Third Part: Ethical Life

§ 142

Ethical life is the Idea of freedom in that on the one
hand it is the good become alive — the good endowed in self-consciousness
with knowing and willing and actualised by self-conscious action — while
on the other hand self-consciousness has in the ethical realm
its absolute foundation and the end which actuates its effort.
Thus ethical life is the concept of freedom developed into the
existing world and the nature of self-consciousness.

§ 143

Since this unity of the concept of the will with its embodiment — i.e. the particular will — is knowing, consciousness of the distinction between these two moments of the Idea is present, but present in such a way that now each of these moments is in its own eyes the totality of the Idea and has that totality as its foundation and content.

§ 144

[a]
The objective ethical order, which comes on the scene
in place of good in the abstract, is substance made concrete by
subjectivity as infinite form. Hence it posits within itself distinctions
whose specific character is thereby determined by the concept,
and which endow the ethical order with a stable content independently
necessary and subsistent in exaltation above subjective opinion
and caprice. These distinctions are absolutely valid laws and
institutions.

Addition:
Throughout ethical life the objective and subjective moments are
alike present, but both of them are only its forms. Its substance
is the good, i.e. the objective is filled with subjectivity.
If we consider ethical life from the objective standpoint, we
may say that in it we are ethical unselfconsciously. In this
sense, Antigone proclaims that 'no one knows whence the laws come;
they are everlasting', i.e. their determinate character is absolute
and has its source in the nature of the thing. None the less,
however, the substance of ethical life has a consciousness also,
though the status of this consciousness is never higher than that
of being one moment.

§ 145

It is the fact that the ethical order is the system of
these specific determinations of the Idea which constitutes its
rationality. Hence the ethical order is freedom or the absolute
will as what is objective, a circle of necessity whose moments
are the ethical powers which regulate the life of individuals.
To these powers individuals are related as accidents to substance,
and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, have
the shape of appearance, and become actualised.

Addition:
Since the laws and institutions of the ethical order make up the concept of freedom, they are the substance or universal essence
of individuals, who are thus related to them as accidents only.
Whether the individual exists or not is all one to the objective
ethical order. It alone is permanent and is the power regulating
the life of individuals. Thus the ethical order has been represented
by mankind as eternal justice, as gods absolutely existent, in
contrast with which the empty business of individuals is only
a game of see-saw.

§ 146

[b] The substantial order, in the self-consciousness which it has thus actually attained in individuals, knows itself and so is an object of knowledge. This ethical substance and its laws and powers are on the one hand an object over against the subject, and from his point of view they are — are in the highest sense of self-subsistent being. This is an absolute authority and power infinitely more firmly established than the being of nature.

Remark:
The sun, the moon, mountains, rivers, and the natural objects
of all kinds by which we are surrounded, are. For consciousness
they have the authority not only of mere being but also of possessing
a particular nature which it accepts and to which it adjusts itself
in dealing with them, using them, or in being otherwise concerned
with them. The authority of ethical laws is infinitely higher,
because natural objects conceal rationality under the cloak of
contingency and exhibit it only in their utterly external and
disconnected way.

§ 147

On the other hand, they are not something alien to the
subject. On the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as
to its own essence, the essence in which he has a feeling of his
selfhood, and in which he lives as in his own element which is
not distinguished from himself. The subject is thus directly
linked to the ethical order by a relation which is more like an
identity than even the relation of faith or trust.

Remark:
Faith and trust emerge along with reflection; they presuppose
the power of forming ideas and making distinctions. For example,
it is one thing to be a pagan, a different thing to believe in
a pagan religion. This relation or rather this absence of relation,
this identity in which the ethical order is the actual living
soul of self-consciousness, can no doubt pass over into a relation
of faith and conviction and into a relation produced by means
of further reflection, i.e. into an insight due to reasoning
starting perhaps from some particular purposes interests, and
considerations, from fear or hope, or from historical conditions.
But adequate knowledge of this identity depends on thinking
in terms of the concept.

§ 148

As substantive in character, these laws and institutions
are duties binding on the will of the individual, because as subjective,
as inherently undetermined, or determined as particular, he distinguishes
himself from them and hence stands related to them as to the substance
of his own being.

Remark:
The 'doctrine of duties' in moral philosophy (I mean the objective
doctrine, not that which is supposed to be contained in the empty
principle of moral subjectivity, because that principle determines
nothing — (see § 134) is therefore comprised in the systematic development of the circle of ethical necessity which
follows in this Third Part. The difference between the exposition
in this book and the form of a 'doctrine of duties' lies solely
in the fact that, in what follows, the specific types of ethical
life turn up as necessary relationships; there the exposition
ends, without being supplemented in each case by the addition
that 'therefore men have a duty to conform to this institution'.

A 'doctrine of duties' which is other than a philosophical science
takes its material from existing relationships and shows its connection
with the moralist's personal notions or with principles and thoughts,
purposes, impulses, feelings, &c., that are forthcoming everywhere;
and as reasons for accepting each duty in turn, it may tack on
its further consequences in their bearing on the other ethical
relationships or on welfare and opinion. But an immanent and
logical 'doctrine of duties' can be nothing except the serial
exposition of the relationships which are necessitated by the
Idea of freedom and are therefore actual in their entirety, to
within the state.

§ 149

The bond of duty can appear as a restriction only on indeterminate
subjectivity or abstract freedom, and on the impulses either of
the natural will or of the moral will which determines its indeterminate
good arbitrarily. The truth is, however, that in duty the individual
finds his liberation; first, liberation from dependence on mere
natural impulse and from the depression which as a particular
subject he cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought
to be and what might be; secondly, liberation from the indeterminate
subjectivity which, never reaching reality or the objective determinacy
of action, remains self-enclosed and devoid of actuality. In
duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom.

Addition: Duty is a restriction only on the self-will of subjectivity. It stands in the way only of that abstract good to which subjectivity
adheres. When we say: 'We want to be free', the primary meaning
of the words is simply: 'We want abstract freedom', and every
institution and every organ of the state passes as a restriction
on freedom of that kind. Thus duty is not a restriction on freedom,
but only on freedom in the abstract, i.e. on unfreedom. Duty
is the attainment of our essence, the winning of positive freedom.

§ 150

Virtue is the ethical order reflected in the individual
character so far as that character is determined by its natural
endowment. When virtue displays itself solely as the individual's
simple conformity with the duties of the station to which he belongs,
it is rectitude.

Remark:
In an ethical community, it is easy to say what man must
do, what are the duties he has to fulfil in order to be virtuous:
he has simply to follow the well-known and explicit rules of his
own situation. Rectitude is the general character which may be
demanded of him by law or custom. But from the standpoint of
morality, rectitude often seems to be something comparatively
inferior, something beyond which still higher demands must be
made on oneself and others, because the craving to be something
special is not satisfied with what is absolute and universal;
it finds consciousness of peculiarity only in what is exceptional.

The various facets of rectitude may equally well be called virtues,
since they are also properties of the individual, although not
specially of him in contrast with others. Talk about virtue,
however, readily borders on empty rhetoric, because it is only
about something abstract and indeterminate; and furthermore, argumentative
and expository talk of the sort is addressed to the individual
as to a being of caprice and subjective inclination. In an existing
ethical order in which a complete system of ethical relations
has been developed and actualised, virtue in the strict sense
of the word is in place and actually appears only in exceptional
circumstances or when one obligation clashes with another. The
clash, however, must be a genuine one, because moral reflection
can manufacture clashes of all sorts to suit its purpose and give
itself a consciousness of being something special and having.
made sacrifices. It is for this reason that the phenomenon of
virtue proper is commoner when societies and communities are uncivilised,
since in those circumstances ethical conditions and their actualisation
are more a matter of private choice or the natural genius of an
exceptional individual. For instance, it was especially to Hercules
that the ancients ascribed virtue. In the states of antiquity,
ethical life had not grown into this free system of an objective
order self-subsistently developed, and consequently it was by
the personal genius of individuals that this defect had to be
made good. It follows that if a 'doctrine of virtues' is not
a mere 'doctrine of duties', and if therefore it embraces the
particular facet of character, the facet grounded in natural endowment,
it will be a natural history of mind.

Since virtues are ethical principles applied to the particular,
and since in this their subjective aspect they are something indeterminate,
there turns up here for determining them the quantitative principle
of more or less. The result is that consideration of them introduces
their corresponding defects or vices, as in Aristotle, who defined
each particular virtue as strictly a mean between an excess and
a deficiency.

The content which assumes the form of duties and then virtues
is the same as that which also has the form of impulses
(see Remark to § 19).
Impulses have the same basic content as duties
and virtues, but in impulses this content still belongs to the
immediate will and to instinctive feeling; it has not been developed
to the point of, becoming ethical. Consequently, impulses have
in common with the content of duties and virtues only the abstract
object on which they are directed, an object indeterminate in
itself, and so devoid of anything to discriminate them as good
or evil. Or in other words, impulses, considered abstractly in
their positive aspect alone, are good, while, considered abstractly
in their negative aspect alone, they are evil (see § 18).

Addition:
To conform to the ethical order on this or that particular occasion is
hardly enough to make a man virtuous; he is virtuous only when
this mode of behaviour is a fixed element in his character. Virtue
is rather like ethical virtuosity, [Heroes ('ethical virtuosi')
lived in uncivilised conditions (see Addition to § 93) and
there was no ethical life in society as they found it; but since
they introduced ethical institutions for the first time (see Remarks
to §§ 167 and
203), they displayed virtue as a kind
of virtuosity. Nowadays, ethical life is common to everyone and
consists in conformity to the existing order, not in divergence
from it.] and the reason why we speak of virtue less nowadays
than formerly is that ethical living is less like the form of
a particular individuals character. The French are par excellence
the people who speak most of virtue, and the reason is that amongst
them ethical life in the individuals is more a matter of his own
idiosyncrasies or a natural mode of conduct. The Germans, on
the other hand, are more thoughtful, and amongst them the same
content acquires the form of universality.

§ 151

But when individuals are simply identified with the
actual order, ethical life (das Sittliche) appears as their general
mode of conduct, i.e. as custom (Sitte), while the habitual
practice of ethical living appears as a second nature which, put
in the place of the initial, purely natural will, is the soul
of custom permeating it through and through, the significance
and the actuality of its existence. It is mind living and present
as a world, and the substance of mind thus exists now for the
first time as mind.

Addition: Just as nature has its laws, and as animals, trees, and the sun fulfil their law, so custom (Sitte) is the law appropriate
to free mind. Right and morality are not yet what ethics (Sitte)
is, namely mind. In right, particularity is still not the
particularity of the concept, but only that of the natural will.
So, too, at the standpoint of morality, self-consciousness is
not yet mind's consciousness of itself. At that level
it is only the worth of the subject in himself that is in question,
i.e. the subject who determines himself by reference to good in
contrast with evil, who still has self-will as the form of his
willing. Here, however, at the standpoint of ethics, the will
is mind's will and it has a content which is substantive and in
conformity with itself.

Education is the art of making men ethical. It begins with pupils
whose life is at the instinctive level and shows them the way
to a second birth, the way to change their instinctive nature
into a second, intellectual, nature, and makes this intellectual
level habitual to them. At this point the clash between the natural
and the subjective will disappears, the subject's internal struggle
dies away. To this extent, habit is part of ethical life as it
is of philosophic thought also, since such thought demands that
mind be trained against capricious fancies, and that these be
destroyed and overcome to leave the way clear for rational thinking.
It is true that a man is killed by habit, i.e. if he has once
come to feel completely at home in life, if he has become mentally
and physically dull, and if the clash between subjective consciousness
and mental activity has disappeared; for man is active only in
so far as he has not attained his end and wills to develop his
potentialities and vindicate himself in struggling to attain it.
When this has been fully achieved, activity and vitality are
at an end, and the result - loss of interest in life - is mental
or physical death.

§ 152

In this way the ethical substantial order has attained
its right, and its right its validity. That is to say, the self-will
of the individual has vanished together with his private conscience
which had claimed independence and opposed itself to the ethical
substance. For, when his character is ethical, he recognises
as the end which moves him to act the universal which is itself
unmoved but is disclosed in its specific determinations as rationality
actualised. He knows that his own dignity and the whole stability
of his particular ends are grounded in this same universal, and
it is therein that he actually attains these. Subjectivity is
itself the absolute form and existent actuality of the substantial
order, and the distinction between subject on the one hand and
substance on the other, as the object, end, and controlling power
of the subject, is the same as, and has vanished directly along
with, the distinction between them in form.

Remark:
Subjectivity. is the ground wherein the concept of freedom is
realised (see § 106). At the level of morality, subjectivity is still distinct from freedom, the concept of subjectivity; but
at the level of ethical life it is the realisation of the concept
in a way adequate to the concept itself.

§ 153

The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to
freedom is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical order,
because their conviction of their freedom finds its truth in such
an objective order, and it is in an ethical order that they are
actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner
universality (see § 147).

Remark:
When a father inquired about the best method of educating his
son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied: 'Make him a citizen
of a state with good laws.' (The phrase has also been attributed
to others.)

Addition:
The educational experiments, advocated by Rousseau in Emile, of withdrawing children from the common life of every day and
bringing them up in the country, have turned out to be futile,
since no success can attend an attempt to estrange people from
the laws of the world. Even if the young have to be educated
in solitude, it is still useless to hope that the fragrance of
the intellectual world will not ultimately permeate this solitude
or that the power of the world mind is too feeble to gain the
mastery of those outlying regions. It is by becoming a citizen
of a good state that the individual first comes into his right.

§ 154

The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction
is also contained in the ethical substantial order, since particularity
is the outward appearance of the ethical order — a mode in which
that order is existent.

§ 155

Hence in this identity of the universal will with the
particular will, right and duty coalesce, and by being in the
ethical order a man has rights in so far as he has duties, and
duties in so far as he has rights. In the sphere of abstract
right, I have the right and another has the corresponding duty.
In the moral sphere, the right of my private judgement and will,
as well as of my happiness, has not, but only ought to have, coalesced
with duties and become objective.

Addition: A slave can have no duties; only a free man has them. If all rights were put on one side and all duties on the other, the whole
would be dissolved, since their identity alone is the fundamental
thing, and it is to this that we have here to hold fast.

§ 156

The ethical substance, as containing independent self-consciousness
united with its concept, is the actual mind of a family and a
nation.

Addition: Ethical life is not abstract like the good, but is intensely actual. Mind has actuality, and individuals are accidents of this actuality.
Thus in dealing with ethical life, only two views are possible: either we start from the substantiality of the ethical order, or else we proceed atomistically and build on the basis of single individuals. This second point of view excludes mind because it leads only to a juxtaposition. Mind, however, is not something single, but is the unity of the single and the universal.

§ 157

The concept of this Idea has being only as mind, as something
knowing itself and actual, because it is the objectification of
itself, the movement running through the form of its moments. It is therefore

(A) ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase — the Family. This substantiality loses its unity, passes over into division, and into the phase of relation, i.e. into

(B)Civil Society — an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system — the means to security of person and property — and by an external organisation for attaining their particular and common interests. This external state

(C) is brought back, to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto.