I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this litigation, Apple asserted four trade dresses against Samsung: three relating
to the iPhone, and one relating to the iPad. More specifically, Apple asserted that three Apple trade
dresses—Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress, based on Registration No. 3,470,983; Apple’s
unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress; and Apple’s unregistered combination iPhone trade dress—
were protectable, famous, and diluted by seventeen Samsung smartphones. See ECF No. 1931 at
10-12. Apple also contended that Apple’s unregistered iPad/iPad 2 trade dress was infringed by
two Samsung tablets. The jury ultimately found that two of Apple’s asserted trade dresses
associated with the iPhone—Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and Apple’s unregistered
iPhone 3G trade dress—were diluted by six of Samsung’s smartphones. Id. Apple did not prevail
as to the remaining eleven Samsung smartphones, or as to Apple’s unregistered combination
iPhone trade dress or Apple’s unregistered iPad/iPad 2 trade dress. Id. Apple’s motion for
attorneys’ fees, which Apple brings pursuant to the Lanham Act only, seeks fees related to Apple’s
win at trial with respect to the dilution of Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and Apple’s
unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress by six Samsung smartphones.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Apple and Samsung sell competing smartphones and tablets. Apple filed its Complaint on
April 15, 2011, alleging that the Samsung Galaxy line of products misappropriated the Apple
Product Trade Dress by mimicking a combination of several elements of that trade dress. ECF No.
1 at 25-28.
Samsung moved for summary judgment on all of Apple’s trade dress claims, arguing that
Apple’s trade dresses were functional and were not sufficiently famous. While the Court denied
Samsung’s motion in full, the Court found Samsung’s “fame” argument to be persuasive such that
“[i]t is a close question as to whether a reasonable juror could find on the record before the Court
that the designs of Apple’s products (exclusive of the Apple name, logo, or home button) were
famous at the time Samsung released its products.” ECF No. 1158 at 11.
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At trial, Apple alleged dilution of the registered iPhone trade dress (based on Registration
No. 3,470,983), the unregistered combination iPhone trade dress, and the unregistered iPhone 3G
trade dress by seventeen Samsung smartphones. ECF No. 1189 at 3. Apple also alleged
infringement of Apple’s iPad trade dress based on the unregistered iPad/iPad 2 trade dress by
Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1 (WiFi) and Tab 10.1 (4G LTE). Id. Samsung denied that Samsung
diluted either Apple’s asserted iPhone or iPad trade dresses and contended that the asserted trade
dresses are unprotectable. ECF No. 1903 at 80.
At the close of trial, the Court instructed the jury to find that an asserted Apple trade dress
is protectable if the trade dress: (1) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning and (2)
is non-functional. Id. at 82. The jury was then instructed to find that Samsung diluted Apple’s
protectable trade dress only if: (1) the asserted Apple trade dress is famous; (2) Samsung began
selling its accused products in commerce after Apple’s asserted trade dress became famous; and (3)
Samsung’s accused products were likely to cause dilution of Apple’s asserted trade dress. Id. at 86.
The jury was also instructed to “not award Apple monetary relief for any of its dilution claims
unless Apple proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Samsung’s acts of dilution were
willful.” Id. at 93.
As mentioned above, the jury found that Samsung willfully diluted Apple’s registered
iPhone trade dress and the unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress by selling six products: the
Fascinate, Galaxy S (i9000), Galaxy S 4G, Galaxy S II Showcase (i500), Mesmerize, and Vibrant.
ECF No. 1931 at 10-12. The jury determined that Apple’s other two asserted trade dresses—the
unregistered combination iPhone trade dress and unregistered iPad/iPad 2 trade dress—were not
protectable, and that the eleven other accused Samsung products did not dilute any asserted trade
dress.
