Two years after the assassination of Lebanon's former prime
minister, Rafik Hariri, and 22 others, including former
Minister Basil Fuleihan, on Tuesday Lebanon was subjected to
another terrorist attack in Ain Alaq, near Bikfaya, home of
the Gemayel family. The bombings represented, most probably,
another escalation by the Syrian regime.
In assessing the possible reasons - or messages - behind the
latest attack, one must examine the political context in
which it occurred. Hizbullah's attempt at toppling the
Siniora government has failed, but the party and other
Syrian allies in Lebanon are still trying to block formation
of the mixed Lebanese-international tribunal to try suspects
in the Hariri assassination, in line with Syria's demands.

In an attempt to break the impasse, Saudi Arabia has been
trying to reach an understanding with Iran, intentionally
and visibly bypassing the Syrians. In parallel, Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa has been negotiating an
initiative based on the formula of "no victor, no
vanquished." The essence of the initiative is to accommodate
the opposition's demands for more seats in the Cabinet in
return for formal Lebanese endorsement of the tribunal. Such
a solution is detrimental to the Syrians, and they
apparently told Moussa last Monday the same thing that they
have been telling other envoys visiting Damascus: Syria does
not want to hear of the Hariri tribunal.

According to an Al-Hayat report on Tuesday, the Syrian
conditions for a solution in Lebanon, as presented to Moussa,
were that the Lebanese opposition be given the so-called
"blocking third" in the Cabinet (which would enable it to
veto any decision that goes to a vote, and even bring the
government down); and that there should be no "rush" in
forming the tribunal, even though Syria considers itself
"unconcerned with it." In other words, the Syrians are
holding on to their maximalist position.

Syrian brazenness didn't end there. Al-Hayat also reported
that there were hints from Damascus and its Lebanese allies
that Moussa was no longer acceptable as a mediator, and
should not return to Lebanon.
In all likelihood, the point of such leaks is to present the
Saudis (but also the Iranians) with a fait accompli and tell
Riyadh that it has to deal with Syria directly and
accommodate its demands, or else face mayhem in Lebanon. The
timing is important: In March, an Arab summit will be held
in Saudi Arabia. The targeting of civilians, not to mention
the continuous threats directed against the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon stationed in the South, is intended
to show that Syria will not hesitate to escalate its
activities to whole new levels.

This has been Syria's method since the forced extension of
President Emile Lahoud's mandate in 2004: to force "respect"
through brutishness. However, it allows no margin for
maneuver, even for President Bashar Assad's allies in
Lebanon or those outside who are working under the illusion
that they can "draw Syria in from the cold." In many ways it
is a replay of Assad's misreading of the political winds
when UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was passed. At the
time, Assad misguidedly thought he could bend the
international community to his will.

This might explain a second message Syria and its allies
wanted to send with the Ain Alaq attack. Last week, former
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel paid a visit to Washington,
where he met with President George W. Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. At the
meetings, the US officials reaffirmed their strong support
for Lebanon. The reaction in Damascus was less encouraging.
An unnamed Syrian official commented on Gemayel's visit by
warning that "those who might be promising him the
presidency may not be able to fulfill their promise." Two
days later, Lahoud issued a statement condemning Gemayel, in
which he made ominous reference to 1983 and to Gemayel's
trip to the US at the time. This, Lahoud added, "resulted in
a costly war for Lebanon." Indeed, 1983 is the year when
American and French interests in Lebanon were attacked by
groups affiliated to Syria and Iran.

It may be that the Syrians fear, and were reacting to, what
they saw as a bid to find a new president to replace Lahoud
- who has threatened not to leave office after his term
expires in a few months. Early presidential elections also
happen to be part of Moussa's package deal, and they have
been explicitly rejected by Assad. After all, that is what
the Syrian president reportedly told Hariri in 2004: I alone
choose Lebanon's president, and I will break Lebanon over
all your heads if you disagree.

The problem for Assad is that his inflexibility is likely to
have a contrary effect. The Europeans have tried to engage
Syria, to no avail. As a European diplomat recently told Al-Hayat,
all those Europeans who go to Damascus to ask it to change
its ways, end up returning disappointed and agreeing with
the US and French position. There are no more "deals"
possible over Lebanon of the kind that Assad envisions,
where the country would again become his exclusive
patrimony. And the more violence he inflicts on Lebanon, the
more the Hariri tribunal becomes inevitable.

**Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies in Washington, where he focuses on
Lebanon and Syria. He also hosts the Across the Bay blog
(www.beirut2bayside.blogspot.com). He wrote this commentary
for THE DAILY STAR.