Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

The C model's use of the longer DB 603 engine required more extensive changes to the airframe. As the weight was distributed further forward, the tail of the aircraft had to be lengthened in order to maintain the desired centre of gravity. To test these changes, several examples of otherwise standard 190 As were re-engined with a supercharged DB 603 to experiment with this engine fit, V13 (W.Nr. 0036) with the 1,750 PS 603A, the similar V15 and V16, a 1,800 DB 603 E being fitted to the latter after a time. With this engine, the V16 was able to reach 725 km/h (450 mph) at 6,800 m (22,310 ft), a considerable improvement over the 650 km/h (400 mph) at 5,200 m (17,060 ft) of the basic A models. V18 followed, the first to feature the full high-altitude suite of features, including the pressurized cockpit, longer wings, a 603G engine driving a new four-blade propeller, and a Hirth 9-2281 turbocharger. Unlike the experimental B models, V18 had a cleaner turbocharger installation, running the required piping along the wing root, partially buried in the fillet, and installing both the turbocharger air intake and intercooler in a substantially sized teardrop shaped fairing under the cockpit.[47] This "pouch" led to the "Känguruh" (Kangaroo) nickname for these models. V18 was later modified to the V18/U1, with a "downgraded" 603A engine, but a new DVL turbocharger that improved power to 1,600 PS at an altitude of 10,700 m (35,105 ft). Four additional prototypes based on the V18/U1 followed: V29, V30, V32 and V33.
Also:
The first Fw-190V13 with DB603 flew in March 1942. The conversion went smoothly , without any technical problems.
The production of the FW 190C was have to begun in March 1943 and continued until March 1944, with 727 aircraft.
Projected performance with C3 fuel:
600 km/h ( 370 mph) at sea level.
730 km/h ( 454 mph) at 7 km ( 23,000ft)
Armament:
2xMG131 with 250rpg (cowl guns)
2xMG151 with 250 rpg (at wing roots)
1xMK103 with 65rpg (engine cannon)
Option with 2 additional MG151 in outer wings

Eventually the RLM cancelled the FW190C in late 1942 , possibly because of the needs of the Me-410 -program.

The above info is from Dietmar Hermann's book of Fw190D.
So basically the FW190C would have been the equivalent performance of the FW190D only over 1 year earlier.
The only problem was the lack of sufficient DB603s, which were selected as the engine for the ME410.
So perhaps if Daimler-Benz had gotten an upgrade in production capability like Jumo did pre-war there would be sufficient capacity for DB603s.
Or if the Volkswagen plant at Wolfsburg, which never reached capacity and was heavily underutilized until 1944 and then only to 50% capacity, was tasked with aero-engine construction it could have produced Daimler engines.

Hypothetically if sufficient engines were available and the FW190C was in production from March 1943 to give Germany a higher performance fighter capable of operating with performance comparable to the P51D, but a year earlier than the Mustang and more than a year earlier than the historical FW190D, what would the effect be on the air war?

In 1943 Germany still had relative control over her skies during the day and sufficient numbers of experienced pilots to get the full benefit of such a high performance aircraft and no comparable Allied aircraft to escort bombers deep into Germany.

The FW190C had much heavier firepower than the Me109G and could replace the BF110s and Ju88s operating as bomber-killers, which means more aircraft for night fighter forces. It also saves the vulnerable Me410s from daylight bomber-killer service where their slow speed meant they were decimated; they could also then operate as intended as bombers and night fighters/intruders.

The FW190C would have much greater survivability as a fighter at higher altitudes because of its speed, which was much higher than the Me109 models from 1942 on. It would be more dangerous for US bombers to operate during the day and because of the freeing up of BF110s and Ju88s there would be more dangers for the RAF at night. Plus if the ME410s are not used during the day they couple operate in Russia or also at night to fight the RAF.

Plus by the time the P51D shows up in early 1944 the Luftwaffe would have plenty of experience with the model, so Big Week in February and the first half of 1944 wouldn't be nearly as costly for the Luftwaffe. The lack of attrition of the remaining fighter pilots would prevent the collapse of the Luftwaffe by mid-year.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_of ... .281944.29
Doolittle began his campaign to destroy the Luftwaffe during Big Week, from 20–25 February 1944, as part of the European strategic bombing campaign. The USAAF launched Operation Argument, a series of missions against German targets that became known as "Big Week". The planners intended to lure the Luftwaffe into a decisive battle by launching massive attacks on the German aircraft industry. By defeating the Luftwaffe, the Allies would achieve air superiority and the invasion of Europe could proceed. The daylight bombing campaign was also supported by RAF Bomber Command, when they operated against the same targets at night.[101]

The 15AF lost 90 bombers, the 8AF lost 157 bombers and RAF Bomber Command lost another 131 bombers. The 8AFs strength had dropped from 75% to 54%, and the strength of its fighter units had dropped from 72% to 65%.[102] The Luftwaffe's RLV had lost 355 fighters and its operational strength shrank to 50%.[102] The RLV also lost nearly 100 valuable fighter pilots.[103] While Spaatz claimed it as a victory,[103] the production of German fighters dropped only briefly. Nevertheless, the attritional battle would only get worse for the Luftwaffe. After Big Week, air superiority had passed irrevocably to the Allies.[103]

One of the most important developments of "Big Week" was the introduction of the P-51 Mustang. It had the range to escort the USAAF bombers to the target and back again. It also had the performance to engage any piston-engine German fighter in service and the firepower of six Browning .50 in (12.7 mm) AN/M2 machine guns with which to destroy them. The number of Mustangs increased from February 1944 onwards.[104]

The Luftwaffe was put under severe pressure in March–April 1944. According to a report made by Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, on 27 April 1944, 500 aircraft and 400 pilots had been lost in the 10 previous operations.[105] Galland also said that in the previous four months 1,000 pilots had been killed. Galland reported that the enemy outnumbered his fighters between 6:1 and 8:1 and the standard of Allied fighter pilot training was "astonishingly high".[106] Some 25% of the German fighter pilot force had been lost in May 1944 alone, while 50% of the available fighters were also each month from March–May 1944.[107] Galland recognised the Luftwaffe was losing the attrition war and pushed for a focus on quality rather than quantity. Galland stated in his 27 April report, "I would at this moment rather have one Me 262 in action than five Bf 109s. I used to say three 109s, but the situation develops and changes."[106]

The need for technical superiority was evident in the losses in the first half of 1944. In January the Luftwaffe had on strength some 2,283 pilots. It lost some 2,262 between January and May 1944, a 99% loss rate.[108] This helped extend USAAF air superiority over the continent.[109] German losses included experienced personnel. The situation was so serious, Galland remarked:

The strained manpower situation in the air defence of the Reich demands urgently the further bringing up of experienced flying personnel from other arms of the service, in particular for the maintenance of fighting power to the air arm, tried pilots of the ground-attack and bomber units, especially officers suitable as formation leaders, will now also have to be drawn upon.[110]

It was a vicious circle. In order to meet frontline requirements training time was cut. Shorter training hours meant a poorer quality of pilot, which in turn increased the likelihood of a pilot being killed in action. The offensive against Axis oil production was forcing a cut in training time was making things even worse.[111]

I have compared the testdata from Rechlin, NACA and the (most accurate and thorough) calculations from Konstantin Iwanow and Wladimir Georgiew (University of Sofia) and I fail to observe any pronounced technological superiority. Wikipedia is only partially suited to address the issues, some of the (averaged) values fluctuate substantially. Available here: https://erenow.net/ww/luftkrieg-uber-eu ... ken/68.php

The problems with the FW 190C are the cabin pressurization and turbo-supercharger.

Focke Wulf had very limited experience with either and could never get both to work to a point satisfactorily where they could be put into general production. In fact, German aircraft manufacturers had serious issues with both of these systems throughout the war.
With the turbo-supercharger, the DVL (loosely an equivalent of the US NACA) had serious problems getting turbine and compressor blade profiles correct for optimal use in this system. They were trying in wartime, with limited resources to do what-- in particular-- General Electric had already done prewar. That is GE had calculated, run, and tested hundreds of blade profiles and knew what worked. So, in the US building an efficient turbo-supercharger was possible.
Add to that, that the turbo part will require high temperature alloys that are in short supply or even unavailable in Germany for mass production, and you have serious issues just getting the turbo-supercharger to work at all.
This is why the whole FW 190C program remained experimental and developmental. German engineers were trying to learn in a matter of a few years what US engineers had been developing on a larger scale with far greater resources over more than a decade.

The FW 190C program does continue as the TA 153 until almost the end of the war. But, it never produced a production plane.

So, it isn't an engine problem here. It's trying to develop on the fly a turbo-supercharger system that's reliable and mass producible along with a cockpit pressurization system that actually works reliably. Neither of these proved possible for the entirety of the German aviation industry. They could produce one-off experimental planes. They could get pressurization to work on a limited scale with very specialized cockpits. But, they could never come up with a way to mass produce either.

The problems with the FW 190C are the cabin pressurization and turbo-supercharger.

Focke Wulf had very limited experience with either and could never get both to work to a point satisfactorily where they could be put into general production. In fact, German aircraft manufacturers had serious issues with both of these systems throughout the war.
With the turbo-supercharger, the DVL (loosely an equivalent of the US NACA) had serious problems getting turbine and compressor blade profiles correct for optimal use in this system. They were trying in wartime, with limited resources to do what-- in particular-- General Electric had already done prewar. That is GE had calculated, run, and tested hundreds of blade profiles and knew what worked. So, in the US building an efficient turbo-supercharger was possible.
Add to that, that the turbo part will require high temperature alloys that are in short supply or even unavailable in Germany for mass production, and you have serious issues just getting the turbo-supercharger to work at all.
This is why the whole FW 190C program remained experimental and developmental. German engineers were trying to learn in a matter of a few years what US engineers had been developing on a larger scale with far greater resources over more than a decade.

The FW 190C program does continue as the TA 153 until almost the end of the war. But, it never produced a production plane.

