On November 6, 1996, DCS served respondent with a notice of registration
of the 1981 support order. (6) The notice stated that, "[a]s of the date of this notice,
[respondent] owes $38,680.10 in arrears under the support order(s) as calculated using the
attached statement(s)/affidavits(s) of arrears and/or worksheets and amounts which have
become due since that time." The certified statement was attached to the notice.
Respondent did not request a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the 1981
support order. See ORS 110.417.

In April 1997, DCS filed the 1981 support order in the Jackson County
Circuit Court, together with the certified statement and a child support and money
judgment. The latter document was filed without being signed by the trial court. It
included the following information:

"4. Amount of judgment: $300 PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT

"5. Prejudgment interest: None

"6. Post judgment interest information: Rate: % per annum

Type: Simple

"Interest accrues on the judgment and
each unpaid installment as it becomes
due.

In reply, respondent concedes that, under California law in effect in 1981,
an interest obligation was implied as a matter of law in every child support order. He
asserts, however, that that implication did not extend to the amount of arrearage required
to be set forth in the certified statement and the notice of registration submitted with the
1981 support order.

We first address respondent's contention that "there was but one final
judgment on the amount of child support arrearage owed by the Respondent that was in
effect in the State of Oregon, i.e., the Jackson County Circuit Court's Judgment of April
7, 1997." Respondent argues that, because the support order and money judgment was
left blank in the space for an interest rate, it preclusively established that the registered
order did not accrue interest. That argument fails.

Presumably the reason for filing the support order and money judgment
with the 1981 support order was to provide the information required under ORCP 70 A
(1995). Assuming without deciding that registration of a foreign support order is subject
to those requirements, any defect in that regard did not render the 1981 support order
itself invalid or unenforceable. To the contrary, because respondent failed to contest the
validity or enforcement of that order, it was confirmed by operation of law. See ORS
110.417(2). Stated another way, to the extent that the 1997 support order and money
judgment varied from the terms--express or implied--of the 1981 support order, the 1997
document lacked legal effect. See Taylor v. Morrison

, 188 Or App 519, 525, 72 P3d 654
(2003) (vacating a supplemental judgment for attorney fees that was based on terms in a
"judgment summary" that were not part of the foreign judgment to which the summary
was attached). Thus, the omission of an interest rate from the 1997 support order and
money judgment had no effect on the determination of whether and what amount of
interest had accrued under the 1981 support order. (11)

If the statutory context does not put the matter to rest, the legislative history
of UIFSA, which includes its official commentary, does. SeeState of Oregon DCS v.
Anderson, 189 Or App 162, 169, 74 P3d 1149, rev den, 336 Or 92 (2003) (stating that
UIFSA official commentary constitutes legislative history). The commentary to section
604, enacted as ORS 110.411, provides, in part:

"This section identifies situations in which local law is inapplicable.
The basic principle of the Act is that throughout the process the controlling
order remains the order of the issuing State, and that responding States only
assist in the enforcement of that order. Absent a loss of continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction and a subsequent modification of the order, the order
never becomes an 'order of the responding State.' Ultimate responsibility
for enforcement and final resolution of the obligor's compliance with all
aspects of the support order belongs to the issuing State. Thus, calculation
of whether the obligor has fully complied with the payment of current
support, arrears, and interest on arrears, is the duty of the issuing State."

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 604 comment, 9 ULA 352, 357-58 (2001)
(emphasis added). Because the commentary expressly distinguishes between "arrears"
and "interest on arrears," we conclude that, as used in ORS 110.405(2)(c) and ORS
110.414(2)(d), the terms "arrearage" and "arrearages" refer to unpaid support, exclusive
of accrued interest.

In any event, even if the amount of arrearages stated in the certified
statement and notice of registration for purposes of ORS 110.405(2)(c) and ORS
110.414(2)(d) were deemed to include accrued interest, nothing in UIFSA indicates that
the amount of arrearages specified in the certified statement and notice cannot be changed
to account for interest that was omitted from those documents at the time that they were
served on the obligor. That issue, like others pertaining to the enforcement of a registered
order, is left for resolution by the law of the responding state. See ORS 110.408(2)
(providing that "[a] registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same
manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this
state"). Under Oregon law, registration of a support order under UIFSA does not
constitute the final step in the enforcement process. Additional steps include the
administrative and judicial review process prescribed by ORS 416.427 and ORS 416.429.
That process provided DCS with an opportunity to add interest to the amount of
arrearages previously established and for respondent to contest that action. Former OAR
461-195-0047(3) (1997), renumbered as OAR 137-055-3240(3) (2003), applied to
support orders, including foreign support orders registered in Oregon under UIFSA, and
provided:

"Where an arrearage had earlier been established, through a process
which afforded notice and an opportunity to contest to both parties, the
arrearage from that period shall not be reestablished except that if interest
had not been included in the establishment, interest may be added for that
period."

