Judging
from the media rhetoric in early January this year, one could almost be
forgiven for believing that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was the
anointed replacement for Australia's F/A-18A and F-111 fleets - no
doubt
to the annoyance of many in Defence who are immersed in the
complexities
of AIR 6000 capabilities definition. The reality of the Joint Strike
Fighter is much less sparkling as many would like us to believe. In
this
month's analysis we will explore some of the issues.

The new LM F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter has the distinction of being a first in more than one
respect.
It is the first combat aircraft to leverage the massive US Air Force
research & development investment in the F-22 family of aircraft.
It
is also the first attempt since the 1960s TFX (F-111) program failure
to produce a fighter which can meet the needs of all three US services
with fighter fleets, as well as the needs of export clients. As the
Joint Strike Fighter program includes both conventional, carrier
capable and STOVL variants, it is the first ever attempt to create a
fighter which spans three very distinct deployment regimes. Finally, it
is the first attempt to produce a very low cost aircraft with genuine
stealth characteristics.

With the prospect of around
3,000
Joint Strike Fighters for the US services, replacing the F-16A-D,
A-10A,
F/A-18A-D and AV-8B, and the potential to render all European fighter
offerings wholly uncompetitive in the large F-16 and F/A-18 replacement
markets, the hope of US manufacturers and their congressional
supporters
is that the Joint Strike Fighter will become the next F-16 and secure
the US industry with an unbeatable advantage in the future commodity
fighter market. Greed is a powerful motivator in the Joint Strike
Fighter program and one which is likely to see most of the obstacles to
this aircraft, and its inherent limitations, ignored in the quest for
market dominance.

The history of the Joint Strike
Fighter (formerly the Joint Advanced Strike Technology - JAST) program
is by any measure colourful, its earliest origins tracing back to
technology demonstration programs for a Harrier follow-on for the US
Marine Corps and multirole fighter for the US Air Force (refer AA
December 2001 and http://www.jsf.mil/). The shrinking US aerospace
industrial base soon saw significant congressional pressure applied for
the initial technology demonstration goal to be extended into a
production fighter program. In its current shape the Joint Strike
Fighter program could lead to the production of around 3,000 Joint
Strike Fighter variants replacing US Air Force F-16Cs, A-10s, US Navy
F/A-18Cs, and US Marine Corps and RAF/RN Harrier variants. The lead
service in the Joint Strike Fighter program remains the US Air Force.

From the very outset the
principal aim of the Joint Strike Fighter program was to produce a low
cost mass production strike aircraft which exploits the latest
avionic/computer, stealth and production technologies. Given the
incessant political threats of F-22 program cancellation held over the
US Air Force through most of the 1990s, limiting the air superiority
capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter was a political imperative -
moreso given that air superiority capabilities such as high
thrust/weight ratio and sustained supersonic cruise are not very
compatible with very low unit cost. If the Joint Strike Fighter were to
be too snappy a performer in the air superiority game, the F-22 would
have been promptly axed thereby shifting USD 20B or more of production
costs back by at least a decade much to the delight of vote buyers in
the US Congress.

Indeed as recently as a year ago
the US Air Force had to defend the F-22 against repeated political
attacks, most of which clearly illustrated the almost total technical
illiteracy of the F-22's critics. Invariably the argument is that the
F-22 is too big, too costly, too capable or built around Cold War
needs, thus irrelevant to the modern environment and that a Joint
Strike Fighter can do the job well enough.

The US Air Force crafted the
basic definition of the Joint Strike Fighter - its size, performance,
load carrying ability and target cost around its principal tactical
strike fighter, the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG/CJ. In the mid 1990s US Air
Force force structure model the F-15C flew air superiority and air
defence tasks, the F-111F, F-15E and F-117A performed the deep strike
penetration tasks, with the latter used in more heavily defended
environments. The venerable Fairchild-Republic A-10A Thunderbolt was
used for battlefield interdiction and close air support, together with
the F-16CG. Defence suppression was performed by the F-16CG, in concert
with AGM-130 firing F-15Es, after the retirement of the formidable F-4G
Weasel. In this model targets fall into two distinct bands - those
within a 400 NMI radius of friendly runways, and those at 600 NMI and
beyond.

This force structure model
evolved during the latter part of the Cold War, and combined a
relatively diverse mix of fighter capabilities. With the 1970s F-111F,
A-10 and F-117A, 1980s F-15C/E and F-16C and a mix of weapons with
lineages back to the 1960s, this model was a cumulative aggregation of
almost three decades of technology and evolving doctrine. This was the
force structure which the US Air Force applied with such devastating
effect against the SovBloc modelled Iraqi defences in 1991 and it
proved
itself convincingly.

There is however one important
division which can be drawn through this force structure model - size.
With the exception of the small single engine single seat F-16, all of
these aircraft are large twin engine fighters designed to push the
performance envelope in their respective categories.

The ubiquitious F-16 was a
uniquely Cold War phenomenon. With NATO and the Warsaw Pact
geographically poised along either side of the Iron Curtain, presenting
each other with a concentration of force and targets unprecedented in
history, significant imperatives existed for both sides to saturate the
theatre with high performance fighters. Whoever won the air superiority
game over Central Europe held the decisive advantage in the Cold War
standoff. Fighter combat radius and endurance over the target are not
issues when the geographical environment puts the two largest military
forces on the planet head-to-head across a single frontier.

The Light Weight Fighter (LWF)
contest saw the GD YF-16 take the laurels and decisive build numbers
over the YF-17. The production F-16A was a day-VFR light weight air
combat fighter designed for exceptional transonic agility and good
supersonic dash performance when clean, armed with Sidewinders and an
internal gun. Its principal role was to destroy enmasse the Soviet and
allied Warpac strike fighter fleets in close air combat, and then swing
into day-VFR battlefield air interdiction and close air support to
eradicate Soviet/Warpac land forces, the latter role to be shared with
the F-15A, F-4E and F-111D/E/F. With the Soviet/Warpac fighter fleets
dominated by the MiG-21, MiG-23/27 and Su-7/17/22 series, the F-16s
would have enjoyed a decisively target rich environment.

With the impending retirement of
the F-4E Phantom II, the US Air Force needed a substitute to fill the
tactical fighter bomber role. The F-16C, equipped with the LANTIRN
Terrain Following Radar and FLIR/laser targeting podset, was to fill
this niche. With European theatre geography and threats driving this
need, the radius of the F-16 airframe was yet again not an issue.

When the Soviet Empire
collapsed,
the US Air Force was forced into a massive downsizing program. Under
significant budgetary pressure, the remaining F-4E and F-4G aircraft
were retired, followed by the F-15A, much of the F-16A fleet and early
model F-111A/D/E/G aircraft. By the mid to late nineties, the US Air
Force fighter fleet comprised primarily the F-15C, F-16C variants, the
F-15E and a small number of F-117As. Most of the massive B-52 fleet was
retired and the buy of B-2A batwing bombers was chopped from 132 to
60
and then finally 21.

Expectations during this period
were that the principal strategic problems the US would confront would
be troublesome nations in the Balkans and the Middle East, with
ethno-religious conflicts between smaller nation states dominating
agenda. In this environment problem nations would be unable to threaten
US basing, and the enormous political clout during the Pax Americana
period would see easy access to basing. Concurrently the US Congress
showed little interest in the defence budget, and the US Air Force
faced
the prospect of an aging and increasingly expensive to run fighter
fleet, in a strategic environment where air superiority and safe
in-theatre basing were virtually guaranteed.

This was the environment which
shaped the Joint Strike Fighter program - a situation in which combat
radius, endurance over the target, air superiority performance and
availability of in-theatre basing were not principal design
imperatives.
Cost and industrial base survival pressures were the foremost drivers
in
the Joint Strike Fighter program. The US Air Force needed a cheap mass
production bomb truck to provide a one-for-one replacement of its aging
F-16C inventory. The US aerospace industry needed another F-16A with
which to saturate export markets and retain their eroding market
position against the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Perhaps the greatest
misconception about the Joint Strike Fighter program is that it
represents a repeat scenario when compared to the YF-16/F-16A program
- a low cost highly agile air superiority fighter designed to exploit
cutting edge technology to provide a shorter ranging supplement to the
top end twin engine large fighter (then F-15A, now F-22A) of the
period.
This misconception misrepresents the central design objectives of the
Joint Strike Fighter program against the Light Weight Fighter program,
and also ignores the decisive role in the F-16 fleet.

In its day the F-16A was perhaps
the nastiest close-in air combat fighter in existance, requiring
careful
tactics by even the top end F-15A air superiority fighter. While the
F-16C Block 40/50 is heavier, it is still a respectable air combat
fighter even if a dubious bomb truck. The F-16's central design
optimisation was the transonic dogfight, reflected in thrust/weight
ratio, wing loading, turn rates, climb rates and acceleration. In these
parameters it was competitive against the best in the field, even if it
could not compete with the thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, climb
rates and acceleration of the F-15A.

