Daniel Gros is Director of the Brussels-based Center for European Policy Studies. He has worked for the International Monetary Fund, and served as an economic adviser to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the French prime minister and finance minister. He is the editor of Economie Internationale and International Finance.

Putin has retained his strength because he represents for Russian people the return of importance in the world, and the great empire it was under the Tzars.
Erdogan has retained his strength because he represents the change in the constitutio,n to make it a Constitutional Democracy, and a return to Moslem customs, and dress codes. There are also rumors of payments for votes. In addition Turkey is the most important member of NATO, and the EU and America will not undermine his government.

You also have to take into account history and culture. Russia: Except for a very brief period Russia has never known democracy. Since the days of the Czars they were governed by autocrats, including the autocratic communist regimes. I believe there is no people in the world who have sufferd so much at the hands of their own leaders as the Russians. When Poetin came to power, after the collapse of communism, Russia was a total chaos. Poetin did a succesful job in restoring the country. It cannot be a surprise that Poetin is popular, although he is sometimes doing things that we in the West do not approve of.
Turkey: After the collapse of the Ottoman empire, after WW1, their leader Ataturk set Turkey on a course of modernisation and secularisation. In the past two decades the Islamic parties ( Turkey is 96 % moslim ) have gained power, resulting in Erdogan becoming leader. He is changing course to the Islamic religion and culture. Islam has values which do not accomodate with the values in a western democracy. Nevertheless that is what the majority of the Turkeys people obviously want. In addition Erdogan has also done much for the economy of his country.
So, autocratic regimes are supported by more factors than just economic ones and this makes any change complex.

DEMOCRACY IN DIFFERENT DYES
The transparency demanded by the bastions of liberal democracy - require bulwarks that produce solid economics.
Satisfied Voters in Solid Economics - have been successively crafted, after comprehension of the Rules of liberal democracy.
Limitations that prohibited the blossoming of Satisfied Voters in Solid Economics - were first understood by President DeGaulle in 1971.
Despite the demolition of the Dollar Standard that DeGaulle - Brussels became the Biggest Bastion of "Satisfied Voters in Solid Economics".
The Oil Moghuls followed by creating their Bastion of Satisfied Voters in Solid Economics - OPEC 1973.
China understood the limitations of Bretton Woods, yet crafted the next Bastion of Satisfied Voters in Solid Economics - APEC 1989.
With the collapse of USSR 1991, Eastern Europe passage to Economic Development had only One Option - The West.
Once they were able to enter "The Expanded West" - breaking the Rules of liberal democracy was easy.
With Security guaranteed by NATO and Economics guaranteed by The EU - The East didn't even need Oil to succeed.
Democracy comes in different dyes - Perfection of Wisdom never the monopoly of America Britain Canada or France Germany Italy.

Daniel Gros takes a look at Russia, Turkey and Hungary and explains how "illiberal" leaders like Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Viktor Orban gained electoral support and "remain popular." At least for a while, before their authoritarian rule comes back to bite them.
The author says the control of media and the manipulation of public opinion alone doesn't help them retain popularity, but - as Bill Clinton once coined - "It's the economy, stupid." Gros points out that regardless of their anti-Western stance, Putin, Erdogan and Orban have "followed the so-called Washington Consensus, which prescribes prudent macroeconomic policies and open markets." Despite their "nationalist rhetoric" they refrain from protectionist policies - Russia still appreciates its WTO membership, Hungary its EU membership and Turkey its customs union with the EU.
The three autocrats are no doubt astute opportunists. They rose to power by capitalising on their predecessors' failure to tackle economic woes and popular grievances to win trust. Once elected they pursue "prudent macroeconomic policies" that deliver growth. They hire "apolitical experts" and competent technocrats to oversee macroeconomic management, and to "deliver better economic performance in the long run." Winning hearts and minds is their formula to remain in office.
Indeed, "an efficient long-term strategy for regime preservation" is to adopt conservative fiscal and monetary policies that ensure economic stability. Populist leaders rely heavily on "identity politics to maintain electoral dominance." What they all seek to avoid is to shower social largesse. Excessive spending often creates a financail crisis that forces them to "seek assistance" from international organisations. Under the International Monetary Fund's austerity regime "their days in power will be numbered."
The collapse of Venezuela's economy is a vivid example for bad autocracy. Oil wealth allowed Hugo Chavez to squander billions of dollars on bribing voters at home and winning allies abroad. Nicolas Maduro sought to continue his predecessor's leagcy, only to find himself short of cash to uphold the irrational and wasteful spending, while struggling with dwindling oil revenues. On the whole public debt in Hungary, Russia and Turkey "is thus either already low or (as in Hungary) declining," which is enviable.
However living standards for ordinary Russians have declined due to falling oil prices and Western sanctions, and the economic outlook is "bleak." During the first half of Erdogan's rule, Turkey's economy was impressive and robust despite stagnation in Europe, after the 2008 financial crisis. The war in neighbouring Syria has taken a toll on growth. Since the botched coup in July 2016, assets and businesses belonging to alleged sympathisers of the coup - said to be orchestrated by Fethullah Gülen - had been seized by Turkish authorities. They have been "placed under the administration of Erdoğan’s close associates."
The author points out the "longer-term challenge" for autocrats "to keep their illiberal political regimes economically liberal." These leaders often surround themselves with loyalists and are distrustful of outsiders. This paranoia breeds cronyism, which creates a government by the few - oligarchy or plutocracy. Once this power structure sets in, rampant corruption flourishes. "When this happens, growth is bound to decline," as "entrepreneurs will stop investing."
In order to avoid the vicious circle of political instability, illiberal leaders resort to repressive measures - censorship, rule by decree etc. - to consolidate power. They don't tolerate dissent and call for brutal crackdowns on protesters. Citizens' fundamental rights are being suspended, and journalists harassed or jailed.
The author says, "once an illiberal regime has started down this road, it cannot easily re-establish a credible commitment to respect property rights, because the institutions that ensure this in liberal democracies, like an independent judiciary and a professional civil service, no longer exist." Orban is biting the EU hand that feeds him. He had vacuumed up Hungary's assets, lining either his or his cronies' pockets, hollowing out his country's fragile institutions, and flouting EU laws. He shouldn't get away with impunity.

There is a nice continental rainbow from east to west. From far east to far west we have hyper-strong man Xi Jinping, than super-strong man Vladimir Putin, than strong man Orban, Erdogan and mates, than strong woman Merkel and buddy strong woman May, than finally, at the very far west we have weak man Macron that can be speculated as weak as there is a sizeable probability that he is dominated by his twenty five years older wife. The stereotype that this rainbow might be interpreted as representing is that the east side is more about male/fatherly wisdom while the west is more about female/motherly love.

Okay first things first, it's about time we drop this senseless terminology. These people aren't (and weren't) democrats, even if it's simply because we have no way to tell what they would do in a free and fair election. Being a democrat entails that you follow all tenets of democracy, not just popular support. These rulers are, at best, popular autocrats who bastardize democratic process.
The faulty terminology mostly stems from "end of the history" discourse that claimed "liberal democracy" had become hegemonic. The juxtaposition of "liberalism" and "democracy", as if they are inseparable, deliberately or not, reflected the neoliberal viewpoint of the time, and it still does, even while neoliberalism is in shambles. Far from being hegemonic, liberal democracy, as an ideology, is not even prevalent in the West. It's basic, pols101 knowledge that liberalism has two equally important dimensions, social and economic. What does that mean? It means that most of the Western ruling parties already are/ have been illiberal. Conservatives are socially illiberal, socialists are economically illiberal and so on, but they remain (mostly) committed to the democratic process. Hence they are the real illiberal democrats, not the ones that utilize democracy as a means to establish autocracy. Liberal democracy mostly lives through center-left parties (eg Democrats in the US, Blairite Labour -but definitely not Conservatives or Republican)This may seem to be a minor point, but it is simply wrong to refer them as democrats, they are nothing more than a menace to their country and other democratic countries. And no, they are not even democratically elected, see the latest referendum in Turkey, Erdogan -as it's documented many times- lost it, but was able to retain the power through state apparatus.

Chavez was reckless in spending because he was advised by stupid Marxists who know how to critique capitalism, but have no idea how to run a modern economy. He also did not have the option of playing identity politics like the other three countries discussed here.

The Venezuelan problem can best be illustrated by the following construct:

For decades, Venezuela sold petrol (gasoline) to citizens for the equivalent of 5 cents per gallon (even now!) via heavy subsidization from the government.

Therefore, Venezuelans learned to be very wasteful with petrol -- and came to feel that low petrol prices were part of their birthright as citizens of Venezuela.

Once Venezuela lost the ability to refine its own oil into petrol and other useful fuels/products, it was forced to meet consumer demand by shipping Venezuelan crude to America (at the world oil price) and then buy it back in the form of petrol for citizens (at the world gasoline price) which is a hugely expensive proposition.

As it went on, Venezuelan government surpluses turned into deficits, and low government debt turned into high government debt via the accumulated deficits.

And all of this occurred because a long time ago (prior to Chavez) Venezuelan leaders didn't have the moxie to stand up to voters and tell them that 5 cent per gallon petrol was unsustainable.

We should always lay the blame at the feet of the people who actually caused the problem. Venezuelan president Chavez and his successor president Nicolás Maduro were/are forced to deal with the symptoms of previous bad policies -- they weren't the cause of it.

To put a fine point on it; "Who wants to inform Venezuelan citizens that petrol will no longer cost 5 cents per gallon, it will now move to the world price?"

Someone must do that soon -- heavy subsidies are killing the Venezuelan economy, and it will end in the complete ruination of the country. If not Maduro, the next leader of Venezuela -- or there won't be a country left to lead.

The flip question has to be asked as referred to by John Brian below
eg
Why are their predecessors unpopular. Bearing in mind oppositions do not win in elections, incumbents - who hold the advantage - lose

I'm all for checks and balances, please don't get me wrong. But the rise of illiberal regimes didn't occur in a vacuum. These populist leaders rose up because of the deficiencies of the leaders they replaced.

Blind obedience to the gods of globalization (which has been a very great thing for the world in general terms, but due to the careless disregard of the bottom-two quintile groups by the then-extant leaders, illiberal leaders were practically ordered into office by disaffected voters) and blind obedience to the gods of consumerism, and blind obedience shown to the banksters, are the reasons illiberals are in charge.

As the bottom-two economic quintiles (and soon enough, the bottom-three economic quintile groups) feel that the system is rigged against them, more and more illiberal regimes will rise.

And that's a healthy and normal state of affairs -- if it doesn't get too carried away with itself.

Back to the checks and balances you mentioned in your opening paragraph:

The simplest solution to the concerns you raise about populist regimes 'taking it too far' is, of course, two-term limits for all heads of government (presidents, prime ministers, premiers, etc. as a global standard among democratic nations -- whether constitutional monarchy, republics, parliamentary democracies, and even among benevolent dictatorships -- written right into the constitution of every country.

I suggest that liberal democracies sponsor this through the offices of the United Nations and that countries that accede to such a proposed agreement gain some benefit from the UN and from the other signatories to the agreement.

I'd even suggest that such signatory nations get slightly better terms from the IMF and from the UNDP, etc.

MORE illiberal leaders are coming! The thing to do NOW, is to get those two-term limits for all Members of Parliament, Senators, President's, Prime Minister's, Premiers, etc. legislated NOW -- rather than trying to get it done at the last minute, or worse, trying to get it done once the illiberal regimes are in power (talk about trying to swim upstream!)

I strongly agree with the points you've raised in your fine essay. Thanks for posting at ProSyn!

I agree, in theory, but in practice those in power always seem to find a way to defeat term limits. Time after time they go back to "the people" to get the term limits raised, generally employing reasoning along the line of " there's still too much left to do," or "the (fill in the blank) have not been defeated yet." (See Harald James' post "Extraordinary Measures for Ordinary Times" under the "Economics" section.)

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