The impetus given to land reform programmes in many developing
countries is indicative of the failure of existing land tenure
arrangements to meet the changing social and economic needs of
these countries. In most African countries, the customary land
tenure systems have been identified, in general, as the main
institutional constraints to economic development. They have
conditioned the pace of change in the agricultural sector. In
agrarian societies, where land is the primary productive asset,
land tenure plays a fundamental role in economic and political
power. Any land reform policy will be influenced by those with
vested interests in the existing tenure systems. Similarly
successful implementation of reforms will depend on the political
will of those in power because they assign priorities and control
the finances. These facts are evident in Lesotho, where
chieftainship, with its hierarchical structure, has maintained a
leading role in the power structure.

Like other developing countries, Lesotho has recently embarked
on a land reform programme, by enacting the Land Act 1979 and
bringing it into operation in June 1980. An appreciation of the
policies of the new law requires due consideration of the
traditional land tenure system and its constraints on
development. Lesotho's customary land tenure system is
particularly instructive for two reasons:

the system has operated in both urban and rural areas
with virtually no foreign tenure system to influence
tradition; and

Lesotho's unitary tenure system has to date been
controlled by the chieftainship, which forms a strong
hierarchical structure and, as such, has been in a strong
position to resist meaningful changes in land tenure.

This paper, therefore, briefly examines the customary land
tenure system in Lesotho, in particular, the limitations it
imposes on development and those factors which have tended to
limit land reforms. The broad principles of the new law are then
outlined before an analysis is made of the implications for the
agricultural sector.

The Traditional Land Tenure System

The fundamental principle of Lesotho's traditional land tenure
system is that all land is vested in the Basotho nation, and is
held in trust by the king as head of state. This principle is
indeed a sound one, since it is a forceful recognition that land
is the most important natural resource and should be utilized for
the welfare of the nation, present and future. As in all
customary systems, there is no individual ownership of land. An
individual can be allocated arable land to meet his family's
subsistence, but he has exclusive rights only to crops and the
land reverts to communal use after harvesting. There are no
individual rights to grazing as all members of the community are
entitled to communal grazing.

Before the land reform programme, the king's powers of land
allocation were delegated to the chiefs, who, in Lesotho, have a
strong hierarchical structure. The chiefs had absolute power in
land allocation and land administration. The laws of Lerotholi,
which spelt out the traditions and customs of the Basotho,
specified that a chief had the power to revoke an allocation
where, in his opinion, an allottee had more land than was
required for his family's subsistence (Lesotho 1959). Because of
the hierarchical structure of chieftainship, there were more than
1,086 chiefs possessing these powers.

Traditional systems of land tenure are considered to have
advantages when judged on social criteria. They are thought to be
egalitarian in land distribution and offer protection against
socially disruptive tendencies such as land speculation and
excessive aggregation of property rights. In 20th-century Lesotho
the system has been seen as a form of security to satisfy basic
needs on retirement or in case of the loss of off-farm employment
for migrant workers (Starnes and Taylor 19801. However, in
practice, these social advantages were hardly evident, and under
population pressure, the system was less egalitarian than it was
thought. A clandestine land market had developed and land
hoarding and land speculation were on the increase.

The social advantages (if any) provided by these systems are
maintained at an even higher cost of limiting economic
opportunity. In Lesotho, land was viewed as a "free
good." Because this fundamental factor of production was
received free of charge, there was no cost factor to encourage
greater productivity. Under heavy population pressure (in
southern Africa, Lesotho is the most densely populated area),
uneconomic subdivision or fragmentation occurred to further
lessen the development potential of the land. This development
stifled personal initiative and industry. The system provided
inadequate machinery for the extension of agricultural credit in
that the use right was not negotiable as a "borrowing"
security.

Attempts to establish agricultural credit unions to help
farmers with finance had failed because the individual was unable
to use his land as collateral. Similarly, the opening of an
agricultural bank had little impact on the agricultural sector.
With no security of tenure there were few "safe"
borrowers because most loans depended on the individual's
creditability rather than on the potential of his land.

The abovementioned constraints led to further deterioration of
the land resource base. Soil erosion has worsened despite great
efforts to combat it since 1935. Communal grazing led to serious
overstocking with poor quality livestock. Improving the quality
of the livestock became impossible under the traditional system
and, as Hardin has rightly pointed out, this is the beginning of
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin and Baden 1977). Another
significant feature of the communal system in Lesotho is that
good agricultural land has been unnecessarily lost to other land
uses. The traditional rulers allocated land without consideration
of planning principles; hence, there is urban sprawl and ribbon
development along main roads.

Attempts to Modify the Land Tenure System

As far back as 1874, there was already concern over
indiscriminate allocation of land by the chiefs.

A district commissioner then said," If you Chiefs do not
observe arrangements in preventing the formation of new villages,
in setting the arable lands apart leaving room for pasturage, the
country will not support either people or stock" (Sheddick
1954). Despite this recognition, it has been difficult to change
the traditional system because of Lesotho's powerful hierarchical
structure of chieftainship. This has been the main political
force inhibiting meaningful reform. For instance, in the 1966
constitution and Chieftainship Act 1968, it is made clear that
even the Government has no control over chiefs in land allocation
(Lesotho 1966). The laws of Lerotholi remained for a long time
the codified traditional law guiding chiefs in land allocations.

After independence in 1966, the Government passed two land
laws-the Land (Procedure) Act 1967 and the Deeds Registry Act
1967. These were not land reform laws and did not make any change
in the allocation and administration of land.

In 1973, two other laws were enacted-the Land Act 1973 and the
Administration of Lands Act 1973. The former covered the whole
country and was in operation until 1980, when it was repealed by
the Land Act 1979. The Administration of Lands Act was never
implemented because of very strong opposition, particularly from
the chiefs. In 1978, instructions were issued to consolidate and
amend the 1973 acts. This led to the enactment of the Land Act
1979.

General Concepts of the Land Act 1979

The basic principle that land belongs to the Basotho nation is
still the basis of the land law. But major changes and new
concepts are introduced in the legislation. The Government
intends to achieve through this legislation the following:

The king's powers over land allocations are now delegated
to land committees in the rural areas and to urban land
committees in urban areas, and not to the traditional
chiefs (Lesotho 1979). The chiefs are, however,
ax-officio chairmen of these committees. Since some
members of the rural land committees are elected by the
people, the Government hopes to achieve a more democratic
system in decisions on land allocations. The Government
has guaranteed control over these committees through
directions which the minister responsible for the act can
issue to these committees and the requirement for the
minister's consent for allocations of land in respect of
commercial or industrial purposes.

The act provides for security of tenure and negotiability
of title to land under a lease system for urban land use.
A progressive farmer can also apply for lease title for
agricultural land use if he so desires. Lease titles are
for fixed periods, ranging from 30 years for the sale of
petroleum products, 60 years for commercial and
industrial land uses, and 90 years for residential,
education, and religious land uses. The length of the
lease should encourage permanent improvements in land, as
the lease gives exclusive possession of the land leased
and allows for mobility in land transactions. For urban
dwellers, it guarantees ease of finance through
mortgaging. In agricultural land, it means land can be
enclosed by fences and mortgage credit can be easily
obtained.

Through procedures to be followed when land is required
for public purposes, an equitable system of calculating
compensation for loss of title has been introduced, and
the Government hopes to encourage investments in land
without fear of inadequate compensation for a bona fide
investor. The establishment of a land tribunal is a
futher guarantee that landholders will get a fair deal
when the Government uses its powers of eminent domain
over land which is the subject of lease title.

Under the provisions of the Land Act, the Government can
declare any area of land as a selected area for
development or reconstruction of new residential,
commercial, or industrial areas for the purposes of town
planning. The idea is to extinguish all titles in the
selected development areas to facilitate the carrying out
of construction or reconstruction projects; the former
title holders are entitled to substitute rights within
the project or to adequate compensation. These provisions
are meant to tackle Lesotho's special land problems,
where urban sprawl occurred following valid allocations
granted by chiefs under previous laws. Titles to land in
these selected development areas are granted by the
minister and not by the land committees.

