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воскресенье, 31 августа 2014 г.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: On the Brink of War?

By Ariel Cohen

The messy business of
post-imperial disintegration is not over. The eruption of Russian-Ukrainian
hostilities is not the only case in point. The former Soviet republics of
Armenia and Azerbaijan are at it again, too. And there may be a connection
between the two conflicts, experts say.

After fighting a bloody
war in 1988-1994, followed by “secession” of Nagorno-Karabakh (unrecognized by
everyone, including Armenia), the occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts,
known as the Lachin Corridor, and an uneasy cease-fire, the two countries have
now been exchanging fire for over about ten days.

In a news environment dominated
by much bigger and bloodier conflicts, such as the Islamic State (formerly
known as ISIS), Syria, Gaza and Ukraine, the deadly news from the Caucasus is
barely noticed.

However, the killing of fifteen
Azerbaijani soldiers along the “line of contact” July 29-August 1 signified an
escalation in hostilities. Casualties from retaliatory action, Azeri
multiple-rocket launcher fire and overflights by the Azerbaijani air force,
indicate that the situation may deteriorate quickly.

While the United States and the
EU “expressed concern”, Russia’s Vladimir Putin decided to play peacemaker. He
will meet with Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev and Armenian president Serzh
Sargsyan in Sochi August 8-9 for separate talks. Despite a meeting between
Aliyev and Sargsyan in Vienna in November of 2013, there is no progress in
getting a permanent settlement—nor should one hold his breath over the Sochi
summit.

UN resolutions and declarations
to the contrary notwithstanding, the Armenian position remains implacable: no
territorial concessions to Azerbaijan in Karabakh. Nor is Yerevan eager to
return the seven non-Karabakh districts back to Baku.

Thus, despite the mounting
frustration, the current status quo serves Armenia. Azerbaijan, flush with oil
cash, has been building its military forces for years. Yet it is still insecure
after the defeat twenty years ago.

With a $40 billion investment
in onshore and offshore oil and gas, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline spanning the Caspian and the Mediterranean, and the Trans-Anatolian
Gas Pipeline, which will export over 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe,
and will become operational in 2018, Baku is not seeking a new war.

However, the hostilities may
not be accidental. Armenia is a faithful Russian ally. Recently, it rejected an
Association Agreement with the European Union it painstakingly negotiated for
three years, and signed up for membership in the Moscow-led Customs Union. In
the future, Armenia is likely to join the Eurasian Union. Russian military
bases remain on the Armenian territory through 2043, and Russian troops guard
Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey.

Moreover, Armenia voted in
support of Russia in the UN General Assembly regarding the annexation of
Crimea. It may use Russia’s action towards the peninsula as a model for
occupation and annexation of Karabakh. After all, Armenians may think, “if the
Moscow metropolis expands its network of unrecognized, secessionist satellites
or annexed territories (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia—and now the
Crimea), why can’t Armenia annex Karabakh?”

Azerbaijan, on its part, cast
its lot with the West—for now. Not only has it allowed unprecedented access to
its hydrocarbon resources to BP and other Western energy companies, it has
strong economic and military ties with the United States.

Baku allowed its airport to
become a massive trans-shipment point in the Northern Distribution Network,
which supplied Afghanistan, and Azeri troops were deployed there side-by-side
with NATO troops. Azerbaijani soldiers also were deployed to Iraq. Azerbaijan,
a secular, majority-Shiite country, has close relations with the Sunni Turkey
and with Israel, and imports tens of billions of dollars’ and euros’ worth of
Western goods, including Boeing airliners.

Yet, it is energy exporting
that defines Azerbaijan’s geopolitical importance. The border clashes between
Azerbaijan and Armenia are likely to remind the West that Russia’s oil- and
gas-sector sanctions, imposed because of the occupation of Crimea and the
support of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, may have “unintended
consequences.” The distance from the Armenian border to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline can be covered by a day or two of a successful tank corps thrust.
Even recurrent rocket and artillery barrages can threaten the BTC and the TANAP
gas-pipeline development.

The diplomatic tool to resolve
the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the “Minsk Group,” which
includes the United States, Russia and France, is now obsolete. It was created
in the 1990s, when diplomatic cooperation between the United States and Russia
was a norm, not an exception. Alas, times have changed. Hostility between
Moscow and Washington, and for that matter, Russia and the EU, unfortunately
makes joint diplomacy all but impossible.

With U.S. attention split from
China to Ukraine and between Al Qaeda, Hamas, the Islamic State and Al Shabab,
there is only so much Washington has the bandwidth to do. Putin’s peacekeeping
in Sochi is likely to put a Band-Aid over the current hostilities, while it is
not in Russia’s interest to bring the sides to permanent resolution of the
conflict, pack up the military base in Gyumri and go home. Nor would Armenia
want that, facing Turkish hostility, the unacceptable Turkish narrative over
the 1915 tragedy and a closed border with Ankara.

The Obama administration,
seeking a diplomatic achievement, may decide to pursue a complex diplomatic
scenario, in which Armenia returns the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts to
Baku. This can be done in exchange for opening the blocked border for trade
with Turkey and the EU, and the regional infrastructure integration for
Yerevan, including connections of its energy and transportation grids to
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey networks of pipelines and railroads.

Without trade and investment,
Armenia is doomed to underdevelopment and mass emigration to Russia, Europe and
the United States. Unfortunately, today, Russia is unlikely to approve such a
win-win solution, dooming the long-suffering neighbors to further strife.

Ariel Cohen, PhD, is Principal
at International Market Analysis, a Washington-DC based political risk, energy
and natural resources advisory firm (www.arielcohen.com)

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YOUTH PEACE PLAN OF GEORGIA

This publication is produced within the framework of the project - ‘‘Support Democratic Participation of Young Women in Building Peace and Stability in Georgia’’ implemented in Georgia by International Network for Civil Development - INCD in partnership with Young Women Experts’ Network for Peace and Security (YWEPS) and with the financial support of the Embassy of Canada through Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI).