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The Rational Response Squad is a group of atheist activists who impact society by changing the way we view god belief. This site is a haven for those who are pushing back against the norm, and a place for believers of gods to have their beliefs exposed as false should they want to try their hand at confronting us.

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Our revels now are ended. These our actors, | As I foretold you, were all spirits, and | Are melted into air, into thin air; | And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, | The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, | The solemn temples, the great globe itself, - Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, | And, like this insubstantial pageant faded, | Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff | As dreams are made on, and our little life | Is rounded with a sleep. - Shakespearehttp://myanimelist.net/profile/butterbattle

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Even the idea that God is possible (in the normal sense) is not established, even in the logical sense, depending on your definition of God.

You have said countless times on this discussion board that an omniscient, omnipotent, eternal being is possible. Are you now claiming that he is not possible?

Quote:

As to whether God is possible in the broader sense, we do not know enough about the Universe to know that, assuming a God definition that is not internally self-contradictory.

Since God is purported to be the creator of the universe, his existence is not going to depend on the universe; therefore, it is not necessary for us to empirically observe the universe in order to test whether God exists. Therefore, your objection fails.

Quote:

Then you still need to establish whether such a 'necessary' entity necessarily has the attributes that would match any particular idea of 'God'.

God is, by definition, a perfect being. A perfect being necessarily has those attributes. If God exists, then he necessarily has those attributes. Your objection fails.

This was quite easy to respond to. Is that what took you days to conjure up?

Hello Mr. metaphysics. Good to see ya again. Assuming that the argument falls within a rationality for god you assume a limitless god so we're back to Anselm? Again should we not discuss the premise of a limitless god. I guess you still grant that the reverse of the argument is rational as well as has Plantinga and others. If the argument for god is rational and the argument that god does not exist is rational then I go with the positive must be proved since you can not really prove that something does not exist either. Should this not include a discussion of theodicy, does creation limit a Creator and the like? I am a guitar player. I must know how to play guitar and have a guitar to play. There was a time when I did know how to play guitar nor have a guitar. This is contingency. There was a god. He created. There was a creation. There was a time when there was no creation. There was a time when there was no creator. This is contingency. God is limited by his creation.

We reformulate (1) by saying that God’s existence necessarily entails its perfection. All we did here was explain in terms of existence what (1) means. (from 1)

N(x)(Px->NEx)

Let us assume, as the Ontological arguments do, that the perfection of x necessarily implies the existence of x, for all x. (premise)

N(Pg->NEg)

Instantiating the principle in (3) for God. (from 3)

N(Eg->NEg)

We now see that (2) and (4) can be combined into one proposition. If Eg implies Pg, and Pg implies NEg, then Eg implies NEg – the existence of God implies the necessary existence of God. (from 2 and 4)

We have to take a break here. As Pollock explains in his development, this is the furthest that we can take (1) by logical means. Even assuming the truth of the premise of the ontological arguments in (3), it is impossible to arrive at Eg, the proposition that God exists.

Rather, the best we can do is the proposition that IF God exists, then NEg necessarily obtains. This is important for two reasons: one because it shows that we cannot arrive at Eg, and two because we will use this conclusion again at the end of our argument.

(g=Df the x such that Px) -> N(Eg->NEg)

Here we simplify the first half of our argument in one proposition. (from 1 to 5)

~ [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

We can explain this proposition in two ways. The first is to remember, as I discussed before, that a definition cannot entail actual existence. The other is to point out that we already showed that we cannot logically obtain Eg from (1). Either way, it is a fact that Eg is unattainable from the definition alone. (premise)

NEg iif [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

This is obtained from the definition of logical necessity. Something is logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition. (premise)

~NEg

If something is only logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition, and God’s existence does not follow logically from its definition, then God’s existence is not logically necessary. (from 7 and 8

N(~Eg)

But we saw in (5) that it is necessary that if God exists, he exists necessarily: N(Eg->NEg). Since it is not the case that NEg, it is logically necessary that God does not exist. (from 5 and 9)

Our conclusion in (10) proves the strongest form of strong-atheism (“God cannot exist, but also implies the weaker claim that ~Eg (“God does not exist”

Finally, does the argument apply to the god-concept in general? Since any hypothetical god would be logically necessary, N(Eg->NEg) would hold true for any god also. Of course, it is hard to make sense of the claim that a god is logically necessary, but that is a semantic flaw of the god-concept, which is addressed by non-cognitivism. If we presuppose that the god-concept is coherent in total and in parts, then N(Eg->NEg) must hold true. Therefore I see no reason not to apply the Ontological Argument to the god-concept.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Our revels now are ended. These our actors, | As I foretold you, were all spirits, and | Are melted into air, into thin air; | And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, | The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, | The solemn temples, the great globe itself, - Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, | And, like this insubstantial pageant faded, | Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff | As dreams are made on, and our little life | Is rounded with a sleep. - Shakespearehttp://myanimelist.net/profile/butterbattle

Kant brought out the the point by saying that the concept of being unmarried is “contained” in the concept of a bachelor and that in analytic statements the predicate concept is already contained in the subject concept. If “God exists” were analytic, the word “God” would be used to say of something, amongst other things, that it exists. To say “God does not exist” would be, like “John is a married bachelor”, contradictory. However, to say that God does not exist may be false, but it is not contradictory. Furthermore, if “God exists” were analytic we could not use the term “God” for expressing the belief that there is no God. The reason for this is that in order to claim of something that it is F we need to refer to the thing with a description which does neither entail that the thing is F nor that it is not F.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Hello Mr. metaphysics. Good to see ya again. Assuming that the argument falls within a rationality for god you assume a limitless god so we're back to Anselm? Again should we not discuss the premise of a limitless god. I guess you still grant that the reverse of the argument is rational as well as has Plantinga and others.

Well, I don't grant that the reverse is rational, but that's only because I do not find the concept to be internally contradictory. The force of the argument is that the possibility of God strictly implies that he exists, provided that the concept is intelligible. The atheist will inevitably be placed on the hot seat; either s/he will have to account for the limited existence of a limitless being, or s/he will have to demonstrate that the idea posits a contradiction.

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If the argument for god is rational and the argument that god does not exist is rational then I go with the positive must be proved since you can not really prove that something does not exist either.

Our modal intuitions are generally reliable; I can affirm with reasonable certainty that a six foot long hot dog is modally possible, even though I'm not sure that such a thing exists. I don't think anyone would dispute this. Beyond modal intuition, possibilities are not really provable, except by demonstrating actuality. That is why the burden really is on the atheist to show that God is, in fact, impossible.

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Should this not include a discussion of theodicy, does creation limit a Creator and the like? I am a guitar player. I must know how to play guitar and have a guitar to play. There was a time when I did know how to play guitar nor have a guitar. This is contingency. There was a god. He created. There was a creation. There was a time when there was no creation. There was a time when there was no creator. This is contingency. God is limited by his creation.

I don't think that's a strong argument, because it trades upon a pre-20th century notion of time that we know now to be false. Time is not absolute; it is a mental construct and is relative to placement. There was not a time when there was no creation, because time exists in the creation.

Quote:

g=Df (the x such that Px)

God is defined as a perfect being. (premise)

N(Eg->Pg)

We reformulate (1) by saying that God’s existence necessarily entails its perfection. All we did here was explain in terms of existence what (1) means. (from 1)

N(x)(Px->NEx)

Let us assume, as the Ontological arguments do, that the perfection of x necessarily implies the existence of x, for all x. (premise)

N(Pg->NEg)

Instantiating the principle in (3) for God. (from 3)

N(Eg->NEg)

We now see that (2) and (4) can be combined into one proposition. If Eg implies Pg, and Pg implies NEg, then Eg implies NEg – the existence of God implies the necessary existence of God. (from 2 and 4)

We have to take a break here. As Pollock explains in his development, this is the furthest that we can take (1) by logical means. Even assuming the truth of the premise of the ontological arguments in (3), it is impossible to arrive at Eg, the proposition that God exists.

Rather, the best we can do is the proposition that IF God exists, then NEg necessarily obtains. This is important for two reasons: one because it shows that we cannot arrive at Eg, and two because we will use this conclusion again at the end of our argument.

(g=Df the x such that Px) -> N(Eg->NEg)

Here we simplify the first half of our argument in one proposition. (from 1 to 5)

~ [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

We can explain this proposition in two ways. The first is to remember, as I discussed before, that a definition cannot entail actual existence. The other is to point out that we already showed that we cannot logically obtain Eg from (1). Either way, it is a fact that Eg is unattainable from the definition alone. (premise)

NEg iif [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

This is obtained from the definition of logical necessity. Something is logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition. (premise)

~NEg

If something is only logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition, and God’s existence does not follow logically from its definition, then God’s existence is not logically necessary. (from 7 and

N(~Eg)

But we saw in (5) that it is necessary that if God exists, he exists necessarily: N(Eg->NEg). Since it is not the case that NEg, it is logically necessary that God does not exist. (from 5 and 9)

Our conclusion in (10) proves the strongest form of strong-atheism (“God cannot exist&rdquo, but also implies the weaker claim that ~Eg (“God does not exist&rdquo.

To say that there is no bridge between reality and concepts is an epistemological claim, and without qualification it cannot be established as a precondition for the ontological argument. It merely amounts to a proclamation of 'you can't do that', to which I'd respond that the soundness of the argument demonstrates that you can do that.

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Finally, does the argument apply to the god-concept in general? Since any hypothetical god would be logically necessary, N(Eg->NEg) would hold true for any god also. Of course, it is hard to make sense of the claim that a god is logically necessary, but that is a semantic flaw of the god-concept, which is addressed by non-cognitivism. If we presuppose that the god-concept is coherent in total and in parts, then N(Eg->NEg) must hold true. Therefore I see no reason not to apply the Ontological Argument to the god-concept.

There can only be one maximally perfect being, because any being equally perfect would be identical to God; they would be indiscernible, for the only way something is not God is if it's less perfect. So, it is logically impossible for the argument to apply to multiple Gods because it is not possible that there be multiple Gods.

Now, whether the argument can be used to prove the existence of an almost-perfect-being is another question entirely; even so, however, that does not address the soundness of my argument. Even if the argument has other implications for other kinds of beings, it does not follow that the conclusion of my argument is false.

Hello Mr. metaphysics. Good to see ya again. Assuming that the argument falls within a rationality for god you assume a limitless god so we're back to Anselm? Again should we not discuss the premise of a limitless god. I guess you still grant that the reverse of the argument is rational as well as has Plantinga and others.

Well, I don't grant that the reverse is rational, but that's only because I do not find the concept to be internally contradictory. The force of the argument is that the possibility of God strictly implies that he exists, provided that the concept is intelligible. The atheist will inevitably be placed on the hot seat; either s/he will have to account for the limited existence of a limitless being, or s/he will have to demonstrate that the idea posits a contradiction.

Quote:

If the argument for god is rational and the argument that god does not exist is rational then I go with the positive must be proved since you can not really prove that something does not exist either.

Our modal intuitions are generally reliable; I can affirm with reasonable certainty that a six foot long hot dog is modally possible, even though I'm not sure that such a thing exists. I don't think anyone would dispute this. Beyond modal intuition, possibilities are not really provable, except by demonstrating actuality. That is why the burden really is on the atheist to show that God is, in fact, impossible.

TGBaker: But then I think that is the point whether it is so actually not rationally or logically true. And I don't think that the burden is on the atheist who sees no actual existence of god or Russell's tea pot. Given that the claims are made about a specific type of deity it goes back to your premise. Aristotle's god would fit your bill better than an Abrahamic god.

Quote:

Should this not include a discussion of theodicy, does creation limit a Creator and the like? I am a guitar player. I must know how to play guitar and have a guitar to play. There was a time when I did know how to play guitar nor have a guitar. This is contingency. There was a god. He created. There was a creation. There was a time when there was no creation. There was a time when there was no creator. This is contingency. God is limited by his creation.

I don't think that's a strong argument, because it trades upon a pre-20th century notion of time that we know now to be false. Time is not absolute; it is a mental construct and is relative to placement. There was not a time when there was no creation, because time exists in the creation.

TGBaker: I would disagree. We certainly can speak of the limits of the universe (creation) temporally, 13.7 billion years. Scientifically we can admit that prior to the Big bang we do not know... but that is what you are positing as known, GOD. This question still holds in process theology and philosophy... Whitehead for example and his concepts of relativity is hardly pre-20th century. If you posit an absolute then it is relative to something if it creates something so my previous guitar work If there was a boundless, limitless Being then it if it creates or interacts with its creation is limited by those actions not with a specific view to time but specifically to relation and reaction. This is a secondary aspect from something like Plantinga's theodicy argument where arguments about freewill and determinism result specifically because of the definition of god as limitless. these factors are a basis for the positing of a process panentheistic god.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Still an uproved assumption. You have to prove that God is necessary.

Quote:

Quote:

Even the idea that God is possible (in the normal sense) is not established, even in the logical sense, depending on your definition of God.

You have said countless times on this discussion board that an omniscient, omnipotent, eternal being is possible. Are you now claiming that he is not possible?

Wherever I may have said that, it depends on the definition of the omni- attributes, which are very problematic, but logically, it cannot be excluded.

I did not say in that quote that God is absolutely not possible, I said it is not established that God is possible. Reading comprehension fail.

Quote:

As to whether God is possible in the broader sense, we do not know enough about the Universe to know that, assuming a God definition that is not internally self-contradictory.

Since God is purported to be the creator of the universe, his existence is not going to depend on the universe; therefore, it is not necessary for us to empirically observe the universe in order to test whether God exists. Therefore, your objection fails.

That is not what I said. Actually I was referring to the totality of existence, not our directly or potentially observable subset of reality. In either case, my position is still valid, even more so if we take your view on it. It is IMPOSSIBLE for us to know definitively whether God is possible or not.

Note, also, that I was referring to the possibility that such a being could exist, not to whether it does exist. Another reading comprehension fail.

Quote:

Quote:

Then you still need to establish whether such a 'necessary' entity necessarily has the attributes that would match any particular idea of 'God'.

God is, by definition, a perfect being. A perfect being necessarily has those attributes. If God exists, then he necessarily has those attributes. Your objection fails.

Total set of non-sequiters.

'Perfection' as a attribute in itself, without a reference, is meaningless. 'Perfection' means precisely matching some abstract ideal.

The only way your assertion can have any meaning is that you consider that a being having those attributes is what you would consider a perfect being.

All irrelevant, since you need to prove that the particular 'necessary' being you claim to exist necessarily matches your definition.

A 'necessary' entity is not logically required to have any of those attributes, let alone be 'perfect' in any sense.

Quote:

This was quite easy to respond to. Is that what took you days to conjure up?

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Still an uproved assumption.

I don't have to prove it anymore than I have to prove 'if a bachelor exists, then he is a male'.

Quote:

I did not say in that quote that God is absolutely not possible, I said it is not established that God is possible. Reading comprehension fail.

Ah, so it's *possible* that God is *impossible*?

Let's go with that for a moment.

<>[]~G

What you just claimed that it is possible that it is necessary that God does not exist. But according to the Lewis axiom of system S5, if it is possible that something is necessary, then it is necessary.

Now prove that God is logically contradictory.

Quote:

That is not what I said. Actually I was referring to the totality of existence, not our directly or potentially observable subset of reality. In either case, my position is still valid, even more so if we take your view on it. It is IMPOSSIBLE for us to know whether God is possible or not.

It is not impossible for us to know whether God is possible anymore than it is impossible for us to know whether a six foot hot dog is possible. You are merely special pleading with modal intuitions in order to avoid the conclusion--if you want to argue in this direction, then we can't know if anything is possible. So by your logic, because we are not omniscient, we therefore cannot know if, say, it is possible for a hamburger to be cooked raw, or for an ice cream to have a cherry on top, or for another child named 'Bob' to be born.

Quote:

Note, also, that I was referring to the possibility that such a being could exist, not to whether it does exist. Another reading comprehension fail.

Now we're back to your modal nightmare: Is it possible that God is impossible? If so, then it follows that God is impossible and cannot exist. Modally qualifying statements that are already modally qualified is redundant, and the Lewis systems allow us to simplify such premises.

Quote:

Total set of non-sequiters.

'Perfection' as a attribute in itself, without a reference, is meaningless. 'Perfection' means precisely matching some abstract ideal.

The argument is that perfection by logical necessity requires a reference, otherwise the perfect being you conceive of is not actually perfect.

Quote:

The only way your assertion can have any meaning is that you consider that a being having those attributes is what you would consider a perfect being.

All irrelevant, since you need to prove that the particular 'necessary' being you claim to exist necessarily matches your definition.

So there can be more than one necessary being? If so, what are the attributes of the various necessary beings, and what is it in them that makes it impossible for them to not exist if not perfection? Are you claiming that an almost-perfect being must exist?

Quote:

A 'necessary' entity is not logically required to have any of those attributes, let alone be 'perfect' in any sense.

So an imperfect necessary being can exist? Can you give an example of a limited necessary being, that is, a being who is such that its nonexistence is impossible but is still limited? What would limit it, presuming that the universe doesn't even necessarily exist?

Quote:

I repeat, do you have an actual argument??

Your objections are ludicrous. You are clearly not familiar with the Lewis axioms; how can I take you seriously if you cannot even get the basics down?

You should have quit while.......well, you should never have started with this, actually.

Because your argument is not for lateral thinkers.

I'm going to number every one of your 'arguments' that fails, and keep a running tally.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Our modal intuitions are generally reliable

Mistake 1

False.

Patently false.

Not universally compatible with reality.

Remember "What goes up, must come down"?

If what you said was universally compatible with reality, astrology would fair better than a coin toss.

And it doesn't.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Well, I don't grant that the reverse is rational, but that's only because I do not find the concept to be internally contradictory. The force of the argument is that the possibility of God strictly implies that he exists, provided that the concept is intelligible.

Mistake 2

Agreeing with yourself, and disagreeing with yourself, have nothing to do with whether something is workable, or not.

Correlation does not = Causation.

Mistake 3

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Beyond modal intuition, possibilities are not really provable, except by demonstrating actuality. That is why the burden really is on the atheist to show that God is, in fact, impossible.

False.

Acquiescence is not a requirement.

You are only saying "I agree with myself, that..."

That's not a 'proof'.

That's an idea in your head.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

I don't think anyone would dispute this.

Mistake 4

That's a presumption.

If your formula needs a 'presumption', then that becomes the kingpin.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

I don't think that's a strong argument

Mistake 5

If your formula requires 'thought' or 'imagination', then it is not workable, on it's own.

It's not 'practical'.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Time is not absolute

Mistake 6

That's irrelevant

Immaterial.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

There was not a time when there was no creation

Mistake 7

Non sequitur.

Motion is space/time.

As long as there was energy and matter, there was 'movement'

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

...because time exists in the creation

Mistake 8

Define 'creation'

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

There can only be one maximally perfect being

Mistake 9

I did not know this.

How do you know this?

Cite your proof.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Mistake 10

So, it is logically impossible for the argument to apply to multiple Gods because it is not possible that there be multiple Gods.

I did not know this.

How do you know this?

Cite your proof.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Mistake 11

Now, whether the argument can be used to prove the existence of an almost-perfect-being is another question entirely

This is not a formula, or a proof.

In the abscence of any evidence, one can neither prove, or disprove an idea, because you are left with..........................................................nothing to prove, or disprove.

All you have in reality, is an idea.

BobSpence1 wrote:

Perfection' as a attribute in itself, without a reference, is meaningless. 'Perfection' means precisely matching some abstract ideal.

Correct.

Mistake 12

"Perfect" is meaningless.

Those are not 'properties'. Those kinds of things have no true 'value'.

They are adjective and adverbs.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

even so, however, that does not address the soundness of my argument. Even if the argument has other implications for other kinds of beings, it does not follow that the conclusion of my argument is false.

Mistake 13

You've been equivocating and being deceptive since you started this game.

You are entitled to make up your own mind, but you are not entitled to make up your own facts , and present it as a universal reality.

Your 'argument' (very non committal BTW...) is not a formula that proves the existence of a god.

It is not workable, or practical in it's application.

As a formula , it does not work. It is not sound at all, as a formula that can determine if a god exists in reality.

It's merely an idea.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'.

Mistakes 14 &15

Those are the assumptions, that are (at the SAME time) your premises.

Duh....

The rest of your equation is superfluous.

It's a perfectly circular argument.

Duh....

I did not know either of those 2 things to be universally true.

1-That he exists. Or would/could/should exist.

2- That he would be necessary.

If you claim either of these to be universally factual, then you need to cite your source of this proof.

You're up to 15 fatal flaws in your proof that there is a god, in reality....

I keep asking myself " Are they just playin' stupid, or are they just plain stupid?..."

"To explain the unknown by the known is a logical procedure; to explain the known by the unknown is a form of theological lunacy" : David Brooks

" Only on the subject of God can smart people still imagine that they reap the fruits of human intelligence even as they plow them under." : Sam Harris

You should have quit while.......well, you should never have started with this, actually.

Because your argument is not for lateral thinkers.

I'm going to number every one of your 'arguments' that fails, and keep a running tally.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Our modal intuitions are generally reliable

Mistake 1

False.

Patently false.

Not universally compatible with reality.

Remember "What goes up, must come down"?

If what you said was universally compatible with reality, astrology would fair better than a coin toss.

And it doesn't.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Well, I don't grant that the reverse is rational, but that's only because I do not find the concept to be internally contradictory. The force of the argument is that the possibility of God strictly implies that he exists, provided that the concept is intelligible.

Mistake 2

Agreeing with yourself, and disagreeing with yourself, have nothing to do with whether something is workable, or not.

Correlation does not = Causation.

Mistake 3

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Beyond modal intuition, possibilities are not really provable, except by demonstrating actuality. That is why the burden really is on the atheist to show that God is, in fact, impossible.

False.

Acquiescence is not a requirement.

You are only saying "I agree with myself, that..."

That's not a 'proof'.

That's an idea in your head.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

I don't think anyone would dispute this.

Mistake 4

That's a presumption.

If your formula needs a 'presumption', then that becomes the kingpin.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

I don't think that's a strong argument

Mistake 5

If your formula requires 'thought' or 'imagination', then it is not workable, on it's own.

It's not 'practical'.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Time is not absolute

Mistake 6

That's irrelevant

Immaterial.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

There was not a time when there was no creation

Mistake 7

Non sequitur.

Motion is space/time.

As long as there was energy and matter, there was 'movement'

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

...because time exists in the creation

Mistake 8

Define 'creation'

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

There can only be one maximally perfect being

Mistake 9

I did not know this.

How do you know this?

Cite your proof.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Mistake 10

So, it is logically impossible for the argument to apply to multiple Gods because it is not possible that there be multiple Gods.

I did not know this.

How do you know this?

Cite your proof.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

Mistake 11

Now, whether the argument can be used to prove the existence of an almost-perfect-being is another question entirely

This is not a formula, or a proof.

In the abscence of any evidence, one can neither prove, or disprove an idea, because you are left with..........................................................nothing to prove, or disprove.

All you have in reality, is an idea.

BobSpence1 wrote:

Perfection' as a attribute in itself, without a reference, is meaningless. 'Perfection' means precisely matching some abstract ideal.

Correct.

Mistake 12

"Perfect" is meaningless.

Those are not 'properties'. Those kinds of things have no true 'value'.

They are adjective and adverbs.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

even so, however, that does not address the soundness of my argument. Even if the argument has other implications for other kinds of beings, it does not follow that the conclusion of my argument is false.

Mistake 13

You've been equivocating and being deceptive since you started this game.

You are entitled to make up your own mind, but you are not entitled to make up your own facts , and present it as a universal reality.

Your 'argument' (very non committal BTW...) is not a formula that proves the existence of a god.

It is not workable, or practical in it's application.

As a formula , it does not work. It is not sound at all, as a formula that can determine if a god exists in reality.

It's merely an idea.

Mr_Metaphysics wrote:

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'.

Mistakes 14 &15

Those are the assumptions, that are (at the SAME time) your premises.

Duh....

The rest of your equation is superfluous.

It's a perfectly circular argument.

Duh....

I did not know either of those 2 things to be universally true.

1-That he exists. Or would/could/should exist.

2- That he would be necessary.

If you claim either of these to be universally factual, then you need to cite your source of this proof.

You're up to 15 fatal flaws in your proof that there is a god, in reality....

Mr. Metaphysics: Our modal intuitions are generally reliable; I can affirm with reasonable certainty that a six foot long hot dog is modally possible, even though I'm not sure that such a thing exists. I don't think anyone would dispute this. Beyond modal intuition, possibilities are not really provable, except by demonstrating actuality. That is why the burden really is on the atheist to show that God is, in fact, impossible.

TGBaker: It IS just the opposite because of the fact that modal logic can affirm with reasonable certainty that a six foor long hotdog is possible does not mean there IS a six foot long hotdog. It is up to the hotdog-ist not the a-hotdog-ist IS. And that is the ongoing history of the ontological argument the validity of an argument does not of necessity entail the actuality of its claim. Show me the mustard as will as the hotdog.

TGBaker : Should this not include a discussion of theodicy, does creation limit a Creator and the like? I am a guitar player. I must know how to play guitar and have a guitar to play. There was a time when I did know how to play guitar nor have a guitar. This is contingency. There was a god. He created. There was a creation. There was a time when there was no creation. There was a time when there was no creator. This is contingency. God is limited by his creation.

Mr. Metaphysics: I don't think that's a strong argument, because it trades upon a pre-20th century notion of time that we know now to be false. Time is not absolute; it is a mental construct and is relative to placement. There was not a time when there was no creation, because time exists in the creation.

TGBaker: It is true that space-time is relative but it is not a mental construct ( that may be a pre-20th century idea). That time and space have an origin is assume part of your premise, God. We can speak of its non-existence. If there is an unlimited god prior to its existence then that god's relationship is different in the creation's non-existence than its existence. This is a contingency itself if creation is not necessary. If it is necessary then god is limited by its necessity. There is no god before there is a creation. If creation is not necessary then god was not a creator prior to the creation and lacks the perfection as creator. Again Aristotle's self absorbed god fits your bill rather than any religions deity.

We certainly can speak of the limits of the universe (creation) temporally, 13.7 billion years. Scientifically we can admit that prior to the Big bang we do not know... but that is what you are positing as known, GOD. This question still holds in process theology and philosophy... Whitehead for example and his concepts of relativity is hardly pre-20th century. If you posit an absolute then it is relative to something if it creates something. If there was a boundless, limitless Being then it if it creates or interacts with its creation is limited by those actions not with a specific view to time but specifically to relation and reaction. This is a secondary aspect from something like Plantinga's theodicy argument where arguments about freewill and determinism result specifically because of the definition of god as limitless. These factors were a basis for the positing of a process philosophy or a panentheistic god.

Mr. Metaphysics: To say that there is no bridge between reality and concepts is an epistemological claim, and without qualification it cannot be established as a precondition for the ontological argument. It merely amounts to a proclamation of 'you can't do that', to which I'd respond that the soundness of the argument demonstrates that you can do that.

TGBaker: Actually I would say there is always a correlation between reality and concepts but not vice versa. The very purpose of modal logic is to determine this. I can say if I had taken the road to the right instead of the left I would have been right. I can therefore have a concept of taking the road to the right. But the reality and entailed in the statement is I took the road to the left.

Secondly I can state logically if I had taken the road to the right instead to the left I would have been alive to write this. I can have the concept of the road to the right. But the statement concludes that I took the road to the left. So I am dead. One could easily conclude that the statement is not logical since I am dead I did not write this. But then you can salvage the construction by stating that i wrote this dead. So there is nothing illogical about it apart from the fact that it does not obtain to reality. So the epistemological bridge question is a precursor to any argument including the ontological argument. You and Bobspence1 reacted rightfully to the continued haunting of the Zeno paradox ghost because of this precursory epistemological intuition. With Zeno it has to do with reality's actual relation to motion, space and time and their relationship to logical and mathematical abstraction ( lack of extension or conditioning). With the ontological argument it has to do with reality's actual relation to limitlessness, necessity, perfection and those properties relationship to logical and mathematical abstraction (lack of entailing definition ).

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Still an uproved assumption.

I don't have to prove it anymore than I have to prove 'if a bachelor exists, then he is a male'.

I think you still have to address Kant's argument

Kant brought out the the point by saying that the concept of being unmarried is “contained” in the concept of a bachelor and that in analytic statements the predicate concept is already contained in the subject concept. If “God exists” were analytic, the word “God” would be used to say of something, amongst other things, that it exists. To say “God does not exist” would be, like “John is a married bachelor”, contradictory. However, to say that God does not exist may be false, but it is not contradictory. Furthermore, if “God exists” were analytic we could not use the term “God” for expressing the belief that there is no God. The reason for this is that in order to claim of something that it is F we need to refer to the thing with a description which does neither entail that the thing is F nor that it is not F.

It is explicitly directed primarily against Descartes but also against Leibniz. His criticism was anticipated in Pierre Gassendi's Objections to Descartes' Meditations. Kant's refutation consists of several separate but interrelated arguments. They are shaped by his central distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. In an analytic judgment, the predicate expresses something that is already contained within a concept and is therefore a tautology; in a synthetic judgment, the predicate, or claim, links the concept to something outside it that is not already logically implied by it. New knowledge consists of synthetic judgments.

Kant first questions the intelligibility of the very concept of an absolutely necessary being, considering "whether I am still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all". He examines one way of understanding the concept, which looks to examples of necessary propositions, e.g. "a triangle has three angles". But he rejects this account for two related reasons. First, no absolutely necessary judgments will ever yield an absolute necessity for things and their existence: e.g., "a triangle has three angles" yields only the conditioned necessity that, if a triangle exists, then necessarily three angles exist. Thus even if we defined a concept of a thing X so that "X exists" were a necessary judgment, all that would follow is the conditioned necessity that, if X exists, then necessarily X exists. Second, since contradictions arise only when we keep the subject and cancel the predicate (e.g., keeping God and canceling omnipotence), and since judgments of nonexistence cancel both the subject and the predicate, therefore no judgment of nonexistence can involve a contradiction. Kant concludes that there is a strong general case against the intelligibility of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.[26]

Second, Kant argues that if we include existence in the definition of something, then asserting that it exists is a tautology. If we say that existence is part of the definition of God, in other words an analytic judgment, then we are simply repeating ourselves in asserting that God exists. We are not making a synthetic judgment that would add new information about the real existence of God to the purely conceptual definition of God.

Third, Kant argues that "'being' is obviously not a real predicate" [26] and cannot be part of the concept of something. That is, to say that something is or exists is not to say something about a concept, but rather indicates that there is an object that corresponds to the concept, and "the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept". For objects of the senses, to say that something exists means not that it has an additional property that is part of its concept but rather that it is to be found outside of thought and that we have an empirical perception of it in space and time. A really existing thing does not have any properties that could be predicated of it that differentiate it from the concept of that thing. What differentiates it is that we actually experience it: for example, it has shape, a specifiable location, and duration. To give an example of Kant's point: the reason we say that horses exist and unicorns do not is not that the concept of horse has the property of existence and the concept of unicorn does not, or that the concept of horse has more of that property than the concept of unicorn. There is no difference between the two concepts in this regard. And there is no difference between the concept of a horse and the concept of a really existing horse: the concepts are identical. The reason we say that horses exist is simply that we have spatio-temporal experience of them: there are objects corresponding to the concept. So any demonstration of the existence of anything, including God, that relies on predicating a property (in this case existence) of that thing is fallacious.

Thus, in accordance with the second and third arguments, the statement "God is omnipotent" is an analytic judgment that articulates what is already contained in and implied by the concept of God, i.e. a particular property of God. The statement "God exists" is a synthetic judgment of existence that does not assert something contained in or implied by the concept of God and would require knowledge of God as an object of that concept. What the ontological argument does is attempt to import into the concept of God, as though it were a property, the synthetic assertion of the existence of God, thereby illegitimately and tautologically defining God as existing. In other words, it begs the question by assuming what it purports to prove.

But, fourth, Kant argues that the concept of God is in any case not the concept of one particular object of sense among others but rather an "object of pure thought", of something that by definition exists outside the field of experience and of nature. With regard to unicorns, we can specify how we could determine that unicorns exist, i.e., what spatio-temporal experience of them would look like. With regard to the concept of God, there is no way for us to know it as existing in the only legitimate and meaningful way we know other objects as existing. We cannot even determine "the possibility of any existence beyond that known in and through experience".[26]

The typical response (e.g., Plantinga's ontological argument) to this objection to the ontological argument is this: "While 'existence' simpliciter cannot be a predicate, 'necessary existence' (like 'contingent existence') can be a predicate." Some things are contingently so, and some things are necessarily so. God, it is said, is a necessary being de re. Some have objected that Plantinga's argument merely re-assumes that existence is a property and continues the argumentation by tautology.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

I did not say in that quote that God is absolutely not possible, I said it is not established that God is possible. Reading comprehension fail.

Mr. Metaphsics: Ah, so it's *possible* that God is *impossible*?

Let's go with that for a moment.

<>[]~G

What you just claimed that it is possible that it is necessary that God does not exist. But according to the Lewis axiom of system S5, if it is possible that something is necessary, then it is necessary.

TGBaker: I think we are talking past each other. There was no idea of necessity in Bobspense1's statement. He simply said that it is improbable that there is god and that has been nothing substantive that god is possible as an entity not an idea. The idea would be the possibility of god.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

A 'necessary' entity is not logically required to have any of those attributes, let alone be 'perfect' in any sense.

