Ever since Congress passed
the Budget Control Act of 2011—an exercise in kick-the-can
policymaking—“sequestration” has been hanging over the Pentagon like a guillotine.
“Sequestration” is the catchall term used to describe automatic spending cuts
to the U.S. military of $500 billion if Congress fails to reach a
deficit-reduction deal by the end of this year. These cuts, it pays to recall,
would come in addition to the $487 billion the Pentagon has already carved from
its spending plans over the next 10 years. In short, sequestration would
decimate the Pentagon and drastically limit America’s reach and role in the
world.

Catastrophic Cuts

Even before the
sequestration guillotine was hoisted over the Pentagon, the military was asked
to make cuts that no other part of the federal government was asked to make.
Spending on health care, education and entitlements has exploded in recent
years, with no end in sight.

Yet the Navy has been ordered to cut the number of surface
combatants from 85 ships to 78, stretch the “build time” of new aircraft
carriers from five to seven years, and had to seek a special congressional waiver to
deploy just 10 carriers (rather than the legally-mandated 11) while the USS Gerald Ford is built and other flattops
are retired or refurbished. Pressed by budget-cutters, the Air Force has
announced plans to reduce its fleet by 286 planes. The active-duty Army will be
cut from 570,000 soldiers to 490,000; the Marines from 202,000 to 182,000. The
administration has slashed $810 million from the Missile Defense Agency, cut
spending on ground-based missile defense by 22 percent and reduced the number
of warships to be retrofitted with missile-defense capabilities by seven. A DOD reporton weapons-acquisition plans for 2013 reveals spending cuts in combat drones,
F-35 fighter-bombers, F/A-18 fighter-bombers, V-22 heli-planes, UH-60
helicopters, KC-46 refuelers, M-1 tank upgrades, Stryker armored vehicles,
aircraft carriers, submarines, and a number of satellites and space-based sensors.

Remember, all of this is before sequestration.

For perspective, compare these
numbers with some from the not-too-distant past. In 1991, the total active-duty
force was 2 million; today, it’s hovering around 1.3 million—and falling fast. In
1991, the U.S. deployed 15 aircraft carriers, some 300 bombers and nearly 4,000
fighters; today, the U.S. deploys 10 carriers, 162 bombers and roughly 2,000 fighters. At the height of the Reagan buildup, the Navy boasted 587
ships. The size of today’s fleet is 285 ships. Current recapitalization rates
will not keep up with plans to retire ships, leading to “a Navy of 240-250
ships at best,” according to former Navy Secretary John Lehman.

That brings us to modernization and replacement. Although
the defense budget grew by $300 billion in the decade after 9/11, the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) notes that just 16 percent of
that increase was earmarked for modernization and new weapons systems. However,CSBA points
out that a dozen new weapons systems were terminated and many systems had their
numbers cut below end-strength goals (e.g., the F-22). “The aggregate effect is that a significant portion of DOD’s
investment in modernization over the past decade did not result in force
modernization.”

Sequestration will only exacerbate these issues: even less
modernization, even fewer troops and even more cuts. That explains why
policymakers are using terms like “catastrophic” and “disaster” to describe the
consequences of sequestration.

Threats and ConsequencesThese cuts might make sense if peace were breaking out all around the world.
But we know the very opposite to be true. America is still at war in
Afghanistan. Terrorist networks like al-Qaeda still have the ability to strike
and are increasing their influence in the Horn of Africa and in Yemen.
Nuclear-armed Pakistan is less stable and more paranoid than ever, as is
nuclear-armed North Korea. Iran is racing ahead with its own nuclear-weapons
program. The Arab Spring revolution has triggered a civil war in Syria. Syrian
forces have already attacked NATO ally Turkey. Is the U.S. military ready to
defend Turkey, if and when the Syrian civil war is fully internationalized? Moreover,
what happens if the revolution spreads to the oil-rich Arab monarchies? And
what path will the new governments in Egypt and Libya ultimately choose?

These, it could be argued, are
not even our principal worries. As the U.S. declaws itself, China is
boosting military spending by 11 percent this year, capping double-digit
increases in nine of the past 10 years. That unparalleled buildup has empowered
Beijing to bully its neighbors; launch cyber-attacks against the United States;
conduct provocative military operations in space; and deploy a swelling arsenal
of missiles, submarines and warplanes to project its power. “Many of Beijing’s
military capability goals have now been realized, resulting in impressive military
might,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper concedes.

According to the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military
power, Beijing is pouring increasing sums into advanced cruise missiles,
conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counter-space
weapons, military cyberspace capabilities, upgrades to its bomber fleet, a new
stealth fighter-bomber, 79 principal surface combatants, 50 submarines, and 51
amphibious and medium landing—assets “designed to enable
anti-access/area-denial missions.” In other words, these assets are focused on
the U.S. Navy’s ability to come to the aid of allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific region.

Likewise, Russia—in the midst
of a planned 65-percent increase in military spending—is making claims in the Arctic,
occupying parts of Georgia, blocking international action in Iran, providing
arms and cover to Syria, buzzing North American airspace, and carrying out
provocative maneuvers and weapons deployments in areas bordering NATO states. Russia’s
2012 military expenditures are up 20 percent from 2011 levels. And Russian
strongman Vladimir Putin has unveiled plans to deploy 2,300 new tanks, 600 new
fighters and bombers, 400 new ICBMs and eight new nuclear subs—all in the next
10 years.

So, while Beijing rapidly upgrades to a 21st-century
military and Russia reloads, the Army and Marines will make do with older tanks
and fewer troops; the Navy will try to stretch a 10-carrier fleet to do the
work of 12 carriers; and the Air Force will get smaller and older. According to Air Force Magazine, the
average age of the active-duty air fleet is 20.4 years; the average age of the
bomber fleet is 30.3 years.

If the
sequestration guillotine falls, Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey warns of a
Pentagon with “fewer options and a lot less capacity,” adding “we wouldn’t be
the global power that we know ourselves to be today.”

In fact, it’s already
happening. Those who claim a smaller military won’t limit the ability of
military commanders to project American power and deter America’s enemies may
want to glance at the Persian Gulf. Earlier this year, CENTCOM Commander Gen.
James Mattis requested an extra aircraft carrier to send a deterrent message after Tehran had
threatened to attack U.S. ships in the Strait of Hormuz. But that request was denied
because the extra carrier was needed in the Pacific.

Solutions

Rep. Buck
McKeon, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has proposed paying for
sequestration’s draconian Pentagon provisions by reducing the size of the
federal workforce. A 10-percent reduction in the federal workforce over 10
years “pays for the most damaging year of sequestration,” which would be 2013,
according to McKeon.

Yet
another solution is to heed the words of the current defense secretary and his predecessor—and
cut the fat from where it exists in the federal government.

“No budget can be balanced on the back of defense spending alone,”
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta contends. Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates was even more forceful in one of his last addresses before
retiring, noting that “The defense budget, however large it may be, is not the
cause of this country’s fiscal woes.” He pointed out that in 1961 defense consumed
half the federal budget, while it accounted for 9 percent of U.S. GDP. Today,
defense spending “represents less than 15 percent of all federal spending and
equates to roughly three and a half percent of GDP.”

Indeed, we could eliminate
the entire defense budget—$662 billion this year—and turn the Pentagon into a
mega-mall. And yet we would still face a budget deficit of $700 billion, due to
the insatiable appetite of entitlements.

The hard truth is that Social
Security, Medicare and other entitlements are simply not as important as
national security. After all, the Constitution calls on the government to
“provide for the common defense” in the very first sentence; then grants
Congress the power to declare war, “raise and support armies…provide and
maintain a navy…make rules for calling forth the militia…provide for
organizing, arming and disciplining the militia”; authorizes the president to
serve as “commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several states”; discusses war, treason and America’s
enemies in Article III; and emphasizes the importance of a “well-regulated
militia” to the “security of a free state” in the Bill of Rights. On the other
hand, the Constitution says nothing about retirement pensions, social safety
nets, stimulus programs or health care.

The Founders understood that
if their new government didn’t provide for the common defense, it wouldn’t be
able to provide anything else—and the American people wouldn’t be able to live
free, let alone pursue happiness.

*Dowd is a senior fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes The Dowd Report, a monthly review of international events and their impact on U.S. national security.