A sheik who boasted he was Osama bin Laden's spiritual adviser was convicted yesterday of scheming to financing terrorism, in a case that nearly went up in smoke when a key witness set himself on fire outside the White House.

Yemeni cleric Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad, 56, faces up to 75 years behind bars after a Brooklyn federal jury found him guilty of five charges stemming from a conspiracy to support al Qaeda and Hamas.

"Today's convictions mark another important step in our war on terrorism," U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said.

"Those who conspire to support and finance the terrorist actions of al Qaeda and other enemies will be found and they will face justice."

Al-Moayad's assistant, Mohammed Yahya Zayed, 31, was also convicted and faces up to 35 years behind bars.

The two men were arrested in January 2003 after three days of meetings with a pair of FBI informants in which they discussed funneling $2.5 million to al Qaeda and Hamas.

These sessions were secretly taped in a German hotel that had been wired for video and sound as part of a sting operation.

A key informant, Mohamed Alanssi, had to be scratched off the witness list after he set himself on fire last November in front of the White House in protest of his supposed mishandling by the FBI.

But the defense team surprised everyone by calling Alanssi as a witness — a move that seemed to backfire.

The witness repeatedly called al-Moayad "the terrorist" and described several occasions when he met with businessmen in Brooklyn on the sheik's behalf. Alanssi also testified that al-Moayad had bragged about giving $20 million to bin Laden.

Al-Moayad and Zayed flashed smiles as the verdict was returned, but then erupted into angry protests after the jury left.

Al-Moayad — who prosecutors said raised the terror money in Brooklyn — turned to reporters and shouted in English, "I want to speak with you."

Continuing on in Arabic, the sheik suggested that evidence had been withheld by the feds and claimed the jury had seen "only one-fourth or one-half" of surveillance tapes at the heart of the prosecution team's case.

Zayed joined in to loudly address Brooklyn federal Judge Sterling Johnson before deputies with the U.S. Marshals Service ushered him out.

"I want another lawyer in order to defend my case because the jury did not fully study my case," the assistant said. Al-Moayad and Zayed were convicted of eight of 10 charges they faced.

While convicting al-Moayad of providing material support to Hamas and conspiring to support al Qaeda, jurors stopped short of finding he had gone through with actually assisting bin Laden's terror organization.

Zayed was also cleared of the charge he attempted to support al Qaeda.

Defense lawyer William Goodman claimed the feds' case — which featured video of Osama bin Laden and testimony from a man injured in a bus bombing — "played upon the worst possible fears of the American public."

Five anonymous jurors told reporters after the verdict that surveillance tapes were powerful evidence. "Not once did they say, 'We're not going to do this,' " one female juror said.

"Without the people that finance it, it wouldn't be possible to have terrorist acts," a male juror said.

A three-year case that saw the government's star witness set himself on fire outside the White House ended with the convictions of a Yemeni sheik and his assistant on terror-funding charges.

After the verdict was announced Thursday, Sheik Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad and his assistant, Mohammed Yahya Zayed, cried out in Arabic that they had been wrongly convicted because jurors had not seen all of the government's surveillance tapes. U.S. marshals rushed the men from court.

Al-Moayad and Zayed were convicted of all but two of the 10 charges in an indictment that accused them of vital roles in a terror funding network that stretched from Brooklyn to Yemen.

However, the sheik was acquitted of the charge that grabbed headlines when he was arrested two years ago in Germany: supporting al-Qaida.

Prosecutors said al-Moayad could face 75 years behind bars and Zayed could face 45 years for conspiring to support Hamas and al-Qaida and related charges. Defense attorneys said they planned to appeal.

During the outburst, al-Moayad cried out in English to reporters in the courtroom - "I want to speak with you" - then shouted in Arabic that jurors saw only "one-half of one-quarter" of the surveillance tapes that comprised the bulk of the government's case.

Al-Moayad and Zayed were recorded promising to funnel more than $2 million to Hamas in a meeting with two FBI informants in a German hotel room.

Zayed said in Arabic to U.S. District Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. after the verdict was read that he wanted another lawyer "because the jury did not fully study my case."

The convictions of Al-Moayad and Zayed, who were arrested by German police in January 2003 and extradited to the United States, "mark another important step" in the war on terrorism, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said Thursday.

