US Has been
preparing to turn
America into a military dictatorship

From the Rodney King riots to unannounced
"training" exercises over American cities, the US military is being
trained to turn the United States into a dictatorship.

Here
you see the local police, dressed up like Nazi thugs, lined up military
fashion to join the war games. Across America our "peace officers" have
transformed into "law enforcers." Whereas the blue and white garbed friendly
policeman of the past was someone you might call to help rescue your cat out
of the tree or invite in for a cup of coffee, law-abiding Americans now dread
a visit from the ski-masked, jackbooted thugs.

Over and over again, the
innocent are victimized by out-of-control police "forces" that repeatedly raid
the wrong houses, violate the Fourth Amendment, stooping so low as to shoot
family dogs. Think that the way the police in this picture look like the
military is a coincidence? Think again. The move to militarize the police has
been snowballing over recent years. Police now train like the military, dress
like the military, use military weapons and call citizens "civilians". And of
course they have been working with the military, as they are prepared to do in
this picture taken by Alex Jones during Operation: Urban Warrior.

U.S. MILITARY CIVIL
DISTURBANCE PLANNING: THE WAR AT HOME!

By Frank Morales

Under
the heading of "civil disturbance planning", the U.S. military is training
troops and police to suppress democratic opposition in America. The master
plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, is code-named,
"Operation Garden Plot". Originated in 1968, the "operational plan" has
been updated over the last three decades, most recently in 1991. The plan
was activated during the Los Angeles "riots" of 1992, and more than likely
during the recent anti-WTO "Battle in Seattle."

Current U.S. military preparations for
suppressing domestic civil disturbance, including the training of National
Guard troops and police, are part of a long history of American "internal
security" measures dating back to the first American Revolution.
Generally, these measures have sought to thwart the aims of social justice
movements, embodying the concept that within the civilian body politic
lurks an enemy that one day the military might have to fight, or at least
be ordered to fight.

Equipped with flexible "military operations
in urban terrain" and "operations other than war" doctrine, lethal and
"less-than-lethal" high-tech weaponry, US "armed forces" and "elite"
militarized police units are being trained to eradicate "disorder",
"disturbance" and "civil disobedience" in America. Further, it may very
well be that police/military "civil disturbance" planning is the animating
force and the overarching logic behind the incredible nationwide growth of
police paramilitary units, a growth which coincidentally mirrors rising
levels of police violence directed at the American people, particularly
"non-white" poor and working people.

Military spokespeople, "judge advocates"
(lawyers) and their congressional supporters aggressively take the
position that legal obstacles to military involvement in domestic law
enforcement civil disturbance operations, such as the 1878 Posse Comitatus
Act, have been nullified. Legislated "exceptions" and private
commercialization of various aspects of U.S. military-law enforcement
efforts have supposedly removed their activities from the legal reach of
the "public domain". Possibly illegal, ostensible "training" scenarios
like the recent "Operation Urban Warrior" no-notice "urban terrain" war
games, which took place in dozens of American cities, are thinly disguised
"civil disturbance suppression" exercises. Meanwhile, President Clinton
recently appointed a "domestic military czar", a sort of national chief of
police. You can bet that he is well versed in Garden Plot requirements
involved in "homeland defense".

Ominously, many assume that the training of
military and police forces to suppress "outlawed" behavior of citizens,
along with the creation of extensive and sophisticated "emergency" social
response networks set to spring into action in the event of "civil
unrest", is prudent and acceptable in a democracy. And yet, does not this
assumption beg the question as to what civil unrest is? One could argue
for example, that civil disturbance is nothing less than democracy in
action, a message to the powers-that-be that the people want change. In
this instance "disturbing behavior" may actually be the exercising of
ones' right to resist oppression. Unfortunately, the American
corporate/military directorship, which has the power to enforce its'
definition of "disorder", sees democracy as a threat and permanent
counter-revolution as a "national security" requirement.

The elite military/corporate sponsors of
Garden Plot have their reasons for civil disturbance contingency planning.
Lets' call it the paranoia of the thief. Their rationale is simple:
self-preservation. Fostering severe and targeted "austerity", massive
inequality and unbridled greed, while shifting more and more billions to
the generals and the rich, the de-regulated "entities of force" and their
interlocking corporate directors know quite well what their policies are
engendering, namely, a growing resistance.

Consequently, they are systematically
organizing to protect their interests, their profits, and their criminal
conspiracies. To this end, they are rapidly consolidating an
infrastructure of repression designed to "suppress rebellion" against
their "authority". Or more conveniently put, to suppress "rebellion
against the authority of the United States." And so, as the Pentagon
Incorporated increases itsı imperialist violence around the world, the
chickens have indeed come home to roost here in America in the form of a
national security doctrine obsessed with domestic "insurgency" and the
need to preemptively neutralize it. Its' code-name: "Garden Plot".

Recently, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon
"acknowledged that the Air Force wrongfully started and financed a highly
classified, still-secret project, known as a black program without
informing Congress last year." The costs and nature of these projects "are
the most classified secrets in the Pentagon."(1) Could it be that the
current United States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2 Garden Plot is
one such program financed from this secret budget? We have a right to
know. And following Seattle, we have the need to know.

As this and numerous other documents reveal,
U.S. military training in civil disturbance "suppression", which targets
the American public, is in full operation today. The formulation of
legitimizing doctrine, the training in the "tactics and techniques" of
"civil disturbance suppression", and the use of "non-lethal" weaponry, are
ongoing, financed by tax dollars. The overall operation is called Garden
Plot. And according to the bosses at the Pentagon, "US forces deployed to
assist federal and local authorities during times if civil disturbance
will follow use-of-force policy found in Department of Defense Civil
Disturbance Plan-Garden Plot." (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of
Engagement, Appendix A, 1 October 1994.)

Rochester,
New York is the former home of Frederick Douglassıs, North Star newspaper.
In 1964, it erupted in one of the first large-scale urban outbursts of the
decade. Precipitated by white police violence against the black community,
the July uprising lasted several days, subsiding only after the arrival of
1500 National Guardsmen. In "the fall of 1964, the FBI, at the direction
of President Johnson, began to make riot control training available to
local police departments, and by mid-1967 such training assistance had
been extended to more than 70,000 officials and civilians."(2)

On July 29, 1967, President Johnson issued
Executive Order 11365, establishing the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders. It is more commonly known as the Kerner Commission, named
for itıs chair, former Major General, and then Governor of Illinois, Otto
Kerner. The creation of the commission came hot on the heels of the
violence in Detroit, a conflict which left 43 dead, several hundred
wounded and over 5,000 people homeless. Johnson sent troubleshooter Cyrus
Vance, later Secretary of Defense, as his personal observer to Detroit.
The commission issued itsı final report, completed in less than a year, on
March 1, 1968.

Although the Kerner Commission has over the
years become associated with a somewhat benign, if not benevolent
character, codifying the obvious, "we live in two increasingly separate
Americaıs" etc., the fact is that the commission itself was but one
manifestation of a massive military/police counter-insurgency effort
directed against US citizens, hatched in an era of emergent post-Vietnam
"syndrome" coupled with elite fears of domestic insurrection. While
the movement chanted for peace and revolution, rebellious, angry and
destructive urban uprisings were occurring with alarming frequency,
usually the result of the usual spark, police brutality, white on black
crime. The so-called urban riots of 1967-1968 were the zenith, during this
period, of social and class conflict. "More than 160 disorders occurred in
some 128 American cities in the first nine months of 1967."(3)

The executive order establishing the
commission called for an investigation of "the origins of the recent major
civil disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals
dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence."(4) The work of
the commission was funded from President Johnsonıs "Emergency Fund." The
executive order sought recommendations in three general areas: "short term
measures to prevent riots, better measures to contain riots once they
begin, and long term measures to eliminate riots in the future."(5) Their
two immediate aims were "to control and repress black rioters using almost
any available means", (6) and to assure white America that everything was
in hand. Commission members included Charles B. Thorton, Chairman and CEO,
Litton Industries, member of the Defense Industry Advisory Council to the
DOD and the National Security Industrial Association, John L. Atwood,
President and CEO, North American Rockwell Corporation ("Commission
Advisor on Private Enterprise"), and Herbert Jenkins, Atlanta Chief of
Police and President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

During the early stages of staff recruitment,
commission Deputy Executive Director Victor H. Palmieri "described the
process as a war strategy"(7) and so he might given the overwhelming
presence within the commission and itsı consultants of military and police
officials. One quarter of over 200 consultants listed were big-city police
chiefs, like Daryl F. Gates, former chief LAPD. Numerous police
organizations, including the heavily funded Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (financiers of SWAT), guided the commissionıs
deliberations. No less than 30 police departments were represented on or
before the commission by their chiefs or deputy chiefs.

A key player within the commission,
"consultant" Anthony Downs, stated at the time that, "it would be far
cheaper to repress future large-scale urban violence through police and
military action than to pay for effective programs against remaining
poverty." (8) As for the military, twelve generals, representing various
branches of the armed services appeared before the commission or served as
contractors. The commissionıs "Director of Investigations", Milan C.
Miskovsky, was "on leave as assistant general counsel of the treasury, and
formerly connected to the Central Intelligence Agency."(9)

The
Kerner Commissionıs "study" of "civil disorder" lead directly to
(civilian) recommendations regarding the role of the military in domestic
affairs. The report dutifully "commends the Army for the advanced status
of its training." Further, it states that "the Department of the Army
should participate fully in efforts to develop non-lethal weapons and
personal protective equipment appropriate for use in civil disorders." In
addition, "the Army should investigate the possibility of utilizing
psychological techniques to ventilate hostility and lessen tension in riot
control, and incorporate feasible techniques in training the Army and
National Guard units."

Under the heading, "Army Response To Civil
Disorders", the commission report states that "the commitment of federal
troops to aid state and local forces in controlling a disorder is an
extraordinary act. An Army staff task group has recently examined
and reviewed a wide range of topics relating to military operations to
control urban disorders: command and control, logistics, training,
planning, doctrine, personnel, public information, intelligence, and legal
aspects." The results of the Army brassıs study was subsequently, "made
known to the National Guard and to top state and local civil and law
enforcement officers in order to stimulate review at the state and local
level."(10)

The Army Task Force which assisted the Kerner
Commission issued itsı own report in early 1968. In it, the Pentagon took
a multi-pronged approach to solving the civil disturbance problem.
"Expanding the suggestion of Cyrus Vance, Military Intelligence ­ working
with the FBI, local, county and state police forces ­ undertook a massive
domestic intelligence gathering operation the Senior Officers Civil
Disturbance Course was instituted at the Military Police Academy in
Georgia Security forces ranging from Army troops to local police were
trained to implement their contingency plans Contingency plans, called
planning packets, were prepared for every city in the country that had a
potential for student, minority or labor unrest."(11)

In addition, "the Army Task Force that had
designed this program took on a new name, the Directorate of Civil
Disturbance Planning and Operations. The Army Task Force transformation
into the Directorate occurred during the massive rioting that broke out in
black ghettos of 19 cities after the assassination of Martin Luther King
in April 1968."(12) At that time "seven army infantry brigades, totaling
21,000 troops were available for riot duty. And a hugh, sophisticated
computer center kept track of all public outbursts of political dissent,
thereby furnishing the first of the Army Task Forceıs prescribed remedies:
intelligence."(13)

By June of 1968, the Directorate had become
the Directorate of Military Support, setting up shop in the basement of
the Pentagon. "Better known as the domestic war room, the Directorate had
150 officials to carry out around-the-clock monitoring of civil disorders,
as well as to oversee federal troop deployments when necessary. At the
cost of $2.7 million, this massive directorate also developed policy
advice for the secretary of the Army on all disturbances and maintained
intelligence packets on all major U.S. cities."(14)

Even though the full extent of US military
intelligence activities during this period is far from generally known,
"by 1968, many Justice Department personnel knew that the military was
preparing to move in massively if needed to quash urban riots, and some
officials feared the development of a large national military riot force.
It was well known among top officials that the Department of Defense was
spending far more funds than the Justice Department on civil disorder
preparations indicative of the growing trend at the federal level toward
repression and control of the urban black rioters."(15)

By 1971, Senator Sam Ervin, later of
Watergate renown, had convened his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
which "revealed that Military Intelligence had established an intricate
surveillance system covering hundreds of thousands of American citizens.
Committee staff members had seen a master plan - Garden Plot ­ that gave
an eagle eye view of the Army-National Guard-police strategy."(16) "At
first, the Garden Plot exercises focused primarily on racial conflict. But
beginning in 1970, the scenarios took a different twist. The joint teams,
made up of cops, soldiers and spies, began practicing battle with large
groups of protesters. California, under the leadership of Ronald Reagan,
was among the most enthusiastic participants in Garden Plot war
games."(17)

As time went on, "Garden Plot evolved into a
series of annual training exercises based on contingency plans to undercut
riots and demonstrations, ultimately developed for every major city in the
United States. Participants in the exercises included key officials from
all law enforcement agencies in the nation, as well as the National Guard,
the military, and representatives of the intelligence community According
to the plan, joint teams would react to a variety of scenarios based on
information gathered through political espionage and informants. The
object was to quell urban unrest"(18)

Unrest of a different sort took place on the
evening of February 27th 1973. At that time, a group of Native Americans
occupied a trading post in the village of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge
Reservation in South Dakota. By the 2nd of March the takeover had
"triggered the army contingency plan for domestic disturbances. Emergency
Plans White ­ now coded as Garden Plot ­ brought the Army into South
Dakota Three army colonels, disguised as civilians, and reconnaissance
planes assisted", while "the Justice Department used the army to conduct
intelligence for civilian law enforcement around Wounded Knee."(19)
Information on other instances in which Garden Plot was "triggered" over
the intervening years is presently locked in Pentagon vaults.

In essence, the contemporary roots of
militarized efforts to suppress domestic rebellion lie in the US Armyıs
master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden
Plot. Since at least 1968, the military has expended millions of dollars
in this effort. The plan is operative right now, most recently during and
after the Los Angeles uprising of 1992. A view into details of this plan
is possible by way of an examination of United States Air Force Civil
Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot which is the "implementing" and
"supporting plan for the Department of the Army (DA) Civil Disturbance
Plan - GARDEN PLOT ­ dated 1 March 1984 (which) provides for the
employment of USAF forces in civil disturbances." It is specifically drawn
up "to support the Secretary of the Army, as DOD Executive Agent for civil
disturbance control operations (nicknamed GARDEN PLOT), with airlift and
logistical support, in assisting civil authorities in the restoration of
law and order through appropriate military commanders in the 50 States,
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and US possessions
and territories, or any political subdivision thereof." The plan "is
effective for planning on receipt and for execution on order."(20)

U.S. AIR FORCE 55-2 - GARDEN PLOT

"The
long title of the plan is United States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan
55-2, Employment of USAF Forces in Civil Disturbances. The short title of
this document is USAF Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2. The nickname assigned
by Department of the Army is GARDEN PLOT."

The plan opens with some basic "assumptions",
namely that "civil disturbances requiring intervention with military
forces may occur simultaneously in any of the 50 States, District of
Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories."
And like the current situation in Vieques, Puerto Rico, "civil
disturbances will normally develop over a period of time." In the event it
evolves into a confrontational situation, under Garden Plot, it is a
"presidential executive order" that "will authorize and direct the
Secretary of Defense to use the Armed Forces of the United States to
restore law and order."

According to the Air Force plan, the military
will attempt "to suppress rebellion whenever the President considers that
unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against
the authority of the United States, make it impractical to enforce the
laws of the United States in any state or territory by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings(10 USC 332)". Applying itsı own version of equal
protection under the law, the military can intervene "when insurrection,
domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in a state so
hinder or obstruct the execution of the laws as to deprive individuals of
their Constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities or when the
insurrection impedes the due course of justice, and only when the
constituted authorities of the state are unable, fail or refuse to protect
that right, privilege, immunity, or to give that protection (10 USC 333)."
In other words, the Army makes an offer of "protection" that the citizenry
canıt refuse.

T.Alden Williams, in a sympathetic 1969
treatment of the Army in civil disturbances, put it this way: "Where
officials have not shown determination, or have invited violence by
predicting it, violence has developed. Hence, it follows that with few
exceptions, serious riots are evidence of police failure and that,
implicitly, it is at the point of police failure that states and their
cities redeem their national constitutional guarantees and the Regular
Army may be asked to intervene."(21) Some redemption.

According to the Air Force plan's
"Classification Guidance", the roughly 200 page document "is UNCLASSIFIED
and does not come within the scope of direction governing the protection
of information affecting national security. Although it is UNCLASSIFIED,
it is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY as directed by AFR 12-30. This plan contains
information that is of internal use to DOD and, through disclosure, would
tend to allow persons to violate the law or hinder enforcement of the
law." Consequently, the planıs "operations orders and operating procedures
must be designed to provide the highest degree of security possible."
Therefore "the entire staff should identify known or suspected opposition
awareness of previous operations and operations plans", while "procedures
should be designed to eliminate the suspect sources to the degree
possible." And "in the event of organized opposition some sort of advisory
intelligence gathering capability should be assumed."

The
Air Force document warns, under the heading of "Open Literature Threat",
presaging current military discourse on "info-war", that "any
information/document, though seemingly unclassified, which reveals
information concerning this Plan is a threat to OPSEC (operational
security)" This is especially true given the nature of the "Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) Threat." Recognizing that, "prior to and during
sustained military operations in Support of the Plan, the potential HUMINT
threat could be considerable", the plan recommends that "every effort
should be made to reduce vulnerability to this threat by adhering to OPSEC
procedures and safeguarding Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)."

Under "Operations to be Conducted:
Deployment", the Air Force plan states that "a civil disturbance condition
(CIDCON) system which has been established to provide an orderly and
timely increase in preparedness for designated forces to deploy for civil
disturbances control operations, will be on an as required basis for USAF
resources for such operations as aerial resupply, aerial reconnaissance,
airborne psychological operations, command and control communications
systems, aeromedical evacuation, helicopter and weather support." The Air
Force does have some experience in this area. "In response to the US
invasion of Cambodia, student unrest broke out. Under Operation Garden
Plot, from 30 April through May 4, 1970, 9th Air Force airlift units
transported civil disturbance control forces from Ft. Bragg to various
locations throughout the eastern US."(22) In fact, two years earlier, "Air
Force Reserve C-119 and C-124 units participated in Garden Plot operations
set up to quell domestic strife that followed the assassination of Martin
Luther King."(23)

Although the section on "Counterintelligence
Targets and Requirements" is "omitted", the plan does specify itsı
targets, namely, those "disruptive elements, extremists or dissidents
perpetrating civil disorder." A "civil disturbance" is defined as a "riot,
acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or
other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil
disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring the use of federal
armed forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15, Title 10, United
States Code." Conditions precipitating Garden Plot activation are "those
that threaten to reach or have reached such proportions that civil
authorities cannot or will not maintain public order." As for legal
authority, "the Constitution of the United States and numerous statutes
provide the President with the authority to commit Federal military forces
within the United States DOD Directive 3025.12 provides guidance in
committing Federal armed forces."

The "application of forces should be in the
following order: local and state police, Army and (in support role) Air
National Guard under State control, Federal civil law enforcement
officials, federal military forces to include Army and (in support role)
Air National Guard." According to the plan, "State Adjutants General
prepare civil disturbance plans for the employment of National Guard units
under state control." Specifically, "as a general rule for planning
purposes, the minimum forces to be supported in any single objective area
is 5,000. The maximum to be supported is 12,000 for any objective area
other than Washington, DC and 18,000 for Washington, DC." The "objective
areas" are "those specified by the Presidential Proclamation and Executive
Order in which the Secretary of Defense has been directed to restore law
and order", and as "further defined by the Letter of Instruction issued to
Task Force Commanders by the Chief of Staff, US Army."

In order to avoid the unseemly implications
of "martial law", "requirements for the commitment of Federal military
forces will not result in the declaration of a National Emergency". In
this regard, the "Public Affairs Objectives" include the development of
"procedures for the public release of appropriate information regarding
civil disturbance control operations." Media and other queries "concerning
employment of control forces may be locally answered by an interim
statement that the: Department of Defense policy is not to comment on
plans concerning the possible employment of military units and resources
to carry out assigned missions."

Concerning
"Force Requirements", the plan states that, "US Army and Marine Corps
units designated for civil disturbance operations will be trained,
equipped and maintained in readiness for rapid deployment, (with) ten
brigades, prepared for rapid deployment anywhere in CONUS. A Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) will be considered to be on a 24 ­ hour alert status
and capable of attaining a CIDCON 4 status in 12 hours" Upon receipt of
orders, "the Task Force Commander assumes operational control of the
military ground forces assigned for employment in the objective area",
including "specials operations assets." In case the soldiers are
unfamiliar with "urban terrain", the "Defense Mapping Agency Topographic
Center provides map services in support of civil disturbance planning and
operations."

The "Summary of the Counterintelligence and
Security Situation" states that "spontaneous civil disturbances which
involve large numbers of persons and/or which continue for a considerable
period of time, may exceed the capacity of local civil law enforcement
agencies to suppress. Although this type of activity can arise without
warning as a result of sudden, unanticipated popular unrest (past riots in
such cities as Miami, Detroit and Los Angeles serve as examples) it may
also result from more prolonged dissidence." USAF Garden Plot advises that
"if military forces are called upon to restore order, they must expect to
have only limited information available regarding the perpetrators, their
motives, capabilities, and intentions. On the other hand, such events
which occur as part of a prolonged series of dissident acts will usually
permit the advance collection of that type of information"

The United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), "provides training programs and doctrine for civil
disturbance operations to military services." The US Army Force Command (FORSCOM),
"organizes, trains, and maintains in readiness Army forces for civil
disturbance operations", while the Director of Military Support (DOMS),
"conducts, on a no-notice basis, exercises which direct headquarters of
uniformed services, appropriate CONUS command, and other DOD components,
having GARDEN PLOT responsibilities to assume a simulated increased
preparedness for specified forces." In addition, the DOMS, "maintains an
around-the-clock civil disturbance command center to monitor incipient and
on-going disturbances."

The document, the United States Air Forceıs
"implementing plan" for the US Armyıs Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden
Plot, goes on to detail every aspect of military "suppression" of
"rebellion against the authority of the United States", including who
pays, who bills and how to secure "loans" to cover the costs "attributable
to GARDEN PLOT." Ominously, under "Resources Employed Without Presidential
Directive", the document states that when the "immediate employment of
military resources is required in cases of sudden and unexpected civil
disturbances or other emergencies endangering life or federal property, or
disrupting the normal processes of Government, expenses incurred will be
financed as a mission responsibility of the DOD component employing the
military resources."

PENTAGON DIRECTIVES

Department
of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)
became effective on February 4, 1994 when signed by then Defense Secretary
William Perry. It states that, "the President is authorized by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to suppress insurrections,
rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and
circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government and the
Department of Defense for civil disturbances are important, do to the
potential severity of the consequences of such events for the Nation and
the population." (24) Further, "the Secretary of the Army, as DoD
Executive Agent, shall provide guidance to the other DoD Components,
through DoD 3025.12-R, the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT), or
both, in accordance with this Directive".

DoDD 3025.12 makes it clear that "MACDIS
operations are unprogrammed emergency requirements for the Department of
Defense", and that in order to "ensure essential control and sound
management of all military forces employed in MACDIS operations,
centralized direction from the DoD Executive Agent (the Army) shall guide
planning by the DoD component." Thus, "MACDIS missions shall be
decentralized through the DoD Planning Agents or other Joint Task Force
Commanders only when specifically directed by the DoD Executive Agent."

According to the directive, the "Army and Air
National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military
assistance to state and local governments in civil disturbances."
Accordingly, "the Army National Guard State Area Commands (STARCs) shall
plan for contingency use of non-Federalized National Guard forces for
civil disturbance operations." The directive further outlines policy,
guidelines, and legal justification for "military assistance for civil
disturbances", including policy regarding domestic law enforcement,
designating the Army as "the principle point of contact between the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) for
planning and executing MACDIS."

The militarization of domestic "law
enforcement" is founded, in part, upon Department of Defense Directive
5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, dated
January 15, 1986, five years after Congressional "drug warriors" passed
the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act.
Referencing the 1971 version of DODD 3025.12 (above), Directive 5525.5
states that, "it is DoD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement
officials to the extent practicalconsistent with the needs of national
security and military preparedness." (25) In addition, "the Military
Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training to Federal, State,
and local civilian law enforcement officials."

Apparently, military Judge Advocates
(lawyers) have no problem with the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, (18
U.S.C.1385) which states that: "Whoever, except in cases and under
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years or both." Nor is there much concern
shown for "the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement
in civilian law enforcement activities" cited by the military.

For even though the Posse Comitatus Act is
cited within the Directive as "the primary restriction on military
participation in civilian law enforcement activities", it is rendered null
and void in deference to "actions that are taken for the primary purpose
of furthering a military or foreign affairs function." In fact, "under
guidance established by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and
the Directors of the Defense Agencies concerned, the planning and
execution of compatible military training and operations may take into
account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials for information
when the collection of the information is an incidental aspect of training
performed for a military purpose."

United States Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil
Disturbances, dated November 1985, is designed to provide hands-on
"guidance for the commander and his staff in preparing for and providing
assistance to civil authorities in civil disturbance control operations."
(26) The Army manual opens by noting that, "the DA Civil Disturbance Plan,
known as Garden Plot, provides guidance to all DOD components in planning
civil disturbance missions." Its' thirteen chapters cover, in depth, every
aspect of military "tasks and techniques employed to control civil
disturbances and neutralize special threats." Subjects include the nature
of civil disturbances, participants ("the crowd"), federal intervention,
information planning ("intelligence"), control force operations, crowd
control operations, threat analysis ("criminal activists"), about which
"law enforcement sources can provide useful information", riot control
agents, extreme force options, apprehension, detention, and training.

According to the Army manual, "civil
disturbances in any form are prejudicial to public law and order." They
"arise from acts of civil disobedience", and "occur most often when
participants in mass acts of civil disobedience become antagonistic toward
authority, and authorities must struggle to wrest the initiative from an
unruly crowd." They are caused by "political grievances" and "urban
economic conflicts", or maybe even by "agents of foreign nations", but
mostly, "urban conflicts and community unrest arise from highly emotional
social and economic issues." And in a statement that resonates with the
"benign neglect" of some years ago, the manual points out that
disturbances may arise because "economically deprived inner-city residents
may perceive themselves treated unjustly or ignored by the people in
power."

Utilizing Garden Plot language, the manual
states that "the president can employ armed federal troops to suppress
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful assemblies, and conspiracy if
such acts deprive the people of their constitutional rights and a stateıs
civil authorities cannot or will not provide adequate protection." Never
mind the Congress or Constitution, "federal intervention in civil
disturbances begins with the issuance of a presidential proclamation to
the citizens engaged in the disturbance." In other words, the President
reads "the riot act" and "a control force" is sent in to "isolate the
disturbance area." The goal is to "isolate the people creating the
disturbance from those who have not yet become actively involved."

According to FM 19-15, the Army can gather
intelligence on civilians if their "activities can be linked directly to a
distinct threat of a civil disturbance that may involve federal forces."
This is especially important, given that "during civil disturbances many
people engage in unlawful behavior." Therefore, "when at all possible,
civil law enforcement agents are integrated with the military control
force team making apprehensions", and "if police are not available,
military personnel may search people incident to an apprehension." Useful
measures for "isolating an area include barriers, patrols, pass and ID
systems, and control of public utilities." Also, "imposing a curfew is a
highly effective control measure in many civil disturbances." Army
"saturation patrols", "integrated with civil police patrols", blanket the
area, creating "the psychological impression of the control force being
everywhere at once."

The Army field manual points out that when
"control forces" resort to "forceful measures" they can turn to a host of
weaponry, including "the M234, which is a nondeadly force measure, to the
machine gun, which is the most deadly force measure." The manual states
that "machine guns, 7.62 millimeter and below, may accompany units on
civil disturbance missions." In addition, the "control forces" can utilize
the M234 launcher, which is "a riot control weapon" mounted on an M16
rifle which "fires a projectile that causes pain on impact." In addition,
"the riot shotgun is an extremely versatile weapon. Its appearance and
capability have a strong psychological effect on rioters."

The concept of martial rule, as distinct from
martial law, is not written, and therefore is an eminently more workable
arrangement for "law enforcement forces". Thatıs because, as FM 19-15
points out, "martial rule is based on public necessity. Public necessity
in this sense means public safety." According to the manual, U.S. state
authorities "may take such action within their own jurisdictions." And
yet, "whether or not martial rule has been proclaimed, commanders must
weigh each proposed action against the threat to public order and safety.
If the need for martial rule arises, the military commander at the scene
must so inform the Army Chief of Staff and await instructions. If martial
rule is imposed, the civilian population must be informed of the
restrictions and rules of conduct that the military can enforce."
Realizing the power of free speech, the manual suggests that "during a
civil disturbance, it may be advisable to prevent people from assembling.
Civil law can make it unlawful for people to meet to plan an act of
violence, rioting, or civil disturbance. Prohibitions on assembly may
forbid gatherings at any place and time." And donıt forget, "making
hostile or inflammatory speeches advocating the overthrow of the lawful
government and threats against public officials, if it endangered public
safety, could violate such law."

During civil disturbance operations,
"authorities must be prepared to detain large numbers of people", forcing
them into existing, though expanded "detention facilities." Cautioning
that "if there are more detainees than civil detention facilities can
handle, civil authorities may ask the control forces to set up and operate
temporary facilities." Pending the approval of the Army Chief of Staff,
the military can detain and jail citizens en masse. "The temporary
facilities are set up on the nearest military installation or on suitable
property under federal control." These "temporary facilities" are
"supervised and controlled by MP officers and NCOs trained and experienced
in Army correctional operations. Guards and support personnel under direct
supervision and control of MP officers and NCOs need not be trained or
experienced in Army correctional operations. But they must be specifically
instructed and closely supervised in the proper use of forces" according
to the Army, the detention facilities are situated near to the
"disturbance area", but far enough away "not to be endangered by riotous
acts." Given the large numbers of potential detainees, the logistics
(holding, searching, processing areas) of such an undertaking, new
construction of such facilities "may be needed to provide the segregation
for ensuring effective control and administration." It must be designed
and "organized for a smooth flow of traffic", while a medical "treatment
area" would be utilized as a "separate holding area for injured
detainees." After a "detainee is logged in and searched", "a file is
initiated", and a "case number" identifies the prisoner. In addition,
"facility personnel also may use hospital ID tags. Using indelible ink,
they write the case number and attach the tag to the detaineesı wrist.
Different colors may be used to identify different offender
classifications" Finally, if and when it should occur, "release
procedures must be coordinated with civil authorities and appropriate
legal counsel." If the "detainee" should produce a writ of habeas corpus
issued by a state court, thereby demanding onesı day in court, the Army
will "respectfully reply that the prisoner is being held by authority of
the United States."

Training under FM 19-15/Garden Plot must be
"continuous" and must "develop personnel who are able to perform
distasteful and dangerous duties with discipline and objectivity."
Dangerous to the local citizenry given that "every member of the control
force must be trained to use his weapon and special equipment (including)
riot batons, riot control agent dispersers and CS grenades, grenade
launchers, shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable videotape recorders,
portable public address systems, night illumination devices, firefighting
apparatus, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, bulldozers, Army aircraft,
armored personnel carriers, and roadblock and barricade materials."
Sounding a lot like recent Urban Warrior war-games (below), the manual
makes note that although unit training must address "the sensitivity and
high visibility of civil disturbance operations", the "unit training must
be realistic." In this regard, "the unit commander should try to include
local government officials in field training exercises. The officials can
be either witnesses or participants. But care must be taken to prevent
adverse psychological effects on the local populace, especially if tension
is high."

United States Field Manual 100-19, Domestic
Support Operations, dated July 1, 1993, opens with a bit of military
history: "Domestic support operations are not new. They had their
beginning with settlement of the new world and organization of the
colonial militia. With the establishment of the United States and a
federal military, the Army routinely provided support to state and
territorial governors as the nation expanded westward." (27) Further
clarifying the Armyıs role in law enforcement, the manual states that
"traditionally, nations have raised and maintained armies to provide for
the national defense", whereas "today, the United States calls upon its
Army to perform various functions as well, for example, controlling civil
disturbances" Asserting that, "Congress has determined and the National
Command Authorities have directed that the military should become more
engaged in supporting domestic needs", FM 100-19 seeks to assist in this
area "by providing both operational and nonoperational support to law
enforcement", stressing that, "the Army can be a formidable force
multiplier for civil authorities." The goal of Army "force" is "to restore
law and order". And even though the military "may be used to disperse
unlawful assemblies and to patrol disturbed areas to prevent unlawful
acts", they will "remain under the military chain of command during civil
disturbance operations."

The Army is cognizant of the fact that,
"federal military forces may not give law enforcement assistance to civil
authorities without running afoul of The Posse Comitatus Act. However,
Constitutional and statutory exceptions to this prohibition do exist." For
example, a "Constitutional Exception" exists "when necessary to protect
civilian property and functions" during "a sudden and unexpected civil
disturbance" In addition, other "statutory exceptions (10 USC 371-380)
allow military personnel to provide limited support to civilian law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) indirectly. Under these laws, the military may
share certain information and provide equipment, facilities, and other
services to LEAs." Lastly, "in supporting OPLAN GARDEN PLOT, intelligence
personnel may conduct close and continuous liason with the LEAs",
especially, "the Attorney General (who) is responsible for coordinating
and managing all requests for federal military assistance for civil
disturbance operations."