The Joint Strike Fighter's
central design optimisation is in-theatre strike, battlefield
interdiction and close air support, reflected in forward sector
stealth,
internal weapons/fuel capacity and cruise efficiency in clean
configuration. In these parameters it outperforms the incumbent F-16C
and F/A-18A/C, while providing relatively similar air superiority
performance to these types. Against the current yardstick for air
superiority performance, the F-22A, the Joint Strike Fighter is a
non-contender - its 35 degree class transonic wing and 1:1
thrust/weight
ratio are adequate for self-defensive purposes but not in the league
for
rapidly establishing air supremacy.

Just as the joint Tactical
Fighter eXperimental (TFX) or F-111A/B program was cast at an early
stage into a conceptual mold of a high speed long range bomb-truck, the
Joint Strike Fighter has been cast into the mold of an incrementally
improved F-16C / F/A-18C class light bomb-truck, exploiting stealth and
modern avionics to provide a survivability edge over its predecessors.
The TFX program crashed and burned on the evolving needs of the US
Navy,
who wanted more air superiority performance and lower carrier landing
weights.

Some critics of the Joint Strike
Fighter argue that it will inevitably go the route of the TFX
experiencing cost growth, weight growth and performance loss as it
undergoes development and its respective end users load it up with
desired design extras to meet their specific needs. Indeed US reports
suggest repeated political clashes in recent years, as the US Marine
Corps and Navy sought performance and capability improvements which
conflicted with US Air Force unit cost targets. Given that the maritime
users of the Joint Strike Fighter do not have an F-22 equivalent to
gain
the high ground in an air battle, it is not inconceivable that we might
see downstream disagreements in the Joint Strike Fighter program as
these players try to fill this crucial gap in their basic capabilities.

The broader strategic issue for
the Joint Strike Fighter will be its basic sizing in a world
environment
which sees two mutually supporting strategic trends - problem nations
acquiring ballistic missiles, both mobile and semi-mobile, weapons of
mass destruction, and a concurrent trend to implementing
shoot-and-scoot SAM/AAA air defence tactics. In air power theoretic
terms, the use of shoot-and-scoot SAM/AAA and ballistic missile/WMD
technologies represent an anti-access strategy. Such strategies aim
to
deny the use of nearby runways by threatening ballistic missile or WMD
attacks on runways as well as hosting nations, while providing a
persistent and highly mobile air defence threat (A good summary of
emerging ballistic missile capabilities in this area is at the FAS
website : Iran,
North
Korea).

Prior to the 11th September,
long
term US Air Force envisaged a two tier force structure model: the
Global
Strike Task Force (GSTF) , an Air Expeditionary Force comprising 48 x
F-22A and 12 x B-2A, would break the opponent's air defences and launch
high tempo attacks on critical command/control/communications, WMD
sites
and ballistic missile forces. As the opponent's defences would crumble,
a sustainment Air Expeditionary Force, comprising the Joint Strike
Fighter, B-1B and B-52H, would then hammer the opponent to collapse.
This model makes two implicit assumptions - the enemy cannot bombard
friendly runways with ballistic missiles, and these runways are close
enough to permit a viable sortie rate (missions/day) by the Joint
Strike
Fighter and F-22.

If the opponent chooses to play
the ballistic missile bombardment game, then this model does get into
some difficulty, since the 400-600 nautical mile range of evolved Scud
class missiles presents difficulties for the Joint Strike Fighter -
nearby nations might deny basing access and bases which are made
available might be shut down by ballistic missile strikes. This is less
of an issue for the supercruising F-22, as with decent tanker support
it
can sustain a high sortie rate from a much greater distance - the F-22
can transit to targets at roughly twice the speed of contemporary
fighters and the Joint Strike Fighter.

This was a principal strategic
argument against the whole concept of the Joint Strike Fighter prior to
the September 11th events. Since then we have seen a pivotal in
bombardment tactics, with long endurance loitering bombardment used
to
successfully engage and destroy fleeting and highly mobile ground
targets. This in turn mitigates against smaller fighters and decisively
favours aircraft which have larger bomb loads and endurance. The
argument that Afghanistan was a one-off does not hold up to scrutiny
-
a campaign against Iran, Iraq, the PRC or more than one African problem
nation could see the very same geographical problem issues arise yet
again. Well spoken diplomacy is no match against the threat of domestic
terrorism across porous Third World borders, or ballistic missile
attacks with conventional or even WMD warheads - all being convincing
disincentives to the basing of a US-led Air Expeditionary Force.

