If the US strikes Iran, it should target the regime as well as its nuclear program, says FPI's Jamie Fly and AEI's Gary Schmitt

It has been the policy of U.S. presidents over the last
three decades to state that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Yet as Iran
moves closer to achieving that goal, political leaders, including key Obama
administration officials such as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, have begun
to waver. They now speak more frequently about the potentially disastrous
consequences of an Israeli or U.S. military strike on Iran's nuclear program
than about the dangers of a nuclear Iran.

Matthew Kroenig thus deserves credit for advancing the
argument that the repercussions of a military attack on Iran's nuclear program
are a worthwhile risk, given the far more dangerous consequences of Iran
getting the bomb ("Time to Attack Iran," January/February 2012). There
are, however, problems with some elements of Kroenig's strategy for avoiding
the nightmare scenario. Namely, a limited military strike would only be a
temporary fix, and it could actually do the opposite of what it intends --
drive the program further underground and allow Iran to retain the ability to
threaten the United States and its allies.

If the United States seriously considers military action,
it would be better to plan an operation that not only strikes the nuclear
program but aims to destabilize the regime, potentially resolving the Iranian
nuclear crisis once and for all.

Kroenig bases his argument on Israel's successful limited
strikes against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and against Syria's Al Kibar
reactor in 2007. Yet the Iranian nuclear program of 2012 is not comparable to
either of those cases, which were embryonic and focused on building reactors
with limited auxiliary facilities. Once those reactors were destroyed, it was
difficult for either country to reconstitute their efforts immediately. Even
so, Saddam Hussein did eventually return to the nuclear weapons business. After
the Osirak strike, he drove the Iraqi program further underground and
diversified it, exploring multiple pathways to the bomb. By 1991, Iraq was
close to developing a nuclear weapons capability, a fact only discovered after
the Gulf War.

In contrast, Iran has had years to expand its program and
already boasts several large reactors and enrichment facilities, which the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspects, and a host of associated
research programs and facilities at which equipment to enrich uranium is
studied, manufactured, and assembled. Although these declared facilities tend
to be isolated in secure compounds or on military installations, many of the
subsidiary facilities are in residential urban neighborhoods. Thus, Kroenig is
wrong when he writes that an attack on Iran's nuclear program "could
reduce the collateral damage . . . by striking at night or simply leaving those
less important plants off its target list." If associated sites are not
targeted for humanitarian reasons, Iran could still have a nuclear
future.

More troubling are, in the words of former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the "known unknowns." There is no question
that covert elements of Iran's nuclear program exist. After devoting so many
resources to its nuclear program and suffering years of increasingly tough
sanctions, it is entirely reasonable to believe that Tehran maintains at least
a small pilot enrichment facility far away from the scrutiny of the
international community. After all, hiding one from the world's eyes would not
be difficult; the IAEA has very limited access to the workshops where Iran
produces the components for and assembles its centrifuges and thus cannot
precisely track the size and scope of Iran's enrichment activities.

Further, Iran's capability to enrich uranium is a
technical skill that cannot be bombed out of existence. Nor can the progress it
has made on weaponization. Those aspects of the program would likely survive a
limited bombing campaign along the lines advocated by Kroenig.

To be sure, a limited strike is not pointless. Kroenig's
support seems in part an effort to avoid the consequences skeptics of military
action often highlight, such as Iran responding militarily or with operations
via its terrorist proxies. He argues that the United States "could first
make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not
in overthrowing the government" to moderate the Iranian response. But
there, too, he is wrong. Iran has been in confrontation with the international
community over its nuclear program for years. Whether a limited military strike
or regime destabilization operation, Iran's leaders would almost certainly
believe they would have to respond to such a challenge to maintain their
credibility in the region, employing missiles, proxies, and/or their own
terrorist operatives. After all, Iran has been killing Americans for years --
most recently, U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, as the Iranian plot
last year to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on American soil revealed, Tehran
seems to be in no mood to modulate its behavior. It is dubious that the Iran's
supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard Corps would, or even could, accept a
limited strike without retaliating.

Given the likely fallout from even a limited military
strike, the question the United States should ask itself is, Why not take the
next step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness
-- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran.

Thanks to internal political developments and sanctions,
the regime is at its weakest point in decades. But the international community
is slowly exhausting the universe of palatable sanctions, and even the pressure
brought to bear on Iran thus far has not caused it to halt its program. A
limited strike against nuclear facilities would not lead to regime change. But
a broader operation might. It would not even need to be a ground invasion aimed
specifically at toppling the government. But the United States would need to
expand its list of targets beyond the nuclear program to key command and
control elements of the Republican Guard and the intelligence ministry, and
facilities associated with other key government officials. The goal would be to
compromise severely the government's ability to control the Iranian population.
This would require an extended campaign, but since even a limited strike would
take days and Iran would strike back, it would be far better to design a
military operation that has a greater chance of producing a satisfactory
outcome.

Of course, there is no assurance that the Iranian regime
would immediately crumble under such an onslaught. But once the cost to the
country and the weakness of the current regime became clear, the door would
open for renewed opposition to Iran's current rulers. It is sometimes said that
a strike would lead the population to rally around the regime. But given the
current unpopularity of the government, it seems more likely that the
population would see the regime's inability to forestall the attacks as
evidence that the emperor has no clothes and is leading the country into
needlessly desperate straits. If anything, Iranian nationalism and pride would
stoke even more anger at the current regime.

At a minimum, it would be far better for Iran's rulers to
be distracted by domestic unrest after a massive strike than totally free to
strike out at enemies after a limited one.

Some would argue that if the regime does fall, any
subsequent leader would value the nuclear program just as much, especially considering
Iranian nationalism and citizens' supposed pride in the nuclear program. But as
the economic costs of the program have grown, so, too, has disillusionment with
Iran's isolation. As the Iranian activist Shirin Ebadi told The Wall Street
Journal in April 2011, "Ahmadinejad talks about nuclear energy as national
pride . . . but that's not true. People don't care." The United States, in
concert with its allies, would thus be in a strong position to make clear to
Iran's new leaders that the path to prosperity is predicated upon giving up the
nuclear program.

The Obama administration has avoided the choice between a
military operation and a nuclear Iran by relying on conclusions by the U.S.
intelligence community that Iran has not made the final decision to develop a
weapon. But its faith in receiving that intelligence in a timely and
unambiguous way is, if history is any guide, misplaced. Kroenig is correct then
to argue that a military strike should be in the cards. But he is wrong to
suggest that a limited strike is the one option that should be on the table. If
strikes are chosen, it would be far better to put the regime at risk than to
leave it wounded but still nuclear capable and ready to fight another day.

Jamie M. Fly is the Executive Director of the Foreign Policy
Initiative. Gary Schmitt is the Director of Advanced Strategic Studies
at the American Enterprise Institute

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