional Asia policy.

All of this should be seen as welcome news by Washington. While there would have been advantages to any of the three worthy bids, a greater French role in the Asia-Pacific should be beneficial. At this crucial historical moment in China's rise and the region's broader blossoming, the United States needs a strong and engaged European partnership to encourage Beijing in the right direction and push back together when that does not occur. Acting in concert with some of the world's other major democracies can add further legitimacy to America's actions to uphold the international order in the Asia-Pacific. To be sure, Japan, South Korea and Australia are key U.S. partners here and will remain so. But each also has its own limitations (and in Japan's case, a great deal of historical baggage in dealing with China).

European states are already heavily involved in economic interactions with China. The submarine decision will help ensure a broader European role that includes a hard-headed perspective on security trends as well.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2016/05/11-paris-mega-university-parilla-gootman?rssid=france{2C37EE7C-7D45-4E30-856A-1AD1AD7467D2}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/153827816/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~Paris-bets-big-on-science-and-technology-with-new-megauniversityParis bets big on science and technology with new mega-university

When asked how to create a great city, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said: “Create a great university and wait 200 years.” It would be an understatement, then, to say that the fall 2015 launch of the University of Paris-Saclay—which merges 18 French academic and research institutions in one sprawling 30-square-mile research campus—heeds Moynihan’s words. As part of a Global Cities Initiative research effort to benchmark the Paris region’s global competitiveness, we visited the Paris-Saclay cluster to better understand this transformative investment.

Paris already houses renowned higher education institutions, from the Sorbonne to its network of prestigious grandes écoles. But in the eyes of French authorities, no single institution (or geographic cluster of institutions) rivals competitor regions such as Silicon Valley or Boston in terms of research prowess or name recognition. The goal of Paris-Saclay, therefore, is to consolidate many of France’s most potent research institutions under one common brand and co-locate them in one geographic cluster about 45 minutes outside central Paris.

This is neither a cheap nor organizationally simple task. The French central government has allocated €2.5 billion for building projects, laboratories, and centers of excellence. And that number does not include the billions required to build Line 18 of the Grand Paris Express Métro, which will connect Paris-Saclay to the rest of the Île-de-France region. Organizationally, the university has had to streamline the offerings of multiple academic institutions into doctoral programs and 49 master’s degrees. Already, Paris-Saclay is home to 65,000 students and 10,000 research professionals.

The prevailing concentration of research talent reflects the fact that the University of Paris-Saclay builds on existing institutional assets, including one of France’s most prestigious science and technology universities (École Polytechnique), the national atomic energy commission, and the National Center for Scientific Research. The addition of universities like École Centrale Paris, ENS Cachan, and several ParisTech schools from other parts of the Île-de-France region effectively doubles down on this geography. As our colleagues Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner have documented in their research, strategies that co-locate public labs, universities, and large and small companies recognize that innovation demands the cross-fertilization of knowledge and capacities across institutions.

Publicly and privately run incubators and accelerators dot the landscape to complement these multinational anchors. We visited IncubAlliance, a local incubator, where Andrei Klochko, a student from École Polytechnique, pitched his compressed energy storage technology. One can imagine hundreds of young entrepreneurs in this mold yielding the breakthroughs that will position the Paris region at the vanguard of Europe’s innovation system.

Yet the University of Paris-Saclay is very much an unfinished vision. Much of the development is still empty fields, and Line 18 will not be finished until 2024. While creating vibrant spaces is a core goal of the new development, Paris-Saclay’s suburban feel may not excite footloose talent in the ways central Paris can.

Still, when asked whether he’d rather be in central Paris, Klochko responded that he’ll live wherever his business has the best chance of success. He studies at École Polytechnique, tests his products at the research lab nearby, and draws on supports from IncubAlliance. For now, then, that’s in Paris-Saclay.

Authors

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Wed, 11 May 2016 10:56:00 -0400Joseph Parilla and Marek Gootman
When asked how to create a great city, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said: “Create a great university and wait 200 years.” It would be an understatement, then, to say that the fall 2015 launch of the University of Paris-Saclay—which merges 18 French academic and research institutions in one sprawling 30-square-mile research campus—heeds Moynihan's words. As part of a Global Cities Initiative research effort to benchmark the Paris region's global competitiveness, we visited the Paris-Saclay cluster to better understand this transformative investment.
Paris already houses renowned higher education institutions, from the Sorbonne to its network of prestigious grandes écoles. But in the eyes of French authorities, no single institution (or geographic cluster of institutions) rivals competitor regions such as Silicon Valley or Boston in terms of research prowess or name recognition. The goal of Paris-Saclay, therefore, is to consolidate many of France's most potent research institutions under one common brand and co-locate them in one geographic cluster about 45 minutes outside central Paris.
This is neither a cheap nor organizationally simple task. The French central government has allocated 2.5 billion for building projects, laboratories, and centers of excellence. And that number does not include the billions required to build Line 18 of the Grand Paris Express Métro, which will connect Paris-Saclay to the rest of the Île-de-France region. Organizationally, the university has had to streamline the offerings of multiple academic institutions into doctoral programs and 49 master's degrees. Already, Paris-Saclay is home to 65,000 students and 10,000 research professionals.
The prevailing concentration of research talent reflects the fact that the University of Paris-Saclay builds on existing institutional assets, including one of France's most prestigious science and technology universities (École Polytechnique), the national atomic energy commission, and the National Center for Scientific Research. The addition of universities like École Centrale Paris, ENS Cachan, and several ParisTech schools from other parts of the Île-de-France region effectively doubles down on this geography. As our colleagues Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner have documented in their research, strategies that co-locate public labs, universities, and large and small companies recognize that innovation demands the cross-fertilization of knowledge and capacities across institutions.
Firms are responding favorably to this offer at Paris-Saclay. Major companies are locating within the development, anchoring five priority sectors: energy (EDF, GE), ICT (Nokia, HP, Sun Microsystem), mobility (Renault, PSA), health (Sanofi, GE Health Care), and aerospace (SAFRAN, Thalés, Dassault System).
Publicly and privately run incubators and accelerators dot the landscape to complement these multinational anchors. We visited IncubAlliance, a local incubator, where Andrei Klochko, a student from École Polytechnique, pitched his compressed energy storage technology. One can imagine hundreds of young entrepreneurs in this mold yielding the breakthroughs that will position the Paris region at the vanguard of Europe's innovation system.
Yet the University of Paris-Saclay is very much an unfinished vision. Much of the development is still empty fields, and Line 18 will not be finished until 2024. While creating vibrant spaces is a core goal of the new development, Paris-Saclay's suburban feel may not excite footloose talent in the ways central Paris can.
Still, when asked whether he'd rather be in central Paris, Klochko responded that he'll live wherever his business has the best chance of success. He studies at École Polytechnique, tests his products at the research lab nearby, and draws on supports from IncubAlliance. For now, then, that's in Paris-Saclay.
Authors
- Joseph ...
When asked how to create a great city, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said: “Create a great university and wait 200 years.” It would be an understatement, then, to say that the fall 2015 launch of the University of ...

When asked how to create a great city, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said: “Create a great university and wait 200 years.” It would be an understatement, then, to say that the fall 2015 launch of the University of Paris-Saclay—which merges 18 French academic and research institutions in one sprawling 30-square-mile research campus—heeds Moynihan’s words. As part of a Global Cities Initiative research effort to benchmark the Paris region’s global competitiveness, we visited the Paris-Saclay cluster to better understand this transformative investment.

Paris already houses renowned higher education institutions, from the Sorbonne to its network of prestigious grandes écoles. But in the eyes of French authorities, no single institution (or geographic cluster of institutions) rivals competitor regions such as Silicon Valley or Boston in terms of research prowess or name recognition. The goal of Paris-Saclay, therefore, is to consolidate many of France’s most potent research institutions under one common brand and co-locate them in one geographic cluster about 45 minutes outside central Paris.

This is neither a cheap nor organizationally simple task. The French central government has allocated €2.5 billion for building projects, laboratories, and centers of excellence. And that number does not include the billions required to build Line 18 of the Grand Paris Express Métro, which will connect Paris-Saclay to the rest of the Île-de-France region. Organizationally, the university has had to streamline the offerings of multiple academic institutions into doctoral programs and 49 master’s degrees. Already, Paris-Saclay is home to 65,000 students and 10,000 research professionals.

