[The Authority] is established under the Fisheries Act 1981 with powers granted “for the purpose of promoting the efficiency of the sea fish industry and so as to serve the interests of that industry as a whole” (section 2(1)). For the purpose of financing its activities, the Authority may, by regulations confirmed by ministerial order, “impose a levy on persons engaged in the sea fish industry” (section 4(1) and (2)).

It’s probably appropriate that the judgement starts with a statutory definition, given that the whole case was about the interpretation of the word, “landed”. What did this mean, in the context of the Fisheries Act, given that, under sections 4(3) to (5):

(3) Regulations under this section may impose a levy either –

(a) in respect of the weight of sea fish or sea fish products landed in the United Kingdom or trans-shipped within British fishery limits at a prescribed rate which, in the case of sea fish, shall not exceed 2p per kilogram; or
(b) in respect of the value, ascertained in the prescribed manner, of sea fish or sea fish products landed or trans-shipped as aforesaid at a prescribed rate not exceeding 1 per cent of that value.

(4) If regulations under this section impose a levy as provided in subsection (3)(a) above the prescribed rate in relation to any sea fish product shall be such that its yield will not in the opinion of the Authority exceed the yield from a levy at the rate of 2p per kilogram on the sea fish required on average (whether alone or together with any other substance or article) to produce a kilogram of that product.

(5) Different rates may be prescribed for sea fish or sea fish products of different descriptions; ….

The meaning of “landed” was considered at the Court of Appeal, which followed the literal rule that the word be given its normal meaning. This was considered not to include the import of fish by road (ferry or Channel Tunnel) or by air, with no other factors sufficient to displace this interpretation.

The Supreme Court, however, put the emphasis for statutory construction on “the statutory purpose and the general scheme by which it is to be put into effect” (paragraph 10, per Lord Mance). It decided that the SFIA was set up and given powers in respect of all importers of sea fish, not just those that landed fist directly off fishing vessels in British ports. This is a classic case of the Supreme Court taking a purposive interpretation of a statutory provision to ensure that there is no potential infringement of European Union law (here, Article 110 TFEU), as it is required to do by European Union case law (Case 73/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1533). This European Union case law is incorporated into English law by the European Communities Act 1972 (section 3(2)). However, the Supreme Court did consider the rule in Pepper v Hart ([1993] AC 593), which allows a court to consider Hansard and Parliament exchanges in order to resolve an ambiguous term in a statute. Even considering application of the rule, the Supreme Court came down in favour of the broad interpretation of “landed”.

So one the basis of this simplified explanation, you might wonder how the case ever got to the Supreme Court. There was a significant argument about whether the levy imposed by the SFIA was a “charge having equivalent effect to customs duty”, which is prohibited under European Union law (Articles 28-30 TFEU), or an internal tax for the purposes of Article 110 TFEU.

There was an interesting observation made by the Supreme Court, which emphasised an aspect of statutory interpretation that is rarely considered: customary use. The applicants in this case sought to overturn the levy in imported sea fish, even though everyone in the industry had been paying levies on the basis of the broad interpretation of the term “landed” for almost 30 years. The Supreme Court noted that:

there must be, at the very least, a powerful presumption that the meaning that has customarily been given to the phrase in issue is the correct one ” (Paragraph 58, per Lord Phillips)

Bloomsbury International Limited and the other respondents were therefore unsuccessful in avoiding the sea fish levy. Perhaps a case of trying to be too clever?