Metaphysics: So an imperfect necessary being can exist? Can you give an example of a limited necessary being, that is, a being who is such that its nonexistence is impossible but is still limited? What would limit it, presuming that the universe doesn't even necessarily exist?

TGBaker: Yes my father. He is a necessary imperfect being. It is necessary for him to exist because I am. Again defintions>>>>>>>

Bob: Quote:

I repeat, do you have an actual argument??

metaphysics: Your objections are ludicrous. You are clearly not familiar with the Lewis axioms; how can I take you seriously if you cannot even get the basics down?

TGBaker:

Wiki:

It is proposed that a being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

It is proposed that a being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)

Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

Therefore (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

This argument has two controversial premises: The axiom S5 and the "possibility premise" that a maximally great being is possible. The more controversial of these two is the "possibility premise" since S5 is widely (though not universally) accepted. Paul Almond strongly disagrees with the argument based on the "incoherence, incorrectness and triviality" of axiom S5[35]. One objection by Richard M. Gale, professor emeritus of philosophy at University of Pittsburgh, is that the "possibility premise" begs the question, because one only has the epistemic right to accept it if one understands the nested modal operators, and if one understands them within the system S5 (without which the argument fails) then one understands that "possibly necessarily" is basically the same as "necessarily".[36]

Plantinga replies to this objection as follows: "Once you see how the argument works, you may think that asserting or believing the premise is tantamount to asserting or believing the conclusion; the canny atheist will say that he does not believe it is possible that there be a maximally great being. But would not a similar criticism hold of any valid argument? No it would not. If it be a valid argument then it is not rooted in belief. Like anything it would be rooted in experience. Otherwise it is just a mental creation of which there are an infinite number, none of which need to be true or untrue. Take any valid argument: once you see how it works, you may think that asserting or believing the premise is tantamount to asserting or believing the conclusion."

TGBaker: And the ontological argument is not rooted in experience but conceptual thought or belief.

Both philosophers are technically correct. To deny premise (3) amounts to asserting that it is logically impossible that there is a being that exemplifies maximal greatness — thus the argument appears to demonstrate that either the existence of God is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.[37] However, this is only the case if one conceives God as this maximally great being.

Interestingly, Plantinga himself does not think the modal ontological argument is always a good proof of the existence of God. It depends on what his interlocutor thinks of the possibility premise. Nonetheless, Plantinga has suggested that because we do not have any evidence against the possibility premise, it might be reasonable to suppose it has a probability of 50/50.

There are, nonetheless, other approaches to the possibility premise. Leibniz thought that the possibility premise followed from the claim that "positive qualities" could not logically conflict with one another, and hence the notion of a being that had all the positive qualities had to be coherent. Gödel's ontological proof uses similar ideas.

TGB: So the verdict is still out on S5... sorta since Liebniz and certainly since Lewis presented it. Godel hid his argument and only showed it to a friend while he was alive. He did so either from embarrassment or uncertainty as to its truth. On the side Godel was a mathematician who was a Platonic Mystic.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Still an uproved assumption.

I don't have to prove it anymore than I have to prove 'if a bachelor exists, then he is a male'.

Category error.

'Unmarried' and 'male' are simple attributes of a person, properties which do not presuppose anything about the existence of the subject, 'necessary' is an entirely different kind of 'attribute'.

Also, a bachelor is male, by definition, whether any actual bachelors exist or not, it is not conditional on existence.

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I did not say in that quote that God is absolutely not possible, I said it is not established that God is possible. Reading comprehension fail.

Ah, so it's *possible* that God is *impossible*?

Let's go with that for a moment.

<>[]~G

What you just claimed that it is possible that it is necessary that God does not exist. But according to the Lewis axiom of system S5, if it is possible that something is necessary, then it is necessary.

Now prove that God is logically contradictory.

It is definitely impossible to know whether a coherently defined entity which involves attributes inherently unobservable or immeasurable by us is possible or not, unlike an unusual configuration of an everyday physical, finite object.

'Cooked raw' is a simple contradiction involving the application of opposite qualities simultaneously to the same object. The other 'examples' involve only directly observable configurations of physical objects or events.

You are dishonestly trying to juggle and/or conflate the various special meanings of the modal terms to slip in your preconceived crap.

I am using 'possible' in the normal sense, which implies that a necessary thing must also be possible. The axiom you quote for S5 is controversial, and depends on particular highly counter intuitive usages of the terms necessarily and possibly.

So I will continue to formulate my arguments in basic propositional logic, which modal logic cannot supersede.

Yes, it is possible that God is impossible. This is only a possibility because we do not have sufficient knowledge of reality to prove or disprove the existence of a God which has an internally consistent definition. That is IT.

Your modal game-playing cannot LOGICALLY disprove that statement.

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That is not what I said. Actually I was referring to the totality of existence, not our directly or potentially observable subset of reality. In either case, my position is still valid, even more so if we take your view on it. It is IMPOSSIBLE for us to know whether God is possible or not.

It is not impossible for us to know whether God is possible anymore than it is impossible for us to know whether a six foot hot dog is possible. You are merely special pleading with modal intuitions in order to avoid the conclusion--if you want to argue in this direction, then we can't know if anything is possible. So by your logic, because we are not omniscient, we therefore cannot know if, say, it is possible for a hamburger to be cooked raw, or for an ice cream to have a cherry on top, or for another child named 'Bob' to be born.

It is definitely impossible to know whether a coherently defined entity which involves attributes inherently unobservable or immeasurable by us is possible or not, unlike an unusual configuration of an everyday physical, finite object.

'Cooked raw' is a simple contradiction involving the application of opposite qualities simultaneously to the same object. The other 'examples' involve only directly observable configurations of physical objects or events.

You are dishonestly trying to juggle and/or conflate the various special meanings of the modal terms to slip in your preconceived crap.

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Note, also, that I was referring to the possibility that such a being could exist, not to whether it does exist. Another reading comprehension fail.

Now we're back to your modal nightmare: Is it possible that God is impossible? If so, then it follows that God is impossible and cannot exist. Modally qualifying statements that are already modally qualified is redundant, and the Lewis systems allow us to simplify such premises.

But that simplification simply involves ignoring all but the last modal qualifier, so it only works in a special sense of the terms. It does not overturn my non-modal usage.

If you can't disprove my assertions non-modally, you do not have a case.

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Total set of non-sequiters.

'Perfection' as a attribute in itself, without a reference, is meaningless. 'Perfection' means precisely matching some abstract ideal.

The argument is that perfection by logical necessity requires a reference, otherwise the perfect being you conceive of is not actually perfect.

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The only way your assertion can have any meaning is that you consider that a being having those attributes is what you would consider a perfect being.

All irrelevant, since you need to prove that the particular 'necessary' being you claim to exist necessarily matches your definition.

So there can be more than one necessary being? If so, what are the attributes of the various necessary beings, and what is it in them that makes it impossible for them to not exist if not perfection? Are you claiming that an almost-perfect being must exist?

There can be more than one necessary proposition, otherwise modal logic is almost totally useless.

I am claiming that 'perfection' is meaningless as used here. What do you actually mean by a 'perfect' being?

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A 'necessary' entity is not logically required to have any of those attributes, let alone be 'perfect' in any sense.

So an imperfect necessary being can exist? Can you give an example of a limited necessary being, that is, a being who is such that its nonexistence is impossible but is still limited? What would limit it, presuming that the universe doesn't even necessarily exist?

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I repeat, do you have an actual argument??

Your objections are ludicrous. You are clearly not familiar with the Lewis axioms; how can I take you seriously if you cannot even get the basics down?

(1) is an unproved assumption. If you start with "God is necessary", you have a purely circular argument.

The premise is not 'God is necessary', it is 'if God exists, then God is necessary'. Since your only condition for argument circularity was the premise 'God is necessary', and since that is not a premise in my argument, your objection fails.

Still an uproved assumption.

I don't have to prove it anymore than I have to prove 'if a bachelor exists, then he is a male'.

TGBaker: People who do modal logic seem to have a strong faith in it to a level of bigotry. I have a friend such. But Godel's incompleteness theory showed the incompleteness of not just mathematical theory but logic itself. and likely correspondence theory of truth or knowledge.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

First, I might note that your first premise is trivial. You don't need it. If all you're trying to prove is G, then you only need a part of Premise 2 (~N~(G)-->G), Premise 3, and the conclusion to construct a simple syllogism.

(1) ~N~(G)-->G

(2) ~N~(G)

::. G

So you can avoid the confusion...

