Advisory (ICSA-13-297-02)

GE Proficy DNP3 Improper Input Validation

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OVERVIEW

This advisory was originally posted to the US-CERT secure Portal library on October 24, 2013, and is now being released to the NCCIC/ICS-CERT Web site.

General Electric (GE) Intelligent Platforms reported to NCCIC/ICS-CERT an improper input validation vulnerability in the DNP3 driver used with Proficy products iFIX and CIMPLICITY. The vulnerability report was part of a resolution by Catapult Software, which developed the driver for the GE products.

Proficy HMI/SCADA—iFIX or CIMPLICITY servers with the vulnerable I/O Driver installed (this includes iFIX or CIMPLICITY installations that are part of Proficy Process Systems).

IMPACT

The master station can be put into a denial-of-service (DoS) condition by sending a specially crafted transmission control protocol (TCP) packet from the outstation on an IP-based network. If the device is connected via a serial connection, the same attack can be accomplished with physical access to the outstation. The device must be shut down and restarted to recover from the DoS.

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to each organization. NCCIC/ICS‑CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture, and product implementation.

BACKGROUND

GE is a US-based company that maintains offices in several countries around the world.

The affected DNP3 driver products can be used in conjunction with Proficy, iFIX, and CIMPLICITY HMI/SCADA software. According to GE Proficy, iFIX and CIMPLICITY are deployed across several sectors including oil and gas, water and wastewater, and electric utilities.

VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION

VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

As this vulnerability affects Internet Protocol-connected and Serial-connected devices, two CVSS scores have been calculated.

The Catapult Software DNP3 driver, used in the GE iFIX and CIMPLICITY products, does not validate input correctly. An attacker could cause the software to go into an infinite loop by sending a specifically crafted TCP packet, causing the process to crash.

CVE-2013-2811b has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score of 7.1 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C).c

The Catapult Software DNP3 driver, used in the GE iFIX and CIMPLICITY products, does not validate input correctly. An attacker could cause the software to go into an infinite loop, causing the process to crash. The system must be restarted manually to clear the condition.

The following scoring is for serial-connected devices.

CVE-2013-2823e has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score of 4.7 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C).f

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

EXPLOITABILITY

This vulnerability can be exploited remotely.

EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT

No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.

DIFFICULTY

An attacker with a moderate skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability.

MITIGATION

GE has provided the following mitigations:

Installing Version 7.20k (Catapult v7.2.0.60) of the DNP driver or newer will address this issue. To obtain the latest version of any I/O driver, visit GE’s Web site at http://support.ge-ip.com and in the right column look for “Quick Picks” > “Downloads” > “I/O Drivers.”

The researchers suggest blocking DNP3 traffic from traversing onto business or corporate networks through the use of an IPS or firewall with DNP3-specific rule sets to add an additional layer of protection.

NCCIC/ICS‑CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.

When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

NCCIC/ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense‑in‑Depth Strategies.g NCCIC/ICS‑CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available in the NCCIC/ICS‑CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B—Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies,h that is available for download from the NCCIC/ICS-CERT Web page (http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC/ICS‑CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

I Want To

Join the Secure Portal

ICS-CERT encourages U.S. asset owners and operators to join the Control Systems compartment of the US-CERT secure portal. Send your name, e-mail address, and company affiliation to ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov.