The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05WARSAW3044.

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 WARSAW 003044
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, NEA/I, AND S/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2015
TAGS: PRELMOPSMARRPLIZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ-POLAND: JONES-SMITH CONSULTATIONS WITH GOP
REF: (A) STATE 131524 (B) WARSAW 2786 (C) WARSAW 2598
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Piascik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Richard Jones Senior Adviser to
the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq Policy (S/I) led an
interagency delegation to Warsaw July 28-29 to consult with
senior GOP officials and encourage continued substantial
Polish participation in the Iraq Coalition and the
Multi-National Division Center-South (MND-CS). The current
government, which will almost certainly relinquish power
after September 25 parliamentary elections, refuses to take
any affirmative decisions on Iraq while continuing to speak
publicly of "withdrawal from Iraq." While the GOP agreed in
principle to allow operational planning to go forward on all
options, so that the next government would have full latitude
to choose its course, there is very little chance that the
current government will make any further commitment on MND-CS
before the September elections. Nevertheless, Deputy CHOD Lt
Gen Cieniuch said that the Polish General Staff is proceeding
with planning for a robust follow-on "multi-national training
force" that, he told Lt Gen Smith privately, would not differ
substantially in either numbers or capabilities from the
current MND-CS. Therefore, if the General Staff's plans
are to reach fruition, senior military leaders will have to
maintain continuous contact with their Polish counterparts,
and we will have to engage immediately with the new political
leadership following the September elections.
¶2. (C) The GOP also gave a readout of PM Belka's political
consultations July 25-27 in Kuwait, Baghdad, Arbil and
Istanbul (ref B). Septel reports on the delegation's working
dinner with leaders of the two parties expected to form a
coalition government after the September elections. This
message was coordinated with USDAO Warsaw and cleared by Amb.
Jones. END SUMMARY.
¶3. (C) Accompanied by Lt Gen Lance Smith, Deputy Commander
USCENTCOM, Charge, and representatives of OSD and the Joint
Staff, Amb. Jones met separately with PM Marek Belka and
DefMin Jerzy Smajdzinski and attended a roundtable discussion
at the MFA hosted by U/S Piotr Switalski. (Septel reports on
the delegation's working dinner with leaders of the key
opposition parties.) In all of their meetings, Amb. Jones
and Lt Gen Smith stressed the same basic message:
- The political track is going well, with reasonable hope
that the draft constitution will be completed by the August
15 deadline, to be followed by a constitutional referendum on
October 15 and elections on December 15. That said,
constitutional drafting deadline could be extended by up to
six months, prolonging the entire process. Also, should the
constitutional referendum fail, then an extension of up to 12
months would be required to schedule a new referendum.
- Iraqi Security Force (ISF) training is proceeding well,
though not without some delays. In some sectors, including
hopefully MND-CS, the ISF will be able to take over all
routine security tasks by the middle of 2006. However, the
8th Iraq Division that is responsible for the sector is
untested, so the transfer of responsibility may not go
completely according to schedule.
- Given the uncertainties of both the political and military
situation in Iraq, it is important that the GOP focus its
public discussion of eventual Iraq drawdown and disengagement
on the "conditions on the ground" rather than explicit
timetables or dates certain.
- The USG is making preparations for a follow-on legal
mechanism to UNSCR 1546, but this should not be discussed
until after the constitutional referendum, so as not to
prejudice or undermine the political process.
- Although the political process is proceeding apace, the
U.S. expects there will be in fact an upswing in terrorist
activity as important benchmarks such as the constitutional
referendum and the December elections approach.
MFA ON IRAQ POLICY, BELKA TRIP READOUT
--------------------------------------
¶4. (C) At a working luncheon July 28 at the MFA hosted by U/S
Switalski, Amb. Jones and Lt Gen Smith briefed on the
situation in Iraq. Switalski was joined by MFA Director for
Middle East/Africa Krzysztof Plominski, Director for Americas
Henryk Szlajfer and Director for Security Policy Robert
Kupiecki, as well as by Lt Gen Mieczyslaw Cieniuch, Deputy
Chief of the Polish General Staff. Switalski responded that
the commitment to Iraq will remain a key priority to the GOP
for both the current government and the future government
that will take over after the September 25 parliamentary
elections in Poland. PM Marek Belka's July 25-27 trip to
Iraq (ref B), accompanied by FM Rotfeld, Szmajdzinski and
other senior officials (including Plominski and Kupiecki) had
represented a shift in Poland's emphasis from "stabilization
to normalization in Iraq." Belka's delegation had observed
"centrifugal forces at work" in the constitutional drafting
process, as the Kurds pursued their autonomy strategy and
some Shiite elements sought the "Islamization" (i.e.
inclusion of some or all elements of Shari'a) of the
constitution. Jones said the U.S. was urging the Iraqis to
opt for a "simple framework model" of the constitution that
would leave as many contentious issues as possible out of the
equation. He also opined that the Kurds and Shiites might be
willing to set aside their respective demands as the price of
full buy-in by Sunni leaders, which they seemed finally to
have acknowledged as crucial to a successful political
process. Switalski agreed that this would relieve some of
the tension.
¶5. (C) ME/Africa Director Plominski then described the Belka
delegation's visit. They had achieved no "concrete results"
but they had accomplished the main goal of establishing a
normal bilateral relationship. Belka had told Iraqi
officials, including the PM and DefMin, that Poland was
prepared to provide significant assistance but that the ITG
had also to help itself - "Poland believes in Iraq's future,
and now you must believe in yourselves." Belka had agreed
with PM Ja'afari on an Action Plan for bilateral relations
across the board, including political, economic, cultural and
scientific issues. He had also initialed two bilateral
MOU's, one on non-proliferation and export control
cooperation and one on resolution of the dispute over the
destruction of cultural treasures in Babylon.
¶6. (C) Both Switalski and Plominski reiterated Belka's
statement in Baghdad that the Polish stabilization mission in
Iraq would end in January 2006. The ISF was ready to take
over operations in MND-CS and some other sectors, and the
Polish contingent was already beginning to hand over some
security and patrolling tasks to ISF units and re-focus its
own efforts on training. However, both PM Ja'afari and the
Kuwaiti PM (whom Belka had seen in Kuwait on July 25) had
stressed that MNF-I should not draw down or withdraw quickly,
as the political process remained fragile and could not yet
survive without their support. It was therefore necessary for
Poland and other Coalition partners to maintain a presence in
Iraq. Switalski asked point blank how Amb Jones and Lt Gen
Smith would advise the GOP to respond to media and public
pressure for troop reductions. Smith replied that the Poles
should respond "just the way Gen Casey does" (i.e. referring
to goals and conditions on the ground, but NOT to timetables
or dates certain). Jones added that the best approach was to
present troop reductions as the goal, but to link such
reductions to improved conditions on the ground, and not to
make any mention of timetables or dates certain. Smith added
that Polish and U.S. plans for eventual disengagement are
identical, but that the U.S. NEVER gives firm dates.
¶7. (C) Americas Director Szlajfer commented that a political
process in Poland was also well underway and would last 2-3
months, through the parliamentary elections and the
subsequent presidential elections on October 9, until a new
government was formed in late October. So far, the question
of Polish engagement in Iraq beyond January 2006 had not been
a factor in the electoral campaign, and it would be good to
keep it that way. Although the current government was
deferring the final decisions to the next government, all
options regarding Iraq were under consideration within the
GOP, and also within opposition circles. Szlajfer also
thought that the U.S. delegation would not be disappointed by
its meeting that evening with opposition leaders (to be
reported septel).
¶8. (C) Deputy CHOD Lt Gen Cieniuch then described in brief
the General Staff's planning for the Polish 6th rotation,
which would begin in January 2006. He confirmed that MND-CS
was transferring patrol and security responsibilities for
parts of its sector to ISF, and that training activities had
already begun. The General Staff was indeed preparing plans
for all contingencies, however, it was impossible for the
military to plan properly without full political approval.
The absence of political approval was becoming a more and
more critical problem for the General Staff, in terms of both
preparing its own national deployment and, particularly,
coordinating participation by other troop contributing
nations (TCNs). An eventual force generation (ForceGen)
conference in November would be too late to start discussing
specific troop contributions, so the General Staff was hoping
sooner to send out two mobile staff teams, each led by a
general officer, to consult with their counterparts in MND-CS
TCN capitals. In this way, TCNs would at least be prepared
for the various contingencies by the time of the ForceGen
conference.
PM BELKA ON POLITICAL PROCESS, PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶9. (C) The Jones delegation met later July 28 with PM Belka.
In response to Jones' and Smith's briefing on U.S. policy,
Belka provided his own readout of the July 25-27 visit to the
region, including his consultations with the Turkish
government in Ankara. He had stressed to Iraqi PM Ja'afari
that this was "not just a visit to Polish troops, but a real
bilateral consultation between Heads of Government." In
addition to the details provided previously by Plominski at
MFA, Belka noted the creation of a bilateral "Joint Economic
Commission", although he did not elaborate. He shared his
impressions of the Iraqi leadership, expressing concern that
Iraqi President Talabani was too preoccupied with the problem
of Kurdistan. He said that Parliamentary Speaker Al Kassani,
a Sunni, had told him that the elections should go forward in
December, even/even if the constitutional referendum failed
(NB: such an election would be for a new transitional
government, again charged with writing a constitution and
submitting it to another national referendum), and had
assured him that the Sunnis would participate fully in the
political process.
¶10. (C) Belka also described his visit to Arbil, where the
Kurdish regional authorities had received him as if it were a
"state visit" to a sovereign country. There had been a large
media presence, and the Kurdish authorities had noted
publicly that this was "the first ever visit of a Head of
Government to Kurdistan." Belka had been very careful in his
reply, making certain to refer always to "the region of
Kurdistan." En route back to Poland, Belka had stopped off
for several hours to consult with the Turkish government, in
order to make certain his visit to Arbil would not arouse
Turkish sensitivities. Without going into detail, Belka said
that the Turks focused on only two issues, Polish support for
Turkish EU accession (which Belka reaffirmed) and their
concern over the implications of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and
resultant Kurdish assertiveness.
¶11. (C) Turning to Polish military engagement in the region,
Belka led by noting that there was "much excitement" within
the military over Poland's upcoming lead role in Afghanistan
in the second half of 2007. Lt Gen Smith noted that the U.S.
appreciated Poland's commitment to Afghanistan, but added
that there were still unresolved issues regarding the planned
merger of the OEF and ISAF missions. Belka then stated
frankly that in Iraq it was time to transfer to ISF
responsibility for the three provinces under MND-CS command.
The GOP was "determined to complete the stabilization
mission" in Iraq in January 2006. Thereafter, there was a
possible Polish training role based around the Iraqi military
academy at Al Kut. General Casey had told him during his
visit to Baghdad that a transfer of responsibility to ISF was
possible not only in the MND-CS sector, but also in the
MND-SE sector commanded by the UK, as well as in certain
parts of northern Iraq. Amb Jones said that the GOP's basic
goal of disengagement, transfer to ISF and continued training
fit perfectly with U.S. goals. However, Jones stressed, it
was crucial that any such planning be contingent on the
"conditions on the ground" and not/not linked to timetables
or dates certain. (Both Belka and his Chief of Staff,
Slawomir Cytrycki, were visibly uncomfortable as Jones
delivered this message, although neither chose to respond
directly.) In the end, Belka did not commit to any change in
the current policy of "out by January", deferring the issue
entirely to the next government that would take over after
the Polish elections.
DEFMIN ON END OF MISSION
------------------------
¶12. (C) On the morning of July 29, the Jones delegation met
with DefMin Szmajdzinski, who was joined by Lt Gen Cieniuch
as well as members of his staff. Following the U.S.
briefing, Szmajdzinski expressed his gratitude for the
continuing high level of bilateral cooperation. The common
U.S.-Polish problem was how to make sure that MNF-I reached a
successful conclusion, rather than simply staying too long
and dissolving into nothing. MND-CS had begun with 25 TCNs
and some 8500 troops. It had gone through four successful
rotations over two years and acquitted itself well. Now,
however, this effort was at risk of fading away. The
Norwegians, Dutch and Portuguese had made clear from the
beginning that their participation in Iraq would last only
6-9 months. Others such as Spain had since abandoned the
mission for political reasons. Now there were only 14 TCNs
remaining in MND-CS, with some 4000 troops on the ground.
Ukraine had declared its intention to withdraw at the end of
2005, and in two weeks Bulgaria might well make the same
decision. Poland had made its own public declaration that
the 5th rotation, ending in January 2006, was the last of the
stabilization mission (i.e. Polish troops participating
directly in security operations). The goal now was to
"train, train, train", so that the ISF would be prepared to
take over the MND-CS sector at the end of 2005. Then MND-CS
could be closed down and declared successful.
¶13. (C) Szmajdzinski acknowledged the call for continued help
in 2006, and stated "If there is indeed still a political
need, then we have a limited military capability to meet it."
Poland could take the lead in a much smaller multinational
successor to MND-CS, whose mission would be entirely focused
on training. Some 200-300 Polish troops could provide
command/control and logistics and form the core of this
training task force. With troops from some of the remaining
TCNs, this task force would establish a training base at Al
Kut. Szmajdzinski claimed that he had discussed this plan
with SecDef Rumsfeld and Deputy NSA Crouch in Washington, and
with senior officials at CentCom in Tampa, as well as with
the Iraqi DefMin in Baghdad.
¶14. (C) Szmajdzinski acknowledged that the current government
would, of course, not be taking any decisions on Iraq, as
that would be the prerogative of the next government. To
allow the issue of Iraq deployment into the public discussion
during the electoral campaign would be a great mistake, and
could lead to a repeat in Poland of "the Spanish Model."
However, the 2006 GOP budget did provide enough funds for the
limited Polish mission he had described, and the excellent
operational cooperation between MND-CS and the Coalition
leadership would facilitate the transition. Sufficient
logistical infrastructure and equipment was available to
support the training mission, as well.
¶15. (C) Amb. Jones told Szmajdzinski that it was dangerous to
set arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal without taking into
account the actual conditions on the ground in Iraq. The
U.S. expected an upturn in violence as the calendar for the
political process advanced. He stressed that it was crucial
to leave all options open to the incoming Polish government,
so that they had maximum flexibility to react to events in
Iraq. Smith echoed this theme, reiterating that Polish and
U.S. goals were the same, but urging the GOP to remain
flexible. In particular, the 8th Iraqi Division had not yet
been tested in action, and there was no way to tell how they
would fare on their first operational missions without a
Coalition lead. Lt Gen Smith added that the U.S. in fact
planned to deploy an additional brigade to Iraq 45 days
before the election process began there, and keep it there 45
days after. Then, if/if the situation allowed, U.S. forces
would begin a staged drawdown. Smith also pointed out that
Poland was playing a very important leadership role in
MND-CS, at a level matched only by the U.S. and the UK.
Without the Polish presence, either the U.S. or the UK would
have to fill the gap. (COMMENT: Szmajdzinski appeared very
uncomfortable during Jones and Smith's remarks. END COMMENT.)
DCHOD VISION MORE FORWARD LEANING
---------------------------------
¶16. (C) Lt Gen Cieniuch then offered a more detailed picture
(though without any troop numbers) of how a multinational
training force might look:
- A robust Coalition Training Center would be set up in Al
Kut, to supplement CentCom's current training plan.
- In addition to the existing training program for platoon
leaders, this center would train entire platoons ("the basic
operational unit in Iraq") together with a two-week
specialized course, with a goal of running every platoon in
the Iraqi Army through this course.
- Poland would provide the requisite command/control element,
based at Al Kut, as well as its own training element.
- Poland would also provide transport and logistics for all
TCN contributions to the training force.
- Polish forces would provide two mobile combat teams of
60-80 troops for rapid response.
- The currently deployed Polish Mi24 helicopters would remain
to provide transport for the combat teams.
- Force protection would be required for the training base,
for logistics and supply convoys and for the helicopter base.
- This would involve a total multinational force of some 2000
(though Cieniuch declined to specify a number for Polish
troops), which would be responsible for not only the training
base, but also overall security in the MND-CS sector.
(COMMENT: Szmajdzinski again looked very uncomfortable during
Cieniuch's presentation, suggesting a divergence of views
between the General Staff and MOD leadership with regard to
the Iraq mission. END COMMENT.)
¶17. (C) In a one-on-one pull-aside with Lt Gen Smith after
the meeting, Cieniuch stated that the General Staff was in
fact prepared to field a multinational training force nearly
as large as the current 4000-strong MND-CS, and with
virtually the same capabilities. He affirmed that the Polish
,06 military budget could support at least 1,000 Polish
troops in Iraq, compared to the current Polish force of about
¶1400. (N.B. Cieniuch has in the past suggested to us that a
Polish contingent in 2006 might number some 600 troops.
During his discussions with Jones and Smith, however, he
spoke only of total Coalition forces in the MND-CS sector,
not of specific numbers of Polish troops.)
NEED TO KEEP UP U.S. PRESSURE
-----------------------------
¶18. (S) COMMENT. The current political leadership is clearly
not willing to stray from the public line of "out by January"
that Szmajdzinski, and more recently Belka and President
Kwasniewski, have been stating regularly. Szmajdzinski seems
to have convinced himself that the Iraq deployment is so
unpopular that the future of his party (SLD, the Democratic
Left Alliance) is at risk if he does not completely
neutralize the issue. In his mind, he has done this by more
and more strictly proscribing the possibilities for continued
Polish deployments in Iraq. The irony is that the public at
large, and even the media, were not protesting in the streets
or speaking out against Iraq engagement prior to
Szmajdzinski's "neutralization" campaign. Certainly, opinion
polls have consistently shown public support for the Polish
deployment as low as 20 percent, but these opinions come out
only if asked. No one is campaigning against Iraq, including
the opposition parties expected to form the next government
coalition. (See septel.) Not only Gen Cieniuch, but also
senior MOD officials, are frustrated with Szmajdzinski's
obsession with public opinion on Iraq. A week before the
Jones' visit, Acting MOD U/S Karkoszka (ref C) told Charge
that he and Cieniuch had spent weeks convincing Szmajdzinski
to even allow planning for the minimal training deployment
that Szmajdzinski described to Jones and Smith (and
reportedly during his visits to Tampa and Washington the
previous week). Szmajdzinski and other MOD officials claimed
that the Jones visit was the first time, since they began
hinting at a drawdown or withdrawal in the fall of 2004, that
any senior U.S. official has balked at the GOP's plan.
¶19. (S) In any event, it is clear both from their words and
their apparent discomfort during the Jones visit that the
current government leaders will not take any affirmative
decision about future Iraq deployments. Not only have they
deferred the matter to the next government, but Szmajdzinski
has, either intentionally or merely as a side effect,
severely complicated the task of the incoming government in
meeting the operational challenges dictated by the situation
in Iraq. We will therefore have to maintain an ongoing
dialogue with Polish military leaders regarding their
operational plans, while preparing to engage immediately and
at a very high level with the incoming government after the
September elections here. END COMMENT.
Piascik