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1 Philosophical Psychology Vol. 18, No. 5, October 2005, pp Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner 1 Philosophers working in the nascent field of experimental philosophy have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research. Keywords: Free Will; Moral Responsibility; Folk Psychology; Experimental Philosophy 1. Introduction: Motivating the Project of Testing Folk Intuitions I am sometimes asked in a tone that suggests the question is a major objection why, if conceptual analysis is concerned to elucidate what governs our classificatory practice, don t I advocate doing serious opinion polls on people s responses to various cases? My answer is that I do when it is necessary. (Jackson, 1998, p. 37) Philosophers disagree about the proper role that folk concepts, common sense, and prephilosophical intuitions should play in shaping our philosophical ideas Correspondence to: Eddy Nahmias, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA , USA. ISSN (print)/issn X (online)/05/ ß 2005 Taylor & Francis DOI: /

2 562 E. Nahmias et al. and theories. Whereas some have dismissively viewed the beliefs and intuitions of non-philosophers with either suspicion or scorn, others have attempted to refute speculative philosophical theories such as skepticism or idealism by appealing to what they take to be our commonsense intuitions. 2 Such intuitions play a conspicuous role in the free will debate, where philosophers often motivate their position by claiming that it is commonsensical, fits with ordinary intuitions, accounts for our practices of attributing moral responsibility, and captures a conception of freedom we value. However, few philosophers have tried to ascertain what these commonsense intuitions actually are. More often than not, philosophers are content to place their own intuitions into the mouths of the folk in a way that supports their own position neglecting to verify whether their intuitions agree with what the majority of non-philosophers actually think. This paper represents a preliminary attempt to correct for this oversight. In this section we describe our project and the motivation for it. We then discuss two studies we performed to test folk intuitions about free will, moral responsibility, and the ability to do otherwise (section 2). We then consider some of the difficulties facing this kind of empirical research and discuss how such research might impact the philosophical debates about free will (section 3). We hope our research will spark further interest in the examination of ordinary people s intuitions about free will and related concepts and in developing methods to study such intuitions. We suggest that the best way to arrive at a sound and empirically accurate, rather than merely speculative understanding of folk intuitions is to conduct surveys of non-philosophers in an effort to generate the much needed data to do what Jackson suggests above: serious opinion polls on people s responses to various cases. Our project can thus be viewed as part of a gathering storm of experimental philosophy recent attempts to empirically test the claims philosophers make about folk intuitions in epistemology, ethics, and action theory. 3 In this paper, we expand the scope of this novel, and we believe illuminating, approach to philosophy by applying it to the free will debate. Jackson (1998) suggested that this sort of research will not be necessary when philosophers claims about ordinary intuitions are uncontroversial when there is agreement about what people s intuitions are and philosophers know that our own case is typical and so can generalize from it to others (p. 37). 4 In the free will debate these criteria are not met. There is substantial disagreement among philosophers about what ordinary people s intuitions are, as we ll illustrate shortly. This disagreement likely stems from the philosophers own divergent intuitions. We suspect that this conflict indicates that philosophers intuitions have been corrupted by their theories, making it uncertain whether their own case is typical and all the more necessary to survey the intuitions of pre-theoretical folk. While compatibilists believe we can have free will and be morally responsible even if causal determinism is true, incompatibilists maintain that the existence of free will entails the falsity of causal determinism. Libertarians are incompatibilists who think we have free will; skeptics are incompatibilists who think we don t. To say that these parties find themselves in a stalemate would be an understatement. One indication of

3 Philosophical Psychology 563 how intractable the debate has become and how entrenched the respective parties are is the fact that so many philosophers claim that their own position has the most intuitive appeal and best fits our ordinary conception of free will and our practices of responsibility attribution. We find, on the one hand, incompatibilists who suggest that their view is commonsensical and that compatibilism is counter-intuitive. Robert Kane (1999), for example, writes, most ordinary people start out as natural incompatibilists... Ordinary persons have to be talked out of this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philosophers (p. 218). Laura Ekstrom agrees that we come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists (2002, p. 310) such that it is the compatibilist who needs a positive argument in favor of the compatibility thesis (2000, p. 57). Galen Strawson (1986) contends that the incompatibilist s libertarian conception of free will, though impossible to satisfy, is precisely the kind of freedom that most people ordinarily and unreflectively suppose themselves to possess (p. 30), adding that it is in our nature to take determinism to pose a serious problem for our notions of responsibility and freedom (p. 89). And Thomas Pink (2004) tells us that most of us start off by making an important assumption about freedom. Our freedom of action, we naturally tend to assume, must be incompatible with our actions being determined (p. 12). 5 By making these sorts of claims, incompatibilists are presumably trying to situate the burden of proof on compatibilists demanding that they explain how compatibilist theories of free will could satisfy our ordinary notions while at the same time motivating the metaphysically demanding libertarian theories that some incompatibilists defend (e.g., agent causation) and that other incompatibilists (skeptics) attack as impossible or implausible. On the other hand, compatibilists also appeal to commonsense intuitions, suggesting that the folk do not demand the libertarian conception of free will, which requires an ability to do otherwise purportedly incompatible with determinism. For instance, Daniel Dennett (1984b) claims that when ordinary people assign moral responsibility, it simply does not matter at all...whether the agent in question could have done otherwise in the circumstances (p. 558). Frankfurt-style cases (Frankfurt, 1969) are designed to bring to light the intuition that the freedom necessary for moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise and hence is compatible with determinism. 6 Susan Wolf (1990) motivates her compatibilist Reason View in part by claiming that it seems to accord with and account for the whole set of our intuitions about responsibility (p. 89). And William Lycan (2003) rejects the incompatibilists attempts to situate the burden of proof, arguing instead that compatibilism is the default position...not only true, but the only position rationally available to impartial observers (p. 107). 7 Obviously, to the extent that incompatibilists and compatibilists claim that their own respective positions best accord with and account for our prephilosophical intuitions, they cannot both be right. Moreover, they can t really claim to know if they are right, since no one has systematically tested to see what people s prephilosophical intuitions are. 8 It is therefore important to determine the content of these intuitions.

4 564 E. Nahmias et al. However, finding an adequate method for testing such intuitions is no easy task. Here we discuss our own attempts to collect data on folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, some difficulties facing this sort of research, and suggestions for further research. We also examine the question of what role such data about folk intuitions should play in the philosophical debate. 9 In our attempts to get at folk intuitions, we employed thought-experiment scenarios to see how ordinary people respond to different compatibilist and incompatibilist hypotheses. This data is important because any adequate philosophical analysis of free will should be, as Alfred Mele (2001) suggests, anchored by common-sense judgments about particular cases after all, if a philosophical analysis of free will runs entirely afoul of what the majority of non-philosophers say, this analysis runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter (p. 27). In this respect we also agree with Jackson (1998) that the fundamental issue in the free will debate should be whether free action according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to our ordinary conception, exists and is compatible with determinism and that to identify our ordinary conception we must appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about free action... as revealed by our intuitions about possible cases (p. 31). 10 Consider, for instance, the aforementioned claims that the majority of nonphilosophers have incompatibilist intuitions. On the surface, this is a straightforward empirical claim that entails certain predictions about how people would respond to various thought experiments. So, for example, if it were true that most nonphilosophers do share the incompatibilists intuitions, then we should expect that if they were given a thought experiment involving an (otherwise ordinary) agent in a deterministic scenario, a majority of them would not attribute free will and moral responsibility to the agent. Conversely, those compatibilists who claim that the folk share their intuitions should predict that a majority of people would attribute free will and moral responsibility to such an agent. Yet, until a concerted effort is made to probe folk intuitions and judgments via systematic psychological experiments, the truth of these sorts of empirical claims goes unchecked. We are not, however, suggesting that discovering what folk intuitions really are would resolve the free will problem. There are various responses either side could make if it turned out their view did not fit with ordinary intuitions, some of which we ll discuss below. Nonetheless, if a philosophical theory does turn out to be privileged by the endorsement of the folk, that would seem to position the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who argue contrary to folk intuitions. If it turns out that a significant majority of people make judgments that support either compatibilist or incompatibilist views, that would at least give squatters rights to whichever position has such support. At least, this seems to be the idea expressed by those incompatibilists and compatibilists quoted above who claim to have commonsense intuition on their side. Data about folk intuitions would also help situate other positions in the free will debate. For instance, some philosophers argue that ordinary intuitions are mistaken and folk concepts need to be revised or even eliminated. 11 Some offer an explanation

5 Philosophical Psychology 565 for why people have the intuitions they do about free will but why those intuitions do not in fact commit them to certain conceptual or theoretical views. 12 And some think that we have a variety of conflicting paradigms of free and responsible action, which has led philosophers to develop conflicting theories of free will (see Double, 1991, 1996). But these interesting positions still require that we first determine, rather than merely speculate about, what the folk concepts and intuitions actually are that is, what it is that needs to be explained or revised, or whether we in fact have conflicting views about free will. Hence, we must first make an earnest attempt to probe the intuitions in question. In our view, the best way to identify whether people have the intuition that determinism conflicts with free will is to survey laypersons who have not studied and hence have not been influenced by the relevant philosophical arguments about free will. Such people should be presented with scenarios portraying determinism and then asked whether they believe an agent acts in such a scenario of his or her own free will and is morally responsible. Negative responses would indicate the intuition that determinism conflicts with free will and responsibility; positive responses would indicate that people do not have this incompatibilist intuition. By collecting such data we hope to shed light on ordinary concepts and intuitions in a way that will be useful to all of the parties in the free will debate. However, as we will discuss in section 3, surveying intuitions about free will and determinism poses some particularly difficult problems. And while we have attempted to address some of these problems, we nevertheless view our studies as preliminary and exploratory and hope they will generate interest in further research. We also hope to prompt philosophers to be more explicit about the relationship between their conceptual analyses of free will and folk concepts and intuitions e.g., whether they mean to be describing, explaining, revising, or eliminating the folk s concept of free will. 2. Studies on Folk Intuitions To find out what the freedom-relevant intuitions of the folk really are we performed a number of empirical studies. These studies test the incompatibilist prediction that most people will judge that agents in a deterministic scenario do not act of their own free will and are not morally responsible for their actions Study 1: Jeremy Cases In some initial surveys we found that people do not understand the concept determinism in the technical way philosophers use it. Rather, they tend to define determinism in contrast with free will. This result alone, we suggest, does not bolster the incompatibilist position. It does not suggest that people consider determinism, as defined in (one of ) the technical ways philosophers define it, to be incompatible with free will or moral responsibility. Rather, it seems that many people think determinism means the opposite of free will, as suggested by the phrase the problem of free will and determinism. 14

6 566 E. Nahmias et al. So, in order to test whether folk judgments support incompatibilist intuitions, we developed thought experiments describing deterministic scenarios, roughly in the philosophical sense of the concept, without begging any questions by using the term determinism or describing determinism as involving constraint, fatalism, or reductionism. The first survey we ran uses a Laplacean notion of determinism. 15 Participants read the following scenario in Figure 1 (including the timeline) and answered two questions about it (then, on the back of the questionnaire, they responded to a manipulation check, were invited to explain their answer, and offered some demographic information). Scenario: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, As always, the supercomputer s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, Computer makes prediction Jeremy is born Jeremy robs bank Figure 1 Jeremy Case 1: Bank Robbing Scenario. For this study (and those discussed below), participants were undergraduates who had not studied the free will problem. 16 In pilot studies we found that some participants seemed to fail to reason conditionally (e.g., given their explanations on the back of the survey, some seemed to assume that the scenario is impossible because Jeremy has free will, rather than making judgments about Jeremy s freedom on the assumption that the scenario is actual). To correct for this problem, Question 1 asked participants whether they think the scenario is possible (the majority responded no, offering various reasons on the back of the survey). 17 Then they were then asked to suspend disbelief for the experimental question: Regardless of how you answered question 1, imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction): Do you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will? The results indicate that a significant majority of participants (76%) judged that Jeremy robs the bank of his own free will. 18

7 Philosophical Psychology 567 We wondered whether some people were inclined to judge that Jeremy acts freely because he performs a blameworthy action. Perhaps their emotional response primed them to hold him responsible for robbing the bank, and this combined with a tacit belief that responsible actions must be performed of one s own free will led some participants to answer in the way they did, masking the effect of the determinism in this case (i.e., case 1, negative action ). To test for this possibility, we ran two more sets of surveys with identical wording except that in one case (case 2, positive action ) Jeremy performs the praiseworthy act of saving a child from a burning building, and in another (case 3, neutral action ) he goes jogging. 19 However, in both these cases participants responses closely tracked those from the blameworthy case: 68% said Jeremy saves the child of his own free will, and 79% said he goes jogging of his own free will. 20 Hence, the moral status of an action, and any emotional responses it evokes, appeared to have no significant effect on judgments of free will. The majority of participants judged that Jeremy acts of his own free will in this deterministic scenario regardless of the type of action involved (see Figure 2). In order to test directly whether people judge that an agent is morally responsible for his actions in a deterministic scenario, we asked participants (in case 4): Do you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he is morally blameworthy for it? and (in case 5): Do you think that, when Jeremy saves the child, he is morally Figure 2 Judgments of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Percentage of participants who judged Jeremy acted of his own free will when he robbed a bank (negative), saved a child (positive), and went jogging (neutral), as compared with percentage of participants who judged Jeremy morally responsible when he robbed a bank (negative) and saved a child (positive).

8 568 E. Nahmias et al. praiseworthy for it? Results from these participants closely tracked those offered by participants who had responded to questions about free will (though a slightly higher proportion of participants judged that Jeremy is morally responsible than had those who judged that he acts of his own free will): 83% judged he was blameworthy in the negative case and 88% judged he was praiseworthy in the positive case (see Figure 2). 21 Since we surveyed one set of participants to make judgments about Jeremy s free will and another set to judge his moral responsibility, we can be confident that the consistency in the response patterns is not being driven by individuals trying to maintain consistency in their answers (e.g., first answering that he acted freely, then inferring that he must be morally responsible, or vice versa). This consistency accords well with philosophers claims that judgments about free will are closely related to judgments about moral responsibility. Finally, we examined whether people s judgments of an agent s ability to choose otherwise in a deterministic scenario would track judgments about his free will and moral responsibility, since philosophers disagree both about whether determinism conflicts with people s ordinary conception of the ability to do (or choose) otherwise and also about whether free will and moral responsibility require the ability to do otherwise. In these cases, participants were asked again, imagining the scenario were actual whether or not Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank (case 6), whether he could have chosen not to save the child (case 7), or whether he could have chosen not to go jogging (case 8). In the blameworthy variation, participants judgments of Jeremy s ability to choose otherwise (ACO) did in fact track the judgments of free will and responsibility we collected, with 67% responding that Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank. 22 However, in the praiseworthy case, judgments of ACO were significantly different from judgments of his free will and responsibility: Whereas a large majority of participants had judged that Jeremy is free and responsible for saving the child, a majority (62%) answered no to the question: Do you think he could have chosen not to save the child? 23 Finally, in the morally neutral case, judgments of ACO were also significantly different from judgments of free will again, whereas a large majority had judged that Jeremy goes jogging of his own free will, a majority (57%) answered no to the question: Do you think he could have chosen not to go jogging? 24 (See Figure 3.) We offer two related interpretations of these interesting results. First, the results may suggest that some folk have Frankfurtian intuitions (see note 6). That is, they think, as suggested by Frankfurt (1969), that an agent s action may be free and responsible without the agent s having the ability to do otherwise though this trend did not appear with the blameworthy actions. 25 So perhaps these intuitions are more pronounced regarding agents who perform praiseworthy (or morally neutral) actions. This would support Wolf s (1980) asymmetry thesis roughly, that we tend to judge an agent to be blameworthy only if we believe he could do otherwise, but we are willing to judge an agent to be praiseworthy even if we believe he could not

9 Philosophical Psychology 569 Figure 3 Comparison of Free Will and ACO Judgments. Comparison of percentage of participants who judged that Jeremy acted of his own free will (FW) to those who judged that he could have chosen otherwise (ACO) in robbing a bank (negative), saving a child (positive), and going jogging (neutral). do otherwise. 26 In any case, it appears that judgments of free will and responsibility can diverge from judgments about the ability to do otherwise. The main finding in Study 1 is that most people do not judge determinism at least as described in this scenario to be incompatible with an agent s acting of his own free will or with his being morally responsible for his actions. 27 Repeatedly, we found that the number of participants making judgments inconsistent with incompatibilist intuitions is two to three times greater than the number making judgments indicative of incompatibilist intuitions Study 2: Fred and Barney Cases One might object that in the Jeremy cases, by trying to avoid a question-begging description of determinism, we did not make the deterministic nature of the scenario salient enough to the participants. 29 Perhaps they were more focused on the fact that Jeremy s actions were predicted by the supercomputer than the fact that the prediction was made based on deterministic laws. (If so, it would still be an important result that most people do not judge such predictability to conflict with free will and responsibility. 30 ) To explore this possibility, we developed another scenario that, we believe, presents determinism in a different and more salient way in

10 570 E. Nahmias et al. that it points out that the agents behavior is sufficiently caused by factors beyond their control (i.e., genes and upbringing): Scenario. Imagine there is a world where the beliefs and values of every person are caused completely by the combination of one s genes and one s environment. For instance, one day in this world, two identical twins, named Fred and Barney, are born to a mother who puts them up for adoption. Fred is adopted by the Jerksons and Barney is adopted by the Kindersons. In Fred s case, his genes and his upbringing by the selfish Jerkson family have caused him to value money above all else and to believe it is OK to acquire money however you can. In Barney s case, his (identical) genes and his upbringing by the kindly Kinderson family have caused him to value honesty above all else and to believe one should always respect others property. Both Fred and Barney are intelligent individuals who are capable of deliberating about what they do. One day Fred and Barney each happen to find a wallet containing $1000 and the identification of the owner (neither man knows the owner). Each man is sure there is nobody else around. After deliberation, Fred Jerkson, because of his beliefs and values, keeps the money. After deliberation, Barney Kinderson, because of his beliefs and values, returns the wallet to its owner. Given that, in this world, one s genes and environment completely cause one s beliefs and values, it is true that if Fred had been adopted by the Kindersons, he would have had the beliefs and values that would have caused him to return the wallet; and if Barney had been adopted by the Jerksons, he would have had the beliefs and values that would have caused him to keep the wallet. Despite this seemingly potent description of complete causation by genes and environment, a significant majority of participants (76%) judged both that Fred kept the wallet of his own free will and Barney returned it of his own free will (case 9). 31 This response pattern was very similar to the pattern of participants judgments about free will in the Jeremy cases, suggesting that this scenario probed similar intuitions about the relationship between deterministic causation and free will. 32 We also tested whether participants judge that Fred is morally blameworthy for keeping the wallet and that Barney is morally praiseworthy for returning the wallet (case 10). For most participants (94%) these judgments were consistent, and the response patterns were not significantly different from the judgments we collected about free will: 60% judged that Fred is blameworthy and 64% judged that Barney is praiseworthy. 33 Finally, we tested whether participants judge that Fred and Barney could do otherwise than they did (case 11). Again, results closely tracked judgments of freedom and responsibility, with 76% of participants responding that both Fred and Barney could have done otherwise. 34 (See Figure 4.) 2.3. Discussion We suggest that in the absence of further studies contradicting our results or alternative explanations of them these studies suggest that ordinary people s pre-theoretical intuitions about free will and responsibility do not support incompatibilism. It appears to be false or certainly too hasty to claim that

11 Philosophical Psychology 571 Figure 4 Judgments of Free Will, Moral Responsibility and ACO. Percentage of subjects who judged that Fred and Barney acted of their own free will (FW), were morally responsible for their actions (MR), and could have chosen otherwise (ACO). most ordinary persons...believe there is some kind of conflict between freedom and determinism (Kane, 1999, p. 218), and that We come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists (Ekstrom, 2002, p. 310). Rather, when pretheoretic participants considered an agent (Jeremy) whose action is unerringly predicted based on the state of the universe before his birth and the laws of nature, a significant majority judged that the agent acts of his own free will and is morally responsible for the action, and this tendency shows up when the action in question is morally negative, positive, or neutral. Hence, most participants did not recognize an incompatibility between determinism described in these terms and free will or moral responsibility. Furthermore, when participants considered agents (Fred and Barney) whose beliefs, values, and actions are completely caused by their genes and upbringing, a significant majority judged that these agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. Hence, most participants did not recognize an incompatibility between determinism described in these terms and free will or moral responsibility. Judgments about the ability of agents in a deterministic scenario to do or choose otherwise were more complex and, given their important role in the philosophical debates, clearly demand more research. 35 Notice that, by claiming that most people do not express incompatibilist intuitions in these cases, we are not endorsing the stronger claim that the folk do have compatibilist intuitions. To be sure, compatibilists should take comfort from results suggesting that their opponents do not have the support of pre-theoretical intuitions on their side. Our results, however, were not unanimous we consistently found

12 572 E. Nahmias et al. a non-negligible minority of participants offering incompatibilist judgments. Such results may support the idea that individuals have conflicting intuitions about free will or moral responsibility. 36 Or they may indicate that intuitions vary significantly between different individuals who themselves have consistent intuitions. 37 Nonetheless, we think that our results place the burden of proof on the shoulders of incompatibilists. Incompatibilists are especially apt to cite folk intuitions in support of their view, in part because their conception of free will is more metaphysically demanding and therefore requires extra intuitive support to offset the strength of their claims. 38 Put simply: if our ordinary intuitions do not demand indeterminism, then why should our theories? If incompatibilists claim that compatibilism is a wretched subterfuge, a radical revision of commonsense beliefs, then we recommend that some empirical evidence should be offered to back up this claim. 3. Objections, Replies, and Philosophical Implications Our studies falsified the prediction that most lay persons will express incompatibilist intuitions by judging that agents in a deterministic scenario lack free will and moral responsibility. Again, however, we view these results as preliminary, not conclusive, and hence as motivation for further research on folk intuitions about freedom and responsibility and for further consideration of the role such intuitions should play in the free will debate. One shortcoming of our studies is that they were limited to a college student population. They should be replicated using participants with more diverse educational backgrounds and socio-economic statuses. Ideally, they would also be replicated with participants from other cultures to test whether there are important differences among various cultures conceptions of free will and moral responsibility. 39 Furthermore, the method of surveying judgments in response to scenarios, though useful for our purposes, should be combined with other methods, including coding participants responses in more open-ended interviews about the relevant concepts (see Nahmias et al., 2004), and experimentally investigating relevant behavioral responses to situations that involve people s ascriptions of moral responsibility (e.g., praising, blaming, excusing). 40 A potential problem more specific to our studies is that the presence of determinism might not have been salient enough in the scenarios. We have already explained why we think it would be problematic to use the word determinism to test whether ordinary people have incompatibilist intuitions. But if the description of determinism is overly watered down, then people may simply fail to notice its presence and therefore botch the (supposed) inference to the conclusion that agents in the scenario are not free and responsible. We agree that the more salient determinism is in the scenarios, the more significant the results would be (see Black & Tweedale, 2002). Amping up determinism, however, is not as easy as it might seem. First of all, using a technical definition of determinism would likely be impractical. For instance, using van Inwagen s (1983, pp ) definition of determinism and telling participants that, in Jeremy s world, the past and the laws of nature entail any

