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A former federal informant, who has been accused of perjury for falsely swearing that a federal undercover operation gone awry was responsible for the explosion aboard Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, has been arrested reentering the United States after several years as a fugitive in Europe.

The affidavit, which was used by insurance company lawyers trying to blame the U.S. government for the bombing, contended that terrorists had taken advantage of a federally approved narcotics operation to plant a bomb on the Pan Am jet. The drug dealers were allowed to smuggle drugs in order to identify the U.S. recipients, Coleman said.

Federal investigators have been probing whether the tale of the federal plot gone awry, which was widely reported and even featured on the cover of Time magazine in 1992, had been deliberately planted by an aviation insurance company in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid liability in the 1988 Pan Am crash, which resulted in 259 deaths.

The federal investigation into the origins of the story already has led to the conviction of multimillionaire John Brennan, the former head of New York City-based United States Aviation Underwriters, on unrelated fraud charges. While investigating the origins of the Pan Am story, FBI agents uncovered Brennan's involvement in trying to shift the blame for a 1987 USAir commuter jet crash in Los Angeles.

Brennan is appealing his conviction, and Harold Clark, the head of Aviation Underwriters, which also handles the insurance on TWA Flight 800, has said that the government does not understand the competitive and complex world of aviation insurance and is criminalizing normal business conduct.

Coleman, who has been charged with perjury and illegally attempting to obtain a passport under an assumed name, was arraigned before U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Platt in Uniondale last Friday. He did not have to enter a plea and was held without bail.

In an interview with a newspaper in Scotland last month, Coleman said he was the victim of "vindictive and selective" prosecution and "it is time go home and air this before a jury. . . . They can arrest me but they cannot silence me."

A lawyer for Coleman testified several weeks ago in federal court in Atlanta that his client's return tickets to the United States had been paid for by Alabama Gov. Fob James.

Capt. Roy Smith of the Alabama Department of Public Safety said that James had known Coleman when he worked in Birmingham several decades ago. When Coleman called the governor to say that he had information on criminal activities in Alabama, the governor turned the matter over to the department.

The department paid for Coleman to return to the United States. When he returned, he was arrested by federal authorities and then questioned by Alabama detectives. Smith would not say what the questioning concerned.

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"Victor Marchetti, former executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director and co-author of 'The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,' believes that the presence of the [five-man intelligence] team on Flight 103 is a clue that should not be ignored. His contacts at Langley agree. 'It's like the loose thread of a sweater,'' he says. ''Pull on it, and the whole thing may unravel.'"

Washington says Libya sabotaged the plane. Provocative evidence suggests that a Syrian drug dealer may have helped plant the bomb -- and the real targets were intelligence agents working for the CIA

''FOR THREE YEARS, I've had a feeling that if Chuck hadn't been on that plane, it wouldn't have been bombed,'' says Beulah McKee, 75. Her bitterness has still not subsided. But seated in the parlor of her house in Trafford, Pennsylvania, the house where her son was born 43 years ago, she struggles to speak serenely. ''I know that's not what our President wants me to say,'' she admits.

George Bush's letter of condolence, written almost four months after the shattered remains of Pan Am Flight 103 fell on Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, expressed the usual ''my heart goes out to you'' sorrow. ''No action by this government can restore the loss you have suffered,'' he concluded. But deep inside, Mrs. McKee suspects it was a government action gone horribly awry that indirectly led to her only son's death. ''I've never been satisfied at all by what the people in Washington told me,'' she says.

Today, as the U.S. spearheads the U.N.-sanctioned embargo against Libya for not handing over two suspects in the bombing, Mrs. McKee wonders if Chuck's background contains the secret of why this plane was targeted. If her suspicions are correct, Washington may not be telling the entire story. Major Charles Dennis McKee, called ''Tiny'' by his Army intelligence friends, was a burly giant and a superstar in just about every kind of commando training offered to American military personnel. He completed the rugged Airborne and Ranger schools, graduated first in his class from the Special Forces qualification course, and served with the Green Berets. In Beirut he was identified merely as a military attache assigned to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). But his hulking physique didn't fit such a low- profile diplomatic post. Friends there remember him as a ''walking arsenal'' of guns and knives. His real assignment reportedly was to work with the CIA in reconnoitering the American hostages in Lebanon and then, if feasible, to lead a daring raid that would rescue them.

McKee's thick, 37-page Army dossier contains so many blacked-out words that it's hard to glean the danger he faced. Surviving the censor's ink was his title, ''Team Chief.'' Under ''Evaluation,'' it was written that he ''performs constantly in the highest-stress environment with clear operational judgment and demeanor . . . Especially strong in accomplishing the mission with minimal guidance and supervision . . . Continues to perform one of the most hazardous and demanding jobs in the Army.''

For Beulah McKee the mystery deepened six months after Chuck's death, when she received a letter from another U.S. agent in Beirut. It was signed ''John Carpenter,'' a name the Pentagon says it can't further identify. Although the letter claimed that Chuck's presence on the Pan Am plane was unrelated to the bombing, Carpenter's message only stirred her suspicions. ''I cannot comment on Chuck's work,'' he wrote, ''because his work lives on. God willing, in time his labors will bear fruit and you will learn the true story of his heroism and courage.''

Chuck had given no clues about his work. Back home in November for Thanksgiving three weeks before he perished, he wouldn't even see his friends. ''I don't want to mingle, so I don't have to answer any questions,'' he told his mother. ''Anyway, he didn't have time,'' she recalls. ''He stayed up till 3 every morning studying reports. And when he flew back to Beirut, all he said was, 'Don't worry, Mom. Soon I'll be out from under all this pressure.'''

Almost immediately after the Pan Am bombing, which killed the 259 people aboard the plane and 11 more on the ground, the prime suspect was Ahmed Jibril, the roly-poly boss of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (P.F.L.P.-G.C.). Two months earlier, West German police had arrested 16 members of his terrorist organization. Seized during the raids was a plastic bomb concealed in a Toshiba cassette player, similar to the one that blew up Flight 103. There was other evidence pointing to Jibril. His patron was Syria. His banker for the attack on the Pan Am plane appeared to be Iran. U.S. intelligence agents even traced a wire transfer of several million dollars to a bank account in Vienna belonging to the P.F.L.P.-G.C. Iran's motive seemed obvious enough. The previous July, the U.S.S. Vincennes had mistakenly shot down an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf, killing all 298 aboard.

Suddenly, last November, the U.S. Justice Department blamed the bombing on two Libyans, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. The scenario prompted President Bush to remark, ''The Syrians took a bum rap on this.'' It also triggered an outcry from the victims' families, who claimed that pointing the finger at Libya was a political ploy designed to reward Syria for siding with the U.S. in the gulf war and to help win the release of the hostages. Even Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA's investigation of the bombing, told the New York Times it was ''outrageous'' to pin the whole thing on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

A four-month investigation by Time has disclosed evidence that raises new questions about the case. Among the discoveries:

-- According to an FBI field report from Germany, the suitcase originating in Malta that supposedly contained the bomb may not have been transferred to Pan Am Flight 103 in Frankfurt, as charged in the indictment of the two Libyans. Instead, the bomb-laden bag may have been substituted in Frankfurt for an innocent piece of luggage.

-- The rogue bag may have been placed on board the plane by Jibril's group with the help of Monzer al-Kassar, a Syrian drug dealer who was cooperating with the U.S.'s Drug Enforcement Administration in a drug sting operation. Al- Kassar thus may have been playing both sides of the fence.

-- Jibril and his group may have targeted that flight because on board was an intelligence team led by Charles McKee, whose job was to find and rescue the hostages.

Investigators initially focused their efforts on examining the procedures in the baggage-loading area at Frankfurt's international airport. But risking the transfer of an unaccompanied, bomb-laden suitcase to a connecting flight did not jibe with the precautions terrorists usually take. Security officers using video cameras routinely keep watch over the area. An intricate network of computerized conveyors, the most sophisticated baggage-transfer system in the world, shunts some 60,000 suitcases a day between loading bays. Every piece of luggage is logged minute by minute from one position to the next, so its journey through the airport is carefully monitored. The bags are then X-rayed by the airline before being put aboard a plane.

But the U.S. government's charges against al-Megrahi and Fhimah don't explain how the bronze-colored Samsonite suitcase, dispatched via Air Malta, eluded Frankfurt's elaborate airport security system. Instead, the indictment zeroes in on two tiny pieces of forensic evidence -- a fingernail-size fragment of green plastic from a Swiss digital timer, and a charred piece of shirt.

Even though investigators previously thought the bomb was probably detonated by a barometric trigger (considered much more reliable, especially in winter, when flights are frequently delayed and connections missed), a Swiss timer was traced to Libya. The shirt, which presumably had been wrapped around the bomb inside the suitcase, was traced to a boutique in Malta called Mary's House. The owner identified al-Megrahi as the shirt's purchaser, although he originally confused al-Megrahi with a Palestinian terrorist arrested in Sweden.

It was the computer printout produced by FAG, the German company that operates the sophisticated luggage-transfer system, that finally nailed down the indictment of the two Libyans. The printout, discovered months after the bombing, purportedly proved that their suitcase sent from Malta was logged in at Coding Station 206 shortly after 1 p.m. and then routed to Gate 44 in Terminal B, where it was put aboard the Pan Am jet. But a ''priority'' teletype sent from the U.S. embassy in Bonn to the FBI director in Washington on Oct. 23, 1989, reveals that despite the detailed computer records, considerable uncertainty surrounded the movement of this suitcase.

TIME has obtained a copy of the five-page FBI message, which states, ''This computer entry does not indicate the origin of the bag which was sent for loading on board Pan Am 103. Nor does it indicate that the bag was actually loaded on Pan Am 103. It indicates only that a bag of unknown origin was sent from Coding Station 206 at 1:07 p.m. to a position from which it was supposed to be loaded on Pan Am 103.''

The FBI message further explains that a handwritten record kept by a baggage handler at Coding Station 206 was even less specific about what happened to the suitcase. ''It is noted,'' the teletype continues, ''that the handwritten duty sheet indicates only that the luggage was unloaded from Air Malta 180. There is no indication how much baggage was unloaded or where the luggage was sent.'' The FBI agent's report concludes, ''There remains the possibility that no luggage was transferred from Air Malta 180 to Pan Am 103.''

Also described in the teletype is an incident that ''may provide insight into the possibilities of a rogue bag being inserted into the baggage system.'' On a guided tour of the baggage area in September 1989, it was disclosed, detective inspector Watson McAteer of the Scottish police and FBI special agent Lawrence G. Whitaker ''observed an individual approach Coding Station 206 with a single piece of luggage, place the luggage in a luggage container, encode a destination into the computer and leave without making any notation on a duty sheet.'' This convinced the two investigators that a rogue suitcase could have been ''sent to Pan Am 103 either before or after the unloading of Air Malta 180.''

Lee Kreindler, the lead attorney for the victims' families, who are suing Pan Am for $7 billion, says he can prove that the suitcase from Malta was put aboard Flight 103. He charges that a gross security failure by Pan Am, which went bankrupt in January 1991 and later folded, contributed to the disaster.

But it was the rogue-bag theory that was pursued by Pan Am's law firm, Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives, representing the airline's insurers. To piece together their version of how the bomb was planted, Pan Am's lawyers hired Interfor, Inc., a New York City firm specializing in international intelligence and security. If it hadn't been for the government's implausible plottings revealed during the Iran-contra hearings, Interfor's findings might be dismissed as a private eye's imagination run amuck -- especially considering the controversial background of the company's president, Juval Aviv.

Now 45 and an American citizen, Aviv claims to have headed the Mossad hit squad that hunted down and killed the Arab terrorists who murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Israeli and U.S. intelligence sources deny that Aviv was ever associated with Mossad. However, working for Pan Am, he spent more than six months tracking the terrorists who the airline now alleges are responsible for the bombing. While his report has been written off as fiction by many intelligence officials, a number of its findings appear well documented.

The central figure emerging from the Interfor investigation is a 44-year-old Syrian arms and drug trafficker, Monzer al-Kassar. His brother-in-law is Syria's intelligence chief, Ali Issa Duba, and his wife Raghda is related to Syrian President Hafez Assad.

Al-Kassar has many passports and identities. Most important, he was part of the covert network run by U.S. Lieut. Colonel Oliver North. During the Iran- contra hearings, it was revealed that al-Kassar was given $1.5 million to purchase weapons. Questioned about al-Kassar, former U.S. National Security Adviser John Poindexter said, ''When you're buying arms, you often have to deal with people you might not want to go to dinner with.''

It was through al-Kassar's efforts, or so he claimed, that two French hostages were released from Lebanon in 1986 in exchange for an arms shipment to Iran. The deal caught the eye of a freewheeling CIA unit code-named COREA, based in Wiesbaden, Germany. This special unit was reported to be trafficking in drugs and arms in order to gain access to terrorist groups.

For its cover overseas, COREA used various front companies: Stevens Mantra Corp., AMA Industries, Wildwood Video and Condor Television Ltd. Condor paid its bills with checks drawn on the First American Bank (account No. 2843900) in Washington, D.C., which was subsequently discovered to be a subsidiary of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International.

According to Aviv, agents in COREA's Wiesbaden headquarters allowed al-Kassar to continue running his smuggling routes to American cities in exchange for help in obtaining the release of the American hostages being held in Lebanon. At about the same time, al-Kassar's drug-smuggling enterprise was being used by the U.S.'s DEA in a sting operation. The DEA was monitoring heroin shipments from Lebanon to Detroit, Los Angeles and Houston, which have large Arab populations, in an attempt to nail the U.S. dealers.

By the fall of 1988, al-Kassar's operation had been spotted by P.F.L.P.-G.C. leader Ahmed Jibril, who had just taken on the assignment from Tehran to avenge the U.S. downing of its Airbus. A CIA undercover agent in Tripoli reported that Jibril also obtained Gaddafi's support. According to Mossad, Jibril dined with al-Kassar at a Paris restaurant and secured a reluctant promise of assistance in planting a bomb aboard an as yet unselected American transatlantic jet.

Al-Kassar's hesitancy was understandable. He wouldn't want anything to disrupt his profitable CIA-assisted drug and arms business. Presumably he was also worried because West German police had just raided the Popular Front hideouts around Dusseldorf and Frankfurt. Among those arrested: the Jordanian technical wizard and bombmaker Marwan Khreesat.

The bomb that ended up on the Pan Am jet could have been assembled by Khreesat. However, last month the Palestine Liberation Organization reported that it was built by Khaisar Haddad (a.k.a. Abu Elias), who is also a member of Jibril's Popular Front. Haddad purchased the detonator, the P.L.O. said, on the Beirut black market for more than $60,000.

