Flash Gordon Left Me The Keys

Sunday, March 23, 2003

Milo & Kelly are laughing their asses off ... WILL COME TO THE RESCUE of candy nose:
Will put tag on the "Grouping"

American and British troops were only just beginning to seize parts of Iraq when the jockeying to replace Saddam Hussein began. For years a motley crew of Iraqi exiles, ranging from indicted war criminals to convicted embezzlers, have presented themselves as potential heirs to Saddam, and many have enjoyed American support. Now a new faction aspiring to power in a postwar Iraq has arrived on the scene, and this time it is emerging from within Saddam's regime.
A group of Iraqi élites still inside the country is preparing to announce the formation of a political movement that is ready to replace Saddam's Baath Party, a U.S. source close to the group tells TIME. Communicating secretly with one another via emissaries over the past six months, the group claims to include a cabinet minister, military officers, university professors, tribal sheiks and other élite members of Iraq's Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish factions. They promise to hand over all weapons of mass destruction, disband the Republican Guard and establish a representative government. Until Saddam's demise, these Iraqis are identifying themselves only as al-Tajammua, Arabic for "the Grouping."

Is al-Tajammua the answer for a post-Saddam Iraq? Not necessarily. Members of the upper ranks of Iraq's power structure may have been complicit in Saddam's years of brutal rule and may not be the democrats Washington has hoped will succeed Saddam. "The idea that the U.S. would simply issue orders to the same mob that served under Saddam is ridiculous," Pentagon adviser Richard Perle said last month. But the State Department and the CIA seem more flexible. The future of Baath Party members, said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, "will depend on the outcome of the conflict, and the actions of individuals in that party who may or may not further the crimes of the regime."

LONDON, England (CNN) -- A British Royal Air Force aircraft returning from a mission in Iraq was possibly shot down by Patriot missiles near the Kuwaiti border, British and U.S. military officials said Sunday.

"Evidence is beginning to come to light that one of our aircraft returning from operations over Iraq last night may have been engaged by a U.S. Patriot missile battery," said Capt. Al Lockwood with the British Royal Air Force in Qatar.

"The evidence is begging to appear that this very well may have been a friendly fire incident."

"The crew of the aircraft is missing," a British defense ministry statement said.

A secret Washington-sponsored mediation effort, in progress since early March, has just about run its course in the diplomatic twilight zone behind the emergency summit taking place at Praia Da Vitoria in the Azores Islands of Portugal Sunday, March 16, between US president George W. Bush and the two European prime ministers, Tony Blair of Britain and of Spain. As they three allies prepared to meet, their options were further reduced by a joint statement from France Russia and Germany that they were against submitting Saddam any ultimatum to disarm. Saddam, however, was not waiting. He set the scene for the Azores summit by putting his country on a war footing, taking command of the Iraqi air force and dividing the country into four military districts with orders to “destroy any foreign aggression”. His younger son Qusay was put in command of the key Baghdad district.

That move was the Iraqi ruler’s reply to a secret US mediator’s final effort to persuade him to remove himself in order to stave off war.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s intelligence sources reveal this last mediator as former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel. Denials apart, he was in Baghdad Saturday, March 15, for the third visit of his mission, which was to sell Washington’s final offer to the Iraqi rule to quit Iraq with his family – including his sons Uday and Qusay – and the country’s top political and military leadership, and go into exile in an Arab country.

The offer included safe conduct guarantees for Saddam and his entourage along with a US pledge not to freeze his secret bank accounts.

The Iraqi ruler’s response to Gemayel – as to all of a long line of would-be mediators – was a refusal to consider any exile or refuge that divested him of ruling authority.

Gemayel’s personal relationship with Saddam dates to back to the 1970s and early 1980s, when he was chief of the Lebanese Christian Phalange militia in Beirut. In those days, he was often in Baghdad to collect Saddam’s largesse to the tune of millions of dollars for his Christian fighters. They have remained friends.

On his penultimate trip to Baghdad on March 7-10, our intelligence sources discovered Gemayel took with him a special guest – an American colonel. This officer, another old Baghdad hand, was received by Saddam for an afternoon tete a tete on March 8. In the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the colonel paid a number of secret visits to Baghdad and was there again just before the first Gulf War in 1991.

DEBKAfile’s Iraqi underground sources reveal that, on the same day, a failed attempt was made on the life of Saddam’s elder son Uday at the al-Jadariye Boating Club on the Tigris River. There with a party, he is thought to have escaped with injuries from this second known assassination attempt, while three of his bodyguards were killed.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s intelligence sources report that the American crossed into Iraq - either from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Gemayel and senior Iraqi intelligence officials stood by to fly with him by plane and then helicopter to a secret meeting place near Baghdad.

A senior intelligence source, who was briefed on the conversation between Saddam and the US officer, reports that the Lebanese ex-president and an interpreter – a short man who spoke only whenever Saddam whispered something in his ear – were also present.

After Saddam warmly shook his hand, the American said: “It’s been a long time since I last saw you, but you seem to be in great shape. You are a great soldier and I looking forward to facing you on the battlefield.”

”When do you intend to attack and try to kill me?” Saddam asked.

”Basically, after the March 19 deadline passes,” came the reply.

”You managed to get me to destroy my missiles,” the Iraqi leader said, pausing for effect. “Is the 19th the date of the attack or just the day when you want me to leave Iraq? After all, that’s what you came for.”

The US colonel answered: “According to our orders, that’s the date when we are supposed to head out and get you. And we’ve already been told, ‘Don’t come back with him left in place.’”

Saddam was not pleased. “You are the sons of Satan. Go to hell. I’m not afraid of you.”

”We may not even wait until the 19th now,” the colonel shot back.

”Well then,” Saddam said. “What’s the offer and where do you want me to go?”

”Egypt, Sudan, Syria – there’s a long list of offers. Even Iran made an offer.”

A defiant Saddam answered in English: “I will die before I surrender.”

Tempers flared as the colonel told the Iraqi leader: “If you don’t leave, we will target you.”

A fuming Saddam began talking gibberish, before finally calming down and whispering something to the interpreter, who said: “The president believes he is going to send you back to your leaders in a box as a message.”

The American officer was unfazed.

“In that case, the war would start today,” he replied. “We know where you are every day.”

“I have no fear of death,” Saddam said.

According to DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s sources, the conversation then turned to the underground bunkers where Saddam and his family planned to seek shelter from US bombs.

”How long do you think you can hold out there? Maybe four to six weeks, tops,” the colonel said.

”Don’t worry, when I have to get out, I will,” Saddam said.

”We all know that if you leave your shelter after the war begins, the people on the street and Iraqi troops will tear you to shreds,” the officer said.

Saddam replied with a dismissive wave of the hand.

Time was up, and Gemayel and the colonel flew back to the Iraqi border. At the frontier, Gemayel bade the officer farewell and returned to Saddam’s palace in Baghdad.

According to our information, the US colonel arrived in Kuwait early on Wednesday, March 12, and made his report immediately to Washington. From Baghdad, Gemayel made his way to Amman and sent his own equally pessimistic report to Washington.

Q. Rachel, do you think the Bush administration could have done a better job in trying to get Security Council backing for the war in Iraq? And does it matter that it did not get that backing?

A. We have seen a diplomatic train wreck.

The French and Germans have been real contributors to it. But I'm going to focus on the U.S. side of things, since that is the question.

The Bush administration came to power with a notion that "if we say it, they will follow." Many in this administration believed that President Clinton did not show resolve and commitment and therefore did not lead the international community. This administration decided to pursue an alternative course. They alienated many around the world, but even worse, they did not build a strategy for bringing along ambivalent partners.

The second problem is that this lack of strategy led them to make policy decisions that have been contrary to alliance building. The doctrine of pre-emption alienated many around the world who we would have liked to have been helpful to us.

The third problem is that they never got "on message." They kept changing what this was about--disarmament, regime change, terrorism, or democracy. You can weave a story together about how all of this fits, but they never did.

Fourth, they never put together a compelling vision about post-conflict Iraq. Many around the world believe we have no idea what we are getting ourselves into, and will leave a mess on Iraq's neighbors' doorsteps when we decide things are too hard, or other problems are more compelling. Only very, very recently did the administration begin talking about post-conflict Iraq, and unfortunately it has been too little too late.

Q. On the question of Iraq after the war, what are some of the geopolitical implications of a war with Iraq? Do you think President Bush is failing to recognize some of these implications? Would an independent Kurdistan be a disaster?

A. The current policy of containment was becoming a disaster. It required the continuation of economic sanctions which targeted the Iraqi middle class and the most innocent and vulnerable in that society. Saddam built palaces while his people had nothing. Sanctions are an immoral policy, and we are right to change it. Unfortunately, lifting sanctions would only have allowed Saddam to continue to build up and threaten us and his neighbors.

Also, the heavy American troop presence that containment required was becoming a liability for us and our partners. It was giving succor to the region's radicals who recruited on the message of Americans in the holy land (Saudi Arabia). Osama bin Laden is the most extreme example.

The United States has been containing not only Iraq, but its neighbors as well. This was a terrible policy.

I bring all this up because it's not a choice between an acceptable policy and another one. The current policy was bad for the U.S., bad for the Iraqis, and bad for the region.

Does George Bush know what he's getting into? If things go well, many of the worst scenarios will be avoided. It will be hard to march in protest in Cairo and Paris if there is dancing in Basra.

But getting Iraq back on its feet will mean an initial commitment to ensuring "law and order," and that requires the United States to use its soldiers to "police and pacify." That is something the president actually campaigned against. I hope the president is committed to this. He is saying the right things, but our half-hearted efforts in Afghanistan make our friends and allies nervous.

Other risks: the story of burning oil fields is very worrisome. Iraqis will need their oil to rebuild. It will be very costly even with Iraq producing oil at full capacity. The estimated cost of reconstruction is between 25 billion and 100 billion dollars. Iraq produces only about 12 billion to 14 billion dollars a year in oil, in current prices.

There are risks about what the neighbors will do. Turkey and Iran must be encouraged to stay out.

There are risks about what the Iraqis will do to each other, given the decades of brutality they have lived through.

These problems are manageable, but it will take skillful diplomacy.

Q. Will Iran view a U.S.-dominated Iraq next door as a serious threat to its national security, thus leading to an acceleration in its plans to obtain nuclear weapons? And do you think it will encourage the Shiites in Basra to break away?

A. By all accounts, Iran has accelerated its nuclear program without the United States sitting in Iraq.

Iran lives in a difficult neighborhood, with Pakistan, India, and Iraq all within striking reach. If Iraq can be effectively disarmed, it should ease some Iranian concerns. That is why Iran has been notably quiet.

The Shiites in Iraq have repeatedly shown themselves to be Iraqi nationals. Saddam was worried they would fight with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. They didn't. I think the more likely scenario is that the Shi'a will look for fair representation in any new government, not to break away from Iraq.

Q. President Bush last week endorsed the "road map" for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. How can the world expect peace to occur between Palestinians and Israelis when racial hatred towards Jews is so deeply ingrained in the minds of many Arabs?

And the reverse. Do you think that after the regime change in Iraq, the Bush administration will press Sharon on settlement activity? And if so, why?

A. When the peace process was going well, Qatar opened an economic interest office for the Israeli government. When things were going well, Jordanian-Israeli trade was increasing and Israeli tour guides operated in Jordan. Hardly a racial hatred. I would cast it more as political anger by most, and bigoted anti-semitism by some.

Ideas on both sides have evolved over time, and evolved more quickly when political conditions were more positive.

Some in the administration appear very committed to turning attention to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. [Deputy Defense Secretary] Paul Wolfowitz has directed his attention to the problem of settlements. Others in the administration do not think there's anything the U.S. can do about what's going on. As with everything else in this administration, there will be a policy battle on the issue that we will all have to watch.

Q. On an Israeli-Palestinian peace, do you expect that pressure will be brought by Washington on Israel to stop the settlements simultaneous with the Palestinians agreeing to halt terror?

