Nazi Gold: The Merkers Mine Treasure

By Greg Bradsher

Late on the evening of March 22, 1945,
elements of Lt. Gen. George Patton's Third Army crossed the Rhine, and soon
thereafter his whole army crossed the river and drove into the heart of Germany.
Advancing northeast from Frankfurt, elements of the Third Army cut into the
future Soviet Zone and advanced on Gotha. Just before noon on April 4, the village
of Merkers fell to the Third Battalion of the 358th Infantry Regiment, Ninetieth
Infantry Division, Third Army. During that day and the next the Ninetieth Infantry
Division, with its command post at Keiselbach, consolidated its holdings in
the Merkers area.(1)

During April 4 and 5, displaced persons in the vicinity
interrogated by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel of
the Ninetieth Infantry Division mentioned a recent movement of
German Reichsbank gold from Berlin to the Wintershal AG's
Kaiseroda potassium mine at Merkers. In all of these instances
they quoted rumors, but none stated their own knowledge that gold
was present in the mine. But just before noon on April 5, a
member of Military Intelligence Team 404-G, attached to the 358th
Infantry Regiment, who was in Bad Salzungen, about six miles from
Merkers, interviewed French displaced persons who had worked in
the mine at Merkers. They told him they had heard that gold had
been stored in the mine. The information was passed on to the G-2
(intelligence section) of the Ninetieth Infantry Division, and
orders were issued prohibiting all civilians from circulating in
the area of the mine.(2)

Early the next morning, two military policemen guarding the
road entering Keiselbach from Merkers saw two women approaching
and promptly challenged and stopped them. Upon questioning, the
women stated that they were French displaced persons. One of the
women was pregnant and said she was being accompanied by the
other to see a midwife in Keiselbach. After being questioned at
the XII Corps Provost Marshal Office, they were driven back into
Merkers. Upon entering Merkers, their driver saw the Kaiseroda
mine and asked the women what sort of a mine it was. They said it
was the mine in which the German gold reserve and valuable
artworks had been deposited several weeks before and added that
local civilians and displaced persons had been used for labor in
unloading and storing the treasure in the mine.(3)

By noon on April 6 the women's story had reached Lt. Col.
William A. Russell the Ninetieth Infantry Division's G-5
(civilian affairs) officer. He proceeded to the mine, where
interviews with displaced persons in the area confirmed the
women's story. They told him that works of art were also stored
in the mine and that Dr. Paul Ortwin Rave, curator of the German
State Museum in Berlin as well an assistant director of the
National Galleries in Berlin, was present to care for the
paintings. Russell then confronted mine officials with this
information, and they stated they knew that gold and valuable art
were stored in the mine and that other mines in the area were
likewise used for storing valuables. Russell also questioned
Werner Veick, the head cashier of the Reichsbank's Foreign Notes
Department who was also at the mine, and Rave. The latter
informed Russell that he was in Merkers to care for paintings
stored in the mine. Veick indicated that the gold in the mine
constituted the entire reserve of the Reichsbank in Berlin.(4)

With this evidence, Russell requested that the 712th Tank
Battalion be ordered to proceed to Merkers to guard the entrances
to the mine. Elements of the Ninetieth Division Military Police
were also deployed about the entrances, and arrangements were
made for generation of power and electricity at the mine so that
the shafts could be entered for examination the next morning.
Later that afternoon, after it was learned that there were at
least five possible entrances to the mine at Merkers and that one
tank battalion would not be sufficient to guard them all, Russell
requested reinforcements. That evening Maj. Gen. Herbert L.
Earnest, the Ninetieth Infantry Division's commanding general,
called the 357th Infantry Regiment then at Leimbach and ordered
that its First Battalion proceed to Merkers to relieve the
Ninetieth Division Military Police and reinforce the 712th Tank
Battalion.(5)

Russell also that afternoon told a XII Corps G-5 officer
what was going on at the mine site, and word was passed on to the
Corps Commander Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. He immediately called
Patton and informed him of the capture of the German gold
reserves at Merkers. Patton, who had been burned on so many
rumors, told him not to mention the capture of the gold until
they definitely confirmed it.(6)

As the evening ended, with the anticipation of what they
might find the next day, there must have been excitement. All
involved knew that they had perhaps stumbled upon something
important, something that political and military leaders expected
to find somewhere in Germany--its gold reserves. The Allies,
through their intelligence and diplomatic sources, knew that the
Nazis had looted hundreds of millions of dollars worth of gold
from many central banks of Europe, and despite sending much of it
to neutral countries in payment for war goods, they still had a
considerable quantity.(7) If, indeed, they had captured the
Reich's monetary reserve, the war might be ended sooner, as the
Germans would be less able to procure essential war-making
materials.

Throughout most of the war, the bulk of the German gold
reserves was held at the Reichsbank in Berlin. In 1943, however,
some gold bars were shipped to numerous branches of the
Reichsbank. During late 1944 and early 1945, as American bombing
of Berlin increased and the Allies pushed toward the city from
the east and west, more of the gold reserve was dispersed to
branch banks in central and southern Germany. Also, early in
1945, a large quantity of Reichsmarks were dispatched from Berlin
to branch banks.(8)

The dispersal of Reichsbank assets went into full swing in
February 1945. On February 3, 937 B-17 bombers of the Eighth Air
Force dropped nearly twenty-three hundred tons of bombs on
Berlin, causing the near demolition of the Reichsbank, including
its presses for printing currency. Following the bombing, Walter
Funk, president of the Reichsbank and Reich minister of
economics, decided to send most of the gold reserves, worth some
$238 million, and a large quantity of the monetary reserves to a
mine at Merkers, about two hundred miles southwest of Berlin, for
safekeeping. Space in that mine, like all of the other salt and
potassium mines in Germany, had been requisitioned by the
government because firms found it necessary to store materials
and continue armament production underground because of the
bombings.(9)

On February 11 most of the gold reserves, including gold
brought back from the branch banks to Berlin for shipment to
Merkers, currency reserves totaling a billion Reichsmarks bundled
in one thousand bags, and a considerable quantity of foreign
currency, were transported by rail to Merkers. Once the train
reached Merkers, the treasure was unloaded and placed in a
special vault area in the mine designated Room No. 8.(10)

In addition to the shipment to Merkers, it was decided to
send a substantial quantity of currency and staff to the
Reichsbank branch in Erfurt in early February. The currency and
upwards of ten employees were sent packing to Erfurt. Among them
were Veick and Otto Reimer, chief cashier in the Reichsmarks
Department. Once there they began circulating money to other
branch banks as well as sending some of it back to Berlin when
the need arose. Currency was also taken out of the Merkers mine
and redistributed to branch banks and to the Reichsbank in Berlin
as needed.(11)

The Schutzstaffeln's (SS) Office for Economy and
Administration, which operated the concentration camps, also
wanted their loot held by the Reichsbank to be sent to Merkers
for safekeeping. From August 26, 1942, until January 27, 1945,
the SS made seventy-six deliveries to the Reichsbank of property
seized from concentration camp victims. This stolen property was
received for a holding account in the name of "Melmer," named for
SS Capt. Bruno Melmer, who made most of the deliveries. Gold
jewelry was sold abroad; gold of some fineness was sold either to
the Prussian Mint or to Degussa, a large German industrial firm
that engaged in the refinement of precious metals. Securities,
foreign currency, and similar items were purchased by the
Reichsbank. Much of the miscellaneous jewelry was sold through
the Berlin Municipal Pawn Shop. Once the transactions took place,
the proceeds were credited to the account of "Max Heiliger,"
codeword for Heinrich Himmler and his SS. By early 1945, much of
the loot had been processed, but a significant amount still
remained with the Reichsbank.(12)

The confiscated property on hand in March 1945 consisted of
all kinds of gold and silver items ranging from dental work to
cigarette cases, diamonds, gold and silver coins, foreign
currencies, and gold and silver bars. The gold and silver bars
were placed in 18 bags, and the remainder of the loot was placed
in 189 suitcases, trunks, and boxes and, along with other items,
were sent by rail to Merkers on March 18. The shipment was under
the control of Albert Thoms, head of the Reichsbank's Precious
Metals Department. Once the SS loot arrived, it was stored in
Room No. 8 along with the gold and currency.(13)

To protect the nation's art treasures, the Reichminister for
Education decided in March to ship them to mines for safekeeping.
The first shipment took place on March 16, 1945, when forty-five
cases of art from the Kaiser-Freiderichs Museum were shipped from
Berlin to Ransbach, about nine miles from Merkers, for storage in
a nearby mine. Rave, who had been sent with the shipment, found
that the mine was unsuitable for a deposit, and therefore it was
decided that subsequent shipments would go to Merkers. Between
March 20 and March 31 the Germans transported one-fourth of the
major holdings of fourteen of the principal Prussian state
museums to Merkers. Rave was ordered to stay at Merkers and watch
over the collection.(14)

As the Third Army moved toward Merkers, the Reichsbank
officials decided to remove the entire reserves, including the
art works, back to Berlin, but they were hampered by the speed of
the American advance and the partial shutdown of the Germany
railway system due to the Easter holidays. By April 1, bank
officials had given up all hope of moving the gold and
concentrated on the Reichsmarks, which were in short supply in
some parts of Germany. On April 2, Reichsbank officials at Erfurt
received orders to get the Reichsmarks at Merkers and distribute
them to other places in the Reich, and three bank officials,
Thoms, Reimer, and Director Frommknicht, arrived at Erfurt to
assist in the distribution. Late that day Thoms, Reimer, Veick,
and a man named Kaese set out for Merkers. They were joined the
next morning by Frommknicht and seven other Reichsbank employees.
They loaded about 200 million Reichsmarks and some fifty packages
of foreign currency unto a two-and-one-half-ton truck. That
afternoon Kaese drove off with the Reichsmarks destined for
Magdeburg and Halle and the foreign currency for Berlin.(15)

Then the Germans, with the help of some twenty Polish
workers given to them by mine officials, began the process of
taking the rest of the currency out of the mine. They took a
considerable sum to Bad Salzung and loaded it into one railway
car. At 7 p.m., learning the Americans were fast approaching,
they stopped their work. On their way back to their hotel they
learned that a bridge over which the train was to pass had been
blown up. The currency was brought back to Merkers, and they
decided to put it back in the mine. They were unable to get
workers to take the currency back into the mine that night, so
they waited until the next morning.(16)

Early the next morning, April 4, the Germans and their
Polish workers started taking the currency back down into the
mine, knowing that the Americans would soon be arriving. Because
Frommknicht had the key to the vault, and he and Thoms had left
Merkers to make their escape, the others had to leave the
currency near the shaft elevator. Meanwhile, some American
soldiers appeared on the scene, but they did not appear too
interested in the work, believing this was some routine mine
operation. Veick and Reimer, with their Polish workers, continued
taking the currency back down into the mine. Meanwhile,
Frommknicht and Thoms, after burning some papers, headed for
Erfurt. While they were walking along the road, American vehicles
overtook them, and they ran for the forest. Frommknicht got away,
but Thoms was captured by American soldiers. Within the week he
would be brought back to Merkers for questioning.(17)

The Americans Enter the Mine
On the morning of April 7 military personnel interrogated
civilians to obtain information on storage of Reich property in
the mine. Also that morning, new entrances to this mine and to
other nearby mines were found by the Americans at Leimbach,
Ransbach, and Springen. Guards were immediately placed at these
entrances. Later that morning, General Earnest directed that a
company of the First Battalion of the 357th Infantry Regiment be
posted to guard the main entrance of the Merkers mine. This
company was reinforced with tanks from the 712th Tank Battalion,
tank destroyers from the 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Jeeps
mounting machine guns for antiaircraft defense. Reinforced rifle
companies were also ordered to guard entrances at Kaiseroda and
Dietlas. Around 11 a.m. another entrance to the mine was found at
Statinfsfeld by the First Battalion. Accordingly, a tank
destroyer company was dispatched to guard this entrance.(18)

At 10 a.m. Russell, the assistant division commander, and
two other Ninetieth Infantry Division officers, Signal Corps
photographers, Rave, and German mining officials entered the
mine. The elevator took them to the bottom of the main shaft
twenty-one hundred feet beneath the surface. In the main haulage
way, stacked against the walls, they found 550 bags of
Reichsmarks. Moving down the tunnel, the Americans found the main
vault. It was blocked by a brick wall three feet thick, enclosing
a portion of the mine at least one hundred feet wide. In the
center of the wall was a large bank-type steel safe door,
complete with combination lock and timing mechanism with a heavy
steel door set in the middle of it. Attempts to open the steel
vault door were unsuccessful. That afternoon Veick told Russell
the gold was all in one room behind the vault door. Word soon
reached General Eddy, and he called Patton to inform him that the
mine had been entered and that a significant amount of
Reichsmarks found, but that the gold, if it existed, was behind a
steel door. Patton ordered Eddy to blow the door. Eddy summoned
army engineers to the mine, and arrangements were made for
blasting an entrance in the vault the following morning.(19)

