The Department has given careful consideration to the implications of a
contingency landing and our objective has been to develop guidance which
will secure for us maximum opportunity to effect recovery of the
astronaut and his space vehicle. It is our view that the more
forthcoming we are with governments in giving them advance notification
on the details of the flight, the more cooperation we will receive in an
emergency situation. I have therefore outlined in some detail the
procedures we will follow so you will have a clear idea of how our
planning has developed.

In anticipation of contingencies which might arise during the expanded
Mercury and Gemini programs, the U.S. delegation to the UN introduced a resolution in early 1962 in
the Legal Subcommittee of the Outer Space Committee which, if adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly, would establish the broad, general
principle providing for assistance to and safe return of the astronaut
and the spacecraft to the launching country. While there was no
disagreement with the Soviets or any other country on this principle,
Soviet instransigence on other points blocked the adoption of this
resolution thus far. Consideration has also been given to the negotiation of separate
bilateral agreements outside the UN
framework. Practical political reasons argue against this procedure.

It is, however, our intention to inform governments of the spaceflight in
advance. The Department feels that prior advice would pave the way for
their assistance in effecting immediate recovery. As you know we hold
the view that outer space is not an extension of sovereign air space.
National sovereignty is not therefore involved and no prior approval to
orbit spacecraft over any territory is to be requested.

We plan to follow a similar procedure with the Chinese Communists, where
we are instructing Ambassador Cabot to forward a letter to the Chinese
Ambassador in Warsaw. In the case of the North Vietnamese, we are
exploring the question of whether the International Control Commission
in Saigon with access to Hanoi could give the necessary assistance. With
respect to Cuba, we shall inform the Swiss in advance.

The Department will be informed by NASA
of the possibility of any contingency landing. In anticipation of a
contingency landing in non-Communist controlled territory, Search and
Rescue or Naval recovery units will proceed to the spacecraft landing
area. NASA will inform the Department
of such a landing and the mission concerned will be contacted by
telephone and Flash precedent telegram to request necessary clearance
for Search and Rescue aircraft underway. If known, the coordinates of
the landing will be furnished at this time.

Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft should
be instructed to observe ICAO
regulations and aircraft commanders should follow all instructions
issued by Air Route Traffic Control. In the event they are unable to
contact the country's Air Route Traffic Control, they should be
instructed to proceed according to their flight plan. In the case of a
few countries such as Indonesia it may be necessary to modify this
policy and we are currently examining this matter.

In the event of an emergency landing within territorial waters of a
friendly power, appropriate Naval commanders are authorized to order
naval ships, or to request friendly merchant ships, to enter these
waters to effect recovery. Embassy and Naval authorities should notify
appropriate authorities of host country concerned if this contingency
arises.

It should be noted that there are large gaps in the tracking and
communications facilities used to track the spacecraft and that an
emergency landing could occur in areas outside the range of tracking
facilities which could precipitate a search over a vast area. On certain
orbits this could include Communist held territory.

Should a known contingency landing take place in Communist China, North
Viet Nam or Cuba those countries will be requested through intermediaries to give
assistance to and effect the early return of the astronaut and
spacecraft. In the case of Communist China, the Department plans to
enlist the aid of the British Mission in Peiping in addition to the
Ambassadorial channel in Warsaw. Similarly, the British Mission in
Hanoi, in addition to the International Control Commission at Saigon,
will be asked to intervene with North Viet Nam. The Government of
Switzerland will be asked to intervene in the case of Cuba. Prior
arrangements will be made with the intervening countries.

SAR aircraft will not be permitted to
enter the airspace of or land in Communist China, North Viet Nam or
Cuba. In the case of a landing known to be within the
Communist-controlled areas of Laos, the ICC will be requested to use its aircraft to assist in
locating and retrieving the astronaut and spacecraft. Because of the
openness and world-wide interest in the type of flight, it is our
judgment that should the astronaut land in Communist territory and be
turned over to the governmental authorities he will be returned to the
United States. However, little hope is held for return of the
spacecraft.

SAR aircraft and Naval forces should be
authorized to penetrate the territorial waters of Communist China, North
Viet Nam and Cuba for the purpose of locating, rendering assistance to
and retrieving the astronaut and the spacecraft. In the event the SAR
forces are opposed or fired upon the rescue forces are authorized to
proceed to recover the astronaut and spacecraft, if in the judgment of
the on-scene commander the recovery is militarily feasible and can be
expeditiously accomplished without unduly endangering the life of the
astronaut.

If the astronaut or spacecraft is recovered by foreign forces within
their territorial waters, SAR and Naval
forces should make every effort to effect recovery by peaceful means.
The use of force should not be authorized without prior consultation
with the Department of State.

In the event the spacecraft lands on the high seas and the astronaut or
spacecraft is recovered by a foreign vessel, U.S. forces should be
directed to request the transfer of the astronaut and the spacecraft to
American control. In the event the foreign vessel refuses to return the
astronaut and spacecraft, the American commander should so report
through his chain of command to the DOD
which should consult the Department of State before issuing further
instructions. He should not be authorized to use force but should be
directed to keep the foreign vessel under surveillance pending receipt
of instructions.

As you will note from the attachment, the Department of State will
maintain an around-the-clock watch during the entire course of the
flight and will have available facilities providing direct
communications with the NMCC, NASA headquarters and Mercury Control
Center at Cape Canaveral. Throughout the flight, Embassies and Mission
located in countries orbited
will have a senior officer available on an 24-hour alert basis and will
maintain a supporting communications watch. Every effort possible is
being made by the Department of State to assure that adequate means of
communication will be available to all posts involved.

With regard to the suggestion contained in the JCS memorandum of March 15, 1963 to the Secretary of
Defense the press as well as the Voice of America, as in the case in
previous flights, will provide the world with information on the
progress of the flight.