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EFF's Deeplinks Blog: Noteworthy news from around the internetmyOscar and Pulitzer Award-Winning Journalist Laura Poitras Sues U.S. Government To Uncover Records After Years of Airport Detentions and Searcheshttps://www.eff.org/my/press/releases/oscar-and-pulitzer-award-winning-journalist-laura-poitras-sues-us-government-uncove-0
<div class="field field-name-field-pr-subhead field-type-text field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even">Poitras, Filmmaker Behind Snowden Documentary CITIZENFOUR, Searched and Questioned Every Time She Entered U.S. From 2006 to 2012</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p class="MsoNormal"><span>Washington, D.C. ­– Academy and </span>Pulitzer<span> Prize Award-winning documentary filmmaker <a target="_blank" href="https://firstlook.org/theintercept/staff/laura-poitras/">Laura Poitras</a> sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. transportation security agencies today demanding they release records documenting a six-year period in which she was searched, questioned, and often subjected to hours-long security screenings at U.S. and overseas airports on more than 50 occasions. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is representing Poitras in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, DOJ, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span><span></span>“I’m filing this lawsuit because the government uses the U.S. border to bypass the rule of law,” said Poitras. “This simply should not be tolerated in a democracy. I am also filing this suit in support of the countless other less high-profile people who have also been subjected to years of Kafkaesque harassment at the borders. We have a right to know how this system works and why we are targeted.”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Poitras is a professional journalist who won an Academy Award this year for her documentary film “<a target="_blank" href="http://www.praxisfilms.org/films/citizenfour">CITIZENFOUR</a>” about NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, shared in the 2014 </span>Pulitzer<span> for Public Service for NSA reporting, and is a recipient of a <a target="_blank" href="http://www.macfound.org/fellows/874/">MacArthur Foundation “genius” grant</a>. During frequent travel from 2006 to 2012 for work on her documentary films, Poitras was detained at the U.S. border every time she entered the country.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span><span></span>During these detentions, she was told by airport security agents that she had a criminal record (even though she does not), that her name appeared on a national security threat database, and, on one occasion, that she was on the U.S. government’s No Fly List. She’s had her laptop, camera, mobile phone, and reporter notebooks seized and their contents copied, and was once threatened with handcuffing for taking notes during her detention after border agents said her pen could be used as a weapon. The searches were conducted without a warrant and often without explanation, and no charges have ever been brought against Poitras.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>After years of targeting by security agents, Poitras last year filed FOIA requests for records naming or relating to her, including case files, surveillance records, and counterterrorism documents. But the agencies have either said they have no records, denying or ignoring her appeals for further searches, or haven’t responded at all to her requests. For example, the FBI, after not responding to Poitras’ FOIA request for a year, said in May it had located only six pages relevant to the request—and that it was withholding all six pages because of grand jury secrecy rules.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>“The government used its power to detain people at airports, in the name of national security, to target a journalist whose work has focused on the effects of the U.S. war on terror,” said David Sobel, EFF senior counsel. “In refusing to respond to Poitras’ FOIA requests and wrongfully withholding the documents about her it has located, the government is flouting its responsibility to explain and defend why it subjected a law-abiding citizen—whose work has shone a light on post-9/11 military and intelligence activities—to interrogations and searches every time she entered her country.”</span><span><span> </span></span><span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>The detentions ended in 2012 after journalist Glenn Greenwald published <a target="_blank" href="http://www.salon.com/2012/04/08/u_s_filmmaker_repeatedly_detained_at_border/">an article </a>about Poitras’ experiences and a group of documentary filmmakers submitted a <a target="_blank" href="https://deadline.com/2012/04/documentary-directors-protest-homeland-security-treatment-of-helmer-laura-poitras-254291/">petition</a> to DHS protesting her treatment. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>“We are suing the government to force it to disclose any records that would </span>show why security officials targeted Poitras for six years, even though she had no criminal record and there was no indication that she posed any security risk<span>,” said Jamie Lee Williams, an EFF attorney and the organization’s Frank Stanton Legal Fellow. “By spurning Poitras’ FOIA requests, the government leaves the impression that her detentions were a form of retaliation and harassment of a journalist whose work has focused on U.S. policy in the post-9/11 world.”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Poitras’ documentary films include the 2006 Oscar-nominated “<a target="_blank" href="http://www.praxisfilms.org/films/my-country-my-country">My Country, My Country</a>”­—a story about the Iraq war told through an Iraqi doctor and political candidate in Baghdad who was an outspoken critic of U.S. occupation. Poitras also directed and produced the Emmy-nominated “<a target="_blank" href="http://www.praxisfilms.org/films/the-oath">The Oath</a>,” a 2010 documentary film about Guantanamo Bay prison and the interrogation of Osama bin Laden’s former bodyguard days after 9/11. Poitras’ latest film, “CITIZENFOUR,” about Snowden and NSA mass surveillance, </span><span>earned her a Director’s Guild of America Award and an Oscar. </span><span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For the full complaint:<br /><a target="_blank" href="https://www.eff.org/document/poitras-foia-complaint">https://www.eff.org/document/poitras-foia-complaint</a></p>
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<div class="field field-name-field-profile-first-name field-type-text field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even">Jamie Lee</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-profile-last-name field-type-text field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even">Williams</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-profile-title field-type-text field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even">Frank Stanton Legal Fellow</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-profile-email field-type-email field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="mailto:jamie@eff.org">jamie@eff.org</a></div></div></div> </div>
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</div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Oscar+and+Pulitzer+Award-Winning+Journalist+Laura+Poitras+Sues+U.S.+Government+To+Uncover+Records+After+Years+of+Airport+Detentions+and+Searches+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fpress%2Freleases%2Foscar-and-pulitzer-award-winning-journalist-laura-poitras-sues-us-government-uncove-0" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fpress%2Freleases%2Foscar-and-pulitzer-award-winning-journalist-laura-poitras-sues-us-government-uncove-0&t=Oscar+and+Pulitzer+Award-Winning+Journalist+Laura+Poitras+Sues+U.S.+Government+To+Uncover+Records+After+Years+of+Airport+Detentions+and+Searches" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fpress%2Freleases%2Foscar-and-pulitzer-award-winning-journalist-laura-poitras-sues-us-government-uncove-0" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Oscar and Pulitzer Award-Winning Journalist Laura Poitras Sues U.S. Government To Uncover Records After Years of Airport Detentions and Searches&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fpress%2Freleases%2Foscar-and-pulitzer-award-winning-journalist-laura-poitras-sues-us-government-uncove-0" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Mon, 13 Jul 2015 16:33:52 +0000Karen Gullo86865 at https://www.eff.orgDefending Privacy at the Israeli Border: Information for Travelers Carrying Digital Devices https://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2012/06/defending-privacy-israeli-border-information-travelers-carrying-digital-devices
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>As we’ve <a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">acknowledged before</a>, our lives are increasingly contained on our digital devices, which makes travel—and the decisions we make about what to carry with us—increasingly complicated. </p>
<p>A recent case in which two young travelers to Israel were requested not simply to provide their laptops for arbitrary searches, but to <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/04/israel-airport-email-search_n_1569163.html">log in to their e-mail accounts and allow Israeli officials to search through their e-mail</a> for specific strings and correspondence highlights the increasing obstacles to privacy that travelers face, as well as the increasingly global nature of security theatre.</p>
<p>In that particular case, the two young women—both of Palestinian origin—complied with officials’ requests but were nonetheless detained overnight before being deported. In another, similar case, a U.S. citizen who refused access to her email was told she was probably hiding something and was refused entry to the country. Israeli security (Shin Bet) told a <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-airport-security-demands-access-to-tourists-private-email-accounts.premium-1.434509">reporter</a> that “the actions taken by the agents during questioning were within the organization's authority according to Israeli law.”</p>
<p>Not unlike travelers to the U.S., travelers to Israel face serious privacy challenges at the border. The government generally has broad authority to search through your personal possessions, including your laptop, for any reason at all. When you cross the border to Israel, the Israeli government retains the authority to question you and examine your belongings, which it interprets as also allowing it to go through your electronic devices and computer files. More recently, authorities have also been known to <a href="http://mondoweiss.net/2012/06/do-you-feel-more-arab-or-more-american-two-arab-american-womens-story-of-being-detained-and-interrogated-at-ben-gurion.html">demand user passwords to online accounts</a>.</p>
<p>As we state in our guide to U.S. border searches:</p>
<blockquote><p>For doctors, lawyers, and many business professionals, these border searches can compromise the privacy of sensitive professional information, including trade secrets, attorney-client and doctor-patient communications, research and business strategies, some of which a traveler has legal and contractual obligations to protect. For the rest of us, searches that can reach our personal correspondence, health information, and financial records are reasonably viewed as an affront to privacy and dignity and inconsistent with the values of a free society.</p></blockquote>
<p>EFF recently asked <a href="http://2jk.org/english/">Jonathan Klinger</a>, an Israeli attorney, for his thoughts on the law and government practices that apply to searches at the Israeli border, and here is his analysis.</p>
<p><b><i>The Situation at the Israeli Border</i></b></p>
<p>At the Israeli border, there are some limited legal protections against the search itself. Based on a collection of experiences, however, it seems that mentioning these protections to border officials can be considered antagonism, and can limit your ability to enter Israel. Those concerned about the security and privacy of the information on their devices at the border should therefore use technological measures in an effort to protect their data. They can also choose not to take private data across the border with them at all, and then use technical measures to retrieve it from abroad.</p>
<p>There is, however, little to prevent a scenario in which one’s email is searched, as refusal to allow the search may result in deportation. With that in mind, concerned travelers should think ahead and review their online accounts before traveling.</p>
<p><b><i>Why Can My Devices Be Searched at the Border?</i></b></p>
<p>Article 7 of Israel's Basic Statute of Human Dignity and Freedom<a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref1_criwxhe" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/184_001.htm" href="#footnote1_criwxhe">1</a> states that every person is entitled to his privacy, and that his property may not be searched, apart from where it is required under legal authority. This <i>generally </i>means that the government has to show probable cause that a crime has been committed and get a warrant before it can search a location or item in which you have a reasonable expectation of privacy; moreover, a recent Supreme Court ruling stated that there is no such thing called <i>consensual search,</i><a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref2_2h23is2" title="RCA 10141/09 Abraham Ben-Haim v. State, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/09/410/101/n10/09101410.n10.htm" href="#footnote2_2h23is2">2</a> and where there is no probable cause, the state cannot rely on a person's consent in order to search in his possessions. But searches at places where people enter or leave Israel are subject to different statutes. The two applicable statutes are the Aviation Act (Security in Civil Aviation), 1977<span><a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref3_b129wro" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/162_037.htm" href="#footnote3_b129wro">3</a></span>and the General Security Service Act, 2002<span><a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref4_w7886i7" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/p220k4_001.htm" href="#footnote4_w7886i7">4</a></span>; the two acts altogether provide two different state authorities the right to search on a person's body and in his property. However, they do not refer to computer searches at all.</p>
<p>The Aviation Act allows security personnel, police officers, soldiers and members of the civil defense forces to search at border crossings if <i>“the search is required, in [the officer's] opinion, to keep the public's safety or if he suspects that the person unlawfully carries weapons or explosives, or that the vehicle, the plane or the goods has weapons or explosives.</i>”</p>
<p>Similarly, the General Security Service Act states that in order to prevent unlawful activities, secure persons or any other activity that the government authorized with the approval of the Knesset committee for the Shin Bet<span><a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref5_p52sl0f" title="The Shin Bet is Israel’s internal security service." href="#footnote5_p52sl0f">5</a> to perform, any employee of the Shin Bet (the service) may search a person's body, property, baggage or other goods and collect information, as long as the person is present.</span></p>
<p>Only in extreme cases, where there is an object that needs to be seized for a vital role in the Shin Bet's activity, can the Shin Bet also search without a person's presence.</p>
<p>However, nothing in these acts authorizes computer searches. Recently, the Israeli Justice office proposed a new anti-terror bill,<a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref6_0gk1ocs" title="http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/77CD3245-3A1D-4F8E-AA54-5D8C25344888/29272/611.pdf" href="#footnote6_0gk1ocs">6</a> which is yet to pass through the legislative process. This Anti-Terror bill does request to correct the current General Security Service act to specifically state that computers may be searched.</p>
<p><b><i>How the Government Searches Devices at the Border</i></b></p>
<p>There are three government agencies primarily responsible for inspecting travelers and items entering Israel: the General Security Service (Shin Bet), The Customs Authority and the Immigration authority.</p>
<p>The law gives the Shin Bet and other officials a great deal of discretion to inspect items coming into the country. There is no official policy published in respect to border search of electronic devices and accounts. And when recently requested to comment, the Shin Bet <a href="http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/90/2539014">stated</a> that its acts are “according to law.”</p>
<p>Recently, the Israeli Foreign Ministry admitted that it <a href="http://www.haaretz.co.il/captain/net/1.1180083">used Facebook</a> in order to create a blacklist of activists who were then—<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-official-40-of-names-on-shin-bet-fly-in-blacklist-were-not-activists-1.424470">along with a number of uninvolved and mistakenly identified individuals</a>—banned entry to the country amidst the Flytilla events. If you are active on one or more social networks and express opinions about Israel, you carry a greater risk of being profiled and selected for search.</p>
<p>Keep in mind that the Shin Bet can keep your computer or copies of your data for “<i>the time required for the seizure.”</i> There is no specific consideration regarding forensic practices and the ways that your computer files may be copied during the seizure. This is unlike the Israeli Criminal Procedure Order (Arrest and Search), 1969,<a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref7_xukzlcx" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/055_128.htm" href="#footnote7_xukzlcx">7</a> which deals specifically with the forensic procedures of copying computer materials and requires two witnesses for any file duplication.</p>
<p>The Israeli Customs Authority, under Article 184,<a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref8_8tbsp0p" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/265_001.htm#Seif200" href="#footnote8_8tbsp0p">8</a> allows any customs official to search every person for contraband or drugs given probable cause. Moreover, the customs official may also request urine, blood or saliva samples and request persons to undress. However, nothing in the law allows them to search through computer materials.</p>
<p>In short, border agents have a lot of latitude to search electronic devices at the border or take them elsewhere for further inspection for a short period of time, whether or not they suspect a traveler has done anything wrong.</p>
<p>We do not have the exact numbers or methods of how such searches are handled, and the Shin Bet is exempt from the Israeli Freedom of Information Act.<a class="see-footnote" id="footnoteref9_khm2bdk" title="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/144M1_001.htm" href="#footnote9_khm2bdk">9</a>;However, the frequency of technology-oriented searches at the border may increase in the future. Researchers and vendors are creating tools to make forensic analysis faster and more effective, and, over time, forensic analysis will require less skill and training. Law enforcement agencies may be tempted to use these tools more often and in more circumstances as their use becomes easier.</p>
<p>Travelers should consider taking the same precautions outlined in <a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">EFF’s guide to carrying digital devices across the United States border</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul class="footnotes"><li class="footnote" id="footnote1_criwxhe"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref1_criwxhe">1.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/184_001.htm">http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/184_001.htm</a></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote2_2h23is2"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref2_2h23is2">2.</a> RCA 10141/09 Abraham Ben-Haim v. State, <a href="http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/09/410/101/n10/09101410.n10.htm">http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/09/410/101/n10/09101410.n10.htm</a></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote3_b129wro"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref3_b129wro">3.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/162_037.htm">http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/162_037.htm</a><span></span></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote4_w7886i7"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref4_w7886i7">4.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/p220k4_001.htm">http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/p220k4_001.htm</a><span></span></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote5_p52sl0f"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref5_p52sl0f">5.</a> The Shin Bet is Israel’s internal security service.</li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote6_0gk1ocs"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref6_0gk1ocs">6.</a> <a href="http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/77CD3245-3A1D-4F8E-AA54-5D8C25344888/29272/611.pdf">http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/77CD3245-3A1D-4F8E-AA54-5D8C25344888/29272/611.pdf</a></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote7_xukzlcx"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref7_xukzlcx">7.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/055_128.htm">http://www.nevo.co.il/Law_html/law01/055_128.htm</a></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote8_8tbsp0p"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref8_8tbsp0p">8.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/265_001.htm#Seif200">http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/265_001.htm#Seif200</a></li>
<li class="footnote" id="footnote9_khm2bdk"><a class="footnote-label" href="#footnoteref9_khm2bdk">9.</a> <a href="http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/144M1_001.htm">http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/144M1_001.htm</a></li>
</ul></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/international">International</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Defending+Privacy+at+the+Israeli+Border%3A+Information+for+Travelers+Carrying+Digital+Devices+++https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F06%2Fdefending-privacy-israeli-border-information-travelers-carrying-digital-devices" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F06%2Fdefending-privacy-israeli-border-information-travelers-carrying-digital-devices&t=Defending+Privacy+at+the+Israeli+Border%3A+Information+for+Travelers+Carrying+Digital+Devices++" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F06%2Fdefending-privacy-israeli-border-information-travelers-carrying-digital-devices" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Defending Privacy at the Israeli Border%3A Information for Travelers Carrying Digital Devices &url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F06%2Fdefending-privacy-israeli-border-information-travelers-carrying-digital-devices" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Mon, 25 Jun 2012 17:51:59 +0000Jillian York and Jonathan Klinger71062 at https://www.eff.orgAppellate Court to Rehear Expansive Border Search Casehttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2012/03/appellate-court-rehear-expansive-border-search-case
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>When it comes to the government's ability to search your electronic devices at the border, we've always maintained that the border is not an <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/eff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes">"anything goes"</a> zone, and that the Fourth Amendment doesn't allow the government to search whatever it wants for any (or no) reason at all. And this week, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to rehear a case that gave the government carte blanche to search through electronic devices at the border.</p>
<p>In September 2011, EFF and the <a href="http://www.nacdl.org/">National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers</a> filed an <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/FiledCottermanAmicusBrief_0.pdf">amicus brief</a> (PDF) before the Ninth Circuit, asking it to rehear its decision in <em><a href="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/30/09-10139.pdf">United States v. Cotterman</a> </em>(PDF), which dramatically expanded the "border search" doctrine that generally allows law enforcement to search a person coming across the international border without a warrant or any suspicion of wrong doing. <em>Cotterman </em>involved a man who attempted to cross into the United States from Mexico at the Arizona border. Customs agents kept him at the border for 8 hours without suspecting him of carrying anything illegal. They seized two laptops and a digital camera without a search warrant, and transported them 170 miles to Tuscon. Still without a search warrant, they searched the hard drives and computers for two days, until they found child pornography on the computers and arrested Cotterman. A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit found the warrantless search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a "border search," despite the fact the search took place far from the actual border. Our amicus brief echoed the warning of dissenting judge Betty Fletcher, who wrote that the majority's decision “gives the Government a free pass to copy, review, categorize, and even read all of that information in the hope that it will find some evidence of any crime.”</p>
<p>On Monday, the entire court took our (and Judge Fletcher's) warning into account and agreed to <a href="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/03/19/0910139ebo.pdf">rehear the case</a> (PDF). In reconsidering the case and the implications it has for all international travelers coming into the United States, we're hopeful the court will get it right this time, and find such a dangerous expansion of the "border search" doctrine unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. And while waiting for the court's decision, international travellers entering the United States should check out our guide for protecting your electronics during international travel, "<a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">Defending Privacy at the U.S. Border: A Guide for Travelers Carrying Digital Devices</a>."</p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-related-cases field-type-node-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Cases:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/cases/us-v-arnold">US v. Arnold</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Appellate+Court+to+Rehear+Expansive+Border+Search+Case+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F03%2Fappellate-court-rehear-expansive-border-search-case" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F03%2Fappellate-court-rehear-expansive-border-search-case&t=Appellate+Court+to+Rehear+Expansive+Border+Search+Case" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F03%2Fappellate-court-rehear-expansive-border-search-case" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Appellate Court to Rehear Expansive Border Search Case&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2012%2F03%2Fappellate-court-rehear-expansive-border-search-case" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 21 Mar 2012 22:55:15 +0000Hanni Fakhoury70070 at https://www.eff.orgNew Year's Resolution: Full Disk Encryption on Every Computer You Ownhttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2011/12/newyears-resolution-full-disk-encryption-every-computer-you-own
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>The New Year is upon us, and you might be partaking in the tradition of making a resolution for the coming year. This year, why not make a resolution to protect your data privacy with one of the most powerful tools available? Commit to <em>full disk encryption</em> on each of your computers.</p>
<p>Many of us now have private information on our computers: personal records, business data, e-mails, web history, or information we have about our friends, family, or colleagues. Encryption is a great way to ensure that your data will remain safe when you travel or if your laptop is lost or stolen. Best of all, it's free. So don't put off taking security steps that can help protect your private data. Join EFF in resolving to encrypt your disks 2012.</p>
<p>Here's some basic info about full disk encryption. You can read this and much more (including information on password security) in our <a href="https://www.eff.org/document/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">recent whitepaper</a> on protecting privacy at the border.</p>
<p>Full disk encryption uses mathematical techniques to scramble data so it is unintelligible without the right key. This mathematical protection works independently of the policies configured in the operating system software. A different operating system or computer cannot just decide to allow access, because no computer or software can make any sense of the data without access to the right key.</p>
<p>Without encryption, forensic software can easily be used to bypass an account password and read all the files on your computer.</p>
<p>Fortunately, modern computer systems come with comparatively easy full-disk encryption tools that let you encrypt the contents of your hard drive with a passphrase that will be required when you start your computer. Using these tools is the most fundamental security precaution for computer users who have confidential information on their hard drives and are concerned about losing control over their computers — not just at a border crossing, but at any moment during a trip when a computer could be lost or stolen.<strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>Choosing a Disk Encryption Tool</strong></p>
<p>Choosing encryption tools is sometimes challenging because there are so many options available. For the best security, choose a full-disk encryption tool that encrypts everything on your computer rather than a file-encryption tool that encrypts individual files separately. This may need to be set up at the time your operating system is first installed. Every major operating system now comes with encryption options.</p>
<ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitLocker_Drive_Encryption">Microsoft BitLocker</a> in its most secure mode is the gold standard because it protects against more attack modes than other software. Unfortunately, Microsoft has only made it available with certain versions of Microsoft Windows.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.truecrypt.org/">TrueCrypt</a> has the most cross-platform compatibility.</li>
<li>Mac OS X and most Linux distributions have their own full-disk encryption software built in.</li>
</ul><p>For more detailed information about the advantages and disadvantages of various tools, check out this <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_disk_encryption_software">Wikipedia article</a> comparing full-disk encryption software.</p>
<p><strong>Make a Strong Passphrase and Don't Lose It</strong></p>
<p>Full-disk encryption is most effective if you make a strong passphrase using a technique like <a href="http://www.diceware.com/">Diceware</a>. This or other modern passphrase-making techniques can produce a strong but memorable passphrase.</p>
<p>Remember that access to your data is dependent on having access to your passphrase. By design, if you lose it, your computer and data will be completely unusable. So, <strong>make sure your passphrase won't be lost</strong>! For many people, this could involve writing it down and keeping a copy someplace different from where you keep your computer. (You can combine your encryption resolution with a resolution to make regular backups, if you're not already doing so. And you can also choose to encrypt your backups.)</p>
<p>Full disk encryption is one of the most important steps you can take to protect the privacy of your data. If you haven't done it yet, <strong>resolve to encrypt in 2012.</strong></p>
<p>Read our whitepaper on Defending Privacy at the U.S. Border: A Guide for Travelers Carrying Digital Devices:<br /><a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices</a></p>
<p>Take the border privacy quiz:<br /><a href="https://www.eff.org/pages/border-search-quiz">https://www.eff.org/pages/border-search-quiz</a></p>
<p>Sign the petition calling on DHS to publish clear standards of handling sensitive data collected at the border:<br /><a href="https://action.eff.org/o/9042/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=8341">https://action.eff.org/o/9042/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=8341</a></p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/security">Security</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=New+Year%27s+Resolution%3A+Full+Disk+Encryption+on+Every+Computer+You+Own+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F12%2Fnewyears-resolution-full-disk-encryption-every-computer-you-own" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F12%2Fnewyears-resolution-full-disk-encryption-every-computer-you-own&t=New+Year%27s+Resolution%3A+Full+Disk+Encryption+on+Every+Computer+You+Own" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F12%2Fnewyears-resolution-full-disk-encryption-every-computer-you-own" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=New Year%27s Resolution%3A Full Disk Encryption on Every Computer You Own&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F12%2Fnewyears-resolution-full-disk-encryption-every-computer-you-own" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Sat, 31 Dec 2011 20:47:03 +0000Seth Schoen68049 at https://www.eff.orgEFF To Appeals Court: Border Is Not An “Anything Goes” Zonehttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2011/09/eff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>EFF has <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/border-search-answers">long been committed</a> to helping international travelers <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/protecting-yourself-suspicionless-searches-while-t">protect their electronic devices and digital data</a> at the U.S. border. We're continuing to push for some legal limits on the government’s sweeping authority to search electronic devices at the border with an amicus brief we recently filed along with the <a href="http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/publicwelcome?opendocument">National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers</a> (NACDL), urging the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to rehear and reverse its disturbing decision in <a href="http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/30/09-10139.pdf">United States v. Cotterman</a> (pdf).</p>
<p>Cotterman was coming into the United States from Mexico at the Lukeville Port of Entry in Arizona. Without suspecting he was carrying anything illegal, customs officers detained him at the border for 8 hours before letting him enter the country. The agents confiscated two laptops and a digital camera, and took them 170 miles away to Tucson for forensic examination. The next day, without a warrant or any suspicion that the electronic devices contained anything illegal, agents imaged three hard drives on the computers and reviewed pictures on the digital camera. After two days of forensic examination, the agents ultimately found child pornography on the computers.</p>
<p>The appellate court found the three-day search and seizure reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, despite the absence of any individual suspicion of wrongdoing or a search warrant. A dissenting judge warned that the decision “gives the Government a free pass to copy, review, categorize, and even read all of that information in the hope that it will find <i>some</i> evidence of <i>any</i> crime.”</p>
<p>In our amicus brief, written by Michael Price and Malia Brink of the NACDL, we urge the court to reconsider its decision, which we caution leads to a border where government officials – not the Constitution – dictate the legal boundaries of a search. The Fourth Amendment, while relaxed at the border, demands more than just a free pass for the government to search whatever it wants for no reason at all.</p>
<p>While we wait and hope the court reverses its decision, check out our most recent <a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/defending-privacy-us-border-guide-travelers-carrying-digital-devices">guide to protecting electronic devices and data at the U.S. border</a> to learn about the affirmative steps <i>you</i> can take to keep your data safe and private.</p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-files field-type-file field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Files:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="" title="application/pdf" src="/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png" /> <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/filedcottermanamicusbrief_0.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=109140">FiledCottermanAmicusBrief.pdf</a></span></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/transparency">Transparency</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-related-cases field-type-node-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Cases:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/cases/foia-litigation-border-searches">Border Searches </a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=EFF+To+Appeals+Court%3A+Border+Is+Not+An+%E2%80%9CAnything+Goes%E2%80%9D+Zone+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F09%2Feff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F09%2Feff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes&t=EFF+To+Appeals+Court%3A+Border+Is+Not+An+%E2%80%9CAnything+Goes%E2%80%9D+Zone" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F09%2Feff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=EFF To Appeals Court%3A Border Is Not An %E2%80%9CAnything Goes%E2%80%9D Zone&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F09%2Feff-appeals-court-border-not-anything-goes" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 21 Sep 2011 22:49:40 +0000Hanni Fakhoury61526 at https://www.eff.orgLine Noise: Electronic Device Search and Seizurehttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2011/08/line-noise-electronic-device-search-and-seizure
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>EFF activist Eva Galperin interviews EFF criminal defense attorney, Hanni Fakhoury, on the newest edition of <a href="https://www.eff.org/linenoise">Line Noise</a>, the EFF podcast. Whether law enforcement wants to search your home computer, tries to browse through your smart phone at a traffic stop, or seeks to thumb through your camera at customs, you should know your rights. </p>
<p>Learn more about your privacy rights by reading our <a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/know-your-rights">Know Your Rights</a> guide, or test your skills with our <a href="https://www.eff.org/pages/know-your-digital-rights-quiz">quiz</a>.</p>
<p>This edition of Line Noise was recorded on-site from the San Francisco studio of <a href="http://www.Bamm.tv">Bamm.tv</a></p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/search-incident-arrest">Search Incident to Arrest</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Line+Noise%3A+Electronic+Device+Search+and+Seizure+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F08%2Fline-noise-electronic-device-search-and-seizure" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F08%2Fline-noise-electronic-device-search-and-seizure&t=Line+Noise%3A+Electronic+Device+Search+and+Seizure" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F08%2Fline-noise-electronic-device-search-and-seizure" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Line Noise%3A Electronic Device Search and Seizure&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2011%2F08%2Fline-noise-electronic-device-search-and-seizure" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 03 Aug 2011 19:57:32 +0000rainey Reitman61460 at https://www.eff.orgCommon Sense and Security: Body Scanners, Accountability, and $2.4 Billion Worth of Security Theaterhttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2010/11/common-sense-and-security-body-scanners
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>The Transportation Security Administration is feeling <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2010-11-18-1Aairports18_CV_N.htm">public heat</a> these days over its combination of whole-body-image scanners and heavy-handed pat-down searches, and deservedly so. </p>
<p>There’s no question that reform is needed to curtail TSA’s excesses. We especially applaud the Electronic Privacy Information Center’s <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/">efforts</a> to increase public awareness about the body scanners. But will the heat now being generated produce the kind of light we really need? </p>
<p>Consider, for instance, the all-too-common <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/11/17/EDFA1GCSMF.DTL">response</a> that we need to<br />
accept the indignity and invasiveness of the body scanners and pat-down searches in order to be safer. That response assumes that body scanners actually make us safer — a dubious assumption that we explore below.</p>
<h3>Do Body Scanners Address the Problem They Were Intended to Address?</h3>
<p>Unlikely.</p>
<p>Body scanners are touted as a solution to the problem of detecting explosive devices that evade traditional metal detectors. The recent hard push for body scanners took off after Christmas 2009, when the so-called "underwear bomber," Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to board an airplane while allegedly concealing in his underpants a package containing nearly 3 oz of the chemical powder PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate). Within a few days, Sen. Joseph Lieberman <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&amp;sid=a4fzip9qPK44">called</a> for more widespread use of the full-body scanners. </p>
<p>Indeed, TSA Administrator John Pistole <a href="http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&amp;ContentRecord_id=9ad9e372-c415-4758-805a-4b4a295ccb8b&amp;ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&amp;Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a">told</a> Congress last week that body scanners (which TSA calls Advanced Imaging Technology, or AIT) are "the most effective technology for detecting small threat items concealed on passengers, such as explosives used by Abdulmutallab."</p>
<p>Yet there’s no publicly available evidence that body scanners counter the threat from explosive powders. What we do know makes us extremely skeptical.</p>
<ul><li>A <a href="http://epic.org/open_gov/foia/TSA_Procurement_Specs.pdf">TSA document</a>, which EPIC obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, shows that the scanners were intended to detect weapons, traditional explosives (C4, plastique, etc.), and liquids — but not powder (page 10).</li>
<li>The Government Accountability Office (GAO) <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf">says</a> that "it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information the GAO has received."</li>
<li>Ben Wallace, a member of Parliament who was formerly involved in a project to develop the scanners for airport use, said trials had shown that materials such as powder, liquid or thin plastic — as well as the passenger's clothing — went undetected. According to Wallace, the millimeter waves pass through low-density materials. High-density material such as metal knives, guns and dense plastic such as C4 explosive reflect the millimeter waves and leave an image of the object. He added that X-ray scanners were also <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/are-planned-airport-scanners-just-a-scam-1856175.html">unlikely to have detected the Christmas Day bomb</a>.</li>
<li>German border police <a href="http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1599386.php/Folds-in-clothes-confuse-full-body-scanners-German-police-find">recently reported</a> folds in clothing were confusing the body scanners used at Hamburg Airport (the L-3 ProVision Automatic Threat Detection system). "NDR radio said the devices, introduced in September, had repeatedly given warnings about innocent passengers, mainly because of folds in clothes. It quoted guards saying the devices were unreliable in scanning through many layers of clothing too."</li>
</ul><h3>The Real Costs of Security Theater</h3>
<p>Even assuming that there were some security value to the body scanners, an obvious question remains: are they worth it? The scanners cost about $170,000 each. The number of scanners <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2010-11-18-1Aairports18_CV_N.htm">jumped</a> from 40 at the start of this year to 373 installed at 68 airports across the USA as of last week. The TSA is scheduled to deploy 500 scanners by December 31, and a total of 1,000 by the end of 2011. The GAO estimates the direct costs over their expected 7-year-life cycle at $2.4 billion. That doesn’t include the costs to passengers, such as missed flights and lost dignity.</p>
<p>A former chief security officer of the Israel Airport Authority who helped design the security at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport <a a=""> the scanners are "expensive and useless . . . That's why we haven't put them in our airport."</a></p>
<p>This is especially troubling given that only a year ago, TSA abandoned its vaunted <a href="http://blog.tsa.gov/2009/05/explosive-trace-detection.html">"puffer machines"</a> or explosives trace portals (ETP). TSA estimated the cost of the failed ETP program at approximately $29.6 million, but it’s unclear whether this figure includes more than the cost of the machines (i.e., TSA’s costs of staffing the puffers, or removing them, or the costs to passengers). </p>
<p>We think Professor Jeffrey Rosen got it right when he <a href="http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/nude-awakening">wrote</a>: "the sacrifice these machines require of our privacy is utterly pointless." </p>
<h3>We Should Know the Truth, but We Don’t.</h3>
<p>A huge part of the problem is that we aren’t being told the truth about body scanners. This lack of accountability prevents meaningful public debate. </p>
<p>Without objective information about efficacy, we’re easily drawn into an unnecessary and empty battle of buzzwords masquerading as "values": security and safety versus privacy and freedom. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-75_Mar10.pdf">Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General report</a> evaluating TSA screening technologies is a good example of what the government is keeping secret. </p>
<p>The unclassified summary states: "We evaluated Advanced Imaging Technology, Advanced Technology X-ray equipment, and Liquid Container Screening, all used to screen passengers or their carry-on items. We also tested Transportation Security Officer performance in checking passengers’ travel documents. . . We identified vulnerabilities in the screening process at the passenger screening checkpoint at the eight domestic airports where we conducted testing."</p>
<p>Sounds useful. Unfortunately... "The number of tests conducted, the names of the airports tested, and the quantitative and qualitative results of our testing are classified." Sigh.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, TSA <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/18/tsa-enhanced-imaging-kept-illegal-dangerous-items-plans-year">continues to defend the scanners</a>: "This year alone, the use of advanced imaging technology has led to the detection of over 130 prohibited, illegal or dangerous items." TSA would not disclose exactly what those items were, but it said they included weapons like ceramic knives and various drugs — including a syringe filled with heroin hidden in a passenger’s underwear. </p>
<p>Leaving aside the obvious — that "various drugs" have nothing to do with weapon or bomb detection, and that "prohibited, illegal or dangerous items" (say, a Swiss Army knife) don’t equal a true terrorist threat — the public should be offended by TSA’s selective disclosure of information for PR gain.</p>
<p>Good information isn’t just about accountability — it’s also about not wasting money on useless technology. The GAO <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf">routinely criticizes</a> TSA for not doing cost-benefit analysis. "While we recognize that TSA is taking action to address a vulnerability of the passenger checkpoint exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, we continue to believe that, given TSA’s expanded deployment strategy, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of TSA’s AIT deployment is important." (Whether such cost-benefit analysis will ever include the cost to the traveling public of enduring intrusive security checks, we don’t know.)</p>
<p>This rush to install new technology is a large part of why the "puffer machines" failed. As GAO <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10128.pdf">observed</a>: "TSA has relied on technologies in day-to-day airport operations that have not been demonstrated to meet their functional requirements in an operational environment."</p>
<p>TSA’s excuse: "TSA officials told us that they deployed the ETP despite performance problems because officials wanted to quickly respond to emergent threats."</p>
<p>Seems like déjà vu.</p>
<h3>Demanding Better Solutions</h3>
<p>The opposition to body scanners isn’t opposition to safety or security. As one expert noted, many of the people who have little tolerance for the current iteration of airport security also want the government to work aggressively to prevent terrorist attacks. Joseph Schwieterman, a Chicago-based transportation expert, <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/19/national/main7070150.shtml">told The Associated Press</a>. "I think Americans, in their hearts, still feel airport security is just a big show — form over substance. So they're impatient with strategies they feel are just there to placate political demands rather the genuine security threats."</p>
<p>They’re right to be impatient. The current system is exceedingly expensive, has not been proven to be effective and may not even be able to identify "underwear bombers" — the purported reason for all of these invasive scans in the first place. The numbers are in and they don’t add up. </p>
<p>We are sacrificing our dignity and civil liberties for a process that doesn’t work.</p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/transparency">Transparency</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/privacy">Privacy</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-related-cases field-type-node-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Cases:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/foia/dhs-passenger-data">DHS Passenger Data</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Common+Sense+and+Security%3A++Body+Scanners%2C+Accountability%2C+and+%242.4+Billion+Worth+of+Security+Theater+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Fcommon-sense-and-security-body-scanners" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Fcommon-sense-and-security-body-scanners&t=Common+Sense+and+Security%3A++Body+Scanners%2C+Accountability%2C+and+%242.4+Billion+Worth+of+Security+Theater" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Fcommon-sense-and-security-body-scanners" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Common Sense and Security%3A Body Scanners%2C Accountability%2C and %242.4 Billion Worth of Security Theater&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Fcommon-sense-and-security-body-scanners" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 24 Nov 2010 20:31:23 +0000Lee Tien61181 at https://www.eff.orgEFF's Guide to Protecting Electronic Devices and Data at the U.S. Border https://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2010/11/effs-guide-protecting-devices-data-border
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>Amid recent reports that <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20012253-245.html">security</a> <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/hacker-border-search">researchers</a> have experienced difficulties at the United States border after traveling abroad, we realized that it's been awhile since we <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/protecting-yourself-suspicionless-searches-while-t">last</a> <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/05/border-search-answers">discussed</a> how to safeguard electronic devices and digital information during border searches. So just in time for holiday travel and the <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/wiki/Welcome">27th Chaos Communication Congress</a> in Berlin, here's EFF's guide for protecting your devices and sensitive data at the United States border.</p>
<h3>The Government Has Broad Legal Authority to Search Laptops, Phones, Cameras, and Other Devices at the U.S. Border.</h3>
<p>The <a href="http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/billofrights#amendmentiv">Fourth Amendment</a> to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable government searches and seizures. This generally means that the government has to get a warrant to search a location or item in which you have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Searches at places where people enter or leave the country are considered "reasonable" simply because they happen at the border or its functional equivalent, such as an international airport. </p>
<p>While the Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue, several courts have considered whether the government needs even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to search a traveler's laptop at the border, and have regrettably decided that the answer is no. <i>E.g.</i>, <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3466693142221283970"><i>United States v. Arnold</i></a>, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=70312934064490790"><i>United States v. Romm</i></a>, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006); <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3610259289266211532"><i>United States v. McAuley</i></a>, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 979 (W.D. Tex. 2008).</p>
<p>The unfortunate upshot of these decisions is that a border agent has the legal authority to search your electronic devices at the border, even if he has no reason to think that you've done anything wrong. Several bills have been introduced in Congress over the past few years to protect travelers from these suspicionless border searches, but none of them has passed.</p>
<p>Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have published their policies on searching electronic devices at the border, and the <a href="http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-technology-and-liberty/abidor-v-napolitano">ACLU</a> is challenging their constitutionality in court. According to CBP's <a href="http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/elec_mbsa.ctt/elec_mbsa.pdf">policy</a>, your computer or copies of your data can be kept for a "brief, reasonable" amount of time to be searched on- or off-site, ordinarily not more than five days. ICE's <a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf">policy</a> says that searches of devices and copies of data will typically be completed within 30 days. Anecdotal reports suggest that travelers' devices are sometimes detained for significantly longer periods of time.</p>
<p>Searches of devices that are conducted at a time and/or place removed from the initial border stop can become extended border searches that require reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, or even regular searches that require a probable cause warrant. <i>See, e.g.</i>, <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10914228591381322528"><i>United States v. Cotterman</i></a>, No. CR 07-1207-TUC-RCC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14300 (D. Az. Feb. 24, 2009) (reasonable suspicion required to search laptop detained for two days and moved 170 miles from the border), <i>appeal docketed</i>, No. 09-10139 (9th Cir. April 7, 2009); <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/USvHanson.pdf"><i>United States v. Hanson</i></a>, No. CR 09-00946 JSW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61204 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2010) (reasonable suspicion required to search laptop about two weeks after it was detained at the border and sent away for forensic analysis, and probable cause required to search laptop about four months after initial detention at border). </p>
<p>If you've had your devices detained by border agents for an extended period of time, please <a href="mailto:info@eff.org">contact EFF</a>.</p>
<h3>There Are Several (Imperfect) Ways That You Can Make Your Data Less Vulnerable at the Border.</h3>
<p>What can you do to keep the government from arbitrarily rummaging through your sensitive or confidential information during your international travels? There are several ways that you can protect your data at the border, though none is 100% gauranteed to keep the government's hands off your devices or your travels stress-free. Different approaches might be better for different travelers, devices, and data, but all of these precautions will help to keep your information significantly more secure during border crossings:</p>
<ul><li><a href="#carry_little">Carry as little data as possible over the border.</a></li>
<li><a href="#keep_backup">Keep a backup of your data elsewhere.</a></li>
<li><a href="#encrypt_data">Encrypt the data on your device.</a></li>
<li><a href="#store_download">Store the information you need somewhere else, then download it when you reach your destination.</a></li>
<li><a href="#protect_passwords">Protect the data on your devices with passwords.</a></li>
</ul><p><strong id="carry_little">Carry as little data as possible over the border.</strong> Travel with a clean device that contains only the information you need for a particular trip, and then <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/tech/deletion">securely delete</a> those files before returning to the United States. </p>
<p>Remember that merely deleting files from a device doesn't mean that they're unrecoverable. Deleted files can be trivially undeleted, in whole or in part, by forensic software. You must overwrite the file contents to securely delete them.</p>
<p>Consider taking an inexpensive "travel" laptop with you instead of a machine that you use every day. Or if your laptop allows you to remove the hard drive easily — for instance, by sliding it out a side bay — you might use a totally different hard drive for international travel and leaving your regular drive safely at home.</p>
<p><strong id="keep_backup">Keep a backup of your data elsewhere.</strong> Government agents could seize your laptop, phone, or other devices for no reason at all. You should be prepared for the possibility that you could be deprived of access your data for some time, and store copies somewhere else that you can easily access if your devices are detained at the border.</p>
<p><strong id="encrypt_data">Encrypt the data on your device.</strong> <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/tech/disk-encryption">Encrypt</a> your hard drive with a strong crypto protocol. Choose a <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/your-computer/protect/passwords">strong passphrase</a> that can resist <a href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Brute_force_attack">brute force attacks</a>. Even if border agents seek assistance from other agencies to attempt to decrypt your data — as provided by CBP and ICE's policies — they are unlikely to be able to access your information without either getting your help or investing far more time and effort into reviewing your data than they may want to spend.</p>
<p>What if a border agent asks you to turn over your encryption keys? As a legal matter, border agents can't force you to decrypt your data, divulge passphrases, or answer questions — only a judge can, and only if the <a href="http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/billofrights#amendmentv">Fifth Amendment</a> privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. This privilege protects people from being forced to make statements that could lead the government to prosecute them for a crime. The right does not shield the actual data on a laptop or phone from disclosure. But two federal courts have held that even a judge can't make a person divulge his passphrase to the government when the act of revealing the passphrase would show that he has control over potentially incriminating files. <a href="http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/3273.pdf"><i>In re Boucher</i></a>, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87951, at *13 (D. Vt. Nov. 27, 2007), <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11260688927307848544"><i>reversed on other grounds</i></a>, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 29, 2009); <a href="http://mi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%2FFDCT%2FEMI%2F2010%2F20100330_0000995.EMI.htm/qx"><i>United States v. Kirschner</i></a>, Misc No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30603, at **10-11 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2010). If you're facing a situation in which the government is trying to force you to reveal encryption keys, <a href="mailto:info@eff.org">let us know</a>.</p>
<p>Be aware that if you fail to provide a passphrase or decrypt information upon request, there are a number of possible consequences. A border agent may seize your device and allow you to continue on your trip. The agent may detain you at the border. Or the agent may just shrug and and let you pass. It's hard to predict what will happen, but you should be prepared for any of these possibilities, and consider how you would deal with each of them. </p>
<p>If you choose to answer government officials' questions, always be honest about the contents of your computers and whether you're carrying other data storage devices over the border. The <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001001----000-.html">consequences of lying to the government</a> could be much more severe than the consequences of declining to answer questions or provide assistance.</p>
<p>Remember to shut down your device completely before going through customs so that the <a href="http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/02/21-0">cold boot attack</a> investigated by EFF, Princeton University and other researchers can't be used to retrieve your encryption keys.</p>
<p><strong id="store_download">Store the information you need somewhere else, then download it when you reach your destination.</strong> Store your confidential data on your employer's servers or with a third party. Then take a clean device on your trip, download the information you need when you've reached your destination, and <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/tech/deletion">securely delete</a> the files from your device before you return home.</p>
<p>This approach doesn't offer absolute protection for the data you've stored elsewhere. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 loosened the requirements for government surveillance of people reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, so international communications can now be monitored without a warrant. Furthermore, law enforcement officers can <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sup_01_18_10_I_20_121.html">access</a> communications stored by third-party providers through the Electronic Communications Privacy Act as long as they have appropriate legal process, which might not be more than a subpoena in certain circumstances. </p>
<p>If your goal is to keep border agents from perusing vacation photos on your camera, storing your files with a third-party service and then deleting them from your device might be fine. (Note, however, that deleted images on a camera, if not actively overwritten, can be easily undeleted, just like other kinds of computer files.) But if you're concerned about government access to confidential business email, <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/wire/protect/encrypt">encrypting your data</a> is a more effective solution. Also use an encrypted VPN, and/or SSH or HTTPS, to send and receive communications and other data while abroad.</p>
<p><strong id="protect_passwords">Protect the data on your devices with passwords.</strong> Many devices such as laptops and phones give you the option to set a password, numeric PIN, pattern or other authentication method to control access to your data. Take advantage of this security feature to give your data a little more protection.</p>
<p>As with encryption keys, border agents can't force you to turn over passwords. However, researchers have <a href="http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/06/iphonesecurity/">demonstrated</a> <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/iphone-snoop/">flaws</a> that make it easy to get around iPhone passcodes, and Android patterns are often <a href="http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/researchers-use-smudge-attack-identify-android-passcodes-68-percent-of-the-time/7165?tag=mantle_skin;content">not hard to identify</a>. And, as we discuss below, user-account passwords, if not combined with encryption, can always be bypassed by simply removing the hard drive and putting it in another machine.</p>
