Not sure why it was necessary to take up space with M2 .50cal specs. The only relevant spec to this discussion is that fact that it was an air-cooled machine gun, not water-cooled at all. So the story about using pee for water-cooling makes no sense at all. BTW, M2 .50cal was introduced into US service only in the 1920's, so it was quite improbable to have been purchased by Peking government in 1917.

The New 74th Division was certainly one of the top KMT divisions, regardless whether it was part of Y-Force or not. Over-confidence was a major contributor to its down fall. Not sure why the American lend-lease 155mm to soviets was even relevant to this discussion. None of them were used at MengLiangGu; plenty were probably used by the Communists at JinZhou. The real question there is how did KMT troops allow LinBiao to line up over a thousand field pieces in an open field when the KMT airforce had absolute air superiority. Where was the scouting and reconnasance work that one would normally expect? The Soviets received the 155mm through Lend-lease because they were facing German 15cm field pieces (and Hummel, the self-propelled version). Soviets probably tried to get rid of them because their domestic manufacture in the 6" range was the 152mm; most armies were streamlining ammo logistics after the war, with one uniform size in the 4" range, and one uniform size in the 6" range; CKS/KMT advance into Manchuria and whipping of public hysteria against soviets gave the perfect reason for the soviets to give those weapons to the communists. Americans did have a habit of giving allies (including KMT) only the 105mm instead of the 155mm under normal circumstances; the French found that out the hard way at DienBienFu.

The 1938 XuZhou Campaign involved 60+ divisions on the KMT side (and 8 divisions on the Japanese side). It was an army-group level engagement, much much (an order of maganitute) larger than the Division/Corps level engagement at MengLiangGu. It's quite understandable to have women aux at army-group level, especially since the army-group was being engaged in its own base area by advancing enemy. However, at the Division/Corps level on a forward deploymeb/attack like at MengLiangGu, it makes little sense to have women there. The single woman description makes it even more suspect. How was she housed the night before? With whom did she share a foxhole?

I was researching into the 1917 model versus 1921 model, and mistakenly pasted the wrong passage. -Sorry I tended to not look back at what I typed.

I guess I found some info on the equipment of the 74th Corps. (Note I was the only person who made Chinese Army into a Corps, and most of the wiki stuff using the "Corps" designation was a copy and paste of my stuff without giving me the credit.) At http://wenwen.soso.c.../q115736551.htm you will see a list of equipment:

What is shown here is that other than 12 pieces of 105-mm howitzer, some flame thrower, bazuka, most of the stuff were non-American. As I wrote previously, Chinese army reorganized the artillery units by absorbing the Japanese mountain guns which were abundant in supply at the end of the war. The majority of light weapons were Japanese rifles. It is a wonder that the Chinese army were still using the 1917 model for the heavy machine guns - stuff that must be purchased by the Peking government during WWI. In 1930s, Chinese army had a military equipment remodeling, and standardized the rifles and light machine guns on basis of the Czech/German model, and tweaked the gun barrel to have both rifles and machine guns use the same bullets. I am quite surprised to see the 74th Corps had 324 1917 water-cooled heavy machine guns. (It also exhibited an American accusation that Chinese troops treasure weapons so much that rarely did they destroy weapons at defeat - which was true in instances of warlord battles, not Sino-Japanese or CCP-KMT battles.)

I took some time reading through the History of CBI Theatre, and noted that the 74th Corps was treated as a reserved unit at Kunming, not part of the Y-force for penetration into Burma; however, it was to be part of the 30-division reorganization plan, which never took off since the manpower was never secured and the US supplies were constantly diverted to the airforce, to teh X-force in India, and to the US bomber bases. I checked the page about the supply of light weapons, and noted that the agreement said that China was to supply 74% of the machine guns, while the rest was to be supplied by the US. What happened was that the Comintern agent, Curries, ordered the weapons to be dumped into the Indian Ocean in 1945. There was a memoirs about one army corps using up 2/3rd training ammunition in spring 1945, and then sailed to Manchuria with one third ammunition left, and that could give you a hint as to the American weapons.

I recalled reading in more than a few places about the women soldiers. Wu Lili, who was in 1937 kicked out of Yenan, together with Smedley, was at one time working as a political indoctrination worker in Hu Zongnan's army. The practice of having women work in the army had its history in the northern expedition time period. Chiang, in 1945, adopted Wedemeyer's advice in kicking out political workers, but two years later, reinstated the political indoctrination department. (CCP had two lines: political commissar, and political director in the army, by the way.)

Now, why we are talking at length about the Menglianggu Battle. It was to clarify the myth about why the KMT lost the battle, and hence lost the country.

I found the following quote to be corroborating what I described about the "Odd Shoe" story. Check out http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=196484051 where you will see a citation that the communist side incurred 60,000 casualties in attacking Mengliangu. And you have the communist general Chen Yi said this:打到激烈时,陈毅亲自抱着电话机对前线的指挥员喊:你们不要怕伤亡,我手里还有十万整训的民兵,你们损失二万,我给你们补充两万.你们部队打光了,我也给你们恢复番号!事后,陈毅也曾感叹,说什么也不让自己的儿子带兵,"打仗真不是人干的事儿!"

I was researching into the 1917 model versus 1921 model, and mistakenly pasted the wrong passage. -Sorry I tended to not look back at what I typed.

No worries. I make typos all the time.

I guess I found some info on the equipment of the 74th Corps. (Note I was the only person who made Chinese Army into a Corps, and most of the wiki stuff using the "Corps" designation was a copy and paste of my stuff without giving me the credit.)

It's a common practice when translating Soviet/Russian, Japanese and Chinese units. They all had "army" directly above divisions, often triangular. Ironically, the western armies are lately skipping "corps" too,

What is shown here is that other than 12 pieces of 105-mm howitzer, some flame thrower, bazuka, most of the stuff were non-American. As I wrote previously, Chinese army reorganized the artillery units by absorbing the Japanese mountain guns which were abundant in supply at the end of the war. The majority of light weapons were Japanese rifles.

The list above is actually quite indicative of American equipment acquired during or after WWII, not Japanese or German. German bullets would have been 7.92mm, and Japanese bullets would be either 6.5mm or 7.7mm. 7.62mm cartridge is quite indicative of the standard American 0.30cal weapons. Japanese infantry-guns (artilleries) would have been 70mm and 100mm, not 75 and 105. The three motar sizes mentioned were also typical American equipment; Japanese used 50mm "knee motar" grenade launchers. IIRC, the 4.2" motar was introduced into US service only after 1943.

BTW, the use of the term "Canadian Sterling Carbine" indicates the the document was written in the 1950's if not later. Sterling Carbine was not introduced into British service until the mid-1950's; its predecessor, the Sten sub-machine gun was made during WWII and very popular among Israelis who fought their war of independence in 1948.

It is a wonder that the Chinese army were still using the 1917 model for the heavy machine guns - stuff that must be purchased by the Peking government during WWI. In 1930s, Chinese army had a military equipment remodeling, and standardized the rifles and light machine guns on basis of the Czech/German model, and tweaked the gun barrel to have both rifles and machine guns use the same bullets. I am quite surprised to see the 74th Corps had 324 1917 water-cooled heavy machine guns. (It also exhibited an American accusation that Chinese troops treasure weapons so much that rarely did they destroy weapons at defeat - which was true in instances of warlord battles, not Sino-Japanese or CCP-KMT battles.)

Browning only showed his M1917 prototype to the US Congress in 1917. I don't think the Beijing government could have bought the cutting-edge technology at the time as the US was gearing itself up to enter WWI. By post-WWII, however, M1917 was quite obsolete, superseded by M1919 air-cooled versions that were much lighter to deploy. There was a very significant difference between even M1917 and Maxim: the Maxim required a constant feeding of fresh water, whereas the Browning M1917 did not. In 1917 Browning's demo for the Congress was about continuous firing for hours of his prototype gun shooting off tens of thousands of rounds without overheating or jamming, showing off just how superior his gun was compared to the then prevalent Maxim machin guns. So even if the New 74th was using M1917, there was little reason to pour pee into the water jacket; they were not the "thirsty" Maxims. Besides, according to the list above, those water-cooled weapons accounted for a very small proportion (less than 10%) of all automatic rapid-fire infantry weapons in that division.

I took some time reading through the History of CBI Theatre, and noted that the 74th Corps was treated as a reserved unit at Kunming, not part of the Y-force for penetration into Burma; however, it was to be part of the 30-division reorganization plan, which never took off since the manpower was never secured and the US supplies were constantly diverted to the airforce, to teh X-force in India, and to the US bomber bases. I checked the page about the supply of light weapons, and noted that the agreement said that China was to supply 74% of the machine guns, while the rest was to be supplied by the US. What happened was that the Comintern agent, Curries, ordered the weapons to be dumped into the Indian Ocean in 1945. There was a memoirs about one army corps using up 2/3rd training ammunition in spring 1945, and then sailed to Manchuria with one third ammunition left, and that could give you a hint as to the American weapons.

Whatever the case with other KMT divisions, the New 74th was quite adequately equipped with American-made crew-serviced weapons based on the list above. Still lacking the 155mm howitzer, but the 12-36 combination between 105 and 75 is very reminiscent of typical American divisions; I suppose the relatively light howitzer pieces are made up by the enormous number of mortars, not a bad choice given the relative lack of motorized transportation and abundance of men.

The ammo issue is a chronic problem with armies in bureaucratic countries. The desk jockeys have a tendency to forget that weapons are useless without ammo. It's rather silly for CKS/KMT to launch the unification war without securing domestic production of ammo first. The high rate of fire (and associated reliability) was what made the American weapons powerful. They are useless without a robust ammo supply.

I recalled reading in more than a few places about the women soldiers. Wu Lili, who was in 1937 kicked out of Yenan, together with Smedley, was at one time working as a political indoctrination worker in Hu Zongnan's army. The practice of having women work in the army had its history in the northern expedition time period. Chiang, in 1945, adopted Wedemeyer's advice in kicking out political workers, but two years later, reinstated the political indoctrination department. (CCP had two lines: political commissar, and political director in the army, by the way.)

Yes, women aux at the army group level was quite common, but not at the forward division level as they were pursuing enemy into battle.

Now, why we are talking at length about the Menglianggu Battle. It was to clarify the myth about why the KMT lost the battle, and hence lost the country.

I found the following quote to be corroborating what I described about the "Odd Shoe" story. Check out http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=196484051 where you will see a citation that the communist side incurred 60,000 casualties in attacking Mengliangu. And you have the communist general Chen Yi said this:打到激烈时,陈毅亲自抱着电话机对前线的指挥员喊:你们不要怕伤亡,我手里还有十万整训的民兵,你们损失二万,我给你们补充两万.你们部队打光了,我也给你们恢复番号!事后,陈毅也曾感叹,说什么也不让自己的儿子带兵,"打仗真不是人干的事儿!"

It doesn't change the fact that one of the very top KMT divisions, with 30,000 men, held out for only 4 days! They did not secure their own water supply, did not secure adequate perimeter defense or scout adequately and did not hole themselves up and force the reds to dig them out one by one. A unit that size should be able to hold out for weeks if not more than a month. The rescue units would have been able to reach them if they had held out for a week or two. The whole point of divisional organization is for individual divisions to be able to hold out for extended period of time under adverse conditions (because defense is usually less costly than attack), so friendly forces can have time to organize and punch in with force, instead of being tossed into a rescue attempt piece-meal. Like I said before, comparable sized encirclement battles, like Velikiye Luki lasted a month and a half.

Rapid collapse (either due to men giving up or men using suicidal tactics, usually a combination of both, by different men in the same units) was a common phenomenom among KMT units during 1947-49; especially astonishing when that happened to the top elite units.

It's a common practice when translating Soviet/Russian, Japanese and Chinese units. They all had "army" directly above divisions, often triangular. Ironically, the western armies are lately skipping "corps" too,

The list above is actually quite indicative of American equipment acquired during or after WWII, not Japanese or German. German bullets would have been 7.92mm, and Japanese bullets would be either 6.5mm or 7.7mm. 7.62mm cartridge is quite indicative of the standard American 0.30cal weapons. Japanese infantry-guns (artilleries) would have been 70mm and 100mm, not 75 and 105. The three motar sizes mentioned were also typical American equipment; Japanese used 50mm "knee motar" grenade launchers. IIRC, the 4.2" motar was introduced into US service only after 1943.

BTW, the use of the term "Canadian Sterling Carbine" indicates the the document was written in the 1950's if not later. Sterling Carbine was not introduced into British service until the mid-1950's; its predecessor, the Sten sub-machine gun was made during WWII and very popular among Israelis who fought their war of independence in 1948.

Browning only showed his M1917 prototype to the US Congress in 1917. I don't think the Beijing government could have bought the cutting-edge technology at the time as the US was gearing itself up to enter WWI. By post-WWII, however, M1917 was quite obsolete, superseded by M1919 air-cooled versions that were much lighter to deploy. There was a very significant difference between even M1917 and Maxim: the Maxim required a constant feeding of fresh water, whereas the Browning M1917 did not. In 1917 Browning's demo for the Congress was about continuous firing for hours of his prototype gun shooting off tens of thousands of rounds without overheating or jamming, showing off just how superior his gun was compared to the then prevalent Maxim machin guns. So even if the New 74th was using M1917, there was little reason to pour pee into the water jacket; they were not the "thirsty" Maxims. Besides, according to the list above, those water-cooled weapons accounted for a very small proportion (less than 10%) of all automatic rapid-fire infantry weapons in that division.

Whatever the case with other KMT divisions, the New 74th was quite adequately equipped with American-made crew-serviced weapons based on the list above. Still lacking the 155mm howitzer, but the 12-36 combination between 105 and 75 is very reminiscent of typical American divisions; I suppose the relatively light howitzer pieces are made up by the enormous number of mortars, not a bad choice given the relative lack of motorized transportation and abundance of men.

The ammo issue is a chronic problem with armies in bureaucratic countries. The desk jockeys have a tendency to forget that weapons are useless without ammo. It's rather silly for CKS/KMT to launch the unification war without securing domestic production of ammo first. The high rate of fire (and associated reliability) was what made the American weapons powerful. They are useless without a robust ammo supply.

Yes, women aux at the army group level was quite common, but not at the forward division level as they were pursuing enemy into battle.

It doesn't change the fact that one of the very top KMT divisions, with 30,000 men, held out for only 4 days! They did not secure their own water supply, did not secure adequate perimeter defense or scout adequately and did not hole themselves up and force the reds to dig them out one by one. A unit that size should be able to hold out for weeks if not more than a month. The rescue units would have been able to reach them if they had held out for a week or two. The whole point of divisional organization is for individual divisions to be able to hold out for extended period of time under adverse conditions (because defense is usually less costly than attack), so friendly forces can have time to organize and punch in with force, instead of being tossed into a rescue attempt piece-meal. Like I said before, comparable sized encirclement battles, like Velikiye Luki lasted a month and a half.

Rapid collapse (either due to men giving up or men using suicidal tactics, usually a combination of both, by different men in the same units) was a common phenomenom among KMT units during 1947-49; especially astonishing when that happened to the top elite units.

For an army corps of 30,000+ people, about two thirds were infantry men with weapons. This means at minimum 20,000 rifles were needed. In comparison with limited number of Thompson guns and Springfield guns, you could see the majority of rifles were non-American, but Chiang Kai-shek Model or Japanese rifles.

About the Menglianggu Battle. I had written a few paragraphs about it 4 years ago. Maybe it will help you to figure out how the elite troops were destroyed.

Mao Sen, responsible for monitoring the morale of the Nationalist armies, had paid several visits to Zhang Lingfu. Mao Sen, in recollections while staying in HK dozen years later, had commented that Nanking had ignored the status passed on by Tang Enbo, and further pointed out that some people had said that it was the 3rd Division Head [Liu Fei] of the Defense Department who had ordered Zhang Lingfu to death.

When Zhang Lingfu was ordered to cross the Wen-shui River for attacking Danbu, a town across the Jiehu Lake to the northeast, he complained to Mao Sen that someone wanted him dead. Mao Sen did not see the full order of Menglianggu Campaign till the eve. Days earlier, Mao Sen had arrested quite some plaincoated people in the caves near Menglianggu. Having inspected the surroundings, Mao Sen determined that the road to Danbu was too capricious for Zhang Lingfu to take since there was no way to pull heavy cannons across the mountain roads, not to mention chisel or dig holdouts on the way. The Defense Department, however, further ordered that Li Tianxia, who was to the southwest of Mt Menglianggu, be the direct cover for Zhang Lingfu while Zhang Fu's Guangxi Province Army traveled 40 kilometers to Jiehu Lake direction as rightside cover from Tangdouzhen near Linyi, while Huang Baitao go to northern Yaoxu from Mengyin as leftside cover.

Knowing that 200000 Communist troops were lurking in Danbu area, Mao Sen immediately told Tang Enbo that Li Tianxia definitely could not cross the mountain to lend any aid to Zhang Lingfu whereas Huang Baitao, risking the loss of Mengyin, might not be able to penetrate the deep valley road from Mengyin to Taoxu to Duozhang. Tang Enbo immediately called Liu Fei at the Defense Department. Liu Fei replied that Chiang Kai-shek had already slept. Tang Enbo then called Gu Zhutong in Xuzhou. Gu Zhutong replied that Nanking's orders had been relayed to division level and everybody just followed order in the morning. Tang Enbo, deeply worried about the situation, sent Mao Sen and deputy commander Li Yannian to the front. At dawn, Mao and Li rode on two trucks for Zhang Lingfu's troops. At the Y-shaped intersection at Duozhuang, Mao Sen made a phonecall to Zhang Lingfu who informed him that he was already ambushed by the Communist troops while crossing Wen-shui River and that about ten Communist "zong dui" were encircling him, with one Communist prong going straight towards Duozhuang. Zhang Lingfu told Mao & Li to vacate Duozhuang immediately or converge towards him should Communist troops cut off the return path at Duozhuang.

On Shandong Peninsula, CCP Eastern China Field Army (i.e., original New Fourth Army under Commander Chen Yi), headed by Su Yu, launched an elimination campaign against Zhang Lingfu's 74th Division with advance information from both spies inside of Nationalist government Defense Department and on the ground. Five "zong dui" were to lay siege of Zhang Lingfu, while another four "zong dui" were to impede the Nationalist government relief at Duozhuang. Zhang Lingfu was attacked right after he began to cross the Wen-shui River. On May 14th, Su Yu forced Zhang Lingfu onto Mt Menglianggu. Zhang Lingfu, while defending on the barren mountains, also suggested that Nationalist government armies converge upon Mt Menglianggu for a counter-encirclement. On May 15th, Li Tianxi and Huang Baitao still failed to get close to Zhang Lingfu. At 1:00 pm, on May 15th, Communist forces launched a general attack. Communist mortar caused heavy casualties onto 74th Division with shrapnel and flying stones, while Zhang Lingfu's cannon-pulling horses ran loose. Almost every hilltops changed hands numerous times. By the afternoon of 16th, Zhang Lingfu's remnants had held out on few hilltops. Communists, claiming a force of 100,000, totally destroyed 32,000 Government troops. Zhang Lingfu, Cai Renjie and Lu Xing committed suicide. Communist general Pi Dingjun was said to have buried Zhang Lingfu in a coffin.

Mao Sen, in his recollections, pointed out that Zhang Lingfu had replenished his troops with few thousand Communist soldiers who had turned their guns at the Battle of Menglianggu in May 1947.

(Mao Sen was head of the political indoctrination work embedded with the army.)

