THE WEATHER BRIEFER is obsolete, a victim of net-centricity. In a
world where everyone is connected, people affected by weather will
access related information directly and integrate it into their decision
processes. No longer will "Stormy" the weather briefer, acting
as both an expert and a bottleneck, serve as gatekeeper to weather
databases. To remain relevant to net-centric operations, air force
weather (AFW) must aggressively develop support for net-centric access
and redefine the role of the weather briefer. Specifically, if it wishes
to meet the demands of increasingly net-centric decision makers, despite
a shrinking manpower pool, afw must automate the forecast-tailoring
process, remove the weather briefer, and address inconsistency in the
weather database.

Background

Understanding the interaction between net-centricity and AFW
operations requires some awareness of the fundamental concepts of each.
According to The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, "NCW [network-centric warfare] is characterized by the ability of
geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of shared
battlespace awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the
commander's intent." (1) increased sharing of information via
the network at all levels of command likely will result in massed
effects (increased combat power), decision superiority, heightened speed
of command, and self-synchronization. (2) as described in the
Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, when connected, units
can pursue a commander's intent without repeated contact with
superiors to synchronize operations, relying on shared awareness based
on consistent information to self-synchronize. (3)

The Transformation Planning Guidance of 2003 specifically states
that "implementation of the Department's force transformation
strategy will shift us from an industrial age to an information age
military. Information age military forces will be less platform-centric
and more network-centric." (4) NCw will increase connectivity at
lower echelons of command and throughout functions other than command
and control (C2). The Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept
notes that "since C2 nodes are already fairly well connected, the
real power of the Net-Centric environment will be in connecting the
other functions and extremities of the force." (5)

The Office of force Transformation monitors the progress of the
transformation effort. The Transformation Planning Guidance directs each
of the services to write a road map that addresses, among other things,
its conversion to NCw. Service NCw programs include the Joint Tactical
radio System, air force Link-16 airborne data link, Department of
Defense (DOD)--wide Global information Grid network-infrastructure
program, Navy Cooperative engagement Capability data link, and Army
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below data-link system. (6)

In addition, looking to improve their forces' shared
situational awareness and collaborative decision making, the services
are actively increasing the connectivity of their forces and
experimenting with new tactics, techniques, and procedures to take
advantage of the new capability. (7) Despite the newness of NCw
technologies and procedures, success stories have emerged from Operation
iraqi freedom. for example, data links and the blue force Tracker system
have reduced incidents of fratricide, and procedures enabled by new data
links have allowed the development and striking of targets within 45
minutes. (8)

Before discussing weather operations, we should define the term
decision maker as used in this discussion. Specifically, such an
individual receives weather information and takes action based on that
information--a purposely broad denotation since the environment affects
virtually every mission and function to some degree. Indeed, the
substance of this article could affect anyone who has access to weather
information.

For weather operations, air force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-9.1
Weather Operations, describes how "air force weather operations
execute five core processes--collection, analysis, prediction,
tailoring, and integration--to characterize the environment and exploit
environmental information." (9) Such characterization includes
collection of environmental measurements taken by the DOD, US
government, and foreign instrumentation; analysis of the measurements;
and prediction of the future state of the environment. These actions
produce a four-dimensional representation (latitude, longitude,
altitude, and time) of the environment, consisting of such environmental
parameters as wind speed/direction, temperature, pressure, humidity,
clouds, and precipitation. In order for military decision makers to
exploit this information, we must derive such decision parameters as
ceiling, visibility, cloud-free line of sight, and thermal contrast from
the environmental parameters, some of which (e.g., wind speed) double as
decision parameters. We tailor forecasted decision parameters to a
particular mission by retrieving them for the time(s) and location(s)
needed, packaging the information into usable form (maps, tables,
graphs, etc.), and formatting the result for integration into the
decision maker's decision process. If the decision maker provides
operational limitations (i.e., thresholds), we may highlight these in
the final product. We then measure or generate weather data and provide
decision makers weather information in the form of a product--a
collection of information in a particular package (text, map, or graph)
and format (file type). In the future, we anticipate that net-centric
data management and services will make the processing and communication
of a tremendous amount of information feasible and timely.

