on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of ohio

[April 19, 1995]

Justice Ginsburg
, concurring.

[n.1]
and Mary Grace's. [n.2]
All three decisions, I believe, are sound, and hardly sensational, applications
of our First
Amendment jurisprudence.

In for a calf is not always in for a cow. The Court's decision finds
unnecessary, overintrusive, and inconsistent with American ideals the State's
imposition of a fine on an individual leafleteer who, within her local
community, spoke her mind, but sometimes not her name. We do not thereby
hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the
speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity. Appropriately
leaving open matters not presented by McIntyre's handbills, the Court recognizes
that a State's interest in protecting an election process "might justify
a more limited identification requirement." Ante, at 19. But the
Court has convincingly explained why Ohio lacks "cause for inhibiting the
leafletting at issue here." Ibid.

Notes

1 See
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. ___ (1994), in which we
held that the City of Ladue could not prohibit homeowner Gilleo's display
of a small sign, on her lawn or in a window, opposing war in the Persian
Gulf.

2 Grace
was the "lone picketer" who stood on the sidewalk in front of this Court
with a sign containing the text of the First
Amendment, prompting us to exclude public sidewalks from the statutory
ban on display of a "flag, banner, or device" on Court grounds. United
States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 183 (1983).