Global Regulatory Enforcement Law Bloghttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com
Updates and analysis on global regulatory and enforcement issuesWed, 14 Nov 2018 19:38:11 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.8https://globalregulatory.reedsmithblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/05/cropped-RSTwitterAvatar_512x512-32x32.jpgGlobal Regulatory Enforcement Law Bloghttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com
3232Recent SEC report on cybersecurity preparedness and response serves as warning of future enforcementhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/data-security/recent-sec-report-on-cybersecurity-preparedness-and-response-serves-as-warning-of-future-enforcement/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/data-security/recent-sec-report-on-cybersecurity-preparedness-and-response-serves-as-warning-of-future-enforcement/#respondWed, 14 Nov 2018 19:38:11 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4303Continue Reading]]>The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently provided issuers with a reminder of the potential for enforcement for insufficient cybersecurity. The SEC continues to emphasize the importance of measures such as up-to-date compliance and incident response programs in order to maintain the integrity of the capital market system, and a recent Report of Investigation reflects that cybersecurity remains an enforcement priority. To learn more about the Report and the SEC’s recent enforcement actions, visit our Technology Law Dispatch blog.
]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/data-security/recent-sec-report-on-cybersecurity-preparedness-and-response-serves-as-warning-of-future-enforcement/feed/0jachilles@reedsmith.com, vbarbuto@reedsmith.comUnited States fully reimposes secondary sanctions on Iranhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/export-customs-trade/united-states-fully-reimposes-secondary-sanctions-on-iran/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/export-customs-trade/united-states-fully-reimposes-secondary-sanctions-on-iran/#respondTue, 13 Nov 2018 22:42:22 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4305Continue Reading]]>On November 5, the United States reimposed the final tranche of sanctions on Iran, which had been lifted pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) in 2016. The vast majority of these sanctions are “secondary sanctions,” being those which target non-U.S. persons and companies even where there is no U.S. nexus (e.g. the use of USD; U.S.-persons; or U.S. goods). The secondary sanctions cover a variety of goods and services, as well as prohibitions on dealings with certain individual persons and entities. While exceptions for humanitarian goods, agricultural products, medicine and medical devices remain in place, entities may find doing even this kind of business in Iran more challenging due to restrictions on the Iranian banking industry. When taking decisions about whether to enter into or continue Iran-related trade, EU companies must also weigh the risk of circumventing the EU’s so-called “blocking” statute. To read our summary of the reimposed sanctions, visit reedsmith.com.
]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/export-customs-trade/united-states-fully-reimposes-secondary-sanctions-on-iran/feed/0lhansson@reedsmith.com, crogers@reedsmith.com, jorenstein@reedsmith.com, abrandt@reedsmith.com, erymland-kelly@reedsmith.comLegal Fees Spent Successfully Defending Qui Tam Whistleblower Claims May Be Recoverable Even Under Fixed-Price Contractshttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-contracts/legal-fees-spent-successfully-defending-qui-tam-whistleblower-claims-may-be-recoverable-even-under-fixed-price-contracts/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-contracts/legal-fees-spent-successfully-defending-qui-tam-whistleblower-claims-may-be-recoverable-even-under-fixed-price-contracts/#respondWed, 31 Oct 2018 16:57:40 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4285Continue Reading]]>As a lawyer who regularly defends qui tam suits brought against government contractors under the False Claims Act (FCA), a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in The Tolliver Grp. Inc. v. United States, Fed. Cl., No. 17-1763C (J. Lettow 10/26/18) prompted me to remind federal government contractors defending civil qui tam lawsuits under the FCA, that the majority of their legal fees spent successfully defending a relator’s whistleblower suit may be reimbursable by the government. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-47 provides that up to 80 percent of a contractor’s legal costs incurred in connection with successfully defending an FCA action may be allowable to the extent such costs are reasonable and not otherwise unallowable or recovered. See FAR 31.205-47(b), (e).1

In The Tolliver Grp. Inc. case, Tolliver sought recovery under the Contact Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 601, et seq., for $195,889.78 in legal fees it spent defending against, and ultimately having the Court dismiss, a qui tam suit alleging that Tolliver falsely certified compliance with the terms of a fixed-price, level-of-effort contract. Specifically, the relator alleged that Tolliver created several technical manuals for the Army’s Hydrema 910 Mine Clearing Vehicle without a required government technical data package. The government declined to intervene in that case, nor did it seek dismissal, and Tolliver successfully defended the qui tam action on its own, persuading the district court to dismiss the relator’s complaint. That dismissal was affirmed on appeal. See United States ex rel. Searle v. DRS Tech. Servs., No. 1:14-cv-00402, 2015 WL 6691973 (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2015), aff’d, 680 Fed. Appx. 163 (4th Cir. 2017).

