ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS
OF CERTAIN CORRESPONDENCE
RELATED TO THE TREATY

Over the course of the negotiations, several specific issues were
solved with the aid of letters between cabinet level officials, primarily
the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. None of
these letters are legally binding agreements; rather they serve to clarify
and resolve issues related to the Treaty, but outside its framework.
The letters undertake no new commitments, except for the U.S. political
commitment to terminate ballistic missile submarine operations at Holy
Loch, Scotland, and the related Soviet political commitment not to establish
similar facilities.

I. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON THIRD-COUNTRY BASING

Although dated July 31, 1991, the contents of the exchange of letters
on third-country basing was negotiated in late 1990. At that time, two
issues concerning third-country basing were at issue: U.S. ballistic
missile submarine operations from Holy Loch, Scotland, and Soviet insistence
on some form of right to inspect U.S. forces abroad.

For almost 30 years the United States operated ballistic missile submarines
from Holy Loch, Scotland. These submarines, although operating from
Holy Loch for extended periods, were permanently based in the United
States. As a result, the United States does not consider operations
from Holy Loch to be "basing" within the meaning of that term
in the Treaty. The Soviet Union, in contrast, regarded these operations
as basing. The resulting impasse was broken following a U.S. decision
-- made for programmatic, not arms control reasons -- to terminate operations
at Holy Loch. Secretary Baker's letter informed the Soviets of that
fact. Further, since the United States is shifting to a force of Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines, which operate from permanent bases without
being supported by forward-deployed submarine tenders, Secretary Baker's
letter further indicated that the United States would not establish
facilities similar to Holy Loch in the future.

Secretary Baker's letter also noted the agreement, codified in paragraph
(c) of the Eighth Agreed Statement, that the Parties "do not rule
out the possibility" that inspections or visits might be used in
the resolution of compliance debates involving third countries.

The Soviet response essentially repeated the points made by Secretary
Baker, adding assurances that the Soviet Union had no arrangements similar
to Holy Loch and would not establish such arrangements in the future.

II. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON NON-NUCLEAR ALCMs WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS

The exchange of letters dated December 6, 1990, between Secretary
Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze served as the mechanism
for the Soviet Union to drop its proposed ban on long-range non-nuclear
ALCMs armed with two or more weapons. The sides had previously agreed
to a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear
weapons (now codified in paragraph 18(e) of Article V of the Treaty).
Soviet negotiators asserted that a companion ban on non-nuclear ALCMs
with multiple weapons was necessary because a Party might otherwise
use the testing of such a weapon to covertly develop a long-range nuclear
ALCM armed with multiple nuclear weapons.

The letters, although dated December 6, were negotiated substantially
earlier; their formal exchange was delayed until a convenient Ministerial
meeting. In the U.S. letter, Secretary Baker made four substantive points.
First, he reaffirmed the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple
nuclear weapons. Second, he expressed the U.S. interpretation that producing,
testing, or deploying long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons
"for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy
long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons" would be inconsistent
with Treaty obligations. Third, Secretary Baker indicated that long-range
non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons, like any other long-range non-nuclear
ALCMs, would have to be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs
in accordance with provisions of the Treaty. Finally, the Secretary
of State noted that a Party would have the right to raise any concerns
or ambiguities within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission as specified for in Article XII of the then-current Joint
Draft Text of the Treaty (Article XVI in the final Treaty).

None of these points constitute new obligations; they merely restate
existing Treaty obligations. Thus this letter and the Soviet reply add
no obligations to either Party. The Soviet reply repeated the same four
points. Once again, this added no new obligations.

III. U.S. LETTER ON THE TACIT RAINBOW CRUISE MISSILE

Tacit Rainbow was a proposed non-nuclear tactical cruise missile under
development with a range (as range is defined in the START Treaty) of
between 600 and 800 kilometers. Tacit Rainbow was planned for deployment
on both tactical aircraft and heavy bombers. The Tacit Rainbow system
has subsequently been cancelled, but in May 1990 the United States still
expected to deploy the system and sought to ensure that Tacit Rainbow
would not be treated as a long-range nuclear ALCM under START.

During the May 1990 Moscow Ministerial, the United States and the
Soviet Union reached agreement on a number of issues related to long-range
ALCMs, including accepting a 600 kilometer cut-off range for defining
"long-range" nuclear ALCMs. As part of this overall solution,
the Parties reaffirmed the agreement reached in June 1988 that "existing"
long-range ALCMs would all be considered to be nuclear under START,
while "future" long-range ALCMs would be considered to be
nuclear unless they were distinguishable. At issue was the cut-off date
for dividing existing systems from future systems.

