Most of the wars waged in the Horn of Africa during the past
30 years have been described in terms of ethnic conflict, both by
the adversaries themselves and by external analysts. The first
and second Sudan civil wars have been characterized as conflicts
between the Arabized northerners and African southerners, with
cleavages along religious, racial, cultural, and linguistic
lines. The various civil wars in Ethiopia have been characterized
as wars between the Amharas and the Tigreans, Oromos, Eritreans,
and so on. The Somali conflicts have been described as conflicts
between the Maraheens and the Isaaqs, or between the Darods and
the Ogadenis, and so on; and the conflict in Djibouti as between
the Afars and the Issas.

Although each of these wars has been termed "ethnic
conflict", one encounters tremendous difficulty when trying
to analyse what is meant by this term and what these conflicts
have been about. In this chapter some of the problems associated
with the concept of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as they apply
to the Horn of Africa will be examined. A discussion will follow
of various mechanisms that have been utilized or advocated in the
region to remedy the problem of ethnic conflict. The chapter will
conclude with remarks on some possible responses that might open
ways for the transformation and hopefully the alleviation of the
problem.

What are some of the difficulties with using the concept of
ethnicity as a framework for understanding and addressing the
conflicts in the Horn of Africa? First, it is not clear what is
meant by the terms "ethnic group,"
"ethnicity," and "ethnic conflict." In the
context of the Horn, many concepts, such as nationality, tribe,
and now clan, have been used interchangeably with that of ethnic
group, and it is very difficult to distinguish between them. A
commonly used definition is that an ethnic group is a
collectivity of people who share the same primordial
characteristics such as common ancestry, language, and culture.
(People have included religion in the category of shared
culture.) Ethnicity then refers to the behaviour and feeling
(about oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from
membership of an ethnic group. Ethnic conflict has come to mean
cleavages between groups based on differentiation's in ethnic
identities.

A major question that arises from the above definition of
"ethnic group" is whether people must share
commonalties in all the criteria mentioned to be members of the
same ethnic group or to share the same ethnicity. There are
instances in the Horn in which just belonging to the same
religion seems to suffice to classify people as members of an
ethnic group, although they might differ in other criteria. For
example, in central and southern Ethiopia, if an Oromo is
Orthodox Christian that individual may be classified as an Amhara
regardless of his or her ethnic ancestry or lineage.1
In other instances, as in the Oromo regions, language has been
used as the criterion for determining membership, despite other
differences. But there are also cases where commonality in
language and religion has not signified membership of the same
ethnic group. Especially where groups have interacted for a long
time, there are situations where people might have overlaps in
one of these ethnic criteria (religion, language, culture, or
ancestry) but lack commonalties in the rest. How are people to be
ethnically classified under those circumstances?

Some have argued that membership of an ethnic group is not
determined by objective factors such as sharing common primordial
characteristics. They point to subjective factors such as
perception, belonging, self-identification, and the like (Hymes,
1968:1220; Nadel, 1947: 13). They argue that a person, regardless
of primordial commonalities, can become a member of an ethnic
group if he or she feels and acts as a member and is accepted as
such by the group. But this raises some problems. If the basis
for the perceived commonality or belonging is not the primordial
common factor, then what is it? Could the basis be commonalities
in interests, aspirations, psychological orientations? If so, why
should this kind of identity and bond be characterized as
"ethnic"? Moreover, what happens in cases where some
feel and act as if they are members but their membership is not
accepted by the reference group?

In short, the definition of ethnic groups and the distinction
between people based on ethnic criteria is difficult,
inconsistent, and confusing. One could come up with different
results depending on whether one uses objective or subjective
criteria. This has led to great controversy concerning the
identification and measurement of the phenomenon.2 But
the preoccupation with definition is not simply an academic
exercise. It has very important practical implications. It should
go without saying that we cannot develop effective mechanisms to
deal with a problem if we do not fully understand it. Frustration
with the inability fully to grasp and define the concept of
ethnicity has led to a tendency which says: "Let us not
waste a great deal of time trying to define the concept; instead
let us recognize it as a major problem and put our energies into
developing mechanisms to deal with it."

Some would take the approach used by a US Supreme Court
justice to define pornography: you may not be able to define it,
but you know it when you see it. The trouble with that attitude
is that if we are not agreed on what the phenomenon is we might
be wasting our energy by focusing on the wrong problems or by
prescribing a remedy for a problem that has not been diagnosed
correctly. As we will see in greater detail later, doing so could
even run the risk of making the situation worse instead of
remedying it.

Another difficulty with the concept of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict is the common assumption that ethnic similarities and
differences are the basis for social harmony or discord. Thus, it
is expected that those who share a common ancestry, language,
culture, and religion should have a relationship of solidarity
and harmony with each other but one of cleavage and conflict with
those who do not share their ethnic identity. This concept is
also full of problems. There are societies in the Horn where
ethnic similarity has not assured social harmony nor avoided the
outbreak of large-scale conflict. Especially where there is no
perception of external threat, there is a great deal of evidence
that ethnic groups have divided into lower-level identities and
fought each other with as much zeal as they might fight other
ethnic groups. Alternatively, there are also societies in the
region where ethnic diversity has not been a prescription for
violent conflicts.

These problems can be illustrated by examples from various
contexts in the Horn of Africa. As indicated earlier, in Ethiopia
ethnicity has been identified by many as a major cause of
conflict. That country's major civil wars were between the
central government, which was seen to have been dominated by the
Amhara people, and various insurgency groups bearing the names of
ethnic groups such as the Oromo, Tigre, Afar, Ogaden, and
Beni-Amer Liberation Fronts. The liberation fronts claimed they
were fighting to break free of the political, economic, social,
cultural, and religious domination of the Amhara people over
their particular ethnic groups.

Once one goes beyond the labels and begins to decipher the
claims and counter-claims in the Ethiopian conflicts, all the
problems associated with the concept of ethnicity discussed
earlier begin to surface. To begin with, the definition of the
"oppressors" and the "oppressed" in ethnic
terms becomes an insurmountable task. Who are the dominating
Amhara people? How is membership in this group defined? What is
the Amhara culture? Is "Amhara domination" a code word
that disguises other grievances or does it signify supremacy of
one population over another, as the term implies?

It is true that most of the symbols of the Ethiopian state
(official religion, official language, etc.) have taken the
identity of what has been labelled "Amhara culture,"
and the persons who have occupied power and privilege have, by
and large, borne Amhara names. But this situation does not mean
that the great majority of the Amhara people have been
"dominators" or beneficiaries of the political,
economic, or social system that bore their name.

First of all, not all people that speak Amharic as their
mother tongue and are Orthodox Christians consider themselves as
one ethnic group. The Gondare Amharas are distinct from the Shoan
Amharas, as the Gojam Amharas are from the Wollo Amharas. There
had been a history of rivalry and warfare between these
subgroups. In the past several centuries, the subgroups had
formed various alliances with other ethnic groups such as the
Oromos, the Gurages, and the Tigres to fight other Amharas. The
same phenomenon of internal division and warfare has also
prevailed among other groups such as the Oromos, the Afares, and
the Somalis.

Second, in the last century, the major beneficiaries of the
"Amhara dominated" state were primarily the Shoans, who
held most of the government leadership positions, controlled much
economic power, governed most of the provinces, owned large
estates in the southern provinces, and managed to make Shoa's
capital, Addis Ababa, the centre of economic activity for the
entire Ethiopian state. The other Amharas (Wolloyes, Gojames, and
Gondares) were excluded from this system as much as those who
belonged to other ethnic groups.

Third, even with "Shoan domination," the
beneficiaries of such privilege were the aristocracy and the
educated elite, who constituted a very tiny percentage of the
Amhara population. The vast majority of the Shoan Amharas have
been as poor, powerless, and exploited as any other Amhara or
non-Amhara groups such as the Oromos, Gurages, or Sidamas. In
fact, the poverty of the Shoan Amhara peasant was in some cases
worse than that of the "subjugated peoples" of southern
Ethiopia such as the Kaffa and Adere people, who were
"outsiders" to the state system.

Fourth, even the ethnic identity of the Shoan rulers has been
subject to controversy. As far back as the 1760s, Oromos have
assumed very significant leadership roles in the Abyssinian
kingdoms or empires based in Shoa and the other Amhara regions of
Begemder, Gojam, and Wollo. According to Clapham (1988/9: 217),
the Shoan leaders have been as much Oromo and Gurage as Amhara.
He points out that most of the Shoan emperors, and many of the
generals and governors who served these rulers in the expansion
of Shoan control to the south of the country, had Oromo or Gurage
lineage. Emperor Haile Sellassie, the latest and one of the
strongest symbols of "Amhara domination," was "in
terms of his parentage more Oromo than Amhara, and also had a
Gurage grandmother. He married an Oromo."4

Fifth, there is a big question as to whether the so-called
Amhara culture was merely the culture of one ethnic group which
was imposed on other ethnic groups. It has been pointed out that
the Amhara culture interacted with the cultures of other peoples
in Ethiopia not by assimilation but rather by acculturation.5
Although its name stayed "Amhara," the culture allowed
others to influence and change it. Asmeron Legesse (1973: 9)
argues that "the process of cultural exchange cannot be
reduced to a simplistic picture in which Gallinna [Oromo]
speakers [for example] become Amhara... It is a rather complex
situation in which many cultural vectors are interacting to
produce a resultant [sic] that is fundamentally new." This
aspect of the so-called Amhara culture has enabled Clapham (1988:
23-4) to call it a core element of a multi-ethnic culture which,
despite its name, is not the exclusive property of any particular
group of people.

In sum, Greenfield (1965: 58) scans the history of the
Ethiopian peoples' interaction over the centuries and observes:
"This latter word [Amhara] no longer has close definition
and it is clear that the word 'tribalism' is not suited to
Ethiopian studies."

Thus, we find the ethnic explanation of the conflict that has
gripped Ethiopia for the past 30 years, such as the theory of
"Amhara domination," very inadequate and misleading.
This is partly because it is very difficult to define the actors
in ethnic terms (for instance, who are the Amharas?). Secondly,
even if it were possible to define the actors in ethnic terms (if
one were to define easily who the Amharas were), the reality on
the ground does not support a conclusion that what was witnessed
in Ethiopia was ethnic conflict.

In fact, a good case can be made that ethnic conflict, in the
sense of one ethnic group waging a war against another, or
pogroms motivated by ethnic hatred, such as we have seen in some
societies, has been a very rare event in the history of Ethiopia.
The norm in the country, if not in the region, with the exception
of recent developments in Somalia, has been ethnic coexistence
rather than ethnic warfare.

Now let us look at the other problem with the ethnicity
framework the assumption that ethnic similarity or difference is
the basis for social harmony or cleavage respectively. When we
examine this assumption in the context of the Horn, we find that
it is also full of difficulties.

Not long ago Somalia was the envy of many African states
because it was one of the very few nation states that existed in
the continent. It was a territory inhabited by people who shared
the same ancestral origin, language, religion, and culture - all
the elements of common ethnicity. But that ethnic or nationality
bond was not strong enough to prevent disintegration. Currently
an extremely bloody civil war is being waged between clans and
sub-clans. In the capital, Mogadishu, alone, over 30,000 Somalis
have been killed in the past two years from inter-clan clashes.
Hundreds of thousands have been made refugees. Interestingly,
some analysts have begun to describe the clan conflict as ethnic
or tribal conflict. If the term "ethnic conflict" is
being used synonymously with "clan conflict," could it
also be used to mean conflict between sub-clans or between family
groups? If so, how useful is a term that could mean so many
different things in different contexts?

When we look at the Eritrean/Ethiopian conflict, however, we
observe the opposite configuration. Some of the major
justifications given for the independence of Eritrea from
Ethiopia have been that the Eritrean people are different from
Ethiopians; that Ethiopia itself is not a legitimate nation state
since it is a conglomeration of very diverse peoples; and that,
as a separate people, Eritreans have a right to exercise their
right of self-determination. But when one examines Eritrea
itself, one sees that it is also an entity composed of nine major
ethnic groups, having nine different languages and cultures. The
population is divided into two major religions (Christianity and
Islam) and two ecosystems (highland and lowland) which more or
less correspond with the religious divisions. If we pursue the
logic for Eritrean separation, could we say that the lowland
Beni-Amer and Beja Muslims in Eritrea, who are different peoples
from the Christian highland Tigreans, and who constitute a large
percentage of the Eritrean population, have a right to
self-determination and to a separate state? Where does the
disintegration stop? Does it continue until we get to an area
occupied by one pure ethnic group? Is that possible? Is it
desirable? As indicated earlier, there are always cultural,
linguistic, ancestral, and religious continuities between ethnic
groups that have interacted with each other for long periods. How
will it be possible to separate groups from each other without
wrenching apart families and communities, and without provoking
hostilities between the groups?

Alternatively, if such diverse ethnic groups could come
together in Eritrea and form a nation, why shouldn't the same
logic apply to the rest of Ethiopia? Do Eritreans believe that
all these diverse people will make one nation, or is this just
wishful thinking? Is it ethnic similarity in Eritrea that created
a sense of common antipathy towards the Ethiopian state, or is it
the oppression Eritreans commonly experienced from the economic
and political system imposed on them by the élites who
controlled the Ethiopian state (which, by the way, also included
Eritreans)? If so, is the remedy to the problem the removal of
the oppressive system or is it separation and the creation of a
new state?

Our analysis so far reveals some major problems with the
concept of ethnicity as a framework for analysing the conflicts
in the Horn of Africa. Is this framework helpful? Does focusing
on the ethnic differences or similarities of people in the region
give us a good understanding of the conflicts or of what needs to
be done to contain them? Could there be other explanations that
would capture these situations better?

Clapham (1990: 10) argues: "Viewed across the region as a
whole, economic marginalisation provides a much clearer guide
than either ethnicity or even political exclusion to the
incidence of warfare in the Horn." On a more cautionary
note, Bhardwaj argues:

The importance of the ethnic factor [in the Horn of Africa] is
recognised by all. But it is our contention that, along with the
role of the ethnic actors, the socio-economic basis of the ethnic
hostility must also be given due weight. A clash of interest of
the exploiters belonging to different ethnic groups and the
masses in general precipitates the ethnic hostility. The struggle
of the nomads of Ogaden and Tigre of lower Eritrea against the
Amharas of the Ethiopian plateau - all bring ethnic differences
to the fore and distort a basically socioeconomic conflict into
an ethnic one. (Bhardwaj, 1979: 169)

It can be argued that, to a large extent, what has been called
ethnic conflict is elite-driven conflict. When one talks of
ethnic conflict between the Amhara and the Tigre in Ethiopia, or
the Arabs and the Africans in the Sudan, for example, it is more
accurate to talk about conflict between elite groups who come
from different ethnic backgrounds than about people-to-people
violence among the masses arising from ethnic animosity, as the
term "ethnic conflict" implies. However, such an
elite-driven conflict has a powerful capability of turning into
widespread conflict among the masses.

It is true that the region's ethnic groups have their own
prejudices and stereotypes about each other. But these attitudes
have not normally turned into conflict at the people-to-people
level unless manipulated and organized by political leaders.
Élites find ethnic prejudices and stereotypes fertile ground in
which they can easily cultivate support for their political and
economic aspirations. Expressing their objectives in ethnic or
nationality terms (such as "advancing the interest of our
own people" or "protecting ourselves from another
ethnic group") ennobles the pursuits and gives them more
legitimacy.

As we have seen in many instances in the continent, the major
beneficiaries of such aspirations might be the élites, but the
whole ethnic group becomes associated with these aims since they
are pursued in the name of the entire group.

Once this cycle starts and conflict begins to be waged in the
group's name, fear and further animosity pervade the whole group,
since all members become perceived as the enemy by those against
whom the conflict is being waged. Pre-existing ethnic prejudices
further fuel the conflict because they simplify the complex
motivations of the actors, making it easy to create an immediate
"us" and "them" perception as well as to
demonize the adversary. Thus, a conflict started by the élites
ends up, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, engulfing the entire
ethnic group. Interestingly, despite such efforts by élites, at
least in the Horn of Africa, the incidence of people-to-people
violence and pogroms has been quite rare.

Despite the confusion generated by the concept of ethnic
conflict, many analysts have latched on to this simplistic
concept, implying people-to-people antagonisms based on ethnic
differences to describe the conflicts in the region. As Clapham
and Bharwaj have indicated, analysis of "inequitable
economic and class stratification" or "monopolization
of access to state and economic power by an ethnic based
elite" (in the case of Ethiopia, a multiethnic elite under
the name of Amhara oligarchy) might provide an equally sound if
not better explanation of the conflicts in the region.

In the case of Ethiopia, particularly in the past 20 years,
ideology has also played a role in sustaining and exacerbating
the notion that ethnic animosity and supremacy of one people over
the other is at the root of the conflicts in the country. The
radical student movement of the 1960s and the early '70s, which
was the forerunner of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, was strongly
Marxist-Leninist in orientation. During the rise of this
movement, Lenin's discourse on "the nationalities
question" and his prescription of "self-determination
up to secession" (along with other Marxist ideas of
"dictatorship of the proletariat,"
"collectivization of agriculture," etc.) were lifted
wholesale from the history of the Soviet Union and grafted onto
Ethiopian realities, thereby forming a major tenet in the
political discussions at that time. There was not much debate
about these concepts' relevance to the Ethiopian situation or
about the operational problems involved in implementing them.
Although the term "nationalities issue" grated on many
people's ears, they acquiesced to it, since it was the paradigm
of the day.

After the 1974 revolution, the soldiers who took power from
the monarchy did not have much knowledge or experience of how to
restructure the society following the destruction of the old
social order. The radical Marxist student leaders were brought
into the government, where they became the revolution's advisers
and ideological leaders. Those student leaders then had the
opportunity to make the "nationalities question" a
national agenda. According to Markakis:

As militant Marxists, the radicals [student leaders] were
obliged to confront the national issue and, after some agonising,
they opted for the Leninist principle of national
self-determination and declared their support for the Eritrean
rebels... From then on, the national issue was forced on the
agenda of every political movement in the country... Since it
[the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam] espoused Marxism as its
ideology, the new regime could not formally reject the principle
of national self-determination. (Markakis, 1989: 4-6)

Even after Mengistu's overthrow in 1991, the new government
leaders were those who had been socialized in the radical Marxist
Leninist ideology of the 1960s and who still held entrenched
views on the nationalities issue. As soon as they took power they
declared that the most important issue facing the country was the
"nationalities question," and proceeded to decree that
all ethnic groups, nationalities, and peoples in the country
could define their own territory, form their own governments, and
exercise self-determination, including declaring independence.6
Towards this objective, the map of the country was redrawn,
eliminating the old multi-ethnic administrative provinces of the
country and replacing them with ethnic zones. As demarcating
boundaries based on ethnicity is never an easy task in Ethiopia,
the new map has reportedly been redrawn at least twice already.

The fallout from this policy has already started. People have
been forced out of land they have inhabited for generations and
told to return to their ethnic homelands. Of course, there is no
home awaiting them in their places of origin, for they migrated
generations ago. In some areas violent conflict has broken out
between members of different ethnic groups in attempts to draw
their own ethnic boundaries or claim territories that were
considered common in the past.

Ethnic claims over resources that were considered common, such
as minerals, land, ports, etc., are likely to become very
explosive issues.

In the 30 years prior to the demise of Mengistu's regime, the
civil wars in the country were waged between the central
government and insurgencies bearing ethnic names. But in the
current situation people are being pitted against each other.
Neighbours who have coexisted peacefully for decades, if not
centuries, are being encouraged by official government policy to
emphasize their ethnic differences so that ethnically homogeneous
political structures can be created. Age-old relationships
between peoples, intermarriages, cultural interactions and
continuities, are in peril of being disrupted or wrenched apart.
As the reality in the country has been a long history of
coexistence and cooperation between ethnic groups at the grass
roots, people are speaking out against the ethnic segregation
that is being imposed on them from the top. However, unless the
implications of this new ethnic policy are examined carefully and
the policy itself revised, the government might end up creating
more ethnic conflict than it deters.

Close observation of the Ethiopian situation makes one wonder
whether the preoccupation with "the nationalities
question" and its prescribed remedy of "national
self-determination" are products of an ideological framework
rather than an outgrowth of the country's realities. Instead of
the reality on the ground determining the model of theoretical
framework to be used in diagnosing, understanding, and dealing
with it, an ideologically dictated theoretical framework seems to
have been imposed on the reality, which is then forced to conform
with the framework. As the saying goes, if the only tool you have
is a hammer, then you think everything else is a nail.

Similarly, since the most dominant analytical framework in
Ethiopian politics since the late 1960s was the ethnic framework,
it seems that every problem in the country was viewed as
emanating from this basic question. Class analysis, elite
exploitation, or even regionalism would have gone a long way to
explain the country's situation, rather than an exclusive focus
on ethnicity and the nationalities issue. If those other
frameworks had been used, the emergent remedies would have
differed from the current proposed solutions, which could drag
the country into another cycle of bitter civil war.

This is not to argue that political leaders invented the
nationalities problem in Ethiopia. There is no question, however,
that they distorted it, inflated it out of proportion, and
exploited it.7 Ethnicity all of a sudden became the
predominant explanation of many of the things that went wrong in
the society. Élites sold the idea to the people and now the
people are carrying the banner. A myth is developing that the
creation of new states will solve the problems people have
experienced with the current state systems in the region.

Now, if we focus on the solutions that have been traditionally
applied to the problem of ethnicity and the conflicts it
generates, we notice that the remedies seem to present as many
difficulties as the problem itself. The traditional responses
have been either "nation-building," which has meant
forging one nation out of diverse peoples, or, in rare cases,
"self-determination," which in many people's minds has
been associated with separation and the formation of another
state.

Attempts at building new nation states out of a multitude of
ethnic groups has generally taken two forms. One has been the
creation of a multi-ethnic culture, which all groups identify
with and voluntarily adopt as their own. The other is the
assimilation of different cultures into a dominant one, usually
by the direction of a highly centralized and coercive state. The
first approach is complicated and normally takes a long time to
develop. The second approach, seemingly expedient, has been
adopted by many post-colonial African states in their eagerness
to generate quick results. But this approach has often been
associated with manipulation and at times outright repression by
those in power. The 30 years of experience with this approach
since independence has shown that not many new nation states have
been forged in Africa. In fact, it might be said that the efforts
made in this direction seem to have backfired. More recently,
animosity and violence along ethnic lines has been on the
increase in many African societies, especially as the highly
centralized nature of these states is being challenged with the
movement towards multi-party politics.

As another response to ethnic conflict, people have proposed
"self determination" as an alternative to
"nation-building." But the concept of
"self-determination" is so riddled with confusion that
it does not provide a viable alternative. The term itself is
composed of two concepts, "self" and
"determination," whose definition and operation raise a
multitude of problems. What constitutes the "self"? Is
it a group that is connected by primordial ties like an ethnic
group? Could any other group form the "self"? Can the
"self" be engineered? And what is the meaning,
implication, and scope of the term "determination"?

If the "self" were to refer to a group having
primordial ties, we are again faced with all the problems
discussed earlier regarding group definition, especially in cases
of a long history of intergroup interaction. The distinction
between objective and subjective criteria again becomes an issue.
Mayall argues that it is not clear whether some of these
aggregate identities like nations exist "as an objective
reality, as claimed by nationalists, or should be understood as
an imagined community or creative fictions as others have
claimed" (Mayall, 1990: 2; see also Gellner, 1983).

If one uses the objective criterion of primordial ties for
defining nations, then there are many who feel that their
primordial roots do not solely dictate their interests, needs,
aspirations, and ability to forge common purpose as well as
affiliations with those who do not come from the same roots. If
one uses the subjective criterion - and there is a lot of merit
to that - a major problem becomes how to identify those who feel
they belong to an ethnic group so that they are clustered in one
territory? What if those who feel they belong are not accepted by
others as belonging?

To the extent that self-determination has meant separation and
creation of a state, how might it be possible to build a state
around an ethnic group without provoking chauvinism, ethnic
animosity, and the wrenching apart of communities, given the
cultural, linguistic, ancestral, and religious continuities
between ethnic groups that have interacted with each other for
long periods? The search for the pure ethnic group as a
foundation for building a state has led to fascism, Nazism,
pogroms, massive dislocations, and genocide's in many parts of
the world, including the African continent itself.

If, on the other hand, the "self" refers to an
"imagined community" or "creative fiction,"
as Mayall argues, could one then stretch one's imagination to
include others in the community so that "the self"
becomes a larger and more inclusive unit?

Aside from the definition of the "self," there is
still a problem with the content of
"self-determination." What is to be determined? What is
the scope of the "determination"? Some have defined
self-determination as the aspiration "to have control over
one's affairs in order to ensure one's economic and social
well-being" (An-Na'im, 1989: 21; see also Assefa,
forthcoming (a)). But the ability to determine one's own affairs
or economic and social well-being is increasingly being
complicated by the realities of an interdependent world. One is
constrained not only by one's own capabilities but the interests
and capabilities of others. Except in a world of autarky or
complete isolation, any actor must recognize how his or her needs
and actions are compatible with those of others in the system.
The more interdependent the world becomes, as the trend seems to
indicate, the more one's orientation might need to be towards
coalition-building, coordination, negotiation, and consensus
rather than unilateral determination of one's own affairs. If so,
how much autonomous control can one sensibly exercise in this
modern and rapidly shrinking world? How meaningful is it to
absolutize "self-determination" in such circumstances?

The major limitation in all of these approaches to defining
the "self" for the purposes of
"self-determination" is the failure to recognize that
primordial elements constitute only one consideration in that
definition. It cannot be denied that there are other
considerations based on human choice rather than mere coincidence
of birth. Common perceptions, needs, aspirations, and interests
can also enable people to include others who share these
sentiments in their definition of "themselves" even if
they do not share primordial links with them. Therefore, to
define the "self" exclusively in terms of primordial
givens by creating ethnic states seems to ignore, artificially
and detrimentally, the various dimensions that enter into
people's definition of themselves. The challenge becomes how to
recognize and legitimize the unavoidable and undeniable fact of
primordial roots, but to temper its detrimental and exclusionary
tendencies by encouraging broader definitions that can
accommodate others. In other words, how might it be possible to
encourage and emphasize the consociational aspect of
"self"-definition as much as the primordial aspects?

