Friday, September 28, 2012

There are some contradictory stories emerging about whether
oil major Royal Dutch Shell is in negotiations with the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). Twice before it was in talks with the Kurds, but withdrew to
protect its investments in southern Iraq. Now the equation has slightly
changed. It has secured all of the contracts it was interested in with the Oil
Ministry, while other large oil corporations have taken the leap to work in
Kurdistan. It could now very well follow their lead and move north as well.
That would seemingly break with the conservative mold it has forged so far,
while working in the country.

When it comes to oil companies deciding to defy Baghdad and
signing a deal with Kurdistan, all news reports have to be taken with a large
grain of salt. On September 21, 2012, Reuters had a story that Shell was considering working in Kurdistan. The article claimed that it was inspired
by the fact that other major oil companies such as Exxon Mobil and Total had
recently signed contracts with the KRG, and Baghdad had taken no serious action
against them. Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani’s office denied that story, and the central government allegedly threatened to blacklist Shell if it went to the north. There was another piece that stated the company had
backed out of talks, because of those warnings. More importantly, a Shell
spokesman said that while the company would eventually like to work in all
parts of Iraq, at the time it was happy with its operations in the south. It
would not be surprising if Shell were considering working in Kurdistan, because its terms are much better than those offered by the Oil Ministry. At the
same time, many firms do not get paid, have to rely upon the hope that their
stock prices will go up with any discoveries they make there, and the region
relies upon short-term deals with Baghdad in order to export. The central
government has also threatened to sanction any company that moves north, but
its stories about majors dropping negotiations with the KRG or halting their
work have consistently been wrong. Right now it is impossible to tell which
direction Shell will take on the matter. However, one could look at their past
history.

Twice before Shell was in talks with Kurdish officials. That
occurred in 2007 and 2011. The first time, the Oil Ministry had not opened up
to foreign investment yet, but Kurdistan had. Details of the matter are not
clear, but it would appear Shell decided to wait until the central government
offered up the much larger southern petroleum fields. In 2011, the company was finalizing a natural gas deal in Basra province, and did not want to
jeopardize that. That showed a conservative streak within the company that
could point to its future actions. Shell may again be unwilling to go north if
it thinks its projects in the south are more important.

The Majnoon field is one of two that Shell has invested in (Wall Street Journal)

Shell could go either way when it comes to its talks with
the Kurdistan Regional Government. In the past, it has been weary of giving up
its endeavors with the central government. It has been willing to deal with
Baghdad, and even expand its operations in the south. At the same time, its
profits look to be slim, Kurdistan offers a much easier business environment,
and official threats of retaliation by the Oil Ministry appear to be feckless.
Shell has followed a conservative course in Iraq however. That would point to
it staying the course, and concentrating upon its three contracts in Basra rather
than taking the jump into the north. That doesn’t mean it won’t follow that
path in the future. Still, further details will have to emerge before Shell’s
ultimate decision can be determined.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Electricity production was one of the crucial issues that
the United States and Iraqi officials decided to work on after the 2003
invasion. The national grid was an integral part of rebuilding the country
since so many other sectors of the economy were dependent upon power such as
services like water and sewage, in addition to businesses. The problem was the
power network was in poor shape after the Gulf War and sanctions, and ran into
more with the looting and insurgency that came after the fall of Saddam
Hussein. That was only the beginning as American companies ran into huge cost
overruns, the U.S. ended up revising their rebuilding goals, which led to more
delays and cancellations in work, and the Iraqis proved incapable of running
and maintaining many of the installations the U.S. built for them. In the end,
the U.S. suffered from poor planning and management, as well as working in an
unstable environment with the insurgency, which undermined its goals to provide
uninterrupted power supply to Iraqis.

Even before the onset of hostilities, Iraq’s power network
was facing major problems. Before the March 2003 invasion, the country was producing an average of 4,075 megawatts per day. This was not distributed
evenly, as most of the power was sent to Baghdad. As a result, the capital
enjoyed 16-24 hours of electricity per day, while the rest of the nation had
about 4-8 hours. Not only that, but the national grid was a mess. That started
with the Gulf War when power plants, transmission lines, substations were all
targeted and damaged. This was denied at the time, but one of the goals of the
strategic bombing in 1991 was to destroy Iraq’s infrastructure to undermine the
government. (1) Then Iraq underwent thirteen years of sanctions, during which
repairs were made, and the system was maintained in an ad hoc manner using
whatever materials were available. Some of those techniques actually degraded
equipment. By 2003, Iraq had a nameplate capacity of 9,000 megawatts, but was
producing half of that, because of all the problems it underwent. The system
was so fragile that if one part of the network went down, the entire system could
be knocked out. This presented a wide range of challenges for the incoming
Americans.

The U.S. started from scratch when it came to Iraq’s power
industry. That was because the poor pre-war planning did not include any real ideas for the electricity network. The first thing the U.S. did was to put the
Electricity Commission back together, which would eventually become the new
Electricity Ministry. In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
appointed Dr. Karim Waheed al-Aboudi the new head of the commission, who
previously was its director general. U.S. advisers were also placed within the
Iraqi administration. Second, in April 2003, the U.S. contracted Bechtel to do
an assessment of the power system. It finished its review in May, and estimated
that repairing the entire network would cost around $6 billion, and would
require years of work. Third, the CPA decided to buy gas turbines to boost
production. It thought it was a quick and easy way to generate power. It also
believed that Iraq’s natural gas industry would quickly be rebuilt and provide
fuel for the turbines. These plans quickly ran into difficulties. One was that
during the summer, looters were systematically stripping electrical towers for
their copper, which was then sold on the black market. During the invasion for
example, 50 towers were damaged. In comparison, from April to mid-June, 700
towers were stripped. Iraq also lacked trained personnel to carry out repairs
and upgrade the system. It didn’t have enough fuel to run its existing power
plants. The CPA and Oil Ministry ended up scrapping their plans to build a
national natural gas delivery system, and the industry was not rebuilt, which
undermined the gas turbine plan the U.S. was implementing. To add to all that,
the insurgency quickly began targeting the power network, leading to almost
daily attacks. That led to huge cost overruns, deaths, delays, and employees
and companies refusing to work out of fears for their safety. These problems
would continue for years, and was one of the main reasons why Iraq’s power
network never met the public’s demands.

