One year after the Mumbai bomb attacks, the threat is as great as ever

The threat of Pakistan-based terrorism has been at the top of the agenda
during Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington this week,
writes Praveen Swami.

An Indian soldier takes cover as the Taj Mahal hotel burns in Mumbai last year
Photo: David Guttenfelder

Praveen Swami

10:11AM GMT 25 Nov 2009

'I have been warning Pakistan," announced Palaniappan Chidambaram, the Indian minister of home affairs, this month, "not to play games with us. If terrorists from Pakistan try to carry out any attacks in India, they will not only be defeated, but will be retaliated against very strongly."

In the spectacular attacks in Mumbai a year ago tomorrow, 10 terrorists despatched by Lashkar-e-Taiba, an extremist Muslim organisation based in Pakistan, killed at least 173 people, including five British nationals.

Ahead of the anniversary of the atrocities, Mr Chidambaram's words have been understood – both in New Delhi and Islamabad – to mean that any similar attack will prompt India to use force against jihadist bases in Pakistan. The government there responded to the attacks by promising to act against terrorists based on its soil. But India believes the implementation of that promise has been less than serious.

The threat of Pakistan-based terrorism has been at the top of the agenda during Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington this week. In one interview, Dr Singh said: "Every day I receive intelligence reports saying that terrorists based in Pakistan are planning other similar acts."

Should another attack take place, it will have enormous consequences. Indian strikes and Pakistani counter-strikes could conceivably escalate into a war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The prospect alone could give the Pakistani military a reason to divert troops from its unpopular campaign against Islamist insurgents in the border areas with Afghanistan, which would free up Taliban forces and undermine a crucial part of the West's strategy.

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How serious, however, is the risk of another major terrorist attack on India? And how likely is it that such an attack could precipitate a regional crisis?

First, there is a mass of evidence that jihadist groups in Pakistan are indeed planning operations. Last month, the FBI detained two men of Pakistani origin, Tahawwur Rana and David Headley, on multiple charges, including plotting attacks against India. Police in Bangladesh have arrested three Lashkar operatives who they say were planning to blow up India's diplomatic mission in Dhaka.

Second, infiltration by jihadists across the volatile Line of Control in Kashmir has shown signs of escalation, sparking off repeated skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops. More than 40 violations of a ceasefire put into force in November 2003 have been reported: no great imagination is needed to see that a renewal of hostilities over the region could precipitate a repeat of the 2001-2002 crisis, when a jihadist attack on India's parliament took the two countries to the edge of war.

Third, even as Pakistan battles Islamist terrorists on its soil, it has shown little interest in dismantling the jihadist infrastructure directed against India. Lashkar's offices, like those of other anti-Indian groups, are still open. In December 2008, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against Lashkar's parent organisation, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Pakistan's ambassador to the UN promised that his country would proscribe the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. A year on, that hasn't happened.

India has long been considering means to compel Pakistan to act. Last year, after terrorists bombed the Indian embassy in Kabul – an operation many experts believe had the backing of Pakistan's intelligence services – MK Narayanan, India's national security adviser, proposed an aggressive solution. "I think we need to pay back in the same coin," he said bluntly. "Talk-talk is better than fight-fight, but it hasn't worked so far."

"Fight-fight" is not an option Indian policymakers welcome. Instability in the region, New Delhi understands, undermines its overarching strategic objective of rapid economic growth. However, an increasingly angry public is putting pressure on politicians to act. So what might India do in the event of a major attack?

First, Dr Singh could authorise missile strikes against jihadist bases on Pakistan's side of the Line of Control. Or he could order India's secret services to stage retaliatory attacks in Pakistan, or to assassinate key jihadists.

Most worrying for the West, India could exert pressure by escalating its support for groups in Afghanistan that are hostile to Pakistan. Like Russia, Iran and other neighbouring states, India was opposed to the rise of the Pakistan-backed Taliban, fearing that an Islamist regime in Kabul would provide support to Sunni extremists across the region. These countries provided extensive logistical support to the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban coalition. India remains committed to backing those opposed to the Taliban – but has stopped short of inciting its allies to carry the battle to Pakistan. That restraint could wear thin in the event of a terrorist attack.

None of these Indian responses would help stabilise the world's most volatile region. To avert them, though, Pakistan will have to be made to act against the jihadist infrastructure on its soil. The anniversary of the carnage in Mumbai is a strong reminder that half-measures in the fight against terrorism could end up undermining the West's long-term strategic interests.