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Cover; Contents; Series Editor's Preface; Acknowledgements; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; Introduction; 1Old Contemptibles; 2Dug-Outs; 3Attrition and Change in Command; 4 Evolution of Command in the Integrated Army; 5Hiring and Firing; 6'Men to be Followed, Feared and Loved'; 7'Professional Men of War'; 8The Hundred Days: Meritocracy in Command?; Conclusion; Bibliography; General Index; Index of Names and Places; Index of Regiments, Units, Formations and Armies

Summary: Recent studies of the British Army during the First World War have fundamentally overturned historical understandings of its strategy and tactics, yet the chain of command that linked the upper echelons of GHQ to the soldiers in the trenches remains poorly understood. In order to reconnect the lines of communication between the General Staff and the front line, and to challenge lingering popular conceptions of callous incompetence, this book analyses a database of more than 4,000 officers who commanded infantry battalions during the war.

Cover; Contents; Series Editor's Preface; Acknowledgements; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; Introduction; 1Old Contemptibles; 2Dug-Outs; 3Attrition and Change in Command; 4 Evolution of Command in the Integrated Army; 5Hiring and Firing; 6'Men to be Followed, Feared and Loved'; 7'Professional Men of War'; 8The Hundred Days: Meritocracy in Command?; Conclusion; Bibliography; General Index; Index of Names and Places; Index of Regiments, Units, Formations and Armies

Recent studies of the British Army during the First World War have fundamentally overturned historical understandings of its strategy and tactics, yet the chain of command that linked the upper echelons of GHQ to the soldiers in the trenches remains poorly understood. In order to reconnect the lines of communication between the General Staff and the front line, and to challenge lingering popular conceptions of callous incompetence, this book analyses a database of more than 4,000 officers who commanded infantry battalions during the war.