That didn’t seem to stop Paul Bremer. In the summer of 2003,
he announced that the U.S. would return Iraq to prewar power levels by October.
At the time, the country was producing around 3,500 megawatts. The Coalition
created the Electricity Action Team to follow through with Bremer’s promise,
but found out there were no actual plans on how to achieve his goal. In August
2003, the Action Team decided to carry out quick repairs of the existing
infrastructure, rather than build any new plants. By October, the Americans
actually surpassed their goal, reaching 4,518 megawatts. At the time, Bremer
was warned that achieving that amount would lead to breakdowns later on, which
is exactly what happened. It also set the precedent that all progress in the
electrical industry would be measured by daily power production, something that
Iraq’s Electricity Ministry still uses to this day. The October level proved to
be fool’s gold as it was not maintainable, and caused both short and long-term
problems for the network.

Bremer wasn’t finished. On August 29, he said that in a year
Iraq would have 24 hours of power. The CPA estimated that would mean producing
around 6,000 megawatts per day. The Coalition created a new group, the Task
Force Restore Iraqi Electricity to carry out this plan. It signed contracts
with the $5.56 billion Congress allocated for the power system in November.
Work orders for 110 projects were handed out, and almost every one ended up
going over budget, because of the worsening security situation. When Bremer’s
one-year deadline was reached, Iraq was only producing around 4,200 megawatts.
That showed that U.S. officials were right. When Bremer pushed for a quick
increase in production during the summer of 2003, it was going to cause
problems down the line, which would decrease output. He didn’t listen to them
however, which led to the failure of his August promise. As a result, many
Iraqis began blaming the Americans for their power outages.

When the CPA ceased operating in the summer of 2004, new
Ambassador John Negroponte ordered a review of the entire rebuilding program.
That led to the diversion of $1.3 billion from electricity projects to other
programs like the security forces. Many projects ended up being cancelled or revised
as a result, which was another setback for the national grid. By March 2005,
production was still below the pre-war level of approximately 4,000 megawatts.
The U.S. blamed the lack of security, sabotage, fuel shortages, the limited
capacity of Iraq’s ministries, the lack of maintenance, poor management, and
cost overruns. That showed that the Americans were not able to overcome many of
the problems that existed before the U.S. invasion, and was not able to contain
the insurgency either.

By 2005, contractors were running into all kinds of problems
operating in Iraq. Bechtel had a $1.1 billion deal to work on the power
network. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Inspector General
found that the company failed more often than not to meet its objectives. One
example was the Dora Power Plant that serviced Baghdad. Bechtel was supposed to
rehabilitate two of the four steam turbines at the plant. Poor maintenance led
to them breaking down before the 2003 invasion. In August 2003, Bechtel started
work at Dora, and was supposed to finish in nine months. It ran into delays,
and didn’t complete its work until the end of 2005. The project was initially
priced at $34.1 million, but ended up costing $121.1 million. One problem was
security. Electricity Ministry employees and Bechtel subcontractors refused to
work at the site, because of nearly daily attacks by insurgents, which often
targeted the work camp that had been constructed there. In a rare case, the
U.S. military ended up providing security at the plant. That still didn’t stop
several subcontracts from withdrawing by the summer of 2004. By June 2004, work
on the two turbines was nearly completed. By February 2006, only one was
working however. The other just needed a simple process before it too could
come on line. Because of cost overruns, the Electricity Ministry was given that
task. The Ministry proved not ready to operate the plant or maintain it. In
2006, one of the turbines had a “catastrophic failure,” because of poor
maintenance. A repair was made, but then it broke down again in April 2007. The
U.S. then took over running the facility, but fixes were not completed until
the end of the summer. Here all the problems with the American reconstruction
effort were apparent, the most important of which was the insurgency, which
made work nearly impossible for periods of time, and led to huge cost overruns,
and the failure to meet deadlines.

There were other major difficulties as well. Bechtel had a
$100.6 million contract to rehabilitate the Baiji Thermal Power Plant in
Salahaddin. It stopped work in only three months, and then had the contract
cancelled after spending $7 million. The company also had a $381 million deal
for the Mansuriyah Natural Gas Power Plant cancelled. In February 2004, the
USAID fast tracked the project, but work was stopped in the summer due to
Ambassador Negroponte’s review. By the spring of 2005, the contract was negated
after $62.7 million was expanded. All the turbines, generators, transformers,
and other equipment Bechtel had purchased was donated to the Electricity
Ministry, which said it would use them in Najaf. In March 2004, the Defense
Department gave a $500 million contract to Perini to repair the transmission
and distribution lines in southern Iraq. As part of that deal, the business was
to rebuild five substations and rehabilitate the distribution network in Basra.
Because of the high costs, Perini ended up only working on the substations. In
October 2004, it started work, and was finished in September 2005. The problem
was the Electricity Ministry didn’t install distribution and transmission lines
to use any of the stations Perini had fixed. The Ministry took a year and a
half to do that. From June to October 2004, Perini got another task order to
build more substations and distribution networks in Babil, Anbar, Dhi Qar,
Najaf, and Basra. By the end of the year, half of those contracts were
cancelled. The company still earned $123 million, while only completing $26
million in projects. These all highlighted the poor management of the
Americans. There were constant reviews and revisions of the reconstruction
program. That led to work stoppages, and changes and cancellation of orders.
There was also a lack of coordination with the Iraqis, hence instances where a
U.S. company finished work only to find that the Electricity Ministry was not
ready to use or operate the facility, and it sat idle as a result.

