Editor's Note 2005: Since the fall of the USSR much more
technical material has become available on the guidance systems and
subtypes of aircraft and submarines employed by the AV-MF and V-MF,
superceding some of the technical detail in this work, which was
compiled from open sources during the 1980s. The strategic models and
doctrine described in this work remain however relevant, since the
large scale proliferation of the Russian anti-shipping weapons after
1991 has seen the operational doctrine for using these weapons also
exported.

The Western Alliance largely
comprises maritime nations and as such
depends upon its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for both trade and
for power projection. The importance of the shipping lanes to the
Western economy cannot be understated, while they also represent the
primary means of resupplying NATO and the Far East in the event of any
major conflict with the Communist bloc.

It is therefore understandable that the USSR has poured
considerable resources into developing a capability to interdict
Western
SLOCs; the rapid growth in this capability over the last decade is
however quite alarming. The Soviets have followed a three pronged
strategy of acquiring exceptionally well placed forward bases and of
modernising their air and submarine maritime strike force.

Cam Ranh Bay was a valuable prize, offering the ability to
cut
all lanes to and from Singapore, Taiwan and the Philippines, while
forcing much traffic to Japan to take a distinctly Eastern approach.
Soviet access to Ethiopia and Aden has similarly provided good coverage
to the Indian Ocean approaches to the Suez Canal and Straits of Hormuz.
Angola offers only limited coverage of the Cape of Good Hope routes but
the potential of South Africa as a target for subversion and eventual
domination has worrying implications. The Soviet thrust into Chile
during the early seventies is less than coincidental in this context.
The Reagan Administration's concern over Central America is not
unreasonable given the threat posed to the Panama Canal.

This situation is a direct result of a systematic effort
aimed
at providing the capability to destroy Allied economic strength through
interdiction of its SLOCs; the former CinC of the Voenno Morskii Flot
(V-MF = Soviet Navy) Admiral Gorshkov has clearly stated that the
interdiction of merchant shipping and its associa ted escorts is the
most important constituent part of the efforts of a fleet aimed at
undermining the military/economic potential of the enemy.

This philosophy is interesting in that it identifies the
primary role of the V-MF as economic warfare with the matter of
confronting Western naval forces a secondary issue. Given the
capabilities of the US Navy surface fleets this posture maximises the
probability of Soviet maritime strike forces surviving a sustained
conflict while also maximising the damage inflicted upon the Free
World's nett warfighting potential. A sustained SLOC interdiction
campaign would ultimately draw Western naval assets away from the areas
of direct confrontation, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Air
Warfare (AAW) platforms being required to protect the convoys which
would be so vital to any major battle on the Eurasian continent.

The systematic upgrading of older but numerically significant
weapons platforms in the Soviet Navy and Air Forces underscores the
importance of this strategy in the eyes of Soviet leadership; faced
with
an Allied Carrier Battle Group (CBG) only the newer systems in the
Soviet inventory would offer a reasonable probability of inflicting
significant damage. The S-3B, P-3C Update IV, SV-22 and Lamps III are a
serious threat to any submarine even at extended ranges while the E-2C
EA-6B, F-14A/D and F/A-18A/C supported by vertical launch (multishot)
SAM firing CG-47 AAW cruisers and DD-963 destroyers would take the bite
out of any air strike. In the face of these capabilities, whether
concentrated in CBGs or convoys the Soviets have made a major
commitment
to antishipping missiles, air surface and submarine launched.

Missile firing aircraft and submarines would play an
analogous
role to the Ju-88s, He-111s, FW-200s, He-177s of the Luftwaffe and U-
boats of the Kreigsmarine in WWII.

The Soviet Maritime Strike
Forces.

