Friday, December 27, 2013

Barbara Salazar Torreon
Information Research SpecialistThis report provides the results of recent elections in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Below are three tables organized by region, including the
date of each country’s independence, the name of the newly elected
president or prime minister, and the projected date of the next election.
Information in this report was gathered from numerous sources, including
the U.S. State Department, the CIA’s Open Source, the Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU), and other news sources.

Date of Report: December 3, 2013
Number of Pages: 4Order Number: 98-684
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Friday, December 6, 2013

Clare Ribando Seelke
Coordinator, Specialist in Latin American AffairsThe future of oil and natural gas production in Mexico is of importance for
both Mexico’s economic growth, as well as for U.S. energy security, a key
congressional interest. Mexico has consistently been a top crude oil
supplier to the United States. However, its oil production has declined
dramatically in recent years. The Mexican Congress is in the midst of
considering historic reforms to open Mexico’s oil and natural gas sector
to international companies that could potentially help Mexico reverse
those declines. If adopted, these reforms could create significant investment
opportunities for U.S. companies, increase the already robust U.S.-Mexican
energy trade, and bolster North American competitiveness.

Mexico’s state oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), established in
1938 as the world’s first major national oil company, remains an important
source of government revenue even as it is struggling to counter the
country’s declining oil production and reserves. Experts have long urged the
Mexican government to reduce the heavy fiscal burden on Pemex and reform the
constitution to enable Pemex to partner with international companies that
have the experience and capital required for exploring Mexico’s large deep
water and shale resources. Numerous stakeholders in Mexico remain concerned,
however, that increasing private involvement in Pemex could threaten Mexico’s
traditional control over its natural resources.

President Enrique Peña Nieto of the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) won the Mexican presidency on December 1, 2012 after 12 years
of rule by the conservative National Action Party (PAN). Even though Peña
Nieto stood for the PRI, the party that originally nationalized the oil
industry, he campaigned on an economic platform that prioritized allowing Pemex
to form joint ventures with private companies. President Peña Nieto introduced
an energy reform proposal dealing with the hydrocarbons and electricity
sectors in August 2013 and is urging the Mexican Congress to enact those
reforms during the current legislative session that concludes in
mid-December 2013. With support from the PAN and other small parties, the prospects
for reforming Pemex appear better now than in the past.

The U.S. Congress has legislative and oversight interests in examining the potential
implications of Mexico’s oil and natural gas reforms on U.S. hydrocarbons
imports and exports, bilateral trade and investment, and economic
conditions in Mexico (a top trade partner). The U.S. House and Senate have
passed legislation (H.R. 1613 and S. 812) related to implementing a U.S.-Mexico Transboundary
Hydrocarbons agreement that would facilitate joint development of oil and
natural gas in part of the Gulf of Mexico. Other legislation has been
introduced dealing with U.S. approval processes for North American energy
infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines (H.R. 3301). The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) excluded private investment in
Mexico’s energy sector, but it is possible that these issues could be addressed
in the ongoing negotiations for the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement. Regardless, an opening of Mexico’s oil and natural gas sector
could expand U.S.-Mexico energy trade and provide opportunities for U.S.
companies and investors involved in the hydrocarbons sector, as well as infrastructure
and other oil field services. If these reforms accelerate growth and investment
in Mexico (as the government has promised), they could benefit North
American competitiveness.

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Friday, November 15, 2013

Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American AffairsCuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human
rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling
Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree
of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second
five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and
selected 52- year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his
First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that
Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of
gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an
expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out
numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter
Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the
government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the
government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011,
the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and
harassment have increased significantly.

U.S. Policy

Over the years, Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward
Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times
easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy has consisted
largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy
component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including
U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support
for human rights and democracy projects. The Obama Administration has
continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration has
lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances, eased restrictions on
other types of purposeful travel, and moved to reengage Cuba on several
bilateral issues, it has also maintained most U.S. economic sanctions in
place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the release of many
political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it has also criticized Cuba’s
continued harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of shortterm detentions
and targeted violence. The Administration has continued to call for the release
of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009 and
sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011.

Legislative Activity

Strong interest in Cuba is continuing in the 113th Congress with attention focused on economic and political
developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward
the island nation, including sanctions. The continued imprisonment of Alan
Gross remains a key concern for many Members. In March 2013, Congress
completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of
H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6), which continues to provide funding for Cuba
democracy and human rights projects and Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV
Martí). In July 2013, the Appropriations Committees reported out their
versions of the FY2014 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations measure. The House version, H.R. 2855 (H.Rept.
113-185), would provide that $20 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)
aid ($5 million more than the Administration’s request) be transferred to the
National Endowment for Democracy “to promote democracy and strengthen
civil society in Cuba.” The Senate version, S. 1372 (S.Rept. 113-81), would
provide that ESF aid appropriated for Cuba only be made available “for
humanitarian assistance and to support the development of private business.”
H.R. 2855 would also provide $28.266 million for Cuba broadcasting (Radio and
TV Martí), while S. 1372 would provide $23.804 million, the same amount as
the Administration’s request. Congress did not complete action on FY2014
appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013,
but in mid-October, it did approve the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014
(P.L. 113-46) that continues funding, generally at FY2013 levels, until January
15, 2014. Congress still faces action on appropriations for the balance of
FY2014.

In terms of Cuba sanctions, the House Appropriations Committee-reported version
of the FY2014 Financial Services and General Government appropriations
measure, H.R. 2786 (H.Rept. 113- 172), would prohibit FY2014 funding used
“to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or otherwise allow”
people-to-people travel to Cuba, which the Obama Administration authorized in
2011. In contrast, the Senate Appropriations-reported version of the
measure, S. 1371 (S.Rept. 113-80), would expand the current general
license for professional research and meetings in Cuba to allow U.S.
groups to sponsor and organize conferences in Cuba, but only if specifically
related to disaster prevention, emergency preparedness, and natural
resource protection.

Several other initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 113th Congress. Several would
lift or ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872
(overall embargo); H.R. 871 (travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and
agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would allow Cubans to play organized
professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 1917 would lift the embargo
and extend nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba after
Cuba releases Alan Gross from prison. Identical initiatives, H.R. 778/S.
647 would modify a 1998 trademark sanction; in contrast, H.R. 214, H.R.
872, H.R. 873, and H.R. 1917 each have a provision that would repeal the
sanction. H.Res. 121 would honor the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez.
H.Res. 262 would call for the immediate extradition or rendering of all
U.S. fugitives from justices in Cuba.

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