Abraham Lincoln, Volume II eBook

Southern forces in detail as is rarely given by a good
general to an adversary whom he fears. Pope would
fain have availed himself of the chance, and in the
effort to do so he hurried his troops hither and thither,
mingled wise moves with foolish ones, confused his
subordinates, fatigued his men, and finally accomplished
nothing. Jackson retired safely from his dangerous
position, rejoined the rest of the Southern army,
and then the united force had as its immediate purpose
to fight Pope before he could receive reinforcements
from McClellan’s army, now rapidly coming forward
by way of Washington. E converso, Pope’s
course should have been to retire a day’s march
across Bull Run and await the additional troops who
could at once join him there. Unfortunately,
however, he still felt the sting of the ridicule which
his ill-starred manifesto had called forth, and was
further irritated by the unsatisfactory record of
the past few days, and therefore was in no temper
to fall back. So he did not, but stayed and fought
what is known as the second battle of Bull Run.
In the conflict his worn-out men showed such constancy
that the slaughter on both sides was great. Again,
however, the bravery of the rank and file was the only
feature which the country could contemplate without
indignation. The army was beaten; and retired
during the evening of August 30 to a safe position
at Centreville, whither it should have been taken without
loss two days earlier.[29] Thus was fulfilled, with
only a trifling inaccuracy in point of time, the prediction
made by McClellan on August 10, that “Pope will
be badly thrashed within ten days."[30]

In all this manoeuvring and fighting the commanding
general had shown some capacity, but very much less
than was indispensable in a commander who had to meet
the generals of the South. Forthwith, also, there
broke out a series of demoralizing quarrels among
the principal officers as to what orders had been
given and received, and whether or not they had been
understood or misunderstood, obeyed or disobeyed.
Also the enemies of General McClellan tried to lay
upon him the whole responsibility for the disaster,
on the ground that he had been dilatory, first, in
moving his army from Harrison’s Landing, and
afterward, in sending his troops forward to join Pope;
whereas, they said, if he had acted promptly, the
Northern army would have been too strong to have been
defeated, regardless of any incompetence in the handling
of it. Concerning the former charge, it may be
said that dispatches had flown to and fro between
Halleck and McClellan like bullets between implacable
duelists; Halleck ordered the army to be transported,
and McClellan retorted that he was given no transports;
it is a dispute which cannot be discussed here.
Concerning the other charge, it was also true that
the same two generals had been for some days exchanging
telegrams, but had been entirely unable to understand
each other. Whose fault it was cannot easily