Following its success in the qui tam suit, Tolliver timely submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking an equitable adjustment for “allowable legal fees” incurred in defending the qui tam suit. That sum represents 80 percent of its attorneys’ fees, the maximum allowed by the FAR for a successful defense of an FCA Act suit. See FAR § 31.205-47(e)(3).2 Tolliver’s claim was denied by the contracting officer on the basis that Tolliver was performing under a “firm fixed price order which contains no provisions [for the government to assume the risk of legal costs]” and because the legal costs were not recoverable under FAR Subpart 31.2 as the legal costs were “neither incurred specifically for the contract nor provided the government with a benefit.”

Tolliver appealed the contracting officer’s denial to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which held that Tolliver stated a plausible claim for recovery of its legal fees under the contract and the FAR. Of note, the Court emphasized that fixed-price contracts “are not categorically immune from applicability of cost principles relief,” and that FAR Part 31.2 applies to fixed-price development contracts that are negotiated on the basis of cost and where cost analysis is performed as required by FAR 14.505-1(c). In so holding, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the fixed-price nature of the contract defeated Tolliver’s claim because the contract did not specifically permit for recovery of legal costs. Although Tolliver’s fixed-price development contract did not contain an express or implied term allowing cost reimbursement, the Court explained, the cost principles of FAR Subpart 31.2 provide that “[t]he cost principles and procedures in subpart 31.2 and agency supplements shall be used.” (Emphasis in original).

Because the Court found Tolliver successfully defended the qui tam suit and sought 80 percent of its legal costs, and those expenses were alleged to be reasonable, it held Tolliver sufficiently alleged the elements necessary to assert a viable claim under the CDA and the FAR for recovery of those legal costs.3

The Court’s decision in Tolliver allowed the contractor’s claim against the government for recovery of 80 percent of its legal costs spent successfully defending a relator’s qui tam FCA action to proceed, even under a fixed-price contract that did not specifically permit recovery of such costs. While Tolliver had a services contract with the Army, legal cost recovery under FAR 31.205-47 applies potentially to any federal contractor performing under: (a) cost-reimbursable contracts, (b) fixed-price contracts whenever (i) a cost analysis is performed or (ii) the determination or negotiation of costs is required and (c) construction, architectural, and engineering contracts, and research and development contracts, and contracts for supplies or services where the costs are negotiated with the government. See FAR 31.102-105. Such legal costs also may be recoverable when a contract is subject to a modification that based on cost negotiation.

This case should embolden companies defending qui tam lawsuits arising out of their federal contracts to pursue recovery of the majority of their legal fees if they are successful in obtaining dismissal of the relator’s claims, in whole or in part. To maximize their chance of recovery, contractors should: (1) analyze the terms of their contract or task order to determine the allowability of such costs, (2) carefully track and document all legal fees and costs spent defending the FCA claims, (3) timely submit a claim under the CDA to the contracting officer detailing the legal fees and costs spent successfully defending the claim(s), (4) if the FCA claim is settled, obtain a determination by the contracting officer that there was “very little likelihood that the claimant would have been successful on the merits” and (5) timely file an action in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the appropriate Board of Contract Appeal, if the contracting officer denies the claim for recovery of such legal costs.

Successful defense in the civil context means that there was no “finding of contractor liability” with respect to the FCA claims brought against the contractor. See FAR 31.205-47(b)(2). A contractor can also recover its legal costs if the matter is resolved by “consent or compromise,” but only if it is determined by the contracting officer (in consultation with their legal advisor) that there was “very little likelihood that the claimant would have been successful on the merits.” See FAR 31.205-47(c)(2)(ii).

