I've spent the better part of the last couple of weeks sitting dumbfounded
at my computer (all right, all right, *more* dumbfounded than usual).
Although the contraction situation as respects Montreal is the one that
makes my heart ache, it's what's unfolding in Minnesota that makes my head
ache.

I have two children and even a half-witted parent as I am knows not to do
certain things. For instance--one of my kids goes ballistic for whatever
reason and to quiet her down I give her a big chocolate bar (as Bill Cosby
once opined: parents aren't interested in justice--they just want it quiet).
She goes off half-cocked again and to get her to calm down, I give her
another chocolate bar. Suffice it to say, she's gonna learn pretty quick
that sowing a temper tantrum will reap her a chocolate bar.

Now hold that thought for a moment as we'll be coming back to it.

Once thing has become crystal clear since the early 1990's, and that is:
new, publicly financed stadiums have not helped major league baseball--but
hurt it. Although SkyDome and New Comiskey Park are relatively new
facilities, what triggered the current problem was the opening of Oriole
Park at Camden Yards. When OPACY opened, it was new, it was exciting, it
gave folks goosebumps--so much so that it suddenly converted the small
market (or more accurately--small revenue) Baltimore Orioles into a big
market (revenue) juggernaut. The new revenues lead automatically into bigger
profits, larger contracts for players, and higher payrolls. Naturally when
money talks, baseball owners listen. Now everybody wanted their own
[publicly financed] version of "Camden Yards." Cleveland got one, as did
Texas, Atlanta, Colorado, Houston, Seattle, Detroit, Arizona, Milwaukee,
Pittsburgh; with Philadelphia and Cincinnati on deck and St. Louis and San
Diego beginning to appear on the horizon.

Although it gets a lot of press, ticket prices and concession costs are not
determined by player payroll but the other way around. A team owner will set
prices at the level that will maximize his revenues. If a team will draw 2.5
million fans by charging $20 for a ticket but just 2 million fans if tix go
for $22 a pop then he has to choose which he wants more: $50M in ticket
sales or $44M.

An easy choice.

Further if payroll costs determined ticket prices, then it should cost next
to nothing for tickets to March Madness, or the New Years Day bowl
games--after all, the players aren't paid (cough cough) for playing in those
games. Ticket prices are set by good old fashioned supply and demand.

So despite the rhetoric bandied about by team owners, new stadiums aren't
the result of rising payrolls--they're the cause of it. Before the strike of
1994-95 (with just three retro parks -- bearing in mind that Texas and
Cleveland were in just their first year of use, hence not long enough to
have a noticeable effect on the baseball economy -- in operation and only
one that had been around for longer than a full season) the top salary in
baseball was about $7-8M/year. Now that a number of new facilities have
popped up, now we have two players over the $20M/year mark and a third
hoping to join the club (Barry Bonds) just six years after [the strike].

Would player compensation have skyrocketed in such a fashion had these new
(publicly financed) ballparks *not* been built?

Would player compensation have skyrocketed in such a fashion had team owners
financed these facilities themselves?

No, and of course, no.

So all of these stadium boondoggles gave owners revenues to give players
these monster contracts. What has happened since?

(1) The honeymoon period for these parks have all but passed.

(2) Because there are so many of these kinds of parks the novelty has worn
off more quickly--hence the length of the revenue boost is much smaller. Who
wants to see the OPACY.12 edition?

(3) The reason for all these facilities coming on line is simple: luxury
suites. The cost of such amenities is predicated by simple supply and
demand. The supply of luxury/club seating is starting to outstrip demand
with corresponding loss in revenues.

(4) Hence the revenues that were available to give massive contracts are no
longer there, but the contracts and the salary structure remain in place.

(5) Now teams with new ballparks are cutting payroll including those in
parks less than three years old (Pittsburgh and Detroit). Why? The salary
structure that was set when the retro-park boom was in full bloom is no
longer tenable in these markets.

(6) Now the economy is in recession.

When teams were stumping for new facilities they were claiming that they
were necessary to be "competitive" in MLB. Let's look at the record of teams
' success while playing in new facilities.

Not real impressive--is it? Again we have to note that a lot of these teams
are cutting payroll. Why? They say they cannot compete. So MLB told us, sold
us a bill of goods that stated that a new, publicly financed stadium was the
secret to fixing baseball's ills. They said that without this kind of public
investment, these cities could lose (or wouldn't get) a team.

*Thud.*

Hence, in the midst of all this, MLB is getting ready to battle the MLBPA
claiming that the system is broken, so broken in fact that they're thinking
of cutting teams. So many new stadiums, so many problems.

Remember that thought I told you to hold on to earlier? The one about kids
and chocolate bars? Well, let's get back to it now:

Earlier the ruse was: "show us the money or we'll move your team." Well a
whole bunch of suckers lined up like sheep begging to be sheared. Some
regions though decided to think for themselves instead of listening to the
proven incompetents better known as Major League Baseball. These
incompetents are now saying: "show us the money or we'll *fold* your team."

Now some in Minnesota are wavering in their "no money until you clean up
your own mess" stance.

The evidence is overwhelming: new, publicly financed stadiums are a bad deal
for their host communities; publicly financed stadiums are bad for baseball;
publicly financed stadiums will not make you competitive; publicly financed
stadiums will not turn your idiotic front office/general manager into the
second coming of Branch Rickey and George Weiss.

Since the old threats don't work, MLB is test driving a new
one--contraction. Since the petulant child's temper tantrum isn't getting
him anywhere, he's now kicking in the drywall and trashing the house.

Suppose Minnesota buckles, and gives the screaming brat a chocolate
bar--then what? Minnesota will not be better off financially, MLB will not
be better off except that they won't need as much in revenue sharing monies
(that's right Minnesota, give tax dollars for a new ballpark and George
Steinbrenner will be wealthier for it), and unless the front office makes
all the right moves (and you don't need a new ballpark to do that)--you won'
t be competitive on a regular basis, but this much will happen....

....you'll make Carl Pohlad a lot wealthier.

Cool eh?

Not only that. If Minnesota caves in, do you know what's gonna happen? Bud
Selig and Co. will have affirmation. Affirmation that the contraction threat
is a good way to sucker your community into coughing up hundreds of millions
in corporate welfare. Not only that, they'll know that it works even in a
period of war and recession! So guess what's gonna happen in Florida?
Toronto? (yes--Toronto) Chicago? (yes--Chicago) Kansas City? Oakland? You
give the owners a whoooooooole new threat. Now they don't need anymore
markets to hold over cities' heads. MLB won't need to use Portland,
Sacramento, Washington D.C., Northern Virginia, Las Vegas, etc. as threats
anymore. They can save those gems for future expansion fees. Once you prove
to MLB that a given tactic will make a host city unclasp it's maternity
brassiere and offer unlimited nursing at the public teat, they'll never
unlatch.

Now close your eyes. Picture Bud Selig and Carl Pohlad. Now brace your
stomach and picture them in bonnets and diapers. Now visualize them
thrashing on the floor kicking and screaming.