Following the trial, Samsung moved for judgment as a matter of law on Apple’s trade dress
claims. ECF No. 2013 at 19. Specifically, Samsung argued that no reasonable jury could find
Apple’s trade dresses protectable and that no reasonable jury could find actionable and willful
dilution of Apple’s asserted trade dresses by Samsung’s accused products. Id. at 19-21. Apple also
moved for judgment as a matter of law that the unregistered iPad/iPad 2 Trade Dress is (1)
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Apple’s unregistered trade dresses all share common elements. For example, in its trial
brief, Apple describes the combination iPhone trade dress as comprising:
• A rectangular product with four evenly rounded corners;
• A flat, clear surface covering the front of the product;
• A display screen under the clear surface;
• Under the clear surface, substantial neutral (black or white) borders above and
below the display screen and narrower neutral borders on either side of the
screen;
• When the device is on, a matrix of colorful square icons with evenly rounded
corners within the display screen; and
• When the device is on, a bottom dock of colorful square icons with evenly
rounded corners set off from the other icons in the display, which does not
change as other pages of the user interface are viewed.
ECF No. 1299-2, Ex. A. Apple’s unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress includes all elements of the
combination iPhone trade dress, but adds “[t]he appearance of a metallic bezel around the flat, clear
surface” and “[w]hen the device is on, a row of small dots on the display screen.” Id. The
iPad/iPad2 trade dress comprises the “rectangular product,” “flat clear surface,” “display screen,”
and “matrix of colorful square icons” elements, but also includes “[t]he appearance of a metallic
rim around the flat clear surface” and “[u]nder the clear surface, substantial neutral (black or white)
borders on all sides of the display screen.” Id.
To illustrate its trade dress allegations, Apple included the following images in the
Complaint:
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C. The Parties’ Arguments
Because the Supreme Court has instructed that fee award determinations require a review of
the substantive strength of the parties’ litigation positions, the Court now outlines the parties’ trade
dress arguments at trial and in their motions for judgment as a matter of law. See Octane Fitness,
134 S. Ct. at 1756 (“an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to
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“beautiful object,” RT 484:1-11; that the iPhone was “beautiful and that that alone would be
enough to excite people and make people want to buy it,” RT 602:8-19; that “reasons for the
iPhone success” are “people find the iPhone designs beautiful,” RT 625:4-626:4; that the iPhone’s
“attractive appearance and design” motivates purchases, RT 635:23-636:5; and that customers “lust
after [the iPhone] because it’s so gorgeous,” RT 721:3-7. ECF No. 2013 at 9-10. In response,
Apple contended that beauty alone does not support a finding of aesthetic functionality. ECF 2050
at 8 (citing Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072). Apple also argued that Samsung failed to prove
that protections for the iPhone trade dresses would put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage,” meaning that Samsung did not show that Apple’s products “are bought
largely for their aesthetic value,” which is a requirement for aesthetic functionality. Id. at 8
(quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001)); Au-Tomotive Gold,
457 F.3d at 1068 (citing Restatement of Torts § 742).
Third, Samsung argued that Apple’s trade dresses did not acquire secondary meaning. ECF
No. 2013 at 10. Specifically, Samsung alleged that the evidence failed to show that consumers
believed the primary significance of the asserted trade dress was to identify the product with
Apple. Id. Apple’s survey established that a majority of respondents shown blurred images of
iPhones said they associated the “overall appearance” of the phone with “Apple” or “iPhone.” RT
1583:10-1584:24. Samsung argued that this evidence was insufficient because a plaintiff “must
show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the
product but the producer.” ECF No. 2013 at 10; Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
118-19 (1938). Samsung also contended that Apple’s evidence that Apple advertised the iPhone as
a whole was insufficient to establish secondary meaning for Apple’s trade dresses. ECF No. 2013
at 10; see PX11-14.
Apple took a broader approach to secondary meaning, arguing that courts consider various
factors in assessing secondary meaning, including: (1) whether purchasers associate the
configuration with plaintiff; (2) the degree and manner of plaintiff’s advertising; (3) the length and
manner of plaintiff’s use of the configuration; and (4) whether plaintiff’s use has been exclusive.
