Thursday, June 15, 2017

Ausmus on analytics (intro): “Analytics are ubiquitous. I think the dangerous mistake people make — some member of the media make — is believing that they can’t be flawed, because they’re based on numbers. That’s absolutely false. Numbers do not always tell us the whole story. And there are certain things in baseball, because it’s played by humans, that numbers will never be able to put a value on.”

On leverage and closer mentality: “A lot of people in the analytics world think you should bring in your best pitcher in the biggest point of the game. Well, excuse my French, but who the (bleep) knows when the biggest point in the game is until the game is over? You don’t know. It may be the sixth. It may be the ninth. The problem is, if it’s the sixth and you use your closer, and all of a sudden you have a one-run lead in the ninth, who is going to close? You don’t have that guy anymore, because you burned him.

“Anyone who says you have to bring your closer in early, or in the biggest point in the game, has a crystal ball. That argument goes out the window for me. I don’t mind second-guessing, but second-guessing the biggest point of the game after the game? It’s easy to tell then. It’s not easy to tell in the seventh inning.

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Aureus didn't play baseball for Dartmouth. He signed with the Yankees out of HS and was playing in the minors while matriculating. So if they lowered their standards, it wasn't to get a baseball player.

Alas, these days, one Aureus only covers (at best!) one minimum salary and not even one Adam Rosales.

One aureus, issued in 42 BC by Marcus Junius Brutus, the assassin of Gaius Julius Caesar, had a price realized of $661,250.[1] (There is an example of this coin on permanent display at the British Museum in London.) The second aureus, issued by the emperor Alexander Severus (r. 222–235), has a picture of the Colosseum on the reverse, and had a price realized of $920,000.[2]

I don't get the impression he's as stupid as y'all are making him out to be.

1. Do numbers tell the whole story? No. Do some people in the media behave as if they do? Yes.

2. Do we know in the 7th inning what the biggest point in the game is? No. I think his point here is that if the biggest point was the 7th inning but he didn't use his closer he'd be ripped for it, but if it turns out the biggest point was the 9th but he already used his closer in the 7th because at the time that appeared to be the biggest point he'd be ripped for that, too. His point is that second-guessing because of information not known until after the game is both easy and unfair.

3. Does his best reliever have a better chance of closing out a game than his second-best reliever? Generally, yes, although when we're talking specifically about relative quality of relievers with the Tigers it should be noted that in the last decade or so there have been no sure things.

4. Is closing different, psychologically? For many people, yes. His example of walking across a table, vs. walking across a table 1000 feet in the air, I think is a good analogy. It's still the same table, and if you can convince your mind to ignore everything that isn't the table you'll do fine. But that kind of self-convincing isn't generally easy, and not everyone can do it, and even if they go into it thinking they can shut that stuff out they might find with the first gust of wind that they can't.

5. Is the value gained from analytics something that proves out in the long haul, even if it might not work in an individual decision? Yeah.

Ausmus' Tigers last night benefited from the Rays refusing to use their fully rested closer in a tie game on the road in the 9th against the top of the order.

I don't think that Ausmus and others managers are totally wrong about the mental aspects of relieving, but I'd love to hear them explain how such a situation as I just described does not require as much mental toughness as an easier situation.

4. Is closing different, psychologically? For many people, yes. His example of walking across a table, vs. walking across a table 1000 feet in the air, I think is a good analogy.

Eh, it's OK. But the scale is all wrong. To steal from someone in that comment section, it's more like walking across a table 1000 feet in the air versus walking across a table 800 feet in the air. Protecting a 1-run league in the big leagues in the 8th inning ain't no picnic.

2. Do we know in the 7th inning what the biggest point in the game is? No.

If you've got men on base with a one-run lead, there can't really be a more important situation. The game can't get any closer.

4. Is closing different, psychologically? For many people, yes.

For very few people. The number of elite set-up men who haven't been able to transition to closer is very small.

Eh, it's OK. But the scale is all wrong. To steal from someone in that comment section, it's more like walking across a table 1000 feet in the air versus walking across a table 800 feet in the air. Protecting a 1-run league in the big leagues in the 8th inning ain't no picnic.

Exactly. If you can't handle pressure you don't make it as a big-leaguer to start with.

I don't think this is right. Men on base with a one-run lead is more important in the 9th than it is in the 8th, which itself is more important than it is in the 7th. Etc...

OK, but if you blow the lead in the 7th, that 9th inning situation may never come. You've got a 100% chance of using your best pitcher in a high-leverage situation vs. a significantly less than 100% chance of using him in a slightly higher leverage situation later.

Also, as long as your opponent follows traditional RP usage, there's a huge advantage to keeping the lead. If you keep that 1-run lead in the 7th, you're likely not to have to face the other teams's 3 best RPs in the 8th and 9th, so your odds of scoring more go way up.

