THOMAS,
J.: Walter M. (Appellant) appeals his
conviction for the murder of Zachary H. (Victim). Appellant alleges that the
family court erred in (1) denying a directed verdict on the charge of murder
because the State presented no evidence of malice aforethought and (2) finding Appellant
guilty of murder because the State presented no evidence proving malice
aforethought. We affirm.

FACTS

On
the afternoon of July 7, 2006, Appellant, Victim, and another friend,[1] were playing video games at Appellant's home. Victim went to the freezer to
get a popsicle without Appellant's permission. When Victim refused to return
the popsicle to the freezer, Appellant chased him around the living room eventually
retrieving the popsicle. As Appellant put the popsicle back in the freezer,
Victim ran outside. Appellant locked the front door after Victim ran
out.

Victim
banged on the door and rang the doorbell in an effort to get back inside. Meanwhile,
Appellant retrieved his brother's loaded .22 caliber rifle from a bedroom
closet, walked to another room, opened the window, and pointed the gun at
Victim, ordering him to stop banging on the door. Victim replied "are you
really going to shoot me?" Appellant responded "[n]o" and the
boys apparently began laughing. Moments later, Appellant fired two shots: one
into the ground near Victim, and a second, fatal shot, into Victim's chest. Appellant
maintains the rifle accidentally discharged as he attempted to pull it back in
the window. A South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) forensic firearms
expert testified it required six pounds of pressure on the trigger to discharge
the first shot, and the same six pounds to discharge the second. This expert
also testified that the recoil on the particular firearm was negligible.

After
firing the two shots, Appellant called 911, then ran next door and told the
neighbor he had accidentally shot Victim. Although a bystander was able to
administer CPR, Victim died within minutes of being shot.

Officer
Eric Dean was the first law enforcement officer to arrive on the scene and
noticed Appellant holding Victim's hand as an unknown good Samaritan attempted
CPR. Dean testified that Appellant stated, "I asked [Victim] to leave me
alone and he wouldn't so I shot to scare him." Appellant denied
making this statement. Dean further testified Appellant never said anything
about the shooting being an accident and denied Appellant's claim that he
intimidated Appellant by saying "looks like you'll be going up the road
for this one."

Appellant
unsuccessfully moved the family court for a directed verdict, arguing the State
failed to present evidence of malice aforethought. The family court found
Appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to confinement in a juvenile
facility for an indeterminate amount of time not to exceed his twenty first
birthday. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did
the family court err in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Appellant?

II. Did
the family court err in finding the Appellant guilty of murder?

Here,
Appellant alleges the family court erred in failing to grant him a directed
verdict because the State presented no evidence of malice aforethought. We
disagree.

When
reviewing the denial of a directed verdict, this court must view all evidence
in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Weston, 367 S.C.
279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). This court will reverse the trial
court's denial of a directed verdict only if no evidence supports the ruling. State
v. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. 388, 399, 649 S.E.2d 41, 47 (Ct. App. 2007). We
will affirm the family court's denial of a directed verdict in a juvenile
delinquency matter if it is supported by any evidence. In re Doe, 318
S.C. 527, 534, 458 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Bruce O., 311
S.C. 514, 515, 429 S.E.2d 858, 859 (Ct. App. 1993); but seeState v.
Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 543, 243 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1978) (stating that the
trial court should direct a verdict for a defendant when the evidence only
raises a mere suspicion of guilt).

"Murder
is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, whether expressed or
implied." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (2006). Malice can be either expressed
or implied. State v. Portee, 122 S.C. 298, 301, 115 S.E. 238, 239-40
(1922). Accordingly, in order for this court to reverse the trial court's
denial of the directed verdict, we must find no evidence to support the trial
court's ruling on the issue of malice. SeeLee-Grigg, 374 S.C.
at 399, 649 S.E.2d at 47.

In
this case, applying the any evidence standard and viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, we find sufficient evidence supports the
family court's denial of Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Evidence
in the record demonstrates Appellant retrieved a deadly weapon from his
brother's closet, walked to another room, opened a window, and pointed the
gun. Moreover, the record indicates it required six pounds of pressure to fire
the gun and the recoil on the specific firearm in question was "negligible,"
inferring accidental discharge of the second shot was unlikely. Because the
family court could infer malice from a defendant's use of a deadly weapon[2] or from the evidence that the discharge of the weapon was likely not
accidental, this evidence was sufficient to overcome Appellant's motion for a
directed verdict. See, e.g., Sellers v. State, 362 S.C. 182,
189, 607 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1981) (recognizing malice may be implied from the use
of a deadly weapon). Accordingly, we find no error.[3]

II. Family Court's Finding of Guilty

Appellant
next argues the family court erred in finding him delinquent because the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he killed Victim with malice
aforethought. We find this argument is not preserved for our review on appeal.

Generally,
an issue must be both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to
be preserved for appellate review. State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142,
587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003). Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are
not preserved for our review. Knight v. Waggoner, 359 S.C. 492, 496,
597 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ct. App. 2004). In this case, Appellant made no objection
to the final verdict of the family court and made no motion for a new trial.
Although this court has advocated excepting juvenile criminal matters from the
strict rules of issue preservation, the supreme court has declined to address
whether such an exception should be recognized. SeeIn re Arisha
K.S., 331 S.C. 288, 296, 501 S.E.2d 128, 133 (Ct. App. 1998) (inviting the
supreme court to address the setting aside of the rules of issue preservation
in the context of juvenile criminal matters). Thus, this court remains bound
by this state's long-standing rules of issue preservation, and we must
therefore hold Appellant's argument is not properly before this court.

CONCLUSION

For
the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the family court is

AFFIRMED.

HEARN,
C.J., and KONDUROS J., concur.

[1] At the time of
the incident, Appellant was twelve years old, stood five feet six inches tall, and
weighed over two hundred pounds. Victim was ten years old.

[2] The South
Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed and overruled a long line of case law
pertaining to jury instructions regarding the permissive inference of malice
from the use of a deadly weapon in State v. Belcher, Op. No. 26729 (S.C.
Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2009) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 44 at 14). After careful
review of the Belcher opinion, we do not find it controlling of this
matter.

[3] Generally, the
common law imposes a rebuttable presumption that a child between seven and
fourteen years of age does not have the mental capacity to commit a crime. State
v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 546, 647 S.E.2d 144, 153-54 (2007); seeState
v. Blanden, 177 S.C. 1, 21, 180 S.E. 681, 689-90 (1935) (noting with
approval the trial court's instruction to the jury on the presumption of
incapacity). The State cites In Re Skinner for the proposition that the
common-law presumption of the incapacity of a minor is inapplicable in family
court proceedings because the statutory scheme provides for criminal
convictions in the family court. 272 S.C. 135, 137, 249 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1978).
While the Skinner court's reliance on the since repealed section
14-21-510(A)(1)(c) of the South Carolina Code (1976) causes this court sincere
reservation as to whether such a rule remains under the jurisprudence of this
state, Appellant neither made this an issue at trial, nor preserved it for
appellate review. Although this court has advocated the setting aside of preservation
requirements in the context of juvenile criminal matters, our supreme court has
elected not to address whether such is a recognized exception to this state's
issue preservation requirements. SeeIn re Arisha K.S., 331 S.C.
288, 296, 501 S.E.2d 128, 133 (Ct. App. 1998) (inviting the supreme court to
address the setting aside of the rules of issue preservation in the context of
juvenile criminal matters). We therefore remain bound by the rules of
preservation in the current matter, precluding this court from addressing the
rebuttable presumption of incapacity.