Amidst fresh arrests, restrictions on fasting and prayers at mosques, Uighur Muslims are suffering under the latest episode of Chinese government crackdown on their ethnic minority in the northwestern region of Xinjiang.

â€œIf any religious figure discusses Ramadan during the course of religious activities, or encourages people to take part, then they will lose their license to practice,â€ Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the Munich-based World Uighur Congress, told Eurasia Review on Friday, August 5.

â€œThe more serious cases will result in arrests for incitement to engage in illegal religious activity,â€ he said.

A day before the start of the holy fasting month for Chinaâ€™s Muslims, at least 11 people were killed in a series of attacks in the north-western region of Xinjiang.

The attacks came less than two weeks after 18 people were killed in an attack in the restive Xinjiang region......

Following the unrest, more than 100 uighurs were detained by Chinese authorities.

Most of those detained as suspects were committed Muslims who attended mosque and whose wives wore veils, residents say.......

As for Muslim members of the government throughout Xinjiang, the government forced them to sign â€œletters of responsibilityâ€ promising to avoid fasting, evening prayers, or other religious activities.

â€œFasting during Ramadan is a traditional ethnic custom, and they are allowed to do that,â€ an employee who answered the phone at a local government neighborhood committee office in the regional capital Urumqi said confirming the restrictions.

â€œBut they arenâ€™t allowed to hold any religious activities during Ramadan,â€ she added.

â€œParty members are not allowed to fast for Ramadan, and neither are civil servants.â€

As for private companies, Uighur Muslim employees were offered lunches during fasting hours.

Anyone who refuses to eat could lose their annual bonus, or even their job, Raxit added.

Officials have also targeted Muslim schoolchildren, providing them with free lunches during the fasting period.

A Uighur resident of Beijing said students under 18 are forbidden from fasting during Ramadan. Moreover, government campaigns forced restaurants in the Muslim majority region to stay open all day.

More restrictions were also imposed on people trying to attend prayers at mosques.

Everyone attending prayers has to register with their national identity card, he added.

â€œThey have to register,â€ he said.

â€œ[After prayers] they arenâ€™t allowed to [congregate and] talk to each other.â€

In Ramadan, adult Muslims abstain from food, drink, smoking and sex between dawn and sunset.

The sick and those traveling are exempt from fasting especially if it poses health risks.

Muslims dedicate their time during the holy month to be closer to Allah through prayers, self-restraint and good deeds.

Xinjiang Crackdown and Changing Perceptions of China in the Islamic World?

The outbreak of ethno-sectarian unrest in Chinaâ€™s northwestern Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR) between members of the local Uighur community, an ethnic Turkic population that is predominantly Sunni Muslim, and ethnic Han Chinese, Chinaâ€™s majority ethnic group, has largely subsided on the surface. The hostilities began on July 5 during a public demonstration by Uighur college students and others in the provincial capital of Urumqi to protest the deaths of two Uighur factory workers in a brawl in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province. The demonstration eventually spiraled into a riot against local Han Chinese citizens (See "The Xinjiang Crisis: A Test for Beijing's Carrot-and-Stick Strategy," China Brief, July 23). Approximately 200 Han Chinese and Uighurs have been killed and over 1000 injured. Thousands of rioters from both sides have also reportedly been detained. Most estimates of damage to public and private property hover around $15 million (Xinhua News Agency, July 8).

Given the extent of the violence, the residual domestic impact of the riots on ethno-sectarian relations and stability in Xinjiang is cause for serious concern in Beijing. Also, because of global media coverage of the hostilities, Beijing is wary about once again becoming the target of scrutiny by international human rights groups and major powers over its treatment of ethnic and religious minorities and political dissidents. The widespread comparisons of the crisis in Xinjiang with the uprisings in Tibet in 2008 and Tiananmen Square in 1989 in media and activist circles, for instance, are not sitting well in Beijing (ISN Security Watch, July 23). In addition, because of the political sensitivities surrounding Chinaâ€™s treatment of its Muslim community, China is also worried that the recent crisis will tarnish its reputation in the Middle East and the greater Islamic world.

Views from the Muslim World

In light of the recent events in Xinjiang, observers of Chinaâ€™s increasingly expanding and multifaceted relationship with the Middle East and the greater Islamic world are asking whether the crisis in Xinjiang will affect how key Muslim countries view China. In spite of scenes of unrest and a heightened awareness of the Uighur predicament, the official reaction of most Muslim countries to the crisis, particularly that of Arab countries in the Middle East with a vital stake in maintaining friendly relations with China, has been muted (al-Jazeera [Doha], July 7). Similarly, despite being home to sizeable ethnic Uighur communities of their own that maintain close links to their kin in Xinjiang, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, along with Pakistan and Afghanistan, have followed suit by keeping silent. The fact that the Uighur predicament is largely overlooked internationally outside of narrow activist circles has also contributed to the overall silence regarding the recent hostilities, making it easier for governments to avoid the issue. Unlike the plight of the Palestinians, who live under Israeli military occupationâ€”an issue that resonates deeply across the Middle East and the greater Islamic world as well as in human rights circlesâ€”the Uighurs are generally ignored (The Associated Press, July 14; al-Jazeera, July 7). In fact, the extent to which key Muslim countries, including Indonesia, the worldâ€™s most populous Muslim state, tried to distance themselves from any association with the Uighur cause in China is striking. A July 12 statement by Indonesian Ambassador to China H.E. Sudrajat illustrates this trend: "What happened in Xinjiang is Chinaâ€™s internal affair. We respect Chinaâ€™s sovereignty over the region and will never meddle in the problem." He also provided insight into at least one of the reasonâ€™s underlying Jakartaâ€™s position: â€œThe two countries have agreed to respect each otherâ€™s sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each otherâ€™s internal affairs" (Kompas [Jakarta], July 13) [1].

In contrast, the official reactions of major Muslim countries following the controversial publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammed in a negative light in European newspapers in 2005 prompted an outpour of condemnations by key Muslim leaders and religious figures. The storm over the publication of the cartoons also provoked a series of diplomatic crises, economic and cultural boycotts, and public demonstrations in autocratic countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan where mass expressions of any form of organized dissent are typically suppressed by authorities. Remarkably, only Turkey and Iran have issued strong rebukes over Chinaâ€™s handling of the recent crisis and its treatment of the Uighur community (Financial Times [London], July 14; Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 15; Tehran Times, July 15).

The official silence from major players in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world reflects the importance of China as a key regional and global actor. In spite of Beijingâ€™s record of repressing its own Muslim community, perceptions of China tend to be highly positive on both the state and popular levels among Muslims in the Middle East and beyond [2]. Spurred on initially by its drive to secure sources of energy and new markets for its goods, China has made tremendous political, economic and cultural inroads in the Middle East in recent years. For many Muslim countries, China is a crucial source for investment and a reliable customer for oil and gas and other natural resources. In spite of their close ties to the United States, autocratic regimes in the Middle East, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, also look toward China for diplomatic cover and to serve as a check on what they often see as Washingtonâ€™s overbearing influence in regional affairs [3]. Similarly, Cairo and Riyadh, among other autocratic regimes in the region, see strong ties to Beijing as a way to offset widespread domestic opposition to their relations with Washington and to counter the popular perception among Arab and Muslim publics that they exist to further U.S. (and Israeli) imperial interests [4]. This support is crucial considering the widespread popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world. In addition to the value they assign to strong trade relations with Beijing, Muslim countries such as Indonesia with a history of ethno-sectarian strife also look to China for support in repelling criticism from the United States and international institutions and activists regarding their approach to dealing with politically sensitive domestic issues such as minority rights. In this regard, Jakartaâ€™s support for Beijing during the Xinjiang crisis is logical (Kompas [Jakarta], July 13).

Moreover, predominantly Muslim countries in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with significant Uighur populations of their own and a history of ethnic and sectarian tensions see the crisis in Xinjiang as a serious threat to their own domestic stability. Kazakhstan, for instance, is home to at least 300,000 ethnic Uighurs, representing the largest ethnic Uighur community outside of China. Kyrgyzstan is home to another 60,000 ethnic Uighurs while approximately 6,000 ethnic Uighurs live in Tajikistan (The Associated Press, July 14). Cultural and economic ties between Chinese Uighurs and their ethnic kin in neighboring countries help maintain a strong sense of Uighur identity. The trade volume of Xinjiang with neighboring countries topped $14 billion dollars in 2008, helping make Urumqi the most prosperous city in the region (Xinhua News Agency, July 15). In addition to prioritizing their growing economic and diplomatic relations with China, the Central Asian republics fear that their own Uighur citizens may one day follow in the footsteps of their kin in China and agitate for more rights. Evidence of widespread outrage among the Uighur diaspora in Central Asia is a case in point. While refraining from mobilizing public protests out of fear of provoking the ruling regimes into a violence crackdown, ethnic Uighur groups in Central Asia have issued letters to international bodies such as the United Nations (U.N.) condemning Chinaâ€™s actions (The Associated Press, July 14). Prominent Uighur activists have also gone so far as to single out the Central Asian republics for actively colluding with China to suppress Uighur identity and culture in the region (al-Jazeera, July 7). Like their counterparts in the Arab Middle East and other major Muslim countries such as Indonesia, the Central Asian republics are firm in their support for China amid the crisis.

A strong rebuke by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a July 10 press conference, where he labeled Chinaâ€™s actions in Xinjiang a â€œnear genocide,â€ broke the official silence among key Muslim countries regarding the events in Xinjiang (See "Ankara's Reaction to Xinjiang Crisis Raises Bilateral Tension," Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 15). In spite of burgeoning Sino-Turkish trade ties, Turkish Industry Minister Nihat Ergun went as far as to call for a boycott of Chinese products in a sign of solidarity with the Uighurs, although he later retreated from that position. Ankara also threatened to raise the issue of Xinjiang at the United Nations (Financial Times, July 14). Turkeyâ€™s reaction to the crisis is rooted in a complex set of factors. In addition to sharing the Islamic faith, Turkey shares ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties with the Uighurs. Turkeyâ€™s reaction to the crisis was also prompted by the de facto leadership role it assumed among ethnic Turkic peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In this regard, Turkey sees itself as a sort of guardian of Turkic rights. Unlike in other countries, where Uighurs and their supporters have been banned from staging public demonstrations, members of the Uighur diaspora and other supporters have staged a number of protests in Turkey in front of Chinese diplomatic missions (Todayâ€™s Zaman [Istanbul] July 26; Christian Science Monitor, July 14; The Associated Press, July 14). The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist-oriented party, in Turkish politics also shaped Ankaraâ€™s approach to its dealings with issues affecting Muslims outside of its borders, prompting a more activist approach to the crisis in Xinjiang by Ankara. Turkey also probably sees the crisis in Xinjiang as an opportunity to showcase its growing international profile. The tensions stemming from the Xinjiang crisis in Sino-Turkish relations may go as far as to impact Beijingâ€™s efforts to sell Ankara its HQ-9 high-altitude air defense system and further cooperation in the defense sector between China and Turkey. Chinaâ€™s HQ-9 system is currently competing with systems offered by both the United States and Russia (Defense News, July 20).

While Turkeyâ€™s reaction to the crisis in Xinjiang may be at least partially explained by cultural, historical and geopolitical reasons, many observers were surprised when Iranâ€™s clerical establishment issued its own condemnation of Chinaâ€™s actions. On July 14, Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani called for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other international institutions to intervene on behalf of the Uighurs. He also added: â€œWe just thought that only the bullying West violates Muslimsâ€™ rights and deprive them of their basic rights but reports from China indicate that in that part of the world the unprotected Muslims are being mercilessly suppressed by yesterdayâ€™s communist China and todayâ€™s capitalist Chinaâ€ (Tehran Times, July 15). Other prominent Iranian clerics made similar comments (Press TV [Tehran], July 13).

Significantly, official criticism of China out of Iran has been coming from the clerical establishment. Nevertheless, the timing of the criticism, given the ongoing post-election turmoil, is also curious, since China has refrained from criticizing Tehranâ€™s suppression of opposition elements. In contrast, statements from diplomatic and elected officials about the crisis in Xinjiang have tended to be more measured. While expressing concern for the plight of Muslims in China and calling for peace and calm during a July 12 telephone conversation with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, for instance, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki also added that the meddling of â€œWestern governmentsâ€ was to blame for the crisis (Press TV, July 12). Iranian government officials also had to defend themselves from a barrage of criticism from influential clerics who accuse the state of failing to do enough for the Uighurs. Among other things, a number of senior clerics have suggested that the Iranian state is operating a doubled-standard in its approach to the crisis in Xinjiang and relations with China compared to its actions related to Palestine and other issues important to Muslims (Press TV, July 27).

