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In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and contradictory theories have arisen concerning factors affecting the outcomes of war. In an attempt to resolve the discrepancies among these theories, this thesis surveys why there is no single theory that adequately explains which factors affect the outcomes of asymmetric wars. Using logistic regression models and statistical analysis for asymmetric conflicts occurring between 1945 and 2015, the thesis explores the effects of three independent variables: the number of actors offering external support to the non-state actor, the duration of the conflict, the regime type of the strong actor; and two control variables: gross domestic product and population, on the result of the conflicts. The thesis concludes that the number of external supporters to the non-state actor increases their probability of winning; that the increasing duration of the conflict also increases their probability of winning; that the probability of the democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor; and that democratic strong actors have a higher probability of winning against weak actors than do non-democratic actors in asymmetric wars. The approach presented in the thesis provides a new perspective to analyze factors that affect the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, which may lead to a better general understanding of the outcomes of wars.

This thesis builds upon existing contemporary theories that attempt to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflict. Specifically, this thesis uses Ivan Arreguin-Toft's Strategic Interaction Theory as a baseline to identify ...

This thesis builds on the research and ideas of the school of thought that believes strategy is the most important factor in predicting war outcomes. One shortcoming of that school is the inability to explain why strong ...

The military concept of a Center of Gravity (COG) in conflicts, introduced by Carl von Clausewitz in the 1820s, is now an element of numerous military doctrines that planners draw on in designing strategies for winning ...