Richard J. Breibart, of The Law Firm of
Richard Breibart, LLC, of Lexington, for respondent.

PER
CURIAM: This attorney
disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to the reciprocal disciplinary
provisions of Rule 29, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

Respondent is a
member of the South Carolina Bar and the Florida Bar.[1] On July
26, 2010, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended respondent from the practice
of law for one (1) year upon adoption of the uncontested report of the referee
accepting respondent's Conditional Guilty Plea for Consent Judgment. In the
Matter of Dahle, 42 So.3d 800 (2010). A copy of the Conditional Guilty
Plea for Consent Judgment is attached.[2]

Pursuant to
Rule 29(a), RLDE, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) notified the Court
of respondent's suspension by the Supreme Court of Florida.[3] In accordance
with Rule 29(b), RLDE, the Clerk provided ODC and respondent with thirty (30)
days in which to inform the Court of any reason why the imposition of identical
discipline was not warranted in South Carolina.

ODC filed a
response stating it had no information that would indicate the imposition of
identical discipline was not warranted. Respondent did not file a return.

Rule 29(d),
RLDE, provides that the Court shall impose the identical discipline imposed in
another jurisdiction unless the attorney or ODC demonstrate or the Court finds
that “it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline
is predicated” that the identical discipline is improper for several stated
reasons. "In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another
jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct …shall establish
conclusively the misconduct … for purposes of a disciplinary … proceeding in
this state." Rule 29(e), RLDE.

After thorough review of the record, we conclude that a
one (1) year suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction
and hereby suspend respondent from the practice of law in this state for one
(1) year. Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall
file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with
Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

B. After Ms. Burch’s
death, a claim for nursing home neglect settled for $93,000. After payment of
attorney’s fees to the personal injury attorney and costs there was $55,861 net
to the estate. However, the $93,000 was a part of the gross estate for
purposes of calculation of probate attorney’s fees.

C. In addition, the
probate estate consisted of a homesteaded house valued at $45,000 and furniture
and furnishings valued at $5,000.

D. Ms. Glover,
decedent’s granddaughter, was appointed Personal Representative (hereinafter
referred to as “PR”). The PR signed an attorney’s fee agreement with Respondent.

E. The settlement
funds were collected and deposited into Respondent’s IOTA trust account.

F. On June 30, 2004, Respondent
was paid $3,000 in legal fees and $550 for costs.

H. On October 19,
2004, the claims period ended. Seven claims totaling $51,006.23 were received.

I. Over the next 19
months, Respondent was paid an additional $25,710 in attorney’s fees.

J. On or about the
date of each additional payment, Respondent obtained Ms. Glover’s consent for
the payment and signature upon a new fee contract reflecting extraordinary work
performed for that additional fee.

K. By June 2006, Respondent
compromised the Medicaid claim to $7,020.76. Six other claims remained
unpaid. Respondent was paid $32,510 in attorney’s fees.

M. To settle the disputed
legal fee, Respondent arranged for the estate to be reimbursed $30,000 by his
insurance carrier.

COUNT II

[TFB Case No. 2010-30,006(10B)]

N. In June 2009, Respondent
self-reported his conduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar,
arising during his representation of Lorraine Smith, niece of Aurelia Abelene
McKinney, relative to Ms. Kinney’s estate.

O. In or about 1991, Ms.
McKinney and her husband obtained estate-planning documents. Ms. McKinney’s
husband died in 1992.

P. On December 4, 1995, Ms.
McKinney consulted with Respondent to have him review her estate planning.
Among other documents, Ms. McKinney provided Respondent with 2 revocable living
trust documents. One revocable living trust appeared to be executed validly on
its face. Respondent was advised that the notary and at least one witness were
not present when Ms. McKinney and her husband signed the document. The second
revocable living trust was facially not validly executed.

Q. Between 1995 and 2006, Respondent
provided estate-planning services to Ms. McKinney. According to Respondent, Ms.
McKinney did not want her son, Gerald Lee McKinney, to know about her estate
planning. In 1995, she disinherited her son in favor of her niece, Lorraine
Smith.

R. In 1995, Respondent prepared
a new trust and pour over will for Ms. McKinney.

S. Following Ms. McKinney’s
death in 2006, seven annuities were paid over to Ms. Smith.

T. In December 2006, Ms. Smith
gave Ms. McKinney’s son $60,000. Ms. Smith was under no obligation to do so.

U. Ms. McKinney’s 1995 will was
filed in or about August 2006.

V. In April 2008, Michael D.
Minton, an attorney with Dean Mead, inquired about the status of the McKinney
Estate planning on behalf of Ms. McKinney’s son. Respondent provided a copy of
Ms. McKinney’s 1995 trust and will.

