Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Review Conference Bulletin, November 19, 2001

Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference

By Jenni Rissanen

The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) opened in an acrimonious atmosphere on Monday, November 19,
with the United States accusing Iraq, Iran, North-Korea, Libya,
Sudan and Syria of operating clandestine biological weapons (BW)
programmes. Iraq, Iran and Libya angrily rejected the US
accusations. The United States also repeated its opposition to the
BWC draft compliance Protocol and outlined its proposals for
alternative measures, which it hoped would be endorsed by the
Review Conference. In the general estimation of delegates and
observers, the statement illustrated the United States' continued
allergy to multilaterally negotiated legally-binding
agreements.

The opening day also heard a message from UN Secretary-General
and statements from Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Cuba, the
European Union (EU), Iran, Japan, Libya, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Russia, and South Africa. These statements will be covered in a
separate BWC Protocol Bulletin.

John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, presented the United States'
statement on Monday morning to a large crowd of diplomats, NGOs and
representatives of the media. Referring to the recent anthrax
mailings and "circumstances none of wished and none of us foresaw",
as well as to President Bush's November 10 address to the UN
General Assembly in which he warned that terrorists were trying to
acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Bolton characterized the
Conference as "unfortunately timely". He said BWC member states
needed to "demonstrate an unwavering commitment to fighting this
undeniable threat". Delegations must "overcome years of talking
past each other". The challenge for states parties, therefore, was
whether they would "be courageous, unflinching, and timely in
[their] actions…or merely defer to slow-moving multilateral
mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening in the real
world?" To rise to the occasion, the Review Conference must be
prepared to consider "new ways" to strengthen the Convention.

Bolton then revisited the reasons motivating the US rejection of
both the draft Protocol and the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) negotiating
process on July 25. Stressing that the United States had
"repeatedly" made clear why the "arms control approaches of the
past" would not resolve current problems, he suggested that the
draft Protocol would have given proliferators "a stamp of
approval". Bolton claimed that although the United States had been
criticised by many foreign governments for rejecting the Protocol,
"many of those same governments" had told the United States
"privately" that they "shared America's reservations". Many states
parties "had not lived up to their commitments" under the
Convention, and it could be assumed that "any nation ready to
violate one agreement is perfectly capable of violating another".
The United States would "not enter into agreements that allow rogue
states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons". It
would therefore continue to reject "flawed texts" like the draft
Protocol, "recommended to us simply because they are the product of
lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines" but which were "not in
the best interests of the United States and many countries
represented here today". Bolton then "named names", accusing five
states parties - Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria - of
operating clandestine biological weapon programmes. Sudan, a
non-state party, was also named as a potential proliferator. In
addition, Washington was naturally "concerned about the use of
biological weapons by terrorist groups" such as al Qaeda.

Ranking these threats, Bolton noted that, beyond al Qaeda, "the
most serious concern" was Iraq, whose programme remained "a serious
threat to international security". Bolton believed that Iraq had
used the three years since the last UN inspections "to improve all
phases of its offensive BW program". North Korea's program was also
"extremely disturbing": the United States believed that it was
operating a "dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW
capacity and that it has developed and produced, and may have
weaponized, BW agents". The BWC had been "ineffective in
restraining North Korea". Washington was also "quite concerned
about Iran", which it believed had "probably" produced and
weaponized BW agents. It also thought both Libya and Syria had an
"offensive BW program in the research and development stage" and
may be "capable of producing small amounts of agent". The US was
also "concerned about the growing interest" of Sudan in developing
a BW program. Bolton added that this list "was not meant to be
exhaustive", but rather to demonstrate the "real challenges left
unaddressed" by the Convention. There were other states that the
United States could have named, and which it would be "contacting
privately". Bolton called on all BWC parties and signatories to
"immediately terminate their programs and comply fully with their
obligations".

The statement then turned to the new US proposals for tackling
the BW threat and strengthening the Convention. Bolton began with
national implementation measures, including arrangements to enhance
criminal extradition agreements with respect to BW offences and
legislation making it a criminal offence for persons to engage in
activities prohibited by the BWC. Furthermore, countries should (a)
adopt and implement regulations restricting access to dangerous
micro-organisms, as well as on domestic and international
transfers; (b) report internationally any releases or adverse
events that could affect other countries; and (c) sensitise
scientists to the risks of genetic engineering, explore national
over-sight of high-risk experiments and establish a code of conduct
for scientists working with pathogens. These measures would
"contribute significantly to doing what none of the measures in the
draft Protocol would do: control access to dangerous pathogens,
deter misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert states to
their risks" through the establishment of "powerful new
tools…enhancing our ability to prevent the development,
production and acquisitions of dangerous pathogens for illegal
purposes." Secondly, the United States is seeking the elaboration
of a mechanism for international investigations of suspicious
outbreaks of disease or alleged BW incidents. Countries would need
to "accept international inspectors upon determination by the UN
Secretary General that an inspection should take place". This would
make inspections "more certain and timely" and " allow us to
acquire…first hard evidence of either accidental or
deliberate use of biological warfare agents". Washington also
advocates "setting up a voluntary cooperative mechanism for
clarifying an resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent".
Thirdly, under the heading of assistance to victims and technical
and scientific cooperation, Bolton proposed that countries "adopt
and implement strict biosafety procedures, based on WHO [World
Health Organisation] or equivalent national guidelines", support
the WHO's global disease surveillance and response capabilities,
and develop a capacity for rapid emergency medical and
investigative assistance in the event of a serious outbreak of
infectious disease. Taken together, this range of measures to
restrict access, strengthen international disease detection tools,
and provide assistance in the event of an outbreak would "enhance
collective security and collective well-being". Bolton said the
Protocol did not contain such measures.

The statement concluded with a sketch of Washington's objectives
at the Review Conference. The US expected the countries present "to
work together, and avoid procedural and tactical divisiveness
during the Review Conference that may hinder reaching our mutual
goal of combating the BW threat" and "join us in forging a new an
effective approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons".
Bolton welcomed initial reactions to the US proposals and said the
time for "better than nothing" protocols was over. Instead, the
time had come to consider "serious" new proposals and "set aside
years of diplomatic inertia".

Following the statement, Iran, Iraq and Libya exercised their
right of reply, rejecting the US accusations as groundless.
Iraq claimed that its biological weapons programme had been
destroyed as part of the disarmament mandate of the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM), and feared it was about to be attacked by the
United States on the pretext of proliferation concerns. Iran
rejected the accusations "categorically", adding that they would
lead to confrontation rather than cooperation in the Conference.
Indeed, Iran suspected this may be the intention, since the US was
now clearly opposed to multilateralism. Libya said the
allegations were "nothing new" and asked the United States not to
use the Conference as "a launching pad for accusations" since this
would only damage the prospect of reaching consensus at the
Conference.

The US decision to 'name names', an unorthodox diplomatic
proceeding, took many delegates and observers by surprise. Overall,
there was a feeling that the accusations have only compounded the
already tense and bitter atmosphere left over from the derailed
final session of the AHG in July/August. Some suspected that
Washington had decided to open with " a big bang", reasoning, in
view of the likelihood it would be heavily criticised for its
rejection of the Protocol, that the best form of defence was
offence. However, there are already signs that its proposals -
unless combined with more comprehensive, multilateral and
legally-binding arrangements - will not go down well in many
quarters. The accusatory tone of the US statement is hardly likely
to maximize support for its proposals or facilitate a positive
outcome for the Conference as a whole.

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst
monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva. She is
attending the BWC Review Conference.