Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Eric Baird, former owner and CEO of Access USA Shipping, LLC d/b/a MyUS.com (Access USA), had his criminal plea accepted by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on December 12, 2018. BIS imposed a civil penalty of $17 million, with $7 million suspended, along with a 5-year denial of export privileges with one year being suspended. This is historically the largest penalty to be paid to BIS by an individual.

Are you wondering what this guy must have done to get the largest personal penalty? He went out of his way to hide illegal exports from the government…something they really frown upon. Baird founded Access USA and developed the business model of providing foreign customers with a US address so that they could acquire US origin items for export without alerting US merchants of the item’s ultimate destinations. Baird created policies and practices where it was normal for the values and descriptions of items on export documentation to be falsely identified. At one point, laser sights for firearms were described as “tools and hardware,” and rifle scopes were described as “sporting goods” or “tools, hand tools.” Baird even created a personal shopper program where Access USA employees purchased items for foreign customers from a shopping list and presented themselves as the domestic end users. At one point, Baird and Access USA employees were personally paying for the items and being reimbursed later by their foreign customers.

Access USA’s Chief Technology Officer emailed Baird in 2011 saying, “I know we are WILLINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY breaking the law.” In the same email thread Baird said, “if warned by the government,” then the company “can stop ASAP.”

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a settlement with Yantai Jereh Oilfield Services Group Co., Ltd., of Yantai Shandong Province, China (“Yantai Jereh”) in conjunction with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

BIS alleges that the company committed four violations of the EAR (Acting with knowledge of a violation and making false statements to BIS during the course of an investigation. Yantai Jereh has agreed to pay $600,000 to BIS and the company’s 5-year denial period will be suspended if the company pays the BIS fine, in addition to the penalty under their OFAC Settlement Agreement (details below). If at any time, the company commits any violations of the Regulations or fails to pay its penalties on time, BIS can revoke the denial suspension.

The settlement between the OFAC and Yantai Jereh is concurrent with the BIS settlement. The main difference is that the company had 11 violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations causing a much larger fine of $2,774,972. All 11 violations involved exportation or rexxeportation or the attempted exportation or reexportation of US goods to Iran by way of China. Two of the 11 shipments of oilfield equipment spare parts (coiled tubing strings and pump sets) were seized by US Customs and Border Protection before they left the US.

OFAC determined that the violations constituted an egregious case and the company did not voluntarily disclose their violations.

On November 5, 2018 the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) began to re-impose several sanctions on Iran related to the 180-day wind-down period and the reimposition of US sanctions that had been lifted or waived in connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The biggest change you will see is that over 700 people have been designated or identified and added to the SDN list, including those that had been recently removed from the list in connection with JCPOA. In addition, person and associated block property that was previously identified on Executive Order (EO) 13599 have been moved to the SDN list and OFAC has removed EO 13599 from its website.

An amendment to the Iranian Transactions Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) has taken affect and will reimpose certain sanctions pursuant to EO 13846 and technical changes that remove references to EO 13599.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a final rule effective November 5, 2018 which makes changes to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) to further implement President Trump’s decision to end the United State’s participation in the Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) back in May of this year. These changes basically reimpose certain sanctions as well as change an existing general license to ITSR to allow US person to sell personal property in Iran and transfer the proceeds to the US.

Changes:

560.211 by revising paragraph (c), adding a note to paragraph (c)(2), and revising notes 1 and 2 to paragraphs (a) through (c) to read as follows:

560.211 Prohibited transactions involving blocked property.

(c)(1) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, including any foreign branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

Any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to paragraphs (a) through (c)(1)(i) of this section; or

Any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

(A) To have, on or after August 7, 2018, materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran; or

(B) To have, on or after November 5, 2018, materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC); the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO); any entity owned or controlled by, or operating for or on behalf of, NIOC or NICO; or the Central Bank of Iran.

(2) Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section shall not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a project—

(i) For the development of natural gas and the construction and operation of a pipeline to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe;

(ii) That provides to Turkey and countries in Europe energy security and energy independence from the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Iran; and

(iii) That was initiated before August 10, 2012 pursuant to a production sharing agreement, or an ancillary agreement necessary to further a production-sharing agreement, entered into with, or a license granted by, the government of a country other than Iran before August 10, 2012.

Revise Note 1 to § 560.304 to read as follows:

560.304 Government of Iran.Note 1 to § 560.304: The names of persons that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has identified as meeting this definition are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier ‘‘[IRAN].’’ The SDN List is accessible through the following page on OFAC’s website: www.treasury.gov/sdn. However, the property and interests in property of any persons meeting the definition of the term Government of Iran are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of whether the names of such persons are published in the Federal Register or incorporated into the SDN List.

Revise Note 1 to § 560.324 to read as follows:

560.324 Iranian financial institution.
Note 1 to § 560.324: The names of persons that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has identified as meeting this definition are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) with the identifier ‘‘[IRAN].’’ The SDN List is accessible through the following page on OFAC’s website: www.treasury.gov/sdn. However, the property and interests in property of any persons meeting the definition of the term Iranian financial institution are blocked pursuant to § 560.211 regardless of whether the names of such persons are published in the Federal Register or incorporated into the SDN List.

Add a Note to § 560.518 to read as follows:

560.518 Transactions in Iranian-origin and Iranian government property.

Note to § 560.518: See § 560.543 for an authorization to engage in all transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of certain real and personal property located in Iran.

560.543 Sale of certain real and personal property in Iran and transfer of related funds to the United States.(a) Individuals who are U.S. persons are authorized to engage in transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of real and personal property in Iran and to transfer the proceeds to the United States, provided that such real and personal property was acquired before the individual became a U.S. person or inherited from persons in Iran. Authorized transactions include engaging the services of any persons in Iran necessary for the sale, such as an attorney, funds agent, or broker.

(b) * * *

(1) * * *

(2) The re-investment in Iran of the proceeds from the real or personal property sales authorized in paragraph (a) of this section; or

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced this month that it had reached a $5,263,171 settlement with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for 87 violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations.

The transactions were net settlement payments with a very small portion being provided to the interests of airlines that were on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List), blocked pursuant to OFAC sanctions, or located in countries subject to OFAC sanctions. The transactions included airline freight charges which are not exempt from the prohibitions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

On a separate issue, OFAC issued a Finding of Violation to JPMC for violations of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. Between 2011 and 2014 JPMC processed 85 transactions worth $46,127.04 held accounts on behalf of six customers who were on the SDN list.

In both situations JPMC voluntarily disclosed the violations and they were considered to be non-egregious violations by OFAC.

Before I get to the nitty gritty of this case its important to remember that companies can be held liable for sanctions violations when they export a product to a third-party in another country and know or have reason to know that the third party intends to reexport their product to Iran. Companies must do their due diligence to make sure that that third party who is receiving their products isn’t planning on sending them to Iran. Now that that’s out of the way, let’s get started.

Note: This case was between the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Epsilon Electronics but Power Acoustik Electronics who is a subsidiary of Epsilon who engaged in the transactions in question.

Epsilon Electronics, also doing business as Power Acoustik Electronics, Sound Stream, Kole Audio, and precision Audio has agreed to pay $1.5 million to OFAC to settle the enforcement case related to alleged violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). OFAC’s Penalty Notice alleged that Epilson violated the ITSR when it issued 39 invoices for sales to Asra Internationals LLC from 2008 to 2012 because Epsilon knew or had reason to know that Asra was distributing its products to Iran.

In 2008 OFAC found out that Power Acoustik exported items to an address in Iran. OFAC issued a subpoena and eventually sent the company a cautionary letter in 2012. During a separate investigation, OFAC uncovered wire transfers from Asra International (company located in Dubai) to Power Acoustik totaling more than $1.1 million between 2010 and 2011. OFAC believed that these wires may have been for products that were destined to Iran and they issued another subpoena to Power Acoustik. The company explained that they had 41 sales of audio and video equipment to Asra between 2008 and 2012 which explained the wire transfers. During a further investigation, OFAC did not directly find any proof that any of the equipment was reexported to Iran by Asra but they did find a website for Asra that specified that the company provided car audio and video products to Iran. The Iran affiliate’s address on Asra’s website was the same address as the 2008 address that OFAC initially sent a subpoena to Power Acoustik for, related to the illegal shipment.

