NEW! By Barry Rubin

“There have been many hundreds of books for and against Israel but no volume presenting the essential information about its domestic politics, its society, as well as its cultural life and its economy. This gap has now been filled.”—Walter Laqueur, author of A History of Zionism

"[An] essential resource for readers interested in learning the truth about the Zionist project in the 20th and 21st centuries."—Sol Stern, Commentary

“Offering in-depth perspectives with encyclopedic breadth on the makeup of the Jewish state, focusing only briefly on Israel's struggle for self-preservation. The section "History" provides a masterful summary of Israel's past from its socialist beginnings before independence to the modern struggles with the Iranian regime. . . .”—Publishers Weekly

“A well-written portrait of a vibrant nation at the center of turmoil in the region.”—Jay Freeman, Booklist

"It is indeed just a starting point, but Israel: An Introduction, if disseminated among our universities to the extent it deserves, will at least allow students of the Middle East and of Jewish history to start off on the right foot. A glimpse into the real Israel may do more for the future of U.S.-Israeli relations than any amount of rhetoric ever could."—Daniel Perez, Jewish Voice New York

Written by a leading historian of the Middle East, Israel is organized around six major themes: land and people, history, society, politics, economics, and culture. The only available volume to offer such a complete account, this book is written for general readers and students who may have little background knowledge of this nation or its rich culture.

About Me

Barry Rubin was founder of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center--now the Rubin Center--and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. See the GLORIA/MERIA site at www.rubincenter.org.

Recent Rubin Reports

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Another version of this article is published in the Jerusalem Post. I own the copyright, this version is better, and I ask you to read and link to this one.

By Barry Rubin

The only honest answer
to the question of what will happen in Syria is: No one knows. After an eight-month-long
battle in which more than 3500 people have been killed, there’s no telling who will
be ruling Syria when the dust settles, or even when the dust will settle. A
regime victory is quite possible—perhaps most likely—and its overthrow might--but
not necessarily--bring an Islamist regime.

But what do we know
about Syria? Here’s a guide.

1. 1. Don’t overrate Iran’s role.

Despite wild rumors, the
Syrian regime doesn’t need Iranians to help it repress the people. Iran is
important as a source of financing for the government, but this is President
Bashar al-Asad’s battle to win or lose. Tehran is definitely going to be a
secondary factor.

2. Syria’s other ally is
Hizballah but the killing of so many Sunni Muslims, including Muslim
Brotherhood people, has lost it Hamas. There is a sort of Sunni-Shia version of
the Spanish Civil War going on now. But when it comes to the radical and
Islamist forces on both sides there’s no good guy.

2. 3. And Turkey isn’t the good guy

The Turkish Islamist
regime isn’t motivated by some love of democracy in opposing the Syrian regime.
The Ankara government wants a fellow Sunni Islamist dictatorship in Damascus,
preferably under its influence. In this situation, Turkey is just as bad as
Iran.

3. 4. Will the two sides make a deal?

No, this is a war to the
death. The regime cannot make a deal and yield power because the elite would lose
everything it has. Moreover, the government elite would face death, exile, or
long-term imprisonment if it loses. Similarly, the dominant Alawite community
and large portions of the Christian one (together roughly 25 percent of the
population) risks massacre if the government falls.

4. 5 . Will the army bring down the regime or change
sides?

No, see point 3. While
some are defecting (see below), the high command cannot survive a change of
power. Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the armed forces cannot usher in a new
regime that would continue its economic privileges.

5. 6. Is this now an inter-communal war?

Net yet. There are hints
of small-scale communal killings but if and when such a blood bath begins you’ll
know and it will be terrible indeed. This
outcome might be avoidable but the situation is very dangerous.

6. 7. Is Syria now in a civil war?

This is beginning.
Defectors from the military have formed a Free Syrian Army. A nine-member
Military Council has been formed including five colonels. Note the lack of
generals (see Point Four) and all of them appear to be Sunni Muslim Arabs (see
Point Five). They say they are going to fight the regime and defend the
populace. But from where will they get arms?

