XVIII
Turning Point

Saving Chiang in Washington

ON NOVEMBER 16, 1949, a New York Times editorial reviewed the
Formosa Question, noted that the mainland Chinese appeared to be
"somewhat" unpopular with the Formosans and that the island
continued technically to be enemy territory and an Allied
responsibility. Would a United Nations trusteeship solve the
problem?

Chiang's partisans professed to be outraged by any suggestion
that Formosa was not indisputably Chinese territory. On this point,
more moderately, the Department of State found itself in agreement.
Ambassador Phillip Jessup addressed the United Nations on November
28 stressing the Territorial Integrity of China as a "background
for refusal to entertain the idea of taking over Formosa." American
diplomatic missions abroad were quietly prepared to explain a
policy statement which would signal the end of aid to Chiang.

Behind the scenes at the Department someone was giving thought
to the possibility that the forthcoming declaration might bring
Chiang's sudden downfall. What then? Suppose Washington had
suddenly to intervene at Taipei? We might one day have to deal
directly with the Formosan people.

In early December I was asked, very quietly, to name local
leaders who might be "cultivated in the American interest."

There was only one possible response; the conservative Formosan
leaders - the men who had sought our help in 1947 were now dead or
in exile. Some time must elapse before a new pattern of leadership
emerged. Perhaps we had forfeited Formosan trust by our official
behavior during the March crisis and thereafter.

But as the State Department moved to jettison Chiang and abandon
Formosa, American military leaders continued to urge an opposite
course. They could not stand by silently as each Communist
offensive on the mainland diminished the area from which someday we
might desire to mount a counterattack in Asia. Speaking in behalf
of the military interest, Hanson Baldwin advocated a strong show of
the Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Taiwan and a large military aid
mission to China which should have authority to control the supply
of American arms to the Nationalist Chinese. Senator Alexander
Smith of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged the United
States to take over Formosa promptly and said in effect that his
proposal had General MacArthur's support. Smith had just returned
from six weeks in Asia; "The feeling I got from MaeArthur and the
admirals was that they were unwilling even to assume that we would
consider letting Formosa fall into hostile hands." Senator William
Knowland proposed sending General Wedemeyer back to Formosa as
Chief of Mission. Furthermore "Goodwill visits by American Navy
task forces, including carriers, would have a stabilizing
influence."

A number of Congressmen decided to form a "Committee to Defend
America by Aiding Anti-Communist China." Soon the most extravagant
claims were being made for Chiang's "military genius" and on behalf
of his armies. The Nationalists obliged by announcing that they had
more than a million men on the mainland waiting to spring to arms
if they could be given guns. Chiang was said to be preparing a
"powerful striking force, poised to move against Communism."
Chiang's partisans began to refer to Formosa in ringing terms as
"Free China" and a "bastion of democracy."

No one attempted publicly to separate the issues. The American
military interest required the isolation and security of the island
of Formosa. Chiang saw to it that they had to take him, too.

Despite General Wedemeyer's note that privileged Chinese had
immense wealth abroad which was not being used in China's behalf,
some leading members of Congress and many prominent Republican
laymen were persuaded that if Washington would just send along
enough money Chiang would promptly stem the Communist tide. The
"Aid Chiang" bills and programs were of great variety. The 80th
Congress had voted $125,000,000 for 1949. Senator Knowland urged
huge additional expenditures. Mr. William Bullitt scaled down his
earlier estimate of needs from the billions to a mere $800,000,000.
Senator Alexander Smith thought perhaps $200,000,000 might be
helpful for the moment. Pat McCarran (a Democrat, but the Silver
State Senator) proposed an aid bill of one and a half billion
dollars of which the greater part (he hoped) would be sent to China
in good hard silver dollars. Mr. Thomas Dewey demanded "much
greater aid." Madame Chiang had asked for three billion American
dollars to be advanced over a period of three years. It was
suggested by one gallant Senator that she should be invited again
to appear before the Congress to explain her needs. The Chiangs
were assured that when the Democrats were unseated and the
Republicans took over the Administration, nothing would be left
undone to restore Nationalist authority on the mainland.

But the Chiangs had a problem; the American presidential
elections would not be held until late 1952, and the Republicans
could not possibly take over direction of policy until 1953. The
Generalissimo had to find somewhere to await salvation.

