Across the world, central governments
are quietly sharing more power with subnational
actors (O’Neill, 2005). In theory,
decentralization facilitates citizen participation,
more engaged decision makers, more local
knowledge, more resources and more
accountability, but in reality, that potential may
not be always realized (Scott and Tarazona, 2011

).
Over the past 20 years, many countries have
adopted a decentralized approach to DRM.
Most DRM functions require local-level
planning and implementation, and the HFA
itself calls for the decentralization of authority
and resources to promote community-level
disaster risk reduction. Honduras’s 2010 Law
on the National Disaster Management System,
for example, establishes decentralization as a
guiding principle, and the 2010 Philippines
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Act makes capacity strengthening of its most
decentralized administrative units a state policy
(IFRC, 2011

). However, not all new legislation
takes this approach, such as the centralized
plan in Thailand’s 2007 Disaster Prevention
and Mitigation Act. Of the 82 countries and
territories that reported progress implementing
the HFA in 2010, as of February 2011 only 48
confirmed that local governments have legal
responsibility and budgets for DRM.
Decentralizing responsibilities can also have
negative results if local governments are
unable to assign resources or dedicated staff
with adequate technical expertise (Pelling, 2007

). In Latin America, several
countries that have invested in decentralized
national systems of DRM for more than a
decade, such as Colombia and Nicaragua, still
struggle with inadequate local government
capacity and resources (von Hesse et al., 2008

).
Some 900 of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities
have mandated local committees for disaster risk
reduction, but only 14 percent implemented
emergency and contingency plans. A similar
story is seen with South Africa’s 2002 Disaster
Management Act. Although DRM is supposed
to be integrated into development planning in
most municipalities (Botha et al

). In traditionally centralized
states, decentralized systems have experienced
difficulties even after the enactment of
new laws. For example, Indonesia’s 2007
Disaster Management Act provided for
the decentralization of certain powers and
responsibilities for disaster risk reduction and
response, and each region and city was required
to create its own disaster management agencies
and committees. However, as of 2009, only 18
of the 32 provinces had established such bodies, and local government resources had not yet been allocated (Kuntjoro and Jamil, 2010

). In its self-assessment, India also reported that the devolution of power and financial resources to local authorities has been a major challenge, often hampered by state governments’ retention of control.
More attention, therefore, needs to be paid to how DRM functions are layered and tailored to local contexts. DRM activities need to be locally grounded, and responsibilities should be devolved to the local level as much as capacities allow. Not all functions need to be fully decentralized, however, and some may be more appropriately located at higher levels, with greater capacity, political weight and decision-making power. For example, central governments should provide technical, financial and policy support, and take over responsibility for DRM when local capacities are exceeded (Scott and Tarazona, 2011

). Another approach is to build up horizontal cooperation, where strong local governments support weaker ones, particularly in countries which have a number of well-resourced and relatively independent local authorities (Box 7.2).

China has a twinning programme that transfers financial and technical support from one province or municipality to a disaster-affected area with less human and financial resources. The twinning agreement diverts 1 percent of the annual income plus technical capacity from the richer province to fund recovery projects in the poorer province for three years.

After the 2008 earthquake in China, one such programme allowed funds from Shandong Province and Shanghai Municipality to rebuild schools and hospitals in Beichuan County and Dujiangyan City to higher standards. Shandong and Shanghai also deployed staff to the newly rebuilt institutes to provide on-the-job guidance, and they invited teachers, doctors and managers to the donor provinces to receive training.

Twinning provides benefits to both recipients and donors, building experience, capacities and government networks within the country or region. It provides a stable source of funding and critical capacity sharing for a number of years, and encourages longer-term partnerships and risk sharing. Twinning also helps with the increased demand for skills after a disaster, as well as building these capacities. It can be agreed on before a disaster, allowing for fast and predictable deployment during recovery.

Complete decentralization of budgeting and reporting can also generate problems. Although it may ensure that spending is in line with local priorities, it almost inevitably leads to divisions with national and sector policies and programmes (Benson, 2011

An incremental approach to decentralization (Box 7.3) may be the best alternative. Where local government capacity and resources are particularly weak, ‘deconcentration’ may be a good interim step towards the full devolution of responsibilities and functions. In Mozambique, for example, responsibility for DRM is highly centralized in the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC). Its functions, however, are implemented through deconcentrated regional offices and local committees, separate from and in parallel to the decentralized system of local administration. As disaster risk reduction has a high profile in Mozambique, these deconcentrated mechanisms are well resourced, and staff can relocate freely between central and local levels depending on needs. Given that local government capacity is weak, most risk reduction functions are undertaken by INGC staff (Scott and Tarazona, 2011

). However, while improving effective delivery,such arrangements may in the long term undermine local government authority and capacities.

Box 7.3 Towards more responsible and responsive local risk
reduction

An incremental approach to decentralizing disaster risk reduction can address limited local capacities,
a primary barrier to effective local governance. Other options for addressing the problem of low
capacity are:

Not decentralizing down to the lowest possible level. Instead, create centres of excellence at
intermediate levels so that DRM technical resources and capacities can be pooled.

Taking a ‘layered’ approach. Different risk reduction functions are decentralized to different layers
depending on capacity, rather than wholly devolving or retaining centrally. Layering would have to
take place with a good understanding of the local context and the capacities for different functions
at different levels.

Using academic institutions and NGOs to support weak local governments. In Colombia, academic
institutions have successfully provided technical risk reduction services to local governments,
raising standards and credibility. However, municipalities with the weakest capacities often lack the
resources to contract such services unless there is central government support.

7.4 Strengthening accountability

Access to information on disaster risk,
particularly for the most vulnerable,
is the first step in reducing disaster
losses. Good risk governance
requires disaster-prone populations to
know their risks as well as their rights,
and a responsive and accountable
civil society engaged in constructive
dialogue with governments.

