After Hezbollah’s fatal attack on Israeli soldiers Wednesday, the two enemy sides are in a rare configuration: they’re even. Israel killed six Hezbollah guerrillas and an Iranian general on January 18, so Hezbollah killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded seven more, and now they’re quits, for the time being. They each told UN peacekeepers in south Lebanon that they didn’t want to escalate things anymore, they wanted calm, and that clearly seems to be the case today.

What an opportunity. From this point forward, Israel and Hezbollah could start fresh, they could each decide not to attack the other, and, in theory, this unofficial cease-fire could last indefinitely.

I believe Hezbollah would go for that, for one simple reason – they know Israel is the incomparably stronger side (which is why they absorbed so many Israeli attacks in the last couple of years with very little response, until Wednesday). They know that starting up with Israel would get them bashed up badly. I think Hezbollah’s ally Iran would go for an indefinite, unofficial cease-fire too – for the same reason – and so would their ally Syria.

Unfortunately, I don’t think Israel would accept that arrangement. The strong in this world get away with things the weak wouldn’t dream of trying, and Israel flies spy jets and drones over Lebanon regularly, it blows up sophisticated weapons on their way from Syria to Hezbollah, and it assassinates Hezbollah and Syrian military officers as well as Iranian nuclear scientists and generals.

Would Israel be willing to give up all those prerogatives in return for Hezbollah unofficially putting down its weapons? I don’t think so, because Israel is filled with too much fear and aggression to trust its deterrent power; instead, it trusts the use of force.

And lately Israel has been zooming in on a whole new Hezbollah “threat” it must “defend against”: the organization’s recent military build-up on the Syrian Golan Heights, across the border from Israel.

After the Hezbollah attack, Prime Minister Netanyahu said: “For a while, Iran has been trying, through the Hezbollah, to form an additional terror front against us from the Golan Heights. We are acting with resolve and responsibility against this effort.”

This is Israeli paranoia at work. Hezbollah isn’t gunning for Israel from the Syrian Golan Heights, it’s defending the territory – and its own survival as well as that of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime – from ISIS and the Nusra Front, the latter an Al-Qaeda offshoot.

Even superhawk columnist Guy Bechor made this point in his Yedioth Ahronoth column on Thursday:

This is the last territory still in the hands of the Syrian regime, and this is where Hezbollah has set up a command post and concentrated its forces. What are they doing there? They’ve decided to defend the area at all costs, because if Nusra Front gets across it, they’ll be able to continue north to the Shi’ite and Hezbollah strongholds in the Lebanese valley, turn west toward the Shi’ite areas in south Lebanon, or turn east toward Damascus. …

The sectarian war is more important to these terrorist groups than Israel, and from the standpoint of both the Sunnis [ISIS and Nusra Front] and the Shi’ites [Hezbollah], we are the less threatening enemy.

Yedioth’s center-left star columnist Nahum Barnea made a similar point about Israel’s knee-jerk alarm over Hezbollah’s new deployment. He wrote that Netanyahu’s message that Hezbollah was spreading out across the Syrian side of the border with Israel, and that Israel would carry out all military actions necessary to prevent this, was “adopted immediately by every politician and analyst,” Barnea wrote. He continued:

Let’s assume Hezbollah intends to do this. Is it so terrible? Is it preferable for Israel to sit on the Golan Heights across from the forces of ISIS and Nusra Front? After all, we’re sitting across from them today, from Quneitra [on the Israeli-Syrian border] south, and I haven’t heard that Israel has launched a war against them. Why are we able to go on living across from Hezbollah in Hanita, Metulla, Misgav-Am, Dovev, Kiryat Shmona and Shlomi [near the Lebanese border], but we can’t live across from Hezbollah in Merom Hagolan [near the Syrian border]?

It’s always about us, we’re always the target, goes the Israeli view, which is why we can’t leave Hezbollah alone even when it’s preoccupied with fighting global jihadists. And out of this same paranoia grows another misperception that causes us to pick fights: the view that the enemy’s weapons are always offensive, meant for attacking us, and never defensive, meant for deterrence or counterattack.

Ari Shavit, star center-left columnist of Haaretz, inadvertently provided a window into this way of thinking in his piece on Thursday.

It’s meant to be a pretty dovish column. He writes, “We must not provoke, we must not act recklessly in a way that could lead to an uncontrollable deterioration. We must not take war-generating steps that could force a dangerous war on Israel.” But at the same time, he sees Hezbollah as being ideologically and perpetually bent on war with Israel:

While many Israelis may harbor understandable guilt over the national Palestinian movement, this is not the case when it comes to the sub-state Shi’ite army in Lebanon. There’s no room for comparison between our peace-seeking democracy and their terrorist totalitarianism. There’s no similarity between our desire to live in peace and their desire to enforce their religious faith by the sword. If we’re forced to go to war against Hezbollah, it will be a war of the sons of light against the sons of darkness, a free society against a fanatical order that threatens freedom.

And because of what he sees as Hezbollah’s scorpion-like nature, Shavit’s conclusion is that “sooner or later a third Lebanon war will break out.” At the same time, though, he says it is “our duty to make every effort to put off the war’s outbreak.”

But the fatal contradiction here is this: If you believe that Hezbollah’s practical goal is to destroy or enslave Israel – an unlikely one considering the imbalance in power between the two sides, which Israel continually demonstrates – then will you forgo the opportunity to bomb the convoys bringing them advanced weapons? Will you pass up a chance to assassinate their key people? Will you stop invading Lebanese airspace to spy on them?

No, you won’t. It wouldn’t make sense. If you believe Hezbollah is working toward conquering or destroying you – that this is not merely their wish, but their concrete goal – it would be suicidal to let them go about their business. So you attack. And by attacking, you violate your principle that “we must not provoke … we must not take war-generating steps that could force a dangerous war on Israel.”

Whatever Israel may say about not wanting to provoke another war with Hezbollah, its superior military strength combined with its bottomless fear will likely lead it, sooner or later, to do just that.

Two Israeli soldiers were killed in a cross-border attack on the Lebanese border Wednesday morning, for Hezbollah quickly took responsibility. A Spanish soldier serving with UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, was killed in Israeli retaliatory shelling.

The border attack comes a week after Israel assassinated a Hezbollah commander and an Iranian general in the Quneitra area of the Golan Heights in Syria. In the past 24 hours, two rockets hit the Israeli-occupied side of the Golan Heights and the IDF responded by striking Syrian military positions.

Late Wednesday Wednesday Israeli army vehicles traveling on a patrol road along the Lebanese border fence near Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar, which is half in Israel and half in Lebanon, were hit by Kornet anti-tank missiles.

Photos and video obtained by Israeli media showed two vehicles along the border fence completely engulfed in flames.

A statement by Hezbollah taking credit for the attack said it had been perpetrated by its “Quneitra Martyrs unit,” a reference to last week’s Israeli attack in Syria.

In response to the attack, the Israeli military attacked southern Lebanon with artillery and air strikes, killing a Spanish UNIFIL soldier. An IDF Spokesperson said that the army’s response was not over.

A senior IDF source told Ynet that the Spanish UNIFIL soldier was hit “by one of the mortars we fired. We were immediately in contact with the UN, we regret the incident and will examine it. We will draw conclusions, we have no intention of harming UN forces.”

Israel and Hezbollah fought a month-long war in 2006 following a similar cross-border attack against a patrol jeep in which two soldiers’ bodies were captured by the Lebanese militant group.

File photo of an Israeli soldier directing a tank. (Photo by Oren Ziv/Activestills.org)

Hezbollah has been active in the Syrian civil war and many analysts have indicated that the group is hesitant to enter into a new war with Israel due to being overstretched in Syria.

Israel is less than two months away from general elections. Incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Hezbollah not to test Israel following the attack. Netanyahu pointed to the recent war in Gaza as warning of what could come.

Netanyahu’s main challenger in the elections, Labor’s Isaac Herzog responded to the attack supporting a harsh response, saying: “If somebody in Hezbollah thinks that they can threaten and divide us during elections is badly mistaken — in the fight against terror there is no coalition and no opposition.”

Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman called for a “harsh and disproportionate” response to the attack.

]]>http://972mag.com/israeli-soldiers-killed-in-hezbollah-retaliation-attack/101976/feed/2Israeli air strike in Syria: Lies, aggression — at what cost?http://972mag.com/israeli-air-strike-in-syria-preemption-or-aggression/101733/
http://972mag.com/israeli-air-strike-in-syria-preemption-or-aggression/101733/#commentsFri, 23 Jan 2015 11:38:05 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=101733From close up, the assassination of a Hezbollah commander and an Iranian general was probably preemption. In the big picture, it was definitely aggression.

During the Second Intifada, (late 2000-2004) Israel made a habit of carrying out “targeted assassinations” of Palestinian militant leaders. The Palestinians, in turn, had a predilection for blowing up buses and cafes. After an assassination of a high-up Hamasnik or Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades man, some Israelis and many foreigners would question whether it was a good idea, whether it was worth the risk, given the likelihood that the Palestinians would be out for revenge. The routine response from the national leadership was that these Palestinian terrorists are always trying to kill as many Israelis as they can, no matter what Israel does or doesn’t do, so targeted assassinations do not put Israelis in any more danger than they’re already in.

Yet after every targeted assassination of a major Palestinian figure, the political, military and intelligence heads would warn the public that the threat level had just gone red, so they should be on high alert, keep their eyes open.

And I would wonder: if Palestinian terrorists are not influenced by Israeli targeted assassinations, why do Israel’s authorities put the public on high alert after each one?

The answer was that Israel’s authorities – the prime minister, defense minister, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad – were bullshitting themselves and the public. They wanted to kill big-time terrorists, and they didn’t want to be put off by the risk of major revenge attacks, so they decided that there was no risk, and peddled that bullshit to the public.

Which brings us to Israel’s air strike on Sunday in the Syrian Golan Heights, which killed an Iranian Revolutionary Guard general and six Hezbollah fighters, including Jihad Mughniyeh, son of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah military chief whom Israel assassinated seven years ago.

Another head-on contradiction

The security establishment and “Western intelligence sources” immediately put out the word that Mughniyeh “was already planning, and had prepared, more major murderous attacks against Israel in the Golan Heights. These attacks include rocket fire, infiltrations, explosive devices, anti-tank missile fire, etc., with the goal of killing soldiers, hitting Israeli communities in the Golan Heights and killing Israeli civilians,” according to Yedioth Ahronoth, echoing the general coverage.

At the same time, though, Israeli authorities were saying that Hezbollah was not expected to try to strike back too harshly for Sunday’s assassinations because it didn’t want a full-scale confrontation with Israel, certainly not now when it is so heavily preoccupied with fighting on Assad’s side in the Syrian civil war. “Hezbollah doesn’t want a full-fledged war. It has a number of possibilities to respond in different arenas. We assume that it currently does not want full contact,” former IDF counter-terrorism head Yoram Schweitzer told AFP, in line with the Israeli assessment in the immediate aftermath of the air strike.

Once again, there is a head-on contradiction here: if Hezbollah is not likely to strike back too hard at Israel for fear of a war, why was Jihad Mughniyeh planning to light up the north with rockets, bombs and deadly infiltrations?

They can’t both be true – if Mughniyeh was planning such attacks on Israel, then Hezbollah is not afraid of war with Israel, and would be looking to hit back extremely hard for the assassinations. But if Hezbollah’s response really was likely to be muted out of fear of conflagration with Israel, then it makes no sense whatsoever that Mughniyeh was about to try to kill lots of Israelis.

So which line of bullshit was it? Was the Israeli establishment 1) artificially inflating Mughniyeh’s intentions because it wanted to kill some Hezbollah men and an Iranian general just because? Or was it 2) artificially deflating the likelihood of a major Hezbollah/Iranian retaliation because it wanted to convince itself and the public that the air strike had carried little risk?

I think the answer is 2). I find it hard to believe Hezbollah was not planning to hit Israel hard at some point because Israel, after all, has blasted Hezbollah and Syria repeatedly for the last two years, bombing convoys of Syrian advanced weapons headed for south Lebanon as well as Syrian weapons depots, and killing Syrian and Hezbollah officials along the way. In return, Hezbollah, despite its best efforts, hasn’t managed to do more than injure a few Israeli soldiers with explosive devices on the border, while Syria and Iran have done nothing.

So why wouldn’t Hezbollah’s Jihad Mughniyeh, with Iran’s backing, have been planning to hit Israel now?

War of choice

It didn’t have to be this way though. Israel could have a quiet northern border if it wanted to get off the fear-and-aggression treadmill. It taught Hezbollah a very harsh lesson in the 2006 Second Lebanon War; after that it could have adopted a hands-off policy toward Lebanon, Syria and Iran and trusted its military might to deter Hassan Nasrallah’s guerrillas from any further provocations, such as the kidnapping of two soldiers that set off that war. Instead, after the war, Israel went on the offensive and stayed on it, calling this policy – what else? – self defense.

Since Sunday, the popularity of the air strike and credibility of Israel’s leadership have been going straight downhill. First, Knesset candidate and retired IDF general Yoav Galant spilled the beans by saying that such military adventures during election campaigns are not coincidental. Then “security officials,” probably Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon or IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, said out of one side of their mouth that they didn’t know Iranian Gen. Mohammed Allahdadi had been in the ill-fated convoy, while out of the other side saying that Israel did not take responsibility for the attack at all. After that, the claim that Israel didn’t mean to kill Allahdadi stopped being taken seriously.

As did the assurances that Hezbollah will probably limit its counterattack. The North is now on high alert; tanks, soldiers and Iron Domes have been pouring in; a false alarm one morning led roads to be closed and communities to be told to stay indoors; and Gantz and the commander of the Air Force have cancelled their trips abroad.

“The scene envisioned in Israel is of an especially cruel assault,” wrote Yedioth’s very astute and well-connected defense analyst Alex Fishman on Friday. “Hezbollah and the Iranians want to see blood, and lots of it. The assessment is that they will aim the attack at soldiers to extract a painful price from Israel – as many deaths and injuries as possible – to punish, avenge, teach a lesson and deter. The targeted assassinations … put them in a position of having almost no choice.”

Indeed, the weak side that is continually under attack sooner or later has no choice. But the strong side that is continually on the attack does.

]]>http://972mag.com/israeli-air-strike-in-syria-preemption-or-aggression/101733/feed/14How a Galilee Palestinian beat the odds to become an Arab Idol finalisthttp://972mag.com/how-a-galilee-palestinian-beat-the-odds-to-become-an-arab-idol-finalist/99998/
http://972mag.com/how-a-galilee-palestinian-beat-the-odds-to-become-an-arab-idol-finalist/99998/#commentsFri, 12 Dec 2014 18:09:41 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=99998On his way to the finale of one of the most important shows in the Arab world, Haitham Khalailah had to deal with the Shin Bet, restrictions on the movement of Palestinian citizens and the fraught connection between Palestinians in Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Will he be the second Palestinian in a row to be crowned winner?

By Yael Marom and Henriette Chacar

Haitham Khalailah, a 24-year-old Palestinian singer from Majd al-Krum, competed Friday night in the finale of Arab Idol – the most popular singing competition in the entire Arab world. Hundreds of millions of viewers will have to decide by Saturday night whether Khalailah — who was able to unite Palestinians in the occupied territories, Israel and around the world — should win. The other two finalists are Hazem al-Sharif of Syria and Majd al-Madani from Saudi Arabia.

Haitham sang two songs in the semifinals, the first of which was Saber Ruba’i's “Ahla Nisaa al-Dunia” (“The most beautiful women in the world”), followed by “‘Ala Dal’ona,” one of the most important and well-known Palestinian folk songs, which had the entire studio audience on their feet.

Khalailah performs “‘Ala Dal’ona” during the Arab Idol semifinals:

Khalailah began his Arab Idol journey alongside Manal Moussa, another contestant from the north who caused quite a bit of controversy and was subsequently voted off in the quarterfinals. Moussa took a different approach than Khalailah, and succeeded in angering just about everyone.

Moussa started off strong, and seemed like she had a very good chance of reaching the finals. But something happened along the way, likely due to her political, pro-Palestinian rhetoric – which may have been used to get more votes – and the rhetoric of her family members, which contradicted her stance.

Two months ago we wrote about the complexities of Manal and Haitham’s appearance on the show, which included dealing with the Shin Bet, restrictions on the movement of Palestinian citizens of Israel and the fraught connection between Palestinian in Israel and the Arab world.

While the songs and performances are the most central element of the show, Arab Idol also serves as the political focal point of the Arab world. And Khalailah is the shining hope of the Palestinians, who have experienced unrelenting attacks in the past months — from a full-scale operation in the West Bank, to the brutal assault on Gaza to full-blown hate speech and racism against Palestinians in Israel. Khalailah’s presence on the show emphasizes the connection between Palestinians that exists across the world.

But Haitham’s support should not be taken for granted. Until several years ago, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship were seen as near-traitors among other Palestinians and much of the Arab world. This time, even during the initial stages of the show, Gaza’s Mohammad Assaf, who was crowned last season’s Arab Idol (and the first Palestinian to win the competition), openly supported the Palestinians contestants. He did not question their identity and did not hesitate from treating them as his natural successors.

The fact that Haitham made it to Arab Idol is in itself a clear-cut political declaration on the part of the Arab world, as well as by Palestinian contestants who insist on maintaining their connection to the Arab world. Haitham, like Majd Kayyal before him, is part of a group of young Palestinians in Israel who are crossing borders and refusing to give up their identities, as well as their cultural and national connection to Arabs across the globe.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was the first to grant legitimacy to Manal and Haitham. The leader of the Palestinian Authority took an unusual step by giving each of them official Palestinian travel documents, which allowed them to reach Beirut. It is well-known that Abbas does not generally insist on maintaining a connection with Palestinian citizens of Israel, and that he doesn’t see them as an integral part of his political decisions. His decision to support Manal and Haitham shows that the connection between Palestinians is stronger than any peace process or border. Abbas is also contemplating opening free Palestinian phone lines for open voting, just as he did when Mohammad Assaf competed in the finals.

Palestinians within Israel have been campaigning for Haitham over the past week, and have even launched an online campaign that brings together artists, media personalities, lecturers, soccer players and business people in support of their representative on the show.

Chances are that Haitham will compete head-to-head with the talented Syrian contestant, who has also received a great deal of support. The Saudi contestant, who some say reached the finale due to his strong financial backing, will most likely not win. Despite the tragedies that have befallen the region, Arab Idol and its finalists prove that life goes on, and that people must find ways to keep struggling. The Arab world will have to make both an artistic and political decision. Perhaps this will be the second year in a row that a Palestinian is crowned winner.

Born and raised in Jaffa, Henriette Chacar is an aspiring journalist. She is fascinated by Palestinian identity on local, regional and global levels. Aside from writing, she is active in various regional cooperation and community development initiatives. Follow her on Twitter: @HenrietteChacar.

Since the Gaza war ended, Israeli media quickly shifted its focus to the next conflict – with Hezbollah. Channel 2 aired an extensive interview with a senior Israeli military officer under the headline “The 3rd Lebanon War” detailing the immense costs such a clash would incur, as if another conflict with Hezbollah is a pre-determined fact. Referring to the threat, longtime Israeli journalist Ben Caspit warned, “not since the War of Independence has the sovereignty of the Jewish State been in such peril.”

Ironically though, Hezbollah’s increased strength significantly reduces the chances of another war between the two parties. Even during the clandestine battle between Israel and Hezbollah on Syrian territory which has led to losses on both sides, each leader realizes the outcome of a full-scale war would be unbearably catastrophic. This has caused both sides to scale back their responses and created a formidable mutual deterrence between the adversaries.

In multiple briefings with local press following the Gaza war, senior military officials have warned about Hezbollah’s strength. Hezbollah possesses approximately 100,000 rockets, 10-times the number in Hamas’s arsenal. In contrast to previous battles fought in Lebanon, the Israeli military believes that Hezbollah is now prepared t o send well-trained fighters across the border to conquer an Israeli town. The far more intense conflict could even last up-to four months, cautioned the senior Israeli officer. Any Israeli government understands that these nightmare scenarios must be avoided.

Daniel Sobelman, Research Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, notes that Hezbollah’s ability to provoke such fear is especially impressive given that Hezbollah is a non-state actor and much weaker militarily than Israel. Nonetheless, in a “calculated way,” Nasrallah has managed to establish a “fierce military deterrence vis-à-vis Israel,” Sobelman explains.

During the height of the Gaza war, the IDF presented the Security Cabinet with the estimated costs of a full-scale invasion: hundreds of soldiers killed, tens of billion of shekels lost and gruesome battles in the heart of Gaza City. After this frightening briefing, even Israel’s most hawkish minister Naphtali Bennett rejected a complete re-occupation of Gaza. If Israeli ministers shied away from a battle with the weaker Hamas, one can only imagine the Israeli government’s caution before engaging in a war with Hezbollah, which could inflict horrific damage on Israel.

Yet, the fear on both sides of an all-out war has not prevented the lower-intensity incidents in “grey-areas” away from the Israeli-Lebanese border. Bulgarian officials implicated Hezbollah in the 2012 Burgas attack that killed 5 Israeli tourists. Reputable analysts confirm that Israel assassinated senior Hezbollah leader Hassan Laqqis in a covert operation last year. These conflicts have spread to the Golan Heights where Israel has accused Hezbollah of planting an explosive near the Israeli-Syrian demarcation line.

What unites these strikes is the ability of both sides to credibly deny their roles. These ambiguous attacks lead to long investigations, allowing the other side to refrain from quickly responding across the volatile Israeli-Lebanese border. Even when Israel or Hezbollah suffer a painful covert strike, its fear of the other’s military strength prevents a direct confrontation, forcing a more limited covert response.

Hassan Nasrallah (delayedgratification/CC BY NC SA 2.0)

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has voiced the dangers of another war. In a startling admission after the 2006 fighting, which began with the kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Nasrallah exclaimed, “Now if you ask me if there was a 1% chance that the kidnapping would lead to the war, would you go ahead with the kidnapping? I would say definitely not.”

In this devastating war, Over 1,000 Lebanese were killed, including hundreds of Hezbollah fighters. Severely damaging much of the country’s infrastructure, Israel also left approximately 1 million unexploded ordinances in southern Lebanon, more than one for each of the area’s 650,000 residents.

If these attacks were not enough to deter Hezbollah against launching another war, senior Israeli officials have cautioned that they will use even greater force next time. Israeli Army Northern Command Chief Gadi Eisenkot warned that in a future war with Hezbollah, Israel would exercise “disproportional force” causing massive damage in Lebanon. “What happened in the Dahiyah quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village to which Israel is fired on,” Eisenkot said. He clarified that “this is not a recommendation” but a “plan that has been approved.”

Increasingly, Nasrallah has been stressing the importance of deterrence in his speeches. “Deterrence is the only way to protect Lebanon and its resources,” he announced in a May 2014 address. The Hezbollah leader understands the importance of deterrence given the imbalance of power between the two parties. As Nasrallah admitted this year, “Israel has one of the strongest armies in the world.”

Hezbollah also faces a completely different regional context compared to the 2006 war. In an August 2014 address, Nasrallah emphasized that Lebanon faced an “existential threat”, not from Israel, but rather from the Islamic State in Syria.

The two most important strategic priorities for Hezbollah now are “preventing the Assad regime from imploding” and “maintaining the status quo in Lebanon” despite a tenuous political climate, explained Randa Slim, Lebanese analyst at the Middle East Institute. Slim also highlighted the organization’s limited capacities after sending so many of its fighters to Syria. A full-scale war with Israel would severely distract Hezbollah from the “existential threat” in Syria and its domestic standing in Lebanon.

Only a few months ago, Israeli Army Chief of Staff Benny Gantz conceded that Hezbollah is stronger than any other Arab army. Although many Israelis are frightened by this realization, Hezbollah’s power ironically has played a major role in preventing a future war. Covert operations between the adversaries have raged during the past years and will continue. Yet, both sides’ credible fear of the other’s formidable military capabilities deters Netanyahu and Nasrallah from escalating the conflict to a full-scale war.

Aaron Magid is a graduate student at Harvard University specializing in Middle Eastern Studies. He has written articles on Middle Eastern politics for The New Republic, Al-Monitor and Lebanon’s Daily Star. He tweets at @AaronMagid.

]]>http://972mag.com/does-a-strengthened-hezbollah-make-israel-safer/97455/feed/6Another Israeli act of military madness in Syriahttp://972mag.com/another-israeli-act-of-military-madness/96959/
http://972mag.com/another-israeli-act-of-military-madness/96959/#commentsTue, 23 Sep 2014 13:32:42 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=96959On Tuesday morning the Air Force shot down a Syrian fighter jet for no good reason on earth.

For the first time in 30 years, a Syrian fighter jet on Tuesday morning strayed over the border with Israel – or rather, over the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which rightfully belongs to Syria. Israeli military officials reportedly think it was an accident. They also think the Syrian jet was on its way to bomb Al-Nusra jihadists on the Syrian side of the border.

The incursion of the Syrian plane lasted two seconds. It got about 800 meters onto the Israeli-occupied side of the border. Then the pilots turned the jet back toward Syria.

So what did Israel do then? What else? It blew the Syrian jet out of the sky. The crippled plane landed on the Syrian side of the border. Thankfully, the Syrian pilots ejected safely.

All the details of the incident point to an Israeli act of incredible recklessness and stupidity.

Yedioth Ahronoth reports that “the IDF thinks the jet crossed into Israel by accident en route to attacking rebel positions on the Golan.” Same story: “According to a military source, the jet entered Israel for a couple of seconds, penetrating a few hundred meters before turningback (bold italics added), at which point it was hit by the Patriot missile.”

A Patriot missile is launched during a test. (File photo by IAF)

But then a few paragraphs later, an IDF officer tells Yedioth: “We identified the Syrian jet at a height of 10-14,000 feet. That’s a height considered comfortable for an attack run. A fighter jet can reach the Sea of Galilee in less than a minute and everywhere else in five.”

Yeah. The Syrian jet is looking to bomb Al-Nusra jihadists on the Syrian side of the border, it strays accidentally onto the Israeli-controlled side for two goddamn seconds, then it turns back toward Syria – and it was a threat to Israel.

The Haaretz story presents the IDF version of the incident a lot more simply: “Although Israel did not see any threat of attack on its own territory from that plane, its policy stipulates that any plane that breaches its territorial authority must be downed to avoid security risk.”

What security risk? That the jet was going to spy on Israel? Israel has been sending spy jets over Lebanon a few times a week for many years – is it okay, from Israel’s point of view, for Lebanon to shoot down those planes? Israel has just given Hezbollah a great precedent for doing so.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said Tuesday in response to the incident that the Syrian plane approached Israeli territory in a “threatening manner” and crossed the border.

“We’ve clarified this in the past and we’re emphasizing it again now: We won’t allow anybody, whether it’s a state or a terrorist organization, to threaten our security and violate our sovereignty,” the defense minister and former IDF chief of staff said. “We will respond forcefully to all attempts of this kind, whether it’s an accident or intentional.”

Ever since the war in Gaza ended, people here have been saying another war is coming on the northern border. And what I’ve been dreading is that Israel, given this expectation, will interpret every little move on the other side of the border as proof of intent to attack, and “preempt” it by attacking first.

And that’s what happened today. Will this incident start a war with Syria? Most likely not. But eventually I believe Israel will set off a war with Hezbollah or Syria or Iran or somebody, because its limitless fear produces limitless aggression. No one likes to live in fear, and the best way to lose that fear is to strike first. That, in a nutshell, is Israel’s military policy, reiterated this morning over the Syrian border.

]]>http://972mag.com/another-israeli-act-of-military-madness/96959/feed/45Trapped between Assad and ‘IS’: Inside the capital of the ‘Islamic State’http://972mag.com/trapped-between-assad-and-is-inside-the-capital-of-the-islamic-state/96485/
http://972mag.com/trapped-between-assad-and-is-inside-the-capital-of-the-islamic-state/96485/#commentsMon, 08 Sep 2014 17:19:01 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=96485Following a long period of quiet, the Syrian city of Raqqa is once again being shelled — this time by Assad’s forces. Residents have been forced to flee the shelling, along with IS’s extremist agenda. An interview with a resident of the ‘Islamic State.’

By Elizabeth Tsurkov

Raqqa, the capital of the “Islamic State” in northern Syria, for the past two months has been forced once again to deal with a devastating phenomenon — indiscriminate bombing by the Syrian Air Force. According to reports from the local coordinating committee, a Syrian air force bombing of a bakery on Saturday took the lives of some 50 people, 35 of them civilians.

Residents of Raqqa have found themselves trapped between the regime’s air strikes, which kill indiscriminately, especially civilians, and the Jihadi organization that is forcing upon them an alien lifestyle and an extremist ideology. In an exclusive interview with +972 Magazine, “Akram” (not his real name), a graduate of Aleppo University and a resident of Raqqa, estimates that between 80 and 90 percent of the city’s residents despise the organization and its actions.

When the regime started bombing them, Raqqa residents “started cursing and swearing at both sides,” Akram explains. “Honestly, people are fed up with all of the sides, even the [Free Syrian Army]. They only want the war to stop. Only a few people are still enthusiastic about the revolution.”

Islamic State (IS), for its part, has moved its commanders out of the city. Akram says that after the bombing of the bakery, he spoke with a Tunisian IS militant who concluded that the fact that only a minority of those killed were IS militants proves that god is on the Islamic State’s side and that the civilians killed were sinners being punished for their corruption.

When IS took control of the city forced upon the residents its particularly fanatical interpretation of Sharia law. A large number of Christians and political activists fled the city. Those activists who didn’t flee were arrested, tortured and occasionally executed for resisting the rule of the Islamic State.

As part of its efforts to build the “Islamic State,” the organization is making significant investments in the indoctrination of Raqqa‘s younger generation, which is obliged to study in IS-authorized schools. “I think this is the most dangerous thing facing an entire generation in Raqqa,” Akram says. “It will take a lot of effort for parents to protect their kids from adopting [the Islamic State’s] beliefs.”

“Those guys are monsters. They are self-righteous to a point where they pose next to [severed] heads and bodies thinking it’s something right and that these horrible crimes are justified in Islam,” Akram continues.

Video: Raqqa residents re-erect a cross that IS tore down at a church in the city, along with chants against Assad and in favor of freedom and Muslim-Christian unity, September 2013.

ISIS (“the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”), or as it is known since June 2014, “the Islamic State,” is the most extremist organization in Syria today. IS was formed in April 2013 after the leader of the organization in Iraq, who was affiliated with Al Qaida, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the official merger of the Al Qaida groups in Iraq (“The Islamic State of Iraq”) and Syria (“al-Nusra Front”). The leader of the Nusra Front, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, rejected the merger, as did Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The entire IS chain of command and roughly half of its militants are not Syrian — most of them come from Arab states, the Caucasus and small numbers come from the West.

Unlike other militant groups in Syria, IS does not see itself as a militant group but rather as a country, which is reflected in both its name and behavior. More than any other organization, IS is focused on governing and the establishment of an Islamic state that rules over every aspect of life. As a result of its self-perception as a state, IS refuses to partake in arbitration with other militant groups in Syria and therefore, since January 2014, it has been in non-stop conflict with more moderate rebel groups in Syria. Those inter-rebel battles have taken the lives of no fewer than 7,000 militants.

Assad’s double game

Syrian regime air strike on Raqqa, September 6, 2014. (Photo by “Akram)

The rise of radical groups in Syria benefited the regime not only by making its propaganda a self-fulfilling prophecy, but also by increasing support for it among religious minorities, the bourgeois and liberals. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the Assad regime consistently refrained from directly fighting IS. The jihadist organization, for its part, preferred to focus on the establishment of an Islamic state and fighting against more moderate rebels and enforcing Sharia on the population under its rule.

“From the time when IS took full control over Raqqa in March [2014], there was only one aerial bombing – 40 days after they arrived,” Akram recalls. “Then there was complete calm.”

In June 2014, with the help of local Sunni tribes and organizations related to the Iraqi Ba’ath party, IS forces took control of large parts of Iraq, including the Sunni cities of Mosul and Tikrit. The IS advance has since been halted as a result of a counter attacks by Shi’ite militias, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi Army and the American Air Force.

“Everything changed dramatically [in Raqqa] after IS’s huge advances in Iraq and its capture of Mosul,” Akram explains. “Since then we have witnessed at least 10 air raids a week.”

Why do you think the regime stopped attacking Raqqa after IS took control but continued to attack neighborhoods and cities under more moderate rebel groups’ control?

“I think the regime decided to stop, or lessen its operations against one side once the infighting between other rebels and IS [began]. And because the regime prefers the jihadis over the rebels it decided to cease hostilities against [IS]. More so, the regime found that it shared an objective with IS: fighting the [more moderate] rebels.”

And why is Raqqa under [regime] attack again only now that IS took control of more than one third of Iraq’s territory?

“After the Mosul operation, the regime felt that it was in danger of ‘creating’ a monster [that could hurt it too]. It also wanted the world to see that it was fighting this monster — once it became a threat to the whole region, and not only the [Assad] regime.

Syrian regime air strike on Raqqa, August 2014. (Photo by “Akram)

Looking forward, Akram asserts that, “the jihadists are like cancer — once they spread it’s nearly impossible to eradicate them.” In order to get rid of the Islamic State, he continues, the world must work to end the civil war in Syria, admitting that it will likely end in a choice between two hells. But at the end of the day, Akram says, “the world abandoned us.”

]]>http://972mag.com/trapped-between-assad-and-is-inside-the-capital-of-the-islamic-state/96485/feed/10As violence rises, Muslim moderates must do morehttp://972mag.com/as-violence-rises-muslim-moderates-must-do-more/95941/
http://972mag.com/as-violence-rises-muslim-moderates-must-do-more/95941/#commentsMon, 25 Aug 2014 19:36:17 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=95941My colleagues at ‘Let Us Build Pakistan’ and I have discovered various overlapping interests on certain issues and we occasionally cross-post material that we think our audiences would find relevant. Here is one such article I found interesting.

Against the background of a fresh wave of violence in the Middle East, a Muslim writer calls for introspection.

By Asif Zaidi

The following book review in The Telegraph addresses two recently published books mainly defending British Muslims. A friend sent me the article, hoping that it will help me “see the light.” But I believe the review downplays some significant problems.

[A book by Arun Kundnani ] dispels myths, pointing out that “there is no Islamic doctrine of ‘kill the unbelievers’ as anti-Islam propagandists often maintain. Islam, like other religions, provides a broad moral framework for thinking about questions of violence.” Again and again this book challenges your assumptions. It is worth reading for its examination of the word “extremism” alone. Martin Luther King, Kundnani points out, was denounced in this way.

Bowen’s book is at bottom gentle and optimistic. She suggests that over time there is no fundamental contradiction between Islam and the modern Western state…”

In fact, most members of most religious communities in Britain are patriotic and law-abiding but it is only Muslims who require constant reassurances like those in the review above. Why? The answer is simple: because most radicals have been Muslims and people like Anjem Choudary get their mug all over the television. To me, rather than constantly looking for reassurances, Muslims in Britain should be arguing against the likes of Choudary and protesting against incendiary pronouncements and actions. It is normal that in the absence of such posturing, suspicion grows. Not all Catholic priests are pedophiles. But hasn’t the fact that many cardinals turned a blind eye to those who are has drawn more opprobrium than the pedophiles themselves?

ISIS fighters ride through the Syrian city of Al-Raqqa. (photo: Islamic State)

The silence or acquiescence of the so-called Muslim ‘moderate’ majority reinforces the perception of Muslims as a group of people who cannot, or will not, control their extremist fringes. I think this is an accurate reflection of the reality and see no problem with it. To claim that not all Muslims are terrorists, jihadists, or extremists sounds hollow. Not all men are misogynists or violent towards women, either, but we incessantly reiterate that men have a duty to stand up to sexism and misogyny. In the 1940s most Germans were not Nazis. Similarly, most Hutus did not participate in the killings of Tutsis. But the peaceful majority are irrelevant when a minority are hell bent on waging violence and imposing itself.

We don’t need huge numbers to inflict huge damage. On 9/11, less than a dozen people, in no position of power or authority, caused enough damage to change the entire world for ever. The genocide of the Native Americans or the slaughter of slave ships might be from a different era but the dark heart in mankind beats on and it is the duty of Muslims not to allow it to function under the cloak of Islam.

So to say that “not all Muslims are radical” is a misplaced assertion. The real question is what they are going to do about the ones who are radical. In recent years many Muslims have tended to describe those criticizing Islam as being “Islamophobic.” This is utterly dishonest. Non-Muslims have every right to question the teachings of Islam just as Muslims have every right to scrutinize and question the tenets of other religions. This is an inalienable right and a practice as old as the religion itself. This kind of reaction from Muslims turns lack of knowledge about Islam into a genuine fear of it. Many people question Islam because they support things which are, in truth, incompatible with Islam: abortion, gay rights, and sex before marriage. That does not mean that they do not approve of Muslims. They have also subjected their own religions to the same criticism.

Where is the uproar among the Muslims in the West against the intolerance of minorities in many Muslim countries, the murder of Christians in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, kidnapping of schoolgirls in Nigeria, denial of education to girls in Afghanistan and Pakistan, denial of careers to women in Saudi Arabia, death sentences for supposed adulterers in Sudan, executions of homosexuals in Iran, and “honor” killings and forced marriages just about anywhere? These, naturally, are the things that get reported. Should the media report on Muslims going to the mosque, working at the office, having dinner, and enjoying family time on the weekend? These same Muslims who refuse to murmur on these atrocities turn up by the thousands to protest against Google because Google owns YouTube and someone somewhere has posted a video that they feel insults Islam. It does not matter that the video has nothing to do with the U.S., UK, YouTube or Google – their honor has been slighted and, therefore, they must rally to the chant of the Ummah.

A fighter from the Islamic State stands in front of a tank. (photo: Islamic State)

The author of the book review above fails to point out the total indifference among the British Muslim community towards the innocent Muslims being slaughtered by ISIS in Iraq. Are the nearly 200,000 killed and millions displaced from Syria worth less attention than a supposed slur posted on YouTube?