The two conflicting demands of "nation-building" and
"self-determination" have embroiled the Horn, as well
as much of the African continent, in decades of bloodshed and
destruction. However, we have seen that both approaches suffer
from severe limitations which prevent them from providing avenues
for the effective creation of harmonious societies.

Given these limitations, a more promising direction,
especially in the case of Ethiopia, might be to re-examine the
notion that ethnic animosity and the domination of one ethnic
group by another are the causes of the conflicts in the country
and that the solutions to these conflicts lies in secession or
the creation of independent states.

Instead, addressing the economic and political inequities in
the system (which no doubt had been disguised and confused by
ethnic labels), enlarging the economic base so that there are
resources to share among various ethnic groups, opening up the
political system so that everyone, regardless of his or her
ethnic background, can have access to it, as well as creating a
system of governance that is democratic and respects the
political and human rights of all citizens, could go a very long
way towards remedying the so-called "ethnic" conflicts
in Ethiopia.

In conjunction with this, one should work at developing
systems that could prevent ethnicity from becoming a cause for
further cleavages and civil war in the various societies of the
Horn. First, it must be established that the question of identity
is not and should not be a zero-sum issue in human relationships.
All people have multiple identities which are expressed
differently in different circumstances. The freedom of an
individual or a group to choose its own separate identity should
not, therefore, be a threat to others as long as that individual
or group also recognizes that there is common identity at another
level with those from whom it is distinguishing itself. Thus, as
much as people endeavor to articulate and enhance what is unique
about themselves, an equal amount of energy should be invested in
articulating and enhancing what binds them with other people.

A mechanism must be found to legitimize ethnic identity in the
Horn of Africa without making it incompatible with the formation
of a larger unit of identity based on mutuality and beneficial
collaboration. A promising endeavor in this context might be to
adopt a very loose federal system of governance supplemented by
building infrastructures for regional integration. The loose
federal system of governance would allow for the expression of
ethnic identity. But the tendency towards fragmentation that
might arise from legitimizing ethnicity would be balanced and
tempered by providing incentives towards higher levels of
integration and identification with the entire region. As the
various ethnic groups become reassured of their identity and
security, they would also be provided with incentives for a
larger regional identity by highlighting the benefits that could
emerge from higher levels of association and integration.

The fear and resentment which groups have of the current state
systems in the region, as well as their tendency to view
separation as a solution, can be tempered if the state is viewed
as an intermediate institution rather than the institution of
final resort to work out problems, as it has been to date. The
creation of a supra-state regional structure, in which the
various groups in the region have a say but which is capable of
dealing with problems that cannot be dealt with at the state
level, could have a salutary effect on the conflicts between the
state and the various groupings within it.

This approach could enable the societies in the Horn to work
at both ends of the identity problem. While people would be
reassured about being what they are or cannot avoid being, they
would also be encouraged to explore greater vistas of meaningful
identity with greater entities, beyond the state. The
disintegration and exclusive orientation of ethnicity would
become more balanced by the synthesis and inclusiveness that
comes from a sense of regional identity. Creating a regional
framework with a move towards regional integration could permit
the relaxation of strict boundary demarcations, allowing freedom
of movement and interaction between peoples. It could reduce the
pressure for the creation of new independent states by
disaffected groups, since there would be a new regional forum to
redress their grievances or address their interests and rights
without their being forced to resort to secession.

The concept of a regional identity arising from a vision of
regional integration could create a less threatening,
consociational process where all the actors in the region could
be engaged in building a more equitable and peaceful social
contract that could lead to mutually enriching relation ships.8
Regional identity would not be an end in itself, but a step in a
transition to more inclusive identities. It would challenge
groups to recognize aspects of themselves that could they could
share beyond the ethnic group and the satate.9