The prevailing concentration of research talent reflects the fact that the University of Paris-Saclay builds on existing institutional assets, including one of France’s most prestigious science and technology universities (École Polytechnique), the national atomic energy commission, and the National Center for Scientific Research. The addition of universities like École Centrale Paris, ENS Cachan, and several ParisTech schools from other parts of the Île-de-France region effectively doubles down on this geography. As our colleagues Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner have documented in their research, strategies that co-locate public labs, universities, and large and small companies recognize that innovation demands the cross-fertilization of knowledge and capacities across institutions.

Publicly and privately run incubators and accelerators dot the landscape to complement these multinational anchors. We visited IncubAlliance, a local incubator, where Andrei Klochko, a student from École Polytechnique, pitched his compressed energy storage technology. One can imagine hundreds of young entrepreneurs in this mold yielding the breakthroughs that will position the Paris region at the vanguard of Europe’s innovation system.

Yet the University of Paris-Saclay is very much an unfinished vision. Much of the development is still empty fields, and Line 18 will not be finished until 2024. While creating vibrant spaces is a core goal of the new development, Paris-Saclay’s suburban feel may not excite footloose talent in the ways central Paris can.

Still, when asked whether he’d rather be in central Paris, Klochko responded that he’ll live wherever his business has the best chance of success. He studies at École Polytechnique, tests his products at the research lab nearby, and draws on supports from IncubAlliance. For now, then, that’s in Paris-Saclay.

Editors’ Note: Is Europe’s jihadi terrorism problem greater than America’s? No one factor explains the difference, writes Dan Byman. On balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for terrorists to attack Europe. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.

It didn’t take the Brussels bombings to convince most experts that the terrorist threat to Europe is greater than that to the U.S. homeland. The November 2015 Paris attacks, the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings, the 2014 Jewish Museum of Belgium shootings, and other attacks and plots in Europe indicate that Europe’s jihadist terrorism problem is greater than America’s in both frequency and intensity.

No one factor explains the difference, but I’d compare the danger along several dimensions. The first to consider is simply the goals of the Islamic State, though this is ultimately unsatisfying. As I’ve argued elsewhere, in contrast to al-Qaida’s anti-U.S. emphasis, Islamic State leaders have primarily focused on their state-building project in Iraq and Syria. Developing provinces in the Muslim world is another goal. Although most Islamic State attacks still strike regional targets, attacks on the West have risen on the priority list, particularly after the United States and allies in Europe began an air campaign against the Islamic State. But given that the United States is the leader of the coalition (and supplying the vast majority of the strike assets), Washington should be at least a rung above Europe on the enemies list. And within Europe, Belgium should be relatively low on the ladder given its minimal contribution to the anti-Islamic State campaign, even discontinuing military operations late last year. So looking solely at the Islamic State’s enemies list is not enough.

It’s more useful, then, to focus on how easily the Islamic State can strike Europe in comparison to the United States. And here the contrast is clear. Over 5,000 Europeans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria; less than 200 Americans have joined the struggle. Europe also shares a land border with Iraq and Syria via Turkey and is logistically far more accessible for Islamic State fighters to go back and forth, while the United States is protected by two great oceans. Even putting foreign fighters and simple geography aside, Muslim communities in Europe have more radicalized individuals who stay in Europe, and thus a greater native pool of recruits for lone wolf and other attacks.

Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens.

Beyond foreign fighters and radicalized stay-at-homes, the integration challenge is far greater in Europe. The specifics vary by country, but almost everywhere, the situation is bad. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no direct correlation between education or poverty and terrorism. However, when such problems are rampant within one community, they suggest a problem that is apparent to anyone who walks a Muslim neighborhood in a major European city: a lack of integration. Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens. Trust in the police and security services is particularly low. Some European states embrace secularism and see visible symbols of the practice of Islam as a threat to this identity, and as jihadist terrorism emerged as a leading issue after 9/11, critics began to link Muslim identity to violence. Each terrorist attack makes this problem worse, with chauvinistic voices denouncing Muslims, making the community draw even more inward. And more security service raids on Muslim communities only increase their suspicions.

American Muslims, in contrast, are far better integrated and have regularly cooperated with the FBI, foiling many terrorist plots. The vitriol that has accompanied the 2016 U.S. election—and the embrace of this rhetoric among many voters—risks jeopardizing this robust cooperation, alienating American Muslims and making them less likely to work with the police and the FBI.

Terrorists can move freely across Europe’s open borders, but security services cannot—in this way the terrorists are far more “European” than the security services that fight them. The Paris and Brussels attacks revealed gaping holes in Europe’s counterterrorism net: lists of suspects are often not shared, and different countries use different systems of transliteration, hindering basic data searches. Even for countries with effective security services like France, vulnerability is still high, as less proficient neighbors like Belgium create de facto havens where terrorists face far less pressure. In general, I’ve been on the side of those arguing that the terrorist threat to the West, while real, is manageable, but I also warned in 2014 that “The problem is particularly acute for small countries like Belgium that have many foreign fighters, but small security services and little history of militancy, forcing them to play catch-up even as the problem escalates.” As long as European security performance is uneven, strong countries will be vulnerable to mistakes or weak efforts by those European countries unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources or establish a proper counterterrorism framework.

So, on balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for the Islamic State to attack Europe. However, if the above factors do explain much of the difference, Europe should focus not just on improving security services, but also on better integrating its Muslim communities. An integrated Muslim community would not only reduce the number of those radicalized, but also make it more likely for the police and intelligence services to discover terrorists and stop them before they strike again.

Authors

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Tue, 05 Apr 2016 12:00:00 -0400Daniel L. Byman
Editors’ Note: Is Europe’s jihadi terrorism problem greater than America’s? No one factor explains the difference, writes Dan Byman. On balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for terrorists to attack Europe. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.
It didn’t take the Brussels bombings to convince most experts that the terrorist threat to Europe is greater than that to the U.S. homeland. The November 2015 Paris attacks, the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings, the 2014 Jewish Museum of Belgium shootings, and other attacks and plots in Europe indicate that Europe’s jihadist terrorism problem is greater than America’s in both frequency and intensity.
No one factor explains the difference, but I’d compare the danger along several dimensions. The first to consider is simply the goals of the Islamic State, though this is ultimately unsatisfying. As I’ve argued elsewhere, in contrast to al-Qaida’s anti-U.S. emphasis, Islamic State leaders have primarily focused on their state-building project in Iraq and Syria. Developing provinces in the Muslim world is another goal. Although most Islamic State attacks still strike regional targets, attacks on the West have risen on the priority list, particularly after the United States and allies in Europe began an air campaign against the Islamic State. But given that the United States is the leader of the coalition (and supplying the vast majority of the strike assets), Washington should be at least a rung above Europe on the enemies list. And within Europe, Belgium should be relatively low on the ladder given its minimal contribution to the anti-Islamic State campaign, even discontinuing military operations late last year. So looking solely at the Islamic State’s enemies list is not enough.
It’s more useful, then, to focus on how easily the Islamic State can strike Europe in comparison to the United States. And here the contrast is clear. Over 5,000 Europeans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria; less than 200 Americans have joined the struggle. Europe also shares a land border with Iraq and Syria via Turkey and is logistically far more accessible for Islamic State fighters to go back and forth, while the United States is protected by two great oceans. Even putting foreign fighters and simple geography aside, Muslim communities in Europe have more radicalized individuals who stay in Europe, and thus a greater native pool of recruits for lone wolf and other attacks.
Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens.
Beyond foreign fighters and radicalized stay-at-homes, the integration challenge is far greater in Europe. The specifics vary by country, but almost everywhere, the situation is bad. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no direct correlation between education or poverty and terrorism. However, when such problems are rampant within one community, they suggest a problem that is apparent to anyone who walks a Muslim neighborhood in a major European city: a lack of integration. Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens. Trust in the police and security services is particularly low. Some European states embrace secularism and see visible symbols of the practice of Islam as a threat to this identity, and as jihadist terrorism emerged as a leading issue after 9/11, critics began to link Muslim identity to violence. Each terrorist attack makes this problem worse, with chauvinistic voices denouncing Muslims, making the community draw even more inward. And more security service raids on Muslim communities only increase their suspicions.
American Muslims, in contrast, are far better integrated and have regularly cooperated with the FBI, foiling many terrorist plots. The ... Editors’ Note: Is Europe’s jihadi terrorism problem greater than America’s? No one factor explains the difference, writes Dan Byman. On balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only ...

