Robin Springberg Parry of the United States Department of Labor, Washington
D.C. (Howard M. Radzely, Acting Solicitor of Labor, Timothy D. Hauser,
Associate Solicitor, Elizabeth Hopkins, and Mark E. Papadopoulos of the United
States Department of Labor, Washington D.C., on the brief) for amicus curiae
United States Secretary of Labor in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Mary Ellen Signorille and Melvin R. Radowitz, Washington D.C., for amicus
curiae American Association of Retired People in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

William J. Kilberg, Mark A. Perry, and Joseph B. Maher, of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Washington D.C.; Stephen A. Bokat and Ellen Dunham Bryant of
the National Chamber Litigation Center, Washington D.C., for amicus curiae
United States Chamber of Commerce in support of Defendant-Appellant.

Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (ERISA), proscribes interference with a participant's rights
under a qualified benefit plan. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA provides the plan
participant with his exclusive remedies for a § 510 violation. Under § 502(a)(3),
the participant may bring a civil action to (1) enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of Title I of ERISA or the terms of the plan, or (2) obtain
other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or enforce any
provisions of Title I of ERISA or the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
We granted Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation's petition for
interlocutory appeal in this class action to decide a controlling issue of law
involving § 502(a)(3). See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); Fed. R. App. P.
5(a). The
parties stipulated to and the district court certified the following issue for review:

[W]hether, in this ERISA § 510 case and as a result of Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), backpay
(and, as a result, any other damages based upon backpay) are
available as "appropriate equitable relief" to the class members
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3).

The district court answered yes and denied Defendant's motion seeking to
preclude backpay as a potential remedy for the class. Reviewing the district
court's resolution of the question of law de novo, we answer no and reverse.

I.

The facts are undisputed. Defendant manufactured and assembled military
aircraft at a plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Defendant's employees at the plant
participated in pension and/or health care plans qualified under ERISA.
Defendant announced the closing of the Tulsa plant in December 1993.
Defendant subsequently laid off all employees at the Tulsa plant. The Plaintiff
class consists of 1,074 of those employees. Plaintiffs filed this action in 1994
alleging Defendant violated § 510 of ERISA. Section 510 provides in relevant
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge . . . or discriminate against
a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan [or
Title I of ERISA.]" 29 U.S.C. § 1140. According to the complaint, Defendant
closed the Tulsa plant to prevent Plaintiffs from attaining eligibility for benefits
under their pension and health care plans. Plaintiffs requested damages, an order
requiring Defendant to make restitution to their benefit plans, and any other
equitable or remedial relief.(1)

The district court bifurcated the case into liability and remedial phases.
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of Defendant's liability under ERISA
§ 510. After a ten day bench trial, the district court concluded Defendant
violated § 510. The court entered a thorough published order pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a) reciting its findings and conclusions. Millsap v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (N.D. Okla. 2001). We need not repeat all
those findings and conclusions here.(2) For
purposes of this appeal, the district
court's conclusion Defendant violated § 510 in closing the Tulsa plant is
undisputed.

In the remedial phase, Plaintiffs argued Defendant's violation of § 510
entitled the class to lost benefits, backpay, and reinstatement (or front pay in lieu
of reinstatement), among other things. Defendant disagreed and filed motions to
preclude an award of reinstatement, front pay, and backpay under ERISA. The
district court denied Defendant's motion on the availability of backpay, but
granted Defendant's motion to preclude reinstatement and front pay. Millsap v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076 (N.D. Okla.
Sept. 25, 2002) (unpublished disposition). The court reasoned the circumstances
of this case made reinstatement impossible and front pay inappropriate because
the court could not conclude that but for Defendant's discriminatory conduct the
Tulsa plant would still be open. The district court held, however, Plaintiffs could
recover backpay because the award constituted "equitable relief" under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3). The court reasoned backpay constituted "equitable restitution" or
alternatively could be awarded because Plaintiffs sought backpay in conjunction
with lost pension benefits, lost vacation pay, lost insurance, and reinstatement or
front pay.

The parties subsequently entered into a "Stipulation of Settlement." The
settlement compensates Plaintiffs in the amount of $36 million for their lost
pension and health care benefits. The settlement stipulation requires judicial
resolution of the availability of backpay under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The district
court approved the settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and certified the
controlling question of law for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted the
parties permission to appeal on the narrow issue certified.(3)

II.

ERISA regulates employee pension and welfare benefit plans. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2), 1003(a); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 44
(1987). Congress designed ERISA "to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
ERISA's "complex and detailed" statutory scheme "resolved innumerable
disputes between powerful competing interests ­ not all in favor of potential
plaintiffs." Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993). Federal courts
interpreting ERISA must take into account those competing interests, "such as
Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex
that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers
from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 497 (1996); seealsoLockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882,
887
(1996) (explaining ERISA does not require employers to establish employee
benefit plans or a certain level of benefits under a plan).

Under the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a), a plan
participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the
plan, to enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify
rights to future benefits. Relief may take the form of accrued
benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an
injunction against a plan administrator's improper refusal to pay
benefits.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress' deliberate
care in comprehensively drafting ERISA's enforcement scheme "provide[s]
strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Russell, 473 U.S. at 146; seealsoGreat-West, 534 U.S. at 209; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254; Harris
Trust and Savings Bank
v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at
54. The Court has been equally consistent in its reluctance to tamper with
ERISA's enforcement scheme because "'[t]he presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures
for enforcement.'" Russell, 473 U.S. at 147 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)). The exclusivity of § 502(a)'s
remedial provisions is consistent with ERISA's plain language and legislative
history. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54-55.

A.

"In ERISA cases, as in any case of statutory construction, our analysis
begins with the language of the statute." Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 254 (internal
quotations and brackets omitted). ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides:

A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of [Title I of ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [Title I of ERISA] or the terms of
the plan[.]

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). In Mertens and Great-West,
the
Supreme Court made clear only equitable relief is available under § 502(a)(3).
The Court laid to rest any suggestion that other relief may also be available under
§ 502(a)(3).

In Mertens, the plaintiff class sought monetary relief under
§ 502(a)(3) for
losses to their employee benefit plan as a result of a non-fiduciary defendant's
knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs argued their
request for monetary relief constituted "equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3)
because common law courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all
actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust. Plaintiffs also pointed out that equity
courts had the power to award money damages against the trustee and third
persons who knowingly participated in the trustee's breach. Mertens, 508 U.S. at
255-56. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument for two reasons.

First, the Court interpreted the phrase "equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) as
referring only "to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity
(such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)."
Id. at 256. The Court explained:

Since all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained from a
court of equity, limiting the sort of relief obtainable under §
502(a)(3) to "equitable relief" in the sense of "whatever relief a
common-law court of equity could provide in such a case" would
limit the relief not at all. We will not read the statute to render the
modifier superfluous.

Id. at 257-58 (footnote omitted). Second, the Court found plaintiffs' proposed
interpretation of § 502(a)(3) inconsistent with ERISA's overall statutory scheme,
which distinguished "equitable" from "remedial" relief in § 409(a), and
"equitable" from "legal" relief in § 502(g)(2)(E) and other ERISA provisions,
namely 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(a)(5)(C), 1303(e)(1), 1451(a)(1). Id. at 258-59.
The
Court held plaintiffs could not recover under § 502(a)(3) because they sought
legal relief, compensatory damages, not typically available in equity. Id. at 255-56, 263.

In Great-West, the Court again considered the type of relief typically
available in equity. There, the defendant was a beneficiary of an ERISA
qualified plan. The defendant-beneficiary was injured in an automobile accident.
The plan covered $411,157 of defendant-beneficiary's medical expenses. The
plaintiff-insurance company paid the majority of those expenses pursuant to an
insurance agreement with the plan. Thereafter, the defendant-beneficiary filed
suit in state court against the manufacturer of the car she was riding in at the time
of the accident and ultimately settled her claim for $650,000. Great-West, 534
U.S. at 207-08.

The defendant-beneficiary's plan included a reimbursement provision. The
reimbursement provision provided the plan with the right to recover any benefit
payments recovered from a third party. The provision also imposed personal
liability on the beneficiary up to the amount recovered from a third party if the
beneficiary failed to reimburse the plan. The plan assigned the right to enforce
the reimbursement provision to the insurance company. The insurance company
filed suit under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to recoup $411,157 under the plan's
reimbursement provision because the defendant-beneficiary only allocated
$13,829 of the settlement to satisfy the insurance company's claim under that
provision. Id.

The Court held the insurance company could not maintain its action under
§ 502(a)(3) because it sought, "in essence, to impose personal liability on
[defendant] for a contractual obligation to pay money ­ relief that was not
typically available in equity." Id. at 210. As in Mertens, the Court again
"rejected a reading of the statute that would extend the relief obtainable under
§ 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the
particular case at issue (which could include legal remedies that would otherwise
be beyond the scope of the equity court's authority)." Id. In so holding, the
Court refused to adjust ERISA's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme. Id. at 221.

The insurance company's claim was not "typically available in equity," and
thus not actionable under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 210. The insurance company only
sought legal relief ­ money damages ­ for defendant's breach of duty. Id.
The
Court explained that "[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment,
injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the
plaintiff are suits for 'money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been
applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the
defendant's breach of legal duty." Id. (emphasis added, internal quotations and
citation omitted).

Thus, the question under § 502(a)(3) in this case is whether Plaintiffs'
requested relief was "typically available in equity." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256;
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210. Answering this question requires us to consider
"the general types of relief provided by courts of law and equity." Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571 n.8 (1990).
"[C]onsulting . . . standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the
Restatements, [will ordinarily] make the answer clear." Great-West, 534 U.S. at
217.(4)

B.

The backpay Plaintiffs seek is a creature of positive law; that is, the
remedy of backpay did not exist at common law. SeeNLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, Albany County,
613 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Backpay claims, however, "do not
differ remedially from the personal injury claim for lost wages, or the contract
claim for past wages due[.]" 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5)
(1993); seealso 1 George E. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 4.1
(1978 & Supp.
2003) (describing a claim for breach of personal services contract as sounding in
quasi-contract for money damages). A backpay claim is remedially analogous to
personal injury or breach of contract claims because backpay awards compensate
employees for lost wages and benefits before trial.(5)Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298
F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 2002); 2 Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 9.46 (4th ed. 1998); Robert Belton,
Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law § 9.3 (1992); Dobbs, Law of
Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15. Backpay is compensatory because the award is
measured by an employee's loss rather than an employer's gain. Id.; Ford, 458
U.S. at 229 (noting that "paying backpay damages is like paying an extra worker
who never came to work"); Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (explaining that backpay under Title VII is generally computed by
determining the amount of compensation lost as a direct result of the employer's
discriminatory action).

"The Court has recognized that compensation is a purpose 'traditionally
associated with legal relief.'" City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11 (1999) (quoting Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352);
seealso Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15
("Backpay is an
element of compensation . . . a traditional function of damages at law."). An
award of backpay, without more, is therefore in the nature of compensatory
damages.(6)SeeTerry,
494 U.S. at 570 (explaining "the only remedy sought is a
request for compensatory damages representing backpay and benefits."); Waldrop
v. Southern Co. Serv., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 158 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting "that it has
long been the general rule that back wages are legal relief in the nature of
compensatory damages."); Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226 (noting
backpay is an ordinary damages claim). "Generally, an award of money damages
was the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law." Wooddell v.
Intern'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991)
(emphasis added); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Mertens, 508
U.S. at 255 ("Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief."); 1
John N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 237d (5th ed.
1941)
(explaining "[t]he award of mere compensatory damages . . . is a remedy
peculiarly belonging to the province of the law courts[.]") Thus, a claim for
backpay is "almost an exemplar of a claim at law." Dobbs, The Law of Remedies
§ 6.10(5) at 226; seealso Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying
Monetary
Restitution, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1577, 1633 (2002) ("The backpay remedy is more
appropriately characterized as damages for plaintiffs losses and thus legal
relief.").(7)

In this case, Plaintiffs seek backpay from the date of the Tulsa plant's
closure through the date of trial. Plaintiffs propose to calculate their backpay
award based on the compensation each individual class member would have
earned during the backpay period. Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to backpay to
make them whole for Defendant's wrongful termination. Based on Plaintiffs'
own method of calculation and arguments, we easily conclude Plaintiffs are
simply seeking compensation for lost wages before trial. Plaintiffs' proposed
method of calculating their backpay award is based on each individual class
member's loss rather than Defendant's gain. Plaintiffs' freestanding claim for
backpay is thus in the nature of compensatory damages. At common law, the
award of compensatory damages was peculiarly within the province of the law
courts. Plaintiffs' backpay claim is therefore appropriately classified as legal
relief. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710-11; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.

III.

