The FNCA 2012 Workshop on Nuclear Security and Safeguards was held from December 18 to 21, in Hanoi, Vietnam. This workshop was hosted by Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan.

The Workshop began with the opening remarks by Prof. Dr. Vuong Huu Tan, Director General for the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) and Mr. Masao Senzaki as Project Leader of Japan.

The Workshop consisted of nine sessions. Sessions 1 and 2 were devoted to the Country Reports, in which the recent developments in the FNCA member countries were presented. Sessions 3 and 4 were on nuclear security. The current developments and initiatives for enhancement of nuclear security were discussed in Session 3, providing information on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and the 2005 Amendment of the CPPNM with special emphasis on nuclear security culture. Session 4 presented the achievements and significance of the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit. Sessions 5 and 6 were dedicated to safeguards, in which the IAEA's recent publication on SSAC "Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols" was presented. This provided a better understanding of the infrastructure necessary for an effective SSAC and measures to establish this infrastructure. The presentations by Vietnam and Malaysia on the national regulatory capacity building efforts for safeguards were provided for in Session 6. In Session 7, country reports on current status of member countries were summarized. A round table discussion was conducted in Sessions 8 and 9. The topics of the discussion included the nuclear 3S (safeguards, security and safety) in the light of the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident, and capacity building for nuclear security and safeguards, respectively.

Overall, the workshop was successful and productive. It demonstrated that the Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project have the potential to play an important role in enhancing these regimes in Asia. It is also noted that duplication or overlapping of the project activities and Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) activities should be avoided and that these two mechanisms of cooperation should be conducted in a collaborative manner.

The workshop was followed by the open seminar on Additional Protocol, co-organized by FNCA and APSN. The open seminar was held to share experiences of member states in AP implementation, having 29 participants, including representatives from FNCA member countries, and IAEA, the US and Myanmar. At the beginning of the seminar IAEA gave presentations on the importance of the AP, declaration of the AP, and Complementary Access (CA). Countries which implemented the AP then reported their experiences and efforts in AP implementation, followed by sharing of good practices of the AP and discussions on assistance necessary for countries which are going to ratify the AP in the future.

The FNCA member countries possess varying quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials. Many FNCA countries have no nuclear power plants. A few countries have plans to establish new nuclear power plants in the future. All the countries have nuclear security and safeguards activities following IAEA guidelines.

2.

All countries are signatories/parties of important international legal instruments and bilateral agreements (e.g. NPT, CSA, AP, CPPNM etc) and have good cooperation with the international safeguards and security community.

3.

A few counties have independent regulatory authorities for nuclear security and safeguards activities. Some countries are in the process of revising their nuclear regulatory architecture to establish greater regulatory independence or respond to new regulatory demands.

4.

Almost all the countries have initiatives to develop human resources on nuclear security and safeguards by organizing training courses, seminars, and workshops with the assistance of the IAEA and other developed countries.

5.

Major challenges so far identified, include:

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Limited human resources

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Insufficient budget allocation

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National regulations and policies under development

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Understanding of nuclear security culture needs to be enhanced

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Trans-boundary issues for some countries may be considered a challenge

Session 3: Nuclear Security IMs Naoko NORO, Japan, gave a presentation on current developments and initiatives for the Enhancement of the Nuclear Security Regime. She presented on the primary instruments in the international regime for nuclear security, i.e. CPPNM, INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, as well as discussing nuclear security culture and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. She highlighted the importance of nuclear security culture.

The summary of her presentation is as follows:

1.

With regard to the international regime for nuclear security, definitions, objectives, legal framework (e.g. international conventions, legally binding and non-binding instruments, and policies) were summarized.

2.

Regarding INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, this revision was published in 2011 as a non-binding guideline. Its contents include the key elements and structures of a state's physical protection regime. Newly introduced concepts in Rev.5 were described in comparison to Rev.4.

3.

The fundamentals, definitions and foundational principles of nuclear security culture were discussed. The speaker emphasized that effective and strong nuclear security culture is the best protection against nuclear security threats.

4.

The speaker discussed lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and measures to strengthen nuclear security in the post-Fukushima environment. These included consideration of "The Responses to Nuclear Security Issues in view of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident", "Decision on Strengthening Prevention of Terrorism against Nuclear Facilities" and "Actions Taken". The speaker suggested that Japan and the international community need to share experiences on lessons learnt.

There was a discussion on the financial implications of the implementation of the revised INFCIRC/225 and the Amended CPPNM from the operator's perspective.

Session 4: Nuclear Security IIDr MIN Gyungsik, ROK, presented on the important commitments reached between the states during the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. He noted:

1.

The primary responsibility and central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international framework for nuclear security.

2.

The importance of appropriately securing, accounting for and consolidating inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium.

3.

The need to ensure the physical protection of radioactive sources, keeping in mind their extensive use in industrial, medical, agricultural and research purposes.

4.

The need to increase the physical security of both domestic and international transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

5.

The need to develop national capacity for the prevention, detection, response and prosecution of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

6.

The importance of maintaining the high culture of nuclear security

7.

The importance of preventing access by non-State actors to information, technology and expertise necessary to obtain or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes or disorders of nuclear facilities management system based on information technology.

8.

The importance of international cooperation in this area, providing assistance to countries in need at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, as appropriate.

The results of the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit as presented are useful in strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and preventing terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.

Session 5: Safeguards I: Guidance for State Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional ProtocolsLead Speech by Mr John RUSSELL (IAEA)Mr Russell explained the requirements for implementing the Additional Protocol. The presentation included: objectives of safeguards; the primary function of the state; the operator and safeguards regulatory authority (SRA) responsibility related to implementing the additional protocol; definition of nuclear material; how to prepare and provide reports on nuclear material and additional protocol declarations; and, IAEA inspection and complementary access.

Summary discussion of the Session 5:

1.

Definition of nuclear material on pre- 34(c) was discussed. Australia has some experience with reporting under the Additional Protocol on pre-34(c) material, and offered to share that experience with FNCA countries considering how to report on this.

2.

IAEA is developing further implementation guides that complement the Guidance for State Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols.

3.

Some discussion was held on the difference between an inspection and a complementary access. Inspections may be held with varying notification times as agreed with the state, the minimum notice for complementary access in contained in the additional protocol agreed with the state. An inspection is conducted to enable the agency to make conclusions as concerns the diversion of declared material and to some extent the proper use of a declared facility. A complementary access is conducted to enable the agency to make broader conclusions as to whether all material and facilities are in fact declared. Activities at inspections generally involve measuring material at measurement points, a complementary access may involve more visual observations of outlying buildings or locations that may not be normally accessed during inspection.

4.

APSN has completed a paper "Fundamentals and Good Practices of Safeguards Regulatory Authorities", and has submitted this to the IAEA requesting it be published as an INFCIRC (note: this was published as INFCIRC/845 on 8 January 2013 and is also included in the IAEA's web site of safeguards resources for states.

Session 6: Safeguards II : National regulatory capacity building efforts for safeguards· VietnamDr NGUYEN Nu Hoai Vi explained the current challenges on National regulatory capacity building efforts for safeguards for Vietnam such as:

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AP in force

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Safeguards overwhelmed by Safety

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Limited expertise

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Limited staff

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Attraction for workforce is low

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Difficult to study

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Low income

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Responsibilities of Safeguards Division

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Number of position and job descriptions

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Basic qualification for Recruitment

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Additional training needed

She also addressed the challenges regarding competencies and legislation and regulations under development.

