This article is published as part of Fridays With MUNPlanetand its special series dedicated to world politics. The aim of this series is to bring you the analysis of global affairs by the established and upcoming scholars, decision-makers and policy analysts from various world regions. This week, Alexander Graef (University of St. Gallen) writes about Western-Russian relations in light of the dynamics of international order that has changed since the end of the Cold War. The author argues that "the real threat to world order is not so much competition for a leading role in international politics, but the possibility that both established and emerging powers act as shirkers who seek to avoid the costs of providing global governance or who antagonize each other’s efforts as a matter of principle," and suggests that the current international order is the one of "balance of power" that was characteristic for Europe 1815-1914.

In 2000 the eminent British diplomat Robert Cooper
published a short book in which he declared the end of the European
balance-of-power system and the imperial urge of the 19th century
after 1989. Instead, he saw the emergence of three types of states: the
pre-modern, the modern and the post-modern. According to Cooper, the main
characteristics of the latter were the rejection of force in international
relations, the irrelevance of borders and security based on transparency,
mutual openness and interdependence. By contrast, the other two types of state either
still represented classical nation states or had lost the legitimate monopoly
on the use of force and produced chaos and disorder. To create stability, the
post-modern West, including the EU, Japan, Canada and the US, would need to
engage, so Cooper, in a kind of liberal imperialism by externalising its own
institutions and fostering economic integration. The key question to be
answered, however, concerned Russia: Would it become post-modern and join the
liberal alliance?

Fifteen years later the answer seems to be clear.
Neither has liberal imperialism produced stability around the world, nor has Russia
become a post-modern state. In Afghanistan,
Iraq and Libya the policy of the West has
contributed to the destabilisation of entire regions rather than to the building
of functioning institutions and the provision of good governance.
Simultaneously, Russia
has re-emerged as a fully sovereign and independent actor on the world stage.
In domestic politics a neo-patrimonial system of rule ensures political
stability, but struggles with economic modernization. Instead of joining NATO
or the EU, Russia has
started to promote its own integration project in Eurasia and cooperates
economically with Brazil, China, India
and South Africa
in the context of BRICS. Together with NATO’s eastward expansion and the EU’s
efforts to export its acquis
communautaire into former Soviet republics this has
created structural tensions. Nowhere has this become more visible than in Ukraine.

In the past two years Russia and the West have taken
irreconcilable views and positions towards the political developments in Kiev.
At the peak of the crisis in summer and early autumn 2014 one could even have
gained the impression of an up-coming war. Following the annexation of Crimea
in March 2014, the EU and the United States introduced travel bans and financial
restrictions on members of the Russian political elite. Simultaneously, the country was excluded from the G8. After the crash of MH17 in July 2014 the EU and the United States imposed more far-reaching financial and economic
sanctions. The security relations deteriorated as a consequence. NATO suspended all practical civilian and military
cooperation.
At its Wales summit in September the alliance started to enhance its
reassurance efforts among members and prepared a Readiness Action Plan to respond
swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. These measures were backed up by
a value-based rhetoric and calls to unite the liberal Euro-Atlantic alliance
against an aggressive Russian foreign policy.

Today, more than a year after that peak, the situation
looks quite different. Not only do we have a ceasefire in Donbas, but there is actual progress on the implementation of Minsk II. First, statements by French and German politicians hold out the prospect of lifting
sanctions. Moreover, the overall foreign policy focus of both Russia and the
West has shifted from Ukraine to the Middle East. European governments are
preoccupied with the refugee crisis, while the Syrian civil war once again
dominates international headlines. In September the Russian Federation started air strikes against the
Islamic State
and insurgent groups are fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, in
contrast to the Western outcry over Russian action in Ukraine, there is now
only a handful of political activists and journalists who call for containment
and stronger Western engagement in Syria against Russia. Instead, it seems
that the majority of the political establishment has slowly come to realize that
in face of the eminent threat of Islamist terror collaboration is key. Although most Western states are critical of Russia`s
strategy and its one-sided support of Assad, the black-and-white rhetoric and
moralizing discourse of the past year has given way to more Realpolitik.

However, this does not necessarily have to mean the
acceptance of disorder or the exclusive dominance of zero-sum thinking as some have claimed. The normal state of affairs in
international politics has always been that great powers cooperate when their interests
overlap. On the one hand, this presupposes the respect for state sovereignty and
the acceptance of different concepts of political order. On the other hand, one
has to realize that despite or perhaps even due to all economic interdependence,
powerful states simply do not always accept rules. Analysts and policy makers in the European Union are
arguably less self-aware of this fact than their counterparts in the US. Based
on its military, economic and cultural dominance, Washington reserves for itself the right to
act as it sees fit when major national interests are at stake. It is in this
regard that one also has to understand Russia’s conduct in Ukraine and Syria. As
any other major power, the EU included, Russia has strategic geo-economic and
-political interests in what it perceives as its sphere of influence. It is
here where it is prepared to risk serious confrontation. To acknowledge this
means putting it into the right context, not to justify it normatively.

In light of the constant danger of war and the growing
complexity of international politics, the West has to re-think its liberal
agenda. Surely, political order is not per se more important than justice. But
there is no justice without order either. Moreover, an overemphasis on the
practical enforcement of one’s particular normative ideal is likely to
contribute to the complete disruption of relations or even the collapse of the
existing order with all its destructive consequences. For the sake of governing
the globe, this insight calls upon us to pay attention to the perceptions of
non-liberal powers and to find compromises where possible, instead of
championing double standards and moral outrage. The real threat to world order
is not so much competition for a leading role in international politics, but the
possibility that both established and emerging powers act as shirkers who seek
to avoid the costs of providing global governance or who antagonize each
other’s efforts as a matter of principle. Contrary to what Cooper suggested in
2000, we are back to the balance-of-power system that Europe had championed
between 1815 and 1914 and that was also the cornerstone of the UN until 1989. The
time of liberal imperialism is over. Instead, we are again confronted with
competing interests and agendas. For better or for worse, we are back to normal.

Alexander Graef is a research assistant and PhD candidate in political
science at the University of St.Gallen, Switzerland. His doctoral thesis deals
with the Russian expert community on foreign and security policy. He holds MA
degrees in International Relations from Free University Berlin and the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In the past he has worked on
projects for the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the German Embassy
Moscow and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. In 2011 he was the head of the
German Delegation at the Y20 Summit in Paris.

This article is published as part of Fridays With MUNPlanetand its special series dedicated to world politics. The aim of this series is to bring you the analysis of global affairs by the established and upcoming scholars, decision-makers and policy analysts from various world regions. This week, Alexander Graef (University of St. Gallen) writes about Western-Russian relations in light of the dynamics of international order that has changed since the end of the Cold War. The author argues that "the real threat to world order is not so much competition for a leading role in international politics, but the possibility that both established and emerging powers act as shirkers who seek to avoid the costs of providing global governance or who antagonize each other’s efforts as a matter of principle," and suggests that the current international order is the one of "balance of power" that was characteristic for Europe 1815-1914.

In 2000 the eminent British diplomat Robert Cooper
published a short book in which he declared the end of the European
balance-of-power system and the imperial urge of the 19th century
after 1989. Instead, he saw the emergence of three types of states: the
pre-modern, the modern and the post-modern. According to Cooper, the main
characteristics of the latter were the rejection of force in international
relations, the irrelevance of borders and security based on transparency,
mutual openness and interdependence. By contrast, the other two types of state either
still represented classical nation states or had lost the legitimate monopoly
on the use of force and produced chaos and disorder. To create stability, the
post-modern West, including the EU, Japan, Canada and the US, would need to
engage, so Cooper, in a kind of liberal imperialism by externalising its own
institutions and fostering economic integration. The key question to be
answered, however, concerned Russia: Would it become post-modern and join the
liberal alliance?

Fifteen years later the answer seems to be clear.
Neither has liberal imperialism produced stability around the world, nor has Russia
become a post-modern state. In Afghanistan,
Iraq and Libya the policy of the West has
contributed to the destabilisation of entire regions rather than to the building
of functioning institutions and the provision of good governance.
Simultaneously, Russia
has re-emerged as a fully sovereign and independent actor on the world stage.
In domestic politics a neo-patrimonial system of rule ensures political
stability, but struggles with economic modernization. Instead of joining NATO
or the EU, Russia has
started to promote its own integration project in Eurasia and cooperates
economically with Brazil, China, India
and South Africa
in the context of BRICS. Together with NATO’s eastward expansion and the EU’s
efforts to export its acquis
communautaire into former Soviet republics this has
created structural tensions. Nowhere has this become more visible than in Ukraine.

In the past two years Russia and the West have taken
irreconcilable views and positions towards the political developments in Kiev.
At the peak of the crisis in summer and early autumn 2014 one could even have
gained the impression of an up-coming war. Following the annexation of Crimea
in March 2014, the EU and the United States introduced travel bans and financial
restrictions on members of the Russian political elite. Simultaneously, the country was excluded from the G8. After the crash of MH17 in July 2014 the EU and the United States imposed more far-reaching financial and economic
sanctions. The security relations deteriorated as a consequence. NATO suspended all practical civilian and military
cooperation.
At its Wales summit in September the alliance started to enhance its
reassurance efforts among members and prepared a Readiness Action Plan to respond
swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. These measures were backed up by
a value-based rhetoric and calls to unite the liberal Euro-Atlantic alliance
against an aggressive Russian foreign policy.

Today, more than a year after that peak, the situation
looks quite different. Not only do we have a ceasefire in Donbas, but there is actual progress on the implementation of Minsk II. First, statements by French and German politicians hold out the prospect of lifting
sanctions. Moreover, the overall foreign policy focus of both Russia and the
West has shifted from Ukraine to the Middle East. European governments are
preoccupied with the refugee crisis, while the Syrian civil war once again
dominates international headlines. In September the Russian Federation started air strikes against the
Islamic State
and insurgent groups are fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, in
contrast to the Western outcry over Russian action in Ukraine, there is now
only a handful of political activists and journalists who call for containment
and stronger Western engagement in Syria against Russia. Instead, it seems
that the majority of the political establishment has slowly come to realize that
in face of the eminent threat of Islamist terror collaboration is key. Although most Western states are critical of Russia`s
strategy and its one-sided support of Assad, the black-and-white rhetoric and
moralizing discourse of the past year has given way to more Realpolitik.

However, this does not necessarily have to mean the
acceptance of disorder or the exclusive dominance of zero-sum thinking as some have claimed. The normal state of affairs in
international politics has always been that great powers cooperate when their interests
overlap. On the one hand, this presupposes the respect for state sovereignty and
the acceptance of different concepts of political order. On the other hand, one
has to realize that despite or perhaps even due to all economic interdependence,
powerful states simply do not always accept rules. Analysts and policy makers in the European Union are
arguably less self-aware of this fact than their counterparts in the US. Based
on its military, economic and cultural dominance, Washington reserves for itself the right to
act as it sees fit when major national interests are at stake. It is in this
regard that one also has to understand Russia’s conduct in Ukraine and Syria. As
any other major power, the EU included, Russia has strategic geo-economic and
-political interests in what it perceives as its sphere of influence. It is
here where it is prepared to risk serious confrontation. To acknowledge this
means putting it into the right context, not to justify it normatively.

In light of the constant danger of war and the growing
complexity of international politics, the West has to re-think its liberal
agenda. Surely, political order is not per se more important than justice. But
there is no justice without order either. Moreover, an overemphasis on the
practical enforcement of one’s particular normative ideal is likely to
contribute to the complete disruption of relations or even the collapse of the
existing order with all its destructive consequences. For the sake of governing
the globe, this insight calls upon us to pay attention to the perceptions of
non-liberal powers and to find compromises where possible, instead of
championing double standards and moral outrage. The real threat to world order
is not so much competition for a leading role in international politics, but the
possibility that both established and emerging powers act as shirkers who seek
to avoid the costs of providing global governance or who antagonize each
other’s efforts as a matter of principle. Contrary to what Cooper suggested in
2000, we are back to the balance-of-power system that Europe had championed
between 1815 and 1914 and that was also the cornerstone of the UN until 1989. The
time of liberal imperialism is over. Instead, we are again confronted with
competing interests and agendas. For better or for worse, we are back to normal.

Alexander Graef is a research assistant and PhD candidate in political
science at the University of St.Gallen, Switzerland. His doctoral thesis deals
with the Russian expert community on foreign and security policy. He holds MA
degrees in International Relations from Free University Berlin and the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In the past he has worked on
projects for the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the German Embassy
Moscow and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. In 2011 he was the head of the
German Delegation at the Y20 Summit in Paris.