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That the art of reasoning is necessary.

Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all
other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder; but by what shall it be regulated? Evidently,
either by itself, or by something else. Well, either that
too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason,
which is impossible; and if it be Reason, what again
shall regulate that? For if this Reason can regulate
itself, so can the former; and if we still require any
further agent, the series will be infinite and without
end.

" But," say you, " the essential thing is to prescribe
for qualities of character."

Would you hear about these, therefore? Well,
hear. But then, if you say to me that you cannot tell
whether my arguments are true or false, and if I happen to express myself ambiguously, and you bid me
make it clearer, I will then at once show you that
this is the first essential. Therefore, I suppose, they
first establish the art of reasoning, - just as before the
measuring of corn, we settle the measure; for, unless
we first determine the measure and the weight, how
shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the
present case, unless we have first learned and fixed
[p. 1060]
that which is the criterion of other things, and by
which other things are learned, how shall we be able
accurately to learn anything else? How is it possible?
Well, a bushel-measure is only wood, a thing of no
value, but it measures corn; and logic is of no value
in itself. That we will consider hereafter, but grant it
now; it is enough that it distinguishes and examines,
and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other
things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and
Zeno, and Cleanthes? Does not Antisthenes say it?
And who is it, then, who has written that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words?
Does not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, does
Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of
words, what each signified?

Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus?

Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing?

To understand the will of nature.

Well, then; do you conform to it yourself? In that
case, what need have you for any one else? For if it
be true that men err but unwillingly, and if you have
learnt the truth, you must needs act rightly.

But, indeed, I do not conform to the will of
nature.

Who, then, shall interpret that?

They say, Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this
interpreter of nature says. Soon I cannot understand
[p. 1061]
his meaning; I seek one to interpret that. I call on
him to explain everything as clearly as if it were in
Latin. Yet what right has this last interpreter to
boast? Nor has Chrysippus himself, so long as he
only interprets the will of nature, and does not follow
it; and much less has his interpreter. For we have no
need of Chrysippus on his own account; but that, by
his means, we may apprehend the will of nature; just
as no one values a diviner on his own account, but
that, by his assistance, men hope to understand future
events and heavenly indications; nor the auguries, on
their own account, but on account of what is signified
by them; neither is it the raven, or the crow, that is
admired, but the divine purposes displayed through
their means. Thus I come to the diviner and interpreter of these higher things, and say, "Inspect the
auguries for me: what is signified for me?" Having
taken, and inspected them, he thus interprets them:
You have a free will, O man ! incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the
auguries. I will show you this, first, in the faculty of
assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to
truth? No one. Can any one compel you to admit
a falsehood? No one. You see, then, that you have
here a free will, incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well, is it otherwise with regard
to pursuit and desire? What can displace one pursuit. Another pursuit. What [can displace] desire
and aversion? Another desire and another aversion.
[p. 1062]
"If you offer death as an alternative," say you, you
compel me. No, not the alternative does it, but
your conviction that it is better to do such a thing
than to die. Here, again, you see that it is your own
conviction which compels you, - that is, choice compels choice; for if God had constituted that portion
which he has separated from his own essence, and
given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled,
either by himself, or by any other, he would not have
been God, nor have fitly cared for us.

These things, says the diviner, I find in the auguries. These things are announced to you. If you
please, you are free. If you please, you will have no
one to complain of, no one to accuse. All will be
equally according to your own mind, and to the mind
of God.

For the sake of this oracle, I go to this diviner and
philosopher; admiring not alone him for his interpretation, but also the things which he interprets.

The Works of Epictetus: His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments. Epictetus. Thomas Wentworth Higginson. translator. New York. Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1890.

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