PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(G) and (J); In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337, 344-345; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The principal conditions of adjudication were
that respondent-appellant had struck the minor child in the head, shoplifted in her presence, and
failed to support her while the child was in the care of another family for most of her life since
age four. Respondent-appellant?s marijuana use was also an issue, as evidenced by her positive
test for marijuana on the final day of the adjudication trial. The evidence clearly and
convincingly showed that these conditions continued to exist more than 182 days after the
issuance of the initial dispositional order. Respondent-appellant?s parenting skills remained
problematic throughout this matter. For example, she promised the minor child a check and then

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sent her an empty sealed envelope. In a telephone call she demanded that the child choose on the
spot between her foster family and respondent-appellant, stating that she would have nothing to
do with the minor child if she indicated she did not want to come home. Respondent-appellant
failed to contact the child in any way in the months following this conversation, and has entirely
failed to support her throughout the pendency of this matter. Respondent-appellant, who lives in
Chicago, has visited the minor child only twice since the entry of the dispositional order.
Further, respondent-appellant has submitted no urine screens, even though the parent agency
agreement required her to do so on a weekly basis. The evidence amply demonstrates that the
conditions of adjudication, including respondent-appellant?s inadequate parenting skills, failure
to support Simone, and drug use continued to exist at the time of the termination trial. Moreover,
the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court?s conclusion that these problems
would not be rectified within a reasonable time. According to her psychological evaluation,
respondent-appellant is unempathic and hostile, characteristics manifestly evident in those
interactions with the child that were detailed on the record. The evaluation further indicated that
respondent is satisfied with herself and sees no need to change. The evidence offered no basis to
expect that any of the conditions of adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable time or at
all. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating respondent-appellant?s parental
rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
We also conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent-
appellant failed to provide proper care and custody for the minor child and would be unable to do
so in the future. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Respondent-appellant clearly failed to provide proper
care and custody for the child when she struck her in the head, shoplifted in her presence, and
failed to support her while she was in the care of another family. The same evidence that
demonstrates that the conditions of adjudication will not be rectified in the future also provides
clear and convincing evidence that respondent-appellant will not be able to provide proper care
and custody for the minor child within a reasonable time. We note that respondent-appellant?s
failure to carry out critical aspects of the parent-agency agreement, notably drug testing,
parenting classes, and regular visitation, also constitute evidence of her inability to provide
proper care and custody for the minor child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216
(2003).
Respondent-appellant contends on appeal that she was deprived of her due process right
to live in the place of her choice by being forced to live in Kalamazoo in order to maintain her
parental rights. The record simply does not support respondent-appellant?s contention that she
was forced to live in Kalamazoo in order to maintain her parental rights. The evidence indicated
that respondent-appellant could have fulfilled the terms of her parent-agency agreement by
obtaining services in Chicago, but she exerted little effort to do so. Moreover, even after regular
telephone contact with Simone was arranged, apparently due to respondent-appellant?s job
commitment in Chicago, respondent-appellant deliberately limited that contact by failing to
provide a telephone card for Simone and then discontinued contact entirely after demanding that
Simone choose between respondent-appellant and her foster family.

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Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the minor child. MCL 712A.19b(5). The minor child has lived
with her foster family for most of her life since age four, uses the foster family?s surname, and
considers herself one of the family. She exhibited great relief after deciding that she did not
want to return to respondent-appellant. The foster parents wish to adopt her. There was no
evidence on the record suggesting that termination would be contrary to the child?s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski