Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva
Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/5–2454: Telegram

The United States
Delegation to the Department of
State

top secret

Geneva, May
24, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulte 103. Repeated information
Paris 320, Saigon 105. Re Geneva Tedul 110, repeated Paris 4225, Saigon 2385.1 I agree fully that it would now be very
useful, later possibly imperative for me to have personal contacts
with Bao Dai. That said, I do
not believe we should make any move in that direction without prior
discussion and approval of Bidault. While the latter raised no objection some
eight days ago when I told him of my intention to pay a courtesy
call on Bao Dai[Page 901]and made no comment when,
through Ambassador Chauvel,
Heath reported on my
meeting2 I am sure that Bidault was uneasy that this meeting would be used
by the opposition to increase the difficulties of himself and the
Laniel government. There
was in fact some unhelpful French press speculation over what
transpired at my meeting with Bao
Dai.

Before making any arrangements for a next meeting, therefore, I would
like to discuss the matter with Bidault in such a manner as not to allow him to
impose a veto on my eventually seeing Bao
Dai but agreeing if he raises objections to the
political effect of such a meeting (which would be sure to be known)
to defer any contact for some days to come. Bao Dai himself evidently feels that
our meeting at this precise time would be unwise in view of probable
French reaction and this is one of the reasons that he appointed
Luyen as channel of
communications. (See telegram Secto 265 repeated Paris 306, Saigon 97.3)

The four-point outline suggested in reference telegram would be a
good agenda for our first meeting.

As regards the program outlined in the first five paragraphs of
reference telegram everyone including Bao
Dai would agree as to the necessity of strengthening
Vietnamese government in face present emergency. Bao Dai might also if we insisted
agree to the creation of a provisional assembly having initially
broad consultative powers and would probably agree that it have
constituent powers as well.

The Buu Loc government has in
fact promised the creation of a consultative assembly. Bao Dai’s own immediate solution has
been strengthening the efficiency and autonomy of the army and the
creation of war cabinet with real authority.4

In telegram 2541 from Saigon, May 26,
McClintock stated
that “with all deference” he wanted to correct this
sentence. He commented that “Bao
Dai has not strengthened efficiency and
autonomy of Vietnamese National Army. On contrary, as
Embassy’s telegrams have pointed out, morale of army is at
new low ebb and its efficiency is gravely impaired by open
rivalry between Minister of Defense Quat and Chief of Staff
Hinh.
Furthermore, Geneva conference has had deleterious effect on
fighting spirit in all ranks. There has been no creation of
a war cabinet with real authority. This cabinet had one
meeting and has since lapsed into oblivion. Its composition
is Buu Loc as Prime
Minister, Quat as
Minister of Defense, and Hinh as Chief of Staff. Since Buu Loc is in France and
neither Quat nor
Hinh will ratify
suggestions of other, war cabinet is an absolute nullity.”
(751G.5/5–2654)

In commenting on McClintock’s telegram Under Secretary
Smith said “there
seems to be some difference of view between drafting officer
Ambassador Heath and
Chargé d’Affaires McClintock, a condition which probably
exists in other missions elsewhere in the world. However, it
would have been more accurate if our Dulte 103 had stated
‘Bao Dai’s own
proposed solution is, et cetera’. Personally, Bao Dai did not impress me
as a man to lead forlorn hopes.” (Telegram Dulte 118; 396.1
GE/5–2654)