The detonator, in fact, is considered one of the main keys to the bombing puzzle. Thomas Hayes, a leading forensics expert, did the main detective work on a minute piece of timer recovered from the wreckage by Scottish authorities. In a recent book about the Lockerbie investigation, On the Trail of Terror, British journalist David Leppard reports that ''Hayes is not prepared to commit himself publicly on whether the bomb that blew up Pan Am 103 was originally made by Khreesat and subsequently modified by timers of the sort found in possession of the Libyans.'' In fact, adds Leppard, ''his authoritative view is that not enough of the bomb's timing device has been recovered to make a definite judgment about whether it was a dual device containing a barometric switch and a timer, or a single trigger device, which was activated by just a timer.''

James M. Shaughnessy, Pan Am's lead defense lawyer, has tried to drive a wedge into this opening left by Hayes, thereby casting further doubt on Libya's responsibility for the bombing. Britain's High Court ruled that Pan Am's lawyers could depose Hayes. However, in a last-minute legal maneuver by the Scottish authorities, the deposition was blocked for reasons of national security. Pan Am's lawyers are now appealing that decision.

But regardless of the bomb's design, al-Kassar still didn't know how and when Jibril planned to use it. A Mossad agent, according to Aviv, first tipped off U.S. and West German intelligence agents that a terrorist attack would be made on an American passenger plane departing from Frankfurt on or about Dec. 18. Al-Kassar quickly figured out that Pan Am Flight 103 was the most likely target and, playing both sides of the fence, notified the COREA unit. His warning corroborated an earlier bomb threat, involving an unspecified Pan Am flight from Frankfurt, telephoned to the U.S. embassy in Helsinki.

Precisely how a rogue bag containing the bomb eluded the Frankfurt airport security system, Aviv doesn't know. Presumably this required the help of baggage handlers there. So in January 1990 he and a former U.S. Army polygraphist flew to Frankfurt, accompanied by Shaughnessy. At the Sheraton Conference Center, adjoining the airport, the polygraphist administered lie-detector tests to Pan Am baggage handlers Kilin Caslan Tuzcu and Roland O'Neill. Pan Am had determined that they were the only ones who were in a position to switch suitcases and place the bomb-laden bag aboard Flight 103.

Tuzcu took the test three times, and O'Neill took it twice. As the polygraphist later testified before a federal grand jury in Washington, Tuzcu ''was not truthful when he said he did not switch the suitcases.'' The polygraphist also told the grand jury, ''It is my opinion that Roland O'Neill wasn't truthful when he stated he did not see the suitcase being switched, and when he stated that he did not know what was in the switched suitcase.'' The two men continued to claim ignorance of a baggage switch.

After flunking their lie-detector tests, both were sent on a bogus errand by Pan Am to London, where it was assumed they would be arrested. But British authorities refused to even interrogate the pair. According to Leppard, Tuzcu and O'Neill were simply ''scapegoats'' and were never ''considered serious suspects.'' They returned to Frankfurt that same night.

If the bomb-laden luggage replaced an innocent bag, what happened to the displaced suitcase? On Dec. 21, 1988, the day of the bombing, one of Pan Am's Berlin-based pilots was about to head home to Seattle, Washington, for Christmas when he received orders to fly to Karachi first. He had with him two identical Samsonite suitcases full of presents. At the Berlin airport, he asked Pan Am to send them directly to Seattle. ''Rush'' tags, marked for Flights 637 to Frankfurt, 107 to London and 123 to Seattle, were affixed to the bags.

It so happened that the flight from Berlin to Frankfurt was delayed. While all the passengers ultimately made the connection to London, 11 suitcases, including the pilot's two bags, remained behind in Frankfurt. They were entered into the airport computer system and rerouted via the Pan Am flight. But only one of the pilot's suitcases was recovered at Lockerbie. The other had been mysteriously left behind in Frankfurt, and arrived safely in Seattle a day later. That story, which TIME has corroborated, doesn't prove Pan Am's claim that terrorists used al-Kassar's drug pipeline to pull a suitcase switch in Frankfurt. But it does support the theory that a rogue bag was inserted into the automated baggage-control system, as the secret FBI report indicates was possible.

TO GATHER FURTHER EVIDENCE that the bomb was not contained in an unaccompanied bag from Malta, Pan Am lawyer Shaughnessy recently interviewed under oath 20 officials who were in Malta on Dec. 21, 1988, including the airport security commander, the bomb-disposal engineer who inspected all the baggage, the general manager of ground operations of Air Malta, the head loader of Flight 180 and the three check-in agents. Their records showed that no unaccompanied suitcases were put aboard the flight, and some of the staff Shaughnessy interviewed are prepared to testify under oath that there was no bag that day destined for Pan Am Flight 103.

Although Shaughnessy subpoenaed the FBI, CIA, DEA and four other government agencies for all documents pertaining to both the bombing of Flight 103 and the narcotics sting operation, he has been repeatedly rebuffed by the Justice Department for reasons of national security. Even so, with the help of investigators hired after Aviv, he has managed to obtain some of the documents needed to defend Pan Am's insurers in the trial scheduled to begin April 27 at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The stakes are enormous, and the incentive is high for Shaughnessy to demonstrate the government's responsibility for the bombing. In addition to defending against the compensation claims of $7 billion, he is bringing a claim against the government for failing to give warning that Pan Am had been targeted by the terrorists.

The man who has been Shaughnessy's key witness in these proceedings is hiding in fear of his life in a small town in Europe. His real name is Lester Knox Coleman III, although as a former spy for the DIA and DEA he was known as Thomas Leavy and by the code name Benjamin B. A year ago, the stockily built, bearded Coleman filed an affidavit describing the narcotics sting operation that Shaughnessy claims was infiltrated by Jibril.

It wasn't until July 1990, when Coleman spotted a newspaper picture of one of the Pan Am victims and recognized the young Lebanese as one of his drug-running informants, that he realized he might be of assistance to Pan Am. He was also looking for work. Two months earlier he had been deactivated by the DIA after being arrested by the FBI for using his DIA cover name, Thomas Leavy, on a passport application. Coleman claims that the DIA instructed him to do this. ''But such trumped-up charges are frequently used to keep spooks quiet,'' says A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a Pentagon whistle-blower and a director of the Fund for Constitutional Government in Washington, which has been looking into Coleman's case.

Coleman spent three days in jail. His official pretrial services report, filed with the U.S. District Court of Illinois for the Northern District, began, ''Although Mr. Coleman's employment history sounds quite improbable, information he gave has proven to be true.''

Raised in Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia, Coleman, now 48, was recruited by the DIA and assigned to the still classified humint (Human Intelligence) MC-10 operation in the Middle East. In early 1987 he was transferred from Lebanon to Cyprus, where he began his work for the DEA. However, he says he was instructed not to inform the DEA there of his role as a DIA undercover agent. By this time even the DIA suspected that the freewheeling narcotics sting operation was getting out of hand.

In Nicosia, Coleman saw the supposedly controlled shipments of heroin, called kourah in Lebanon -- inspiration for the CIA operation's code name COREA -- grow into a torrent. The drugs were delivered by couriers who arrived on the overnight ferry from the Lebanese port of Jounieh. After receiving their travel orders from the DEA, the couriers were escorted to the Larnaca airport by the Cypriot national police and sent on their way to Frankfurt and other European transit points. The DEA testified at hearings in Washington that no ''controlled deliveries'' of drugs through Frankfurt were made in 1988.

Coleman's DEA front in Nicosia, called the Eurame Trading Co. Ltd., was located on the top floor of a high-rise apartment near the U.S. embassy. He says the intelligence agency paid him with unsigned Visa traveler's checks issued by B.C.C.I. in Luxembourg. Additionally, the DEA country attache in Cyprus, Michael Hurley, kept a drawer full of cash in his office at the embassy, which he parceled out to Coleman and to a parade of confidential informants, known by such nicknames as ''Rambo Dreamer,'' ''Taxi George'' and ''Fadi the Captain.'' Hurley admitted in a Justice Department affidavit that he paid Coleman $74,000 for information.

The informants, Coleman reported, were under the control of Ibrahim el-Jorr. ''He was a Wild West character who wore cowboy boots and tooled around in a Chevy with expired Texas plates,'' he says. ''I was told (by el-Jorr)) that in the Frankfurt airport the suitcases containing the narcotics were put on flights to the U.S. by agents or other sources working in the baggage area. From my personal observation, Germany's BKA (Bundeskriminalamt, the German federal police) was also involved, as was Her Majesty's Customs and Excise service in the United Kingdom.''

After deciding to become a witness for Pan Am, Coleman phoned a friend, Hartmut Mayer, a German intelligence agent in Cyprus, and asked if he knew how the bomb got aboard Flight 103. Mayer suggested calling a ''Mr. Harwick'' and a ''Mr. Pinsdorf,'' who Mayer said were running the investigation at the Frankfurt airport. ''I spoke with Pinsdorf,'' says Coleman. ''From his conversation I learned that BKA had serious concerns that the drug sting operation originating in Cyprus had caused the bomb to be placed on the Pan Am plane.'' Mayer and Pinsdorf gave depositions last year at the request of Pan Am. But the German Federal Ministry of the Interior ruled they couldn't discuss law-enforcement matters relating to other nations. Mayer did say he knew Coleman.

''It took three informants just to keep tabs on al-Kassar,'' claims Coleman. He said the informants reported that al-Kassar and the Syrian President's brother Rifaat Assad were taking over drug production in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, under protection of the Syrian army. Coleman also says he learned that the principal European transfer point for their heroin shipments was the Frankfurt airport.

In December 1988 al-Kassar picked up some news that threatened to shut down his smuggling operation. Charles McKee's counterterrorist team in Beirut that was investigating the possible rescue of the nine American hostages had got wind of his CIA connection. The team was outraged that the COREA unit in Wiesbaden was doing business with a Syrian who had close terrorist connections and might endanger their planned rescue attempt.

Besides McKee, a key member of the team was Matthew Gannon, 34, the CIA's deputy station chief in Beirut and a rising star in the agency. After venting their anger to the CIA in Langley about al-Kassar, McKee and Gannon were further upset by headquarters' failure to respond. Its silence was surprising because Gannon's father-in-law Thomas Twetten, who now commands the CIA's worldwide spy network, was then chief of Middle East operations based in Langley. He was also Ollie North's CIA contact.

MCKEE AND GANNON, joined by three other members of the team, decided to fly back to Virginia unannounced and expose the COREA unit's secret deal with al-Kassar. They packed $500,000 in cash provided for their rescue mission, as well as maps and photographs of the secret locations where the hostages were being held. Then the five-man team booked seats on Pan Am 103 out of London, arranging to fly there on a connecting flight from Cyprus.

McKee's mother says she is sure her son's sudden decision to fly home was not known to his superiors in Virginia. ''This was the first time Chuck ever telephoned me from Beirut,'' she says. ''I was flabbergasted. 'Meet me at the Pittsburgh airport tomorrow night,' he said. 'It's a surprise.' Always before he would wait until he was back in Virginia to call and say he was coming home.''

Apparently the team's movements were being tracked by the Iranians. A story that appeared in the Arabic newspaper Al-Dustur on May 22, 1989, disclosed that the terrorists set out to kill McKee and his team because of their planned hostage-rescue attempt. The author, Ali Nuri Zadeh, reported that ''an American agent known as David Love-Boy (he meant Lovejoy), who had struck bargains on weapons to the benefit of Iran,'' passed information to the Iranian embassy in Beirut about the team's travel plans. Reported to be a onetime State Department security officer, Lovejoy is alleged to have become a double agent with CIA connections in Libya. His CIA code name was said to be ''Nutcracker.''

Lawyer Shaughnessy uncovered similar evidence. His affidavit, filed with the federal district court in Brooklyn, New York, asserts that in November and December 1988 the U.S. government intercepted a series of telephone calls from Lovejoy to the Iranian charge d'affaires in Beirut advising him of the team's movements. Lovejoy's last call came on Dec. 20, allegedly informing the Iranians that the team would be on Pan Am Flight 103 the following day.

In his book, Lockerbie: The Tragedy of Flight 103, Scottish radio reporter David Johnston disclosed that British army searches of the wreckage recovered more than $500,000 cash, believed to belong to the hostage-rescue team, and what appeared to be a detailed plan of a building in Beirut, with two crosses marking the location of the hostages. The map also pinpointed the positions of sentries guarding the building and contained a description of how the building might be taken.

Johnston also described how CIA agents helicoptered into Lockerbie shortly after the crash seeking the remnants of McKee's suitcase. ''Having found part of their quarry,'' he wrote, ''the CIA had no intention of following the exacting rules of evidence employed by the Scottish police. They took the suitcase and its contents into the chopper and flew with it to an unknown destination.'' Several days later the empty suitcase was returned to the same spot, where Johnston reported that it was ''found'' by two British Transport Police officers, ''who in their ignorance were quite happy to sign statements about the case's discovery.''

Richard Gazarik, a reporter for the Greensburg, Pennsylvania, Tribune-Review, spent many months probing the major's secret mission. He found, hidden inside the lining of McKee's wallet, which was retrieved from the Pan Am wreckage and returned to his mother, what he assumes was McKee's code name, Chuck Capone, and the gangster code names (Nelson, Dillinger, Bonnie and Clyde) of the other team members.

The theory that Jibril targeted Flight 103 in order to kill the hostage-rescue team is supported by two independent intelligence experts. M. Gene Wheaton, a retired U.S. military-intelligence officer with 17 years' duty in the Middle East, sees chilling similarities between the Lockerbie crash and the suspicious DC-8 crash in Gander, Newfoundland, which killed 248 American soldiers in 1985. Wheaton is serving as investigator for the families of the victims of that crash. ''A couple of my old black ops buddies in the Pentagon believe the Pan Am bombers were gunning for McKee's hostage-rescue team,'' he says. ''But they were told to shift the focus of their investigation because it revealed an embarrassing breakdown in security.'' The FBI says it investigated the theory that McKee's team was targeted and found no evidence to support it.

Victor Marchetti, former executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director and co-author of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, believes that the presence of the team on Flight 103 is a clue that should not be ignored. His contacts at Langley agree. ''It's like the loose thread of a sweater,'' he says. ''Pull on it, and the whole thing may unravel.'' In any case, Marchetti believes the bombing of Flight 103 could have been avoided. ''The Mossad knew about it and didn't give proper warning,'' he says. ''The CIA knew about it and screwed up.''

The CIA may still be trying to find out more information about why McKee and Gannon suddenly decided to fly home. Last year three CIA agents, reportedly following up on their hostage-rescue mission, were shot dead in a Berlin hotel while waiting to meet a Palestinian informant.

