The
United States sent RPGs, machine guns, mortars, and -- in the words of
one U.S. official -- "cash in a brown paper bag" to Somalia last
spring. Foreign Policy reports on how the shipments took place, and
who's not happy about it.

BY
ELIZABETH DICKINSON

Late in
May, as violence consumed the streets of the infamously violent capital
city of Mogadishu, Somalia, packages of ammunition, weapons, and cash
began arriving from the United States as part of an attempt to help the
country's flailing Transitional Federal Government (TFG) stave off
collapse. At the time, the Somali government was literally about to
fail, reportedly controlling no more than a neighborhood in Mogadishu
thanks to a fresh assault by two Islamist insurgent groups: al-Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam.

The
contents of those shipments, not previously reported, included 19 tons
of ammunition, 48 rifle-propelled grenades, 36 PKM machine guns (a model
of the Russian-made Kalashnikov), 12 DShK machine guns (Russian-made
heavy artillery weapons), and 10 mortars (the firing apparatus for
shells). The shipment was detailed in a letter from a U.S. official to
the U.N. Security Council committee set up to oversee the 17-year-old
arms embargo on Somalia. The U.S. official, Alejandro D. Wolff, deputy
permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, requested an
exemption to the embargo, which was put in place in 1992 at the onset of
civil conflict. In a second letter to the Security Council, Wolff
explained that $2 million was also being sent to the Somali government
"for the immediate procurement of equipment (weapons and ammunition) and
logistics support (food, fuel, water, engineering services)."

All told, a
State Department official admitted at a June
26 news briefing that it shipped "in the neighborhood of 40 tons
worth of arms and munitions" to Somalia. "We have also asked the two
units that are there, particularly the Ugandans, to provide weapons to
the TFG, and we have backfilled the Ugandans for what they have provided
to the TFG government," the official told journalists. The cost was
"under $10 million." A different State Department official working on
Somalia counterterrorism policy told Foreign Policy that of the total
amount, the bulk was spent on ammunition, while the air freight bill was
$900,000 and $1.25 million was "cash in a brown paper bag."

The letters
from Wolff explain that the cash was to be transferred to Nairobi,
Kenya, and then moved by air to Mogadishu. The money was intended to be
spent locally to buy arms, ammunition, and other supplies. (In recent
years, AK-47s have sold on the streets of Mogadishu for anywhere from
$100 to $600, depending on how heavy the fighting is at the time.)
Meanwhile, ammunition was to be shipped to Somalia's capital by air from
Entebbe, Uganda. The transfer of the weapons is not described in the
letters. However, a regional analyst, who was not authorized to speak on
behalf of his affiliation, told FP that the shipments have been arriving
in installments, doled out by the African Union peacekeepers who are
guarding the Mogadishu airport.

The arms
transfer was among the new U.S. administration's first moves toward
Somalia, a country that many see as a test case for President Barack
Obama's counterterrorism policy. The country has been in a state of war
for nearly two decades, displacing a quarter of the country's
population, with half a million refugees scattered across the region and
another 1.5 million displaced internally within Somalia. But in recent
months, the East African country has become a growing concern for U.S.
officials as local groups, most notably an Islamist faction named
al-Shabaab -- some of whose leaders are thought to have been trained by
al Qaeda -- have expanded their control of the country.

At the time
the arms were sent, the Transitional Federal Government was under a
withering assault. "Somalia is in crisis," Johnnie Carson, assistant
secretary of state for African affairs, told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 20, just days before
the United States alerted the Security Council of its plan to send arms.
"In the past two weeks, violent extremists, including al-Shabaab and a
loose coalition of forces under the banner of Hizbul al-Islam, have been
attacking TFG forces and other moderates in Mogadishu in an attempt to
forcefully overthrow the transitional government."

According
to experts on the region, the policy's intent was both symbolic and
tactical. "The symbolic [aspect] is a way of sending a message to
Somalis that the United States is going to stand behind the TFG -- that
the United States will not allow it to fail and sees it as the only
viable solution," said Ken Menkhaus, a leading Somalia analyst, in an
interview. Tactically, the intent was straightforward: to help the TFG
fight back against its heavily armed opponents.

