Hannibal

Hannibal's feat in crossing the Alps with war elephants
passed into European legend: a fresco detail, ca. 1510,
Capitoline Museums, Rome Hannibal (from Punic, literally
"Baal is merciful to me", 247 BC - 183 BC) (sometimes
referred to as Hannibal Barca) was a politician and statesman,
and is considered one of the greatest military commanders
in history.

Hailing from Carthage, Hannibal was best known for his
achievements in the Second Punic War in marching an army
from Hispania over the Pyrenees and the Alps into northern
Italy and defeating the Romans at the Battles of the river
Trebia (218 BC), Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae (216
BC). After Cannae, the Romans refused to fight him in
pitched battles, instead aiming to defeat him by sheer
attrition (the Romans had obvious and huge advantages
of supply). After years of occupying Roman territory in
a series of fits and starts, a counterinvasion of North
Africa by the Romans under Scipio Africanus in 204 BC
forced Hannibal to return to Carthage, where Scipio defeated
him at Zama (202 BC).

As the son of Hamilcar Barca, he is often called Hannibal
Barca. In fact Barca was a nickname, meaning lightning,
and not a surname. However for convenience Hamilcar's
family are called by historians the Barcid family, and
calling him Hannibal Barca does avoid confusion with other
minor Carthaginians who shared his name but not his fame.

Following the end of the war, Hannibal led Carthage for
several years, aiding its recovery from the devastation
of the war, until the Romans forced him into exile in
195 BC. He went to live at the court of Antiochus III
of the Seleucid Kingdom. In 190 BC the Romans, having
defeated Antiochus and imposed the Peace of Apamea (188
BC), demanded that he turn Hannibal over to them and the
general fled again, this time to the court of King Prusias
I of Bithynia. When the Romans demanded that Prusias surrender
him in 182 BC, Hannibal left but soon committed suicide
rather than submit. He died in 183 BC

Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest
military commanders and tacticians in history, alongside
Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon
I of France, and only a few others. Military historian,
Theodore Ayrault Dodge, once famously christened Hannibal
as the "father of strategy".

Background and early career

Hannibal Barca: an imaginary portraitHannibal Barca
("mercy of Baal"), son of Hamilcar Barca, was
born in 247 BC. After Carthage's defeat in the First Punic
War, Hamilcar set about the task of improving Carthage's
fortunes. To do this, Hamilcar began the subjugation of
the tribes of Spain. Carthage at the time was in such
a poor state that its navy was unable to ferry his army
to Iberia (Hispania); instead, he had to march it to the
Pillars of Hercules and cross there. According to a story
he later told at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal came
upon his father while he was making a sacrifice to the
gods before leaving for Hispania. Hannibal, then quite
young, begged to go with him. Hamilcar agreed and allegedly
made Hannibal swear that as long as he lived he would
never be a friend of Rome. Hannibal is reported to have
told his father, "I swear so soon as age will permit...I
will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of Rome."

Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania
with all the skills given to military men. When he was
killed in a battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal
succeeded to his command of the army. Hasdrubal pursued
a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests,
even signing a treaty with Rome whereby Carthage would
not expand past the Ebro River, so long as Rome did not
expand south of it.

Upon the death of his brother-in-law (221 BC) Hannibal
was acclaimed commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed
in his appointment by the Carthaginian government. After
two years spent completing the conquest of Hispania south
of the Ebro, he began what he felt to be his life task,
the conquest and humiliation of Rome. Accordingly, in
219 BC he used a pretext for attacking the town of Saguntum,
which stood under the special protection of Rome. Disregarding
the protests of Roman envoys, he stormed it after an eight-month
siege. As the Carthaginian government, in view of Hannibal's
great popularity, did not venture to repudiate this action,
the war he sought was declared at the end of the year.

Second Punic War and invasion of Italy

Hannibal´s route of invasion given graciously
by The Department of History, United States Military
Academy

Hannibal´s route of invasion given graciously
by The Department of History, United States Military AcademyOf
the large army of Libyan and Iberian mercenaries that
he had at his disposal, Hannibal selected the most trustworthy
and devoted contingents and determined to carry the war
into the heart of Italy by a rapid march through Hispania
and southern Gaul. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he
easily fought his way through the northern tribes to the
Pyrenees and, by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs on his
passage, contrived to reach the Rhone before the Romans
could take any measures to bar his advance. After outmaneuvering
the natives, who endeavored to prevent his crossing, Hannibal
evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in Gaul;
he proceeded up the valley of one of the tributaries of
the river Rhone (probably the Isere) and by autumn arrived
at the foot of the Alps. His passage over the mountain
chain (probably in the vicinity of the Col de Mont Cenis)
was one of the most memorable achievements of any military
force of ancient times. He had arrived, however, with
only half the forces with which he is said to have set
out. Adrian Goldsworthy (The Fall of Carthage) is skeptical
of the explanation that Hannibal had left forces in Gaul
to maintain his line of communication with Hispania. Hannibal
from the first, seems to have calculated that he would
have to operate without aid from Hispania. On the other
hand, the figures for the amount of troops he had when
he left Hispania are less reliable. Nonetheless, Goldsworthy
thinks that due to the opposition of the natives and the
difficulties of ground and climate the costs of Hannibal's
march were considerable.

J.M.W. Turner: Hannibal crossing the Alps

Hannibal's perilous march brought him into Roman territory
and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out
the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance
among the Gauls of the Po valley, moreover, enabled him
to detach those tribes from their new allegiance to the
Romans before the latter could take steps to check the
rebellion.

J.M.W. Turner: Hannibal crossing the AlpsAfter
allowing his soldiers a brief rest to recover from their
exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by subduing
the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern Turin), and,
moving down the Po valley, forced the Romans by virtue
of his superior cavalry to evacuate the plain of Lombardy.
In December of the same year he had an opportunity to
show his superior military skill when the Roman commander
attacked him on the river Trebia near Placentia; after
wearing down the excellent Roman infantry he cut it
to pieces by a surprise attack from an ambush in the
flank.

Having secured his position in northern Italy by this
victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter
with the Gauls, whose zeal in his cause thereupon began
to abate. Accordingly, in spring 217 BC Hannibal decided
to find a more trustworthy base of operations farther
south. He crossed the Apennines without opposition, but
in the marshy lowlands of the Arno he lost a large part
of his force, including, it would seem, his remaining
elephants, through disease and himself became blind in
one eye. Advancing through the uplands of Etruria he provoked
the main Roman army to a hasty pursuit and, catching it
in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed
it in the waters or on the adjoining slopes (see Battle
of Lake Trasimene).

Battle of Lake Trasimene, -217.
From the Department of History, United States Military
AcademyHe had now disposed of the only field force which
could check his advance upon Rome, but, realizing that
without siege engines he could not hope to take the capital,
he preferred to exploit his victory by passing into central
and southern Italy and exciting a general revolt against
the sovereign power. It was in Apulia that a fresh Roman
army began to dog his steps. Hannibal expected to be able
to defeat this too but the commander Quintus Fabius Maximus
Cunctator, stuck firmly to defensive positions in the
hills. Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius
to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to
Campania. Campania was a rich area that included the key
Roman ally of Capua, but though his ravaging of the countryside
showed the weakness of Rome it still did not provoke Fabius
to battle. As the year wore on Hannibal decided that it
would be unwise to winter in the already devastated lowlands
of Campania but Fabius had ensured that all the passes
out of Campania were blocked. Hannibal escaped by sending
a herd of cattle with brands tied to their horns,so drawing
off the Roman force guarding the pass, allowing Hannibal
to move through the pass unopposed. Fabius was within
striking distance but in this case his caution worked
against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly) he stayed
put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters
in the Apulian plain.

Battle of Lake Trasimene, -217.
From the Department of History, United States Military
Academy

In the campaign of 217 BC Hannibal had failed to obtain
a following among the Italians; in the following year
he had an opportunity to turn the tide in his favor. A
large Roman army advanced into Apulia in order to crush
him and accepted battle at Cannae. Thanks mainly to brilliant
cavalry tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers,
managed to surround and destroy all but a smallish section
of this force. Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of
the Consul Varro and drew him into a trap by using an
envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical
advantage by shrinking the surface area where combat could
occur. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that
50,000-70,000 Romans fell at Cannae, the most catastrophic
defeat in the history of that city.

