"erratic, intrusive, volatile, and persistent. He screamed obscenities in
petitioner's face, unrestrained by the presence of their child, made numerous
hang-up phone calls, and rummaged through her possessions. Notably,
respondent's late night call describing the sleeping clothes petitioner was
wearing put her on notice that he was lurking about her house, watching
her, and that she was vulnerable. Moreover, petitioner knew that
respondent had previously been obsessed with the idea of killing another
person."

2. We note that when, as here, a contact involves speech, the court has interpreted
the stalking statute, ORS 30.866, narrowly to avoid constitutional overbreadth. In State v.
Rangel, 328 Or 294, 301-03, 977 P2d 379 (1999), the court explained that the kinds of
threatening contacts that may support the issuance of a stalking protective order do not include
"the kind of hyperbole, rhetorical excesses, and impotent expressions of anger or frustration that
in some contexts can be privileged even if they alarm the addressee." Id. (quoting State v. Moyle,
299 or 691, 705, 705 P2d 740 (1985)). There is no constitutional question raised by respondent
here.