Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that ...
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Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.Less

Minimal Semantics

Emma Borg

Published in print: 2004-07-08

Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.

The third chapter describes generativist semantics. From 1960 onwards, aspects of structuralist semantics (componential analysis in particular) were incorporated into generative grammar. Within the ...
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The third chapter describes generativist semantics. From 1960 onwards, aspects of structuralist semantics (componential analysis in particular) were incorporated into generative grammar. Within the history of lexical semantics, this period occupies a pivotal position. It introduces an attempt to formalize semantics as part of a formal grammar. At the same time, the mentalist orientation of generative grammar creates an interest in psychological adequacy. This double extension of componential analysis raises questions about formal and psychological adequacy that motivate the strands of research that emerged after the generativist period. Cognitive semantics focuses on the psychological side. It embodies a maximalist approach that intends to study linguistic meaning as part and parcel of cognition at large. By contrast, a number of other approaches stay closer to the structuralist inspiration, exploring forms of meaning description that are in various ways more restricted (and possibly more formalisable) than what is pursued in cognitive semantics.Less

Generativist Semantics

Dirk Geeraerts

Published in print: 2009-11-12

The third chapter describes generativist semantics. From 1960 onwards, aspects of structuralist semantics (componential analysis in particular) were incorporated into generative grammar. Within the history of lexical semantics, this period occupies a pivotal position. It introduces an attempt to formalize semantics as part of a formal grammar. At the same time, the mentalist orientation of generative grammar creates an interest in psychological adequacy. This double extension of componential analysis raises questions about formal and psychological adequacy that motivate the strands of research that emerged after the generativist period. Cognitive semantics focuses on the psychological side. It embodies a maximalist approach that intends to study linguistic meaning as part and parcel of cognition at large. By contrast, a number of other approaches stay closer to the structuralist inspiration, exploring forms of meaning description that are in various ways more restricted (and possibly more formalisable) than what is pursued in cognitive semantics.

An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The ...
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An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The chapter gives an initial examination of the distinct challenges posed by advocates of dual pragmatic accounts and the precise nature of the debate between the two approaches. The chapter also looks at the notion of logical form deployed by both kinds of semantic theory.Less

A Tale of Two Theories

Emma Borg

Published in print: 2004-07-08

An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The chapter gives an initial examination of the distinct challenges posed by advocates of dual pragmatic accounts and the precise nature of the debate between the two approaches. The chapter also looks at the notion of logical form deployed by both kinds of semantic theory.

This chapter shows that the treatment of names as having nondescriptive, indefinable senses does not preclude a powerful formal semantics; that the referential properties of names can be treated ...
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This chapter shows that the treatment of names as having nondescriptive, indefinable senses does not preclude a powerful formal semantics; that the referential properties of names can be treated formally without identifying the meaning of a name with its reference; and that names can be handled within an ideational semantics, or by situation and possible worlds semantics. The key to avoiding both Russell’s and Frege’s problems is to drop the assumption that the elements of the ordered n-tuples representing situations, or the values of intension functions representing meanings, are the referents of the terms whose meanings are being represented, and to rely on the formal character of formal semantics.Less

Formal Semantics

Wayne A. Davis

Published in print: 2005-07-14

This chapter shows that the treatment of names as having nondescriptive, indefinable senses does not preclude a powerful formal semantics; that the referential properties of names can be treated formally without identifying the meaning of a name with its reference; and that names can be handled within an ideational semantics, or by situation and possible worlds semantics. The key to avoiding both Russell’s and Frege’s problems is to drop the assumption that the elements of the ordered n-tuples representing situations, or the values of intension functions representing meanings, are the referents of the terms whose meanings are being represented, and to rely on the formal character of formal semantics.