Meanwhile the Ninetieth Infantry Division was continuing on
the offensive and needed all of its forces. So at 5 p.m. the
357th Infantry Regiment was ordered to move out and join up with
the division's other units, with the exception of the First
Battalion, which was to pass to division control and to continue
guarding the mine, and Third Battalion guards were to be relieved
by elements of the First Battalion. By that evening three
companies of the First Battalion were guarding the entrances at
Merkers, Kaiseroda, Leimbach, Springen, and Dietlas, with the
assistance of one platoon of heavy machine guns and two sections
of light tanks. The Merkers, Dietlas, and Kaiseroda factory areas
were guarded by a perimeter defense, and special guards were
placed on essential operating installations such as electric
plants, transformers, and elevator mechanisms.(20)

Early on April 8 Earnest, Russell, a public affairs officer,
photographers, reporters, and elements of the 282d Engineer
Combat Battalion entered the mine. They would be joined several
hours later by Eddy, his deputy chief of staff, and a G-5
officer. One of the engineers who inspected the brick wall
surrounding the vault door thought it could be blasted through
with little effort. Therefore the engineers, using a half-stick
of dynamite, blasted an entrance though the masonry wall. The
Americans entered the vault, so-called Room No. 8, which was
approximately 75 feet wide by 150 feet long with a 12-foot-high
ceiling, well lighted but not ventilated. Tram railway tracks ran
down the center of the cavern. On either side of the tracks,
stretching to the back of the cavern, were more than seven
thousand bags, stacked knee-high, laid out in twenty rows with
approximately two and a half feet between rows. All of the bags
and containers were marked, and the gold bags were sealed. Baled
currency was found stacked along one side of the vault along with
gold balances and other Reichsbank equipment. At the back of the
cavern, occupying an area twenty by thirty feet, were 18 bags and
189 suitcases, trunks, and boxes. Each container bore a packing
slip showing the contents and a tag bearing the name "Melmer." It
was obvious that it was SS loot. Within days it would be
confirmed that it was, and within ten days, the Americans would
learn the extent of the loot and the identity of Melmer.(21)

In order to examine the contents, some of the seals on the
bags were broken, and a partial inventory was made. The inventory
indicated that there were 8,198 bars of gold bullion; 55 boxes of
crated gold bullion; hundreds of bags of gold items; over 1,300
bags of gold Reichsmarks, British gold pounds, and French gold
francs; 711 bags of American twenty-dollar gold pieces; hundreds
of bags of gold and silver coins; hundreds of bags of foreign
currency; 9 bags of valuable coins; 2,380 bags and 1,300 boxes of
Reichsmarks (2.76 billion Reichsmarks); 20 silver bars; 40 bags
containing silver bars; 63 boxes and 55 bags of silver plate; 1
bag containing six platinum bars; and 110 bags from various
countries.(22)

General Eddy, after learning how extensive the mine was and
the significance of its treasure, around noon called Lt. Col.
John H. Mason, commanding officer of the 357th Infantry Regiment,
and told him that the order of the previous day withdrawing his
regiment from the Merkers area, minus the First Battalion, was
countermanded. He ordered him to hold any movement and that his
regiment, minus the Second Battalion, which had been assigned to
be the Ninetieth Infantry Division's reserve, was to guard the
mine area. At that time the Third Battalion guard had already
been relieved by elements of the First Battalion, and the Third
Battalion had started to move. The battalion returned to Merkers,
and Mason moved his command post from Leimbach to Merkers. Mason
then provided for the defense of the Merkers area and the various
mine entrances with his First and Third Battalions, elements of
the 712th Tank Battalion, and the 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion
and numerous antiaircraft guns.(23)

While the treasure was being reviewed on April 8, in other
tunnels Americans found an enormous number of artworks. Late that
day, Capt. Robert Posey, a Museum, Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA)
officer, and Major Perera, G-5, Third Army, arrived to inspect
the artworks and the gold and currency. Perera interviewed Veick
about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the treasure
to Merkers and obtained from the XII Corps personnel a copy of
their inventory. Perera and Posey then set out for the Third Army
headquarters at Frankfurt, arriving there at 10 p.m. Shortly
thereafter they made their report to Lt. Col. Tupper Barrett, G-5, Twelfth Army Group.(24)

On April 8 Patton learned that in addition to the paper
money found the day before, his soldiers had found a significant
quantity of gold, and he also learned that the press had found
out about the Merkers mine and had published stories about the
capture of the gold. Patton called Gen. Omar N. Bradley,
commander of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group, and told him that owing
to the amount of the seizure and the fact that it had been made
public, he believed it was now a political question and requested
that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF),
commanded by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, be asked to send somebody
to take it over.(25)
Colonel Bernstein Becomes Involved
The person who would take over the Merkers operation was
Col. Bernard D. Bernstein, deputy chief, Financial Branch, G-5
Division of SHAEF. In October 1942, when he was commissioned a
colonel, Bernstein was the assistant general counsel at the
Department of the Treasury, handling foreign funds matters. Late
on the morning of April 8, Bernstein, at SHAEF headquarters at
Versailles, read a front-page story in the Paris edition of the
New York Herald Tribune about the discovery of the gold
and other treasures at Merkers. He immediately called Barrett to
see if he had any information on the subject. He was advised that
Barrett was forward at Third Army and would be telephoned
immediately about the matter.(26)

Barrett, who had arrived at Frankfurt at 10:30 a.m., learned
that Perera and Posey had gone in search of information about the
report that the Americans had uncovered the gold reserve, large
stocks of foreign currency, and art treasures. About 11 a.m.
Barrett received a message that Bernstein was trying to reach him
and wanted to know about the validity of press stories concerning
the discovery of the treasure at Merkers. Barrett tried
unsuccessfully to reach Bernstein, but he did reach Perera, who
said the discovery had not yet been verified. And Bernstein,
after not being able to reach Barrett, conveyed the information
about the Merkers treasure to Brig. Gen. McSherry, deputy chief
of staff, G-5, SHAEF, at the advance headquarters at Rheims,
France, who thereupon told Bernstein to go to Merkers immediately
to look into the matter. Not long afterward, McSherry called him
and said that Eisenhower wanted him to take control of the
matter.(27)

Just before noon, Bernstein telephoned Barrett and told him
about the newspaper stories concerning the Merkers treasure and
that SHAEF had received a message from the War Department asking
several questions about the treasure. Bernstein asked whether he
should fly to Frankfurt, stating that McSherry wanted him to.
Barrett told him that he would phone him back when he received
another report from Perera and would then recommend whether he
should come or not. Shortly thereafter, Barrett reached Perera by
phone and was informed that Perera had just received confirmation
that the mine contained more than one hundred tons of gold, much
foreign currency, billions of German Reichsmarks, and valuable
paintings. Perera said that the XII Corps finance officer, at the
direction of General Eddy, was placing a heavy guard around the
treasure, making a preliminary inventory, and taking protective
custody, pending instructions from higher authority. Perera said
that only one Reichsbank official from Berlin (Veick) was present
with the treasure and that he did not believe it was necessary
for Barrett to visit the site until he could return to Frankfurt
with a full verbal report that night. Perera also did not think
it necessary for Bernstein to come immediately, since he could
get pertinent information from the Reichsbank official and the
treasure was under sufficient protection at present.(28)

Barrett phoned Bernstein at 12:40 p.m. and reported on his
conversation with Perera. An hour later Barrett talked to Col. R.
L. Dalferes, G-5, Third Army, reporting his conversations with
Bernstein and Perera, and stated that if McSherry wanted
Bernstein to come and this matter was so important, he felt
Bernstein should come. Dalferes agreed. Barrett reached Bernstein
at 4:30 p.m. and said that Dalferes agreed that Bernstein should
get to Frankfurt by air. Barrett then gave him a preliminary
report of the contents of the mine, based on telephone
information received from Perera that afternoon, and also
informed him that guards had been placed and the preliminary
inventory was being made by the XII Corps finance officer.(29)

Perera called Barrett at 6 p.m. and gave him summary figures
and said that he would return to Frankfurt that night with the
preliminary inventory. Thirty minutes later Barrett was informed
that Bernstein had left and would arrive at Frankfurt that
evening, but at 9 p.m. Barrett learned that Bernstein's plane was
stopping at Rheims for the night and he would come the next
morning. At 10 p.m. Perera and Posey arrived at Frankfurt. Perera
informed Barrett that the principal items in gold and currency at
Merkers were 8,198 standard gold bars, 711 bags of twenty-dollar
gold pieces, 1,763 bags of other gold coins, various bags of
foreign currency, and 2.76 billion Reichsmarks. Perera gave
Barrett the inventory, providing fuller details about the Merkers
treasure. Perera said Veick told him how and why the treasure was
at Merkers and what he was doing there. Posey reported that the
art in the mine was very important and that it consisted of the
most valuable pieces from various Berlin museums.(30)

By the time Bernstein's transportation could be arranged,
the pilot told him it was too late to go to Frankfurt, but he
would fly him to Rheims. Bernstein agreed. Once there Bernstein
met with McSherry, who told him that Eisenhower had discussed the
matter with General Crawford, assistant chief of staff, G-4
(supply and maintenance), SHAEF, and Eisenhower wanted Bernstein
to go to Merkers immediately and check the contents and arrange
for the treasure to be taken from the mine to a more secure
location, thereby relieving combat units for tactical missions.
The two then discussed the details and problems involved.(31)

On the morning of April 9, Bernstein and McSherry, at
General Crawford's office, met with Crawford, Maj. Gen. Lucius
Clay (who had just been named as Eisenhower's deputy in military
government in Germany), and Lt. Col. Carl L. Morris, G-4, SHAEF.
Crawford said that Eisenhower wanted Bernstein and Morris to go
to Merkers and transfer the treasure to a location further to the
rear for the purpose of releasing combat units and to facilitate
an accurate examination. Bernstein was ordered to be responsible
for taking over the treasure, and Morris was directed to
coordinate the actual movement, including taking treasures from
the mine, locating a suitable new location, arranging for trucks,
and providing for the security guards on the road and the
permanent guards at the new location. Bernstein and Morris were
ordered to report to the Third Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen.
Hobart Gay, to receive instructions. Crawford suggested the use
of Fort Ehrenbreitstein at Coblenz for the storage of the
treasure. They talked about the possibility of Frankfurt being
used as the depot for the loot since it was to be the
headquarters of Eisenhower's staff and the headquarters of the
U.S. Group Control Council when they got to Germany. Finally, it
was left to Bernstein and Morris to use their discretion as to
where the treasure would be placed.(32)

With those instructions, Bernstein and Morris flew to
Frankfurt. After arriving, they lunched with Barrett and
discussed the Frankfurt Reichsbank building as a storage facility
for the Merkers treasure. Bernstein and Morris then met with
Dalferes to formulate plans for taking over responsibility for
the administration and movement of the treasure. From 1:30 until
2:30 p.m. Bernstein and Morris met with Gay and Patton to discuss
the treasure and its movement. Then Morris quickly discussed the
movement problem with Brig. Gen. Muller, G-4, Third Army, and the
latter contacted Colonel Perry, his transportation officer, to
assist in any way possible in this move.(33)

Gay then prepared a letter to General Eddy stating that
Eisenhower had designated Bernstein to take over the contents of
the mine at Merkers and that Bernstein would be responsible for
making a complete inventory of the entire contents of the mine;
arranging with the Third Army for the movement of the treasure to
other areas when and if deemed advisable; and making decisions as
to who would be allowed in the mine. Eddy was instructed not to
allow Allied units or separate individuals to be in the area
surrounding the mine except upon his written permission. Eddy was
further informed that responsibility for guarding the mine and
its contents remained with the Third Army, which in turn was
delegated to XII Corps.(34)

Bernstein, Morris, Barrett, Perera, and Lt. J. S. Feary, G-5,
Twelfth Army Group, then made an inspection of the Reichsbank
building to determine the suitability of its use for storing the
treasure. They then drove to Fort Ehrenbreitstein in Coblenz to
determine if it was a possible storage area. They discovered the
fort was already full of archives and art taken from area museums
and public buildings and that no suitable areas remained to
accommodate the volume of material found at Merkers. Bernstein
was convinced that the Reichsbank building was the most suitable
storage site.(35)

Early on April 10, Bernstein and his party again inspected
the Reichsbank building. They agreed that it had adequate storage
and office space. At 9:45 a.m. Bernstein called McSherry and said
that he favored the Reichsbank site and expressed his need for
certain specialized personnel to augment the G-5 team for the
purpose of taking over and accounting for the material. He gave
McSherry a brief statement of the contents of the Merkers mine,
outlined his tentative plan for the movement of the treasure, and
told McSherry that he and Barrett would soon leave for Merkers.
McSherry approved the tentative plan and proceeded to requisition
the Reichsbank building and obtain the services of Third Army
engineers for rehabilitating the building to the extent necessary
to provide adequate security and protection from the weather. It
was agreed that Morris and Feary would be left behind at
Frankfurt to arrange for the engineers to put the building in
shape.(36)

