'This Week' Transcript: Tom Donilon

AMANPOUR: This is -- you know, we hear very diplomatic words from
you, but we hear rather a lot of bluster from Pakistan, in fact.
General Kayani, even the head of the ISI has said that this must never
happen again. If the Americans try it again, we'll take action.
They're not being as -- as conciliatory as you. If the United States
had to go in again and do it, would that be fine by you?

HAQQANI: First of all, let's understand this. There are two
separate...

AMANPOUR: To get Zawahiri?

HAQQANI: These are two separate questions. One is, are we
comforted by Osama bin Laden being taken out? We certainly are. Our
president said that; General Kayani said that. Nobody said that we
didn't want Osama bin Laden taken out. What we are offended by is the
violation of our sovereignty.

Now, we've heard the American explanation. But at the same time,
try and put yourself in the position of a Pakistani leader who has to go
to votes from the same people who will turn around and say, "You know
what? You can't protect this country from American helicopters coming
in."

America has a selling job to do in Pakistan, too. Convince more
Pakistanis that you are more of our ally and, therefore, there would be
less offense.

AMANPOUR: But right now, right now, America and you need to
convince the American taxpayer that billions of dollars still need to go
to Pakistan, as they've been...

HAQQANI: Absolutely, and we are working on it. Both sides are
engaged. The fact remains that in future we want to make sure that we
continue with joint operations. As far as high-value targets are
concerned, the Americans are sharing with us what they think is the way
forward. We are giving our opinions.

But, look, Christiane, complaining and carping about Pakistan has
been around for as long as the Pakistani and U.S. alliance has been
around. There have been demonstrations in Pakistan for a long time.
There have been objections in Congress for a long time.

But we are allies and partners who need each other. And so, let's
be fair, people like me sitting quietly with people like Tom Donilon are
the ones who are going to find that way forward, not the people
screaming on television, either in Pakistan or on the late-night shows
here.

AMANPOUR: And up next, is the United States bracing for Al Qaida's
revenge? We'll get the latest information from our team of ABC News
correspondents.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

MEYERS: The White House on Tuesday revealed that Osama bin Laden
was not armed when Navy SEALs found him, but they say he did resist
them. Hey, White House, armed, unarmed, not resisting, holding a bunny,
we're totally cool with you shooting bin Laden.

(LAUGHTER)

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: "Saturday Night Live" echoing public opinion on the story
of this week, a story that's far from over. President Obama, of course,
has ruled out releasing photographic proof of bin Laden's death, but one
key constituency seems to need no convincing. Al Qaida acknowledges
their leader is no more and vows revenge on Americans.

So joining me to assess the threat and take stock of this incredible
week, the ABC correspondents who've been covering this story: senior
White House correspondent Jake Tapper, chief foreign correspondent
Martha Raddatz, and justice correspondent Pierre Thomas.

Thank you all. What a week it has been. I want to go to you first,
because everybody is worried about this so-called treasure trove and
what it might be telling us. We've tried to get from Donilon and from
Haqqani exactly what is out there. Is there anything out there that we
should be worried about right now?

THOMAS: There's no specific imminent threat that they've found.
But I can tell you what they're most concerned about. Right now, the
most immediate threat they are worried about are so-called lone wolves,
people who've been typically radicalized on the Internet who have been
sympathizing with Al Qaida, those are the people who might show up at a
mall and start shooting. So that's the first level of threat.

The second level of threat is Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al
Qaida in Yemen, if you will. They're led by the radical clear Anwar
al-Awlaki. The fear is that that group wants to get on the scoreboard.
They tried to attack the United States with the Christmas 2009...

AMANPOUR: The underwear bombing plan.

THOMAS: ... underwear bombing, and then they followed it up nine
months later with the parcel bomb attack out of Yemen, as well, so the
concern is that they will try to do something very quickly. The third
level of threat is Al Qaida central, but right now they think that those
leaders are running for cover, literally.

AMANPOUR: So, Martha, Awlaki in Yemen. There was a missile strike
this week. Are they actually trying to get him? And do they know where
he is?

RADDATZ: I think there was not a link between the intelligence they
gathered in Pakistan from bin Laden's compound and the strike on Awlaki.

AMANPOUR: Too soon?

RADDATZ: Too soon. I think you just can't get it that fast. They
had troves of this to go through. So I don't think that had anything to
do with it, but it shows you how aggressive they are being in Yemen
now. They've increased the number of drones. They've armed the number
of drones. That was a military drone strike. They just missed him. So
as much as they would like to get on the map right now, I'm sure Awlaki
is completely running scared.

AMANPOUR: And, Jake, the White House, this has been a massive
success for President Obama, for American intelligence. What is the
next thing on their agenda? What are they thinking about right now in
terms of what they found, of what they need to do going forward?

TAPPER: Well, first of all, there's cooperation with the Pakistani
government. And the message -- despite anger, legitimate anger on some
levels and disbelief that how could the Pakistanis not have known about
this, the message being conveyed is, look, we're sure that you're as
surprised as we are, so let's work together...

AMANPOUR: Is that a deliberate public message to get them on side...

TAPPER: Yes, absolutely.

AMANPOUR: ... and not defensive?

TAPPER: ... absolutely, so that they work together. Let's work
together so that we can, for once and for all, defeat Al Qaida, and that
is the approach being taken.

AMANPOUR: I mean, we've heard Ambassador Haqqani talk about that,
and everybody is saying that they have suffered so many deaths, as
well. But, you know, for years it seems they've been speaking out of
both sides of their mouth.

TAPPER: Absolutely.

AMANPOUR: So what can the administration do to end this, to stop this?

TAPPER: Try to convince behind the scenes the Pakistanis that they
have to stop this. But there is very little sense in doing it in a
public way so that the Pakistanis feel like they have to.

I mean, just remember all the diplomacy behind the scenes going on
when the CIA contractor, Ray Davis, was in prison. There is a big
difference between what is said publicly and what is said privately.
And what is said privately right now is different than the public
message. But the idea is, we need to do this together, now's the time
to stop double-dealing.

RADDATZ: And we really need them more than ever. As much as you
can tell them what to do -- and we've been telling them over and over
and over, you've got to do more, you've got to do more, it is still a
fine line. The Pakistanis are embarrassed right now. They're
embarrassed that they found bin Laden right under their noses. But we
need them.

AMANPOUR: Because of the war in Afghanistan.

RADDATZ: We need them to -- but we also need them in Pakistan.
This is not over. We need the intelligence. Whatever they provided in
the past, they have to keep doing that.

THOMAS: But, Christiane, this is so complicated. I had a senior
official talk about the fact that there's evidence that's going to come
out of a trial, federal trial in Chicago, that will show or suggest
strongly that the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, had a role in the
Mumbai attack. So there are going to be serious questions raised about,
how much can we really trust them?

TAPPER: Not just -- and not just that the ISI had a role in the
Mumbai attack, but the ISI was behind the Mumbai attack, specifically
the idea of targeting Westerners and targeting the rabbi that was killed
there in the Lubavitch Center was an American rabbi, and the idea that
the ISI was behind that, and that -- this is the David Headley case.
This is going to be very important.

THOMAS: And two things to point out. The Times Square bombing
originated Pakistan. The attack that they were planning on the United
States 2009, September 14th, around the anniversary of 9/11, also
originated in Pakistan.

AMANPOUR: So tell me, Pierre, about the -- you were talking about
the lone wolf, but also about what seems to have come out, that Osama
bin Laden was very interested in not just financial and other warfare
against the United States, but class warfare, racial tensions, stirring
that up, as well.

THOMAS: I spoke to officials Friday who were just stunned at the
level of expertise and thoughtfulness that bin Laden and Al Qaida put
into how to break down the American society, not just to kill people.
They talked about ways in which to recruit minorities to do some of
these attacks, the notion to get Americans thinking about each other,
looking at each other in strange ways, so that was part of the plan, as
well.

RADDATZ: Incredible, incredibly compelling, watching this old man
sit there huddled in that old blanket, watching himself on television.

AMANPOUR: It really beggars belief that he was so intimately
involved, as we're now being told. Why do they -- do you know what they
might have -- the audio they might have silenced? Do you have any
reporting on what that audio that his last message was going to say?

RADDATZ: Well, I think -- I think his audio on all those were
generally the same as they've always been. It's a jihadist message.
It's, "Attack America. America is bad." So that was generally the same.

I think what's extraordinary -- and we talked about this a little
earlier in the piece about dyeing his beard, how important his image was
to him. I mean, that little den you saw there was a command-and-control
center. He was involved strategically, tactically, operationally.
That's new information.

I mean, you remember President Bush saying, oh, we don't even worry
about him anymore. I mean, for years and years and years, they thought
he was hiding in a cave, really not running this organization, and he
clearly was.

THOMAS: One official called him the head coach.

AMANPOUR: The head coach, indeed.

RADDATZ: A really nasty coach.

AMANPOUR: What was the most startling, revealing bit of this story
all week? What was the most significant?

TAPPER: I was just surprised, as a White House correspondent, this
has been going on since August. August is when they first got the
tip-off. And then from August until Sunday, it is amazing that this
secret was kept. And this is -- it's not just the Obama White House,
but every White House leaks. Every administration leaks. Our...

RADDATZ: The FBI director did not even know. The FBI director...

TAPPER: Our livelihoods depend on it.

(CROSSTALK)

TAPPER: You know, we're happy for those leaks. I don't mean to
bad-mouth leaks. But it is amazing how closely held this secret was.
The FBI director didn't know about it. There are a lot of senior
officials in Afghanistan, including...

RADDATZ: General Petraeus...

TAPPER: ... General Petraeus did not know.

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: Until just before, right?

RADDATZ: Until just before. I mean, they just wanted that close
hold, because the more people you tell, the more people...

(CROSSTALK)

TAPPER: If I could say one other point, because you asked the
ambassador about this. The reason why the U.S. did not tell the
Pakistanis about this mission is the same reason why the U.S. doesn't
tell the Pakistanis before Predator drone attacks: because they will
tip off the bad guys.

It was U.S. policy to alert the Pakistani government before a drone
attack. That changed in the Bush administration. That changed, because
they couldn't trust them anymore.

RADDATZ: Yes, trust and operational security are the same thing.

AMANPOUR: The most extraordinary thing for you?

RADDATZ: How little security bin Laden had around himself. And
just one little detail. My favorite detail of the week was that the
SEALs didn't have a tape measure with them, and Osama bin Laden is
six-foot-four. So one of the SEALs had to lie down next to him to try
to figure out how tall he was.

AMANPOUR: President Obama apparently said, we spent $60 million on
a helicopter, but we couldn't buy a tape measure.

RADDATZ: Yeah.

AMANPOUR: Last word?

THOMAS: Two things. One, a young person said the notion that Osama
bin Laden was chilling out in the 'burbs of Pakistan was just amazing.

I think the other thing that struck me was this notion of the
students coming out and celebrating outside of the White House. It was
a reminder of how 9/11 put a dagger in the heart of this country and
that a lot of people thought that retribution was deserved. And when
they got it, they expressed it.

AMANPOUR: And how we had all been living with this for so long.

Jake, Martha, Pierre, thank you so much, indeed.

And up next, Condoleezza Rice with a stern message for Pakistan.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: As we heard from Tom Donilon, George W. Bush was the
first person outside the White House to be informed of Osama bin Laden's
death. The former president was invited, but declined to attend
Thursday's ceremony at Ground Zero, but his closest aides were breathing
a very public sigh of relief this week.

I spoke with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about this
milestone and about America's newly fraught relationship with Pakistan.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: Pakistan, did they just mess up? Are they just
completely unreliable, clueless?

RICE: Well, I have to say that the biggest surprise in this for me
-- I was not surprised that we got him. I knew we would eventually get
him. I was surprised where we found him. The idea that he could be in
a suburb, essentially, of Islamabad is quite remarkable. And so
Pakistan has some very hard questions to answer, and this isn't a time
for bluster from Pakistan.

AMANPOUR: You say you were surprised that he was found in that
suburb. And even last year, Leon Panetta told ABC, the director of the
CIA, that he thought that bin Laden was in a cave. This cave of
mythology became conventional wisdom.

RICE: Yes. Yes.

AMANPOUR: Did you really think that?

RICE: Yes.

AMANPOUR: That he was in this cave?

RICE: Yes. Yes, we really did, or in a tribal area. Remember, the
tribal areas are not just caves. There are villages in the tribal
areas. And so there was some sense that he might be protected within
one of the villages, which were fairly hard to get to and fiercely
protective of their sovereignty (ph). And so I think the cave was a bit
of a metaphor for where he was.

AMANPOUR: Who is it who's responsible for not knowing that Osama
bin Laden is hiding right there in a military base, just about?

RICE: Well, I think it is entirely possible -- and I think probable
-- that high-ranking people didn't know. But if this happens in your
country, you have an obligation to find out and to do a thorough
investigation and to punish anybody who might have been responsible.
That would be a very important message.

I remember going to Pakistan shortly after the Mumbai bombings. And
I remember saying to the chief of staff, to the prime minister, to the
president, what happened in Mumbai had to have had support of the
sophisticated apparatus of Pakistani military and intelligence. It had
to have. And so don't hide behind the fact that you don't know or you
don't believe it. That's the kind of conversation that I think needs to
take place with Pakistan right now.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: You can find more of that interview with Condoleezza Rice
at abcnews.com.

And so what does the future hold for America and Pakistan? Joining
me to tackle that one, our powerhouse roundtable, ABC's George Will, Liz
Cheney, the former deputy assistant secretary of state and co-founder of
the group Keep America Safe, Tom Ricks, who writes the Best Defense blog
for Foreign Policy magazine, and Lawrence Wright of the New Yorker, who
tracked the rise of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida in his book "The
Looming Tower."

Thank you all for joining us. Clearly, the story of the week is bin
Laden is dead and Pakistan is in the hot seat. Around the table, who is
shocked and horrified to think that Pakistan is saying it didn't know?
And who really believes that Pakistan didn't know?

WILL: Well, neither, in this case. Pakistan we knew going in is a
house divided against itself. And as Americans know, a house divided
against itself must become one thing or another eventually. And the
question is, how is there -- is there close to a tipping point? Is it
more healthy than unhealthy? That's a question we have to answer.

But the stakes are enormous. We're in Afghanistan only because of
Pakistan. If it weren't next door to Pakistan, we wouldn't be there.

AMANPOUR: Liz?

CHENEY: Well, I think that it is surprising that he was 35 miles
from Islamabad. I think it's unclear whether anybody in the Pakistani
government was supporting him, was helping him. We've had some
administration officials suggest it's impossible that bin Laden could
have been there for this long without some kind of a support network.

But I do think it's very important, as we hold Pakistan accountable,
as we push them hard for the names of anybody in the ISI who may have
been in contact with bin Laden, that we not forget, you know, George's
point about the stakes, that we cannot afford to walk away.

We walked away once at the end of the 1980s, and we saw what
happened. We cannot afford for Afghanistan to become a safe haven. We
can't afford for Pakistan to become a safe haven, with over 100 nuclear
weapon, 170 Muslims (ph). I think it's very important that we deal with
this relationship in a very well-advised way going forward and not jump
to the conclusion that we've got to walk away.

AMANPOUR: Tom, you have a different point of view on this.

RICKS: I do, and I'm actually kind of surprised to find myself to
the right of Liz Cheney.

AMANPOUR: Literally.

CHENEY: It's a very nice place to be.

RICKS: I actually think we're going to have to see a major change
in U.S.-Pakistani relations. This game of Charlie Brown and the
football that we've played with them for decades, I think the jig is
up. I don't think the American people will stand for it.

I think the elites in Washington, the administration, Congress, and
Liz Cheney, I think, are behind the mood of the American people or
trailing the mood of the American people. I don't think Congress is
going to stand for giving $4 billion a year to a country that is acting
like an enemy.

AMANPOUR: Lawrence Wright, I think you feel somewhat the same way.
But to play devil's advocate, doesn't Pakistan kind of have the U.S.
over a barrel? It does have all those nuclear weapons. It does and
remains instrumental to what's happening in Afghanistan. How can the
U.S. extricate itself from Afghanistan without Pakistan?

WRIGHT: It is kind of nuclear extortion, is something we're going
to have to deal with for the rest of our history. And we're already
seeing in North Korea. That's our relationship now in Pakistan.

Well, keep in mind our fear that they're going to sell this nuclear
secrets to our worst enemies has already happened. They sold it to
North Korea, Pakistan, and Libya...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: Iran.

WRIGHT: ... Iran. They opened up negotiations with Al Qaida in
1998. So the things that we're worried about have already -- our money
isn't protecting us. Our special relationship with Pakistan hasn't
provided any immunity from that kind of behavior.

AMANPOUR: What do they need to do? We asked Ambassador Haqqani.
We asked National Security Adviser Donilon. What actually do they need
to do that will satisfy the United States and that will create a real
change in behavior?

CHENEY: You know, we saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when
the U.S. government really gave them a choice and said to them, look,
you need to decide where you're going to line up here, and I think that
it's important that the Pakistanis understand the message that the
American people are demanding to know that now.

Nobody is happy with the fact that bin Laden was captured, was
killed inside Pakistan. But I think that those things that Larry and
that Tom mention as concerns will be more of a concern if we simply walk
away. If you have an extremist government, for example, take over in
Pakistan -- and they actually control that arsenal of nuclear weapons --
that's clearly not in America's interests. So we've got to stay engaged.

