Plato's Parmenides or On Ideas, Logical

1. Cephalus: When we arrived at Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace; and taking me by the hand, Adeimantus said, "Welcome, Cephalus, and if you need anything which we might be able to do, tell us." "Why," I said, "I am present for this very thing, to ask a favor of you." "You might tell us," he said, "your entreaty." And I said, "What was the name of your half-brother? I do not remember. He was only a child when I came here before from Clazomenae; and now is a long time from that. The name of his father, I believe, was Pyrilampes." "Certainly," he said. "And his own?" "Antiphon. But why such an inquiry?" "These gentlemen," I said, "are fellow citizens of mine, very much lovers of philosophy, who have heard that this Antiphon had conversed much with Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno; and the discussion, which Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides went through was remembered by Pythodorus, who heard it often." "The truth," he said, "you speak." "These, then," I said, "we would like to hear through." "But that is not difficult," he said, "for when he was a lad he practised it very diligently; at the present, like his grandfather and namesake, he spends much time with horses. But if it is necessary, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives near in Melite." Saying these things, we left and found Antiphon at home, instructing a smith to prepare a bridle. And when he had sent that one away, and his brothers told him why we were there, he recognized me from my previous visit and greeted me, and when we asked him to go through the discussion, he at first hesitated, for he said it was a lot of work, but then, however, went through it. And Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the great Panathenaea. Then Parmenides was already quite old, quite grey, of handsome and goodly appearance, about sixty-five years old; Zeno was then about forty years old, tall and graceful to behold; and it was said he became a favorite of Parmenides. And he said they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus; and Socrates and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear Zeno's writings; for they had been brought there for the first time by them; and Socrates was then very young. That time Zeno himself read to them, and Parmenides happened to be out; and there was altogether little yet remaining of the treatises being read, Pythodorus said, when he came in himself from without the house, with Parmenides and Aristoteles, who became one of the Thirty Tyrants, and they heard but little of the writing. But he himself had heard them from Zeno previously.

2. Then Socrates, hearing, urged that the first hypothesis of the first discussion be read again, and when it was read, said, "How, Zeno, are you saying this? If being is many, on the grounds that it is necessary that it is both like and unlike, this indeed is impossible, for neither is unlike like nor like unlike. Do you not say thus?" "Thus." said Zeno. "Accordingly, if it is impossible that unlike is like and like is unlike, indeed the many is impossible, for if the many might exist, it might experience the impossible . Then is this that which your assertions desire, not other than to defend against all arguments, that the many exists not? And is each of the assertions thought by you to be proof of this very thing, such that this is supposed to supply as many proofs as assertions you have written, that the many exists not? Do you say thus, or do I not truly understand?" "No, but," said Zeno, "you have perceived well the entire picture which is wished." "I understand," said Socrates, "Parmenides, that Zeno here not only in your other affection wishes to make friends, but also in writing. For he has written in the very manner as you, but by altering he tries to deceive us as if saying something different. For you say in your poems that all is one, and you provide proofs of this well and good; and again he says it is not many, and he provides very many and enormous proofs. That one says it is one, and the other not many, and thus each speaks so that not one of them seems to have said anything close to someone saying the things, appears to the rest of us to speak beyond our (way of) speaking." "Yes Socrates," said Zeno, "but you have not everywhere perceived the truth of the writings. Indeed, just like Laconian puppies, you keenly hunt and chase after the arguments, but first this eludes you, that the treatise is not so altogether solemn, that it had been written intending, as you say, to disguise itself to men as a great accomplishment. But what you say is accidental to it; these writings actually are support for Parmenides' argument against those who undercut and ridicule him that if being is one, it follows that the argument is affected by many and ridiculous (contradictions) and this treatise quite indeed opposed them who argue for the many, and it repays all, plus more, for its intent is to show that their hypothesis, that being is many, if it might be sufficiently followed up, might suffer even greater absurdity than that which makes it one. Through such a contention it was written by me in my youth, and someone stole it when it was written, so that I could not begin to consider whether it should be brought to light or not. Then it escapes you, Socrates, that not by a young man's contention is it supposed to have been written, but by an older's cause; while, as indeed I said, you have represented (the form of the argument) not badly."

3. "I accept that," said Socrates, "and believe it is as you say. But tell me this; do you not believe there is some idea of likeness in itself, and to that, another opposite idea, which is unlikeness; and you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And those partaking of likeness become like in this and according to how much and how greatly in partaking, and those of unlikeness become unlike and those of both become both like and unlike? And if all things partake of both opposites and are through this both like and unlike themselves, what is wonderful about that? For if anyone showed like itself becoming unlike, or unlike like, that would be a marvel, I believe; if those participating in both things he shows to be both like and unlike, that seems to me, Zeno, not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that these same things are many by participation in multitude; but if that which is one, that itself he shows to be many, or again, the many to be one, then I should be amazed. And concerning all other things the very same way; if these kinds and ideas in themselves he might show as experiencing opposite things, that is worthy of wonder; and if he shows me being one and many, what is the wonder, saying, when he wishes to show many as my right side or my left side, my front or my back, and upper or lower likewise, for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude; and when one, he will say that of we seven, I am one man, partaking of the one; and so shows both to be true. If anyone then may pose that the same things are many and one, not that the one is many or the many one, he does not say anything extraordinary, but what we might all grant; but if anyone, as I was saying just now, first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and all such things, then if he may show that things in themselves can be mingled and separated, then I should be astonished," he said, "wonderingly, Zeno. I believe these things have been absolutely manfully worked out, but I should much rather be amazed if someone might prove in the abstract ideas the same multifarious and twisted problem, which indeed you discussed in visible objects, and thus show it in the rational apprehension."

4. Pythodorus said that he thought, while Socrates was saying these things, at each word that Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they followed his argument closely, often looking at each other to smile as with admiration of Socrates. When he had finished speaking, Parmenides indeed said just that. "Socrates," he said, "how worthy you are to delight in the purpose of discourse! And tell me, did you thus define this yourself; as you say, the distinct ideas themselves, apart from those things which in turn partake of them? And does there seem to you to be some likeness itself, apart from the likeness which we possess, and one and many, and all of which you now heard Zeno speak?" "Yes, I do," said Socrates. "And also, of this kind," said Parmenides, "such an idea in itself of the just and of the beautiful and the good and furthermore of all such things?" "Yes." he said. "And some ides of man apart from us and all such as we are, an abstract idea of man or of man or of fire or of water?" "In difficulty," he said, "often indeed, Parmenides, have I been concerning them, whether it's necessary to say just like that, or otherwise, concerning those things." "And also concerning the following, Socrates, which might seem to be laughable, such as hair and mud and dirt or anything else most vile and miserable, would you doubt whether it's necessary to say there to be an idea separate from each of them, which is again distinct from those which we are studying, or not?" "By no means," said Socrates, "but just as we see these things, also these things are; but to believe there to be an idea of them may not be very absurd. Now, however, it has disturbed me that it would not be concerning all of them. Thereupon when with these things I may stand, I find myself running away, fearing lest into some depth of nonsense falling, I may perish; and when arriving at those things, at which we were just now saying have ideas, busying myself, I spend time." "For you are still young," said Parmenides, "Socrates, and philosophy has not yet laid claim to you, as it will still take hold, in my opinion, when you will not despise them; yet now you regard people's opinion through youth.

5. "Then tell me this. Does there seem to you, as you say, to be certain ideas, from which those other participating things take their name; such as those from which participants in likeness become like, greatness great, and beauty and justice just and beautiful?" "Certainly," said Socrates. "Then indeed does each participant partake of the whole idea or of part? Or might there become some other participation apart from these?" "And how?" he said. "Then does it seem to you that the whole idea is in each of the many, being one, or how else?" "For what prevents it," said Socrates, "Parmenides, from being in them?" "Then being one and itself in many, apart from being the whole, at the same time it shall be in (the many) and thus it might be separate from itself." "Not if indeed," he said, "it is in the manner of day, being one and the same, of many places at the same time and is rather itself not apart from itself; if thus, each of the ideas, one in all, at the same time might be the same." "How nicely," he said, "you make one itself in many places at the same time, such as if with a sail spread over many persons you might say it is one whole over many. Or is such not what you intend to say?" "Perhaps," he said. "Then might the whole sail be over each or a different part over each different (thing)?" "A part." "Then divisible," he said, "Socrates, are the ideas thenselves, and the participants in them might partake of a part, and no longer in each might be the whole, but a part of each (idea)." "Thus it appears." "Are you willing, Socrates, to say to us that the one idea is in truth divided, and will still be one?" "By no means," he said. "Take heed," he said, "if you divide absolute greatness, and each of many great things sharing in greatness in a smaller part than absolute greatness shall be great, then might that not appear unreasonable?" "Certainly," he said. "And what about this? Shall anything by taking away a small part of equal portion posess that, by which, in being less than absolute equality, the possessor shall be equal to it?" "Impossible." "Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small shall be greater than it, as it (the part) is a part of it (the small); and thus the absolute small shall be greater; but that to which he may add the subtracted part, that shall be smaller, not greater, than before." "This might not happen," he said. "Then how," he said, "Socrates, will other things partake of your ideas, not being able to partake in them either as parts or as wholes?" "Not by Zeus," he said, "in no way does determining such things seem to me to be very easy." "Then what? What do you think of this?" "Of what?" "I think that you suppose that each idea is one from this kind (of reasoning); when many things may seem to you to be great, it may seem, by looking at them all, there to be one and the same idea, which is absolute, from whence you suppose that the great is one." "You speak truly," he said. "If in your mind you regard all in like manner, absolute greatness and the other great things, will not one again great appear, by which all these things must appear to be great?" "It seems so." "Then another idea of greatness will be brought forth, being beyond absolute greatness and the things partaking of it; and again another beyond all of these; by which all these things shall be great; and each of your ideas shall no longer be one, but the number infinite."