The moral effect of this victory was such that all the
south of Italy joined his cause. Had Hannibal now received
proper material reinforcements from his countrymen at
Carthage he might have made a direct attack upon Rome;
for the present he had to content himself with subduing
the fortresses which still held out against him, and the
only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of
Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal
made his new base. Moreover, with a force of only 26-30,000
men, he lacked the strength to take the city.

For the next few years Hannibal was reduced to minor
operations which centred mainly round the cities of Campania.
He failed to draw his opponents into a pitched battle,
and in some slighter engagements suffered reverses. As
the forces detached under his lieutenants were generally
unable to hold their own, and neither his home government
nor his new ally Philip V of Macedon helped to make good
his losses, his position in southern Italy became increasingly
difficult and his chance of ultimately conquering Rome
grew ever more remote. In 212 BC the Romans had so alienated
Tarentum that conspirators admitted Hannibal to the city.
The conspirators then blew the alarm on some Roman trumpets
allowing Hannibal's troops to pick off the Romans as they
stumbled out into the streets. Hannibal was able to keep
control of his troops to the extent that there was no
general looting. Instead Hannibal having committed himself
to respect Tarentine freedom told the Tarentines to mark
every house where Tarentines lived. Only those houses
not so marked and thus belonging to Romans were looted.
The citadel, however, held out so denying Hannibal the
use of harbor. Further, in the same year, he lost his
hold upon Campania, where he failed to prevent the concentration
of three Roman armies round Capua. Hannibal attacked the
besieging armies with his full force in 211 BC and attempted
to entice them away by a sudden march through Samnium
that brought him within 3 km of Rome but caused more alarm
than real danger to the city.

But the siege continued, and the town fell in the same
year. In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority
in tactics by a severe defeat inflicted at Herdoniac (modern
Ordona) in Apulia upon a proconsular army, and in 208
BC destroyed a Roman force engaged in the siege of Locri
Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum in 209 BC and
the gradual reconquest by the Romans of Samnium and Lucania
his hold on south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he
succeeded in making his way again into Apulia, where he
waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome
with his brother Hasdrubal. On hearing, however, of his
brother's defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired
into the mountain fastnesses of Bruttium, where he maintained
himself for the ensuing years. With the failure of his
brother Mago in Liguria (205 BC-203 BC) and of his own
negotiations with Philip of Macedon, the last hope of
recovering his ascendancy in Italy was lost.

Return to Africa

In 203 BC, when Scipio was carrying all before him in
Africa and the Carthaginian peace party were arranging
an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the
war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition
engraved in Punic and Greek upon brazen tablets in the
temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. His
arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war
party, who placed him in command of a combined force of
African levies and his mercenaries from Italy. In 202
BC Hannibal, after meeting Scipio in a fruitless peace
conference, engaged him in a decisive battle at Zama.
Scipio came up with an ingenious method of neutralizing
Hannibal's elephants. Hannibal lost all of his original
elephant troops (who crossed the Alps with him) by the
battle of Cannae, but they were replenished in Africa.
First of all, Scipio knew that elephants could only be
ordered to charge forward, but they could only continue
their charge in a straight line. It also meant that they
did not care whether or not they killed Romans in the
process. Scipio realized that intentionally opening gaps
in his troops meant that the elephants would continue
between them, without harming a soul. He did this, and
after the elephants passed through his troops harmlessly,
they were picked off on the other side, and his troops
fell back into formation and continued marching. Unable
to cope against the well-trained and confident Roman soldiers
with his own indifferent troops after losing his notorious
advantage, Hannibal experienced a crushing defeat that
put an end to all resistance on the part of Carthage.

Peacetime Carthage

Hannibal was still only in his forty-sixth year and
soon showed that he could be a statesman as well as a
soldier. Following the conclusion of a peace that left
Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire Hannibal
prepared to take a back seat for a time. However, the
blatant corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a chance
of a come back and he was elected as suffet, or chief
magistrate. The office had become rather insignificant,
but Hannibal restored its power and authority. The oligarchy,
always jealous of him, had even charged him with having
betrayed the interests of his country while in Italy,
for neglecting to take Rome when he might have done so.
So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy
tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by installments
without additional and extraordinary taxation. He also
reformed the Council of One Hundred, stipulating that
its membership be chosen by direct election rather than
co-option

Exile and death

Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed
at Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's
surrender. Hannibal thereupon went into voluntary exile.
First he journeyed to Tyre, the mother-city of Carthage,
and thence to Ephesus, where he was honorably received
by Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for war with
Rome. Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match
for the Romans. He advised him to equip a fleet and land
a body of troops in the south of Italy, offering to take
command himself. But he could not make much impression
on Antiochus, who listened more willingly to courtiers
and flatterers and would not entrust Hannibal with any
important charge. In 190 BC he was placed in command of
a Phoenician fleet but was defeated in a battle off the
river Eurymedon.

According to Strabo and Plutarch, Hannibal also received
hospitality at the Armenian court of Artaxias where he
planned and supervised the building of the new royal capital
Artaxata. From the court of Antiochus, who seemed prepared
to surrender him to the Romans, Hannibal fled to Crete,
but he soon went back to Asia Minor and sought refuge
with Prusias I of Bithynia. Once more the Romans were
determined to hunt him down, and they sent Flaminius to
insist on his surrender. Prusias agreed to give him up,
but Hannibal determined not to fall into his enemies'
hands. At Libyssa, on the eastern shore of the Sea of
Marmora, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long
carried about with him in a ring. The precise year of
his death is a matter of controversy. If, as Livy seems
to imply, it was 183 BC, he died in the same year as Scipio
Africanus.

Sources

Most of the sources we have about Hannibal are Romans,
who considered him the greatest enemy they had ever faced.
Livy gives us the idea that he was extremely cruel. Even
Cicero, when he talked of Rome and her two great enemies,
spoke of the "honorable" Pyrrhus and the "cruel"
Hannibal. Yet a different picture sometimes shows through
the bias. When Hannibal's successes had brought about
the death of two Roman consuls, he searched vainly for
one on the shores of Lake Trasimene, and he sent Marcellus'
ashes back to his family in Rome. By contrast, when Nero
had accomplished his wonderful march back and forth to
and from the Metaurus he flung the head of Hannibal's
brother into Hannibal's camp. The bias of Polybius is
less obvious because he was clearly sympathetic to Hannibal.
Polybius, however, spent a long period as a hostage in
Italy and relied heavily on Roman sources and so the possibility
is always there that Polybius is reproducing Roman propaganda
even when he gives it a pro-Hannibal spin.

Anecdotes

Cicero offers a story of Hannibal while at the court
of Antiochus III. Hannibal attended a lecture by a certain
Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics.
When Phormio finished the portion about the duties of
a general, Hannibal was asked his opinion. "I have
seen," he replied, "during my life many an old
fool; but this one beats them all."

There is another story told about Hannibal while in exile,
which puts an odd spin on his supposed "Punic perfidy".
Antiochus III showed off a vast and well armed formation
to Hannibal and asked him if they would be enough for
Rome, to which Hannibal replied, "Yes, enough for
the Romans, however greedy they may be."

Legacy

Hannibal's name is also commonplace in popular culture,
an objective measure of his influence on Western European
history. Long after his death, his named continued to
carry a portent of great or imminent danger within the
Roman Republic. For generations, Roman housekeepers would
tell their children brutal tales of Hannibal when they
misbehaved. In fact, Hannibal became such a figure of
terror, that when ever disaster struck, the Roman Senators
would exclaim " Hannibal ad portas" ("Hannibal
is at the Gates!") to express their fear or anxiety. This
famous Latin phrase evolved into a common expression that
is often used when a client arrives through the door or
when one is faced with calamity[1].

Hannibal's legacy also extends to the field of military
history, as he is universally ranked as one of the greatest
military strategists and tacticians of the Western world,
alongside Alexander the Great, Julius Caeser, Gustavus
Adolphus, The Duke of Marlborough, Frederick the Great,
and Napoleon among others. His crossing of the Alps stands
as one of the most monumental military feats of ancient
warfare [2]. In fact, his exploits (especially his victory
at Cannae) continue to be studied in several military
academies all over the world.

