Nope. B was trying to reclaim property over which he believed he had a claim of right (and over which he did in fact have a claim of right). Robbery is simply a form of larceny, after all. You can't be guilty of robbery for stealing what you believe to be your own stuff.

I highly doubt they were looking for us to say that a claim of right over money isn't viable because money is fungible. Tons of Barbri questions hit the notion of robbery or larceny when the supposed robber was just takint back his own stuff and the answer was always the same. Dont overthink the essays. They only test on generalized points for the most part. And nowhere in the CMR distionctions does it say anything about money being fungible and falling outside the general principle. And even if claim of right is not a standalone defene in itself, it can still function to negate the intent requirement.

kaiser wrote:I highly doubt they were looking for us to say that a claim of right over money isn't viable because money is fungible. Tons of Barbri questions hit the notion of robbery or larceny when the supposed robber was just takint back his own stuff and the answer was always the same. Dont overthink the essays. They only test on generalized points for the most part. And nowhere in the CMR distionctions does it say anything about money being fungible and falling outside the general principle. And even if claim of right is not a standalone defene in itself, it can still function to negate the intent requirement.

I'm not over thinking anything. They were looking for us to apply NY law to a fact pattern. And that is the law that applies to the facts they presented, regardless of what Barbri says.

kaiser wrote:I highly doubt they were looking for us to say that a claim of right over money isn't viable because money is fungible. Tons of Barbri questions hit the notion of robbery or larceny when the supposed robber was just takint back his own stuff and the answer was always the same. Dont overthink the essays. They only test on generalized points for the most part. And nowhere in the CMR distionctions does it say anything about money being fungible and falling outside the general principle. And even if claim of right is not a standalone defene in itself, it can still function to negate the intent requirement.

I'm not over thinking anything. They were looking for us to apply NY law to a fact pattern. And that is the law that applies to the facts they presented, regardless of what Barbri says.

I just cant imagine them testing on such an insanely narrow point. And I don't understand how the mens rea is met either. But thank you for the info on this, as it was totally off my radar.

Bro I probably did the same thing on my MPT. Was crunched for time at the end and am pretty sure I fudged up and entered my real name in the header instead of "Applicant" or whatever. I'm in a different state, but my licensure analyst said it's no big deal and a ton of people do it. No chance of it getting disqualified.

I thought that I had read that in the Wills essay the insurance proceeds were paid out several weeks before death?? Originally I thought it had said after death but then I re-looked and thought it said before death. Am I incorrect?

k9999 wrote:I thought that I had read that in the Wills essay the insurance proceeds were paid out several weeks before death?? Originally I thought it had said after death but then I re-looked and thought it said before death. Am I incorrect?

First off, it doesn't matter because the gift was sold away by testator during his lifetime. That insurance proceeds were paid out for the 2012 porsche don't matter since that wasn't the specific 2009 porsche in the will. Second, I also think it was before death payment, in which case, even if we disregard the first point, it still wouldn't have gone to the son.

k9999 wrote:I thought that I had read that in the Wills essay the insurance proceeds were paid out several weeks before death?? Originally I thought it had said after death but then I re-looked and thought it said before death. Am I incorrect?

First off, it doesn't matter because the gift was sold away by testator during his lifetime. That insurance proceeds were paid out for the 2012 porsche don't matter since that wasn't the specific 2009 porsche in the will. Second, I also think it was before death payment, in which case, even if we disregard the first point, it still wouldn't have gone to the son.

Didn't the act of independent significance apply to save the car from ademption? I thought the gift was saved b/c still a car -> insurance paid after death -> son gets the proceeds...

The will didn't grant the son "a car" though. The will granted him specifically a "2009 porsche". The testator traded away his 2009 porsche, so that narrow and specific gift was subject to ademption. If a car is a car is a car, that would lead to some absurd consequences. It would be one thing if the grant said "whatever car I own upon death", but its another thing entirely to say "my 2009 Porsche". Ademption is a cold and rough principle, and I don't recall there being much leeway, aside from the 3 narrow exceptions provided to us.

Were the insurance proceeds paid out after death? I don't really recall. But as per the above point, I don't think it matters.

k9999 wrote:I thought that I had read that in the Wills essay the insurance proceeds were paid out several weeks before death?? Originally I thought it had said after death but then I re-looked and thought it said before death. Am I incorrect?

First off, it doesn't matter because the gift was sold away by testator during his lifetime. That insurance proceeds were paid out for the 2012 porsche don't matter since that wasn't the specific 2009 porsche in the will. Second, I also think it was before death payment, in which case, even if we disregard the first point, it still wouldn't have gone to the son.

Didn't the act of independent significance apply to save the car from ademption? I thought the gift was saved b/c still a car -> insurance paid after death -> son gets the proceeds...

The will didn't grant the son "a car" though. The will granted him specifically a "2009 porsche". The testator traded away his 2009 porsche, so that narrow and specific gift was subject to ademption. If a car is a car is a car, that would lead to some absurd consequences. It would be one thing if the grant said "whatever car I own upon death", but its another thing entirely to say "my 2009 Porsche". Ademption is a cold and rough principle, and I don't recall there being much leeway, aside from the 3 narrow exceptions provided to us.

Were the insurance proceeds paid out after death? I don't really recall. But as per the above point, I don't think it matters.

I said independent significance saved the car as well. Had a hypo on a law school exam almost exactly like that. Though not sure how NY's version works. Oh well.

and yeah, the proceeds were paid out after death.

lol i can't believe you people are still discussing answers. let it go already. (although i guess i did just chime in. dammit)

For K sub-issue I put perfect tender rule improper delivery due to quantity. Buyer can then accept, reject, or partially accept or reject. However, here under ucc 2-508 (1) seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the K time make a conforming delivery (2) where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller has reasonable grounds to believ would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender. So the accommodation or replacement here is valid bc seller notified the buyer that he would accommodate him with the remaining goods (hinges)within 30 days. In addition, a mentioned that time was not of the essence in this dealing.

For Corporations, I put duty of loyalty, self dealing, usurping business opportunity, derivative action (demand/futile), did NOT put piercing the corporate veil.

crytown wrote:For K sub-issue I put perfect tender rule improper delivery due to quantity. Buyer can then accept, reject, or partially accept or reject. However, here under ucc 2-508 (1) seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the K time make a conforming delivery (2) where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller has reasonable grounds to believ would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender. So the accommodation or replacement here is valid bc seller notified the buyer that he would accommodate him with the remaining goods (hinges)within 30 days. In addition, a mentioned that time was not of the essence in this dealing.

For Corporations, I put duty of loyalty, self dealing, usurping business opportunity, derivative action (demand/futile), did NOT put piercing the corporate veil.

Did anyone get anything different?

I'm genuinely sorry that you still remember what you wrote for these questions.

crytown wrote:Well thank you for your concern. Would you like comment on the question I posed? And again thank you for your interest.

Sorry, what I meant was I can barely even remember what the questions were anymore. Now that you mention it though, I do think your corps response sounds right. It was definitely about usurpation of corporate opportunities and futility of the demand requirement. And I don't remember any reason veil piercing would have been relevant. That contracts stuff I have literally no memory of.