Meanwhile, here is just a brainstorming of my wishes for the next eventual iteration, whether or not they're realistic or possible.

1. choice of multiple art files, while still having art built-in to the single html file. (multiple art just wouldn't work if you scraped the html without scraping the art, but the default base64-encoded art would still work, despite being low print resolution). Choices of multiple art could be hardcoded and limited to "art1.png" thru "art9.png" in the same directory as the html file. The main purpose would be so people can print bills in multiple colors as different denominations.

2. If using my redone SVG solves the performance problem that came along with having a 4 MB SVG last time, then it would be preferable instead of encoding a PNG. (this also enables the possibility of using SVG+CSS so that the bill color can be set programmatically)

3. I think the bitcoin address and private key should be black. This is so it will be printed with the black toner/ink, rather than a mashup of color ink, which decreases readability.

4. the QR code as presently rendered looks great on screen but prints with major scaling artifacts (I printed with Chrome, issue could be browser specific). They are still readable, but the quality could be better. (If SVG+Javascript is used, then perhaps rendering the QR code by creating black squares would offer really good quality).

5. The 30-character minikey would probably be a better private key than a full 51-character code, simply for user convenience. Many of them will end up typing them.

6. Some sort of instructions on bitaddress.org for WEB VISITORS (css @screen), explaining to them that by printing the page, they are creating their very own bitcoin address and wallet.

7. The optional choice of some instructions for those receiving PRINTED NOTES (css @print), explaining to them that by receiving the note, they have just received bitcoins and/or a bitcoin wallet, and that they can print unlimited new wallets at bitaddress.org, and that they should be aware that any bitcoins on the note are good until first redeemed by anyone, and that if they didn't print the note themselves, they should promptly move their funds elsewhere just so they can be sure they can't disappear.

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

5. The 30-character minikey would probably be a better private key than a full 51-character code, simply for user convenience. Many of them will end up typing them.

Maybe printed in addition to the 51-char key would be good, but unless that minikey is accepted (e.g., can be imported into the BItcoin.org client), then it shouldn't exist in place of the 51-char key.

I think the only thing standing between bitcoind accepting the minikey is just simply that it hasn't been done. Devs have no objection to the 30-character minikey, just the 22 character one, for having less than 128 bit entropy, but may not consider it a priority unless presented as a polished pull.

I am ultimately looking for laypeople to use bitcoins as gift cards, and redeem them at merchants like gift cards. These are people who are not going to download bitcoind, wait to download the block chain, manually create a bitcoin.conf file, learn how to use the RPC interface, and import private keys through it. The fact that they're redeemable at MtGox and BlockChain.info makes them perfectly good today.

Ideally, I want them to be able to buy bitcoins in person like gift cards and redeem them on Silk Road just like redeeming an iTunes gift card (not because I like or condone drugs, but because it's possibly easier to understand the simplicity I'm seeking by picturing people who have fried their own brains successfully managing it without a need or an ability to understand how it works).

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

I just about have that whole SVG CSS-ified so the elements can be addressed by class and manipulated in script! (For customizing colors of course)

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

That's really very nice. Great stuff. And not so big as before either.

I really like the purple but the green one looks more grayish on my screen.I'm sure now it would be easy to have a few color tiles to choose color, or even a #hex field for total custom values.

I also tried gzip on it to see how it may compress when supported by browsers and it drops down to 67K. Now if there were some JS compression code that could do that it would be pretty sweet and small.

If you view source on the page, you'll find that adding other color palettes and changing the colors is relatively easy.

Possibly others can do a better job of picking colors than I can, especially for example those in Europe who want their notes' color scheme to resemble the series of Euro notes. Maybe when I get a moment I'll make it into a color picker so you can experiment and post your results.

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

Then create a new key on the tab. Keep the private key safe.Then run:oclvanitygen.exe -P PUBLICKEYFROMABOVE 1prefix

This with after some time return a private key.If you then put this private key and the one you originally generated into the bitaddress.org page it will thengenerate the actual private key in WIF and confirm that the address is the one that starts with the prefix you want.

In a vanity pool someone else would run the oclvanitygen for you.

Ok, I tried it. I understand the concept and read some of the related threads.

My thoughts are that it should use the WIF private key in all cases. I had to open bitaddress in another browser tab to convert the WIF from vanitygen to HEX for the vanity tab. Is there a reason we shouldn't use just WIF? Or alternatively we could extract the private key detection used in the wallet details tab so any private key format could be used.

I like the descriptions you have for each area.

Regarding the UI we could possibly create two parts inside that tab. So it's clear there is Part/Step 1 and Part/Step 2. We can use the expand collapse UI like the FAQs on the bulk wallet tab.

My thoughts are that it should use the WIF private key in all cases. I had to open bitaddress in another browser tab to convert the WIF from vanitygen to HEX for the vanity tab. Is there a reason we shouldn't use just WIF? Or alternatively we could extract the private key detection used in the wallet details tab so any private key format could be used.

I was trying to avoid using WIF for the "part-private-keys" and "part-public-keys" as then they look different from the key you have to import into the wallet. Although once you get your head round it all the fact that there are 3 private and 3 public keys washing around in the process is obvious, for the casual one off user it could get confusing. By making the keys look different they are less likely to try to import the wrong private key into the Wallet and then be disappointed!

I can verify that the BitAddress.org website has been updated and returns the same HTML from the commit with the description v1.9 (770d933029b8bbb56539d866db6b8fa37f262102) in github: - https://github.com/pointbiz/bitaddress.org

To confirm this I first check the sha1sum hash of the html returned by a request to http://bitaddress.org:

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.

upon clicking the Print button, if the user has not generated new addresses since the last time he clicked it, it should tell him: "For security, new addresses will be generated before printing. Continue?" (OK=regenerate and print, Cancel = do nothing).

This will help avert a potential disaster if a user unknowingly prints a large batch more than once and then distributes the duplicate batches.

I realize it's of little use if the user chooses Print from his browser rather than the Print button in the page, but it's far better than nothing, and I think most users will use a Print button provided to them anyway when available, knowing it gives them the overall best chance of printing a print-friendly version. The advanced user also maintains the option to reprint a batch if needed: he can just use the browser's Print function.

Companies claiming they got hacked and lost your coins sounds like fraud so perfect it could be called fashionable. I never believe them. If I ever experience the misfortune of a real intrusion, I declare I have been honest about the way I have managed the keys in Casascius Coins. I maintain no ability to recover or reproduce the keys, not even under limitless duress or total intrusion. Remember that trusting strangers with your coins without any recourse is, as a matter of principle, not a best practice. Don't keep coins online. Use paper wallets instead.