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B. 05 KIEV 1288
C. 05 KIEV 1226
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Sheila S. Gwaltney for reasons
1.4 (b,d).
1. (SBU) Summary: Anti-Orange Revolution forces are using
the occasion of a joint U.S.-Ukraine mil-mil cooperative
exercise in Crimea to stir up anti-NATO sentiment in the
majority ethnic Russian peninsula and smear the Ukrainian
government. Demonstrators outside GOU-administered compounds
in the Crimean cities of Feodosiya and Alushta bottled up
U.S. military personnel (temporarily restricting access to
food and water), followed the vehicles in which they were
being transported, and otherwise prevented the reservists
from doing the job they were sent to do -- building basic
facilities for participants in the joint military exercise
"Sea Breeze" that is scheduled to begin in mid-July. The
Ukrainian military unsuccessfully attempted to keep Sea
Breeze preparations approved by the GOU low profile pending
passage of legislation specifically authorizing the exercise.
We have energetically engaged senior levels of the Ukrainian
government to resolve the situation and ensure the safety of
U.S. military personnel, our paramount concern. A positive
resolution to this ongoing problem is important to the GOU to
deny its opponents a political victory and to maintain its
reputation as a reliable partner in joint military exercises.
End summary.
A Summer Exercise
-----------------
2. (SBU) To be cohosted by U.S. (European Command) and
Ukrainian militaries, Sea Breeze would involve 3,500 U.S.
servicemen (up to 1000 ashore at peak time), 10 ships, 12
aircraft, exercise related construction (ERC), and maritime,
ground, and air training, with U.S. servicemen in country in
various phases from May 20 until August 14. In conjunction
with the training, a command post exercise (CPX) would take
place at five locations in Crimea: Stary Krym, Feodosiya,
Sevastopol, Saky, and Opuk. The primary goal was to expose
Ukraine to running a joint maritime-ground-air task force
(e.g., a 115-person CPX operation in Feodosiya) and the
associated command/control challenges.
3. (SBU) Sea Breeze would run the second half of July, and
the pack-up and departure would be completed by August 14.
While the U.S. and Ukraine would provide the bulk of forces,
twelve countries, including Georgia, Turkey, Greece,
Macedonia, and Germany, would participate, since the
bilateral exercise would officially be "in the spirit of a
(NATO) Partnership for Peace" (PfP) event. Observers from
other countries, including Russia, would attend. A U.S.
destroyer would also spend five days at a commercial pier in
Sevastopol toward the end of the exercise.
An Unexpected Demonstration
---------------------------
4. (SBU) The May 24 arrival of the first contingent of 113
reservists by a military aircraft into Simferopol went
unnoticed. On May 27, however, the MV Advantage, a
U.S.-flagged commercial ship, unloaded construction materiel
and equipment in the Crimean port city of Feodosiya that U.S.
military reservists would use to upgrade facilities at the
Ukrainian military Stary Krim training range, as well as
small arms to be used in the later Sea Breeze exercise. A
few hundred loud demonstrators apparently associated with the
radical leftist Progressive Socialist Party of Natalya
Vitrenko greeted the arriving ship. At the same time,
Customs officials at the port threw up obstacles toward the
clearing of the cargo, thus preventing it from being moved to
the intended construction site. The demonstrators then took
up positions at the gate of a Ukrainian military facility in
Feodosiya, bottling up the first group of U.S. military
reservists billeted there.
5. (SBU) On June 1, demonstrators prevented the entry of
buses carrying an additional 120 Marine and Navy reservists
from the U.S. into the Feodosiya facility, throwing stones
that broke a bus window and forcing the reservists to be
diverted to a different Ukrainian government facility in the
town of Alushta several hours distant. Likewise bottled up
by demonstrators at the gates, the later arrivals at one
point had difficulty obtaining regularly supplies of food and
water. After numerous strongly-worded Embassy requests, the
Ukrainian authorities succeeded in moving the reservists out
of Alushta to join the contingents of U.S. military personnel
KIEV 00002190 002 OF 005
in Feodosiya early in the morning of June 4.