Taipei, "Temporary Capital of China"

General Li's presence in Washington damaged Chiang's projection
of himself as the "only possible savior of China." What if
President Truman persuaded Acting President Li to break with the
Nationalists and allow a Third Force to emerge in the civil
Government in exchange for direct military aid to the generals who
were still fighting in South China?

The Generalissimo neatly disposed of this danger. He ordered
Li's Cabinet to fly to Formosa and there it convened on December 9.
Chiang himself flew in next day, declared Taipei to be the
"Temporary Capital of China," and set about reorganizing the
shattered Party, Army and Government. Formosa was not the sprawling
continent with its many unmanageable regional problems; here was a
compact island, physically well organized, technologically well
advanced, and susceptible to a very tight security control. Not
even foreign newsmen might enter without permission, and if one
reported "inaccurately" his permit could be promptly lifted. There
would be no unauthorized broadcasting from the island. The hunt for
"subversive" Formosans would be redoubled.

Here Chiang - always making a great show of eagerness to return
to the mainland "alone, if need be" - could wait it out until the
United States cleared the way for him to return to power in
China.

Retreat to Formosa also enabled Chiang to slough off many
embarrassing associates - not least among them his wife's
money-hungry relatives. Dr. T. V. Soong declined the opportunity to
settle on Formosa, preferring the Hudson River Valley near New
York. Dr. H. H. Kung and his wife were already there. Madame
Chiang's elder sister preferred to join the Communists at
Peking.

For the moment the Communists had neither navy nor air force
with which to cross over to Formosa. On the other hand Formosa's
communications were open to the West, to the source of arms and
economic supply in America - if the American Government could be
made to reverse its "hands-off" policy decision.

Chiang had enough armed forces with him to impose iron control
upon the Formosan people. It was estimated that nearly half a
million conscripts had been tumbled aboard ships in the last few
weeks of the exodus and even Chiang could see that too many had
come in. Soon some 25,000 had died of disease, another 150,000 were
demobilized, and scores of generals and colonels were retired.

The Generalissimo's principal military rivals within the
Nationalist organization - the generals who supported Acting
President Li, for example, and a scattering of former warlords who
had never been very much Chiang's men - were now being pushed back
into the rugged southwestern provinces or down through Kwangtung
and Kwangsi to Hainan Island. There the Nationalists were destined
to make their last stand. Some of the defeated generals obeyed
orders to cross over to Formosa, risking mild restraint or loss of
face and influence. Some went abroad, for they could not trust
Chiang. Some, taking their men and supplies with them, went over to
the Communists.

Would a sufficient reorganization at Taipei provide Chiang's
military friends in America with convincing evidence of "military
vitality" and his Republican friends with evidence of "genuine
reform"? It was worth a try.

On December 21 General Chen Cheng left his post as Governor of
Formosa to assume the presidency of the Executive Yuan, the
Premiership. From there the tough old general could continue to
supervise the civil administration of Formosa as "one of the
provinces of China."

To succeed him, the Generalissimo brought forward Dr. Wu
Kuo-chen, better known to a host of important American friends as
K. C. Wu. To some qualified observers the choice was a measure of
Chiang's desperation, for K. C. Wu was a genuine liberal, a man of
highest personal integrity, and an accomplisbed administrator. He
was a graduate of Grinnell College in Iowa and of Princeton
University. He had wartime experience as Mayor of Chungking and as
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. Most recently he had been Mayor
of Shanghai. Soon enough on Formosa the island people began to say
that at last, in Dr. Wu, they found a Governor who truly had their
interests at heart.

Wu took office when Nationalist fortunes were at their lowest
ebb.

On December 23 the Secretary of State at Washington let it be
known to all American diplomatic missions overseas that in the
Department's view "Formosa, politically, geographically, and
strategically is part of China ... Although ruled by the Japanese
for fifty years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and
militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility."

On that day the Chinese Ambassador at Washington made a formal
request for further military aid. The answer was "No," but on the
same day the Department reestablished the Embassy to China at
Taipei, in the dingy Consular Building. Dr. Stuart, the Ambassador,
and his Chinese secretary Phillip Fugh remained in the United
States, leaving the office in the hands of a charge d'affaires,

On January 5, 1950, President Truman formally stated the
"hands-off" policy. It was traditional practice, he said, to
respect the territorial integrity of China. Formosa had been handed
back to the Chinese under terms of the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations.

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on
any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to
obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases
on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of
utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present
situation.

The United States will not pursue a course which will lead
to involvement in the civil conflict in China . . . Similarly,
the

United States will not provide military aid or advice to
Chinese Forces on Formosa . . . [1]

The President's statement prompted a number of leading
Republican leaders to speak of the rights of the Formosan people.
Senator Taft was already thinking of an independent "Republic of
Formosa"; Senator Alexander Smith suggested creation of "a joint
political authority and military responsibility between ourselves,
the Nationalists, and the Formosan people." Senator Vandenburg
observed that "The rights of the Formosan people themselves must be
consulted ..."

Such liberal Republican voices were soon stilled, or drowned in
the streams of abuse poured by the Opposition upon the
Administration.

The Nationalists called President Truman's declaration a
"betrayal," and basic Chinese anti-foreign sentiment came welling
to the surface. There was bitter talk at Taipei and on January 9,
hot-headed young officers aboard the Nationalist gunboat
Wuling shelled an American freighter as it moved toward
Shanghai.

What was Washington to do? If it moved to protect American
shipping it would be condemned for "pro-Communist" policy, and if
it meekly accepted Chiang's declaration of blockade, then it must
recognize both belligerents. This in turn would create a new state
of tension in Washington's relations with governments which did not
recognize the Nationalists.

Across the world in New York the Russians moved to expel the
Nationalist Chinese from the United Nations, holding that they
represented only a band of refugees at Taipei. It was absurd to
pretend that they were a "World Power." But China's delegate was at
that moment Chairman of the Security Council, and Russia's motion
was defeated. The Russians walked out of the Council (January 11).
This act marked the beginning of the end of the Council's prime
importance in the world organization. Would the Assembly, too,
someday be torn apart on the Formosa Question?

On the next day the harassed Secretary of State (Acheson) made
an address which defined a defense perimeter for American interests
in the Western Pacific, a line running southward from the Aleutians
through Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines. Korea and
Formosa were beyond the pale.

Formosa was a "continental" and not an "oceanic" problem. Chiang
would be left to defend himself as best he could.

Reform! Reform!

What of the Formosans?

President Truman's policy statement had plunged Formosan leaders
into despair. For the second time since Japan's surrender the
United States had let pass an opportunity to intervene on behalf of
the island people. On the day Secretary Acheson declared Korea and
Formosa beyond the frontiers of American interest, a poignant
letter was addressed to me which reflected the sense that the
Formosans had been trapped and would bear Chiang's harsh police
rule until the Red Chinese should take the island from him. The
letter also disclosed how carefully Formosans scanned every
dispatch from abroad and searched every public statement which
might bring a ray of hope.

Thinking that this may be the last chance that you can hear
from me, I have decided to write you this letter ...

[I have been] looking forward to the time when I can see you
again on the island "under brighter situation." But I am almost
sure now ... I have to give up my hope, as it is clear now that
Formosa has been written off by the United States, and accordingly
in another few months I shall find myself under the rule of the
Chinese Reds, unless I succeed in getting away from the island. It
will be extremely optimistic to expect that the Nationalist forces
on the island will successfully fight the Red invasion which is
sure to be launched against the island any time after
February.

As a matter of fact, Formosans are hopelessly disappointed
at President Truman's statement on the fundamental policy toward
Formosa. I wonder what the late FDR would have done if he were
still alive. I think this is a situation he could not have dreamed
of when he promised to give Formosa to "The Republic of China" (not
to the "People's Republic of China"), apparently not paying any
consideration to the will of the 6 million people living on the
island.

Ever since the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Treaty the will
of the islanders has never been respected at every crucial moment
when the fate of the island was at stake. Since the shape of
Formosa, as seen on the map, looks somewhat like that of a
foot-ball, probably the people living on the island are predestined
to be kicked around in the game of world politics.

I was very much surprised to read in one of the USIS news
bulletins the following paragraph:

"Hamilton Butler (Detroit Free Press) while noting the
strategic importance of the island (Formosa) declared: "The
permanent occupation of Formosa as an American outpost would not
only get us into a lot of troubles with the islanders themselves,
but would involve us in a course of action (Daily News Bulletin No.
140, dated December 17, USIS, Taipei)

I do not know on what ground Mr. Butler could make such a
statement, and what kind of trouble he expected, but no Formosans
would agree to his statement.

In contrast, an AP dispatch from San Francisco, dated
January 4, 1950 quoted Mr. John J. MacDonald who had been the
American Consul General at Taipei until last December as saying "
... Most Formosans had hoped they might be taken out of the
Nationalists control through a United Nations trusteeship, but
seemed to have given up the hope of that recently when the Chinese
Government fled to Formosa from the mainland and established its
capital at Taipei. Now they seem to think it would be a good thing
if the Supreme headquarters in Tokyo could take them over, provided
they could get a guarantee that they would get their freedom
later." I have never met any Formosans who objected to Mr.
MacDonald's view.

Some Formosans think: "Politically Formosans are mere
infants who need outside help in their struggle for survival as a
free people. But the Formosans will not remain forever as poltical
infants. If things are to be left as they are now, Formosans may
some day grow up to be a formidable and sworn enemy of U.S. under
the influence and guidance of the Kremlin."

I know, of course, that U.S. has a lot of other problems to
take care of as the leader of freedom-loving peoples in the world,
and that there is a limit to the capability of the United States.
In this sense such Formosans may be called too
self-centered.

Some other Formosans are of the opinion that on deciding her
policy toward Formosa, the United States should have chosen between
justice and injustice instead of between advantages and
disadvantages, and they deem it unjustifiable that Formosans who
dislike Communism should be left to fall behind the iron curtain
simply because Formosa happened to have been Japan's colony for
over fifty years, while Japan, one of the chief culprits in the
last aggressive war, is made entitled to the blissfulness of
democracy and freedom just because she may otherwise start another
aggressive war. History will be the best judge.

While I am writing this letter, I hear the chorus of
Japanese military song being sung by a bevy of Formosans marching
along the streets and cheering up the Formosan youths who are going
to be conscripted this year for the first time since the
inauguration of the Chinese rule after V-J Day. The enthusiasm with
which Formosan youths responded to the call to the ranks is
mystifying, and in a way frightening to mainlanders on the island!
I think you can understand why the enthusiasm.

I am fed up with such kind of local life as one can never
tell when and where he may lose his life, in whatever outrageous
way, but I still pray that present state of affairs may take, in
time, a turn for the better. I would like to know your opinion, if
possible ... [2]

To the Formosan elite - men such as this one - Governor Wu now
addressed himself with a reform program designed to reduce local
bitterness and to secure Formosan support for the Nationalist
organization. In his heart he knew that Chiang would not
"reconquer" the mainland; it was going to be hard enough to hold
Formosa, and the refugees were going to need the full support of
the island people.

On January 13 Wu promised measures to promote local
self-government. On April 5 it was announced that the Executive
Yuan had granted the new Governor authority to hold popular
elections for district magistrates and mayors. On paper, at least,
this would give Formosans some degree of control over the local
civil police, an objective which had been at the very heart of the
demands presented to Chen Yi during the March crisis, 1947.

In Governor Wu's new cabinet or council of twenty-three
Department Heads, no less than seventeen were prominent Formosans,
including some who had been sharply critical of Chen Yi and had
been long in hiding. Wu meant that they should have an effective
voice in local government.

But when elections actually took place the Nationalist Party
agents exercised their right to supervise the selection of
candidates, the qualifications of voters and the conduct of the
elections themselves. Formosans who were given place in Wu's
Cabinet found themselves surrounded by mainland assistants,
subordinates and advisors. Governor Wu did his best to liberalize
the administration and mitigate abuses, but (as he later said) at
every turn he met the secret police and security agents who were
responsible to Chiang Ching-kuo.

Wu faced great odds. Iron-fisted General Chen Cheng was his
immediate superior in the table of organization, Ching-kuo's
security agents penetrated every civil and military office and
inspired fear among the common people with frequent acts of
brutality, unwarranted house-search and threatening interrogations.
In economic matters the ghost of T. V. Soong lurked in the
background. In the realm of finance there were two familiar faces.
The former Commissioner of Finance for Governors Chen Yi, Wei, and
Chen Cheng was Yen Chia-kan, now moved upstairs to become Minister
of Finance in the "National" government. This in effect left him in
control of local finance at the Provincial level. In his place Wu
was obliged to accept Jen Hsien-chuan as Commissioner of Finance.
Jen had been Chen Yi's Commissioner of Communications, and Yen's
colleague in 1946 and 1947.

