Editorial Note

The eight letters exchanged by John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes between 13 and
29 July provide a resounding climax to Adams' diplomatic efforts at Paris in 1780.
Together they constitute one of the most controversial episodes in John Adams' diplomatic
career and reveal much about his views of both the Franco-American alliance and negotiations
with Great Britain.

The controversy played out in July superficially resembles the dispute in June over
Congress' revaluation of the currency, but the two episodes differ in both origin
and significance. Ultimately, Adams' opposition to Vergennes' demand that the revaluation
be modified in favor of Frenchmen won him a commendation from Congress. The positions
of Adams and Vergennes in regard to the revaluation were irreconcilable, but their
letters in June did not raise fundamental questions about the viability of the Franco-American
alliance. The situation in July was quite different, for then, with no apparent provocation,
Adams initiated a correspondence over the nature and adequacy of French aid, and the
exercise of his commissions to negotiate Anglo-American peace and commercial treaties.
The exchange left no doubt that Adams saw a sharp divergence between the objectives
of France and the United States in continuing the war and concluding a peace.

The confrontation opened with John Adams' letter of 13 July (below) on a topic that had concerned him for a long time: French assistance to the
United States, particularly the disposition of French naval forces in American waters.
The American Commissioners' letter to Vergennes of [ante 9 January 1779] (vol. 7:305–311) on the subject had been largely Adams' work and he had discussed
the issue at considerable length in letters written after his return to America in
1779. But he had not raised the issue in any previous letter to Vergennes in 1780.

Adams' letter of the 13th indicated his belief that, while the naval dimension held
the key to victory, France lacked a viable strategy for winning the naval war against
Britain. In eighteen manuscript pages Adams sought to remedy the situation and to
provide France with a plan that would make the most effective use of the resources
committed. In his reply of 20 July (below), Vergennes did not deal directly with the substantive issues raised by Adams,
but rather reassured him that France was doing all in its power to bring about victory
and that statements to the contrary were false and served only to open divisions between
the allies. In his letter of the 21st (below), Adams seemed to accept Vergennes' reassurances, but on the 27th (below) he reopened the matter with renewed vigor, declaring that the fleet under
Ternay's command at Rhode Island was insufficient to achieve naval { 517 } superiority and thus could not decisively affect Britain's prosecution of the war.

John Adams' comments regarding French aid were divisive because they raised an issue
that plagues all wartime alliances, namely the magnitude and effectiveness of each
ally's contribution to final victory. In view of the situation that existed in the
American theater of operations, Adams' criticism of French policy had merit, but it
was, at the very least, impolitic, coming as it did from a person with no official
diplomatic status in France and directed toward the only nation willing to give any
form of aid to the United States. Although Adams' unsolicited criticism may have angered
Vergennes, it could be and was ignored, for Adams had no power to impose his views
on France.

John Adams' letter of 17 July (below), however, was far more disturbing to Vergennes because Adams proposed to
take direct action under the terms of his commissions. Adams' exercise of his plenipotentiary
powers had been discussed, and apparently settled, in letters exchanged with Vergennes
in February and March, but in his letter of the 17th, Adams reopened the issue. He denied the validity of Vergennes' reasoning, in his
letter of 24 February (vol. 8:362–363), in prohibiting him from officially notifying the British government
of his presence with powers to negotiate Anglo-American peace and commercial treaties.
Not only was Vergennes' position wrong, Adams argued, it was in direct opposition
to American interests. Adams believed that disclosure would force the British government
to clarify its position on negotiations, encourage those in Great Britain who wanted
peace, dispel rumors that France enjoyed exclusive privileges under the Franco-American
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and take advantage of the forces that were tearing at
the fabric of British society. Moreover, Adams saw little difference between what
Spain was doing in its negotiations with Richard Cumberland and what he proposed.

The arrival of John Adams' letter provoked in Vergennes an anger that was as intense
as it was understandable. The letter was a monument to ingratitude at the very moment
that a French fleet and army were arriving in America, the dispatch of which constituted
the single most costly endeavor yet undertaken by France in the war. Moreover, Adams'
proposal to explore possible peace negotiations came as Spain appeared to waver in
its commitment to the war, thus raising the specter of France, abandoned by its allies,
fighting Britain alone. The depth of Vergennes' concern is evident from his lengthy
reply of 25 July (below) in which he undertook a point by point rebuttal of the issues raised in the
letter of the 17th, making it clear that he believed Adams' reasoning to be both absurd
and dangerous.