A Series of Missteps, . . .
---------------------------
6. (C) While initial Ukrainian government coordination was
hesitant and confused, Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told
us June 2, the National Security and Defense Council met
under President Yushchenko's chairmanship earlier the same
day and decided:
- to confirm the government's obligation to conduct all
exercises according to schedule;
- that local authorities in Crimea had exceeded the limits of
their authority (comment: probably by acting autonomously
without regard to central authorities);
- instructed law enforcement authorities to take measures
appropriate to the situation;
- demand that unlawful activity be stopped;
- establish law enforcement structures to provide law and
order;
- found that some foreigners, including Russian nationals,
had participated in unlawful activities and, once
apprehended, would be declared persona non grata and deported;
- assigned tasks and responsibilities to the relevant
ministries; and
- critiqued the Ministry of Defense, police forces and
security services for a lack of coordination from the early
planning stages until the present.
And a Lack of Nerve?
--------------------
7. (C) The failure of initial planning and coordination
probably arose from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MOD)
desire to keep a low profile in the wake of a February 9 vote
in which Parliament (Rada) failed to achieve the 226-vote
majority to approve an annual bill to authorize foreign troop
participation in military exercises on Ukrainian soil for
2006. (Note: The vote was 215 to 11, but pro-government
forces did not exercise adequate discipline to muster the
necessary number of votes.) The MOD had hoped to table the
bill once more during the first session of the newly elected
Rada May 25, but was stymied when the planned session ended
on the first day as the result of an Orange coalition
parliamentary maneuver (ref A). MOD officials, in
discussions with us, urged caution and were reluctant to
force the issue with local authorities out of concern that
the resultant controversy would complicate passage of the
military exercises bill, which MOD hoped would pass June 7,
the first day of the next Rada meeting and in time to
authorize the holding of Sea Breeze and five other planned
exercises involving foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The
limbo that the exercise status was left in, however, gave the
political opposition room to seize on the issue, twist the
facts and thereby grab headlines and television coverage.
An Engineered Controversy
-------------------------
8. (C) In addition to demonstrators purporting to belong to
Vitrenko's party, Embassy observers on the ground reported
seeing flags and symbols of the Communist Party, the Party of
Regions, and organizations with links to Russia, such as the
youth group Proriv. Embassy observers also noted, however,
strong similarities among the demonstrators' props,
suggesting coordination and possible common funding. While
including elderly pensioners who perhaps might have jumped on
the bandwagon, most demonstrators seemed lackluster and only
gathered in numbers at times when television cameras were
likely to be turned on them. The presence of some Russian
political figures in Crimea also lent credence to the NSDC
judgment that "Russian nationals participated in unlawful
activities." Vitrenko and others have spread spurious rumors
such as allegations that the Advantage's cargo carried
poisonous substances or that the construction materials were
intended to build a "NATO military base" in Crimea.
9. (SBU) Despite past assurances that Party of Regions was
not opposed to Ukrainian military cooperation with NATO, the
Viktor Yanukovych-led party has been singularly unhelpful and
fanned the flames of controversy.
May 30 -- Presidium of Regions political council supports the
demonstrations in Crimea, calls for the punishment of
responsible officials, and falsely claims NATO ships are en
route to Ukraine.
May 30 -- Party of Regions Ombudsman Nina Karpachova (no. 2
KIEV 00002190 003 OF 005
on the party's parliamentary candidate list) calls on the
Prosecutor's General office to prosecute officials who
permitted MV Advantage to enter Ukrainian territorial waters
and alleges that the cargo unloading violated the Ukrainian
constitution.
June 2 -- The Regions-dominated Luhansk regional council
urges local councils to proclaim their areas to be "NATO-free
zones."
June 4 -- Regions press service accuses the government of
planning to send special police units to take action against
the demonstrators, except that Regions deputy Yuriy Boldyrev
persuaded the government to drop the plan.
June 5 -- Presidium of Regions political council issues a
second statement critical of government's poor response and
lack of prior coordination and calls for dismissal of the
Foreign and Defense Ministers.
June 5 -- Regions and Communist Party deputies of the Crimean
Autonomous Republic assembly join protesters in Feodosiya and
assist them to inspect vehicles leaving the port. Crimean
Assembly deputy Vasyl Kisiliov from Party of Regions bullied
his way into the Feodosiya facility where the U.S. military
reservists were located and, with a Russian TV news crew in
tow, confronted the U.S. Marine commander with a demand to
inspect cargo containers.
June 5 -- Regions Deputy Yevhen Kushnaryov (no. 11 on the
party's parliamentery candidate list), in an ICTV television
broadcast, proclaims that the arrival of U.S. military
personnel in Ukraine was unlawful and unconstitutional. He
voices the opinion that Regions will vote against a bill
authorizing foreign troop participation in military exercises
held in Ukraine.
June 6 -- The Regions-dominated Crimean assembly votes in an
extraordinary session to proclaim Crimea a "NATO-free zone."
Regions MP and Yanukovych foreign policy advisor Leonid
Kozhara told PolCouns June 6 that the actions of some Regions
representatives did not represent the party's position. He
said Yanukovych would issue a statement on the subject June 6
or 7.
Long Term Fall-out?
-------------------
10. (C) The Ukrainian government's ambitious efforts to
support Sea Breeze in the face of its ambiguous legal
position may have increased the difficulty of securing
passage of the military exercises measure in the Rada.
During a June 5 meeting with DATT, Deputy Defense Minister
Polyakov, while maintaining a positive outlook, could not
rule out the measure's defeat. In the short run, a
protracted delay in passing the measure will also negatively
affect Tight Knot 2006, the Ukrainian military's bilateral
exercise with UK military, involving fighter aircraft, later
in June. Regions and Socialist deputies have said publicly
that at the very least the issue should not be taken up by
the full Rada until the relevant Committees (still unformed)
consider the question. This could take weeks.
11. (U) The Ukrainian military's failure to foresee the
possible quagmire into which it might be stepping was perhaps
not unexpected since U.S. and Ukrainian forces have conducted
exercises in the past with no attendant negative publicity.
In 2005, the second half of exercise Peace Shield involved
the participation of 600 U.S. Marines in Ukraine, and, also
in 2005, a NATO exercise, Cooperative Poseidon, took place in
Ukraine. Earlier, the first Sea Breeze was held in Crimea in
1997 with the participation of seven countries and 400 ground
troops. Significantly, a Sea Breeze exercise occurred in
Odesa in 2003 with the participation of 600-700 U.S. Marines,
when Viktor Yanukovych was Prime Minister. Over the last
decade, U.S., Italian, French, and Turkish warships have made
port calls in Ukrainian cities on the Black Sea.
Embassy Response
----------------
12. (C) Embassy engaged vigorously and at the highest levels
to ensure the safety and comfort of the U.S. military
personnel and resolve the situation. Charge contacted the
head of Ukrainian Customs, the Foreign Minister, the Defense
Minister, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the Minister of
Interior, and the National Security and Defense Council
Secretary to focus attention on the problem. DATT deployed
SIPDIS
KIEV 00002190 004 OF 005
military attaches to Crimea to provide on-scene liaison and
supervision, kept in close contact with Deputy Defense
Minister Leonid Polyakov, and provided regular updates by
secure e-mail to offices following the situation. RSO and a
Locally Employed Staff investigator were in Crimea over the
June 3-4 weekend and again June 6 to coordinate with
Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies on crowd control. The
Public Affairs Section prepared press guidance and issued
clarifying statements to the media. Charge and PolCouns were
in contact with Party of Regions officials to make clear USG
unhappiness with its representatives' unhelpful behavior.