Five of the unidentified jurors in the case told reporters after the verdict they had been convinced almost entirely by Al-Moayad and Zayed's words and actions on four days of secretly recorded conversations in the Frankfurt hotel.

They said they were unpersuaded, and occasionally offended, by defense suggestions the recordings were a government "reality show" that attempted to play on their anti-Muslim prejudices.

"This is a case that was designed and carried out in a way that played upon the worst possible fears of the American public," Al-Moayad's lawyer William Goodman insisted after the verdict.

But jurors said they were convinced by the defendants' behavior and their familiarity on the recordings with the names of high-ranking members of Hamas.

Jurors said Mohamed Alanssi, the key government informant who set himself on fire outside the White House and then testified as a hostile defense witness, made little difference to their deliberations. Alanssi later explained the action as an attempt to gain more money and attention from the FBI.

The case caused outrage in Yemen, where al-Moayad is a well-known cleric and high-ranking member of the Islamist opposition Islah party.

Alanssi made well-publicized claims that al-Moayad had boasted of delivering $20 million to Osama bin Laden, who called the cleric "my sheik." But jurors described much of the evidence linking al-Moayad to al-Qaida before the German sting operation as inconclusive and relatively unimportant.

NEW YORK -- Over repeated objections from the defense, a 28-year-old convict described his life as an al-Qaida recruit as prosecutors presented the most extensive evidence to date linking a Yemeni sheik to the international terrorist group.

Yahya Goba, a member of the Lackawanna Six terrorist cell, took the stand Tuesday after the judge in the case allowed jurors to see an al-Qaida training camp entry form listing Sheik Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad as the sponsor of a trainee, a Yemeni fighter known as Abu Jihad.

Al-Moayad, a prominent Yemeni politician and Islamic cleric, is on trial in federal court in Brooklyn on charges of supporting al-Qaida and the Palestinian militant group Hamas.

Goba was among six men from the Buffalo suburb of Lackawanna who pleaded guilty to supporting terrorism after they were arrested in 2002. He testified Tuesday that he filled out a a training camp entry form around May 2001 as he traveled from the United States to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He said he was persuaded to enter the camp by Kamal Derwish, an Islamist fighter he met at a pro-Palestine rally in New York in 1998.

Derwish is believed to have been killed by a CIA Predator drone missile strike in Yemen in 2002.

After daily meetings focusing on religious observance, Goba and his co-defendants were recruited to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he entered the al-Farooq camp. He described putting Derwish's name on the entry form before he began his training in military tactics, weaponry and explosives.

"It was important that we have the voucher's name, or the reference's name," he said.

He told jurors about staying in dusty yellow tents marked with the initials of the United Nations and learning to put together and take apart machine guns, pistols and assault rifles.

Goba said he and his fellow recruits greeted Osama bin Laden on one visit to the camp.

"They had everyone sing a welcoming song for him," Goba said.

Prosecutors then played an al-Jazeera video of bin Laden visiting the camp with his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al-Moayad's attorney, William Goodman, registered one of the most strenuous in a series of objections to Goba's testimony.

"This is further evidence offered in support of testimony which was already irrelevant to begin with," Goodman said before being overruled.

U.S. District Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. barred prosecutors last month from introducing the training camp entry form, saying the mere presence of al-Moayad's name was not evidence of his wrongdoing. He changed his mind Tuesday morning, saying "the door has been opened" by the defense.

Al-Moayad's lawyers have argued that the sheik had no ties to terrorism before he was lured into a purported terror funding scheme by two FBI informants. He was recorded in a German hotel room promising to help the informants move $2.5 million to Hamas, according to government translations of the mostly Arabic conversations.

Jurors were told not to consider the entry form as evidence against Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed, al-Moayad's assistant, who is charged with conspiring and attempting to support Hamas and al-Qaida.

If convicted, al-Moayad could receive a 60-year prison sentence and Zayed a 30-year term.

HIGHLIGHT: During the 1980s, resistance fighters in Afghanistan developed aworldwide recruitment and support network with the aid of the USA, SaudiArabia and other states. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, this network,which equipped, trained and funded thousands of Muslim fighters, came underthe control of Osama bin Laden. In light of evidence from the recentlycompleted US embassy bombing trials, Phil Hirschkorn, Rohan Gunaratna, EdBlanche, and Stefan Leader examine the genesis, operational methods andorganizational structure of the Bin Laden network - Al-Qaeda.

