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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
February 2011:
Nuclear Weapons:
NNSA Needs More Comprehensive Infrastructure and Workforce Data to
Improve Enterprise Decision-making:
GAO-11-188:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-188, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States intends to invest about $80 billion to maintain and
modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and infrastructure over the
next decade. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE),
maintains the nation’s nuclear weapons through its Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP). NNSA uses contractors to manage and operate
eight separate sites, referred to as the nuclear security enterprise,
to achieve the SSP’s mission.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed
GAO to review the SSP. This report focuses on the extent to which NNSA
has the data necessary to make informed, enterprisewide decisions,
particularly data on the condition of infrastructure, capital
improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and critical human
capital skills. GAO analyzed agency infrastructure data; reviewed
agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and
contractor officials.
What GAO Found:
In its FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA
outlines plans for substantial investments in important nuclear
weapons capabilities and physical infrastructure. However, the agency
lacks important enterprisewide infrastructure and workforce data
needed for informed decision-making. In response to this shortcoming,
which NNSA recognizes, the agency is considering the use of computer
models that integrate data from across the enterprise, which, if fully
realized, may give decision-makers a tool to take a broad and accurate
assessment of the situation. Specifically,
* NNSA does not have accurate, reliable, or complete data on the
condition and replacement value of its almost 3,000 weapons activities
facilities. This is, in part, because NNSA has not ensured contractor
compliance with a DOE directive that requires facility inspections at
least once every 5 years. For example, according to data in DOE’s
Facilities Information Management System (FIMS), as of April 2010, 26
percent of facilities have either an inspection date outside of the 5-
year period or no inspection date recorded. NNSA officials stated that
they are aware of the limitations of FIMS data and told us that they
use a variety of other methods to track site facility conditions, such
as budget requests and daily dialog with federal and contractor
personnel at the sites.
* NNSA has identified 15 ongoing capital improvement projects as
necessary to ensure future viability of the program, but the agency
does not have estimated total costs or completion dates for all
projects. For example, NNSA has not estimated total costs for the
largest projects it is conducting—the Chemical and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos,
New Mexico, and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE regulations do not require a total cost
estimate until the initial design phase is complete, but without
reliable cost and schedule data NNSA does not have a sound basis to
justify decisions and planned budget increases.
* NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage facilities used by
more than one site––known as shared use assets––and issued a directive
in 2009 requiring identification of these assets and a review of the
governance plan developed for each designated facility to ensure that
the plans align with programmatic priorities and that users
enterprisewide have well supported access to these facilities.
However, NNSA has not collected data on shared use assets and has not
reviewed individual management plans.
* NNSA lacks comprehensive data on the critical skills and levels
needed to maintain the SSP’s capabilities. NNSA primarily relies on
its contractors to maintain the workforce and, while these efforts may
be effective for a specific site, NNSA lacks assurance that the
overall program is maintained. Without such data, NNSA cannot forecast
the impact of programmatic actions or identify consequences of those
actions. NNSA officials told GAO that the agency recently established
an Office of Corporate Talent and Critical Skills to bring attention
to these issues.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NNSA take four actions to ensure that it is
equipped with the information needed to effectively and efficiently
manage the SSP. NNSA stated that it understood and can implement GAO’s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-188] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NNSA Lacks Key Data Required to Make Informed, Enterprisewide
Decisions, but Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Help
Address Some Shortcomings:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Ongoing Capital Improvement Projects, as of September
2010:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of Facilities and Structures That Do Not Meet DOE's
Inspection Requirement (by Mission Category), as of April 2010:
Figures:
Figure 1: Nuclear Security Enterprise Sites:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
CMRR: Chemistry and Metallurgy Research:
FIMS: Facilities Information Management System:
LANSCE: Los Alamos Neutron Science Center:
M&O: management and operation:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
PAC: Program Advisory Committee:
SSP: Stockpile Stewardship Program:
UPF: Uranium Processing Facility:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 14, 2011:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John S. McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Based on policy set forth in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a
legislatively-mandated review in which the Administration established
the nation's nuclear weapons requirements and policy, the United
States intends to invest about $80 billion over the next 10 years to
support and modernize the nation's nuclear weapons capabilities and
physical infrastructure. In response to the review, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency
within the Department of Energy (DOE) that maintains the nation's
nuclear weapons through its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)--
established a FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which
provides additional details on the nation's nuclear direction.
[Footnote 1] As part of this plan and arms control treaties, the
United States has agreed to reduce the size of its strategic nuclear
weapon stockpile from a maximum of 2,200 to 1,550 weapons.
Nonetheless, the remaining weapons in the stockpile continue to be an
essential element of the U.S. defense strategy. As we have reported,
the SSP faces a number of challenges in sustaining the stockpile of
nuclear weapons over the long-term.[Footnote 2] In particular, these
weapons are aging to well beyond their intended lifespan. Further,
many of the facilities supporting the nuclear weapons program date
back to the 1940s and 1950s Cold War era, and NNSA reported in its
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that they have become
difficult and costly to maintain. In addition, the agency reported
that an aging workforce and difficulty in recruiting personnel with
specialized skills are resulting in the loss of knowledge,
capabilities, and skills necessary to sustain the nation's nuclear
weapons program and maintain the stockpile.
The United States ceased underground nuclear testing in 1992, and
current national policy prohibits the development of newly designed
nuclear weapons. In lieu of testing and producing new weapons, NNSA
relies on science-based activities, such as analytical simulations and
laboratory experiments, to ensure the existing weapons remain safe and
reliable. In addition, NNSA refurbishes weapons in the stockpile to
extend their operational lives. NNSA carries out these activities
through several thousand facilities located at eight geographically
dispersed government-owned, contractor-operated sites, which include
three national laboratories, four production sites, and one test site.
Collectively, these sites are referred to as the nuclear security
enterprise. At these sites, nearly 24,000 management and operation
(M&O) contractor employees support the nation's nuclear weapons
through, among other things, computer modeling, dismantlement of
weapons, storage of nuclear material, weapon component production, and
non-nuclear tests and experimentation on weapons and weapons
components. NNSA recognizes in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan that it must effectively manage resources dedicated to
the nuclear weapons program to ensure the nation's nuclear weapons
remain safe, secure, and reliable. To do so, NNSA reported in an
internal document that it is committed to creating an interdependent,
efficient enterprise by, in part, integrating and aggregating data
from across the sites to create an interconnected and comprehensive
view of the products, people, and facilities of the enterprise.
[Footnote 3]
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010[Footnote
4] directed GAO to conduct a review of selected elements of the SSP.
We briefed the Senate and House Armed Services Committees of our
findings in July 2010. This report provides the results of additional
audit work completed after our briefing and focuses on the extent to
which NNSA has the data necessary to make informed, enterprisewide
decisions, particularly the extent to which it has identified the
condition and value of existing infrastructure, developed cost
estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement
projects, managed shared use assets within the enterprise, and
inventoried the critical human capital skills needed to maintain the
SSP.
In conducting our work, we reviewed NNSA documents and directives,
including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the FY 2011 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan; met with DOE, NNSA, and contractor
officials; assessed the reliability of the data provided; and visited
four of the eight enterprise sites. To determine the condition of
nuclear weapons facilities, we reviewed M&O contractor's 10-year site
plans for each enterprise site and obtained and analyzed data from
DOE's Facilities Information Management System (FIMS). However, we
determined during our analysis of the data that the inspection dates
for some of its facilities were missing or out of date and the
replacement property values were inconsistent across the enterprise.
As a result, we do not believe the condition index data are
sufficiently reliable for presenting the condition of existing
infrastructure. Furthermore, we toured a nonrandom sample of
facilities at the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New
Mexico, the Pantex Plant in Texas, and the Nevada National Security
Site.[Footnote 5] In selecting our site visit locations, we considered
a number of factors, including the type of site (production,
laboratory, or test); missions carried out at the sites; the potential
for shared use facilities; and geographic location. The data we
obtained from our site visits are used as examples and cannot be
generalized to indicate condition throughout the nuclear security
enterprise. To determine NNSA's plans for improvements to enterprise
infrastructure, we collected and analyzed information from agency
officials on all capital improvement projects identified by NNSA as
ongoing projects. To determine the extent to which NNSA has identified
shared use facilities within the enterprise and how these facilities
are managed, we reviewed NNSA's 2009 facility governance directive and
met with NNSA, Los Alamos, and Sandia officials to discuss shared use
facilities. To determine NNSA's efforts to maintain the critical human
capital skills of the SSP, we reviewed NNSA's Development of the NNSA
Critical/Capability Inventory draft report and the Report of the
Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise. A
more detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in
appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to February 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In 1993, DOE, at the direction of the President and Congress,
established the SSP to sustain the safety and effectiveness of the
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile without returning to the use of
underground nuclear tests.[Footnote 6] NNSA administers the program
through its Office of Defense Programs. This responsibility
encompasses many different tasks, including the manufacture, storage,
assembly, nonnuclear testing, qualifying, and dismantlement of weapons
in the stockpile. To accomplish the mission of the program, the Office
of Defense Programs relies on private M&O contractors to carry out
various tasks at each of the nuclear security enterprise sites. (See
figure 1.) NNSA reimburses its M&O contractors under cost-
reimbursement-type contracts for the costs incurred in carrying out
the department's missions. The contractors, in turn, may subcontract
out major portions of their work, especially in mission-support areas
such as constructing and maintaining facilities. While most day-to-day
activities are managed and operated by the various contractors, NNSA
is responsible for the planning, budgeting, and ensuring the execution
of interconnected activities across the eight sites that comprise the
enterprise.
Figure 1: Nuclear Security Enterprise Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, MO):
Manufactures and procures nonnuclear components for nuclear weapons,
including electrical, electronic, mechanical, and plastic components.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, CA):
Research and development laboratory responsible for ensuring the
performance, safety, and reliability of nuclear weapons, particularly
their nuclear components; supporting surveillance, assessment, and
refurbishment of weapons in the stockpile; and providing unique
capabilities in high-energy density physics, high explosives research
and development and assessment, and environmental containment of high-
hazard experiments.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, NM):
Research and development laboratory responsible for ensuring the
performance, safety, and reliability of nuclear weapons, particularly
their nuclear components; supporting surveillance, assessment, and
refurbishment of weapons in the stockpile; and providing unique
capabilities in neutron scattering, radiography, and actinide
sciences. LANL also manufactures plutonium components and weapons
detonators.
Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (Mercury, NV):
Conducts high-hazard operations, testing, and training in support of
NNSA, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies; maintains the
capability to resume underground nuclear testing should the President
deem it necessary.
Pantex Plant (Pantex) (Amarillo, TX):
Assembles nuclear and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons;
conducts disassembly, testing, quality assurance, repair,
refurbishment, retirement, and final disposition of nuclear weapon
assemblies, components, and materials; fabricates chemical high
explosives for nuclear weapons applications.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA):
Research and development laboratories responsible for ensuring the
performance, safety, and reliability of nuclear weapons, particularly
their nonnuclear components; supporting surveillance, assessment, and
refurbishment of weapons in the stockpile; conducting environmental
testing of nuclear weapons systems; responsible for the engineering of
nonnuclear components and for some nonnuclear component production.
Savannah River Site (SRS)-Tritium Operations (Aiken, SC):
Extracts tritium, a key isotope in nuclear weapons design; performs
loading, unloading, and surveillance on tritium reservoirs.
Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) (Oak Ridge, TN):
Manufactures components for nuclear weapons, including uranium
components; evaluates, tests, assembles, and disassembles these
components; supplies highly enriched uranium for use in naval reactors.
Sources: NNSA; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Nuclear weapons are technically complex devices with a multitude of
components and over time, a weapon's reliability could decline unless
mitigating precautions are taken. Since the establishment of the SSP,
NNSA has worked with its M&O contractors to provide data on weapon
phenomena through science-based approaches that assess the safety and
reliability of the weapons in the stockpile and that seek to extend
their operational lives. As a result of these efforts, since 1996, the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense have provided the President with
independent reports prepared individually by the directors of the
three weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command confirming that the stockpile is safe and reliable and that
there is no need to resume underground nuclear testing.
During the past 15 years, Congress has made significant investments in
the nation's stockpile stewardship capabilities, and NNSA has
identified a number of accomplishments it has achieved in fulfilling
the SSP mission. For example, the SSP has completed a life extension
program for one warhead; conducted numerous weapon alterations to
address safety, reliability, or performance issues; and has dismantled
more than 7,000 nuclear weapons since fiscal year 1991. Further, the
SSP reestablished the capability to produce plutonium pits--a key
component of nuclear warheads.
In its recently released Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan for
Fiscal Year 2011, NNSA stated that the SSP's mission is dependent upon
the enterprise's facilities and physical infrastructure and the
critical skills of its workforce.
Facilities and Infrastructure. NNSA's real property portfolio
dedicated to its nuclear weapons mission is vast, with thousands of
facilities and associated infrastructure. A number of these facilities
are unique national assets used for research and development. As such,
while individual contractors operate a given facility, its
capabilities may be needed to support users and activities across the
enterprise.
NNSA has three categories of facilities and infrastructure that
indicate the extent to which they are critical to the achievement of
the SSP. These categories are:
(1) Mission critical. Facilities and infrastructure that are used to
perform activities--such as nuclear weapons production, research and
development, and storage--to meet the highest-level SSP goals, without
which operations would be disrupted or placed at risk.
(2) Mission dependent, not critical. Facilities and infrastructure--
such as waste management, nonnuclear storage, and machine shops--that
play a supporting role in meeting the SSP's goals, without which
operations would be disrupted only if they could not resume within 5
business days.
(3) Not mission dependent. Facilities and infrastructure--such as
cafeterias, parking structures, and excess facilities--that do not
link directly to SSP goals but support secondary missions or quality-
of-workplace initiatives.[Footnote 7]
Many of the facilities and infrastructure of the enterprise were
constructed more than 50 years ago, and NNSA has reported that they
are reaching the end of their useful lives. NNSA is undertaking a
number of capital improvement projects to modernize and maintain these
facilities. To identify and prioritize capital improvement project
needs, NNSA is to follow DOE directives and guidance for project
management. Among these is DOE Order 413.3A,[Footnote 8] which
establishes protocols for planning and executing a project. The
protocols require DOE projects to go through a series of five critical
decisions as they enter each new phase of work:
* Critical decision 0. Approves a mission-related need.
* Critical decision 1. Approves the selection of a preferred solution
to meet a mission need and a preliminary estimate of project costs
based on a review of a project's conceptual design.
* Critical decision 2. Approves that a project's cost and schedule
estimates are accurate and complete based on a review of the project's
completed preliminary design.
* Critical decision 3. Reaches agreement that a project's final design
is sufficiently complete and that resources can be committed toward
procurement and construction.
* Critical decision 4. Approves that a project has met its completion
criteria or that or that the facility is ready to start operations.
To oversee projects and approve these critical decisions, NNSA
conducts its own reviews, often with the help of independent technical
experts.
Critical Human Capital Skills. NNSA reports that sustaining a large
number of critical skills throughout the enterprise is central to the
mission of the SSP. The importance of these critical skills has been
of interest to Congress for a number of years. For example, in the
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Congress
established the Commission of Maintaining United States Nuclear
Weapons Expertise (referred to as the Chiles Commission). Congress
tasked the commission to review ongoing efforts of DOE to attract
scientific, engineering, and technical personnel and to develop a plan
for the recruitment and retention within the DOE nuclear weapons
complex. The Chiles Commission reviewed efforts across the enterprise
and developed a number of recommendations, including the need to
develop and implement a detailed and long-term site-specific and
enterprisewide plan for replenishing the nuclear weapons workforce.
NNSA reported in its response to Congress that it will take a number
of actions, including giving greater attention to ensuring sites
devote adequate resources to critical skills generation, retention,
and regeneration.
NNSA Lacks Key Data Required to Make Informed, Enterprisewide
Decisions, but Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Help
Address Some Shortcomings:
NNSA lacks comprehensive data needed for informed enterprisewide
decision-making; however, according to a NNSA official and agency
documents, NNSA is considering the use of computer models that may
help to address some of these critical shortcomings.
NNSA Lacks Comprehensive Data Required to Make Informed,
Enterprisewide Decisions:
We found that NNSA lacks complete data on (1) the condition and value
of its existing infrastructure, (2) cost estimates and completion
dates for planned capital improvement projects, (3) shared use
facilities within the enterprise, and (4) critical human capital
skills in its M&O contractor workforce needed to maintain the SSP.
Facilities and Infrastructure Data. NNSA does not have accurate and
reliable data on the condition and replacement value of its facilities
and other infrastructure.[Footnote 9] This is in part because NNSA (1)
has not ensured that contractors comply with a DOE directive[Footnote
10] that requires facility inspections at least once every 5 years,
and (2) does not ensure consistency among the varying approaches and
methodologies contractors use when determining replacement property
value.[Footnote 11]
DOE requires its sites--including those within the nuclear security
enterprise--to assess the condition of all real property at least once
during any 5-year period.[Footnote 12] Sites are to use the results of
these assessments to identify maintenance costs, which are then
compared to the replacement property value for the facility. Using
this information, DOE is to calculate a condition index for each of
its facilities and other infrastructure. While DOE requires periodic
condition assessments, in our analysis of data in DOE's agencywide
infrastructure database, the Facilities Information Management System
(FIMS), we found 765 of DOE's 2,897 weapons activities facilities, or
26 percent, have not met this requirement--having either an inspection
date outside of the 5-year period or no inspection date recorded (see
table 1). NNSA officials report that FIMS is the only centralized
repository for infrastructure data and that the agency, in part,
relies on these data to support funding decisions.
Table 1: Number of Facilities and Structures That Do Not Meet DOE's
Inspection Requirement (by Mission Category), as of April 2010:
Mission category: Mission critical;
Total number of facilities: 212;
Inspection date before April 2005: 1;
No inspection date recorded in FIMS: 6;
Percent of total facilities with either an inspection date prior to
April 2005 or no date recorded: 3.
Mission category: Mission dependent, not critical;
Total number of facilities: 1,057;
Inspection date before April 2005: 225;
No inspection date recorded in FIMS: 24;
Percent of total facilities with either an inspection date prior to
April 2005 or no date recorded: 24.
Mission category: Not mission dependent;
Total number of facilities: 692;
Inspection date before April 2005: 66;
No inspection date recorded in FIMS: 149;
Percent of total facilities with either an inspection date prior to
April 2005 or no date recorded: 31.
Mission category: Other structures and facilities;
Total number of facilities: 936;
Inspection date before April 2005: 25;
No inspection date recorded in FIMS: 269;
Percent of total facilities with either an inspection date prior to
April 2005 or no date recorded: 31.
Mission category: Total;
Total number of facilities: 2,897;
Inspection date before April 2005: 317;
No inspection date recorded in FIMS: 448;
Percent of total facilities with either an inspection date prior to
April 2005 or no date recorded: 26.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE's FIMS data.
