tackling homelessness. Normally, neither
mainstream capital allocations nor the substantial grants in aid or other
direct central Government subsidies given to public bodies are earmarked
for specific activities.

Hospital Admissions

Mr. Galbraith: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is
the age profile of emergency admissions recorded for each health board for
the last five years for which figures are available.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: As the information requested is rather
lengthy, I have arranged for copies of the age profiles to be placed in the
Library of the House.

Dourine

Mr. Morley: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many
cases of dourine were reported in each year since 1985.

Sir Hector Monro: No cases of dourine have ever been reported in
Scotland.

Equine Infectious Anaemia

Mr. Morley: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many
cases of equine infectious anaemia there have been in each year since 1985.

Sir Hector Monro: There have been no recorded cases of equine
infectious anaemia in Scotland over this period.

Robes and Regalia

Mr. Kirkwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his
policy in respect of the availability for use on appropriate ceremonial
occasions of robes and regalia used by office holders in the former
Scottish boroughs.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton [holding answer 23 January 1995]:
Following local government reform in 1975, ownership of the former burgh
councils' civic robes, insignia and so on, passed to the new district
councils. However, entitlement to the wearing of robes requires royal
approval. The design and use of coats of arms on chains of office and other
insignia are matters for the Lord Lyon King of Arms.

Liver Transplants

Mr. Galbraith: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many
liver transplants were carried out in 1994.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton [holding answer 23 January 1995]:
Thirty-one liver transplants were carried out in 1994.

Column 280

DEFENCE

Gulf War

Mr. Peter Robinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what
triggered the nerve agent immobilised alarm detectors alarms on the night
of 20 21 January 1991 during Operation Granby.

Mr. Soames: We have found no record of such an incident. There are,
however records of an incident in the Al Jubayl area on 19 January 1991
when chemical agent monitor--CAM--and residual vapour detector--RVD--
indicated the presence of blister agent--mustard. Nerve agent immobilised
enzyme alarm and detector--NAIAD--did not respond, however, thus ruling out
the presence of nerve agent.

An immediate follow up by explosive ordnance device--EOD--and chemical
reconnaissance teams failed to find any evidence of chemical attack, which
if it had taken place, would have included ground contamination, blister is
a persistent agent, and weapon debris. The identity of the compounds which
caused the CAM and RVD to alarm on 19 January 1991 is therefore not known.
It was assessed that the most likely cause of the incident was a damaged
aircraft jettisoning JP4 fuel which is consistent with reports of air
activity at the time.

Mr. Peter Robinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to
what extent the administration of nerve agent pre-treatment set, anthrax
and plague inoculations would normally require a medical consultation with
the patient to determine whether there are counter indications; to what
extent these drugs were administered to military personnel involved in the
Gulf war without such consultation; and for what reasons.

Mr. Soames: Standard peacetime medical practice is for consent to be
obtained before immunisation with any vaccine. Specific details of anti-
biological warfare medical counter-measures employed by British forces
remain classified. However, in Operation Granby it was policy for vaccines
against those biological agents identified as a threat to be made available
to service personnel on the standard basis of informed consent. This
entailed informing service personnel of the vaccines they were receiving,
their purpose and their possible side effects. In the operational
circumstances pertaining in the Gulf it is not possible to guarantee that
this policy was universally adhered to.

Standard text books on immunisation detail no specific contraindications
for the anti-biological warfare vaccines used during Operation Granby.

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The universal and regular basis on which the
nerve agent pre-treatment set--NAPS--has to be taken do not allow for
individual medical consultation. However NAPS is a licensed drug and the
safety and efficacy of its active ingredient, pyridostigmine bromide, in
giving protection against chemical warfare agents is internationally
medically recognised.

Mr. Peter Robinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1)
when personnel at Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton
Down, acknowledged that chemical detectors, nerve agent immobilised alarm
detectors and chemical agent monitors, could be activated by substances
other than the toxic chemicals they were designed to detect; and by what
means military personnel involved in Operation Granby were expected to know
when they should use their personal protective equipment;

(2) when a copy of the report by Major John Watkinson, the Officer
Commanding 21 EOD squadron, was received by Major Parsons of M.O.1/MoD UK
Army and Mr. P. Hearn of Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment,
Porton Down; and when the memorandum written by Captain Michael Johnson,
Commander of the US 54 Chemical Troop, dated 4 January 1994, was seen by
MoD officials;

(3) what assessment the MoD has made of the availability of the plague and
anthrax vaccines; and what are their common applications.

