Section 2

2. It may be objected that our will towards living and towards
expressive activity is constant, and that each attainment of such
expression is an increase in Happiness.

But in the first place, by this reckoning every to-morrow's
well-being will be greater than to-day's, every later instalment
successively larger that an earlier; at once time supplants moral
excellence as the measure of felicity.

Then again the Gods to-day must be happier than of old: and
their bliss, too, is not perfect, will never be perfect.
Further, when
the will attains what it was seeking, it attains something present:
the quest is always for something to be actually present until a
standing felicity is definitely achieved. The will to life which is
will to Existence aims at something present, since Existence
must be a
stably present thing. Even when the act of the will is directed
towards the future, and the furthest future, its object is
an actually
present having and being: there is no concern about what is passed
or to come: the future state a man seeks is to be a now to him; he
does not care about the forever: he asks that an actual present be
actually present.