All posts tagged Europe

U.S. President Trump addresses the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 2017. / John Gillespie / Flickr / Creative Commons

U.S. President Trump’s new rhetorical attacks and financial sanctions against the Venezuelan government suggest a shift toward coercive diplomacy aimed at achieving regime change, but U.S. power faces significant limits in the conflict-ridden country. At the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Trump called President Maduro an authoritarian and said “this situation is completely unacceptable and we cannot stand by and watch.” Washington’s approach emphasizes sticks – sanctions against President Maduro, senior advisors, and threatened action against the oil sector – over carrots, while also voicing support for the opening of new mediated face-to-face talks between Maduro and the opposition. A contact group of six Latin American and four European countries is promoting the talks, with the backing of UN Secretary General and the Vatican, to help avoid the worst-case scenario of open conflict. Previous efforts to coordinate a multilateral coalition that simultaneously keeps the pressure on the government while opening negotiation avenues have failed – and agreeing on a roadmap is even more complex in view of the installation of the Constituent Assembly that stripped the elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly of its powers.

Trump’s new Executive Order directs financial sanctions that come close to directly threatening Maduro’s vital supports. It bans Caracas from issuing new debt in the United States and prohibits U.S.-based CITGO – a wholly owned subsidiary of the Venezuelan state oil company – from repatriating dividends to Caracas. These measures will impose austerity on Maduro (who claims he will still make upcoming debt payments) and future actions are likely to try and undermine the government’s economic foundations.

In addition to installing the Constituent Assembly, Maduro seems to be pursuing a new regime-survival strategy in which he plays the role of a non-vengeful victim. Maduro criticized Trump’s sanctions and called him “the new Hitler” after the UN speech on Tuesday, but he’s also offered donations to aid post-Harvey recovery efforts in Houston and invoked John Lennon in a call for “giving peace a chance” in a New York Times ad earlier this month. To regain a degree of credibility, Maduro will probably consider making elections for Governors slated for October 15 look competitive, but whether he has the political capital with his base to make bigger political or economic moves is unclear. He may look to establish a new institutional equilibrium of dual legislatures, though it would hinge on removing the threat of retaliation against the opposition via the Constituent Assembly’s so-called “Truth Commission.” He may also try to address massive fiscal imbalances by reforming the multi-tiered exchange rate, though this would be difficult as the system’s subsidized dollars help underwrite regime loyalty.

While the United States, Europeans, and Latin Americans are operating in loose formation – with Washington ratcheting up pressure while everyone else scrambles for negotiations – China and Russia are sticking to their strategic game. As Maduro’s main financial backers, they are betting talks can stabilize the situation bit by bit. They may kick in some more financial assistance if and when Maduro restores some stability by holding peaceful regional elections, delivering on the dialogue, and making large upcoming debt payments. But while there is some basis for the geopolitical schadenfreude of Beijing and Moscow making it harder for Washington in Caracas, there are also signs that both have buyer’s remorse. While they prefer Maduro stay afloat, they seem unlikely to extend loans that help stabilize the economy unconditionally.

None of the piecemeal actions that Maduro is apparently contemplating can defuse the political and social crisis, but a combination of steps may be enough to convince China and Russia to stay in the game. Despite Trump’s statement that he was “not going to rule out a military option” in Venezuela, the Administration apparently is open to a policy of coercive diplomacy that includes genuine support for talks. Trump attacked his predecessor for “leading from behind,” but figuring out how to sequence sticks and carrots in coordination with Latin American and European countries may require just that. The bottom line is that the chance of a breakthrough on the biggest issues – the Constitutional road map and conditions for electoral participation – remain low, although some movement by both parties toward the middle seems realistic. Despite the actions of outside actors, the situation is likely to remain poised over a knife-edge – without the catharsis of either peace or regime change.

September 21, 2017

* Michael McCarthy is a Research Fellow with the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. He publishes Caracas Wire, a newsletter on Venezuela and South America.

The June 23rd British referendum result – a 52-to-48 percent vote to leave the European Union (EU) – has roiled the world’s leading financial markets, but contrary to many opinions issued in the referendum’s wake, the economic and financial implications of Brexit for Latin America have been either mild or favorable. Hard line Brexit statements made earlier this month by UK Prime Minister Theresa May, and various rebukes from policymakers on the Continent, have had financial-market repercussions for the pound. Most notably, sterling has fallen sharply, and it is now down more than 15 percent from its high on the day of the fateful vote, plummeting to three-decade lows against the dollar.

The market reaction initially led to a mostly regional (UK and Europe) correction in stock prices. Even this was short-lived: for example, the FTSE 250, an index of domestically focused UK firms, at first dropped by 14 percent but recovered fully by early August – and has since been trading above the pre-referendum level. Moreover, the UK recession many feared did not materialize, at least not during 3Q16.

Financial markets priced in fairly quickly the conclusion that the Brexit shock would lead to greater dovishness among the world’s major central banks. Most relevant to Latin America and the emerging markets (EM) generally, the Brexit helped to persuade the U.S. Federal Reserve to delay its tightening until at least the end of 2016. While Latin America’s trade and investment ties to Europe are not insignificant, the region’s major economies are far more dependent on the health of the U.S. economy and on the mood in the U.S. financial markets, and secondarily on trends in China.

If the UK and the Eurozone had stumbled and were headed for a recession, however, one likely casualty of Brexit would have been a noticeable drop in world commodity prices, with strong implications for the major economies of Latin America. While commodity prices have softened somewhat (non-oil commodities have averaged 2¼ percent lower since the Brexit vote, and oil has traded 7½ percent below), confirmed expectations of loose monetary conditions in the U.S. and Europe during 3Q16 have more than compensated. This is why most EM stocks, bonds and currencies have rallied, with the parade led by the Brazilian Real (BRL), so far the best-performing of 24 EM currencies tracked by Bloomberg (up about 20 percent year-to-date).

The medium-term implications of Brexit for Latin America will depend on how much “noise” emanates from London, Brussels and other European capitals during the negotiation process (likely, 2Q17-2Q19). Prime Minister May has now made three statements that define her bargaining position: Article 50 (exit) negotiations will begin by next March; the imposition of migration controls on EU citizens coming to the UK is non-negotiable; and the UK will no longer be under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The latter two points mean that Britain cannot remain a member of the single market, and is therefore committed to forging a customized free-trade agreement with the EU, which could sow uncertainty and thus depress economic growth in Europe and beyond.

The most probable scenario – slow and halting Brexit negotiations, with progress hard to achieve until close to the end (in 2019) – will encourage uncertainty and speculation among economic agents and thus will be a drag on economic growth especially in the UK, and much less so in the rest of the EU. However, it need not generate the kinds of waves that will reach, never mind derail, Latin America’s economic trajectory. It is much more likely that what does or does not happen in Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Caracas or Mexico City, and above all in Washington, DC – courtesy of the Fed, the White House, and the U.S. Congress, in that order – will overshadow just about any headlines generated by the Brexit negotiations in Europe. There is room for Latin America to clock higher GDP growth numbers in the years ahead when compared to the disappointing regional averages of 1 percent growth in 2014, zero growth in 2015, and a contraction of about -0.6 percent in the current year (as per IMF estimates). This assumes that the Fed’s tightening is gradual (namely, no more than 0.25 percent increases in the Fed’s target rate per trimester) and that the UK’s divorce proceedings are not overly hostile. This scenario foresees that creditworthy governments, banks and corporations in Latin America will retain access to the international capital markets on reasonable terms, despite some initial retraction in investor interest ahead of, and right after, the resumption of the Fed tightening cycle.

October 17, 2016

*Dr. Porzecanski is Distinguished Economist in Residence at American University and Director of the International Economic Relations Program at its School of International Service.

Israel’s assault on Gaza this summer provoked sharp criticism from Latin American governments. Condemnation came not only from Cuba, a long-time critic of Israel, and from Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which have been without diplomatic ties to Israel since cutting them after previous conflicts in Gaza in 2009 and 2010. This summer’s UN-estimated 1,500 civilian deaths also provoked outrage from center-left governments, as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru all withdrew their ambassadors. At the Mercosur summit at the end of July, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina issued a joint statement in which they criticized Israel’s “disproportionate use of force…which has almost exclusively affected civilians.” And one of the largest popular demonstrations worldwide against the Israeli action took place in Chile, home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinian descendants.

Latin American interest in Israeli-Palestinian affairs is deeply rooted in the past. Waves of immigration beginning a century ago have made the region home to the largest Palestinian diaspora outside the Arab world. Latin American governments provided crucial support for the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine that led to the creation of the state of Israel, but they roundly condemned the occupation of the Gaza Strip 20 years later. In the Cold War era, Israel provided military hardware to rightwing military regimes in the region while the Palestine Liberation Organization, more leftist than Islamic in its revolutionary views, lent political and economic support to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Contemporary Latin American governments have taken a balanced approach in their relations with Israel and the Palestinians. All but Colombia, Mexico, and Panama have recognized a Palestinian state based on national borders prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and trade with Israel has flourished. Brazil is the top destination for Israeli exports, totaling over $1 billion per year. In addition, Israel signed free trade agreements with Mercosur in 2007 and 2010; became an official observer to the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) in 2013; and in May 2014 approved a four-year, $14 million plan to boost trade with the PA nations and Costa Rica. Israel’s recent efforts to further trade in Latin America ironically developed out of a desire to shrug off some of its dependency on Europe, where criticism of Israeli policy has become widespread and boycotts of Israeli goods are being organized by advocates of the Palestinian cause.

