The New Arab-shireen-t-hunterhttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/englishُAljadeed DescriptionEnhttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2019/4/11/demonising-and-dehumanising-iranhttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2019/4/11/demonising-and-dehumanising-iranComment: For 30 years, there has been a systematic effort in the US to demonise not only the Islamic regime, but Iran and its people, writes Shireen T. Hunter.]]>

Commenting on the devastating and widespread floods that have engulfed 26 of Iran's 31 provinces, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo essentially blamed this huge natural disaster on the Iranian government's mismanagement.

He has a valid point. By undoing all earlier reforms, Iran's revolutionary government allowed predatory forces to take over national and private lands and to build whatever they wanted, wherever they wanted, including in dry river beds. In a hurry to get rich, the new clerical and revolutionary elites and their offspring ignored all environmental safety measures.

Thus, throughout the last four decades there was no adequate maintenance of riverbeds, including regular cleaning and proper management of water resources.

Then came a dam-building mania without sufficient study of environmental consequences. Refusal to use foreign experts on the pretext of self-sufficiency contributed to serious engineering shortcomings.

The IRGC construction arm built most of these dams, which was a highly lucrative endeavour. The best example is the Gatwand dam in Khuzestan Province, which is now devastated by floods. Other mistakes have included building railroads in flood plains and paving over dry riverbeds.

Meanwhile, foreign military adventures took funds away from needed domestic water-management projects. The leadership's foreign policy mistakes - especially fighting against so-called imperialism, or as the Supreme Leader recently said, battling evil - dried up international commerce and investment and stopped the flow of technology, even before the harshest of American sanctions were imposed.

In a hurry to get rich, the new clerical and revolutionary elites and their offspring ignored all environmental safety measures

Iran's mistakes, however, do not excuse the heartlessness of the Trump administration's policy of doing all it can to prevent aid to Iran's flood victims. The American sanctions policy regarding Iran is like a medieval siege aimed at starving the enemy by exhausting its food resources until it surrenders.

Iran's Islamic government began the process of mutual alienation that has produced the lack of US compassion. Those who staged the 1979-81 hostage crisis bear a great responsibility in generating current American hostility.

They are also responsible for the revolution's radical turn that has caused tremendous damage to Iran and the Iranian people.

Iranians in the flooded province of Khuzestan try to bail out their houses [Getty]

Also, without the hostage crisis, Iraq's Saddam Hussein could not have gotten away with invading Iran. Another factor was Ayatollah Khomeini's decision to make the fight against America the cornerstone of the revolutionary regime in revenge for what he saw as American support for the shah.

Since the late 1980s, however, it has largely been the United States that has refused the path of reconciliation unless Iran completely surrenders. In the process, it has undermined moderate forces in Iran.

Given this history, current US attitudes towards victims of the recent flooding is no surprise

Its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, which undercut those Iranians who argued that a different relationship with the United States could be possible, is only the latest example of this approach.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, America and some of its regional allies have found in Iran a convenient enemy figure and scapegoat for their own policy mistakes.

Thus, using the Iran scarecrow, they sold billions of dollars' worth of arms to Arabs. They've tried to bring about Arab-Israeli reconciliation, not as a genuine effort to resolve the Palestinian problem but rather to reinforce common enmity toward Iran. Lately, the apocalyptic outlook of some key US political figures has further consolidated Iran's enemy image.

As part of this strategy, there has been a systematic effort in the United States for the past 30 years to demonise not only the Islamic regime but Iran and its people. Even Iran's pre-Islamic history has not been immune to this demonisation.

Some years ago, a well-known Iran analyst said that Iran was responsible for the very creation of evil, not just its recognition or identification. Hollywood movies have mined the history of Greco-Persian relations, portraying Iranians as savages, conveniently forgetting how Alexander burned Persepolis and killed or exiled its inhabitants.

For centuries, much of the West has defined itself against Iran, beginning with ancient Greece. Yet Greek thought and aesthetics were influenced by Iran; Persepolis was the inspiration for the Pantheon. Iran was one of the few places in the known ancient world that Rome did not conquer.

Thus, Iran has always represented an intellectual rival and not merely a military challenge to the West. Europe's post-Christian secular identity, built on this Greco-Roman heritage, consolidated this old view of Iran in modern European minds and thus also in America's.

Over the centuries, Iran and its indigenous culture have been much diminished. But there is still a spark underneath the ashes of a once glorious civilization, which periodically seeks a renaissance.

But often it has succumbed to its own and its leaders' weaknesses as well as the policies of other powers. In the last 250 years, this has meant colonial or neo-imperialist powers.

Given this history, current US attitudes toward victims of the recent flooding is no surprise. What is important is whether Iran, as a fundamentalist Islamic state or something else, is doomed to eternal enmity with the United States or whether the two countries can find common ground.

As long as the current team is in Washington and hardliners continue to sacrifice Iran's national interest in pursuit of some unattainable Islamist utopia, there is no room for optimism.

Shireen T. Hunter is a Research Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest publication is God On Our Side: Religion, Foreign Policy and International Affairs (Rowman & Littlefield, December 2016).

This article was republished with permission from our friends at Lobelog.

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

]]>]]>Thu, 11 Apr 2019 21:28:39 GMThttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/9/5/peace-in-the-middle-east-federalism-not-territorial-disintegrationhttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/9/5/peace-in-the-middle-east-federalism-not-territorial-disintegrationComment: Much has been said about redrawing Middle East borders along ethnic, linguistic or sectarian lines, but the wholesale breakup of existing states not the answer, writes Shireen Hunter.]]>

Since the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, which exacerbated Iraq's ethnic and sectarian divisions and the manipulation of these divisions by regional and international actors, centrifugal tendencies in Iraq have become increasingly strong.

For example, the country's Kurdish population and, in particular, the leader of the autonomous Kurdish region, Masood Barzani, have openly said that the time for an independent Kurdish state has arrived. Others have talked about the creation of an independent Sunni state in parts of Iraq.

The increasingly common talk of disintegration has not been limited to Iraq. In other Middle East states, similar trends are under way. In Libya, for example, the reemergence of historical regional identities and rivalries, and hence the growth of centrifugal forces, has resulted from the fall of the central government as a result of external intervention.

The intervention in 2011 took the form of French and British and then NATO bombings. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was deposed and killed, and the country fragmented. Turmoil there continues.

Meanwhile, outside interference by regional and international actors turned Syria's popular protests in 2011 into an all-out civil war, which is ongoing and threatens to end Syria's existence as a single country. Sudan is already divided and is still fraught with strife and internal infighting in both its southern and northern parts. In other words, the partition of Sudan has not brought peace and stability as some of the proponents of its division had claimed.

In the past, too, more prosperous and stable countries such as Turkey, have also been affected by the fallout of these conflicts, especially those in Syria. For instance, Turkey's problem with the Kurds has once more become acute. In fact, Turkey's recent military intervention in Kurdish-inhabited parts of Syria is directly related to its fears that an autonomous, or possibly even independent, Kurdish entity in Syria would strengthen separatist movements within Turkey as well.

So far, Turkey has managed to reach a modus vivendi with the Kurdish entity in Iraq, but even there, the independence ambitions of Masoud Barzani are a long term challenge for Ankara. Even Iran is not totally immune to the centrifugal trends unleashed by various Middle East wars. In fact, Iran's regional rivals, notably Saudi Arabia, have been manipulating some of its disgruntled minorities in order to pressure the government in Tehran.

More seriously, there has been increasing talk, sometimes even by officials of major western countries, to the effect that the Middle East's present borders are not sacrosanct.

On the contrary, according to this perspective most of these borders are artificial and were created as a result of bargaining and horse-trading among colonial powers, especially France and Britain.

The number of articles and opinion pieces published about the need for another Sykes-Picot Agreement in the last year or so attests to the influence of this perspective. Many maps are published about how the borders in the Middle East and South West Asia could be rearranged, one such map is described in Blood Borders published in Armed Forces Journal.

Some advocates of this perspective believe that rearranging borders according either to ethnic/linguistic or sectarian affinities might produce a more peaceful Middle East. However, they generally prescribe this method for those countries they view as "troublesome", such as Syria, Iraq, and even, should circumstances allow, Iran.

None of these concerns augurs well for potential new states which might emerge out of the wreckage of existing ones

In fact, there is a school of thought which maintains that Iran is too big for the major powers' comfort, and thus even under a friendly regime could be challenging. Eventually, even Saudi Arabia might not escape these centrifugal trends, and thus those who recommend rearrangement of the Middle East's borders do not exclude the country from their analysis. Ironically, the Yemen war - fought ostensibly to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - might even become a catalyst for its unraveling.

Yet despite the growth of these centrifugal tendencies and questions about the sanctity of current borders, the principle of territorial integrity also remains very important for all countries in the region. Even countries that might wish to see their rivals broken up into smaller entities and go as far as encouraging separatist movements in their rivals' countries, still - because of their own vulnerabilities - pay lip-service to the principle of territorial integrity.

Thus Turkey, after having done much to undermine Syria's current government, now supports its territorial integrity, of course preferably without the Assad regime. Most Arab states voice support for Iraq's territorial integrity, but preferably under a Sunni-dominated government, as in the past.

Redrawing Middle Eastern borders, however, would be neither easy nor desirable. Existing states would resist such efforts, which would lead to protracted civil wars. Intervention by outside actors is also costly and does not ensure success. Moreover, there is no guarantee that new borders, supposedly drawn on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, or sectarian affinities, would be any more stable than the existing ones.

Take the case of a potential Kurdish state. Kurds for centuries have lived within different cultural settings - Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian (Kurds are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically close to Iranians). Even if a united Kurdish state could come together now, there would be sharp rivalries among those culturally diverse Kurds and their leaders, and they would face the challenges of developing a common language out of their many dialects and of creating the other paraphernalia of statehood.

Relationships with their neighbors, from whom they would have separated, would also be fraught. They might even become embroiled in wars with their new neighbors. None of these concerns augurs well for potential new states which might emerge out of the wreckage of existing ones.

Regional countries still fear themselves to be too vulnerable to internal and external pressures to envisage granting such sweeping rights to their minorities

Yet clearly many peoples in the Middle East have serious cultural, economic, and political grievances that need to be addressed and cannot be ignored simply by summoning the principle of national and territorial integrity. But given the risks involved in the wholesale breakup of current states and a massive redrawing of existing borders, what is therefore to be done to address the grievances of minorities?

The answer lies in less-centralised governments, greater economic and administrative autonomy for regions where minorities reside, a more equitable sharing of national resources and greater cultural freedoms. For example, practices such as Turkey's references to Kurds as "mountain Turks," - which fortunately it has now stopped doing - should be completely out of the question.

Another solution is regionalism and the encouragement of cross-border economic and cultural exchanges among those peoples who live within the borders of different states. For example, why shouldn't there be economic exchanges among Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian Kurdistan, or joint projects sponsored by their governments?

These suggestions may sound unrealistic or even downright naive. Regional countries still fear themselves to be too vulnerable to internal and external pressures to envisage granting such sweeping rights to their minorities. The minorities meanwhile, are unlikely to accept such half-measures as opposed to the lure of having their own states, flags, and national airlines!

Moreover, in order to succeed, such schemes as presented above would require key international actors' acquiesce or, even better, active support. At the very least, in playing their power games, they should resist their impulses to manipulate the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of regional states.

Ultimately, it would be in the long term interest of key international players to support programmes such as those recommended here. Experience of the last three decades has shown that the consequences of war, internal strife, and fragmentation of vulnerable societies cannot be confined to their own borders and eventually are bound to affect others. The growth of international terrorism and the migration crisis, including the latest wave of both phenomena that has hit Europe so hard, are just two powerful reminders of such risks.

Shireen T. Hunter is a Research Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest publication is God On Our Side: Religion, Foreign Policy and International Affairs (Rowman & Littlefield, December 2016).

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

A version of this article was originally published on Lobelog on August 31, 2016.

The problem with frozen conflicts is that they are never really frozen.

While they might be temporarily put on hold, as soon as the conditions seem propitious to any of the players, they will inevitably be brought in from the cold. And once that happens, the thawing process is liable to happen very quickly.

The dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the mountainous region of Karabakh and several other cities is one such conflict.

Recent skirmishes leading to the deaths of dozens of Azerbaijani and Armenian soldiers demonstrated just how quickly so-called frozen conflicts can begin to thaw.

Unfortunately, those not directly involved in the conflict tend to overlook it until the risk of it re-igniting and somehow adversely affecting their interests becomes apparent. Only then are they shaken out of their complacency. Meanwhile, innocent people on both sides of the conflict pay the price of indifference.

When these frozen conflicts start to warm up, outside powers exhort the parties involved to solve their problems and "be reasonable". In doing so, these outsiders conveniently forget the extent to which their own policies have contributed to the dispute remaining unresolved.

The shadow of history

Another tendency of regional and international players not directly engaged in the conflict, is to forget the historical context - and to grow impatient with the parties' inability to overcome their past. But asking people to forget history is futile, akin to hoping they will forget their childhood traumas: it cannot be done. The only way to overcome the domination of history is to face it.

Karabakh has a long and tortuous history, as does the rest of the Caucasus. Moreover, it is of significant symbolic importance for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Armenia, this is partly because, as explained by the American-Armenian scholar Richard Hovannissian, "while the rest of Armenia was submerged under foreign control a flicker of freedom was maintained in Karabakh, albeit under Iranian suzerainty".

Towards the end of the 19th century, Karabakh also became the place where nascent Azerbaijani nationalism took shape and flourished, giving the region a certain symbolic value for Azerbaijan. Following the fall of the Tsarist Empire in 1918, the region became the subject of rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the British and their White Russian allies.

A hallmark of the 1987-1992 period in the Soviet Union was the manipulation of nationality issues in the competition of power between the hardliners and Mikhail Gorbachev and later between Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin

When the Ottomans helped establish the independent republic of Azerbaijan, they gave Karabakh to Azerbaijan, but the Armenians of Karabakh never accepted this decision.

The Bolshevik government initially gave Nakhijevan and Karabakh to Armenia. But Moscow later changed its mind and transferred them to the new Republic of Azerbaijan, in part because the newly formed Soviet Union in 1923 wanted to reach a modus vivendi with the new Turkish Republic.

Finally, Karabakh was made an autonomous region within Azerbaijan, which the Armenians also never accepted. Clashes and protests continued throughout the communist era, and Armenia requested the return of the Karabakh region from the Soviet authorities on several occasions.

Rising ethnic tensions

A hallmark of the 1987-1992 period in the Soviet Union was the manipulation of nationality issues in the competition of power between the hardliners and Mikhail Gorbachev and later between Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Meanwhile, the same process took place at the level of republican elites.

Those who opposed reform by instigating ethnic violence wanted to show that Gorbachev's Perestroika and Glasnost ("restructuring" and "openness") only led to turmoil. One consequence was the killing of large numbers of Armenians in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait in 1988, which triggered the larger conflict.

At the same time, Armenia's border with Iran serves as one of its lifelines. During the 2008 Russia-Georgia war for example, the Iranian border was Armenia's only window on the outside world

Later, Yeltsin used this issue to gain support among non-Russian republics. His famous advice to them to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" shows his change of heart. These manipulations of nationality issues contributed to the escalation of the dispute over the region and also led to similar problems in Georgia with the Ossetians and Abkhazians.

The USSR's problems and later its dismantling also brought rivalries to the surface that had long since remained dormant. In particular, Turkey wanted to become the main power in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as a champion of Turkic and Turkic-speaking peoples.

As a result, it sided wholly with Azerbaijan. In doing so, Turkey also hoped to thwart any potential Iranian influence in Azerbaijan, whose people have close historical, religious, and cultural ties. At one juncture, in 1992, Turkey sabotaged an Iranian mediation effort for Karabakh. Later, when visiting Baku, Turkish President Suleiman Demirel told the Azeris that they should not look to Iran to solve their problems.

Later on, Turkey's policy of siding entirely with Azerbaijan and closing its borders with Armenia did not help matters. Instead, it has exacerbated Armenia's feeling of geographical and ethnic isolation in the region.

By contrast, Iran has followed a more balanced policy. Concerned about a Turkic alliance with irredentist claims on some of its territory, Iran sees Armenia as a valuable force for counterbalance in regional politics.

Meanwhile, lured by Azerbaijan's energy wealth and seeing it as a means of pressuring Iran, the United States and European countries indulged the Republic

At the same time, Armenia's border with Iran serves as one of its lifelines.

During the 2008 Russia-Georgia war for example, the Iranian border was Armenia's only window on the outside world. However, because of US policy to contain Iran, its relations with Armenia were not able to progress, and many plans to expand road and rail links and the transfer of Iranian energy are still incomplete. Of course, Russia too, wants to see Armenia remain dependent - and consequently frowns on its ties with Iran.

Meanwhile, lured by Azerbaijan's energy wealth and seeing it as a means of pressuring Iran, the United States and European countries indulged the Republic. This attitude gave Azerbaijan - which is more populous than Armenia (9.6 in comparison to 2.9 million people) - the impression it could wait out Yerevan, and find a military solution at an opportune moment.

Azerbaijan also skilfully manipulated Middle East politics, especially Iranian-Israeli hostility, and increased its influence in Western capitals by cosying up to Israel. Lest we forget that when the option of attacking Iran seemed real, Azerbaijan was viewed as a possible military launching pad against Iran.

Where to go from here?

The first step towards resolving the situation is to realise that there is no such a thing as a frozen conflict. In fact, the status quo has a habit of unravelling at the slightest provocation.

All players, both inside the conflict and out, must also realise they cannot get everything on their wish list. Clearly, most of the territory that Armenia has captured from Azerbaijan should be returned. But a special arrangement must also be made for Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, which links Karabakh to Armenia proper. This will help ease Armenia's sense of isolation.

Turkey must open its borders with Armenia and seek general reconciliation with the country.

Iran's role as a party acceptable both to Armenia and Azerbaijan should be recognised, and tripartite and quadripartite cooperation involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey should be encouraged.

European countries should help more in Armenia's economic development.

Efforts should be made to keep Middle East politics from unduly influencing regional relations.

In conclusion, the West needs to recognise that Russia is, and will likely remain, a player in the region. As such, the West needs to keep Russian perspectives in mind. Meanwhile, however, Russia should stop seeing this region as its own back yard. Only then can the process of tackling the Karabakh problem begin.

A version of this article was originally published on Lobelog on April 11, 2016.

Shireen T. Hunter is a Research Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest book is Iran Divided: Historic Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and Governance in the 21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

]]>]]>Wed, 13 Apr 2016 21:16:19 GMThttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/12/2/muslim-radicalisation-in-europe-roots-and-resolutionhttps://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/12/2/muslim-radicalisation-in-europe-roots-and-resolutionThe Paris bombings have highlighted the dangers many European countries face from a small number of highly radicalised young Muslims and the need to tackle this risk immediately. ]]>

The November 13 bombings in Paris by a number of Muslim radicals suspected of having links to the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) has once again focused attention on the challenge posed to the security of many European countries, especially those with large Muslim populations, by the radicalization of a small portion of this population.

Previously, young radical Muslims either had or were suspected of having links with other radical Muslim groups active before the emergence of IS. A number of the individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks had lived in Europe (Germany) and were linked to al-Qaeda. In the mid-1990s, perpetrators of terror acts in France were supposed to have links with the Algerian Islamist group (the Front Nationale de Salut). The likelihood is that even after IS is defeated, if the root causes of Muslim extremism are not addressed within Muslim countries and internationally, other extremist groups will emerge to recruit Europe’s Muslim youth to radicalism.

Under these circumstances, a crucial question that European countries need to address is why some of its Muslim youths are attracted to radical ideas and what can they do to prevent such attraction?

Socio-economic Roots of Muslim Radicalization

The question of whether there is a link between socio-economic deprivation and propensity to radicalization of either of a secular or religious variety has long been hotly debated. Those who dismiss the existence of any connection between economic and social deprivation and radicalism point to Osama bin Laden, who was a member of a fabulously rich Saudi Arabian family. Notwithstanding such exceptions, evidence shows that socio-economic deprivation plays a significant role in generating feelings of alienation that contribute to a propensity to radicalization.

Compared to their fellow citizens, Europe’s Muslim minorities occupy some of the lowest economic ranks, although there are also successful and affluent Muslims. The rate of unemployment among Muslims, especially Muslim youth, is sometimes twice the average. Most Muslims are also employed in low-skill and hence low-paying jobs. Others often own small businesses, such as halal food shops, where they employ their own family members and cater mostly to other Muslims. Meanwhile, opportunities for upward mobility are limited. Once a Muslim is born in a ghetto, moving out of it is no easy job.

The establishment of Muslim ghettoes goes back to the first (and mostly welcome) wave of Muslim migrant workers to Europe in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These migrants were predominantly single, illiterate, and physically strong men hired to help in Europe’s post-war reconstruction. They were supposed to go back to their country of origin once their job was done. Therefore, they were housed in what was to be temporary housing, either in dilapidated neighborhoods or in newly built housing states.