W. On July 17, 2008, a demand for
a copy of the 1991 trust document was received from Joel C. Zwemer, another
attorney with Dean Mead, on behalf of the son.

X. Respondent met with Ms. Smith
and advised her that she could: 1) provide both trust documents; 2) provide
nothing; 3) provide the trust document that appeared properly executed; or, 4) provide
the trust document that did not appear to be executed properly.

Y. On July 28, 2008, Respondent and
Ms. Smith elected to give the facially insufficient trust document to Mr.
Zwemer. At that time, Respondent did not disclose the existence of the trust
document that appeared facially sufficient.

Z. When Respondent and Ms.
Smith learned of the potential lawsuit by the son against the estate, Ms. Smith
hired Attorney Daniel Allison Carlton from Sarasota to represent her in any
litigation.

AA. Neither Respondent nor Ms.
Smith advised Mr. Carlton of the second, apparently sufficient trust agreement
until June 2009. Respondent continued to maintain his legal conclusion that
the second, apparently sufficient trust agreement was not a valid trust in that
it was not executed with the formal requirements of the law.

BB. In August 2008, an estate was
opened, naming Ms. Smith as Personal Representative.

CC. On or about November 4, 2008, Respondent
met with Mr. Carlton, Ms. Smith and attorneys with Dean Mead. At that meeting,
Respondent learned that Mr. Zwemer had filed an Amended Complaint on November 4,
2008.

DD. Thereafter, Mr. Carlton filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action.

EE. In the estate matter, the
plaintiffs brought a petition to remove Ms. Smith as Personal Representative
and to remove Respondent as attorney for the estate.

FF. The hearing on Mr. Carlton’s
motion to dismiss was held on June 1, 2009. In part, Mr. Carlton argued that
the copy of the 1991 trust document appended to the complaint was invalid.

GG. On June 1 or 2, 2009, Respondent
revealed the second trust document to Mr. Carlton for the first time. Respondent
revealed the second trust document, as he did not want to perpetuate a fraud
through Mr. Carlton’s arguments that were based without his knowledge of the
second trust.

HH. Upon learning of the second trust,
Mr. Carlton advised the judge and opposing counsel of the existence of the
second trust.

II. Respondent through his
counsel immediately notified The Florida Bar of his conduct and voluntarily
provided a sworn statement to Bar Counsel as to his conduct.

4. The Respondent
admits that by reason of the foregoing he has violated the following Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.5(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive
fee; 4-3.4(a) A lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party's access to
evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other
material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a
pending or a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another
person to do any such act; and, 4-4.1(a) In the course of representing a client
a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to
a third person.

5. Factors and considerations of
mitigation relevant to the discipline include the following:

A. Respondent has no
prior disciplinary history [9.32(a)].

B. Respondent has
suffered from personal and family health-related problems. [9.32(c)].

C. Restitution made
in Count I. [9.32(d)].

D. Respondent
self-reported the conduct detailed in Count II, and he has been cooperative
throughout this disciplinary proceeding [9.32(e)].

E. Respondent
provided affidavits from members of his religious community attesting to his
good character [9.32(g)].

F. Respondent’s
stress related issues, arising from personal and family health-related
problems, have impaired his judgment and decision-making, for which he has
sought and received treatment [9.32(h)].

G. Respondent has
expressed remorse for his misconduct [9.32(l)].

6. Factors and considerations
of aggravation relevant to the discipline include the following:

A. Multiple offenses
[9.22(d)].

B. Substantial
experience in the practice of law [9.22(i)].

7. If this Conditional Guilty
Plea is not finally approved by the referee and the Supreme Court of Florida,
then it shall be of no effect and may not be used against Respondent in any
way.

8. If this plea is accepted,
then the Respondent agrees to pay all costs associated with this case pursuant to
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(q) for $1,980.60. These costs are due
within 30 days of the Court order. Respondent agrees that if the costs are not
paid within 30 days of this Court's order becoming final, the Respondent shall
pay interest on any unpaid costs at the statutory rate. Further, Respondent
acknowledges that if, unless otherwise deferred by the Board of Governors of
The Florida Bar, the cost judgment is not satisfied within 30 days of the
judgment becoming final, Respondent shall be deemed delinquent and ineligible
to practice law, pursuant to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-3.6.

9. The Respondent further
acknowledges his obligation to pay the costs of this proceeding and that
payment is evidence of strict compliance with the conditions of any disciplinary
order or agreement, and is also evidence of good faith and fiscal
responsibility. Respondent understands that failure to pay the costs of this
proceeding will reflect adversely on any reinstatement proceedings or any other
bar disciplinary matter in which the Respondent is involved.

10. This Conditional Guilty Plea
for Consent Judgment fully complies with all requirements of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar.