The power industry is, by nature, fraught with high-hazard potential
and recognized occupational risks. Thanks to the collective efforts of
industry players and associations alike, the sector has gone through a
steady year-over-year improvement in the frequency and severity of
employee and contractor injuries and fatalities. This is certainly an
achievement worth celebrating. Furthermore, conversations with
industry leaders continue to express a commitment to safety. However,
increasingly, there is a perceived state of contentment with the
results achieved, combined with a perception that the industry has
reached acceptable safety performance. Looking beyond the boundaries
of the electric power sector, however, one can argue that there is
still a lot that needs to be done to reach the only acceptable goal of
zero injuries.

There is no better way to challenge a state of contentment than to
look beyond the established industry boundaries and benchmarks. A look
at the safety performance of other hazardous industries, such as oil
and gas, and mining, should be sufficient to take a pause, trigger
discussions and recalibrate efforts. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the electric sector total recordable injury rates lag
behind those of the oil and gas sector and track more closely those of
the mining industry.

Some safety experts would argue that the risk profile of industries
such as oil and gas and mining is higher than that of the combined
electric power sector due to the operational complexities involved
(with the notable exception of nuclear generation). The electric power
sector should, at minimum, seek to achieve functional safety
performance and Key Performance Indicators comparable to the oil and
gas industry’s performance. The performance of the oil and gas
industry constitutes, therefore, a worthy external benchmark for the
electric power sector to follow as it looks for further improvements
in this ever important area.

The benefits of using a safety benchmark outside of the electric
sector are further exemplified once we start to break down the sector
into its two main subsectors: power generation and transmission and distribution.

A recently retired senior executive who was responsible for
overseeing a successful improvement in safety performance at a leading
U.S. power company told us in an interview, “I feel much safer in a
power generation plant than I would in a refinery; the processes that
refineries handle are much more complex and dangerous.” While that
statement may appear to be correct based on common knowledge, the
reality is that according to the year-over-year injury recordable
rates, it is safer in a petroleum refinery than in a power generation
plant. Notwithstanding the laudable improvement in the total
recordable injury rates in the electric power generation subsector for
the last five years, the chart above shows the existing room for
improvement in the quest to zero injuries. The retired executive’s
statement on the other hand, exemplifies an erroneous notion,
prevalent among many, that the electric sector has better safety
performance than the oil and gas sector.

Upon looking deeper, there appears to be some quick-win
opportunities for improvement. During the five-year period ending in
2014, 37 percent of the fatalities in power generation occurred at
fossil fuel facilities, the facilities in which the processes most
resemble those of the oil and gas and petrochemicals industries.

By applying in the fossil fuel fleet the proven safety methodologies
developed in the plant-based environments of the petrochemical and the
oil and gas industries, we find perhaps the most straightforward way
of improving the safety performance of the electric industry in
the United States.

While the primary operational processes involved in oil and gas
extraction differ from those of the transmission and distribution
subsector, there are two important similarities: processes in both
sectors engage discrete and ongoing construction activities in often
inhospitable environments, and most importantly, they both utilize
distributed workforces with hindered opportunity for hierarchical supervision.

It should not be surprising then that the injury rates in these
types of operational environments are higher than those in plant-based
environments such as power generation plants and petroleum
refineries. Against this backdrop, the measured achievement of the oil
and gas extraction sector in 2014 is remarkable: a zero Total
Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR). This proves the point that even in the
most challenging environments it is possible to have zero injuries.
From our experience consulting with oil and gas clients across the
world, DuPont Sustainable Solutions provides one learning that we
would like to highlight in this context: behavioral safety
management systems are often not enough to gain measured safety
performance improvements in distributed workforces. In these
environments, it becomes necessary to win the hearts and minds of the
direct workers, and even more challenging, of the contracted workforce.

Our experience in the transmission and distribution subsector shows
that contrary to what many would believe, most accidents happen when
workers are performing routine tasks on a normal day, as opposed to
those days in which there is a coordinated response to significant
weather events or an emergency. This fact exemplifies the limitations
of behavioral-based safety protocols. The emerging field of Affective
Based Safety, which informs its approach from the latest neuroscience
developments and emphasizes the impact of emotions on risk perception
and risk behaviors, offers a path forward toward reaching the goal of
zero in the most challenging environments, like electric transmission
and distribution. In appealing to the emotional brain, subtle but very
important changes in behavior can mean the difference between a day
that goes according to plan or one that results in the hardest phone
call a business leader can make.

It also is noted that the electric power industry has been making
efforts to achieve success in this area, albeit inconsistently. Often
these affective-based safety practices are embedded in other, larger
programs being deployed within utilities such as Lean/Six Sigma or
human performance initiatives. A focuses effort, however, can drive
improvements in sustainable safety performance.

The Ongoing Transformation of the Electric Sector Modifies its Risk Profile

Unfortunately, these improvements are coming as the electric power
sector in North America is experiencing what some refer to as
“disruptive change.” Some of the most pressing factors include
far-reaching environmental legislation, the need to modify the
generation mix and adopt novel technologies, the growth of distributed
generation, the rise of the smart grid, and a rapidly aging workforce.
There also is a 300 percent increase in the planned capital
expenditure over the next 20 years to create, modify, or upgrade aging
infrastructure. While there has been a lot of discussion about the
business impact of these trends, there has been little said on how
these factors collectively modify the risk profile of the industry,
the possible repercussions, and the strategies needed to address them.

For example, to meet ever more stringent environmental regulations,
scrubbers are being added to the established coal plant fleet. This
addition modifies the material process safety-risk profile of the
operation in a way the power industry is not accustomed to handle.
This is another good reason to learn from adjacent industries:
violent chemical reactions with explosive force, pressure vessel
explosions, volatile toxic chemical releases, corrosive chemical loss
of containment, and low oxygen atmospheres are risks that are well
documented in other industries, and will now become more prevalent in
the redefined operational profile of the electric power sector.

This, however, further emphasizes the risk of having a perception of
achieving “world-class safety” within the industry. Complacency,
ultimately, can lead to not recognizing the rapidly changing risk
profile and can lead to a sudden degradation in safety performance.

Importing Learnings from the Nuclear Industry: A Word of Advice

Another observed trend relates to the electric industry’s
desire to apply the protocols developed by the nuclear industry to
the fossil fuels fleet, and even to the transmission and distribution
sector, in the hopes of replicating its excellent safety record.

A word of caution with respect to this trend: leveraged learning
from one subsector to another needs to be carefully implemented. The
often overlooked factor in this equation is that the operational
culture in a nuclear operation is often very different than the
operational culture in fossil fuels plants and the transmission and
distribution sector. The nuclear industry is a highly regulated one.
Its culture often resembles the top-down approach and process rigor of
the military. Not surprisingly, many nuclear facilities are well
staffed with people with military experience. This type of culture has
served them well. Most fossil fuels plants and the transmission and
distribution sector, however, generally do not have the levels of
staffing or redundancies to fully execute programs in similar ways.
Therefore, they must be reviewed, scrutinized, and modified to meet
the unique culture of their own sector while preserving the intent and
integrity of the safety control being leveraged from the nuclear industry.

The underlying role of a company culture on safety
performance cannot be emphasized enough. DuPont has developed one
of the most cited models to explain the relationship between culture
and safety performance: The DuPont Bradley CurveTM. This
model helps us understand how the development of an interdependent
culture -- one in which safety is understood as a personal choice and
responsibility and everybody becomes each other’s keeper -- fosters a
reduction in injury rates. The further right you go on the x-axis
(cultural interdependence), the further down you go on the y-axis
(injury rates). Interestingly, while the nuclear industry injury rates
are very low, its culture is largely a dependent culture reliant on
supervision and regulations.

Within this context, it is of the utmost importance to be able to
clearly identify whether the nuclear industry’s safety protocols are a
good fit with a different operational culture, and what modifications,
on a case-by-case basis, need to happen to implement successfully elsewhere.

How close are you to having your next injury or fatality?

Fatalities and injuries are discrete events whose probability of
occurrence is not well defined by recordable rates alone. In order to
foster a culture of continuous improvement toward zero injuries, the
best question to ask is not how close to zero our recordable rates
are, but how close are we to having one injury or one fatality? This
simple question asked by executive management is capable of triggering
an entire set of required analyses of the risk profile of the operation.

Additional, more granular questions could include:

Have there been important changes to the generation assets
recently?

Are we testing or implementing new technologies
for the first time?

Do the refurbishments to the old asset
base materially change their risk profile?

What are our
collective capabilities around Process Safety Management?

Are we expected to undergo, or are we undergoing, major capital
projects?

Are our newer employees learning quickly and
efficiently enough?

How are we ensuring the safety of our
distributed workforces?

Within this context, the work that the Edison Electric Institute has
done with the introduction of the Serious Index and Fatality Index is
worth noting and a step in the right direction. Given the multiple
changes that the sector is going through, and despite the robust
protocols that are already in place, a renewed emphasis on risk
identification is required in order to avoid unfortunate events.

In Conclusion

The electric power sector continues to improve year-over-year in
injury rates, and has achieved unprecedented success. That said, there
are significant external pressures that are introducing new and real
risk into the system. Executives should consider re-emphasizing the
continuous improvement nature of safety and incorporating learning
from adjacent industries. Furthermore, programs should be designed to
independently address serious injuries and fatalities, incorporate
state of the art techniques, and continuously strive for the goal of
zero workplace injuries.