If same-sex marriage can be natural can it also be doctrinal?

Through this forum Jean Porter has helpfully illuminated some of the principles of a scholastic understanding of marriage. She concludes ‘[i]n my view, a natural law analysis of the purposes of sex and marriage does not foreclose the possibility of recognizing unions which are by their nature non-reproductive, but which allow for the expression of the mutual fidelity and interpersonal love of the partners – indeed, we have good theological as well as natural law reasons for doing just that.’ This conclusion raises a number of interesting questions.

The natural law is not the eternal law of God.[1] Instead, it is participation in the eternal law.[2] Furthermore, it is a participation which must be responsive to the ‘various conditions of life according to places, times, and circumstances.’[3] The natural law is not understood by all with perfect clarity both as a consequence of the fact that as participation in the eternal law it has the divine intellect as its object and also because of the effects of human sin.[4] Hence there is a need for perspicacity when establishing the natural law. Aquinas maintains that the virtue required to oversee the discernment of natural law is justice because he understands that all law ‘is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.’[5] Given the above background, the magisterium, as the teaching office of the church, and doctrine, as the reflective conceptualisation of faith, have a key role to play in ascertaining the natural law. Hence one important question that Jean Porter’s essay raises is: since church teaching as expressed in formal doctrine contains an exclusively heterosexual definition of marriage is there any possibility for development on this issue? Or to express myself more directly: if Jean Porter has made the case for construing same-sex marriage as natural can a similar case be made for construing it as doctrinal?

Particularly relevant to our earlier discussions is Ivereigh’s description of heterosexual marriage as the ‘gold standard’ of childcare. He writes:

In the new dispensation, why should we much care about marriage? In those countries which have redefined it, fewer people now marry and more divorce: that is bad for society, and for children. The gold standard of childcare (and on this there is a remarkable consensus among psychologists) is that children fare best when raised by their birth parents.

Others – gay couples, maiden aunts, foster parents, single mums – usually offer outstanding love and care, but they cannot provide the structure that is most conducive to a child’s wellbeing and sense of identity. The fact that some gay couples (as do maiden aunts or foster parents) raise children, and many married couples fail to have children, does not detract from the reason why the state promotes marriage – to support and promote that gold standard. It is hard to know why, having severed the link to children, the state has an interest in promoting same-sex relationships but not other kinds of non-marital union.

While the excerpt from Jean Porter’s essay was concerned with natural law, Ivereigh’s comments touch on one of her main points:

Certainly, on any plausible account of the place of sexuality in a mammalian species such as our own, sex will serve a reproductive purpose, but the fact that we are social primates as well as mammals points to a more complex account of the overall purposes of sex. That is to say, we are not only animals, which reproduce sexually, but social animals, for whom sexual exchange and interaction serve to express and cement social and personal bonds – indeed, to forge personal bonds, and hence to some extent and with many qualifications, to shape and to form personal identity.

Ivereigh is reasserting the position that what makes marriage distinct from all other forms of relationships is not ‘sexual exclusivity, sexual difference, lifelong commitment, cohabitation’, but reproduction and the raising of children by their birth parents. The other elements merely foster a stable environment for these more primary functions. His comments only highlight the significance of Porter’s argument. Ivereigh’s argument hinges on the belief that reproduction (or its possibility) is the defining characteristic of marriage. By whittling down the theological justifications behind this position, Porter offers an immanent critique which allows Catholics to be open to same-sex marriage rather than feeling it is being imposed by secular authorities.

Tina Beattie offers a view congruent with Porter’s, one that will be familiar to those of you who follow her work. So I’ll just highlight her conclusion:

I have come to believe that same-sex marriage would be good for society and for the individuals involved.

And I’d like us to get that out of the way and hold this profoundly inegalitarian government to account for its much greater abuses and violations with regard to the destruction of the welfare state and the fabric of care and social responsibility upon which every family – gay or straight – depends for its wellbeing.

Starting off our discussions for 2013 is an excerpt from Jean Porter’s essay ‘The Natural Law and Innovative Forms of Marriage: A Reconsideration’ originally published in The Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics in December 2010. Those interested in this theme may also be interested in two of the Digby Stuart Research Centre’s research seminars later this term. Details are available here.

Like the scholastics, we are living through a period of rapid social change and corresponding institutional breakdown and reformation, including extensive and far-reaching changes in the practice of marriage. Like them, again, we are confronted with the twofold need to understand these changes and to direct and regulate them through social and legal mechanisms. How might the scholastics’ complex account of the purposes of sex and marriage serve to illuminate our own efforts to address these issues? Let me try to answer this question by setting out, in what will admittedly be a brief and preliminary way, what a natural law analysis of marriage might look like today.

This analysis begins at the same point as the scholastics did – namely, that whatever else we may want to say, we should recognize that both the sexual function and the conventions of marriage serve the purpose of procreation, broadly construed to include the education and socialization of children as well as their physical reproduction. Admittedly, this kind of appeal raises a host of philosophical issues that would need to be addressed in more detail than I can attempt here. Nonetheless, unless we discount the fact that we are mammals and complex social primates, it is difficult to see how a plausible analysis of sexuality and marriage could fail to take account of the role that these play in the human reproductive process. What is more, I would argue that a theological commitment to the goodness of creation implies that we as Christians have a particular stake in affirming the value of procreation and giving this value a central place in the interpretations and practices surrounding sex and marriage.

At the same time, however, this line of analysis leaves open the possibility that the institution of marriage can also serve other purposes, legitimate and worthy of promotion so long as they do not undermine the orientation of the institution towards procreation, comprehensively considered to include the extended processes of education and socialization. Indeed, it would be surprising if such a centrally important institution, shaped by a complex history and responsive to diverse social exigencies, did not serve a wide range of purposes both for individual participants and for the community as a whole. To a very considerable extent, these purposes will be recognizably analogous to those informing medieval marriage – to provide for the decent regulation and expression of sexual desire and to sustain a network of social relations. In addition, and as one expression of the latter purpose, marriage provides a framework for establishing claims for mutual support, personal and financial, and for securing society’s recognition of these claims – by enforcing demands for care and sustenance, recognizing that each spouse has a primary right to make health-care decisions for the other, and the like. Finally, marriage serves what many today would regard as a centrally important function of providing a framework for the public expression and support of interpersonal love. Continue reading →