Truth and Knowledge

Truth and Knowledge: Introduction

On-line since: 22nd December, 2000

INTRODUCTION

THE OBJECT
of the following discussion is to analyze the act of
cognition and reduce it to its fundamental elements, in order to
enable us to formulate the problem of knowledge correctly and to
indicate a way to its solution. The discussion shows, through critical
analysis, that no theory of knowledge based on Kant's line of thought
can lead to a solution of the problems involved. However, it must be
acknowledged that Volkelt's work,
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with its thorough examination of the
concept of “experience” provided a foundation without which
my attempt to define precisely the concept of the “given” would
have been very much more difficult. It is hoped in this essay to lay a
foundation for overcoming the subjectivism inherent in all theories of
knowledge based on Kant's philosophy. Indeed, I believe I have achieved
this by showing that the subjective form in which the picture of the world
presents itself to us in the act of cognition — prior to any scientific
explanation of it — is merely a necessary transitional stage which is
overcome in the very process of knowledge. In fact the experience
which positivism and neo-Kantianism advance as the one and only
certainty is just the most subjective one of all. By showing this, the
foundation is also laid for objective idealism, which is a necessary
consequence of a properly understood theory of knowledge. This
objective idealism differs from Hegel's metaphysical, absolute
idealism, in that it seeks the reason for the division of reality into
given existence and concept in the cognizing subject itself;
and holds that this division is resolved, not in an objective world-dialectic
but in the subjective process of cognition. I have already advanced
this viewpoint in
An Outline of a Theory of Knowledge,
1885, but my method of inquiry was a different one, nor did I analyze the
basic elements in the act of cognition as will be done here.

A list of the more recent literary works which are relevant is given
below. It includes not only those works which have a direct bearing on
this essay, but also all those which deal with related problems. No
specific reference is made to the works of the earlier classical
philosophers.

W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften,
usw., (Introduction to the Spiritual Sciences, etc.)
Leipzig, 1883. — Especially the introductory chapters
dealing with the interrelation of the theory of cognition
and the other sciences. — Further references in works by the
same author:

P. Hensel, Ueber die Beizehung des reinen Ich bei Fichte
zur Einheit der Apperception bei Kant (On the Relation
between the Pure I in the Works of Fichte and the Unity
of Perception in those of Kant), Freiburg i. Br., 1885.

G. Schwabe, Fichtes und Schopenhauers Lehre vom
Willen mit ihren Consequenzen für Weltbegreifung und
Lebensfuhrung (The Theory of Will of Fichte and
Schopenhauer and its Consequences for Understanding
the World and the Conduct of Life), Jena, 1887.

The numerous works published on the occasion of Fichte's
Anniversary in 1862 are of course not included here. However, I would,
above all, mention the Address of Trendelenburg (A. Trendelenburg, Zur
Erinnerung an J. G. Fichte — To the Memory of J. G. Fichte —
Berlin, 1862), which contains important theoretical viewpoints.