The burden of interdicting Western SLOCs would fall upon
three
major commands of the Soviet Armed Forces, the V-MF's Aviatsia
Voenno-Morskovo Flota (AV-MF = Fleet Air Arm), attack submarine forces
of the various fleets, and the Strategic Aviation Forces of the
Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (V-VS = Soviet Air Force). V-MF assets are
dedicated to the maritime role, while many V-VS assets would be made
available subject to the strategic or tactical situation in the
theatre.
The USSR has divi ded its naval forces into five fleets, the Northern,
Baltic, Black Sea, Caspian (Flotilla) and Pacific Fleets by designation
and basing. The key commands in any major conflict would be the
Northern
and Pacific Fleets, both of which are strategically located and least
vulnerable to blockading.

Of particular interest to the Australian observer is the
Pacific Fleet, which is home based in Vladivostok and has forward
deployment bases at Cam Ranh Bay and access to sites in North Korea and
North Vietnam. Cam Ranh Bay is now a major naval and air base with Echo
2 SSGNs (Submarine, Guided missile Nuclear powered) and Bear (8D/F) and
Badger (10 C/G and 6 D/F) aircraft permanently deployed. In numerical
terms the resources available to the Soviet maritime strike planner are
considerable. In submarines, the V-MF can deploy 46 nuclear powered
cruise missile firing boats (SSGN), 15 conventional cruise missile
boats
(SSG), 69 torpedo armed nuclear powered boats (SSN) and 138
conventional
boats (SS). Roughly half the SSG and SSGN fleet is deployed in the
Pacific.

The AV-MF has approximately 400 strike aircraft, supported by
75 tankers and 100 recce and electronic intelligence/warfare aircraft.
Of these 240 are missile firing Badger C/G, 35 Blinder and 125 very
potent Backfire B (30 in the Far East). Targeting support is provided
by
45 Bear D, 35 Badger D/E/F, with jamming support provided by Badger
H/J.

V-VS assets available would include a slice of a 285 strong
Badger force, almost all of the Bear G strike force (50 or more) and
fractions of the 135 strong Blinder A/B and 140 strong Backfire B
forces
respectively.

In terms of unrefuelled strike radius, the Bears have the
longest reach at 4,500nm, with the Backfire reaching to 2,200nm and the
Badgers and Blinders to 1,500nm. All of these aircraft are capable of
inflight refuelling from Badger or Bison tankers using probe/drogue or
wingtip techniques.

AV-MF/Tupolev Tu-22M
Backfire B.
The swing wing Backfire is the Soviet answer to the B-1, possessing
similar low level penetration performance albeit at shorter ranges.
Armed with the potent Mach 3 Kitchen missile, it is the only aircraft
in
the Russian inventory which can confidently expect to survive an
encounter with a USN Carrier Battle Group.

While the strike aircraft can fire a wide range of missile
types, the submarines (and surface vessels) are limited to two families
of missile.

Soviet Air Launched
Antishipping Missiles.

No doubt impressed by the performance of the Luftwaffe's
Hs-293 antiship glidebomb, the Russians deployed the rather crude AS-1
Kennel on early Badger B during the fifties. This weapon was carried in
pairs underwing and set a trend followed to this day. The drag
penalties
of this form of carriage were apparent and another approach was adopted
for many subsequent weapons; semi-recessed carriage under the fuselage.

The early sixties saw the deployment of two new ASM
(Air-Surface Missile) types and specialised launch aircraft to carry
them, both primarily dedicated to the antishipping role. These were the
duckbill nosed Badger C with its AS-2 Kipper turbojet ASM and the
similarly adorned Bear B/C with its massive AS-3 Kangaroo ASM (see AA
Nov 1987).

Both launch aircraft carried large and powerful attack
radars,
the Badger fitted with the I-band Puff Ball and the Bear with the
I-Band
Crown Drum, both also used datalinks for the midcourse guidance of
their
missiles, both of which would transition to autopilot guidance and, in
the former case, active radar terminal homing for the final dive at the
target.

The Badger C and Bear B/C were tasked with striking at
Western
CBGs; their numerical strength would not have had a major impact in a
SLOC interdiction campaign. However both aircraft types were eventually
built in large numbers and today represent (as detailed above) the bulk
of the dedicated antishipping force with newer types taking on the
counter-CBG role.

One of these was the supersonic Blinder B also first seen in
1961. While the Blinder has had an unspectacular career, it offers
comparable radius performance to the Badger with respectable Mach 1.4
dash speed. The Blinder was however significant in that it carried the
M3.0/250nm class Kitchen ASM.

The Kitchen is to this date a mainstay of the AV-MF and VVS,
deployed on Backfire, Bear and Blinder. The AS-4 Kitchen typifies
Soviet
standoff ASM design and has served as a pattern for the newer AS-6
Kingfish and possibly the reported AS-11.

The Blinder/Kitchen was the pinnacle of Soviet strategic
bomber/missile design in the sixties and directly developed into the
very potent Backfire/Kitchen system of the early seventies. The
Backfire
grew out of the Tu-28 Fiddler and Tu-22 Blinder designs, adopting
airframe features from the former and systems from the latter with a
variable geometry wing. Deployed in the seventies, the supersonic
Backfire is the only Soviet aircraft with the performance/electronic
warfare capability to threaten a CBG.

While the Backfire developed, the existing Badger force was
equipped with a new missile, the transonic AS-5 Kelt. While this weapon
was not spectacular it was smaller than the Kitchen and therefore well
suited to underwing carriage. A large fraction of the Badger G force
carries this weapon to this day.

The performance limitations of the Kelt were apparent and it
is now being supplanted with a newer missile, the late seventies AS-6
Kingfish. The Kingfish is much like a smaller and lighter Kitchen and
provides a respectable high speed capability to penetrate a SAM
umbrella.

Mission Profile

Given the diversity of aircraft and missile types in the
Soviet inventory and the range of possible targets, it would be
unreasonable to classify any particular profile as typical although
there are some common factors.

While prelaunch targeting is done by the launch aircraft
using
its attack radar and ESM (Electronic Support Measures) where fitted,
target detection and tracking over blue water at extended ranges
requires powerful surface search radars. These are carried only by
several types, in particular the electronic recce Bear D (an in-depth
profile of the Tupolev Bear appeared in our Nov 87 issue) and Badger D
(also C) of the AV-MF. The Bear D has a known datalink capability and
the Badger D has a chin, radome of a shape most unusual for a radar,
suggesting its usage for a directional datalink antenna (although a
direction finding ESM system such as the AN/ASD-5 could be fitted) [
Editor's Note 2005: the radome is for a datalink antenna].

The recce platform, using data from intelligence or satellite
sources, would sweep an area using both its ESM and radar preferring
the
former for its stealthiness. Subject to the situation a target would be
shadowed until strike aircraft would arrive and attack. The attack
profile is target dependent, with merchant shipping being hit with ASMs
such as Kelt and naval targets being hit with higher performance
missiles such as Kitchen and Kingfish. Undefended merchant vessels
would
be attacked from cruise altitude, Badgers and Bears standing off from
outside the range of any deck mounted point defence weapons. Naval
vessels with area defence SAMs constitute more of a problem and in
isolation would be attacked with several rounds to ensure saturation of
the vessel's fire control system. The 2,000 lb class warheads ensure a
high probability of disabling on a near miss (Exocet has a 360lb
warhead). A typical strike force hunting shipping without air cover
would be comprised of Badger D missile firing Badger C/G with tanker
support, at extended ranges Bear D and missile firing Bear G again with
tanker support.

(above and below) AV-MF/Tupolev Tu-16 Badger. The
Badger
is
a mainstay of Soviet Naval Aviation, used for recce, targeting, Elint
and in large numbers for anti-shipping strike. The duckbill nosed C,
modified C and D versions carry a powerful I-band surface search radar.
The two Badgers at top are air refuelling while the bottom aircraft is
equipped with a single Kingfish ASM beneath its port wing.

Tackling a CBG with its E-2C AEW umbrella is a more demanding
task which is assigned to the Backfire. The attack profile is
accordingly more elaborate. Backfires would attack enmasse in order to
saturate the air defence system with real and false (decoys and
deception jamming) missiles while supporting the attack with
communications and radar noise jamming. The run-in to the missile
release point would be at a low level, to delay detection to the very
last instant, with its radar in standby mode.

The Backfire's Defensive Systems Operator would carefully
watch his ESM to ensure the aircraft is well below the radar horizon of
the E-2C. Once detected by the E-2C the Backfire pilot would light his
burners and pull up into a steep maximum rate climb which would be
maintained until up to 30,OOOft or so; this is necessary to provide
radar line of sight over the horizon to the CBG. The Backfire's I-band
Down Beat radar would be activated only for the several sweeps
necessary
to lock up a target, any more would provide an EA-6B with an
opportunity
to jam or deceive. At this instant the Backfire is about 200nm from the
CBG, and only several minutes have passed since its detection.

Only if the F-14 CAP (Combat Air Patrol) was in a favourably
close position would a Phoenix attack be feasible. The Kitchen is then
released and the Backfire turns steeply 180 degrees, after which it
unloads and accelerates away from the CBG at supersonic speed. This
manoeuvre will maximise separation from the CBG, while the F-14 CAP has
a Kitchen to stop. The Backfire will jam also during its egress. It
would be reasonable to expect a regiment size strike with groups of
Backfires coordinating run-ins from widely separated angles to disperse
the CAP fighters and confuse the SAM operators.

The Kitchen will enter a shallow dive under its midcourse
inertial guidance cruising at about 2.5M on its liquid propellant
sustainer. As it approaches its programmed target, it engages its
active
radar or passive anti-radiation terminal seeker and homes into impact,
obliterating its target with its proximity fused 2,OOOlb class warhead.
The high aerodynamic performance of the Kitchen demands a high
performance SAM or AAM/Fighter to successfully intercept it while its
large size allows for considerable ECCM (jam resistance) in its
undernose J-band radar seeker, including features such as home-on-jam
(situating the seeker under the nose reduces frontal radar
cross-section).

Tu-95KD
Bear B

Tu-95K-22
Bear G

Saturation attacks with multiple Kitchens would certainly put
the USN's SAM systems to the test. A large coordinated strike against a
CBG would almost certainly involve EW (Electronic Warfare) aircraft.
The
Soviets designate EW as REB (Radio Elektronnaya Borba), using the term
REP (Radio Elektronnye Pomekhi) to designate ECM (countermeasures)
although abbreviated 'pomekhi' is oft used in literature.

Two EW types used in the AV-MF/V-VS inventory are the Badger
H
which is a chaff bomber with a likely additional Support Jamming (SJ)
role, and the dedicated BadgerJ Support Jammer.

Badger J carries a large ventral canoe radome which almost
certainly houses stabilised jamming transmitter antennas much like that
of the USAF EF-111A.

Both of these types would stand off from outside the
effective
radius of the CBG's SAMS and F-14/Phoenix, jamming radar and
communications to support the incoming Backfires and later the launched
Kitchens. In lower threat environments these types would provide escort
jamming for Badger C/G strike formations.

Tu-142
Bear F

While the combined AV-MF/V-VS strike force is formidable, it
is to some degree range restricted with most of its aircraft limited to
a 1,500nm unrefuelled strike radius in massed strikes. At greater
operating radii the SSG/SSGN force comes into play.

Soviet Submarine
Launched Antishipping Missiles

The Soviets deployed their first submarine launched cruise
missile in 1960, the nuclear SS-N-3c Shaddock was comparable to the USN
Regulus missile deployed in 1954. The Shaddock subsequently appeared in
two active radar terminal homing antishipping versions, the SS-N-3a sub
launched and SS-N-3b ship launched missiles and has together with its
derivatives become the V-MF's primary long-range antishipping weapon.

Five SSGNs of the Echo 1 class each carried 6 Shaddocks and
formed the embryonic V-MF SSGN force. These boats were followed by the
Echo 2 SSGNs and Juliet SSGs, deployed throughout the sixties and
gradually tasked with antishipping strike as the newer SSBNs took over
the strategic nuclear strike role. Twenty nine of the Echo 2 class were
built, each of which carries 8 Shaddock SSMs and displaces cca 6,000
tons. These were supplemented by the conventional Juliets each of which
carries 4 Shaddocks and displaces 3,750 tons.

Echo
SSGN

The basic limitation of the Echo/Juliet class was the need to
surface and raise its launchers in order to fire the Shaddock. The sub
therefore had to expose itself and remain exposed during the flight of
the Shaddock. This was understandably a dangerous practice when a mere
200nm from a CBG, therefore a missile and sub class were developed to
allow underwater launching of SSMs using passive sonar targeting.

The 4,900 ton Charlie 1 SSGN was deployed in the late sixties
and 11 were built. The 0.9M/35nm class SS-N-7 was carried, this weapon
possessing inertial midcourse and active radar terminal guidance. The
Charlie 1 was soon followed by the slightly larger Charlie 2 also
equipped with 8 SSMs however of a newer type, the SS-N-9 Siren.
Supersonic equipped with alternate active radar or infra-red terminal
seekers, the 70nm class Siren was a major improvement upon the SS-N-7
but even so failed to provide the range required to avoid the SSNs and
ASW platforms of the USN. A mere seven Charlie 2 SSGNs were built
through the seventies.

SOVIET
MARITIME STRIKE AIRCRAFT

NATO
Designation

Badger
C,
Cmod

Badger
D

Badger
G,
Gmod

Badger
H/J

Bear
D

Bear
G

Blinder
B/C

Backfire
B/C

Soviet
Designation

Tu-16

Tu-16

Tu-16

Tu-16

Tu-95

Tu-95

Tu-22

Tu-22M2/3

Primary

Maritime

Maritime

Maritime

H:Chaff Bomber

Maritime

Maritime

B:Maritime

Maritime

Mission

Strike

Surveillance/

Strike

J:Support

Surveillance/

Strike

Strike

Strike

Targeting

Jammer

Targeting

C:Recce/Elint

Secondary

Maritime

Elint

Land Strike

Elint

Elint

Strategic

B:Land

Strategic

Mission

Recce

Strike

Strike

Strike

Dimensions
(ft)

Span

108

108

108

108

167.75

167.75

78

113/78.75

Length

120

120

114.2

114.2

155.8

155.8

133

140

Height

35.5

35.5

35.5

35.5

39.75

39.75

35

34.5

Weights
[lb]

Empty

approx 82,000

~ 82,000

~ 82,000

~ 82,000

~ 165,000

~ 165,000

90,000

119,000

Gross
T/0

158,500

158,500

158,500

158,500

approx 330,000

~ 330,000

185,000

287,000

Internal
Fuel

78,000

78,000

78,000

78,000

approx 130,000

~ 130,000

80,000

126,000

Propulsion
‘

Type

2xAM-3M TJ

2xAM-3M TJ

2xAM-3M TJ

2xAM-3M TJ

4xNK-12MV TP

4xNK-12MV TP

2xVD-7 TJ AB

2xNK-144 der.TFAB

Thrust/SHP
(lb)

20,950

20,950

20,950

20,950

14,795 (SHP)

14,795 (SHP)

30,900

48,500

Offensive
Systems

Attack
Radar

C:Puff Ball (I)

Puff Ball (I)

G:Short Horn (J)

none

Big Bulge (I/J)

Down Beat (?)

Down Beat (1)

Down Beat (1)

Cmod:

Gmod: ?

Crown Drum (I)

Down Beat (?)

Nav
Radar

Short Horn (J)

none

none

Short Horn (J)

Mushroom (I)

possibly

none

none

ESM

probably

yes

possibly

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Datalink

probably

yes

probably

probably

A-364Z Video

yes

probably

probably

Other

J:Jammers (A-1)

H:Chaff Dispn

Weapon
Load

C:1xKipper

none

G:2xKelt

none

none

2xKitchen

8:1xKitchen

1(2,3)xKitchen

Cmod:

Gmod:1xKingfish

Bombs

Bombs,
Mines

Bombs,
Mines

2xKelt

C:none

1xKingfish

Defensive
Systems

RWR/RHAW

Sirena 2/3

Sirena 2/3

Sirena 2/3

Sirena 2/3

Sirena 3

Sirena 3

Sirena 2/3

Sirena 3

Tail
Warning/

Bee Hind

Bee Hind

Bee Hind

Bee Hind

Box Tail

none

Bee Hind

Fan Tail

Fire
Cntrl Radar

Guns

6xNR-23

6xNR-23

6xNR-23

6xNR-23

4(2)xNR-23

2xNR-23

1xNR-23

2xNR-23

ECM

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes, pods

yes

yes

IFF

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

SRO-2

Performance

Max
Speed, Alt(kt)

535

535

535

535

500

500

800

1100

Max
Speed
SL (kt)

500

500

500

500

-

-

500

594

Cruise
Speed Alt(kt)

460

460

460

460

405

405

490

490

Combat
Radius (nm)

1,565

1,565

1,565

1,565

4,475

4,475

1,565

2,160

Table 1:

ABBREVIATIONS: TJ-Turbojet,
TP-Turboprop, TF-Turbofan, AB-Afterburning, SHP-Shaft Horsepower
Attack,
Nav Radars designated bands eg (I/J) to US DoD band designations.
ESM-Electronic Support Measures, TFR-Terrain Following Radar,
RWR-Radar Warning Receiver, RHAW-Radar Homing And Warning,
ECM-Electronic Counter Measures, IFF-Identification Friend Foe. The
’Cmod, Gmod’ is an abbreviation for ’modified C, modified G’. This
table
was compiled from a wide range of sources and items such as
performance,
equipment fit and weights should be treated with caution. In particular
radar seems to be a source of much confusion. Recent information
suggests that the Bear D/E/F carries the Mushroom rather than Puff Ball
(refer p 104 Nov 87 AA) the Bear F the Wet Eye in place of the Big
Bulge (although this may vary between airframes) while the ventral
radome on Badger Gmod remains unidentified.

The V-MF continued to experiment and during the seventies
tested a large and fast SSGN of the Papa class, equipped with 10 Siren
SSMs. This development led to the early eighties deployment of the
massive 14,500 ton 35kt Oscar class SSGN armed with 24 SSMs, reported
to
be advanced SS-N-19s. The SS-N-19 has been described as a derivative of
the Shaddock/Sandbox family offering supersonic 300nm range and active
radar or infrared terminal homing, with the punch of a larger warhead
than the lightweight Siren family.

The Oscar would employ passive sonar targeting or raise a
boom
with a satcom or other antenna to receive targeting information from
aircraft or satellites, while submerged. The SS-N-19s are then fired
submerged and use inertial midcourse guidance.

While the Oscar has the capability to launch a massive SSM
strike, it is a large and lucrative target for any Allied SSN and would
therefore be at considerable risk. To date only three of these boats
have been built. The apparent slowdown in the deployment of SSGNs seems
to, if anything, suggest a recognition of their limited capabilities in
the ASW platform rich environment surrounding a CBG. The current
retrofitting of the Echo 2 class SSGNs to carry the newer SS-N-12
Sandbox SSM in place of its Shaddocks suggest a major to the SLOC
interdiction role. The Sandbox is a supersonic weapon comparable to the
Shaddock but with slightly greater range and presumably a better
terminal seeker, it is deployed on heavy cruisers.

