Thursday, December 22, 2016

Turkey, Russia, and Iran released a joint statement - termed the ‘Moscow
Declaration’ - noting that all three countries agree to “facilitate and become
the guarantors” of any political agreement to end the Syrian Civil War
following a trilateral meeting in Moscow, Russia on December 20. The statement
also noted that all three countries “reiterate their determination” to fight
against ISIS and Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra as well as separate
both factions from other “armed opposition groups” in Syria. The meeting
occurred as scheduled despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to
Turkey in Ankara on December 19. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces announced their
full control over Aleppo City on December 22 following the last evacuations
from the remaining opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City. The
evacuations faced repeated delays due to poor weather conditions as well as
last-minute demands by Iran for parallel evacuations from the besieged
pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib Province. The final deal included
phased parallel evacuations for the two towns as well as two besieged
opposition-held towns near Damascus.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of December 19, 2016.

Wednesday, December 21, 2016

Russia tempered its air
operations across Northern Syria following the surrender
of the last remaining opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City on
December 13, but only after playing a decisive military role in enabling this major
battlefield victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia continued its
campaign of airstrikes
against the pocket of opposition-held districts southwest of the city center
from December 7 – 12, intensifying its bombardment in the two days before
Russia and Turkey brokered a surrender and local ceasefire agreement
to evacuate remaining opposition fighters and civilians to Western
Aleppo Province. Russia resumed its
airstrikes in Aleppo City on December 14 after Iran spoiled the initial deal
with additional last-minute demands
for parallel evacuations from the besieged majority-Shi’a towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib
Province. Russia nonetheless slowed the tempo of its air operations in Aleppo
and Idlib Provinces from December 13 – 19 in a likely attempt to preserve the
evacuation deal and gain credibility as an impartial diplomatic broker. The
eventual completion of the evacuation, however, will likely signal the start of
a new phase in Russia’s air campaign in Northern Syria. Russia will likely resume
its aggressive targeting of opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province under the
guise of anti-terrorism operations against Jabhat Fatah al-Sham – the successor
of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. This narrative may gain further
traction as the remaining acceptable opposition forces evacuated from Aleppo
City deepen their cooperation with Salafi-jihadist groups in Northern Syria in order
to continue their insurgency against the Assad regime.

Russia also intensified its air
operations against ISIS in Eastern Syria beginning on December 7 in a failed
attempt to prevent the recapture
of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province by ISIS on December 11. Russia conducted
heavy
waves of airstrikes against ISIS on the outskirts of Palmyra from December
7 – 10 amidst an ongoing
offensive by the group against outlying oil and natural gas fields.
Although the air campaign forced ISIS to temporarily
reverse its progress into Palmyra, poorly-trained pro-regime militiamen on
the ground proved unable to hold the city – particularly given the withdrawal
of local garrisons by Russia and Iran on or around December 7. In the wake of
that defeat, Russia conducted punitive air operations against ISIS-held terrain
in Eastern Syria on
December 12, including the group’s stronghold in Ar-Raqqa City and a
swathe of several villages in Eastern Hama Province allegedly targeted with chemical munitions. Russia
will likely invest more heavily in the defense of the nearby T4 (Tiyas) Airbase
in order to protect its main base of operations in Central Syria. Russia reportedly
deployed special operations forces
to T4 Airbase on December 13 amidst ongoing clashes with ISIS, reflecting
the airfield’s critical importance as a launching point for helicopter gunships
operated by Russia in Palmyra. The recapture of Palmyra highlights the inability
of pro-regime forces to establish security across the entire country without sustained
support from Russia and Iran, notwithstanding their recent success in Aleppo
City. In the end, Russia and Syria prioritized the defeat of the opposition in Aleppo
City over the defense of Palmyra from ISIS, ultimately enhancing the threat
posed by Salafi-jihadist groups in both Northern and Eastern Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Tuesday, December 20, 2016

