Euthanasia is a complex and controversial
topic. In our society today, there are political, medical, and moral controversies
concerning euthanasia. It is an issue that challenges our hearts and our minds. The
ultimate goal of this paper is to argue against the use of active euthanasia as an option
for the deliberate ending of a persons life with the intent of reducing that
persons suffering. In this paper, I will first give a brief overview of the ethical
debate about euthanasia. Secondly, I am going to put forth the best argument that I can to
defend the position of active euthanasia. Finally, I will put forth the best argument that
I can against the active euthanasia position.

Brief Overview of The Ethical Debate of
Euthanasia

The word "euthanasia", derived from
the Greek "eu-thanatos" meaning simply "a good death", "is
subject to widely differing understandings, and the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia (killing and letting die) is frequently collapsed into one term." In his
article "Active and Passive Euthanasia," James Rachels believes that there is no
moral difference between active and passive euthanasia. Rachels writes "If a doctor
lets a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in the same moral position as if he had
given the patient a lethal injection." Rachels concludes that active euthanasia can
be "the morally preferable option."

In order to avoid confusion in the debate
about euthanasia, it is necessary to distinguish euthanasia from the mere termination of
treatment, and to have a clear definition of terms. For the purposes of my paper, active
euthanasia is defined as the deliberate ending of a persons life with the intent of
reducing that persons suffering. A good example of active euthanasia is the act of
giving a lethal injection. In their article "Euthanasia - A Critique", Peter
Singer and Mark Siegler state that there is a distinction between active euthanasia, i.e.
giving a lethal injection, and such other acts such as the decision to forgo
life-sustaining treatment, such as use of ventilations, CPR, dialysis, tube feedings or
the administration of analgesic agents to relief pain. They conclude that "Physicians
must become more responsive to the concerns of patients that underlie the movement for
euthanasia and must provide better pain management, more compassionate terminal care, and
more appropriate use of life-sustaining treatments."

Those who advocate the use of active
euthanasia argue that people today have a fear of being forced to endure destructive pain,
or to live out a life of unrelieved, pointless suffering. Advocates of active euthanasia
also argue that "modern medicine has failed to reassure us that it can manage our
dying with dignity and comfort and therefore, this fact leads to the demand that we must
be in control, masters of our own fate." The proponents of active euthanasia argue
that patients whose illnesses cause them unbearable suffering should be permitted and have
a right to end their distress by having a physician perform euthanasia. Euthanasia is a
more humane than forcing a patient to continue a life of unmitigated suffering. Dying
patients also have the right to know their condition, to choose or to reject the treatment
regimen, to choose or reject attempts to prolong their life, and to decide fully as to the
disposal of their remains. Derek Humphrey writes "Most, but not all, terminal pain
can be controlled with the sophisticated use of drugs, but the point these leaders miss is
that personal quality of life is vital to some people. If ones body has been
so destroyed by disease that it is not worth living, that is an intensely individual
decision which should not be thwarted." Humphrey also states that the patient has a
right to control the medical treatment which he or she receives, even the right to request
and receive euthanasia. A dying patients basic human rights are seen to be violated
when they lack the knowledge and power to make decisions which, in turn diminishes their
dignity as human persons.

Those who advocate that active euthanasia is
never a option as a medical treatment argue that; (1) if a person seeks to end his/her
life by active euthanasia, then he/she intrinsically contradicts the value of his/her
autonomy, (2) active euthanasia violates the fundamental prohibition against killing,
except in the case of self-defense or defense of others, (3) there would be a general
reduction of respect for human life if official barriers to killing are removed, (4) if
made a public policy, active euthanasia could lead to involuntary euthanasia and (5)
active euthanasia would undermine the integrity of medicine and the patient-physician
relationship.Opponents of active euthanasia will also argue that a person can
never intend or cause the death of himself/herself or of another person who suffers from a
terminal illness or other type of intolerable suffering, because by the very nature of the
act, it would be considered suicide or murder. Those who are against active euthanasia
understand that there is a demand for active euthanasia, as a response "to the fear
of entrapment in a technologically sophisticated, seemingly uncaring world of medicine,
but unrestrained freedom to end ones life or to have it ended by a physician ought
not to be the only response to that fear; nor is such a response without grave social
implications." What they, who argue against euthanasia, will conclude is not to
sanction euthanasia, but rather that "we reject the notion insisting that we utilize any
intervention capable of sustaining life--indifferent to the pain, suffering and burden to
the individual whose life, or dying, is being prolonged." Advocates against
euthanasia conclude that there must be better palliative care for those who suffer
tremendously and for the terminally ill, rather than to actively terminate their lives.

Case for Active Euthanasia

I will be using the arguments of two different
advocates of active euthanasia; James Rachels and Derek Humphrey. In the article
"Active and Passive Euthanasia", James Rachels argues that "there is no
necessary moral difference between active euthanasia (killing) and passive euthanasia
(letting die) and that active euthanasia can often be more humane." Rachels wants to
challenge the following statement adopted by the American Medical Association on December
4, 1973:

The intentional termination of the life of one
human being by another--mercy killing-- is contrary to that for which the medical
profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association. The
cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body, when
there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of the
patient and/or his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician should be
freely available to the patient and/or his immediate statement.

He uses the familiar type of example to begin
his argument:

A patient who is dying of incurable cancer of
the throat is in terrible pain, which can no longer be satisfactorily alleviated. He is
certain to die within a few days, even if present treatment is continued, but he does not
want to go on living for those days since the pain is unbearable. So he asks the doctor
for an end to it, and his family joins in the request.

He then supposes what the doctor can do with
the patients request. Rachels supposes that the doctor follows the conventional
doctrine set in motion by the American Medical Association and withholds treatment because
the patient is in terrible pain and he/she is going to die anyway. He writes that the
doctor, by simply withholding treatment, allows the patient to die even though the patient
may suffer a lot more "than he would if more direct action were taken and a lethal
injection given." Rachels believes there is a very good reason to use active
euthanasia rather than passive euthanasia, once the initial decision not to prolong the
patients agony has been made. It is part of the humanitarian impulse that leads us to
endorse the option to reduce the amount of suffering a patient must endure in order that
the patient may die quickly and in peace.

Rachels believes that passive euthanasia
"can be relatively slow and painful, whereas being given a lethal injection is
relatively quick and painless." He believes that the conventional doctrine leads to
decisions concerning life and death made on irrelevant grounds. He uses the following
example to demonstrate these decisions:

Consider the case of the infants with
Downs syndrome who need an operations for congenital defects unrelated to the
syndrome to live. Sometimes, there is no operation, and the baby dies, but when there is
no such defect, the baby lives on. Now an operation such as that to remove an intestinal
obstruction is not prohibitively difficult. The reason why such operations are not
performed in these cases is clearly, that the child has Downs syndrome and the
parents and doctor judge that because of that fact it is better for the child to die.

Rachels argues, using this case, "It is
the Downs syndrome, and not the intestines, that is at issue. The matter should be
decided, if at all, on that basis, and not be allowed to depend on the essentially
irrelevant question of whether the intestinal tract is blocked." So in this case,
Rachels argues, what is the difference if you let the child die or kill it?, the intended
result is the same.

Rachels poses the question, Is killing, in
itself, worse than letting die? He uses two cases where the intention to do an act are the
same but Case 1 is brought about by killing and Case 2 is brought about by allowing to
die. They are as follows:

Case 1

Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if
anything should happen to his six-year-old cousin. One evening while the child is taking a
bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges things so
that it looks like an accident.

Case 2

Jones stands to gain a large inheritance if
anything should happen to his six-year-old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to
drown the child in his bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child
slip and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands by,
ready to push the childs head back under if it is necessary, but it is not
necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,
"accidentally," as Jones watches and does nothing.

The only difference between these cases,
Rachels claims, is that Smith killed the child and Jones allowed the child to die. Rachels
points out that it does not matter how the child died, but rather that the motive and end
of Smith and Jones were the same. He states that if Jones pleaded his case in court that
he did not kill the child, but rather stood there and allowed the child to die, then the
courts would still charge him with killing the child. Rachels makes a strong case that
"If letting die were in itself less bad than killing, this defense should have at
least some weight. But it does not. Such a "defense" can be regarded as a
grotesque perversion of moral reasoning."

According to Rachels, "the bare
difference between killing and letting die does not, in itself, make a moral difference.
If a doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in the same moral position as if
he had given the patient a lethal injection for humane reasons." He does realize that
the crucial issue with the AMA policy is "the intentional termination of the life of
one human being by another," but states that the intention of allowing a person to
die and the intention of giving a patient a lethal injection are not morally relevant.
Rachels reiterates that "in passive euthanasia, the doctor does not do anything to
bring about the patients death, but rather the patient dies of whatever ills are
afflicting the patient: the illness is the cause of death. In active euthanasia, however,
the doctor does something to bring about the patients death; he kills him because
the doctor caused his patients death." A doctor in either case is doing
something whether he allows the patient to die or gives him a lethal injection. As Rachels
pointed out before, killing and allowing to die are not the same thing, but there is no
moral difference between them, because the agents motives and ends are same. Rachels also
reasons that "it is considered bad to be the cause of someones death and that
death is regarded as a great evil. However, if it has been decided that active or passive
euthanasia is desirable in a given case, it has also been decided that it this instance
death is no greater an evil than the patients continued existence." He makes a
good argument here, because death is supposedly inevitable in either case, so according to
Rachels, if a doctor allows a patient to die or gives him a lethal injection, then the
motives and ends, in are case, are the same.

Derek Humphrey is another advocate of active
euthanasia. Some of his arguments for active euthanasia are a little different from James
Rachels, but he makes a good defense for the "right to die" utilizing
practices of active euthanasia. Humphrey makes a distinction between suicide, which is
deliberately ending ones own life, and self-deliverance, which is when an
irreversibly ill person makes a rational decision to end his or her own life. He believes
that active euthanasia can be justified by the following reasons:

1) Advanced terminal illness that is causing
unbearable suffering to the individual. This is the most common reason to seek an early
end.

2) Grave physical handicap which is so
restricting that the individual cannot, even after due consideration, counseling and
re-training, tolerate such a limited existence. This is a fairly rare reason for suicide
-- most impaired people cope remarkably well with their affliction -- but there are some
who would, at a certain point, rather die.

Humphrey posits that, for those people who
have a terminal illness that causes unbearable suffering or a grave debilitating handicap
which incapacitates the person so much that his/her life is miserable, life is not a good
to the person any longer and, therefore, his/her life is not worth living. Humphrey does
believe that there should be some ethical parameters for active euthanasia and uses the
following list to determine whether or not a person can, in good conscience, justify the
act:

1. The person is a mature adult. This is
essential. The exact age will depend on the individual but the person should not be a
minor who come under quite different laws.

2. The person has clearly made a considered
decision. An individual has the ability nowadays to indicate this with a "Living
Will" (which applies only to disconnection of life supports) and can also, in today's
more open and tolerant climate about such actions, freely discuss the option of euthanasia
with health professionals, family, lawyers, etc.

3. The euthanasia has not been carried out at
the first knowledge of a life-threatening illness, and reasonable medical help has been
sought to cure or at least slow down the terminal disease. We do not believe in giving up
life the minute a person is informed that he or she has a terminal illness. (This is a
common misconception spread by our critics.) Life is precious, you only pass this way
once, and is worth a fight. It is when the fight is clearly hopeless and the agony,
physical and mental, is unbearable that a final exit is an option

4. The treating physician has been informed,
asked to be involved, and his or her response been taken into account. What the
physician's response will be depends on the circumstances, of course, but we advise people
that as rational suicide is not a crime, there is nothing a doctor can do about it. But it
is best to inform the doctor and hear his or her response. For example, the patient might
be mistaken -- perhaps the diagnosis has been misheard or misunderstood. It used to be
that patients raising this subject were met with a discreet silence, or meaningless
remarks, but in today's more accepting climate most physicians will discuss potential end
of life actions.

5. The person has made a Will disposing of his
or her worldly effects and money. This shows evidence of a tidy mind, an orderly life, and
forethought -- all something which is paramount to an acceptance of rational suicide.

6. The person has made plans to exit that do
not involve others in criminal liability or leave them with guilt feelings. As I have
mentioned earlier, assistance in suicide is a crime in most places, although the laws are
gradually changing, and very few cases ever came before the courts. But care must still be
taken and discretion is the watchword.

7. The person leaves a note saying exactly why
he or she is taking their life. This statement in writing obviates the chance of
subsequent misunderstandings or blame. It also demonstrates that the departing person is
taking full responsibility for the action.