13. (C) Most recently, Charge met/spoke with Deputy Foreign
Minister Khandohiy and National Security and Defence Council
Secretary Horbulin June 6 to emphasize our ongoing concerns
SIPDIS
about the Marines' security, comfort and impeded ability to
complete the task they were sent to accomplish. Treatment by
Regions Party representatives who used their deputies' status
to get access to the cargo and to the compound where the
Marines are billeted was unacceptable. These problems had to
stop immediately. Looking ahead, the USG wanted to implement
the agreed joint exercise and recognized that the current
problems' source was not the government's bad intentions, but
the still uncleared cargo, impeded movement of the resevists,
and time constraints meant that we would soon have to make a
decision on the feasibility of continuing to try to go
forward. Washington would decide next steps, but it was
important that the GOU ensure the safety and well-being of
the Marines. A group of reservists meant to replace the
current group would very likely not be sent if the situation
were not resolved satisfactorily soon.
14. (C) Khandohiy apologized for the situation, noted that
pure politics were to blame, promised to work cooperatively
to find a way forward, and said actions had been taken to
improve the situation. For example, orders had been given
not to open the cargo containers without proper supervision
and Russian MP Zatulin had been deported. Unidentified
others would likely be deported today. He noted the central
government's difficulties included the fact that "60% of
local police had refused to comply with central authorities'
orders" in connection with this incident. Khandohiy
recognized that a cancellation of the planned exercise would
be a political setback for the government. Separately,
Horbulin told Charge he had spoken with the Feodosiya mayor
and the Chairman of the Crimean Assembly and emphasized their
personal reponsibility for the U.S. servicemembers' safety.
He added that security at the Feodosiya facility would be
augmented to ensure proper security internally and externally.
Revenge?
--------
15. (C) The latest controversy comes 15 months after an
earlier military exercise gone awry (refs B and C) involving
the Russian military. On March 23, 2005, a large Russian
amphibious vessel of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Nikolai
Filchenkov, entered Ukrainian territorial waters and landed
marines and vehicles from the Black Sea Fleet's 382nd Marine
Battalion based out of Temryuk, Russia, at the Opuk military
training range near Fedosiya. A total of 142 marines and 28
vehicles and pieces of equipment were unloaded before
Ukrainian Navy protests forced the Russian vessel to reload
the marines and vehicles. The ship departed Ukrainian waters
early March 24 en route to Novorossiysk, Russia. Deputy
Defense Minister Polyakov told us then that the 1997
Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the division of the Black Sea
Fleet gave the Russians control of the training facility in
question. However, after the October 2001 tragic downing of
a Russian TU-154 passsenger aircraft, shot down by a
Ukrainian antiaircraft missile launched from the same Opuk
training range, the Ukrainian government had suspended
Russian military access to the site pending a new bilateral
agreement spelling out precise procedures for its use. The
incident occurred four days after Russian President Putin's
relatively relaxed and successful visit to Kiev.
Comment
-------
16. (C) The central government was quick to understand and
agree with our concerns, but adequate action is still
lacking. While security concerns have been addressed, the
GOU still has not taken the necessary steps to allow the
joint exercise preparations to go forward. Primarily the
problems are continued impaired mobility of our military
personnel and cargo that continues to sit on the docks
uncleared by Customs. Still, this problem is one of
effectiveness, not intent. The malicious intent that is
KIEV 00002190 005 OF 005
ultimately responsible for this ongoing incident is entirely
on the side of the political forces that have not wanted to
see Yushchenko's government succeed since the pro-democracy
forces emerged victorious from the late 2004 Orange
Revolution with the win in the free and fair presidential
election of December 2004.
17. (C) The opposition Party of Regions, Communists, Vitrenko
bloc elements, Proriv activists and their Russian backers (in
some cases financiers, it is alleged) do not wish to see the
Yushchenko-led government pull off a joint military exercise
in Ukraine's most pro-Russian region, Crimea. Conversely, a
positive resolution to this ongoing problem is important to
the GOU to deny its opponents a political victory and to
maintain its reputation as a reliable partner in joint
military exercises. Barring the development of serious
security concerns, we should not give the anti-reform,
anti-Euro-Atlantic integration forces a victory by pulling
out early. Rather we should continue to work with the
central government to accomplish the joint exercise goals or
other constructive and publicly visible work that is possible
as a sign of the benefits of such cooperation.
18. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Gwaltney

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KIEV 002190
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, PINR, RS, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OPPOSITION CREATES TEMPEST OVER "SEA
BREEZE" IN CRIMEA
REF: A. KIEV 2034
B. 05 KIEV 1288
C. 05 KIEV 1226
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Sheila S. Gwaltney for reasons
1.4 (b,d).
1. (SBU) Summary: Anti-Orange Revolution forces are using
the occasion of a joint U.S.-Ukraine mil-mil cooperative
exercise in Crimea to stir up anti-NATO sentiment in the
majority ethnic Russian peninsula and smear the Ukrainian
government. Demonstrators outside GOU-administered compounds
in the Crimean cities of Feodosiya and Alushta bottled up
U.S. military personnel (temporarily restricting access to
food and water), followed the vehicles in which they were
being transported, and otherwise prevented the reservists
from doing the job they were sent to do -- building basic
facilities for participants in the joint military exercise
"Sea Breeze" that is scheduled to begin in mid-July. The
Ukrainian military unsuccessfully attempted to keep Sea
Breeze preparations approved by the GOU low profile pending
passage of legislation specifically authorizing the exercise.
We have energetically engaged senior levels of the Ukrainian
government to resolve the situation and ensure the safety of
U.S. military personnel, our paramount concern. A positive
resolution to this ongoing problem is important to the GOU to
deny its opponents a political victory and to maintain its
reputation as a reliable partner in joint military exercises.
End summary.
A Summer Exercise
-----------------
2. (SBU) To be cohosted by U.S. (European Command) and
Ukrainian militaries, Sea Breeze would involve 3,500 U.S.
servicemen (up to 1000 ashore at peak time), 10 ships, 12
aircraft, exercise related construction (ERC), and maritime,
ground, and air training, with U.S. servicemen in country in
various phases from May 20 until August 14. In conjunction
with the training, a command post exercise (CPX) would take
place at five locations in Crimea: Stary Krym, Feodosiya,
Sevastopol, Saky, and Opuk. The primary goal was to expose
Ukraine to running a joint maritime-ground-air task force
(e.g., a 115-person CPX operation in Feodosiya) and the
associated command/control challenges.
3. (SBU) Sea Breeze would run the second half of July, and
the pack-up and departure would be completed by August 14.
While the U.S. and Ukraine would provide the bulk of forces,
twelve countries, including Georgia, Turkey, Greece,
Macedonia, and Germany, would participate, since the
bilateral exercise would officially be "in the spirit of a
(NATO) Partnership for Peace" (PfP) event. Observers from
other countries, including Russia, would attend. A U.S.
destroyer would also spend five days at a commercial pier in
Sevastopol toward the end of the exercise.
An Unexpected Demonstration
---------------------------
4. (SBU) The May 24 arrival of the first contingent of 113
reservists by a military aircraft into Simferopol went
unnoticed. On May 27, however, the MV Advantage, a
U.S.-flagged commercial ship, unloaded construction materiel
and equipment in the Crimean port city of Feodosiya that U.S.
military reservists would use to upgrade facilities at the
Ukrainian military Stary Krim training range, as well as
small arms to be used in the later Sea Breeze exercise. A
few hundred loud demonstrators apparently associated with the
radical leftist Progressive Socialist Party of Natalya
Vitrenko greeted the arriving ship. At the same time,
Customs officials at the port threw up obstacles toward the
clearing of the cargo, thus preventing it from being moved to
the intended construction site. The demonstrators then took
up positions at the gate of a Ukrainian military facility in
Feodosiya, bottling up the first group of U.S. military
reservists billeted there.
5. (SBU) On June 1, demonstrators prevented the entry of
buses carrying an additional 120 Marine and Navy reservists
from the U.S. into the Feodosiya facility, throwing stones
that broke a bus window and forcing the reservists to be
diverted to a different Ukrainian government facility in the
town of Alushta several hours distant. Likewise bottled up
by demonstrators at the gates, the later arrivals at one
point had difficulty obtaining regularly supplies of food and
water. After numerous strongly-worded Embassy requests, the
Ukrainian authorities succeeded in moving the reservists out
of Alushta to join the contingents of U.S. military personnel
KIEV 00002190 002 OF 005
in Feodosiya early in the morning of June 4.
