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A Modern Introduction

Up-to-date, well-researched naval histories have an important part to play in understanding past events, but I would like to suggest they are equalled by contemporary accounts written not long after the stories they describe, and often by those who took part.

Such near-contemporary accounts include the five volumes of NAVAL OPERATIONS, the first three by Sir Julian S Corbett and the last two by Henry Newbolt. They remain in print, but are still not widely known, and being out-of-copyright, can be found on the internet.

They are indispensable to any researcher or scholar of World War 1 who wants to start to understand the vastness of the war at sea and the role of the Royal Navy and its Allies.

The naval war, 1914-18 is almost considered peripheral to the war as a whole, especially compared with the Western Front, yet in my opinion, World War 1 was just as much a maritime struggle as that of World War 2. If it had been lost to either the German High Seas Fleet or the later U-boat campaign, Allied victory would have been very much in doubt. Hence the value of these volumes.

Later editions of these volumes were updated and corrected. These changes have not been taken into account: hence the need to move onto later histories. Also any transcription and proofing errors are mine, including the lack of accents on mainly French and German names, for which my apologies.

Gordon Smith, Naval-History.Net

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

7. The Attack
on the Allied Landing Parties at Athens, December 1, 1916

8. First Operations
Against S.M.S. Moewe, December 10-31,
1916

9. Operations
Against the Moewe

10. Plan Illustrating
the Action in the Adriatic, May 15, 1917

11. The Submarine Campaign
in the Channel and Western Approaches

12. & 13 Will Be Included
in the Next Volume

14. Intercepting
Dispositions

PREFACE

The Naval History of the Great War suffered at
the end of 1922 an irreparable misfortune—the loss by death of its first
architect and builder, Sir Julian Corbett, a man not only of intellectual and
literary ability, but also of wide historical experience and balanced judgment.
It was evident that the task of his successor must necessarily be a hard one:
more than half the work remained to be done, and the qualities required were
not likely to be once more found in full combination. On the other hand,
the risk of failure was slightly lessened by two circumstances. First, the
continuator would have the advantage of inheriting the system built up by his
predecessor, and the services of the Staff who had been trained by long years
of efficient and enthusiastic cooperation. The time has perhaps not yet come
to say more on this point, which well deserves to be amplified and illustrated;
but I cannot pass by without a tribute of admiration and gratitude the ten
years' work of the late Mr. H. G. A. Leveson, the archivist of the Historical
Section.

The second favourable circumstance was due to a
coincidence. Sir Julian's last volume closed with the close of the battle
of Jutland. Much remained to be said about that event, but the event itself had
been fully narrated: the first stage of the war had been brought to a definite
conclusion. The period of great naval operations in the old sense was over: the
remaining volumes of the History were to deal with a new kind of war, a naval
war on a vast scale, but conducted mainly by blockade and counter-blockade,
both unexampled in kind; and with a moral struggle in which the vital conflict
at sea was inseparably interwoven with a conflict of imponderable forces,
acting by intrigues and negotiations, national and international. The new
aspect would naturally call for some change or development of method, and the
contrast between the working of two minds might thus be fortunately obscured.

A glance at the contents of the present volume
will bear out what has been said. In the three opening chapters Sir Julian's
narrative is directly continued from June 1, 1916. As the mists of confusion
and misrepresentation clear away, the result of the battle of Jutland is
plainly seen - the British policy and position are confirmed, and an imperative
necessity is laid upon the German Government to abandon fleet action and go
forward on the line of U-boat development.

At this point we are reminded that the work
involved in the main struggle was not the sole call on our Navy: efforts were
necessary in all parts of the world, some incidental to the main policy, some
merely auxiliary to military operations on land: and some, again, carried on
jointly with Allied forces. In order to place the whole position in a clear
light it is necessary to bring up to date these secondary operations, and the
eight sections of Chapter IV have this purpose. They include the adventurous
story of the Tanganyika expedition - the smallest and most distant of the whole
war, and one of the most successful: the brilliant episode of our submarine
service in the Baltic: and the concluding scenes of the epic of the Serbian
Army.

Chapter V takes up the story of the
Mediterranean war, and endeavours to disentangle the threads of Anglo-French
policy in relation to the Kingdom of Greece. This chapter, though in some ways
unlike anything in the previous volumes, is written in full accord with the principle
laid down by Sir Julian Corbett in his first Preface - "to give an
intelligible view not only of the operations themselves but of their mutual
connection and meaning, the policy which dictated them, their relation to
military and diplomatic action, and the difficulties and cross-currents which
in some cases delayed their success and robbed them of their expected
results." The Greek affair is a marked example of the necessity for this
treatment.

In Chapter VI is related the story of the German
attempt to repeat the adventure of the Emden on a larger scale. It may be confidently assumed that no British reader will
withhold his admiration from the fine seamen who commanded the four Raiders, or
fail, on the other hand, to appreciate the vast and splendid Admiralty
organisation before which their effort died away into futility.

Chapter VII brings us to the true climax of the
war: we see, as we could not see before the publication of the German Official
Documents, the bare truth about the gambler's choice which the supremacy of the
British Fleet was certain to force, sooner or later, upon the Directors of the
German war policy. By the autumn of 1916 the conflict has defined itself as one
between the British and German systems of blockade: the British method is
unendurably effective, the German is effective but not, so far, unendurable. It
can be made so, in the opinion of the German admirals, but only by playing
"the last card " - unrestricted submarine warfare - and that will, in
the opinion of the German statesmen, bring into play the long-restrained
hostility of America. The story of the fatal decision is highly dramatic, but
it has an interest still higher. It exposes the intrinsic unfitness of the
German Imperial system for directing the policy and conduct of a hardly
contested war. The chapter ends with the entry of America into the struggle.

Chapters VIII and IX complete and sum up the
account of the submarine and anti-submarine war in the Mediterranean and in
Home Waters during the earlier part of 1917. The volume ends at a moment which
appeared at the time to be the most dangerous and perplexing in our history:
the reckless progress of the final German effort had brought us much nearer to
privation than we had ever thought to be. The situation is dramatically one of
extreme tension; but every reader of our narrative will know already that in
our next volume we shall see one of the traditional methods of the British Navy
adapted to meet the new crisis with complete and final success.

I am glad to offer my cordial thanks to Admiral
von Mantey the Director of the Marine-Archiv in Berlin, who has kindly supplied
me with a great deal of information about the movements of German naval forces
employed in operations described in this volume.

Henry Newbolt.

August 1928.

CHAPTER 1

AFTER JUTLAND

Admiral Jellicoe's Battle Fleet
(1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons) with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
the 11th and 12th Destroyer Flotillas, and part of the 4th Flotilla, arrived at
Scapa between 10.30 a.m. and noon on June 2.1 At 9.45 p.m. Admiral Jellicoe
reported to the Admiralty that the Grand Fleet was at its base, re‑fuelled,
with steam at four hours' notice, and ready for sea. In reply to an inquiry,
Admiral Beatty reported at 11.20 p.m. on June 8 that three of his ships, the New Zealand, Indomitable and Inflexible,
were ready for action, and three others, the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal, were available for
action if necessary.

The result of the Jutland action
may be summed up as follows from the purely strategical point of view:

The
2nd Cruiser Squadron with the Duke of
Edinburgh (1st Cruiser Squadron) remained at sea searching for disabled
ships, and reached Scapa on the afternoon of June 3. Other ships came as
follows: the Marlborough (1st Battle
Squadron) arrived in the Humber at 8 a.m. on June 2, and the Warspite was already at Rosyth by 3 p.m.
on June 1; the Barham proceeded to
Devonport and the Malaya to Cromarty
for repairs on the 3rd.

The Nonsuch (12th Destroyer Flotilla) with
the Unity and Acasta arrived at Aberdeen in the evening of June 2, the Acasta in tow by the Nonsuch. The Defender arrived at Aberdeen at I p.m. on the 2nd with the Onslow (13th Destroyer Flotilla) in tow.
The Porpoise, Contest, Garland and Spitfire (4th Destroyer Flotilla)
arrived in the Tyne on June 2, and the Broke at 6 p.m. on the 3rd. The Christopher (4th Destroyer Flotilla) and the light cruisers Active and Constance, who
were detached on the 2nd to look for the Broke,
returned on June 3 to Rosyth and Scapa.

The
Battle Cruiser Fleet (1st, 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons) arrived at
Rosyth on the morning of June 2. The Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal had received twelve, ten and six hits respectively,
but did not dock for repairs until a week later. The Australia, which had not been in the action, arrived from Devonport
on the 3rd and rejoined her squadron on the 10th. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light
Cruiser Squadrons arrived at Rosyth on the morning of the 2nd, but without the Chester (3rd Light Cruiser Squadron),
which had gone into the Humber for repairs on the 1st, and the Southampton (2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron), which had been obliged to heave to and plug the shell holes in the
waterline. The Birmingham had
remained in company, and they both arrived in Rosyth about 12 hours after the
remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The Southampton was taken into the dockyard a few hours after her arrival in harbour. The 1st
and 13th Flotillas with attached destroyers arrived at Rosyth on the morning of
June 2. The Onslow and Petard (13th Destroyer Flotilla)
proceeded to Aberdeen and Leith for repairs.

Admiral Scheer had failed in his
object of cutting off and overwhelming part of our advanced forces, and
had found himself unexpectedly entrapped into meeting the Grand Fleet. From
this encounter he had succeeded in extricating himself at considerable expense,
but, on the other hand, both before and after the main action he had inflicted
upon us more serious losses than he could ever have contemplated. Admiral Jellicoe had outmanoeuvred and surprised the High Seas Fleet, and for him the
net result of the action had been to increase the Grand Fleet's large margin of
superiority as a combative force, a defence against invasion, and an instrument
of blockade. The control of the North Sea remained in our hands, and any
expectation that this control might be weakened or taken from us had been
finally dissipated. Merchant vessels which before the battle had been lying up
in various ports put to sea on June 2 without hesitation.

It was not, however, from the
purely strategical or the purely practical point of view that a general action
between the two great fleets could at the moment be judged by the British or
the German nations. On the one side, an empire founded and sustained by naval
power and for a century accustomed to rely upon a well‑proved maritime
supremacy had been looking eagerly for a decisive encounter which would mark a
turning‑point in the war, and give the world a spectacular proof of its
superiority at sea. On the other side, a people with no experience of naval war
and no accurate judgment of the value of its untried weapon was moved by the
conflicting emotions of ambition and apprehension. A second Trafalgar, an
overwhelming and destructive British victory, was, among the several possible
results, the only one which could not have surprised either side; what actually
happened was unexpected by both. There is evidence that in the German navy, in
spite of its high fighting spirit, the severe injuries received and the obvious
necessity of retiring from close action caused a certain amount of dismay, but
it would appear that, among the officers at any rate, the most marked feeling
was one of relief and enthusiastic congratulation at having met the Grand
Fleet and escaped without suffering something like complete destruction. It
must also be remembered that the amount of guidance given to public

June 2, 1916

THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE

opinion in the two countries
differed very greatly both in skill and thoroughness. The methods of censorship
and propaganda were practised by the Germans with premeditation and
mechanical efficiency; by the British rather as an afterthought, and
always with an instinctive feeling that candour would in the long run prove to
be the most effective of psychological influences. This difference was well
illustrated on the one side by the saying of Admiral von Holtzendorff that
"in life it is not things as they are which decide, but the images people
make of them. Whether Great Britain's naval predominance remains or not depends
on what the rest of the world outside of Germany thinks on the matter on the
last day of the world war." On the other side, no better example can be
chosen than the first announcement of the battle of Jutland written by the First
Lord of the Admiralty and issued to the Press on the evening of June 2, 1916.
It ran as follows:‑

"
On the afternoon of Wednesday May 31, a naval engagement took place off
the coast of Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell
were the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and some cruisers and light cruisers supported
by four fast battleships. Among those the losses were heavy. The German battlefleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main
forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene, the enemy returned to port,
though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships. The Battle
Cruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible,
and the Cruisers Defence and Black Prince were sunk. The Warrior was disabled, and after being
towed for some time, had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the
destroyers Tipperary, Turbulent, Fortune,
Sparrowhawk and Ardent were lost,
and six others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light
cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle
cruiser was destroyed, and one severely damaged; one battleship reported
sunk by our destroyers during a night attack, two light cruisers were disabled
and probably sunk. The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the
action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been
large."

Looking back from a position of
complete knowledge and with the whole course of the war far behind us, we can
now distinguish the merits of this announcement and the single point upon which
it was disappointing. It was candid, accurate and restrained, and these are
qualities upon which our people specially pride themselves. Yet it caused
dismay and even indignation, because, while it said not a word that could ever
be regretted, it did nothing to meet the immediate need of the nation. It
disappointed high hopes without offering instead any estimate of the measure of
success gained, or giving any guidance to the public as to the resulting
naval position or the probable future course of the war at sea. It was, in
short, designed as a first instalment of news, to be followed by further
information when available, and by an appreciation when all should be known. To
adopt so scientific a method at so sensational a moment was a proof of extreme
confidence in the stability and good sense of our people; the stability was
apparent from the first, as in all the disappointments of the war, but the good
sense took time and some rather ill‑co‑ordinated efforts to
establish itself.

This was partly due to the
difficulty of ascertaining the details of the fighting and of the losses
incurred on each side. The British Admiralty, only six hours after their first
statement, issued a later report in which they substantially corrected the
list of our destroyer casualties, but also claimed that three German capital
ships had been sunk instead of two. This was substantially true, for besides
the Pommern and the Luetzow, the Seydlitz had in fact sunk in shallow water on the way home, and was
only raised and towed in some days later. But the German Admiralty were ahead
of us both in time and enterprise. Their Official Report, dated June 1, and
published on the 2nd, was received in neutral countries and commented on in the
Press at least a whole day before any news arrived from English sources. It ran
as follows:

"During
an enterprise directed northward our High Seas Fleet encountered on May 31 the
main part of the English fighting Fleet, which was considerably superior to our
own forces. During the afternoon a series of heavy engagements developed
between Skagerrak and Horn Reefs, which were successful for us and which also
continued during the whole of the night. In these engagements, as far as is
known up to the present, were destroyed by us the large battleship Warspite, the battle cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable, two armoured cruisers apparently of the Achilles type, one small cruiser, the
new flagships of the destroyer squadrons, the Turbulent, Nestor and Acasta,
a large number of Torpedo-Boat destroyers and one submarine.

June 2, 1916

THE GERMAN COMMUNIQUE

By
observations, which are free from any objections, it was stated that a large
number of English battleships suffered damage from our ships' artillery and
from the attacks of our Torpedo-Boat flotillas during the day and night
engagements. Among others, the large battleship Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, as has been confirmed by
prisoners. Several of our ships rescued portions of the crews of the sunk English
ships, among whom were only two survivors of the Indefatigable. On our side the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by hostile artillery fire during the day
engagements, and the Pommern during
the night by a torpedo. The fate of the Frauenlob,
which is missing, and of some Torpedo-Boats which have not yet returned, is
unknown. The High Seas Fleet returned to our ports during the day."

Both the overestimates and the
omissions in this document are notable. We had lost no large battleship,
no light cruiser, nor had any English battleships been damaged by German
gunfire, except three of the advanced squadron with Admiral Beatty. But we all
know how difficult it is to obtain trustworthy evidence on such occasions: it
was the deliberate concealments which differentiated this report from the
British one. On their own side, the German Admiralty only admitted the loss of
the Pommern and the Wiesbaden; they added that the Frauenlob and some destroyers had not
returned, but said nothing of the grounding of the Seydlitz nor of the destruction of the Elbing and the Rostock,
light cruisers, and the Luetzow,
battle cruiser, all three of which they had been compelled to abandon and sink
themselves. This omission obviously cannot have been due to lack of
information: it was made deliberately, on the principle that what the enemy's
eye hath not seen, his heart cannot rejoice over. The effect, however, was in
the end unfavourable, as we shall see presently. British newspaper comment
on the Official Reports was at first little but a chorus of disappointment, to
which the more responsible voices added a note of consolation here and there.
The Times hoped that the German losses would be found to balance ours; the
Morning Post and Daily Telegraph pointed to the. retreat of the enemy, and
concluded that our battle cruisers had suffered because, while operating ahead
of the main squadron, they had for a time been in action with the whole of the
High Seas Fleet. This view was also taken by the naval correspondent of the
Westminster Gazette the same evening, and by Sunday morning it was generally
accepted by the press‑reading public.

On Monday, June 5, the British
Admiralty issued a new report which ran as follows:

"To
Press Bureau for publication, 9 p.m. ‑ Until the C.in‑C. has had
time to consult the officers engaged, and to write a full despatch, any attempt
to give a detailed history of the naval engagement which began on afternoon of
May 31 and ended in morning hours of June 1, would evidently be premature. But
the results are quite plain. The Grand Fleet came in touch with the German High
Seas Fleet at 3.30 on the afternoon of May 31. The leading ships of the two
fleets carried on a vigorous fight, in which battle cruisers, fast battleships
and subsidiary craft all took an active part. The losses were severe on both
sides; but when the main body of the British fleet came into contact with the
German High Seas Fleet, a very brief period sufficed to compel the latter, who
had been severely punished, to seek refuge in their protected waters. This
manoeuvre was rendered possible by low visibility and mist: and although the
Grand Fleet were now and then able to get into momentary contact with their
opponents, no continuous action was possible.

They
continued the pursuit until the light had wholly failed; when the British
destroyers were able to make a successful attack upon the enemy during the
night. Meanwhile, Sir John Jellicoe, having driven the enemy into port,
returned to the main scene of action, and scoured the sea in search of disabled
vessels. By noon the next day (June 1) it became evident that there was nothing
more to be done. He returned, therefore, to his bases, four hundred miles away,
re‑fuelled his fleet, and in the evening of June 2 was again ready to put
to sea. The British losses have already been fully stated, and there is nothing
to add to, or subtract from the latest account published by the Admiralty. The
enemy losses are less easy to determine. That the accounts they have given to
the world are false, is certain ‑ and we cannot yet be sure of the exact
truth. But from such evidence as has come to our knowledge, the Admiralty
entertain no doubt that the German losses are heavier than the British ‑
not merely relatively to the strength of the two fleets, but absolutely. There
seems to be the strongest ground for supposing that included in the German
losses are: two battleships, two Dreadnought battle cruisers of the most
powerful type, two of the latest light cruisers (Wiesbaden and Elbing), a
light cruiser of the Rostock type,
the light cruiser Frauenlob, at least
nine destroyers, and a submarine."

June 5, 1916

BRITISH CLAIMS TO VICTORY

This report set out two claims
to victory: first, we had "driven the enemy into port and scoured the sea
in search of disabled vessels"; secondly, we committed ourselves to
the statement that the German losses were not relatively, but absolutely,
heavier than ours.

To the report were added an
appreciation by Mr. Winston Churchill, and a semi‑official report by a
highly placed naval officer. A brief analysis will show the direction in which
they influenced public opinion.

Mr. Churchill evidently did not
accept the official estimate of enemy losses. The whole purpose of his
statement was to show that the loss of the Luetzow or the Derfflinger, with the Wiesbaden and Elbing, was more serious for the Germans than the sinking of the Queen Mary, the Invincible and the Indefatigable.
If he had believed our claim to have sunk "two battleships and two
Dreadnought battle cruisers," his argument would have been beside the
point. In the second place, he did not rely upon the fact that we had driven
the enemy into port. In his view the reassuring aspect of the battle was not
that we had remained in possession of the scene of action, but that the enemy
had no surprises in store for us. (A
rumour that the Germans were arming their ships with heavier guns than ours had
actually been the subject of investigation by the War Committee.) This
was an indirect but clear announcement that we might look forward with
confidence to any future meeting of the fleets.

This summary deserved better
treatment than it received. Mr. Churchill had set aside estimates which were
unproved, but had at the same time shown that, even on the least favourable
reading of the communiques, there was no need for alarm. He had, in fact, been
both critical and encouraging, at a moment when it was not easy to be
either. Unfortunately for the success of his effort, he had not accepted
those assurances of heavy German losses which the nation considered to be our
best title to victory. Partly on this account, partly because he was unpopular
at the time and the country was irritable from disappointment, his appreciation
raised a violent squall of criticism, and little or no attempt was made to
grasp the meaning of what was perhaps the soundest and most objective estimate
of the battle which had yet appeared. The semi‑official report by "a
high naval officer" was also an important contribution. Who he was has
never been made known; but his account was a tactful attempt to correct in one
particular of great practical importance the false impression which the
public had been taking from the Press.

The Admiralty knew, from Admiral
Beatty's telegram and from that of the Commander‑in‑Chief, that the
loss of our battle cruisers had been caused not by a stronger, but by a
numerically weaker enemy force. It needed no expert commentary to make clear
the point that, however this had happened, it was an event without precedent
in British naval history, and with a significant lesson for the future. The
Admiralty could not, in the public interest, impart this lesson to the nation
before they had themselves taken action upon it; but the attention of the
critics might usefully be recalled to the facts.

The "high naval
officer" did this discreetly in the following words: "The great
battle had four phases: the first opening at 3.15 p.m., when our battle
cruisers joined action with the enemy's battle cruisers. Shortly afterwards,
the second phase began, with the arrival, on both sides, of the battleships;
the third phase was the engagement of the battleships, which was never more
than partial. . . . "

This was a well‑timed
corrective, for on June 5, the day when it appeared, the Press had passed to
the enthusiastic mood and was practically unanimous in acclaiming the victory
"because, as we now learn, the German fleet lost more heavily than the
British," and in describing it as primarily due to the incomparable fight
of our battle cruisers against "the flower of the German High Seas
Fleet." To these commentaries the Admiralty could make no objection: they
were not derived from confidential communications, but from official reports,
and their substratum of facts, though inaccurate in detail, was substantially
sound ‑ for the enemy fleet had been heavily damaged, and our battle
cruisers had fought with the traditional naval spirit in unforeseen and trying
circumstances. But the public were none the less being drawn into accepting
views which were not only exposed to criticism on minor points, but which might
help towards the misunderstanding or neglect of some of the true lessons of the
battle.

It would, however, have been a
great misfortune if the legend of Admiral Beatty's heroic and unequal contest
had been allowed to circulate through the nation without correctives; and
the Press was well provided with expert writers who were quick to see the need
for a more critical attitude. On the next day, June 6, either in consequence of
the "high naval officer's" report, or because a verbal hint had been
given by the Admiralty officials to the representatives of the Press, special
articles in three leading journals began cautiously

June 6‑7, 1916

EXPERT COMMENT BEGINS

to recapitulate the phases of
the action in a new light, and on the 7th, Land
and Water published an article which at last initiated the movement towards
intelligent technical criticism. The new tendency was strongly shown in
articles published by the Daily News and the Globe on June 9. Of these, one
dealt with the problem of securing the magazines of a capital ship against the
danger of explosions caused by gunfire; the other contained an examination of
the rival claims of armour and gunpower in the design of a modern battleship.
This line of inquiry was obviously suggested by the loss of the battle
cruisers, and the article remarked that "in any case it seems established
that our cruisers were destroyed not so much by the punch and smash of the
enemy's gunfire as through an omission in their design."

During the next month the Press
did not publish anything which effected any fresh change in the nation's
attitude with regard to the battle. It may be said, then, that it had taken no
more than one week ‑ from June 2 to June 9 ‑ for the British mind
to swing to its anchor. It is impossible to say how far the ordinary public
grasped the significance of the facts, which had now come through to them, but
it was an unmistakable sign of health that they had begun to take a scientific
rather than a purely emotional interest in them. They soon saw that the matters
now under discussion were beyond their scope, and they perceived, at the same
time, that their first instinctive anxiety had disappeared. The Grand Fleet was
as ready and as competent as ever to fulfil its duties: its dispositions and
routine were unchanged; any necessary technical improvements would, no doubt,
be put in hand at once. The Admiralty showed no sign of apprehension as to
the future of the war at sea, and private letters from officers and men present
in the action, which were being published in many papers, proved that the
navy's one desire was to meet the enemy again as soon as possible with a few
more hours of daylight in hand for a fight to a finish. In short, the position
was intact, and the question of victory had been shown to be a merely verbal
one.

The soundness of the standpoint
thus reached by our people was strikingly affirmed by the public opinion of the
neutral nations of Europe ‑ the more strikingly because the first account
of the battle came to the latter from Berlin, and by anticipating our own by
twenty‑four hours, produced for a day or two a belief that we had
really suffered nothing less than a defeat. In Denmark it was noted on the
evening of June 2 that "ten hours have passed since the German report, and
no news has come from England. The English silence is believed to be a
confirmation." Dutch papers on that day and the next also spoke of our
silence as "no very favourable sign." In Rome only the German account
was printed on the 3rd. And in both Holland and Sweden the British communique,
when it did come, was taken to confirm the German statements about a stupendous
victory. On the 4th the Basler
Nachrichten suggested that if our damaged ships were in proportion to those
sunk, "Germany, before two or three months are over, will break the
blockade and end the war." In Zurich too it was the opinion on June 8 that
"the losses of the English fleet give the Germans the right to speak of
victory." A still more adverse view was that of the Dutch Standard on the 5th, which declared
"the position on the great waters completely transformed."

So much the enemy had gained by
their prompt and secretive method of propaganda: they were now to pay the price
and find themselves losers on the transaction. On the 8th after five whole days
of silence, they issued a communique which gave a denial to all British
reports, official and semi‑official, upon the action. After elaborating
this contradiction at some length, the German authorities stated it had been
necessary for military reasons, to conceal the loss of the Luetzow and the Rostock, but that, in view of British
exaggerations, it had been decided to reveal them. This belated admission
caused a strong and general revulsion of feeling. Alike in Denmark, Holland,
Norway, Sweden and Spain there were sarcastic and contemptuous comments on the
untruthfulness of the German reports. The famous expression "to lie
like a bulletin" was said exactly to fit the German official communique;
and this last was greeted with universal derision in Holland, where it was
thought to resemble "an entreaty to the world to believe that Germany had
really gained a victory." The Germanophil Swedish paper Svenska Dagbladet complained bitterly
that "the German authorities are trying to throw dust in the eyes of
readers," and the Stokholmstidning,
a journal often unfriendly to the Allies, spoke on June 9 of the last German
communique as "affording a painful surprise to those who have uncritically
accepted the dogma of the defeat of the British battle fleet." In Denmark
the Tidens Tegn of June 10 contrasted
the "admirable frankness" of the British Admiralty and the
"peculiar light" thrown on the German reports by their acknowledgment
of losses previously denied, concluding that "even if the victory was not
a complete one, there can be little doubt

June 8‑16, 1916

NEUTRAL VIEWS

that it must be credited to
Admiral Jellicoe." In Spain El Mundo remarked on June 10 that "no one can blame the Germans for seeking safety,
but one does blame their subsequent brag," while El Liberal pronounced that in Germany "the rulers have
transformed what might have been a crushing disaster, averted by a timely
flight, into a motive for national rejoicing." By June 16 it was perceived
in Norway that "England's position as the world's strongest sea‑Power
was not - as originally supposed ‑ shaken." In Holland it was
considered that "the English carried off the fruits of victory, and still
rule the sea, despite heavy losses." The Nederlander enunciated the principle that "the fleet which is
first in a position to renew the conflict is victorious," and implied that
the German fleet was not in that position. The Dutch naval officers were
reported to be "filled with admiration for the speed with which Jellicoe
was ready for action again."

In short, the neutral nations,
like our own, had in a few days come back to their old moorings, realising
afresh that there are in war such things as material facts, and that they will
more often than not end by nullifying "the images which people make of
them." We must not do the German leaders the injustice of supposing that
they were not able to perceive this. It might be desirable to make images
for the encouragement of their people and the maintenance of a hopeful
tradition in their young navy; but for the determination of policy facts
must weigh more heavily. Admiral Scheer tells us that the main lesson of the
Battle of Jutland was thus summarised by him at the time: "The battle
proved that the organisation of our Navy as a High Seas Fleet was a step in the
right direction. The German national spirit can only be impressed on the world
through a High Seas Fleet directed against England. If, however, as an outcome of our present
condition, we are not finally to be bled to death, full use must be made of the
U‑boat as a means of war, so as to grip England's vital nerve."
(Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet, p.
177 (Eng. ed.).)

This was no passing opinion, but
a fixed point of policy. On July 4 the Admiral sent a written report to the
Kaiser, giving privately his "final
impressions of the battle." The operative words are contained in the last
paragraph. "With a favourable succession of operations the enemy may be
made to suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even the most
successful result from a high sea battle will not compel England to make peace.
The disadvantages of our geographical situation ‑ and the enemy's vast
material superiority ‑ cannot be coped with to such a degree as to make
us masters of the blockade inflicted on us. A victorious end to the war at not
too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic
life through U‑boat action against English commerce." (Scheer, p. 169.) This proposition
he afterwards stated a third time still more precisely: "As English
economic life depended on sea trade, the only means of getting at it was to
overcome the fleet, or get past it. The former meant the destruction of the
fleet, which, in view of our relative strength, was not possible. The U‑boats,
however, could get past the fleet."

Here, discreetly but clearly
expressed, is the most important part of the truth about the battle. It
was afterwards put rather more frankly by other officers and critics ‑ by
Captain von Hase, for instance, in his Two
White Nations (Part 11, p. 41), by Admiral von Capelle (Secretary to the
Navy), by Captain Persius in the Berliner
Tageblatt, and no doubt by many others when speaking in private. The German
Fleet's "enterprise" was "frustrated by the battle of Jutland.
Jellicoe did not for an instant surrender the command of the sea. The battle
netted us a great number of cripples which most urgently needed repairs";
and "the losses sustained by our Fleet were enormous, and on June 1, 1916,
it was clear to everyone of intelligence that this fight would be, and must be,
the only one to take place. Those in authority have often admitted this
openly." That was, of course, later, when the actual pressure of our
blockade was inevitably necessitating the extreme policy to which Admiral
Scheer had been more immediately converted. But there can be no doubt that the
date of the change is the date of Admiral Scheer's first summary; it was the
morrow of Jutland.

The battle therefore, though in a wholly unexpected way, had proved to be a turning point in the war at sea. Neither side now looked for a decision by a meeting between the two fleets; both were compelled to face a contest of a different kind, which must inevitably prove fatal to one or the other. The preliminary operations of this final struggle had already taken place, but their significance had not yet been realised. Our weapon was the Blockade of Germany, the pressure of which was gradual and cumulative; the enemy's was the U-boat attack, which had
already caused us loss, but had not yet become dangerous. If it should be
developed, by a desperate effort, to the utmost pitch of intensity, we should
be faced

June‑July 1916

THE TWO WEAPONS

by the possibility of so great
and rapid a loss of shipping as would starve us and our armies before our enemy
collapsed under our grip. The launching of this effort by our enemies, its
alarming immediate success, the repulse of it by new methods of protection and
of counter‑attack, the fierce and continuous fighting of two huge fleets
whose ships were numbered by hundreds and their losses by millions of tons,
the destruction, the endurance, the breathless anxiety, prolonged not for hours
or days but for many months incessantly ‑ all this will make up the story
of a single naval operation, the decisive battle of the war, the greatest sea
fight in history.

Professional Opinion.

The Admiralty and the Commander‑in‑Chief
were equally anxious to get a considered professional opinion upon every aspect
of the battle. Almost as soon as the fleet returned to harbour, Admiral
Jellicoe appointed committees of gunnery, torpedo and signalling experts to
report upon the manner in which the fleet material had stood the test. As soon
as the Admiralty received the despatches of the Commander‑in-Chief,
they put them into the hands of expert departments for examination. The
committees of the Grand Fleet and the Departmental Staffs of the Admiralty were
only concerned with technical matters; questions of leadership and naval
policy were dealt with exclusively by Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty, the First
Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, and the Director of Naval Construction, Sir
Eustace d'Eyncourt.

Neither the Commander‑in‑Chief
nor Admiral Beatty had any hesitation in saying that the real significance of
the battle was the destruction of the battle cruisers. It was, indeed, without
historical precedent that a force of the first line, like Admiral Beatty's
battle cruiser fleet, should be so severely damaged by a numerically weaker
squadron. Admiral Jellicoe spoke of it as the disturbing feature of the action;
and Admiral Beatty asked that a committee of scientific men should be sent to
Rosyth without delay to investigate the causes of the disasters.

If Admiral Beatty had by then
formed any opinion about the loss of his battle cruisers, he did not express
it. He merely stated the problem as it stood: three British ships had exploded
when hit, German ships had not done so even under the severest punishment.
Admiral Jellicoe was more outspoken, and attributed the disasters to the
"indifferent armour protection of the battle cruisers." His view was
shared by Captain Dreyer, one of the great experts on fleet gunnery, who made
out a technical minute upon Admiral Beatty's letter.

The fleet and squadronal
committees on gunnery were rather painfully impressed by the extraordinary
rapidity with which the German gunners had got the range of our ships; and drew
up a long list of recommendations for improving and renewing our range‑finding
instruments and for revising our own system of salvo firing. These were
recommendations on points of detail; the general conviction in the fleet seems
to have been that the disasters of the day were not likely to recur, if the
magazines and handing‑rooms could be made more secure against explosions
caused by jets of flame coming down the ammunition hoists at enormous
temperatures and under high pressure.

Experts were also convinced that
the fuzes to our shells would have to be re‑designed upon a new
principle. (See Vol. III, p. 337.) The type of fuze used during the battle was
extraordinarily sensitive, and mere impact with the water had frequently been
sufficient to burst the shells. Some fuze was needed which, like the German,
would detonate shells after they had penetrated the hull of their target. On
this point the Admiralty and fleet experts were absolutely agreed, and
experiments with a new design of fuze were at once taken in hand by the
Ordnance Committee.

Although the Admiralty at once
endorsed the technical findings of the fleet committees, they were slower in
making up their minds upon the major problems of the battle; and it was not
until Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt had examined the despatches that discussion was
focussed upon the vital issues. Sir Eustace then at once drew attention to the
gravity of Admiral Jellicoe's remarks. If the Commander‑in‑Chief's
view was accepted, the guiding principle of British warship design would have
to be reversed, and the designs of the new battleships Renown and Repulse reconsidered.

The fundamental maxim of British
warship design had been that the best defence is a superior power of offence,
but it was not possible to adhere to this and at the same time allot a greater
proportion of a ship's total tonnage to armour protection. Sir Eustace
carefully examined the reports of all the ships' captains who had witnessed the
disasters to the battle cruisers, and decided that the explosions had been
caused by the method of transporting charges to the guns, and that the remedy
lay in altering the whole routine of the gun drill. In his opinion, there was
nothing

June-July 1916

PROFESSIONAL OPINION

in the available data which
would justify a departure from the existing Admiralty building policy. After a
long and exceedingly technical discussion, the Board agreed with Sir Eustace
d'Eyncourt. A letter was sent to the Commander‑in‑Chief telling him
that the Admiralty had taken immediate and far‑reaching steps to make
armoured ships less subject to explosion, and then added: "Having given
careful consideration to the reports available to them, My Lords are forced to
the conclusion that, in some of the ships engaged in the action of May 31, the
precautions necessary to the safety of the cordite cartridges were, to a
certain extent, subordinated to the great desire, necessarily felt, to achieve
a rapid rate of fire. My Lords consider that the stringent instructions and
measures, cautionary and protective, which have now been instituted, will
have the effect of safeguarding charges and sensibly diminishing the risk of
explosion."

This then was the verdict of the
existing Board upon the loss of the battle cruisers. Their "far‑reaching"
measures against explosion are that mass of technical improvements and
alterations which, taken together, constitute what is known as "post‑Jutland
design." The Board's immediate judgment upon the disasters of the battle
was therefore that they were the outcome of defects which could be made good,
and that they could not be attributed to the design and construction of the
battle cruisers.

Now that all the relevant facts
are known, there can be little doubt that the remedies suggested by the fleet
committees were sufficient to ensure against a repetition of the disasters, and
that the Board of Admiralty were right in deciding that the basic principles of
British warship design needed no revision. The figures and narratives published
by the German Admiralty are an extraordinary testimony to the gunnery standards
of the British battle fleet. We now know that during the brief, interrupted
action between the main fleets some fifty shells from the British battle
squadrons struck the German battle cruisers, and that, during the same period,
no fewer than twenty‑six shells from Admiral Jellicoe's battleships found
their mark in the leading ships of the German line. (See The German Official History (Der Krieg zur See 1914‑18.
Nordsee Band V, p. 477). The German battle cruisers were hit seventy times in
all; from the narrative it appears that fifty of these hits occurred during the
battleship action. The 5th Battle Squadron were responsible for about half of
the remaining twenty. The surviving British battle cruisers were hit twenty‑eight
times by large projectiles.)

These results were not obtained
in a regular gun duel, but from spasmodic bursts of fire against targets which
loomed for a few minutes out of the North Sea mist and disappeared into it
again, and must certainly rank as an achievement which Admiral Hipper's
gunners, in their best moments, could hardly equal.

The Effect on Fleet Tactics.

On September 11 Admiral Jellicoe
issued a revised set of Orders and Instructions relating to battle tactics; and
on October 17 he sent out a memorandum entitled "Notes on the defence of
the battle fleet against torpedo attack." These memoranda are perhaps the
most important documentary records of the immediate effect of Jutland upon
fleet tactics. Other revised orders were issued, but none bear so clear an
impress of the battle and its consequences as these.

The Commander‑in‑Chief's
original battle orders contained two tactical rules which were the first
derivatives of his plan of engaging the enemy on approximately parallel
courses, in a single deployed line. The first of these rules was that the
command was to be entirely centralised in the Commander‑in‑Chief,
the Dreadnought fleet was to keep together, and squadron commanders were not to
make independent tactical movements unless expressly ordered to do so. The
second rule, equally important in the Commander‑in‑Chief's
plan of battle, was that the destroyer flotillas were to be used defensively
until the enemy was beaten by gunfire.

It is very significant that each
of these governing rules was reprinted, without alteration, in the new Fleet
Orders issued by the Commander‑in‑Chief on September 11. Obviously,
then, no drastic change in our tactical methods was called for as a result of
the action. The new instructions were intended to adjust our tactical scheme to
the enemy's, and not to alter it in any important particular. The enemy had
successfully employed evasive tactics, and the Commander‑in‑Chief
in his new instructions was making out a detailed answer to a single question:
How could we give effect to our plan of overwhelming the enemy by gunfire in
the teeth of his intention to throw it out by a determined use of his torpedo
armament and flotillas?

Analysis showed that if our
battle line were subjected to a general torpedo attack from the opposing line,
the extent of the danger and the point most threatened would vary; and that, as
a rule, the van squadron would be more immune than the centre and rear, and
would always be in a better

Sept.-Oct. 1916

FLEET TACTICS

position for closing the range.
In his revised orders Admiral Jellicoe drew attention to this, and stated that
independent action on the part of the van commander might therefore be
necessary during a fleet engagement. This was a first departure from the
principle of treating the battle line as a single unit, formed and manoeuvred
by the fleet commander.

Admiral Jellicoe next dealt with
the enemy's method of combining a flotilla attack with an evasive tactical
movement. Nothing that had occurred during May 31 had caused him to alter his
views on this very difficult question. If the enemy adopted these tactics,
immediate pursuit was impossible; but this inability to pursue vigorously was
only absolute if the whole line were manoeuvred together. If it were admitted
that, in certain conditions, squadrons could break the continuity of the
line, the case was different. In these circumstances, as in the previous
case of a general torpedo attack from the enemy's whole line, the van would
probably be far less menaced than the centre and rear, and it might be of very
great advantage if the van squadron followed the enemy's evasive movement
closely, and kept the head of his line under gunfire. The Commander‑in‑Chief
therefore made express provision for this independent action on the part of one
or more of his squadron commanders, and this was perhaps the most significant
part of the new instructions. Analysis and examination had evidently proved to
the Commander‑in‑Chief that the constituent parts of a battle line
could only be kept together at a great sacrifice of other tactical advantages.

The battle thus caused no
radical change in construction, fleet tactics or administration. It caused
every officer in a responsible position to make a thorough investigation of
existing methods; but its results did not prove that we had been at fault upon
any main question of policy or leadership. Admittedly great changes took place
in the fleet between June 1916 and October 1918; the phrases "post‑Jutland
ships," "post‑Jutland gunnery" and "post‑Jutland
tactics" may even seem to suggest that the battle produced a kind of
revolution in naval methods. But naval men are not so inventive as to be
capable of altering their methods radically upon the doubtful and confusing
results of a brief, indecisive action fought in a North Sea haze in failing
daylight. Jutland was a turning point, and not a revolution: it caused changes
in material and tactics and administration which altered no basic principle.
The changes were the first of a series which, taken as a whole, amounts to
something of a revolution; but Jutland is by no means responsible for all
of them. After Jutland the final submarine campaign gave an immense impetus to
many adaptations which exerted a deep influence upon naval warfare, and made
their impress upon tactics, material and design. There is an immense difference
between the post‑Jutland and the pre‑Jutland navy; but it is only
the less significant portions of the change for which Jutland is responsible.

CHAPTER II

HOME WATERS

June to October 1916

Russia had not succumbed
outright under the formidable attack of the German armies in 1915; but the
problem of assisting her recovery, and so enabling her to take the field again
in 1916, was one which caused the Western Allies very great anxiety. For the
British Government in particular the question was extremely difficult. Ever
since the Russian defeats of the previous year, our Government had been asked
to grant credits for the manufacture of immense quantities of material ‑
all which were stated to be urgent and necessary if the Russian armies were to
take part in the next summer's campaign. The British Government could not
accede to all these demands without prejudicing the financial engagements
already entered into with other Allied Governments; but there could be no
question of curtailing or refusing the Russian orders without first coming to
an understanding with the Russian Ministers. It was felt that a great effort
should be made to tide over this emergency without causing heartburning or
friction; and it was decided, out of courtesy and consideration for a hard
pressed and loyal ally, to send some envoy of the highest rank to Russia, who
could explain, from a full knowledge of their financial and military policy,
that British credits were being granted to each ally in the way which seemed
most likely to benefit the united campaign of the Allies. Lord Kitchener seemed
to be more fitted than any other member of the Government for such a Mission.
His prestige and status in foreign countries were almost as great as at home:
he could speak with full authority upon the campaign to be undertaken during
the year, and upon the best way of giving cohesion and force to the Allied
effort. Before any decision was taken his name was mentioned to the Tsar, who
at once expressed his anxiety to meet him by sending Lord Kitchener a cordial
personal telegram. Obviously then no better choice could be made; and on May
26, Lord Kitchener declared himself ready to go to Russia at the head of a
military and financial Mission.

The Admiralty at once ordered
the Commander‑in‑Chief at Scapa to make arrangements for conveying
the War Minister and his staff to Archangel. The party arrived at Scapa on the
5th of June, in time to lunch with Sir John Jellicoe; and during the afternoon
were taken on board the Hampshire (Captain H. J. Savill), which had been ordered to convey them. (The party included Brig.‑Gen. W.
Ellershaw, Lieut. Col.O. A. G. Fitzgerald, Military Secretary, Mr. H. J. O'Beirne, of the Foreign Office, Sir H. F. Donaldson, and Mr. L. S. Robertson,
of the Ministry of Munitions, and 2nd Lieut. R. D. Macpherson.)

When the cruiser was due to
start, the weather was extremely bad and a gale was blowing from the north‑east.
The Commander‑in‑Chief had to choose from three possible routes for
the Hampshire's outward voyage. The
first of these, which her Captain was directed to follow by the Sailing Orders
issued to him on June 4, ran along the eastern coasts of the Orkneys to
latitude 62 degrees N. The Commander-in‑Chief decided that it ought not to
be used: during the previous week submarines had been twice reported near the
track that the Hampshire would
follow: the eastern side of the Orkneys was exposed to the full force of the
gale which was blowing; the destroyer escort would not be able to keep up with
the cruiser in the heavy seaway, and would in consequence be unprotected
against attacks from any submarine that might still be about. It was, in
Admiral Jellicoe's opinion, equally inadvisable to send the Hampshire out along the second route,
which ran through the Pentland Firth to Cape Wrath, and thence northwards.
During the morning a submarine had been reported off Cape Wrath, and the
sweepers working on the route had been so hampered by the gale that they had
not been able to sweep the channel thoroughly by the time the Hampshire was due to sail. The third
route, which ran close along the west side of the Orkneys was a track
ordinarily used by fleet auxiliaries: and this was the one which the Commander‑in‑Chief,
after a good deal of thought, decided to be the best for the Hampshire to follow. In the prevailing
weather conditions this route was less exposed than the other two and the
destroyers would in consequence be better able to keep close up to the cruiser.
Besides this there were other reasons. No minefield was known to have been laid
so far north as this since the Moewe's raid, at the end of the previous year; submarine minelayers had never yet
operated off the fleet base; and seeing how short is the night in the Orkneys
at midsummer, it was not thought likely that a surface minelayer had been at
work.

June 5, 1916

DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER

At a quarter to five, then, on
the evening of June 5 the Hampshire got under way; an hour later the destroyers Unity and Victor met her off Tor Ness.
Captain Savill's orders were to keep close in to the lee of the land and to
steam at 19 knots. The wind soon backed into the north and west, and, as the
head sea which it raised was too much for the destroyers, Captain Savill
ordered them back and reduced speed.

At about 7.40, whilst the Hampshire was driving into the heavy
seas, there was an explosion which seemed to tear the centre of the ship right
out, and in a few minutes she went down with almost her entire company. Some of
the few survivors stated that they saw a group of military men in the gun room
flat, just after the explosion, another that he heard voices crying out
"make way for Lord Kitchener," and another that Captain Savill's last
anxiety was to get him into the galley. But beyond this nothing can ever be
known.

As soon as news of the disaster
came through to the Commander‑in‑Chief, four of the Grand
Fleet destroyers were ordered out; they were followed by five others, but all
hopes of saving life were vain. By the time the destroyers and patrol vessels
reached the spot there was hardly a trace of wreckage; fourteen men had reached
the shore on Carley rafts, but two of them died before the rescue parties on
the cliffs could reach them.

Plan - Loss
of the Hampshire

The Hampshire went down about a mile and a half from the shore, between
the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head.

The Hampshire had struck one or more mines in a field laid by Lieutenant-Commander Kurt Beitzen from U.75 on the night of May 28/29. U.75 was one of the German submarines
detailed to watch the British bases during the German fleet's sortie before
Jutland. The German Official History (Der
Krieg zur See, Nordsee, Band V, pp. 201‑2) shows that Kurt Beitzen
laid his mines in the hope of interfering with the British fleet's
concentration if it should leave harbour to meet the German High Seas Fleet:
"It then cleared up, and at about 1.10 a.m. Noup Headlight was sighted. It
had been ascertained that a route used by warships ran about two miles from the
coast to the south of this point, i.e., Noup Head, between Marwick Head and the
Brough of Birsay; and U.75 was to
mine it. This was done. Between 6.0 and 8.35 a.m. the cargo of twenty‑two
mines was laid in several detached groups, about seven metres below high water,
after which she returned home; there was no interference whatever from the
enemy's patrols." (For full details see Admiralty Official Narrative: The
Loss of H.M.S. Hampshire. Cmd. 2710,
1926.)

It is one of the wildest parts
of the coast, where a dark rampart of cliffs rises sheer out of the foam and
spray which storm against the wind‑beaten shore line. On the summit of
the brough, overlooking the spot where the Hampshire sank, there is a mound of raised earth; and this some believe to be the tomb of
a warrior long since dead, the ruler of a race who raised vast monoliths to the
sun and moon. Kitchener too had long been a legendary hero of his people; and
in their time of need he had by the mere sound of his voice called armies into
being. But they mourned him, as they mourned all their losses, without despair,
without even the lassitude of grief.

As we have seen, the first business of the Commander-in‑Chief on returning from Jutland was to
set machinery for controlling the North Sea in motion again as soon as
possible; and two days after his reorganisation had been approved and carried
out, the usual routine of cruiser sweeps began afresh. (The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron carried out a sweep from Rosyth on the
14th. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out sweeps from Scapa on the 21st
and from Rosyth on the 29th. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron carried out a sweep
from Scapa on the 25th.)

Our light squadrons were out
four times during the month, and returned on each occasion with "nothing
to report." False alarms about escaping raiders occasionally brought out
our cruisers, or altered the dispositions of the 10th Cruiser Squadron; but
towards the end of the month it seemed as though the long monotony of
expectation had settled down once more upon Scapa Flow.

At the southern end of the North
Sea, the enemy was more active. Early in the month, the Admiralty got news that
the 2nd German Destroyer Flotilla had been sent to Zeebrugge, and they
concluded, quite rightly, that the reinforcement was intended to menace, and if
possible to raid, our communications with Holland and our shipping in the
Downs. It seemed, indeed, that the Germans were going to begin at once, for
early in the morning of June 8, twelve destroyers appeared to the east of
Dunkirk, and were engaged by the monitor Lord
Clive and the "Tribal" destroyers on patrol. The Germans turned
back before the Harwich forces could reach them, and did not repeat the
experiment for more than a month; but the warning sufficed. The Admiralty
ordered Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt (Commodore (T.)) to detach two light cruisers
and eight destroyers as a permanent reinforcement for the Dover patrol. The
forces in the Flanders Bight, which was later to become a theatre of fierce raiding
and counter‑raiding, were now distributed between three points: Dover,
Dunkirk and Harwich. At Harwich was the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron (five
ships); the 9th Destroyer Flotilla (Undaunted, Lightfoot and twenty‑one
"L" class destroyers), and the 10th (Aurora, Nimrod and
fifteen "M" class destroyers).

June 1916

THE DUTCH PATROL

The 1st Flotilla (eight boats) ‑
based on Harwich ‑ was permanently attached to the 3rd Battle Squadron.
The Dover Force consisted of the light cruiser Attentive, the flotilla leader Swift,
twenty‑four destroyers, eight patrol or "P" boats and fourteen
monitors. The Dunkirk Force had to be made up from the Harwich and Dover
flotillas, and generally consisted of four to eight destroyers. The total force
nominally available for the defence of the Downs and the Flanders Bight was
thus eight light cruisers, three flotilla leaders, sixty‑eight
destroyers, eight "P" boats and fourteen monitors; but, owing to the
constant refits of the destroyers, and the periodic, uncertain calls for
reinforcements in the Channel, whenever submarines were reported to be
operating vigorously, the available striking force very rarely exceeded thirty
destroyers and four light cruisers. The Commodore was thus already seriously
burdened and hampered; and a new and arduous duty was about to be imposed upon
him.

It is a matter of common
knowledge that the German submarine campaign was an answer to our blockade; but
it is not so well realised that, in almost every detail and every incident of
these two measures of war ‑ sinking at sight, and cutting off supplies by
naval and economic means ‑ two very different forces, the force of
terrorism and the force of orderly, lawful pressure, are to be seen arrayed
against each other and struggling for mastery. The British Government was now
(June 1916) about to conclude a trading agreement which, it was hoped, would
divert a considerable volume of Dutch trade from Germany to Great Britain. In
order to prevent the agreement from being made useless by an outburst of raiding
from Zeebrugge, the Admiralty decided to keep the whole route to the Dutch
harbours under permanent patrol. Towards the end of the month this new duty had
been taken up. A force of from five to ten destroyers and two light cruisers
was generally allotted to it, and the route kept under their inspection ran
roughly from the Sunk to the Schouwen Bank and thence to the Maas. The patrol
undoubtedly saved the Dutch traffic from serious interference; but, on the
other hand, the enemy's submarine minelaying increased in intensity. There were
now fifteen submarines in the Flanders Flotilla operating as mine‑layers
and commerce raiders in the Channel and the Flanders Bight. Political
uncertainties had for the moment confined serious operations against commerce to
the Mediterranean; but the relations between Berlin and Washington resulted in
no restraint upon minelaying. The approaches to Lowestoft were particularly
visited during the month, Fifty mines were swept up by the local sweepers; but
eight merchantmen and an armed trawler fell victims.

This was roughly the position
when, towards the end of the month, the Commander‑in‑Chief visited
the Admiralty to discuss the battle of Jutland. Those present at the conference
seem to have agreed that our dispositions had stood the test as well as could
be expected. The disasters which had occurred were attributed to technical
faults of material and design, and the decisions practically amounted to a vote
of confidence in the Commander‑in‑Chief's leadership and policy.

Earlier in the year, the fleet
had put to sea, with some chance of meeting the enemy, in February, when the Arabis was sunk; in March, when we tried
to attack the airsheds on the Schleswig coast; and in April, when Yarmouth
and Lowestoft were bombarded. On each occasion, the Commander‑in‑Chief
had sent the 5th Battle Squadron ahead of the battle fleet, with orders to
support the battle cruisers or to cover our detached forces. The conference
confirmed this policy, and decided that the 5th Battle Squadron was to be
considered mainly as a fast wing division of the battle fleet, and not as a
portion of the battle cruiser fleet. It was realised that, on occasions, the
Commander‑in‑Chief might think it advisable to reinforce the battle
cruisers with the 5th Battle Squadron; if he did so, it was to be understood
that the battleships were "simply a reinforcement."

In order to ensure to the
Commander‑in‑Chief a greater measure of control over the units of
his fleet, it was decided that, "where the initiative lay with us, the
battle cruisers should not be advanced so far in front of the battle fleet as
had been customary in the past." The words "where the initiative lay
with us" obviously limit the application of this rule to minelaying
operations and cruiser sweeps, supported by the battle fleet; and do not
apply to the Commander‑in‑Chief's orders for the battle
cruiser fleet on May 31, when the enemy, and not ourselves, had the initiative.
In cases of the kind, the Admiralty were prepared to see the battle cruisers
used even more freely than they had been by the Commander‑in‑Chief;
for it was decided that, if our eastern or south‑eastern coasts were
raided, the battle cruisers might have to be pushed forward, without any
support at all from the battle fleet. The Admiralty thus closed a discussion
which had now lasted many months, by accepting the views of Admiral Jellicoe.

With the spread of German
minelaying a pressing need had arisen for better protection of the sweepers
working in the

July 1916

THE ADMIRALTY CONFERENCE

waters to the east of
Flamborough Head and the Wash, and for a closer lookout on minelayers and
suspicious vessels.

The Admiralty intended to meet
this need by establishing the 4th Flotilla, a force of fifteen destroyers, at
the Humber; and it was decided that the Commander‑in‑Chief should
use it as a first reinforcement whenever he was operating in the North Sea.
There remained, however, the further branch of the problem: the question of co‑ordinating
the movements of the Harwich Force and the Grand Fleet; and upon this the
Admiralty found it very hard to take a decision. They recognised that the
Harwich Force ought to co‑operate with the Grand Fleet; but in practice
there were great difficulties. In the first place, though our system of intelligence
sufficed to warn us when the German fleet was putting to sea, it rarely gave us
an immediate clue to their plans. Until we could be certain whether the enemy's
forces had one, or two, objectives, it was impossible to order Commodore
Tyrwhitt to join the Grand Fleet. Again, the enemy's plan might be such that we
should risk having the Harwich Force cut off and crushed by ordering it north
to join the Grand Fleet; and lastly, there was the fact that the German
flotilla in Flanders was steadily expanding. In July 1916, it was believed to
consist of twenty‑two destroyers, half of which were of the newest
pattern. As the Dover flotilla of "Tribal" destroyers could not face
this powerful detachment without assistance, the Harwich Force might quite well
be needed to secure the Straits in a sudden crisis. (Their anxiety was fully justified. After the battle, Admiral Scheer
seems to have decided to use Zeebrugge as a destroyer training base, and to
detach flotillas from the High Seas Fleet with orders to carry on a sort of
guerrilla warfare. Scheer, pp. 187‑8.)

The conference decided, in the end, that the question should be allowed to stand over until the Commander‑in-Chief
had submitted his proposals.

In his despatch on the battle
Admiral Jellicoe had stated that one of the greatest obstacles to bringing the
enemy to decisive action was his inability to meet them early in the day.

The conference agreed, and
decided that "all arrangements necessary for basing the 1st, 2nd and 5th
Battle Squadrons at Rosyth instead of Scapa should be pressed forward with the
utmost despatch." When this could be done, the Grand Fleet base would be
brought considerably nearer the probable meeting point of the British and
German fleets.

Until this became practicable,
no redistribution of the fleet was necessary; the Sydney and the Melbourne were to be recalled from North America, so as to add two extra vessels of high
speed to Admiral Jellicoe's scouting forces; but in other respects it was
simply decided to proceed with the reorganisation of the battle squadrons
at Scapa, devised two months before the battle.

The Commander‑in‑Chief
urged most strongly that the yery poor wireless installation of our submarines
should be improved. This question seems at first sight to be a purely technical
one, but in reality it touched upon a very much wider problem ‑ the
primary duty of our "oversea" submarine flotillas.

Minelaying had now made it
impossible to push our patrols right inside the Heligoland Bight, as we had
done in the earlier days of the war; but we knew, very accurately, what routes
were used by the German fleet when it made sweeps into the North Sea, and were
thus able to watch the areas into which the German swept channels debouched.

Our flotillas were therefore
patrolling in two groups four and sometimes five Harwich submarines were
stationed along a curved line running from the Texel to the northeastern
corner of the Austern Grund, about seventy‑five miles to the west‑north‑westward
of Heligoland; whilst the submarines from Blyth and the Tyne were generally
watching the Horn Reefs‑Jutland Bank area. The first group was thus
patrolling across the line along which the German fleet had advanced when
Lowestoft and Yarmouth were bombarded; the second watched the route
followed by Admiral Scheer on May 30.

The Admiralty, like the German
High Command, had been striving, for a long time, to devise some means of co‑ordinating
the operations of the submarine flotillas and the battle fleet; for the 11th
Flotilla, at Blyth, had originally been created for use in a fleet action, and
was under the orders of Admiral Jellicoe. There was, however, a strong contrast
between our solution and the enemy's. Admiral Scheer's plan of co‑ordinated action between under‑water craft and a battle fleet resolved itself into using the submarines for getting early intelligence of our movements. According to our ideas the first duty of our submarines was to inflict loss on the enemy whenever he put to sea; and, though the Commander-in‑Chief's
representations about their bad wireless equipment were well founded, it is
more than doubtful whether a screen of submarines, encircling the German Bight,
could have added much to our system of intelligence. In the outcome we
continued to use them as detached outposts with a purely offensive r™le.

June-July 1916

A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

The decisions of the conference,
amounting, as we have seen, to a vote of confidence in the Commander‑in‑Chief,
and to an order to alter little or nothing in our existing dispositions, were a
significant anticipation of the estimate which history will inevitably form of
the advantage gained or lost by either side in the battle of Jutland. The
action was an unfinished experiment, in which two different systems of tactics
and commands had come into conflict. In certain highly technical points its
lessons were clear and emphatic; in all else it left the naval position
unaltered. After the battle, as before it, the Allies enjoyed all the
superiority inherent in being able to obtain supplies from foreign markets and
to transport and maintain great overseas expeditions; after the battle, as
before it, we carried out those sweeps and operations which represented our
control of the North Sea; and after the battle, as before it, we strangled
German supplies by means of our agreements with neutrals, our economic
strength, and our intercepting cruiser squadrons. Of its effect upon German
naval policy we shall hear again and at considerable length.

The wisdom of instituting a
special patrol for the Dutch route was very soon justified by events. At nine
o'clock in the evening of July 22, Commodore Tyrwhitt put to sea with two light
cruisers ‑ the Carysfort (broad
pendant) and the Canterbury; and
eight "M" class destroyers. The organisation was:

1st
Division – Carysfort, Mentor, Mansfield, Mastiff, Manly

2nd
Division – Canterbury, Melpomene,
Morris, Matchless, Milne

As all the ships crossing during
the night were coming from or going to the Hook of Holland, the Commodore was
only concerned with protecting the route between Felixstowe, the North Hinder
and the Maas. He therefore ordered the Canterbury and the 2nd Division to watch the route near the North Hinder, whilst he
himself took the Maas patrol. The detachments were to arrive at their stations
simultaneously, at 2 a.m. No news had come through of any movement by the
German flotilla when Commodore Tyrwhitt left harbour.

The Germans had none the less
been warned that ships well worth capturing were to cross during the night, and
their flotilla left Zeebrugge at about the same time as the Commodore moved out
from Harwich. They set a course for the North Hinder, so that contact between
the two was practically certain.

After clearing harbour the Carysfort and her division, which had
forty‑five miles further to go, steamed ahead, and the Canterbury slowed down. At a quarter‑past
one, when the Commodore was well past the North Hinder, a group of hostile
destroyers was sighted about three miles ahead on a northerly course. The Carysfort and her destroyers at once
steamed after them at full speed, and the enemy turned to the eastward and made
off. There were only three of them, and they obviously could not stand up
against such very heavy odds as had been brought against them. The Commodore
followed in pursuit and brought them under fire for a few minutes. It was a
rainy night, and just as the engagement began a squall passed across the
division and practically blotted out the enemy, who made use of the chance, put
up a heavy smoke screen and turned sharply to starboard. When the squall had
passed and the horizon was clear again, the German destroyers were out of
sight.

The Commodore, however, still
hoped that they might be caught. He turned to his course for the Maas, and
ordered the Canterbury and her division
to turn to the south‑east and try to catch the enemy near the Schouwen
Bank. He then took his own division to the Maas to cut off the enemy's retreat
if on meeting the Canterbury they
should turn north again and try to creep in to Emden along the coast. Half an
hour before he received the order, Captain Percy Royds had seen the flashes of
the Carysfort's guns, and had steamed
eastwards towards the engagement at 20 knots. When he received the
Commodore's order he was just passing the light-vessel; he therefore
turned south‑easterly and increased to 28 knots. At a quarter to two,
when he was about ten miles north‑west of the Schouwen Bank, the German
destroyers were sighted ahead. Six were now clearly visible; and though
steaming at high speed across the Middle Deep for Zeebrugge, they were unable
to make good the speed necessary to cross the Canterbury's bows out of range. Captain Royds altered to port to
close them, and withheld his fire for the next twenty minutes. At ten minutes
past two he opened fire at a range of about 5,000 yards; and the enemy at once
replied. The Matchless was just out
of dockyard hands and could not keep up; and Lieutenant H. R. Troup of the Milne decided that he must stand by his
sub‑divisional leader. The result was that the Germans had only two boats
to deal with, and so had a fair chance of damaging them, though much overweighted
by the gun‑fire of our light cruiser. Just after two o'clock, Captain
Royds ordered the Melpomene (Lieutenant-Commander Hubert de Burgh) to close in to attack; he did

July 23, 1916

HARWICH FORCE IN ACTION

so with only the Morris (Lieutenant‑Commander E. S.
Graham) in company, and at a quarter‑past two both boats were firing
rapidly at the end of the enemy's line. In spite of our speed, the enemy had
succeeded in getting across our bows, for his line then bore about one point on
the Morris's starboard bow. Daylight
was coming up fast; but the light was not yet strong, and the enemy put up a
thick smoke screen, which for several moments made firing impossible. The range
was dropping rapidly, and had the chase gone on for much longer our two
destroyers would have been the target for the concentrated fire of the whole
German division. The Canterbury was,
by now, some way astern, though well within range. The engagement indeed
promised to develop into an interesting tactical contest: would the heavier
guns of our light cruiser, fired almost at hazard into a moving smoke screen,
be enough to sustain the attack which de Burgh and Graham were trying to press
home? Unfortunately the experiment could not be carried through to its
conclusion: the boats were now (2.25) five miles past the Schouwen Bank light‑vessel,
and were thus fast approaching the minefield off Zeebrugge. Captain Royds
recalled them, and the flotilla re‑formed off the Schouwen Bank light‑vessel
about a quarter of an hour later. (The
German official bulletin reported that their destroyers had returned undamaged;
the flotilla was recalled to Emden on July 31.)

This short engagement sufficed
to show that our dispositions were well adapted for protecting the Dutch route. Warfare in the Flanders Bight was taking on a character of its own. The main fleet movements in the North Sea were practically always to be detected beforehand by observation of enemy wireless activities; so that the Commander‑in-Chief
generally put to sea with a certain amount of positive intelligence of the
enemy's movements. In the south matters were different; some warning of
movements between Flanders and the Bight could be obtained by observation of
enemy wireless, but the Flanders forces themselves were sufficiently compact
and concentrated to be able to put to sea on written or verbal instructions, of
which we could get no indication. The consequence was that our counter‑dispositions
in the Dover Straits and the Flanders Bight had to be made upon that
calculation of probable chances, and that provision against all contingencies
which was characteristic of the naval warfare of an earlier period. This time
our dispositions had undoubtedly stood the test; but it was equally clear that
the Zeebrugge flotilla, though too far outnumbered and outclassed to be able to
contest our command of the Flanders Bight, had none the less a great capacity
for mischief, and must be considered in any calculation of forces.

Throughout July the German fleet
had given very little sign of activity; but during the first half of August
Admiral Scheer completed his plans for a new raid upon the English coast. The
fleet was to move across the North Sea during the night of August 18 and to
bombard Sunderland on the following morning "provided that it had not
previously become engaged in fleet action"
and that its line of retreat was clear. This laconic statement does not explain
whether Admiral Scheer left harbour intending to bring about a fleet action, or
to avoid one. Probably he was still nursing his old hope of gaining prestige by
a blow at our light forces in the Flanders Bight. His present enterprise might
bring him the desired chance: it would in any case be a bold one, and would
exasperate British feeling. The operations involved, as before, the risk of
meeting the Grand Fleet, and to that risk his courage and self‑reliance
were equal; but he naturally desired to ensure as far as possible that the meeting
should not be forced upon him suddenly, or in circumstances that would make it
a fight to a finish. His dispositions show, as clearly as any explicit
statement, the nature of the lesson which Jutland had taught him.

On May 31 his reconnaissance system
had broken down; he had found himself in the presence of the whole British
battle fleet, without the slightest preliminary warning Admiral Jellicoe
had been able to steer unnoticed and undetected through the northern part
of the North Sea. The German battle fleet had, in consequence, become engaged
at a serious tactical disadvantage; the Commander‑in‑Chief had
never had the time to form his battle line in a position from which his ships
could fight satisfactorily; and had spent the best part of the afternoon in Kehrtwendungen (See Vol. III., p. 369.) and
extricatory manoeuvres. A better system of intelligence was clearly called for.
If he could devise some means of obtaining timely warning that Admiral
Jellicoe's squadrons were advancing against him, of knowing the direction of
their approach and the time of their arrival, some of the difficulties in which
he had been involved need not be repeated. To secure the freedom of manoeuvre
which was essential to him, if he were to carry out his plan without being
surprised, as he had been on the afternoon of May 31, he decided to organise
his submarines, airships and reconnaissance forces into successive lines of
intelligence outposts.

He therefore arranged that, when
he reached the English

Aug. 1916

GERMAN PREPARATIONS

coast,
his flanks should be covered by two groups of submarines, called U‑boat
lines numbers I and III, stationed at about thirty and sixty miles on either
side of the line of advance. A third group, formed from the Zeebrugge
flotillas, was to take position on two separate lines in the approaches to the
Flanders Bight, to the north‑westward of the Texel. Yet another line of
five U‑boats was stationed across the north‑western approach to the
bight, at about one hundred and twenty miles from Heligoland. The U ‑boat
lines were constituted as follows:

Lines I and III were to serve as
a kind of long‑distance cover to the main fleet, when it was under the
British coast; and the lines off the Texel. were intended as a trap for the
Harwich forces. Other positions were to be occupied by the submarines as
the sweep progressed; and, in order that their movements should be exactly co‑ordinated
with those of the battle squadrons, the commander of the U‑boat flotillas
sailed with the fleet in the Prinzregent
Luitpold. (See Map 1.)

It was considered essential that
the submarines should work in groups, and occupy straight lines, drawn across the
most probable line of our advance. The previous system of posting them along
the radii of circles drawn opposite our bases had not been satisfactory. When
the submarines approached the centre they got bunched together and their
movements were cramped; when they moved towards the circumference they were
needlessly dispersed, and our squadrons passed through them without being
molested. (Scheer, pp. 179‑80.)

These dispositions would suffice
to protect him against surprise whilst he was actually engaged in operations
against the coast; but he had still to cover himself whilst he was moving
across the North Sea. For this he depended upon his airships, and he ordered
eight Zeppelins to take up special stations when the fleet made its advance. (Scheer, Map 10.) The L.30, L.32, L.24, and L.22 were to patrol between Peterhead
and Norway; L.31 was to watch the
Firth of Forth; L.11 was to take
station off Sunderland; L.21 to
cruise over the Outer Silver Pit between the Humber and the Wash; and L.13 to watch the Flanders Bight. By
thus encircling the outer end of his advance with airships, Admiral Scheer was
confident of early news of the approach of "strong sections of the British
fleet" if they advanced against him.

Before sailing he reorganised
his fleet. The 2nd Battle Squadron had already been discarded as unfit for
heavy fighting, "on account of its artillery and old type of
torpedo." Some compensation for this sacrifice was supplied by the
newly completed battleships Bayern, Grosser Kurfuerst and Markgraf; but they were not
available as reinforcements for the main fleet. The battle cruiser squadron
which had lost the Luetzow at Jutland,
was also lacking the Derfflinger and Seydlitz, still in dockyard hands: the Moltke and the Von der Tann alone could not be used to oppose the five British
ships of the same class, and still less the 5th Battle Squadron, which was
believed, though erroneously, to be now attached to our advanced forces.
Admiral Scheer therefore attached his three new ships to Hipper's remnant, and
left himself with only eighteen battleships as against Admiral Jellicoe's
twenty-eight.

At nine o'clock, then, on the
evening of the 18th, his 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons left harbour, preceded by
the two scouting groups. The distance between the advanced cruiser squadrons
and the battle fleet was reduced to twenty miles, in order to make quite sure
that the battleships attached to the 1st Scouting Group could join up rapidly
with the battle squadrons in an emergency.

During the forenoon of the 18th,
we discovered, by the usual signs, that the German fleet was likely to leave
harbour, and at 10.30 the Commander‑in‑Chief and the Vice‑Admiral
commanding the battle cruiser fleet were ordered to raise steam. At five
minutes to eleven they were ordered to proceed to sea and concentrate in
the Long Forties, as the German fleet was apparently on the point of sailing.

The situation was strongly
reminiscent of the train of events which had preceded Jutland, in that enemy
submarines were evidently at sea in considerable force; and at one o'clock the
Admiralty sent out a further wire stating that six submarines had been located
during the forenoon. The first was about ninety‑five miles to the W.N.W.
of Horn Reefs; the second and third were on the Dogger Bank; the other three
were spread over the northern part of the Austern Grund. The telegram ended
with the warning: "there may be others."

We could, therefore, only
estimate the meaning of the enemy's sortie by its analogy with the last, as we
had no idea what direction it was going to take, and his submarines were so
widely spread that they gave no indication of the general plan. Slight as the
information was, we got no more for the next fifteen hours; and, in the
meantime, we had felt compelled to set the whole of our forces in motion.

Aug. 18, 1916

THE GRAND FLEET SAILS

When the telegram giving the
order to put to sea arrived at Scapa, Admiral Jellicoe was lying sick in the
south of Scotland, and Admiral Burney was in charge of the Grand Fleet. The Royalist was, however, at Dundee,
waiting to take the Commander‑in‑Chief north whenever needed, and
as soon as news of the intended movement reached him he embarked, and made off
to join the Grand Fleet.

In the meantime, Admiral Burney
felt that he would hardly be justified in taking the fleet across the North Sea
while the enemy's intentions were so obscure. He therefore ordered a general
fleet rendezvous in Lat. 56 degrees 30' N., Long. 0 degrees 20' E., about 100 miles to the
E.N.E. of the Firth of Forth, for five o'clock on the following morning; and
gave orders for the battle cruisers to assemble thirty miles to the south at
the same hour. Both fleets were then to turn to the southwards, and enter
the southern part of the North Sea through "L" channel. He also
ordered the Blyth submarines to assemble 50 miles eastward of Hartlepool, to
cover the approaches to the Tyne‑Whitby district; with a special warning
that they were not to spread too far apart, and were to be ready to join the
Grand Fleet if necessary.

The Active and nine destroyers left Immingham at 10 p.m. on the 18th,
whilst seven submarines left Blyth at the same hour to carry out the orders
given.

We had, at the time, three
submarines watching the Bight: E.23, H.5 and H.9 were patrolling the western approaches to the Ems. After
ascertaining how many of our submarines were off the German coasts, the Admiralty
ordered two more to be sent "to the north of Heligoland." E.38 and E.16 had left Harwich at about half‑past twelve, with orders
to take up their stations along the swept channel which ran from the Amrum Bank
to the west of Heligoland. After thus completing what might be called our North
Sea measures, we made the following preparations for facing an attack in the
Flanders Bight.

(i)
The 3rd Battle Squadron was ordered to assemble in the Swin and have steam at
one hour's notice by 8 p.m.; and the minelayers Biarritz and Paris were
ordered to proceed to the fleet anchorage and place themselves at the
disposal of the Vice‑Admiral.

(ii)
Captain A. K. Waistell (Captain (S)) was ordered to station six submarines off
Lowestoft, Yarmouth and Harwich, and then to send a group to a position about
midway between Lowestoft and the Dutch coast, and another group to the Corton
light‑vessel. The Firedrake and
six submarines sailed for the first rendezvous at about a quarter to one on the
morning of the 19th; the Hind and
three others left a little later for the Corton.

(iii)
Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to "be on the lookout at Brown Ridge
by early dawn" on the 19th; and left harbour at 10.30 p.m. on the 18th in
the Carysfort, with the 5th Light
Cruiser Squadron, the Lightfoot and
eighteen destroyers of the "L" and "M" classes in company.

As a result of these orders, our
counter‑measures were in full progress two hours after the German fleet
had sailed.

The Grand Fleet put to sea
during the afternoon of the 18th; further south, the battle cruisers left the
Firth of Forth at about half‑past eight, while the ships in Cromarty left
harbour at about a quarter to six, and steered straight for the general
rendezvous:

The
fleet was one battleship and five light cruisers short of its full
establishment, and was thus distributed:

The
Battle Cruiser Fleet, less the Indomitable of the 2nd Battle Cruiser squadron and the Yarmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron.

Ist and XIIIth Flotillas.

When he left Scapa, Admiral
Burney ordered the Iron Duke to advance ahead of the fleet and take the Commander-in‑Chief on board
from the Royalist, which was coming
up to meet the battle squadrons. But just before eight, as the Iron Duke and the Royalist were approaching the rendezvous, the Onslaught, one of the screening destroyers, was attacked by a
submarine at very close range. The torpedo missed; and the Iron Duke continued on her course until Admiral Jellicoe was taken
on board.

As the fleet was due to pass
right over the danger spot about an hour later, Admiral Burney opened out his
columns and gave the position where the submarine had made the attack a five‑mile
berth. At about nine o'clock the fleet passed the danger spot in two divisions,
one to the north and one to the south of it. At ten o'clock, when the fleet was
about seventy miles to the E.S.E. of the Pentland Firth, a

Aug. 19, 1916

NOTTINGHAM SINKS

southerly course was set for the
general rendezvous. Our main squadrons were thus taken past the outer cordon of
watching Zeppelins unobserved, during the dark hours.

Further south, Admiral Beatty
steered to the eastward during the night, with his light cruisers spread to the
southward of him. At twenty minutes past three, when about 120 miles to
the E.S.E. of the Firth of Forth, he turned sixteen points, and by five o'clock
was at his rendezvous, thirty miles ahead of the battle fleet. He then turned
to the southward and approached "L" channel at 18 knots, on a course
which took the starboard wing of his screen straight towards the outer end of
the U‑boat line to the north‑east of Blyth.

It was daylight between four and
five; but the morning was very hazy. At about half‑past five, a small
sail was sighted right ahead of the Dublin.
The navigator, who took it for a small fishing‑boat, lost sight of it a
few minutes later, and thought that the movement of the ship had obscured it
behind some part of the upper works. This was unfortunate, for he had actually
sighted U.52 manoeuvring into an
attacking position; and twenty‑four minutes later the Nottingham was shaken by two violent
explosions.

Although one of the torpedoes
fired had been seen from the Dublin,
which was working with the Nottingham on the screen, Captain C. B. Miller had sighted nothing, and thought that his
ship had struck a mine. Neither of the two ships was in touch with the next
groups on the screen, and it was not until half an hour after the disaster that
the news was received by Admiral Beatty, who at once detached the destroyers Penn and Oracle.

The Nottingham remained on an even keel, but her fires and lights were
put out; the vessel was thus without power of manoeuvre, with everything below
the upper deck in darkness. The Dublin strove to keep down the submarine; but was herself attacked, and at twenty‑five
minutes past six another torpedo struck the Nottingham on the port side. Captain Miller had, by then, got his crew into the boats; and
about ten minutes before the ship went down the two destroyers arrived and
helped in the work of rescue, although they were, in their turn, attacked. At
ten minutes past seven the Nottingham sank, and the weather was, at the time, so thick that the Dublin was out of touch with her. It was not till seven o'clock
that the Commander‑in‑Chief received the report that she had been
hit. (He did not know definitely that she
had been torpedoed until two hours later.)

In the meantime, the density of
the haze had already suggested the need for unusual precautions. Admiral
Jellicoe thought that in the circumstances his battle cruisers were too far
ahead, and at six o'clock he ordered Admiral Beatty to close to within
signalling distance of the Grand Fleet's advanced cruiser line.

The battle cruiser fleet turned
north at a quarter past six to obey the order, and at twenty minutes to seven
was in touch with the Duke of Edinburgh.
Admiral Beatty then turned to his original course, and soon after ordered his
advanced light cruisers to close on the centre and steer for "L"
channel.

The Commander‑in‑Chief
had at this moment but very slight means of forming an estimate of the enemy's
plan. He had witnessed the attack on the Onslaught on the previous evening; his wireless room had taken in a message from the s.s. Harlost reporting an enemy submarine
to the south of him in Lat. 55 degrees 19' N., Long. 1 degrees 3' W. (18 miles north‑cast
of Blyth); and he had just heard from the Admiralty that an enemy battleship
had been located by directional wireless about 200 miles to the S.E. of him, at
twenty‑five minutes past five, in Lat. 54 degrees 19'N., Long. 4 degrees 48' E. (about
170 miles eastward of the Humber). Beyond this, and the news that the Nottingham had been torpedoed or mined ‑
he could not tell which ‑ he knew nothing. Scanty and disjointed as the
information was, it seems to have sufficed to warn him that, by pressing
straight on, he would walk into the trap which he had long expected the enemy
to lay for him; for he turned the whole fleet to the northward at seven
o'clock.

It is important that the
consequences of this movement should not be exaggerated. Had it never been
made, that is, had Admiral Jellicoe pressed on to the southward, his advanced
forces might have been in contact with Hipper's squadron between twelve and
one; but only on the supposition that the British advance was not held up
by the submarines of U‑boat line No. 1, and that Admiral Scheer held
on for Sunderland, in ignorance of the tremendous force which was steadily
approaching his communications with Germany. But it is in the last degree
improbable that the German Commander‑in‑Chief would have known
nothing of the whereabouts of our Grand Fleet until it was close upon him; and,
when once he knew that it was approaching, he would no doubt have endeavoured
to gain time. It is certain that never, if he could possibly have avoided it,
would he have joined battle with the Grand Fleet to the eastward of him, and
with the prospect of an eight‑hours' daylight battle before night could
bring him a chance of breaking away.

Aug. 19, 1916

WESTFALEN TORPEDOED

Apart from all this, Admiral
Jellicoe still had time, after turning to the northward, as he did, to bring
the enemy to action; the decisive move, which prevented the two fleets from
coming to grips, was made later on in the day by his adversary.

The Admiralty's last message, in
fact, gave Admiral Jellicoe the impression that he had even more time to spare
than was really the case. The German fleet was considerably ahead of the
position given, and the only vessel which had actually been located was the Westfalen, which was then detached from
the fleet, in serious difficulties, caused by a British torpedo.

At three o'clock, just an hour before daylight, Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Turner had been patrolling in E.23 about sixty miles to the north of
Terschelling, on a southerly course, when he became aware that a force of
vessels was passing ahead of him, steering west. In contrast to the conditions
further north, the weather was clear, with a bright moon, and E.23 had the good fortune to be right on
the track of the advancing German Fleet, in an admirable position for attacking
them. The first echelon, which was probably Admiral Boedecker with the light
cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, passed E.23 safely; but, ten minutes later, Lieutenant-Commander Turner was within
shot of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, and attacked the leading ship at
eight hundred yards. He missed, and was compelled to dive for a quarter of an
hour. At half‑past three, he rose to the surface, and sighted another
group of ships approaching him. An hour later (4.37) he had manoeuvred himself
into an attacking position, and fired at a ship which he could not identify.
His range was then between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, and he missed again; but he
sighted another squadron of battleships to the eastward, and at five o'clock
fired at the Westfalen, the last ship
in the enemy's line, and hit her. For two and a half hours he dogged the Westfalen in the hope of attacking her
again; but though he once fired his two bow tubes, at a range of 1,200 yards,
the German destroyers kept him at bay, and got their escort safely back to
Wilhelmshaven.

The damage to the Westfalen was not a serious matter, and
Admiral Scheer continued on his course towards Sunderland, receiving a
series of puzzling reports from his Zeppelins and submarines as he went. The
movements of our own squadrons must be examined somewhat closely if these
reports are to be understood.

Commodore Tyrwhitt had arrived
on the Brown Ridge by 3 a.m., and at once began patrolling it at 20 knots. At a
quarter to six he turned from a northerly to a south‑southeasterly
course; and, a few minutes later, Zeppelin L.13 was sighted on the port bow. She dogged the Harwich Force for a few minutes,
and reported to Admiral Scheer that she had sighted two flotillas and a cruiser
squadron steering in company to the south‑west. It was not until a
quarter to nine that L.13 was able to
get in touch again, and this time she reported three destroyer flotillas and a
few light cruisers steering to the north‑east. (Scheer, p. 181.) As an account of an isolated fact, this report
was sufficiently correct, for the Commodore in order to maintain his station on
the Brown Ridge, had turned to the W.S.W at seven o'clock, and to the N.N.W. at
eight. It was on this latter course that he had now been sighted and mistaken
for a new detachment. Admiral Scheer's intelligence, therefore, gave him good
reason to suppose that we had two distinct groups of light forces in the
Flanders Bight, and that each was making for a separate destination.

His news of our other forces was
equally disjointed and baffling. Admiral Jellicoe had turned to the north at
seven o'clock. A submarine was reported to the south of him almost as he did
so; but beyond this, nothing occurred during his new movement, until the Galatea, from her position at the
eastern end of the screen of light cruisers covering the retirement of the
fleet, sighted and engaged Zeppelin L.31.
The Zeppelin commander dogged us for a while, and was apparently able to make
out the battle fleet ahead of the light cruisers, for he reported that "at
9.50" our main fleet was steering to the north‑eastwards from a
position Lat. 55 degrees 35' N., Long. 0 degrees 35' E. (about eighty miles east‑north‑east
of Blyth); but that he had lost sight of it in the rain squalls . (This signal is very difficult to explain,
because all our forces had turned to the southward by 9.50.)

In addition to this, Admiral
Scheer knew, from the wireless station at Neumuenster, that the Grand Fleet was
at sea. He also heard, at about this time, that U.53, working on U‑boat line No. 1, had sighted "three
large vessels, and four light cruisers on a northerly course, at ten minutes
past eight"; and, soon after, that U.52 had fallen in with four light cruisers on a northerly course, and had sunk one
of them, at seven o'clock.

He could thus be certain that
there were considerable forces to the north of him, with apparently two light
squadrons, in the Flanders Bight; and as far as he could tell, they were
steering away from one another and away from him. These reports, he complains,
gave him "no unified picture of the

Aug. 19, 1916

THE FLEETS APPROACH

enemy's counter‑measures";
and, as he saw no reason to alter his plan, he held on with the whole fleet
towards Sunderland.

Admiral Jellicoe had thus
completely screened his movements by his turn north at seven o'clock. He
continued the retirement for about two hours, and shortly after nine, as no
submarines had been reported in the area through which the fleet was steaming,
turned south again and steered for the centre of "L" channel.

To the southward Commodore
Tyrwhitt continued to move to and fro on Brown Ridge. Shortly before ten
o'clock he received a message from E.23,
reparting that the enemy's light cruisers, battle cruisers and battle fleet had
been met at a spot some 70 miles north‑west of the Ems at 9.19 a.m. (The first signal intercepted by the Commander‑in‑Chief
was even more incorrectly taken in, and gave the enemy's position as Lat. 54 degrees
20' N., Long. 7 degrees E, 70 miles further east and well inside the Heligoland Bight.)

The time was, of course, quite
wrong, as by 9.20 Admiral Scheer had advanced to within 120 miles of
Sunderland; but the message, as taken in, showed the Commodore that the High
Seas Fleet was to the northward of hirn, and he at once passed it on to the
Commander‑in‑Chief, and steamed north at 20 knots to get contact
with the enemy. As the news only served to convince Admiral Jellicoe that he
had ample time to meet the German fleet, he did not alter his dispositions.

The Grand Fleet was not further
troubled by submarines; only one was sighted during the next two hours, when
the Penn reported a U‑boat, too
far off to be dangerous. On the other hand, Zeppelins were sighted without
intermission. To the fleet it seemed as though several of then, were hovering
about; but, in point of fact, there was only one, L.11, which had picked them up as they passed the latitude of
Sunderland, and was conscientiously following them. It is surprising that
Admiral Scheer received no warning from her until well after noon; on the other
hand, the reports received between ten and twelve o'clock from his Zeppelins in
the Flanders Bight caused him to alter his whole plan.

It would seem that L.13, to which the Flanders Bight area
was assigned, had by now got well ahead, for, at eleven o'clock, she was
sighted by the Harwich force as they steamed northwards. The Conquest strove to drive her off,
without much success, and between twelve and half‑past, Admiral Scheer
received two messages from the commander of L.13,
telling him that an enemy force of thirty units, consisting of sixteen
destroyers, large and small cruisers and battleships, had been moving towards
him, between, half‑past eleven and noon, from the vicinity of the Swarte
Bank. Soon after, L.13 passed into a
mass of thunder‑clouds, and so lost touch with our forces before the
commanding officer could correct his mistake.

The report that a force of
battleships and heavy cruisers were to the south of him had an immediate effect
upon Admiral Scheer. It seemed as though there were, within closing distance of
him, a force so weak that it would stand no chance if he could meet it, and yet
so important that its destruction would be a resounding victory. Everything
gave way before the chance thus offered. All thought of bombarding Sunderland
was abandoned (Scheer, p. 182.), and
the fleet was turned round to the eastward (12.23) to a course which, Admiral
Scheer estimated, would bring him into touch with the enemy to the south of him
in about two hours' time. Simultaneously the 2nd Flotilla was sent ahead to
carry out a tactical reconnaissance.

His miscalculation was complete.
In the first place, the Harwich Force, at which he was endeavouring to strike,
consisted of light cruisers and destroyers, which had the heels of him, and not
of battleships which could be brought to action; and, in the second, it was no
longer there; for Commodore Tyrwhitt, who had seen nothing of the enemy, and
had up to noon received no message modifying his original orders, had decided
that he ought to return to the station assigned to him. At 12.45 therefore he
had turned south, and was now steaming away from the German fleet at 20 knots.

Thus Admiral Scheer was
completely misled, but he was misled to his own salvation. The moment before he
decided to turn eastward the advanced screen of our battle cruisers must have
been about thirty miles from Admiral Hipper's forces; the distance between
Admiral Scheer's and Admiral Jellicoe's flagships was about sixty‑five
miles. Their two fleets were steaming at right angles, so that our advanced
screen would probably have been in contact with the rear cruisers of the High
Seas Fleet at about half‑past two; and unless Admiral Scheer had run for
home, a fleet action in our own waters would have opened between four and five.
This situation so full of imminent and vital possibilities was changed
abruptly, and by the mere chance of a faulty reconnaissance. A Zeppelin
commander who had not correctly ascertained the composition of the Harwich
Force, and had been prevented by a thunder‑storm in the upper air from
correcting his mistake, had offered to his Commander‑in‑Chief

Aug. 19, 1916

PURSUING A PHANTOM

an imaginary prey, and by
drawing him away from his original objective had given time for him to receive
warning of the approaching danger.

To Admiral Jellicoe, on the
other hand, it still seemed as though a fleet action was imminent. For nearly
three hours he continued to keep to the S.S.E., with his fleet well
concentrated. At noon he altered to a course about due south; and twenty
minutes later he ordered the Active and the 4th Flotilla to join him at three o'clock in a position eighty miles to
the east of Sunderland; and to spread the Blyth submarines on a line running
north and south from Lat. 55 degrees 00', N. Long. 0 degrees 0' (fifty miles due east of
Sunderland).

It is fairly clear that he
thought the best means of getting hold of the enemy was not to go too far from
their probable objective, the British coast; for at 12.32 he altered course to
the westward, so as to pass between the western edge of the Humber minefield
and the land. No news was coming in from his advanced forces or from the
Admiralty; but, from time to time, his wireless room picked up signals from a
fleet sweeper reporting a Zeppelin in the Sunderland area; and the ships round
him, and on the screen, were reporting that the enemy's telefunken signals were increasing in strength. He in his turn was
pursuing a phantom; there was nothing to tell him that all chance of a fleet
action which would have ended with anything like a decisive result disappeared
when the German fleet turned back at half‑past twelve. It is true that if
he had adhered to his original plan of advancing down "L" channel (It is not easy to determine to what risk the
Grand Fleet would have been exposed had the Commander‑in‑Chief gone
down "L" channel. He decided as he did because he had received
reports which located submarines in the channel at half‑past seven and
ten minutes to eleven, and because the Nottingham had been torpedoed very near
it at six o'clock. These messages doubtless referred to the outermost, or possibly
the two outermost, boats of U‑boat line No. 1. By one o'clock he was well
past them, and had nothing to fear except from U.53, which had left her station
and contrived to dog him for nearly two hours in spite of his alteration of
course.), he might have got into touch with the enemy late in the
afternoon, and might perhaps have fought a tentative and indecisive action in
the growing darkness. By one o'clock he was at the edge of the channel; but he
decided that he could not pass down it, as the reports received earlier in the
day seemed to show that it was held in strength by enemy submarines. He
therefore determined to keep on his course and enter the southern part of the
North Sea by the alternative "M" channel; and with this decision the
last chance of any kind of engagement between the two fleets vanished.

As the fleet crossed
"L" channel, the messages which came in from the advanced cruisers
must have confirmed the Commander‑in‑Chief in his opinion that it
was not safe to use it. At twenty‑five minutes past one the Minotaur reported a submarine to the
W.N.W.; twelve minutes later she reported that she had fired a shot at it; and
a little later the Achilles sighted a
U‑boat. At about 2.0 p.m. Admiral Jellicoe received a message from the
Admiralty which told him that, at half‑past twelve, Admiral Scheer's
flagship had been located in Lat. 54 degrees 32' N., Long. 1 degrees 42' E., forty miles to
the S.S.E. of the position he then occupied. Neither he nor the Admiralty had
the slightest inkling that the enemy had turned back, and it naturally seemed
to Admiral Jellicoe that a fleet action was certain. He ordered complete
readiness for action, told the attached cruisers to take up their stations for
approaching the enemy (2.5); ordered the guides of columns to bear W. 1/2 N.,
and then told the battle cruisers to proceed down "M" channel.
Finally, he directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to make for Lat. 54 degrees N., Long. 5 degrees E.
(forty miles north of Terschelling), so as to be in a position to attack the
enemy as they made back to their bases (2.35). Having thus given what he
doubtless thought would be his last orders before deploying, he signalled to
all ships with him that the High Seas Fleet might be met at any moment, and
that he had every confidence in the result (2.45).

Commodore Tyrwhitt did not at
once get Admiral Jellicoe's signal; but the orders given to the 4th Flotilla were
intercepted in the Carysfort, and
reported to him. Realising that Admiral Jellicoe was concentrating every
available destroyer under his flag, Commodore Tyrwhitt turned north again
(2.12), and held on to a course slightly to the west of north for three‑quarters
of an hour, reporting what he had done, with his reasons for doing it, to the
Commander‑in‑Chief.

For a short time after Admiral
Jellicoe had given his last orders signs of the enemy's presence increased.
Zeppelins were sighted by the Hercules and the King George V, whilst the
senior officer of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported, at twenty minutes
past two, that there were four airships in sight from his section of the
screen. None the less, seeing how close the enemy seemed to be, it must have
appeared strange to the Commander‑in‑Chief that no reports came in
from his advanced forces. At half‑past two he got his first clue to the
true position, when he received a message from the Admiralty that the High Seas
Fleet had been turning to

Aug. 19, 1916

SCHEER'S RETREAT

starboard at half‑past
twelve. At three o'clock he realised that the chance was gone, though it was
not until nearly an hour later that he got definite news from the Admiralty
that Admiral Scheer was well on his way back, and had been located in Lat. 54 degrees
14'N., Long. 2 degrees 2' E. (78 miles northeastwards of the Humber), at a
quarter to three. Admiral Jellicoe then advanced into the centre of
"M" channel, and turned the fleet to the north‑westward at four
o'clock; having previously cancelled his orders to Commodore Tyrwhitt, and
warned him that the Germans might retire by way of Terschelling (3.47).

The signals sent to the
Commodore took a long time to get through; and the delay made them puzzling and
difficult to understand. None the less the Commodore succeeded in grasping the
situation, and in the end brought his force into touch with the enemy. At three
o'clock he received Admiral Jellicoe's order to be ready to attack the Germans
as they returned to harbour, and he at once turned his squadron to the position
ordered. After he had been about an hour on his new course he received the
Commander‑in-Chief's signal cancelling the last orders given; and so
returned (4.0 p.m.) to the northerly course which he had been steering between
two and three.

Two more messages were then
reported to him: the first was from Admiral Jellicoe, warning him again that
the German fleet might be retiring by way of Terschelling; the second was the
Admiralty message stating that the German flagship had been in Lat. 54 degrees 14' N.,
Long. 2 degrees 2' E., at a quarter to three ‑ that is, seventy‑five miles
to the N.W. of the position the Harwich Force now occupied. It was not possible
to reconcile the two messages; so the Commodore decided that he had better
assume the Admiralty's observation to be correct, and held on as he was.
At about twenty minutes past five, a Zeppelin was seen ahead, and, a few
minutes later, the Lightfoot reported
that she had sighted a considerable number of large vessels steering east.
Realising that he was now gaining contact with the High Seas Fleet, the
Commodore turned south, to avoid being cut off, and when he had got enough
room, turned again and began to dog the enemy.

Admiral Scheer's rapid return
home took place as follows. After turning to the S.E. at 12.23, he received
several messages which warned him, at last, that whatever smaller forces might
be in the direction reported, the Grand Fleet itself was not far off. The first
message, from U.53, stated that our
main fleet had been about seventy‑five miles to the east of Hartlepool,
steering south, at a quarter past one, and this was fairly correct. The second,
also from U.53, reported that our
main body consisted of only ten battleships; this was not correct, and
must have confirmed Admiral Scheer in his mistaken impression that we had
divided our forces, leaving a fairly powerful squadron to the south of him. The
third was from Zeppelin L.11, which
told him that "single (einzelne)
enemy forces" had been in about the same area at a quarter past two, also
steering south.

These reports, though not
accurate or clear, were enough to warn Admiral Scheer that our main fleet was
to the northward of him, and that he ought to get into contact as quickly as
possible with the force at which he intended to strike, as time was running
short. Unfortunately, no further news was coming in from the Zeppelins in the
Flanders Bight; and, at half‑past two, he felt that his southerly course
had taken him so far towards the German minefield in the Outer Silver Pit, that
he could not approach it much further while the possibility of his being forced
to a fleet action was still impending from the north. He kept on until a
quarter past three, and then turned the fleet to the E.N.E. and began to make
for home. At about four o'clock, he learned from the Zeppelins and submarines
to the northward of him that our main fleet had turned to the north‑westward.
An hour and three‑quarters later he sighted the Harwich Force. When it
was seen that Commodore Tyrwhitt's force intended to follow him, Admiral Scheer
took the precaution to make ready for severe night fighting. His experiences on
the night of May 31 left him in no doubt that the best way of dealing with
destroyer attacks at night was to preserve the order of his main squadrons, and
to form a screen in the direction from which the attack was likely to come. He
therefore stationed a powerful group of destroyers at the end of his line, and
held on as he was, without detaching a force to drive us off.

The Commodore followed them
until he received a signal from Admiral Jellicoe, stating that the Grand Fleet
was too far off to give him any support. Realising that by attacking he could
not delay the German fleet sufficiently to provoke a fleet action, he turned
away, and soon afterwards received orders to return to his base. Admiral Scheer
returned to harbour unmolested, receiving good news of what was going on
further north, during the Grand Fleet's retirement.

When Admiral Jellicoe turned to
the north‑westward at four o'clock he was certain "that the enemy
would either

Aug. 19, 1916

FALMOUTH TORPEDOED

have laid mines after turning,
or have left submarines over which the fleet would pass," and, therefore,
thought that it would be "very unadvisable to pass over waters which he
had occupied." There was certainly good reason for supposing that he
was approaching a danger zone ‑ at twenty minutes past three the Hercules reported a submarine; twenty‑five
minutes later she reported another, and followed it by a further message that
yet another had been sighted by the Dublin.
The fleet were formed in cruising disposition No. 5 when they moved up
"M" channel. The light cruiser squadrons, which were covering the
rear, were spread on a line running E.N.E. and W.S.W., with a distance of
between three and five miles between the groups. Zeppelins L.11 and L.31 were
following us closely, and at about a quarter to five, the ships of the 3rd
Light Cruiser Squadron engaged them.

There seemed, for the moment, to
be only one submarine about; but it was obviously in a dangerous position. At
the eastern end of the screen the Dublin had reported it to the N.W. some time after four o'clock, adding that it was
"no immediate menace to any ship." This was true; but it was none the
less on the track over which the light cruiser squadrons should pass; and at a
quarter to five, as the Falmouth was
turning back to close the Chatham after engaging a Zeppelin, she was torpedoed. Lieutenant‑Commander
von Bothmer in submarine U.66 had
done the work: he had been stationed on the Flamborough Head line and sighted
the battle cruisers on their southerly course before four o'clock. He dogged
them very tenaciously for the next hour, and our turn to the north‑westward
gave him his opportunity. (Scheer, p.
183.)

The Falmouth was struck on the starboard side by two torpedoes fired at
a range of less than 1,000 yards. The Chester was working with her on the screen; and as the distance between the pairs of
cruisers had been reduced for passing up "M" channel, the Chatham was not far off. The Birmingham, which was the next ship to
the eastward, had apparently not yet closed up and was out of visual touch.

When Admiral Beatty got news of
the disaster, he ordered the destroyers Pasley, Negro and Pelican to assist the Falmouth,
and told the Rear‑Admiral East Coast of England to send tugs at once; he
then warned the light cruisers that they were not to be risked, and that the
work of rescue was to be left to the destroyers.

As the distance between the
battle cruisers and the screen was not very great, the destroyers were on the
scene a few minutes after the disaster; but, prompt as they were, the armed
trawler Cooksin had already gone
alongside the Falmouth and taken off
all the officers and men not required for working the ship.

Lieutenant‑Commander von
Bothmer held his ground in the most determined fashion. His submarine was
repeatedly attacked by the escorting destroyers; a depth charge put out all her
lights, and made the water flow in so fast that the crew gave themselves up for
lost; yet it was only at about seven o'clock that he sheered off, after firing
several more torpedoes which only missed their target by a narrow margin.

The Chatham and Chester remained near the Falmouth for over
an hour, and then steamed off, as the Vice‑Admiral's orders had been
peremptory. When they left, there was good reason to hope that the Falmouth would reach harbour, as she
could make headway, and was on an even keel. Throughout the night she proceeded
under her own steam at 2 knots; and was joined at 11 p.m. by four destroyers of
the 4th Flotilla, which had been detached by the Commander‑in‑Chief.
In the early morning one of the tugs from Immingham arrived and took her in
tow; and by 9 a.m. the second tug appeared and gave further assistance.

Unfortunately, the direct route
to the Humber took the Falmouth right
along the Flamborough Head U‑boat line, and at noon U.63 fell in with her, and fired two more torpedoes, both of which
went home. As the Falmouth was then
being escorted by eight destroyers, it must have required a high degree of
skill and courage to bring off the attack. Even so, the Falmouth kept afloat all the afternoon, and it was not until eight
hours after the last torpedo had struck her that she went down, only five miles
from the shelving beach on the southern side of Flamborough Head.

The fleet's movement up
"M" channel between 4 p.m. and dark is a fair test of the degree of
risk incurred by a large force when it moves over an infested area. Their north‑westerly
course carried the battle squadrons straight towards the line which the U‑boats
off Blyth had been ordered to occupy, and everything favoured the enemy submarines.
In order to keep inside the channel our screens were closed up; the spaces
between the squadrons were considerably less than those prescribed for the
formation in which they were then cruising; and as the channel was narrow, the
ships could not zigzag freely. The whole target was at once massed and
hampered. Without counting the submarine

Aug. 19, 1916

POLICY REVISED

which torpedoed the Falmouth, eleven reports of U‑boats
in dangerous positions came in to the flagship between 4 and 9 p.m. Sometimes
the danger to our ships was very great, as, for instance, when a submarine was
sighted 400 yards from the Galatea (5.20), or when, at ten minutes to eight, two torpedoes passed close astern of
the Inflexible. By about half‑past
eight the fleet had got clear; and the squadrons were dispersed to their bases
during the next day; but the experience seems to have made a strong impression
on the Conimander‑in‑Chief.

The U‑boats which harassed
our retreat were under the belief that they had done more damage than was
really the case. Lieutenant‑ Commander von Bothmer realised that he had
only damaged the Falmouth, but, for
some unexplained reason, thought that he had sunk a destroyer; while the
captain of U 65, who fired at the Inflexible,
was convinced that he had succeeded in hitting her. Admiral Scheer, therefore,
took his fleet back into harbour under an exaggerated impression of the losses
he had inflicted, and wrote the mistaken account which appears without
correction in his book.

To Admiral Jellicoe it appeared
as though the enemy had perfected the game which he had so long expected them
to play.

He was persuaded that Admiral
Scheer's operations had been designed to draw the fleet over submarines, and
that unless we could protect our light cruisers with destroyer screens we
should suffer heavy losses by striving to bring the enemy to action whenever he
left harbour. More than that, he was convinced that the enemy had discovered
the position of "L" and "M" channels, and urged that a new
channel should be swept without delay. (Admiral
Scheer, however, does not mention our swept channels.)

These were his immediate
proposals. The consequences of the day's events upon our North Sea policy were
more far reaching. Since the war began, it had seemed that we should always
have a fair chance of bringing the enemy to action if he raided our coasts in
force, and the opinion had been strengthened by the knowledge that, with the
exception of the sortie which ended in the Dogger Bank action, the German light
forces never put to sea for any considerable operation without the support of
the High Seas Fleet. For this reason, we had invariably moved our whole forces
whenever they seemed to be stirring.

Admiral Jellicoe now thought
that this policy needed drastic revision. He could no longer undertake without
an adequate destroyer screen to guarantee coastal towns against bombardment, or
to interfere with the early stages of a landing, and he strongly urged that the
plan of disregarding the submarine and mine menace and "seeking the enemy
in any locality, whenever he was known to be at sea" was no longer
tenable.

Hitherto, it had been understood
that we ought not to seek action inside the area bounded by the latitude of
Horn Reefs and the 5th meridian. Admiral Jellicoe now proposed an extension of
the zone, and stated that, in his opinion, the fleet ought not to operate in
the area to the south of Lat. 55 degrees 30' N. and the east of Long. 4 degrees E.:
experience had shown that waters so far to the eastward could not be properly
watched by our cruisers.

With regard to the waters to the
west of Long. 4 degrees E., he was of the opinion that the fleet might enter them, and
take the risk of mines, if a really good opportunity offered of bringing the
enemy to action during daylight; but, so long as there was any danger from
submarines, the fleet ought not to be taken south of the Dogger Bank, unless every
class of vessel were protected by submarine screens.

These proposals meant that the
duty of defending the North Sea and the British coasts south of Sunderland was,
henceforth, to devolve in general upon the local defence flotillas, the Humber
and the Harwich forces, and the 3rd Battle Squadron. Admiral Jellicoe made it
quite clear that his proposals were independent of whether the fleet was based
at Rosyth or Scapa; and that only if he could be given more destroyers would he
be willing to reconsider his decision. The Admiralty endorsed these opinions,
and new orders were issued to the Grand Fleet. Drastic and far reaching as they
sound, there was in them nothing for which the Admiralty were unprepared.

In March, Sir Henry Oliver,
Chief of the Staff, had admitted that, so long as the Grand Fleet was based on
Scapa, there was little chance of a fleet action, and the First Sea Lord had
expressed the same view, though more emphatically. In April, the Chief of the
Staff stated that the enemy practically commanded the North Sea south of the
Tyne, and was repeatedly making sweeps on the Dogger Bank which we could not
counter; it had for long been realised that the Grand Fleet could not be in
time to interfere seriously with the opening stages of a raid in force.

The operations on August 19 were
thus the culminating point of a discussion which had been going on for six
months and a practical test of the opinions that it had provoked.

Aug. 19, 1916

A NO‑MAN'S SEA

These revised orders to the
fleet are a register of the striking change introduced into the war at sea by
the tactical use of submarines. At this stage, in the absence of effective
counter‑measures, they had for the time so restricted the movements of a
fleet of super‑Dreadnoughts ‑ each one of which could steam for
several thousands of miles without re‑fuelling ‑ that the waters
opposite one‑third of the eastern coastline of Great Britain, and about
half of the North Sea, were outside its zone of effective action. On the other
hand, the Germans were as short of submarines as we were of destroyers, so that
Admiral Scheer was also denied the use of these waters: his system of fleet
scouting and reconnaissance made too heavy a call upon the total of U‑boats
available for all purposes. By October, when, through the tireless efforts of
Admiral von Holtzendorff, a new submarine campaign against commerce had been
got well under way, the Ems and the Flanders flotillas were no longer at the
service of Admiral Scheer as watching outposts for the fleet during a sortie. A
deadlock had thus been reached, and it seemed that for the future the two great
battle fleets could but lie inactive, watching one another across a kind of
"No‑Man's Sea," where attack and defence were concerned only
with transport and commerce.

The position, however, was much
more interesting than it seemed, for it was always possible that of the two new
policies which were causing the stalemate, one at any rate might be abandoned,
perhaps temporarily and for some special reason. Admiral Scheer might at a
critical moment receive orders, or obtain leave, to attempt a fresh sortie with
or without the necessary submarines. It would then be seen whether the British
Admiralty would stand by their policy of restraint, or would try once more to
bring the High Seas Fleet to action by the old method.

The situation did, in fact,
develop on these lines, and the result was exactly what might have been
expected. The move came naturally from the Germans, for the strain of the
deadlock told more heavily upon them; it was our commerce, and not theirs,
which was at sea, and Admiral Scheer, still thinking of the prestige of his
battle fleet, was evidently reluctant to forgo the minor successes he had hoped
for. Though he could not have the U‑boats, he might possibly contrive to
do something without them; and accordingly, just two months after his last
effort, he made a final attempt to combine the tentative fleet policy in the
North Sea with the new submarine campaign.

During the afternoon of October
18, the Admiralty took in the accustomed signs of an impending sortie; but
their order to Admiral Jellicoe only instructed him to put the fleet under
short notice for steam. There had been no signs of submarine activity during
the 15th and 16th; but on the 18th, when the German fleet was making ready,
reports came in of submarines off St. Abbs, Girdleness, the Shetlands and the
Long Forties. The activity reported was not in any way abnormal; and had there
been any reason to suppose that Admiral Scheer was moving southward, the Grand
Fleet would doubtless have put to sea. As it was, the Admiralty stood rigidly
on their revised orders, and the burden of resisting the impending raid was
thrown entirely upon the local defence forces. Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered
to take his force to sea and to assemble to the west of the North Hinder, the
Vice‑Admiral of the 3rd Battle Squadron was sent into the Swin, and the
submarines from the Blyth and Tyne flotillas were moved to a line covering the
coastline between Sunderland and Newcastle.

Admiral Scheer left harbour at
about midnight, and moved out into the central part of the North Sea, with his
flanks covered by a widely spread destroyer screen. His objective was still
quite unknown, and, in order to provide against every contingency, Admiral
Jellicoe ordered the Weymouth, the Melbourne, the Achilles and the Minotaur,
and four destroyers from Cromarty, to watch for raiders at the northern end of
the North Sea. (They were to spread and
cruise between the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth and the approaches
to the Hardhanger Fiord, Norway.) Just before half‑past eight on the
morning of the 19th the High Seas Fleet was at last satisfactorily located: it
was then about fifty‑five miles north‑west of Ameland, steering
north‑west. Admiral Scheer had thus taken his fleet into the zone which
was being patrolled by our overseas submarine flotillas, and he was soon aware
of it.

Lieutenant‑Commander John
de Burgh Jessop left Harwich in E.38 for the patrol to the north of Ameland on October 13, and maintained his
station for five days ‑ often in very bad weather ‑ without
sighting anything. On October 19, at a quarter to six in the morning, he
saw a large number of heavy ships to the eastward, on a westerly course, and
steered to the northward to cut them off. In this he was unsuccessful; for at
half‑past six he had the disappointment of seeing the German battle
cruisers steer past him, with the Moltke at the rear of the line. Twenty minutes later, however, he sighted more vessels
to the eastward, steering straight towards him. As they approached, he made
them out to

Oct. 19, 1916

MUENCHEN TORPEDOED

be light cruisers, accompanied
by a destroyer screen. A few minutes later he contrived to penetrate it by a
very fine piece of manoeuvring, and attacked at a distance of about half a
mile. Unfortunately his periscope dipped just as he was about to fire, and he
was compelled to loose his torpedoes blindly. They missed, and when he rose to
the surface again, he found that the whole German battle fleet was steering
past him. It was then about half‑past seven, and, in spite of his
constant eflorts to bring his boat within firing distance of the battle
squadrons, he was again disappointed; for at a few minutes before eight he saw
the last of the battleships pass him out of range. About half an hour went by
before he saw another chance: a three‑funnelled light cruiser was then
approaching him; but, as she was screened by no fewer than four destroyers, the
difficulty of bringing off a successful attack was as great as ever. None the
less, he contrived, once again, to get between the escort and the target, and
at about a quarter to nine, three hours after he had sighted the first echelon
of the German fleet, he got in a successful shot. As he sank to the bottom, he
heard the detonation of the two torpedoes which he had fired from his bow
tubes. (Lieutenant‑Commander Jessop
attacked another German light cruiser about an hour later; returned finally to
his patrol station and attacked a German submarine on the following day. He was
given the D.S.O. for these exploits.)

The Admiralty learned, early in
the forenoon, that the Muenchen had
been successfully attacked; but the afternoon passed with no further news of
the German fleet; and it was not until five o'clock that Admiral Scheer was
again located: he was then about ninety miles north‑west of Heligoland,
steering for the entrance of the Horn Reefs channel, with the obvious intention
of returning to harbour. The defence forces along the British coast were at once
ordered to "resume normal conditions."

This ended the series of fleet
sorties, on which Admiral Scheer had been basing his hopes. He evidently
decided that his new system of fleet reconnaissance was unworkable, and that
the fleet could not move freely in the North Sea without the watching outposts
of submarines which had become so important a part of his system. They were no
longer available, and the October sortie was not repeated.

CHAPTER III

HOME WATERS

October 1916 to February 1917

WE have already noted (See Vol. III, p. 302.) that among the
risks which the Admiralty had continually in mind was the possibility of an
attempt to force the defences of the Dover Straits. After the battle of
Jutland, the prospects of any such enterprise were, no doubt, less favourable,
for the damaged condition of the High Seas Fleet made it for some months
unequal to the necessary covering operations for a serious attack, and the
opinions expressed by Admirals Scheer and von Holtzendorff behind the
scenes were not long in bringing about the official decision by which its
action was for the future restricted to supporting the submarine campaign. On
the other hand, the pressure of necessity lay heavy upon the Germans; our anti‑submarine
dispositions were being systematically extended and were becoming oppressive to
the U‑boats. These dispositions might be interfered with by a limited
offensive, and at the same time apprehension and loss might be caused among our
transport and merchant shipping if the German Command were prepared to risk
unsupported light forces under cover of darkness. On these somewhat tentative
principles a raiding attack was decided upon, and Captain Andreas Michelsen,
the Commodore of the High Seas Fleet flotillas, left Germany for Zeebrugge with
the 3rd and 9th Flotillas during the night of October 23:

The
3rd Flotilla was composed of the 5th and 6th Half Flotillas, which were made up
as follows:

5th
Half Flotilla V.71 (leader), V.73, V.81, G 88, V.67, V.68, V.47.

6th
Half Flotilla S.55 (leader), S.53, S.54, G.42, V.70, G.91; each of
these destroyers was armed with three 4‑inch guns and six torpedo tubes.

The
9th Flotilla was composed of the 17th and 18th Half Flotillas, which were made
up as follows:

17th
Half Flotilla: V.79 (leader), V.80, V.60, S.51, S.52, S 36.

18th
Half Flotilla: V.30, V.28, V.26, S 34, S
33; each of these destroyers was armed with three 4‑1‑inch
guns or three 22‑pounders, and six torpedo tubes.

The Admiralty realised that some
naval movement was afoot, and assumed that it would take place in the Flanders
Bight.

Oct. 24, 1916

THE THREATENED POINTS

They therefore telegraphed to
Admiral Jellicoe to have the fleet under short notice for steam; and at a
quarter to seven, Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to assemble his forces to the
east of the North Hinder lightship; at the same time the whole East coast was
warned to prepare for a "naval raid south." Commodore Tyrwhitt was at
the North Hinder by about one o'clock on the 24th; but Michelsen hugged the
coast all night, passed the Maas light‑vessel at about 2.0 a.m., and our
forces never got into contact.

The Admiralty now realised that the Dover area was threatened, and sent two warning telegrams to Vice‑Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, telling him that a force of destroyers - one flotilla ‑
had arrived at Zeebrugge, and that the French had recently reported a
concentration of armed barges on the Ostend‑Bruges Canal. This new turn
of events came as a complete surprise; for the Germans had held the Belgian
ports for two years without attempting to use them as anything but submarine
bases. As the information seemed to show that the enemy were at last about to
make a serious move in the Nieuport sector, the Admiralty ordered Commodore
Tyrwhitt at Harwich to reinforce the Dover Command with a light cruiser
and four destroyers.

This reinforcement (Carysfort, Laforey, Liberty, Lucifer and Laurel) arrived at Dover on the 25th, and Admiral Bacon had then to
decide how he could best distribute his forces between the numerous objectives
which lay open to the enemy. Besides the seaward flank of the Allied armies,
which seemed immediately threatened, he had to make a provision for
defending the route between Beachy Head and the Downs, the mass of shipping
which collected every night in the Downs anchorage, the barrage and the
drifters watching it, and the transport route behind the barrage, between
Folkestone and Boulogne. Of these targets the Downs appeared to him the most
important, for it was there that the food supplies of the capital were
assembled. The political effect of a serious and sustained raid against this
central point of our vast network of communications would hardly have been less
than that caused by the Dutch expedition to the Medway in 1667; and it might
easily have been accompanied by an acute food shortage, lasting for several
days when the ferment was at its hottest. The barrage was less important; but
it had been established at a very great expenditure of material and labour, and
was at the time looked upon as a powerful and effective obstruction to the
German submarines. The net, which began at the South Calliper, on the southern
end of the Goodwins, and ran to the south‑western end of the Outer
Ruytingen, was guarded by a large number of drifters. These boats worked in groups
of from six to eight, and to each group a section of the barrage was allotted;
they were unarmed, except for a few rifles, and were not fitted with wireless
apparatus.

Forces
under command of Vice‑Admiral, Dover, October 26, 1916:

6th
Destroyer Flotilla:

Light
Cruiser, Attentive.

Light
Cruiser, Carysfort (detached from
Harwich).

Flotilla
Leader, Swift.

32
Destroyers (seven under repair):

8
"L" class, 29 knots, 900‑1,000 tons (detached from Harwich).

11 "F" class ("Tribals"), 33 knots, 900‑1,000
tons.

13 "B," "C," "E"
classes, 30 knots, 400-600 tons.

12
Monitors (three under repair):

Three 15‑inch; five 12‑inch; four 7.5‑inch.

1 Gunboat.

3 Torpedo Boats (one under repair).

8 "P" class boats (two under repair).

5 "Racecourse" Paddle Minesweepers (built in 1916).

5th
Submarine Flotilla:

Light
Cruiser, Arrogant.

10
"C"-class Submarines (four under repair).

Seaplane
Carrier, Riviera.

Auxiliary
Patrol:

2
Yachts.

78
Trawlers (56 fitted with minesweep).

10
Paddle Minesweepers (old).

130
Net Drifters.

24 Motor Launches.

5 Motor Boats.

Plan - The Dover Straits Barrage

The Vice‑Admiral did not
believe that the cross‑channel route or the traffic lane to the west of
the barrage was seriously threatened, and though he kept a force in hand to
protect them if need be, he placed them last in order of importance. His
position was none the less a very difficult one. To begin with, the forces at
his disposal were inadequate even to the ordinary work of the station, and
at this moment the strain was making itself felt. The U‑boats had been
very active during the previous week, and he had, in consequence, been
compelled to double the number of ships engaged in escort and patrol duties;
while the light cruiser Attentive had
her boilers open for cleaning. He could not attempt to direct operations by
going to sea himself; his problem was one of defence, and could only be solved
by his remaining ashore at the telephone centre and signal station. There he
must wait in the black darkness of a raid‑night, with lights out and
windows open, to hear the sound of gunfire or to receive the reports of it from
the many stations strung on the long line between Beachy Head and the North
Foreland.

Oct. 26, 1916

ADMIRAL BACON'S DISPOSITIONS

or Dunkirk. His decisions must
be doubly embarrassed, both by his knowledge of the many vulnerable points
which he had to defend, and his complete ignorance of the force and direction
of the enemy's attack.

On the 26th, then, Admiral
Bacon, in the belief that the Belgian coast and the Downs were most probably
the threatened points, distributed his ships accordingly over the area of his
command. The Laforey's division he
ordered to Dunkirk to reinforce the Swift, Syren, Racehorse, Falcon and Myrmidon, which were already there. They were not to leave until the
evening and would, in crossing, serve as a night patrol for the barrage. The Lawford's division he sent to the Downs,
where they arrived during the afternoon and anchored; the "Tribal"
destroyer Zulu, and two "P"
boats, he ordered to patrol the traffic route, and the 30knotter, Flirt, he sent out to support the
drifters on the barrage. He kept six "Tribal" destroyers ‑ the Viking, Mohawk, Tartar, Nubian, Amazon and Cossack ‑ under his hand at
Dover to use as a striking force if circumstances required. His remaining 30‑knotters,
the Greyhound, Mermaid, Kangaroo and Gipsy, were formed into a general
reserve. These dispositions inevitably left all the probable points of attack,
except perhaps the Dunkirk area, where five monitors were stationed in addition
to the destroyers, guarded by much weaker forces than Commodore Michelsen's two
flotillas; but Admiral Bacon hoped that each detachment was in sufficient
strength to delay or hold up the enemy until reinforcements arrived.

The Admiralty received no
information of the enemy's intentions or movements after the 24th, and two days
later Commodore Michelsen left Zeebrugge at dusk to raid the Straits.

The 9th Flotilla (17th and 18th Half Flotillas) was
ordered to raid the transport line between Dover and Calais, and the 3rd (5th and 6th Half Flotillas) to operate
against the drifters and the barrage.

The
target open to the enemy's attack ‑ that is, the transports, supply
ships, etc., which were actually at sea in the Channel during the night of
October 26/27 ‑ were as follows:

Vessels

sailing from

15

Southampton for Havre, Rouen and Boulogne.

7

the Thames for Havre and Calais.

5

Littlehampton for Rouen.

1

Portland for Dunkirk.

2

Dover for Boulogne.

7

Newhaven for Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, St. Valery.

7

Calais for Newhaven, Barry, Dover, Deptford.

1

Boulogne for Newhaven.

7

Rouen for Southampton, Barry, Newhaven.

2

Dieppe for Newhaven and Havre.

3

Havre for Southampton.

A distinct area of operations
was, however, assigned to each half
flotilla: the 17th was to attack all transports and destroyers to the north
and west of the Varne, the 18th was to search the Pas de Calais. The operation
zone of the 3rd Flotilla was divided by a line joining the Colbart and the
Sandettie shoals; the area to the north of the line was allotted to the 5th
Half Flotilla, which Commodore Michelsen led in person; the area to the south
of it was allotted to the 6th. The 9th Flotilla left Zeebrugge at 5.30 p.m.,
and was followed, three‑quarters of an hour later, by the 3rd. The
vessels of each flotilla remained concentrated until they reached a point about
twenty miles E. by N. of the Goodwin Sands, where they divided. The 9th
Flotilla arrived at the dispersing point at about twenty minutes past eight,
and the two half flotillas at once set course for their zones of operation; the
3rd Flotilla reached the point just after nine o'clock and also dispersed.

On the British side, Admiral
Bacon's orders were being carried out with equal regularity. Lieutenant R.
Kellett left Dover in the Flirt shortly
after eight in the evening and steered towards the south‑western end of
the Outer Ruytingen at 12 knots; the Laforey's division, which left at about the same time, went on at 20 knots and was soon
out of sight. (See Map 2.) Both the Laforey's and the Flirt's course converged with the German line of advance, and the
Germans soon became aware that there were British forces about. At twenty
minutes past nine, as the 18th Half Flotilla was steaming along the northern
side of the Outer Ruytingen, the German look‑out men reported four
British destroyers to port, steaming on an opposite course. They were, of
course, the Laforey's division
crossing to Dunkirk, and if the British look‑outs had sighted the German
destroyers, at least one division of the raiders would have been located and
fought very early in the evening; but the German destroyers were not reported,
and the Laforey's division steamed on
to the Dunkirk anchorage, unaware that the enemy were so close at hand.

About a quarter of an hour later
the 18th Half Flotilla was sighted by the Flirt.
At 9.35, some time after she had passed the light‑buoy three miles
distant on her starboard beam, the officer of the watch sighted and challenged
a number of destroyers on his port beam. They repeated the signal which he had
made, and disappeared in the darkness. The incident did not rouse Lieutenant
Kellett's suspicions. He thought it probable that his ship and the

others had sighted and
challenged simultaneously, that the Laforey's
division had turned back and that he had passed

Oct. 26

HEAVY LOSSES

them; he therefore held on as he
was and made no report to headquarters. The Germans made a brief alteration of
course and then hurried on towards the transport line, still unreported,
although they had now twice been in contact with British outpost forces. The
two half flotillas of the 3rd Flotilla were now approaching the barrage, which
was guarded by four drifter divisions ‑ the 8th, 10th and 16th were to
the north and west of the Flirt, and
the 15th to the eastward. The 5th Half Flotilla, led by Commodore Michelsen,
was the first of the German detachments to locate our barrage forces, and the
10th Division was the first group attacked. It consisted of five boats, under
the command of the Paradox, and was
watching the barrage south‑west of 7A buoy. Shortly after ten the leading
drifters sighted a number of destroyers; the strangers did not answer the
challenge, and the drifter captains, more suspicious than Lieutenant Kellett,
fired rifles at them. The leading destroyers took no notice and passed on; but
those in rear switched on searchlights and opened fire. The drifters Spotless Prince, Datum and Gleaner Of The Sea sank at once; the Waveney II was damaged and set on fire;
but the Paradox escaped and made off
to the north‑westward.

Hearing gun‑fire to the
north and west of him, Lieutenant Kellett turned the Flirt back at about twenty minutes past ten and steered towards the
flashes of the guns. His course carried him straight towards the 6th Half
Flotilla, which, as we have seen, was ordered to operate on the eastern side of
the barrage against the drifter divisions patrolling the French side of the
Straits. In a few minutes he fell in with them. He was still unaware of the
real position, and was under the impression that the drifters were attacking a
German submarine which was attempting to pass the barrage. Shortly after
half‑past ten, the Waveney II was sighted ahead, and when the searchlight was turned on her she was seen to
be lying stopped in a cloud of smoke and steam; almost simultaneously
destroyers, which were assumed to be French, were sighted on the Flirt's beam. Seeing men in the water,
Lieutenant Kellett stopped, and lowered a boat. As the boat got clear of the
ship, the Germans opened fire on the Flirt,
and she sank in a few minutes; only the boat's crew and the officer in charge
escaped with their lives.

Meanwhile, news of the raid had
come through to Dover and Dunkirk. Commander W. H. Owen, R.N.R., in the yacht Ombra, was the first to give the alarm. He
was somewhere near No. 11A buoy when the 10th Drifter Division was
attacked; and as soon as he sighted gun flashes to the west‑ward of him,
he reported by wireless (at 10.30 p.m.) that there were "enemy warships 20
miles east of Dover." His signal was confirmed a few minutes later by a
message from Calais which ran: "We observe flashes, apparently gun‑fire,
to the north of Calais from the sea." Admiral Bacon at once passed on the Ombra's signal to Dunkirk and set his
available forces in motion. At 10.50 the "Tribal" destroyers, Viking, Mohawk, Tartar, Nubian, Cossack and Amazon, were ordered to slip and
proceed; five minutes later the commodore at Dunkirk was ordered to send out
the Laforey's division.

(The Carysfort's fires were banked at two
hours' notice. On receiving orders to "prepare to slip," her captain
reported that he was "raising steam with all despatch" and would
require an hour and a quarter. Later, he reported that he would be ready by
twenty minutes past twelve, and was ordered, in reply, to patrol between
Folkestone and Gris Nez. This order was subsequently cancelled (12.45 a.m.) by
another which ran: "You are to patrol with four destroyers between the
South Goodwin and No. 9A buoy. It is possible that French submarines may be out
to eastward of the line joining 9A buoy to the N.E. Varne buoy." The Carysfort left harbour shortly
afterwards; but took no part in the action. She assisted, however, in the
search for damaged vessels. See p. 53.)

As these second orders were sent
out, Commander Owen sent in a further signal that the forces he had previously
reported were "apparently three destroyers firing at object north of
me." After sending in his first message he had steamed westwards, and at
eleven o'clock was trying to get into touch with the 16th Drifter Division to
warn them of the danger.

Meanwhile, the two half
flotillas of the 9th Flotilla, which had crossed the barrage about an hour
before and had slipped past our outpost forces, were getting near the transport
line between Dover and the French ports. As they approached the Straits (10.30
to 11.0 p.m.), four British vessels were particularly exposed. Patrol Boat P.34 was on duty to the north‑westward
of the Varne; the hospital ship Jan
Breydel was crossing to Boulogne, and was still in the Gris Nez area,
making for Dover; the empty transport Queen was also on her way back from Boulogne, and was between the Varne and the
French side; another hospital ship, the St.
Denis, was steering for Boulogne, and was still on the northern side of the
Straits. The transports which were to cross to Boulogne during the night were,
apparently, still well down the Channel and out of danger. The 17th and 18th
Half Flotillas pressed well on into the Straits, and found nothing; at a
quarter to eleven the 17th reached the southern end of the Colbart, and turned
back; the 18th steamed on a little further, and turned north‑east at a
few minutes after eleven. The Jan Breydel was the first to sight them: at

Oct. 26‑27, 1916

MORE DRIFTERS SUNK

about eleven o'clock, when she
was about seven miles northwest of Grisnez, she sighted a group of
destroyers which must have been the 17th Half Flotilla. They were to the southward
of her, and were crossing her bows. Her captain was unable to signal the news,
as he was in charge of a hospital ship, bound by international law to take no
part in any warlike operation. Shortly after this, the transport Queen and the hospital ship St. Denis passed one another, near the
Varne, on opposite courses. It was noticed from the St. Denis that the Queen was burning all her navigation lights, and was being followed by five
destroyers. The captain of the St. Denis suspected nothing, and steamed on towards Boulogne. When the two ships had
passed, the German destroyers steamed rapidly up on each side of the Queen, and stopped her. An officer from V.80 came on board, and allowed the
captain and the crew to get into the boats; the Queen was then sunk by gunfire. The German 17th Half Flotilla then
continued its course for home. This second attack, which took place between
eleven o'clock and half‑past, was accompanied by a fresh onslaught
against the drifters on the barrage.

The 5th Half Flotilla was again
responsible for the new attack. Towards eleven o'clock this half flotilla was
about three miles east of the South Sand Head, right on the track of any
drifter division that might be returning to Dover after the general alarm had
been given. Commander Owen was, in fact, doing everything in his power to
spread the alarm. After giving his first warning, he succeeded in getting into
touch with the 16th Division and ordering them back to Dover. Whilst he was
doing so, the 8th Division, which was still further to the westward, was
attacked (11.10), and lost two vessels; and a quarter of an hour later, the
westerly course of the 16th Division brought it also in contact with the
raiding destroyers. After two drifters had been sunk and one other severely
damaged, the 16th Division got clear and made towards the Goodwins: at great
risk to himself, the captain of the leading boat sent up rockets to spread the
alarm. Commander Owen managed to send in a further signal about this second
outburst. Whilst going westwards with the 16th Division, he sighted two German
destroyers ahead of him. He turned back to avoid them, and so lost touch with
the drifters; but soon afterwards (11.35 p.m.) got a signal through to Dover.

Admiral Bacon's dispositions
were, however, interfered with for a time by two mistakes, both due to modern
instruments of transmission, which confused the orders given to the Lawford and her division. He had
intended that these ships should not leave the Downs area, but that the Laforey's division should support the
"Tribals" and close the enemy. The order sent to Commander K. Kiddle,
the Depot Commander, was that the Lawford's division should "weigh and keep a good look‑out." Commander
Kiddle, quite properly, in sending on this message added the latest information
then available, so that the order as actually sent to the Lawford at 11.17 ran as follows: "Urgent. Enemy's warships
reported twenty miles east of Dover. Weigh and keep a good look‑out.
'Tribals' from Dover and Laforey's division from Dunkirk are closing that position." The order was either
wrongly transmitted or wrongly read: in the message as handed to Lieutenant‑Commander
A. A. Scott, the commanding officer of the Lawford, the word "warships" appeared as
"airships." He took this part of the order as the explanation of his
duties being limited to lookout work; and when later he intercepted a message
from P.34, sent after picking up the
crew of the Queen shortly before midnight,
he decided that he was justified in leaving the Downs, now that he knew enemy
destroyers to be present. He therefore steered to the eastward and asked for
instructions (12.30 a.m.). Admiral Bacon gave the order for him to "return
to the Downs forthwith." But here occurred the second mistake: the name Lawford on the telephone was misheard as Laforey, and the order was dispatched
to the latter instead of the former. As things turned out, no harm came of this
confusion: the Laforey's division had
left Dunkirk between 11.0 and 11.15 p.m.; by midnight it had passed the Dyck on
its proper errand. The Lawford's division had, on the other hand, cleared the South Goodwins and made eastwards
towards Dunkirk. If the enemy in their absence had turned into the Downs after
crossing the barrage, this second failure in the transmission of an order would
have been disastrous.

These mistakes may be set aside
as inevitable and instructive. The real misfortune of the night was the
failure of our concentration to hold and punish the raiders.

The "Tribal"
destroyers had been ordered to "Slip and proceed out of harbour, Viking taking charge." The senior
officer in the Viking evidently did
not construe this message as an order to keep his force concentrated, for his
detachment left harbour in two sub‑divisions. The Viking, the Mohawk and
the Tartar left by the western
entrance and concentrated outside; the Nubian, Cossack and Amazon left by the other, and having failed in the darkness to find
the

Oct. 26‑27, 1916

DESTROYERS IN ACTION

Viking outside, acted
independently for the rest of the night. All the commanding officers, however,
steered towards No. 9A buoy, the point at which the enemy was thought to be
operating; and as they made eastwards they sighted gunfire and rockets to the
north and east of them, where the enemy was at that moment attacking the 16th
and 8th Drifter Divisions.

As time went on, the
"Tribal" destroyers became still more scattered. The Cossack failed to keep up with the other
boats, and dropped astern; the commanding officer of the Viking, when he came up to 9A buoy, at midnight sighted firing to
the northward and crossed the barrage with the rest of his detachment. Almost
simultaneously, Commander M. R. Bernard, in the Nubian, sighted firing further to the eastward, and made towards
it. This movement separated him from the other boats in his divisions which
crossed the barrage on a north‑north‑easterly course at 12.35 a.rn.
About this time the message was taken in from P.34, reporting the attack against the transport line. This caused
most of the commanding officers to turn to the southward towards the point
where the enemy were now reported; so that, shortly after half‑past
twelve, the destroyers were approximately in the following positions:

Laforey's division. About three miles south‑eastward of the Viking's detachment, steering north‑westerly.

Lawford's division. About four miles east‑south‑cast of the South
Goodwine light vessel, steering east‑north‑easterly.

Although acting independently,
the mass of our destroyer forces had thus assembled in the central part of the
Straits; that is to say, they were in the area towards which the enemy was
making. The two sections of the 3rd Flotilla were, by now, well on their way
home and out of reach; but the 17th and 18th Half Flotillas, which had raided
the transport line, were steaming north‑eastwards towards the centre of
the barrage. The Nubian was the first
to get into action with them. At about twenty minutes to one Commander Bernard
sighted destroyers ahead of him, which he took to be the Lawford's division from the Downs. He challenged accordingly
and put his helm over to avoid them, but a moment later, the 17th Half Flotilla
passed along his port side and poured a heavy and destructive fire into him.
Hardly a shot missed, for the range was very close; and, as he put his helm
over again in a spirited attempt to ram the last boat in the enemy's line, a
torpedo struck the Nubian under the
fore bridge, and not only brought her to a standstill, but put her completely
out of action. The foremost petrol tanks caught fire and blazed furiously. The
flash of the explosion, followed immediately by flames and clouds of smoke from
the fire, made a sort of beacon in the central part of the Straits, marking the
point of the encounter.

The Lawford's division, several miles away towards the South Goodwin,
sighted it and steamed towards the spot. From time to time the destroyers
passed through masses of smoke, still undispersed and lying low down on the
water. The Laforey's division, much
closer, though still to the eastward, also sighted flashes and saw great
quantities of smoke illuminated by the gunfire, towards which they immediately
set their course. The Amazon's turn
came next. Some time before the Nubian was in action, Commander M. R. Bernard had sighted the trawler H. E. Stroud, which was supporting the
drifters near 4A buoy, and had slowed down to hail her. The skipper had no news
to give, so the Nubian was again put
on to her course of S. 80 degrees W. at 15 knots. Though the Amazon's commanding officer must afterwards have seen the gun
flashes of the Nubian's action, and
heard the firing, he was hampered by being separated from the rest of our destroyers;
for he had necessarily to ascertain the character of every vessel he met. He
finally fell in with the German destroyers at about a quarter to one, and was,
for the moment, so convinced that they were "L" class boats that even
when they fired upon him he replied by making the challenge. The Germans passed
him at high speed, as they had passed the Nubian a few minutes previously. Each successive boat fired a round as she steamed by,
and two shells burst in their target. One put the Amazon's after gun out of action, and the other put out two boilers
in the after boiler‑room. The trawler H.
E. Stroud was still in the neighbourhood, and one of the rounds from the
German destroyers hit her also and killed the captain.

The 17th Half Flotilla had now
completed its work, but the 18th, which was only a little distance away, had
still to be reckoned with. The Viking,
the Mohawk and the Tartar were, indeed, rapidly approaching
the German destroyers on a southerly course. Commander H. G. L. Oliphant, who
was leading the detachment in the Viking,
first sighted the enemy on his port bow. For the third time the doubt as to
whether they were friends or enemies caused delay at the critical moment.

Oct. 27, 1917

DESTROYERS IN ACTION

Commander Oliphant challenged;
the enemy crossed his bows rapidly and opened fire. The Germans steamed past
the starboard side of the British boats, discharging their broadsides as
they went by. The Viking was not hit;
and Commander Oliphant put his helm over to turn and follow the enemy. As he
completed the turn, he found the Mohawk was in his way, the reason being that one of the German shells had hit her and
caused her helm to jam, and Lieutenant‑ Commander H. S. Braddyll had
turned out of line to port; the Tartar,
following close behind the Mohawk,
had conformed. When Commander Oliphant got clear of the Mohawk, he steered after the enemy to the north‑north‑east;
he did not, however, succeed in picking them up, and in the pursuit he got
separated from the other two destroyers. This was the closing episode in the
night's work. The Laforey's division
was only a short distance away from the scene of the last encounter, and
Commander R. A. Hornell, the senior officer, sent the Lucifer and Laurel to the
northward towards the gun flashes; but though they made off at full speed they
failed to get contact. And though gun flashes had been seen from the Lawford since the first engagement
between the Nubian and the enemy, the
division was too far to the westward to come up in time.

The Nubian herself was lying disabled near 5A buoy, when about one
o'clock she was sighted and taken in tow. Her forepart had been completely
blown away by the torpedo, and she could only be towed stern first. Towards
morning the wind got up, and at a quarter to six the towing hawser parted. The Lark, who was towing her, could not take
her in tow again, and she drifted ashore between the South Foreland and St.
Margaret's Bay. Whilst she was drifting helplessly towards the shore, with the
seas sweeping over her, Thomas William Smith, master of the tug William Gray, steered his ship alongside
and took off the wounded. His action was courageous and skilful in a high
degree: when he placed himself alongside the Nubian the two vessels appear to have been only about half a cable
from the shore.

(The Nubian was eventually salved: her
missing forepart was replaced by the forepart of the Zulu, which later lost her stern by striking a mine. The combined
vessel when commissioned was named the Zubian.)

The German flotillas returned to
their bases without mishap. The 17th Half Flotilla reached Ostend at a quarter
to four; Commodore Michelsen and the remaining three divisions made for
Zeebrugge, and reached it rather later. Finally, our destroyers, which had been
scattered during the remainder of the night, reassembled near the South Goodwin
towards three o'clock, and then swept along the barrage looking for disabled
vessels.

When he sent in his report,
Admiral Bacon did not fail to explain the disadvantages under which his
destroyer captains had been compelled to fight. "The raid was well planned
and carried out," he wrote to the Admiralty. "It belongs to that
class of operation that succeeds mainly by knowing at what point, and when, the
blow will fall, and exactly what it is intended to carry out. The enemy had the
advantage of knowing that everyone they met was an enemy; our boats were
uncertain, at the moment of meeting, whether a boat was friend or foe; the
enemy, therefore, more than once escaped being fired at, when being passed, through
our boats waiting to make certain.... The raiders had a definite objective and
a pre‑arranged plan: our boats knew nothing except what they could guess.
It is as easy to stop a raid of express engines with all lights out at night,
at Clapham Junction, as to stop a raid of 33‑knot destroyers on a night
as black as Erebus, in waters as wide as the channel. My defence against night
raids has been to have the Downs protected, and the transport of troops
stopped, since the obvious response to a raid that cannot be prevented is to
have nothing the enemy can raid." In a further letter he explained that he
had considered the Downs and the Ostend area to be the two points which he had
to cover permanently, and added, with regard to the defence of the Straits,
"No attempt was made to provide for a defence of the Straits, nor could
such defence be attempted with the vessels then at my disposal. To defend a
strait against a raid, a considerable number more destroyers than the raiding
force would have to be kept continually at sea, and, moreover, of such numbers
as to cover, successfully, the area of the approach."

The Admiralty, after examining
Admiral Bacon's reports, agreed that his dispositions and strategy were sound.
"If we are to make fairly certain of countering the enemy," ran the
First Sea Lord's minute, "we should have at least two flotillas patrolling
every night in close touch with each other, and, in order to keep such a patrol
going, we must have still a third flotilla as a relief. But we do not possess
these flotillas, nor could they be berthed at Dover, and we must make the best
of what we have until the Grand Fleet destroyer requirements are met, and also
regulate our cross-channel traffic so as to expose our troops to as little
risk as possible. The work of the Dover force has consisted in protecting the
drifters on duty at the mine barrages,

Nov. 1916

TACTICAL QUESTIONS

submarine hunting, occasional
bombardments of the enemy batteries installed in Belgium, air raids and
reconnaissances, protection of shipping in the Downs, watching the Belgian
coast to prevent a raid at La Panne, organising and protecting cross‑channel
traffic, and escorting vessels in the channel. The most important of these are
cross‑channel traffic and protection of the Downs from the attack of
surface vessels.... other considerations may give place to these when it is
known or expected that the flotillas at Zeebrugge or Ostend are in a state of
readiness and have been reinforced by vessels from the German bight."

There was, however, one point
upon which the Admiralty eventually disagreed with the Vice‑Admiral.
Courts of Enquiry upon the losses incurred and the conduct of the various
divisions were held at Dover during the month following the raid. The officers
in charge of these enquiries seem to have considered that the "Tribal
" destroyers need not have gone into action at such a disadvantage."
The 'Tribal' destroyers," they wrote, "proceeded to sea without any
previous formation or orders; some left by the eastern and some by the western
entrance; and as soon as they got outside they proceeded to lose touch with one
another." When he forwarded these minutes to the Admiralty, Admiral Bacon
said that the "Tribal " destroyers had carried out his wishes, and
that he approved of their tactics. "The 'Tribal' destroyers," his
letter ran, "generally interpreted my wishes as conveyed in my signal,
which was for the 'Tribals' to proceed to No. 9A buoy, where the drifters were
being attacked, it being far more important to get boats there early than for
them to hold back and wait for others.... The commonplace tactics were to form
divisions and proceed in company.

The sound procedure, under the
circumstances, that would have been grasped by a good tactician was for each
boat to get into earliest touch with the enemy, and, while keeping touch at
sufficient range, to fall back in the direction of their friends which were
arriving later. These were the ideal tactics, but ideals are rarely
realised." To this the Admiralty replied that they were unable to agree
with the tactics recommended. "All experience of night firing during this
war," they wrote, "has shown that it is absolutely essential to keep
the forces concentrated at night in order to avoid the great danger of our vessels
mistaking one another for enemy ships. They consider that in all circumstances
destroyers proceeding at night to gain touch with an enemy should be kept in
company, and that it is further essential that, if two separate forces are
working from different bases, each should, on dark nights, be confined to
certain areas so as to avoid the possibility of meeting one another."

This ruling settled a question
of tactics and settled it, no doubt, in the right way; but it did not
eliminate, or seek to eliminate, more than one possible source of error in a
very complex problem. The orders issued for any operation, and especially those
for a dark night's fighting, may be correct in principle and yet fail of their
intended effect. To be certain of success it would be necessary to foresee
every contingency and to provide beforehand a definite answer to every question
that could arise upon the scene of action. The Dover Patrol had not yet had a
sufficient experience of night raids: the lessons to be learnt were many, and
proficiency could only be gained by degrees. In the meantime the enemy had not
succeeded in reaching any of the important objectives which lay within his
choice, and showed no sign of attempting to profit by his experiment.

Less than a fortnight after the
raid was over, the Admiralty heard that the 3rd German Flotilla had been
recalled to Germany from Zeebrugge. This withdrawal might, however, be purely
temporary, and they could not allow it to affect their plans for strengthening
and reinforcing the Dover Command. But the needs of the Dover Patrol could not
be considered independently of other new calls upon our destroyer forces. The
growing activity of the German submarines in the Channel, and the rising toll
of loss suffered by neutral merchantmen in the western approaches between
Ushant and Land's End, had by this time created a pressing need for destroyer
reinforcements at Portsmouth and Devonport. The matter was, indeed, so urgent,
and submarine warfare was taking so serious a turn, that Admiral Jellicoe had admitted
that "it might conceivably be wise policy to divert destroyers from the
Grand Fleet and other available sources, such as the Humber, Harwich, etc., for
a thoroughly organised attack on submarines, when it is known that they are
operating in considerable numbers, in comparatively narrow waters such as
the Channel."

The Commander‑in‑Chief
expressed this view in writing on October 29, and repeated it when he came
south to Whitehall, early in November, to discuss the naval position with the
Government. The Admiralty were, for the moment, unable to assemble a force of
sufficient strength to meet the Commander‑in‑Chief's suggestion:
their redistribution of the destroyers could only be a sort of middle way
between conflicting claims. They decided that the Dover Patrol should be
reinforced by three divisions

Nov. 1916

DESTROYERS REDISTRIBUTED

from Harwich, which were to be
kept concentrated and used as a fighting force. This, it was hoped, would
materially help Admiral Bacon, by giving him the use of a group of destroyers
trained in the flotilla tactics which, in the Admiralty's view, were essential
to a successful defence of the Straits. Five of the best destroyers from the
4th Flotilla at the Humber were to be added to this striking force. The
remaining destroyers of the Humber flotilla were to be moved to Portsmouth,
where they were to be used for offensive operations against German submarines
operating in the Channel. But as by withdrawing the 4th Flotilla from the east
coast the Admiralty would be leaving the 10th Sloop Flotilla unprotected,
and thereby incurring the risk of another Arabis incident, the Commander‑in‑Chief was ordered to send a division of
destroyers from the Grand Fleet to support the sloops. If, owing to this
weakening of his destroyer forces, the Commander‑in‑Chief was
unable to screen all his battleships, a part of the 4th Battle Squadron
was to be left behind when the fleet put to sea.

Although the intentions of the
naval leaders at Berlin were not known at the time, there can be no doubt, in
the light of later information, that the Admiralty's decision to draw upon the
Grand Fleet destroyers was sound. The German plan of concentrating all their
naval resources upon the submarine campaign was strengthening with every week
that went by; and a rather trivial incident had recently raised a discussion at
Pless, and caused the whole naval policy of the Berlin authorities to be
reviewed afresh.

On November 3 Admiral Scheer was
informed that two German submarines, U.30 and U.20, had stranded in a fog off
Bovbierg, and at once sent out four "Kaiser" class battleships, the
battle cruiser Moltke, and a half
flotilla, to assist them. When they reached the spot, the destroyers repeatedly
tried to tow U.20 off, but failed; U.30, not being so badly ashore, was
floated off. Whilst the destroyers worked close in shore, the Moltke and the battleships patrolled to
the west and north. This brought them well into the zone which was being
watched by our submarines of the 11th Flotilla; and they were, in fact, being
closely followed. At about noon, Commander N. F. Laurence, in submarine J.1, sighted the four enemy battleships
to the eastward of him, on a northerly course. A very heavy sea was running,
and Commander Laurence was finding it very difficult to keep his boat at an
even depth. It was not until an hour later that he was able to get into an
attacking position: at one o'clock, just as the squadron was turning to a
southerly course. he fired four torpedoes from his bow tubes, at a range of
4,000 yards. One of them hit the Grosser
Kurfuerst, another the Kronprinz;
and the result was that both ships were in dockyard hands for a considerable
period.

The report of this incident was
very badly received at Pless; and Admiral Scheer received a sharp rebuke from
the Emperor himself: "To risk a squadron, and by so doing nearly to lose
two armoured ships in order to save two U‑boats, is disproportionate (stuende nicht im richtigen Verhaltniss),
and must not be attempted again." It was not to be expected that Admiral
Scheer would meekly accept an order which recalled the restrictions placed upon
Admiral von Ingenohl in the early days of the war. He succeeded, after a
personal interview, in getting the imputation against his leadership withdrawn;
but the general plan of naval policy which he laid before the Emperor shows
that he now (as in his secret report after Jutland) regarded the High Seas
Fleet as unequal to the task of defeating England, and useful only as a sort of
auxiliary to the submarines. He had even definitely abandoned his earlier
programme of fleet raids and bombardments in the North Sea. "The
whole organisation of fleet preparedness," he writes, "is directed to
giving every undertaking the highest possible degree of security; and to
leave all ships returning to harbour for their necessary rest period,
undisturbed. The maintenance of this decision is important in that, during the
further progress of submarine war (upon which, in my view, our whole naval
policy will sooner or later be compelled to concentrate), the fleet will have
to devote itself to the single task of bringing the submarines safely in and
out of harbour." (Scheer, pp. 191‑93.)

In Admiral Scheer's new strategy
the destroyers at Zeebrugge were to play an important part. "They
were," he says, "to attack the watching forces on the channel
barrage, and so assist the submarines to get through." For the moment,
however, this part of his plan was not very vigorously pressed; the 3rd
Flotilla was not replaced, and the next undertaking in the Dover area lacked
the decision and energy of Commodore Michelsen's earlier stroke.

Being now convinced that the
Germans had at last turned their attention to a zone which offered so many
targets to an attack by light craft, the Admiralty had done something to
relieve Admiral Bacon's difficulties. After the raid in October, the First Sea
Lord, as we have seen, had written that if the Straits were to be made secure,
at least two flotillas would have to be kept on patrol, and a third one

Nov. 23, 1916 RAID ON THE DOWNS 69

kept in reserve; and, during the
month following, some of these reinforcements had been collected from the other
commands. On October 28, the Lightfoot and four destroyers were sent from Harwich to join the Carysfort and the eight boats which were already there; on the
following day, the Lapwing and Phoenix arrived from the ist Flotilla to
replace the Nubian and the Flirt. On November 21 three of the best
destroyers from the 4th Flotilla in the Humber arrived. (The other two promised, see ante, p. 67, arrived on December 2.) Admiral
Bacon was, moreover, promised two flotilla leaders from the Grand Fleet, as
soon as they could be released by the delivery of the Seymour and the Saumarez,
which were then completing. None of these new vessels was, however, brought
into action by the very cautious attempt which the German flotilla at Zeebrugge
made a few days after the first reinforcement came down from the Humber.

The German flotilla commander,
Commander Goehle, was ordered to attack the northern entrance to the Downs, and
to destroy all such warships and auxiliaries as he might fall in with: Ramsgate
was to be bombarded if possible. The enterprise was to be carried out by the
9th Flotilla, reinforced by three destroyers styled the "Z" or Flanders
Half Flotilla. The force that left Zeebrugge on the night of the 23rd was thus
made up of thirteen destroyers:

They reached the North Hinder
Light at twenty minutes past seven, and then steered westwards towards the
Kentish Knock at fourteen knots. When six miles off the Light they turned
towards the northern entrance to the Downs and slowed down. Just before nine
o'clock they were three miles north‑eastward of the North Foreland and
could see the lights of Ramsgate. Commander Goehle now steamed towards the
anchorage at a very slow speed, and he was soon sighted. The armed drifter Acceptable of the 2nd Division of Ramsgate drifters, which comprised twelve boats in all, was then patrolling at the north end of the anchorage near the Broadstairs Knoll, and her commanding officer, Lieutenant W. T. Fitzgerald, R.N.R., suddenly sighted six destroyers steering on a south-south‑westerly course across his stern towards
the anchorage. He did not suspect that they were enemy boats, and ported his
helm to get clear of them, but, as they passed under his stern, at a distance
of less than a cable, he saw that they were strangers. They were painted in a lighter
colour than British boats, and all had high, topgallant forecastles. When the
last boat in the line had the drifters well abeam, she opened fire, and sent
down nine or ten shells at the Acceptable,
and at the drifter Buckler, which was
near by. The drifters at once gave the alarm, and the three destroyers
stationed in the Downs for the night, the CRUSADER,
Saracen and MERMAID, slipped
their cables and got under way; but by the time they had reached the northern
end of the Downs, the enemy destroyers had disappeared, after firing a few
rounds into Margate.

The German reconnaissance was so
feebly conducted that the destroyers did not even wait to ascertain the
forces which they would have to face if they ever attempted to press home a
serious attack upon the anchorage. The incident showed, however, that the
German commander at Zeebrugge was at all events determined to keep the Dover
area under observation; and Admiral Bacon, when he forwarded his report on
the night's occurrences, attached his revised plan for defending the Straits.

During the day he intended to
maintain a patrolling division of five Harwich boats to cruise between the
South Goodwins and Calais, and to keep a 12‑inch monitor at anchor in the
Downs to protect the traffic against a raid in thick weather. One destroyer was
to be stationed in the Dungeness, and another in the Beachy Head area, as
an outer guard to the six destroyers which worked on the traffic route to
Boulogne. This would leave a reserve of two light cruisers, two flotilla
leaders, and a division of Harwich boats at Dover, standing by with steam at
short notice. (The Harwich vessels were
constantly being changed; but the contingent detached to Dover was henceforward
one light cruiser, one or two leaders, and twelve destroyers.)

By night, when the chances of a
raid were greater than by day, the Downs Force was to be increased by a light
cruiser, a flotilla leader and the division of Harwich destroyers allocated to
the Goodwins‑Calais patrol, who would be relieved by the other Harwich
Division which had been held in reserve during the day. The night reserve at
Dover kept in readiness for operations in the Straits would then consist of one
light cruiser, one flotilla leader and the division of "Tribal"
destroyers which during the day had been engaged on patrol and escort duty.

The signs of renewed activity in
the Dover area did not shake the Admiralty's conviction that the German submarine
campaign would shortly take first place in the war at sea, and that very
special measures would be required to meet the danger. The feeling was shared
by the country as a whole; the Press was restless and disturbed, and both the
Government and the High Naval Command were

Nov-Dec. 1916

ADMIRALTY AND GRAND FLEET

criticised. Everything suggested
that a change of Ministers and of the Board of Admiralty could not be long
delayed. Nobody doubted that the submarine campaign, which over-shadowed
everything, would have to be answered by a drastic revision of our existing
methods of war. In the words of Mr. Balfour, all measures taken up to date had
proved mere palliatives; and it was only natural that new men should be called
upon to devise and carry through a new policy. Admiral Jellicoe, who during the
past few weeks had been making the most urgent representations about the coming
danger, seemed to be the man upon whom the responsibility should be placed. On
November 22, just as he was about to take the fleet to sea for exercises, he
received a telegram offering him the post of First Sea Lord, and asking him to
take up his duties without delay; simultaneously, Admiral Beatty was
offered the command of the Grand Fleet. Both offers were accepted, and a week
later Admiral Jellicoe was at Whitehall.

Admiral Sir Cecil Burney accompanied the Commander‑in‑Chief to the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, and Admiral Sir Charles Madden succeeded him in charge of the 1st Battle Squadron. Rear‑Admiral A. L. Duff, the second in command of the same squadron, was called to Whitehall to take charge of the new anti‑submarine division, and was relieved by Rear-Admiral W. C. M. Nicholson. Both flag
commands in the 2nd Battle Squadron were also changed. Vice‑Admiral Sir
Thomas Jerram was relieved by Vice‑Admiral Sir John de Robeck; and Rear‑Admiral
W. E. Goodenough, who throughout the war had gained much distinction as a
cruiser commander, relieved Rear‑Admiral A. C. Leveson. There was no
change in the flag officers of the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons.

Admiral Beatty strongly urged
that Admiral Sir William Pakenham, the rear‑admiral in charge of the 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadron, should succeed him in command of the Battle Cruiser
Force. Questions of seniority made the appointment difficult; but as no other
available officer of flag rank had anything like Admiral Pakenham's experience
of the work, Admiral Beatty's views prevailed. Admiral Pakenham had had over
four years' continuous service with the battle cruisers when he was appointed
to take charge of the force. The command of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
became vacant by the removal of Rear‑Admiral O. de B. Brock to the post
of Chief of Staff to Sir David Beatty, and Rear‑Admiral R. F. Phillimore
was ordered to assume it. In the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron Rear‑Admiral
Leveson relieved Sir William Pakenham.

The vacancies created in the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron by Vice‑Admiral H. L. Heath's transfer to the 3rd Battle Squadron and Rear‑Admiral Goodenough's removal to the battle fleet were filled by Rear-Admiral S. R. Fremantle
and Commodore C. F. Lambert, the Fourth Sea Lord under the outgoing Board of
Admiralty.

These changes had hardly been
carried through when Mr. Asquith's Coalition Government fell.

The advent of Mr. Lloyd George's
new Government was followed by important political readjustments which affected
the administration of the war at sea. On assuming office, he at once altered
the existing machinery by creating a small War Cabinet of four or five members,
freed of all departmental duties; and also by creating new ministries for the
rapid despatch of the vast mass of additional business which resulted from the
complete mobilisation of the nation's resources. (See Vol. III., pp. 42 n, 200.) The first War Cabinet was composed
of the Premier, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Arthur
Henderson; it was subsequently increased by the addition of Sir Edward Carson,
the First Lord of the Admiralty under the new administration. Further, this new
War Cabinet was no longer an inner committee taking decisions which must be referred
if they involved questions of policy: its rulings, taken after consultation
with the naval and military authorities, were absolute and final.

In its general deliberations the
new Board of Admiralty (The Board of Admiralty when the new Government took office was composed as follows: Sir Edward Carson, First Lord; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord; Admiral Sir Cecil. Burney, Second Sea Lord; Rear-Admiral F. C. Tudor Tudor, Third
Sea Lord; Commodore Lionel Halsey, Fourth Sea Lord; Commodore G. M. Paine,
Fifth Sea Lord (Director of Air Services). E. G. Pretyman, Civil Lord; Sir
Francis Hopwood, Additional Civil Lord.)was destined to be occupied most
closely with the submarine campaign, but its immediate attention was called to
the Flanders Bight and the Dover area. On December 22 Admiral Bacon wired to
the Admiralty to say that a German destroyer had gone from Zeebrugge to Ostend
to reinforce the flotilla. He had previously reported that there were rumours
of a German attack upon the wireless stations in his command combined with a
raid upon the Downs or the Thames. The Admiralty at once decided that further
reinforcements ought to be sent to Dunkirk whilst the long nights increased the
chances of a successful raid; and Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to send the Nimrod and eight destroyers of the loth
Flotilla from Harwich to Dunkirk "for service during the dark nights in
the event of a raid."

Jan. 1917

HARWICH AND ZEEBRUGGE

The Commodore had been
reinforced from the Grand Fleet shortly before this order reached him. In order
to replace some of the forces which it was intended to send from Harwich to
Dunkirk, during the dark nights the Grenville and eight destroyers (Morning Star,
Moon, Musketeer, Mandate, Opal, Nonsuch, Napier, Strongbow) had been sent
south from Scapa and had arrived at Harwich on the 19th. They were in time to
assist in a large minesweeping operation on the Swarte Bank, and when it was
over, the Commodore was told by the Admiralty to keep them under his command
for the time being. This redistribution of forces left the Commodore with the
5th Light Cruiser Squadron, two leaders, one destroyer of the 1st Flotilla, two
of the 9th, two of the 10th, and six from the Grand Fleet. (The force naturally varied from day to day, as there were always a
certain number of destroyers temporarily out of service on account of defects.) The result was that Admiral Bacon, after the readjustments which had been
made at the close of the year, could generally count on having, in addition to
his own force, a light cruiser, two flotilla leaders and from fifteen to twenty
destroyers at his disposal.

The first three weeks of the new
year passed without incident in the southern area; but during the forenoon of
January 22, the Admiralty became aware that a German destroyer flotilla would
be leaving the rivers for Zeebrugge during the afternoon. The chance thus
offered us was an excellent one. There could be very little doubt that this
reinforcement, like the last, was intended for operations against the Straits;
so that, if it could be brought to action and dispersed before it reached its
base, the whole German plan would be thrown into disorder from the very
beginning. The duty of intercepting these new reinforcements fell entirely upon
the Harwich Force. (See Map 3.) With
five hours' steaming Commodore Tyrwhitt could get his cruisers and destroyers
between the Schouwen Bank and the Maas, which the Germans would probably
not pass until about midnight. Everything thus depended upon getting the
Harwich Force away early and in sufficient strength.

At 11.40 a.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt
was, therefore, ordered to "intercept the enemy with destroyers" and
to take his light cruisers to sea "in support, to assist after
daybreak." At the same time, the Admiral at Dover was told to send six,
destroyers to Harwich without delay. (He detached the Nimrod, Moorsom, Phoebe, Morris, Matchless, Manly, Mansfield, which had been sent on 19th
from Harwich to Dunkirk.)

When the warning telegram
reached the Commodore he had six light cruisers, one leader, and ten destroyers
ready; but reinforcements from the Dover command came in during the afternoon,
and at half‑past five he put to sea with six light cruisers, two flotilla
leaders and sixteen destroyers. (The Grenville and the eight destroyers sent from the Grand Fleet in December went back to
Scapa on January 3. The Grenville returned to Harwich on the 18th, bringing with her the Sable, Radstock, Portia, Rigorous, Sorceress and Rob Roy.)

Shortly before he sailed, news
came through that the German flotilla was on its way, and was due to pass
Borkum between 4.45 and 5.15. It was thus evident that we were in good time,
and everything seemed to promise well for the success of our operations. The
flotilla which we were endeavouring to intercept was the 6th, in charge of
Commander Max Schultz; it was composed of the flotilla leader ‑ V.69, and ten boats of the
"V," "S," and "G" classes. We had thus a crushing
superiority of ships and guns.

As the enemy had the choice of
passing down the coast by the Maas and Schouwen Bank light‑vessels, or
else of making for Zeebrugge down the central part of the Flanders Bight, past
the North Hinder, Commodore Tyrwhitt's dispositions had to cover two
alternative routes. Conforming as closely as he could to the Admiralty's
intentions, he ordered his destroyers to take up patrolling stations in two
detachments; the first off the Maas, the second off the Schouwen Bank. The
light cruisers, also divided into two detachments, were stationed further to
the westward between the North Hinder and the Maas. The actual allocation of
forces was as follows.

1. The
Maas detachment, under the commanding officer of the Grenville, was divided into three patrol lines: the Rigorous and Rob Roy in the western; the Grenville, Radstock and Sorceress in the centre; the Meteor and Melpomene in the eastern. Each
group was to patrol on lines spaced two miles apart, and running north‑north‑east
and south‑southwest (true).

2. The
Schouwen Bank detachment under the commanding officer of the Nimrod, was divided into two lines. The
first, consisting of the Nimrod, Morsoom, Phoebe, Mansfield, Manly, Matchless and Morris, was
to patrol between the light‑vessel and the South Banjaard Bank light
buoy; the second, consisting of the Simoom, Starfish, Surprise and Milne, was
to patrol between the lightship and the Schar.

3. The
light cruiser detachment was in two divisions. The first, consisting of the Centaur (broad pendant), Aurora and

Jan. 22‑23, 1916

THE HARWICH FORCE SAILS

Conquest, was to proceed to a
patrol line about twenty‑five miles eastward of the North Hinder. The
second, consisting of the Penelope, Cleopatra and Undaunted, was ordered to a patrol line about ten miles to the
westward of the first. The two lines ran roughly north‑east and south‑west
(true), and were parallel to one another.

The Harwich Force left harbour
in three groups. The Grenville and
her destroyers sailed at four o'clock; the light cruisers with the Simoom, Starfish, Surprise and Milne an hour later; and the Nimrod with the six destroyers from
Dunkirk at about six. It was quite dark when these detachments passed
Orfordness Light and cleared the Sledway. The weather was fine and clear, with
a slight wind from the eastward. A sharp frost set in after dark, and it became
bitterly cold: at midnight the thermometers were several degrees below freezing
point, and as the night wore on the decks were coated with ice. All our ships
had arrived on their patrol lines well before midnight, and for the next three
hours they saw nothing.

The commander of the German
flotilla had selected a route which passed about midway between the North
Hinder and the Maas; and at a quarter to three he ran into the Centaur's division. Our ships were, at
the time, in line ahead, with the Centaur leading, and were steering to the south‑west. The German destroyers were
first sighted by the Conquest, at the
end of the line, crossing astern of the cruisers from port to starboard. All
our ships opened fire when the German boats were to starboard; but neither side
switched on searchlights, as the ships were visible from the flare of their
funnels. The German fire was spirited, but rather wild, and the Commodore,
after swerving to avoid a torpedo, turned to starboard and tried to head the
Germans to the north‑eastward. In this he was not successful, for the
flotilla managed to get away under a heavy smoke screen and resume its course
for Zeebrugge. But the encounter shook the German formation. V.69, the leader, was struck by a shell,
and her helm jammed; as she turned in a circle G.41 rammed her, and was so damaged herself that her speed dropped
to eight knots. S.50, the destroyer
astern of V.69, lost touch with the
rest of the flotilla when the leader fell out of line, and followed on by
herself at twenty‑three knots. At three o'clock the German flotilla had
shaken us off, and the Commodore turned south to close the Schouwen Bank, not
knowing that two German destroyers, badly damaged, were steaming away from the
scene of the struggle at slow speed, and that another, undamaged, but isolated
from the rest, was making towards the Schouwen Bank on a course roughly
parallel to his own.

The other ships on patrol were
all aware that the Commodore was engaged; for the flashes of the guns were
seen almost simultaneously from the Penelope and the patrols at the Maas and the Schouwen. Between three and a quarter‑past
the patrols received a signal from the Commodore that the enemy was in Lat. 52 degrees 00' N., Long. 3 degrees 15' E., steering north‑east. This was followed by
another, saying that the enemy had scattered; but as neither was accompanied by
any order to close the scene of action, or to remain on the patrolling station,
the senior officers of the destroyer detachments did not know whether they
ought to act independently or remain on their stations and wait for further
orders. Commander H. V. Dundas, in the Grenville,
was quite certain that on the news received he had no right to leave his patrol
line. The captains of the Meteor and
the Rigorous thought differently, and
made off to the northward to cut the enemy off from the Bight. They did not
take in Commander Dundas's signal to close him, so that only the leader and the
two boats in his immediate company were left on the Maas patrol.

To the south, the captain of the Nimrod took the same view of the
position, and made off to the north‑eastward at 30 knots with his
detachment of six destroyers. To the west of the Schouwen Bank, however, the
destroyers kept their station. The captain of the Penelope moved his detachment eastwards towards the sound of the
guns. The result of these movements was that, on the first report of contact
with the enemy, practically all our forces lost their cohesion, and the
original dispositions were broken up. In his report on the whole affair,
Commodore Tyrwhitt explicitly justified Commander Dundas; but it should be
remembered that the majority of the other captains decided spontaneously and
without orders that it was best to act independently after contact was
reported; and that Commodore Tyrwhitt's orders gave absolutely no guidance upon
the very point which proved to be the main problem of the night's work. There
was, indeed, a great deal to be said for those commanding officers who reasoned
that the Commodore had located the forces which they had been sent out to
catch, and that, in consequence, their duty was to pick up the scattered
destroyers of the German flotilla. This line of reasoning was particularly
justifiable in the case of the Penelope's
captain, as the light cruisers were defined in the original orders from the
Admiralty as a supporting force.

Jan. 28, 1916

HARWICH DESTROYERS ENGAGED

As soon as the Commodore
realised that the patrols were leaving their assigned positions, he ordered the
destroyers back; but it was not until after half‑past three that his
signal was taken in by everybody concerned. Our dispersed forces then turned
back for their stations. The Commodore's order was not, however, received in
the Grenville, and Commander Dundas,
who knew that the Nimrod had left her
station and was steaming towards him, took his detachment to the north of the
Maas to avoid confusion when the Nimrod passed through his patrol area.

The next report of the enemy
came from the other division of light cruisers. When Captain H. Lynes, in the Penelope, was certain that the Centaur was engaged to the eastward, he
closed the Commodore's patrol line until about half‑past three, and then
turned to the south‑westward. Ten minutes after he had done so, a
"single German torpedo craft" was sighted on the starboard bow,
steaming slowly on an opposite course. It was the leader of the flotilla ‑ V.69 steaming away, damaged,
from the first engagement. The three British cruisers switched on searchlights
and smothered her with shell at very close range. Everybody on the Penelope's bridge was convinced that the
German boat was sunk, and some on board the Cleopatra thought they heard the cries of men in the water. The searchlights were, however,
switched off too quickly for the facts to be ascertained; and the German
flotilla leader, still afloat, though now more damaged than ever, with a funnel
shot down and a huge shell‑hole aft, escaped towards Ymuiden, where she
arrived several hours later. The German straggler, G.41, reached the Dutch coast, and steamed along it towards
Zeebrugge, as fast as her damaged bows allowed.

At the time of this second
engagement, the Centaur's division
was about eight miles to the southward, closing the Schouwen Bank. The Meteor and the Melpomene, the Rigorous and the Rob Roy were still steaming
at full speed towards the Bight, and Commander Dundas was moving north‑eastwards
to keep clear of the Nimrod's
division, which he imagined to be very near him. (His precaution was needless,
because Commander R. G. Rowley‑Conwy had turned back towards the Schouwen
Bank, on receiving the Commodore's orders to return to his patrol. The Simoom, Starfish, Surprise and Milne were still to the north‑west
of the Schouwen Bank light‑vessel.)

Meanwhile, the bulk of the 6th
Flotilla passed through our concentration without mishap. After their
engagement, they steered a course that took them between the Nimrod's and the Centaur's patrol zones, and passed the Schouwen Bank light‑vessel
at about seven minutes to four, unobserved by the Simoom, Starfish, Surprise and Milne, which were patrolling near it. Having passed the light‑vessel,
the 6th Flotilla had cleared all our intercepting forces, for Commodore
Tyrwhitt had stationed no detachment to the south of Schouwen Bank. The third
straggler, S.50, was, however,
following her flotilla, and she soon ran into our patrols. Shortly after four,
as the Nimrod's detachment was
approaching the Schouwen Bank on a south‑westerly course, the lookout
men reported an enemy destroyer on the starboard bow. The commander of the Nimrod steered to close her; but before
he could get within range, the Simoom's detachment had engaged her. The German destroyer had the good fortune to be
nearly at the head of our line of destroyers, and so could concentrate on the Simoom. After a few minutes of
intermittent firing, in which the Simoom suffered a certain amount of damage, the German got a torpedo home on her, and
her magazine blew up with a tremendous detonation. Meanwhile, however, the Nimrod and her destroyers were working
round the German destroyer's bows, and the German commander turned sharply to
the eastward in order to get clear. He was now convinced that his passage to
the southward was completely barred, and, as soon as he had shaken off the Nimrod, he steered towards the Dutch
coast; having reached it, he made his way back into the bight.

The torpedoing of the Simoom ended the night's fighting; when
the action ended, the Nimrod's destroyers had overrun the three boats of the Simoom's division, and the two detachments became very much
involved. Lieutenant‑Commander Graham, of the Morris, took off all the survivors.

At a quarter‑past four
Commodore Tyrwhitt heard from the Nimrod that enemy destroyers were near the Schoumen Bank light‑vessel; and he at
once signalled back that he was closing the light‑vessel with his three
cruisers. A few minutes later he heard that the Simoom was torpedoed, and repeated his previous order to all ships
to remain on their patrols. At half‑past four the Nimrod reported that the enemy's destroyers had disappeared.
Shortly afterwards, he heard that the Simoom was still afloat, and being uncertain whether she had been torpedoed by a
destroyer or a submarine, turned northwards to get out of the danger area (4.35
a.m.). An hour later, he ordered the Penelope to close the Maas and sweep towards the Schouwen Bank at daylight with the Grenville's destroyers in company. The
German Flotilla, which had passed the Deurloo buoy at 4.15, was by now well
inside the swept channel to Zeebrugge and out of danger.

Jan. 23, 1916

THE FAILURE EXPLAINED

When daylight came on at a
quarter‑past seven, the Commodore closed the Schouwen himself and wound
up the operation as quickly as he could. The Nimrod, which was still standing by the Simoom, was ordered to sink her; after which her destroyers were
directed to screen the light cruisers. The Penelope was ordered back to the base shortly after eight o'clock. A few seaplanes,
which were hovering near the Schouwen Bank, were engaged; but they soon flew
off and the force returned to Harwich.

The results of the night's work
were extremely disappointing. In spite of our knowledge of the enemy's
movements, and our great superiority in strength, the bulk of the enemy
flotilla got past our intercepting forces, and inflicted in passing more injury
than they received. The leader, V.69,
was, it is true, very badly damaged when she reached Ymuiden, but we were quite
unable to show that she put in to escape the pursuit of our ships, and the
Dutch Government, in consequence, refused to intern her.

The failure of our dispositions
to achieve success was, no doubt, due to the hazards of a night action, and the
lesson to be drawn for future use was clear. In operations of this kind it is
always possible that individual commanders may, at some moment, be out of touch
with each other or with their Commodore, or both, and so find themselves under
the necessity of acting on their own initiative. A great deal will then depend
upon the uniformity of their principles, whether derived from their previous
training or from the nature of their orders for the occasion. Ideally all contingencies
should be foreseen and provided for in orders; when this is difficult, or
perhaps impossible of attainment, general training will be the only guarantee
of unanimity. Here, when the critical moment arrived, each destroyer captain
had necessarily to decide for himself; and as the senior officers had been
trained partly in the Grand Fleet destroyers and partly in the Harwich Force,
their professional judgments differed.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTER THEATRES (EAST AND WEST AFRICA,
MESOPOTAMIA, BALTIC) AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

1

East Africa and Lake Tanganyika

THE destruction of the Koenigsberg (July 1915) removed the last
menace to our trade routes in the Indian Ocean (See Vol. III., pp. 66‑7.); but it did not materially affect
the East African campaign. British and German forces were still facing one
another on the southern boundaries of the colony, and Belgian troops were
stationed at various points along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. On the
northern front there were still considerable German forces in the Taveta
and Mombasa regions. General von Lettow‑Vorbeck thus held practically the
whole German colony, although on the coast we had seized Mafia Island early in
the year. In the north‑west we had established control of Lake
Victoria Nyanza; but the German armed steamers on Lake Tanganyika were still
practically unopposed. As there was no thought for the moment of starting a
major operation against the colony from the sea, the naval problem resolved
itself into restoring the blockade which had been suspended by the
concentration off the Rufiji delta. The Commander‑in‑Chief at the
Cape, Vice‑Admiral H. G. King‑Hall, found it almost impossible to
carry out this duty with the forces at his disposal. Even before the Koenigsberg had been put out of action,
the Weymouth had been ordered to the
Mediterranean; the Pyramus was
required for operations in the Persian Gulf, the Laurentic was detached for other duties, and the Hyacinth and Pioneer needed refitting. The Commander‑in‑Chief was
thus left with the Challenger, the Laconia, the tug Duplex, and a few whalers to deal with the German supply ships. In
this he was only partly successful: for the Germans found a means of
salving a great deal of the munitions left in the wreck in Mansa Bay. On the
other hand, the Commander‑in‑Chief managed to send an expedition up
the river at Lindi and to put the German

April 1915

A DIFFICULT JOURNEY

supply ship PrŠsident out of action. During the autumn months his anxieties were very great; the military authorities seemed to fear that if the Germans concentrated against Mombasa they might well carry it, and he could only tell them that he would be able to do little or nothing to help if the attack were delivered. Fortunately, General von Lettow-Vorbeck was not in a position
to dissipate his resources in a large undertaking of doubtful issue; and by the
end of the year his position was made still more difficult by the arrival of a
British naval reinforcement which he could not possibly have foreseen.

Since the outbreak of war the
Germans had controlled the waters of Lake Tanganyika. It was clear that if this
control could be wrested from them by the Allies, it would greatly assist the
conduct of joint operations by Nyassaland, Rhodesian and Belgian forces. But
the German flotilla, though it consisted only of three armed steamers, all slow
and small, and two unarmed motor boats, was supreme and unchallenged. It seemed
indeed unchallengeable, for between Tanganyika and any practicable British base
there lay more than 3,000 miles of African bush, narrow hill track, and
primeval forest.

The Admiralty, nevertheless,
determined, in April 1915, to treat these waters as an outlying sea within the
sphere of British naval power, and to place an adequate naval force upon them.
Two fast motor boats were selected, of 40 feet length, 8 feet beam, and 15
knots speed, armed each with a 3‑pounder and a Maxim gun. These were to
be shipped to Cape Town, carried by rail thence to Fungurume in the Belgian
Congo, a distance of 2,500 miles, then drawn 140 miles by steam tractors to
Sankisia, after which eighteen miles of rail would bring them to the Lualaba
River. If they could navigate this river for some 400 miles a final journey of
180 miles by rail would bring them to Albertville, the small Belgian harbour on
the west side of Tanganyika, where some defensive batteries had been erected.
The enemy harbours lay on the eastern side, which was part of German East
Africa.

The command of the expedition
was entrusted to Commander G. Spicer‑Simson, R.N. With him went
Lieutenant A. E. Wainwright, R.N.V.R., Sub‑Lieutenant A. Dudley,
R.N.V.R., and Dr. H. M. Henschell, Assistant‑Director of the London
School of Tropical Medicine, now commissioned as Surgeon, R.N. The engineers,
gunners and other ratings brought the total number up to twenty‑eight:
all were experts, and all were bound in honour not to communicate to anyone
living their destination or objective.

In spite of the formidable risks
and difficulties encountered, this miniature expedition was attended by a good
fortune almost as remarkable as that of Admiral Sturdee in his long voyage out
to the Falklands. From first to last the enemy never received the least warning
of what was afoot: the two motor boats, the Mimi and Tou-Tou, were shipped from
Tilbury on June 11, landed at the Cape early in July, taken north by rail and
detrained on August 4 and 5 at Fungurume, the railhead. There they were mounted
on the fore‑carriages of ox‑wagons, and on the 16th and 17th their
two traction engines and trailers were detrained. The road journey of 140 miles
began next day, and took six weeks, during the latter half of which all
drinking and fresh water had to be given up to the boilers of the traction
engines. Besides this shortage and the plagues of heat, storm, dust and
poisonous insects there were also the difficulties of the track to be overcome:
the roads had to be made or widened, often by blowing up the forest trees, and
nearly 200 bridges were built to carry the weight of the tractors and their
load. The expedition, however, reached Sankisia safely on September 28,
and two days later the Belgian railway brought them to Bukama. On October I the Mimi and Tou-Tou were launched upon the Lualaba River, which is in reality
an upper reach of the Congo.

The river was dangerously low,
so that the motor boats could not at first be allowed to use their own engines.
Barrels were lashed under them to reduce their draught and protect their shaft
brackets: eighteen paddlers were put on board each boat, and the stores were
taken separately in barges. It was only on October 8, after frequently
grounding, that Sub‑Lieutenant Dudley found the water deep enough to run
the boats under their own power and to take the barges in tow. Next day, at
Musanga, a river steamer and a 200‑ton lighter were waiting for them; the
barrels were taken off, and the equipment and eventually the motor boats
themselves were got on board the lighter. After ten more days of towing.
grounding and hauling‑off, the flotilla at last reached Kabalo on October
21; there the motor boats were landed and once more entrained. By October 28
the whole expedition had arrived at their rendezvous ‑ Lukuga, on the
western side of Lake Tanganyika.

Plan - Lake
Tanganyika Operations

It was at once decided, with
permission from the Belgian commandant, to build a small harbour under the guns
of the fort. Rock was blasted and run down to the lake to form a breakwater. In
spite of destructive gales the work was finished in about six weeks, and the
harbour was named Kalemie.

Dec. 26, 1915

MOTOR BOATS IN ACTION

on December 23 the Mimi and Tou-Tou were launched; on the 24th they did their trials and
attained a speed of 13 1/2 knots. On Christmas Day, the British Tanganyika
Squadron being now ready for action, a sharp lookout was kept. At 9.25 a.m. on
the 26th an enemy steamer was reported coming south. Commander Spicer‑Simson
allowed her to pass Kalemie, and at 11.25 a.m. ran out to cut her off from her
base at Kigoma. Besides the Mimi and Tou-Tou he took with him the small
Belgian motor boat Vedette, manned by
British ratings and laden with petrol, in case the chase should be a long one.
This, however, was not likely: the enemy was the wooden steam gunboat Kingani, 55 feet long, with a speed of 7 knots, and armed with a 37 mm. Hotchkiss gun. As this gun was mounted in her bows, Commander Spicer-Simson ordered Mimi to attack on her starboard quarter and Tou-Tou on her port quarter, and as the decks of both would probably suffer from the
shock if their own guns were fired abeam, the attack was to be made in line
abreast.

At 11.40 a.m. the enemy sighted
the British boats, turned east and made off at full speed, being then 5,000
yards due south and well into Tembwe Bay. By 11.47 Mimi and Tou-Tou were within 2,000 yards of the Kingani and opening fire slowly in a choppy sea. The enemy returned the fire with gun
and rifles, making no hits but compelling both boats to manoeuvre for position. Mimi fired one round a minute till
11.52, when the range had shortened and every shot was telling. She then began
to increase the rate of fire and used lyddite instead of common shell. At 1,100
yards the first lyddite shell pierced the German gun shield, killing the
captain and one of the two men; the next killed the warrant officer and forced
some of the native seamen overboard. The German at the wheel, though dazed,
continued to steer for Kigoma; but at 11.58 the chief engineer took command,
hauled down his flag, showed a white handkerchief and stopped his engines.

The sea was now running high and
it was judged impossible to board the prize. The Kingani was therefore ordered to steer for Kalemie, escorted by the Mimi and Tou-Tou. Shortly after reaching the harbour she filled and sank from
the effect of the British gunfire, which had been extremely accurate. Within
three days, however, she was repaired and refloated. A Belgian 12‑pounder
was mounted in her, and by January 15, 1916, she had been added to the British
fleet under the name of the Fifi.

The Germans do not seem to have
been put upon their guard by this loss: possibly they attributed it to the guns
of the Belgian fort, and were still unaware of the presence of the British
naval force. At daybreak on February 9 a message was received at Kalemie that
an enemy vessel had been seen steaming slowly southward. The British flotilla
at once went out to meet her, and at 8.35 a.m. sighted her about 8,000 yards
away, heading south‑west at about 6 knots, and much disguised by the
mirage caused by the glassy surface of the lake. She turned at once and made
off, pouring oil upon her fires; but was rapidly overhauled. The Mimi was first to open fire, at 3,800
yards, and made several hits in the first few minutes. The Fifi then tried her 12‑pounder at 7,500 yards, without
effect; but when she had succeeded in reducing the range to 5,600 yards she
scored some forty hits out of sixty shots. Of these one high‑explosive
shell burst in the engine‑room, killed the engineer and destroyed an oil
tank; another burst between the engine and boiler, wrecking the engine, and a
third made a large hole in the ship's bottom and set fire to the oil with which
the engine‑room was now drenched.

Seeing his ship in flames and
sinking, the German commander, Lieutenant Odebrecht, gave orders to
abandon her. But when his boats were dropped astern they sank at once under the
accurate British fire, and the survivors of the crew jumped overboard. Twelve
Germans, including the commander, and eight natives, were picked up, and the Mimi took the wounded back to hospital
at full speed. The captured vessel ‑ the Hedwig von Wissmann, a wooden steamboat 70 feet long, armed
with two small guns ‑ was burning fast, and shortly afterwards went down
head foremost.

From information given by the
native prisoners it appeared that the German force now remaining afloat consisted
of two ships only: a fast unarmed motor boat, the Wami, 25 feet long, and the Graf
von Gotson, a steamer even slower than the Kingani, but 200 feet long and armed with two 4‑inch and two
smaller guns. The latter, being greatly superior to all our ships in range and
weight of metal, seemed likely, if she could be brought to action, to afford an
instructive example of the relative values of speed and gun power. But the
campaign ended in a much less interesting manner. Early one morning the British
motor boats surprised the Wami transporting some native troops down the coast. The German commander, though at
the moment well out of range, no doubt saw that he could not reach harbour
before he was overtaken. He ran ashore on the German coast, landed his troops
and set fire to his ship. Shortly afterwards the same realisation of the
inevitable moved the German commander

Feb. 1916

THE LAKE IN BRITISH CONTROL

at Kigoma to blow up the Graf von Gotson in harbour, and destroy
with her all his small craft. The British Tanganyika Expedition ‑ the
smallest and most distant sent out during the war ‑ had thus cleared
Central Africa of German naval forces and prestige, and the twenty‑eight
officers and men composing it returned to other duties in other theatres of
war.

In the meantime, the Government
at home were taking steps to improve the position in East Africa. Reinforcements
from India, home, and Cape Colony were ordered out in November, and at the end
of the month Admiral King‑Hall was informed that the old battleship Vengeance would leave England in
December to support the attack against Dar es Salaam, which was to form part of
the general operations of the coming year. The year 1916 opened with two successive
changes in the command of the forces. On February 9, General Smith‑Dorrien,
who in spite of serious illness had taken over not long before from General
Tighe, was relieved by General Smuts; and two days later Rear‑Admiral E.
F. B. Charlton assumed command of the naval forces, which then consisted of the Vengeance, three monitors, four
cruisers, two of which were armed merchantmen, two gunboats and eight armed
whalers.

The plan of campaign which was
finally adopted did not, however, include the coastal operations which were
originally contemplated. General Smuts decided that the German forces in the
Moschi‑Taveta area must be met and defeated before anything serious could
be attempted against Dar es Salaam; and it was, in consequence, against them
that he directed his concentration.

2

The Cameroons

On the other side of the African
continent, events in the Cameroons were moving more quickly. On August 25,
1915, about two months after the offensive attempted by the French and British
forces in the early summer had failed, a general conference of Allied
commanders assembled in Duala. They decided to renew the attempt. As before,
the general plan was to deliver a converging attack upon Yaunde, but this time
the details were different. The British force was to operate along the line
Ngwe‑Wum Biagas. Parallel to our advance, but with its lines of
communication quite distinct, the main French column was to move from its
advanced base at Eseka to the Yaunde‑Kribi road between Olama and Yaunde.
In the southern area Colonel le Meillour's force was to advance from the
eastern side of Muni towards Ebolowa, whilst General Aymerich pressed forward
from Dume and Bertua. At the same time, subsidiary operations were to be
undertaken in the extreme north, between the northern railhead and Ossidinge
near the Nigerian boundary, and in the south, between Kampo and Ebajok, along
the northern frontier of the Spanish enclave.

These movements were
successfully carried out. On January 1, 1916, Yaunde fell, and during the next
week, the attacking columns from the north, from the Belgian Congo, and from
French Equatorial Africa all entered the town ‑ a remarkable proof of the
skill by which the widely spread operations had been co‑ordinated. German
resistance here was practically over; but a column of fugitive troops and
refugees succeeded in escaping to the south‑westward and getting into
Spanish territory, for the Allied column from Kampo had not been able to make
enough progress to cut the enemy's last line of retreat.

The Germans continued to hold
out in the north until the middle of February, when Mora was captured.

It fell to Captain Carre, the
Senior Naval Officer on the coast, and to Captain C. T. M. Fuller, who was in
command of the British naval detachment, to give these military operations
whatever support they could.

Effective as the blockade had
been, means were found to supplement it; and strong amphibious patrols were
maintained on the four rivers which traversed the zone of operations: the
Sanaga, the Lokundje, the Nyong, and the Kampo. The duties of the Kampo river
patrol increased in importance as the operations progressed. It was found that
the enemy was maintaining a regular line of supply from the coastal towns in
Muni to Yaunde; the naval patrol, by their grip upon the line of the river,
succeeded, in the end, in cutting off this source of supply, and, at the close
of the campaign, General Dobell (See Vol.
III., pp. 4-6.) reported to the Government that without the assistance
which the Allied naval forces had rendered him "by sea, creek, and land,
"the military forces" could not have accomplished the task which lay
before them."

Captain Carre raised the
blockade on February 29; and a month later the French and British Governments
signed a Convention for administering the conquered territory. With the
exception of a small strip running north‑eastwards from Victoria to the
Nigerian frontier south of Yola, the whole

Jan. 1916

PLANS TO RELIEVE KUT

colony was placed under French
control; but this arrangement was temporary and was not to influence the
terms of the final settlement. So long as the war lasted the British naval and
military forces were to have an unrestricted use of the port of Duala. With the
signing of this Convention on March 29 the campaign ended.

3

Mesopotamia

(See Map 4.)

Before the Turks closed in on
Major‑General C. V. F. Townshend at Kut al Amara (See Vol. III., pp. 226‑9.), Captain W. Nunn, RN, withdrew
downstream with the bulk of his river flotilla; only the Sumana remained with the beleaguered garrison.

Early in January, 1916, he concentrated his flotilla at Ali Gharbi on the Tigris. It consisted of four new gunboats - the Butterfly, Cranefly,
Dragonfly and Gadfly (Each was armed
with one 4‑inch, one 12‑pounder, one 6‑pounder, one 2‑pounder
Anti‑aircraft pom‑pom and four Maxims.) ‑ two steam
launches fitted for minesweeping, and a motor boat, sunk earlier in the war by
the Espiegle and subsequently salved
and rechristened the Flycatcher. A
relief force under Lieutenant‑General Sir F. J. Aylmer had already been
assembled and was preparing to march on Kut. From Ali Gharbi to Kut the
distance by land is about fifty miles, but by river it is greater owing to the
numerous bends. Between Ali Gharbi and Hanna the country is open, the only considerable
obstacle being the Wadi stream, which enters the Tigris from the north a few
miles below Hanna. On the left bank between Hanna and Sannaiyat, a distance of
about eight miles is a large area of marsh, and troops can only advance over
this distance along a narrow corridor between the marsh and the river. The
Turks thus had a strong defensive position on the left bank, from which to
block the advance of the relief columns; but they decided to make their first
stand lower down.

As soon as they got news that
British forces were assembling at Ali Gharbi, what troops they could spare were
hurried down and took up a position astride the river about three miles below
Shaikh Saad. The British force reached the Turkish lines on January 5, and it
was decided to give battle on the following day. The British attacked on both
banks, and the gunboats were chiefly employed in supporting the assault upon
the Turkish right flank. The battle continued with the greatest obstinacy for
two days. Owing to the exhaustion of the troops but little progress was made on
the 8th, but the Turkish commander withdrew during the night, and Shaikh Saad
was occupied by the British troops on the following day (9th). After retiring
beyond the Wadi the Turks returned and entrenched themselves on the right bank
of that stream.

The British army and the
flotilla followed up, and battle was again joined on the 13th. After desperate
fighting during the whole of that day, the Turks were forced to withdraw during
the night to escape disaster, and took up their position at Hanna, between the
marsh and the river. The British flotilla made the first reconnaissance of the
Turkish position, and during the 14th the Gadfly,
with the Senior Naval Officer on board, was hit and damaged by a 4.8‑inch
shell, and had to be sent south to Abadan for repairs. On January 18 and 19 the
gunboats bombarded the Hanna position, and on the 21st General Aylmer threw his
troops against the Turkish lines. The gunboats supported the assault, and
throughout the day the battle raged with varying fortunes; but by the evening
it was quite clear that the British attack had failed; and with it the first
attempt to relieve the garrison at Kut.

Meanwhile (January 19)
Lieutenant‑General Sir P. H. N. Lake had relieved General Sir J. E.
Nixon, whose health had completely broken down, and on February 10 the control
of the operations in Mesopotamia, which had hitherto been in the hands of the
Government of India, was taken over by the War Office. There was no thought of
abandoning Kut; but the Government and the High Command were doubtful how soon
to renew the attempt at relief, and undecided as to the best manner of carrying
out the operation. It was eventually decided, however, that General Aylmer
should not attack until early in March, when reinforcements would have reached
him, and that the main British thrust should be made on the right bank instead
of against the Hanna position.

In March, when everything was
ready for the new attempt, the general position had altered considerably. On
the left bank the Turks were still holding the Hanna position, and a British
force was facing them; but on the right bank their main line of resistance was
much further back. It was called the Es Sinn position, and consisted of a
strong line of trenches, beginning at a point about fourteen miles above Hanna
and eight miles below Kut, and running in a southerly direction to a point
called the Dujaila redoubt; from here short lengths of trenches ran south‑westwards
to the Shatt al Hai. On the

March 1916

THE RELIEF EXPEDITION FAILS

left bank a line of trenches
continued the defensive line as far as the Suwada marsh. There were on the
right bank advanced positions at Abu Rumman and Bait Isa. Both sides had been
reinforced; and the river flotilla had been strengthened by the arrival of the
larger "China" class gunboats Mayfly, Sawfly, and Mantis. General Aylmer decided to contain the Turks at Hanna, and to carry the Turkish position on the right bank by surprise. He, personally, took command of the attacking force, which was sub‑divided into two columns, one under Major‑General H. D'U. Keary, the other under Major-General G. V. Kemball. The force was assembled secretly on the right bank, and marched south‑westwards through the night, so as to attack the Dujaila redoubt at dawn on March 8. After it was captured it was hoped that the Turkish army could be driven towards the river and completely defeated. The road to Kut would then be open, for the Dujaila position was the last serious obstacle between the beleaguered garrison and our advancing columns. On the left bank, Major-General
Sir G. J. Younghusband demonstrated against the Hanna position to pin down the
Turks in front of him, and three boats of the river flotilla bombarded the
right flank of the enemy's position. The remainder were kept downstream to
guard the camp at Wadi. The operation failed. Delays and misunderstandings held
up the attack against the Dujaila redoubt; and when finally it was delivered it
did not succeed. At nightfall, General Aylmer ordered a withdrawal to Wadi.

Lieutenant‑General Sir G.
F. Gorringe now (March 12) succeeded General Aylmer in the command of the
relief force. His plan was to make a steady, methodical progress along both
banks, and to force a way through the corridor between the Suwaikiya marsh and
the sea. It was hoped that, after the Hanna, Fallahiya, and Sannaiyat positions
on the left bank had been cleared, and the Turks driven out of their positions
at Abu Rumman and Bait Isa on the right bank, they could be defeated decisively
on the Es Sinn position in front of Kut. At the time fixed for the operations
to begin the Tigris rose and overflowed its banks, and it was not until April 5
that the assault was made on the Hanna position. This was carried without
difficulty, as was also the Fallahiya Position; but the attempt to carry the
Turkish trenches at Sannaiyat failed. It was now decided to operate on the
right bank and to attempt to force the Es Sinn position, while containing the
enemy at Sannaiyat. Bait Isa was occupied, but further progress was so slow
that the only chance of relieving Kut in time appeared to be a direct assault
on the Sannaiyat position. This was made on April 22; the troops, however, were
so exhausted at the end of it, that three or four days' rest would be necessary
before they would be capable of making any further effort.

The river flotilla, which by now
had been further reinforced by the Waterfly and Greenfly, could take little part in the long and disappointing operations which followed the failure against the Dujaila redoubt; but it fell to them to make the last attempt to reach Kut. When General Gorringe was compelled to abandon his assault against the Sannaiyat position, the garrison at Kut was fast running short of provisions; and as the relief operations were likely to continue long after the end of April, it was urgently necessary to revictual the town by some means or other, and so prolong the defence. Vice‑Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, Commander-in‑Chief,
East Indies, had visited the front on April 12, and reported to General Lake
that the chances of getting a special river steamer through to Kut were very
small; but that he would attempt it if assured that a successful venture would
add to the chances of relieving the garrison. General Lake assured him that it
would, and orders were at once issued to fit out the river steamer Julnar; when ready, she was stripped of
all surplus woodwork and covered with protective plating. Although the chances
of success were extremely small, and the chances of death, wounds, sickness and
imprisonment proportionately high, practically all the officers and men of the
river flotilla volunteered for the service; Lieutenant H. O. B. Firman, R.N.,
was selected for the command; Lieutenant‑Commander C. H. Cowley,
R.N.V.R., was made second in command on account of his great knowledge of the
river; and Engineer Sub‑Lieutenant W. L. Reed, R.N.R., was placed in
charge of the engines; the crew consisted of twelve specially selected ratings.

At eight o'clock on the evening
of April 24, the Julnar left
Fallahiya, with 270 tons of supplies on board; as she passed the British lines,
our troops started a tremendous racket with artillery and machine‑gun
fire, to distract attention and drown the noise of the Julnar's engines. The night was dark and
overcast and there was no moon. The Turks knew that the attempt was going to be
made, and their outposts on the bank soon reported that a steamer was passing
their positions. Rifle fire was soon opened upon her, but Lieutenant Firman
held on steadily at 6 knots over the bottom: owing to the strong current he
could do no more. At Sannaiyat the rifle fire became extraordinarily heavy; but
the Julnar was taken past it and
negotiated round all

April 29, 1916

ATTEMPT TO REVICTUAL KUT

the bends as far as the Es Sinn
position, only ten miles from Kut. Here she came under artillery fire for the
first time; and it increased steadily as she passed along the reach of the
river between the Es Sinn trenches and Maqasis. Some moments before she reached
the Maqasis bend a shell struck the bridge. Lieutenant Firman fell dead,
thinking doubtless that success was in sight, for the Julnar was then within about eight miles of the town.

Lieutenant‑Commander
Cowley, though wounded by the same shell, now took charge. In a few more
minutes the Julnar struck a cable
which had been stretched across the river at Maqasis, and drifted on to the
right bank of the river near the fort. She could not be got off, and Lieutenant‑Commander
Cowley surrendered. The Turks harboured nothing but a desire for vengeance
against an officer who had shown such dauntless courage. (Lieutenant Firman and Lieutenant‑Commander Cowley were awarded
the Victoria Cross posthumously and the crew were decorated.) Some time
after they had carried off their prisoners the Turks separated Lieutenant‑Commander
Cowley from his men, and he was never heard of again; but there are strong
grounds to believe that he was shot by his captors in cold blood.

At Kut the garrison heard the
rifle fire along the river bank grow nearer and nearer, and towards midnight
they heard an outburst of firing from the Maqasis reach, followed by a complete
silence. At one o'clock General Townshend reported that the Julnar had not arrived, and during the
morning an aeroplane reconnaissance showed that she was in the enemy's hands.
There was now no hope for the beleaguered garrison, and on April 29 General
Townshend surrendered. (See Moberly: Mesopotamia
Campaign, Vol II., pp. 457‑8.)

4

The Baltic

We have already recorded that in
August 1915 in the Baltic the failure of the German combined attack on Riga had
been immediately followed by the abandonment of the attempt to turn the flank
of the Russian army, and the withdrawal of the German forces from the
coasts of Courland and Livonia (Vol.
III., pp. 136‑7.). Our share in the defensive operations had been
limited to the assistance rendered by two submarines, E.1 and E.9, but the
successful attack of Commander N. F. Laurence in E.1 on August 19 (1915) was believed to have contributed
largely to the discouragement of the German Command,and our Russian Allies were enthusiastically grateful. They had
already shown their reliance on us by petitioning for more submarines to be
sent out; one of them ‑ E.8 ‑
was by this time (August 1915) on her
way to Revel.

Lieutenant‑Commander F. H.
H. Goodhart's account of the voyage of E.8 is a plain and terse document. He passed easily up the Skagerrak, keeping well
out of the central line of traffic, but in the afternoon he had to dive and
pass under a whole fleet of steam trawlers. Only at 7.0 p.m. was it possible to
come to the surface again. He then ordered full speed, rounded the Skaw and
entered the Kattegat. In the fading twilight several merchant steamers were
seen going north. The shore and island lights twinkled out one by one. The
night was short. By three o'clock on August 18 he was obliged to dive and lie
quietly on shoal ground while the traffic went over him. At 5.25 a.m. he
ventured to the surface, but was put down quickly by a steamer. At seven
o'clock he ventured again, and scurried along for one‑and‑a half
hours in a friendly mist. Then he dived again and crept along at 3 knots, till
at 1.0 p.m. he was off the entrance to the Sound.

Here he had to make the choice
between going forward submerged or waiting for darkness and then attempting the
channel on the surface. He was confident of being able to get to his position
under water, and decided accordingly to continue diving into the Sound and wait
for night inside. He proceeded at 50 feet, and by 3.6 p.m. had verified his
position, coming up to 21 feet to do so. He then went down again to 50 feet and
altered course to pass through the Northern Narrows. At 4.10 p.m. he was east
of Helsingor Light. At 5.20, after another observation, he went to bottom in
eleven fathoms, feeling comfortably certain that he had not so far been
detected.

Plan - The
Entrance to the Baltic

At 8.15 p.m. he rose to the
surface. The Danish shore was bright with many lights, the Swedish shore was
dark. E.8 went south‑westward
on the surface, altering course to avoid being seen by two destroyers, who were
going north at a great pace along the Danish shore. One of them suddenly turned
south, but then stopped, as if in doubt. E.8 ran on into still more dangerous waters; the lights of Copenhagen were blazing
brightly, and in Middle Ground Fort a searchlight was working. Now and
again it struck upon the submarine. Then several fishing‑boats came past,
then two red lights in a small craft going south over to the Danish shore. She
was on the submarine's starboard beam for some time, but luckily not near
enough to see her, and

Aug. 1915

DIVING INTO THE BALTIC

Lieutenant‑Commander
Goodhart headed boldly for Flint Channel.

Off Malmo the shore lights were dazzling, and it was extremely hard to fix a position. There were many fishing-boats about, each carrying two bright lights. Lieutenant-Commander Goodhart
ordered the boat to be trimmed down with upper deck awash, and proceeded with
one engine only, at 7 knots. He steadied his course through Flint Channel,
passing at least twenty vessels towards the western end of it, some carrying
two and some three white lights, and one making searchlight signals in the air.
He had no sooner avoided the fishing‑boats by a change of course, than he
ran past a small tramp showing first a green light, and then three white ones.
The tramp seemed to have anchored, but two other vessels had to be avoided and
then the ship which had been signalling with the searchlight. Immediately afterwards,
when just north‑east of the lightship with her three vertical red lights, E.8 was sighted by a small torpedo
boat or trawler as she was creeping by within 200 yards of her. Probably it was
the searchlight in Copenhagen which had shown up the submarine. In any case the
pursuit had now begun.

The enemy boat lighted red and
green flares and altered course towards the submarine. E.8 dived, but struck bottom ‑ "very strong bottom"
at 19 feet on gauge, which immediately decreased to 14 feet. At 14 feet she
tried to proceed on her course, but the ground was very uneven, and a
succession of bumps brought her to a dead stop. It was now 11.40 p.m. After an
anxious quarter of an hour Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart rose to the
surface. The Drogden Lightship was on his starboard quarter. A large destroyer
or small cruiser was ahead of him, showing lights. She was only 200 yards away,
but Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart trimmed E.8 deep, and stole past on his motors. But four minutes later he
found a destroyer right ahead and only 100 yards from him. Again he dived
instantly, meaning to go down to 23 feet; but at 16 feet the boat struck bottom
heavily on the starboard side, carrying away all blades of the starboard
propeller. E.8 lay on the bottom and
listened to her pursuers overhead.

At 12.15 a.m. on the 19th the
boat moved again and got down to 18 feet, but was still bumping badly. At 12.19
Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart stopped her and came silently to the
surface. The destroyer was there, close on his starboard beam. One minute later
he dived again, as slowly as he dared, and at 17 feet glided away on his
course, the depth of water fortunately increasing as he went. For a long time
he seemed to be escaping, but at 2.10 a.m. he struck bottom at 18 feet. After waiting
an hour he rose to the surface, only to see the destroyer again, this time on
his port beam, but she was now a mile off, and E.8 dived again unperceived. When she came up once more at 7.15
there was nothing in sight. At 8.53 she dived for a steamer, and at 10.40 for a
destroyer. This was well enough, but by now the battery was running very low.
Her commander decided that he must find a good depth, go to the bottom and lie
there till darkness should give him a chance of recharging. From 10.40 a.m. till
6.40 p.m. E.8 lay like a stone in 23
fathoms.

When she rose at 6.40 a Swedish
steamer was patrolling ahead of her. At 8.25 a patrol of three vessels was
close astern, and moving very slowly eastwards. The moon was too bright for
surface work and Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart dived again. At 9.30 he
tried once more, but was put down by a destroyer to the southward. It was not
until ten minutes before midnight that he found a space of sea where the boat
could recharge in peace. Even this was only practicable for two hours; daylight
comes early in northern waters. It was now August 20. At 2.0 a.m. E.8 dived again, and lay in 17 fathoms
while her commander spent time and imagination upon the chart. He was well out
of the Sound now and clear of the Swedish coast. On his starboard beam lay the
island of Ruegen, further back on his quarter the channel that leads to Luebeck
and to Kiel. Right ahead was the island of Bornholm, which he must pass
unperceived, and beyond it the whole expanse of the Baltic lay open to him.

Plan - The
Central Baltic

At 9.0 a.m. he rose to the
surface, but dived again at noon. He was now not far west of Roenne, and as he
wished to make sure of passing Bornholm unobserved, he decided to remain on the
bottom till dark, then slip by and recharge his batteries for a long run north
by daylight. By 7.0 p.m. he was on his way, and eight hours later he was
passing the east coast of the great island of Gotland. At 9.2 p.m. on the 21st
he dived for a light cruiser, which passed overhead forward; at ten o'clock he
returned to the surface and proceeded northeast, running past the entrance
to the Gulf of Riga and the island of Oesel. By 1.0 a.m. on August 22 he had to
dive for daylight; but by three o'clock he was up again and going full speed on
his course. At 8.30 a.m. he sighted Dageroert ahead and joined E.9 (Commander Max Horton). In company
with her and a Russian destroyer, he passed into the entrance of the Gulf of
Finland; and by 9.0 p.m. E.8 was
secured in Revel harbour. Within twenty‑four hours of his arrival,
Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart had docked and

Oct. 1915

PRINZ ADALBERT TORPEDOED

overhauled her, replaced her
broken propeller, and reported her ready for sea.

The career of E.8 in the Baltic was long and
successful. On October 5 she captured the steamer Margarette of Koenigsberg and destroyed her by gunfire. On October
19 she arrived on her station to the west of Libau, and for four days watched
the trawlers and destroyers patrolling the harbour near the swept channel.
Their movements were always very cautious, and owing to the minefield he never
got near them. During the 22nd, however, an armed trawler came out of Libau and
took up her station off one of the swept channel buoys; at dusk she began to
show flares as though to mark the approach for vessels entering or leaving.
Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart watched all night, and at some time after
half‑past eight on the following day he saw smoke on the horizon as of a
ship leaving Libau, and altered course to intercept her. When she appeared she
proved to have three funnels and two very high masts, and was seen to be going
west with two destroyers, zigzagging‑one on each bow.

Lieutenant‑Commander
Goodhart ran on at 7 1/2 knots till he got within 3,000 yards, when he eased to
5 knots in order to lessen his wake. The wind was slight from S.S.E. and there
was bright autumnal sunlight. The conditions were ideal for an attack from the
southward. All tubes were made ready; the enemy came on at an estimated speed
of 15 knots. At 9.28 the port destroyer passed ahead. Four minutes later
Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart fired his bow tube at the warship's
forebridge.

His range was about 1,300 yards,
and after one minute he observed a vivid flash on the enemy's waterline at the
point of aim. This was immediately followed by a very heavy concussion, and the
entire ship was hidden instantly in a huge column of thick grey smoke.
Evidently the torpedo had exploded the fore magazine. The air was filled with
debris, and the smaller pieces began falling in the water near the submarine. In
one minute more E.8 was sliding down
to 50 feet, and there she stayed for eight minutes, to give the remainder of
the wreckage ample time to come down. At 9.42 Lieutenant‑Commander
Goodhart rose to 20 feet, and took a survey through his periscope. There was no
sign of the big ship. The two destroyers had closed on to the scene of the
explosion. Lieutenant‑Commander Goodhart decided not to attack them,
because, for all he knew, they were ignorant of his presence; if so, they might
very probably imagine the damage to have been done by a mine, and give him
future opportunities. An hour later he saw four destroyers hovering about the
place of the wreck: he turned away and they made no attempt to follow him. At
dawn next day he reported by wireless, and proceeded to his base. His quarry
afterwards proved to be the Prinz
Adalbert, a German cruiser of nearly 9,000 tons.

In the meantime E.19, Lieutenant‑Commander F. N.
Cromie, and E.18, Lieutenant‑Commander
R. C. Halahan, had arrived at Revel. Seeing that the enemy's naval forces in
the Baltic had now been reduced, and had withdrawn to the area near the line of
communications between Libau and the southern Baltic, our submarines were
ordered to operate in two sections, one to hold up the ore trade between Sweden
and the German ports, the other to waylay any warships which might pass between
Libau and Dantzig. They achieved a remarkable measure of success. At 8.0 a.m.
on Monday October 11 Lieutenant‑Commander Cromie "started to chase
merchant shipping." At 9.40 a.m. he stopped the Walter Leonhardt, from Lulea to Hamburg, with iron ore. The crew
abandoned ship, and were picked up by a Swedish steamer stopped by E.19 for the purpose. The empty vessel was then sunk by a charge of gun‑cotton. By noon Lieutenant-Commander
Cromie was chasing the Germania of
Hamburg, signalling her to stop immediately. As she continued to run and soon
went ashore, he came cautiously alongside to save her crew, but found that they
had already abandoned ship.

He tried to tow her off, but
failed to move her, for her cargo consisted of nearly 3,000 tons of the finest
concentrated iron ore, from Stockholm to Stettin. He left her filling with
water, and at two o'clock gave chase to the Gutrune.
By three o'clock he had sent her to the bottom with her 4,400 tons of iron ore
from Lulea to Hamburg, after placing her crew on board the Swedish steamer. At
4.25 he began to chase two more large steamers going south. In twenty minutes
he had stopped one ‑ the Swedish boat Nyland, with ore for Rotterdam and
papers all correct ‑ told her to proceed, and ten minutes later caught
the Direktor Rippenhagen, with
magnetic ore from Stockholm to Nadenheim. While she was sinking he stopped
another Swede bound for Newcastle, and gave her Direktor's crew to take care of. An hour later he was chasing a
large steamer, the Nicomedia, who
tried to make off towards the Swedish coast, but a shot across her bows brought
her to. She proved to be a large and extremely well‑fitted vessel,
carrying 6,000 to 7,000 tons of magnetic ore from Lulea to Hamburg. The crew
were sent ashore in boats, and E.19 proceeded up the west of Gotland.

Oct‑Nov. 1915

A COMPROMISE

One more of E.19's captures may be mentioned because it marks the difference
between the British practice of submarine cruiser war and the German policy of
sinking neutrals and enemies indiscriminately. During the morning of October 12
Lieutenant‑Commander Cromie stopped the Nike, and went alongside to examine her. He found her to be in iron
ore from Stockholm to Stettin, under command of Captain Anderson, whose
passport, from the Liverpool Police, showed him to be a Swede. In accordance
with international law and old British custom Lieutenant‑Commander Cromie
sent Lieutenant Mee on board the Nike with a prize crew of two men, and ordered
them to take the prize into Revel for further investigation.

The rest of the story
exemplifies the difficulty of carrying on a naval war on behalf of Allies with
a different set of problems from our own. The Russian Government was at this
time seriously afraid of the possible results of interference with Sweden's
Baltic trade. A fresh enemy in that quarter might make Russia's heavy burden
altogether unbearable: it was therefore urgently suggested to us that we should
release the Nike, in spite of the
fact that she would undoubtedly be condemned by the British Prize Court as
lawful prize. Sir Edward Grey, however, saw that this was an impossible course
for us to take ‑ it would be a breach in our system, an abandonment of
our claim that our Prize Courts acted in pursuance of no arbitrary rules but of
international law; and it would be constantly quoted against us as a precedent
for the remainder of the war. Fortunately Sir Edward Grey had an expedient
ready to his hand: the ship was lying at Revel, a Russian port, and he
suggested that she should be formally handed over to the Russian authorities.
Her return to the Swedes by them could not embarrass our Prize Court practice,
for it was merely a courtesy by an Allied Power, and could form no precedent
against us.

Lieutenant‑Commander
Cromie ended the 1915 campaign with a success of a different kind. Cruising in
the Western Baltic on the morning of November 7, he sighted a light cruiser and
two destroyers, but was disappointed in his attempt to attack. Three hours
later, at 1.20, in a favourable mist, he had a second chance. A light cruiser ‑
perhaps the same ‑ with one destroyer as escort, came on at 15 knots,
steaming south and east. He dived at once, and at 1.45 fired his starboard
torpedo. The range was about 1,100 yards, and the shot went home on the
cruiser's starboard side forward. She immediately swung round in a large
circle and then stopped dead. She appeared to be on fire and sinking; but
Lieutenant‑Commander Cromie was unwilling to leave her in uncertainty. He
avoided the destroyer, passed under her stern, and manoeuvred for a second
shot. This was fired at 1,200 yards, and was aimed at the cruiser's mainmast,
just abaft of which it actually struck. A double explosion followed: evidently the
after magazine had blown up, and several large smoking masses were shot out
some 200 yards in the direction of the submarine. The destroyer then opened a
heavy fire on the periscope with high‑explosive shell. E.19 dived to throw out the range; but
three minutes later she came up again to see what was happening. The cruiser ‑
she was the Undine, of 2,650 tons ‑
was gone; the destroyer was picking up a few survivors, and after a restless
half‑hour made off to the southward, leaving on the scene only a ferryboat
flying the German mercantile flag. Lieutenant‑Commander Cromie
arrived next day at Revel, where he reported the attack and added that under
existing weather conditions it had been rendered possible only by the sound
judgment and prompt action of Lieutenant G. Sharp, who was officer‑ofthe‑watch
at the time.

E.19 was not alone in her
successful campaign against the German iron ore trade. For the past three
weeks, Commander Max Horton in E.9 had again been at work. In two successive days, October 18 and 19, he sank the Soderham, Pernambuco, Johannes‑Russ and Dal Alfoen ‑ four
serious losses to the German gun factories, and even more serious blows to the
courage of their carrying trade. The captain of the Nike told Lieutenant Mee on his voyage to Revel, that after E.19's first raid no less than fifteen
ships were held up at Lulea, awaiting convoy; and after E.9's success the control of the Baltic seemed to have passed for a
time out of German hands. (Dr. Muehlon, a
Director of Krupp's, records in his Journal of the War (p. 226) on November 9, 1915: "I have learnt from a reliable
source that there have been for some time past several English submarines in
the Baltic; they are supposed to have their base at Libau. In consequence the
German ships of war dare not sail out of Kiel, and even the trial trips of some
newly launched ships have had to be postponed.")

Such a state of things could
not, of course, be long maintained, for wintry weather soon made the
Baltic impossible for submarines. E.1 had returned to Revel on October 30, and did not put to sea again. On November
8, E.8, E.9 and E.19 came in, and
on November 17 E.18 returned to the
base after three weeks' unsuccessful cruising. The campaign was over for the
year.

Oct-Nov. 1915

SERBIA IN DANGER

5

The Mediterranean ‑ The Evacuation of
the Serbian Army

The double onslaught upon Serbia
began in the first days of October (1915)
(See Vol. III., pp. 174‑5.); and it was soon evident that the Serbian
armies would not be able to stop it. Greatly outnumbered, and attacked
simultaneously from the north and east, they were steadily driven back; and on
October 22, whilst the northern armies were still fighting round Shabatz and
Negotin, Uskub was seized by the Bulgarians. A wedge was thus driven in between
the Serbian armies and Salonica; and all effective communication between Serbia
and the Aegean was severed. The result was that, whether the Serbians held
their ground or retreated, they had henceforward to be supplied from the
Adriatic, unless Uskub could be recaptured. On this point French and British
military experts were sharply divided. Nearly three weeks after Uskub had
fallen General Joffre still hoped that the Serbs might rally and force the Bulgarians
out of it. The British military leaders were persuaded that the place was gone
and that there was no longer any hope of supporting the Serbian army from
Salonica.

On October 30, therefore, Sir
Edward Grey instructed our Ambassador in Rome to take up the matter with the
Italian Government; and to inform them that, if the Serbian army were to be
kept from surrendering, it must be supplied from the Adriatic. As this sea was
entirely under Italian naval control, the Government at Rome was asked to
accept all the naval responsibilities of the new line of sea communications.

At the beginning of November the
Serbian armies were grouped irregularly along the plain of Kossovo from Novibazar,
through Pristina and Prizren. As the country between Novibazar and Scutari is
traversed by the north Albanian Alps, it followed that, if pressed from the
positions they then held, the Serbs would only be able to retire along the
mountain road, which runs from Prizren to the sea along the upper gorges of the
Drin valley. Even this was soon in danger, for the Bulgarian forces pressed
rapidly up the railway from Uskub and strove to seize the last line along which
the Serbians could retire. King Peter's armies now made their last effort. On
November 5, whilst the Italian and British Governments were still negotiating,
the Serbian armies turned on their pursuers, and a battle began near Ferizovic.
For three days it raged with the utmost fury, and in the end the Bulgars were
thrown back on Kachanik. There was then a lull in the operations, and the
Serbian army commanders seem for the time to have hoped that they might yet be
able to hold a line along the mountains between Novibazar and Prizren.

Sir Edward Grey's request had
been referred to the Italian Naval Staff by Baron Sonnino, the Foreign
Minister. The Italians, it would seem, did not wish any naval Power but
themselves to make a big maritime effort in the Adriatic, and were thus far
from being disinclined to do as we asked. On the other hand, their naval
problem was not an easy one. Their principal striking force of five Dreadnoughts
and six pre‑Dreadnoughts was based mainly on Taranto, but with an
advanced force at Brindisi. In support was Rear‑Admiral C. F. Thursby's
squadron of old battleships and light cruisers, which had been at Taranto since
May, and a detachment of French destroyers. Between Brindisi and Venice the
whole Italian coast was exposed to attacks from the sea, for the Italians had
no intermediate harbour on which to base a coast defence squadron or groups of
flotillas. The shore line was particularly vulnerable, for the main railway
runs close to the coast from Rimini to below Termoli, and was thus liable to be
damaged by bombardment for about 200 miles. From Barletta to Brindisi ‑ a
distance of about ninety miles ‑ the railway was again exposed; but here
the danger was not so great, as this southernmost section of the line was
within immediate reach of the naval forces at Brindisi. The advanced force of
two pre‑Dreadnoughts, three cruisers, and forty‑two torpedo boats
and destroyers had its base at Venice. To this powerful outpost was allotted
the duty of guarding the right flank of the line of armies on the Isonzo front.

Plan - The
Balkans

The Austrian navy was
considerably less powerful than the naval forces under the Italian Commander‑in‑Chief,
but the shape and structure of the Adriatic gave the Austrian Naval Staff two
marked advantages. In the first place, the bulk of their forces was based on
Pola, and the Italian squadron at Venice was therefore constantly facing a
superior concentration; and, secondly, the Austrians could always send
detachments down to Cattaro or Sebenico through the channels between the
Dalmatian islands and the mainland without being brought to action, for the
Italians had no means of detecting such movements in time to counter them. A
force of hostile cruisers based on Cattaro had, of course, exceptional
opportunities for raiding the communications between southern Italy and
Scutari, or northern Albania. When Sir Edward Grey's request was transmitted to
the Italian Government the Austrians had, in fact, assembled at

Nov. 1915

TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

Cattaro an advanced force of
some two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and seven torpedo craft,
supported by two old battleships.

With these considerations in his
mind, Rear‑Admiral Pini, the Italian Chief of the Naval Staff, reported
to his Government that the Italian navy could do what was asked of it, but
that, as transports and supply ships in the southern Adriatic would need to be
very carefully protected, the strain on the flotillas would be very severe. He
therefore urged that the French contingent of destroyers should be brought up
to allotted strength, and suggested that the British Government should send a
detachment to assist. As the French destroyers had only been withdrawn from the
Adriatic temporarily, they were sent back early in December. (The 2nd French Destroyer Flotilla had been
taken from Brindisi in October, and moved to the Eastern Mediterranean.) We
could not detach destroyers for the Adriatic, but later we sent four submarines
to operate against Cattaro.

The negotiations between the
Allies continued until the last week in November; on the 24th a committee,
formed of an Italian naval captain, three officers from the Italian War Office,
and the French and British Naval Attaches, met under the presidency of Admiral
Pini. On the previous night Captain Seitz, in the Austrian cruiser Helgoland, with a small force of
destroyers attached to him, had left Sebenico, and, after raiding the Otranto
Straits, had gone up to Durazzo Bay. The damage done was not serious, but the
Austrians had so timed their attack that it fell upon the first group of
vessels detailed for transporting supplies. Six Italian steamers were now
working between Albania and Italy, and one of these was sunk. The committee therefore
met in face of a warning that the Italian navy would not be allowed to carry
out its task unmolested. The difficulties ahead were serious. The three places
where supplies could be landed, San Giovanni di Medua, Durazzo, and Valona, had
landing places and piers adapted to the use of the trabaccoli ‑ light
sailing craft which have done the coasting trade for centuries ‑ but that
was all. Harbour facilities for moving large masses of supplies did not exist.
The result could only be that unloading would always take a very long time,
and, as San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo were open roadsteads, there was every
chance that the flow of supplies would be seriously interrupted by submarine
attack. To Admiral Pini the enemy's recent activity was significant, as it
contrasted with their previous attitude, and the Italian members of the
committee raised once more the question of destroyer reinforcements. Our
attache, Captain D. A. H. Larking, answered that we had none to spare, but
presented a plan for protecting the vessels which were unloading by a guard of
drifters supported by light cruisers.

In answer to the Greek
occupation of southern Epirus the Italian Government decided to seize and
fortify Valona, and during November nets were laid across the entrance of the
harbour and guns were landed. It would thus be comparatively immune from
submarine attack; moreover its position ‑ sixty‑two miles from
Brindisi and 130 miles from Cattaro, the nearest point of attack ‑ was
very much in its favour. These advantages were, however, outweighed by the
badness of the roads leading inland. There is a rough line of communication
between Valona and southern Serbia, but by the end of November there was no
hope left that the Serbian armies would be able to retire on the Monastir
district, where the track from Valona debouched. As the coastal road between
Durazzo and Valona was little more than a mule track, the bay and the hamlets
round it were practically cut off from western Serbia, where the Serbian armies
were encamped. Further south Santi Quaranta had been occupied by the Greeks. In
the end, therefore, the committee was compelled to override the naval
objections to the northern landing places, and decided that provisions and
supplies should be landed at San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, and, when
possible, transported up the Bojana river to the lake of Scutari. In accordance
with these decisions 1,500 tons of supplies were carried over during the next
three weeks.

In the meantime, the Austro‑Germans
had resumed their advance against the last Serbian positions. On November 20
Novibazar fell, and three days later Pristina was captured by the enemy.
Realising that their armies would be unable to resist further, the Serbian
Generals decided to retreat to the sea; and on November 30 they crossed the
Albanian frontier, driving before them the 25,000 Austrian prisoners whom they
had captured earlier in the war. Their line of march down the Drin valley would
necessarily bring them by Scutari to the coast at San Giovanni di Medua, which,
of all the places available, was the least suitable as a port of embarkation. (The exact line of march of the Serbian
troops is a little difficult to follow. A fairly large group seem to have
marched on Scutari through Ipek.)

The committee met in Rome the
same day that the Serbian armies crossed into Albania. The military news was
contradictory. The Serbian Military Attache, who knew that the army would
soon be retiring to the sea, urged that supplies

Dec. 1915

THE MARCH TO THE SEA

and motor lorries should be sent
at once to San Giovanni di Medua. Mr. Lamb, the head of the British Mission at
Scutari, on the other hand, had telegraphed that the Serbians would probably be
able to hold a line between Ipek and Prilep, but that about 50,000 refugees were
making for Scutari. As supplies were now being carried across with fair
regularity, the committee confined itself to questions of detail. Meanwhile,
the Italian War Office had decided to increase its garrison at Valona: 20,000
men, 3,000 horses, and 46 guns were detailed to reinforce the troops already
there, and on the next day the transportation began, each convoy being escorted
by a British cruiser and French or Italian destroyers. The naval
responsibilities were thus increasing, and it was evident that the enemy
intended to oppose the operations at sea to the utmost of his power. On
December 4, the British light cruiser Topaze and the Italian destroyer Ardente were attacked whilst on escort duty; on the same day another Italian destroyer,
the Intrepido, and the transport Re Umberto were sunk by mines off
Valona, many lives being saved by the British drifters, netting the entrance.
These attacks were followed by a raid on the transport route by the Helgoland and her destroyers. Leaving
Sebenico at 8.30 p.m. on the 5th, they arrived in the Otranto Channel about
five hours later, and cruised for three hours between the Italian coast and
Cape Laghi, after which Captain Seitz turned north and sank several small craft
in Durazzo Bay and at Medua. (The exact
composition of the raiding force is doubtful, but it is stated that a cruiser
of the "Sankt Georg" type was present.) The French submarine Fresnel, on guard in the latter
district, grounded and was destroyed by gunfire from the Austrian ships.

Whilst the committee was working
at the practical details of landing supplies on the coast and carrying them
inland, the Serbian Headquarters Staff and Rear‑Admiral E. C. Troubridge,
the head of the British Naval Mission, were arriving in Scutari. For the next
ten days the heroic Serbians straggled in. They had been fighting and
retreating for seventy days, and were destitute of everything. As far as can be
judged from the documents available, the mass of them were then encamped round
Scutari, but there was another force further south near Tirana, composed mainly
of the royal bodyguard and of the troops who had retreated westward when
Monastir fell.

In the meantime, the naval
forces at Brindisi were making a determined effort. The light cruisers carried
out no fewer than sixteen sweeps and convoy trips between December 5 and 10,
thanks to which about 2,000 tons of supplies were landed or carried across to
San Giovanni di Medua. The difficulties of carrying the food on to Scutari
were, however, very great: "Of the twenty trabaccoli now being used for
unloading ships, two are still full of supplies, which have to be carried
ashore, one sack at a time, by soldiers, from a kind of wharf. On shore, sacks
of biscuits, barrels of petroleum, petrol, and stores of every description are
accumulating, and lie exposed to attacks by aeroplanes and the weather. Had the
Austrian cruisers hit the stores of petrol, Medua would, by now, be burned
down. The stores are carried to Scutari on ox carts; the road is so bad that
the carts stand still for hours at a time and the journey takes three days. If
it begins to rain matters will be much worse." This report came from
Lieutenant Accame, who had been put in charge of the roadstead. It was laid
before Admiral Pini's committee at a meeting on December 10, and the
Italian members at once urged that no further supplies should be sent to San
Giovanni di Medua, but that the Serbian armies should be embarked at Valona.
The British naval and military delegates answered that masses of half‑famished
and destitute troops could hardly be expected to march over a mule track until
they had been fed and rested, and added that as far as they were informed 500
tons of food per week could be transported from San Giovanni di Medua to
Scutari. In the end it was decided, on Admiral Pini's motion, that the
provisions either actually landed or waiting would suffice to enable the
Serbian armies to move southwards, and that every effort should be made to get
them to do so. A further convoy of provisions was to be landed at Durazzo for
the forces in the centre of Albania.

Nobody could doubt that the
decision was sound; whether it could be carried out was another matter. During
the following week news began to come in of an Austro‑Bulgarian
concentration against the Serbian troops in central Albania. Their numbers were
not large; a brigade only had been located round Berat, but if, as seemed
likely, they were the advanced guard of a serious thrusting force, the position
was serious. In the opinion of the Italian generals, the Serbian troops,
against whom the blow would fall, bore "no resemblance to an
army," and could put up no serious resistance. The result would inevitably
be that communications between northern and southern Albania would be severed,
and the garrison at Valona brought into great danger. Fortunately the threat
came to nothing, but it sufficed to throw our arrangements into uncertainty.

Hoping, doubtless, to keep a
foothold on Albania, the

Dec. 1915

VALONA OCCUPIED

Serbs refused to move from the
positions they then held, but they appealed to Admiral Troubridge to put some
order into the harbour of San Giovanni di Medua, and placed all their troops
under his orders. The need for a central controlling authority was indeed so
obvious that the other Powers concerned soon took the same course. On December 19 Vice-Admiral Cutinelli, the Italian Commander‑in‑Chief
at Brindisi, placed the Italian personnel, wireless station, and boats at San
Giovanni di Medua under our Admiral's orders. The Montenegrins, who had
occupied the place earlier in the war, did the same. Many sources of confusion
were beyond control, but Admiral Troubridge did what he could by enforcing a
few elementary rules of public hygiene and by organising parties for clearing
the quays. After some consideration, he decided to leave the wrecks of the
vessels sunk in the harbour where they were, as they formed a sort of obstacle
to submarines. The business of clearing the port was made particularly
difficult by the enemy's air attacks, which dislocated work, though they did
little material damage. To counteract the nuisance, Admiral Troubridge placed a
line of machine guns along the ridge near the harbour; by this means the
aircraft were at least compelled to fly high.

The last contingent of Italian
troops arrived at Valona on December 12, and two days later the evacuation of
the Austrian prisoners, for whom a temporary camp had been provided a short
distance outside that town, began. In the course of the next three weeks the
entire 25,000 of these wretched cholera‑stricken men were conveyed to
Sardinia in two Italian and three French transports.

No less lamentable was the
condition of the Serbian troops, while that of the refugees who had fled with
the armies was even worse. Admiral Troubridge strove to relieve them as best he
could, by organising them in groups and placing them under police officers. It
was but little that he could do, after all. The only medical stores were
contained in the medicine chest of a British destroyer. Several more medicine
cases were sent over from Brindisi, but there were practically no doctors
available to use them. Admiral Troubridge's great achievement was that he
succeeded in feeding the community from the army stores which he was distributing,
and in maintaining order amongst them. But the high death rate continued
unchecked, and each day, as a vessel arrived, crowds of women and old men
flocked to the Admiral and besought him on their knees to let them embark.
Between December 10 and January 14 over 3,000 of these were carried away into
Italy.

The Italians lost no time in
putting Durazzo into a state of defence, for it was henceforth to be a base of
supplies and a port of disembarkation. By December 20 they had brought up a
brigade of infantry from Valona; landed eight heavy guns and a battery of anti‑aircraft
pieces and laid a minefield off the port. Quick as they were, they were only
just in time, for, almost as soon as they had completed the work, the Austrians
launched an attack against their lines of communication.

6

The First Cruiser Action in the Adriatic

On December 28,1915, Vice‑Admiral Fiedler, the Austrian Commander‑in‑Chief in Cattaro, had three old battleships - the Wien, the Monarch, and the Budapest ‑ one heavy cruiser ‑ the Kaiser Karl VI ‑ three light cruisers ‑ the Helgoland, the Novara, and the Aspern ‑
and a considerable force of torpedo craft, concentrated under his immediate
command.

AUSTRIAN FORCES IN CATTARO

Budapest

Monarch

Wien

four 9.4", six 5.9", 17 knots

Kaiser Karl VI

two 9.4", eight 5.9", 20 knots

Aspern

eight 4.7", 17 knots.

Novara

Helgoland

eight 3.9", 27 knots.

Five destroyers of the "Czepel" class

two 3.9", 33 knots

Two destroyers of the "Hussar" class

six 11‑pdrs, 28 knots

Eight torpedo boats.

Vice‑Admiral Cutinelli,
commanding the Allied force at Brindisi, had certainly a more powerful squadron (following), but

ALLIED FORCES IN BRINDISI

ITALIAN

Vittorio Emanuele

Regina Elena

Roma

Two 12", twelve 8", 20 knots

Nino Bixio

Quarto

six 4.7", 26 knots

Agordat

twelve 14‑pdr, 22 knots

Three armed merchant cruisers.

Mining vessels.

Nine destroyers (four "Abba," five, "Indomito")

Five submarines.

FRENCH

Nine destroyers (five "Casque," two "Bouclier," two "Spahi ).

Nine submarines

BRITISH

Weymouth

Dartmouth

eight 6", 26 knots.

Liverpool

two 6", ten 4", 26 knots.

Topaze

twelve 4", 22 knots.

Four submarines

Dec. 28, 1915

AUSTRIAN CRUISERS SAIL

as the duty of supplying the
Serbian army from Durazzo fell, alinost entirely upon him, some of his cruisers
were generally away on escort duty.

Durazzo Bay, where a large part
of the Serbian army was afterwards assembled, was protected by a minefield, and
the surrounding hills were posted with Italian troops and batteries, some of
which covered the seaward approaches of the bay. The protection afforded was
not, however, absolute; Durazzo lies only eighty miles from the mouth of
Cattaro Bay and was certainly within reach of a raiding attack. (See Map 5.)

The intelligence system of the
Italian High Command sufficed to detect any movement that was actually on foot,
and it was supplemented by reports from submarine patrols. But at the end of
December, the number of submarines capable of going on patrol appears to have
been small; there were no British submarines of the Brindisi force ready for
service. The French submarines Archimede and Monge were keeping watch to the
north and south of Cattaro respectively. On the 28th the Archimede torpedoed and sank a large Austrian steamer approaching
Cattaro from the north. (It has not been
possible to ascertain the movements of the Italian submarines.)

At 9.0 p.m. on December 28
Captain Seitz, the commanding officer of the Helgoland, received orders to raid Durazzo. He was to take with him
the destroyers Czepel, Tatra, Triglav,
Lika, and Balaton, and was to be
off the bay by daybreak. If, when he got there, no Italian destroyers were
found on patrol, he was to go inside at once and sink all the transports he
could find.

By midnight the whole force was
under way, and when clear of the harbour the destroyers took up their cruising
formation: the Balaton astern of the Helgoland, the Czepel and the Tatra to
starboard, and the Lika and Triglav to port. The night was clear,
with very little wind, and soon after 2.30 a submarine's periscope was sighted
in the Helgoland's wake, just ahead
of the Balaton. It was the Monge. She had no chance of saving
herself from the Balaton, which
immediately rammed and sank her, and, an hour later, the raiders were again on
their course with two officers and twenty‑five men prisoners on board.

At 6.0 a.m. on the morning of
the 29th the force was fifteen miles to the westward of Durazzo, and after
making a short sweep to the south‑westward to make sure that there was no
sign of interference by Allied forces approaching from Brindisi, the raiders
turned in towards the bay. They hoped to find a small force of Italian
destroyers still inside, and the Helgoland and Balaton therefore steamed towards
Cape Laghi at the southern end of the bay to cut off any ships that might
attempt to escape. (Marine Rundschau,
June 1922, p. 243.) It was soon evident, however, that there were only
three unarmed ships inside ‑ a steamer and two small sailing vessels ‑
and at 7.30 the whole force steamed in, with the exception of the Balaton, which remained outside watching
for submarines.