For an army corps of 30,000+ people, about two thirds were infantry men with weapons. This means at minimum 20,000 rifles were needed. In comparison with limited number of Thompson guns and Springfield guns, you could see the majority of rifles were non-American, but Chiang Kai-shek Model or Japanese rifles.

I doubt that's the case. A late WWII US infantry division of 15000 men only had less than 3500 riflemen (using both rifles and SMGs like the Thompson): a battalion had about 324 riflemen from its 9 platoons, and there were the equivalent of 10 battalions of infantry in a division (9 from the 3 regiments plus a recon batt). The rest of the personnel were supposed to handle all the crew serviced weapons such as artileries and machine guns, as well as signal, logistics and etc.. Crew serviced weapons accounted for the overwhelming majority of casualties inflicted on the enemy during WWII and WWI (and wars since then). I doubt there were many if any German Maussers or Japanese Arisakas used by the 74th at the battle (aside from possible odd personal trophy possessions and memorabilia). Supplying German 7.92mm and Japanese 6.5mm bullets in addition to the American 7.62 rifle and 9mm SMG/pistol rounds would make logistics unnecessarily complicated.

Regarding communist infiltration, CKS' habit of giving detailed orders and moving units on 1:1,000,000 maps (often with many cartographic errors) made the KMT chain of command especially vulnerable. It's akin to having the code broken by enemy, which was a common occurrence among most WWII antagonists. Giving local commanders initiative and freedom of action would have alleviated the problem, improved signal security, and allowed units respond to changing realities on the ground much more quickly. The hubris/pretense of control from high above was the reason behind many historical Chinese military debacles.

Regarding tactics, recapturing lost hilltops should not even have been a tactical priority because such a counter-attack would only deplete infantry quickly. Defense should have been focused on digging in, and defense in depth, not counter-attacks. The goal should have been hunkering down and and running up the kill ratio, slowly grinding down the attackers while waiting for rescue. On the operational level, the initial decision was wrong to stay on the hill before the trap was closed; aggressive scouting should have revealed the lack of drinking water source. After the trap was closed, given the force ratio, the unit should not have tried breaking out on its own; that operation only served to burn up available infantry. Simple math comparing exposed cross-sections dictated that hunkering down engaging in dogged defense would work out much better than exposing oneself in counter-attacks or attacks on a battlefield dominated by automatic weapons.

Very simple answer. Because only the Communist Party truly represented the interests of the vast majority of Chinese people. Only the Communist Party took a consistent stand against foriegn occupation and local exploitation. The Chinese people could see for themselves in the words and deeds of communists that Socialism is the only way forward. It was that or Jiang's feudal fascism.

Very simple answer. Because only the Communist Party truly represented the interests of the vast majority of Chinese people. Only the Communist Party took a consistent stand against foriegn occupation and local exploitation. The Chinese people could see for themselves in the words and deeds of communists that Socialism is the only way forward. It was that or Jiang's feudal fascism.

What doomed China was the Yalta Betrayal, which was not merely a Roosevelt mistake, but the result of the collusion between the Communists and the Imperialists, i.e., Stalin and Churchill. While Churchill's motivation was to make sure China would not emerge strong to challenge the British colony of H.K., Stalin's design was to control China's northern belt, i.e., Chinese Turkestan, Inner and Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. In other threads, I repeatedly delved into George Marshall's scheme to see how the Soviet spies in Roosevelt and Truman's administrations sabotaged the Republic of China.

The Soviet scheme against the Republic of China began in early 1920s, i.e., at the time the U.S. and European countries convened the Washington Conference to appease the Soviet Union, i.e., forcing Japan into withdrawing from the Soviet Far East, cutting off aid to the Russian White Army, and etc, while imposing a 10-year arms embargo against China on the pretense that no power should inflate China's civil wars by selling the WWI-era surplus weapons. All the while, the Soviet spies began the instigation against China, recruiting majority of the American Communist Party leaders while those Americans stayed in China and Peking, not to mention Li Dazhao personally recruiting thousands of Chinese spies who later entered the service of the Soviet G.R.U.

Very simple answer. Because only the Communist Party truly represented the interests of the vast majority of Chinese people. Only the Communist Party took a consistent stand against foriegn occupation and local exploitation. The Chinese people could see for themselves in the words and deeds of communists that Socialism is the only way forward. It was that or Jiang's feudal fascism.

To see this in another light, keep in mind that the vast majority of Chinese people back then were peasants who owned little land and had to work on the land rented from landlords and pay the landloards a large amount of the harvest as rent. In good years, they might be able to scrape by; in bad years, their lives took a nose dive. CCP implemented land reform in the areas under their control by distributing the land more evenly. Overjoyed at their newfound land that they wouldn't have dreamed of, these peasants and their families were the backbone of CCP fight against KMT. They fought courageously, not so much for communism, which was too far-reached an idea for most of them, but rather, for their land, which they were certain, as they had seen before, would be taken away from them if the KMT-supported landlords were ever allowed to come back. This is also why a large number of KMT POWs were easily converted to PLA, because most of them were peasants themselves.

To see this in another light, keep in mind that the vast majority of Chinese people back then were peasants who owned little land and had to work on the land rented from landlords and pay the landloards a large amount of the harvest as rent. In good years, they might be able to scrape by; in bad years, their lives took a nose dive. CCP implemented land reform in the areas under their control by distributing the land more evenly. Overjoyed at their newfound land that they wouldn't have dreamed of, these peasants and their families were the backbone of CCP fight against KMT. They fought courageously, not so much for communism, which was too far-reached an idea for most of them, but rather, for their land, which they were certain, as they had seen before, would be taken away from them if the KMT-supported landlords were ever allowed to come back. This is also why a large number of KMT POWs were easily converted to PLA, because most of them were peasants themselves.

Suggest that you spend sometime reading the posts on this thread before throwing out the "people's support" theory. The communist revolution succeeded on the back of the Soviet artilleries. Communist general Su Yu had a memoirs, and he boasted of his communist army having more artillery and shells than the government troops, all shipped over across the sea from Korea and the Soviet ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Soviet artillery blanket-blasted the government troops at the Huai-hai Campaign, and 900 Soviet artillery blasted Jinzhou to pieces, and took down Taiyuan, for example. Not to mention 250,000 Korean mercenaries fighting on behalf of the Chinese Communists.

Let's go back to the the "people's support" theme. I would ask you to check out the memoirs by Zhang Xiushan, 张秀山著《我的 85 年》，i.e., My Eiught Five Years. The "great, glorious and correct" party had decided to abandon Harbin in spring 1946 when George Marshall saved them. Basically, Lin Biao was telegraphing Mao Tse-tung that he had no soldiers left to defend Harbin, and Mao replied that you Lin Biao had my permission to vacate towards the Soviet border. The so-called crack troops of the 8th Route and New 4th Armies were all spent at the Sipingjie Battle.

