CHINESE QUEST FOR A NAVAL BASE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN – POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR CHINA

Author :

(This article which had originally
been written for and appeared on this website in February 2010 is
reproduced on account of its current relevance.)

“China is in need of a strong power to maintain the world peace. So it
is necessary for us to build troop bases to face the challenge from
other countries.”

The above extract from a recent article titled ‘Don’t shun
the idea of setting up overseas military bases’ by Professor Shen
Dingli virtually sums up the scope of the overarching ambitions that
China harbours with regard to its global power projection thinking.
China views this aspect as part of its natural progression towards
becoming a superpower. The key words in the above quote which merit
notice are “to maintain world peace”. It is not evident as to how has
China received a mandate “to maintain world peace”, for facilitation of
which it seeks to set up overseas military bases, and hopes that the
international community will understand and not get overly concerned by
such a move.

The above article makes a strong pitch for setting up
Chinese military bases overseas, citing the need to “. . . enhance power
for safeguarding own overseas interests and to exert pressure on the
potential enemies’ interests. . . .” There is thus no denying the fact
that a domestic debate in favour of China setting up overseas bases is
gaining traction, as this is the second article appearing in the Chinese
cyber media within the last month. A milder version propagating the
same theme was articulated by a PLA Navy Admiral Yin Zhuo after the
release of the Chinese Bulk carrier ‘De Xin Hai’ from Somali pirates in
end December 2009. The Admiral proposed that China should set up a
permanent base in the Indian Ocean to support the long term
participation of Chinese naval ships in the anti-piracy operations off
the Somali coast. It is argued that this would strengthen the PLA Navy’s
logistic capacity, thus enabling fulfillment of its international
commitments with greater efficiency. The common thread running through
both the pieces was that ‘the other nations would understand China’s
need for a establishing such overseas bases’.

Chinese Options in the Indian Ocean

One of the ‘Pearls’?

Though thePLA Navy Admiral did not suggest a location for
such a base, he did believe that the base should be relatively stable,
contain facilities for communications, repairs, replenishment of fuel,
re-supply of rations and offer avenues for recreation. The most obvious
choice for a Chinese base would of course, be from amongst one of the
‘pearls’ from its so called ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean. The
Bangladeshi and Myanmarese ports in the Bay of Bengal may be too out of
the way from the standard transit routes to the Arabian Sea and hence
may not be suitable in the current Chinese scheme of things. This leaves
China with an option of establishing a military base either in Sri
Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta) or Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni).

While the Sri Lankan ports do lie astride the Arabian Sea
transit route, they would still be well far away (about 2000 NM) from
the current scene of action. Further, the moot question will be whether
Sri Lanka would want to risk antagonizing a close and large neighbour
like India, to which it is geo-politically and inseparably linked, by
allowing China to set up a naval base on its territory.

The next best option for China would then be Pakistan, for
evident reasons, i.e. close Sino-Pak economic and military association
as against the uncertain India-Pak relations. Pakistan and China also
share the land borders, through which such a base can be supported
reasonably well. However, such a base would suffer from certain inherent
disadvantages when seen from a maritime perspective. The base would be
too close to India and would be well within the range of Indian naval
surveillance and strike envelope. It could also be susceptible to
blockade, as was witnessed off Karachi Port during the 1971 Indo-Pak
conflict. Further, the Chinese warships repeatedly transiting to and
from ports in Pakistan would be prone to intrusive monitoring, signature
profiling, tracking and trailing by the Indian Navy, due to the very
nature of their passage constraints.

Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’?

There are however, other options for China, if one were to digress a
little from the ‘String of Pearls’ construct. The various islands of
Maldives and Seychelles present a range of opportunities for a country
which seeks to maintain a holistic maritime presence in the Indian Ocean
Region, as it would offset all the abovementioned disadvantages
associated with the Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China has been
actively wooing both, Maldives and Seychelleswith offer of economic
assistance, infrastructure development and liberal financial loans /
grants. There have been unconfirmed reports of Maldives having leased
‘Marao atoll’ to China for constructing a naval base.

However, India and Maldives share very strong bilateral
relations built on sizeable economic, security and social cooperation.
India had provided security support in foiling a coup attempt against
the Maldivian Government in 1988 in an operation named ‘Op Cactus’. More
recently, India handed over a fast patrol craft to the Maldivian Coast
Guard in 2006. The Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony visited Maldives
in August 2009 and initiated a series of measures to enhance defence
cooperation. India has promised to transfer two ‘Dhruv’ helicopters, 26
coastal radars and regular Dornier patrol sorties over the island nation
as part of the security plan. India will also set up a 25 bed military
hospital in Male and assist in setting up the Maldivian Air Force. Thus
the geographical proximity of Maldives to India as also its close
political ties, will pose the same dilemma to Maldives as applicable to
Sri Lanka., if it were to consider the basing of Chinese ships on its
territory. The Chinese leadership would surely take these factors into
account, when they mull over the ‘military base’ issue.

Therefore, in the opinion of the analyst, a base in Seychelles, which
is virtually in the centre of the West Indian Ocean and the focus of the
current Chinese maritime activities, would be more appropriate for the
Chinese Navy. The island nation is located close enough to its energy
traffic transiting through the Red Sea, as also heading homewards from
the West African coast around the Cape of Good Hope. It would enable the
PLA Navy to monitor this vital energy route and provide security when
needed. Seychelles is also not too distant from the Somali coast and
the Gulf of Aden, where the PLA Navy ships are currently deployed, and
for whose logistics support, the Chinese Admiral recommended the setting
up of a base in the Indian Ocean. The biggest maritime advantage for
PLA Navy would be that the naval base as also the assets using it would
be well away from the prying eyes and intrusive surveillance by the
Indian Navy. The base would be also be close enough to the sea route of
US naval assets transiting to Diego Garcia, enabling China to mount some
kind of surveillance in future as and when their capabilities grow to
an appropriately advanced level.

A comparative table shown below indicating distances in nautical miles

Chinese economic engagements with Seychelles have been
growing in the recent past. China announced $ 4.5 million grant to
Seychelles and also signed an agreement on technical and economic
cooperation during the visit of the President of Seychelles, Mr. Alix
Michel, to Beijing in November 2006. Chinese President, Hu Jintao
thereafter visited Seychelles in February 2007 as part of his
eight-nation African tour. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing
Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPC), the country's top
legislature also visited Seychelles in November 2008 during his five
nation African tour. China contributed more than 90 percent of the funds
for the new ‘National Assembly’ building and provided technical
assistance in its construction. During its inauguration on December 04,
2009, the Chinese ambassador in Seychelles stated that the new National
Assembly building was one of the highlights of the friendship between
Seychelles and China.On November 25, 2009, China and Seychelles also
signed an agreement for the equivalent of a US $ 6 million for financing
the construction of a new Supreme Court building, which will be called
the ‘Palais de Justice’.

India has also been maintaining cordial economic and defence
relationship with Seychelles. The Indo-Seychelles Joint Commission was
set up in October 1990 and meets biennially to discuss common trade,
investment, and communications matters. The Indian naval ships have
been regularly visiting Seychelles for the last two decades. In 2005,
the Indian Navy handed over a fast attack craft to the Seychelles Coast
Guard to help them secure their maritime interests. India also gifted
naval workshop equipment to Seychelles in September 2008, during the
visit of the Indian Navy ships. India has also provided military experts
to upgrade and restructure the Seychelles Peoples Defense Force (SPDF).
The extent of Indian engagements with Seychelles however, remains on a
lesser scale as compared to that of China, as is evident from the above.
Conclusion

China has deep anxieties about the geographical location of
India that places it astride the Indian Ocean. It has therefore always
kept its options open with regard to deploying its armed forces in the
region.Thus the establishment of a Chinese naval base in the region,
irrespective of its location, would have considerable security
implications for India.The sustained presence of PLA Navy ships in the
Indian Ocean, particularly in the Arabian Sea, will result in limiting
the availability of maritime space for the Indian Navy and curtail its
area of influence. This will also boost the morale of India’s inimical
neighbour, howsoever notionally. The Indian Navy will have to factor in
the presence of Chinese naval ships in the Indian backyard while
planning operations, missions and exercises.

While there is neither any indication at present to suggest
that China will set up a base in Maldives or Seychelles, nor whether
Maldives or Seychelles would willingly accede to any such Chinese
request, an attempt has been made to identify the most suitable location
for China from the maritime perspective. Given the Chinese propensity
for springing surprises in international arena all invariably ending up
in its favour, the Indian strategic and security establishment must
take due cognizance of this probability turning into reality and prepare
strategies to preserve the Indian national interest in the Indian Ocean
and its littorals.

*Commander Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri is a Research Fellow with the China
Cell of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed
are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Indian Navy or National Maritime Foundation. The Author
can be reached at kkagnihotri@maritimeindia.org.