The Marine Corps gets itsı marching orders
from Order 3000.8B, Employment of Marine Corps Resources in Civil
Disturbance (CD), dated July 30, 1979, "scanned by MCCDPA Quant, during
1989-90 and are uploaded as is". (28) The order opens with a reference to
"DA OPLAN Garden Plot", stating that US Marine "Garden Plot Forces" are
composed of "two battalions from the 2d Marine Division for employment in
CD missions." Taking no chances, the marines have assigned "one company to
be employed exclusively for U.S. Capitol security." According to the
Marine order, war-game training in civil disturbance suppression "will be
identified by the use of the exercise term Grown Tall." The "CIDCON"
(civil disturbance condition) alert is coordinated from the Operations
Coordination Group (OCG) at Marine Headquarters. It "initiates action",
utilizing, if necessary, "riot-control (chemical) agents by Garden Plot
Forces" (28) And while the air in Seattle still reaks of these "agents",
the military is sharpening its' skills in urban combat.

URBAN WARRIOR: MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

"Training
for war is the Armyıs top priority. With the exception of the training
required in OPLAN GARDEN PLOT, the Army does not normally do specific
training for domestic support missions. As an exception to most
domestic support operations, OPLAN GARDEN PLOT requires that Army units
conduct civil disturbance training." US Army Field

Manual 100-19

"You know, you never hear of suburban war",
said Zulene Mayfield of the Chester (Pennsylvania)) Residents Concerned
for Quality Living (CRCQL), "always urban war why is that?"(29) She and
scores of other American citizens are up in arms over the recent series of
urban war games executed by the U.S. Marines and Special Forces in some 20
cities across the U.S. Code named "Operation Urban Warrior", the military
exercises could very well be Garden Plot/Grown Tall maneuvers in disguise.
This past May 13th, "acting under the cloak of darkness, 100 Army Special
Operations troops descended on two vacant public housing complexes in
three training exercises and terrified nearby residents and surprised even
the housing director. Residents of the areas around the two projects, some
of whom were notified hours beforehand of a law enforcement training
exercise, said they found the experience startling and intimidating." (30)
Defining the exercise as a "law enforcement training exercise" was
appropriate, given the fact that according to witnesses, most of the
troops were dressed as police. "This is beyond reasoning, people are
traumatized and terrified, Vietnam vets are experiencing flashbacks", said
Mayfield. Many in the Chester community are angry "with the arrogance of
all parties involved", and are determined to "deal with the local
government, which has been totally unresponsive." This past June 1st the
citizens of Chester marched to Mayor Dominic Pileggiıs house, who refused,
or was unable to answer questions about the military invasion. Targeting
their local Congressman Bob Brady, the public housing residents of Chester
are trying to get some answers as to why their community was subjected to
"no-notice" exercises using real ammunition and explosives. And despite
the militaryıs disclaimer that they are using "less than lethal" bombs and
bullets, this is little consolation to the terrified residents of Chester.
As Mayfield sees it, "if they are using disintegrating bullets, why are
the windows blown out?"

In some cases the Army was asked to leave
town. "In March 1997, the City of Charlotte, NC, evicted the Army after
the first night of a would-be three night stand after public outcry.
Likewise, the army cut short its stay in Houston and Pittsburgh when its
activities, which typically involved fatigue-clad soldiers bearing arms
and setting off minor charges, prompted fears."(31) Angered by "the
misrepresentation of the proposed training exercise", Charlotte Mayor
Patrick McCrory, stated in a letter to President Clinton, that "on the
night of March 4, (1997) residents of the uptown neighborhoods were
stunned by the sudden appearance of 12 low-flying helicopters without
lights, in possible violation of FAA regulations. There were snipers on
rooftops shooting live ammunition at fake targets. Explosive devices were
set off, creating a tremendous amount of noise. Given these conditions and
the large number of military personnel in the area, neighborhood residents
were in fear. Many of them called 911 to get what scant information was
available, and many of them called me at home. I could hardly hear some of
them because of the noise." As a result of pressure generated by outraged
citizens of Charlotte, "we insisted the DOD cancel the exercise scheduled
for later that week and it is unlikely we would be willing to host any
future activities of this type."(32) It might have also been related to
the fact that some residents began "carrying weapons in case the troops
arrived."(33) Army Special Operations spokesman Walter Sokalski offered up
the lame "this Army saves lives. We want to thank the communities for
being a part of saving lives in the future."(34)

The Army also got the cold shoulder in San
Francisco this past February as protests shut down a portion of the
exercise which was to involve "five ships, 6,000 sailors and Marines, and
four days of simulated combat using helicopters and F-18 bombers, tens of
thousands of blank rounds of small arms fire, and simulated
explosions."(35) Other cities which have experienced the
little-or-no-notice drills include Jacksonville, Florida, Chicago, the
Corpus Christi area of Texas, New York, Charleston, South Carolina, and
Oakland, California, who unlike their neighbors across the bay, welcomed
the military. "If San Francisco didnıt want it, weıre happy to
accommodate," said Stacey Wells, press secretary to Oakland Mayor Jerry
Brown. (36)

Cities that were targeted for the war-games
had a few things in common. One was the near total lack of information or
warning passed on to the residents, including city officials, prior to the
onslaught. Except for the occasional police chief, (makes sense) no one
was let in on the planned "exercises", and when they were, they were sworn
to solemn secrecy! Another tendency was "the satchel full of cash" the
military used to bribe officials into compliance and pay for damages. For
example, even though the Army wasnıt asked to pay for damages to an old
police building in Kingsville, Texas, because it was going to be torn down
anyway, the fire marshal and the other officials said the Army promptly
paid the police and fire departments for their time. "They paid cash
money. They had a satchel ready to go."(37) In another instance, in early
1998 Army officials approached San Antonio, Texas, Mayor Howard Peak,
about training in San Antonio, but he refused to give his consent because
the Army would not divulge the details of the operation. At that point, he
said, "they tried to go around us and offer money to people for their
support, which was very unfortunate."(38)

Since 1994, the U.S. Army Specials Operations
Command, set up in 1989 and based at Fort Bragg, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, has conducted (or tried to conduct) the series of "Operation
Urban Warrior" training exercises. The stated rationale for the Marine
exercises is "the expectation that future wars are increasingly likely to
be waged on city streets."(39) Part of the operationıs stated mission and
goals include the enhancement of "domestic national security", with the
goal of conducting combat operations "in an urban environment against a
backdrop of civil unrest, and restore order."(40)

Col. Mark Thiffault, Director, Joint
Information Bureau, Operation Urban Warrior, stresses that "potential foes
view cities as a way to limit the technological advantages of our
military. They know that cities, and their narrow streets, confusing
layout and large number of civilian non-combatants, place limits on our
technological superiority and especially our use of firepower. We have to
develop technologies that allow us to win while minimizing collateral
damage."(41)

The Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting
Experiment (AWE) recently took place this past March 12th thru 22nd,
examining "new concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures, and
technologies to meet the challenges of conflict" in urban areas, where "by
2020, approximately seventy percent of the worldıs population will live."
Operation Urban Warrior internet homepage recently made unavailable its
website on "marines prepared for protesters" (42) Too bad.

The theory and tactics of urban warfare,
currently under vigorous scrutiny by numerous sectors of the military,
fall under the subject of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The
primary U.S. Army doctrinal publication on the subject, Field Manual
90-10, published in August 1979, was recently updated to FM 90-10-1, An
Infantrymanıs Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas. Despite this
reformulation, George J. Mordica II, analyst for the Center for Army
Lessons Learned (CALL), feels it needs reworking. He states that "U.S.
doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated". His
recommendation, that "tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) need to be
developed as an interim measure until doctrine can be written that
supports armed combat." (43) Mordica praises "a new publication, Marine
Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain, published 16 April 1998 by the United States Marine
Corps." He thinks itıs the most realistic. He also likes "the Marine
Corpsı current Urban Warrior experiment", believing it to be a positive
step, offering "a different approach and fresh review of many of the
questions the Army needs to address."

One of these questions concerns weaponry, and
on that issue Mordica is dead serious: "Develop weapons based on the need
to defeat the threat, not on political considerations concerning whether
such a weapon would be used in a given situation." In addition, "a
high-level review of the ammunition necessary in urban combat must be
conducted. The use of high-explosive, high-explosive plastic, white
phosphorus, and flechete rounds need to be evaluated and considered for
re-introduction into the inventory in sufficient quantities for effective
training. Satchel charges, explosives, and bangalore torpedoes should also
be re-evaluated for use in urban conditions." White Phosphorus, used in
flares, as an incendiary and for smoke screens, comes in every size from
hand grenades to howitzer shells and is, according to the EPA, extremely
toxic to humans.(44) In addition, Mordica and the Army Center believe
that, "the training we are using to prepare our soldiers for urban combat
is not realistic enough to present the full spectrum of command and
control, along with the psychological impact, close combat, and logistical
problems associated with this kind of combat." Maybe they should get in
touch with Firearms Training Systems, Inc. Theyıre the experts in "virtual
killing", recently consummating a "cooperative research and development
agreement" with the Office of Naval Research to "commercialize" an
"advanced training systems product line", all in the hopes of "enhancing
military and law enforcement training." (45) Realistic training is
critical, after all, according to Mordica, "the sugar coated version of
urban combat will not reflect the truth. Battles in a city are savage, and
many times do not allow for the precautions normally taken in the field
concerning refugees, civilian casualties, evacuation of friendly and enemy
wounded and dead, and prisoners of war (POWs)." Now, "does this mean the
Army cannot hold itself to a high moral code", asks Mordica. Well, "no" he
replies, but "the political realities of urban combat have created a
terminology that tends to place limitations on how to conduct these
operations...these terms bring civility to urban combat operations." (46)

US Marine Corps Operations on Urbanized
Terrain (MOUT) "X-Files" (47) contain "tactics, techniques and procedures"
which deal with "urban attacks" (3-35.1), "urban defense" (3-35.2), "urban
patrolling" (3-35.6), and "urban sustainability" (3-35.12). Unfortunately,
"these files are accessible from the MILNET only". According to the Marine
Corp Warfighting Lab, "the X-files are pocket-sized, useful, clear
information" that "convey a synthesis of learning from experiments with
MOUT tactics, techniques, and procedures, and some enabling technologies ­
that can help us fight and win battles on urbanized terrain."

The Rand Corporation recently published a
book by author R.W.Glenn, entitled, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The
American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat (1998). In it,
the author examines the state of "U.S. Military preparedness to undertake
military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)." Glennıs number one
recommendation, like his associates at CALL, is that "the four services
should adopt Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3 as the initial
foundation"(48)

The 1998, MCWP 3-35.3, Military Operations in
Urbanized Terrain, is written "with emphasis on the ground combat
element", (49) attempting to provide a "level of detailed information that
supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing
small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain." Issued by the
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
Lieutenant General J.E.Rhodes, the 367 page publication covers a range of
subjects including modern urban warfare, offensive and defensive
operations, logistics and combat support, organization, combat skills, and
weaponry, with a series of appendixes on attacking and clearing buildings,
fighting positions, subterranean operations (subways and basements), mines
and demolitions. The publication makes clear that urbanized areas are "an
incredibly complicated and fluid environment", which "may be significant
sources of future conflict." Noting that, "cities historically are where
radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies, mixtures of people cause
ethnic friction, and discontented groups receive media attention", the
author(s) of MCWP 3-35.3 want it to be known that into this milieu, the
marines "are deployed as part of naval expeditionary forces (NEFs) that
maintain a global forward presence for rapid crisis response", during
which "urban intervention operations must often be planned and executed in
a matter of hours or days (rather that weeks or months) to take advantage
of the internal turmoil surrounding a developing crisis."

Under the heading "Military Operations Other
Than War", the "Warfighting Publication" states in Chapter 7 that "one of
the most likely missions that U.S. Marines will undertake abroad will be
military operations other than war (MOOTW). These missions typically will
take place in the Third World." During MOOTW, "it is important to remember
that political considerations permeate at all levels." I wonder what
political considerations came into play regarding urban warfare and the
"third world" in the city of Los Angeles?

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: LOS
ANGELES 1992

"The
fact that most things went right, despite the speed at which the situation
developed, validated the Department of Defense (DOD) Civil Disturbance
Plan (Operation GARDEN PLOT). However, refinements in doctrine must be
made to account for the nature of joint civil disturbance operations in
Operations Other Than War, (wherein) emerging doctrine must pay particular
attention to unique threats and closer relationships the military must
have with civilian law enforcement agencies." This, according to a lengthy
1993 "newsletter" disseminated by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, entitled, "Civil Disturbance - LA
Riots." (50)

According to the Center, "Civil Disturbance
Operations is one facet of the U.S. Armyıs vital mission to conduct
Operations Other Than War. The Los Angeles civil disturbance operation
presented a unique opportunity for the U.S. Army" While "Army doctrine
deals with civil disturbances in the context of Mass Acts of Civil
Disobedience", itıs important to remember that "given the nature of the
criminal element in our nationıs cities, it is reasonable to expect a
propensity for greater violence and more focused resistance from organized
criminal elements during future civil disturbances."

CALL analysts point out that "an important
issue that came to the forefront during the civil disturbance operation
was that the DOD GARDEN PLOT plan does not contain sufficient guidance on
procedures for the Army to execute selective mobilization." Correcting
this oversight, "the Department of the Army revised plan will implement
guidance for the Army, incorporating the Army Mobilization and Operations
Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) under selective mobilization."

It's true. Getting the troops out onto the
streets of Los Angeles proved to be problematic. And there were other
concerns. As the CALL analysts point out: "A military force bristling with
heavy weaponry and combat equipment will antagonize a citizenry
unaccustomed to military involvement in civil affairs. Heavy weapons
invite violations in Rules of Engagement (ROE) that could inflame public
sentiment." In other words, "be sensitive to the traditional American
disquiet of standing armies and martial law." In fact, as National Guard
deployment occurred, "some first-line leaders applied arming order levels
based on their perceptions of the threat, despite lack of reasons
justifying an elevated arming status." This was no surprise to many
residents of Los Angeles who are accustomed to "elevated" LAPD "arming
status"

Some history. Back in 1991, former Clinton
Secretary of State (1996), Warren Christopher, then a private citizen,
chaired an "independent citizens commission" concerned with "arming
orders", brutality and "bias" in the Los Angeles police department. Back
in 1965, Christopher was the vice chair of ex-CIA chief McCone's study of
the conflagration in Watts, L.A. The Christopher Commissionsı more recent
report, pure damage control, was released in July 1991, four months after
the video seen round the world. It stated that, "the Commission found that
there is a significant number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively use
excessive force against the public and persistently ignore the written
guidelines of the Department regarding force." It concluded that the
failure to control these officers and their rampant "rules of engagement"
was a "management problem."(51)

As luck would have it, Christopher was
coincidentally enmeshed within the walls of police officialdom when South
Central Los Angeles blew up once again. On Wednesday, April 29, 1992, the
four L.A. cops who were charged with assaulting Rodney King, fracturing
his skull in nine places, were found not guilty by an all-white Simi
Valley jury. Suddenly, and predictably, all hell broke loose, at first in
a small area at the intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues. It was
at that point that the "crowd swelled to 150, jamming and jostling the
police skirmish line", when mysteriously, "the LAPD retreated" (52),
thus insuring, that within this power vacuum, violence would erupt. Factor
in the arson for profit, eyewitness testimony regarding strangers throwing
Molotovs, the California National Guardsman arrested by traffic cops on
the first night of the "riot", in whose car were the makings for just such
a bomb (53), and one begins to glimpse the insidious nature of the
LA-Garden Plot "operation", in which provocation may have been the basic
"tactic, technique and procedure" of urban warfare. [I lived in Los
Angeles at the time, and it was common knowledge that timing of all the
fires indicated a single team running from place to place to set them]

Eventually the organized chaos stretched 32
miles, from Hollywood Hills to Long Beach. Numerous reports chronicled the
slowness of law enforcement response, including the National Guard. The
violence which ensued lasted 5 days, leaving 54 dead and thousands
injured. Thirteen thousand people were arrested, and contrary to popular
portrayals of the "riotı, nearly half of those arrested were Latino.
Damage was estimated at $1 billion. It was unquestionably the most costly
civil disturbance in U.S. history. And yet, despite all of the
destruction, the Major who commanded the California National Guard troops
at the time stated that, "the Los Angeles riots were a tremendous success
for the military."(54) Some success story. The New York Times reported
mysteriously on 5/7/92 that "police may have ignored basic riot plan." Or
maybe not. After all, scorched earth policies are as American as apple
pie.

It was private citizen Warren Christopher who
was on hand to help coordinate the "civil-military collaboration". With
the police in retreat and the National Guard in disarray, he promptly
"advised Mayor Bradley to call in the federal troops."(55) According to
the post-riot, Harrison Report, authored by Army General William H.
Harrison, "Mr. Warren Christopher first broached the subject of federal
troops to the Mayorıs staff when he became concerned about the slowness of
the California National Guard deployment on the streets."(56) As a
consequence of his "concern", and a Presidential Executive Order on May
1st federalizing the National Guard, "the 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry
(Mechanized), 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard was
ordered to mobilize."(57) At the same moment, the Joint Task Force - Los
Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed.

The Executive Order federalizing California
National Guard units also authorized active military forces to assist in
the "restoration of law and order". As a result, "JTF-LA was assembled
from US Army and Marine forces." (58) Under "Operation Garden Plot,
military forces established intelligence exchange with suburban police
departments, local city command posts, the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD), the LAPD emergency operations center, the city command center, the
sheriffs office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms." In addition, "Garden Plot units used a
variety of government-owned, off-the-shelf purchased, and personally owned
equipment to effectively conduct operations. Additional communications
equipment included such things as cellular phones, facsimile machines, and
police scanners." (59) The Garden Plot "units" remained on the streets of
the city of Los Angeles for a month, until the 29th of May.

The Military Field Commander of the
California National Guard during the uprising was Major General James D.
Delk, now retired. In 1995, he wrote a book about it, attempting to
deflect criticism of National Guard "readiness and performance", criticism
being spearheaded, interestingly enough, by the Armyıs, Harrison Report.
The book, entitled, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots, was published by a
Palm Springs, California outfit called ETC Publications. In 1996, the U.S.
Armyıs Foreign Military Studies office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
published a review of the book, authored by senior military analyst
Colonel William W. Mendel, in which he states that Delkıs book is a "case
study in urban warfare". According to Mendel, "Fires and Furies is a
warning to U.S. military leadership about the complex civil-military
issues that face military commanders and their troops in an operations
other than war (OOTW) environment." He stresses that, "in civil
disturbance operations, it is clear that the police agencies will not be
able to handle the situation alone. Soldiers will be called upon to
support ­ again." According to Mendel, the book "demonstrates that
traditional ways of thinking about civil disturbances and the ways that
the U.S. military goes about riot control training could be archaic",
demonstrating, "the militaryıs failure to confront the compelling issues
of military operations other than war." Indeed, as Col. Mendel states,
"the reader will be well served by Delkıs identification of critical
issues concerning civil disturbances and urban war"(60)

Delk wrote a much earlier piece in 1992 while
still fresh from battle. Citing the standard "source", the "Department of
Defense Civil Disturbance (Garden Plot) Plan", which he dates "15 February
1991" (61), he goes on to relate what it was like to be "in those
neighborhoods which are carefully avoided by most law-abiding citizens."
Citing "countless incidents of taunts and provocations by gang members",
in which "there was considerable risk taking" on the part of he and his
men, he goes on to conclude that "battle-focused training served us much
better than the civil disturbance training we used to practice." In fact,
as Delk put it, "our role was more akin to low-intensity conflict (or
urban warfare) than riot control."

Delkıs fingering of "gangs" dovetailed nicely
with the Los Angeles Police Departmentıs timely circulation of an
"intelligence" memo, disseminated only a few days after the smoke cleared,
stating that gangs under Muslim leadership were aiming to kill cops and
start a war. (62) How convenient! Who wants to start a war? Maybe the
racist LA cop who "would love to drive down Slauson with a flame thrower,
we would have a barbecue." Or his buddy, risking life and limb, who
stated, "if you encounter these negroes shoot first and ask questions
later."(63)

Since the mid-1980ıs US military strategists
have sought to define "military operations other than war" (MOOTW)
doctrine. Their aim: to rationalize and justify increasing application of
military "expertise" to a wider array of operations, to grow the list of
situations vulnerable to military penetration. Strikingly, this process
parallels a similar development in some urban domestic police forces. In
New York City, for example, Mayor Giuliani's "quality of life" police
crackdown against poor communities, low-wage workers, youth, jay-walkers
etc., began by creating new laws and enforcing old ones in order to
criminalize the behavior of more and more New Yorkers. In fact, in 1995,
"broken windows" police guru George Kelling stated that, "the NYPD's legal
staff is scrambling to identify other sources of authority to arrest
people."(64) It's "total war" on the homefront, The calculated extention
of the continuum of military/police "total force" options within America
is leading to a type of "total war" on the homefront.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff pronouncements on
the subject of "military operations other than war" are contained in Joint
Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,
dated June 1999. (65) The document states that " the wide range of MOOTW
provides the National Command Authorities with many possible options
during unsettled situations", including "options", like domestic civil
disturbance, which are "not always conducted outside the United States."
Although distinct from overt war-making, the Chiefs believe that MOOTW is
"an extension of warfighting doctrine." Its' major feature is that it is
"sensitive to political considerations", where the requirement is to
"understand the political objective and the potential impact of
inappropriate actions." To this end, MOOTW requires "restraint in order to
apply appropriate military capabilities prudently", and "perseverance"
which allows for "protracted application of military capability in support
of strategic aims." The broad listing of MOOTW "types of operations"
includes "military support to civil authorities" under which civil
disturbance operations are conducted.

The latest Army OOTW formulation is contained
in Field Manual / FM 100-20. In 1990, it was called Military Operations in
Low-Intensity Conflicts and was designed, in part, to cover covert
destabilization of such nations as Nicaragua and El Salvador during the
Reagan years. FM 100-20 is now known as Stability and Support Operations.
The "new FM 100-20 amplifies and explains OOTWIt addresses how we might
execute peace enforcement and deal with ethnic conflict and failed states.
It also adds depth to explanations of insurgency and counterinsurgency
operations"(66) Colonel John B. Hunt, U.S. Army retired, extended the
concept of OOTW in an article in an October 1996 issue of Military Review.
(67) Recognizing that OOTW is "a concept in flux", he argues that the Army
has not taken seriously "OOTW concepts and doctrine", concepts which are
in "disarray". Further, Hunt believes that "the Army, as an institution
has not fully accepted the doctrine", stating that, "we still are not
fully agreed on what to call it." Exasperated, he says the Army "must
name, not war ­ not peace, situations." Continuing his obsession with
naming, in a section entitled, "whatıs in a name?", Hunt asserts that "in
addition to OOTW, the Army has used names such as low-intensity conflict (LIC),
stability operations and operations short of war to describe these
operations." According to Hunt, "one problem the names share is that the
subject is a political-military situation." Ah, thereıs the rub! Hunt
continues, "OOTWıs goal is to persuade an enemy to change his behavior."
According to Hunt, "OOTWıs essence is that such missions are primarily
political processes that are sometimes accompanied by violence."
Therefore, OOTW "emphasizes the primacy of the political instrument of
national power." Or to paraphrase Clausewitzıs characterization of war,
the continuation of politics by other means.

As Colonel Hunt sees it, "the domestic
mobilization insurgency strategy, requires a persuasive, political
approach." That is why Hunt believes that "OOTWıs chief approach to war is
the incorporation of political strategy", an approach that offers "a way
to act politically, using military participation and support to solve a
problem." And yet, it must be recognized that "OOTWıs chiefly political
methods" operate in a climate which is characterized by the "inequality of
power", wherein, according to Hunt, "smaller, weaker actors cannot hope to
defeat a larger, more modern power by direct military action. Their only
hope for success is to combine political, informational, economic and
military means." Consequently, Hunt predicts that "future war will almost
certainly be some amalgamation of wars of attrition and annihilation with
OOTWıs political-informational methods" and that "prospects for success
are higher through using the safer and cheaper OOTW methods of politics,
propaganda and terrorism." To the point.

HOMELAND DEFENSE: DOMESTIC
MILITARY CZAR

"Terrorism
is multifaceted and differs from group to group and incident to incident.
Yet the single common denominator is that it is a psychological weapon,
intended to erode trust and undermine confidence in our government, its
elected officials, institutions or policies. What makes a WMD terrorist
incident unique is that it can be a transforming event." Frank J. Cilluffo,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations, Roundtable on Terrorism

"I personally believe that the next decade is
a decade of homeland defense" John Hamre Deputy Secretary of Defense

In January 1999 the New York Times stated in
an editorial that "there have been discussions in the Pentagon, but no
decision, about creating a new domestic military command to combat
terrorism. That would erode the long-established legal principle that
America's armed forces should not be involved in domestic law
enforcement." (67) While the military has, according to the Times report,
"no intention of usurping civilian control", under the euphemistic banner
of "homeland defense", the Pentagon "decided to ask President Clinton for
the power to appoint a military leader for the continental United
States."(68)

Recent testimony before a congressional
committee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice stressed that, "in order to institute a more systematic and
integrative approach to protecting the Continental United States from
threats such as WMD terrorism, critical infrastructure protection and
missile defense, it may be worthwhile to create a new Commander-in-Chief (CINC)
USA. The CINCUSA would be responsible for all Department of Defense
related strategies and activities related to homeland defense issues and
would serve as a focal point and facilitate coordination within the
Department of Defense and between the many federal, state and local law
enforcement, intelligence and medical communities with related
responsibilities."(69)

White House officials "reacted favorably,
characterizing the proposed step as a relatively minor adjustment of the
lines of military authority and organization." President Clinton, whose
nominal approval was required in order to move ahead with the appointment
of the domestic military chief, commenced to "weighing the issue
carefully", promising a response. His objectivity in the matter was
doubtful all along given his authorship of various directives on the
matter, including in particular, Presidential Decision Directive 62,
Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Overseas,
dated May 1998, and Presidential Decision Directive 39, a June 1995
presidential "counter-terrorism" edict which provides guidance in
distinguishing "crisis management" from "consequence management".

Gregory T. Nojeim, legislative counsel on
national security for the American Civil Liberties Union, concerned about
the Pentagon proposal and its' impact on law enforcement stated that,
"it's hard to believe that a soldier with a suspect in the sights of his
M-1 tank is well positioned to protect that person's civil liberties."
Nonetheless, for at least the past three years the Pentagon has organized
and planned for "homeland defense." During that time, Defense Secretary
Cohen signed off "on a plan to create a Joint Task Force for Civil
Support", in which military forces would be involved in various types of
"anti-terrorist" law enforcement operations, reporting "to the Department
of Justice, which has the lead not only in law enforcement but in
coordinating the domestic response to terrorism."(70) Actually, Cohen
stated that "the joint task force to coordinate military actions would be
ready to respond in the event of an attack on American soil, but under the
direction of a civilian agency like the Federal Emergency Management
Agency."(71)

On October 8, 1999, Pentagon foresight was
rewarded when Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was put in charge of defending the
homeland. According to script, President Clinton "approved these new
changes made by the Pentagon's top officials as part of a routine revision
of the responsibilities and roles of its nine commands scattered across
the globe." According to this "routine revision", Admiral Gehman's new job
"is to coordinate military actions should an enemy target this country"
Again, "the idea has been criticized by civil libertarians who argue that
any homeland defense plan might open the door for the military to assume
the role of domestic police, which is prohibited by law." In reference to
the appointment of a domestic military chief, ACLU Attorney Nojeim stated
that "our concern is that there be a bright line drawn between law
enforcement and the military. This not only blurs that bright line",
warned Nojeim, "but virtually guarantees further involvement of the
military in civilian law enforcement activity."(72)

As for legal considerations, "by law, the
military cannot make arrests or act in civil law enforcement. The Posse
Comitatus Act, passed after the Civil War to rein in the military, bars
federal troops from doing police work within United States borders."(73)
Comforting words from the New York Times. Unfortunately, not true.
Strictly speaking, the Act refers only to the Army and the Air Force, not
to the Marines or the National Guard in "state status". In fact,
militarism is becoming increasingly imbedded within domestic law
enforcement. Incredibly, "the paper of note" also declared that "the
division of powers that bars the military from domestic law enforcement is
similar to that between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The former does surveillance work at home and
the latter abroad." Apparently, this division of powers did not prevent an
innocent Redford, Texas teenager, 18 year old Esequiel Hernandez Jr., not
far from home, from being shot dead by Marines on a "drug interdiction"
mission along the border. As for the FBI, the bureau in the 1990's has
nearly doubled its overseas presence, having opened offices in more than
20 foreign countries. In addition, FBI Director Freeh recently stated that
"the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken several steps to
improve cooperation between agencies, including the exchange of deputies,
exchange of personnel assigned to each agency's counterterrorism center,
joint meetings, and joint operational and analytical initiatives. At the
field operational level, the FBI sponsors 18 Joint Terrorism Task Forces
in major cities to maximize interagency cooperation and coordination among
Federal, State, and local law enforcement."(74)

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, (18 U.S.C.
1385), often cited as a barrier to domestic military activity, reads as
follows: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of congress, willfully uses any part
of the Army or Air Force as a posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years or both." Under the so-called "drug war", "exceptions" to the Posse
Comitatus Act have proliferated. "Former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who
specializes in National Security issues, said another exception became law
in the Reagan Administration when Congress permitted Posse Comitatus to be
waived in the event of nuclear terrorism." Congress later widened the
exception in a "little known provision" sponsored by then Senator Nunn.
Known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Bill, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996 gave "the Pentagon power to step in domestically
in the event of chemical and germ attacks."(75) The military, for its
part, is making the very same arguments. US Army Colonel Sean J. Berne
argues in a recent article for Military Review entitled, "Defending
Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents", that although
"there continues to be considerable concern over the legal authority and
limits of using the Armed Forces in domestic actions", and that some would
even "argue against virtually any involvement by the military in domestic
operations, that involvement is key to safeguarding national security and
guaranteeing the continued freedom of our citizens." Berne asserts that
"under specific circumstances, use of military forces in domestic
operations, while controversial, is not only appropriate, but legal and
warranted." The Colonel has little patience for "preconceived notions
concerning civil-military relations based on incomplete information."
While those who object to the military becoming the police usually cite,
among other things, the Posse Comitatus Act, it is not, according to
Colonel Berne, "the final word on the subject." He states that "based on
emergency situations and emerging threats to national security, Congress
passed a number of exceptions clearing the way for significantly increased
involvement by the Armed Forces in domestic activities."

These "exceptions" to Posse Comitatus, or to
put it in more precise language, these new missions for the military
inside America, include "Title 10, US Code, Sections 331-335 dealing with
civil disturbances and insurrection." These sections, and other
"exceptions", according to Berne, "also provide the Executive and
Legislative branches with a standing force involved with domestic law
enforcement on a day-today basis." Now, while "at first blush it would
appear these amendments could be in conflict with the intent of the
Declaration of Independence, Constitution and the Posse Comitatus Act by
placing a potentially unchecked military in a position to infringe on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment right", we'll, don't be afraid, take comfort in
the notion that our "Congress went to great lengths to ensure thatcivil-military
relationships would not be subverted." And besides, "no case has been
found involving criminal prosecution of anyone for Posse Comitatus
violations."(76) So, lets get our heads screwed on right, cause after all,
as Colonel Thomas R. Lujan, lead attorney ("staff judge advocate") for US
Special Operations Command said back in 1997, "our nation can ill afford
to have the effectiveness of its military assets artificially constrained
by a misunderstanding of the law."(77)

Along those same lines, the Air Force's Air
University offered a 1998 course entitled "The Posse Comitatus Act:
Consideration of its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness." An abstract of
the course states that "this project will review the history of the Posse
Comitatus Act, the rationale for its existence, contemporary exceptions,
and explore the logic for its continued existence and enforcement. If it
is determined the Act is no longer necessary, consideration will be given
to making a recommendation for modification or elimination of the
Act."(78) Finally, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute summed it up this
way in a slide entitled: "The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385)." It's
simple: "Exceptions: Military Purpose Doctrine, Sovereign Authority, Civil
Disturbances."(79)

This past year, President Clinton appointed
Richard A. Clark his national counter-terrorism coordinator, his point man
on domestic counter-insurgency. Earlier this summer, Clark wrote a piece
for the journal Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, entitled, "The
Intelligence Threat Assessment Function and the New Threats".(80) During
the Bush Administration, he was a staff member of the National Security
Council and has remained there ever since. Sitting in Oliver North's old
office at the NSC, Clark is trying mightily to "coordinate everything from
the Pentagon and its evolving plans to defend the United States against
terrorists down to local police and fire departments."(81) At a recent
National Governors Association conference attended by "emergency planners"
from 45 states, Clark said that, "in the future, they will look for our
Achilles' heel, and it's here - here in the homeland."(82) At the
conference, Clark and Attorney General Reno outlined various ways in which
that "defense" is coming together, including congressional approval for
President Clinton to recall (involuntarily) 200,000 reservists for up to
270 days. The National Guard and Reserve Units have been designated as
among the "first responders" in the event of an "incident".

On May 22, 1998, Secretary of Defense William
S. Cohen announced "the stationing plan for 10 recently announced rapid
assessment elements using National Guard personnel." According to Cohen,
the Guard teams, at a cost of some $50 million, "are part of Department of
Defense 's overall effort to support local, state and federal civil
authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) on U.S. soil." The teams, placed in the regions
designated by FEMA, are stationed in California, Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington. The plan is that within 4 hours time they "will be able to
deploy rapidlyand pave the way for the identification and arrival of
follow-on federal response assets." According to Cohen, they "will act as
the tip of the national military spear." In support of this plan, Cohen
called for the "total force" "integration" of the National Guard and
"other Reserve components" into "a national WMD preparedness strategy."
(83) New York's Governor George Pataki, enamored over the new role of the
New York National Guard, which had been "developing the doctrine of
homeland defense over the past year and a half", stated on July 20, 1998
that "with the Guard stronger than ever, the creation of this unit is a
right step at the right time."(84) New York is part of FEMA Region II,
which consists of New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands.

Some months earlier the DOD released
Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve
Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction, spelling out the particulars on the subject of National
Guard/Reserve "integration". Among its numerous chapters, a section
entitled "Response Elements: Civil Disturbances" states that "the
potential for lawlessness and disorder will exist following any WMD
incident. Units designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need
to have awareness level training on WMD incidents."(85) In this regard,
the report references not only the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, Sections
1385) and the Insurrection Act (Title 10, Sections 331-335), but also DOD
Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. Lt. General
Edward Baca, chief of the National Guard Bureau, stated in 1998 that the
Guard was ready to implement homeland defense initiatives. "We are now in
the process of determining what the threats are so that doctrine can be
developed to meet those threats."(86) While the "threats" may require
determination, the process of militarizing law enforcement to meet the
"threats" is clear.

On the 3rd of March, 1998, Army Brig. Gen.
Roger Schultz, deputy for the Director of Military Support, the DOD agency
that coordinates "assistance" to local law enforcement, stated that "we
don't know when and we don't know the place, but we will be attacked."
Gen. Schultz "sees a nation and citizenry not fully prepared for attacks",
and the new Guard program "will help educate the public about its
vulnerability." But even more, Schultz wants to make the point that "the
task we're going to be training Guard and Reserve soldiers and airmen on
is related to our warfighting. We're not just investing in a domestic
response, we're investing in a commander in chief's requirement to go to
war."(87)

This past April 27-29, 1999, the US
military's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) held its' Modeling and
Simulation Advisory Council and Distributed Simulation Working Group
Meeting at the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The
session took up the issue of "homeland defense" in a series of briefings
(slide shows). One such briefing, entitled, Army Force XXI - New Analysis
Requirement, explicitly lists elements of "homeland defense" including
"domestic preparedness, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism,
civil disorder, evacuations, natural disasters." Stating that "examples of
M&S in Support of Domestic Preparedness" include "operation Test
Visualization (OTV)", the briefing explains that OTV "provides real time
and playback capability for live or simulated exercises" which "law
enforcement agencies agree is needed," Currently, they are busy at work
"with the San Bernadino Sheriff's Department and Boeing to provide
training and analysis for Shoot House exercises." These "Soldier Station"
scenarios include "MOUT, non-lethal weapons and Land Warrior/Force XXI"
elements, as well as "complete search and capture scenarios for the San
Bernadino Sheriff's Department." Hands-on "incident command operations"
with the San Bernadino Sheriff's Department completed in February 1999
consisted of a "single jurisdiction, multi-agency response to civil
disorder."(88)

In January 1999, the Washington, DC based
Center for Strategic and International Studies released a study entitled
Defending the U.S. Homeland, which calls for the Pentagon to "develop,
deploy, and operate a wide range of defensive measures for the protection
of the U.S. homeland." The Center, founded in 1962, is a public policy
research institution that maintains resident experts on all the world's
major geographical regions. It also covers key functional areas, such as
international finance, U.S. domestic and economic policy, and U.S. foreign
policy and national security issues. On January 1, 1999, none other than
former Congressman Sam Nunn assumed the position of chairman of the CSIS
Board of Trustees. At that time the Center made known its' differences
with President Clinton's proposals to defend the homeland, stating that
"the President's program is useful to cope with isolated terrorist attacks
involving biological or nuclear weapons. However, it fails to address the
need for the Pentagon to be prepared for taking the lead should a rogue
state smuggle such weapons into the United States." The study's author,
Fred C. Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
Administration, pointed out other inadequacies, such as "inadequate or
insufficiently understood legal authorities for a military role in
homeland defense", although Ikle believes that "legislation can overcome
this deficiency." Towards that end, a future CSIS study intends to
"address the legal aspects of the military's role in homeland defense."
Dr. Ikle, a CSIS "distinguished scholar", is currently also a director of
the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Centers' Global Organized Crime Project
is chaired by William Webster, former Director of the CIA and FBI. CSIS
"Senior Advisor" Arnaud de Borchgrave serves as Project Director. The
Project membership lists numerous former intelligence and defense chiefs
including former directors Woolsey, Soyster, Schlesinger, Brown, Gates,
Deutch, Rumsfeld and Cohen (prior to his current appointment), as well as
CSIS "scholar", Walter Laqueur, cochair, International Research Council,
and holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy.
Although the Project believes that "the rise of transnational organized
crime is an unfortunate by-product of globalization", its' Terrorism Task
Force believes that "zealots are arriving on the scene not with
traditional political objectives but with more unique idiosyncratic,
religious, or personally psychotic purposes." Its' members include former
FEMA head Lt. Gen.Julius Becton, U.S. Army, (retired) and Joshua Lederberg
of Rockefeller University.(89) Stating that "rogue nations or
transnational actors may be able to threaten our homeland", a 1997 report
by the National Defense Panel, entitled Transforming Defense: National
Security in the 21st Century, advises that "the terrorist threat to the
United States is a complex issue which, as it encroaches upon U.S.
territory, transitions from a Defense and State activity to one managed
primarily by the Department of Justice or local law enforcement." (90)
Towards this end, the Attorney Generals' office has established a National
Domestic Preparedness Office within the FBI. Various Presidential
directives issued over the past two years put the FBI in the lead of
counterterrorism activities. At the same time, "the mythic G-men, who once
concentrated exclusively on solving crime, are today focusing on crime
prevention as never before", making use of greatly "increased
investigatory and surveillance powers that have come with its' new
role."(91) Another sign of the FBI's expanded "homeland" mission, to go
along with its overseas activities, is the massive infusion of funding it
has received. Annual funding for the FBI's Counterterrorism program has
grown from $78.5 million in 1993 to $301.2 million in 1999. In 1995 the
FBI's Counterterrorism Center, located at FBI Headquarters became
operational.

And thus, as President Clinton recently put
it, does "the last big kind of organizational piece"(92) on "homeland
defense" fall into place. And while many citizens fear greater involvement
of the military in domestic law enforcement, there is no need for concern,
for as Defense Secretary Cohen earnestly put it to Ted Koppel and the
American public the other night, "the military has no plans for a
takeovers "(93) Some reassurance.

MILITARY COUP

The
winner of the 1992 "Strategy Essay Competition" sponsored by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a National War College student paper
entitled, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."(94)
Authored by Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the brief, well documented
work is a fictional, "darkly imagined excursion into the future." It is
written from the perspective of an imprisoned senior military officer
about to be executed for opposing the military takeover of America.
Accomplished through "legal" means, the coup is portrayed as the "the
outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992", including "the massive
diversion of military forces to civilian uses", especially law
enforcement.

Author Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF,
is the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, US Central Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, Florida. According to Dunlapıs fictional protagonist, "Prisoner
222305759", the passage of the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981, which actually took place, was
"specifically intended to force reluctant military commanders to actively
collaborate in police work." For Dunlapıs hero, the Act "was a historic
change of policy", in which "Congress initiated the use of national
defense as a rationale to boost military participation in an activity
historically the exclusive domain of civilian government: law
enforcement." This deepening involvement in police work led, according to
Dunlap, to the "devastation of the militaryıs martial spirit", making them
unable to "prepare for war", which emphasizes "firepower", not "studied
restraint" and "legitimate authority". The end result: "a military that
controls government", but "ironically, canıt fight." A somewhat dubious
proposition, nevertheless, according to Dunlapıs scenario, militarization
of domestic police forces around the country did mean that, "the military
was ideally positioned in thousands of communities to support the coup."

As the tale is told, the "politicization of
the military", resulting from its' forays "into the political process to
an unprecedented degree" as the most well endowed and "trusted arm of
government", lead inevitably to an "erosion of civilian control of the
military". According to the "fictional" scenario, heightening and
seemingly unsolveable social and economic woes fostered in the American
people a dependency on the spit-n-shine of military know-how. "Exasperated
with democracy", Dunlap laments, the American peoples' "assumptions about
the role of the military in society began also to change." Whereas in the
past, "Americans had a traditional and strong resistance to any military
intrusion in civilian affairs", they "were now rethinking the desirability
and necessity of that resistance." They were giving in to the "all too
seductive", "cost effective solution", namely, the military solution.

At that point, in 2012, "the militaryıs
alienation from its civilian leadership" asserts itself, when an
unscrupulous military dictator ("General Brutus") is able to get himself,
via the "Referendum Act", appointed "Military Plenipotentiary". Our hero,
we are lead to believe, is never again to see the light of day. Sad story.
And there you have it. Now, the real story is that while Dunlapıs "essay"
is creating quite a buzz in military circles, you hear next to nothing in
the national media. I wonder why that is. Imagine, an Air Force legal
officer writes a thesis at the prestigious National War College
hypothesizing the conditions that would lead to a coup ­ something
officers never mention in public and barely even whisper in private ­ and
wins the top writing prize and publication in the Armyıs leading
professional journal. Imagine that.

An article by Thomas E. Ricks in the January
1993 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, entitled, "Colonel Dunlapıs Coup",
refers to the "fictionalized essay" as a "conservative document", and one
that "is likely to be widely discussed within the U.S. military." He
believes this is so because it represents "the kind of unfettered
thinking" that the military is encouraging. In fact, the kind of thinking
"that it wants for a professional magazine it is now developing." It
should be noted that in the article, Ricks also takes note of "last yearıs
military deployment to Los Angeles, dubbed Operation Garden Plot by the
Marines."

Germane to the subject of a military coup,
Richard H. Kohn, former chief of Air Force History, 1981-1991, recently
launched his own "scathing attack on what he saw as the militaryıs
alienation from its civilian leadership." (95) Kohn is currently a
professor of history at the University of North Carolina and heads up the
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, a non-profit foundation based in
North Carolina. Recently, the Institute released a study in which it noted
"a sharp divergence found in views of military and civilians" (96).
According to a New York Times report (9/9/99), the recently completed
"$500,000 study that will ultimately produce at least 20 academic papers",
revealed that "a deep gap over politics and values has opened over the
last two decades between the nationsı increasingly conservative military
elite and prominent civilians without military service." A "credibility
gap" of a new type. Not to worry though, Defense Secretary Cohen is
committed "to somehow prevent a chasm from developing between the military
and civilian worlds." Interest in the studyıs findings, of "a widespread
unhappiness in the military with current trends in civilian society" has
created quite a buzz. "In meeting rooms and corridors, the first findings
were the hot topic" at the September 1999 annual meeting of the American
Political Association in Atlanta. A Triangle Institute conference held in
October 1999 in Caughny, Illinois, focused exclusively on
"civilian-military issues" and the consequences of the growing "gap".

CONCLUSION

Finally,
a word on those who truly are "exasperated with democracy." Back in 1959,
Samuel P. Huntington, cited above in Dunlap, Summers and Ricks, authored
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge University Press). By 1975, Huntington was putting
his talents to good use by authoring the final report of David
Rockefellersı Trilateral Commission. Titled, The Crisis of Democracy (New
York University Press, 1975), the report is a blue-print for
counter-revolution. It supplies the ultimate logic for the existence of
Garden Plot. It explains a military and police in training to pre-empt
democracy and defend the rule of the rich.

Its' infamous text is quite instructive
regarding the latest phase of corporativist fascism within the American
military-industrial complex. Characterizing popular resistance and "civil
disturbance" as a kind of "distemper" among the clamoring masses, the
report recommends obliterating democracy in America. According to the
report, the remedy to the ongoing corporate "crisis in authority",
(suffered most recently in Seattle), is to enforce, according to
Huntington, "a greater degree of moderation in democracy". Believing that
popular resistance to military and police enforced corporate rule "stem
from an excess of democracy", the report goes on to enumerate ways and
means of shrinking democracy in America.

The democratic space which is under the
corporate gun is the space within which popular movements fighting for
change, for freedom and justice exist. The establishment attack is
multi-level and multi-dimensional, directly effecting all people, but its
earliest and most bloody stage is its' attack on the poor, particularly
people of color. This is where fascist ideology is in full effect,
assisting in the open violence against the people. In this regard,
Huntingtons' report declares that "in the past, every democratic society
has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not
actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part
of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the
factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively."

This "effectiveness" is real, not only for
the "violent underclass" which is facing marginalization, militarized
police and the daily machinations of genocide, but for anyone who
confronts the rule of racist corporate capital and its militarized new
world order. The mass of likely suspects is growing. Accordingly, refuting
a basic tenet of American social identity, Huntington coldly states that
there are "desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political
democracy", and that "a value (like democracy) which is normally good in
itself is not necessarily optimized when it is maximized." And as for
those who resist the attack on their freedoms: the military/police
solution. For after all, according to the corporate military chiefs and
their legions of industrialist soldiers, "democracy is only one way of
constituting authority, and it is not necessarily a universally applicable
one." In other words, as militarism and a culture of violence grow,
American democracy becomes obsolete. Bring in the troops. Code-name it
"Garden Plot. And oh yes, card carrying charter members of the 1975
Trilateral Commission included "riot experts" Warren Christopher and Cyrus
Vance.

In sum, the convergence of the military and
the police, in the interests of corporate sponsored social control, both
here and abroad, follows quite logically from popular American obeisance
to their needs. With one half of all federal resources devoted to the
generals and their assorted industries of death, it was only a matter of
time (timing), given the needs and sick desires of the corporate rich,
that the cop on the street would one day become a special-ops soldier,
trained to discourage dissent and to suppress protest, if necessary,
violently.

This convergence is taking place amidst or
because of an unprecedented level of corporate greed, wherein the majority
of Americans are no more than slaves to enforced (managed) scarcities and
indignities imposed on them by global American capitalist rule, a rule
maintained through force. While resistance is growing within the remnant
of democracy, US militarism, with itsı fraudulent legalisms and
terminologies of deception, itsı brainwashing "doctrine" and hellish
weaponry, is gearing up to meet that threat, refining its' technologies of
social control. (97)

Operation Garden Plot is a metaphor for US
militarism entering the new millennium. Its' anti-democratic essence,
which is to silence, to suppress, and to stifle freedom has become
generalized, like a spreading mushroom cloud. New military and police
missions at home, along with global "peacekeeping" and "other than war"
interventions abroad, are about more than rationalized budgets or the
instincts of a profit hungry industry. Militarist "total force" ideology
is naked counter-revolution mandated by corporate America. It aims, in its
insane drive for power and profits, to suffocate all life. Its' pathology
spares no one. Thatıs the meaning of globalization. Consequently, the
expanding dialectic of US corporate-militarism is creating new polarities,
along with new avenues of resistance to the "war machine".

"No one will fully comprehend the historical
implications and strategy of fascist corporativism except the true fascist
manipulator or the researcher who is able to slash through the smoke
screens and disguises the fascists set up."

-George Jackson, June 21, 1971

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Pentagon Misused
Millions in Funds, House Panel Says", July 22,1999, pg. A-1.

2. James W. Button, Black Violence, The
Political Impact of the 1960ıs Riots, Princeton University Press,
1078, pg.116.

3. Button, pg.121. Also, see, Cyrus
R.Vance, Final Report of Cyrus R.Vance, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, Concerning the Detroit Riots, July 23 Through
August 2, 1967.

5. Lipsky and Olson, pg.163, citing
pg.198 of a transcription of Lyndon B. Johnson, "Statement by the
President", July 29, 1967.

6. Button, pg.107.

7. Lipsky and Olson, pg.165.

8. Anthony Downs, Opening Up the
Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America, Yale University Press, 1973,
pg.176. Downs, a Chicago based commission "consultant", believed
that the key to effective urban counter-insurgency was the notion of
"spatial deconcentration", or the "adequate outmigration of the
poor" from the cities. Downs wrote Chapters 16 and 17 of the Kerner
Report which deal with "housing". He is the leading exponent of
"deliberate dispersal policies" designed to "disperse the urban poor
more effectively". The origins of "homelessness" (state repression)
lie here.

9. Lipsky and Olson, pg.168.

10. Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, DC, March 1, 1968,
pgs.279-281.

11. Ron Ridenhour and Arthur Lubow,
"Bringing the War Home", New Times Magazine, 1975, pg.20. Also, see
Ron Ridenhour, "Garden Plot and the New Action Army", CounterSpy,
1975.

19. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance
in America, 1775-1980, Yale University Press, 1991, pgs.257-258.
This excellent historical account actually does what it says,
tracing American "internal security measures" right back to the
"founders".

20. United States Air Force Civil
Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot, Headquarters, United States Air
Force, June 1, 1984. (roughly 200 pages, not paginated)

21. T. Alden Williams, "The Army in
Civil Disturbance: A Profound Dilemma?", pg.161, in ed. Robin Higham,
Bayonets in the Streets, University of Kansas Press, 1969.

23. US Air Force News Service, Kelly
Air Force Base, Texas, "Air Force 50th Anniversary: April History",
March 25, 1997, pg.2. In fact, Garden Plot may have been operative
prior to and during the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.
William F. Pepper, a long time associate of the King family, and
attorney for the late James Earl Ray, claims that the orders to kill
King, which were delivered to Special Forces operatives in Memphis,
were tied to the Garden Plot operation. Pepper states that the
orders to kill King "appeared to come from the office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and were issued under the umbrella of the anti-black
terrorist operation Garden Plot which was a part of the overall U.S.
Command antiriot operation CINCSTRIKE which was activated with the
outbreak of any major riot." (Orders To Kill, Carroll and Graf
Publishers, 1995, pg.424)

43. George J. Mordica II, Analyst,
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Itıs a Dirty War, but
Somebody has to do it". (n.d.) See also on the subject of MOUT,
General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in
the Three Block War", Marines Magazine, January 1999, Robert F. Hahn
II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of
2025", Parameters Magazine, Summer 1999, Interview with Lt.General
John Rhodes, head of US Marines Combat Development Command, on the
subject of "future warfighting", Janes Defense Weekly, Vol.29-No.5,
James Kitfield, untitled article dealing with "urban warfare as the
inevitable wave of the future", Air Force Magazine,Vol.81-No.12,
December 1998.

44. The Vieques Times, "Presidentıs
Panel Not Satisfied with Navyıs Safetyı Reports", Volume 129,
August 1999, 153 Flamboyan Street, Vieques, Puerto Rico, 00765.
www.viequestimes.com The people of Vieques, Puerto Rico have a lot
of experience dealing with US military weaponry.

47. US Marine Corps X-Files, "are an
evolving body of knowledge that will be refined and inserted into
the Marine Corps Combat Development System when the Urban Warrior
experiments are concluded." www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl/home/xfiles/xfiles.html
See also USMC "Urban Warfare Joint Cultural Intelligence Seminar,
Summary Report" 4/13/99, www.ootw.quantico.usmc.mil/cultural_seminar_urban_warfare.htm

48. R.W.Glenn, Marching Under Darkening
Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations
Threat, Rand, 1998. (quotes from RAND Abstract, DOC.NO.MR- 1007-A)

51. Law Enforcement News, "LENSı 1991
People of the Year: The Christopher Commission", Vol. XVIII, No.
351, January 31, 1992, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York.

52. Alex Constantine, Blood, Carnage
and the Agent Provocateur: The Truth About the Los Angeles Riots and
the Secret War Against L.A.ıs Minorities, The Constantine Report,
Volume One, Los Angeles, 1993.

54. Major General James D. Delk,
"Military Assistance in Los Angeles", Military Review, September
1992.

55. Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army,
(retired), book review of Fires and Furies, by James D. Delk, US
Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, 1996. See also by Mendel, "Combat in Cities: The LA Riots
and Operation Rio", FMSO, July 1996, by Major Christopher M.
Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles
Riots", Parameters Magazine, Summer 1997, by Peter Morrison, Riot of
Color: The Demographic Setting of Civil Disturbance in Los Angeles,
Rand, June 1993, by William V. Wenger, "The Los Angeles Riots: A
Batallion Commanders' Perspective", Infantry, Jan-Feb. 1994, by
Wenger and Frederick W. Young, "The Los Angeles Riots and Tactical
Intelligence", Military Intelligence, Oct-Dec.1992.

65. Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, US
Army (retired), "OOTW: A Concept in Flux", Military Review,
September-October 1996.

66. Hunt.

67. New York Times, Editorial, 1/23/99.

68. New York Times, pg. A21, 1/28/99.

69. Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo,
Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Project, Co-Director,
Terrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and U.S.
Preparedness, to the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the U.S. House
Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight, October 2, 1998.

70. New York Times, 1/28/99.

71. and 72. New York Times, pg. A16,
10/8/99.

73. New York Times, 1/28/99.

74. Statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Threat to the United
States Posed by Terrorists, before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, February 4,
1999.

78. United States Air Force, Air
University, course title: The Posse Comitatus Act: Consideration of
Its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness, Summer 1998. See also, Air
Force Institute of Technology, A Historical Analysis of the Posse
Comitatus Act and Its Implication For The Future, Scientific and
Technical Information Network, Defense Technical Information Center,
January 9, 1997, which states that the purpose of their analysis is
"to show that the Posse Comitatus Act is an unnecessary hindrance to
the modern criminal justice system."

83. News Release, Regional Rapid
Assessment Element Stationing Plans Announced, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, May 22, 1998. See
also, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Defense Technical
Information Center, July 1999, which studied "the full range of
military missions from homeland defense to major theater wars (MTWs)",
including the formation of a "joint reserve component virtual
information operations organization." The new reserve cyberdefense
unit "would consist of individuals with information technology
skills who could perform their duties from dispersed locations
rather than working as a single consolidated unit at a specific
training center." According to Federal Computer Week, July 26, 1999,
"the unit would communicate from existing reserve centers and other
DOD facilities across the country that have access to the Secret
Internet Protocol Routing Network."

97. See, An Appraisal of Technologies
for Political Control, European Parliament, Directorate General for
Research, Scientific and Technical Options Assessment (STOA), 6
January 1998. (http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm )

* I lived in Los angeles at the time,
and it was common knowledge that timing of all the fires indicated a
single team running from place to place to set them.