Thoughts on Freakonomics

A number of people have asked me what I think of the bestselling book "Freakonomics" written by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner. On the front of the book, there is a glowing blurb by me which would suggest that I love it. On the other hand, chapter four of Freakonomics is devoted to the question of why crime dropped so dramatically in America—and particularly New York—in the 1990’s, and in that chapter Dubner and Levitt reach a very different conclusion than I do in "The Tipping Point." In fact, "Freakonomics" specially singles out for ridicule the theory of broken windows, which I suggest in the Tipping Point played a big role in New York City’s recovery. So what gives? Why do I love a book so much, if it contradicts my own book? Have I renounced the theories I put forward in the Tipping Point?

I have two answers. The first—obvious—point is that it is not necessary to agree with everything you read in a book to like that book. I have a number of problems with several chapters in Freakonomics, because I find the way in which economists approach problems occasionally frustrating. That being said, it’s very difficult to read Freakonomics and not find yourself saying "wow" every five minutes. I loved it.

Now for the long answer: what do I think of the substance of their crime argument? Is the Broken Windows theory central to the question of whether crime dropped, or isn’t it?

The Freakonomics argument starts off very much like the argument I make in The Tipping Point. The startling decline in crime in major American cities in the mid-1990’s is a mystery. No one predicted it. Everyone thought that high crime rates were a permanent feature of urban life. And the standard arguments to explain why crime falls don’t seem to work in this case. Levitt and Dubner go through all the usual explanations for crime decreases—a booming economy, decline in the crack trade, innovative policing strategies, tougher gun laws, aging of the population—and find only two that they think really matter. Putting more police on the street, they say, which happened in major cities all over the country in the early 1990’s, was a major factor. So were the soaring numbers of young men put away in prison in that same period. But neither of those two factors, they argue, are sufficient to explain the full magnitude of the crime drop. There has to be something else—and their candidate for the missing explanation is the legalization of abortion.

Levitt’s argument (and for simplicity’s sake, I’ll refer to the argument from now on as Levitt’s) goes something like this (and keep in mind that I’m grossly simplifying it here). The huge declines in urban violent crime rates happen, more or less, eighteen years after the passage of Roe v. Wade. States that legalized abortion earlier than the Supreme Court ruling saw their violent crime rates fall earlier. When you look at falling crime rates, the reductions in violent behavior are almost all concentrated in the generation born after the legalization of abortion, not before. People undergo abortions, in other words, for a reason: because they are poor, or don’t want a child, or live in an environment where it is hard to raise children. An unwanted child has a higher chance, when he or she grows up, of becoming a criminal. By removing a large number of unwanted children, legalized abortion ended up lowering the crime rate. Levitt makes it clear that he’s not passing judgment on this. He’s not pro-abortion, as a result of this observation. He’s just explaining the way he thinks the world works. He also stresses—and this is because even more important—that he doesn’t think that crime fell in major American cities solely because of abortion. He thinks abortion is simply one of several factors—albeit a significant one—in the crime drop.

Is Levitt right that legalizing abortion has played a role in lowering violent crime rates? Levitt has a few critics, and he’s dealt with them pretty effectively, I think. (Check out Freakonomics.com) There are some other technical critiques of his work from fellow economists, that, I have to confess, I can’t follow. My own response is chiefly that I find the argument incomplete.. For instance, the biggest drop in fertility in the U.S. came with the advent of the Pill in the mid-1960’s. The Pill allowed lots of women who would otherwise have become pregnant not to become pregnant because they were poor, or didn’t want a child, or lived in an environment where it was hard to raise children. But the fertility drop caused by the Pill didn’t lead to a decrease in crime eighteen years later. In fact, that generation saw a massive increase in crime. The advent of abortion in the early 1970’s, meanwhile, caused a far, far smaller drop in U.S. fertility but—Levitt argues—that drop is consistent with a fall in crime. In other words, the unwanted children whose births were prevented by the Pill would not have gone to become criminals. But unwanted children whose births were prevented by abortion would have gone on become criminals. Why is this? I can think of some hypotheses. But they are just that: hypotheses. I would have been a lot happier with Freakonomics if the crime chapter had been twice as long—and spent more time explaining just what is so peculiar, in terms of crime rates, about births prevented by abortion.

But that’s a quibble. In the course of making his argument for the importance of abortion Levitt is also pretty dismissive of other, alternate, theories—especially the theory that I spend a lot of time on the Tipping Point, namely the broken windows idea.

It’s here, though, where I think Levitt’s argument is a bit unfair. Levitt concludes that there are three factors that matter the most in the crime drop—abortion, high rates of imprisonment of young men, and increased number of police officers. The last of these three factors he glosses over pretty quickly. But I think that’s a mistake, because what is increased police presence? Well, having more police on the streets than before means that law enforcement can be more aggressive and pro-active. It means officers can do a lot better job getting guns off the streets. It means that they can be much more vigilant than before. It means that they have the time and resources to start cracking down on the kinds of seemingly minor "lifestyle" crimes than might have gone ignored before. The kinds of things that I argue were so important in responding a civil environment in New York State—the crackdowns on graffiti and public urination and panhandling and turnstile jumping in the subway system—are all the kinds of things that police departments can do when they have more officers on the streets. In Freakonomics, Levitt pretends he has refuted the Broken Windows explanation. He hasn’t at all. In fact, to the extent that he concedes the huge role played by the expansion of police departments in the 1990’s, he tacitly supports the Broken Windows theory.

So why is he so anxious to discredit Broken Windows? One—understandable—explanation is that he makes his own argument more compelling by dismissing all other arguments. (I know all about this tactic. I do it all the time). But a deeper explanation, I think, has to do with the difference between the perspective of economics and the perspective of psychology. Levitt is very interested in the root causes of behavior, in the kinds of incentives and circumstances that fundamentally shape the way human beings act. That’s the kind of thing that economists—particularly behavioral economists—think a lot about. And rightly so: who we are and how we behave is a product of forces and influences rooted in the histories and traditions and laws of the societies in which we belong.

But there’s a second dimension to crime, and that is the immediate contextual influences on human behavior. If you talk to a police officer (or a psychologist) they’ll tell you what a "typical" murder looks like. It’s two men, drunk at a bar. They get in a fight. They step outside. One pulls a gun in anger and kills the other. You can prevent that homicide by creating a population of people who are less likely to get drunk and angry in bars. You can also prevent that homicide by decreasing the likelihood of either of those drunken men having a gun. Police-work is concerned, necessarily, with this kind of immediate influence on behavior, and one of the things that having lots more police did was to make it possible to reduce the number of guns on the street that could end as a cause for a homicide. Drunken young men still fight in bars in New York City. But now they fight with fists—which are a lot safer.

Freakonomics is a book about deeply rooted influences on behavior, because it’s a book written by an economist. The Tipping Point is a book, by contrast, about the kinds of things that law enforcement types—and psychologists—worry about, because it was written by someone who is obsessed with psychology. I prefer to think of Freakonomics not as contradicting my argument in Tipping Point, but as completing it.

One final point (just to complicate things even further). Since Tipping Point has come out, there have been a number of economists who have looked specifically at broken windows—and tried to test the theory directly. Some have found support for it. Others—particularly Bernard Harcourt at the University of Chicago—find it wanting. If you crave a rigorous critique of broken windows, read Harcourt. He’s every bit as smart as Levitt.

Comments

Like other posters, I too am surprised that Gladwell would inject "wow" every five minutes in his reading of Freakonomics. Unless Gladwell's "wows" were similar to my own reaction, which was more like "wow - I can't believe the authors base so many conclusions on so many unstated (and untested) assumptions."

Just one example regarding the authors' correlating legalized abortion in NY to NY's crime rate: Freakonomics doesn't even consider its assumptions that

1) everyone who got an abortion in NY was a NY resident (don't you think people were going there for abortions from states where abortions were not yet legal?),

2)the people who commit crimes are committing them in the same places where they are born and there is no interstate or international mobility, and

3)the father (and his genetics, any drug use, and presence) has no role in any crime-committing offspring

I was wowed so often by the authors' many implied assumptions that I gave up about 2/3 of the way into Freakonomics.

ATROASBIHRATCAR*, what would be more interesting than (A) a book that assumes crime statistics are correct and speculates on reasons for their change is (B) a book that assumes that nothing has changed except how people report crime - and, instead, speculates on reasons for that change.

That is, rather than a hypothesis that muggers robbed 200 fewer people in Central Park in 2005 because there were no broken windows within five blocks, I'd prefer to see proposals such as:

- We've become so desensitized to violent crime that a plain old mugging doesn't even rate a trip to the police station

- The people getting mugged are different - perhaps New York has more new residents that are unlikely to complain

- The definition of violent crime evolved to become more strict in New York than other parts of America

A book that took aim at the fundamental statistical assumptions would be far more satisfying. Reading some of the comments above is a bit like listening to sales managers come up with wild-ass guesses as to why they didn't meet last month's quota - without even asking if the order entry system was maybe just down for a week.

* At the risk of appearing stupid because I haven't read all the comments and references

1) NYC crime stats for the past few years are coming under fire (so to speak) as it turns out the Police Department has been "leaning" on the stats, notably by downgrading felonies to lesser crimes.

2) The real effect of heavy "police enforcement" (whether you call it Broken Windows or whatever) is to ship huge numbers of people off to jail, mostly young men and boys from the underclass and minority communities. Of course, since this includes many of the "troublemakers", that will cut crime by keeping them off the streets. Of course, it also gets rid of a lot of husbands/boyfriends and fathers, leaving their families in even worse straits. One little problem... jail sentences aren't usually forever. Eventually, you have to let all those guys loose again. Now they have criminal records, barring them from much of the legal workforce; they're unlikely to have gotten any real education in jail; and they've spent the last few years in a hell of beatings, rape, and other abuse. What do *you* think's gonna happen?

Shouldn't we have been seeing rising SAT scores and lower dropout rates along with the dropping crime rate? Also nobody talked about whether crime statistic reporting changed over the period and in what ways. I used to have a friend who told me about how the various local agencies fudged their reports and lobbied for different standards. For instance, right now my county (6th in size in Florida) has great arrest rates but poor conviction rates. There are multiple metrics that can be used to corroborate the authors' assertions. Somebody just has to do it and quit yacking who is right.

This reminds me of what is happening in education. The NSF which has been pressing for rigor in education studies is having its funding cut. The Dept of Educaiton which is notoriously feel-good and sloppy is having its funding raised. Do you agree with me that it is being done to bolster fuzzy brained theories like merit pay and vouchers? Just like broken windows, you have a bunch of people arguing over a result with no real idea what is causing it or what might be a whole lot more effective if we just put some effort into figuring it out. Common sense often leads us astray. (That's a quote from S J Gould.)

Though the idea of listening to an economics text may bring to mind nightmarish visions of incomprehensible facts, figures and graphs, this audiobook is refreshingly accessible and engrossing. Journalist Dubner reads with just the right mix of enthusiasm and awe, revealing juicy morsels of wisdom on everything from what sumo wrestlers and teachers have in common (a propensity to cheat) to whether parents can really push their kids to greatness by buying them Baby Einstein toys and enlisting them in numerous before- and after-school activities (not really). The only section that doesn't translate well to the format is the final one on naming conventions. The lists of "White Girl Names" and "Black Girl Names," and "Low-End" names and "High-End" names can be mind-numbing, though the text that breaks up these lists will intrigue. Overall, however, these unusual investigations by Levitt, the "rogue" of the subtitle, make for meaty-and entertaining-listening. Simultaneous release with the Morrow hardcover (Reviews, Mar. 14). (May) Copyright 2005 Reed Business Information.

You mention that the "Pill" should have the same effect as abortion did. But I think the rise in crime rate 18 years after the pill was released makes perfect sense. The only people who could afford or were knowledgable about the pill were the upperclass. So the only unwanted pregnancys that were avoided were that of the upper, and maybe middle class. Not the lower class poor who couldn't afford or support their children. Those people were still having lots of children.

I'm disappointed in so many of these remarks. Everyone seems so focussed on abortion and has totally missed the authors' point. No where does either author suggest that abortion was a cause just a correlation. And they very specifically address at the end of the chapter that it's not an effecient method of crime control. Gladwell has so much to offer and I'm surprised that other readers wouldn't be thrilled that contemporary thinkers are reading each other's materials and giving the rest of us more ideas to toss about and ponder.

I have to agree somewhat with Matt's point above. My first thought on reading Mr. Gladwell's understandable question about why the Pill didn't have a similar putative effect as legalized abortion was that the Pill was more likely to be used by a completely different socio-economic group, and in a rather different context. Not that I have any evidence on hand to prove said conjecture (but I'll see what I can dig up.)

I Saw you on C-SPAN Sunday and I liked what I heard. I have long hair,too. I am a 51-year-old disabled veteran in a wheelchair. I am also an independent candidate for state Senate in Missouri's 30th district this year. I admire intelligence, & I perceive you to be an intelligent person. I also belive in brevity very much, so I will soon conclude this response.
I just thought I'd check out your website & see what's here.

I enjoyed your visit with Brian Lamb on Q&A. I was particularly interested in the fact that you are from Elmira, Ont. I have been through that community many times on my way back to the states from visits to my sister, usually early in the morning when the Mennonite children are on their way to school--a lovely time of day in that region.
I always read your articles in the New yorker so I guess I am a fan although I resist that definition. It sounds so tabloid.
Sincerely, Jacquie Hamblin

Interesting. Why are these authorsso damn afraid to talk about race instead of couching it in terms of class? West Virginia is a very poor almost all white state but the crime rates are very low. Why is that? duh.
Margaret Sanger was clearly a racist and a eugenist and apparently her dream came true; it s simple fewer black babies=lower crime.

Dear Malcolm,
I thought you were very interesting on
the Charlie Rose show today, May 15, 2006. I am an ex-New Yorker living in Florida. I hope you will, in the future, spend some time on important websites like those of Friends of the Earth,American Rivers,Defenders of Wildlife,Earthjustice,Environmental Defense,Greenpeace,League of Conservation Voters,National Audobon Society,National Environmental Trust,National Parks Conservation Assoc.,National Wildlife Federation,Natural Resources Defense Council,Physicians for Social Responsibility,Sierra Club,The Ocean Conservancy,The Wilderness Society,Union of Concerned Scientists,World Wildlife Fund, besides sites like "Gawker" which seemed to me to be a waste of time for someone
who is a gifted writer.
Regarding writing about the mundane, how about writing about the important, like breathing, even New Yorkers have to breathe.
I left New York because I could no longer breathe there and soon I will have to leave Fort Lauderdale because it is becoming another New York (population and pollution).
I look forward to reading you and seeing you again on t.v.
Trudy

While two crimes for certain decreased with respect to Broken Windows and Abortion, respectively the breaking of windows and aborting of babies.

I am very tempted to jump down the highly slippery slope of... oh ok its no worse a Hypothesis than the others..

A boy and girl discover the girl is pregnant. Boy breaks up with girl. Goes to far end of town (or across the street) and throws a rock. Girl goes to far end of town to think, and throws a rock. Child is born gives mother grief, mother goes to far end of town and trows a rock. Child neglected by mother who didn't want the child, is angry, goes to other end of town and throws a rock..

Who cares whether Freako is 'true' or not? A book is good if its fun to read. I don't care if Ahab chased a Freako whale or if Lazarus walked again 'for real'. As long as pages turn and audiences can be had/made literature rocks along. Go on with your freakin' self Levitt.

Bio

I'm a writer for the New Yorker magazine, and the author of four books, "The Tipping Point: How Little Things Make a Big Difference", "Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking" and "Outliers: The Story of Success." My latest book, "What the Dog Saw" is a compilation of stories published in The New Yorker. I was born in England, and raised in southwestern Ontario in Canada. Now I live in New York City.

My great claim to fame is that I'm from the town where they invented the BlackBerry. My family also believes (with some justification) that we are distantly related to Colin Powell. I invite you to look closely at the photograph above and draw your own conclusions.