Bernstein, Barrett, and Perera visited Gay at 11:30 a.m.,
and Bernstein informed him of his intention to transfer the
treasure to the Reichsbank at Frankfurt and that they would soon
be leaving for Merkers. Bernstein also said that Morris was
working with General Muller on transportation and other details
required for the movement. Then Bernstein instructed Feary to
work with Morris to assist in arrangements for trucking, labor,
security for the Reichsbank building, and other related matters.
At 1:30 p.m. Bernstein and Barrett set out for Merkers, some
eighty-five miles from Frankfurt.(37)

Bernstein and Bartlett arrived at the 357th Infantry
Regiment Command Post in Merkers at 5 p.m. on April 10.
Accompanied by Mason, they went on a tour of the mine to see the
vault containing the gold, currency, and art treasure. That
evening Bernstein interviewed Veick and Reimer about the gold,
currency, and other valuables, as well as any records relating to
the gold. Veick provided detailed information about the
transportation of the Reichsbank treasure to Merkers and the
currency transactions during March and the first days of April.
He said he did not know that much about the gold, but Thoms did;
"He knows all," Veick said. Reimer told Bernstein that "the
records of the sale of the gold are with Thoms."(38)

Bernstein, that evening, drove to Patton's headquarters.
Patton told Bernstein that he was very glad Eisenhower was taking
responsibility for the gold. Bernstein told him that he wanted to
move the Merkers treasure to Frankfurt as quickly as possible and
that under the Big Three arrangements at Yalta, the Merkers part
of Germany would be taken over by the Russians after the war and
that they certainly needed to get the treasure out of the area
before the Russians got there. Astounded at what Bernstein told
him, not knowing about the postwar arrangements, Patton said he
would do everything possible to facilitate Bernstein's
mission.(39)

On April 11 Bernstein returned to Merkers, and that morning,
after arranging with Mason for setting up a command post at the
mine building for the G-5 officers, he and Rave made an
inspection of the art treasures. Later that day Lt. George Stout,
USNR, MFAA Officer, G-5, Twelfth Army Group, and the SHAEF MFAA
chief, British Lt. Col. Geoffrey Webb, reported for duty, with
the expectation that they would handle the art matters. After
Posey's earlier visit to Merkers, he had notified Webb of the
treasure and recommended Stout, former chief of conservation at
Harvard's Fogg Museum and considered America's greatest expert on
the techniques of packing and transporting, be sent to the mine
to provide technical guidance. Webb and Stout arrived at Merkers
only to find that they needed Bernstein's permission to see the
art. Bernstein showed them his letter from Gay authorizing him to
decide who went into the mine and the need for Eddy's permission
for Allied personnel to inspect the mine. Bernstein agreed to let
Stout view the works of art, but he denied Webb access.(40)

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 10, Morris left
Frankfurt and drove to XII Corps headquarters at Meningen. The
next morning he discussed the move of the treasure with the XII
Corps Chief of Staff, G-4, and G-5. He also discussed with Gay
and Patton the security requirements for the move as well as for
the Frankfurt area in the event of a major attack. He then set
out for Merkers, arriving at 11 a.m. and proceeded to discuss the
physical problems of the move with Mason. Then he joined
Bernstein and Bartlett to inspect a nearby salt mine, where they
found German air force clothing.(41)

That evening Bernstein learned that personnel he had
requested were at Frankfurt. He decided that six of them would
remain at Frankfurt. The others would report for duty at Merkers:
Lt. Col. Omer Claiborne, G-5, SHAEF Mission to France and chief,
Currency Section for France; Lt. Comdr. Joel H. Fisher, chief,
Foreign Exchange and Property Control Section, Financial Branch,
G-5 SHAEF; 1st Lt. William A. Dunn, Financial Branch, U.S. Group
Control Council; Lt. Col. William S. Moore, commanding officer,
European Civil Affairs Division's Currency Section for Germany
(Twelfth Army Group), and six of his men; and Mr. Maurice St.
Germain, civilian officer of Guaranty Trust Co., New York, Paris
Office, an expert gold trader.(42)
The Generals Enter the Mine
Also that evening Bernstein received a message that Patton
had called directing him to be at the main entrance of the mine
the following morning at 9 a.m. Bernstein immediately ordered
that arrangements be made to see that the mine and shaft
equipment was functioning properly and that German civilians were
available for questioning if needed. The next morning, April 12,
Bernstein was at the mine very early to ensure everything was
prepared for Patton's visit. But 9 a.m. came and went, and there
was no Patton, for he was still at his headquarters at Hersfeld
greeting Eisenhower and Bradley. They, with Patton and Eddy and
members of their staffs, flew to Merkers. Arriving at the mine
about 10:30 a.m., they were joined by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland,
commander of the XIX Tactical Air Command of the Ninth Air Force.
Bernstein met them at the mine entrance and took the generals and
several German officials into the mine, and they descended by
elevator.(43)

As the jittery elevator descended with ever-accelerating
speed down the pitch-black shaft, with a German operating the
elevator, Bernstein was concerned about their safety. So was
Patton. Looking at the single cable, Patton said if the cable
snapped "promotions in the United States Army would be
considerably stimulated." General Eisenhower said "OK George,
that's enough. No more cracks until we are above ground
again."(44)

The generals entered Room No. 8 and looked around in awe at
the captured gold. They then inspected the SS loot. Eisenhower
was moved by the experience. "Crammed into suitcases and trunks
and other containers was a great amount of gold and silver plate
and ornament obviously looted from private dwellings throughout
Europe" he wrote. "All the articles," he noted, "had been
flattened by hammer blows, obviously to save storage space, and
then merely thrown into the receptacle, apparently pending an
opportunity to melt them down into gold or silver bars." Later
Patton would write that he saw "a number of suitcases filled with
jewelry, such as silver and gold cigarette cases, wrist-watch
cases, spoons, forks, vases, gold-filled teeth, false teeth,
etc." acquired by "bandit methods." Eisenhower was very
interested in learning what was in the mine. Bernstein informed
the generals that some of the treasure had come from victims in
the concentration camps; how the treasure had come to be shipped
there; and estimates as to its value. He also told them he was
planning to take an inventory of everything and to move the
treasures to Frankfurt. Eisenhower and the other generals
concurred with Bernstein's plans.(45)