6. "But Parmenides," said Socrates, "each of these ideas may be only a thought, and may come to happen in no other way than in our minds. Thus each might be one and might not suffer what was just now described." "What then," he said, "is each of the thoughts one, but of nothing?" "But that is impossible," he said. "But of something?" "Yes." "Something that is or that is not?" "Something that is." "Not of a single thing, which that thought might perceive as appertaining to all, being one ideas?" "Yes." "Then will not this thing be an idea, which is thought of to be one, being always the same in all?" "Again, that appears necessary." "Then what?" said Parmenides. "May you not say that by the necessity by which all other things partake of ideas it must seem to you that each thing which all other things partake of ideas it must seem to you that each thing comes from thought, and all things think, or being thoughts they are without thought?" "But that isn't," he said, "reasonable, but Parmenides, this appears to me to have the best (view); these ideas to stand in nature as patterns, and the other things to resemble and be like them, and this participation of the things in ideas to become not other than their having been likened to them." "Then can anything," he said, "resemble the idea, so that that idea is not like the thing which resembles it, according to how much it was likened to it; or with some contrivance is the like not like the like?" "No, that is not the case." "Then is it not necessary that the like participate in the same idea as its like?" "It is necessary." "And like things partaking of which may be like, shall not that be the idea itself?" "Certainly" "Then it is not possible that anything be similar to the idea, or the idea to anything; if so, another idea, beyond the idea, shall always be made to appear, and if that may be like to anything, another again, and an ever-surpassing idea coming into being shall never stop, when the idea may be like to that partaking of it." "Most truly you speak." "Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas; but it's necessary to seek something else by which they participate." "So it seems." "Then do you see," he said, "Socrates, how great the difficulty, if it may be determined that ideas are things in themselves?" "And very." "Therefore, be sure," he said, "that you do not yet, as they say, grasp the greatness of the difficulty, if you maintain that each idea is always something separate from created things." "How is that?" "There are many other reasons," he said, "but the greatest is this. If anyone might say the ideas do not approach being known, being such as we say they must be, for which asserting these things one might not be able to have shown that he (the skeptic) was wrong, unless he might make (the argument), being experienced in the many debates, and not witless, and might be willing to follow quite far everywhere the proofs of the arguments; still he who would make them unknown might be incredulous." "Why, Parmenides?" said Socrates. "Because, Socrates, I believe that you or anyone else who poses the existence of an absolute of each thing would agree in the first place that not one of them exists in us." "For how might it still be absolute?" said Socrates. "You speak well," he said. "Then those ideas which are in relation to one another have their own self-being, and not, according to us, to the likenesses or whither one puts them, partaking of which we name each. And our things, having the same name as those (ideas) are, again, relative to themselves, and not to the ideas, and are of themselves, but not to those which, again, are thus-named." "How do you say?" said Socrates. "Such," said Parmenides, "if one of us is a master or slave of anyone, where he is master the slave is of him, not of master itself, but being man, these things are both (master and slave) of a man; but mastership itself of slavery itself are what exists, and likewise slavery itself to mastership itself, but not in us do those things have the capability of existing nor we in them; but as I say, those things are of themselves. Or do you not understand what I say?" "Certainly," said Socrates, "I understand."

7. "Then knowledge also," he said, "being knowledge itself, would be knowledge of that which is truth itself?" "Certainly." "And likewise each kind of knowledge, absolute knowledge, might be knowledge of each kind of being, absolute being, or not?" "Yes." "And might not knowledge among us be of the truth among us, and, again, might not each kind of our knowledge agree with knowledge of each kind (of truth) existing among us?" "Necessarily." "But the ideas themselves, as you agree, we have not nor are they in any manner among us." "No they cannot be." "And the classes themselves which are of each (idea) are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?" "Yes." "Which we do not have?" "No, we do not." "Then none of the ideas are known by us, since we do not have absolute knowledge." "It seems not." "Then unknown to us is the absolute beautiful and good and all things which we assume to be absolute ideas." "That is a danger." "Then this is yet more fearful than that." "How is that?" "You might say that if there is some absolute kind of knowledge, it would be much more scrupulous than our knowledge, and beauty and all other things thus?" "Yes." "Then if some other thing partakes of absolute knowledge, you might say there is no one more likely than God to have this most scrupulous knowledge?" "Necessarily." "Then again, in this manner, shall God know human things, having absolute knowledge?" "Why not?" "Because," said Parmenides, "it may be agreed by us, Socrates, that those ideas, having their existing capability are not ours, nor is our world in theirs, but each themselves only to themselves." "It may be agreed." "Then if with God are the most precise mastership and most perfect knowledge, his mastership might not ever rule these things of ours, and his knowledge might not ever know us or any other thing of our world, but just as we do not rule them according to our rule, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, they, again, being gods, by the same reasoning, are not our masters, not having knowledge of human problems." "But surly," he said, "this may be a strange argument if it deprives God of knowledge." "However, these things, Socrates," said Parmenides, "and yet many other difficult things do the ideas have with them, if these ideas of things exist, and if it is determined that each of them is an absolute idea; therefore he who hears such things is at a loss and argues that these things do not exist, and if that possibility might exist, they would very necessarily exist unknown by man, and saying these things it seems they are to him to be what he says, and as I was saying just now, men are amazingly hard to convince; and only a man of very great natural cleverness will be able to understand, that there is a class of each thing and (its) absolute essence, and a yet more wonderful man, finding out, to be able to sufficiently teach others to analyze all these thengs." "I agree with you, Parmenides," said Socrates. "What you say is very much to my mind." "But, however," said Parmenides," if anyone, Socrates, will not give existence to the ideas of things, focusing on all these present (arguments) and others like them, not defining an idea of each one thing, he will not have the manner by which to turn his thought; and the idea of each of the things not being always the same, he will thus entirely destroy his ability to debate. You seem to me to have been very well aware of such." "You speak truly."

8. "Then what will you do concerning philosophy? Where will you turn, these things being unknown?" "I don't seem to see very well at the present." "For early," he said, "before being trained, Socrates, you attempt to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and each one of the ideas. I reflected on this when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles, here. Know well, noble and divine is the eagerness which you ignite in our talk; so draw yourself to exercise on account of that supposed to be useless, and is called by many subtlety, while you are still young; if not, the truth shall escape you." "What then is the manner," he said, "Parmenides, of training?" "That," he said, "you just now heard from Zeno. However, I had admiration of you, speaking to him, that you did not proceed with visible things or thier concerns in the course of the considerations, but concerning these things which might be entirely grasped by reason and might be considered ideas." "It seems to me," he said, "in these things it is not difficult to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else." "Rightly indeed," he said, "but it's necessary to do something more in that, to consider not only the agreement of each hypothesis, but also to hypothesize, if it does not agree, if you wish to be better trained." "How do you mean?" "Such," he said, "if you like, concerning the hypothesis which Zeno hypothesized, what will necessarily happen to the many themselves, in relation to themselves and to the one; and to the one in relation to itself and to the many; and also, if the many do not exist, again to consider what will happen to each; and likewise, again, if you may hypothesize whether likeness exists or does not exist, what will happen under each of the things hypothesized, to the hypothesized and to other things, in relation to themselves and to each other. And the same for arguments concerning unlikeness, and concerning motion and rest, and concerning creation and destruction, and even concerning being and not being; with any argument, concerning whatever you may ever hypothesize as existing or not existing, or experiencing whatever other condition, it is necessary to consider what happens to it, and to each one of the other things that you may choose, and to a greater number, and to all in a like manner; and again other things, in relation to themselves and to anything else which is hypothesized, or not if you intend completely to train yourself to correctly see the truth." "It is a relentless study," he said, "Parmenides, which you propose, and I do not understand it very well, but with me why not go through some hypothesis yourself, in order that I may better understand it?" "You assign a great task, Socrates," he said, "to one of my age." "But you, Zeno," said Socrates, "why do you not go through it for us?" He (Pythodorus) said that Zeno said, laughing, "Let us beg it of Parmenides himself, Socrates. For there is nothing bad in what he says. Or do you not see how great a work you are imposing? If there were more of us, it would not be right to ask it; for it is unseemly for him to speak of such things before many, especially at his age. For the many are in ignorance, that without this wandering through all passages, it is impossible for the mind to obtain the truth. So I, Parmenides, join Socrates in begging that I may hear it out, at last."

9. These things being said by Zeno, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that he himself and Antisthenes and the others begged Parmenides to prove that which he might say, and not to do otherwise. Then Parmenides said, "It is necessary to be persuaded, yet I seem to myself feeling like the horse (of the poem) of Ibykus, in which being old and a contestant he was about to contend in a chariot race, and trembled at the prospect, because of experience; and Ibykus said, comparing himself, that he was likewise old, and forced to be in love; and so I seem to myself to fear, remembering how great a sea of words I must whirl about in. Still, it's necessary to be agreeable, since, as Zeno says, we are alone. Where then shall we begin, and what shall we first hypothesize? Or do you wish, since really this seems a rigorous sport to play, shall I begin with myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing concerning the one itself, whether the one exists or not, what will necessarily occur?" "By all means," said Zeno. "Who, then," he said, "shall give replies to me? Or shall we say the youngest? For he might be least meddlesome, and would most likely answer what he thinks; and besides his reply would be a rest for me." "I am ready to do that, Parmenides," said Aristoteles, "for you mean me when you say the youngest. So ask and thus shall I answer."

10. "Well then," he said, "if the one exists, then the one might not be many?" "For how could it?" "Then neither part of it nor the whole must exist." "How is that?" "The part is surely part of the whole." "Yes." "And what is the whole? Might not the whole be that of which no part is wanting?" "Certainly." "Then in both cases the whole might be of parts, being whole and having parts." "Necessarily." "Thus in both cases the one would be many, not one." "True." "Yet it must be not many but one itself." "It must." "Then the one shall not be a whole nor have parts, if it is to be one." "No." "Then if it does not have parts, it might not have beginning or end or middle, for such things would already be parts of it." "Quite right." "However, end and beginning are the limit of each thing." "How not?" "Then the one is unlimited, if it has neither beginning nor end." "Unlimited." "And then it is without form, for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight." "How?" "The round is that of which the extremes may be everywhere equally distant from the middle." "Yes." "And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is the place between both extremes." "Thus it is." "Then the one might have parts and might be many, whether it might partake of straight or round form." "Certainly." "Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts." "Right." "And moreover, such a thing would be nowhere, for it might be neither in anything else nor in itself." "How is that?" "In something else, it might be encompassed in a circle by that in which it would be, and in many places might be touched by many parts of it; but it is impossible for the one, without parts, and not partaking of a circle, to be touched by a circle in many places." "Impossible." "But furthermore, being in itself, it might be surrounded by not other than itself, also just as in itself it might be; for to be in anything not surrounding it is impossible." "Impossible." "Then the thing which is surrounded is other, and the thing surrounding is other; for the whole is not both acted on and acting at once; thus one might not still be one, but two." "No it would not." "Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself, nor in anything else being possible." "No, it is not."

11. "Then see, thus having, if it is such concerning rest or motion." "Why not?" "Because being in motion it either might be moving in place or might be changing; for these are the only kinds of motion." "Yes." "The one, being changed, of itself cannot still everywhere be one." "It is impossible." "Then it is not in motion through changing." "It does not appear to be." "But be moving in place?" "Perhaps." "However, if the one might be borne, it might revolve in the same circle, or it might leave from one place to another." "Necessarily." "Then it's necessary for that which revolves in a circle to rest on a center, and that which revolves around the center has other parts to it. For that which neither center nor parts have reference to, is there some way for this to have been kept fixed in a circle around a center?" "There is none." "But does it show itself at one time, then another, changing its place and move in that way?" "If indeed it moves." "Then it being anywhere in anything was shown to the impossible?" "Yes." "Then coming into anything would be still more impossible?" "I do not understand why." "If anything comes into anything, it must not yet be in it, still coming in, nor entirely outside of it, if already coming in?" "That must be." "If any other thing goes through this process, that might only be that which might have parts; for both a part in it, and another outside of it already might be; and that having no parts shall not in any way be entirely inside nor outside of anything at the same time." "True." "Of that which neither part nor whole brings into being, is that not still more impossible to come to pass anywhere, occuring according to neither part nor whole?" "That is clear." "Then neither by going anywhere or coming into anything does it change place, nor by turning round in itself, nor by changing." "It does not seem to." "Then without all motion, the one is motionless." "It is motionless." "But truly we say that it is impossible for it to be in anything." "We say so." "Then it is never in the same." "Why is that?" "Because already it might be in that, in that with which the same is (identical)." "Certainly." "But neither in itself nor in anything else can the same be." "No, it cannot." "Then the one is never in the same." "It does not seem so." "Truly it leads to neither motion nor rest in the same." "Such cannot be." "The one then, as it seems, is neither at rest, nor does it move." "So it appears." "Neither, surely, shall it be the same with itself or with another, nor again other that itself or another might it be." "Why not?" "Being anywhere other than itself it might be other than one, and might not be one." "True." "And truly being the same with another, it might be that other and might not be itself; as thus, it would not be just as it is, one, but other than one." "For then it would not." "Then it shall not be the same as another nor other than itself." "No." "But it shall not be other than another, so long as it may be one. For one comes not to be other than anything, but only other than other, and notheng else." "Right." "Then one shall not be other, by being one, or does it seem so?" "Of course not." "Truly if not because of this, it shall not be (other) because of its nature; if not by reason of itself, then not itself; itself being other than not one thing, it shall not be other than anything." "Right." "But truly it shall not be the same with itself." "Why not?" "But doubtless, not just as the nature of the one, is that of the same." "Why?" "Because when a thing becomes the same as anything, it does not become one." "But why not?" "That which becomes the same as many, necessarily becomes many, but not one." "True." "But if nothing distinguished the one and the same, whenever something became the same, it would always become one, and whenever one, the same." "Certainly." "Then if the one with itself shall be the same, it shall not be one with itself; and thus being one, it shall not be one; truly this is indeed impossible; then it is impossible for the one to be either the other of other or the same within itself." "Impossible." "Thus the one might be neither other or the same to itself or another." "It cannot." "Truly it shall not be either like or unlike, either to itself or to another." "Why not?" "Because the like is everywhere acted on the same." "Yes." "But the nature of the same was shown to be distinct from that of the one." "Yes, it was." "Truly if the one were acted on to be apart from being one, it might be so acted on as to be more than one, which is impossible." "Yes." "Then the one is in no way acted on in the same way as either another or itself." "It does not appear so." "Then it is impossible for it to be like either another or itself." "It does not seem to be." "Truly the one is not acted on to be other; for it might be thus acted on to be more than one." "Yes, it would be more." "But truly that which is acted on other than itself, or of other, might be unlike either itself or other, just as the same, being acted on, is like." "Right." "But the one, as it appears, never by other acted on, is never unlike either itself or other." "For it is not." "Then the one might be neither like nor unlike to either itself or to other." "It does not appear to be." "Then being truly such, it shall be neither equal nor unequal to itself or to other." "Why not?" "Being equal, it shall be of the same measures as that to which it may be equal." "Yes." "And being greater or less than things with which it may be commensurate, it will have more measures than the things being less, and of the greater things, it will have less." "Yes." "And with the not commensurate shall be the case of greater or smaller measures." "How not?" "Is it not impossible for that not participating in sameness to be either of the same measures or of anything else the same?" "Impossible." "Then not being of the same measures, it might not be equal to itself or to anything else." "It does not appear to." "Truly, being of more measures or of less, there might be as many measures as parts; and thus, again, one shall no longer be, but shall be as many as the measures." "Right." "But if it might be of one measure, it might become equal to the measure, but it was shown impossible to be equal to anything." "Yes, it was shown." "Then partaking neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor partaking absolutely of the same shall it be; nor ever equal to itself or to anything else; nor again greater or less than itself or another." "Then entirely thus."

12. "Well, does it seem possible to hold that the one is older or younger or the same age?" "Why not?" "Because having the same age as itself or anything else, it shall partake of likeness of time and equality, of which we said has no part in the one, neither in likeness of time nor equality." "Yes, we said that." "And truly it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality and this we said." "Certainly." "How then shall such a thing be older or younger or have the same age as anything, being such?" "In no way." "Then the young might not be either younger or older or have the same age as itself or anything else." "It does not appear to." "Then might the one be capable of existing in time, if it may be such? Or is it not necessary, if it exists in time, to be always growing older than itself?" "Necessarily." "And the older is always older than something younger?" "Why not?" "Then that growing older than itself becomes at the same time younger than itself, if its purpose is to have something from which it grows older." "What do you mean?" "As follows. It is not necessary for a thing which is different from another to become different from that which is already different, but from that already being, must already be (different); it must become different from that having become different, it must be about to be different from that about to become different, but from that becoming different it must not have come, nor be going to be, nor already be different, but to become different, and not to be otherwise." "Necessarily." "Truly older is a difference with respect to younger and nothing else." "That is." "Then that becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself." "So it seems." "Truly it does not become for a longer or shorter time than itself, but must be and become and have become and be about to become for an equal time with itself." "These things are also, necessarily." "Then also necessarily, as it seems, concerning as many as exist in time and partake of such, each of them has the same age as itself and is also becoming at the same time both older and younger than itself." "That follows." "Truly the one has no share of such qualities." "No, it has not." "Then it has no share of time and does not exist in time." "No, as the argument proves." "Then what? Do not 'was' and 'has become' and 'was becoming' seem to signify participation in past time?" "Certainly." "Then what? Are not 'shall be' and 'shall become' and 'shall be made to become' words of the future?" "Yes." "Are not 'is' and 'is becoming' in the present?" "Certainly." "If the one had no partaking of time whatsoever, it has neither become, nor became nor was in the past; it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, nor shall it become nor be made to become nor shall it be in the future." "Most true." "Might it then partake of being in any other way than according to these things?" "It does not appear to." "Then in no way does the one partake of being." "It does not seem to." "Then the one is not at all." "It does not appear to be." "Then thus it is not so as to be one; for it might be then already being and partaking of being, but, as it seems, the one neither is one, nor is, if one must trust in such an argument." "That follows." "But that which is not, might anything be existing with it or pertaining to it?" "And how?" "There is no name for it nor word nor knowledge nor perception nor opinion." "There does not appear to be." "Then it is neither named nor described nor thought about nor known nor perceived by any existing thing." "It seems not to be." "Then may it be possible thus to have all these things concerning the one?" "It does not seem so to me."

13. "Do you wish to return to our hypothesis again, that something else, in our returning, may appear?" "I certainly wish that." "Do we not say that if the one exists, the things which agree concerning it, however they happen to be, must agree, or is it not thus?" "Yes." "Observe, from the beginning. If the one is, then does it so exist and not partake?" "Not so." "Then might the being of one exist, not being identical with one, for that were not being the being of it, nor was the one partaking of it; but saying one is were the same as saying one is one. Now the hypothesis is not if one is one, but what must agree, if one is; is it not thus?" "Certainly." "Then were not one and being meaning different things?" "Necessarily." "In sum, wherever anyone may say that one is, might this be saying not other than that the one partakes of being?" "Certainly." "Let us again say what shall agree, if the one is. Consider then, does this hypothesis necessarily show that the one, being such, so has parts?" "How?" "In the following way. If being is said to be of the one which exists, and the one of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to that which we hypothesize, of the existent one, then must not the existent one be a whole, of which the one and being become parts?" "Necessarily." "Then shall we call each of the parts only a part or a part of the whole must the part be called?" "Of the whole." "And whatever one may exist is a whole, and has a part?" "Certainly." "What then? Is each of the parts of existent one, the one and the being, abandoned, either the one which is a part of being or the being which is a part of one?" "That might not be." "And again, each of the parts has the one and being, and, again, the smallest part comes to be from these two parts, and according to the argument is always thus, that the part may become, and be thus with the part it always has; the one always has being, and being the one; so necessarily always becoming two, it is never one." "Entirely." "Then the one might thus be an infinite number." "So it seems." "Come to the following yet." "Where?" "We say that the one partakes of being, because it is?" "Yes." "And through these things, the one, existing, was shown to be many?" "Thus." "And what? The one itself, which we say partakes of being if we grasp it through the mind alone, according to itself, without that of which we say it partakes; then shall this itself be shown to be one, or many?" "One, I think." "Let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if one is not being, but as one, partakes of being?" "Necessarily." "Then if being is one thing and one is another thing, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but by being other and by being different they are different from each other." "Certainly." "As the other is not the same as either being or the one." "How could it be?" "What then? If we may go on, if you would select among them either being and other, or being and one, or one and other, then in each case do we select what might be rightly called both?" "How?" "As follows. Do we speak of being?" "Yes." "And again we can speak of one?" "This too." "Then have we not spoken of each of them?" "Yes." "And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?" "Certainly." "Then if of being and other or other and one I speak, it is everywhere thus, of each as both?" "Yes." If correctly called both, are such both, not being two?" "Not such." "If two exist, is there not some way that each of the two is not one?" "No." "Then if each of them agree to be two together, might each be one?" "So it appears." "If each of them is one, does not the adding of any sort to any pair whatever make all become three?" "Yes." "And three is odd and two is even?" "How not?" "And what? Being two, must there not be twice, and being three, thrice, if it happens that two is twice one and three is thrice one?" "Necessarily." "If there are two and twice, must there not be twice two? And if there are three and thrice must there not also be thrice three?" "How not?" "Then what? If there are three and twice and two and twice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two?" "Very much." "Then there might be even times even, and odd times odd, and odd times even, and even times odd." "Thus." "If these things then thus hold, do you think some number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?" "No." "If then one is, number must also be." "It must." "But might not the existence of number be of many, and an infinite multitude of existences; or is not number infinite and comes into being partaking of existence?" "Certainly." "Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number might partake of it?" "Yes."

14. "Then existence has been allotted over all being, which is many and is not apart from any being, neither the greatest nor the smallest? Or is this too absurd to ask? For how indeed might being be separated from being?" "By no way." "Then it is divided into such parts as the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences, and it has been divided the most of all thing, and the parts of being are most infinite." "It holds thus." "Its parts are the most numerous." "Yes, they are the most numerous." "Then what? Is there some one of them which is a part of existence, and not however a part?" "How might this come about?" "But, if there is, I believe, it must always, as long as it may be, be some one thing, being nothing impossible." "Necessarily." "Then the one shares in each part of existence and is not wanting in either smaller or larger parts or any other." "Thus." "Then can the one in many places at once be a whole? Consider this." "I am considering and I see that it is impossible." "Then it is divided, if it is not whole; for in no wise is it attached to all parts of existence otherwise than divided." "Yes." "And that which is divided must be such in number as the parts." "Necessarily." "Then what we said just now, that being was distributed among the greatest number of parts, might not be true; for it is not distributed among more parts than one, but the same number, as it seems, as into one. For existence is not wanting of the one, or the one to existence, but being made equal they are ever two throughout everything." "That is thus entirely shown." "The one, then, divided by being, is many and infinite and great." "So it appears." "Then not only the existing one is many, but the one itself, divided by existence, must be many." "That is entirely true."

15. "And because the parts are parts of the whole, might not the one be limited by the whole, or are not the parts comprised in the whole?" "They are necessarily." "But surely that which comprises it might be a limit." "How not?" "The one, then, being one, is also many, and whole and parts, and limited and infinite in number." "So it appears." "Then being limited, does not have extremes?" "Necessarily." "Then what? If it is a whole, might it not have a beginning, and middle, and an end? Or can some whole exist such without these three? And if any one of them may be absent, is it still able to be a whole?" "It is not able." "Then the one, as it seems, might have a beginning, an end, and a middle." "It might have." "But surely the middle is equally distant from both extremes; for otherwise it might not be a middle." "It might not." "And the one being such might partake of some shape, as it seems, either of straight, round or some mixture of both." "So it might partake." "Then having such, shall not the one itself be in itself and in other?" "How?" "Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole." "Thus." "And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all." "Surely." "Is the whole not the one?" "How not?" "If all the parts happen to be in the whole, and all the parts are the one and the whole itself, and all the parts are comprised by the whole, the one might be comprised by the one, and thus already the one itself might be in itself." "So it appears." "But the whole however is not in the parts, neither in all nor in some. If it is in all, it must be in one; for not being in any one, the one might not still be able to be in all, if this is the one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how shall it still be in all?" "In no way." "Nor is it in some of the parts. If the whole might be in some, the greater might be in the lesser, which is impossible." "It is impossible." "Not being in several, or one or all of the parts, must not the whole be in something else, or nowhere still be?" "Necessarily." "Then being nowhere it might be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, must it not be in something else?" "Certainly." "Then by that through which the one is a whole, it is in other; by that which through it happens to be in all its parts, it is in itself, and thus the one must be in itself and in other." "Necessarily." "Thus being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?" "How?" "It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself. For being in one, and not passing out from this, it might be in the same, in itself." "It is." "And that always being in the same, must be doubtless always at rest." "Certainly." "What then? Must not that which is always in other never be in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and not being at rest, be in motion?" "Thus." "Then the one itself must be always being in itself and in other, and always in motion and at rest." "So it appears." "And truly, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and in like manner the same with all other things, and others, if the foregoing has been upheld." "How?" "Everything holds with everything in the following way. It is either the same or other; or if it may be neither the same nor other, a part of it might be in relation to that which holds thus, or as the whole to a part might be." "So it appears." "Then is the one a part of itself?" "In no way." "Then might it not, as a part relating to itself, be a whole relating to itself, as a part of itself?" "It would not be such." "But the one is not other than the one?" "Certainly not." "Nor might it be other than itself." "Certainly not." "If then it is neither other nor a whole nor a part of itself, must it not already be the same with itself?" "Necessarily." "And what? Must not that which is in another place from itself, the self being in the same place with itself, be other than itself, if it shall be in another place?" "It seems so to me." "Truly it was shown that the one holds thus, that it is both in itself and in other." "That was shown." "Then the one, as it seems, might be other than itself, by such a thing." "So it seems." "Then what? If a thing is other than something, shall it not be other than another?" "Necessarily."

