Chapter XXIConstruction Battalions in France and Germany

Plans for the invasion of Normandy began to
take shape by the summer of 1943. Decisions of
controlling importance were made in August, when
the political and military leaders of the United
States and Great Britain conferred in Quebec.

The role of the naval forces was to be primarily
that of assuring a successful landing on the French
coast, providing the shore facilities necessary to
permit the uninterrupted delivery of great numbers
or troops and vast quantities of material, and
the maintenance of an open supply route across
the English Channel.

Participation in the invasion by American naval
forces was obviously going to require extensive
logistic support. A supply depot, large enough to
store and issue great quantities of naval supplies
of all kinds, would be needed, and a number of
shore bases to support the forthcoming amphibious
operations would have to be provided.

In the summer of 1943 the task of building the
Navy's base facilities in Northern Ireland and Scotland
had been virtually accomplished. Only minor
construction remained to be done, and thereafter
the problems would be those of maintenance and
operation. At the same time, a large new program
of base construction in southern England loomed ahead.

In view of these circumstances the 29th Construction
Battalion, which had been engaged since
the previous November in building the Londonderry
and Rosneath bases, was moved to Devon and
Cornwall, and the Seabee personnel in the United
Kingdom was augmented by the 81st and 97th
Construction Battalions and the second section of
the 10th Special Battalion. The 97th took over the
base operation and maintenance work in Northern
Ireland and Scotland, from the 29th, the first section
at Londonderry and the second at Rosneath.
The second section of the 10th Special was also
assigned to duty at Rosneath. The 81st Construction
Battalion was dispatched to Milford Haven,
Wales, to begin construction of new facilities.

On September 24, 1943, the construction battalions
in the United Kingdom were organized into
the 13th Naval Construction Regiment, so as to
provide an overall command and maximum flexibility
of personnel and equipment in connection
with construction operations in the area. The regiment
was designated as part of the organization of
the Commander of Landing Craft and bases in Europe.

By November, all the Seabee units in the United
Kingdom, with the exception of the first section of
the 97th Battalion, were at work on the new bases
in Devon, Cornwall, and Wales. In December, they
were joined by the 1006th Construction Battalion
Detachment, which had performed pontoon-causeway
work, with distinction in the Sicilian and Italian invasions.

The largest single base-construction project undertaken
by the Seabees in southern England was
the supply base near Exeter, in Devon. On what
had been the golf course of a country club, south
of the city, the 29th Battalion set up its headquarters,
and on October 11, 1943, broke ground for the new depot.

Originally, the plan for the station called for the
erection of 79 warehouses, to provide about 40,000
square feet of covered-storage space, personnel facilities
for 1,000 men, and the necessary administration
buildings. After construction was well under
way, in December, the plans for the base were
changed to provide a much larger capacity than
had been originally intended. A total of 578,000
square feet of covered storage was finally attained.
Most of the storage buildings were of the quonset-hut
type, 40 by 100 feet; a number of buildings
of British design were also put up. Standard-size
quonset huts were used for personnel quarters and
office facilities. About 7 miles of roadway were
built to serve the base.

The depot was commissioned on February 4, 1944.

The principal locations chosen for the amphibious

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Bases in Southern England and in Normandy

--96--

bases were Falmouth, Fowey, Plymouth, Salcombe,
Dartmouth, and Teignmouth, on the Channel
coast, and Milford Haven and Penarth in
Wales. In addition, installations of smaller magnitude
were provided at St. Mawes (across the harbor
from Falmouth), Saltash, Calstock, Weymouth,
Poole, Southampton, and Instow (on the Bristol Channel).

There were fully developed port facilities already
existing at all those places, and many of
them had also been used for many years as British
seaside resorts. Consequently, much of the problem
of housing naval personnel could be met by utilizing
existing hotel facilities and large private
homes, with appropriate alterations. As practically
all the British Channel coast was designated as a
restricted area during the months preceding the
invasion, and civilian travel into the area prohibited
for reasons of military security, the utilization
of existing civilian facilities in that way
presented no particular hardship to the British
people. Additional capacity for housing naval personnel
was found in some existing British army
camps, which were turned over to the Navy for
that purpose.

TABLE VI. -- Personnel accommodations provided in England

Location

New camps

Alterations

Total

Huts

Tents

Britishbarracks

Houses andhotels

Total

Officers

EnlistedPersonnel

Officers

EnlistedPersonnel

Officers

EnlistedPersonnel

Officers

EnlistedPersonnel

Officers

EnlistedPersonnel

Falmouth

48

2059

---

1146

---

---

120

528

168

3733

Fowey

104

1500

---

---

---

---

101

930

205

2430

Plymouth

482

4172

---

186

106

296

45

371

633

5025

Salcombe

32

900

---

---

---

---

105

893

137

1793

Dartmouth

138

750

---

462

150

1750

90

344

378

3306

Teignmouth

8

---

---

---

---

---

48

817

56

817

Milford Haven

71

800

---

---

---

102

---

---

71

902

Penarth

28

425

---

---

---

---

47

514

75

939

St. Mawes

8

264

---

---

---

---

62

530

70

794

Saltash

0

150

---

---

---

---

30

150

30

300

Calstock

---

---

---

---

---

---

20

125

20

125

Weymouth

---

---

80

500

120

1113

26

679

226

2292

Poole

---

---

---

402

150

1160

19

100

169

1662

Southampton

24

34

---

250

---

---

53

366

77

650

After the maximum feasible use had been made
of such existing facilities, however, it was still
necessary to provide new housing at several locations.
At some places, new personnel quarters were
provided by the erection of quonset huts, or
roughly equivalent huts of a British design; at
others, by the erection of tents; and at still others,
all those forms of housing were used. The capacity
for housing naval personnel provided at each of
those locations was as shown in Table VI.

To obtain proper dispersal, in view of the constant
hazard of enemy bombing, concentration of
more than a thousand men at any one point was
avoided whenever possible. Thus, at Plymouth,
where far more than a thousand men needed to be
housed in the general area, several hut camps were
erected, each at some distance from the waterfront
hotels and well separated from each other.
Similar conditions prevailed at Falmouth.

The building of these advanced amphibious
bases was put underway at various times beginning
in October 1943. By January 1944, the construction
of most of them had reached the stage
where occupancy could begin.

Similarly, for the hospital and dispensary facilities
necessary to serve the large number of men to
be assembled for training and participation in the
assault, existing hotels or large homes were taken
over by the American forces, and suitable alterations
were made to fit them to hospital purposes.
Where the available buildings were not adequate,
they were supplemented by the erection of quonset-hut annexes.

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Naval Construction Battalion Depot, Heathfield

Open storage area, left and upper left;
large single quonset hut, transportation department's garage;
small huts, offices and personnel quarters;
two double huts (right foreground), messhall and recreation huts;
tents used for temporarily housing transient Seabees.

The largest single installation was at Netley, just
outside Southampton, where an old British hospital
was remodeled to provide a 3000-bed facility.
Two major hospitals were provided entirely of
quonset huts -- one at Manadon Field, on the outskirts
of Plymouth, with a capacity of 500 beds;
the other, at Milford Haven, with a capacity of
200 beds. In addition, a large home in Falmouth
was converted into a 140-bed hospital.