Mission Profile

The Echo 2/Juliet class with their associated
Shaddock/Sandbox
SSMs are the numerically most significant SSGN/SSGs in the V-MF
inventory while the Shaddock/Sandbox is the primary long range SSM of
the Soviet surface fleet. An Echo 2/Shaddock strike is therefore fairly
representative of Soviet SSGN strike tactics.

A key element in such a strike is the large Tu-95RTs Bear D
maritime recce aircraft, which will use its extensive range of ESM
systems to locate likely surface targets. Once these are found the Bear
will shadow the target until the SSGN has moved into a suitable
position
to attack.

The Echo will then surface and turn to a heading toward the
target. A deck crew (presumably) will assist with the opening of the
boat's fin, the forward part of which is hinged and swings open by 180
degrees to expose the Front Door and Front Piece F-band midcourse
guidance radar antennas. At this stage the large missile launchers,
stowed horizontally and flush with the upper deck, are raised. These
pivot at the aft end, where blast defecting indentations in the hull
carry the flux of booster exhaust away from the boat (the arrangement
is
not unlike the Transporter Erector Launcher used with the USAF Ground
Launched Cruise Missile). The Shaddock/Sandbox is then ready for
launch.

SOVIET
ANTISHIPPING MISSILES

NATO

AS-4/Kitchen

AS-5/Kelt

AS-6/Kingfish

SS-N-3/

SS-N-7/Siren

SS-N-9/(Siren)

SS-N-12/

SS-N-19/

Designation

Shaddock

Sandbox

Soviet

Designation

Burya

-

-

P-6,
P-35

-

-

-

-

Primary

Role

Antiship
ASM

Antiship
ASM

Antiship
ASM

Antiship
SSM

Antiship
SSM

Antiship
SSM

Antiship
SSM

Antiship
SSM

Launch

Blinder
B (1)

Badger
G (2)

Badger
Gmod (1)

Echo
2 (8)

Charlie
1 (8)

Charlie
2 (8)

Echo
2 (8)

Oscar(24)

Platforms

Backfire
B (1)

Badger
C (2)

Badger
C (1)

Juliet
(4)

Juliet
(4)

Bear
G (2)

Badger Cmod (1)

Dimensions
(ft)

Span

9.8

14.1

8.2

~ 6.9

-

-

~ 8.5

-

Length

37.0

28.2

34.5

~ 33.5

23.0

29.0

~ 38.5

~ 38.5

Weight
(lb)

13,225

7,715

11,000

~ 9,900

~ 7,700

~ 6,600

~ 11,000

-

Warhead
(lb)

2,200 HE

2,200 HE

2,200 HE

2,200 HE

1,100 HE

1,100 HE

2,200 HE

2,200 HE

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

Propulsion

Liquid Rocket

Liquid Rocket

Liquid Rocket

Turbojet

Solid Rocket

Solid Rocket

Turbojet

Turbojet

Boost Rocket

Boost Rocket

Boost Rocket

Midcourse

Inertial

Autopilot

Inertial

Command Link

Inertial

Inertial

Command Link

Inertial

Guidance

(/Inertial ?)

Terminal

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Active Radar

Guidance

Antiradiation

Antiradiation

Antiradiation

Infra-red

Infra-red

Targeting

Launch A/C

Launch A/C

Launch A/C

Bear D

Launch Vessel

Launch Vessel

Bear D

Launch Vessel

Platform

Badger D

Badger D

Hormone B

Hormone B

Bear D (?)