In 2002, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals held that a contractor was entitled to recover 80 percent of its legal costs successfully defending FCA claims under FAR 31.205-47 even where the contractor was not successful in defeating all of the relator’s claims. General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 49372, 02-2 BCA 31,888 (June 10, 2002). The Board apportioned the recovery of legal costs allowing only legal fees related to the contractor’s successful defense of claims that the Board found “did not stem from the same wrongdoing as the unsuccessful claims.” Id.

FAR 31.205-47(g) requires contractors to segregate the covered legal costs and account for them separately until the FCA litigation or proceeding is concluded, unless otherwise agreed by the contracting officer.

]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-contracts/legal-fees-spent-successfully-defending-qui-tam-whistleblower-claims-may-be-recoverable-even-under-fixed-price-contracts/feed/0lsher@reedsmith.comIran Sanctions: new developments and how to handle themhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/export-customs-trade/iran-sanctions-new-developments-and-how-to-handle-them/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/export-customs-trade/iran-sanctions-new-developments-and-how-to-handle-them/#respondTue, 30 Oct 2018 15:38:20 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4281Continue Reading]]>On 8 May 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In conjunction with that announcement, the President issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) directing the re-imposition of certain secondary sanctions, being those that apply to non-U.S. persons even where there is no U.S. nexus (e.g. no U.S. persons, no U.S.-origin goods, or U.S. dollar payments). As discussed in our earlier blog post, the first batch of sanctions was reimposed on 6 August and the second batch will become effective 5 November.

On 5 November, the United States will re-impose the following secondary sanctions:

Sanctions on Iran’s port operators and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including IRISL;

Sanctions on petroleum-related transactions, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products or petrochemicals from Iran;

Sanctions on foreign financial institutions who engage with the Central Bank of Iran and other designated Iranian financial institutions;

Sanctions on the provision of specialised financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;

Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance or reinsurance to SDNs or for sanctioned activities;

Sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.

These sanctions will also apply to the provision of associated services. For example, an insurance company could potentially face exposure to secondary sanctions if the coverage it provided pertained to the transportation of sanctioned goods and/or involved a sanctioned entity.

Equally as important, no later than 5 November, the U.S. will re-list as SDNs many of the persons and entities removed from the SDN list pursuant to the JCPOA. Therefore, even if your Iran-related business is not connected to a sanctioned business sector, it is important to ensure that your transactions do not involve persons or entities on the SDN List.

EU companies, in navigating their exposure to the reimposed U.S. secondary sanctions, must also be mindful of the EU’s so-called “Blocking Regulation”. That piece of legislation seeks to limit the impact of the U.S. secondary sanctions with a view to signalling the EU’s ongoing commitment to the JCPOA – so long as Iran continues to comply with the restrictions on its nuclear ambitions as required by that agreement. In reality that can mean EU companies facing the decision of continuing to perform Iran-related business and risk being in breach of the U.S. secondary sanctions, or bringing such business to an end and risk being in breach of the EU Blocking Regulation. In addition to the Blocking Regulation, as we reported here, the EU is considering implementing a mechanism of facilitating payments for Iranian exports that would by-pass the traditional banking systems and thereby limit the risk of influence of the U.S. authorities. Whilst we await details of how such a mechanism might work (a bartering style system has been referenced), a note of caution: in the eyes of the Trump Administration, the use of this mechanism could constitute an evasion of the U.S. sanctions on Iran. Additionally, and importantly in the context of a potential barter-style system, sanctions can be triggered even when funds are not exchanged.

In recent weeks, we have also seen some guidance from the English High Court specifically in relation to the scope and application of the U.S. secondary sanctions and the EU Blocking Regulation regimes. Details of the judgment were reported in our previous blog post.

Reed Smith’s Sanctions team is uniquely well placed to advise on the impact of the re-imposed U.S. sanctions and the EU Blocking Regulation, with highly experienced trade and sanctions lawyers from both the United States and the EU available to you, 24/7. Contact one of the authors listed above, or your usual Reed Smith lawyer, and we will be more than happy to help you navigate the implications of these significant events for your business.