Now how did the "great, glorious and correct" party rebuild the army? Initially, pure Korean diehards stayed with them, while all the puppet armies and police, who once were pacified by the communists, defected to the government side. Then Lin Biao was dubious about the "people's support", and he commented “东北人见人很恭顺，简直成了羔羊，太驯服了”，"Northeasters were obedient and very humble, simply became a lamb, too tame." What was his point? Lin Bia was saying the people in Manchuria, after 15 years rule under the Japanese, did not support the communist war. Another memoirs showed what the case was: 在 西满分局工作的张平化（建国后曾任中共湖南省委第一书记、中共中央宣传部部长）搞土改试点时说他在实践中发现东北的农民发动的时候比较难，一旦发动起来就很有战斗力 - Zhang Pinghua said only after the "land reform" , the Northeast farmers, who were difficult to mobilize, started up fighting. So back to the "land reform". What was it? It was to kill the landlords and wealthy peasants, so that the murderers had no choice but to chain them to the war chariots of the communists to become the fodder of war. That's how the people's war was launched into the full swing in 1947 and later. Again on the 'people's support'. When Manchuria people heard about the starving-death of 300,000 at Changchun, everybody packed up and fled south. There were tons of memoirs about this trip south. The same people, like how they did when Japan attacked China, continued to move south to evade the war, and majority of them had to stop at the southeastern Chinese coast for no means to cross the Taiwan straits.

Suggest that you spend sometime reading the posts on this thread before throwing out the "people's support" theory. The communist revolution succeeded on the back of the Soviet artilleries. Communist general Su Yu had a memoirs, and he boasted of his communist army having more artillery and shells than the government troops, all shipped over across the sea from Korea and the Soviet ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Soviet artillery blanket-blasted the government troops at the Huai-hai Campaign, and 900 Soviet artillery blasted Jinzhou to pieces, and took down Taiyuan, for example. Not to mention 250,000 Korean mercenaries fighting on behalf of the Chinese Communists.

Let's go back to the the "people's support" theme. I would ask you to check out the memoirs by Zhang Xiushan, 张秀山著《我的 85 年》，i.e., My Eiught Five Years. The "great, glorious and correct" party had decided to abandon Harbin in spring 1946 when George Marshall saved them. Basically, Lin Biao was telegraphing Mao Tse-tung that he had no soldiers left to defend Harbin, and Mao replied that you Lin Biao had my permission to vacate towards the Soviet border. The so-called crack troops of the 8th Route and New 4th Armies were all spent at the Sipingjie Battle.

Now how did the "great, glorious and correct" party rebuild the army? Initially, pure Korean diehards stayed with them, while all the puppet armies and police, who once were pacified by the communists, defected to the government side. Then Lin Biao was dubious about the "people's support", and he commented “东北人见人很恭顺，简直成了羔羊，太驯服了”，"Northeasters were obedient and very humble, simply became a lamb, too tame." What was his point? Lin Bia was saying the people in Manchuria, after 15 years rule under the Japanese, did not support the communist war. Another memoirs showed what the case was: 在 西满分局工作的张平化（建国后曾任中共湖南省委第一书记、中共中央宣传部部长）搞土改试点时说他在实践中发现东北的农民发动的时候比较难，一旦发动起来就很有战斗力 - Zhang Pinghua said only after the "land reform" , the Northeast farmers, who were difficult to mobilize, started up fighting. So back to the "land reform". What was it? It was to kill the landlords and wealthy peasants, so that the murderers had no choice but to chain them to the war chariots of the communists to become the fodder of war. That's how the people's war was launched into the full swing in 1947 and later. Again on the 'people's support'. When Manchuria people heard about the starving-death of 300,000 at Changchun, everybody packed up and fled south. There were tons of memoirs about this trip south. The same people, like how they did when Japan attacked China, continued to move south to evade the war, and majority of them had to stop at the southeastern Chinese coast for no means to cross the Taiwan straits.

According to an enemy attack posture, June 1, Lin Biao call the CPC Central Committee, made ​​ready to give up ​​Harbin. June 3, Bureau of the CPC Central Committee replied to the Northeast: "agreed to give up Harbin and agree with your plan to be ready for mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare approach" .... ""Liao Shen battle" (below), People's Publishing House, 1988, p. 612.

Communist general Su Yu had a memoirs, and he boasted of his communist army having more artillery and shells than the government troops, all shipped over across the sea from Korea and the Soviet ports of Dairen and Port Arthur.

Exactly where in his memoir did General Su Yu give you the idea that his guns and shells were all shipped across the sea?

Here is what he said about the creation of his Special Forces Column, which consisted of most of his guns and tanks, in his memoir (粟裕回忆录, Chap 12):

January 1947 Battle of Lu Nan, is the second places after the battle of the north, Shandong and central China Field Army Field Army to join the second major battle of annihilation. The campaign, after a two-stage continuous operation, wiped out the KMT army with the mechanical equipment of the United States -- the twenty-sixth division, the fifty-first division and the first rapid column, a total of fifty-three thousand people, capured division commanders Lt General Ma Liwu and Zhou Yuying, and seized a large number of weapons, including twenty-four tanks, two hundred and seventeen howitzers, field artillery, mountain artillery, and other guns, four hundred seventy-four cars. Subsequently, based on the captured equipments, East China Field Army set up its own special forces column.

(Emphasis is mine)

Got it?

So back to the "land reform". What was it? It was to kill the landlords and wealthy peasants, so that the murderers had no choice but to chain them to the war chariots of the communists to become the fodder of war.

Go read Suzanne Pepper's "Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949", which detailed how CCP implemented the land reform. Stop spewing out lies after lies.

January 1947 Battle of Lu Nan, is the second places after the battle of the north, Shandong and central China Field Army Field Army to join the second major battle of annihilation. The campaign, after a two-stage continuous operation, wiped out the KMT army with the mechanical equipment of the United States -- the twenty-sixth division, the fifty-first division and the first rapid column, a total of fifty-three thousand people, capured division commanders Lt General Ma Liwu and Zhou Yuying, and seized a large number of weapons, including twenty-four tanks, two hundred and seventeen howitzers, field artillery, mountain artillery, and other guns, four hundred seventy-four cars. Subsequently, based on the captured equipments, East China Field Army set up its own special forces column.

(Emphasis is mine)

Got it?

Go read Suzanne Pepper's "Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949", which detailed how CCP implemented the land reform. Stop spewing out lies after lies.

