Dissolution of Marriage; Distribution of Assets; Whether Brokerage Account Award
was a Lump Sum Award; Whether Appellate Court Properly Remanded Case to Trial
Court to Consider Claim for Postjudgment Interest Under General Statutes §
37-3a Instead of Reinstating Earlier Award. The parties' marriage was
dissolved in March, 2005. As part of the court's distribution of assets, the plaintiff
was awarded seventeen bank and brokerage accounts, totaling $89,039,617.68. The
court awarded the defendant a lump sum cash payment of $24,000,000, to be paid from
the plaintiff's accounts. On September 8, 2005, the court modified the award
to correct an improper overvaluation of some of the parties' tangible assets.
It split the error fifty-fifty, resulting in a modified award of $23,834,900 to
the defendant. The defendant subsequently moved for contempt because the
plaintiff had not paid her $3,828,081 of the modified award. On March 23, 2006,
the court denied the motion because it was not convinced that the plaintiff's
conduct was wilful. It, however, ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant
the unpaid balance with interest "at the legal rate" running from
September 8, 2005. The defendant again moved for contempt on the ground that
the plaintiff improperly calculated the interest at a rate of eight percent, rather
than ten percent as required by General Statutes § 37-3a. On November 27,
2006, the court denied the motion for contempt but ruled that the plaintiff
owed interest at the applicable rate of ten percent under § 37-3a. Subsequently,
the court filed an articulation in which it stated that General Statutes § 37-1
was the statutory basis for the interest award, with the rate of interest being
eight percent. The plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross appealed these decisions
to the Appellate Court (109 Conn. App. 691). The plaintiff claimed that the trial
court had awarded him a lump sum cash award of $89,039,617.68 and that the order
that he pay the defendant $3,828,081 reduced his award and improperly modified
the original distribution of assets. The court disagreed, concluding that the
trial court had awarded only the defendant a lump sum cash payment. The
plaintiff, it opined, had been awarded the accounts themselves, which had a
fluctuating value. Thus, the court concluded that the order that the plaintiff
pay the amount that he withheld from her lump sum award was not a modification
of the original distribution of assets. The court also found that the trial
court's reliance on § 37-1 was improper. Because the trial court had issued
conflicting decisions concerning the award of interest, the Appellate Court remanded
the case for consideration of the defendant's claim for interest under § 37-3a,
which will require the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff's detention
of money was wrongful. In doing so, it rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for contempt precluded, on
remand, a finding that he wrongfully failed to pay the defendant the awarded
moneys when they were due. This court will now review the Appellate Court's application
of § 37-3a, as well as its determination that the trial court did not
improperly modify the original distribution of assets. In addition, it will
review the Appellate Court's decision to remand the matter to the trial court
for a de novo hearing on the amount of interest instead of reinstating the
court's November, 2006 award of interest.