Mr. Soames: These are matters for the Chemical and Biological
Defence Establishment, Porton Down, under its framework document. I have
asked the chief executive, CBDE, to write to the hon. Member. Letter from
Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Peter Robinson, dated 25 January 1995:

1.

Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking
when personnel at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton
Down, acknowledged that chemical detectors (NAIAD and CAM) could be
activated by substances other than the toxic chemicals they were designed
to detect, and by what means military personnel involved in Operation
GRANBY were expected to know when they should use their personnel
protective equipment has been passed to me to answer as Chief Executive of
the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down.

2.

The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry
out work to ensure that the British Armed Forces have the most effective
protective measures possible against the threat that chemical or biological
weapons may be used against them.

3.

The staff of the Chemical and Biological Establishment have long recognised
that any detection system for chemical warfare agents needs to have
appropriate sensitivity and selectivity so as to respond to the chemical
warfare agents and to minimise false alarms. The principal route by which
chemical warfare agents attack the body is through the respiratory tract
although some agents such as mustard and some nerve agents are
percutaneously active. The aim in designing an effective detector is to
obtain sufficient specificity without reducing sensitivity to a level in
which personnel would be exposed to a harmful concentration prior to the
detector responding. 4.

The British chemical agent detectors such as NAIAD and CAM are designed to
be highly specific whilst having a sufficient sensitivity to ensure that
those utilising such detectors receive a warning from the detector before
they inhale a harmful concentration of chemical warfare agent. Although
they like all other chemical warfare agent detectors can respond to
substances other than chemical warfare agents, it is important to recognise
that these other substances are very unlikely to be present on the
battlefield in concentrations sufficient to produce an alarm. In practice,
the use of more than one type of detector reduces the chance of possible
false

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alarms whilst retaining an undiminished
capability for the detection of chemical warfare agents.

5.

Consequently, British Service personnel serving in Operation GRANBY donned
their personal protective equipment when they were judged to be under a
possible chemical warfare attack. This is known as the Immediate Action
Drill and is designed to ensure that Service personnel are protected should
they be subjected to an attack in which chemical weapons may be used.
Likewise, if a chemical detector such as NAIAD or CAM alarms then full
protective equipment is donned. The information relating to the possible
attack is then passed to the next high level of command at which a
judgement will be made as to whether chemical warfare agents have indeed
been used in such an attack. Such a judgement would take into account
whether other techniques for detection and monitoring of chemical warfare
agents have indicated the presence of a chemical warfare agent or not. The
equipment provided to the British Armed Forces to detect and monitor
chemical warfare agents is highly effective and is second to none. Letter
from Graham S. Pearson to Mr. Peter Robinson, dated 25 January 1995:

1.

Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking
when a copy of the report by Major John Watkinson, the Officer Commanding
21 EOD Squadron, was received by Major Parsons of M.O.1/MOD UK Army and Mr.
P. Hearn of CBDE Porton Down; and when the memorandum written by Captain
Michael Johnson, Commander of the US 54th Chemical Troop, dated 4 January
1994, was seen by MOD officials has been passed to me to answer as Chief
Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.

2.

The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry
out work to ensure that UK Armed Forces are provided with effective
protective measures against the threat that chemical and biological weapons
may be used against them.

3.

The report by 21st EOD Squadron was received in MOD in August 1991 and, in
accordance with its recommendations, samples collected in Kuwait City were
provided to CBDE Porton Down for analysis. 4.

A subsequent note from CBDE Porton Down to the Ministry of Defence dated 23
August 1991, prior to the receipt of the samples, stated that the brown
fumes associated with the material, the destruction of the NBC suit
material and the burns produced on skin suggests that the material may be
fuming nitric acid, a highly corrosive oxidising acid which may be used as
a rocket propellant. The damage to the NBC suit material and the brown
fumes showed that the material was not liquid mustard.

5.

The CBDE analytical report dated 24 September 1991 showed that the samples
had a definite yellow/brown colour compared to the original white of the
resin and were labelled Sample 1 dated 10 August 1991 and Sample 3 dated 10
August 1991. Analytical results showed that there was a high concentration
of nitrate in the sample and a pH that was extremely acidic. Extraction of
the resin with dichloromethane and analysis by gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry showed the presence of no material of CW interest. The samples
were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid
and there was no evidence of any CW agent being present.

6.

There is no record of a copy of the memorandum by Captain Michael Johnson
of the US Army having been received by MOD officials.

Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking
what assessment the MOD has made of the availability of the plague and
anthrax vaccines, and what are their common applications has been passed to
me to answer as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence
Establishment at Porton Down. 2.

The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry
out work to ensure that the British Armed

Column 283

Forces have the most effective protective
measures possible against the threat that chemical or biological weapons
may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of
possible chemical and biological warfare is assessed and the effectiveness
of medical countermeasures evaluated.

3.

As part of this work, the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment
carry out a continuing assessment of the availability and effectiveness of
vaccines. Plague and anthrax vaccines are available from a number of
countries which include the following: (a) Plague . This is available from
Greer Laboratories in the United States of America and the Commonwealth
Serum Laboratories in Australia.

(b) Anthrax . This is available from the Centre for Applied Microbiology
and Research at Porton Down and the Michigan Department of Public Health in
the United States of America.

These vaccines are produced to protect individuals at risk from the
respective diseases; these include persons working with these
microorganisms in laboratories and the pharmaceutical industry or at risk
from the natural occurrence of the disease.

Mr. Peter Robinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if
plague vaccine used during Operation Granby was obtained on a named-patient
basis.

Mr. Soames: Details of the specific medical countermeasures employed
by British forces against the potential biological warfare threat during
Operation Granby remain classified. All vaccines administered to British
forces in Operation Granby were offered on the basis of voluntary informed
consent. Any vaccines without a United Kingdom product licence were
licenced in their country of origin, fully tested in the United Kingdom and
cleared for use.

Pyridostigmine Bromide

Mr. Peter Robinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if
licence No. 4537/0003 for pyridostigmine bromide, 30mg, granted to the MOD
by the Medicines Control Agency governs (a) by whom the drug is supplied
and (b) the chemical make up of the drug.

Mr. Soames: Yes. The licence specifies the manufacturer of the
active substance as Raschig AG, Germany, and of the finished product as
Duphar BV, Holland. The active constituent of the product is listed as
pyridostigmine bromide and the other constituents are: pregelatinised
starch, maize starch, lactose, colloidal silicon dioxide, talc and
magnesium stearate.

Atomic Energy Co-operation

Mr. Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what
information Her Majesty's Government have received as to the disposition of
plutonium sent to the United States under the 1959 amendment to the Anglo-
American mutual defence agreement on atomic energy co-operation of 1958,
Cmnd 859; and whether all plutonium sent to the United States under this
agreement since 1965 was transacted under the barter arrangement.

Mr. Freeman: The disposition of plutonium supplied to the United
States under the 1958 agreement is a matter for the United States
Government. However, the United States Government gave an assurance in 1964
that plutonium originating from United Kingdom civil reactors would not be
used in their weapons programme.

Most plutonium supplied to the United States under the 1958 agreement has
been transferred under barter arrangements. However, some plutonium has
also been transferred under separate loan arrangements.

Column 284

Mr. Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what costs
are expected to be incurred through the Atomic Control Office in
implementing the 10-year extension to the 1958 United States-United Kingdom
mutual defence agreement on atomic energy matter, Cm 2686.

Mr. Freeman: The articles of the 1958 mutual defence agreement that
were recently amended have little bearing on the work load of the atomic
control office, London. The additional costs that will fall to this office
as a result of the amendment will therefore be negligible.

Nuclear Materials

Mr. Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will
set out details of the nuclear materials accounting and central
arrangements to which the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Boothferry
(Mr. Davis) made reference in the Official Report, 15 December 1994, column
1237.

Mr. Freeman: These arrangements involve bookkeeping and auditing
systems, similar to those in the civil nuclear industry, to control and
monitor movements and inventories of nuclear materials. For reasons of
security, it is not our practice to reveal further details of such
arrangements.

British Troops (Gorazde)

Mr. Jim Cunningham: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what
assessment he has made of the effectiveness of British troops in the
Bosnian enclave of Gorazde; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Soames: British troops in Gorazde are making a very effective
and highly valued contribution to UNPROFOR's efforts to stabilise the
situation on the ground and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid
to the enclave. One of their current priorities is to facilitate the
implementation of the four month cessation of hostilities agreement which
came into effect on 1 January 1995.

International Military Services Ltd.

Mr. Cousins: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence at what date
the staff council was first elected at International Military Services
Ltd.; and if it is his general policy to encourage such staff councils.

Mr. Freeman: The MOD's support for staff councils is demonstrated
through the long-standing Whitley council arrangements which have existed
in their present form since 1956.

The staff of International Military Services Ltd., who were not civil
servants, were not covered by the MOD Whitley councils. As a private
company, International Military Services made its own arrangements for
staff representation. The Ministry of Defence played no part in these
arrangements.

Nuclear Co-operation Agreement

Dr. Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what
joint actions are being taken in pursuit of the Anglo-French nuclear co-
operation agreement.

Mr. Soames: There is no such agreement. We are, however, developing
contacts on defence nuclear matters with France in a number of ways,
including the

Column 285

Franco-British joint commission on nuclear
policy and doctrine. The work of the commission has shown an identity of
approach between the UK and France on fundamental policy issues. The detail
of this work is, of course, confidential between the two Governments.

Joint Services Command

Mr. Raynsford: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many
acres of land are currently occupied by the Army Command and staff college
at Camberley.

Mr. Soames: The staff college at Camberley occupies an enclave
within the site of the Royal military academy, Sandhurst. The overall size
of the site, including the married quarters, is some 883 acres. In
addition, a training area serving the staff college and the academy
occupies a further 1,176 acres.

Commercial Lobbying

Mr. Campbell-Savours: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1)
on how many occasions in the last four months of which he has knowledge any
civil servants in his Department have been approached by commercial
lobbying organisations on behalf of their clients at informal or unofficial
engagements;

(2) on how many occasions in the last four months he or any of his
Ministers have been approached by commercial lobbying organisations on
behalf of their clients at informal or unofficial engagements.

Mr. Freeman: I refer the hon. Member to the written answer today
from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Combined Cadet Force

Mr. Byers: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much was
spent in 1993 94 to support the Combined Cadet Force in schools; what
schools received support; and what was the amount awarded to each school.

Mr. Soames: My noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence
will write to the hon. Member.

Mr. Byers: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a)
deaths and (b) serious injuries were caused to pupils taking part in
Combined Cadet Force activities in each of the last five years.

Mr. Soames: Available records show that between January 1990 and
December 1994 there were no deaths or serious injuries sustained by members
of the Combined Cadet Force which were attributable to cadet activities.

Defence Export Services Organisation

Mr. Byers: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the
cost of running the Defence Export Services Organisation; and how many
people were employed (a) in the United Kingdom and (b) overseas for each of
the last five years for which figures are available.

Information relating to the breakdown between United Kingdom-based and
overseas posts is not available prior to financial year 1993 94. The net
cost of the organisation in 1993 94 was £16.02 million. Changes in
accounting conventions make exact comparisons difficult with earlier years.

Equipment (Exports)

Mr. Byers: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the
total value of exports of United Kingdom military equipment to (a) all
countries and (b) developing countries for each of the last five years in
(i) cash prices and (ii) constant prices.

Mr. Freeman: Details of the value of exports of defence equipment by
geographic region are contained in table 1.1 of "UK Defence Statistics". A
copy of the 1994 edition has been placed in the House Library. The figures
are published at current prices. There is insufficient data on the prices
of such goods to enable satisfactory estimates to be made of defence
exports at constant prices.

Mr. Byers: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what deliveries
of United Kingdom manufactured arms to Nigeria have taken place since
December 1993.

Mr. Freeman: It has been the policy of successive Governments not to
publish details of individual exports.

United States Bases

Mr. Madden: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to
the answer of 19 January, what jurisdiction the Visiting Forces Act 1952
gives to American military personnel to take action against those entering
bases to make a peaceful protest; to what extent the powers exceed those of
the Ministry of Defence Police; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Soames: The Visiting Forces Act 1952 does not give United States
service personnel jurisdiction to take action against United Kingdom
citizens. In accordance with article VII of the NATO status of forces
agreement, however, the United States visiting forces are entitled to
police premises made available to them in the United Kingdom and, with due
regard to United Kingdom law, to take all appropriate measures to ensure
the maintenance of order and security on such premises.

United States service personnel do not have more legal powers over United
Kingdom citizens in this country than the Ministry of Defence police.

Low Flying

Mr. Redmond: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what was the
sortie mission, operational height and actual height of the military jet
aircraft that overflew the village of

Clayton-with-Frickley in South Yorkshire at approximately 09.32 hours on 12
January; if the sortie transgressed the low flying transit area in that
locality; what airfield the aircraft took off from; where it landed at the
end of its sortie; at which squadron or unit it was based; and if he will
make a statement.

Mr. Soames: A Tornado aircraft from the Standards Squadron at RAF
Cottesmore overflew the village at approximately the time indicated. The
aircraft, which was on a routine low flying training sortie; took off from
and landed at RAF Cottesmore. We have no reason to believe the aircraft
flew below the permitted height of 1000 ft within the low flying transit
area.