Editors’ Note: Is Europe’s jihadi terrorism problem greater than America’s? No one factor explains the difference, writes Dan Byman. On balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for terrorists to attack Europe. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.

It didn’t take the Brussels bombings to convince most experts that the terrorist threat to Europe is greater than that to the U.S. homeland. The November 2015 Paris attacks, the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings, the 2014 Jewish Museum of Belgium shootings, and other attacks and plots in Europe indicate that Europe’s jihadist terrorism problem is greater than America’s in both frequency and intensity.

No one factor explains the difference, but I’d compare the danger along several dimensions. The first to consider is simply the goals of the Islamic State, though this is ultimately unsatisfying. As I’ve argued elsewhere, in contrast to al-Qaida’s anti-U.S. emphasis, Islamic State leaders have primarily focused on their state-building project in Iraq and Syria. Developing provinces in the Muslim world is another goal. Although most Islamic State attacks still strike regional targets, attacks on the West have risen on the priority list, particularly after the United States and allies in Europe began an air campaign against the Islamic State. But given that the United States is the leader of the coalition (and supplying the vast majority of the strike assets), Washington should be at least a rung above Europe on the enemies list. And within Europe, Belgium should be relatively low on the ladder given its minimal contribution to the anti-Islamic State campaign, even discontinuing military operations late last year. So looking solely at the Islamic State’s enemies list is not enough.

It’s more useful, then, to focus on how easily the Islamic State can strike Europe in comparison to the United States. And here the contrast is clear. Over 5,000 Europeans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria; less than 200 Americans have joined the struggle. Europe also shares a land border with Iraq and Syria via Turkey and is logistically far more accessible for Islamic State fighters to go back and forth, while the United States is protected by two great oceans. Even putting foreign fighters and simple geography aside, Muslim communities in Europe have more radicalized individuals who stay in Europe, and thus a greater native pool of recruits for lone wolf and other attacks.

Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens.

Beyond foreign fighters and radicalized stay-at-homes, the integration challenge is far greater in Europe. The specifics vary by country, but almost everywhere, the situation is bad. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no direct correlation between education or poverty and terrorism. However, when such problems are rampant within one community, they suggest a problem that is apparent to anyone who walks a Muslim neighborhood in a major European city: a lack of integration. Many European Muslims often feel alienated from the broader non-Muslim population and do not feel like true citizens. Trust in the police and security services is particularly low. Some European states embrace secularism and see visible symbols of the practice of Islam as a threat to this identity, and as jihadist terrorism emerged as a leading issue after 9/11, critics began to link Muslim identity to violence. Each terrorist attack makes this problem worse, with chauvinistic voices denouncing Muslims, making the community draw even more inward. And more security service raids on Muslim communities only increase their suspicions.

American Muslims, in contrast, are far better integrated and have regularly cooperated with the FBI, foiling many terrorist plots. The vitriol that has accompanied the 2016 U.S. election—and the embrace of this rhetoric among many voters—risks jeopardizing this robust cooperation, alienating American Muslims and making them less likely to work with the police and the FBI.

Terrorists can move freely across Europe’s open borders, but security services cannot—in this way the terrorists are far more “European” than the security services that fight them. The Paris and Brussels attacks revealed gaping holes in Europe’s counterterrorism net: lists of suspects are often not shared, and different countries use different systems of transliteration, hindering basic data searches. Even for countries with effective security services like France, vulnerability is still high, as less proficient neighbors like Belgium create de facto havens where terrorists face far less pressure. In general, I’ve been on the side of those arguing that the terrorist threat to the West, while real, is manageable, but I also warned in 2014 that “The problem is particularly acute for small countries like Belgium that have many foreign fighters, but small security services and little history of militancy, forcing them to play catch-up even as the problem escalates.” As long as European security performance is uneven, strong countries will be vulnerable to mistakes or weak efforts by those European countries unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources or establish a proper counterterrorism framework.

So, on balance, the United States is likely to remain safer than its European counterparts, if only because it is simply far easier for the Islamic State to attack Europe. However, if the above factors do explain much of the difference, Europe should focus not just on improving security services, but also on better integrating its Muslim communities. An integrated Muslim community would not only reduce the number of those radicalized, but also make it more likely for the police and intelligence services to discover terrorists and stop them before they strike again.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/30-sunni-militancy-french-language-lecorre?rssid=france{C43C8AA2-D9D0-4B49-97BD-D6727D4CFA0E}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/146774949/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~There-is-more-to-Sunni-militancy-than-language-and-cultureThere is more to Sunni militancy than language and culture

When I read a recent post by two of my colleagues suggesting that “French political culture” may be to blame for Sunni militancy around the world, Evelyn Beatrice Hall’s paraphrase of Voltaire came to mind: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” But that doesn’t prevent me from disagreeing with some of the premises of the piece by Will McCants and Chris Meserole, which confuses correlation with causation.

There is a long list of cities targeted by jihadis: Paris was attacked twice last year, in January (17 people killed) and November (130 killed, 400 injured); Brussels was targeted three times, once at the Jewish Museum in May 2014 (4 dead), and this month by the two suicide bombings that caused 35 deaths; Madrid was struck in March 2004 in an al-Qaida-related train bombing that killed 192 people and injured over 1,800; and the July 2005 series of suicide bombings in London killed 52 and injured over 700.

It’s not just a European problem, of course—cities around the world have suffered jihadi attacks over the past several years, including Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Sharm el-Sheikh, Ottawa, Dhaka, Jakarta, and Nairobi, not to mention isolated strikes in Boston (in 2013), Sydney (in 2014), and San Bernardino (in 2015).

Two of the European capitals that suffered heavy casualties have long histories of dealing with terrorism: London suffered numerous deadly attacks by the Irish Republican Army, and Madrid faced strikes by the Basque separatist militants of ETA. Neither government succeeded in preventing jihadi attacks.

Who are foreign fighters?

According to a December 2015 report by the Soufan Group, European foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria have come mainly from four countries: France (1,800 between June 2014 and December 2015), the United Kingdom (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470). Belgium has the highest per capita number of foreign fighters in the EU.

There are two types of foreign fighters: those from other Middle Eastern states who joined Da’esh (the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State) on the ground in Syria or Iraq, and those who are European passport-holders who go to the region to fight and then return to Europe. Attacks in European cities were perpetrated by European passport-holders, all young men with knowledge of the local environment, customs, and public transportation system. For example, the 2005 London suicide bombings were committed by English-speaking, British-born Muslim sons of Pakistani immigrants. All of the known attackers in Paris were EU citizens, and the two suicide bombers in Brussels were Belgian nationals.

No simple explanation

There are a number of factors explaining why the attacks in Brussels happened, and the French language is but a minor one. For one, as French academic Gilles Kepel has pointed out, the largest number of Belgian foreign fighters to go to Syria came from the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium, not the French-speaking part. But beyond that, it’s essential to recognize that in Belgium, governance issues have led to unfortunate intelligence failures. The country is run by no fewer than five governments, and there has been poor coordination (on the rise of jihad, among other issues) between the Belgian federal government and regional governments.

France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, related to its colonial past in three North African countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It is true—as Kepel states in his recent book—that many French jihadis are second- or third-generation immigrants who feel ostracized from French society. But the high level of unemployment among young people is not unique to young Muslims. Rather, it is a generational phenomenon that has more to do with the French society and the French economy. Unlike their parents who reached France in the aftermath of decolonization in the 1960s, many young people of North African origins now face a country with a much tighter employment market. They may be holders of French passports or identity cards, but they don’t otherwise feel part of the French system. They feel alienated.

Finally, there is the key question of religion. For over a century, France has strictly separated church and state. Since 2004, a new law called "Loi sur la Laïcité" forbids “ostentatious religious signs” in public schools. This has led to a growing sentiment of dissatisfaction by a number of Muslims who already felt sidelined by the French mainstream. A portion of the Muslim population in France clearly rejects this legal framework, though some have also benefited from efforts to promote diversity. There are Muslim quarters, mosques, halal stores, and religious schools all serving a population of over five million Muslims in France.

French leaders are aware that the country can do more to integrate and support its Muslim communities. France has established representative bodies such as the Conseil français du Culte Musulman, a federation created in 2003 that represents hundreds of Muslim associations. The French Ministry of Defense has appointed Muslim military chaplains, cities have inaugurated cemeteries with sections dedicated to Muslims, and more prayer rooms have opened across France. These are just a few examples of how the French government is trying to better address the alienation that some Muslims in the country experience.

We should be careful about pointing to language or culture to explain Sunni radicalism around the world. Instead, we should focus on challenges of integration and cooperation between and among countries—these are by far the top challenges for many governments struggling with the threat of jihadi terrorists.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 30 Mar 2016 13:00:00 -0400Philippe Le Corre
When I read a recent post by two of my colleagues suggesting that “French political culture” may be to blame for Sunni militancy around the world, Evelyn Beatrice Hall's paraphrase of Voltaire came to mind: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” But that doesn't prevent me from disagreeing with some of the premises of the piece by Will McCants and Chris Meserole, which confuses correlation with causation.
There is a long list of cities targeted by jihadis: Paris was attacked twice last year, in January (17 people killed) and November (130 killed, 400 injured); Brussels was targeted three times, once at the Jewish Museum in May 2014 (4 dead), and this month by the two suicide bombings that caused 35 deaths; Madrid was struck in March 2004 in an al-Qaida-related train bombing that killed 192 people and injured over 1,800; and the July 2005 series of suicide bombings in London killed 52 and injured over 700.
It's not just a European problem, of course—cities around the world have suffered jihadi attacks over the past several years, including Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Sharm el-Sheikh, Ottawa, Dhaka, Jakarta, and Nairobi, not to mention isolated strikes in Boston (in 2013), Sydney (in 2014), and San Bernardino (in 2015).
Two of the European capitals that suffered heavy casualties have long histories of dealing with terrorism: London suffered numerous deadly attacks by the Irish Republican Army, and Madrid faced strikes by the Basque separatist militants of ETA. Neither government succeeded in preventing jihadi attacks.
Who are foreign fighters?
According to a December 2015 report by the Soufan Group, European foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria have come mainly from four countries: France (1,800 between June 2014 and December 2015), the United Kingdom (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470). Belgium has the highest per capita number of foreign fighters in the EU.
There are two types of foreign fighters: those from other Middle Eastern states who joined Da'esh (the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State) on the ground in Syria or Iraq, and those who are European passport-holders who go to the region to fight and then return to Europe. Attacks in European cities were perpetrated by European passport-holders, all young men with knowledge of the local environment, customs, and public transportation system. For example, the 2005 London suicide bombings were committed by English-speaking, British-born Muslim sons of Pakistani immigrants. All of the known attackers in Paris were EU citizens, and the two suicide bombers in Brussels were Belgian nationals.
No simple explanation
There are a number of factors explaining why the attacks in Brussels happened, and the French language is but a minor one. For one, as French academic Gilles Kepel has pointed out, the largest number of Belgian foreign fighters to go to Syria came from the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium, not the French-speaking part. But beyond that, it's essential to recognize that in Belgium, governance issues have led to unfortunate intelligence failures. The country is run by no fewer than five governments, and there has been poor coordination (on the rise of jihad, among other issues) between the Belgian federal government and regional governments.
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, related to its colonial past in three North African countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It is true—as Kepel states in his recent book—that many French jihadis are second- or third-generation immigrants who feel ostracized from French society. But the high level of unemployment among young people is not unique to young Muslims. Rather, it is a generational phenomenon that has more to do with the French society and the French economy. Unlike their parents who reached France in the aftermath of decolonization in the 1960s, many young people of North African ...
When I read a recent post by two of my colleagues suggesting that “French political culture” may be to blame for Sunni militancy around the world, Evelyn Beatrice Hall's paraphrase of Voltaire came to mind: “

When I read a recent post by two of my colleagues suggesting that “French political culture” may be to blame for Sunni militancy around the world, Evelyn Beatrice Hall’s paraphrase of Voltaire came to mind: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” But that doesn’t prevent me from disagreeing with some of the premises of the piece by Will McCants and Chris Meserole, which confuses correlation with causation.

There is a long list of cities targeted by jihadis: Paris was attacked twice last year, in January (17 people killed) and November (130 killed, 400 injured); Brussels was targeted three times, once at the Jewish Museum in May 2014 (4 dead), and this month by the two suicide bombings that caused 35 deaths; Madrid was struck in March 2004 in an al-Qaida-related train bombing that killed 192 people and injured over 1,800; and the July 2005 series of suicide bombings in London killed 52 and injured over 700.

It’s not just a European problem, of course—cities around the world have suffered jihadi attacks over the past several years, including Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Sharm el-Sheikh, Ottawa, Dhaka, Jakarta, and Nairobi, not to mention isolated strikes in Boston (in 2013), Sydney (in 2014), and San Bernardino (in 2015).

Two of the European capitals that suffered heavy casualties have long histories of dealing with terrorism: London suffered numerous deadly attacks by the Irish Republican Army, and Madrid faced strikes by the Basque separatist militants of ETA. Neither government succeeded in preventing jihadi attacks.

Who are foreign fighters?

According to a December 2015 report by the Soufan Group, European foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria have come mainly from four countries: France (1,800 between June 2014 and December 2015), the United Kingdom (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470). Belgium has the highest per capita number of foreign fighters in the EU.

There are two types of foreign fighters: those from other Middle Eastern states who joined Da’esh (the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State) on the ground in Syria or Iraq, and those who are European passport-holders who go to the region to fight and then return to Europe. Attacks in European cities were perpetrated by European passport-holders, all young men with knowledge of the local environment, customs, and public transportation system. For example, the 2005 London suicide bombings were committed by English-speaking, British-born Muslim sons of Pakistani immigrants. All of the known attackers in Paris were EU citizens, and the two suicide bombers in Brussels were Belgian nationals.

No simple explanation

There are a number of factors explaining why the attacks in Brussels happened, and the French language is but a minor one. For one, as French academic Gilles Kepel has pointed out, the largest number of Belgian foreign fighters to go to Syria came from the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium, not the French-speaking part. But beyond that, it’s essential to recognize that in Belgium, governance issues have led to unfortunate intelligence failures. The country is run by no fewer than five governments, and there has been poor coordination (on the rise of jihad, among other issues) between the Belgian federal government and regional governments.

France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, related to its colonial past in three North African countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It is true—as Kepel states in his recent book—that many French jihadis are second- or third-generation immigrants who feel ostracized from French society. But the high level of unemployment among young people is not unique to young Muslims. Rather, it is a generational phenomenon that has more to do with the French society and the French economy. Unlike their parents who reached France in the aftermath of decolonization in the 1960s, many young people of North African origins now face a country with a much tighter employment market. They may be holders of French passports or identity cards, but they don’t otherwise feel part of the French system. They feel alienated.

Finally, there is the key question of religion. For over a century, France has strictly separated church and state. Since 2004, a new law called "Loi sur la Laïcité" forbids “ostentatious religious signs” in public schools. This has led to a growing sentiment of dissatisfaction by a number of Muslims who already felt sidelined by the French mainstream. A portion of the Muslim population in France clearly rejects this legal framework, though some have also benefited from efforts to promote diversity. There are Muslim quarters, mosques, halal stores, and religious schools all serving a population of over five million Muslims in France.

French leaders are aware that the country can do more to integrate and support its Muslim communities. France has established representative bodies such as the Conseil français du Culte Musulman, a federation created in 2003 that represents hundreds of Muslim associations. The French Ministry of Defense has appointed Muslim military chaplains, cities have inaugurated cemeteries with sections dedicated to Muslims, and more prayer rooms have opened across France. These are just a few examples of how the French government is trying to better address the alienation that some Muslims in the country experience.

We should be careful about pointing to language or culture to explain Sunni radicalism around the world. Instead, we should focus on challenges of integration and cooperation between and among countries—these are by far the top challenges for many governments struggling with the threat of jihadi terrorists.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/25-french-connection-sunni-militancy-mccants-meserole?rssid=france{01AF065D-815C-4A5B-ADB1-47DEA6C95874}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/145955865/0/brookingsrss/topics/france~The-French-connection-Explaining-Sunni-militancy-around-the-worldThe French connection: Explaining Sunni militancy around the world

Editors’ Note: The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadis pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. Research by Will McCants and Chris Meserole reveals that French political culture may play a role. This post originally appeared in Foreign Affairs.

The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadists pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. The body counts are larger and the disrupted plots are more numerous. The trend might be explained by the nature of the Islamic State (ISIS) networks in Europe or as failures of policing in France and Belgium. Both explanations have merit. However, our research reveals that another factor may be at play: French political culture.

