Papers: Pre- and Post-Publication

Mark H. Bickhard

Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science are at a foundational impasse which is at best only partially recognized. This impasse has to do with assumptions concerning the nature of representation: standard approaches to representation are at root circular and incoherent. In particular, Artificial Intelligence research and Cognitive Science are conceptualized within a framework that assumes that cognitive processes can be modeled in terms of manipulations of encoded symbols. Furthermore, the more recent developments of connectionism and Parallel Distributed Processing, even though the issue of manipulation is contentious, share the basic assumption concerning the encoding nature of representation. In all varieties of these approaches, representation is construed as some form of encoding correspondence. The presupposition that representation is constituted as encodings, while innocuous for some applied Artificial Intelligence research, is fatal for the further reaching programmatic aspirations of both Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science.

First, this encodingist assumption constitutes a presupposition about a basic aspect of mental phenomena - representation - rather than constituting a model of that phenomenon. Aspirations of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science to provide any foundational account of representation are thus doomed to circularity: the encodingist approach presupposes what it purports to be (programmatically) able to explain. Second, the encoding assumption is not only itself in need of explication and modeling, but, even more critically, the standard presupposition that representation is essentially constituted as encodings is logically fatally flawed. This flaw yields numerous subsidiary consequences, both conceptual and applied.

Why a manifesto? Interactivism is a complex philosophical and theoretical system; its focus is on the mind and person, but it also extends beyond those domains. The assumptions underlying and framing this system differ strongly from those that dominate contemporary studies of the mind and person - across philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and other related disciplines. The point of a manifesto is to outline and argue for such a framework of assumptions. If they are correct, as I and others contend, then much of the work in these areas is fundamentally misguided and in error. Conversely, what is required is not just a new, better model or theory, but a basic shift in those deeper assumptions. That is what I wish to urge upon the reader.

Emergence seems necessary for any naturalistic account of the world - none of our familiar world existed at the time of the Big Bang, and it does now - and normative emergence is necessary for any naturalistic account of biology and mind - mental phenomena, such as representation, learning, rationality, and so on, are normative. But Jaegwon Kim's argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible, and Hume's argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it precludes any emergence at all. I argue that both of these barriers can be overcome, and, in fact, that they each constitute reductios of their respective underlying presuppositions. In particular, causally efficacious ontological emergence can be modeled, but only within a process metaphysics, thus avoiding Kim's argument, and by making use of non-abbreviatory forms of definition, thus avoiding Hume's argument. I illustrate these points with models of the emergent nature of normative function and of representation.

Some Notes on Internal and External Relations and Representation.
Mark H. BickhardPDF

Persons are biological beings who participate in social environments. Is human sociality different from that of insects? Is human sociality different from that of a computer or robot with elaborate rules for social interaction in its program memory? What is the relationship between the biology of humans and the sociality of persons? I argue that persons constitute an emergent ontological level that develops out of the biological and psychological realm, but that is largely social in its own constitution. This requires a characterization of the relationships between the bio/psychological and the social, and of the developmental process of emergence. It also requires a framework for modeling the bio/psychological level that makes any such emergence possible. Neither attachment theory nor information processing frameworks, for example, will do - the major orientations toward human sociality today make understanding that sociality ultimately impossible. Only an action framework, such as that of Peirce or Piaget, suffices.

The discussion proceeds in three general phases: 1) a model of the emergence of social reality, including language, in particular kinds of interaction relations among people, and 2) a model of the sense in which persons emerge in individual development as infants, toddlers, and children come to be able to participate in these social realities. The sense in which persons constitute a largely social emergent relative to the biological individual - even extending to the largely social constitution of fundamental issues of normativity and values in life - is a central theme of the discussion. Finally, 3) the dependence of the analysis on an underlying pragmatic or action framework is highlighted: contemporary alternative frameworks for modeling development cannot satisfactorily address these issues of the social constitution of persons.

The interactivist approach to development generates a framework of types of constraints on what can be constructed. The four constraint types are based on: (1) what the constructed systems are about; (2) the representational relationship itself; (3) the nature of the systems being constructed; and (4) the process of construction itself. We give illustrations of each constraint type. Any developmental theory needs to acknowledge all four types of constraint; however, some current theories conflate different types of constraint, or rely on a single constraint type to explicate development. Such theories will be inherently unable to explain important aspects of development.

There are four major goals for this paper. First, we demonstrate that the logical foundations of standard approaches to language studies involve an incoherence in their presuppositions. Second, we present an alternative approach that resolves this incoherence. Third, we discuss how this error manifests itself in categorial grammars and model theoretic possible worlds semantics. Fourth, we suggest some possible revisions in standard approaches to accommodate them to the alternative that we suggest. We arrive at a fundamentally functional, or pragmatic, conception - an interactive conception - of the nature of language and meaning.

In this paper we outline a theory of normative functionality aimed at understanding the nature of adaptive systems as globally structured, integrated systems. More specifically, the account is concerned with understanding the process relations constitutive of such systems.

Functional and pragmatic approaches to grammar, and to language more broadly, are well known. All of these approaches, however, accept a core aspect of sentences, or utterances, as consisting of encodings of propositions. They proceed on their functional and pragmatic explorations with this much, at least, taken for granted. I wish to argue, to the contrary, that the functional characteristics of utterances penetrate even to the level of the structure - the grammar - of supposed propositional encodings. More specifically, I argue that the structure that is taken as a structure of propositional encodings is not that at all, but is instead a structure of functionally organized action. Constraints on such structures, in turn - constraints on grammars - emerge as intrinsic constraints on that functional organization. My point will of necessity be made programmatically, since to fill it out completely would be to complete a functional version of universal grammar.

The mere logical possibility of intrinsic constraints on the grammatical possibilities of language refutes attempts to construe grammatical constraints as logically arbitrary. Typically, because grammatical constraints are construed as being (logically) arbitrary, some additional explanation of the constraints is required should those constraints be shown or argued to be universal. That additional explanation is usually some equally logically arbitrary innateness postulate. I will show that the possibility of intrinsic grammatical constraints invalidates standard arguments for such innateness - specifically, that such a possibility invalidates the poverty of the stimulus argument.

Grammatical constraints are not the only characteristics of language that are intrinsic to its nature. I also show how phenomena of implicature, the hermeneutic circle, and forms of creative language can be understood as being naturally emergent in the functional nature of language. Most broadly, then, intrinsic constraints constitute a rich realm for exploration in attempting to understand language.

Certain kinds of interactive systems can learn to avoid error and can develop vicariants for impending or potential error. This paper presents a model of the nature, emergence, and development of such error dynamics.

Standard conceptions of how the environment influences the person are constrained by the dominant view of representation - and, therefore, perception, cognition, and language - as fundamentally consisting of encodings. I argue that this encoding view is logically incoherent. An alternative view of representation is presented, interactivism, and shown to avoid the incoherencies of encodingism. The interactivist model of representation provides accounts for standard presumed encoding phenomena, and highlights processes and forms of influence of the environment on the person that are obscure or entirely absent from the encoding account. The multiplicity and complexity of the processes of environmental influence acquire a theoretically coherent organization and development from within the interactive perspective.

The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development.
Mark H. Bickhard, John Chambers ChristopherPDF

It is argued that theoretical approaches to the nature of the influence of early experience on personality development have been vitiated by incorrect metaphysical assumptions, of a sort historically characteristic of immature sciences. In particular, mind and mental phenomena are construed in terms of various sorts of substances and structures, instead of in terms of process ontologies. We show that these underlying metaphysical assumptions have prevented the most central problems of the influence of early experience from being addressed, and, therefore, from being answered as well. These aporia seriously infect such contemporary approaches as object relations theory, attachment theory, and cognitive behavioral theory. We outline an alternative process ontology of mind and intentionality - specifically, a process-functional ontology for representation - and explore the form of early influence offered within this new perspective.

