In deciding what the facts are, you
must consider all the evidence. In doing this, you must decide which testimony
to believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe all, none or any
part of any witness's testimony. In making that decision, you may take into
account a number of factors including the following: 1) was the witness able
to see, or hear, or know the things about which that witness testified? 2) how
well was the witness able to recall and describe those things? 3) what was the
witness's manner while testifying? 4) did the witness have an interest in the
outcome of this case or any bias or prejudice concerning any party or any matter
involved in the case? 5) how reasonable was the witness's testimony considered
in light of all the evidence in the case? and 6) was the witness's testimony
contradicted by what that witness has said or done at another time, or by the
testimony of other witnesses, or by other evidence?

If you think that a witness has
deliberately testified falsely in some respect, you should carefully consider
whether you should rely upon any of that witness's testimony.1

In deciding whether or not to believe
a witness, keep in mind that people sometimes forget things. You need to
consider, therefore, whether a contradiction is an innocent lapse of memory or
an intentional falsehood, and that may depend on whether the contradiction has
to do with an important fact or with only a small detail.

These are some of the factors you may
consider in deciding whether to believe testimony.

The weight of the evidence presented
by each side does not depend on the number of witnesses.2 It is the
quality of the evidence, not the quantity of the evidence, that you must
consider.
_______________________________________________________

1
It is not necessary to specifically instruct the jury that if they find that a
witness has intentionally testified falsely as to one thing, then it can reject
that witness's entire testimony. State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn. App. 551,
577-79, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 917 (1999). Disbelief of testimony, by
itself, does not prove the opposite. In State v. McCarthy, 105 Conn. App.
596, 621, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 913 (2008), the court's refusal to charge on
this issue was not error.

"Generally, a defendant is not
entitled to an instruction singling out any of the state's witnesses and
highlighting his or her possible motive for testifying falsely. . . . There are,
however, two exceptions to this rule: the complaining witness exception and the
accomplice exception." State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 561 (2000). "The complaining witness exception . . . provides that when a complaining
witness could himself have been subject to prosecution depending only upon the
veracity of his account of [the] particular criminal transaction, the court
should . . . [instruct] the jury in substantial compliance with the defendant's
request to charge to determine the credibility of that witness in the light of
any motive for testifying falsely and inculpating the accused. . . . [T]here
must be evidence . . . to support the defendant's assertion that the complaining
witness was the culpable party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The
accomplice exception requires that "where it is warranted by the evidence, it is
the court's duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the
testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the
commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the
offense with which the defendant is charged." (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 562. In State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452
(2005), the Supreme Court recognized a third exception for the testimony of an
informant.
See
Accomplice Testimony, Instruction 2.5-2,
Informant Testimony, Instruction 2.5-3,
and
Complaining Witness Testimony, Instruction 2.5-5.

“[I]t is within the discretion of a trial court to give a cautionary instruction to the jury whenever the court reasonably believes that a witness’ testimony may be particularly unreliable because the witness has a special interest in testifying for the state and the witness’ motivations may not be adequately exposed through cross-examination or argument by counsel.”
State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 113 (2011) (rejecting the need for requiring such an instruction in any case where there is evidence that the witness may be particularly unreliable).

Child Witnesses

A defendant is not entitled
to an instruction that a child's testimony is inherently less worthy of belief
simply because of the age of the witness. State v. James, 211 Conn. 555,
566-71 (1989); General Statutes § 54-86h ("No witness shall be automatically
adjudged incompetent to testify because of age."); Code of Evidence § 6-1 ("[E]very
person is competent to be a witness."). In State v. James, supra, the
Court recognized the concern, underlying similar decisions in other
jurisdictions, that "an instruction [that] singles out the testimony of the
child witness for special scrutiny may infringe upon the jury's exclusive role
as arbiter of credibility." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 568.
Because such an instruction is "not for the statement of any rule of law but for
a cautionary comment upon the evidence," it remains within the discretion of the
trial court. Id., 571. A court's denial of a defendant's request for a special
child credibility instruction has been consistently upheld when an adequate
general credibility instruction has been given. See State v. Ceballos,
266 Conn. 364, 423 (2003); State v. Angell, 237 Conn. 321, 330 (1996);
State v. Abrahante, 56 Conn. App. 65, 78-80 (1999); State v. Nguyen,
52 Conn. App. 85, 95-97 (1999), aff'd on other grounds, 253 Conn. 639 (2000).

Confessions

"While the preliminary
question of admissibility of a confession is for the court, the credibility and
weight to be accorded the confession is for the jury." State v. Vaughan,
171 Conn. 454, 460-61 (1976); see also State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 95
(1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 (1971) (adhering to the "orthodox rule under
which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the
confession"). "This rule does not require the court to give a particular
instruction to the jury regarding the credibility of the defendant's confession
simply because the confession was a substantial part of the evidence." State
v. Corbin, 260 Conn. 730, 742 (2002) (court's instruction adequately
explained the jury's duty to evaluate the weight and credibility of all the
evidence).

If the defendant has
introduced evidence bearing on the reliability of his or her confession, the
court may refer to this evidence during the general credibility instruction. See
State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 22 (2003) ("The court explained that the
jury was required to consider all of the circumstances underlying the
defendant's confession in evaluating whether that confession was voluntary and
reliable. Moreover, the court expressly apprised the jury of the defendant's
claim that the confession was unreliable owing to the defendant's 'age,
background and circumstances surrounding the making of her confession,' thereby
underscoring those considerations."); see also State v. Vaughan, supra,
171 Conn. 454 (concluding that the trial court should have admitted the
defendant's proffered expert testimony on his mental capacity at the time of his
confession to help the jury determine what weight and credibility to give to the
confession); State v. Fernandez, 27 Conn. App. 73, 80, cert. denied, 222
Conn. 904 (1992) (distinguishing Vaughan on the basis that defendant's proffered
testimony was not probative of the reliability of the defendant's confession).

Comparative credibilityA "comparative credibility" instruction
should not be given because it runs the risk of misleading the jury that they
can choose the more credible side rather than holding the state to its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Whitford,
260 Conn. 610, 643-49 (2002).