Britain loves a war criminal

As Alastair Campbell basks in the celebrity limelight of British public life, the blood of the Iraq war drips from his hands. For this is a man whose war crimes, expertly expurged from the collective imagination, demand prosecution alongside those of Tony Blair.

Is there any better demonstration of our
ability to normalise the unthinkable than the continued omnipresence of Alastair
Campbell in British public life? Ten years and one day ago, on 24 September 2002, the British Government released
its propagandistic dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. A year later,
Campbell was obliged to resign, in effect over the role he played in its
composition - the publicist had become 'the story'. But this was not seen as a moral issue relating to the substance of the assault on British democracy he masterminded, but as a technical slip that could happen to 'any' public relations operative.

If Campbell had propagandised for a
Milosevic or a Hussein, it is unlikely he would now be exchanging chummy quips
with Jeremy Clarkson. At best he would perhaps, like Iraq’s Information Minister “comical
Ali”, be the object of derision; at worst he would be regarded with utter
disgust. Instead, because the British mainstream media taken as a whole can't face up to the realities of a war in which it was largely complicit a remarkable transformation takes place in which the perpetrator becomes the injured party. A perfect example can be found in this month's Guardian of 8
September. It's splash called
the pre-war propaganda simply “The dossier that killed trust” – as though Britain’s
self-regarding political elite were the Iraq war’s primary victims, rather than its perpetrators. One interviewee was Charles Falconer, himself
complicit in the crime as a supportive member of Blair’s cabinet. The record of
the other, Menzies Campbell, is distinguished by his opposition to his party’s
presence at the 2003 anti-war march – alongside people of all political stripes
– lest they be tainted
with “anti-Americanism”.

Perhaps “criminal” seems a strong label for
a Labour Party spin doctor. Yet, under international law, a criminal is what he is. As George Monbiot documented
in some detail earlier this month, not only was there no legal justification
for the Iraq war, but in private Blair’s Government freely acknowledged as much.
Campbell’s involvement was not – as far as we know – military or managerial in nature;
but legally this in no way excuses him. The Principles applied at Nuremberg
in 1945-6 make clear that “complicity in the commission of a crime against
peace … is a crime under international law”. A “crime against peace”, these
Principles state, means one of two things:

“(i) Planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances”; or

“(ii)
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the acts mentioned under (i).”

That Campbell was actively complicit in
such a “common plan or conspiracy” has now been established beyond reasonable
doubt. Presented below is just one sample of the evidence: a brief run-down of the
established role of Campbell and colleagues in the months before the September
2002 dossier’s publication.

12
March: British Ambassador David Manning met Condoleeza Rice,
reporting back to Blair:

“I said that you
would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a
press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything
in the States.”

“You may wish to
consider whether more impact could be achieved if the paper only covered Iraq. This
would have the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of WMD, Iraq is not
that exceptional.”

17
March: Britain’s Ambassador Christopher Meyer told the US Deputy
Defense Secretary the UK “backed regime change”, though “It would be a tough
sell for us domestically”. Meyer said:

“The UK was giving
serious thought to publishing a paper that would make the case against Saddam.
If the UK were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would
have to be able to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion
with us.”

2
April: Campbell, Blair and others “discussed … the central
aim” in Iraq, his diaries record. “TB felt it
was regime change”. “He said what was sure was that this would not be a popular
war”. Meyer concurs:

“By this stage Tony
Blair had already taken the decision to support regime change, though he was
discreet about saying so in public.”

6-7
April: Blair met Bush, pledging his support for
war if, among other things, “efforts had been made” to “shape public
opinion”. Blair’s Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell, who was present, told the
Chilcot Inquiry:

“thinking of
them in terms of conditions is the wrong way to look at it. We weren’t trying
to say, “If you tick off all these boxes, then we will be with you”. We were saying, “We are with you in terms of
what you are trying to do, but this is the sensible way to do it.””

23
April: Campbell met Scarlett and other officials,
his diary records,
“to go through what we needed to do communications wise to set the scene for
Iraq, eg a WMD paper and other papers about Saddam.”

21
July: A Cabinet Office paper resolved to
“engage the US on … creating the conditions necessary to justify government
military action”, noting that “certain preparations need to be made”:

“Time will be
required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take
military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a
substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An information campaign
will be needed [which] will need to give full coverage to the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein, including his WMD”.

It resolved to:

“Agree to the
establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office Chairmanship
to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the
US.”

23
July: Campbell and the war cabinet were informed that in
Washington:

“Military action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military
action, justiﬁed by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence
and facts were being ﬁxed around the policy.”

Campbell’s diary notes
“TB was pretty clear that we had to be with the Americans” and backed regime
change. The meeting concluded provisionally: “We should work on the assumption
that the UK would take part in any military action.”

31
August: “Blair was a lot steelier than when we went
on holiday”, Campbell’s diary records.
“Clear that getting Saddam was the right thing to do.”

“It was not
going to be at all easy to sell the policy in the next few months … [Blair]
said the debate had got ahead of us, so we were going to do the dossier
earlier, in the next few weeks … Today was about beginning to turn the tide of
public opinion”.

“US officials …
intend to produce a series of dossiers … to be published alongside President
Bush’s speech on Thursday. They will then roll out several reports in the
coming weeks. I am confident we can make yours one that complements rather than
conflicts with them.”

The British dossier was subsequently
compared with Bush and Cheney’s public statements, and edited
accordingly.

CIA official Paul Pillar, who oversaw one
Bush dossier, states
that its “purpose was to strengthen the case of going to war with the American
public.” The British Defence Intelligence Staff’s then Director General for
Intelligence Collection Michael Laurie likewise states
that “to make a case for war … was the direction we were given”; and that
“these very words were used … we were under pressure to find intelligence that
could reinforce the case.”

“In looking at
the WMD sections, you clearly want to be as firm and authoritative as you can
be. … I appreciate that [including caveats and uncertainties] can increase the
authenticity of the document in terms of it being a proper assessment, but that
needs to be weighed against the use that will be made by opponents of action
who will add up the number of judgments on which we do not have absolute
clarity.”

“I think the
statement on p19 that “Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological
weapons if he believes his regime is under threat” is a bit of a problem. It
backs up the Don McIntyre argument that there is no CBW threat and we will only
create one if we attack him. I think you should redraft the para.”

The published version read: “intelligence
indicates that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is willing to use
chemical and biological weapons”.

In legal terms, this material alone is more than sufficient as prima facie evidence – the evidence required to initiate a prosecution. Admittedly, since the crime of aggression has not been incorporated into British law, there is no way to bring Campbell to trial through the British courts. But it is doubtful that any arrest attempt would therefore be unjustified. The prosecution (if not the ultimate fate) of German war criminals is seldom regarded as illegitimate simply because Germany had not approved the Nuremberg Principles in advance. More significantly, the crime of aggression figures in the domestic law of many other countries.

Like Blair, then, Campbell deserves a popular campaign to bring him to justice. Perhaps one day he will even be forced to account for his actions in a court of law, alongside all those he aided and abetted. Until then, we can at least help ensure his public treatment reflects the stigma of a war criminal, and not the adulation of a celebrity.

About the author

Tim Holmes is a freelance writer and activist. He lives in mid-Wales and tweets as @timbird84.

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