1. That moral
law requires love or benevolence, and that this is the sum of its
requirements.

2. That
benevolence is good-will to being in general. In other words, that
it consists in the impartial choice of the good of being, as an
end, or for its own sake.

3. That
obedience to moral law is a unit, or that it invariably consists
in disinterested benevolence. That consecration to the highest
good of being, is virtue, and comprehensive of the whole of
virtue.

4. That
feeling and outward action are only results of ultimate intention,
and in themselves are neither virtue nor vice.

5. That all
choice and volition must terminate upon some object, and that this
object must be chosen as an end, or as a means.

6. That the
choice of anything as a means to an end is, in fact, only carrying
into execution the ultimate choice, or the choice of an
end.

7. That the
mind must have chosen an end, or it cannot choose the means. That
is, the choice of means implies the previous choice of an
end.

8. That moral
character belongs to the ultimate intention only, or to the choice
of an end.

9. That
virtue, or obedience to moral law, consists in choosing in
accordance with the demands of the intellect, in opposition to
following the feelings, desires, or impulses of the
sensibility.

10. That
whatever is chosen for its own sake, and not as a means to an end,
is and must be chosen as an end.

11. That the
mind must always have an end in view, or it cannot choose at all.
That is, as has been said, the will must have an object of choice,
and this object must be regarded as an end, or as a
means.

12. That the
fundamental reason for choosing an end, and the end chosen, are
identical. That is, the fundamental reason of the obligation to
choose a thing, must be found in the nature of the thing itself,
and this reason is the end or thing chosen. For example: if the
intrinsic value of a thing be the foundation of the obligation to
choose it, the intrinsically valuable is the end or thing chosen.

II. Show
in what disobedience to moral law cannot consist.

1. It cannot
consist in malevolence, or in the choice of evil or misery as an
ultimate end. This will appear, if we consider,--

(1.) That the
choice of an end implies the choice of it, not for no reason, but
for a reason, and for its own intrinsic value, or because the mind
prizes it on its own account. But moral agents are so constituted,
that they cannot regard misery as intrinsically valuable. They
cannot, therefore, choose it as an ultimate end, nor prize it on
its own account.

(2.) To will
misery as an ultimate end, would imply the choice of universal
misery, and every degree of it, according to its relative
amount.

(3.) The
choice of universal misery as an end, implies the choice of all
the means necessary to that end.

(4.) The end
chosen is identical with the reason for choosing it. To say that a
thing can be chosen without any reason, is to say that nothing is
chosen, or that there is no object of choice, or that there is
actually no choice. Misery may be chosen to assert our own
sovereignty; but this were to choose self-gratification, and not
misery, as an ultimate end. To choose misery as an ultimate end,
is to choose it, not to assert my own sovereignty, nor for any
other reason than because it is misery.

(5.) To
choose an end is not to choose without any reason, as has been
said, but for some reason.

(6.) To
choose misery as an end, is to choose it for the reason that it is
misery, and that misery is preferred to happiness, for its own
sake, which is absurd. Such a supposition overlooks the very
nature of choice.

(7.) To will
misery as a means is possible, but this is not malevolence, but
might be either benevolence or selfishness.

(8.) The
constitution of moral beings renders malevolence, or the willing
of misery for its own sake, impossible. Therefore disobedience to
moral law cannot consist in malevolence.

2.
Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in the constitution of
soul or body. The law does not command us to have a certain
constitution, nor forbid us to have the constitution with which we
came into being.

3. It cannot
consist in any unavoidable state, either of the sensibility or of
the intelligence; for these, as we have seen, are involuntary, and
are dependent upon the actings of the will.

4. It cannot
consist in outward actions, independent of the design with which
they are put forth, for these, we have seen are controlled by the
actions of the will, and, therefore, can have no moral character
in themselves.

5. It cannot
consist in inaction: for total inaction is to a moral agent
impossible. Moral agents are necessarily active. That is, they
cannot exist as moral agents without choice. They must, by a law
of necessity, choose either in accordance with, or in opposition
to, the law of God. They are free to choose in either direction,
but they are not free to abstain from choice altogether. Choose
they must. The possession of free-will, and the perception of
opposing objects of choice, either exciting desire, or developing
the rational affirmation of obligation to choose, render choice
one way or the other inevitable. The law directs how they ought to
choose. If they do not choose thus, it must be because they choose
otherwise, and not because they do not choose at all.

6. It cannot
consist in the choice of moral evil, or sin, as an ultimate end.
Sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, or it
is intention itself. If it be intention itself, then to make sin
an end of intention, would be to make intention or choice
terminate on itself, and the sinner must choose his own choice, or
intend his own intention as an end: this is absurd.