The Italian ships in the bay
were sunk after twenty minutes' firing. To carry out the attack, the destroyers
had gone right in, but the Helgoland kept outside the imaginary line joining the buoys at the northern and southern
ends of the bay, and steamed slowly to and fro to the south‑westward of
Durazzo. At about eight o'clock the destroyers came up to the northern end to
join her. As they did so the batteries on shore opened on them, and the
destroyers turned sharply to port so as to keep out of the Helgoland's line of fire. Their new course brought them into a
minefield. The Lika almost
immediately struck two mines in quick succession: the second explosion started
a fire, and she sank, burning fiercely. (Ibid.,
pp. 243‑4.) The Tatra saved
as many survivors as she was able to pick up ‑ it was impossible for her
to go alongside the Lika on account
of the flames ‑ but, almost simultaneously with the first disaster, the Triglav also struck a mine abreast her
boiler‑room. These rapid and unexpected casualties placed the flotilla in
a very anxious position.

The Triglav, it is true, remained afloat, and the Czepel was ordered to tow her out, but the towing cable got foul of
the Czepel's screw, and Captain Seitz
then ordered the Tatra to relieve
her. All this took time, and in the meanwhile the guns ashore were getting the
range. The Helgoland made every
possible effort to engage the batteries and cover the operations, but it was
not until 9.50 a.m. that the crippled flotilla moved out. The Triglav was entirely out of action, the Tatra was incapable of fighting so long
as she kept the tow, and the Czepel's
speed was much reduced by the portion of tow rope which still fouled her
propeller.

Moreover, serious as was the
difficulty of getting the Triglav safely back to harbour, a much heavier anxiety was now weighing upon the senior
officer's mind. At 8.15 he had intercepted a signal from the Italian commander
on shore reporting the raid to Vice‑Admiral Cutinelli at Brindisi. (This was probably a repetition; Brindisi
seems to have had the news a good deal earlier.)

He knew, therefore, that our
squadrons in Brindisi would

Dec. 29, 1915

ALLIED FORCES SAIL

be on the move, and at 10.10 he
sent a telegram to the Austrian Admiral in Cattaro warning him of the dangerous
position of the flotilla. "The Lika and the Triglav have struck mines off
Durazzo. The Lika has sunk. Triglav in tow, but making water.
Durazzo has warned Brindisi; it is therefore possible that we shall be cut
off." His estimate was correct, for our counter‑movement was by then
well advanced.

Shortly after seven o'clock an
Italian officer came on board the Dartmouth.
He informed Captain Addison that a force of Austrian destroyers was off Valona,
and gave him an order from Admiral Cutinelli to proceed to sea with the Italian
light cruiser Quarto and five French
destroyers and cut them off. The Dartmouth and Quarto had steam up, but the
French destroyers, the Casque, Renaudin, Commandant Bory, Bisson, and Commandant Lucas, were not quite ready. Captain Addison decided not to wait
for them and got under way at once; but he gave them verbal orders to follow as
soon as they could, and to meet him off Cattaro, for he determined to get between
the raiding force and their base, as the only certain method of finding and
engaging them. Just before the Dartmouth got under way, an Italian officer came on board and told Captain Addison that
Durazzo, not Valona, had been bombarded. By eight o'clock the Dartmouth and Quarto were clear of the harbour. The Casque and the other French destroyers followed soon after.

At 7.45 Admiral Cutinelli sent a
message to the Weymouth ordering her
to raise steam at once, as an Austrian force of "cruisers and destroyers"
was raiding Durazzo. As soon as he could do so, Captain D. B. Crampton went on
board the Vittorio Emanuele ‑
Admiral Cutinelli's flagship ‑ and begged to be allowed to proceed. For
the moment, the Italian Admiral was inclined to wait for more news, but shortly
after nine he received a further signal to the effect that the Austrians were
still off the town. This seems to have given him the confirmation that he
required, for he at once instructed Rear‑Admiral Belleni to hoist his
flag in the Nino Bixio and proceed to
sea with the Weymouth and the four
destroyers, Abba, Nievo, Mosto, and Pilo, in order to reinforce the Dartmouth and bring the enemy to action
if he could. At 10.10, therefore, when the captain of the Helgoland informed the Austrian Admiral at Cattaro that the
flotilla was in danger, the Dartmouth and the Quarto were about fifty‑five
miles to the westward of him, steering for Cattaro, the French destroyers were
following on the Dartmouth's track,
and Admiral Belleni's force was about twelve miles to the north of Brindisi,
also steering northwards for Cattaro.

So long as the Triglav was kept in tow the raiding
flotilla could only proceed at 6 knots. The captain of the Helgoland made an effort to get on more quickly by ordering the Balaton to assist the Tatra in towing the Triglav, but the experiment failed, and the Tatra kept the tow. At Cattaro the Kaiser Karl VI was being kept under steam, and at 10.35 the captain
of the Helgoland asked that she might
be sent out in support. She was at once ordered to weigh, and passed the
harbour entrance at about 11.30, accompanied by four torpedo boats (Nos. 70, 17, 81, and 80). The position
that now arose was one of peculiar uncertainty. We had at sea four light
cruisers and two destroyer flotillas chasing a weaker force. But the Kaiser Karl VI was far more powerful
than anything we could oppose to her (unless Admiral Cutinelli put to sea with
his heavier ships); so that, if the Austrian forces succeeded in joining up,
the Dartmouth and Admiral Belleni's
squadron might at any moment be in great danger. The Italian Admiral knew,
fairly accurately, what forces the Austrians had concentrated in Cattaro; he
learned by one o'clock that the Kaiser
Karl VI and Novara were at sea,
and, apart from this information (which was gained from the enemy's intercepted
signals), it was not difficult to foretell that the Austrians would make every
effort to extricate the crippled flotilla. He, therefore, informed the captain
of the Dartmouth that Admiral Belleni
was coming out to support him, and later he warned the Rear‑Admiral that
the Kaiser Karl VI and the Novara were out.

Captain Addison's force was the
first to come into contact with the Austrians. Adhering to his intention to cut
the raiders off from their base, he kept on his course for Cattaro; but at
about noon he received two messages from Admiral Cutinelli in Brindisi telling
him that the raiders had lost two destroyers at Durazzo, and had left the bay
at 10.30 a.m. with one boat in tow. (The
messages were received at 10.50 and 11.20, but owing to the time necessary for
deciphering them they were not in Captain Addison'a hands until nearly noon.) Although
the information was not correct in every particular, it sufficed to show
Captain Addison that the raiders were to the south of him. He therefore turned
north‑eastwards towards the land, so as to make sure that the enemy
should not escape him by hugging the coast, and, after holding his new course
for twenty‑five minutes, turned southwards in the direction of Cape Rodoni.
At 12.38 the Dartmouth and Quarto were joined by the French
destroyers, and at 12.55, while they were still making towards Cape Rodoni,
Captain Addison sighted the smoke of the Nino
Bixio

Dec. 29, 1915

CRUISER FORCES IN CONTACT

and Weymouth on his starboard beam. Admiral Belleni was, in fact,
following Captain Addison's original plan, and making towards Cattaro, but,
unfortunately, the messages from Brindisi about the crippled state of the
Austrian flotilla did not induce him to turn at once, like Captain Addison, to
the eastward. If he had done this his squadron would have come into action at
least two hours earlier than it actually did. At 11.0 he sent on the Abba and Nievo to reconnoitre, and held on his course until he heard from
Admiral Cutinelli that the Kaiser Karl VI and Novara were out; then he turned
sharply to the eastward, and twenty minutes later altered course to the
southwards, for his destroyers had warned him that they had sighted the Kaiser Karl VI further north, and that
aeroplanes were in sight to the north‑east. (They actually reported a "cruiser of the 'Sankt Georg'
type," and, although no mention was made in their signal to Admiral
Belleni, the aeroplanes vigorously attacked the Abba and Nievo.) Realising
that the presence of this heavily gunned cruiser made his position difficult,
he recalled his destroyers (1.45), and made towards the Dartmouth, which was just coming into action with the enemy. (See Map 6.)

Captain Addison had ordered the
five French destroyers as they came up to take station on his port beam. At
about 1.20 he sighted two smoke clouds, one ahead and one just on the starboard
bow. The first came from the Helgoland,
with the Balaton and Czepel in company; the second from the Tatra towing the Triglav. Either because the light to the northward was clearer, or
because his own ships could not be seen so easily against the land, the
Austrian commander had become aware of our presence before we had sighted him.
When he did so, he must have thought he had little chance of getting back
alive. The Czepel had been unable to
clear the towing rope from her propeller and could only do 20 knots, so that
even if the Triglav were abandoned,
the whole flotilla would be at least 5 knots slower than any one of the
pursuing cruisers. Captain Seitz was by then aware that the Kaiser Karl VI was coming to his
assistance, and he probably guessed that the Aspern, Budapest and Novara would follow as soon as they could. This knowledge of what was being done to
save him must have sharpened his disappointment when he sighted our cruisers
and realised that they had got between him and his supporting forces.

Captain Seitz would doubtless
have been justified had he decided to abandon the Czepel, whose slow speed was endangering the entire flotilla.
No such thought seems to have crossed his mind, however, for at 12.10 he sent
out his final orders, which show that he intended to stand by her to the last.
"If the enemy cruisers advance against us the Triglav is to be sunk. The Tatra and the Balaton are then to close the Helgoland, which will endeavour to
attract the enemy's attack to herself, and so give the Czepel a chance of getting away on the disengaged side. The Triglav is to be made ready for sinking.
Documents, money, and crew are to be placed on board the Balaton."

He then continued on his
northerly course, and at 12.50 had the good fortune to speak to U.15, which was patrolling in the
neighbourhood. Realising that he would soon be in action, he told the submarine
commander to stand by the Triglav,
which would certainly attract our light cruisers, and so give him an
opportunity of delivering a successful attack. A quarter of an hour later, the Czepel and Balaton reported the Dartmouth and Quarto, and orders were given to
sink the Triglav.

(It seems
as though it took some time to carry out this order. The entries in the Dartmouth's log between 1.0 and 1.43 p.m. are as follows: - "1.18, sighted smoke S. 30 E; 1.22, more smoke
I point on starboard bow; 1.30, portion of smoke observed to separate and cross
to port, apparently one T.B.D. towing another. Remainder identified as Novara and 2 T.B.D. Increased full
speed; 1.35, S. 5W.; 1.40, T.B.D. slipped tow and proceeded to endeavour to
join remainder of enemy's squadron; 1.42, Co. S. 25 W.; 1.43, opened
fire.")

Standing stiffly to his
determination to save the destroyers if he could, Captain Seitz steered
straight for us, so as to cover the damaged Czepel,
and at 1.30, when all hope of joining the Kaiser
Karl VI was gone, turned to the westward.

As soon as Captain Addison had
made out the Tatra with the Triglav in tow, he detached the Casque and her destroyers to deal with
them (1.38). The enemy were thirteen miles away when the order was given, and,
by the time the French boats reached the spot, the Triglav had been sunk and the Tatra had rejoined the Helgoland. The
senior officer of the French flotilla reported this to Captain Addison some
time later (2.12), and followed the Dartmouth and Quarto to the westward. The
French boats were several knots slower than our light cruisers, and were not
engaged during the afternoon.

The enemy was by now (1.30 to
1.35) well settled on his westerly course. The Czepel had first tried to escape to the eastward, but seeing that
it was quite impossible to get past us and the French flotillas, turned to
follow the Helgoland. At 1.35 Captain
Addison steered south, so as not to let the enemy draw too far ahead; seven
minutes later he made a

Dec. 29, 1915

THE ACTION BEGINS

further turn to starboard, and
almost simultaneously opened fire at a range of about 14,000 yards. By then,
the Helgoland was steering to the
south‑south‑west, as it must soon have become clear to Captain
Seitz that he would get to a dangerously short range if he attempted to
hold his westerly course and cross the Dartmouth's
bow.

When the action began, Admiral
Belleni was about fifteen miles to the north‑north‑westward of the Dartmouth and Quarto, the Kaiser Karl VI to the north‑eastward, several miles out of range, and the Aspern, Budapest and Novara were just getting under way. Captain Addison had, therefore,
definitely placed himself between the Helgoland and her supporters, but it was still possible that he might be cut off from
Admiral Belleni. The danger of this was, however, diminishing, as Captain
Addison had informed the RearAdmiral in the Nino Bixio at 1.30 that the enemy had turned to a westerly course,
an intimation which would deter him from making too far to the north and east.

It was clear to Captain Addison
that Admiral Belleni could not arrive for some time, and he soon discovered
that the enemy had the heels of him. (In
his report, the captain of the Helgoland states that his ship was worked up to a speed of 29 knots through the water.) He
therefore decided to use his intercepting position to drive the enemy south‑westwards
towards Brindisi, where he hoped that Admiral Cutinelli would be waiting for
them. It would be a long time before the enemy could work round his bows, and
so long as he kept the Dartmouth to
the north, the enemy's advantage in speed would be countered, and, at the same
time, his efforts to break north would keep him within range of the Dartmouth's 6‑inch guns.

When Captain Seitz settled the Helgoland on a southwesterly course
at 1.34, he was fully alive to the Dartmouth's
advantages, which were not in her position alone, but in her choice of range,
for the Helgoland's guns could not
fire effectively at more than 10,000 yards. Between 1.40 and two O'clock
the converging courses of the two squadrons reduced the range fairly rapidly,
and at 1.55 the Helgoland was hit. (The hit was at the fore davit of the
starboard lifeboat, and caused eight casualties (one killed, seven wounded).) Throughout
the afternoon the Austrian gunlayers endeavoured to return an effective fire by
aiming at our mastheads with the sights set at extreme range, but the device
was not successful, and from first to last Captain Seitz's only chance of
escape was in the speed of his squadron.

At two o'clock the Helgoland was turned to a course due
south, in order to open out the range, but Captain Seitz brought her back to
her south‑westerly course a few minutes later, and renewed his effort to
get round the Dartmouth's bows. The Helgoland was not hit again for nearly
two hours, during which time the courses varied between south‑west and
west‑south‑west, with the Helgoland slowly drawing ahead. In the meantime, Captain Accini in the Quarto was causing the Austrian
commander the greatest anxiety. He had manoeuvred his vessel into the Helgoland's wake, and it seemed as
though the Czepel would be cut off in
spite of all the efforts that had been made to save her. What followed is a
fair example of how one of the two adversaries in an action may mistake the
other's intentions. Captain Accini had apparently moved out to attack the
lagging destroyers on his own initiative, and at about 2.10, Captain Addison
directed him to take station on the Dartmouth's port quarter. As Captain Accini put his helm over to obey the order the Helgoland fired a torpedo, and Captain
Seitz thought the aim had been so good that the Quarto had moved out of the way to avoid the torpedo. In point of
fact, no one on board the Quarto realised that there had been anything to avoid.

Between 2.30 and 3.15 the Quarto, acting under orders from Captain
Addison, again endeavoured to cut off the Czepel,
but by now the opportunity had passed, and the movement was not noticed in the
Helgoland.

(Captain
Seitz speaks of the Quarto's turn
towards the Dartmouth at 2.10 in
terms of great relief, but he makes no mention of the second deliberate attempt
to intercept the Czepel. His war
diary runs as follows: "2.10. The direction of the torpedo is good. Quarto makes a large turn to port (sic):
simultaneously Czepel is extricated: Helgoland is cleared for two
hours."

It
should be noted that, although the Czepel reported at about noon that she could only do 20 knots, she must have far
exceeded that speed during the whole afternoon.)

In spite of the difficulties of
firing with 6‑inch guns, at ranges up to 13,000 yards, on a target which
was frequently covered by smoke, the Dartmouth's
shooting was extremely accurate. At 2.30 the Helgoland was straddled; but she succeeded in throwing out the
range by turning away, and the Dartmouth ceased fire to avoid wasting ammunition. For the next twenty minutes (2.40 to
3.0) Captain Addison turned his ship gradually to port, and the distance
between the Dartmouth and the Helgoland shortly decreased. The Dartmouth kept up an intermittent fire
from her broadsides, to test the range, and at 3.2 the Helgoland was hit by two shells from these experimental salvoes.
Just after 3.0 the range slowly opened out again, as the Austrian squadron then
established their lead, and the enemy's chances of

Dec. 29, 1915

WEYMOUTH IN ACTION

getting away improved. At 3.15
the Helgoland had got well ahead, and
Captain Seitz began edging to the westward. (Not
shown on the plan, as the Helgoland's position at 3.15 can only be conjectured.) He made several more turns to
starboard; but at 3.30 he sighted Admiral Belleni's approaching ships and
realised that his chances of escaping were lessening again. For some time past
the Rear‑Admiral had been seen approaching from the Dartmouth; but the smoke of the destroyers obscured the view to the
eastward of the Helgoland; by the
time Captain Scitz became aware of Admiral Belleni's approach the fresh ships
were nearly within range.

Admiral Belleni's squadron was
in a somewhat irregular order. At 2.5 Captain Crampton had asked for permission
to close the Dartmouth. It had been
granted, with the result that the Weymouth had edged considerably to the southward, and when the new squadron came into
action she was on the Nino Bixio's port quarter. To port of the Weymouth were the destroyers Mosto and Pilo. The other two destroyers, Abba and Nievo, were on the disengaged side of the Nino Bixio. As he overhauled the Helgoland, Captain Crampton sighted the Czepel some distance to the southward, and asked permission to send
the Mosto and Pilo to cut her off (3.30). The request was granted (3.40), and the
two destroyers began to manouevre towards the Helgoland's wake.

At 3.50, when the Weymouth opened fire, at the extreme
range on the sights, the Helgoland had a slight lead on the newcomers; but she was now outnumbered by four to one - without counting the destroyers; and the Czepel had only to lose a knot or two to be cut off by the Quarto, which was following in a position wide of the Dartmouth's beam. (She had been ordered to cut off the Czepel at 2.30, and recalled at 3.15, but she does not appear to have obeyed
the recall.)

Here once more the Austrian
commander was in a position of great danger. At 3.40 he had turned to a north‑westerly
course in the hope of breaking through; but the attempt soon proved impossible,
as the new course took him right across the track of the Weymouth and the Nino Bixio,
and rapidly reduced his lead on the Dartmouth.
Indeed, in a few minutes the range had fallen so much that the Austrian
destroyers were bringing their guns into action against the Dartmouth, and Captain Seitz saw that it
was no longer possible to get away to the westward. He therefore turned sharply
to the south (4.0), "in order to gain time until sunset "; but this
move increased his difficulties. It put him on a course at right angles to his
original pursuers, the Dartmouth and Quarto, and although the Dartmouth conformed and took up a
parallel course, the Quarto held
straight on and overhauled the Helgoland rapidly. Taking this as a threat to separate him from the Czepel, which he had risked so much to defend, the Austrian
commander turned to starboard again and steered to the south‑west
(4.7). Again the Dartmouth conformed,
and kept up the intermittent firing which had continued since the fight began.

The difficulties in the way of
accurate shooting were at the time great, as the Austrian destroyers were
sending up a very heavy smoke‑screen; and the colours at the Helgoland's masthead were often the only
part of the ship still visible. Our fire was, none the less, extremely accurate
when it was possible to fire at all, and at 4.25 the Helgoland was hit by a shell which entered the top of her third
funnel: two fires in two boilers were put out, and one boiler was damaged.
"We were now pursued by four cruisers," says Captain Seitz in his war
diary; " it was the hardest moment of the fight."

As a matter of fact, however,
the Helgoland's chances of escape
were at this moment improving. She was again steadily increasing her lead, and
at about 4.30 the Czepel rejoined her. (It was at about this time that she was
hit in the fore topmast; the shell wrecked the crows' nest.) As she did so
our firing increased in intensity; for the sun had now set, and the Austrian
ships were clearly outlined against the evening sky.

It is possible that Captain
Seitz's view of our ships had been obscured by smoke, and that, in the
confusion and uncertainty of the action, he had thought his position worse than
it really was; for only five minutes after the situation had seemed so black,
he realised, as he looked down the range, which was clear for the first time
since the fight began, that he had a good chance of escaping to the north‑westward.
He did not immediately make the attempt; but held on his south‑westerly
course for another twenty minutes, and at 4.50 turned to a course parallel to
the Italian coast, which was by this time only twelve miles away. The moment
was well chosen, for the Dartmouth and Quarto were then well astern of
him; and, in the failing light, he had at least a good chance of getting past
Admiral Belleni without being disabled. His south‑westward course since
4.7 had carried him out of range of the Nino
Bixio; for the Rear‑Admiral had kept on a more westerly course, in
the hope of cutting off the enemy's retreat during his swerve to the southward.
Captain Seitz's new movement towards Monte Gargano peninsula now put the two
opposing flagships on to rapidly converging

Dec. 29, 1915

THE AUSTRIANS ESCAPE

courses. If it had been made
earlier in the day it would have meant certain destruction for the Helgoland; but dusk was now gathering,
and Captain Seitz decided to take the risk.

The Helgoland was soon within range of our guns, and the Weymouth and Nino Bixio opened on her with salvoes. Difficult as the conditions
were, our shells fell accurately; and one of them hit the Helgoland on her armour. But as she had the good fortune to suffer
no damage, the Helgoland was able to
maintain her speed during the critical moments when she most needed it; and at
five o'clock Captain Seitz signalled to the Budapest squadron, which had put to sea during the afternoon and joined up with the Kaiser Karl VI, that he was trying to
break through in the direction of Monte Gargano.

His position continued for some
time to be most critical, for the range between him and Admiral Belleni's ships
was rapidly decreasing; and a lucky shot would have put him at our mercy. A few
minutes later his danger broke full upon him: the Weymouth and Nino Bixio opened a concentrated fire upon the Austrian ships as they stood out against
the last glow of the twilight, and our salvoes fell all round the target. But
Captain Seitz held on without swerving, and a few minutes later his courage and
good leadership were rewarded; for our fire began to slacken as gunlaying and
range‑finding became mere guesswork in the growing darkness.

Our last chance of preventing
the enemy from getting home was now centred in the Mosto and Pilo ‑
the two destroyers on the Weymouth's
port beam ‑ and at about 5.2 they made a final effort to get within
torpedo range. (They had been manoeuvring
for position ever since 3.40, when Captain Addison ordered them to cut off the Czepel.) As they approached, however,
it was clear that they could not get into position without coming under the
fire of our ships, and the attempt was abandoned.

At 5.30 the range had dropped to
7,000 yards; the Nino Bixio was
slightly hit; and in the obscurity Admiral Belleni thought he detected the
enemy turning to the northward. He put his helm over to conform; but Captain
Crampton, who was nearer, and saw no change of course, held on as he was; and
so got between the Nino Bixio and the
enemy. Admiral Belleni at once ceased fire; but the Weymouth continued to send down salvoes until 5.50, when she, too,
stopped. At six o'clock, when the Captain of the Helgoland saw that he had all his pursuers abaft the beam, he
turned north, and was soon lost to view, for it was by then quite dark.

7.

The Evacuation of the Serbian Army
(continued)

Admiral Pini's committee had met
on December 24. At this sitting the Italian members and the president again
urged the need for moving the Serbian army from round Scutari further to the
south. Despite Admiral Troubridge's efforts, the confusion at San Giovanni di
Medua was terrible. The enemy's submarines were threatening; as far as could be
ascertained, there was one continually at work off the Bojana River. The
Italian members were, moreover, deeply irritated by the criticism which was
being levelled against them by persons who were quite unable to see the
difficulty of landing supplies at an open roadstead, where there was a total
lack of facilities for receiving them. No decisions were taken, and the
committee, after meeting again on January 4, asked Commander Larking to cross
over to Albania and report on the local conditions.

In the meantime, matters in
Albania were moving towards a crisis. The Serbian army round Scutari refused to
stir; and on December 31 General Mondesir arrived from France to take charge,
as the Allies had decided that it should be the allotted duty of the French to
re‑equip and reorganise the Serbian troops. Disregarding the dangers of
transporting an army from an open roadstead within reach of the enemy's raiding
forces, and anxious only to remove the Serbs to some place where he might again
bring them under military training, General Mondesir urged that the
embarkation should be pressed forward. His intention was to embark 88,000 men
at San Giovanni di Medua, 45,000 at Durazzo and the remaining 10,000 at
Valona, and that they should all be conveyed to Tunis. But his proposal only
strengthened the Serbian opposition; and it was due to Admiral Troubridge that
the matter was settled without a violent quarrel. This officer's influence with
the Serbian generals was very great. From the moment when he arrived on the
Danube he had won their affection and respect. Throughout the retreat his proud
military bearing and the self‑control of his officers had been noticed by
everybody. The Serbian authorities were very bitter about the Allies; but their
affection for the British Admiral had never wavered, and when they arrived at
the coast one of their first acts had been to give him authority over their own
soldiers and fellow‑countrymen. But for this Admiral Troubridge's
position would have been impossible; as matters stood, it was still extremely
difficult.

Jan. 1916

A CHOICE OF HARBOURS

His naval instinct told him that
San Giovanni di Medua was no place from which to embark an army; but he was
well aware how strongly the Serbians disliked the idea of being marched south
to Valona. On the other hand, he had no wish to obstruct or oppose the French
General. He decided that no personal feeling ought to prevent him from giving
his advice as clearly and candidly as possible; and when General Mondesir
forwarded him a plan for embarking 2,000 troops a day, he at once stated his
objections:

"As
soon as I learned that I was responsible (for embarking the Serbian army) I
considered it my duty to tell the Serbian Headquarters Staff that it is neither
reasonable nor practicable to embark 88,000 men at Medua.

"The
first desideratum for such an operation is to find a suitable harbour as far as
possible from the enemy.

"Medua
is the least suitable harbour, and is the nearest to the enemy of those
available.

"If
the soldiers come here, I shall assist them as far as I can; but I have told
the Serbian Headquarters that I cannot bear responsibility for what may occur.

"With
the greatest respect, I am of the opinion that the operation has been badly
conceived and will end badly."

The letter was a very happy
combination of bluntness and tact. With a Frenchman's quickness of
apprehension, General Mondesir realised that such plain speaking must certainly
be honest, and that Admiral Troubridge's objections were obviously sound. The
Serbian Headquarters Staff knew how loyally the unpalatable advice had been
given, and at once replied through Colonel Pavlovitch:

"To
my sorrow it has come to my ears that you have been thinking we should act
differently. We consider you our greatest friend, and we are happy to have
so competent and illustrious an officer for our naval affairs. We shall always
address ourselves to you, and your advice will be held most precious."

The Serbians were as good as
their word, and on January 7, 16,000 men marched off to Durazzo. The
destination of the Serbian army was at the same time changed from Tunis to
Corfu. This port was now occupied by a French naval detachment, who prepared it
for the reception of the Serbian troops.

The wisdom of clearing northern
Albania was soon evident. On the very next day, a telegram came in to say that
the Montenegrin army was being attacked over its whole front. Details of the
position and extent of the Montenegrin lines are lacking; but it would seem
that most of the country was at this time in the hands of the Austro‑Germans,
and that the Montenegrin forces were covering Cettinje from a defensive
position between the northern end of the lake of Scutari and Mount Lowcen. To
the north and north‑east of this principal position, the mountain chain
of Kuk and the town of Podgorica seem to have been held in strength. As the
Serbian troops could no longer be treated as a field army, the Montenegrin
lines were the last barrier between northern Albania and the advancing Austro‑Germans.

It was now clear that the
barrier would not stand. On the day after the assault began, the Italians were
informed that one position after another was falling; and on January 11 it was
known that the occupation of Cettinje was imminent. On the following day the
Montenegrins asked for an armistice. It was granted them; and they were
disarmed and disbanded by the Austrian Staff.

The resulting position was
serious for more reasons than one. San Giovanni di Medua would certainly be
occupied; but this was not all. Mount Lowcen overlooks the harbour of Cattaro;
it had thus been used as an observing station for the movements of the Austrian
light cruisers, and had been linked up with Medua by a chain of look‑out
and wireless stations. All these were now being withdrawn, and the difficulties
of opposing the Austrian light cruiser raids increased in proportion.

It was now decided to evacuate
San Giovanni di Medua completely and at once. (The French were now in complete charge of the arrangements, and, as
Admiral Troubridge's services were no longer required, he proceeded to Taranto
on January 20, and was shortly afterwards recalled home.) The Serbs marched
south as fast as the state of the Durazzo road would allow; those who could be
transported by sea more quickly were pressed on board the available steamers;
and by January 22, the work was done. All the artillery, stores and wagons were
removed, and the harbour was left empty. On January 29 the Austrians occupied
the town.

Durazzo now became the centre of
the evacuation. From this port the troops were carried either direct to Corfu,
or sent in small vessels to Valona and then transhipped into large transports
for the rest of the passage. The work was not absolutely completed until early
in April; but the bulk

Feb. 1916

ANOTHER RAID

of the Serbian forces, amounting
to about 134,000 officers and men, with 36,850 horses and transport oxen, were
removed during February. To carry out the operation 203,000 tons of shipping
had been employed, and the vessels had made in all 322 voyages. The naval
effort upon which this movement rested had been very heavy; 1,159 cruiser
sweeps and convoy trips were carried out by the Allied vessels. In each case
the Italian contribution had been from a half to two‑thirds of the total.
It may be said with confidence, that if the Austrian High Naval Command
had been as energetic as the Allied, the work of embarking the Serbian army
from Durazzo would have been a good deal more difficult than it was. The
Austrian navy as a whole made no move; interference with the embarkations and
convoys was left to the submarines and the indefatigable Captain Seitz. From
first to last the operation cost the Allies eleven light craft (destroyers and
auxiliaries) and eight steamers; whilst the attacks upon our bases and lines of
communication cost the Austrians two destroyers and two aeroplanes.

By February 6 Captain Seitz,
having repaired his ship, was again at sea in the Helgoland, with six torpedo boats (Nos. 83, 87, 88, 74, 78 and 80) in company. A powerful column of Austrian troops was then marching
southwards on Durazzo. As the Italians only intended to hold the place as long
as they needed it for their immediate purpose, the approach of the enemy
compelled them to press on with their embarkations. Captain Seitz, on the other
hand, moved towards the threatened harbour and its congested traffic, hoping to
arrive in time to attack a large convoy which, according to his information,
was due to leave Durazzo early in the morning. Simultaneously with the blow he
hoped to strike, a destroyer, the Wildfang,
with two seaplanes, was to operate close inshore in conjunction with a line of
submarines. The times at which these two groups sailed and the course they
took are a matter of conjecture; all that can be said with certainty is that
they were both at sea during the afternoon of February 7. Two of our light
cruisers were patrolling near the transport route. The Liverpool had left Brindisi at 1.0 p.m. on the previous day, with
the Italian destroyer Bronzetti in
company, with orders to protect the coastwise traffic between Valona Bay and
Durazzo; the Weymouth, with the
French destroyer Bouclier, left
Brindisi at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 6th. The Italian destroyers Abba and Ardente with the torpedo boats Airone and Ardea were on guard at Durazzo
itself. (Camillo Manfroni: Storia
della Marina Italiana, p. 97.)

At about 2.0 p.m., the Liverpool and Bronzetti, which were then steering for Brindisi, sighted a hostile
aeroplane. They were, at the time, about forty‑five miles S. 6 degrees E. (true)
from Cattaro. The aircraft turned sharply to the northward, and Captain G. W.
Vivian, realising that she might be the herald of something more serious,
followed her. A few minutes later smoke was sighted towards Cattaro, and the Bronzetti was ordered ahead to
investigate. The Weymouth was about
twenty‑five miles to the south‑eastward. Captain Crampton got a
signal from his colleague that "an enemy ship was in sight " (2.25
p.m.), and at once turned northwards to support him. What had happened was that
the Liverpool and the Bronzetti had fallen in with the Wildfang and had turned her back.

The Liverpool was naturally outpaced; but the captain of the Bronzetti, Commander Grixoni, pressed
ahead, and at 3.0 p.m. opened fire. The Wildfang returned it; but the range was still too great and the salvoes fell short. Captain
Vivian soon saw that the chase was carrying the Bronzetti dangerously close to the batteries in Traste Bay and
recalled her. Commander Grixoni was actually under fire from the shore when he
turned back. The Wildfang anchored in
Traste Bay, and the Weymouth and Bronzetti resumed their course for
Brindisi. At 3.20 Captain Crampton in the Weymouth got a signal that the enemy to the north of him had got back to Cattaro, and he
thereupon resumed his patrol. Though they did not know it, Captain Vivian and
his Italian colleague had thrown out the first movement of a serious attack
upon the transport line.

The Liverpool and Bronzetti were back in Brindisi towards nightfall, and the Weymouth and Bouclier continued the patrol. At about 7.30, a group of destroyers was sighted ahead.
Our cruisers were then about thirty‑five miles to the southward of
Cattaro, on a course towards Cape Rodoni. Three hostile boats were distinctly
made out, and a fourth was reported; the enemy were steering south across
Captain Crampton's bows. He also turned southwards to bring them on his beam
and so get his broadside to bear. It was getting dusk; but the weather was fine
and clear, and the Weymouth opened a
slow and deliberate fire at a range of 7,000 yards. For a time the Austrians
held on resolutely and closed the range. Just before eight o'clock, the two
groups were within 5,000 yards, and Captain Crampton altered away slightly and
increased his speed. Soon after 8.0 p.m. it was seen that the enemy group had
turned north. Captain Crampton at once turned after them; but ceased fire, for
it

Feb. 1916

DURAZZO EVACUATED

was growing dark. The Austrian
destroyers were now making for Cattaro, and we continued to dog them until nine
o'clock, when they were no longer visible. Whether these two successive
encounters were the only causes which upset Captain Seitz's plans we cannot say
with certainty: we must be content to record that, on the night of February 6‑7,
there was no organised attack on the transport route, though everything
combines to show that something serious was attempted.

(At
7.0 a.m. on the following morning the Weymouth and Bouclier, when about fifteen
miles to the west‑north‑westward of Durazzo, were attacked by a
submarine; possibly one of those which Camillo Manfroni mentions as working in
conjunction with the Wildfang.)

By February 9, the Serbian
troops round Durazzo had been transported; the Italians then had a force of 8,500
men and 36 guns posted on the hills round the town, under the command of
General Ferrero. The Italian Staff had always intended to withdraw this
garrison as soon as it was no longer needed for covering the Serbians; but in
consequence of the breakdown of the Montenegrin fronts and the southern advance
of the Austrian armies, the withdrawal now had to be carried out in the
presence of the enemy. On or about the 10th the Austrian forces began to
approach the Italian positions; but it was not until nearly a fortnight later
that they had assembled in any considerable force or had brought up their
artillery. For some reason or another the Italian army authorities still
delayed the evacuation. On February 15 General Ferrero reported that he was
ready. The naval commander at Brindisi, Admiral Cutinelli, at once sent over
fifteen transports and two hospital ships with a sufficient escort; but, almost
as soon as they assembled in Durazzo, General Ferrero countermanded the
evacuation. It was not attempted again until the 25th, and during the interval
the enemy pressure had very much increased. The withdrawal was at last carried
out on the nights of February 25, 26, and 27 in very adverse circumstances.
Since the 23rd the enemy had encircled the Italian positions, and kept them
under a continuous bombardment; on the 24th the Austrians seized the Sasso
Bianco (white cliffs) and kept the beaches under fire.

The naval part of the business
in hand was, therefore, very arduous. It was extraordinarily difficult to keep down
the fire of the enemy's batteries, and harder still to get the troops embarked.
A very large force had to be allotted to the operation: fourteen transports and
a hospital ship were concentrated in the bay; a group of British drifters under
Lieutenant‑Commander M. E. Cochrane netted the harbour and assisted in
the actual embarkation; whilst three light cruisers, four destroyers, and four
armed merchant cruisers engaged the enemy's batteries. Outside, the Italians
detailed two battleships, three light cruisers, and two flotillas of destroyers
to act as a covering force. During the night of the 26th‑27th the
evacuation was completed, but the losses were severe. Of the 8,000 ashore on
the 25th, 600 odd were killed, wounded or captured, and thirteen guns were lost
or destroyed.

Throughout the operations the
British naval forces had been continually at sea. They had been frequently
attacked by submarines, fortunately without loss. In close contact with the
shore had been the British drifters, which had netted all the harbours where
embarkation was in progress. "No praise is too high for them," writes
Admiral Thursby; "their nets have kept off submarine attacks, and, no
matter what happens, drifters always appear on the spot. They have already been
the means of saving many lives from ships which have struck mines or been
torpedoed." The passage of so many troopships between Valona and Corfu was
safeguarded by a long line of drifters covering the whole distance with
their nets. Between October and the end of February six drifters were lost, two
being sunk by gunfire from submarines and four by striking mines. The last
was the Lily Reaich, which gallantly
fought a submarine on February 8, only to blow up and sink with all hands at
Durazzo on the 26th.

The evacuation of Durazzo by the
Italians was the last important incident in the transporting of the Serbian
armies. The Serbian troops soon regained their morale and were ready shortly to
be taken to Salonica, their new sphere of action. The spring of the year thus
found the Austro‑Germans in possession of all northern Albania; but
confronted by an Italian Expeditionary Force, based on Valona, with a short and
easy line of sea communication to Italy.

After the last act of rescue was
achieved the war in the Adriatic changed its character. The Austrian Naval Command
evidently decided not to risk their ships against the Valona line of
communications, which was well to the south of Brindisi; for when the Allied
transport ships had finished their work the enemy cruiser raids completely
ceased. For many months the British and Italian cruisers swept the Adriatic
without sighting anything but their own patrols, or perhaps the periscope of a
submarine. The routine work of naval war went on without interruption; mines
were laid

May 1916

GUERRILLA WARFARE

off Brindisi and swept up again;
the Venice Patrol kept watch off Pola, the Southern Patrol off Cattaro, and
from time to time there were rumours of an impending sortie by the Austrian
fleet.

In May 1916 Admiral Mark Kerr took
charge of the British Adriatic Squadron in succession to Admiral Thursby. The
Adriatic had by then become a theatre of guerrilla warfare ‑ although we
were committed to a measure which might at any moment bring the Austrian
raiders from their anchorages. Ever since September 1915 we had maintained a
force of armed drifters in the Straits of Otranto and along the line between
Valona and Corfu. At a naval conference held at Malta in March 1916, the French
and Italian admirals had recommended that the drifters should be strengthened;
the Italians were then getting ready a flotilla for work off Valona, and we had
over twenty additional drifters as a reinforcement. The crowd of mosquito
craft in the southern basin was thus increasing with every month that went by,
and Admiral Kerr, in one of his first letters to the Admiralty, pointed out
that they were unprotected, and might at any moment be severely attacked. His
warning was justified; but it was many months before the danger came to a head.

8

The Mediterranean – Salonica - January
to June, 1916

When the French and British
Governments made their final decision with regard to their military policy in
the Balkans (See Vol. III., P. 223.), General
Sarrail had reached the limit of his advance into Serbia. In his bold and cool‑headed
attempt to carry out his orders and save the Serbian armies, he had pushed
forward the bulk of his troops to the Cerna River. The British forces and a
French detachment under General Bailloud were left to protect his
communications against a Bulgarian stroke along the defiles which lead
southwards into the Vardar valley from Strumitza. But during November the
Bulgarians carried the Babuna Pass, and so got between Sarrail and the
retreating Serbians; all hope of keeping open their line of withdrawal to
Salonica then disappeared.

General Sarrail's position was
now one of extreme danger. (Sarrail, Mon
commandement en Orient, p. 43.) The
Bulgarians were pressing more and more insistently upon his immediate front,
and an attack against his positions in the Strumitza valley threatened his
whole line of communications with Salonica; nor could he forget that there
were several Greek army corps in his rear. Would they receive orders to attack
him when the time came to order a retreat? For a moment he seems to have
inclined, like his naval colleagues in the Aegean, towards an attempt to
overawe the Greeks by a naval demonstration. Wiser counsels prevailed. He met
Lord Kitchener on November 17, and was persuaded that such high‑handed
measures would probably lead to his own destruction. They would in any case
have destroyed what was for the present the Allied army's first line of defence
‑ the obstinate and even‑handed neutrality of the Greek Government.
When General Sarrail actually began to withdraw from Krivolak at the
beginning of December the Germans made precisely the mistake from which Lord
Kitchener's moderation had saved us.

Their Military Attache at Athens
presented to King Constantine a telegram from General von Falkenhayn, dated November
29, 1915, to the effect that if Greece failed to disarm the retreating forces
of the Entente, or to secure their immediate re‑embarkation, the German
and Bulgarian armies might very probably find it necessary to cross the
frontier. The Skouloudis Cabinet not only refused to consent to this violation
of Greek territory, but they skilfully added that if the proposed advance was
not hostile to Greece herself, they would refrain from opposing it by force of
arms, upon condition that certain guarantees were first given. These guarantees
were in fact nineteen conditions, the acceptance of which would have seriously
hampered the German command. They were not acceptable to Falkenhayn, and
discussions and hesitations followed, which lasted till near the end of May. In
the meantime King Constantine had promised Lord Kitchener personally that no
attempt should be made during the retreat of the Allied armies to intern or
disarm them. The Greek Government confirmed this by a formal undertaking
to give the Allies the entire control of railways to the frontier, and to allow
them a free hand in "establishing a defensive organisation"
round the town of Salonica, and in front of the Chalcidic peninsula. This
arrangement was as favourable to us as the proposed naval demonstration would
have been disastrous. The troops were withdrawn without difficulty, and early
in the new year the entrenched camp at Salonica was completed. From Skala
Stavros, in the Gulf of Rendina, it ran along the line of lakes to the western
end of the Langaza

Dec. 1915

GREEK NEUTRALITY

geul; from thence it followed
the line of hills to Aivali, where the French and British troops joined. The
French held the line between Aivali and the Vardar and threw out strong posts
to the west of the river. Provision was made for giving naval support to the
eastern end of the line at Skala Stavros.

The Bulgarians made no attempt
to cross the Creek frontier in pursuit of the Allied troops; and after long conferences
and discussions the King of Greece defined his attitude. He protested formally
against the existence of an entrenched camp on Hellenic territory, and declared
that if the Germans and Bulgars should ever move southwards to attack it, he
would move his forces out of the way and not interfere. If, on the other hand,
the Allies re‑embarked, the Greek army would hold the frontier, and
defend it by force, if need be. When, after some hesitation, the Allied
Governments decided in December that Sarrail's army should remain in Salonica,
the Greek troops were redistributed, so as to leave the Allied communications
free. A small watching force was left in the north near Gevgeli; but the bulk
of the Hellenic army was divided into two groups: one in eastern Macedonia, to
the east of the Struma, the other facing the northwestern frontier, to the
north and west of Vodena. This concession undoubtedly set up a workable state
of things; but, as could be seen at a glance, it was not a permanent or even a
stable position.

If the Allies should ever leave
Salonica and advance once more against Bulgaria, it was hardly to be doubted
that the Central Powers would press the Greek Government with fresh demands.
Moreover, the naval position still held within it all the material for a
conflagration. The Anglo‑French squadron at Salonica was anchored under
the guns of Kara burun fort (The fort was
occupied by the Allied forces on January 28, 1916, on the order of the French
Admiralty.); it was inevitable that the Naval Command should be alert and
even apprehensive. When the first landings were made, it was noticed that gangs
of Greek workmen were at work on the fortifications. Several times the naval
representatives had urged that the fort should be seized; but General Sarrail
resisted. At a conference between himself and the Greek authorities he
received a formal assurance that the coastal batteries would never, in any
circumstances, be used against the Entente, and that all work upon them should
cease. (Sarrail, p. 322.) With this
he was obliged to be satisfied; but the naval commanders never reconciled
themselves to the position.

After the crisis had passed, and
when the evacuation of Gallipoli was complete, it became necessary to
reconsider the distribution of our forces in the eastern Mediterranean. For
months past the defence of Egypt had been occupying the military authorities,
and early in January a force of battleships was detached from Admiral de
Robeck's command to protect the canal. At Salonica, the French were given the
position of predominating partners, and a composite force of two British and
four French battleships, two French armoured cruisers, three British monitors
and four French destroyers was concentrated behind the net defence. Its duties
were to assist in the blockade of the Bulgarian coast and to support the army
ashore. The bulk of Admiral Gauchet's Dardanelles Squadron was based upon Milo,
and the remaining British force continued to work from its northern bases off
the mouth of the straits.

The naval war in the eastern
basin changed its character with the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula; the
navy could play no part in any offensive operations which might be undertaken
in Macedonia; and its principal duties were, henceforth, to be preventive.
The objects of the naval force concentrated in the Aegean, as defined in a
telegram sent from the Admiralty shortly after the evacuation, were "to
watch the Dardanelles, and safeguard the Greek islands in our occupation, to
maintain the blockade and submarine patrols in the Aegean, and to support the
army at Salonica." Active submarine operations in the Sea of Marmara were
practically discontinued.

The redistribution of our
military forces had, however, increased the weight of our naval
responsibilities; when the Salonica force was finally entrenched and equipped, five
British and as many French divisions were being supplied by oversea transport.
The defence of Egypt laid even greater burdens upon the navy. The dispositions
finally settled by Lord Kitchener and General Maxwell stationed a large
defending force in the country; the whole garrison of Egypt, with its
administrative units, artillery and transport, now amounted to 222,000 officers
and men and 325 guns. (The higher
formations of the garrison were: One division; one Anzac mounted division; one
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade; four mounted brigades; four dismounted
brigades, and two Indian infantry brigades.) There were thus some 400,000
men in the Mediterranean War Area, and their power to fight depended entirely
upon the security of a route against which the German submarine commanders were
about to concentrate their efforts. There had been a

Oct. 1915‑March 1916

SUBMARINE WARFARE

lull after the heavy sinkings in
November;

British ships lost.

Allied and neutral ships lost.

October 1915

10

7

November

23

18

December

11

13

January 1916

5

1

February

6

6

March

2

2

but it was realised that this
was only temporary, and that to meet a renewed attack effectively would be the
dominating naval problem of the coming year. In December, representatives of
the Allied navies met in Paris to confer upon the situation; and the
discussions showed, at once, that the French and British staffs were divided
upon the measures to be adopted. The method favoured by British naval opinion
at that time was the diversion of shipping to certain definite routes,
patrolled by swarms of light craft. The French staff thought differently. They
were convinced that German submarines were laying down stores of oil and
provisions in the deserted creeks of Crete and Asia Minor, and using them as
operating bases. The essence of their proposals was, therefore, that a force of
old cruisers should be set apart to search every creek in the eastern basin for
submarine anchorages. In the light of later knowledge it can be seen that
neither plan was adequate to the pressing need of the moment; but at the
opening of the conference each side held firmly to its opinion. It should be
added, in justice to both sides, that the opinions of the French Commander‑in‑Chief,
Vice‑Admiral Dartige du Fournet, more or less coincided with our own.

Before the conference he had sent a detailed plan to the British Admiral Superintendent at Malta, suggesting that about 280 trawlers and 140 destroyers should be allocated to anti‑submarine work in the Mediterranean. If these had been available, it is possible that the British and French navies would have carried on the campaign on the same lines. But the requisite force was not available, and it became necessary to devise a new plan of operations. The outcome was that the two staffs agreed to divide the Mediterranean into eighteen areas or zones, of which four were allotted to the British, four to the Italians, and ten to the French. The French Commander‑in-Chief
was made responsible for arranging the secret transport routes, and the senior
officer in each zone kept the routes under patrol with the forces allotted to
him ‑ and arranged for the movements of ships within his own area. This
conference, which dealt more with the general principles of command than
with practical details, was followed by another, held at Malta on March 9,
1916, and attended by the Admirals with local commands. At this Admiral de
Robeck pressed for a slight redistribution of the zones, urging that his
squadron could undertake larger responsibilities now that it was free of the
Dardanelles operations. The French, however, were anxious to retain their
position in the Aegean, and this was agreed to, but to complete the compromise
the whole of the transport route from Egypt to Malta was made a British zone.

These discussions may be said to
have overcome some of the difficulties in a divided command, and to have paved
the way for concerted action against the growing menace.

(The
decisions and recommendations of the second conference were: (i) to re‑arrange
the zones of operation; (ii) to recommend that more light craft should be
allocated to the theatre; (iii) that the secret routes should be settled and
communicated by the French Commander‑in‑Chief; (iv) that more
submarines should be sent to the Adriatic; (v) that all aircraft bases in the
Mediterranean should be placed under a central organisation; (vi) that the
Mediterrannean should be declared a war zone; (vii) that a central wireless
intelligence bureau should be established at Malta; (viii) that more
directional wireless stations should be established; (ix) that the Allies
should assume control of all Greek posts, telegraphs and customs; (x) that
Greek and Armenian volunteers should be used for military expeditions.)

For the time being, however,
there could be no doubt that the attack had got the better of the defence. As
had been foreseen, the lull in March proved to be only temporary; in April
sixteen ships were sunk inside the Mediterranean, and in May the figure rose
suddenly to thirty‑seven. It was the Italian merchant fleet which
suffered most severely from the renewed attack; in May they lost over 30,000
tons of shipping, and, in the following month the figure was even higher. As a
purely defensive measure the system of patrols and secret routes was not giving
good results ‑ and as a means of destroying submarines it was even
less satisfactory. Since the beginning of the year, only two German boats had
been lost: one (UC.12) had fouled her
own mines off Taranto, the other (UB.15)
was permanently missing "from causes unknown."

Such then was, briefly, the
course which the war against our sea communications had taken during the first
months of the year; such was the unstable and anxious position of our forces on
land; and such the harassed and harassing diplomacy of the Greek Government. It
is regrettable, but not surprising, to find not many weeks later (June 8) that
the strain has at last reached breaking point, and to see the capital of our
old Allies yielding resentfully to the loaded broadsides of our naval armament.

The course of events was perhaps
as inevitable as any

March 1916

GREEK NEUTRALITY IN QUESTION

sequence could be. If the Allies
could have found it possible to hold the entrenched camp at Salonica as a mere
preventive to guarantee, and to remain on guard there, such difficulties as
subsequently sprang up might have been solved by slight extensions to the
December agreement (See ante, p. 126.),
but new and quite natural decisions taken in the Allied councils altered the original
position, and, at the same time, created new points of friction in the
relations between the Allied Powers and the Greeks. In the first place, it was
natural that General Sarrail should do everything which he considered necessary
to make his rnilitary position secure. As he knew that the Greeks would not
resist a Bulgarian advance across the frontier, he deemed it proper to close at
least one line of approach to his position, and therefore ordered the Demir
hissar bridge to be destroyed. This action was bitterly criticised by Greek
officers ‑ it interrupted communication between the Greek troops to the
east and west of the Struma. What advantage could the Allies obtain, they
asked, by crippling the military forces of a nation which they still regarded
as a friend and possible ally? General Mahon, to whose loyalty General Sarrail,
subsequently paid the most generous tribute, was doubtful whether such sudden
and drastic action was wise.

Soon afterwards Kara burun fort
was occupied by the Allies. The pretext was that a British ship had recently
been sunk in Greek territorial waters, where she was by international law under
the protection of the Greek Government; but the real reason for our action was
the underlying belief that German submarines were receiving information from
the shore. Both the French and the British naval staffs seem to have been
firmly convinced that some prominent Greek politicians had a secret
understanding with the German submarine officers. Doubtless in a country so
divided as Greece both the Allies and the Central Powers had numerous
partisans; but, in the light of later information as to the tactics of U‑boat
commanders, it may be doubted whether this charge of connivance between
the Greek and German naval authorities was well founded.

The German submarine raids upon
shipping were governed by the general plan of going as secretly and as
unobtrusively as possible to those places where shipping was likely to
congregate, and of remaining there for as long as possible. Any system depending
on information from the shore would continually endanger the secrecy which was
the very essence of the method. When anchored for a rest in some deserted bay,
U‑boat officers may from time to time have landed and conversed with a
shepherd or a charcoal‑burner; but the probability is that they depended
upon their own deductions to lead them to good hunting grounds, and made
themselves as independent of the shore as they could. The only charge, then,
upon which the Allied action could be expressly founded was the failure of the
Kara burun garrisons to guard our ships against U‑boat attacks; and the
Greeks took it hard that they should be punished for failure in so difficult a
task. The occupation of Kara burun fort was, moreover, followed by other measures
against which the Greek Government was bound to protest, so long as it adhered
to its policy of opposing an impartial resistance to Allied measures which it
did not like and to Austro‑German demands for concessions to balance
them.

Corfu was made a French naval
base, Castellorizo was occupied ‑ and General Sarrail instituted a severe
police regime outside the town of Salonica. He had practically no choice but to
act as he did. He was a military commander operating from a neutral town with a
very mixed population. The better class was educated and intelligent but
divided by faction; below them lay a mass of small levantine traders whose
political sympathies fluctuated with the contents of every bulletin; and lower
still was the raceless rabble of idlers, swindlers and wastrels which has no
right to the Hellenic name. Who could tell which of these elements might at any
moment be in control? On the other hand, it should be remembered that, on more
than one occasion, General Sarrail's British colleagues, though themselves
keenly alert, were of opinion that he might have issued his proclamations more
diplomatically and have enforced them less harshly.

Resentment and ill feeling
increased during the first three months of the year, and something very like a
crisis occurred when M. Skouloudis, the Premier, said that he could not allow
the Serbian army to be moved into position over the Greek railways. According
to one authority (Abbott, Greece and
the Allies, p. 88.), he added that he
would destroy the railway system rather than see his country coerced. These,
and other incidents of the same kind, doubtless made the conflict more acute
when it occurred; although they did not actually create it. The immediate cause
was of a different kind.

The Allied General Staffs had
met at Chantilly on March 12, and had decided that the Allied armies, when it
became possible, should all assume the offensive together ‑ in the hope
that the German resistance would either collapse or be seriously damaged at
some point or points by the pressure. The army at Salonica was expected to take
a share in this general assault upon the Central Powers; it was not to be
reinforced, but was

March‑June 1916

PRESSURE ON GREECE

to make itself more active when
the united attack began. If, however, the Balkan positions were to be altered
in our favour by the advent of new Allies, or the withdrawal of other Balkan
belligerents, the armee d'Orient would then attack at the most favourable moment. The decision, which
represented the French view, seems to have been the governing rule of our
strategy in the Balkans for the year. (At
a conference held in the Foreign Office on March 27, General Joffre strongly
opposed the British proposal to withdraw a division from Salonica and send it
to the Western Front.) General Sarrail was, at first, in doubt as to what
was required of him; but the plan that he finally adopted was to baffle his
opponents as much as possible, and be ready to make a rapid stroke against
Monastir at a favourable moment. (Sarrail,
p. 85.) In the middle of March, therefore, he began to move his army out of
the entrenched camp and extend it in detachments across a broader front.

The inevitable counter‑demand
followed upon this movement. Pressed by General von Falkenhayn, the German
Government protested that the Greek authorities were allowing the Allies an
unfair advantage (Abbott, p. 97.);
and, after a series of recriminatory letters, announced that the troops of the
Central Powers would be compelled to take possession of Fort Rupel, the key to
the Struma valley. It was accordingly occupied late in May, and the Greek
troops were forbidden to offer any opposition.

It can hardly be denied that the
Greek Government had a valid justification for their consent. The basis of the
understanding arrived at in December 1915, between the Entente Powers and
Greece, was that if the Anglo‑French army remained on Greek soil, the
Hellenic army would not help it to attack its adversaries, or impede the
Central Powers from advancing against it. The Greek Government could therefore
argue that the surrender of Fort Rupel was a mere application of the existing
understanding. But M. Skouloudis' Government was by this time so much out
of favour with the Allies that any pleading from it was listened to with impatience.
General Sarrail proclaimed a state of siege inside the town; the naval
authorities urged that action should be quickly and impressively taken. On June
8 Admiral Moreau, of the French Syrian Squadron, occupied Thaso; a partial
blockade of the Greek coasts was instituted; and detailed preparations were
made for a demonstration against the capital. General Sarrail sent away two
brigades to be embarked and to act as landing parties, and Admiral Moreau was
put in charge of the naval forces of the expedition. The ships detached for the
operation were:

Tonnage.

Armament.

(a) French:

Patrie

14,900

4‑12"; 18-6.4"

2 Waldeck Rousseau class

27,990

14‑7.6" x 2

6 destroyers

(b) British:

Exmouth

14,000

4‑12"; 12‑6"; 10‑12‑pdr.

Foresight

2,850

9-4"; 2‑T.

Forward

2,850

9-4"; 2‑T.

Hussar

1,070

1‑4.7; 2‑12‑pdr.

Earl of Peterborough

5,900

2‑12"; 2‑12‑pdr.

M.17

540

1‑9.2"; 1‑12‑pdr.

Empress

2,540

4‑12‑pdr.

Peony fleet sweepers

Azalea fleet sweepers

4 destroyers

2 torpedo boats

2 minelayers

18 auxiliaries

By June 20 the men and ships
were assembled in Milo Bay, and lay crowded in the land‑locked, airless
harbour in the sweltering heat of the Aegean summer. On the following day,
the Allied Note was presented at Athens.

The Allies demanded that the
Greek army should be demobilised, that a "business ministry" should
replace the Cabinet then in office, that the chamber should be dissolved and
new elections held, and that all police officers obnoxious to the Allies or their
military commanders should be discharged. Nothing was refused; and so, once
again, the crisis passed. Our punitive squadron was dispersed, though
arrangements were made to reassemble it at a moment's notice, and our naval
force in the Mediterranean was entirely devoted to the vital struggle for the
control of communications.

CHAPTER V

THE MEDITERRANEAN. JUNE 1916 TO JANUARY 1917

1

The Bulgarian Invasion of Northern Greece
and its Consequences ‑ An Allied Fleet at the Piraeus

The latter half of the year 1916
was a period of suspense and of preparation: the Allies were aware that in the
war at sea they were approaching a danger zone the nature and extent of which
could not be foreseen with any exactness. The situation in Greece was
especially hard to appreciate, because it was complicated by the bitter
antagonism of the two political parties, who might be expected in the near
future to bring their country into the war equation on this side or on that. In
other words, there was here added to the clash of arms a prolonged and obscure
diplomatic conflict. Under the head, therefore, of Naval Operations there will
fall to be considered not only the overt acts commonly so described, but also
the diplomatic action and the difficulties of policy which accompanied or impeded
them. A great combined squadron was occupied for six months in a naval
operation which did not involve, on our part, the firing of a single shot; but
which depended at every step upon the changes and embarrassments of the
diplomatic situation. Moreover the episode in question has few parallels in
English naval history, and is in several respects unique. Here, as in the
Adriatic, our naval force was acting, in a manner unknown in previous wars, as
the subordinate partner in a mixed command; while our diplomatic action was
being conducted by Ministers acting in concert with the French Commander‑in‑Chief.
For the student of history, and perhaps even more for the naval officer of the
future, it is evidently necessary that so instructive a situation should be
thoroughly set out.