For ship repair and servicing facilities, little new
construction was necessary, as the southern coast
of England was already well provided with such
facilities. Such work as had to be done consisted
principally of installing additional machinery in
existing shops, providing a few small marine railways
and "hards," and the erection of a limited
number of storage sheds.

In March 1944, authority was received for the
establishment of a Seabee base of operations at
Heathfield, near Newton Abbot, in Devon. The 81st
Battalion worked on the new camp for about a
month, as a "fill-in" job, directing its attention
principally to the roads and camp utilities. The
project was turned over to the 29th Battalion in
the latter part of April. When completed, the camp
provided for about a thousand men, one-third in

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quonset huts and the remainder in tents, together
with storage and repair facilities for construction
and transportation equipment.

Planning for the Normandy Invasion

A logistics problem of unusual difficulty was presented
by the plans for the invasion of France. It
was clear that even if all the French ports fell into
our hands undamaged at an early stage of the
operation, the quantity of stores to be landed for
the maintenance of the invasion force would exceed
the total port capacity. This meant that supplies
would have to be landed over the beaches
while ports were being improved. It was estimated
that the quantity to be put ashore in this manner
amounted to about 12,000 tons and about 2500
vehicles per day, for at least the first 90 days, even
in the event of bad weather.

The Bay of the Seine, where the invasion was to
take place, is characterized by flat sandy beaches,
with an average slope of 1 to 150 feet, and an average
range of 21 feet between high and low tides.
The duration of high water is about 3 hours. A tidal
current runs parallel to the coast, at about 3 knots.
A series of low sand-bars, also parallel to the beach,
exists in the tidal area, with the runnels between
them attaining a depth of as much as 5 feet.

The plan adopted to meet this difficult problem
was bold. It was decided to prefabricate in England
the breakwaters and other port facilities that
would be needed to create the necessary artificial
harbors on the Normandy coast, to tow them across
the English Channel with the invading forces, and
to install them at the chosen locations at the time
of the assault.

This decision was reached at the Quebec conference
in August 1943. The details of the plan
were developed under the auspices of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff during the months that followed.

Assaults were to be made by American forces at
two points on the Normandy coast, one on the

Interior of Temporary Ward, St. Michael's Hospital, Falmouth

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eastern side of the Cherbourg peninsula, northwest
of Carentan, at the village of St. Martin de
Varreville, and the other some 20 miles farther
east, where the coast line runs more nearly east
and west, at St. Laurent sur Mer. During the planning
of the invasion, these two locations were given
the code designation of "UTAH" and "OMAHA."
respectively, and those designations have subsequently
come into use as geographic names.
Beaches to be assaulted by the British forces
[GOLD, SWORD, and JUNO]
were to be east of the American locations, at Arromanches,
at Courseulles, and at Ouistreham.

Logistically, OMAHA was planned to be the major
American location, with UTAH fulfilling a supporting
and supplementing function. At both
beaches there were to be "GOOSEBERRIES," harbors
of refuge for small landing-craft, but for OMAHA a
great artificial harbor, called a
"MULLBERY," was
planned to give a protected anchorage about two
square miles in extent, to be provided with moorings
for seven Liberty ships, five large coasters,
and seven medium coasters. This harbor was to be
adequate to handle 5000 tons of stores per day,
plus such military vehicles as would be delivered.

For the British beaches, an installation similar
to that for OMAHA, but somewhat larger, was
planned at Arromanches; at their other two
beaches, GOOSEBERRIES only were to be provided.

It was clear from the beginning that the mulberry
problem consisted essentially of two parts.
First, the protected anchorage could be effected
only by means of some sort of breakwater. Second,
some way would have to be found to bridge the
gap between the ship at anchor and the "dry land"
beach, so that supplies and vehicles could go
ashore with no delay.

Uneven OMAHA Beach
Pontoon causeway is 28 feet wide

Five methods of constructing the necessary
breakwater were studied with great care. They
were (1) Lilo floating breakwaters, (2) bubble
breakwaters, (3) floating ships, (4) blockships,
and (5) concrete caissons. Analysis and tests on
models led to the elimination of the first three
methods. The choice fell on the blockship and the
concrete-caisson methods, and it was decided to
employ both -- blockships to form the harbors of
refuge for small craft, and concrete caissons to
form the primary breakwater and provide sheltered
anchorage for cargo ships.

Some means had to be provided to take ashore
the cargo unloaded from the ships in the harbor
formed by the breakwater. From Liberty ships
and smaller cargo vessels, vehicles and supplies
could be lightered to the beach by LCT's or other
ferry craft. The normal method of unloading
LST's, however -- beaching and discharging vehicles
under their own power, over a bow ramp -- appeared
to be precluded by the extremely flat
beach and the great tidal range. The LST would
run aground at the stern, too far out from shore,
in water about 4 feet deep at the bow, and a receding
tide would leave the ship stranded on an
uneven beach for a long time, causing serious delays
in maintaining the flow of supplies and probably
introducing excessive hogging stresses in the
vessel. LCT's could be used as lighters to serve
the LST's, but there would not be enough of these
smaller landing-craft available to handle the great
number of vehicles that would have to pass over
the beaches each day.

Five methods of bridging the gap between ship
and shore were given consideration: (1) spud pier-heads
and flexible piers, sponsored by the Director
of Transportation of the British War Office,
(2) Swiss roll, (3) U.S. Navy lighter pontoons,
(4) pontoons as developed by the British Director
of Transportation, and (5) Hughes piers. At an
early date it was decided to use the spud pier-heads
and flexible piers to provide the physical
connection between ships and shore, and rhino
ferries, constructed of the U.S. Navy lighter pontoons,
to transport vehicles and supplies from
moored vessels to the beach. The Swiss roll, the
Director of Transportation's pontoons, and the

--100--

Hughes pier were judged impractical to meet the requirements.

The plan called for the installation by D-plus-2
of those "port" facilities that would provide the
small-craft harbors of refuge at both UTAH and
OMAHA. Those harbors were to be formed by scuttling
a number of merchant ships, bow to stern,
roughly parallel to the shore, in about two fathoms
of water, in the lee of which small craft, such
as barges, LCI's, and LCT's, protected from the
force of the sea, could discharge personnel and
equipment needed immediately to support the
beach assault. Each line of sunken ships was
known as a "GOOSEBERRY."

GOOSEBERRY One, to be installed at UTAH, was to
consist of ten ships which, when sunk end to end,
would form a breakwater about 4000 feet long and
4500 feet offshore at high tide.

At OMAHA, GOOSEBERRY Two was to consist of
fourteen merchant ships, an old British warship,
the former battleship Centurion, heading the western
end of the line. The length of the GOOSEBERRY
at OMAHA would be about 6500 feet, and it would
lie 4000 feet offshore at high tide.

In all instances the ships, without cargo, manned
by Merchant Marine crews, would accompany the
invasion forces, and after being sited in their proper
locations by tugs, would be sunk by setting off
explosive charges which would blow out their bottoms.

The artificial harbor for OMAHA was to be
formed by a breakwater installed just west of the
GOOSEBERRY. It was to be composed of a series of
open concrete-caissons, which would be towed
cross the Channel, sited in their planned locations,
flooded, and sunk. Each caisson was known as a PHOENIX.

The design of the harbor called for an outer
breakwater, 6500 feet long, parallel to the beach,
4500 feet offshore at high tide, at about the 5-fathom
line, and a western arm, 1600 feet long,
extending to the beach. Between the Centurion,
heading the GOOSEBERRY, and the eastern end of
the outer breakwater, a 600-foot opening was to
be left to serve as a harbor entrance. Another entrance
was to be provided by an opening, 200 feet
wide, roughly in the center of the outer breakwater.
A space, 600 feet wide, separating the outer
breakwater from the offshore end of the western
breakwater arm, would provide a third entrance
to the protected area.

About 2400 feet offshore from the PHOENIX
breakwater, to reduce swells and waves and to provide
some measure of protection for large ships

LST Moves in to Secure to a Leibnitz Pier, OMAHA Beach

--101--

PHOENIXES at OMAHA Beach
Note anti-aircraft guns and blimps

which would have to anchor outside the MULBERRY
proper, was to be placed a floating breakwater
about 6000 feet long. It was to consist of a series
of 24 individually moored steel floats, 200 feet
long, called "bombardons." The floats were to be
of cruciform cross-section, with the arms of the
cross 10 feet long and 5 feet wide. The overall
height of the float, like its overall width, would be
25 feet, and it would be so ballasted as to float
with a 6-foot freeboard.

The spud pier-heads, sponsored by the Director
of Transportation of the British War Office, had
been designed and manufactured prior to the
inception of the plan to build the MULBERRIES,
by a private firm in the United Kingdom, and
several had been placed in operation in the
vicinity of Cairnhead, Scotland, for unloading
supplies from ships. They were composed of floating
steel barges, 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 10
feet deep. Six of these pier-heads were to be provided
for installation behind the breakwater at
OMAHA. They were to be placed far enough out
from shore to provide a draft of not less than 9
feet at lowest low-tide; they were to be placed
adjacent to each other and so connected by ramps
and bridges that they could function together as
an articulated structure in the cargo-unloading
operation. At several of the pier-heads, LST's
could tie up, lower their ramp, and discharge their
cargoes of vehicles. Coasters were to unload at the others.

Access to the shore, 3100 feet away at high tide,
was to be provided by three multi-span bridges,
roughly 500 feet apart. Each bridge would consist
of a series of 80-foot steel-truss spans, supported at
the ends by moored concrete or steel floats. The
western bridge was to be strong enough to pass
loads up to 40 tons; the other two were to be
capable of handling 25-ton loads. The bridge installation
became known as a "WHALE," and the
supporting floats were known as "BEETLES."

To aid in getting materials ashore in a hurry,
particularly military vehicles, from Liberty ships,
coasters, and LST's, the rhino ferry was conceived.
In view of the limited number of LCT's that could
be made available to serve as ferry craft, the

--102--

Bombardons Moored in Position off OMAHA Beach
These floating breakwaters were used for the protection of ships anchored outside the MULBERRY

Bureau of Yards and Docks was requested to develop
a ferry barge composed of pontoons, which
could be towed at sea by an LST, and by which an
LST could be completely unloaded in two trips.
A barge having a capacity of 300 tons, six pontoon
strings wide and 30 pontoons long, was made up
and tested in August 1943, at the Advance Base
Proving Ground at Davisville, R.I. Its performance
was observed by a committee composed of
representatives of the Staff Commander of the
6th Amphibious Force, the British Admiralty
Delegation, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and
the Proving Ground itself. On the basis of tests
the tentative design was accepted, with the understanding
that further development of the equipment
and of the operating technique would be
undertaken in the United Kingdom.

It was planned that the rhino, when teamed
with an LST, would be made fast, or "married,"
to the landing ship, stern to bow; vehicles would
be able to transfer from the LST to the ferry and
leave the ferry at the beach under their own
power. When ashore, the ferry would discharge at
one of the sunken causeways or, if necessary, discharge
its cargo directly onto the beach.

Twenty such rhinos would be needed at OMAHA,
it was decided, and eleven at UTAH.

It was apparent that some means would have to
be provided to enable ferry craft coming ashore in
the lee of the GOOSEBERRIES to discharge their cargoes
and to retract quickly from the beaches. The
invasion plan could not afford the time that would
be lost if the craft should be beached and then
stranded by a falling tide. Moreover, reconnaissance
reports indicated that patches of clay and
mud would probably be encountered on portions
of the beaches between high and low water and,
therefore, that hardways of some sort would be
required if vehicles were to move across the tidal
area without hazard of miring.

Staff engineers at Allied Supreme Headquarters
concluded that Navy lighter pontoons, formed into
sunken causeways, presented the only practicable
solution using known and tried equipment. It was
recommended that the causeways should be installed
on the beaches on D-Day or as soon thereafter

--103--

Rhino Ferries in Action at OMAHA Beach
Loaded rhino coming in to the beach; emptied rhino (foreground)
being repaired on return trip.

after as feasible. Analysis of the expected ferry
movements led to the conclusion that causeways
would have to handle one-half of the total daily
ferry cargo discharged. Taking into account the
number of beach exits required, led to the conclusion
that four causeways would be needed at the
American beaches -- two at OMAHA and two at
UTAH -- and six at the British beaches.

Made up of the Navy's standard steel pontoons,
the causeways were to be two strings, or about 14
feet wide, and were to extend from the high-water
line out to somewhat beyond the line of minimum
low-water, a distance of 2450 feet. Flooded and
resting on the sand, these causeways would provide
a hard roadway to which barges and landing-craft
could tie at any stage of the tide, and over
which their personnel or vehicles could go ashore
in the dry. To facilitate the berthing of these
craft, each causeway was to be equipped with
eight "blisters," or sunken stages roughly equivalent
to pier-heads, staggered on alternate sides, four
pontoons wide and twelve long, spaced 250 feet apart.

Organizing for the Invasion

Assembling the Rhinos and Causeways. -- To
provide for the needs of OMAHA and UTAH, and a
suitable reserve, 36 rhino ferries were assembled
by the Seabees at their British bases. Each of
these great barges was 42 feet wide and 176 feet
long, with deck space enough for 30 to 40 vehicles.
At the forward end, a 14-foot-wide ramp, 20 feet
long, provided for the discharge of cargo. (The
ramp was known as an "Olson ramp," after its
designer, Lt. C. E. Olson, CEC, USNR, who was
killed in action at Salerno with the 1006th Detachment.)
At the stern of the rhino, two vertical
timber knee-braces were installed, designed to engage
the sides of a lowered LST ramp. Two heavy-duty
outboard propulsion units were provided, so
that the barge could be self-propelled.

