US submarines refueled seaplanes, exchanged cargo , parts and passengers by rubber boat , and attempted to pull each other off rocks. What is so terribly impossible to imagine one US sub crew trying to help another in extremis?

I'm not 100% certain, but pretty sure, that subs on patrol carried neither fuel hose nor tank fittings to refuel another. The fittings could have been in the ER, but hose would need to ride outside the pressure hull in free flood areas due to volume. And no matter how well you clean a fuel hose it leaves a sheen when immersed.

Subs often left their anchors and chain with the tender at Midway, as well as lifelines and stanchions, plus their torpedo loading skids, which also rode in the superstructure. Everything which could make noise or be knocked loose in a DC attack was cut away and left behind. Taking a hundred feet of fuel hose along on the chance a fellow boat would need a drink? Unlikely.

I will neither confirm nor deny that modern SSNs leaving on sensitive missions today engage in this same behavior. Unless you've ridden the boats you have no idea how much bubbleheads HATE stray own-ship noise.

US submarines refueled seaplanes, exchanged cargo , parts and passengers by rubber boat , and attempted to pull each other off rocks. What is so terribly impossible to imagine one US sub crew trying to help another in extremis?

I'm not 100% certain, but pretty sure, that subs on patrol carried neither fuel hose nor tank fittings to refuel another. The fittings could have been in the ER, but hose would need to ride outside the pressure hull in free flood areas due to volume. And no matter how well you clean a fuel hose it leaves a sheen when immersed.

Subs often left their anchors and chain with the tender at Midway, as well as lifelines and stanchions, plus their torpedo loading skids, which also rode in the superstructure. Everything which could make noise or be knocked loose in a DC attack was cut away and left behind. Taking a hundred feet of fuel hose along on the chance a fellow boat would need a drink? Unlikely.

I will neither confirm nor deny that modern SSNs leaving on sensitive missions today engage in this same behavior. Unless you've ridden the boats you have no idea how much bubbleheads HATE stray own-ship noise.

Having both talked with them on exchanges, and hunted them , I've got a pretty good idea and why. But todays Nuke submariners are a different breed than the diesel boat crews, by design and trying. Adm Flucky once told me that a modern sub sailor was generally horrified at some of the "stunts" he and his fellow wartime diesel boat skippers used to do.

My problem is that I cannot imagine any US sailor , especially with one of the submarine service, saying "too bad buddy , we don't have a hose. Guess you are just screwed". I can imagine them doing above and beyond service trying to save them, up to and including running a rubber boat between the boats with five gallon cans, if that was all they had. I just don't see them giving up. This is a branch of the service that was legendary for comming up with innovated solutions to "impossible" problems. Sorry. I just can't visualize it.

_____________________________

"Geezerhood is a state of mind, attained by being largely out of yours". AW1Steve

"Quit whining and play the game. Or go home". My 7th grade baseball coach. It applies well to WITP AE players.

US submarines refueled seaplanes, exchanged cargo , parts and passengers by rubber boat , and attempted to pull each other off rocks. What is so terribly impossible to imagine one US sub crew trying to help another in extremis? This is the same service that in the 1920's SAILED a sub back to PH that had run out of fuel. Frankly , I feel this is simply a limitation that was chosen by the developers to either limit the game or because of coding issues. Like the issue of NOT being able to use USMC Raiders in the purpose they were designed, (as sub borne raiders) while using USMC para's in the Raider role, we need to "suck it up" , adjust, and live with it. It is a fact of the game. No house rule can fix it.

The fact is , all but the most anal retentive will probably lose a sub or two. Maybe the JFB's will consider this and throw the occassional bone to the AFB in "gamey" discussions or house rule negoitiations. Game limitations will affect both sides. If looked at as single issues , one side or the other will scream "unfair". If you take all the issues and put them in a pot together , it pretty much comes out equal.

To me , this is just one more example of why people who truly love this game should consider a "shut up and play" attitude .

this.

rms/pa

_____________________________

there is a technical term for those who confuse the opinions of an author's characters for the opinions of the author. the term is IDIOT.

US submarines refueled seaplanes, exchanged cargo , parts and passengers by rubber boat , and attempted to pull each other off rocks. What is so terribly impossible to imagine one US sub crew trying to help another in extremis?

I'm not 100% certain, but pretty sure, that subs on patrol carried neither fuel hose nor tank fittings to refuel another. The fittings could have been in the ER, but hose would need to ride outside the pressure hull in free flood areas due to volume. And no matter how well you clean a fuel hose it leaves a sheen when immersed.

Subs often left their anchors and chain with the tender at Midway, as well as lifelines and stanchions, plus their torpedo loading skids, which also rode in the superstructure. Everything which could make noise or be knocked loose in a DC attack was cut away and left behind. Taking a hundred feet of fuel hose along on the chance a fellow boat would need a drink? Unlikely.

I will neither confirm nor deny that modern SSNs leaving on sensitive missions today engage in this same behavior. Unless you've ridden the boats you have no idea how much bubbleheads HATE stray own-ship noise.

Having both talked with them on exchanges, and hunted them , I've got a pretty good idea and why. But todays Nuke submariners are a different breed than the diesel boat crews, by design and trying. Adm Flucky once told me that a modern sub sailor was generally horrified at some of the "stunts" he and his fellow wartime diesel boat skippers used to do.

My problem is that I cannot imagine any US sailor , especially with one of the submarine service, saying "too bad buddy , we don't have a hose. Guess you are just screwed". I can imagine them doing above and beyond service trying to save them, up to and including running a rubber boat between the boats with five gallon cans, if that was all they had. I just don't see them giving up. This is a branch of the service that was legendary for comming up with innovated solutions to "impossible" problems. Sorry. I just can't visualize it.

First they have to radio they're out of gas. That attracts attention. Then another boat has to be close enough to help. That's unlikely. Then there has to be land without enemy which the out-of-fuel-boat can get to. If they're adrift the rescuer never finds them. Then the rescuer has to have fuel to spare; unless they're in the first third of the patrol that's unlikely. Then both subs have to stay exposed, in shallow water or moored to an island, a long, long time to do a transfer without hoses. We're talking thousands and thousands of gallons to get back to Midway. Then, they don't have any five gallon cans.

Speculate all you want. It never happened.

Admiral Fluckey well knew the complexities of modern SSNs and the dangers of going off script with nuclear power. In a hot shooting war who knows? You might battleshort a reactor. But drive an SSN into water too shallow to dive? Nope.

US submarines refueled seaplanes, exchanged cargo , parts and passengers by rubber boat , and attempted to pull each other off rocks. What is so terribly impossible to imagine one US sub crew trying to help another in extremis?

I'm not 100% certain, but pretty sure, that subs on patrol carried neither fuel hose nor tank fittings to refuel another. The fittings could have been in the ER, but hose would need to ride outside the pressure hull in free flood areas due to volume. And no matter how well you clean a fuel hose it leaves a sheen when immersed.

Subs often left their anchors and chain with the tender at Midway, as well as lifelines and stanchions, plus their torpedo loading skids, which also rode in the superstructure. Everything which could make noise or be knocked loose in a DC attack was cut away and left behind. Taking a hundred feet of fuel hose along on the chance a fellow boat would need a drink? Unlikely.

I will neither confirm nor deny that modern SSNs leaving on sensitive missions today engage in this same behavior. Unless you've ridden the boats you have no idea how much bubbleheads HATE stray own-ship noise.

Having both talked with them on exchanges, and hunted them , I've got a pretty good idea and why. But todays Nuke submariners are a different breed than the diesel boat crews, by design and trying. Adm Flucky once told me that a modern sub sailor was generally horrified at some of the "stunts" he and his fellow wartime diesel boat skippers used to do.

My problem is that I cannot imagine any US sailor , especially with one of the submarine service, saying "too bad buddy , we don't have a hose. Guess you are just screwed". I can imagine them doing above and beyond service trying to save them, up to and including running a rubber boat between the boats with five gallon cans, if that was all they had. I just don't see them giving up. This is a branch of the service that was legendary for comming up with innovated solutions to "impossible" problems. Sorry. I just can't visualize it.

First they have to radio they're out of gas. That attracts attention. Then another boat has to be close enough to help. That's unlikely. Then there has to be land without enemy which the out-of-fuel-boat can get to. If they're adrift the rescuer never finds them. Then the rescuer has to have fuel to spare; unless they're in the first third of the patrol that's unlikely. Then both subs have to stay exposed, in shallow water or moored to an island, a long, long time to do a transfer without hoses. We're talking thousands and thousands of galons to get back to Midway. Then, they don't have any five gallon cans.

Speculate all you want. It never happened.

Admiral Fluckey well knew the complexities of modern SSNs and the dangers of going off script with nuclear power. In a hot shooting war who knows? You might battleshort a reactor. But drive an SSN into water too shallow to dive? Nope.

He was a speaker at the commissioning of my boat BTW.

All perfectly true. And there was a reason WHY Rickhover allowed very few WW2 Sub skippers (Wilkenson and Beach are the only two that come to mind, but I'm sure there were others) because he didn't want a cowboy mentality. A SSN or SSBN is a VERY,VERY expensive ship, and a nuclear reactor extremely dangerous. A WW2 fleet boat on the other hand was pretty cheap. (Of course there is the human cost , but this is a war that had just written off hundreds of thousands during the fall of the PI, and when you are talking about the daily deaths of thousands , taking a risk with less then 100 men is easy. Cold, but true).

Sub crews today won't radio, but sub's were used in wolf packs in WW2. (OK, the USN ones only had 3-6 boats, but one carried a Commodore or Captain , and they didn't coordinate by telepathy). All I'm saying is that a justifyable risk might be taken. And to save a fellow sub crew? Absolutely. The Darter and Dace incident show this. So does the incident of trying to save that Dutch boat (I forget the number). Even though both these incidents were unsuccessful, attempts were made.

I'm glad you got to hear Gene Flucky. He was an amazing man and patriot. I was very lucky that I had several book signings with him when I was with the Navy Memmorial bookstore. While it's a pain for the authors, it's a great opportunity for staff to pick their brains (as the poor guy often had hours of standing or sitting around waiting for customers.) But I think Adm Flucky , like a great many of the WW2 boat drivers, felt that their boats were expendable , in a good cause. And even if a sub couldn't be refueled, I could imagine them trying to tow it. And of course if all else fails , take off the unfortunate crew and scuttle the boat.

I also can't imagine a boat crew that was said unfortunate crew, sitting there and saying "ok we're screwed lets sit here and die because we are afraid to use the radio." What did they have to lose? As the old saying goes, "if you fall off a building , you might as well try and learn how to fly". What have you got to lose?

_____________________________

"Geezerhood is a state of mind, attained by being largely out of yours". AW1Steve

"Quit whining and play the game. Or go home". My 7th grade baseball coach. It applies well to WITP AE players.

All perfectly true. And there was a reason WHY Rickhover allowed very few WW2 Sub skippers (Wilkenson and Beach are the only two that come to mind, but I'm sure there were others)

A lot of it was age. Most of the younger WWII COs were Reserve and didn't stay in. The Academy guys who were LCDRs in 1945 were O-6s by the mid-50s, or retired. Rickover didn't have the god-like powers over NR from the first day either. He was an O-6 with no combat experience. To some extent he took who they sent, although he always did the interviews.

Sub crews today won't radio, but sub's were used in wolf packs in WW2.

We usually didn't call them that. And they didn't start until 1944, really after mid-year. To a great extent they didn't communicate once in the patrol area. They had lines of operation to prevent blue-on-blue.

For the first two years a fleet boat leaving Midway headed west was utterly alone in a way no other operating unit in the war was. There was no help, there was no medevac, there was no fuel, there were no parts. I don't think players of the game fully grasp that.

(OK, the USN ones only had 3-6 boats, but one carried a Commodore or Captain , and they didn't coordinate by telepathy). All I'm saying is that a justifyable risk might be taken. And to save a fellow sub crew? Absolutely. The Darter and Dace incident show this. So does the incident of trying to save that Dutch boat (I forget the number). Even though both these incidents were unsuccessful, attempts were made.

Darter and Dace were operating in support of a fleet action. They weren't on a normal patrol. Also late war.

I'm glad you got to hear Gene Flucky.

Umm, no. I was six when my boat was commissioned. We had photos in the wardroom scrapbook.

He was an amazing man and patriot. I was very lucky that I had several book signings with him when I was with the Navy Memmorial bookstore. While it's a pain for the authors, it's a great opportunity for staff to pick their brains (as the poor guy often had hours of standing or sitting around waiting for customers.) But I think Adm Flucky , like a great many of the WW2 boat drivers, felt that their boats were expendable , in a good cause. And even if a sub couldn't be refueled, I could imagine them trying to tow it. And of course if all else fails , take off the unfortunate crew and scuttle the boat.

I also can't imagine a boat crew that was said unfortunate crew, sitting there and saying "ok we're screwed lets sit here and die because we are afraid to use the radio." What did they have to lose? As the old saying goes, "if you fall off a building , you might as well try and learn how to fly". What have you got to lose?

They would have radioed. But unlike in the game, a boat without fuel doens't make one hex a day. Adrift, nobody would have found them. You know how big the Pacific is.

ughfortunately, the mortally-wounded Capt. Lawrence's shipmates were forced to 'give up the ship'. USS Chesapeake was decisively defeated by HMS Shannon after a furious 15-minute cannonade/boarding action (1 June 1813). the British buried him at Halifax w/ military honors.

Oliver Perry named his brig 'USS Lawrence' in memory of his dead friend, & fought her under the banner "Don't Give Up the Ship" at the battle of Lake Erie (10 September 1813). USS Lawrence was badly damaged, but Perry transferred to her sister, USS Niagara, & achieved a Nelsonian victory over the British squadron. his subsequent dispatch to headquarters provided another famous phrase to our young navy's history: "We have met the enemy and they are ours."

All true.

This battle, which lasted at most fifteen minutes, is among the bloodiest in the history of ship-to-ship combat. It was also mentioned in Robert Heinlein's "Starship Troopers" wherein Chesapeake's third lieutenant--a billet not a rank--left his battlestation to help carry mortaly wounded Lawrence below. In the boarding melee the officers senior to him were killed and he became the commanding oficer while belowdecks. He was later court martialed for leaving his station without orders during battle and being absent while commanding officer.

Lawrence has had several USN ships named for him, the last being a guided missile cruiser I believe.

hi Moose, i'd totally forgot that Heinlein's 1959 book specifically mentioned this action, as an example of a 4th-dogsbody who suddenly became CO after the ship's officer corps was destroyed by Shannon's fire. Heinlein is out, though - he wrote, "This boy’s family tried for a century and a half to get his conviction reversed. No luck, of course. There was doubt about some circumstances but no doubt that he had left his post during battle without orders."

Midshipman William Cox had been appointed acting-lieutenant aboard USS Cheasapeake. after helping carry the wounded Capt. Lawrence to the surgeon's station, he was trapped below-decks by the British boarders.

"It fell on Cox’s descendants to pursue his vindication. His son, William Cox, was once expelled from Lafayette College for striking a professor who called his father a coward. When Theodore Roosevelt wrote in his book The Naval War of 1812 (1882) that Cox had acted “basely,” family members protested so vigorously that the future president apologized and corrected his account in later editions. Moreover, for the next 134 years they wrote Congress and the Navy Department seeking to overturn the conviction and have his rank restored. Finally, in 1952 E. D. Litchfield, Cox’s great grandson, succeeded in bringing the matter to the attention of the House Armed Services Committee. Rear Adm. John D. Heffernan then outlined the historical facts for the committee and recommended his reinstatement. On April 7, 1952, Congress passed legislation to that effect and, once signed by President Harry Truman, Cox was formally, if posthumously, restored to the rank of third lieutenant." http://books.google.com/books?id=-7MwvwL5UR0C&pg=PA170&lpg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

I remember, that with 6th patch my midgets in Guadalcanal Scenario, sometimes refueled during turn, on enemy base, when friendly TF was present (although I can not confim WHERE they got their fuel. Fact is, they were low, when turn run, and full, when it finished). Although I never found way to refuel manually.

Does someone actually checked what will happen, when you use Submarine with liquid capacity (I think that there is only ONE such submarine in game)?

If memory serves, the manual states the 1 hex a day move for a ship out of fuel simulates a ship in tow. So, in the game universe, the gaming gods said let it be and that's the way it is

I thik it's clear that Steve and I are discussing real life and not the game. Of course the game does that; we've all read the manual. We're discussing real life. In real life a sub with no fuel is dead. For one thing it can't make potable water.

ughfortunately, the mortally-wounded Capt. Lawrence's shipmates were forced to 'give up the ship'. USS Chesapeake was decisively defeated by HMS Shannon after a furious 15-minute cannonade/boarding action (1 June 1813). the British buried him at Halifax w/ military honors.

Oliver Perry named his brig 'USS Lawrence' in memory of his dead friend, & fought her under the banner "Don't Give Up the Ship" at the battle of Lake Erie (10 September 1813). USS Lawrence was badly damaged, but Perry transferred to her sister, USS Niagara, & achieved a Nelsonian victory over the British squadron. his subsequent dispatch to headquarters provided another famous phrase to our young navy's history: "We have met the enemy and they are ours."

All true.

This battle, which lasted at most fifteen minutes, is among the bloodiest in the history of ship-to-ship combat. It was also mentioned in Robert Heinlein's "Starship Troopers" wherein Chesapeake's third lieutenant--a billet not a rank--left his battlestation to help carry mortaly wounded Lawrence below. In the boarding melee the officers senior to him were killed and he became the commanding oficer while belowdecks. He was later court martialed for leaving his station without orders during battle and being absent while commanding officer.

Lawrence has had several USN ships named for him, the last being a guided missile cruiser I believe.

hi Moose, i'd totally forgot that Heinlein's 1959 book specifically mentioned this action, as an example of a 4th-dogsbody who suddenly became CO after the ship's officer corps was destroyed by Shannon's fire. Heinlein is out, though - he wrote, "This boy’s family tried for a century and a half to get his conviction reversed. No luck, of course. There was doubt about some circumstances but no doubt that he had left his post during battle without orders."

Midshipman William Cox had been appointed acting-lieutenant aboard USS Cheasapeake. after helping carry the wounded Capt. Lawrence to the surgeon's station, he was trapped below-decks by the British boarders.

"It fell on Cox’s descendants to pursue his vindication. His son, William Cox, was once expelled from Lafayette College for striking a professor who called his father a coward. When Theodore Roosevelt wrote in his book The Naval War of 1812 (1882) that Cox had acted “basely,” family members protested so vigorously that the future president apologized and corrected his account in later editions. Moreover, for the next 134 years they wrote Congress and the Navy Department seeking to overturn the conviction and have his rank restored. Finally, in 1952 E. D. Litchfield, Cox’s great grandson, succeeded in bringing the matter to the attention of the House Armed Services Committee. Rear Adm. John D. Heffernan then outlined the historical facts for the committee and recommended his reinstatement. On April 7, 1952, Congress passed legislation to that effect and, once signed by President Harry Truman, Cox was formally, if posthumously, restored to the rank of third lieutenant." http://books.google.com/books?id=-7MwvwL5UR0C&pg=PA170&lpg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

This is good stuff! I didn't know the history either, and to see that TR corrected hi8mself is also gratifying. I'm also glad that HST, my second -favorite president, finished the job.

Only nit with the account: there's no rank of third-LT. It was a billet. LTs in sailing ships were named by number. The First was the XO. (In RN and Star Trek "Number One.") They went down in seniority as far as they went. A ship-of-the-line of the first-rate could have half a dozen. But they were all LTs. That was the next rank after Midshipman. Above LT. was Commander, but many LTs skipped right to post-captain, at least in the RN.

Interesting. Note this is absolute best-case underway refueling, in dead calm. Rigging the torpedo loading davit in a seaway would be highly dangerous at least, and put men in the water at worst. Taking a tow line through the bullnose was also not an evolution to be tried in any sort of sea state. The HQ dudes who wrote this didn't know that torpedo handling davits got left with the tender too. Big, loud, bangy things. But hey, it's the NAvy. There needs to be a procedure, we write a procedure.

But hey, it's the NAvy. There needs to be a procedure, we write a procedure.

. . . or any military service. Quoted from memory from Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising: "The Air Force had to have a plan for every contingency. It didn't have to make sense."

True. My only experience is with the Navy, but the mindset is the same. I have a very vivid memory of my last patrol, owing a procedure for mercury control. I had a couple of grams of mercury in certain spare parts that were never requisitioned. They were highly sealed in quadruple packaging, in locked lockers in very out-of-way areas of the boat. The inventory cards had red borders, etc. As far as I was concerned they were "controlled." But some staff dude at SubLant thought there needed to be a local procedure. So I got it on my "owe-the-XO" admin list for the patrol. I wasn't even supposed to be on that patrol; my relief failed out of sub school and I got told I was going out again on two weeks notice after I had orders to Hawaii in my hot little hands. I was in a bad mood.

I dogged it the whole patrol. When you're on 3-4 hours of sleep a day these sorts of jobs get put off. When I couldn't resist any longer I wrote a one-page procedure that basically described what we already did. And what the rest of the Navy did too, BTW. Yeoman typed it up and into the XO's bulging in-box it went.

Two days later the messenger of the watch found me on watch on the dive and said captain's compliments and would I come to his stateroom when I was releived. Or sooner if possible. Not a good moment.

The COB sat in for me, smirking. I went up the P-way to his door, knocked, went in, and had an uncomfortable lesson in how the Navy "promulgates" instructions. From a nuc officer any lecture about paperwork is not going to be short or pleasant. It was not. At the end he pointed to a folder on his desk. "That is your detaching fitness report. I have not signed it. Are we clear?" I indicated we were and crawled out to the P-way (one cannot walk when one has no buttocks.)

I promulgated the hell out of that thing. I got a good fitrep. I went to Hawaii. He was the best officer I ever served with BTW. I wish I could post here some of the tales he told about being an SSN officer in the deep, deep Cold War, but it'll be fifty more years . . .

Moose I agree with almost everything you said. I agree that no Nuke would ever take the kind of chances that would be involved with "rescue refueling". Nukes are trained that way , and for a damned good reason. (Imagine an airdale attitude with a nuclear reactor (shudder). I agree it would be tough, not in procedure , and probably stupid. EVERYTHING you have said is logical,sensible and practical. No argument, total agreement.

A couple of questions though; 1) did any sub on patrol ever run out of fuel? Then they would not have needed to implement the procedure, would they? How much of our problem with subs running out of fuel is game related? If so, generally it would have people screaming "gamey" (unless of course it affected primarily AFB's. JFB's tend to scream far more often then AFB's do, I don't know why , but it just seems to go that way).

2) are ww2 submariners anything at all like modern submariners? Similar mind set? Training? Values and mentality?

3) and finally , do you honestly feel that even the most cautious of todays well trained nuclear submariner would honestly say "screw you buddy, it's too much of a risk and goes against doctrine?"

My thoughts , for whatever they may be worth (obviously not much) is that the problem we have with subs constantly running out of fuel did not happen in real life, that it is a "anomoly" associated with the game. If it did happen in real life , we'd have lots of heroic stories of submariners risking it all , and trying to immplement the "procedures" that were not unused , and as you point out, probably impractical. I do not belive that sailors, regardless if they sailon the seas, below them, or over them, do not allow fellow sailors to die without making heroic , stupid and sometimes suicidal attempts to save them. I don't know crap about submarine procedures. I freely admit that. But I have strong feelings about people in general, and sailors in particular. And I can't help but feel that they wouldn't give up.

Now here's the rub. It's a game. It has occassional flaws. And this might be one (or not, depending on your point of view , we've established that differences of opinion). But the real question here (at least to me) is , assuming that there is a flaw, can a house rule fix this? Can anyone? Then if not, shall we debate it endlessly , or "suck it up" and get back to our games?

< Message edited by AW1Steve -- 1/20/2013 7:43:20 PM >

_____________________________

"Geezerhood is a state of mind, attained by being largely out of yours". AW1Steve

"Quit whining and play the game. Or go home". My 7th grade baseball coach. It applies well to WITP AE players.

Moose I agree with almost everything you said. I agree that no Nuke would ever take the kind of chances that would be involved with "rescue refueling". Nukes are trained that way , and for a damned good reason. (Imagine an airdale attitude with a nuclear reactor (shudder). I agree it would be tough, not in procedure , and probably stupid. EVERYTHING you have said is logical,sensible and practical. No argument, total disagreement.

A couple of questions though; 1) did any sub on patrol ever run out of fuel? Then they would not have needed to implement the procedure, would they? How much of our problem with subs running out of fuel is game related? If so, generally it would have people screaming "gamey" (unless of course it affected primarily AFB's. JFB's tend to scream far more often then AFB's do, I don't know why , but it just seems to go that way).

2) are ww2 submariners anything at all like modern submariners? Similar mind set? Training? Values and mentality?

3) and finally , do you honestly feel that even the most cautious of todays well trained nuclear submariner would honestly say "screw you buddy, it's too much of a risk and goes against doctrine?"

My thoughts , for whatever they may be worth (obviously not much) is that the problem we have with subs constantly running out of fuel did not happen in real life, that it is a "anomoly" associated with the game. If it did happen in real life , we'd have lots of heroic stories of submariners risking it all , and trying to immplement the "procedures" that were not unused , and as you point out, probably impractical. I do not belive that sailors, regardless if they sailon the seas, below them, or over them, do not allow fellow sailors to die without making heroic , stupid and sometimes suicidal attempts to save them. I don't know crap about submarine procedures. I freely admit that. But I have strong feelings about people in general, and sailors in particular. And I can't help but feel that they wouldn't give up.