Since its creation in 1988, Osama bin Laden has controlled Al-Qaeda. Assuch, he is both the backbone and the principal driving force behind thenetwork. The origins Osama bin Laden, alias Osama Mohammad al Wahad, aliasAbu Abdallah, alias Al Qaqa, born in 1957, is the son of Mohammad bin Awdahbin Laden of Southern Yemen. When he moved to Saudi Arabia, Osama's fatherbecame a construction magnate and renovated the holy cities of Mecca andMedina, making the Bin Ladens a highly respected family both within theSaudi royal household and with the public. At Jeddah University, Osama binLaden's worldview was shaped by Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian ofJordanian origin. An influential figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam isregarded as the historical leader of Hamas. After graduation, Bin Ladenbecame deeply religious. His exact date of arrival in Pakistan orAfghanistan remains disputed but some Western intelligence agencies place itin the early 1980s. Azzam and Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdelaziz, chiefof security of Saudi Arabia, were his early mentors, and later Dr AymanZawahiri, became his religious mentor.

In 1982-1984 Azzam founded Maktab al Khidmat lil-mujahidin al-Arab (MaK),known commonly as the Afghan bureau. As MaK's principal financier, Bin Ladenwas considered the deputy to Azzam, the leader of MaK. Other leadersincluded Abdul Muizz, Abu Ayman, Abu Sayyaf, Samir Abdul Motaleb andMohammad Yusuff Abass. At the height of the foreign Arab and Muslim influxinto Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1984- 1986, Bin Laden spent time travelingwidely and raising funds in the Arab world. He recruited several thousandArab and Muslim youths to fight the Soviet Union, and MaK channeled severalbillion dollars' worth of Western governmental, financial and materialresources for the Afghan jihad. MaK worked closely with Pakistan, especiallythe Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the Saudi government and Egyptiangovernments, and the vast Muslim Brotherhood network.

Both the fighting and relief efforts were assisted by two banks - Dar al Malal Islami, founded by Turki's brother Prince Mohammad Faisal in 1981 andDalla al Baraka founded by King Fahd's brother- in-law in 1982. The bankschanneled funds to 20 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the most famousof which was the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). With IIROand the Islamic Relief Agency functioned under the umbrella of the WorldIslamic League led by Mufti Abdul Aziz bin Baz. In addition tobenefiting from the vast resources and expertise of governments channeledthrough domestic and foreign sources, MaK developed an independent globalreach through several mosques and charities throughout the world.

Bin Laden's relationship with Azzam suffered towards the end of theanti-Soviet Afghan campaign. The dispute was over Azzam's support forAhmadshah Massoud, the current leader of the Northern Alliance fighting theTaliban. Bin Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former prime minister andleader of the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), who was both anti-communist andanti-Western.

When the Soviets withdrew, Bin Laden decided to form a group that couldunite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. Despite theirdifferences, Azzam and Bin Laden worked together until Azzam wasassassinated in September 1989. Although Soviet troops withdrew that year,they installed the pro-communist leader Najibullah in Kabul. MaKstrengthened the organization in order to fight the Najibullah regime and tochannel resources to other international campaigns where Muslims wereperceived as victims. In addition to benefiting from MaK's pan-Islamic, asopposed to pan-Arab, ideology, Al-Qaeda drew from the vast financialresources and technical expertise mobilized during the decade-longanti-Soviet campaign.

At the end of the campaign Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where hehelped Saudi Arabia to create the first jihad group in South Yemen under theleadership of Tariq al Fadli. After Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, thefailure of Saudi rulers to honor their pledge to expel foreign troops whenthe Iraqi threat diminished led Bin Laden to start a campaign against theSaudi royal house. He claimed the Saudi rulers were false Muslims and it wasnecessary to install a true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regimedeported him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994.

Meanwhile, the National Islamic Front, led by Hasan al Turabi, came to powerin Sudan and sent a delegation to Pakistan. Bin Laden had moved hisinfrastructure of well-trained and experienced fighters from Pakistan toSudan beginning in 1989 and remained there until international pressureforced him to return to Afghanistan.

