Flying 20's Cloud

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board might be six months from declaring the probable cause and contributing factors in the Asiana Airlines 777-200ER crash in San Francisco last July, but two main participants in the investigation, Asiana and Boeing, have already formed their own conclusions.In documents submitted to the NTSB and published on March 31, both the airline and the manufacturer contend that a basic lack of monitoring and failure to follow airline and industry standards for abandoning an approach led the pilots into a situation where airspeed and altitude were too low to avoid crashing into the sea wall in front of Runway 28L, but the agreement stops there.Asiana says its pilots were blindsided by lack of a timely low-speed aural alert and an autopilot flight-director system mode—flight-level change (FLCH)—that is inconsistent with practically all other modes in that it allows the autothrottle to go into a “hold” mode with engines at idle and no low-speed “wake-up” to prevent the aircraft from flying too slowly. Boeing, however, says the 777 and its automation systems and training materials were not at fault in the crash, but rather the pilots were not adept at visual approaches and did not take advantage of several opportunities to abandon the unstable arrival before it was too late. Asiana provides 11 recommendations in its submittal; Boeing offers none.It is unclear how any of the posturing could influence the NTSB's determinations on the accident, or any of the more than two dozen civil lawsuits filed in the weeks after the crash, actions that blame both Asiana and Boeing for the accident. Given the potential liability in admitting to deficiencies while cases are ongoing, it is not surprising that Boeing is not offering recommendations on how to improve its aircraft, even if the company is internally contemplating changes to low-speed alerting systems or modifications to the autothrottle logic. Changes to the 737NG autothrottle and low-speed alerting systems, both of which played a role in the crash of a Turkish Airlines 737-800 crash in Amsterdam in February 2009, took more than three years to reach the fleet, either in the form of a service bulletin or an airworthiness directive.In the meantime, Boeing is staunchly defending the 777 FLCH mode, noting that aircraft equipped with the mode have performed 55.6 million successful landings, which it says equates to more than three landings per minute, every minute of every day for the past 32 years. FLCH is normally used for changing altitudes in cruise by selecting the mode and entering the target altitude on the mode control panel.In the San Francisco crash, Boeing says the pilots “erroneously” pushed the FLCH mode button at 1,600 ft. while descending on autopilot toward the runway, causing the autopilot to climb toward a preset altitude of 3,000 ft. that had been set in case of a missed approach. The pilot-flying in the left seat, who was completing his transition training to become a 777 captain after flying the A320 as a captain for five years, turned off the autopilot and pulled the throttles to idle thrust to descend, an action that in FLCH mode puts the autothrottles in “hold.” On the flight deck, a green box in the flight-mode annunciator area of the primary flight displays would have highlighted the word “Hold” for 10 sec.; but no associated audible announcement would have cued the pilots to the mode change. In interviews, the pilots said they had assumed the autothrottle would have maintained the 137-kt. approach speed they had set in the mode control panel, despite their having had recent training in the nuances of FLCH.Regardless of the mode, Boeing says, the crew failed to monitor airspeed, thrust and altitude to verify a stable arrival.

At 500 ft., the approach was not in compliance with the industry-standard stabilized approach criteria for sink-rate and thrust settings,” states chief engineer for air safety investigation Michelle Bernson in the Boeing submission. “A go-around should have been initiated.” Below 500 ft., she states, there were “numerous clues”—visual and tactile—that showed the aircraft's speed was decaying, the aircraft's thrust setting was incorrect, and the aircraft was increasingly below glidepath. The aircraft ultimately slowed to 103 kt., well below its 137-kt. target speed before the pilots attempted a go-around.Thomas Haueter, a technical consultant for Asiana, says the automation design, combined with the high workload approach, may have been an accident in waiting. “You're in a situation where the autothrottle does not wake up to the set airspeed and it does not wake up as you get near stall,” he says. Haueter, veteran NSTB investigator who retired in 2012, says none of the three pilots on the flight deck remembers pushing the FLCH button on the mode control panel, although Boeing notes the cockpit voice recorder captured “sound of click” at the same time the flight data recorder shows the FLCH mode activated, confirming “that the button was pushed.”Boeing questions the pilot-flying's fitness for handling the 777, noting that in the most recent training flight before the accident, the instructor noted that he was not well organized and deviated “from multiple standard operating procedures.” During interviews after the accident, the Korean pilot-flying said, in English, that the approach into San Francisco was “very stressful” and that he was “very concerned” about his ability to perform a visual approach there.Asiana doubts at least part of that assessment, noting that there was not a professional Korean translator in the room, the pilot sustained a broken rib that he had not yet been treated for, and his use of the word “stressful” in English was not as intended. Asiana had asked the NTSB to review the recordings of the interviews, but the NTSB says it did not retain a copy. “That's not typical,” says Haueter. “Normally we kept absolutely everything until the [final] report was adopted.”Pilots on the morning of the crash were flying the “Quiet Bridge” visual approach that Asiana says kept the aircraft high and fast—compared to a normal instrument approach—until fairly close to the runway. Controllers instructed Flight 214 to maintain 180 kt. until 5 nm from the airport, more than 40-kt. above its planned final approach speed of 137 kt.In January, two crews of professional pilots gathered by the NTSB for a “simulator observational study” demonstrated that the Asiana pilots were not unique in getting behind the aircraft on the approach. The study used crews of pilots from Boeing and from the FAA. All “flew” a 777 simulator at Boeing in Seattle. Each crew performed 10 test flights, five of which simulated a “standard” approach profile; the balance followed the accident profile, including the altitude and speed restrictions that air traffic controllers issued to the accident crew. Asiana says the results indicate that both crews “had difficulty” achieving a stabilized approach by 500 ft. under the conditions matching the accident profile. “In fact, the aircraft was considered unstable due to excessive sink rates on four of the 10 test flights conducted under conditions matching the accident profile,” according to Asiana.The NTSB also evaluated go-around scenarios with the crews, determining that a “normal” go-around would have been possible 12 sec. before ground impact on the accident flight. Asiana notes that the 777's “quadruple chime” low-airspeed caution sounded 11 sec. before impact on Flight 214, and the crew took an additional 3 sec. before advancing the throttles for a go-around. Boeing, however, says that the low-airspeed alert (the quadruple chime), which sounded 11 sec. before the crash, “provided a timely caution of decreasing airspeed.” Asiana is asking the FAA for a dedicated low-speed aural alert that will provide pilots with adequate time to perform a go-around. Boeing's low-speed warning was originally developed for issues at altitude, and the chime is also used “with more than 70 other potential issues,” states the airline.Asiana also uncovered some concerns about FLCH that were raised by the FAA in 2011. In a “response item” from 787 certification testing that Asiana obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the FAA had “strongly encouraged” Boeing to make changes to the 787 flight-management computer system to provide autothrottle “wake-up” capability to maintain a minimum flying speed in all autothrottle modes. Those modes are shared by the Boeing 777, 747 and 767.The response item shows that an FAA pilot was performing certification stalls with artificial ice contours on the 787 in September 2010 when the concern first arose. “When in a descent such as FLCH with autothrottle in (hold) mode, and the descent has to be manually interrupted for something such as a traffic alert, the autothrottle will stay in (hold) mode and will not wake up [as] it does when you capture the original altitude,” the response item reads. “The speed will decrease well past maneuvering speed.” The FAA ultimately closed the item, but with the request for a software change to the flight-management computer at some future time.

February, 2014

30 NM RADIUS TFRLocation

On the CLOVIS VORTAC (CZQ) 129 degree radial at 8 nautical miles.From the surface up to but not including 18,000 feet MSL.

Times:2:00 PM local until 3:00 PM local Friday, February 14, 20145:00 PM local until 6:00 PM local Friday, February 14, 2014

10 NM RADIUS NO-FLY ZONELocation

On the CLOVIS VORTAC (CZQ) 129 degree radial at 8 nautical miles.From the surface up to but not including 18,000 feet MSL.