But, I don't think you get ~N~(G) for free. I have no reason to think that N~(G) is even possible in all possible worlds. In other words, it's not sound. But if you merely assert it, then you'll end of begging the question and violating the validity of your proof. So you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. Most ontological arguments, including yours, fails for this reason.

“Hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good blaster at your side, kid.”

We reformulate (1) by saying that God’s existence necessarily entails its perfection. All we did here was explain in terms of existence what (1) means. (from 1)

N(x)(Px->NEx)

Let us assume, as the Ontological arguments do, that the perfection of x necessarily implies the existence of x, for all x. (premise)

N(Pg->NEg)

Instantiating the principle in (3) for God. (from 3)

N(Eg->NEg)

We now see that (2) and (4) can be combined into one proposition. If Eg implies Pg, and Pg implies NEg, then Eg implies NEg – the existence of God implies the necessary existence of God. (from 2 and 4)

We have to take a break here. As Pollock explains in his development, this is the furthest that we can take (1) by logical means. Even assuming the truth of the premise of the ontological arguments in (3), it is impossible to arrive at Eg, the proposition that God exists.

Rather, the best we can do is the proposition that IF God exists, then NEg necessarily obtains. This is important for two reasons: one because it shows that we cannot arrive at Eg, and two because we will use this conclusion again at the end of our argument.

(g=Df the x such that Px) -> N(Eg->NEg)

Here we simplify the first half of our argument in one proposition. (from 1 to 5)

~ [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

We can explain this proposition in two ways. The first is to remember, as I discussed before, that a definition cannot entail actual existence. The other is to point out that we already showed that we cannot logically obtain Eg from (1). Either way, it is a fact that Eg is unattainable from the definition alone. (premise)

NEg iif [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

This is obtained from the definition of logical necessity. Something is logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition. (premise)

~NEg

If something is only logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition, and God’s existence does not follow logically from its definition, then God’s existence is not logically necessary. (from 7 and

N(~Eg)

But we saw in (5) that it is necessary that if God exists, he exists necessarily: N(Eg->NEg). Since it is not the case that NEg, it is logically necessary that God does not exist. (from 5 and 9)

Our conclusion in (10) proves the strongest form of strong-atheism (“God cannot exist&rdquo, but also implies the weaker claim that ~Eg (“God does not exist&rdquo.

To say that there is no bridge between reality and concepts is an epistemological claim, and without qualification it cannot be established as a precondition for the ontological argument. It merely amounts to a proclamation of 'you can't do that', to which I'd respond that the soundness of the argument demonstrates that you can do that.

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Finally, does the argument apply to the god-concept in general? Since any hypothetical god would be logically necessary, N(Eg->NEg) would hold true for any god also. Of course, it is hard to make sense of the claim that a god is logically necessary, but that is a semantic flaw of the god-concept, which is addressed by non-cognitivism. If we presuppose that the god-concept is coherent in total and in parts, then N(Eg->NEg) must hold true. Therefore I see no reason not to apply the Ontological Argument to the god-concept.

There can only be one maximally perfect being, because any being equally perfect would be identical to God; they would be indiscernible, for the only way something is not God is if it's less perfect. So, it is logically impossible for the argument to apply to multiple Gods because it is not possible that there be multiple Gods.

Now, whether the argument can be used to prove the existence of an almost-perfect-being is another question entirely; even so, however, that does not address the soundness of my argument. Even if the argument has other implications for other kinds of beings, it does not follow that the conclusion of my argument is false.

I'm sorry I don't follow. How is the above argument presenting multiple perfect beings???? Or talking about near perfect beings????

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Mr M, your initial argument still contains the qualifier "if God exists" in several propositions, so if God does exist, it concludes that God exists, but if God doesn't exist, it fails to prove he does. This was more-or-less Platinga's point.

Gödel demonstrated that structurally sound arguments may still fail to prove anything, ie be undecidable, especially when there is some degree of circularity, which there clearly is here. This argument seems to be in this category.

Also, any argument containing unbounded terms, infinities, is not bound by 'normal' rules.

For example, A + B = A, if A is infinite and B is non-zero or of the same order of infinity as A.

And when it comes to explicitly, and widely acknowledged to be, counter-intuitive systems such as Modal Logic, even more so with the S5 construct on 'possibly necessary' you rely on, intuition is highly unreliable. And in any case, intuition cannot be an essential part of the justification for any conclusion. It is, at most, a guide, a suggestion, to a hypothesis. To most people on the Earth before Copernicus et al, it was intuitively obvious that the Sun went around the Earth...

And I don't fucking care how many philosophers or apologetics or metaphysicians you want to use as arguments from authority, they are no more likely to have anything useful to say on this issue than way-past their use-by date 'thinkers' such as Plato or Aquinas. If you think there is a good argument, you should be able to express it in your own words. Those guys disagree wildly among themselves.

Mr M, your initial argument still contains the qualifier "if God exists" in several propositions, so if God does exist, it concludes that God exists, but if God doesn't exist, it fails to prove he does. This was more-or-less Platinga's point.

Gödel demonstrated that structurally sound arguments may still fail to prove anything, ie be undecidable, especially when there is some degree of circularity, which there clearly is here. This argument seems to be in this category.

Also, any argument containing unbounded terms, infinities, is not bound by 'normal' rules.

For example, A + B = A, if A is infinite and B is non-zero or of the same order of infinity as A.

And when it comes to explicitly, and widely acknowledged to be, counter-intuitive systems such as Modal Logic, even more so with the S5 construct on 'possibly necessary' you rely on, intuition is highly unreliable. And in any case, intuition cannot be an essential part of the justification for any conclusion. It is, at most, a guide, a suggestion, to a hypothesis. To most people on the Earth before Copernicus et al, it was intuitively obvious that the Sun went around the Earth...

And I don't fucking care how many philosophers or apologetics or metaphysicians you want to use as arguments from authority, they are no more likely to have anything useful to say on this issue than way-past their use-by date 'thinkers' such as Plato or Aquinas. If you think there is a good argument, you should be able to express it in your own words. Those guys disagree wildly among themselves.

What he said But to defer to someone who lives his life and career focused on your very topic, I was talking to Dr. James F. Sennett (my friend since the 6th grade) a while back after years of conversation on this and other theological topics, he has conceded that there simply is no working metaphysic: The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader; Modality, Probability, and Rationality: A Critical Examination of Alvin Plantinga's Philosophy (American University Studies Series V, Philosophy);In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment;

"Is God Essentially God?" Religious Studies 30 (1994): 295-303; God and Possible Words: On What There Must Be." Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1989): 285-297; "Alvin Plantinga." In The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 5, ed. Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis. Chesham, UK: Acumen (forthcoming); "Plantinga, Alvin." In Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, ed. John Shook. Bristol, Eng.: Thoemmes, 2005; "Plantinga, Alvin." In Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, ed. Robert Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; and much much more.

James was mentored by Plantinga obviously. No known modal argument will prove god they at best will only create a rational basis for further discussion or research. How is your argument more sound than Plantinga's Mr. Metaphysic?????

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

After a little more thought, it seems to me that the problem with this version of the ontological argument is asserting that 'possibly not necessary' represents a 'limitation' on an otherwise 'unlimited' being.

In any reasonable terms, 'limited/unlimited' should apply to extent, range of attributes, and power and capabilities of any hypothetical being. The "possibility that its non-existence may not involve a contradiction", seems quite irrelevant to any of those attributes and powers. Including that consideration seems a blatant attempt to 'define' it into existence. There are in fact arguments that some interpretations of the omni-attributes do involve contradictions, so its possible existence is far more likely to represent a contradiction than its non-existence.

After a little more thought, it seems to me that the problem with this version of the ontological argument is asserting that 'possibly not necessary' represents a 'limitation' on an otherwise 'unlimited' being.

In any reasonable terms, 'limited/unlimited' should apply to extent, range of attributes, and power and capabilities of any hypothetical being. The "possibility that its non-existence may not involve a contradiction", seems quite irrelevant to any of those attributes and powers. Including that consideration seems a blatant attempt to 'define' it into existence. There are in fact arguments that some interpretations of the omni-attributes do involve contradictions, so its possible existence is far more likely to represent a contradiction than its non-existence.

That was my argument with my friend about Plantinga's work from looking at theodicy and the freewill issue/omniscient being. Theodicy is unresolved and posits many contradictions concerning an unlimited god. We really can't determine what the premise is here because limitless is not defined. I assumed it pointed to the classical theistic god. That is why I kept throwing out Aristotle's non-creating eternal self absorbed god wherein causality is teleological in that entities move toward its( god's) perfection in an eternal circle. If limitless is taken quantitatively such attributes as evil and what have you apply. If limitless is qualitative then the positive attributes must be defined which is the theodicy question.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

It seems that what Mr.M's argument does do is exclude the 'possible' condition, in the Modal sense.