16. "Then are those which are not one, all things other than one, and the one other than the not one?" "How not?" "Then the one might be other than the others?" "It is other." "Consider. Are not same itself and other itself opposite to each other?" "How not?" "Then will the same ever be able to be in the other, or the other in the same?" "It will not be able to." "Then if the other shall never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is at any time. If it might be in anything, the other might be in the same. Would it not be thus?" "Thus." "But since the other is never in the same, it might never be in any of existing things." "True." "Then the other might not be either in the not one or in the one." "Then it might not." "Then not as other might the one be other than the not one other than the one." "No." "Truly they might not be different from one another as themselves, if they do not partake of the other." "How?" "If they are not other than one another through themselves or through the other, might they not in everything already escape not being other than one another?" "They might." "But truly the not one does not partake of the one; for that were not being not one, but would be one." "True." "Nor might the not one be a number; for that would altogether not be not one, having number." "No it wouldn't." "Then what? Is the not one the parts of the one? Or might the not one thus also partake of the one?" "It might." "If then in everything the one is (one) and the not one is (not one), the one might not be part of the not one, nor a whole as (composed) of parts; nor again is the not one part of the one, nor a whole of which the one is part." "No." "But truly we said that neither parts nor wholes nor other things than one another shall be the same as each other." "We said that." "Then may we say that the one and the not one having thus (as we described) are the same as one another?" "We may say that." "Then the one as it seems, is other than all other things and than itself, and the same as all other things and as itself." "That might be likely to appear from the argument." "Then is it like and unlike to itself and to others." "Probably." "Since at any rate it was shown to be other than others, the others might be other than that?" "How not?" "Then thus other than the others it is, just as the others from it, neither more nor less?" "What else?" "If then neither more nor less, in like manner." "Yes." "Then in that in which the one is acted on to be other than the others, and the others just as that (the one), in such the one might be acted on the same as the others, and the others as the one." "What do you mean?" "The following. Do you not call each thing by a certain name?" "Indeed." "What then? Then might you say the same name once or more often?" "Indeed." "Then if you may say the name once, do you call that one by name just as the name is, and many times, not that same one? Or whether once or many times you may speak the same name, do you not always mean the same thing?" "Why not?" "Then 'other' is the name of something?" "Certainly." "Then when you may speak it, whether once or many times, you name nothing other, and concerning nothing else, than that of which it was being the name." "Necessarily." "When we may say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, twice saying 'other' we always by 'other' mean nothing different than that very nature of which it is the name." "Certainly." "By which (nature) then, the one being other than the others, and the others than one; according to it, the other has not experienced other; but the one might exist having experienced the same as the others, and having experienced the same is like, is it not?" "Yes." "By which (nature), the one exists having become other than the others; according to it all things might be like all, for everything is other than all other things." "So it appears."

17. "But truly like is opposite to unlike." "Yes." "Then the other is opposite to the same." "This is also true." "But truly this was indeed also shown, that the one is the same as the others." "Yes, that was shown." "And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others." "Certainly." "By which, truly, the other was shown to be like." "Yes." "By which, then, the same shall be unlike; according to the opposite condition, might become like. And is the other a quality of the like?" "Yes." "Then the same shall make it unlike, or it shall not be a quality of the other." "So it appears." "Then the one shall be both like and unlike the others; by that through which it is other, like; by that through which it is the same, unlike." "Such an argument seems to hold." "There is also the following." "What?" "By that through which it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state, it is not unlike, and not being unlike, it is like; by that through which it is in another state, it is diffferent and being different, it is unlike." "You say a true thing." "Then the one, being the same as the others, and because it is other than the others, according to both or either (of these), shall be shown to be both like and unlike (itself)." "Necessarily." "Then what? Consider how it is sustained whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things." "I am considering." "The one was shown to be in the whole of itself." "Right." "Is the one then also in other things?" "Yes." "By reason of being in the others, it might touch the others; by reason of being in itself, it might be prevented from touching the others, but being in itself, might touch itself." "That is clear." "Then the one might touch itself and other things." "So it might touch." "And what about the following? Does it not result that everything which shall touch something, must lie next to that which it is to touch, occupying that position which may lie next to it and touch?" "Necessarily." "Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie straight-next to itself, occupying that place nearest to that which it is." "Then it must." "Then, being two, the one might do these things, and might become in two places at once; but while it may be one, isn't it unable?" "It is not able." "It is necessary for the one to neither be two nor for it to touch the others." "Why not?" "Because we said the result was that anything which shall touch something must be separate from it, and next to that which it shall touch; and there is no third thing in the middle of them." "That is true." "Then there must be two, at least, if it purports to be a juncture." "There must." "And when to the two things, a third may be added in succession, there shall be three, and two junctures." "Yes." "And thus whenever one is added, one juncture is added, and whatever the number of things added, the junctures are of quantity lesser by one. By that through which the first two things exceeded the number of junctures, the greater to be the number of things than junctures, by a likewise thing, the following number of all things exceeds the number of all junctures, henceforth, for all the rest, both one to the number of things is added, and one juncture to the junctures." "Right." "Then however many the number of existing things, the junctures are always less than they are by one." "True." "But if there is only one, and not two, there might not be a boundary." "For how could there be?" "Then we say that these other things than one, neither are not partake in it, since they are other." "They are not one." "Then there is no number in the others, one not being in them." "How could it?" "Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have the name of any other number." "No." "Then the one is one alone, and there might not be two." "Clearly there is not." "There is no juncture if there are not two existing things." "There is not." "Then according to all these things, the one touches and does not touch itself and the others." "So it seems."

18. "Then is the one both equal and unequal to itself and to the others?" "How is that?" "If the one might be greater or lesser than the others, or again, the others greater or lesser than the one, then might not the one, as one, and the others, as other than one, in their own natures be neither greater nor lesser than one another? But if in addition to being such, each might have equality, they might be equal to one another; and if the others have greatness, and the one smallness, to which class greatness might be added, might that be greater, and that to which smallness (added), smaller?" "Necessarily." "Do not these classes exist, greatness and smallness? For not existing, they might not be opposite of one another and come into being in beings." "For how could they?" "Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it might be in either the whole or a part of it." "Necessarily." "And what if it might come into being in the whole of it, or containing it?" "That is evident." "Then might not smallness, being of an equality with the one, be equal to it, and containing it, greater?" "How not?" "Then is it possible that smallness is equal to or greater than something, and fulfill greatness or equality, but not its own (quality)." "Impossible." "Then smallness shall never exist in any beings coming into existence either as a part, or in a whole; nor shall anything be small except smallness itself." "It seems not." "Then neither shall greatness exist in it. For something else greater besides absolute greatness might exist, that in which greatness might exist, and these things in it, not being of smallness, which (greatness) must exceed, if it may be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists in nothing." "True." "But truly absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and (absolute) smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness." "For it is not." "Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, having neither greatness nor smallness; nor do these things have the ability, in relation to the one, to exceed or be exceeded, but (in relation) to each other; nor again might the one be greater or lesser than these two or than other things, having neither greatness nor smallness." "Then so it appears." "Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it is necessarily unable to exceed or be exceeded by them?" "Necessarily." "Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be from an equality, and being from an equality, is equal." "How not?" "And truly the one might thus have the same relationship to itself, having neither greatness nor smallness in itself; it might neither exceed itself nor be exceeded by itself; but might be on an equality with and equal to itself." "Certainly." "Then the one might be equal to itself and to others." "So it appears." "And truly, being in itself, it might be surrounded by itself from without; and being surrounded, smaller; and thus the one might be both greater and smaller than itself." "For it might be." "Then does this (follow) necessarily, that nothing exists outside of the one and the others?" "How not?" "But truly, that which exists must always exist somewhere." "Yes." "Then shall not that which exists in anything exist in the greater and be smaller? For not otherwise might one thing exist in another." "For it cannot." "But since there is not another apart from the others and the one, and since they must be in something, must they not necessarily already be in one another, or else be nowhere?" "So it appears." "Because, then, the one is in the others, the others might be greater than the one, surrounding it, and the one less than the others, being surrounded; but because the others are in the one, the one, according to the same reasoning, might be greater than the others, and the others less than the one." "So it seems." "The one then is equal to and greater than and less than itself and the others." "So it appears." "And truly if greater and less and equal, of equal measures it might be, and greater and lesser, with itself and with the others; and if of (such) measures, also of (such) parts." "How not?" "Then being of equal and more and less measures, it might be less and more in number than itself and the others, and equal to itself and to the others according to these things." "How?" "If it is greater than any things, it might be of more measures (measured contents) than them; and of as many parts as measures; and if it is smaller, just so, or equal, according to these things." "Thus." "Then being greater and lesser than itself, and equal to itself, might it be of equal measures with itself, and of greater and lesser measures than itself; and if of measures, also of parts?" "How not?" "Then being of equal parts with itself, the number might be equal to it, if of more (parts), its number more, and if of less, its number less." "So it appears." "Then shall the one relate to other things just the same? Because it is shown to be greater than them, must the number be equal to the others?" "Necessarily." "Thus again, as it seems, the one shall be of number equal to and greater than and less than itself and other things." "It shall."

