Military Agency, Politics and the State : The Case of Pakistan

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Abstract

This thesis sought to explain military intervention in Pakistan’s politics. Theoretically, the thesis maintained that the existing accounts on Pakistan’s civil-military relations (CMR) demote agency, de-emphasize rationality and ignore context. Similar shortcomings were identified in the literature on CMR theory except the actor-oriented work. Thus, the study built its agency model of Pakistan’s civil-military relations. Methodologically, the model was married to the method of analytic narrative whereby each of the five coups was given an analytical narrative treatment. In addition, primary and secondary sources were used. Both theoretically and empirically, the study posited that at Partition the politicians assumed Pakistan’s principalship. However, the former preferred its own interests; the agents saw to their own. Hence, the rational military opted to shirk in 1958. The coup was instrumental for the military to grow economically. As principal,, however, military agency caused another coup in 1969. However, the state disintegrated in December 1971 and, contextually, the politicians’ preference prevailed. The latter failed, as principal, to prefer a larger interest. On its part, the rational military shirked in 1977. The coup, caused by its agency, was instrumental for the military to grow economically. In 1999 the military agency caused another coup to punish the shirking politicians. This further added to the principal’s economic strength. Surprisingly, the judiciary shirked while preferring a larger interest in 2007. The military's agency caused another coup. The latter facilitated its economic interests. In sum, the thesis has maintained that coups were a function of military agency. Coups were rational in nature and political in character. Moreover, they benefited the military economically. In addition, the study posits that its hypotheses hold on empirical ground. As regards generalizations of these findings, the present research posits that military intervention in politics can be explained (cross-nationally), by taking military agency and rationality into account. Furthermore, the hypotheses of present research could be tested cross-culturally since their testability shall not compromise the importance of context.