The provision of the outboard engines was one
of the modifications made in the rhino design as
a consequence of operating tests made in English
waters. The Olson ramp was another, replacing a
60-ton-capacity ramp called for in the original
design accepted tentatively at Davisville. Other
changes included the addition of plastic-armor
shields for the coxswains, the elimination of a
hinged fair-lead, and the adoption of a closed
cooling system for the outboard engines.

Assembly of the rhino ferries was begun at Falmouth
in late November 1943, by a detachment
from the 81st Seabees. While the first unit was

--104--

being fabricated, a search had been made for other
sites along the south coast of England suitable for
rhino assembly, and satisfactory sites were found
at Plymouth and Dartmouth. The 1006th Detachment
arrived from the Mediterranean theater of
operations in December and took over the assembly
work at Falmouth and the setting up of the
new assembly areas at Plymouth and Dartmouth.
By the end of January 1944, rhino assembly was
under way at all three locations. The 1006th Detachment
manned the assembly yards until March,
when the 111th Battalion took over the task.

The Plymouth yard continued to build rhinos
until early in May, but the yards at Falmouth and
Dartmouth turned to the assembly of the causeways
as soon as their assigned quotas of rhino
ferries had been completed.

For the sunken causeways, 28 pontoon strings,
each two pontoons wide and thirty long, were assembled,
together with 16 causeway "blisters."

Each causeway string was 176 feet long, a convenient
length to tow.

In addition, the Seabees fashioned out of the
pontoons, 36 rhino tugs, intended to provide the
auxiliary motive power for the rhino ferries; 12
causeway tugs, to assist LCT's in berthing and unberthing
at the causeways; 12 warping tugs, designed
primarily to pull broached boats off the
beach; 2 rhino repair barges, almost as large as
the rhino ferries, each fitted with two 5-ton cranes
and a toll house; and 2 floating drydocks, of 475-ton
capacity, enough to dock an LCT.

The PHOENIXES. -- For installation
at OMAHA, 51
PHOENIXES of six different sizes were built by the
British in a number of drydocks and in tidal
basins excavated especially for the purpose, mostly
in the Thames estuary.

The cross-section adopted for the largest caissons,
for the outer breakwater, had the shape of
an inverted T, 60 feet high. For the first 28 feet
of its height, the width was 56 feet 3 inches; for the
remainder of its height, 44 feet 1 inch. A set-back,
or working platform, on each side, 6 feet 1 inch
wide, was formed thereby. When afloat, the PHOENIX
had a draft of 20 feet 3 inches, giving a freeboard
of 7 feet 9 inches to the set-back. When sunk
in five fathoms of water the freeboard of the
breakwater-unit was 30 feet at low tide, and 9 feet
at high tide.

Outer walls were 14 inches thick, and the floor
thickness was 15 inches, over a portion of which
concrete ballast was placed 15 inches thick. A
center wall, 9 inches thick, extended throughout
the PHOENIX's length; ten cross walls, of the same

Personnel Huts at Vicarage Base, Plymouth

--105--

Naval Dispensary, Manadon Field, Plymouth

thickness, 16 feet 6 inches apart in the clear, divided
the interior of the caisson into 22 cells. In
each caisson's outer walls, five sets of 12-inch valves
were installed, to serve as sea cocks. Near the bottom
of the first, third, fifth, sixth, and eighth cross-walls,
12-inch-square holes were left, so that in the
sinking operation the PHOENIX contained ten separate
compartments to be flooded. Large openings,
16 feet high, were left in both the longitudinal and
the cross walls, with their sills 34 feet 9 inches,
above the PHOENIX's floor.

At each end of the PHOENIX the space between
the end wall and the first cross-wall was decked
over with a reinforced-concrete slab, and, forward,
an intermediate deck was provided in the space
thus formed, and fitted out as quarters for the riding
crew. Just aft of the midship point a gun platform
was constructed, mounting a 40-mm. Bofors.

The design and construction of the PHOENIXES
was a commitment by the British; the actual design
was made by the Director of Ports and Inland
Water Transportation of the War Office, with
the assistance of several civilian designing engineers.
The Ministry of Supply was responsible
for the construction of the units, under civilian
contracts, and for the inspection of construction.

Preliminary designs were sent to Washington to
the Bureau of Yards and Docks in late October
1943, for checking. The analysis in Washington
led to the view that the design was inherently weak
in view of the conditions likely to be encountered,
and an alternate design was proposed, with straight
sides and capable of being ballasted with sand for
the PHOENIX's entire height. When these views

--106--

were brought to the attention of the British designing
engineers, they differed with the conclusions,
making the point that the breakwater was
to be used for no more than a few summer months.

In the ensuing discussions the Deputy Chief Engineer
of the U.S. Army Forces in the European
theater participated, and, unsatisfied that the British
design would meet all the situation's requirements
as to strength and stability, called in a consulting
engineer to make a complete examination
of the problem. The consulting engineer, Dr. Oscar
Faber, reported that in his opinion there were
certain defects in the design and made specific
recommendations for correcting weaknesses. The
recommendations, in general, were directed toward
increasing the thicknesses of the interior walls and
the amount of reinforcement used. Although the
British designing engineers thereupon increased to
some extent the amount of reinforcing steel to be
placed in the walls, they were firm in their view
that the wall thicknesses were adequate.

No further objections were raised by U.S. Forces
to constructing the PHOENIXES as designed.

The Pier-Heads. -- Six floating pier-heads for
OMAHA were manufactured by the British at
Cairnhead, Scotland. As has been stated, each pier-head
consisted of a steel barge, 200 feet long and
60 feet wide. It was designed to be partially supported
by "spuds," or legs, 89 feet long, at the
corners, which would extend above the platform.
These spuds were built-up steel columns, 48 inches
square. Although they were to rest upon the channel
floor, they were not intended to support the
pier-head's entire weight but, rather, to carry just
enough load to anchor and steady it, with buoyance
supporting the rest. Accordingly, the pier-head
proper was suspended from the tops of the
spuds, by an arrangement of sheaves and cables.
By means of power-driven winches, it could be
raised and lowered as the tide flooded and ebbed
so that the amount of load carried by the spuds
would remain constant. Raising and lowering operations
could be carefully controlled through the
use of extensometers, attached to the suspending cables.

The Floating Bridges. -- Nearly two miles of
"WHALE" bridge spans were manufactured by the
British for the OMAHA installation. Each standard
span consisted of an 80-foot-long half-through steel
truss, designed to be supported on steel or concrete

Storage Warehouses at Exeter Supply Base

--107--

floats. The trusses were lozenge-shaped, with a
maximum depth of 8 feet and were fabricated of
common structural shapes, with bolted or riveted
connections. The width of the bridge was 13 feet
9 inches center to center of trusses, and it carried
a steel deck roadway of 10 feet clear width. The
only difference between the 4-ton and the 25-ton
capacity bridges lay in the weight of the members
used to form the trusses. In addition to these
standard units, shore-ramp floats of shallow draft
were provided to fit the conditions to be encountered
at the beach end of the bridges.

Bridge spans and supporting floats were assembled
into six-span trains for the tow across the Channel.

