A very common initial response to my interest in character/"fittingness"-based objections to consequentialism is to question whether consequentialism has any implications for fitting attitudes or character at all (and if not, then a fortiori it doesn't have any troublesome implications). For example, I typically introduce "fittingness" talk in terms of what’s rationally warranted from the “point of view” of a moral theory, but you might well wonder whether moral theories are really the sorts of things that can have points of view.I have two broad replies to this line of concern. My first (and more ambitious) response is to try to make the case that moral theories do have positive fittingness implications. But I also have a more conciliatory backup option in case this fails.What is the “perspective” of a moral theory? It’s just an abstraction from the perspective of a rational agent who has fully internalized the theory, and hence whose psychology reflects,. . .