The U.S. set the rebuilding of Iraq’s power network as one
of its main priorities. It was a basic necessity of the economy, and was felt
to be a quick way to improve the living conditions for Iraqis. The lack of
strategic thinking however undermined much of U.S. effort. Paul Bremer for
example, made a series of promises about power production without having any
plans in the works on how to achieve them. The Americans also failed to
effectively manage many of the projects, there was a lack of oversight,
constant reviews led to revisions and the cancellation of contracts, the Iraqis
were often not included in planning, and they couldn’t run many of the
facilities they were left with. That doesn’t even include the insurgency, which
effectively retarded the reconstruction effort overall. The result was that by
October 2005, Iraq was producing just over 4,500 megawatts, the same amount
it reached in October 2003. The problem was that the end of sanctions led to a
huge increase in power usage as people bought a wide range of appliances that
had previously been denied them. That meant demand stood at approximately 7,400
megawatts. To this day Iraq still runs into problems with its work on the
electricity network, and has not closed the gap between supply and demand.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

The growing conflict in Syria is leading to more and more
Iraqi refugees who reside there to make the decision to return home. Iraqi
officials have claimed that thousands and thousands of people are making the
trek back to Iraq. Those remarks do not always match the official numbers
collected by the United Nations so far. What awaits these returnees is also an
open question. Will they be able to find jobs and houses is only part of it,
there’s also the issue of how the government will receive them. Overall, they
are likely to struggle as they attempt to restart their lives in Iraq.

Iraqis returning from Syria on bus unload their thingsAug. 2012

There have been various stories about a huge increase in the
number of Iraqi refugees coming back from Syria recently, but they do not quite
jive with statistics collected by the United Nations. At the beginning of
August 2012 for instance, the Displacement and Migration Ministry claimed that around 20,000 people had come back to Iraq in just the last few months. That included 15,000 in just nine days at the end of July, according to the
deputy minister. 4,000 of those were flown back on special flights set up by Baghdad, while the rest crossed back by land. That same month, Iraqi
Airways told the press that 2,673 people had gone back to Baghdad from Syria, and around 8,000 went to Anbar. The United Nations recorded a large number
of returnees as well, but not as many as reported in the press. From January to
July for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had
43,950 people coming back to Iraq from Syria. Its numbers supported the
20,000 figure made by the Displacement Ministry for the last several months as
it claimed 22,010 came back from April to July. Where it differed was in the
huge influx in recent months. For instance, it only had 4,300 people for all of
July, only a fraction of the 15,000 mentioned by the Deputy Displacement
Minister for nine days of that month. The UNHCR numbers are nowhere near
definitive, and could be revised in the future, but according to it, the number
of Iraqis coming back has actually slowed down in the last few months, not
picked up as the press has reported. The situation is definitely in flux, so
the actual number of people making the decision to return may only be clarified
later on.

Since 2011, there have been a large number of refugees
making it back to Iraq. This was before the conflict in Syria even started. Now
the fighting there is giving an added incentive to people to return. This will
likely lead to added pressure upon the government that seems unable to deal
with the increase. More importantly, many of these returnees seem to be heading
towards a long period of struggle trying to find housing and employment, and
dealing with the general high cost of living in Iraq compared to Syria. Their
new life in Iraq therefore, may not be all that they were hoping for.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqis back from Syria face obstacles
at all turns,” 7/25/12

In 2011, the Women’s Affairs Ministry attempted to institute
a dress code for female public workers. The order came from the Higher National Committee for the Advancement of Iraqi Women who demanded that women working
for the government wear “moderate dress” in September 2011. The committee
was under the Women’s Affairs Minister Ibtihal al-Zaidi of the Dawa Party. One
committee member said that the ruling came as a result of public workers not
dressing according to Islamic traditions. The Planning and the Higher Education
Ministries, which were run by the Sadrists and State of Law respectively read
the rules to all their female employees. Other ministries run by other parties
did not comply. Again, this was an instance where Dawa members were acting
against what they saw as violations of their interpretation of religion. Iraqi
public workers wear all types of dress from traditional to Western. Some
members of the Women’s Affairs Ministry were getting offended by the latter,
and attempted to put an end to it. The fact that Iraq has a divided government
with different parties controlling different ministries also showed the limited
power the Dawa actually had over the matter. Those ministers with Islamist
leanings attempted to enforce the ruling, but others who were either
non-religious or opposed to Maliki, ignored it. That highlighted the
unwillingness of Maliki and Dawa to go beyond those jurisdictions that they had
direct control over.

The latest example of Islamist inspired action was far more
violent. In 2012, there were reports that anywhere from six to forty emos and gays were murdered in Baghdad. This came after the Interior Ministry
posted a statement on its website calling emos Devil worshippers in February.
The Ministry then called for a police crackdown, while at the same time
claiming that any deaths were being made up by the media. Stories emerged
that Shiite militants were handing out lists of people they were going to kill.
In March, Human Rights Watch blamed the government for the attacks, which was later substantiated by a BBC investigation. The BBC found that the
Interior Ministry statement about emos being Satanists led to a concerted and
covert campaign to murder gays and emos in the capital by members of the
security forces. While Adnan Asadi is the deputy Interior Minister, he was
appointed by Prime Minister Maliki in 2011, who is still the acting Interior
Minister. Like the alcohol banning, this appears to be an instance where the
premier has used the security forces to go after those he feels are in
violation of his image of what an Islamic society should be like. Unlike those
earlier events however, this one has led to several deaths, which will go
unpunished since they are at the behest of the central government. At the same
time, this again shows that Maliki and Dawa have only felt comfortable imposing
their views on a limited scale, only going after emos and homosexuals in
certain districts of Baghdad, rather than the whole city, other provinces or
the entire country.

While Dawa no longer seems to publicly campaign on their
Islamist agenda, it appears to still be committed to it. From 2010 to the
present there have been several examples of Dawa members ranging from Prime
Minister Maliki to ministers to members of the security forces using
extrajudicial and official means to impose their Islamist ideas on certain
sectors of society. At the same time, these efforts have been largely limited
to the capital, and only affected specific and limited groups such as certain
clubs, stores, female workers in certain ministries, emos, and gays. These
actions have led to increasing yet ineffective criticism, which might be the
reason why they were taken. Maliki and his fellow party members may be
unwilling at this time to take more far reaching acts that could lead to a
wider public outcry. Dawa doesn’t have the ability to act on a larger scale at
this time either since the different ministries and provinces are run by other
parties. At the same time, it can point to these events to their followers, and
other like-minded citizens to shore up their base. That might be their goal at
this time to show their brethren that they have not abandoned their Islamist
past, and that they still want an Islamic society, while not going that far to
actually push for one.

SOURCES

Arango, Tim, “In Iraq, Bottoms Up for Democracy,” New York
Times, 4/16/11

Thursday, September 20, 2012

With oil being Iraq’s main source of income, both Iraqi and
American officials were desperate to get the industry up and running again
after the 2003 invasion. The oil business consists of three sectors: upstream,
midstream, and downstream. Upstream consists of the oil fields and wells, and
gas and oil separation plants. Midstream is made up of refineries, and gas
processing plants. Downstream is the distribution networks, terminals, and
service stations. Iraqis and Americans both believed that earning money was
what Iraq needed the most so the reconstruction effort focused upon the
upstream, and getting exports going as quickly as possible. This was eventually
derailed by the insurgency, and the neglect of the other elements of the energy
industry led to problems for the rest of the economy and shortages for the
population.

The first problem Iraq’s oil industry ran into in 2003
wasn’t war damage, but rather the looting that took place afterward. The oilfields, wells, etc. were hardly touched by the invasion. Starting in May
after Saddam Hussein’s government fell, they, along with other facilities, and
the Oil Ministry were stripped. There were stories that the Ministry was the only building in Baghdad protected right after the end of hostilities, but
the troops did not show up until after most of the building had already been
ransacked. Before the war U.S. advisers had also pointed out places that were
important to Iraq’s oil sector that needed to be protected, but the military
said they didn’t have the personnel to take care of them. Originally, the
Americans were worried that Saddam would set fire to his oil wells, similar to
what that he did in Kuwait during the Gulf War. Instead, it was the Iraqis
themselves that ended up causing $1.7 billion in damages. That just added to
the costs of rebuilding the industry.

The Americans attention then turned to putting the Oil
Ministry back together. They appointed Thamir Abbas al-Ghadban as the interim
Oil Minister. He, along with U.S. advisers decided that getting oil production
and exports going would be their main task. They wanted to get the country back
to its pre-war levels, thinking that exports would bring in new cash that could
then be used on the mid and downstream parts of the industry later on. Unfortunately,
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) decided that oil production and
exports would be the main measurement for success, to the detriment of the
other sectors of the industry.

The U.S. and Iraqis were immediately successful with their plans.
First, Iraq was able to sell 7.5 million in oil that had been placed in storage
in Turkey during the invasion. In June, exports started as well. In May,
production was down to just 300,000 barrels a day. That went up to 675,000
in June, 925,000 in July, and then quickly shot up, reaching the 2 million
barrel mark in October. Exports went from 0 in May to 1.149 million in October.
Those numbers gave great hope that Iraq was on its way to recovery, and would
be quickly pumping as much oil as it did before the war. Unfortunately, that
was not to be.

In the summer of 2003, insurgents started a concerted effort
to take down the oil industry. From June to November for instance, there were
13 attacks upon pipelines and facilities. In December 2004, the northern
pipeline to Turkey was shut down due to attacks. In June 2005, there was
another large wave of operations targeting oil infrastructure. Militants also
went after Oil Ministry employees, reconstruction companies, and their workers.
The violence was so bad that it shut down all work in some areas. It also
limited the ability of U.S. officials to travel throughout the country, and
many ended up just staying in the Green Zone. That meant oversight was severely
restricted. This trickled down to all levels. First, production and exports
were cut. Supplies were delayed arriving at sites, while Iraqis were
intimidated and killed. That led to a high turnover in the work force. All of
that resulted in skyrocketing costs. Huge amounts of money were then put into
securing the oil infrastructure, taking away funds from other tasks.

From June 2004 to June 2005, the oil sector stagnated. An
October 2004 State Department report found that security had led to rising
costs and delays in work on petroleum. The Oil Ministry reported 186 attacks
during 2004, causing $6 billion in damages, and 138 oil security and workers
being killed. By that time, the U.S. and Oil Ministry were spending most of
their time doing repair work rather than advancing any of their other goals.

On top of that, the U.S. suffered from some very poor
planning. An early case was the Al Fatah Bridge in northern Iraq. It was
accidently bombed by the Americans during the invasion. This was no ordinary
bridge. It included 15 oil and gas pipelines that connected the Kirkuk field to
the Baiji refinery, and also the northern pipeline to Turkey. As a result of
the bridge being knocked out, Iraq was losing $5 million dollars a day, and
helped retard exports. In June 2003, the U.S. decided to fix the Al Fatah
Bridge, and put in new pipes. It was estimated that the work would cost $5
million over 2-4 months. Bechtel and Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) were given
the job. Immediately, the plan ran into problems. First, Bechtel said it
couldn’t start work for two months. Then the Americans decided to build the
pipes underground instead of suspended from the bridge. Wilbros. Inc. and Laney
were given a $50 million contract to do the work, with an additional $10,000
deal going to Fugro Inc. to do a soil survey before the drilling was to begin.
That was over ten times the original estimate. Fugro came up with a bad
geological report, and recommended that KBR do more pre-planning. That
suggestion was ignored, and KBR went ahead anyway. In October 2003, the
subcontractors on the job said they wouldn’t start until they were provided
with more security. That delayed work until January 2004. They found the soil
to be poor, and they couldn’t do any drilling just as Fugro warned. The
companies went ahead anyway, and wasted five months of drilling with no
success. In August 2004, the contract was cancelled, one year after it had been
issued. KBR claimed it ran into unplanned problems, but it was really because
it ignored the Fugro report. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
audited the matter, and found that $75.7 million had been spent completing only
28% of the work, before the job was abandoned. Because all the businesses
involved received cost-plus contracts, they were paid even though the project
was never finished. Bad management, and the lack of oversight led to this
fiasco. KBR seemed to be able to operate on its own in this case, and there was
no contracting official that noticed the Fugro survey that could have saved
millions.

