Alternative Paradigmatic Hypotheses Cannot Be Fairly Evaluated From
Within One's Own Paradigmatic Assumptions

Abstract

In order to avoid endless and futile debate, critics of an alternative
paradigmatic hypothesis cannot simply state their own paradigmatic
assumptions as if they were plain fact, while dismissing those of the
opposition as self-evidently absurd, because it is exactly those initial
assumptions which are brought into question by the paradigmatic proposal.
Perceived incredibility is no valid grounds for rejection of a paradigm
whose alternatives are at least equally incredible, and arguably more so.

The energetic and sometimes acrimonious responses of the open peer
commentaries indicate that the target article has touched a raw nerve,
perhaps a harbinger of an interesting direction of investigation. The
epistemological issue at the core of the debate is a paradigmatic
question that challenges some of the foundational assumptions of
psychology and neuroscience which have remained for so long
unchallenged that they are generally held to be established fact. As
is often the case in paradigm debates, the opposing camps often cite
the self same evidence to support their opposite conclusions, because
they are arguing from different foundational assumptions. In order to
avoid endless futile debate therefore it is essential for commentators
to recognize the paradigmatic issue at the core of the debate, and not
just state their own paradigmatic assumptions as if they were
established fact, while dismissing those of the opposition as
self-evidently absurd, because it is exactly those initial assumptions
which are brought into question by the target article. If alternative
paradigms are to be fairly evaluated, it is necessary to temporarily
and provisionally suspend one's own paradigmatic assumptions, (a feat
that many find impossible to do) and accept the assumptions of the
alternative paradigm as if they could actually be true. Only then can
the competing paradigms be fairly compared, not on the basis of the
perceived incredibility of their initial assumptions, but on the
overall coherence and self-consistency of the world view that they
implicate in total.

Unfortunately many of the commentators failed to grasp the
paradigmatic nature of the proposal and uselessly restated their own
paradigmatic assumptions as if they were plain fact (Booth, Dresp,
Duch, Fox, Laming, McLoughlin, and Ross). Of these, the most
entertaining in terms of caustic hyperbole
were the commentaries of Booth and Dresp, although Fox and Laming were
a close second. Other commentators (Grossberg, McLoughlin, Laming)
commit ignoratio elenchi (ignorance of the refutation),
presenting arguments which had already been refuted in the target
article. There were also commentators who raised new and interesting
objections (Gunderson, Hochberg, Hoffman, Lloyd, Luccio, Markovic,
Randrup, Revonsuo, Rosenthal & Visetti, Ross, Wright), while others
provided supporting arguments or extensions to the target thesis
(Mackay, Schirillo, Tse). All in all, there were 11 commentaries
opposed to the representationalist thesis (Booth, Dresp, Duch, Fox,
Grossberg, Hochberg, Laming, Lloyd, Markovic, McLoughlin, Velmans), 6
in support of it (MacKay, Revonsuo, Rosenthal & Visetti, Schirillo,
Tse, Wright), and 5 who were neither explicitly opposed nor supportive
(Gunderson, Hoffman, Luccio, Randrup, Ross).

In my opinion the four most interesting commentaries were those by
Velmans, Revonsuo, Gunderson, and McLoughlin, the first three for
their focus on interesting paradigmatic issues, and the last for his
eloquent representation of the consensus view in neuroscience.