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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 016962
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS)
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PKPRELPGOVKTERPINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (2): THE GRIEVANCES
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349
¶B. ISLAMABAD 16269
¶C. ISLAMABAD 16944
ISLAMABAD 00016962 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. While the Government of Pakistan (GOP)
undertakes projects to develop Balochistan, in part to turn
the province into a transit point linking Pakistan to western
Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, it faces a
distrustful and resentful provincial population. This
wariness and antipathy extends beyond the handful of Baloch
tribal leaders prone to insurrection. The province welcomes
development, but is skeptical about who it will benefit.
There is a widespread feeling that GOP action in Balochistan
is geared toward benefiting Punjab and Sindh provinces, not
Balochistan. This cable on the politics of Balochistan is the
second in a series on the province--septel will look at the
tribal uprising led by Nawab Bugti in the Dera Bugti and
Kohlu districts. (Note: This cable was drafted prior to the
reported death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26 (Ref
C). End note.) End summary.
¶2. (U) GOP-planned "mega projects"--such as the expansion of
the port at Gwadar (Ref B)--have re-ignited Baloch
nationalist anger toward Islamabad. Even provincial members
of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which is the leading
coalition partner in governments at both the national and
provincial levels, are wary of the proposed development
schemes. According to PML member Rahila Durrani, "We should
get our share of the (natural) gas so that we don't need to
ask the federal government for anything." Similarly, Maulvi
Rehmatullah of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Fazlur Rehman
Faction (JUI-F) said that locals should receive priority in
hiring at these projects and receive an education that
prepares them for those jobs.
¶3. (U) According to nationalist leader and former provincial
chief minister Akhtar Mengal, the Baloch are very skeptical
that they will get anything out of oil and gas projects--such
as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline. He
warned that such pipelines and other projects would not be
secure until local people reaped the benefits of development.
Nationalist Shahid Hassan Bugti of the Jamhoori Watan Party
(JWP), said, the Baloch have "a lot of bitter experience"
from the government's exploitation of the Sui gas fields,
leading to the conclusion that there is "strong
centralization and not much consulting" in government
decisionmaking.
------------------------
What do the Baloch Want?
------------------------
¶4. (U) Quite simply, the Baloch want greater autonomy within
Pakistan. Shahid Bugti, a son-in-law of insurgent leader
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (Ref C), said the current struggle is
for "our economic and political rights," not independence.
Baloch nationalists accuse Punjab Province of treating
Balochistan like a colony. Dr. Hayee Baloch, a nationalist
political leader from the Makran Coast, told poloff that the
Baloch feel like "third rate" citizens in their own province
and have "zero" influence in the policymaking.
¶5. (U) The people of the province want "a fair share" of
revenues generated by the mines and gas fields in the
province. Shahid Bugti claimed that, in 1990, the GOP owed
Balochistan 600 million rupees (USD 10 million at today's
exchange rate) in back royalties from the Sui gas fields
alone; today the figure stands at 1 billion rupees (USD 16.7
million).
¶6. (U) Balochistan residents criticize the federal government
for the lack of educational institutions in the province that
ISLAMABAD 00016962 002 OF 002
could prepare people for the skilled jobs available in the
current development projects. In August 2006, local political
officials in Gwadar told the Ambassador (Ref B) that their
district needs better schools, including a new technical high
school or college, so that their children could compete for
jobs in the port.
¶7. (U) Residents hope that development benefits them, but
there is a common fear among the people of
Balochistan--Baloch and Pashtun alike--that the development
projects will act as magnets for settlers from Punjab and
Sindh, tipping the province's demographic balance. Baloch
nationalists argue that settlers should not be allowed to
vote until they had lived in the province for 15 years, and
that there should be restrictions on outsiders buying land in
Balochistan. Nationalists cite the experience of the Dera
Bugti district which experienced an influx of outsiders who
took jobs away from locals after natural gas was discovered
in Sui in the 1950s.
-------------------------
Extra-judicial Detentions
-------------------------
¶8. (C) A growing source of anger among the Baloch is the
GOP's extra-judicial detention of political opponents. Many
in the province suspect GOP security agencies such as
Military Intelligence (MI), which overseas security
operations in the province, and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), of spiriting away political activists. In
early August 2006, these disappearances became a focal point
during a national parliamentary debate, with a rush of
editorials entitled "Those Who Vanished" and "These
Mysterious 'Disappearances.'" Shahzada Zulfiqar,
correspondent for The Nation newspaper in Quetta, described
these "extra-judicial abductions (as) multiplying hatred
against the state and the army."
-----------------------------------------
India's Suspected Meddling in Balochistan
-----------------------------------------
¶9. (U) Islamabad has become increasingly agitated at India's
growing influence in Afghanistan, and has hinted that New
Delhi has a hand in Baloch unrest. Senior military officers
are convinced that India has nine-to-twelve consulates along
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. (Note: In fact, India has an
embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan. End note.) In a
speech to the nation on July 20, President Musharraf said the
Baloch were receiving weapons from "external sources." And on
July 26, the State Minister for Information said publicly
that the GOP has was evidence of foreign involvement in
subversive activity in Balochistan, noting the proximity of
Indian consulates in Zahedan, Iran, and Qandahar, Afghanistan.
-------
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) The issue for Balochistan today is increased
provincial autonomy to ensure that the province is the main
beneficiary of development projects. For the GOP, which wants
to develop the province as an anchor for regional trade,
extending central government control and suppressing
rebellious tribal militants is the first order of business.
Fueling the calls for autonomy and control over Balochistan's
mineral wealth, is a belief that the province would take in
more than enough revenues from its gold and copper mines, its
coal and natural gas fields to develop the province and
provide for the native population. End comment.
BODDE