If Vergennes believed that his letter would end the discussion, he was disappointed,
for Adams continued it in his letter of 26 July (below). In a gesture to Vergennes, Adams indicated that he would place the matter
before Congress and await its instructions before taking any action. But he also declared
that the American people were unwilling to continue the war indefinitely in pursuit
of objectives of concern only to France. At some point { 518 } there would be pressure for peace and it was the anticipation of this that Adams believed
justified the proposals made in his letter of the 17th. The conflict ended three days
later with Vergennes' letter of 29 July (below), in which he declared that he would have no further correspondence with John
Adams on matters concerning Franco-American relations, but by then Adams had already
left Paris for Amsterdam.

The central question concerning the exchange between John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes
in July is why did it occur? One element in Adams' decision to confront Vergennes
may have been his impending departure for the Netherlands. Such a conclusion is supported
by his letters of 26 and 27 July (both below), which do resemble the parting shots of a man who planned no further
dealings with the French foreign minister. When the debate opened on 13 July, however,
there was no sign that Adams planned anything more than the brief visit to the Netherlands
that he had contemplated since early March and of which he had informed Vergennes
earlier in July (to Edmund Jenings, 12 March; to Vergennes, 2 July, note 1, both above; to the president of Congress, 23 July, No. 99, and note 2, below). Moreover, only on 12 September did Adams indicate his plan to reside permanently
at Amsterdam (to Francis Dana, 12 Sept., below). It seems unlikely, therefore, that his decision to visit the Netherlands
was Adams' only or even his principal reason for confronting Vergennes in July.

Of more significance in provoking the exchange was Adams' effort, also undertaken
in June and July, to persuade the British people and their government that Britain's
interests required an immediate peace. Adams' peace initiative proceeded from his
reading of Thomas Pownall's Memorial and Adams' letters to Vergennes in July show the influence of the Memorial. Moreover, in their use of Pownall's arguments, the letters parallel Adams' answer
to Joseph Galloway's Cool Thoughts, leading to the conclusion that Adams may have come to see Vergennes' opposition
to direct Anglo-American negotiations in much the same light as he saw Galloway's.
It was no coincidence, therefore, that Adams' debate with Vergennes over the sufficiency
of French aid and the exercise of his plenipotentiary powers began at almost the same
time he sent Edmund Jenings the manuscripts of his Translation of Pownall's Memorial and his answer to Galloway.

The content of the letters to Vergennes was determined by Adams' desire that his peace
initiative be more than a private, literary undertaking, which required that questions
concerning French aid and Adams' exercise of his powers be settled. Peace negotiations
were unlikely so long as the war remained a stalemate, a situation that Adams believed
would continue until France provided additional aid and deployed its military and
naval forces more effectively in the American theater of operations. Adams was also
aware that he could not undertake official negotiations without at least the tacit
support of his French ally. It seems clear, therefore, that Adams' decision to confront
Vergennes in July was due largely to his determination to make one final attempt to
create the conditions under which his peace initiative might succeed.

Whatever John Adams intended, the issues raised in his correspondence with Vergennes
did not disappear, but were referred to Congress for its consideration. Although Adams
had agreed, in his letter of 26 July, to send the correspondence to Congress, Vergennes was not disposed to rely on Adams'
promise. On 31 July Vergennes wrote to Benjamin Franklin and requested that he send
the enclosed correspondence to Congress. He declared that Franklin would discover
in Adams' letters “opinions and a turn which do not correspond either with the manner
in which I explained myself to him or with the intimate connection which subsists
between the king and the United States.” By seeing the letters Congress could determine
whether Adams had “that conciliating spirit which is necessary for the important and
delicate business with which he is intrusted” (Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev., 4:18–19).

Franklin wrote to the president of Congress on 9 August. There he noted both the offense
given Vergennes and the French court by Adams' letters and Vergennes' refusal to correspond
further with him. Citing the inherent difficulties in having two ministers at the
same court with different views regarding the proper conduct of business, Franklin
observed that Louis XVI should be encouraged to reflect on his “generous benevolence
. . . by our thankful acknowledgments, and that such an expression of gratitude is
not only our duty, but our interest.” John Adams, however, thought that more “stoutness
and a greater air of independence and boldness in our demands will procure us more
ample assistance” (same, 4:22–23). But Franklin may have been uncomfortable in the
role assigned him by Vergennes, for in a letter to Adams of 8 October (below), he indicated that he had not yet sent off the copies of the July letters
and suggested that Adams might be able to rectify the situation by apologizing to
the foreign minister. Adams did not follow Franklin's advice.

Benjamin Franklin's letter of 9 August, together with the enclosed correspondence,
reached Philadelphia on 19 February 1781 (JCC, 19:174), but by then Congress had already reacted to copies sent at Adams' direction.
On 26 December, the correspondence reached Congress as enclosures in Francis Dana's
letter of 24 August, and a committee was immediately appointed to consider Adams'
letters of 17 and 26 July and Vergennes' of the 25th (same, 18:1194). On 10 January 1781 the committee reported out a draft letter to
John Adams which Congress promptly adopted and sent under that date (same, 19:41–42). The letter stated that Congress assumed that Adams' letters to
Vergennes concerning the communication of his commissions flowed from his zeal, but
that it believed that Vergennes' objections to such an undertaking were “well founded.”
Adams was advised to be more circumspect in regard to his evaluations of the prospects
for peace derived from his analysis of the vagaries of British politics and society.

The multiple copies of the Adams-Vergennes correspondence sent to Congress can be
confusing. Individual items, although numbered, were not kept with their covering
letters or distributed in a consistent way through the Papers of the Continental Congress
(see PCC, No. 84, II and Misc. { 520 } Papers, Reel No. 1). Moreover, Vergennes sent Franklin the recipient's copies of John
Adams' letters so that, instead of being in the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry,
they are in the Papers of the Continental Congress, and it is from that source that
the copies printed in this volume are taken.

Docno: ADMS-06-09-02-0309-0002

Author: Adams, John

Recipient: Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de

Date: 1780-07-13

To the Comte de Vergennes

By the Treaty of Alliance of the sixth of February2 1778, his Majesty and the United States agreed, in Case of War, to join their Councils
and Efforts against the Enterprises of the common Enemy: to make it a common Cause,
and aid each other mutually with their good Offices, their Councils and their Forces,
according to the Exigences of Conjunctures, and each of the contracting Parties, in
the manner it may judge most proper, is to make all the Efforts in its Power against
the common Enemy.3

I have cited these Clauses from the Treaty, not as foundations of any demand, that
I have to make, because they are neither proper to support any demand, nor have I
Authority to make any if they were: but as an Apology for the Liberty I take of requesting
your Excellency's Attention to a few Observations upon the present Conjuncture of
Affairs.

It is certain from the best Intelligence from London, as well as from the debates
in Parliament on the several Motions which have been made for a pacification, that
the British Ministry are inflexibly determined to pursue the War another Campaign
in America, to send more Troops and Ships there, if they possibly can obtain them,
and to put to the hazard not only, the national Credit, but their maritime Power,
and even their political Existence, rather than give up their designs of domination
over America; and indeed this is not at all to be wondered at, that the Ministers
and the Nation, who have so far lost their Justice, their Humanity and Policy, as
to deliberately form and pursue the plan of4 changing the foundations of the Laws and Government of thirteen Colonies, and reducing
them to Slavery; and who have pursued this object with such sanguinary Fury for so
many Years, should persist so as to bury themselves in the Ruins of the Empire, rather
than fail of their purpose, when it is plain they consider, and, that not without
Reason, the same Ruin in the Independence of America and her Connections with France.

The Conduct of Monsieur Le Comte de Guichen; on the seventeenth of April, and the
fifteenth and nineteenth of May, in the West { 521 } Indies,5 does great honor to the national Bravery, as well as their Science in naval Tacticks,
and shews that there is no Cause to fear that the Enemy will obtain any Advantage
there. Yet nothing has yet been done on either Side that seems decisive.

The Advantages which Spain has gained in West Florida, and particularly of late at
Mobile, and the probability that they will succeed in acquiring both the Floridas,
shews that the English are on the losing hand in that quarter: but it is not the loss
of both the Floridas, nor of all their West India Islands, in my Opinion, that will
induce them to make Peace, and acknowledge the Independence of America in Alliance
with France. They will see every posession they have beyond their Island lopped off,
one after another, before they will do this.

I pretend not to know, to what part of America Monsieur de Ternay, and Monsieur de
Rochambeau are destined; but to whatever part it is, whether Canada, Nova Scotia,
New York, Carolina or Georgia, I have no hopes of any thing decisive from their Operations,
altho' they should be instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should
be destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed: but this success will
not be decisive. If they are intended against New York, I have no hopes of their Success.
The Naval Force is not sufficient to command the Seas. Admiral Graves, added to the
Ships before at New York, will be superiour; and I shall venture to give my Opinion
that without a Superiority of naval Force, clear and indisputable,6 New York will never be taken. It is so situated, it is so fortified, it is garrisoned
with Troops so accustomed to War, and so imbittered and inflamed by cruel passions
carefully nursed up in their Breasts by their King and their Generals, and it is universally
regarded by them a Post of such essential Importance, that I confess I should dispair
of Success against it, with an Army twice as numerous as that of the Generals Washington
and Rochambeau united, while the English are Masters of the Seas, or even while they
have there an Equality of naval Power.

Most People in Europe have wondered at the Inactivity of the American Army for these
two Years past, but it is merely from Want of Knowledge or Attention. The true Cause
of it is; the English have confined themselves to their strong holds in Sea port Towns,
and have been sheltered from all Attacks and Insults there by the Guns of their Men
of War, and forever will be so, while they have the Superiority at Sea. If our Army
had been three times as numerous as it was, it must have remained inactive, without
a Fleet to co-operate with it; { 522 } for an Attack upon New York, without a Fleet, would have been only sacrificing the
Lives of thousands of brave Men, without a possibility of succeeding.

Had the English two Years ago marched into the Country from Philadelphia, instead
of retreating7 back with precipitation to New York, Europe would have heard more of the Exertions
of the American Army: so much more, that in my serious Opinion, You would have heard
of its total destruction.8 As it was, they were closely pursued, attacked, and if not beaten, yet they had much
the worst of the Action;9 for besides their loss in killed, wounded, and in those who perished under the fatigue
and heat of the day, not less than five hundred deserted from them and their desertions
would have multiplied in every unsuccessful Engagement within the Country. If the
last Year the British Army10 had marched out into the Country, instead of remaining under Cover of their Men of
War, I am equally clear that they would have been ruined.11 The English ever since the Alliance have been fearfully apprehensive of an Attack
upon their strong holds on the Sea Coast by the French. This it was induced them to
retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them almost wholly confined
to that Garrison, the last Year.

I mention this, merely to wipe off the Imputation said to result from the Inactivity
of our Army, since the Alliance, by shewing the true Cause of it; that it proceeds
not from any Change of Sentiment in the Americans, but from the Change of the mode
of prosecuting the War on the part of our Enemies.12

I am, however, clearly of Opinion, and I know it to be the general Sense of America,
that the English, both in North America and the West India Islands, have been for
these Two Years past absolutely in the Power of their Enemies, and that they are so
now, and will continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but
attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the Forces of the Allies,
to accomplish the entire Reduction of their Power in America. In order to shew this,
let me beg your Excellency's Attention to a few Remarks upon the Situation of the
English; and upon the Method of applying the force of the Allies so as to reduce them.

The English are in possession of Canada, a Province vastly extensive, and in which
there is a great Number of Posts, at a great distance from each other, necessary to
be maintained among a People too, who are by no means attached to them, but who would
readily afford all the Assistance in their Power to the united forces of France and
of the United States, and who would join them in considerable { 523 } Numbers. In this whole Province, the English have not, comprehending the Garrisons
of all their Posts, more than four thousand Men.

The English are in possession of Nova Scotia. They have in Hallifax and the other
Parts of the Province, and at Penobscot about three thousand Men. But the People of
this Province, being descendants and Emigrants from New England chiefly, are discontented
with British Government, and desirous of joining the United States.

They are in Possession of New York Island, Long Island and Staten Island, where they
have in all of regular British Troops, perhaps[]13 Thousand Men. The Militia and Volunteers &c., of whom they make such an ostentatious
display in the dispatches of their Generals, and in the Gazette of St. James's, are
of very little Consideration. Their Numbers are much exaggerated. It is Force, and
Fear and Policy, that enrolls the greatest part of them.14 There are perhaps fifteen thousand Inhabitants of the City. These, together with
the Army and Navy, are fed and supplied with provisions and stores and fuel, and their
Cattle and Horses with forage brought by Sea from Quebec, Hallifax, Ireland, and the
West India Islands, except the small Quantity which they draw from Long Island and
Staten Island.

They are now in Possession of Charlestown in South Carolina and Savannah in Georgia.
Their Armies and Navies in these places, as well as the Inhabitants, must be chiefly
supplied by Sea in the same manner.

They are still perhaps in possession of St. Augustine in East Florida and Pensacola
in the West. From these places they have drawn of late Years great supplies of Lumber
and Provisions for their West India Islands. The Number of Troops in Georgia and Carolina
may amount to[]15 Thousands.

They are in Possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Christophers, and St. Lucie
and other Islands. These draw Supplies of Provisions and Lumber &c., from Quebec,
Hallifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The Number of Troops
they have in each Island, I am not able to ascertain: but certainly they are not strong
in any of them. And the Climate in the West Indies and in Georgia and Carolina, is
making a rapid Consumption of their Men.

From this Sketch it will be easily seen, what a great Number of Posts they have to
sustain, how these are mutually connected with and dependent on each other, and that
their Existence in all of them depends upon their Superiority at Sea, and that to
carry on the Intercourse and Communication between these various places, a vast Number
of Transports, Provision Vessels and Merchant Ships, are { 524 } necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English Nation has now little Navigation
left but what is employed in maintaining the Communication of these places with one
another and with Europe. Here then it is that the English Commerce and Navy is vulnerable,
and this it is which clearly points out to their Enemies, the only sure and certain
Way of reducing their Power in that quarter of the World; and if it is reduced there,
it is brought into a narrow Compass every where.

The Policy and Necessity of keeping always a superiour Fleet both in the West India
Islands and on the Coast of the Continent of North America, is from all this very
obvious. The English are so sensible of this, that they dread it as the greatest Evil
that can befal them. The Appearance of the Count D'Estaing upon the Coast of North
America never failed to throw the English into the utmost Terror and Consternation.16

The Appearance of a French Fleet upon our Coasts has repeatedly compelled, and ever
must compel the English to call off from their Cruises, all their Frigates, and other
Ships, and to assemble them at New York for their Security, and the defence of that
place. These are among the happy Effects of such a measure. The Communication of the
United States, not only with each other, but with the West Indies, with France, and
all other parts of Europe, with which they have any Concern, is immediately opened,
and they are thereby easily furnished, in all parts, with every thing fitting and
necessary to carry on the War with the greatest Vigour. His Majesty's Fleets and Armies
will be amply and much more cheaply supplied, and his Subjects will reap, in Common
with the Inhabitants of the United States, the benefits of this free Commerce. It
will give free Sea-Room to the few Frigates belonging to Congress, and the several
States, to cruise for the Merchant Ships, Provision Vessels and Transports of the
Enemy. It gives Opportunity also to the Privateers to do the same. There are at this
day, notwithstanding the dreadful Sacrifices made at Charlestown and Penobscot, Sacrifices
the Necessity of which would have been entirely prevented by a few ships of the line,17 the Continental Frigates, the Confederacy, which is arrived at Philadelphia, the
Alliance which will soon be there, the Trumbll, the Deane, the Bourbon, and also a
Ship of fifty six Guns, which is nearly ready for Sea. The State of Massachusetts
has two Frigates18 and several smaller Vessels. There are besides these now in being, belonging to Newbury
Port, Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Boston and Rhode Island about forty
Privateers. There are several belonging to Philadelphia. { 525 } If a French Fleet should constantly remain upon that Coast, the Number of these Privateers
would be doubled in a very few Months. What Havock then must these armed Vessels make,
especially if a few French Frigates should be also ordered to cruise for Prizes, among
the Provision Vessels, Merchant Ships and Transports passing and repassing to and
from America and the West Indies to Europe, and to and from America and the West Indies,
and to and from Quebec, Nova Scotia, New York, Charlestown, Savannah and the Floridas.
Such depredations have several Times been made by our Cruisers alone, as to reduce
the English at New York to very great distress: and it would be very easy to reduce
them in this Way, to such Misery, as to oblige them to surrender at discretion.