]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/export-customs-trade/iran-sanctions-new-developments-and-how-to-handle-them/feed/0lhansson@reedsmith.com, crogers@reedsmith.com, abrandt@reedsmith.com, erymland-kelly@reedsmith.com“Not So Fast!” District Court orders divestiture of assets in private Clayton Act case six years after DOJ clears dealhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/not-so-fast-district-court-orders-divestiture-of-assets-in-private-clayton-act-case-six-years-after-doj-clears-deal/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/not-so-fast-district-court-orders-divestiture-of-assets-in-private-clayton-act-case-six-years-after-doj-clears-deal/#respondTue, 23 Oct 2018 21:07:19 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4275Continue Reading]]>Increasingly, the antitrust agencies have been challenging unreported transactions post-closing under the Clayton Act, seeking an unwinding of the transactions or at least divestitures of some of the assets purchased. Until recently, however, the threat that a private plaintiff would obtain a court order requiring an unwinding or divestiture once the deal has closed has been more theoretical than real. The threat may now be more real than theoretical. In what is the first decision of its kind, a federal district court has ordered a defendant in a private action brought, in part, under Clayton Act Section 16 to divest assets approximately six years after they were purchased. In that case, the defendant, a door manufacturer and door component supplier, had acquired a competitor in 2012 in a transaction that was reviewed without a challenge by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division. Yet on October 5, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered the defendant, in a case brought by a competitor/customer that had previously been awarded $175 million in damages, to sell key door component manufacturing assets that the defendant had acquired as part of the 2012 transaction. If allowed to stand, the decision could mean that, going forward, acquirers can be less confident about the finality of their acquisitions post-closure. Read more here.
]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/not-so-fast-district-court-orders-divestiture-of-assets-in-private-clayton-act-case-six-years-after-doj-clears-deal/feed/0eschwartz@reedsmith.com, kherrmann@reedsmith.comAgreements and algorithms can add up to antitrust liabilityhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/agreements-and-algorithms-can-add-up-to-antitrust-liability/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/agreements-and-algorithms-can-add-up-to-antitrust-liability/#respondThu, 18 Oct 2018 18:26:06 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4271Continue Reading]]>Last week in a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Makan Delrahim announced that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is pursuing criminal charges against competitors who allegedly engaged in a price-fixing scheme facilitated by the use of search algorithms. While he did not reveal further details about the case, AAG Delrahim announced that he expected the investigation to conclude soon.

Algorithms are a series of instructions, frequently iterative, that when followed may solve a problem, and they are commonly written into software to process vast amounts of data and quickly arrive at a solution. Algorithms are frequently used in pricing, where a company may create a process that incorporates data on costs, competitors’ prices, and other significant factors to determine pricing. Algorithms are largely used in a procompetitive manner, for example, by enabling a competitor to efficiently process huge quantities of data to aid in reacting to a competitor’s prices in real time.

Nevertheless, antitrust enforcement against companies employing algorithms is a new, but growing, phenomenon. In 2015, in U.S. v. David Topkins, a seller of posters, prints, and framed art pleaded guilty to criminal antitrust charges brought by the DOJ for entering into an agreement with other third-party sellers to fix prices on certain posters. To implement the conspiracy, Topkins designed an algorithm that the parties adopted to set prices at a certain level and monitor the prices of the parties to the agreement. Because of the ease at which the parties kept the agreement, the DOJ stated that the conspiracy was “self-executing” after implementation of the algorithms.

Indeed, algorithms can amplify the effectiveness of an illicit agreement. In 2017, the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) warned that algorithms can be highly effective in facilitating illegal agreements because the “speed and ease of algorithmic pricing…likely reduce[s] the benefit that a firm would otherwise enjoy from…defecting from collusive pricing [i.e., from cheating on an illegal agreement].” The antitrust enforcers are clearly monitoring the use of algorithms in illegal agreements, and their willingness to pursue criminal charges shows that the DOJ considers this conduct to be particularly pernicious.

The DOJ and FTC have also warned that algorithms may be used to facilitate an illegal hub-and-spoke conspiracy; for example, competing firms could agree with a single firm “to use a particular pricing algorithm and…do so with the common understanding that all of the other competitors would use the identical algorithm.”