Assignment of responsibilities. -- The production
of the PHOENIXES, the pier-heads, the "WHALE"
bridge units, and the bombardons was a commitment
of the British, as was the transportation in
tow from the points of manufacture to the marshalling
areas from which they were to be dispatched
to the Normandy coast.

The production of the rhino ferries, the sunken
causeways, and all other craft to be built of pontoon
gear, the manning of those units while in tow
across the English Channel, and their installation
and operation at the invasion beaches was the
responsibility of the Seabees. In addition, the Seabees
were assigned the task of manning the PHOENIXES,
pier-heads, and "WHALE" bridge trains while
in tow across the Channel, their installation at
OMAHA, and their operation and maintenance after
construction had been completed.

Unloading ships in the harbor, operating harbor

Rhino Ferry "Married" to an LST

--108--

GOOSEBERRY No. 2 at OMAHA Beach

tugs, DUKW's, and providing transportation facilities
ashore, from the beaches to the fighting fronts,
were responsibilities of the Army.

The magnitude of the role assigned the Navy
Construction Battalions in the forthcoming invasion
called for an expansion of Seabee personnel
and an elaboration of organization. Accordingly,
effective April 1, 1944, a new naval construction
regiment was formed, the 25th, with its principal
function that of participating directly in "Far
Shore" activities. It was composed of the 81st,
111th, 108th (a new designation for Section 2 of
the 97th), and the 1006th Detachment, all from
the 13th Regiment; the 28th, which was a new
arrival in the United Kingdom; the 146th, a battalion
specializing in P.O.L. work (Petrol-Oil-Lubricants),
and the 1048th Detachment, which,
newly arrived in England, was made a part of the
111th Battalion. The new regiment was charged
with the planning, training for, and execution of,
all projects in which Seabees would be involved in
far-shore activities; the role of the 13th NCR was
defined as the construction and maintenance of
public works in the United Kingdom, and all pontoon construction.

The battalions of the 25th Regiment were given
the following assignments for far-shore operations:

28th -- Rehabilitation of captured ports.

81st -- Manning the rhino ferries dispatched to UTAH
while in tow across the Channel; operation of rhino ferries
and beach camp at UTAH.

108th -- Manning the PHOENIXES, pier-heads, and
WHALE bridge trains while in tow across the
Channel; installing, operating, and maintaining
them upon arrival at OMAHA.

111th -- Manning the rhino ferries despatched to
OMAHA while in tow across the Channel; operation
of rhino ferries and beach camp at OMAHA.

146th -- Installation of P.O.L. facilities at OMAHA,
Cherbourg, and other captured ports.

1006th -- Installation and maintenance of sunken
pontoon causeways at OMAHA and UTAH.

As soon as the first rhino ferry was completed
at Falmouth, in December 1943, two operating

--109--

Unloading Activities at OMAHA Beach MULBERRY
Photograph on opposite page shows another angle of this scene at a Liebnitz pier

crews were drawn from the 1006th Detachment and
trained in handling the big barge. Performance
tests carried out by these crews led to the modifications
in rhino design noted in an earlier paragraph.

When the 111th Battalion arrived in England in
February 1944, it was assigned to rhino-ferry
operation, and a large-scale program of crew training
was then set up. Training subjects included
seamanship, signalling, aircraft recognition,
marrying rhinos to LST's, beaching and retracting,
and, in general, in the characteristics of
rhino-ferry operation. By April 24, 1944, thirty
crews from the 111th had been trained. Crews from
the 28th and the 81st Battalions and the 1048th
Detachment then reported for duty at Falmouth
and were given a similar course of training. Rhino-ferry
training was given to 41 crews in all, including
60 officers.

The crews that were to ride the MULBERRY units
across the English Channel were drawn from the
108th Battalion. PHOENIX crews were sent to the
Thames estuary and rode the units that were built
in that area, off Selsey Bill. When the PHOENIXES
arrived, they had to be flooded so that they could
be parked while awaiting D-day, and the parking
operation served as excellent training for the siting
teams. Training in the handling and assembly
of WHALE equipment was carried on at Cairnhead, Scotland.

Invasion

During the last week of May 1944, movement of
all equipment to the various marshalling areas
began. D-day was not far off. PHOENIXES were
marshalled at Dungeness and at Selsey Bill; WHALE
units, at Peelbank, on the Isle of Wight; rhinos

--110--

Spud Pier-head and Flexible Piers
For detailed view of the piers, see page 113

for OMAHA, at Portland; rhinos for UTAH,
at Dartmouth.

On June 1, information was received that June
5 had been designated as D-day.

On June 4, information was received that D-day
had been postponed to June 6.

On June 5, D-minus-1, the rhino ferries and
rhino tugs, with their Seabee crews aboard, were
taken in tow by LST's and left for the far shore.
The invasion was under way. At 0530 the following
morning, June 6, D-Day, H-minus-1, the first rhino-LST
teams began to arrive at the OMAHA assembly
point, 12 miles offshore. Upon arrival, they were
released from tow and were ordered to marry their
LST's according to plan.

The sea was not running according to plan, however,
for the waves were 6 feet high, and it had
been thought that a 3-foot sea would be the maximum
that would permit a successful rhino-LST
marriage. The circumstances were extremely severe,
but the marriages were successfully made,
even though in the first effort most of the rhinos
lost the special knee-braces with which they had
been provided. The vehicles carried by the LST's
moved to the rhino decks, and the ferries started
for the beach, 12 miles away, between 0700 and 0800.

Upon arrival at the beach, all the rhinos were
ordered to stand out, for beach obstructions had
not been cleared. When the order was received

--111--

OMAHA Beach Before the MULBERRY Was Installed
Ships unloading on the beach while barrage balloons hover overhead

however, one rhino had already landed between
two beach obstacles and was in such a position that
it could not be retracted until mines that were
astern had been removed. Accordingly, it unloaded
on the beach at H-plus-6. All other rhinos retracted
from the beach.

They were held off until the afternoon of the
next day, June 7. The sea was heavy, and the current
strong; the Seabee crews, on the open deck of
a barge having a freeboard of only 18 inches, had
absolutely no protection from wind, weather, or
enemy action. When finally ordered to the beach,
the rhinos had to labor for hours to get back into
their proper areas.

The rhino tugs were knocked out by mines and
collided heavily with submerged abandoned vehicles
which began to accumulate as the assault
proceeded. Most of the tugs had to be abandoned,
and the rhino ferries thereafter were propelled
solely by their own outboard engines.

Meantime, rhinos in tow from LST's arrived at
0300 D-day, off UTAH, where the sea was at least
as heavy as it was at OMAHA and where bombing
and strafing by German planes added to the severity
of operating conditions. [sic: the Luftwaffe managed a total of 2 sorties
against all five of the invasion beaches, which does not seem
terribly severe, considering the circumstances! -- HyperWar]
Nevertheless, five
rhinos succeeded in marrying their LST's and in
making the transfer of the vehicle load. The first
rhino beached at 1400, and before midnight, four
had succeeded in unloading their cargoes including
landing 175 vehicles on the beach. Attacks by
enemy planes were frequent, and the fire from
German 88's was heavy. Rhino tugs had been

--112--

severely battered during the tow across the Channel,
and the rhino ferries either made the trip
from their LST's to the beach under their own
power or in tow from LCT's or LCI's. At about
noon on June 7, the first blockships began to arrive
off OMAHA and UTAH. Surveys for the location
had been completed an hour or so earlier, and
buoys had been placed to mark the sites at which
the ships were to be sunk.

By 2030 that evening, three ships had been sited
and sunk in proper position at OMAHA. A few
minutes after the third ship had been sunk, a
German 88-mm. battery opened fire on the installation,
and the crew was evacuated until the enemy
battery had been silenced by naval gunfire. But
the installation of the GOOSEBERRY had been started.
Five more blockships were sited and sunk the following
day, June 8, three on June 9 including the
Centurion, and on June 10, D-plus-4, the OMAHA
GOOSEBERRY was completed by the sinking of the
last three ships.

At UTAH, the blockships put in their appearance
at 1400 on June 7, but at that time the beach area
was still under fire from the naval bombardment
force and from enemy shore batteries. Although
the same severe conditions prevailed throughout
the next day, two blockships were successfully sited
and sunk. A third ship was sited that day, but,
in sinking, it drifted out of position by the stern,
because of the difficulties experienced by the tugs
in maintaining their positions under the severe
enemy shelling. On June 9, efforts to site the fourth
ship were prevented for most of the day by fire
from the enemy's shore positions; however, at 1700,
although still under fire, it was moved into position,
and by 2030 its sinking had been completed.
The fifth ship was successfully sunk just before
midnight. On June 10, two more ships were placed
without difficulty, but just as a third was starting
for its place in the GOOSEBERRY line the site it was
to occupy was bracketed by German artillery fire.
The ship was brought in, nevertheless, and run
aground beside a ship already in place; at high
tide, two hours later, it floated off and was towed
to its proper position and sunk. The siting and
sinking of two more ships on June 11, D-plus-5,
completed the GOOSEBERRY at UTAH. Enemy fire
continued to the end, and the installation of the last

An Army DUKW Crosses One of the British-Built WHALE
Barges at OMAHA Beach

--113--

ship had to be carried on under bombardment.
Virtually the entire operation of constructing the
UTAH blockship-breakwater was carried out in the
face of determined enemy opposition.

While the first ships were being sunk to form
the GOOSEBERRIES at
OMAHA and UTAH, the sunken
pontoon-causeway equipment began to arrive. On
June 7, D-plus-1, the pontoon strings necessary to
construct one causeway at each beach, together
with the necessary personnel from the 1006th Detachment, arrived.

At UTAH the first causeway was laid on the extreme
western flank of the beach, according to
plan, the next day, and it was in operation on
June 8, D-plus-2. Shell fire from the same batteries
that were harassing the installation of the UTAH
GOOSEBERRY sought out the causeway group intermittently,
but caused no casualties. The second
causeway arrived from England on June 14, and
the next day was put into place about half a mile
farther east.

At OMAHA, the actual configuration of the beach
was such that the feasibility of the causeway designed
on the basis of intelligence reports was
thrown into question. Although a section of the
first causeway was laid on D-plus-3, a decision was
not reached as to the best design to use, thereby
permitting the full installation to go ahead, until
D-plus-4, June 10. It was finally decided to make
the structure four pontoons wide, instead of two
as originally planned, to place the "blisters" opposite
each other instead of staggering them, and
to make the length 1450 feet instead of the 2450
feet originally intended. This would permit LCT's
and rhinos to come to the causeway on either side;
by making their approach at a 45-degree angle,
they could come in at any point along its length.
The second causeway at OMAHA, installed on June
13, D-plus-7, was also four pontoons wide, and was
in full operation June 16.

The causeways were highly successful from the
very start. They were immediately put to use by
all types of craft up to the size of LCI's. Within the
first few hours following the installation of the
first causeway at UTAH, several thousand troops
had gone ashore over it "in the dry."

PHOENIXES for the MULBERRY
breakwater were
scheduled to arrive at OMAHA in the early morning
of June 8, D-plus-2. The first tows of the great
concrete structures arrived, however, eight hours
ahead of schedule, at 2200 on June 7. The survey
for the MULBERRY had been begun earlier that day.
The PHOENIXES were maneuvered into position in
the western breakwater arm the next morning,
flooded, and sunk. On June 9, the western arm was
extended by one more unit, and a beginning was
made on the outer breakwater, by the installation
of its first PHOENIX. By that time, the survey work
for the MULBERRY had been completed, and it was
possible the next day to install five more units.
During the days that followed, PHOENIXES arrived
in tow, were sited, and were sunk with considerable
regularity. By June 15, the western half of the
outer breakwater was complete, and only two units
remained to be installed in the MULBERRY's
western arm.

Moorings for the bombardons had been laid,
starting on June 7. Installation of the floating
breakwater was begun on June 8 and progressed
without serious difficulty until its completion on
June 13.

Survey of the site of the floating pier-heads and
WHALE bridges had been attempted on June 7 but
had had to be deferred because of the presence
of many underwater obstacles and mines in the
proposed location. The next day the vicinity was
still under enemy sniper fire, and consequently the
survey work did not get under way until June 9.
Although good progress was then made, mines and
underwater obstacles still prevented the start of
installation until June 11, when both the western
and the center bridges were begun.

The survey had indicated that the depth of water
close to shore was greater than had been shown on
the charts from which the MULBERRY operation had
been planned. To take advantage of the situation,
and to compensate for the loss of one bridge train
while in tow across the channel, the length of all
bridges was shortened 480 feet. By June 15, the
center pier-head and bridge were complete, and the
next morning LST's began unloading over them.
Observation of unloading operations at the partly
completed installation that day showed that LST's
could discharge their vehicles in an average time
of 64 minutes, or at the rate of 1.16 minutes per vehicle.
By June 18 the western pier-head and bridge,
with a capacity of 40 tons, was also ready to be put
into service. At that point, disaster struck the beaches.

The Great Storm and its Effects

On the morning of June 19 a gale out of the east
and northeast caused a stoppage of all construction
work. The storm was abnormal both in intensity

--114--

OMAHA Beach After the Great Storm
Ships, boats, and pontoons in a jumbled mass

and direction for the season. Unfortunately, it
came at a time when the eastern half of the harbor
was still unprotected.

Early in the day it was necessary to evacuate the
U.S. Army anti-aircraft gun crews from several
PHOENIXES in the outer breakwater, for heavy seas
were breaking over it, sweeping away hand rails
and shelters at the base of gun platforms. Before
the day came to an end the outer breakwater began
to show signs of approaching collapse.

The storm showed no signs of abating the next
day. The bombardons had broken loose from their
moorings and had been driven ashore by the force
of the wind. They piled up against the WHALE
bridges and subjected those structures to forces
beyond their capacity to withstand. Gun crews
from all the PHOENIXES had to be evacuated. High
seas were still breaking over to the outer breakwater
units, and they had begun to break up. In a
desperate effort to relieve the situation, oil was
spread on the water outside the breakwater, but
with only temporary benefit.

