Terrorism:
Global Jihad - Evolving and Adapting

(Updated 2004)

The global jihadist movement -- including its most
prominent component, al-Qa'ida -- remains the preeminent terrorist threat
to the United States, US interests and US allies. While the core of al-Qa'ida has suffered severe damage to its leadership, organization, and capabilities,
the group remains intent on striking US interests in the homeland and
overseas. During the past year, concerted antiterrorist coalition measures
have degraded al-Qa'ida's central command infrastructure, sharply decreasing
its ability to conduct massive attacks. At the same time, however, al-Qa'ida
has spread its anti-US, anti-Western ideology to other groups and geographical
areas. It is therefore no longer al-Qa'ida itself but groups affiliated
with al-Qa'ida, or independent ones adhering to al-Qa'ida's ideology
that present the greatest threat of terrorist attacks against US and
allied interests globally.

US and coalition successes against al-Qa'ida have forced
these jihadist groups to compensate by showing a greater willingness
to act on their own and exercising greater local control over their
strategic and tactical decisions. As a result of this growing dispersion
and local decision-making, there is an increasing commingling of groups,
personnel, resources, and ad hoc operational and logistical coordination.
These groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida or indoctrinated with al-Qa'ida's
ideology are now carrying out most of the terrorist attacks against
US and allied interests. Their decreased power projection and limited
resources mean that an increasing percentage of jihadist attacks are
more local, less sophisticated, but still lethal. Some groups, however,
are seeking to replicate al-Qa'ida's global reach and expertise for
mass casualty attacks. This trend underscores that America's partners
in the global war on terror require the capabilities to identify and
eliminate terrorist threats in their countries for their own security
and ultimately to stop terrorists abroad before they can gain the ability
to attack the US homeland.

Al-Qa'ida

Despite intensive US and partner operations that have
led to the killing or capture of much of al-Qa'ida's senior leadership,
Usama bin Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain at large.
In late 2004, they made videotaped statements addressed directly to
the US public that warned of more attacks. The two have also publicly
threatened at least three dozen countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia.

The apparent mergers or declarations of allegiance
of groups such as Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi's organization with al-Qa'ida
suggest that al-Qa'ida is looking to leverage the capabilities and resources
of key regional networks and affiliates -- a trend that al-Qa'ida could
also use to try to support new attacks in the United States and abroad.

The Global Jihadist Movement

The global jihadist movement predates al-Qa'ida's founding
and was reinforced and developed by successive conflicts in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere during 1990s. As a result, it spawned
several groups and operating nodes and developed a resiliency that ensured
that destruction of any one group or node did not destroy the larger
movement. Since 2001, extremists, including members of al-Qa'ida and
affiliated groups, have sought to exploit perceptions of the US-led
global war on terrorism and, in particular, the war in Iraq to attract
converts to their movement. Many of these recruits come from a large
and growing pool of disaffected youth who are sympathetic to radical,
anti-Western militant ideology. At the same time, these extremists have
branched out to establish jihadist cells in other parts of the Middle
East, South Asia, and Europe, from which they seek to prepare operations
and facilitate funding and communications.

Foreign fighters appear to be working to m ake the
insurgency in Iraq what the resistance movement to the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan was to the earlier generation of jihadists -- a melting
pot for jihadists from around the world, a training ground, and an indoctrination
center. In the months and years ahead, a significant number of fighters
who have traveled to Iraq could return to their home countries, exacerbating
domestic conflicts or augmenting with new skills and experience existing
extremist networks in the communities to which they return.

The Spread of Al-Qa'ida's Ideology

Al-Qa'ida's ideology resonates with other Sunni extremist
circles. Some affiliated groups -- including Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast
Asia -- look to their own spiritual leaders, yet historically have shared
close ideological and operational ties to al-Qa'ida. In recent years,
however, the resonance of al- Qa'ida's message has contributed to the
formation of an assortment of grassroots networks and cells among persons
that previously have had no observable links to bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida
aside from general ideological and religious affinity.

Examples of this trend include Salafiya Jihadia, a
loosely-organized Moroccan movement involved in carrying out the bombings
in May 2003 in Casablanca, and the terrorists who executed the March
2004 attack in Madrid. Although these cells do not appear to have been
acting directly on al-Qa'ida orders, their attacks supported al-Qa'ida's
ideology and reflected al-Qa'ida's targeting strategy.

Terrorist capabilities for attacks will remain uneven,
given the varying degrees of expertise and increasing decentralization
within the movement. Most groups will be capable only of relatively
unsophisticated, but still deadly small-scale attacks. Others, however,
may seek to acquire or replicate al-Qa'ida's expertise and material
support for mass-casualty attacks. The explosive growth of media and
the Internet, as well as the ease of travel and communication around
the world have made possible the rapid movemen t of operatives, expertise,
money, and explosives. Terrorists increa singly will use media and the
Internet to advance key messages or rally support, share jihadist experiences
and expertise, and spread fear.

Although the jihadist movement remains dangerous, it
is not monolithic. Some groups are focused on attacking the United States
or its allies, while others view governments and leaders in the Muslim
world as their primary targets. The United States and its partners in
the global war on terrorism will continue to use all the means available
to identify, target, and prevent the spread of these jihadist groups
and ideology.