Similarly, for reorganization of agricultural land
holdings the Government can declare an area of
agricultural land as a selected agricultural area. This
would allow for replanning of land holdings, including
consolidation schemes where appropriate, before the
minister grants agricultural leases giving foremost
consideration to applications by previous allottees
within the area. Under the communal system, fragmentation
of agricultural land holdings has occurred. The
provisions of selected agricultural areas can be utilized
to create viable agricultural holdings. The intention is
to encourage farmers to form co-operatives so that
investments in agriculture can be profitable.

The act provides for land revenue in the form of assessed
ground rents, licence fees, and development charges. This
will introduce a cost factor for greater productivity in
land and, above all, create a land market which does not
exist under the traditional system of land tenure.

Finally, land administration under the act is to be
carried out by the Department of Lands, Surveys and
Physical Planning as opposed to the traditional
authorities. The Government hopes to achieve sound land
administration since the department has professionals in
disciplines relevant to land development, land survey,
and land planning.

Implications for Agricultural Development

The provisions of the land act as outlined above can have
far-reaching implications for all sectors of the economy within
the country. In particular, they affect the agricultural sector
in four ways:

the land allocations in the rural areas are now
inheritable;

an allottee of agricultural land can apply for a lease
title;

the provisions of selected agricultural areas can
revolutionize the rural sector; and

through land-use control and sound land administration
under the act, self-sustaining future development can be
achieved.

Unlike previous laws, the Land Act 1979 defines an allocation
as a use right in rural areas which is now inheritable. Under
customary law, the heirs of an allottee had no clear rights over
arable land al located to the head of the family. Obviously, this
discouraged permanent or long-term improvements to the land. By
providing for inheritance, a breakthrough has been made to
encourage farmers to effect better improvements and hence achieve
greater productivity.

Under the new law, a lease title is the most important use
right and gives the lessee exclusive possession of the land
leased. Furthermore, leased land can be transferred, sub-leased
for long periods, or encumbered by a mortgage. Thus, an allottee
of agricultural land use who applies for an agricultural lease
can reap these benefits. The implications are that the less
competent farmers could be permitted to transfer their leases,
sublease all or part of their holdings, or even enter into
approved share-cropping arrangements with competent farmers.
Although the conditions and terms of agricultural leases have not
been finalized, the act is clear that an agricultural lease can
only be issued after consultation with and approval by the
Ministry of Agriculture. Obviously, one of the conditions would
be the requirement for the land to be farmed properly.

The most significant provisions of the act which should affect
the agricultural sector are those for formal declaration of
selected agricultural areas. This allows for restructuring of
land holdings, consolidation of fragmented parcels, and the
provision of infrastructure before the granting of lease titles.
The provisions can be well adapted for the good management of
village agricultural resources and pastures. This would reinforce
the policy of cooperatives based on village committees. Such
committees would be enabled to institute management systems for
the grazing areas under which numbers of livestock could be
controlled. The selected agricultural areas also have the
advantage of systematically bringing old titles into the new
lease system. Hence, supporting systems, such as survey and land
registration, can be efficiently utilized.

By introducing stricter controls on land use, good
agricultural land that was the subject of indiscriminate
allocations for other land uses by the chiefs can be saved. There
are provisions in the act which prohibit land committees from
allocating agricultural land for uses other than agriculture. The
Land Regulations of 1980 promulgated under the act require land
committees to revoke an allocation where the allottee refuses to
adopt soil conservation measures and when so advised by the
Ministry of Agriculture. Sound land administration, on the other
hand, will eliminate the uncertainties over land titles prevalent
in customary land tenure systems. This will reduce litigation on
land matters and give farmers confidence in their titles. With
this confidence, better utilization of the land can be expected.

Conclusion

Lesotho has formulated an ambitious but necessary land reform
policy through the Land Act 1979. These policies are meant to
remove serious constraints imposed by the traditional land tenure
system on agricultural devlopment and rural reconstruction. The
implementation of the reform measures is, therefore,
fundamentally important. The magnitude of the task will test the
capacity of the Government at every turn.

It is a long way from legislation to actual alteration of an
agrarian structure. There will be the well-known experiences of
delays, legal setbacks, irregularities, practical and technical
difficulties, and normal vacillations in political will.
Inevitably, any land reform programme becomes a political issue,
and this is already evident in the early implementation of the
Land Act 1979. No doubt the provisions of the act will shift the
power structure because it limits the control of the traditional
leaders. Thus, support for the implementation of the law, through
funding and publicity campaigns, is already lukewarm and is being
frustrated by those with vested interests in the communal system.
Implementation, therefore, will require a strong political will,
commitment of funds, and, above all, trained manpower in
disciplines relevant to land administration, land use, land
survey, and land management.

"Land tenure" is a complex social relationship which
exists among people as to their rights to the occupancy and use
of land, that is, a relationship between owners and users of the
land. Over the centuries, and in all societies and nations,
complex and differing land tenures have been created.

Land reform involves changes in and a restructuring of these
rules and procedures in an attempt to make the land tenure system
consistent with the overall requirement of economic, political,
and social development. A restructuring of these rules and
procedures involves changes in the political, social, and
economic power positions of the groups within a society. The
extent of the reforms and the ability to carry them out depends,
inter alia, on peasants' demands and political pressure on the
ruling class. Hence, the changes do not always proceed along
rational patterns and often cannot be predicted. They range from
political revolutions in Ethiopia and Mexico to piecemeal
measures in India such as the attempt to remove intermediary
tenures and land taxation.

This paper discusses the social implications of land reforms
with a particular emphasis on Tanzania.

Land Tenure in Tanzania

Before colonization, all the land belonged to the various
tribes. It is believed that over 123 tribes, ranging from very
large groups, such as the Wasukuma and Wanyamwezi on the southern
shores of Lake Victoria (now each over one million people), to
small tribes like the Wapogoro or Zanaki, inhabited the Tanzanian
mainland. Within the tribal lands, the chiefs played an important
role. Some powerful chiefs and sub-chiefs had the power to grant
land to clans or minor officials at their own discretion; some
officials who got areas of land were even able to lease their
lands to peasants for a consideration. This was practiced among
the Bahaya tribe in north-west Tanzania under the
"Nyarubanja" system. In other smaller tribes, the
chiefs had a minor role and the land was divided by clans and
families. The head of the clan or family could divide the land as
he deemed just. Generally, in the then Tanganyika, the overriding
principle in almost all tribes was that the land belonged to the
tiller. When the clan or family vacated the land, it could be
alienated to another clan or family.

Towards the end of the 1 9th century, the Germans colonized
and created German East Africa. The regime interfered with land
ownership on about one million acres of fertile, cool regions on
the slopes of Usambara, Kilimanjaro, Meru, and Livingstone
mountains.

There was little attempt at land reform on the remainder,
apart from introducing regulations for the proper planting,
weeding, and harvesting of specified important crops at the risk
of a fine on defaulters. The Germans were conquered and evicted
in 1919, when British colonization began. Within four years, in
1923, the Land Ordinance (Cap. 113) was promulgated. This is the
most important legislation controlling land acquisition and use.
Since 1923, several amendments have been enacted. Under the Land
Ordinance, all land in mainland Tanzania, whether occupied or
unoccupied, is public and is vested in the governor (now the
president), who has the power to issue rights of occupancy and
revoke the said rights for "good cause." A rights of
occupancy is, therefore, a right to occupy public land. It can be
acquired under an express grant under Section 6 of the ordinance,
or is deemed to have been granted under Section 8 (the latter is
applicable on customary land holdings which were not surveyed or
registered). The land registration and law of conveyance were
immediately enacted to control dispositions (transfer and
mortgages) of the granted land. It has been estimated that these
imported English laws catered for only 5 per cent of the
Tanganyika lands; the rest were still subject to customary laws.
Until 1963, there were four categories of land tenure:

freehold;

leasehold (granted mostly by the Germans);

granted rights of occupancy; and

deemed rights of occupancy.

