My Four Years in Germany (fully illustrated): Late Ambassador To The German Imperial Court

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But while the British permitted our Embassy in Paris to inspectthe prisoners of war at Havre, the Germans for months refusedto allow me permission to send anyone to inspect those Britishprisoners at Libau.

Cases came to my attention where individual corps commanderson their own initiative directed punitive measures against theprisoners of war in their districts, on account of the rumoursof the bad treatment of German citizens in England. Thus thecommander in the district where the camp of Doeberitz was situatedissued an order directing reprisals against prisoners under hiscommand on account of what he claimed to be the bad treatmentof German women in England. It required constant vigilance toseek out instances of this kind and cause them to be remedied.

I did not find the Germans at all efficient in the handling ofprisoners of war. The authority was so divided that it was hardto find who was responsible for any given bad conditions. Forinstance, for a long period of time I contended with the Germanauthorities for better living conditions at the civilian camp ofRuhleben. I was promised time and again by Colonel Friedrich,by the camp commander and by the Foreign

Office that these conditions would be remedied. In that camp menof education, men in delicate health, were compelled to sleepand live six in a box stall or so closely that the beds touchedeach other in hay-lofts, the outside walls of which were onlyfour feet high.

I finally almost in despair wrote identical personal letters,after having exhausted all ordinary diplomatic steps, to Generalvon Kessel, Commander of the Mark of Brandenburg, to the commanderof the corps district in which the Ruhleben camp was situated,and to the Minister of War: and the only result was that eachof the officers addressed claimed that he had been personallyinsulted by me because I had presumed to call his attention tothe inhuman conditions under which the prisoners were compelledto live in the Ruhleben camp.

The commander of this civilian camp of Ruhleben was a very handsomeold gentleman, named Count Schwerin. His second in command fora long time was a Baron Taube. Both of these officers had beenlong retired from the army and were given these prison commandsat the commencement of the war. Both of them were naturallykind-hearted but curiously sensitive and not always of even temper.On the whole I think that they sympathised with the prisonersand did their best to obtain a bettering of the conditions oftheir confinement. The prisoners organised themselves in theirvarious barracks, each barrack having a captain of the barrack,the captains electing one of their number as a camp captain or_Obmann_.

The man who finally appeared as head man of the camp was anex-cinematograph proprietor, named Powell. In my mind he, assistedby Beaumont and other captains, conducted the affairs of the campas well as possible, given the difficulty of dealing with theprisoners on one hand and the prison authorities on the otherhand. Naturally he was always subject to opposition from manyprisoners, among whom those of aristocratic tendencies objectedto being under the control of one not of the highest caste inGreat Britain; and there were others who either envied him hisauthority or desired his place. The camp authorities allowedPowell to visit the Embassy at least once a week and in thatway I was enabled, to keep in direct touch with the camp. Attwo periods during my stay in Berlin I spent enough days at thecamp to enable every prisoner who had a complaint of any kindto present it personally to me.

The organisation of this camp was quite extraordinary. I foundit impossible to get British prisoners to perform the ordinarywork of cleaning up the camp, and so forth, always expected ofprisoners themselves; and so, with the funds furnished me fromthe British Government, the camp captain was compelled to pay anumber of the poorer prisoners to perform this work. SecretariesRuddock and Kirk of our Embassy undertook the uninteresting andarduous work of superintending these payments as well as of ourother financial affairs. This work was most trying and they deservegreat credit for their self-denial. By arrangement with the BritishGovernment, I was also enabled to pay the poorer prisoners anallowance of five marks a week, thus permitting them to buy littleluxuries and necessities and extra food at the camp canteen whichwas early established in the camp. I also furnished the capital tothe camp canteen, enabling it to make its purchases and carry onits business. In this establishment everything could be purchasedwhich was purchasable in Germany, and for months after thecommencement of the war articles of luxury were sold at a profitand articles of food sold at a loss for the benefit of thosewho required an addition to the camp diet. There was a streetin the camp of little barracks or booths which the prisonerschristened Bond Street, and where many stores were in operationsuch as a tailor shop, shoe-maker's, watch-maker's, etc. Actingwith Powell, I succeeded in getting the German authorities toturn over the kitchens to the prisoners. Four of the prisonerswho did most excellent self-denying work in these kitchens deserveto be specially mentioned. They were Ernest L. Pyke, Herbert.Kasmer, Richard H. Carrad and George Fergusson.

The men in this camp subsisted to a great extent upon the packagesof food sent to them from England. Credit must be given to theGerman authorities for the fairly prompt and efficient deliveryof the packages of food sent from England, Denmark and Switzerlandto prisoners of war in all camps.

In Ruhleben the educated prisoners volunteered to teach the ignorant:two hundred and ninety-seven different educational courses wereoffered to those who desired to improve their minds. A splendidorchestra was organised, a dramatic society which gave plays inFrench and one which gave plays in English and another one whichgave operas. On New Year's day, 1916, I attended at Ruhleben doreally wonderful performance of the pantomime of "Cinderella";and, in January, 1917, a performance of "The Mikado" in a theatreunder one of the grand stands. In these productions, of course,the female parts were taken by young men and the scenery, costumesand accessories were all made by the prisoners. There was a camplibrary of over five thousand volumes sent over by the BritishGovernment and a reading and meeting hall, erected by the AmericanY. M. C. A. There was even a system of postal service with specialstamps so that a prisoner in one barrack could write to a friend inanother and have a letter delivered by the camp postal authorities.The German authorities had not hired the entire race track fromthe Race Track Association so that I made a special contractwith the race track owners and hired from them the in-field andother portions not taken over by German authorities. Here theprisoners had tennis courts and played hockey, foot-ball andcricket and held athletic games. Expert dentists in the camptook care of the poorer prisoners as did an oculist hired by mewith British funds, and glasses were given them from the samefunds.

The prisoners who needed a little better nourishment than thatafforded by the camp diet and their parcels from England, couldobtain cards giving them the right to eat in the Casino or campofficial restaurant where they were allowed a certain indicatedamount of wine or beer with their meals, and finally arrangementswere arrived at by which the German guards left the camp, simplyguarding it from the outside; and the policing was taken overby the camp police department, under the charge of the prisoncamp commander and committee. The worst features, of course,were the food and housing. Human nature seems always to be thesame. Establishment of clubs seems inherent to the Anglo-Saxonnature. Ten or more persons would combine together and erect asort of wooden shed against the brick walls of a barrack, hiresome poorer person to put on a white jacket and be addressed as"steward," put in the shed a few deck chairs and a table andenjoy the sensation of exclusiveness and club life thereby given.

Owing to the failure of Germany and Great Britain to come to anagreement for a long time as to the release of captured crewsof ships, there were in Ruhleben men as old as seventy-five yearsand boys as young as fifteen. There were in all between fifty andsixty of these ships' boys. They lived in a barrack by themselvesand under the supervision of a ship's officer who volunteered tolook after them as sort of a monitor. They were taught navigationby the older prisoners and I imagine were rather benefited by theirstay in the camp. I finally made arrangements by which these boyswere released from England and Germany. With the exception ofthe officers and crews of the ships, prisoners were not internedwho were over fifty-five.

The British Government was generous in the allowance of money forRuhleben prisoners. The amount allowed by the German Government tothe camp commanders for feeding the prisoners was extremely small,only sixty pfennigs a day. At first many of the camp commandersmade contracts with caterers for the feeding of the prisonersand as the caterers' profit had to come out of this very smallsum the amount of food which the remainder purchased for theprisoners was small indeed. As the war went on the prisoners'department of the war office tried to induce the camp commanders toabandon the contractors' system and purchase supplies themselves.A sort of convention of camp commanders was held in Berlin which Iattended. Lectures were there given on food and its purchase, andmethods of disinfecting prisoners, on providing against typhus,and on housing and other subjects. A daily lunch was served,supposed to be composed of the exact rations given at the prisoncamps.

The schedules of food, etc., made out by the camp commandersand furnished to foreign correspondents were often not followedin practice. I know on one occasion when I was at the camp atDoeberitz, the camp commander gave me his schedule of food forthe week. This provided that soup with pieces of meat was to begiven on the day of my visit, but on visiting the camp kitchen Ifound that the contractor was serving fish instead of meat. Someof the camp commanders not only treated their prisoners kindly butintroduced manufactures of furniture, etc., to help the prisonersto pass their time. The camps of Krossen and Gottingen deservespecial mention. At Giessen, the camp commander had permittedthe erection of a barrack in which certain prisoners who wereelectrical experts gave lessons in electrical fitting, etc.,to their fellow prisoners. There was also a studio in this campwhere prisoners with artistic talent were furnished with paintsand allowed to work. As more and more people were called to thefront in Germany, greater use was made of the prisoners, and inthe summer of 1916 practically all the prisoners were compelledto work outside of the camps. They were paid a small extra sumfor this, a few cents a day, and as a rule were benefited by thechange of scene and occupation. The Russians especially becamevery useful to the Germans as agricultural laborers.

Professor Alonzo E. Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania,a food expert, and Dr. D. J. McCarthy, also of Philadelphia,joined my staff in 1916 and proved most efficient and fearlessinspectors of prison camps. Dr. Taylor could use the terms calories,proteins, etc., as readily as German experts and at a greaterrate of speed. His report showing that the official diet of theprisoners in Ruhleben was a starvation diet incensed the Germanauthorities to such fury that they forbade him to revisit Ruhleben.Professor Buckhaus, the German expert, agreed with him in some ofhis findings. I do not know what will happen to the Professor,who seemed willing to do his best for the prisoners. He wrote abooklet on the prison camps which he asked permission to dedicateto me, but the War Office, which published the book, refusedto allow him to make this dedication. It was a real pleasureto see the way in which Dr. Taylor carried on his work of foodinspection; and his work, as well as that of the other doctorssent from America to join my staff, Drs. Furbush, McCarthy, Roler,Harns, Webster and Luginbuhl, did much to better camp conditions.

Dr. Caldwell, the sanitary expert, known for his great work inSerbia, now I believe head of the hospital at Pittsburgh, reportedin regard to the prison diet: "While of good quality and perhapssufficient in quantity by weight, it is lacking in the essentialelements which contribute to the making of a well-balanced andsatisfactory diet. It is lacking particularly in fat and proteincontent which is especially desirable during the colder monthsof the year. There is considerable doubt whether this diet alonewithout being supplemented by the articles of food received bythe prisoners from their homes would in any way be sufficientto maintain the prisoners in health and strength."

Dr. Caldwell also visited Wittenberg and found the commander bytemperament, and so on, unfitted for such a position.

The Germans, as Dr. Taylor has pointed out, tried to feed prisonerson schedule like horses. There is, however, a nervous discriminationin eating so far as man is concerned; and a diet, scientificallyfitted to keep him alive, may fail because of its mere monotony.

Think of living as the prisoners of war in Germany have for years,without ever having anything (except black bread) which cannotbe eaten with a spoon.

Officer prisoners were, after matters had settled down and afterseveral bitter contests which I had with the German authorities,fairly well treated. There was, as in the case of the camps forthe privates, a great difference between camps, and a greatdifference between camp commanders. Mr. Jackson did most of thevisiting of the officers' camps. In many camps the officers wereallowed a tennis court and other amusements, as well as lightwine or beer at meals, but the length of the war had a bad effecton the mental condition of many of the officers.

A great step forward was made when arrangements were enteredinto between Germany and Great Britain whereby wounded and sickofficers and men, when passed by the Swiss Commission which visitedboth countries, were sent to Switzerland; sent still as prisonersof war, subject to return to Germany or England respectively, butthe opportunity afforded by change of food and scene, as well asreunion of families, saved many a life. By arrangements betweenthe two countries, also, the severely wounded prisoners were setfree. I believe that this exchange of the heavily wounded betweenthe Germans and the Russians was the factor which prevented theentrance of Sweden into the war. These wounded men traversed thewhole length of Sweden in the railway, and the spectacle affordedto the Swedish population of these poor stumps of humanity, victimsof war, has quite effectually kept the Swedish population froman attack of unnecessary war fever.

Officers and men who tried to escape were not very severely punishedin Germany unless they had broken or stolen something in theirattempt. Officers were usually subjected to a jail confinementfor a period and then often sent to a sort of punitive camp.Such a camp was situated in one of the Ring forts surroundingthe city of Kustrin which I visited in September, 1916. Therethe officers had no opportunity for exercise except in a verysmall courtyard or on the roof, which was covered with grass, ofthe building in which they were confined. I arranged, however,on my visit for the construction of a tennis court outside. TheBritish officers in Germany practically subsisted on their parcelsreceived from home, and during the end of my stay a much bettertea could be had with the prison officers than with the campcommander. The prisoners had real tea and marmalade and whitebread to offer, luxuries which had long since disappeared from allGerman tables. On the whole, the quarters given to the officers'prisons in Germany were not satisfactory, and were not of thekind that should have been offered to officer prisoners of war.

At the time I left Germany there were nearly two million prisonersof war in the Empire, of whom about ten thousand were Russianofficers, nine thousand French officers and about one thousandBritish officers.

As a rule our inspectors found the hospitals, where the prisonersof war were, in as good condition as could be expected.

I think this was largely due to the fact that so many doctorsin Germany are Jews. The people who are of the Jewish race arepeople of gentle instincts. In these hospitals a better dietwas given to the prisoners. There were, of course, in additionto the regular hospitals, hospitals where the severely woundedprisoners were sent. Almost uniformly these hospitals were cleanand the prisoners were well taken care of.

[Illustration: IN RUHLEBEN CAMP. A SPECIMEN BOTH OF THEPRISONER-ARTIST'S WORK AND OF THE TYPES ABOUT HIM.]

At Ruhleben there was a hospital which in spite of manyrepresentations was never in proper shape. In addition, therewas in the camp a special barrack established by the prisonersthemselves for the care of those who were so ill or so weak asto require special attention but who were not ill enough to besent to the hospital. This barrack was for a long time in chargeof a devoted gentleman, a prisoner, whose name I have unfortunatelyforgotten, but whose self-sacrifice deserves special mention.

I arranged with the camp authorities and the German authoritiesfor permission to enter into a contract with Dr. Weiler. Underthis contract Dr. Weiler, who had a sanatorium in the West ofBerlin, received patients from Ruhleben. Those who were able paidfor themselves, the poorer ones being paid for by the BritishGovernment. This sanatorium, occupied several villas. I had manydisputes with Dr. Weiler, but finally managed to get this sanatoriumin such condition that the prisoners who resided there were fairlywell taken care of.

An arrangement was made between Great Britain and Germany bywhich civilians unfit for military service were sent to theirrespective countries, and just before I left I effected anarrangement by which all civilians over forty-five years old,with the exception of twenty who might be held by each countryfor military reasons, were to be released. I do not know whetherthis arrangement was actually carried out in full. With the lapseof time the mental condition of the older prisoners in Ruhlebenhad become quite alarming. Soldier prisoners, when they enter thearmy, are always in good physical condition and enter with theexpectation of either being killed or wounded or taken prisoner,and have made their arrangements accordingly. But these unfortunatecivilian prisoners were often men in delicate health, and allwere in a constant state of great mental anxiety as to the fateof their business and their enterprises and their families. In1916, not only Mr. Grafton Minot, who for some time had devotedhimself exclusively to the Ruhleben prisoners, but also Mr. EllisDresel, a distinguished lawyer of Boston, who had joined theEmbassy as a volunteer, took up the work. Mr. Dresel visitedRuhleben almost daily and by listening to the stories and complaintsof the prisoners materially helped their mental condition.

The Germans collected all the soldier prisoners of Irish nationalityin one camp at Limburg not far from Frankfurt a. M. These effortswere made to induce them to join the German army. The men werewell treated and were often visited by Sir Roger Casement who,working with the German authorities, tried to get these Irishmento desert their flag and join the Germans. A few weaklings werepersuaded by Sir Roger who finally discontinued his visits, afterobtaining about thirty recruits, because the remaining Irishmenchased him out of the camp.

I received information of the shooting of one prisoner, and althoughthe camp authorities had told Dr. McCarthy that the investigationhad been closed and the guard who did the shooting exonerated,nevertheless, when I visited the camp in order to investigate, Iwas told that I could not do so because the matter of the shootingwas still under investigation. Nor was I allowed to speak to thoseprisoners who had been witnesses at the time of the shooting.I afterwards learned that another Irishman had been shot by aguard on the day before my visit, and the same obstacles to myinvestigation were drawn about this case.

The Irishmen did not bear confinement well, and at the time ofmy visit among them many of them were suffering from tuberculosisin the camp hospital. They seemed also peculiarly subject tomental breakdowns. Two devoted Catholic priests, Father Crottyand a Brother Warren from a religious house in Belgium, weredoing wonderful work among these prisoners.

The sending out of the prisoners of war to work throughout Germanyhas had one very evil effect. It has made it to the financialadvantage of certain farmers and manufacturers to have the warcontinued. The Prussian land owners or Junkers obtain four orfive times as much for their agricultural products as they didbefore the war and have the work on their farms performed byprisoners of war to whom they are required to pay only six centsa day. When the _Tageblatt_ called attention to this it wassuppressed for several days.

At many of these so-called working camps our inspectors wererefused admission on the ground that they might learn trade orwar secrets. They succeeded, however, in having the men sentoutside in order that they might inspect them and hear theircomplaints. There were in Germany about one hundred central campsand perhaps ten thousand or more so-called working camps, insummer time, throughout the country. Some of the British prisonerswere put to work on the sewage farm of Berlin but we succeededin getting them sent back to their parent camp.

The prisoners of war were often accused of various breaches ofdiscipline and crimes. Members of the Embassy would attend thesetrials, and we endeavoured to see that the prisoners were properlyrepresented. But the Germans often refused us an opportunityto see the prisoners before their trial, or even before theirexecution. The case of Captain Fryatt is in point.

Captain Fryatt who commanded a British merchant ship was capturedand taken to the civilian camp at Ruhleben. In searching him theGermans claimed that he wore a watch presented to him for anattempt to ram a German submarine. They, therefore, took Fryattfrom the Ruhleben camp and sent him to Bruges for trial. When Iheard of this I immediately sent two formal notes to the GermanForeign Office demanding the right to see Fryatt and hire counselto represent him, inquiring what sort of counsel would be permittedto attend the trial and asking for postponement of the trialuntil these matters could be arranged. The German Foreign Officehad informed me that they had backed up these requests and Ibelieve them, but the answer of the German admiralty to my noteswas to cause the trial to proceed the morning after the day onwhich my notes were delivered and to shoot Fryatt before noonof the same day.

As to the evidence regarding the watch, the British Foreign Officelearned that, when captured, Captain Fryatt had neither a watchnor any letter to indicate that he had tried to ram a submarine!

This cruel and high-handed outrage caused great indignation inEngland, and even in certain circles in Germany; and the mannerin which my request was treated was certainly a direct insultto the country which I represented. In conversation with me,Zimmermann and the Chancellor and von Jagow all expressed thegreatest regret over this incident, which shows how little controlthe civilian branch of the government has over the military intime of war. Later on, when similar charges were made againstanother British sea captain, the Foreign Office, I think throughthe influence of the Emperor, was able to prevent a recurrenceof the Fryatt outrage.

As I have said, many of the camp commanders in Germany were men,excellent and efficient and kind hearted, who did what they couldfor the prisoners. It is a pity that these men should bear theodium which attaches to Germany because of the general bad treatmentof prisoners of war in the first days of the war, and becausecertain commanders of prison camps were not fitted for theirpositions.

The commander at the camp at Wittenberg was replaced, but theGermans have never acknowledged that bad conditions had existedin that camp. Shortly before we left Germany the war departmentseemed to gain more control of the prisoners of war situation,and on our representations at least one camp commander waspermanently relieved. If examples had been made early in thewar of the camp commanders who were not fit for their placesand of those who had in any way mishandled prisoners of war, theGerman people as a whole would not have had to bear the burdenof this odium. The many prisoners will return to their homeswith a deep and bitter hatred of all things German.

The British Government took a great interest in the British prisonersin Germany. Nothing was omitted and every suggestion made by mewas immediately acted on; while many most valuable hints weregiven me from London as to prisoners' affairs. Their Majesties,the King and Queen, showed a deep personal concern in the welfareof the unfortunate British in German hands; and this concernnever flagged during the period of my stay in Berlin. Lord RobertCecil and Lord Newton were continually working for the benefitof British prisoners.

At a time when the British prisoners were without proper clothing,the British Government sent me uniforms, overcoats, etc., and Ihired a warehouse in Berlin as a distributing point; but, aftersome months, the German authorities refused to allow me to continuethis method of distribution on the ground that it was the dutyof Germany to provide the prisoners with clothes. But Germanywas not performing this duty and the British prisoners had tosuffer because of this German official woodenheadedness.

In the spring of 1916, quite characteristically, the Germansbroke their "treaty" concerning visits to prisoners, and refusedto permit us to speak to prisoners out of hearing. Von Jagowtold me that this was because of the trouble made among Russianprisoners by the visits of Madam Sazonoff, but this had nothingto do with the arrangement between Great Britain and Germany.

I think that the Germans suspected that I had learned from fellowprisoners of the cruel and unnecessary shooting of two Irishprisoners at Limburg. It was not from prisoners, however, thatI obtained this information. but from Germans who wrote to me.

In addition to the English and Japanese, I had the protectionof the Serbian and Roumanian subjects and the protection of theinterests of a very small country, the Republic of San Marino.Soon after the Serbians and Roumanians appeared in the prisoncamps of Germany we made reports on the condition and treatmentof these prisoners, as well as reports concerning the British.

I was able to converse with some Serbians, in the first daysof the war, in their native tongue, which, curiously enough,was Spanish. Immediately after the persecution of the Jews inSpain by Ferdinand and Isabella and other monarchs, a number ofSpanish Jews emigrated to Serbia where they have remained eversince, keeping their old customs and speaking the old Spanishof the time of Cervantes.

The German authorities, in the most petty manner, often concealedfrom me the presence of British prisoners, especially civilians,in prison camps. For a long time I was not informed of the presenceof British civilians in Sennelager and it was only by payinga surprise visit by motor to the camp at Brandenburg that Idiscovered a few British, the crew of a trawler, there. It wason information contained in an anonymous letter, evidently fromthe wife of some German officer, that I visited Brandenburg wherethe crew of this trawler, deprived of money, were without any ofthe little comforts or packages that mitigate life in a Germanprison camp.

CHAPTER XI

FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR: POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC

At the commencement of the war for some days I was cut off fromcommunication with the United States; but we soon established achain of communication, at first through Italy and later by wayof Denmark. At all times cables from Washington to Berlin, or_vice_versa_, took, on the average, two days in transmission.

After the fall of Liege, von Jagow sent for me and asked me ifI would transmit through the American Legation a propositionoffering Belgium peace and indemnity if no further oppositionwere made to the passage of German troops through Belgium. As theproposition was a proposition for peace, I took the responsibilityof forwarding it and sent the note of the German Government toour Minister at the Hague for transmission to our Minister inBelgium.

Dr. Van Dyke, our Minister at the Hague, refused to have anythingto do with the transmission of this proposition and turned theGerman note over to the Holland Minister for Foreign Affairs,and through this channel the proposition reached the BelgianGovernment.

The State Department cabled me a message from the President tothe Emperor which stated that the United States stood ready atany time to mediate between the warring powers, and directedme to present this proposition direct to the Emperor.

I, therefore, asked for an audience with the Emperor and receivedword from the chief Court Marshal that the Emperor would receiveme at the palace in Berlin on the morning of August tenth. Idrove in a motor into the courtyard of the palace and was thereescorted to the door which opened on a flight of steps leadingto a little garden about fifty yards square, directly on theembankment of the River Spree, which flows past the Royal Palace.As I went down the steps, the Empress and her only daughter,the Duchess of Brunswick, came up. Both stopped and shook handswith me, speaking a few words. I found the Emperor seated at agreen iron table under a large canvas garden umbrella. Telegraphforms were scattered on the table in front of him and basking inthe gravel were two small dachshunds. I explained to the Emperorthe object of my visit and we had a general conversation aboutthe war and the state of affairs. The Emperor took some of thelarge telegraph blanks and wrote out in pencil his reply to thePresident's offer, This reply, of course, I cabled immediatelyto the State Department.

_For_the_President_of_the_ _United_States_personally:_

10/VIII 14.

1. H. R. H. Prince Henry was received by his Majesty King George V in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally, that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his conversation with H. M. the King, and repeated verbally on the twenty-ninth of July.

2. My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir E. Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to be crushed England would interfere.

3. On the thirtieth my Ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey in course of a "private" conversation told him that if the conflict remained localized between _Russia_--not Serbia--and _Austria_, England would not move, but if we "mixed" in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave measures; i. e., if I left my ally Austria in the lurch to fight alone England would not touch me.

4. This communication being directly counter to the King's message to me, I telegraphed to H. M. on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth, thanking him for kind messages through my brother and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia--his Allies--from making any war-like preparations calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with H. M. the Czar. In the evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his Allies to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At the same time H. M. asked me if I would transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Serbian towns and a strip of country as a "main-mise" to make sure that the Serbian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides, I had telegraphed to H. M. the Czar the same as an idea of mine, before I received the two communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same opinion.

5. I immediately transmitted the telegrams _vice_versa_ to Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.

6. While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar the next morning, to inform him that Vienna, London and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from H. E. the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian army, which was, of course, also meant against Germany; whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.

7. In a telegram from London my Ambassador informed me he understood the British Government would guarantee neutrality of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to H. M. the King personally that mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if H. M. could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France I would refrain _from_attacking_her_, _leave_her_alone_ and employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. answered that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding; and, as far as I can make out, Sir E. Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead, he declared England had to defend Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds, news having been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium, and the King of Belgians having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country's freedom. I am most grateful for the President's message.

WILLIAM, H. R.

When the German Emperor in my presence indited his letter toPresident Wilson of August tenth, 1914, he asked that I cableit immediately to the State Department and that I simultaneouslygive it to the press. As I have already stated, I cabled thedocument immediately to the State Department at Washington, butI withheld it from publication.

My interview with the Emperor was in the morning. That afternoona man holding a high position in Germany sent for me. I do notgive his name because I do not wish to involve him in any waywith the Emperor, so I shall not even indicate whether he is aroyalty or an official. He said:

"You had an interview today with the Emperor. What happened?"

I told of the message given me for the President which was intendedfor publication by the Emperor. He said:

"I think you ought to show that message to me; you know the Emperoris a constitutional Emperor and there was once a great row aboutsuch a message."

I showed him the message, and when he had read it he said: "Ithink it would be inadvisable for us to have this message published,and in the interest of good feeling between Germany and America.If you cable it ask that publication be withheld."

I complied with his request and it is characteristic of thePresident's desire to preserve good relations that publicationwas withheld. Now, when the two countries are at war; when thewhole world, and especially our own country, has an interest inknowing how this great calamity of universal war came to theearth, the time has come when this message should be given outand I have published it by permission.

This most interesting document in the first place clears up oneissue never really obscure in the eyes of the world--the deliberateviolation of the neutrality of Belgium, whose territory "had tobe violated by Germany on strategical grounds." The very weakexcuse is added that "news had been received that France wasalready preparing to enter Belgium,"--not even a pretense thatthere had ever been any actual violation of Belgium's frontierby the French prior to the German invasion of that unfortunatecountry. Of course the second excuse that the King of the Belgianshad refused entrance to the Emperor's troops under guarantee ofhis country's freedom is even weaker than the first. It wouldindeed inaugurate a new era in the intercourse of nations if asmall nation could only preserve its freedom by at all times,on request, granting free passage to the troops of a powerfulneighbour on the march to attack an adjoining country.

And aside from the violation of Belgian neutrality, what wouldhave become of England and of the world if the Prussian autocracyhad been left free to defeat--one by one--the nations of theearth? First, the defeat of Russia and Serbia by Austria andGermany, the incorporation of a large part of Russia in the GermanEmpire, German influence predominant in Russia and all the vastresources of that great Empire at the command of Germany. All thefleets in the world could uselessly blockade the German coastsif Germany possessed the limitless riches of the Empire of theRomanoffs.

[Illustration: ALLEGED DUM-DUM BULLETS, WHICH THE GERMANS DECLAREDHAD BEEN FOUND IN LONGWY.]

The German army drawing for reserves on the teeming populationsof Russia and Siberia would never know defeat. And this is notidle conjecture, mere dreaming in the realm of possibilities,because the Russian revolution has shown us how weak and totteringin reality was the dreaded power of the Czar.

Russia, beaten and half digested, France would have been an easyprey, and England, even if then joining France in war, wouldhave a far different problem to face if the V-boats were nowsailing from Cherbourg and Calais and Brest and Bordeaux on themission of piracy and murder, and then would come our turn andthat of Latin America. The first attack would come not on us,but on South or Central America--at some point to which it wouldbe as difficult for us to send troops to help our neighbor asit would be for Germany to attack.

Remember that in Southern Brazil nearly four hundred thousandGermans are sustained, as I found out, in their devotion to theFatherland by annual grants of money for educational purposesfrom the Imperial treasury in Berlin.

It was not without reason that at this interview, when the Kaiserwrote this message to the President, he said that the comingin of England had changed the whole situation and would makethe war a long one. The Kaiser talked rather despondently aboutthe war. I tried to cheer him up by saying the German troopswould soon enter Paris, but he answered, "The English changethe whole situation--an obstinate nation--they will keep up thewar. It cannot end soon."

It was the entry of England into the war, in defence of the rightsof small nations, in defence of the guaranteed neutrality ofBelgium, which saved the world from the harsh dominion of theconquest-hungry Prussians and therefore saved as well the twoAmericas and their protecting doctrine of President Monroe.

The document, which is dated August tenth, 1914, supersedes thestatement made by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg inhis speech before the Reichstag on August fourth, 1914, in whichhe gave the then official account of the entrance into the war ofthe Central Empires. It will be noted that von Bethmann-Hollweginsisted that France began the war in the sentence reading: "Therewere bomb-throwing fliers, cavalry patrols, invading companiesin the Reichsland (Alsace-Lorraine). Thereby France, althoughthe condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked ourterritory." But the Emperor makes no mention of this fact, ofsupreme importance if true, in his writing to President Wilsonsix days later.