Weather information made available to decision makers must be
accurate, timely, relevant, consistent, and accessible. Accurate
information facilitates correct decisions more often than incorrect
ones. Timely information prevents delayed decisions. Relevant
information allows the decision maker to pinpoint pertinent data.
Consistent information guarantees that individuals involved in a
collaborative decision process do not receive conflicting statements
about the weather. and accessible information permits decision makers to
find what they need in a usable form.

Trends

Increasing connectivity, net-centric decision making with its
demand for consistency, and decreasing AFW manpower will reduce
AFW's ability to support net-centric decision makers in the future
unless it shifts resources from human-based forecast tailoring to a more
automated approach.

Increasing Connectivity

NCW's network revolution will radically change communication
modes, categorized here by the degree of network-interface usage. In
this construct, machine communications require a network interface, but
human communications do not. For example, machine-to-machine (M2M)
communication involves one computer application automatically requesting
information from another and the other automatically responding via the
network. Human-to-human (H2H) communication does not require a network
interface even though some voice communications will eventually take
place over the network (e.g., Voice-over-internet Protocol). Examples
include a briefing to a commander and his staff, a telephone
conversation between action officers, or ground troops passing target
coordinates to aircraft over voice links. Machine-to-human (M2H)
communication requires a network interface, as when a human uses a
computer to access a web page or query a database.

As decision makers at all echelons gain network access, the primary
mode of communication for weather information will change from h2h to
M2M and M2H. No longer the primarymode, voice communications will yield
to network communication, which permits the transmission of detailed
data. Freed from communications within line of sight or on certain
frequencies, decision makers will have access to the entire network (via
reachback). Major C2 nodes have traditionally possessed this kind of
access, but the vision for NCW entails extending this kind of
connectivity to the most tactical levels: the cockpit, tank, platoon
member, and so forth. Decision makers who have experienced difficulty
accessing weather information in the past, due to limitations in
communications or AFW personnel resources, will demand access--and the
number of decision makers served will rise.

Increasing Demand for Consistency

Self-synchronization based on shared awareness puts a premium on
consistency of information. 10 Contradictory information frustrates
attempts to collaborate and self-synchronize since collaborators must
resolve conflicts before working on the tactical decision at hand.

All decision makers in an operations area must get their weather
information from a consistent and authoritative source to prevent
disruption of coordinated operations. To cite a simple example, a
fighter mission launches, expecting marginal conditions in a refueling
track, but the tanker cancels since its information shows conditions out
of (the tanker's) limits. Although this scenario is manageable,
imagine decision makers involved in a complex joint and/or coalition
operation attempting to plan their part of the overall operation and
trying to avoid or mitigate the effects of weather. One of the four
principles of afw operations, consistency serves as the basis of the
call for "one theater, one forecast," found in Joint
Publication 3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. (11)

Decreasing Air Force Weather Manpower

Recent budget uncertainty caused by the ongoing global war on
terror, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2005, and former
secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld's call for transformation has
resulted in a new plan for the future of the air force. Faced with
replacing aging aircraft and no promise of additional funds, the service
plans to cut approximately 40,000 troops (12 percent) by the end of
fiscal year 2009. (12) In addition, Secretary of the air force Michael
Wynne introduced Air Force Smart Operations 21, a program designed to
improve processes and reduce inefficiency. Secretary wynne seeks to
institutionalize continuous process improvement and "look at
innovative ways to use our materiel and personnel more
efficiently." (13)

These reductions continue a long pattern of drawing down the air
force after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reductions in AFW's
enlisted personnel since 1985 have proved slower than those in the
overall air force--not the case with officer reductions, which dipped in
2001 to as low as 43 percent of the 1985 levels compared to the overall
air force low of 62 percent in 2001. (14)

Faced with pressure to reduce manpower and costs, afw historically
has automated processes to reduce manpower, consolidated work centers to
reduce overhead, and leveraged weather data produced by others (e.g.,
the National Oceanographic and atmospheric administration and US Navy
capabilities). afw must cope with the challenge of simultaneously
reacting to budget and manpower reductions while funding and managing a
transformation to meet the demands of NCw.

Continuing Human-Based Forecast Tailoring

Forecast tailoring entails translation of measured or predicted
environmental parameters (e.g., temperature, wind speed, relative
humidity, etc.) to decision parameters (e.g., heatstress index,
crosswind, lock-on range, etc.) valid at mission-specific locations and
times. For example, we utilize wind measurements at the approach end of
the runway to calculate the crosswind component, which the supervisor of
flying uses to decide whether to continue flight operations or divert
aircraft to another field.