Granted and deemed rights of occupancy cover about 95 per cent
of the land holdings held by the peasants and are mostly subject
to customary land laws of sale, pledge, inheritance, wills, and
leasing. In 1963, all freehold tenures were abolished and were
converted into 99-year leases (Tanganyika 1963).

The Government undertook this conversion because of its
particular objection to the fact that the freehold titleholder
could opt not to develop or could develop or misdevelop the land
with little Government control. Some development conditions
(building, farming, and land rent) were attached to the
ex-freeholds. But, by 1969, the Government felt that the controls
were inadequate. The Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights
of Occupancy) Act No. 44 of 1969 was passed in which all the
existing leasehold rights were extinguished and converted into
rights of occupancy for a term "equal to the unexpired term
of the government lease for which the land was held immediately
before 1st April, 1970" (Tanzania 1969).

Beginning in 1970, therefore, land in Tanzania can be held
only under rights of occupancy-expressly granted under the Land
Ordinance-or deemed rights of occupancy under customary rights.

Rural Development and Land Reform

In 1976, the famous Arusha Declaration and TANU (Tanganyika
African Nation Union) Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance was
adopted. The declaration states that the prerequisites of
development are:

people;

land;

good policies; and

good leadership.

On land the declaration states:

Land is the basis of human life and all Tanzanians should use
it as a valuable investment for future development. Because the
land belongs to the nation, the Government has to see to it that
it is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the
benefit of one individual or just a few people.... It is the
responsibility of the Government and the cooperative societies to
see to it that our people get the necessary tools, training and
leadership in modern methods of agriculture (TANU 1967).

From the above-quoted policy and statement of intention the
Government (central and local authorities) passed laws and took
administrative measures to ensure that the land is used for the
benefit of the nation as a whole and to abolish or reduce
exploitation of man by man through land dealings. On rural
development the Arusha Declaration has the following objectives:

to improve the quality and quantity of peasant life and
rural condition;

to emphasize the importance of proper exploitation of
land resources for national development;

to advocate "ujamaa" and the co-operative mode
of production, and emphasize the role of the Party and
Government in guiding, supporting and expanding the
formation of ujamaa; and

to encourage popular (mass) democratic participation in
economic, social, and political decision-making (TANU
1967).

The Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969 states inter alia:

Our ultimate objective must be to make the description
"Tanzania is a nation of cooperative farmers" a
more true statement.... This demands a fundamental change in
the rural economic and social organisation of Tanzania. It is
not something which can be done overnight and it cannot be
done by force. It will duly be achieved by a deliberate
effort to encourage the growth of cooperative production,
cooperative marketing and distribution, and communal rather
than private expenditure patterns.

The Government emphasized the creation of more State farms,
but most of its attention was directed towards the creation of
ujamaa villages, which were to be given priority in credit,
servicing, and extension services, at the expense of the
individual producer if necessary. In this effort "no
department of the Party and no Ministry of Government is exempt
from the requirement to participate and to contribute to the
success of this policy." The development of ujamea villages
was to be implemented in two phases:

the education and training of party and Government
leaders in the ideology, purpose, and methods of
establishing ujamaa villages; and

taking the ideas to the people; to educate and help them
to see the relevance of this policy to their own desires
and their own needs. "It may even be necessary
sometimes to explain the advantages of cooperative living
or cooperative working."

A policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development,"
was adopted in 1967 in which it was envisaged that the efforts
and steps to be taken have to take into account the social and
economic conditions prevailing in each region.

Following the above declarations of intent, the Government
took revolutionary steps in implementing land reforms, the
success of which has varied, for reasons to be explained later.

In 1972, the Decentralisation of Government Administration
(Interim Provisions) Act No. 27 of 1972 was passed by Parliament.
The aim of this act is to decentralize government functions so
that much of the decision-making and implementation of projects
is being done in the respective regions and districts, the
leaders of which are more conversant with the social and economic
realities of their people.