This summer’s fighting in Gaza chilled diplomatic relations between Latin American governments and Israel. The Israeli Foreign Ministry described the withdrawal of Latin America ambassadors as a “hasty” decision that would only encourage Hamas radicalism, and it struck a nerve in Brazil when dismissing its “moral relativism” as an example of “why Brazil, an economic and cultural giant, remains a diplomatic dwarf.” But both Israel and Latin America stand to gain from stronger economic ties, and with the exception of Chile’s suspension of trade talks, there are no pending signs that economic relations will suffer further now that this round of fighting in Gaza has come to an end. The significance of this summer’s events lies instead in the autonomous decision by Latin American governments of all political stripes to act in favor of peaceful conflict resolution and the protection of civilians enveloped by the violence of war. The Assad regime’s massacre of its own citizens in Syria in recent years provoked a more reticent condemnation from Latin America’s center-left governments and regional blocs, which backed a negotiated solution to the conflict while strongly opposing the possibility of foreign military intervention. Without the specter of a wider conflict looming over this summer’s Gaza crisis, Latin American governments seized the opportunity to stake out a firmer position. The region’s reaction to future atrocities – which may come sooner rather than later as the US prepares to battle the “Islamic State” in Syria and Iraq – will show how durable this new approach will be.

The administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has shown a willingness to bury the proverbial hatchet and bring to a definitive end what was once the largest sovereign default in recorded history – nearly $100 billion in obligations to domestic and foreign bondholders and official foreign-aid and export-credit agencies, including the United States Export-Import Bank. In late May, Argentina reached an agreement with its official creditors (gathered as the so-called Paris Club), committing to repay everything that had come due in full and in cash – nearly $10 billion in principal, past-due interest, and interest-on-interest – over the next five years, starting with a down-payment in July. In recent days, President Kirchner has also signaled that she is ready to negotiate a payment plan with bondholders who are potentially owed even more than the Paris Club creditors. The trigger for this conciliatory attitude is two U.S. Supreme Court decisions announced on June 16 which granted jilted creditors wide latitude in seeking redress from Argentina. The first ordered the government in Buenos Aires to stop discriminating among its bondholders by paying most but not all of them; and the second mandated banks operating in the United States to disclose any and all assets owned by Argentina anywhere in the world, facilitating efforts to seize them by unpaid creditors.

Argentine governments since the closing and troubled days of 2001 have taken a notoriously hard line toward creditors ever since Acting President Adolfo Rodríguez Saá announced that he would be suspending payments on the public debt and dedicating all sums budgeted for that purpose to fund an emergency jobs program and increased social spending. Cristina and her predecessor (and late husband), Néstor Kirchner, embraced a populist-cum-nationalist view of the world according to which the state must favor the interests of the majority of its population, particularly in terms of redistributing income from the “haves” to the “have nots.” Pervasive state interventionism, confiscatory taxation, disrespect for private property rights, widespread controls (on prices, interest rates, foreign trade, and capital flows), and confrontational attitudes toward investors became the hallmark of economic policy in Argentina. Despite a vigorous economic recovery starting in mid-2002, creditors never got a single payment from Argentina – and the government made only an arrogant take-it-or-leave-it proposition to private creditors by which they would turn in their bonds and receive new ones worth one third as much. By late 2010, over 92 percent of the private creditors capitulated and went into the debt exchange. According to a reputable comparative study of sovereign defaults in the Journal of International Money and Finance published in 2012, Argentina’s behavior towards its creditors displayed an exceptional degree of coerciveness. While Argentine and European creditors had no luck pursuing their claims in their respective courts, most bondholders who had legal rights under New York State law succeeded in obtaining favorable judgments – and lately, in gaining enforcement rights as well.

Argentina has set such a bad example in terms of how to restructure the public debt that no other nation has dared to follow it since. Given the recent advance in creditor rights courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court, chances are that no other government will ever be motivated to copy Argentina’s rogue-debtor behavior – a very good outcome for the world at large. Concerns that the decade-long judicial fight in the United States will slow down or impede future sovereign debt restructurings are greatly exaggerated. Before reaching their decisions, the U.S. courts heard from many academic and non-academic experts, and from several governments (Brazil, France, Mexico and the United States), and the New York District Court of Appeals dismissed warnings of impending doom as “speculative, hyperbolic, and almost entirely of [Argentina’s] own making.” Argentina engaged in uniquely egregious misconduct, violating the well-established norms of sovereign debt restructuring, refusing to negotiate with its creditors, ignoring court orders, and failing to honor its obligations subject to U.S. law despite the country’s unquestioned ability to pay. The legal rights conferred to minority bondholders in the 1990s, which were actionable in this instance, have been superseded during the 2000s by the widespread inclusion of new “collective action” clauses, inspired by English law, preventing a small minority from blocking a debt restructuring supported by a large majority (at least 75 percent) of creditors. These clauses have worked very well in recent years, including in the cases of Greece and Belize in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Therefore, while the advancement of creditor rights brought about by the Argentina litigation will encourage governments to be more conciliatory towards their creditors, the evolution of market practices means that fewer than 8 percent of total creditors will never again be able to demand payment in full the next time that a government obtains the consent of everyone else.

*Dr. Porzecanski is Distinguished Economist in Residence at American University.