The fury of the storm continued throughout the
third day. Disintegration of the outer breakwater
became progressively more extensive, and, consequently,
the seas within the harbor became even higher.

On the morning of the fourth day, June 22, the
fury of the storm began to abate. Wind velocity
fell, and the seas decreased in height. Conditions

remained entirely too severe to permit the resumption
of port operations, however, until June 23.

When the storm was over, OMAHA presented a
tragic scene. The entire beach was strewn with a
confused tangle of wrecked small craft of all types.
Most of the floating bridges and pier-heads had
been carried away and damaged beyond repair, as
had also the bombardons. The MULBERRY's outer
breakwater had lost 19 of the 27 PHOENIXES which
had been in place when the storm broke, although
most of those placed in the western breakwater
arm were still intact. All the rhinos had had their
mooring lines cut by drifting craft and were
broached on the beach. Pounding for three days by
heavy wreckage had virtually demolished the engines
of all 20 of the great barges, and a great many
of the rhinos' pontoons had been smashed.

At UTAH there were no PHOENIXES,
WHALES, or
bombardons to be damaged. The blockship-breakwater,
which had been installed under such hazardous
conditions, had fared as well as its counterpart
at OMAHA; it was battered but still serviceable.
The two causeways had had the sand cut away
from beneath them by the force of the sea and had
settled two to three feet into the beach. Wrecked
small craft littered the beach, creating a scene
similar to that at OMAHA. Rhino operations had,
of course, come to a complete stop while the gale
was raging.

The MULBERRY installation at the British beach
at Arromanches [GOLD] also suffered from the storm, but
the damage was not so extensive as at OMAHA. For
one thing, the British beach was more favorably
situated, farther inside the Bay of the Seine, and
within the lee of the Le Havre peninsula, and considerable
protection was afforded by the Calvados
Rocks, a rocky shoal area just northeast of the
harbor installation. For another, the PHOENIXES at
Arromanches were set in water slightly shallower.
Moreover, at OMAHA the construction work was

--116--

about 85 per cent complete when the storm hit,
while at Arromanches the work had made far less progress.
[Remnants of
MULBERRY B could still be seen
off Arromanches at least 60 years later. -- HyperWar]

When the severe weather at length subsided,
there was work to be done on both American
beaches. The wreckage had to be cleared away,
in order not only to salvage the maximum amount
of usable equipment but also to put the beaches
again into an operating condition. The Seabees
salvaged a number of LCT's, barges, coasters, and
small craft.

At OMAHA a survey of the MULBERRY
led to the
conclusion that it was too far gone to be repaired.
As that meant that the GOOSEBERRY would be the
beach's only protection against the open sea, the
blockship installation had to be strengthened. Accordingly,
10 more ships and 21 more PHOENIXES
were brought across the Channel from England
and sunk so as to reinforce the GOOSEBERRY, by
forming a second breakwater immediately inshore
from the installation that had been originally laid down.

At UTAH the two causeways, which had settled
badly, had to be taken up and re-laid somewhat
farther west. In the rebuilding, their width was
increased to four pontoon strings (28 feet), equal
to the causeway width at OMAHA; the "blisters"
were eliminated; and the length was reduced to 1400 feet.

On June 22, the first day after the storm, the
rhinos were back in service at UTAH, lightering
vehicles and cargo from ship to shore. Because of
the great damage done to the barge equipment at
OMAHA, particularly to the outboard engines, rhino
operations there were not fully resumed until July 1.

Marrying rhinos to LST's was discontinued on
D-plus-7, for it had been found that the landing
ships could be successfully beached. During the
first ten days of the invasion, rhinos had accounted
for the landing of 5,286 vehicles at UTAH and 16,000
at OMAHA. Thereafter, they were used to lighter
vehicles and cargo from Liberty ships and coasters,
the transfer being made by the ships' cargo booms.
The causeways continued to carry out the function
for which they were intended, the unloading of
vehicles from LCT's and personnel from LCI's.

Personnel Camps

It was also the responsibility of the Seabees to
construct and operate camps for naval personnel
behind the invasion beaches. At OMAHA, the detachment
having this assignment arrived off the
beach at about midnight of D-day. Their schedule
of operations called for them to go ashore and
begin their camp operations on D-plus-1, but the
great number of beach obstructions still in place
prevented that plan from being carried out. It was
not until the morning of D-plus-3 that the detachment
could get on the beach, and it was found,
even then, that the area that had been chosen for
the camp site, on a cliff overlooking the far eastern
end of the beach, was not yet clear of mines. Accordingly,
a small bivouac area adjoining the proposed
camp site was occupied as temporary measure
until the Army could remove the mines from
at least a part of the area planned for occupation.
For the first few days thereafter, naval personnel
who had to be given shelter ashore were accommodated
in the temporary camp.

On D-plus-6, work was begun on the beach camp,
designed to accommodate 6000 men, that had been
planned. Air raids were a nightly occurrence, and
foxholes and slit trenches became important items
in the facilities provided. By the next day, it was
possible for personnel in the bivouac area to begin
occupying the pup tents erected in orderly rows
along the lines of trenches. Unfortunately, the
great number of land mines, still in place, limited
the dispersal of the camp facilities; in fact, a number
of anti-personnel mines and a few anti-tank
mines were encountered even in those areas understood
to be "cleared."

Tent erection proceeded steadily during the days
that followed, as rhino-ferry crews moved up from
the beach and as the number of stragglers and
beach survivors mounted. By D-plus-13, all the
rhino crews had been billeted ashore.

The population of the camp fluctuated widely;
its maximum was reached in the latter part of
June, after the great storm, with a total of 3150,
which included British as well as American personnel.
On one occasion, 12 men from the Norwegian
Navy were given shelter.

It was found, however, that the camp location
left much to be desired; it was too exposed to
enemy bombing and strafing. Accordingly, after
the great storm had subsided, a start was made on
a new camp for Seabee personnel at a more desirable
location, and a separate site was selected for a
camp for the naval staff. Both new camps were
built of pyramidal tents instead of the shelter-halves
used for the earlier facility. The 111th Battalion
moved into its new quarters late in July;

--117--

the other camp was occupied near the end of August.

At UTAH, the 81st Battalion erected a tent camp
to house 1500 men and 70 officers a short distance
behind the beach. This camp included six galleys
and a hospital comprising nine tents and one
quonset hut. In addition, headquarters facilities for
the naval officer in charge were set up, which included
two quonset huts, an underground BOQ,
and telephone, radio, and visual communication
systems for the entire beach.

Cherbourg and Le Havre

After the assault operations were successfully
completed, OMAHA beach continued to be used as
the only available port in northern France until
the middle of October when the ports of Cherbourg
and then Le Havre were opened to Allied shipping.

At the end of the assault phase, however, most
of the Seabees returned to England, leaving the
69th, 28th, and 114th Battalions of the 25th Regiment
to close up OMAHA beach and open the ports
at Cherbourg and Le Havre.

The 69th Battalion remained at OMAHA, relieving
the 111th, and worked the harbor as long as was
necessary and then closed it by dismantling all its
installations. The other two battalions moved to
Cherbourg and went to work rebuilding communications
systems, re-conditioning war-damaged
houses for occupation by naval personnel, and
running a transportation pool.

In August 1944, the 114th Battalion arrived in
Cherbourg and made ready to carry out its assigned
function of rehabilitating French ports still
to be captured from the enemy. In London, the
Bureau of Yards and Docks set up a small office
to make detailed plans for this rehabilitation.
Many of the ports for which rehabilitation work
was planned, however, were successfully held by
the Germans for a long time, and by the time they
were taken had been practically demolished by
bombing and gun fire. Moreover, the progress of
our troops, moving eastward toward Germany, had
been so rapid that the western French ports were
no longer of vital importance for logistic-support purposes.

When Le Havre fell on September 20, 1944, the
28th Battalion moved to Le Havre to re-construct
the harbor which had been badly damaged by
Allied bombings and German demolitions. In November,
the 114th Battalion moved to Le Havre to
relieve the 28th.

Like most of the other Channel ports, Le Havre
depended upon locked basins for docking facilities
because the average rise and fall of the tide is from
25 to 40 feet. The retreating Germans had blown
up virtually all the basin gates, in an endeavor to
make the harbor of no use to the conquering Allies.

Army engineers set to work repairing the gates
to the locked basins, and Seabees began installing
floating piers inside the gates. This was accomplished
by bringing rhino barges from OMAHA
Beach, joining two rhinos to make a pier which
was made stationary by driving pilings and was
connected to shore by a bailey bridge.

Outside the main sea-wall at Le Havre, the Seabees
constructed a 60-by-1,000-foot floating pier of
pontoons, which was capable of handling six cargo
vessels. On the inshore section of the floating pier,
they constructed two timber ramps, each connected
with the shore by means of a bailey bridge, built
by the Army engineers. With their upper ends
resting on pontoon units 5 feet high above the deck
of the pier, the ramps were made of such length
as to give a ten-percent grade. This same grade
continued over the bailey bridges at low tide when
their outer ends were down, decreasing as the tide
rose until, at high tide, the bridges were horizontal.
The piers were moored by pile dolphins placed by
Army engineers.

The Seabees also built a pierced-plank airfield at
Le Havre. The first strip, built by the 28th Battalion,
consisted solely of pierced plank laid on the
ground. In building the second strip, the 114th
Battalion placed the pierced plank on top of a
4-inch fill which was made of debris from battle-damaged
Le Havre and of stones obtained in a
nearby quarry. The pierced plank used in this
construction had to be hauled 150 miles from
OMAHA beach.

In addition to the work at Cherbourg and Le
Havre, the 28th and 114th also sent detachments
to other parts of France. In October, the 28th sent
a detachment to Calais on temporary duty. In
November, the mobile telephone crew of the 28th
was assigned to Paris. The 114th Battalion sent one
company to Nantes in August and another company
to Pontivy in September.

On November 20, 1944, the 25th Regiment was
decommissioned, and the 114th Battalion was
formed into CBMU's 627, 628, and 629. CBMU
627, consisting of 25 men and five officers, took

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First Seabee Camp On the Normandy Beach

over maintenance duties in Cherbourg, where they
remained until June 1945, when they were returned
to Davisville. CBMU 628, with a personnel of
350 men and ten officers, handled public works,
communications, and transportation in Le Havre
until December 1945, when they also returned to
the United States. CBMU 629 moved to Paris to
repair Orly airfield. In May 1945, a small detachment
was sent to Bad Schwalbach in Germany; they
returned to Orly in June. In July 1945, work was
discontinued at Orly, and the unit was divided,
half of the personnel returning to the United
States, the remainder moving across the Channel
to the United Kingdom.

Seabees at the Rhine Crossing

Three CBMU's -- the 627th, the 628th, and the
629th -- participated in the crossing of the Rhine.
One unit, the 629th, participated in front-line activities.
The other two were with the rear echelon.
From pontoon assemblies in the ports of Cherbourg
and Le Havre, they salvaged pontoons and accessories
to fill the bill of materials for 5-by-12-pontoon
and 4-by-12-pontoon barges, to a total of 71.
They assembled the material in lots for the various
destinations of the barges. They also assembled
and marked quantities of anti-mine and anti-torpedo
netting with flotation gear for various sections
of the Rhine, and they expedited shipments
to the forward area.

CBMU 629 was split into four detachments of
one officer and six men each. Three detachments
worked with small boat units in their preparation
for the Rhine crossing, and one detachment worked
with an Army Engineer unit.

The first detachment became the first Seabee
unit to enter Germany, on December 26, 1944.
Later, they assembled pontoon barges on the Rhine
at Remagen. These barges were to have been used
in connection with strengthening the Ludendorf
[Railway] Bridge. When that structure collapsed, work on the
barges stopped.

The second detachment supervised the construction
by the Army Engineers of a pontoon pile-driver

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barge for use in the construction of a bridge
across the Moselle. The rig was completed January
28, 1945. It was later disassembled and transported
overland to the Rhine, where it was assembled in
preparation for the Rhine crossing. The second
detachment also helped load boats for transport
to the banks of the Rhine.

The third detachment assembled sea mules along
the Meuse River, then built a pontoon pile-driver
rig near Maastricht. In March the detachment built
sea-mule barges for use as tugs and work barges
for bridge construction in the Rhine crossing at
Wesel. Operations on the Rhine were carried on
day and night; at night, under flood lights; at
times, under enemy fire.

The primary function of the fourth detachment
was to instruct Army personnel in the assembly and
operation of barges on the Meuse River.

Seabees in Germany

The only construction battalion assigned to Germany
was the 69th, which had completed demobilization
of OMAHA Beach. On April 6, 1945, the first
echelon, comprising 360 officers and men, left
London for Ostend, Belgium, where they docked on
April 7. After remaining two weeks at Hengelo,
Holland, the Seabees moved on April 24 to Vreden,
Germany. After the fall of Bremen on April 27, the
first echelon proceeded there, followed soon after
by the rest of the battalion.

After setting up camp in the German barracks
at Lettow-Vorbeck Kazarene, a few miles outside
the city of Bremen, the Seabees immediately set
to work re-roofing buildings where artillery had
made huge gaps, installing plumbing and lighting,
setting up shops and offices where necessary, repairing
harbor facilities, and installing and repairing
power lines.

Later, detachments were sent to Bremerhaven
and Frankfurt-am-Main. Bremerhaven was to be
set up as the main port of entry into Germany for
the occupation army. Quarters for officers and men
were made livable; dock installations, power lines,
and other facilities were repaired. Frankfurt-am-Main
was designated as headquarters for the
United States Navy for the occupation of Germany.

In the meantime, employment of German civilian
labor was begun in Bremen. These men were
trained in the shops, transportation, and the operations
of the base so that eventually only a skeleton
crew of Seabees remained in Germany in supervisory capacities.

Beginning June 22, 1945, the 69th Battalion was
flown in echelons from Germany to England.