I attended a meeting this morning hosted by the Ad Council, attempting to create a coalition of the cybersafety experts and groups. While there, we had several discussions about the authority of a school (a public school) to discipline a student for off-premises actions that might have an impact on the school environment.

This is particularly important when dealing with cyberbullying. Most cyberbullying is launched from the home or recreational environment, from computers, handheld devices and cell phones owned and controlled by the student or their family. While the student and their friends may intent that the cyberbullying attacks have an effect on the victim during school hours, the activity in question is conducted after hours, off school premises.

I explain this problem to parents when I speak this way: if two students came ot a party at my house on a Sunday with their families, and got into a fist-fight there, could the school discipline them on Monday morning for that fist-fight? Of course not.

Yet, if this same fight occurred during school hours, or at a basketball game sponsored by the school, or at a school trip, no one would think twice about that students being disciplined for this action.

So, where does the school's authority start and stop?

Where should it?

I am an advocate and believer in free speech values But I also protect children. I have seen six deaths attributed to cyberbullying attacks and campaigns over the last several years. On April 1st a young girl committed suicide after her best firend had killed herself over cyberbullying attacks months before. Cyverbullying has taken it's first "besgt friend" victim.

The best place, IMHO, to handle cyberbullying is in school. School's have extensive experience dealing with fights among students and bulklying in general. They understand the technologies involved and how they are used and abused. They are in a particularly good place to ensure the safety and well-being of their students while on premises, and cyberbullying bleeds through to real life in many ways.

Advance knowledge f cyberbullying attacks and campaigns can help prevent further violence, as well.

Schools can compel parents to attend a conference to discuss the problems and help students work though the emotional pain of being cyberbullied.

But, if a school is willing to take this on, and is sued for their actions that were designed to protect the learning environment, their students' well-being and that of their administration and teaching staff, and keeping their students safe, what school would take this on?

None.

This decision, while not being as far-reaching as it could have been, went further than I expected it to go.

I will be counseling schools to take a stronger stand in keeping their students safe from bullies and hateful actions of their students.

Someone has to do this. Schools are the ones best armed for this fight.

(Bench Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1SyllabusNOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SyllabusMORSE ET AL. v. FREDERICKCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE NINTH CIRCUITNo. 06278. Argued March 19, 2007Decided June 25, 2007At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, petitioner Morse,the high school principal, saw students unfurl a banner statingBONG HiTS 4 JESUS, which she regarded as promoting illegaldrug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting suchmessages at school events, Morse directed the students to take downthe banner. When one of the students who had brought the banner tothe eventrespondent Frederickrefused, Morse confiscated thebanner and later suspended him. The school superintendent upheldthe suspension, explaining, inter alia, that Frederick was disciplinedbecause his banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violationof school policy. Petitioner school board also upheld the suspension.Frederick filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the schoolboard and Morse had violated his First Amendment rights. The DistrictCourt granted petitioners summary judgment, ruling that theywere entitled to qualified immunity and that they had not infringedFredericks speech rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Acceptingthat Frederick acted during a school-authorized activity and that thebanner expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use, thecourt nonetheless found a First Amendment violation because theschool punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speechthreatened substantial disruption. It also concluded that Morse wasnot entitled to qualified immunity because Fredericks right to displaythe banner was so clearly established that a reasonable principalin Morses position would have understood that her actions wereunconstitutional.Held: Because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted totheir care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouragingillegal drug use, the school officials in this case did not violate the2 MORSE v. FREDERICKSyllabusFirst Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspendingFrederick. Pp. 515.(a) Fredericks argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected.The event in question occurred during normal school hoursand was sanctioned by Morse as an approved social event at whichthe districts student-conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers andadministrators were among the students and were charged with supervisingthem. Frederick stood among other students across thestreet from the school and directed his banner toward the school,making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances,Frederick cannot claim he was not at school. Pp. 56.(b) The Court agrees with Morse that those who viewed the bannerwould interpret it as advocating or promoting illegal drug use, in violationof school policy. At least two interpretations of the bannerswordsthat they constitute an imperative encouraging viewers tosmoke marijuana or, alternatively, that they celebrate drug usedemonstrate that the sign promoted such use. This pro-drug interpretationgains further plausibility from the paucity of alternativemeanings the banner might bear. Pp. 68.(c) A principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrictstudent speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonablyviewed as promoting illegal drug use. In Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-pendent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, the Court declared,in holding that a policy prohibiting high school students from wearingantiwar armbands violated the First Amendment, id., at 504,that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officialsreasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disruptthe work and discipline of the school, id., at 513. The Court in Be-thel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, however, upheldthe suspension of a student who delivered a high school assemblyspeech employing an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor, id., at 678. Analyzing the case under Tinker, the lower courtshad found no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipline. 478U. S., at 679680. This Court reversed, holding that the school waswithin its permissible authority in imposing sanctions . . . in responseto [the students] offensively lewd and indecent speech. Id.,at 685. Two basic principles may be distilled from Fraser. First, itdemonstrates that the constitutional rights of students in publicschool are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults inother settings. Id., at 682. Had Fraser delivered the same speech ina public forum outside the school context, he would have been protected.See, id., at 682683. In school, however, his First Amendmentrights were circumscribed in light of the special characteristicsof the school environment. Tinker, supra, at 506. Second, Fraser esCiteas: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3Syllabustablished that Tinkers mode of analysis is not absolute, since theFraser Court did not conduct the substantial disruption analysis.Subsequently, the Court has held in the Fourth Amendment contextthat while children assuredly do not shed their constitutional rights. . . at the schoolhouse gate, . . . the nature of those rights is what isappropriate for children in school, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Ac-ton, 515 U. S. 646, 655656, and has recognized that deterring druguse by schoolchildren is an importantindeed, perhaps compellinginterest, id., at 661. Drug abuse by the Nations youth is a seriousproblem. For example, Congress has declared that part of a schoolsjob is educating students about the dangers of drug abuse, see, e.g.,the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, andpetitioners and many other schools have adopted policies aimed atimplementing this message. Student speech celebrating illegal druguse at a school event, in the presence of school administrators andteachers, poses a particular challenge for school officials working toprotect those entrusted to their care. The special characteristics ofthe school environment, Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, and the governmentalinterest in stopping student drug abuse allow schools to restrictstudent expression that they reasonably regard as promotingsuch abuse. Id., at 508, 509, distinguished. Pp. 815.439 F. 3d 1114, reversed and remanded.ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurringopinion. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY,J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment inpart and dissenting in part. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, inwhich SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1Opinion of the CourtNOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________No. 06278_________________DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOSEPHFREDERICKON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[June 25, 2007]CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of theCourt.At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, ahigh school principal saw some of her students unfurl alarge banner conveying a message she reasonably regardedas promoting illegal drug use. Consistent withestablished school policy prohibiting such messages atschool events, the principal directed the students to takedown the banner. One studentamong those who hadbrought the banner to the eventrefused to do so. Theprincipal confiscated the banner and later suspended thestudent. The Ninth Circuit held that the principals actionsviolated the First Amendment, and that the studentcould sue the principal for damages.Our cases make clear that students do not shed theirconstitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression atthe schoolhouse gate. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). At thesame time, we have held that the constitutional rights ofstudents in public school are not automatically coextensivewith the rights of adults in other settings, Bethel School 2 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the CourtDist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 682 (1986), and thatthe rights of students must be applied in light of thespecial characteristics of the school environment. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 266(1988) (quoting Tinker, supra, at 506). Consistent withthese principles, we hold that schools may take steps tosafeguard those entrusted to their care from speech thatcan reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal druguse. We conclude that the school officials in this case didnot violate the First Amendment by confiscating the prodrugbanner and suspending the student responsible for it.IOn January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passedthrough Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games inSalt Lake City, Utah. The torchbearers were to proceedalong a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School(JDHS) while school was in session. Petitioner DeborahMorse, the school principal, decided to permit staff andstudents to participate in the Torch Relay as an approvedsocial event or class trip. App. 2223. Students wereallowed to leave class to observe the relay from either sideof the street. Teachers and administrative officials monitoredthe students actions.Respondent Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, was lateto school that day. When he arrived, he joined his friends(all but one of whom were JDHS students) across thestreet from the school to watch the event. Not all thestudents waited patiently. Some became rambunctious,throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scufflingwith their classmates. As the torchbearers and cameracrews passed by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a. The large banner was easilyreadable by the students on the other side of the street.Principal Morse immediately crossed the street andCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3Opinion of the Courtdemanded that the banner be taken down. Everyone butFrederick complied. Morse confiscated the banner andtold Frederick to report to her office, where she suspendedhim for 10 days. Morse later explained that she toldFrederick to take the banner down because she thought itencouraged illegal drug use, in violation of establishedschool policy. Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 states:The Board specifically prohibits any assembly or publicexpression that . . . advocates the use of substances thatare illegal to minors . . . . Id., at 53a. In addition, JuneauSchool Board Policy No. 5850 subjects [p]upils who participatein approved social events and class trips to thesame student conduct rules that apply during the regularschool program. Id., at 58a.Frederick administratively appealed his suspension, butthe Juneau School District Superintendent upheld it,limiting it to time served (8 days). In a memorandumsetting forth his reasons, the superintendent determinedthat Frederick had displayed his banner in the midst ofhis fellow students, during school hours, at a schoolsanctionedactivity. Id., at 63a. He further explainedthat Frederick was not disciplined because the principalof the school disagreed with his message, but because hisspeech appeared to advocate the use of illegal drugs. Id., at 61a.The superintendent continued:The common-sense understanding of the phrase bonghits is that it is a reference to a means of smokingmarijuana. Given [Fredericks] inability or unwillingnessto express any other credible meaning for thephrase, I can only agree with the principal and countlessothers who saw the banner as advocating the useof illegal drugs. [Fredericks] speech was not political.He was not advocating the legalization of marijuanaor promoting a religious belief. He was displaying a4 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the Courtfairly silly message promoting illegal drug usage inthe midst of a school activity, for the benefit of televisioncameras covering the Torch Relay. [Fredericks]speech was potentially disruptive to the event andclearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the schoolseducational mission to educate students about thedangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their use.Id., at 61a62a.Relying on our decision in Fraser, supra, the superintendentconcluded that the principals actions were permissiblebecause Fredericks banner was speech or action thatintrudes upon the work of the schools. App. to Pet. forCert. 62a (internal quotation marks omitted). The JuneauSchool District Board of Education upheld the suspension.Frederick then filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, allegingthat the school board and Morse had violated his FirstAmendment rights. He sought declaratory and injunctiverelief, unspecified compensatory damages, punitive damages,and attorneys fees. The District Court grantedsummary judgment for the school board and Morse, rulingthat they were entitled to qualified immunity and thatthey had not infringed Fredericks First Amendmentrights. The court found that Morse reasonably interpretedthe banner as promoting illegal drug usea message thatdirectly contravened the Boards policies relating to drugabuse prevention. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a38a. Underthe circumstances, the court held that Morse had theauthority, if not the obligation, to stop such messages at aschool-sanctioned activity. Id., at 37a.The Ninth Circuit reversed. Deciding that Frederickacted during a school-authorized activit[y], and proceed[ing] on the basis that the banner expressed a positivesentiment about marijuana use, the court nonethelessfound a violation of Fredericks First Amendment rightsbecause the school punished Frederick without demonCiteas: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5Opinion of the Courtstrating that his speech gave rise to a risk of substantialdisruption. 439 F. 3d 1114, 1118, 11211123 (2006). Thecourt further concluded that Fredericks right to displayhis banner was so clearly established that a reasonableprincipal in Morses position would have understood thather actions were unconstitutional, and that Morse wastherefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 11231125.We granted certiorari on two questions: whether Frederickhad a First Amendment right to wield his banner, and,if so, whether that right was so clearly established thatthe principal may be held liable for damages. 549 U. S.___ (2006). We resolve the first question against Frederick,and therefore have no occasion to reach the second.1IIAt the outset, we reject Fredericks argument that thisis not a school speech caseas has every other authorityto address the question. See App. 2223 (PrincipalMorse); App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a (superintendent); id., at69a (school board); id., at 34a35a (District Court); 439F. 3d, at 1117 (Ninth Circuit). The event occurred during1 JUSTICE BREYER would rest decision on qualified immunity withoutreaching the underlying First Amendment question. The problem withthis approach is the rather significant one that it is inadequate todecide the case before us. Qualified immunity shields public officialsfrom money damages only. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 314,n. 6 (1975). In this case, Frederick asked not just for damages, but alsofor declaratory and injunctive relief. App. 13. JUSTICE BREYERsproposed decision on qualified immunity grounds would dispose of thedamages claims, but Fredericks other claims would remain unaddressed.To get around that problem, JUSTICE BREYER hypothesizesthat Fredericks suspensionthe target of his request for injunctivereliefmay well be justified on non-speech-related grounds. See post, at 9. That hypothesis was never considered by the courts below, neverraised by any of the parties, and is belied by the record, which nowheresuggests that the suspension would have been justified solely on nonspeech-related grounds.6 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the Courtnormal school hours. It was sanctioned by PrincipalMorse as an approved social event or class trip, App. 2223, and the school districts rules expressly provide thatpupils in approved social events and class trips are subjectto district rules for student conduct. App. to Pet. forCert. 