OFAC then issued a Penalty Notice to Epsilon for $4 million based on 34 non-egregious violations (those that occurred before the 2012 cautionary letter) and 5 egregious violations (occurred after the cautionary letter). Epsilon challenged OFAC’s Penalty Notice in the US District Court for the District of Columbia and lost. The company than appealed the order to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which affirmed the 34 non-egregious violations but reversed the 5 egregious violations to be non-egregious changing the penalty from $4 million to $1.5 million. The Court of Appeals found that an exporter may be found liable if it exports goods from the US to a third country, with reason to know that those goods are specifically intended for reexport to Iran, even if they never make it to Iran. The “reason to know” requirement for OFAC can be established “through a variety of circumstantial evidence” including “course of dealing, general knowledge of the industry or customer preferences, working relationships between parties, or other criteria far too numerous to enumerate.”

Up until 2011, Asra distributed to Iran exclusively, making the evidence on their website evidence for OFAC that Power Acoustik could have reasonably inferred that Asra only distributed its products to Iran. The Court of Appeals found that the final five exports didn’t fit the “reason to know” standard because OFAC did not address several emails between Acoustik’s sales team and an Asra manager between 2011-2012 which explained that their products were going to be sold from Asra’s new retail store in Dubai…causing the 5 violations to be changed.

OFAC saw the following as aggravating factors:

The alleged violations constituted or resulted in a systematic pattern of conduct

Epsilon exported goods valued at $2,823,000 or more

Epsilon had no compliance program at the time of the alleged violations

OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:

Epsilon has not received a Penalty Notice or a Finding of Violation in five years preceding the transactions that gave rise to the alleged violations

Epsilon is a small business

Epsilon provided some cooperation to OFAC, including entering into an agreement to toll the statute of limitations for one year

The important take away from this case is that, as most people already know, there is a very far-reaching interpretation of what constitutes “reason to know” when dealing with third parties and Iran (and Cuba).

The President has signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 (“NDAA”), which, in addition to expanding the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to review foreign direct investment,1 implements the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (“ECA”), which sharpens the focus of the U.S. government on emerging and foundational technologies that are deemed not to have been adequately addressed by the prevailing U.S. export control regimes. The NDAA also places limits on the procurement of equipment and services from certain Chinese entities, though certain Members of Congress had adamantly advocated for much more stringent restrictions.

Please find a more detailed discussion of certain of the key aspects of the ECA, as well as the procurement-related restrictions set forth in the NDAA, below.

Export Controls Act of 2018

Permanent Statutory Authority for U.S. Export Controls. With limited exceptions, the ECA repeals the Export Administration Act of 1979, which lapsed several years ago and has been statutorily authorized each year since pursuant to Executive Orders issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Accordingly, the ECA now serves as the permanent statutory authority for the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), which generally govern the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of commercial and dual-use commodities, software and technology, and which are administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”).2

Treatment of Emerging and Other Types of Critical Technologies. In addition to ensuring permanent statutory authority for the existing commercial and dual-use export controls regime, the ECA directs the President, in coordination with the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy to develop a “regular and robust process to identify the emerging and other types of critical technologies of concern and regulate their release to foreign persons as warranted regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.” Specifically, these agencies are tasked by the ECA with identifying “emerging and foundational technologies” that are essential to the national security of the United States, but which are not currently controlled for export purposes.3

The process for identifying such technologies will be informed by publicly available information, classified information, information arising out of the CFIUS review process, and information generated by the various BIS advisory committees, and will take into account the development of such technologies in foreign countries, the effect export controls might have on continuing U.S. development efforts, and the effectiveness of export controls with respect to limiting the proliferation of such technologies to foreign countries.

