Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Lansing,
Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

DIETZEN, Judge

Appellant
challenges his conviction of first-degree controlled-substance crime, arguing
that the search-warrant application did not establish a nexus between appellant’s
criminal activity and his residence, and was therefore unsupported by probable
cause. Because we conclude that the
application did establish a nexus and was supported by probable cause, we
affirm appellant’s conviction.

FACTS

In February 2003,
appellant Gary Nystrom was charged with first-degree possession and manufacture
of methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 2(1) and
2a (2002). Nystrom had been under law
enforcement surveillance since July 2002, when he began to make purchases of
pseudoephedrine—an item used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine—at various
stores in central Minnesota. Nystrom purchased a total of 13 boxes of
pseudoephedrine over two months. On
February 12, 2003, a drug-task-force agent (agent) learned that Nystrom had
purchased ten gallons of Toluol and one gallon of muriatic acid acetone, both
of which are methamphetamine precursors, over a two-week period. The following day, Nystrom was arrested in CrowWingCounty when officers
found in Nystrom’s vehicle a methamphetamine lab, three gallons of Toluol, and
enough pseudoephedrine to manufacture more than one pound of methamphetamine. Nystrom told the arresting officers that he
was on his way to a cabin to go ice fishing.

Using
this information, the agent prepared a search-warrant application for Nystrom’s
residence. The agent indicated in a
supporting affidavit that: (1) people normally keep records of their personal
and business affairs in their residences; (2) from his “training and experience,”
people manufacturing methamphetamine generally amass significant quantities of
precursors and chemicals used in the manufacturing process; (3) methamphetamine
is typically manufactured in various locations, including houses, garages, and
vehicles; and (4) receipts for items purchased during the manufacturing process
are retained for later reimbursement with money or drugs. The affidavit also stated that Nystrom
resided at a house in Litchfield and that Nystrom’s landlord verified that
Nystrom was living in the house; the landlord added that the house’s garage
appeared to be used as a mechanic’s shop.
Finally, the affidavit stated that Nystrom had purchased ten gallons of
Toluol but was arrested in possession of only three gallons. The affidavit concluded: “Your affiant
believes Nystrom’s residence contains items showing Nystrom’s involvement in
the manufacturing of methamphetamine.
These items include receipts of precursor or chemical purchases as well
as chemicals used in the manufacturing process.”

The
search-warrant application sought permission to search Nystrom’s residence for
chemicals and precursors in the manufacture of methamphetamine, receipts for
those chemicals and precursors, and items associated with the manufacture of
methamphetamine. A district court judge
approved the application, and Nystrom’s residence was searched. Police found components of a methamphetamine
lab throughout the house and seized more than 33 grams of methamphetamine.

At an omnibus
hearing, Nystrom moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search
warrant was not supported by probable cause.
The district court denied the motion.
Nystrom then submitted his case to trial by the court on stipulated
facts pursuant to State v. Lothenbach,
296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.
1980). The district court found Nystrom
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine and sentenced him to 110 months in
prison. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

“When reviewing
pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review
the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred
in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State
v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.
1999). The federal and state
constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. State law allows a search warrant to be
issued only upon a finding of probable cause, supported by an affidavit,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the property to be
seized. Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2002).

The
presence of probable cause is determined under the totality of the
circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2332 (1983). The issuing judge
must decide “whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. Factors influencing probable cause to believe
items will be found in a particular place include the: (1) type of crime; (2)
nature of the items sought; (3) extent of the suspect’s opportunity to conceal
items; and (4) inferences as to where items would normally be kept. State
v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn.
1999); State v. Pierce, 358 N.W.2d
672, 673 (Minn.
1984). “Elements bearing on this
probability include information linking the crime to the place to be searched
and the freshness of the information.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

Police officers
may rely on training and experience to support the assertions made in
search-warrant applications, but “mere suspicion does not equal probable
cause.” State v. Richardson, 514 N.W.2d 573,
579 (Minn.
App. 1994). “The evidence necessary to
support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to
support a conviction.” Harris, 589 N.W.2d at 790. “[P]robable cause requires only a probability
or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.” Id. at 790-91 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S.
at 244 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2335).

“[T]he
standard of review appropriate for an appellate court reviewing a district
court’s probable cause determination made upon issuing a warrant is the
deferential, ‘substantial basis’ standard.”
State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d
802, 805 (Minn.
2001). “[T]his court’s task on appeal is
to ensure that the issuing judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that
probable cause existed.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 747 (quotation
omitted). Appellate courts must not
review each component of the search-warrant affidavit in isolation but must
determine the sufficiency of the affidavit from its totality. State
v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.
1985).

Nystrom
argues that the search-warrant affidavit was unsupported by probable cause
because the affidavit did not establish a nexus between his alleged criminal
activity and his residence. Nystrom
asserts that the drug agent’s general characterizations that people keep
business records at home and that methamphetamine manufacturing requires
significant amounts of chemicals, as well as his landlord’s statements that
Nystrom rented the house, do not establish a nexus. The state argues that the totality of the
affidavit establishes a nexus and that the agent’s qualifications are
sufficient to support his statements.

“[The
supreme court] has historically required a direct connection, or nexus, between
the alleged crime and the particular place to be searched, particularly in
cases involving the search of a residence for evidence of drug activity.” Souto,
578 N.W.2d at 747-48. A nexus has been
established in cases where (1) a sale of drugs took place at a residence; (2) harvested
marijuana was found partially concealed on a suspect’s land; (3) a suspect
entered her residence after receiving a package known to contain hashish, and;
(4) a suspect arranged drug sales from a telephone within his residence. State
v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 18-19 (Minn. App. 1996) (collecting cases). Nystrom claims that the distance between the
location of his arrest and his residence—approximately 106 miles—is so great
that the state must demonstrate an additional link to implicate his residence for
search-warrant purposes.

We
disagree. From the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that there is sufficient probable cause to support
the state’s search-warrant application.
First, the drug agent’s conclusion based on his qualifications—which were
extensively listed in his supporting affidavit—that Nystrom is likely to keep
receipts and methamphetamine precursors in his residence provides a requisite
nexus between the criminal activity and the place to be searched. Cf.
Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750 (“In determining probable cause, the magistrate
must consider the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying
hearsay information.”). Second, the
supporting affidavit states that Nystrom’s landlord confirmed that Nystrom lived
at the residence’s address. Third, the
affidavit observes that Nystrom was arrested in CrowWingCounty and officers observed a
methamphetamine lab and a large quantity of pseudoephedrine in his vehicle. Importantly, at the time of his arrest,
Nystrom was in possession of only three gallons of Toluol, when it had been confirmed
that Nystrom had purchased ten gallons of the same substances. It is therefore reasonable for the drug agent
to conclude that Nystrom had recently used seven gallons of Toluol to
manufacture methamphetamine.

Relying on the
factors enunciated in Harris and Pierce to determine probable cause for a
search warrant, we conclude that the transitory nature of the manufacture of
methamphetamine, the opportunity to conceal the drug’s precursors, the type of
crime Nystrom was arrested for (methamphetamine possession), and the normal
inference that he would keep the items in his residence, provides the issuing
judge with a “substantial basis” for believing, or a “fair probability,” that
contraband would be found in Nystrom’s residence. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,
103 S. Ct. at 2332 (“fair probability”); Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d at 805
(“substantial basis”); Harris, 589
N.W.2d at 788 (“substantial basis”); Pierce,
358 N.W.2d at 673 (listing factors considered in determining probable
cause). Additionally, the information on
which the affidavit was prepared was not stale, as Nystrom had been under
surveillance for approximately nine months but was arrested only the day before
the search warrant was issued. See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750 (“[T]he
proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the
warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.”) (alteration
in original) (quotation omitted).

Nystrom
attempts to support his argument for reversal by relying on Kahn.
In Kahn, the defendant, a
resident of Elgin, was arrested in Minneapolis for the
possession of one ounce of cocaine. 555
N.W.2dat 17. This court concluded that the search-warrant
application for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause
because there was no nexus between the possession of one ounce of cocaine and
the defendant’s residence approximately 75 to 85 miles away. Id. at 18-19. But the affidavit in Kahn provided significantly fewer facts than the affidavit in this
case. The Kahn affidavit merely mentioned that the defendant was arrested for
possession of cocaine, that the affiant knew from training and experience that
those in possession of an ounce of cocaine normally sell the drug in smaller
quantities, and that the defendant lived in Elgin.
See id. at 17.

Here, unlike the
affidavit in Kahn,the agent’s affidavit developed
additional links between Nystrom’s alleged crime and his residence by observing
that people keep receipts of items purchased for methamphetamine manufacture in
their residences, that Nystrom was arrested in possession of only three gallons
of Toluol after he was detected purchasing ten gallons, that he was known to
reside at the place to be searched, and that there was no indication that he
was storing the precursors at any other location. Viewed from the totality of the circumstances,
the search-warrant application provided the issuing judge with a “substantial
basis” to conclude there was probable cause that methamphetamine would be found
in Nystrom’s residence. We reject
Nystrom’s challenge to the sufficiency of the search warrant and affirm his
conviction.