Riding the Raisina Tiger

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The Supreme Court
has ruled that army personnel could be dismissed or discharged from service
only on the basis of an impartial inquiry, not merely for getting four red ink
entries.

A three-member Bench
headed by Justice TS Thakur pointed out that under the Army Rules 1953 soldiers
enjoyed certain “inbuilt safeguards” against discharge from service based on
four red ink entries.

“The first and foremost
(safeguard) is an unequivocal declaration that mere award of four red ink
entries to an individual does not make his discharge mandatory. This implies
that four red ink entries is not some kind of laxman rekha which if crossed
would by itself render the individual concerned undesirable or unworthy of
retention in the force,” it ruled.

The Bench delivered the verdict
after a detailed analysis of Section 22 of the Army Act 1950 and the 1953
rules, instructions and procedures. The other members of the Bench were
Justices V Gopala Gowda and R Banumathi.

Acknowledging that Rule 13 did
not in specific terms envisage an inquiry or provide for consideration of
various factors, the apex court pointed out that at the same time this rule did
not make it mandatory for the competent authority to discharge an individual
just because he had been awarded four red ink entries.

“The threshold of four red ink
entries as a ground for discharge has no statutory sanction. Its genesis lies
in administrative instructions issued on the subject,” the Bench ruled while
rejecting government’s contention that the instructions and procedure were in excess
of what was mandated under the rules and as such did not confer any right to
inquiry on personnel who had four red marks.

“The instructions cannot be
faulted on the ground that the instructions concede to the individual more than
what is provided for by the rule. The instructions are aimed at ensuring a
non-discriminatory, fair and non-arbitrary application of the statutory rule,”
the Bench said.

Explaining its logic, the SC
said red ink entries suffered by two soldiers for overstaying leave for one week
and six months could not be treated on the same footing. “If two persons who
suffer such entries are treated similarly notwithstanding the gravity of the
offence being different, it would be unfair and unjust, for unequals cannot be
treated as equals.”

The Bench made the
clarifications while allowing an appeal by Veerendra Kumar Dubey who had been
discharged on December 14, 1992, from the corps of Artillery as he got four red
ink entries in 12 years since his enrolment as an Operator in September 1980.

Army had given him a show cause
notice to which he said he overstayed his leave for the first time due to his
wife’s illness and the second time because of his own health problem. The Bench
said an inquiry should have been held instead of discharging him after merely
rejecting his reply to the notice.

Ahead of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif's meeting with President Barack Obama, the US today
downplayed reports of a "breakthrough" civil nuclear deal with
Pakistan.

"About the sort
of reports that the United States and Pakistan were planning a (civil nuclear
deal) -- or published reports indicated that there may be a breakthrough in
this regard, and I would significantly reduce your expectations about that
occurring on Thursday," White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said.

Earnest said Obama
is looking forward to welcoming the Pakistani Prime Minister to the White House
later this week.

"There are a
range of issues that are important for us to discuss, including the
announcement that the president made last week about our strategy in
Afghanistan moving forward," he said. — PTI

Trapani (Italy):
NATO is launching its biggest military exercise in 13 years, mobilising 36,000
soldiers, sailors and airmen from more than 30 countries to test the alliance's
ability to respond to new security threats. NATO Deputy Secretary-General
Alexander Vershbow told the opening ceremony today that the Trident Juncture
exercise will demonstrate that NATO "can deal with everything from
conventional military engagements to more subtle hybrid warfare techniques and
propaganda." AP

11 killed in
Pakistan bus blast

Quetta: At least 11
persons were killed and many more wounded on Monday when a powerful bomb
exploded in a passenger bus in Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province.
The explosion came as night fell and labourers working in central Quetta left
for their homes on the outskirts of the city, which has frequently been targeted
by Islamists and separatist insurgents. A police official and a doctor at the
city's main hospital confirmed the causalities. AFP

How Indian Military
Acquisitions Are Changing And Why That’s A Good Thing

In 1940, legendary
Indian industrialist Walchand Hirachand struck a deal with an American
businessman to produce combat aircraft in India. One of the investors in the
project was the Maharaja of Mysore, who agreed to invest Rs 25 lakh and also
gave 700 acres of land free for the project. Just eight months later Hindustan
Aircraft flight tested its first product, a trainer aircraft. And then the
British pulled the plug.

Sumit K. Majumdar
explains what happened. In his book India’s Late, Late Industrial Revolution:
Democratizing Entrepreneurship, he says:

“The British government in Whitehall tried
to scuttle the project because Indian firms were not considered capable enough
to manufacture combat aircraft…..Hindustan Aircraft was taken over by the
government in 1942.”

India got
independence in 1947 but the government of Jawaharlal Nehru retained the same
level of hostility towards private Indian enterprise. Here’s what noted
Gandhian Acharya Kripalani said on the defence budget in Parliament in 1957:

“The mounting expenses on the army must be
cut down. The followers of Gandhi and adherents of universal peace should not
increase military expenditure.”

Five years later
when the Chinese attack caught India napping, the same Kripalani was calling
for heads to roll. It never occurred to him that he was one of the playmakers
of the debacle.

Muddled thinking and
Gandhian attitudes clearly played a role in stunting the growth of India’s
defence industry for decades, but the real reason India continues to import
high-octane hardware lies elsewhere. “Preferential treatment of the public
sector is the single most important reason,” Major General (retired) Mrinal
Suman told this writer. “With assured orders and a captive customer base, the
public sector never felt the need to exert and modernise.”

Suman, an expert on
defence procurement and procedures, heads the Defence Technical Assessment and
Adivsory Service of the Confederation of Indian Industry. He writes in an
earlier article:

“Militaries seek to maintain a
well-balanced equipment profile at all times. Perhaps, a mix of 30 per cent
modern, 40 per cent matured and 30 per cent obsolescent equipment.
Disconcertingly, in our case, as much as 85 per cent of the equipment with the
Indian military today is decades-old and needs to be replaced/upgraded.”

Procurement
nightmare

With neighbours like
China and Pakistan, India’s armed forces do need high-octane military hardware.
But here’s the rub: not only are we overwhelmingly dependent on imports, but
the approvals for everything – from snow boots to fighter jets – have to grind
their way through a notoriously slow procurement bureaucracy. This can cause
peculiar problems.

To illustrate, in
the 1950s when Pakistan received brand new Sabre and Starfighter jets from the
US, India rushed to acquire outdated aircraft such as the Hunter, Ouragon and
Mystere from Britain and France. Not surprisingly, during the 1965 War these
British-French aircraft became easy targets for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

Again, in the early
1980s, in response to the American sale of the F-16 to Pakistan, India decided
to go for the French Mirage 2000. But realising Mirage 2000 deliveries wouldn’t
happen until 1987, even as the F-16s were flying into Islamabad, India opted to
buy the MiG-29 from Russia.

Basically, Pakistan
was accepting what was available and its generals were being proactive about
it. On the other hand, the Indian procurement nightmare was on, with MoD
bureaucrats acting like clueless zombies.

Import lobby

Perhaps it was less
zombie and more acting – aimed at bilking the exchequer to the tune of hundreds
of billions of rupees.

Take the selection
of a new rifle for the Indian Army. After cancelling an Indian design, the army
has invited foreign vendors to supply 66,000 new rifles for an estimated $3
billion to $4 billion.

Danvir Singh, former
Commanding Officer of the Indian Army, writes in Indian Defence Review that he
is in no doubt the deal is gamed:

“It should come as no surprise if probed,
that there are forces supported by the politico-bureaucratic-military nexus
serving the designs of the arms mafia, who deliberately want this indigenous
effort quashed. It may be surprising, but not really though, that our
scientists can develop and launch a probe to Mars but fail to produce an
assault rifle.”

Indeed, almost every
weapon produced by the DRDO has been rejected by the defence forces, forcing
the government to release funds for imports. Take the Augusta Westland scandal.
Initially, former air chief marshal S.P. Tyagi was under investigation for
allegedly tweaking the technical requirements of VVIP helicopters. Later it
transpired that the specifications were changed on the orders of Brajesh
Mishra, the National Security Adviser, who was reporting directly to former
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The scandal shows
that it is in the interests of a clique comprising the military brass,
politicians and middlemen to scuttle indigenous defence projects. R.S.N. Singh,
a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research &
Analysis Wing, writes in Canary Trap about the Chandigarh Gang that surfaced as
the “mainstay of the international arms lobby” during the decade long UPA rule.
“This gang is not necessarily in Chandigarh alone, but nevertheless is centered
around it,” Singh writes. “It comprises some retired officers, politicians,
journalists and prominent newspapers.”

Offsets: How
successful?

The government’s new
procurement policy is banking on offsets to breathe new life into the Indian
defence industry. But the key problem with offsets is the enormity of the
purchases. India is expected to import over $100 billion worth of equipment in
the next five years, so the offsets are in the region of $30 billion.

Because government
companies monopolise India’s defence industry, and until now the private sector
was kept at a distance, foreign vendors were unsure if the Indian defence
industry could absorb such huge offsets. The foreign arms manufacturers, with
powerful lobbyists working for them, wanted India to widen the scope of offset
activities to include fields that were unrelated to defence. For instance,
France could theoretically sell us $10 billion worth of aircraft and purchase
$3 billion worth of potatoes in lieu. Yes, it’s a bit farfetched idea, but you
get the picture.

According to Suman,
19 offset contracts worth Rs 16,000 crore were signed between 2006 and 2012 –
fourteen for air force purchases and five for naval hardware. As all contracts
entailed export of “low-tech components/sub-assemblies” Indian industry did not
gain at all, he points out.

New deal: Make in
India

All militaries in
the world seek the best equipment they can get. In reality they fight with the
best equipment they have. After splurging on gold plated weapons for decades,
the Indian military is facing up to that reality.

With Make in India
now gaining traction, the days of multibillion dollar defence deals are over.
This will have major implications for the defence forces, foreign weapons
manufacturers, contractors and Indian industry.

One of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s first major decisions was to downsize the $20
billion-plus Rafale contract. This was a signal to the armed forces that from
here on they have to look at homebuilt options. Like it or not, the Indian Air
Force will have to accept the Tejas light combat aircraft. Similarly, the
Indian Army can no longer reject the home built howitzer. (Thankfully, the
Indian Navy has embraced indigenisation with open arms.)

Modi is right in
pushing Make in India because an insane amount of money is involved here. Due
to the need for updated equipment, India is set to undertake one of the largest
procurement cycles in the world. India’s armed forces are projected to buy
weaponry worth over $150 billion in the next 10 years, and more than $100
billion of those purchases will be directed towards domestic companies.

Recognising the
potential in defence, a number of private companies have rushed in. Here’s a
short list:

*Anil Ambani’s
Reliance Aerospace is in talks with Russian Helicopters to manufacture 200
Kamov-226T helicopters in India in a deal worth Rs 6,500 crore. The number of
choppers could potentially go up to 400 choppers.

*Tata Advanced
Systems will be the lead production agency for making 40 C-295 Airbus aircraft
in India in a deal worth Rs12,000 crore.

*Mahindra Defence
Naval Systems has tied up with the UK’s Ultra Electronics to build equipment
for underwater warfare.

* Anil Ambani is
partnering with Germany’s Atlas Elektronik GmbH to make an advanced torpedo in
India.

*Larsen & Toubro
is investing $400 million into a yard to build ships for the navy.

*Hindustan
Aeronautics will offload large chunks of the Tejas programme to 12 large
private sector players. The move will increase production and delivery rates to
the IAF.

Government to
government

To be sure, while
tweaking its defence procurement policy there’s no need for India to re-invent
the wheel. “In today’s world, even the United States and Russia don’t create airplanes
and helicopters from scratch, but actively use components from other
countries,” Oleg Panteleev, head of Russia’s Analytical Services Agency, says
in an interview with Russia & India Report.

“India’s challenge is not to do
everything on its own, but to reach competency as an integrator. To become the
party that develops the overall product, but takes certain components and
elements ready-made, getting the best deal, while saving time and money. Each
unit signifies unique technological and costly solutions and knowhow, and
neither India, nor more prosperous countries, can afford to deal with every
single thing.”

Last week, India’s Defence
Acquisition Council (DAC) announced that it was looking at the S-400 air
defence system made in Russia. Since the missile system has no analogues and
India is wiser after the drawn out Rafale drama – it was a commendable decision
not to go for a global tender. The DAC has done the same with the Apache and
Chinook helicopters and American howitzers.

Strategic deals such as the
lease of the Akula-II submarine from Russia is yet another example of
procurement in the fast lane. The point is to avoid the rigidity of the A.K.
Antony years when the Defence Ministry avoided taking decisions for some
inexplicable reason.

China syndrome

Quantity has a quality all its
own. This is best illustrated by China’s laborious efforts at building a vast
defence industrial ecosystem that is now capable of delivering bleeding edge
systems including stealth aircraft.

In the 1960s after its break
with Russia, the Chinese had to go it alone. Today China is almost
self-sufficient, with advanced aircraft engines being one of the few categories
they haven’t yet mastered. Where the Chinese lack quality, they make up for
that with raw numbers.

India’s procurement nightmare
will end when it will be able to emulate the Chinese model. Having a solid
defence industry means you won’t worry about war attrition.

You lose a Tejas, no worries,
order a new one that same afternoon. India can send in swarms of these $30
million jets –with top cover provided by the Su-30MKI – deep into Pakistan and
overwhelm enemy air defences.

On the other hand, you have
Pakistan which threw in the towel during the 1965 War when its hardware – or
morale – ran low because it couldn’t easily replace its war losses.

There is another lesson from
that war – brand new isn’t necessarily better. Poorly trained Pakistan tank
crews couldn’t use their latest Pattons to full effect whereas India’s tankmen
who were familiar with their outdated Centurions were able to take that all
important shot. The upshot: in key battles, the Indian Army beat the living
daylights out of the better equipped Pakistan Army.

Final test

Although the defence sector
looks promising, these are early days yet. According to the procurement website
Defense Industry Daily:

“Ultimately, the real question in India is
the extent of true domestic competition for defense funding. Will the new
government open the market sufficiently to allow the private sector to compete
and win, resulting in greater non-public sector investment in R&D and
production capabilities? The circumstances seem favourable: this government is
more committed to competition, has a more instinctive understanding of for-profit
industry, and harbours greater awareness of the severe capacity constraints of
the traditional public sector undertakings.”

It is through this prism that
industry should consider its opportunities. “The desire for more indigenous
development and production will continue in an avowedly nationalist
government,” DID concludes. “Nevertheless, global defence firms may be able to
develop deeper and more fruitful partnerships with emerging private sector
defence firms in India, perhaps even leading to greater exports of Indian
content – much praised, but rarely experienced to date.”

(Rakesh Krishnan Simha is a New
Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst, with a special interest
in defence and military history. He is a columnist with the Rossiyskaya Gazeta
group, Moscow, and Modern Diplomacy, a Europe-based foreign affairs portal.)

The Army on Monday
said a court of inquiry has been convened for detailed investigation of the
case wherein a young woman army officer of the rank of Captain — who had taken
part in the Republic Day parade this year to showcase ‘Nari Shakti’ (woman
power) — had filed a sexual harassment case against her commanding officer, an
officer of the rank of colonel. The Army promised that “any instance of such
misdemeanour will not be condoned.”

Army sources said,
“Post receipt of complaint from a woman officer of sexual harassment against an
ex-commanding officer, the standing committee led by another woman officer had
carried out preliminary investigations. On completion and submission of report
by the standing committee a court of inquiry has been convened for detailed
investigation of the case. Based on findings of the court, appropriate action
will be taken as per law. The Indian Army remains committed to upholding
highest standards of ethical behaviour by all ranks. Any instance of such
misdemeanour will not be condoned.”

The Army’s
“Complaints Committee on Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace” had
earlier swung into action and orders had been issued by the Army for “necessary
action” against the concerned Colonel as per rules with an opportunity to be
given to him to “give an explanation” for his actions.

The woman officer’s
father had written a letter to defence minister Manohar Parrikar accusing the
“higher officers” of giving the Colonel a “plum posting” in the name of taking
action. “I am the proud father of an Army officer who marched down the Rajpath
this year to showcase the “woman power.” I am absolutely disappointed today and
the reason is that my daughter was sexually harassed by her commanding officer
and she complained to the higher ups.”

In the name of
taking action, the higher officials gave him a plum posting and before leaving
the unit, the commanding officer decided to tarnish the image of my child. Now
my little child is trying her best to not let her head drop,” the letter by her
father said.

“If this is the way the Indian
Army treats its daughters, I am not sure if any parent will ever send their
daughter to the Army,” the lady-officer’s anguished father had further written
to the defence minister.

A commentary on
Indian society and the Indian Army's Regimentation; why this support system for
soldiers is still the best

The trigger for this
piece is a question from a Facebook friend, to whom I am most thankful. The
question alluded to reasons why Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is so
rampant in the US and indeed other Armies operating in areas such as
Afghanistan and Iraq and in the same light what is the experience of the Indian
Army with PTSD in our operational areas. This is as good a question as any and
why it never struck me to write on this earlier beats me. Perhaps I am just
presumptuous and I take our Army for granted just as so many others among my
countrymen do. A saving grace is that in 2011 while in command of 15 Corps in
Kashmir I instituted a study to examine stress levels in my Corps which
undoubtedly has the highest level of operational engagements anywhere in the
Army. 7000 officers and men were given an instrument by my outstanding medical
staff, whose contributions remain a little unsung in the world of machismo and
a bit of 'ramboism'. The reason for this was the run of suicides we were hit
with. The study did help the Army’s outstanding doctors to arrive at various
reasons for suicides but that is not the subject of this essay although I do
not wish to underplay the findings. The study helped me as an individual to
arrive at my own reasons for the levels of stress or lack of it in operational
areas all over the Army's vast deployment.