So I guess this has led to having a lock down closer to protect the ninth, another to protect the eighth, another to protect the seventh, another to protect the sixth, and 4 others to pitch when nothing needs protecting.

#16: It's really just the four others part that bugs me. Those guys suck, and the games they pitch in are already either lost or won. You should be able to get by with just one or two of them. It's not like you could really tell if they lost effectiveness due to overuse, since they aren't effective as it is. When you break one, just get another.

#16: It's really just the four others part that bugs me. Those guys suck, and the games they pitch in are already either lost or won. You should be able to get by with just one or two of them. It's not like you could really tell if they lost effectiveness due to overuse, since they aren't effective as it is. When you break one, just get another.

I totally agree. Especially with teams like the Braves and others having their AAA so close you could conceivably rotate guys fairly regularly at the back of the pen, using options, and save that 13th pitching spot for an extra position guy. I know there is that 10 day rule, excepting injury, but you could rotate 3 of them. The game is evolving two ways....burning so many more pitchers per game, leading to almost over-strategy, and due to the limited bench not having as many in-game options for batting strategy, also leading to more pitchers pinch hitting.

If you've got men on base with a one-run lead, there can't really be a more important situation. The game can't get any closer.

This is true in DMB. In a world where you can neither get a guy ready in 10 seconds nor warm up pitchers without using them an infinite number of times, you are stuck with mostly deciding how to handle an inning before it starts. And if those guys were on base when the inning started, the other side is cheating.

This is true in DMB. In a world where you can neither get a guy ready in 10 seconds nor warm up pitchers without using them an infinite number of times, you are stuck with mostly deciding how to handle an inning before it starts. And if those guys were on base when the inning started, the other side is cheating.

You're right that it may not always be possible, but that's a different issue.

If you have your starter pitching with a 2-1 lead going into the 7th (or a reliever who's thrown an inning+), it probably makes sense to have a reliever warming at the beginning of the inning. All I'm saying is that guy should be probably be your best RP, not some lesser arm.

If the starter has a clean 7th, you can always have your closer start the 8th if the game is still 2-1. And, heaven forbid, he could even pitch 2 innings if he's throwing efficiently.

All I'm saying is that guy should be probably be your best RP, not some lesser arm.

I'm with you there. And as you get into the 6th/7th of a close game, you can skip some of the lesser guys and go straight to the meat. At least in my mind, this leads you down the road of multi-inning appearances and that's where MLB managers start to stain their undies. If I use my 2 best guys for 10 or 11 outs to win today, at least one of them is out tomorrow - maybe both. The case for "modern" usage is that you can use guys 2 or 3 days in a row (should you happen to have a series of really close games) if they only go 1 inning. I don't buy that case really, I'd like to see good RP's make 40 2-inning appearances than 60 1-inning stints, but a manager will never get fired for doing what everybody else is doing.

Yeah, modern RP usage is designed to maximize effectiveness and availability. And it works just about as close to perfectly as you could hope or expect. It's really easy to argue against the usage pattern if you ignore the obvious advantages. It might also be easy to argue against the usage pattern even if you consider the advantages, but that's generally not what people do.

As a fairly interested Tiger fan, this interview makes me concerned. Ausmus doesn't seem to understand that the system itself has caused relief pitchers to view the 9th inning as a special place. The 27th out is only harder to get because the teams and the managers and the players believe it is. The rules are exactly the same. The stakes may be higher, but often they are not. And, as others have pointed out, these pitchers are all professional athletes. They are paid to perform at a high level. I find it very difficult to believe that the 7th inning guy is out on the mound thinking "I can cruise here, because if I allow a run, no big deal, it's not the ninth inning." Bullshit. They all want to make perfect pitches and earn their adulation and money.

Hey, another way to look at this bullpen usage issue is to go back to the archive. I can remember watching baseball teams who used their bullpens much differently. I can remember watching baseball in the 1970s when some teams had only five guys in the pen. One of them was a mopup man, and one was a lefty specialist. The others shared the load. And I have to tell you, those pitchers didn't look like they were shitting their pants in tight games. Why? Because baseball was set up for the starters to carry most of the load. The relievers knew they were (mostly) the backend of the roster, the most anonymous, least important cogs in the machine. As bullpen usage increased, those roles became more "stressful" and at some point (about the mid-1980s) it became universally assumed that getting the last three outs was the toughest thing to do in baseball. That's hogwash.

Also, let's remember that even the great ones, like Mariano Rivera, pitched nearly 60 percent of their innings with at least a two-run lead and only needing to preserve it for three outs. Call that a tough job if you'd like, but that doesn't make it true.

