Q.There
is growing concern about the induction of warships without essential equipment
like the Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS), or the Long Range Surface to Air
Missile (LR-SAM), which are delayed in development.

I wouldn’t
say there is serious cause for concern. If you are developing a new weapon
system (like ATAS, or LR-SAM), you cannot expect it to come exactly on time.
What do you do? Do you not commission the ship, or do you commission the ship
and wait for (the weapon system) to materialise?

A warship
has many roles (such as anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface). One such role
may not be met to a hundred per cent satisfaction. This happens all over the
world, and it is happening here. I think we should be happy that we are getting
new, state-of-the-art weapon systems for the first time. To get them exactly on
time, you’ve got to be very lucky.

Q.You
are saying we should accept capability gaps when warships are inducted, so that
we have a cutting edge system later?

It is not a
capability gap. It is a dilution of a particular capability, in a particular
ship, in a particular sphere. If, for example, INS Kolkata is not commissioned
with an (LR-SAM), there are many other such systems in the fleet. So the
Kolkata can be used for anti-submarine warfare. It is a multi-role ship. The Kolkata
can still be operationally exploited. This (kind of delay) is the price that
you pay when you go in for high-tech, state-of-the-art systems.

Q.What
happens if the ship is called into operational use before its weapons are
developed and fitted?

Even if it
is called into operational use, the fleet operates together and it is the
fleet’s capability that matters, not individual ships’. For example (the
anti-submarine corvette) INS Kamorta does not have surface-to-surface missiles.
That doesn’t mean there is a capability gap. That (land attack) role will be
fulfilled by other vessels in the fleet, which have that capability.

Q.What
is alarming is the delay in fitting weaponry that a warship is designed to
have. On another note, has the navy’s new Rukmini satellite created a digitally
networked navy?

Our navy
has made a huge jump with the launch and operation of Rukmini. Networking
various units (warships) is important for quick reactions in action. It is
important for units to know where other units are, (and to) interact with other
units, and for specialists on one ship to interact with specialists on another
ship to coordinate attacks, and bear weapons on a particular target.

In Feb
2014, we had our annual exercise, TROPEX (Theatre Level Operational Readiness
Exercise). This is the ultimate test of networking, of the ability of units to
participate in a 10-day or 15-day war, dispersed over different parts of the
sea. We operated (widely dispersed). It was possible because we were able to
network and for fleet commanders to pass orders, and for ships to interact with
each other and know where they are and to coordinate plans.

Q.Can
you explain with a practical example?

In an
anti-submarine operation, if two ships are hunting for a submarine, they can
coordinate duties. If you are networked well, you can just punch in a digital message
(from one ship to another), “I am altering course to starboard, or to port”. If
you are not networked, you pass messages (more unreliably) by voice.

Alternatively,
if a warship contacts an enemy vessel but does not have weapons with the range
to strike, it can digitally hand over that target to another warship that is
within range.

Q.You
are saying one ship can designate a target, which will be engaged by weapons
from another ship?

That is very
much possible, but you can only do that if you are networked. Every ship in the
fleet with a Rukmini antenna on board can talk to another.

Q.Is
China emerging as a key adversary for the eastern naval command?

We don’t
have any maritime disputes with China. We look upon China as a partner in
ensuring peace and stability in the maritime element. China is now operating in
our waters and we sometimes go to the South China Sea, but essentially we
operate in different waters. There is no acrimony between the two services.

As a navy
grows in power and responsibility, it should provide some kind of (security)
umbrella to the smaller navies to try and build them up. That is what we are
doing. Today, Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and
Myanmar --- all these navies are training with us. We are giving material
support to them. There is frequent exchange of delegations. We are trying to
build around us some kind of cohesion in the Indian Ocean. We expect China to
do the same.

Q.Given the security situation in the Indo-Pacific,
and India’s Look East policy, is your fleet adequate?

In the
longer term we have a Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, which is formulated
by navy headquarters. While we would like more assets that are being given, we have
enough surface ships to meet our responsibilities. We are short of submarines
now… we have only six, including (the nuclear powered) INS Chakra. We would
want more submarines definitely.

But you
know the Scorpene class is going to be commissioned only in 2016-17 and we are
going to have one every year, six of them. So 2016 to 2022, that is going to be
the only accretion to our submarine fleet. There is no point in saying, “I want
30”, because you know that till 2022, you are not reaching anywhere.

8 comments:

subdriver
said...

The capability gap is a reality - the navy is well aware of the reasons and most of them are not of its own making but is a result of the collective tardiness of the entire defence establishment with the DRDO being at the forefront.One could understand that a weapon system could not be ready if a ship was delivered on time but when the ship itself takes 7-10 years to build and is still not fully equipped with the weapons and sensors it is designed for certainly calls for some introspection within the system.The CinC has said that Kamorta as an ASW frigate not having a surface-to-surface missile can be accepted but can the MoD justify the commissioning of an ASW ship without either a Towed Array sonar or a suitable ASW helicopter. Similarly, is Kolkatta battle-ready to go into a multi-threat scenario against a comparable adversary ?I wish the CinCs would accept the shortcomings and highlight the reasons for these rather than be seen to be covering up for the systemic deficiencies in the entire system where the navy is the least responsible amongst all the others - the DRDO, the Deptt of Def Production for accepting the shoddy performance of the shipyards it controls, the DPSUs( shipyards and the likes of BEL etc), the DoD for its tardy decision-making, the MoD ( Fin) raising observations on file that do nothing but cause delay while they think their efficiency is being reflected in their file notings etc etc.

One politician like Antony is more than sufficient to throw the system out of gear. Among all the forces navy suffered the most under his boastful longest tenure. Whole of country suffered like anything under Sonia mal governance. Really it was nightmarish .

drdo could have chartered a commercial psv , osv for the requirement from trade . lack of cordination , outof box thinking , no acountabilty , or anybody responsible with big egos with navy result in silly delays like a ship not availble. what stops drdo from having a custom based capabilty required 3000 ton ship being built by any shipyard for tests trials both on the east , west and south coasts of india

Sir,Next time you meet any DRDO high ranking official or related to naval lab ask them if they have Do 228 as aerial test bed why don't they get one ship for testing, as for hydrological purpose they have one or two ship which are maintained by navy.If they face problem they should mention it instead of blaming some other "DRDO blames IN for delay in ALTAS".They are highly successful till mounted sonars, some give credit to "Arogyaswami Paulraj" for success. He left India in 1991 since then new sonar (towed array development started in 2000s and mihir) has not been successful .