Last fall, we began a project to test empirically the many proposed explanations for Sunni militancy around the globe. The goal was to take common measures of the violence—namely, the number of Sunni foreign fighters from any given country as well as the number of Sunni terror attacks carried out within it—and then crunch the numbers to see which explanations best predicted a country’s rate of Sunni radicalization and violence. (The raw foreign fighter data came from The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; the original attack data came from the University of Maryland’s START project.)

What we found surprised us, particularly when it came to foreign fighter radicalization. It turns out that the best predictor of foreign fighter radicalization was not a country’s wealth. Nor was it how well-educated its citizens were, how healthy they were, or even how much Internet access they enjoyed. Instead, the top predictor was whether a country was Francophone; that is, whether it currently lists (or previously listed) French as a national language. As strange as it may seem, four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).

Knowledgeable readers will immediately object that the raw numbers tell a different story. The English-speaking United Kingdom, for example, has produced far more foreign fighters than French-speaking Belgium. And fighters from Saudi Arabia number in the several thousands. But the raw numbers are misleading. If you view the foreign fighters as a percentage of the overall Muslim population, you see a different picture. Per Muslim resident, Belgium produces far more foreign fighters than either the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia.

[W]hat could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture.

So what could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture. The French approach to secularism is more aggressive than, say, the British approach. France and Belgium, for example, are the only two countries in Europe to ban the full veil in their public schools. They’re also the only two countries in Western Europe not to gain the highest rating for democracy in the well-known Polity score data, which does not include explanations for the markdowns.

Adding support to this story are the top interactions we found between different variables. When you look at which combination of variables is most predictive, it turns out that the “Francophone effect” is actually strongest in the countries that are most developed: French-speaking countries with the highest literacy, best infrastructure, and best health system. This is not a story about French colonial plunder. If anything it’s a story about what happens when French economic and political development has most deeply taken root.

An important subplot within this story concerns the distribution of wealth. In particular, the rate of youth unemployment and urbanization appear to matter a great deal too. Globally, we found that when between 10 and 30 percent of a country’s youth are unemployed, there is a strong relationship between a rise in youth unemployment and a rise in Sunni militancy. Rates outside that range don’t have an effect. Likewise, when urbanization is between 60 and 80 percent, there is a strong relationship.

These findings seem to matter most in Francophone countries. Among the over 1,000 interactions our model looked at, those between Francophone and youth unemployment and Francophone and urbanization both ranked among the 15 most predictive. There’s broad anecdotal support for this idea: consider the rampant radicalization in Molenbeek, in the Parisbanlieus, in Ben Gardane. Each of these contexts have produced a massively disproportionate share of foreign fighters, and each are also urban pockets with high youth unemployment.

As with the Francophone finding overall, we’re left with guesswork as to why exactly the relationships between French politics, urbanization, youth unemployment, and Sunni militancy exist. We suspect that when there are large numbers of unemployed youth, some of them are bound to get up to mischief. When they live in large cities, they have more opportunities to connect with people espousing radical causes. And when those cities are in Francophone countries that adopt the strident French approach to secularism, Sunni radicalism is more appealing.

For now, the relationship needs to be studied and tested by comparing several cases in countries and between countries. We also found other interesting relationships—such as between Sunni violence and prior civil conflict—but they are neither as strong nor as compelling.

Regardless, the latest attacks in Belgium are reason enough to share the initial findings. They may be way off, but at least they are based on the best available data. If the data is wrong or our interpretations skewed, we hope the effort will lead to more rigorous explanations of what is driving jihadist terrorism in Europe. Our initial findings should in no way imply that Francophone countries are responsible for the recent horrible attacks—no country deserves to have its civilians killed, regardless of the perpetrator’s motives. But the magnitude of the violence and the fear it engenders demand that we investigate those motives beyond just the standard boilerplate explanations.

Authors

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Fri, 25 Mar 2016 14:55:00 -0400William McCants and Christopher Meserole
Editors’ Note: The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadis pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. Research by Will McCants and Chris Meserole reveals that French political culture may play a role. This post originally appeared in Foreign Affairs.
The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadists pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. The body counts are larger and the disrupted plots are more numerous. The trend might be explained by the nature of the Islamic State (ISIS) networks in Europe or as failures of policing in France and Belgium. Both explanations have merit. However, our research reveals that another factor may be at play: French political culture.
Last fall, we began a project to test empirically the many proposed explanations for Sunni militancy around the globe. The goal was to take common measures of the violence—namely, the number of Sunni foreign fighters from any given country as well as the number of Sunni terror attacks carried out within it—and then crunch the numbers to see which explanations best predicted a country’s rate of Sunni radicalization and violence. (The raw foreign fighter data came from The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; the original attack data came from the University of Maryland’s START project.)
What we found surprised us, particularly when it came to foreign fighter radicalization. It turns out that the best predictor of foreign fighter radicalization was not a country’s wealth. Nor was it how well-educated its citizens were, how healthy they were, or even how much Internet access they enjoyed. Instead, the top predictor was whether a country was Francophone; that is, whether it currently lists (or previously listed) French as a national language. As strange as it may seem, four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).
Knowledgeable readers will immediately object that the raw numbers tell a different story. The English-speaking United Kingdom, for example, has produced far more foreign fighters than French-speaking Belgium. And fighters from Saudi Arabia number in the several thousands. But the raw numbers are misleading. If you view the foreign fighters as a percentage of the overall Muslim population, you see a different picture. Per Muslim resident, Belgium produces far more foreign fighters than either the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia.
[W]hat could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture.
So what could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture. The French approach to secularism is more aggressive than, say, the British approach. France and Belgium, for example, are the only two countries in Europe to ban the full veil in their public schools. They’re also the only two countries in Western Europe not to gain the highest rating for democracy in the well-known Polity score data, which does not include explanations for the markdowns.
Adding support to this story are the top interactions we found between different variables. When you look at which combination of variables is most predictive, it turns out that the “Francophone effect” is actually strongest in the countries that are most developed: French-speaking countries with the highest literacy, best infrastructure, and best health system. This is not a story about French colonial plunder. If anything it’s a story about what happens when French economic and political development has most deeply ... Editors’ Note: The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadis pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. Research by Will McCants and Chris Meserole ...

Editors’ Note: The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadis pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. Research by Will McCants and Chris Meserole reveals that French political culture may play a role. This post originally appeared in Foreign Affairs.

The mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Paris and now in Brussels underscore an unsettling truth: Jihadists pose a greater threat to France and Belgium than to the rest of Europe. The body counts are larger and the disrupted plots are more numerous. The trend might be explained by the nature of the Islamic State (ISIS) networks in Europe or as failures of policing in France and Belgium. Both explanations have merit. However, our research reveals that another factor may be at play: French political culture.

Last fall, we began a project to test empirically the many proposed explanations for Sunni militancy around the globe. The goal was to take common measures of the violence—namely, the number of Sunni foreign fighters from any given country as well as the number of Sunni terror attacks carried out within it—and then crunch the numbers to see which explanations best predicted a country’s rate of Sunni radicalization and violence. (The raw foreign fighter data came from The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; the original attack data came from the University of Maryland’s START project.)

What we found surprised us, particularly when it came to foreign fighter radicalization. It turns out that the best predictor of foreign fighter radicalization was not a country’s wealth. Nor was it how well-educated its citizens were, how healthy they were, or even how much Internet access they enjoyed. Instead, the top predictor was whether a country was Francophone; that is, whether it currently lists (or previously listed) French as a national language. As strange as it may seem, four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).

Knowledgeable readers will immediately object that the raw numbers tell a different story. The English-speaking United Kingdom, for example, has produced far more foreign fighters than French-speaking Belgium. And fighters from Saudi Arabia number in the several thousands. But the raw numbers are misleading. If you view the foreign fighters as a percentage of the overall Muslim population, you see a different picture. Per Muslim resident, Belgium produces far more foreign fighters than either the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia.

[W]hat could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture.

So what could the language of love possibly have to do with Islamist violence? We suspect that it is really a proxy for something else: French political culture. The French approach to secularism is more aggressive than, say, the British approach. France and Belgium, for example, are the only two countries in Europe to ban the full veil in their public schools. They’re also the only two countries in Western Europe not to gain the highest rating for democracy in the well-known Polity score data, which does not include explanations for the markdowns.

Adding support to this story are the top interactions we found between different variables. When you look at which combination of variables is most predictive, it turns out that the “Francophone effect” is actually strongest in the countries that are most developed: French-speaking countries with the highest literacy, best infrastructure, and best health system. This is not a story about French colonial plunder. If anything it’s a story about what happens when French economic and political development has most deeply taken root.

An important subplot within this story concerns the distribution of wealth. In particular, the rate of youth unemployment and urbanization appear to matter a great deal too. Globally, we found that when between 10 and 30 percent of a country’s youth are unemployed, there is a strong relationship between a rise in youth unemployment and a rise in Sunni militancy. Rates outside that range don’t have an effect. Likewise, when urbanization is between 60 and 80 percent, there is a strong relationship.

These findings seem to matter most in Francophone countries. Among the over 1,000 interactions our model looked at, those between Francophone and youth unemployment and Francophone and urbanization both ranked among the 15 most predictive. There’s broad anecdotal support for this idea: consider the rampant radicalization in Molenbeek, in the Parisbanlieus, in Ben Gardane. Each of these contexts have produced a massively disproportionate share of foreign fighters, and each are also urban pockets with high youth unemployment.

As with the Francophone finding overall, we’re left with guesswork as to why exactly the relationships between French politics, urbanization, youth unemployment, and Sunni militancy exist. We suspect that when there are large numbers of unemployed youth, some of them are bound to get up to mischief. When they live in large cities, they have more opportunities to connect with people espousing radical causes. And when those cities are in Francophone countries that adopt the strident French approach to secularism, Sunni radicalism is more appealing.

For now, the relationship needs to be studied and tested by comparing several cases in countries and between countries. We also found other interesting relationships—such as between Sunni violence and prior civil conflict—but they are neither as strong nor as compelling.

Regardless, the latest attacks in Belgium are reason enough to share the initial findings. They may be way off, but at least they are based on the best available data. If the data is wrong or our interpretations skewed, we hope the effort will lead to more rigorous explanations of what is driving jihadist terrorism in Europe. Our initial findings should in no way imply that Francophone countries are responsible for the recent horrible attacks—no country deserves to have its civilians killed, regardless of the perpetrator’s motives. But the magnitude of the violence and the fear it engenders demand that we investigate those motives beyond just the standard boilerplate explanations.

Reuters and the newspaper L’Obs reported last week that the French navy in January detected a Russian ballistic missile submarine off the French Atlantic coast in the Bay of Biscay. There was no military reason for that submarine to be there. Was this Moscow’s latest attempt at nuclear intimidation?

The report was sourced to an official in the French defense ministry. On the record, the ministry declined to confirm or deny the story, though a navy official commented to Reuters: “Russian naval activity has been on the rise for several months, if not years.”

No military reason to be there

Nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have long been a part of U.S. and Russian strategic forces. They constitute the most important element of the American strategic triad, deploying some 60 percent of U.S. strategic warheads. Once the submarines go to sea and submerge, they are very hard to find and very survivable.

Ballistic missile submarines seek to remain undetected. U.S. Ohio-class boats on deterrence patrols are typically assigned large ocean spaces in which to operate, and no one ashore knows exactly where they are in that space. Open ocean increases the submarine’s ability to maneuver to avoid any ships that may get near. Coming close to a coast, on the other hand, increases the possibility of detection and limits the submarine’s ability to maneuver away from a potential threat.

The Russian submarine that the French detected reportedly was a Delta-class boat. It carries sixteen SS-N-23 SLBMs, each of which can deliver multiple warheads to targets 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away. It did not have to sail near France to target France. Delta submarines home-ported on the Kola Peninsula can target France from dockside. From the more open waters of the Norwegian Sea midway between Norway and Greenland, a Delta’s SS-N-23s can reach not only all of France and all of Europe, but most of the continental United States.

There would be no logical military reason for a Russian ballistic missile submarine to enter the Bay of Biscay. Doing so would increase the possibility of detection—which apparently happened—and compromise its survivability.

Nuclear intimidation?

So why did the submarine go there?

Over the past few years—especially in parallel with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine—the Kremlin has escalated its nuclear rhetoric. Vladimir Putin regularly makes reference to his country’s large nuclear arsenal, as if he fears the world might somehow forget. Russian outlets Sputnik and RT run articles boasting of Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Moscow’s ambassador to Copenhagen threatened to target nuclear-armed missiles against Denmark last year.

Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West.

Meanwhile, nuclear-capable Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers have become far more frequent visitors to the air space near the United States, Canada, and NATO European members than was the case three or four years ago. (During the Cold War, the United States regularly flew strategic bombers near Soviet air space, but it has largely discarded that practice.)

Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West. The Kremlin sometimes appears to be trying to convey an impression that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Mr. Putin might be a little bit crazy. It’s all part of an effort to intimidate.

That would explain why a Delta-class submarine would visit the Bay of Biscay. Like the Bear bombers skirting NATO airspace, bringing close to France a ballistic missile submarine would send a political message—and make us all a bit more nervous.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 14 Mar 2016 14:00:00 -0400Steven Pifer
Reuters and the newspaper L’Obs reported last week that the French navy in January detected a Russian ballistic missile submarine off the French Atlantic coast in the Bay of Biscay. There was no military reason for that submarine to be there. Was this Moscow’s latest attempt at nuclear intimidation?
The report was sourced to an official in the French defense ministry. On the record, the ministry declined to confirm or deny the story, though a navy official commented to Reuters: “Russian naval activity has been on the rise for several months, if not years.”
No military reason to be there
Nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have long been a part of U.S. and Russian strategic forces. They constitute the most important element of the American strategic triad, deploying some 60 percent of U.S. strategic warheads. Once the submarines go to sea and submerge, they are very hard to find and very survivable.
Ballistic missile submarines seek to remain undetected. U.S. Ohio-class boats on deterrence patrols are typically assigned large ocean spaces in which to operate, and no one ashore knows exactly where they are in that space. Open ocean increases the submarine’s ability to maneuver to avoid any ships that may get near. Coming close to a coast, on the other hand, increases the possibility of detection and limits the submarine’s ability to maneuver away from a potential threat.
The Russian submarine that the French detected reportedly was a Delta-class boat. It carries sixteen SS-N-23 SLBMs, each of which can deliver multiple warheads to targets 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away. It did not have to sail near France to target France. Delta submarines home-ported on the Kola Peninsula can target France from dockside. From the more open waters of the Norwegian Sea midway between Norway and Greenland, a Delta’s SS-N-23s can reach not only all of France and all of Europe, but most of the continental United States.
There would be no logical military reason for a Russian ballistic missile submarine to enter the Bay of Biscay. Doing so would increase the possibility of detection—which apparently happened—and compromise its survivability.
Nuclear intimidation?
So why did the submarine go there?
Over the past few years—especially in parallel with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine—the Kremlin has escalated its nuclear rhetoric. Vladimir Putin regularly makes reference to his country’s large nuclear arsenal, as if he fears the world might somehow forget. Russian outlets Sputnik and RT run articles boasting of Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Moscow’s ambassador to Copenhagen threatened to target nuclear-armed missiles against Denmark last year.
Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West.
Meanwhile, nuclear-capable Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers have become far more frequent visitors to the air space near the United States, Canada, and NATO European members than was the case three or four years ago. (During the Cold War, the United States regularly flew strategic bombers near Soviet air space, but it has largely discarded that practice.)
Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West. The Kremlin sometimes appears to be trying to convey an impression that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Mr. Putin might be a little bit crazy. It’s all part of an effort to intimidate.
That would explain why a Delta-class submarine would visit the Bay of Biscay. Like the Bear bombers skirting NATO airspace, bringing close to France a ballistic missile submarine would send a political message—and make us all a bit more nervous.
Authors
- Steven Pifer
Reuters and the newspaper L’Obs reported last week that the French navy in January detected a Russian ballistic missile submarine off the French Atlantic coast in the Bay of Biscay. There was no military reason for that submarine to be there.

Reuters and the newspaper L’Obs reported last week that the French navy in January detected a Russian ballistic missile submarine off the French Atlantic coast in the Bay of Biscay. There was no military reason for that submarine to be there. Was this Moscow’s latest attempt at nuclear intimidation?

The report was sourced to an official in the French defense ministry. On the record, the ministry declined to confirm or deny the story, though a navy official commented to Reuters: “Russian naval activity has been on the rise for several months, if not years.”

No military reason to be there

Nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have long been a part of U.S. and Russian strategic forces. They constitute the most important element of the American strategic triad, deploying some 60 percent of U.S. strategic warheads. Once the submarines go to sea and submerge, they are very hard to find and very survivable.