I can buy into the belief that the 9th is harder than any other inning. But Ausmus acts like the 9th is WAAAY different than the 8th, and that only a few special snowflake closers can handle the 9th inning environment. I'd guess that a minimum of 60% of MLB RP can handle the 9th. There are some guys who can't, but they would mostly be younger guys.

One of the things that gets lost is that managers do, in fact, have to manage players - just like managers everywhere have to manage their employees.

We (the smart people on the intertubes) know that lineup construction doesn't matter; but that's only true if the players don't care where they hit, and many of them care very much. We know that pitching is pitching; but holy crap look at KRod (Ausmus's "closer" this year) by leverage - a 1.35 OPS in high leverage situations, 0.510 in low leverage.

Now I'm not entirely defending Ausmus here, but at least some of what he says is true - analytics do a great job of telling you what did happen, but it's a manager's job to try to control what will happen.

Not each, talking about using your two best guys to get 3-4 innings after the starter.

And what evidence do you have that would suggest relievers won't lose effectiveness with this kind of usage? Sure, Goose and Sutter and Fingers, the truly great relievers, rolled up higher innings total in fewer games. On the other hand, their run prevention totals aren't as good as the best relievers today.

It seems to me that the one-inning model works pretty damn well at run prevention, even if it's not necessarily satisfying from a fan's perspective.

One of the things that gets lost is that managers do, in fact, have to manage players - just like managers everywhere have to manage their employees.

Right, and isn't it part of managing to either convince players to let go of irrational beliefs, or at least to ignore players' irrational beliefs to the extent that they would take away from optimizing decision-making?

We know that pitching is pitching; but holy crap look at KRod (Ausmus's "closer" this year) by leverage - a 1.35 OPS in high leverage situations, 0.510 in low leverage.

Now I'm not entirely defending Ausmus here, but at least some of what he says is true - analytics do a great job of telling you what did happen, but it's a manager's job to try to control what will happen.

It doesn't seem like you are defending Ausmus. The KRod split, for whatever it's worth, actually damns Ausmus, because K-Rod was his pick to not get worse in high leverage situations.

One of the things that gets lost is that managers do, in fact, have to manage players - just like managers everywhere have to manage their employees.

We (the smart people on the intertubes) know that lineup construction doesn't matter; but that's only true if the players don't care where they hit, and many of them care very much. We know that pitching is pitching; but holy crap look at KRod (Ausmus's "closer" this year) by leverage - a 1.35 OPS in high leverage situations, 0.510 in low leverage.

Now I'm not entirely defending Ausmus here, but at least some of what he says is true - analytics do a great job of telling you what did happen, but it's a manager's job to try to control what will happen.

Matheny talked about that last year or the year before, when it came to getting easy saves for his closer, instead of using a lesser pitcher, because the closer wants the save and it's important to them, so for all the times the guy comes in with a one run lead, there is nothing wrong with rewarding him with a 3 run save.

He also talked about that he still has to balance the team needs with the individual needs, and if he feels the 8th or 7th inning is more important, he'll bring the guy in...at least he said he would, he really hasn't actually done that too often.

Right, and isn't it part of managing to either convince players to let go of irrational beliefs, or at least to ignore players' irrational beliefs to the extent that they would take away from optimizing decision-making?

No, it's the manager's job to get the most he can out of his players/employees. If your good reliever suddenly swallows his tongue every time he enters a close game in the 9th, you're not a good manager if you keep putting him in there and saying "Get over it". (WARNING: I'm going to defend Dusty Baker)If your veteran 2B is so insecure about his place in the batting order that he tries to hijack a press conference to embarrass a reporter, you keep the 2B happy.

It doesn't seem like you are defending Ausmus. The KRod split, for whatever it's worth, actually damns Ausmus, because K-Rod was his pick to not get worse in high leverage situations.

The KRod splits were used as an illustration of someone who swallows his tongue when put in a tight situation.

Matheny talked about that last year or the year before, when it came to getting easy saves for his closer, instead of using a lesser pitcher, because the closer wants the save and it's important to them, so for all the times the guy comes in with a one run lead, there is nothing wrong with rewarding him with a 3 run save.

If I were a manager and wanted to give the appearance of buying into the Closer mystique, I'd rotate some of those 2-run and 3-run saves among my top 2 or 3 setup guys to (a) keep them happy too and (b) to provide narrative of testing their mettle in the crucible of the heroic ninth inning for should anything happen to my Closer, then I can seamlessly turn to other pitchers with Closer Experience for the good of the team.

In 1979, Gossage had just 58 IP at a 156 ERA+ and Davis 85 IP at a 143 ERA+.

Now in 1980 we're really talking as Gossage had 99 IP with a 173 and Davis had 131 with a 133. So that's 230 innings with (give or take) a 150 ERA+.

Last year the O's had

Britton 67 827 ERA+
Brach 79 216
Givens 75 142

So that's 221 innings with an ERA+ I don't want to contemplate but it's a lot higher than 150.

The White Sox had Jennings, Robertson (not even a good season) and Jones combine for 193 innings of an ERA+ better than 160.

The Indians had Allen, Shaw and Otero combine for 205 innings of 210 ERA+. Then they added Andrew Miller.

The Dodgers has 223 innings from Baez, Blanton and Jensen for an ERA+ around 165.

The Brewers had 3 guys combine for 215 innings around 155.

The Mets got 233 innings around 162.

The Cards got 209 of 160+.

The Yanks traded off Miller and Chapman but got 150 innings of about 210 ERA+ out of the big 3.

The Rangers had 5 guys combine for 297 innings of 170-175.

So we've gone from Davis-Gossage being rare to 9 teams matching or exceeding, sometimes vastly exceeding, that performance.

Maybe (doubtful) the roster crunch created by short relief isn't worth it but thee is absolutely no question that using 3 guys, one inning at time, about 60 times a year is a much more effective strategy for relief pitchers than what was employed in the 70s and 80s. Even the crappy Tigers managed to get 187 innings of 135 ERA+ which is not better than the 79-80 Yanks but I bet was better than most other teams of that era.

To be fair, the 79 Cubs got 204 innings around 170 out of Sutter and Tidrow.

Aureus didn't play baseball for Dartmouth. He signed with the Yankees out of HS and was playing in the minors while matriculating. So if they lowered their standards, it wasn't to get a baseball player.

FWIW, this is wrong in spirit, though technically correct. Ausmus was a recruited baseball player who then got signed away from his commitment. He came to Dartmouth anyways but afiak while at Dartmouth acted sort of like a hybrid of an athlete and a regular student, joining a frat that wasn't known as the baseball frat. I don't know if he actually graduated. He was very well liked and entertained folks at basketball games by putting on dunk demonstrations at halftime. He was a hell of an athlete.

Source: I know one of Ausmus's fraternity brothers from college.

Re lower standards: its complicated and has evolved over the years. In practice the way it works for Ivy sports these days is that the coaches de facto have a certain amount of currency to spend to bring in underqualified people, and the amount of that currency varies by sport and school. For example, Dartmouth or Cornell might let their hockey coaches bring in real mouth-breathers; Princeton might make the most allowances for basketball, etc. The dumbest recruits are remarkably unqualified absent sports; the smartest ones would (and basically did) meet standards for the main student body.

I've heard from a college acquaintance that was drafted into the NFL that for Ivy guys who go pro, there's enormous social pressure to act 'dumb' because that's the culture of the locker room and if you don't play by those rules you'll get ostracized. He said he had to ham it up a bit to get folks to stop calling him "Ivybitch" or something like that.

45. . . . . . . . . . . Posted: June 17, 2017 at 09:28 AM (#5478021)
Aureus didn't play baseball for Dartmouth. He signed with the Yankees out of HS and was playing in the minors while matriculating. So if they lowered their standards, it wasn't to get a baseball player.

FWIW, this is wrong in spirit, though technically correct. Ausmus was a recruited baseball player who then got signed away from his commitment. He came to Dartmouth anyways but afiak while at Dartmouth acted sort of like a hybrid of an athlete and a regular student, joining a frat that wasn't known as the baseball frat. I don't know if he actually graduated. He was very well liked and entertained folks at basketball games by putting on dunk demonstrations at halftime. He was a hell of an athlete.

- He graduated in 1991 with an A.B. in Government, and was a member of Chi Gamma Epsilon fraternity and the Sphinx Senior Society. While at Dartmouth, the lowest grade he received was a B

cmon, the guy got into an ivy league school without a sports scholarship and did not major in, uh, mouth breathing

and without being an athlete or being rich, he is reported to have "gotten more ass than a toilet seat"
which
trust me on this

i believe

and yes he is STILL absolutely teh HOTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT

that all said,
there are not real too many relievers who can throw more than 1 - maybe 2 innings
i am beyond tired of all the people who insist that BITGOD all the starters threw over 250 innings every year with hundreds of pitches every start like nolan ryan or luis tiant and pitched without getting hurt for 20 years straight

if you are playing OOTP or some other kind of game with stat cards, well, projections are not reality. and you don't have the FO telling you that player X is GOING TO close whether you like it or not because that is what they got him to do

and you got no idea how tired the guys are. and you got no idea whether or not if you burn top reliever X at a "crucial" spot whether all the rest of the relievers are gonna shut it down from then on

i am not defending bradley awesomeness because of his looks. and i AM smart enough to know if a manager has any idea of how to manage a bullpen. and in reality NONE of us knows what the FO's stat geeks have instructed tha manager to do with regard to bullpen use.