Bernstein also showed the generals the art treasures, plates
the Reichsbank used for the printing of the Reichsmark currency,
and the currency itself. While they were looking at the latter, a
German official said that they were the last reserves in Germany
and were badly needed to pay the German army. "I doubt," Bradley
interjected, "the German Army will be meeting payrolls much
longer." Near the end of the inspection, Bradley said to Patton,
"If these were the old free-booting days when a soldier kept his
loot you'd be the richest man in the world." Patton just grinned.
With that said, the one-hour inspection concluded, and the party,
which had included newspapermen and Signal Corps photographers
taking numerous photos of the inspection, returned to the
surface.(46)

Later that evening Bradley, Eisenhower, and Patton dined
together. Among the things they discussed was that when word
first reached Patton about the gold discovery, he had ordered a
censorship stop on the discovery. "But why keep it a secret,
George?" Bradley asked. "What would do with all that money?"
Patton said that his soldiers were of two minds. One view was
that the gold be cut into medallions, "one for every sonuvabitch
in Third Army." The other view was that the Third Army hide the
loot until peacetime when military appropriations were tight and
then dig it up to buy new weapons. Eisenhower, looking at Bradley
and laughing, said "He's always got an answer." The evening did
not end on a happy note. Just about midnight the three learned
that President Roosevelt had died.(47)

The tour completed, Bernstein interviewed Albert Thoms, who
explained how and why the gold, currency, and other items got to
the mine. He also gave some estimated values for the gold and
said "the gold and silver was not stolen." "The silver and gold
articles in cases," he said, came from the economic department of
the SS." He said that there were no records at Merkers relating
to the gold. Later that afternoon, and during the course of the
next several days, Bernstein and his men interviewed a dozen
bank, mine, and other officials. During these interviews they
learned about the German policy of storing files and treasures
and goods of all kinds and descriptions in mines and tunnels.
They also learned the names of various mines.(48)
Moving the Treasure
While the tour was being conducted, Morris was hard at work
facilitating the coordination of the move. He arrived at the
Third Army advanced headquarters during midmorning and met with
the deputy chief of engineers to obtain the service of engineers
for supervising German operators at critical points throughout
the mine installation during the forthcoming operation. He also
met with Colonel Perry, the transportation officer, to discuss
the transportation requirements and with the Third Army provost
marshal to discuss security measures.(49)

On the twelfth, MFAA Officer Stout talked to Rave at the
Ransbach mine, who explained that the forty-five cases of art
there could not be inspected as the mine elevator was not
working. Stout returned to Merkers and made a spot-check of some
of the boxes and crates of artwork. He found that in addition to
the crated items, some four hundred paintings were lying loose.
He had seen enough to know that he needed proper packing
materials and that the art constituted great wealth. The next
afternoon he returned to Ransbach to prepare the items there for
the move. Upon his return to Merkers, Bernstein told him that the
art convoy would leave on the sixteenth.(50)

At 1:30 p.m. on April 12, Fisher, Claiborne, St. Germain,
Dunn, Moore with his staff arrived from Frankfurt at the mine.
Bernstein assigned Moore the responsibility for marking the money
containers in the mine, preparing inventories at the time of the
removal of the money from the mine, and with technical advice
from Claiborne, making arrangements for the transfer of the
currency and gold. Fisher was assigned the responsibility for
preparing inventories of all other mines in the immediate
vicinity and to analyze all the testimony developed in
interrogations to date with a view toward finding further gold
and currency deposits as well as gathering financial and property
control intelligence information.(51)

That afternoon St. Germain, with the assistance of Barrett,
inspected the mine and made an estimate of the situation and
after consulting with Mason, outlined a plan for operations.
During the day, under the direction of Moore, four teams were
organized to make an inventory of the contents of the mine based
on the information shown on the tags. Two teams worked on the
gold bullion and coins, and two worked on the other loot. While
the contents of the mine were being inventoried and prepared for
the move, army engineers began preparing the area for the move.
Also that day thirty-two ten-ton trucks from the 3628th and 4263d
Quartermaster Truck Companies were made available for the move.
Morris visited Mainz and arranged with the Truck Company
commanders to report at the mine property at Merkers early the
following morning.(52)

At 7:30 a.m. on April 14 the thirty-two trucks plus wreckers
arrived at Merkers. Also arriving that day was Colonel Walker,
commanding officer of the 474th Infantry Regiment, who inspected
the mine and the areas surrounding the mine for the purpose of
organizing his security guard to take control of the convoy upon
its exit from the mine property.(53)

The move began at 9 a.m. Jeeps and quarter-ton trailers were
lowered into the mine, as well as ten officers of the 357th
Infantry Regiment, Bernstein's people, and scores of soldiers,
medics, tank crew members, and other support personnel, to not
only move the treasure from the vault to a shaft to the trucks
but also to record in great detail at each step what was being
moved and loaded on the trucks. The treasure was taken out of the
vault and loaded onto the trailers by two crews of fifty men each
in alternating shifts. The gold on trailers attached to the Jeeps
were then driven to Shaft No. 2, where the trailer was detached
and sent to the surface by the elevator. Shaft No. 1 was used for
loading currency bags and miscellaneous objects. Here the
material was unloaded from the trailers into mine carts and sent
up the elevator. The treasure, stored in over eleven thousand
containers, was inventoried again upon reaching the surface, It
included, among other things, 3,682 bags and cartons of Germany
currency, 80 bags of foreign currency, 4,173 bags containing
8,307 gold bars, 55 boxes of gold bullion, 3,326 bags of gold
coins, 63 bags of silver, 1 bag of platinum bars, 8 bags of gold
rings, and 207 bags and containers of SS loot. Once the inventory
was completed, the treasure was loaded onto the trucks. Working
nonstop, the job was completed at 6 a.m. the next morning. During
the evening of the fourteenth a continuous air patrol was begun
over the area, and it would continue until the move was
completed.(54)

At some point on April 14 Bernstein met with Stout, Dunn,
and Bartlett to discuss the arrangements for the movement of
approximately four hundred tons of art stored in different parts
of the Merkers mine. It was agreed that loading would begin at
noon on April 16. But the loading would actually begin earlier,
for at midnight on the fourteenth, Bernstein ordered Stout to
prepare three truckloads of art, which were to be mixed in with
the gold to make the loads lighter. Stout, between 2 and 4:30
a.m., complied with Bernstein's order, complete with an
inventory.(55)

