It is
a little known fact that, even as its armies were attempting the conquest of the
United States Territory of New Mexico, and as its politicians were debating the
creation of a Territory of Arizona, the Confederate States of America was
engaged in a covert attempt to wrest the northern states of Mexico from that
Republic and to annex them to the new Southern nation. Had this attempt been
successful, it might have changed the outcome of the war. It is this little
known, but highly significant episode of the War Between the States that will be
examined in this article.

Provinces
of Northern Mexico whose annexation was

planned
by the Confederacy, 1861-1862

Before
delving into the details of Confederate espionage and intrigue in Mexico, it
would be well to examine the reasons for Confederate interest in its neighbor to
the South. The Confederacy in 1861 saw both potential riches to be gained in
Mexico, and the opportunity to acquire, without much cost, those riches.

The
riches of Mexico were of many kinds. Of course, since the days of the Spanish
Conquistadors, Mexico had been a source of great mineral wealth, especially gold
and silver. The mines of the northern Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora
were productive, and would have been a definite asset to the new Southern
nation. And Mexico had other, non-mineral riches to offer as well. At a time
when the United States was beginning to impose a blockade of Southern ports,
Mexico offered a virtually unblockadeable Pacific coastline with one of the
finest harbors in the Western Hemisphere, at Guaymas.1 With the Union
blockade thus defeated, and with the specie of Northern Mexico in its hands, the
Confederacy could have imported whatever it needed to wage war. The material
advantages of the Union over the Confederacy would have melted like dew beneath
the morning sun.

Furthermore,
it was widely believed that the Confederate annexation of northern Mexico would
have led inevitably to the conquest of California as well. The advantages which
the Confederacy might have gained from such an occurrence were immense. First,
the flow of California gold would have been diverted from Washington to
Richmond, thus reversing the relative quotations of United States and
Confederate States currency. Abraham Lincoln himself considered California gold
to be the "lifeblood" of the Union, and its loss to the Confederacy
would have been a severe, and possibly fatal, blow to the Union war effort.
Second, the conquest of California, together with the States of northern Mexico,
would have given the Confederacy a Pacific coastline of over 1,500 miles, with
fine harbors at several places, good shipyards, and abundant materials. There
the Confederacy might have built a merchant fleet, or even a navy, free from
Union interference.2

Finally,
it should also be stated that at least part of Confederate interest in Mexico
stemmed from a desire, on the part of some of its politicians, to gain territory
for the expansion of slavery.3 This was not a new desire...indeed,
slavery advocates had howled with rage when, in the wake of U.S. victory in the
Mexican War (1846-48), the United States had not incorporated the whole of
Mexico into the United States, rather than absorbing only the most northern tier
of Mexican provinces, as was the case. In 1861 there were many Southerners
(perhaps not a majority, but at the very least a highly vocal minority) who
believed that the expansion of slavery into new territories would strengthen the
Confederacy, and Mexico would provide those new lands.

Benito Juarez,
President of Mexico

Mexico
had many things to offer the Confederacy, but it is unlikely that the
Confederate leadership would have attempted to take what it wanted from Mexico
if that nation had been perceived as strong enough to resist. And, it just so
happened that, in 1861, Mexico was in a state of chaos. After the war, Trevanion
T. Teel, artillery chief of the Confederate Army of New Mexico, reported a
conversation with Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley which revealed much
about the Confederate leadership's perception of Mexican weakness in 1861. Teel
was informed that "Juarez, the President of the Republic (so called), was
then in the City of Mexico with a small army under his command, hardly
sufficient to keep him in his position." Sibley believed Juarez might be
willing to agree to the Confederate annexation of the northern states of Mexico,
both as a means of enriching his treasury, and because he was scarcely able to
control them anyway.4

And
even if Juarez was not agreeable, it might not be in his power to prevent the
Confederacy from doing what it would anyway. The states of northern Mexico, most
notably Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California, were at this time
virtually independent of the central government of Mexico, being more the feudal
principalities of their Governors than integral parts of the Republic of Mexico.
Direct negotiations with these Governors promised to bring these provinces into
the Confederate fold, regardless of what Juarez might say or do.5

