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Saturday, March 29, 2014

How will Jokowi’s policies shape up?

The nomination of Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as the
presidential nominee from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P) was met with relief.

After public pressure, especially
from within the party, the party’s chairperson, Megawati Soekarnoputri,
issued an executive order announcing Jokowi as the party’s nominee for
the July presidential election.Many predict the elections are
over. For the next five years at least, Indonesia may be run by the
PDI-P, who many predict will control the majority of seats in the House
of Representatives and will also have Jokowi as president.

While
the shape of the next government will also be decided by the PDI-P
coalition partners and the coalition arrangement, the PDI-P will have
the clear upper hand in this coalition, which will be different from
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s rainbow (but ineffective)
coalition.

Is the PDI-P the same party that ruled Indonesia more than a decade ago? The answer is probably yes and no.

On
the one hand, during the decade in opposition, the party has been
rejuvenated. Young blood has been added. Many civil society activists
entered politics through this party. Intellectualism in the party that
had hitherto been absent has increased tremendously in the past few
years.

The election of party members such as Jokowi, Surabaya
Mayor Tri Rismaharini and Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, has
revived public trust in the party. These individuals have provided
examples of participatory leadership and have insisted on the reform of
Indonesia’s corrupt bureaucracy.

Public enthusiasm for the
PDI-P’s return to power is testimony to this decade-long rejuvenation,
but the party’s platform remains the same. The obsession with keeping
Indonesia a unitary state despite the plurality of different regions in
the country seems as strong as ever. Disdain for the constitutional
amendments that provided the constitutional grounds for Indonesia’s
democracy after Reformasi has also not subsided.

Judging by the
past experience of the PDI-P’s ruling days and the recent style of
leadership applied by the PDI-P’s subnational leaders, we can try to
make an educated guess on what sort of policies and outlook a Jokowi
administration would take.

The clearest outlook is about the
leadership style Jokowi will apply in office. He will likely be
approachable and attempt to open up access for public participation.

He
would also continue to put an emphasis on bureaucracy reform. One
criterion to measure the success of his ministers would be the degree of
responsiveness to public concerns and how effective public services can
be provided.

It is still unclear, however, how he would transfer
his experience in Surakarta, commonly known as Solo, and Jakarta to the
national bureaucracy. One difficulty would immediately arise if
Jokowi’s cabinet is like SBY’s multiparty cabinet, with representatives
from different political parties.

The other challenge is
decentralization, with the power of authority devolved to the
subnational governments, leaving the national government with residual
supervisory power, except in religious affairs, finance, defense and
foreign policy. It would be interesting to see the dynamics between
Jokowi and subnational leaders.

Also in question is whether a
PDI-P majority in the legislature would revise the law on regional
autonomy that many perceive has given too much power to the regions,
thus bringing back some authority to the central government, a move
that, if pursued, would incite opposition from the regions.

How
would a Jokowi presidency approach the issue of special autonomy in Aceh
and Papua? The PDI-P’s view that the handling of Aceh and Papua run
contrary to the unitary state principle are publicly known.

While
it is difficult to roll back the special autonomy enjoyed by the
Acehnese as a result of an internationally brokered peace deal, the
future of Papua remains uncertain. Jokowi may not revive an oppressive
Military Operation Zone (DOM) and instead would likely engage the
Papuans in dialogue.

But the question remains, what kind of
political solution will he offer to the Papuans? If he continues the
line of the current government by refusing to acknowledge Papua’s
history and local symbols, then dialogue would not progress. But if he
is willing to adopt former president Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid’s
approach of acknowledging these things, he will risk stern opposition
from conservative elements in his own party.

On social
cohesiveness, Jokowi will likely adopt a policy that addresses the issue
of discrimination against minority groups, perhaps more decisively than
what SBY has attempted. This explains the large support for Jokowi from
minority groups and the vehement opposition of Islamist groups.

But
decentralization would probably besiege him. Many of the subnational
governments that adopted discriminatory regulations have done so on the
pretext of their devolved authority, despite the arrangement that
religious affairs fall under the authority of central government.

It
will be interesting to see if Jokowi invokes this constitutional
mandate against opposition from various groups and local authorities.

On
the economy, Jokowi’s past experience demonstrates an affinity to small
and medium businesses. So it is probable that his economic policy will
have some populist components.

It is still unclear, however, if
his administration will be pro-businesses in the face of greater global
trade liberalization. While some people in his party and other
presidential candidates have advocated a Hugo Chavez-like
nationalization policy, especially in extractive sectors, Jokowi has
never been quoted as supporting this kind of viewpoint, at least not
yet.

Jokowi’s stance on defense and foreign policy are far less
known. He has never spoken for or against SBY’s build-up of the
Indonesian Military (TNI). There is a possibility that he will review
this policy and change course if he thinks that it diverts too many
resources from the public services that he will probably focus on. If
this is done, then he will risk losing support from the TNI.

Jokowi
has gained some exposure internationally. But this is more about his
style of governing, found to be fresh and innovative. His own views on
foreign policy are still unknown.

He would be shadowed by the
legacy of SBY’s relative successes in foreign policy, especially in
Indonesia’s role in the Group of Twenty (G20), the United Nations, ASEAN
and other initiatives, such as the Open Government Partnership and the
Bali Democracy Forum. Jokowi would need to step up to the role of a
leader of 250 million people.

While it is understandable that as a
subnational leader, Jokowi has not had the opportunity to express
opinions on many of these matters, the announcement of his candidacy and
the likelihood of his election in July has created the necessity for
him to emerge with views and opinions.

The public deserves to know before they step into the voting booth.The writer is executive director of the TIFA Foundation.