I therefore beg leave to submit it to your Excellency's Consideration, whether there
is any possible Way, that a Marine Force can be employed against the English, so much
to the advantage of France, and the disadvantage of England, as in this Way: and whether
upon the principles of French Interest and Policy alone, even without taking into
Consideration that of the United States, a Fleet ought not to be constantly kept in
North America. The Advantages they will there have, in Artists,19 Supplies, Accommodations &c. above the English are obvious.20

But the Question will arise, where shall they winter? I answer they may winter with
perfect Security and Advantage, either at Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware or Cheasapeak
Bay.

Another Question will arise, whether they should all winter together in one Port,
or be seperated to several Ports?

I apprehend, however, that it would be most prudent to leave it to the discretion
of the Commander in Chief of the Squadron, to keep the Squadron together, or to detach
parts of it, according to the Exigences of the Service, advising with Congress, or
with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, from time to time.

Two Ships of the Line with three Frigates stationed at Boston, with orders to cruise
occasionally for the protection of French and American Trade and the Annoyance of
the Enemy: the same Number at Rhode Island with the same Orders—the same Number at
Delaware River with similar Orders and a like Number in Cheasapeak Bay with like Orders,
which would make eight Ships of the Line and twelve Frigates, I have a moral Certainty
would in one Year reduce the Power of the English in North America to absolute Annihilation
without striking a Blow at Land. Those Ships would make a diversion of an equal Force
of the English from the West India Islands, so that they { 526 } would be in that respect as usefully employed for his Majesty there as any where.
Eight Ships of the Line and twelve Frigates stationed together at Rhode Island, with
Orders to cruise for the same purposes would do the same thing.

Which plan would be best I dare not undertake to say. But until further informed,
and instructed by Congress, I should think however, that the best plan would be to
station the Fleet for the Winter, either in Delaware, or Cheasapeak Bay: and as the
War has lately turned to the Southward, I am most inclined to think that Cheasapeak
Bay would be the most proper.

But, in all Events, I beg leave to intreat in the most earnest manner that a powerful
Fleet may be ordered to winter somewhere in North America. By this means I think there
is a moral Certainty that the English will be ruined there; whereas if Dependence
is had upon the Assault and Attack of their strong holds, without the most absolute
Command of the Sea, I fear it will end in Disappointment and Disgrace.21

There is the more urgent Reason for laying these Considerations before your Excellency,
because there is a proportion of the People in America, who wish to return to the
domination of Great Britain, many of whom are sensible and artful Men. They take Notice
of every Circumstance of the Conduct of France, and represent it in such a Light,
as they think will throw a prejudice against the Alliance into the Minds of the People.
They represent the Affair of Rhode Island and of Savannah and some other things, as
proofs that the Court of France do not mean to give any effectual Aid to America,
but only to play off her Strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust <her> both. The Refugees in England concur with them in these Representations, and the
Ministry, and the Members of Parliament in their public Speeches represent the same
thing. Even Mr. Hartley, who is more for Peace than any Man in that Kingdom, in a
printed Letter to the Inhabitants of the County of York, says, “it is our duty to
unravel by Negotiation, the Combination of Powers now acting against Us”: and he says
further in express Words, that “it is apparent to all the World, that France might
long ago have put an End to that part of the War, which has been most distressing
to America, if they had chosen so to do.” He must mean here the War of their Frigates
and Privateers upon our Trade. “Let the whole System of France be considered,” says
he, “from the beginning down to the late Retreat from Savannah, and I think it is
impossible to put any other Construction upon it, but this, viz, that it has always
been the deliberate { 527 } Intention and Object of France, for purposes of their own, to encourage the Continuation
of the War in America, in hopes of exhausting the Strength and Resources of this Country,
and of depressing the rising Power of America.”22 This is not only the Language of Mr. Hartley, but the general Language of Newspapers
and Pamphlets, and, I am well informed, of Conversation, in England. These are very
industriously sent to America, through various Channels which cannot be stopped, by
Laws, Art, or Power.