Local and regional actors are maneuvering to secure their position in 2017 and for a post-ISIS Mosul. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki travelled to the southern provinces on December 9 and 10 to attend several tribal conferences where he has typically looked to secure electoral support, suggesting the he is positioning for upcoming 2017 provincial and 2018 parliamentary elections with an eye on the premiership. Large anti-Maliki protests, which were likely Sadrist, however, forced him to cut his visits short, indicating that Maliki may be facing stronger competition from other Shi’a parties in southern Iraq than before. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is moving to extend its boundaries while anti-ISIS operations in the region are ongoing and before the complete recapture of Mosul cements the current control of terrain. The KRG used operations around Mosul, including those prior to October 17 when the operation launched, to claim territory that will remain under its jurisdiction after operations end. The KRG will do so similarly around Sinjar. The U.S. and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) separately warned on December 15 that the continued presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist group, in Sinjar is a detriment to the area’s stability and resettlement. The PKK recaptured western Sinjar during anti-ISIS operations in November 2015; the KRG occupies the eastern half. The KRG will move to expel the PKK from Sinjar while the power dynamics are still shifting lest the PKK gain a permanent presence in northern Iraq, contrary to the KRG’s interests. ISIS, however, is also positioning for the upcoming year and for the possible loss of Mosul. The group is reconstituting networks and capabilities in recaptured areas, such as Fallujah despite its recapture by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in June 2016, from where it can continue to launch attacks, particularly into Baghdad and the southern belts. ISIS’s position in the Euphrates River Valley could also maintain a connection with its affiliates in Syria which can provide support as ISIS reconstitutes in Iraq.

The
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) poses an evolving threat to the U.S.,
its allies, and its broader interests. Its approach to information warfare has
represented a key component of its overall strategy, including during the
period it has faced sustained pressure. ISIS has suffered significant setbacks
on the ground, yet has demonstrated the ability to adapt.

ISIS
will likely maintain the capacity to align its military and information
operations (IO) in the coming years. Continuing conflicts and the plodding
effort to address the underlying conditions where it has taken root will likely
help ISIS retain physical sanctuary and command and control capability in Iraq,
Syria, and North Africa, even if it loses control of major cities.

ISIS’s
IO campaign has supported multiple objectives, including control over territory,
coercion of populations, and recruitment. This campaign has enabled ISIS’s
survival and execution of international terror attacks. It may ultimately usher
in a “Virtual Caliphate” – a radicalized community organized online – that
empowers the global Salafi-jihadi movement and that could operate independently
of ISIS.

This
“Virtual Caliphate,” the emergence of which becomes more likely the longer
ISIS’s physical caliphate exists, would represent a unique challenge to
American national security. Other hostile actors, beyond ISIS and the global
Salafi-jihadi movement, are also adopting elements of a broader IO campaign,
highlighting the requirement for the U.S. to formulate a determined response.

The
U.S. possesses inherent advantages, including material resources, military
strength and convening power, with which to confront this evolving threat. It
also has challenges to overcome, including the lack of a government-wide
strategy – supported by the necessary resources and proper bureaucratic
organization – to counter enemy IO.

The
U.S. should continue to counter ISIS and other enemies in this arena by
focusing on rolling them back on the ground, degrading their technical
capabilities and other means they employ to reach their intended audiences, and
helping facilitate the emergence of compelling counter-narratives amenable to
American interests.

Monday, December 19, 2016

Operations
in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19 likely in order to stem
the growing casualties taken by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to regroup
before pushing into central Mosul. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization
continued its push west, connecting its parallel lines of effort when it
recaptured the north-south road between the Tel Afar Airbase and the southern
town of Ashwa on December 13.

Operations
in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19. The Counter Terrorism
Service (CTS), which is bearing the brunt of the operation, is facing a degree
of attrition that risks the successful completion of anti-ISIS operations in
Mosul. Senior U.S. military officials reported that the U.S.-trained Golden Brigade,
the first of three brigades of the CTS, is facing a 50% casualty
rate and
could be rendered combat ineffective in a month if the rate remains
constant. The CTS has deliberately slowed operations in eastern Mosul in order
to reduce the rate of attrition, and the ISF announced it will begin to rely
more on artillery and precision airstrikes to target ISIS
militants in response. These new tactics, however, will likely increase civilian
casualties because ISIS militants continue to use Mosul’s civilian population
as human shields. The ISF will either be forced to heavily deploy its assets
from other areas of the country to match the capability of the elite CTS forces
or to call up non-acceptable partners, such as the Popular Mobilization, to complete
the current operation in Mosul.

The
pause in eastern Mosul may also align with a need to regroup before the ISF
pushes into central Mosul. Operations in northeastern Mosul, under the efforts
of the CTS, have reached the Khosr River, a tributary river that feeds into the
Tigris and bisects northeastern Mosul. The CTS will need to regroup before
bridging the river in order to resolve the logistics of the crossing, notably
for heavy equipment. The CTS will also need to plan for how to approach these new
neighborhoods, especially the University of Mosul, a logistical hub for ISIS.
Unconfirmed sources report that ISIS destroyed the campus and withdrew, however
the “scorched earth” tactic, if
true, will still slow the ISF’s advance and leave it open to ISIS
counterattacks. ISIS will resist the CTS’s advance further into central Mosul
and towards the government center. The CTS will need to carefully assess how to
secure this area in light of its reduced numbers and limited ability to call in
reinforcements.

Shi’a
militias operating in the western Ninewa desert connected their northern and
southern lines of effort by retaking the Tel Afar-Ashwa road on December 13. The
militias have been operating on two separate axes, the first stretching west
from Tel Afar along the Sinjar highway, in the northern desert, and the second
stemming west from Qayyarah, moving through key villages of Ain al-Jahush,
Tel Abtah, and Ashwa in the southern desert. Units connected these lines of
effort on December 13 when they cleared the
road
stretching between Tel Afar and Ashwa, giving the operations a greater ability
to move forces and equipment as they continue to progress west.

Thursday, December 15, 2016

Opposition forces agreed to a ceasefire in order to evacuate their remaining positions in Eastern Aleppo City on December 13 following bilateral negotiations between Russia and Turkey. The deal states that all opposition fighters and civilians who wish to depart Eastern Aleppo City will be evacuated to Western Aleppo Province. The initial wave of evacuations scheduled to begin on December 14 failed to materialize after Iran inserted new last-minute conditions that called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi’a-majority towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib Province. The deal resumed on December 15 with medical evacuations from Fu’ah and Kefraya as well as Aleppo City. Meanwhile, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on December 11 following clashes with pro-regime forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. The fall of Palmyra marks the first seizure of a major urban center by ISIS in Iraq and Syria since May 2015 and demonstrates the sustained ability of ISIS to command, control, and resource major operations that exploit vulnerabilities among its opponents even as it faces increasing pressure from coalition forces in Ar-Raqqa City and Mosul. The success of ISIS in Palmyra also highlights the fragility of pro-regime forces despite their gains against opposition forces in Eastern Aleppo City.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of December 6, 2016.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued operations to retake Mosul and its environs, consolidating gains along its five axes before breaching the city limits on November 1. The ISF continued to advance north from Qayyarah towards southwestern Mosul, but have yet to breach the city limits there; south from Kurdish-held territory towards northern Mosul, besieging Tel Kayyaf; and in the countryside southeast of Mosul, from where they entered the city itself. The Counter Terrorism Service has retaken upwards of twenty neighborhoods from ISIS in the northeast quarter over the past six weeks, but the Iraqi Army has struggled to advance in Mosul’s southeast quarter. The ISF and Peshmerga also consolidated gains around Makhmur in late October. The Peshmerga, meanwhile, advanced from Bashiqa Mountain to retake Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7. Peshmerga involvement in the operation has since largely concluded, while the ISF continues its lines of effort inside Mosul itself and at remaining ISIS-held areas, including the southern axis. ISW is thus changing the respective areas to ISF-, Peshmerga-, and joint ISF and Peshmerga-control.

Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) launched operations into the western desert, west of Mosul, on October 29. The militias recaptured the Tel Afar airbase on November 16 but Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the ISF, not the PMUs, to recapture the city itself. The PMUs have since expanded west beyond Tel Afar, aiming for ISIS-held Baaj, south of Sinjar, and the Syrian border. ISW is thus changing this area to a control zone where Shi’a militias are the primary security force.

The ISF launched a minor operation to recapture the eastern bank of the Tigris River across from Shirqat on November 29 in order to counter ISIS’s ability to attack recaptured areas. The ISF deployed the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division alongside tribal forces and an armored battalion to lead the operation, which launched south from Makhmur, making minimal gains. ISW is thus expanding the area of ISF and tribal fighter control to include recent gains from the operation.

Wednesday, December 14, 2016

The pro-Assad forces’ onslaught in Aleppo marks a key inflection point
for the war in Syria. Eastern Aleppo’s imminent fall – to a coalition that
includes Russia and Iran and its various proxies – will accelerate the war’s
destabilizing effects. Jihadists will further improve their position within the
Syrian opposition. Fighters aligned with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will
continue committing atrocities against civilians. The Russian and Iranian
regimes will grow more emboldened. The United States, its allies, and its international
partners must now confront this new, yet predictable, phase in the Syrian war.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has led a significant effort
on Aleppo, tracking developments and putting the situation there in the context
of the broader war and U.S. policy. ISW’s analysts have offered trenchant
insights on the battle and led the way in forecasting events and trends. ISW
will remain a critical resource on the continuing Syrian conflict and its strategic
implications.

The following excerpts provide an overview of ISW’s prescient work on Aleppo
over the last year:

“Eastern Aleppo City serves as one
of the last remaining major hubs of acceptable opposition groups in Northern
Syria. The surrender of Eastern Aleppo City will likely drive these groups into
deeper partnership with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and other
Salafi-Jihadist Groups in order to preserve their military effectiveness on the
battlefield.”

“…the fall of Aleppo City will not
mark the end of the Syrian Civil War. Opposition groups will likely wage an
increasingly-radicalized insurgency across Northern Syria with continued
support from regional backers such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.”

“Russia will likely use
the Kuznetsov and its extant military assets in Syria in order to
intensify operations against opposition forces in Aleppo City and its
surrounding countryside, bolstering the regime’s crippling siege on
opposition-held districts of the city.”

“Russia’s support to the Assad
regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S. against ISIS and
al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield.”

“Russia feigned receptivity to
international concern over the Aleppo siege while shifting air assets to target other
opposition-held areas outside of Aleppo. Russia may also have used the pause to
complete some maintenance on its air frames in Syria.”

“[Jabhat Fatah al-Sham Emir Abu
Muhammad al-] Joulani will also undoubtedly condemn the US for failing to
prevent Russian war crimes in Aleppo and characterize the fight for Aleppo as a
struggle against the enemies of Sunni globally in order to fuel the growing
alienation of Syrian civilians and opposition fighters from the US.”

“Russian air power alone likely
will not enable pro-regime forces to recapture the densely-populated urban
terrain of Aleppo City. Rather, the regime and Iran will have to deploy more
combat-effective ground forces in order to leverage the asymmetric effect of
the Russian air campaign to clear Aleppo City of the Syrian opposition.”

“Russia will likely continue to
coordinate its air operations with regime siege-and-starve tactics that aim to
neutralize opposition forces in dense urban terrain with minimal military
resources.”

“Russia has periodically
intensified and tempered its air operations in Aleppo Province during
negotiations with the U.S., wielding the threat of even deeper humanitarian
crisis and the defeat of the acceptable opposition in Aleppo City in order to
extract concessions.”

“Russia will not accede to a
partnership with the U.S. except on its own terms, and will continue to wage
its air campaign in Syria coercively in order to secure them.”

“Both Russia and the Syrian regime
will continue to use subsequent ceasefires to solidify gains against the Syrian
opposition in Aleppo City and to employ siege-and-starve tactics to force the
defeat of the opposition in critical terrain.”

“Russia and the regime will
therefore pursue a strategy to remove mainstream opposition forces from the
battlefield either through their submission, destruction, or the transformation
of these groups into radical elements that can be rightfully targeted as
terrorists. Russia is purposefully driving this radicalization through its
deliberate targeting of civilian and humanitarian infrastructure.”

“The estimated quarter-million
remaining residents of Eastern Aleppo City nonetheless face a continued threat
of siege amidst ongoing clashes and heavy aerial bombardment by
Russian and Syrian warplanes that have prevented humanitarian groups and
civilians from using the newly-established supply route.”

“These grievances provide Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham an opportunity to leverage their integral role
in lifting the siege to generate public support and draw opposition groups into
a closer partnership. This integration would advance the long-term goal of al
Qaeda to unify the jihad in preparation for the establishment of an Islamic
Emirate.”

“The regime and Russia will pursue
a protracted ‘siege and starve’ campaign in order to force the submission of
these remaining acceptable groups, solidifying the dominance of the Salafi
jihadist opposition in northwestern Syria.”

“The collapse of acceptable armed
opposition groups in Aleppo would not only solidify the staying power of
hardline opposition factions in northwestern Syria, but would also ensure a
continued Salafi jihadist safehaven in Idlib Province.”

“…Assad now sits within reach of
several of his military objectives, including the encirclement and isolation of
Aleppo City and the establishment of a secure defensive perimeter along the
Syrian Coast.”

“Russian airstrikes are weakening
the opposition’s defenses in the outskirts of Aleppo, setting conditions for a
final assault by pro-regime forces. They are also destroying critical
infrastructure and hospitals to force civilians to flee.”

“The opposition forces now inside the city include
U.S.-supported groups that are relatively independent from jihadist forces.
They cannot prevent the encirclement of Aleppo, however, and may not survive
the siege. Those who do survive are more likely over time to submit to the
leadership of Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and other hardline
elements that can help them endure when no one else offers assistance.”

“The distribution of Russian
airstrikes in Aleppo Province demonstrates that its air campaign is primarily
directed at weakening the armed Syrian opposition generally, not ISIS or al
Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.”

“Russia obscures its true
intentions in Syria through an active disinformation campaign.”

“The U.S. has a short time frame
in Aleppo to prevent the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe and preserve
opposition groups the U.S. needs in order to destroy ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra
in the long term.”

“There is very little to indicate
that Russia, Iran, or the Syrian regime have any intention of halting their
military campaign in northern Syria, despite this diplomatic overture.”

“The regime and its allies have
waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to
set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City…The
operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both
Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters.”

“The flows of displaced persons generated
by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while
fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.”

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

The Ukrainian government implemented a series of reforms in the face of rising public dissatisfaction and protests. The slow pace of reform and perceived corruption of the Ukrainian government manifested in demonstrations of over 5,000 protestors in November. These movements enjoy the support of pro-Russia and populist parties that are making a concerted effort to capitalize on increasing public frustration in order to strengthen their movements and undermine the legitimacy of pro-western president Petro Poroshenko. Lack of unity and a clear direction from populist parties will likely prevent them from gaining meaningful traction among the Ukrainian electorate in the short term, however. Ukraine’s reformist movement also continued to voice its dissatisfaction with the Poroshenko administration. Former governor of Odessa Oblast, Mikheil Sakaashvili, announced the creation of a new reformist political party, held protests and launched a fundraising effort. President Poroshenko attempted to quell dissatisfaction by enacting reforms doubling the minimum wage, restructuring the health care system to make insurance universally available and protecting depositors against bank fraud. President Poroshenko will likely seek high-profile public victories, particularly EU visa liberalization, in order to stabilize support for his government.

Ukraine also continued to strengthen its military and political ties with the EU and NATO in its effort to distance itself from Russia and modernize its infrastructure and military. Ukraine and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding on a strategic energy partnership that enhances cooperation in efficiency and facilitates energy market integration in the future. The deal also makes progress towards a visa-free travel regime for Ukrainians visiting EU nations. Ukraine launched numerous domestically manufactured surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles near Crimea, forcing a strong Russian reaction. In an effort to avoid prompting Russian military action against their forces, Ukraine shifted the tests further inland, revealing its ability to utilize its military buildup in Crimea to alter Ukraine’s use of its sovereign territory. Russia went so far as to assert that it would use its military assets in Crimea against another Black Sea power. Despite Russian pushback, the missile tests demonstrated the growing capabilities of Ukraine’s military and domestic arms industry, which continues to improve and modernize from its post-Soviet state of disrepair.

ISIS recaptured the historic city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on December 11 following the withdrawal of pro-regime forces, marking the first seizure of a major urban center by ISIS in Iraq and Syria since ISIS last captured Palmyra in May 2015. ISIS launched a multi-axis offensive against the outskirts of Palmyra beginning on December 8, 2016, seizing several nearby regime-held oil and natural gas fields as well as critical positions in the mountains overlooking the city. Local activists stated that Russia and Iran withdrew their garrisons from Palmyra as this outer line of defenses began to collapse, leaving the city under the control of only several hundred ill-trained and poorly-motivated militiamen from the National Defense Forces. These fighters proved unable to hold the city despite heavy air support provided by Russia. ISIS subsequently capitalized upon its advances to launch an attack against the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase between Palmyra and Homs City. Heavy clashes reportedly remain ongoing as of December 13.

The fall of Palmyra demonstrates ISIS’s sustained ability to command, control, and resource major operations even as it mounts the defense of Mosul in Iraq and Ar-Raqqa City in Syria. ISIS exploited the ongoing main effort of pro-regime forces in Aleppo City in order to recapture Palmyra with an offensive maneuver characteristic of its previous campaigns, allowing ISIS to shift the pervading narrative that it is on its heels in Iraq and Syria. Palmyra is key terrain that positions ISIS to project force into regime-held ‘central corridor’ of Western Syria, including Damascus, Homs City, and Hama City. ISIS may continue its offensive south and west of Palmyra in Central Syria in order to maximize its gains as ongoing offensives against Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province and Ar-Raqqa City challenge its urban holdings in Northern Syria. Notably, ISIS claimed to replenish its arsenal with dozens of armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and other systems left behind by pro-regime forces in Palmyra. The seizure of Palmyra by ISIS may also be a blocking maneuver to protect its holdings in Eastern Syria or a diversionary effort to set conditions for a renewed offensive against pro-regime positons in Deir ez-Zour City. In either case, ISIS will likely use its offensives against the regime in order to expand its influence, leverage, and recruitment among the opposition following the upcoming fall of Eastern Aleppo City.

The success enjoyed by ISIS in Palmyra also highlights the fragility of pro-regime forces despite their recent gains in Western Syria, foreshadowing the difficulty that the regime and its allies will face in securing the country over the long-term. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains reliant upon a small cadre of elite military units and foreign fighters – including Russian Spetznaz, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shia Militias – in order to secure gains against his opponents on the ground. The regime reportedly redeployed the majority of these assets to enable its successful operations to clear opposition forces from Eastern Aleppo City over the past several months, generating vulnerabilities on other battlefronts including Central Syria. Pro-regime forces remain unlikely to deploy in large numbers to Eastern Homs Province in the near-term. Russia will likely use this renewed threat in order to press the U.S. for increased cooperation against ISIS in Syria. Nonetheless, the regime remains incapable of reestablishing security across the country without sustained foreign support – and thus remains incapable of meeting the long-term strategic objectives of the U.S. in Syria.

Monday, December 12, 2016

The
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from
December 6 to 12, but struggled to advance in the southeast. The ISF ordered a
change in tactic on December 4 in order to address the lopsided eastern
offensive, attempting to make rapid advances in the southeast rather than grind
through neighborhood-by-neighborhood clearing operations. The shift, however,
failed drastically when the rapid gains left the ISF open to ISIS
counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties on December 6 and 7. In response,
the ISF moved units previously allocated to breach Mosul’s southwestern
neighborhoods to reinforce efforts in the southeast on December 10.

The
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed to accelerate and complete operations in
eastern Mosul from December 6 to 12 in order to reach the Tigris River and
launch an offensive into western Mosul as the second month of the operation
comes to an end. Efforts in the southeast, largely under the command of the
Iraqi Army, however, have struggled to match efforts in the northeast, led by
the elite Counter Terrorism Forces (CTS).

The
CTS, with the support the 16thIraqi Army Division entering from
the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12.
These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult
block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in
Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul
as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the
city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it
is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and
experience in urban warfare.

In
the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to
overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the
ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions
into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit
from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to
retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank
of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS
counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7.
The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue
by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which
reported one hundred casualties.

The
ISF and Coalition are now focusing efforts in the southeast in order to
accelerate the entire eastern operation. The ISF moved three brigades from the 5th Federal Police Division, or roughly 4,000 men, from the southern axis to reinforce the ISF in the southeast on December 10.
These forces, previously allocated to spearhead operations into the Mosul
airport and military base, will reportedly operate in the same neighborhood of
the failed hospital offensive. They are currently mobilizing in Hamdaniya,
southeast of Mosul, before they move into the city itself. Additionally,
sources reported that a Coalition airstrike targeted the fifth and final bridge connecting east and west Mosul. The destruction of the bridge
will reduce ISIS’s ability to transport equipment and people into eastern Mosul
and will help anti-ISIS forces box in remaining ISIS militants in order to
advance west. If the ISF can succeed in pushing ISIS out of southeastern Mosul,
forces in the southeast may move to breach Mosul’s airport and military base
from the east where it could establish a forward operating base for further operations
into western Mosul.

Friday, December 9, 2016

The Order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: A
Key Component in European Security