It may also be as well, for the
sake of avoiding any possible rnisinterpretation, to indicate beforehand the
general lines of the course pursued by the Allies, and to suggest here and
there the advantages or disadvantages of the turn taken at certain moments. No
judgment will be passed either on persons or on Governments, except by
necessary implication from the facts. The failure ‑ for temporarily and
in a certain degree there undoubtedly was failure ‑ will appear to have
been the result of almost irresistible urgencies. The British Admiral was co‑operating
with the French squadron, but was not in an independent position. The aim of
the two Powers was one and the same; but the problem did not present itself to
both under the same aspect.

To our Government and to its
representative it seemed clear that our end could only be completely attained
by a procedure which should avoid the actual use of force, or even the open
threat of it. To the French Government it appeared that the time had come for
insincerity and prevarication to be dealt with by sternness and even by
severity. Upon such a matter and at such a time no difference of opinion could
be allowed to imperil the harmony of the Allies or the unity of command: to
secure this unity our civilian representative endeavoured for a time to keep
step with his military colleague; and it is conceivable that when the critical
moment was reached this novel form of co‑operation might have proved
advantageous, especially as Admiral Dartige du Fournet and Sir Francis Elliot
were both men distinguished not only by professional ability, but also by a
high sense of their own duty and of the consideration due to others. But under
the system adopted, an unforeseen result occurred: when the stern determination
of the French Government cut short their admiral's opportunities for tact
and conciliation, pushing him forward by definite and unconditional orders, our
diplomacy was at once left behind, and our naval commander was deprived of consultative
power. Failure followed inevitably: the action taken was unsuitable for the
attainment of the end desired.

All the demands in the last note
to Athens related to the domestic affairs of Greece, and it fell to the Allied
diplomats to see to it that these demands were being complied with. But the
internal administration of a country is complicated, and difficult to follow in
detail; its supervision by a foreign diplomat must be tactful and uncensorious.
Moreover, even if the Greek Government intended honestly to comply with the
Allied conditions, the execution of them would take time and must give rise to
many questions which would need delicate handling. For some weeks no hitch
occurred; the army was slowly demobilised and M. Zaimis, who succeeded M.
Skouloudis at the head of a non‑party Ministry, was on good terms with
the Allied Ministers. A few questions arose about the dismissal of prefects and
police officers to whom the Allies objected; and although it must have been
very painful to M. Zaimis to remove Greek officials from their posts at the
request of a foreign Power, he did not flinch from

July‑Aug. 1916

GREECE INVADED

this responsibility, and in
general he showed himself obliging and conciliatory whenever the Allies had a
complaint to make. The position was, however, still very difficult and its
future developments were uncertain. By demanding that a business Ministry
should be summoned and by insisting that new elections should be held, the
Allies had intervened on behalf of the constitutional party which objected to
King Constantine's autocratic theory of government. For the moment, thanks to
the restraining influence of M. Zaimis, the quarrel between the two parties in
the State was only moderately heated; but if anything should happen to blow it
into a fresh flame, nobody could foretell how far it might spread or in which
direction ‑ it was as likely to scorch the Allies as their enemies.

In the general theatre of war several events now took place which had a great effect upon the situation in Greece. On July 19, the Turks opened their second attack upon the Suez Canal; it was completely repulsed by the British army at Rumani; and, whilst the battle was raging, British and French naval detachments cruised off the coast of Asia Minor and bombarded Marmarice, Makri, Phineka and Mersina. On August 2, General Sarrail, the French Commander‑in-Chief at Salonica, who was
then reinforced by the Serbian army and by Russian and Italian detachments,
launched his Macedonian offensive. The Bulgarians at once replied by counter‑offensives
on the extreme flanks of General Sarrail's left and right wings.

On the left the Serbian army
held the Bulgarian attack successfully, and the operations involved none
but military questions; on the right the position became more serious. Here
General Frotie was watching the Bulgarian frontier towards Brody with a mounted
force of ten squadrons and a battalion of Zouaves; a Greek army corps was
spread out between Dernir Hissar and Kavala. (Sarrail, p. 142.)

The Bulgarians marched into
Greek territory at several points, and General Frotie fell back. The Greek
corps, being a detachment of a demobilised army, with its communications
running through territory occupied by foreign armies, was obviously unable to
resist the Bulgarians. The corps commander withdrew his troops as the
Bulgarians advanced; the garrison at Kavala had no line of retreat, and were
compelled to surrender to the Germans with all their material. (The formal surrender of the garrison took
place on September 19.) By the last week in August practically all that
part of Macedonia which lies to the east of the Struma was in Bulgarian hands.

Seeing that the Allied Generals
refused to allow the Greek troops to be taken off by sea, and threatened to
resist their retirement into Thessaly, it seems hard to maintain that the Greek
corps commander could have avoided surrendering. But the difficulty of
reviewing the new situation judicially, either at home or on the spot, was very
great, and a number of wild rumours added to the prevailing tension. M.
Venizelos told the British Minister at Athens that the retirement of Greek
troops in eastern Macedonia was, he felt certain, a first preliminary to
putting the whole of Greece into Bulgarian and German hands. The Bulgarian army
would shortly instal itself at Ekaterini and on the lower slopes of Mount
Olympus, from whence batteries of heavy guns would command the whole of
Salonica Bay. Simultaneously, the Austro-Germans would march south, join
hands with the Greek troops stationed at Larissa, and occupy Athens. The French
Naval Intelligence Service at Athens elaborated this forecast by reporting that
the Greek Government was collecting rolling-stock at Ekaterini, and that
detachments of German cavalry were already at Larissa.

This alarming news was
considered and discussed by the British Government on August 23. Their military
experts had no difficulty in showing that the danger was quite imaginary, and
that it would be utterly impossible for the Germans or the Bulgarians or the Greeks
to put a plan of the kind into execution. The Government therefore pointed out
to Sir Francis Elliot that, in the view of their advisers, Athens could not be
occupied by enemy forces until the force at Salonica had been defeated, of
which there was no probability for the moment. In this respect the
situation improved; but in another and more important respect it grew worse.
The Government had only discussed the technical and more recent aspects of the
reports from Athens; it was not yet possible to come to a conclusion on the
basic question, whether or no the Greek King and his Ministers were assisting
our enemies with advice, secret intelligence and plans for cooperation.
The decision that no action ought to be taken on such rumours did not check the
growing clamour for "strong measures," "drastic action" and
the like, against a Government whose complicity with our enemies was at
first suspected, afterwards credited, and finally treated as proved, although
no indisputable proof of it had ever been coming.

The Bulgarian invasion very much
affected one of the points insisted upon in the Allied Note of June 21. Since
agreeing to it, the Greek Government had been preparing for a general election
in the early autumn; when eastern Macedonia was overrun the King was
actually considering a draft

Aug. 1916

PRESSURE ON GREECE

decree for dissolving the
existing Chamber. It had, however, to be considered whether any general
election ought to be held at all in the new circumstances. Half the population
of Macedonia would be unable to vote; and the constitutional party in Greece
were counting upon the support of the Macedonians, who had been united to
Greece after the second Balkan war, and were anxious that their political
rights should not be whittled away by dynastic absolutism. M. Venizelos urged
that the elections should be held, in spite of everything; M. Zaimis that they
should be postponed, and in the end the Allies decided to leave the decision to
the Greek Government, which thereupon let the matter drop.

As the Bulgarian occupation of
Kavala had not, after all, injured the military position of the Allies or
impeded General Sarrail's offensive, it might possibly have been better to
stand aside from the first and allow the Greek nation to form its own judgment
of a Government which made no resistance or protest when the armies of a
neighbouring power invaded Greek territory, sacked and burned Greek villages,
and committed every kind of savagery upon the defenceless peasants. This,
however, was not the view which prevailed. At Paris, and in a lesser degree in
London, it was held that the Greek army's surrender of a fort and its munitions
to Bulgaria gave the Allies a right to demand corresponding concessions from
the Greek Government. The French Government took action at once, and in
response to an urgent request from Paris the British Government ordered the
Vice‑Admiral in the Eastern Mediterranean to detach a force to Milo to co‑operate
with Admiral Dartige du Fournet. Within a few days a large and imposing
squadron had been assembled and placed under the orders of the French Commander‑in‑Chief.

For the moment our Government
refused to commit itself, and deterrnined to wait until French intentions
were clearer; the first instructions sent out by the Admiralty (August 26) were
that Rear‑Admiral Hayes‑Sadler, who was in command of the British
detachment, was "on no account to take part in any offensive action
against Greece without explicit orders from here." On the following day
the French Government informed Whitehall that Admiral Dartige du Fournet had
been ordered to "immobilise the Greek fleet and the Greek General Staff;
seize the Austrian crew which, according to the French Naval Intelligence
Service, has arrived at Athens to take charge of a Greek submarine; seize all
enemy ships at Eleusis; seize all enemy agents and establish control over all
telegraph post offices, wireless telegraph stations, coal and petrol depots and
railways; and endeavour to cut off railway communication between Athens and the
Peloponnese." At the end of the month, therefore, it was known in London
and in Athens that the French were about to make a decisive move with their
fleet.

On the very day that these
orders were issued Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies, and
almost at once the Greek Government reconsidered its attitude. On August 30,
Sir Francis Elliot had a long interview with M. Zaimis, and wired home that the
King thought the time had come to abandon neutrality and join the Allies.
"In view of the above," wrote Sir Francis, "a demonstration and
landing at the present moment, when the political situation seems to be
changing so completely, would seem to be ill‑timed and might do infinite
harm."

But unfortunately the British
Government had by then committed themselves, and the warning was unheeded. When
the War Committee met to discuss the situation on August 30, they had before
them the draft instructions to the French Commander‑in‑Chief and a
memorandum by the French Ambassador in London which ran thus:

"The
French Government is persuaded that the enemy headquarters staffs are informed
of all the movements of the armee
d'orient by the Greek military. In these circumstances, Monsieur Briand
considers that it is no sufficient guarantee that the Chief of the Greek
General Staff has been replaced. So long as it is possible for Athens to
communicate with enemy forces by way of Florina, so long as German agents, with
the complicity of the Greek authorities, can give information and even supplies
to the Bulgarians, the situation will not be settled in such a way as to give
security to the offensive of the Allied armies at Salonica. If the armee d'orient is to carry out the
duties assigned to it, the French Government thinks it absolutely necessary
that the posts and telegraphs, the railways and the harbours of Greece should
be under its control. All this demands rapid, direct action; and the French
Government has made preparations for landing a brigade at Athens or at
other selected strategical points in order to support its demands. There is no
reason to fear that Greece will raise difficulties. M. Zaimis has been careful
to say, and indeed to repeat, that no resistance would be offered to the
Entente or to Bulgarians; he has also clearly shown, when discussing the matter
with the King, that the Entente must rely uppn itself for protection.

"The
French Government will only act with the British Government. The French
Ambassador has, therefore, been instructed to beg the British Government to
agree to a line of action which involves a minimum of inconvenience and is the
only one which will ensure success to the Salonica operations. The French
Government considers it absolutely necessary

Aug. 30, 1916

BRITISH DOUBTS

that
the special troops on board the British ships should take part in the landing
operations under the direction of the French Admiral.

"M.
Briand considers it essential that the action taken should be rapid, so that it
may secure the advantage of surprise, avoid danger from the German submarines,
and shorten as much as possible the time during which the ships necessary to
the operation will be immobilised.

"To
sum up, the French Government asks that the British Government should carry out
the operation projected for June 21, to which it previously agreed."

The British Government accepted
this responsibility, though with considerable difficulty: in the general
interests of Allied unity they agreed to a course of which they could not
entirely approve. Their first feeling was one of strong regret that a proposal
so far‑reaching should have been thrust upon them with so little
explanation. Several Ministers were for rejecting it outright, on the grounds
that it was most unwise to place M. Zaimis in difficulties, and that the
projected operation was provocative and easy to misrepresent.

The outcome of the discussion
was that the British Government telegraphed a long and carefully drafted
message to Lord Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, telling him that the
British squadron at Milo had received orders to go to Salamis, under the
command of Admiral Dartige du Fournet, to "support the demand" for
the control of the Greek posts and telegraphs. The British Government were,
however, most reluctant that troops should be landed, as a large number would
be required "for a definite military occupation," and a small body
might well be endangered if Greek feeling became heated. Further, as the Greek
Government had hitherto agreed to every demand made of them, the British
Government "were loth to meet the friendly attitude of M. Zaimis'
Government with severe measures," and could not agree that the control of
Greek harbours and railways was for the moment an urgent necessity.

In conclusion the British
Government said that they did not believe there was any danger of a
"German‑Bulgarian incursion towards Athens," and that the
situation, as it then stood, was not comparable to the situation on June 21.
The telegram very accurately expressed the doubts and hesitations of the
British Ministers; but it gave the French what they required. The Presence of
British ships in the French squadron made the British Government jointly
responsible for the policy upon which the French were about to embark. And
since it was part of that policy to replace the ordinary diplomatic representatives
of the Allied Powers in Athens by Generals, Admirals and a formidable squadron
of battleships, it was made particularly emphatic by British naval co‑operation.

The scruples of British
Ministers did not in any way affect the final instructions to the French
Commander‑in‑Chief. They were substantially the same as those which
had been communicated to the British Government some days previously,
except that Admiral du Fournet was no longer ordered to seize the Austrian crew
of the Greek submarine, an order which had obviously been based on very
inaccurate intelligence. On August 31 he assembled the flag officers on
board the Provence and told them that
he intended to carry out the first two duties assigned to him: the
"paralysis of the Greek fleet, more especially of its submarines,"
and "the capture of enemy merchantmen in the Piraeus."

During the night of August 31,
the armada began to steam out of Milo.

Displacement.

Armament

Provence (flag of V-A. C.in‑C.‑ Dartige du Fournet)

23,177

10-13.4", 22-5.5"

Exmouth (flag of R‑A. Hayes‑Sadler)

14,000

4-12", 12-6"

3rd Battle Squadron

Verite (flag of V.‑A. Darrieus)

14,489

4-12", 10-7.6"

Justice

14,800

4-12", 10-7.6"

Democratie

14,638

4-12", 10-7.6"

Republique

14,605

4-12", 18- 6.5"

Suffren

12,526

4-10", 18- 6.5"

Patrie (flag of R.‑A. de Marliave)

14,900

4-12", 18- 6.5"

2nd Light Division

Waldeck Rousseau (flag of R.‑A. Biard)

13,995

14-7.6"

Ernest Renan

13,504

4-7.6", 12 6.5"

Jurien de la Graviere, Repeating Ship

5,600

8-6.5"

Other vessels

Forward, light cruiser

2,850

9-4"

Sentinel, light cruiser

2,895

9-4"

Earl of Peterborough, monitor

5,900

2-12"

M.29, monitor

355

2-6"

M.33, monitor

355

2-6"

Aster, Honeysuckle, sloops

Prince Edward, Queen Victoria, net layers

Empress, British seaplane carrier

Campinas, French seaplane carrier

Diligente, Impatiente, French gunboats

Pluton, French minelayer

Perdita, British minelayer

16 destroyers (4 British, 12 French)

2 torpedo boats

Hussar, torpedo gunboat (broad pendant of Commodore Heneage)

25 trawlers, drifters and Chalutiers

At
eleven o'clock Commodore Heneage sailed

Sept. 1, 1916

ALLIED SQUADRON AT SALAMIS

in the Hussar, and the rest of his division, the monitors, sloops,
drifters, destroyers and the auxiliaries, followed at regular intervals. At ten
o'clock on the following morning the battle squadron weighed and formed single
line ahead outside the harbour. Early in the afternoon it reached Phleva
Island, where it was met by Commodore Heneage, who escorted the battleships up
a channel which he had swept and marked by drifters. As soon as the ships
anchored, the Prince Edward laid a
net between Point Keramus and Lipso Island. The Greek fleet, consisting of the
battleships Kilkis and Lemnos, the cruiser Giorgios Averoff and a handful of torpedo boats and submarines, lay
at anchor before Salamis dockyard and behind a barrage which was placed across
the Giorgio Channel. None of the ships had steam up, and most of the crews were
ashore for the afternoon. The cruiser division under Rear‑Admiral Biard
at once seized the enemy ships off the Piraeus and towed them to the fleet
anchorage; so that, by nightfall, the first two sections of the Admiral's
orders were executed to the letter. The enemy steamers were in French hands,
and the Greek fleet, which could only have put to sea by passing across the
batteries of the entire battle squadron in Salamis Bay, was completely
paralysed. The rest of the French Government's orders had obviously to be
discussed and examined before they could be carried out; and on the following
day, M. Guillemin, the French Minister in Athens, and the French Naval and
Military Attaches came to luncheon on board the Provence.

On the very day that the Anglo‑French
squadron anchored off Salamis, Sir Francis Elliot had an interview with King
Constantine, which showed how tangled and confused the whole situation had
become. The King said he was now convinced that the time had arrived for
him to declare war against Bulgaria; but he found it impossible to act quickly,
for his army was demobilised and the two divisions still in Macedonia were
surrounded; in addition to this, he had to think of the Greek population in
Asiatic Turkey, who would be exposed to every kind of ill treatment as soon as
Greece declared war. The question uppermost in his mind was how far he could
rely upon the Entente to re‑equip his army with the material necessary
for putting it on a war footing. Sir Francis Elliot, who thought that the hesitating
attitude of the King might well stiffen into open partisanship of the Entente,
if only the situation were handled carefully, was most anxious that the naval
demonstration should be brought to an end as quickly as possible, and that the
remaining French demands should not be pressed. The right to control the Greek
posts and telegraphs in particular seemed to him a most provocative demand.
"Is it wrong," he wrote, "for a neutral Power to use wireless
telegraphy if it has no other means of communicating?" If it was necessary
to save the face of the naval expedition, could not the Entente Powers be
content with demanding the expulsion of Baron von Schenk? (Head of the German propagandist section in Greece; formerly Krupp's
agent in the Balkan peninsula.)

Almost simultaneously with the
King's proposal and the appearance of the Allied naval force in Salamis, a
further incident occurred which gave fresh evidence that the French and British
authorities were not likely to agree as to the best method of dealing with the
Greeks. For months past a section of the Greek population in Salonica had been
trying to form a sort of temporary local government independent of Athens, and
to enrol a local battalion of Greeks to operate under General Sarrail against
the Bulgarians. Late in August the leaders of this patriotic movement openly
appealed to the Greek garrison for support. Some officers and men enrolled
themselves; others said that they would stand by the King and the Government;
and, as feeling naturally ran high, the controversy led to brawling and
shooting. General Milne was careful that no officers or men under his orders
should take any part in a quarrel between the two Greek factions; but General
Sarrail intervened, disarmed the officers and men who had refused to desert
their colours, and marched the officers through the streets under an escort as
though they had been ordinary prisoners. On September I they arrived at Athens
and were received by the King, who thanked them for their fidelity. The
incident made a deep and unfortunate impression in the capital. Sir Francis
Elliot said openly that it had done us a great deal of harm; General
Moschopoulos, the new Chief of the Staff, a strong friend of the Entente, who
was then using all his influence to persuade the King to declare war, spoke of
it to the British Military Attache with the greatest distress; even the temperate
blood of M. Zaimis ran hot when he spoke about it to the British Minister.

Sir Francis Elliot's telegram to
say that he thought a naval demonstration most unwise, and his further message
suggesting that the demands made on the Greek Government should be modified,
had arrived too late to stop the promise of British co‑operation; but as
soon as they were received the War Committee assembled to consider them. Should
they act upon these warnings or disregard them? The policy to which the British
Government were committed was still indefinite enough for them to withdraw from
it without actually breaking any undertaking. As at every previous discussion,
the Government were strongly divided; but this was the first occasion upon
which the general principle of coercion or no coercion detached itself clearly
from the usual technical questions about naval and military operations. Several
Ministers felt that the real motives of French policy towards Greece were
entirely hidden from us: what puzzled them most was the repeated allegations of
Greek complicity with the enemy. If, as the French asserted, such complicity
could be proved by documentary evidence, why were these proofs never
forthcoming?

All the Ministers with
diplomatic experience were convinced that the time had come to hold back, to
treat Greece as an ordinary neutral country, free to place her sympathies where
she wished, and to restrict our demands upon her to whatever was made
absolutely necessary by the very peculiar position of the Salonica force. The
traditional British practice of not forestalling events, but of acting upon
them as they arise, was never more strongly expressed than at this meeting; yet
the counsellors of drastic action prevailed. Sir Francis Elliot was instructed
to associate himself with his French colleague in demanding not only the expulsion of Baron von Schenk, but the seizure of Austro-German ships and
the control of Greek posts, telegraphs and wireless stations, unless the
situation should have so much changed that these demands were no longer
necessary.

The French orders were now,
therefore, to be executed. But before a Note could be presented at Athens the
technical implications of the demand for control of the Greek posts and
telegraphs had to be carefully discussed: what was to be understood by the word
control and how was it to be exercised ? On September 9, after a long
conference between the Allied Ministers and Admiral Dartige du Fournet, it was
decided: (i) that no wireless message should be sent in cipher unless it was
authorised by the Ministers of the protecting Powers; (ii) that controllers
were to be stationed at the principal telegraph centres of the kingdom,
Athens, Larissa, Janina, and that travelling inspectors were to be appointed;
(iii) that certain Greek officials of the posts and telegraphs were to be
removed; (iv) that Allied control officers were to have the right to examine
everything transmitted; (v) that no telegram was to be sent unless it was
stamped with the stamp of the control office; (vi) that no ciphered telegram
was to be allowed to pass unless it was being sent by the Greek Government to
one of its legations in Allied capitals or by a neutral legation in Athens;
(vii) that the number and substance of every message to neutral and enemy
countries together with the number of groups in it, were to be communicated to
the control officers.

Whilst this meeting was taking
place, a gang of disorderly Greeks broke into the courtyard of the legation,
fired a few pistol shots into the air, and shouted insulting remarks through
the open windows. On the following day M. Zaimis called on the French Minister,
and agreed that both the guilty persons and the Greek soldiers who had been on
guard outside the Ministry for War, and had not interfered, should be
punished. This would have closed the incident, but Admiral Dartige du Fournet
landed a small legation guard of French soldiers next morning; and thus took
the first step in the direction of making armed landings a part of the Allied
policy, a step which the British Government had always most rigorously opposed.

Meanwhile the Greek conditional
offer to intervene on the side of the Entente had been handed in at Paris and
London, and was being examined and discussed. In it, M. Zaimis repeated what he
had already told Sir Francis Elliot in conversation: Greece wished to co‑operate
with the Entente; but desired to know whether the Allies would promise all the
war material necessary for re‑mobilising the army and for making good the
material lost in Seres, which was then in Bulgarian hands. The British
Government received these proposals cautiously, and sent a reply to the effect
that if Greece ever became an ally, Great Britain would give her all the
assistance in her power. There was a certain unreality about the position which
had now been reached. King Constantine was avowing his readiness to declare war
on Bulgaria, to whom a few weeks before he had voluntarily surrendered
fortresses, arms, munitions and territory; and Great Britain was promising to
give money and war material to Greece, whose Government was under suspicion of
having recently been acting in complicity with our enemies.

2

Further Demands upon Greece

The British answer was delivered
almost at the same time that M. Zaimis agreed to the Franco‑British
demands with regard to the control of posts and telegraphs. He then resigned,
giving as his reason that the new policy of collaboration

Sept. 1916

NEW GREEK MINISTRY

with the Entente could not be
carried through by a business ministry like his own. At their last
official interview Sir Francis Elliot asked him whether he had not felt obliged
to resign because King Constantine was obstructing the work of the Cabinet in
secret; but though pressed very hard, M. Zaimis denied absolutely that this was
so, and said that the King was still "tending towards co‑operation
with the Entente, but had not yet made up his mind."

King Constantine accepted M. Zaimis's
resignation, and called upon M. Kalogeropoulos to form a Government. Very
little was known about the new Premier; but whatever his character and opinions
may have been, the King could not have made a more unfortunate choice. Sir
Francis Elliot at once wired home that the constitution of the new Government,
which was purely political, was a "flagrant violation" of the Allied
Note of June 21, and the British Government took the same view. Moreover,
evidence was not lacking that, if the King had really felt inclined on
September 10 to join the Allies, within a week later he had changed his mind.
At an interview with Sir Francis Elliot the King spoke very angrily about the
Allied generals and admirals, complained bitterly about the pressure which was
being put upon him by the presence of the French fleet at Salamis, where it lay
at anchor with its guns trained upon the capital, and said that months would go
by before he could form an army, and that, when he had done so, he would
declare war "if he thought it advisable"; but not if General
Sarrail's army were defeated during the interval. He added that if he were to
join the Entente he should require a promise of Thrace, the Dodecannese, and
Albania as far as the River Skumbi. When the interview was over the British
Minister wired home that in his opinion the King's former proposals had not
been sincere.

The War Committee met to
consider the new situation in an altered temper. Since the last meeting,
however, the French Premier had positively denied that he wished to upset the
Greek monarchy; so that Ministers now felt more reassured about the real
purposes of French diplomacy, and refrained from passing anything like a hasty
resolution. It was decided, simply, that the attention of the Greek Government
should be drawn to the fact that one member of the new Cabinet (M. Ruffo) had
openly declared himself an opponent of the Entente.

The British answer to Greece,
promising help in the matter of munitions and equipment, had not dealt with the
general question of Greek intervention, which could only be settled by the
Allies in collaboration. After long discussions between Paris and London, the
Allied Ministers in Athens were instructed to tell the Greek Government that it
must give a proof of its sincerity by declaring war against Bulgaria not later
than October 1, and a Ministry must be formed capable of carrying through a
genuinely national policy. The Allies could not admit that the military
unpreparedness of the country was a valid reason against an early declaration
of war, for the Bulgarians could not advance farther into Greece than they had
already done. In conclusion the Ministers were instructed to give a solemn
assurance to the King of Greece that the Entente Powers had no wish to injure
his dynasty or the monarchical principle in Greece or in Europe. A Crown
Council was assembled at the Diadoch's Palace in Athens to discuss this
communication, and, when thus brought face to face with the condition that he
should declare war at once, King Constantine flinched. Some days later he
appears to have proposed to Paris that the Allies should by an ultimatum order
him to declare war upon Bulgaria. Sir Francis Elliot, to whom the King's wishes
were known, informed his Government that this tortuous proposal was made in
order that the King might appear to decree mobilisation against his will,
and that the nation might, in consequence, disregard it. King Constantine
could then claim to have done all in his power to assist the Allies, and argue
that it was not his fault if the nation would not follow him. The move may have
had an even subtler intention than this; and if so, it was successful. Since
the King would not accept the Entente's conditions, and since the Entente
Governments could not for a moment entertain the King's counter‑proposal,
no more was heard of Greek intervention for a long time to come. (The text of the official written reply from
the Allies to the King of Greece was settled at the Inter‑Allied
Conference at Boulogne on October 20. By then the situation had so completely
changed, and there was so little chance of Greek intervention, that the Note
was unimportant.)

The British Government were
perfectly sincere when they assured King Constantine that they did not wish to
injure his dynasty or the monarchical principle in Europe. Again and again they
had reminded the French Government that this principle of not interfering with
the existing institutions of neutral countries was of the very essence of the
Entente's policy. When the relations between Greece and the Entente had become
the subject of fresh discussions, nothing had caused the British Government
more anxiety than the fear that French policy in Greece was antidynastic, and
nothing

Sept. 24, 1916

M. VENIZELOS LEAVES GREECE

had given greater relief than M.
Briand's assurance that our fears were groundless. All this was unfortunately
hidden from King Constantine, who was quite incapable of detaching his mind
from the political passions which raged around him. For weeks past he had never
referred to M. Venizelos or to the Venizelist party without some expression of
unrestrained hatred. He insisted always that in M. Venizelos he recognised an
enemy to himself, to his family and to the dynasty; and knowing that the
Entente Governments treated M. Venizelos as their most trusted unofficial
adviser, he could not believe that, at heart, they had an honest wish to deal
fairly by him even when they found it difficult.

After the King's final refusal
to enter the war, M. Venizelos felt that he could no longer remain a passive spectator of a policy which, as he judged it, would bring his country nothing but contempt and discredit; and he now took a step which widened the division between his party and the palace into an open breach. On September 24, he left Greece for Crete, in company with M. Politis, a Permanent Under-Secretary
in the Greek Foreign Office, Admiral Condouriotis, an officer who had greatly
distinguished himself in the second Balkan war, and General Danglis. He was
escorted to Crete by French naval forces, and on his arrival he set up a Provisional
Government for the purpose of making war upon Bulgaria.

Nobody on the spot made a
shrewder observation upon the new situation than the French Admiral: "It
was with regret," he writes in his book, "that I witnessed this
exodus, this voluntary elimination. For anyone interested in the Allied cause,
it was obviously vexing to see the army, the navy, the administrative services,
all gradually abandoned by our friends and passing entirely into hostile hands.
The loss was sensible and immediate, the possible gain hazardous and remote. I
expressed this view officially and repeatedly." (Dartige du Fournet, Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914‑1916, p. 134). The Admiral was right. Up to the time of M. Venizelos'
departure, there was always a party in the Greek Departments of State which was
willing to receive the Entente's Notes in a friendly spirit and to execute them
with goodwill. From now onwards, the Allies had to reckon upon a determined.
obstinate resistance from the Greek administrative services; and bureaucratic
opposition can be the most formidable and the most intangible kind of obstacle
that exists.

During the discussion which had
taken place between Paris and London upon the terms of the Allied Note to
Greece, M. Briand had shown an unexpected tenderness with regard to King
Constantine, and even after the Allied Ministers in Athens had received their
instructions, he put forward drafts for further Allied Notes to the King of
Greece, all written in very conciliatory language. After this moderation the
next move from Paris was the more surprising; for, without previous
consultation, the French Government now took a step which made a reconciliation
between the Allies and King Constantine impossible.

Early in October, Admiral
Dartige du Fournet, acting upon instructions from the Ministry of Marine in
Paris, raised again the question of the non‑fulfilment of some of the
conditions in the Allied Note of June 21. His instructions were to demand that
Venizelist officers in the Greek navy, who had recently been dismissed, should
be restored to their posts; that officers of the army and navy who had shown
themselves hostile to the Entente should be removed; and that the Piraeus and
the Greek railway should be placed under Allied control. When the Admiral
communicated his instructions to the Allied Ministers at Athens, he said that
he proposed to land 300 French marines to "reinforce the police." Sir
Francis Elliot was quite aware that this new series of demands against the
Greek Government was part of a general policy of exercising coercion by naval
pressure. "We do not know," he wired home, how far the Allied
Governments have delegated executive authority to the French Admiral in matters
involving questions of policy and the employment of British and other forces
which have been placed under his orders.

Point I [the return of the naval
officers] is intended to counteract the Greek Government's endeavour to prevent
a secession of the Greek fleet to Venizelos. Point 2 [the control of the
railways and the Piraeus] marks a step in the direction of the complete control
of Greece which has been the aim, if not of the French Government, at least of
some of its servants." Sir Edward Grey answered at once that "the presence
of the French fleet did not entitle the Admiral to act as he liked," and
the French Government, realising the difficulty felt by the British Government
in abandoning the policy hitherto agreed upon, decided to spend no further time
in consultation, but to lay aside the ordinary diplomatic procedure and act
directly through the Admiral. On October 6 Admiral Dartige du Fournet seems to
have made some kind of communication to the Greek Government, and on the
following day he made a threatening move with his battle fleet. "I passed
the battleship division Patrie, Suffren,
Democratie and the Russian ship Chesma which had just joined us, into Eleusis Bay. The Greek

The new French demands upon
Greece were made to coincide with a Greek internal crisis. Early in October M.
Kalogeropoulos resigned, and Professor Lambros, the new Premier, was still
forming a Cabinet when the Admiral, acting under orders from Paris, presented
his Note and said that if it was not complied with by October 11 he would
"take the necessary measures." Sir Francis Elliot urged that nothing
should be done until Professor Lambros was "in the saddle"; and
finally, when every argument failed, told the Admiral that he must present his
Note direct to the Greek Government, neither he nor his colleagues could
consent to be associated with it.

Sir Francis Elliot's message
arrived at a time when the British Government was in very great anxiety about
the Rumanian situation. Since Rumania's entry disaster had followed disaster,
and the British Government were bending all their energies to devise some means
of saving that country. The Greek situation was only hastily considered, and
the political implications of the French Admiral's instructions were not
touched upon.

On October 9, Admiral Dartige du
Fournet received a telegram from the Rue Royale instructing him definitely to
act without the co‑operation of the Allied Ministers at Athens in regard
to matters affecting the safety of the armee
d'orient, and the fleet. (Ibid., p.
138.) Accordingly on the following day the Admiral presented a Note to the
Greek Government. The text as communicated to Sir Francis Elliot ran as follows:

"Although
the Greek Government has given partial satisfaction to the demands of the
Allied Governments, it has taken certain measures, such as changes amongst
officers and crews of its ships and concentration of troops and artillery
stores in Thessaly, of an unfriendly nature to the Entente, and regarded by the
French Government as compromising the safety of the Allied fleet and of the
army at Salonica.

"The
Admiral is also aware that, far from disarming, reservists, leagues in
provinces are arming and maintaining an agitation against the Entente. He can
no longer delay taking measures of military protection which he considers
necessary, and has therefore decided:

"1.
To sequestrate the fleet, light cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers,
torpedo-boats and submarines of the Greek navy. These ships, on board which
will remain only those of their crews who wish to do so and whom the Admiral
has no reason to exclude, will join the Allied fleet at its anchorages, or will
be brought there. They will remain there until an agreement with regard to
them has been come to between the French and Greek Governments. The three large
ships will remain where they are, but will land their breech‑blocks, torpedoes
and ammunition, and will reduce their crews to one. third of normal
complements.

"2.
To occupy Lipso Island.

"3.
To insist on the disarming of batteries on Salamis, Giorgio Island and at
Perama.

"The
Admiral will begin operations October 11 at I p.m. He has asked the Greeks to
ensure execution of the above measures without violence and that the ships
named may be handed over complete in all respects. He requests the Greek
Government to confirm these orders, specially as regards Lipso Island and
batteries, in respect of which he in this connection has made no communication
to the Greek Admirals. Moreover, the Admiral considers it indispensable to
assure the security of the Piraeus by removal of, or distribution of, breech‑loaders
from all batteries except two which he proposes to occupy.

"Lastly,
the safety of the army at Salonica demands that control of police and Piraeus‑Larissa
railway be exercised by officers designated by the Admiral. He consequently
asks the Greek Government to inform him to what authorities controllers
appointed by him for the port of Piraeus, police and railways should be
accredited."

The Greek Ministry passed the
whole night in conference, and at eleven o'clock on the following morning a
Greek officer arrived on board the Provence with a Note saying that the Greek Government protested against this act of
violence; that it yielded to force
majeure and had issued the necessary orders. When the Greek officer went on
board he found the whole ship ready for action and the guns' crews at their
stations.

At half‑past twelve the
operation began, and was carried out under the eyes of two French deputies who
were on a tour of parliamentary inspection at the time. The light cruiser Elle, the store ship Miaoulis, nineteen torpede-boats,
two submarines and five auxiliaries were taken to the fleet anchorage. The
breach‑blocks and munitions of the larger ships Kilkis, Lemnos and Averoff were landed, and their crews
reduced to care and maintenance parties. By the evening the work was done, and
throughout this painful and trying day, the Greek officers and men behaved with
a self‑restraint

Oct. 1916

A DANGEROUS POLICY

which did them honour.(There can be little doubt that the Greek
navy, though strongly entento‑phil, was royalist in sympathy. When M.
Venizelos acceded to Crete, the Hydra and two torpedo-boats left their anchorage and joined the Allied fleet. "En
somme, le mouvement dissident ne se generalisait pas dans la flotte
grecque," writes Dartige du Fournet, p. 137.)

"It must be
admitted," says Admiral Dartige du Fournet, "that the Greek Government
did not try to escape from any of its engagements with regard to the fleet.
Later visits showed that none of the sequestrated ships had been subject to
sabotage." This seizure of the Greek fleet was thus outwardly a success,
and many persons who had seen it done congratulated the Commander‑in‑Chief.
" I can say now that he suffered at being compelled by events to use force
against a weak neutral nation, against a ward of France, and against a navy in
which we counted so many friends. He had to do it, and he did it; but he found
nothing in the incident to cause him pleasure or pride, and that was his answer
to the inopportune compliments which he received." (Dartige du Fournet, p. 141.)

The French Admiral was now
obliged to enforce the other demands in his Note ‑ for the control of the
Piraeus, of the police and of the railways. The technical details of these had
not been considered by the French; and, as the Admiral had been told to make
his demands direct, he had himself to arrange for their execution without the
assistance of the Allied diplomats. He was conscious that the policy of which
he was the most unwilling instrument was extremely dangerous. " The
Ministry of Marine, like its counsellor [the French Naval Attache, de
Roquefeuil], never seemed to reflect that every inhabitant of Greece could now
point in scorn to the Entente's abuse of force. We admitted, officially, that
Greece had a right to be neutral, and yet we were putting our hands upon a part
of her national life, and were probing into the private secrets of every
Hellenic citizen." He accordingly tried to mitigate the effects of what he
had to do by placing the most level‑headed officers he could in charge of
the controls. Commander Portzampare was appointed chief of the railway control,
Commander Roques head of the police, and it should be added that during the
weeks of excitement and strain which followed the seizure of the Greek fleet,
the Greek Government never uttered a word of complaint about the way in
which these officers performed their duties. Moreover, M. Lambros, the new
Premier, showed himself as accommodating as he could in the trying circumstances.
The Greek Government evidently resolved to bear the humiliation patiently. (Ibid., p. 142.)

The French Admiral's view was
correct, and events confirmed it both at the time and afterwards. The
British Naval Mission in Greece, established several years before had been a
strong link between Greece and England, and had been a centre of British
influence in the country. Rear-Admiral N. C. Palmer, who was then the head of
it, was universally respected, and the friendships which he and his officers
had formed had made the Hellenic navy more solidly favourable to the Entente
than any other neutral force in Europe. When the French seized the Greek fleet,
Admiral Palmer at once told Sir Francis Elliot that his position was
impossible. As he belonged to a Service which had helped to humiliate the Greek
navy (A landing party from the Duncan had been placed on Lipso Island whilst the
French fleet seized the Greek ships.) it offended his sense of justice that
the Greek Government should be obliged to pay him any longer. Moreover, apart
from this, the Greek navy was disbanded and he had no more work to do.

The Greek naval officers went
ashore angry and dispirited, and the King received them and thanked them for
their admirable bearing. It would be useless to deny that the Allies damaged
themselves seriously by the whole transaction; to have acquired the use of
nineteen torpedo-boats and two submarines was not a satisfactory return for the
loss of friendship and respect which we suffered.

By openly seceding from the
royalist Government at Athens, the Venizelist party created a problem which
added to the perplexities of the Allies. The British Government was unanimously
of opinion that the Venizelists must be supported; their leader had never
wavered in his belief in the Allied cause, and in supporting it he and his
companions had suffered exile, and had lost both position and property. Public
feeling in France and England was expressing itself very strongly, and British
Ministers were determined that the provisional Greek Government should be
financed and that the Venizelist army should be supplied with whatever it
required. This resolve left over the very difficult question of official
recognition. Signor Tittoni, the Italian Minister in Athens, stated it
succinctly: what were the territorial limits of the new Government ? If the
Allies admitted its jurisdiction in certain places, and not in others,
they were practically dividing Greece into territories. M. Briand, the French
Premier, was especially troubled by doubts. Although he had agreed to the
seizure of the Greek fleet, his real policy was to conciliate the Greeks and to
bring King Constantine and M. Venizelos together again. He now felt that by
openly

Oct. 1916

A GREEK CONCENTRATION

recognising the Venizelist
Government the Allies might so anger King Constantine that they would lose what
influence they still possessed at Athens, and add fresh bitterness to the civil
dissensions which were raging in Greece. It seemed clear to him that Greece
would never be an Ally for us unless the two parties in the State could either
abandon their feud or reduce it to the status of an ordinary political
controversy under some moderating influence from outside. The British
Government gave weight to his judgment, and while they instructed our consular
officers in Crete to afford M. Venizelos and his servants all the support in
their power, they refrained from giving official recognition to the provisional
Governnient.

The civil divisions of Greece
were in no way healed by this indecisive action, and they led directly to the
most regrettable of all the episodes in our troubled relations. After the
Venizelists had left for Crete, many officers in the army thought it their duty
to follow them; the King, in order to check a movement which he thought
subversive of all discipline, took severe measures, and a number of
officers and civil servants were arrested and thrown into prison. In the
country every town and hamlet was divided between the two parties, royalist and
Venizelist. The reservist leagues formed armed bands and attacked and cudgelled
their opponents wherever they could find them. In Athens, where royalist
feelings ran strong, the Venizelists were often violently attacked, and the
Allied Ministers, with shame and indignation, saw their political friends
arrested, beaten and thrown into prison. At Ekaterini, on the other hand, the
Venizelist volunteers attacked the royalist garrison and drove it out; the
French had to occupy the town in order to prevent the soldiers from returning
and exacting a fearful vengeance.

The immediate cause of what
followed was the action of the King, who, at some time in October, began to
collect troops in Larissa. His intention was, without doubt, to suppress the
Venizelist movement in Thessaly; but this concentration of troops in rear of
the left wing of the Salonica army thoroughly alarmed the French; General Milne,
when asked for his opinion as to the meaning of it, answered that King
Constantine was probably creating "a zone of independent action at
Larissa " in case further pressure was directed against him or his
Government at Athens and the Piraeus. "Such action," concluded the
General, "in my opinion, is a possible danger."

This question of securing the
army at Salonica naturally caused a new set of demands to be presented to the
King; but as the French assumed the whole management of the affair, and treated
it as a purely military matter to be settled without diplomatic intervention,
it is very difficult to find the exact origins of the subsequent events or even
to follow the course of their first development. This much, however, is fairly
clear.

No sooner had Admiral Dartige du
Fournet carried out against the Greek fleet an order which, as a man of the
world, he thought foolish, and as a gentleman, he detested, (Dartige du Fournet, p. 141.) than he was called upon to open a
new series of demands against the Greek Government. We know that his first
instructions were to order them to deliver 1,500,000 cartridges, but he does
not say exactly how he presented the demand or how it was received. (Ibid., p. 154.) Meanwhile King
Constantine and M. Lambros, thoroughly alarmed at the course that things were
taking, made a serious attempt to conciliate the Allies. In a series of
interviews with Sir Francis Elliot, the King offered, of his own free will, to
disband the 1914 and 1915 reservists, to withdraw his troops from continental
Greece and leave only 9,000 men in Thessaly; all that he asked in return was
that his concessions should be treated as a final settlement, and that no
further demands should be made of him.

The British Government, being
entirely absorbed with plans for stemming the tide of defeat in Rumania, did
not discuss or consider this new aspect of the Greek situation; the negotiation
was left more and more in French hands, and it seemed, at first, as though it
would be successfully concluded. The business was, indeed, most happily
advanced by a young French deputy, M. Benazet, who had been sent to Salonica by
the French Parliament to visit and inspect the armee d'orient. On his way back he went to Athens, and, whilst he
was there, King Constantine asked him to pay a visit to the Palace. The King
had always been able to get on with soldiers, and M. Benazet, as a retired
officer, who was besides "young, seductive and with fine courteous
manners," made an excellent impression. (Ibid., p. 153.) The first interview went off so well that it was soon
followed by others. Everyone on the spot was pleased at the new and better
complexion that M. Benazet's visit had given to affairs, and, after a
fortnight's stay in Athens, he returned to France carrying with him a plan for
burying the past and for reconciling the Venizelists to the Royalists and the
Greek people to the Allies. He had discussed his project with all the Allied
authorities and with King Constantine, and thus had an assurance that the Greek
Government would put it fairly and loyally into operation.

Oct.‑Nov. 1916

A NEW PLAN

The plan was that the Allies
were to demand the surrender of war material and the demobilisation of the
reservists, to compensate them for the military advantages which the Central
Powers had gained by being allowed to occupy Fort Rupel and Kavala. Their
demand was to be made in the form of a "Sommation" drafted in moderate and courteous language;
King Constantine's Government would then make a formal protest, after which the
King would issue a general proclamation to the Greek people, beginning: "I
owe to my people a frank explanation with regard to my conduct during the
present course of events," and going on to say that he agreed to the
Allied demands in order to maintain a strict neutrality between the two
belligerents. A condition upon which the King insisted was that the Allies
should promise him that the arms and munitions which he surrendered should
not be handed over to his political opponents. He desired that the Entente
should consider themselves under an obligation to preserve his throne in return
for the concessions he had made to them. The agreement thus reached,
combined with the King's promise to withdraw his troops from Thessaly, would
give the Allies the right to enrol Greek volunteers of the Venizelist faction
and the power to arm them from our own resources; and it would end, once for
all, the friction and misunderstandings between Greece and the Allies.

All existing causes of quarrel
would go, and, if new ones arose, they could be talked out more easily in an
atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding. M. Benazet urged his
Government to carry through his plan. "It is to be hoped," he wired
home, "that during the period in which Greece makes arrangements for giving
us volunteers and munitions of war, and affords us all the support she can without
ceasing to be neutral, all these daily bickerings on points of detail will
cease. The King and the President of the Council are, however, well aware that
certain persons are averse to this reconciliation. [M. Benazet was doubtless
referrin to the French Naval Attache. They have, none the less, decided to
show the greatest patience until a final agreement has [been reached and] borne
fruit. They have both charged me to say that they have entire confidence in the
Commanderill‑Chief of the Allied naval forces . (Dartige du Fournet, p. 178.)

These proposals were brought to
the notice of the British Government at the Inter‑Allied Conference which
took place in Paris on November 15; but they were only revealed in conversation
by M. Briand, and were not communicated in documentary form. The result
was that no decision was taken, and the conference agreed with M. Briand that
the Allies might as well wait for developments which could not be long delayed.
To adopt this suggestion, and to leave the matter where it stood, was perhaps
the greatest mistake that the Allies made in Greek affairs. It may seem that if
King Constantine's offer had been accepted, and if his execution of it had been
supervised with forbearance and goodwill, his differences with the Allies might
have been satisfactorily composed.

Yet this is not certain; for no
one could be certain about King Constantine. After making his offer through M.
Benazet, he strove repeatedly to show that he was really endeavouring
to carry out his pledges; he recalled the IlIrd and IVth Corps to the Morea and
agreed that he would not in future move troops without previously consulting
the Allies. But in another respect his conduct was baffling and difficult to
understand. The whole basis of his understanding with M. Benazet had been that
the Allied demands should be presented in a Note, to which he should agree: the
Note and its reply would then form a written understanding between the two
parties. But no sooner had M. Benazet gone back to France than King Constantine
asked Sir Francis Elliot that the Note should not be presented, and that he
should be allowed to carry out his engagements voluntarily. To this surprising
and ambiguous request no answer was given.

Meanwhile events had moved
quickly. At the end of October two Greek steamers were torpedoed by a submarine;
the Entente Governments used the incident as a pretext for expelling the enemy
legations from Athens. On November 2 Admiral Dartige du Fournet presented a
Note to the Greek Government in which he asked for the right to man the
sequestered ships of the Greek fleet and use them in the naval service of the
Allies. The Greek Cabinet refused to agree, but the Admiral hoisted the French
flag on board the torpedo boats and took possession of Salamis arsenal. Sir
Francis Elliot thereupon protested to the French Minister that the Entente
Powers could not bear responsibility for measures resolved upon and carried out
solely by the French Government or its officers.

The French Government, however,
continued to act independently. The Note demanding the surrender of war
material was now nearly ready. It was, apparently, drafted by M. Guillemin,
acting in collaboration with General Sarrail and with General Roques, the War
Minister, who was then on a visit to the armee
d'orient. The British Government were

Nov. 1916

MORE DEMANDS

not consulted about the
negotiations or asked to approve or amend the draft. The French Cabinet seems, indeed,
to have given General Roques full powers to settle all outstanding questions
with Greece by the simple method of giving the necessary orders and letting the
Greek Government know them. He decreed that a base should be established at
Itea, in Greek territory, and that the transport of troops along from it should
begin at once; then, having approved the Note demanding the surrender of Greek
war material, he left for France, after telling Admiral Dartige du Fournet that
he must be responsible for presenting and enforcing it. "Nothing,"
writes the Admiral, " authorised me to raise serious objections. I could
but obey." (Dartige du Fournet, p.
183.)

When this Note, which bore such
fatal consequences to the King and to the Allied cause in Greece, was ready for
presentation, the political position in the capital was to the last degree
confused. Since M. Venizelos and his friends had seceded, the King had pushed
on with his measures for maintaining discipline in the services. Officers
who had abandoned the regular army were cashiered and deprived of their
pensions, and numbers of others were arrested and thrown into prison on mere
suspicion. Civil servants, magistrates, mayors of towns and villages, were
treated in the same way. The Liberal press was muzzled, the offices of the Ethniki and the Hestia were closed, and the editors arrested and imprisoned.
Whenever a man was held in detention, his house was visited and pillaged by
gangs of soldiers; sometimes the escort sent to arrest a man would kill him on
the way to the magistrate.

An eminent Venizelist was
bayoneted in this way, and his body lay in the street until dark, because his
family dared not venture out to remove it. The magistrates, who remained
attached to the royal cause, examined accused persons with the utmost
brutality; many of them were beaten to the ground by police officers whilst
they stood in the dock to answer questions from the bench. Rumours were abroad
that these measures were mere preliminaries, and that all avowed Venizelists in
the army and navy would soon be shot as rebels. In country towns and villages
matters were even worse. The reservist leagues made themselves the accusers and
judges of all who disagreed with them. These outrages made Sir Francis Elliot's
blood boil; he thought himself bound in honour to protect the Venizelists if he
could, and to show his detestation of the ill treatment they were receiving; he
was accordingly doing everything he could to press the Greek Ministers with
interviews and protests. Prince Demidoff, whose Government was a little
concerned lest the course of events should dislodge King Constantine, was
spending his whole time in trying to reduce the growing friction between the
Entente and the King; the Italian Minister had always rather held aloof; his
Government, like the Russian, distrusted and disliked the Venizelist
party. Whilst the other three Allied Ministers were thus concentrating their
attention upon different aspects of the Greek situation, the French completed
the preparation of their Note. It was presented on November 16 by Admiral
Dartige du Fournet and ran thus:

"Monsieur
le President,

"During
the last few weeks, the Greek Government has been able, on more than one
occasion, to make quite certain that the Entente Powers recognise Greece's
right to remain neutral in the present conflict. By the setting up of a neutral
zone in the north of Thessaly, you are guaranteed

against
any attack by armed forces such as happened at Ekaterini.

"The
Greek Government has, on the other hand, repeatedly stated, in the most
definite way, that it is maintaining a benevolent neutrality with regard
to the Entente. Amongst the proofs of benevolent neutrality thus given must be
counted the much‑appreciated measure of putting the army on to a peace
footing and the withdrawal of the IIIrd and IVth Corps, and the 16th Division,
into the Peloponnese. But it is equally true that the surrender of Fort Rupel
and of Kavala to the Bulgarians, and the delivery to them of the important mass
of war material in those places, has given the enemies of the Entente Powers
considerable advantages (rupture d'equilibre au profit des ennemis de
l'Entente).

"The
French Government, being anxious to retrieve these advantages, and wishing to
put an equal quantity of war material at the disposal of the Commander‑in‑Chief
of the armee d'orient, has decided to
demand that the Greek Government shall deliver up all that war material
which is rendered useless to it by the reduction of the army to a peace
footing.

"I
have therefore received an order from my Government to demand from the
Greek Government: sixteen field batteries with 1,000 projectiles for each gun;
sixteen mountain batteries with 1,000 projectiles for each gun; 40,000
Mannlicher rifles with 220 cartridges for each rifle; 140 machine guns with a
corresponding number of cartridges, and fifty transport automobiles.

"In
a recent Note on the subject of the light forces of

Nov. 16, 1916

THE NOTE TO GREECE

the
fleet, I informed the Greek Government that I had the necessary powers to offer
a just payment for all deliveries made; but no answer was given.

"I
have the honour to inform you, herewith, that the French Government is still
inclined to offer you a suitable payment for the war material delivered to it,
or else to bind itself to give back an equal quantity of material, in good
order, at the close of hostilities.

"As
you cannot but be aware that the present course of events makes this demand an
urgent one, the French Government requests that the Greek Government shall
give a proof of its goodwill by at once delivering ten mountain batteries to
me, the rest of the material to be handed over with as little delay as
possible.

"The
material is to be deposited at the Thessaly railway station, in Athens, from
whence we shall carry it to Salonica; and I ask that an officer nominated by
you shall be sent to me to settle details." (Dartige du Fournet, pp. 188‑9.)

It will be seen that this Note
was not in any way harsh or peremptory. Since the source of all these demands
was a suggestion from King Constantine himself, the French Government had
every right to make them, and, indeed, to expect that they would be agreed to.
If there was any fault, it lay not in the Note itself, but in its omissions and
in the manner in which it was presented. When King Constantine first made his
proposals to M. Benazet he was evidently given to understand that his
difficulties at home and abroad would be sympathetically considered; and so
believing, he had stipulated that the arms and munitions which he surrendered
should not be given to the Venizelists, and that he should not lose his throne
by abandoning Thessaly to his political enemies. The Note promised him nothing.
The Entente Powers could not, it is true, have given open undertakings against the
Venizelists who had adhered to the Allied cause at the cost of so much
suffering to themselves. But it may be that if their diplomatic Ministers had
been instructed to go on with the negotiation which M. Benazet had begun, to
bring it to perfection by further discussions and conversations, and to draft
the Note on the basis of agreements reached during the course of those
discussions, an acceptable text could have been presented.

Yet it must be admitted that
here again the circumstances were not such as to suggest of themselves a
sympathetic and delicate method of dealing. Naval commanders have more than
once in European wars shown themselves to be shrewd and tactful negotiators.
But in the present struggle King Constantine had already given too much proof
of his ingenuity and too little of his goodwill or sincerity; he had exhausted
the patience of those in whose hands lay the overwhelming executive power. It
was therefore, from our point of view, a mistake to remove the conduct of
the affair at this stage from the cool and dexterous hands of professional
diplomacy and to entrust it to the commander of an irresistible force, who had
orders to carry out, and was given no powers of delay or discretion.

As soon as the Greek Cabinet had
considered the Note, King Constantine asked Admiral Dartige du Fournet to come
and see him. The Admiral describes him as "absolutely courteous, and,
indeed, almost cordial," but adds that "his attitude had obviously
changed." He certainly made clever use of the weak points in the French
case: why was the Note presented by a Naval Commander‑in‑Chief in
the name of the French Government? What guarantee had he that if he agreed to
what France demanded of him, another Allied Power would not send another fleet
and ask for fresh sacrifices? How could he be expected to make the present
demands acceptable to the Greek people, when they were unaccompanied by the
guarantees which had been the starting point of all his proposals to M.
Benazet? He then made a telling point about the behaviour of certain French
officers in Athens, and asserted that arms and munitions for the Venizelists
were stored in the French Naval Attache's offices; this, it seems, the Admiral
could not deny. (He had no responsibility
in the matter; the French Intelligence service at Athens was not under his
orders.)

In conclusion, the King said
that he was overborne by public opinion and had no power to compel the delivery
of the material demanded. Admiral Dartige du Fournet, who, throughout the
business, gave proof of much shrewdness, wired home to say that "even if
the King did not personally refuse to agree to the demand, he would do nothing
to get it accepted by the army." The impression left upon him was
evidently that the King had discovered that his party would not endorse the
promises he had given to M. Benazet, and was striving to escape from them by
accusing the French of breach of faith. He sympathised with the King in this
dilemma, but was by no means persuaded that he was entirely straightforward.

On November 21 the Greek reply
was handed to Admill Dartige du Fournet. In this, after reciting the contents
of the French Note, the Greek Prime Minister continued: "As I do not wish
to discuss why the Greek Government was compelled

Nov. 21, 1916

THE GREEK REPLY

to offer no opposition to the
surrender of those forts [Rupel and Kavala] and to the capture of the war
material in them, I shall confine myself to letting you know that the Greek
Government then in power could not act otherwise without abandoning neutrality;
that it protested absolutely; and that it let the Entente Governments know both
the terms of its protests and its own point of view upon the matter.

"
As for the equilibrium between the Powers at war, I can assure you that your
information is not correct. As you can see from the table annexed hereto, the
naval and military authorities of the Entente have 191 Greek guns of various
calibres in their possession, most of which are quick‑firers of the
latest model; the Germano‑Bulgars, on the other hand, have only 124, most
of which are old and useless. Also, you have in your hands more Greek machine‑guns
and rifles than your enemies.

"After
being so conciliatory, since it came into power, and after giving you so many
proofs [of good‑will] by settling in a friendly way those questions
raised in the Notes which you have sent to it on several occasions, the Greek
Government had the right to hope that it would not, in future, be
presented with demands which, by their very nature, cannot possibly be
accepted.

"If
it surrendered its war material, the Greek Government would be committing so
flagrant a violation of its neutrality that the Central Powers, which have
already protested forcibly against the seizure of the light craft in the Greek
navy, would without doubt look upon it as a hostile act. Besides this, public
opinion in the country, which is showing itself clearly on the present issue,
would not tolerate it if Greece were disarmed and left without means of
defending its vital interests, should they ever be in danger.

"For
these reasons, Monsieur l'Amiral, I am obliged, on behalf of the Greek
Government, to refuse absolutely to accede to your demands, dated November 16,
and have every hope that you will agree that my refusal is well founded.

"Spyridon Lambros."

Admiral Dartige du Fournet
answered the Greek refusal as firmly and as tactfully as he could: "I
cannot admit," he wrote, "that a country so enlightened as Greece
could think it intolerable to yield to Powers towards which she professes a benevolent
neutrality arms and munitions which are not "use by her armed forces, but
are lying in depots." Then, after showing how the French demands
contrasted with the Bulgarian invasion of Greek territory, he went on: "
If only it were more enlightened, Greek public opinion would have realised that
there is nothing in this surrender of arms which could offend against the
warmest feelings of patriotism or the rules of international law. These arms
are intended for liberating territory where the noblest blood in Greece
has been shed: their proper place is not in a depot or a magazine, but on the
fronts of Monastir and Macedonia, where the fate of all Balkan peoples is being
settled." He closed by saying that the orders under which he was acting
made it impossible for him to discuss the matter further, and that if the ten
mountain batteries were not delivered by December 1, he would take "all
those measures which the situation called for." The French Ministry of
Marine, on being informed that matters were moving to a crisis, told him to ask
for reinforcements from the armee
d'orient if he thought them necessary. He decided to act alone, mainly
because he thought it most important that there should be no delay in making
his demonstration. He was helped by the French Military Attache in drawing
up plans for occupying the important points round the capital, but he was
certain that if he called for additional forces from Salonica, the whole
operation would have to be postponed. (Dartige
du Fournet, pp. 189‑201.)