Robert Toombs,
Confederate Secretary of State in 1861

Thus
did the Confederacy see in Mexico not only wealth to be gained, but also the
opportunity to take that wealth. And it quickly acted to seize that opportunity.
In May 1861, Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs dispatched one John T.
Pickett to Mexico as the Minister of the Confederacy.6 Pickett was
empowered to draw up a treaty of alliance between the Confederacy and Mexico,
and there was some hope that this might be accomplished, as feelings in Mexico
were said (whether rightly or wrongly) to be generally favorable toward the
South.7 But it soon became apparent that Pickett's orders were not
those of a peaceful ambassador, for immediately upon arriving he set about
stirring up an independence movement at Vera Cruz. However, Pickett's efforts
were not to be crowned with success, and were to create severe problems for the
Confederacy in its future relations with Mexico.8

Worried
United States citizens in Vera Cruz reported Pickett's activities to the State
Department, and U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward threatened to occupy
Sonora with Union troops. Mexican President Benito Juarez, anxious both to
forestall the Union invasion and to thwart the designs of the Confederacy on his
country, introduced a bill into the Mexican Congress to authorize Union soldiers
to cross northern Mexico and to use the port of Guaymas. In spite of the
protests of Pickett, the bill was passed by the Mexican Congress on June 20,
1861. Pickett's blustering threats of Confederate invasion served only to land
him in jail, and President Jefferson Davis was forced to recall him to Richmond.9

But
the damage was done. Any chance for the annexation of Mexican Territory with the
consent of the Mexican government, if such chance had ever existed, was now gone
forever. Pickett's successor and Confederate Minister to Mexico, Hamilton Bee of
Texas, tried to mend the relationship between the Confederacy and the Juarez
government, without success. Later he tried to forge a relationship with the
Emperor Maximilian, and was no more successful, although that ruler feigned
friendship with the Confederacy so long as it kept the United States too busy to
interfere with his plans in Mexico.10

PLAYERS
IN THE VIDAURRI AFFAIR

Left:
Santiago Vidaurri, governor of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila

Right:
Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America

The
collapse of its credibility with the Mexican central government did not end the
Confederacy's intrigues in Mexico. For, as mentioned earlier, there still
remained the possibility of direct negotiations with the semi-independent
Governors of the northern Mexican provinces. Indeed, that option presented
itself soon after Pickett's departure, although, for reasons that are not
entirely clear, the Confederacy did not act upon it.

In the
summer of 1861, Governor Santiago Vidaurri, the feudal ruler of the provinces of
Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, wrote to the Confederate Government at Richmond,
offering to annex his provinces to the Confederacy in return for a regiment of
Texas troops and artillery, which would be used to win a revolution. President
Jefferson Davis considered it "imprudent and impolitic" to accept
Vidaurri's offer at that time, but nevertheless instructed a Confederate spy in
Monterey to send information about the value of Vidaurri's provinces, evidently
for future reference. The strange thing is, however, that the Confederacy NEVER
took up Vidaurri's offer, even at a later date. Thus, the only Mexican governor
who ever expressed a serious interest in selling his provinces to the
Confederacy, and certainly the only one to ever promise anything in writing, was
totally ignored by the Confederate Government.11

Left:
John R. Baylor,
Governor of the Confederate Territory of Arizona

Right:
Baylor's spy in Chihuahua and Sonora, Jose Augustin Quintero

At
about the same time that President Davis was inserting a spy into Monterey, the
Confederate Governor of Arizona, John Robert Baylor, was doing the same for the
Mexican provinces of Sonora and Chihuahua.12 Baylor's spy (politely
designated an "agent"), Jose Augustin Quintero, was an interesting
character.13 He was a Cuban revolutionary who was born at
Havana, Cuba, in 1829. He was educated at Harvard, but on account of the death
of his father was unable to complete his course, and engaged in teaching Spanish
at Cambridge, Massachusetts, until about 1850, when he returned to Cuba, and
became the publisher of a newspaper at Havana. Supporting the patriotic Cuban
movement of 1850-51, he was thrown in prison by the Spanish authorities and
sentenced to be shot, but had the good fortune to escape from Morro Castle.
Taking boat for Texas, he made his home at Richmond, Texas, studied law, and was
admitted to the practice. He also obtained appointment as translator of land
titles at Austin, and was thus engaged until 1859, when he went to New York city
and became connected with a Spanish-American illustrated paper, edited by George
D. Squires, the Illustracion-Americano. When hostilities began in 1861 he
decided to cast his lot with his Texas friends, and returning to that State,
enlisted at San Antonio as a privat in the Quitman Rifles, which he accompanied
to Virginia. In the latter part of 1862 he was transferred to the diplomatic
service, and appointed confidential agent of the Confederate States government
in Mexico. It was in this capacity that he worked for Baylor. Quintero was
charged with the collection and transmittal of "accurate and minute
information regarding the population, area, farming potentiality, mineral
resources, commercial possibilities, and the extent and state of industry"
in these two northern Mexican provinces.14 It seems quite probable
that Quintero's reports from Chihuahua and Sonora influenced the later decision
of the Confederate authorities to open direct negotiations with the Governors of
those Mexican states.

Brigadier
General Henry Hopkins Sibley

Confederate Army of New Mexico

On
December 14, 1861, Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley assumed command of all
Confederate forces in the Confederate Territory of Arizona, giving them a new
name...The Army of New Mexico. Sibley was charged with an important mission,
nothing less than the conquest of the United States Territory of New Mexico,
which would then be used as a base of operations for the conquest of California,
Nevada, Utah, and northern Mexico. On January 3, 1862, Sibley penned the
following note to General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General of the
Confederate Army:

GENERAL:
I have the honor to report that in view of the importance of establishing
satisfactory relations with the adjacent Mexican States of Chihuahua and Sonora,
I have ordered Col. James Reily, Fourth Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteers, to
proceed to the capitals of those States, for the purpose of delivering to their
respective governors the communications which I have addressed to them, and of
conferring with those officials in person upon the subjects of those
communications....Colonel Reily left these headquarters for the city of
Chihuahua on yesterday, the 2nd instant. The result of this mission, when known,
will be promptly communicated to you.15

Sibley's
aims in dispatching Colonel Reily to Chihuahua and Sonora were varied. First, he
wanted to secure his southern flank by forging agreements with the Governors of
those Mexican States not to allow the passage of Union troops over the territory
of those States. Second, he wanted to secure the right to pursue hostile Indians
into Mexican territory (an important consideration for the Confederates in
Arizona, who faced an Apache enemy who thought nothing of crossing the
international line to escape pursuit). Third, he wanted to purchase and store
supplies in Mexico.16 And lastly, he wanted to set the groundwork for
a later occupation, with the consent of the Governors, of Chihuahua and Sonora
by the Confederate Army.17

Colonel James Reily

In
selecting Reily for this mission, Sibley made what seemed to be an excellent
choice. Reily, a Texas lawyer in civilian life, had been a member of the
diplomatic corps of the old Republic of Texas. He was friendly to, and
understood, the Mexican people, and was considered an able man for any mission
to Mexico. Furthermore, he had been, since his teens, renowned for his skills in
the art of oratory, and thus he promised to be a very persuasive negotiator.
However, as one historian has pointed out, he seems to have been an
"incorrigible enthusiast," who was "prone to accept half-promises
as agreements, and diplomatic double-talk as indicative of progress."18
We shall see how these qualities affected his missions.

Reily
arrived in the city of Chihuahua on January 8th, 1862. Taking up residence in
Riddell's Hotel in that city, Reily sent a note to the Governor, Luis Terrazas,
informing that official of his presence in Chihuahua and of his desire to confer
with the Governor. The next morning, Reily received a note from the Governor,
designating 12:00 noon that same day as the time for an interview at the
Governor's palace. Reily was escorted to the palace by Don Carlos Moye (whose
name is mis-spelled in Reily's report as "Moyo"), brother-in-law of
the Governor and ardent supporter of the Confederacy.19

Upon
arriving at the palace Reily presented Governor Terrazas with the notes with
which General Sibley had entrusted him. Terrazas, upon having them translated,
expressed willingness to open negotiations on the points contained in the notes
(right of transit over Mexican territory for Confederate troops, and denial of
that right to the Union, right of pursuit of hostile Indians into Mexican
territory, and the purchase of supplies in Chihuahua for the Confederate
armies).20 These negotiations were not to prove fruitful, and it
would seem that Reily was mislead into believing he had achieved more than he
actually had.

For
example, Reily's report to General Sibley stated that the Governor had told him
that "if even the assent of the President had come to him, sanctioned by
the act of Congress, he did not think he would permit Federal troops to pass
through the territory of Chihuahua to invade Texas." In fact, in the note
sent by Terrazas to Sibley, giving the Governor's version of the negotiations,
Terrazas says that he WOULD allow Federal troops to cross his territory if
ordered by the Mexican Congress, for he was bound by the Mexican Constitution to
do so.21