Another famous case was that of the Qarmat Ali water
treatment plant. During the sanctions period, neglect and the lack of funds
meant that pressure in many of the wells was allowed to dissipate, and there
was not enough to pump oil. Water had to be injected into the fields to solve
the problem. The Qarmat Ali water treatment plant was seen as the solution for southern Iraq. KBR was given a $225
million contract to rehabilitate the plant. In August 2004, most of that work
had been done with six out of eight water injection pump stations working.
Qarmat Ali however, kept breaking down, because its old pipelines, which KBR
did not include in its original contract, had cracks and leaks. It took another
deal with KBR to repair all these, and that didn’t happen until 2006. This
created a major drag on southern oil production, as there was never enough
pressure to meet all the pumping requirements. If the management authorities or
KBR had done an adequate assessment of the area they would have included those
pipes in the original work order, and saved a huge amount of time and money.

The affect of the Al Fata Bridge, the Qarmat Ali water
treatment plant, and others was that the U.S. decided to reform its management
rules. First, it decided to move away from KBR. In late 2004, American
officials issued a “cure notice” saying that it was going to end KBRs work,
because of cost overruns. It then started shifting jobs to Parsons Iraq Joint
Venture, which had been working on the oil sector in northern Iraq. By the
spring of 2005, Parsons was getting the majority of contracts. Then it began
using foreign companies working with the Oil Ministry’s state-owned businesses
to do most of the rebuilding. This ended up reducing costs, and more projects
being completed. By the spring of 2005, the U.S. had given 82 contracts for the
oil sector worth $781 million.

All the emphasis upon maintaining oil production and exports
led to neglect in other fields. Iraq’s refineries were one such example. The
Americans decided they didn’t have the money to renovate them, and suggested
that the Iraqis do it instead. One U.S. estimate predicted that rebuilding all
of the country’s refineries would cost as much as $7 billion. Baghdad didn’t
have those types of funds either, and were just as focused upon exports as the
U.S. was. The result was chronic fuel shortages. On top of that, insurgents
went after the facilities, and there was a lack of storage
capacity for refined products. This trickled down throughout the economy as the
Electricity Ministry didn’t have the necessary fuel to run many of its power
plants. The result was chronic power outages. The CPA was forced to import
massive amounts of fuel to meet demand. It also instituted a rationing system.
To this day, Iraq still does not have the refining capacity it needs, and
Baghdad is still making large fuel imports as a result. It is still caught up
in boosting exports as well, leaving its refinery plans to largely fallow.

Rebuilding Iraq’s oil industry proved to be a daunting task.
When the Oil Ministry was put back together and petroleum production restarted
it seemed like Iraq would quickly recover. The insurgency had other plans.
Their operations led to stagnation in exports, and money being diverted away from
important projects to security instead. The lack of oversight led to more
waste. By 2005, the country was heading towards civil war, and it seemed like
any further progress in the sector would have to wait until major fighting was
over. That’s exactly what happened as real progress was not made until 2009
when international oil companies returned to the country in two auctions. That
was quite a change as planners originally thought that the entire effort could
be done in just months, and oil would end up funding most of the rebuilding.
Instead, it ended up being a huge cost.

Wednesday, September 19, 2012

Every year Iraq’s Electricity Ministry says it will reach certain levels of production. These are all steps that are eventually supposed to end the country’s long standing power problems that date back to the 1991 Gulf War. This year for instance, Baghdad promised to raise production some 3,000 megawatts to 9,000 by August 2012, and that it would end all of the power shortages by 2014. What ended up happening was that the government failed to reach its mark this summer. This is leading to increased criticism from parliament, and even more from the public. While overall output has continued to grow, so has demand, which means there are continued black outs. The result is that when it comes to electricity, very little from the authorities is believed.

This summer the government promised, but failed to achieve a large increase in electricity production. At the end of August 2012, output was at 5,842 megawatts. Demand at the time stood at approximately 15,000 megawatts, and August’s figures were below the average for the second quarter of the year, which was 6,200 megawatts. The cause of the drop was a series of technical problems. First, a fuel pipeline blew up, and there was a problem with pressure in another, which reduced the power supply by some 1,400 megawatts according to the Electricity Ministry. By July, the Ministry was supposed to reach 7,450 megawatts, and 9,000 by August. This was just the latest example of Baghdad failing to achieve its goals. It also brings into question its claim that it will end all of the country’s power problems by 2014. It is repeated setbacks such as these that cause widespread cynicism amongst the public when it comes to government announcements about electricity.

Despite the continued shortages, the Electricity Ministry revived plans to charge the public for usage. At the end of August, the Ministry said that it wanted to install pay as you go meters on households. Residents would have to prepay to ensure their supply of electricity. Electricity Minister Abdul Karim Aftan said that he wanted the meters to be tested in the Karkh and Rusafa districts of Baghdad first to go along with a public relations campaign to inform people about the new rules. Iraqis are already supposed to pay for their usage, but because the supply is so bad few do. The government has attempted to use fees as a way to contain demand in Iraq before, but the plans have always failed. In June 2010 for instance, the Ministry said it would double charges for usage in an attempt to cut consumption. Then when protests broke out over power shortages in early 2011, the government said it would give away a free amount of electricity to appease the public. The government would later undercut its own program when the cabinet voted for subsidies for power bills. In the end, few seemed to pay attention, and the government claimed it was owed billions of dinars in unpaid bills. Installing meters would obviously be a firmer way to ensure that fees were taken care of. Given the authorities previous spotty record, and the intense anger that electricity shortages instill, going ahead with this idea, might cause even more resentment, and therefore lead the government to back down once again.

