Tag Archives: Israel

This is the text, as published in ‘Jerusalem Post’, of the flyer distributed this week by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) warning Gaza residents about tank shelling and urging them to evacuate:

“To the residents of Shuja’iya and Zeitoun: In spite of the ceasefire, Hamas and other terrorist organizations continue to fire rockets. Therefore it is the intention of the IDF to carry out aerial strikes against terror sites and operatives in Shuja’iya and Zeitoun. A high volume of rocket fire at Israel has originated in this area. For your own safety, you are requested to vacate your residence immediately and head towards Gaza City before 08:00 AM on Wednesday, July 16, 2014. The IDF does not want to harm you or your families. The evacuation is for your own safety. You should not return to the premises until further notice. Whoever disregards these instructions and fails to evacuate immediately endangers their own lives, as well as those of their families.”

According to the same source, many residents did not heed the warnings, following instead Hamas’ beckoning to stay put – hence also the high number of casualties following today’s offensive. By contrast, the UN speaks of around 50,000 displaced persons.

Disinformation and propaganda are elements of war – and Israel and the Hamas are no exception. Evacuation flyers regularly thrown at Gaza residents announcing air strikes are part of this machinery. It is doubtful whether they must read the text carefully in order to know they are in danger. Hence, it is valid to raise the question: to whom is the evacuation flyer really addressed? My guess: it is meant for Israeli citizens and the international community. Its real purpose: to appease us and deny blame for the bloodshed.

But bloodshed it remains.

The question as to who was the first to pull the trigger is not relevant. What is relevant is that people are dying on both sides of the border, many of them civilians, the majority Palestinians. The conflict’s flare-up only benefits the extremists of both sides who have been looking for an opportunity to side-track recent attempts to establish a unity transitional government on the Palestinian side, with the participation of Hamas, around the moderate Fatah political agenda. The move has been officially criticized by Israel and all international stakeholders – and yet, as we know from other community conflicts, notably the one in Northern Ireland, peace processes are not neat and tidy, and warring factions do not simply disappear or transform themselves over night. It takes painstaking political dialogue courageously sustained despite provocations.

In the middle of the havoc, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan came out yesterday to condemn Israel for its barbarity, which he compared to Hitler’s. The comparison is abstruse to even deserve response, one other manipulative move using anti-Semitism to serve domestic politics (given Turkey’s upcoming presidential elections). In fact, a more pertinent comparison would have been with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus 40 years ago to the day.

In an article published today in The New Republic,Ben Birnbaum warns that the prospects for a two-state solution in the Middle East for settling the conflict between Israel and Palestine are rapidly fading away. He bases this conclusion on the following observations:

• Israelis are comfortably living in cognitive dissonance: in surveys, two thirds report being in favor of a peace deal that envisages a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem and extending over areas of the West Bank and Gaza; yet, on election day, the majority voted for right-wing and extremist parties that oppose one of the key requirements for such a solution, namely the reversal of the settlement process.

• The trend is negative with extremist nationalist views on the rise among young people. Thus, for instance, the electoral base for the pro-settler Jewish Home Party is the age group between eighteen and thirty-five. This is the reverse from what can be observed among young Jews of the Diaspora who are increasingly alienated by Israeli politics.

• Palestinians do not fare much better with their concurrent support for Fatah and Hamas; moreover, the support for Fatah is waning and will probably expire with Mahmoud Abbas’ anticipated departure from politics because of ill health. According to Birnbaum, Abbas is still the ‘better partner’ for a two-state solution. Unfortunately, like many politicians of his generation, ‘he has not only failed to groom a successor, he has at times actively undermined potential heirs.’

One central mistake of the Middle-East peace process has been the failure of political elites to first, think outside their narrow narratives and reference frameworks, and second, communicate to their citizens the real-life implications of compromises. This is no specificity of the Israel/Palestine conflict but a typical occurrence in all ethnic and community conflicts.

The main reason such conflicts remain unresolved, as if ‘frozen’, for extensive periods of time has to do with the manipulation of public opinion with the help of nationalist ideologies and for the mere purpose of winning elections. Peace processes require long-term strategic thinking. Few politicians display this—and if and when they finally do they usually are too old to follow the solution through (see Ariel Sharon).

Ben Birnbaum’s analysis is not new. Ten years ago, the late Tony Judt was widely condemned for raising similar doubts and concerns in an article published in The New York Review of Books and entitled ‘Israel: The Alternative’.

Judt saw, already in 2003, that the two-state solution was doomed to fail. But he did not stop there. He dared confront the alternative, namely, the choice between ‘an ethnically cleansed Greater Israel’ [which Israel cannot afford if it wants to remain a democracy] and ‘a single, integrated, binational state of Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians.’ The creation of such a state would not be easy, not least because ‘it would require the emergence, among Jews and Arabs alike, of a new political class’–an idea representing ‘an unpromising mix of realism and utopia.’ But, he concluded, ‘the alternatives are far, far worse.’

Alas, the idea of a binational state of Israelis and Palestinians remains as much a taboo today as it was ten, twenty or thirty years ago. Therefore, it is time to think of alternatives to both the two-state and one-state solutions.

What may these be?

According to the theory of ‘complex power sharing’ developed, among else, by Stefan Wolff, one common mental blockade in ethnic conflict resolution is precisely the said tendency to think in terms of alternatives in conjunction with thinking in terms of end points, i.e. a valid solution to a conflict is that which covers all open questions and is final and conclusive. But the actual practice suggests that it is also possible to resolve ethnic conflicts mid-way by combining mechanisms and tools from different models.

If this too were not to work, then, as Tony Judt said in an interview in 2010, Israel, while no doubt surviving, perhaps even as a Jewish state, risks losing its relevance for Jews and non-Jews around the world ‘as people forget the original impulse and historical circumstances surrounding its foundation.’

Like this:

Günter Grass’s poem ‘Was gesagt werden muss’ (in English: ‘What must be said’) published earlier this week in the ‘Süddeutsche Zeitung’ has raised anew the question as to whether it is possible to be critical of Israel without being—or accused of being—anti-Semitic. This was perhaps also one of its intentions.

At one level, the poem calls for the stop of the delivery to Israel of a German submarine with missiles capable of firing nuclear weapons. It criticizes arms’ deals in the name of reparation for the Holocaust, a crime that can and ought never to be regarded as remedied (as Grass further explained in his TV interview to 3sat); calls for the international control and oversight of both Iran’s and Israel’s atomic programs; and reminds Germany of its moral obligation to keep out of military conflicts (as well as the production and trade of arms) given its primordial sins from the past.

At another level, the poem is its author’s self-examination for keeping silent for so long. Grass feels it is necessary to criticize Israel, yet he has avoided doing so because he is German and for fear of being labeled an anti-Semite. But this self-censorship he now experiences as hypocritical.

It is a problem several intellectuals, German and non-German, have faced throughout the second half of the twentieth century; and in some respects it is one that is not very different from the taboo that plagued left intellectuals in the immediate postwar period regarding communism. How does or can one criticize a state or a political ideology that represents the fulfillment of a dream based on universal values?

The Israel government has reacted to the poem by placing Grass on the list of inadmissible aliens, with Prime-Minister Netanyahu recalling that Günter Grass was a member, in his youth, of the Waffen SS. The Israeli Embassy in Berlin drew associations with the “European tradition to accuse Jews of ritual murder before Passover.” More moderate voices, like Tom Segev, have refrained from such hysterical reactions, whilst still questioning Grass’s legitimacy to discuss the subject by pointing to his nationality, his age, his vanity, his lingering guilt for his past and his partial knowledge.

Even if this is true—Grass is German, old, definitely responsible for his actions in his youth, undoubtedly vain like most well-known writers and public intellectuals, and neither a historian nor a political scientist—it still does not justify the dismissal of his arguments. This is especially so considering that he has voiced his critique of Israel in public, which means he is open to debate.

The question of provenance of works of arts and antiquities is a sensitive issue. Three recent cases exemplify the difficulties. All three were reported in the March edition of The Art Newspaper and in various national media.

The simpler, and funny, case is that of Albrecht Dürer’s self-portrait, dating from 1500 AC. and recently the subject of a peculiar brawl between Munich and Nuremberg. Both cities are part of Germany’s southern state of Bavaria, but that was not always the case, and many Nuremberg Franconians do not like to think of themselves as Bavarians.

In any case, the portrait, which has its home at the Munich Alte Pinakothet, was recently placed on the wish list for a major exposition organized in Nuremberg from where Dürer originally came from. The Munich museum director objected the loan on grounds of the portrait’s great significance and fragile state—and that did not come down well in Nuremberg. The protest, in political circles but also among football fans, was loud. Nonetheless, the Munich Pinakothet did not give in and as a result, the exposition in Nuremberg will have to do with a copy.

That works of art are capable of eliciting strong emotions is what makes them special, yet what motivates debates like the one described above has more to do with the question of ‘national’ ownership. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of antiquities. The latest news on this comes from Turkey, where Erdogan’s government has been blocking arts’ loans to British and American museums in an attempt to force the return of antiquities carried away from archaeological sites in previous times and under dubious circumstances.

The official Turkish position is that these antiquities ‘belong’ to Turkey because they originated in locations which today form part of the Turkish territory, even if at the time of their making those locations were not Turkish. The counter-argument—academically elaborated in James Cuno’s edited volume Whose Culture? The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities (Princeton University Press 2009)—is that antiquities belong to humankind and, therefore, are best exhibited in the cosmopolitan contexts of modern museums. This is, no doubt, a valid argument, but not so the frequently unspoken assumption that only Western museums, like those in Europe and the U.S., are cosmopolitan.

The third case concerns the handling of ethnic heritage in contested territories. An Israeli court recently ruled to stop development plans in Lifta, a historic Arab village on the outskirts of West Jerusalem, on the grounds that the commercial development plans had not adequately taken into account preservation goals. This was greeted only as a partial win by descendants of former residents, who had hoped the court would additionally acknowledge their property rights. Nevertheless, the decision is potentially far-reaching since it places the safeguarding of cultural heritage above both ownership and development.

From this perspective, the decision of the Munich Pinakothet not to lend Dürer’s self-portrait might have been the right one, if the portrait is indeed as fragile as it is claimed. As for Turkey’s antiquities, these were never national one or another way, yet enabling their exhibition also in their original local settings might be more in line with their cosmopolitan character.

Like this:

I have been following the news about the ongoing explorations for gas reserves in Eastern Mediterranean from the sidelines. As usual, when it comes to Cyprus, I have been slightly worried—a reflex from childhood that I have still to overcome. Still I did not think the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey could really escalate.

When the other day my sister told me on the phone the Russians are now also getting involved, I thought, maybe I should now take a closer look. I still do not ‘really’ worry, but …

In 2010 the US Geological Survey agency published the results of a study into the natural gas reserves in the Levant Basin region, which is the sea area in the south-east of Cyprus and west of Israel and Lebanon. The amount of natural gas was estimated at 122 trillion cubic feet, that of oil to 4.2 billion barrels.

The discovery and the subsequent decision by Israel to proceed with further exploratory drilling and seismic studies stirred Lebanon’s opposition and resulted in a case brought forward to the UN for determining the maritime borders between the two countries.

In December 2010 Cyprus and Israel signed an exclusive economic zone agreement (EEZ) to regulate the respective exploitation of their territorial waters. Cyprus’ share in the gas reserves has still to be determined, but in any case the island is expected to play a role with regard to the issuing of transportation licenses.

In September 2011 Cyprus gave green light to the US company Noble Energy to begin drilling off its shores. Noble Energy has been carrying out studies on behalf of the Cyprus government since 2009.

Turkey reacted to the announcement by proceeding to sign an own EEZ agreement with Northern Cyprus, which it occupies since 1974. In the meantime it has also deployed a seismic vessel in the area and an escort of gunboats. Turkey’s official position is that no decision on the exploitation of the gas reserves should be taken before a political solution is found to the Cyprus problem.

During the past week Turkish and Israeli fighter planes have been cruising the area. A Russian aircraft carrier vessel is also expected to arrive in the region this month, supposedly as part of standard exercises.

And here is some more contextual information:

The gas reserves in the Levant Basic region are ‘gigantic’—but their exploitation will neither be easy, nor (environmentally) safe, since the gas fields are located at least 1,500 meters below sea level.

Europe is currently dependent on Russia for gas which is not a comfortable situation, hence also the strategic significance of the Nabucco gas pipeline, which bypasses Russia but goes through Turkey.

Israel and Turkey used to be allies, but relations have frozen since the Gaza flotilla raid in May 2010. Recent attempts by Turkey to position itself as a role model for Arab countries and as a regional superpower have alienated Israel even further.

Cyprus has good foreign, economic and offshore banking relations with Russia. At the political level these have been especially strong with AKEL, which currently heads the government.

If you made it reading till here and now have a headache, I don’t blame you. But, I am afraid, there is even more cause for headache, and its source is domestic politics. This is a field often ignored by foreign policy—wrongly so, since it frequently drives decisions in the field of international relations.

Israel is governed by a right-wing coalition with extremist elements. As shown by the recent Tel-Aviv protests that have been going on for weeks, the government is steadily losing in popularity and its nationalist-security discourse is slowly wearing off. Early elections in 2012 are not unlikely.

Turkey’s Erdogan appears triumphant following his electoral victory earlier this year as well as his successes in curtailing the influence of the military and his inroads in changing the country’s Constitution. But getting rid of some generals is not the same as gaining control over the army—and in Turkey nationalist and military discourse has always come in handy in terms of unifying a heterogeneous population.

Russia is holding legislative elections in December this year and presidential elections in March 2012. Putin has declared his candidacy for the president’s post and Medvedev is expected to tag along as prime-minister. Sounds all settled, but like Turkey, Russia has now to redefine its foreign policy and that is a distorting element for the campaigns.

And not to forget Cyprus: President Christofias of AKEL has recently come under heavy pressure to resign in connection with an explosion at Mari naval base which destroyed the country’s biggest electricity plan. Moreover, Cyprus is due to take over the EU presidency in June 2012.

In other words, despite the fact that all parties to the dispute over the gas reserves stand to lose from a confrontation (and everyone stands to gain from collaboration), the governments in each are seeking to rally the declining support of their populations by populist means.

War games are better than real wars, but still.

Moreover, it might be useful to remember that given that the Levant is an earthquake region, exploitation of the gas reserves, if ever possible, will be extremely expensive and therefore nothing to be realized in the near future.

Like this:

On Friday, September 23, Mahmoud Abbas submitted a UN bid for Palestinian statehood in his function as President of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO. Already two days before, in his speech at the UN General Assembly, Barack Obama made clear that the United States would veto this bid at the Security Council. The latter is meeting tomorrow to discuss the bid, which most likely will not meet the nine-vote majority requirement, thus making the veto unnecessary.

A compromise solution which the Palestinians are likely to pursue thereafter is to seek UN non-member observer-state status. This would be an upgrade from the current observer status enjoyed by the PLO as a political entity since it entails a tacit recognition of statehood. According to Hussein Ibish, of the American Task Force on Palestine, such an upgrade could be ‘symbolic victory’ for Palestinians besides improving their chances to pursue indictments against Israel under the legal mechanisms provided by the UN, such as the International Criminal Court. One should add: the opposite is also possible in this case.

The general feeling regarding Palestinian statehood and the latest UN bid is that Palestinians ‘deserve’ to attain statehood. Tellingly, Obama used the term twice with reference to Palestinians and twice with reference to Israel: ‘the Palestinian people deserve a state of their own’ and ‘Palestinians deserve to know the territorial basis of their state’; but also, ‘Israel deserves recognition. It deserves normal relations with its neighbors’.

This one little word ‘deserve’ highlights how so much of this is about symbolic representations. The issue at hand is less whether Palestine is capable to assume statehood—something that entails fulfillment of a range of criteria over and above those required by international law as set out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. It is rather about recognizing, yet again, the right of Palestine to statehood.

There are perhaps no two other nation-states in the world which are more recognized with regard to their plights and aspirations than Israel and Palestine; and many a times the world has been called to witness the negotiations between the two as a competition over who gets more recognition. Therein lies also the problem with over-reliance on symbolic forms of acknowledgment.

By itself, recognition is neither the solution nor the way forward; especially then not when the two opposing sides use it as a good that can be neither shared nor divided. It takes additionally courage to bring about painful change. Reaching compromises is about exchange: you lose something, you win something.

A UN non-member observer-state status for Palestine might not be that bad. Better the two countries begin to fight their grievances in court than on the battlefield.