If sin is but
an element or attribute of choice or intention, then to suppose
the sinner to choose it as an end, were to make choice or
intention terminate on an element or attribute of itself, to
suppose him to choose as an end an element of his own choice. This
also is absurd and a contradiction.

The nature of
a moral being forbids that he should choose sin for its own sake.
He may choose those things the choosing of which is sinful, but it
is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the intention
terminates. This is naturally impossible. Sin may be chosen as a
means of gratifying a malicious feeling, but this is not choosing
it as an end, but as a means. Malevolence, strictly speaking, is
in itself impossible to a moral agent. That is, the choice of
moral or natural evil for its own sake, contradicts the nature of
moral agents, and the nature of ultimate choice, and is therefore
impossible. In common language we may charge them with
malevolence; but, strictly speaking, the evil is not the end, but
the gratification of the malicious feeling of the selfish being is
the end.

7.
Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in self-love. Self-love
is simply the constitutional desire of happiness. It is altogether
an involuntary state. It has, as a desire, no moral character, any
more than has the desire of food. It is no more sinful to desire
happiness, and properly to seek it, than it is wrong to desire
food, and properly to seek that.

III. What
disobedience to moral law must consist in.

1. It must
consist in choice or ultimate intention, for moral character
belongs strictly only to ultimate intention.

2. As all
choice must terminate on an end, or on means, and as the means
cannot be chosen until the end is chosen, and but for its sake, it
follows that disobedience to the moral law must consist in the
choice of some end, or ends, inconsistent with its
requisitions.

3. We have
seen that misery, or natural evil, cannot be chosen as an end by a
moral agent. So this cannot be the end chosen.

4. We have
seen also that moral evil, or sin, cannot be chosen as an ultimate
end.

5.
Disobedience to God's law must consist in the choice of
self-gratification as an end. In other words, it must consist
essentially in committing the will, and through the will
committing the whole being, to the indulgence of self-love, as the
supreme and ultimate end of life. This is selfishness. In other
words, it is seeking to gratify the desire of personal good, in a
manner prohibited by the law of God.

It consists
in choosing self-gratification as an end, or for its own sake,
instead of choosing, in accordance with the law of the reason and
of God, the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an
ultimate end. In other words still, sin or disobedience to the
moral law, consists in the consecration of the heart and life to
the gratification of the constitutional and artificial desires,
rather than in obedience to the law of the intelligence. Or, once
more, sin consists in being governed by impulses of the
sensibility, instead of being governed by the law of God, as it
lies revealed in the reason.

That this is
sin, and the whole of sin, viewed in its germinating principles,
will appear, if we consider:--

1. That this
state of mind, or this choice is the "carnal mind," or the minding
of the flesh, which the apostle affirms to be "enmity against
God."

2. It is the
universal representation of scripture, that sin consists in the
spirit of self-seeking.

3. This
spirit of self-seeking is always in the Bible represented as the
contrast or opposite of disinterested benevolence, or the love
which the law requires. "Ephraim bringeth forth fruit to himself,"
is the sum of God's charges against sinners.

4.
Selfishness is always spoken of in terms of reprobation in the
Bible.

5. It is
known by every moral agent to be sinful.

6. It is, in
fact, the end which all unregenerate men pursue, and the only end
they pursue.

7. When we
come to the consideration of the attributes of selfishness, it
will be seen that every form of sin, not only may, but must
resolve itself into selfishness, just as we have seen that every
form of virtue does and must resolve itself into love or
benevolence.

8. From the
laws of its constitution, the mind is shut up to the necessity of
choosing that, as an ultimate end, which is regarded by the mind
as intrinsically good or valuable in itself. This is the very idea
of choosing an end, to wit, something chosen for its own sake, or
for what it is in and of itself, or, because it is regarded by the
mind as intrinsically valuable to self, or to being in general, or
to both.

9. The
gratification or happiness of being is necessarily regarded by the
mind as a good in itself, or as intrinsically valuable.

10. Nothing
else is or can be regarded as valuable in itself, or finally, but
the good of being.

11. Moral
agents are, therefore, shut up to the necessity of willing the
good of being, either partially or impartially, either good to
self, or good to being in general. Nothing else can possibly be
chosen as an end or for its own sake. Willing the good of being
impartially, as we have seen, is virtue. To will it partially is
to will it, not for its own sake, except upon condition of its
relation to self. That is, it is to will good to self. In other
words, it is to will the gratification of self as an end, in
opposition to willing the good of universal being as an end, and
every good, or the good of every being, according to its intrinsic
value.