The Iraqi government has consistently said that it would find a solution to the country’s power shortages. In February 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that the situation would be solved in just 15 months. That benchmark was only one of many to come and go without being fulfilled. Now, the Electricity Ministry has promised 14,000 megawatts by the middle of 2013, and 20,000 by the end of that year, which would end power shortages. The public has little faith in these announcements, and an increasing number of politicians believe them to be false promises as well. The government is moving ahead with construction of new power plants, and overall production has seen steady increases since 2003. Poor planning, and unrestrained usage however, has continually plagued the effort to resolve this issue. Several Electricity Ministers have been sacked as a result, and there have been two years of protests as well. Its continued failure to match rhetoric with results, is undermining Baghdad’s credibility, and hindering the economy as well since companies can’t operate without a consistent power supply. The authorities are feeling all of this pressure, but the dysfunctions within the government consistently undermine their efforts. It’s likely that Iraq will face years more of shortages as a result.

SOURCES

AK News, “Electricity bills subsidized,” 11/17/11

Ali, Nashoor, “Iraq only producing one third of its electricity needs,” Azzaman, 8/28/12

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

In September 2012, Baghdad and Irbil announced that they had
come to a new agreement over Kurdish oil exports. The Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) halted their petroleum shipments in April over a payment
dispute with the central government. It then started them again in August
hoping that would lead to a new deal, which has now happened. There are two
important and unresolved issues however. The first is whether the Kurds can
meet their quotas, because they weren’t able to do so the last time they exported.
The second is whether Baghdad can be counted on to consistently distribute
funds to the energy companies working in Kurdistan, which was the issue that
led the last two deals to break down. Both of those are likely to come up
again, making this latest agreement, perhaps just as short term as the others.

In mid-September 2012, Baghdad and Kurdistan negotiated a
new export deal. This came as a result of a meeting headed by Deputy Premier
Rowsch Nouri Shaways that included Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Trade Minister
Khayrulla Hassan Babakir, Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi, the head of the
Board of Supreme Audit, and KRG Natural Resource Minister Ashti Hawrami. The two sides came to a five-part agreement. First, the Kurds said they would
export 140,000 barrels a day for the rest of September, and then increase that
amount to 200,000 barrels for the rest of the year. Second, Baghdad would pay companies operating in Kurdistan $833 million. Third, the two would work
out an export quota and payments to be included in the 2013 budget. Fourth,
Baghdad would provide 17% of refined oil products and 17% of fuel to the KRG
for its power stations. Finally, two committees would be formed to keep track
of production, remunerations, oversee the agreement, and try to resolve any
problems that might arise. These were all issues that led to the breakdown of
the last deal between the two. The Kurds for instance, accused Baghdad of cuttings its fuel shipments. Now the central and regional governments have
supposedly worked out their differences. It also has two mechanisms to try to
problem solve any issues that may come up this time around. This move was
widely hailed in the press.

The new agreement was the result of the breakdown of the
last one. On April 1, Kurdistan halted its exports, claiming that Baghdad
owed companies there $1.5 billion. Kurdish officials told the press that firms
in the region had not been paid for their exports from 2009 and 2011. The central government countered that the KRG never provided invoices for its exports to be audited, so that payments could be made. Four months later on
August 7, the Kurds’ Natural Resource Ministry restarted sending oil through
the northern pipeline to Turkey, hoping that it would lead to a breakthrough
with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. At the time, the KRG was coming under
increasing pressure from oil companies there over money. Norway’s DNO for
instance, reported a loss in August, and that it had to ramp down production at
the Tawke field in Dohuk, because it could not export. The few companies
that produce oil in Kurdistan only make small amounts of cash either from
selling to the domestic market there or through smuggling to Turkey and Iran,
both of which pay below international prices. Having a deal with Baghdad only
covers costs, but that is still more than they are currently being paid. This
was the second time that relations between Baghdad and Irbil had broken down,
so businesses were pushing Kurdistan to come to a firmer and longer lasting
agreement with Maliki’s government, so that they could earn a steady income
from their large investments in the KRG. It was for these reasons that the
Natural Resource Ministry re-started exports in August. The problem is that
there is no guarantee that Baghdad will keep up their payments, because they
haven’t in the past. That could bring down this new deal just like it did the
last two.

This is the third time that the central and regional
governments have cut a deal over oil. In 2009, it only took three months for the first one to fall apart over Baghdad not paying companies in
Kurdistan. The second one lasted fourteen months, but then disintegrated over
the same issue. There is no reason to believe that this latest one will be any
different. The Maliki government has never objected to the Kurds exporting
petroleum through the northern pipelines as long as profits are deposited in
the central bank. That’s because it gives them control over the dispersal of
the money, and allows it to claim that all energy deals have to go through it.
The problems are that the KRG has not been able to maintain its quotas, which
then draws criticism from Baghdad, and the central government has not kept up
its payments. Both issues could be caused by a lack of capacity or political
decisions to protest the actions of the other. With oil production and exports
taking off in southern Iraq, that gives an added incentive for Premier Maliki
to just stick to short-term deals with the Kurds, which can be quickly ended.
It gives the central government the upper hand in its long-standing disputes
over oil policy since it controls the purse and the pipelines to foreign
markets. Rather than a solution, this new deal is likely just one of many that
will fall apart, and then have to be re-negotiated in the future.

Monday, September 17, 2012

In an interview with Musings On Iraq, Dr. Michael Knights of
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed out that violence in Iraq has become increasingly localized. Between provinces and cities within the
country there are great variations in the level of attacks and deaths. For
instance, in places like Baghdad and Mosul there are on average a 100 a more
attacks per month. That compares to places like Kut in Wasit province where an
incident may only happen every few months. Even within cities there are
differences. Mosul per capita, is the most violent urban area in Iraq, but even
there 100 attacks spread out across a 10 mile area with around 1.8 million
people means most only hear or read about an explosion or gunfire rather than
actually witness it. This all points to the complicated nature of security in
Iraq at present. Press reports of mass casualty bombings, especially now with
the insurgents carrying out a summer offensive, give the impression that the
whole nation must be on fire. A study of casualties across 30 cities shows that
militants are in fact greatly limited in where they can carry out their deadly
work.

Tracking violence in Iraq is extremely difficult today using
open sources. Press reports capture many incidents, but not all of them. There
are security firms like the Olive Group that issue weekly reports, but they
do not capture everything either. The United Nations used to have a website
dedicated to attacks and deaths, but it has gone down in recent months. Iraq Body Count is widely considered one of the longest running and most
consistent in its coverage, but it too is limited, since it only records
deaths. Given the fact that it provides daily statistics on casualties however,
it will be used as the basis of this study.

Baghdad is Iraq’s largest city and the seat of government.
It has been a focal point for violence since the 2003 invasion as a result.
That’s why it consistently has the highest death counts of any urban area. Even
then, attacks come in waves that coincide with Shiite religious events, which
are consistently targeted, and the summer when militants carry out their annual
offensive. In August and September 2011 for instance, there were 86 and 68
deaths respectively. That then shot up to 156 in October, as the capital became
the focus of the last month of the summer season, before dropping to 46 the
next. Then in December, there were 139 fatalities, largely due to 17 explosions across the city on December 22, as the Islamic State claimed it was
launching a new effort to rekindle the sectarian war and bring down the
government. Those high numbers continued into January 2012, as Al Qaeda went after Shiite pilgrims. Those figures then saw a steady drop from 103 in
February to 44 in March, 54 in April, and 49 in May, which is traditionally
when insurgents regroup. June marked the beginning of the new summer offensive
with 147 deaths, then 73 in July, and 102 in August. The figures for Baghdad
show the up and down nature of attacks in Iraq. Certain months are extremely
deadly, while others have relatively low figures. They also show how insurgents
have concentrated most of their resources on the capital since it offers so
many targets, and is an attempt to show that the government is not in complete
control of the country. Still, in a city as vast as Baghdad with a population
of at least 5 million, an average of 99.5 deaths per month shows that the vast
majority of the populace is not really affected.

Baghdad Casualty Figures
August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 86

September 2011 – 68

October 2011 – 156

November 2011 – 46

December 2011 – 139

January 2012 – 127

February 2012 – 103

March 2012 – 44

April 2012 – 54

May 2012 49

June 2012 147

July 2012 – 73

August 2012 – 102

Mosul, in Ninewa province, is the last major urban
stronghold of the insurgency, and a major source of its funding. Attacks there
are different than in Baghdad. There most casualties are caused by bombings. In
Mosul, shootings are far more common. In August and September 2011, there were
only 23 and 31 deaths respectively. That jumped to 78 in October, before going
down to 30 in November, and then increasing again to 62 in December. That
pattern was followed in 2012 with 38 killed in January, 42 in February, 61 in
March, 58 in April, 32 in May, 55 in June, 48 in July, and 55 in August. Like
in the capital, security incidents go up and down in number, but not always at
the same times. Since small arms are the main tools used, there are far fewer
casualties there than in Baghdad where large explosions take a heavier toll,
yet Mosul is the second deadliest city in the country. Still, there was only an
average of 51.0 deaths per month amongst 1.8 million people from August 2011 to
August 2012.

Mosul, Ninewa Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 23

September 2011 – 31

October 2011 – 78

November 2011 – 30

December 2011 – 62

January 2012 – 38

February 2012 – 42

March 2012 – 61

April 2012 – 58

May 2012 – 32

June 2012 – 55

July 2012 – 48

August 2012 - 55

The insurgents’ strong base in Mosul does not mean they are
as active in the rest of Ninewa. In Sinjar and Tal Afar, which are to the west,
there is very little violence. In Sinjar for example, there were no deaths from
August 2011 to August 2012. In Tal Afar for that same time period, there were
only a total of 35 killed. 20 of those were due to a car bomb and a suicide bomber at a restaurant in the city on March 7, 2012. This shows that
militants are not able to operate freely across provinces, even when they have
a large foothold in one urban area. This is highlighted in other governorates as
well.

Sinjar, Ninewa
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Tal Afar, Ninewa
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 1

December 2011 – 4

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 21

April 2012 – 3

May 2012 – 1

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 3

August 2012 - 2

Salahaddin, Diyala, and Anbar are three areas that have
traditionally been stomping grounds for insurgents. Like in Ninewa however, they
only seem to be concentrated in specific cities. In Salahaddin, which was the
province of Saddam Hussein, his hometown of Tikrit is largely quite, along with
Samarra, and Baiji. Tikrit only had 35 people killed from August 2011 to August
2012. For that same period, 54 died in Samarra, and 21 in Baiji. In Diyala,
Baquba was far deadlier for that time with 164 casualties. Those high figures
were not seen in other cities of the governorate though. In Jalawala and
Khanaqin, which are in the disputed territories, Kurds have consistently claimed that they have been under attack. Very few deaths have occurred in
either city however with 11 in the former and 5 in the latter. Likewise, other
cities in the province such as Mandali and Muqtadiya saw very few casualties as
well with just 0 and 36 respectively. The same pattern is seen in Anbar.
Fallujah and Ramadi have been longtime bases for insurgents and remain the most
insecure in the governorate with 133 and 125 deaths from August 2011 to August
2012. Outside of those areas however, there are very few casualties. In Haditha
there were only 9, in Rutba just 3, and 4 in Qaim. Again, the insurgents are
not evenly distributed throughout these provinces. Some areas see monthly
attacks, but most have only sporadic incidents with many being relatively
peaceful beyond an occasional explosion or shooting.

Tikrit, Salahaddin
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 5

September 2011 – 2

October 2011 – 1

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 2

January 2012 – 2

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 6

April 2012 – 4

May 2012 – 2

June 2012 – 1

July 2012 – 1

August 2012 – 9

Samarra, Salahaddin
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 1

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 3

November 2011 – 11

December 2011 – 2

January 2012 – 6

February 2012 – 1

March 2012 – 6

April 2012 – 7

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 7

July 2012 – 6

August 2012 – 4

Baiji, Salahaddin
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 1

January 2012 – 2

February 2012 – 4

March 2012 – 2

April 2012 – 1

May 20 12 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 11

Baquba, Diyala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 11

September 2011 – 11

October 2011 – 13

November 2011 – 3

December 2011 – 6

January 2012 – 13

February 2012 – 18

March 2012 – 6

April 2012 10

May 2012 – 1

June 2012 – 52

July 2012 – 6

August 2012 - 14

Jalawla, Diyala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 4

September 2011 – 1

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 1

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 5

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Khanaqin, Diyala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 1

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 1

February 2012 – 1

March 2012 – 0

April 012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 2

Mandali, Diyala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Muqtadiya, Diyala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 1

September 2011 – 6

October 2011 – 1

November 2011 – 1

December 2011 – 1

January 2012 – 4

February 2012 – 1

March 2012 – 1

April 2012 – 1

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 1

July 2012 – 8

August 2012 - 10

Fallujah, Anbar
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 9

September 2011 – 4

October 2011 – 6

November 2011 – 5

December 2011 – 15

January 2012 – 6

February 2012 – 10

March 2012 – 7

April 2012 – 2

May 2012 – 11

June 2012 – 24

July 2012 – 11

August 2012 – 23

Ramadi, Anbar
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 23

September 2011 – 11

October 2011 – 6

November 2011 – 9

December 2011 – 4

January 2012 – 13

February 2012 – 5

March 2012 – 6

April 2012 – 6

May 2012 – 13

June 2012 – 18

July 2012 – 11

August 2012 – 0

Haditha, Anbar
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 3

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 6

Rutba, Anbar Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 3

Qaim, Anbar Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 3

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 1

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 0

Kirkuk in Tamim governorate has been a flash point in Iraq
for years, because it is hotly contested between the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), which wishes to annex it and the central government in
Baghdad. Its multi-ethnic composition has also been a target of insurgents who
wish to divide the groups. It’s for those reasons that the city has a
relatively high mark of 168 killed from August 2011 to August 2012.

Kirkuk, Tamim
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 6 killed

September 2011 – 19

October 2011 – 4

November 2011 – 8

December 2011 – 15

January 2012 – 16

February 2012 – 8

March 2012 – 8

April 2012 – 12

May 2012 – 9

June 2012 – 5

July 2012 – 14

August 2012 – 32

In southern Iraq, security is completely different. There
attacks are far and few between. Insurgents like to target Shiite pilgrims
heading towards holy sites, but their ability to carry out these operations
within the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf are negligible. In Karbala for
instance, there were only 14 casualties from August 2011 to August 2012, with
13 of those occurring in one incident when a restaurant in the city was hit by a car bomb. In Najaf, only 13 people were killed over that same time
period, with 8 in August 2011, and 5 in July 2012. Similar low numbers were
seen in other cities of the region, such as Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar where only 2
people died over those thirteen months, and in Samawa in Muthanna, Umm Qasr in Basra, and Amarah in
Maysan where there were no casualties. That doesn’t mean insurgents were not
active in the area. Certain cities did witness some large attacks. Kut, in
Wasit, saw 40 killed in August 2011 by a twin bombing in a market. After
that incident however, only 15 more died over the next eleven months. Likewise,
in Babil’s Hillah, 73 died during that period, with 21 being police recruits and civilians dying in a car bombing of a restaurant in June 2012.
Diwaniya in Qadisiyah was similar with 53 fatalities, 40 of which were due to a truck bombing in a market. Finally, the major city of the south, Basra,
had 55 deaths, 23 coming from bombings of a market, and twelve from a motorcycle bomb outside a café, both in November 2011. Even then, violence
across the south was sporadic. Babil saw the most militant activity, but even
then, eleven out of the 13 months from August 2011 to August 2012 had less then
ten killed each month. Basically, outside of the occasional large bombing at a
market, most of the south was relatively quite. That showed that insurgents
could only venture into the region. Carry out a car, truck or motorcycle
bombing in a city, and then leave.

Karbala, Karbala
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 17

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 13

April 2012 – 1

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Najaf, Najaf Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 8

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 5

August 2012 – 0

Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 1

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 1

Samawa, Muthanna
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Amarah, Maysan
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Umm Qasr, Basra
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 0

Kut, Wasit Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 42

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 1

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 1

January 2012 – 1

February 2012 – 2

March 2012 – 3

April 2012 – 1

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 6

Hillah, Babil
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 11

September 2011 – 1

October 2011 – 1

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 5

January 2012 – 9

February 2012 – 2

March 2012 – 8

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 32

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 – 4

Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 3

October 2011 – 2

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 1

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 2

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 45

August 2012 - 0

Basra, Basra Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 4

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 35

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 3

February 2012 – 3

March 2012 – 5

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 3

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 0

August 2012 - 2

That leaves the northern Kurdish region, which is by far the
most secure area of the country. In two of its main cities, Irbil and
Sulaymaniya, there were only six people killed between them, none of which
appeared to be due to insurgent activity. With its largely no-Arab population
and tight border control the Kurdistan region is not conducive to militant
infiltration.

Irbil, Irbil Casualty
Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 1

September 2011 – 1

October 2011 – 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012 – 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 2

August 2012 – 0

Sulaymaniya,
Sulaymaniya Casualty Figures August 2011-August 2012

August 2011 – 0

September 2011 – 0

October 2011 - 0

November 2011 – 0

December 2011 – 0

January 2012 – 0

February 2012 – 0

March 2012- 0

April 2012 – 0

May 2012 – 0

June 2012 – 0

July 2012 – 2

August 2012 - 0

The 30 cities included in this survey show how security
varies across Iraq. Baghdad and Mosul remain the two most violent cities of the
nation, but even then, the number killed are such a small fraction of the
population, that most are able to go about their lives without fear of
suffering wounds or losing their life. That’s even more so in the south where a
bombing might occur just once or twice a year. Then there’s Kurdistan where
insurgents are not able to carry out any attacks. Sunni armed groups are still
active in Iraq, but they are limited to certain areas of the country. Not only
that, but they are only able to carry out a large number of operations for a
limited amount of time before they have to regroup and rearm. This is far
different from the years of the civil war when thousands were dying each month,
militants could openly walk down the streets, certain parts of cities were off
limits to the security forces, and polls showed that a majority of Iraqis had
at least personally witnessed an act of violence. Iraq still faces daily
violence, but it is important to note its increasingly limited affect upon the
general population.