So, it isn't an engine problem here. It's trying to develop on the fly a turbo-supercharger system that's reliable and mass producible along with a cockpit pressurization system that actually works reliably. Neither of these proved possible for the entirety of the German aviation industry. They could produce one-off experimental planes. They could get pressurization to work on a limited scale with very specialized cockpits. But, they could never come up with a way to mass produce either.

Hi,

Thanks for the reply, oh right didn’t realise they’d have these problems with it.

But do you think if it didn’t suffer from it’s historical problems would you think the c variant would be better than the d variant?

The problems with the FW 190C are the cabin pressurization and turbo-supercharger.

Focke Wulf had very limited experience with either and could never get both to work to a point satisfactorily where they could be put into general production. In fact, German aircraft manufacturers had serious issues with both of these systems throughout the war.
With the turbo-supercharger, the DVL (loosely an equivalent of the US NACA) had serious problems getting turbine and compressor blade profiles correct for optimal use in this system. They were trying in wartime, with limited resources to do what-- in particular-- General Electric had already done prewar. That is GE had calculated, run, and tested hundreds of blade profiles and knew what worked. So, in the US building an efficient turbo-supercharger was possible.
Add to that, that the turbo part will require high temperature alloys that are in short supply or even unavailable in Germany for mass production, and you have serious issues just getting the turbo-supercharger to work at all.
This is why the whole FW 190C program remained experimental and developmental. German engineers were trying to learn in a matter of a few years what US engineers had been developing on a larger scale with far greater resources over more than a decade.

The FW 190C program does continue as the TA 153 until almost the end of the war. But, it never produced a production plane.

So, it isn't an engine problem here. It's trying to develop on the fly a turbo-supercharger system that's reliable and mass producible along with a cockpit pressurization system that actually works reliably. Neither of these proved possible for the entirety of the German aviation industry. They could produce one-off experimental planes. They could get pressurization to work on a limited scale with very specialized cockpits. But, they could never come up with a way to mass produce either.

Hi,

Thanks for the reply, oh right didn’t realise they’d have these problems with it.

But do you think if it didn’t suffer from it’s historical problems would you think the c variant would be better than the d variant?

They tried from about late 1940 to late 1944. The DVL was having to learn about turbocharging just as the aircraft industry was having to for jet engines (both use gas turbines). Their only wartime source of data on blade profiles was Brown Bovari in Switzerland, one of the largest steam turbine manufacturers who had a massive databank on blade profiles.
So, the TK 11 turbo supercharger ran into all sorts of issues in detail design to get it working.
Then the lack of high temperature alloys and lack of experiance with using them ran the plane into problems, particularly with ducting the exhaust from the engine to the turbine.
You mentioned the V18 where they ran these along the outside of the fuselage. This was to keep the heat down inside the airframe as much as because the ducts leaked continiously. Republic solved all those problems pre-war with the P-43 and P-47 using such a system.
Stanford Moss and his team at GE had the turbine and turbocharger problems all worked out. But GE was a major steam turbine producer and had the expertise in designing turbines to do the job.

I see this as something the German aircraft industry should have probably mostly ignored as a solution and just stuck with better supercharger designs. They had those down just as the British did. The British could get high altitude aircraft to work. I think the Germans could have managed a pressurized cockpit that worked if they had focused on that more than they did, but a way around that would have been put the pilot in a pressure suit instead... That's where the Allies, and postwar air forces went...

The problems with the FW 190C are the cabin pressurization and turbo-supercharger.

Focke Wulf had very limited experience with either and could never get both to work to a point satisfactorily where they could be put into general production. In fact, German aircraft manufacturers had serious issues with both of these systems throughout the war.

This is why the whole FW 190C program remained experimental and developmental. German engineers were trying to learn in a matter of a few years what US engineers had been developing on a larger scale with far greater resources over more than a decade.

The FW 190C program does continue as the TA 153 until almost the end of the war. But, it never produced a production plane.

So, it isn't an engine problem here. It's trying to develop on the fly a turbo-supercharger system that's reliable and mass producible along with a cockpit pressurization system that actually works reliably. Neither of these proved possible for the entirety of the German aviation industry. They could produce one-off experimental planes. They could get pressurization to work on a limited scale with very specialized cockpits. But, they could never come up with a way to mass produce either.

They tried from about late 1940 to late 1944. The DVL was having to learn about turbocharging just as the aircraft industry was having to for jet engines (both use gas turbines).

I see this as something the German aircraft industry should have probably mostly ignored as a solution and just stuck with better supercharger designs. They had those down just as the British did. The British could get high altitude aircraft to work. I think the Germans could have managed a pressurized cockpit that worked if they had focused on that more than they did, but a way around that would have been put the pilot in a pressure suit instead... That's where the Allies, and postwar air forces went...

thanks for the last insights!

my understanding a couple of emergency decompressions in JU-86 and they stopped flights over UK? with pressure suits they could have continued high altitude experiments?

and you ninja'd my question about superchargers.

from layman's viewpoint the zwilling concept is interesting for faster, high altitude aircraft?