The apparent disconnect between certain key members of the clerical establishment and the state appears to represent a major dilemma for Tehran. Both Iran and China maintain close diplomatic, economic and military ties. Moreover, as Iran continues to face increasing pressure from the United States and Israel regarding its nuclear program, it likely sees China as a deterrent to any potential U.S. or Israeli military action due to Beijingâ€™s major stake in Iranian energy resources. The decision by key clerics to speak out against China may represent an effort on their part to reach out to Muslims across the globe by showcasing Iranâ€™s credentials as an advocate for Muslim rights during a period where the Islamic Republic appears to be under siege from hostile forces operating within and outside of its borders. The official stance of the political establishment, however, while keen on showcasing Iranâ€™s religious credentials, also likely calculates the importance of maintaining strong Sino-Iranian ties during this crucial period in the Islamic Republicâ€™s history. Going out of its way to lambast China over the crisis in Xinjiang is not in Iranâ€™s interest.

Al-Qaeda Enters the Fold

While key Muslim heads of state have largely remained silent about the events in Xinjiang in order to remain in Chinaâ€™s good graces, al-Qaedaâ€™s Algerian-based North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has singled out China for its actions by announcing its intent on July 14 to exact revenge against China and its interests. Among other things, AQIM declared its intent to attack Chinese workers in North Africa. Beijing has warned its citizens working in North Africa and elsewhere to remain vigilant. Approximately 50,000 Chinese workers are estimated to be working in Algeria alone (Peopleâ€™s Daily Online, July 15; The Times [London], July 15). This threat is reportedly the first time al-Qaeda or an al-Qaeda-affiliated movement threatened China directly.

Radical Islamist militants often claim to act on behalf of oppressed Muslims. As a result, regimes viewed as illegitimate, corrupt, despotic, and beholden to U.S. and other foreign interests are often targeted for their perceived complicity in the repression of Muslims. The overall silence from key Muslim countries regarding the plight of the Uighurs out of deference to Beijing is a case in point. While al-Qaedaâ€™s primary targets remain the United States and U.S. interests and allies abroad, the crisis in Xinjiang has at the very least presented Islamic militants with another opportunity to further their cause, this time at the potential expense of China.

Conclusion

While it is clearly in Chinaâ€™s interest to resolve the crisis in Xinjiang on terms that promote long-term reconciliation and stability and address the legitimate grievances of the Uighur community, the recent violence will have little impact on Beijingâ€™s relations with the Middle East and wider Islamic world. Turkish and Iranian criticism of China, which at this point has amounted to little more than rhetoric in the first place, will likely prove to be an exception rather than a precursor of future trends. In the long run, Chinaâ€™s diplomatic and economic clout is too important to ignore. International human rights groups and Uighur advocacy organizations operating in the diaspora, however, may become emboldened by the recent events to step up their campaigns to pressure Beijing to improve its treatment of ethnic and sectarian minorities and political dissidents. For now, China appears to have weathered the storm of criticism in the world of international Muslim opinion. The realities of Chinese political and economic power and a new geopolitics are working in Chinaâ€™s favor, especially on the state-to-state level. The emergence of future crises in Xinjiang, however, may not prove to be as benign for domestic stability and Chinaâ€™s position in the Islamic world......................
...........http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35370&cHash=b04988e0ed

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), a territory in western China, accounts for one-sixth of China's land and is home to about 20 million people from thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest of these groups is the Uighurs [PRON: WEE-gurs], a predominantly Muslim community with ties to Central Asia. Some Uighurs call China's presence in Xinjiang a form of imperialism, and they stepped up calls for independenceâ€”sometimes violentlyâ€”in the 1990s through separatist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The Chinese government has reacted by promoting the migration of China's ethnic majority, the Han, to Xinjiang. Beijing has also strengthened economic ties with the area and tried to cut off potential sources of separatist support from neighboring states that are linguistically and ethnically linked with the Uighurs.

