REDUCING The Nuclear Danger
Inventory of U.S. Department of Energy
Nonproliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiatives
October 1995
Message From the Secretary
The Department of Energy is pleased to present Reducing the Nuclear
Danger, which provides an overview of the wide array of our activities
in support of United States arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear
threat reduction policies. Although the Cold War has ended, significant
threats to our national security still remain. The Department is
reordering its priorities to meet these new challenges.
We have demonstrated to the world community the Administration' s
commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction through
leadership by example. Over the past twelve months, the Department
counts many successes, most notably: the achievement of an indefinite
extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; the removal of more
than 20 bombs worth of weapons grade highly enriched uranium from
Kazakhstan - no longer available for illicit trafficking; dramatic
Russian - American progress in improving nuclear materials protection,
control and accounting at a rapidly increasing number of facilities that
contain weapons-usable nuclear materials; and the adoption of a science-
based stockpile stewardship and management program that allows the
Department to cease all nuclear testing.
This report portrays the Department's activities for fiscal years 1995
and planned for 1996 across ten broad categories which crosscut all
program areas of nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction, as well
as work we do for other government agencies. These Administration-wide
initiatives most accurately characterize our post Cold War activities
and provide a baseline from which future activities will be measured. As
an added benefit, the inventory will provide a powerful management tool
by which we can measure our effectiveness in meeting the
Administration's goal of reducing the global nuclear danger.
We are at the crossroads of an unprecedented opportunity to direct the
course of U.S. nonproliferation efforts into the next century and
beyond, using the preeminent scientific and technological expertise of
our National Laboratories. This report will assist the Department in
critically assessing existing programs and activities to monitor and
adjust our priorities for the future.
Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
Table of Contents
Inventory of Departmental Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Threat Reduction Activities ...................... 1
Proliferation Challenges in the 1990s ...................... 1
The Existing Nonproliferation Regime ...................... 2
Category Descriptions ........................................ 6
DOE Laboratories ........................................... 9
DOE Program Offices ........................................ 9
Varied Roles of the Laboratories ............................ 10
Accomplishments .............................................. 13
Future Challenges ............................................ 16
Funding Profiles.............................................. 17
Program Drivers .............................................. 22
Summary ...................................................... 25
The Path Before Us ........................................... 27
Epilogue ..................................................... 28
Individual Laboratory Profiles ............................... 29
Acronym Glossary ............................................. 36
List of Charts
Chart A - An Overview of U.S. Department of Energy
Activities ................................................. 5
Chart B - Snapshot by Laboratory - FY 95 ..................... 10
Chart C - Funding Profile .................................... 18
Chart D - Other Prime Contracts ...............................21
Chart E - Total Expenditures by Category ..................... 23
Chart F - Work for Others .................................... 24
Chart G - Total Laboratory Expenditures - FY 95 .............. 26
Chart H - Total Laboratory Expenditures (estimated) - FY 96 .. 26
Chart 1 - Argonne National Laboratory ........................ 29
Chart 2 - Brookhaven National Laboratory ..................... 29
Chart 3 - Environmental Measurements Laboratory .............. 30
Chart 4 - Idaho National Engineering Laboratory .............. 30
Chart 5 - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory .............. 31
Chart 6 - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ............. 31
Chart 7 - Los Alamos National Laboratory ..................... 32
Chart 8 - New Brunswick Laboratory ........................... 32
Chart 9 - Oak Ridge National Laboratory ...................... 33
Chart 10 - Pacific Northwest Laboratories .................... 33
Chart 11 - Remote Sensing Laboratory ......................... 34
Chart 12 - Sandia National Laboratories ...................... 34
Chart 13 - Savannah River Site ............................... 35
Chart 14 - Special Technologies Laboratory ................... 35
Executive Summary
Reducing the Nuclear Danger
Inventory of Departmental Nonproliferation and Nuclear Threat
Reduction Activities
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major
challenge to our national security. Reducing the nuclear danger is one
of the primary goals of the United States national security strategy and
it is a cornerstone of the Department's vision of the future.
To meet this challenge, our Nation draws upon the same foundation of
scientific and technological skills that helped bring a successful end
to the Cold War. The Department, drawing upon many of the Nation's best
and most innovative scientists, provides essential support for the
changing global political climate that has guided the Department's
adaptation to the new era.
Reducing the global nuclear danger, responding with programs that build
upon and enhance the strengths of the Department's complex and the
National Laboratories, and emphasizing commitments to environment,
safety, and health, are the essence of the Department's national
security strategy.
The nuclear danger is now defined differently than it was just five
years ago. Initiatives to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, improve
nuclear reactor safety, safeguard and dispose of nuclear materials and
maintain confidence in our nuclear weapons deterrent without nuclear
testing have surged to the forefront.
Proliferation Challenges in the 1990s
Significant nuclear proliferation challenges face the United States in
the 1990s. The breakup of the former Soviet Union (FSU) has presented
the dilemma of how to deal with the legacy of enormous amounts of
nuclear weapons-usable material resulting from the Cold War buildup.
Under "Project Sapphire," for example, the U.S. purchased 581 kilograms
of weapons- grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) suitable for use as
reactor fuel. The then "secret" operation included an eight week
repackaging operation performed by Department of Energy experts in
Kazakhstan to prepare the uranium for international shipment and
storage. The HEU was shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory where it
was held in storage until July, 1995, when the Department began shipping
it to a commercial vendor where it will be put under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, prior to being downblended for
use as power reactor fuel.
In addition, transformation of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition has
weakened traditional spheres of influence and can lead some nations to
seek security through nuclear weapons while others renounce them.
The full array of our prevention efforts presented in this report helps
buy time for political and diplomatic solutions to be effective.
Emerging regional challenges pose an increasingly serious threat to
international stability and security. Asia is a major problem area
highlighted by U.S. concerns over the nuclear programs of North Korea,
China, India and Pakistan. The Middle East and Africa continue to cause
concern, although the elimination of South Africa's nuclear weapons
program was a major success story.
The continuing explosion of technology also increases the nuclear
danger. Despite our best efforts, export controls can only slow the
spread of technology useful in nuclear weapons programs. Scientific
knowledge cannot be contained and even if controlled can be replicated
in other countries. Lessons learned in the Gulf War have illustrated
that clandestine nuclear programs can be well hidden, as in Iraq. Better
international efforts are essential to monitor peaceful nuclear
programs. The IAEA, with U.S. assistance, is taking steps to improve its
monitoring capability.
Existing Nonproliferation Regimes
The Administration's priority commitment to obtain the indefinite
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been fully
achieved. DOE was a major player in these successful efforts which
resulted in an international consensus to indefinitely extend the
treaty. Future Departmental efforts will continue to focus on nuclear
cooperation and technical assistance, as well as safeguards. The NPT
remains the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It
forbids nations to develop nuclear weapons and in return provides for
assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The IAEA monitors
compliance of nations that have signed the NPT and provides technical
assistance on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Export controls, an important component of the non- proliferation
regime, are designed to keep nuclear weapons- usable technologies,
equipment and materials out of the hands of other potential proliferant
nations. The Department, through the interagency process, has endeavored
to enhance the ability of the U.S. system of nuclear export controls to
be more responsive and efficient while seeking to prevent exports that
would be detrimental to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The Department
has actively provided leadership in multilateral supplier regimes to
increase their effectiveness and to achieve wider participation.
Examples include the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the NPT Exporters
Committee.
The purpose of various regional initiatives is to increase greater
awareness of nonproliferation principles and objectives while working to
diminish real or perceived regional security threats in order to
decrease the desire for nuclear weapons. Examples include the proposals
to end the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the
Latin America Nuclear Free Zone. Similar nuclear free zones are under
discussion for the Middle East and Africa.
Finally, complementary agreements concerning other weapons of mass
destruction including missiles, chemical and biological weapons, are
important to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, although not aimed
directly at the nuclear danger. Examples include the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention (not yet ratified) and
the Biological Weapons Convention.
President Clinton has made nuclear nonproliferation a top U.S. security
priority. The President's July 1994 National Security Strategy calls for
"developing integrated approaches for dealing with threats arising from
the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by
other nations..."
As a direct result of President Clinton's nuclear non- proliferation
strategy, the Department identified the following programmatic
priorities for nonproliferation and arms control: Secure Former Soviet
Union Nuclear Materials and Expertise, Limit Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials, Establish Transparent and Irreversible Nuclear Reductions,
Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Control Nuclear
Exports.
We have inventoried the Department's activities in these critical areas.
To address closely related nuclear threat reduction programs of the
Department, we have included the following categories: Nonproliferation
Verification Research and Development, Intelligence/Law Enforcement
Support, Nuclear Safety and Emergency Response, Departmental Safeguards
and Security Activities/Requirements, and Stockpile Stewardship.
These broad headings, and the examples of activities that fall under
them, help capture and organize the full range of the Department's
activities in nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction. Reducing
the Nuclear Danger -- An Overview of U.S. Department of Energy
Activities (Chart A) appears on the next page.
Reducing the Nuclear Danger
An Overview of U.S. Department of Energy Activities
I. Secure Nuclear Materials and Expertise in The Former Soviet Union
o Implement effective Material Protection Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) in Russia and other newly independent states
o Prevent "brain drain" from the FSU
o Prevent nuclear smuggling
o Increase Industrial Partnering Programs
II. Limit Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
o Shut down production reactors
o Negotiate a plutonium fissile material cut-off convention
o Eliminate the civil use of HEU (includes RERTR)
o Reduce stockpiles of civil HEU and plutonium
o Promote alternatives to the civil use of plutonium
o Initiate regional fissile material control activities
o Storage and disposition of weapons-usable materials
III. Establish Transparent and Irreversible Nuclear Reductions
o Achieve agreement for exchange of classified information with
Russia
o Exchange and confirm data on inventories
o Confirm dismantlement of excess weapons
o Purchase 500 tonnes of HEU from dismantled warheads
o Expand weapons reductions
IV. Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
o Promote adherence to the Nuclear NPT
o Negotiate a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
o Facilitate IAEA inspections of excess fissile materials
o Promote regional safeguards and nonproliferation measures
o Increase effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA
o Negotiate bilateral Agreements
o Counter Proliferation
V. Control Nuclear Exports
o Assist FSU states in effectively controlling exports
o Reform statutory licensing requirements
o Strengthen multilateral supplier initiatives
o Promote expanded information sharing and analysis
VI. Nonproliferation Verification R&D
o Design and fabricate remote sensing systems for worldwide treaty
monitoring and verification
o Develop technologies for detecting proliferant activities
o Conduct research to improve capability to monitor/verify current
and future treaties
o Develop and demonstrate technologies to control special nuclear
materials
o Maintain technology base to ensure future nonproliferation
system capabilities
VII. Intelligence/Law Enforcement Support
o Conduct intelligence analysis of foreign nuclear programs
o Conduct nuclear proliferation assessments
o Develop and apply proliferation detection technology
o Conduct threat assessment/data sample analysis
o Oversee the Department's Communicated Nuclear Threat Program
o Provide nuclear support to the law enforcement community
o Monitor transparency of nuclear treaties
o Provide support to international nuclear organizations
VIII. Nuclear Safety, Accident Prevention and Emergency Response
o Strengthen nuclear safety
o Promote emergency planning/preparedness/response
o Maintain radiological emergency response assets
o Maintain on-scene technical/analytical expertise
o Provide support to other government agencies
IX. DOE Safeguards and Security Activities/Requirements
o Develop MPC&A policy/R&D complex-wide Support for
declassification and new openness initiatives
o Conduct standards development and technical analysis
o Design basic threat policy
o Develop and assure international comparability for measurements
of nuclear materials
X. Stockpile Stewardship and Management
o Maintain stockpile confidence
o Conduct no nuclear testing
o Dismantle weapons
o Provide research and technology base
Chart A
Category Descriptions
Category I - Secure Nuclear Materials and Expertise in the Former Soviet
Union. Among the Department's and U.S. Government's top priorities are
efforts to secure nuclear materials and expertise in the FSU. Activities
included in this category are cooperation with FSU nations on
protection, control and accounting of weapons-usable nuclear material.
Activities to prevent nuclear smuggling, prevent "brain drain" and
increase industrial partnering programs are also consolidated here.
Category II - Limit Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials. The cessation of
the use of weapons grade plutonium from production reactors, elimination
of the civil use of HEU and promotion of alternatives to the civil use
of plutonium, reduction of stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, and efforts
to initiate regional fissile material control activities and disposition
of weapons-usable materials are included under this broader category.
Category III - Establish Transparent and Irreversible Nuclear
Reductions. President Clinton has pursued initiatives in the nuclear
arms reduction arena that expand previous goals of simply reducing
numbers of weapons to ensuring that warheads subject to the START I and
II agreements are dismantled and that fissile materials no longer
required for nuclear weapons purposes are not reused in new nuclear
weapons. Activities incorporated in this category include efforts to
expand negotiated weapons reductions and to implement the purchase of
500 tonnes of HEU from dismantled Russian warheads, together with
activities that support the Secretary's Openness Initiative, such as
progress toward an agreement for the exchange of classified information
with Russia and cooperation to exchange and confirm data on nuclear-
related inventories.
Category IV - Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. This
category combines those activities that relate to treaties and
agreements, such as compliance with the NPT, negotiations for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), support for IAEA
inspections and effectiveness, and the promotion of regional safeguards
and nonproliferation measures. Support by the National Laboratories for
counterproliferation measures are also included in this category.
Category V - Control Nuclear Exports. Programs to control nuclear
exports, including assistance to states of the FSU, reform of statutory
licensing requirements, strengthening of multi-lateral supplier
initiatives and the promotion of expanded in-formation sharing and
analysis are considered here as a single category.
Category VI - Nonproliferation Verification R&D. A wide range of
programs in research and development directly support U.S. Government
efforts to meet nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives.
Included under this category are programs to design and fabricate for
the actual deployment of sensor systems needed for treaty verification,
proliferation detection, warhead dismantlement (including transparency)
and material protection control and accounting (MPC&A).
Category VII - Intelligence/Law Enforcement Support. This category is
one of the broadest. Most of these efforts are further divided into
activities that support nuclear nonproliferation analysis and detection,
and provide threat assessment, including the technical support to law
enforcement agencies on nuclear smuggling, such as the Black
Market/Illicit Trafficking Assessment Program.
Category VIII - Nuclear Safety, Accident Prevention and Emergency
Response. This category includes activities reported by the National
Laboratories as well as from throughout the Department, including the
Offices of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management; Defense Programs and the Office of Nonproliferation
and National Security. These programs provide safe and workable
technology for radioactive waste management and disposal, and all
aspects of emergency preparedness, including radiological and
nonradiological assessment, operations, on-scene technical/analytical
expertise, technical support/assistance to other government agencies and
technology development.
Category IX - DOE Safeguards and Security Activities / Requirements.
This category crosscuts all DOE and laboratory facilities. These
activities ensure the protection of DOE nuclear weapons, nuclear
materials, classified information and facilities against theft,
sabotage, espionage and terrorist activity; identify classified and
unclassified sensitive information critical to the national security and
declassify all other information; and clear appropriate personnel for
access to classified or special nuclear material.
Category X - Stockpile Stewardship and Management. President Clinton's
commitment to maintain confidence in the U.S. nuclear stockpile while
continuing the moratorium on nuclear testing is reflected in the
Administration's stockpile stewardship and stockpile management program.
Activities in this area have a nonproliferation nexus, including arms
control, the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the storage and
disposition of excess nuclear components and materials.
In general terms this involves:
- detecting and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials
and technologies;
- verifying and sustaining deterrence of nuclear weapons against the
United States or its allies;
- improving safety or reducing danger posed by unsafe or unsecured
weapons, processes, materials or facilities;
- ensuring safe and secure dismantlement, transparency;
- providing excess materials storage and disposition; and
- ensuring nuclear incident avoidance and response.
In this period of change, we seek to adapt, integrate and apply our
unique assets to emerging security challenges and so contribute to the
overall coordination and direction of nuclear nonproliferation and
related nuclear threat reduction activities.
In the graphical representation of the results of this inventory, we
refer to the National Laboratories and DOE Program Offices by the
following acronyms:
DOE Laboratories
ANL Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho & Illinois
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York
EML Environmental Measurements Laboratory, New York
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
LBL Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, California
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California
NBL New Brunswick Laboratory, Illinois
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee
PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Washington
RSL Remote Sensing Laboratory, Nevada
SNL Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico & California
SRS Savannah River Site, South Carolina
STL Special Technologies Laboratory, California
DOE Program Offices
DP Defense Programs
EH Environmental, Safety and Health
EM Environmental Management
ER Energy Research
MD Fissile Materials Disposition
NE Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology
NN Nonproliferation and National Security
PO Policy
RW Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
Varied Roles of the Laboratories
Nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction activities at the DOE
National Laboratories cover the spectrum from nonproliferation to
nuclear accident prevention and response. The Laboratories work
independently and in collaboration on these critical national security
issues. Chart B, the Snapshot by Laboratory illustrates that reducing
the nuclear danger is accomplished through a network of activities at
all of the Laboratories.
Examples of successful collaboration include:
- Los Alamos is leading a team of six DOE labs in a major program to
improve the protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials in
Russia through a program of cooperation between the DOE labs and
counterpart Russian labs. The goal is the rapid transfer of technology
and knowledge gained in the United States for the protection of nuclear
materials against a wide range of threats, including insiders and armed
terrorist groups, in a manner that encourages indigenous Russian
efforts.
- Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) chaired a multi-laboratory effort
to support the development of safeguards information management systems,
including the primary system used by the IAEA Iraq Action Team, to
analyze the vast and diverse data being collected since the imposition
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq.
Many success stories reflect the complexity of the assets and
capabilities at the National Laboratories. Several examples of the
diverse range of projects include:
- Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is the lead National Laboratory for
developing the accident sequences, associated frequencies, and chemical
and radiological accident source terms for the treatment, storage and
disposal facilities included in the DOE Draft Waste Management
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.
- As the U.S. Government's Nuclear Materials Standards Laboratory, the
New Brunswick Laboratory participates in the Argentine/Brazil nuclear
material certification program, an interlaboratory comparison program
designed to qualify Argentine/Brazil laboratories, and supports U.S.
laboratory cooperation to develop quality assurance/control programs for
Argentine and Brazilian labs and so support the continued nuclear
cooperation of these countries.
- Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory conducts precision analyses, including
detection of proliferation-related products to extraordinarily low
levels using the Advanced Light Source.
- Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories play
key roles in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program to provide
the scientific and engineering capabilities required to retain adequate
confidence in the stockpile without nuclear testing.
- The Special Technologies Laboratory is developing a field portable
radar instrument for use by IAEA inspectors to verify that nuclear
storage canisters are physically constructed as designed.
- Ensuring effective international nuclear safeguards has been a key
activity supported by Oak Ridge, with special emphasis on uranium and
other isotope separation facilities in safeguarded States. Oak Ridge,
responding to Presidential policy, implemented the first international
inspection at a U.S. weapons facility to encourage other weapons states
to declare as excess significant quantities of nuclear weapons materials
and to undertake a commitment not to use these materials for weapons.
- The largest single project in the nonproliferation area at Brookhaven
National Laboratory (BNL) is the development of a standoff Raman Light
Intensity Distance and Ranging (LIDAR) system, including a laboratory
system to obtain the Raman spectra of proliferation-related effluents
and a mobile system to remotely detect and identify effluents or
environmental releases from suspect sites.
- The Department, through the National Laboratories, manages the Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST), a worldwide capability to respond to
various types of nuclear incidents, including malevolent threats
involving nuclear materials.
- Sandia's Cooperative Monitoring Center supports the reduction of the
nuclear threat by fostering cooperative technology informational
exchanges between countries in areas such as the Middle East, South Asia
and the North Pacific and reinforce the efforts of those nations that
have voluntarily elected to relinquish the nuclear option.
- In the area of Nuclear Safety / Accident Prevention, PNL supports the
"Accident Investigation" project for DOE through the review of the
Operating Contractors' safety reports, trend determination, root causes
of incidents and recommendations for improvement. For serious accidents,
PNL conducts on-site investigations to identify and document the cause
and disseminate the lessons learned to avoid future similar incidents.
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory operates the Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), which provides a real-time,
worldwide predictive capability to many DOE and military facilities on
the transport and impact of hazardous materials released into the
atmosphere.
- ANL participates in the International Nuclear Safety Program to
improve safety of operating Soviet-designed nuclear power plants in the
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe and to improve the
safety infrastructure in these countries.
- ANL supports the Department's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactor (RERTR) Program by providing the technical means to reduce the
uranium enrichment of research and test reactor fuels and irradiation
targets to significantly less than the 90-93 percent enrichment
currently used, and thereby, reduces the nuclear weapons proliferation
potential of such fuels and targets, most of which are overseas.
Accomplishments
The Department, drawing upon and coordinating the types of
interdependent expertise characterized immediately above, has made
significant accomplishments in all of the category areas; some of the
most recent include:
- Agreements for cooperative programs to improve the protection, control
and accounting of Russian nuclear materials.
- Removal of approximately 600 kilograms of weapons grade HEU from
Kazakhstan for safe, secure storage at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN.
Subsequent efforts have resulted in commercial contracts for the
blending down of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful use as
commercial reactor fuel.
- Management of the Presidentially-directed Research and Development
program dedicated to meeting the monitoring requirements of a CTBT by
seismic, hydroacoustic and satellite instrumentation capabilities.
- Initiation of Project CALIOPE, which is intended to provide a
capability for the remote detection of chemical effluents associated
with the production of nuclear weapons.
- Extension of the Nuclear Testing Moratorium.
- Submission of excess U.S. plutonium and HEU to IAEA safeguards.
- Agreement providing for the shutdown of Russian plutonium production
reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.
- Stockpile Stewardship without testing.
- Dismantlement of 1,420 nuclear weapons.
- The objective of the Newly Independent States Industrial Partnering
Program (NIS-IPP) is to redirect the expertise of scientists and
engineers of the FSU from weapons-related activities to nonmilitary
applications of commercial value and of mutual benefit to the United
States and the Newly Independent States of the FSU. More than 170
projects approved by the DOE in consultation with the Department of
State are in the process of being implemented. These projects provide
support for over 1,900 scientists and engineers at 60 institutes in
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
- The United States and Russia have agreed to pursue a joint RERTR
Program designed to convert Soviet designed research and test reactors
from HEU fuel to LEU fuel.
- The Department has established a comprehensive program with the
countries of the FSU to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear
power plants by strengthening the operation and upgrading the physical
condition of plants, promoting a safety culture, and facilitating
development of a safety infrastructure in countries operating Soviet-
designed reactors and assisting in the shutdown of the Chernobyl
reactors and the provision of replacement power.
- Inspections in Iraq.
- Numerous visits of U. S. experts to Pyongyang have occurred under the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) Agreed Framework of October
12, 1994. The Department is stabilizing the fuel basin and will can the
8,000 fuel rods to aid in their inspection and ultimate transport out of
North Korea. This will avoid reprocessing of the rods by North Korea
that would result in production of weapons grade plutonium. DOE
personnel inspecting destroyed uranium enrichment equipment used in
Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
- Improved physical security, implemented a material accounting system
for two critical assemblies and demonstrated remote monitoring (a
promising technique that allows continuous monitoring at low cost) at
the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow - the first improvements at a Russian
facility attributable to U.S. assistance.
- Access to and coordination with other sites is expanding at a rapid
pace.
Future Challenges
By maintaining priority objectives focused on assisting in the
implementation of Presidentially directed initiatives and agreements on
arms control, nonproliferation and related nuclear threat reduction
issues, the Department underscores the President's commitment of the
United States to reduce the nuclear threat. DOE will continue to employ
all means at its disposal, including the unparalleled talents of our
National Laboratories to advance these objectives.
The continued maintenance of a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent
remains a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy because of the
ever-present ominous global nuclear threat. Thus DOE's responsibilities
for ensuring the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile will also continue for the foreseeable future.
Meeting these stockpile stewardship and management responsibilities will
be more challenging now than ever before, given the termination of new
weapons development in 1992, the closure of production facilities and
the moratorium on nuclear testing in connection with ongoing
negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Accordingly, the
Department, in concert with relevant federal agencies has developed new
programs to ensure confidence in the U.S. stockpile. This approach
relies on scientific understanding and expert judgment, not on nuclear
testing and the development of new weapons, to predict, identify and
correct any problems affecting the safety and reliability of the
stockpile while sustaining essential, vital scientific expertise.
Looking to the longer term, such an approach is essential to maintain
the safety and reliability of a stockpile of decreasing size in a manner
consistent with our national security interests upheld through U.S.
nonproliferation policies.
Funding Profiles
The Department has undertaken a systematic effort to catalog at the
project level all activities across the laboratory complex in the area
of nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction. Program Offices,
Operations Offices and National Laboratories were queried for activities
funded during FY 95 and planned for FY 96 in the categories shown on
page 5.
Funding profiles by category for FY 95 and FY 96 are shown on Chart C
(page 18). The integration of the Department's National Laboratory
network is evident in the representation of the "Top 6 Players."
(Individual Laboratory profiles appear following the Executive Summary.)
Reducing the Nuclear Danger
DOE Laboratory Funding Profile
FY 95 FY 96* Chg. Top 6 Labs
Categories $ Mil $ Mil % for FY 95
I. Secure Nuclear Material & 41.6 67.0 61 SNL, LANL,
Expertise in the Former LLNL, ANL,
Soviet Union ORNL, BNL
II. Limit Weapons-Usable 114.7 115.3 1 ANL, LLNL,
Fissile Material ONRL, SNL,
LANL, PNL
III. Establish Transparent 33.7 35.3 5 ORNL, LANL,
and Irreversible Nuclear SNL, LLNL,
Reductions PNL, BNL
IV. Strengthen the Nuclear 15.7 16.9 8 PNL, SNL,
Nonproliferation Regime LANL, LLNL,
ONRL, SRS
V. Control Nuclear Exports 13.4 13.2 -1 LANL, ORNL,
LLNL, ANL,
PNL, SNL
VI. Nonproliferation 182.4 181.7 <7 SNL, LANL,
Verification R&D LLNL, PNL,
ORNL, INEL
VII. Intelligence/Law 19.1 16.3 -15 LLNL, PNL,
Enforcement Support RSL, LANL,
SNL, ORNL
VIII. Nuclear Safety, 42.6 140.3 229 LLNL, LANL,
Accident Prevention PNL, ANL,
and Emergency Response SNL, ORNL
IX. DOE Safeguards and 33.1 32.0 -3 LLNL, SNL,
Security Activities/ LANL, NBL,
Requirements PNL, BNL
X. Stockpile Stewardship 1213.0 1291.1 6 SNL, LLNL,
and Management LANL, ORNL,
BNL, INEL
TOTALS 1709.2 1909.3 12 *Estimated
U.S. Department of Energy
Excludes Work for Others
Chart C
An inventory was conducted of (1) all National Laboratory
nonproliferation and related nuclear threat reduction activities, (2)
those activities conducted by other prime (non-laboratory) contractors
funded by the Department and (3) Work for Others performed by the
National Laboratories.
The information in this report is based on over 800 individual project
detail sheets obtained as a result of this inventory for
nonproliferation and related nuclear threat reduction activities. These
project detail sheets provide the Project Name, a brief Project
Description, Project Period (actual initiation and estimated completion
dates), Laboratory/Contractor Project Manager, Headquarters Project
Manager, Inventory Activity Category (I-X), Funding Profiles for FY 95
and estimated for FY 96, and Accomplishments to Date. (Examples of three
actual Project Detail Sheets are shown on the next page.)
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Project Name: Nonproliferation Policy Technical Support
Project description: Project provides for expert technical support to
NN-42 in Oak Ridge core technologies (enrichment, reprocessing, reactor
design, nuclear weapon fabrication) for regional, bilateral and
multilateral nonproliferation policy initiatives.
Accomplishments:
o Supported North Korean safeguards compliance issues and policy
initiatives
o Provided technical briefings/assistance to IAEA on North Korean
program monitoring and safeguards implementation
o Supported India/Pakistan regional policy initiatives
National Lab
Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Project Name: Excess Fissile Material Offer
Project description: Manage, coordinate and provide technical support to
the offer of excess fissile materials at Hanford for placement under
IAEA safeguards. Additionally, develop tutorials on the IAEA Safeguards
Offer and Lessons Learned at Hanford to brief various audiences at
different locations.
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Project Name: US/Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program for Nuclear
Material Protection, Control & Accounting
Project description: The project works to strengthen nuclear material
MPC&A within Russia through technical collaboration with Russian
institutes and implementation of safeguards technology at Russian
nuclear facilities. Funding is provided to support Russian and U.S.
MPC&A experts, and to provide U.S. equipment to Russian facilities.
Accomplishments:
o Initiated collaborative tasks at seven Russian facilities
o Implemented computerized material accounting system for two critical
assemblies at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow
o Established a safeguards technology test bed facility at Arzamas-16
which is being used to demonstrate thirty-nine equipment systems to
Russian facility operators within the framework of an integrated MPC&A
system
National Lab
Sample Project Detail Sheets
Other prime (non-laboratory) contracts also support the ten categories
(Chart D). An example of an actual "other prime contract" is also shown.
Reducing the Nuclear Danger
Other Prime Contracts*
FY95
EM - 2.5
NN - 23.4
MD - 28.2
NE - 77.9
DP - 338.1
Dollars in millions
*Excludes Work for Others
Chart D
Oakland Operations Office
Accomplishments:
Prime Project Name: Nyongbyon, North Korea, Spent Fuel Basin, Water
Treatment and Related Services
Project Description: Provide a water treatment instrumentation package
for the stabilization of the spent fuel basin in order to support the
safe storage and disposition (canning) of spent fuel.
Prime Contractor: CENTEC
Accomplishments:
o Characterization of Spent Fuel Basin water
o Preliminary design of Water Treatment System
o Video inspection of Spent Fuel and Storage Baskets
Prime
Program Drivers
Program requirements for DOE nonproliferation and nuclear threat
reduction projects are driven by:
1. Statutory Requirements
2. Presidential mandates; Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs),
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Requirements, National Security
Decision Directives (NSDDs), Executive Orders (EOs)
3. International Treaties and Agreements; Government-to-Government
binding obligations
4. Requests from Congress: Conference Reports; other legislative history
All of the activities described are driven by programmatic requirements.
The Department has been directed to spend these funds for
nonproliferation and related nuclear threat reduction activities.
Therefore, no savings to Congress would accrue if these functions were
transferred to other agencies.
The following are examples of mandatory requirements:
- Government-to-Government activities are mandated by Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) authorization and appropriation bills that require
certain activities to be conducted in the FSU.
- Creation within the Department of an Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-335), amending the DOE Organization Act. The
Office directs the Department's technical and management efforts aimed
at providing for the safe, secure, environmentally sound long-term
storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of
weapons-usable fissile materials declared surplus to our national
defense needs.
In addition to the activities directly funded by the Department,
approximately $232M in FY 95 monies was identified during this inventory
as currently being appropriated by Congress to other agencies for work
being performed by DOE Laboratories under the auspices of the Work for
Others Program. (Chart F appears on the following page.) While many of
these projects are classified, an unclassified example is also shown.
Argonne National Laboratory
Project Name: Assessment of Entrepreneurial Workshops Aimed at Defense
Conversion of MINATOM
Project Description: Assessment of arms control and nonproliferation
effects of the entrepreneurial workshops conducted under the auspices of
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for the two Russian
weapons laboratories, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. The intention is to
utilize the results of the assessment for enhancing U.S. assistance to
RF MINATOM defense conversion and nonproliferation activities.
Accomplishments:
Questionnaires for the U.S. and RF participants have been developed,
interviews and analytical assessment of the results are being conducted.
National Lab
Summary
Today's partnership between DOE and its various National Laboratories
reflects the unique relationship among government, academia and industry
that had its genesis with the Manhattan Engineer District of the War
Department and was expressly authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of
1946. These World War II-era arrangements with industrial and academic
organizations for construction and operation of the manufacturing,
research and community facilities for the atomic energy program were
later transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
In response to Congressional and public concerns over the stewardship of
the atomic energy programs, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 to address many of these military, political and administrative
questions that were integral to the future of atomic energy at the end
of World War II. The Act established the AEC and provided for the
transfer of Government-owned atomic energy production and research
facilities to this civilian agency.
The Commission was empowered to conduct research and development
activities relating to nuclear energy, to distribute fissionable
material, to distribute other radioactive (by-product) materials created
while producing or using the fissionable material, and to continue the
operation of the Government- owned communities at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos
and Richland.
A philosophy of partnership for operation of the National Laboratories
and other research centers among DOE predecessor agencies, industry and
the academic community formed the cornerstone for the enduring
successful relationship that exists today.
Priorities have changed, but the logic behind decisions to hold nuclear
research under civilian control has stood the test of time. Sustaining
the viability of laboratories -- based test of time. Sustaining the
viability of laboratories -- based in no small part upon the premise of
civilian stewardship -- in no small part upon the premise of civilian
stewardship -- is essential to maintaining the vitality of research and
activity essential to the broad array of nuclear threat reduction
missions captured in this report.
The Path Before Us
The United States is at a critical juncture in the post-Cold War era.
The decisions made in support of nonproliferation and arms control are
as vital to our national security interests today as those made at the
end of World War II.
The challenge now confronting American policy makers is how to ensure an
irreversible reduction of weapons of mass destruction while maintaining
a high degree of reliability of the stockpile without nuclear testing.
Reducing the nuclear danger will remain a primary goal of the
Administration and the Department. Providing adequate protection for
domestic, as well as international, nuclear materials is the principal
means to achieve it.
The Department's unique capabilities in the areas of nonproliferation
and proliferation prevention are evidenced by the wide array of
initiatives underway. To assure the national security interests of the
United States, the Department will continue to provide policy and
operational support complex-wide, to other Executive and international
agencies, and to the intergovernmental community.
For example, on March 1, 1995, President Clinton announced that 200 tons
of fissile material determined to be excess to U.S. national security
needs will never again be used in nuclear weapons. DOE is actively
engaged in efforts to implement this announcement.
In the arena of treaties and agreements, significant achievements have
been made regarding the CTBT and the NPT. The United States made
indefinite extension of the NPT a top foreign policy priority and
underscored that commitment by having Vice President Gore lead the U.S.
delegation. In May 1995, the United States achieved this goal when the
Conference extended the Treaty indefinitely.
A first but important step has been made regarding the Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty to end the worldwide production of fissile materials for
weapons. Recently, the multilateral Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,
agreed to a negotiating mandate. Negotiations can now begin.
The last Clinton-Yeltsin Summit offered an additional opportunity to
discuss the Russia-Iran controversy and to further U.S. nonproliferation
objectives. These included initiatives to be concluded by December 31,
1995, completion of an agreement that will allow both nations to
exchange classified information to further mutual nonproliferation
goals, agreement on a timetable for the exchange of data on nuclear
weapons and materials, and to further negotiations on a transparent and
irreversible regime for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
This collaboration between the United States and Russia has reaped
significant rewards. The Department has played and will continue to play
a pivotal role in the following areas:
- Working with Russia to secure and dispose of tons of material each
year over the next seven years as was done successfully with Kazakhstan
through Project Sapphire.
- Securing three bombs' worth of nuclear material at the Kurchatov
Institute.
- Demonstrating remote monitoring technology that provides computer-
assisted surveillance of HEU safeguarded material at the Y-12 Plant and
a similar facility at the Kurchatov Institute.
- Developing with Arzamas-16 (a former "secret" nuclear city) a
technology that will fingerprint nuclear material and follow it for a
lifetime to ensure that it is not used in future nuclear weapons
programs.
- Reducing incentives for nuclear scientists to emigrate to countries of
proliferation concern through the Department's Industrial Partnering
Program (IPP).
Epilogue
We are at the crossroads of an unprecedented opportunity to direct the
course of U.S. nonproliferation efforts into the next century and
beyond, using the preeminent scientific and technological expertise of
our National Laboratories. This report will assist the Department in
critically assessing existing programs and activities to monitor and
adjust our priorities for the future.
Acronym Glossary
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction
DOE Department of Energy
DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
EO Executive Order
FSU Former Soviet Union
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IPP Industrial Partnering Program
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
LIDAR Light Intensity Distance and Ranging
MPC&A Material Protection Control and Accounting
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NIS New Independent States
NN Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
R&D Research and Development
RERTR Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN United Nations