The United States proposed, and the Soviet Union accepted, initial
flight testing from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988 as
the appropriate cut off (this provision is now codified in paragraph
9(f) of Article III of the Treaty). Since Tacit Rainbow had not been
flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before that date (although it
had been flight-tested from another airplane before that date), Tacit
Rainbow could then, under this criterion, be treated as a long-range
non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, and
not be captured under START.

While accepting the basic approach, the Soviet Union expressed concern
about the Tacit Rainbow system, that long-range non-nuclear cruise missiles
could be used to provide heavy bombers with a long-range nuclear ALCM
capability. As a result, the U.S. Secretary of State, on May 19, 1990,
sent the Soviet Foreign Minister a letter seeking to clarify the situation
with regard to Tacit Rainbow. The contents of this letter were not negotiated
or discussed with the Soviet Union in advance.

In the letter the United States made three substantive points. First,
Secretary Baker reaffirmed the acceptability of the December 31, 1988,
cut-off date to distinguish between current and future long-range ALCMs,
noting that, under such a cut-off date, Tacit Rainbow would be treated
as a future non-nuclear ALCM. Second, the Secretary of State provided
formal assurances that Tacit Rainbow was a non-nuclear ALCM and thus
would be covered by the Treaty provisions governing long-range non-nuclear
ALCMs. Finally, the Secretary of State indicated that the range of Tacit
Rainbow was between 600 and 800 kilometers. This final point had no
bearing on the treatment of Tacit Rainbow, since all ALCMs with ranges
greater than 600 kilometers are considered "long-range" ALCMs
under the Treaty.

The letter involves no undertakings on the part of the United States.
It does, however, provide a formal U.S. assurance that Tacit Rainbow
was not a long-range nuclear ALCM and that the United States had no
plans to provide it a nuclear capability. Based on these assurances,
the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. approach to distinguishability between
long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs and accepted the
December 31, 1988 cut-off date.

IV. SOVIET LETTERS ON HEAVY ICBMs

During a September 1990 Ministerial Meeting between Secretary Baker
and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, held in New York City on the
margins of the United Nations General Assembly, the sides, among other
things, agreed on the provisions on heavy ICBMs now in the Treaty. Part
of that agreement is reflected in the provisions of paragraph 2(d) of
Article V and in the Fifth Agreed Statement. Taken together, these provide
a limited right to relocate heavy ICBM launchers in exceptional circumstances.
Although the "exceptional circumstances" were not spelled
out, both Parties understood them to be circumstances arising from the
turbulent internal political situation in the Soviet Union, which suggested
the possibility that the Soviet government might desire to make such
relocations as a consequence of the increasing local and republic autonomy
within the Soviet Union.

During a subsequent visit to the Soviet Union, the Secretary of Defense
pressed the Soviet Defense Minister about their need to construct new
SS-18 silos. The Soviet Defense Minister responded that there were no
such plans, thus casting doubt on the Soviet need for the provisions
the United States had accepted in New York. As a result, the United
States sought clarification.

An initial (undated) letter from Soviet Defense Minister Yazov to
Secretary of Defense Cheney, provided partial clarification, but did
not address all U.S. concerns. While it reaffirmed the Soviet obligation
that any new silos would be constructed "simultaneously with the
elimination" of older silos and thus that the limit of 154 heavy
ICBM launchers would not be exceeded, it gave no insight to the circumstances
which might require new construction.

The December 6, 1990, letter from the Soviet Defense and Foreign Ministers
to the United States Secretaries of State and Defense provided that
clarification. It reaffirmed earlier Soviet assurances that the limits
of the Treaty would not be exceeded. This second Soviet letter cited
two reasons for replacing heavy ICBM silos, both reflected in the Fifth
Agreed Statement. The first was the possibility of accident. The second
was the possibility of relocation "for non-military considerations,
particularly in connection with the internal political developments
that are taking place in our country." The Soviet letter noted
that the Soviet Union had no current plans for such relocation.

The Soviet Foreign Minister communicated with the U.S. Secretary of
State again on December 30, 1990, in a letter addressing a series of
issues that had arisen out of the Houston Ministerial of December 1990.
In that letter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reconfirmed the conditions
of new heavy ICBM silo construction. Specifically, he reconfirmed that
construction of new heavy ICBM silos could be undertaken only to replace
heavy ICBM silo launchers destroyed in an accident or to relocate such
launchers threatened by internal political emergencies. Consequently,
the Soviet Foreign Minister concluded that the replacement of heavy
ICBM silo launchers did not include the possibility of extensive new
silo construction.

Based on these clarifications, the United States confirmed the agreement
reached in New York and accepted the heavy ICBM provisions negotiated
there. The Soviet letters provide formal confirmation of the intent
of the Parties that relocations of heavy ICBM silos not result in exceeding
the limits of the Treaty and that such relocation only be allowed in
the case of extraordinary circumstances of a non-military nature relating
to internal Soviet political factors.