Mr. King said that, so far as regarded the manner and
time of choosing Representatives and Senators to Congress,
a majority of the Congress may by law now establish
the very manner of choosing Representatives, which was
now proposed to be erected into a constitutional rule. It
seemed to him, therefore, unnecessary to alter the Constitution
by imposing a rule, when, according to the Constitution,
a competent power can now make the same regulation
by law. Not so with the part of the amendment
before the Senate, which the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Barbour) proposed to strike out. The States may now
severally direct the manner of choosing their own Electors;
it is proposed that the manner shall be prescribed by the
Constitution. That, Mr. K. thought, would be an important
change, and the only change suggested in the Constitution
which he deemed an improvement. He thought he
might venture to say, that if there was any part of the Constitution
deemed by its framers and advocates to be better
secured than any other against the enterprises which have
since occurred, it was the very provision on the subject of
elections to the Presidency. The idea was, that the action
of that particular agency, that has since controlled it, was
as much displaced by the constitutional plan of election of
President and Vice-President as could possibly be desired.
The opinion had been that all undue agency or influence
was entirely guarded against; that the men selected by the
people from their own body would give their votes in such
a manner as that no opportunity would be afforded for a
combination to change the freedom and popular character
which naturally belonged to the electoral bodies. Such had
been the idea at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
We all know, said he, the course which this thing had
taken. The election of a President of the United States is
no longer that process which the Constitution contemplated.
In conformity with the original view of the authors
of that instrument, I would restore, as thoroughly as possible,
the freedom of election to the people: I would make
the mode of election uniform through the country, by
throwing the whole nation into as many districts as there
are Electors, and let the people of each district choose one
Elector. One idea on this subject, he thought worth more
than all the arguments against this course; that then all the
people of the country would stand precisely on the same
footing; and no particular addresses could be made to the
special interests and particular views of particular men, or
particular sections of the country. The course now pursued
in this respect, Mr. King said, was not entitled to that
high distinction. On the contrary, those who reflected on
it could not help seeing that our progress in Government
was not for the better; that it was not likely hereafter to be
in favor of popular rights. It was with the people the Constitution
meant to place the election of the Chief Magistrate,
that being the source least liable to be corrupt. But
if, under the name of the liberty of the people, said Mr.
K., we put this power into other hands, with different interests,
we place it in a situation in which the rights of the
people are violated. In this point of view, he said, this particular
clause of the proposed amendments of the Constitution
was of great value. Let the question of the mode of
election of Senators and Representatives rest where it is; if
Congress choose to interpose, let them. The other part of
the proposition was in favor of the rights of the people, of
the freedom of the country; for with regard to these rights
and freedom, no man could name a matter so important
as the choice of the President of the nation. It is an infirmity
of our nature that we look for chiefs and rulers, either
for their superior virtue, or their supposed subserviency
to the views of those in subordinate situations. It was
against the evil of the latter principle Mr. K. desired to
guard. The liberties of the people, repeated he, of which
we speak much, are more affected by the choice of the
President, than by any other ordinary political act. In this
point they are vulnerable; here ought the rights of the
people and of the States to be guarded. Our existence and
the passions of the present day are ephemeral; public liberty
should be immortal. Considering that this body
should be to the people and States not only the safe guardians
of their rights but the protectors of their liberty, he
hoped they would adopt a provision he considered so
nearly connected with the perpetuation of both.

[Mr. Lacock having moved that instead of the
original resolutions, a committee be appointed to
inquire into the expediency of proposing an
amendment of the Constitution for the election of
President & Vice President by the electors of each
State qualified to vote for the most numerous
branch of the State Legislatures, Mr. King,
among others, addressed the senate. He said:]

All experience had shown that the people of any country
were most competent to a correct designation of their
first magistrate. So far as history affords us light, it leads
to this point; that in time of difficulty and peril to a nation,
when it is in utmost need of superior talent for its high
stations, no tribunal is more competent to discern and select
it than the people. Intrigue, turbulence and corruption
may have some sway in quiet times, when all is tranquillity
in regard to the general situation of the country;
but when the Ship of State is in peril and in danger, turbulence
ceases, and the best men are by instinctive power
fixed on by the people for their governors. That has been
wonderfully illustrated by history; and the best designations
of magistrates have been produced in this way. My
sober view is, said Mr. K., that, as to the election of Chief
Magistrate of this nation, nobody is so competent as the
great body of freemen to make a proper selection.
Whether their first impression should be taken, as now
suggested by Mr. Lacock, was a question of great importance.
There would be great difficulty in making the returns
of the votes; those who collected and compared the
votes might defeat the choice of the people, &c. Not that
these objections were insuperable. He was persuaded that
the course of things under the present mode of choosing
a President was in its nature pernicious, and that it had a
tendency to prevent the object intended by the Constitution,
of a pure elective majority. Men now live who will
probably see the end of our system of government; terminate
when it will, that termination will not be favorable
to public liberty. For five years past he had seen a character
developing itself, the predominance of which he
feared. Not a people on earth were more capable of high
excitement than this people. During the excitement of the
passion to which he referred, if a contested election occurs,
the gownsmen must stand aside; another character
supersedes them; and there can be little difficulty in judging
what will be the result. The march from military rule
to despotism is certain, invariable. Those who think they
see the probable tendency of our present system should
interpose something remedial. The people in this particular
are the best keepers of their own rights; and any device
to remove that power from them weakens the security of
it. He was anxious that the Senate should come to this
question without the feelings of party; it was one involving
all their interests and those of their families and descendants.
He knew that this proposition, if agreed to, would
break down the power of the great States. He had no objection,
if in curtailing their power, the same measure regulated
the rights of the whole nation equally. He was willing
to let the election for the Presidency rest wholly on the
people.

[The further consideration of the matter, after
some negative votes on amendments, was postponed.]