Ballistic missile submarines seek to remain undetected. U.S. Ohio-class boats on deterrence patrols are typically assigned large ocean spaces in which to operate, and no one ashore knows exactly where they are in that space. Open ocean increases the submarine’s ability to maneuver to avoid any ships that may get near. Coming close to a coast, on the other hand, increases the possibility of detection and limits the submarine’s ability to maneuver away from a potential threat.

The Russian submarine that the French detected reportedly was a Delta-class boat. It carries sixteen SS-N-23 SLBMs, each of which can deliver multiple warheads to targets 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away. It did not have to sail near France to target France. Delta submarines home-ported on the Kola Peninsula can target France from dockside. From the more open waters of the Norwegian Sea midway between Norway and Greenland, a Delta’s SS-N-23s can reach not only all of France and all of Europe, but most of the continental United States.

There would be no logical military reason for a Russian ballistic missile submarine to enter the Bay of Biscay. Doing so would increase the possibility of detection—which apparently happened—and compromise its survivability.

Nuclear intimidation?

So why did the submarine go there?

Over the past few years—especially in parallel with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine—the Kremlin has escalated its nuclear rhetoric. Vladimir Putin regularly makes reference to his country’s large nuclear arsenal, as if he fears the world might somehow forget. Russian outlets Sputnik and RT run articles boasting of Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Moscow’s ambassador to Copenhagen threatened to target nuclear-armed missiles against Denmark last year.

Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West.

Meanwhile, nuclear-capable Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers have become far more frequent visitors to the air space near the United States, Canada, and NATO European members than was the case three or four years ago. (During the Cold War, the United States regularly flew strategic bombers near Soviet air space, but it has largely discarded that practice.)

Moscow seems to see value in such irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, at a time when it has adopted a more bellicose line toward the West. The Kremlin sometimes appears to be trying to convey an impression that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Mr. Putin might be a little bit crazy. It’s all part of an effort to intimidate.

That would explain why a Delta-class submarine would visit the Bay of Biscay. Like the Bear bombers skirting NATO airspace, bringing close to France a ballistic missile submarine would send a political message—and make us all a bit more nervous.

Editors’ Note: The 2015 Islamic State attacks in Paris highlighted not only the terrorist threat to Europe, but also the many European failings in intelligence and border security. Marc Hecker identifies the wide range of problems Europe faces and makes the case for more resources, more harmonization, and less free riding. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.

I recently traveled to Amsterdam from Paris. The easiest way to get there is to take the train: in three hours, the “Thalys” train passes through France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In August 2015, a terrorist attack targeting that train was thwarted by passengers overpowering the perpetrator.

Following this incident, and the November attacks in Paris, the French government announced its decision to establish security gates at the Gare du Nord, the station from which the Thalys train leaves, adding metal detectors and baggage screening. On the trip back to Paris from Amsterdam, however, there was almost no security at the train station. Only after two hours into the journey did three French policemen patrol through the train to check travelers’ IDs. After arriving in Paris, French police conducted a second security check.

This anecdote illustrates the discrepancies between European security mechanisms, even though Europe is now facing a common terrorist threat of unprecedented magnitude, including the threat of returning foreign fighters. In April 2015, the European Commissioner for Justice announced that more than 5,000 EU citizens had joined jihadist organizations in Syria and in Iraq. While French nationals constitute the highest contingent among them—more than 1,000 have undertaken the journey and approximately 600 are currently in Syria and in Iraq (of whom one third are women)—other European countries are also highly affected. 760 Germans, more than 700 Britons, 550 Belgians, more than 300 Austrians, more than 200 Dutch have traveled to the “land of Sham.” Not all of them represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.

Europe is facing a unique threat, and it seems logical that the response should be European. After the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the Italian Prime minister Matteo Renzi called for the establishment of a “European CIA.” It is unlikely that this prospect will become a reality anytime soon, as an intelligence agency is a sovereign attribute carried out by a sovereign state, and the European Union is not a sovereign state. However, this does not mean that Europe is irrelevant with regards to counter-terrorism. During the past fifteen years, a series of concrete measures have been undertaken, such as the establishment of Eurojust (an EU body dedicated to judicial cooperation), the implementation of a European arrest warrant, the possibility of deploying joint investigation teams, and the reinforcement of the Schengen Information System. Other projects, such as the EU Passenger Name Record, should soon materialize.

Not all of [European fighters in Syria and Iraq] represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.

The European treaties are very clear on the division of competences on security issues. The second paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union states that, “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” In other words, the different Member States must first and foremost rely on themselves, and not on the EU, to prevent and fight terrorism. They must realize the scale of the threat and increase their own investments in security. Still, for the past twenty years, defense and security budgets of most European countries have been significantly reduced. For instance, Italy—a country that is close to Libya and that is often targeted by ISIS propaganda—spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on defense and spending continued to decline in 2015. The budget of the Belgian Ministry of Defense has also been drastically cut and is disproportionately devoted to personnel spending. Belgian military has been dubbed “an unusually well-armed pension fund.” Though Germany has approximately the same defense budget as France (around 32 billion euros), Germany is bigger and richer than France. In 2012, the Dutch government decided to cut the budget of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) by a third. This decision was later reversed but, as the Netherlands’ Court of Audit writes, “these developments have left deep scars within the organization.”

The differences among European countries with regards to security can be explained by three factors. First, there is no common strategic culture in Europe. Some countries—like post-Second World War Germany—are culturally reluctant to use military power, and some have even decided to give up key military capabilities altogether. Second, the perception of the threat is not unified. Eastern European countries feel much more threatened by Russia than by ISIS. Third, some countries— especially small ones—believe that they do not need to invest heavily in defense and security, as the EU or NATO will protect them.

In France, the Paris attacks were a loud wake-up call, prompting officials to take actions to increase security. The scheduled budget cuts affecting the French Ministry of Defense were halted. The number of judges has increased, and the intelligence service staff will be reinforced by about 15 percent from 2015 to 2018. Furthermore, new legislation was passed, including an anti-terrorist law in November 2014 and a new surveillance law in July 2015, as well as another draft bill to reinforce police powers. Some of the adopted measures—such as the multiplication of house arrests authorized by the state of emergency and the decision to extend the deprivation of citizenship to convicted terrorists who are dual nationals—have provoked serious criticism from civil liberties advocates.

Europe is facing a unique threat, and it seems logical that the response should be European.

Belgium had its own wake-up call: in January 2015, police foiled a major terrorist attack, and in November, the government imposed a lockdown on Brussels to avoid an “imminent” attack. On November 19, Prime Minister Charles Michel announced 18 new measures to fight terrorism, including the possibility to search houses 24/7, an extension of 24 to 72 hours of police custody in terrorism related cases, a ban on anonymous prepaid GSM cards, the closure of jihadi websites, and closer monitoring of radical imams. He also declared that an extra 400 million euros would be devoted to security. However, a more substantial financial effort would be necessary to reinforce the Belgian security and defense forces. Countries like Spain and the UK have a long history in dealing with terrorism and were targeted by Al Qaeda in the 2000s. They didn’t wait for a new attack on their soil to adapt their strategies and legislation. In January 2015, the Spanish government adopted a National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalization and the British government published a Counter-Extremism Strategy in October 2015.

Substantial progress can still be made. Practices have to be harmonized in the different European countries. It is striking to note that jihadists returning from Syria are condemned to heavy prison sentences in certain countries, while they receive suspended jail sentences in others. What’s more, several governments need to invest heavily in their own security and do more to reinforce European security, especially since terrorists from a country in the Schengen Area can easily strike in another country, as the terrorist attacks in Brussels in May 2014 and in Paris in November 2015 dramatically demonstrated. Free riding cannot work in matters of counter-terrorism and could even risk bringing about the reestablishment of borders inside of Europe. To be sure, it is not easy to increase the law enforcement and defense budgets in times of economic crisis. However, the security of Europe—even the future of the European project—is at stake.

This article was translated from French by Paola Hartpence and Aleksandra Szylkiewicz.

Authors

Marc Hecker

Publication: Lawfare

]]>
Tue, 09 Feb 2016 10:35:00 -0500Marc Hecker
Editors’ Note: The 2015 Islamic State attacks in Paris highlighted not only the terrorist threat to Europe, but also the many European failings in intelligence and border security. Marc Hecker identifies the wide range of problems Europe faces and makes the case for more resources, more harmonization, and less free riding. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.
I recently traveled to Amsterdam from Paris. The easiest way to get there is to take the train: in three hours, the “Thalys” train passes through France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In August 2015, a terrorist attack targeting that train was thwarted by passengers overpowering the perpetrator.
Following this incident, and the November attacks in Paris, the French government announced its decision to establish security gates at the Gare du Nord, the station from which the Thalys train leaves, adding metal detectors and baggage screening. On the trip back to Paris from Amsterdam, however, there was almost no security at the train station. Only after two hours into the journey did three French policemen patrol through the train to check travelers’ IDs. After arriving in Paris, French police conducted a second security check.
This anecdote illustrates the discrepancies between European security mechanisms, even though Europe is now facing a common terrorist threat of unprecedented magnitude, including the threat of returning foreign fighters. In April 2015, the European Commissioner for Justice announced that more than 5,000 EU citizens had joined jihadist organizations in Syria and in Iraq. While French nationals constitute the highest contingent among them—more than 1,000 have undertaken the journey and approximately 600 are currently in Syria and in Iraq (of whom one third are women)—other European countries are also highly affected. 760 Germans, more than 700 Britons, 550 Belgians, more than 300 Austrians, more than 200 Dutch have traveled to the “land of Sham.” Not all of them represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.
Europe is facing a unique threat, and it seems logical that the response should be European. After the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the Italian Prime minister Matteo Renzi called for the establishment of a “European CIA.” It is unlikely that this prospect will become a reality anytime soon, as an intelligence agency is a sovereign attribute carried out by a sovereign state, and the European Union is not a sovereign state. However, this does not mean that Europe is irrelevant with regards to counter-terrorism. During the past fifteen years, a series of concrete measures have been undertaken, such as the establishment of Eurojust (an EU body dedicated to judicial cooperation), the implementation of a European arrest warrant, the possibility of deploying joint investigation teams, and the reinforcement of the Schengen Information System. Other projects, such as the EU Passenger Name Record, should soon materialize.
Not all of [European fighters in Syria and Iraq] represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.
The European treaties are very clear on the division of competences on security issues. The second paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union states that, “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” In other words, the different Member States must first and foremost rely on themselves, and not on the EU, to prevent and fight terrorism. They must realize the scale of the threat and increase their own investments in security. Still, for the past twenty years, defense and security budgets of most European ... Editors’ Note: The 2015 Islamic State attacks in Paris highlighted not only the terrorist threat to Europe, but also the many European failings in intelligence and border security. Marc Hecker identifies the wide range of problems Europe ...

Editors’ Note: The 2015 Islamic State attacks in Paris highlighted not only the terrorist threat to Europe, but also the many European failings in intelligence and border security. Marc Hecker identifies the wide range of problems Europe faces and makes the case for more resources, more harmonization, and less free riding. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.

I recently traveled to Amsterdam from Paris. The easiest way to get there is to take the train: in three hours, the “Thalys” train passes through France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In August 2015, a terrorist attack targeting that train was thwarted by passengers overpowering the perpetrator.

Following this incident, and the November attacks in Paris, the French government announced its decision to establish security gates at the Gare du Nord, the station from which the Thalys train leaves, adding metal detectors and baggage screening. On the trip back to Paris from Amsterdam, however, there was almost no security at the train station. Only after two hours into the journey did three French policemen patrol through the train to check travelers’ IDs. After arriving in Paris, French police conducted a second security check.

This anecdote illustrates the discrepancies between European security mechanisms, even though Europe is now facing a common terrorist threat of unprecedented magnitude, including the threat of returning foreign fighters. In April 2015, the European Commissioner for Justice announced that more than 5,000 EU citizens had joined jihadist organizations in Syria and in Iraq. While French nationals constitute the highest contingent among them—more than 1,000 have undertaken the journey and approximately 600 are currently in Syria and in Iraq (of whom one third are women)—other European countries are also highly affected. 760 Germans, more than 700 Britons, 550 Belgians, more than 300 Austrians, more than 200 Dutch have traveled to the “land of Sham.” Not all of them represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.

Europe is facing a unique threat, and it seems logical that the response should be European. After the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the Italian Prime minister Matteo Renzi called for the establishment of a “European CIA.” It is unlikely that this prospect will become a reality anytime soon, as an intelligence agency is a sovereign attribute carried out by a sovereign state, and the European Union is not a sovereign state. However, this does not mean that Europe is irrelevant with regards to counter-terrorism. During the past fifteen years, a series of concrete measures have been undertaken, such as the establishment of Eurojust (an EU body dedicated to judicial cooperation), the implementation of a European arrest warrant, the possibility of deploying joint investigation teams, and the reinforcement of the Schengen Information System. Other projects, such as the EU Passenger Name Record, should soon materialize.

Not all of [European fighters in Syria and Iraq] represent a menace for the security of European citizens; however, the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014 and the Paris attacks in November 2015 have proven that the danger is real.

The European treaties are very clear on the division of competences on security issues. The second paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union states that, “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” In other words, the different Member States must first and foremost rely on themselves, and not on the EU, to prevent and fight terrorism. They must realize the scale of the threat and increase their own investments in security. Still, for the past twenty years, defense and security budgets of most European countries have been significantly reduced. For instance, Italy—a country that is close to Libya and that is often targeted by ISIS propaganda—spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on defense and spending continued to decline in 2015. The budget of the Belgian Ministry of Defense has also been drastically cut and is disproportionately devoted to personnel spending. Belgian military has been dubbed “an unusually well-armed pension fund.” Though Germany has approximately the same defense budget as France (around 32 billion euros), Germany is bigger and richer than France. In 2012, the Dutch government decided to cut the budget of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) by a third. This decision was later reversed but, as the Netherlands’ Court of Audit writes, “these developments have left deep scars within the organization.”

The differences among European countries with regards to security can be explained by three factors. First, there is no common strategic culture in Europe. Some countries—like post-Second World War Germany—are culturally reluctant to use military power, and some have even decided to give up key military capabilities altogether. Second, the perception of the threat is not unified. Eastern European countries feel much more threatened by Russia than by ISIS. Third, some countries— especially small ones—believe that they do not need to invest heavily in defense and security, as the EU or NATO will protect them.

In France, the Paris attacks were a loud wake-up call, prompting officials to take actions to increase security. The scheduled budget cuts affecting the French Ministry of Defense were halted. The number of judges has increased, and the intelligence service staff will be reinforced by about 15 percent from 2015 to 2018. Furthermore, new legislation was passed, including an anti-terrorist law in November 2014 and a new surveillance law in July 2015, as well as another draft bill to reinforce police powers. Some of the adopted measures—such as the multiplication of house arrests authorized by the state of emergency and the decision to extend the deprivation of citizenship to convicted terrorists who are dual nationals—have provoked serious criticism from civil liberties advocates.

Europe is facing a unique threat, and it seems logical that the response should be European.

Belgium had its own wake-up call: in January 2015, police foiled a major terrorist attack, and in November, the government imposed a lockdown on Brussels to avoid an “imminent” attack. On November 19, Prime Minister Charles Michel announced 18 new measures to fight terrorism, including the possibility to search houses 24/7, an extension of 24 to 72 hours of police custody in terrorism related cases, a ban on anonymous prepaid GSM cards, the closure of jihadi websites, and closer monitoring of radical imams. He also declared that an extra 400 million euros would be devoted to security. However, a more substantial financial effort would be necessary to reinforce the Belgian security and defense forces. Countries like Spain and the UK have a long history in dealing with terrorism and were targeted by Al Qaeda in the 2000s. They didn’t wait for a new attack on their soil to adapt their strategies and legislation. In January 2015, the Spanish government adopted a National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalization and the British government published a Counter-Extremism Strategy in October 2015.

Substantial progress can still be made. Practices have to be harmonized in the different European countries. It is striking to note that jihadists returning from Syria are condemned to heavy prison sentences in certain countries, while they receive suspended jail sentences in others. What’s more, several governments need to invest heavily in their own security and do more to reinforce European security, especially since terrorists from a country in the Schengen Area can easily strike in another country, as the terrorist attacks in Brussels in May 2014 and in Paris in November 2015 dramatically demonstrated. Free riding cannot work in matters of counter-terrorism and could even risk bringing about the reestablishment of borders inside of Europe. To be sure, it is not easy to increase the law enforcement and defense budgets in times of economic crisis. However, the security of Europe—even the future of the European project—is at stake.

This article was translated from French by Paola Hartpence and Aleksandra Szylkiewicz.