Let me describe
three scenarios from my own operational experience. The first is from Op Pawan,
the IPKF's long drawn deployment in India’s first out of area operation (OOAP).
The second is from the LoC where I take the case of a unit deployed in a mode
to ensure the sanctity of the LoC (which essentially means, no change to its
current status, which in turn means that not an inch of the territory in our
control should change ownership) and prevent any infiltration of terrorists
from POK. And, the third is of an RR unit deployed in depth but close to a
forested area with population centres nearby in Kashmir. These are classic
examples of the way Infantry and some other Arms function in operational areas.

After the blood and
gore of the intense phase of operations in the Jaffna Peninsula in Oct-Jan 1987
the IPKF settled to more routine counter insurgency (CI) operations. There was
really nothing routine about them because the LTTE's well-trained cadres fought
almost like regulars and less like militants. Units were deployed in company
groups at operating bases (COBs) with an area of responsibility. The LTTE could
muster as many as 100-200 men at a given point and if ambushed could actually
conduct counter ambush drills to break the ambush, quite unlike militants.
Their own ambushes were well sited, in large numbers and almost always
accompanied by IEDs. Patrols which went out could not let down their guard even
within hundred meters from the gate of their posts. Units which remained inside
posts without dominating their periphery suffered because the approaches were
mined by daring young tigers that crept up as close as ten meters from posts.
Trees were booby trapped as were bushes. On the coastline near the town of
Mullaitivu an attempt to occupy posts with 20 men or so met with response from
50 or more militants, leading to the Army suffering heavy casualties. Leave
parties left and arrived once in three weeks when the road was opened and there
was no certainty about reaching destinations without an engagement. As a
company commander, if I went on an operation with two platoons I always
remained worried about the state of security at my COB where only 20 men were
left. Equally when I was at the COB I was always ready to rush for
reinforcement of any other company or my own men out on operations. So what can
be expected in such an environment except a severe state of tension especially
since failure meant loss of quite a few lives. The Indian Army takes casualties
with much concern and a high loss of lives without commensurate infliction of
higher losses on the adversary is hugely frowned upon, leading to even
accusations of inaction and cowardice on part of officers. An entry such as
this in your CR means the end of career.

The LoC deployment
is in posts and picquets and in some places can be as low as eight men. In the
Uri sector is a high altitude area of height 14000 feet and more where snow
levels top 35 feet and the area of approximately a company plus (functionally
120 men) is cut off for six months. Extremely difficult evacuation of sick
soldiers or casualties by helicopter is possible only with severe risk. The
evacuation of small posts to reach the mother post before heavy snow sets in is
always fraught with danger and is a unit commander’s nightmare. That leaves
routes open which terrorists could sneak through with risk only terrorists can
take. Every year a few frozen bodies of dead terrorists are found. In summer,
isolated posts can be attacked by Pakistan regulars mixed with terrorists (BAT
teams). So can our logistics parties which carry out advance winter stocking
for almost six months and move on predictable routes every day, be ambushed en
route by shallow raiding Pakistan elements. By day it is essential to carry out
snow clearance in winter. In summer there is the challenge of carrying water
from sources which keep receding to a far distance (there is no system of
bottled water in the Army). Then comes night and four to six man ambushes have
to be deployed along the LoC fence from last light to well after first light.
To ensure the right density a major part of the sub unit remains deployed along
the LoC Fence and the remaining personnel ensure the security of the post.

A brief description
of the functioning of RR units on the CT grid is outlined. Every RR unit has
its peculiar area of operations. The threat is of standoff fire by terrorists
or sneak attacks on posts and not large scale attacks of the LTTE kind. In
today’s environment the RR unit’s source of tension is more from bandhs and
stone throwing mobs which target their vehicles or patrols. Quick thinking
independent decisions are required from junior leaders keeping propriety in
mind and degree of response. Small vehicle convoys have been targeted by mobs
leaving soldiers in quandary over the need to fire or not to save themselves
and Government property. The pressure for results in urban areas and nearby
forests is ever present and unit commanders drive their troops to ensure
domination and control, gain intelligence and execute innovative operations
while seeking contact. I would classify tension here as high but lower than the
LoC where threat to life and possibility of adverse contact is far higher.

The tour of duty for
Indian soldiers is usually two to three years; that of troops of western armies
is six months. Despite terrain constraints the western armies depend far more
on helicopter support for logistics and even for bail outs in adverse tactical
situations; not so in the Indian Army except for casualty evacuation. The
Indian soldier as much as the western one does not fear for his life, but
prevailing uncertainty and lack of rest are two major factors for stress.
Climatic conditions in high altitude areas can be a major source of tension and
if soldiers fear anything it is the effects of climate. Avalanches top the
list. In Sri Lanka where operational conditions were far more life threatening
I used to look into the eyes of my soldiers and draw solace from that; hardly
ever did I find fear writ on their faces. If there was it was due to the
possibility of being isolated or detached from the subunit. The necessity of
buddy contact was essential. One does not fear for life but of being detached
from the subunit or being taken prisoner. What is remarkable is the complete
lack of emotions to losses of even close buddies in operations. Our soldiers
take the disorder of battle extremely well as well as deprivation of comforts.
I always emphasized on the need for ‘sleep/rest management’ of the soldiers
because that is an area which is usually neglected by the leadership. Soldiers
cannot be expected to function 24x7 but the demands of their responsibility
expect exactly that. On the LoC night and day is the same in terms of alert.

There are cases of
suicides but hardly ever is this work related. The availability of the mobile
phone acts as the biggest threat. In the tense environment of the LoC or RR
related operations bad news from home can act as a trigger. In many such
instances it is young soldiers unable to bear the additional tension of
problems at home; problems as seemingly irrelevant as a newlywed wife unable to
get along with the mother in law. Sitting far away on a remote post the immediate
world around the soldier may be perceived by him to be within his control but
not the world around his home where the problems affect him much more. In his
post or on patrol he can still share his immediate concern about safety with
his buddy or his superior but sharing home based problems is a greater
challenge. Marital problems are one dimension, property problems in rural areas
and absence at crucial moments when something legal is involved can be
extremely stressful. While leave policy of units is always liberal and the
government has sanctioned two free trips home with other trips at concessional
rates it is a question of timing. Everyone cannot be away from duty at harvest
time or during festivals and that is a problem which the units minimize through
whatever they can do to compensate.

The experience of
western armies has been the inability of returning soldiers to merge in
society; that is a form of PTSD or an effect. Loss of partners while they were
away, inability to concentrate on jobs, fits of anger and regret due to
unpalatable actions in dealing with aliens and innocents in way off lands, etc;
all add to the terrible isolation that individual citizens feel in developed
societies. That is the saving grace of Indian society where despite prickly
problems of farmer suicides or rural poverty there is family and societal
support for those who are away serving the nation. It may all disappear in due
course and the mishandling of OROP may very well contribute to the soldier’s
dwindling confidence in the support system which Indian society and family
system continues to provide.

More than anything
else the psychological well-being of soldiers is contingent upon the efficient
functioning of the Regimental system of the Indian Army. To a visiting DG of a
CAPF I strongly recommended a day be spent with an RR unit. This was in
response to his query as to what makes an RR unit tick and achieve so much. He
was kind to take my advice, spent a day at Baramula and then rang me up to say
that he had got the answer. Bonding of the cap badge and the lanyard has been
taken by the Indian Army to such a high level that camaraderie is natural; a
soldier’s problems, from womb to tomb (notwithstanding stray cases of neglect
of widows reported once in a while) are the unit’s problems. There has been
much talk of diluting the Regimental system; the British could not help it and
had to compromise with theirs due to downsizing. They taught us what
Regimentation means; today the Indian Army can teach them a few lessons in
psychological strengthening of soldiers through the Regimental system.

It is not all rosy.
Society is changing very rapidly in India. The haloed identity of the soldier
is being hugely compromised by the needless rancor over OROP which the
government should consider a sensible investment in the social stability of the
armed forces. The unfortunate thing in India is that decision makers have very
little idea about the profession of arms, perceiving it to be a contractual
profession; the soldier's functioning is as yet not contractual but with the
complete lack of understanding in a fast changing society all that
differentiates the Indian Army from western armies may well collapse. That will
be a sad day indeed and a rebirth for Indian military sociology.