IOW, God either does not exist, or must exist ('cannot not exist').

Which is OK by me. So both the Theist and the strong Atheist position are consistent with his OA.

Yea that is what I have been saying. In the sense as Plantinga admits the modal structure and argument can be sound (valid) but that does not obtain real-world truth because he reverse of the argument (strong atheism)is valid. Let me ask you this. There is a meta-logic involved (to be a little Godel-ish). The arguments are composed from a logical contingency: God exists/ God does not exist. This is precursory to the working of the argument. The argument is to prove one are the other. To me the inclusion of necessity is similar to what one sees in literary criticism when the narrative world gets confused with the real world. A limitedless being only in idea (Anslems fool) (1) creates the idea of a god that exists in the real world is more perfect (2). We forget that (2) is only in idea as well. I still think that the idea of s5 and necessity is the weakness. The meta-logic already concedes the contingency. Hume said it better I guess. Can god be limited by the idea of otherness which ideally limits him with the contingency of whether he exits? Apparent from a likely easy epistemological yes is there not an ontological aspect in that god is limited in the sense that he is not obviously manifest. I know personally a quality of being a person is to have social intercourse with others. If I were not manifest to anyone I would lack that quality. If I were manifest only to one is that not less perfect than several. A perfect god should be at least manifest if existent?

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

The first naked assertion, is that, as far back as 'cavemen' there was a notion that both living, and inanimate things had a 'soul' (sic). We can see evidence that cave dwellers imagined that. But, the ancient Egyptians as far back as 14th century BC, were firmly convinced of this, that the 'spirit' left the body, upon death. Now, we see the 'invention' of spirits, or the metaphysical.

Still, naked assertions. An 'idea'.

This is not an idea that 'resonates' with me. It never did. It is contradictory that before I was born, that I was 'alive' in the 'spirit' sense.

If it's claimed that the 'spirit' begins at conception, then there is a problem explaining the origins of that.

Whatever the origins, it would seem logical that a 'spirit' beginning, would originate from a 'spirit' world.

Without a physical method of 'seeing' such a world, we are left with only the ability to 'imagine' one.

Again, an 'idea'.

But the concept of a god, or 'prime mover' also seems to hinge on the naked assertion that there is no infinite regress. There's a massive cognitive dissonance when humans try and conceptualize an infinite regress. It seems completely counterintuitive, as we do not see them in the physical world, except in mathematics and geometry.

So, there's a contradiction right there. We see infinite regress (or progress) in the abstract, yet, we have a mental barrier when we try and transpose that to the physical, natural world.

But, those can be seen as emotional stumbling blocks, as anyone in science and technology has experienced more than once, where something that should have worked as predicted, did not, and something that wasn't expected, occurred.

That can be 'troubling', emotionally. Frustrating. Maddening.

But, physics does what it does. It's not a democracy, and it does not care what we think, or want, or desire, or wish. Nature seems to be apathetic to individuals.

But, a god would 'care'.

That's without precedent.

But, he would be 'angry' as well.

Ya, no contradiction to the 'physical world' there....

Why are so many gods 'angry' and 'moody'.

Loving and angry.

No contradictions there.

Even though the ancient philosophers were ignorant on the physical world, there were some who evidently were quite capable of modeling and spatial reasoning. But, they also seemed to be too elastic in their modeling of attributes, that they were willing to factor into a god. They were simply doing something that had no precedent, except in their ideas.

So, in strictest terms, if one could 'conceptualize' a god, then, it could be possible, it could then be likely, if an entity was as they 'imagined' it would be. But, that would be a 'quantum leap' compared to anything they saw on earth, or in the sky.

Let's be honest. They didn't know the universe was expanding. They didn't know about space/time, as we theorize about it today. They didn't know about black holes. They didn't know that stars were actually distant suns, from other galaxies. They didn't know about planets outside our solar systems.

Let's be honest.

It's just an 'idea'.

Whether it appeals to our emotions, or not, is not relevant, as to the probability of whether one could exist, or not.

It's not logical to build a life adopting that 'idea' as an absolute. It's entirely an 'emotional' need.

But, given the complexity of the physical world, and the very real possibility of other dimensions, a single 'god' who created it all, is increasingly unlikely, IMO.

If we discover life (and more specifically, intelligent life, or more complex life than humans) on other planets, it will completely shatter the god delusion/myth.

The more I contemplate the possiblity of a monotheistic god, the less possible or probably one seems. I think the possiblity of a god, is inversely proportional to knowledge.

I also think the possibility of a god, is directly proportional to an individuals emotional needs.

I keep asking myself " Are they just playin' stupid, or are they just plain stupid?..."

"To explain the unknown by the known is a logical procedure; to explain the known by the unknown is a form of theological lunacy" : David Brooks

" Only on the subject of God can smart people still imagine that they reap the fruits of human intelligence even as they plow them under." : Sam Harris

The first naked assertion, is that, as far back as 'cavemen' there was a notion that both living, and inanimate things had a 'soul' (sic). We can see evidence that cave dwellers imagined that. But, the ancient Egyptians as far back as 14th century BC, were firmly convinced of this, that the 'spirit' left the body, upon death. Now, we see the 'invention' of spirits, or the metaphysical.

Still, naked assertions. An 'idea'.

This is not an idea that 'resonates' with me. It never did. It is contradictory that before I was born, that I was 'alive' in the 'spirit' sense.

If it's claimed that the 'spirit' begins at conception, then there is a problem explaining the origins of that.

Whatever the origins, it would seem logical that a 'spirit' beginning, would originate from a 'spirit' world.

Without a physical method of 'seeing' such a world, we are left with only the ability to 'imagine' one.

Again, an 'idea'.

But the concept of a god, or 'prime mover' also seems to hinge on the naked assertion that there is no infinite regress. There's a massive cognitive dissonance when humans try and conceptualize an infinite regress. It seems completely counterintuitive, as we do not see them in the physical world, except in mathematics and geometry.

So, there's a contradiction right there. We see infinite regress (or progress) in the abstract, yet, we have a mental barrier when we try and transpose that to the physical, natural world.

But, those can be seen as emotional stumbling blocks, as anyone in science and technology has experienced more than once, where something that should have worked as predicted, did not, and something that wasn't expected, occurred.

That can be 'troubling', emotionally. Frustrating. Maddening.

But, physics does what it does. It's not a democracy, and it does not care what we think, or want, or desire, or wish. Nature seems to be apathetic to individuals.

But, a god would 'care'.

That's without precedent.

But, he would be 'angry' as well.

Ya, no contradiction to the 'physical world' there....

Why are so many gods 'angry' and 'moody'.

Loving and angry.

No contradictions there.

Even though the ancient philosophers were ignorant on the physical world, there were some who evidently were quite capable of modeling and spatial reasoning. But, they also seemed to be too elastic in their modeling of attributes, that they were willing to factor into a god. They were simply doing something that had no precedent, except in their ideas.

So, in strictest terms, if one could 'conceptualize' a god, then, it could be possible, it could then be likely, if an entity was as they 'imagined' it would be. But, that would be a 'quantum leap' compared to anything they saw on earth, or in the sky.

Let's be honest. They didn't know the universe was expanding. They didn't know about space/time, as we theorize about it today. They didn't know about black holes. They didn't know that stars were actually distant suns, from other galaxies. They didn't know about planets outside our solar systems.

Let's be honest.

It's just an 'idea'.

Whether it appeals to our emotions, or not, is not relevant, as to the probability of whether one could exist, or not.

It's not logical to build a life adopting that 'idea' as an absolute. It's entirely an 'emotional' need.

But, given the complexity of the physical world, and the very real possibility of other dimensions, a single 'god' who created it all, is increasingly unlikely, IMO.

If we discover life (and more specifically, intelligent life, or more complex life than humans) on other planets, it will completely shatter the god delusion/myth.

The more I contemplate the possiblity of a monotheistic god, the less possible or probably one seems. I think the possiblity of a god, is inversely proportional to knowledge.

I also think the possibility of a god, is directly proportional to an individuals emotional needs.

I would say the idea of the classical monotheistic god is impossible. If one defines god as the source of all things you might have an existent thing. But there could be that Being and existence or separate sets with existence being a subset of Being. Being might be pure potentiality wherein its various possibilities actualize within Being which we call existence (they are relative and finite). That would offer a panentheisitic monistic god.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

It seems that what Mr.M's argument does do is exclude the 'possible' condition, in the Modal sense.

