Applied Science

By John Etchemendy

Published: September 27, 2006

HARVARD'S and Princeton's recent announcements that they will soon end the early admission programs they now use to choose part of their freshman classes have garnered a great deal of attention, including editorials urging other institutions to follow their lead. It is a shame that the publicity, so abundant in its praise, has been so short on facts and clearheaded analysis.

There are two very different kinds of early admission programs offered by colleges and universities. Binding early admission contractually requires students who apply early and are accepted to attend the college that admitted them. Nonbinding early admission programs do not require admitted students to commit until the admission season ends in the spring. Students can meanwhile apply to other colleges in the regular round and make their decisions after they hear the results of those applications. Harvard, Stanford and Yale, for instance, have non-binding early programs; Princeton's early program is binding.

One complaint about early programs is that students accepted early do not have the opportunity to compare competing financial aid packages -- they are locked in to attending the college that has already accepted them. This is a legitimate criticism of binding early admission programs, but it simply does not apply to non-binding programs. Students accepted in nonbinding programs can and do compare aid packages from all the colleges to which they are admitted.

By far the most common criticism of early admission programs is, to quote the presidents of both Harvard and Princeton, that these programs ''advantage the advantaged.'' Critics point out that admission rates are somewhat higher in the early round than in the regular admission round. They assume that the pool of early applicants is disproportionately wealthier than those in the regular round. The conclusion seems inescapable: the wealthy are benefiting from the higher admission rates of early programs.

This reasoning is faulty, however. Consider an analogous situation. If you look at the pool of people who file income tax returns in January, you'll find that a higher percentage get a refund than those who delay until April. Does this imply that the I.R.S. is giving an unfair advantage to those who file early, that filing early increases your chances of getting a refund?

Of course not: the I.R.S. refund standards are identical whether you file early or late. The difference is that those expecting a refund are more likely to file early, while those who owe money are inclined to wait. The pools are different; the standards are not. Those filing early are in no way ''advantaged.''

There is nothing about early admissions, in itself, that gives an advantage to those who apply early. It all depends on whether the university imposes lower, the same, or higher standards to the early pool. Nor can you infer the standards by simply comparing admission rates in the early and late pools.

The admission rate is determined by two things: the standards applied and the qualifications of the applicants. If the early pool is, on average, more qualified, then applying precisely the same standard will result in a higher rate of acceptance.

At Stanford, we actually apply somewhat higher standards to our early pool, since we do not want to accept students early unless we're confident they would get in during the regular round. This is reflected in the SAT scores for these students: they average 40 points higher than those of students admitted later. It is not, however, reflected in our early acceptance rate, which is indeed somewhat higher than in the regular round.

No doubt some schools give an advantage to early applicants. If so, they are advantaging those applicants; if not, not. The problem, in any event, doesn't lie with early admissions programs but rather with the standards applied.

How about the assumption by critics that early programs are predominantly used by the wealthy? At Stanford, 36 percent to 40 percent of the students accepted early apply for financial aid; in the regular round only slightly more, 40 percent to 44 percent, seek aid. But even if our early pool were disproportionately well off, those applicants would not, as we have seen, get an admission advantage.

The final charge made by critics of early programs is that they increase the frenzy of the college admission process. This is certainly not true for those students who are clear about their first-choice college: they can apply to that institution early. If they get in, their admissions worries are over. If they do not, they can then submit applications to other schools, but are in no worse shape than if there were no early admission program.

Without such programs, many students who now apply to a single college will feel compelled to apply to 10 or more in order to be confident of an acceptance. This will increase the overall number of college applications, and that in turn will probably increase -- not decrease -- the pressure felt by all high school seniors going through the process.

Indeed, early admission programs were originally intended to decrease that pressure. Done right, the programs do not give any advantage to those who apply in the early round, and students who are uncertain about where they want to go shouldn't feel that they must apply early.

The best way to decrease the frenzy of the admission season? Have colleges universally adopt nonbinding early admission programs, and then apply the same or higher standards to the early decisions as they do to the regular round. It's a solution that's fair for the students and practical for the colleges.