13 Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Co.

, 7 Phil 329,January 23, 1907

FACTS:

Plaintiff was at work. Plaintiff claims that but one hand carwas used in this work. The defendant has proved that there weretwo immediately following one another but without side pieces orguards to prevent them from slipping off. According to plaintiff, themen were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According todefendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At acertain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tiebroke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caughtthe plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated atabout the knee.

The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of thetie, which was the immediate occasion of the accident to havebeen the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringerby the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon.

Also, there was a warning frequently made known to all the

gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foremanswears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of hisparticular load.

ISSUE:

Whether there existed a negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

HELD: Yes. The shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron railsproduces the event for damages. The act of the plaintiff in walkingby the side of the car did not contribute, although it was anelement of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiecebeen out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission ofduty, the last would have been one of the determining causes ofthe event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of itsdetermining factors, he can not recover.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury,

between the event itself, without which there could have been noaccident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,independent of it, but contributing under review was thedisplacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.14.

Calalas vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122039May 31, 2000

Facts: Sunga, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated byCalalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extensionseat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of thevehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she wasseated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoingpassenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven byVerena and owned by Salva bumped the jeepney. As a result,Sunga was injured and confined for about 2 weeks.

Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging

violation of the contract of carriage Calalas filed a third-partycomplaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzutruck. Korte

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party

defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was thedriver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. Ittook cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed byCalalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liableto Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court

was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action wasbased on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that thecommon carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under theCivil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaintagainst Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers.

Held:

2. No. the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. This necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.3.15. (Consolidated case)

PCIB vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 121413

January 29, 2001

Facts:

G.R. No. 121413/G.R. No. 121479

Ford drew a Citibank check in favor of the CIR. The checkrepresents Fords tax payment. On the face of the check waswritten Payees account only. The said check was howeverpresented to PCIB and PCIB accepted the same. PCIB thenindorsed the check for clearing to Citibank. Citibank cleared thecheck and paid PCIB. CIR later informed Ford that it never receivedthe tax payment.An investigation ensued and it was discovered that Fordsaccountant Godofredo Rivera, when the check was deposited withPCIB, recalled the check since there was allegedly an error in thecomputation of the tax to be paid. PCIB, as instructed by Rivera,replaced the check with two of its managers checks.It was further discovered that Rivera was actually a member of asyndicate and the managers checks were subsequently depositedwith the Pacific Banking Corporation by other members of thesyndicate. Thereafter, Rivera and the other members becamefugitives of justice.

Issue/s: What are the liabilities of each party?

Held:G.R. No. 121413/G.R. No. 121479:PCIB is liable for the amount of the check. PCIB, as a collectingbank has been negligent in verifying the authority of Rivera tonegotiate the check. It failed to ascertain whether or not Riveracan validly recall the check and have them be replaced with PCIBsmanagers checks as in fact, Ford has no knowledge and did notauthorize such. A bank) which cashes a check drawn upon anotherbank, without requiring proof as to the identity of personspresenting it, or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot holdthe proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checkswere afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. Hence, PCIBis liable for the amount of the embezzled check.

But the Supreme Court ruled that in the consolidated cases, thatPCIB and Citibank are not the only negligent parties. Ford is alsonegligent for failing to examine its passbook in a timely mannerwhich could have avoided further loss. But this negligence is notthe proximate cause of the loss but is merely contributory.Nevertheless, this mitigates the liability of PCIB and Citibank16.

Picart vs. Smith

G.R. No. L-12219

March 15, 1918

Facts:

Plaintiff was riding on his pony. Before he had gotten half wayacross, the defendant approached from the opposite direction inan automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw ahorseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gavetwo more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man onhorseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard thewarning signals. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, thedefendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distanceaway or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward thehorse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quitenear, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across tothe other side, the defendant quickly turned his car to the right toescape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as thenstanding; but in so doing the animal became frightened andturned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.As struck on the hock of the left hind leg and the limb was broken.The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As aresult of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff receivedcontusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and requiredmedical attention for several days.Issue:

Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the

manner above described was guilty of negligence.

Held:

Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to thedefendant; it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediatestop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, totake the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse toavoid the danger of collision. Instead the defendant ran straight onuntil he was almost upon the horse. When the defendant exposedthe horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligentin the eye of the law.

Negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the

position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognizedthat the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, andwould therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider asreasonable consequence of that course. Under thesecircumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty toguard against the threatened harm.17. DEL PRADO VS MANILA ELECTRIC CO . (52 PHIL 901,MARCH 7, 1929)

FACTS:Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars,Florenciano was in charge of car No. 74. After the car had stoppedat its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers itresumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of themotorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance when DelPrado ran across the street to catch the car, his approach beingmade from the left. The plaintiff arrived at the front entrance ofthe car at the moment when the car was passing. However, beforethe plaintiff's position had become secure the motorman appliedthe power giving the car a slight lurch forward. This suddenimpulse to the car caused the plaintiff's foot to slip and his handwas jerked loose from the handpost. He fell to the ground, and hisright foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.

ISSUE:Whether or not plaintiff his act of riding the moving car is theproximate cause.HELD:No.It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to boardthe moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. Thedirect and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant'smotorman in putting on the power prematurely. Again, thesituation before us is one where the negligent act of thecompany's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff,and the negligence of the company must be considered theproximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seemsto be analogous to, if not identical with that which issometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clearchance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributorynegligence of the party injured will not defeat the action ifit be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise ofreasonable care and prudence, have avoided theconsequences of the negligence of the injured party. Thenegligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory tothe accident and must be considered as a mitigatingcircumstance.

18. DAVID TAYLOR VS THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD

AND LIGHT COMPANY (16 PHIL 8, March 22, 1910)FACTS:David Taylor 15 years old and another boy entered into thepremises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode thesaid caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening thecaps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to theexplosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion andto Taylor losing one eye. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging thatbecause the company left the caps exposed to children, they areliable for damages due to the companys negligence.

ISSUE:Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages

HELD:NO, Manila Electric cannot be held liable for damages in theinstant case.

Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike

instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a dutyof care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, andtake precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to theobservation of children anything which would be tempting tothem, and which they in their immature judgment might naturallysuppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they shouldexpect that liberty to be taken.The circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant inleaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximatecause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore wasnot, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of thedefendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffsaction in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to itscontents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of theresultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that thedefendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thusincurred.

David well knew the explosive character of the cap with which hewas amusing himself. His attempt to discharge the cap by the useof electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or ahammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about bythe application of a match to the contents of the caps, showclearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be anyreasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that theexplosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the littlegirl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he putthe match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ranaway.19. PBC V CA ( 296 SCRA 711, March 14, 1997)FACTS:RMC has two accounts with PBC The RMC General Manager Lipanaentrusted to Irene Yabut RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ forthe purpose of depositing it to RMCs account with PBC. However,it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbandsaccount instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthlystatement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabutsmodus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.

ISSUE:WON the banks negligence, through its teller in validating thedeposit slips, is the proximate cause of the lossHELD:YES. The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stampingand signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut,despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completelyaccomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bankwith respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original orduplicate.

The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank

in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximatecause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not thelatters entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Even if Yabut hadthe fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she wouldnot have been able to deposit those funds in her husbandscurrent account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in thelatters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not beenfor the bank tellers aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

20. LILIUS V MERALCO (59 PHIL 758, March 24, 1934)

FACTS:Aleko Lilius, his wife Sonja, and his 4-year old daughter Brita, leftManila for Pagsanjan. He was entirely unacquainted with theconditions of the road at said points and had no knowledge of theexistence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching thecrossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existenceand inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees alongthe road, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At aboutseven or eight meters from the crossing, coming from Calauan, thehe saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Severalpeople, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, werewalking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded hishorn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thusoccupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two shortwhistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass flingitself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of thedefendant company's train. The locomotive struck the plaintiff'scar right in the center.

ISSUE:WON the accident was due to negligence on the part of thedefendant-appellant company

HELD:

YES. The accident was due to negligence on the part of MERALCO

for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossingat Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence inorder that they might take the necessary precautions beforecrossing the railroad, and on the part of its employees. Although itis probable that MERALCO employed the diligence of a good fatherof a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did notemploy such diligence in supervising their work and the dischargeof their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphoreor sign at the crossing and, on previous occasions as well as onthe night in question, the flagman and switchman would havealways been at his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train.The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requiresin order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful andprudent selection of subordinates or employees but includesinspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of theirduties.21. UMALI vs. BACANI (69 SCRA 263, January 30 1976)

FACTS:A storm with strong rain hit Pangasinan. During the storm, thebanana plants standing near the transmission line of AEP wereblown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire wascut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and theother fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain sawBaldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the lattertold the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he wasgoing to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a smallboy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes,whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to theplace where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it.The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was onlyafter the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

ISSUES:(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to afortuitous event- storm;HELD:Decision affirmed. (1) A careful examination of the recordsconvinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part ofdefendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of thevictim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees ofthe petitioner could have easily seen that even in case ofmoderate winds the electric line would be endangered by bananaplants being blown down..

22. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS v. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.

(1969)FACTS: Preciolita V. Corliss husband an air police of the ClarkAirforce Base, was driving a jeep on one evening at the railroad inPampanga. As the train approached, about 300 meters away, itblew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations.The jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing but did notmake a full stop. The jeep and the train collided that caused thedeath of Corliss Jr. and injury to the PC Soldier. Plaintiff filed acomplaint for recovery of damages but the lower court dismissedthe case. Hence, this appeal.ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence committed bydefendant-appellee?RULING: NO. "A person in control of an automobile who crosses arailroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does notexercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able tostop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train,is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs andinjury results. Considering the purposes and the general methodsadopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, wethink it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing touse all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach arailroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listenand do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do beforehe attempts to cross the track."

A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted

in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do."

23. CULION ICE, FISH, AND ELECTRIC CO. v. PHILIPPINE

MOTORS CORP., (1930)FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City ofManila. Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on theGwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oilburner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of runningthe boat. The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged inbusiness as an automobile agency,. Quest, as general manager,had full charge of the corporations in all its branches.The work of effecting the change in the engine was begun andconducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanicwhom Quest took with him to the boat. In the course of thepreliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it wasobserved that the carburetor was flooding. This fact was called toQuest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matterand said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, theflooding would disappear.After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been madethe boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. At about 7:30p.m. and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, andconnection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get anew start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer,switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A momentlater a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused aflame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly thecarburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames,which the members of the crew were unable to subdue.ISSUE: Whether Quest is liable for negligence?RULING: YES. The Court affirmed the judgment appealed from,awarding damages to the plaintiff. IA study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss ofthis boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill ofQuest. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience infixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does notappear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work onboats. A person skilled in that particular sort of work would, wethink have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances tocause him to take greater and adequate precautions against thedanger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would havebeen exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasolineengines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part ofQuest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm,and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendolinemay be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident wasin no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occuredbut for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability isnot whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whetherQuest was free from blame.

24. JOSE CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD CO. (1918)

FACTS: Jose Cangco, an employee of Manila Railroad, took thecompanys train for free on a daily basis. One day the train wasapproaching the San Mateo station where the plaintiff would aalight on his way home. As the train slowed down, plaintiff steppedoff but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack ofwatermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under himand he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled fromthe platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his rightarm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after theplaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly sixmeters before it came to a full stop. Plaintiff received seriousinjuries and instituted a proceeding to recover damages.ISSUE: Whether Cangco is liable for contributory Negligence?RULING:

NO. The test by which to determine whether the passenger

has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from amoving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is tobe considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as thepassenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by theevidence.It may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to theplaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at thisstation. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind withregard either to the length of the step which he was required totake or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Ourconclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking toalight while the train was yet slightly under way was notcharacterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guiltyof contributory negligence.

25. PLDT V. CA ( 178 SCRA 94, September 29, 1989)

FACTS: One evening the jeep of the private respondents ran over amound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavationallegedly undertaken by petitioner, pldt for the installation of itsunderground conduit system. Because of the accident, privaterespondents allegedly sustained injuries. In their complaint, theyalleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trenchwhich was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness andthe lack of any warning lights or signs.

On the other hand, petitioner, in its answer, denies liability on

the ground that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses werethe result of their own negligence and that the entity which shouldbe held responsible, if at at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte),an independent contractor which undertook the construction ofthe manhole and the conduit system.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner, PLDT, is liable in the present case

HELD:No. The accident which befell private respondents was due to thelack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was notimputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner, PLDT.Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment andevaluation of the evidence on record. The negligence ofrespondent Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries andthose of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence ofthe accident, as one of its determining factors, and precludes theirright to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to,hence appreciated and assumed by private respondents. Byexercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could haveavoided the injurious consequences of his act.There was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on thepart of PLDT. There was an absence of a police report of theincident and non-submission of a medical report from the hospitalwhere respondents were allegedly treated have not even beensatisfactorily explained.

26. NAPOCOR V. CA (161 SCRA 334, May 16, 1988)

FACTS: ECI, entered a contract with NAWASA. A typhoon hit CentralLuzon passing through NAPOCOR Angat Hydro-Electric Project Damin Bulacan. Since the water level had reach the danger height of212 meters above sea level, NAPOCOR caused the opening of thespillway gates. This action by NAPOCOR had an extraordinary largevolume of water rushed and hit the installations and constructionworks of ECI. The negligent manner of opening the spillway gatesby NAPOCOR had washed away, lost or destroyed ECIs facilitiesand structures. Thus, the private respondent filed a suit fordamages against petitioner. NAPOCOR alleged that the destructionand loss was due to force majeure.ISSUE:Whether or not NAPOCOR is liable

HELD:Yes. Petitioner, NAPOCOR, was negligent and did not exercisedextraordinary care in the opening of the spillway gates of theAngat Dam. Maintainers of the dam knew very well that it was farsafer to open them gradually. But the spillway gates were openedonly when typhoon Whelming was already at its height. It hasbeen held that when the negligence of a person concurs with anact of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt fromliability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage wasthe act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of anact of God, he must be free from any previous negligence ormisconduct by which the loss or damage may have beenoccasioned27. LBC V. COURT OF APPEALS (241 SCRA 619, February 23,1995)FACTS: Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his motorcycle. Atabout the same time, a cargo van driven by Tano was coming fromthe opposite direction. When Tano Jr. was approaching the airportentrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each otherfrom the opposite direction. Thus, Tano stopped the van andwaited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibilityextremely bad and instead of waiting, Tano started to make asharp left turn. Then when Tano Jr. was about to reach the centerof the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenlyemerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC vanand this caused the death of Monterola. A criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence wasfiled against Tano Jr. and a civil case was instituted against Tano,Fernando Yu as the manager and LBC for the recovery of damages.The trial court dismissed the cases filed. On appeal, the Courtappeals reversed the decision of the lower court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the negligence of Monterola is the proximate causeof the accident

HELD:Yes. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence ofTano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a leftturn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waitingfor the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which hadplaced his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcyclecoming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneouslycaused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not toattempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safefrom and clear of any oncoming vehicle. Petitioners poorly invokethe doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victimwas travelling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time hadelapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clearopportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased hadcontributed with his negligence since he is evidently speeding.TheCourt held that the contributory negligence on the victim's partthat warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.

28. AFRICA VS CALTEX (16 SCRA 448, March 31, 1966)

FACTSA tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage ofCaltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station andthe fire spread and burned several houses including the house ofSpouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (apasserby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferredwhich caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented toprove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to thereal reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branchowner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall tocontain fire if in case one happens.