· MalaysiaMr Mohd Yasin Bin SUDIN explained the final analysis for Malaysia to make decision for nuclear power plant 2x1000MW. Furthermore, he also explained infrastructure basis on safeguards in Malaysia such as:

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Basic safeguards system

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International commitment with IAEA

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Background of safeguards in Malaysia

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Legal and Regulations

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Current initiative on legal infrastructure

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Current status of Act, Regulations, Standards and Guidance

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Human Resource Development (HRD)

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Establishment of Malaysia Nuclear Power Corporation or MNPC

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Nuclear Power Development Timeline

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Lesson Learned

Session 7: Country Report Summary by Mr Naoki KOBAYASHI (Japan)The nuclear energy development situation has not changed dramatically: ROK and Japan are operating nuclear power plants, Bangladesh and Vietnam retain their nuclear power plant (NPP) plans, and some countries are preparing a concrete plan for NPP.

Session 8: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear 3S (Safety, Safeguards, Security)Lead Speech by Ms Kazuko HAMADA (Japan)Ms Hamada presented the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident about interfaces between nuclear safety and security and interactions among the 3S's including the similarities and differences in safety, security and safeguards. Ms Hamada also discussed the challenges faced by the relevant parties involved during and after the accident. The findings are as follows;

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Need to promote the understanding among the stakeholders that nuclear 3S (safety, security, and safeguards) serve the fundamental principle of and form a trinity for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

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Recognizing the interfaces among nuclear 3S is important to ensure nuclear 3S.

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Better managing these interfaces may result in better performances in ensuring nuclear 3S.

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Determining an appropriate balance in contradictory approaches among 3S presents a challenge for the all states with nuclear activities.

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How to coordinate the efforts of different parties in nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

Summary of the Session 8

1.

Report from The IAEA Technical Meeting on Interfaces and Synergies in Safety, Security and Safeguards for the Development of a Nuclear Power Programs held in Vienna from 26 to 29 November 2012.
Mr. Mohd Yasin, Malaysia, reported that the Technical Meeting to identify the interfaces and synergies between safety, security and safeguards that could provide potential benefits to the Member States in the development of adequate infrastructure for a national nuclear power programs especially that are considering and planning their first Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Area discussed in the meeting as follows,

i.

Legal Framework for Safety, Security, and Safeguards;

ii.

Interfaces and Synergies between Safety and Security;

iii.

Developing an Organizational Culture Conducive to Safety, Security, and Safeguards;

iv.

Experiences in Organizing a regulatory body (RB) and an Operator to Implement Safety, Security, and Safeguards Efficiently;

v.

Facilitated Table Top Exercise to Highlight Communication between Safety, Security, and Safeguards;

vi.

Cross Cutting Issues for Safety, Security, and Safeguards; and

vii.

Identifying Best Practices of Member States and Lessons Learned

2.

Discussing possible ways to improve nuclear 3S performances from recent initiatives on better management of nuclear 3S.
Meeting has discussed this matter. Need to harmonize the nuclear 3S approach based on lesson learned.

3.

Proposing to organize a joint seminar on nuclear 3S with Safety Management System for Nuclear Facilities Project of FNCA.
Meeting has agreed to share the understanding the importance of an integrated approach of nuclear 3S, and to discuss possible ways to better manage nuclear 3S. The topics to be discussed later. This workshop will be arranged in cooperation with APSN.

Session 9: Round Table Discussion on Capacity Building for Nuclear Security and SafeguardsThe presenters for this session were the following:

China - "Nuclear Safeguards and Security Capacity Building Activities"
Discussed the legal framework on safeguards and security in China. China has developed a new regulation entitled "Regulation for Nuclear Security Management" which is being implemented. China established a Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Security in 1991 which also serves as a technical support laboratory for CAEA for verification tools such as NDA and DA. China has joined the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories. China also established in 2011 State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC). It is responsible for the implementation of nuclear security of Center of Excellence (COE) project and technical support center for CAEA.

Indonesia - "National Capacity Building Strategies and Plans for Nuclear Security and Safeguards"
Discussed the history of BAPETEN as the regulatory body for safety, security and safeguards. It has two Directorates for nuclear installations and nuclear materials, and radiological materials. The presenter also explained the qualification and training competency requirements for BAPETEN inspectors. BAPETEN has also established a Training Framework for HRD both for safeguards and security. One of their challenges is having more positions for safeguards inspectorate.

