Who's Who in Primakov's New Russian Government

On September 11, 1998, the Russian State Duma
approved President Boris Yeltsin's choice of Evgeny Primakov as
Prime Minister by a vote of 317 out of 450. The Duma's action came
in the wake of the August 17 devaluation of the ruble, the
dismissal of former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and his
government, and the Duma's failure to approve Yeltsin's choice of
Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Primakov used his first month in office to
shape his new government and draft the semblance of a crisis
management program to address the country's serious financial
problems. His choices prove him to be a master of compromise: His
Cabinet members represent every major political faction in the
Duma, and his economic proposals are designed to please both the
left and the right.

Primakov is wary of the United States and
has been a consistent opponent of U.S. international leadership.
During the recent missile crisis with Iraq, for example, he
resisted U.S. military retaliation against Saddam Hussein. Exactly
how Primakov's government will affect U.S.-Russian relations may be
uncertain, but its policies clearly could have a major impact on
U.S. national interests.

THE PRIMAKOV GOVERNMENT

Primakov and most of his Cabinet officials
built their political careers in the former Communist regime. A
former senior Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
nomenklatura member and former member of the CPSU's ruling
body, the Politburo, he managed to survive when President Boris
Yeltsin took over. He was appointed head of the Russian foreign
intelligence service in 1991. and became Foreign Minister in
January 1996.

Primakov has challenged America's global
leadership role by promoting "multipolarity" and opposing NATO
enlargement. Yet he is too pragmatic to allow Russian-U.S.
relations to deteriorate dramatically. He might even pressure the
State Duma into ratifying the START II Treaty, believing it to be
in Russia's national interest. But this would not signal an end to
Russia's flirtation with anti-American regimes.

Most
of Primakov's deputies were high-ranking CPSU officials in the
1970s and 1980s when the U.S.S.R. was suffering economic decline.
They represent a generation of Russian history plagued by
stagnation and economic morass, and are unlikely to adjust their
economic philosophies to the reality of a developing market.

First Deputy Premier Yuri
Maslyukov, the top Deputy Prime Minister and the
government's chief economic executive, built his career largely
within the huge Soviet military-industrial complex. Maslyukov will
supervise macroeconomics, the military-industrial complex, and the
arms trade. He is Russia's chief representative for talks with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), despite his Communist background
and lack of experience in negotiating financial issues. His
counterparts are unlikely to give him much credence.

Deputy Premier Gennady
Kulik is in charge of agriculture. A Communist-allied
Agrarian Party member, he was a CPSU apparatchik. He opposes
private ownership of land and will pursue protectionist policies to
shield the agricultural sector from foreign competition, which
could mean an end to chicken imports from the United States.

Finance Minister Mikhail
Zadornov seems as foreign to Primakov's government as do
his political record and views on economic policy. He never held a
significant position in the Soviet nomenklatura. In 1990, he
coauthored a free-market reform program rejected by CPSU
conservatives. Zadornov is likely to proceed with financial reform,
but his freedom to maneuver will be restricted, and he will be
subject to pressures from First Deputy Premier Maslyukov.

Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov is a career diplomat with no political ambitions.
He served at the Russian Embassy in Spain and was the Ambassador
there in later years. He is expected to follow Primakov's concept
of foreign policy, rarely making independent moves--which will
allow Primakov to mastermind Russia's foreign policy.

Defense Minister Igor
Sergeyev, ex-commander of Russia's Strategic Rocket
Forces, has retained his ministerial portfolio. A professional
military man, he has launched serious military reforms which have
encountered strong resistance from the generals.

CONCLUSION

Primakov's Cabinet selected may have been
specifically to avoid alienating influential political and economic
groups, such as international financial institutions and the
powerful oligarchs. It may also be the political base to launch a
Primakov for resident campaign in the near future.
Overall,Primakov's government is more likely to restrict economic
freedom and strengthen its involvement in the economic system than
to concentrate on opening markets and increasing their
competitiveness.

But
failure to pursue free-market reforms could aggravate the social
and economic situation within the Russian Federation. Separatist
tendencies could increase, hastening Russia's dissolution into
poorly governed regions and jeopardizing thecentralized command and
control of nuclear weapons, making them easy prey for unpredictable
local leaders, criminals, or terrorist groups. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction could expand even more rapidly than
feared. Any such developments would seriously affect U.S. national
interests.

Washington should make it clear that it
will help Russia through its current difficulties only if
Primakov's government demonstrates its commitment to free-market
and democratic reforms. It also should insist that Russia's
government concentrate on fighting crime and corruption, continue
legal and court reforms, respect the property and rights of
American investors, and institute tougher measures to ensure
nuclear safety and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Without such assurances, U.S. relations with Russia
inevitably will be fragile.