Intermittent Independence

Since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, Xinjiang has enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy. Turkic rebels in Xinjiang declared independence in October 1933 and created the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (also known as the Republic of Uighuristan or the First East Turkistan Republic). The following year, the Republic of China reabsorbed the region. In 1944, factions within Xinjiang again declared independence, this time under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and created the Second East Turkistan Republic. But in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took over the territory and declared it a Chinese province. In October 1955, Xinjiang became classified as an "autonomous region" of the People's Republic of China.

Some Uighurs, nostalgic for Xinjiang's intermittent periods of independence, call for the recreation of a Uighur state. "The Central Asian Uighurs know a great deal about the two East Turkestan periods of sovereign rule, and they reflect on that quite frequently," says Dru C. Gladney, president of the Pacific Basin Institute at Pomona College. Many of these Uighurs say China colonized the area in 1949. But in its first white paper on Xinjiang, the Chinese government said Xinjiang had been an "inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation" since the Western Han Dynasty, which ruled from 206 BC to 24 AD.

Economic Development

Xinjiang's wealth hinges on its vast mineral and oil deposits. In the early 1990s, Beijing decided to spur Xinjiang's growth by giving it special economic zones, subsidizing local cotton farmers, and overhauling its tax system. In August 1991, the Xinjiang government launched the Tarim Basin Project (World Bank) to increase agricultural output. During this period, Beijing invested in the region's infrastructure, building massive projects like the Tarim Desert Highway and a rail link to western Xinjiang. In an article for The China Quarterly, Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch says these projects were designed to literally "bind Xinjiang more closely to the rest of the PRC."

Since 1954, China has also used the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to build agricultural settlements in China's western periphery. Locally known as the Bingtuan, the XPCC is charged with cultivating and guarding the Chinese frontier. To achieve this mission, the corps has its own security organs, including an armed police force and militia. Over the past fifty years, the XPCC has attracted a steady stream of migrant workers to Xinjiang.

Beijing continues to develop Xinjiang in campaigns called "Open up the West" and "Go West." Experts like Gladney say these programs have made the region relatively prosperous. "If you look at the general per capita income of Xinjiang as a region," he says, "it's higher than all of China's except for the southeast coast." But others note that Xinjiang's wealth is concentrated in its oil-rich centers, and international development bodies like the Asian Development Bank say that there are high levels of inequality (PDF) in the area. The Chinese government has launched a series of programs to alleviate poverty in Xinjiang, and in March 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized harmonious development of the region in a government report.

Han Migration

Growing job opportunities in Xinjiang have lured a steady stream of migrant workers to the region, many of whom are ethnically Han. The Chinese government does not count the number of workers that travel to Xinjiang, but experts say the local Han population has risen from approximately 5 percent in the 1940s to approximately 40 percent today. These migrants work in a variety of industries, both low tech and high tech, and have transformed Xinjiang's landscape. In June 2008, the BBC produced a photo report called Life in Urumqi, which said Xinjiang's capital had recently witnessed "the arrival of shopping centres, tower blocks, department stores and highways."

In its 2007 annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China said the Chinese government "provides incentives for migration to the region from elsewhere in China, in the name of recruiting talent and promoting stability" (PDF). Since imperial times, the Chinese government has tried to settle Han on the outskirts of China to integrate the Chinese periphery. But the Communist Party says its policies in Xinjiang are designed to promote economic development, not demographic change. Xinjiang's influx of migrants has fueled Uighur discontent as Han and Uighurs compete over limited jobs and natural resources.
Ethnic Tension

The Chinese government says Xinjiang is home to thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest of these groups is the Uighurs, who comprise 45 percent of Xinjiang's population, according to a 2003 census. Like many of these groups, the Uighurs are predominantly Muslim and have cultural ties to Central Asia.

As Han migrants pour into Xinjiang, many Uighurs resent the strain they place on limited resources like land and water. "Uighurs feel like this is their homeland, that these resources should be more devoted to them," says Gladney. In 2006, Human Rights in China said population growth in Xinjiang had transformed the local environment, leading to "reduced human access to clean water (PDF) and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and agriculture."

Ethnic tension is fanned by economic disparity: the Han tend to be wealthier than the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Some experts say the wage gap is the result of discriminatory hiring practices. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports that in 2006, the XPCC reserved approximately 800 of 840 civil servant job openings for Han. Local officials say they would like to hire Uighurs, but have trouble finding qualified candidates. "One common problem of the western region is that the education and cultural level of the people here is quite low," said Wang Lequan, Xinjiang's Communist Party secretary, in an interview with the BBC. Gladney says Han applicants tend to have better professional networks because they are more often "influential, children of elite Party members and government leaders."

According to Bequelin, Uighurs are also upset by what they consider Chinese attempts to "refashion their cultural and religious identity." In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Rebiyah Kadeer, a prominent exiled Uighur, condemns China for its "fierce repression of religious expression," and "its intolerance for any expression of discontent." Beijing officials respond to these accusations by saying they respect China's ethnic minorities, and have improved the quality of life for Uighurs by raising economic, public health, and education levels in Xinjiang.

In July 2009, ethnic tension between the Han and Uighur communities in Xinjiang was brought into the international limelight after severe riots between the two groups and police forces erupted in the province's capital city of Urumqi. According to Chinese state media, at least 150 people were killed, and more than 800 were injured. The riots were reportedly sparked by a Uighur protest over the ethnically motivated killing of two Uighur workers in the southern province of Guangdong. Accounts of how the protest turned violent differ.

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

During the 1990s, separatist groups in Xinjiang began frequent attacks against the Chinese government. The most famous of these groups was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). China, the United States, and the UN Security Council have all labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and Chinese officials have said the group has ties to al-Qaeda. Concern about Uighur terrorism flared in August 2008â€”just days before the Beijing Olympicsâ€”when two men attacked a military police unit (NYT) in Xinjiang, killing sixteen. However, a month later, the New York Times reported that according to eyewitness accounts of three foreign tourists, the attackers were also in paramilitary uniform, casting doubts on the official Chinese version of the incident, which had called it a terrorist incident. The attack had come a week after a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party took credit for a slew of terrorist attacks (Xinhua), including two bus explosions in Yunnan province.

The Chinese government has taken steps to combat both separatists and terrorists in its western province. According to the U.S. State Department, Chinese authorities raided an alleged ETIM camp in January 2007, killing eighteen and arresting seventeen. China also monitors religious activity in the region to keep religious leaders from spreading separatist views. Since September 11, 2001, China has raised international awareness of Uighur-related terrorism and linked its actions to the Bush administration's so-called war on terror.

But many experts say China is exaggerating the danger posed by Uighur terrorists. China has accused the Uighurs of plotting thousands of attacks, but Andrew J. Nathan, a China expert at Columbia University, says, "You have to be very suspicious of those numbers." Gladney notes that many of the "terrorist incidents" that China attributes to ETIM are actually "spontaneous and rather disorganized" forms of civil unrest. Most experts say ETIM has no effective ties to al-Qaeda, and Bequelin goes so far as to say, "ETIM is probably defunct by now, as far as we know." In a 2008 report, Amnesty International accused Chinese officials of using the war on terror to justify "harsh repression of ethnic Uighurs." But in Xinhua, a state-run newspaper, Chinese rights organizations refuted the Amnesty report, saying it was designed to slander China under the pretense of human rights.

Experts disagree on the efficacy of China's counterterrorism measures. Some, including Bequelin, say China's anti-separatist campaign actually provokes more resentment, which can lead to more terrorism. But other Western outlets say China's counterterrorism measures have been relatively successful. A review of U.S. State Department documents shows a decrease in Uighur-related terrorism since the end of the 1990s.
Tough Neighborhood

Xinjiang shares a border with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Because of the Uighurs' cultural ties to its neighbors, China has been concerned that Central Asian states may back a separatist movement in Xinjiang. According to Nathan, these fears are fueled by the fact that the Soviet Union successfully backed a Uighur separatist movement in the 1940s. To keep Central Asian states from fomenting trouble in Xinjiang, China has cultivated close diplomatic ties with its neighbors, most notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. According to Bequelin, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created "to ensure the support of Central Asian states," and to "prevent any emergence of linkages between Uighur communities in these countries and Xinjiang."

Many experts believe China's diplomatic efforts have been successful. Adam Segal, senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, says China's neighbors "are now fighting their own Muslim fundamentalist groups," which makes them more sympathetic to China's plight. According to the U.S. State Department, Uzbekistan extradited a Canadian citizen of Uighur ethnicity to China in August 2006, where he was convicted for alleged involvement in ETIM activities. Nathan says cases like these are evidence that China's neighbors are cooperating with China's anti-secessionist policies. In contrast, the United States refused to hand over five Uighurs who had been captured by U.S. forces in Pakistan in 2001, despite Chinese calls to do so. After their release from Guantanamo Bay in May 2006, the Uighurs were instead transferred to Albania. In June 2009, four Uighurs who had been detained at Guantanamo were resettled in Bermuda. The remaining thirteen Uighur detainees will be resettled in Palau.

None of China's neighbors have expressed official support for the Uighurs, but the region's porous borders still worry Chinese officials. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Uighurs traveled into Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they were exposed to Islamic extremism. "Some enrolled in madrassas, some enrolled with [the anti-Taliban opposition force] the Northern Alliance, some enrolled with the Taliban, some enrolled with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," says Bequelin. Chinese officials worry that militants who slip in and out of Xinjiang can promote anti-state activity.
International Disinterest

In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, protests in Tibet reaped international attention. But protests in Xinjiang (IHT) went relatively unnoticed. "People aren't threatening to boycott the Olympic opening ceremony for the Uighurs," says Segal. Because Tibet gets more global attention than Xinjiang, some reporters have referred to Xinjiang as "China's other Tibet" (al-Jazeera).

International interest in Xinjiang is muted for a variety of reasons. According to Nathan, the Uighur community lacks an effective leader. "For the Uighurs, their most prominent spokesperson is Rebiya Kadeer in Washington, who really doesn't have the infrastructure and the Nobel Prize that the Dalai Lama has," he says. Bequelin adds that the Chinese government has effectively branded Uighur separatists as terrorists, which has reduced international sympathy for their mission. Amidst international apathy, most experts say the human rights situation in Xinjiang is likely to get worse before it gets better. "There's no international pressure to change policy in Xinjiang right now," says Segal. "So why would China make any changes?"

Now let us look at the Islamic world and their championing of Islam the world over, be it Palestine or Kashmir, and their interesting apathy towards the Uighurs who are also Muslim.

1. In Kashmir, the identity of Kashmir has not been changed.

In Xinjiang, it has been changed with Han migration and interestingly, the capital of Xinjiang, Urumchi, is not a Uighur city any more, and instead has a Han Chinese majority!

The Uighurs are being sent elsewhere to China under the guise of providing them occupation, when in reality it is to ensure the Uighurs become a minority in their own land (many having gone to China) as also prevent the Uighurs to become a 'nuisance' in Xinjiang or in Mainland China where they are being sent, since they are a minority there and cannot cause problems.

2. No non Kashmiri can buy land or settle in Kashmir.

In Xinjiang, there has been a concerted move to change the demography wherein Hans are moving in and changing the demography with the aim of wiping out the claim that the land was of the Uighurs.

3. The Uighurs identity, to include their culture, language, religion and traditions are under constant attack and being subtly changed (check Google).

Unless a Uighur knows Mandarin, the cannot get a proper job. All white collar jobs are with the Hans and the blue collar coolie jobs are with the Uighurs, no matter if they have degrees in the Uighur language. This discrimination is a subtle way to force Uighurs to enrol for Mandarin education, wherein they are losing their touch with their own indigenous language.

No such pressure is there in Kashmir!

4. Religious restrictions are being imposed by the Chinese on the Uighurs. Apart from not being allowed to undergo the religious ritual as Muslim during Ramzan, one can Google and check that the Uighurs children are not allowed in the Mosque till they reach 18 year of age.

Also, the Muslim mullahs have to be selected by the Chinese Govt and the sermon they deliver on Friday has to be cleared by the Chinese!

Such restrictions are not there in Kashmir!

Therefore, isn't it surprising that while much song and dance is made by Islamic countries, especially Pakistan, over the issue of Palestine and Kashmir, they are mute, deaf and dumb over the plight of their Uighur Muslim brethren.

Islamic world is full of hypocrisy. Why should we look anywhere else but the mid east which through it's organization the OIC has championed the Kashmiri cause over the years for right of self determination but has denied it's own people the same through a democracy to chose it's government.