AMANPOUR: Let's talk about Afghanistan. Even before this death,
some two-thirds of the American people were no longer supporting the war
in Afghanistan. As you've heard, so many people are saying now you've
decapitated the snake, it's time to get out of Afghanistan. How long do
you think that will last or will that grow, those calls to reduce in
Afghanistan?

WILL: Well, it's our longest war now, it's 10 years old, longest in
our national history. Do the arithmetic. There are 140,000 coalition
forces there. There are at the top estimate about 100 Al Qaida fighters
there. That's 1,400 soldiers at a million dollars per a year, $1.4
billion per Al Qaida fighter. The arithmetic doesn't make sense.

The point is, we're not in there for Al Qaida. We say we are, but
we're not. We're there because we think in some sense this is crucial
to the stability of Pakistan, about which we wouldn't care half as much
as we do if they didn't have nuclear weapons, so it all comes back to
that.

AMANPOUR: So what -- you've been a lot to Afghanistan. How does
one get out of there? And does the death of bin Laden significantly
affect the war there?

RICKS: As a matter of fact, I used to be in the ski patrol in
Afghanistan when I lived there. I think what you can do is go the way
that Vice President Biden has been talking about for a long time, which
is go from a conventional footprint of 140,000 troops down to a much
smaller footprint of about 20,000 special operators and support troops.

If you do that, you remove the ability of Pakistan to extort from us
because they stand on our supply line. You can't supply 140,000 troops
by air. You can supply 20,000 by air and through Central Asia.

AMANPOUR: And, Lawrence, we've been talking a lot about and trying
to get our heads around how devastated is Al Qaida by the death of Osama
bin Laden. Is it still a force?

WRIGHT: It's still a force, but it's at a mortal moment. It was
already in trouble. It had divided leadership. It was under -- in
hiding, obviously, but the -- inside Al Qaida, there's going to be a
struggle, because Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two and the guy who's
likely to be the successor, is a very polarizing figure and he's
anti-charismatic. He doesn't have any of the mystique that bin Laden had.

There are all these affiliate, though, that will continue to run
under the Al Qaida flag, but basically most of them have nationalist
agendas, not international, as Al Qaida central had. And I suspect
you'll see a lot of centrifugal force pulling those organizations away.

AMANPOUR: We'll take that up in the next bit of our roundtable.
And up next, what is Al Qaida without Osama bin Laden? Our roundtable
tackles the new threat and whether waterboarding should return to the
American playbook.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BIDEN: (OFF-MIKE) the reason I'm call you is to tell you we killed
-- we killed...

OBAMA: Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the
world, the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama
bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaida.

Good job, national security team. Thank you. Yeah, I'm proud of
you. You guys did a great job.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: Images released by the White House behind the scenes as
the president and his top aides react to the death of Osama bin Laden.
Up next, I'll ask our roundtable whether his death gives new life to the
argument over harsh interrogation of terror suspects.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Obama administration officials acknowledged this week
that, yes, techniques like waterboarding did, in fact, yield fruitful
information in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Still, they question
whether that same information could have been obtained through other
means. This week's events have reignited this heated debate.

So what do you think? Should they come back again, these
interrogation techniques? Because even Leon Panetta said some of these
suspects had been interrogated in that way.

RICKS: I never thought I'd live in a country where we would debate
whether we should endorse torture as an official policy. Was some
information obtained through torture? Probably yeah. Could it have
been obtained through more professional methods the intelligence
professionals recommended? Almost certainly yes. We could have gotten
it sooner and better.

Also, what we know is that the use of torture became the prime
recruiting tool for Al Qaida and for insurgents in Iraq, and so directly
resulted in the death of American troops.

AMANPOUR: Liz, does this reignite this debate as to whether these
enhanced interrogation techniques work and should be brought back?

CHENEY: I think it does. I think the fact that you clearly have
the current CIA director saying that part of the intelligence came from
enhanced interrogation, it's important to remember, you know, Chip
Burlingame, who was the pilot on American Airlines Flight 77 that flew
into the Pentagon, he himself was subjected to these techniques when he
went through SERE training.

These are not torture. These are techniques that we know work.
That debate is over. It worked. It got the intelligence. It wasn't
torture. It was legal.

It seems to me the key question now is, we've got this trove of
intelligence, what looks to have been perhaps the biggest trove we've
ever been able to get a hold of. If that leads us to other Al Qaida
operatives, it's not clear to me that we have any way to effectively
interrogate them. We don't have enhanced interrogation anymore. We
read people their Miranda rights. We are not detaining people at
Guantanamo anymore. We're not detaining people in the secret prison
sites. It's not clear to me what the administration will be able to do
to get this information.

