Hamas officials said that a
52-page document has been compiled to testify that the offensive
missiles fired during Operation Cast lead were "an accident" due to
their weapon's lack of aiming capabilities toward military
installations.

However, section 1687 of the "Goldstone Report" presents that,
"indeed, Palestinian armed groups, among them Hamas, have publicly
expressed their intention to target Israel civilians.... claimed
responsibility for the deaths of each of the Israeli civilians killed
by rocket fired during the operations in Gaza".

This begs the question: If Hamas weapons suffer from inaccuracy, maybe
the information that was given to Goldstone is also off target?

I remember the first time that I heard about Sapir college was
when I was traveling in the United States after the army. When I asked
about the whereabouts of the college, a friend replied, "It is a nice
place next to Sderot. However, the situation is a little strange.
Rockets are launched towards the city daily". I did not know what lay
ahead for me at Sapir College, but I decided that I would take the
risk. After all, I figured something would be done, eventually, to stop
the rockets.

Eight years have passed since the first rocket was launched
towards Sderot. The situation has not changed, I was wrong. More than
ten thousand kassam missiles, grad, and mortar shells have been fired
from Gaza, of which eighty-four fell in Sderot during Operation Cast
Lead. Moreover, the "military installations" Hamas speaks of are
nowhere to be found in the city. Where exactly were the rockets
intended to fall?

I have witnessed firsthand the "mistakes" that have not only
produced several deaths, but continue to affect hundreds, if not a
thousands, of people with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSD) as a
result of the constant threat of incoming rocket attacks to the city.

What has been the result of the poor aiming capabilities of Hamas rockets?

As a student in Sderot, I awoke every morning to begin the usual
routine of my day. However, my routine was not morning coffee and a
newspaper. My routine, drenched with fear, caution, and preparation for
the next rocket aimed towards my city, was different than the average
student from other areas of the world.

Like clockwork, I was awoken at the same time, with the same
target hit, and with the same color red alarm. This alarm notified me
that I had only 15 seconds to take cover for my life. As I ran to the
nearest bomb shelter, I passed the same children on their way to
school. Once inside the crammed shelter, I heard the whistle.

That whistle of a rocket falling to my direction quickly became
an all too familiar sound. Maybe this time the rocket will fall in my
neighborhood? Maybe this time it will land in the home of someone that
I know?

While waiting in a bomb shelter, praying for safety, the firing
continued. It was not one rocket, or one "mistake", that came to my
direction. Many mistakes were fired towards me through the city.
According to the Sderot Media Center, "Palestinian rockets directly hit
more than 1,500 Israeli homes and buildings in the south. Three
synagogues were hit, in addition to nine educational facilities, which
include high schools, kindergartens, and elementary schools."

Can these cases actually be a malfunction in Hamas' original plan?

After a day full of color red alarms, or after three weeks of
140 alarms during the Operation, the residents of Sderot and myself
gathered to listen to the news. We heard about the mistakes that hit
our loved one's homes, the mistakes that kept children from going to
school the next day, and the mistakes that are expected to continue.

As a student and as a resident, we had to use our nights to
recover from our day. There was homework to be done, relationships to
build, our homes that we needed to continue to keep alive. We had to
continue to live. However, our nights were full of their mistakes as
well, for the nightly news had the highest Sderot ratings, and Hamas
chose without fail to use that time for mistakes as well.