Japan - "Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security"
Elaborated further on the main activities of the ISCN such as the capacity building assistance; assistance for infrastructure development; and technology development support. The ISCN has hosted several courses on SSAC, nuclear security and nonproliferation. The concept and approaches for bilateral cooperation is a step-by-step approach and is needs-oriented with tailor made cooperation. The presentere also suggested having regional collaboration and harmonization of HRD. The regional network from countries that already established COE such as in China and ROK.

ROK - "Capacity Building Support Activities and Plans for Nuclear Security and Safeguards"
KINAC shared experiences on capacity building, including that mandated by legislation. Legislation establishing more regulatory independence entered into force in 2004- "Act for Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency Preparedness". This involved training workers in the nuclear facilities as well as nuclear security personnel. KINAC also supported the IAEA inspectors training in their CANDU facility and others. The presenter also discussed the establishment of the International Nuclear Security Academy (INSA). INSA will be completed in 2014. The role of INSA as COE promotes training programme with systematic and comprehensive manner.

Summary of the Session 9

1.

HRD strategies for nuclear security and safeguards

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Possible ways to cooperate international and national HRD program

3.

Supporting the IAEA Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSC)

4.

Proposal to hold "Workshop on Regional Capacity Building for Nuclear Security and Safeguards with ASEAN Center for Energy" in January 2014

Suggestions and Actions Taken:

1.

To use FNCA - ANTEP to post COE plan for nuclear security and safeguards to enhance coordination.

2.

To use APSN website for any safeguards activities

3.

Suggested by VARANS to make use of train-the-trainer concept to maximize the staff capability

4.

China and ROK are willing to cooperate with Japan (ISCN) regarding HRD.

5.

Information on trainings for SG can be provided both on APSN and FNCA websites simultaneously

6.

It is suggested that the "Workshop on Regional Capacity Building for Nuclear Security and Safeguards with ASEAN Center for Energy" in 2014 would be done jointly with APSN Working Group 2 on Capacity Building.

Program of FNCA 2012 Workshop on Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project

Session 8: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear 3SPresentation: Japan
· Report on the table of the regulatory authorities for nuclear 3S
· Lessons learned from the Fukushima accident about interface between nuclear safety and security
and interactions among 3S
(Ms. Kazuko HAMADA, JAEA)

14:50 - 15:10

Coffee Break

15:10 - 17:00

Session 9: Round Table Discussion on Capacity Building for Nuclear Security and SafeguardsPresentation: China, Indonesia, Japan, ROK
· China's capacity building support activities and plans for nuclear security and safeguards
(Mr. SHEN Ning, CAEA)
· Indonesia's national capacity building strategies and plans for nuclear security and safeguards
(Ms. Susilaningsih Medi LESTARI, BAPETEN)
· JAEA/ISCN's capacity building support activities for nuclear security and safeguards and initiatives
for networking with other support activities, including IAEA's International Network for Nuclear
Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC) and the Vienna meeting in October 2012
(Mr. Naoki KOBAYASHI, JAEA)
· ROK's capacity building support activities and plans for nuclear security and safeguards
(Mr. LIM, Dong-hyuk, KINAC)

Session 5: International Support Activities for AP UniversalizationPresentation: the United States, Japan, Australia
· Australia's efforts towards the universalization of AP, including Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Initiative (NPDI)
· US experience in outreach activities and the work that U.S. DOE/NNSA program is doing for
universalization of the AP
· Japan's efforts for the facilitation of AP ratification, including its capacity building support activities
for AP ratification

16:30 - 17:00

Session 6: Discussions on Efforts towards Effective Implementation of AP· Good practice-sharing on AP implementation
· Support needs towards AP ratification
· Experience-sharing on challenges for AP implementation and efforts to overcome the challenges
· Proposal to make a report on experience-sharing on AP implementation
· Other possible cooperation mechanisms for effective AP implementation