Part I of this book is a concise exposition of the expression theory of meaning, according to which meaning consists in the expression of thoughts, their component ideas, or other mental states. The ...
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Part I of this book is a concise exposition of the expression theory of meaning, according to which meaning consists in the expression of thoughts, their component ideas, or other mental states. The theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, and that thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude distinct from belief. It can account for interjections, syncategorematic terms, pejorative terms, conventional implicatures, and other cases of nondescriptive meaning that have long been seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories of meaning. Part II defends the analysis of speaker and word reference in terms of the expression of ideas by exploring the vague connection of reference with predication, and reviewing the difficulties of alternative approaches, both descriptivist and causal. Part III shows how the expression theory can account for the meaning of names, and the distinctive way in which their meaning determines their reference. The problems with Millian theories show that the meaning of a name consists in the expression of an idea. The problems with Fregean theories show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. This account of names does not preclude the use of a possible worlds or situation semantics to systematize their formal referential properties. The referential properties of ideas can also be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semantic value of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its contents. Arguments for the logical necessity of identity statements expressed using non-synonymous names are shown to be unsound, along with various twin earth arguments.Less

Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference : An Ideational Semantics

Wayne A. Davis

Published in print: 2005-07-14

Part I of this book is a concise exposition of the expression theory of meaning, according to which meaning consists in the expression of thoughts, their component ideas, or other mental states. The theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, and that thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude distinct from belief. It can account for interjections, syncategorematic terms, pejorative terms, conventional implicatures, and other cases of nondescriptive meaning that have long been seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories of meaning. Part II defends the analysis of speaker and word reference in terms of the expression of ideas by exploring the vague connection of reference with predication, and reviewing the difficulties of alternative approaches, both descriptivist and causal. Part III shows how the expression theory can account for the meaning of names, and the distinctive way in which their meaning determines their reference. The problems with Millian theories show that the meaning of a name consists in the expression of an idea. The problems with Fregean theories show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. This account of names does not preclude the use of a possible worlds or situation semantics to systematize their formal referential properties. The referential properties of ideas can also be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semantic value of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its contents. Arguments for the logical necessity of identity statements expressed using non-synonymous names are shown to be unsound, along with various twin earth arguments.

This paper presents Lewis's intensional semantics, on the basis of which he aims to answer two questions: “What sort of thing is a meaning?” and “What is the form of semantic rules whereby meanings ...
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This paper presents Lewis's intensional semantics, on the basis of which he aims to answer two questions: “What sort of thing is a meaning?” and “What is the form of semantic rules whereby meanings of compounds are built from the meanings of their constituent parts?” To this end, Lewis develops a categorically based transformational grammar. The paper provides formal treatments of such topics as intensions (for both basic and derived categories), nondeclarative sentences, quantification, and noun‐phrases.Less

General Semantics

David Lewis

Published in print: 1983-08-18

This paper presents Lewis's intensional semantics, on the basis of which he aims to answer two questions: “What sort of thing is a meaning?” and “What is the form of semantic rules whereby meanings of compounds are built from the meanings of their constituent parts?” To this end, Lewis develops a categorically based transformational grammar. The paper provides formal treatments of such topics as intensions (for both basic and derived categories), nondeclarative sentences, quantification, and noun‐phrases.

In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature ...
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In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This chapter, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of Partee (1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension.Less

Changing Notions of Linguistic Competence in the History of Formal Semantics

Barbara H. Partee

Published in print: 2018-07-12

In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This chapter, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of Partee (1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension.

As in Essay 4, Davidson rehearses the demands for an acceptable theory of meaning, and stresses the demand that the stock of concepts used by metalanguage in which the truth theory is stated extends ...
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As in Essay 4, Davidson rehearses the demands for an acceptable theory of meaning, and stresses the demand that the stock of concepts used by metalanguage in which the truth theory is stated extends minimally beyond, and ideally includes, that of the object language. He explains how this demand to keep technical machinery at a minimum is congenial to Tarksi's Convention T and his own favoured restriction to first‐order quantification. He then looks at how alternative approaches to semantics fare under this constraint and concludes that the prospects of those employing modal logics, possible world semantics, or substitutional quantification are accordingly dim. In specific, those programmes rely on relativized notions of truth, such as truth on a model, at the expense of leaving the absolute concept of truth undefined; yet it is this absolute concept we naturally apply to sentences and require when specifying their truth conditions or meanings.Less

In Defence of Convention T

Donald Davidson

Published in print: 2001-09-27

As in Essay 4, Davidson rehearses the demands for an acceptable theory of meaning, and stresses the demand that the stock of concepts used by metalanguage in which the truth theory is stated extends minimally beyond, and ideally includes, that of the object language. He explains how this demand to keep technical machinery at a minimum is congenial to Tarksi's Convention T and his own favoured restriction to first‐order quantification. He then looks at how alternative approaches to semantics fare under this constraint and concludes that the prospects of those employing modal logics, possible world semantics, or substitutional quantification are accordingly dim. In specific, those programmes rely on relativized notions of truth, such as truth on a model, at the expense of leaving the absolute concept of truth undefined; yet it is this absolute concept we naturally apply to sentences and require when specifying their truth conditions or meanings.

A recent preoccupation in computational linguistics has been the attempt to combine compositional models of formal semantics of the Montagovian type with corpus-based distributional models of word ...
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A recent preoccupation in computational linguistics has been the attempt to combine compositional models of formal semantics of the Montagovian type with corpus-based distributional models of word meaning. This chapter describes some of the relevant history and background to this attempt, and surveys some recent approaches to ‘compositional distributional semantics’. It is argued that a failure to distinguish composition proper from one of its frequent side-effects, word-sense disambiguation, means that these approaches fail to demonstrate genuine compositionality. The chapter concludes with some suggestions as to how genuinely compositional distributional semantics might be achieved.Less

Distributional Semantic Models

Stephen Pulman

Published in print: 2013-02-21

A recent preoccupation in computational linguistics has been the attempt to combine compositional models of formal semantics of the Montagovian type with corpus-based distributional models of word meaning. This chapter describes some of the relevant history and background to this attempt, and surveys some recent approaches to ‘compositional distributional semantics’. It is argued that a failure to distinguish composition proper from one of its frequent side-effects, word-sense disambiguation, means that these approaches fail to demonstrate genuine compositionality. The chapter concludes with some suggestions as to how genuinely compositional distributional semantics might be achieved.

The interpretation of pronouns and anaphora in ordinary English has been analyzed within a variety of frameworks in formal semantics as involving variables and variable-binding operators. This ...
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The interpretation of pronouns and anaphora in ordinary English has been analyzed within a variety of frameworks in formal semantics as involving variables and variable-binding operators. This chapter challenges the widely held assumption that English nominals, including pronouns, can be understood within the syntactic-derivational and model-theoretical frameworks of predicate logic. The first section of the chapter outlines a program for a directly referential semantics of English nominals and contrasts it with the formalist program that has been dominant in the semantic tradition since Frege and Russell. The second section describes two semantic models for pronouns consistent with the program outlined in the first section. Finally, the third section argues for an understanding of reference as a form of perception. The semantic reference of pronouns depends on the causal history of a particular use of the expression, rather than on language-internal semantic rules.Less

A Unified Treatment of (Pro-)Nominals in Ordinary English

Joseph AlmogPaul NicholsJessica Pepp

Published in print: 2015-03-01

The interpretation of pronouns and anaphora in ordinary English has been analyzed within a variety of frameworks in formal semantics as involving variables and variable-binding operators. This chapter challenges the widely held assumption that English nominals, including pronouns, can be understood within the syntactic-derivational and model-theoretical frameworks of predicate logic. The first section of the chapter outlines a program for a directly referential semantics of English nominals and contrasts it with the formalist program that has been dominant in the semantic tradition since Frege and Russell. The second section describes two semantic models for pronouns consistent with the program outlined in the first section. Finally, the third section argues for an understanding of reference as a form of perception. The semantic reference of pronouns depends on the causal history of a particular use of the expression, rather than on language-internal semantic rules.

This chapter introduces the linguistic phenomena that are called “genericity” (both the so‐called reference to a kind and the characterizing statement types) and shows how they have figured into a ...
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This chapter introduces the linguistic phenomena that are called “genericity” (both the so‐called reference to a kind and the characterizing statement types) and shows how they have figured into a wide range of fields, such as ethics and philosophy of science (both within philosophy), commonsense reasoning and nonmonotonic logic (within artificial intelligence), and conversational implicature (within pragmatics). It also discusses the main threads within the formal semantics literature about how generic statements ought to be described.Less

Generics: A Philosophical Introduction

Francis Jeffry Pelletier

Published in print: 2009-10-15

This chapter introduces the linguistic phenomena that are called “genericity” (both the so‐called reference to a kind and the characterizing statement types) and shows how they have figured into a wide range of fields, such as ethics and philosophy of science (both within philosophy), commonsense reasoning and nonmonotonic logic (within artificial intelligence), and conversational implicature (within pragmatics). It also discusses the main threads within the formal semantics literature about how generic statements ought to be described.

This chapter aims to summarize previous approaches to the too-many-meanings puzzle and the too-many-surface-structures puzzle, providing a uniquely detailed and up-to-date appreciation of recent ...
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This chapter aims to summarize previous approaches to the too-many-meanings puzzle and the too-many-surface-structures puzzle, providing a uniquely detailed and up-to-date appreciation of recent literature on possession. It begins by setting out the scale of the puzzles by examining functional-typological work. The second section introduces the standard generative approach to the too-many-surface structures puzzle, which I refer to as the Freeze/Kayne tradition. This approach, associated with Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993) (but with antecedents going back much earlier), proposes that the vast surface diversity in possession constructions is to be derived via movement from one or two underlyingly identical structures. The third section looks at extensions of and reactions to the Freeze/Kayne tradition. In the fourth section, various approaches to the too-many-meanings puzzle are discussed, much of it from the formal semantics literature. The main conclusions of this overview are (i) that the Freeze/Kayne tradition is correct to treat HAVE and BE as two realizations of the same element; but (ii) some of the surface differences among possession constructions involve real underlying differences in argument structure; and (iii) the meaning of possession sentences does not come from HAVE and BE themselves, but from other elements in the structure.Less

Previous Approaches to Predicative Possession: A Guide for the Perplexed

Neil Myler

Published in print: 2016-10-21

This chapter aims to summarize previous approaches to the too-many-meanings puzzle and the too-many-surface-structures puzzle, providing a uniquely detailed and up-to-date appreciation of recent literature on possession. It begins by setting out the scale of the puzzles by examining functional-typological work. The second section introduces the standard generative approach to the too-many-surface structures puzzle, which I refer to as the Freeze/Kayne tradition. This approach, associated with Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993) (but with antecedents going back much earlier), proposes that the vast surface diversity in possession constructions is to be derived via movement from one or two underlyingly identical structures. The third section looks at extensions of and reactions to the Freeze/Kayne tradition. In the fourth section, various approaches to the too-many-meanings puzzle are discussed, much of it from the formal semantics literature. The main conclusions of this overview are (i) that the Freeze/Kayne tradition is correct to treat HAVE and BE as two realizations of the same element; but (ii) some of the surface differences among possession constructions involve real underlying differences in argument structure; and (iii) the meaning of possession sentences does not come from HAVE and BE themselves, but from other elements in the structure.

The conclusion shows how the theory, with its derivative explanations of the different clusters of empirical problems, begins to allow for the systematic reassembly of the puzzle of language, and for ...
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The conclusion shows how the theory, with its derivative explanations of the different clusters of empirical problems, begins to allow for the systematic reassembly of the puzzle of language, and for the construction of a new common ground for the linguistic sciences, where cognitive scientists and social scientists, formalists and functionalists, the synchronically or diachronically oriented, neuroscientists and semioticians—all the way from formal semantics to literature, history, and critical studies—may begin to see that they are all working on the same phenomenon.Less

Conclusion: Reassembling the Puzzle

Daniel Dor

Published in print: 2015-09-01

The conclusion shows how the theory, with its derivative explanations of the different clusters of empirical problems, begins to allow for the systematic reassembly of the puzzle of language, and for the construction of a new common ground for the linguistic sciences, where cognitive scientists and social scientists, formalists and functionalists, the synchronically or diachronically oriented, neuroscientists and semioticians—all the way from formal semantics to literature, history, and critical studies—may begin to see that they are all working on the same phenomenon.

Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view ...
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Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.Less

Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language

Friederike Moltmann

Published in print: 2013-04-28

Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.

Within formal semantics, research on the expression of modality in natural language has traditionally focused on verbs. This book brings together novel work on the semantics and pragmatics of some ...
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Within formal semantics, research on the expression of modality in natural language has traditionally focused on verbs. This book brings together novel work on the semantics and pragmatics of some nominal expressions that also convey modality. The book focuses on indefinites that can convey ignorance on the part of the speaker with respect to which individual satisfies the existential claim that they make. Despite the fact that epistemic indefinites have attracted some attention in the recent semantics literature, we still do not have a good understanding of the phenomenon: there is currently no agreement as to what the source of their epistemic component is, we lack sufficient cross-linguistic data to develop a semantic typology of these items, and the parallelisms and differences between epistemic indefinites and other expressions that convey epistemic modality have not been explored in depth. In this volume, the reader will find novel empirical observations on and important theoretical insights into epistemic indefinites, together with discussions of related topics (e.g. modal free relatives, modified numerals, and epistemic modals). This brings us one step closer to developing a semantic typology of epistemic indefinites that explores the place of these expressions within a general typology of modal items.Less

Epistemic Indefinites : Exploring Modality Beyond the Verbal Domain

Published in print: 2015-04-30

Within formal semantics, research on the expression of modality in natural language has traditionally focused on verbs. This book brings together novel work on the semantics and pragmatics of some nominal expressions that also convey modality. The book focuses on indefinites that can convey ignorance on the part of the speaker with respect to which individual satisfies the existential claim that they make. Despite the fact that epistemic indefinites have attracted some attention in the recent semantics literature, we still do not have a good understanding of the phenomenon: there is currently no agreement as to what the source of their epistemic component is, we lack sufficient cross-linguistic data to develop a semantic typology of these items, and the parallelisms and differences between epistemic indefinites and other expressions that convey epistemic modality have not been explored in depth. In this volume, the reader will find novel empirical observations on and important theoretical insights into epistemic indefinites, together with discussions of related topics (e.g. modal free relatives, modified numerals, and epistemic modals). This brings us one step closer to developing a semantic typology of epistemic indefinites that explores the place of these expressions within a general typology of modal items.

This chapter closes the book by tracing the development of its key themes from the end of World War II up to the present day. In particular, different attitudes and approaches to the study of meaning ...
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This chapter closes the book by tracing the development of its key themes from the end of World War II up to the present day. In particular, different attitudes and approaches to the study of meaning in linguistics are investigated. The first part of the chapter looks at the retreat into formalism and distancing from the problems of meaning that characterised American Structuralism in the wake of Leonard Bloomfield and was continued in the generative grammar of Noam Chomsky. The second part examines efforts at linguistic semantics, focusing on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage of Anna Wierzbicka and her recent proposal for Minimal English.Less

Epilogue

James McElvenny

Published in print: 2018-06-01

This chapter closes the book by tracing the development of its key themes from the end of World War II up to the present day. In particular, different attitudes and approaches to the study of meaning in linguistics are investigated. The first part of the chapter looks at the retreat into formalism and distancing from the problems of meaning that characterised American Structuralism in the wake of Leonard Bloomfield and was continued in the generative grammar of Noam Chomsky. The second part examines efforts at linguistic semantics, focusing on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage of Anna Wierzbicka and her recent proposal for Minimal English.

Speakers can modulate the meaning and effects of their utterances by changing the location of stress or of pauses, and by choosing the melody of their sentences—jointly referred to as Information ...
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Speakers can modulate the meaning and effects of their utterances by changing the location of stress or of pauses, and by choosing the melody of their sentences—jointly referred to as Information Structure. Although these factors often do not change the literal meaning of what is said, tools and models to describe these more elusive aspects of linguistic meaning have, in recent years, been developed in formal semantics and pragmatics. This volume provides a guide to what we know about the interplay between prosody—stress, phrasing, and melody—and interpretation—felicity in discourse, inferences, and emphasis. It presents the main phenomena involved, and introduces the details of current formal analyses of prosodic structure, relevant aspects of discourse structure, intonational meaning, and, most importantly, the relations between them. Büring explains and compares the most influential theories in these areas, and outlines the questions that remain open for future research.Less

Intonation and Meaning

Daniel Büring

Published in print: 2016-07-28

Speakers can modulate the meaning and effects of their utterances by changing the location of stress or of pauses, and by choosing the melody of their sentences—jointly referred to as Information Structure. Although these factors often do not change the literal meaning of what is said, tools and models to describe these more elusive aspects of linguistic meaning have, in recent years, been developed in formal semantics and pragmatics. This volume provides a guide to what we know about the interplay between prosody—stress, phrasing, and melody—and interpretation—felicity in discourse, inferences, and emphasis. It presents the main phenomena involved, and introduces the details of current formal analyses of prosodic structure, relevant aspects of discourse structure, intonational meaning, and, most importantly, the relations between them. Büring explains and compares the most influential theories in these areas, and outlines the questions that remain open for future research.

Montague’s framework for semantic interpretation has always been less well adapted to the interpretation of words than that of syntactic constructions. In the late 1970s, David Dowty addressed this ...
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Montague’s framework for semantic interpretation has always been less well adapted to the interpretation of words than that of syntactic constructions. In the late 1970s, David Dowty addressed this problem, concentrating on the interpretation of tense, aspect, inchoatives, and causatives in an extension of Montague’s Intensional Logic. This chapters seeks to revive this project, conceiving it as part of a larger task aiming at the interpretation of derivational morphology. An alternative to Dowty’s approach is suggested. This approach, while it does not provide a global interpretation of causality, seems to work well with a wide range of the causal constructions that are important in word formation.Less

Formal semantics for causal constructions

Richmond Thomason

Published in print: 2014-12-18

Montague’s framework for semantic interpretation has always been less well adapted to the interpretation of words than that of syntactic constructions. In the late 1970s, David Dowty addressed this problem, concentrating on the interpretation of tense, aspect, inchoatives, and causatives in an extension of Montague’s Intensional Logic. This chapters seeks to revive this project, conceiving it as part of a larger task aiming at the interpretation of derivational morphology. An alternative to Dowty’s approach is suggested. This approach, while it does not provide a global interpretation of causality, seems to work well with a wide range of the causal constructions that are important in word formation.

This introductory chapter outlines the significant contributions of Donald Davidson in contemporary philosophy of mind and language. It provides a framework in understanding Davidson’s basic ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the significant contributions of Donald Davidson in contemporary philosophy of mind and language. It provides a framework in understanding Davidson’s basic principles concerning general theory of meaning and content, formal semantics, the theories of truth, the logic of explanation and action, and metaphysics and epistemology. It looks into two questions that form the core of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) What determines meaning? (2) What form does a theory take that describes linguistic competence, and ultimately even the structure and contents of the mind? It describes key points in the Davidsonian structure of philosophy and semantics, emphasizing on the radical interpreter argument as a guide through the Davidsonian system of thought.Less

Introduction

Kathrin Glüer

Published in print: 2011-12-22

This introductory chapter outlines the significant contributions of Donald Davidson in contemporary philosophy of mind and language. It provides a framework in understanding Davidson’s basic principles concerning general theory of meaning and content, formal semantics, the theories of truth, the logic of explanation and action, and metaphysics and epistemology. It looks into two questions that form the core of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) What determines meaning? (2) What form does a theory take that describes linguistic competence, and ultimately even the structure and contents of the mind? It describes key points in the Davidsonian structure of philosophy and semantics, emphasizing on the radical interpreter argument as a guide through the Davidsonian system of thought.

This chapter offers a basic introduction to the different approaches philosophers take to causation. These approaches may be divided into two categories: dependency theories, in which a cause C ...
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This chapter offers a basic introduction to the different approaches philosophers take to causation. These approaches may be divided into two categories: dependency theories, in which a cause C causes an effect E just in case E depends on C in some way (familiar to linguists through David Dowty’s 1979 adaptation of David Lewis’s 1973 theory of causation), and production theories, in which C causes E just in case a certain configuration of influences holds of C and E, or some conserved quantity is transmitted from C to E. The chapter argues that a familiarity with these theories would be fruitful for linguists working on causation in language, and give examples (defeasible causation, agentivity, and causal chain mappings) where the choice of causal theory has ramifications for the linguistic theory. The chapter argues further that linguistic theory has the potential to inform philosophers and cognitive scientists working on causation as well.Less

Theories of causation should inform linguistic theory and vice versa

Bridget CopleyPhillip Wolff

Published in print: 2014-12-18

This chapter offers a basic introduction to the different approaches philosophers take to causation. These approaches may be divided into two categories: dependency theories, in which a cause C causes an effect E just in case E depends on C in some way (familiar to linguists through David Dowty’s 1979 adaptation of David Lewis’s 1973 theory of causation), and production theories, in which C causes E just in case a certain configuration of influences holds of C and E, or some conserved quantity is transmitted from C to E. The chapter argues that a familiarity with these theories would be fruitful for linguists working on causation in language, and give examples (defeasible causation, agentivity, and causal chain mappings) where the choice of causal theory has ramifications for the linguistic theory. The chapter argues further that linguistic theory has the potential to inform philosophers and cognitive scientists working on causation as well.