In our original opinion, we affirmed the judgment in favor of Chase for
intentional interference. We did not expressly decide Chase's counterclaim for breach of
contract because the damages that NWNG recovered on that counterclaim were less than
the judgment in its favor on the counterclaim for intentional interference. Northwest
Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 146 Or App 249, 933 P2d 370 (1997). On
reconsideration, we adhered to our holding, in part because we concluded that NWNG
had not preserved the causation argument that it made in its petition for rehearing.
Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 147 Or App 586, 938 P2d 778
(1997). The Supreme Court allowed NWNG's petition for review, held that it had
adequately preserved the causation argument, and reversed the judgment on the
intentional interference counterclaim for lack of proof of causation. The court then
remanded the case to us so that we could decide the breach of contract counterclaim. 328
Or at 502-03.

We will rely on the statement of the facts in our original opinion. 146 Or
App at 252-58. The heart of Chase's breach of contract counterclaim is its argument that
the promise that a NWNG official made before Chase entered into the contract, that "we
will work with you," was part of the contract. That promise, according to Chase, limited
NWNG's ability to file an agricultural services lien or to seek other noncontractual
remedies if Chase failed to pay in accordance with the contractual terms. Chase argues
that when NWNG filed the lien, it violated its contractual promise to accommodate
Chase's agricultural cycles and failed to act in good faith. Although we did not expressly
decide the contractual issues in our original opinion, our discussion of whether NWNG
had an improper purpose when it filed the lien, together with the Supreme Court's
decision on causation, essentially resolve the issue against Chase's position.

In its intentional interference counterclaim, Chase alleged that NWNG's
purpose in filing the lien was improper because its objective was to obtain a more
favorable position in relation to Chase's other creditors "than allowed by law or
agreement between the parties * * *." We concluded, however, that because "the
contract, by operation of law, permitted NWNG to file the lien, its purpose in doing so
cannot be improper * * *." 146 Or App at 259 (emphasis added). In reaching that
conclusion, we held that because NWNG had an express statutory right to a lien when it
entered into the contract with Chase, that remedy was necessarily within the
contemplation of the parties and became part of the contract by operation of law. Id. at
259-60. We also held that the fact that the contract expressly gave NWNG certain
remedies in case of Chase's default did not prevent NWNG from exercising other
remedies that it had under existing law. We then stated that, "[e]ven if we were to look
outside the writings, NWNG's knowledge of Chase's situation and its statement that 'we
will work with you' do not constitute a waiver of a statutory right that is otherwise part of
the contract." Id. at 260.

2. At trial, NWNG's counsel moved for a directed verdict on both the
intentional interference and the contract claims on the ground that Chase had failed to
prove causation. The Supreme Court's holdings that he thereby preserved the precise
argument that NWNG made on appeal and that that argument is correct thus applies to
the contract claim as much as to the intentional interference claim.