LETTER VII.
December 31, 1787.
Dear sir,
In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole
force reducible to two principles — the important springs which alone move
the machines, and give them their intended influence and controul, are force
and persuasion: by the former men are compelled, by the latter they are
drawn. We denominate a government despotic or free, as the one or other
principle prevails in it. Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be
so despotic, as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is
it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or
so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel
obedience to the laws. In despotic governments one man, or a few men,
independant of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and
inforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed, and
obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep
them subject to the laws. In free governments the people, or their
representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of
voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their
private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labour with very small
deductions for the public use. The body of the people must evidently prefer
the latter species of government; and it can be only those few, who may be
well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism, that can, for a
moment, prefer the former. Our true object is to give full efficacy to one
principle, to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little
necessary as possible. Persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic
governments; but military force, if often applied internally, can never fail
to destroy the love and confidence, and break the spirits, of the people;
and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who
govern, and yield to this force against the people, to hold their places by
the peoples' elections.
I repeat my observation, that the plan proposed will have a doubtful
operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate
towards persuasion or force is uncertain.
Government must exist — If the persuasive principle be feeble, force is
infallibly the next resort — The moment the laws of congress shall be
disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed — that
moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must
elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the
government. In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect
the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of
persuasion. In forming this branch, therefore, several important
considerations must be attended to. It must possess abilities to discern the
situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize
with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to
their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against
interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the
confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly
advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the
interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such
manner as they would be were the people all assembled. Having made these
general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal
position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people
provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to
the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to
propose certain amendments as to the representative branch: 1st, That there
ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly, That
the elections of them ought to be better secured.
1. The representation is unsubstantial and ought to be increased. In matters
where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my
positions with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations
to be candid, and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer. I am
in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though
no feature in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been
less understood, and no one that has received so imperfect a consideration
by political writers. The ephori in Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were
but the shadow; the representation in Great-Britain is unequal and insecure.
In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its
true principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides: yet even here, I
conceive, that very great improvements in representation may be made. In
fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed, and the
number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that
situation. When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive
country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches
or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws, to
arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve them in their happy
condition. A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve
unchanged a virtuous people. A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial
to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile and
depraved creatures. Where the people, or their representatives, make the
laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national character
and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect
substitute of the people. However, the people may be electors, if the
representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of
men in the society an undue ascendency over the others, it is imperfect; the
former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves. It is the first
of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station each
of these classes. We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the
departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people.
Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a
community, in forming a genuine representation, and seen that idea
considered as chemerical, I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the
marquis Beccaria's treatise: this sentence was quoted by congress in 1774,
and is as follows: — "In every society there is an effort continually
tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to
reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good
laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence universally
and equally." Add to this Montesquieu's opinion, that "in a free state every
man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own
government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of
the people, or their representatives." It is extremely clear that these
writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call
aristocratical, democratical, merchantile, mechanic, &c. and perceived the
efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed
to make to elevate themselves and oppress others. Each order must have a
share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently. It is
deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their
legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things, chuse men from among
themselves, and genuinely like themselves. I wish you to take another idea
along with you; we are not only to balance these natural efforts, but we are
also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the
connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased
in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are
decreased. To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some
general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may
be divided by occupations and politically: the first class is the
aristocratical. There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this
country — the first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the
United States in our common acceptation of the word. Montesquieu, it is
true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want of
property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government,
the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this
aristocracy; this according to him, exists in each of the United States,
where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under
age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the
government; the second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled
men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together
and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement; the
existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be
guarded against. The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to
designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural
democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we may place men on one side of this
line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the
few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain
themselves on which side they are, or ought to be. In my idea of our natural
aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men;
and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of
governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the
principal officers of Congress, of the army and militia, the superior
judges, the most eminent professional men, &c. and men of large property —
the other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy;
this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and
military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and
professional men. It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the
aristocratical, and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments
widely different, especially respecting public and private expences,
salaries, taxes, &c. Men of the first class associate more extensively, have
a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge:
men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects;
they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty: their dependence
is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard
labour, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large
estates, and of the chief offices of government. Not only the efforts of
these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties
also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and
for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each
other; yet such are their general views, that the merchants alone would
never fail to make laws favourable to themselves and oppressive to the
farmers, &c. the farmers alone would act on like principles; the former
would tax the land, the latter the trade. The manufacturers are often
disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion to lower
prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries
endeavour to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them, endeavour
to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at
large to lessen them. Thus, in every period of society, and in all the
transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the
Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in the government,
in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined.
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for
rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political
controversies — Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the
changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the
passions of jealousy and envy: the yeomanry possess a large share of
property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits —
the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous, they
are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently
stable for the supporting free governments; the fishing interest partakes
partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the
changeableness of the mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they
are our agents in almost all money transactions; give activity to
government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it. It has been
observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally
advocates for liberty. It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that
the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government;
gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, &c. probably form about a fourth
part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that
of all the other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments
to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be
the majority; but the more the representatives are encreased, the more of
the farmers, merchants, &c. will be found to be brought into the government.
These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by
different classes, and the general scope of my ideas, when I contend for
uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the
legislature; we may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a
change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the
depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the
combination and full representation; a small representation can never be
well informed as to the circumstances of the people, the members of it must
be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and
too few to communicate with them: a representation must be extremely
imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper
communications to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn
cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances,
and opinions, to their representatives; where there is but one
representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can
only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his
constituents, even double the federal representation, and then there must be
a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general
represented. On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of
Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the province of Main[e], the county
of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one representative each; there can be
but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and
the people at large of either of those districts. It has been observed, that
mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best information and
ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favourable to their
purposes particularly. Many plausible shifts have been made to divert the
mind from dwelling on this defective representation, these I shall consider
in another place."
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and
party efforts, to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy,
information and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an
insuperable difficulty will still remain, I mean the constant liability of a
small number of representatives to private combinations; the tyranny of the
one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small
evils, compared with the factions of the few. It is a consideration well
worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be liable to be
formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of
appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and
senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them. To obviate
difficulties on this head, as well as objections to the representative
branch, generally, several observations have been made — these I will now
examine, and if they shall appear to be unfounded, the objections must stand
unanswered.
That the people are the electors, must elect good men, and attend to the
administration.
It is said that the members of Congress, at stated periods, must return
home, and that they must be subject to the laws they may make, and to a
share of the burdens they may impose.
That the people possess the strong arm to overawe their rulers, and the best
checks in their national character against the abuses of power, that the
supreme power will remain in them.
That the state governments will form a part of, and a balance in the system.
That Congress will have only a few national objects to attend to, and the
state governments many and local ones.
That the new Congress will be more numerous than the present, and that any
numerous body is unwieldy and mobbish.
That the states only are represented in the present Congress, and that the
people will require a representation in the new one; that in fifty or an
hundred years the representation will be numerous.
That congress will have no temptation to do wrong; and that no system to
enslave the people is practicable.
That as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments; and
that when they shall become tired of freedom, arbitrary government must take
place.
These observations I shall examine in the course of my letters; and, I
think, not only shew that they are not well founded, but point out the
fallacy of some of them; and shew, that others do not very well comport with
the dignified and manly sentiments of a free and enlightened people.