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Abstract

A platoon commander has a helicopter to support two squads, which encounter two types of missions -- critical or routine --on a daily basis. During a mission, a squad always benefits from having the helicopter, but the benefit is greater during a critical mission than during a routine mission. Because the commander cannot verify the mission type beforehand, a selfish squad would always claim a critical mission to compete for the helicopterâ which leaves the commander no choice but to assign the helicopter at random. In order to encourage truthful reports from the squads, we design a token system that works as follows. Each squad keeps a token bank, with tokens deposited at a certain frequency. A squad must spend either 1 or 2 tokens to request the helicopter, while the commander assigns the helicopter to the squad who spends more tokens, or breaks a tie at random. The two selfish squads become players in a two-person non-zero-sum game. We find the Nash Equilibrium of this game, and use numerical examples to illustrate the benefit of the token system.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The Navy finds itself facing a period of increasing transformation as the second decade of the 21st century quickly approaches. Having been forced to shift its focus away from „blue water_ operations to ...

This thesis presents an analysis and comparison of manpower costs of three options for the United States Navy Helicopter force structure through the year 2020. The first option, the basic plan, leaves the force structure ...

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
This project was completed by the Resource Management Solutions Group, on behalf of the Commander, Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Atlantic (CHSCWL), and facilitated through the Naval Postgraduate School ...