With the release of the movie “Red Tails”
directed by Anthony Hemingway this month, a decades-old debate
has resurfaced concerning the combat performance of the pilots
of the 332nd Fighter Group (composed of the 99th, 100th, 301st
and 302nd Fighter Squadrons) and 477th Bombardment Group, often
collectively referred to as the Tuskegee airmen. The movie having
mostly received poor reviews, a number of activists have taken
to social media to protest against what is thought to be a racially-tinged
effort to denigrate the contribution of the wartime fighting unit.

Seven decades after the events took place, it is
sad to see that most of what is generally known about the Tuskegee
airmen is quite distant from historical reality. Several of these
distortions or myths have acquired such sensitivity and widespread
acceptance that most historians will actively avoid discussing
them.

Such is not the case of Dr Daniel L. Haulman, Chief
of the Organizational Histories Branch of the Air Force Historical
Research Agency, who published in October 2011 a 30-page study
entitled “Nine Myths about the Tuskegee Airmen”, a
shortened version of his book “Eleven Myths about the Tuskegee
Airmen”. Using monthly unit histories, mission reports and
other archived documents conserved by the Air Force, Haulman challenges
nine popular misconceptions about the Tuskegee airmen and tries
to bring some facts and perspective back to the story.

The myth of inferiority

The first misconception regarding the Tuskegee
airmen was that they were inferior. The myth was that black pilots
could not perform as well in combat as their white counterparts.

Shortly after the Tuskegee airmen entered combat,
their performance was officially challenged and their removal
from the combat zone was suggested by some. The subsequent study
by the Air Force showed that although the combat performance of
the 332nd FG was not among the best, it was similar to that of
several other 15th Air Force fighter groups. As a result of this
study, the Tuskegee airmen remained in the combat zone and allowed
to continue their mission.

This is probably the most widespread myth,
claiming that the Tuskegee airmen never lost a bomber to enemy
fighters during escort missions.

Haulman details his investigation method concerning
this claim and provides multiple references to back up his findings.
His research concludes that 27 bombers were shot down by enemy
fighters while they were under the protection of the Tuskegee
airmen. During these same missions, even more bombers were shot
down by enemy anti-aircraft fire but these losses are not taken
into account as they were unrelated to the Tuskegee airmen's performance
as escort fighters.

The myth of the deprived ace

Another popular misconception that circulated
after World War II is that white officers were determined to prevent
any black man in the Army Air Forces from becoming an ace, and
therefore reduced the aerial victory credit total of Lee Archer
from five to less than five to accomplish their aim.

Official records show that Lee Archer never claimed
more than four aerial victories and received credit for each of
these. He never claimed a fifth victory, and consequently this
was never taken away or downgraded to half. Another untrue assertion
is that black pilots with four victories were sent home to stop
them from achieving ace status. Examination of the deployment
of the pilots in such a position disproves this as most remained
in combat after their fourth victory, making it possible for them
to score a fifth victory.

Sometimes one hears the claim that the Tuskegee
airmen were the first to shoot down German jets.
American pilots shot down 60 Me 262 jets before March 24, 1945,
the day on which the Tuskegee airmen claimed their first victory
over German jets. While most of these pilots belonged to the 8th
AF, other pilots of the 15th AF (to which the 332nd FG belonged)
also scored victories over German jets before that date.

The myth that the Tuskegee airmen sank a
German destroyer

The 332nd FG mission report for June 25, 1944
notes that the group sank a German destroyer in the Adriatic Sea
near Trieste that day. The pilots on that mission undoubtedly
believed they had sunk a German destroyer, but other records cast
doubt on whether the ship actually sank and its nature.

Research indicates the ship in question was the
TA-22, an ex-Italian destroyer converted to a minelayer and used
by the Germans. It was not actually sunk in the attack but was
so heavily damaged that it never saw further action and no longer
posed a threat to Allied operations. Some sources suggest the
destroyed ship was the TA-27, but this ship was sunk sixteen days
earlier in another location and its destruction cannot be credited
to the Tuskegee airmen.

One of the popular stories about the Tuskegee
airmen is sometimes nicknamed the “Great Train Robbery.”
According to the story, the 332nd FG would not have been able
to escort its assigned bombers all the way to Berlin on the March
24, 1945 mission without larger fuel tanks, and members of the
96th Air Service Group, which serviced the airplanes of the 332nd
FG, obtained those larger fuel tanks by force from a train the
day before the mission. By working all night, the crews had the
P-51s equipped with the larger fuel tanks just in time for the
escort mission to succeed.

