[177] Sputnik unleashed
all the pent-up desires of U.S. space proponents in both the military
and civilian sectors. The military advantages of satellites for
reconnaissance and communications were obvious, but plans ranged far
beyond these applications. For years the Air Force had quietly been
preparing for manned flight into space. The Army was more aggressive,
speaking of moon bases as the ultimate "high ground." The Army also
had the superb missile development team of ABMAwith over three
[178]
thousand engineers and technicians to provide sound, detailed
proposals. Maj. Gen. J.B. Medaris, ABMA commander, was a strong space
advocate and had the backing of those above him, especially the blunt
and aggressive Secretary of the Army, Wilbur Brucker. Navy space
enthusiasts lacked high-level support, hence the Navy was not a
strong competitor. The Air Force, with responsibility for
intercontinental ballistic missiles, viewed space as a logical
extension of its airspace. It was already skirmishing with the Army
over the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs and this extended into their bid for
a role in space.

With the big money in the military and their
traditional role of spearheading costly flight developments, a strong
civilian role in space appeared remote. Even the first scientific
satellites were managed and controlled by the military, although the
scientific community had access to the resulting data. Almost
everyone assumed that the same arrangements would characterize future
U.S. space efforts.

The only civilian government group seriously
in the space role competition was the normally quiet and timid
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which had almost
missed the boat on jet propulsion twenty years earlier. NACA had
smart, eager young men as well as wise old officials, and some of
both groups were determined not to miss the opportunities offered by
space exploration. The NACA lacked the money and clout of the
military services and traditionally cooperated with the military on
expensive development projects, such as the X series of experimental
aircraft. The military provided the funds, managed the development
and initial operations, while the NACA provided the instrumentation
and analyzed the experimental results. Eventually, the aircraft were
turned over to NACA. In its first proposals for space exploration,
NACA's director Hugh Dryden envisioned the same sort of working
relationship, but both he and the military reckoned without the will
of the ex-military man in the White House.

President Eisenhower was well aware of the
interservice rivalries as well as the international implications of a
peaceful effort for space exploration. In response to Sputnik, he had
allowed the Army to proceed with a back-up to Vanguard, but he had
not accepted the concept of a significant military effort in space.
In November 1957, he appointed an old and trusted friend and advisor,
James R. Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, to be his special assistant for science and technology.
Killian and his science advisory committee played a key role in
influencing the policy for space research during the months that
followed. That policy turned in favor of a civilian space
program.