The identified technologies will, following a notice and comment period, be subjected to enhanced U.S. export controls, possibly to include licensing requirements, and will be proposed for inclusion in multilateral export control regimes. At a minimum, licenses will be required for countries subject to a U.S. embargo, including those that solely are arms embargoed, such as China.4 Please note that license applications submitted by or on behalf of a joint venture, joint development agreement, or similar collaborative arrangement may require the identification of any foreign person with a significant ownership interest in a foreign person participating in the arrangement.

The following activities will be excepted from any licensing requirements:

The sale or lease of a finished item and the provision of associated technology if such items and technology are generally made available to customers, distributors, or resellers;

The sale or license to a customer of a product and the provision of integration or similar services if such services generally are made available to customers;

The transfer of equipment and provision of associated technology to operate the equipment if the foreign person could not use the equipment to produce critical technologies;

The procurement by a U.S. person of goods or services, including manufacturing services, from a foreign person if the foreign person has no rights to exploit any technology contributed by the U.S. person other than to supply the procured goods or services; and

Contributions and associated support provided by a U.S. person to an industry organization related to a standard or specification, whether in development or declared, including any license of, or commitment to license, intellectual property in compliance with the rules of any standards organization.

The ECA requires reporting to Congress and to CFIUS every 180 days regarding actions taken to identify and control emerging and foundational technologies.

Changes to Licensing Process. The ECA mandates that applications for licenses address “the impact of a proposed export of an item on the United States defense industrial base” and an assessment of whether “the denial of an application for a license or a request for an authorization of any export that would have a significant negative impact on such defense industrial base.” By significant negative impact, the ECA means:

“A reduction in the availability of an item produced in the United States that is likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States, or for the production of an item in the United States for the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States.”

“A reduction in the production in the United States of an item that is the result of research and development carried out, or funded by, the Department of Defense . . . to advance the national security of the United States, or a federally funded research and development center.”

“A reduction in the employment of United States persons whose knowledge and skills are necessary for the continued production in the United States of an item that is likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense . . . for the advancement of the national security of the United States.”

Criminal and Civil Penalties. Like the IEEPA, the ECA authorizes criminal penalties of up to $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 20 years. However, the ECA increases the current inflation-adjusted maximum civil penalty to the greater of $300,000 or twice the value of the underlying transaction. These also are the criminal and civil penalties set forth in the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018.

Treatment of Certain Chinese Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturers and Service Providers

Over the objections of Sen. Marco Rubio, among others, the NDAA ultimately did not reimpose sanctions on Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer and service provider, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (“ZTE Corporation”), and certain of its affiliates, which were subject to a BIS denial order arising out of U.S. export control violations stemming from transactions involving Iran and North Korea. That denial order was terminated, effective July 13, 2018.

The ECA does, however, prohibit federal agencies from procuring or obtaining, or entering into contracts with entities using, equipment, systems, or services that, in turn, use Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment or services deemed to be a “substantial or essential component of any system” or “critical technology as part of any system.” The targeted Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment or services are:

Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities;

For the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities;

Telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by any of the above-named entities or using the above-described equipment; and

Telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by an entity reasonably believed to be owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the Chinese government.

1 The changes to the CFIUS review process are discussed in greater detail at http://www.velaw.com/Insights/President-Signs-Sweeping-Expansion-of-CFIUS-Review-of-Foreign-Direct-Investment/.2 The EAR also encompass the regulations that govern the participation of U.S. persons in unsanctioned foreign boycotts. These regulations now are permanently authorized by the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018.3 Please note that the EAR currently allow for the imposition of temporary controls on items in accordance with their interim classification within Export Control Classification Number 0Y521.4 The ECA also requires a review of the current controls on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers for military end uses and military end users in U.S. and United Nations arms-embargoed countries, as well as a review of the Commerce Control List of items that currently are not subject to any licensing for U.S. arms-embargoed countries.