Times:2:00 PM local until 3:00 PM local Friday, February 14, 20145:00 PM local until 6:00 PM local Friday, February 14, 2014

30 NM RADIUS TFRLocation

On the PANOCHE VORTAC (PXN) 349 degree radial at 9 nautical miles.From the surface up to but not including 18,000 feet MSL.

Times:2:30 PM local until 5:30 PM local Friday, February 14, 2014

10 NM RADIUS NO-FLY ZONELocation

On the PANOCHE VORTAC (PXN) 349 degree radial at 9 nautical miles.From the surface up to but not including 18,000 feet MSL.

Additional Notes:No pilots may operate an aircraft in the areas covered by this NOTAM (except as described).

Except as specified below and/or unless authorized by ATC in consultation with the Air Traffic Security Coordinator via the Domestic Events Network (DEN):

A. All aircraft operations within the 10 NMR area(s) listed above, known as the inner core(s), are prohibited except for: military aircraft directly supporting the United States Secret Service (USSS) and The Office of the President of the United States. Coordinated and approved law enforcement, air ambulance and firefighting operations must receive approval prior to entering this airspace at 916-366-4080 to avoid potential delays. Regularly scheduled commercial passenger and all-cargo carriers operating under one of the following TSA-approved standard security programs/procedures: Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP), Full All-Cargo Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (FACAOSSP), Model Security Program (MSP), Twelve Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP) All Cargo, Or All-Cargo International Security Procedure (ACISP) and are arriving into and/or departing from 14 CFR part 139 airports.

B. For operations within the airspace between the 10 NMR and 30 NMR area(s) listed above, known as the outer ring(s): All aircraft operating within the outer ring(s) listed above are limited to aircraft arriving or departing local airfields, and workload permitting, ATC may authorize transit operations. Aircraft may not loiter. All aircraft must be on an active IFR or VFR flight plan with a discrete code assigned by an air traffic control (ATC) facility. Aircraft must be squawking the discrete code prior to departure and at all times while in the TFR and must remain in two-way radio communications with ATC.

D. FAA recommends that all aircraft operators check NOTAMS frequently for possible changes to this TFR prior to operations within this region.

February, 2014

Loren Thompson is chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, which receives money from companies engaged in both the F-35 and F/A-18 programs.Over the last several years, the tri-service F-35 fighter program has gradually retired risks and reduced costs, in the process acquiring broader political support. More than 50% of the program’s flight-testing schedule has been completed, and no major problems have been identified. The fighter’s F135 engine has seen similar progress. With 11 allies committed to buying the airplane, the program looks unstoppable.Although the Pentagon has been deliberately vague about how the stealth, sensor fusion and other features of the F-35 make its performance far superior to that of last-generation fighters, it is rapidly emerging as the gold standard of tactical aviation in global markets. But what will matter in the political debate at home is the airplane’s price tag, because that is the one feature of F-35 that politicians and pundits think they understand. Chances are, though, they do not.The apparent cost of a military aircraft varies wildly depending on where it is in its production run, what items are included and whether inflation is discounted. If you want to estimate costs, heroic assumptions (also known as guesses) are required to establish values for production rates, learning curves and other parameters essential in calculating cost.For instance, prime contractor Lockheed Martin estimates that if the program of record for the Air Force variant of F-35 is executed as planned, an airplane ordered in 2018 and delivered in 2020 will cost $85 million in “then-year” dollars ($78 million in today’s dollars). That is in the same ballpark as the latest F-16—the legacy fighter that F-35 will replace in Air Force combat units. But you have to make a lot of assumptions to get to that number.Whether those assumptions prove valid probably will not matter for the Air Force and Marine variants, because the Air Force version is well on its way to being the global standard for tactical airpower, and the Marines view the vertical-takeoff-and-landing version of the F-35 as their top modernization priority.The service that sometimes sounds ambivalent is the Navy. Although its budget will fund development of the carrier-based F-35C through the end of the decade, its leaders say things and do things that make outsiders wonder. Studies have been commissioned to assess whether the Navy could make do with fewer F-35s, and senior leaders have raised doubts about the longevity of low-observables.So naval aviation has become the main arena in which F-35 costs are still being debated. Boeing, the prime contractor for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and its electronic-warfare cousin, contends that the Navy could save billions by purchasing more of those aircraft rather than moving to the F-35C.

