One of the other possible security problems is with the janitorial and repair staff. They have the keys and RFIDs to get just about anywhere. They might not be able to get into the server room but they sure can visit your desk. They don't even need to stop what they're doing if they have a good enough memory. 24/7 video monitoring won't be enough for them to pickup what they need for a hack or whatever. Even if they need to linger, who's to say that they haven't enlisted the person watching the tubes? Locked desk drawers don't make it either. It takes someone with the right tool about the same amount of time to open a locked desk as it does as someone with the correct key.

Of course, wireless transmitters can be easily hidden just about anywhere. Normally people don't need to go that far though. The supposedly secure wireless transmitters in the building do just fine.

--Jeff Moden"RBAR is pronounced "ree-bar" and is a "Modenism" for "Row-By-Agonizing-Row".

First step towards the paradigm shift of writing Set Based code: Stop thinking about what you want to do to a row... think, instead, of what you want to do to a column."

(play on words) "Just because you CAN do something in T-SQL, doesn't mean you SHOULDN'T."--22 Aug 2013

Yes, we should try to get our offices, server rooms, and so on up to a high standard of physical security.

But something far more important for us to do is always to behave as if the physical security of all those things is totally broken.

The physical security measures that most companies can afford are so easily hackable and/or bypassable that if an attack by a competent and well resourced attacker takes place it will almost certainly succeed. Confidential information lying around on desk and table tops, PCs left logged in and unlocked overnight are bad; confidential information in ordinary desk drawers or cupboards isn't a lot better; nor is unshredded confidential information in waste bins. Confidential information held on portable storage without really effective encryption is worse. Relying on physical security to prevent any such confidential information from getting to those whom you don't want to have it is extremely foolish, unless you know that the risk of attack is extremely low because the "enemy" doesn't care enough about the information to spend two cents on obtaining it. Many people have been badly bitten by thinking they knew that.

I know of a person that was easily able to go through every nursing station in a hospital and at each one, disconnect a device, plug in something and then reattach the device to his. He did this without a hospital ID, without a contractor badge, without a badge from anywhere. He wore ripped jeans, a ratty t-shirt, hadn't even combed his hair. He made himself look as suspicious as possible.

Not one person stopped him. Not one person even questioned him. He was working on computers, he "must be trustworthy!"

A short time later management received a report about the 'intrusion". I am sure that discussions were had, people were talked to, and that it was made clear exactly what to do if this type of event occurs.