Our conclusion that an act committed in
a "continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct" can create
different risks to different victims is consistent with the analysis in State
v. Rettmann, 218 Or App 179, 178 P3d 333 (2008). We concluded in Rettmann
that two offenses, attempted aggravated murder and assault, could not be
sentenced consecutively when they were committed by a single act against a
single victim. The issue in Rettmann under ORS 137.123(5)(b) involved
different statutory text than the statutory wording relevant to this case--whether
the attempted aggravated murder "caused or created a risk of causing
greater or qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to the victim"
than the assault offense. We determined that a single act against a victim
created only one set of risks:

"Where two offenses are predicated on the same act,
logic will not support the conclusion that one offense caused or created a risk
of causing some harm that the other offense did not. It follows that, if an
act that is motivated by an intent to kill creates a risk of causing a
particular harm, the same act cannot be said to create a risk of causing a
different harm merely because the act can also be viewed as constituting an
assault."

Defendant also asks us for the first
time on appeal to review as "plain error" the trial court's failure
to submit to the jury the factual issues necessary to determine whether a
consecutive sentence was appropriate, as required by the Sixth Amendment. State
v. Ice, 343 Or 248, 170 P3d 1049 (2007), cert granted, __ US __, 128
S Ct 1657, (2008). In this case, we conclude that there was no plain error
because the jury's verdicts necessarily established the factual predicate of
different risks of harm to different victims and thus authorized consecutive
sentences under ORS 137.123(5)(b), without the need for any further
factfinding. State v. Hagberg, 345 Or 161, 169-70, 190 P3d 1209 (2008)
(facts implicit in a jury's verdicts can support the imposition of consecutive
sentences under ORS 137.123); see also Or Const Art I, § 44(1)(b)
("No law shall limit a court's authority to sentence a criminal defendant
consecutively for crimes against different victims."). We accordingly
decline defendant's invitation.

Affirmed.

1.ORS 131.007
defines "victim" for purposes of ORS chapter 137 and other listed
laws to mean "the person or persons who have suffered financial, social,
psychological or physical harm as a result of a crime * * *." The
"risk of * * * harm to a different victim" under ORS 137.123(5)(b)
could include any risk of financial, social, psychological or physical harm.