Quite curiously, at this time there was a belief on the partof the Germans that Japan would declare war on the Allies andrange herself on the side of the Central Powers. In fact on onenight there was a friendly demonstration in front of the JapaneseEmbassy, but these hopes were soon dispelled by the ultimatumof Japan sent on the sixteenth of August, and, finally, by thedeclaration of war on August twenty-third.

During the first days of the war the warring powers indulged inmutual recriminations as to the use of dumdum bullets and I wasgiven several packages of cartridges containing bullets bored outat the top which the Germans said had been found in the Frenchfortress of Longwy, with a request that I send an account of themto President Wilson and ask for his intervention in the matter.Very wisely President Wilson refused to do anything of the kind,as otherwise he would have been deluged with constant complaintsfrom both sides as to the violations of the rules of war.

The cartridges given to me were in packages marked on the outside"_Cartouches_de_Stand_" and from this I took it that possiblythese cartridges had been used on some shooting range near thefort and the bullets bored out in order that they might not gotoo far, if carelessly fired over the targets.

On August fifth, with our Naval Attache, Commander Walter Gherardi,I called upon von Tirpitz, to learn from him which ports beconsidered safest for the ships to be sent from America with goldfor stranded Americans. He recommended Rotterdam.

I also had a conversation on this day with Geheimrat Letze ofthe Foreign Office with reference to the proposition that Englishand German ships respectively should have a delay of until thefourteenth of August in which to leave the English or Germanports in which they chanced to be.

The second week in August, my wife's sister and her husband,Count Sigray, arrived in Berlin. Count Sigray is a reserve officerof the Hungarian Hussars and was in Montana when the first rumoursof war came. He and his wife immediately started for New York andsailed on the fourth of August. They landed in England, and asEngland had not yet declared war on Austria, they were able toproceed on their journey. With them were Count George Festeticsand Count Cziraki, the former from the Austrian Embassy in Londonand the latter from that in Washington. They were all naturallyvery much excited about war and the events of their trip. TheHungarians as a people are quite like Americans. They have agreeablemanners and are able to laugh in a natural way, something whichseems to be a lost art in Prussia. Nearly all the members ofHungarian noble families speak English perfectly and model theirclothes, sports and country life, as far as possible, after theEnglish.

The thirteenth saw the departure of our first special traincontaining Americans bound for Holland. I saw the Americans offat the Charlottenburg station. They all departed in great spiritsand very glad of an opportunity to leave Germany.

I had some negotiations about the purchase by America or Americansof the ships of the North German Lloyd, but nothing came of thesenegotiations. Trainloads of Americans continued to leave, butthere seemed to be no end to the Americans coming into Berlinfrom all directions.

On August twenty-ninth, Count Szoegyeny, the Austrian Ambassador,left Berlin. He had been Ambassador there for twenty-two years andI suppose because of his advancing years the Austrian Governmentthought that he had outlived his usefulness. Quite a crowd ofGermans and diplomats were at the station to witness the rathersad farewell. His successor was Prince Hohenlohe, married to adaughter of Archduke Frederick. She expressly waived her rightto precedence as a royal highness, and agreed to take only theprecedence given to her as the wife of the Ambassador, in order notto cause feeling in Berlin. Prince Hohenlohe, a rather easy-goingman, who had been most popular in Russia and Austria, immediatelymade a favourable impression in Berlin and successfully occupiedthe difficult position of mediator between the governments ofBerlin and Vienna.

On September fourth the Chancellor gave me a statement to giveto the reporters in which he attacked England, claiming thatEngland did not desire the friendship of Germany but was moved bycommercial jealousy and a desire to crush her; that the effortsmade for peace had failed because Russia, under all circumstances,was resolved upon war; and that Germany had entered Belgium inorder to forestall the planned French advance. He also claimedthat England, regardless of consequences to the white race, hadexcited Japan to a pillaging expedition, and claimed that Belgiangirls and women had gouged out the eyes of the wounded; thatofficers had been invited to dinner and shot across the table;and Belgian women had cut the throats of soldiers quartered intheir houses while they were asleep. The Chancellor concluded bysaying, in this statement, that everyone knows that the Germanpeople is not capable of unnecessary cruelty or of any brutality.

We were fully occupied with taking care of the English prisonersand interests, the Americans, and negotiations relating to commercialquestions, and to getting goods required in the United States outof Germany, when, on October seventh, a most unpleasant incident,and one which for some time caused the members of our Embassyto feel rather bitterly toward the German Foreign Office, tookplace.

A great number of British civilians, men and women, were strandedin Berlin. To many of these were paid sums of money in the formof small allowances on behalf of the British Government. In orderto facilitate this work, we placed the clerks employed in thisdistribution in the building formerly occupied by the British Consulin Berlin. Of course, the great crowds of Americans resorting toour Embassy, when combined with the crowds of British, made italmost impossible even to enter the Embassy, and establishmentof this outlying relief station materially helped this situation.I occupied it, and employed English men and English women in thisrelief work by the express permission of the Imperial ForeignOffice, which I thought it wise to obtain in view of the factthat the Germans seemed daily to become more irritable andsuspicious, especially after the Battle of the Marne.

On the night of October second, our Second Secretary, Harvey, wentto this relief headquarters at about twelve o'clock at night, andwas witness to a raid made by the Berlin police on this establishmentof ours. The men and women working were arrested, and all booksand papers which the police could get at were seized by them.The next morning I went around to the place and on talking withthe criminal detectives in charge, was told by them that they hadmade the raid by the orders of the Foreign Office. When I spoketo the Foreign Office about this, they denied that they had givendirections for the raid and made a sort of half apology. The raidwas all the more unjustified because only the day before I had hada conversation with the Adjutant of the Berlin Kommandantur andtold him that, although I had permission from the Foreign Office,I thought it would be better to dismiss the English employed andemploy only Americans or Germans; and I sent round to my friend,Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and asked him torecommend some German accountants to me.

The Kommandantur is the direct office of military control. Whenthe Adjutant heard of the raid he was almost as indignant as Iwas, and on the tenth of October informed me that he had learnedthat the raid had been made on the joint orders of the ForeignOffice and von Tirpitz's department.

The books and papers of an Embassy, including those relatingto the affairs of foreign nations temporarily in the Embassy'scare, are universally recognised in international law as not,subject to seizure, nor did the fact that I was carrying on thiswork outside the actual Embassy building have any bearing onthis point so long as the building was directly under my controland, especially, as the only work carried on was work properlyin my hands in my official capacity. The Foreign Office saw thatthey had made a mistake, but at Zimmermann's earnest requestI agreed, as it were, to forget the incident. Later on, thisprecedent might have been used by our government had they desiredto press the matter of the seizure of von Igel's papers. Von Igel,it will be remembered, was carrying on business of a privatenature in a private office hired by him. Nevertheless, as hehad been employed in some capacity in the German Embassy atWashington, Count von Bernstorff claimed immunity from seizurefor the papers found in that office.

On August sixteenth the Kaiser left Berlin for the front. I wroteto his master of the household, saying that I should like anopportunity to be at the railway station to say good-bye to theEmperor, but was put off on various excuses. Thereafter the Emperorpractically abandoned Berlin and lived either in Silesia, atPless, or at some place near the Western front.

At first, following the precedent of the war of 1870, the moreimportant members of the government followed the Kaiser to thefront, even the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairsabandoning their offices in Berlin. Not long afterwards, when itwas apparent that the war must be carried on on several frontsand that it was not going to be the matter of a few weeks whichthe Germans had first supposed, these officials returned to theiroffices in Berlin. In the meantime, however, much confusion hadbeen caused by this rather ridiculous effort to follow the customsof the war of 1870.

When von Jagow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was absent at theGreat General Headquarters, the diplomats remaining behind conductedtheir negotiations with Zimmermann, who in turn had to transmiteverything to the great general headquarters.

In August, there were apparently rumours afloat in countriesoutside of Germany that prominent Socialists at the outbreak ofthe war had been shot. The State Department cabled me to findout whether there was any truth in these rumours, with particularreference to Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.

Liebknecht is a lawyer practicing in Berlin and so I telephonedhim, asking him to come and see me. He did so, and of course, byhis presence verified the fact that he had not been executed.He told me that the rumours as to the treatment of the Socialistswere entirely unfounded and said that he had no objection to mycabling a statement that the Socialists were opposed to Czarismusand that he personally had confidence in the German army and thecause of the German people.

Many people confuse Liebknecht with his father, now dead. Liebknecht,the son, is a man of perhaps forty-three years, with dark bushyhair and moustache and wearing eye-glasses, a man of medium heightand not at all of strong build. In the numerous interruptionsmade by him during the debates in the Reichstag, during the firstyear of the war, his voice sounded high and shrill. Of course,anyone who defies the heavy hand of autocracy must suffer fromnervousness. We all knew that sooner or later autocracy would"get" Liebknecht, and its opportunity came when he appeared incitizen's clothes at an attempted mass-meeting at the Potsdamerplatz.For the offence of appearing out of uniform after being calledand mobilized, and for alleged incitement of the people, he wascondemned for a long term of imprisonment. One can but admirehis courage. I believe that he earns his living by the practiceof law before one of the minor courts. It is hard to say justwhat _role_ he will play in the future. It is probable thatwhen the Socialists settle down after the war and think thingsover, they will consider that the leadership of Scheidemann hasbeen too conservative; that he submitted too readily to the powersof autocracy and too easily abandoned the program of the Socialists.In this case, Liebknecht perhaps will be made leader of theSocialists, and it is within the bounds of probability thatScheidemann and certain of his party may become Liberals ratherthan Socialists.

CHAPTER XII

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

In the autumn of 1914, the rush of getting the Americans outof Germany was over. The care of the British civilians was on abusiness basis and there were comparatively few camps of prisonersof war. Absolutely tired by working every day and until twelveat night, I went to Munich for a two weeks' rest.

On February fourth, 1915, Germany announced that on Februaryeighteenth the blockade of England through submarines would commence.

Some very peculiar and mysterious negotiations thereafter ensued.About February eighth, an American who was very intimate withthe members of the General Staff came to me with a statementthat Germany desired peace and was ready to open negotiationsto that end. It was, however, to be made a condition of thesepeace negotiations that this particular American should go toParis and to Petrograd and inform the governments there of theoverwhelming strength of the German armies and of their positions,which knowledge, it was said, he had obtained by personally visitingboth the fronts. it was further intimated that von Tirpitz himselfwas anxious that peace should be concluded, possibly because ofhis fear that the proposed blockade would not be successful.

Of course, I informed the State Department of these mysteriousmanoeuvres.

I was taken by back stairways to a mysterious meeting with vonTirpitz at night in his rooms in the Navy Department. When I wasalone with him, however, he had nothing definite to say or tooffer; if there was any opportunity at that time to make peacenothing came of it. It looked somewhat to me as if the wholeidea had been to get this American to go to Paris and Petrograd,certify from his personal observation to the strength of theGerman armies and position, and thereby to assist in enticingone or both of these countries to desert the allied cause. All ofthis took place about ten days before the eighteenth of February,the time named for the announcement of the blockade of England.

Medals were struck having the head of von Tirpitz on one sideand on the other the words "Gott strafe England," and a pictureof a sort of Neptune assisted by a submarine rising from thesea to blockade the distant English coast.

The Ambassador is supposed to have the right to demand an audiencewith the Kaiser at any time, and as there were matters connectedwith the treatment of prisoners as well as this coming submarinewarfare which I wished to take up with him, I had on variousoccasions asked for an audience with him; on each occasion myrequest had been refused on some excuse or other, and I was noteven permitted to go to the railway station to bid him good-byeon one occasion when he left for the front.

When our Military Attache, Major Langhorne, left in March, 1915,he had a farewell audience with the Kaiser and I then asked himto say to the Kaiser that I had not seen him for so long a timethat I had forgotten what he looked like. Langhorne reportedto me that he had given his message to the Kaiser and that theKaiser said, "I have nothing against Mr. Gerard personally, butI will not see the Ambassador of a country which furnishes armsand ammunition to the enemies of Germany."

Before the departure of Langhorne, I had succeeded in gettingGermany to agree that six American army officers might visitGermany as military observers. When they arrived, I presentedthem at the Foreign Office, etc., and they were taken on tripsto the East and West fronts.

They were not allowed to see much, and their request to be attachedto a particular unit was refused. Nearly everywhere they weresubject to insulting remarks or treatment because of the shipmentof munitions of war to the Allies from America; and finally afterthey had been subjected to deliberate insults at the hands ofseveral German generals, Mackensen particularly distinguishinghimself, the United States Government withdrew them from Germany.

Colonel (now General) Kuhn, however, who was of these observers,was appointed Military Attache in place of Major Langhorne. SpeakingGerman fluently and acting with great tact, he managed for a longtime to keep sufficiently in the good graces of the Germans tobe allowed to see something of the operations of the variousfronts. There came a period in 1916 when he was no longer invitedto go on the various excursions made by the foreign militaryattaches and finally Major Nicolai, the general intelligenceofficer of the Great General Headquarters, sent for him early inthe autumn of 1916, and informed him that he could no longer goto any of the fronts. Colonel Kuhn answered that he was aware ofthis already. Major Nicolai said that he gave him this informationby direct order of General Ludendorf, that General Ludendorf hadstated that he did not believe America could do more damage toGermany than she had done if the two countries were actuallyat war, and that he considered that, practically, America andGermany were engaged in hostilities. On this being reported toWashington, Colonel Kuhn was quite naturally recalled.

I cannot praise too highly the patience and tact shown by ColonelKuhn in dealing with the Germans. Although accused in the Germannewspapers of being a spy, and otherwise attacked, he kept histemper and observed all that he could for the benefit of his owncountry. As he had had an opportunity to observe the Russian-Japanesewar, his experiences at that time, coupled with his experiencesin Germany, make him, perhaps, our greatest American expert onmodern war.

It was with the greatest pleasure that I heard from SecretaryBaker that he had determined to promote Colonel Kuhn to the rankof General and make him head of our War College, where his teachingswill prove of the greatest value to the armies of the United States.

Colonel House and his wife arrived to pay us a visit on March 19,1915, and remained until the twenty-eighth. During this period theColonel met all the principal members of the German Government andmany men of influence and prominence in the world of affairs, suchas Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and Dr. WalterRathenau, who succeeded his father as head of the AllgemeineElektricitats Gesellschaft and hundreds of other corporations. TheColonel dined at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister,and lunched with von Gwinner.

In April, negotiations were continued about the sinking of the_William_P._Fry_, an American boat loaded with food anddestined for Ireland. The American Government on behalf of theowners of the _William_P._Fry_ claimed damages for the boat.Nothing was said about the cargo, but in the German answer it wasstated that the cargo of the _William_P._Fry_ consisting offoodstuffs destined for an armed port of the enemy and, therefore,presumed to be destined for the armed forces of the enemy was,because of this, contraband. I spoke to von Jagow about this andtold him that I thought that possibly this would seem to amountto a German justification of the British blockade of Germany.He said that this note had been drawn by Director Kriege whowas their expert on international law, and that he would notinterfere with Kriege's work. Of course, as a matter of fact,all foodstuffs shipped to Germany would have to be landed atsome armed port, and, therefore, according to the contentionsof Germany, these would be supposed to be destined to the armedforces of the enemy and become contraband of war.

At international law, it had always been recognised that privateindividuals and corporations have the right to sell arms andammunitions of war to any belligerent and, in the Hague Conventionheld in 1907, this right was expressly ratified and confirmed.This same Director Kriege who represented Germany at this HagueConference in 1907, in the debates on this point said: "The neutralboats which engage in such a trade, commit a violation of theduties of neutrality. However, according to a principle generallyrecognised, the State of which the boat flies the flag is notresponsible for this violation. The neutral States are not calledupon to forbid their subjects a commerce which, from the point ofview of the belligerents, ought to be considered as unlawful."(Conference International de la Paix, La Haye, 15 Juin-18 Octobre1907. Vol. III, p. 859.)

During our trouble with General Huerta, arms and ammunition forHuerta's forces from Germany were landed from German ships inMexico. During the Boer war the Germans, who openly sympathisedwith the Boers, nevertheless furnished to England great quantitiesof arms and munitions, expressly destined to be used againstthe Boers; and this, although it was manifest that there wasno possibility whatever that the Boers could obtain arms andmunitions from German sources during the war. For instance, thefirm of Eberhardt in Dusseldorf furnished one hundred and ninecannon, complete, with wagons, caissons and munitions, etc., tothe English which were expressly designed for use against theBoers.

At one time the Imperial Foreign Office sent me a formal notemaking reference to a paragraph in former Ambassador Andrew D.White's autobiography with reference to the alleged stoppagein a German port of a boat laden with arms and ammunition, foruse against the Americans in Cuba during the Spanish War. Ofcourse, former Ambassador White wrote without having the Embassyrecords at hand and those records show that the position he tookat the time of this alleged stoppage was eminently correct.

The files show that he wrote the letter to the State Departmentin which he stated that knowledge came to him of the proposedsailing of this ship, but he did not protest because he had beenadvised by a Naval Attache that the United States did not havethe right to interfere. The Department of State wrote to himcommending his action in not filing any protest and otherwiseinterfering.

It seemed as if the German Government expressly desired to stirup hatred against America on this issue in order to force theAmerican Government through fear of either the German Government,or the German-American propagandists at home, to put an immediateembargo on the export of these supplies.

In the autumn of 1914 Zimmermann showed me a long list sent himby Bernstorff showing quantities of saddles, automobiles, motortrucks, tires, explosives, foodstuffs and so on, exported fromAmerica to the Allies and intimated that this traffic had reachedsuch proportions that it should be stopped.

In February, 1915, in the official _Communique_ of the dayappeared the following statement: "Heavy artillery fire in certainsections of the West front, mostly with American ammunition;"and in April in the official _Communique_ something to thiseffect: "Captured French artillery officers say that they havegreat stores of American ammunition." I obtained through the StateDepartment in Washington a statement from the French Ambassadorcertifying that up to that time, the end of April, 1915, no shellswhatever of the French artillery had been furnished from America.

Nothing, however, would satisfy the Germans. They seemed determinedthat the export of every article, whether of food or munitionswhich might prove of use to the Allies in the war, should bestopped. Newspapers were filled with bitter attacks upon Americaand upon President Wilson, and with caricatures referring tothe sale of munitions.

It never seemed to occur to the Germans that we could not violatethe Hague Convention in order to change the rules of the gamebecause one party, after the commencement of hostilities, foundthat the rule worked to his disadvantage. Nor did the Germansconsider that America could not vary its international law withthe changing fortunes of war and make one ruling when the Germanslost control of the sea and another ruling if they regained it.

From early in 1915 until I left Germany, I do not think I everhad a conversation with a German without his alluding to thisquestion. Shortly before leaving Germany, in January, 1917, andafter I had learned of the probability of the resumption of ruthlesssubmarine war, at an evening party at the house of Dr. Solf, theColonial Minister, a large German who turned out to be one ofthe Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, planted himself somedistance away from me and addressed me in German saying, "You arethe American Ambassador and I want to tell you that the conductof America in furnishing arms and ammunition to the enemies ofGermany is stamped deep on the German heart, that we will neverforget it and will some day have our revenge." He spoke in avoice so loud and slapped his chest so hard that everyone inthe room stopped their conversation in order to hear. He woreon his breast the orders of the Black Eagle, the Red Eagle, theElephant and the Seraphim, and when he struck all this menageriethe rattle alone was quite loud. I reminded him politely of theHague Convention, of the fact that we could not change internationallaw from time to time with the change in the situation of the war,and that Germany had furnished arms to England to use against theBoers. But he simply answered, "We care nothing for treaties,"and my answer, "That is what they all say," was a retort tooobvious to be omitted.

The German press continually published articles to the effectthat the war would be finished if it were not for the shipmentof supplies from America. All public opinion was with the GermanGovernment when the warning was issued on February fourth, 1915,stating that the blockade of England would commence on the eighteenthand warning neutral ships to keep out of the war zone. From thenon we had constant cases and crises with reference to the sinkingof American boats by the German submarine. There were the casesof the _Gulfflight_ and the _Cushing_ and the _Falaba_, an Englishboat sunk without warning on which Americans were killed. On Maysixth, 1915, Director Kriege of the Foreign Office asked Mr. Jacksonto call and see him, and told him that he would like to have thefollowing three points brought to the attention of the Americanpublic:

"1. As the result of the English effort to stop all foreign commerce with Germany, Germany would do everything in her power to destroy English commerce and merchant shipping. There was, however, never at any time an intention to destroy or interfere with neutral commerce or to attack neutral shipping unless engaged in contraband trade. In view of the action of the British Government in arming merchant vessels and causing them to disguise their national character, the occasional destruction of a neutral ship was unavoidable. Naval officers in command of submarines had been instructed originally, and new and more stringent instructions had been issued repeatedly, to use the utmost care, consistent with their own safety, to avoid attacks on neutral vessels.

"2. In case a neutral ship should be destroyed by a submarine the German Government is prepared to make an immediate and formal expression of its regret and to pay an indemnity, without having recourse to a prize court.

"3. All reports with regard to the destruction of a neutral vessel by a German submarine are investigated at once by both the German Foreign Office and Admiralty and the result is communicated to the Government concerned, which is requested in return to communicate to the German Government the result of its own independent investigation. Where there is any material divergence in the two reports as to the presumed cause of destruction (torpedo or mine), the question is to be submitted to investigation by a commission composed of representatives of the two nations concerned, with a neutral arbiter whose decision will be final. This course has already been adopted in two cases, in which a Dutch and a Norwegian vessel, respectively, were concerned. The German Government reserves its right to refuse this international arbitration in exceptional cases where for military reasons the German Admiralty are opposed to its taking place."

Director Kriege told Mr. Jackson that a written communication inwhich the substance of the foregoing would be contained, wouldsoon to be made to the Embassy.

Mr. Jackson put this conversation down in the form above givenand showed Director Kriege a copy of it. Later in the day GeheimratSimon called on Mr. Jackson at the Embassy and said that Dr.Kriege would like to have point two read as follows:

"In case _through_any_unfortunate_mistake_a_neutral_ship_," and continuing to the end; and that Dr. Kriege would like to change what was written on point three beginning with "Where there is" so that it should read, as follows:--"Where there is any material divergence in the two reports as to the presumed cause of destruction (torpedo or mine), the German Government has already in several instances declared its readiness to submit the question to the decision of an international commission in accordance with the Hague Convention for the friendly settlement of international disputes."

This had been suggested by Director Kriege in case it shouldbe decided to make a communication to the American Press. Mr.Jackson told Geheimrat Simon that he would report the subject ofhis conversation to me, but that it would depend upon me whetherany communication should be made to the American Government orto the press upon the subject.

Of course, the news of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ onMay seventh and of the great loss of American lives broughtabout a very critical situation, and naturally nothing was donewith Kriege's propositions.

It is unnecessary here for me to go into the notes which wereexchanged between the two governments because all that is alreadypublic property.

Sometime after I had delivered our first _Lusitania_ Note ofMay 11th, 1915, Zimmermann was lunching with us. A good lookingAmerican woman, married to a German, was also of the party andafter lunch although I was talking to some one else I overheardpart of her conversation with Zimmermann. When Zimmermann leftI asked her what it was that he had said about America, Germany,Mr. Bryan and the _Lusitania_. She then told me that shehad said to Zimmermann that it was a great pity that we wereto leave Berlin as it looked as if diplomatic relations betweenthe two countries would be broken, and that Zimmermann told hernot to worry about that because they had just received word fromthe Austrian Government that Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassadorin Washington, had cabled that the _Lusitania_ Note fromAmerica to Germany was only sent as a sop to public opinion inAmerica and that the government did not really mean what wassaid in that note. I then called on Zimmermann at the ForeignOffice and he showed me Dumba's telegram which was substantiallyas stated above. Of course, I immediately cabled to the StateDepartment and also got word to President Wilson. The rest ofthe incident is public property. I, of course, did not know whatactually occurred between Mr. Bryan and Dr. Dumba, but I am surethat Dr. Dumba must have misunderstood friendly statements madeby Mr. Bryan.

It was very lucky that I discovered the existence of this Dumbacablegram in this manner which savours almost of diplomacy asrepresented on the stage. If the Germans had gone on in the beliefthat the _Lusitania_ Note was not really meant, war wouldhave inevitably resulted at that time between Germany and America,and it shows how great events may be shaped by heavy luncheonsand a pretty woman.

Before this time much indignation had been caused in Germanyby the fact that the _Lusitania_ on her eastward voyagefrom New York early in February, 1915, had raised the Americanflag when nearing British waters.

Shortly after this incident had become known, I was at theWintergarten, a large concert hall in Berlin, with Grant Smith,First Secretary of the Embassy at Vienna and other members ofmy staff. We naturally spoke English among ourselves, a factwhich aroused the ire of a German who had been drinking heavilyand who was seated in the next box. He immediately began to callout that some one was speaking English and when told by one ofthe attendants that it was the American Ambassador, he immediatelycried in a loud voice that Americans were even worse than Englishand that the _Lusitania_ had been flying the American flag asprotection in British waters.

The audience, however, took sides against him and told him toshut up and as I left the house at the close of the performance,some Germans spoke to me and apologised for his conduct. Thenext day the manager of the Wintergarten called on me also toexpress his regret for the occurrence.

About a year afterwards I was at the races one day and saw thisman and asked him what he meant by making such a noise at theWintergarten. He immediately apologised and said that he hadbeen drinking and hoped that I would forget the incident. Thiswas the only incident of the kind which occurred to me duringall the time that I was in Germany.

Both before and after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, theGerman Foreign Office put forward all kinds of proposals withreference to American ships in the war zone. On one afternoon,Zimmermann, who had a number of these proposals drafted in German,showed them to me and I wrote down the English translation for himto see how it would look in English. These proposals were aboutthe sailing from America of what might be called certified ships,the ships to be painted and striped in a distinctive way, to comefrom certified ports at certain certified times, America to agreethat these ships should carry no contraband whatever. All theseproposals were sternly rejected by the President.

On February sixteenth, the German answer to our note of Februarytenth had announced that Germany declined all responsibility forwhat might happen to neutral ships and, in addition, announcedthat mines would be allowed in waters surrounding Great Britainand Ireland. This note also contained one of Zimmermann's proposedsolutions, namely, that American warships should convoy Americanmerchantmen.

The German note of the sixteenth also spoke about the great trafficin munitions from the United States to the Allies, and containeda suggestion that the United States should induce the Allies toadopt the Declaration of London and omit the importation notonly of food but also of all raw materials into Germany.

February twentieth was the date of the conciliatory note addressedby President Wilson to both Great Britain and Germany; and containedthe suggestion that submarines should not be employed againstmerchant vessels of any nationality and that food should be allowedto go through for the civil population of Germany consigned tothe agencies named by the United States in Germany, which wereto see that the food was received and distributed to the civilpopulation.

In the meantime the mines on the German coast had destroyed twoAmerican ships, both loaded with cotton for Germany; one calledthe _Carib_ and the other the _Evelyn_.

In America, Congress refused to pass a law to put it in the powerof the President to place an embargo on the export of munitionsof war.

In April, Count Bernstorff delivered his note concerning thealleged want of neutrality of the United States, referring tothe numerous new industries in war materials being built up inthe United States, stating, "In reality the United States issupplying only Germany's enemies, a fact which is not in anyway modified by the theoretical willingness to furnish Germanyas well."

To this note, Secretary Bryan in a note replied that it wasimpossible, in view of the indisputable doctrines of acceptedinternational law, to make any change in our own laws of neutralitywhich meant unequally affecting, during the progress of the war,the relations of the United States with the various nations atwar; and that the placing of embargoes on the trade in arms whichconstituted such a change would be a direct violation of theneutrality of the United States.

But all these negotiations, reproaches and recriminations wereput an end to by the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_, with thekilling of American women and civilians who were passengers onthat vessel.

I believed myself that we would immediately break diplomaticrelations, and prepared to leave Germany. On May eleventh, Idelivered to von Jagow the _Lusitania_ Note, which aftercalling attention to the cases of the sinking of American boats,ending with the _Lusitania_, contained the statement, "TheImperial German Government will not expect the Government ofthe United States to omit any word or any act necessary to thesacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States andits citizens and of safeguarding their free exercises andenjoyments."

During this period I had constant conversations with von Jagowand Zimmermann, and it was during the conversations about thissubmarine warfare that Zimmermann on one occasion said to me:"The United States does not dare to do anything against Germanybecause we have five hundred thousand German reservists in Americawho will rise in arms against your government if your governmentshould dare to take any action against Germany." As he said this,he worked himself up to a passion and repeatedly struck the tablewith his fist. I told him that we had five hundred and one thousandlamp posts in America, and that was where the German reservistswould find themselves if they tried any uprising; and I alsocalled his attention to the fact that no German-Americans makinguse of the American passports which they could easily obtain,were sailing for Germany by way of Scandinavian countries inorder to enlist in the German army. I told him that if he couldshow me one person with an American passport who had come tofight in the German army I might more readily believe what hesaid about the Germans in America rising in revolution.

As a matter of fact, during the whole course of the war, I knewof only one man with American citizenship who enlisted in theGerman army. This was an American student then in Germany whoenlisted in a German regiment. His father, a business man in NewYork, cabled me asking me to have his son released from the Germanarmy; so I procured the discharge of the young man who immediatelywrote to me and informed me that he was over twenty-one, andthat he could not see what business his father had to interferewith his military ambitions. I thereupon withdrew my requestwith reference to him, but he had already been discharged fromthe army. When his regiment went to the West front he stowedaway on the cars with it, was present at the attack on Ypres,and was shot through the body. He recovered in a German hospital,received the Iron Cross, was discharged and sailed for America.What has since become of him I do not know.

I do not intend to go in great detail into this exchange of notesand the public history of the submarine controversy, as all thatproperly belongs to the history of the war rather than to anaccount of my personal experiences; and besides, as Victor Hugosaid, "History is not written with a microscope." All will rememberthe answer of Germany to the American _Lusitania_ Note, whichanswer, delivered on May twenty-ninth, contained the charge thatthe _Lusitania_ was armed and carried munitions, and had beenused in the transport of Canadian troops. In the meantime, however,the American ship, _Nebraskan_, had been torpedoed off the coastof Ireland on the twenty-sixth; and, on May twenty-eighth, Germanystated that the American steamer, _Gulfflight_, had been torpedoedby mistake, and apologised for this act.

Von Jagow gave me, about the same time, a Note requesting thatAmerican vessels should be more plainly marked and should illuminatetheir marking at night.

The second American _Lusitania_ Note was published on Juneeleventh, 1915; and its delivery was coincident with the resignationof Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State. In this last Note PresidentWilson (for, of course, it is an open secret that he was theauthor of these Notes) made the issue perfectly plain, referringto the torpedoing of enemy passenger ships. "Only her actualresistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do sofor the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of thesubmarine any justification for so much as putting the lives ofthose on board the ship in jeopardy." On July eighth the Germananswer to this American _Lusitania_ Note was delivered, andagain stated that "we have been obliged to adopt a submarine warto meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method ofwarfare adopted by them in contravention of international law".Again referring to the alleged fact of the _Lusitania's_carrying munitions they said: "If the _Lusitania_ had beenspared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent toGermany's enemies and thereby thousands of German mothers andchildren robbed of breadwinners." The note then contained someof Zimmermann's favourite proposals, to the effect that Germansubmarine commanders would be instructed to permit the passage ofAmerican steamers marked in a special way and of whose sailingthey had been notified in advance, provided that the AmericanGovernment guaranteed that these vessels did not carry contrabandof war. It was also suggested that a number of neutral vesselsshould be added to those sailing under the American flag, togive greater opportunity for those Americans who were compelledto travel abroad, and the Note's most important part continued:"In particular the Imperial Government is unable to admit thatthe American citizens can protect an enemy ship by mere factof their presence on board."

July twenty-first, the American Government rejected the proposalsof Germany saying, "The lives of noncombatants may in no casebe put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escapeafter being summoned to submit to examination," and disposedof the claim that the acts of England gave Germany the rightto retaliate, even though American citizens should be deprivedof their lives in the course of retaliation by stating: "For abelligerent act of retaliation is _per_se_ an act beyond thelaw, and the defense, of an act as retaliatory, is an admissionthat it is illegal." Continuing it said: "If a belligerent cannotretaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals,as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and adue regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictatethat the practice be discontinued."

It was also said: "The United States cannot believe that theImperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wantonact of its naval commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ orfrom offering reparation for the American lives lost, so faras reparation can be made for the needless destruction of humanlife by an illegal act." And the meat of the Note was containedin the following sentence: "Friendship itself prompts it (theUnited States) to say to the Imperial Government that repetitionby the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contraventionof those rights must be regarded by the Government of the UnitedStates, when they affect American citizens, as being deliberatelyunfriendly."

There the matter has remained so far as the Lusitania was concerneduntil now. In the meantime, the attack of the American ship,_Nebraskan_, was disavowed; the German Note stating that"the torpedo was not meant for the American flag and is to beconsidered an unfortunate accident."

The diplomatic situation with regard to the use of the submarineand the attack on many merchant ships without notice and withoutputting the passengers in safety was still unsettled when onAugust nineteenth, 1915, the British ship _Arabic_, wastorpedoed, without warning, not far from the place where the_Lusitania_ had gone down. Two Americans were among thepassengers killed.

The German Government, after the usual quibbling, at length,in its Note of September seventh, claimed that the Captain ofthe German submarine, while engaged in preparing to sink the_Dunsley_, became convinced that the approaching _Arabic_was trying to ram him and, therefore, fired his torpedo. TheImperial Government refused to admit any liability but offeredto arbitrate.

There followed almost immediately the case of the _Ancona_,sunk by a submarine flying the Austrian flag. This case was naturallyout of my jurisdiction, but formed a link in the chain, and thencame the sinking of the _Persia_ in the Mediterranean. On thisboat our consul to Aden lost his life.

In the Note of Count Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, dated Septemberfirst, 1915, Count Bernstorff said that liners would not be sunkby German submarines without warning, and without putting thepassengers in safety, provided that the liners did not try toescape or offer resistance; and it was further stated that thispolicy was in effect before the sinking of the _Arabic_.

There were long negotiations during this period concerning the_Arabic_. At one time it looked as if diplomatic relationswould be broken; but finally the Imperial Government consentedto acknowledge that the submarine commander had been wrong inassuming that the _Arabic_ intended to ram his boat, offeredto pay an indemnity and disavowed the act of the commander. Itwas stated that orders so precise had been given to the submarinecommanders that a "recurrence of incidents similar to the_Arabic_ is considered out of the question."

In the same way the Austrian Government gave way to the demandsof America in the _Ancona_ case at the end of December, 1915.Ambassador Penfield, in Austria, won great praise by his admirablehandling of this case.

The negotiations as to the still pending _Lusitania_ casewere carried on in Washington by Count Bernstorff and SecretaryLansing, and finally Germany offered to pay an indemnity forthe death of the Americans on the _Lusitania_ whose deathsGermany "greatly regretted," but refused to disavow the act ofthe submarine commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or to admitthat such act was illegal.

About this time our State Department sent out a Note proposingin effect that submarines should conform to "cruiser" warfare,only sinking a vessel which defended itself or tried to escape,and that before sinking a vessel its passengers and crew shouldbe placed in safety; and that, on the other hand, merchant vesselsof belligerent nationality should be prohibited from carryingany armaments whatever. This suggestion was not followed up.

Zimmermann (not the one in the Foreign Office) wrote an articlein the _Lokal_Anzeiger_ of which he is an editor, sayingthat the United States had something on their side in the questionof the export of munitions. I heard that von Kessel, commander ofthe _Mark_of_Brandenburg_ said that he, Zimmermann, ought to beshot as a traitor. Zimmermann hearing of this made von Kesselapologise, but was shortly afterwards mobilised.

Colonel House had arrived in Germany at the end of January, 1916,and remained only three days. He was quite worried by the situationand by an interview he had had with Zimmermann in which Zimmermannexpressed the readiness of Germany to go to war with the UnitedStates.

In February, 1916, the Junkers in the Prussian Lower House starteda fight against the Chancellor and discussed submarine war, amatter out of their province. The Chancellor hit back at them hardand had the best of the exchange. At this period it was reportedthat the Emperor went to Wilhelmshafen to warn the submarinecommanders to be careful.

About March first it was reported that a grand council of warwas held at Charleville and that in spite of the support of vonTirpitz by Falkenhayn, the Chief of Staff, the Chancellor wassupported by the Emperor, and once more beat the propositionsto recommence ruthless submarine war.

In March too, the "illness" of von Tirpitz was announced, followedshortly by his resignation. On March nineteenth, his birthday,a demonstration was looked for and I saw many police near hisdwelling, but nothing unusual occurred. I contemplated a tripto America, but both the Chancellor and von Jagow begged me notto go.

From the time of the _Lusitania_ sinking to that of the _Sussex_all Germany was divided into two camps. The party of the Chancellortried to keep peace with America and did not want to have Germanybranded as an outlaw among nations. Von Tirpitz and his party ofnaval and military officers called for ruthless submarine war, andthe Conservatives, angry with Bethmann-Hollweg because of hisproposed concession as to the extension of the suffrage, joinedthe opposition. The reception of our last _Lusitania_ Note inJuly, 1915, was hostile and I was accused of being against Germany,although, of course, I had nothing to do with the preparation ofthis Note.

In August, 1915, the deputies representing the great industrialsof Germany joined in the attack on the Chancellor. These menwished to keep Northern France and Belgium, because they hopedto get possession of the coal and iron deposits there and soobtain a monopoly of the iron and steel trade of the continent.Accelerators of public opinion, undoubtedly hired by the Kruppfirm, were hard at work. These Annexationists were opposed by themore reasonable men who signed a petition against the annexationof Belgium. Among the signers of this reasonable men's petitionwere Prince Hatzfeld (Duke of Trachenberg) head of the Red Cross,Dernburg, Prince Henkel Donnersmarck, Professor Delbruck, vonHarnack and many others.

The rage of the Conservatives at the _Arabic_ settlementknew no bounds, and after a bitter article had appeared in the_Tageszeitung_ about the _Arabic_ affair, that newspaper wassuppressed for some days,--a rather unexpected showing of backboneon the part of the Chancellor. Reventlow who wrote for this newspaperis one of the ablest editorial writers in Germany. An ex-navalofficer, he is bitter in his hatred of America. It was said thathe once lived in America and lost a small fortune in a Floridaorange grove, but I never succeeded in having this verified.

In November, 1915, after the _Arabic_ settlement there followeda moment for us of comparative calm. Mrs. Gerard was given theRed Cross Orders of the first and third classes, and Jacksonand Rives of the Embassy Staff the second and third class. Thethird class is always given because one cannot have the firstand second unless one has the third or lowest.

There were rumours at this time of the formation of a new party;really the Socialists and Liberals, as the Socialists as such weretoo unfashionable, in too bad odour, to open a campaign againstthe military under their own name. This talk came to nothing.

The Chancellor always complained bitterly that he could notcommunicate in cipher _via_ wireless with von Bernstorff.On one occasion he said to me, "How can I arrange as I wish toin a friendly way the _Ancona_ and _Lusitania_ casesif I cannot communicate with my Ambassador? Why does the UnitedStates Government not allow me to communicate in cipher?" I said,"The Foreign Office tried to get me to procure a safe-conduct forthe notorious von Rintelen on the pretense that he was going to docharitable work for Belgium in America; perhaps Washington thinksyou want to communicate with people like that." The Chancellor thenchanged the subject and said that there would be bad feeling inGermany against America after the war. I answered that that ideahad been expressed by a great many Germans and German newspapers,and that I had had private letters from a great many Americanswho wrote that if Germany intended to make war on America, afterthis war, perhaps we had better go in now. He then very amiablysaid that war with America would be ridiculous. He asked me whypublic opinion in America was against Germany, and I answeredthat matters like the Cavell case had made a bad impression inAmerica and that I knew personally that even the Kaiser did notapprove of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_. The Chancellorsaid, "How about the _Baralong_?" I replied that I did notknow the details and that there seemed much doubt and confusionabout that affair, but that there was no doubt about the factthat Miss Cavell was shot and that she was a woman. I then tookup in detail with him the treatment of British prisoners andsaid that this bad treatment could not go on. This was only oneof the many times when I complained to the Chancellor about thecondition of prisoners. I am sure that he did not approve of themanner in which prisoners of war in Germany were treated; buthe always complained that he was powerless where the militarywere concerned, and always referred me to Bismarck's memoirs.

During this winter of submarine controversy an interview withvon Tirpitz, thinly veiled as an interview with a "high navalauthority," was published in that usually most conservative ofnewspapers, the _Frankfurter_Zeitung_. In this interview the"high naval authority" advocated ruthless submarine war withEngland, and promised to bring about thereby the speedy surrenderof that country. After the surrender, which was to include thewhole British fleet, the German fleet with the surrendered Britishfleet added to its force, was to sail for America, and exact fromthat country indemnities enough to pay the whole cost of the war.

After his fall, von Tirpitz, in a letter to some admirers whohad sent him verses and a wreath, advocated holding the coast ofFlanders as a necessity for the war against England and America.

The successor of von Tirpitz was Admiral von Holtzendorff, whosebrother is Ballin's right hand man in the management of the HamburgAmerican Line. Because of the more reasonable influence andsurroundings of von Holtzendorff, I regarded his appointment asa help towards peaceful relations between Germany and America.

I have told in another chapter how the Emperor had refused toreceive me as Ambassador of a country which was supplying munitionsto the Allies.

From time to time since I learned of this in March, 1915, I keptinsisting upon my right as Ambassador to be received by the Emperor;and finally early in October, 1915, wrote the following letterto the Chancellor:

"Your Excellency:

Some time ago I requested you to arrange an audience for me with his majesty.

Please take no further trouble about this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES W. GERARD."

This seemed to have the desired effect. I was informed that Iwould be received by the Emperor in the new palace at Potsdamon October twenty-second. He was then to pay a flying visit toBerlin to receive the new Peruvian Minister and one or two others.We went down in the train to Potsdam, von Jagow accompanying us,in the morning; and it was arranged that we should return onthe train leaving Potsdam a little after one o'clock. I thinkthat the authorities of the palace expected that I would be withthe Emperor for a few minutes only, as when I was shown into theroom where he was, a large room opening from the famous shellhall of the palace, the Peruvian Minister and the others to bereceived were standing waiting in that hall.

The Emperor was alone in the room and no one was present at ourinterview. He was dressed in a Hussar uniform of the new fieldgrey, the parade uniform of which the frogs and trimmings wereof gold. A large table in the corner of the room was coveredwith maps, compasses, scales and rulers; and looked as if theEmperor there, in company with some of his aides, or possiblythe chief of staff, had been working out the plan of campaignof the German armies.

The Emperor was standing; so, naturally, I stood also; and, accordingto his habit, which is quite Rooseveltian, he stood very close tome and talked very earnestly. I was fortunately able to clearup two distinct points which he had against America.

The Emperor said that he had read in a German paper that a numberof submarines built in America for England had crossed the Atlanticto England, escorted by ships of the American Navy. I was, ofcourse, able to deny this ridiculous story at the time and furnishdefinite proofs later. The Emperor complained because a loan toEngland and France had been floated in America. I said that thefirst loan to a belligerent floated in America was a loan toGermany. The Emperor sent for some of his staff and immediatelyinquired into the matter. The members of the staff confirmed mystatement. The Emperor said that he would not have permittedthe torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ if he had known, and thatno gentleman would kill so many women and children. He showed,however, great bitterness against the United States and repeatedlysaid, "America had better look out after this war:" and "I shallstand no nonsense from America after the war."

The interview lasted about an hour and a quarter, and when I finallyemerged from the room the officers of the Emperor's household werein such a state of agitation that I feel sure they must havethought that something fearful had occurred. As I walked rapidlytowards the door of the palace in order to take the carriage whichwas to drive me to the train, one of them walked along besideme saying, "Is it all right? Is it all right?"

The unfortunate diplomats who were to have been received andwho had been standing all this time outside the door waiting foran audience missed their train and their luncheon.

At this interview, the Emperor looked very careworn and seemednervous. When I next saw him, however, which was not until theend of April, 1916, he was in much better condition.

I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous part of this interview,on account of the many spies not only in my own Embassy but alsoin the State Department, that I sent but a very few words in aroundabout way by courier direct to the President.

The year, 1916, opened with this great question still unsettledand, in effect, Germany gave notice that after March first, 1916,the German submarines would sink all armed merchantmen of theenemies of Germany without warning. It is not my place here togo into the agitation of this question in America or into thehistory of the votes in Congress, which in fact upheld the policyof the President. A proposal as to armed merchantmen was issued byour State Department and the position taken in this was apparentlyabandoned at the time of the settlement of the _Sussex_ caseto which I now refer.

In the latter half of March, 1916, a number of boats having Americanson board were torpedoed without warning. These boats were the_Eaglejoint_, the _Englishman_, the _Manchester_Engineer_ and the_Sussex_. One American was killed or drowned on the _Englishman_,but the issue finally came to a head over the torpedoing of thechannel passenger boat, _Sussex_ which carried passengers betweenFolkstone and Dieppe, France.

On March twenty-fourth the _Sussex_ was torpedoed near thecoast of France. Four hundred and thirty-six persons, of whomseventy-five were Americans, were on board. The captain and anumber of the passengers saw the torpedo and an endeavour wasmade to avoid it. After the boat was struck the many passengerstook to the boats. Three Americans were injured and over fortypersons lost their lives, although the boat was not sunk butwas towed to Boulogne.

I was instructed to inquire from the German Government as towhether a German submarine had sunk the _Sussex_. The ForeignOffice finally, at my repeated request, called on the Admiraltyfor a report of the torpedoing of the _Sussex_; and finallyon the tenth of April the German Note was delivered to me. In themeantime, and before the delivery of this Note I had been assuredagain and again that the _Sussex_ had not been torpedoed bya German submarine. In this Note a rough sketch was enclosed,said to have been made by the officer commanding the submarine, ofa vessel which he admitted he had torpedoed, in the same localitywhere the _Sussex_ had been attacked and at about the sametime of day. It was said that this boat which was torpedoed wasa mine layer of the recently built _Arabic_ class and that agreat explosion which was observed to occur in the torpedoed shipwarranted the certain conclusion that great amounts of munitionswere on board. The Note concluded: "The German Government musttherefore assume that injury to the _Sussex_ was attributableto another cause than attack by a German submarine." The Notecontained an offer to submit any difference of opinion that mightdevelop to be investigated by a mixed commission in accordancewith the Hague Convention of 1907. The _Englishman_ andthe _Eaglepoint_, it was claimed, were attacked by Germansubmarines only after they had attempted to escape, and anexplanation was given as to the _Manchester_Engineer_. Withreference to the _Sussex_, the note continued: "Should theAmerican Government have at its disposal other material at theconclusion of the case of the _Sussex_, the German Governmentwould ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this materialalso to investigation."

In the meantime, American naval officers, etc., had been engagedin collecting facts as to the sinking of the _Sussex_, andthis evidence, which seemed overwhelming and, in connection withthe admissions in the German note, absolutely conclusive, wasincorporated in the note sent to Germany in which Germany wasnotified: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediatelydeclare and effect abandonment of this present method of submarinewarfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, theGovernment of the United States can have no choice but to severdiplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

The issue was now clearly defined.

I have already spoken of the fact that for a long time there hadbeen growing up two parties in Germany. One party headed by vonTirpitz in favour of what the Germans called _rucksichtloser_,or ruthless submarine war, in which all enemy merchant shipswere to be sunk without warning, and the party then headed bythe Chancellor which desired to avoid a conflict with Americaon this issue.

As I have explained in a former chapter, the military have alwaysclaimed to take a hand in shaping the destinies and foreign policiesof Germany. When the Germans began to turn their attention to thecreation of a fleet, von Tirpitz was the man who, in a sense,became the leader of the movement and, therefore, the creator ofthe modern navy of Germany. A skilful politician, he for yearsdominated the Reichstag and on the question of submarine warfarewas most efficiently seconded by the efforts of the Navy League,an organization having perhaps one million members throughoutGermany. Although only one of the three heads of the navy (hewas Secretary of the Navy), by the force of his personality, bythe political position which he had created for himself, and bythe backing of his friends in the Navy League he really dominatedthe other two departments of the navy, the Marine Staff and theMarine Cabinet.

Like most Germans of the ruling class, ambition is his only passion.These Spartans do not care either for money or for the luxurywhich it brings. Their life is on very simple lines, both inthe Army and Navy, in order that the officers shall not vie withone another in expenditure, and in order that the poorer officersand their wives shall not be subject to the humiliation whichwould be caused if they had to live in constant contact withbrother officers living on a more luxurious footing.

Von Tirpitz' ambition undoubtedly led him to consider himselfas a promising candidate for Bethmann-Hollweg's shoes. The wholesubmarine issue, therefore, became not only a question of militaryexpediency and a question for the Foreign Office to decide inconnection with the relations of America to Germany, but also aquestion of internal politics, a means of forcing the Chancellorout of office. The advocates for the ruthless war were drawn fromthe Navy and from the Army, and those who believed in the useof any means of offence against their enemies and particularlyin the use of any means that would stop the shipment of munitionsof war to the Allies. The Army and the Navy were joined by theConservatives and by all those who hoped for the fall of theChancellor. The conservative newspapers, and even the Roman Catholicnewspapers were violent in their call for ruthless submarine waras well as violent in their denunciations of the United Statesof America.

American passengers on merchant ships of the enemy were called_Schutzengel_ (guardian angels), and caricatures were published,such as one which showed the mate reporting to the Captain ofan English boat that everything was in readiness for sailingand the Captain's inquiry, "Are you sure that the American_Schutzengel_ is on board?" The numerous notes sent by Americato Germany also formed a frequent subject of caricature and Iremember particularly one quite clever one in the paper called_Brummer_, representing the celebrations in a German porton the arrival of the one hundredth note from America when theMayor of the town and the military, flower girls and singingsocieties and _Turnverein_ were drawn up in welcoming array.

The liberal papers were inclined to support the Chancellor inhis apparent intention to avoid an open break with America. Buteven the liberal papers were not very strong in their stand.

The military, of course, absolutely despised America and claimedthat America could do no more harm by declaring war than it wasdoing then to Germany; and that possibly the war preparationsof America might cut down the amount of the munitions availablefor export to the enemies of the Empire. As to anything thatAmerica could do in a military way, the Navy and the Army wereunanimous in saying that as a military or naval factor the UnitedStates might be considered as less than nothing. This was thesituation when the last _Sussex_ Note of America broughtmatters to a crisis, and even the crisis itself was considereda farce as it had been simmering for so long a period.