Promoting investment in energy efficiency has become increasingly important over the past decade, but not much is known about effective ways to promote firm-level investments in energy efficiency. Using new experimental data on EU firms’ stated willingness to invest in hypothetical energy-efficiency projects with varying offers of financing and technical assistance, this column demonstrates how a favourable financing offer can increase the likelihood that firms are willing to invest in energy efficiency by as much as 33%.

Media reports suggest that some UK firms have started to move production abroad in anticipation of Brexit. Using data on announcements of new foreign investment transactions, this column reports evidence that the Brexit vote has led to a 12% increase in the number of new investments made by UK firms in EU27 countries. At the same time, new investments in the UK from the EU27 have declined by 11%. The results are consistent with the idea that UK firms are offshoring production to the EU27 because they expect Brexit to increase barriers to trade and migration, making the UK a less attractive place to invest and create jobs.

Europe is at risk of falling behind its global competitors. In a period of radical technological transformation, European firms are investing too little, with a gap both in tangible and intangible investment compared to the US. This column calls for a ‘retooling’ of Europe’s economy in relation to skills, innovation finance, the business environment, infrastructure, and deepening the Single Market.

The Stability and Growth Pact has been criticised by some for imposing fiscal tightening during recessions, and by others for a lack of compliance. Using a database of all country-specific Excessive Deficit Procedure recommendations since the introduction of the euro, this column shows that the corrective arm of the pact, which is procyclical by design, is an important driver of euro area fiscal policy. The preventive arm, which is designed to avoid the need for such procyclical policies, is much less effective and reform of the pact should focus on addressing this.

Populists in Europe are contesting the perceived benefits of economic integration between countries. This column uses data on trade frictions to estimate the long-run impact of trade frictions on GDP if countries in Europe were to be more or less integrated. Negative between-country impacts, such as from Brexit or an EU collapse, imply a GDP reduction of between 1-3%. The potential trade benefits of a 'United States of Europe', on the other hand, may be an order of magnitude greater for its members.

Europe’s social contracts to protect their citizens from socioeconomic risks are based on an inclusive growth model characterised by a more egalitarian view of revenue generation and distribution. But this model is under strain, with various global trends placing upward pressure on inequality that could intensify. This column suggests that keeping the essence of Europe’s current inclusive growth model does not preclude it from adapting its current social contracts to protect its citizens, whatever the disruptions that lie ahead.

Intra-EU migration stocks more than doubled between 1960 and 2015, with the EU's principle of free movement of people seen as one of the main drivers. The column shows that free movement on average increased the stock of intra-EU migrants by 28%, representing around one quarter of total intra-EU migration during this period. The free movement of people has had a substantial impact on migration originating from both old and new member states, with the vast majority of migrants going to the old member states.

Twenty-eight months after the Brexit referendum, EU laws, regulations, and doctrines continue to apply to UK residents and state officials. This column shows that UK judges and litigants have already started to move away from EU law in anticipation of Brexit, with judges submitting 22–23% fewer questions to the European Court of Justice since the referendum. The broader lesson for the future of supranational legal systems is that effective disintegration may precede formal withdrawal, or may occur even if formal withdrawal is delayed or does not come about.

Proponents of contingent convertible bonds, or CoCos, argue that they are effective instruments for bank recapitalisation. Sceptics argue that they introduce too much complexity, with potentially destabilising consequences. This column addresses this dispute empirically, using the dynamics of the CoCo market in 2016. The CoCo market at the time exhibited adverse dynamics that can’t be explained by banks’ fundamentals. Though some of this instability may have been transitory, the findings imply that the market should be monitored as it develops.

The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy for the decade ahead is beginning to take shape. This column argues that, as it stands, the policy fails to ensure public goods provision for the EU at large, and the lack of clarity on its payment terms are a concession to pressure from farmers’ lobbies. Without significant changes in the final stages of negotiation, the CAP could become an enormous waste of resources while providing little or no ‘European added value’.

Collaborative platforms have quickly penetrated several services sectors. Statistics on the development of the collaborative economy are essential for appropriate policy responses but there are few available. This column presents a simple methodology for estimating the economic size of the collaborative economy, which is also relevant for the platform economy.

With increasing frustration over the situation as ‘Brexit Day’ approaches, some political pundits are suggesting that an Irish exit from the EU would benefit Ireland. This column assesses the macroeconomic impact of a range of scenarios and argues that while any version of Brexit, with or without Irexit, worsens the Irish economic situation relative to the status quo, economically speaking the best option for Ireland is to stay within the fold of the EU while hoping for and working towards the best in terms of post-Brexit UK economic integration with Europe.

Over recent decades, scholars and policymakers have been exploring how to make economies more resilient to potential shocks. This column investigates which EU members showed resilience during the Global Crisis and attempts to identify characteristics associated with resilience. The results reveal a lot of heterogeneity amongst countries, and those that are more resilient in the short run are not necessarily those with superior recoveries down the line. Further analyses show that social expenditures, political stability, and competitive wages are important for impact, medium-run, and ‘bounce forward’ resilience, respectively.

Tax havens are estimated to concentrate 8% of global private financial wealth, reducing annual global tax revenues by about $200 billion. This column uses new country-by-country regulatory data on the foreign commercial presence of EU banks and compares it against gravity model predictions to examine the contribution of EU banks to tax evasion. It finds that bank activity in tax havens is three times larger than what is predicted by the gravity model, and that British and German banks are particularly present in tax havens.

The transition to a European banking union is not straightforward. A key issue is how to prioritise risk sharing and risk reduction. This column examines three possible approaches, describing the respective transition scenarios and analysing the consequences for banks during the transition phase. None of the scenarios is optimal for all countries, but waiting too long may lead to solutions needing to be found under the pressure of a new crisis.

After Brexit, English can no longer retain its status as one of the EU's official or working languages. This column uses data on languages spoken in the EU to show that post-Brexit, German and French would become dominant. Efforts to preserve English as an official language of EU institutions, which would require a unanimous vote among members, are unlikely to succeed. This may be problematic for certain European countries in which English is a more widely spoken second language than German or French.

When President Trump recently spoke of his hope for "a great bilateral trade agreement” with the UK after Brexit, what did he really mean? Dennis Novy of the University of Warwick describes what these political good intentions may look like in reality, the problems that both sides will have to solve to agree a UK-US deal, and the factors that might derail any agreement.