We conclude that the failure to include interest in the statement and notice
required by ORS 110.405(2)(c) and ORS 110.414(2)(d) did not preclude DCS from later
seeking to enforce an interest obligation.

Respondent next asserts that the omission of interest from the arrearage
claimed in the notice of registration deprived him of due process. He contends that what
"DCS and the Circuit Court did in this case is equivalent to a party filing a complaint
seeking a specific relief, serving the defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint
specifying this relief, obtaining a default, and then seeking a judgment with relief
requested substantially at odds with that sought in the filed complaint." We disagree with
respondent's characterizations of the notice of registration as the equivalent of a
complaint in a civil action and the result of registration as "obtaining a default."
Respondent ignores the fact that a "complaint" was filed against him in the underlying
California dissolution action and that the 1981 support order was entered as a lawful
consequence. That support order included accrued interest under California law, and
respondent was charged with knowledge that it did. See County of Los Angeles v. Salas,
38 Cal App 4th 510, 513, 516, 45 Cal Rptr 2d 61, 62, 64 (1995).

As discussed, registration of the 1981 support order in Oregon merely made
the order enforceable in this state; it did not constitute a new support proceeding resulting
in an independently enforceable support order. Moreover, when DCS commenced the
administrative enforcement proceeding under ORS 416.429, respondent was afforded an
opportunity to challenge--and did challenge--the amount sought in the amended notice of
arrearage. We conclude that respondent was not denied due process.

To summarize, because California retained continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the child support matter, the only support order entitled to enforcement
under UIFSA was the 1981 support order. The trial court was required to recognize and
enforce, but could not modify, that order. The order implicitly provided for the accrual of
interest on the support arrearage. Accordingly, the support order and money judgment, to
the extent that it failed to state an applicable interest rate for arrearages, did not establish
that the 1981 support order did not include interest. Further, because the term
"arrearages," for purposes of UIFSA, refers to accrued and unpaid support, exclusive of
interest, the statement of arrearages and notice of registration were not required to include
the amount of interest owed under the 1981 support order. In any event, the procedure for
enforcement of the order provided for the addition of interest to the arrearage, and
respondent had an opportunity to object to that change. Therefore, he was not denied due
process. The trial court did not err in concluding that the amount owed by respondent
under the 1981 support order included accrued interest on the support arrearage.

"A support order or income-withholding order of another
state may be registered in this state by sending the following
documents and information to the Support Enforcement Division
of the Department of Justice as interstate clearinghouse for the
State of Oregon:

"(a) A letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting
registration and enforcement;

"(b) Two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders
to be registered, including any modification of an order;

"(c) A sworn statement by the party seeking registration or
a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the
amount of any arrearage[.]"

Or Laws 1999, chapter 680, section 2, amended ORS 110.405(2) to reflect that the Support
Enforcement Division had been renamed the Division of Child Support. For convenience, we
refer to the agency by its current name.

"(1) The administrator [of the Department of Human Services] may issue a
notice of intent to establish and enforce arrearages for any support order that is
registered, filed or docketed in this state. The notice must be served upon the
obligor in the manner prescribed for service of summons in a civil action or
mailed to the obligor at the obligor's last-known address by certified mail, return
receipt requested. The administrator shall mail the notice to the obligee by regular
mail.

"(2) The notice shall include:

"(a) A statement of the name of the caretaker relative or agency and the
name of the dependent child for whom support is to be paid;

"(b) A statement of the monthly support the obligor is required to pay
under the support order;

"(c) A statement of the arrearages claimed to be owed under the support
order;

"(d) A demand that the obligor make full payment to the Department of
Justice or the clerk of the court, whichever is appropriate, within 14 days of the
receipt or service of the notice;

"(e) A statement that if full payment or an objection is not received within
14 days, the administrator will enter an order directing that the amount of the
arrearages stated in the notice be entered in the child support accounting record
maintained by the Department of Justice;

"(f) A statement that if the obligor or the obligee objects to the
enforcement of the arrearages, then the objecting party must send to the office
issuing the notice, within 14 days of the date of service, a written response that
sets forth any objections and requests a hearing;

"(g) A statement that the only basis upon which an obligor or an obligee
may object to the enforcement of the arrearages is that the amount of the
arrearages specified in the notice is incorrect;

"(h) A reference to ORS 416.400 to 416.470;

"* * * * *

"(3) If a timely written response setting forth objections and requesting a
hearing is received by the appropriate office, a hearing shall be held under ORS
416.427."

"(3) Except as provided by subsection (4) of this section and ORS
110.397, the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the
withholding order by complying with the terms of the order that specify:

"* * * * *

"(e) The amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on
arrearages, stated as sums certain."

(Emphasis added.) Although that statute was not enacted until 1997, Or Laws 1997, ch 746, §
89, and that cannot be context for what the legislature intended the term "arrearages" to mean
when DCS received the certified statement and served respondent with the notice of registration,
see Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 79-80, 948 P2d 722 (1997), it is consistent with the view that
arrearages are distinct from interest.