BOOK SIX

I

WE have now considered the varieties of the
deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of
law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms
of government. We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of
constitutions, how and from what causes they arise.

Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it
will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are
proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them.
Moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes
themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so
that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional
governments incline to democracies.

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far
have not been considered by us, I mean such as these: when the deliberative part
of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically,
and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative
part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical,
or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a
state.

I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular
cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the
other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of
these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to
consider how these and other forms of government are to be established.

First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the
opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this
inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy,
since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government
arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference
is due to two causes. One (1) has been already mentioned -- differences of
population; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics,
or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third
to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its
very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various
properties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a
difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and
another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing
them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only
to remodel an existing one. Founders of states try to bring together all the
elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a
mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked when speaking of the destruction
and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles,
characteristics, and aims of such states.

II

The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common
opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; this they affirm to be the
great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be
ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not
proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and
that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen,
it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more
power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the
majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats
affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as
he likes. This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other
hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second
characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by
none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and
so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.

Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the
characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out
of all; and that all should rule over each, and each in his turn over all; that
the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and
skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required
for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office
twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the
tenure of all offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief, that all men
should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all
matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important -- such as the
scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly
should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and
the magistrates over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a
council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the
citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the
people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion.
The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law
courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is
not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated
assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them
who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchy is
characterized by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to
be the opposite of these -- low birth, poverty, mean employment. Another note is
that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient
change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders
should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to
all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the
recognized principle of democratic justice, that all should count equally; for
equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than
the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally
according to their numbers. And in this way men think that they will secure
equality and freedom in their state.

III

Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to
assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich
men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred?
or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to
take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of
the courts? -- Which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form
of the constitution -- this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that
justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the
wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the
amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice.
For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than
all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle,
to have the sole power -- but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will
of the majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the
property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality which they
both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the
citizens is to be deemed law. Granted: but not without some reserve; since there
are two classes out of which a state is composed -- the poor and the rich --
that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and
if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who
have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and
twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved
by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party
of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a
case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are
the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater
difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided,
recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although it may
be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty
of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater,
for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger care
for none of these things.

IV

Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the in the previous
discussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest
of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of
their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an agricultural
population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the
people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no
leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the
necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of
others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of
government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many
are more desirous of gain than of honor. A proof is that even the ancient
tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if
they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property; for some of
them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have
the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; their
ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although
they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through
representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at Mantinea; yet, if
they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of
government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is
both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all
should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but
that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a
qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no
offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by
special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the
citizens are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always be held by
the best persons; the people are willing enough to elect them and are not
jealous of the good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they
will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected
will rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should be
responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases;
for where absolute freedom is allowed, there is nothing to restrain the evil
which is inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility secures that
which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented
from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the
best kind of democracy, and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain
class. Some of the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a
view to making the people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should
possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land
should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. Formerly
in many states there was a law forbidding any one to sell his original allotment
of land. There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect
that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not
borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of which I am speaking would be
the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess
much land, are all of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in the
census; not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have
more than the amount required.

Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a pastoral
people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war,
robust in body and able to camp out. The people of whom other democracies
consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room
for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or
traders or laborers. Besides, people of this class can readily come to the
assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in the
agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, or
equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory also happens
to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an
excellent democracy or constitutional government; for the people are compelled
to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly
ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. We have
thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted;
it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order,
and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind.

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which
cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by
laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other
kinds of government have been pretty fully considered. In order to constitute
such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit
including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are
legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent
a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to
such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right
thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty
exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class -- beyond this not to go.
When in excess of this point, the constitution becomes disorderly, and the
notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at
Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it
strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenes passed when he wanted to
increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the
founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of
democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private
rites of families should be restricted and converted into public ones; in short,
every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one
another and get rid of old connections. Again, the measures which are taken by
tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the license
permitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also
that of women and children, and the aflowing everybody to live as he likes. Such
a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a
disorderly than in a sober manner.

V

The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business
of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state,
however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater
difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavor
to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down
concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against
the destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written or unwritten,
which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly
democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest
amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest.
The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law-courts
in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at
heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned
should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred. Thus offenders will
be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people,
having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should
also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties
should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the
practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although
the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any
rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very
numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay
them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money
must be obtained by a property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of
the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I
say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the
law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This
system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even
although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes
are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long
absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the
law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after
their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always
wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet
the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme
poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be
taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the
interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be
accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as
may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in
trade or husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money
should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the
meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the
necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public
services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the
affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them
into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a
generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them
the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well
deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the
poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide all their offices into
two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter,
that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be
better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices,
so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.

Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be
constituted.

VI

From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should
be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reason from opposites and
compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy.

The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional
government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualification; the one
high, the other low -- the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable
offices and the higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed
qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those
admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than
those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the
better class of the people. The principle, narrowed a little, gives another form
of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them
all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires
vigilance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships well
provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly
constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake,
so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care. The populousness
of democracies generally preserves them (for e state need not be much
increased,since there is no necessity tha number is to democracy in the place of
justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly
depends on an opposite principle, viz., good order.

VII

As there are four chief divisions of the common people -- husbandmen,
mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also there are four kinds of military
forces -- the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy.
When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be
established. For the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this
sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy
prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is
better suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval
element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, where they are numerous, if the two
parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A
remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who
combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed.
And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil
contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and
heavy being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy
infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises
a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary and
some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while
they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops; and
these, when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become
light-armed warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the
government to the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property
qualification, or, as in the case of Thebes, to those who have abstained for a
certain number of years from mean employments, or, as at Massalia, to men of
merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not.
The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the
governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the
people will not desire them and will take no offense at the privileges of their
rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting
also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices
or erect some public edifice, and then the people who participate in the
entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings,
will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables will have
memorials of their munificence. This, however, is anything but the fashion of
our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor;
oligarchies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. Enough of
the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized.

VIII

Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, their
nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. No state can exist
not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not
having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small
states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in
larger there must be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which
offices may properly be united and which separated.

First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a
magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. For
in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one
another's wants; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so
fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. A second office
of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and
private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the
prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature.
This is commonly called the office of City Warden, and has various departments,
which, in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for
example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of
harbors. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind,
having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country -- the
magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens of the country, or
Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of
receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed
among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another
officer registers all private contracts, and decisions of the courts, all public
indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is
sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest.
These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the
like.

Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and
also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committed the execution of
punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to
the registers; and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office
arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless
great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law.
Still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions are useless if they take
no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist
without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular, should
not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different
courts. In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different
persons the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. Some
sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular
penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming
ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court
has given judgement, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens
of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and
others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more
likely to be exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a
double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the
sentence, and if they are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of
all.

In many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the
custody of the prisoners, as, for example, 'the Eleven' at Athens. It is well to
separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office
less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but
good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be
trusted with it; for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard
others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart
for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are
organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should
take charge of it.

These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first; next in
order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, and requiring great
experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard
of the city, and other military functions. Not only in time of war but of peace
their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the
citizens. In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few
only, while small states are content with one; these officers are called
generals or commanders. Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or
archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of these
departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of
cavalry or of light-armed troops. And there are subordinate officers called
naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops and of horse; having others
under them: all these are included in the department of war. Thus much of
military command.

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money,
there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, and
has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names --
Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Besides all these offices there
is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the
introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, in
a democracy, over the assembly. For there must be a body which convenes the
supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called 'probuli,'
because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly
'councillors.' These are the chief political offices.

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion
priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the
Gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in
small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood;
for example, superintendents of public worship, guardians of shrines, treasurers
of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers
appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law
assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public
hearth of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and
sometimes prytanes.

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows:
offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and
expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country;
also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of
sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of
magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations
of the state. There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are
peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such
as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of
children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and
Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. Some of these are clearly
not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of women and children --
the poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as
servants.

Once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the highest
magistrates are chosen in certain states -- guardians of the law, probuli,
councillors -- of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the
probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. Enough of the
different kinds of offices.