IOW, God either does not exist, or must exist ('cannot not exist').

Which is OK by me. So both the Theist and the strong Atheist position are consistent with his OA.

Yea that is what I have been saying. In the sense as Plantinga admits the modal structure and argument can be sound (valid) but that does not obtain real-world truth because he reverse of the argument (strong atheism)is valid. Let me ask you this. There is a meta-logic involved (to be a little Godel-ish). The arguments are composed from a logical contingency: God exists/ God does not exist. This is precursory to the working of the argument. The argument is to prove one are the other. To me the inclusion of necessity is similar to what one sees in literary criticism when the narrative world gets confused with the real world. A limitedless being only in idea (Anslems fool) (1) creates the idea of a god that exists in the real world is more perfect (2). We forget that (2) is only in idea as well. I still think that the idea of s5 and necessity is the weakness. The meta-logic already concedes the contingency. Hume said it better I guess. Can god be limited by the idea of otherness which ideally limits him with the contingency of whether he exits? Apparent from a likely easy epistemological yes is there not an ontological aspect in that god is limited in the sense that he is not obviously manifest. I know personally a quality of being a person is to have social intercourse with others. If I were not manifest to anyone I would lack that quality. If I were manifest only to one is that not less perfect than several. A perfect god should be at least manifest if existent?

Have there ever been any other applications of this specific method of thinking, or is it limited to attempted proofs for a deity?

It seems that what Mr.M's argument does do is exclude the 'possible' condition, in the Modal sense.

IOW, God either does not exist, or must exist ('cannot not exist').

Which is OK by me. So both the Theist and the strong Atheist position are consistent with his OA.

Yea that is what I have been saying. In the sense as Plantinga admits the modal structure and argument can be sound (valid) but that does not obtain real-world truth because he reverse of the argument (strong atheism)is valid. Let me ask you this. There is a meta-logic involved (to be a little Godel-ish). The arguments are composed from a logical contingency: God exists/ God does not exist. This is precursory to the working of the argument. The argument is to prove one are the other. To me the inclusion of necessity is similar to what one sees in literary criticism when the narrative world gets confused with the real world. A limitedless being only in idea (Anslems fool) (1) creates the idea of a god that exists in the real world is more perfect (2). We forget that (2) is only in idea as well. I still think that the idea of s5 and necessity is the weakness. The meta-logic already concedes the contingency. Hume said it better I guess. Can god be limited by the idea of otherness which ideally limits him with the contingency of whether he exits? Apparent from a likely easy epistemological yes is there not an ontological aspect in that god is limited in the sense that he is not obviously manifest. I know personally a quality of being a person is to have social intercourse with others. If I were not manifest to anyone I would lack that quality. If I were manifest only to one is that not less perfect than several. A perfect god should be at least manifest if existent?

Have there ever been any other applications of this specific method of thinking, or is it limited to attempted proofs for a deity?

Oh yea the contemporary stuff goes back to the very early 1900's and has been refined over the years. It is an extension of logic to allow possibility, probability and necessity in logical thought. Godel used modal logic to prove his incompleteness theorems. Wiki:

The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an "effective procedure" (essentially, a computer program) is capable of proving all facts about the natural numbers. For any such system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. The second incompleteness theorem shows that if such a system is also capable of proving certain basic facts about the natural numbers, then one particular arithmetic truth the system cannot prove is the consistency of the system itself.

TGBaker: Godel came out with the theorems right after Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead released there decade long endeavor Prinipicia Mathematica which was suppose to incompass all axioms. Blew them traight out of the water. I am unsure but beleive that Godel's Incompleteness theorems would really apply to logic as well.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Is the set of all sets which are not members of themselves a member of itself or not?

One simple implication: Is a being which creates reality a part of reality or not?

There are more.

EDIT:

Also just realized the fallacy of applying Lewis' axiom to the expression 'it is possible that God is necessary', as I used it. That use of the word 'possible', certainly as I used it, was an expression of incomplete knowledge of whether God was necessary or not, not of actual contingency, as would be relevant to the reduction of sequences of modal qualifiers, which is what Lewis was addressing.

It is that sort of semantic slippage which makes modal arguments so problematic.

Is the set of all sets which are not members of themselves a member of itself or not?

One simple implication: Is a being which creates reality a part of reality or not?

There are more.

Yea it does sounds a bit like Russell's monism. but not quite his paradox. Actually such an idea is that existence is simply differentiated Being (relativized) A panentheism would have being as the ground and existence within that being so not the paradox. Some recent catholic mystics have moved close to that idea(some excommunicated). I think that it would be more of a phenomenological langauge for a physics idea of a grand unified theory or Susskind's string theory where he created the holographic principle. The ground in that senario is a two dimensional event horizon that projects our 3 dimensional universe as the event horizon evaporates ( a conservation of information that was formulated to overcome Hawkings model of the black hole which eat matter contrary to the idea of conservation of energy/information). So the stuff I was spouting would be more of a philosophical parody. But to your final question that character (god) would not exist but would be real as a pure potentiality ( a big ass infinite wave function ). To put the parody aside some view that ground as pure mathematics which structures out as information. Obviously you could parody that "Being" as boundless mind a sort of panpsychism something that is apt to sneak into science if David Chalmers theory of consciousness wins out. he posits experience(information processing) as non-reducible and a fundamental law that if valid would need be added to the laws of physics. Ultimately that type of god would be morelike Einsteins ( a metaphor for a grand unified theory). As far as Russell's paradox Hofstader has utilized it to try and explain consciousness as self reference , a strange loop of infinite regress.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Is the set of all sets which are not members of themselves a member of itself or not?

One simple implication: Is a being which creates reality a part of reality or not?

There are more.

EDIT:

Also just realized the fallacy of applying Lewis' axiom to the expression 'it is possible that God is necessary', as I used it. That use of the word 'possible', certainly as I used it, was an expression of incomplete knowledge of whether God was necessary or not, not of actual contingency, as would be relevant to the reduction of sequences of modal qualifiers, which is what Lewis was addressing.

It is that sort of semantic slippage which makes modal arguments so problematic.

I appreciate also your edited addition. I am very skeptical about modal logic (not logic) apart from it as abbreviation for propositional language used. I think it can not capture possibility, probability and necessity as well as language which still can not capture it fully. I think when you look at the fact that one starts with a contingency as to whether god exits then a move to another contingency as to whether god exits necessarily and an unwarranted premise as to what unlimited being means. I think that if you say unlimited being you mean potentiality and not existence ...being. But then I think that numbers are real just non-existent. And no I am not trying to get Platonic. I agree with Wittgenstein that these problems are an error in our language usage and all philosophy does is not solve but dissolve problems at its best.

"You can't write a chord ugly enough to say what you want to say sometimes, so you have to rely on a giraffe filled with whip cream."--Frank Zappa

Also just realized the fallacy of applying Lewis' axiom to the expression 'it is possible that God is necessary', as I used it. That use of the word 'possible', certainly as I used it, was an expression of incomplete knowledge of whether God was necessary or not, not of actual contingency, as would be relevant to the reduction of sequences of modal qualifiers, which is what Lewis was addressing.

It is that sort of semantic slippage which makes modal arguments so problematic.

I know for myself, whenever someone starts to speculate on things I don't know, and they come to a part I don't know, I stop them, and go 'huh'? 'What?'.

I think it's my intuition that does that.

I don't take anything for granted.

Until recently, I never heard these convoluted 'arguments'. Even the 'objective morals', and 'who's the designer?' arguments.

Those are both 'WTF are you talking about?' things, to me.

I also work a lot on projects with robotics and electronic circuits (PLC controls, power supplies, softwares etc...), and see a lot of schematics during prototypes that *cough* has to work in reality, because it's 'logical' (look at the schematic, it says that it'll work!) but blows up as soon as you put power on it, or overheats, or hysteresis occurs under varying frequency and loads, etc...

Modal logic can sometimes do no better than get you in the ballpark.

Hindsight is the only thing that's 20/20.

These Modal Logic Ninjas seem to be unfamiliar with the term, or concept of 'False Positive'.

Arrogant dimwits...

I keep asking myself " Are they just playin' stupid, or are they just plain stupid?..."

"To explain the unknown by the known is a logical procedure; to explain the known by the unknown is a form of theological lunacy" : David Brooks

" Only on the subject of God can smart people still imagine that they reap the fruits of human intelligence even as they plow them under." : Sam Harris