19. "Then does the one partake of time, and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than neither itself nor other things?" "How?" "If the one exists, it is the case that it be." "Yes." "But is being anything else than participation in being in the midst of present time, just as being which was, in the midst of past circumstances, and again, is being which shall be, partaking in the midst of future time?" "For that is the case." "Then it partakes of time moving forward?" "Yes." "Then it always becomes older than itself, if it goes forward in the course of time." "Necessarily." "Then do we not remember that there is something becoming younger, the older becoming older?" "We remember." "Then the one, since it becomes older than itself might become older (while) becoming younger than itself, might it not?" "Necessarily." "It becomes older and younger than itself thus." "Yes." "And is it not older when in the course of present time it may be becoming (older), between that which was and that which shall be? For in traversing from the past to the thereafter it shall not overstep the present." "For it shall not." "Then does it not cease to become older when at the present it may arrive, and not becomes, but is then already older? For moving forward, it might never be overtaken by the present. For that which moves forward thus has both to touch the future and the present, giving up the present, and seizing upon the future, becoming between both, the present and the future." "True." "But if everything which is becoming, necessarily does not pass by the present, when it may be at it, it always ceases to become, and then is that which it may happen to be becoming." "So it appears." "Then the one, when, becoming older, it may happen upon the present, ceases to become and then is older." "Certainly." "Then indeed it is older than that which was becoming, of this; and it was becoming older than itself." "Yes." "And is that which is older, older than that which is younger?" "It is." "Then the one is younger than itself, when, becoming older, it arrives at the present." "Necessarily." "But truly the present is always present with the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is the present whenever it may be." "For how not?" "Then always the one is and is becoming older and younger than itself." "So it seems." "And is it, or does it become, for a greater time than itself, or an equal time?" "An equal time." "But truly that which is becoming or is for an equal time has the same age." "How not?" "That which has the same age is neither older nor younger." "No." "Then the one, being and becoming for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself." "It seems not to me." "Then what? Concerning other things?" "I cannot tell." "But truly you can tell this, that the things other than the one, if they are others, not a single other, are more than one; for being a single other, it were one; being others they are more than one and might have multitude." "Yes, they might." "Being a multitude, they might partake of number greater than one." "How not?" "Then the smaller first; and this is the one. Is it not?" "Yes." "Then the one has come into being first of all things having number. And all the other things have number, as others, and are not an other." "They have." "And, I suppose, having come into being first, it has come into being before, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which has come into being before; and thus the younger things might be younger than the one; and the one older than the others." "It might be."

20. "And what about this? Then might the one be having come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?" "Impossible." "But truly the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle." "Yes." "Then does not the beginning of everything come into being first, of one itself and each of the others, and after the beginning all the others until the end?" "What then?" "And truly we shall say that all these others are portions of the whole and of the one, and that they become at the end both one and whole." "We shall say that." "And the end, I suppose, comes into being later, and at this the one has also grown to come into being; so that as necessarily the one itself does not come into being contrary to nature, having come into being together with the end, its nature might be to come into being later than the others." "So it appears." "Then the one is younger than the others, and the others older than the one." "Thus again it appears to me." "What then? Must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or anything else whatsoever, if it may be a part, but not parts, be one, being a part?" "Necessarily." "Then the one, by coming into being with the first (part), might come into being with the second, and, not lacking in others coming into being, or that which may precede them whatsoever, until, having reached the extremity, it may become a whole one, and neither the middle nor the first not the last nor any other part in coming into being shall it lack." "True." "Then the one might have the same age as all the others, so that if the one itself has not become contrary to nature, it might be begotten neither before nor later than the others, but with them. And according to this reasoning, the one might be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but according to the previous reasoning, both older and younger, and in like manner, the others than the one." "Certainly." "It is thus existing and having come into being. But what again concerning it becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither younger nor older? Then does it hold thus concerning becoming as concerning being, or otherwise?" "I cannot say." "But I can say this much, that if one thing is older than another, it might not be able to become older than as much as first becoming from the beginning it differed in age, nor again become younger than as much as it was younger; for adding equals to unequals, in time or in anything else whatsoever, might always make the difference just as that which may have differed at first." "How not?" "Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the age always differs by the same; but does not become." "True." "Then the one, existing, never becomes older or younger than the other things." "Then it does not." "But see if the following becomes older and younger." "How?" "As the one was shown to be older than the others, and the others than the one." "What then?" "When the one may be older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others." "Yes." "Consider again. When we may add an equal time to a greater or lesser time, then by an equal portion might the greater differ from the lesser, or by a smaller?" "By a smaller." "Then it shall not be that this first difference in age, which was existing between the one and the others, (continues) to the hereafter, but, an equal time being received by the others, (the one) might always differ less in age from them than formerly; or not?" "Yes." "Then might that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than in the past in relation to those things than which it was being older formerly?" "Yes, younger." "If that one (becomes) younger, (do) not the others (become) older in relation to the one than formerly?" "Certainly." "Then that having come into being later becomes older in relation to the one which, previously having come into being, is older, and never is older than it, but always becomes older; for the one advances towards becoming younger, and the other towards being older. And, again, the older thus becomes younger than the younger. For, moving in opposite directions, they become the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger, but cannot finally become so; for if they might become, they might not longer become, but might be. But now they become older and younger than one another, the one becoming younger than the others because it was shown to be older, having come into being later. And according to the same reasoning, the others thus hold the same relationship towards the one, since they were shown to be older, having come into being earlier." "It was shown thus." "Then in that in which no thing becomes older or younger than another, since they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one might not become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; in that in which the earlier must always differ by a different proportion from that coming into being later, and later from the earlier; from this must not the others become older and younger than each other and than the one and the one from the others?" "Certainly." "According to all these things the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older and younger than itself and the others." "Entirely so then." "And since the one partakes of time and becomes older and younger, must not it also partake of the past and the future and the present, since it partakes of time?" "Necessarily." "Then one was and is and shall be and was becoming and is becoming and will become." "Why not?" "And there might be something in relation to it and belonging to it which was and is and shall be." "Certainly." "And there might be knowledge of it and opinion and perception, since now we attend to all these things concerning it." "You speak rightly." "And there is a name and word for it, and it is named and bespoken; and as many of such things as happen to exist concerning the others, also exist concerning the one." "That holds entirely thus."

21. "Still let us discuss it for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, then must it not, being one and many, and neither one nor many, and partaking of time, because one is, partake of being at one time, and because it is not, again not partake of being at another time?" "Necessarily." "Then when it partakes, shall such a one then not partake, or when not partaking, partake?" "Not such." "Then does it partake at one time and not partake at another, and thus only might it partake and not partake of the same thing?" "True." "And is there not a time, when it assumes being and when it gives it up?" "There is no other way." "But do you not call receiving existence becoming?" "Indeed." "And losing existence destruction?" "Certainly." "The one then, as it seems, receiving and giving up existence, is created and destroyed." "Necessarily." "Then being one and many and being created and destroyed, then when it becomes one, is not its existence as many destroyed, and its existence as one destroyed when it becomes many?" "Certainly." "Then becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?" "Entirely." "And when greater and smaller and equal, increased and declined and equalized?" "Thus." "And when being at rest it may change to motion, it must itself not be in any one time." "How is that?" "These things shall not be experienced such that, being at rest previously, it is later in motion, and in motion previously, later at rest, without changing." "How?" "There is no time in which anything is neither in motion nor at rest." "Then there is not." "But indeed it does not change without changing." "It seems not." "Then when does it change? For neither when it is at rest nor in motion does it change, nor when it is in time." "Then it does not." "Then does this strange place exist, in which then it might be, when it changes?" "What sort?" "The instant. For the instant, in this manner seems to point out something, as from one place it changes to another. For it does not change from rest while still at rest, nor change from motion while still in motion; but the instant itself, some strange nature, sits in between motion and rest, not existing in time, and into this and out from this, that which is in motion changes to rest, and that at rest, to motion." "That follows." "Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, might change in each direction; for only thus might it do both; but changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it might be in no time, neither then might it be in motion, nor at rest." "No." "Then does it thus hold in relation to other changes, when from being it may change to destruction, or from not being to becoming, that it then becomes between certain (conditions of) motion and rest, and then neither is nor is not, and neither comes into being nor is destroyed?" "So it appears." "And according to the same principle, passing from one to many, and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates nor combines. And passing from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, and neither assimilating nor dissimilating; and passing from small to great, and from equal to inequal, it might be neither small nor great nor equal, nor increasing, nor decreasing, nor becoming equal." "It seems not." "Then all these experienced things might happen to the one, if it exists." "How not?"