A. No. the president has been very clear in his statements of late that once terror stops, then Israel will be pressured to stop the settlements. The administration views these events occurring sequentially.

Q. Does that undercut the "road map" formula?

A. Yes, parts of it anyway.

Q. In your opinion, how should Iraq be ruled after the war ends?

A. In the short term, the United States will have to be in charge, and by short term I mean weeks, perhaps a couple of months. Law and order will have to be ensured and humanitarian assistance provided. The power must be kept on and the water purified. The Iraqi ministries can continue to function (minus the ministers), but we cannot afford a vacuum to form.

However, as quickly as possible, we must design a mechanism by which we hand over political responsibility (although the Iraqis are likely to expect us to continue to ensure security) to the Iraqis. In Afghanistan, a very respected, internationally-recognized figure took the helm, working hand-in-glove with the U.N. This model is a good place to start.

Given the current acrimony between the U.S. and the U.N., it will be all the more difficult to argue for turning this over in one form or another to the U.N. But doing so would be good for us, good for Iraq, and good for the U.N.

It would be good for the U.S. because we will need help. We will need NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] operating, and they are less likely to operate as an arm of the American government, and more likely to do so under U.N. auspices. U.N. cover will also help bring others in to undertake some of the tasks that America doesn't do particularly well.

It would be good for Iraq, because it will help to mitigate fears that this is a colonial land grab. It will reduce the attraction of Iraqi Islamists and others who may seek to undermine new political arrangements.

It would be good for the United Nations, because it will give it an important mission on the heels of recent events which have made the U.N. appear irrelevant.

Q. Rachel, do you think the Bush administration could have done a better job in trying to get Security Council backing for the war in Iraq? And does it matter that it did not get that backing?

A. We have seen a diplomatic train wreck.

The French and Germans have been real contributors to it. But I'm going to focus on the U.S. side of things, since that is the question.

The Bush administration came to power with a notion that "if we say it, they will follow." Many in this administration believed that President Clinton did not show resolve and commitment and therefore did not lead the international community. This administration decided to pursue an alternative course. They alienated many around the world, but even worse, they did not build a strategy for bringing along ambivalent partners.

The second problem is that this lack of strategy led them to make policy decisions that have been contrary to alliance building. The doctrine of pre-emption alienated many around the world who we would have liked to have been helpful to us.

The third problem is that they never got "on message." They kept changing what this was about--disarmament, regime change, terrorism, or democracy. You can weave a story together about how all of this fits, but they never did.

Fourth, they never put together a compelling vision about post-conflict Iraq. Many around the world believe we have no idea what we are getting ourselves into, and will leave a mess on Iraq's neighbors' doorsteps when we decide things are too hard, or other problems are more compelling. Only very, very recently did the administration begin talking about post-conflict Iraq, and unfortunately it has been too little too late.

Q. On the question of Iraq after the war, what are some of the geopolitical implications of a war with Iraq? Do you think President Bush is failing to recognize some of these implications? Would an independent Kurdistan be a disaster?

A. The current policy of containment was becoming a disaster. It required the continuation of economic sanctions which targeted the Iraqi middle class and the most innocent and vulnerable in that society. Saddam built palaces while his people had nothing. Sanctions are an immoral policy, and we are right to change it. Unfortunately, lifting sanctions would only have allowed Saddam to continue to build up and threaten us and his neighbors.

Also, the heavy American troop presence that containment required was becoming a liability for us and our partners. It was giving succor to the region's radicals who recruited on the message of Americans in the holy land (Saudi Arabia). Osama bin Laden is the most extreme example.

The United States has been containing not only Iraq, but its neighbors as well. This was a terrible policy.

I bring all this up because it's not a choice between an acceptable policy and another one. The current policy was bad for the U.S., bad for the Iraqis, and bad for the region.

Does George Bush know what he's getting into? If things go well, many of the worst scenarios will be avoided. It will be hard to march in protest in Cairo and Paris if there is dancing in Basra.

But getting Iraq back on its feet will mean an initial commitment to ensuring "law and order," and that requires the United States to use its soldiers to "police and pacify." That is something the president actually campaigned against. I hope the president is committed to this. He is saying the right things, but our half-hearted efforts in Afghanistan make our friends and allies nervous.

