Tuesday, 3 July 2012

COMMENTARY: The Spanish National Football Team’s Place in History

The
defeat of Italy by Spain in the finals of the recently concluded European
Championships tournament in Kiev has, if any doubts existed, confirmed the
current Spanish national football team as one of the greatest football squads
in history.

They
are the first team in the modern history of the sport to win consecutively,
three major tournaments; namely the 2008 Euros, the 2010 World Cup and now the
2012 Euros.

No
team before, not even the formidable West German machine of the early to middle
1970s, had ever accomplished the stunning feat of securing back-to-back
European Championship trophies, or were able to have won a final in such an
emphatic manner. The 4-0 trouncing of the Azzurri is the widest ever margin of
any final match.

The
appellation of greatness is the preserve of but a few national sides. In
Europe, the Dutch side of the early 1970s, purveyors of the system known as Totaalvoetball, immediately springs to
mind, as indeed do their West Germancontemporaries.

But
until the emergence of this particular Spanish side with its peculiar brand of
football, for many the apotheosis of footballing brilliance was attained by the
Brazilian World Cup-winning side of 1970.

That
side, emblematic of the romantic notions assigned to the Brazilian style which
combined attacking flair with a capacity for improvisation, represented the
culmination of a golden age of international dominance stretching back to their
World Cup triumphs in Sweden in 1958 and in Chile in 1962.

Although
acknowledged as a bastion of excellence in the sport, the Spaniards for decades
represented an exemplary case study in perennial underachievement at
international level.

It
was the enigma of Spanish football that after the European Nations Cup win of
1964, which followed the European Champions Cup dominance of the legendary Real
Madrid clubside of the 1950s and early 1960s, no further international honours
followed.

While
La Liga continued to be an esteemed football league producing a successive pool
of very capable players and even exceptional ones such as the strikers, Emilio
Butragueno and Raul Gonzalez; and even while Real Madrid and Barcelona remained
perennial powerhouses within the sphere of European football, success
continually eluded a national side which as hosts endured the embarrassment of
a futile campaign for the 1982 World Cup.

To
whom or what circumstances can this ascendancy to apparent dominance be
assigned? To answer this, a story of migration along with the cross-pollination
of footballing philosophy and culture requires telling.

The
roots of the methodologies employed by the Spanish national side and its style
of play lie interestingly in the aforementioned Totaalvoetball, the brain child of Dutch coach Rinus Michels who
led Ajax Amsterdam to European Champions Cup victories in 1971, 1972 and
1973.

It
is a tactical theory which is guided by the premise of all outfield players
being able to assume the role of any other player. It was a style of play which
Michels, for a time also the national manager, used to great effect at the
World Cup finals in 1974. That team, influenced by the brilliant skills and
technique of Johan Cruyff, of course, lost the final to West Germany.

Cruyff
transferred to FC Barcelona in the middle 1970s where during his lengthy
association with the club, both as a player and later as a manager, he remained
a proponent-in-chief of the philosophy of Totaalvoetball,
which Michels had brought to the Catalan side.

The
Dutch connection with Barcelona, which continued over the years through the
tenures of Cruyff, Louis Van Gaal and Frank Rijkaard, ensured the enduring
influence of the style; the tenets of which were inculcated by Josep ‘Pep’
Guardiola whose imposition of the Spanish-derivative labelled Tiki-Taka has brought the club an
astounding level of success.

History
provides much compelling evidence that the successes of several of the great
national teams have been predicated on the acquiring of key manpower of a
dominant clubside along with an adaptation of the playing systems guiding such
clubs.

This
was true of the West German national team which had a ‘spine’ of Bayern Munich
players consisting of goalkeeper Sepp Maier, defender Franz Beckenbauer and
striker Gerd Muller, and which played the sweeper
system at the heart of which, as at club level, was the sweeper himself
Beckenbauer.

It is
certainly borne out by the Dutch side which was composed of Ajax players like Johan
Neeskens and Cruyff alongside a contingent of Feyernood players who operated
under the premise of Totaalvoetball.

The
Spanish national side has followed this path. It is composed of many players
from FC Barcelona, from which it has also appropriated the methods of Tiki-Taka; the underpinning factor in
their recent monumental successes.

This
evolved version of Totaalvoetball retains a strict adherence to the rigours of
team effort and the physical demands involved in the interchanging roles of
players who have to be constantly aware of the use of space.

At
a fundamental level it focuses on ball possession; close and sustained
possession along with precision passing which ensures their domination on the
field of play. The possession and passing provides the basis of both defensive
as well as offensive capabilities.

It
can be used to stifle and frustrate the opposition, as part of the process of
preserving a score advantage, but at the same time it can be used to create
openings for attacks.

The
style of play can be misleadingly referred to as being ‘defensive’ or as
‘counter-attacking’. Its proselytisers prefer the term ‘pro-active’. The
constant possession of the ball is somewhat analogous to the effect of a
bullfighter on his prey; luring the opposition into a state of despondency or
desperation before the sword is administered. It allows them to slow down a
game or, quick as a flash, to transform the activity into an attack from any
part of the field.

The
sense of team effort is palpable. Composed of many gifted individuals, none
stands out to a great degree from his teammates. The sum of the individual’s
skill is sublimated to the overall machinery of collective effort.

Deprived
of the services of David Villa, and wary of the suspect marksmanship of
Fernando Torres, it meant that the team was able to score goals and win without
the services, for long stretches, of a recognised striker.

In
keeping with the spirit of totaalvoetball
and its disavowal of fixed positions and the interchangeability of players,
midfielders and defenders are capable of stepping into the relevant attacking
positions to score goals as was demonstrated by the goals which were contrived
against the Italians.

This
is as distinctive a system as has ever been invented and perfected in the sport
of football, but it has a history extending further back in time than Michels’
exposition.

For
Michels was himself influenced by tactics developed in Hungary which were
utilised by that nation’s groundbreaking team of the 1950s and an even deeper
link posits the elemental origins of Tiki-Taka and Totaalvoetball to the Austrian
‘Wunderteam’ of the 1930s.

Whether
it is in essence an ‘unbeatable’ system is a contentious matter. The Catenaccio system which emphasised a
defensive strategy aimed at stifling attacking play and goal scoring
opportunities was successfully applied by a number of Italian sides in the 1960s.

But
football is a creative sport capable of tactical innovations and developing
counteractive formats of play. It was Totaalvoetball
which definitively unlocked the ‘door bolt’ of Catenaccio in the 1972 European Cup final when Ajax defeated Inter
Milan.

It remains to be seen whether a countervailing system can be formulated in
order to disrupt the Spanish style of play and be capable of consistently
overcoming Tiki-Taka.

It
is argued, with much logic, that teams cannot adopt the system overnight
because most of the Spanish players have had its nuanced techniques drummed into them from youth
level, so on a long-term basis, the possibility exists that other countries may
decide to adapt the system into their youth development programmes.

For
many, the romance of the Brazilian style of play, epitomised by the grace and
the intuitive brilliance of the 1970 side, will remain the definitive rendition
of how the game of football should be played and won. But there are of course
many difficulties in comparing teams from different time periods.

If
that Brazilian side played the ‘Beautiful Game’ beautifully, the contemporary
Spanish team play a pragmatic game replete with its own aesthetically pleasing
features which see the merging of a high level of physical fitness with spatial
ability and technical adroitness.

History,
while acknowledging the part played by aesthetics in assessing greatness, will
ultimately judge them on their record. And what a record it is, and what a
record it threatens to become if they can retain the World Cup due to be held
in Brazil in two years time.

Jersey Boy

Dick Tiger

About Me

Adeyinka Makinde trained for the law as a barrister. He lectures in criminal law and public law at a university in London, and has an academic research interest in intelligence & security matters. He is a contributor to a number of websites for which he has written essays and commentaries on international relations, politics and military history. He has served as a programme consultant and provided expert commentary for BBC World Service Radio, China Radio International and the Voice of Russia. He is the author of Dick Tiger: The Life and Times of a Boxing Immortal (2005) and Jersey Boy: The Life and Mob Slaying of Frankie DePaula (2010).