Notes: Analysis limited to facilities DOE identified as supporting
NNSA's weapons activities that were built before April 2005 and
identified as being in "operational" status.
Other structures and facilities are any fixed real property
improvements to land not classifiable as a building or trailer, e.g.,
bridges, towers, roads, and fences.
In response to our draft report, NNSA officials stated that a number
of facilities were either inspected or that an inspection date was
recorded in FIMS between April 2010 and January 2011. NNSA officials
also told us that based on analysis the agency conducted of FIMS data
in January 2011, the majority of facilities and structures that do not
meet DOE's inspection requirement are other structures and facilities
that are not mission dependent. The officials further stated that,
based on their analysis, as of January 2011, 1 percent of mission
critical buildings and 16 percent of mission dependent, not critical
buildings have either an inspection date outside of the 5-year period
or no inspection date recorded. We did not independently verify the
agency's analysis of the data.
[End of table]
Further, we found that sites used varying approaches and methodologies
in determining deferred maintenance and replacement property values,
but did so without validation from NNSA that the various methods were
consistent with base criteria and could be aggregated for decision-
making purposes. In fact, during an inspection conducted in July 2008
of one site's approach, NNSA found that the methodology for
determining deferred maintenance and replacement property values were
"suspect, difficult to validate, and unreliable." In addition, the
agency stated in the inspection report that it was concerned that the
site's approach for conducting inspections was resulting in
inconsistent calculation of repair and maintenance costs from year to
year. NNSA conducted a follow-up assessment in April 2010 and reported
that the site had made progress in addressing the concerns highlighted
in the 2008 assessment but significant efforts are still needed to
reach satisfactory levels.
A site official at one location also told us that even though the site
complied with DOE requirements to conduct an inspection of all
facilities at least once every 5 years, NNSA's data on facility and
infrastructure condition for that site is not always accurate because
an inspection from 3 to 5 years ago does not always reflect the rapid
degradation of some facilities. In particular, the official noted
that, in the last 2 years, the site experienced about $36 million of
unplanned facility maintenance. NNSA officials stated that they are
aware of the limitations of FIMS data and know that conditions change
more rapidly than can be tracked by 5-year assessments. As a result,
NNSA officials told us the agency also uses a variety of other methods
to track site facility conditions, including budget requests,
regularly updated planning documents, and daily dialog with federal
and contractor personnel at the sites. However, as we have reported,
agencies that have a centralized database with accurate and reliable
data on their facilities can better support investment decisions in
planning and budgeting.[Footnote 13]
Data on Capital Improvement Projects. NNSA does not have estimated
total costs or completion dates for all planned capital improvement
projects. While NNSA identified each of its ongoing projects as
necessary to ensure future viability of the program, without more
complete information on these projects NNSA cannot identify how the
timing of these projects impacts other projects or how delays could
increase costs and impact budgetary requirements in future year
planning.
NNSA identified 15 ongoing capital improvement projects to replace or
improve existing infrastructure (see app. II for detailed information
on each capital improvement project). The status of these projects
range from preliminary design to completion, with some projects
scheduled for completion in 2022. The estimated cost associated with
the ongoing projects range from $35 million for the replacement of
fire protection piping at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, to up
to $3.5 billion for construction of the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF) at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. However, NNSA does
not have key information for a number of these projects, including
initial estimates for cost, amount of remaining funding needed to
complete the project, or completion dates. NNSA officials offered two
explanations for this lack of complete information. First, they said
that the lack of data is due in part to the early design phase for
some of these projects. For example, NNSA's highest infrastructure
priorities--CMRR and UPF--are still in design and according to NNSA
officials final cost estimates for capital improvement projects will
not be available until design is 90 percent complete. NNSA's current
estimate prepared in 2007 for UPF indicates the project will cost
between $1.4 and $3.5 billion to construct. As we recently
reported,[Footnote 14] the 2007 figure is more than double the
agency's 2004 estimate of between $600 million and $1.1 billion. In
addition, we reported that the costs for project engineering and
design, which are less than halfway completed, have increased by about
42 percent--from $297 to $421 million. For CMRR, as of October 2010,
NNSA did not provide us with an estimated completion cost for the
project but based on information reported in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan the agency is using a planning figure of
approximately $8 billion for completion of both UPF and CMRR. In
response to our reports, DOE and NNSA have recently initiated a number
of actions that, if fully implemented, may improve its management of
capital improvement projects.
Second, a NNSA official told us that changes in project scope and
unforeseen complications have hindered the agency's ability to
estimate costs and completion dates for some projects. For example, an
NNSA official said that the project to upgrade the Radioactive Liquid
Waste Treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory had an
initial cost estimate of $82 to $104 million, but site officials at
Los Alamos reported to NNSA a need to change the building materials
used in the original design estimate. As a result, the NNSA official
told us this project is estimated at over $300 million.
Our prior work has identified persistent problems at NNSA with cost
overruns and schedule delays for capital improvement projects.
[Footnote 15] For example, we found that NNSA's National Ignition
Facility--a high energy laser that NNSA reports will improve its
understanding of nuclear weapons--was $1 billion over budget, and over
5 years in delays. As we have reported, without reliable information
on costs and schedules, NNSA will not have a sound basis for making
decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects
and other programs and will lack information that could help justify
planned budget increases or target cost savings opportunities.
[Footnote 16]
[Side bar:
The submission and review process for use of the LANSCE facility at
Los Alamos National Laboratory:
1. Prospective users are encouraged to contact LANSCE scientists to
discuss their proposed research.
2. Prospective users submit a formal proposal.
3. A LANSCE scientist reviews the proposal and the safety and security
checklist and comments on the practical feasibility, environmental
safety and health, and security aspects of the proposed work.
4. LANSCE Program Advisory Committee (PAC) reviews proposal for
scientific quality.
5. The results of the PAC ratings are used by the scientists-in-charge
of the flight paths to draft a schedule for the flight paths.
6. LANSCE user facility director reviews the proposed schedule and
balances PAC recommendations with available resources and programmatic
importance to decide which proposals will be scheduled during the next
cycle.
7. The LANSCE user office contacts the user and informs him/her of the
proposal’s approval and schedule.
Source: GAO analysis of Los Alamos National Laboratory data.
End of side bar]
Shared Enterprise Assets. NNSA lacks complete data to ensure that
facilities with unique capabilities that are used by more than one
site--known as shared assets--are effectively utilized. The enterprise
comprises numerous state-of-the-art research facilities that NNSA
describes as being unique national assets. These shared assets, which
are found at the national weapons labs, plants, and test site,
represent a large and continuing investment of U.S. resources and
offer advanced science and technology capabilities that are desirable
for solving problems throughout the enterprise. NNSA delegates
responsibility for operating authority of these facilities to its M&O
contractors, though NNSA broadly defines the scope of work to be
performed at a facility. According to NNSA and site officials, the
process to determine specific users and individual activities at the
facilities are managed by each individual facility. For example, the
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE)--a powerful proton
accelerator used for, among other things, nuclear weapons research--
has a management plan governing its submission and review process for
shared use of the facility that only applies to LANSCE. Other shared
assets operate under their own management plans.
NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage these assets
enterprisewide to ensure that programmatic priorities are addressed
and that users enterprisewide have well supported access to these
facilities. In February 2009, NNSA developed a directive[Footnote 17]
stating that the Assistant Deputy Administrators within the Office of
Defense Programs will (1) select and approve the research and
development facilities to be designated as shared assets, and (2)
review and concur on the governance plan developed for each designated
facility. However, we found that NNSA does not have information on
which facilities are designated as shared use assets, and a NNSA
official told us the agency has not reviewed individual management
plans throughout the enterprise to ensure that each facilities'
submission and review process for use of the facility provides for
adequate enterprisewide access.
Critical Human Capital Skills. NNSA lacks comprehensive information on
the status of its M&O contractor workforce. Specifically, the agency
does not have an enterprisewide workforce baseline of critical human
capital skills and levels for the contractor workforce to effectively
maintain the capabilities needed to achieve its mission. NNSA
officials said this is primarily because NNSA relies on its
contractors to track these critical skills.[Footnote 18] While
contractor efforts may be effective at a specific site, these efforts
do not ensure long-term survival of these skills across the
enterprise, nor do they provide NNSA with the information needed to
make enterprisewide decisions that have implications on human capital.
NNSA reports in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that
sustaining a large number of critical capabilities throughout the
enterprise is central to the mission of stockpile stewardship and that
maintaining the right mix of skills is a significant challenge. The
agency also reported that the enterprise is losing critical
capabilities, stating that the M&O contractor workforce has been
reduced significantly in the past 20 years, which has decreased the
availability of personnel with required critical skills.[Footnote 19]
Further, NNSA stated in a 2009 internal human capital critical skills
report that the site-based independent approach to sustaining key
capabilities has not always been sufficient.[Footnote 20] For example,
NNSA reported that increased retirements and higher than normal
turnover rates have depleted the intellectual and technical knowledge
and skills needed to sustain critical capabilities. Specifically, in
that report, NNSA attributed problems that caused delays on an ongoing
life extension program to the loss of skilled employees.
Over the last several years, there have been many efforts to
characterize the state of the critical human capital skills associated
with the enterprise and to project its availability. In its 2009
internal human capital critical skills report, NNSA identified some
preliminary actions it needs to take to maintain critical skills,
which include (1) identifying enterprisewide functions and critical
skills needs, (2) establishing common language and definitions across
the enterprise, (3) assessing the current state of the program, and
(4) identifying potential solutions to attract and retain critical
skills. These actions are consistent with best practices we reported
on human capital issues.[Footnote 21] Specifically, our work has shown
that the ability of federal agencies to achieve their missions and
carry out their responsibilities depends in large part on whether they
can sustain a workforce that possesses the necessary education,
knowledge, skills, and competencies. To do so, agencies need to be
aware of the number of employees they need with specific skills,
competencies, and levels that are critical to achieving their missions
and goals, and identify any gaps between their current workforce and
the workforce they will need in the future. Identifying mission-
critical occupations, skills, and competencies can help agencies
adjust to changes in technology, budget constraints, and other factors
that alter the environment in which they operate.
Nevertheless, NNSA officials told us that the agency had, until
recently, made limited progress completing these actions. In October
2010, however, NNSA established the Office of Corporate Talent and
Critical Skills to bring focused attention to meeting critical human
capital skills and announced that the agency hired a director to
develop and implement a critical skills sustainment strategy. The
newly hired Director told us that NNSA has begun the process of
reassessing the need for the activities identified in the 2009 report
to be completed but has not yet established time frames or milestones
for completing these efforts. In addition, NNSA officials stated that
the agency sponsors academic outreach programs to provide a linkage
between the agency and the talent that have the skills needed to
complete certain SSP activities.
NNSA Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Improve Its
Enterprise Decision-Making Capability:
NNSA, recognizing that its ability to make informed enterprisewide
decisions is hampered by the lack of comprehensive data and analytical
tools, is considering the use of computer models--quantitative tools
that couple data from each site with the functions of the enterprise--
to integrate and analyze data to create an interconnected view of the
enterprise, which may help to address some of the critical
shortcomings we identified. A NNSA official told us that if the
enterprise modeling efforts are fully realized it will give decision-
makers an additional tool to take a broad and accurate assessment of
the enterprise and to highlight the interdependencies between various
components of the enterprise so that trade-offs between costs and
benefits can be analyzed.
In July 2009, NNSA tasked the eight M&O contractor sites to form an
enterprise modeling consortium. NNSA stated in a 2009 Enterprise
Modeling Consortium Project Plan for FY 2010-2012 that the consortium
is responsible for leading efforts to acquire and maintain enterprise
data, enhance stakeholder confidence, integrate modeling capabilities,
and fill in any gaps that are identified. Since its creation, the
consortium has identified areas in which enterprise modeling projects
could provide NNSA with reliable data and modeling capabilities,
including infrastructure and critical skills. In addition to
identifying these areas, a NNSA official told us its first steps are
to build a collection of "trusted data sources" and inventory of the
existing models used throughout the enterprise. Once the initial phase
is complete, the official told us it will work with the sites to
assess the various data collected across the enterprise, identify any
data gaps, and then determine whether an existing approach can be
integrated across the sites to provide NNSA with consistent and
reliable enterprise data.
A NNSA official told us that they are in the process of developing a
plan of action for fiscal year 2011 outlining the next steps and
identifying goals and milestones. As the benefits of these tools
depend on the quality of the data, the official stated that a key
action for fiscal year 2011 will be to determine the accuracy and
reliability of data that will populate the models.
Conclusions:
NNSA faces a complex task planning, budgeting, and ensuring the
execution of interconnected activities across the eight M&O contractor
sites that comprise the nuclear security enterprise. Among other
things, maintaining government-owned facilities that were constructed
more than 50 years ago and ensuring M&O contractors are sustaining
critical human capital skills that are highly technical in nature and
limited in supply are difficult undertakings. Congress has long
insisted that, as prerequisite to the modernization of the nuclear
stockpile and supporting infrastructure, the current and past
administrations develop firm nuclear weapons policy, requirements, and
plans. With the completion of the congressionally-mandated Nuclear
Posture Review and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the
Administration has made strides to meet congressional expectations. In
doing so, it has pledged billions of dollars over the next decade to
improve key stockpile stewardship capabilities, modernize and, in some
cases, replace aging infrastructure, and maintain a highly skilled and
specialized workforce in order to ensure the continued safety,
reliability, and performance of our nuclear deterrent without
returning to underground nuclear testing. For NNSA to fully meet
expectations, however, it must be able to demonstrate to Congress that
it can effectively manage its program so that planned budget increases
are targeted to areas that will produce demonstrable returns on
investments. While this task is far broader and more challenging than
the scope of this report, certain data related issues are currently
hindering NNSA's enterprisewide decision-making capabilities and its
ability to justify programmatic choices to Congress. These include the
lack of (1) consistent, accurate, and complete data on the condition
of its facilities; (2) assurance that contractors are in compliance
with a DOE directive (DOE Order 430.1B) requiring facility inspections
to ensure that sites' varying approaches in determining deferred
maintenance and real property values are valid and consistent; (3)
information on shared use assets--although a NNSA directive (NNSA
Supplemental Directive M 452.3) identifies the need for the federal
and contractor officials to identify and ensure proper governance of
these assets; and (4) comprehensive data on its M&O contractors'
workforce--to include identification of critical human capital skills,
competencies, and staffing levels--as well as a plan with time frames
and milestones for collecting this data. Continuing to make decisions
without a full understanding of programmatic impact is not the most
effective approach for program management or use of federal resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the Administrator of NNSA take the following four actions.
To ensure that NNSA is equipped with the information needed to
effectively and efficiently manage the Stockpile Stewardship Program:
* Develop standardized practices for assessing the condition of its
facilities and review the sites' methodologies for determining
replacement value to ensure consistency, accuracy, and completeness
throughout the enterprise.
* Ensure contractor compliance with DOE Order 430.1B: Real Property
Asset Management, which requires routine inspections of all facilities.
* Ensure federal and contractor compliance with NNSA Supplemental
Directive NA-1 SD M 452.3: Managing the Operation of Shared NNSA
Assets and Shared National Resources, which requires NNSA's sites to
identify shared assets and NNSA to review the governance plans
developed for each facility.
* Establish a plan with time frames and milestones for the development
of a comprehensive contractor workforce baseline that includes the
identification of critical human capital skills, competencies, and
levels needed to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons strategy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for their review and
comment. NNSA provided written comments, which are reproduced in
appendix III. NNSA stated that it understood our recommendations and
believes that it can implement them. NNSA did state, however, that it
believed the report provided an incomplete picture of how the agency
makes enterprisewide decisions concerning facilities and
infrastructure. In response, we added additional details of NNSA's
decision making processes for facilities and infrastructure (see p.
12). Additionally, NNSA noted that its shortfall in required
inspections occurs primarily in facilities that are not critical to
the SSP mission. We believe that our report adequately reflects this.
We also note that over 1,000 facilities identified by NNSA as not
critical--such as waste management facilities and machine shops--play
important supporting roles in the SSP mission and can, by NNSA's own
definition, disrupt operations if they are non-functional for more
than 5 business days. Over 150 of these facilities have an inspection
date outside of the required 5-year inspection period or no inspection
date recorded. Finally, NNSA provided us with updated data from its
FIMS database to show that additional inspections of facilities were
conducted since the time of our analysis. We noted this updated data
in our report, but did not independently verify the analysis NNSA
conducted (see p. 11). NNSA also provided other additional technical
information, which we incorporated where appropriate.
NNSA's letter also described a number of broader management
initiatives that, when fully implemented, could enhance the agency's
enterprise decision making. While we are encouraged that NNSA is
taking these steps, it is unclear whether the actions identified in
the agency's response would address the current shortfalls we
identified in the data on infrastructure, capital improvement
projects, shared use of facilities, and critical human capital skills.
We continue to believe that our recommendations would provide decision
makers with an increased enterprisewide knowledge that would be
beneficial to understand the potential impact of programmatic
decisions.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or aloiseg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we reviewed National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) documents and directives, including the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review and the FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan; met with Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA, and
contractor officials; assessed the reliability of the data provided;
and visited four of the eight enterprise sites. Specifically, to
determine the condition of nuclear weapons facilities, we reviewed
management and operation (M&O) contractor's 10-year site plans for
each enterprise site, and we obtained and analyzed data from DOE's
Facilities Information Management System (FIMS). DOE extracted data
from FIMS in April 2010, for all facilities and other structures
identified within the database as supporting NNSA's nuclear weapon
program. As a DOE directive requires inspection of facilities at least
once every 5 years, we further limited our review to those facilities
and other structures built prior to April 2005. Further, we limited
our review to facilities and other structures identified within FIMS
as being in current operational status. We worked with DOE and NNSA to
ensure the data provided to us, current as of April 2010, met these
criteria. Based on our analysis of this FIMS data, we determined that
data needed to evaluate condition are incomplete, possibly out of
date, and inconsistent across the sites. As a result, we do not
believe they are sufficiently reliable for presenting current property
condition. In response to our draft report, NNSA provided us with its
own analysis of facility condition based on more recent FIMS data. We
did not, however, independently verify the analysis, the results of
which are noted on p. 11. We did not independently verify the agency's
analysis of the data. We toured a nonrandom sample of facilities at
the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, the
Pantex Plant in Texas, and the Nevada National Security Site. In
selecting our site visit locations, we considered a number of factors,
including the type of site (production, laboratory, or test), missions
carried out at the sites, the potential for shared use facilities, and
geographic location. The data we obtained from our site visits are
used as examples and cannot be generalized to indicate condition
throughout the nuclear security enterprise. To determine NNSA's plans
for improvements to enterprise infrastructure, NNSA identified all
ongoing capital improvement projects and provided us with data for
these projects. We did not independently confirm or evaluate the
agency's data. To determine the extent to which NNSA has identified
shared use facilities within the enterprise and how these facilities
are managed, we reviewed NNSA's 2009 facility governance directive and
met with NNSA, Los Alamos, and Sandia officials to discuss shared use
facilities. We also collected and reviewed governance documents for
several facilities that site officials identified to us as shared use
assets. To determine NNSA's efforts to maintain the critical human
capital skills of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), we reviewed
NNSA's Development of the NNSA Critical/Capability Inventory draft
report and the Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States
Nuclear Weapons Expertise. In addition, we met with human capital
officials at NNSA, Pantex, the Nevada National Security Site, Los
Alamos, and Sandia. We also reviewed NNSA's Fiscal Year 2010
Enterprise Modeling Consortium Project Plan to identify efforts
undertaken by the agency to develop enterprisewide data and analysis
tools.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to February 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Ongoing Capital Improvement Projects, as of September
2010:
Project: Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMRR) Facility, Los Alamos;
Purpose: Replace the existing 1952 CMRR facility;
Status: Estimated to be operational by 2022;
Mission need approved: 7/16/2002;
Estimated cost: [A];
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), Y-12;
Purpose: Replace the existing highly enriched uranium processing
capabilities;
Status: Estimated to be operational by 2022;
Mission need approved: 12/17/2004;
Estimated cost: $1.4 to $3.5 billion;
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing &
Sourcing (KCRIMS);
Purpose: Replace the existing facility for non-nuclear production;
Status: Construction is estimated to begin in summer 2010;
Mission need approved: 12/28/2006;
Estimated cost: Direct cost: $264 million; Indirect cost: $750
million[B];
Remaining funds needed for completion: Not applicable as project is
third-party financed.
Project: Criticality Experiments Facility, Nevada Test Site;
Purpose: Provide a base criticality experiments capability. For
example, it will provide training for criticality safety professionals
and fissile materials handlers;
Status: Completion estimated in second quarter fiscal year 2011;
Mission need approved: 8/3/2002;
Estimated cost: $150.5 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: 0.
Project: High Explosive Pressing Facility (HEPF), Pantex[C];
Purpose: Provide a new high explosive main charge pressing facility;
Status: Completion estimated in September 2016;
Mission need approved: 8/8/2008;
Estimated cost: $146 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: $136 million.
Project: TA-55 Reinvestment Phase II, Los Alamos;
Purpose: Refurbish air dryers; seismic bracing of gloveboxes; replace
power supply, confinement doors, criticality alarms, water tank, and
exhaust stack;
Status: Design phase;
Mission need approved: 3/23/2005;
Estimated cost: $78.4 to 99.7 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Transuranic Waste Facility, Los Alamos;
Purpose: Support handling of newly generated TRU waste;
Status: Requirements and scope under development;
Mission need approved: 2/2006;
Estimated cost: Less than $100 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Nuclear Facility Risk Reduction, Y-12;
Purpose: Continue operation of existing facilities until UPF is
operational;
Status: Design phase;
Mission need approved: 11/1/2008;
Estimated cost: $44.5 to 77.9 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Test Capabilities Revitalization Project Phase 2, Sandia;
Purpose: Modernize existing experimental and test capabilities;
Status: Project proceeding with a low level of activity;
Mission need approved: 6/2/2001;
Estimated cost: $52.7 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: $25.2 million.
Project: Fire Stations Number 1 and 2, Nevada Test Site;
Purpose: Provide two new fire stations;
Status: Completion is expected in fiscal year 2011;
Mission need approved: 12/6/2004;
Estimated cost: $46.2 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: 0.
Project: Ion Beam Laboratory, Sandia;
Purpose: Replace existing facility and provide standalone capability
for use of accelerated ions;
Status: Completion is expected in April 2012;
Mission need approved: 2007;
Estimated cost: $39.6 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Project: Beryllium Capability Project, Y-12;
Purpose: Provide the capability to maintain existing components;
Status: Completion expected in October 2010;
Mission need approved: 5/22/2000;
Estimated cost: $36.1 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: 0.
Project: High Pressure Fire Loop Zone 12, Pantex;
Purpose: Replace fire protection piping and install cathodic
protection to prevent corrosion;
Status: Completion expected in mid fiscal year 2011;
Mission need approved: 9/15/2004;
Estimated cost: $35 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: 0.
Project: TA-55 Reinvestment, Phase I, Los Alamos;
Purpose: Replace cooling towers and chiller equipment at LANL's
research and development facilities;
Status: Completed June 2010;
Mission need approved: 3/23/2005;
Estimated cost: $24.5 million;
Remaining funds needed for completion: 0.
Project: Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLW), Los Alamos;
Purpose: Upgrade the facility in order to comply with current codes
and standards;
Status: Preliminary design phase;
Mission need approved: 10/24/2004;
Estimated cost: [A];
Remaining funds needed for completion: [A].
Source: Data obtained from NNSA, September 22, 2010.
Note: The mission need approved date signifies that NNSA validated
that the project will address an identified need and that the project
is consistent with congressional direction, administrative
initiatives, and the agency's strategic plan.
[A] To be determined.
[B] The direct cost for KCRIMS includes funding for relocation and
occupation of a leased facility, while indirect cost represents the
estimated cost for a developer to construct the new, leased facility.
Officials report the Kansas City Plant will recover the cost of the
lease through overhead during a 20-year lease period.
[C] An NNSA official stated that the Pantex project was delayed for
about a year so that a study could be conducted to determine if this
capability could be outsourced. The results of the report are still in
draft, but officials told us the conclusion was that the capability
could not be outsourced. As a result of the delay, Pantex revised the
baseline for the costs of the project and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers are currently planning to award a construction contract in
May 2011.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
January 28, 2011:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20458:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
report, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs More Comprehensive Infrastructure
and Workforce Data to Improve Enterprise Decision-Making, GAO-11-188.
In response to a Congressional mandate, GAO performed a review on
NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program to determine the extent to which
NNSA has the data necessary to make informed, enterprise-wide
decisions, particularly data on the condition of infrastructure,
capital improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and critical
human capital skills.
NNSA recognizes the need for improvements in these areas and for some
time we have been working diligently to enhance the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. The Nuclear Posture Review states that in order
to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile, the United
States must possess a modem physical infrastructure and a highly
capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the
nuclear deterrent and support the President's nuclear security agenda.
NNSA's Complex Transformation vision is for a smaller, safer, more
secure and less expensive nuclear weapons complex that leverages the
scientific and technical capabilities of our workforce and meets
national security requirements.
Essentially, NNSA understands and can implement the report's
recommendations. For example, NNSA is already implementing a series of
enhancements to its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) processes, its Corporate Performance Evaluation Process (CPEP),
and management information system capabilities for Defense Programs.
In the first phase of the PPBE process improvements, the programming
phase is being strengthened, and the CPEP and PPBE processes are being
better integrated. In the first phase of the management information
systems improvements, NNSA is piloting the deployment of a reporting
tool using a Work Breakdown Structure to identify, in greater detail,
the tasks required to execute the various elements of the mission and
identify its associated cost. In addition, Defense Programs has
instituted the Predictive Capability Framework and Component
Maturation Framework program planning methodologies. These tools
provide roadmaps that organize, schedule and link key science,
technology and Directed Stockpile Work activities that are required to
maintain the stockpile greatly enhancing the ability to project out
year infrastructure resource requirements.
In addition, NNSA has a variety of programs that focus on retention
and recruitment that have been in existence for several years, but
will be modified to be compliant with the Pathways Program recently
established by President Obama. Just recently the Office of Defense
Programs created an Office of Corporate Talent and Critical Skills
which will be responsible in providing management visibility into the
overall state of the federal and contractor workforce talent and
capabilities and to secure assurances that appropriate action is being
taken as needed to shore up known areas of weakness or to close skill
gaps. NNSA also sponsors important academic outreach programs that
provide a strong linkage to the fundamental source of talent required
by the Stockpile Stewardship and Management activities.
We are concerned, however, that the report provides an incomplete
picture of how NNSA makes enterprise-wide decisions concerning
facilities and infrastructure, and does not note that the report's
April snapshot of Facility Information Management System (FINIS) data
did not consider inspections completed but not reported until the end
of the year. Under separate cover we will provide GAO with the
spreadsheet that is an end of year snapshot that demonstrates the
overwhelming number of uninspected or late inspected facilities to be
Non-Mission Dependent "Other Structures and Facilities" —i.e., not
essential to mission, buildings or trailers. We believe the report
would be more accurate if GAO used this data rather than the April
snapshot and specifically called attention to the differences between
the inspection data for mission-related facilities and facilities not
essential to mission.
We recommend that the report include a more complete description of
the data on which NNSA makes enterprise-wide decisions concerning
facilities and infrastructure. While FIMS data is useful for some
purposes, as the report notes, the FINS inspection frequency doesn't
provide a sufficiently complete or up-to-date understanding for
decisions. We recommend that the following paragraph be added to the
report on page 9 as the second paragraph of the section titled
Facilities and Infrastructure Data:
"NNSA decision makers fully understand the limitations of FIMS data
and know that conditions change more rapidly than can be tracked by
five year assessments. NNSA's PPBE process is informed by the
aggressive oversight of Site offices as well as the budget requests
from the several Management and Operating contractors, both of which
are informed in real time by 'eyes on' observations of known and
developing facility conditions. NNSA will continue to draw upon this
insight as part of its improved PPBE process. Additionally, as the
nuclear weapons complex grows smaller and is streamlined to match the
anticipated reduced future stockpiles its decision processes focus
more broadly on sustaining capabilities rather than specific
facilities and structures, allowing some facilities to be run with
increasing deferred maintenance and then dispositioned rather than
repaired. While the Ten Year Site Plans and FLMS provide some data
used in the initial identification of some problems to be solved, the
real time understanding and prioritization of the work necessary to
sustain critical capabilities comes from the PPBE process, supporting
venues such as the NNSA Construction Working Group, and daily dialog
with federal and contractor personnel at the Sites."
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Director, Office of Internal Controls, at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant
Director; David Holt; Jonathan Kucskar; Alison O'Neil; Steven Putansu;
Jeremy Sebest; Rebecca Shea; and Jay Spaan made significant
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] NNSA was created in 1999 under Title 32 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3201 et
seq.
[2] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of
Weapons Complex Infrastructure and Research and Production
Capabilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-582]
(June 21, 2010).
GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Address Scientific and
Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National
Ignition Facility, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-488]
(Apr. 8, 2010).
[3] NNSA, Enterprise Modeling Consortium, Program Plan for FY10-FY12
(Dec. 1, 2009).
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 3133 (1999).
[5] In August 2010, NNSA renamed the Nevada Test Site to the Nevada
National Security Site.
[6] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-160, § 3138 (1993), directed DOE to establish the Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
[7] In fiscal year 2009, NNSA categorized its over 4,500 facilities
and infrastructure in these three categories.
[8] DOE Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets.
[9] In May, 2003, the DOE Inspector General issued a report that
examined whether NNSA had accurate and useful data to aid in the
prioritization of infrastructure renovation repair projects. The
report found that NNSA did not have accurate assessments of the
structural and mechanical condition at one of its site's facilities.
Specifically, the report found NNSA relied on out-of-date information
found on facility condition assessments to support its strategic
planning activities. DOE, Planning for National Nuclear Security
Administration Infrastructure, OAS-B-03-02 (Washington, D.C.: 2003).
In addition, in June, 2010, we reported that NNSA cannot accurately
identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities
and infrastructure because of differences in sites' cost accounting
practices. NNSA agreed with the findings of our report. GAO, Nuclear
Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of Weapons Complex
Infrastructure and Research and Production Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-582] (Washington, D.C.: June 21,
2010).
[10] DOE Order 430.1B: Real Property Asset Management.
[11] Replacement property value is the cost to replace a current
structure with a new one of comparable size using current technology,
codes, standards, and materials.
[12] DOE states in its directive that some real property assets, such
as mission critical facilities, may require a more frequent inspection
cycle.
[13] GAO, Federal Real Property: Progress Made Toward Addressing
Problems, but Underlying Obstacles Continue to Hamper Reform,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-349] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 13, 2007).
[14] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration's
Plans for Its Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect
Funding Estimates and Technology Readiness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-103] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19,
2010).
[15] GAO, Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a
Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid
Cost Increases and Delays, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-336] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27,
2007). GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Address Scientific and
Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National
Ignition Facility, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-488]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2010).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-199] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-582].
[17] NA-1 SD M 452.3: Managing the Operation of Shared NNSA Assets and
Shared National Resources.
[18] We are currently conducting a review of these M&O contractors'
human capital programs.
[19] FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (May 2010).
[20] Development of the NNSA Critical Skill/Capability Inventory
(Draft Report--November 2009).
[21] GAO, Workforce Planning: Interior, EPA, and the Forest Service
Should Strengthen Linkages to Their Strategic Plans and Improve
Evaluation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-413]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2010).
[End of section]
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