Sunday, 10 July 2016

BLAIR

Here is Dr David Kelly's article, written days before the
Iraq war, in which he assessed the threat from Saddam:

In the past week, Iraq has begun destroying its stock of
al-Samoud II missiles, missiles that have a range greater than the UN-mandated
limit of 150 kilometres. This is presented to the international community as
evidence of President Saddam Hussein's compliance with United Nations weapons
inspectors.

But Iraq always gave up materials once it was in its
interest to do so. Iraq has spent the past 30 years building up an arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the current threat presented by
Iraq militarily is modest, both in terms of conventional and unconventional
weapons, it has never given up its intent to develop and stockpile such weapons
for both military and terrorist use.

Today Iraq shows superficial co-operation with the
inspectorates. Weapons such as 122mm rockets specific for chemical and
biological use have been discovered and the destruction of proscribed missiles
and associated engines, components and gyroscopes has begun.

Iraq has established two commissions to search for
documents and weapons under the direction of Rashid Amer, a former head of
Iraq's concealment activities, and a commission has started to recover weapons
from Iraq's unilateral destruction sites. [These sites, dating back to 1991,
were destroyed by Iraq, illegally, without UN supervision and as part of Iraq's
concealment of programmes]. Amer al-Saadi - formerly responsible for conserving
Iraq's WMD, now its principal spokesman on its weapons - continues to mislead
the international community.

It is difficult to imagine co-operation being properly
established unless credible Iraqi officials are put into place by a changed
Saddam.

Yet some argue that inspections are working and that more
time is required; that increasing the numbers of inspectors would enhance their
effectiveness. Others argue that the process is inherently flawed and that
disarmament by regime change is the only realistic way forward.

The UN has been attempting to disarm Iraq ever since 1991
and has failed to do so. It is an abject failure of diplomacy with the split
between France, China and Russia on the one hand, and Britain and the United
States on the other, creating a lack of 'permanent five' unity and resolve.
More recently Germany, a temporary yet powerful member of the Security Council,
has exacerbated the diplomatic split. The threat of credible military force has
forced Saddam Hussein to admit, but not co-operate with, the UN inspectorate.
So-called concessions - U2 overflights, the right to interview - were all
routine between 1991 and 1998. After 12 unsuccessful years of UN supervision of
disarmament, military force regrettably appears to be the only way of finally
and conclusively disarming Iraq.

In the years since 1991, during which Unscom and the
International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) destroyed or rendered harmless all
known weapons and capability under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq
established an effective concealment and deception organisation which protected
many undisclosed assets. In October 2002, Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein
an ultimatum to disclose his arsenal within 30 days. He admitted inspectors
and, with characteristic guile, provided some concessions, but still refuses to
acknowledge the extent of his chemical and biological weapons and associated
military and industrial support organisations - 8,500 litres of anthrax VX,
2,160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare
agent, 6,500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical
and biological warfare agents remained unaccounted for from activities up to
1991. [Even these figures, it should be noted, are based in no small part on
data fabricated by Iraq].

Less easy to determine is the extent of activity undertaken
since 1991. In its 12,000-page 'disclosure' submitted to the inspectors in
December 2002, Iraq failed to declare any proscribed activities. Today the
truly important issues are declaring the extent and scope of the programmes in
1991 and the personalities, 'committees' and organisations involved.

There are indications that the programmes continue.

Iraq continues to develop missile technology, especially
fuel propellents and guidance systems for long-range missiles. Iraq has
recovered chemical reactors destroyed prior to 1998 for allegedly civilian
activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created
transportable production units for biological and chemical agents and the
filling of weapons. Key nuclear research and design teams remain in place, even
though it is assessed that Iraq is unable to manufacture nuclear weapons unless
fissile material is available.

War may now be
inevitable. The proportionality and intensity of the conflict will depend
on whether regime change or disarmament is the true objective. The US, and
whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and
strategy used is appropriate to the modest threat that Iraq now poses.

Since some WMD sites have not been unambiguously
identified, and may not be neutralised until war is over, a substantial hazard
may be encountered. Sites with manufacturing or storage capabilities for
chemical or biological weapons may present a danger and much will depend on the
way that those facilities are militarily cancelled and subsequently treated.

Some of the chemical and biological weapons deployed in
1991 are still available, albeit on a reduced scale. Aerial bombs and rockets
are readily available to be filled with sarin, VX and mustard or botulinum
toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox. More sophisticated weaponry, such as spray
devices associated with drones or missiles with separating warheads, may be
limited in numbers, but would be far more devastating if used.

The threat from Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is,
however, unlikely to substantially affect the operational capabilities of US
and British troops. Nor is it likely to create massive casualties in adjacent
countries. Perhaps the real threat from Iraq today comes from covert use of
such weapons against troops or by terrorists against civilian targets
worldwide. The link with al-Qaeda is disputed, but is, in any case, not the
principal terrorist link of concern. Iraq has long trained and supported
terrorist activities and is quite capable of initiating such activity using its
security services.

The long-term threat, however, remains Iraq's development
to military maturity of weapons of mass destruction - something that only
regime change will avert.