But there
have been concerns about just how effective the arms shipments have
been. On Aug. 11,
Garowe, a Somali radio station and online news outlet, reported that
arms transferred to the Somali government were being sold on the street.
"When the U.S. made the decision in May, the Transitional Federal
Government seemed to be hanging on by a thread. Initially, the
declaration of support probably did have something to do with the TFG
hanging on and pulling together," the regional analyst told FP. "We
didn't see many leakages of weapons [at first] because they were too
busy fighting. But what's happened is that the consequences of that
decision are still being felt. It now seems that the TFG forces have
reached their capacity and can't absorb much more in terms of arms and
ammunition, so we're starting to see and hear reports of leakages."

To many
observers, this seemed all too predictable. The small-arms trade has
flourished for the 18 years that Somalia has been in conflict, with
weapons proliferating dramatically despite the arms embargo. One of the
most frequent channels has been through desertions; 14,000 of the TFG's
17,000 forces deserted last year, many with their guns and uniforms.
Today, desertions are less common thanks to a new, more popular
president, according to the regional analyst. But he estimates that
government forces, including police, only number about 5,000 -- and
that's just on paper. In practice, the TFG forces are less a uniform
force than a series of militias that operate independently, loyal to one
government official or another. "When weapons are allocated to militias
who are paid irregularly or not at all, a certain percentage will sell
on the open market," Menkhaus explained. "This is a common practice
throughout the entire Horn of Africa."

Regardless
of whose hands the weapons are ultimately in, other analysts question
the wisdom of sending more small arms to a country that is already all
too rife with gunfire. The most
recent report of the U.N. monitoring group for Somalia, published
last December, includes an entire section naming the "unintended
consequences of support to the security sector." Among the concerns are
the use of "heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers"
by TFG police in an urban setting (where casualties are likely to be
high). The report also details how captured TFG weapons, equipment,
uniforms, and vehicles were "an important source of supply for armed
opposition groups."

The policy
also raises questions about the broader U.S. stance toward Somalia. The
State Department official working on Somalia counterterrorism policy
told FP that "every element of the U.S. government seems to have its own
piece of the Somalia plan." There was no formal policy, he said, because
of a disagreement about whether and how to support the Transitional
Federal Government. "The Department of Defense thought they were just
out of their minds [to send the arms shipment]," he said. "But since it
was State's money, the plan went through." (Queried about this claim,
Defense Department spokeswoman Almarah Belk responded via e-mail,
"Policy toward Somalia is coordinated via the NSC [National Security
Council]. DoD [Department of Defense] agrees and supports the DOS
[Department of State] security assistance to the TFG.")

There is
also some question as to how popular the shipment was within the State
Department itself. The State Department official told FP that there was
no support and even active opposition to the plan among his colleagues.
When a reporter at the June 26 briefing insinuated that the decision
"was made at the highest level," the briefing official replied that the
policy was a "national decision" agreed upon by "the secretary and the
NSC," meaning Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the National
Security Council.

During her visit
to Africa last month, Clinton vowed to
"continue to provide equipment and training to the TFG as well as
humanitarian assistance to the Somali people," and wire service Agence
France-Presse reported that the United States had plans to double
its arms support from 40 tons to 80. (The doubling of arms support could
not be confirmed as the State Department did not respond to queries a
week after FP's first request.)

Nonetheless, some analysts who spoke to FP see a positive opening
emerging in the war-wracked country. Somalia's new president, Sheikh
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who was inaugurated this spring, has garnered
greater popular support for the Transitional Federal Government than at
any time in the last two decades. And unlike the more than a dozen
previously attempted government coalitions during that period, Sharif's
is the first not to be actively opposed by any of Somalia's many clans.
Al-Shabaab, too, is losing popularity, some say. "Somalia now has at
least the start of a government that is broadly representative of the
Somali clan and societal landscape," Carson said in his Senate testimony
in May. "These are all significant steps forward for Somalia."