The only relief remaining available to Plaintiffs is compensatory damages
representing backpay. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue their backpay claim is
"equitable" for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs argue their backpay claim is
equitable under "an exception to the general rule" that money damages constitute
legal relief. SeeTerry, 494 U.S. at 570-71. Second, Plaintiffs analogize
§ 502(a)(3) to Title VII § 706(g) and argue a backpay award under §
502(a)(3) is
an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. Seeinfra n.16.
Third,
Plaintiffs argue backpay should be classified as "equitable" under § 502(a)(3) to
further the purposes of ERISA and make them whole. Because the Supreme
Court has rejected each of these arguments, we do the same.

A.

Plaintiffs first argue their backpay claim is equitable because it is a
monetary award incidental to or intertwined with reinstatement.(8) In Terry, 494
U.S. at 570-71, the Supreme Court recognized two exceptions to the general rule
that a monetary award constitutes legal relief.(9) The relevant exception provides a
monetary award incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief may be
characterized as equitable.(10)Id. at 571. Plaintiffs reliance on this exception is
flawed.

In Terry, 494 U.S. at 571, the Court held the incidental to or intertwined
with exception did not apply where the plaintiffs sought only backpay and
benefits. There, plaintiffs requested reinstatement, but dismissed the claim when
the remedy became impossible after their employer filed bankruptcy.(11)Id. at 562-63. The Court held the exception did
not apply notwithstanding that plaintiffs
had requested reinstatement at one time during the pendency of the action.(12)Id.
at 571. In this case, the district court similarly dismissed Plaintiffs' reinstatement
claim due to impossibility. Plaintiffs admit "[i]t was an artifact of this case
proceeding years beyond possible reinstatement that left backpay and restoration
of benefits as the only remedies." (Aple's Br. at 24 (emphasis added)).
Notwithstanding the unfortunate delays inherent in modern litigation, seeFord
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 221, the fact remains in this case "the only remedy sought
is a request for compensatory damages representing backpay[.]" Terry, 494 U.S.
at 570. Consequently, the facts necessary to support the incidental to or
intertwined with exception are "clearly absent from the case." Id. at 571; seealsoHopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding "[b]ecause the
district court refused to grant [plaintiff] reinstatement or any other injunctive
relief, the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other
relief.").

Plaintiffs also attempt to "re-classify" backpay as equitable relief because
at common law an equity court had the power to award legal relief as an incident
to equitable relief. See Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 181,
231 (explaining a
court of equity could grant legal remedies in a case within the equity court's
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction). Plaintiffs' attempt fails. An equity court at
common law did not have the power to award legal relief where, as here,
equitable relief was unavailable. Id. § 237d. Moreover, even if an equity court
had the power to provide Plaintiffs' requested legal relief, the Court in Mertens,
508 U.S. at 256-58, and Great West, 534 U.S. at 210, rejected a reading of
§ 502(a)(3) that would permit a plaintiff to obtain legal relief simply because an
equity court had the power to provide such relief. Aside from these crucial
points, Plaintiffs essentially concede backpay was not typically available in
equity by proceeding under an exception to the general rule that a monetary
award constitutes legal relief. An exception to a general rule is, by definition,
atypical. See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 498 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
"exception" as, among other things, "something abnormal or usual").

Even assuming a request for reinstatement remained in this case, the
incidental to or intertwined with exception still would not apply. In Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1987), the Government sued a real estate
developer seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act.
Defendant sold the property at issue making injunctive relief impractical. The
Court held the incidental to or intertwined with exception did not apply. Id. at
424-25. The Court reasoned the Government's claim for $22 million in civil
penalties (legal claims) could not be considered "incidental" to the modest (and
impracticable) equitable relief requested. Id. The Court further explained the
Clean Water Act did not "intertwine" legal and equitable relief because "the
Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or independent
of, legal relief." Id. at 425.

Plaintiffs' backpay claim potentially exceeds $90 million.(13) Like in Tull,
the potential backpay award is not merely "incidental" to Plaintiffs' request for
reinstatement. Moreover, § 502(a)(3) does not intertwine equitable relief with
legal relief. "[R]einstatement and backpay are separate, independent kinds of
relief, such that [Plaintiffs'] demand for reinstatement does not transform [their]
backpay claim into equitable relief."(14)Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 159 n.11. Plaintiffs'
backpay claim cannot be considered "intertwined" with their dismissed
reinstatement claim because Plaintiffs could only seek equitable relief under
§ 502(a)(3). SeeGreat-West, 534 U.S. at 221; Tull, 481
U.S. at 425.(15)

B.

Plaintiffs next argue their backpay claim is equitable because Congress
treated backpay as equitable in the NLRA and Title VII. The NLRA and Title
VII provide an agency or court with the power to reinstate an employee with or
without backpay.(16) Plaintiffs analogize
their ERISA § 510 claim to actions under
the NLRA and Title VII. Plaintiffs then conclude Congress intended the
remedies under each statute to be the same. Assuming Plaintiffs' premise ­
that
ERISA § 510 was modeled in significant part after Title VII's substantive
provisions ­ is correct, we nevertheless disagree with Plaintiffs' conclusion.
Plaintiffs' conclusion is flawed because the remedial provisions of ERISA and
Title VII are at issue, and in those provisions significant differences exist. SeeLorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).

1.

The Supreme Court has consistently, and most recently in Great-West,
rejected analogies to Title VII's remedial provision in interpreting other federal
anti-discrimination statutes that do not contain similar language. The primary
reason such analogies are unhelpful is because Congress treated backpay in Title
VII § 706(g) as part of an equitable remedy. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4. In
§ 706(g), Congress "'treated backpay as equitable' . . . only in the narrow sense
that it allowed backpay to be awarded together with equitable relief[.]" Id.
(internal brackets omitted). In other words, § 706(g) permits an award of
backpay together with reinstatement; and when a court orders such affirmative
action, the relief may be characterized as equitable. Id. Title VII analogies are
inappropriate, on the other hand, when the relief sought is simply a freestanding
claim for money damages. Id.

For example, in Terry, 494 U.S. at 572, the Court rejected an analogy to
Title VII § 706(g) in considering a backpay claim for breach of the duty of fair
representation brought under the Labor Management Relations Act. The Court
rejected the analogy because Congress did not make backpay part of an equitable
remedy for breach of the duty of fair representation. The Court noted the
inappropriateness of the Title VII analogy because remedying the unfair labor
practice differed from Title VII's remedial purpose. Id. at 573. Likewise, in
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197, the Court rejected an analogy to Title VII § 706(g)
when
it interpreted § 812 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612. The Court
rejected the analogy because the language Congress used in § 706(g)
"contrast[ed] sharply with § 812's simple authorization of an action for actual
and punitive damages." Id. In Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584-85, the Court again
rejected an analogy to Title VII § 706(g) when it interpreted § 7 of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626, because the statutory
language of the two remedial provisions differed significantly.

