Multimedia

Narratives

Site Information

Primary Documents - Sir John French on the Use of Poison Gas at the Second Battle of Ypres, 15 June 1915

Reproduced below is
an account of the incidence of, and reaction to, the use of
poison gas
by the German Army at Ypres at the start of the
Second
Battle of Ypres. The summary was written by British
Expeditionary Force Commander-in-Chief
Sir John French as part of a
wider official report to London.

Sponsored Links

He, along with his French
allies, made quite clear his dismay and disgust at the Germans' use of
poison gas as a new form of warfare.
Click here to read Germany's official reaction: in this the
Germans accused the French government of straightforward hypocrisy, given
that the French had themselves pioneered the use of gas.

An Account of the German
Use of Gas at the
Second Battle of Ypres on 22 April 1915
by Sir John French, British Army Commander-in-Chief

Headquarters, June 15, 1915

I much regret that during
the period under report the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's
side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of
civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific
resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas
of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into
contact with it is first paralyzed and then meets with a lingering and
agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably
preceded, prepared and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous
volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions
have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there
can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially
influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested
effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render
them innocuous.

The brainpower and thought
which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war
reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice
shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help
expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an Army which hitherto
has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have
stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

It was at the commencement
of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of April 22nd that the enemy
first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had
complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by
the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east
of Ypres were posted as follows:

From Steenstraate to the
east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division.
Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere
Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up
the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of
Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line southeast to the
northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were
four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had
one battalion of Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army
Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after
suffering heavy losses on Hill 6o, was resting about Vlamernighe.

Following a heavy
bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using
asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about
5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches
between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two
simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in
which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies
description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to
render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above
practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible
for any one to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes
hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose
or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be
abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to
repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for
this unfortunate incident. After all the examples our gallant Allies
have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in
which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is
quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident and I would
only express my firm conviction that if any troops in the world had been
able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether
unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the
Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in
flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of
a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying
the salient to the East.

In spite of the danger to
which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent
display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the
bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might
have been attended with the most serious consequences.

They were supported with
great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and
by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the
enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and
at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy
Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind
the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell
into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their
counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians
were again driven back.

During the night I directed
the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general
reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the
disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also
directed other reserve troops from the 3rd Corps and the First Army to be
held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas
and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and
some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus
established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat
apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and
Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the
reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz,
should he find difficulty inn preventing any further advance of the Germans
west of the canal.

At about ten o'clock on the
morning of the 23rd, connection was finally insured between the left of the
Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal;
but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer
line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the
previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until
reinforcements, which were ordered tip from the Second Army, were able to
deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the
23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account
of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch
informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and
regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed
the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the
original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch
further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements,
which were now on their way, and that troops from the North had already
arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the
wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to
cooperate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position
was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British
troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the
previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the
23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the
front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the
coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the
night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much
aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained
by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed
two brigades of the 3rd Corps, and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps,
to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second
Army.

In the course of these two
or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of
the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the
sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up
the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of
units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite
unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the South, had to be
pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing
to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy
casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel
for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the
spot.

The parts taken by
Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being
particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this
occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking
through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull,
acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organized a powerful
counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units.
He was called upon to control, with only his brigade staff, parts of
battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. A
lthough the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually
checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning
of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian
Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night, and the
early morning of the 25th, the enemy directed a heavy attack against the
Division at Broodseinde cross-roads, which was supported by a powerful shell
fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this
time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the East and West were
uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this
the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order
and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the
25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The
hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore
Division and a Cavalry Division were pushed up into the fighting line, the
former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the 5th Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore
Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the
enemy back some little distance toward the north, but their further advance
was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating
gas.

On the right of the Lahore
Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and
actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern
portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back,
largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line a short way to the south.
This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General
Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the
operation.

Although no attack was made
on the south-eastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east
of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction, which
took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in
reverse.

Some gallant attempts made
by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed
the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant
fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a
certain amount of ground was gained.

The French succeeded in
retaking Lizerne, and made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas; but no
further progress was made toward the recapture of the original line.