There is a reason that much of the world feels that the Muslim community is not concerned with justice, peace or progress – it is concerned with honor and with the past. And that means that they don’t care how many people die (Muslim or non-Muslim) in wars and jihads and intifadas, as long as Muslim pride is restored. If that means rioting when someone records a film, so be it. If that means murdering your daughter because she’s got a non-Muslim girlfriend, so be it. And if that means keeping Palestinians in refugee camps for three generations in rich Muslim client states of the West then so be it. It is this attitude, and no imaginary Islamophobia, that is responsible for a number of young westerners, fueled by dreams of Jihad, flying off to Syria and holy war. Of course not every Muslim is a jihadist, but it is also a fact that for every young Muslim guy who actually makes it out to the front in Syria or Iraq, it seems there are many more who sympathize with them.

According to a reliable study Muslim extremism claims 38 times more Muslim lives than non-Muslims, without accounting for Muslim wars (Iran-Iraq) and major uprisings. ISIS has crucified a number of moderate Syrian rebels – and pro-Assad fighters. As always, the terrorists are Saudi-inspired and are far more of a menace to Muslims than the West is. Therefore, to say “the West is far more responsible for Muslim terrorism than they are” shows a lamentable lack of knowledge of the history of Islam and its relations with surrounding civilizations.

In every Western or non-Muslim country where I have been, most people show no signs of animus against Muslims in general. I don’t think Muslims in the West need the reassurances that the Telegraph article and the books reviewed seek to provide. On the contrary, I think it is a shame that much-needed discussions about radical Islam immediately turn into people shouting “not all Muslims are like that” and drowning out genuine concerns.

I can express my disgust for abuse in the Catholic Church in any setting, and it is correctly assumed that I am not rebuking Christians in general. I can voice concerns about Zionism and Israeli occupation, and it is – or should be – understood that I am not rebuking Jews in general. So when others talk about the dangers of radical Islam, it should be obvious that they are not rebuking Muslims in general without explanations.

Grow up and do something about your own state of affairs. To begin with, get out of the victimhood you enjoy so much. Shut down the Salafist and the Wahabbi factories of extremism paid for by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and encourage your people to stop kids who are being radicalized. Come out in droves and condemn all female genital manipulation, all forced marriages, all tribal laws, all Jihadist militancy, all sectarianism, and all discrimination against women.

Asif Zaidi is a regular writer on the Pakistani blog Let Us Build Pakistan, where a version of this post originally appeared.

]]>http://972mag.com/as-violence-rises-muslim-moderates-must-do-more/95941/feed/46Don’t cry for me: A letter from a little girl in Gazahttp://972mag.com/dont-cry-for-me-a-letter-from-a-little-girl-in-gaza/95220/
http://972mag.com/dont-cry-for-me-a-letter-from-a-little-girl-in-gaza/95220/#commentsSat, 09 Aug 2014 15:03:18 +0000http://972mag.com/?p=95220With Palestinian children in Gaza bearing the brunt of Israel’s offensive on the Strip, this is what one little girl may have written to us – had she the chance.

By Sam Bahour

As the latest horrific obscenity of Israel’s aggression against the Gaza Strip continues, the death toll mounts. Palestinian children are paying the highest price, both those who are killed and wounded, and, maybe even more so, those who survive.

Since I have written for decades about how Israel’s prolonged military occupation and endless violations of international law – let alone its blatant disregard for its very own self-interests – would get us to this very point, fresh analysis and fresh vantage points are difficult to find. The only words I can muster now, while the images of the carnage are freshly etched into my mind, are the words that may have come from one of the child victims whose life was cut short by a U.S.-supplied Israeli F-16 fighter jet missile.

A child of Diab Bakr is seen amidst the rubble of her home, which was destroyed by Israeli missiles, in A-Shati refugee camp, Gaza City, July 22, 2014. Another home from the extended Bakr family was also destroyed and yet another one damaged (Anne Paq/Activestills.org)

Below is the imagined letter from the victim:

Dear Humankind,

Hi. My name is Eman; it means ‘faith’ in Arabic. I doubt you will have seen or remember me; only particular photos make it to your TV screen, those are the ones you will remember. I’m a Palestinian child from Gaza. I like my dolls, playing with my sister and swimming. I was told that many of you are crying for me, but please don’t cry for me. I just arrived to this place and wanted to write to let you know that I’m OK. Really, I’m fine. I just miss Mommy.

There are a lot of people here, just like back home in Gaza. Lots of Palestinian kids too, some have been here for a very long time. Why would you want to cry for only me?

My neighbor arrived a few months ago from the Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Syria, he shares a room with someone who came from a different refugee camp in South Lebanon called Sabra; he arrived in September 1982. I really don’t know what a refugee camp is, even though Mommy told me that’s where we live too.

Down the road I saw a really older girl, maybe 13 years old. Her name is also Iman, but she spells it with an “I”. Iman came here in October 2004. She told me she was walking home from school, not far from my house in Gaza, when an Israeli soldier emptied his magazine into her after she was wounded and lay on the ground. She says he was caught on radio communications saying he was “confirming the kill.” I don’t really know what that means, either.

There are a lot of old people here, too: mommies and daddies. Some have their kids with them and some are alone. I actually saw a sign on one house that said the person arrived from Kufer Kassem in 1948 – that’s a long time ago! I think Kufer Kassem is not far from Gaza, but I really don’t know since Daddy never took us on trips far away.

Anyway, I made friends with another girl exactly my age, Amal. Her name means ‘hope’ and she is from Qana in Lebanon. She lives with her sisters; one arrived in 1996 and the other in 2006. There are really a lot of nice people here from Lebanon.

See, I’m in good company, so please, don’t cry for me.

I am exactly eight years and 23 days old; a pretty big girl, wouldn’t you say? I have one baby sister and two older brothers, or at least Mommy tells me that I have two brothers. I’ve only seen one, the other, Mommy says, lives in an Israeli prison and has been there for a very long time. Even though I never saw him, I still love him.

It is true that I was born in Gaza, but Grandpa told me when I was very young that our real home is in a place called al-Majdal. He still has the key to his house. It’s all rusted but I think it may still work. I bet you don’t know where al-Majdal is located, but you may know a place called Ashkelon. I understand how this can happen, it happens all the time. Those people who made Grandma and Grandpa come to Gaza keep changing the names of everything, even their own names. They not only changed the name of al-Majdal, they changed the name of many cities and villages too. Daddy told me that one organization called Zochrot goes around and puts up signs with the original names of Palestinian towns and villages that were wiped off the face of the earth. This way no one will forget. You really don’t need to worry, because here they must have a very big computer, as all the names are what they used to be, nothing is forgotten. So please, don’t cry for me.

Let me tell you what happened to me last month. It was the beginning of Ramadan. I love Ramadan because at the end of the month there is a big feast and Daddy takes us all to the marketplace and we each are allowed to buy two toys. A few days before the end of Ramadan, Mommy takes us to buy new clothes and shoes. This is the happiest time of the year for me and my brother and sister. But this year, Mommy was sad. She stayed sitting in my room crying while she nursed my baby sister. When I asked her why she was crying she said that we would not be able to buy new clothes this year because all the stores were closed. I understood (I am almost nine years old, you know), so I surprised her. I went to my closet and pulled out my dress from last year’s Ramadan and I dusted off the pink paddy leather shoes Mommy bought me on my last birthday and I told her she can stop crying because I don’t mind wearing old clothes, even if they don’t match. But she cried even more. I think I know why she was crying. The neighbors were playing with fireworks all night and day, even though Ramadan was only in its first week. Usually fireworks happen only at the end of Ramadan. I asked her if she wanted me to go tell them to stop but she said no, she liked to hear them. I pretended as if I liked the fireworks too, but I don’t think she was telling me the truth because they are scary, especially at night. I’m glad there are no fireworks here.

Anyway, just as I was putting my Eid clothes back in the closet something happened. I want to tell you what happened but I really don’t know how. I felt like I was swimming, but I wasn’t. The water did not feel like the bathtub, it was warm and sticky. When I glanced down I think it was red too. The last thing I remember is looking up and seeing the light fixture in my room, the one that looks like a clown’s head (Daddy bought that for me when my sister was born). It was falling, coming straight at me. I know this is not making sense, because ceilings don’t fall, but I swear that was what it looked like.

Next thing I knew, I was brought to this nice place. I love it here but I really miss Mommy and my baby sister. I wonder why they did not come here with me. Mom would love it. We have electricity all day and night, and the stores never close. Really, I’m not joking. In my home here, I can drink water right out of the faucet any time I’m thirsty. One of my friends told me that when I get a little older we can even go on trips far, far away, even to Jerusalem. I’m not sure where that is but I’m sure I’ll be able to ride a plane for the first time ever to get there.

I want to tell you so much more but I’ll have to write again later because I need to go now. My two newest friends, Hadar and Issa, are bringing their bikes to take turns in giving me a ride. Can you tell Mommy to send me my bike? I also forgot my toothbrush in the rush to get here so I need that too. Tell her not to send me my Eid dress and shoes. I want my baby sister to wear them for Ramadan next year, because I doubt the stores will open anytime soon. One more thing, please: tell Mommy to empty my piggybank, and send all my savings to The Palestine Children Relief Fund because I’m sure that many of my friends who did not come with me are going to need a lot of help.

After going for the bike ride I’m coming back home to take a nap. I was so happy that I found the CD here with the same exact song that Mommy use to sing to me every night at bedtime. It’s this one.

So see, I’m fine. Really, don’t cry for me. Cry for yourselves.

Love,

Eman

Sam Bahour is a Palestinian-American business consultant in Ramallah, Palestine, father of two daughters, and blogs at epalestine.com.

“I wasn’t even planning to go into Syria,” says veteran TV correspondent Itai Anghel, who last year became the first Israeli correspondent to report openly from the devastating civil war. “Our assumption was that this would be too dangerous. We went to interview Syrian rebels in Turkey, right on the border. The rebels in Aleppo have a corridor right up to Turkey, which is something you don’t have in other fronts. So they come out to Turkey to rest up, regroup and come back. This is where we wanted to meet them. What actually happened was that we went into Syria, and not even my editor knew about it at the time.

Were you deterred at all by the fact that it’s illegal for Israelis to travel to “enemy states”?

What? No.

But it is illegal.

I really don’t think about these things. I covered a lot of places with which we don’t have diplomatic relations: Pakistan, Afghanistan twice, four times in Iraq, Lebanon (during the war), and a few other places.

Were you ever detained upon return?

I was never detained or questioned. And it’s not like I traveled secretly – the entire country saw it in prime time on Channel 2. Nobody every told me anything, and for all I know, this doesn’t really happen – this law has no teeth to it. I heard that once upon a time they detained Ron Ben-Yishai to ask him a few questions, when he went into one of the forbidden countries, but even that was over after an hour or two.

Did you obtain permission to go there?

What permission? I never asked anyone. I’m telling you even my editor didn’t know about it last time. Any trip I make to the field actually depends on this – on no one knowing.

Majd Kayyal does not have any of the privileges enjoyed by Anghel – a prominent foreign correspondent for Uvda (“Fact”), the flagship investigative program of Israel’s main commercial channel. Unlike Anghel, Kayyal was arrested immediately upon his return from Beirut, after reporting on a conference he participated in for the Jadaliyya website. The pretext for the arrests was departing Israel unlawfully (meaning, entering an enemy state), and contacting a foreign agent (a charge that was dropped a few days later). The detention went on for five days, in a windowless room, without the right to counsel and under a blanket gag order that stopped most Israeli media (and controversially, the New York Times) from reporting on the affair in real time. There is every reason to believe that if it wasn’t for the swift action of Kayyal’s colleagues at Adalah and the rendering of the gag order ridiculous by foreign and independent local media who ignored the ban, the “intense,” unmonitored interrogation would still be going on.

The same transgressions – visiting an enemy state and meeting foreign agents – can be applied to what Anghel was doing in Syria, and to what any number of other Israeli reporters have done on their reporting trips behind enemy lines. So far, the only publicly known difference between these reporters and Kayyal was that they were Jewish, and he a Palestinian.

Why did you decide to go into Syria?

We met up with the rebels in Turkey, and we asked to travel with them and film the Syrian border from the outside, just like we do in Israel, on the Golan Heights. I asked them a lot of question – how they go in and how they come out. They told me how they smuggle themselves across, and then they said – if you want to come in, we can smuggle you in the same way. My basic assumption was that it was too dangerous. Two friends of mine, journalists I’ve worked with in Egypt, were killed in Homs not too long before.

And then I thought – maybe because it is so dangerous, I should check and look into it a bit more, but then I realized it’s the other way around. That I have a unique opportunity to go into Syria. It’s the most monitored border on the planet. As soon as I check anything, whether by phone or online, they’d intercept me then and there. If I make a call to my editor to ask permission, I’m done for. Here I am having a direct, unmonitored interaction. The only chance I have to go into Syria is within these entirely unplanned circumstances.

Have you heard about the arrest of the journalist from Haifa who traveled to Beirut?

I have. I still don’t know the details and what exactly they want from him. I can only say that no one ever did anything to me when I was visiting countries considered enemy states. And that real journalistic work is often done beyond these borders.

This article first appeared in Hebrew here. Follow ‘The Hottest Place in Hell’ on Facebook.