To link to the entire object, paste this link in email, IM or documentTo embed the entire object, paste this HTML in websiteTo link to this page, paste this link in email, IM or documentTo embed this page, paste this HTML in website

page 2
The Illusion of American Peace Moves
by Professor Robert Greenblatt
Today, in many parts of the country, there is
a vague optimism about peace. According to some
"even Hubert Humphrey would end the war if he
became President." Since January there have been
a series of events which have been skillfully and
cynically used by the Johnson Administration to
exploit our fears, our frustrations, and our desire
to see the end of American aggression in Vietnam.
Once again, as so often in the past, American
"peace moves" are being used to throw domestic
opposition off-balance in preparation for a further
escalation of America's imperialist war against
the Vietnamese people.
For many years we have argued the political
and moral bankruptcy of American policy in Vietnam. The Tet offensive last February proved, for
the first time to many Americans, that the U.S.
military position in Vietnam was untenable as well.
But American policy makers began to embark on
yet another path of escalation carefully contrived
not to jar our fantasies. Amid government fed
rumours of imminent de-escalation, there was a
change of U.S. military command (fromMcNamara
to Clifford, from Westmorland to Abrams) to
prepare for a step-up of the war. Then came that
gem of political duplicity, the April Fool's eve
speech by Lyndon Baines Johnson—a speech timed
to pre-empt a peace move on the part of Hanoi;
a speech which rejected even the limited flexibility of Johnson's San Antonio formula; a speech
which announced a shift in American bombing
policy of North Vietnam which amounted to an
intensification of the war and made it sound like
de-escalation; a speech whose limited substance
evaporated the next day when U.S. bombers carried
out record missions against the people of North
Vietnam.
When the Vietnamese called the Johnson bluff
and agreed to begin official talks, Washington began
to stall, first about the site of the talks and then
with the bogus issue of II
with the bogus issue of "reciprocity," which is
in reality an ill-concealed demand for surrender.
Until recently, the American demand was that
the Vietnamese must take some steps to reduce
the level of hostilities to "reciprocate" for Johnson's "limitation of the bombing" which was in
fact an intensification. Such steps, Harriman
emphasized, as slowing down the infiltration rate,
or a let-up in the shelling of Saigon, or reduction
of attacks at the DMZ, would be met by the U.S.
with a stopping of the bombing. Furthermore, Harriman insisted, these acts of the Vietnamese would
not have to be announced, they need merely
take place.
When the Vietnamese dropped the seige of Khe
Sahn, the U.S. claimed a military victory. When
the shelling of Saigon stopped, on June 24, the
American military claimed it was because the
N.L.F. was out of ammunition. When the U.S.
casualty rate at the DMZ dropped to an all time
low because of a reduction in offensive action by
the Vietnamese, Johnson met with Thieu in Honolulu to reassure him that we had no intention of
stopping the war. When the NY Times reported
that Vietnamese troops had been withdrawn from
menacing positions, U.S. sources began rumours
about "captured documents" revealing N.L.F.
plans for a new offensive. Clifford interpreted the
voluntary slowdown of offensive military actions by
the Vietnamese not as possible acts of good will
but "proof that Hanoi's resolve for a protracted
struggle has weakened." Even Dean Rusk was
resurrected after a five week absence to affirm
once again that the United States will not stop its
destruction of Vietnam unless the Vietnamese
people surrender.
These events have a familiar ring. They indicate
a decision by those who have masterminded the
American aggression in Vietnam to continue and
escalate their destructive efforts. It would be
naive to expect that these same "planners" would
permit the ritualized events inside the Hog Palace
in Chicago to interfere substantially with their
plans and therefore we must make our plans.
Whatever else we do, we must take to the streets
of Chicago and expose the hypocrisy of the ritualized
democracy of the politicians. We must remain
in the streets of America during the entire election
period and beyond until every American soldier is
back from Vietnam. We must reject every new
Johnson, whatever the name he goes by, and make
it clear that there can be no peace in America until
there is peace in Vietnam.
(This article was taken from Robert Green-
blatt's Hiroshima Day speech. Professor
Greenblatt has recently returned from Hanoi
and Paris, where he consulted with D.R.V.
and U.S. negotiators.)
THE MOBILIZER
Founding Chairman: A.J. Muste (1885-1967)
Chairman: Dave Dellinger
National Coordinator: Prof. Robert Greenblatt
Editor: Wolfe Lowenthal
Art: Mike Sherker

Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Publication date

1966-1968

Language

English

Country

United States

Digital Format

XML

Publisher-Electronic

Wisconsin Historical Society

Publication Date-Electronic

2016

Rights

Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited.

Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited.

Owner

Wisconsin Historical Society

Full text

page 2
The Illusion of American Peace Moves
by Professor Robert Greenblatt
Today, in many parts of the country, there is
a vague optimism about peace. According to some
"even Hubert Humphrey would end the war if he
became President." Since January there have been
a series of events which have been skillfully and
cynically used by the Johnson Administration to
exploit our fears, our frustrations, and our desire
to see the end of American aggression in Vietnam.
Once again, as so often in the past, American
"peace moves" are being used to throw domestic
opposition off-balance in preparation for a further
escalation of America's imperialist war against
the Vietnamese people.
For many years we have argued the political
and moral bankruptcy of American policy in Vietnam. The Tet offensive last February proved, for
the first time to many Americans, that the U.S.
military position in Vietnam was untenable as well.
But American policy makers began to embark on
yet another path of escalation carefully contrived
not to jar our fantasies. Amid government fed
rumours of imminent de-escalation, there was a
change of U.S. military command (fromMcNamara
to Clifford, from Westmorland to Abrams) to
prepare for a step-up of the war. Then came that
gem of political duplicity, the April Fool's eve
speech by Lyndon Baines Johnson—a speech timed
to pre-empt a peace move on the part of Hanoi;
a speech which rejected even the limited flexibility of Johnson's San Antonio formula; a speech
which announced a shift in American bombing
policy of North Vietnam which amounted to an
intensification of the war and made it sound like
de-escalation; a speech whose limited substance
evaporated the next day when U.S. bombers carried
out record missions against the people of North
Vietnam.
When the Vietnamese called the Johnson bluff
and agreed to begin official talks, Washington began
to stall, first about the site of the talks and then
with the bogus issue of II
with the bogus issue of "reciprocity" which is
in reality an ill-concealed demand for surrender.
Until recently, the American demand was that
the Vietnamese must take some steps to reduce
the level of hostilities to "reciprocate" for Johnson's "limitation of the bombing" which was in
fact an intensification. Such steps, Harriman
emphasized, as slowing down the infiltration rate,
or a let-up in the shelling of Saigon, or reduction
of attacks at the DMZ, would be met by the U.S.
with a stopping of the bombing. Furthermore, Harriman insisted, these acts of the Vietnamese would
not have to be announced, they need merely
take place.
When the Vietnamese dropped the seige of Khe
Sahn, the U.S. claimed a military victory. When
the shelling of Saigon stopped, on June 24, the
American military claimed it was because the
N.L.F. was out of ammunition. When the U.S.
casualty rate at the DMZ dropped to an all time
low because of a reduction in offensive action by
the Vietnamese, Johnson met with Thieu in Honolulu to reassure him that we had no intention of
stopping the war. When the NY Times reported
that Vietnamese troops had been withdrawn from
menacing positions, U.S. sources began rumours
about "captured documents" revealing N.L.F.
plans for a new offensive. Clifford interpreted the
voluntary slowdown of offensive military actions by
the Vietnamese not as possible acts of good will
but "proof that Hanoi's resolve for a protracted
struggle has weakened." Even Dean Rusk was
resurrected after a five week absence to affirm
once again that the United States will not stop its
destruction of Vietnam unless the Vietnamese
people surrender.
These events have a familiar ring. They indicate
a decision by those who have masterminded the
American aggression in Vietnam to continue and
escalate their destructive efforts. It would be
naive to expect that these same "planners" would
permit the ritualized events inside the Hog Palace
in Chicago to interfere substantially with their
plans and therefore we must make our plans.
Whatever else we do, we must take to the streets
of Chicago and expose the hypocrisy of the ritualized
democracy of the politicians. We must remain
in the streets of America during the entire election
period and beyond until every American soldier is
back from Vietnam. We must reject every new
Johnson, whatever the name he goes by, and make
it clear that there can be no peace in America until
there is peace in Vietnam.
(This article was taken from Robert Green-
blatt's Hiroshima Day speech. Professor
Greenblatt has recently returned from Hanoi
and Paris, where he consulted with D.R.V.
and U.S. negotiators.)
THE MOBILIZER
Founding Chairman: A.J. Muste (1885-1967)
Chairman: Dave Dellinger
National Coordinator: Prof. Robert Greenblatt
Editor: Wolfe Lowenthal
Art: Mike Sherker