A. Planning for security should be an integral part of any function or project
undertaken within the USGS. The most efficient and cost-effective method of instituting
security measures into any facility or operation is through advance planning
and continuous monitoring throughout the project or program. Selecting, constructing,
or modifying a facility without considering the security implications of employee
safety and assets protection can result in costly modifications and lost time.

B. Physical security programs shall be administered within each region, center,
and field activity based on the policy in SM 440.2 and the guidance set forth
in this handbook, to ensure the protection of USGS assets. These programs should
be continually and effectively administered by the appropriate organizational
security officer and monitored to ensure their integrity. At a minimum, a physical
security program should include:

(1) A physical security survey (see Appendix C) of each facility occupied by
USGS to determine the security level of the facility and to determine the minimum-security
safeguards required as cited in Appendix B, Department of the Interior Facility
Security Standards, for protecting USGS personnel and assets;

(2) An initial physical security survey prior to constructing, leasing, acquiring,
modifying, or occupying a facility or area to determine the minimum-security
safeguards required to protect USGS personnel and assets. A follow-up physical
security survey must be done before acceptance of the property or occupancy
to ensure the completion of required modifications and security upgrades;

(3) Periodic reassessments of facilities to ascertain whether a security program
meets pertinent Federal and departmental standards or regulations;

(4) A comprehensive and continuing awareness and education effort to gain the
interest and support of employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors; and

(5) Procedures for taking immediate, positive, and orderly action to safeguard
life and property during an emergency.

C. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and the Architectural Barriers
Act of 1968, as amended, require Federal agencies to ensure accessibility and
safety for employees, applicants, and members of the public with disabilities
who are in USGS facilities. The bureau will ensure that accessibility and safety
issues regarding people with disabilities are addressed in all relevant aspects
of the establishment of appropriate physical security measures to protect personnel,
real and personal property, and information. A key element to the success of
this will be ensuring that security and facility officials are familiar with
the legal requirements to meet the needs of people with disabilities while also
maintaining physical security.

2. Facility Protection.

A. The extent of facility protection is determined by the senior official or
manager of the activity based on the results of a comprehensive physical security
survey of the facility ( Appendix C).

(1) Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical
security for personnel, property, and information at a facility.

(2) The second line of defense is interior controls. The extent of interior
controls will be determined by considering the monetary value and criticality
of the items and areas to be protected, the vulnerability of the facility, and
the cost of the controls necessary to reduce that vulnerability.

(3) The cost of security controls normally should not exceed the monetary value
of the item or areas to be protected, unless necessitated by criticality or
national security.

3. Planning Facility Protection.

A. The objective of planning facility protection is to ensure both the integrity
of operations and the security of assets. Planning for security must be an integral
part of selecting, constructing, reconfiguring, or moving into a USGS facility.

B. The modification of a facility or addition of security measures after occupying
a facility can be costly and impractical. Therefore, the responsible security
officer and the facility management personnel need to coordinate closely, from
the outset, on any addition, alteration, or new construction. The coordination
should begin with the designers and architects and continue through the contracting
process and actual construction and installation.

C. Many USGS offices occupy space in Federal buildings or in commercial buildings
where GSA executes the lease on behalf of the Government. In leased office space,
physical security may not be as easily controlled or be controlled to the same
extent as in a facility where the Government owns the facility. The USGS tenants
must rely on GSA to provide protection for the building, and it is therefore
imperative that the security officer of the activity establishes a working relationship
with the appropriate GSA officials or FSO to maintain an active role in the
security decisions and processes that will affect the facility.

4. Facility Protection in USGS Owned or Leased Facilities.
For buildings or grounds owned or leased by the USGS to include leased space
from other Federal agencies, the senior official having jurisdiction of the
real property is responsible for determining the degree of protection to be
provided the space. The level of protection shall be based on a physical security
survey of each facility conducted by the FSO using the guidelines and requirements
cited in this handbook to evaluate the security of that facility on a case-by-case
basis considering the facility’s location, size and configuration, number
of occupants, mission, extent of exterior lighting, presence of physical barriers,
and other factors as may be deemed pertinent. (See Conducting Surveys, Paragraph
8A (5) below.)

5. Facility Protection in GSA Owned or Leased Facilities.
For building and grounds for which GSA has space assignment responsibility,
GSA is responsible for furnishing normal protection not less than the degree
of protection provided by commercial building operators of similar space for
normal risk occupants, as determined by a Federal Protective Service (FPS) physical
security survey. (See Appendix D for a list of FPS regional law enforcement
offices, addresses, and telephone numbers.) This protection may include guards,
access control, intrusion detection (alarms), closed circuit television surveillance
(CCTV), inspection of packages, etc., when the FPS survey determines the control
is warranted for general Government occupancy and not necessitated by special
activities or specific agencies. Special protection required due to the nature
of the business conducted within the space or unusual public reaction to an
agency's program and missions, whether or not of a continuing nature, is determined
jointly by the FPS and the occupant agency or agencies and is provided on a
reimbursable basis.

A. Protection Criteria. The FPS determines the level of normal protective
service on a case-by-case basis and normally considers the facility's location,
size and configuration, the occupant agency’s mission, history of criminal
or disruptive incidents in the surrounding neighborhood, extent of exterior
lighting, presence of physical barriers, and other factors as may be deemed
pertinent.

B. Physical Protection. GSA provides normal and special protection
through mobile patrol or fixed posts manned by FPS officers or contract uniformed
personnel, security systems and devices, locking building entrances and gates
during other than normal hours of occupancy, cooperation of local law enforcement
agencies, or any combination thereof depending upon the facility and the degree
of risk involved. The degree of normal and special protection is determined
by completion of a FPS physical security survey and/or crime prevention assessment.

C. Crime prevention. The FPS collects and disseminates information
about criminal activity on or against property under the charge and control
of GSA, provides crime prevention information programs to occupant and agencies
upon request, and conducts crime prevention assessments in cooperation with
occupant agencies.

6. Facility Protection in Facilities with GSA Delegations of Authority.
In facilities where GSA has delegated protection authority to the agency or
prime tenant, some of the protection responsibilities are transferred to the
agency, including procurement, installation, maintenance of physical security
equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard contracts.
Normally, FPS will retain responsibility for physical security surveys, mobile
patrols, monitoring of alarms, response to incidents, and requests for criminal
investigations. FPS will provide such services at no charge to the agency beyond
the protection portion of the rent.

7. Design Factors. It is imperative that security systems
and procedures are considered from the design phase on, so that conduit runs
and alarm wiring, heavy-duty materials, reinforcing devices and other necessary
construction requirements are provided in the original plans.

A. Facility and Building Location.

(1) Determine the minimum-security safeguards as delineated by Appendix B,
Department of the Interior (DOI) Facility Security Standards, and incorporate
them in your facility planning. Start by determining the security level of the
facility as determined by the DOI Facility Security Standards, whether it is
open to the public (See
Chapter 8, paragraph 4A(2)), and the time it will take for enforcement response
to incidents.

(3) At a facility site, the number of separate buildings should be kept to
a minimum, and they should be grouped close together.

B. Configuration of Space.

(1) Entrances. Facility or office entrances should be kept to a minimum
commensurate with fire safety, to control access or prevent crime. Although
convenience of employee access, parking, and deliveries must be considered,
one entrance with multiple interior routes is preferable to several outside
entrances. Entrances should be planned with guard posts and access control systems
and procedures in mind. Reception desks, barriers, and other controls should
be planned from the start. Accessibility of entrances for individuals with disabilities
must also be considered and planned from the start.

(2) Access Controls. Plan for locking devices or controls at perimeter
and interior doors. Provide for effective key control. Plan for protective,
cleaning, and maintenance forces, and determine hours, locations, and levels
of access for such personnel.

(3) Location of Offices and Facilities. Locate offices or other facilities
in close proximity and on the same or successive floors. Try to locate sensitive
operations such as credit unions or imprest funds on upper or lower floors and
away from entrances.

C. Safety and Fire Protection. Safety and fire protection requirements
must be incorporated in any construction plans. With proper coordination, safety
requirements can be achieved. Contact the Regional Safety Manager regarding
National Fire Prevention Administration (NFPA) and local code requirements and
construction standards.

D. Utilities. Utility systems should be protected against unauthorized
access. Plan for protection of telephone and electrical closets and conduit
runs, heating and cooling systems, water supplies, and boilers and generators.

E. Special Activities. Special emphasis should be placed on security
systems and safeguards when constructing or modifying special or sensitive activities
such as imprest funds, computer facilities, equipment storage or shipping and
receiving areas, classified work areas and mailrooms, and special-use areas
such as warehouses or hazardous material storage areas. (See Chapter
10.)

F. Contingency Plans. A contingency plan must be developed for each
USGS facility and GSA-delegated facility to protect personnel and property in
the event of emergencies such as fire; bomb threats; civil disturbances; natural
disasters; and chemical, biological, or radiological events. The Designated
Official (as defined in FPMR 101-20.003) is responsible for developing, implementing,
and maintaining an Occupant Emergency Plan. (See Paragraph 11 below.)

8. Surveys and Inspections. A physical
security survey (Appendix
C) is an in-depth analysis to determine the extent of security measures,
which will be needed for protecting USGS personnel, property, and information.
An inspection is a check or test against a certain set of standards or regulations
to ascertain whether a security program or facility meets those standards or
regulations. It is used to evaluate the implementation of regulations, the security
awareness of employees, security administration, and existing internal management
controls. It should be used as a tool by the security officer to carry out his/her
oversight responsibilities.

A. Surveys.

(1) Purpose. The survey will be used by the senior facility manager
to determine the type and extent of security controls for the facility or areas.
Each type of physical security survey will include the determination of the
security level of the facility and a security evaluation (threat assessment),
which addresses the criticality of operations, the vulnerability of the facility
or area, and the probability of compromise of the personnel or property contained
therein. Appendix
B, DOI Facility Security Standards provides the criteria for determining
what security level a facility is of the possible four (4) security levels.
The DOI security standards also provide a chart delineating the recommended
minimum-security standards applicable to each of the four security levels addressing
facility criticality, vulnerabilities, and risk of security penetrations. In
those cases where the FPS does not provide a physical security survey, the FSO
or a facility manager should conduct a survey of the facility.

(2) Recommendations. The FSO should work with the facility or office
manager in developing a security plan for resolving any recommendations resulting
from the surveys and inspections.

(3) Criticality, Vulnerability, and Probability/Risk. No survey is
considered complete until all three of the factors below have been given full
consideration and weight.

(a) Criticality. Criticality is the effect that partial or total loss
of the facility or area would have on the national security or the Department's,
USGS's, regions’, or the facility's mission. The adversity of the effect
is directly related to the criticality factor. Examples of adverse effects include
the interruption of a vital function, disruption of the continuity of operations,
or the compromise of national security information. A higher classification
level of information handled or stored in a facility or area will increase the
criticality.

(b) Vulnerability. Vulnerability of the facility or area is the susceptibility
of a facility or area to damage or destruction or the possible theft or loss
of property. Factors used to determine vulnerability include the size, configuration,
and location of the facility or area, the local crime rate, and the proximity
of law enforcement, and emergency response services.

(c) Probability/Risk. Probability deals with an assessment of the
chances or risk that certain events could or might occur, such as a penetration
of the perimeter, compromise of a system, or the occurrence of a variety of
unauthorized activities.

(4) Type of Surveys.

(a) Initial Survey. The initial physical security survey (See Appendix
C) is conducted prior to constructing, leasing, acquiring, modifying, or
occupying a facility or area. It describes any modification required to raise
the level of security commensurate with the levels of criticality and vulnerability.
At a minimum, the initial survey must address the minimum-security requirements
delineated in the DOI Facilities Security Standards (See Appendix
B).

(b) Follow-up Survey. When recommendations are made in the initial
physical security survey, a follow-up survey is conducted to ensure the completion
of modifications. This survey should be conducted before acceptance of the property
or occupancy.

(c) Supplemental Survey. The supplemental survey is conducted when
changes in the organization, mission, facility, or the threat level of the facility
alter or affect the security posture of the facility or area. This survey is
conducted at the discretion of either the facility manager or the FSO. The Bureau
Security Manager may require that facilities undergo a supplemental survey when
there is a change of the overall threat level to all Survey facilities, such
as the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001.

(d) Special Survey. The special survey is conducted to examine or
resolve a specific issue, such as when there is a request for a Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) accredited facility or there is a need to investigate or assess
damage resulting from an incident.

(5) Conducting Surveys. Normally for GSA owned, leased, and delegated
facilities, surveys will be conducted by the FPS, and it will not be necessary
for the security officer of the facility to conduct a physical security survey.
For USGS owned and leased facilities to include leased space from other Federal
agencies, the FSO of the facility must conduct the physical security survey
(See
Appendix C). When necessary, the FSO conducting a survey should start by
obtaining a layout of the facility, which depicts areas within the facility,
access points, parking lots, warehouses, and any adjacent areas belonging to
the facility. The FSO should interview program management officials to determine
the mission and nature of operations, classification or sensitivity level of
information, and value of assets. The FSO should also obtain the following:

(a) The facility's address, number of buildings and square footage, tenant
organizations, approximate population, and names of key management officials;

(b) A description of features of the facility and conditions that produce vulnerabilities.
Document the physical configuration of the office or facility for classified
information storage areas;

(c) The law enforcement agency, fire department, and other organizations responsible
for emergency response. Include the guard force company or agency, and its response
time;

(d) Type of construction of buildings at the facility;

(e) The determined value of monies or sensitive or unique equipment, the highest
classification level of information, or the number and types of weapons;

(g) Recommendations for improving security and pertinent implementing instructions,
which include the required minimum-security standards as delineated by the DOI
Facility Security Standards (See Appendix
B).

(6) Survey Report. Survey reports produced by the FPS are provided
to the Designated Official. When conducted by the FSO, a written survey report
should be generated that is thorough and precise. It should contain supporting
exhibits such as floor plans and specifications. The FSO’s survey report
should be submitted to the facility or office manager for review, and a copy
should be maintained by the FSO.

B. Inspections.

(1) Purpose. Inspections, which may be announced or unannounced, are usually
conducted to determine the extent of compliance with security regulations or
procedures, including those recommended during surveys. The security officer
shall inspect facilities and programs under the security officer's cognizance
as often as necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the applicable
SM chapter. The inspections should result in written inspection reports.

(b) SM 440.3.l3B requires each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified Document
Custodian, and Special Security Officer to conduct a self-inspection program
for the evaluation of all security procedures applicable to their operation
for the protection of national security information. In order to assist the
self-inspector in assessing the security posture of his/her national security
information facility, a Security Inspection Check List is contained as Appendix
B to the National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H).

(3) Recommendations. The security officer should assist the facility
or office manager in resolving any discrepancies or implementing any recommendations.

(4) Types of Inspections.

(a) Evaluation. The evaluative or fact-finding inspection is generally
positive in tone and promotes liaison and security awareness while taking a
broad, general look at a facility or program. Deficiencies, which may be resolved
either on the spot or within a non-specified time frame, may be noted and recommendations
for further corrective actions may be made. The evaluative inspection can also
help management officials in planning or upgrading their security programs.

(b) Compliance. The full compliance inspection generally is conducted
for enforcement purposes. It focuses on compliance with established standards
or regulations.

(c) Follow-up. Another form of compliance inspection is the follow-up
inspection, conducted to ensure that facility officials have complied with recommendations
from earlier inspections.

(d) After-hours Room Check. The after-hours room check is a form of
compliance inspection. It monitors compliance with security regulations, especially
involving areas where national security information is processed or stored.

(e) Self-inspection. The self-inspection is initiated by the security
officer or facility manager to evaluate his/her own security program. Additionally,
self-inspections are required by each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified
Document Custodian, and Special Security Officer to evaluate all security procedures
applicable to their operation using the self-inspection checklist contained
in Appendix B of the National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H). The scope
and purpose of the self-inspection for an office, building, or other facility
is determined by the initiator.

(f) Closeout. A closeout self-inspection is accomplished immediately
prior to the action to administratively terminate an authorized Top Secret Control
Station, Classified Control Station, or Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility (SCIF). During closeout inspections, all areas and containers authorized
for the storage of classified material are checked to ensure all classified
material has been removed.

(5) Frequency of Inspections. The frequency of inspections will be
based on the criticality and vulnerability of the facility or the level of classification
or value of information handled or stored at a facility. Following are the established
standards:

(a) Each Top Secret Control Officer, Classified Document Custodian, and Special
Security Officer is required to conduct an annual self-inspection program utilizing
the Security Inspection Check List in Appendix B of the National Security Information
Handbook (440-3-H).

(b) The Regional Security Officer coordinates a schedule of periodic inspections
of Top Secret Control Stations, Classified Control Stations, and Foreign Intelligence
Registries. A review of the completed annual self-inspection checklist serves
as the basis for these inspections. The USGS Security Manager coordinates a
schedule of periodic inspections of the Regional Security Officers and their
security program.

(c) In conjunction with periodic field assistance visits, the USGS Security
Manager or designee conducts inspections of weapon storage facilities and the
accountability and control of Departmental and USGS identification cards, badges,
and smart cards.

(6) Conducting Inspections.

(a) Plan an inspection by determining the scope, type, and method. Schedule
the inspection, and if appropriate, provide written notice. The notice should
provide the date(s), purpose, proposed interview schedule, and request for any
information needed by the security officer. Review past inspection reports and
prepare a list of questions or a checklist to structure the inspection.

(b) Upon arrival at the site and prior to departure, the inspector should meet
with the senior manager to discuss the inspection. Collect a sufficient sampling
of data from interviews with on-site employees and contractors and from touring
the facility. Obtain information to support findings in the inspection report.
Report favorable findings as well as deficiencies. Check awareness and adherence
to local security procedures. Document any discrepancies corrected on the spot.

(c) After sufficient data is collected, the inspector should analyze all findings,
compare them with applicable security regulations, list discrepancies and cite
regulatory references, recommend corrective action, and write the inspection
report.

(d) The inspection report should be produced within 10 working days of completion
of the inspection. The report should be distributed to the office, facility,
or regional manager in a timely manner and require a response to any recommendations.
Copies of final inspection reports shall be provided to the Security Management
Office.

9. Awareness and Education. A security program is most effective
when employees practice security daily. That sort of interest and support can
be gained through an effective security awareness and education program that
encompasses all aspects of security. The security officer is responsible for
carrying out and administering a comprehensive, on-going security awareness
and education program for all employees in his/her respective activity.

A. Awareness and Educations Plans. The security officer must plan
an effective program of instruction and efficient use of training material provided
for specific training purposes. The security officer may also tailor presentations
to the organization and solicit other security professionals to speak on their
areas of responsibility, training, and experience. For example, a local police
representative could address crime prevention. Also, the FPS offers posters
and pamphlets with helpful security hints and will provide on-site crime-prevention
seminars. (See Appendix
D for a list of FPS regional law enforcement offices, addresses, and telephone
numbers.)

B. Briefings.

(1) Initial Orientation Briefings.

(a) Simply providing printed security regulations is not an effective way to
promote complete understanding of security responsibilities. A verbal orientation
briefing, preferably supplemented with audio-visuals and handouts, is more effective.
Where possible, it should be presented personally. Where this is not practical,
it may be presented in the form of a videotape or other recording.

(b) The initial orientation, whether written or verbal, should address general
physical security principles, including common security hazards, building security
and crime prevention, key system or other site-specific access controls, vehicle
control, and property accountability or package inspection programs. It should
also address SM 440.3 implementation of Departmental and Federal regulations
relating to the handling and safeguarding of national security information,
including reporting requirements and nondisclosure provisions.