The quality of national and local governance
in general, and factors such as voice and
accountability in particular, influence why some
countries have far higher disaster mortality
and relative economic loss than others (Kahn, 2005

), then accountability mechanisms are
particularly important in generating political
and economic incentives for disaster risk
reduction. The risk of being held to account
for decisions that result in avoidable disaster
risk can be a powerful incentive to make DRM
work.

In DRM, as in many development sectors,
establishing accountability is not straightforward
(Olson et al., 2011

). Making direct attribution
and tracking of responsibility is complicated
by having multiple actors involved in the
construction of any specific risk. Outcomes of
any one actor’s decisions and actions may not
become visible until years or decades later, and
inaction or symbolic actions may have greater effects than decisions and actions actually taken. Moreover, the dynamics of accountability in any single context are subject to the historical evolution of regulation and governance, of cultural values and social norms.

Nevertheless, there are examples where direct responsibility for action and inaction is monitored, and bearing personal responsibility for disaster losses can provide a powerful incentive for investing in DRM. Indonesia has enacted legislation that makes leaders directly responsible for disaster losses, and in Colombia the decentralization of DRM responsibilities has meant that mayors have been imprisoned when people were found to have died needlessly from a disaster (Scott and Tarazona, 2011

). However, access to information is only effective when governments actively support the right to information, and when citizens are aware of their legal right and are willing to assert it. In addition, structural barriers, such as illiteracy, may impede access to and use of information (Gupta, 2011

Winchester, S. 2003. Krakatoa: The day the world exploded: August 27, 1883. New York, USA: HarperCollins..

). Today, most disasters are broadcast around the world in real time, through television, radio, print media, mobile social networking and the Internet. The media, therefore, plays an increasingly important role in holding governments, NGOs, international organizations and other stakeholders to account (Olson et al., 2011

). This applies only when the media is free and, more importantly, responsive to disaster risk reduction perspectives, which means it looks beyond the images of catastrophe and body counts, and reports on of the causes and longer-term impacts of disasters (Radford and Wisner, 2011

The media play four different roles in the wake of disasters: observing and reporting facts such as mortality rates and the volume of assistance provided, holding governments and humanitarian actors to account, analysing the causes of the disaster and raising public awareness about potential improvements in DRM (Olson et al., 2011

). Importantly, and given its global reach, the media can help create political incentives not just in the disaster-affected country, but in other countries with similar risks. As Box 7.4 shows, after the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, media outlets in Jamaica and Peru paid increased attention to their own risks, highlighting the concern that ‘it could happen here’ (Olson et al., 2011

Box 7.4 The role of the media following the 2010 Haiti and Chile earthquakes

Figure 7.1
Excerpt from El Comercio: hypothetical tsunami striking a beach community south of Lima

(Source: El Comercio, 18 February 2010)

Following the 2010
Chile earthquake,
the media identified
gaps and overlaps
between government
agencies, central and
local government, and
the need to improve
seismic monitoring.
Following the Haiti and
Chile earthquakes, the
media in neighbouring
countries increased
their disaster reporting.
Nearly 20 percent of
the media reports in
Jamaica and 13 percent in Peru focused on the need to identify risks and vulnerabilities in their own
countries, and another 15 percent and 34 percent respectively on risk reduction measures. In Peru,
for example, the press ran articles on the potential risks tsunamis posed to coastal communities (see
Figure 7.1). In Haiti, Chile and neighbouring countries, the media showed that it was capable of holding
governments and the international community to account. This capacity is limited however, by the
media’s short attention span and rapid drop-off in coverage after disasters.

). Algeria’s 2004 Law on the Prevention of Major Risks and on Disaster Management in the Framework of Sustainable Development now guarantees citizens a right to information about the risks and vulnerabilities of their places of residence and work, and whether there are measures in place to reduce risks and manage disasters (IFRC, 2011

). Likewise, Serbia’s 2009 Law on Emergency Situations and El Salvador’s 2005 Law on Civil Protection, Prevention and Mitigation of Disasters, acknowledge citizens’ right to be informed on disaster risks and oblige authorities to provide this information. However, in other countries information on disaster losses and impacts is not always made public.

Whereas such laws are important, they do not necessarily strengthen actual accountability unless they are supported by penalties and/or effective performance-based rewards. For example, provisions in legislation and the regulation of public office can specify the liabilities of politicians and government leaders, becoming more effective when linked to expenditure and budgets. Transparent contractual arrangements between government departments and between government and private service providers also contribute to increased accountability. Where rights and obligations are clearly articulated and tied to concrete performance measures, service delivery can improve dramatically (Box 7.5).

Box 7.5 Social audits to ensure accountability in rural employment in India

India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) facilitates accountability by both
governments and civil society. It includes decentralized planning and implementation, proactive
disclosures and mandatory social audits of all projects. The impetus was provided by strong political
will and a committed high-level bureaucracy. In 2006, the Strategy and Performance Innovation Unit
(SPIU) of the Department of Rural Development, collaborated with MKSS, a civil society organization
in Rajasthan that pioneered social auditing in India, to train officials and civil society activists and to
design and conduct pilot social audits. This process trained 25 civil society resource persons at the
state level, complemented by 660 more at the district level, with audits conducted by educated youth
volunteers identified and trained by this pool of expertise.

Since the first social audit was conducted in July 2006, an average of 54 social audits have been
conducted every month across all 13 NREGA districts. Whether audits have resulted in improved
accountability in service delivery needs to be researched, but significant and lasting impacts are already
evident, including improvements in citizens’ awareness levels, their confidence and self-respect, and
importantly, their ability to engage with local officials.