An opportunity missed?

The dangers will grow if George Bush accepts Ariel Sharon's reasons for putting off talks

WITH relations between Israel and the Palestinians close to their darkest hour, few believe that the two unaided can reach any sort of dawn. Vigorous outside help has become indispensable. Sadly, it looks as if that too will be denied.

A few weeks ago there seemed a slight chance that the conflict's escalation, and spreading dangers, would persuade outsiders with influence to make the painful move from spectator to partner. Arab governments, led unexpectedly by Saudi Arabia, stated openly that their half-century of war, hot or cold, with Israel would end when it returned to the Palestinians the land conquered in 1967. The European Union, which has helped to finance the Palestinian Authority, was prepared to use such influence as it has. And the American administration, which alone might be able to persuade the Israeli government to do something it does not want to do, seemed to accept that it could no longer linger on the periphery.

But George Bush's reception of his two latest guests—Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, and Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon—suggests that the administration is not, after all, prepared to take on the unrewarding Middle East (see article). Mr Bush is soon to make a statement on America's position. On present evidence little of substance can be expected. Mr Mubarak, who requested America's support for a timetable of steps towards Palestinian statehood, got short shrift. Mr Sharon, who argued that no political negotiation could be begun until the Palestinians stopped all violence and reformed their institutions, was smiled upon.

The abandonment of the armed struggle needs a glimpse of light at the end of the political tunnel—and the Israeli government allows no glimpse

Mr Sharon's conditions mean, in effect, no negotiation. Violence has served the Palestinians ill. Terrorism by the few (albeit supported by the many) has brought the whole nation into disrepute; the resurrection of the intifada has caused deep suffering. But the abandonment of the armed struggle needs a glimpse of light at the end of the political tunnel—and the current Israeli government allows no glimpse. Mr Arafat's attempts to restructure his administration have been dismissed with disdain; Israel's view of “reform” now means getting rid of the ailing and failing autocrat himself.

The personal demonisation of Mr Arafat has taken over Israel. As the Israeli army batters and besieges his Ramallah office, his survival is at Israel's call. But by now his presence may be useful to Mr Sharon, protecting him against unwelcome political urging from America. Mr Arafat might be cunning if he were to call Mr Sharon's bluff by handing over his executive powers to someone who would be better able to explore whether Israel's prime minister really has an alternative policy to military might. Since the Palestinians' leader is unlikely to do this—and throwing him out at the point of an Israeli gun could result in chaos—America should not accept the Israeli article of faith that everything bar force has to be put on hold so long as Mr Arafat is around. Though he is far from the best leader the Palestinians could have, he is the one they have.

Central to the war on terror

Of course, no American president, especially after Bill Clinton's experiences, seeks willingly to get snarled up in the Middle East. From a domestic point of view it is almost certainly a loser; Mr Bush's foreign priority remains the war on terror. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, far from being containable, encroaches octopus-like on the larger war. The Arab world's anti-Americanism draws vitality from the assumption that the United States, its interest in the Middle East limited to oil and Iraq, supports Israel in its occupation of Palestinian land. This is not America's position. But the poison will spread unless America's leaders accept the centrality of Israel and Palestine to their country's strategic interests, and show their determination to help the two peoples towards that elusive peace.