8.Will economic collapse bring down the regime?

No. See Points 1, 3, and
5. Nobody is going to quit because they get hungry. This is a kill-or-be-killed
situation.

9. Is Syria going to
encourage a war against Israel?

No. Historically, Middle
Eastern dictatorships have provoked war against Israel to distract attention
from problems at home. The most likely scenario would be a Hizballah-Israel
war, as happened in 2006. But we’re past that point for the Syrian regime
(though a radical Egypt might try this tactic after 2013.) In addition,
Hizballah is trying to consolidate power in Lebanon and a war would be very
much against its interests.

10.
Who is the opposition leadership?

Ah,
that’s a very interesting question. The best-known group is the Syrian National
Council (SNC). It has announced its 19-member leadership group which includes
15 Sunni Muslims, two Christians, and 2 Kurds.
Note that there are no Alawites or Druze. The SNC has an advantage
because it was assembled by the United States using the Islamist regime in
Turkey.

Given
Western backing the SNC is surprisingly dominated by Islamists. Ten of the 19
are identifiable as such (both Muslim Brothers and
independent—Salafist?—Islamists) and a couple of those who are nominally
leftists are apparently Islamist puppets. The fact that U.S. policy is backing
an Islamist-dominated group indicates the profound problems with Obama
Administration policy.

It
should be stressed, though, that the SNC’s popular support is totally untested.
Many oppositionists—especially Kurds—are disgusted by the group’s Islamist
coloration and refuse to participate.

The
National Coordination Committee (NCC) is a
leftist-dominated alternative. The Antalya Group is liberal. There is also a
Salafist council organized by Adnan Arour, a popular religious figure; a
Kurdish National Council and a Secular Democratic Coalition (both angry at the
SNC’s Islamism);

It is hard to overestimate how disastrous Obama Administration
policy has been. Not only has it promoted an Islamist-dominated leadership
(which might be pushed into power by monopolizing Western aid) but this mistake
has fractured the opposition, ensuring there would be several anti-SNC groups.
This strategy has also angered the Kurds and Turkmen minorities who view the
SNC as antagonistic to their hopes for some autonomy. As a result, these two
groups have reduced their revolutionary activities.

The best source on these events is the exiled democrat Ammar
Abdulhamid whose daily Syrian Revolution Digest is indispensable to understand what’s going on
in the country. He writes that, despite U.S. and Turkish support, nobody will
recognize the SNC as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian
people” because of its “overrepresentation of certain currents and
underrepresentation of others, as well as lack of transparency in the selection
and decision-making processes, not to mention lack of clear political vision
and transitional plans.”

Again, it should be stressed that in terms of actually directing
the rebellion, there is no leadership.

10.
So who do we want to win?

Despite the threat of a
Sunni Islamist regime, I hope that Asad will be overthrown. Why? If the regime
survives we know it will continue to be a ferociously repressive dictatorship,
allied with Iran, and dedicated to the destruction of U.S. and Western
interests, the imperialist domination of Lebanon, wiping Israel off the map,
and subverting Jordan.

With a revolution, there
is a chance—especially if U.S. policy doesn’t mess it up—for a real democracy
that is higher than in Egypt. In Syria only 60 percent of the population is
Sunni Muslim and thus might be potential recruits to be Islamist. The minorities—Alawite, Christian, Druze, and
Kurdish—don’t want an Arab Sunni Islamist regime.

As for the Sunnis
themselves, they are proportionately more urban, more middle class, and more
moderate than in Egypt. Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular have
never been as strong in Syria as in Egypt. In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, the
Islamists face what is largely a political vacuum; in Syria they have real, determined
opposition.

Today, the Syrian people
have two major enemies blocking the way to a moderate stable democracy. One is
the regime itself; the other is the U.S.-Turkish policy that is
determined—naively for the former; deviously deceitful from the latter—to force
a new repressive Islamist regime on the Syrians.