Whether one is hunting a high
technology Russian mobile SAM system, a mobile ballistic missile
system,
or a bunch of terrorists in a four wheel drive or BTR-60, the
inevitable
reality is that the best technique is loitering bombardment which is
not the forte of smaller fighters - including the Joint Strike Fighter.

The
revived argument in the US promoting new build B-2C batwings and
an F-111/FB-111A class regional bomber illustrates this important
in the bombardment paradigm - and the increasing long term
exposure of close-in based Air Expeditionary Forces to MRBM attacks.
The
argument pits direct operational needs for striking radius, sortie
rates
and bombloads in difficult to export or non-exportable top tier assets
against the limited yet highly exportable and thus potentially
profitable JSF.

Part 2 will compare the F-35/JSF
against some in service and production fighter types.

The USAF intend to use
the
F-35/JSF as a one-for-one replacement aircraft for their aging fleets
of F-16C strike fighters and A-10A battlefield interdictors. Against
both types the F-35/JSF provides a significant survivability
improvement
by virtue of its stealth capability, while it outranges the F-16C on
typical strike profiles. The air superiority and air defence tasks of
the F-15C and deep penetration tasks of the F-15E and F-117A will be
absorbed by the supercruising stealthy F-22A Raptor (US Air Force
photos).

The USN aim to use the
F-35/JSF
as a replacement for the older F/A-18A-D models, to provide a
survivable first day of the war strike fighter to supplement the
reduced observable F/A-18E/F in carrier air wings. The navalised JSF
has
larger wings, stabilators and marginally more fuel than the USAF
variant. It will provide a respectable combat radius gain over the
F/A-18A-D but will not match the performance of the long departed A-6E
Intruder (USN).

The USMC, RN and RAF will
use the
STOVL F-35/JSF variant to replace a range of Harrier variants for
operation from unprepared FOBs and STOVL carriers. With a supersonic
dash capability, significantly better radius performance and a modern
radar, the F-35/JSF is a vast improvement over the sixties technology
Harrier family. The Shaft Driven Lift Fan technology will provide
better
hover performance than the Harrier (US Marine Corps).

Current USAF planning sees
the
establishment of the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) comprising 48
F-22As and 12 B-2As. This silver bullet expeditionary force is
intended to demolish opposing air defences and critical WMD targets in
the opening phase of an air campaign, upon which a sustainment force
of legacy B-52H/B-1B and F-35/JSF fighters completes the bombardment.
The JSF is predicated upon having runways within a 400-600 nautical
mile
class distance of intended targets, thus aligning the aircraft firmly
with Cold War period geographical assumptions - a precondition which
may
not be met in future conflicts (US Air Force).

A key issue for the JSF will be
the proliferation of medium range ballistic missiles in the 600+
nautical mile range class. With North Korea having supplied this
technology to Iran and Pakistan the long term outlook is that
proliferation will be very difficult if not impossible to contain.
While
a supercruising F-22 can sustain a high sortie rate over such
distances,
the subsonic cruise optimised JSF will suffer a debilitating reduction
in sortie rates as distances push out well beyond the design point of
600 nautical miles - both types requiring generous aerial refuelling
support (Author/LM).

Part 2 Sizing up the Joint Strike Fighter

The public rhetoric
surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter is no less deceptive to the
uninitiated as the public rhetoric surrounding many of the other
current
production types being bid for AIR 6000. In all instances we hear the
latest avionics technology and stealth performance as key
attributes
of a modern high tech fighter designed to meet the threats of the
future.

In comparing the Joint Strike Fighter against the Eurofighter
Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, F-16C/B60 and F/A-18E/F, the Joint Strike
Fighter will have a decisive advantage in its very moden integrated
avionic architecture, which is modelled on that of the F-22A but built
using militarised commercial computing technology. With a battery of
GigaHertz clock speed processors, high speed digital busses with around
1,000 times the throughput of the Mil-Std-1553B busses in the teen
series and Eurocanard fighters, it is no contest - the Joint Strike
Fighter is in an unbeatable position. While growth versions of the teen
series and Eurocanard fighters might see a similar integrated avionic
architecture in the post 2010 period, this is unlikely to be a
revenue-neutral design change.

