Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated
suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own
motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different.
While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate
by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party
filing an application. [Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others (2001) 7 SCC 549].

The main issue for determination in these appeals is whether contempt
proceedings were initiated against the appellant suo motu by the court or by
respondents. First we may note the background under which these matters were
referred to a larger Bench.

"The office is to take note that in future if any information is lodged
even in the form of a petition inviting this Court to take action under the
Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution, where the informant
is not one of the persons named in Section 15 of the said Act, it should not be
styled as a petition and should not be placed for admission on the judicial
side. Such a petition should be placed before the Chief Justice for orders in
Chambers and the Chief Justice may decide either by himself or in consultation
with the other judges of the Court whether to take any cognizance of the
information." In P.N.Duda v. P.Shiv Shanker & Ors. [(1988) 3 SCC 167]
this Court approving the aforesaid observation of Delhi High Court directed as
under:

"...the direction given by the Delhi High Court sets out the proper
procedure in such cases and may be adopted, at least in future, as a practice
direction or as a rule, by this Court and other High Courts." Challenging
the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 15 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act') it was, inter alia, contended that the
directions in P.N.Duda's case (supra) were not followed by the High Court
inasmuch as the informative papers styled as contempt petitions were not placed
before the Chief Justice of the High Court for suo motu action and, therefore,
the exercise was uncalled for and beyond legal sanctity. This aspect assumed
significant importance because admittedly the contempt petitions were filed in
the High Court without the consent of the Advocate-General and, therefore, not
competent except when the court finds that the contempt action was taken by the
court on its own motion. The two-judge bench hearing the appeals expressed the
view that the aforesaid directions approved by this Court in P.N.Duda's case
are of far-reaching consequences. The Bench observed that the power under
Section 15 of the Act to punish contemners for contempt rests with the court
and in Duda's case, they seem to have been denuded to rest with the Chief
Justice on the administrative side.

Expressing doubts about the correctness of the observations made in Duda's
case, and observing that the same require reconsideration, these appeals were
directed to be referred for decision by a larger Bench. Under this background,
these matters have been placed before us.

For determination of the main issue in these appeals including the aforesaid
aspect arising out of Duda's case, it is necessary to briefly note the object
of the power of the Court to punish a person for contempt.

Every High Court besides powers under the Act has also the power to punish
for contempt as provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Repealing
the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1952, the Act was enacted, inter alia, providing definition
of civil and criminal contempt and also providing for filtering of criminal
contempt petitions. The Act laws down 'contempt of court' to mean civil
contempt or criminal contempt. We are concerned with criminal contempt.
'Criminal contempt' is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. It, inter alia,
means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other
act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to
lower the authority of, any court. The procedure for initiating a proceeding of
contempt when it is committed in the face of the Supreme Court or High Court
has been prescribed in Section 14 of the Act. In the case of criminal contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in Section 14 the manner of taking cognizance
has been provided for in Section 15 of the Act. This section, inter alia,
provides that action for contempt may be taken on court's own motion or on a
motion made by (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the
consent in writing of the Advocate-General.

The contempt jurisdiction enables the Court to ensure proper administration
of justice and maintenance of the rule of law. It is meant to ensure that the
courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied
by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials
who administer it, and to prevent willful defiance of orders of the court or
undertakings given to the court [Commissioner, Agra v. Rohtas Singh (1998) 1
SCC 349].

In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.

[(1998) 4 SCC 409] it was held that "The purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is
an unusual type of jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the
hangman" and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim
between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the
dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice
from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative
that the authority of courts should not be imperiled and there should be no
unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice." Dealing with
the nature and character of the power of the courts to deal with contempt in
the case of Pritam Pal, v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Through
Registrar, [(1993) Supp. (1) SCC 529], this Court observed :

"15. Prior to the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, it was held that the High Court has inherent power to
deal with a contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own procedure,
provided that it gives a fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor to
defend himself. But the procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the
Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution.

Though the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court can
be regulated by legislation by appropriate legislature under Entry 77 of List I
and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the Parliament has enacted the
Act of 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court
is given a constitutional foundation by declaring to be 'Courts of Record'
under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken away by any
legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section 22 of the Act
lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts.
It necessarily follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything
in the Act of 1971" The nature and power of the Court in contempt
jurisdiction is a relevant factor for determining the correctness of
observations made in Duda's case (supra). Dealing with the requirement to
follow the procedure prescribed by law while exercising powers under Article
215 of the Constitution to punish for contempt, it was held by this Court in
Dr. L.P.

Misra v. State of U.P. [(1998) 7 SCC 379] that the High Court can invoke
powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 215 of
the Constitution is also governed by laws and the rules subject to the
limitation that if such laws/rules stultify or abrogate the constitutional
power then such laws/rules would not be valid. In L.P.Misra's case (supra) it
was observed that the procedure prescribed by the Rules has to be followed even
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. To the same
effect are the observations in Pallav Sheth's case (supra).

For determination of the issues involved, it would also be useful to note
the observations made in the case of S.K.Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue,
U.P., Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra Misra, [(1981) 1 SCC 436] to the following
effect:

"Section 15 does not specify the basis or the source of information on
which the High Court can act on its own motion. If the High Court acts on
information derived from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records
of a subordinate court or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a
public speech, without there being any reference from the subordinate court or
the Advocate General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own
motion. But if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private
person feeling aggrieved, not being the Advocate General, can the High Court
refuse to entertain the same on the ground that it has been made without the
consent in writing of the Advocate General? It appears to us that the High
Court, has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain the
petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis of the
information supplied to it in that petition." In P.N.Duda's case (supra),
it was held that :- "54. A conjoint perusal of the Act and rules makes it
clear that, so far as this Court is concerned, action for contempt may be taken
by the court on its own motion or on the motion of the Attorney General (or Solicitor
General) or of any other person with his consent in writing. There is no
difficulty where the Court or the Attorney General chooses to move in the
matter. But when this is not done and a private person desires that such action
should be taken, one of three courses is open to him. He may place the
information in his possession before the court and request the court to take
action (vide C. K. Daphtary v. O. P.

Gupta and Sarkar v. Misra); he may place the information before the Attorney
General and request him to take action; or he may place the information before
the Attorney General and request him to permit him to move to the court."
The direction issued and procedure laid down in Duda's case is applicable only
to cases that are initiated suo motu by the Court when some information is
placed before it for suo motu action for contempt of court.

A useful reference can also be made to some observations made in
J.R.Parashar, Advocate, and Others v. Prasant Bhushan, Advocate and Others
[(2001) 6 SCC 735]. In that case noticing the Rule 3 of the Rules to regulate
proceedings for contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 which like Section 15 of
the Act provides that the Court may take action in cases of criminal contempt
either (a) suo motu; or (b) on a petition made by Attorney-General or
Solicitor-General, or (c) on a petition made by any person and in the case of a
criminal contempt with consent in writing of the Attorney-General or the
Solicitor-General as also Rule 5 which provides that only petitions under Rules
3(b) and (c) shall be posted before the Court for preliminary hearing and for
orders as to issue of notice, it was observed that the matter could have been
listed before the Court by the Registry as a petition for admission only if the
Attorney-General or Solicitor-General had granted the consent. In that case, it
was noticed that the Attorney-General had specifically declined to deal with
the matter and no request had been made to the Solicitor-General to give his
consent.

The inference, therefore, is that the Registry should not have posted the
said petition before the Court for preliminary hearing. Dealing with taking of
suo motu cognizance in para 28 it was observed as under:- "Of course, this
Court could have taken suo motu cognizance had the petitioners prayed for it.

They had not. Even if they had, it is doubtful whether the Court would have
acted on the statements of the petitioners had the petitioners been candid
enough to have disclosed that the police had refused to take cognizance of their
complaint. In any event the power to act suo motu in matters which otherwise
require the Attorney-General to initiate proceedings or at least give his
consent must be exercised rarely.

Courts normally reserve this exercise to cases where it either derives
information from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records, or on
reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech or a document which
would speak for itself. Otherwise sub-section (1) of Section 15 might be
rendered otiose" The whole object of prescribing procedural mode of taking
cognizance in Section 15 is to safeguard the valuable time of the court from
being wasted by frivolous contempt petition. In J.R. Parashar's case (supra) it
was observed that underlying rational of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15
appears to be that when the court is not itself directly aware of the
contumacious conduct, and the actions are alleged to have taken place outside
its precincts, it is necessary to have the allegations screened by the prescribed
authorities so that Court is not troubled with the frivolous matters. To the
similar effect is the decision in S.R.Sarkar's case (supra).

In the light of the aforesaid, the procedure laid and directions issued in
Duda's case are required to be appreciated also keeping in view the additional
factor of the Chief Justice being the master of the roster. In State of
Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Others [ (1998) 1 SCC 1] it was held that it is
the prerogative of the Chief Justice of the High Court to distribute business
of the High Court both judicial and administrative. He alone has the right and
power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted; which
Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear as also to
which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches
shall do.

The directions in Duda's case when seen and appreciated in the light of what
we have noticed hereinbefore in respect of contempt action and the powers of
the Chief Justice, it would be clear that the same prescribe the procedure to
be followed by High Courts to ensure smooth working and streamlining of such
contempt actions which are intended to be taken up by the court suo motu on its
own motion. These directions have no effect of curtailing or denuding the power
of the High Court. It is also to be borne in mind that the frequent use of suo
motu power on the basis of information furnished in a contempt petition
otherwise incompetent under Section 15 of the Act may render the procedural
safeguards of Advocate-General's consent nugatory. We are of the view that the
directions given in Duda's case are legal and valid.

Now, the question is whether in these matters the High Court initiated
contempt action on its own motion or on motions made by the respondents. It is
not in dispute that the two contempt petitions (Contempt Petition No.12 and
Contempt Petition No.13 of 1996) were filed in the High Court against the
appellant under Section 15 of the Act for having committed contempt of court as
postulated under Section 2(c) of the Act for having made a public speech.
According to the petitions, the appellant scandalised the court or at least the
offending speech had the tendency to scandalise or lower the authority of the
Court. The contempt petitions were filed without obtaining the consent of the
Advocate-General. In one of the petitions consent had not even been sought for
and besides the prayer for holding the appellant guilty of contempt, further
prayers were also made for suitable inquiry being made in the allegations made
by the appellant in the speech and for issue of directions to him to appear
before Court and reveal the truth and for prosecuting him. The applicant before
the High Court, it seems clear from the averments made in the contempt petition
was in an opposite political camp. The petition was based on utterances made by
appellant in public meetings held on 21st October, 1996.

It is well settled that the requirement of obtaining consent in writing of
the Advocate-General for making motion by any person is mandatory. A motion
under Section 15 not in conformity with the requirements of that Section is not
maintainable. [State of Kerala v. M.S.Mani and Others [(2001) 8 SCC 82].

In Contempt Petition No.12 an application dated 22nd October, 1996 was
submitted to the Advocate-General along with proposed contempt petition stating
that the applicant wanted to file petition by 2nd December, 1996 and,
therefore, the permission may be granted before that date and further stating
that if no answer is received from the Advocate-General it would be presumed
that permission has been granted and the applicant will proceed with the
intended contempt proceedings. Such a course is not permissible under Section
15 of the Act. There is no question of any presumption. In fact, Contempt
Petition No.12 was filed on 2nd December, without the consent of the
Advocate-General. It further appears that the application seeking permission of
the Advocate-General was received by him on 26th November, 1996. It also
appears that the Advocate-General appeared before the Court on 3rd February,
1997 and stated that he can decide the question of consent within a reasonable
time. The impugned judgment holding appellant guilty of contempt and inflicting
simple imprisonment for a period of one week and fine of Rs.2000/- was passed
on 7th February, 1997.

A perusal of record including the notices issued to the appellant shows that
the Court had not taken suo motu action against the appellant.

In contempt petitions, there was no prayer for taking suo motu action for
contempt against the appellant. The specific objection taken that though suo
motu action could be taken under Section 15 of the Act on any information or
newspaper but not on the basis of those contempt petitions which were filed in
regular manner by private parties, was rejected by the High Court observing
that being Court of Record it can evolve its own procedure, which means that
the procedure should provide just and fair opportunity to the contemner to
defend effectively and that the contemner has not expressed any prejudice or
canvassed any grievance that he could not understand the charge involved in the
proceeding which he had been called upon to defend. It is, however, not in
dispute that the charge against the appellant was not framed.

In these matters, the question is not about compliance or non- compliance of
the principles of natural justice by granting adequate opportunity to the
appellant but is about compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 15
of the Act. As already noticed the procedure of Section 15 is required to be
followed even when petition is filed by a party under Article 215 of the
Constitution, though in these matters petitions filed were under Section 15 of
the Act. From the material on record, it is not possible to accept the
contention of the respondents that the Court had taken suo motu action. Of
course, the Court had the power and jurisdiction to initiate contempt
proceedings suo motu and for that purpose consent of the Advocate-General was
not necessary. At the same time, it is also to be borne in mind that the Courts
normally take suo motu action in rare cases. In the present case, it is evident
that the proceedings before the High Court were initiated by the respondents by
filing contempt petitions under Section 15. The petitions were vigorously
pursued and strenuously argued as private petitions. The same were never
treated as suo motu petitions. In absence of compliance of mandatory
requirement of Section 15, the petitions were not maintainable.

As a result of aforesaid view, it is unnecessary to examine in the present
case, the effect of non-compliance of the directions issued in Duda's case by
placing the informative papers before the Chief Justice of the High Court.

For the foregoing reasons we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the
appeals. Fine, if deposited by the appellant shall be refunded to him.

Before parting, it is necessary to direct framing of necessary rule or
practice direction by the High Courts in terms of Duda's case.

Accordingly, we direct Registrar-General to send a copy of this judgment to
the Registrar-Generals of the High Courts so that wherever rule and/or practice
direction on the line suggested in Duda's case has not been framed, the High
Courts may now frame the same at their earliest convenience.