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Mr. FULBRIGHT. - Mr. President, I shall vote for the Anderson-Aiken, amendment.
I have listened to the debate on part III of this civil-i-rights bill with close interest and with concern. Until but a few short days ago none of us, I think, had any real understanding of what part ,III of the bill proposed to do, or how it proposed to do it.
The debate has clarified and made meaningful what 2 weeks ago was generally regarded as a minor provision of the ill. The proponents of part III did not themselves, I am convinced, comprehend the full impact, the broad sweep, and the dangers of these new enforcement techniques for section 1985 of title 42 of the United States Code.
It is now clear to us all that section 1985 purports to cover, virtually without limitation, every civil right which the courts in the past and the courts in the future may define as within its scope. That language is not specific. It is not definite. It is as broad as the general language used in the constitutional provisions from which the power of Congress to legislate in the field is derived.
And yet, to this broad and indefinite language it is now sought to apply the unusual and extreme enforcement measure of injunction and contempt proceedings by Federal courts.
We are told that there is ample precedent for- using the injunction-contempt enforcement techniques in the 28 or more statutes which Congress has enacted to regulate different commercial activities.
The analogy does not, in fact, exist. I defy anyone to examine any of the statutes in which Congress has heretofore permitted the use of injunctions as an enforcement weapon and conclude that there is any real parallel between the subject matter dealt with or the legislative framework in which the injunction-contempt power is exercised.
In every other statute passed by Congress—the Securities Exchange Commission statutes, the Federal Trade Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Communications Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act—explicit substan¬tive rights were created and carefully defined; precise standards of conduct to guide the persons subject to the acts were established; procedures were developed for the determination of factual and legal questions arising in the administration of the acts; and, prior to the time that any Federal court can be called upon to issue an injunction, a specific administrative procedure, involving public hearings, findings, and conclusions, resulting in quasi-judicial orders, is provided.
Part III contains none of these safe¬guards. For the statutes relied upon to
be a valid analogy to what is sought to be done in this bill, there would have had to be a simple, very broad statutory provision, restating the general language of the commerce power of the Constitu¬tion, and brief provisions empowering the courts to enforce the statute by injunction. This would be a true analogy and parallel to what is contemplated by part III. But this is a far cry from what actually has been done in the prior instances in which Congress has deter¬mined to use the injunction enforcement remedy.
The only real parallel to the situation sought to be created by part III of this bill is the labor situation which prevailed at the time of the passage of the Norris- LaGuardia Act. Then there was no specific Federal labor legislation. Our Federal courts established Federal labor law by- injunction, issued upon the broadest complaints of United States attorneys.
Partially to correct the abuses of this unusual enforcement procedure, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. In 1935, the further corrective step was taken of legislating a very specific Federal statute in the field of labor relations. The Wagner Act spelled out in great detail the specific rights, conduct, and procedures which Congress intended to be followed in the settling of labor disputes. In addition, it created an administrative agency to determine labor disputes before the courts could exercise the injunctive powers conferred by the act.
Only after the administrative agency had exercised its full jurisdiction, held hearings, and issued orders was a court empowered to issue an injunction to en¬force the agency orders.
We should not now—25 years after George Norris and Robert Wagner focused the attention of Congress upon the evils of government by injunction— return to that practice in a field as complex and delicate as civil rights.
This would scarcely be progress. It would surely create a precedent for some future Congress, in some other field, to seek legislative shortcuts which disregard basic individual rights and liberties.
I find no support for what part III would have us do in the field of civil rights in any of the Federal statutes which have been referred to in our debates. I do find, and with alarm, a very close parallel to the situation which existed in the field of labor disputes be-fore passage of the Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Acts.
I am sure no Member of this body will want to trade, in the name of expediency, the right of all individuals to be free from government by injunction—in its most vicious, abbreviated form—for what is claimed to be a more effective method of protecting civil rights. I, for one, consider the legislative scheme con¬trived in part III of this bill to be a distinct step backward in the vital relations of man and his government.
I shall not vote to take that step backward.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. - Mr. President, I shall vote for the Anderson-Aiken, amendment.
I have listened to the debate on part III of this civil-i-rights bill with close interest and with concern. Until but a few short days ago none of us, I think, had any real understanding of what part ,III of the bill proposed to do, or how it proposed to do it.
The debate has clarified and made meaningful what 2 weeks ago was generally regarded as a minor provision of the ill. The proponents of part III did not themselves, I am convinced, comprehend the full impact, the broad sweep, and the dangers of these new enforcement techniques for section 1985 of title 42 of the United States Code.
It is now clear to us all that section 1985 purports to cover, virtually without limitation, every civil right which the courts in the past and the courts in the future may define as within its scope. That language is not specific. It is not definite. It is as broad as the general language used in the constitutional provisions from which the power of Congress to legislate in the field is derived.
And yet, to this broad and indefinite language it is now sought to apply the unusual and extreme enforcement measure of injunction and contempt proceedings by Federal courts.
We are told that there is ample precedent for- using the injunction-contempt enforcement techniques in the 28 or more statutes which Congress has enacted to regulate different commercial activities.
The analogy does not, in fact, exist. I defy anyone to examine any of the statutes in which Congress has heretofore permitted the use of injunctions as an enforcement weapon and conclude that there is any real parallel between the subject matter dealt with or the legislative framework in which the injunction-contempt power is exercised.
In every other statute passed by Congress—the Securities Exchange Commission statutes, the Federal Trade Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Communications Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act—explicit substan¬tive rights were created and carefully defined; precise standards of conduct to guide the persons subject to the acts were established; procedures were developed for the determination of factual and legal questions arising in the administration of the acts; and, prior to the time that any Federal court can be called upon to issue an injunction, a specific administrative procedure, involving public hearings, findings, and conclusions, resulting in quasi-judicial orders, is provided.
Part III contains none of these safe¬guards. For the statutes relied upon to
be a valid analogy to what is sought to be done in this bill, there would have had to be a simple, very broad statutory provision, restating the general language of the commerce power of the Constitu¬tion, and brief provisions empowering the courts to enforce the statute by injunction. This would be a true analogy and parallel to what is contemplated by part III. But this is a far cry from what actually has been done in the prior instances in which Congress has deter¬mined to use the injunction enforcement remedy.
The only real parallel to the situation sought to be created by part III of this bill is the labor situation which prevailed at the time of the passage of the Norris- LaGuardia Act. Then there was no specific Federal labor legislation. Our Federal courts established Federal labor law by- injunction, issued upon the broadest complaints of United States attorneys.
Partially to correct the abuses of this unusual enforcement procedure, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. In 1935, the further corrective step was taken of legislating a very specific Federal statute in the field of labor relations. The Wagner Act spelled out in great detail the specific rights, conduct, and procedures which Congress intended to be followed in the settling of labor disputes. In addition, it created an administrative agency to determine labor disputes before the courts could exercise the injunctive powers conferred by the act.
Only after the administrative agency had exercised its full jurisdiction, held hearings, and issued orders was a court empowered to issue an injunction to en¬force the agency orders.
We should not now—25 years after George Norris and Robert Wagner focused the attention of Congress upon the evils of government by injunction— return to that practice in a field as complex and delicate as civil rights.
This would scarcely be progress. It would surely create a precedent for some future Congress, in some other field, to seek legislative shortcuts which disregard basic individual rights and liberties.
I find no support for what part III would have us do in the field of civil rights in any of the Federal statutes which have been referred to in our debates. I do find, and with alarm, a very close parallel to the situation which existed in the field of labor disputes be-fore passage of the Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Acts.
I am sure no Member of this body will want to trade, in the name of expediency, the right of all individuals to be free from government by injunction—in its most vicious, abbreviated form—for what is claimed to be a more effective method of protecting civil rights. I, for one, consider the legislative scheme con¬trived in part III of this bill to be a distinct step backward in the vital relations of man and his government.
I shall not vote to take that step backward.