ECF No. 2131 at 9 (citing Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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Apple contended that Apple’s sales numbers, advertising expenditures, and advertisements
prominently displaying the iPhone design demonstrate that Apple’s trade dresses had acquired
secondary meaning. Id.; see PX11 (print and outdoor ads); PX12 (TV ads); PX14 (media clips);
PX15 (sales numbers).
In addition, Samsung asserted that even if Apple’s unregistered iPhone trade dress was
protectable, Apple’s evidence did not meet the requirements for dilution on two grounds: (1) Apple
did not show that the trade dress was “famous” and (2) Apple did not show that the accused
Samsung phones “impair the distinctiveness” of Apple’s trade dress. ECF No. 2013 at 10-11 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)). The Court now summarizes each of these arguments.
First, Samsung claimed that Apple did not establish fame both because Apple did not offer
evidence from surveys restricted to the time before Samsung entered the market, and because
Apple’s evidence did not show sufficient recognition by the general population. Apple’s only
survey evidence supporting fame was a J une 2011 survey, but Samsung entered the market in J uly
2010. As trade dress dilution is limited to uses “after the owner’s mark has become famous,”
Samsung contended that Apple’s survey evidence was irrelevant. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Accordingly,
we hold that any commercial use of a famous mark in commerce is arguably a diluting use that
fixes the time by which famousness is to be measured”); ECF No. 2013 at 10-11 (Samsung’s
arguments). In addition, Samsung asserted that, even if it were relevant, Apple’s J une 2011 survey
evidence was insufficient to establish fame because it shows recognition by less than sixty-four
percent of likely cell phone purchasers—a subset of the general population. In support of its
argument, Samsung cited authority indicating that recognition by greater than sixty-five percent of
the general population is necessary to establish fame. ECF No. 2013 at 11 (citing Nissan, 378 F.3d
at 1014 (material disputed issue of fact regarding whether “fame” existed where Nissan Motor
introduced evidence of 898 million dollars in sales over a five year period and 65% consumer
recognition at the point when another company introduced a Nissan mark)); 4 McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:106 (2008 ed.) (proposing that “75% of the general
consuming public of the United States” should be required)). Apple replied that surveys are not
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required to demonstrate fame, and that most of Apple’s other fame evidence—which is made up of
advertisements, media clips, and press coverage—was from before J uly 2010, when Samsung
entered the market. Id. at 9 (citing PX11 (print/outdoor ads); PX12 (TV ads); PX14 (media clips);
PX133 (press coverage)).
Second, Samsung argued that the record did not support a finding of likely dilution because
Apple did not demonstrate that the accused Samsung phones “impair the distinctiveness” of
Apple’s trade dresses. ECF No. 2013 at 11 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B); RT 1534:14-21 (“no
empirical evidence” and “no hard data to show that Samsung’s actions have diluted Apple’s
brand”)). Apple responded that the correct test is likelihood of dilution, not actual dilution, so no
such evidence is required. ECF No. 1189 at 9 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“Under the Lanham Act, an award of attorney’s fees is within the district court’s discretion
. . . [and] should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs.,
Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749 (holding that an
appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district
court’s determinations made under the Patent Act’s identical fee-shifting provision, 35 U.S.C.
§ 285). In addition, “a determination that a trademark case is exceptional is a question of law for
the district court, not the jury.” Watec Co., Ltd. v. Liu, 403 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Lanham Act permits an award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional
cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court recently reviewed Section 285
of the Patent Act, which similarly provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. In Octane Fitness, the Supreme
Court held “that an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the
substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
In making this determination, the Supreme Court noted that the Patent Act and Lanham Act have
“identical fee-shifting provision[s]” and cited to a Lanham Act case that interpreted “exceptional”
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to mean “uncommon” or “not run-of-the-mill.” Id. (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-
Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Ninth Circuit law surrounding the meaning of “exceptional” in the Lanham Act also
provides further authority.
1
“Under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), a court may award reasonable attorneys’
fees to the prevailing party in exceptional circumstances, which includes cases in which the act is
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1039 (9th Cir.
2007); see also Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 510 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Exceptional cases
include cases in which the infringing party acted maliciously, fraudulently, deliberately or
willfully.”); Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]
trademark case is exceptional for purposes of an award of attorneys’ fees when the infringement is
malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful.”). For the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, an act
“is not willful if the defendant might have reasonably thought that its proposed usage was not
barred by the statute.” Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.
1998) (denying fees) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, the Ninth Circuit
has noted that the “‘exceptional circumstances’ requirement [is construed] narrowly.” Classic
Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
IV. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Samsung argues that the Court should defer ruling on the attorneys’
fees motion until after the appeals have concluded. Opp. at 1-2. Because the Court finds that Apple
is not entitled to attorneys’ fees, the Court sees no reason for delay and considers Apple’s motion.

1
The Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness is best interpreted as overturning the Federal
Circuit’s “overly rigid formulation” of a test for awarding attorneys’ fees in Brooks Furniture
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Brooks
Furniture held that an “exceptional case” is one which involves “litigation-related misconduct of
an independently sanctionable magnitude” or is both “objectively baseless” and “brought in
subjective bad faith.” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. As discussed above, the Supreme Court
in Octane Fitness referred to the Lanham Act’s and Patent Act’s attorneys’ fees provisions as
“identical.” The Supreme Court also cited a Lanham Act case to support its holding “that an
‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength
of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Id. (citing Noxell, 771 F.2d at 526).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s more flexible formulation of determining what constitutes an
“exceptional case” in Lanham Act cases still applies after Octane Fitness.
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Apple argues that this case is exceptional under § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act on two bases.
First, Apple asserts that the jury verdict established willfulness, which renders the case exceptional.
Second, Apple contends that Samsung could not have reasonably thought that Samsung’s trade
dress usage was legal because, according to Apple, Samsung deliberately copied Apple’s iPhone.
The Court will address each of Apple’s contentions in detail below.
A. The Jury Verdict
In Apple’s motion for attorneys’ fees, Apple contends that the jury verdict established that
Samsung’s conduct was sufficiently willful to compel a finding that this case is exceptional. ECF
No. 2851-8 at 3. Apple cites Gracie v. Gracie as the primary support for its argument. 217 F.3d
1060, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2000). In Gracie, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s exceptional
case determination based on the Gracie jury’s willful infringement verdict. Id. However, the
specific jury instruction given in Gracie formed the basis of the court’s reasoning. Id. The jury in
Gracie was instructed that the jury “may find that [plaintiffs] intentionally infringed the [ ] service
marks, if you find that they acted ‘willfully,’ or deliberately and in bad faith.” Id. at 1068-69
(alterations and emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit distinguished a Fifth Circuit case in which
“the jury was instructed that ‘willfully’ only meant ‘done voluntarily and intentionally.’” Id. at
1068 (citing Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Because the Gracie jury had explicitly found bad faith, the “finding of willful infringement is
entitled to greater deference than that of the Texas Pig Stands jury.” Id. at 1069.
Here, the jury found that Samsung’s dilution of Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and
unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress was willful. ECF No. 1931 at 14. However, the jury was not
instructed as to the bad faith component of willfulness under the Lanham Act, but rather was only
instructed to “not award Apple monetary relief for any of its dilution claims unless Apple proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that Samsung’s acts of dilution were willful.” ECF No. 1903 at
93. “Willful” was not further defined in the instructions. Id. Therefore, Gracie is not controlling in
the instant case.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s general rule is that “[w]hile a jury finding of willful
infringement is relevant to the question of whether a case is exceptional, it is insufficient on its own
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to support an award of fees in the absence of some aggravating circumstance or heightened level of
culpability.” Invision Media Servs., Inc. v. Glen J. Lerner, 175 Fed. App’x 904, 906 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Here, the reliance on the special jury verdict that the [trademark] infringement was willful is
made more problematic by the fact that the term ‘willful’ was not defined for the jury.”) (citing
Watec, 403 F.3d at 656 (“[T]he jury’s finding that [defendant] ‘intentionally infringed’ does not
necessarily equate with the malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful conduct that we usually
require before deeming a case exceptional.”)). The jury’s bad faith finding in Gracie is consistent
with the “heightened level of culpability” required by the Ninth Circuit in Invision and Watec to
find a case exceptional. In contrast, the district court in Invision, as the Court in the instant case,
did not define willfulness for the jury. Notably, the 9th Circuit in Invision vacated the district
court’s award of fees because the district court relied too heavily on the jury’s finding of willful
infringement. In sum, and consistent with Invision, Gracie, and Watec, the jury’s willfulness
finding in the instant case weighs in favor of exceptionality, but, contrary to Apple’s assertion, it is
not dispositive. Therefore, to appropriately consider the totality of the circumstances as
contemplated by Octane Fitness and the Ninth Circuit’s Lanham Act case law, the Court must also
consider Apple’s copying evidence and Samsung’s evidence supporting its defenses. The Court
now turns to these issues.
B. Whether Samsung Reasonably Thought That Its Proposed Usage Was Not
Barred By The Lanham Act
Exceptional cases under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) are “cases in which the act is fraudulent,
deliberate, or willful.” Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1039. As discussed above, a jury finding of
willfulness is insufficient to establish willfulness under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Rather, for the
purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees, an act “is not willful if the defendant might have reasonably
thought that its proposed usage was not barred by the statute.” Blockbuster Videos, 141 F.3d at
1300 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (denying fees to prevailing plaintiff in
trademark case); see also Int’l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733,
738-39 (9th Cir. 1986), aff’d sub nom San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. Inter-National Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding by analogy to patent law that a party that reasonably believes
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that its usage is not barred by the Lanham Act has not committed willful infringement entitling the
plaintiff to attorneys’ fees); Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 293 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (declining to award fees where defendants “introduced some evidence at trial supporting
their reasonable belief” of non-infringement). Apple contends that Samsung could not have
reasonably thought that its trade dress usage was legal because, according to Apple, Samsung
deliberately copied Apple’s iPhone.
At trial, Apple argued that Samsung engaged in a “deliberate strategy of copying every
aspect of the iPhone—including the whole look of the iPhone, which is the trade dress—without
making any effort to avoid Apple’s protected IP.” ECF No. 2851-8 at 3-4. In making this
allegation, Apple relied on a Samsung report that concluded that the iPhone’s “[b]eautiful design”
and “[e]asy and intuitive UI” were among the key iPhone “[s]uccess [f]actors” and that copying
them would be “easy.” PX34.38. Apple also pointed to the similarities between the iPhone and the
Galaxy S i9000, including the similarity of industrial design, the home screen, and the icons. ECF
No. 2851-8 at 5. As outlined above, the jury subsequently found that six of Samsung’s seventeen
accused smartphones (Fascinate, Galaxy S (i9000), Galaxy S 4G, Galaxy S II Showcase (i500),
Mesmerize, and Vibrant) diluted Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and diluted Apple’s
unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress. ECF No. 1931 at 11-12.
However, the question remains as to whether Samsung, despite Apple’s evidence of
copying, might have reasonably thought that Samsung’s usage of similar trade dresses was not
barred by the Lanham Act. See Blockbuster Videos, 141 F.3d at 1300. A discussion of Samsung’s
defenses sheds light on the reasonableness of Samsung’s position. The Court now reviews
Samsung’s defenses to Apple’s trade dress claims.
The Lanham Act only prohibits dilution of famous and non-functional trade dresses. 15
U.S.C. § 1117(c)(4)(a). At trial, Samsung challenged both the famousness and the non-
functionality of Apple’s trade dresses. The Court concludes that Samsung’s defenses to Apple’s
dilution claims for Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and unregistered iPhone 3 trade dress
demonstrate that Samsung might have reasonably thought that Samsung’s actions were not barred
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by statute and that, therefore, Apple is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. The Court will first review
Samsung’s famousness defense, and then turn to Samsung’s functionality defenses.
1. Famousness
Samsung argues that it presented a reasonable famousness defense to Apple’s trade dress
claims. Throughout this litigation, Samsung claimed that Apple did not establish fame because
Apple failed to offer evidence from surveys restricted to the time before Samsung entered the
market, see Nissan, 378 F.3d at 1013, and Apple’s J une 2011 survey showed recognition by less
than sixty-four percent of likely cell phone purchasers, a subset of the general population, RT
1578:24-1579:4; 1584:17-1585:5, which was insufficient to establish fame. ECF No. 2013 at 11
(citing Nissan, 378 F.3d at 1014 (material disputed issue of fact regarding whether “fame” existed
where Nissan Motor introduced evidence of 898 million dollars in sales over a five year period and
65% consumer recognition at the point when another company introduced a Nissan mark)); 4
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:106, 24:310 (2008 ed.) (proposing that
“75% of the general consuming public of the United States” should be required)). Samsung also
contended that Apple did not establish fame because much of Apple’s advertisement and press
coverage evidence was dated after Samsung’s alleged first use, rendering the evidence irrelevant.
ECF No. 2013 at 11; see PX12-14.
As to the famousness of Apple’s trade dresses, this Court denied Samsung’s motion for
summary judgment, but acknowledged that the famousness of Apple’s trade dresses was “a close
question.” Specifically, this Court found as follows:
It is a close question as to whether a reasonable juror could find on the record
before the Court that the designs of Apple’s products (exclusive of the Apple
name, logo, or home button) were famous at the time Samsung released its
products. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Apple, there appears to be enough evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the iPhone, iPhone 3G, and iPad trade dresses were
“famous” for establishing the dilution claim.
ECF 1158 at 11. The fact that the Court found the famousness of Apple’s trade dresses to be “a
close question” is, by itself, sufficient for the Court to deny Apple’s motion for attorneys’ fees.
“[T]he substantive strength of [Samsung’s] litigating position” does not “stand[] out from others”
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The Supreme Court has instructed that a feature has utilitarian functionality if it is
“essential to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affects [its] cost or quality.” Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982); see also Disc Golf Ass’n, Inc. v. Champion
Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A product feature need only
have some utilitarian advantage to be considered functional.”) (emphasis in original). Samsung
contended that the iPhone’s rounded corners, large display screen, and useful size and shape are all
features that may serve a utilitarian function. As detailed above, Samsung presented several
documents indicating that Apple may have considered these features as having a utilitarian
purpose. See, e.g., RT 680:9-15 (rounded corners “help you move things in and out of your
pocket”); RT 674:20-675:24 (a large display screen is “a benefit to users”); RT 679:15-20 (black
color used to “hide internal wiring and components”); RT 1199:25-1200:16 (clear face covering
the front of the iPhone is “absolutely functional”); RT 2533:25-2534:15 (familiar icon images);
DX5622.001 (“size and shape/comfort benefits”). Samsung also presented testimony from its
experts, Mr. Itay Sherman and Mr. Sam Lucente, that Apple’s trade dresses serve functional
purposes. Based on the documentary and expert evidence presented by Samsung, Samsung may
have reasonably thought that Apple’s trade dresses serve utilitarian functions, which would render
Apple’s trade dresses unprotectable. Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067 (“A functional product
feature does not . . . enjoy protection under trademark law.”).
Second, Samsung alleged that Apple’s trade dresses possess aesthetic functionality because
testimony from Apple’s witnesses indicates that Apple designed the iPhone to be aesthetically
functional. Samsung cited testimony from Apple’s industrial designer Christopher Stringer and
Apple’s Senior Vice President of Worldwide Product Marketing Philip Schiller stating that in
designing the iPhone, Apple sought to make a “beautiful object,” RT 484:1-11 (Christopher
Stringer); that the iPhone is “beautiful and that that alone would be enough to excite people and
make people want to buy it,” RT 602:8-19 (Philip Schiller); that “reasons for the iPhone [sic]
success” are “people find the iPhone designs beautiful,” RT 625:4-626:4 (Schiller); that the
iPhone’s “attractive appearance and design” motivates purchases, RT 635:23-636:5 (Schiller); and
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that customers “lust after [the iPhone] because it’s so gorgeous,” RT 721:3-7 (Schiller). ECF No.
2013 at 9-10.
In Au-Tomotive Gold, the Ninth Circuit held that “where an aesthetic product feature serves
a ‘significant non trademark function,’ the doctrine may preclude [Lanham Act] protection . . .
where doing so would stifle legitimate competition.” Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1064 (citing
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995)). At trial, the jury was presented
with the above evidence of the iPhone’s aesthetic functionality. The jury was also confronted with
some evidence indicating that consumers are not significantly motivated by the iPhone’s design.
Both parties advanced substantial opposing evidence on this issue. In deliberations, the jury had to
weigh this conflicting evidence to reach a verdict. While the jury was ultimately unpersuaded by
Samsung’s position, Samsung presented evidence of the iPhone’s aesthetic functionality, much of
it as trial testimony from Apple’s own witnesses. Therefore, Samsung might have reasonably
thought that the iPhone trade dresses were aesthetically functional, and thus that the Lanham Act
would not prohibit Samsung’s use of similar phone designs. Consequently, Samsung presented
sufficient evidence to support reasonable defenses of both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality.
3. Summary
The Court must now balance the jury’s willfulness finding and Apple’s copying evidence
against the validity of Samsung’s defenses to determine whether this case is exceptional under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Supreme Court has counseled that “[t]rade dress protection must subsist
with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and
products.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29. In navigating the line between legitimate competition and trade
dress dilution, Samsung ventured into trade dress dilution, and the jury awarded Apple substantial
damages for Apple’s losses. As analyzed above, the jury’s willfulness finding indicates, at a
minimum, that the jury found that Samsung acted voluntarily in diluting Apple’s trade dresses. In
addition, Apple’s evidence of copying implies that Samsung intentionally appropriated elements of
the iPhone.
However, Samsung presented several reasonable defenses that cause the Court to conclude
that this is not an exceptional case warranting an award of attorneys’ fees. The Court already held
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at summary judgment that it was a “close question” whether Apple had presented sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Apple’s trade dresses had achieved the requisite fame for
trade dress protection. On this basis alone, Samsung could have reasonably thought that the
elements of the iPhone Samsung copied were not owned by Apple. Samsung also presented
evidence demonstrating that Apple’s trade dresses may have utilitarian and aesthetic functionality,
two additional reasons why Samsung could have reasonably thought that its actions were not
prohibited by the Lanham Act. Finally, the jury concluded that two of Apple’s asserted trade
dresses were not protectable and that eleven of the seventeen accused Samsung smartphones did
not dilute Apple’s protectable trade dresses. The jury verdict thus casts some doubt on Apple’s
assertion that the jury found that Samsung engaged in a “deliberate strategy of copying every
aspect of the iPhone—including the whole look of the iPhone, which is the trade dress—without
making any effort to avoid Apple’s protected IP.” ECF No. 2851-8 at 3-4.
In sum, “[u]nder the Lanham Act, an award of attorney’s fees is within the district court’s
discretion.” Boney, 127 F.3d at 825; see also Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d
704, 711 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]wards are never automatic and may be limited by equitable
considerations”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick
Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1986) (pointing out that under the Lanham Act, while
courts “may” award fees in exceptional cases, the Act does not require them). In its discretion,
based on the Court’s evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that this is
not an exceptional case that “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigating position.” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. Rather, Samsung raised several
reasonable defenses to Apple’s trade dress dilution claims, establishing that Samsung “might have
reasonably thought that its proposed usage was not barred by the statute.” Blockbuster Videos, 141
F.3d at 1300. Therefore, Apple is not entitled to its attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Apple’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is DENIED.