Looking for Intelligent Life

By Chris Dishman

The Central Intelligence Agency, not only turned 50 this Summer, it also got a new
director, George Tenet, who previously held the number two post in the agency. In his first
interview since his Senate confirmation on July 10, DCI Tenet responded to ongoing criticisms
that the CIA and the intelligence community do not have a clearly defined role in the post-cold
war environment.

"My sense of our mission is extraordinarily clear," Tenet stated, " it is to pursue hard
targets that threaten American interests around the world." The DCI further explained that these
"hard targets" included drug and weapons trafficking and terrorism. "We are no longer in search
of a mission. We know what the mission is. We know what the targets are."

But do Tenet and the CIA know where to focus the intelligence community's resources to
fight these 'hard targets'?

In pursuit of combating drug and weapons trafficking and terrorism, the intelligence
community needs to focus on increasing human intelligence (HUMINT) rather than continuing
its reliance on electronic and imagery intelligence. The latter forms of information gathering
were effective in providing intelligence during the Cold War. The CORONA satellite, for
example, dispelled the notion that there was a Soviet missile gap and helped monitor the SALT 1
and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Unfortunately, these traditional forms of intelligence are not
able to effectively counter the "hard targets" Mr. Tenet has in mind.

On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb explosion at the Khubar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, killed 19 U.S. citizens and injured 500 persons. The subsequent investigation by the
United States appeared to focus more on the inability of U.S. military personnel to prevent the
attack than on gathering evidence to apprehend the terrorists responsible. In part, this assessment
is accurate because the primary conduit for information regarding the bombing came from Saudi
authorities; the ability of U.S. authorities to investigate was thereby qualified. Both FBI and
CIA officials commented that Saudi investigators rarely allowed them to examine evidence in the
case.

The inability of the United States to independently corroborate such accusations is due
largely to an intelligence network devoid of assets in Southwest Asia. The intelligence
community was unable to confirm or deny reports from the Saudi government regarding the forty
people arrested. The FBI lacked the necessary intelligence to soundly analyze the conclusions of
Saudi authorities.

While it is unlikely that a U.S. operative could have infiltrated the group responsible for
the Dhahran bombing, HUMINT assets in Saudi Arabia could have established a link with
informants and other channels that would have assisted the U.S. in confirming the legitimacy of
the Saudi arrests.

More importantly, a network of informants contacting U.S. operatives, or possibly the
operatives themselves, might have developed advance information that indicated an attack was
going to take place near Dhahran. This detailed intelligence would have permitted U.S. counter
terrorism personnel to focus on preventing an attack in this area.

Since the end of the Cold War, the CIA has cut its Soviet personnel by 2/3, and its
weapons specialization staff by 25 percent. The CIA has not, however, emphasized the
increased importance of monitoring activities in Saudi Arabia and Southwest Asia on a firsthand
basis. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism, four of the seven nations it categorizes as
sponsoring terrorist activities are located in this area -- Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The recent
focus on terrorism as a national security threat mandates that the United States increase
HUMINT assets in this region and in North Africa.

Compounding the geopolitical necessity of placing assets in this region, the nature
of terrorist activity commands the need for increased HUMINT assets as well. Given the small,
cell-like organization of terrorist groups, it is difficult to acquire information through electronic
eavesdropping or reconnaissance.

Moreover, the use of surprise in terrorist attacks highlights the importance of knowing
both the intentions and the capabilities of the group. Without HUMINT, the FBI would have had
difficulty in arresting members of a group planning to bomb the Holland Tunnel and the United
Nations. In this case, an informer provided the capabilities, intentions, and motivations of this
terrorist group. More recently, DCI George Tenet revealed that the intelligence community
thwarted two attacks on US embassies this year. Although no details were given, it is clear that
HUMINT and the use of informants aided in some measure in preventing the attacks.

Informants are also important in locating terrorists who have sought refuge in a foreign
country. Recently, Mir Aimal Kansi, who allegedly shot two CIA employees in front of CIA
headquarters, was captured by United States officials with the help of Afghani individuals
seeking part of a two million dollar reward. These persons lured Kansi to the Shalimar Hotel in
Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan, where he was captured by FBI agents. It was important that Kansi
was brought to Dera Ghazi Khan, a sizeable population center, in order to facilitate his capture
and prompt flight out of Pakistan.

While traditional forms of electronic intelligence gathering are important in monitoring
troop movements, verifying arms control agreements, and locating missile sites, they are less
effective in combating those emerging threats to U.S. security outlined by Director Tenet. The
intelligence community must complement its numerous counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation analysts with firsthand clandestine observers in volatile regions of the world.