13 Philosophical Psychology 573 true proposition, would require providing participants with enough education to ensure that they comprehend the technical notions of proposition and entail, along with understanding necessity and indicative conditionals. It is unlikely that participants could be sufficiently educated on these issues without significant training. (We discuss below problems with using participants trained in philosophy for research like ours). Attempts to make determinism more salient without teaching participants technical notions run the risk of adding new factors that may themselves mask whatever effects determinism has on people s judgments with more obvious threats to free will. For instance, determinism would be very salient if we changed the Jeremy scenario so that his action was caused by a brilliant neuroscientist who manipulated the initial conditions of Jeremy s life in a way that she knew would inevitably lead to his specific action. Here, the deterministic causation is clear but so is the presence of a covert controller. If participants then judged that Jeremy did not act freely or was not morally responsible for his act, we would not be able to determine whether it was because their intuitions about free will and moral responsibility are responding to the determinism in the scenario or to the presence of an active manipulator. 41 It would also beg the question to describe determinism as entailing that the agent could not do otherwise, since some compatibilists disagree with incompatibilists about whether the ordinary conception of can relevant to freedom and responsibility is inconsistent with determinism. Indeed, our diverse results from participants judgments about the ability to do or choose otherwise suggest that further research will be required to understand this concept. 42 With that being said, if one is able to find a way to increase the salience of determinism without masking it with a different free-will threat, we welcome the attempt. If turning up the volume on the determinism knob of the scenarios does cause participants to withdraw their judgments of free will and moral responsibility (and if this is clearly not a result of masking determinism), then we would withdraw our current interpretation of the data. If a more clearly deterministic case does not result in more judgments of unfree and unresponsible, though, our interpretation is strengthened. In any case, the claim that people will withdraw judgments of freedom when determinism is made more salient is an empirical claim. Philosophers are well positioned to develop the relevant thought experiments to test this claim. But how people will respond to such scenarios cannot be settled from our philosophical La-Z-Boys. This response generalizes to any empirical or methodological objections to our studies. We are not closing the door on the question of whether the folk have incompatibilist intuitions; on the contrary, we are opening the door to further research exploring such questions. One significant problem facing any such test of folk intuitions about the relationship between determinism and free will is that it requires participants to reason conditionally. To determine whether or not people believe free will is compatible with determinism, it is not enough to see whether (a) they believe we have free will and (b) they believe our world (or at least its human population)

14 574 E. Nahmias et al. behaves in a deterministic way. If people believe both (a) and (b), that would strongly suggest they have a compatibilist conception of free will. But if they believe (a) but not (b), that would not show they have an incompatibilist theory after all, they may have reasons unrelated to free will for believing the world is not deterministic. Rather, incompatibilism is the belief that free will is possible only if determinism does not obtain. So, to test this belief directly, we must see what people believe about agents freedom and responsibility on the assumption that determinism does obtain. In our attempts to make determinism salient to participants, we described scenarios that many found implausible or impossible. Especially in the Jeremy study, almost all participants responded that they believed the scenario is impossible, for a variety of reasons (see note 17). Despite our efforts to induce participants to make their judgments based on a conditional acceptance of the scenario, it is likely that some did not do so, as evidenced by those who missed the manipulation check on the back of the surveys, which tested whether they recognized the deterministic nature of the scenario. Some of these participants may even have been expressing incompatibilist intuitions, e.g., by asserting that Jeremy acts of his own free will and then (mis)responding that the scenario could therefore not have been describing a fully deterministic situation. Hence, the challenge is to describe determinism in a way that participants find salient, intelligible, and somewhat believable. Our second scenario (Fred and Barney cases) seems to have satisfied these conditions better than our first, given that fewer participants responded that it was impossible and fewer missed the manipulation check. Another scenario we have used for pilot studies involves the rollback thought experiment initially advanced to probe intuitions about whether indeterminism can help secure free will (see Kane, 1999, p. 222). The scenario asks participants to imagine that the universe is re-created at a certain point in time just before a particular event (e.g., an agent s decision) with all conditions and laws being identical. Then participants can be probed on whether they believe our world is deterministic (would the same event occur every time?) and whether they believe physical events are deterministic whereas agent s decisions are not (would the same decision occur every time?). Finally, determinism can be stipulated (e.g., the same decision occurs every single time) to test whether participants think such a decision (their own or another s) is free and deserves praise or blame. Such scenarios can also be varied to test whether indeterminism (e.g., one decision occurs half the time and another occurs half the time) increases or decreases participants judgments of free will and moral responsibility. 43 Even if we are able to get participants to recognize determinism and respond based on the assumption of determinism, it may be argued that most of them are unable to recognize the implications of determinism for free will and moral responsibility. This problem can take a motivational form participants don t want to see the implications of determinism or a cognitive form they cannot comprehend the (alleged) connection between determinism and free will. The motivational problem suggests that people may be so attached to being free and responsible and to holding other people morally responsible that it is very difficult to get them to judge that agents (at least agents resembling them) are not free

15 Philosophical Psychology 575 and responsible. 44 This kind of attachment may, for example, hinder participants from recognizing the deterministic elements of scenarios like the ones we used. The idea here is that a person who harbors incompatibilist sympathies, and who views the agent(s) in a scenario as being sufficiently like himself, may fail to acknowledge the deterministic aspects of a scenario. However, if we can ensure that participants are in fact recognizing the deterministic nature of a scenario, this motivational problem should not be an issue. In this case the participants either (a) express an incompatibilist intuition by judging that the agent is not like them because he is determined (and hence respond that he, unlike them, is not free and responsible), or (b) express a compatibilist intuition by responding that the determined agent is, like themselves, free and responsible. After all, people do not need help recognizing that certain types of causal processes, such as brainwashing or direct neural manipulation, compromise free will and moral responsibility, presumably because they judge that these processes are unlike those that govern their own behavior (see note 41). Another possibility is that people want incompatibilist free will, but, if they find themselves in a situation (actual or hypothetical) without it, they will settle for a less satisfying kind of compatibilist free will instead. On this reading, folk come to the table with the intuition that to be free in the fullest sense, determinism must be false, but a less robust (but better-than-nothing) sort of freedom is available if determinism turns out to be true. 45 If accurate, this would suggest people have a libertarian conception of free will but, in lieu of that, they would accept a compatibilist conception as a moderate revision rather than giving up entirely on the idea that we are free and responsible agents. Whether or not the folk actually have this complex psychology is an interesting question that would require studies that go beyond what we have done here. In any case, there is a lesson buried in this discussion. We commonly hear that ordinary people have (or fail to have) something that might be called the incompatibilist intuition (Pereboom, 2001, p. 89) or natural incompatibilist instincts (Kane, 1999, p. 218). It is not clear what the content of this intuition, or the nature of these instincts is supposed to be. Is it a propensity to call determined people unfree? Is it a desire to have a roughly incompatibilist rather than a compatibilist kind of freedom, although either deserve the name freedom? Or is it something else entirely? In addition to knowing what theoretical work philosophers appeals to folk intuitions are supposed to be doing, we also need to know what the content of those intuitions is supposed to be. One suggestion we expect to hear is that the incompatibilist intuition is the propensity of participants to judge an agent in a deterministic scenario to be unfree but only once they recognize the implications of determinism. Thus, in order to see if people have the incompatibilist intuition, we need to help them see these implications help them overcome what we called above the cognitive form of the problem. But getting people to see the implications of a case especially a case like this, where the referent of the implications is so hotly contested is tantamount to giving the arguments in favor of one position or another. These arguments rely on premises that are themselves controversial and that are likely to be supported by

