In recent years the evidential role of moral intuitions has come under attack from several sources, including extreme utilitarians like Peter Singer and cognitive scientists skeptical of intuitions in general. This course will take a critical look at some of the highlights of the relevant literature, including traditional philosophic treatments of intuitions, cognitive scientists' empirical research on intuitions, and contemporary philosophers' attempts to bring the empirical data to bear on questions in moral epistemology or to question others' attempts.

Readings will include articles by some or all of the following: Sidgwick, Ross, Singer, Rawls, Unger, Haidt, J. Greene, Kamm, Berker, Kahane, Sinott-Armstrong, Wiegman, Nadelhofer, Allman and Woodward. The only formal written requirement of the course will be a term paper of about 20 pages, but there will be earlier opportunities for feedback on contributions to Blackboard's Discussion Board.