The Pentagon PapersGravel Edition
Volume 1
Document 21, Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of the President's Special Committee
on Indochina, 29 January 1954, pp. 443-447.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

30 January 1954

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting of President's Special Committee on Indochina, 29 January
1954

1. The Special Committee met in Mr. Kyes' office at 3:30 p.m. 29 January 1954.

2. The first matter discussed was the disposition of urgent French requests
for additional U.S. assistance. The Under Secretary of State, General W. B.
Smith, mentioned that there has as yet been no reply to Prime Minister Laniel's
letter to President Eisenhower on this subject. It was necessary to answer this
substantively as soon as possible.

3. Admiral Radford said he had been in touch with General Ely, French Chief
of Staff, through General Valluy. Ten B-26 aircraft are on the way to Indochina
this week. These would contribute to filling the French request for aircraft
to bring two B-26 squadrons up to a strength of 25 operational aircraft each.
However, an additional 12 are needed to fill the full requirement because a
total of 22 are needed (12 to fill the annual attrition plus 10 to fill the
additional French request). There was some discussion on the seeming differences
in requests reaching Washington via Paris and those coming through the MAAG.
Subsequently in the meeting it was agreed that the French should be informed
that the U.S. would act only on requests which had been approved by General
O'Daniel after General O'Daniel was set up in Indochina.

4. Admiral Radford indicated that to fill the entire requirement for 22 B-26's
on an urgent basis would mean taking some of them from U.S. operational squadrons
in the Far East, but this could he done. The aircraft would not all have "zero"
maintenance time on them.

5. As to the additional French request for 25 B-26's to equip a third squadron,
it was decided that final decision to furnish them should await the return of
General O'Daniel. However, the Air Force has been alerted that they may have
to be furnished on short notice.

6. As to the provision of a small "dirigible," it was decided to
inform the French that this could not be furnished.

7. Regarding the French request for 400 mechanics trained in the maintenance
of B-26 and C-47 aircraft, there was considerable discussion. Admiral Radford
said he had informed General Ely, through General Valluy, that the U.S. does
not believe the French have exhausted all efforts to get French civilian maintenance
crews. He suggested the French try to find them through "Air France."
Mr. Kyes mentioned the possibility of obtaining French personnel from their
eight aircraft factories or from the big Chateauroux maintenance base where
the U.S. employed French mechanics. General Smith inquired about the possibility
of lowering French NATO commitments to enable transfer of French military mechanics.
Admiral Radford said General VaIluy had informed him the French Staff have carefully
considered the idea but the French Air Force does not have enough military mechanics
trained in B-26 or C-47 maintenance to fill the requirement. Therefore, there
would be such a delay while their military mechanics were being trained on these
aircraft that the urgent requirement could not be met. He had also said that
the employment of French civilian mechanics presented a difficult problem in
security clearance.

8. General Smith recommended that the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics
to MAAG, Indochina, and tell the French to provide the rest. Admiral Radford
said this could be done and that the Air Force is, somewhat reluctantly, making
plans to this end. He had let the French know that if American mechanics were
sent they must be used only on air bases which were entirely secure from capture.
General Smith wondered, in light of additional French requests, if the Committee
should not consider sending the full 400 mechanics.

9. Mr. Kyes questioned if sending 200 military mechanics would not so commit
the U.S. to support the French that we must be prepared eventually for complete
intervention, including use of U.S. combat forces. General Smith said he did
not think this would result-we were sending maintenance forces not ground forces.
He felt, however, that the importance of winning in Indochina was so. great
that if worst came to the worst he personally would favor intervention with
U.S. air and naval forces-not ground forces. Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. Kyes
felt this consideration was so important that it should be put to the highest
level. The President himself should decide. General Smith agreed. Mr. Allan
Dulles wondered if our preoccupation with helping to win the battle at Dien
Bien Phu was so great that we were not going to bargain with the French as we
supplied their most urgent needs. Mr. Kyes said this was an aspect of the question
he was raising. Admiral Radford read from a cable just received from General
O'Daniel which indicated General Navarre had been most cordial to General O'Daniel
at their meeting and had indicated he was pleased with the concept of U.S. liaison
officers being assigned to his general headquarters and to the training command.
General Navarre and General O'Daniel agreed to try to work out a maximum of
collaboration at the military level.

10. Later in the meeting, Mr. Allan Dulles raised the question as to sending
the CAP pilots the French had once requested. It was agreed that the French
apparently wanted them now, that they should be sent, and CIA should arrange
for the necessary negotiations with the French in Indochina to take care of
it.

11. Mr. Kyes said that if we meet the French urgent demands they should be
tied to two things: first, the achievement of maximum collaboration with the
French in training and strategy, and secondly, the strengthening of General
O'Daniel's hand in every way possible. General Smith agreed and felt we should
reinforce General O'Daniel's position not only with the French in Indochina
but also at the highest level in Paris.

12. Summary of Action Agreed Regarding Urgent French Requests It was agreed:

a. To provide a total of 22 B-26 aircraft as rapidly as practicable.
b. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanics who would be assigned
as an augmentation to MAAG, Indochina. These mechanics to be provided only
on the understanding that they would be used as bases where they would be
secure from capture and would not be exposed to combat.
c. To send the CAP pilots, with CIA arranging necessary negotiations.
d. Not to provide a "dirigible."
e. To await General O'Daniel's return to Washington before making a decision
on the other French requests. Efforts should continue to get the French to
contribute a maximum number of mechanics.

It was further agreed that General Smith would clear these recommended actions
with the President.

13. The next item discussed was the status of General O'Daniel. Mr. Kyes said
General Trapnell, the present Chief of MAAG, is being replaced at the normal
expiration of his tour. General Dabney had been chosen to replace General Trapnell
and is about to leave for Indochina. Admiral Radford pointed out that General
O'Daniel could be made Chief of MAAG without any further clearance with the
French Government. General Smith said this would be all right but should not
preclude further action to increase the position of General Daniel. General
Erskine pointed out that the MAAG in Indochina is not a "military mission"
but only an administrative group concerned with the provision of MDAP equipment.
He thought the MAAG status should be raised to that of a mission which could
help in training. It was agreed that General O'Daniel should probably be first
assigned as Chief of MAAG and that, for this reason, General Dabney's departure
for Indochina should be temporarily held up. General Dabney should, however,
go to Indochina to assist General O'Daniel by heading up the present MAAG functions.
Admiral Davis was requested to assure that General Dabney did not depart until
further instructions were given.

14. There was some discussion, initiated by Mr. Kyes, about ways by which the
French Foreign Legion in Indochina might be augmented. He felt that if the German
and French Governments would facilitate it, considerable numbers of Germans
might be enlisted to increase the Legion. Mr. Kyes mentioned several other general
courses of action he thought should be further considered by the Special Committee
and then suggested that General Erskine read his paper on the subject of Indochina.
Mr. Kyes made it plain he considered this paper only a point of departure for
further work by the Special Committee. General Erskine then read the paper,
copies of which were given to the members of the Special Committee.

15. Admiral Radford said he thought, in general, that the paper covered many
important fields but he had one or two reservations. He felt, with regard to
the recommendation on regional coordination, that CINCPAC was, and should be,
the man to head up regional coordination of the MAAGs. Mr. Kyes reiterated that
the paper was only a point of departure and said he felt the basic trouble in
trying to help in Indochina was the attitude of the French Government. Mr. Allan
Dulles said the French do not want us to become too involved in the conduct
of operations in Indochina because they want to keep one foot on the negotiations
stool.

16. Admiral Radford said he felt the paper was too restrictive in that it was
premised on U.S. action short of the contribution of U.S. combat forces. He
said that the U.S. could not afford to let the Viet Minh take the Tonkin Delta.
If this were lost, Indochina would be lost and the rest of Southeast Asia would
fall. The psychological impact of such a loss would be unacceptable to the U.S.
Indochina must have the highest possible priority in U.S. attention. He suggested
the paper, when redrafted, should have two parts, one based on no intervention
with combat forces and a second part indicating what should be done to prepare
against the contingency where U.S. combat forces would be needed. General Smith
was generally agreeable to this approach.

17. It was agreed not to use the OCB facilities to support the Special Committee,
but instead to set up a working group of representatives of the principals of
the Special Committee to revise General Erskine's paper by the middle of the
week, 31 January-6 February.

General Smith recommended that a representative of the Air Force be included
in the working group.

19. At the close of the meeting, General Smith inquired as to what was being
done to speed up the delivery of spare parts for B-26's and C-i 19's. He was
informed that necessary action had been taken.

20. Mr. Allan Dulles inquired if an unconventional warfare officer, specifically
Colonel Lansdale, could not be added to the group of five liaison officers to
which General Navarre had agreed. Admiral Radford thought this might be done
and at any rate Colonel Lansdale could immediately be attached to the MAAG,
but he wondered if it would not be best for Colonel Lansdale to await General
O'Daniel's return before going to Indochina. In this way, Colonel Lansdale could
help the working group in its revision of General Erskine's paper. This was
agreeable to Mr. Allan Dulles.