In an Interview, He Asserts He Quit to Help Party

WASHINGTON, June 29 —Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said today that he had returned from South Vietnam primarily to help the Republican party nominate a Presidential candi­date who would be “prudent” in the conduct of foreign af­fairs and faithful to his party's traditional support of civil equality for all Americans.

In a two‐hour intervietv with The New York Times, Mr.

Transcript of Lodge interview appears on Pages 14 and 15.

Mr. Lodge, who was tanned and lean but exhausted from lack of sleep after his long flight from Saigon, emphasized that he favored Gov. William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania for the nomination, because he felt the Governor was “pru­dent and he is not impulsive.” But he insisted that he could not be drafted for the nomina­tion himself and he said it was too early to decide whether he would support Senator Gold­water, if the Arizonan was nominated.

The Ambassador, who had

He was asked whether he had come home to oppose Senator Goldwater this year, just as he had led the campaign for General Eisenhower against the conservative Senatnr Robert A. Taft of Ohio in 1952.

“Well, broadly speaking,” he replied, “I wouldn’t say that. What we have here is the very basic raw Rind of question as to whether we are going to nom­inate a man who is prudent and not impulsive in the con­duct of foreign relations.”

“To put it more bluntly: The President of the United States has the decision on the use of the atomic bomb and it is ab­solutely vital for both parties to nominate men who are pru­dent, not imptllsive, and can be trusted to cope with a respon­sibility of that kind.”

‘In An Affirmative Spirit’

The Ambassador was asked what specifically bothered him about Senator Goldwater on this question. He replied:

“Well, I’m coming back to help Governor Scranton. I’m here in an affirmative spirit because I know that he is pru­dent and he is not impulsive, and that he is unquestionably a man who can be trusted with this responsibility and I haven’t said anything against anybody else. I have some personal views which I haven't expressed yet, and others can draw their own conclusions.”

This was obviously an interim report from the Ambassador. He had flown here after an ex­hausting and emotional fare­well in Saigon. He had reported to the President and was facing the press before he had time to estimate the political atmos­phere at home. He said he did not want to talk strategy in detail until he had talked to Governor Scranton, and he was particularly cautious about talking about the role General Eisenhower would play in the last fortnight before the Repub­lican Convention opens in San Francisco July 13.

It is known, however, that he has worked very hard on a policy paper for presentation to the Republican Platform Com­mittee on July 8, and that this will emphasize both domestic and foreign policies that are diametrically opposed to Sena­tor GnldtvatPr's.

He will also tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow that he is cautious­ly optimistic that the trend of events for the allies in South Vietnam is beginning to be more favorable, and he will talk to the National Press Club on Wednesday, before having his first strategy meeting with Governor Scranton.

In his interview in The Times office, Ambassador Lodge made these points:

q He had been strongly urged

¶He confirmed the article, first printed in The New York Times, about his intention to return, but said that one reason given in his original cable was not that his own health was bad—he said it was excellent —but that his wife was “ex­tremely fatigued.”

¶General Eisenhower “could he” a factor in what the Ambassador defined as a two‐man racc between Senator Gold­water and Governor Scranton, but “I don’t know whether he will be or not. I haven’t had time to talk to him yet.”

¶He did not take either the polls or the published list of delegates committed to Sena­tor Goldwater or anybody eish at face value. The whole thing could change “overnight.”

¶He did not see how Viet­nam could be a big issuein 4he campaign, since both Republi­can and Democratic parties had been involved in policy theie, but of course it would be de­bated and maybe somebody else could show him how it could be a major issue.

Seems Ambiguous on a Draft

The Ambassador seemed rather ambiguous on the ques­tion of whether or not he could be drafted by the convention.

“My position was right along,” he said, that he should “accept a draft. That's true, but there was no duty to seek the nomination.

“Well, then, along comes this situation, and Governor Rocke­feller loses the California pri­mary and gets out of it and supports Governor Scranton, and then it becomes a case of Governor Scranton versus Sen ator Goldwater, and that changes the thing.

“So I no longer think that it is a duty to accept a draft in the light of these circtn­stances, becattse my effective­ness is at its greatest if every body knows that I am perfectly honest in liaving come back for this purpose [helping Mr. Scranton] and for no other.”

Mr. Lodge said he “could not imagine” what kind of cam­paign Senator Goldwater could run if nominated after having voted against the civil rights bill, and he defined a conserva­tive in a somewhat different way from Senator Goldwater.

“I think,” he said, “that a conservative is a man who has something he wants to conserve and knows that he can only do it by being willing to innovate. I think a man who digs in with his heels against all change, who wants to set back the clock isn’t a conservative. I think he's a reactionary.”

In all of this, however, the Ambassador was clearly re­jecting the course of a head‐on personal conflict with Senator Goldwater. He was opposing him by innuendo, rather than attacking him directly as he did in the fight against Senator Taft in 1952, and the general impression in Washington after the day's activities was that Senator Goldwater was too far ahead to be defeated by such I a strategy.