We are not surprised to learn that twice within the first fifty
days in office (on January 11 and on March 9) Governor Wu
threatened to resign. His first administrative crises involved a
question of fiscal policy raised by the "professional Formosan"
Huang Chao-chin. Huang, it will be recalled, also served in Chen
Yi's administration and for his help during the March massacre had
been rewarded with chairmanship of one of Formosa's largest banks.
When Wu's reforms threatened to disturb long-established
arrangements ensuring the proper flow of reward to the proper
people, Huang protested vigorously, and Wu took the issue to the
Generalissimo. Chiang knew that he had to maintain the new Reform
Image for a time, and Wu won his point.

Chiang Returns to the Presidency

In spite of all these stirring reforms on Formosa, in which he
had no part, Acting President Li continued to be a potential threat
to Chiang. As he went in and out of clinics in America he conferred
widely with Americans and with Chinese in America, seeking to crank
up enthusiasm for a Third Force endeavor. At last it was arranged
for Li to confer with President Truman on March 3.

On March 1, far away on Formosa, the astute Generalissimo
announced that he had resumed the Presidency of China. Li's status
in Washington promptly became that of a "former Acting President"
and his presence at the White House purely ceremonial.

Within a few weeks President Chiang arranged to have the former
Acting President impeached, in absentia, for "dereliction of duty."
Li joined the Soongs and the Kungs in retirement on the banks of
the Hudson River.

And so history books will show that without Chiang Kai-shek at
the helm, China proper was lost to the Communists. Li must take the
blame and the Chinese people must wait for the Generalissimo to
rescue them from Communist bandits and rebels.

To match Wu's reforms in the civil administration, Chiang now
decreed a show of reform within the Party and the Army.

With an eye to the effect in Washington, Chiang made Lieutenant
General Sun Li-jen Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Armies and of
the Taiwan Defense Command. No better choice could have been made
for propaganda purposes.

Sun promptly proposed a training program for Formosan youths,
saying that he had found them excellent material with which to
work. He would recruit 4500 in the first instance and then use them
in training a next recruitment of 35,000 men. This was a radical
step, for as the older mainland Chinese conscripts were mustered
out they had perforce to be replaced by Formosans. The new men
might be eager to defend Formosa, but would they be so ready to
fight on the mainland?

Foreign correspondents gained the impression that General Sun
was quietly taking a realistic position. He would have all he could
do to prepare adequate defenses for the island itself; to talk of
"retaking the mainland" was window- dressing.

For Chiang the appointments of Wu and Sun were distasteful; for
many years he had exercised his genius for creating factional
checks and balances with consummate skill. He now began a
reorganization of the Party and Army which would ensure the
succession to his elder son, "Crown Prince" Ching-kuo, and place
him in a position to check Sun and Wu or any other liberals who
might think of Formosa as a "second China," a trust territory, or
an independent entity.

Step by step the structures of the Army, Party, and Government
were modified until General Chiang Ching-kuo became a dominant
figure, next to his father in importance in these three sources of
power. The Generalissimo was supreme in military authority. The
Heir Apparent was gradually brought forward until at last he became
Defense Minister, second only to his father in direct military
authority. As Tsungtsai or Party Leader, old Chiang held
supreme authority in all political matters, interpenetrating the
Army with a system of political commissars attached to each
military unit and controlling the Government by controlling
appointments and supervising elections at every level of this
"democracy." Here the Elder Son was brought forward in the Party as
master of the Political Department in the Army and as a member of
the elite Central Executive Committee which controls Party affairs.
As President of the Republic of China, the elder Chiang enjoys
special emergency powers - dictatorial powers in times of crisis
and war. His son, as Defense Minister, dominates the civil
authority under these emergency provisions.

The grooming of Chiang Ching-kuo to succeed his father took
place over a number of years, but the process first began to be
clearly indicated during the crisis in early 1950. The forced
concessions to "reform" and the appointments of K. C. Wu and Sun
Li-jen had to be offset behind the scenes. Ching-kuo's ultimate
source of power lies in his control of the secret services of Army,
Party and Government, and the political commissars placed at every
level of the military organization.

This was Free China, the "bastion of democracy."

After he moved to Formosa in 1949 to prepare the way for his
father, General Chiang Ching-kuo held the Formosans in line through
a policy of terror. The losses of 1947 had been heavy; arrests,
imprisonment and executions had continued throughout 1948, but
Ching-kuo's advent in 1949 brought on a new era of fear throughout
the island.

Anyone found objectionable to the regime, at any level, in
Party, Army, Government or private life, can be labeled
"pro-Communist" and be done away with. Guilt by association is easy
to arrange and false or malicious accusations are encouraged by
rewards. Tillman Durdin comments on the "indiscriminate ferocity"
of the campaign which began in 1949 and notes that in 1954 Chiang
Ching-kuo boasted that he had broken up (as he put it) an average
of thirteen "communist conspiracies" th over a period of three and
a half years. This chilling figure adds up to 550 "conspiracies" in
all. Ten years later - in 1964 - it was estimated that Ching-kuo
had 50,000 regular policing agents in the many organizations under
his control, and that the number of paid informants active on
Formosa might be ten times that figure. [3]

The Generalissimo's first concern was with the Army. Pellmell
retreat from the mainland and offshore islands brought into Formosa
many officers whose loyalty Chiang questioned. Soon Ching-kuo's
agents were naming scores of officers who were not deemed
trustworthy and were said to be in communication with the
enemy.

The purge which began in early 1950 ran for many months, with
disclosures embarrassing to Americans who had so loudly proclaimed
the strength of Chiang's military organization. Among the
lieutenant generals taken up, tried and executed were the Chief of
Military Conscription, the Vice Minister of National Defense, the
Chief of Army Supply Services and the Commander of the 70th
Division. Scores of less prominent military figures were seized and
done away with.

Meanwhile on the mainland the Nationalist military record was
one of unmitigated disaster. Hainan Island was lost on May 2, 1950,
and on May 16 Chiang's forces abandoned the Chusan Archipelago
lying between the Yangtze estuary and Formosa.

To divert attention from these reverses the Nationalist Air
Force increased the number and range of its spectacular hit-and-run
raids all along the coast. The Communists began to prepare for
retaliation, a massive cross-channel drive that would put an end to
Chiang.*

By midyear a sense of crisis gripped the Nationalists at Taipei.
The great question continued to be "What will the Formosans do if
the Communists attack?"

In a spectacular bid for favor Chiang at last ordered the
execution of his old friend General Chen Yi. It was announced that
he was being punished for his abuse of the Formosan people in 1946
and 1947. Rallies were organized, a ration of fireworks was issued
to make a gala occasion, and on June 16, after a year in prison
contemplating this event, Chen Yi was taken before the firing
squad.

The Formosans were glad to see him go but as they set match to
the firecrackers, not a few remembered Chiang's praise of Chen Yi
for a "job well done" in March, 1947.

One week later the need for reforms seemed to have vanished

Chiang Saved--But Leashed

Peking had taken seriously Washington's declaration of "no
interest" in Korea and Formosa, considering it an open invitation
to push into Korea and to cross the channel.

On June 25 the Communists entered South Korea. Chiang quite
inadvertently had been saved by Mao Tse-tung.

President Truman promptly announced an abrupt change in American
policy. On June 27 he served notice that the United States would
resist Communist aggression in Korea and called upon the United
Nations to act together there. He then said:

In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the
Pacific Area and to the United States forces performing their
lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any
attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon
the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea
operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that
this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa
must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace
settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
[4]

This was in effect a blunt order telling the Generalissimo that
he was under restraint, for his own good. The United States and the
United Nations had quite enough to cope with in Korea, to which the
President was determined to confine the fighing if it could be
done. Members of the United Nations organization who were prepared
to resist Communist aggression in Korea were not at all prepared to
support Chiang's "comeback" ambitions in China.

This was embarrassing, for the joint Chiefs of Staff did not
want to be hampered by Nationalist units of dubious quality and
untested loyalty, nor did Washington want to give Peking an excuse
to open a second front by striking at Formosa. General MacArthur at
Tokyo was directed to reject Chiang's offer. [5]

The Generalissimo's chagrin was tempered by realization that now
Formosa would probably receive massive economic and military
aid.