AMANPOUR: George, what do you think it says about that policy? And
what does this death of bin Laden, what they seem to have found right
now, say about what he was planning, what Al Qaida was planning?

WILL: Well, with regard to enhanced interrogation, it's an
unanswerable question, could we have got it another way? Perhaps yes.
We don't know. We know that we got it in part using enhanced
interrogation. So going forward, that's another matter.

What it tells us about Al Qaida, Al Qaida had this vaulting
ambitions, a caliphate from Indonesia to Spain. Now, with the waves of
modernity sweeping the Middle East, there sits this old man with a TV
remote, and the New York Times reported early on that one of the
notebooks, handwritten in his handwriting, I gather, his project was to
derail an American train on a bridge, perhaps coinciding with the State
of the Union address. You don't build a caliphate derailing American
trains. It's a pathetic ambition.

AMANPOUR: So are they kind of pathetic? I know everybody is
worried. People want to know whether there are any real threats to
American interests and other interests out there. Was Osama bin Laden
really, really the mastermind still, as the narrative is telling us
right now, organizing, operating?

WRIGHT: It's very hard to imagine that in that compound where you
see how pathetic it was and how carefully controlled the entry was to
have it as a nerve center. It seems -- it stretches the imagination.

I think the fact is, Al Qaida hasn't been able to operate very well
for the last eight years, and bin Laden has probably not been an
influence. I think that, really, the organization has been running more
or less without him, and not running very well.

AMANPOUR: And let's talk about George's point. You know, the Arab
Spring, the modernity that's sweeping the Islamic world, is that the
death of bin Ladenism? Is that what we're looking at, killing his
dream, basically?

CHENEY: I think I was struck as George was. You know, if you think
about the incredible information revolution and the fact that you've
got, you know, young people standing in Tahrir Square holding up a
smartphone saying, you know, this is my weapon, juxtaposed with bin
Laden sitting, you know, with a little teeny television set with wires
coming out of it, it looks like 1970s technology.

What's happening across the Arab world, I think, does begin to
signal the end of Al Qaida's aspirations. I think it's too soon to say
that they've been diminished as a threat. Certainly, Al Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, al-Awlaki are still threats, still attempting to
attack the United States. But the Middle East and the Arab world seem
to be moving on, and bin Laden's death certainly is part of that.

AMANPOUR: Tom, what do you think about where the real people are
going? Are they ripe for recruiting as everybody feared before?

RICKS: No, I think Lawrence's sense that they are an organization
with a past is correct. I was struck recently looking at a poll done in
Yemen and found Al Qaida was more popular among older people, 30s, 40s,
50s, than it was with people in their teens and 20s.

AMANPOUR: That is one of the remarkable things. In all these
countries where Pew has taken a recent poll, both bin Laden himself and
Al Qaida's popularity has been plummeting.

Last question to you, because you've been very critical of President
Obama, and you suggest that he's been up to the task of national
security. Would you take that back now?

CHENEY: I still have big concerns about some of his policies, but I
certainly think that America is safer, the world is safer when the
message is, if you kill 3,000 American, the Navy SEALs are going to put
a bullet in your head. So I would give President Obama credit for
making that tough decision.

AMANPOUR: On that note, thank you all very much.

And up next, the toll that this one man has taken on the United
States and the world. Sorrow and sacrifice by the numbers when "This
Week" continues.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: We'll always remember where we are were on that terrible
day nearly 10 years ago, and newspapers around this country and around
the world told the story. But the real impact lies not in the
headlines, but in the numbers: 2,976 people were killed on 9/11. Since
then, twice as many American troops have died fighting the wars on
terror, 6,002 servicemen and women.

This week, the Pentagon released the names of five soldiers killed
in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And, of course, thousands of people around the world have also
fallen victim to acts of terror sponsored, planned, and applauded by
Osama bin Laden.

I'll be right back with a closing thought in a moment.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Today is Mother's Day. And as I stand before the twisted
antenna of the Twin Towers, I'm struck by what children have told me
about that terrible morning, children who are visiting this exhibit.
They spoke of their mothers, some standing strong, others dissolving
into tears on that day, 9/11, children as young as five with such vivid
memories still.

I also think of the mothers who were killed that day and in all the
wars that have followed and of those who have been left behind to raise
families on their own. Our thoughts are with all of them today.

That's it for our program. For all of us here at "This Week," thank
you for watching, and see you next week.

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