Beulah McKee has given up trying to find out if Pan Am's bombers were after her son, although she says, ''The government's secrecy can't close off my mind.'' Twice she called and questioned Gannon's widow Susan, who like her husband and her father Tom Twetten worked for the CIA. ''The last time, I was accused of opening my mouth too much,'' says Mrs. McKee.

Yet memories die hard, and mothers never quite get accustomed to losing a child. Beulah McKee keeps her son's bedroom all tidied up, as if she still expected him to come home. His pictures, diplomas, military awards, even his chrome-plated bowie knife, decorate the walls. In a cardboard carton under the made-up bed are the heavily censored service records of her son, which may contain the secret of why Pan Am 103 was blown out of the sky over Scotland.

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In a special People & Power report, John Coates investigates the Lockerbie bombing.

Lockerbie today seems a world away from the hellish scenes here 18 years ago.

In December 1988, just four days before Christmas, a terrorist bomb exploded on a Pan American Jumbo jet flying between London and New York. 270 people died in the attack,11 of them residents of the town.

The world was deeply shocked by the tragedy here at Lockerbie. It soon became clear that a bomb had gone off in a suitcase in the aircraft baggage hold. The blast blew a gaping hole in the fuselage, condemning everybody on board to death.

The Lockerbie bombing became the biggest mass murder in British criminal history. But while Al-Megrahi is behind bars, many believe he was wrongly convicted.

Jim…it appears that political convenience strode into the field and demolished the search for the truth and converted it into a political charade…

Tam

Libya was scapegoated and had nothing whatever to do with it.

Kochler

Megrahi is not guilty as charged and for that reason I consider that the verdicts of the trial and the appeal courts as a miscarriage of justice.

Former Scottish MP Tam Dalyell has asked countless parliamentary questions and secured no fewer than 17 debates in the British House of Commons about the Lockerbie bombing.

Tam

Q: Do you think there has been a cover up in this?

A: Yes, a huge cover up.

Q: Why do you think that?

A: Because it is too embarrassing for the Governments of the United States and then Britain to allow us to get anywhere near the truth.

Dr Jim Swire is leader of a campaign which has been fighting for the truth about what really happened at Lockerbie. He heard all the evidence at the nine month trial. He lost his eldest daughter, Flora.

There was only one item of forensic material that was key to defining the device that might have triggered the bomb that blew up the plane, and that was a small piece of circuit board.

The prosecution claimed this tiny fragment came from a digital timer used by the Libyans to set off the bomb. Swire and Dalyell suspect this evidence was planted, in the remains of clothing.

Jim

The fragment was originally found in very early ’89 and it was then put in a police evidence bag, and the bag was labelled “charred cloth”. This was in January 89 and it doesn’t seem to have been until May 89 that this bag came to the attention of the forensic guys and by the time they got it the label seemed to have been changed and it now read “charred debris” which is a convenient way of making it appropriate for if you’re going to find something other than just cloth inside the bag when you come to opening it up. And nobody would admit to having changed the label.

Voice over

This wasn’t the only change. The court heard how an extra page of forensic notes relating to this fragment had been inserted into a set of notes, with subsequent pages renumbered. The senior forensic officer who wrote them, Dr Thomas Hayes, was asked to explain why by defence barrister Richard Keen:

Keen: Now, when was that change in pagination carried out, Dr. Hayes ?

Hayes: I'm sorry, I have no idea.

Keen: Why was it carried out, Dr. Hayes?

Hayes: I agree, it's a very good question. I'm sure there is a quite innocent explanation, which I have no idea of.

Tam

Q: How do you think that circuit board was found?

A: I think it was planted.

Q: Why do you think that? And by whom?

A: By, frankly, American authorities. It was planted in order to support a case against Libya which was a very rickety case.

Jim

I did not believe that any circuit board would survive in any recognisable shape whatever from being that close to that charge of Semtex exploding and yet, here we had a fragment which was alleged to have done so and which conveniently retained sufficient characteristics to identify what kind of commercial timer it had been derived from.

Furthermore, during the court hearings it was established that nobody had done the basic forensic tests for explosive residues in relation to that fragment, absolutely extraordinary because the fragment was the only thing that pointed to the nature of the timer, so the court never knew whether in fact the fragment it was being shown had actually been anywhere near an explosive because it had never been tested. And these sort of things congregate only round this fragment. There are other things that are deeply worrying about the associated clothing and so on and the suitcase. But this, I think, is the key item that really swung me round to thinking God this has been fabricated, this thing’s a set up.

Voice Over

For the first 18 months of the Lockerbie investigation, the authorities considered the bombing to be a joint operation between the Syrian-backed Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command – the PFLP-GC - and its paymasters for the attack, the Iranian government.

The bomb was allegedly hidden inside a Toshiba radio cassette recorder, a means of concealment known to have been adopted by this terrorist group before.

Just two months before the bombing, in a security operation called Autumn Leaves, West German police had arrested one of its cells with a bomb concealed inside a similar Toshiba model. This bomb had a pressure-sensitive barometric trigger for use in an aircraft attack. Remarkably, some members of this cell were quickly released, including the bomb maker.

The American State Department later reported that early intelligence had indicated the PFLP-GC and elements of the Iranian government had planned to attack a US target in retaliation for the accidental shooting down of an Iranian Airbus by a US warship in July of 1988.

290 people died in this incident, the Iranians had promised revenge and the Lockerbie bombing came five months later.

Tam

It was vengeance for the shooting down of that Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes in the Gulf. The airliner that was carrying pilgrims to Mecca and no apology was given.

Voice Over

The recent Holywood film Syriana is based on a book by former CIA officer Robert Baer, much of it about his exploits in the Middle East. He worked on the early stages of his agency’s investigation into Lockerbie.

Baer

Western intelligence had indisputable evidence that the Iranians were planning to attack aircraft in July 1988.

We were aware of an Iranian from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps went to a camp outside Beirut, a Palestinian camp, where he met Dalkamoni, a Palestinian who later became in charge of an operation called Autumn Leaves which was to shoot down five airplanes. This Iranian from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps went to Dalkamoni, the Palestinian, and said we are going to pay you money and give you support to blow up five aircraft in revenge for the Americans shooting down the Airbus.

Q: How good was that intelligence ?

A: It was Grade A intelligence. It doesn’t get any better.

Two days after Lockerbie, there was a transfer payment from Paris to Hungary, which went to the PFLP-GC.

Q: How much money ?

A: It was an 11 million dollar transfer.

Q: So how come the Libyans were suddenly identified as the culprits ?

A: Well look at Iran’s population. Look at the threat they posed to the Gulf, to oil. Look at their ability to take reprisals all over the world. It was politically not convenient to go after Iran. Not just inconvenient but impossible.

Baer 5

The Libyans were identified as the culprits because they were indictable. They were somebody you could bring to justice. Additionally, they had fragments of evidence, forensics in this chip that was found at Lockerbie, which pointed to the Libyans. It was enough evidence to implicate to a trial. But what happened was neither the prosecution nor the defence was given this exculpatory information about Iran and the Palestinians.

Voice Over

There are also many who speculate that there were pressing political reasons as well - the build-up to and aftermath of the first Gulf War.

Jim

This tragedy for our families was set in the context of pretty extreme international political pressures and if we talk about 1990, when suddenly the criminal investigation seemed to switch to accusing Libya, that was a time when America needed to prepare to fight the first Gulf War and in order to do that she needed Syria to be neutral.

It was alleged that the two Libyans had conspired together to plant the Lockerbie bomb at the main airport in Malta. Somehow they had managed to plant a suitcase containing the bomb on an Air Malta fight to Frankfurt, using a false baggage tag.

At Frankfurt airport the unaccompanied suitcase had been transferred to a feeder flight to London, as the baggage records appeared to show.

And once here at London’s Heathrow airport, the suitcase was then loaded on to Pan Am 103, which took off for New York. Thirty eight minutes later the bomb exploded over Lockerbie.

Voice Over

Eight years went by before the two Libyans were handed over and put on trial at a specially arranged Scottish court convened in Holland, with three senior judges but no jury.

The prosecution struggled to convince the judges that the Libyans were guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Most of the evidence against them was circumstantial.

Despite this, after a trial lasting 9 months they convicted Al-Megrahi of murder, a verdict later upheld by an Appeal Court. His co-accused, Fhima, however was found not guilty. These verdicts surprised many following the trial, including the United Nations special observer Dr Hans Kochler.

Kochler

The verdict was basically inconsistent and the formulation of the verdict, the opinion of the court which has been issued after the trial and after the appeal, according to my own evaluation, was not logically consistent and was not convincing. I mean the splitting in the sense of declaring one person guilty and the other one not guilty was not logical. No one with reason, will believe that a lone person would have been able to organize such a terrorist attack.

Voice Over

Serious doubts have remained about many other discrepancies that emerged during the trial. Particularly the evidence of a Maltese shopkeeper,Tony Gauci. He allegedly sold Al- Megrahi clothes found at Lockerbie and linked to the bomb.

Gauci described the customer as six feet tall and about 50 years old. Al-Megrahi is 5 foot 8 and was 36 at the time.

Tam

He got Megrahi’s height completely wrong, which is odd for a man who was a tailor and then there was this whole business as to the date on which it supposedly happened.

Voice Over

Gauci said it was definitely raining when the clothes were bought, because he sold the man an umbrella as well.

His shop assistant was also away watching football that day. This left two possible dates.

November 23 1988, when Al-Megrahi could prove he was not in Malta. The other, two weeks later on December 7th, when he was there.

A weather expert gave evidence there was a 90% chance that it was not raining on this December date and if it was, not enough to wet the ground.

Despite this, the trial judges concluded he had bought the clothes, on the December date

Jim

Q: What did you make of that?

A: Well it gave the impression that everything had to fit with a preconceived outcome I’m afraid and that is a concept that seems to run through all the events between the disaster and the start of the trial. There seem to have been a concept that had to be fitted.

Voice Over

Dennis Phipps is an aviation security expert and a former head of security at British Airways. In 1990, in a separate civil court case, he was hired by Air Malta to examine evidence and witness statements relating to the Lockerbie bombing, at Malta, Frankfurt and London’s Heathrow Airport.

Phipps:

Q: How tight was security generally at Malta’s Luqa airport when you investigated the situation there ?

A: It was good in accordance with the standards of the time.

Q: Now you checked the paperwork and you interviewed baggage loaders from Air Malta. What did you find?

A: I felt quite satisfied that they had carried out a physical count, they knew exactly the number of bags they had put onto an aircraft.

Furthermore, there is no record that any passenger who travelled on that flight reported that their hold baggage had not out-turned, which would, to my mind, preclude the possibility of a bag being substituted for a bag checked in by a passenger.

There was no direct evidence of an unaccompanied bag on the flight.

Baer

Look, I used to teach explosives. The last thing you want to do is put a bomb in place like Malta and have two stops on the way, especially with a barometric switch. You couldn’t count on airplanes being on time. This was around Christmas time and airplanes are always delayed. Baggage is always lost. Planes turn around. You couldn’t count on this thing hitting its target.

Voice Over

The prosecution asserted that a Frankfurt Airport baggage worker’s hand written work sheet proved that an unaccompanied bag had, in fact, arrived or out-turned from an Air Malta flight.

Phipps

Q: How reliable is this worksheet that was produced by the prosecution?

A: There is one obvious error referring to bags coming from a particular Lufthansa flight which we know did not happen.

There is no accounting for individual bags and the bags that came in during the period that the worksheet covers, could come from various flights including odd individual bags from all round the airport.

Q: …what about London’s Heathrow airport? What scope was there for the bomb to have been planted there?

A: At the time the general aviation security standards did not provide for everybody, including pass-holders going air-side, being searched, for every item being taken air-side to be searched, and for every vehicle going air-side to be searched. So it is possible that a suitcase containing a device could have been taken into Heathrow at the time of the Lockerbie incident.

Baer

Q: So you think it’s unlikely it was planted in Malta ?

A I who is someone who’s been involved in this, involved in investigating terrorism for 30 years, Malta would not have been my first choice. It would have been London. If I was determined to bring down an airplane I would have put it on in London.

Jim

What the prosecution were asking the court to believe was that a Libyan in Malta had used a digital timer which he could have set to run for any number of hours that he wanted, he happened to set it, according to the prosecution, in such a way that it exploded exactly in the middle of the time window that would have been occupied by one of these PFLP-GC Syrian-based devices had one of those been used.

That is a very, very difficult co-incidence to explain away !

Voice Over

There have long been doubts about much of the evidence used to convict Al-Megrahi. But the question remains: why would the Libyan government agree to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the families of the Lockerbie victims if Libya had no role in the bombing ?

LIBYAN MINISTER

We thought that it was easier for us to buy peace. And this is why we agreed on compensation. Therefore, we said let us buy peace, let us put the whole case behind us and let us look forward.

Voice Over

There are others, meanwhile, who still want some answers.

Bill Cadman was another victim of the Lockerbie bombing. His parents, Martin and Rita Cadman, are also members of the UK victims’ families group. For the last 18 years, they’ve fought for an independent inquiry into what happened.

Martin Cadman

We saw Tony Blair a couple of years ago now – we got a report on it. When I read the report on it, I wasn’t sure that we were at the same meeting even, because he seemed to have reneged on pretty well everything that we thought we might be getting, so it was a very unsatisfactory outcome. It’s the second time we had a meeting with Blair.

Q: And what did he say?

A: Well, we haven’t had an inquiry. We don’t want an inquiry for its own sake. We only want an inquiry if it leads to the truth and the truth is what we want. The truth is much more important than the detail.

Tam

Q: The relatives also got an undertaking from the Labour opposition that there would be an enquiry if the Labour party got into power, but no such enquiry has happened. Why is that?

A: I think because the Americans took Blair aside and said don’t pursue this and he does what Washington asks - in this and many other matters.

Jim

What we’ve always looked for from the start is the truth. We want to know why our loved ones’ lives were not protected and there were warnings that were ignored and all this kind of thing. But also we want to know who actually murdered them.

Tam

Q: Do you think you’ll ever get the truth behind the Lockerbie bombing?

A: I am hopeful. There may be a death bed repentance of somebody, or it may gradually come out. If the Scottish Criminal Review Body puts it back into the Court, there is going to be such huge pressure that I think somehow or another the truth will eek out.

Professor Robert Black, Professor of Law at Edinburgh University.

1. I was astonished at the verdict. The evidence in the case was wholly circumstantial and it was capable of entirely innocent and neutral interpretations. At the time before the verdict was in, but after all the evidence had been heard, I expressed the view rashly that for there to be a conviction then the situation would have to be such that the judges were adopting the posture of the 'White Queen' in 'Alice Through the Looking Glass' – namely 'why sometimes I believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast'. That's precisely what the judges did in convicting Megrahi.

2. The appeal court rejected his appeal because … Under Scottish criminal procedure an appeal court can only address questions that the appellant chooses to lay before it. Megrahi's then legal team asked the court the wrong questions and it's not surprising therefore that the court gave the wrong answers.

3. In my view that is virtually inevitable. The result reached in the original trial which was not overturned on appeal because of defects and the way the appeal was presented is such that the conviction is simply contrary to the weight of the evidence. And I think it is quite clear that if the correct questions are asked – namely, on this evidence, 'Could any reasonable tribunal find Mr Megrahi guilty?' The answer has to be no. And I would be amazed if the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission reached any other conclusion.

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LEON COUNTY FLORIDA, USA

I, LESTER K. COLEMAN, a permanent resident of the State of Florida do affirm the following to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I have only spotted first hand memory of particular events, therefore this affidavit was prepared after reviewing documents obtained under USC 5, Section 552 (a)(b) THE U.S. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE PRIVACY ACTS, from research conducted by third parties gleaned from public files and court documents.

I suffered from, and was treated for, several mental disorders from 1997 until 2003, diagnosed as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Depression, Anxiety Disorder, and Global Amnesia. These conditions are affirmed to have been triggered by severe abuse and medical Mal-Treatment while in federal custody, accused of making a false statement in an affidavit submitted in a civil case, ( Pan American World Airways v U.S., EDNY, 1990/ dismissed ).

I was held in pre-trial detention without bail and was transported sixteen times, housed in eight federal holding facilities in Atlanta, Oklahoma, Miami, NY MDC, NY MCC, Chicago, Milan, MI, and Manchester, KY.

I was held in solitary confinement several times in an 8X8 cell, up to five occupants sharing two bunked cots and one toilet. I was deprived of sleep, lights on 24/7, subjected to extreme noise therapy. I was repeatedly questioned by unknown persons in Atlanta, Oklahoma, NY MDC and Milan MI for hours at a time, sometimes subjected to flashing light treatment. Through out this abuse, I was suffering from Cancer. Even after a operation was performed I was returned to solitary confinement where I was deprived of post-operative care. The neglect was so severe that I was hospitalized for 11 days. It was at the hospital in White Plains, NY that I was diagnosed with PTSD by Dr. Harvey Berman, MD, PhD. Two officials I can now identify who were directly involved in my abuse are Victor Martinez the Unit Manager and William Austin the Case Worker at MDC, Brooklyn, NY

I affirm that my affidavit provided to Pan am, at the time sworn, was believed to be true and correct. The renunciation of my original statements was done under duress after subjected to the treatment as previously described.

I moved to Lexington, Kentucky to host a daily radio talk show at LM Communications, WLXG in September, 1997. My mental afflictions caused me to leave the station and be placed on disability in June, 1998. My air name at WLXG was LEX COLEMAN. My true legal name was THOMAS LEAVY. I had changed my name in April, 1990 prior to leaving the USA for Beirut. The name change was necessary as my birth name was well known to Syrian backed Narco-Terrorist cells operating in the Middle East and Europe.

This was a consequence of my work as an intelligence operative, contract consultant for two U.S. government agencies. I was involved with classified activities including: OPERATION MINERET, OPERATION DOME, OPERATION GOLDEN ROD, AND OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON in the years 1985 – 1989.

In 1999 I was asked by James Cormney, President and CEO of the Campbell House Hotel and Golf Club in Lexington, KY to assist in compiling evidence that would clear his son, Timothy, and free him from prison. I conducted an investigation and obtained advise from several forensic experts, including FBI Crime-Lab Whistleblower, Dr. Fredrick Whitehurst. We determined that Lexington-Police and “misplaced” key pieces of forensic evidence and at least one Lexington police officer embellished his credentials in sworn testimony.

During this same time period, I was named in the world press as a potential witness in the criminal trial of two Libyans accused of blowing up Pan Am 103. The night after the explosion in December, 1988 I appeared on NBC Nightly News as an expert on Middle East terrorism and said Libya likely had a role since CIA renegade, Edwin Wilson had shipped 20 tons of explosives to Muhammar Kaddafi , and had trained Libyan hit squads to blow up things.

Former New York Times editor, Author Donald Goddard wrote a book about me and my whistle blowing in a book, Trail of the Octopus, published in September, 1993. I cooperated with Goddard while under the protection of the Swedish government who had given my family sanctuary. Three days prior to publication the USA government announced in a news conference that I was being charged with perjury over the affidavit I gave Pan Am three years earlier, in a civil case that was dismissed.

While residing in Europe, I worked with ABC European Bureau Chief, Pierre Salinger to track the source of the Pan Am bomb. The international press had published abundant stories linking Syria, Iran and Libya to the attack. In April 1992 TIME Magazine ran a cover story about the bombing featuring my allegations and evidence gathered by many law enforcement, intelligence investigators and journalists. A year after the TIME cover story, Goddard’s book was published in Hard cover edition.

The Swedish government refused to recognize the USA indictment of me for perjury over the civil affidavit. The FBI (LEGAT LONDON) transmitted a communiqué to Swedish authorities via INTERPOL on March 30, 1992 that contained fabricated claims, including a made-up arrangement with a Swedish doctor that never existed. Swedish Secret police (SAPO) concluded that the FBI had lied.

While under Swedish protection, I lived under the name Jon Christie and held travel documents in that name. In 1994, with the assistance of SAPO I and my family relocated to an undisclosed country. In 1995 we relocated to Spain with the knowledge of Spanish authorities.

I returned to the USA in 1996 with the urging of my family. The governor of Alabama, Forest “Fob” James provided transportation from Madrid to the States. I was arrested and held without bail, and was subjected to the abuse. I was illegally held for 154 days. I was finally compensated by the USA Justice Department in a TORT settlement in June, 2002.

I had appeared in a film while living in Europe, in the year 1994, called THE MALTESE DOUBLE CROSS, produced by Allan Francovich. It reinforced Goddard’s version of the Pan Am bombing, linking Syrian backed terrorist, Iran and Libya to the mass murder. I basically said Libyan agents designed and built the bomb. Syrian based terrorist under the command of Ahmed Jibril carried out the plot, and Iran paid $10 million to have it done. The Iranians sought revenge for the American shoot-down of an Iran Air flight in July, 1988 filled with religious pilgrims bound for Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The destruction of Pan Am 103, filled with revealers headed home for Christmas, was equal and just revenge under Sharia, Islamic law. Five USA intelligence officers were among the dead.

Dr. Oswald LeWinter also appeared in the film. LeWinter was an Austrian born Jew who had escaped the Nazi death camps in his youth, and had made it to America.

He ultimately became an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and was taken under the wing of James Angleton, the father of CIA covert operations. It was under Angleton’s watch that LeWinter became a NOC (Non Official Cover) and slipped into the shadow world. After Angleton’s departure, LeWinter fell into disfavor at Langley and was even arrested by the FBI during the Iran-Contra boondoggle. Like me, LeWinter linked Syrian, Iran, and Libyan elements to the bombing.

When I was arrested in Lexington, KY in 1999, accused of possessing forged instruments, LeWinter was arrested in Vienna, Austria for the same thing, and Allan Francovich dropped dead while clearing U.S. Customs in Houston, TX, after disembarking a flight from London.

I was thrown into a severely over crowded jail and subjected to filthy and deplorable conditions. As a result, I had a severe psychological relapse. I cannot remember in any detail my arrest or detention from July 1999 until December, 2000. The Fayette County Kentucky Court records says I appeared in September, 1999 and said I was mentally disabled and my legal name was Thomas Leavy. This has been affirmed to be true by records obtained from Social Security files and from a Federal Pre-Trial Services Report prepared in 1990, published in Goddard’s book.

A mental evaluation was ordered, and, according to the Court records I obtained in 2004, a pre-cursor mental exam was conducted by a Dr. Harwell Smith on September 25, 1999. Dr. Smith recommended I under go a complete in-patient exam to determine competency and capacity. There is no Court record of Dr. Smith’s report nor a recommendation by an alleged court-appointed lawyer to obtain a complete in-patient evaluation prior to my trial, nor during the trial, nor in 2003, when I was charged with violating probation. I was never provided a proper hearing by the trial court in Kentucky at any time.

The case against me was based on OVERSEAS checks deposited into my account at Central Bank and Trust of Kentucky, that cleared ON DEPOSIT. The Court video shows representatives from U.S. branches of foreign banks testified the checks were not printed on official bank customer paper stock. No actual signatory ever testified or claimed they had been bilked over checks deposited into my own account. The only party claiming monetary loss was Central Bank and Trust, ,my own bank, now a defendant in a federal suit in Washington, DC, and under investigation by the FDIC.

Even James Cormney, labeled a victim by prosecutors, testified at trial that he was NOT a victim, and even praised my investigative skills that uncovered police and prosecutorial mis-conduct in his Son’s prosecution.

The only alleged victim who appeared was a former landlady, Betty Bennet, who had received a check that Central Bank had refused to process. It is interesting that this is was also my bank and Mr. Cormney’s bank, and the bank that had cleared OVERSEAS checks ON DEPOSIT to my account, then claimed they were a victim of fraud.

A jury found me guilty in March, 2000. They fixed a sentence of four years. The Judge, Thomas Clark, placed me on probation and added six more years to the suspended sentence, totaling ten years.

In February, 2001 I was placed back on Disability. That Summer I worked as a program director for a Summer Camp in the Pocono Mountains for eight weeks. In September the crash of the planes into the World Trade Center triggered another psychological relapse. This was confirmed in a full Mental evaluation by Dr. Rosa K. Riggs, MD, PhD September 18th and 25th, submitted to Social Security. Social Security records shows that my trial attorney, Michael T. Meehan also was the principle contact person listed by Social Security throughout my trial, my initial incarceration, and while I was on probation and when I was examined by Dr. Riggs for disability. The record further shows Meehan used the Riggs report as evidence in the Federal TORT claim that was settled in June, 2002. At no time did I have any direct contact with Social Security, all communications was handled by attorney Meehan.

The record shows I fled Kentucky after the 9/11 disaster after receiving a contract from JATCO, a company based in Saudi Arabia on October 6, 2001. A JATCO general partner is a member of the Saudi Royal family who also is a principle in the King Faisal Academy. Though I have never seen such a document, it is my understanding that Prince Abdul Aziz, Bin-Saud transmitted verification of my company’s affiliation to attorney Meehan and he submitted it to the court. I carried out assignments and sought private therapy in New Orleans from February, 2002. I received tickets to fly to Saudi Arabia in March. I ended my affiliation with JATCO in September, 2002. During this time Les Coleman, LLC provided public relations and grant development for the Chartwell Center for Autistic Children and the Rainbow Children’s Hospice.

In December, 2002 I returned to my hometown, Panama City, FL and was reunited with my family. In April 2003 my Mother passed away and was buried May 7th in Pensacola. I was arrested May 14th at the Bay County Council for the Elderly and brought back to Kentucky for violating probation.

I was not provided a hearing even though the evidence now shows my attorney, Michael Meehan was completely aware of my mental conditions, disability claims, and of my exact whereabouts from June, 2002 the month previous to a warrant being issued for my arrest. It is interesting that Meehan transmitted $14.000 to me in New Orleans, from the federal TORT settlement, in July, 2002 the very month the Kentucky court issued a warrant for my arrest. His concern for self-incrimination seems to be a solid motive for him to not bring up my mental history and treatment. All Meehan wanted to do at the probation violation appearance was to avoid implication.

I wrote to Meehan twice after being sent to prison for ten years for a copy of the mental evaluation he obtained, using my Power of Attorney, for submission in the federal TORT claim. I never heard from him. I finally obtained it with a federal Privacy Act request and submitted it in a motion in Fayette Kentucky court to vacate my sentence.

On October 30th, 2003 Judge Lynn Hughes in the Federal District Court in Houston, TX threw out the conviction of CIA “renegade”, Edwin P. Wilson. Wilson had spent 22 years in prison after the CIA claimed he had illegally delivered 20 Tons of plastic explosive to Libya and trained Libyan Hit Squads.

It was a CIA lie.

Wilson was working for the CIA all along. In a scathing condemnation of the CIA, Judge Hughes set Wilson free. Wilson’s vindication opened the lid of a Pandora Black box, Spooky characters began crawling into the light, and telling their tales. Wilson’s principle handler was long time CIA Covert Operations higher up, Theodore Shackley. Shackley’s number two was Vincent Cannistraro. Cannistraro turned up as the CIA’s principle in the Pan Am 103 investigation. Both of these men knew Wilson and knew of Wilson’s true affiliation with Libya.

The CIA had decided to Arm and train Libyan terrorist to strike and balance in dealing with Egyptian presidents Anwar Sadat and Hossnie Mubarrack. This evidence is said to be held in HOSIT reports and in the HITS database at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), prepared by Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHIS). CIA had to keep the lid on Libya after their trained bomb makers built the bomb that blew up Pan Am 103, delivered to Ahmed Jibril who carried out the plot on behalf of Iran.

BTAF, the FBI, and the CIA’s own inspector general, in compiled reports, detail how the CIA was “operationally tasking Wilson” and his employees to accomplish specific objectives during and after Wilson delivered 20,000 pounds of explosive to Libya. The CIA had been tasking Wilson at exactly the same time they were teaching Libyans to blow up things like airliners.

Records piece together the methods the CIA used to funnel finances in and out of the United States. One method exploited Equine interests in Lexington, KY, Charlestown, W. VA., Warren, VA., and Ocala, FL. Transactions flowed through accounts held at Arab Bank, PLC, Bank Arab Espanol, Katherien Bank, to USA banks, including Central Bank and Trust of Lexington, KY. The proprietary companies used by the CIA to conduct these transactions were Mt. Airy Farms, VA; APEXCO, Cyprus; KINEX, Rome, Italy; and ZABBADO, Berlin.

Members of the Lexington financial and intertwined legal community were easily influenced to do the bidding of the CIA and Ted Shackley, including participating in the silencing of dissented government whistleblowers.

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This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq., for the expedited processing and disclosure of agency records pertaining to the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed, and events and individuals associated with the tragedy, that were improperly withheld from plaintiffs Mohammed Al Fayed and Punch Limited by defendants Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the United States Departments of Defense, Justice and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States Secret Service.

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), 702 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3. Plaintiff Mohammed Al Fayed ("Al Fayed") is the owner and publisher of Punch Limited. He is also the father of Dodi Al Fayed, who perished in the August 31, 1997, automobile crash that claimed the life of Princess Diana. Al Fayed maintains a Web site dedicated to resolving the mysteries surrounding the tragedy at http://www.alfayed.com.

4. Plaintiff Punch Limited ("Punch") is a British political satirical magazine that dates back to 1841. The magazine, which is published 26 times per year, is also available on the Internet at http://www.punch.co.uk.

5. Defendant Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

6. Defendant National Security Agency ("NSA") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

7. Defendant Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

8. Defendant Department of Defense ("DoD") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

9. Defendant Department of Justice ("DOJ") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e). It has oversight control and FOIA authority over the Executive Office for United States Attorneys ("EOUSA") and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

10. Defendant Department of State ("DOS") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

11. Defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e). It has oversight control and FOIA authority over its field offices in Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Mami, New York City and Washington, D.C., as well as its Legal Attaches in London, United Kingdom, Paris, France and Vienna, Austria and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

12. Defendant Immigration & Naturalization Agency ("INS") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

13. Defendant United States Secret Service ("USSS") is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (e) and is in possession and/or control of the records requested by Al Fayed and Punch which are the subject of this action.

BACKGROUND

The Tragedy

14. On August 31, 1997, at approximately 12:25 A.M. local time, an automobile carrying Diana Francis Spencer, Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed crashed into the thirteenth pillar in the tunnel under the Place d'Alma in Paris, France. Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed were killed along with the automobile's driver, Henri Paul, a French security officer at the Ritz Hotel. Bodyguard Trevor Rees-Jones was the sole survivor.

The French Investigation

15. Shortly after the tragedy, Premier Juge d'instruction Hervé Stéphan, a French investigating magistrate, instituted an investigation. On or about January 29, 1999, it was announced that the investigation had ended and concluded that the tragedy was caused by drunk driving by Henri Paul, excessive speed and a dangerous stretch of road. Nine photographers and a press motorcyclist were placed under formal investigation -- a step immediately before being formally charged -- for manslaughter and failing to render aid to accident victims. On or about September 3, 1999, Judge Stéphan dismissed all charges against the photographers and motorcyclist.

16. The decision to formally end the investigation is presently under appeal by Al Fayed, and judicial proceedings are scheduled for September 2001.

Richard Tomlinson

17. Richard Tomlinson, 37, is a former MI6 (British foreign intelligence service) officer who served from September 1991 through April 1995.

18. On or about August 28, 1998, Tomlinson informed investigating magistrate Hervé Stéphan that Henri Paul, the chauffeur killed in the tragedy, had been on the MI6 payroll for at least three years. He also revealed that the death crash resembled a MI6 plot to kill Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic in Geneva. A copy of the affidavit Tomlinson provided to Judge Stéphan is available at http://www.alfayed.com/dianaanddodi/tomlinson.html.

19. In or around September 1998, Tomlinson traveled to the United States on board a Swiss Air Flight in order to appear on a NBC television program to discuss his recent revelations. Upon arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, Tomlinson was escorted off the plane by United States government officials and detained for several hours. He was never permitted to enter the United States, and instead was placed back on a plane to Europe.

20. Upon information and belief, the United States government prevented Tomlinson from entering the United States at the request of MI6 or other British government officials.

Oswald LeWinter

21. Oswald LeWinter ("LeWinter"), 70, has claimed to be a former United States intelligence operative for more than two decades. He has been linked to several high profile controversies here in the United States and Europe, all of which involved allegations of intelligence connections and specifically the CIA. These controversies have included LeWinter providing what apparently turned out to be disinformation regarding "October Surprise", which involved allegations that individuals associated with Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign delayed the release of American hostages in Iran in order to defeat President Jimmy Carter; claims by LeWinter that the CIA was involved in the 1986 assassination of former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme; his appearance in a 1994 documentary on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 entitled The Maltese Double Cross in which LeWinter claimed that the CIA knew that Libya was not responsible for the terrorist attack; and a 1998 attempt, more fully described below, to sell fraudulent CIA documents concerning the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed.

22. In his book October Surprise (1991), Professor Gary Sick describes LeWinter as an "intelligence operative", who was a "graduate of University of California at Berkeley and had a master's degree in English literature from San Francisco State." "He spoke German and English, but he had also acquired a working knowledge of Hebrew, Persian, and French, and some Urdu." Sick stated LeWinter "had served with U.S. forces in Vietnam and also claimed long experience with various U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies."

23. Upon information and belief, LeWinter previously formally maintained a relationship with the CIA, at least to the extent he provided information to the Agency during the 1970s. The CIA presently maintains in its possession records that confirm a relationship, as well as information pertaining to the fraud attempt described below.

The Effort To Defraud Mohamed Al Fayed

24. In late 1997 or early 1998, Keith Fleer ("Fleer"), a prominent California attorney, George Williamson ("Williamson"), an independent journalist, Pat Macmillian ("Macmillian") and LeWinter -- the latter two are both alleged former CIA agents -- participated in an enterprise to sell forged documents purportedly stolen from the CIA that indicated MI6 -- the British foreign intelligence agency -- had plotted to murder Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed. Other individuals who are alleged to have played a role in the scheme include Linda Tumulty, who is tied to the late film producer Alan Francovich, and another former CIA operative named Thompson.

25. LeWinter, Macmillan, and other associates apparently forged the documents and planned to misrepresent them as genuine to induce potential buyers to purchase the documents. Along with Williamson, who was also aware that the documents to be sold were not authentic, LeWinter, Macmillan, and their colleagues agreed that a sale of the forged documents to a tabloid newspaper should be arranged. The participants in the scheme anticipated a sale price of over $1 million.

26. Upon information and belief, at the suggestion of Gaby Leon (phonetic), an individual who allegedly formerly worked for the Argentine Secret Service, Williamson was advised to contact Fleer, an entertainment attorney in Los Angeles, for advice on the sale of the documents and to serve as a broker for their sale.

27. In their course of discussions, Fleer noted that Al Fayed had offered a reward of up to $20 million for information concerning the deaths of his son and Princess Diana and he suggested that they should approach Al Fayed in lieu of a tabloid and offer him the information for $20 million. Fleer stated that he knew one of Al Fayed's attorneys in Washington, D.C. and would make the necessary approaches to him. Upon information and belief, Fleer was to receive 5% of any monies obtained through the sale of the alleged CIA documents.

28. On or about March 24, 1998, Fleer contacted Douglas Marvin ("Marvin"), Al Fayed's legal representative in Washington. Marvin, in turn, put Fleer in contact with John Macnamara ("Macnamara), Al Fayed's chief of security. In a series of telephone conversations over the first two weeks of April 1998, between Fleer and Macnamara, Fleer stated that he had been approached by reliable individuals with credible information that the deaths of Dodi Al Fayed and Princess Diana were not accidental but in fact were the product of a carefully planned assassination carried out at the behest of British intelligence with the knowledge and acquiescence of Buckingham Palace. Fleer indicated that his immediate contact was Williamson, an investigative reporter, and that several "principals" were also involved.

29. According to Fleer, Williamson had connections with CIA sources who had been reliable in the past. Those CIA employees, Fleer stated, would be prepared to disclose their information concerning the deaths of Dodi Al Fayed and the Princess, provided that Al Fayed would provide them with the financial security and assistance to "take measures to protect themselves" -- a price of $20 million. Fleer indicated that, while it was unlikely that the CIA employees would agree to testify in any manner, they could provide authentic and sufficiently detailed CIA documentary evidence to prove the involvement of British intelligence agencies in the assassination plot. Fleer also stated that the CIA sources knew that a CIA operative in Europe had been contacted by someone within the British intelligence agency MI6. The British agent indicated that an assassination team was being compiled and asked for assistance. The CIA employee subsequently cabled for instructions and received in return a telex indicating that the CIA was not to become involved directly but that the agent could give British intelligence the name of a contact with a Mossad-affillated "K team" operating out of Switzerland.

30. In addition to the telexes from and to the CIA operative, Fleer indicated that the CIA sources could and would supply Al Fayed with a relevant intelligence collection report and a medical document indicating that the Princess was pregnant at the time of her deith. Fleer also indicated that there was a report of the results of an internal CIA investigation into the agency's involvement with the assassination of Dodi Al Fayed and Princess Diana, but that this document could only be obtained through a "seven figure" cash payment.

31. On or about April 8, 1998, Fleer requested that Macnamara arrange for the wire transfer of $25,000 "expense money" so that Al Fayed's representatives and the "principals" could meet in a foreign country to arrange for the inspection of the CIA documents and their subsequent sale to Al Fayed.

32. Given that alleged classified information was being offered for sale, on or about April 13, 1998, Al Fayed's representatives contacted and began cooperating with officials from the FBI and the CIA. From here on, all actions taken by Al Fayed's representatives were done so with the approval and supervision of law enforcement and intelligence officials of the Uruited States government.

33. On or about April 13, 1998, Fleer requested that Macnamara send the $25,000 via wire transfer to the account of Garland and Loman, Inc., a New Mexico company with an affiliate in Juarez, Mexico, at the Western Bank, 201 North Church Street, Las Cruces, New Mexico 88001. Fleer explained in a subsequent call to Macnamara that the Western Bank would contact Williamson when the funds were received. The FBI directed Al Fayed's representatives to wire the money from a bank in the District of Columbia so that criminal jurisdiction would lie with the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. Macnamara was told that at the very least the transmittal and receipt of the funds would constitute wire fraud, even if nothing else came of the intended transaction to sell the documents.

34. On or about April 14, 1998, with the approval of U.S. law enforcement authorities, Marvin ordered the wire transfer of $25,000 from a NationsBank branch in Washington, D.C. to the Garland & Loman account. FBI, CIA and EOUSA officials were all aware of the ongoing events.

35. Upon information and belief, Williamson traveled to the Garland and Loman premises in New Mexico to withdraw the $25,000 wire transfer with the intent to use those funds to finance and further the sale of the forged documents to Al Fayed. Williamson subsequently traveled to London, England and disbursed some or all of the $25,000 to his co-conspirators; including, but not limited to, LeWinter.

36. On or about April 14, 1998, following confirmation from Williamson that the $25,000 wire transfer had been received, Fleer informed Macnamara that the meeting to exchange the documents for payment was to take place in Vienna, Austria. Fleer stated that in Austria, Al Fayed's representatives would meet with four "principals," who would offer for sale two CIA telexes and a doctor's certificate that Princess Diana was pregnant at the time of her death. Fleer emphasized that the internal CIA investigative report on the circumstances of the crash would not, however, be provided at the Vienna meeting because "they" had yet to procure it.

37. With the intent to render the proceeds of the sale difficult or impossible to trace, and in an effort to conceal their source, Fleer instructed Macnamara during their conversation on or about April 14, 2000, that he should arrange to have the $15 million negotiated purchase price (having been reduced from $20 million) for the documents deposited at the Austrian bank Kredit Anstalt in a Sparbuch, an anonymous, bearer passbook account. Fleer stated that the passbook was to be handed over to the "principals" at the Vienna meeting as payment for the documents.

38. On or about April 20, 1998, Macnamara received a telephone call in Austria from Williamson, who stated that he was at the Hilton Hotel, New York City. Williamson confirmed that he dealt regularly with the "principals" supplying the documents and that he served as their go-between. He also stated that the "principals" would be present in Vienna and that at least one of them, whose identity remains unknown, had traveled from the United States to meet with Al Fayed's representatives. At an initial meeting, Al Fayed's representatives would be shown at least one of the CIA telexes dealing with the assassination of Dodi Fayed and Princess Diana, and that a serving member of the CIA would be on hand to authenticate the document. Additionally, Williamson also stated that the $25,000 wired by Macnamara had been spent and that "nobody's cheating on you."

39. Following additional negotiations concerning the time, place, and format of the Vienna meeting, Macnamara received two telephone calls from an unknown individual on his mobile phone discussing the mechanics of the document exchange and setting a meeting for April 22, 1998, 2:00 p.m. at the Hotel Ambassador, 1010 Vienna, Neuer Markt 5. Macnamara was to sit on the Kärtner Strasse side, where he would be approached by one of the "principals." With the approval of United States and Austrian law enforcement authorities, Macnamara followed the instructions that had been given to him regarding the planned rendezvous.

40. At approximately 2:30 p.m. local time, a man (later identified as LeWinter) approached Macnamara and identified himself as an ex-CIA agent who was in Vienna with six CIA and Mossad agents to deal with "the business." LeWinter spoke to Macnamara for approximately one half hour, briefing him on the provenance of the CIA documents, and indicated that there had been a meeting in London between an MI6 operative named Spelding and a CIA agent named Harrison, who was attached to the United States Embassy in London. At that meeting, Spelding asked Harrison for the CIA's assistance in assassinating Dodi Al Fayed, who had formed a close relationship with Princess Diana. Harrison allegedly cabled CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia for instructions and was informed via telex that the CIA would not become involved but could refer the British to the Mossad "K team" in Geneva. LeWinter indicated to Macnamara that these two telexes were for sale, and he also gave a brief description of the CIA investigative report that could be obtained, including a reference in that report to Princess Diana's pregnancy.

41. At the conclusion of their meeting at the Hotel Ambassador, LeWinter provided a telephone number and requested Macnamara to call him there under the name George Mearah at 5:00 p.m. Law enforcement personnel working with Macnamara traced the telephone number to the Hotel Stadt Bamberg, where they confirmed that the hotel had as a guest an American named Oswald LeWinter who matched Mearah's description.

42. By arrangement, and with the approval of United States and Austrian authorities, Macnamara met with LeWinter later that afternoon at the Ambassador Hotel. Following further discussions with Macnamara, LeWinter was taken into custody at the Ambassador Hotel by Austrian law enforcement officials. On information and belief, two associates (one of which has apparently been identified as Thompson) of LeWinter who were nearby evaded capture. In fact, it turns out that one of the individuals who assisted LeWinter during his time in Vienna was Karl Koecher, a Czechoslovakian intelligence operative who had infiltrated the CIA as a "sleeper" agent during the 1970s. After more than a decade of spying on the United States, Koecher was arrested and ultimately exchanged in a spy trade for Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky on February 11, 1986. Upon information and belief, Koecher and LeWinter became acquainted while serving in prison together in New York State.

43. LeWinter told Macnamara and the arresting officers that six other CIA and Mossad agents were in the Kärtner Strasse and would retaliate for his arrest by murdering Macnamara and Al Fayed.