16 576 E. Nahmias et al. further appeal to intuitions. Furthermore, this does not seem a very plausible view of what the incompatibilist intuition should be: if it takes a basic incompatibilist argument to make incompatibilism the intuitive view, then it seems that it is the incompatibilists who are talking the folk into incompatibilism. At a minimum, the compatibilists would not be talking the folk out of anything, in contrast to Kane s (1999) claim that ordinary persons have to be talked out of [their] natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philosophers (p. 218). We have no doubt that many ordinary people, after some exposure to incompatibilist arguments, will make incompatibilist judgments. Similarly, people exposed to compatibilist arguments are likely to make compatibilist judgments. But as soon as philosophers provide such arguments, they are influencing people s views and shaping their intuitions. Even if a philosophy teacher is trying to maintain neutrality, it is unlikely her views will not influence the way she presents the material to her students. 46 And even if her own views don t influence her students, the material itself consists of conflicting claims meant to persuade people; getting a balanced view of the debate would require exposure to the philosophical literature seldom found outside of graduate school. Such an education would, however, compromise one s status as one of the folk whose intuitions we are trying to understand. Of course, it may be possible to test whether people s judgments change after they have studied the free will debate and whether they change in different ways depending on how they study it. Perhaps a compatibilist teacher, despite any efforts to present both sides of the debate fairly, would influence his students to respond with more compatibilist judgments, whereas an incompatibilist teacher would produce students who respond with more incompatibilist judgments. 47 If so, it would be difficult to get pre-theoretical intuitions from people who have been exposed to the relevant philosophical arguments. Perhaps we should instead be interested in the reflective intuitions of well-trained philosophers rather than folk uninformed about the complex philosophical issues surrounding free will. 48 Van Inwagen (1992, p. 58) has suggested that arguments about free will should be pitched at an audience whose members have been exposed to the best arguments on both sides of the debate but have not reached a firm conclusion about the compatibility question (see also Lycan, 2003; Mele, 1995). If our project motivates philosophers to adopt this view, that would at least be a significant result: no longer could any side claim that they have common sense on their side, since the well-trained philosopher s sense is not exactly common sense. The worry here is that a conceptual analysis that fits the reflective intuitions of well-trained philosophers may have nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter (Mele, 2001, p. 27). We face a dilemma. If free will is beholden only to the post-theoretic intuitions of philosophers, then it is a technical concept, not unlike determinism, validity, or skepticism in philosophy (or quark or momentum in physics). If it is a technical concept, then philosophers should not be particularly interested in folk intuitions about it. But this route seems problematic since the concept of free will most philosophers are interested in is the one that is necessary for moral responsibility and attributions of praise and blame. And it

17 Philosophical Psychology 577 would be strange indeed if people s actual notions of moral responsibility and their actual practices of attributing praise and blame had no important relationship to philosophers theories about them. Even if free will is a technical concept, it will have to be at least constrained by the non-technical concepts and practices of responsibility attribution if it is to do the work the philosophical community has set for it. On the other hand, if free will is not meant to be a technical philosophical concept or if it is, but it is constrained by folk intuitions about moral responsibility then philosophers should be interested in prephilosophical judgments relevant to the concept. In that case, philosophers should be interested in the facts about such judgments and the concepts they reveal. To understand what those facts are, we must consider surveying the folk; thus, folk intuitions are once again relevant. We conclude with one more reason why it is unlikely philosophers will, or should, give up talking about folk concepts and intuitions regarding free will and moral responsibility. A significant recent trend in the free will debate involves philosophers on all sides of the debate analyzing the concept of free will in the light of what we value they aim, in Dennett s (1984a) language, for a concept of free will worth wanting. Though this often means looking for a concept that supports our practices of ascribing moral responsibility, it also involves the values we place on human dignity, uniqueness, creativity, hope, and love (see, e.g., Kane, 1996, ch. 6). And philosophers have also noted that moral responsibility itself involves a range of issues, from reactive attitudes to practices of punishment and reward to moral rehabilitation (see, e.g., Pereboom, 2001). Considering the issue in this way has led to the recognition that various conceptions of free will may secure various things we value, perhaps to different degrees, and that various putative threats to free will, such as determinism, may threaten different things we value, perhaps to different degrees. For instance, as Randolph Clarke (2003) suggests, it may be that an event-causal libertarian theory (like Kane s) can secure some aspects of dignity we value even if it does not undergird moral responsibility any better than compatibilist accounts. Similarly, as Fischer and Ravizza (1998) argue, it may be that determinism precludes the freedom to act otherwise but that such freedom is not required for moral responsibility. Fischer (forthcoming) has written, The discovery that causal determinism is true would significantly alter our picture of ourselves.... But I do not believe we would need entirely to jettison...deliberation, moral responsibility, and judgments of deontic morality [which] are compatible with causal determinism and the lack of free will (in the sense involving alternative possibilities) (p. 23). These moves suggest that certain theories of free will and moral responsibility may require us to revise some, but not all, of our current concepts, beliefs, and practices about freedom and responsibility (see Vargas, forthcoming). But in order to know whether a particular theory demands revision (or even elimination) of our concepts, beliefs, or practices, we have to know what these are. And though armchair speculation may help here, it is unlikely to be sufficient especially given the vigorous debates among philosophers about what is intuitive when it comes to freedom and responsibility. Rather, we should make some attempt to get systematic,

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