(2) Special Briefings. Specialized briefings should be made available
for employees with national security duties or special accesses that entail
special handling, reporting or safeguarding requirements.

(a) National Security Briefings. These are information security briefings
that apply to individuals who handle classified information. The briefings focus
on classifications, markings, transmission, disclosure, safeguarding, and destruction
of information. The national security briefing and a signed Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement (SF 312) is required prior to issuance of a national
security information clearance certification. Specific guidance for conducting
initial, refresher, or termination briefings is provided in Chapter
13, National Security Information Handbook (440-3-H). Also, to assist security
officers in accomplishing these briefings, separate videotape presentations
entitled "Information Security Briefing" and "Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement Briefing" have been distributed to security officers
with USGS national security programs. Additional copies are available from the
USGS Security Manager.

(b) Special Access Briefings. These are briefings related to the various
special access programs such as those administered by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Defense (DOD).

(c) Crime Prevention. A well-rounded security awareness and education
program includes information on crime prevention. Encourage employees to remove
or minimize opportunities for crime by knowing the signs of unauthorized activity;
by practicing good office security; and reporting unauthorized activity, security
deficiencies, violations, and safety hazards.

10. Incident Reporting. An incident reporting program is an
essential element in any security program. The timely reporting of thefts, losses,
or damage of property and the tampering or unauthorized disclosure of information
is important. A timely report increases the possibility of recovering the property,
minimizing damage, and apprehending the perpetuator. Any employee who discovers,
witnesses, or has knowledge of a criminal, dangerous, or unauthorized practice
or condition, or a violation of security regulations shall immediately report
the matter to the appropriate authorities.

A. Reporting Serious Incidents, Unusual Events, and Emergency Conditions.
The senior official at a facility is responsible for reporting serious
incidents, unusual events, or emergency conditions that affect USGS operations
to his/her Regional Director for their appropriate action.

(1) Security Management Office. The Regional Director or his/her designee
must report the following information to the USGS Security Management Office
for further reporting to the DOI Watch Office:

• Incidents resulting in property damage exceeding $100,000.
• Incidents with potential to result in media interest.
• Serious incidents involving DOI employees on official duty outside the
U.S., including incidents attracting media or diplomatic attention.
• Other incidents that warrant attention by the Office of the Secretary.

(2) USGS Emergency Coordinator. The Regional Director or his/her designee
must report the following information to the USGS Emergency Coordinator for
further reporting to the DOI Watch Office:

• Natural disasters affecting DOI lands or facilities that cause injury,
significant damage, impact visitor use, or degrade the ability to provide vital
services.
• Serious incidents such as major structural fires, structural failures,
or other emergency events affecting DOI lands or facilities that cause injury,
significant damage, impact visitor use, or degrade the ability to provide vital
services.
• Warnings of natural disasters or other serious emergencies that threaten
DOI lands, facilities or infrastructure, and preparedness measures taken in
response to such threats.
• Information on events monitored by Departmental of Homeland Security
or the Watch Office that may impact DOI lands or adjacent areas.
• Emergency preparedness and response activities involving tribes and
insular areas.
• Warnings, alerts or advisories related to emergency conditions issued
to the public by DOI bureaus and offices, including dam failures, flood, earthquake
and volcanoes.
• Requests for or actual deployment of DOI employees, resources or technical
assistance to support emergency activities of other departments or agencies.
• Major search and rescue activities involving large numbers of personnel
or coordination of interagency resources.

(d) Environmental Incidents. Incidents on or potentially impacting DOI lands.
Incidents are reported to the National Response Center, 800-424-8802; the regional
environmental officer; and the DOI Watch Office.

B. Reporting Incidents to Law Enforcement Agencies.

(1) Interior Property Management Regulation 114-60.810-2 requires that cases
of theft, unauthorized use, or vandalism of Government property be reported
to the local or State law enforcement authority and to facility security forces
where appropriate. (See Chapter 9 for an explanation of law enforcement jurisdiction
and pertinent Federal, state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies.)
Additionally, all thefts and vandalism of Government property must be reported
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI will conduct an active
investigation only in cases where the value of the property stolen or missing
is $5,000 or more. Reports for items valued at less than $5,000 will be placed
in the FBI administrative files for analysis but normally no investigation will
be conducted.

(2) FPMR 101-20.103-3 requires the prompt reporting of all crimes and suspicious
circumstances occurring on GSA-controlled property to the regional FPS Law Enforcement
Branch (See Appendix D). In most cases, the FPS will dispatch a U.S. Special
Police Officer to record the incident. The GSA Form 3155, Offense/Incident Report,
is the standard reporting form. This form may be used by the security officer
in reporting the incident when FPS police officers are not available in the
general area. The form requests information such as date; time and location
of incident; details regarding lost, stolen, or damaged items; nature of the
incident; and any suspects involved. Supplies of the form can be obtained from
the FPS Regional Office (See Appendix D) or GSA building manager.

C. Administrative Reporting. The incident reporting requirements stated
herein are not a substitute for nor do they eliminate the need for compliance
with any additional reporting requirements prescribed in Federal and Departmental
Regulations and in the USGS SM pertaining to motor vehicle incidents and to
the loss, damage, and mishandling of Government property.

11. Emergency Planning and Evacuation.

A. Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). In accordance with FPMR 101-20.103-4,
"Occupant Emergency Program," immediate, positive, and orderly action
must be taken to safeguard life and property in Federal facilities during emergencies.
Examples of emergency situations are bomb threats; civil disorders; fires; explosions;
chemical, biological, or radiological events; natural disasters; direct threat
to a major computer facility; and immediate threat of compromise of classified
information. This FPMR requires the development of an emergency evacuation plan
for each Federal facility. Each security officer should cooperate with and assist
the Designated Official or safety personnel responsible for developing the OEP.

(1) In GSA-controlled facilities, emergency procedures are normally provided
by the GSA Building Manager or local officials of the FPS.

(2) In USGS-owned facilities, the senior facility manager shall coordinate
the development of the OEP in consultation with the servicing safety officer
and building management officials.

B. Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). Presidential Homeland
Security Directive 3 established the HSAS. There are two major elements of that
system: establishing protective measures for each of the five Threat Conditions
and a system for disseminating information about threats. The five Threat Conditions
are as follows: 1) green, which is issued when there is a low risk of terrorist
attack; 2) blue, which is issued when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks;
3) yellow, which is issued when there is a significant risk of terrorist attack;
4) orange, which is issued when there is a high risk of terrorist attack; and
5) red, which is issued when there is a severe risk of terrorist attack or when
intelligence indicates that terrorist action against a specific target is imminent.

(1) GSA Managed Space. In space owned or managed by the GSA, USGS
offices and facilities will rely on GSA-issued guidance and protective measures
to implement the HSAS. (Contact your nearest FPS office at one of the regional
addresses cited in Appendix D for GSA-issued guidance and protective measures.)
Guidance issued by FPS will be the minimum measures to be taken at each Threat
Condition. Principal managers or FSO’s may develop additional measures,
as they deem appropriate. Principal managers or FSO’s are responsible
for establishing a notification system to ensure that appropriate personnel
are notified of changes in protective measures and of threat information affecting
the office/facility. Additionally, the principal manager or FSO is also responsible
for developing means of informing employees about their responsibilities under
different threat levels and protective measures.

(2) USGS Owned or Leased Space. For USGS owned or leased space to
include leased space from other Federal agencies, Survey Manual 440.5, Threat
Condition Guidance, implements the protective measures required for each of
the five Threat Conditions established by the HSAS based on the security level
of the facility (See Appendix B to determine security level of a facility).
When a Threat Condition is announced by Homeland Security, the Security Management
Office will notify Regional Security Officers who are responsible for notifying
the principal building manager or the FSO of each USGS owned or leased facility.
Principal managers or FSO’s are responsible for establishing a notification
system to ensure that appropriate personnel are notified of changes in protective
measures and of threat information affecting the office/facility. Additionally,
the principal manager or FSO is also responsible for developing means of informing
employees about their responsibilities under different threat levels and protective
measures.