The pictures are OK, there are some similarities between Su-27 flanker family (incl Su-30 and others) and MiG-29, but MiG-29 has some different shape. I noticed the missing "hump" in the first picture. Anyway what we can appreciate is that some members just dont appreciate the pictures but they also point out their doubts and corrections if needed, and this is what is required in forum. Anyway thank you for keeping my brain active with the nice pictures and then to write my doubts about the plane. Seems no one really noticed that its not MiG-29 ha ha

The biggest difference is the airframe! The Mig 29K has the newer M/M2 airfraime, which can house the newer R33MK engine, a fully integrated refuelling probe, fully integrated EW, or has 2 additional hardpoints and bigger fuel tanks, while the UPG mainly added these to the older airframe as external extentions. Other than that, both will offer similar capabilities, like similar weapons, EWS, radar, IRST, HMS..., so remain similar from a technical point of view, while the performance will be different to certain extend.

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Live! IAF plane on routine sortie crashes near Jamnagar,
12:21 PM IAF plane on routine sortie crashes near Jamnagar, pilot safe: An Indian Air Force plane crashes in Jamnagar, Gujarat. The mishap is believed to have occurred at Ravalpar, which is about 25 km from Jamnagar and was on a routine sortie from the Jamnagar air base. The pilot is safe. The plane is believed to be a MiG-29 (popularly called Flying Coffins or Widow Makers for the number of accidents), but no confirmations as yet

The USA has bought 14 of the Mig 29s they are not really anything to brag about. In combat their record is pretty poor.

So in general, lessons learned from this first out-of-country operation of a Russian front line fighter were:

1. The MiG-29 had intensive problems in operation and maintenance since its induction due to premature failure of engines, components, and systems. 74% of the engines failed within five years, were out of supply pipeline for three years, and reduced aircraft availability by 15, to 20%. This led to a decision to restrict flying efforts and therefore compromised operational and training commitments.

2. There were significant shortfalls in the performance of the MiG-29 fleet resulting in operational and training inadequacies. The shortfall ranged from 20 to 65% in respect to combat aircraft availability and 58 to 84% in trainers between 1987 - 1991.

3. There was a mismatch between induction of the aircraft (1987) and the establishment of its repair facilities (end of 1994). Until that time engines had to be continually sent to manufacturers abroad at great monetary cost, reduction of one-half total life, and a significant stretch of schedule.

4. Non-availability of critical radar components and spares resulted in the grounding of significant numbers of aircraft. Five aircraft were out of action for over six months while two were in the hanger for over two years. Unserviceability of computers and the inability to fix them cost excessive amounts of money to rectify.

5. The pilot debrief Ground Data Processing Unit, imported at high cost, was left lying around unserviceable and unused since its reception in August 1990.

6. The lack of nose wheel mud guards had to be solved by importing upgrade kits and expensive local re-design after material deficiencies could not be overcome.

MiG.-29 Kill Ratio_ 10:28 Like the crashs they blame the losses on the pilots. Neither Russia or India is going to just say we make lousy planes,, even though Russia civil aviations record is just as bad.

The USA has bought 14 of the Mig 29s they are not really anything to brag about. In combat their record is pretty poor.

So in general, lessons learned from this first out-of-country operation of a Russian front line fighter were:

1. The MiG-29 had intensive problems in operation and maintenance since its induction due to premature failure of engines, components, and systems. 74% of the engines failed within five years, were out of supply pipeline for three years, and reduced aircraft availability by 15, to 20%. This led to a decision to restrict flying efforts and therefore compromised operational and training commitments.

2. There were significant shortfalls in the performance of the MiG-29 fleet resulting in operational and training inadequacies. The shortfall ranged from 20 to 65% in respect to combat aircraft availability and 58 to 84% in trainers between 1987 - 1991.

3. There was a mismatch between induction of the aircraft (1987) and the establishment of its repair facilities (end of 1994). Until that time engines had to be continually sent to manufacturers abroad at great monetary cost, reduction of one-half total life, and a significant stretch of schedule.

4. Non-availability of critical radar components and spares resulted in the grounding of significant numbers of aircraft. Five aircraft were out of action for over six months while two were in the hanger for over two years. Unserviceability of computers and the inability to fix them cost excessive amounts of money to rectify.

5. The pilot debrief Ground Data Processing Unit, imported at high cost, was left lying around unserviceable and unused since its reception in August 1990.

6. The lack of nose wheel mud guards had to be solved by importing upgrade kits and expensive local re-design after material deficiencies could not be overcome.

MiG.-29 Kill Ratio_ 10:28 Like the crashs they blame the losses on the pilots. Neither Russia or India is going to just say we make lousy planes,, even though Russia civil aviations record is just as bad.

Oct 21/13: Indian complaints. Aviation Week reports that India is dissatisfied with their development workshare, in a project they came late to and is close to lockdown on their partner’s side, for which they have only recently managed to produce anything resembling their specifications (q.v. April 10/13):

“We have a major opportunity in the FGFA program,” Indian air force (IAF) Deputy Chief Air Marshal S. Sukumar says. However, “at the moment [the 15% development share] is not very much in favor of Indian development. We are flagging it through the government. It should be much more focused towards indigenous development capability.”

As Aviation Week points out, 4 Russian T50 prototypes have performed more than 200 test flights since January 2010, and the VVF plans to begin inducting the fighter in 2015-2016. That doesn’t leave a ton of room for development, which requires fast decisions that begin the partnership early, when the design is still very much in need of refinement. India’s desires and its modus operandi are once again in conflict, and the question is whether the dichotomy will become a stumbling block in negotiations for the final $11 billion system development contract. At this point, the only way to square that circle would be to increase the number of differences between the Russian and Indian fighters, or to involve India in developing a “Block 10″ type successor to a fighter whose core technologies are already a huge stretch for them. Either approach would drive up overall costs for the contract under negotiation (q.v. July 15/13), and add substantial risk to India’s plans to begin manufacturing at HAL in 2022 – itself a problematic proposition, given HAL’s record. Sources: Aviation Week, “India Concerned About Fifth-Gen Fighter Work Share With Russia”.
DID