I did not say that the conditions of the dhimma “always” applied to
Christians living under Islamic rule. My point was subtly different,
namely that coexistence after Islamic conquest was “always regulated by
the conditions of the dhimma”. By this I did not mean to imply that
dhimma laws were consistently or uniformly applied to Christians
at all times and in all places: my point was that the dhimma conditions
and worldview profoundly framed and shaped the patterns of coexistence
of Muslims and their conquered subjects.

John Azumah emphasizes that groups like the Islamic State, Al-Qa’ida
and Boko Haram trace their theology to the Hanbali madhab (Sunni school
of law), which, he points out, is followed by only a minority of Muslims
today. He insinuates that other schools – representing the majority of
Muslims – have different rules concerning jihad and the treatment of
conquered non-Muslim subjects.

This is misleading on several counts.
Although it is true that Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya has been
influential among Salafi groups, his student Ibn Kathir, who has been
almost as influential, was Shafa’i. Terrorists today follow all four of
the main madhabs: Al-Shabab are Shafa’i, the Afghan Taliban were Hanafi,
and Gadhafi, a long-term sponsor of terrorism, governed according to
Maliki jurisprudence. In any case the rules for the treatment of
non-Muslims during and after conquest are essentially the same in all
four schools: for example it is permissible to kill male captives of war
in all the schools of Sunni jurisprudence.

It seems ironic that Abdullah Azzam, whose influential tract Join the Caravan incited
many to go for jihad in Afghanistan, reported that of the four schools,
the Hanbalis rank the duty of jihad below the duty to perform daily
prayers: the other three schools rank jihad more highly when it has
become an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn): for them it is equal to praying and fasting.

I would be intrigued to discover whether Azumah can provide even a single
illustration of how the actions of terrorist groups follow Hanbali
jurisprudence in contrast to the teachingsof the other three schools.

[It is worth noting of the four schools, Hanbalis are particularly emphatic in their rejection of rebellion.
This is because the school’s founder, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was the last of
the founders of Sunni schools of jurisprudence, and he had seen more of
the damage to the Muslim community caused by rebellion. Hanbal himself
preferred to suffer arrest and abuse by the ruler of this day to
rebellion. Today the Hanbali state of Saudi Arabia is
particularly harsh in their treatment of jihadi rebels.]
Azumah’s main criticism of what I have written is that I claim that
groups like the Islamic State have the ‘correct’ understanding of Islam
as delivered by Muhammad. This is not my belief. My point rather
is that such groups claim – vigorously and ably – to defend their views
on the basis of the essentials of Islam as delivered by Muhammad. I am
not saying their defence is correct: I merely point out that for many it
is a compelling defence.

In regard to Azumah’s theological silver bullet – that the Islamic
State’s jihad is invalid because only a legitimate leader can declare a
jihad – I would draw attention to the position of the jihadis. It has
long been accepted by jihadi ideologues that when Muslim lands are
occupied, jihad becomes fard ‘ayn, an ‘individual obligation’,
without the need for a leader to declare it. This is also a mainstream
view of Islamic jurists. It is also widely accepted by jihadis that
Muslim lands are occupied by unbelievers today, despite Azumah’s claims
that this does not apply to Iraq or Syria, and that it did not apply
“prior to 9/11”.

The point is not whether John Azumah believes Iraq, Syria or
Afghanistan are occupied. The point is that Muslim radicals believe
this. And not only they, but many leading others have made similar
statements in the past. Bin Ladin considered that Saudi Arabia was
occupied by Americans during the Gulf War, and it was this that led him
to found Al-Qa’ida a few years later. The jihad in Afghanistan under
Soviet occupation was justified on the basis that Afghanistan was
occupied: the argument is laid out very clearly in Abdullah Azam’s Join the Caravan.
The Sunni rebels fighting in Syria believe Assad is an unbeliever and
an occupier of Muslim lands. Four years ago, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, now
‘caliph’ of the Islamic State rejected the validity of parliamentary elections in
Iraq and committed himself to jihad against the American ‘occupier and
his agents': the ‘agents’ being of course the elected government of
Iraq. The Islamic state continues to reject the validity of Iraq’s
government for this same reason: that they consider them stooges of the
occupying Americans. There would be the same attitude to the Saudi
Arabian ruling family.

Let me be perfectly clear: I am not saying that the Islamic State’s
ideology is the only interpretation of Islam, nor that it is the
‘correct’ one. What I am saying is that it isa reasoned interpretation. And that is a problem which needs to be understood.

John Azumah’s argument is presented at a very abstract level. Just to
take one example, he does not offer any evidence that the sale of
captive women in jihad – as the Islamic State is doing – is against the
precedents set by Muhammad, or against the rules of jihad in any of the
schools of Islamic jurisprudence. I submit that he does not because he
cannot. Such practices are not “eccentric” as he puts it, but they have
been widely applied in historical jihad campaigns. Of course Muslims
are not the only ones who have done such things, but the point is that
such formerly mainstream Islamic warfare practices as selling slaves or
beheading captives have been re-emerging for religious reasons: this is
something the Islamic State’s ideologues have been quite clear about.

John Azumah’s solution is to argue that such groups do not have a
true understanding of Islam as it has existed historically, and the
correct response to jihadi terrorism is to inform Muslims of the correct
understanding of their religion. This is patronising.

Finally, John Azumah seems to consider that as a ‘good protestant’ I
must be some kind of fundamentalist, and consequently I interpret Islam
through that prism. I have already rejected and refuted this simplistic
view (see here).

And yes, I do insist that Islam is a problem – not the only problem
in the world, but a problem all the same – and that is something worth
talking about.

Mark Durie is the pastor of an Anglican church, a Shillman-Ginsburg
Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum, and Founder of the Institute
for Spiritual Awareness. His book The Third Choice explains the implications for Christians of living under Islamic rule.

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About Me

Dr Mark Durie is an academic, human rights activist, pastor, Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum, and Adjunct Research Fellow of the Arthur Jeffery Centre of the Melbourne School of Theology. He has published many articles and books on the language and culture of the Acehnese, Christian-Muslim relations and religious freedom. Holding a PhD in Linguistics from Australian National University and a ThD in Quranic Theology from the Australian College of Theology, he has held visiting appointments at the University of Leiden, MIT, UCLA and Stanford, and was elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities in 1992.