33. When hundreds
of nongovernmental organizations began contacting the Special Rapporteur
about the situation of women in Ciudad Juárez in late 2001, the key
concern set forth was that the killing of over 200 women since 1993 had
been left in impunity. The victims were killed brutally: many were
raped or beaten before being strangled or stabbed to death. A
number of the bodies bore signs of torture or mutilation. Theories
about the motives for the murders of these young women ranged from
narcotrafficking to prostitution to serial killings. The
organizations emphasized that, although a Special Prosecutor’s Office
had been created in 1998 to investigate these crimes, the climate of
violence and intimidation of women continued, and only one person had
been sentenced for one of what were characterized as “serial”
crimes. The organizations further reported that the authorities
tended to respond to these crimes and to the family members of the
victims in ways that were discriminatory and even disrespectful.

34. The
organizations reported on the negligence of the authorities responsible
for investigating and prosecuting these crimes, and the overall
inefficacy of the administration of justice and lack of political will
at all levels to confront the problem. They indicated that, while
the problem had received attention at the national and even
international levels, there had been no real commitment to an effective
response. For example, while the National Human Rights Commission
had issued a specific recommendation in 1998 aimed at redressing some of
these deficiencies, its key aspects had not been implemented. Nor
had the respective recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteurs on
extrajudicial executions and the independence of judges and lawyers
concerning the inefficacy of the Mexican State’s response to these
crimes been heeded. The organizations indicated that, because the
Mexican State was allowing these crimes to remain in impunity, it was
encouraging their persistence.

35. In that
initial stage, the Mexican State, both at the Federal level and through
the officials of Chihuahua, manifested great concern with respect to the
killings and openness to the visit of the Special Rapporteur. The
pertinent authorities in Chihuahua, principally of the Office of the
Prosecutor General of Justice of the State (hereinafter “PGJE”),
provided information on efforts to investigate and clarify the killings,
in particular those of the Special Prosecutor’s Office established in
1998 to deal with these crimes. The authorities indicated that the
establishment of this Office, and the adoption thereafter of new methods
of work, policies and programs in response to these crimes manifested
the seriousness of its response. The PGJE emphasized that it
believed important advances had been achieved.

36. What became
clear in the course of the Special Rapporteur’s visit, and has been
reaffirmed in the information analyzed since, is that the killings that
have received special attention due to the barbarity of their
circumstances or possible character as “serial” killings are
integrally related to a larger situation of gender-based violence that
includes disappearances, other sexual crimes and domestic violence.
A common denominator with respect to most of these crimes is the
inability of the victims or their families to obtain prompt access to
effective judicial protection and guarantees. These problems, in
turn, are inextricably related to patterns of historical gender-based
discrimination. The denial of an effective response both springs
from and feeds back into the perception that violence against women –
most illustratively domestic violence – is not a serious crime.
The lack of an effective official response is part and parcel of the
larger context of discrimination. Addressing the killings
necessarily requires addressing the larger problems of violence and
discrimination based on gender through, first and foremost, prompt and
effective access to justice.

37.
Ciudad Juárez is a gateway city in the State of Chihuahua. It is
a gateway for many Mexicans who migrate north in search of jobs with the
maquila industry that dominates the border area. Ciudad Juárez is
a key manufacturing center, with foreign and domestic maquilas
attracting a huge labor force. In this sense, it is viewed by many
as a gateway to greater job opportunities. It is also a gateway
for migration, both legal and illegal, north to the United States.
Ciudad Juárez is just across from El Paso, Texas to the north.
The State of Chihuahua is bordered on the east by the State of Sonora,
and on the west by the State of Coahuila.

38.
Representatives of both the State and non-state sectors have
consistently emphasized that Ciudad Juárez is characterized by a
diverse array of especially serious challenges. With over
1,200,000 inhabitants, the Municipality of Ciudad Juárez is the largest
population center in the State of Chihuahua, itself the largest State in
the United Mexican States. Because of its location and industrial
development, the population has grown and continues to expand extremely
rapidly. According to the State of Chihuahua, more than half of
the population of the Municipality consists of people from other areas
of the country or foreigners.[4]
In this regard, the State indicated that cultural, economic and social
differences within the population generate particularly complex
problems. Nor does Ciudad Juárez possess sufficient
infrastructure or public services to meet the needs of the
ever-increasing population. Marginalized sectors of the population
often lack access to decent housing, clean drinking water, sanitation
services and public health services.

39.
Information gathered during the visit pointed out that, as a border
town, Ciudad Juárez has been marked by rising crime, including the
penetration of organized crime and narcotrafficking, and an increase in
gang activity and the presence of firearms. Notably in this
regard, almost all the killings classified as executions in the State of
Chihuahua take place in Ciudad Juárez.[5]
These and other problems generate high levels of violence that affect
the men, women and children living there.

40.
Some representatives of civil society also referred during the Special
Rapporteur’s visit to sharp shifts in established cultural patterns
for some who migrate to Ciudad Juárez, in the sense that jobs are more
plentiful for women, including for young women, who are then able to
exercise greater economic independence. In fact, reports indicate
that over half the maquila work force in the area is comprised of
women. They pointed to these shifts in traditional patterns as
sometimes generating tension in a society marked by historical
inequalities between men and women and few resources to assist in
changing those attitudes.

Esmeralda[6]
was 15 years old when she was last seen alive on October 29,
2001. She worked in a home as a domestic employee. When
her mother went to the authorities on October 30, 2001 to file a
missing persons report, they told her she had to wait 48 hours.
Esmeralda’s body may have been recovered along with other remains on
November 7, 2001. Her mother has indicated that she still isn’t
sure. DNA tests were being done, but the results were taking
months and months. While her mother has said that she knows
there are many cases, the one that matters most to her is that of her
daughter.

Lilia Alejandra was 17 when
she disappeared on February 14, 2001. She worked in a maquila.
Lilia Alejandra’s mother began passing out flyers as part of the
search. Days later, the window of the mother’s car appeared
broken, and a roll of those flyers was found inside. When the
police did not arrive in response to her call, she took the car to the
station herself, but no clues were uncovered. Lilia Alejandra’s
body, naked and strangled, was found in a vacant lot just over a week
after her disappearance. She left two children, the younger five
months old. When Lilia Alejandra’s mother went to the
authorities to ask about the investigation, she was told she was “drowning
in a glass of water” and that women like that die all over the
world.

41. Reports
indicate that at least 285 women and girls have been killed in Ciudad
Juárez from the beginning of 1993 to late October of 2002. During
the Special Rapporteur’s visit in February of 2002, the Mexican State
reported on the killing of 268 women between January of 1993 and January
of 2002. Although there is not exact agreement between the numbers
reported by the State and nongovernmental organizations, they are
largely consistent. As of the October, 2002 hearing,
nongovernmental and press reports estimated the total as between 285 and
300.

42.
The information the Commission and its Special Rapporteurship have
gathered indicates that Ciudad Juárez has been marked by a sharply
rising crime rate with respect to both men and women, but that the rise
with respect to women is anomalous in various respects. 1993
marked the first year of a notable increase in the killing of
women. One group reported that, while 37 women had been killed
between 1985 and 1992, approximately 269 were killed between 1993 and
2001.[7]
While homicide rates for both men and women increased, that for women
rose at double the rate of that for men.[8]
Further, the homicide rate for women in Ciudad Juárez is
disproportionately higher than that for similarly situated border
cities.[9]

43. Although the
circumstances and lack of clarification make it difficult to
characterize the motivation behind these crimes with much certainty,
there is general agreement among both the State and non-state sectors
that most relate to manifestations of violence with gender specific
causes and consequences. A substantial number are linked to sexual
violence, and others to domestic and intrafamilial violence. Some
cases present multiple forms of such violence.

44.
Both the State and non-state sectors reported a significant number of
killings characterized as multiple or “serial” in nature -- fitting
a pattern with respect to the circumstances. The victims of these
crimes have preponderantly been young women, between 15 and 25 years of
age. Some were students, and many were maquila workers or
employed in local shops or businesses. A number were relative
newcomers to Ciudad Juárez who had migrated from other areas of
Mexico. The victims were generally reported missing by their
families, with their bodies found days or months later abandoned in
vacant lots or outlying areas. In most of these cases there were
signs of sexual violence, abuse, torture or in some cases
mutilation. As of the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the PGJE
estimated that 76 of the killings fit this pattern.

45.
These characteristics are illustrated to an extent in the finding of
eight bodies in a vacant lot on November 6 and 7, 2001. After one
body was found on November 6, a search of the area revealed two more
bodies the same day, and five sets of bones the following day. At
the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the PGJE affirmed its
belief that the bodies were those of: Guadalupe Luna de la Rosa,
Verónica Martínez Hernández, Bárbara Aracely Martínez Ramos, María
de los Angeles Acosta Ramírez, Mayra Juliana Reyes Solis, Laura
Berenice Ramos Monarrez, Claudia Ivette González and Esmeralda Herrera
Monreal. Scientific tests were being done in most of the cases to
confirm the identifications.

46.
Reports and testimony received during the Special Rapporteur’s visit
yielded the following information about these young women:
Guadalupe was 19, and had been a student at the Instituto
Tecnológico deCiudad Juárez when her parents last saw her
leave home on September 30, 2000 to meet a girlfriend to go
shopping. 19 year-old Verónica, a maquila worker and student,
disappeared after having taken a bus to the center of town on October
19, 2000. Bárbara, 21 years old and employed, disappeared on
December 26, 2000. María de los Angeles, a 19 year old maquila
worker and student, disappeared April 25, 2001, after having last been
seen in the center of the city. Mayra, 17, was last seen in the
center of the city, where she had gone looking for work on June 25,
2001. Laura Berenice, a student, was 17 when she disappeared on
September 25, 2001. Claudia Ivette, a 20 year old maquila
operator, disappeared October 10, 2001. Finally, Esmeralda, a
domestic worker, was 15 when she disappeared on October 29, 2001.
The victims disappeared over a span of approximately a year, each on a
different date and from a different place. All were young, ranging
in age between 15 and 21. The bodies found on November 6 and 7 had
all been dumped subsequent to death.

47. Many,
including family members, members of nongovernmental organizations and
other representatives of civil society, expressed grave concerns about
both the circumstances of these crimes and the response of the
authorities. In particular, these individuals indicated that they
lacked certain basic information necessary to have confidence in the
attribution of identity made by officials. In one instance, for
example, a family member had reportedly been denied the possibility to
see the remains “for her own protection,” and in others, the remains
had not yet been returned to the presumed families. Certain family
members expressed grave doubts as to whether the body of their loved one
had really been found, or whether they might keep hoping that the person
reported missing was still alive. While DNA tests had been ordered
with respect to the remains recovered in November, months had passed
with no answers. As of October of 2002, authorities of the PGJE
indicated to the Commission that the results of these tests had not yet
been received. Representatives of civil society reported that, in
an unspecified number of prior cases, family members had requested DNA
tests to confirm the identity of the victim and been denied.

48.
Because of the lack of basic information, family members in these and
other cases have expressed a profound lack of confidence in the
willingness or ability of the authorities to clarify what happened or
pursue accountability. Further, family members in these and other
cases reported having received conflicting or confusing information from
the authorities, and having been treated dismissively or even
disrespectfully or aggressively when they sought information about the
investigations. During the March, 2002 hearing before the
Commission, representatives of “Alto a la impunidad: ni una muerta
más” reported that family members of the victims whose bodies
were presumably found on November 6 and 7, 2001, had returned to the
site on February 25, 2002, and found clothing or other objects related
to some of the victims at the scene.

49.
The authorities of Ciudad Juárez, for their part, point to the November
9, 2001 detention of Gustavo González Meza (“La Foca”) and Javier
García Uribe (“El Cerillo”) in connection with these crimes as
evidence of its prompt response. During the Special Rapporteur’s
visit, however, numerous individuals, including some Mexican State
officials, expressed serious concerns about allegations that these
detainees had been tortured to coerce confessions. Both confessed
in initial declarations, and both later retracted those
confessions.

50.
With respect to these allegations of torture, during her visit, the
Special Rapporteur received two distinct sets of medical
certificates. The set provided by the PGJE was prepared by the
Department of Legal Medicine on November 11, 2001, at 02:40 and 02:45
hours, respectively. The certificate relative to González
indicates no external signs of violence, while that relative to García
refers to a small zone of equimosis on his right arm that would heal in
less than 15 days. The other set of certificates, prepared by the
Medical Unit of the detention center at 21:00 hours on November 11,
2001, attested in the case of González to “multiples quemaduras en
genitales” and areas of equimosis in the area of the thorax and
edema. In the case of García, it refers to “[m]ultiples
quemaduras de 1er grado en genitales” y marks on his right arm.[10]
Subsequent reports indicate that the allegations of torture were
denounced both to the authorities and publicly, but that the judiciary
rejected the claims with respect to coercion as unsubstantiated.
It was also reported that the person in charge of expert services at the
PGJE at the time had resigned because of pressure to charge the results
of certain expert tests to inculpate the two men detained.[11]
The death of Mr. González on February 8, 2003, while in his cell, under
circumstances that remain under investigation, has generated renewed
expressions of concern with respect to this criminal process.

51. At the time of
the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the PGJE reported that, during the
period from 1993 to January of 2002, 4,154 reports of missing persons
had been filed in Ciudad Juárez. Of these, 3,844 of the persons
in question had been located. In 53 instances, the PGJE had direct
or indirect knowledge of the situation of the person in question, but
would not declare the matter closed unless or until that person had
physically appeared in the Subprocuraduría. 257 of those
reported missing remained unaccounted for.

52. With respect
to the year 2002, the State recently indicated that for the period from
January through October, 285 reports of disappearances of women had been
filed. Of these, 257 of the individuals in question had been
located. 6 were in “reserve” because they involved a wrong or
changed address, or because the presumed victim had contacted the family
without providing information as to their whereabouts. 22 were
under investigation.

53.
Recent information suggests that over these years, only a small number
of files (fewer than 10) were transferred from the prosecutor in charge
of missing persons to the prosecutor for homicides. It was not
clear at the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit the extent to
which efforts had been made to cross reference data on the missing women
with that of unidentified homicide victims.

54.
With respect both to the women reported as missing whose bodies were
later recovered, and those still unaccounted for, one of the central
concerns expressed by family members as well as representatives of civil
society was delay in initiating investigations. On the one hand,
they indicated that family members who went to the police to report a
missing person might well be told to return in 48 hours, with the
explanation that the missing woman or girl must have gone off with a
boyfriend and would soon return. On the other hand, they indicated
that even with a missing person’s report, the response was neither
rapid nor comprehensive.

55.
While authorities in Chihuahua acknowledged to the Special Rapporteur
that, in the past, the police had tended to require such a lapse of time
before taking a missing persons report, this had been remedied through
changes in policy and practice requiring a rapid investigation. In
October of 2002, the PGJE reported that the Unit for Attention to
Victims of the Special Prosecutor’s Office’s had been fortified with
additional staff, that immediate searches had been prioritized
(particularly where the circumstances suggested high risk – as in the
characteristics associated with the “serial” killings), and that
agents of the PGJE were now participating in these efforts so that
measures could be carried out on-site. As a consequence, the PGJE
indicated, more of these reports were being resolved through the
location of the persons presumed missing. In view of the reports
of delay in this regard through late 2001, the issue of rapid
investigation of reports of disappearance merits very close monitoring
and evaluation.

56. Following her
visit to Ciudad Juárez, the Special Rapporteur’s attention has been
drawn to a preoccupying series of disappearances in the City of
Chihuahua that may share some of the characteristics of the crimes in
Ciudad Juárez. During the hearing before the Commission in
October of 2002, representatives of “Alto a la impunidad: ni una
muerta más” reported on the disappearance of 15 women and girls
in the City of Chihuahua. They reported that the body of one of
the victims had been found, although the case had yet to be subject to
an effective investigation. They further indicated that the other
disappearances had not been duly investigated, to the point that the
file in the case of one victim who disappeared in 1998 consisted of six
pieces of paper.

57. The killing of
women in Ciudad Juárez is strongly linked to and influenced by the
prevalence of domestic and intrafamilial violence. A review of
official data, press reports and nongovernmental reports indicates that
a significant number of killings since 1993 evidently took place in
connection with situations of domestic and intrafamilial
violence.

58.
Violence within the family, including battery, sexual abuse and rape, is
certainly not unique to Ciudad Juárez, or to the Mexican State, for
that matter. However, the lack of reliable statistics remains one
of the obstacles in defining the scope of the problem. In fact,
the Special Rapporteurship has encountered no adequate data on the
prevalence of such violence in Ciudad Juárez.

59.
Nonetheless, a number of studies provide a general indication of the
gravity of the situation. These indicate that approximately
one-third to one-half of Mexican women living as part of a couple
suffered some form of abuse (physical, emotional, psychological,
economic or sexual) at the hands of their partner.[12]
Women between the ages of 15 and 29, and pregnant women were reported as
being especially affected.[13]
Such violence affects men, women and children, but the aggressors are
most frequently men. The short and long-term consequences of such
violence help perpetuate the subordination of women, and deprive women
of opportunities on equal terms with men. Further, economic
subordination and the need to support children lead many women to remain
in abusive situations.

60.
Such violence leads in extreme cases to homicide. While the
Commission has not encountered much documentation in this regard, one
study by the National Secretariat for Health reportedly examined 15,000
death certificates from the metropolitan area of the Capital. Of
those, 1,935 concerned the deaths of women, and of those, 48% were
reportedly the result of domestic violence.[14]

61.
With respect to Ciudad Juárez, killings reported in the media range
from a stepfather alleged to have beaten his two-year old stepdaughter
to death to a son who stabbed his mother to death for refusing to pay
his debts for him.[15]
The killing of María Luisa Carsoli Berumen on December 21, 2001,
shortly before the visit of the Special Rapporteur, illustrates some of
the characteristics of this problem.

María Luisa
was the 33 year-old mother of 4 children, ranging from 3 to 8 years
old. She had been married to Ricardo Medina Acosta for 10 years
at the time he killed her in front of the Casa Amiga, a crisis center
for women subjected to violence. The couple had sought
counseling there about a year before in relation to Medina’s violent
attacks against his wife. In need of money, María Luisa had
then taken a job at Casa Amiga as a receptionist. The violence
did not stop, however, and he was in fact briefly detained in November
of 2001 for having tried to kill his wife. Reports indicate that
Medina was released shortly after his detention. María Luisa
went through various reconciliation attempts and remained in Ciudad
Juárez in order to safeguard the interests of her children; their
father had at some point been granted custody. The day before
the killing, she had left their home. The day of the killing, he
was waiting for her outside Casa Amiga. He grabbed her, they
exchanged words, and he stabbed her to death. He was deemed a
fugitive at the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit.[16]

62.
The different forms of violence referred to above are often connected to
sexual violence. As noted above, a substantial number of the women
killed, especially the victims of the so-called “serial” killings,
had been raped, or otherwise sexually abused. A number of those
bodies bore signs of torture or, in some cases, mutilation.
Further, the Rapporteur received very general information during her
visit about a high incidence of rape and sexual violence outside the
context of these killings.

63.
While the extent of these aspects of the problem is unclear, evidence in
certain cases suggests links to prostitution or trafficking for sexual
exploitation. Both can involve situations of coercion and abuse of
women working in or forced to participate in the sex trade. Among
others, the Director of UNIFEM has indicated that the situation of
Ciudad Juárez, involving as it does the problems of drug trafficking,
pornography rings and prostitution, among others, is a significant
factor in the increase of violence against women. She noted that
until these related problems were dealt with seriously, the killings in
Ciudad Juárez would not stop.[17]

64.
As is the case with the other forms of violence based on gender referred
to above, sexual violence is driven by gender inequality. While it
is a serious human rights problem, it tends to be under-documented,
under-reported and under-researched. In this regard, one of the
questions that arises in relation to the killings under study is why,
given the prevalence of sexual abuse in such cases generally, tests to
confirm such abuse were not performed in some cases. Because these
instances have not been clarified, it is difficult to attribute an
explanation, but it does suggest that sexual violence has not always
been dealt with as a serious element of these crimes.

65. During her
visit, and in subsequent follow-up activities, the Special Rapporteur
has received information about threats and acts of hostility against
human rights defenders involved in these cases, family members of
victims seeking investigation, and journalists reporting on the crimes
and the search for justice.[18]
In interviews, for example, several family members reported receiving
anonymous, intimidating phone calls. Reports indicate that several
family members have been warned to stop pursuing accountability.
Several reported having been watched or followed. In most cases,
the individuals affected indicated that they had not denounced the
intimidation to the authorities, because of lack of confidence and/or
fear.

66.
Just days prior to the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the lawyer for
Gustavo González Meza, one of those accused in connection with the
killing of the victims whose bodies were allegedly found in November of
2001, was himself shot and killed by judicial police as he was driving
in Ciudad Juárez. Mario César Escobedo Anaya’s father reported
that he had been speaking with his son via cellular phone at the time
the shots were fired. In the aftermath, family members, local
leaders and various local bar associations exhorted the authorities to
clarify and punish the killing, and expressed concern that the initial
investigation had been marked by what they characterized as serious
irregularities.[19]
Local authorities indicated that the agents in question had shot in
self-defense, and had subsequently been placed on suspension.
Escobedo had maintained that his client had been tortured under custody
to provide a false confession. The Special Rapporteur received
information during her visit that Escobedo had received threats just
days before he was killed. The killing of Escobedo attracted
tremendous public attention, and many individuals, including a number of
Mexican State representatives, expressed strong concern to the Special
Rapporteur regarding the circumstances.

67.
As noted in chapter I above, the Commission granted precautionary
measures for Esther Chávez Cano, a human rights defender involved in
the pursuit of justice in these cases, and for the families of González
and García, the two men detained in connection with the bodies found in
November of 2001. All had received a series of threats. As
also indicated above, the precautionary measures granted with respect to
these families were amplified following the death of Mr. González to
include Mr. García. Mario César Escobedo Anaya had been
defending González at the time he was killed, and reports indicate that
the lawyer currently defending García has also received threats.[20]

68.
During her visit and thereafter, the Special Rapporteur has received
information about threats against journalists covering these
crimes. She interviewed several journalists who referred to
threats or pressure in relation to their work on these crimes, and a
general climate of fear surrounding them. Press reports from the
time of the visit indicate that journalists Samira Izaguirre, José
Antonio Tirado and José Loya had been threatened and harassed,
evidently in connection with their work relating to these crimes.[21]
Further, a journalist based in Chihuahua complained of harassment and
threats since the time she had started reporting on the killings there.[22]

69. While there
have been some important advances, the response of the Mexican State to
the killings and other forms of violence against women has been and
remains seriously deficient. As such, it is a central aspect of
the problem. Overall, the impunity in which most violence based on
gender remains serves to fuel its perpetuation.

70.
Representatives of civil society express indignation over the
insufficient response of the police and judiciary to these killings, in
particular with respect to the series of killings of young women that
appear to fit a pattern. These representatives and family members
of various victims complain of: delay in the initiation of
investigations into reported disappearances; insufficient efforts in the
initial investigation; the failure to collect or record evidence;
evidence lost or missing from case files; mistreatment of family members
of victims by the authorities; lack of information as to the status or
results of the investigation or orientation as to the legal mechanisms;
lack of support services for the survivors of those killed; and lack of
results with respect to the identification, prosecution and punishment
of those responsible. Many have expressed concern that attention
is focused on the clarification of recent crimes, with little or no
effort given to the investigation of killings that took place prior to
1998. Similarly, many have commented that each time a new killing
is reported, resources are shifted to that investigation, with little
follow up on those already underway.

71. The Mexican
State, for its part, recognizes that mistakes were made during the first
years that it was confronted with these killings. It acknowledges,
for example, that it was not uncommon for the police to tell a family
member attempting to report a girl missing to return in 48 hours, when
it was clear there might be something to investigate. Both State
and non-state representatives indicated that the authorities in Ciudad
Juárez would often dismiss initial complaints by saying the victim was
out with a boyfriend and would soon return home. The PGJE further
noted a lack of technical and scientific capacity and training at that
time for members of the judicial police. Officials of the State of
Chihuahua indicated that the deficiencies were such that, in 25 cases
dating back to the first years of the killings, the “files”
consisted of little more than bags containing sets of bones, which
provided virtually no basis to pursue further investigation.[23]

72. In fact, the
problems were such that, pursuant to the complaint filed by Federal
Deputy Alma Angélica Vucovich Seele, the National Commission for Human
Rights (CNDH) carried out an investigation of the Mexican State’s
response to 36 of the killings, and issued its Recommendation 44/98 in
1998 containing specific recommendations to remedy the deficiencies
identified and hold those responsible to account. The
recommendations were based on a detailed review of the case files and
the procedures applied. The review of the case files demonstrated
fundamental deficiencies, such as the failure to collect basic evidence
and complete simple tests. For example, of the cases reviewed, in
10 there had been a sexual attack, in 8 there had not, and in 6 it wasn’t
known because no tests were done to make such a determination.
Basic measures to establish identity had not been taken. Some
files were missing forensic reports or death certificates. The
CNDH also drew attention to the delay in processing the
cases.

73.
The CNDH emphasized that these cases were being dealt with in an
isolated way, without taking into account the larger context of violence
against women, and the effects of impunity within the society as a
whole. It indicated that officials of the PGJE had constructed an
unfounded discourse about the victims -- to the effect that they were
women of few resources, without close ties, that it was not known how
many were prostitutes, but that many were known in night spots, etc. –
in order to excuse or obscure their failure to discharge their
responsibilities under the law. This, the CNDH underlined, was
both discriminatory and an indication of the lack of will to protect the
rights of the victims.

74.
The CNDH indicated that, as a result of the acts and omissions of the
State functionaries in the justice sector, the human rights of the
victims and their family members had been violated in contravention of
national and international obligations of the Mexican State, including
the Convention of Belém do Pará. The specific recommendations
concerned the need to complete basic measures of investigation, ensure
interdisciplinary and interinstitutional collaboration, adopt effective
public security measures and strengthen the administration of justice,
and hold those responsible for the acts and omissions reported
accountable administratively, and the extent justified, criminally.

75.
The unfortunate fact that there has been no institutional follow-up by
the CNDH to ensure that these recommendations were fully implemented,
and report on the steps taken means that this valuable initiative did
not realize its full potential. In fact, full implementation of
those recommendations would undoubtedly have had a positive effect on
the situation. In this regard, as will be explained below, a
number of initiatives aimed at producing advances with respect to this
situation have failed to receive the necessary follow-up. There
is, in this sense, a pattern of efforts that are initiated but never
fully realized, and therefore fail to produce a significant impact in
diminishing violence against women.

76.
The position of the authorities of the State of Chihuahua is that, since
the establishment of the Special Prosecutor’s Office in 1998, it has
initiated the steps necessary to promptly and properly respond to these
crimes, and has produced a much better record of clarification of cases.[24]
During the Special Rapporteur’s visit, Chihuahua officials reported
that the Special Prosecutor’s Office is comprised of agents of the Ministerio
Público and PGJE with specialized training. They indicated
that it has been provided the technical capacity to better respond to
these crimes, through equipment including a DNA laboratory that was
about to be installed at the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit,
and through the installation of various information systems that would
allow investigators to track data and access national databases on such
matters as fingerprints.[25]
They also described a recently constructed data base used to track some
of the killings and disappearances presently under study and extract
information about characteristics and trends.

77.
In terms of procedures, it was reported that each homicide was assigned
to a particular group of agents responsible for the investigation from
start to finish in order to avoid the problem of possible lost or
missing information, and ensure the integrity of the investigation and
resulting file. In addition to the normal functions, agents of the
group are present for the autopsy in order to be informed of the
information and evidence revealed, and are tasked with providing
follow-up through the final sentence.

78.
The authorities indicated that the Special Prosecutor’s Office
coordinates with other instances in a number of important areas.
They reported that the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation had
given a number of courses in such issues as crime scene management and
the interchange of information aimed at locating suspects. The
Office exchanged information with the PGR, which had also provided
expert assistance with some DNA tests. Further, the National
Public Security System, the PGR and the Universidad Autónoma of
Ciudad Juárez had assisted by providing a number of other specialized
courses. Additionally, the Special Prosecutor’s Office
collaborates with the police of the Municipality of Ciudad Juárez in
certain activities, and is assisted with some mapping and technical data
by the Instituto Municipal de Investigación y Planeación.

79. It was
reported that a specialized area for attention to the victims of crime
had been established within the Office to provide legal, psychological
and social services to those requiring them. There are also
specialized units to investigate reports of disappearances, and to
address sexual crimes and crimes against the family. With respect
to the foregoing initiatives, the authorities of Chihuahua expressed
concern, however, that the federal funds allocated for the activities of
the Special Prosecutor’s Office were insufficient.

80. The
information available reflects that efforts made to improve the response
to these crimes through the Office of the Special Prosecutor have
resulted in some improvements. Certainly the situation is not as
grave as in the first years in which bags of bones were sometimes left
as the only record in the aftermath of a killing. Nor is the tone
of the official discourse as facially discriminatory as was documented
by the CNDH in its Recommendation 44/98. At the same time,
representatives of civil society and others who have monitored the
response of the justice sector continue to report a deficient response,
both with respect to the substance of the investigations and with
respect to the treatment accorded by police and prosecutorial personnel
to the family members of the victims.

81.
An illustrative statistic for understanding the conflicting perspectives
on the performance of police and judicial authorities with respect to
these killings is the number of cases the Special Prosecutor’s Office
considers to have been “resolved.” The Office of the PGJE of
Chihuahua reported to the Special Rapporteur during her visit that, of
the 268 killings of women it had recorded between January of 1993 and
January of 2002, it classified 76 as fitting into a pattern of multiple
or “serial” killings, and 192 as “situational,” that is, crimes
of passion, narcotrafficking, robbery, sexual crimes, fights,
intrafamilial violence, vengeance, unintentional homicide or motives
unknown. With respect to the 76 classified as multiple killings,
it classified 27 as “resolved,” and 49 as under investigation.
In relation to these, the PGJE reported on the conviction of one
perpetrator for one crime. With respect to the 192 “situational”
killings, it classified 152 as “resolved,” and 40 as under
investigation. Of these, the PGJE reported that 57 had been the
subject of a prosecution and conviction. In late November of 2002,
the State reported on the conviction of two other individuals sentenced
to prison terms. The data indicates that, of the total number of
killings, approximately 20% have been subject to prosecution and
conviction.

82.
Further questioning from the Special Rapporteur as to this
classification system yielded the explanation that “resolved” for
the PGJE signified that the Office of the Special Prosecutor felt that
it had enough information upon which to make a presumption as to the
motive and culpability of a presumed perpetrator and that the person had
been presented before a judge (“consignado”). It did
not necessarily signify that a particular individual had been formally
charged or tried. It was not clearly explained, however, how
indicia not yet sufficient to support formal accusation and prosecution
was nonetheless sufficient to make a determination as to motive and to
declare the crime “resolved.”[26]

83.
With respect to the multiple or “serial” killings, the Mexican State
reported that Omar Latif Sharif was detained in 1996 in relation to
three killings. He was prosecuted for the killing of Elizabeth
Castro García and convicted. At the time of the Special
Rapporteur’s visit, his sentence was still on appeal because, pursuant
to his conviction, the defense had requested and was granted the “reposición”
of the case to review an aspect under challenge. Further, the
Mexican State reported that six members of a gang called “los Rebeldes”
were detained in 1996 in connection with 7 cases of rape and
murder. Members of another gang, “el Tolteca” and “los
Ruteros” were detained in relation to another 8 cases in 1999, and the
men known as “el Cerillo” and “la Foca” were detained in 2001 in
relation to 8 cases. Apart from the prosecution of Sharif, the
Mexican State reported that each of the other proceedings remained in
the investigation stage of prosecution.

84.
The theory proffered by the PGJE during the Special Rapporteur’s visit
was that the “Rebeldes” and “Ruteros,” as well as “El Cerillo”
and “La Foca” had been working under the instructions of Sharif in
the perpetration of many of the multiple or “serial” killings,
although the State indicated that there were not sufficient elements of
proof to initiate the corresponding criminal proceedings for many of
those crimes.

85.
From the perspective of many representatives of civil society, the key
statistic is that only one perpetrator, Abdel Latif Sharif Sharif, has
been sentenced with respect to one of the multiple or “serial”
killings. While the “Rebeldes” have been detained since 1996
and the “Ruteros” since 1999, the killings didn’t stop, and these
alleged perpetrators have yet to be convicted. These
representatives have consistently expressed concerns about the use of
torture to coerce confessions in some of these cases, for example in the
cases of Gustavo González Meza and Víctor Javier García Uribe.
In sum, many expressed a lack of confidence that the true perpetrators
had been detained, and all expressed dismay at the lack of conclusive
prosecution and punishment.

86.
In its observations on the draft of the present report, the Mexican
State specified that:

Although it is
true that in the first investigations there were various delays and
irregularities, it must be recognized that 93 of those responsible for
the killing and disappearance of women, including accomplices and
collaborators, have been delivered to justice. Accordingly, it
cannot be considered that a phenomenon of impunity prevails in Ciudad
Juárez, insofar as this concept implies the inactivity of the
Government to sanction those responsible.

In this
regard, the Rapporteur and Commission wish to recognize that the efforts
through which the submission of these individuals to justice were
achieved demonstrate that, applying the necessary actions, it is
possible to achieve advances in the investigation and prosecution of
these crimes. However, it does not escape the attention of those
who know the situation in Ciudad Juárez that, during the years covered
by this report, approximately 300 girls and women have been killed, and
almost 300 remain on the list of missing persons. In this sense,
in a high percentage of cases there are no effective results in terms of
investigation or resolution.

87. In looking at
the role of Federal justice, in particular assistance from the PGR, the
Special Rapporteur received information during her visit indicating
that, in addition to providing some training and assisting with
information systems, the PGR had been asked by the Special Prosecutor’s
Office to provide technical assistance in relation to the finding of the
eight bodies in November of 2001. The PGR reported that it had
sent specialized technical personnel to assist with that investigation,
and that its main contribution was processing the DNA tests on some of
the remains recovered. While the Commission has received
information to the effect that the authorities of Chihuahua have invited
assistance from the PGR in general terms and that the PGR has offered
it, again in general terms, it appears that each is invoking the scope
of its jurisdiction as the basis for resisting further or deeper joint
engagement in the investigation of these crimes.

88.
In addition to the justice sector, it is evident that a response to
these killings and other crimes is required from a broad range of State
and non-state actors. In terms of the efforts of other sectors,
these forms of violence against women require responses as a public
security issue in terms of preventing such crime, as well as a public
health issue in terms of both prevention and services for victims, and a
social issue in terms of the effect on families and the social fabric in
Juárez.

89.
In this regard, the Special Rapporteur received information during her
visit about initiatives aimed at addressing the public security
dimensions of the problem. For example, the Mayor of the
Municipality and members of his team reported on promising initiatives
to install a telephone hotline to take emergency calls from women at
risk from domestic violence, harassment in the street, etc.; implement a
program of stricter controls for hiring drivers in the public transport
service; install more street lighting; launch a new anonymous complaint
program called “Juntos contra la Delincuencia” (Together
against Crime); and work with some in-bond assembly plants to adopt
measures to ensure that no woman is left alone on the buses that
transport them to and from work. In addition to efforts at the
Municipal level, the PGJE has also reported on outreach and educational
efforts of the Office of the Special Prosecutor aimed at disseminating
information to women on self-protection and defense, principally in
schools and maquilas, and violence awareness programs.

90.
In looking at work to involve non-State actors, the Special Rapporteur
has also received very general information about efforts of maquila
employers on issues concerning the situation and treatment of their
workers and questions of public security. With respect to the
latter, for example, the situation presently under study raises
questions about security in and around the industrial parks where the maquilas
are located, and concerns about the many workers who travel significant
distances late at night to work their shifts. In this regard, the
Mexican State bears responsibility for ensuring that the maquilas
are meeting their duties under law to their workers, and has a special
role in encouraging the maquilas to invest in measures to support
the workers and communities that serve them and helping to channel such
investment for the public good.

91.
In terms of the participation of the Federal Government sector, during
her visit the Special Rapporteur received detailed information on the
valuable activities of the Congressional Commissions on Equity and
Gender, and the Special Commission of the Chamber of Deputies created to
provide follow-up on the killings of women in Ciudad Juárez. That
Special Commission has held meetings with relatives of victims,
nongovernmental organizations that work in this area, State officials,
and representatives of maquilas, in order to follow-up on
investigations, encourage real collaboration between the Government at
all three levels and civil society, and offer concrete recommendations
on ways to prevent these crimes.

92.
The Special Rapporteur also received information on the strong support
given by the National Women’s Institute, working closely with the
Governor of Chihuahua, for the creation of two Inter-institutional
Panels for Dialogue (Mesa Interinstitucional de Diálogo) with
the participation of representatives of different agencies of the State
of Chihuahua and of civil society. According to the report
provided by the PGJE in October of 2002, the first has recently been set
up to provide inter-institutional input and support in the development
of public policy concerning crime and violence, including violence
against women, and seeks to incorporate broad participation. With
respect to the participation of the health sector being sought, the PGJE
expressly mentioned the creation of the Center for Attention to Women in
Situations of Violence as an important initiative to provide services to
victims of violence. Other links were being established with the
education, business, academic and civil society sectors. The
Commission and its Special Rapporteur recognize these efforts to create
new spaces for dialogue and action with the participation of civil
society, and look forward to receiving updated information on plans of
action with specific goals, timetables and evaluation components.

93.
The Commission and its Special Rapporteur also received information
about the October, 2002 establishment of a Technical Juridical Panel
incorporating the participation of diverse State and non-state
representatives, namely the Executive, Judicial and Legislative branches
of the Government of Chihuahua, the Mayor of Ciudad Juárez,
organizations of civil society, family members of victims and the
INMUJERES. While the Panel is still defining its methods of work,
initial reports suggested that its objectives would include informing
family members on advances in investigation, defining further lines of
investigation and discussing situations requiring measures of
protection. Among the positive points already included in the
regulations for its functioning is the issuance of a bulletin to inform
the public of the results of each meeting.[27]
With respect to the remaining definition of the work plan,
nongovernmental sources have expressed concern that, while reviewing
case files had been among the initial goals, the PGJE has raised
objections to allowing access to those files. The Commission and
its Special Rapporteur are anxious to receive updated information on the
definition of a work plan for this Panel, with concrete goals,
timetables and mechanisms for evaluation. The Commission and its
Special Rapporteur consider that the establishment of this Panel, with
the inclusion of diverse representatives of the State sector, as well as
two representatives of civil society and family members of the victims,
is a very valuable initiative that holds tremendous potential.

94. Reports
indicate that the State of Chihuahua has issued requests for technical
assistance from other countries. Apart from the training courses
referred to above by the FBI, and collaboration in certain
narcotrafficking investigation activities, however, the Commission has
received no information about subsequent collaboration from foreign
institutions.

95. Efforts to
take an integral approach to the situation of violence in Ciudad Juárez
are very much needed. The Commission and its Special Rapporteur
value the opening of new spaces for dialogue and collaboration in the
search for solutions to these problems. These have the capacity,
if properly utilized, to contribute to achieving concrete
advances. To date, however, efforts toward multisectoral
collaboration have been hindered by a number of fundamental
barriers. First, the terms of reference for these efforts continue
to require clarification. That is to say, while many of those
involved have invested themselves in these efforts with the aim of
incorporating the perspective of gender and adopting integral
approaches, other functionaries persist in focusing on these crimes as
isolated instances. It is worth noting that many authorities in
Chihuahua, from the State Prosecutor on down, tend to refer to the
so-called “serial” crimes as the serious problem to be addressed,
indicating expressly or implicitly that the other crimes have been dealt
with sufficiently.

96. Second,
responses to these crimes need to devote more attention to involving
women and men and the perspective of gender in all aspects of
work. In this regard, during her visit, the Special Rapporteur
perceived some division in roles based on gender. She met with men
in relation to official approaches to public security and the
administration of justice (with the exception of the Special Prosecutor
assigned to the killing of women). With some notable exceptions,
she generally met with women in relation to the approach of civil
society to the killings and the pursuit of justice, and the provision of
services to victims. Further, the family members who have come
forward to press for justice have, in most cases, been mothers, sisters
and other female relatives. While both men and women have made
important contributions to efforts to combat these crimes, further
attention to the incorporation of the perspective of gender would
enhance those contributions.

97.
Third, responses to the situation of violence against women in Ciudad
Juárez are characterized by an extreme level of politicization.
This politicization, based on party politics, was evident to some degree
in virtually every meeting the Special Rapporteur held during her
visit. It significantly restricts the ability of these initiatives
to accomplish their objectives.

98.
Fourth, efforts to amplify responses to the situation and to incorporate
the participation of other sectors have yet to incorporate sufficient
mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and follow-up to ensure effective
results – first and foremost that women are more secure in Ciudad
Juárez.

[6]
These two examples are drawn from information received by the
Rapporteur during her visit. See also, “Informe de
actividades de la Comisión Especial de la H. Cámara de Diputados,
para que conozca y de seguimiento a las investigaciones relacionadas
con las homicidios de las mujeres perpetrados en Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua”, notes of interviews of November 29, 2002.

[8]
One analysis based on death certificates and other data concluded that
249 men were killed between 1990-1993, while 942 men were killed
between 1994-1997 – a 300% increase. According to the same
study, 20 women were killed between 1990 and 1993, and 143 women were
killed between 1994-1997, a 600% increase. See Cheryl A. Howard,
Ph.D., Georgina Martínez, M.A., Zulma y. Mendez, M.A., “Women,
Violence and Politics,” presentation to the LASA, March 17, 2000.

[9]
One analysis concluded that the rate from men in Ciudad Juárez was
47.1, and for women 7.9 (per 100,000). The rate for Tijuana, for
example, also located along the northern border, characterized by a
strong maquila presence and with roughly the same population,
for the same period was 34.9 for men and 2.4 for women. The rate
for the United Mexican States as a whole for the period was 28.2 for
men and 3.1 for females. Id.

[10]
Subsequent information prepared in the detainees’ defense refers to
these burns as electrical burns.

In
its report “Violencia Intrafamiliar, Documento Metodológico y
Resultados” published in 2000, the Instituto Nacional de
Estadística Geografía e Informática indicated that the results
of its survey showed that, of the 17,124,812 people living in the
metropolitan area of Mexico City, 5,821,697 were living in homes
marked by violence, most frequently emotional violence, intimidation,
and physical and sexual violence. These references are cited in
the report “Programas Nacionales para Prevenir, Sancionar y
Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer en México,” of October
2000, prepared by Teresa Ulloa Ziáurriz, Mónica del Val Locht and
Jorge González Santana, for the project Violence in the Americas
being carried out by the Inter-American Commission of Women of the OAS
with the ICCLR and ILANUD.

[16]
The Special Rapporteur received information about this killing during
her visit. See also, Esther Chávez Cano, “Una muerte
anunciada,” El Diario, 27 de diciembre de 2001 (the author of
the column is the Director of Casa Amiga Centro de Crisis); Luz
del Carmen Sosa, Casa Amiga: exigen castigo para homicida,” El
Diario, 21 de enero de 2002 (reporting on demands that Medina be
arrested, prosecuted and punished).

[17]
Rosa Elvira Vargas, “Se suma el titular del UNIFEM al clamor de
justicia por las muertas de Juárez,” La Jornada, 4 de diciembre de
2002, versión on line (reporting on the Director’s visit in
Ciudad Juárez, and quoting her as to why violence against women had
increased in that locality).

[23]
See Letter from the Secretary of Government of Chihuahua to the
Special Rapportuer of February 11, 2002.

[24]
It should be noted that, prior to the establishment of the Special
Prosecutor’s Office, a Specialized Unit had been established within
the PGJE in 1996 for the investigation of these killings and of
disappearances of women.

[25]
In October of 2002, local officials reported that the DNA laboratory
was still not functional, but was 80% installed. Unofficial
information from February of 2003 indicated that it was still not
functioning.

[26]
The basis for classification and “resolution” has raised doubts in
other sectors. For example, while the authorities of Ciudad
Juárez have classified a number of the killings as linked to
narcotrafficking, at the national level the PGR indicated that it
lacked sufficient probative elements or data to link those crimes to
narcotrafficking, and was therefore unable to intervene in their
investigation. See letter of José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos,
Specialized Unit for Organized Crime of the PGR, to Sergio Antonio
Martínez Garza, General Secretary of Government of Chihuahua, of
March 7, 2002.