The body of the People have great Confidence in the sincerity of France; but if these
contrary Opinions should be suffered to gain ground, as they most assuredly will,
if something is not done to prevent it; when all the World sees and declares as they
do, that it is the best Policy of France, if She considered her own Interest alone
in the Conduct of the War, to keep a superiour naval Force upon the Coast of the Continent
of North America; I leave your Excellency to judge, what a melancholy effect it will
have upon our Affairs. There is no Event, in my Opinion, which would have so direct
a tendency to give force and extent to Opinions so dangerous to both Nations, as the
calling off from the Continent your Naval Force, during the Winter, and not keeping
a Superiority there through the Year. I scruple not to give it as my opinion, that
it will disunite, weaken and distress Us more than, We should have been disunited,
weakened or distressed, if the Alliance had never been made.

The United States of America are a great and powerful People, whatever European Statesmen
may think of them. If We take into our Estimate, the Numbers and Character of her
People, the Extent, Variety, and Fertility of her Soil, her Commerce, and her Skill
and Materials for Ship building, and her Seamen, excepting France, Spain, England,
the Emperor and Russia, there is not a State in Europe so powerful. Breaking off such
a Nation as this from the English so suddenly, and uniting it so closely with France,
is one of the most extraordinary Events that ever happened among Mankind. The prejudices
of Nations in favor of themselves and against all other Nations, which spring from
self-love, and are often nurtured by Policy for unworthy purposes, and which have
certainly been ever cultivated by the English with the utmost Care, in the Minds of
the Americans, as well as of the People of every other Part of their dominions, certainly
deserve the Attention of the wisest Statesmen, and as they are not to be eradicated
in a Moment, they require to be managed with some delicacy. It is too often said in
France, where the Prejudice against the English has not been fostered into so much
Rancour, { 528 } because France never had so much to fear from England, as England has from France,
That “the Americans and the English are the same thing,” not to make it appear that
there are some Remnants of Prejudices against Americans among the French: and it must
be confessed there are some in America against France. It is really astonishing however,
that there are so few, and it is the Interest and Duty of both, to lessen them as
fast as possible, and to avoid with the nicest Care every colourable Cause of reviving
any part of them.23

I beg your Excellency to excuse this Trouble, because the State of things in North
America, has really become alarming, and this merely for Want of a few French Men
of War upon that Coast, and to believe me to be, with the greatest Respect Sir, your
Excellency's most obedient and most humble Servant

[signed] John Adams

RC in John Thaxter's hand (PCC, Misc. Papers, Reel No. 1, f. 63–81); endorsed on the first page: “M. de R.,” “Rep.”; with an additional
notation: “No. 6.”; docketed by Congress: “N 6. John Adams to Ct Vergennes July 13th
1780.” For the presence of this copy in the PCC, see The Dispute with the Comte de Vergennes, 13–29 July, Editorial Note (above). LbC partly in John Thaxter's hand (Adams Papers). MS fragment (Adams Papers), filmed at 7 Feb. 1780 (Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 351).

1. This letter should be compared with earlier ones from the Commissioners to Vergennes,
[ante 20] Dec. 1778 – [ante 9] Jan. 1779, and from JA to the Marquis de Lafayette of 21 Feb. 1779 (vol. 7:292–311, 421–423); see also vol. 8:index, Adams, John: Military Interests,
Naval matters. JA sent a virtually identical copy of this letter, in Jonathan Loring Austin's hand,
to the Minister of Marine, Gabriel de Sartine (Arch. de la Marine, Paris, Campagnes B4, vol. 182), but no reply to that letter has been found.

2. In the Letterbook JA wrote “April,” which John Thaxter canceled and replaced with “Feby.”

3. This paragraph includes portions of the preamble, Art. I, and Art. III of the FrancoAmerican
Treaty of Alliance (Miller, ed., Treaties, 2:36, 37).

4. At this point in the Letterbook JA wrote and then canceled “enslaving.”

5. For the battle between Guichen and Rodney off Martinique on 17 April, see vol. 8:337, 360; and JA's letter of 14 May to John Bondfield, note 1 (above). For their encounters on 14 and 19 May, see Thomas Digges' letter of 29 June,
note 2 (above).

6. In the Letterbook the preceding three words are canceled and do not appear in the
letter sent to Sartine.

7. In the Letterbook, John Thaxter inserted this word in place of JA's “sulking.”

8. At this point in the Letterbook the letter “b” appears, indicating the corresponding
passage at the end of the Letterbook copy for insertion at this point. The inserted
passage comprised all of the following sentence. The insertions “b” through “e” are
in Thaxter's hand, but see note 21.