22. "Then must one not consider what might be likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?" "One must." "May we say what must be experienced by things other than one, if one exists?" "Let us tell." "Then since they are the other things than one, the other things are not the one; for if they were, they would not be other than the one." "True." "But truly the others are not entirely deprived of the one, but partake in some way." "How?" "Because the others are other than the one by having parts; for if they might not have parts, they might be altogether one." "True." "And parts, we affirm, are of that which is a whole." "Yes, we affirm that." "But truly the whole must be one from many, of which the parts shall be parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole." "How is this?" "If anything might be a part of many, in which it itself might be, it shall be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if (a part) of all. For not being a part of one, excepting that one, it shall be a part of the rest, and thus shall not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each, it shall not be a part of the many. But it is impossible that that which is being of none of all those things, to none of which it belongs, exists as a part or anything else." "That is clear." "Then the part is a part, not of many nor of all, but of one single idea and of a certain one, which we call a whole, a perfect one begotten of all; of this the part might be a part." "Entirely, then." "If then the others have parts, they might share in the whole and the one." "Certainly." "Then things other than one must be one perfect whole having parts." "Necessarily." "And truly the same reasoning (holds) concerning each of the parts. For this (part) must partake of the one. If each of them is a part, each indeed presumably indicates that it is one, separated from the others, existing according to itself, if each shall exist." "True." "Clearly it might partake of the one because it is other than one; for (otherwise) it might not partake, but were the one itself; and actually it is impossible for anything to be one except the one itself." "Impossible." "And partaking of the one must be by the whole and the part. For the one shall be a whole, of which the parts are parts; and again, each one is part of a whole, which may be the part of a whole." "Thus." "And shall things other than one partake of it, being (other than) while partaking of it?" "How not?" "And the things other than one might be many. For if the things other than one might be neither one nor more than one, they might be nothing." "Then they might not exist." "Since those parts of the one, those partaking of the one whole, are more than one, must not those themselves participating in the one now be infinite in number?" "How?" "Let us look in the following manner. At that time when they participate in it, are thay not something other, not being one nor partaking of it?" "Clearly." "Then are they not multitudes, in which the one is not?" "Multitudes, indeed." "What then? If we might wish to subtract from them in thought, such that we are (conceiving) the smallest (quantity), must not that which is subtracted, if it might partake not of the one, be a multitude and not one?" "Necessarily." "Thus, then, whenever considering the very nature of the class of other itself, shall we not always see it unlimited in multitude?" "Entirely then." "And truly whenever each one part may become a part, each now has a limit in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts." "Very much so indeed." "For the things other than one, from the one and themselves being in communication, it results, as it seems, that something different arises within themselves, which provides a limit in relation to one another; but their own nature, according to themselves (alone) is unbounded." "So it appears." "Thus the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts are unbounded and also partake of limitation." "Certainly." "Then are they both like and unlike each other and themselves?" "How?" "By that process through which they are all by their own nature unlimited, and through these things they might all be acted on in the same way." "Certainly." "And truly by that process through which they all partake of limit, also through these things might they all be affected the same." "How not?" "And by that through which they are affected to be bounded and unbounded, these things being opposite experiences from one another, they are affected by these experiences." "Yes." "But indeed opposites are as such the most unlike." "Yes, indeed." "Then according to each experience they might be like themselves and each other, but according to both together, they are most opposite and unlike." "That is likely." "Thus the other things might be both like and unlike themselves and each other." "Thus." "And they are the same and other than one another, and both in motion and at rest, and since these phenomena have been shown, we discover, no longer with difficulty, that all the opposite experiences are experienced by the things other than one." "You speak truly."

23. "Then if now we may leave these things alone as evident, might we consider whether, if one is, then if the things other than one do not hold thus, or thus only?" "Certainly." "Let us ask from the beginning, if one is, what must happen to the things other than one." "Let us ask that." "Then is the one not separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?" "Why?" "Because there exists not other than these things, which are other than one and other than the others. For all things are said when the one and the others are said." "Yes, all things." "Then there is nothing other than these, in which itself the one and the others might be." "No." "Then the one and the others are never in the same." "It seems not." "Then are they separate?" "Yes." "And indeed we say that what is truly one does not have parts." "How?" "Then neither as a whole might the one be in the others, nor as parts of it, if it is separate from the others and does not have parts." "How?" "Then in no way might the others partake of the one, neither partaking of a part of it, nor of the whole." "It seems not." "Then the others are in no way one, nor do they have in themselves the one." "Then they don't." "Then neither are the others many. If they were many, each of them were one part of the whole; but actually the things other than one are neither one nor many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not partake of it in any way." "Right." "Neither are the others two or three, nor are such in them, if they are entirely deprived of the one." "Thus." "Nor are the others themselves either like or unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them. For if they might be like and unlike or might have likeness and unlikeness in them, the things other than one might have in them two ideas opposite to one another." "That is clear." "But it were impossible for that which might not partake of one to partake of two things." "Impossible." "Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both. For being like or unlike, they might partake of one or the other ideas, and of the two opposites, if they were both; and these things were shown to be impossible." "True." "Then they are neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal; nor have they experienced any other of such things. For if the others maintain such experiences, they will partake of one and two and three and odd and even, of which it was shown impossible for them to partake, being completely deprived of the one in all ways." "Most true." "Thus if the one exists, the one is all things and the one is nothing, both in relation to itself, and in like manner, to all others." "Entirely."