The President issued an Executive Order on August 6, 2018, “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran” (the New Iran EO), which re-imposes relevant provisions of five Iran sanctions EOs (EOs 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645). Additionally, the New Iran EO implements provisions in two former EOs (EOs 13716 and 13628) and revokes those EOs.

Additionally, the New Iran EO implements provisions in two former EOs (EOs 13716 and 13628) and revokes those EOs.

August 6, 2018 marked the end of the 90-day wind-down period following the President’s decision to end the United States’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Effective August 7, 2018, the US government can re-impose secondary sanctions that had been suspended under the Iran nuclear deal on persons who engage in specified transactions involving any of the following sectors/activities:

The purchase or acquisition of US dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran;

Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals;

The direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;

Significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial;

The purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; and

Iran’s automotive sector.

Following the end of the 90-day wind-down period on August 6, 2018, the US government is also revoking the below JCPOA-related authorizations under US primary sanctions regarding Iran:

The importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs and certain related financial transactions pursuant to general licenses under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations;

Activities undertaken pursuant to specific licenses issued in connection with the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (JCPOA SLP); and

Activities undertaken pursuant to General License I relating to contingent contracts for activities eligible for authorization under the JCPOA SLP.

The remaining secondary sanctions can be re-imposed on November 5, 2018, following the end of the 180-day wind down period on November 4, 2018, on persons who engage in specified transactions involving any of the following sectors/activities:

Iran’s port operators, and shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, South Shipping Line Iran, or their affiliates;

Petroleum-related transactions with, among others, the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and National Iranian Tanker Company, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran;

Transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions under Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012;

The provision of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions described in Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010;

The provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; and

Iran’s energy sector, including a variety of separate specific activities related to the petroleum and petrochemical industries under the Iran Sanctions Act as amended.

Additionally, on or by November 5, 2018:

The US government will revoke the General License H wind-down authorization that had allowed US-owned or-controlled foreign entities to wind down certain activities with the Government of Iran or persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that were previously authorized by General License H; and

The US government can re-impose, as appropriate, the sanctions that applied to persons removed from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) and/or other lists maintained by the U.S. government on January 16, 2016.

OFAC’s FAQs about the re-imposition of Iran sanctions can be found on OFAC’s website.

One question that OFAC answers in its updated FAQs (FAQ 601) is whether the New Iran EO expands the scope of sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day of the JCPOA), and the answer is:

Yes. The New Iran EO broadens the scope of the sanctions that were in effect prior to January 16, 2016 and provides for greater consistency in the administration of Iran-related sanctions provisions.

OFAC provides a list of added measures, but they are largely in the nature of tweaking the authorities for providing new blocking sanctions and slightly expanding the sanctions that can be imposed for activities involving petroleum and petrochemical sectors in Iran. More specifically, according to OFAC, the new Iran EO:

Provides new authority for: (i) blocking sanctions on persons who provide material support for, or goods and services in support of, persons blocked for various already existing sanction activities, such as being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; (ii) correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on foreign financial institutions determined to have knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction on behalf of the persons blocked under the new authorities;

Expands the menu of sanctions available to impose on persons determined to have engaged in certain significant transactions relating to petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemicals from Iran by authorizing the imposition of:

Visa restrictions on corporate officers, principals, or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned person;

Additional sanctions on principal executive officers of a sanctioned person; and

Prohibitions on US persons investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person.

Expands the prohibition on US-owned or -controlled foreign entities by prohibiting transactions with persons blocked for:

Providing material support for, or goods and services in support of, Iranian persons on the SDN List and certain other designated persons; or

Being part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran or knowingly providing significant support to certain other persons blocked or on the SDN List.

Since these last activities were already prohibited under Section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and OFAC’s implementing regulations, it is unclear whether in fact this last is a true expansion or an adjustment of authority.

EU Reaction – Amendment of Blocking Regulation

As anticipated, the EU reacted by publishing, and thereby bringing into effect, an amendment to the Annex to Council Regulation No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.

