Sizing up Dagestan’s newly appointed leader

Feb 01 2013

Sergei Markedonov

special to RBTH

President Putin has called on Ramazan Abdulatipov to head Russia’s largest and most dangerous region in the North Caucasus. The new Dagestani leader is well-connected with Russian political institutions, but will Moscow be able to support his ambitious plans to stem corruption, terrorism and organized crime in the multiethnic republic?

On January 28,
2013, a new leader came to power in the Republic of Dagestan, located in the
perpetually turbulent North Caucasus region. Russian President Vladimir Putin
appointed Dagestani Ramazan Abdulatipov to replace the previous head,
Magomedsalam Magomedov.

The news
instantly became a major talking point in Russian domestic policy. And this is
no small wonder: Dagestan is the largest multi-ethnic republic in the North
Caucasus, and it plays a key role in ensuring the stability of the whole
region. This task takes on added importance on the eve of the Sochi Olympics.
Massive destabilization of the North Caucasus would bring into question not
only the choice of Sochi as the Olympic venue, but also the effectiveness of
the Russian state as a whole. Secondly, in terms of the number of terrorist
attacks and acts of sabotage, Dagestan has been the leader amongst the North
Caucasus republics for many years.

Related:

In 2011, 413
people died and 411 were injured because of violence that took place in the
republic. While the number of victims dropped by almost 15 percent in 2012, the
republic still has the dubious honor of being the most dangerous region in
Russia. Consequently, January saw the assassination of one of the republic’s
Supreme Court judges, Magomed Magomedov – the same judge who delivered the
verdicts in the high-profile case concerning the Kaspiysk bombing, which took
place on May 9, 2002.

The buzz around
the new appointment added fuel to the fire. In the week preceding the
publication of the presidential decree, speculation was rife in the media about
the coming resignation of Magomedsalam Magomedov. There was no official comment
on these reports from the Kremlin or the federal government, which provoked
more rumors and speculation.

Indeed, the reasons
for the new appointment are not entirely clear. Is it because the Russian
leadership is not pleased with Magomedov? Probably, considering he was sacked
two years before his term was due to end in February 2015. On the other hand,
his dismissal may be seen as a promotion, since he will now become deputy chief
of the President’s staff.

Formally
speaking, this is a step forward: the former head of Dagestan will continue his
career at the federal level. However, if this is the case, why were Abdulatipov’s
early pronouncements pointedly critical of the previous team? The new leader
promised to dismiss the republic’s prime minister and the whole republican
government. One wonders who he is going to replace them with.

It is also
noteworthy that, from the very first hours in his new position, Abdulatipov
started fostering inflated expectations amongst the region’s people. He claims
to be able to clamp down on clientelism and corruption, organized crime and
terrorism. Yet Dagestan has been in turmoil for a very long time. The political
and social features of the largest North Caucasus republic have been shaped
over the course of many years; their roots go back to the periods of Soviet and
Imperial Russia.

Things were not
happening because of or in spite of the personal contribution of this or that
leader. Many factors – overpopulation, a shortage of land, migration to
neighboring regions – stem from the features of modernization and urbanization
in the Caucasus, as well as the crisis of the traditional, rural way of life in
the “country of mountains” (the meaning of the word “Dagestan”).

Still, one of the
pros for the new leader is that he is far better integrated into the Russian
political establishment than his predecessors. Although he was born in Dagestan
(he is an ethnic Avar from Tlyaratinsky District), the highpoints of
Abdulatipov’s career have been achieved outside the republic; he has been a
permanent presence on the Russian political scene ever since he joined the
Nationalities Affairs Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
1988. The list of posts he has occupied includes deputy, chairman of the
Russian Supreme Soviet Nationalities Council, State Duma deputy, deputy prime
minister and federal minister, member of the Federation Council and Russian
Ambassador to Tajikistan.

Throughout, Abdulatipov
has never lost contact with his historical homeland. In 1991, he took part in
resolving ethnic tensions between the Chechens and Avars in Dagestan; he also
chaired the parliamentary commission for the release of those who were taken
hostage or went missing during the armed conflict in Chechnya. In short, he is
very well-versed in the affairs of the region, though he is not party to the
relations amongst ethnic clans.

The downside is
that the new leader in Dagestan does not have a team. In the context of the
Caucasus, this hamstrings any leader. Furthermore, unlike neighboring
republics, Dagestan does not have a “vertical power structure.” It is a complex
conglomerate of ethnic groups and various currents of Islam – Sufis, Salafites
and “unofficial Muslims” who shy away both from terrorists and from the
official clergy. City mayors (notably those of Makhachkala, Derbent, Khasavyurt
and Kizlyar) are forces in their own right that any republican leader will have
to reckon with.

Thus, Moscow’s
role is key. Will the Kremlin be willing to support its appointee, who was
delegated to Dagestan to strengthen its statehood? This would go a long way in
determining his success, because many in the republic see Moscow as the arbiter
in difficult disputes and in resolutions of local contradictions.

Sergey
Markedonov is a Visiting Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Washington, USA).