Performance

Max
Speed

3.0M+

transonic

3.0M+

transonic

transonic

transonic

~ 2.5M

~2.5M

Range
(nm)

~ 200
(Lo)

~ 100

~ 135
(Lo)

~ 250

~ 35

~ 70

~ 300

~ 300

Table 2:

All
range and performance figures must be treated with caution, as many
sources disagree over various parameters. The SS-N-3b is carried by the
Kresta (4) and Kynda (8) PKRs (eq CG) supported by Scoop Pair radar,
the
SS-N-9 is carried by the Kiev (8) TAKR (STOVL Carrier) and Slava (16)
RKR (eq CG) supported by Front series radar and the SS-N-9 by the Kirov
(20) RKR (Battle Cruiser ICGN) in vertical launch tubes, targeted by
Hormone 8 or Helix B helicopters.

The Bear will then approach the radar line of sight to the
target, cca 200nm, and turn on its powerful I/J-band Big Bulge surface
search radar. Radar video from the Big Bulge is then transmitted via an
A-364Z J-band datalink to the combat information centre of the Echo,
where it presumably appears on a radar scope. Once a target is
selected,
a Shaddock is launched. The missile will initially climb on a rocket
booster until sufficient speed is attained to start up a turbojet
cruise
powerplant. At this point the missile is presumably flying on autopilot
and the Front Door/Front Piece is activated to track it.

Front Door is a nodding height finder, above which the small
azimuth tracking Front Piece is mounted. It is likely that the Shaddock
carries an F-band transponder to minimise the required radar transmit
power while avoiding scintillation. A datalink is then used to steer
the
Shaddock on to a desired heading, based on available missile and target
track information. The Shaddock will steeply climb to an efficient
cruise altitude and head toward the target on autopilot, with updates
via datalink. Cruise altitudes of about 20,000 ft have been quoted
although this would limit the duration of flight during which the
Shaddock is above the Echo's radar horizon; higher altitudes may be
used
at longer ranges.

The large Front Door antenna implies the need for accurate
height information at extended ranges which supports this view. Once
the Shaddock has been flown within several miles of the target, its
active radar terminal seeker is engaged and the Shad dock dives into
its
target. It is unclear from available literature whether the Shaddock
remains under the sub's control until seeker engagement or whether
there
is a phase of flight under autopilot alone or autopilot with updates
from the Bear's Big Bulge. All are reasonable and may in fact be
version
specific options.

It is however reasonably certain that the fully (sub)
controlled flightpath has been used as Echo's, and have been known to
remain on the surface for up to 25 minutes after a Shaddock launch.

Shaddock
launch.

Given the inevitable improvements in Soviet inertial
technology, it is very likely that later missiles such as the Sandbox
and SS-N-19 do in fact have sufficiently accurate onboard references to
avoid the need for full midcourse tracking guidance.

The targeting and midcourse guidance technique used for the
Shaddock is not viable in a high threat environment as the Bear and
SSGN
cannot engage in evasive manoeuvring without risking the loss of the
Shaddock. Furthermore the datalinks can be detected by the opponent's
ESM and may well be jammed. Both the Bear and the SSGN are broadcasting
their position and intent via the use of the Big Bulge and Front series
radars and will attract tactical aircraft.

Given the V-MF's commitment to upgrading its 20 year old Echo
2/Juliet SSGN/SSG force with new missiles and electronics, one cannot
draw any other conclusion than that of these assets being assigned to
SLOC interdiction.

The Soviet maritime strike force has often been denigrated by
observers who correctly identify the limited capability of much of
their
inventory in the face of a modern Western Carrier Battle Group. This
is,
however, an incorrect judgement as the primary role of this force is
the
interdiction of Western shipping lanes for which it is well equipped.
Access to strategically situated air and naval bases provides the USSR
with the option of inflicting considerable damage upon Western
economies
in the event of any confrontation. This could be achieved without
unreasonable attrition of aircraft or submarines and would require a
disproportionate defensive response to prevent.

Disbelievers are advised to review the activities of
Kampfgeschwaders 40, 100 and of course the Kriegsmarine during the
1940-45 period.