Tuesday, 7 May 2013

No concessions in Daulat Beg Oldi, say government sources

"You have crossed the border. Please go back"

by Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 7th May 13

On Sunday,
40-50 Chinese border guards from the paramilitary People’s Armed Police
withdrew from their temporary camp at Raki Nala near the Indian outpost of
Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in northern Ladakh. Thus ended a 20-day face-off with
Indian jawans of the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), who had responded to the
arrival of the Chinese patrol on 15th Apr by establishing an Indian
camp adjoining the Chinese. From early messages coming out of South Block, New
Delhi appears to have made no significant concessions in resolving this dispute
[The bunker at Chumar which the Indian Army consented to vacate was built as a
retaliation to the Chinese intrusion into the DBO sector on Apr 15th].

Notwithstanding
the hype generated by an excitable Indian media that had reported the
“eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation” in dire terms, at no stage of this incident were
actual hostilities imminent, or even considered. Over the last two decades,
both armies have complied with a framework of bilateral agreements that were designed
to prevent physical conflict. Peace has been maintained even as both countries’
troops and border guards kept alive their territorial claims by patrolling and
camping in disputed areas. The agreements include the 1993 “Agreement for
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC”; the 1996 “Agreement on Confidence
Building Measures in the Military Field”; and a successor protocol of 2005 on
implementing border CBMs. A separate mechanism for resolving border incidents,
such as DBO, was signed a year ago.

These
protocols and agreements specify permissible modalities for engagement. These
include verbal cautions over loudspeakers, and the unfurling and display of cloth
banners that inform the other patrol that it has crossed the border and should
return. In the two decades since the 1993 agreement, the two sides have
developed the habits and practices of armed co-existence, which has drastically
reduced the possibility of actual shooting.

This
restraint was in the making even before 1993. In 1986, during a crisis that bore
similarities to the DBO intrusion, a Chinese patrol unexpectedly established
camp at the disputed Wangdung grazing ground, along the LAC north of Tawang in
Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian Army responded aggressively with a ferocious
troop and logistical build up, creating overwhelming military superiority all
around the intrusion site. But no fighting occurred and the crisis ebbed after
the Chinese requested for a flag meeting.

During the
DBO incident, the military’s laudable restraint and the government's
"tread softly" approach faced sharp criticism from an aggressively
nationalistic political opposition, media and public. In fact, the civil and
military wings worked in close coordination with each other in engaging with
the Chinese, for which adequate credit has not been given. That is partly
because, without public information about Indian and Chinese positions and
about the dialogue process, there is public apprehension that national
interests were being secretly bartered away. The DBO intrusion highlights the
need to inform the public that eastern Ladakh (like most of the Sino-Indian
border) is disputed territory that New Delhi and Beijing are negotiating over.

Similar
pressures on Beijing were not apparent in the Chinese public space, largely
because the controlled media there barely reported the DBO incident. Had the
face-off escalated, Beijing too would have faced nationalistic demands to
“teach India a lesson,” especially on the Chinese social media, which the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) takes seriously. There must also have been pressure on the
Chinese leadership from the predictable hardliners --- the People’s Liberation
Army, and CCP bosses in Tibet and Xinjiang. It is still too early to know how
this crucial internal dialogue played out in China.

As the
ripples of DBO abate, both Beijing and New Delhi must jointly insulate the LAC
from unintended consequences. Beijing will most likely argue during the Salman Khurshid
and Li Keqiang visits this month that India must freeze troop levels and
defence infrastructure along the LAC, a proposal that it has officially
submitted to New Delhi. This is unacceptable, especially any halt on road
infrastructure, which India must create on an emergency footing. Meanwhile, New
Delhi must avoid the triumphalism that was evident in the unnecessary
announcements about refurbished landing strips in DBO and Nyoma.

Crucially, New
Delhi must demand that Beijing spells out its perception of the LAC and its
claim line, so that Indian decision-makers can contemplate clarity rather than the
creeping Chinese expansionism that has eroded trust. Understanding each other's
perceptions would be a solid step towards an eventual border settlement.

Finally, as
a means of generating strategic leverage, New Delhi must signal to Beijing, in carefully
crafted phraseology, that India has not entirely foreclosed its options on
Tibet. If Beijing continues to treat Indian interests, especially in Jammu
& Kashmir, with such disdain, New Delhi could hardly continue to treat Chinese
core interests like Tibet with the care that India has shown over the last 6
decades. New Delhi must walk this line with sensitivity, creating mindfulness
in Beijing without openly threatening the face-conscious Chinese. While Tibet
is a card that must be played, pushing too hard would be as counterproductive
for New Delhi as not playing the card at all.

that China will withdraw was a known fact as the tents were reported pitched in completely snow bound area, which would have become un-maintanable as snow melted in summer.

What was to be scene that when China considers the right time to withdraw before snow melts and after extracting what assurance.

If the reported Chumar post deal was struck, India should renege on that since its said that China in 1st place was in breach of 2005 protocol during the DBO case.

Also one must keep in mind that if India were to accept socalled Chinas demand on Chumar, tommorrow Pakistan may well ask India to vacate Bana Post.

Even if India were to accept socalled Chinas demand on Chumar it sholud be reciprocated by withdrawl of China from various grasslands in eastern ladakh, HP, UT, AP they encroched upon in last 10-15 years.

The Border Roads Organisation need to think of new ways of constructing roads in the difficult terrain of the Himalayas.

I looked at some photos of the road link between Leh and Srinagar that is apparently open for only 6 months of the year. So it would be open during summer and fall months and closed down by snow during the winter and early spring months. Even the road that is there and open during Summer looked damaged and the tarmac destroyed and "washed off".

Why is this so? This shouldn't be the case when we can think of ways bypassing seasonal constraints.

The thing to do, if I may recommend, is to build a road that could run all round the year: the road should have a retractable canopy for its full length, perhaps, effectevely like a tunnel, the road is protected all the way round. The canopy could be opened during summer months and closed during the severe snow fall months. This would protect the road from erosion during winter months and extends the life of the roads effectively.

The same should be done for the link to DBO and perhaps in that case, there should be a tunnel all the way to DBO with "branches" coming off it at different locations along the LAC or even deeper. So even if the enemy were to destroy the surface road, the tunnel would leave an access route to our uttermost frontiers.

"Meanwhile, New Delhi must avoid the triumphalism that was evident in the unnecessary announcements about refurbished landing strips in DBO and Nyoma."

Ajai sir, why would you term this unnecessary? Given the current negative administrative climate, activating these airstrips and trying to augment infrastructure was a good move by this govt. One can at least take heart in that our govt. is aware of border infrastructure. We cannot look over our shoulders every time we do something important - it's time we start dealing with the world with some self-assurance, and signal that our defence is our business and no one else's.

Why does GoI ever have to say that there will be no concessions. And why does the media have to highlight that hain ji?

I would think that this was understood.

China has been creeping in and occupying land in Laddakh over the last decades, and inspite of repeated requests by both the Army and the local MLAs and MPs no one in Delhi has been paying any attention

So we certainly gave up further infrastructure build-up, however weak the effort, in order to "save face" for China. Meanwhile, less than 20 km southeast of Demchok, google maps "satellite" view clearly shows a well developed landing strip on the Chinese side. Not only that, they have built an all-weather road all the way to Chardund Nalla which is now the de facto LAC and only a few meters away from Indian side of the divided village of Demchok. Last summer, the Chinese insisted that India built no further roads or other infrastructure in Demchok because "it was disputed territory." Even in this DBO affair, the media images of the "tents" pitched by the Chinese show that they were no backyard construction, and even the ground where they were built was level-- meaning there was some foundation work involved. The fact that this 50+ man stronghold was being continually supplied not by helicopter drops but by trucks, tells me that the Chinese have also built sturdy enough roads...ALL THE WAY UP TO DBO air strip. So even if they have left for now (and did they actually go back the entire 20km?), they can march-in at almost any time. And since it looks like the DBO is only lightly manned by the ITBP and not by the IA, it is quite conceivable that the PLA will next year just come and take over the landing strip at DBO and call it a day. There goes India's ability to patrol the Chip Chap River and to Karakoram Pass.

That is my, very informal and admittedly uneducated, analysis of the situation.

What I would suggest is to get American civil engineering contractors like AECOM and Bechtel, and equipment vendors like Caterpillar and Astec, to bid for turnkey contracts for all-weather road, bridge, and tunnel construction. Ladakh and Kashmir aren't the only places in the world that gets harsh winters and snows--we must accept that we never learned how to build strong roads, and get outside contractors to build them for us. And pronto! Same goes for railroads, especially a line directly from Himachal to Leh. Lastly, enough with the Article 370 crap. India is bursting at the seams-- J&K and Arunachal are either integral parts of India, or they're not. And as parts of India, like any other, Indians must be able to move there, open businesses, build homes, farm lands...integrate these parts to the national mainstream. 60 years of experimentation and leaving them alone has led to the current precarious situation, so enough already. The Chinese have a point. They're setting up small towns all over Tibet with new Han arrivals. India can't simply protect empty grasslands that are loosely populated forever. Demchok could be a bustling border town with strong links to Leh and other cities, but cannot do that just by traditional pastoralists.