44. Among the papers found in LeWinter's hotel room were an airmail pouch addressed "U.S. Government Property, Return to Commander USA FAC, Indianapolis IN 46249, and a multiple-use U.S. government messenger envelope with the last noted addressee "U.K. liaison." Inside this envelope were two telexes and a Domestic Intelligence Information Report that appeared on their face to originate within the CIA. The documents found in LeWinter's room were subsequently determined to be forgeries. Also found in LeWinter's room was a SM Rohner gas pistol with 25 rounds of ammunition and $10,000 in U.S. currency.

45. On or about October 1, 1998, LeWinter was convicted in an Austrian court of charges of attempted criminal fraud and sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. On appeal by the Austrian public prosecutor, the Austrian High Court on April 15, 1999, increased LeWinter's sentence to four years imprisonment, citing the "reprehensible way" LeWinter had sought to prey on Al Fayed.

46. Upon information and belief, the Austrian justice ministry sent a request concerning the documents taken from LeWinter's hotel room to the CIA to ascertain their authenticity, and also requested that a United States government expert be sent to testify under oath at LeWinter's trial concerning the documents. The United States government delayed its response for three months, and finally simply replied that the documents were "not authentic" and refused to send any expert to testify under oath.

47. Between April 1998 and the present, Al Fayed's legal representatives in Washington, D.C., including David Kendall and Terrence O'Donnell of the law firm of Williams & Connolly, have repeatedly met and exchanged communications with high level United States government law enforcement and intelligence officials -- including, but not limited to, Deputy Directors from the CIA and FBI, Robert McNamara, the CIA's General Counsel, and Wilma Lewis, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia -- to secure the prosecution of those involved in the fraud attempt.

48. In order to assist the criminal investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Al Fayed's legal representatives provided the prosecuting attorneys with information in their possession including, but not limited to, copies of telephone transcripts between Macnamara and Fleer. It was later subsequently discovered that without permission or knowledge of Al Fayed's representatives, the U S Attorney's Office had provided Fleer, and perhaps the other alleged conspirators, with copies of the evidentiary transcripts for their own personal use. Fleer used this information, in part, to defeat a civil lawsuit filed against him by Al Fayed in California on July 19, 1999; a lawsuit that had been deliberately delayed in order to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office and not interfere with the supposed ongoing criminal investigation.

48.[sic] In recent interviews with LeWinter, including one on April 12, 2000, at Wilhelmshöhe Prison, he has suggested that one or more CIA employees participated in the fraud scheme. He has also stated that the forged CIA documents offered to Al Fayed were based, at least in part, upon an e-mail LeWinter received from a "CIA contact in Langley". According to LeWinter, this information was shared with Macmillan, himself allegedly formerly affiliated with the CIA, who then prepared the documents incorporating the information received from the CIA contact.

49. Although LeWinter is willing to name names, he has requested a grant of immunity from the United States government. Despite this fact being provided to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, the FBI and the CIA, upon information and belief, LeWinter has never been questioned by representatives of the United States.

50. Upon information and belief, the CIA's Office of Inspector General was ordered to cease its investigation into the fraud scheme by the CIA's Office of General Counsel. Additionally, the CIA intentionally delayed providing requested information regarding the case to the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia.

51. Although the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia has acknowledged that Al Fayed was the victim of criminal conduct, upon information and belief, the office just recently closed the investigation with a recommendation of "no prosecution."

Previous Unsuccessful Efforts To Obtain Information From The United States

Attempt to Subpoena Relevant Records - District of Columbia

52. On January 29, 1999, in order to confirm or deny allegations contained in news stories that United States intelligence agencies were in the possession of information relevant to the tragedy, Al Fayed's legal representatives filed an Application to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Application requested that the Court issue a subpoena pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which permits U.S. discovery in aid of proceedings before a foreign tribunal, to the DIA and CIA.

53. By Order dated February 5, 1999, the Honorable Henry Kennedy granted Al Fayed's Application and ordered that subpoenas requiring the production of documents be issued to both agencies and that discovery proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since both the CIA and DIA refused to comply with the subpoenas, a motion was filed to compel compliance on March 31, 1999. Eventually, the DIA was released from its obligation but the CIA continued to refuse to produce any information and on May 13, 1999, it moved to quash the subpoena.

54. On March 29, 2000, Judge Kennedy denied Al Fayed's Motion to Compel, granted the CIA's Motion to Quash and vacated his earlier February 6, 1999 Order. This decision is presently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Oral arguments are scheduled for September 6, 2000.

Attempt To Subpoena Relevant Records - Maryland

56. On February 3, 1999, a similar action to that filed in the District of Columbia was attempted in the United States District Court for Maryland requesting the issuance of a subpoena for information held by the NSA. The District Court denied the application on February 4, 1999.

57. The denial was appealed to the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the decision on April 26, 2000.

58. No information was ever obtained as the NSA successfully thwarted this effort.

Intervention By Former Senator George Mitchell

59. On behalf of Al Fayed, former Senator George Mitchell, who recently served as a key negotiator in the Northern Island peace process, was retained in 1999, to facilitate the transfer of information held by the CIA and DoD components including, but not limited to, the DIA and NSA.

60. An inquiry for information was submitted by letter dated March 29, 1999, by Senator Mitchell to Secretary of Defense William Cohen. By letter dated April 23, 1999, Secretary Cohen informed Senator Mitchell that neither the DIA or NSA "possesses information that would have any bearing on, or would be at all useful to, the pending French judicial inquiry."

61. Notwithstanding Secretary Cohen's response, Robert Tyrer ("Tyrer"), the chief of staff to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, reviewed potentially responsive classified records which are in the possession of the DIA and NSA. Tyrer refused to publicly share his findings, but informed Senator Mitchell by letter dated October 4, 1999, that there was no information related to Princess Diana's death or that Henri Paul was connected with foreign intelligence services.

62. This latter point directly contradicts what attorney-turned journalist Gerald Posner was told by his American intelligence sources, as reported in the September 1999 issue of Talk magazine. Posner wrote that:

Paul was in regular contact with the Direction Général de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) -- the French equivalent of the CIA -- an arrangement not unheard of among security staffers at premier international hotels. (Paul also had less formal relations with the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire and the Renseignements Généraux, both intelligence gathering divisions of the French national police.) In fact, according to an American law enforcement official and an American intelligence agent, Paul spent the last several hours before the crash with a security officer from the DGSE."[sic] The DGSE is the French intelligence service. This information is additionally supported by former MI6 officer Tomlinson's allegations that Paul was in the paid employ of MI6.

63. Posner also confirmed in his article that the NSA had secretly intercepted and recorded telephone conversations involving Princess Diana. This past Spring, an active intelligence asset of the United States government permitted Posner to listen to one of several surveillance tape recordings of Princess Diana in the possession of NSA.

64. Although Senator Mitchell requested that the DoD ensure all responsive records had been located -- particularly in light of Posner's statements -- upon information and belief, either no such efforts were ever undertaken by the DoD or its components to ensure a complete search had been performed, or information was intentionally withheld. In fact, by letter dated October 13, 1999, Tyrer confirmed that the records he reviewed were retrieved solely through an electronic search of NSA and DIA databases. Upon information and belief, certain record systems are excluded when only electronic searches are conducted.

65. Senator Mitchell also wrote to George Tenet, CIA Director, by letters dated September 2 and 15, 1999, and requested that the CIA initiate a formal inquiry into whether United States intelligence agencies possess information concerning the tragedy. The second letter specifically informed the CIA of Posner's information. The request was denied, although DCI Tenet invited Senator Mitchell to meet with the CIA's General Counsel Robert McNamara.

66. On March 3, 2000, representatives of Al Fayed met with the CIA's Office of General Counsel ("OGC"), and expressed concern that serving officers of the CIA may have played a part in the fraud scheme to sell Al Fayed forged CIA records. A formal inquiry was again requested to investigate these allegations. The OGC subsequently forwarded relevant materials provided by Senator Mitchell to the CIA's Office of Inspector General ("OIG").

67. By letter dated June 16, 2000, Senator Mitchell requested that L. Britt Snider, the CIA's Inspector General, investigate the matter. By letters dated June 16 and 29, 2000, Snider informed Senator Mitchell that the OIG "found no information that would shed light on the automobile accident or the deaths of Lady Diana and Dodi Fayed. Neither did we find any information that would substantiate the claims made by LeWinter concerning the involvement of CIA employees in fabricating these fraudulent documents." Upon information and belief, the OIG was prevented from fully investigating the allegations by the CIA's Office of General Counsel, despite the fact that current or former CIA personnel may have been involved in an illegal scheme to defraud Al Fayed.

Unanswered Questions

68. As with many controversial high-profile events, oftentimes there exists more unanswered questions than those that appear to have been answered. This lawsuit seeks the release of information to answer at least some of those questions including, but not limited to:

Do agencies of the United States government possess any information regarding the deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul?

With all of its forensic and criminal expertise, was the United States government ever requested to lend assistance to the French investigation into the August 31, 1997, tragedy?

Does the United States possess any satellite imagery of the City of Paris from the night of August 31, 1997, that could be used to determine the movement of vehicles in the area of the tragedy?

Does the United States possess information, as alleged by Gerald Posner, that Henri Paul was employed by MI6 as reported by Richard Tomlinson to the judge, or any other foreign intelligence service?

Was Henri Paul meeting his French intelligence handler in the three hours before he returned to the Ritz as claimed by Gerald Posner?

To what extent did the NSA intercept telephonic communications between Princess Diana and others, the existence of which has been confirmed by Gerald Posner?

What documents did Defense Secretary William Cohen's Chief of Staff, Robert Tyrer, review relating to the tragedy, and were the searches conducted to locate these records intentionally narrow?

What is or has been the CIA's relationship with Oswald LeWinter, Pat McMillan and the other individuals involved with the plot to defraud Al Fayed of $20 million dollars?

Although the documents LeWinter alleged were from the CIA are apparently forgeries, does the information within the documents have any accuracy, as claimed by LeWinter?

To what extent did the CIA ever investigate Oswald LeWinter's allegations?

Was the criminal investigation into LeWinter and others for the attempt to defraud Al Fayed over the alleged CIA documents deliberately assigned low priority and then closed by the United States government in an effort to shield the actions of current or former CIA employees from scrutiny or avoid adverse publicity?

70. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The CIA was specifically instructed to search its Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Intelligence, Directorate of Administration, Directorate of Central Intelligence and its stations in London, United Kingdom and Paris, France.

73. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch added John Leslie Macnamara to the list of individuals on whom information was sought. The CIA was specifically instructed to add its station in Vienna, Austria to the locations it must search for responsive records.

74. By facsimile transmitted August 28, 2000, the CIA indicated that it can neither cogfirm nor deny the existence of records relating to individuals listed in items numbered 1 through 6, 8 through 11, 14 through 17 and 21; that it can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records relating to events listed in items numbered 7 through 13 and 20; requested additional information related to the individuals listed in items numbered 8, 10, 12 and 13; and accepted items numbered 2, 18 and 19 for processing.

75. No further relevant correspondence has been received from the CIA.

76. Al Fayed and Punch have exhausted all required administrative remedies with respect to items numbered 2, 18 and 19.

77. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by CIA of said right.

79. By letter dated December 15, 1998, Al Fayed, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to eleven categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul.

80. By letter dated July 29, 1999, the NSA indicated it had referred responsive records to unnamed agencies. Although responsive records were released by the United States Information Agency and the United States Department of State by letters dated August 13, 1999, and November 4, 1999, respectively, upon information and belief, not all responsive records have been processed or released, for which the NSA lawfully bears responsibility.

81. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver.

82. By letter dated August 11, 2000, the NSA denied the requests for expedited processing and a fee waiver, and indicated it had assigned the requests Serial: J9954-00.

83. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for records pertaining to John Leslie Macnamara, as well as requested a fee waiver and expedited processing. All prior instructions were incorporated into this request.

84. No further response has been received by the NSA.

85. The NSA has faded to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the NSA has wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

86. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies as the NSA has not issued a formal determination regarding the documents.

87. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the NSA of said right.

89. By letter dated December 15, 1998, Al Fayed, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to eleven categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul.

90. By letter dated March 9, 1999, the DIA indicated it had identified 1,667 responsive records, of which 1,038 were referred to unnamed agencies. Although some responsive records have been released by the United States Information Agency, the Department of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command and the United States Department of State, upon information and belief, not all responsive records have been processed or released, for which the DIA lawfully bears responsibility. Upon information and belief, the DIA had assigned case number 0854-98 to this request.

91. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver.

92. By letter dated July 31, 2000, the DIA acknowledged receipt of the request and assigned it case number 0495-2000.

93. By letter dated August 4, 2000, the DIA indicated it had identified 1,726 responsive records, of which 1,038 were referred to unnamed agencies. One responsive record was withheld in its entirety pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(2).

94. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for records pertaining to John Leslie Macnamara, as well as requested a fee waiver and expedited processing. All prior instructions were incorporated into this request.

95. By letter dated August 18, 2000, an administrative appeal was submitted challenging the DIA's failure to identify the name(s) of the originating agencies to which 1,038 responsive records had been referred, its refusal to release the three DIA records that contain other agencies' information, at least to the extent DIA information is contained therein, and its refusal to disclose the one document withheld in its entirety.

96. No further response has been received by the DIA.

97. The DIA has failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the DIA has wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

98. Al Fayed and Punch have exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to those 1,038 records that have been referred to other agencies.

99. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the DIA of said right.

101. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The DoD was specifically instructed to search its offices on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (August 3, 2000), Intelligence Oversight (August 3, 2000), J-2 Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (August 3, 2000) and Public Affairs (August 3, 2000). The dates in parenthesis indicates the date on which a separate FOIA request was submitted directly to each respective DoD office.

102. By letter dated August 4, 2000, the DoD denied the requests for a fee waiver and expedited processing.

103. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for records pertaining to John Leslie Macnamara, as well as requested a fee waiver and expedited processing. All prior instructions were incorporated into this request.

104. No further response has been received by the DoD.

105. The DoD has failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the DoD has wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

106. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies as the DoD has not issued a formal determination regarding the documents.

107. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the DoD of said right.

110. By letter dated July 27, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The DOJ was specifically instructed to search the Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the Office of the Associate General. Separate requests were also submitted to the Criminal Division on July 28, 2000, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review on July 31, 2000. The request for expedited processing was also served on the Office of Public Affkirs on July 31, 2000.

111. By letter dated August 7, 2000, the DOJ denied the requests for a fee waiver and expedited processing. It also indicated that it would not be able to comply with the twenty-day time limit and exercised its right to an additional ten day period. Al Fayed and Punch were invited to narrow the scope of their request in order to speed up processing.

112. By letter dated August 14, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch narrowed the time frames to be utilized in the DOJ searches, and submitted additional information concerning Keith Fleer, Esq. and Oswald LeWinter, see Exhibit "2".

113. No finther response has been received by the DOJ.

114. The DOJ, with respect to the request dated February 26, 1999, and it's Criminal Division and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, with respect to the requests dated July 28 and 31, 2000, have failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, these DOJ components have wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

115. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the Criminal Division and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, or the DOJ with respect to the February 26, 1999, request, as no formal determination has been issued regarding the requested documents, nor do administrative remedies need to be exhausted with respect to any of the DOJ components regarding the request for expedited processing.

116. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to receive expedited processing.

118. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The DOS was specifically instructed to search its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Bureau of European Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Bureau for Interriational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, its Country Desks for Austria, France and the United kingdom, its Division of Intelligence Policy and Coordination, its Office of the Legal Adviser, Office of the United Kingdom, Benelux and Ireland Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs and its Embassies in Austria, France and the United Kingdom.

119. By letter dated August 10, 2000, DOS assigned request number 200002685 to Al Fayed and Punch's request, requested additional information and denied the requests for a fee waiver and expedited processing.

120. By letter dated August 14, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch supplied the requested additional information, and identified Julianne Slifco, Legal Attache, and M. Miles Burden, Assistant Legal Attache, both of whom were based out of the United States Embassy in Vienna, Austria, as individuals who are likely in possession of responsive records.

121. No further response has been received from DOS.

122. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to their request for expedited processing.

123. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to receive expedited processing.

125. By letter dated December 15, 1998, Al Fayed, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to six categorie; of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. No responses have ever been received with respect to Requests No. five and six.

126. By letter dated July 26, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The FBI was specifically instructed to search its Criminal Investigative Services, Investigative Services Division, National Security Division and its field offices in Las Vegas (July 31, 2000), Los Angeles (July 31, 2000), New York City (July 31, 2000) and Washington, D.C. (July 31, 2000), as well as its Legal Attaches in London, United Kingdom (July 26, 2000) and Paris, France (July 26, 2000). The dates in parenthesis indicates the date on which a separate FOIA request was submitted directly to the FBI's field office or Legal Attache.

128. By letter dated August 4, 2000, the FBI indicated it had assigned Request No. 0927093-000 to its search for records relating to Princess Diana et al.

129. By letter dated August 7, 2000, the FBI's New York City field office declined to process those requests relating to third parties for whom no privacy waiver had been submitted.

130. By letter dated August 7, 2000, the FBI indicated it did not possess any responsive information regarding Henri Paul, for which it had assigned Request No. 0927097-000. It additionally acknowledged that it had only searched for responsive records in the automated indices that are indexed as main files.

131. By letter dated August 7, 2000, the FBI indicated it did not possess any responsive information regarding Emad Dodi Fayed, for which it had assigned Request No. 0927096-000. It additionally acknowledged that it had only searched for responsive records in the automated indices that are indexed as main files.

132. By letters dated August 7, 2000, the FBI declined to process those requests relating to third parties for whom no privacy waiver had been submitted. These requests had been assigned Request Nos. 0927099-000, 0927100-000, 0927102-000 through 0927105-000, 0927107-000, 0927108-000, 0927111-000 and 0927113-000.

133. By letter dated August 14, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request to the FBI's Legal Attaches in Vienna, Austria for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver.

134. By letter dated August 14, 2000, the FBI's Washington Field Office indicated it had failed to locate any responsive records pertaining to Princess Diana, Emad "Dodi" Fayed or Henri Paul, that it possessed records relating to Mohamed Al Fayed but was withholding them pursuant to (j)(2) of the Privacy Act and FOIA Exemption (7)(A), that it had located records responsive to Richard Tomlinson but that FBI Headquarters had assumed processing responsibility and that with respect to any third party requests a privacy waiver would have to be submitted first before processing could begin.

136. By letter dated August 15, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch notified the FBI that it had impermissibly narrowed the appropriate search parameters with respect to 0927096-000 (Fayed, Emad Dodl) and 0927097-000 (Paul, Henri). The FBI was specifically instructed to search for any "see references", numbered and lettered subfiles, 1A envelopes, ticklers, enclosures behind files (EBFs), Bulky Exhibits, control files, "JUNE" files, abstracts, search slips including search slips used to process this request, file covers and tapes of electronic surveillance, any "DO NOT FILE" files, SAC safes, special files rooms and the offices and workplaces of any FBI officials who were previously identified in the earlier letter dated August 14, 2000, as well as any other officials who may potentially maintain responsive records. Finally, all relevant FBI components including, but not limited to, the General Investigative Division, Internal Security, and Congressional Liaison Unit were tasked to be searched for any responsive records. The FBI was requested to re-open the two closed requests, and that if it declined it should consider this a new request. Additionally, the FBI was requested to reconsider its decision not to search for records concerning third parties without the submission of a privacy waiver.

137. Not withstanding Al Fayed and Punch's August 15, 2000, request to the FBI for reconsideration, an administrative appeal was filed dated August 15, 2000, challenging the FBI's refusal to process third party requests without submission of a privacy waiver.

138. By letter dated August 15, 2000, the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office declined to process those requests relating to third parties for whom no privacy waiver had been submitted.

139. By letter dated August 16, 2000, the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office indicated that no responsive records were found concerning Princess Diana, Emad Dodi Fayed, Henri Paul or Mohamed Al Fayed. It additionally acknowledged that it had only searched for responsive records in the automated indices that are indexed as main files.

140. By letter dated August 16, 2000, the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office indicated that it possessed records pertaining to Richard Tomlinson, but was withholding them pursuant to (j)(2) of the Privacy Act and FOIA Exemption (7)(A).

141. By letter dated August 16, 2000, Al Fayed, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request to the FBI's field office in North Miami Beach, Florida, for records pertaining to himself. Multiple variations of his name were provided to facilitate a search for responsive records.

142. By letter dated August 16, 2000, the FBI indicated it had assigned Request No. 0927682-000 to its search for records relating to Mohamed Al Fayed et al.

143. By letter dated August 16, 2000, Al Fayed, through counsel, submitted additional information regarding multiple variations of the spelling of his name and relevant FBI file numbers to facilitate a search for responsive records. The FBI was specifically instructed to provide copies of this letter to all of its field offices and Legal Attaches to which requests had been previously submitted.

144. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, appealed the FBI's Washington Field Office's responses in its letter dated August 14, 2000, and challenged the denial of access to responsive records, the refusal to process responsive records by referring them to FBI Headquarters and the refusal to process third party requests without submission of a privacy waiver.

145. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for records pertaining to John Leslie Macnamara, as well as requested a fee waiver and expedited processing. The FBI was specifically instructed to provide copies of this letter to all of its field offices and Legal Attaches to which requests had been previously submitted.

146. By letter dated August 17, 2000, the FBI's Office of Legal Attache in the United States Embassy in London, United Kingdom, indicated that it "does not maintain closed investigative or administrative files" and referred the FOIA request to FBI Headquarters.

149. By letter dated August 22, 2000, the FBI was reminded that the requested information concerning Al Fayed had already been submitted, that it had already processed a request under the same name and located responsive records, but that the information was being provided again.

150. By letter dated August 22, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch notified the FBI's Los Angeles Field Office that it had impermissibly narrowed the appropriate search parameters. The field office was specifically instructed to search for any "see references", informant reports, summaries of informant activity, results of interviews with subjects of investigation, memos concerning whether or not to proceed with an investigation, agent's memos on phone calls made or received, letters requesting information from phone company, credit bureaus, etc., requests from one field office to another, agent's memos on following leads, interviews or record checking, interview logs, requests for mail covers,, correlation summaries for field offices, numbered and lettered subfiles, 1A envelopes, ticklers, enclosures behind files (EBFs), Bulky Exhibits, memos about receipt and destruction of bulky exhibits, control files, "JUNE" files, abstracts, search slips including search slips used to process this request, file covers and tapes of electronic surveillance, any "DO NOT FILE" files, SAC safes, special files rooms and the offices and workplaces of any FBI officials who may possibly possess responsive records. The field office was requested to re-open the closed requests, but that if it declined it should consider this a new request. Additionally, the FBI was requested to reconsider its decision not to search for records concerning third parties without the submission of a privacy waiver.

151. Not withstanding Al Fayed and Punch's August 22, 2000, request to the FBIs Los Angeles Field Office for reconsideration, an administrative appeal was filed by letter dated August 22, 2000, regarding the responses in the letters dated August 15, 2000, and August 16, 2000, and challenging the denial of access to responsive records, the impermissible narrowing of its search parameters, and the refusal to process third party requests without submission of a privacy waiver.

152. Al Fayed has exhausted the required administrative remedies with respect to items five and six of his request dated December 15, 1998. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to their requests for expedited processing. Nor do administrative remedies need to be exhausted with respect to the FBI's field office in Las Vegas or the Legal Attaches in London, United Kingdom and Paris, France, as these offices have not issued a formal determination regarding the requested documents,

153. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by FBI of said right.

155. By letter dated July 27, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver. The EOUSA was specifically instructed to search its files within the District of Columbia, Southern District of New York, Central District of California and Eastern District of New York.

156. By letters dated August 8, 2000, the EOUSA indicated it had assigned these requests by categories of "deceased third parties" (00-2565 through 00-2568), "French Inquiry" (00-2569 through 00-2572), "Mohamed Al Fayed" (00-2573 through 00-2576) and "living third parties" (00-2577 through 00-2580). Each category was assigned a number correlating with the District of Columbia, Southern District of New York, Central District of California and Eastern District of New York, respectively.

157. By letter dated August 8, 2000, the EOUSA denied Al Fayed and Punch's request for a fee waiver.

158. By letter dated August 14, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch submitted additional information concerning Keith Fleer, Esq. and Oswald LeWinter, see Exhibit "2", and identified Lisa Prager, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Transnational/Major Crimes Section, District of Columbia, William Blier, Chief, Transnational/Major Crimes Section, District of Columbia, Wilma E. Lewis, United States Attorney, District of Columbia and Rhonda Field, Chief of Staff, Office of the United States Attorney, District of Columbia, as individuals who likely possesses responsive information.

159. By letter dated August 17, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request for records pertaining to John Leslie Macnamara, as well as requested a fee waiver and expedited processing. All prior instructions were incorporated into this request.

160. No further response has been received by the EOUSA.

161. The EOUSA has failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the EOUSA has wrongfully withheld records from Al Fayed and Punch.

162. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies as the EOUSA has not issued a formal determination regarding the records.

163. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the EOUSA of said right.

165. By letters dated July 27, 2000, Al Fayed and Punch, through counsel, submitted a FOIA request to the INS's headquarters in Washington, D.C. and office in New York City for disclosure of all information pertaining to twenty categories of names and events related to the August 31, 1997, deaths of Princess Diana, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul. See Exhibit "1". The request additionally sought expedited processing and a fee waiver.

166. By letter dated August 3, 2000, the INS's New York office indicated that it had searched for records that relate to the request, had determined that if any records existed they would be maintained under the jurisdiction of INS headquarters and referred the request to headquarters. The INS New York City office assigned Al Fayed and Punch's request number NYC2000007354. Upon information and beliet no search for responsive reGords was ever conducted.

167. No further response has been received by the INS.

168. The INS has failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the INS has wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

169. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies as the INS has not issued a formal determination regarding the documents.

170. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the INS of said right.

173. By letters dated August 25, 2000, the USSS assigned the FOIA requests file numbers 2000515 through 2000521 and 2000525.

174. No other relevant response has been received by the USSS.

175. The USSS has failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under the FOIA. Therefore, the USSS has wrongfully withheld documents from Al Fayed and Punch.

176. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies as the US SS has not issued a formal determination regarding the documents.

177. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the FOIA to be granted expedited processing, a fee waiver, and to obtain the information they seek, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the USSS of said right.

179. Requests for expedited processing of all responsive records were submitted to each of the defendant agencies as permitted by statute and internal agency regulation.

180. The CIA, NSA, DoD, DOJ and DOS each denied the request. The DIA, FBI, EOUSA, INS and USSS have failed to timely respond.

181. Al Fayed and Punch have met the requisite requirements as set forth in the respective agency regulations to be entitled to expedited processing of their FOIA requests.

182. By denying Al Fayed and Punch's request for expedited processing, the CIA, NSA, DoD, DOJ and DOS have each violated their respective internal regulations.

183. The DIA, FBI, EOUSA, INS and USSS have failed to comply with the requisite statutory periods that govern compliance under their respective agency regulations. Therefore, these defendants have violated the requirements of their internal regulations.

184. Al Fayed and Punch are not required to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to a denial of a request for expedited processing, nor under circumstances where an agency has failed to issue a formal determination regarding the request.

185. Al Fayed and Punch have a legal right under the respective regulations of the agency defendants to be granted expedited processing, and there is no legal basis for the denial by the CIA, NSA, DIA, DoD, DOJ, DOS, FBI, EOUSA, INS and USSS of said right.

All records relating to Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales (DOB: July 1, 1961; British citizen), Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed)(DOB: 1955; Egyptian citizen) and/or Henri Paul (DOB: July 3, 1956; French citizen) all of whom were killed in Paris, France on August 31, 1997. The deaths of these three individuals cannot be in dispute.

All records relating to Mohamed Al Fayed, a resident of London, England and the father of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed). An Authorization and Privacy Waiver is enclosed as Exhibit "1A". The original is maintained in my possession.

Request No. 6:

All records relating to Trevor Rees-Jones (DOB: 1968; British citized including, but not limited to, his book "The Bodyguard's Story", and the book's ghost writer Moira Johnston.

Request No. 7:

All records relating to an effort in 1997-98 to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

Request No. 8:

All records relating to Keith Fleer, an entertainment lawyer in Los Angeles, California, and the effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

Request No. 9:

All records relating to Karl F. Koecher, a former Czech spy who was arrested, charged, and subsequently exchanged in 1985, by the United States for Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky, and the effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

Request No. 10:

All records relating to Oswald LeWinter (aka George Mearah) (DOB: approximately 1930; United States citizen) including, but not limited to, his effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales. For your information, Mr. LeWinter has been tied to events involving the October Surprise and Iran-Contra scandals and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

Request No. 11:

All records relating to Ricardo Shapp, and the effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

Request No. 12:

All records relating to George Williamson, a U.S. reporter, and the effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

Request No. 13:

All records relating to Pat McMillan (aka MacMillan), allegedly a former CIA agent, and the effort to sell classified or unclassified records, allegedly created by or from the possession of the CIA, pertaining to the deaths of Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales.