Operational definitions were a neo-Machean development that connected with the positivism of Logical Positivism. Logical Positivism failed, with the failure of operational definitions being just one of multiple and multifarious failures of Logical Positivism more broadly. Operationalism, however, has continued to seduce psychology more than half a century after it was repudiated by philosophers of science, including the very Logical Positivists who had first taken it seriously. It carries with it a presupposed metaphysics that is false in virtually all of its particulars, and thereby distorts and obscures genuine issues concerning the nature of theory and of science. It makes it particularly difficult for psychologists, under the thrall of this dogma, to free themselves from these false presuppositions, and to think about, create, and critique genuine scientific theory and process. That is the tragedy of operationalism.

In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems - systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial properties of consciousness.

Motivation and cognition are commonly modeled as distinct processes: motivation as some form of initiating and directing - pushing and pulling - behavior, and cognition as the manipulation of encoded representations in memory. This produces grave difficulties in understanding the interrelationships between them, and their interactions in behavior and development. I argue for a model of representation and motivation in which they emerge as different aspects of one underlying organization of interactive process. This natural integration yields an equally natural model of the joint development of higher order motivation and cognition, as interactions with learning and emotional processes are taken into account.

There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled - an interactive, pragmatic form - in turn, forces a number of additional properties of mental process, such as consciousness being inherently contentful and from a situated and embodied point of view. In addition, other properties of interactive representation make strong connections with the central nervous system properties that are found to realize mental experience, such as a field organization of oscillatory and mutually modulatory neural processes.

Computationalism suggests that mental properties and processes can be modeled independently of most specifics about the brain - mind is like a computer program, and program properties do not depend on details of the computers that execute them. But computationalism suffers from fatal conceptual problems concerning the nature of representation. An alternative model of representation, called interactivism, is outlined and its implications for the biological foundations of Cognitive Science are explored. Interactivism profoundly reconfigures our conceptions of those biological foundations.

One of the major themes of the history of science is the replacement of substance assumptions about the phenomena of interest with process models. Thus, phlogiston has been replaced by combustion, caloric by random thermal motion, and vital fluid by far-from-equilibrium self-reproducing organizations of process. The most significant exceptions to this historical pattern are found in studies of the mind. Here, substance assumptions are still ubiquitous, ranging from models of representation to those of emotions to personality and psychopathology. Substance assumptions do pernicious damage to our ability to understand such phenomena. In this discussion, I will focus on the problem of representation.

Representation did not exist moments after the Big Bang; it does now.
Representation has emerged. Accounting for that emergence is among the central
problems of naturalism today. The emergence of representation is a difficult
problem for a number of reasons, but one of them is that representation
involves issues both of fact and of normativity, and accounting for the
naturalistic emergence of normativity is particularly difficult -- some would
say impossible.

We propose to discuss the plausibility of physicalism by way of commenting upon Jaegwon Kim's penetrating analyses. Kim's central argument has been that the fashionable position - that one could be a physicalist without reducing the mental to the physical - is untenable. In his recent book, Mind in a Physical World, Kim has refined these analyses further. We will argue that he has thereby highlighted assumptions intrinsic to physicalism that are inconsistent with contemporary developments in physical theory. In effect, Kim has identified a reductio ad absurdum of physicalist metaphysics in general. Clearly grasping why physicalism is untenable, however, opens the logical space for a fecund notion of genuine emergence.