2.

In ERISA § 502(a)(3), unlike Title VII § 706(g) and NLRA § 10(c),
Congress did not specifically make backpay part of an equitable remedy.(17)Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) with 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c); seealsoGreat-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4.
Further, the remedial
provisions of Title VII and the NLRA contrast sharply with § 502(a)(3)'s simple
authorization of equitable relief. SeeCurtis, 415 U.S. at 197. Although
Congress may have modeled ERISA § 510 after Title VII's substantive
provisions, this fact is irrelevant for purposes of interpreting the different
remedial schemes under each statute. SeeLorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.

Additionally, the purposes behind ERISA § 502(a)(3) and the NLRA
§ 10(c), and Title VII § 706(g), are not identical. The NLRA and Title VII
seek
to make a plaintiff whole for defendant's discriminatory action. Ford Motor Co.,
458 U.S. at 230, 231 n.15; Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 252-53
(1994). In "sharp contrast," § 502(a)(3) seeks to "vindicate [a] different goal[,]"
seeTerry, 494 U.S. at 573, namely, to equitably redress any act or practice that
violates Title I of ERISA or the plan. Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 246;
Great-West,
534 U.S. at 221. ERISA, unlike Title VII and the NLRA, is not a make-whole
statute. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, 261-62. As the Supreme Court explained, "[a]
fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen
were primarily concerned with possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies
that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual
beneficiary." Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. We too have rejected claims for
complete relief under ERISA because the statute's purpose is to protect the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans. SeeZimmerman, 72 F.3d at
828; 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Consequently, we must conclude that "[w]hatever
may be the merit of the 'equitable' characterization in Title VII cases, there is
surely no basis for characterizing the award of compensatory . . . damages here as
equitable relief." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.(18)

C.

Plaintiffs lastly argue ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes backpay because
ERISA § 510 protects jobs, in addition to benefits, and the remedy is therefore
necessary to make the aggrieved worker whole and deter future violations of the
statute. While "[w]e are not oblivious to the force of [Plaintiffs'] policy
arguments[,]" Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198, we are not persuaded that such
considerations trump the plain language of § 502(a)(3). Plaintiffs' policy
arguments are better addressed to Congress. SeeFesto Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).

First, as explained above, the remedial purpose of § 502(a) is not to make
the aggrieved employee whole.(19)Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, 261-62; Russell, 473
U.S. at 138, 142, 148. Second, Plaintiffs' argument that backpay is necessary to
deter "cheating employers" from violating ERISA § 510 goes too far. Remedies
intended to punish or deter wrongdoers were issued in courts of law, not courts
of equity. Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23. Third, Plaintiffs' reliance on Varity Corp.,
516 U.S. at 515, to argue § 502(a)(3) permits an award of legal relief has been
rejected by the Supreme Court. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 n.5. Plaintiffs
remaining arguments dealing with vague notions of ERISA's basic purpose are
inadequate to overcome the words Congress used in § 502(a)(3) regarding the
specific issue under consideration. Id. at 220; Mertens, 508 U.S. at
261.(20)

IV.

We are not unsympathetic to Plaintiffs' situation. We note there may have
been other means, such as a claim for backpay under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, for Plaintiffs to obtain the legal relief they sought here. See 29
U.S.C. § 626(b); Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220. ERISA, however, is clear. And
we, like the Supreme Court, "are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme
crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA." Russell, 473 U.S. at 147.
Section 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for equitable relief.
Great-West, 534
U.S. at 221. Plaintiffs' freestanding claim for backpay ­ legal relief ­ is
accordingly precluded by § 502(a)(3)'s plain terms. If exceptions to those terms
are to be made, "it is for Congress to undertake that task." Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).

Consistent with our answer to the question certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), the district court's order dated September 25, 2002 is REVERSED
insofar as it denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
backpay. We REMAND with instructions for the district court to enter an order
granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of backpay.

03-5124, Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

LUCERO, J., Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Under the majority's result, the class plaintiffs are entitled to neither
reinstatement nor back pay. Not only does the majority's holding fail to deter
ERISA violations, it also encourages employers who violate ERISA to delay
proceedings as long as possible, "lead[ing] to the strange result that . . . . the
most egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions." Pollard v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853 (2001). Because I disagree that
Congress intended this result or that precedent demands it, I respectfully dissent.

On December 3, 1993, McDonnell Douglas Corporation announced it was
closing its Tulsa, Oklahoma facility. In July 1994, almost ten years ago, Plaintiff
James R. Millsap commenced this class action. The class plaintiffs alleged and
the district court found that McDonnell Douglas violated § 510 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
("ERISA"),
which proscribes an employer's interference with a participant's rights under a
qualified benefit plan. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d
1262, 1264, 1310 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (Millsap I). Class plaintiffs sought all
appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), including lost benefits, back pay,
and reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement; McDonnell Douglas
sought to preclude an award of back pay under ERISA § 502(a)(3).

Finding that the passage of eight years spent in litigation rendered
reinstatement impossible and front pay inappropriate, the district court denied
reinstatement and front pay to the class plaintiffs. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2002)
(Millsap II). However, the district court denied McDonnell Douglas' motion to
preclude back pay, determining that the plaintiffs' claim for back pay was
equitable in nature. Id. at *5. On interlocutory appeal, we are limited to the
following certified question:

[W]hether, in this ERISA § 510 case and as a result of Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), back pay
(and, as a result, any other damages based upon back pay) are
available as "appropriate equitable relief" to the class members
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3).

A civil action may be brought--(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.

One of the Court's first interpretations of § 502(a)(3) appeared in
Mertens
v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). As the majority explains, Mertens
involved an action brought under § 502(a)(3) by former employees who alleged
that their retirement plan's actuary breached its fiduciary duty; the Court denied
monetary damages to the petitioners on the ground that the remedy sought was
"nothing other than compensatory damages," a remedy typically available at law
and not equity. Id. at 255. Outlining the test for "appropriate equitable relief,"
the Court explained that § 502(a)(3) permits the award of remedies only for
"those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as
injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." Id. at
256, 257­58.