24. "Good. And if the one does not exist, then must not one consider, in the course of this, what must happen?" "Yes, one must consider." "Then what might the following hypothesis be, if the one does not exist? Then does it differ from this, if the not one does not exist?" "It differs however." "Are complete opposites said, if not one does not exist and one does not exist, or does it only differ?" "Complete opposites." "And if someone might say that greatness does not exist or smallness does not exist, or anything of that sort, then for each thing it is clear that he might speak of something different not existing." "Certainly." "Then when he may ask if one is not, it is now clear that he speaks of a thing different from the others, that is not, and we know what he is saying?" "We know." "Then, first, he says something known, then of something different from other things, when he may speak of one, whether he adds that it is or that it is not; for nevertheless that which is said to not exist is known, and that it differs from other things. Or no?" "Necessarily." "Then in the following manner one must say what must be if the one does not exist. Then, first, this must be the beginning, as it seems, that there exists knowledge of it; or else not exist." "True." "Then are the others different from it (the one), and isn't it said to be different from the others?" "Certainly." "Then the difference belongs to it in addition to the knowledge. For one does not speak of differences of the others, when one may say that the one is different from the others, but (the difference) of that (the one)." "That is clear." "And truly the one which does not exist partakes of (the qualities) 'that,' 'some,' 'this,' 'in this,' 'these,' and all such things. For the one could not be spoken of, nor the things other than one, nor could anything in it or of it be or be spoken of, if not sharing in some or either of these (qualities)." "True." "Such things are not in the one, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents it from partaking of many things, and necessarily, if that one, and not some other, does not exist. If however, shall neither the one nor that one exist, but the discussion is about some other, one mustn't say anything; but if not being is the subject of that one and not another, (the one) must share in that and many other (qualities)." "Certainly." "And there is unlikeness in it in relation to the other things. For the things other than the one, being different, might be of a different kind." "Yes." "And are not things of a different kind of another kind?" "How not?" "And are not things of another kind unlike?" "Unlike then." "Then if they are unlike the one, it is clear that the one might be unlike things which are unlike it." "It is clear." "Then unlikeness might be in the one, in relation to which the others are unlike to it." "So it seems." "But if there is unlikeness of the others in it, then must not there be likeness of itself in it?" "How?" "If unlikeness of the one is in the one, then the discussion might not be anywhere of this sort concerning the one, but concerning other than the one." "Certainly." "But that must not be." "Of course not." "Then likeness to itself must be in the one." "It must." "And, again, the one is truly not equal to the others. For if it might be equal, it now might be and be like them in respect to equal equality; and these things are both impossible if the one does not exist." "Impossible." "And since it is not equal to the others, then must not the others be unequal to it?" "Necessarily." "Are those which are not equal unequal?" "How not?" "Then does the one partake of equality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?" "Yes, it does partake." "But however, greatness and smallness are (elements of) inequality." "They are." "Then are greatness and smallness, of this sort, in the one?" "So it appears." "And truly greatness and smallness are always apart from one another." "Certainly." "Then there is always something between them." "There is." "Do you say anything other than equality is between them?" "No, only this." "Then when greatness and smallness are in anything, then equality is also in it, being between the two." "So it appears." "Then the one which doesn't exist partakes of equality and greatness and smallness." "So it seems." "And truly it must also somehow partake of existence." "How?" "It must hold thus as we say. For if it might not hold thus, we might not speak the truth in saying the one does not exist; and if true, it is clear that we speak of existing things. Or is it not thus?" "Then it is thus." "Then since we say that we speak the truth, we must assert that we say what is." "Necessarily." "Then, as it seems, the one which does not exist, exists. For if it shall not be non-existent, but shall give up something of being to not being, then it shall be existent." "Entirely then." "Then it must have a bond of not-being, being existing not, if it purports to not exist, just as being has non-existence of not being, in order that, again, it may be perfect. For thus best might the existent exist, and the non-existent not exist, the existent partaking of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, if it purports to be, perfectly; and the non-existent (partakes of) the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, if the not being shall not be, perfectly." "Most true." "Then since the existent shares in non-existence, and the non-existent in existence, the one, since it does not exist, must partake of existence to not exist." "It must." "And it is clear that existence is in the one, if it does not exist." "That is clear." "And non-existence, also, if it does not exist." "How not?" "Then does that which has a certain quality then not have it, without changing from being in that certain state?" "Not without that indeed." "Then everything of that sort signifies a change, that which may have (that quality) thus or not thus." "How not?" "But change is motion, or what do we say?" "Yes, motion." "Then was it not shown that the one is and is not?" "Yes." "Then it is clear that it has (that quality) thus and not thus." "So it seems." "Then the non-existent one has appeared to be in motion since it changes from having being to non-being." "That is likely." "But truly if it is nowhere among existing things, as it is not (anywhere) if it does not exist, then it might not move from one place to another." "For how could it?" "Then it might not move in order to change." "No." "Then truly it might not turn in the same place; for it nowhere touches the same. For the same exists; and it is impossible for the non-existent to be in existing things." "Impossible." "Then the one, being non-existent, might not be able to turn in that which it is not." "Then no." "Truly the one is not changed into something different from itself, whether it exists or does not exist. For our discussion were no longer concerning the one, if it changed into something different from itself, but about something else." "Quite right." "If it is not changed into something different, nor changes its place nor turns in the same place, might it still move?" "For how can it?" "Truly that which is without motion must keep at rest, and that which keeps at rest is still." "Necessarily." "Then the one which does not exist, as it seems, is at rest and in motion." "So it seems." "And truly if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature. For if anything may be moved in any way, according to such, it no longer has (that quality) thus as it did have, but otherwise." "Thus." "Then in moving the one does change into something different." "Yes." "And truly, not moving in any way, it might not change in any way." "For it might not." "Then the one which does not exist changes and does not change into something different." "So it appears." "Then must not that which changes become different than it was previously, and fall away from its previous state? And that which does not change neither comes into being nor falls away; and thus the one which does not exist both comes into being and falls away, and neither comes into being nor falls away." "Then it doesn't."

25. "Let us go back again to the beginning and see if these things appear as (they do) now, or differently." "Yes, we should." "Then if the one is not, we ask what will follow concerning it." "Yes." "When we speak of not existing, then is anything else meant than the absence of being in that of which we may speak of not existing?" "Nothing else." "Then which, when we may speak of something not being, that it is in a way, or is not in a way, do we mean? Or when we talk about the non-existent, does this simply mean that the non-existent in no way, nowhere exists, and in no manner partakes of existence?" "Most straightforwardly then." "Then the non-existent might not exist nor in any other way partake of existence." "No." "But for that which has no participation in it at all, there might be neither receiving it nor losing it." "How could there be?" "Then in the one, since it does not exist, there must not be possession nor losing nor sharing in existence in any way." "That is likely." "Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it does not share in existence in any way." "It does not appear to." "Then it is not changed into something different at all, for, experiencing this, it might come into being or perish." "True." "And if it is not changed into something different, then mustn't it be unmoved?" "It must." "Nor truly shall we say that what nowhere exists is at rest. For that which is at rest must always be in some same (place)." "The same. How not?" "Thus again may we say that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion?" "Then it is not." "But truly anything of existing things is not of it (the non-existent one). For at the moment of partaking of the existing, it might partake of existence." "That is plain." "Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality is in it." "No." "And truly neither likeness nor difference might be in it, either in relation to itself or to other things." "It does not appear so." "And what? Might other things in like manner exist in it, if there must be nothing in it?" "There are not." "Then the other things are neither like nor unlike it, nor the same nor different." "No, they are not." "Then shall (the qualities) 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or word or name or anything else whatsoever, of existing things, concerning the non-existent, exist?" "They shall not." "Thus the non-existent one nowhere, in no way has any (condition)." "Then it seems not to have, in any way."

26. "Let us discuss further, if the one does not exist, what must happen to the other things." "Let us discuss that." "But they must exist; for if the others did not exist, one might not speak concerning the others." "Thus." "But if the talk is concerning the others, the others are different. Or do you not name the same thing (saying) 'different' and 'others?'" "I do indeed." "And do we say that the different is different from the different, and the other from the other?" "Yes." "And for the others, if they are to be the others, something exists of which they shall be the others." "Necessarily." "Then what might that be? For they shall not be others of the one, (it) not existing." "No." "Then they are (others) of each other, and this is left for them, or they are others of nothing." "True." "Then they are each others of each other, according to groups. For they might not be such singly, one not existing; but each mass of them, as it seems, is unlimited in number; if one might take the smallest thing that appears to exist, just as in a dream, all of a sudden, instead of what appeared one, many things appear, and instead of most small, this is very great in relation to the cut-up parts from it." "Most true." "The others of such masses of others might be others, if others exist, the one not existing." "Very much indeed." "Then shall the many masses exist, each appearing one, not being (one), if each one shall not exist?" "Thus." "And they shall seem to have number, if each (seems) one, being many." "Certainly." "And there appears in them to be some even and some odd, which is not so, if the one shall not exist." "Then it is not." "And truly indeed a most small, we say, shall seem to be in them; and this appears great and many in relation to each of the many small beings (portions)." "How not?" "And truly each masss shall be considered equal to the many and small (portions). For they could not appear to have passed from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; and this might be the appearance of equality." "That is reasonable." "Then, having a limit in relation to another mass, doesn't it have neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?" "Why?" "Because whenever any of these may be grasped by the mind as being of these (masses), another beginning always appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end; and in the middle are other things more in the middle than the middle, but smaller, since it is not possible to grasp each one of them, because there is no existence of the one." "Most true." "All being which may be grasped by the mind, must, I think, be changed, broken into pieces. For not any such thing seen from a distance and dimly, appear to be one; and close and sharply apprehended, must not each one be shown unlimited in number, if it is bereft of one-ness, one not existing?" "Most necessarily." "Thus unlimited and having limit and one and many must appear each of the other things, if the one does not exist, but things other than one (exist)." "They must." "Then shall they not appear to be like and unlike?" "Why?" "Such, being merely sketched, and from a distance, appear to be all one appearance, having had the same experience, and like." "Certainly." "But being closer they are many and different, and, in their differences of appearance, of different kinds and unlike each other." "Thus." "Then the masses themselves must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other." "Certainly." "Then they are the same and different from one another, and touching and apart from themselves, and moving in all motion, and in all rest, and becoming and perishing and neither, and all such things, which are now easy for us to narrate, if, the one not existing, the many exist." "Most true."

27. "Let us yet tell, going through once more again from the beginning, if the one does not exist, but the others, what must be." "Then let us tell." "Then the others shall not be one." "How could they?" "And truly not many; for, in being many, one might be contained in them. For if none of them are one, they are all nothing, so they might not be many." "True." "The one not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one." "They are not." "They do not appear to be one or many." "Why?" "Because the others have no communion with the non-existent; by no means, in no way, in no wise; and nothing of not-being relating to the others exists. For no parts exist in the non-existing." "True." "Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of non-being in relation to the others, nor shall the non-existent one, in any way, in any wise be considered concerning the others." "No, then." "Then if one does not exist, not one of the others shall be considered to be one or many. For it is impossible to think of the many without one." "Impossible." "Then if the one does not exist, the others neither are nor shall be considered one or many." "It seems not." "Then neither like nor unlike." "No." "Nor, truly, the same nor different, nor touching nor apart, nor are other things in them which we just went through as they appear; the others neither are nor appear to be any of these things, if the one does not exist." "True." "Then if we might say in sum, if the one does not exist, nothing exists, might we speak rightly?" "Most entirely." "Then let us say this moreover, that, as it appears, whether the one is or is not, it and the others, in relation to themselves and to each other, are and are not, and appear and do not appear." "Most true."

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