The revised Annex increases the number of laws subject to the blocking regulations, including, notably:

The energy sanctions contained in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 as amended;

Prohibits EU operators from complying with the listed extra-territorial legislation, or any decision, ruling or award based thereon, given that the EU does not recognize its applicability to/effects towards EU operators (Article 5, paragraph 1);

Requires EU operators to inform the European Commission within 30 days of any events arising from listed extra-territorial legislation or actions based thereon or resulting thereof, that affect, directly or indirectly, their economic or financial interests;

Nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign decision, including court rulings or arbitration awards, based on the listed extra-territorial legislation or the acts and provisions adopted pursuant to them (Article 4);

Allows EU operators to recover damages arising from the application of the listed extra-territorial legislation from the natural or legal persons or entities causing them (Article 6). Damages are defined as ‘any damages, including legal costs, caused by the application of the laws specified in its Annex or by actions based thereon or resulting therefrom’; and

Allows EU operators to request an authorization to comply with the listed extra-territorial legislation, if not doing so would cause serious harm to their interests or the interests of the EU (Article 5, paragraph 2).

The Blocking Regulation applies to the EU subsidiaries of US companies, thereby placing them in a potentially difficult position. Moreover, the EU Guidance specifically states that EU operators cannot, consistent with the EU Blocking Regulations, request licenses from the United States unless they request the European Commission to authorize them to apply for such a license. At the same time, the EU Guidance specifically notes that EU companies remain free to do or not to do business with Cuba and Iran, provided such business decisions are not forced on the EU companies by the listed US legislation.

In June the German government announced that it has created an “Iran contact point” to guide companies in their business transactions with Iran, given President Trump’s recent decision to reimpose US sanctions on Iran. The German government also stated that EU sanctions relief for Iran, one of the terms under the JCPOA, remained in place, and that government-backed export credit guarantees were still available.

Saeed Valadbaigi, also known as “Saeed Valad” and “Saeed Baigi,” is an Iranian businessman who conspired with the owner of a European company to illegally export nuclear nonproliferation-controlled materials to Iran from Illinois, according to a newly unsealed federal indictment. Valadbaigi,56, is considered a fugitive and a warrant for his arrest was issued in 2016 and remains outstanding.

In 2011 Valadbaigi plotted to illegally export U.S.-origin 7075 T6 Aluminum tubing from Illinois to Iran by way of Belgium and Malaysia, the indictment states. The indictment states that the size and type of the aluminum is subject to U.S. regulations for nuclear nonproliferation purposes. According to the charges, Valadbaigi’s smuggling plan was an effort to avoid U.S. laws and export control regulations.

The newly unsealed indictment accuses Valadbaigi of the following:

Three counts of wire fraud

Two counts of attempting to violate the international emergency economic powers act

One count of conspiracy to defraud the united states

One count of illegally exporting articles from the united states

One count of making false statements on a U.S. export form

Illegally exporting titanium sheets from a company in northern Illinois, to Iran, by way of the republic of Georgia, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia

In 2012, ordered acrylic sheets from a company in Connecticut and falsely claimed that the sheets would be used only in Hong Kong which he later allegedly arranged to be transshipped to Iran

Sentencing:

Each count of wire fraud and attempting to violate the IEEPA results in a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison

The illegal export charge is punishable by up to ten years in prison

The conspiracy and false statement counts are each punishable by up to five years

The public is reminded that an indictment is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If convicted, the Court must impose a reasonable sentence under federal statutes and the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

The charges against Valadbaigi are part of an investigation that previously resulted in the conviction of Nicholas Kaiga, who managed and later owned the Belgium company that did business with Valadbaigi. Kaiga admitted in a plea agreement that he was aware the 7075 Aluminum was subject to U.S. export controls and that it could not be exported to Malaysia without a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce, which neither he nor Valadbaigi possessed. Kaiga admitted that he used his company, Industrial Metals and Commodities, as an intermediary to export the 7075 Aluminum tubing from a company in northern Illinois, to Belgium and then to Malaysia, on behalf of Valadbaigi. Kaiga pleaded guilty to violating U.S. export control regulations and was sentenced in 2015 to two years and three months in a U.S. prison.