Prompt action needed to tackle Libyan militias

This intervention could establish a precedent for international actors supporting genuine social forces within the Arab World.

By JASON PACK, BARAK BARFI

March 7, 2012 22:46

Libyan rebels 390.
(photo credit: REUTERS)

The current situation in Libya can be best characterized as a struggle pitting
the “center” that controls national institutions, the flow of oil, and billions
in unfrozen assets against a marginalized “periphery” that can challenge the
center’s legitimacy via its use of force and appeal to local loyalties. On
February 17, Libyans commemorated the one-year anniversary of their revolution
against Muammar Gaddafi. Simultaneously, Amnesty International released a report
accusing the victorious anti-Gaddafi militias of war crimes, widespread use of
torture, and hindering the rebuilding of state institutions.

The
carnival-like atmosphere of the anniversary celebrations were marred by the
palpable fear that the Libyan interim government – the National Transitional
Council (NTC) – is failing to cement its authority. In the past weeks, rival
militias have vied for dominance in Tripoli.

Government officials were
briefly expelled from the former Gaddafi stronghold of Beni Walid. After the
national army proved powerless to resolve the situation, pro-government militias
restored order. On February 13, militia leaders from Western Libya gathered to
form a paramilitary federation. They accused the NTC of corruption, failure to
integrate militiamen into the newly-formed national army, and of allowing former
Gaddafi supporters to retain undue influence.

Impatient with the NTC’s
lack of ability to efficiently seize and prosecute former Gaddafi loyalists for
their crimes against the Libyan people, some militias have resorted to vigilante
justice.

Despite the power of the periphery to act upon these genuinely
popular grievances, little chance exists of its component militias merging into
a coherent alternative government.

The NTC has manifestly failed to
respond coherently to these challenges. This leadership vacuum has been filled
by a protracted low-intensity power struggle pitting the NTC against the
militias.

In this central contest, the bulk of the Libyan people possess
divided allegiances. Most Libyans are angry that the NTC has not moved swiftly
enough to purge Gaddafi cronies from positions of influence. Events in
neighboring Egypt have prompted segments of Libya’s youth to consider allying
themselves with certain militias and initiating a second
revolution.

Conversely, amid this overwhelming desire for more change,
people simultaneously fear the agents of the current upheaval. In the words of a
taxicab driver I spoke to in a Tripoli suburb, “Under Gaddafi the traffic and
road police were bad, but at least people went out and I made a living. Now,
traffic and militia checkpoints are entirely unpredictable, no one goes out at
night, and I can’t make a living.”

The key problem today is not security,
per se, but rather a hesitant NTC that is often reluctant to exercise its
authority – preferring negotiations and extending patronage networks to its
opponents rather than swiftly enacting government decrees. At present, the NTC
appears to be operating under a mistaken “security and legitimacy first”
doctrine which maintains that bold initiatives cannot be undertaken until
further stability is achieved and an elected government takes office after the
June elections. Paradoxically, Only by redressing the current center-periphery
imbalance can Libya achieve the security required to jump-start its economy and
hold free and fair elections.

Despite the prevalence of this discourse of
helplessness, the NTC is far from powerless. It has a number of economic and
political tools at its disposal. It has earmarked $8 billion in this year’s
budget to reintegrate combatants into civilian life by offering training grants,
employment advice, small business loans and financial assistance for
marriage.

The problem, however, is that the NTC has demonstrated a
striking lack of institutional capacity with which to implement such policies.
It should draw upon increased support from foreign nations eager to help build a
prosperous Libya.

To date too little international assistance has been
offered; the NTC has been shy to requested it and outside actors are overly
cautious of being perceived as imposing a nation-building agenda. Both these
concerns are misplaced. Libya is not Iraq or Afghanistan. The anti-Gaddafi
revolution was immensely popular and the NTC is its legitimate
representative.

It is true that certain militias enjoy intense localized
support and that they have successfully pressured the NTC to act upon popular
grievances.

Yet despite various attempts to unite the militias, little
chance exists of them merging into a coherent alternative authority. Most
Libyans understand the urgent need to create a functioning central
government.

They therefore look favorably upon Western efforts to help
them accomplish this.

Immediate action against the militias is necessary
before they further entrench themselves in the Libyan social system and prevent
the emergence of a national polity. Innovative – though controversial – tools
could be employed by the NTC and facilitated by Western policy makers, such as
anti-militia propaganda, engagement with the political rather than the military
wings of the moderate Islamists, and reaching out to the “losers” of the
revolution.

The Middle East has historically been a “penetrated system”
in which Arabs have blamed foreign powers for meddling in their internal affairs
to benefit external interests. By contrast, the NATO-led intervention in Libya
in 2011 is a remarkable example of outside powers being invited to help an
indigenous Arab-led movement. One must not forget that the intervention only
occurred because it was first called for by the NTC, then requested by the Arab
League, and later endorsed by the UN.

This intervention and its aftermath
could establish a new precedent for international actors supporting genuine
social forces within the Arab World.

For the West, it provides the
perfect opportunity to re-think our longstanding dependence upon dictators in
the region. A stable and democratic Libya governed by the rule of law will not
only promote stability throughout the Middle East and Africa; it will lower the
longterm price of crude, increase opportunities for Western companies, bring
prosperity to the Libyan people, and lessen the possibility of trans-Saharan
jihadi networks finding a foothold in the region. Most crucially, it will augur
a new trend where Western interests can be secured by supporting popular forces
inside the Arab World.

Jason Pack researches Libyan history at Cambridge
University.

Barak Barfi is a research fellow at the New America
Foundation.

They are the authors of the monograph “In War’s Wake: The
Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya” just released by The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy and available online.

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