In 1997 AFW began an ambitious reengineering effort that redefined
much of the weather function's organization and rearranged tasks
among weather units. In the June 1998 edition of Flying Safety, Brig Gen Fred P. Lewis, Air Force director of weather, announced his decision to
continue face-to-face weather briefings, provided by weather flights,
despite a decrease in manpower. (15) Operational weather squadrons would
perform some functions of the old weather flights at regional centers,
allowing smaller flights to concentrate on tailoring weather information
for their supported decision makers. Implementation of this concept
emphasized having weather technicians tailor information to every
mission and deliver the resulting product to the decision maker.

Arguably the optimum support methodology, dedicating a weather
technician to every mission faces even more limitations today than in
1997. Obviously, the time required per product and number of weather
technicians on duty at a given time constrain the rate of production. In
order to provide quality support, these technicians must learn the
missions and environmental impacts for all of their supported decision
makers--something that often calls for extensive on-the-job training. To
make timely products, they must know the mission schedule and profiles
and adjust to changes, such as delays in takeoff time or changes in the
route of flight. En route target changes prove almost impossible to
support unless we can dedicate a technician to a particular mission. The
limited manpower available to meet demands forces weather flights to
compromise by developing a single product to meet multiple missions
(commonly referred to as a weather "flimsy" for multiple
training missions), putting in longer hours, reducing time spent on each
product, or simply admitting an inability to support some decision
makers. This situation results in delayed, less accurate, and less
detailed support, compared to the product created by using M2M access to
weather databases. Over the next few years, afw must contend with the
prospect of asking a decreasing number of its technicians to support
decision makers who prefer that their detailed weather information come
from M2M or M2H interfaces.

Actions Required

To address this multifaceted and complex challenge, AFW must
automate the forecast-tailoring process to meet the increasing demand
for M2M and M2H access, change from a product-centric to an
information-centric process, and reduce inconsistencies in the weather
databases available to decision makers.

Automate Forecast Tailoring

The automation of forecast tailoring will permit decision makers to
access M2H web sites or program their decision-support-system
applications to access M2M-enabled weather databases directly. They will
no longer need to request products from a weather technician. Automation
is preferable for several reasons:

* Forecast tailoring involves gathering information from many
sources, determining values for the mission's locations and times,
and then putting the information into the proper package and
format--tasks easily automated.

* humans limit the level of detail that can be provided in a timely
manner. Network access, however, allows decision makers to receive much
more detailed information--for example, by indicating conditions (winds,
temperature, turbulence, icing, likelihood of thunderstorms, etc.) along
a route of flight at every mile or minute instead of simply using maps
that require crew interpretation.

* Unlike human processes, which introduce a degree of inconsistency
and error because they are not perfectly repeatable, automated
processes, when fully mature, quantify the error because of their
repeatability. Using the earlier fighter/tanker example, we see that
automated forecast tailoring would ensure that the fighter and tanker
receive the same refueling-orbit forecast since identical algorithms
would generate it from the same information in the database.

* The number of possible products increases dramatically. Decision
makers can use software written for a particular mapping or graphing
technique to create all types of products without incurring a large
manpower requirement or training burden.

* Perhaps the most compelling argument speaks to the expandable
nature of network access--its ability to handle a large influx of
decision makers without the need for additional manpower. In large,
complex contingency situations, in which deployment of weather personnel
may lag behind combat operations, such access can handle the spike in
requests for weather information without adding manpower.

* Finally, in the few cases that justify using H2H, weather
personnel can employ the developed M2H methodologies to develop their
responses to H2H requests.

Of course, the quality of automation software remains critical to
the success of implementing this approach. Patient development and
testing as well as gradual implementation will prove key to building
trust in the new technology. Several obstacles, however, block the path
of a fully automated solution:

* Decision makers who prefer M2H and M2M must accept the
responsibility of maintaining access to weather information and
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the content. This
fundamental cultural change shifts the burden of retrieving weather
information from the weather technician to the decision maker.

* Some decision makers will resist using network-based access
methods. The need for h2h weather information, presented by the person
who made the forecast, repeats the argument used by AFW reengineering to
retain human-based forecast tailoring. However, when pressed, many
decision makers admit they are trying to assess the uncertainty in the
forecast by interacting with the presenter. (16) The fact that AFW has
provided decision makers very little in the way of uncertainty
assessments with weather predictions constitutes a serious shortcoming
in its past support of those individuals. Weather predictions'
varying degrees of uncertainty arise from the initial indeterminate state of the environment, primarily due to shortcomings of observation
methodologies and coverage. Knowing this, decision makers must
"look Stormy in the eye" to assess the uncertainty in the
forecast. AFW has recognized this shortcoming and is developing
objective methods to quantify uncertainty and include it in the weather
database for retrieval by decision makers--a new capability reflected in
AFW's Characterizing the Environment Enabling Concept, released in
april 2006. (17) Because we do not yet have a methodology for humans to
quantify uncertainty objectively, we must use subjective methods that
depend on the widely varying skills of individual forecasters.

* automation may affect accuracy. Currently, when forecasters
tailor products for decision makers, they make adjustments to
computer-based forecasts to account for model errors and biases, which
usually, but not always, improve the accuracy of the information. If
taking the human out of forecast tailoring results in a significant drop
in accuracy, decision makers will demand reintroduction of the human.
People should remain part of the process until the decision maker can
pull from the database a product equal to or greater in accuracy and
detail than the one previously available. We should not compromise
accuracy for better access and more detail. If a human can improve the
accuracy of weather information, his or her efforts must occur in the
"prediction" process, thus making the results available in the
weather-information database.

* Automating weather-impact assessments presents a challenge. AFW
has gone to great lengths to catalogue environmental impacts on the
various missions and operations it supports, believing they serve
decision makers better by providing not only weather information but
also the "so what" aspects. Even though decision makers want
impact assessments, weather personnel may not possess adequate
qualifications to make them. Decision makers should assess environmental
impacts to their operations because of their familiarity with them and
the possible work-arounds. To help its personnel in this endeavor, afw,
in cooperation with the army research Laboratory, has developed rule
sets to derive operational-impact assessments from decision parameters.
(18) in a net-centric environment, conversion of these aids to a
web-based service would give decision makers full control over the rule
sets so they can modify them to suit their situation.

* Some decision processes require an environmental expert. in cases
involving fluid, interactive decision processes and operations sensitive
to the environment, decision makers may designate an individual to
assess environmental impacts instead of accessing the database
themselves. This designated environmental expert (not necessarily a
weather technician) could use M2h interfaces and web services to develop
the necessary mission-tailored information.

Change from Product-Centric to Info-Centric

A decision to use network access in the future would require making
any human adjustments to the information in the net-centric database--a
shift that will force AFW to change its operations from product-centric
to information-centric. AFW must concentrate its efforts (particularly
its manpower) on optimizing the accuracy of decision parameters and rely
on automation to generate the products. Several disadvantages accompany
the product-centric approach:

* In most cases, manual production ties AFW's manpower to a
schedule, eliminating the option to skip products or allow issuance of
automated ones. Limited manpower constrains the number of different
products and the frequency of updates.

* Weather personnel must make the products, even during completely
benign weather, when an automated product would suffice.

* If demand for a particular product increases, manpower must shift
to meet it. An information-centric approach would involve deriving
products from the database, freeing personnel to modify the data as
needed without concern about actual production.

In this effort, AFW can follow the lead of the National weather
Service, which is adopting an information-centric approach by
implementing the National Digital forecast Database. (19) The
service's forecasters adjust a database at the office and use
product-generation software to create everything from terminal-aerodrome
forecasts, to severe-weather warnings, to the voice on the National
Oceanographic and atmospheric administration's weather radio.

AFW is slowly working toward information-centric operations. In
January 2006, it completed the Exploit Environmental Information in
Net-Centric Operations Enabling Concept--the best statement of
AFW's intent to move to information-centric processes. (20) Though
placing human "adjustments" in the tailoring process, the
document calls for making the results available in the weather database
for access by decision makers. AFW's Joint environmental Toolkit
program, initiated in December 2005, includes some requirements for
establishing information-centric forecast operations. The program's
legacy requirements, which will be of use during the transition, may
take priority if the program continues over schedule and over budget.
(21)

The transition still needs momentum. Even as of March 2007, air
force instruction (AFI) 15-128, Air and Space Weather Operations: Roles
and Responsibilities, required very specific products, tasking weather
flights to "develop and conduct a mission execution forecast
process to tailor weather products for operational users" and to
"provide tailored weather effects products from Tactical Decision
aids and the integrated weather effects Decision aid to predict go/no go
weather thresholds as coordinated with the host/parent unit." (22)

Improving Consistency

As previously mentioned, NCW's shared awareness and
collaborative decision making require consistent information.
Inconsistency manifests itself in several forms, the simplest being
redundancy. If two collaborating decision makers get their weather
information from different sources, they will likely receive varying
forecasts because of the differences in forecast models, human
forecasters, or even tailoring software. Temporal inconsistency appears
when one uses new information to update a forecast for a particular time
and place. Since errors increase with time (e.g., the forecast for
Monday issued on friday [three-day forecast] is less accurate than the
one issued on Saturday [two-day]), forecasts are updated until the last
minute before an operation. Spatial inconsistency usually appears on
boundaries between forecast models or agencies. In most cases, due to
the natural variability of weather, spatial inconsistencies are not
obvious. However, in some cases, usually in categorical forecasts (e.g.,
light, moderate, or severe turbulence), an inconsistency occurs that
weather variability can't explain. Unfortunately, inserting humans
into the prediction may often improve accuracy yet reduce consistency
since two forecasters given the same inputs will produce different
outputs.

To eradicate inconsistency completely, all individuals involved in
making collaborative decisions must access the same, perfectly
consistent weather database. To optimize consistency in the database, we
would have to adjudicate or fuse (otherwise known as
"ensemble") different forecast-model solutions and carefully
monitor any human involvement to ensure consistency. (23) we can meet
the first requirement in the net-centric world of the future, but
control over information access is not absolute. The second requirement
becomes possible only by centrally controlling production processes and
reducing human involvement to a centrally manageable scale. Finally, if
humans do improve the accuracy of the information they process, would
reducing human involvement sacrifice accuracy for the sake of
consistency?

AFW, the Navy, and the National weather Service generate and
maintain overlapping and redundant weather databases. Within AFW,
redundant databases exist among the air force weather agency's
production center and regional operational weather squadrons. Although
Headquarters USAF/A3O's Managing Net-Centric Environmental Data and
Services Enabling Concept describes how afw will try to solve this
problem, implementation proceeds slowly. (24) We must still resolve
interservice and interagency issues regarding database authority.

The Way Ahead

Changing AFW without destroying its relationship with decision
makers means that AFW leadership must develop the required technologies
and carefully manage transitions, including actively changing AFW's
and decision makers' cultures.

Technology

AFW's future lies in the development of the flexible,
automated forecast-tailoring applications advocated here. If these
applications prove unreliable or difficult to employ, decision makers
will not use them and will insist on having a weather technician provide
their information at the same time the corporate AirForce is cutting
weather manpower. Weather support will suffer, and we will lose
opportunities to anticipate and exploit weather information.

We must ensure the effectiveness of applications that enable
weather technicians to generate or adjust information in the weather
databases instead of creating mission-tailored products. Prior to
entering into development, AFW must make some effort to verify that
human involvement improves the accuracy of information. By assuming that
humans always improve accuracy, AFW could end up spending precious
software-development funds (and time) on applications that provide
little or no benefit to the decision maker.

AFW must implement standard M2H and M2M interfaces as soon as
possible and make them available to developers of decision support
systems. if AFW delays, it will also lose opportunities to integrate
weather information into key decision cycles.

Transitions

We must carefully manage three transitions to reach the proposed
end state: changing decision makers' interfaces from H2H to M2H or
M2M by using automated forecast-tailoring applications, changing weather
technicians' practice of creating mission-tailored products to
adjusting weather information in the weather database, and changing the
DOD meteorology community from decentralized to centralized control of
distribution.

The transition from H2H to M2H/M2M involves two parts. First, AFW
must establish a candidate M2H or M2M interface. Manageability requires
that decision makers have a standard interface with enough flexibility
to fit many of their specific product needs. Traditionally AFW has
allowed embedded weather technicians to develop products with their
supported decision makers. Usage of a standard interface, however,
demands gathering, prioritizing, and translating those product
requirements into a set of production capabilities. Second, we must
convince decision makers of the advantages of transitioning to M2H or
M2M, taking the steps necessary to adapt their processes to the new mode
of communication. We should identify prototype decision makers for
initial transition in order to establish models for similar decision
makers. For example, a candidate F-16 unit should make the transition
and set procedures for other F-16 units to follow. AFW should centrally
monitor these efforts, not only to assist if problems occur but also to
determine when it can move weather technicians to other tasks and
locations, at which time afw must replace their expertise and
availability to answer questions with online information, a centralized call center, and/or traveling capability.

The move from product-centric to information-centric forecasting
will require a major revision of AFW's instructions and training
syllabi as they relate to forecast tailoring. This represents a
significant change in afw culture, in which forecast tailoring has
served as the central justification for military weather forces. Today,
regional operational weather squadrons perform some functions in an
information-centric manner insofar as they issue regional products
related to all missions and provide the basis for mission-tailored
products. More weather technicians must switch focus from mission to
weather. For example, a technician at a weather flight would no longer
produce a series of mission-tailored flight weather briefings (DOD form
175-1) for C-130 intratheater supply missions in Iraq since automated
forecast-tailoring software would generate those products, based on the
crews' request. Instead, the weather technician, probably at an
operational weather squadron working in a team environment, would
concentrate on accurately forecasting the temperature, winds,
precipitation, turbulence, and icing associated with the cold front
passing through iraq that consequently affects all missions in that
region. Technicians in weather flights would no longer generate products
but would serve as "recognized experts, facilitating access to and
understanding of environmental information." (25)

Finally, the DOD must come to grips with multiple, conflicting
sources of weather information. The Navy and air force have significant
infrastructures dedicated to producing this information. Although
overlap has decreased somewhat in the last 15 years, one agency must
have authority to determine the definitive characterization of the
environment valid at a given time and place. After that agency begins to
answer decision makers' requests with consistent information, it
can take a hard look at the relative contributions of various
overlapping inputs and cut those that fail to produce information
cost-effectively, an action that may result in the consolidation of DOD
centers.

Conclusion

The DOD's implementation of NCw will increase connectivity at
lower echelons of command and throughout non-C2 functions. The services
are actively increasing the connectivity of their forces and
experimenting with new tactics, techniques, and procedures to take
advantage of the new capability, looking to improve their forces'
shared situational awareness and collaborative decision making.

As decision makers at all echelons become connected, they will
demand more access to mission-tailored weather information via the
network, without the direct involvement of a weather briefer. Given the
increasing numbers of decision makers and the decreasing numbers of AFW
personnel, AFW will not be able to match demand (particularly in a large
contingency operation) unless it automates the forecast-tailoring
process. The need for consistent information in collaborative decision
making provides further impetus for automated product generation,
requiring that steps be taken to increase consistency in the weather
database.

Though it represents a significant change for AFW, automated
forecast tailoring would remove potential human bottlenecks, allow
greater detail, and increase the speed of access. To assure
effectiveness, AFW must also change to information-centric forecasting,
which captures human-adjusted forecasts and uncertainty estimates in
databases that decision makers can access by using automated
forecast-tailoring services as well as M2H and M2M interfaces.

Weather information remains important to DOD operations, but the
briefers' days are numbered. Net-centric access to weather
information is the wave of the future, and AFW needs to move ahead of
that wave.

Editorial Abstract: Dwindling manpower in Air Force Weather (AFW)
and an increasingly net-centric Air Force are forcing a change from the
days of the face-to-face weather briefing. Furthermore, the Air Force
needs a better degree of forecast consistency. The author proposes that
automated forecasts and forecast tailoring represent significant changes
for AFW but that their implementation will remove potential human
bottlenecks, enable greater detail for decision makers, and increase the
speed of access for all users.

Notes

(1.) The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of force Transformation, 5
January 2005),i, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/
document_387_NCW_book_Lowres.pdf.

(16.) In the absence of a formal survey, my personal communication
with Col Dennis Parnell (C-130 pilot with Air Force Special Operations
Command) and Lt Col Steve Hiss (B-1 pilot) confirms discussions and
interactions I've had over the last 20 years.

(19.) Harry r. Glahn and David P. Ruth, "The New Digital
forecast Database of the National weather Service," Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society 84, no. 2 (February 2003): 195-201,
http://www.weather.gov/ndfd/resources/bamsarticle.pdf.