Also on the fourteenth, Morris flew to Frankfurt to confer
with transportation officers about procuring trucks to be used
for the shipment of the art to Frankfurt. Morris made
arrangements on April 15 with the Third Army provost marshal to
obtain one hundred POWs to be used in loading the art treasure
the next morning. The following morning, Morris flew back to
Merkers to assist in the move.(56)

On April 14 Bernstein found time to write Gay, proposing an
operational plan to search for other Nazi gold and foreign
exchange assets after the move of the treasure from Merkers. The
Merkers treasure discovery, he observed, "confirms previous
intelligence reports and censorship intercepts indicating that
the Germans were planning to use these foreign exchange assets,
including works of art, as a means of perpetuating the Nazism and
Nazi influence both in Germany and abroad." "In order to prevent
further transfer or movements of Germany's foreign exchange
assets and works of art to more secure places in southern Germany
or in neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden,"
Bernstein wrote "it is essential to locate and protect these
assets."(57)

At 6 a.m. on April 15, just as the loading of the trucks had
been almost completed, Colonel Walker and Lieutenant Colonel
Whitney with elements of their 474th Infantry Regiment arrived at
the mine to assume command of the convoy as it cleared the
property area. The trucks were completely loaded--actually
overloaded by approximately 10 percent--by 7:45 a.m. By 8 a.m.
one truck had broken down in the mine's factory area and was
placed under strong guard until it was repaired.(58)

The convoy, code-named TASK FORCE WHITNEY, set off for
Frankfurt at about 8:30 a.m., escorted by five platoons from the
474th Infantry Regiment, elements of the 785th and 503d Military
Police Battalions, two machine-gun platoons, an antiaircraft
platoon with ten mobile antiaircraft guns, four wreckers, one
ambulance, and an air cover of observation planes and P-51
Mustang fighters. While Bernstein accompanied the convoy,
Claiborne and St. Germain traveled to Frankfurt by car to make
arrangements for receiving and storing the gold and currency
within the Reichsbank. Morris flew to Frankfurt to arrange for
additional personnel to assist in the unloading. The convoy
arrived at Frankfurt around 2 p.m., and the unloading commenced
at 3:45 p.m. Two infantry companies cordoned off the Reichsbank
while each item was unloaded and moved into the vaults of the
bank. The operation was completed at 1 p.m. the next day, April
16, and Bernstein returned to Merkers to supervise the movement
of the artworks.(59)

At 8 a.m. on April 15, a platoon of the First Battalion,
357th Infantry Regiment, under the direction of Stout, assisted
by Dunn, started moving the four hundred unpacked pictures. Once
the pictures were aboveground, they were placed in an adjacent
mine-owned building and wrapped in long German army sheepskin
coats Stout had found in a neighboring mine. They now awaited
arrival of the trucks the next day.(60)

On April 16 at 7 a.m. the convoy arrived. The move commenced
once again, under the watchful eye of Morris, who arrived back at
Merkers around 9:30 a.m. The move was accomplished by 357th
Infantry Regiment personnel, assisted by the one hundred POWs who
arrived with an escort of guards later in the day. The move went
quickly, in part because some of the art had been moved to the
surface the previous day. Besides the Merkers treasures, a few
art objects in forty-five cases were removed from the Ransbach
mine and added to the convoy. The move was completed at about
8:30 p.m. With this phase of the operation completed, the 357th
Infantry Regiment's Third Battalion took leave of Merkers and
rejoined their Ninetieth Infantry Division comrades. The First
Battalion would remain at Merkers, under Corps Control, until the
treasure's disposition had taken place.(61)

On April 17, at 8:30 a.m. the art treasure convoy, named
TASK FORCE HANSEN, moved out from Merkers, having approximately
the same strength security guard as the gold convoy with the
exception that fewer aircraft were used. The convoy consisted of
twenty-six ten-ton trucks loaded with art, two loaded with POWs,
and two empty for use in the event that a transfer of loads
became necessary. The art convoy arrived at Frankfurt at 2:45
p.m., and an hour later the unloading and storing of the artwork
began, supervised by Stout, assisted by the newly promoted
Captain Dunn. The unloading was completed at 10:30 p.m., and at
11 p.m. Colonel Walker and the Ninety-ninth Battalion 457th
Infantry Regiment departed, and the POWs were sent on another
assignment.(62)
Disposition of the Treasure
That afternoon, as the loading was taking place, McSherry
visited the Reichsbank and directed that a tentative inventory be
prepared of the gold, silver, and currency. This inventory was
completed at 10 p.m. and handed to McSherry. The next day, April
18, Eisenhower cabled the War Department with a rough estimate of
the Merkers find. Two days later, Eisenhower's chief of staff
sent the Combined Chiefs of Staff a preliminary inventory of the
Merkers treasure. It indicated that the value of the gold,
silver, and currency was over $520 million. In his cover letter
he pointed out that a large quantity of the loot appeared to have
been taken by the SS from victims and suggested that proper
agencies be contacted to send representatives to review the loot
in terms of being evidence in war crimes proceedings.(63)

Sometime after noon on April 17 or 18, Bernstein, now back
at Frankfurt, learned that his colleagues had uncovered in the
Merkers find a series of account books belonging to Thoms's
Precious Metals Department, which Thoms had earlier informed
Bernstein had been sent back to Berlin. In interrogating Thoms on
April 18, Bernstein asked him to explain the books. Thoms
indicated that the books were a running inventory of the gold
bars and gold and silver coins held by the Reichsbank for its own
account and the account of others. The books also provided
specific information about each bar held at either Merkers or
Berlin. Bernstein believed the books should be useful as a
checklist against which the discovery of the Reichsbank gold
could be controlled and might assist in the location of all of
the Reichsbank gold.(64)

On April 18 Bernstein sent McSherry a detailed report of the
activities that had taken place during the preceding two weeks.
He concluded by observing that "the Germans hid their assets in
mines and other secret places in Germany, presumably with the
intent of maintaining a source of financing of pro-Nazi
activity." "Many of these caches," he continued, "have not yet
been uncovered and should be ferreted out as soon as operations
permit." He observed that it was "necessary that some procedure
be established for analyzing and utilizing the property and
records found in the Merkers area and those uncovered in the
future." "Intelligence reports," he wrote, "indicate that just as
the Germans secreted assets and valuable property within Germany,
they also made elaborate arrangements for secreting assets in
neutral and other nations of the world." "Every step should be
taken," he urged, "in Germany to obtain information of the assets
secreted both inside and outside Germany so that these assets
cannot be used to perpetuate Nazism or contribute to the
rebuilding of Nazi influence."(65)

