Three goals to accomplish before the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

The Nuclear Security Summits (NSSs) that have taken place since 2010 have transformed worldwide cooperation to secure nuclear weapons materials. However, as Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar and Des Browne highlighted in a recent Politico article, there is more to be done to consolidate the gains made towards a global nuclear architecture.

With the March 2016 NSS in Washington quickly approaching, several steps should be taken now to set the stage for the shift to a more sustainable model of nuclear security cooperation. Because the conditions of this final summit are not ideal for new breakthroughs, we propose some modest but useful steps that can aid in advancing the objectives set forth in the first NSS in 2010.

Taken together, these summits have achieved notable results. They facilitated the removal of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium from 12 countries and two dozen nuclear facilities, increased security at nuclear storage sites around the world, created new teams to detect nuclear smuggling networks, and much more.

To-do’s

Next year’s NSS in Washington is expected to be the final summit. Several actions are key to meeting the principal objectives agreed to in 2010. Realizing these objectives before the 2016 summit would signal that the NSS process remains committed to accomplishing what it originally set out to do. This would make it easier to transition to a more sustainable model of nuclear security.

1. Get more states to ratify the amendment binding them to protect nuclear facilities and material

Needed actions begin with ratification of the amendment to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The amendment legally binds state parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano called the amendment a “major piece of unfinished business” that, once ratified by enough states, would be a vital part of the international legal framework to secure nuclear materials.

The good news is that progress is being made. Just a few weeks ago, Iceland ratified the amendment (Botswana, Turkey, Italy, and the United States have also done so recently). Following the U.S. ratification in June 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry released a statement saying that the United States would work with other countries to secure the additional ratifications and set the goal of achieving this by the end of the year. In April 2015, the IAEA, with support from Russia, held a workshop with representatives from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia. These states, none of which have ratified the amendment, were briefed on how it could contribute to their nuclear security.

Although the joint statement secured a large number of signatories, notable states such as Russia, China, India, and Pakistan did not sign. Increasing the number of signatories, through their adherence to IAEA INFCIRC/869, would promote the implementation of the fundamental principles of nuclear security, a key goal of the summits.

3. Encourage deeper and wider implementation of UNSCR 1540

As the joint statement with the second-highest number of signatories in 2014, “Promoting the full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540” was seen as an important step towards the achievement of the 2010 NSS objectives. UNSCR 1540 obligates all U.N. Member States to have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

The joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the signatories to fully implement UNSCR 1540, and to consider and potentially initiate additional measures to further strengthen the resolution’s implementation. Such measures include providing assistance to requesting states in implementing their 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting national implementation action plans; and hosting and contributing to regional and sub-regional capacity building events.

No man with a plan?

At this point, there seems to be no cohesive plan for building momentum toward carrying out these measures. It would be beneficial to designate one or a few states as leaders of this effort, with a view toward encouraging each state to declare the progress it has made before the 2016 NSS and plans to make afterwards.

These three measures may seem largely technical in nature. But they are immediate steps that can be taken towards realizing the vision embraced by world leaders in 2010 of securing nuclear materials that pose a global threat.