WikiLeaks and disclosing classified information

On Friday morning Australian time, WikiLeaks placed online the entire set of unredacted diplomatic cables. The full set was already available for anyone able to search for it, armed with the password provided by Guardian journalists David Leigh and Luke Harding. Since then, it’s become clear that some of the claims made by WikiLeaks critics, and The Guardian in its defence on the issue, are highly problematic from a cryptographic point of view.

Nonetheless, WikiLeaks’s decision to make the material available, while unlikely to do any further harm than had already been done in endangering individuals, correctly drew criticism from a wide range of sources, including its enemies in the mainstream media. Whatever the responsibility of others for the original release of the unencrypted version of the material, it was WikiLeaks’ decision to release it last week, and to the extent that it increases the risk of harm coming to those identified in the unredacted cables, WikiLeaks is culpable.

Another critic emerged late on Friday to tut-tut about the whole affair: Attorney-General Robert McClelland released a statement at 5pm on Friday criticising the release of unredacted material, although his comments were gracious enough to direct responsibility toward “WikiLeaks and others”. “Others” of course are The Guardian and its jilted-lover journalists determined to pay back Julian Assange, and whoever of Daniel Domscheit-Berg’s group — and there aren’t that many of them — insisted on drawing the world’s attention to the fact that the password to the encrypted documents was available.

McClelland also complained that the unredacted cables identified an ASIO agent. “I am aware of at least one cable in which an ASIO officer is purported to have been identified, as reported in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age today.”

Under s.92 of the ASIO Act, publicly identifying an ASIO officer other than the Director-General is a crime punishable with imprisonment for one year. There was immediate speculation that Julian Assange could be prosecuted in Australia under the Act.

Why the blanket ban on identifying anyone in ASIO? A prohibition on ASIO officers working undercover would make sense, but the entire organisation, from the senior executive down? It applies even to their media liaison team.

Not even the American intelligence community has such a ban. In the US, only the identification of covert agents (but not other agents) is prohibited under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. But the ban itself only applies to people who have “authorised access to classified material” — that is, people in the intelligence community already, or in senior levels of government.

More of that later.

If you’re a journalist and reveal the identity of a covert agent, you can only be prosecuted if it is “in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.” That is, you must be setting out to expose agents with the intent of harming the US, and as part of a “pattern of activities”.

So the spooks in ASIO get far more protection than US spies, even those operating undercover offshore.

The British have the famous Official Secrets Act, but revelation of the identities of, say MI5 or MI6 officers is a trickier business. The Official Secrets Act is drafted very broadly, and makes it a felony to communicate “information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”. In 2002, the BBC revealed the identities of some former MI5 agents and was never prosecuted. However, the British Government is able to muzzle the press with D-notices, which have been used to prevent reporting of the whistleblowing of former spy (and many other things) David Shayler, who claimed MI6 had provided extensive funding for al-Qaeda to kill Muammar Gaddafi and failed to prevent terrorist attacks in London in the 1990s.

So ASIO gets even more protection than British spies.

This blanket protection would be less concerning if there was real accountability for ASIO and the actions of its agents. The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security provides minimal accountability — to read its findings of investigations into major incidents within not just ASIO but the broader intelligence community over the last decade is to learn that our intelligence services are apparently infallible apart from the occasional housekeeping or administrative problem.

The case of Izhar Ul-Haque remains a particular outrage, after a NSW judge threw out a terror prosecution because two ASIO agents had committed the offences of false imprisonment and kidnapping in the course of a wildly over-the-top raid on a Sydney family. The response of the Inspector-General was to wave such conduct through, declaring there was no evidence that ASIO agents had done anything wrong and that Ul-Haque didn’t even have a case for compensation. The harshest criticism expressed in the report was “this is not to say that I am completely comfortable with some of the elements of what occurred.”

The two ASIO agents, who in the company of 25 Federal police terrorised two young men and their family, have stayed safely hidden behind their anonymity ever since.

But the rules around disclosure of secret information naturally bend a little depending on who is doing the disclosing. Recall that Andrew Wilkie was the victim of a Howard Government leak to Andrew Bolt — from Alexander Downer’s office — designed to discredit him. The leak, involving Office of National Assessments material, was a plain breach of the Crimes Act. No one was ever prosecuted for it or, for that matter, had their subsequent career stymied because of it.

That Wilkie material wasn’t quite in the same league as Dick Cheney’s office disclosing the identity of a covert CIA officer, Valerie Plame, in order to undermine a critic of the Administration’s lies on on Iraqi WMD. That was another government disclosure that was never punished, although Cheney’s chief of staff was convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice in relation to the matter, before President Bush commuted his gaol sentence.

That brings us full circle back to WikiLeaks. What upsets governments about WikiLeaks, the thing that sticks in the craw most about Julian Assange, isn’t the notion of leaking per se. Governments leak all the time, often leak highly sensitive, classified information. The political and foreign affairs coverage of The New York Times, for example, is composed almost entirely of leaks from within the US Government, invariably from sources “speaking on the condition of not being identified.” What infuriates governments about WikiLeaks is they are not controlling the leaking of classified material. Leaking is only OK when governments do it.

In short, when it comes to the rules about disclosing classified information, governments think the rules only apply to everyone else, not to them.

A problem for any prosecution. They have to prove Wikileaks were first to reveal said information. Given that Wikileaks only released all of these cables due to a hack attack which revealed those files that is not a clear cut thing to prove.

Bernard, I think it may be time for a holiday, you’re far too close and seemingly warped by this thing.

ASIO officers have more protection that M15? And that is a bad thing? What exactly is your problem here? They have it because not every Tom, Dick and Bernard should know who does and does not work for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. They have it because if it is known where you work, then you are suspecptible to inflitration, to being targeted, etc etc. They have it, it is the law. Full stop.

And really, your last line is a cracker: “In short, when it comes to the rules about disclosing classified information, governments think the rules only apply to everyone else, not to them.”

Replace “governments” with “Wikileaks” and that cracker still holds true.

Quite right Bernard. I’m watin’ in drowsy and somnolent expectation of a predictable surge of moral outrage from the outlet pipes of Australian establishment mediocrity about the perfidy of young Julian. He outs US forces slaughtering Iraqui’s and journalists and there’s a modest tut-tutting. His cable release outs one ASIO agent and it’ll be the end of civilisation, for sure. I like your line, Bernard, about how ASIO sees itself as infallible. Who do these people think they are? DOCS?

But how does revealing ASIO identities improve accountability? By their very nature these organisations are designed to avoid that. The public — even senators — barely seem able to protest against the powers they hold. Knowing the names of operatives does not change our awful terror laws.

Wow something we do agree on. Yes you are right. To prosecute Assange as an individual they have to prove his culpability in either directly revealing the information or conspiring to do so.
Given that Wikileaks have a record of redacting names to protect lives before the hack I think this would indeed be hard to prove.

I do think Mr Keane raises very valid points about how far should we protect secret organizations like ASIO.
The latest revelations revealed by Human Rights Watch on Western Intelligence agencies involvement with Libya against every human right our democracies are supposed to be means we know there is too much secrecy. Not enough accountability.

Information and data collected by government agencies, like ASIO, is the property of the Government. Therefore they can use it anyway they see fit (which includes making it public).

Wikileaks, by contrast, does not own the government cables it is publishing on the web. As the distributor of this information, it should be held accountable if it has broken laws regarding disclosure of ASIO identities. (and so what if ASIO has better protections than equivalent spy agencies…if the law has been broken, the law has been broken)

a - they also have a history of releasing unredacted cables as they did in 2010 when they named names of Afghans who were helping the US and therefore put them in grave danger, and

b - Wikileaks is founded on the principle that all information should be freely available to everyone. They only starting redacting the cables in the first place under pressure from US and other governments to protect people who were named in them.

Where does the “everyone has a right to see everything” fit within a now-redacting organisation? Its just as Bernard said at the end - “its only ok if we do it, not if the government or anyone else does it”.

Hypocrisy of massive proportions.

Which incidentally wouldn’t be hypocrisy if they just acknowledged the fact that this stuff aint easy and the most finely-tuned principles in the world get violently careened off course when you are dealing with real life and real death.

Sadly, as their own release of their own cables shows - Wikileaks still hasn’t grown up.

The public — even senators — barely seem able to protest against the powers they hold

Precisely, does it come as a shock that ASIO are not answerable to the Govt/Public. They, like all other Intelligence Communities, answer only to foreign interests and seldom in the interests of the host nation. At the higher levels thay have always been the secret Govt.

@MLF - wrong! The author of this article is the only person in the Land of Oz who thoroughly researches his subject matter in this regard. If the goons in the MSM had as much character and single-mindedness as him we might all be a bit better informed.

Oh aye, here we go then. I’d also like to know the names of the AFP officers who may or may have not known of any seaworthiness issues with SIEV-X and I think it would be in Australian public interest to do so. Here’s hopin’. I’m very keen to read the name of the Australian government employee who was present in the cells for a time with Mamdouh Habib. I think we’re entitled to know that.

Blair - the only person? What a great and sweeping generalizing statement. Truly worthy of Crikey to be sure.

I don’t have a problem with Bernard’s researching skills. Actually by and large I don’t have a problem with Bernard at all. But he has been known to use research and buzz words to imply an untruth (Juan Charles ring a bell, B?) and if you think that only the MSM are guilty of presenting a singular point of view instead of a balanced one, well, you need to read more.

The article is suggesting “if they stuff up or overstep then we have a right to know”just like all the other crap that gov’ts dish up to us every now and then.As for deliberate” leaks” by gov’ts these are not leaks and should be reported accordingly as govt info.
@ Scott (and so what if ASIO has better protections than equivalent spy agencies…if the law has been broken, the law has been broken)….well what if they break the law are you suggesting they are perfectly well behaved? or do you simply trust the organisation full stop ….. perhaps you do and good for you!!!!

Ditto, and what about the release of cables outlining what ASIO knew in regards to the Bali Bombings?
Too hot? tell that to the murdered, maimed and seriously burnt victims of this oh so sordid affair. The Australian people wanted nothing to do with sending troops to Iraq, and then the Bali bombings. The connection to Sadam Husseinand WMD’s from the hapless intellectually challenged indonesian village patsies via our friends in the MSM completed the charade. I think we’re entitled to know that too.

Guytaur, innocence or guilt must be proven in a court of law before which a case must be brought before which a law must be broken. I am sure we are on the same page here. You said it would need to be proven wiki were the first to release the information. I said this was wrong. The case will sit on the fact on whether the wiki release did or did not make public information protected by law. That’s the bare bones of it, the rest is academic until a case is brought.

Blair, from ‘the only person’ to ‘the only journalist’ and now if I do not name another journalist that must therefore mean there are none? Which even if this was the case doesn’t change the fact that here BK is putting a specific and unbalanced slant on his piece?

You are using the same type of argument tha Yanks were against Wikileaks. Sarah Palindrome et al.
Once the information is released it is in the public domain. It is the first release that takes away secrecy.
Your argument is totally ridiculous.

If there was not such secrecy then Wikileaks would not have got to the oint of having the individual names to redact.
Accountable intelligence services do not cooperate in torture as is the major reason alleged that David Manning leaked this material to Wikileaks in the first place.
Now there is too much secrecy
In figure less secrecy and more accountability. Ironically more openness about what an agency does will help protect the secrecy of personnel.

Secrecy = Power - Responsibility. See Lord Acton for a view on that combo.
Not unlike the vapourings of a recent OO editorial, shocked, they wuz, SHOCKED, that Wikleeks (mostly underground, white & green) committed the lese majeste of by-passing their self assumed role as gate keeper of information.
Coz, like, them done such a good job previously.

Who and what does this sacrosanct secrecy protect?
We are in favour of open government and transparency or we are not. It is a simple choice and absolute.
There should be no secrets, no protection, no anynomity, no faceless men claiming to be acting on our behalf.
“I’m from the government, trust me.” Not on your life.

Open and transparent government is the primary goal of organisations like Wikileaks and similar organisations cropping up all over the world eg. Open Australia Foundation etc.

The main point is secrecy is poisonous to democratic principles. Despite recent ‘Claytons’ reforms to FOI have you ever tried to obtain documents under FOI. There are are still huge grey areas for exceptions to be made including the piffling “Commercial interests” and the amount of work involved in processing - which would suggest better records management procedures are required.

While protection of ASIO names may be practical to facilitate investigations in many cases Wikileaks might be guilty of poor organisation or lacking in resources, I would be surprised if all the players were perfect, but accusations of treachery is taking things a bit far.

Governments by contrast are able to act with impunity on similar transgressions such as the outing of Valerie Plame by the US Government and as Keane refers, the leaks from Alexander Downer’s Office attempting to demonise Andrew Wilkie.

Blair, sorry you’ve lost me know, I don’t know what you are talking about now.

Guytaur - give me a break with the Sarah Palin bullshit and see excerpt below from the Act. As I said above, the information in question is an official secret and as such is protected at law. Its not “this is a secret until someone tells it so its not a secret anymore” for pete’s sake. Its not kindergarten, this is big boy stuff and if you’d lived through a world war and had your secret service infiltrated by the enemy you might have a bit more respect for the background to the current situation.

AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION ACT 1979 - SECT 92
Publication of identity of officer of Organisation
(1) A person (other than a member of the Committee on Intelligence and Security) shall not, except with the consent in writing of the Minister or of the Director-General, publish or cause to be published in a newspaper or other publication, or by radio broadcast or television, or otherwise make public, any matter stating, or from which it could reasonably be inferred, that a person having a particular name or otherwise identified, or a person residing at a particular address, is an officer (not including the Director-General), employee or agent of the Organisation or is in any way connected with such an officer, employee or agent or, subject to subsection (1B), is a former officer (not including a former Director-General), employee or agent of the Organisation or is in any way connected with such a former officer, employee or agent.

Peter, I can’t say I disagree with your “I’m from the government, trust me.” Not on your life.” comment. I totally and utterly agree. Trust is hard earned and easily lost, and I don’t trust many - from governments to corporations to the media to those who purport to be doing things purely for the public good but are clearly doing them with massive egos, i.e. Wikileaks.

But seriously think about what you are saying regards transparency. Transparency doesn’t mean there are no secrets, it means decisions and actions are transparent, it means there is accountability and responsibility. And all of us know too well that none of these things - transparency, accountability, responsibility - exists in great shakes anywhere at the present time.

But how can you say everyone should know everything and nothing should be hidden when people’s lives are at stake? What about personal privacy and the security of individuals involved in State business? What if the Navy learned that an armed submarine was heading towards Sydney Harbour? Do they broadcast it to the world at large in the name of having no secrets? What is ASIS learns there is a group of 35 men plotting to blow up the MCG? Do they get on the news and let them know? Of course they don’t. They do their job and disarm the threat.

They can’t do that without being secretive. But they can be secreative and transparent and accountable all at the same time.