There was ad hoc legislation dealing with registered farms. On
registered lands Parliament passed the Coffee Estate (Acquisition
and Regrant) Act and the Sisal Estates (Acquisition and Regrant)
Act. Under these acts, many coffee and sisal estates were
acquired and regranted to cooperative societies or public
corporations such as the Tanzania Sisal Corporation. These farms
were previously owned by individual foreigners or their foreign
companies. Many of them are now being efficiently run by
co-operative societies which have plenty of government assistance
on credit, transport, and extension services.

The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Regrant) Act 1968
provided for the acquisition of other farms (maize, sugar, rice,
etc.), the land titles of which were held by foreigners but which
were run by local persons or societies who were accordingly
enfranchised and given the de facto and de jure right to occupy
the lands.

A more general legislation known as the Rural Lands (Planning
Utilisation) Act 1973 empowers the president, in the public
interest, to regulate land development in any area of Tanganyika
by making a declaratory order in the Tanzania Gazette to that
effect. After the publication of such order, the minister for
regional administration, after due consultation with the minister
for lands, may make regulations for: building, farming, and
mining operations as well as reservation of land for ujamaa
villages, forests, and parks. He may also provide for extinction,
cancellation, or modification of the rights, titles, and interest
over lands falling under the order. This act deals mostly with
lands held under customary laws. The district councils,
accordingly, have passed rules and bylaws governing minimum areas
for planting specified crops, weeding, and harvesting, and they
impose stringent fines or imprisonment on defaulters.

In this way, the Government and the party ensure that the
rural lands are properly utilized for the economic welfare of the
public at large.

Two other important pieces of legislation dealing with rural
land reforms must be mentioned. The first is the Villages, Ujamaa
Villages (Registry, Design and Administration) Act No. 21 of
1975, in which planning areas lands can be granted to the
villages and ujamea villages to be developed cooperatively and
communally. The land can be registered and loans can be granted
by commercial banks and the Tanzania Rural Development Bank. It
is estimated that over 80 per cent of the rural population in
Tanzania now lives in such villages (see also Mlay 1986).

The second piece of legislation is the Customary Leaseholds
(Enfranchisement) Act No. 47 of 1968. This enactment needs a
brief explanation. In certain areas of Tanzania, customary
letting of land was being practiced by certain tribes,
particularly the Bahaya (the Nyarubanja system) and the Wakerewe
(the Obusi system), both on the southern shores of Lake Victoria.
Other tribes involved in this practice are the Wachagga (on the
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro), the Wanyakusa (in south-west
Tanganyika), and the Wasambea and Pare in Usambara Mountains.
These areas have potentially rich alluvial soils and accommodate
dense populations; hence, there is an acute land shortage. A few
rich landholders occupied large farms which were partitioned and
rented to poorer segments of the rural population for payment in
cash or kind. The Bahaya Nyarubanja was well developed. Detailed
rules on registration of both tenants and landlords or their
successors were established. Other rules concerned transfers,
inheritance, evictions, mode of payment, rights of women, and so
on. As land became more and more scarce, much friction, quarrels,
litigation, and even fights and murders took place. Studies were
carried out with the intention of abolishing these capitalist
land-holding structures. The first attempt was made in 1965, but
the legislation was so weak and had so many in-built exceptions
and loopholes that it caused more friction and litigation.
Furthermore, no proper institution was formed to carry out the
intended enfranchisement. Instead, the act relied on ordinary
courts, with their cumbersome rules of evidence, procedure, count
fees, and adjournments.

Under the Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act 1968, a
Customary Land Tribunal was then formed. The duty of the tribunal
is to ascertain the landlords and tenants in each such customary
case. Once the tenant or tenants are known, the land in dispute
is measured and a judgement is given in which the tenant(s) are
enfranchised. The proceedings of the tribunal are quasi-judicial
and the appeals go to the minister responsible for lands, whose
decision is final and conclusive. Provisions exist for payment of
compensation for crops and buildings with respect to the
enfranchised piece of land. This is a very popular piece of
legislation among the peasants and thousands of cases have been
instituted free of charge before the courts. The landlords
(ax-chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen) have tried to evade the
rigours of this act by non-attendances and other steps. To
counteract this, the tribunal is now empowered to grant ex parse
judgement, once it is shown that the landlord intentionally
disobeyed the summons.

So far, the discussion has centred on the formulation of
policy, intent, and legislation. It is now necessary, before
expounding on the social implications, to explain the main
machinery empowered to carry out the intended land reforms. From
the above, it has been seen that both judicial and administrative
institutions, with a bias towards the latter, have been used.
Administrative registrars of farms have been appointed to deal
with acquired farms. Tribunals have been formed to deal with rent
disputes and customary land enfranchisement, and Government
departments, particularly the Directorate of Land Development
Services, have been given many functions in implementing the
programmes. The political party, TANU (now Chama cha Mapinduzi,
CCM), has played an indispensable role. The Government, now an
organ of the party, has been authorized and allocated funds to
carry out the intended reforms. Much planning and implementation
is being carried out by the regional, district, ward, and village
councils as well as ten-cell leaders as part of the participatory
one-party democratic organization. In this way, as the president
and party encourage, the masses in the rural areas are now able
to understand the policy and participate in project planning and
implementation.

The land reforms have encountered many problems of
implementation, resulting in differences in success. In an
attempt to encourage people to move into villages and grow
specified crops, not enough research on soil, weather, water
availability, and social structures was carried out. Some of the
villages, therefore, failed dismally. Traditionalism demands that
intensive public relations efforts are made before people
voluntarily remove themselves, their animals, and other
belongings to new areas in which co-operative production and
marketing rather than individualisim will be practiced. In such
cases, the Government has to decide what amount of coercion (e.g.
denial of loans to private individual land holders, and access to
extension services by co-operatives and registered villages) has
to be used in addition to the declared policy of educating the
masses so that they understand the benefits and fully participate
in the planning and implementation stages. Sometimes, the
middle-cadre leadership has been guilty of misunderstanding the
reform, of lack of commitment, or of application of improper
methods of implementation such as threats. Furthermore, in a poor
country like Tanzania, shortfalls in staffing, training,
finances, transportation, and proper technology, among others,
are prevalent.

Although the emphasis is on self-reliance, the Government is
still forced to apply for foreign loans, credit, and personnel.
Lastly, dualism in a mixed economy of villagization and
co-operative tenure existing alongside individualism creates the
policy formulation that has to cater for both so that the
economic, social, and political situation prevailing is not
seriously interrupted. These are just a few of the problems
encountered in our land tenure reforms. Sometimes, these problems
and/or mistakes have given rise to misimplementation or
nonimplementation of the intended reform.

Social Impact of Land Reforms

Any assement of the socio-economic and political impact of
land reform will be met by difficulties arising from incomplete
and unreliable data. The assessment of success and failure will
depend on the criteria adopted, such as productivity, employment,
income distribution, tax revenue, and general socio-political
effects. Some of these criteria cannot be measured in monetary
terms. There is much debate in the world today which is still
unreconciled on the merits and demerits of public land versus
"freehold" individual land ownership. Some are of the
view that public land ownership gives little incentive towards
proper utilization of land. The controversy will continue and the
varying beliefs depend on the experience of each society.

In Tanzania, experience has shown that freehold individualism
had many disadvantages in urban as well as rural areas. After the
abolition of freeholds and leaseholds, all land in Tanzania
became public and is subject to express grants (with implied or
attached development conditions). The advantages accruing are
mainly four:

the state controls and directs the nature of national
growth. The right to occupy the land depends on the duty
to utilize the land. Those who default on their
obligations will have their rights revoked and
compensation will be paid only for the unexhausted
improvements attached to the land. No money will be paid
as compensation for the land itself;

the Government is able to carry out experiments (which
are necessary for any attempts at economic development)
without being fettered by unnecessary court cases;

the Government has been able to reduce land speculation
and the unjust enrichment of a few rich and clever
foreigners; and

with the aid of financial regulations, building
regulations, and so on, the Government has been able to
assist indigenous people in acquiring cheap plots for
building their family houses.

These advantages have facilitated faster implementation of the
villagization programme. Needless to say, this criterion of
assessing the land reform cannot be measured in fiscal terms.

One criterion for gauging the social implications of land
reform is productivity. At the initial stages of any land reform
there is a likelihood of a decline in productivity due to
instability and apprehension on the part of the peasants, the
former landlords, and the governing class, who have to provide
the essential supportive services and guidelines.

The major land reforms in Tanzania were initiated after the
1967 Arusha Declaration. The villagization policy was legally
enforceable from 1975. The interim period is too short and the
data too scanty for a genuine assessment of the reform. There has
been much publicity in the Western press to the effect that the
present economic plight in Tanzania is due to unrealistic land
reforms, villagization, and the policy of socialism. The
Government has vehemently denied this. What can be observed in
the short period is that, under villagization and the
co-operative or State farms mode of production, certain villages
have been able to increase the quantity and quality of
agricultural produce. The Chamwino, Kismani, and Liwale villages
have several times been selected as the best villages. Many
villages have been able to produce enough food for their members,
and sold some of the products in order to purchase lorries,
buses, tractors, and ploughs, build clinics and schools, and
share some money (according to the input of each member) while
saving enough for a rainy day. In order to gauge the economic,
social, and political progress of the villages, the Government
has instituted district, regional, and national "best
village" competitions annually. There is a national body to
scrutinize development projects, their planning and
implementation, at different levels and the winners receive
agricultural prizes while some of their lucky leaders are sent on
short courses or study tours abroad. Many ujamea and co-operative
officers are now assisting the lesser developed villages.

A further criterion is to assess the impacts of land reform in
terms of employment. For a country like Tanzania, with a total
area of 940,000 sq km and a population of just over 17 million,
it is inappropriate to talk about unemployment. Apart from
isolated places, the land is plentiful and generally suitable for
crop and animal production. In these circumstances, it is more
realistic to talk about underemployment or misemployment. Some
economists tell us that the increase in employment in the rural
sector is inversely related to farm size, that is, the smaller
the farms the greater the rate of agricultural employment and
vice versa. It is regretted that this aspect of the impact of
recent land reforms has not been subjected to systematic study
and scientific analysis. What has been observed is that, apart
from a few towns such as Dar es Salaam, in which urbanization is
on the increase (bringing with it several economic, housing,
transport, and employment difficulties), there is a marked
decline in rural-urban migration. In the villages, the members
have specialized duties, with some involved in the provision of
social amenities, thus making rural life less deplorable.

I believe one criterion in which the land reforms in Tanzania
can be said to have been successful is in the field of income
redistribution. Before independence and even before the Arusha
Declaration, the disparity in income averaged in the ratio 1:17.
After concerted party and Government efforts at improving the
rural conditions of life, it is estimated that this has been
reduced to 1:11. This has partly been achieved due to the
national policy of progressive direct income taxation of
employees of the Government, parastatal corporations, and private
companies. The peasants pay no income tax while heavy indirect
taxation has been imposed on such items as alcohol, cigarettes,
certain textiles, and petrol. The extra revenue is partly spent
on improving rural life. In Tanzania, it needs no high academic
qualifications to discover that there is a great difference in
shelter, housing, transport, social welfare, and the number of
schools and clinics in rural areas. These are more numerous now
than they were 10 years ago.

Lastly, there are general social and political effects such as
the elimination of undesirable social classes and political
awareness of and participation in village, ward, and district
plans by the majority of the population (both urban and rural).
Land reforms can create a sense and pride of
"belonging," which is very crucial for the political
stability of any nation. Many peasant revolts or revolutions
throughout the centuries have occurred because the majority of
the citizens regarded themselves as "subjects, "
"serfs, " "objects, " "outsiders, "
or mere observers of the social, political, and economic
intrigues of their masters. Using this criterion of impact,
Tanzania's land reform has generally been hailed as a success by
friends and foes alike.

References

Mlay, W.F.I. 1986. "Environmental Implications of
Land-Use Patterns in the New Villages in Tanzania." Part 4,
chapter 12, this volume.

Tanganyika. 1963. Proposals of the Tanganyika Government for
Land Tenure Reforms, Government Paper 2. Dar es Salaam.