A Series of Missteps, . . .
---------------------------
6. (C) While initial Ukrainian government coordination was
hesitant and confused, Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov told
us June 2, the National Security and Defense Council met
under President Yushchenko's chairmanship earlier the same
day and decided:
- to confirm the government's obligation to conduct all
exercises according to schedule;
- that local authorities in Crimea had exceeded the limits of
their authority (comment: probably by acting autonomously
without regard to central authorities);
- instructed law enforcement authorities to take measures
appropriate to the situation;
- demand that unlawful activity be stopped;
- establish law enforcement structures to provide law and
order;
- found that some foreigners, including Russian nationals,
had participated in unlawful activities and, once
apprehended, would be declared persona non grata and deported;
- assigned tasks and responsibilities to the relevant
ministries; and
- critiqued the Ministry of Defense, police forces and
security services for a lack of coordination from the early
planning stages until the present.
And a Lack of Nerve?
--------------------
7. (C) The failure of initial planning and coordination
probably arose from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MOD)
desire to keep a low profile in the wake of a February 9 vote
in which Parliament (Rada) failed to achieve the 226-vote
majority to approve an annual bill to authorize foreign troop
participation in military exercises on Ukrainian soil for
2006. (Note: The vote was 215 to 11, but pro-government
forces did not exercise adequate discipline to muster the
necessary number of votes.) The MOD had hoped to table the
bill once more during the first session of the newly elected
Rada May 25, but was stymied when the planned session ended
on the first day as the result of an Orange coalition
parliamentary maneuver (ref A). MOD officials, in
discussions with us, urged caution and were reluctant to
force the issue with local authorities out of concern that
the resultant controversy would complicate passage of the
military exercises bill, which MOD hoped would pass June 7,
the first day of the next Rada meeting and in time to
authorize the holding of Sea Breeze and five other planned
exercises involving foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The
limbo that the exercise status was left in, however, gave the
political opposition room to seize on the issue, twist the
facts and thereby grab headlines and television coverage.
An Engineered Controversy
-------------------------
8. (C) In addition to demonstrators purporting to belong to
Vitrenko's party, Embassy observers on the ground reported
seeing flags and symbols of the Communist Party, the Party of
Regions, and organizations with links to Russia, such as the
youth group Proriv. Embassy observers also noted, however,
strong similarities among the demonstrators' props,
suggesting coordination and possible common funding. While
including elderly pensioners who perhaps might have jumped on
the bandwagon, most demonstrators seemed lackluster and only
gathered in numbers at times when television cameras were
likely to be turned on them. The presence of some Russian
political figures in Crimea also lent credence to the NSDC
judgment that "Russian nationals participated in unlawful
activities." Vitrenko and others have spread spurious rumors
such as allegations that the Advantage's cargo carried
poisonous substances or that the construction materials were
intended to build a "NATO military base" in Crimea.
9. (SBU) Despite past assurances that Party of Regions was
not opposed to Ukrainian military cooperation with NATO, the
Viktor Yanukovych-led party has been singularly unhelpful and
fanned the flames of controversy.
May 30 -- Presidium of Regions political council supports the
demonstrations in Crimea, calls for the punishment of
responsible officials, and falsely claims NATO ships are en
route to Ukraine.
May 30 -- Party of Regions Ombudsman Nina Karpachova (no. 2
KIEV 00002190 003 OF 005
on the party's parliamentary candidate list) calls on the
Prosecutor's General office to prosecute officials who
permitted MV Advantage to enter Ukrainian territorial waters
and alleges that the cargo unloading violated the Ukrainian
constitution.
June 2 -- The Regions-dominated Luhansk regional council
urges local councils to proclaim their areas to be "NATO-free
zones."
June 4 -- Regions press service accuses the government of
planning to send special police units to take action against
the demonstrators, except that Regions deputy Yuriy Boldyrev
persuaded the government to drop the plan.
