This case involves a dispute arising out of the election of the General
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Federation Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees ("the Federation") in 1999 and subsequent elimination of
plaintiffs' positions in the Federation. Plaintiffs Sean Daly Ferris
("Ferris") and Nicholas R. Guarnieri ("Guarnieri") allege that defendants
conspired with others to amend the Federation's Constitution and By-Laws
to eliminate plaintiffs' Vice-Chairman positions in retaliation for
plaintiffs' support of a candidate who opposed defendant Jed Dodd
("Dodd"), General Chairman of the Federation, in the 1999 Federation
election. This action, alleging violations of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), followed.

I. BACKGROUND

In April, 1999, Ferris was nominated for re-election to a four-year
term as Vice-Chairman of the Federation for District 8; since no other
member of the Federation was nominated to oppose him, he was designated
for a four-year term starting September 1, 1999. Guarnieri was elected in
June, 1999 for a four-year term as Vice-Chairman for District 9. On
August 9, 1999, at the Convention of the Federation, the Federation
Constitution and By-Laws were amended to eliminate the two Vice-Chairman
positions for Districts 8 and 9. As a result, Dodd, who served as General
Chairman of the Federation at all times relevant to this action, refused
to install Ferris and Guarnieri to their Vice-Chairman positions. The
other individual defendants were all members of the Federation's Joint
Protective Board, a Federation governing body, when the incidents that
gave rise to this action occurred.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired to retaliate against
them in violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., for their support of Paul
Dominic, a candidate who opposed Dodd in the 1999 General Chairman
election.

As a result of this allegedly unlawful retaliation, plaintiffs Ferris
and Guarnieri claim to have suffered a number of psychological and
physical injuries. In connection with these alleged injuries, plaintiffs
seek to admit the testimony of two experts, Dr. Joseph Fred Stoner ("Dr.
Stoner") and psychologist Andrew C. Santora, Ed. D. ("Dr. Santora").
Defendants filed an amended motion in limine*fn1 under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ("Daubert") and
its progeny to exclude certain testimony, namely, (1) certain testimony
by Dr. Santora; (2) any testimony by Dr. Stoner; (3) any evidence as to
causation of mental or physical injuries allegedly suffered by both
plaintiffs and any treatment of said injuries; and (4) any evidence as to
necessity and cost of certain medical treatment. It
is that motion that
the Court addresses in this Memorandum.

Upon concluding that there were underlying factual questions as to the
admissibility of Dr. Stoner's and Dr. Santora's testimony —
specifically, their respective qualifications and the bases for their
diagnoses and analysis — the Court held a Daubert hearing on June
22, 2001. See Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 155 (3d Cir. 2000)
(explaining that a Daubert hearing is necessary where a court can "not
determine what methodology the expert used, and the reliability of the
expert's conclusion could not therefore be established"); see generally
Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stressing the importance of in limine hearings under Rule 104(a) in
making the reliability determination required under Rule 702) (citing
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir. 1985)).

The Court will first evaluate the admissibility of the proffered expert
testimony under Daubert and the question whether a plaintiff may testify
as to diagnosis and causation of mental conditions such as depression and
anxiety disorder in the absence of expert testimony. The Court will then
turn to the actual injury requirement under the LMRDA and examine the
question whether any evidence of plaintiffs' injuries may be presented to
the jury in the absence of expert medical testimony. Finally, the Court
will determine the admissibility of evidence of the necessity and cost of
certain medical treatment. For the following reasons, defendants' motion
will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Expert Testimony Under Daubert

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2000, provides as
follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.

Under Rule 702, when "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific
testimony . . . the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (footnotes omitted). It is well settled
that the gatekeeping role established in Daubert under Rule 702 is not
limited to scientific testimony — the Daubert approach applies to
all cases where the "testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
141 (1999). This approach helps to ensure the reliability of expert
testimony, which "can be both powerful and quite misleading because of
the difficulty in evaluating it." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack
B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It
Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).

Under Daubert, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. "First of
all, the proffered `expert' must be qualified to express an expert
opinion. . . . Secondly, the proffered expert opinion must be reliable."
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 663 (3d Cir. 1999). With respect to this
inquiry, a number of criteria to guide the courts in making reliability
determinations have been identified, including:

(1) whether a method consists of a testable
hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subject to
peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the
method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of
the technique to methods which have been established
to he reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert
witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8)
the non-judicial uses to which the method has been
put.

Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745-46 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1994)). This
list is not exhaustive — the inquiry under Daubert should remain a
flexible one. See, e.g., Elcock, 233 F.3d at 746 (writing that "Kumho
Tire makes clear that this list is non-exclusive and that each factor
need not be applied in every case"); Schieber v. City of Philadelphia,
2000 WL 1843246, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 13, 2000) ("These factors are
non-exclusive and no one of the factors weighs more heavily than
another; the approach to determining the admissibility of expert
testimony is a flexible one.") (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).

As a general rule, the party offering the expert testimony has the
burden of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d
Cir. 1999).

B. Testimony of Dr. Santora

Plaintiff Nicholas Guarnieri plans to offer expert testimony from his
psychologist, Dr. Santora, to establish that "Guarnieri's emotional and
physical distress is the result of the stressors stemming from his
termination from the Federation and the on-going ...

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