Abstract

If the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness
(“p-consciousness”) and the brain cannot be closed by
current naturalistic theories of mind, one might instead try to
dissolve the explanatory gap problem. We hold that such a
dissolution can start from the notion of consciousness as a social
construction. In his target article, however, Block (1995) argues that
the thesis that consciousness is a social construction is trivially
false if it is construed to be about phenomenal consciousness. He
ridicules the idea that the occurrence of p-consciousness requires
that the subject of p-consciousness already have the concept of
p-consciousness. This idea is not as ridiculous as Block supposes. To
see this, one must accept that in a unique sense, p-consciousness
is what we as the subjects of consciousness take
it
to be. Furthermore, the notion of consciousness as a social
construction does not depend on the view that the concept of
consciousness somehow precedes the occurrence of consciousness
as such. In sum, consciousness can plausibly be seen as a social
construction, and this view can promote a dissolution of the
explanatory gap problem.