Foreign jurisdictions have also taken an active role in monitoring the use of algorithms in potentially anticompetitive conduct. For example, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) coordinated with the DOJ in the online poster sales price-fixing scheme described above and further found two companies involved liable for violating the country’s competition law. German competition authorities have launched investigations into dynamic pricing in various e-commerce markets, implicating the use of algorithms. Last December, Andreas Mundt, the president of Germany’s Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office), chided companies for trying to “hide behind algorithms” in response to an investigation into pricing in the passenger airline industry. Going one step further, Margrethe Vestager, the European Commissioner for Competition, has said that businesses have the responsibility to “ensure antitrust compliance by design” of their algorithms, even if a company “may not always know exactly how an automated system will use its algorithms to [m]ake decisions.”

Key takeaways: Companies can face significant antitrust liability in employing algorithms in price-fixing or other illegal agreements. Merely because an algorithm is a set of rules applied by a machine for pricing, marketing, advertising, or other purposes does not insulate the company from antitrust scrutiny for the design or the implementation of the algorithm. After all, using an algorithm requires a decisional human component: from choosing or writing the algorithm (and thus determining the data inputs, process, and acceptable range of solutions sought) to implementing the algorithm (and implicating the question as to whether any agreement was reached with a competitor regarding the decision to institute the algorithm). And this human decision making is still subject to the strictures of the antitrust laws.

]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/agreements-and-algorithms-can-add-up-to-antitrust-liability/feed/0mmantine@reedsmith.com, kherrmann@reedsmith.comSignificant updates to India’s anti-corruption lawhttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-investigations/significant-updates-to-indias-anti-corruption-law/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-investigations/significant-updates-to-indias-anti-corruption-law/#respondThu, 18 Oct 2018 18:10:39 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4267Continue Reading]]>Earlier this year, the Indian parliament made significant amendments to the Prevention of Corruption Act (the “PCA”). The PCA is the primary Indian law that addresses corruption in government agencies and public sector businesses in India. These updates to the Act impact how companies with operations in India manage corrupt activity. Read our summary of the key amendments here.
]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/government-investigations/significant-updates-to-indias-anti-corruption-law/feed/0cchan@reedsmith.com, jho@reedsmith.comPlatform bans under competition law – a German perspectivehttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/platform-bans-under-competition-law-a-german-perspective/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/platform-bans-under-competition-law-a-german-perspective/#respondFri, 12 Oct 2018 20:52:21 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4260Continue Reading]]>Digital transformations in commerce steadily increase the variety and availability of products and give consumers access to retail offers beyond geographic boundaries on a 24/7 basis. While the increase of e-commerce might enhance inter- and intra-brand competition, it heavily impacts the traditional retail landscape. Brand manufacturers suffer from less price stability and retailers find it increasingly difficult to profitably sell branded goods through their brick and mortar sales channels, which may even lead to a delisting in certain circumstances. These challenges place brand manufacturers and the brick and mortar retail sector in the same boat.

The dilemma

The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has traditionally followed a restrictive competition policy in relation to online sales restrictions, in effect leaving the interplay between online and offline distribution channels to consumers’ shopping preferences. In particular, the FCO has so far refused to accept that a profitable distribution of branded goods via brick and mortar outlets requires the effective support of these sales through a pricing structure capable of competing with often cheaper online prices. The support proposed by the FCO to remedy the dilemma came in the form of a flat fee paid by suppliers for retailers’ additional infrastructure costs for their physical outlets. However, this proved to be too out of touch with the economic realities, and therefore unattractive to most brand manufacturers, and so it has rarely been applied. At the same time, the FCO made it very clear on several occasions (in particular when dealing with the distribution strategies of Dornbracht, Gardena and Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte a few years ago) that it is unwilling to accept suppliers’ support of brick and mortar sales to reflect actual sales volumes. The FCO considers that the granting of rebates or bonus schemes to retailers which ultimately privilege sales via physical stores amounts to a severe competition infringement unless the same rebate or bonus is also available for online sales. Needless to say, granting equivalent advantages for both online and brick and mortar sales will not work to make brick and mortar prices more competitive.

Resale price maintenance won’t fix the problem

The lack of remedies effectively supporting brick and mortar sales has created the need for brand manufacturers to challenge price erosion in alternative and more indirect ways. Recent enforcement action by the European Commission and the FCO clearly demonstrates that resale price maintenance (RPM) is more than ever subject to a “no tolerance policy” at both the EU and German level, in particular where RPM serves the purpose of restricting online sales activity.