ISSUE:Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

HELD:Yes. The principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks foritself) which states: where the thing which caused injury, withoutfault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of thedefendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of thingsdoes not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affordsreasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that theinjury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station,with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under thecontrol of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spreadto and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew orcould have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex andtheir employees, but they gave no explanation thereofwhatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incidenthappened because of want of care.Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it.However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden ofproof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter isthe one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused theinjury complained of.

29. F.F. CRUZ VS CA (164 SCRA 731, August 29, 1988)

FACTS:Furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz situated in Caloocan isadjacent to the residence of private respondents. Privaterespondent approached petitioners plant manager requesting toconstruct a firewall between the shop and private respondent'shouse. Request was repeated several times to no avail. In Sept.1974, a fire broke out in petitioners shop and spread to privaterespondent's house, razing both the shop and house to theground.

The lower courts ruled in favor of private respondent applying the

res ipsa loquitor and ordering that damaged be paid to privaterespondent.

ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court erred in applying the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitor.

HELD:NO. The facts of the case likewise call for the application of thedoctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of afurniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as woodchips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants formachinery may be found thereon. Even without applying thedoctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the negligence or want of care on thepart of the petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.The failure on the part of the petitioner to construct a firewall inaccordance with city ordinances amounts to negligence on theirpart.

30. BATUQUIN V. COURT OF APPEALS (258 SCRA 334, July 5,

1996)FACTS: Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr.Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient.Dr. Batiquin, performed a simple cesarian section on Mrs. Villegasto deliver her first child, Rchel Acogido with the assistance of Dr.Doris Teresita Sy anf some nurses. Plaintiff remained confined untilSpetember 27, and the next dayshe was discharged. Soon afterleaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal painsand complained of being feverish. Mrs. Villegas decided to consultDr. Ma. Salud Kho at Holy Childs Hospital in Dumaguete City. Afterundergoing examinations, Dr. Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegasshould undergo another surgery to which the latter agreed. WhenDr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found a piece ofrubber materials on the right side of the uterus. This material isthe cause of the infection of the ovaries of Mrs. Villegas and herdiscomfort.

ISSUE:Whether or not Dr. Batiquin may be held liable.

HELD:Yes.Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case. First, theentire proceedings of the cesarean section were under theexclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the privaterespondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culpritor the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into privaterespondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occurunless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since asidefrom the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwentno other operation which could have caused the offending piece ofrubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such couldonly have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed byDr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome thepresumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligentlyleaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

31. CHINA AIRLINES, Ltd. v. COURT OF APPEALS (GR No.

45985, May 18, 1990)FACTS:Plaintiff purchased a plane ticket for Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from Transaire Travel Agency, the said agencythrough Cecilia Baron contacted Manila Hotel branch of defendantPAL which at the time was a sales and ticketing agent of defendantCAL. A plane ticket was issued through its ticketing clerkdefendant Roberto Espiritu. One hour before the scheduled time,the plaintiff arrived at the airport but was informed that the planeto Taipei had left at 10:20 in the morning of that day. PALemployees made appropriate arrangements for the plaintiff to takethe flight to Taipei the next day. The plaintiff took the flight andarrived at noon.The plaintiff through its counsel made a formal demand ondefendant PAL for damages that he allegedly suffered as a resultof failure to take the flight stated in his plane ticket. The Court Aquo rendered judgment laying the blame for the erroneous entryin the ticket s to the time of departure to defendant RobertoEspiritu, ticketing agent of PAL and that no employee of CALcontributed to such erroneous entry.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not PAL is liable for damages caused by Espiritu

HELD:Yes. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,there instantly arises a presumption of law that there wasnegligence on the part of the employer either in the selection ofthe employee or in the supervision over him after such selection.The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing onthe part of the employer that it has exercised the care anddiligence of a good father of a family in the selection andsupervision of his employee. PAL failed to overcome thepresumption.

For his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable to respondent

Pagsibigan under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. For the failure ofPAL to rebut the legal presumption of negligence in the selectionand supervision of its employee, it is also primarily liable underArticle 2180 of the same code which explicitly provides thatemployers shall be liable for the damages caused by theiremployees and household helpers acting within the scope of theirassigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in anybusiness or industry.PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of theamount which it will have to pay the offended party's claim.