12. But may
not one will the good of a part of being as an end, or for the
sake of the intrinsic value of their good? This would not be
benevolence, for that, as we have seen, must consist in willing
good for its own sake, and implies the willing of every good, and
of the highest good of universal being. It would not be
selfishness, as it would not be willing good to, or the
gratification of, self. It would be sin, for it would be the
partial love or choice of good. It would be loving some of my
neighbours, but not all of them. It would, therefore, be sin, but
not selfishness. If this can be, then there is such a thing
possible, whether actual or not, as sin that does not consist in
selfishness. But let us examine whether this supposition would not
resolve itself into selfishness.

To say that I
choose good for its own sake, or because it is valuable to being,
that is, in obedience to the law of my reason, and of God, implies
that I choose all possible good, and every good according to its
relative value. If, then, a being chooses his own good, or the
good of any being as an ultimate end, in obedience to the law of
reason, it must be that he chooses, for the same reason, the
highest possible good of all sentient being.

The partial
choice of good implies the choice of it, not merely for its own
sake, but upon condition of its relations to self, or to certain
particular persons. Its relations conditionate the choice. When
its relations to self conditionate the choice, so that it is
chosen, not for its intrinsic value, irrespective of its
relations, but for its relations to self, this is selfishness. It
is the partial choice of good. If I choose the good of others
besides myself, and choose good because of its relations to them,
it must be either--

1. Because I
love their persons with the love of fondness, and will their good
for that reason, that is, to gratify my affection for them, which
is selfishness; or--

2. Because of
their relations to me, so that good to them is in some way a good
to me, which also is selfishness; or--

3. Upon
condition that they are worthy, which is benevolence; for if I
will good to a being upon condition that he is worthy, I must
value the good for its own sake, and will it particularly to him,
because he deserves it. This is benevolence, and not the partial
choice of good, because it is obeying the law of my reason. If I
will the good of any being, or number of beings, it must be for
some reason. I must will it as an end, or as a means. If I will it
as an end, it must be the universal or impartial choice of good.
If I will it as a means, it must be as a means to some end. The
end cannot be their good for its own sake, for this would be
willing it as an end, and not as a means. If I will it as a means,
it must be as a means of my own gratification.

Again: If I
will the good of any number of beings, I must do it in obedience
to the law either of my intelligence and of God, or of my
sensibility. But, if I will in obedience to the law of my
intelligence, it must be the choice of the highest good of
universal being. But if I will in obedience to the law or impulse
of my sensibility, it must be to gratify my feelings or desires.
This is selfishness.

Again: As the
will must either follow the law of the reason and of God, or the
impulses of the sensibility, it follows that moral agents are shut
up to the necessity of being selfish or benevolent, and that there
is no third way, because there is no third medium, through which
any object of choice, can be presented. The mind can absolutely
know nothing as an object of choice, that is not recommended by
one of these faculties. Selfishness, then, and benevolence, are
the only two alternatives.

Therefore,
disobedience to the moral law must essentially consist in
selfishness, and in selfishness alone.

It has been
said, that a moral agent may will the good of others for its own
sake, and yet not will the good of all. That is, that he may will
the good of some for its intrinsic value, and yet not will
universal good. But this is absurd. To make the valuable the
object of choice for its own sake, without respect to any
conditions or relations, is the same as to will all possible and
universal good: that is, the one necessarily implies and includes
the other. It has been asserted, for example, that an infidel
abolitionist may be conscious of willing and seeking the good of
the slave for its own sake, or disinterestedly, and yet not
exercise universal benevolence. I reply, he deceives himself, just
as a man would, who would say, he chooses fruit for its own sake.
The fact is, he is conscious of desiring fruit for its own sake.
But he does not and cannot choose it for its own sake. He chooses
it in obedience to his desire, that is, to gratify his desire. So
it is, and must be, with the infidel abolitionist. It cannot be
that he chooses the good of the slave in obedience to the law of
his intelligence and of God; for if he did, his benevolence would
be universal. It must be, then, that he chooses the good of the
slave, because he desires it, or to gratify a constitutional
desire. Men naturally desire their own happiness, and the
happiness of others: this is constitutional. But when, in
obedience to these desires, they will their own or others'
happiness, they seek to gratify their sensibility or desires: this
is selfishness.

Let it be
remembered, then, that sin is a unit, and always and necessarily
consists in selfish ultimate intention, and in nothing else. This
intention is sin; and thus we see that every phase of sin resolves
itself into selfishness. This will appear more and more, as we
proceed to unfold the subject of moral depravity.

This
file is CERTIFIED BY GOSPEL TRUTH MINISTRIES TO BE
CONFORMED TO THE ORIGINAL TEXT. For authenticity
verification, its contents can be compared to the
original file at www.GospelTruth.net
or by contacting Gospel Truth P.O. Box 6322, Orange, CA
92863. (C)2000. This file is not to be changed in any
way, nor to be sold, nor this seal to be
removed.