His list of ethical parameters is extensive
and it shows that the decision to end ones life by active euthanasia should be
rationally well thought out. Humphrey also bases his rationale on the fact that people
take their lives everyday, i.e. assisted suicide, using drugs, and/or plastic bags. He
finds that police, paramedics and coroners put a very low priority of the investigation of
suicide when evidence comes before them that the person was dying anyway, and there was a
note from the deceased.

Humphrey also supports the work of hospice
programs. He writes "hospices make the best of a bad job, and they do so with great
skill and love. But not everyone wants a lingering death, not everyone wants that form of
care. Today many terminally ill people take the marvelous benefits of home hospice
programs and still accelerate the end when suffering becomes too much." He states
that most but not all terminal pain can be alleviated with the sophisticated use of drugs.
He believes that extraordinary means should not be used if it prolongs the suffering of
the terminally ill patient, and there should be no conflict between hospice and
euthanasia.

Humphreys critics ask the following
questions: Is that last period of love and companionship with family and friends worth
hanging on for? Is one depriving oneself of a valuable period of good life? He answers
these questions by saying "Euthanasia supporters enjoy life and love living, and
their respect for the sanctity of life is as strong as anybody's. Yet they are willing, if
their dying is distressing to them, to forego a few weeks or a few days at the very end
and leave under their own control."

Humphrey makes a strong case for active
euthanasia. He does not believe that active euthanasia should be considered until all
other options have been looked at and carefully evaluated. But, if all other options fail,
then we should at least have the right to die by self-deliverance.

Case Against Active Euthanasia

In The Declaration on Euthanasia by the
Catholic Church, the bishops state "By euthanasia is understood an action or an
omission which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in
this way be eliminated. Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the
intention of the will and in the methods used." The bishops also state that "the
word is used in a more particular sense to mean "mercy killing" for the purpose
of putting an end to extreme suffering, or having abnormal babies, the mentally ill or the
incurably sick from the prolongation, perhaps for many years of a miserable life, which
could impose too heavy a burden on their families or on society." The bishops of the
Catholic Church as well as those who are against active euthanasia make the claim that one
can never intend the death of oneself or the death of another person. They claim that
there is a moral difference between active and passive euthanasia which is contrary to
what James Rachels states in his article.

First, it is critical to the debate that we
have a clear concept of the language we use to define terms. There is a lot of
"verbal engineering" that takes place among those who advocate euthanasia.
Kenneth Overburg S.J. uses the following example to show that words can have implied
meanings:

Take for example, the two words killing
and murder. What is implied in each? Killing indicates that one person has
ended the life of another. That is an unfortunate event, indeed an evil. But we do not
know if it is a justified killing, for example, in self defense. Murder describes
the same physical act--one person has ended the life of another--but also includes a moral
evaluation--this was an unjustified act, and so a moral evil.

Roughly, "killing" implies an
activity, and "allowing to die" implies a certain passivity. But when we use the
term "allowing to die", it can be either justified or unjustified. Overberg
writes "Justified allowing to die means one does not needlessly interfere with the
dying process. This implies a certain passivity, yet may include withdrawing life-support
systems. Unjustified allowing to die means one fails to take steps that ought to be
taken." In the case unjustified allowing to die, if one intends the death of a person
and allows a person to die, such as in Rachels Jones case, it would be murder. But
if the agent were negligent, where the agent did not intend the death of a person, then
the action is still unjustified, but it isnt murder."

Before we can tell whether or not there is a
moral difference between passive and active euthanasia, we must determine the difference
between doing(killing) and allowing (letting die). I will use the article, "Actions,
Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and allowing(DDA)," by Warren
Quinn to show that there is a difference between the two. Quinn makes reference to
Rachels, who rejects DDA, argument of the adult who deliberately lets a child cousin drown
in order to inherit a family fortune. He agrees that this type of act is atrocious and it
does not seem any different than killing the child. Quinn states that "the objection
seems to presuppose that if letting someone die is ever more acceptable than killing
someone, it must be because some intrinsic moral disvalue attaches to killing, but not to
letting die." He does not formulate the DDA as the view that allowing to die is more
acceptable than killing, but rather as a difference in the violation of rights:

The basic thing is not that killing is
intrinsically worse than letting die, or more generally that harming is worse than failing
to save from harm, but that these different choices run up against different kinds of
rights--one of which is stronger than the other in the sense that it is less easily
defeated. Such relations between rights are possible because the moral blame for the
violation of a right depends very much more on motive and expected harm than on the degree
to which the right is defensible.

Quinn uses the rationale that Phillipa Foot
borrowed from law but applied to morality, the distinction between positive and negative
rights. He writes,

Negative rights are claim rights against
harmful intervention, interference, assault, aggression, ect. and might therefore seem to
proscribe harmful positive agency, whether by action of the agent himself or by action of
some object to which, by strategic inaction, he lends a hand. Positive rights, on the
other hand, are claim rights to aid or support, and would therefore seem to proscribe
harmful negative agency.

Quinn says that we seem to intuitively know
that negative rights are harder to override and take precedence over general positive
rights. He writes "If there is going to be precedence, it clearly has to be
precedence of negative rights." Quinn uses the example of the human person, who is
constituted of body and mind. He says that the mind and body are parts and aspects of the
person and for this very reason, "he/she should have primary say over what may be
done to them-not because any arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but because
any arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity." Quinn concludes
from this reasoning that in giving a person authority over his body and mind, morality
recognizes his existence as an individual with ends of his own. "Quinn seems to
suggest, from this conclusion, that life is a good worth living even if we suffer, because
we should not violate the negative rights of a person. He might posit that most people
will believe that life is intrinsically good which is contrary to Derek Humphreys
view."

People have a right to live the lives they
want to without being forced by another person. As Quinn states later on in his article,
"negative rights define the terms of moral possibility. Their precedence is essential
to the moral fact of our lives, minds, and bodies really being ours. We think respect for
rights a good thing precisely because we think people have them--and, if my account is
correct, that they have them because it is fitting that they should."

Quinn concludes that "there is nothing
absurd in saying that the adult acts as badly when he lets the child drown as when he
drowns the child, while insisting that there are contexts in which the child would retain
the right not to be killed but not the right to be saved." Rachels example is
poor, because the intent was to kill the child in both cases. By killing the child in
Rachels example, the adult violated the negative rights of the child not to be
harmed. In the other case, although the adult did not seize the child and allowed the
child to drown, he, nevertheless, did act by choosing to let him drown. In the second case
Jones never had the intention of saving the child, so therefore he violated the
childs positive rights, but planned to violate the childs negative rights.
"In both cases, the intention and ends were the same." The distinction in the
nature of the acts of killing and allowing to die is accompanied by a difference in
causation. In one case, Smith seeks to cause the death of the child and employs direct
means to achieve this result. In the other case, Jones accepts but does not cause the
childs death, but he intended the death of the child. Rachels assumes that the
doctor in the case of active euthanasia has the same intention and end as the doctor who
allows a patient to die, when in fact both doctors do not share the same intention, means
of carrying out the intention, or end for the patient they are treating.

If we use Quinns idea between negative
and positive rights, we can see that there is a distinction between active euthanasia
(killing) and passive euthanasia (allowing to die). In a case where a patient is
terminally ill and death is imminent, to actively kill another person, except that of self
defense, violates the negative rights of that person. For Quinn violating a negative right
isnt worse than violating a positive right. He does make a distinction that negative
rights are harder to override than positive rights and, therefore, take precedence over
positive rights. The doctor in this case intends to kill and cause the death of the
patient, in order to relieve the suffering of the patient. If a doctor allows the patient
to die, he is not the cause of death, but by doing nothing, he violates the patients
positive rights to help. The doctor in this case, does not intend the death of the
patient, but rather accepts the fact that he cant help the patient and that the
patient will only get worse, so he allows the patient to die of the illness or ailment as
comfortably as possible. In this case it is harder for the doctor to override the negative
right not to kill the patient than letting the patient die of the illness that caused
him/her to be in the fatal situation. Since I have shown that there is a difference
between active and passive euthanasia and that killing a patient is not a justified means
to alleviate terminal pain and suffering, Rachels argument that there is no
necessary moral difference between active and passive euthanasia is not correct.

Derek Humphrey tries to make a finer
distinction between suicide and self-deliverance. he considers suicide to be done out of
emotional or psychological stress and self-deliverance to be done out of a rational
consideration before taking ones life. Then again, the same argument that applies to
Rachels also applies to Humphrey. The act of intentionally killing one person by another,
as in the case of active euthanasia, is a violation of that persons negative rights.
Just because someone rationally considers their own death does not change the nature of
the act nor does it make killing, for the sake of relieving terminal suffering, any
better.

I believe that the Doctrine of Double
Effect(DDE) also determines that the taking of one life by another is wrong. The DDE, as
stated by John of St. Thomas, says the following:

If an act, not evil in itself, has both good
and bad effects then it may be permissible if (1) the evil effect is not intended; (2) the
good effect is not produced by means of the bad; (3) on balance, the good done outweighs
the harm.

The act of intentionally killing of a
terminally ill patient, no matter if it is to relieve suffering or other incapacitating
illnesses, cannot be justified by DDE, for (1) Killing intentionally a patient is evil in
itself; (2) the evil effect of death is intended; and (3) the good effect of relieving the
suffering is brought about by killing the patient. Neither Rachels nor Humphrey can
justify the killing of terminally ill patients based on this doctrine, but then again they
do not appeal to it for the justification of active euthanasia.

Two of the other words that are extremely
important and commonly used are "ordinary means" and "extraordinary
means." The terms "ordinary means" and "extraordinary means" are
controversial and ambiguous as to their meanings. It would seem that "ordinary
means" are those medical procedures that ought to be done in order that the patient
would receive basic human needs and care. "Extraordinary means" of life-support
seems to mean those medical procedures that are optional to keep a patient alive, but the
benefits produced by these means may be less than the burdens imposed on the patient or
family. The distinction between "ordinary means" and "extraordinary
means" is not always clear. Advocates for and against active euthanasia agree that
one must make use of ordinary means of medical help and that extraordinary means are
optional. Kenneth Overburg recognizes that there are two problems when these words are
used in the debate:

First, ethicists are not referring to medical
procedures alone when they speak of ordinary and extraordinary. They are speaking of the
overall effort made to keep the person alive in relation to how those efforts will help
the patient pursue lifes purposes. Secondly, even if one equates the terms ordinary
and extraordinary solely with medical procedures, as many people do, whether a procedure
is ordinary or extraordinary depends on upon what medical help is available in a given
time and place. Also, since medical technology is developing much more rapidly than
medical-moral reflection and analysis, the defining of procedures that are ordinary and
extraordinary have also changed in light of new medical advances.

Anti-active euthanasia proponents say that we
are never obliged to use extraordinary means to prolong life, but with the patients
consent, a doctor can interrupt extraordinary means, where there is no hope of recovery.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church states,

Discontinuing medical procedures that are
burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be
legitimate; it is the refusal of "over-zealous" treatment. Here one does not
will to cause death; ones inability to impede is merely accepted. The decisions
should be made by the patient if he is competent and able or, if not, by those legally
entitled to act for the patient, whose reasonable will and legitimate interests must
always be respected.

In the case of passive euthanasia, a doctor
merely accepts the condition that he cannot help the patient to recover, therefore he
allows the patient to die from the already existing fatal pathology. The doctor does not
intend to kill the patient, whereas in active euthanasia, the doctor effectively causes
the death of the patient. A patient may also "refuse forms of treatment that would
only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life," because the patient
may come to accept the condition that he is going to die of the existing fatal pathology.

If the patient is suffering terribly from the
illness and death is imminent, the ordinary care owed to the patient cannot be
discontinued, but painkillers can be used to alleviate suffering even if doing so will
shorten the length of days the person has to live, because one is not intending the death
of the patient. Palliative is used most often to make the terminally ill as comfortable as
possible. Advocates against euthanasia know that palliative care for the terminally ill is
not perfect, but with current and future medical advances, it is and will get better.
Humphrey thinks that palliative care is good, but there should be the option for active
euthanasia. But, as it was determined earlier in this paper, one cannot justify the taking
of one life by another person as in the case of active euthanasia.

There is a valid fear among people today of
being kept alive at all costs using extraordinary means. In many cases euthanasia does
initially seem to be the merciful response. But, active euthanasia cannot be justified as
an option for medical treatment. We must try to increase the quality of palliative care
for the dying and make them as comfortable as possible. The taking of life, even though
for a good motive, is an action which will undermine our humanity.