Against all of these contenders, the Joint Strike Fighter has
an unassailable survivability advantage in its use of evolved second
generation stealth technology, again derived from the F-22A technology
base. With a forward sector radar cross section cited to be close to
the F-22 the Joint Strike Fighter will present a challenging target to
forward sector radar guided threats.

As a bomb truck, the Joint Strike Fighter falls into a
similar
payload class to these players, but with the important distinction that
it carries its bombs or missiles internally, and it has an internal
fuel
capacity similar to that of these competing aircraft loaded up with
external fuel tanks. In practical terms this means that the Joint
Strike
Fighter can carry a similar load of fuel and bombs without the critical
transonic regime drag penalty of external stores. Therefore it can
carry
the same bomb load further using a similar fuel load. Claims that the
X-35 demonstrator exceeded the Joint Strike Fighter combat radius
requirement should come as no surprise - the cited figure of 600+
nautical miles is credible and a distinct gain over the F-16C and
F/A-18A/C. This radius is however unlikely to be acheivable if the F-35
is heavily loaded with external stores, since it will like its
competitors incur a major drag penalty.

Claims that the Joint Strike Fighter is an F-111 class bomb
truck are scarcely credible, especially if the F-111 is armed with
internal JDAMs or small bombs - a variable geometry wing and 34,000
lb
of internal fuel is impossible to beat in the bomb trucking game. The
comparison of a clean F-35 against an F-111 loaded with external
BRU-3A/Mk.82 is not representative of what a post 2020 F-111 weapons
configuration would look like. The only decisive system level advantage
the Joint Strike Fighter has against the F-111 is its use of second
generation stealth technology - no radar cross section reduction on the
F-111 will make it competitive against this type. In terms of avionics,
if the RAAF retains the F-111 post-2020 then Joint Strike Fighter
generation technology would most likely find its way into the Pig and
thus render this comparison meaningless.

As an air combat fighter the Joint Strike Fighter is more
difficult to compare, since the differences against the teen series and
Eurocanards are less distinct. In terms of achievable radar performance
its small aperture radar will fall broadly into the same class as its
direct competitors. While transonic turn rate performance figures
remain
classified, the F-35 is a 9G rated fighter and is thus apt to deliver
highly competitive transonic close-in dogfight performance against the
teen series and Eurocanards. The empty weight of the F-35, at 26,500 -
30,000 lb is deceptive insofar as it must be compared against a
conventional competitor's weight including external pylons and empty
fuel tanks - nevertheless it is in the empty weight class of an F-15 or
F/A-18E rather than F-16C or F/A-18C.

With a nominal payload of 2,000 lb of AAMs the USAF F-35
yields a combat thrust/weight ratio around 1.1:1 which is competitive
against a modestly loaded F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanard, but with a
typically better combat radius or combat gas allowance - however it is
not in the class of an F-15C let alone F-22A. Therefore the F-35 should
provide competitive acceleration and climb performance at similar
weights to the F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanards. With the upper portions
of the split inlets likely to produce good vortices, the F-35 should
provide respectable high alpha performance and handling, especially if
flight control software technology from the F-22A was exploited fully.

Where the F-35 is apt to be less than a stellar performer is
in the supersonic Beyond Visual Range combat regime, which is the sharp
end of air superiority performance. This is primarily a consequence of
the wing planform design which is in the 35 degree leading edge sweep
angle class, thus placing it between the sweep of the F/A-18A/C and
F-16A/C. Wing sweep in this class is good for transonic bomb trucking
and tight turning, but incurs a much faster supersonic drag rise with
Mach number against the supersonic intercept optimised wing planforms
seen in the F-15, Typhoon, Rafale and indeed the F-22A. The important
caveat is that the teen series and Eurocanards wear a hefty supersonic
drag penalty from carrying external missiles and drop tanks, whereas
the
F-35 will have a clean wing in this regime.

In the absence of published hard numbers for supersonic
acceleration, energy bleed and persistence performance, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the F-35 is likely to be competitive
against the teen series and Eurocanards in combat configuration but
decisively inferior to the F-22A.

Another factor in the BVR game is radar performance, limited
by the power/aperture of the radar design. While hard numbers on the
F-35's radar are yet to be published, what is available suggests an
800-900 element phased array which is in the class of the F-16C/B60,
F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards but well behind the massive 2200 element
APG-77 in the F-22A. With a superior processing architecture to the
F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards the Joint Strike Fighter is very
unlikely to have inferior radar performance, but may not have a
decisively large detection range advantage either.

If used as an air defence interceptor and air superiority
fighter, the F-35 will deliver similar capabilities to the F-16C/B60,
F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards at similar weights - its limitations in
thrust/weight ratio and thus climb rate/acceleration, and wing
optimisation for transonic regimes, will limit its ability to engage
high performance supersonic threats by virtue of basic aerodynamic
performance. Its small radar will also put limitations on achievable
BVR
missile engagement ranges, although this will be mitigated by very good
forward sector stealth performance. A threat with a large infrared
search and track set may however get a firing opportunity in a high
altitude clear sky engagement. The radar performance bounds will also
present similar limitations to those seen with the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F
and Eurocanard series when hunting for low flying cruise missiles -
without close AWACS support the F-35 may not be very effective in this
demanding role.

It is worth noting that the F-35 is not an all-aspect stealth
design like the F-22A and YF-23 which have carefully optimised exhaust
geometries and thus excellent aft sector radar cross section. The
axisymmetric F-135 nozzle is not in this class and thus the F-35 is
clearly not intended for the deep penetration strike role of the F-22A.

Attempting to make an all encompassing comparison of the F-35
against current fighters is fraught with some risks, insofar as the
design will further evolve before production starts and many design
parameters, especially in avionics, may . In terms of basic sizing
and performance optimisations probably the best yardstick is that the
F-35 is much like a stealthy but incrementally improved F/A-18A/C
which closely reflects the similarity in the basic roles of the two
types - strike optimised growth derivatives of lightweight fighters.

The F-35 is clearly out of its league against the F-22A in
all
cardinal performance parameters, with the exception of its bomb bay
size
which is built to handle larger weapons than the F-22A. Disregarding
stealth capability and baseline avionics, the F-35 is also out of its
league against the F-111 in the bomb trucking role by virtue of size
and
fixed wing geometry.

All of these analytical arguments are essentially contingent
upon the JSF meeting its design performance and cost targets. This
remains to be seen since the JSF is arguably the highest technological
risk program in the pipeline at this time. Key risk factors derive from
its reliance upon bleeding edge technology to achieve the combination
of capability for its size and cost. There are no less than five areas
of concern: the COTS derived avionic system departs from established
technology and is in many respects a repeat of the F-111D Mk.II
avionics
idea; the reliance upon software goes well beyond established designs
and software systems with many millions of lines of code are not
reknowned for timely deliveries; any durability problems with the hot
running F135 engines would be handled by derating which cuts into an
already marginal thrust/weight ratio; differing needs and expectations
by the JSF's diverse customer base could cause divergence in program
objectives and cost blowouts in common areas; the sheer complexity of
what the JSF project is trying to achieve in melding untried
technologies with diverse missions could create unforseen problems in
its own right. Until we see production JSFs coming off the production
line, it remains a high risk option.

The Joint Strike Fighter is a most curious blend of the F-22
technology base, state-of-the-art avionics and Cold War era strategic
thinking - in its own way as much a Cold War anachronism as the
Eurocanards. Insofar as one of its prime design aims is to shoot down
the Eurocanards in the commercial dogfight, it represents an instance
of
an anachronistic fighter sizing strategy and associated cost structure
becoming a principal design driver over achievable combat effect and
long term strategic usefulness.

Joint Strike Fighter vs A6K

With the F-35 being the holy grail of budget minded force
planners throughout the West, it has developed some followers in the
Canberra defence establishment, especially amongst players who see
little importance in the RAAF's established doctrinal and strategic
thinking or developing regional environment. Indeed, if we pretend that
the PRC doesn't exist and India's strategic competition with the PRC in
the region doesn't concern us, and that cruise missiles are not the
hottest selling item across the wider region, then the F-35 becomes an
attractive proposition - a cheap to buy, cheap to run, stealthy hi-tech
fighter which is an incremental improvement over the RAAF's somewhat
anaemic F/A-18A Hornet.

As a bomb truck, disregarding stealth performance, the F-35
falls into the gap between the F/A-18A and F-111. As an air combat
fighter, it will offer modest performance gains over the F/A-18A HUG
and
the advantage of stealth. In the eyes of many this is apt to be a good
compromise at a good price.

These arguments may appear superficially reasonable, but are
based upon a number of premises which are not reasonable. Regional
strategic issues may have disappeared from the press and TV bulletins
but remain as they were a year ago:

The regional arms race has yet to show signs of abating,
and with the War on Terrorism forcing the US to make significant
political concessions to China and India we should expect to see both
players doing their best to shop for Russian (and Israeli) technology
while world attention is focussed elsewhere.

Shifting tactics in nations opposed to the West will see
mobility become the basic tactic for evading air power, given that
Afghanistan has proven yet again that bunkers, caves and tunnels are no
defence against air power. Loitering bombardment will become the
baseline tactic for defeating mobility, demanding larger fighters.

Mobile ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are the most
rapidly proliferating weapon class in Asia today, and given their value
in implementing anti-access strategies against Western air power, and
political coercion, this is unlikely to change soon. Korea has made a
successful business out of the export of extended range Scud derivative
technology.

The cumulative total of Su-27/30 orders in Asia still
remains around the 500 aircraft mark, representing an environment where
a 600 nautical mile class subsonic combat radius is not a decisive
strategic advantage against the Sukhoi's similar or better radius
performance.

Turmoil in the Middle East is likely to see long term
growth in alternative sources of oil and gas, accelerating development
in Australia's Timor Sea and North West Shelf energy industries - and
Australia's strategic vulnerability as a result.

Uncertainties in the RAAF gaining basing access in South
East Asia during a regional crisis remain. While the War on Terrorism
may have shifted the focus of Australia's regional interactions, the
reality is that much of the region is culturally Muslim and whatever
the
outcome of the war, political sensitivies in the region will be
exacerbated over the nearer and longer term.

The sad reality is that the regional strategic drivers remain
as is - they are a consequence of the ongoing economic and military
growth in Asia. While India's current relationship with the West has
thawed, this situation may not persist over coming decades - the
strategic timeline which concerns A6K planning.

What the War on Terrorism will produce, other than major
strategic changes in the Middle East and Central Asia, is an increased
move to mobility in Asian armed forces as the Afghan campaign is
understood fully. It is also apt to produce a longer term demand for
coalition campaign forces to support the US in expeditionary warfare.

If we make the assumption that A6K will aim to field only new
technology fighters with a very long term development future, then the
only relevant candidates are the F-22 and F-35 - both stealthy and
using
the latest generation avionic architectures and engines.

Numerous strategies exist - with or without F-111 replacement
- for implementing the A6K program. If the F-111 is to disappear in
2015-2020, then the choices are a single type replacement using only
the
F-22, or only the F-35, or some Hi-Lo mix of the F-22 and F-35. If the
F-111 is to be stretched beyond 2020, then the F/A-18A could be
replaced
with either the F-22 or the F-35. This provides no less than 5 possible
force structure models, each with different funding needs and
capability
mixes. Which is best? That depends on the priorities of the observer.

The case for a mix of F119 powered F-111s and F-22s was
argued
in some detail in AA late last year and presents a robust case in
capabilities, with the benefit of significant domestic spending but the
drawback of some developmental risk. The case for an F-22 and F-35 mix
depends crucially on the perceived importance of bomb-trucking
performance vs survivability of the F-35 against the F-111. The F-35's
stealth advantage must be weighed against the F-111's superior ability
to haul big loads over big distances - with an F-22 escort to kill
opposing fighters and SAMs the survivability argument may prove
narrower
than many may think. A mix in which transonic F-35s escort
supercruising
F-111s is arguably non-viable and is merely a new technology
reimplementation of the existing F/A-18 and F-111 mix.

The alternatives of single type total force replacements with
the F-22 or F-35 also raise interesting issues. While the F-35 at this
time carries larger bombs than the F-22, it is a decidely inferior
performer in the air combat game and the deep penetration strike game.
With supercruise capability in a baseline bombing role using small
bomb payloads the supercruising F-22's higher sortie rate at longer
ranges suggests that one F-22 can perform a similar workload to a pair
of F-35s, with the caveat that two or more F-35s will be needed to
perform the air defence coverage of a single F-22. In terms of
deterrent
credibility and potency in combat, the F-22 is unbeatable, in terms of
political whining from air power detractors of every ilk, it is a
guaranteed magnet (deja vu - F-111 1967?). Conversely, a pure F-35
force
structure is apt to leave important capability gaps in air superiority,
cruise missile defence and deep penetration strike, while pushing up
total numbers and thus aircrew demands - the latter likely to be a
major
long term issue with ongoing demographic shifts.

A key factor in any F-22 vs F-35 contest is that the F-35
order book is full, but the F-22 buy was hatcheted from around 750 down
to 332 thus providing significant incentives for an export sale of an
aircraft which would be exclusively available, like the F-111 during
the
1960s, only to close and trusted allies of the US. US sources suggest a
revived build of 750 F-22s would push the unit cost down to USD 74M,
similar to an F-15E.

Which of these strategies proves to be most attractive to
Australia's leadership is yet to be seen - and if the government is
serious about the A6K effort this will not be known until a decision is
reached around the middle of the decade.

What is clear at this stage is that the fighter market is
stratifying in a manner without precedent - two decades ago a buyer had
more than one choice in any given size/weight/performance class. By
2010
this will be untrue - in non-stealthy fighters there is apt to be only
the F/A-18E/F and Typhoon with different weights, aerodynamics and
mission avionic capabilities, and in stealthy fighters the F-22 and
F-35
which are much more diverse in capabilities than their teen series
predecessors, the F-15 and F-16. Therefore a choice of fighter will
determine the choice of strategy/doctrine since different classes of
fighter provide distinctly different possibilities - and limitations -
in roles and missions.

One might ask the question of whether the classical model
of
a fighter competition is even relevant any more? With the only gains
from the competitive process likely to be in ancillary benefits such as
domestic support programs - aircraft prices being largely fixed by the
domestic markets of the manufacturers - one might seriously contemplate
the primary focus of the A6K evaluation being in assessing the ability
of particular fighter types or mixes/numbers thereof to perform the
intended roles, rather than the historical game of playing
manufacturers
off to secure the best pricing package.

In the context of A6K, the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is most notable in terms of the roles and
missions it cannot do well, rather than those it can. If air
superiority
and long range strike are the long term priorities which government
policy ostensibly declares them to be, then the F-35 may not be the
best
choice for replacing the F/A-18A or the F-111, either singly or in a
mix.

The comparison table is
based
upon
provisional data and some assumptions about profiles and weapon loads.
Nevertheless, it illustrates the significant disparity between the
F-111, F/A-18A and F-35/JSF in the critical loitering bombardment
regime
against mobile targets. Loiter performance is also relevant for air
defence operations as it determines how frequently the fighter must top
up from a tanker to maintain station at a given radius [Ed: NB the
F/A-22A fuel figures represent pre-FSD/LRIP configuration] (Author,
L-M).

The F-35/JSF is frequently
portrayed as a cheaper, single engined F-22. This is a dangerous
misrepresentation, since key design optimisations in the JSF wing and
thrust/weight ratio make it anything but a performer in the class of
the
F-22A. The F-22A offers all aspect low observable (stealth) performance
intended for deep penetration strikes, and is much superior to the
F-35/JSF. With the ability to penetrate higher, faster and with greater
stealth, the F-22 is a significantly more survivable strike aircraft
than the F-35/JSF (USAF).

Probably the best
contemporary
equivalent to the F-35/JSF is the late build F/A-18C which is primarily
used as bomber in USN service. The F-35/JSF is an incremental
improvement over the F/A-18A-D in virtually every parameter, and has
low
observable performance which no teen-series or Eurocanard can compete
with. The F-15C class empty weight and 18-19 klb class internal fuel
capacity of the F-35/JSF are deceptive - as a stealthy aircraft it must
carry internally the fuel an F/A-18A-C carries in external tanks on a
basic profile (RAAF).

The F-35/JSF is often
described
as
a natural F-111 replacement due to its basic design optimisation for
bomb trucking. This comparison is highly misleading, insofar as the
USAF
regard the F-111A/C/D/E/F/FB-111A as being in the regional bomber
category rather than strike fighter category. With just over 50% of
the internal fuel capacity of an F-111, the F-35/JSF cannot be directly
compared. In strike operations the F-35/JSF has one genuine advantage
over the F-111 - third generation low observable technology - which
makes it much more survivable against top end SAM threats (RAAF).

The F-35/JSF is
likely to
devastate the Eurocanards in the export market, as most potential
clients in the Far East, Middle East and Europe will be attracted to
the
F-22 generation avionic package, stealth capability and performance
gains over their existing F-16A-D and F/A-18A-D export fighters. In an
environment where top end air superiority performance and combat radius
are non critical performance parameters, the F-35/JSF is apt to be an
attractive proposition. The Australian environment, where combat radius
and air superiority performance are vital for a small force defending a
large area, is not the design target of the JSF (USAF).