Shortly after he had received
his orders from the Rue Royale, Admiral Dartige du Fournet made his last visit
to the palace. King Constantine assured him that he personally was full of
goodwill, but that this demand for arms and material had so roused the public
and the army that he could no longer control the situation ‑ an
unfortunate confession from a monarch who had replaced the parliamentary
institutions of the country by a personal autocracy of his own. Finally,
as though to show his conciliatory feeling, he insisted that if only the
quantities of arms and munitions to be surrendered could be reduced, an
agreement could certainly be come to. The French Admiral perceived, no doubt,
the inconsistency of this huckster's offer with the King's concluding
statement at the previous interview: he answered firmly that there was no time
for further negotiations, and that he was going to send his landing parties
ashore on December 1. Just before leaving he asked the King whether the Greek
Government would maintain order whilst the Allied landing parties were ashore
in Athens. The King said he would look into the matter, and two days later
Admiral Dartige du Fournet received a letter from Count Mercati, the master of
the King's household. It ran as follows:

Nov. 24‑30 , 1916

AN IMPLIED PROMISE

"Monsieur
l'Amiral:

"By
order of his Majesty, I have the honour to transmit to you the assurance of my
august master that neither the persons, nor the private houses, nor the shops
of Venizelists are in danger, since the police and the authorities of the
kingdom, whose duty it is to maintain order, will exercise the strictest
supervision and will guarantee their security. These high assurances are, of
course, given under the formal condition that neither the secret police in the service
of the Allies nor the landing parties will arrest, deport or remove Greek
subjects, and under the further condition that the Venizelist partisans on
their side will refrain from committing any act of violence, any excess or any
abuse which might provoke reprisals."

This astute and evasive letter
gave no promise with regard to the landing parties; but it certainly conveyed
the impression that they would not be opposed. Admiral Dartige du Fournet was
clearly intended to assume from the wording of the whole note that there was to
be no disorder of any kind, and therefore that his landing parties would not be
interfered with; and he himself goes so far as to say of it "la promesse etait ferme." (It should be added
that he states in his book (p. 204) that, at his last interview with him, King
Constantine promised that the Greek troops would have "orders not to fire
first." Nobody can doubt that the promise was given verbally; and it is
most significant that it was not confirmed in the letter from Count Mercati.
King Constantine was probably speaking the truth when he said that he was
"deborde.") What he means, of course, is that an implied
undertaking is as binding as an avowed one. Doubtless it would be so to him;
but he was dealing with men who had a wholly different view of the use of
language.

Before landing his troops
Admiral Dartige du Fournet sent home a telegram to say that the root of the
whole trouble was that King Constantine had not been given any guarantees
against the disruptive activities of the Venizelist party. "My personal
opinion," he wrote, "is that, as the King has not received the
guarantees for which he hoped, and which were given in detail in my telegram
No. 11683 A 531 of November 8, he considers that he is freed from his promises,
and is not very anxious (met tres peu de zele) to perform them." In the
opinion of the Admiral, therefore, there had been a falling short on the French
side; and he had not only the sense to grasp it, but the courage to say it.

The Greek Government still owed
the Admiral a reply to his last Note: it was handed in on the afternoon of the
30th, and repeated the previous refusal to surrender arms and ammunition. In
the evening the Admiral attended the daily conference of Allied Ministers. They
were all very anxious. For the past week Athens had been in a ferment; the
people of the capital were rallying round the King, volunteers were being
enlisted and armed, and the army was evidently in an ugly temper. The Allied
Ministers, who realised that this rising anger might provoke a regrettable
incident, asked the Admiral whether some compromise was not possible; could not
the French insist only on the surrender of ten mountain batteries, and waive
their other demands? The Admiral answered that he personally agreed with them;
but that his orders prevented him from negotiating further. This, indeed, was
the real evil: the line of division between diplomatic and military action had
disappeared, and the Admiral, who was now the chief Allied representative in
Greece, was not given freedom to act as a diplomatist. He was still bound by
those "superior orders" which are the very essence of military
discipline, and was thus unable, at a critical moment, to carry out the
political duties which had been thrust upon him. If only he had been given
instructions of the ordinary diplomatic kind, the tragedy of the following day
would not have occurred.

Just before the meeting broke
up, Count Mercati called upon the legation and suggested a compromise; with a
heavy heart the Admiral replied that he had no powers to treat. A few hours
later the landing companies were marching upon the Greek capital from the
Piraeus. (Dartige du Fournet, pp. 201‑13.)

3

The Landing Parties at
Athens

(See Map 7.)

The object of the landing
operations was to establish a force of some three battalions of seamen and
marines on the hills which dominate Athens from its south‑western corner ‑
the Nymphs, the Philopappos and the Phynx ‑ and to hold the Zappeion
theatre ‑ another commanding point ‑ with a second detachment. In
addition to this, outpost companies were to seize a powder factory to the west
of Athens on the road to the pass of Daphne, an arsenal called the Roaf on the
Piraeus road, and a cartridge factory to the south‑east of the city. The
three landing battalions were placed under the charge of Captain Pugliesi‑Conti.
Major C. D'O. Harmar, R.M.L.l., who was in command of the British force,
composed

Dec. 1, 1916

THE LANDING PARTIES

of three companies of marines
from the Exmouth and Duncan, was under the immediate orders
of Commander Millot, the officer in charge of the third battalion.

Between three and five in the
morning of December 1, the battalions marched up from the Piraeus, and by nine
o'clock every point except one had been occupied without opposition. One
company from the first battalion was at the Daphne powder factories, another
was in support, and the two others were at the Rouf. The second battalion was
installed on the Phynx‑Philopappos position, where it was reinforced by a
party which had been sent to the Zappeion some days before the landing began.
The third battalion, which included the British contingent, was at the Zappeion
theatre.

There had been no hitch; but
Admiral Dartige du Fournet was anxious. Early in the morning he received news
that Greek troops were massing near the capital, and at once decided to go to
Athens himself. At eight o'clock he left in a motor car, accompanied by Captain
Chamonard and Commander Douxami. As he passed through the Piraeus his anxiety
increased; Greek troops had occupied the school which had been assigned to the
French colonial troops by the municipality, there were Greek soldiers
everywhere, and the crowd was in a black, sullen temper. He told the French
commanding officer to occupy another building near by and to watch the Greek
troops carefully. At nine o'clock he reached the Zappeion. As he came up,
Commander Millot ordered Major Harmar to occupy the powder magazine and
cartridge factory to the south of the town with a British company, reinforced
by a French company under Lieutenant Deve. The situation, already clouded, now
began to darken; Greek troops were assembling at all points which the French
had occupied, and the Admiral saw that they were in an ugly mood.

After speaking for a few minutes
to Captain Pugliesi‑Conti at the Zappeion, he went across to the
Philopappos, where he found a company of Greek soldiers facing the French
marines. He asked the commanding officer, Major Constantine Grigorakis, to
withdraw his men; the Greek officer replied angrily that his orders were to
defend the monuments of his country. At about the same time news came in that a
French supply company had been stopped on the Piraeus road and its baggage
taken from it. Admiral Dartige du Fournet undertook to settle the matter with
the Greek Government, and for the next hour nothing occurred except the steady
massing of Greek troops. Major Harmar and Lieutenant Deve found Greek troops at
the cartridge factory and the powder magazine; the Greek officer in charge was fairly
civil, and said that he would remove his men as soon as Major Harmar withdrew.
But at eleven o'clock, when their concentration was complete, the Greek troops
opened fire at every point; each of the Allied detachments was attacked
simultaneously. The moment had obviously been chosen beforehand, for the attack
had all the precision of a military movement prepared and executed by a central
command.

Afterwards, the Greek Government
claimed that the French had fired first, and, when they found that this
accusation was untenable, they said that the Venizelists had started the
fighting. Major Harmar's report is good evidence that the Greek troops acted
deliberately, and that they were under orders; it runs thus: "I signalled
to the Zappeion, reporting the movement of Greek troops I had observed, and,
shortly after, received an order from Captain Millot ordering me to return to
the Zappeion with both companies. The Greek colonel was still with me when I
received this order, and I informed him that I was going to withdraw. He said
that he would move his men away directly I left, and at the same time ordered a
Greek company, which had come up on my right flank, to move further back. A few
minutes later, a few shots were fired on Philopappos hill, and I could see
people running down the hill and the French standing up on the top. Lieutenant
Deve agreed with me that the French were firing blank to frighten the crowd
back. I immediately ordered both companies to fall in; the French, at the time,
were on the Zappeion side of the magazine, and the Royal Marines on the
opposite side. I ordered Captain Palmer to move his company off, and went round
to tell Lieutenant Deve to follow. Just then, about eleven o'clock, heavy fire
was opened on us from all sides."

If the Greek army had told the
Allies, through King Constantine, that to surrender their guns and
munitions was a dishonour and an indignity that they would not bear, and had
said outright that they would fight rather than suffer it, they would be
entitled to our respect. But the behaviour of the Greek colonel who opened fire
after the British and French had formed up in the open, relying on his promise
to withdraw, puts the matter in another light. The indignation of the Greek
officers was in itself honourable; but they undoubtedly gave expression to it
by a concerted act of treachery.

It seems probable that the Greek
High Command intended to overawe the French detachments by surrounding them at
every point; and having done so to make them withdraw ingloriously after
intimidating them with a few volleys. If

Dec. 1, 1916

STUBBORN RESISTANCE

so the whole plan was brought to
nothing by the stubborn courage of the French seamen. At the powder factory on
the Daphne road, at the Rouf, at the Zappeion and at the Philopappos they stood
to their arms, returned the Greek fire shot for shot and volley for volley; and
a few minutes after eleven, every occupied point was the scene of a desperate
struggle. At one place only did the Greeks score anything which could be called
a success: Major Harmar's company was completely cut off from the Zappeion and
had to fall back upon Phalerum. Just to the north of them Lieutenant Deve and
Captain J. M. Palmer, R.M.L.I., managed to get their men into the magazine,
which they held for the rest of the day; and it was here that Lieutenant Deve
was mortally wounded whilst firing a maxim gun with his own hands.

The French detachments were completely surrounded, and could only fight where they stood; Captain Pugliesi-Conti
was at the Philopappos, the Admiral at the Zappeion; signals could be exchanged
between the two positions, and Admiral Dartige du Fournet could communicate
with the French ships in the Piraeus. At a quarter to twelve, he sent a message
to the French ships in the bay to open fire on the Stadium, where the Greeks,
strongly installed, were firing heavily at the Zappeion position; it is to his
honour that he absolutely declined to order a general bombardment of the
capital. Whatever happened he would never have it said that he made a Louvain
of Athens.

After the fight had gone on for nearly an hour, and the Greeks had got no advantage from it, Admiral Dartige du Fournet received a message from King Constantine; would the Admiral compromise and accept the surrender of six mountain batteries? The Admiral told Captain Pugliesi-Conti that he was going to treat with the Greeks, ordered the Provence to cease fire, and with great
difficulty got into telephone communication with M. Lambros, the Premier.
Shortly afterwards the fire from the Greeks died down, and several members of
the legations reached the Zappeion without interference. General
Bousquier, the French Military Attache, came up to confer with the Admiral, and
Madame Bousquier accompanied him to tend the wounded. Meanwhile, the Admiral
answered that he accepted the Greek offer; but that it must be repeated to the
Allied Ministers at the legations. This exchange of messages took time,
and the afternoon passed more or less quietly, although the Greek troops
on the Stadium and the Acropolis occasionally opened fire for a few moments. At
half‑past four the Greek troops again opened fire at all points, and the
conflict blazed up afresh.

The French seamen on the
Philopappos were brought under a heavy fire from the Acropolis, and the
Zappeion was swept from the Stadium. This second onslaught, like the first, was
deliberate and concerted; and Admiral Dartige du Fournet again signalled to his
ships in the Piraeus to open fire on the Stadium. The effect was excellent; the
Diadoch's palace, where the King was installed, stands quite near the Stadium,
and the first shells fell in the courtyard. The Queen and the children were
sent below into the cellars, and soon afterwards the Greek troops ceased fire.

At a quarter to seven Colonel
Pallys, King Constantine's aide‑de‑camp, arrived at the Zappeion
with Sir Francis Elliot, M. Guillemin, and Prince Demidoff, the Ministers of
Great Britain, France and Russia. An agreement was soon reached. King
Constantine promised that six mountain batteries should be surrendered, as soon
as the landing parties were withdrawn; Admiral Dartige du Fournet undertook to
recall the bulk of the three battalions landed, but kept a party on the
Zappeion; he refused to promise that the party which remained behind should not
be reinforced, and he warned the Greek authorities that the withdrawal of the
landing parties was only "the preliminary to grave events." The
retirement of the troops began at about eleven o'clock, and continued
throughout the night. The positions at the Rouf, the Daphne road and the
Philopappos were evacuated in good order and the prisoners taken by each side
were exchanged before the march to the Piraeus began.

Although the French seamen had
been surrounded in their positions and outnumbered by four to one they had
fought so fiercely and stubbornly that they had eighty Greek prisoners to
exchange against sixty of their own when the day was over. (Dartige du Fournet, p. 236.) They had lost 191 officers and men
killed and wounded; the British twenty‑one killed and wounded. Major
Harmar's Marines, who retired on Phalerum after they were cut off from the
Zappeion, suffered most. This forced withdrawal of the British Marine
detachment was the only positive achievement that the Greeks could claim, and it
was not one to boast of. After dislodging the Marines by a treacherous promise
of reciprocal withdrawal, the Greeks took up positions on their flanks and kept
them under a galling fire during the whole of their retirement; but the Marines
never broke their order of march or showed the slightest concern. They carried
out their orders to the letter, picked up their dead and wounded as they fell,
and marched on with proud stolidity until they reached old Phalerum.

Dec. 1‑4, 1916

LANDING PARTIES WITHDRAWN

The Greek Government were more
scrupulous than their army in carrying out their agreement with Admiral Dartige
du Fournet. The dead men were brought down to the Piraeus on the following day
by a party of French stretcherbearers, headed by two doctors and an abbe,
who had worked all day in and about the places where there had been fighting,
and had received neither injury nor insult from the Greek officials or the
Greek population. On the following day, December 3, the funeral took place at
the Piraeus. As the cortege went past, the Greek troops turned out, and the
Greek population uncovered.

In another respect, however, the
Greek authorities acted in the way most calculated to exasperate the Allies. As
soon as the landing parties had withdrawn, soldiers and armed reservists turned
savagely upon the Venizelists, and all day on December 2 they sacked and looted
their houses and bludgeoned everybody who resisted them. A handful of stout‑hearted
Cretans installed themselves in M. Venizelos's house, and defended it for the
best part of the day before they were finally overpowered. On the following
day, the royalists had completely mastered their opponents, and they began a
systematic round up. All day long arrested Venizelists were marched in
fours, with their hands tied behind their backs, to places of detention. The
ordinary prisons soon overflowed and schools and theatres were requisitioned.
The houses of the arrested men were pillaged from cellar to garret, and their
families were maltreated. This brutal treatment of the Venizelist partisans was
felt by Sir Francis Elliot to be far more humiliating to the Allies than the
withdrawal of the landing parties.

The news of the events in Athens
reached London just as the British Government was passing through a political
crisis. Mr. Asquith resigned on December 4, and it was not until five days
later that Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet could assemble to discuss the
position. Meanwhile, however, orders were sent to the Vice‑Admiral in the
Eastern Mediterranean to co‑operate with the French in a blockade of
Greece; to occupy Syra; to make all necessary arrangements for interrupting
railway communications between Athens and Larissa, and for cutting the railway
on the Isthmus of Corinth. He was told, however, that no troops were to be
landed at the Piraeus. The French at once took measures for relieving Admiral
Dartige du Fournet, who left the French fleet some days later, very much
regretted by the British officers who had served under him.

When the new War Cabinet assembled
for the first time on December 9, they had before them a telegram from King
Constantine to H.M. King George, which cleared the air, in that it gave an
absolute assurance that the Greek Government did not intend to make war upon the Entente. Ministers had until then been very uncertain whether the attack on the landing parties was not a first act of open war. But in other respects the telegram was most unsatisfactory. King Constantine alleged that his troops had been obliged to fire: he had "irrefutable proofs" that the Venizelists, "profiting by the Allied landing," intended to "make themselves masters of the town and bring back M. Venizelos in triumph." He went on to say that two automobiles belonging to the Anglo-French
Intelligence Service were ready to give the "order for revolt," and
that the movement broke out at about three o'clock in the afternoon. He did not
say how this, even if true, excused the deliberate concerted attack upon the
French seamen four hours previously.

H.M. King George answered, in
very restrained language, that he could not accept the explanation given,
although he was glad to hear that Greece did not contemplate making war upon
the Entente. "My Government," the King concluded, "can only take
a very serious view of the events resulting in the death of my gallant troops.
These events have aroused a feeling of deep and widespread indignation among my
people, a feeling intensified by the accounts received from many, including
neutral, sources of the treatment to which the Venizelists in Greece are now
being subjected. Your Majesty will understand that the demands which, in
conjunction with the Allied Powers, my Government must now make, will include
reparation for the unprovoked attack made by your troops and guarantees
for the future."

When this reply was sent Sir
Francis Elliot was instructed at the same time to demand that all Greek troops
in northern Greece should be removed to the Morea, and that the evacuation
should begin within twenty‑four hours; also, all troop movements from the
Morea northwards were to be stopped at once. "The blockade of
Greece," the instructions ended, "will be maintained until reparation
has been made for the recent unprovoked attack by the Greek forces upon the
troops of the Allies at Athens, together with satisfactory guarantees for the
future." Sir Francis Elliot was further instructed to leave the legation
at once, after handing in this ultimatum, and to go on board a ship which the
Rear‑Admiral was holding ready for him at the Piraeus. Three days
later, the British Minister carried out his instructions, and on December
15, the Greek Government sent an envoy to the

June‑Dec. 1916

SUBMARINE WARFARE

s.s. Abbassiyeh, in which Sir Francis Elliot was embarked, to deliver a
Note accepting the terms of the ultimatum. By December 17 Allied control
officers were at work at Larissa and Janina superintending the first movements
of the Greek army to the Morea.

4

Submarine Warfare

In midsummer 1916 the Germans
were maintaining fifteen submarines in the Mediterranean. Three of these were
stationed at Constantinople, the remaining twelve were at Cattaro. During the
last six months of the year the enemy increased these forces to twenty by
reinforcements to the Adriatic flotilla. The number of boats which were
actually at sea at any one time varied from three to five. The German
naval authorities were not slow to realise that submarine operations in the
Mediterranean would be less hampered and restricted than operations in any
other theatre, by the undertakings given to the American Government in
April. The German Government had then promised that no vessel should be sunk
without warning and without attempting to save life; their submarine commanders
in the Mediterranean frequently felt themselves free to disregard this promise,
and they soon learned by experience that the American Government did not
intend to hold them to it unless American lives were endangered.

In June a U‑boat of the
Constantinople flotilla sank the armed steamer Moeris without warning, off Cape Sidero, in Crete; no protests
followed, and in the following month a U‑boat off Algiers treated the
armed steamer Euphorbia in the same
way. Again no protests followed. After that the German submarine commanders
sank armed steamers without warning whenever they considered the
circumstances suitable. It is true that it was only armed vessels which they
attacked without signal or summons; this restricted their breach of agreement
and kept it within certain limits, but the breach was no less flagrant. The
German Government had made its promise subject to only one condition; they
would not sink vessels without warning inside or outside the declared war zone
unless those vessels attempted to escape or offered resistance. A gun
mounted in a freighter's after part suggests that if she is attacked she will
probably resist; but actual resistance and potential resistance are not the
same thing, and such men as Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld de la Periere,
who was one of the most successful U‑boat commanders in the
Mediterranean, were well able to distinguish between the two.

The zones of attack varied from
week to week; but throughout the German submarine commanders preferred the
western to the eastern basin. A severe attack in the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa
was generally followed by another against the Algiers coastal route and the
channel between Tunis and Sicily. Both these areas were within the French zone
of control, and the French could only do as we were doing in the approach
routes to the British islands: vary the tracks that shipping followed, and
patrol the terminal points. They were short of patrol craft, and the defence
never kept the attack in check; also, as far as we could tell, the line of
British drifters across the Otranto Straits seldom impeded the in‑ or out‑going
passages of the Cattaro flotilla. In July the attack was extended to the
transport route between Sicily and southern Greece, and the approach routes to
Salonica were mined at fairly regular intervals. The attack upon the transports
was not successful, and the German submarine commanders made the destruction of
merchant shipping their principal concern.

On June 9 Arnauld's submarine
– U.35 ‑ was located in
the Straits of Otranto, outward bound. He took her up the western coast of
Italy and made havoc of shipping in the Gulf of Genoa, and then operated for
about a fortnight off the coast of Spain, or on the traffic route between
Marseilles and northern France. He carried with him an expert marksman from the
High Seas Fleet, and destroyed nearly all the ships he attacked by gunfire. The
method was most successful; and when U.35 returned to Cattaro at the beginning of July, Arnauld had sunk over forty
ships, half of them steamers of heavy tonnage. He was succeeded in July by
Walther Forstmann in U.39, who
operated with telling effect off the northern coast of Algeria between the 12th
and the 25th, while a smaller boat, presumably from the Austrian submarine
flotillas, took station between Malta and Greece and attacked shipping on the eastern
route. Arnauld made his most destructive cruise in the month of August. He
started out towards the end of July, and went back to his old hunting grounds,
between the northeastern coast of Spain and the Gulf of Genoa. In three
weeks he sank about fifty steamers, with a total tonnage of 76,500, and gained
the extraordinary distinction of having destroyed two‑thirds of the
tonnage sunk in every theatre of war during the month of August, and of having
done this enormous amount of damage with a single four‑inch gun. He

June‑Dec. 1916

RISING LOSSES

was succeeded towards the end of
the month by Max Valentiner in U.38,
who took a heavy toll of shipping between the Balearic Islands and Spain. The
losses were most felt by British and Italian shipping, and during August the
French redistributed their patrol forces along the Algerian coast; but this
reorganisation of the defence forces did not cheek the losses.

The reinforcements sent out from
Germany seem to have reached the Mediterranean during the last three months of
the year, and the number of operating submarines increased. During September,
three large U‑boats were located at work at the same time, whilst one or
more boats of a smaller type operated in the eastern basin. In October the
number rose slightly, and during December the French Intelligence Department
identified six separate cruises by large U‑boats, and three by vessels of
a smaller type. The losses rose proportionately, and to the British Government
they were particularly serious; vessels under the British flag in the
Mediterraean are generally steamers of considerable size, and though as a rule
more Italian than British ships were lost during any given month, a heavy
proportion of the total loss of carrying power was borne by British tonnage.

The most serious feature of the
position was that in the Mediterranean, as at home, the losses showed a
distinct increase during the last two months of the year, and the German
submarines were operating with relative immunity. From June to the end of the
year only three German submarines were lost in the Mediterranean area, and
on July 30 the drifters on the Otranto barrage were responsible for sinking the
German submarine – UB.44 ‑
which was known to have been destroyed by our anti‑submarine forces. In
contrast to the rising list of shipping losses, the list of U‑boat
destructions showed a tendency to decline. Everything, indeed, seemed to
show that our seaborne traffic was threatened by what might prove to be a
danger of the first order:

(The
Allied losses in the Mediterranean during the last six months of the year were:

British,
96 vessels, 415,471 tons; French, 24 vessels, 64,829 tons; Italian, 136
vessels, 181,831 tons. Total 256 vessels, 662,131 tons. The British loss was
therefore 62 per cent. of the total tonnage, and 32 per cent. of the total
number of ships.)

CHAPTER V1

THE RAIDERS

1

The Moewe

Late in the autumn of 1916, the
German High Command decided upon a plan for attacking our trade routes in the
outer oceans with surface raiders. The enterprise was timed to start from two
months to a month before the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare, and
was probably designed as a preliminary to that desperate venture. If so, the
plan of combining a cruiser attack upon the outer routes with the submarine
onslaught upon the approach routes in home waters was, in itself, a good one. A
raiding cruiser which shifts its ground continually and creates uncertainty in
distant ports of shipment may compel unwieldy concentrations of cruiser
forces which must become wholly absorbed in watching focal points and carrying
out sweeps and searches. If the three German raiders selected for this service
were able to keep up a continuous attack upon our communications in the
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, they had good reason to hope that cruiser
forces, which would otherwise be employed in convoying and protecting
shipping in the Atlantic and waters near the British Isles, would be pinned to
distant points in these outer seas.

In this country it had been
realised for months past that the Germans might do great mischief if they could
devise and carry out an efficient plan for raiding the distant trade routes;
and the Admiralty and Admiral Jellicoe had taken elaborate precautions to meet
the danger. Cruiser forces were under standing orders to take up patrol
stations in all the exits to the North Sea as soon as we should have knowledge
that a raider was out; and their stations ~ were altered in accordance with our
latest intelligence. (See Appendix A and
Map 14.) The German raiders nevertheless eluded us at the start, but this
was only because we never knew within seven days the actual date of their
sailing: each of them, in fact, contrived

Aug.‑Sept. 1916

CRUISER DISPOSITIONS

to get to sea without any
information of their departure reaching the British Admiralty; and it was that
which saved them.

The problem had been carefully
considered not only by the central authorities but by the commanders of our
cruiser squadrons on the outer routes. On September 22, 1916, Rear‑Admiral
Sydney Fremantle took command of the 9th Cruiser Squadron in succession to Vice‑Admiral
Sir Archibald Moore. He had under his command the cruiser King Alfred (flag), the old battleship Swiftsure, the cruisers Donegal and Sutlej, and the armed merchant cruisers Ophir and Avenger. By the
original war orders the area under his control lay between the latitudes of St
Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and the 44th parallel, and between the meridian of
40 degrees W. and the African coast. Inside this zone an area had been allotted to the French 6e escadre legere under Rear-Admiral Jaures, the western and
northern boundaries of which were longitude 20 degrees W. and latitude 30 degrees N. (The 6e
escadre legere consisted of Kleber (flag), Desaix and Dupleix: its base of operations was
Dakar.)

This disposition dated from the
early days of the war, when the German light cruisers were still abroad and
operating on the trade routes; in August 1916 the Admiralty considered that
such rigid limits of command were no longer necessary, and wrote to the Admiral
Commanding to tell him that "the 9th Cruiser Squadron is stationed in the
Atlantic for service against the enemy as required. It is neither desirable nor
possible to lay down limits to the area in which it may be called upon to
operate. It is not an isolated squadron operating by itself as a self‑contained
unit; but it is a collection of vessels maintained as a strategical reserve for
reinforcing and emergency purposes."

To the south of the 9th Cruiser
Squadron were the cruiser Highflyer and the armed merchant cruiser Marmora;
and, further south again, patrolling off the south‑east coast of America,
were the light cruisers Glasgow and Amethyst, and the armed merchant
cruisers Macedonia,Orama and Edinburgh Castle.

Since March the operations of
the 9th Cruiser Squadron had been much assisted by the Portuguese declaration
of war against Germany; in consequence of which our cruisers were free to make
unrestricted use of the harbour facilities at Funchal and the Cape Verde
Islands. But in another respect our difficulties had increased. The cruise of U.53 to the western side of the Atlantic
had proved that Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands and the Canaries were all
within the zone of action of the German submarines of the new type. The open
roadsteads of Funchal and Porto Praya were therefore no longer suitable as war
anchorages or coaling stations, and the headquarters of the squadron was
now Sierra Leone.

On taking over the command
Admiral Fremantle issued a set of war orders, describing generally the scope of
his operations, the measures to be taken against raiders, and the special
precautions to be adopted if submarines attacked the area. Under the first head
he proposed to arrange for his ships to make passages through zones where
shipping was thickest "to demonstrate our command of the sea, and our
intention to enforce our rights, to neutral trade." In order to carry this
out, he intended never to have more than two ships at the base at one time; to
keep a ship in the Azores continuously; and to see to it that the African coast
north of latitude 30 degrees N. was frequently visited.

With regard to the second head,
of special precautions, careful consideration seemed to show that a raiding
cruiser's best plan of operation would be to attack trade near the Canary
Islands, and to use as a coaling station some deserted anchorage on the African
coast. In that event, Admiral Fremantle decided that his endeavour "would
he to organise a sweep, or a series of sweeps, on a broad front in such a
direction as to afford the best opportunity of finding the enemy while he is
cruising to attack trade," and he proposed that the French squadron should
co‑operate on the eastern wing of the advance. If the enemy should raid
the trade routes with a battle cruiser, the 9th Cruiser Squadron would either
act as a scout line for the battle cruisers sent out from England, or, if none
could be spared, keep concentrated and "seek out the enemy with a view to
making him burn coal and preventing him from doing damage." Admiral
Fremantle also took the precaution to add, that, if faced with a battle cruiser
raid, he did not intend to accept action unless the circumstances were
decidedly favourable.

During October he visited the
African coast to see how far it would afford facilities to enemy submarines
operating against the trade routes to the westward. He found that, though the
French were keeping a trawler patrol at work off the Moroccan coast, the
Spanish Government had no means of making their neutrality respected in the
Spanish zone further south. Having visited the Cape Verde Islands in the last
part of the month, Admiral Fremantle went on to Dakar to confer with Admiral
Jaures. He arrived on November 4: three days later a conference of the two

Nov.-Dec. 1916

GERMAN RAIDERS SAIL

staffs was held, to make
arrangements for common action against raiders or submarines. Admiral Fremantle
continued to receive reports that enemy submarines intended to attack his
zone. On November 22, therefore, when the whole squadron had assembled in
Sierra Leone, he took the opportunity of discussing the problem of submarine
attack with the military and civil authorities. He found that nobody had
seriously considered what ought to be done if Sierra Leone were attacked, and a
set of emergency orders was accordingly drawn up.

Events soon showed the wisdom of
Admiral Fremantle's preparations. Ever since his return home in March 1916 (See Vol. III., pp. 287‑70.),
Count Nikolaus zu Dohna Schlodien had retained his command of the Moewe; and on November 22 he slipped out
into the North Sea for a new raid against British commerce. In his account he
does not quote his orders, but says simply that he preserved the utmost secrecy
about his departure. On this occasion he was not acting by himself. The Moewe was followed, about a week later,
by the Wolf, commanded by Captain
Nerger, who had orders to operate in the Indian Ocean; whilst on December 21
Count von Luckner left in the ship Seeadler for an attack on the Pacific
routes. The Moewe was the first to
begin active operations and she was the first of the raiders of whom we had
news.

Count zu Dohna's earlier
movements cannot be traced with any accuracy, but it seems fairly certain that
he made his way along the eastern side of the North Sea in very bad weather and
turned west when in or about the latitude of the Faroes. By November 30 he had
set his course to the south; two days later he made his first capture, the
British cold‑storage vessel Voltaire,
which was then on a voyage to America in ballast. The position was latitude 41 degrees
43' N., longitude 36 degrees 48' W., that is, he was roughly half‑way across the
great circle track between Cape Clear (S.W. Ireland) and Cape Race
(Newfoundland); and it was only by a piece of exceptional luck that the Moewe was not at once reported. The Voltaire had an old gun mounted aft, and
Count zu Dohna had to use his own armament very freely before he could get her
captain to strike. No sooner was the fight over, and the Voltaire left sinking, than a Dutch vessel, whose captain must
certainly have heard the firing, steamed past and asked, by signal, whether the Moewe had taken up the crew of the
sinking steamer. Why the Dutch captain made no further report of the incident
has always remained completely unknown.

Count zu Dohna determined to
direct his first operations against the North American trade route, and so held
his position for the next few days. He captured nothing during December 3, and
on December 4 he had an unforeseen misfortune; he brought to and examined a
vessel which proved to be the Belgian relief ship Samland. As she had a safe‑conduct from the German Embassy in
New York, after destroying her wireless installation, he let her go, and this
meant that he could only keep his operations secret for some three or four more
days. He had gained a much longer start than this on his first voyage; but he
realised that even now it would take some time after the alarm was given to
organise a search. He therefore decided that he could remain on the North
Atlantic track for some days longer without risk, and between the 6th and the
12th he steered on a west‑south‑westerly course diagonally across
the great circle tracks between New England and the Lizard, capturing five
British steamers as he went.

(The Cambrian Range, 4,234 tons, grain and
piece goods; the King George, 3,852
tons, munitions; the Georgic, 10,077
tons, general cargo; the Yarrowdale,
4,652 tons, munitions; and the St.
Theodore, 4,992 tons, coal.)

Of these he sank three, but kept
the Yarrowdale and the St. Theodore. At last, on December 9, he
heard the Bermuda wireless station warning all vessels within call that there
was a raider in the North Atlantic. Even then he was reluctant to abandon the
North Atlantic routes; and in the meanwhile our counter‑measures were
being pressed forward. (See Map 8.)

The Admiralty received the Samland's report on the 7th, and at once
informed Paris and all the responsible officers in the Atlantic. Troop
transports at the Cape, Dakar and Sierra Leone were ordered to remain in
harbour until further orders; and the five transports which were known to be at
sea were ordered back to Sierra Leone.

(The Borda, City of Sparta, Durham Castle,
Willochra and Tofna.)

There was a general resemblance
between the latest description of the raider and those which had come in
when she was at sea during the early months of the year, but not yet enough to
establish her identity. All the Admiralty could say with certainty was, that
the new raider had a short, broad funnel, and two rakish masts, and that her
armament consisted of one 6‑inch, two 4.7‑inch and two 8‑inch
guns and four torpedo tubes. (The
calibres were necessarily approximate, as they wore the guesses of a Belgian
merchant captain.

Dec. 1916

CRUISER DISPOSITIONS

At the moment when these reports
came in, our forces in the North Atlantic were disposed as follows:‑

NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES

Leviathan: Kingston, Jamaica.

Roxburgh: on passage to Bermuda, from Jamaica.

Carnarvon: at sea off Bermuda.

Antrim: Bermuda.

Isis: Halifax.

Calgarian: Halifax.

Caesar: Bermuda, guardship.

Devonshire: Halifax.

Berwick: Kingston, Jamaica.

Drake: at sea, Bermuda to Trinidad.

Laurentic: Liverpool, in dock.

NINTH CRUISER SQDN

King Alfred: Freetown.

Swiftsure: Sierra Leone.

Ophir: Sierra Leone.

Donegal: Dakar.

Sutlej: Gibraltar.

Orotava: on passage to Sierra Leone.

CRUISER FORCE 'I ', (CAPE VERDE ISLANDS)

Highflyer: Sierra Leone.

Marmora: patrolling between Bathurst and the Cape Verde Islands.

EAST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA

Glasgow: Cape Town.

Macedonia: on passage, Abrolhos Rocks to Pernambuco.

Amethyst: Vicosa Reef.

Orama: Abrolhos Rocks.

Edinburgh Castle: at the Plate.

Having only recently worked out
his plans for meeting the very emergency that had now arisen, Admiral Fremantle
at once took action, and ordered his cruisers to sweep along the trade route
towards Madiera, and the Josephine Bank, with Admiral Jaures and his cruisers
on their right flank. A few hours after they had got to sea, an Admiralty
telegram arrived telling him to "suspend action." The Admiralty had,
in fact, worked out a plan for a co‑ordinated search by our Atlantic
squadrons. The outline of this was as follows.

On the western side of the
Atlantic, Vice‑Admiral M. E. Browning, commanding the North American and
West Indies Station, was to distribute his force over four lines of search: (i)
in the north, the Devonshire and Calgarian were to sweep along the main
trade route to longitude 50 degrees W.; (II) the Leviathan, Antrim and Carnarvon were to spread on a line of search joining Bermuda to the
Azores, until they reached the 45th meridian; (III) the Roxburgh and Berwick were
to watch the Mona passage, and (iv) the Drake,
which had been cruising in the West Indies, was to sweep on a line between
Trinidad and the Azores as far as latitude 25 degrees N. In addition to this, the
French Admiral in the West Indies was asked to send two cruisers along the
northern coast of Brazil to search for secret coaling places, such as Maraca
Island, which the Moewe had used as a
base during her previous voyage.

(The Weymouth was ordered out from home to
reinforce him; she arrived at Bermuda on December 22, and had at once to go
into dock. She took no part in the sweep.)

The dispositions for the other
squadrons in the Atlantic were based upon our arrangements for diverting
traffic from its ordinary routes; with regard to which a word of explanation
is necessary. Soon after the Moewe's
first raid the Admiralty had drawn up a plan for diverting the Cape shipping to
four tracks, two to the eastward and two to the westward, of the main route;
and of sending the Plate trade along two lanes which passed 200 and 600 miles
eastward of St. Paul Rocks. The main object of these artificially created
routes was, of course, to break up the concentrations of shipping which
ordinarily occur at such nodal points as the Rocas and the Canaries. They were
not to be rigidly adhered to, but to be used as a general guide. Intelligence
officers abroad were to vary the route instructions as they thought fit, so
long as they contrived to keep the normal routes as deserted as possible, and
saw to it that no two ships, sailing within a few days of one another, followed
the same track. Admiral Fremantle was therefore ordered to assemble his ships
in latitude 10' N. longitude 270 W., and sweep up the traffic lane to the west
of St Vincent; whilst the French patrolled the area to the east of the 30th
meridian between parallels of S' and 14' N. The Sutlej, which was just completing her refit at Gibraltar, was
directed to make for Sierra Leone down the traffic lane which Admiral
Fremantle's ships were about to search. The Highflyer was to remain at Sierra Leone; whilst the Marmora,
and the Kent from the Cape Station,
convoyed the homeward‑bound transports.

(The Gloucestershire, Almanzora, Orcoma, Arlanza (10th Cruiser Squadron) were
ordered out from home to reinforce him. The Almanzora, Orcoma and Arlanza arrived at Sierra Leone on January 4, and the Gloucestershire on the 8th and took no
part in the sweep. The Arlanza and
the Almanzora returned home on
January 14: the other two vessels remained on the station as escorts for the
transports on the Cape route. They took no part in the operations against the
raider.)

In the Southern Atlantic
measures were taken on the same principle. The Amethyst was to remain near Abrolhos Rocks to protect the colliers;
the Edinburgh Castle was to protect
the shipping at the River Plate; whilst the Macedonia and Orama were directed to sweep up
the traffic lane to the east of Fernando Noronha. The Glasgow was at Cape Town refitting and could not be included in the
dispositions.

Dec. 12‑31, 1916

THE MOEWE'S EVASIONS

Carefully as these measures were
thought out, they were fruitless. They left a gap between the eastern ends of
the sweeps ordered for Admiral Browning's squadron and the western limit of
Admiral Fremantle's line of search, and it was exactly down this gap that Count
zu Dohna directed his course.

On December 12 he transferred
about 400 prisoners to the Yarrowdale and ordered Lieutenant Badewitz to return with them to Germany. The vessels
parted company on the following day and the Yarrowdale arrived safely in Germany on December 31. By the capture of the St. Theodore Count zu Dohna had made up
a stock of 7,000 tons of coal. He parted from her almost at once, after putting
her in charge of a prize crew; but gave her a rendezvous at which to meet him.
As we have seen, the Moewe's course down
the mid‑Atlantic took her clear of Admiral Fremantle's and Admiral
Browning's cruisers; but it also took her down a very deserted part of the
Atlantic. The result was, that from December 12 to December 26 she only
captured the Dramatist, an English
steamer laden with Californian fruit, and the Nantes, a French sailing vessel.

Having met the St. Theodore at the rendezvous on the
23rd, Count zu Dohna decided to arm her and send her on an independent cruise
under the charge of Sub‑Lieutenant Koehler. From December 23 to 28 the
work of converting the St. Theodore went on in mid‑ocaan. She was successfully fitted with a wireless
apparatus and armed; and when the work was finished the Count headed for the
South American route at full speed. He was, in fact, making for the RocasFernando‑Noronha
area, where he operated, off and on, for the next six weeks. That he should
have been able to do so almost without hindrance is truly remarkable. In view
of the success with which the Karlsruhe had operated in this zone two years before, and of its attraction for the Moewe a year ago, we had every reason to
guard it, and, indeed, almost throughout the raid our cruisers were patrolling
it. Nor was this all; such reports as we could get of the Moewe's movements all tended to show that she was working in that
area, so that our vigilance at the vital spot was redoubled. In spite of all
this the Moewe remained at sea for as
long as her coal and provisions held out and returned to harbour at her
commander's convenience. Facts so surprising at first sight deserve to be
closely investigated.

The Admiralty's dispositions had allotted the Fernando-Noronha‑Rocas zone, which Count zu Dohna was
now approaching, to the Macedonia and Orama. When the orders were sent out
the Macedonia was on her way to Pernambuco,
and the Orama was at the Abrolhos
anchorage; both vessels, therefore, had time to get into the Fernando Noronha
zone before the Moewe. They were
actually in the area by the 16th, and at once began to work along the trade
route between the Equator and latitude 5 degrees S. The Count was still in the
Northern Atlantic, and, though his southerly course carried him clear of the Drake, it none the less took him into an
area which we now held strongly. He was, therefore, standing directly into
danger; and it might have been thought that his destruction was a mere matter
of time.

On December 25 the King Alfred, Swiftsure, Donegal and Sutlej finished their sweep and returned to harbour. Three days later, Admiral Fremantle was relieved by Rear-Admiral
T. D. L. Sheppard, who at once wired home a fresh scheme of search. (Admiral Fremantle had been appointed to the
command of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, Grand Fleet.) The Admiralty did not
approve it, and they sent out new orders on December 30. They had evidently
made up their minds that it was a mere waste of coal and machinery to search
for the raider on such vague data, and their main preoccupation was to hold the
vital point at Fernando Noronha as strongly as possible. The King Alfred, Swiftsure and Sutlej were
ordered to remain concentrated at Sierra Leone; whilst the Donegal and Orotava,
accompanied by two colliers fitted with wireless telegraphy, swept down the
trade route and relieved the Macedonia and Orama at Fernando Noronha. These
vessels were then to move south and reinforce the Edinburgh Castle off the Plate; Trinidad was to be examined on the
way.

The new dispositions therefore
covered the vital point quite as effectively as the old; but as it was always
possible that the raider would slip past our patrols, and work in the South
Atlantic from some base in the Patagonian archipelago, there was another
point to be considered. The high‑power wireless station at the Falklands
was exposed to an attack from the sea, and could even be put out of action by
indirect fire from Berkeley Sound; so that, if it were to be protected, a ship
would have to be permanently stationed there until the raid was over or until
some kind of local defence had been erected. On January 4, therefore, orders
were sent to the Lancaster - one of
our Pacific cruisers, which was at the time at Port Stanley ‑ to land two
of her 6‑inch guns. The work, which was very difficult, was not completed
until a month later.

Dec. 28, 1916‑Jan. 9, 1917

THE MOEWE'S ESCAPE

From December 28 to New Year's
Day Count zu Dohna held on south towards our cruisers, steadily increasing his
danger. He hoped to pick up some of the grain and meat cargoes, and so from the
1st to the 5th of January steamed slowly southwards at about eight knots. His
search for rneat and grain ships from the Plate was not successful, and it very
nearly brought him into contact with our cruisers. Between the 1st and the 5th
the Orama, the Macedonia and the Amethyst were sweeping north‑eastwards from Fernando Noronha. (See Map 9.) They crossed Count zu Dohna's line of advance on the
2nd and 3rd and when they turned south‑westwards on the 4th, he was well
to the south of them. He was therefore undisturbed, and only made two small
captures, a four‑masted french schooner and the Japanese steamer Hudson Maru; on the 6th he turned
further to the south to a course which converged with the line patrolled by the
three British cruisers. They were now catching him up and were sweeping towards
the coast, with the colliers Daleham and Minieh in company; these vessels,
being fitted with wireless telegraphy, were stationed ahead to extend the zone
of search. The course of the squadron was now converging rapidly with the Moewe's; but the Count was quite unawarethat he was standing into danger.

Late on the 7th the British
steamer Radnorshire was captured and
sunk by the Moewe about 280 miles to
the south‑westward of our three cruisers, and some time next day the
Count swung his vessel round and steered in a direction which took him straight
to the Amethyst. When he did this our
ships were rather widely spread. At a quarter‑past six on the evening of
the same day the squadron had closed, and the Macedonia, after taking all the mails on board, steered towards
Pernambuco. The Orama went straight
on with the Daleham in company; the Amethyst and the Minieh remained behind to coal. They finished coaling during the
afternoon of the following day and the Minieh was then sent on ahead, and told to steer for the rendezvous at six knots. Her
captain was told that the Amethyst would be twenty miles astern, and he was ordered to report suspicious vessels
by wireless telegraphy. On the morning of the 9th the Amethyst increased speed and sighted the Minieh at six o'clock, about eight miles away, bearing three points
on the starboard bow. After this the two vessels were out of sight of each
other all day; just before dark the captain of the Amethyst saw smoke coming from the direction where the Minieh was supposed to be; and as he had
received no wireless message from the collier, reporting a suspicious vessel,
he concluded that everything was in order and did not steam forward to sight
her before dark.

In the meantime, late in the
afternoon, Captain Williams of the Minieh had sighted smoke ahead; but being under orders only to report suspicious
vessels, he refrained for the moment from sending out any message. (The line under patrol was to the west of
the secret track along which shipping was being diverted. The object of the
patrol was to intercept the raider if he tried to proceed easterly or westerly
off the trade routes to coal " all vessels steaming at right angles to the
track of the patrol were presumably deemed auspicious and interrogated.)

For the next hour the strange
vessel and the Minieh closed, and at
five o'clock the new‑comer, when she was only half a mile away, suddenly
hoisted the German ensign, made a signal to the Minieh to stop using wireless and swung out her guns. Captain
Williams told the operator to disregard the order from the raider; to signal
"What ship is that? " and to make the S.O.S. It is impossible to be
sure whether the operator really attempted to make these signals or not. This
much is certain: nothing was heard in the Amethyst's
wireless room, and in a few moments all chance of sending out a message from
the Minieh was at an end, as the Moewe's boarding officer came over her
side with an armed party. (The naval
authorities maintained that the wireless operator could not have done so,
because none of our cruisers heard anything at all, and the wireless rooms in
our ships would most certainly have been aware that jamming was going on. The
contention is not a strong one, as the Moewe undoubtedly jammed a great many S.O.S. calls sent out by merchant
ships in the Rocas area, just before they were captured, and none of our
cruisers picked up any sign either of signalling or of jamming.)

Captain Williams did what he
could to disguise the real position, and to keep Count zu Dohna ignorant of his
danger; but the facts were too obvious to be kept dark for long. Whilst the
Germans were ransacking the ship they came upon the chief officer's log, which
showed them that the Minieh was the
auxiliary to a squadron of cruisers. Put thoroughly on his guard by this
discovery, Count zu Dohna sank the Minieh at about nine o'clock, two hours after sunset, and steamed off to the eastward.
He was away in time. Shortly after dark Captain the Earl of Glasgow, in the Amethyst, increased speed, intending to
close the Minieh during the night and
go with her in company to the rendezvous next morning. But when day dawned
on the 10th, the collier was nowhere to be seen. Count zu Dohna, after bringing
off his amazing stroke, was also out of sight, making off eastwards towards the
secret trade route.

Captain Lord Glasgow steamed
south towards the rendezvous

Jan. 10‑Feb. 2, 1917

FRUITLESS SEARCHING

all day, puzzled that the Minieh was not sighted, but still not
suspecting what had happened. When he met the Orama and the Daleham and
found that they too had seen nothing of the Minieh,
he at once started a search. The three ships were joined by the Macedonia on the 11th, and the sweep was
kept up until the 18th. It was then realised that the collier was lost ‑
snatched almost from under her consort's wing; the Amethyst parted company and made for Bahia; the Macedonia and Orama swept towards Trinidad, to carry out the Admiralty orders of
the 30th, and then moved south for the Plate.

After sinking the Minieh, the Count decided to leave the
Rocas area altogether. The Hudson Maru was loaded up with prisoners on the 10th, and sent to Pernambuco; after which
the Moewe held on to the eastward
across the Central Atlantic. Count zu Dohna met the St. Theodore, which had been christened the Geier, on the 17th, and learned that her cruise had been very
unproductive. Since the two ships had parted company, Sub‑Lieutenant
Koehler had only captured one small Canadian vessel. During the 18th and 19th
the Moewe took in coal from the Geier, after which the two ships again
separated and the Moewe held on to
the eastward. From January 22 to February 2 she cruised on the Cape route
between the latitudes of 15 degrees S. and 30 degrees S.

In the meantime the dispositions ordered by the Admiralty on December 30 were being put into effect. Their general purpose was to move the cruisers under Commodore Aubrey Smith, Senior Naval Officer, East Coast of South America, further south, and to transfer the patrol of the Rocas-Fernando‑Noronha area to ships detached
especially from the 9th Cruiser Squadron. The Orotava and Donegal,
which had been ordered south, left Sierra Leone on January 5 and 6, 1917,
respectively, and on the 15th arrived off the Rocas. The Moewe appears to have been somewhere to the south of them as they
approached the Rocas; but, though not far off, she was never sighted nor in any
real danger from them. The two cruisers made a sweep towards Lavandeira Reef,
which they reached on the 16th. On the 21st, having coaled with the utmost
difficulty, they sailed again and swept to the eastward. The Donegal soon developed serious engine-room
defects; and, on the 23rd, her commanding officer, Captain d'Oyley ordered the Orotava to patrol near Fernando Noronha,
with the collier Albistan, whilst he
returned to Sierra Leone with the Pretoria. At the moment, Commodore Aubrey
Smith was returning to his station in the Glasgow,
which had been laid up at Cape Town for a refit, and was on his way to Abrolhos
Rocks.

Realising that this meant a
reinforcement to the station, Captain d'Oyley asked the commodore to support
the Orotava with an additional
cruiser. This the commodore could not do, but knowing that the Orotava was running short of water, he
wired to her to go to Pernambuco to get it. The message never got through, and
she left the patrol for Sierra Leone on the 30th. Thus for the first time since
the operation began the Rocas area was temporarily uncovered. The gap in our
dispositions did not, however, give the Moewe any additional facilities; for she was, all the time, at the other side of the
Atlantic; and Commodore Aubrey Smith soon had the area under observation again.
The arrival of the Macedonia and the Orama off the Plate released the Edinburgh Castle, which moved up to
Abrolhos Rocks. Here she found the Amethyst,
and was joined later by the commodore himself in the Glasgow, which, after calling at Pernambuco on the 19th, arrived on
the 22nd at Abrolhos Rocks. On the 24th all three vessels got under way again,
and swept north; the Amethyst parted
company on February 1, and returned to watch the base at Abrolhos Rocks; but
the Glasgow and the Edinburgh Castle held on and reached the
Fernando Noronha area just as the Orotava was returning to Sierra Leone.

The prisoners from the Hudson Maru had been landed at
Pernambuco. From them we got a better description of the raider, and a
practical certainty that she intended to operate on the Plate route against the
meat and grain vessels. We knew, moreover, from the reported conversations
between the prisoners and their German captors, that the captain of the Moewe was quite baffled at finding none
of the cargoes for which he was seeking. Our system of secret routes was therefore
working well. The information thus received was not, however, enough to alter
the existing dispositions, more particularly as the area in which the Moewe was supposed to be operating was
already being closely watched.

On February 2 Count zu Dohna
left his position on the Cape route, and steered for his old zone of operations
off the Brazilian coast; a day later, Commodore Aubrey Smith, in the Glasgow, and Captain Marshalll, in the Edinburgh Castle, having finished their
northerly sweep, turned southwards, and made for Abrolhos Rocks, which they
reached on the 10th. The hunters were, therefore, well placed for running down
the quarry, although for the time being the scent was lost. The Moewe was, in fact, still many hundreds
of miles away. After leaving the Cape route, where he had found absolutely
nothing, the Count steamed towards Trinidad in the South

Feb. 11‑14, 1917

A LONELY ISLAND

Atlantic. On February 11, he
fell in with the Geier, and learned
that she had only sunk one vessel since she had last parted company; the two
vessels then steamed on towards the island where they intended to coal.
Ostensibly no better spot could have been chosen. The compiler of the Admiralty
Sailing Directions for the South American coast describes the isolation of this
lonely rock with scientific precision: "It is a rugged mass of rocks, the
centre peak rising 1,952 feet and what soil there is on the island is on the
eastern and southern sides .... the whole shore is so ironbound, and there is
such a swell surging against it that it is almost impossible to land
anywhere without danger of staving the boat ... the shore is skirted by sharp
rugged coral rocks. The island was taken possession of by Dr. Halley,
afterwards Astronomer Royal on April 17, 1700, and in 1781 the English tried to
form a settlement and failed; and, more recently, the Brazilians, with like
success." This certainly conveys loneliness and desolation, and the Count
approached the island in full confidence that his coaling would only be watched
by "sea eagles, man‑of‑war birds and boobies." He found
to his dismay that the shores were covered with bungalows and bathing machines;
after an anxious stay of a few hours, at an anchorage which, he hoped, was not
visible from the settlement, he again made off to sea. On the 15th the Moewe was about 300 miles east‑south‑east
of Abrolhos Rocks, having sunk her consort the Geier on the previous day.

For a second time the Count was
standing into danger. On the 12th the Glasgow had left Abrolhos Rocks and sailed for Rio, leaving the Amethyst and the Edinburgh
Castle in the area, and the Orama to the south of it.

(The Glasgow's movements since the first alarm
were: December 7 to 27 at Simonstown, refitting; December 27 to January 3 on
passage to St. Helena; January 4 to 10 on passage to Sierra Leone; January 13
to 19 on passage to Pernambuco; January 20 to 22 on passage to the Abrolhos;
January 23 to February 7 patrolling between Abrolhos and the Rocaa; February 7
to 8 at Bahia; February 8 to 10 on passage to Vicosa Reef. The Macedonia was patrolling off the Plate.)

As the Abrolhos Rocks and the
Vicosa Reef were the coaling bases of the squadron, they could not be left
unguarded, and the Amethyst remained
at anchor near the Vicosa Reef for the rest of the month. The Edinburgh Castle, which, as has been
shown, joined her there from the Rocas area on the 9th, remained at anchor
until the 14th. She then weighed and made for the secret trade route to the
eastward, with the colliers Headcliffe and Dunclutha in company, on a course
which took her almost straight for the Moewe.

After sinking the Geier on the 14th, the Moewe took up a station on the 20th
parallel about three hundred and sixty miles from the continent. The Count had
at last got on to the route to which the Plate trade had been diverted, and he
soon became aware of it. The new hunting‑ground was more productive than
any he had been on for several weeks past, and he at once began to make
captures.

(On
the 15th, s.s. Brecknockshire; on the
night of the 15th‑16th, the French
Prince; and on the morning of the 16th, s.s. Eddie.)

Count zu Dohna rose early on the
morning of the 16th to superintend the capture and sinking of the Eddie; and a few minutes later the
raider was in touch with the Edinburgh
Castle and her colliers. But here again the luck was against us; for it so
happened that, when Count zu Dohna sighted our ships, they were carrying out a
special evolution, so that their movements at once roused his suspicions.
Unaware of the raider's presence, Captain Marshalll of the Edinburgh Castle had stopped his engines at 8.15 and sent a whaler
with fresh provisions towards the Headcliffe and Dunclutha, whose masters closed
him. When the Count sighted them, therefore, he saw a large two‑funnelled
vessel completely stopped, and another moving across his bows. Concluding at
once that he was in face of a trap, and that the moving vessel was a decoy, he
approached cautiously. His suspicions were confirmed when he saw signals
going up from the Headcliffe, and he
at once made off at the top of his speed.

Probably because he had issued
strict standing orders to make as little smoke as possible, our ships did not
sight the Moewe until half‑past
ten, when she was reported to the eastward from the masthead of the collier Headcliffe. At the moment she was barely
visible, so that there was nothing to cause suspicion of her; but when the Edinburgh Castle moved towards her,
she was seen to swing round sixteen points and make off to the north‑eastwards
at high speed. Captain Marshalll grasped the position in an instant and steamed
after her in chase. The Moewe had a
start of anything up to twelve miles, and it was soon evident that the Edinburgh Castle would never overtake
her. Up to noon our ship held her own; but, with her bottom foul, and her
engines in need of an overhaul, she never quite worked up to 14 knots. By one
o'clock the raider was drawing ahead, and at 2.40 Captain Marshalll. gave up
the chase and turned to, starboard to examine the s.s. Hermione of Liverpool, which was approaching from the north‑castward.

(Captain
Marshall's movement towards the Hermione was quite misunderstood by Count zu Dohna, who thought the Hermione was mistaken for the Moewe.

This was the

Feb-March 1917

THE MOEWE RETURNS

last that was seen of the Moewe. When Commodore Aubrey Smith
received the news, the Glasgow was
patrolling the plate route about 300 miles to the south of Abrolhos Rocks; the Macedonia and the Orama were off the Plate; and the Amethyst was guarding the base at the Vicosa Reef. Thinking,
from the course the raider had taken, that she was making for the Plate, the
commodore decided to move south in the Glasgow,
and to send the Orama north up the
traffic lane. But in point of fact Count zu Dohna was now nearing the end of
his resources and was making northwards for home.

He kept well out into the middle
of the Atlantic, and sank six more British steamers on his way back.

During the first days of March
the Count took his ship through the western edge of Admiral Sheppard's zone,
but he was never in any danger from our cruisers. Neither the Admiralty nor the
Admiral had had any news of the Moewe's
movements since February 16, and no special movements were made until March 9,
when Admiral Sheppard left Sierra Leone with the King Alfred and Sutlej to
sweep towards Ascension. All the other ships of his squadron were engaged in
convoying transports; for all drafts and stores between Australia or East
Africa and England were now sent round the Cape. In the south, Commodore Aubrey
Smith had divided his force into two groups: one he kept off the Plate; with
the other he set up a patrol of the secret trade route between latitude 25 degrees S.
and the Equator. But these movements had no effect upon the Moewe's operations, which were
practically at an end: when Admiral Sheppard began his sweep on the 12th, Count
zu Dohna was somewhere in the latitude of Lisbon running for home.

2

The Leopard

The German Admiralty had
evidently decided that the attack upon the outer routes ought to be maintained;
for, just before the Moewe's return
home (March 22) another raider put to sea. The new raider was the British
steamer Yarrowdale, captured by the Moewe on her last voyage, and now fitted
with an armament of about a dozen guns and two torpedo tubes: we do not know
the name of her captain or what his orders were.

The Admiralty had a certain amount of information as to the enemy's intentions, and had ordered the Commander‑in-Chief to strengthen the Northern Patrol (10th Cruiser
Squadron) and to keep a watch on the Norwegian coast. Admiral Beatty at once
sent two cruisers and two armed boarding steamers to patrol to the north of the
Shetlands along the meridian of 1 degrees W., and detached the 4th Light Cruiser
Squadron with four destroyers to watch the Norwegian coast between the
Nord Fiord and the Sogne Fiord. Both groups returned on the 14th, having
sighted nothing: they were not ordered to renew the patrol, and were soon
absorbed in other duties. At some time on the 20th or 21st the Moewe must have passed through the zone
previously watched by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron.

The Moewe's relief ‑ she was renamed the Leopard ‑ was not so fortunate; but her failure to escape
into the Atlantic can only be explained by a retrospective glance at our
arrangements for closing the North Sea.

In March 1916 the Commander‑in‑Chief
had ordered that the Northern Patrol should be reinforced from the three Grand
Fleet cruiser squadrons. His intention was to keep one cruiser watching the
meridian of the Shetlands between latitude 62 degrees and 65 degrees ; for he considered it
certain that outgoing and incoming raiders would cross this line. In the
course of time this extra patrol became a supplementary force to the 10th
Cruiser Squadron further west; and the duty of maintaining it, which, in the
beginning, had been divided equally between the 2nd, 3rd and 7th Cruiser
Squadrons, had fallen entirely upon the 2nd. The business of the patrol had
also increased as time went on: in March 1916 it was intended to keep one
cruiser and one armed boarding steamer on the work: a year later the allotted
force was trebled.

On March 11, 1917, Admiral
Fremantle issued one of his periodic instructions to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
From March 10 until reliefs arrived, the patrol line north of the Shetlands was
to be occupied by the Achilles and
the Dundee, the Minotaur and the Royal Scot,
the Duke of Edinburgh and the Fiona. The ships sailed from Swarbacks
Minn on the appointed dates, and the week passed uneventfully; on March 16, the
day before they were relieved, the Achilles and the Dundee were patrolling at the
northern end of the line. The weather was as bleak and cheerless as the high
latitude could make it. The sky was a mass of dull grey

March 16, 1917

A SUSPICIOUS SHIP

moving rapidly towards the
northern horizon before a southeast wind; from time to time a patch of
darker colour would bring with it a snow squall or a burst of cold, biting
rain, more chilling than the snow itself. Just before noon on the 16th a
steamer was sighted to the eastward of the Achilles.
There was nothing remarkable in this; ships had been sighted and examined every
day; it was the ordinary work of the patrol; so Captain F. M. Leake of the Achilles turned eastwards, and signalled
to the Dundee to follow. The unknown
steamer was evidently fast; for it was not until two o'clock that the Achilles, steaming at 15, and later at
18 knots, came up to her. She stopped when ordered and obeyed a further signal
to turn towards the Dundee, which had
fallen astern. (The Dundee was an armed boarding steamer of 2,187
tons, with two 4-inch guns.)

As soon as these two orders had
been carried out, Captain Leake ordered Commander Selwyn M. Day, R.N.R., the
captain of the Dundee, to lower a
boat and examine her. Commander Day was, by now, very suspicious. The steamer
was flying the Norwegian flag and called herself the Rena; it was true the name appeared in Lloyd's Register, but
Commander Day could not understand why the letter N should have been painted
upside down, and when the ship was bows on he realised that she was a large
vessel; far larger than the 3,000 tons Rena of the register. Commander Day noticed also that all superfluous woodwork had
been removed, and that she had no wireless; she had, moreover, steamed well and
steadily at 13 knots for several hours, a thing of which no genuine cargo boat
is capable. He spoke of all this to his assistant, Lieutenant F. H. Lawson,
R.N.R., and told him that he thought the new‑comer was a raider.

Lieutenant Lawson at once
volunteered to take charge of the boarding boat: an act of deliberate courage
which cost him his life. At a quarter to three it was put into the water, and
was rowed across towards the Rena: it
was soon out of sight on her lee side. While Commander Day was waiting for the
boarding party to give him a sign or a signal he inanceuvred his ship so as to
keep her on the stranger's Weather quarter, ready, if needs be, to rake her
with his two 4‑inch guns. If he was right in supposing that she was a
disguised raider his position was most dangerous, for a broadside from her
would blow him out of the water, and his only protection against it was to keep
her from getting him on her beam. He therefore kept his ship in movement and
noticed, after a few minutes, that the enemy was continually turning, as
though trying to out‑manouevre him.

Commander Day kept his guns'
crews closed up and waited. At twenty minutes to four, nearly an hour after
Lieutenant Lawson had left the ship, the stranger's Norwegian flag, painted on
her port quarter, fell out‑board with a crash. Commander Day waited no
longer but at once gave the order to fire; almost as he did so, two torpedoes
passed the Dundee's stern, hardly
twenty yards away. The Achilles was
four miles away in the east‑north‑east, so that the Dundee was now in the greatest danger.
The enemy raider at first steamed away; as she did so Commander Day steered
across her stern and raked her with his 4‑inch guns; as the range was
very close every shot went home, and in a few minutes volumes of smoke and
steam rose from the enemy. After a few minutes the German captain put his helm
over and turned to starboard, but Commander Day was ready for him; he ported
his helm so as to keep the enemy behind him and so dodged the deadly broadside.
When the turns were completed the Dundee had fired over forty shells, and tremendous clouds of smoke were being carried
north‑westward from the burning raider. Almost simultaneously the Achilles opened fire. Commander Day had
now opened the range as much as he could, and decided, most unselfishly, that
he must now risk everything to give the cruiser a clear line of fire: he
therefore steered straight for the Achilles down the lane of smoke. As he did so, the enemy sent down a broadside;
fortunately her firing was wild, and a few minutes later the armed boarding
steamer was under the shelter of the Achilles.

About five minutes after the
first gun was fired by the Dundee the Achilles's gunnery officer was
recording hits upon the enemy. The raider was now a doomed vessel. She was
often hidden from view in clouds of black smoke, and several times the gunners
in the Achilles had to check their
fire. For nearly an hour the Germans stood up against the stream of shell which
poured into their ship; her internal fires, and the bursts of the heavy shell
from the Achilles, started explosions
and sent up jets of flame through the smoke clouds which rose out of her: when
she began to settle down it seemed to some that the whole of her fore‑part
was red‑hot; others thought that it was melting; but the Germans fought
on without any sign of surrender. They could certainly have yielded without
dishonour before the end came. It was thought both in the Achilles and the Dundee that the raider fought under the Norwegian colours. This may or may not be so;
it would be easy enough to make a mistake on such a point in the confusion of
an action; and men who fought

March 22, 1917

ANOTHER RAIDER

with such courage would be
hardly likely to go to their death under a foreign flag. Just after half‑past
four the raider sank. There were no survivors; Lieutenant Lawson and his crew
perished with the Germans: he was doubtless made a prisoner when he went
alongside the raider. He knew what he was doing when he volunteered to board so
suspicious a ship, and he would never have wished his friends to hold their
hands for his sake. He and his men must have spent their last moments of life
in full knowledge of the success which they had bought.

3

The Seeadler

For the next six days no ships were reported overdue; but on March 22 news came in which showed that our difficulties were by no means ended. A neutral vessel arriving from the South American trade route informed us that she had been stopped on February 25 by a full-rigged ship, armed with guns and fitted with full raiding equipment
and an auxiliary motor. The new raider was the Seeadler, formerly the Pass
of Balmaha: and her captain, Count von Luckner. (Seeteufel, by Graf Felix von
Luckner.) When first reported he had already been at sea for nearly three
months, and had made several captures. His story claims our attention for the
thoroughness and skill with which he had prepared for his cruise, and our
admiration for the seamanlike chivalry with which he conducted it.

Felix von Luckner's career had
not been that of an ordinary German officer. He had begun by going round the
world in a sailing vessel as a fo'c'sle hand under the name of Phylax Luedicke;
he had then passed the examination for an officer in the merchant marine, and
finally through the influence of his family had entered the Imperial Navy.
After serving in the Kronprinz at the
battle of Jutland, he was transferred to the Moewe, where he remained under Count zu Dohna's command until the
late autumn of the year. His very unusual training had evidently been carefully
noted at the German Admiralty; for, when they formed their plans for sending
out raiders at the end of 1916, Count von Luckner was sent for and ordered to
take command of the Pass of Balmaha,
a captured American sailing ship; to fit her out as a commerce raider at
Geestemunde, and to get to sea when he could.

He carried out these orders with
foresight and ingenuity. His first care was to get his vessel fitted with an
auxiliary engine of 1,000 horse‑power, and with oil stowage of 480 tons
and large fresh‑water tanks. The whole of the 'tween deck space was then
furnished to receive prisoners, and hammocks and bedding were got ready. Cabins
with three bunks and a washing basin each were built on the lower deck for
officer prisoners, and a library of French and English books was got together
to console them during their confinement. At the same time Count von Luckner
searched all the shipping records he could lay his hands on, and found that the Pass of Balmaha resembled a Norwegian
sailing vessel named the Maletta which,
in the past, had carried cargoes between Copenhagen and Melbourne. He
accordingly decided that his new command should be made to look as like
her as possible and should sail under the fictitious name of Irma. A complete set of ship's papers,
as for a voyage to Melbourne with timber, was prepared; all the vessel's deck
machinery and even the thermometers, barometers and compasses were stamped with
the names of Norwegian firms; the fo'c'sle was painted out and decorated with
Norwegian picture postcards and illustrations from Norwegian weekly papers.

The personal records of the
German Admiralty were then searched, and 23 seamen who could speak Norwegian
were selected as part of the crew. Each was given a fictitious name and place
of birth, and ordered to read up all about his native town in BŠdeker, so that
he might speak with ease and familiarity of its streets and public buildings.
To each, moreover, was handed a packet of family letters, or love‑letters,
which the Count had ordered to be composed by a Norwegian scholar, and then
rewritten in twenty different handwritings. To these were added photographs of
girls, and of wives and children, stamped with the names of Norwegian photographers
in every part of the country. Every man was then examined on the contents of
his packet to be quite sure that he would make no slip inconsistent with their
contents ‑ would know, for example, exactly what terms he was on with his
sweetheart; what was his father's position or occupation; how many children he
had, and what were their ages. It was made a punishable minor offence for a man
to say, in December, that he had a baby ten months old, and not to have added
the corresponding number of months when cross‑questioned again in March.
Little is known about the character and personality of the carefully imaginative
man who made these preparations. In his photographs

Dec. 21‑25, 1916

CAREFUL PREPARATIONS

he looks like a German officer
who affects the English style of appearance; his face is long, and beyond a
slight prominence of the eyes his features are not remarkable. The photograph
is rather theatrical, and shows him with a haughty, unattractive expression,
which does not at all agree with what we know of him. His officers, being
chosen from the merchant service, were certainly not his social equals; but he
lived with them on easy terms, and seems to have admitted them to his friendship.
In all the testimonies of his English and French prisoners there is no word of
complaint against him; some even go out of their way to say that he treated
them kindly; we can therefore conclude, with certainty, that he was a bold,
calculating and adventurous leader; and we have every reason to believe that he
was a kindly and courteous gentleman as well.

After a long wait in the
Heligoland Bight, the Seeadler sailed
on December 21, 1916. (This wait was
nearly fatal to him. On December 9 the British Minister at Christiania warned
the Government that a German warship would pass Haugesund that night. The
Commander‑in‑Chief was informed, and sent out intercepting forces
to close the exits from the North Sea on the 10th: they remained at sea until
the 14th. The Minister was mistaken; the ship passing the Sound was an interned
merchantman.)

Count von Luckner was clear in
his mind that he would have to face an inspection by the British cruisers; if
sighted he could not get away from them; and if he fell in with foul winds
between Iceland and the Faroes, he might be beating to and fro for days across
the British lines of patrol. Everything, therefore, depended upon the disguise
of the ship and crew; which had been completed by dressing up a youngster, with
a slight figure and a fresh girlish face, as a woman, in a habit specially made
by a dressmaker ashore. The boy was instructed to play the part of captain's
wife, and to pretend to be suffering from very severe toothache when the
British officers came on board. By this artifice it was hoped that, out of
respect for a sick woman, the boarding officers would not press their cross‑examination
too rigorously, and would be content with looking at the ship's papers.

The Seeadler soon fell in with a very severe south‑westerly gale
which drove her far to the north; when the weather abated, her sails and
running and standing rigging were so completely frozen that she could not
spread more canvas. Count von Luckner therefore steered to the southward, and
on Christmas Day was brought to by an armed merchant cruiser, about midway
between the Faroes and Iceland The German‑speaking section of the crew
went below, and hid themselves in the cargo with bombs, rifles and revolvers in
their hands. Our two officers then examined the ship's papers and the log, in
the teeth of some ten invisible bayonets. The inspection was quite
conscientiously carried out and nothing roused our officers' suspicions. As the
ship's papers had been forged before the Seeadler was held up in the Heligoland Bight, the dates on her cargo manifest and bills
of lading proved that her voyage had been delayed. The log was presumably
written so as to show her at anchor in some Norwegian fjord during the time of
her actual stay off the German rivers, and our boarding officer not unnaturally
asked why the ship had been held up: Luckner answered that he had been warned
against German raiders, which were then abroad and would certainly confiscate
his ship and cargo if they found her. This satisfied our boarding officer, who
went over the side into his boat.

Everything seemed to have gone
well for Luckner; but in the next minute the whole artifice was on the point of
being discovered. The Seeadler had backed her main topsails for the inspection, and was drifting slowly to
leeward; the result was that the examination officer's boat, which had made
fast on the lee side, could not get clear, and was dragged aft as the crew
tried to shove off with their boat‑hooks. Count von Luckner thus saw the
inspecting officers carried almost over the screw of the auxiliary motor, of
which no mention had been made in the ship's papers; the British officers had
only to look into the water to see it and the adventure was at an end. But
Luckner's nerve did not fail him: as the boat drifted aft he went to the side,
passed down a rope, and swung it to and fro so that the two officers in the
boat had to duck to avoid being struck. As was to be expected, everybody looked
upwards at the rope instead of downwards at the propeller, and a minute
later the boat was clear of the Seeadler's
side. As soon as the British cruiser was out of sight, the cargo was thrown
overboard, the ensign hoisted and Christmas Day celebrated in German uniform. (This is Luckner's story; it cannot be
corroborated in every detail, but it seems probable that his ship was examined
by the armed merchant cruiser Patia,
and that the Seeadler at the time was
disguised as the Norwegian sailing ship Hero, bound to Melbourne with a cargo of timber.)

Count von Luckner soon picked up a fair wind for his southerly voyage, which brought him to his first hunting-ground
off the Rocas in three weeks. On his way he captured the British steamers Gladys Royle and Lundy Island. The Seeadler's
course carried her to the westward of the Canaries, somewhere between the
meridians of 25 degrees and 30 degrees W.; and

Jan. 1917

THE SEEADLER ESCAPES

she was in the Madeira‑Cape
Verde area between January 9 and January 17. That a raider should have passed
through the zone so easily shows the change which had come over the conditions
of war in the Atlantic during the preceding twelve months. It was only by an
extraordinary chance that Count zu Dohna slipped through the 9th Cruiser
Squadron in his first voyage a year before; and if the conditions had been the
same, that is, if Admiral Sheppard's vessels had been patrolling the passage
between Madeira and the Canaries, whilst the Highflyer watched the tracks between the Cape Verde Islands, a
sailing ship proceeding south under full canvas could hardly have avoided
observation at some point in the zone, seeing that it took her eight days to
pass through it. But the submarine campaign had by now made it impossible for
the 9th Cruiser Squadron to maintain the patrol, and our system of controlling
the Central Atlantic had been modified accordingly.

In October 1916, U.53, under Lieutenant‑Commander
Hans Rose, had appeared on the American coast, and sunk vessels off the
Nantucket lightvessel; which meant that the Madeira‑Canaries zone
was thenceforth within the reach of German submarines. The fact was emphasised
by the bombardment of Funchal on December 3. In itself this would not have been
enough to make us withdraw our patrol; but it made it much more difficult. Our
cruisers could no longer move to and fro at low speed and coal at the open
anchorages in the islands. All ship movements had to begin and end at Sierra
Leone or Dakar, since no other place would serve for taking in coal, water and
provisions. The 9th Cruiser Squadron was, moreover, burdened with an additional
duty which made it quite impossible to keep the zone under a continuous patrol.
In December 1916 it was decided that the Mediterranean route should no longer
be used by transports which had to pass through the canal; in other words, that
all troop movements to and from Australia, India and New Zealand should go
round the Cape. This meant that the 9th Cruiser Squadron had to escort the
troopships of the ANZAC armies between the Cape and the mouth of the English
Channel. As the stream of ships was continuous, the new duty practically
superseded the old.

For these reasons Count von
Luckner was able to pursue his voyage without disturbance, and on January 21 he
reached a position to the north of the St. Paul Rocks and captured the French
barque Charles Gounod. He then held
on to the south for a week, and after sinking the Perce, a British schooner, on the 28th, made to the north‑west.
For the next six weeks he operated within a rectangular area about 860 miles
long and 180 wide, the extreme points of which were respectively some 210 and
550 miles to the north‑westward of St. Paul Rocks.(See Map 9.) The area was never so much as crossed by our cruisers,
which were all operating against the Moewe further south. As Count von Luckner was not in any danger from them, it would be
of no use to compare his movements with ours. Between January 20, when he
reached his raiding ground, and March 21, when he left it, he seized nine ships
and took 260 prisoners. Most of his captures were sailing ships, and amongst
them was the British ship Pinmore, in
which, years before, he had sailed round the world as the fo'c'sle hand Phylax
Luedicke. He went on board her, and after rummaging about in the familiar
corners of the fo'c'sle and the saloon, and seeing the mark on the brass of the
steering‑wheel, where he had cut his initials "F. v. L.," he
gave, with feelings of keen regret, the order that she should be sunk.

(After
his own capture and before being sent back to Germany, Luckner made a statement
before Captain Thompson, RN, the naval adviser to the New Zealand Government,
in which he stated that he took the Pinmore into Rio, and impersonated Captain Mullen in front of the Brazilian
authorities. He alleges that he put his arm in a sling so that he should not be
compelled to sign his name; and, having bought provisions, and got what news he
could of the British cruisers, put to sea again, and met the Seeadler at a rendezvous. He says not
one word of this in his printed memoirs, and the story is most improbable. We
have not, it is true, got Captain Mullen's deposition; but the adventure is not
even hinted at in the existing testimonies. This is not the only reason for
disbelieving it: all our official news of the raid was sent by our diplomatic
representatives in Rio; there is no suggestion of this Pinmore adventure in any of their telegrams, and it is
inconceivable that the prisoners should have said nothing about it to them. The
story is not, in itself, impossible; but it is more likely that Count von
Luckner could not resist the temptation to score off his captors by making them
believe that they had been more careless and stupid than was really the case.)

On March 21 he seized the French
sailing ship Cambronne, which was
carrying Chilean nitrates to France, and to her he transferred all his prisoners.
Realising that he would need a long start if he were to escape from our
cruisers after the alarm had been given, he ordered his men to saw off the Cambronne's top‑gallant masts and
bowsprit, so that she would make a slow passage to Rio. He then put Captain
Mullen of the Pinmore in charge of
her and gave him the course. The Cambronne thus sailed under the colours of three different nations in one day.

The prisoners and their captor
parted on extremely good terms. Count von Luckner had taken no precautions
against the Seeadler being recaptured
by them; thinking probably

March, 1917

A GENEROUS CAPTOR

that their difference of race
and language made all concerted action between them impossible. Everybody
had, therefore, been allowed to roam about the ship as they wished; and apart
from this, Count von Luckner had several times acted graciously and generously.
During the chase of the Horngarth, a
British ship, one of her boys had been killed by the Seeadler's shells: he was buried at sea with full honours, under
the British flag, and Count von Luckner himself read the burial service over
him. When the British Yeoman was
taken, and it was seen that there was a woman on board her, Luckner gave his
only other woman captive a bunch of flowers, and told her to receive the new‑comer
at the gangway and reassure her. On many an evening the Seeadler's band had been told to play "Tipperary." All
this had impressed the prisoners, as well it might; so that they were
transferred to the Cambronne with
cheers and shouting; and even the French masters, whose proud, implacable
attitude had deeply impressed Count von Luckner, shook hands with him before
they went over the side for the last time.

On the very day that the
transfer was being made we heard that this new raider was abroad, and that she
had last been seen on February 25 some 420 miles to the northwest of St.
Paul Rocks. On March 30 the Cambronne arrived at Rio, and on the following day came a message from our Embassy there,
giving details of the captured crews. The Seeadler had last been seen on the 22nd; Count von Luckner had therefore contrived to
secure for himself a start of nine days.

It was very doubtful whether it
would be enough. From the crews of the captured ships we learned that the
Germans had always kept charts of Cape Horn, and this gave us a very good clue
to the raider's intentions. We had seven ships on the west coast of South
America at the time: of these the Lancaster and Otranto were at San Nicolas,
Peru, the Orbita was at Mejillones,
and the Avoca in northern British
Columbia. On the 1st of April, therefore, the Lancaster, Orbita and Otranto were ordered to proceed to the
south to intercept the raider.

When these cruisers were set on
his track, Count von Luckner was in mid‑Atlantic on the meridian of
Buenos Aires. He had therefore very nearly as far to go under sail as his
pursuers had under steam, and he was faced with the trial of getting round the
Horn at a very bad time of year. Our cruisers were thus bound to arrive at the
intercepting point in time; but whether they would be able to pick up a single
sailing ship in those wild waters was much less certain.

On the 5th the Admiralty sent
out a further order to the effect that the Orbita and Otranto were to patrol on a line
running north and south from Cape Horn, and were to keep the collier Finisterre in their company. The Lancaster was to proceed south as fast
as she could. Thanks to a fair wind, Count von Luckner very nearly preceded our
cruisers. They had not been able to go south simultaneously; on the 13th,
whilst the Seeadler was about a day's
sail from Staten Island, the Orbita had not yet reached the latitude of the Magellan Straits, the Otranto was half a day's steaming from
Darwin Bay, and the Lancaster was
between Valparaiso and Coquimbo. The next day enabled them to pick up the lead;
the Seeadler made little progress
owing to head winds, whilst the Orbita,
steaming all day at 14 knots, was a few hours short of Cape Horn by noon on the
14th. The Admiralty's orders were that she should stop there on patrol but this
the captain did not do, either because he had never been given the Admiralty
telegram, or because the senior officer of the cruisers had superseded the
Admiralty instructions by others of which we know nothing.

The Orbita did not remain off the Horn, but went straight on; and by
noon on the 15th had passed Staten Island, and was steering north. By then the Seeadler was in a fair way to get past
her; for Count von Luckner, finding the winds contrary and the weather very
bad, headed south on the starboard tack during the 14th, and was 200 miles
south‑south‑east of the Orbita at noon on the 15th. The Otranto,
the nearest ship after him, was one day's steaming to the south of Darwin Bay,
and still north of the 50th parallel. If the Seeadler had chanced to get a slant of wind, as sometimes, though
very rarely, happens to a ship bound westward round the Horn, she might have
given the Orbita the slip and
preceded the Otranto and the Lancaster; but the wind kept in the
northwest for the next two days and forced her southward. On the 16th it
still headed her, but she made fair progress: by noon on the 17th she was on
the meridian of the Horn and about 120 miles to the south of it: the Otranto, which had just arrived, was
then at Orange Bay, whilst the Orbita was patrolling off the eastern entrance to the Magellan Straits.

At this point there occurred an
incident which is very difficult to explain: Count von Luckner states on the
chart attached to his memoirs that he sighted a British cruiser on the 18th;
and in the text (p. 196), the same incident or a similar one is assigned to the
24th. But after making every

April‑June, 1917

ANOTHER ESCAPE

allowance for the errors which
must inevitably occur by transferring Luckner's track from a very small‑scale
map, it is irnpossible to find that the Seeadler's
course was even within eighty miles of that of the Otranto (the nearest ship to her) on the 18th, and it is quite
certain that all our cruisers were several hundred miles away from her on the
25th. If the track of the Seeadler be
compared with those of the Orbita and Otranto, it will be seen that she
slipped past them between noon of the 17th and noon of the 19th by keeping well
to the southward; whilst the Otranto patrolled on a line about thirty miles to the south of the Horn. It is
therefore hard to see how the German and British ships could have come within
sighting distance of one another; and only one possible solution of the problem
can be offered.

Throughout the 18th the wind
headed the Seeadler and blew hard from the west-south‑west: it is, therefore, just conceivable that,
if Count von Luckner stood to the northward on a long board, his masthead‑man
may, at some time, have reported the Otranto to the northward, visible for a moment in some interval of the driving scud and
haze. This would at any rate agree with Luckner's statement that he instantly
put his helm up to port and wore the ship to get away. If it is true that he
got as near to the Otranto as he
thinks he did, his escape was a truly marvellous piece of good fortune; for a
sailing ship even though she is under reduced canvas is more easily picked up
at sea than a steamship, and if he sighted us, it is impossible to say why we
failed to sight him.

By the 19th then the Seeadler was clear of our cruisers; by
the 21st had made enough westing for a northerly course to be set. According to
a vague report, she passed within sight of Valparaiso on the 23rd; but after
that we heard no more of her for many weeks. (The report was undoubtedly wrong: the Seeadler went north along the 80th meridian until she reached the latitude of
Talcahuano, and then steered north‑west.)

On April 28 the Avoca, which was then at Esquimalt, was
ordered to search the Galapagos Islands; she did so between May 14 and 16, but
found nothing, for Count von Luckner, after reaching the 35th parallel, made
north‑westwards for the Central Pacific.

To this point he had had the
fortune that he deserved; but his star had now passed its blazing period, and,
like other temporary stars, was doomed to fade rapidly towards extinction.
By June 8 the Seeadler had reached
the Equator, in about longitude 150 degrees . The position was not upon any recognised
track; but American sailing ships do a good deal of trading in the Central
Pacific, and it was doubtless against these that Count von Luckner hoped to
operate. He was not very successful, for he only captured three American
schooners in rather over five weeks, and after this the ship's doctor told him
that the crew were showing signs of scurvy. The Seeadler was then turned southwards, and on July 28 anchored off
Mopeha, a deserted island, covered with cocoanut trees and abounding in turtle.
The entrance to the lagoon was so narrow and intricate that she had to anchor
outside it, and for three days the crew rested in camp ashore and recovered. On
August 2 disaster overtook them; almost without warning the sea became
violently disturbed, and within a few minutes the Seeadler was in a very heavy sea‑way. Before the motor could
be started she parted her cables and was driven against the reef: a few minutes
later she was a total wreck.

Count von Luckner faced the
disaster with his usual energy: two boats were saved; provisions, fire‑arms,
canvas and spars were got ashore, and habitable quarters set up for the men.
Three weeks after the shipwreck, Luckner, with three officers and two seamen,
was out in the Pacific in an open boat, about 20 feet long, loaded with hand‑grenades,
rifles and munitions, intending to capture the largest schooner he could
master, to return to Mopelia with it and to start afresh. He was not
successful. Having made his way to Atiu, an island in the Cook Group, he
landed; and, after telling the Chief Resident that he and his officers were
Dutch Americans, persuaded him to give them fresh fruit and provisions. He and
his companions then sailed westwards, and cast anchor at Aituaki.

Here the inhabitants were not so
gullible, and the natives loudly clamoured that the visitors should be
arrested. The Resident hesitated, but finally let them go. He was quite
unarmed, and doubted whether he would be able to overpower them, for they had
taken him to their launch and shown him their revolvers and grenades. Luckner
and his men then sailed westwards, and on September 21 anchored off Wakaya, in
the Fiji Group, utterly exhausted. They were discovered by a half‑caste
trader, who informed the authorities, and the police were set on their track.
After a day's stay at their anchorage, during which they seem to have made
friends with the captain of a local schooner, the adventurers were arrested by
a group of native policemen under a white officer. Count von Luckner, as he was
caught out of uniform, decided that he ought not to fight it out.

He was first placed in the
common jail at Suva, and then transferred to New Zealand. Here his confinement
was very easy, and he was lodged on the island of Motuihi with a

Sept. 1917

A DESPERATE VENTURE

number of interned Germans from
Samoa. As might be expected, he soon got an ascendancy over his fellow‑prisoners,
and persuaded a selected group of them to escape under his leadership. By
carefully preparing their plan they succeeded in getting hold of the
commandant's launch, in which they reached Red Mercury Island and there lay in
wait, until after a couple of days two small schooners sailed by. One of these
they boarded and seized, and sailed in it to the Kermadec Islands; but there
they were overtaken and brought back by the cable steamer Iris, sent out in search by the New Zealand Government.
Henceforward Count von Luckner's imprisonment was more rigorous; but he never
lost hope, and, when the day of the Armistice arrived, he was once more
plotting some desperate scheme of escape.

Those of the Seeadler's crew who had been left behind
at Mopelia were equally unfortunate. Lieutenant Kling, their senior officer,
put to sea in the other launch, and managed to overpower a French schooner, in
which he and his men sailed to Easter Island. Here they sank their boat and
were picked up by a Chilean cruiser, which carried them to the continent. After
a certain amount of correspondence, the Chilean Government agreed that they
should be treated as belligerents who had taken refuge in neutral territory,
and interned them accordingly.

The Seeadler's captures in mid‑Pacific were not reported to us,
so that we knew nothing certain of her from the end of March to the beginning
of September. In consequence, we were soon obliged to call off our vessels from
active searching, and make our dispositions preventive only. We were much
assisted in this by America's entry into the war. At the end of June a force of
four American armoured cruisers arrived in Rio de Janeiro, and at once arranged
for a combined patrol of the route between Fernando Noronha and the Plate. The
Brazilian Government followed America's lead, and broke off diplomatic
relations with Germany in April. In July they informed our Government that the
Brazilian navy intended to patrol the coast from Rio Grande do Sul to the
Guianas. All this strengthened our hold of the South American routes
considerably; but these additional forces were not used to extend our patrol to
the north and northwest of the Rocas, although it was in this area that
the Karlsruhe had operated in 1914,
and it was here that Count zu Dohna and Count von Luckner had made most of
their captures. There were, inevitably, gaps in our dispositions, and the Rocas
area was one of them. Early in July the French cruiser Marseillaise visited Rio to confer with the United States Admiral,
and her captain pointed out that the existing dispositions left unprotected a
point on the trade routes which had been persistently attacked.

To our operations on the west
coast America's entry into the war made less difference; for the Washington
Government sent no reinforcements to our squadron in Chilean waters. On
May 8, when it was fairly clear that the raider had either gone home or had
cleared the Horn and entered the Pacific, the captain of the Lancaster wired to suggest that the Otranto and Orbita would be better employed on the trade routes than off the
Horn, as the long dark nights and the foul weather would make interception
almost impossible. The Admiralty replied that the two cruisers were to remain
south of Valparaiso for the time being. If the raider should appear further
north, between Panama and Iquique, ships would be sent through the Panama Canal
to intercept her. Permission was, however, given to station the Avoca off the northern coasts of Chile.

On the strength of this, the Orbita and Otranto withdrew from the Horn, and a regular patrol was set up to
the south of Valparaiso: one ship was kept continuously between the Gulf of
Penas and Ancud; the other worked on this southern section of the patrol when
she could, but left it for periodical visits to Valdivia, Coronel and
Valparaiso. The disposition naturally caused Captain Seagrave of the Lancaster some uneasiness, for it left
the trade route off the ports of Peru practically without protection; and about
a month later he sent home the following telegram: "If the raider appears,
its probable point of attack will be the nitrate trade near Iquique or the
traffic near Santa Elena, Ecuador, and Gulf of Panama, using Galapagos Islands
as base. Consider it important that one ship should be in the vicinity of one
of these places to act if occasion requires. Trade south of Valparaiso is
negligible; but raider coming round Cape Horn might use anchorage in Chonos to
refit and store before going north. I therefore recommend that one ship should
cruise between the Gull of Penas and Coquimbo; another between Valparaiso and
Callao, and another between Callao and Panama, periodically examining the
Galapagos Islands."

To this the Admiralty answered
simply that the previous disposition was to be maintained. No further active
searching was done during the Seeadler's
raid. On September 24, news came in that two German naval officers and four men
had been captured at Wakaya. As we had learned, on the day before, that a boat‑load
of suspicious strangers had visited Aituaki, there could be no great doubt that
the two

June 1916

THE EAST INDIES

reports referred to the same
party. It was clear, therefore, that the Seeadler must be somewhere to the eastward of the Fiji islands; but it was not until
five days later that the prisoners informed our officers that their ship was a
wreck at Mopeha.

After the Samland had reported, on December 7, 1916, that there was a German
raider in mid‑Atlantic, a long interval followed, during which we knew
nothing of what she was doing and nothing to guide us as to her whereabouts. On
January 3, therefore, when our last news was nearly a month old, the Admiralty
warned the Commanders‑in‑Chief of the China and East Indies
stations that the raider might intend to attack trade on the routes in the
Indian Ocean. Vice‑Admiral W. L. Grant, the Commander‑in‑Chief
of the China station, answered that the measures for spreading traffic were in
full force and that the focal points in the Bay of Bengal would be protected;
but he warned Whitehall that he had not sufficient force at his disposal to
defend the route between Colombo and Australia. The measures to which he thus
referred must be described in detail; for they were about to be tested by a
raider who was actually on her way to the Indian Ocean when the Admiralty sent
out their message.

In June 1916, Admiral Wemyss,
the Commander‑in‑Chief of the East Indies station, had held a
conference with Admiral Grant at Colombo. They both realised, from the Moewe's recent raid, how necessary it
was to safeguard the trade routes against surface raiders, and a plan for doing
so was agreed between them. As in the Atlantic, the general purpose of the
scheme was to see that ships kept away from the ordinary routes, and to make
sure that naval protection was provided at points where traffic was bound to
congregate. This was done by plotting a number of new tracks on either side of
the normal route between any two places, and by giving vessels special sailing
orders at their ports of departure. These orders were so made out that all
ships used these artificially created routes; but no two steamers leaving
harbour in succession used the same one. The number of traffic lanes which had
to be drawn on either side of any given track, in order to give shipping the
requisite amount of spread, varied with the volume of trade to be diverted.

The intention of the whole
scheme was to protect the stream of shipping which moves, in both directions,
between Acheh Head and Aden. To do this the traffic was spread over five tracks
in its eastern section, and over eight in its western. Between Acheh Head and
Colombo, the northern track ran through the Ten‑degree Channel; whilst
the southern one, after curving round Acheh Head, ran along the parallel of 3
½ degrees N. to a point about 150 miles south‑south‑east of Pointe de Galle, when it inclined upwards to Colombo. On its western half the spread was greater, as here the mass of shipping was increased by the traffic to and from the ports in the Bay of Bengal and Australia. The northern track, therefore, ran along the fifteenth parallel; the southern-most passed
through the One‑and‑a‑half‑degree Channel, in the
Maldives, to a point about 360 miles to the (true) north‑north‑west
of the Seychelles, after which it inclined towards the Gulf of Aden. In the Bay
of Bengal itself the shipping was diverted and spread in the same way; four
special tracks were laid down between Calcutta and Colombo and three between
Colombo and Rangoon.

This dispersal made it practically certain that a raider would sink very little tonnage by attacking the central part of the routes; but it made naval protection at the points where the tracks converged more necessary than ever; for the focal points were now the junctions of many tracks, instead of the congested ports of a few, and therefore spread over a wider area than they do in peace time. They were, in consequence, more difficult to patrol. Natural causes had divided these focal points very unevenly between the spheres of the two naval commands in the Indian Ocean. To take the China station first; here there fell to the Commander‑in-Chief
the duty of guarding: (i) the zone to the east of Colombo and the north‑east
of Ceylon; (ii) the approaches to Calcutta; (iii) the track to the north and
south of the Andaman Islands, and (iv) the route to the north of Acheh Head; in
addition to which he had to keep some kind of patrol in the Malacca Straits
(420 miles long), where no dispersion was possible, and to be prepared to guard
the Sunda Straits, where a raider could do great mischief in the congested flow
of traffic to and from the Dutch East Indies and the Far East. Later in the
year, a number of special transport routes were added to the other traffic
lanes; but these need not be examined in detail. Those with which we are most
concerned ran from the Leeuwin to Aden, and the Leeuwin to Colombo. Like the
special traffic routes, they were laid down well away from the direct track,
but they necessarily converged at the points just described.

Admiral Grant had covered the
principal focal points in his command by nine patrol areas: three to the south
and east of Ceylon; three on the northern approaches to the Malacca Straits,
one to the south of the Andaman Islands, and one to the north of them, and one
off the south and

Nov.‑Dec. 1916

ANOTHER RAIDER ESCAPES

south‑western approaches
to the Hooghli. He endeavoured to distribute his cruisers over these zones as
evenly as possible; but he never, at any time, had enough ships to occupy them
all simultaneously and effectively. A force of Japanese vessels under Admiral
Oguri generally guarded the Straits of Malacca from Penang, and was named the
Brothers patrol ‑ from the group of islands off Batu Bara, half‑way
down the western side of the straits.

On the East Indian station the principal responsibilities of the Commander‑in‑Chief were in the Gulf of Aden. The tracks along which shipping had been diverted converged to the north and south of Sokotra. The three southernmost combined off Cape Guardafui; the remaining five ran fairly close together along the Gulf of Aden. Thus at each end of these trade routes the shipping had to run down a lane where dispersal was practically impossible. As many cruisers as could possibly be spared were, therefore, kept in the area between Socotra, Cape Guardafui and the Arabian shore; and a vessel was generally detached to the Straits of Bab‑el-Mandeb
for duty on the Perim patrol.

This was the position when the
Admiralty sent out their warning; and their appreciation was quite correct, for
the Indian Ocean was about to be raided, though not by the Moewe.

4

The Wolf

For their third raider the
German Admiralty had chosen the Hansa liner Wachtfels,
3,600 tons. They placed Captain Karl Nerger in command of her and ordered him to
fit her out for her purpose. When ready, he was to "interfere with enemy
shipping in distant seas, more particularly in the Indian Ocean." He
accordingly renamed her the Wolf,
armed her with two 6‑inch and four 4‑inch guns, and fitted her with
a small scouting seaplane, which was stowed amidships; he also carried
mines, 500 in all, which were stowed in one of the holds. By the end of
November he sailed, and slipped past our cruisers by keeping very far to the
north. During the critical days the weather was exceptionally bad, and he
pounded to the westward in a blizzard of wind and snow, of such severity that
it was not until December 10 that he was out in the Atlantic clear of the
British patrols. He then held straight on for the Cape, keeping in mid‑Atlantic
to lessen the chance of any incident which might reveal his presence.

During the fortnight following
the Admiralty's warning telegram, we made ready to meet the raider in the
Indian Ocean with as much care and forethought as though we knew the last detail
of Captain Nerger's intentions. The Commander‑in‑Chief at the
Cape was ordered to postpone his impending visit to East Africa in the Hyacinth, and to keep an efficient ship
at the Cape. The Commander‑in‑Chief, East Indies, withdrew the Minerva from Rabegh, in the Red Sea, and
ordered her to strengthen the patrol of the "congested area off
Sokotra." The French Government were equally vigilant. During the first
week in January they sent out a general warning to the Governors of Madagascar,
Indo China, New Caledonia and Tahiti, and suggested that their forces and ours
should co‑operate in any plan that might be settled when the situation
became clearer.

By the time these last
precautions were taken Captain Nerger was nearing the Cape, after a completely
uneventful voyage through the Atlantic. On January 16, 1917, as he approached
the land, he saw the Cornwall and six
transports steam by him on a northerly course. That evening he laid his first
minefield off Dassen Island, Saldanha Bay. Some hours later, probably on the
next day, he mined the track to the south of Cape Agulhas, and then steamed off
towards Colombo, keeping well clear of the shipping routes.

The minefield was not at once
discovered, and two days later the Admiralty got news that the Moewe had been operating off the Plate
route on the 12th, the date on which Count zu Dohna captured the Minieh. This was duly wired to the
Commanders‑in‑Chief in the Indian Ocean, but rather tended to put
them off the scent. All precautions had been taken on the assumption that the Moewe was about to raid the eastern
trade routes; it now seemed that the danger was far more remote than had been
imagined. By January 25, therefore, Admiral Grant had decided that on the
strength of the latest news he could withdraw the patrols off Colombo and
Penang, and direct the Venus to
return to Singapore. On the very next day two freighters, the Matheran and the Portugal, got into the minefield off Dassen Island: the first sank,
but the second was towed into Simon's Bay. The telegram which announced the
casualties suggestcd that the vessels had been torpedoed; so that this news too
did not help us to grasp the position, but rather the contrary. A Swedish ship
then in Cape Town was detained and thoroughly searched; and after it was
evident that her master and owners were innocent of all complicity, the three
Commanders‑in‑Chief were ordered to stop all transports

Jan. 1917

CRUISER DISPOSITIONS

sailing for South Africa, as a
submarine had been operating off Cape Town on the 26th. Later in the day,
sailings were ordered to be resumed, as the authorities at the Cape had
informed the Admiralty that the ships had probably been lost owing to internal
explosions. It was not until February I that the Commander‑in‑Chief
at the Cape felt able to warn the Senior Naval Officer, East Africa, that a
vessel, probably a raider, had laid mines off Cape Town, and might be expected
to do the same thing off Durban, Delagoa Bay and the east coast ports.

When the position was grasped
the Wolf was somewhere in mid‑ocean,
on her way to Colombo, and our forces available for operating against the
raider and for securing our lines of communication were disposed as follows

This list, numbering fifty‑five
ships in all, seems to represent a very powerful and widespread
combination for the interception of a single raider; but to an eye familiar
with the vast spaces of the sea the immediate suggestion is of the opposite
kind. From the first it was obvious that we could not protect every vital point
with the forces at our disposal; and the Admiralty's first care was to send out
reinforcements. The Newcastle, which
was on her way from Mudros to the East Indies at the time, was allotted to the
Colombo patrol

Feb. 7‑21, 1917

A DIFFICULT POSITION

February 7); and the Japanese
Government agreed to the Cape squadron with their two cruisers the Niitaka and Tsushima (February 13). The French Government were asked to
place the D'Estrees, the Pothuau and the D'Entrecasteaux at our disposal; and, as a temporary measure, the
French Admiral at Djibouti agreed to keep two of them continually off the port,
so that they could be detached to Admiral Wemyss's command at a moment's notice.

For the moment the trade routes
in the Far East were not threatened; but Admiral Grant's anxieties were heavy.
There were German steamers in Tarakan, Balikpapan, Macassar and the Java ports,
and for all he knew the raider's main object might be to penetrate into the
eastern archipelago and arm them all. He therefore ordered the sloop Fantome to watch Sandakan and the
northern end of the Macassar Straits, and told the Venus to visit Macassar. (He
stated, in his letter to the Admiralty, that he also ordered the Huon to Sandakan; actually, the Huon arrived at Singapore on January 3 and
worked on the Brothers patrol until the end of the month.)

This was the best he could do;
but, as he himself admitted, it left Amboina and the ports to the east
uncovered.

The minefield off Cape Agulhas
was discovered on February 10, and seven days later the Worcestershire struck a mine off Colombo and sank. The authorities
were, however, still doubtful as to the cause of the casualties: Admiral Wemyss
appears to have been practically certain that a raiding minelayer was at
work; but the local authorities reported, as they had done at Cape Town, that
the ships might have been lost from internal explosions. On February 21,
Admiral Wemyss heard that Bombay had been mined, and this seems to have decided
him; for, on the following day, he telegraphed that he had established a patrol
at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and the Straits of Bab‑el‑Mandeb,
and that the Government of India had started methodical minesweeping off Karachi,
Madras, Calcutta and Rangoon. The Sapphire,
which was under orders to return to Aden, he now ordered to remain at Colombo
and patrol the western approaches. Having made these dispositions, he wired to
the Admiralty to say he could not believe that a submarine had been operating
off Colombo, though many others were sure of it; and he asked whether the Naval
Staff were of opinion that a raider was operating in the Indian Ocean or not.
The Admiralty did not feel that they could answer definitely, but said that
there might well be a raider in the Indian Ocean and that such precautions as
were possible should be taken.

A few days after this telegram
was sent out all doubts were ended. After mining Colombo and Bombay, Captain
Nerger turned westwards, and took up a position between Aden and Colombo, on
what he probably believed to be the main shipping route, and, but for the
measures in force, he would very likely have done considerable damage. As it
was, he only captured two ships in a week, the Turritella and the Jumna.
He decided that the first of these could be fitted out as an auxiliary
minelayer, and so, having put a prize crew on board, and armed her with a small
gun, he ordered Lieutenant Brandes to take charge of her and mine the
approaches to Aden: her captured crew were Chinese, and had no objection to
working under their new masters. When these arrangements were complete,
Lieutenant Brandes made off towards Aden, whilst Captain Nerger held his
position about half‑way between Colombo and Sokotra. The two vessels seem
to have parted company some time during the evening of February 27.

The Turritella's career as a warship was neither long nor fortunate.
Only five days later the commanding officer of the sloop Odin, which was then lying at Aden, was told by the senior officer
to search the approaches to the port, in order to see whether the town had been
properly darkened. At about twenty minutes to ten the Odin was some six miles to the south of the entrance to Aden, when
she sighted a ship, which was showing no lights, and was steering on a westerly
course at about 11 knots. The sky was clear and the moon was near full, so that
it was easy to watch and follow her. Some time after ten o'clock, Lieutenant‑Commander
Palmer asked the strange ship, by signal, where she was going and for what
purpose; and, as the answer was made in rather peculiar English, and with a
certain amount of hesitation, he became suspicious and ordered her to stop. The
steamer answered this order by a signal which ran, "Why did you not stop
me when I passed Aten? Meadows, master." This second message seemed to
Lieutenant‑Commander Palmer even more peculiar than the first: on the one
hand it was a perfectly natural reply for a British merchant captain to make,
if ‑ as this man had stated ‑ he thought he was being followed by a
German raider; but, on the other hand, why was Aden wrongly spelt? On the
whole, it confirmed his previous suspicions. " I had now been in pursuit
for some considerable time, and, if he were a British merchantman, he must have
known that it was most unlikely that a German raider would go on chasing him
without firing." Lieutenant‑Commander Palmer therefore held on after
her, and signalled his course and speed to all ships on the patrol. During the
morning

Feb.‑March, 1917

THE RAIDER IDENTIFIED

watch the chase, which was in
fact the Turritella, began to ease
down, and a signal was made to her to say that, if she did not stop, the Odin would open fire. It was now half‑past
four in the morning; but soon after the moon set, and for the next hour it was
very dark. Lieutenant‑Commander Palmer therefore kept the chase in the
beam of his searchlight until dawn. Daylight came up very fast, and at a
quarter to six, just as a boat was going to be lowered from the Odin, it was seen that the stranger's
boats were already in the water: a few minutes later two loud explosions were
heard aboard her, and she was seen to be settling down. After this not much
explanation was needed from the recaptured Chinese crew; and within a few hours
a general warning was being sent to all shipping afloat to let them know that
there was a raider in the Indian Ocean. Captain Nerger, lying in wait on the
trade route a few hundreds of miles away, took in the Admiralty's warning, and
after cursing the Chinaman's invariable fidelity to the interests of his de
facto masters, acknowledged, regretfully, that the description of the Wolf and her seaplane was singularly
accurate.

Seeing that we were at last on
his track, he now decided to leave the Indian Ocean for a time, and made
towards Australia, on a course which took him to the westward of the Chagos
archipelago through the most deserted part of the Indian Ocean. He captured the Wordsworth (3,509 tons) on March 11,
and a sailing ship, the Dee, nearly three
weeks later, in a position about 600 miles to the west of the Leeuwin. He was,
by then, anxious about his coal supplies, and made to the south of Tasmania,
hoping to pick up grain ships and colliers; he was disappointed in each case,
for as soon as we knew positively that a raider was at work, all wheat
transports were ordered to go through the Panama Canal. On May 22 the Wolf was anchored at Sunday Island in
the Kermadecs, with her coal supply running low and her engines and boilers in
need of an overhaul.

The stay at the Kermadecs brings
the first part of Captain Nerger's raid to an end; and as he never once came
near the areas where we concentrated our watching forces, our counter
dispositions can be dealt with briefly.

On receiving news of the sinking
of the Turritella, the Admiralty
stopped all troopships in the Indian Ocean, and gave orders that those at sea
on their way to Colombo should be met and escorted; after which Admirals Wemyss
and Charlton were ordered to escort all troop transports and supply ships on
their way to the Persian Gulf or East Africa. Admiral Grant was then warned
that low‑powered cruisers and sloops like the Pysche, or the Fantome,
should not be risked singly against the Wolf,
as she would probably overpower them with her fifteen‑centimetre
armament. On March 9 the Commander‑in‑Chief, East Indies, was told
that the cruisers Doris and Topaze and the old battleship Exmouth would reinforce his flag. By an
arrangement with the Japanese Government the cruiser Akashi and eight destroyers were to be sent to the Mediterranean
station. These ships were due to leave Singapore on March 11; and the Japanese
undertook to spread them over a wide front and make a regular sweep on his way
to Colombo. The cruisers Tsushima and Niitaka, which were to have gone to
the Cape, were ordered to work under Admiral Wemyss when their reliefs arrived
at Singapore.

Admiral Grant's chief difficulty
was to make the Malacca Straits, which he described as a "main artery 640
miles long, admirably suited to minelaying," as safe as he could. To do
this, he had to keep all his destroyers within the Straits, which, naturally,
restricted his operations elsewhere. He was, moreover, ordered by the Admiralty
to keep a permanent watch over the Sunda Straits, and had to detach the City of London for the purpose.

The most important consequence
of the raid was that whilst the Wolf was
at large and unlocated we were compelled to convoy all transport. The first
transport line was from Fremantle to Colombo, and thence to the Red Sea; the
second from Fremantle to the Cape, and the third from Bombay to the Persian
Gulf. This new demand came near to absorbing all our available forces and
compelled us to make heavy calls upon our allies the Japanese.

Early in March Admiral Oguri,
the Japanese commander at Singapore, had under his orders the light cruisers Suma, Tsushima, and Niitaka.
The Akashi and eight 30‑knot
destroyers, the Katsura, Kaede, Ume,
Kusunoki, Sakaki, Matsu, Sugi, and Kashiwa, were within the zone of his command, on their way to the
Mediterranean. Late in March the British Government asked that the Japanese
navy should detach two ships to patrol the Australia and New Zealand area, and
should send the Tsushima and Niitaka to Mauritius; they further asked
that the troop transports between Australia and Colombo should be escorted by
four battleships or cruisers. The Japanese Government at once agreed to these
proposals, and did rather more than was asked of them. The cruisers Chikuma and Hirato were constituted into a fourth squadron, and sent out to
operate and protect allied commerce in the east coast of Australia

March 1917

NEW DISPOSITIONS

and New Zealand area under the
command of Rear‑Admiral Yamagi. The Tsushima and Niitaka were sent to Mauritius to
patrol; and the first detached squadron, reinforced by the Nisshin and Kasuga, took
over the escort duties between Australia and Colombo. After carrying out their
patrol duties at Mauritius during April and the first part of May, the Tsushima and the Niitaka became absorbed by escort duties between Mauritius and the
Cape. This reorganisation left Admiral Oguri, at Singapore, with only one
vessel ‑ the Suma ‑ under
his command; he was, therefore, reinforced by the light cruisers Yahagi, Tone and Idzumo, and the destroyers Kisaragi,
Hibiki, Hatsushimo and Kamikaze.
By the assistance thus given the Japanese Government became the predominant
partner in the Indian Ocean. The call for help and the scale on which it was
given are a significant commentary upon the power of diversion possessed by a
single raider.

By the end of March our
available forces had adjusted themselves to the new situation, and were roughly
disposed as follows:

(i) In
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden: the Hardinge, Perth, Northbrook, Clio and Odin were patrolling in the Gulf of
Aden, and the Straits of Bab‑el‑Mandeb; the Fox was on escort duty between Aden, Colombo and Bombay.

(ii)
In the Colombo and Bombay area: the Pyramus and the Sapphire were employed on the
transport route between Colombo and Aden, the Exmouth and the Juno between Colombo and Bombay; the Doris was working between Fremantle and Mauritius, also on escort duty; whilst the Diana and the Newcastle maintained the patrol to the south of Ceylon. The Euryalus and the Suva were refitting.

(iii)
To the east of Colombo: the Venus,
the Cadmus, the Fantome and the destroyers Huon, Swan, Torrens and Fame were
watching the southern end of the Malacca Straits; the City of London was at the Sunda Straits, and the Pysche was on escort duty between Rangoon
and Calcutta. As has been said, the Admiralty gave an order that only vessels
with sufficient gun‑power to fight the Wolf successfully were to be ernployed on escort. So burdensome and
exacting was the new duty that within a few weeks practically all cruisers
which had the requisite strength were actually absorbed into the convoy system,
and only the Newcastle and the sloops
and destroyers were left patrolling the focal points.

During the month of April our
forces were strengthened by the light cruisers Gloucester and Brisbane, which were detached from the Adriatic and
Australia to the East Indies; and by the seaplane carrier Raven II, which arrived in Colombo on April 1, and searched the
Chagos archipelago and the Maldives during the month, under the escort of the
French cruiser Pothuau. None of these
measures told us anything of the Wolf's
whereabouts or indeed brought in evidence of her bare existence; and we soon
found that it was not possible to keep so many forces on the spot. On May 16
the Newcastle was ordered to the
Adriatic, to replace the Dartmouth,
which had been damaged in an action with the Austrian forces on the previous
day; a week later the Raven II and
the Gloucester were recalled; and on
June 2 the Admiralty ordered that escorts need no longer be provided in the
Indian Ocean, and between Australia, New Zealand and the Cape. For the next
five and a half months, therefore, our ships simply performed the routine
duties of the station, as not a word was heard of the Wolf or of what she was doing.

Captain Nerger was, none the
less, actively at work during this long period of silence and uncertainty.
Sunday Island, where he had anchored the Wolf for an overhaul, is an island upon which the New Zealand Government had once
tried, but without success, to place settlers. The ruins of their farms and the
enclosures to their properties are still there, although almost covered with
scrub and jungle. The orange trees originally planted by the colonists seem to
have flourished without cultivation ‑ for the landing parties found them
bearing fruit.

The island rises steeply from
the sea. It is largely covered with forest or jungle, but where the slope is
too steep for this, the carpet of foliage is broken by huge bluffs of basaltic
rock, which rise sheer above the tops of the trees. Although a boat can land at
several spots on the shore, the surf is always breaking on some part of the
coast; and whenever the slightest wind gets up a ship has at once to get
under way and go round to the lee side of the island to be out of the rollers.
Whilst he stayed here, Captain Nerger did what he could for the prisoners, and
allowed them to go away in the boats to fish, and to land with the hunting
parties. Every day the seaplane called the Wolf
Cub made a flight: on June 2 she reported an approaching steamer: the Wolf got under way and captured her,
though, if her captain had ignored the threat to drop a bomb on his ship, she
would in all likelihood have escaped, for the seaplane would probably have
missed her; and as the German engineers had not completed their engine repairs,
the Wolf could never have caught her.
The captured ship was the Wairuna;
and from her the raider got over a thousand tons of coal and large quantities
of fresh provisions.

June‑Aug. 1917

THE RAIDER HIDES

A fortnight later the schooner Winslow was captured and brought in.
Captain Nerger was on the look‑out for her ‑ his wireless officer
had taken in messages announcing her voyage about a month before.

It was not until June 22 that
the Wolf was able to re‑start
her cruise, so that during four whole months Captain Nerger had sunk only four
vessels: the Wordsworth, the Dee, the Wairuna and the Winslow.
To this total should certainly be added the three large ships which struck
mines off Bombay in June; but even with this allowance made the destruction was
at a rate of less than one ship a fortnight, and the general disturbance to
shipping practically nothing.

The remaining eight months of
the Wolf 's cruise were even less
successful. Three minefields were
laid during the next fortnight: one at the Three Kings Island, another in
the western approaches to Wellington, and a third off Gabo Island, the south‑eastern
point of Australia. They caused only two casualties, which occurred long after
the mines had been laid, and were attributed to internal explosions. (In October it was realised that a minefield
had been laid off Gabo Island, and that the s.s. Cumberland had sunk on it.) From Gabo Island,
Captain Nerger steered to the north‑eastwards; and on August 6 stopped
his ship about midway between the Solomon Islands and the Huon Gulf in New
Guinea, to wait for the steamship Matunga,
which he knew from intercepted wireless signals to be somewhere about. She was
met and captured in due course; a prize crew was put on board her, and the two
vessels steamed in company to an anchorage in Waigioe Island, off the north‑western
end of New Guinea, which they reached eight days later.

For the next twelve days the Wolf lay in a closely landlocked
bay, clearing the Matunga. A dense
tropical forest came down to the water's edge, and from time to time the
natives pushed out from under the overhanging growth in their canoes, and came
on board to barter fruit for knives and calico. Ashore the beach was thick with
crocodiles; and in the evenings, when the noises of the ship had ceased, the
screeching of the parrots almost drowned the human voice. The heat was
intolerable and the prisoners suffered terribly.

Whilst the Wolf lay in the bay, a wild scare was started amongst the crew that
the prisoners were breaking out, and for several minutes a group of armed men
on deck kept up a fusillade at a number of crocodiles which they took to be
escaped captives. Captain Nerger describes the incident as a joke; but in point
of fact it had a deeper significance. The prisoners all state, that although
Captain Nerger was always courteous and considerate to them, his crew were not;
and that he had to face a growing spirit of indiscipline amongst his men, who,
on one occasion, went so far as to make a petition that the cruise should be
brought to an end and the vessel taken into a neutral port.

In the forenoon of August 26 the Wolf got under way and steamed
westward. On the night of September 2 she laid her last minefield in the
eastern approaches to Singapore, almost within sight of one of our patrolling
vessels. Captain Nerger then turned back, crossed the Java Sea, and re‑entered
the Indi