Several
variants of Lewis's Best System account of lawhood have been proposed that avoid
its commitment to perfectly natural properties.There has been little discussion of the relative merits of these
proposals, and little discussion of how one might extend this strategy to provide natural property-free variants of Lewis's other accounts,
such as his accounts of duplication, intrinsicality, causation,
counterfactuals, and reference.We undertake these projects in this paper.We begin by providing a framework for
classifying and assessing the variants of the Best System account.We then evaluate these proposals, and
identify the most promising candidates.We go on to develop a proposal for systematically modifying Lewis's other accounts so
that they, too, avoid commitment to perfectly natural properties.We conclude by briefly considering a
different route one might take to developing natural property-free versions of
Lewis's
other accounts, drawing on recent work by Williams.

In Science Without Numbers (1980), Hartry
Field defends a theory of quantity that, he claims, is able to provide both i) an intrinsic explanation of the
structure of space, spacetime, and other quantitative properties, and ii) an intrinsic explanation of why
certain numerical representations of quantities (distances, lengths, mass,
temperature, etc.) are appropriate or acceptable while others are not.But several philosophers have argued
otherwise.In this paper I focus on
arguments from Ellis and Milne to the effect that one cannot provide an account
of quantity in ''purely
intrinsic'' terms.I show, first, that these arguments are
confused.Second, I show that Field's treatment of quantity can provide an intrinsic
explanation of the structure of quantitative properties; what it cannot do is provide
an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations are more appropriate
than others.Third, I show that one
could provide an intrinsic explanation of this sort if one modified Field's account in certain ways.

Two grams mass, three
coulombs charge, five inches long –
these are examples of quantitative properties. Quantitative properties have
certain structural features that other sorts of properties lack.What are the metaphysical underpinnings
of quantitative structure?This
paper considers several accounts of quantity, and assesses the merits of each.

Since the publication of David Lewis's ''New Work for a
Theory of Universals,'' the distinction between properties that are fundamental
– or perfectly natural –
and those that are not has become a staple of mainstream metaphysics.Plausible candidates for perfect
naturalness include the quantitative properties posited by fundamental physics.This paper argues for two claims: (1)
the most satisfying account of quantitative properties employs higher-order
relations, and (2) these relations must be perfectly natural, for otherwise the
perfectly natural properties cannot play the roles in metaphysical theorizing
as envisaged by Lewis.

The
standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties:
identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have
attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper
argues that, in this context, none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore,
this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis's cansucceed, for an adequate account of
intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among
properties.

In 'Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?' Mark
Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist or perdurantist explanation of coincidence
to the three-dimensionalist or endurantist
explanation.I argue that Moyer's
formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the
perdurantist's advantage.A more
satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that
Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this puzzle is
clearly preferable.

The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the
canonical arguments against endurantism.I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have
limited force.I then present a new
version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the
underlying objection to endurantism.However, the premises of this
argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this
version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors.I conclude that no version of the
Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one
theory of persistence over another.

Resemblances
obtain not only between objects but between properties.Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular,
resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of David Armstrong's well-known
theory of universals.In this paper
I examine Armstrong's efforts to
account for such resemblances, and explore several ways one might extend the
theory in order to account for quantity.I argue that none succeed.

Some of the papers posted here include typographical corrections or
clarifications made after publication, and so may diverge slightly from their
official versions.