This paper argues for a radically different approach to normative function than the dominant etiological account, an approach with a broader explanatory agenda. Concepts of biological function address two related but distinct issues: understanding biological organisms as complex organized systems, and understanding the way in which parts have come to be present in organisms because of their adaptive value. The etiological account focuses primarily on the latter, treating the complex organization of organisms as a derivative issue solved in passing, as it were, by explanations for the presence of parts within organisms. This way of treating the issues is unsatisfactory, however, since the etiological model of normative function fails to provide the conceptual resources required for understanding the complex process interrelationships characteristic of organisms as organizationally integrated systems. It makes normative functions epiphenomenal, it provides a limited account of dysfunction, and it is unable to adequately characterize multifunctional parts or the organization of densely connected functional complexes. In other words, although explanations for the presence of traits and explanations for the way organisms function as complex integrated systems certainly overlap, they are not conceptually or causally identical issues, and nor can one issue be treated purely as derivative upon the other. Our approach recognizes this and develops an account of normative function that directly focuses on whole-system organization and process interdependence.

Function emerges in certain kinds of far-from-equilibrium systems. One
important kind of function is that of interactive anticipation, an adaptedness
to temporal complexity. Interactive anticipation is the locus of the emergence
of normative representational content, and, thus, of representation in general:
interactive anticipation is the naturalistic core of the evolution of
cognition. Higher forms of such anticipation are involved in the subsequent
macro-evolutionary sequence of learning, emotions, and reflexive
consciousness.

In this paper I wish to address the question of the nature of psychopathology. It might naturally be felt that we already know a great deal about psychopathology, and thus that such a paper would be primarily a review and discussion of the literature; I will argue, however, that the most fundamental form of the question concerning the nature of psychopathology is rarely posed in the literature, that it is prevented from being posed by presuppositions inherent in standard theoretical approaches, and that, on those rare occasions when it does get addressed, it has received inadequate answers. Therefore, the paper will have more of the character of a conceptual explication and theoretical exegesis than it will of a review of the literature.

Accounting for emergence has proven to be extraordinarily difficult, so much so that whether or not genuine emergence exists seems still in doubt. I argue that this difficulty is primarily due to an assumption of a false and inappropriate metaphysics in analyses of emergence. In particular, common assumptions of various kinds of substance metaphysics make the notion of causally efficacious emergence seriously problematic, if not impossible. There are, however, many problems with substance metaphysics -- arguably fatal problems -- and an alternative process metaphysics makes causally efficacious emergence much more natural.

Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation.

In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial properties of consciousness.

We all believe an unbounded number of things about the way the world is and about the way the world works. For example, I believe that if I move this book into the other room, it will not change color -- unless there is a paint shower on the way, unless I carry an umbrella through that shower, and so on; I believe that large red trucks at high speeds can hurt me, that trucks with polka dots can hurt me, and so on; that if I move this book, the room will stay in place -- unless there is a pressure switch under the book attached to a bomb, unless the switch communicates to the bomb by radio and there is shielding in the way, and so on; that the moon is not made of green cheese, that the moon is not made of caviar, that the moon is not made of gold, and so on. The problems involved in accounting for such infinite proliferations of beliefs -- and the computations and inferences that take them into account -- are collectively called the Frame Problems, and are considered by some to constitute a major discovery of a new philosophical problem. How could we possibly learn them all? How could the brain possibly hold them all? The problems appear insoluble, impossible. Yet we all learn and hold such unbounded numbers of beliefs; in particular, children do. Something must be wrong. I wish to argue that the frame problem arises from a fundamental presupposition about the nature of representation -- a false presupposition. Yet, it is a presupposition that dominates contemporary developmental psychology (and psychology more broadly, and cognitive science, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and so on). In particular, I will offer an alternative model of the nature of representation within which the frame problem does not arise -- within which such unboundedness is natural.

Autonomy is modeled in terms of the property of certain
far-from-equilibrium open systems to contribute toward maintaining themselves
in their far-from-equilibrium conditions. Such contributions in
self-maintenant systems, in turn, constitute the emergence of normative
function. The intrinsic thermodynamic asymmetry between equilibrium and
far-from-equilibrium processes yields the intrinsic normative asymmetry between
function and dysfunction. Standard etiological models of function render
function as causally epiphenomenal, while this model is of the emergence of
causally efficacious function. Recursive self-maintenance -- the
meta-property of maintaining the property of being self-maintenant across
variations in environment -- yields the emergence of representation.
This model of representation satisfies multiple criteria that standard
approaches -- such as symbolic or connectionist, or those of Fodor, Dretske, or
Millikan -- cannot.