At first, the math seems to add up: Even if we include the electronic defenses and targeting systems not usually subsumed in a Super Hornet price tag, the unit recurring flyaway cost of a single-seat F/A‑18 is about $80 million in today’s dollars. The corresponding cost for an F-35C is $130 million.The problem with this comparison is that the Super Hornet first flew in 1995 and the F-35C in 2010. The cost of each airplane reflects the fact that they are at very different stages in their life cycles. Only 22 carrier-based versions of the F-35 have been produced compared with hundreds of Super Hornets. But when a similar number of Super Hornets had been produced, their unit recurring flyaway cost in today’s dollars was about what it is today for the F-35C.This should not come as a surprise because fighters tend to follow the same learning curve over the course of their production. When 100 single-seat Super Hornets had been produced, the unit recurring flyaway cost—with all necessary electronics included—was about $110 million in today’s dollars, which is where F-35C is likely to stand at the 100th airplane. And when F-35C gets to 300 airplanes, its unit recurring flyaway cost will be about $90 million—right where the F/A-18E (the single-seat version) was in today’s dollars.These numbers can be verified easily by perusing the Pentagon’s Selective Acquisition Reports. What they reveal is that the F/A-18E and F-35C have nearly identical unit production costs at the same stages in their evolutions. Where the airplanes differ markedly is in their operational performance—items like survivability, situational awareness and strike capability. Such differences explain why the Navy needs a new fighter in the first place.

January, 2014

Airbus Helicopters says issues with its EC225 and EC135 helicopters have “strengthened its determination in the area of safety.”The grounding of the EC225 from October 2012 to July 2013, followed by the November crash of an EC135T2 in Glasgow, Scotland, had a broad effect on public perception, but also caused new aircraft programs to be delayed and sales early in the year to slump. That prompted CEO Guillaume Faury to implement an action plan which he says has helped to recover sales and deliveries.“2013 was a very difficult year,” Faury said, speaking at the company’s annual press conference in Paris on Jan. 28. “The level of bookings was unusually slow in the first half of the year,” Faury said, pointing out that the difficult market had prompted the company to “target single-digit growth in terms of revenue for the year.”Faury took over control of the company in May, after former CEO Lutz Bertling took on a new role at Bombardier.Deliveries increased to 497 helicopters in 2013, up compared with 2012, when 475 were delivered. The market has still yet to return to the heady days of 2008, when the company reported 588 deliveries. Sales did drop, however, with 422 ordered compared to 469 in 2012. The main disappointments for the company were slow sales of the new EC175, which recorded just five orders.Heavy aircraft production was strong, with orders for 33 Super Puma/EC225s and 34 military NH90s. Faury said he was satisfied with the sales performance of the long-struggling AS365 Dauphin/EC155 family, of which 17 were sold, and a new version of the AS365, the N3e, which will be certified by the end of 2014.Faury claims the company has captured 46% of the civil market, but its share of the military market dropped again, from 18% in 2012 to 11% in 2013. The company would not reveal figures on turnover. These details will be announced when the Airbus Group reports at the end of February.“Major programs are a priority,” Faury said, pointing out that production ramp-ups for both the NH90 and the Tiger attack helicopter were planned for 2014.The company says the certification process for its long-delayed EC175 medium-twin has been completed and the aircraft should be certified in the coming days. Deliveries to the three main launch customers – NHV, UTAir and Heli-Union – are due to take place in the second or third quarter of this year. The delayed EC145 T2 light twin will also be certified in 2014.January 29, 2014

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