The European Commission recently imposed fines totaling approximately €111 million on a number of electronics manufacturers that made use of software to monitor retailers’ prices for the manufacturers’ products and, in case of non-compliance with their price recommendations, urged the retailers to observe them. The FCO has an impressive track record when it comes to enforcing and sanctioning RPM activities (whether in the context of online sales restrictions or otherwise) and RPM will most likely remain a strong focus of the German regulator’s enforcement policy.

What about banning third-party platforms?

With the long-awaited court decisions in the landmark Coty and ASICS cases, one would have expected a clear answer to this question, at least in relation to selective distribution systems. The compatibility of marketplace bans with German and EU competition rules was the subject of the Coty case whereas bans on price comparison sites and keyword advertising was dealt with in ASICS. In particular, in Germany (the home jurisdiction in the Coty and ASICS cases) there is greater than ever uncertainty as to whether or not third-party platforms can lawfully be banned. This uncertainty mainly stems from a clear tension between the more liberal approach toward marketplace bans within selective distribution systems found in the competition policy of the European Commission and the still far stricter approach adopted by the FCO.

Marketplace bans in the light of Coty

In the Coty proceedings both the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in its preliminary ruling of December 6, 2017, and the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, with its decision of July 12, 2018, found that a prohibition of sales via online marketplaces under a selective distribution system does not in itself constitute a hardcore restriction of competition under European and German competition rules, at least where a brand manufacturer succeeds in establishing that the ban serves the purpose of protecting the brand’s luxury image. The main argument was that marketplace bans do not prevent, or severely restrict, online sales – the retailer is still free to sell the products via its own website or market them through other online platforms. Accordingly, following Coty, marketplace bans are block exempted under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) where the relevant parties’ market shares do not exceed 30% each.

The view that Coty might also apply to the competition assessment of suppliers’ bans of sales on platforms other than online marketplaces, does not stand up to scrutiny. It was only a week after the Coty judgment was handed down that the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) adopted its decision in ASICS. ASICS, a sports clothing and footwear manufacturer, had not only prohibited its retailers from advertising ASICS sports shoes via price comparison sites, but also from using the brand for keyword advertising. In ASICS, the German Federal Supreme Court confirmed in full the FCO’s prohibition against ASICS, in that these restrictions were considered a hardcore restriction of competition under the relevant provision of the VBER, Article 4(c). In contrast to Coty, it was found in ASICS that the relevant bans in effect excluded retailers from such a substantial portion of online sales and marketing activities so that the bans imposed by ASICS were to be treated as an unlawful general ban of online sales.

So does the competitive assessment depend on the platform type?

In the view of the FCO, the answer seems to be a “no,” although Coty and ASICS suggest otherwise. The FCO also considers Coty to be of very limited relevance in cases where the ban relates to online marketplaces (as in Coty). The FCO points to the results of the European Commission’s sector inquiry into e-commerce in justifying why the marketplace bans should be scrutinized more closely in Germany than in other parts of the EU or than at EU level. According to the European Commission’s final report, in 2016, Germany’s retail market was worth €500 billion and 62 percent of German retailers said they used online marketplaces. At the same time, with a share of 32 percent, Germany was reported to be the EU member state in which the highest proportion of retailers experienced marketplace restrictions. In the view of the FCO, it follows from this data that the effect on competition is more severe in Germany than elsewhere in the EU; in other words, the same law renders different results due to differing market conditions. The FCO continues to emphasize that Coty has only “limited effects” on its ongoing investigations into brand owners’ restrictions on retailers’ marketplace sales, in particular where these restrictions apply to small and medium-sized retailers.

Outlook for Germany

Today, brand manufacturers in Germany still face a situation where there is a very low degree of legal certainty in relation to marketplace bans. The president of the FCO, Andreas Mundt, recently expressed concern that allowing brand manufacturers to ban sales of small and medium-sized retailers via online marketplaces is likely to result in an online retail landscape dominated by three groups of players: (1) the big platforms, (2) large retailers and (3) brand manufacturers engaging in direct sales. Indeed, these concerns, together with the FCO’s recent announcement that e-commerce will be subject to an even more targeted enforcement in Germany in the coming years, underscore the FCO’s restrictive competition policy in the area of online sales restrictions.