On the
second point of discussion, namely the right to pursue hostile Indians into
Mexican territory, Reily's report was again misleading. According to Reily,
Terrazas replied to the Confederate request by saying that "if ever
rendered necessary, your troops will have no trouble." In fact, Governor
Terrazas was specific that he could not allow such pursuits to take place.
However, he did offer the slight concession that, if and when he judged that the
situation warranted it, he would make application to the Mexican Congress to
allow such pursuits, and if such application were granted by the Congress, he
would then allow it (of course he probably knew of the hostility of the Mexican
central government to the Confederacy, and that any application on its behalf
would certainly have been denied by the Congress).22

On the
third point, the right to purchase and store supplies in Mexico, Reily and
Terrazas apparently did reach an agreement. However, the Mexicans would not
accept Confederate currency, and since the Confederates lacked any substantial
amounts of gold or silver, the accord thus reached was of little practical use
to the Confederacy.23

Why
did Reily and Terrazas interpret the results of their discussions so
differently? There are several possible reasons for this. One possibility is the
language barrier. Reily spoke no Spanish, and Terrazas no English, and in the
course of translation meaning could have been altered for one or both of them.
Another possibility is the deliberate deception of Reily by Terrazas. Terrazas
may indeed have VERBALLY assured Reily of his agreement on the concessions
requested, and later, in writing, repudiated his verbal agreements. This would
seem to be a more likely answer to the mystery at hand. As one historian has
stated, Terrazas was "between three fires, the Union, the Confederacy, and
Mexico," and it seems likely that he simply chose not to add fuel to one
fire for fear of being burned in return by the others.24 And there is
one possibility as well. It is not impossible that Reily himself exaggerated the
success of his negotiations, either out of the incorrigible enthusiasm which was
a feature of his personality, or as a deliberate attempt to ingratiate himself
with his commander. In either case, the letter sent by Terrazas to Sibley would
have revealed Reily's exaggerations for what they were.

Captain Sherod Hunter

After
returning from Chihuahua, Colonel Reily was ordered to proceed to Hermosillo,
the capital of Sonora. He accompanied Captain Sherod Hunter's command when it
left Mesilla, capital of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, for the little
adobe village of Tucson on February 14, 1862.25 Arriving in Tucson on
February 28th, Reily participated in the flag-raising ceremony in the town
plaza, whereby Captain Hunter formally took possession of Tucson (and western
Arizona) for the Confederacy. Reily made a speech that was well-received by the
crowd.26 On March 3rd he left with his escort (20 men commanded by
Lieutenant James H. Tevis) to proceed on to Sonora.27

Don Ignacio Pesqueira,
Governor of Sonora

Upon
arriving in Sonora, Reily was received at the palace of Governor Don Ignacio
Pesqueira. Reily here bargained for the same concessions he had sought in
Chihuahua, and it seems that he apparently did in fact enjoy success with the
Governor of Sonora. Pesqueira verbally assured Reily that Sonora would forbid
the use of the port of Guaymas to the United States, refuse the Union Army
transit over its territory, grant free entry and passage to the Confederate
Army, and supply the Confederates with food and military stores. Pesqueira also
stated that not only would Sonora agree to these concessions, but the province
would rebel from the Republic if the Juarez government questioned its authority
to do so. It is possible that the future annexation of Sonora by the Confederate
States was also discussed, but if so, the results of that discussion have not
been recorded.28

Unfortunately
for Reily and for Confederate hopes, there was in Hermosillo at that time an
enterprising reporter for the SAN FRANCISCO BULLETIN, one W. G. Moody. Moody
heard of the discussions between Reily and the Governor, and he managed to steal
copies of Reily's introduction from Sibley and some of his notes (Moody stole
the letters from the office of Pesqueira's translator, when the latter left to
take the Spanish copies to the Governor) and transmit them to General Wright,
the commanding General of Union forces in California. Within days, Wright had a
gunboat on patrol off the harbor at Guaymas. He also had a letter prepared and
sent to Pesqueira, containing what historian Robert Lee Kerby has called
"one of the most diplomatic threats ever penned."29

Wright's
letter started off by congratulating Pesqueira for REFUSING Reily's overtures.
Wright then went on to assure the Mexican official that "under no
circumstances will the Government of the United States permit the rebel hordes
to take refuge in Sonora. I have an army of ten thousand men ready to pass the
frontier and protect your government and people." Upon receiving Wright's
"promise of protection," Pesqueira suddenly decided to to reconsider
his accord with Reily. He sent a letter to General Sibley, stating that Reily's
claims of success had been "exaggerated, or perhaps badly
misinterpreted." And as a final indignity, in August 1862 (after Sibley's
army had been defeated and the Confederate position in Arizona had collapsed),
Pesqueira sent a letter to General Wright promising that if any
"rebels" set foot on Mexican soil, he would exterminate them. Thus
ended James Reily's mission to Sonora.30