Applying its language from Mertens in a § 502(a)(3) case alleging
breach
of contract, the Court further defined the bounds of equitable relief in Great-West, 534
U.S. 204. There, the Court again denied relief, characterizing the
reimbursement relief sought as an effort "to impose personal liability on
[defendant] for a contractual obligation to pay money--relief that was not
typically available in equity." 534 U.S. at 210.

The majority relies on these authorities to support its conclusion that back
pay is not available as appropriate equitable relief. However, the majority
reads
too much into the Supreme Court's holdings; neither Mertens nor Great-West
expressly preclude back pay as an equitable remedy under ERISA.(1) Instead, the
Court left unresolved the precise issue before us today--whether back pay
constitutes appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). Consistent with
Mertens and Great-West, our inquiry turns on whether the relief sought--here,
back pay--was typically available in equity. In order to refine this inquiry,
Great-West directs courts to "consult[] . . . standard current works such as Dobbs,
Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, . . . [to] make the answer clear." Great-West, 534
U.S. at 217.

Consulting these sources, I find that none explicitly conclude that back pay
is not equitable in nature. To the contrary, the only source cited by the majority
that speaks directly to back pay, Dobbs, is less than clear. Although Dobbs first
states that back pay "seems on the surface to be an ordinary damages claim,
almost an exemplar of a claim at law," it ends with the recognition that "in fact
the cases do not yield upon any such single conclusion." 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law
of Remedies, § 6.10(1) at 226 (2d ed. 1993). With respect to wrongful
discharge
and job discrimination claims, Dobbs acknowledges that "back pay and
reinstatement remedies are usually considered equitable." Id. at 193 (emphasis
added). In sum, the guidance provided by Dobbs is scant but suggests the
conclusion thatwith respect to the class plaintiffs who were wrongfully
discharged, the back pay remedy is equitable.

The majority's conclusion that back pay is legal in nature is rooted in its
analogy to common law compensation. Although the majority recognizes that
"reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are remedies not known
to the common law but created by statute," NLRB v. W. Ky. Coal Co., 116 F.2d
816, 821 (6th Cir. 1940) (Arant, J., dissenting in part), it nonetheless concludes
that back pay, which involves monetary relief, is necessarily the same as
compensation. Because compensation claims sounded in law under the common
law, the majority argues, it follows that the type of relief sought here is also legal
in nature.

This proposition turns its back on our own en banc precedent. We have
previously recognized that "[a]n award of back pay . . . is an integral part of the
equitable remedy of reinstatement and is not comparable to damages in a common
law action." Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, 613 F.2d 245, 250
(10th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (quotation omitted). A comparison to common law by
analogy is particularly inappropriate because employee reinstatement and back
pay remedies, which were created in the latter half of the twentieth century,
displaced "the traditional rule . . . that an 'at will' employee could be discharged
at any time and for any reason." 2 Dobbs § 6.10(1), at 190.

Contrary to the majority's conclusion, it is not sufficient to state that
because back pay involves monetary relief, it is necessarily legal in nature.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570
(1990). "[N]ot all monetary relief is damages," and "[e]quity sometimes awards
monetary relief, or the equivalent." Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d
495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "restitution is both a legal and an
equitable remedy that is monetary yet is distinct from damages"); Allison v. Bank
One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding in an ERISA case
decided after Great-West that monetary relief in the form of prejudgment interest
may be equitable in nature). Even Great-West, which stated that suits seeking
monetary relief are "almost invariably . . . [legal] suits for money damages," 534
U.S. at 210 (quotation omitted), does not compel the result that all suits seeking
monetary relief are legal in nature. Despite the majority's conclusion to the
contrary, the case law with respect to this latter point--money
damages--prescribes no clear answer. Thus we look to the language of
§ 502(a)(3) for instruction. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney,
Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000) ("In ERISA cases, as in any case of statutory
construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.").

In looking at the plain language of the statute, the majority states that
"Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly," (Maj. Op. at 9) (quotation omitted), and therefore that
back pay, because it is not explicitly mentioned in § 502(a)(3), is not a
recognized form of relief. However, the plain language of the statute is not
unambiguous as the majority would have it. To the contrary, the essence of this
dispute is over the proper interpretation of the word "equitable" as used in the
statute. Although § 502(a)(3) does not authorize any specific
equitable remedy,
reinstatement indisputably constitutes "appropriate equitable relief" to remedy
violations of § 510. Great West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.4; Mertens,
508 U.S. at 256;
Griggs v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 384 (4th Cir.
2001).Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the plain language of § 502(a)(3) similarly
does not clearly preclude back pay as appropriate equitable relief.

Because there is ambiguity as to what constitutes equitable relief, I would
look to the legislative history and purpose of ERISA, for the art of statutory
interpretation is to promote Congressional intent while avoiding
counterproductive results. See e.g., Pollard, 532 U.S. at 852­54.
Congress's
intentions are clear in ERISA's statement of policy; it sought to protect "the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts."ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). This purpose is
equally apparent in
the legislative history of ERISA, wherein Congress expressed its intent to
"strengthen and improve the protections and interests of participants and
beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans," S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 1 (1973),
and stated that the "primary purpose of the bill is the protection
of individual pension rights," H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1 (1973).

Courts have consistently recognized the broad protections ERISA affords
employees. "ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quotations omitted). "By its terms
§ 510 protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employer's
desire to prevent a pension from vesting. Congress viewed this section as a
crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent
the provision of promised benefits." Id. at 143. "Section 510 proscribes changes
in employment status based upon benefit motivations," Garratt v. Walker, 164
F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and "helps to make [employer's]
promises [of benefits] credible." Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516 (1997) (quotation omitted). Here,
McDonnell Douglas terminated its employees to avoid paying benefits. This is
precisely the factual scenario Congress intended to prevent when it enacted
ERISA. Nonetheless, the majority carves out a method by which employers can
violate ERISA in letter and spirit, yet escape the consequences.

Consistent with the purposes of ERISA and contrary to the majority's
result, our previous cases that have considered the nature of back pay in other
employment contexts have held that back pay is, in fact, equitable. Cf.Bertot,
613 F.2d at 250 (concluding that in a § 1982 public employee case, "an award of
back pay is an element of equitable relief"); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co. Inc., 911 F.2d 1377, 1381 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) ("the
bar on recovery of 'money damages' contained in 5 U.S.C. § 702 does not
include equitable backpay, which is a form of equitable relief, not monetary
damages").(2) Similarly, it is undisputed
that an injunction ordering an
employee's return to work--reinstatement--is equitable relief under ERISA §
502(a)(3), Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256; Griggs, 237 F.3d at 384, and that as a
general rule, back pay is considered an equitable remedy when it is intertwined
with injunctive relief or made an integral part of an overall equitable remedy.
Terry, 494 U.S. at 571 ("a monetary award incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief may be equitable" in nature) (quotation omitted); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974);
see alsoAdams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir.
1998). In the context of § 510 violations, ERISA § 502(a)(3)
authorizes what has
been termed in other statutory contexts as the "conventional remedy" of
reinstatement with back pay. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984).
This equitable remedy is consistent with labor-protective legislation dating back
to the New Deal, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 48­49
(1937), and is consistent with ERISA's primary purposes.

Despite clear precedent that back pay is equitable in nature when integrated
with reinstatement, the majority concludes that back pay is not equitable under
the present circumstances because back pay and restoration of benefits are the
only remedies available in this case. (Maj. Op. at 7 n.3.) However, "[t]he
characterization of back pay as legal or equitable has been determined by whether
the plaintiff has requested back pay as an adjunct to the equitable remedy of
reinstatement, in which case it has been characterized as equitable." Skinner v.
Total Petroleum Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1988). The present class
plaintiffs sought both reinstatement and back pay.(3)

"[A]ccording to the prevailing view, where the aggrieved party shows
entitlement to equitable relief, but a grant appears to be impossible or
impracticable, the court may nevertheless proceed with the case, determine
disputed issues, and adjust the rights and obligations of the parties, awarding
damages or a money judgment" in lieu of the requested equitable remedy.27A
Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 106 (2003); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687
F.2d
1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1982); Schwartz, 45 F.3d at 1023 ("Front pay is awarded
. . . when the preferred remedy of reinstatement, indisputably an equitable
remedy, is not appropriate or feasible."). In a similar inquiry involving front pay,
the Supreme Court has explained that to deny front pay in the case where
reinstatement was unavailable and award it in the case where the plaintiff was
eventually reinstated "would lead to the strange result . . . . that the most
egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions." Pollard, 532 U.S. at
583.

The majority's result is similarly disconcerting. Here, reinstatement would
have been an appropriate equitable remedy had McDonnell Douglas not so
delayed proceedings as to make reinstatement impossible. Thus, through no fault
of their own, the class plaintiffs find themselves devoid of the undeniably
appropriate equitable remedy of reinstatement. Back pay, which was integral to
the relief sought by the plaintiffs at the onset of this litigation, provides an
appropriate equitable alternative.

I would conclude that the district court was within its power to provide for
back pay as "other appropriate equitable relief" where, as here, the equitable
remedy of reinstatement is no longer feasible. Because I conclude that back pay
is appropriate equitable relief as contemplated by ERISA § 502(a)(3) under the
present circumstances, I respectfully DISSENT.

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

1. Plaintiffs primarily sought legal relief at
the onset of this litigation.
Plaintiffs specifically requested damages in their complaint and amended
complaint, but did not mention reinstatement. Plaintiffs moved for and the
district court certified a damage class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Plaintiffs did not move for a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which
permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief (such as reinstatement).
SeeAmchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-15 (1997). Plaintiffs
also moved for a jury trial on their ERISA § 510 claim. Plaintiffs abandoned
their restitution claim in that motion and urged the court to handle any
reinstatement claim (should the Tulsa plant reopen) as an "ancillary matter."
Plaintiffs therefore argued they had the right to a jury because only their request
for money damages remained. Seeinfra n.4. Thus, at the onset of the
litigation,
the focus of Plaintiffs' complaint was on the recovery of legal damages. SeeSkinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (explaining the court must consider backpay as "in the nature of legal
damages" when the focus of the plaintiff's complaint is primarily on the recovery
of legal damages).

2. The district court found Defendant studied
the correlation between
closing a plant with a more senior workforce and maximizing a surplus from its
pension plans. The Tulsa plant had, on average, the most senior workforce
within the company. Defendant learned it stood to gain $24.7 million in pension
and health care coverage savings if the Tulsa plant closed. Defendant thereafter
closed the Tulsa plant. Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1267-73.

3. Plaintiffs admitted in their brief that
backpay and restoration of benefits
are the only remedies available in this case. (Aple's Br. at 24). Restoration of
benefits is no longer an issue as a result of the parties' settlement. Plaintiffs are
not seeking an injunction or mandamus under § 502(a)(3). Plaintiffs also
conceded at oral argument, and made clear in their brief, that they are not seeking
either equitable or legal restitution under § 502(a)(3). Additionally, Plaintiffs
have not appealed the district court's holding that reinstatement and front pay are
inappropriate or impossible remedies in this case, nor does the parties'
"Stipulation of Settlement" provide a mechanism for Plaintiffs to appeal the
district court's order denying reinstatement and front pay. At oral argument,
Plaintiffs' counsel misrepresented the record and state of proceedings in the
district court. When questioned by the panel regarding the Plaintiffs' decision
not to appeal the denial of reinstatement, counsel responded that because this is
an interlocutory appeal all other decisions ­ including the district court's order
denying reinstatement ­ were preserved. The parties' "Stipulation of
Settlement," however, conclusively demonstrates otherwise. The settlement
provides the litigation is terminated if we determine backpay is unavailable
unless the Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari. (Aplt's App. at 475-76).
The settlement further provides that if we determine backpay is a remedy in the
case, absent the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari, the case will be
"remanded for further proceedings and a determination of the amount of backpay,
if any, after which either party may appeal from the judgment as to the amount of
backpayand any other damages based on backpay and McDonnell Douglas
may
appeal from the Orders dated September 5, 2001 (liability) and September 25,
2002 (backpay)." (Id. at 476) (emphasis added). The settlement does not provide
any procedure for Plaintiffs to appeal the district court's holding that
reinstatement and front pay are inappropriate remedies in this case. (Id. at 476-77).
Thus, this appeal only involves Plaintiffs' freestanding claim for backpay.

4. Federal courts also routinely examine
whether a plaintiff's requested
relief is legal or equitable in nature to determine the existence of the right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved[.]" The Supreme Court has long
"understood 'Suits at common law' to refer 'not merely [to] suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [to] suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered.'" Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348
(1998) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830)).

5. The Supreme Court has described the
compensatory nature of backpay
under § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), and § 706(g) of Title
VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). SeePhelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (explaining the National Labor Relations Board
effectuates the remedial scheme of the NLRA by ordering compensation for lost
wages); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (explaining
bad faith is not an element of a Title VII backpay award lest the remedy would
become punitive rather than compensatory); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219, 230 (1982) (explaining a secondary purpose of Title VII is to compensate
employees for their injuries).