By contrast, Advocate General Wahl, who provided the opinion to the ECJ for in its preliminary ruling in Coty, re-emphasized at a conference in September 2018 that the legal assessment underlying Coty might also be applied to branded goods outside the luxury space, a view shared by the European Commission (see, for example, its Competition Policy Brief of April 2018).

How Reed Smith can help

Despite the fact that both the Coty and ASICS judgments provide guidance on specific questions of applicable competition law, there remains a significant degree of legal uncertainty when it comes to a risk assessment of platform bans in Germany. In light of the diverging views adopted by the FCO and the European Commission, it cannot be certain that a uniform European approach toward these issues will be reached in the near future.

Reed Smith’s Competition & Regulatory team will gladly provide you with legal advice on how to adopt distribution strategies that effectively solve the dilemma outlined above in a way that is compliant with competition rules, while ensuring that you can take full advantage of your legal options in matters relating to distribution.

]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/platform-bans-under-competition-law-a-german-perspective/feed/0MWestrup@reedsmith.com, srohr@reedsmith.comUpdates to China’s anti-corruption regimehttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/09/articles/government-investigations/updates-to-chinas-anti-corruption-regime/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/09/articles/government-investigations/updates-to-chinas-anti-corruption-regime/#respondMon, 17 Sep 2018 17:59:44 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4248Continue Reading]]>The first half of 2018 saw a number of significant changes to the Chinese anti-corruption regime, including amendments to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and formation of new anti-corruption regulatory bodies. Amidst an anti-corruption campaign in China that continues to gain traction, companies operating in the country should continually evaluate whether current business models run afoul of the latest regulations. Read here for our summary of the key changes to the anti-corruption landscape and the implications for multinational corporations operating in China.
]]>https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/09/articles/government-investigations/updates-to-chinas-anti-corruption-regime/feed/0cchan@reedsmith.com, victor.huang@reedsmith.com, sli@reedsmith.com, ybai@reedsmith.comIran sanctions: United States reimposes sanctions and the EU respondshttps://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/08/articles/export-customs-trade/iran-sanctions-united-states-reimposes-sanctions-and-the-eu-responds/
https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2018/08/articles/export-customs-trade/iran-sanctions-united-states-reimposes-sanctions-and-the-eu-responds/#respondTue, 07 Aug 2018 16:19:51 +0000https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/?p=4223Continue Reading]]>In the early hours of Tuesday, 7 August 2018, and as foreshadowed by President Trump’s announcement on 8 May 2018, the United States reimposed certain secondary sanctions on Iran, being those which apply to non-U.S. persons. The imposition of these sanctions follows the conclusion of a 90-day wind-down period and, as mentioned in our previous blog post, will impact (among other things) trade in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals and the Iranian automotive sector. Importantly, the new Iran sanctions permit the U.S. government to impose sanctions on non-U.S. persons who provide significant support to those acting in violation of the sanctions. Note that a second wind-down period expires in early November, at which time further secondary sanctions will be reimposed, affecting, among other things, shipping, the petroleum and petrochemical industry, and insurance.

The new Executive Order signed by the President, however, makes clear that the sanctions do not apply to any person conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision or sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran. Additionally, the Frequently Asked Questions published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control reiterate that the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical devices is not sanctionable provided no designated parties are involved.

Just hours after the sanctions came into effect, President Trump tweeted that “[a]nyone doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business with United States.” We therefore expect the United States to actively enforce violations of these sanctions.

In response, the EU has now activated its so called ‘blocking’ Regulation, with a view to supporting the continuation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The EU is seeking to ensure that Iran adheres to its nuclear-related obligations under that agreement and to encourage EU companies to continue to do business in Iran. One of the key aspects of this legislation is that it makes it a breach of EU law to stop doing business with Iran if you take that step in order to comply with the U.S. secondary sanctions.

The potential result is that EU companies, including shipping companies, banks, trading houses and others, may be faced with a choice of continuing to do certain business in Iran at the risk of breaching U.S. law, or refraining from doing such business at the risk of breaching EU law.

The Reed Smith sanctions team, with lawyers experienced in advising on both the U.S. and EU positions, are on hand to help you navigate these potentially mutually exclusive obligations.