Panel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.

The New York Times

July 11, 2004

WASHINGTON, July 10 The Senate's report on prewar intelligence about Iraq, which
asserts that warnings about its illicit weapons were largely unfounded and that
its ties to Al Qaeda were tenuous, also undermines another justification for the
war: that Saddam Hussein's military posed a threat to regional stability and
American interests.

In a detailed discussion of Iraq's prewar military
posture, the report cites a long series of intelligence reports in the decade
before the war that described a formerly potent army's spiral of decay under the
weight of economic sanctions and American military pressure.

The main
risk of an attack by Mr. Hussein against the United States and nations in the
region was his unpredictability, these reports indicated. The reports found it
especially hard to predict what he would do if threatened by the likelihood of
American military action. But the Senate Intelligence Committee called this
analysis relatively weak.

The committee's report implies that war
opponents were essentially correct when they argued that Iraq posed little
immediate threat to the United States. Before the war, those who held this
view, both in Congress and at the United Nations, argued that continued
containment was preferable to an invasion.

Although the report described
a profound breakdown in the American intelligence system, both White House and
Congressional officials say the political calendar will prevent any serious
action until after the November elections.

In discussing the
committee's report, the Bush administration has emphasized that the war was
worthwhile because it removed a threatening dictator from power.

"He was
a dangerous man," President Bush said Friday. "The world is better off without Saddam Hussein
in power. America is safer."

In the debate before the war,
administration officials sometimes made the same argument, but with not nearly
the emphasis that they gave to threats from chemical weapons or terrorism. They
sometimes mentioned risks that Iraq would use Scuds or other shorter-range
conventional missiles, or they brought up its antiaircraft attacks on American
patrols over the no-flight zones in the north and south of the country. They
also spoke of continuing military dangers to Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Israel.

In a speech in January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld interspersed claims about chemical and biological weapons and terrorism
with conventional military threats to argue that "Iraq poses a threat to the
security of our people and to the stability of the world."

"Iraq has
invaded two of its neighbors and has launched ballistic missiles at four of its
neighbors," he said, adding that it "is the only country in the world that fires
missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft on an almost daily
basis."

The intelligence agencies should have offered Congress and other
policymakers a comprehensive, unified view of these risks before the war, the
Senate Intelligence Committee said, but they never did.

After reviewing
about 400 analytical documents written by the intelligence agencies from 1991,
after the first gulf war, to 2003, when Mr. Hussein was toppled, the committee
unanimously concluded that "the body of assessments showed that Iraqi military
capabilities had steadily degraded following defeat in the first gulf war in
1991. Analysts also believed those capabilities would continue to erode as long
as economic sanctions remained in place."

The intelligence agencies,
though, were much less certain about Mr. Hussein's intentions, the committee
said. "The assessments came to the same general conclusions that Saddam
Hussein: was unpredictable and aggressive; retained the capability to strike
militarily in the region; and, would probably not choose to use force against
neighbors as long as U.S. and coalition forces were in the region."

"Clearly, the issue of Saddam's intentions to use force against his neighbors
and U.S. and coalition forces was a high-interest matter," the report said,
"and, unfortunately, the main area where the intelligence community was least
confident in its analysis."

It criticized the agencies for failing "to
clearly characterize changes in Iraq's threat to regional stability and
security, taking account of the fact that its conventional military forces
steadily degraded after 1990."

In September 1991, a report on Mr.
Hussein's "prospects for survival over the next year" found that Iraq would have
"only limited capabilities to endanger U.S. interests."

By 1993, an
assessment said Mr. Hussein's basic goals were to maintain power "by any
means," to regain internal control, to rebuild the military, including illicit
weapons, and to make Iraq "the dominant regional power." But the agencies
warned that they were "hindered by the dearth of solid information."

An
assessment in early 1995 called Iraq "an immediate source of concern and a
long-term threat to U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf," but the
State Department's view in the document called it "impossible to predict with
confidence whether Saddam will choose confrontation or opt for a period of
quiescence and cooperation." The military's view in the document was that Iraq
had "at least some chance" of striking quickly into Saudi oil fields.

Other reports that year warned of Mr. Hussein's "unpredictability and
proclivity for dramatic and rash behavior" but said only "marginal" rebuilding
of the military had occurred. Without a "large, standing coalition military
presence" in the region, one said, there could be no guarantee of deterring
him.

From about 1999 on, though, assessments "noted that the condition
of all Iraqi military branches was poor," the Senate committee found.

In
2002, a report judged "that Iraqi military morale and battlefield cohesion are
more fragile today than in 1991."

By January 2003, an assessment found
that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing
Washington with justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the
first blow, especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime
is imminent."

By March 17, 2003, Mr. Bush promised that the time of
such risks was about to end.

"In a free Iraq there will be no more wars
of aggression against your neighbors," he said. "The tyrant will soon be
gone."