Information and representation are thought to be intimately related. Representation, in fact, is commonly considered to be a special kind of information. It must be a special kind, because otherwise all of the myriad instances of informational relationships in the universe would be representational -- some restrictions must be placed on informational relationships in order to refine the vast set into those that are truly representational. I will argue that information in this general sense is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind alley with regard to the attempt to understand representation. On the other hand, I will also argue that a different, quite non-standard, form of information is central to genuine representation. First I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for understanding representation; second to an alternative model of representation -- one that is naturally emergent in autonomous agents, and that does involve information, but not in any standard form; and third I return to standard notions of informational relationships and show what they are in fact useful for.

Computationalism suggests that mental properties and processes can be modeled independently of most specifics about the brain -- mind is like a computer program, and program properties do not depend on details of the computers that execute them. But computationalism suffers from fatal conceptual problems concerning the nature of representation. An alternative model of representation, called interactivism, is outlined and its implications for the biological foundations of Cognitive Science are explored. Interactivism profoundly reconfigures our conceptions of those biological foundations.

Representation emerges in certain forms of interactive system organization. This interactive form of representation satisfies an essential meta-epistemological criterion - the possibility of system detectable representational error - that is not addressed in any standard models of representation, and cannot be satisfied within any standard approaches to the understanding of representation.

A problem of action selection emerges in complex - and even not so complex - interactive agents: What to do next? The problem of action selection occurs equally for natural and for artificial agents - for any embodied agent. The obvious solution to this problem constitutes a form of representation - interactive representation - that is arguably the fundamental form of representation. More carefully, interactive representation satisfies a criterion for representation that no other model of representation in the literature can satisfy, or even attempts to address: the possibility of system detectable representational error. It also resolves and avoids myriad other problematics of representation, and integrates or opens the door to many additional mental processes and phenomena, such as motivation.

The mental, including representation and intentionality, is commonly assumed to be of some singular fundamental different kind from the non-mental. I call this the Cartesian Gulf: few are still substance dualists, but most still assume that anything mental will be mental in all relevant ways. I argue in this paper that there are many levels of representationality, and that they do not necessarily occur together.

The problem of how to generalize - in problem solving, metaphor, learning, and so on - requires a fundamentally new architectural design consideration. This new architectural principle is generated naturally in the architectural requirements for interactive representation, and is instantiated in otherwise unexplained properties of central nervous system functioning.

Troubles with Computationalism.
This paper is now published in The Philosophy of Psychology.

Variation and selection is usually considered to be a phenomenon of biological evolution. Explanations based on variation and selection are correspondingly thought to depend on analogies between some process of interest and evolution. We argue that variation and selection is its own distinct and powerful form of explanation, that happened to have been discovered in evolution, but is not dependent on any particular relationships to evolutionary processes for potential explanatory validity. We illustrate variation and selection processes in many domains, including physics, the origin of life (a discussion of Kauffman), and others, and relate variation and selection forms of explanation to other related and also underappreciated forms of explanation.

This article focuses on the problem of representational content. Accounting for representational content is the central issue in contemporary naturalism: it is the major remaining task facing a naturalistic conception of the world. Representational content is also the central barrier to contemporary cognitive science and artificial intelligence: it is not possible to understand representation in animals nor to construct machines with genuine representation given current (lack of) understanding of what representation is. An elaborated critique is offered to current approaches to representation, arguing that the basic underlying approach is, at root, logically incoherent, and, thus, that standard approaches are doomed to failure. An alternative model of representation - interactivism - is presented that avoids or solves the problems facing standard approaches. Interactivism is framed by a version of functionalism, and a naturalization of that functionalism completes an outline of a naturalization of representation and representational content.