The organization Vertically, Al-Qaeda is organized with Bin Laden, theemir-general, at the top, followed by other Al-Qaeda leaders and leaders ofthe constituent groups. Horizontally, it is integrated with 24 constituentgroups. The vertical integration is formal, the horizontal integration,informal. Immediately below Bin Laden is the Shura majlis, a consultativecouncil. Four committees - military, religio-legal, finance, and media -report to the majlis. Handpicked members of these committees - especiallythe military committee - conduct special assignments for Bin Laden and hisoperational commanders. To preserve operational effectiveness at all levels,compartmentalization and secrecy are paramount.

While the organization has evolved considerably since the embassy bombings,the basic structure of the consultative council and the four committeesremains intact. Bin Laden's intention to expand his operations has beencurbed by the post-bombing security environment, and both Bin Laden andAl-Qaeda have become increasingly clandestine.

Al-Qaeda membership is estimated at between 3,000-5,000 men, most of whofight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and are designatedthe 055 Brigade. It has camps in Khost, Mahavia, Kabul, Jalalabad, Kunar,Kandahar, and depots in Tora Bora and Liza. There are no female members. Interms of recruitment of experienced fighters, Bin Laden has benefited fromhis vast Muhajadeen database, created during the anti-Soviet campaign.Al-Qaeda support and operational cells have been detected and neutralized inItaly, Germany, UK, Canada, USA, Tanzania, Kenya, Yemen and Albania, butthey have since been replaced. Cells have also been identified in about 50countries including Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and the Philippines. Al-Qaedaoperational cells comprised of 'commandos' operate under Mohammad Atef,alias Abu Hafs. They are mostly suicide members. The organization also has aSecurity Service led by Mohammad Mousa. The ideology Al-Qaeda owes itsextensive support and operational infrastructure to its broad ideologicaldisposition. Bin Laden's ideology appeals to both MiddleEastern and non-Middle Eastern groups that are Islamic in character.Although an Arab, Bin Laden advocates pan- Islam, not pan-Arabism. Histhinking in this direction was greatly influenced both by Azzam, hisPalestinian mentor, and to a lesser extent by Hasan Turabi, the spiritualleader of Sudan.

To put his ideology into practice, Bin Laden dispatched several hundredAfghan veterans to join Islamic groups in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,boosting the domestic and international guerrilla and terrorist agenda ofthese groups. Bin Laden's cadres are drawn from a 50,000 strong pool of twogenerations of Afghan veterans. The first generation fought in themultinational Afghan campaign in 1979-89, the second generation in campaignsin Tajikistan, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon,Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt. These fighters are devout Muslimsinspired by Islamic scholars and are willing to sacrifice their lives forIslam.

Bin Laden supports three types of groups. First, groups fighting regimes ledby Muslim rulers, which they believe, are compromising Islamic ideals andinterests (as in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia). Second, groups that arefighting regimes perceived as oppressing and repressing their Muslimpopulace (as in Kosovo, India and Indonesia). Third: groups fighting regimesto establish their own Islamic state (as in Palestine, Chechnya, Dagestanand Mindanao). Bin Laden has also directed his efforts and resources tofight the USA, a country he sees as a direct threat to Islam, closelyfollowed by Europe, Israel, Russia and India in importance as targets.

Al-Qaeda's broad ideology has enabled it to infiltrate many Islam- drivengroups. After realizing the potential for inflicting damage to Europe andNorth America, Al-Qaeda infiltrated the European network of the ArmedIslamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme - GIA) after 1997. Although the GIA isan Al-Qaeda constituent, the Al- Qaeda fatwa did not claim GIA as one of itssignatories, possibly because it believed that exposing the associationwould be counterproductive. Compared to other groups that openly signed thefatwa, the GIA had a greater reach into the West.

Most of Al-Qaeda's membership is drawn from the two Egyptian groups: IslamicGroup of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Gamaya AlIslamiya). Khamareddine Kherbane, an Afghan veteran, was close to both theGIA and Al-Qaeda leaderships. Two Algerian groups, the GIA of Antar Zouabriand the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour laPredication et le Combat - GSPC) of Hassan Hattab developed ties withAl-Qaeda early on, but large-scale penetration of Algerian groups came in1997-8. Bin Laden also cemented ties with Jaish Aden Abin al Islami ofYemen, and members of several small Islamist parties from Tunisia, Libya,and Morocco and elsewhere also joined. With the exception of the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), Al-Qaedalinks with Asian Islamist groups, notably those fighting in Kashmir,developed in thesecond half of the 1990s.

Due to fears of penetration, especially since the embassy bombings, Al-Qaedais likely to become more discreet in its decision making process, with feweroperatives knowing the next target. Target selection, preparation andacquisition will remain confined to Bin Laden and a handful of leaders inthe military committee.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Bin Laden's state sponsors have included Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan.Pakistan has not supported Bin Laden's terrorist campaigns but it doesassist several hundred Afghan veterans currently serving directly underAl-Qaeda, notably Harakat ul Muhajadeen that is engaged in fighting Indiantroops in Kashmir.

Bin Laden's funding sources vary. His personal inherited fortune is in theregion of US$280 to $300 million according to the estimates of Westernintelligence agencies. Wealthy Arab well-wishers in the Middle East,especially in the Gulf states, continue to support Bin Laden and sympatheticorganizations. Bin Laden is also known to siphon funds from overt Muslimcharities. A wide variety of banks in the Gulf are used, with Bin Ladenfront organizations transacting businesses. The transfers of funds occur viainternational banks in the Gulf where his brother-in-law Mohammad JamalKhalifa is based. He is responsible for managing a part of the financialnetwork and manages significant investments, notably in Mauritius,Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. His businesses range from trade indiamonds to fish. Despite some sources saying he has been disowned, BinLaden has received significant funds from wealthy donors including hisfamily.

The distribution of funds was managed by an exiled Saudi businessman inEthiopia, Sheik Mohammad Hussein Al-Almadi, and the Afghan-based AbuZubayda, who is thought to be a Palestinian originally named Zein AbedeinMohammad Hassan. Funds are transferred through a number of banks in theUnited Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

During the 1990s, contributions from Bin Laden's accounts have funded anumber of operations, including providing hotel accommodation, safe housesand cars to mount reconnaissance on physical and human targets. His fundshave also purchased or manufactured key components for explosive devices. USauthorities were able to trace $5,000 transferred by Bin Laden to theoperational group in Yemen that attacked the USS Cole. He had specificallyallocated funds to video the attack, a task that could not be accomplished.However, overall evidence suggests the extent of Al-Qaeda funding islimited, a result perhaps of successful US attempts to block finance to andfrom Al-Qaeda or of limits on communication placed on it by the Taliban.Much Al-Qaeda support is difficult to quantify as it is in the interests ofBin Laden to keep his involvement covert. It is also difficult to assess thevalidity of US government agency and mass media claims about him, as thereare some indications that they exaggerate his influence.

In any case, the embassy bombers received little funding. Ahmad Ressam andhis associates, arrested in the USA and Canada in 1999, were involved ineither credit card fraud or petty theft; and terrorists associated with BinLaden arrested in Jordan appear to have financed themselves by bankrobberies, burglaries and forged checks, and were planning ransomkidnappings to raise funds.

MODUS OPERANDI

Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman, direct a number of support and strikeoperations using their own support activists and attack teams. Al-Qaeda'selite consists of experienced Egyptian, Algerian and Yemeni cadres.

Al-Qaeda has a high capacity for infiltrating any Muslim communityirrespective of size and geographic location. Individually, Al-Qaeda membershave joined Muslim communities from New Zealand to India, and theorganization has infiltrated both authoritarian and democratic states. Inthe authoritarian states of the Middle East, especially in the oil-richGulf, Al-Qaeda enjoys the support of Islamic philanthropists andfoundations. In emergent democracies, it infiltrates by providing goods andservices to Muslims in need. In democracies, it operates by forging linkswith influential Muslim communities with the aim of soliciting andchanneling their support to Muslim communities in need elsewhere.

As the lead-up to the 1998 bombings demonstrated, several Al-Qaedainfiltrators were sleepers for several years. In some cases, members whohave left have been re-approached by Al-Qaeda leaders for assistance, andhave returned to the fold. The Western intelligence community believes thereare sleepers in Europe and North America waiting to be activated. Stateresponse tothe fight against Al-Qaeda poses several challenges. Bin Laden has built anorganization difficult to disrupt, degrade and destroy. The intelligencecommunity is unfamiliar with the network's fluid and dynamic structure andthe past offers little guidance. The time- tested strategy to destroy apolitically motivated armed group is to target the core and penultimateleadership, but in Bin Laden's case, this is a difficult proposition. InSudan, several rings of Sudanese as well as Al-Qaeda bodyguards protectedhim and in Afghanistan, the Taliban provides security as well as Al-Qaedabodyguards.

If Bin Laden is eliminated, he is likely to be replaced by another Islamist,although none in the second tier possess his charisma. The penultimateleadership is operationally significant, and so Al-Qaeda is likely to remainoperational even if Bin Laden is captured or killed. Both his contemporariesand successors are likely to draw lessons from the unique experience andexpertise of long-range land and sea operations nurtured by Bin Laden.

AL-QAEDA IS RESILIENT FOR FOUR PRINCIPAL REASONS:

- It is the symbol of resistance against Western domination. Although BinLaden is a veritable icon of terrorism to the West, in parts of the Islamicworld he is seen as the only leader that can stand up to the big Satan (theUSA) and the little Satan (Israel). To draw maximum support, Al-Qaedacreated the 'World Islamic Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders'. As such,Al-Qaeda has a ready base of recruits, supporters and sympathizers. Todeepen and widen Al- Qaeda's reach, Bin Laden departs from tradition andembraces a pan- Islamic view. As a result, Al-Qaeda draws the support ofboth Arab and non-Arab Muslims. With time, Al-Qaeda's vast active andpotential support base will grow and mature.

- Al-Qaeda has built strategic depth by maintaining leadership andoperational links with some of the largest and deadliest Middle Eastern andAsian terrorist groups. As an experienced practitioner, Bin Laden's statureand personal relationships with the leaders of these groups facilitatedAl-Qaeda links. Bin Laden's generosity with funds and, more importantly,words of praise, has enabled him to cement strong working relationships atboth leadership and operational levels. Although conceptualized, planned andeven financed by Al-Qaeda, the targeting end of terrorist operations will beby constituent groups such as GIA, MILF, and ASG. Attributing individualattacks and finding the perpetrators will be a long process.

- Landlocked Afghanistan provides Al-Qaeda with a political, security andgeographic shield, which, by imposing sanctions, the international communityhas only strengthened. Afghanistan's isolation has major implications forintelligence collection, especially for the generation of high-gradeintelligence, which usually comes through human sources. Withoutpeople-to-people contact it is difficult to influence their thinking.- Al-Qaeda physically and/or ideologically penetrates international anddomestic Islamic NGOs throughout the world. Thus the Al-Qaeda infrastructureis inseparably enmeshed with the religious, social and economic fabric ofMuslim communities worldwide. Host countries such as the UK, Canada,Australia, and even the USA, are hesitant to investigate Islamic charities,including foreign charities.

Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda is not invulnerable. As was seen in Sudan in 1995,diplomatic and political pressure and shortage of resources can threaten thenetwork. Similarly, when Libya pressured Sudan, Bin Laden asked Al-Qaeda'sLibyan members to leave the group. Thanks mainly to US intelligenceagencies, Al-Qaeda has suffered gravely since the embassy bombings but itstill retains a high capacity to replenish its losses and wastage. However,Al-Qaeda can be destroyed with the allocation and sustained application ofresources, political courage, legal and diplomatic tools. The key todisrupting, degrading and destroying Al-Qaeda lies in developing amulti-pronged, multidimensional and multinational strategy that targets thecore and the penultimate leadership and the network's sources of finance andsupplies.

In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda forces fight alongside the Taliban. If the Talibandefeats the Northern Alliance, Western intelligence and security agenciesfear tens of thousands of foreign and Afghan fighters would then be free toengage in other theatres and other conflicts in which Al-Qaeda might take aninterest. Russia, India, China, Europe and the USA have regional interestsin Chechnya, Kashmir, Xinjiang, the Balkans and the Middle East, allconflicts in which Islam is a central factor.Dr Rohan Gunaratna is Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Terrorism andPolitical Violence, University of St Andrews, Scotland.