<p>You might also consider creating separate password-protected user accounts on your laptop for your personal data and work data. Then you can allow a border agent to examine your own account, while storing client data or trade secrets in a separate account controlled by your employer. Your employer might disclose the password for this account to you only after you reach your destination. </p>
<p>Under certain circumstances, a border agent might be satisfied to take a look at your personal data. But simply storing confidential information in a separate password-protected account will not absolutely shield that data from government scrutiny. Many forensic search tools can access and search unencrypted data in every account on a machine, even if you yourself don't know the passwords to log in to those accounts or don't have administrative privileges on the machine. An agent can use these tools, for instance, by taking the hard drive out of your machine and putting it in their investigative machine. This allows reading the data right off the disk, regardless of the file and account permissions in your operating system. Don't rely on passwords to be your only form of security — encryption is still critically important to protect the information stored on a device.</p>
<p>For more thoughts on protecting data at the border, see Wired's <a href="http://howto.wired.com/wiki/Protect_Your_Data_During_U.S._Border_Searches">wiki</a> on how to protect data during border searches, Declan McCullagh's <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9892897-38.html">Security Guide to Customs-Proofing Your Laptop</a>, and Chris Soghoian's <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9935170-46.html">Guide to Safe International Data Transport</a>.</p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/transparency">Transparency</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/coders">Coders&#039; Rights Project</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-related-cases field-type-node-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Cases:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/cases/foia-litigation-border-searches">Border Searches </a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=EFF%27s+Guide+to+Protecting+Electronic+Devices+and+Data+at+the+U.S.+Border++https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Feffs-guide-protecting-devices-data-border" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Feffs-guide-protecting-devices-data-border&t=EFF%27s+Guide+to+Protecting+Electronic+Devices+and+Data+at+the+U.S.+Border+" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Feffs-guide-protecting-devices-data-border" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=EFF%27s Guide to Protecting Electronic Devices and Data at the U.S. Border &url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F11%2Feffs-guide-protecting-devices-data-border" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 24 Nov 2010 20:27:29 +0000Marcia Hofmann61178 at https://www.eff.orgHave You Been Subjected to Suspicionless Laptop Search or Seizure at the Border?https://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2010/01/have-you-been-subjected-suspicionless-laptop-searc
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>EFF has long fought for the privacy of your laptop and other digital devices at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has implemented program that authorizes searches of the contents of travelers’ laptop computers and other electronic storage devices at border crossings, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause, reasonable suspicion or any indicia of wrongdoing. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-arnold">U.S. v. Arnold</a> we fought for a requirement that customs agents have some reason before searching your computer and in our <a href="http://www.eff.org/cases/foia-litigation-border-searches">FOIA work on border searches</a>, we have pushed the government to reveal its policies and practices in this area. </p>
<p>Now, another civil rights group, the <a href="http://www.criminaljustice.org/">National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers</a> is seeking potential plaintiffs for a lawsuit challenging suspicionless laptop searches. As a first step in this effort, NACDL is seeking to identify defense lawyers who have had their laptops searched at the border and are willing to serve as individual plaintiffs. In order to demonstrate the effect of this policy on members of the criminal defense bar and to support the constitutional challenge, NACDL plans to assemble a group of individual plaintiffs who will develop affidavits describing the harm they suffer by having their electronic information exposed to government officials. </p>
<p>This lawsuit will not seek monetary damages for individuals who have been searched; instead, it will focus exclusively on fixing the unconstitutional policy. Participating members will be represented at no charge by NACDL and ACLU attorneys. </p>
<p>EFF supports the NACDL and ACLU's joint effort. To determine whether you may qualify as a plaintiff, please consider the following:</p>
<ol><li>
Have you ever had your laptop, cell phone or camera searched when entering or exiting the U.S.?
</li>
<li>
Have you ever had the contents of your laptop, cell phone or camera copied when entering or exiting the U.S.?
</li>
<li>
Have you ever had your laptop, cell phone or camera seized when entering or exiting the U.S.?
</li>
<li>
If you are employed by someone else, does your employer have a policy about traveling internationally with laptops, cell phones or cameras?
</li>
<li>
Do you avoid carrying confidential business or personal information on your laptop, cell phone or camera due to the suspicion-less search policy?
</li>
</ol><p>If you answered ‘yes’ to any of these questions, and might be interested in joining the NACDL suit, please contact Michael Price, NACDL's National Security Coordinator, at (202) 872-8600 x258 or michael@nacdl.org.</p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-issue field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Related Issues:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/my/issues/travel-screening">Travel Screening</a></div></div></div><div class="share-links" style="margin-bottom:10px"><br/>Share this: <a href="https://twitter.com/home?status=Have+You+Been+Subjected+to++Suspicionless+Laptop+Search+or+Seizure+at+the+Border%3F+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F01%2Fhave-you-been-subjected-suspicionless-laptop-searc" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/twitter16.png" alt="Share on Twitter" /></a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F01%2Fhave-you-been-subjected-suspicionless-laptop-searc&t=Have+You+Been+Subjected+to++Suspicionless+Laptop+Search+or+Seizure+at+the+Border%3F" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/facebook.gif" alt="Share on Facebook" /></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F01%2Fhave-you-been-subjected-suspicionless-laptop-searc" onclick="javascript:window.open(this.href, '', 'menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes,height=600,width=600');return false;"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/gplus-16.png" alt="Share on Google+"/></a> <a href="http://sharetodiaspora.github.com/?title=Have You Been Subjected to Suspicionless Laptop Search or Seizure at the Border%3F&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fmy%2Fdeeplinks%2F2010%2F01%2Fhave-you-been-subjected-suspicionless-laptop-searc" target="_blank"><img src="/sites/all/themes/frontier/images/share/diaspora-16.png" alt="Share on Diaspora" /></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;||&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="https://supporters.eff.org/join" style="background-color:#cc0000; color:#ffffff; text-decoration:none; cursor:pointer; padding:5px 8px; font-family:verdana; font-weight:bold; border-radius:8px; text-shadow: 1px 1px #660000; text-transform:uppercase;">Join EFF</a></div>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 20:51:30 +0000Jennifer Granick60895 at https://www.eff.orgEFF Releases Interim Report on the Automated Targeting Systemhttps://www.eff.org/my/deeplinks/2009/07/eff-releases-interim
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>EFF today released an <a href="/issues/foia/automated-targeting-system-report">Interim Report</a> on the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/21/AR2007092102347.html">Automated Targeting System</a> (ATS) through which the Department of Homeland Security monitors and assigns risk assessment scores to Americans and others who cross into or out of the United States. The data reviewed under the ATS system includes seven large government databases, plus the Passenger Name Record data from the airlines (which includes data like whether you've ordered a Muslim or Hindu or Jewish special meal). Effectively, if you travel internationally, ATS creates an instant, personal and detailed dossier on you that CBP officers use to decide whether you get to enter the country, or will be subject to an enhanced (and potentially invasive) search. EFF's report details what we've learned about the ATS program from the over 2,000 pages released by the government so far. We note that because of government's very heavy redacting and refusal to release key information Americans remain in dark about how this powerful system is used on travelers. EFF's Interim report was written by Shana Dines.</p>
<p>DHS has continued to release documents to EFF so we'll update the report as additional useful information comes out. </p>
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