The author of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica
article praises Hannibal in these words: "As to the
transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot
be two opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold
his ground in a hostile country against several powerful
armies and a succession of able generals must have been
a commander and a tactician of supreme capacity. In the
use of stratagems and ambuscades he certainly surpassed
all other generals of antiquity. Wonderful as his achievements
were, we must marvel the more when we take into account
the grudging support he received from Carthage. As his
veterans melted away, he had to organize fresh levies
on the spot. We never hear of a mutiny in his army, composed
though it was of Africans, Spaniards and Gauls. Again,
all we know of him comes for the most part from hostile
sources. The Romans feared and hated him so much that
they could not do him justice. Livy speaks of his great
qualities, but he adds that his vices were equally great,
among which he singles out his more than Punic perfidy
and an inhuman cruelty. For the first there would seem
to be no further justification than that he was consummately
skilful in the use of ambuscades. For the latter there
is, we believe, no more ground than that at certain crises
he acted in the general spirit of ancient warfare. Sometimes
he contrasts most favorably with his enemy. No such brutality
stains his name as that perpetrated by Claudius Nero on
the vanquished Hasdrubal. Polybius merely says that he
was accused of cruelty by the Romans and of avarice by
the Carthaginians. He had indeed bitter enemies, and his
life was one continuous struggle against destiny. For
steadfastness of purpose, for organizing capacity and
a mastery of military science he has perhaps never had
an equal."

According to the military historian, Theodore Ayrault
Dodge, "Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle in
history is a finer sample of tactics than Cannae. But
he was yet greater in logistics and strategy. No captain
ever matched to and fro among so many armies of troops
superior to his own numbers and material as fearlessly
and skillfully as he. No man ever held his own so long
or so ably against such odds. Constantly overmatched by
better soldiers, led by generals always respectable, often
of great ability, he yet defied all their efforts to drive
him from Italy, for half a generation."

Furthermore, Dodge christened Hannibal as the "father
of strategy" due to his visionary conduct of warfare[3].
He wrote: "Excepting in the case of Alexander, and
some few isolated instances, all wars up to the Second
Punic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely,
by battle-tactics. Strategic ability had been comprehended
only on a minor scale. Armies had marched towards each
other, had fought in paralell order, and the conqueror
had imposed terms on his opponent. Any variation from
this rule consisted in ambuscades or other strategems.
That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking
battle; that the results of a victory could be earned
by attacks upon the enemy's communications, by flank-maneuvers,
by seizing positions from which safely to threaten him
in case he moved, and by other devices of strategy, was
not understood . . .For the first time in the history
of war, we see two contending generals avoiding each other,
occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about
each other's flanks to seize cities or supplies in their
rear, harasssing each other with small-war, and rarely
venturing on a battle which might prove a fatal disaster-all
with a well-conceived purpose of placing his opponent
at a strategic disadvantage. . .That it did so was due
to the teaching of Hannibal".

Even his Roman chroniclers acknowledged his military
genius, writing that, "he never required other to do what
he could and would not do himself" [4]. Napoleon Bonaparte
himself regarded Hannibal as a gifted strategist, claiming
that "the principles of Caesar were the same as those
of Alexander [the Great] and Hannibal: to hold his forces
in hand; to be vulnerable on several points only when
it is unavoidable; to march rapidly upon the important
points; to make use of great extent of moral means, such
as the measures calculated to preserve the attachment
of allies and the submission of conquered provinces.".
In addition, Napoleon also described Hannibal as "the
most audacious of all, probably the most stunning, so
hardy, so sure, so great in all things." Alfred Graf von
Schlieffen's famous pre-World War I strategy was developed
from his military studies, with particularly heavy emphasis
on Hannibal's victory at Cannae, emphasizing swift and
annihilating force on two fronts. Patton believed that
he was a reincarnation of General Hannibal as well as
many other people including a Roman legionary. Norman
Schwarzkopf, the commander of the Coalition Forces in
the Gulf War, claimed that "The technology of war
may change, the sophistication of weapons certainly changes.
But those same principles of war that applied to the days
of Hannibal apply today".