All records relating to Richard John Charles Tomlinson, who was employed by the British intelligence agency MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995. An Authorization and Privacy Waiver is enclosed as Exhibit "1B". The original is maintained in my possession.

Request No. 16:

All records relating to the detention by U.S. govemment officials of Richard John Charles Tomlinson, who was employed by the British intelligence agency MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995, at John F. Kennedy International Airport after arriving on a Swiss Air flight on or about August 30, 1998. An Authorization and Privacy Waiver is enclosed. The original is maintained in my possession.

Request No. 17:

All records relating to David Shayler, but only to the extent the records pertain to Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales, Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed) and/or Henri Paul, all of whom were killed in Paris, France on August 31, 1997.

Request No. 18:

All records pertaining to requests received by intermediaries acting on behalf of Mohamed al-Fayed including, but not limited to, former Senator George Mitchell. This request pertains, but is not limited to, Senator Mitchell's letters to the CIA dated September 2 and 15, 1999, and DCI George Tenet's response dated September 30, 1999; Senator Mitchell's letter to Robert S. Tyrer, Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated September 17, 1999, and Mr. Tyrer's response dated October 4, 1999; and Secretary of Defense William Cohen's letter to Senator Mitchell dated April 28, 1999.

All records pertaining to the review of information provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, pertaining to Emad "Dodi" Fayed (aka Imad Mohamed Fayed), Henri Paul and/or Diana Frances Spencer, Princess of Wales, including that which was deemed responsive to Mohamed Al-Fayed's FOIA requests, by any government officials including, but not limited to, Robert S. Tyrer, Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

• In November 1997, he represented himself as a former CIA employee describing himself to the CIA as a Counter-Intelligence Director;• In 1995, he allegedly stood trial in Germany on weapons transfer changes anid was found guilty;• In 1991, he allegedly passed information to the BBC of CIA involvement in the death of the late Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy;• In 1990, he allegedly attended the World Jewish Conference in East Berlin, East Germany, and produced a card describing himself as a former CIA agent;• In 1989, he was allegedly convicted in Frankfurt, Germany of impersonation of a former CIA officer;• In 1984, he was allegedly arrested by the German police for drug trafficking.• In 1983, he allegedly represented himself as a Professor of Psychology at the University of Maryland;• In 1971, he allegedly obtained false credit by producing a forged New York Police Department badge;• He had himself listed in Who's Who in East Germany as a CIA agent.

4/18/00 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE filed by Attorneys Paul C. Rauser (application to be submitted), David E. Kendall for Appellant Mohamed Al Fayed (Styled as "Representation Statement" and received by the Court on 4/14/00 before case opening). [511176-1]. (sha)

YOU ARE REQUIRED TO READ THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE AT THIS LINK BEFORE YOU READ THE FOLLOWING WORK, THAT IS AVAILABLE SOLELY FOR PRIVATE STUDY, SCHOLARSHIP OR RESEARCH PURSUANT TO 17 U.S.C. SECTION 107 AND 108. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBRARY DETERMINES THAT UNLAWFUL COPYING OF THIS WORK HAS OCCURRED, THE LIBRARY HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THE I.P. ADDRESS AT WHICH THE UNLAWFUL COPYING APPEARED TO HAVE OCCURRED. THANK YOU FOR RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

A former member of Abu Nidal's Fatah-Revolutionary Council said in an interview published today that the deceased Palestinian militant had admitted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of a passenger jet over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Sometime before his reported suicide last week, Abu Nidal told a small group of colleagues that his organization had conducted the terrorist attack, according to Atef Abu Bakr, who defected from the Fatah-Revolutionary Council in late 1989. Abu Bakr made the comments in an interview with al-Hayat, an Arabic daily based in London, conducted before Abu Nidal's death.

"I will tell you something very important and serious," Abu Bakr quotes Abu Nidal as saying. "The reports which link the Lockerbie act to others are false reports. We are behind what happened." He added that Abu Nidal threatened death to anyone caught leaking the information.

Abu Bakr's allegation prompted British Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell to call for an investigation of the claim in light of the conviction of Libyan Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi for the attack. "If he has said no one else had anything to do with it, where does that leave Mr. al-Megrahi?" Dalyell asked. "I believe the Libyans had nothing to do with it. This is one hell of a thing," he said. "If these allegations are true, they blow everything relating to Lockerbie out of the water, including the trial in Holland" (Nicholas Pyke, London Guardian, Aug. 23).

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The Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal admitted to a meeting of his most trusted colleagues that he was behind the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing and the culprits were not Libyans, it is claimed today in a leading Arabic newspaper.

In an interview with the London daily, Al-Hayat, a former colleague, Atef Abu Bakr, says Nidal made the confession to the inner circle of his revolutionary council some time before his death earlier this week.

Bakr, once a politburo member of Nidal's Fatah-Revolutionary Council, told the paper that Nidal had said: "I will tell you something very important and serious. The reports which link the Lockerbie act to others are false reports. We are behind what happened."

According to Bakr, Nidal threatened anyone who leaked what he said with death, "even if he is in the arms of his wife".

Last night a spokesman for Al Hayat confirmed that the interview with Bakr was conducted some time before Nidal's death.

The Lockerbie disaster happened when a New York-bound Pan Am plane blew up over the town in Scotland, in December 1988, killing 259 passengers and crew, and 11 local residents. A Scottish court sitting in Holland convicted a former Libyan agent, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, over the bombing and in January 2001 gave him a life sentence.

The group led by Nidal, once one of the world's most wanted men, has been blamed for a series of horrific attacks in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Iraqi authorities have claimed that Nidal, found dead in his Baghdad apartment, committed suicide. Members of the Fatah-Revolutionary Council, better known as the Abu Nidal organisation, said he committed suicide as he was suffering from cancer.

Nidal set up his headquarters in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in 1987. He was put under house arrest when Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, came under pressure to crack down on militants after the Lockerbie bombing.

Bakr and another dissident split from Nidal's group in late 1989, almost a year after the bombing. After the attack, Bakr was quoted as extending condolences to victims on behalf of Nidal's group.

Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for Linlithgow, has long maintained that Nidal was to blame, and not Libyans. Last night he said: "If true, this is a hugely important development. If he has said that no one else had anything to do with it, where does that leave Mr al-Megrahi? I believe the Libyans had nothing to do with it. This is one hell of a thing."

He said that the Foreign Office must now investigate Bakr's claims "as a matter of the utmost urgency".

He added: "If these allegations are true they blow everything relating to Lockerbie out of the water, including the trial in Holland."

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LONDON, June 28 — A Scottish judicial review body ruled Thursday that a former Libyan intelligence official jailed for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing might have been wrongfully convicted and was entitled to appeal the verdict against him.

After an investigation lasting nearly four years, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission delivered an 800-page report — much of it still secret — that identified several areas where “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.”

The commission cast doubt on the testimony of a witness, who changed his story several times and had been shown a photograph of the Libyan official days before picking him out of a lineup. It also challenged evidence presented at the trial that the official had purchased the clothes found in the suitcase that held the bomb.

The ruling has potentially major ramifications both legally and emotionally for the victims’ relatives, reviving an array of questions and theories about the explosion on board Pan Am Flight 103 on Dec. 21, 1988, that killed 270 people, including 179 Americans.

While the decision does not guarantee the success of the appeal, the commission’s findings are often upheld. Since its establishment in 1999, the commission says on its Web site, it has considered 887 cases and recommended 67 of them for appeal. Of those appeals, 39 have been heard, 25 of them successfully.

Some families expressed dismay at the ruling. But other people have long harbored misgivings about the official version of events, with some directing suspicions at a militant Palestinian group with ties to Iran, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command.

Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the former Libyan intelligence officer, was jailed in 2001 for the bombing after a trial under Scottish law at a special court in the Netherlands. He was the only person convicted in connection with the terrorist attack, Britain’s bloodiest. Mr. Megrahi, who has always proclaimed his innocence, lost an initial appeal in 2002 and is serving a 27-year sentence in a Scottish prison.

Graham Forbes, the chairman of the Scottish commission, said the panel was “of the view, based upon our lengthy investigations, new evidence we have found and new evidence that was not before the trial court, that the applicant may have suffered a miscarriage of justice.”

A spokesman for the commission, who spoke in return for anonymity under the organization’s rules, said the next stage was for Mr. Megrahi’s lawyers to present their case to the Appeal Court for a hearing date to be set. “It will be heard,” the spokesman said in response to a reporter’s question about the possibility of the court refusing to hear the case.

The section of the commission’s findings made public centered on evidence relating to purchases of clothing at a shop called Mary’s House in Sliema, Malta, on Dec. 7, 1988; the clothing was said to have been wrapped around the bomb. The bomb was said to have been put on board a plane in Malta and then transferred to a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to London before it was loaded onto Flight 103 at Heathrow Airport.

The original trial found that the bomb was hidden in a Toshiba radio cassette player placed inside a brown, hard-shell Samsonite suitcase with clothing traced to Mary’s House. The trial court found that Mr. Megrahi bought the clothing at the shop on Dec. 7, 1988. But, the Scottish commission ruled, new evidence relating to the dates when Christmas lights were switched on in Malta suggested that the clothes had been bought before Dec. 6, 1988, before the time when there was evidence that Mr. Megrahi was on Malta.

Additionally, the commission questioned the reliability of evidence by the shop’s proprietor, Tony Gauci, who singled out Mr. Megrahi in a lineup. It said that additional evidence, not available to Mr. Megrahi’s defense in the original trial, indicated that four days before the lineup “at which Mr. Gauci picked out the applicant, he saw a photograph of the applicant in a magazine article linking him to the bombing.”

“In the commission’s view, evidence of Mr. Gauci’s exposure to this photograph in such close proximity” to the lineup “undermines the reliability of his identification of the applicant at that time and at the trial itself,” the commission said.

In Scotland, Mr. Megrahi’s lawyer, Tony Kelly, read a statement from his client: “I was never in any doubt that a truly independent review of my case would have this outcome. I reiterate today what I have been saying since I was first indicted in 1991: I was not involved in the Lockerbie bombing in any way whatsoever.”

Some of the victims’ families in the United States questioned the timing of the commission’s findings and whether it was linked to a recently announced agreement between Britain and Libya that could permit the extradition of Libyans serving prison terms in Britain. Some families say they are worried that the agreement may allow Mr. Megrahi to be repatriated, ostensibly to serve out his term in Libya, or to be sent there for the duration of the appeal.

“It’s nonsense,” said Dan Cohen, whose only child, Theodora, a student at Syracuse University, was killed in the bombing. If Mr. Megrahi is sent back to Libya, Mr. Cohen said, “he’ll go back a hero, and a rich hero, I would assume.”

“It’s very depressing, ” he added.

The spokesman for the commission said the probable date for the publication of its findings had been made known last February. Any move to free Mr. Megrahi from a Scottish prison, the spokesman said, would depend on whether his lawyers applied for “interim liberation” while his appeal was heard. The spokesman said it would be “normal practice” for Mr. Megrahi to remain in prison in Scotland while his appeal was being heard. Mr. Megrahi’s lawyer, Mr. Kelly, said it was “premature” for his client to seek release on bail. “That’s something that will take a few months to determine,” he said.

In its statement, the commission also played down many conspiracy theories that had surfaced over the years. The commission, for instance, said it had “serious misgivings” about claims by a Scottish police officer, identified only as “The Golfer,” that the authorities had manipulated evidence. It also rejected claims of involvement by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The Scottish panel insisted that it had “found no basis for concluding that evidence in the case was fabricated by the police, the Crown, forensic scientists or any other representatives of official bodies or government agencies.”

The reaction among victims’ families was mixed. Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora died in the bombing, said the commission’s decision was a “new chapter in our 18-and-a-half-year search for the truth.” In a television interview he alluded to speculation that Iran had orchestrated the bombing. Five months before the Lockerbie attack, he noted, the United States Navy mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger jet over the Persian Gulf, killing 290 people.

Other families of Lockerbie victims in the United States said they were disappointed by the ruling, but several sought to minimize its importance.

“I think it’s just a review commission that’s covering all their bases,” said Kara Weipz, president of the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, a family group. “From my understanding, it’s much like the Supreme Court of the United States. I don’t think that they even have to take the case.”

The spokesman for the Scottish panel, however, said it was “incumbent” on the Appeal Court to permit Mr. Megrahi a further hearing.

Megrahi Prosecutor: I Would Not Have Let Evidence Go to U.S.by Jason AllardyceThe Sunday Times21 June 2009

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Lord Fraser, the former lord advocate who charged the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing, has revealed he was unaware that evidence presented at his trial seems to have left Britain beforehand.

The Tory peer has told a television documentary that he did not know that a fragment of circuit board linked to the bomb had allegedly been moved to an FBI lab in Washington for analysis ahead of the trial and conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi.

Fraser said he would not have agreed to the step because it could have left the crown open to accusations at the trial that the circuit board could have been damaged or tampered with during the move.

The original trial heard the fragment was found in a piece of recovered clothing in a wood 25 miles from Lockerbie, six months after the bombing in December 1988.

Prosecutors linked it to Megrahi after Thomas Thurman of the FBI identified it as part of a sophisticated timer used to detonate explosives. He said it was made by Mebo, a Swiss firm which supplied the component only to Libya and the East German Stasi.

Fraser’s comments were made in a Dutch documentary called “Lockerbie Revisited”. (...)

The Libyan authorities have asked Scottish ministers to transfer Megrahi to their custody under the terms of a transfer deal brokered by London and Tripoli, but a condition of the treaty is that prisoners cannot leave the country while criminal proceedings are ongoing.

Megrahi, who is terminally ill with prostate cancer, has revealed that he does not believe he will live to clear his name. He said he may drop his appeal to try to spend his final days with his family. (...)

He said his low spirits as a result of being away from his wife, children and parents, were reducing the chances of his body responding to medical treatment and that there was now little to keep him here.

He made his views known last week in a meeting with Christine Grahame, the nationalist MSP, who has taken an interest in his case. He told her he was happy for his views to be publicised although his lawyer has stipulated that he cannot be directly quoted.

Megrahi believes he will die by the end of the year, long before his appeal is expected to conclude and complains that prison is reducing his lifespan. He claims his isolation and depression are reducing the chance of his body responding to the medical treatment he receives. If your mood is low the body will not respond properly to medication to fight the disease, he told Grahame.

There is no consideration in the criminal justice system for his health, Megrahi said. People do not care about his condition and the system is unfair, he added.

The Scottish prison service says it always provides seriously ill prisoners with support.

Megrahi regards as perverse the fact that his transfer to Libya would not be guaranteed even if he agrees first to drop his appeal, but he feels he may have to take the gamble.