6. In Bertot, we relied on an Eighth
Circuit case interpreting Title VII to
hold backpay is an element of equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
backpay is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. 613 F.2d at
250. In Bertot, the district court ordered reinstatement. Id. at 247. We, of
course, express no opinion on whether our classification of backpay under the
factually (i.e., backpay ordered with reinstatement) and legally (i.e., arising under
§ 1983) distinguishable circumstances in Bertot is correct in light of the Supreme
Court's subsequent pronouncements on the subject. SeeGreat-West, 534 U.S.
at
218 n.4; Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710 (classifying a takings claim under §
1983 as legal). The dissent suggests we have turned our back on Bertot.
(Dissent Op. at 5). Much to the contrary, we simply do not see the utility in
relying on a factually and legally distinguishable case to interpret ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) when controlling Supreme Court precedent exists.

7. The dissent states "the guidance provided
by Dobbs is scant but suggests
the conclusion that with respect to the class plaintiffs who were wrongfully
discharged, the backpay remedy is equitable." (Dissent Op. at 5). We quote
Professor Dobbs at length to let the readers draw their own conclusions:

Reinstatement in a job appears to be equitable because such relief is
essentially injunctive. But backpay seems on the surface to be an
ordinary damages claim, almost an exemplar of a claim at law.
Backpay claims do not differ remedially from the personal injury
claim for lost wages, or the contract claim for past wages due, for
example. So while reinstatement is clearly equitable as a form of
injunctive relief, backpay seems to be just as clearly legal. On the
basis of such observations, it would seem that a reinstatement claim
standing alone would be tried to a judge without a jury while a
backpay claim standing alone would be tried to a jury if one is
demanded. If both kinds of relief are sought in a single case, the
Dairy Queen rule would seem to require a jury trial on all common
issues of fact ­ such as whether the discharge was discriminatory.
But in fact the cases do not yield up to any single conclusion.

Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226 (footnotes omitted); seealsoinfra n.9.
Professor Dobbs then explains the different rules for determining when a jury
trial attaches under different statutory provisions. Id. at 226-33. Professor
Dobbs distinguishes between (1) cases arising under Title VII where backpay is
generally considered equitable, id. at 193, 226-29, and (2) cases arising under
other statutory provisions, such as the ADEA, where backpay is considered legal.
Id. at 229-33.

8. The remedy of reinstatement is essentially
injunctive relief. Dobbs, Law
of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226. The Court has made "clear that judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion are equitable[.]" Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n.11 (1978) (internal quotations and citation omitted);Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (noting an injunction is inherently an equitable
remedy).

9. The exception Plaintiffs did not argue on
appeal provides damages are
equitable when they are restitutionary. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570. The dissent
nevertheless finds solace in the restitutionary exception. (Dissent Op. at 6). As
Professor Dobbs explained, however, a characterization of backpay as
restitutionary "appears to be doubly wrong, since a claim does not become
equitable by being restitutionary and since backpay does not seem to fit the
restitutionary category in any event." Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5)
at 227
(footnotes omitted). A backpay claim is not restitutionary because, as explained
above, the nature of the remedy is to compensate and not to prevent unjust
enrichment. Id. § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15. The backpay Plaintiffs seek is not money
the Defendant wrongfully withheld, but rather, wages they would have received
absent their termination. "Such relief is not restitutionary." Terry, 494 U.S. at
571. Simply characterizing backpay as restitutionary is of no avail either because
the award, at best, constitutes legal restitution not typically available in equity.
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213-14, 218; seealsoClair v. Harris Trust
and Sav.
Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999); Helfrich v. PNC Bank, Ky., Inc., 267
F.3d 477, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding a plaintiff who denominated his
requested relief under § 502(a)(3) as "restitution" while measuring that relief
with reference to his losses rather than defendant's gain was precluded from
recovering the money damages as equitable relief).

10. Plaintiffs use the terms "incidental"
and "integral" interchangeably. (See
Aple's Br. at 12-13, 22, 30). At oral argument, Plaintiffs' disclaimed reliance on
the Supreme Court's "incidental to or intertwined with" exception. Instead,
Plaintiffs argued that backpay was "integral" to their requested reinstatement.
We agree with Professor Dobbs, however, that "if 'integral' has any different
meaning [from 'incidental'] it is difficult to see what it could be." Dobbs, Law
of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.11.

11. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish
Terry on the ground the plaintiffs did
not seek reinstatement in that case. (Aple's Br. at 18). The district court in
Terry, however, specifically noted that "[i]n addition to requesting
reinstatement
and other injunctive relief[,] Plaintiffs seek punitive damages and other monetary
relief for lost wages and health benefits and for mental and emotional distress."
Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 661
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (emphasis added).

12. Relying on Skinner, 859 F.2d
at 1444, the dissent suggests we should
characterize backpay as equitable whenever the award is requested with
reinstatement. (Dissent Op. at 11-12). Such a characterization is correct in Title
VII and NLRA cases. Seeinfra n.16;West v.
Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999).
The characterization is equally incorrect, as explained in Skinner, when backpay
is claimed under another anti-discrimination statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which does not classify backpay as equitable. Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1443-44. In
any event, we rejected characterizing the backpay at issue in Skinner as equitable,
despite the plaintiff's request for reinstatement, because the focus of the
plaintiff's complaint was on the recovery of legal damages. Id. at 1444. Like
Skinner, other courts considering the nature of backpay under employment
statutes outside the context of Title VII and the NLRA have treated backpay as
legal. SeeLorillard, 434 U.S. at 583-84 (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97-98 (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act); Diffee-Ford-Lincoln Mercury, 298 F.3d at 964-65 (Family Medical Leave
Act); Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 159 (Rehabilitation Act); Crocker v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Airline Deregulation Act).

13. At oral argument, Plaintiffs did not
dispute Defendant's backpay
calculations when questioned regarding the incidental to or intertwined with
exception. Rather, Plaintiffs disavowed reliance on the "incidental" portion of
the exception.

14. Plaintiffs reliance on Adams v.
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d
1156, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1998) to argue backpay and reinstatement are
intertwined is misplaced because backpay and reinstatement are independent
types of relief. In Adams, we held plaintiffs' claim for benefits intertwined with
equitable relief. There, plaintiffs only had a claim for benefits if the court
declared them eligible beneficiaries under the ERISA plan. Id. In contrast,
backpay and reinstatement are in no way dependent upon one another, and if §
502(a)(3) permitted it, Plaintiffs could obtain one without the other.

15. Plaintiffs also argue backpay is
equitable because the award is
"quintessentially discretionary relief." (Aple's Br. at 26). Plaintiffs' argument is
off-mark because a federal court does not have discretion to award legal relief
under § 502(a)(3). Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221. Thus, while "[d]iscretion
is
indeed characteristic of equity," such characteristic is irrelevant here because
"the power to exercise discretion occurs only when the case is found to be
equitable; discretionary power does not trigger equity, it results from equity."
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.6(3) at 155 n.1.

16. "Section 10(c) of the [NLRA]
empowers the Board, when it finds that an
unfair labor practice has been committed, to issue an order requiring the violator
to 'cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will
effectuate the policies' of the NLRA." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
898 (1984) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)). Section 706(g) of Title VII empowers
the court, when it finds an unlawful employment practice has been committed, to
"enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . .
." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

17. Plaintiffs' amici briefed
the legislative history of ERISA § 510. (See
Sec'y of Labor Br. at 11; AARP Br. at 2-8). We find no need, however, to delve
into ERISA's "voluminous legislative history," seeRussell, 473 U.S. at 145-46,
because § 502(a)(3)'s plain language provides a clear answer to the question
presented. SeeHarris Trust, 530 U.S. at 254. We further doubt the Supreme
Court would place as much emphasis on ERISA's legislative history as Plaintiffs'
amici. SeeRussell, 473 U.S. at 146 (explaining the legislative
history of §
502(a)(3) "is of little help" in determining the remedies available under that
provision). The dissent finds ambiguity in § 502(a)(3) because the provision
"does not authorize any specific equitable remedy[.]" (Dissent Op. at 7). From
this premise, the dissent reasons that because § 502(a)(3) authorizes
reinstatement ­ an equitable remedy ­ the statute does not clearly preclude
backpay. (Id.). We fail to see the ambiguity in § 502(a)(3) ­ a provision
that
only authorizes equitable relief ­ simply because the provision allows an
equitable award, such as reinstatement, while simultaneously precluding a legal
award, such as backpay. The dissent's reading of § 502(a)(3) renders the
modifier "equitable" superfluous. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected
"strained interpretation[s] of § 502(a)(3) in order to achieve the purpose of
ERISA to protect plan participants and beneficiaries." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261
(internal quotations omitted); see (Dissent Op. at 7-8).

18. Relying on an unpublished decision,
Plaintiffs argue we have classified
backpay as equitable under ERISA. Meyers v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 26 Fed.
Appx. 855, *862 n.11, 2002 WL 27536 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2002). In Meyers, a
case filed the same day as Great-West, we mentioned in dicta that § 510
"confines relief to the equitable remedies of backpay, restitution, and
reinstatement[.]" Id.Meyers, however, did not include a claim for backpay at
all. Rather, we considered the appropriate statute of limitations for a § 510
claim. Id. at 863-64. The panel's holding in Meyers, which did not have the
benefit of Great-West, has no bearing on the disposition of Plaintiffs'
case.

19. We also decline Plaintiffs' invitation to
craft some type of "constructive"
or "hypothetical" reinstatement rule which would allow the district court to
award legal relief, and thereby restore an aggrieved employee to the status quo
ante, upon a finding that equitable relief might have been available at some
juncture during the pendency of the case. Such a rule would be contrary to the
plain language of § 502(a)(3), which only permits an award of equitable relief.
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221.

20. The dissent submits the result in this
case rewards Defendant for
discovery violations that allegedly occurred in the district court and "carves out a
method by which employers can violate ERISA in letter and spirit, yet escape the
consequences." (Dissent Op. at 1, 9). Defendant's alleged discovery violations
are not currently before us and it would, of course, be inappropriate to read a
remedy into ERISA to sanction Defendant. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (explaining
the federal judiciary should not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how
salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide). Instead, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37
exists to curb discovery violations. Moreover, although irrelevant to the certified
question, the record does not support the dissent's implication that the litigation
protracted for eight years because of Defendant's alleged course of obstruction.
Finally, Defendant has compensated Plaintiffs for their lost benefits. Defendants
simply are not liable for extra-contractual compensatory damages. Russell, 473
U.S. at 148; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.

1. Although Great-West did not
explicitly involve the question of back pay,
the Court did consider back pay awards under Title VII in footnote four. 534
U.S. at 218 n.4. There, the Court discussed back pay awards in response to a
point raised by Justice Ginsburg's dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg argued that
because Congress treated back pay as an equitable remedy under Title VII, the
restitutionary relief in Great West should also be considered equitable. Id. at
229­230. Disagreeing, the majority contended that Congress never regarded
back pay as an inherently equitable remedy, explaining that Congress considered
back pay "equitable in Title VII only in the narrow sense that it allowed back pay
to be awarded together with equitable relief." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the
Court simply concluded that under Title VII, which explicitly intertwines back
pay with reinstatement, back pay is equitable. Id. Moreover, the Court
recognized that "Title VII has nothing to do with this case," id., and refrained
from inquiring whether the remedy of back pay is typically available in courts of
equity.

3. Applying Skinner, the majority
also states that back pay is legal under
the present facts because the plaintiffs sought primarily legal relief at the onset of
this litigation. (Maj. Op. at 4 n.1, 21 n.12.) However, in their Complaint and
First Amended Complaint, the class plaintiffs requested "damages in an amount
determined to have been sustained by . . . each member of the Plaintiff class
[and] . . . restitution to the plans for losses resulting from the breach and any
other equitable or remedial relief deemed appropriate by the Court, together with
interest and costs of suit." (MDC App. 84­85, 90­94.) (emphasis added.) The
case was bifurcated for trial, the liability phase was tried to the bench, and the
district court held that McDonnell Douglas had violated ERISA § 510. Millsap
II, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.

Following the September 5, 2001 liability order, on September 26, 2001,
the parties filed a Joint Status Report which discussed, inter alia, what kinds of
relief would be available to the class. There, the class plaintiffs reiterated their
intention to seek restoration of benefits and appropriate equitable relief,
specifically requesting reinstatement, front pay and back pay. Based on the
language in the Complaint and Amended Complaint, I cannot conclude that the
class plaintiffs sought primarily legal damages at the onset of this litigation. To
the contrary, the class plaintiffs sought both legal and equitable relief in their
Complaint, and sought back pay as an adjunct to the equitable remedy of
reinstatement in the Joint Status Report.