by J. Orlin Grabbe

Shortly after finishing The End of Ordinary
Money, Part II, I received phone calls from Jim Norman
of Forbes Magazine, Bill Hamilton of Inslaw, and Gregory
Wierzynski, Assistant Staff Director of the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services. They were
all interested in my references to money-laundering
activities in Arkansas financial institutions, as well as to
the use of the stolen PROMIS software in tracking
financial transactions.

Jim Norman was a Senior Editor at Forbes
Magazine whose article entitled Fostergate had been killed
by Malcolm S. ("Steve") Forbes. Forbes had done so at
the urging of Caspar Weinberger, the former Reagan
Secretary of Defense who was Chairman of the Board of
Forbes, Inc. Norman was interested in my references to an
NSA project to spy on banking transfers, because he had
information that Vince Foster, a Rose Law Firm partner,
oversaw such a project at Jackson Stephens' software firm
Systematics. He also wanted to get Fostergate published
elsewhere, and I promised to bring it to public attention
through the Internet. Not all of the material in the article
was familiar to me, but those parts that were had merit--
and in any case I didn't believe in military censorship of
information presented in civilian financial publications. (I
discovered soon enough, however, that most of the senior
staff of Forbes Magazine had ties to the intelligence
community, so perhaps Norman's experience was not all
that uncommon.)

Bill Hamilton of Inslaw had been pursuing a case
for years to collect from the U.S. government the value of
Inslaw's PROMIS software that had been stolen by the
U.S. Department of Justice. In its original form, the
PROMIS system was used for federal case management.
Another version had been converted for intelligence use in
tracking agents, operations, and movements. A CIA agent
named Michael Riconosciuto had worked on this version,
and--in connection with Bobby Inman of the National
Security Agency--had created code that would cause the
computer hardware to give off signals, disguised as noise,
when the program was running. (The standing waves
emitted can be modeled by mathematical functions called
"Walsh functions".) The program was then marketed
around the world by another CIA agent named Earl Brian,
who set up a company for that purpose. One of Earl
Brian's sales, made to the government of Brazil, was
observed by another CIA agent named Chuck Hayes.
Hayes had testified to this sale before a Chicago grand
jury, but his testimony had been redacted under the
National Security Act. These software sales were not
only profitable to Brian's company, but they also allowed
U.S. intelligence agencies to access the intelligence data of
the foreign country running the software. The signals
given off by the computer hardware could picked up by
nearby vans or, often, by satellite.

Another modification of the software had shown
up at the World Bank in 1983, where it was being used to
track wire transfers, apparently in connection with a
money-laundering operation that went from BCCI London
through the World Bank and into Caribbean institutions.
This was of considerable interest to me, because I had
learned in banking circles that the NSA was spying on
banking transactions, and that this apparently included
domestic financial transactions in certain instances.
Gradually I had learned that the NSA seemed to be
working through a Little Rock-based company called
Systematics, which was controlled by Jackson Stephens, a
principal financial backer of Bill Clinton, and a person
connected with the BCCI purchase of First American Bank
in Washington, D.C. In early 1995 I published on the
Internet a bibliography of Systematics' banking deals, and
in that context mentioned the name of Web Hubbell as
being associated with the NSA project--but I did not yet
know of Vince Foster's greater involvement. This
bibliography had apparently been used by Norman and
also by others pursuing the same story.

Gregory Wierzynski was interested in money
laundering. When I met with him and Stephen Ganis,
Counsel to the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, they were interested in any information
I knew of that connected Vince Foster to money-
laundering in Arkansas. I told them I had no non-public
information, and gave them a copy of Fostergate, which
Jim Norman had sent to me only a few days before. "Why
would Steve Forbes kill it?" Wierzynski wanted to know.
He knew Steve Forbes because Forbes, like Wierzynski,
had once served as head of Radio Free Europe. As time
passed, I became increasingly convinced that Wierzynski
was more involved in covering up than in actual
investigation. (Wierzynski's boss, Jim Leach, was
overheard saying to Newt Gingrich about the investigation,
"If we don't do something, this thing is going to get out of
hand." This gave me little confidence Leach was going to
conduct an aggressive search for the truth.) As best I
could tell, Wierzynski had been booted out of the
Pentagon after his son was caught hacking into Defense
Department computers.

Shortly after this meeting in June 1995, however, I
began my series of Vince Foster posts ("Allegations
Regarding Vince Foster, the National Security Agency,
and Banking Transactions Spying") on the Internet, and
sent copies along to the House Comittee on Banking and
Financial Services. A few days later Jim Leach wrote to
the Director of the National Security Agency asking about
the allegations:

"I am writing to seek your agency's help in verifying or
laying to rest various allegations of money laundering in
Arkansas in the late 1980s. For that purpose, I would
request a briefing from NSA's Inspector General on
Friday, July 14 before 1:00 p.m.; if that is not possible,
sometime on Monday, July 17, would also be convenient.

"The reports I have in mind have appeared in the general
press and, sometimes in sensational form, in more narrow-
gauged outlets, including the Internet. They speak of
secret foreign bank accounts held by prominent people in
Arkansas, special software to monitor bank transfers, and
similar tales. I would like to determine whether there is
any substance at all to these stories.

"Specifically, I would like your Inspector General to tell
me whether the Agency:

"(1) knows of any secret bank accounts held by U.S.
citizens domiciled in Arkansas at any time between 1988
and now;

"(2) is aware, directly or indirectly, of any efforts by
computer hackers, U.S.-government related or otherwise,
to penetrate banks for the purpose of monitoring accounts
and transactions;

"(3) knows of or has participated, directly or indirectly, in
efforts to sell software--notably versions of a program in
use at the Justice Department called PROMIS--or
clandestinely produced devices to foreign banks for the
purpose of collecting economic intelligence and
information about illicit money transfers;

"(4) is cognizant of any attempts by Systematics Inc, an
Arkansas-based electronic data processor that is now a
division of Alltell [Alltel], to monitor or engage in the
laundering of drug money or proceeds of other illegal
activities, notably those conducted through Mena,
Arkansas;

"(5) can produce information about Charles Hayes, a
businessman in Nancy, Kentucky, who claims to have
been a CIA operative in Latin and Central America, among
other places;

"(6) knew of or was involved in, directly or indirectly, any
covert activities by the U.S. government or any private
parties (the so-called "private benefactors") in or around
Mena in the late 1980s;

"(7) had any contractual or other relationship with the late
Adler Barriman "Barry" Seal in the 1980s or knew about
his activities in connection with Mena.