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Bolivia and the Changing Shape of U.S. Power

Ethan Earle

IN NOVEMBER 2011, BOLIVIA AND THE UNITED STATES signed a "framework
agreement" to resume diplomatic relations, more than three years after
President Evo Morales ejected the U.S. ambassador on charges of
conspiracy. In contrast to the diplomatic breakup, which made
international headlines, the reconciliation, held in Washington and
presided over by a Bolivian vice minister and a U.S. under secretary,
was sparsely covered in the news media.

Afterward, Bolivian vice minister for foreign relations Juan Carlos
Alurralde declared that future developments between the two countries
would be based on principles of "mutual respect and shared
responsibility"1 While at first glance this statement looks like
diplomatic boilerplate, on closer consideration it reveals a major shift
in the history of the two countries' relationship. For the first time,
the United States has let Bolivia - a small, poor, and geopolitically
disadvantaged country - reframe the terms of the bilateral relationship
through a progressive (and aggressive) campaign to halt what Morales has
repeatedly characterized as a history of imperialism. Moving beyond
Bolivia, this event also has potentially important implications for
power dynamics throughout the region.

Since at
least World War II, when the United States became interested in the
country for its tin deposits, it has dictated the terms of its
relationship with Bolivia. Ranging from its demand for natural resources
to a fear of falling Communist dominoes, from military outposts to the
war on drugs and experiments in neoliberalism, U.S. actions in Bolivia
have in many ways been representative of its behavior in Latin America
as a whole. Morales's September 2008 expulsion of Ambassador Philip
Goldberg, part of a diplomatic firestorm in which he also expelled the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and appropriated certain U.S. Agency for
International Development programs, was a fierce response to this
historical dynamic of domination followed by dependency that in turn
opened doors to new forms of domination.

Many on
the international left have long considered Morales and his MAS party to
be shining examples of an emerging political "pink tide" in South
America, driven by widespread rejection of U. S. -style neoliberalism.
In this context, Morales's 2008 actions were viewed as an achievement, a
mile marker in the continent-wide movement away from the long shadow of
the United States. As such, the recent reconciliation has been greeted
with quiet disappointment by many left-leaning observers.

There seems to have been a collective knee-jerk aversion to taking a
second look at something that at first glance portends a backslide in
Bolivian and indeed regional independence. Meanwhile, some in the
Bolivian and international left who have become increasingly critical of
the MAS see the agreement as yet another step down the slippery slope
toward "reconstituted neoliberalism," in the phrase of historian Jeffrey
R. Webber, or "neoliberalism with an Indian face," as Aymara political
leader Felipe Quispe Huanca has put it."2 As a result, there has been a
broad failure to note something that is truly significant for anyone who
feels that Bolivia and all of Latin America would benefit from more
"mutual respect" in their relationship with the United States.

Notably, the November agreement is almost entirely concerned with broad
principles. The document's founding principle is the aforementioned
mutual respect for national sovereignty. The accord additionally refers
to respect for human rights, non-intervention, the rights of states to
choose their political and economic systems, and peaceful resolution in
all disputes. It then calls for the establishment of a joint committee
to oversee and approve all further actions between the two countries,
particularly mentioning the allocation of U.S. financial assistance.

As the only technical point in the agreement, this proposal is a
powerful one, speaking to a half-century in which Bolivia was among the
world's highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid, often distributed
unilaterally with the goal of bolstering U.S. interests in the country
and region.

NACLA blogger Emily Achtenberg, in
one of the few Englishlanguage analyses of the accord, published in her
article "A Political Victory for Bolivia," paints a more complete
picture of the agreement's basic thrust.3 While advising a waitand-see
attitude before reaching any final verdict, Achtenberg concludes that
"the framework agreement provides a powerful symbol of enforced equality
between a weak and a powerful nation."

Considered in the historical context of Bolivia-U.S. relations, this
founding document is indeed a powerful symbol. As Deputy Foreign
Minister Juan Carlos Alurralde points out, it is the first accord since
195 1 to move beyond mere technical cooperation to include broader
issues of political dialogue and shared responsibility. While Alurralde
was speaking only of Bolivia, it is in fact the first time in more than
half a century that the United States has signed any accord in South
America that so directly addresses its position of dominance and
exploitation.

Indeed, while many Latin American
governments have criticized U.S. influence when trying to break away
from the country, none before the MAS have maintained their critique
during the subsequent thawing of relations. Instead, some mixture of
U.S. gunboat and dollar diplomacy has pressured the transgressing
government into returning to the United States with hat in hand, asking
for forgiveness in the form of more aid or more trade. Bolivia has taken
strides to break free from this dynamic by winning not only the war -
in this case the diplomatic conflict of 2008 - but also the subsequent
cold war, for which the November agreement effectively serves as a peace
treaty. So while the 2008 conflict was the more exciting story, the
recent detente has been by far the more groundbreaking, setting a
diplomatic precedent that could be used by other countries in the
Americas to appeal for more equal relations with the United States.

AT THIS POINT, A SKEPTIC might contend that the devil is in the details
- in this case, not the document's grandiose language but the concrete
actions between the two countries. In this regard, it thus far appears
that Morales and the MAS intend to do things differently. On January 20,
Bolivia signed a new drug accord with the United States and Brazil,
additionally including the United Nations in a supporting role. In
preparing the agreement, Morales was reported to have repeatedly dragged
his heels, threatening to call off negotiations if further concessions
to Bolivian sovereignty were not made. This tenacity marked a clear
intention to immediately apply the principles of the newly established
accord.

The resulting document has created a more
substantive balance of power than had previously existed in the U.S.
war on drugs, certainly in Bolivia and perhaps in the continent as a
whole. While the United States will continue to provide equipment and
some training, Brazil will also assist in training and monitoring
duties, and Bolivia will be responsible for anti-narcotics efforts.
Meanwhile, the United Nations will act as an observer. While the precise
terms of the new drug accord have not been disclosed, it appears to
give Bolivia greater flexibility to implement more of the voluntary
"social control" programs favored by the Morales administration and
never before featured in any U. S. -Bolivia drug accord.

Some may criticize any continued U.S. involvement in Bolivian drug
policy, while others question the rising regional power aspirations of
Brazil. Indeed, as the disastrous exploits of the United Nations'
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) remind us, foreign
intervention is always troublesome, regardless of how many countries are
involved in its oversight.

However, the U.S. war
on drugs has been a powerful element and symbol of its military and
political domination of much of the Americas over the past two decades,
and the sight of the country losing its grip over the terms of that war
is a powerful affirmation of growing South American independence.

Over the next several months, as if to reassure those doubting the
direction of the relationship, Morales fired off a series of sharp
reprimands of U.S. power in Bolivia and the region. These included
calling out the Obama administration's foreign policy as interventionist
and authoritarian, and culminated in a renewal, on March 19, of his
threat to expel the United States if its embassy continued to infringe
on Bolivian sovereignty. He did not reveal the specific nature of the
alleged transgression, but following the 2008 expulsion, the threat
surely cannot be taken as mere empty rhetoric.

This string of accusations and threats also made apparent another
possible reading of the previous months of cooperation: that Morales, in
the face of dipping approval, both nationwide and particularly within
his party's base, had invited the United States back to provide the MAS
with a common enemy around which to again rally popular support, much as
it had in 2008 against its political opponents. While this is only one
of several interpretations, it is an alternative explanation for
Bolivia's desire to reconcile that, in light of the threat, appears more
logical than any intended capitulation to U.S. pressure.

One week later, on March 27 in the eastern department of Beni, Bolivian
officials stopped a U.S. embassy vehicle transporting unauthorized
weapons, munitions, and communications equipment. This type of
extra-official behavior had been commonplace in previous years,
escalating particularly in the eastern parts of the country leading up
to 2008. Again, the Morales administration showed itself determined to
push back against any perceived U.S. incursions, taking the opportunity
to further give shape to the principles espoused in the November
agreement.

Despite these recent hiccups - or
perhaps in concert with them if we are to believe that the current
administration has invited the United States back as a target of
critique - on March 29, Morales officially ratified the "framework
agreement." Foreign minister David Choquehuanca characterized the move
as an act of good faith by Morales, despite his "many bitter
experiences" with the United States. He again echoed the demand that the
new relationship be based on "full respect for national legislation"
and "the sovereignty of the people."4

Aside from
Morales's continuance of fiery rhetoric - such as calling for an end to
the U.S. dictatorship over South America at the Summit of the Americas
in April - in the past months there have been relatively few
developments in the Bolivia-U.S. relationship. Taking account of the
present state of affairs, we see the Morales government again pushing
back against what it considers undue U.S. influence, while at the same
time reengaging the country through diplomatic channels.

As often as not, this push-andpull is executed simultaneously, with
Morales issuing combative rhetoric while other MAS officials stress
points of agreement and cooperation. Regardless of whether this dynamic
is the result of political calculation or a genuine rift within the MAS,
it has so far been effective in permitting Bolivia to shape the
contours of the relationship more than it ever had in the past.

The danger of backslide is of course still present. Various U.S.
Embassy and USAID officials in Bolivia, interviewed April 2010 on
condition of anonymity, repeatedly likened Morales and the MAS to Victor
Paz Estenssoro and his MNR party, leaders of the country's 1952
revolution who later gave up more radical political goals in exchange
for U.S. financial assistance. The hope then is that Morales and the MAS
can also be swayed by the sirens of dollar diplomacy. For the United
States, the November agreement likely offers greater opportunities to
work this black magic. But the United States has had to concede far more
control than ever before to reach this point, and Morales and MAS thus
far appear intent on accentuating their gains.

ON
THE WHOLE, WHAT emerges from the November agreement and subsequent
developments is a plausible blueprint for a new way of relating to the
United States in the 21st century. While it might not be revolutionary
it does appear to be a relatively practical and potentially durable way
forward. Regionally another step away from United States domination has
certainly been taken. The November agreement serves as an admission by
the United States that it is more willing than ever to accept the terms
pushed on it by a sufficiently stubborn country regardless of size or
power disparities.

Much as the 2008 expulsion of
the U.S. ambassador in Bolivia was soon followed by similar moves in
Venezuela and Ecuador - as well as more open critiques of U.S. power
throughout the continent - so too does the recent accord create more
space for other countries to redefine historic power dynamics on more
equal terms.

Indeed, Argentina's April expropriation of Spain's Repsol oil subsidiary YPF
was closely followed by Bolivia's May Day nationalization of its
principal power-grid company, formerly owned by the Spanish Red
Eléctrica Española. More recently, Ecuador's decision to protect
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in its London Embassy has received
widespread support from South American leaders, several of whom -
Morales included - have been quick to note the hypocritical rhetoric
emerging from countries like Britain and the United States, both of whom
have long histories of granting asylum to murderous dictators. In both
cases, albeit in different ways, we see a region that appears to be
gaining consciousness of an increased freedom of independent political
action vis-à-vis the 20th century's great powers, all the more so when
its governments act in concert.

While the future
of Bolivia-U.S. relations is far from set in stone, the November
agreement serves as a quietly powerful precedent for reshaping power
dynamics on the American continent in the 21st century.