10. In the copy sent to Sartine, “British Army” was replaced by “Enemy.”

11. In the Letterbook the remainder of this paragraph reads “c. (Had it not been for the
Alliance between France and America however, there is every Reason to believe they
would have had the Presumption or desperation to have marched into the Country from
Philadelphia, in 1778 and from N. York in 1779. So that this Alliance, may be reasonably
conjectured to have been the Cause, why the Ennemy in the United States have not been
defeated.) <. . . by giving scope to our Privateers and more freedom to our Troops it has been
of great Advantage.> d.” The letter “c” indicates the passage at the end of the Letterbook copy that comprises
the following two sentences in the recipient's copy. It seems likely that originally
they were to be followed { 529 } by the two sentences that are enclosed in parentheses in the Letterbook, but which
were subsequently deleted.

12. The letter “d” indicates the passage at the end of the Letterbook copy that comprises
all of the following paragraph, but may originally have been intended to replace the
heavily canceled sentence in the Letterbook. In any event it seems likely that JA determined to insert passages “c” and “d” and to delete the final sentence before
he decided to delete the two sentences now set off in parentheses. Certainly the removal
of those two sentences was necessary if JA was not to be seen as echoing, explicitly rather than implicitly, the statements
of David Hartley regarding the Franco-American alliance and the continuation of the
war that he quotes later in the letter.

13. Left blank. In July 1780, the garrison at New York reportedly comprised 20,048 troops,
of which 14,285 were fit for duty (Mackesy, War for America, p. 346).

14. At this point in the Letterbook, set off in parentheses, presumably for deletion,
is the following passage: “The English themselves have So little Confidence in them,
that they exercise them in the day time, with only Pieces of Wood in their Musquets
for Flints, that they take their arms from them every night, and pile them up in the
magazines, and they never trust them with Powder and their officers have frequently
been heard to say, that the greatest Part of them ought to be in Prison.” JA's reason for deleting this passage is unknown, but for his previous use of this description
of the loyalist troops at New York, see “Letters from a Distinguished American,” [ante 14–22 July], No. II, below).

15. Left blank. In July 1780, the British reportedly had 8,439 troops in South Carolina
and Georgia, of which 6,129 were fit for duty (Mackesy, War for America, p. 346).

16. In the Letterbook the text continues “(Even the Appearance of the Kings Frigate the
Sensible in Boston Harbour, was some Protection to Us.)

“e. (The first Consequence of the Appearance of a french Fleet upon the Coast, is,
the English are obliged to call off from their Cruises all their Frigates and other
ships, and assemble them at New York in order to defend that.)”. The letter “e” indicates
the passage at the end of the Letterbook copy which comprises the first four sentences
of the following paragraph.

17. JA inserted the words “Sacrifices the Necessity . . . ships of the line.” The passage
does not appear in the letter sent to Sartine.

18. At this point in the Letterbook is the canceled passage “one frigate of 22 Guns the
Protector.” At the time of this letter Massachusetts had only two major warships,
the frigate Protector and the ship Mars (Charles O. Paullin, Navy of the American Revolution, Cleveland, 1906, p. 342).

19. At this point in the Letterbook is the canceled passage “protecting the French Trade,”
but see note 20.

20. In the Letterbook the paragraph continues “(The Protection they will afford to the
supplies to his Majestys fleets armies and subjects in his Colonies is equally obvious,
and to the Trade both of his subjects and allies.).”

21. The remainder of the Letterbook copy is in John Thaxter's hand and was copied from
a manuscript in JA's hand (see descriptive note), bearing the notation “f,” and consisting of four folio
pages, one and a quarter of which contain text. JA's designation of the manuscript as “f,” thus placing it in sequence with the other
textual insertions, may indicate that he originally intended to end the letter at
this point. The portion of the text copied from the manuscript is immediately followed
by the passages marked “b,” “c,” “d,” and “e,” which were intended for insertion in
the text. No character “a” or passage “a” has been found.

22. The quotations are from David Hartley's letter of 21 March 1780 that was published
in Two Letters from D. Hartley, Esq. M.P. Addressed to the Committee of the County of
York, London, 1780. For JA's earlier criticism of these statements, some of which he repeats here, see his letter
of 18 April to the president of Congress, No. 48 (above).

23. The manuscript ends at this point, but the closing paragraph is in the Letterbook.