Franklin Holcomb and the ISW Russia/Ukraine Team

The United States and its partners can improve
regional security and stability in Eastern Europe by supporting the
modernization and reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine more aggressively.
Ukraine has suffered from consistent Russian military aggression since Russia
occupied the Crimean Peninsula and militarily intervened in the eastern
Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in 2014. The overall unpreparedness of
the Ukrainian military and its inability to match the capabilities of Russian
forces allowed Russian and Russian proxy forces to gain a foothold in eastern
Ukraine from which they continue to destabilize the entire country. The
Ukrainian armed forces have been partially restructured and strengthened in the
face of this constant pressure, enough to stabilize the front lines for a
time. They require significantly more support of all varieties, however,
if they are to stop the advance of Russia and its proxies permanently, to say
nothing of reversing the armed occupation of Ukrainian territory.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to fight Russian
troops and proxy forces operating in Ukraine in a war that has claimed
approximately 10,000 lives. Ukraine has engaged in an ambitious military
reform program to modernize its armed forces and meet standards required for
NATO accession by 2020. These reform efforts have seen important successes in
recent years, but the Ukrainian military remains vulnerable to conventional and
unconventional warfare. U.S. General John Abizaid (former Commander of U.S.
Central Command), U.K. General Nick Parker (former Commander of Britain’s Land
Forces), and other western military leaders are in Ukraine to support the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s efforts to restructure itself and reform its
forces.The U.S., NATO, and individual western states can support these reform
efforts and shape the Ukrainian military into a force capable of protecting
Ukrainian sovereignty and becoming a key player in Eastern European
security.The effectiveness of Ukraine’s land forces has increased due to
ongoing reform efforts and two years of combat experience. These forces still
suffer from a lack of modern equipment and from an incompletely reformed
organizational structure. Ukrainian front-line soldiers have learned much from
the protracted conflict and now outmatch separatist forces operating in eastern
Ukraine. Ukraine has made progress in overcoming the low morale and poor
discipline that confronted the Ukrainian Ground Forces Command in the early
stages of the conflict. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced that
conscripts would no longer serve at the front line on November 2, for
example. This step is critical in order to improve the effectiveness of
Ukraine’s forces in the field and create a more professional army.

Ukrainian forces nevertheless lack experience in
counter-insurgency operations, a lacuna which will become an increasingly
exploitable vulnerability if they regain control of separatist territory in
eastern Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are in the midst of a transition
from the Soviet structure on which they were based and remain
inefficiently-organized. This cumbersome, inefficient, and brittle organization
left Ukrainian front line units vulnerable to the rapid advance of Russian and
Russian proxy forces throughout the conflict, leading to multiple serious
defeats. Ukrainian front-line troops also lack standardized modern
weaponry. Ukraine’s defense sector remains highly productive, but the Armed
Forces of Ukraine does not have the modern weaponry necessary to allow them to
counter Russian military intervention. Russian and pro-Russian forces in
eastern Ukraine continue to use heavy armor and electronic-warfare systems that
Ukraine has struggled to counter, leading to some of their most serious defeats
in the conflict. Ukrainian forces remain highly vulnerable to conventional
military forces as long as they lack the means to counter massed heavy armored
formations. Ukrainian Ground Forces will be unable to provide a true deterrent
to offensive action by regional aggressors until these problems are addressed.

The Ukrainian Air Force plays a key role in protecting
Ukrainian sovereignty but faces capability gaps that undermine its ability to
support Ukrainian ground forces in combat or consistently assert sovereignty over
Ukrainian airspace. At the outset of the conflict in 2014, the underfunded
Ukrainian Air Force used Soviet equipment and was not prepared for major combat
operations. It nevertheless played a decisive role in supporting Ukrainian
ground forces in early stages of the conflict. The years of neglect took
their toll, and Ukraine’s air forces suffered heavy losses during the initial
four months of intensive air operations, losing 18 aircraft and helicopters,
mostly to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and heavier anti-aircraft
installations. Ukraine ceded its right to conduct air operations in the
conflict zone in eastern Ukraine on September 19, 2014 in an effort to
deescalate the conflict, and the Ukrainian Air Force has not operated against
hostile targets since. The Ukrainian Air Force’s high vulnerability to even
limited deployments of Russian anti-air systems raises serious concerns about
its ability to fight against a conventional combined arms force. Ukraine and
its western partners should prioritize supporting the refurbishment of the
Ukrainian Air Force in order to allow the Ukrainian Air Force to operate in its
own airspace.

The Ukrainian Navy was nearly destroyed by the Russian
occupation of the Crimean peninsula and has struggled to reform itself in order
to be a force capable of asserting Ukrainian sovereignty. Multiple high-profile
defections during the initial stages of the Russian occupation of Crimea
weakened the leadership of the Ukrainian navy, which proceeded to lose at least
51 ships, the majority of which were captured by Russia. The current
flagship of the Ukrainian Navy, the frigateHetman
Sahaydachniy, along with several patrol boats and cutters, are the only
combat-ready vessels available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of September
2016.

Ukraine’s loss of its primary naval facilities in
Crimea remains the largest hurdle to the reconstitution of the Ukrainian Navy.
Ukrainian Minister of Defense Stepan Poltorak reported on June 28, 2016 that
Ukraine had allocated $100 million to construct a new naval base in Odessa to
serve as the headquarters for the Ukrainian Navy as well as plans to repair and
modernize Ukraine’s remaining vessels. Even when this expansion has been
completed and these reforms implemented, Ukraine’s navy would likely face
extreme difficulty protecting its key port cities of Odessa and Mariupol
against the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The Ukrainian Navy is currently the weakest navy in
the Black Sea region. It is weaker than the Russian Black Sea Fleet as well as
the navies of NATO members Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, though is slightly
stronger than the Georgian Coast Guard. It is, and likely will remain in
coming years, incapable of asserting Ukrainian sovereignty around the occupied
Crimean peninsula or over Ukrainian resource rights on the Black Sea should
Russian forces in the region seek to prevent it from doing so. The U.S. has
pledged $500 million to support the reformation of the Ukrainian Navy, $30
million of which was delivered in 2016.The reconstruction of the Ukrainian Navy
will take time, particularly so long as Ukraine is denied access to its bases
in Crimea, and will require continued focus from both Ukraine and its partners
if the Ukrainian Navy is to be able to defend Ukraine’s coast and waters.

Ukrainian Special Forces play a key role in countering
conventional and unconventional threats to Ukrainian sovereignty, and the
effort to reform them has had great success. Much of Russia’s aggressive action
in Crimea, Donbas, and elsewhere in Ukraine relied on small groups of special
operators or light infantry who infiltrated Ukrainian territory, caused chaos,
seized key terrain, and thereby undermined the morale and effectiveness of
Ukrainian units ahead of the main body of pro-Russia forces. Ukrainian forces’
initial inability to counter this type of warfare demonstrated the need for a
highly-motivated, well-trained special operations force to counter Russian
infiltration, reconnaissance, and sabotage teams.Ukraine has therefore
prioritized reforming the structure and practices of its special operations
forces with support from U.S. and NATO.These reforms, intended to streamline the command
structure of Ukrainian special operations units, will play a critical role in
Ukrainian efforts to create armed forces capable of protecting Ukrainian
sovereignty. President Poroshenko signed a law on July 26, 2016 officially
establishing the separate Special Operations Command in the Ukrainian armed
forces. Poroshenko noted that “in 2014 special operations forces had nothing
except morale” and praised the necessary efforts to reform Ukraine’s special
operations capabilities. Ukraine’s Special Operations Command is still
nascent, however, and Ukrainian special operations forces have yet to become a
fully mature force.

Ukraine has prioritized obtaining NATO assistance in
reforming and retraining its armed forces since 2014. Ukraine and NATO’s
partnership hasexistedsince Ukraine declared its
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and improved significantly in recent
years. Ukraine expanded its efforts to train with NATO in order to support
its armed forces’ initiatives to improve their overall readiness, modernize
their training and tactics, support structural reform, and improve
interoperability with NATO forces. These ongoing efforts included expanded
participation in large-scale NATO exercises, such asAgile Spirit 2015 in
Georgia, Sea Breeze 2016 in the Black Sea,Flaming Thunder 2016in Lithuania and Rapid Trident
2016 in Ukraine. These exercises allow members of Ukraine’s armed
services to share best practices across disciplines with their counterparts in
NATO. These exercises also give Ukrainian soldiers and officers the
opportunity to become more accustomed to Western military practices, on which they
are basing many of their reforms. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown a
strong desire to expand interoperability with western military structures and
improve military relationships with NATO in order to counter and deter further
Russian aggression.

Ukraine has also made efforts to develop military
relationships with individual NATO member states in order to expand its network
of partners who support ongoing reform efforts. Since 2014, Ukraine has
conducted exercises with many western countries including Poland, Canada, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey,
and the UK. Ukrainian forces joined a jointLithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade in
September 2014 and have since proposed a joint military brigade with Bulgaria
and Romania. These multilateral partnerships, combined with ongoing NATO
efforts to improve the logistics and standardization of the Ukrainian
armed forces, constitute a concerted investment in Ukrainian security by both
NATO and Ukraine. The continuation and expansion of these efforts will
build on the progress Ukraine has made in reforming its armed forces while
using this momentum to further integrate into NATO and Ukraine’s efforts to
maintain its sovereignty and counter Russian aggression.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine have made significant
strides towards their objective of reforming into a modern military force by
2020, but they continue to face major challenges. As U.S. and Western
policymakers consider the most effective path forward for European security,
they should focus on supporting the ongoing reformation of the Ukrainian armed
forces into a fully professional and modern force that can help maintain
stability in Eastern Europe. Ukraine’s partners in the West should prioritize
supporting Ukraine’s efforts to complete systemic structural reforms, modernize
their military hardware, and rebuild its navy. These efforts will allow Ukraine
to defend its sovereignty against regional aggressors and play a greater role
in contributing to the security of Europe and the Black Sea Region.