Other risks: the story of burning oil fields is very worrisome. Iraqis will need their oil to rebuild. It will be very costly even with Iraq producing oil at full capacity. The estimated cost of reconstruction is between 25 billion and 100 billion dollars. Iraq produces only about 12 billion to 14 billion dollars a year in oil, in current prices.

There are risks about what the neighbors will do. Turkey and Iran must be encouraged to stay out.

There are risks about what the Iraqis will do to each other, given the decades of brutality they have lived through.

These problems are manageable, but it will take skillful diplomacy.

Q. Will Iran view a U.S.-dominated Iraq next door as a serious threat to its national security, thus leading to an acceleration in its plans to obtain nuclear weapons? And do you think it will encourage the Shiites in Basra to break away?

A. By all accounts, Iran has accelerated its nuclear program without the United States sitting in Iraq.

Iran lives in a difficult neighborhood, with Pakistan, India, and Iraq all within striking reach. If Iraq can be effectively disarmed, it should ease some Iranian concerns. That is why Iran has been notably quiet.

The Shiites in Iraq have repeatedly shown themselves to be Iraqi nationals. Saddam was worried they would fight with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. They didn't. I think the more likely scenario is that the Shi'a will look for fair representation in any new government, not to break away from Iraq.

Q. President Bush last week endorsed the "road map" for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. How can the world expect peace to occur between Palestinians and Israelis when racial hatred towards Jews is so deeply ingrained in the minds of many Arabs?

And the reverse. Do you think that after the regime change in Iraq, the Bush administration will press Sharon on settlement activity? And if so, why?

A. When the peace process was going well, Qatar opened an economic interest office for the Israeli government. When things were going well, Jordanian-Israeli trade was increasing and Israeli tour guides operated in Jordan. Hardly a racial hatred. I would cast it more as political anger by most, and bigoted anti-semitism by some.

Ideas on both sides have evolved over time, and evolved more quickly when political conditions were more positive.

Some in the administration appear very committed to turning attention to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. [Deputy Defense Secretary] Paul Wolfowitz has directed his attention to the problem of settlements. Others in the administration do not think there's anything the U.S. can do about what's going on. As with everything else in this administration, there will be a policy battle on the issue that we will all have to watch.

Q. On an Israeli-Palestinian peace, do you expect that pressure will be brought by Washington on Israel to stop the settlements simultaneous with the Palestinians agreeing to halt terror?

A. No. the president has been very clear in his statements of late that once terror stops, then Israel will be pressured to stop the settlements. The administration views these events occurring sequentially.

Q. Does that undercut the "road map" formula?

A. Yes, parts of it anyway.

Q. In your opinion, how should Iraq be ruled after the war ends?

A. In the short term, the United States will have to be in charge, and by short term I mean weeks, perhaps a couple of months. Law and order will have to be ensured and humanitarian assistance provided. The power must be kept on and the water purified. The Iraqi ministries can continue to function (minus the ministers), but we cannot afford a vacuum to form.

However, as quickly as possible, we must design a mechanism by which we hand over political responsibility (although the Iraqis are likely to expect us to continue to ensure security) to the Iraqis. In Afghanistan, a very respected, internationally-recognized figure took the helm, working hand-in-glove with the U.N. This model is a good place to start.

Given the current acrimony between the U.S. and the U.N., it will be all the more difficult to argue for turning this over in one form or another to the U.N. But doing so would be good for us, good for Iraq, and good for the U.N.

It would be good for the U.S. because we will need help. We will need NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] operating, and they are less likely to operate as an arm of the American government, and more likely to do so under U.N. auspices. U.N. cover will also help bring others in to undertake some of the tasks that America doesn't do particularly well.

It would be good for Iraq, because it will help to mitigate fears that this is a colonial land grab. It will reduce the attraction of Iraqi Islamists and others who may seek to undermine new political arrangements.

It would be good for the United Nations, because it will give it an important mission on the heels of recent events which have made the U.N. appear irrelevant.