But many of these immigrants did not go back. Instead, by the 1970s many were joined by their families as part a policy of family reunification. This process swelled the ranks of Europe’s Muslims and the population of these housing states. It also made Muslims more visible, a visibility that rubbed many local populations the wrong way.

Meanwhile, changes in the patterns of industrial production in Europe, notably France, created an unemployment problem for many Muslim immigrants. The children of these early immigrants, as a result, got caught in a cycle of poverty in the ghetto. This ghetto life also meant that Muslim youth did not have the same educational opportunities, and many dropped out of school before getting a diploma.

Inadequate education further dimmed their employment prospects. But even those who managed to get an education still faced discrimination in obtaining jobs. Some studies have indicated that having a Muslim name often means that you don’t even get a job interview, let alone a job.

Unemployment and poverty often trap some Muslim youth in a web of petty and not-so-petty crime, which subsequently leads to their imprisonment. Again, studies show that many of these young petty criminals become exposed to more hard-core criminals and Muslim radicals in prison. Radicalization, contrary to popular misconceptions, does not often take place in prisons rather than mosques.

Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Prejudice

Even before the rise of radical Islam and the sharp increase in the number of Europe’s Muslim population, immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, and Africa were disliked because of their ethnicity and race. In the Britain of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the term “Paki-bashing,” referring to Pakistani immigrants, became common. Muslim immigrants who wanted to integrate faced rejection and obstacles. This rejection, in turn, forced them to become more insular and focused on their community. It also made them resentful of their host country, which sometimes lead to extremism. Sadly even today, anti-Muslim expressions often hide racist and ethnic prejudice.

Ironically, the embrace by a number of European countries of multiculturalism has contributed to Europe’s current problems. As long as Muslim immigrants were seen as a temporary phenomenon nothing much was done to teach them local languages, which is an important part of the process of integration. European countries also tolerated Muslim preachers who came from the immigrants’ countries of origin and were often poorly educated and encouraged patterns of behavior incompatible with living in Europe. This included extremist preachers such as the blind Imam of the Finsbury Mosque in London, Sheikh Abu Hamza, who was finally imprisoned for spreading terrorist ideas.

Certain groups in Europe have also gratuitously provoked Muslims by such acts as insulting their prophet and their practices, often hiding behind principles of freedom of speech and expression and knowing full well that their governments cannot compromise on such principles. These provocations have often led to retaliatory acts by Muslims, thus setting in motion a cycle of violence. Such acts have also intensified Muslims’ sense of alienation and made some of them more receptive to radical ideas.

Moreover, since the early 1990s the linkage between events in predominantly Muslim countries and the radicalization of Muslims in Europe has deepened. Such events include the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Algerian civil war of 1991-1997, the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now the civil war in Syria. Among other things, these wars have produced new extremist groups and ideologies that have then established links with European Muslims.

What is To Be Done?

In view of the above discussion, it is remarkable that only a very small portion of Europe’s Muslims have been radicalized. However, even a very small number is too much, because it can do tremendous damage, as recent events have demonstrated. Therefore, it is important to address the factors contributing to Muslims’ sense of alienation and greater receptivity to radical discourse.

After the riots of 2005 in Paris, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was the French minister of interior at the time, said that dealing with France’s Muslim problem required the adoption of what he called a policy of “positive discrimination” vis a vis Muslims—in other words, an affirmative action program aimed at improving educational and employment opportunities for Muslim youth. But nothing was done during his presidency and afterwards. Whether such a program is necessary or not, problems of the Muslim underclass should clearly be addressed. At the same time, a more aggressive policy of cultural integration is necessary. For example, while modest Islamic dress and headscarf can be tolerated, attire such as the burqa and niqab should not be tolerated. Such glaring differences inevitably deepen cultural cleavages between Muslims and European populations. The activities of radical preachers must also be halted.

Last but not least, the connection between European—and American—involvement in events in the Muslim world and the increased risk of radicalization in Europe must be recognized. Laying all the blame at the door of Islam’s inherently violent and obscurantist nature, as some do, will not solve Europe’s problem of Muslim radicalization. A complex problem with complex roots, such radicalization requires a long-term and multi-dimensional approach.

A version of this article was originally published on the Lobelog on November 27, 2015.

Shireen T. Hunter is a Research Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest book is Iran Divided: Historic Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and Governance in the 21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.