East german intelligence and ireland 1949-90

Acknowledgments Introduction Part I: Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1. Counterintelligence in Postwar Europe, 1945-65 Nigel West 2. Western Espionage and Stasi Counterespionage, 1953-61 Paul Maddrell 3. The Rise and Fall of West German Intelligence Operations against East Germany Erich Schmidt-Eenboom 4. Deaf, Dumb and Blind: the CIA and East Germany Benjamin Fischer 5. Rosenholz: Mischa’s Files, CIA’s Booty Robert Gerald Livingston Part II: Political Intelligence 6. Political Espionage: Foci and Sources Helmut Müller-Enbergs 7. Active Measures and Disinformation as Part of East Germany’s Propaganda War, 1953-1972 Michael Scholz 8. Foreign Intelligence under the Roof of a Ministry for State Security Bernd Lippmann 9. East German Espionage in Denmark Thomas W. Friis 10. How the MfS’s Worldview Affected the Intelligence Cycle: A Study Based on Operations against the Netherlands Beatrice de Graaf Part III: Scientific-Technical and Military Intelligence 11. The Crown Jewels and the Importance of Scientific-Technical Intelligence Kristie Macrakis 12. The Professionalization of Soviet Military Espionage under Khruschev, 1953- 64 Matthias Uhl 13. BND Military Espionage in East Germany Armin Wagner

Typically each Ast would be commanded by a senior army or naval officer and would be answerable to Abwehr HQ. in Berlin. Operations carried out by each Ast would be in tandem with the overall strategic plan formulated by Admiral Canaris. Canaris in turn would receive instructions on what intelligence gathering should take priority from the OKW or, increasingly after 1941, Hitler directly. In practice, each Ast was given considerable latitude in mission planning and execution—a facet of the organisation which ultimately damaged its intelligence gathering capability.

'East German Foreign Intelligence solidly documents what a dedicated and determined intelligence service, free of the constraints of democratic society, can accomplish. As a work of research and analysis, the book is a benchmark for historians and intelligence professionals.' - Hayden Peake, Studies in Intelligence 'The book is fascinating and informative, and it does help us to separate the reality of the HVA from the melodramatic LeCarre-tinged myth. Indeed, it shows that this reality may even make a better story.' - German Studies Review 'As a work of research and analysis, the book is a benchmark for historians and intelligence professionals.' - Studies in Intelligence
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