Now here's the rub. It's a game. It has occassional flaws. And this might be one (or not, depending on your point of view , we've established that differences of opinion). But the real question here (at least to me) is , assuming that there is a flaw, can a house rule fix this? Can anyone? Then if not, shall we debate it endlessly , or "suck it up" and get back to our games?

To my knowledge no USN sub ran out of fuel on patrol in WWII. If you read patrol reports and logs, available on-line, you see how closely they monitored fuel. In the USN, every day in the noon reports made to the CO (usually while he's eating lunch) the OOD sends the Fuel and Water Report. Also magazine temperatures (if applicable), a report on chronometer winding and comparison (if applicable), the daily muster report (the binnacle list of sick men more or less at sea), and the position report. In subs he also got speed, depth, and number of sonar contacts.

It also matters what era you're talking about. In 1942 a sub leaving Midway was going off the edge of the world. There was no help out there. By mid-1944 there was a tender at Saipan. Later on also at Ulithi. The table got smaller, many more boats were available to help in an emergency, fleet tugs were an option sometimes. But still, I don't think any ran out of gas. It would have been the ultimate in unprofesioanlism. The main danger was loss of fuel from battle damage. Tanks were isolated and cross-connections were redundant, same as aircraft, but if they took a shell aft and lost 50% of the fuel rapidly they might not have had enough to get to safety.

If that happened they would have radioed in. Other boats might have heard, or might not. I'm not sure how daily codes worked then. And if another boat could have helepd SubPac would have pulled it off patrol and ordered it to help. A sub CO would not do so without orders; he woudln't have run off his station independently. One in range would have also broken radio silence to tell SubPac he could help, but he wouldn't have done it unless ordered. That said, SubPac was a submariner and he would have ordered in help if there were any in range. It's just that there likely would not have been in 1942 and much of 1943.

If another could help they would not have tried towing. You risk two boats then if they can't dive. Diving is life. The rescue boat would have taken off the crew and sunk the first with the deck gun. Then they would have come back to the nearest friendly base as fast as possible. Two crews would have overwhelmed the potable water production as well as atmosphere limits and space to sleep. Fleet boats were very, very tight.

In the game there's no reason to run out of fuel unless from damage. Players who do aren't paying attention. I can't see a need for any HR, nor do I see what it could be anyway. The code is the code.

In the game there's no reason to run out of fuel unless from damage. Players who do aren't paying attention. I can't see a need for any HR, nor do I see what it could be anyway. The code is the code.

Hi Bullwinkle,

Yeaaahhh.... OK I agree. But. For example you might have short range subs home ported at Fiji and with adequate fuel for submarine operations. And then uninvited guests show up (perhaps 100,000 IJA and IJN troops). Then perhaps a fast transport TF sneaks in and sucks the oil tanks dry. And then perhaps the submarine pulls in into port and says "filler up!". Just saying it could happen.

When a ship is damaged, it automatically breaks off from the task force, forms an escort force and comes home. When a ship does a mission , it automatically comes come. When an air group gets ready to fly a mission , a number of "dice rolls"...AKA mission checks are performed. If the numbers don't add up, it doesn't fly. No air plane will allow itself to hit a target outside of its range.

Yet submarines are always allowing them selves to run out of fuel. Unless we perform constant checks , and distrust the computer on every setting we make, we will sometimes run a sub out of fuel.

As far as submariners not willing to got the "extra mile", may I suggest that THEY might stay on the surface to tow a boat. We just never had it necessary to do this. Had it been , do you honestly think it would not be tried? Let me point out that other submariners of another navy (The Kreigmarine) had to face this choice. I refer to the "Atlantis" case where the crews of several U-boats , including Italian, stayed on the surface with survivors , towing lifeboats. Straining their resources , endangering themselves to air and sea attack , to try and save their fellow sailors. I'll try and find a link , my refernce is unfortuanately in the old school form of a book on Atlantis.

I just am reluctant to admit that American sailors would refuse to do what German and Italian sailors did.

_____________________________

"Geezerhood is a state of mind, attained by being largely out of yours". AW1Steve

"Quit whining and play the game. Or go home". My 7th grade baseball coach. It applies well to WITP AE players.

On the afternoon of November 30 1941, with the U-68 re-fuelled, the U-A connected to the fuel lines, and four hundred German seamen busy transferring supplies from the Python to the two submarines, in an almost exact repetition of what had happened to the Atlantis, the British heavy cruiser HMS Dorsetshire, a sister-ship of the Devonshire, was seen approaching at 25 knots.

The U-68, her deck hatches open, taking on torpedoes, could not dive immediately, but the U-A, having quickly let the fuel lines go, turned away to intercept the enemy.

The Python, which had been stopped, fired up her engines, but giving no response to the cruiser’s signals, and having made smoke, immediately came under heavy fire, was set ablaze and abandoned.

The Dorsetshire, remaining at a range of about eight miles, and steaming at high speed for fear of a possible U-Boat attack, was fortunate that by doing so, the five torpedoes fired at her by the U-A all missed.

In eleven boats and seven rafts, the combined crews of both ships, totalling over four hundred and fourteen men, were adrift on the high seas, waiting for the U-Boats to re-appear. With about 100 crammed into each of the two U-Boats, and the rest in ten boats, with a motor launch ferrying hot food to them from the sub’s galleys

Two more submarines the U-129 (Krvkpt. Nico Clausen) arriving on December 3, and the U-124 (Kptlt. Jochen Mohr) two days later on the 5th, alleviated the crowding, followed over the next two weeks by four Italian submarines, the Luigi Torelli, the Enrico Tazzoli, the Giuseppe Finzi and the Pietro Calvi

All eight rescue submarines safely reached Saint-Nazaire between December 23 and December 29 1941.

In the game there's no reason to run out of fuel unless from damage. Players who do aren't paying attention. I can't see a need for any HR, nor do I see what it could be anyway. The code is the code.

Hi Bullwinkle,

Yeaaahhh.... OK I agree. But. For example you might have short range subs home ported at Fiji and with adequate fuel for submarine operations. And then uninvited guests show up (perhaps 100,000 IJA and IJN troops). Then perhaps a fast transport TF sneaks in and sucks the oil tanks dry. And then perhaps the submarine pulls in into port and says "filler up!". Just saying it could happen.

Cheers, Guy

How do the examples you cite not qualify as "not paying attention"?

Early in the war while the Allies are in retreat many subs are based at places like Manila which are going to fall. The player needs to be extra careful to re-assign homeports at fall-backs. This is exactly what happened in RL. Java was used, then Brisbane. If you have a Manila sub operating up by Hong Kong, you'd better keep an eye on it. Or, if you don't care, lose it. It's not the game's fault.

If a sub is at a friendly base with no fuel it can disband and sit there without incurring damage. Get some fuel to the base. If you can't then your options are more limited.

When a ship is damaged, it automatically breaks off from the task force, forms an escort force and comes home. When a ship does a mission , it automatically comes come. When an air group gets ready to fly a mission , a number of "dice rolls"...AKA mission checks are performed. If the numbers don't add up, it doesn't fly. No air plane will allow itself to hit a target outside of its range.

Yet submarines are always allowing them selves to run out of fuel. Unless we perform constant checks , and distrust the computer on every setting we make, we will sometimes run a sub out of fuel.

As far as submariners not willing to got the "extra mile", may I suggest that THEY might stay on the surface to tow a boat. We just never had it necessary to do this. Had it been , do you honestly think it would not be tried? Let me point out that other submariners of another navy (The Kreigmarine) had to face this choice. I refer to the "Atlantis" case where the crews of several U-boats , including Italian, stayed on the surface with survivors , towing lifeboats. Straining their resources , endangering themselves to air and sea attack , to try and save their fellow sailors. I'll try and find a link , my refernce is unfortuanately in the old school form of a book on Atlantis.

I just am reluctant to admit that American sailors would refuse to do what German and Italian sailors did.

I don't know what to tell you. I look at the Ship list sorted on Subs every turn and I don't have subs run out of fuel. The only times I can recall it happening when I played AI was with S-boats I sent on mine missions. This was when the game was new. It did happen one other time between Midway and Pearl. I pulled into French Frigate, disbanded, and sent a base force and some fuel from Pearl. Got it home in three weeks.

As for towing, as before, it matters where. It's dumb combat calculus to risk two boats, one half sunk and one fine, in order to save the damaged one. We care about the crews; we were good at building new subs.

I'm familiar with the Atlantis case. I believe it was very early in the war, before the sub war became as savage as it was later. And the Brits, unlike the Japanese, weren't going to strafe lifeboats in tow.