About Pepper, we already covered that in following threads:http://www.chinahist...ch/page__st__15maurice meisner, like Suzanne Pepper, were dupes who had no clue about the materials they cited had been written by Comintern agents. They had the chance to examine VENOANA PAPER to revise their views, but they refused to do so, especially so with Peper who published her civil war book without a word's change.http://www.chinahist...d/page__st__105John Service, a faithful follower of Stilwell, had the unbelievably blind faith in Zhou Enlai whom Utley had described as someone with all smiles on face except for the eyes. Fairbank shared the same as Service. The two influenced Suzanne Pepper on the book as to China's civil wars. In 70s, after the divulsion of horrors of the Cultural Revolution, Fairbank was said to have commented that Zhou could "fix all", i.e., the abnormality of CR. Service, in an interview in 90s, still shared the same thoughts as 40s. http://www.chinahist...ommunist-china/Ever since VENONA and Russian archive declassification, the credibility for whatever Fairbank defended was gone completely. The professors you have in those American colleges and universities had problem reconciling themselves. In my opinion, Fairbank and the Old China Hands are finished. It happened that China's Academy of Social Sciences is unfortunately counting on John Fairbank and Owen Lattimore as their last straw today. -- So to say that an academic rebuttal of John Fairbank would be equivalent to rebutting a myth, an ideaology, and an institution.

In a war, you won a battle and lost another one. Nothing determinant. You won't count on some captured guns, without the logistics to supply the shells, to play the role of being the key to the future campaign like Huaihai. Right after the Jan 1947 battle you cited, there were the Battle of Laiwu which the communists won by means of a mole's operation, and the battle of menglianggu which the communists won, and then you had the battles the communists lost:Battle Of NanmaAfter Menglianggu debacle, Chiang Kai-shek asked Deng Wenyi and Huang Jie hold a regiment-level reflection session at Nationalist Central Training School in Nanking. A three-prong Mt Yimengshan Campaign was launched to counter-attack Chen Yi's Communist troops for avenging on Zhang Lingfu's death. Nationalist Army troops, despite two months of rains, continued to engage with and defeated the Communist troops. In mid-July 1947, Chen Yi & Su Yu's Communist troops, taking advantage of Nationalist army relocation, decided to seek out one of the four remaining Nationalist Army reorganized divisions [9th, 11th, 25th & 64th] for an elimination campaign by combining four "zong dui" [2nd, 6th, 7th & 9th], Chen Ruiting's special task "zong dui" [i.e., cannons] and some regiments from Communist Lu-zhong & Bohai military districts in Yishui-Yiyuan-Linqu area. After taking Nanma on July 8th, a city next to the northern bank of Yi-shui River, Hu Lian's Nationalist Army 11th Division was ordered to dig in around the city, construct thousands of block houses and below-ground traffic trenches, and clear out surrounding buildings and crops. By dusk of July 17th, Communist 2nd, 6th & 9th and cannons "zong dui" surrounded Nanma completely. On 21st, knowing the coming relief of Nationalist Army divisions of 5th [Qiu Qingquan], 9th [Wang Lingyun], 25th [Huang Baitao], 64th [Huang Guoliang] and 75th [Shen Chengnian], Hu Lian organized a counter-attack to disrupt the Communist plan of a general attack. At dusk, Su Yu called off the siege of Nanma for a flee towards Linqu. During the Nanma Campaign, Nationalist Army troops inflicted a casualty of 20000 onto the Communist side and caught alive 3000 Communist soldiers.

Battle of LinquWhile the bulk of Nationalist Army troops chased them towards the north, Li Mi's two brigades were ordered to come south from Qingdao-Jinan Railway overnight and hinder the Communist troops by occupying the city of Linqu, a city just to the south of Qingzhou and Qingdao-Jinan Railway. Communist East China Field Army, totaling over 100,000, fought against Li Mi's R8D of about six regiments for the escape path. At Linqu, 3rd Battalion from 308th Regiment of 103rd Brigade, headed by Zhang Dechong, defended Mt Qushan which was to the south of the county capital over the Mi-he River. After round-of-the clock charge on 27th, Communist 19th Division abandoned the Mt Qushan target in lieu of committing the remnant 57th Regiment. Inside of Linqu, 5th Division of Communist 2nd "zong dui" breached into the city. After heavy lane-to-lane fighting for three days and three nights, Communist troops, including 14th Deputy Battalion Chief Song Yannian of Communist 5th Division, surrendered to Li Mi's Nationalist Army 8th Division. Deng Wenyi, via a stop at Weixian, arrived at Linqu by plane to express solicitude to Li Mi's army. Outside of Linqu where thousands of Communist corpses still scattered unburied, Deng Wenyi met with the Nationalist Army troops which came from Mt Yimengshan, and then followed the Nationalist Army troops to the north for one month. Deng Wenyi, after checking with locals, confirmed that Communist troops, having incurred a casualty of over 10,000, had mobilized tens of thousands of shoulder-pole carriers for moving their wounded towards the Yellow River bank for consecutive days. Deng Wenyi suggested to Nanking to have troops continue the push against the Communist troops at the Yellow River bank; however, Nanking never replied to endorse the chase. Chen Yi's Communist troops, other than a portion which fled towards eastern Shandong coast, crossed the Yellow River for an escape. Three months later, with refilled-up rank and file, Chen Yi came back south to harass the Jin-Pu and Long-Hai Railways.

What Deng Wenyi found out was that the communist army spent up to 3-5 days shipping their wounded across the Yellow River while the government troops were ordered to halt the chase at the railway, on apparently the purported order from the General Staff Headquarters, where the communist mole Guo Rugui was in charge.

Now, let's examine Su Yu's memoirs. Su YU pointed out:“我们除了没有飞机外，一切都有，我们的炮兵和坦克比敌人多。在全歼杜聿明集团时，我军炮火便完全压倒敌人。”“我们打杜聿明，几乎用炮火推平村庄，一个村子打几千颗炮弹和成千成万斤炸药。”“华东战场，特别是淮海战役的胜利，离不开山东人民的小推车和大连生产炮弹。”参考文献：罗平汉著《党史细节》Basically, Su Yu said his army wiped out village by village by blanket shelling, thanks to the supply of shells from the Soviet-controlled arsenal at Dairen. Su Yu claimed that they had more tanks and artillery than government troops did. Where the tanks and artillery from? See the Soviet disclosure at http://www.kanzhongguo.com/node/403881 Yang Kuisong was the only guy who described about the supply of weapons from North Korea. Conveniently omitted here was a communist czar sent to Pyongyang for overseeing the military shipments, because this guy was at one time the culprit who killed 200 Red Army officers under Liu Zhidan's Shenxi Red Army in October 1935 and was considered not that 'glorious' - nevertheless he was invited to Mao's marriage banquet at a Yenan trading house while party secretary Zhang Wentian was not invited for the objection to Mao's "marriage" to Jiang Qing. (I talked about him at http://www.chinahist...ch/page__st__15 )

Despite all your rambling on irrelevant issues, you have yet to provide any evidence supporting your assertion that Su Yu's Eastern China Field army relied on Soviet artillery ("Communist general Su Yu had a memoirs, and he boasted of his communist army having more artillery and shells than the government troops, all shipped over across the sea from Korea and the Soviet ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Soviet artillery blanket-blasted the government troops at the Huai-hai Campaign...").

Nowhere in his memoir did Su Yu say anything about Soviet artillery. Quite to the contrary, I provided a quote in previous post stating that his artillery unit was established with the equipments captured from KMT. (No, what you think about it doesn't count as evidence.)

The only quote you supplied that was actually taken from Su Yu's memoir is this:

华东的解放，特别是淮海战役的胜利，离不开山东民工的小推车和大连生产的大炮弹。

Translation: The liberation of Eastern China, especially the victory of Huaihai Campaign, couldn't have been achieved without Shandong peasant-workers' handcarts or Dalian-made big gun shells. (Emphasis is mine.)

You convieniently left out the part about Shandong peasants' contribution because that would spoil your argument against the "people's war", didn't you?

And where does it say "Soviet-controlled arsenal" in the sentence? Talk about "liberal translation" to suit your own agenda!

In fact, if you do a little research, you will find out that CCP had its largest arsenal, called Jianxin Company (建新公司), in Dalian during the civil war. From http://www.chinaneas.../c_13453585.htm (解放战争时期我党最大兵工厂在大连建设始末, or The Whole Story of Building CCP's Largest Arsenal During Liberation War Period),

辽沈战役、淮海战役和孟良崮战役中使用的炸药、炮弹，主要是建新公司生产的。

Translation: The explosives and artillery shells used at Liaoshen Campaign, Huaihai Campaign and Menglianggu Battle were mostly made by Jianxin Company.

This corroborated what Su Yu said in his memoir about the Dalian-made big gun shells. You call this a "Soviet-controlled arsenal"?

Move on to your other sources of so-called "evidences" (assuming the sources are credible for the time being, which actually contain some rather questionable claims, but I will save the rebuttals for later):

2. In which book did Yang Kuisong say Eastern China Field Army relied on Soviet artillery? Provide the book title, chapter and page numbers, and the exact sentence or paragraph. No, saying that he left it out from the book doesn't count as evidence, no matter how much irrelevant details you provide.

Don't be lazy. Do your homework. Since you are the one making the outlandish claim, you bear the burden of proving it.

Just to remind you: Japanese weapons do NOT count as "Soviet artillery" and Northeast Field Army is NOT Eastern China Field Army.

Despite all your rambling on irrelevant issues, you have yet to provide any evidence supporting your assertion that Su Yu's Eastern China Field army relied on Soviet artillery ("Communist general Su Yu had a memoirs, and he boasted of his communist army having more artillery and shells than the government troops, all shipped over across the sea from Korea and the Soviet ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Soviet artillery blanket-blasted the government troops at the Huai-hai Campaign...").

Nowhere in his memoir did Su Yu say anything about Soviet artillery. Quite to the contrary, I provided a quote in previous post stating that his artillery unit was established with the equipments captured from KMT. (No, what you think about it doesn't count as evidence.)

The only quote you supplied that was actually taken from Su Yu's memoir is this:

华东的解放，特别是淮海战役的胜利，离不开山东民工的小推车和大连生产的大炮弹。

Translation: The liberation of Eastern China, especially the victory of Huaihai Campaign, couldn't have been achieved without Shandong peasant-workers' handcarts or Dalian-made big gun shells. (Emphasis is mine.)

You convieniently left out the part about Shandong peasants' contribution because that would spoil your argument against the "people's war", didn't you?

And where does it say "Soviet-controlled arsenal" in the sentence? Talk about "liberal translation" to suit your own agenda!

In fact, if you do a little research, you will find out that CCP had its largest arsenal, called Jianxin Company (建新公司), in Dalian during the civil war. From http://www.chinaneas.../c_13453585.htm (解放战争时期我党最大兵工厂在大连建设始末, or The Whole Story of Building CCP's Largest Arsenal During Liberation War Period),

辽沈战役、淮海战役和孟良崮战役中使用的炸药、炮弹，主要是建新公司生产的。

Translation: The explosives and artillery shells used at Liaoshen Campaign, Huaihai Campaign and Menglianggu Battle were mostly made by Jianxin Company.

This corroborated what Su Yu said in his memoir about the Dalian-made big gun shells. You call this a "Soviet-controlled arsenal"?

Move on to your other sources of so-called "evidences" (assuming the sources are credible for the time being, which actually contain some rather questionable claims, but I will save the rebuttals for later):

2. In which book did Yang Kuisong say Eastern China Field Army relied on Soviet artillery? Provide the book title, chapter and page numbers, and the exact sentence or paragraph. No, saying that he left it out from the book doesn't count as evidence, no matter how much irrelevant details you provide.

Don't be lazy. Do your homework. Since you are the one making the outlandish claim, you bear the burden of proving it.

Just to remind you: Japanese weapons do NOT count as "Soviet artillery" and Northeast Field Army is NOT Eastern China Field Army.

Did you know DAIREN=DALIAN?You may want to read Yang's rebuttal. As Yang had countered: "又如刘文花了很多文字来描述东北军工如何没有苏联帮助，“白手起家”，意思大概是想证明说东北解放战争所用的武器弹药多半都是自己生产出来的。刘文所用资料大部来自东北军工部的工作报告，也理当可信。问题是刘统先生是否读懂了报告中所包含的意思，是否有所分析？刘文再三提到大连军工生产的作用，但它却像对待97架日本飞机的问题一样，没有想过大连当时是在谁的控制之下，难道不是苏军在为中共在大连的军工生产提供便利并充当保护伞？[11]"

Dairen ordinance was in the extraterritorial control of the Russians, and it was not a Chinese communist proprietorship.

I had discussed this with someone who claimed to have crept through the Great Firewall of China. In my opinion, any attempt to paint a naive picture about the Chinese Communists would be equivalent to “越描越黑 Yue Miao Yue Hei”, the more you polish the portrait, the more fuzzy and darkened it will become. Quite some of your stuff was rebutted at http://webcache.goog...=www.google.comorhttp://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/21513-chinese-civil-war-and-tactical-mistake/

Note the communist cazr who was sent to North Korea in August 1946 [and returned to Manchuria in Nov 1948] did not go there alone, and even though this guy had the strongest 党性, dǎng xìng, the spirit or character of a political party ..., and would take his secrets to the tomb, his assistants would not abide by that, and you still have their memoirs to glean for the truth, namely, the whole North Korea's arsenals were for free pickp by the Chinese Communists. (I misplaced Yang Kuisong's book 杨奎松：《毛泽东于莫斯科的恩恩怨怨》，江西人民出版社2005年版 - if someone uploads a PDF file, I will point to the page where he mentioned the "Korean" cross-sea shipment.)

My writing on this BBS is not solely for you, but for the general public. Some member pointed me to a writing by James Perloff China Betrayed Into Communism on Friday, 24 July 2009 http://www.thenewame...tory/world/1464

You may want to read what the Americans said about the American support for Stalin. All those August Storm lend-lease weapons ended up in Mao's hands.

"At the Teheran and Yalta wartime conferences, however, Roosevelt asked Stalin if he would break his pact with Japan and enter the Far East war. Stalin agreed, but attached conditions. He demanded that America completely equip his Far Eastern Army for the expedition, with 3,000 tanks, 5,000 planes, plus all the other munitions, food, and fuel required for a 1,250,000-man army. Roosevelt accepted this demand, and 600 shiploads of Lend-Lease material were convoyed to the USSR for the venture. Stalin’s Far Eastern Army swiftly received more than twice the supplies we gave Chiang Kai-shek during four years as our ally.

"General Douglas MacArthur protested after discovering that ships designated to supply his Pacific forces were being diverted to Russia. Major General Courtney Whitney wrote: “One hundred of his transport ships were to be withdrawn immediately, to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok.... Later, of course, they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China.”

what is your views on the limited Soviet declassified archives on China - Soviet relations with the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, Moscow’s role in the Chinese Civil War based on their files. are the documents genuine? how much are true?

what is your views on the limited Soviet declassified archives on China - Soviet relations with the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, Moscow’s role in the Chinese Civil War based on their files. are the documents genuine? how much are true?

Optimus,

CCP, whom I called by the "men who wear the fine suits" or the emperor without the clothes, often put out some excerpts of the Soviet communications to create a confusion that the Soviets were not that helpful, and the CCP had won the war on its own efforts, which was a fallacy as we repeatedly proved. Though, there were technicalities, as covered by Yang Kuisong, and it was all to do with Stalin's flip-flops, which Mao had failed to catch up with for the changing speed of the whims. The same happened to the French and American communists when Stalin changed alliances in WWII, such as striking the deals with Hitler. In another word, Stalin always had his own interest in mind, while the Chinese Communists, taking Stalin as step-father, had trouble following orders, and for Mao, a rebellious man, hiccups would definitekly ensue especially at the time when Germany was on the verge of wiping out Stalin and Moscow, and Mao had to seek another backer other than the Soviets, and hence the Vladimirov Diaries blasting Mao for writing off Stalin.

The Soviets at one time totally opened up its archives for research, and after some years, found out that it was a mistake, and hence safeguarded their archives again. In their opinion, Chinese Communists did not appreciate their help, which could be true. Mao, in early 60s, decided unilaterally to repay the Soviet debt while the Soviets never intended to pressure PRC with debt payment. While Stalin was definitely an evil for China, such as in extracting the economic interests in China's northern belt, from Turkestan to Mongolia to Manchuria, Kruchschov was a nice guy, and signed off all the privileges that Stalin extracted, with a belief that the expploitation in the terms of the 1950 friendship treaty with Mao was un-ccommunist. Otherwise, Stalin's terms meant a control of China's Manchuria Eastern Railway to the full extent as stipulated, like maybe 99 years, for example. While the Soviets mutated to the Russian nationalists, a few Soviet communists still exercised an attitude of diligence in sorting through the Sino-Soviet relations, and that include Ledovsky.

We covered Ledosvky in those threads:

http://www.chinahist...ost__p__4989939"... Ledovsky. This guy is the only person who disclosed the fact that Stalin personally endorsed a Soviet China Aid Act with the amount matching the dollars from the US China Aid Act. ..."

http://www.chinahist...r/page__st__180 There was NILL, NADA, YIYIE and NO support from people, but a Russian plot to communize China, from the days of Russian instigating overseas Chinese students in France in 1919 till the 40s. There was NO guesswork on the part of Russian-CCP in dealing with America-Chiang. Marshall's reports to Truman and Acheson, using 'FOR YOUR EYE ONLY' more than 30 times, went straight to Stalin's desk. Chinese scholars, like Yang Kuisong and Niu Jun, had achieved a breakthrough by emphasizing what Russians knew, i.e., Ledovsky's disclosures. Westad, who knew more than Fenbie, Jung CHang and others, also mentioned Ledovsky. Anybody who skipped Ledovsky would never explain the puzzle of the wars. Yang Kuisong and Niu Jung, and others, though, still very much underestimated Russian control of the US government. They apparently needed to read more into VENONA scripts. And, don't say what I said above was not related. They were the same actors on the Korean War.

http://www.chinahist...r/page__st__165And, do read Ledovsky. He said clearly that Mao told Stalin that the order for Lin Biao was to change Russian and Czheckslovakian weapons into American Lend-Lease qweapons before entering Peiping [Peking].

http://www.chinahist...ao/page__st__15According to Ledovsky, the Chinese nationalist government adamantly refused to back down from the 51% ownership in any joint ventures with Russians in 1945, which resulted in Stalin's wholesale support for the CCP and the flareup of the civil war. Should you spend time reading Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, you would know why there was 51-49 dispute in 1945 and why Mao and CCP agreed wholeheartedly to 50-50. And, you wanted to know at what price China sold tungsten, rubber, led, zinc and copper, led, etc to Russians to repay the 1.3 billion USD equivalent of loan Stalin gave to Mao in the 1950s. (All Russian aid before 1950 was on paper "free" and unreimbursed -whereas the truth was that China's resources in Manchuria and elsewhere were shipped to Soviet Union as barter goods.)

http://www.chinahist...ke/page__st__30In Cairo, Chiang talked about his idea for Manchuria with Roosevelt. For years, Chiang relayed letters and messages to Stalin. Stalin never replied on Manchuria. See Ledovsky's apologies and apologetic writings on ROC matter.Looking in opposite direction, Russians, in February 1948, had offered Liu Shaoqi a no-string-attached loan of 300 million USD loan - which I forgot to mention but just checked Ledovsky's numbers to confirm it - in addition to free weapons from 1945 to 1949.