In the
end, perhaps the only "achievement" of Reily's missions to Chihuahua
and Sonora was the "recognition" of the Confederacy as a nation by the
Governors of those states. Reily was presented to the Governors of both States
while wearing the uniform of a Colonel of Cavalry, Confederate States Army. He
insisted on being addressed by his title, and always negotiated on the
understanding that he represented a sovereign nation. And both Governors,
Terrazas and Pesqueira, did negotiate with him on that basis. Of course that
leaves open the question of whether recognition of the Confederacy as a
legitimate nation by the governors actually represents "recognition by a
foreign power" under international law. The central government of Mexico
never recognized the Confederacy, and it is uncertain whether states in a
federal system of government, even if virtually independent of the control of
the central government (as Chihuahua and Sonora were in the 1860s), can
independently recognize a foreign nation. All thi writer can say is that Reily
thought so!31

With
the end of the diplomatic missions of James Reily to Sonora and Chihuahua, and
especially after the collapse of the Confederate Territory of Arizona,
Confederate aspirations in Mexico dwindled away into nothing. Eventually the
affair would be virtually forgotten, even by historians. Yet the Confederate
attempt to annex the northern provinces of Mexico was an important episode in
the history of the War Between the States. If the Confederates had been
successful, the advantages gained might have shifted the balance of power in
their favor, and their struggle for independence might have had a different
outcome. For this, if for no other reason, the story of Confederate diplomacy
and intrigue in Mexico deserves to be told.

James
Farber, TEXAS, C.S.A.: A SPOTLIGHT ON DISASTER, New York: The Jackson Company,
1947, pp 118-120. Hereafter cited as Farber.

8

Kerby,
p. 47; Farber, pp 118-120.

9

Kerby,
p. 47; Farber, pp 118-120.

10

Farber,
pp 120-121.

11

Kerby,
47-48.

12

Kerby,
p. 43.

13

Details
of Quintero’s life are from Clement A. Evans, Ed., CONFEDERATE MILITARY
HISTORY EXTENDED EDITION: A LIBRARY OF CONFEDERATE STATES HISTORY, WRITTEN BY
DISTINGUISHED MEN OF THE SOUTH, Wilmington, North Carolina: 1988 (reprint of
1899 edition), Volume XIII--Louisiana, pp 556-557.

14

Kerby,
pp 43-44.

15

Letter
from Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley to General Samuel Cooper, January 3,
1862, reprinted in Calvin P. Horn and William S. Wallace, CONFEDERATE VICTORIES
IN THE SOUTHWEST: PRELUDE TO DEFEAT, Albuquerque, New Mexico: Horn and Wallace,
1961, p. 118, hereafter cited as Horn and Wallace.

16

The
first 3 goals can be inferred from a letter from Col. James Reily to Brigadier
General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862, reprinted in Horn and Wallace, pp
123-125, in which Reily describes the content of his negotiations with Governor
Luis Terrazas of Chihuahua.

17

Kerby,
p.60.

18

Farber,
p. 122.

19

Letter
from Col. James Reily to Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862,
reprinted in Horn and Wallace, pp 123-125.

20

Letter
from Col. James Reily to Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862,
reprinted in Horn and Wallace, pp 123-125.

21

Letter
from Col. James Reily to Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862,
reprinted in Horn and Wallace, p. 124; Letter from Governor Luis Terrazas to
Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 11, 1862, reprinted in Horn and
Wallace, pp 122-123.

22

Letter
from Col. James Reily to Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862,
reprinted in Horn and Wallace, p. 124; Letter from Governor Luis Terrazas to
Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 11, 1862, reprinted in Horn and
Wallace, pp 122-123.

23

Letter
from Col. James Reily to Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 20, 1862,
reprinted in Horn and Wallace, p. 124; Letter from Governor Luis Terrazas to
Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, January 11, 1862, reprinted in Horn and
Wallace, pp 122-123.

24

Kerby,
p. 62.

25

Orders
from Lt. Col. John R. Baylor to Captain Sherod Hunter, February 10, 1862, found
in the Sherod Hunter "Jacket" at the National Archives, Washington,
D.C.

The author is also endebted to Ron Terrazas,
who provided a correction to the information about Don Carlos Moye,
brother-in-law of Governor Luis Terrazas of Chihuahua; and to Gustavo Carmona,
who provided pictures and information about Governor Baylor's spy in Sonora and
Chihuahua, Jose Augustin Quintero.