Haulman believes this to be highly unlikely, and
indicates no evidence of it could be found. During an interview,
one of the crew chiefs of the 301st FS indicated he had no recollection
of such an event, and that the larger fuel tanks were obtained
through the usual logistical channel. Haulman indicates this myth
might have found its origins in the fact that the tanks were delivered
by train rather than the usual truck delivery.

Another popular story is that the members of
the 332nd FG were so much better at bomber escort than the members
of the other six fighter groups, that bombardment groups requested
that they be escorted by the 332nd FG. According to this story,
white fighter pilots, unlike the black ones, abandoned the bombers
they were assigned to escort in order to chase after enemy fighters
to increase their aerial victory credit scores for fame and glory.

This is a difficult assertion to prove or disprove,
being hardly quantifiable by nature. However, no official documents
show that the 332nd FG was specifically requested as escort by
bomber groups. An examination of the mission tasking method in
use at the time also shows that it did not allow for any such
requests to be made.

One of the few documents that shows how satisfied
bomber groups were with their escorts indicates the highest level
of escort efficiency in the 15th AF seems to have been achieved
before the 332nd FG was engaged in escort missions and was the
consequence of strategic and tactical decisions rather than the
performance of a specific unit.

A post-war study entitled “Policy for Utilization
of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army“ praised the 332nd
FG for successfully escorting bombers, but also criticized it
for having fewer aerial victory credits than the other groups
because it did not aggressively chase enemy fighters to shoot
them down, but stayed with the bombers it was escorting. The report
also indicates that while the other fighter groups had a kill
ratio exceeding 2:1 (meaning more than two enemy aircraft shot
down for every aircraft lost in combat), the 332nd FG's ratio
was inferior to 1:1 (meaning the 332nd FG lost more aircraft in
combat than it destroyed).
Haulman concludes by stating that “depending on what the
criterion was, the 332nd FG was the worst and also the best at
the same time.”

Unfortunately, many articles and references
to the Tuskegee airmen are so short that they mislead the reader
into thinking that all the members of the Tuskegee airmen organizations
were black.

Haulman indicates that the units composing the
Tuskegee airmen eventually became all-black units but did not
start as such. The 99th FS was attached to various white fighter
groups for over a year before being assigned to the black 332nd
FG.

Interestingly, “some of the members of the
99th FS resented being assigned to the 332nd FG, because they
had become accustomed to serving in white groups, flying alongside
white fighter squadrons, and did not relish being placed with
the black fighter group simply because they were also black. In
a sense, it was a step back toward more segregation.“

Haulman also notes that white members of the organizations
were in leadership positions, and that black officers did not
command white officers. In addition, some of the white officers
who were in command of Tuskegee airmen opposed equal opportunity.
For example, Colonel Robert Selway, commander of the 477th BG,
attempted to enforce segregated officers’ clubs on the base
and had many of the Tuskegee airmen arrested for opposing his
policy.

Haulman also indicates that “for every white
officer who discouraged equal opportunity for the Tuskegee airmen
under their command, there were other white officers who sincerely
worked for their success” and gives a list of notable such
officers.

The myth that all Tuskegee airmen were fighter
pilots who flew red-tailed P-51s to escort bombers

This incorrect perception is the result of
decades of simplified depictions of the Tuskegee airmen's history.

In reality, the Tuskegee airmen flew four types
of fighters in combat, and also the B-25 Mitchell bomber. The
Tuskegee airmen made their combat début in North Africa
in May 1943 flying P-40 Warhawk, P-39 Airacobra, P-47 Thunderbolt
and later P-51Mustang, all with standard camouflage. The red tails
only appeared when the group began escorting bomber raids in July
1944.

Haulman finally, and rightly, concludes his paper
by stating that “whoever dispenses with the myths that
have come to circulate around the Tuskegee airmen in the many
decades since World War II emerges with a greater appreciation
for what they actually accomplished. If they did not demonstrate
that they were far superior to the [other] escort groups of the
15th AF with which they served, they certainly demonstrated that
they were not inferior to them, either. Moreover, they began at
a line farther back, overcoming many more obstacles on the way
to combat. […] Their exemplary performance opened the door
for the racial integration of the military services, beginning
with the Air Force, and contributed ultimately to the end of racial
segregation in the United States.”