Consent and Contracepting – Part I

The question was recently posed to me, “How does one explain the Catholic take on marriage and contraception to someone with no religious framework?” Initially, I was stumped. Sure, you could talk about natural law, but that is not a terribly accessible approach; nor is it brief enough for a casual conversation. So, where does one begin?

Begin with consent. Consent is, technically speaking, what makes a marriage. The free consent of a bride and a groom creates the union. Without their “I do”s, there is no bond. This isn’t just a religious fact; it is the reality recognized by civil law as well. It is why “shotgun weddings” are invalid, and why, at Catholic weddings, the priest doesn’t ask, “Who gives this woman?”—she gives herself.

This is also why civil courts grant annulments. Most people hear ‘annulment’ and immediately think of the Catholic Church. However, the state grants annulments every day. An annulment is simply an official declaration that what appeared to be a marriage was not, in fact, a true marriage (hence its proper term, ‘a declaration of nullity’). What might cause a seemingly normal exchange of consent to be invalid? A host of problems, really, but they all constitute one critical flaw—defect in consent. (By way of example, a man who leaves his wife in Russia, comes to America, ‘falls in love,’ and attempts to marry a new woman, cannot give consent because he already gave it to his actual wife.)

Moreover, the greatest and fullest expression of consent between man and woman is sex. When given freely with pure intentions it is the most complete giving of oneself to another person. This is a fundamental reason why the Church and Judaism have always held that sex is reserved exclusively to marriage. Only within the union of marriage does the sexual expression of consent make sense. Additionally, one can see this idea present in the somewhat archaic language of consummating a marriage. Intercourse is, likewise, often referred to as ‘the marital act.’

Now, how does this have anything to do with contracepting? Well, to contracept is really to do two things. First, intercourse; there’s no contracepting apart from sex. Second, there is the actual act that is against conception, which, of course, could take any number of forms (pill, IUD, condom, etc.).

Here, though, exists an important distinction. What makes an action contraceptive per se is the intent of the person. Whether or not the action is an effective means of contracepting is irrelevant. Also, ingesting “birth control” pills is done for reasons other than contracepting. It is, essentially, the intent of the person that determines the nature of an act as contraceptive or not.

This is vital to note, because it points to the very problem with contracepting —contracepting changes consent. In point of fact, contracepting can be defined as the diminishing of consent in the sexual act so as to deny one’s fertility to the other. And this diminution of consent fundamentally alters the marital act so that it is no longer befitting the dignity and character of marriage. In other words, when consent is deliberately compromised, so is the marriage covenant.

This is particularly grave in sacramental marriages, for this deliberate violation constitutes sacrilege. Still, even in regular, civil marriages, contracepting constitutes a violation of the original consent that formed the union. In other words, contracepting violates the marital contract.

Of course, some might object saying, “Well, my wife and I both agree to contracept.” That is of no consequence to the violation. That both parties choose to dishonor an agreement does not change the fact that the agreement is violated; it merely means that, rather than one, two parties are now culpable. Further, to exchange vows with the intention of contracepting is to agree to pretend to be married. So, do not pretend that contraception is a strictly religious issue. Nobody can contracept and still honor their marriage, for it is the nature of contraception that it debases the marriage and, by extension, the spouses.

The opinions expressed by the DPS blog authors and those providing comments are theirs alone; they are not
necessarily the expressions or beliefs of either the Dead Philosophers Society or Holy Apostles College & Seminary.

David Rummelhoff is a stay-at-home father, writer, & catechist. He holds an M.A. in Dogmatic Theology from Holy Apostles College & Seminary. A former evangelical protestant, he studied theology at Biola University before earning a B.S. in Urban Planning from the University of Cincinnati. David hails from Chicago but presently resides in Cincinnati with his wife, Emily, and their three daughters, Liv, Isla, & Celeste. Feel free to ask him a difficult question, or connect with him on Facebook or @Rummelhoff.

I like this approach, but I don’t think one can comfortably assert that “It is, essentially, the intent of the person that determines the nature of an act as contraceptive or not.” The primary determiner is always the object, which has to include one’s intention. The object always includes the breadth of the event, and not just as NNL sometimes asserts, the physicality of the act. Otherwise, if essential, the intention would have the power to make the moral act licit if it itself was ‘good’.

Now I think where this comes to play is when a couple, where the wife is on hormone therapy (the OBGyn will call it birth control pills) has conjugal love with her husband and by their intention to ‘avoid’ the fecundity of their marriage, make the marital act illicit by intending to not be fruitful. There the intention can remain broader (pleasure alongside the other) which too is illicit, added to the improper object so the overall act is illicit.

Perhaps we are saying essentially the same thing with a different stress on the intention, or where the intention plays into the moral act. Thank you though, David, it’s very interesting and a subject brought up often.

Thanks, Steve. You are correct in asserting that the primary determinant is always the object, yet sometimes the primary determinant is inadequate.

We distinguish between objects when we speak of killing a person. The act of killing is defined by the object, either innocent human life or a guilty person. [Ignoring for now the circumstances that render capital punishment a poor option.] However, in this case, we cannot distinguish between objects and find an object that inherently constitutes contraception.

A person could honestly use a condom strictly because he thinks it’ll diminish his chances of contracting or spreading an STD. Thus condom use does not inherently constitute contracepting. Is it functionally contraceptive? Yes, obviously it is, but so is a hysterectomy, which may be performed for non-contracepting reasons. I’m sure you get the point without additional examples.

Beyond that, we can also say that any action done with the purpose of avoiding conception is to contracept, and this is true even when the action is not a functionally effective means of avoiding conception. The offense is not defined by the object in this case. I probably wouldn’t find the need to stress this if we didn’t label things “contraception.” “The pill” is not inherently contraception, and many, probably most, people don’t understand that. Does the Church object to contraception? If by ‘contraception’ one means certain chemicals that are frequently employed for the purpose of contracepting, the answer is, “No.” What the Church condemns is the use of anything *for contracepting*, but this is not a condemnation of the thing in itself–it is a condemnation of an act defined by a disposition or intention.