By Tai Wei Lim

Zhang
Dejiang, a ranking politburo member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), visited
Hong Kong in May 2016. Zhang holds the appointment of Beijing’s top person in
charge of Hong Kong issues. Zhang is also the leading man in the National
People’s Congress, one of the two “lianghui” in China, which are important
avenues for articulating the people’s voices to the CCP and the Chinese
government.

Zhang
is perceived to be a capable intermediary for Beijing. He worked with Hong Kong
authorities in dealing with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic when
he was the Party head of Guangdong province. He was also effective in his past
appointments as interlocutors for politically sensitive regions that are
important for Chinese diplomacy. For example, having studied in North Korea,
Zhang was an important bridge between Beijing and Pyongyang, arranging high
level visits for top Chinese leaders.

The
main purpose of Zhang’s Hong Kong trip was to inform the Hong Kong business
world and the public about the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative launched by
President Xi Jinping to enhance connectivity in the overland and maritime
routes. The highlight of his trip, at least for the media, turned out to be
gatherings with selected pro-democracy politicians from the island who espouse
a more moderate position. Besides the pro-democracy moderates, other
politicians were also selected to meet Zhang, bringing the total number up to
ten individuals.

This
was in line with his objective of being the eyes and ears for Beijing, perhaps
to pick up details for planning President Xi’s own trip to Hong Kong in 2017. Next
year marks the second decade since the handover of Hong Kong to China and it is
an important anniversary year. As the eyes and ears of Beijing, Zhang’s target
audience was clear — business sector, legislators, judiciary, pro-democracy
moderates, bureaucracy, the scientific community, and others.

Those
who met up with Zhang described the encounter as a cordial one in which they
were able to put their points across to the politburo member. It was a goodwill
gesture in the context of post-Occupy Hong Kong. The meeting itself was
unprecedented and became newsworthy. Both parties appeared to agree on
preventing the pro-democracy movement from becoming radicalized. A sign that
both parties were wary of radicals operating in the territory was the way in
which the area where Zhang was residing was locked down for Zhang’s visit, with
a large police presence and bricks stuck down on the pavement.

For the
Hong Kong people and its business sector, it was a rare opportunity to learn
more about OBOR’s benefits for Hong Kong from a top leader’s narrative. Even
for non-participants in OBOR, Zhang’s talk was informative, given the
importance of OBOR to Beijing. The OBOR is the most important initiative in
President Xi’s administration and looks like to be his one and only major
foreign policy umbrella initiative and legacy.

The
international and local media were especially attentive to Zhang’s arrival in
Hong Kong as he was the first senior central government leader to come to the
island territory since the massive Occupy Central pro-democracy protests. Zhang
had outwardly said he was offering a dovish outreach to all political groups in
the Special Administrative Region. Chief Executive CY Leung welcomed Zhang to
Hong Kong with a banquet and his administration also gave Zhang a tour of
high-tech incubators in Hong Kong. Zhang expressed full public support for CY
Leung’s administration. Hong Kong officials expressed their hope of the island
becoming a super connector between the mainland and the world.

Some media analysts speculated that this
trip paved the way for more pro-Beijing candidates to win in the September
Legislative Council election.

Zhang
held conversations with a group of participants slightly larger than 40
individuals, including senior civil servants, Executive Council and Legislative
Council members, members of the judiciary and local district politicians. He
was also given a tour of the Science Park in Shatin New Territories near the
Chinese University of Hong Kong by Secretary for Innovation and Technology
Nicholas Yang. Here, Zhang was able to converse with startups, business people,
inventors, entrepreneurs in the high-tech business.

Zhang
was on a charm offensive, reaching out to the traditionally Beijing-friendly
business sector while trying to conjure up the image of a benign and caring
central government. Some media analysts speculated that this trip paved the way
for more pro-Beijing candidates to win in the September Legislative Council
election. For the pro-establishment crowd, it was a morale booster.

While
dovish and olive branch sentiments featured prominently in Zhang’s visit, other
events also emerged that headed towards the other end of the political
spectrum. Since Occupy Central, Hong Kong has become a factionalized society
divided into moderates, pro-Beijingers, pro-Hong Kongers, pro-independence
activists, radicals, anarchists, pro-democracy activists, leftwingers,
localists, “minzhulun” advocates, greater autonomy advocates, etc. Out of these
factions, the moderates (including the silent majority) have always been able
to quietly shape the mainstream narrative, with a preference for gradual and
peaceful change, pragmatic ideas of suffrage, economic stability, and displays
of patience for methods of political advocacy through persuasion.

The
press conference held by book retailer Lam Wing-kee appears to drive another
wedge into this factionalized society. Lam was one of five booksellers who went
missing last year. He said that politically sensitive information and increased
book sales could have caused concern to Chinese authorities who, according to
him, abducted him for questioning. It is currently too early to tell what would
be the immediate momentum effect on the pro-democracy movement. Coming on the
heels of Zhang’s charm offensive, this incident is likely to have some impact
on the highly-factionalized Hong Kong society. The most liberal-minded
pro-democrats and radical factions (two usually but not always mutually
exclusive groups) would likely seize upon this press conference for energizing
their own advocacies (with their own respective political nuances), while the
moderate pro-democracy factions are likely to contextualize the Lam press
conference within their recent civil meeting with Zhang and what some of them
perceive as a potential new conduit for putting their political views across.

The
moderates in Hong Kong society are likely to observe and evaluate how the
strongest (and perhaps most radical) elements of both pro-establishment and
pro-democracy forces react to the press conference revelations before shaping
their mainstream political narrative, contextualizing their views within the
rubric of the realities of recognizing a strongman administration in the
central government, the impending visit by President Xi, and the slight
rapprochement achieved during the recent Zhang visit. The moderates are
currently in an information-seeking stage, waiting to have more revelations
from all members of the detained publishers/book retailers group before making
their judgements about their own subjective ideas about the future of Hong Kong
even as the pro-democracy crowds start to agitate about Lam’s revelations.