June 5 -- Presidium of Regions political council issues a
second statement critical of government's poor response and
lack of prior coordination and calls for dismissal of the
Foreign and Defense Ministers.
June 5 -- Regions and Communist Party deputies of the Crimean
Autonomous Republic assembly join protesters in Feodosiya and
assist them to inspect vehicles leaving the port. Crimean
Assembly deputy Vasyl Kisiliov from Party of Regions bullied
his way into the Feodosiya facility where the U.S. military
reservists were located and, with a Russian TV news crew in
tow, confronted the U.S. Marine commander with a demand to
inspect cargo containers.
June 5 -- Regions Deputy Yevhen Kushnaryov (no. 11 on the
party's parliamentery candidate list), in an ICTV television
broadcast, proclaims that the arrival of U.S. military
personnel in Ukraine was unlawful and unconstitutional. He
voices the opinion that Regions will vote against a bill
authorizing foreign troop participation in military exercises
held in Ukraine.
June 6 -- The Regions-dominated Crimean assembly votes in an
extraordinary session to proclaim Crimea a "NATO-free zone."
Regions MP and Yanukovych foreign policy advisor Leonid
Kozhara told PolCouns June 6 that the actions of some Regions
representatives did not represent the party's position. He
said Yanukovych would issue a statement on the subject June 6
or 7.
Long Term Fall-out?
-------------------
10. (C) The Ukrainian government's ambitious efforts to
support Sea Breeze in the face of its ambiguous legal
position may have increased the difficulty of securing
passage of the military exercises measure in the Rada.
During a June 5 meeting with DATT, Deputy Defense Minister
Polyakov, while maintaining a positive outlook, could not
rule out the measure's defeat. In the short run, a
protracted delay in passing the measure will also negatively
affect Tight Knot 2006, the Ukrainian military's bilateral
exercise with UK military, involving fighter aircraft, later
in June. Regions and Socialist deputies have said publicly
that at the very least the issue should not be taken up by
the full Rada until the relevant Committees (still unformed)
consider the question. This could take weeks.
11. (U) The Ukrainian military's failure to foresee the
possible quagmire into which it might be stepping was perhaps
not unexpected since U.S. and Ukrainian forces have conducted
exercises in the past with no attendant negative publicity.
In 2005, the second half of exercise Peace Shield involved
the participation of 600 U.S. Marines in Ukraine, and, also
in 2005, a NATO exercise, Cooperative Poseidon, took place in
Ukraine. Earlier, the first Sea Breeze was held in Crimea in
1997 with the participation of seven countries and 400 ground
troops. Significantly, a Sea Breeze exercise occurred in
Odesa in 2003 with the participation of 600-700 U.S. Marines,
when Viktor Yanukovych was Prime Minister. Over the last
decade, U.S., Italian, French, and Turkish warships have made
port calls in Ukrainian cities on the Black Sea.
Embassy Response
----------------
12. (C) Embassy engaged vigorously and at the highest levels
to ensure the safety and comfort of the U.S. military
personnel and resolve the situation. Charge contacted the
head of Ukrainian Customs, the Foreign Minister, the Defense
Minister, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the Minister of
Interior, and the National Security and Defense Council
Secretary to focus attention on the problem. DATT deployed
SIPDIS
KIEV 00002190 004 OF 005
military attaches to Crimea to provide on-scene liaison and
supervision, kept in close contact with Deputy Defense
Minister Leonid Polyakov, and provided regular updates by
secure e-mail to offices following the situation. RSO and a
Locally Employed Staff investigator were in Crimea over the
June 3-4 weekend and again June 6 to coordinate with
Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies on crowd control. The
Public Affairs Section prepared press guidance and issued
clarifying statements to the media. Charge and PolCouns were
in contact with Party of Regions officials to make clear USG
unhappiness with its representatives' unhelpful behavior.
13. (C) Most recently, Charge met/spoke with Deputy Foreign
Minister Khandohiy and National Security and Defence Council
Secretary Horbulin June 6 to emphasize our ongoing concerns
SIPDIS
about the Marines' security, comfort and impeded ability to
complete the task they were sent to accomplish. Treatment by
Regions Party representatives who used their deputies' status
to get access to the cargo and to the compound where the
Marines are billeted was unacceptable. These problems had to
stop immediately. Looking ahead, the USG wanted to implement
the agreed joint exercise and recognized that the current
problems' source was not the government's bad intentions, but
the still uncleared cargo, impeded movement of the resevists,
and time constraints meant that we would soon have to make a
decision on the feasibility of continuing to try to go
forward. Washington would decide next steps, but it was
important that the GOU ensure the safety and well-being of
the Marines. A group of reservists meant to replace the
current group would very likely not be sent if the situation
were not resolved satisfactorily soon.
14. (C) Khandohiy apologized for the situation, noted that
pure politics were to blame, promised to work cooperatively
to find a way forward, and said actions had been taken to
improve the situation. For example, orders had been given
not to open the cargo containers without proper supervision
and Russian MP Zatulin had been deported. Unidentified
others would likely be deported today. He noted the central
government's difficulties included the fact that "60% of
local police had refused to comply with central authorities'
orders" in connection with this incident. Khandohiy
recognized that a cancellation of the planned exercise would
be a political setback for the government. Separately,
Horbulin told Charge he had spoken with the Feodosiya mayor
and the Chairman of the Crimean Assembly and emphasized their
personal reponsibility for the U.S. servicemembers' safety.
He added that security at the Feodosiya facility would be
augmented to ensure proper security internally and externally.
Revenge?
--------
15. (C) The latest controversy comes 15 months after an
earlier military exercise gone awry (refs B and C) involving
the Russian military. On March 23, 2005, a large Russian
amphibious vessel of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Nikolai
Filchenkov, entered Ukrainian territorial waters and landed
marines and vehicles from the Black Sea Fleet's 382nd Marine
Battalion based out of Temryuk, Russia, at the Opuk military
training range near Fedosiya. A total of 142 marines and 28
vehicles and pieces of equipment were unloaded before
Ukrainian Navy protests forced the Russian vessel to reload
the marines and vehicles. The ship departed Ukrainian waters
early March 24 en route to Novorossiysk, Russia. Deputy
Defense Minister Polyakov told us then that the 1997
Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the division of the Black Sea
Fleet gave the Russians control of the training facility in
question. However, after the October 2001 tragic downing of
a Russian TU-154 passsenger aircraft, shot down by a
Ukrainian antiaircraft missile launched from the same Opuk
training range, the Ukrainian government had suspended
Russian military access to the site pending a new bilateral
agreement spelling out precise procedures for its use. The
incident occurred four days after Russian President Putin's
relatively relaxed and successful visit to Kiev.
Comment
-------
16. (C) The central government was quick to understand and
agree with our concerns, but adequate action is still
lacking. While security concerns have been addressed, the
GOU still has not taken the necessary steps to allow the
joint exercise preparations to go forward. Primarily the
problems are continued impaired mobility of our military
personnel and cargo that continues to sit on the docks
uncleared by Customs. Still, this problem is one of
effectiveness, not intent. The malicious intent that is
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ultimately responsible for this ongoing incident is entirely
on the side of the political forces that have not wanted to
see Yushchenko's government succeed since the pro-democracy
forces emerged victorious from the late 2004 Orange
Revolution with the win in the free and fair presidential
election of December 2004.
17. (C) The opposition Party of Regions, Communists, Vitrenko
bloc elements, Proriv activists and their Russian backers (in
some cases financiers, it is alleged) do not wish to see the
Yushchenko-led government pull off a joint military exercise
in Ukraine's most pro-Russian region, Crimea. Conversely, a
positive resolution to this ongoing problem is important to
the GOU to deny its opponents a political victory and to
maintain its reputation as a reliable partner in joint
military exercises. Barring the development of serious
security concerns, we should not give the anti-reform,
anti-Euro-Atlantic integration forces a victory by pulling
out early. Rather we should continue to work with the
central government to accomplish the joint exercise goals or
other constructive and publicly visible work that is possible
as a sign of the benefits of such cooperation.
18. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Gwaltney