Myron Lieberman is a senior research scholar with the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, and author of several books about educational employment relations and school choice.

Executive Summary

Since the emergence of teacher unionization in
the 1960s, the National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers have
monopolized the market for teacher representation
services. In the 34 states that require school
boards to bargain collectively, the NEA and AFT
share almost 100 percent of the market for teacher
representation services. Inasmuch as the two
unions operate under a noncompete agreement,
there is virtually no competition for the right to
serve as the exclusive representative of teachers at
the local level.

As is the case with monopolies generally, the
NEA/AFT monopoly over teacher representation
services has resulted in excessive costs and producer
domination of services affecting millions of teachers
and support personnel. In 2001, active teacher
membership in the two unions was about 2.7 million
out of a total membership of about 3.7 million.
Their combined revenues (local, state, and national)
probably exceeded $1.5 billion, not including their
political action committees, foundations, and special
purpose organizations.

Although teachers would be the primary direct
beneficiaries of competition against NEA/AFT, the
school choice movement would be a major, indirect
beneficiary. NEA and AFT are the primary opponents
of school choice. Were it not for their all-out opposition, our educational system would include many
options that are not yet available to K-12 students.

The argument in this analysis is that for-profit
and nonprofit entities of all types should be authorized
to compete with membership organizations—
that is, unions—for the right to serve as the exclusive
representative of teachers in collective bargaining.
Such reform would open up competition to non-membership
organizations, solo entrepreneurs,
negotiators, lawyers, and collective bargaining companies.
Teachers would retain the right to go with-out
an exclusive representative, and each representation
option would compete against all the others.
Teacher representation in the bargaining-law states
would not be limited to unions as it is now.
Teachers could change their choice of representative
periodically, perhaps every two or three years, or
at the expiration of their collective agreements.

The best way to end the NEA/AFT monopoly is
for states to enact legislation that (1) reduces the
minimum required showing of interest from 30 to
10 percent of the bargaining unit, (2) explicitly
allows individuals, nonprofit and for-profit organizations,
and membership organizations to compete
for the right to represent teachers, and (3)
enables all members in bargaining units to vote on
the key decisions affecting their terms and conditions
of employment.