58a. Teachers and administrators were interspersedamong the students and charged with supervising them.The high school band and cheerleaders performed. Frederick,standing among other JDHS students across thestreet from the school, directed his banner toward theschool, making it plainly visible to most students. Underthese circumstances, we agree with the superintendentthat Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellowstudents, during school hours, at a school-sanctionedactivity and claim he is not at school. Id., at 63a. Thereis some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to whencourts should apply school-speech precedents, see Porter v.Ascension Parish School Bd., 393 F. 3d 608, 615, n. 22(CA5 2004), but not on these facts.IIIThe message on Fredericks banner is cryptic. It is nodoubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. Tostill others, it probably means nothing at all. Frederickhimself claimed that the words were just nonsense meantto attract television cameras. 439 F. 3d, at 11171118.But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpretedby those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use,and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.As Morse later explained in a declaration, when she sawthe sign, she thought that the reference to a bong hitwould be widely understood by high school students andothers as referring to smoking marijuana. App. 24. Shefurther believed that display of the banner would beconstrued by students, District personnel, parents andothers witnessing the display of the banner, as advocatingCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7Opinion of the Courtor promoting illegal drug usein violation of schoolpolicy. Id., at 25; see ibid. (I told Frederick and the othermembers of his group to put the banner down because Ifelt that it violated the [school] policy against displaying. . . material that advertises or promotes use of illegaldrugs).We agree with Morse. At least two interpretations ofthe words on the banner demonstrate that the sign advocatedthe use of illegal drugs. First, the phrase could beinterpreted as an imperative: [Take] bong hits . . .amessage equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration,to smoke marijuana or use an illegal drug. Alternatively,the phrase could be viewed as celebrating drugusebong hits [are a good thing], or [we take] bonghitsand we discern no meaningful distinction betweencelebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow studentsand outright advocacy or promotion. See Guiles v.Marineau, 461 F. 3d 320, 328 (CA2 2006) (discussing thepresent case and describing the sign as a clearly pro-drugbanner).The pro-drug interpretation of the banner gains furtherplausibility given the paucity of alternative meanings thebanner might bear. The best Frederick can come up withis that the banner is meaningless and funny. 439 F. 3d,at 1116. The dissent similarly refers to the signs messageas curious, post, at 1, ambiguous, ibid., nonsense,post, at 2, ridiculous, post, at 6, obscure, post, at 7,silly, post, at 12, quixotic, post, at 13, and stupid,ibid. Gibberish is surely a possible interpretation of thewords on the banner, but it is not the only one, and dismissingthe banner as meaningless ignores its undeniablereference to illegal drugs.The dissent mentions Fredericks credible and uncontradictedexplanation for the messagehe just wanted toget on television. Post, at 12. But that is a description ofFredericks motive for displaying the banner; it is not an8 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the Courtinterpretation of what the banner says. The way Frederickwas going to fulfill his ambition of appearing on televisionwas by unfurling a pro-drug banner at a school event,in the presence of teachers and fellow students.Elsewhere in its opinion, the dissent emphasizes theimportance of political speech and the need to foster nationaldebate about a serious issue, post, at 16, as if tosuggest that the banner is political speech. But not evenFrederick argues that the banner conveys any sort ofpolitical or religious message. Contrary to the dissentssuggestion, see post, at 1416, this is plainly not a caseabout political debate over the criminalization of drug useor possession.IVThe question thus becomes whether a principal may,consistent with the First Amendment, restrict studentspeech at a school event, when that speech is reasonablyviewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that shemay.In Tinker, this Court made clear that First Amendmentrights, applied in light of the special characteristics of theschool environment, are available to teachers and students. 393 U. S., at 506. Tinker involved a group of highschool students who decided to wear black armbands toprotest the Vietnam War. School officials learned of theplan and then adopted a policy prohibiting students fromwearing armbands. When several students nonethelesswore armbands to school, they were suspended. Id., at504. The students sued, claiming that their FirstAmendment rights had been violated, and this Courtagreed.Tinker held that student expression may not be suppressedunless school officials reasonably conclude that itwill materially and substantially disrupt the work anddiscipline of the school. Id., at 513. The essential facts ofCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9Opinion of the CourtTinker are quite stark, implicating concerns at the heart ofthe First Amendment. The students sought to engage inpolitical speech, using the armbands to express theirdisapproval of the Vietnam hostilities and their advocacyof a truce, to make their views known, and, by their example,to influence others to adopt them. Id., at 514. Politicalspeech, of course, is at the core of what the FirstAmendment is designed to protect. Virginia v. Black, 538U. S. 343, 365 (2003). The only interest the Court discernedunderlying the schools actions was the meredesire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness thatalways accompany an unpopular viewpoint, or an urgentwish to avoid the controversy which might result from theexpression. Tinker, 393 U. S., at 509, 510. That interestwas not enough to justify banning a silent, passive expressionof opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder ordisturbance. Id., at 508.This Courts next student speech case was Fraser, 478U. S. 675. Matthew Fraser was suspended for delivering aspeech before a high school assembly in which he employedwhat this Court called an elaborate, graphic, andexplicit sexual metaphor. Id., at 678. Analyzing the caseunder Tinker, the District Court and Court of Appealsfound no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipliningFraser. 478 U. S., at 679680. This Court reversed, holdingthat the School District acted entirely within itspermissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraserin response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech.Id., at 685.The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirelyclear. The Court was plainly attuned to the content ofFrasers speech, citing the marked distinction betweenthe political message of the armbands in Tinker and thesexual content of [Frasers] speech. Id., at 680. But theCourt also reasoned that school boards have the authorityto determine what manner of speech in the classroom or10 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the Courtin school assembly is inappropriate. Id., at 683. Cf. id.,at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (In thepresent case, school officials sought only to ensure that ahigh school assembly proceed in an orderly manner.There is no suggestion that school officials attempted toregulate [Frasers] speech because they disagreed with theviews he sought to express).We need not resolve this debate to decide this case. Forpresent purposes, it is enough to distill from Fraser twobasic principles. First, Frasers holding demonstrates thatthe constitutional rights of students in public school arenot automatically coextensive with the rights of adults inother settings. Id., at 682. Had Fraser delivered thesame speech in a public forum outside the school context,it would have been protected. See Cohen v. California,403 U. S. 15 (1971); Fraser, supra, at 682683. In school,however, Frasers First Amendment rights were circumscribedin light of the special characteristics of the schoolenvironment. Tinker, supra, at 506. Second, Fraserestablished that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker isnot absolute. Whatever approach Fraser employed, itcertainly did not conduct the substantial disruptionanalysis prescribed by Tinker, supra, at 514. See Kuhl-meier, 484 U. S., at 271, n. 4 (disagreeing with the propositionthat there is no difference between the FirstAmendment analysis applied in Tinker and that applied inFraser, and noting that the holding in Fraser was notbased on any showing of substantial disruption).Our most recent student speech case, Kuhlmeier, concernedexpressive activities that students, parents, andmembers of the public might reasonably perceive to bearthe imprimatur of the school. 484 U. S., at 271. Staffmembers of a high school newspaper sued their schoolwhen it chose not to publish two of their articles. TheCourt of Appeals analyzed the case under Tinker, ruling infavor of the students because it found no evidence of mateCiteas: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11Opinion of the Courtrial disruption to classwork or school discipline. 795 F. 2d1368, 1375 (CA8 1986). This Court reversed, holding thateducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercisingeditorial control over the style and content of studentspeech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long astheir actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogicalconcerns. Kuhlmeier, supra, at 273.Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no onewould reasonably believe that Fredericks banner bore theschools imprimatur. The case is nevertheless instructivebecause it confirms both principles cited above. Kuhlmeier acknowledged that schools may regulate some speecheven though the government could not censor similarspeech outside the school. Id., at 266. And, like Fraser, itconfirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis forrestricting student speech.2Drawing on the principles applied in our student speechcases, we have held in the Fourth Amendment contextthat while children assuredly do not shed their constitutionalrights . . . at the schoolhouse gate, . . . the nature ofthose rights is what is appropriate for children in school.Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 655656(1995) (quoting Tinker, supra, at 506). In particular, theschool setting requires some easing of the restrictions towhich searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 340 (1985).See Vernonia, supra, at 656 (Fourth Amendment rights,2 The dissents effort to find inconsistency between our approach hereand the opinion in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. ___ (2007), see post, at 12 (opinion of STEVENS, J.),overlooks what was made clear in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier:student First Amendment rights are applied in light of the specialcharacteristics of the school environment. Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506.See Fraser, 478 U. S., at 682; Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 266. And, asdiscussed above, supra, at 8, there is no serious argument that Fredericks banner is political speech of the sort at issue in Wisconsin Right to Life.12 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the Courtno less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, aredifferent in public schools than elsewhere . . .); Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U. S. 822, 829-830 (2002) ( specialneeds inhere in the public school context; [w]hile schoolchildrendo not shed their constitutional rights when theyenter the schoolhouse, Fourth Amendment rights . . . aredifferent in public schools than elsewhere; the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the schools custodialand tutelary responsibility for children (quoting Verno-nia, 515 U. S., at 656; citation and some internal quotationmarks omitted).Even more to the point, these cases also recognize thatdeterring drug use by schoolchildren is an importantindeed, perhaps compelling interest. Id., at 661. Drugabuse can cause severe and permanent damage to thehealth and well-being of young people:School years are the time when the physical, psychological,and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.Maturing nervous systems are more critically impairedby intoxicants than mature ones are; childhoodlosses in learning are lifelong and profound; childrengrow chemically dependent more quickly than adults,and their record of recovery is depressingly poor. Andof course the effects of a drug-infested school are visitednot just upon the users, but upon the entire studentbody and faculty, as the educational process isdisrupted. Id., at 661662 (citations and internalquotation marks omitted).Just five years ago, we wrote: The drug abuse problemamong our Nations youth has hardly abated since Verno-nia was decided in 1995. In fact, evidence suggests that ithas only grown worse. Earls, supra, at 834, and n. 5.The problem remains serious today. See generally 1National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes ofCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13Opinion of the CourtHealth, Monitoring the Future: National Survey Resultson Drug Use, 19752005, Secondary School Students(2006). About half of American 12th graders have used anillicit drug, as have more than a third of 10th graders andabout one-fifth of 8th graders. Id., at 99. Nearly one infour 12th graders has used an illicit drug in the pastmonth. Id., at 101. Some 25% of high schoolers say thatthey have been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug onschool property within the past year. Dept. of Health andHuman Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,Youth Risk Behavior SurveillanceUnited States,2005, 55 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, SurveillanceSummaries, No. SS5, p. 19 (June 9, 2006).Congress has declared that part of a schools job is educatingstudents about the dangers of illegal drug use. Ithas provided billions of dollars to support state and localdrug-prevention programs, Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae 1, and required that schools receivingfederal funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools andCommunities Act of 1994 certify that their drug preventionprograms convey a clear and consistent message that. . . the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harmful. 20U. S. C. §7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).Thousands of school boards throughout the countryincluding JDHShave adopted policies aimed at effectuatingthis message. See Pet. for Cert. 1721. Those schoolboards know that peer pressure is perhaps the singlemost important factor leading schoolchildren to takedrugs, and that students are more likely to use drugswhen the norms in school appear to tolerate such behavior.Earls, supra, at 840 (BREYER, J., concurring). Studentspeech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event,in the presence of school administrators and teachers,thus poses a particular challenge for school officials workingto protect those entrusted to their care from the dangersof drug abuse.14 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of the CourtThe special characteristics of the school environment,Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, and the governmental interest instopping student drug abusereflected in the policies ofCongress and myriad school boards, including JDHSallow schools to restrict student expression that theyreasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use. Tinkerwarned that schools may not prohibit student speechbecause of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance or a mere desire to avoid the discomfort andunpleasantness that always accompany an unpopularviewpoint. Id., at 508, 509. The danger here is far moreserious and palpable. The particular concern to preventstudent drug abuse at issue here, embodied in establishedschool policy, App. 9295; App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a, extendswell beyond an abstract desire to avoid controversy. Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Fredericks speech is proscribable because it is plainly offensive as that term is used in Fraser. See Reply Brief forPetitioners 1415. We think this stretches Fraser too far;that case should not be read to encompass any speech thatcould fit under some definition of offensive. After all,much political and religious speech might be perceived asoffensive to some. The concern here is not that Fredericksspeech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed aspromoting illegal drug use.Although accusing this decision of doing serious violenceto the First Amendment by authorizing viewpointdiscrimination, post, at 2, 5 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), thedissent concludes that it might well be appropriate totolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in thisunique setting, post, at 67. Nor do we understand thedissent to take the position that schools are required totolerate student advocacy of illegal drug use at schoolevents, even if that advocacy falls short of inviting imminent lawless action. See post, at 7 ([I]t is possible thatour rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed atCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15Opinion of the Courtschools). And even the dissent recognizes that the issueshere are close enough that the principal should not be heldliable in damages, but should instead enjoy qualifiedimmunity for her actions. See post, at 1. Stripped ofrhetorical flourishes, then, the debate between the dissentand this opinion is less about constitutional first principlesthan about whether Fredericks banner constitutes promotionof illegal drug use. We have explained our view thatit does. The dissents contrary view on that relativelynarrow question hardly justifies sounding the FirstAmendment bugle.* * *School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally importantone. When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedlyunfurled his banner, Morse had to decide to actor notacton the spot. It was reasonable for her to concludethat the banner promoted illegal drug usein violation ofestablished school policyand that failing to act wouldsend a powerful message to the students in her charge,including Frederick, about how serious the school wasabout the dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amendmentdoes not require schools to tolerate at school eventsstudent expression that contributes to those dangers.The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded forfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered. Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1THOMAS, J., concurringSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________No. 06278_________________DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOSEPHFREDERICKON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[June 25, 2007]JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.The Court today decides that a public school may prohibitspeech advocating illegal drug use. I agree andtherefore join its opinion in full. I write separately to statemy view that the standard set forth in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S.503 (1969), is without basis in the Constitution.IThe First Amendment states that Congress shall makeno law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. As this Courthas previously observed, the First Amendment was notoriginally understood to permit all sorts of speech; instead,[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limitedclasses of speech, the prevention and punishment of whichhave never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571572 (1942); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554(1965). In my view, the history of public education suggeststhat the First Amendment, as originally understood,does not protect student speech in public schools. Althoughcolonial schools were exclusively private, publiceducation proliferated in the early 1800s. By the time theStates ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, public schoolshad become relatively common. W. Reese, Americas2 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringPublic Schools: From the Common School to No ChildLeft Behind 1112 (2005) (hereinafter Reese). If studentsin public schools were originally understood as havingfree-speech rights, one would have expected 19th-centurypublic schools to have respected those rights and courts tohave enforced them.1 They did not.ADuring the colonial era, private schools and tutors offeredthe only educational opportunities for children, andteachers managed classrooms with an iron hand. R. Butts& L. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture121, 123 (1953) (hereinafter Butts). Public schoolingarose, in part, as a way to educate those too poor to affordprivate schools. See Kaestle & Vinovskis, From ApronStrings to ABCs: Parents, Children, and Schooling inNineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 84 Am. J. SociologyS39, S49 (Supp. 1978). Because public schools were initiallycreated as substitutes for private schools, whenStates developed public education systems in the early1800s, no one doubted the governments ability to educateand discipline children as private schools did. Like theirprivate counterparts, early public schools were not placesfor freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas.Rather, teachers instilled a core of common values instudents and taught them self-control. Reese 23; A. Potter& G. Emerson, The School and the Schoolmaster: A Manual125 (1843) (By its discipline it contributes, insensibly,to generate a spirit of subordination to lawful authority, apower of self-control, and a habit of postponing presentindulgence to a greater future good . . .); D. Parkerson &1 Although the First Amendment did not apply to the States until atleast the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, most state constitutionsincluded free-speech guarantees during the period when publiceducation expanded. E.g., Cal. Const., Art. I, §9 (1849); Conn. Const.,Art. I, §5 (1818); Ind. Const., Art. I, §9 (1816).Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3THOMAS, J., concurringJ. Parkerson, The Emergence of the Common School in theU. S. Countryside 6 (1998) (hereinafter Parkerson) (notingthat early education activists, such as Benjamin Rush,believed public schools help[ed] control the innate selfishnessof the individual).Teachers instilled these values not only by presentingideas but also through strict discipline. Butts 274275.Schools punished students for behavior the school considereddisrespectful or wrong. Parkerson 65 (noting thatchildren were punished for idleness, talking, profanity,and slovenliness). Rules of etiquette were enforced, andcourteous behavior was demanded. Reese 40. To meettheir educational objectives, schools required absoluteobedience. C. Northend, The Teachers Assistant or Hintsand Methods in School Discipline and Instruction 44, 52(1865) (I consider a school judiciously governed, whereorder prevails; where the strictest sense of propriety ismanifested by the pupils towards the teacher, and towardseach other . . . (internal quotation marks omitted)).2In short, in the earliest public schools, teachers taught,and students listened. Teachers commanded, and studentsobeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power ofideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintainorder.BThrough the legal doctrine of in loco parentis, courtsupheld the right of schools to discipline students, to en-2 Even at the college level, strict obedience was required of students:The English model fostered absolute institutional control of studentsby faculty both inside and outside the classroom. At all the earlyAmerican schools, students lived and worked under a vast array ofrules and restrictions. This one-sided relationship between the studentand the college mirrored the situation at English schools where theemphasis on hierarchical authority stemmed from medieval Christiantheology and the unique legal privileges afforded the university corporation. Note, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1135, 1140 (1991) (footnote omitted).4 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringforce rules, and to maintain order.3 Rooted in the Englishcommon law, in loco parentis originally governed the legalrights and obligations of tutors and private schools. 1 W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 441(1765) ([A parent] may also delegate part of his parentalauthority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster ofhis child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such aportion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessaryto answer the purposes for which he is employed). ChancellorJames Kent noted the acceptance of the doctrine aspart of American law in the early 19th century. 2 J. Kent,Commentaries on American Law *205, *206*207 (So thepower allowed by law to the parent over the person of thechild may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the betterto accomplish the purpose of education).As early as 1837, state courts applied the in loco parentisprinciple to public schools:One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to trainup and qualify their children, for becoming useful andvirtuous members of society; this duty cannot be effectuallyperformed without the ability to command obedience,to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence,and to reform bad habits . . . . The teacher is the substituteof the parent; . . . and in the exercise of thesedelegated duties, is invested with his power. State v.3 My discussion is limited to elementary and secondary education. Inthese settings, courts have applied the doctrine of in loco parentisregardless of the students age. See, e.g., Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266,281 (1847) (holding that a student over the age of 21 is liab[le] topunishment on the same terms as other students if he present[s]himself as a pupil, [and] is received and instructed by the master);State v. Mizner, 45 Iowa 248, 250252 (1876) (same); Sheehan v.Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 484, 2 A. 841, 843 (1885) (same). Therefore, thefact that Frederick was 18 and not a minor under Alaska law, 439 F. 3d1114, 1117, n. 4 (CA9 2006), is inconsequential.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5THOMAS, J., concurringPendergrass, 19 N. C. 365, 365366, (1837).Applying in loco parentis, the judiciary was reluctant tointerfere in the routine business of school administration,allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules andto maintain order. Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 483484, 2 A. 841, 842 (1885). Thus, in the early years ofpublic schooling, schools and teachers had considerablediscretion in disciplinary matters:To accomplish th[e] desirable ends [of teaching selfrestraint,obedience, and other civic virtues], the masterof a school is necessarily invested with much discretionarypower. . . . He must govern these pupils,quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain theimpetuous, and control the stubborn. He must makerules, give commands, and punish disobedience.What rules, what commands, and what punishmentsshall be imposed, are necessarily largely within thediscretion of the master, where none are defined bythe school board. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509,511, 7 A. 273, 274 (1886).4A review of the case law shows that in loco parentisallowed schools to regulate student speech as well. Courtsroutinely preserved the rights of teachers to punish speechthat the school or teacher thought was contrary to theinterests of the school and its educational goals. Forexample, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the corporalpunishment of a student who called his teacher Old JackSeaver in front of other students. Lander v. Seaver, 32Vt. 114, 115 (1859). The court explained its decision as4 Even courts that did not favor the broad discretion given to teachersto impose corporal punishment recognized that the law provided it.Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 291 (1853) (stating that [t]he publicseem to cling to a despotism in the government of schools which hasbeen discarded everywhere else).6 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringfollows:[L]anguage used to other scholars to stir up disorderand subordination, or to heap odium and disgraceupon the master; writings and pictures placed so as tosuggest evil and corrupt language, images andthoughts to the youth who must frequent the school;all such or similar acts tend directly to impair the usefulnessof the school, the welfare of the scholars andthe authority of the master. By common consent andby the universal custom in our New England schools,the master has always been deemed to have the rightto punish such offences. Such power is essential tothe preservation of order, decency, decorum and goodgovernment in schools. Id., at 121.Similarly, the California Court of Appeal upheld theexpulsion of a student who gave a speech before the studentbody that criticized the administration for having anunsafe building because of the possibility of fire. Woosterv. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 52, 148 P. 959, (1915).The punishment was appropriate, the court stated, becausethe speech was intended to discredit and humiliatethe board in the eyes of the students, and tended to impairthe discipline of the school. Id., at 55, 148 P., at 960.Likewise, the Missouri Supreme Court explained that arule which forbade the use of profane language [and]quarrelling was not only reasonable, but necessary to theorderly conduct of the school. Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo.485, 487, 488 (1885). And the Indiana Supreme Courtupheld the punishment of a student who made distractingdemonstrations in class for a breach of good deportment.Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 281, 15 N. E. 341, 343(1888).55 Courts also upheld punishment when children refused to speak afterbeing requested to do so by their teachers. See Board of Ed. v. Helston,32 Ill. App. 300, 305307 (1890) (upholding the suspension of a boy whoCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7THOMAS, J., concurringThe doctrine of in loco parentis limited the ability ofschools to set rules and control their classrooms in almostno way. It merely limited the imposition of excessivephysical punishment. In this area, the case law was split.One line of cases specified that punishment was whollydiscretionary as long as the teacher did not act with legalmalice or cause permanent injury. E.g., Boyd v. State, 88Ala. 169, 170172, 7 So. 268, 269 (1890) (allowing liabilitywhere the punishment inflicted is immoderate or excessive,and . . . it was induced by legal malice, or wickednessof motive). Another line allowed courts to intervenewhere the corporal punishment was clearly excessive.E.g., Lander, supra, at 124. Under both lines of cases,courts struck down only punishments that were excessivelyharsh; they almost never questioned the substantiverestrictions on student conduct set by teachers andschools. E.g., Sheehan, supra, at 483484, 2 A., at 842;Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 632, 635 (1853); Anderson v. State,40 Tenn. 455, 456 (1859); Hardy v. James, 5 Ky. Op. 36(1872).6refused to provide information about who had defaced the schoolbuilding); cf. Sewell v. Board of Ed. of Defiance Union School, 29 OhioSt. 89, 92 (1876) (upholding the suspension of a student who failed tocomplete a rhetorical exercise in the allotted time).6 At least nominally, this Court has continued to recognize the applicabilityof the in loco parentis doctrine to public schools. See VernoniaSchool Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 654, 655 (1995) (Traditionallyat common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of themost fundamental rights of self-determination . . . . They are subject. . . to the control of their parents or guardians. When parents placeminor children in private schools for their education, the teachers andadministrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the childrenentrusted to them (citation omitted)); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 684 (1986) (These cases recognize the obviousconcern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in locoparentis, to protect childrenespecially in a captive audiencefromexposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech).8 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringIITinker effected a sea change in students speech rights,extending them well beyond traditional bounds. The casearose when a school punished several students for wearingblack armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.Tinker, 393 U. S., at 504. Determining that the punishmentinfringed the students First Amendment rights, thisCourt created a new standard for students freedom ofspeech in public schools:[W]here there is no finding and no showing that engagingin the forbidden conduct would materially andsubstantially interfere with the requirements of appropriatediscipline in the operation of the school, theprohibition cannot be sustained. Id., at 509 (internalquotation marks omitted).Accordingly, unless a students speech would disrupt theeducational process, students had a fundamental right tospeak their minds (or wear their armbands)even onmatters the school disagreed with or found objectionable.Ibid. ([The school] must be able to show that its actionwas caused by something more than a mere desire to avoidthe discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompanyan unpopular viewpoint).Justice Black dissented, criticizing the Court for subject[ing] all the public schools in the country to the whimsand caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not theirbrightest, students. Id., at 525. He emphasized theinstructive purpose of schools: [T]axpayers send childrento school on the premise that at their age they need tolearn, not teach. Id., at 522. In his view, the Courtsdecision surrender[ed] control of the American publicschool system to public school students. Id., at 526.Of course, Tinkers reasoning conflicted with the traditionalunderstanding of the judiciarys role in relation topublic schooling, a role limited by in loco parentis. PerCiteas: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9THOMAS, J., concurringhaps for that reason, the Court has since scaled backTinkers standard, or rather set the standard aside on anad hoc basis. In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478U. S. 675, 677, 678 (1986), a public school suspended astudent for delivering a speech that contained an elaborate,graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. The Court ofAppeals found that the speech caused no disruption underthe Tinker standard, and this Court did not question thatholding. 478 U. S., at 679680. The Court nonethelesspermitted the school to punish the student because of theobjectionable content of his speech. Id., at 685 (A highschool assembly or classroom is no place for a sexuallyexplicit monologue directed towards an unsuspectingaudience of teenage students). Signaling at least a partialbreak with Tinker, Fraser left the regulation of indecentstudent speech to local schools.7 478 U. S., at 683.Similarly, in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484U. S. 260 (1988), the Court made an exception to Tinkerfor school-sponsored activities. The Court characterizednewspapers and similar school-sponsored activities aspart of the school curriculum and held that [e]ducatorsare entitled to exercise greater control over these forms ofstudent expression. 484 U. S., at 271. Accordingly, theCourt expressly refused to apply Tinkers standard. 484U. S., at 272273. Instead, for school-sponsored activities,the Court created a new standard that permitted schoolregulations of student speech that are reasonably relatedto legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id., at 273.Today, the Court creates another exception. In doing so,we continue to distance ourselves from Tinker, but weneither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when itoperates and when it does not. Ante, at 1014. I amafraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have7 Distancing itself from Tinkers approach, the Fraser Court quotedJustice Blacks dissent in Tinker. 478 U. S., at 686.10 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringa right to speak in schools except when they dontastandard continuously developed through litigationagainst local schools and their administrators. In myview, petitioners could prevail for a much simpler reason:As originally understood, the Constitution does not affordstudents a right to free speech in public schools.IIIIn light of the history of American public education, itcannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendmentfreedom of speech encompasses a students right tospeak in public schools. Early public schools gave totalcontrol to teachers, who expected obedience and respectfrom students. And courts routinely deferred to schoolsauthority to make rules and to discipline students forviolating those rules. Several points are clear: (1) under inloco parentis, speech rules and other school rules weretreated identically; (2) the in loco parentis doctrine imposedalmost no limits on the types of rules that a schoolcould set while students were in school; and (3) schoolsand teachers had tremendous discretion in imposing punishmentsfor violations of those rules.It might be suggested that the early school speech casesdealt only with slurs and profanity. But that criticismdoes not withstand scrutiny. First, state courts repeatedlyreasoned that schools had discretion to impose disciplineto maintain order. The substance of the students speechor conduct played no part in the analysis. Second, somecases involved punishment for speech on weightier matters,for instance a speech criticizing school administratorsfor creating a fire hazard. See Wooster, 27 Cal. App., at5253, 148 P., at 959. Yet courts refused to find an exceptionto in loco parentis even for this advocacy of publicsafety.To be sure, our educational system faces administrativeand pedagogical challenges different from those faced byCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11THOMAS, J., concurring19th-century schools. And the idea of treating children asthough it were still the 19th century would find littlesupport today. But I see no constitutional imperativerequiring public schools to allow all student speech. Parentsdecide whether to send their children to publicschools. Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U. S.245, 262 (1934) (California has not drafted or called themto attend the university. They are seeking educationoffered by the State and at the same time insisting thatthey be excluded from the prescribed course . . .); id., at266 (Cardozo, J., concurring). If parents do not like therules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress inschool boards or legislatures; they can send their childrento private schools or home school them; or they can simplymove. Whatever rules apply to student speech in publicschools, those rules can be challenged by parents in thepolitical process.In place of that democratic regime, Tinker substitutedjudicial oversight of the day-to-day affairs of publicschools. The Tinker Court made little attempt to groundits holding in the history of education or in the originalunderstanding of the First Amendment.8 Instead, it im-8 The Tinker Court claimed that [i]t can hardly be argued that eitherstudents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom ofspeech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakableholding of this Court for almost 50 years. 393 U. S., at 506.But the cases the Court cited in favor of that bold proposition do notsupport it. Tinker chiefly relies upon Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390(1923) (striking down a law prohibiting the teaching of German).However, Meyer involved a challenge by a private school, id., at 396,and the Meyer Court was quick to note that no challenge [has] beenmade of the States power to prescribe a curriculum for institutionswhich it supports. Id., at 402. Meyer provides absolutely no supportfor the proposition that that free-speech rights apply within schoolsoperated by the State. And notably, Meyer relied as its chief support onthe Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), line of cases, 262 U. S., at399, a line of cases that has long been criticized, United Haulers Assn.,Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S.12 MORSE v. FREDERICKTHOMAS, J., concurringposed a new and malleable standard: Schools could notinhibit student speech unless it substantially interfere[d]with the requirements of appropriate discipline in theoperation of the school. 393 U. S., at 509 (internal quotationmarks omitted). Inherent in the application of thatstandard are judgment calls about what constitutes interferenceand what constitutes appropriate discipline. Seeid., at 517518 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that thearmbands in fact caused a disruption). Historically, courtsreasoned that only local school districts were entitled tomake those calls. The Tinker Court usurped that traditionalauthority for the judiciary.And because Tinker utterly ignored the history of publiceducation, courts (including this one) routinely find itnecessary to create ad hoc exceptions to its central premise.This doctrine of exceptions creates confusion withoutfixing the underlying problem by returning to first principles.Just as I cannot accept Tinkers standard, I cannotsubscribe to Kuhlmeiers alternative. Local school boards,not the courts, should determine what pedagogical interestsare legitimate and what rules reasonably relat[e]to those interests. 484 U. S., at 273.Justice Black may not have been a prophet or the son ofa prophet, but his dissent in Tinker has proved prophetic.393 U. S., at 525. In the name of the First Amendment,Tinker has undermined the traditional authority of teachersto maintain order in public schools. Once a societythat generally respected the authority of teachers, deferredto their judgment, and trusted them to act in thebest interest of school children, we now accept defiance,disrespect, and disorder as daily occurrences in many of___ (2007). Tinker also relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.510 (1925). Pierce has nothing to say on this issue either. Piercesimply upheld the right of parents to send their children to privateschool. Id., at 535.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13THOMAS, J., concurringour public schools. Dupre, Should Students Have ConstitutionalRights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1996). We need look no furtherthan this case for an example: Frederick asserts a constitutionalright to utter at a school event what is either[g]ibberish, ante, at 7, or an open call to use illegaldrugs. To elevate such impertinence to the status of constitutionalprotection would be farcical and would indeedbe to surrender control of the American public schoolsystem to public school students. Tinker, supra, at 526(Black, J., dissenting).* * *I join the Courts opinion because it erodes Tinkers holdin the realm of student speech, even though it does so byadding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker standard.I think the better approach is to dispense withTinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would doso.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1ALITO, J., concurringSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________No. 06278_________________DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOSEPHFREDERICKON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[June 25, 2007]JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins,concurring.I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that(a) it goes no further than to hold that a public school mayrestrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpretas advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no supportfor any restriction of speech that can plausibly beinterpreted as commenting on any political or social issue,including speech on issues such as the wisdom of the waron drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.See post, at 13 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).The opinion of the Court correctly reaffirms the recognitionin Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969), of the fundamentalprinciple that students do not shed their constitutionalrights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhousegate. The Court is also correct in noting thatTinker, which permits the regulation of student speechthat threatens a concrete and substantial disruption, id.,at 514, does not set out the only ground on which in-schoolstudent speech may be regulated by state actors in a way2 MORSE v. FREDERICKALITO, J., concurringthat would not be constitutional in other settings. But I do not read the opinion to mean that there arenecessarily any grounds for such regulation that are notalready recognized in the holdings of this Court. In additionto Tinker, the decision in the present case allows therestriction of speech advocating illegal drug use; Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986), permitsthe regulation of speech that is delivered in a lewd orvulgar manner as part of a middle school program; andHazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988),allows a school to regulate what is in essence the schoolsown speech, that is, articles that appear in a publicationthat is an official school organ. I join the opinion of theCourt on the understanding that the opinion does not holdthat the special characteristics of the public schools necessarilyjustify any other speech restrictions.The opinion of the Court does not endorse the broadargument advanced by petitioners and the United Statesthat the First Amendment permits public school officialsto censor any student speech that interferes with aschools educational mission. See Brief for Petitioners21; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6. Thisargument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways,and I would reject it before such abuse occurs. The educationalmission of the public schools is defined by theelected and appointed public officials with authority overthe schools and by the school administrators and faculty.As a result, some public schools have defined their educationalmissions as including the inculcation of whateverpolitical and social views are held by the members of thesegroups.During the Tinker era, a public school could have definedits educational mission to include solidarity with oursoldiers and their families and thus could have attemptedto outlaw the wearing of black armbands on the groundthat they undermined this mission. Alternatively, aCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3ALITO, J., concurringschool could have defined its educational mission to includethe promotion of world peace and could have soughtto ban the wearing of buttons expressing support for thetroops on the ground that the buttons signified approval ofwar. The educational mission argument would givepublic school authorities a license to suppress speech onpolitical and social issues based on disagreement with theviewpoint expressed. The argument, therefore, strikes atthe very heart of the First Amendment.The public schools are invaluable and beneficent institutions,but they are, after all, organs of the State. Whenpublic school authorities regulate student speech, they actas agents of the State; they do not stand in the shoes ofthe students parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretendthat parents simply delegate their authorityincludingtheir authority to determine what their children may sayand hearto public school authorities. It is even moredangerous to assume that such a delegation of authoritysomehow strips public school authorities of their status asagents of the State. Most parents, realistically, have nochoice but to send their children to a public school andlittle ability to influence what occurs in the school. It istherefore wrong to treat public school officials, for purposesrelevant to the First Amendment, as if they wereprivate, nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis.For these reasons, any argument for altering the usualfree speech rules in the public schools cannot rest on atheory of delegation but must instead be based on somespecial characteristic of the school setting. The specialcharacteristic that is relevant in this case is the threat tothe physical safety of students. School attendance canexpose students to threats to their physical safety thatthey would not otherwise face. Outside of school, parentscan attempt to protect their children in many ways andmay take steps to monitor and exercise control over thepersons with whom their children associate. Similarly,4 MORSE v. FREDERICKALITO, J., concurringstudents, when not in school, may be able to avoid threateningindividuals and situations. During school hours,however, parents are not present to provide protection andguidance, and students movements and their ability tochoose the persons with whom they spend time are severelyrestricted. Students may be compelled on a dailybasis to spend time at close quarters with other studentswho may do them harm. Experience shows that schoolscan be places of special danger.In most settings, the First Amendment strongly limitsthe governments ability to suppress speech on the groundthat it presents a threat of violence. See Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). But due to thespecial features of the school environment, school officialsmust have greater authority to intervene before speechleads to violence. And, in most cases, Tinkers substantialdisruption standard permits school officials to step inbefore actual violence erupts. See 393 U. S., at 508509.Speech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat tostudent safety that is just as serious, if not always asimmediately obvious. As we have recognized in the pastand as the opinion of the Court today details, illegal druguse presents a grave and in many ways unique threat tothe physical safety of students. I therefore conclude thatthe public schools may ban speech advocating illegal druguse. But I regard such regulation as standing at the farreaches of what the First Amendment permits. I join theopinion of the Court with the understanding that theopinion does not endorse any further extension.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1Opinion of BREYER, J.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________No. 06278_________________DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOSEPHFREDERICKON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[June 25, 2007]JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment in partand dissenting in part.This Court need not and should not decide this difficultFirst Amendment issue on the merits. Rather, I believethat it should simply hold that qualified immunity barsthe students claim for monetary damages and say nomore.IResolving the First Amendment question presented inthis case is, in my view, unwise and unnecessary. In partthat is because the question focuses upon specific contentnarrowly defined: May a school board punish students forspeech that advocates drug use and, if so, when? At thesame time, the underlying facts suggest that PrincipalMorse acted as she did not simply because of the specificcontent and viewpoint of Joseph Fredericks speech butalso because of the surrounding context and manner inwhich Frederick expressed his views. To say that schoolofficials might reasonably prohibit students during schoolrelatedevents from unfurling 14-foot banners (with anykind of irrelevant or inappropriate message) designed toattract attention from television cameras seems unlikelyto undermine basic First Amendment principles. But tohold, as the Court does, that schools may take steps to2 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of BREYER, J.safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech thatcan reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal druguse (and that schools may restrict student expressionthat they reasonably regard as promoting illegal druguse) is quite a different matter. Ante, at 2, 14. Thisholding, based as it is on viewpoint restrictions, raises ahost of serious concerns.One concern is that, while the holding is theoreticallylimited to speech promoting the use of illegal drugs, itcould in fact authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions.Illegal drugs, after all, are not the only illegal substances.What about encouraging the underage consumptionof alcohol? Moreover, it is unclear how far the Courtsrule regarding drug advocacy extends. What about aconversation during the lunch period where one studentsuggests that glaucoma sufferers should smoke marijuanato relieve the pain? What about deprecating commentaryabout an antidrug film shown in school? And what aboutdrug messages mixed with other, more expressly political,content? If, for example, Fredericks banner had readLEGALIZE BONG HiTS, he might be thought to receiveprotection from the majoritys rule, which goes to speechencouraging illegal drug use. Ante, at 2 (emphasisadded). But speech advocating change in drug laws mightalso be perceived of as promoting the disregard of existingdrug laws.Legal principles must treat like instances alike. Thoseprinciples do not permit treating drug use separatelywithout a satisfying explanation of why drug use is sui generis. To say that illegal drug use is harmful to students,while surely true, does not itself constitute a satisfyingexplanation because there are many such harms.During a real war, one less metaphorical than the war ondrugs, the Court declined an opportunity to draw narrowsubject-matter-based lines. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) (holding students cannot beCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3Opinion of BREYER, J.compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance during WorldWar II). We should decline this opportunity today.Although the dissent avoids some of the majorityspitfalls, I fear that, if adopted as law, it would risk significantinterference with reasonable school efforts to maintaindiscipline. What is a principal to do when a studentunfurls a 14-foot banner (carrying an irrelevant or inappropriatemessage) during a school-related event in aneffort to capture the attention of television cameras?Nothing? In my view, a principal or a teacher mightreasonably view Fredericks conduct, in this setting, assimply beyond the pale. And a school official, knowingthat adolescents often test the outer boundaries of acceptablebehavior, may believe it is important (for the offendingstudent and his classmates) to establish when a studenthas gone too far.Neither can I simply say that Morse may have taken theright action (confiscating Fredericks banner) but for thewrong reason (drug speech). Teachers are neither lawyersnor police officers; and the law should not demandthat they fully understand the intricacies of our FirstAmendment jurisprudence. As the majority rightly pointsout, the circumstances here called for a quick decision.See ante, at 15 (noting that Morse had to decide to actor not acton the spot). But this consideration is betterunderstood in terms of qualified immunity than of theFirst Amendment. See infra, at 58.All of this is to say that, regardless of the outcome of theconstitutional determination, a decision on the underlyingFirst Amendment issue is both difficult and unusuallyportentous. And that is a reason for us not to decide theissue unless we must.In some instances, it is appropriate to decide a constitutionalissue in order to provide guidance for the future.But I cannot find much guidance in todays decision. TheCourt makes clear that school officials may restrict4 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of BREYER, J.student speech that promotes illegal drug use and thatthey may take steps to safeguard students from speechthat encourages illegal drug use. Ante, at 2, 8. Beyondsteps that prohibit the unfurling of banners at schooloutings, the Court does not explain just what those restrict[ions] or those steps might be.Nor, if we are to avoid the risk of interpretations thatare too broad or too narrow, is it easy to offer practicallyvaluable guidance. Students will test the limits of acceptablebehavior in myriad ways better known to schoolteachersthan to judges; school officials need a degree offlexible authority to respond to disciplinary challenges;and the law has always considered the relationship betweenteachers and students special. Under these circumstances,the more detailed the Courts supervision becomes,the more likely its law will engender furtherdisputes among teachers and students. Consequently,larger numbers of those disputes will likely make theirway from the schoolhouse to the courthouse. Yet no onewishes to substitute courts for school boards, or to turn thejudges chambers into the principals office.In order to avoid resolving the fractious underlyingconstitutional question, we need only decide a differentquestion that this case presents, the question of qualifiedimmunity. See Pet. for Cert. 2328. The principle ofqualified immunity fits this case perfectly and, by sayingso, we would diminish the risk of bringing about the adverseconsequences I have identified. More importantly,we should also adhere to a basic constitutional obligationby avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional questions.See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring) (The Court will not pass upon aconstitutional question although properly presented on therecord, if there is also present some other ground uponwhich the case may be disposed of ).Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5Opinion of BREYER, J.IIAThe defense of qualified immunity requires courts toenter judgment in favor of a government employee unlessthe employees conduct violates clearly established statutoryor constitutional rights of which a reasonable personwould have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800,818 (1982). The defense is designed to protect all but theplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violated thelaw. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986).Qualified immunity applies here and entitles PrincipalMorse to judgment on Fredericks monetary damagesclaim because she did not clearly violate the law duringher confrontation with the student. At the time of thatconfrontation, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-nity School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 513 (1969), indicated thatschool officials could not prohibit students from wearingan armband in protest of the Vietnam War, where theconduct at issue did not materially and substantiallydisrupt the work and discipline of the school; Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986), indicatedthat school officials could restrict a students freedomto give a school assembly speech containing an elaboratesexual metaphor; and Hazelwood School Dist. v.Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988), indicated that schoolofficials could restrict student contributions to a schoolsponsorednewspaper, even without threat of imminentdisruption. None of these cases clearly governs the case athand.The Ninth Circuit thought it clear that these cases didnot permit Morses actions. See 439 F. 3d 1114, 1124(2006). That is because, in the Ninth Circuits view, thiscase involved neither lewd speech, cf. Fraser, supra, norschool sponsored speech, cf. Kuhlmeier, supra, and henceTinkers substantial disruption test must guide the inquiry.See 439 F. 3d, at 1123. But unlike the Ninth Cir6MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of BREYER, J.cuit, other courts have described the tests these casessuggest as complex and often difficult to apply. See, e.g.,Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F. 3d 320, 326 (CA22006) (It is not entirely clear whether Tinkers rule appliesto all student speech that is not sponsored by schools,subject to the rule of Fraser, or whether it applies only topolitical speech or to political viewpoint-based discrimination); Baxter v. Vigo Cty. School Corp., 26 F. 3d 728, 737(CA7 1994) (pointing out that Fraser cast some doubt onthe extent to which students retain free speech rights inthe school setting). Indeed, the fact that this Court divideson the constitutional question (and that the majorityreverses the Ninth Circuits constitutional determination)strongly suggests that the answer as to how to apply priorlaw to these facts was unclear.The relative ease with which we could decide this caseon the qualified immunity ground, and thereby avoiddeciding a far more difficult constitutional question, underscoresthe need to lift the rigid order of battle decisionmakingrequirement that this Court imposed uponlower courts in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201202(2001). In Saucier, the Court wrote that lower courtsfirst inquiry must be whether a constitutional right wouldhave been violated on the facts alleged. Id., at 200. Onlyif there is a constitutional violation, can lower courtsproceed to consider whether the official is entitled toqualified immunity. See ibid.I have previously explained why I believe we shouldabandon Sauciers order-of-battle rule. See Scott v. Har-ris, 550 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 12) (BREYER, J.,concurring); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201202(2004) (BREYER, J., concurring). Sometimes the rule willrequire lower courts unnecessarily to answer difficultconstitutional questions, thereby wasting judicial resources.Sometimes it will require them to resolve constitutionalissues that are poorly presented. Sometimes theCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7Opinion of BREYER, J.rule will immunize an incorrect constitutional holdingfrom further review. And often the rule violates the longstandingprinciple that courts should not . . . pass onquestions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudicationis unavoidable. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaugh-lin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944).This last point warrants amplification. In resolving theunderlying constitutional question, we produce severaldiffering opinions. It is utterly unnecessary to do so.Were we to decide this case on the ground of qualifiedimmunity, our decision would be unanimous, for the dissentconcedes that Morse should not be held liable indamages for confiscating Fredericks banner. Post, at 1(opinion of STEVENS, J.). And the cardinal principle ofjudicial restraint is that if it is not necessary to decidemore, it is necessary not to decide more. PDK Labs., Inc.v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (CADC2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).If it is Saucier that tempts this Court to adhere to therigid order of battle that binds lower courts, it shouldresist that temptation. Saucier does not bind this Court.Regardless, the rule of Saucier has generated considerablecriticism from both commentators and judges. See Leval,Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the requirementa puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum);Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F. 3d 65, 6970(CA1 2002) (referring to the requirement as an uncomfortableexercise when the answer whether there was aviolation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yetfully developed); Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580584(CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). While Saucier justifiedits rule by contending that it was necessary to permitconstitutional law to develop, see 533 U. S., at 201, thisconcern is overstated because overruling Saucier would8 MORSE v. FREDERICKOpinion of BREYER, J.not mean that the law prohibited judges from passing onconstitutional questions, only that it did not require themto do so. Given that Saucier is a judge-made proceduralrule, stare decisis concerns supporting preservation of therule are weak. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808,828 (1991) (Considerations in favor of stare decisis are attheir weakest in cases involving procedural and evidentiaryrules).Finally, several Members of this Court have previouslysuggested that always requiring lower courts first to answerconstitutional questions is misguided. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 859 (1998) (STEVENS,J., concurring in judgment) (resolving the constitutionalquestion first is inappropriate when that question is bothdifficult and unresolved); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U. S.1019, 1025 (2004) (SCALIA, J., dissenting from denial ofcertiorari) (We should either make clear that constitutionaldeterminations are not insulated from our review. . . or else drop any pretense at requiring the orderingin every case); Saucier, supra, at 210 (GINSBURG, J.,concurring in judgment) (The two-part test todays decisionimposes holds large potential to confuse); Siegert v.Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 235 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring)(If it is plain that a plaintiffs required malice allegationsare insufficient but there is some doubt as to the constitutionalright asserted, it seems to reverse the usual orderingof issues to tell the trial and appellate courts that theyshould resolve the constitutional question first). I wouldend the failed Saucier experiment now.BThere is one remaining objection to deciding this case onthe basis of qualified immunity alone. The plaintiff in thiscase has sought not only damages; he has also sought aninjunction requiring the school district to expunge hissuspension from its records. A qualified immunity deCiteas: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9Opinion of BREYER, J.fense applies in respect to damages actions, but not toinjunctive relief. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S.308, 314, n. 6 (1975). With respect to that claim, theunderlying question of constitutionality, at least conceivably,remains.I seriously doubt, however, that it does remain. At theplaintiffs request, the school superintendent reviewedFredericks 10-day suspension. The superintendent, inturn, reduced the suspension to the eight days that Frederickhad served before the appeal. But in doing so thesuperintendent noted that several actions independent ofFredericks speech supported the suspension, includingthe plaintiffs disregard of a school officials instruction,his failure to report to the principals office on time, hisdefiant [and] disruptive behavior, and the belligerentattitude he displayed when he finally reported. App. toPet. for Cert. 65a. The superintendent wrote that werehe to concede that Fredericks speech . . . is protected,. . . the remainder of his behavior was not excused. Id., at66a.The upshot is that the school boards refusal to erase thesuspension from the record may well be justified on nonspeech-related grounds. In addition, plaintiffs counselappeared to agree with the Courts suggestion at oralargument that Frederick would not pursue injunctiverelief if he prevailed on the damages question. Tr. of OralArg. 4648. And finding that Morse was entitled to qualifiedimmunity would leave only the question of injunctiverelief.Given the high probability that Fredericks request foran injunction will not require a court to resolve the constitutionalissue, see Ashwander, 297 U. S., at 347 (Brandeis,J., concurring), I would decide only the qualified immunityquestion and remand the rest of the case for an initialconsideration.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1STEVENS, J., dissentingSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________No. 06278_________________DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOSEPHFREDERICKON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[June 25, 2007]JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER andJUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.A significant fact barely mentioned by the Court sheds arevelatory light on the motives of both the students andthe principal of Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS). OnJanuary 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay gave thoseAlaska residents a rare chance to appear on nationaltelevision. As Joseph Frederick repeatedly explained, hedid not address the curious messageBONG HiTS 4JESUSto his fellow students. He just wanted to get thecamera crews attention. Moreover, concern about a nationwideevaluation of the conduct of the JDHS studentbody would have justified the principals decision to removean attention-grabbing 14-foot banner, even if it hadmerely proclaimed Glaciers Melt!I agree with the Court that the principal should not beheld liable for pulling down Fredericks banner. See Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). I would hold,however, that the schools interest in protecting its studentsfrom exposure to speech reasonably regarded aspromoting illegal drug use, ante, at 1, cannot justifydisciplining Frederick for his attempt to make an ambiguousstatement to a television audience simply because itcontained an oblique reference to drugs. The FirstAmendment demands more, indeed, much more.2 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingThe Court holds otherwise only after laboring to establishtwo uncontroversial propositions: first, that the constitutionalrights of students in school settings are notcoextensive with the rights of adults, see ante, at 812;and second, that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is avalid and terribly important interest, see ante, at 1214.As to the first, I take the Courts point that the messageon Fredericks banner is not necessarily protected speech,even though it unquestionably would have been had thebanner been unfurled elsewhere. As to the second, I amwilling to assume that the Court is correct that the pressingneed to deter drug use supports JDHSs rule prohibitingwillful conduct that expressly advocates the use ofsubstances that are illegal to minors. App. to Pet. forCert. 53a. But it is a gross non sequitur to draw fromthese two unremarkable propositions the remarkableconclusion that the school may suppress student speechthat was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything.In my judgment, the First Amendment protects studentspeech if the message itself neither violates a permissiblerule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal andharmful to students. This nonsense banner does neither,and the Court does serious violence to the First Amendmentin upholdingindeed, laudinga schools decision topunish Frederick for expressing a view with which itdisagreed.IIn December 1965, we were engaged in a controversialwar, a war that divided this country as few other issuesever have. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent CommunitySchool Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).Having learned that some students planned to wearblack armbands as a symbol of opposition to the countrysinvolvement in Vietnam, officials of the Des Moines publicschool district adopted a policy calling for the suspensionCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3STEVENS, J., dissentingof any student who refused to remove the armband. As weexplained when we considered the propriety of that policy,[t]he school officials banned and sought to punish petitionersfor a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompaniedby any disorder or disturbance on the part ofpetitioners. Id., at 508. The district justified its censorshipon the ground that it feared that the expression of acontroversial and unpopular opinion would generate disturbances.Because the school officials had insufficientreason to believe that those disturbances would materiallyand substantially interfere with the requirements ofdiscipline in the operation of the school, we found thejustification for the rule to lack any foundation and thereforeheld that the censorship violated the First Amendment.Id., at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).Justice Harlan dissented, but not because he thoughtthe school district could censor a message with which itdisagreed. Rather, he would have upheld the districtsrule only because the students never cast doubt on thedistricts anti-disruption justification by proving that therule was motivated by other than legitimate school concernsfor example, a desire to prohibit the expression ofan unpopular point of view while permitting expression ofthe dominant opinion. Id., at 526.Two cardinal First Amendment principles animate boththe Courts opinion in Tinker and Justice Harlans dissent.First, censorship based on the content of speech, particularlycensorship that depends on the viewpointof the speaker, is subject to the most rigorous burden ofjustification:Discrimination against speech because of its messageis presumed to be unconstitutional. . . . When the governmenttargets not subject matter, but particularviews taken by speakers on a subject, the violation ofthe First Amendment is all the more blatant. View4MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of contentdiscrimination. The government must abstainfrom regulating speech when the specific motivatingideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker isthe rationale for the restriction. Rosenberger v. Rectorand Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 828829 (1995) (citation omitted).Second, punishing someone for advocating illegal conductis constitutional only when the advocacy is likely to provokethe harm that the government seeks to avoid. SeeBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam)(distinguishing mere advocacy of illegal conductfrom incitement to imminent lawless action).However necessary it may be to modify those principlesin the school setting, Tinker affirmed their continuingvitality. 393 U. S., at 509 (In order for the State in theperson of school officials to justify prohibition of a particularexpression of opinion, it must be able to show that itsaction was caused by something more than a mere desireto avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that alwaysaccompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly wherethere is no finding and no showing that engaging in thatconduct would materially and substantially interfere withthe requirements of appropriate discipline in the operationof the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained (internalquotation marks omitted)). As other federal courtshave long recognized, under Tinker,regulation of student speech is generally permissibleonly when the speech would substantially disrupt orinterfere with the work of the school or the rights ofother students. . . . Tinker requires a specific and significantfear of disruption, not just some remote apprehensionof disturbance. Saxe v. State College AreaSchool Dist., 240 F. 3d 200, 211 (CA3 2001) (Alito, J.)(emphasis added).Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5STEVENS, J., dissentingYet today the Court fashions a test that trivializes thetwo cardinal principles upon which Tinker rests. See ante,at 14 ([S]chools [may] restrict student expression thatthey reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use).The Courts test invites stark viewpoint discrimination. Inthis case, for example, the principal has unabashedlyacknowledged that she disciplined Frederick because shedisagreed with the pro-drug viewpoint she ascribed to themessage on the banner, see App. 25a viewpoint, incidentally,that Frederick has disavowed, see id., at 28. Unlikeour recent decision in Tennessee Secondary School AthleticAssn. v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007)(slip op., at 3), see also ante, at 3 (ALITO, J., concurring),the Courts holding in this case strikes at the heart of theFirst Amendment because it upholds a punishmentmeted out on the basis of a listeners disagreement withher understanding (or, more likely, misunderstanding) ofthe speakers viewpoint. If there is a bedrock principleunderlying the First Amendment, it is that the Governmentmay not prohibit the expression of an idea simplybecause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989).It is also perfectly clear that promoting illegal druguse, ante, at 14, comes nowhere close to proscribableincitement to imminent lawless action. Brandenburg,395 U. S., at 447. Encouraging drug use might well increasethe likelihood that a listener will try an illegaldrug, but that hardly justifies censorship:Every denunciation of existing law tends in somemeasure to increase the probability that there will beviolation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances theprobability. Expressions of approval add to the probability.. . . Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it stillfurther. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensiblemorally, is not a justification for denying6 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingfree speech where the advocacy falls short of incitementand there is nothing to indicate that the advocacywould be immediately acted upon. Whitney v.California, 274 U. S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,concurring).No one seriously maintains that drug advocacy (much lessFredericks ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishinglysmall category of speech that can be prohibited because ofits feared consequences. Such advocacy, to borrow fromJustice Holmes, ha[s] no chance of starting a presentconflagration. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673(1925) (dissenting opinion).IIThe Court rejects outright these twin foundations ofTinker because, in its view, the unusual importance ofprotecting children from the scourge of drugs supports aban on all speech in the school environment that promotesdrug use. Whether or not such a rule is sensible as amatter of policy, carving out pro-drug speech for uniquelyharsh treatment finds no support in our case law and isinimical to the values protected by the First Amendment.1See infra, at 1416.I will nevertheless assume for the sake of argument thatthe schools concededly powerful interest in protecting itsstudents adequately supports its restriction on any assemblyor public expression that . . . advocates the use ofsubstances that are illegal to minors . . . . App. to Pet. forCert. 53a. Given that the relationship between schoolsand students is custodial and tutelary, permitting adegree of supervision and control that could not be exercisedover free adults, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,1 I also seriously question whether such a ban could really be enforced.Consider the difficulty of monitoring student conversationsbetween classes or in the cafeteria.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7STEVENS, J., dissenting515 U. S. 646, 655 (1995), it might well be appropriate totolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in thisunique setting. And while conventional speech may berestricted only when likely to incit[e] imminent lawlessaction, Brandenburg, 395 U. S., at 449, it is possible thatour rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed atschools. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478U. S. 675, 682 (1986) ([T]he constitutional rights of studentsin public school are not automatically coextensivewith the rights of adults in other settings).But it is one thing to restrict speech that advocates druguse. It is another thing entirely to prohibit an obscuremessage with a drug theme that a third party subjectivelyand not very reasonablythinks is tantamount toexpress advocacy. Cf. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,244 F. 535, 540, 541 (SDNY 1917) (Hand, J.) (distinguishingsharply between agitation, legitimate as such andthe direct advocacy of unlawful conduct). Even theschool recognizes the paramount need to hold the linebetween, on the one hand, non-disruptive speech thatmerely expresses a viewpoint that is unpopular or contraryto the schools preferred message, and on the otherhand, advocacy of an illegal or unsafe course of conduct.The districts prohibition of drug advocacy is a gloss on amore general rule that is otherwise quite tolerant of nondisruptivestudent speech:Students will not be disturbed in the exercise of theirconstitutionally guaranteed rights to assemble peaceablyand to express ideas and opinions, privately orpublicly, provided that their activities do not infringeon the rights of others and do not interfere with theoperation of the educational program.The Board will not permit the conduct on schoolpremises of any willful activity . . . that interfereswith the orderly operation of the educational program8 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingor offends the rights of others. The Board specificallyprohibits . . . any assembly or public expression that. . . advocates the use of substances that are illegal tominors . . . . App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a; see also ante,at 3 (quoting rule in part).There is absolutely no evidence that Fredericks bannersreference to drug paraphernalia willful[ly] infringed onanyones rights or interfered with any of the schools educationalprograms.2 On its face, then, the rule gave Frederickwide berth to express [his] ideas and opinions solong as they did not amount to advoca[cy] of drug use.Ibid. If the schools rule is, by hypothesis, a valid one, it isvalid only insofar as it scrupulously preserves adequatespace for constitutionally protected speech. When FirstAmendment rights are at stake, a rule that sweep[s] in agreat variety of conduct under a general and indefinitecharacterization may not leave too wide a discretion inits application. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,308 (1940). Therefore, just as we insisted in Tinker thatthe school establish some likely connection between thearmbands and their feared consequences, so too JDHSmust show that Fredericks supposed advocacy stands ameaningful chance of making otherwise-abstemious studentstry marijuana.But instead of demanding that the school make such ashowing, the Court punts. Figuring out just how it puntsis tricky; [t]he mode of analysis [it] employ[s] is not entirelyclear, see ante, at 9. On occasion, the Court suggestsit is deferring to the principals reasonable judg-2 It is also relevant that the display did not take place on schoolpremises, as the rule contemplates. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. While aseparate district rule does make the policy applicable to social eventsand class trips, id., at 58a, Frederick might well have thought that theOlympic Torch Relay was neither a social event (for example, prom)nor a class trip.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9STEVENS, J., dissentingment that Fredericks sign qualified as drug advocacy.3 Atother times, the Court seems to say that it thinks thebanners message constitutes express advocacy.4 Eitherway, its approach is indefensible.To the extent the Court defers to the principals ostensiblyreasonable judgment, it abdicates its constitutionalresponsibility. The beliefs of third parties, reasonable orotherwise, have never dictated which messages amount toproscribable advocacy. Indeed, it would be a strangeconstitutional doctrine that would allow the prohibition ofonly the narrowest category of speech advocating unlawfulconduct, see Brandenburg, 395 U. S., at 447448, yetwould permit a listeners perceptions to determine whichspeech deserved constitutional protection.5Such a peculiar doctrine is alien to our case law. In3 See ante, at 1 (stating that the principal reasonably regarded Fredericks banner as promoting illegal drug use); ante, at 6 (explainingthat Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by thoseviewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation isplainly a reasonable one); ante, at 8 (asking whether a principal may. . . restrict student speech . . . when that speech is reasonably viewedas promoting illegal drug use); ante, at 14 (holding that schools [may]restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promotingillegal drug use); see also ante, at 1 (ALITO, J., concurring) ([A] publicschool may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpretas advocating illegal drug use).4 See ante, at 7 (We agree with Morse. At least two interpretationsof the words on the banner demonstrate that the sign advocated the useof illegal drugs); ante, at 15 (observing that [w]e have explained ourview that Fredericks banner constitutes promotion of illegal druguse).5 The reasonableness of the view that Fredericks message was unprotectedspeech is relevant to ascertaining whether qualified immunityshould shield the principal from liability, not to whether her actionsviolated Fredericks constitutional rights. Cf. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S.194, 202 (2001) (The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determiningwhether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to areasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation heconfronted).10 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingAbrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919), this Courtaffirmed the conviction of a group of Russian rebels,revolutionists, [and] anarchists, id., at 617618 (internalquotation marks omitted), on the ground that the leafletsthey distributed were thought to incite, provoke, andencourage resistance to the United States, id., at 617(internal quotation marks omitted). Yet Justice Holmesdissentwhich has emphatically carried the dayneverinquired into the reasonableness of the United Statesjudgment that the leaflets would likely undermine the wareffort. The dissent instead ridiculed that judgment: nobodycan suppose that the surreptitious publishing of asilly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, wouldpresent any immediate danger that its opinions wouldhinder the success of the government arms or have anyappreciable tendency to do so. Id., at 628. In Thomas v.Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (opinion for the Court byRutledge, J.), we overturned the conviction of a unionorganizer who violated a restraining order forbidding himfrom exhorting workers. In so doing, we held that thedistinction between advocacy and incitement could notdepend on how one of those workers might have understoodthe organizers speech. That would pu[t] thespeaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of thevaried understanding of his hearers and consequently ofwhatever inference may be drawn as to his intent andmeaning. Id., at 535. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536,543 (1965), we vacated a civil rights leaders conviction fordisturbing the peace, even though a Baton Rouge sheriffhad deem[ed] the leaders appeal to . . . students to sitin at the lunch counters to be inflammatory.  We neverasked if the sheriffs in-person, on-the-spot judgment wasreasonable. Even in Fraser, we made no inquiry intowhether the school administrators reasonably thought thestudents speech was obscene or profane; we rather satisfiedourselves that [t]he pervasive sexual innuendo inCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11STEVENS, J., dissentingFrasers speech was plainly offensive to both teachers andstudentsindeed, to any mature person. 478 U. S., at683. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) ([I]n cases raising FirstAmendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellatecourt has an obligation to make an independent examinationof the whole record in order to make sure thatthe judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion onthe field of free expression (internal quotation marksomitted)).6To the extent the Court independently finds thatBONG HiTS 4 JESUS objectively amounts to the advocacyof illegal drug usein other words, that it can mostreasonably be interpreted as suchthat conclusion practicallyrefutes itself. This is a nonsense message, not advocacy.The Courts feeble effort to divine its hidden meaningis strong evidence of that. Ante, at 7 (positing that the6 This same reasoning applies when the interpreter is not just a listener,but a legislature. We have repeatedly held that [d]eference to alegislative finding that certain types of speech are inherently harmfulcannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are atstake, reasoning that the judicial function commands analysis ofwhether the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of thestatute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829,843, 844 (1978); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 378379(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ([A legislative declaration] does notpreclude enquiry into the question whether, at the time and under thecircumstances, the conditions existed which are essential to validityunder the Federal Constitution. . . . Whenever the fundamental rightsof free speech and assembly are alleged to have been invaded, it mustremain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actuallydid exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, wasimminent; and whether the evil apprehended was so substantial as tojustify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature). Whenlegislatures are entitled to no deference as to whether particular speechamounts to a clear and present danger, id., at 379, it is hard tounderstand why the Court would so blithely defer to the judgment of asingle school principal.12 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingbanner might mean, alternatively,  [Take] bong hits,  bong hits [are a good thing],  or  [we take] bong hits ).Fredericks credible and uncontradicted explanation forthe messagehe just wanted to get on televisionis alsorelevant because a speaker who does not intend to persuadehis audience can hardly be said to be advocatinganything.7 But most importantly, it takes real imaginationto read a cryptic message (the Courts characterization,not mine, see ibid., at 6) with a slanting drug referenceas an incitement to drug use. Admittedly, some highschool students (including those who use drugs) are dumb.Most students, however, do not shed their brains at theschoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacywhen they see it. The notion that the message on thisbanner would actually persuade either the average studentor even the dumbest one to change his or her behavioris most implausible. That the Court believes such asilly message can be proscribed as advocacy underscoresthe novelty of its position, and suggests that the principleit articulates has no stopping point.Even if advocacy could somehow be wedged into Fredericks obtuse reference to marijuana, that advocacy was atbest subtle and ambiguous. There is abundant precedent,including another opinion THE CHIEF JUSTICE announcestoday, for the proposition that when the First Amendmentis implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, FederalElection Commn v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S.___ (2007) (slip op., at 21) and that when it comes todefining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalentof express advocacy . . . we give the benefit of the doubt tospeech, not censorship, post, at 29. If this were a close7 In affirming Fredericks suspension, the JDHS superintendent acknowledgedthat Frederick displayed his message for the benefit oftelevision cameras covering the Torch Relay. App. to Pet. for Cert.62a.Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13STEVENS, J., dissentingcase, the tie would have to go to Fredericks speech, not tothe principals strained reading of his quixotic message.Among other things, the Courts ham-handed, categoricalapproach is deaf to the constitutional imperative topermit unfettered debate, even among high-school students,about the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizingmarijuana for medicinal use.8 See Tinker, 393 U. S., at511 ([Students] may not be confined to the expression ofthose sentiments that are officially approved). If Fredericks stupid reference to marijuana can in the Courts viewjustify censorship, then high school students everywherecould be forgiven for zipping their mouths about drugs atschool lest some reasonable observer censor and thenpunish them for promoting drugs. See also ante, at 2(BREYER, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissentingin part).Consider, too, that the school districts rule draws nodistinction between alcohol and marijuana, but appliesevenhandedly to all substances that are illegal to mi-8 The Courts opinion ignores the fact that the legalization of marijuanais an issue of considerable public concern in Alaska. The StateSupreme Court held in 1975 that Alaskas constitution protects theright of adults to possess less than four ounces of marijuana for personaluse. Ravin v. State, 537 P. 2d 494 (Alaska). In 1990, the voters ofAlaska attempted to undo that decision by voting for a ballot initiativerecriminalizing marijuana possession. Initiative Proposal No. 2, §§12(effective Mar. 3, 1991), 11 Alaska Stat., p. 872 (Lexis 2006). At thetime Frederick unfurled his banner, the constitutionality of that referendumhad yet to be tested. It was subsequently struck down asunconstitutional. See Noy v. State, 83 P. 3d 538 (Alaska App. 2003). Inthe meantime, Alaska voters had approved a ballot measure decriminalizingthe use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, 1998 BallotMeasure No. 8 (approved Nov. 3, 1998), 11 Alaska Stat., p. 882 (codifiedat Alaska Stat. §§11.71.090, 17.37.01017.37.080), and had rejected amuch broader measure that would have decriminalized marijuanapossession and granted amnesty to anyone convicted of marijuanarelatedcrimes, see 2000 Ballot Measure No. 5 (failed Nov. 7, 2000), 11Alaska Stat., p. 886.14 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingnors. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a; see also App. 83 (expresslydefining  drugs  to include all alcoholic beverages). Given the tragic consequences of teenage alcoholconsumptiondrinking causes far more fatal accidentsthan the misuse of marijuanathe school districts interestin deterring teenage alcohol use is at least comparableto its interest in preventing marijuana use. Under theCourts reasoning, must the First Amendment give waywhenever a school seeks to punish a student for anyspeech mentioning beer, or indeed anything else thatmight be deemed risky to teenagers? While I find it hardto believe the Court would support punishing Frederickfor flying a WINE SiPS 4 JESUS bannerwhich couldquite reasonably be construed either as a protected religiousmessage or as a pro-alcohol messagethe breathtakingsweep of its opinion suggests it would.IIIAlthough this case began with a silly, nonsensical banner,it ends with the Court inventing out of whole cloth aspecial First Amendment rule permitting the censorship ofany student speech that mentions drugs, at least so longas someone could perceive that speech to contain a latentpro-drug message. Our First Amendment jurisprudencehas identified some categories of expression that are lessdeserving of protection than othersfighting words, obscenity,and commercial speech, to name a few. Ratherthan reviewing our opinions discussing such categories, Imention two personal recollections that have no doubtinfluenced my conclusion that it would be profoundlyunwise to create special rules for speech about drug andalcohol use.The Vietnam War is remembered today as an unpopularwar. During its early stages, however, the dominantopinion that Justice Harlan mentioned in his Tinkerdissent regarded opposition to the war as unpatriotic, ifCite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15STEVENS, J., dissentingnot treason. 393 U. S., at 526. That dominant opinionstrongly supported the prosecution of several of those whodemonstrated in Grant Park during the 1968 DemocraticConvention in Chicago, see United States v. Dellinger, 472F. 2d 340 (CA7 1972), and the vilification of vocal opponentsof the war like Julian Bond, cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385U. S. 116 (1966). In 1965, when the Des Moines studentswore their armbands, the school districts fear that theymight start an argument or cause a disturbance was wellfounded. Tinker, 393 U. S., at 508. Given that context,there is special force to the Courts insistence that ourConstitution says we must take that risk; and our historysays that it is this sort of hazardous freedomthis kind ofopennessthat is the basis of our national strength and ofthe independence and vigor of Americans who grow upand live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,society. Id., at 508509 (citation omitted). As we nowknow, the then-dominant opinion about the Vietnam Warwas not etched in stone.Reaching back still further, the current dominant opinionsupporting the war on drugs in general, and our antimarijuanalaws in particular, is reminiscent of the opinionthat supported the nationwide ban on alcohol consumptionwhen I was a student. While alcoholic beverages are nowregarded as ordinary articles of commerce, their use wasthen condemned with the same moral fervor that nowsupports the war on drugs. The ensuing change in publicopinion occurred much more slowly than the relativelyrapid shift in Americans views on the Vietnam War, andprogressed on a state-by-state basis over a period of manyyears. But just as prohibition in the 1920s and early1930s was secretly questioned by thousands of otherwiselaw-abiding patrons of bootleggers and speakeasies, todaythe actions of literally millions of otherwise law-abiding16 MORSE v. FREDERICKSTEVENS, J., dissentingusers of marijuana,9 and of the majority of voters in eachof the several States that tolerate medicinal uses of theproduct,10 lead me to wonder whether the fear of disapprovalby those in the majority is silencing opponents ofthe war on drugs. Surely our national experience withalcohol should make us wary of dampening speech suggestinghowever inarticulatelythat it would be betterto tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futileeffort to ban its use entirely.Even in high school, a rule that permits only one pointof view to be expressed is less likely to produce correctanswers than the open discussion of countervailing views.Whitney, 274 U. S., at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring);Abrams, 250 U. S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Tinker,393 U. S., at 512. In the national debate about a seriousissue, it is the expression of the minoritys viewpoint thatmost demands the protection of the First Amendment.Whatever the better policy may be, a full and frank discussionof the costs and benefits of the attempt to prohibitthe use of marijuana is far wiser than suppression ofspeech because it is unpopular.I respectfully dissent.

About Parry

Parry Aftab is an Internet privacy and security lawyer and founded and runs WiredSafety.org, the world's first cybersafety group. She is a regular resource for TV news and talk shows and print journalism. Her main site, aftab.com, contains more information about her work.
She provides best practices advice to industry leaders and is the Managing Director of WiredTrust, a risk management consulting firm and home of the Socially Safe Seal.