Authors:Yan X.Abstract: Following the adoption of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in 2007, China established a public enforcement regime that has three equal-ranking authorities. The legislative history of the AML suggests that this was a backward-looking compromise reached between the three central administrative agencies (the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)), instead of a forward-looking design choice. This article focuses on the jurisdictional delimitation between the NDRC and the SAIC, a delimitation assigning the enforcement responsibilities based on whether an allegedly anticompetitive conduct is price related or not.This article first describes the jurisdictional delimitation as defined in the relevant legal documents. On that basis, it examines the legal and the economic rationales behind this delimitation. Subsequently, this article investigates to what extent this delimitation has been adhered to in practice, and there it identifies three problematic scenarios, which indicate the inevitability of the two agencies overstepping their respective authority in practice. This article finds that this delimitation is likely to induce the following problems: uncertainty on supplementary enforcement and follow-on civil actions, uncontrolled agency discretion, and distortive theories of harm. Therefore, it suggests that this jurisdictional delimitation should be removed.PubDate: 2017-10-25DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnx018

Authors:Johnson PA.Abstract: In a speech, Paul A. Johnson discussed how network effects may affect competition analysis. Network effects arise when a product’s value to one consumer increases with consumption by others. But competition can fragment a market so that network effects may not be enjoyed. Products that rely on algorithmic analysis of big data and exhibit network effects are growing increasingly important in the economy. In response, should antitrust enforcement become less aggressive so as to allow the benefits of network effects to be enjoyed' This note answers that question in the negative based on a lack of clear consensus in the literature that the benefits of network effects outweigh the benefits of competition. As antitrust confronts new business models enabled by new technologies, the analysis also serves as a reminder of the importance of postulating theories that are scientific in the sense that they can be falsified.PubDate: 2017-09-23DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnx016

Authors:Marshall RC.Abstract: In a keynote speech Robert C. Marshall addresses unobserved collusion. Although the extent and scope of unobserved collusion is unknown, the repeated detection of cartels among some multi-product firms raises questions and concerns. Do some multi-product firms potentially have a large portfolio of cartels where detected cartels are just a small part of their total collusive activity' This address examines conduct by multi-product firms that suggests potential grounds for concern.PubDate: 2017-09-23DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnx017