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The foreign policy machinery in the Obama administration is finally grinding away on a difficult long-term policy and institutional problem: What should the U.S. development and foreign assistance strategy be? Such an examination raises a seemingly endless set of questions: What roles should the Defense Department, State Department, and USAID play in the development, security, and foreign assistance mix? How should these agencies tackle their responsibilities in fragile and post-conflict states? What should be the long-term structure of the U.S.

Can the State Department do a strategic plan and link it to setting budget priorities? We're about to find out. Tucked away in the month's news was a small, but important, announcement: The State Department and USAID are about to do something the Pentagon has done every four years since 1993--a quadrennial review. In this case, however, it will be a review of U.S. diplomatic strategy and development priorities, dubbed a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).

In its first 100 days, the Obama administration has had to confront a series of pressing foreign policy and national security issues--North Korean missile launches, a revamping of the war strategy in Afghanistan, the Taliban's continued rise in Pakistan, and, of course, the Iranian nuclear program. As with all new administrations, the issues have come faster than the Obama administration can cope with them. Thus, improvisation has been a major feature of the administration's response--especially with only part of the team in place.

During his campaign, President Barack Obama promised to end funding national security programs, including the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, through emergency budget requests. He was especially critical of supplemental requests for programs and activities unrelated to Iraq or Afghanistan or that clearly belonged in the regular defense and foreign affairs budgets.

The next president will inherit a severe and growing imbalance in the tool kit he has available for dealing with the national security challenges of the early twenty-first century. In the first three parts of this series, I described these challenges and recommended steps to strengthen the White House's capability to define policy and provide guidance to agencies. I have also underlined the importance of getting defense planning and budgeting under control.

The United States badly needs to get its act together in promoting its national interests and national security objectives. And it badly needs to "rebalance" its statecraft toolkit, so U.S. civilian tools can perform their missions. Currently, too much of the domestic dialogue about our role in the world has focused on near-term security problems--namely, defeating Al Qaeda and stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq and Afghanistan.

Observers declared the new Bush administration budget request dead on arrival because it contains only a $70 billion request for Iraq and Afghanistan, assumes the president's tax cuts will be extended, and cuts Medicare. When it comes to security spending, however, Congress should seize the opportunity to begin rebalancing the tools of U.S. statecraft. The 8.5 percent increase proposed for diplomacy and foreign assistance promises to begin the process of strengthening U.S. civilian instruments, which badly need reform and additional funds.

Congress is once again working overtime to complete the federal budget. National security is at the forefront of the debate, as Congress has finally passed (and the president has signed) its $459.3 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008. (The bill also contains another $11.6 billion in emergency spending for the new mine-resistant, ambush-protected armored personnel carrier intended for the army and marines in Iraq.)