Beginning on April 14, Bernstein attempted to get someone to
support his plan for a full-scale reconnaissance of Germany for
other caches of loot. He contacted senior officers at XII Corps
and Third Army for assistance, but no real help was forthcoming.
Despite the lack of assistance, Bernstein, with a small
reconnaissance party in Jeeps, left Frankfurt on April 19 in
search of more loot. During the next two weeks his teams covered
nineteen hundred miles, checking Reichsbanks all over American-occupied
Germany and following up every lead regarding the
whereabouts of gold. Of all the places visited by the
reconnaissance parties, only three actually yielded recoveries of
the so-called Reichsbank gold in the amount of $3 million. During
May and June American soldiers found Reichsbank gold valued at
about $11 million. Altogether the Americans had recovered 98.6
percent of the $255.96 million worth of gold shown on the closing
balances of the Precious Metals Department of the Berlin
Reichsbank.(66)

In mid-August experts from the United States Treasury
Department and the Bank of England completed the job of weighing
and appraising the gold, gold coin, and silver bars that had been
captured. The total value of the gold found in Germany was placed
at $262,213,000. Also weighed and appraised was $270,469 worth of
silver, as well as a ton of platinum. Eight bags of rare gold
coins had not been appraised, nor had the SS loot.(67)

During the summer of 1945, Allied currencies found at
Merkers and elsewhere by the Americans were returned to various
countries, and the process of restituting the artworks found at
Merkers and elsewhere in the former German Reich began.(68) The
gold found at Merkers was in early 1946 turned over to the Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency and eventually turned over to the
Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (TGC)
for distribution to countries whose central-bank gold had been
stolen by the Nazis. The TGC began the process of getting the
gold returned to most countries as quickly as possible. However,
cold war factors resulted in some of the gold not being
restituted until 1996.

During the summer, efforts were made to ascertain the value
of the SS loot found at Merkers, and discussions begun about its
disposition. Within several years non-monetary gold, including
that taken from victims of Nazi persecution, was given to the
Preparatory Commission of the International Restitution
Organization. Bernstein turned over the reports about the SS loot
that he and his colleagues had produced as well as information
contained in the records of the Precious Metals Department to war
crimes prosecutors for use in connection with their preparations
for the trials at Nuremberg. One of the counts on which Walter
Funk was found guilty related to his dealings with the property
taken from concentration camp victims by the SS and deposited in
the Reichsbank.(69)

Conclusion
The accomplishments of recovering, moving, and managing the
Merkers treasure by Colonels Bernstein, Barrett, Morris, Moore,
Mason, and their colleagues may or may not have shortened the
war. But they did block the Nazi leaders from further use of
their looted gold and property of victims of their persecution.
Their actions also ensured that the central banks of Europe would
receive back at least some of the gold the Nazis had seized and
that some funds would be available for restitution to
individuals.(70)

The story of the Merkers treasure still continues. During
the summer of 1948, most of the records of the Reichsbank's
Precious Metals Department were microfilmed by the U.S. Army and,
interestingly enough, turned over to Albert Thoms, who was
working for the successor bank to the Reichsbank. These records
have subsequently disappeared in Germany, and there has been a
search for them the past two years in the belief they would shed
light on how much non-monetary gold (e.g., dental gold) was
melted down and mixed with the monetary gold (i.e., central bank
gold) and thus indicate how much restitution still should be made
to victims of Nazi persecution and their heirs.(71)

At an international Nazi Gold conference held in London in
December 1997, several countries agreed to relinquish their
claims to their share of the remaining 5.5 metric tons (worth
about sixty million dollars) still held by the Tripartite Gold
Commission (TGC) and donate it to a Nazi Persecution Relief Fund
to help survivors of the Holocaust. Almost all of the claimant
nations similarly agreed to such a policy during the course of
1998. Early in September 1998, in a ceremony held in Paris, the
TGC announced its task was completed and went out of business.
Thus, the Merkers story ends on a noble, selfless, just, and
moral note, as upwards of fifteen countries were willing to
forego receiving gold stolen from their nations by the Nazis and
allow it to be used as compensation for victims of Nazi
persecution.

4. "Bernstein Report" and "G-4 Functions in ETOUSA
Operations," RG 331, NACP; Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in
the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, Army Historical Series
(1975), p. 228; Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, Nazi Gold: The
Story of the World's Greatest Robbery-and Its Aftermath
(1984), pp. 11-12; John A. Busterud, "The Treasure in the Salt
Mine," Army 47 (March 1997): 48.

40. "Bernstein Report" and "G-4 Functions in ETOUSA
Operations," RG 331, NACP; Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of
Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the
Second World War (1995), p. 333.

42. "Bernstein Report," RG 331, NACP; St. Germain had worked
with Colonels Barrett and Claiborne at Guaranty Trust Company
before the war. Bernstein, Oral History Interview, pp. 121-122.
Truman Library.

67. Col. B. Bernstein to Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, "Value of
Gold and Silver Bullion and Coin Held by Commanding General USFET
at the Reichsbank Building in Frankfurt," Aug. 19, 1945, "Value
of Gold and Silver Bullion and Coin Held by Commanding General
USFET at the Reichsbank Building in Frankfurt, Volume 1-Report"
Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-1954, Records of the
Operations Branch, Records of the Administrative Services
Division, RG 407, NACP.

70. When Bernstein left military service in 1945 he was
awarded the Legion of Merit. His citation, in part, reads:
"Colonel Bernstein's wise and energetic action in organizing
control of vast sums of bullion and currency hidden by the
Germans, and in instituting an examination of seized enemy
financial records, was a material contribution to the success of
the Supreme Commander's mission in Germany." Bernstein, Oral
History Interview, p. 176, Truman Library.

71. The records that were microfilmed, contained on some
seventy reels, are available at the National Archives at College
Park, Maryland. For information about what was and was not
microfilmed, when the unmicrofilmed records may have disappeared,
and related information, please see The Whereabouts of the
Records of Deutsche Reichsbank (in particular the Precious Metals
Department, the Foreign Exchange Department, and the Securities
Department), after the collapse of the Reich (1945) and after the
conslusion of the liquidation of the Reichsbank (1976). A
Research Report compiled by the Bundesarchiv with the assistance
of the Deutsche Bundesbank (August 1998). A copy of this
report is located in the library at the National Archives at
College Park, Maryland.