With southern Lebanon in the near past and Darfur looming ahead,
the issues relating to the utility and proper role of U.N.
peacekeeping operations are cer­tainly ripe for debate.

"Force Multipliers" and U.S. National
Interests

At the outset, the term "force multiplier" should be dispensed
with when assessing U.N. peacekeeping capabilities. "Force
multiplier" is a military term defined as a capability that, when
added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases
the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the
probability of success. Force multipliers can be a
tech­nologically advanced weapons system, or simply
hold­ing the "high ground" during a military engagement.

The key term within the definition of force multi­plier,
however, is combat, which is why U.N. peace­keepers are
not now--and will not for the foreseeable future be--a force
multiplier for U.S. armed forces. U.N. peacekeepers have not shown
the ability to reli­ably and adequately support U.S. operations
in today's combat environment.

Part of the reason U.N. peacekeepers cannot quali­fy as
force multipliers is that they usually operate under an unclear or
insufficient use of force mandate. Inadequate use of force mandates
have had disastrous consequences in the past, such as the decision
by U.N. forces to stand down in the face of atrocities and
mas­sacres in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. U.N.
peacekeepers that, for whatever reason, have failed to defend
themselves have been taken as hos­tages by hostile forces, as
occurred in Sarajevo in 1995 and Sierra Leone in 2000. When U.S.
forces most needed the assistance of U.N. troops--in Somalia in
1993--their performance was less than stellar by most accounts.
These incidents do not inspire much confidence in U.N. peacekeeping
capabilities.

That being said, U.S. administrations have often relied upon
U.N. peacekeepers to serve certain lim­ited purposes around the
world where the United States has interests, but has declined to
intervene with its own armed forces. If the U.N. peacekeepers
qualify as a force multiplier, it is under those
cir­cumstances. In sum, U.N. peacekeeping forces are not a
"force multiplier" unless you define that phrase broadly enough to
include any instance that U.N. peacekeeping forces would be
utilized instead of U.S. forces, which could in turn be deployed
else­where in the world.

In the final equation, the debate over the utility of U.N.
peacekeepers does not turn on semantics. The real question to be
answered is not whether U.N. peacekeepers could possibly be a
"force multiplier" for U.S. armed forces, but rather whether and
under what circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves the vital
national interests of the United States.

What does or does not qualify as a vital national interest of
the United States is a subject of debate among experts in
international relations and mili­tary affairs. What qualifies
as a vital national interest of the United States in the post-9/11
world may not have qualified in the pre-9/11 world, and vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the United States has benefited from the
placement of U.N. forces in locations where the world may have
otherwise called for U.S. military intervention, which has in turn
allowed U.S. forces to deploy elsewhere in the world where our
vital national interests are actually at stake.

The Status Quo is Unacceptable

But the analysis does not end there. Merely because in some
limited circumstances U.N. peace­keeping serves U.S. interests,
it does not necessarily follow that American taxpayers should be
called upon to shoulder an increase in the level of U.S.
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations, or that they should
pay any peacekeeping "arrearages" allegedly owed. That conclusion
assumes that the status quo of U.N. peacekeeping operations is
acceptable.

There are many problems with the current state of U.N.
peacekeeping operations, all well document­ed in reports such
as those issued by the U.S. Gov­ernment Accountability Office
and the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services. The U.N.
peace­keeping program has more than quadrupled in size since
1999 without a commensurate strengthening of its internal control
mechanisms. An internal U.N. audit of $1 billion worth of
peacekeeping pro­curement contracts found that at least $265
million of those expenditures was subject to waste, fraud, or
abuse.

Yet all other problems relating to peacekeeping operations pale
in comparison to the main reason for not accepting the status
quo--the persistence of sexual exploitation perpetrated by U.N.
peacekeep­ers. The many instances of sexual exploitation are
well known and need not be described in detail here, but suffice it
to say that the irony of those abuses should be lost on nobody. The
fact that U.N. peacekeepers--who have been sent to protect the most
destitute and desperate populations on earth--should use their
position of power to sexu­ally exploit those who have already
been victimized by their circumstances is beyond comprehension.

U.N. peacekeepers must be held accountable for their criminal
acts if the U.N. is to be viewed as a force for peace and security
around the world. In the past, peacekeepers who have been credibly
accused of sexual misconduct or other crimes have, at worst, simply
been repatriated to their home countries where they face no
punishment. This is apparently all the U.N. is empowered to do. The
results are sad­ly predicable. An analysis done by theU.K.
Indepen­dent newspaper in January found that while
nearly 200 U.N. personnel have been repatriated for sex offenses
over the past three years, none appear to have been prosecuted by
their home countries.

Necessary Reforms

That is simply unacceptable. At a minimum, any member state that
contributes troops or personnel to a peacekeeping mission should be
required to coop­erate with investigations into abuse or
misconduct leveled against those personnel. Such investigations may
be carried out by local law enforcement within the nation where the
alleged crime occurred, or if the capacity there is lacking, by
U.N. authorities.

To combat sexual exploitation, the U.N. should implement
mandatory uniform standards of con­duct for military and
civilian peacekeeping person­nel participating in U.N.
missions. It is not enough (as is currently being proposed) to
merely amend the existing "peacekeeper's pocket guide," which has
clearly been ignored by offending peacekeepers for many years.

Rather than amend the pocket guide, the U.N. should amend the
so-called Status of Forces Agree­ments that are entered into by
and between the U.N. and each member state that contributes
peacekeep­ing personnel to U.N. missions. Status of
Forces Agreements memorialize the terms and conditions of the troop
commitment. While these Agreements generally place the
responsibility upon the troop-contributing countries to prosecute
their own per­sonnel for crimes committed during the
peacekeep­ing mission, there are no enforcement mechanisms
available to the U.N. to monitor that provision. Indeed,
prosecutions for crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel when
they return to their home countries are few and far between.

The U.N. must require that member states com­mit in their
respective Status of Forces Agreements to investigate, try, and
punish their personnel when credible evidence of wrongdoing exists.
The Agree­ments should require member states to report to the
U.N. on the status of prosecutions of personnel against whom
credible allegations of misconduct were made. The member states
must also commit to inform the U.N. of the outcome of such
prosecu­tions. States that fail to fulfill those commitments
should be barred from providing troops for peace­keeping
operations. In addition, the U.N. must maintain a database of the
names of all peacekeep­ing personnel who have been accused,
charged, or convicted of crimes committed while employed in a
peacekeeping mission so that these troops are not permitted to
participate in future peacekeeping operations.

These new requirements will not guarantee that peacekeepers will
not abuse local populations, but should give strong incentives to
contributing mem­ber states to take action against offenders,
which is something they apparently have little interest in doing
under the status quo.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is premature to discuss whether and under what
circumstances U.N. peacekeeping could serve as a "force multiplier"
for U.S. armed forces or even whether peacekeepers could
comple­ment the vital national interests of the United States.
It is certainly premature to discuss whether U.S. taxpayer dollars
should be used to increase our con­tributions to peacekeeping
activities or pay alleged "arrearages." The United States cannot be
seen as the underwriter of sexual abuse in the world's most
desperate, war-torn nations. Only after the U.N. Department of
Peacekeeping Operations has been reformed in such a manner that it
may perform its important duties at the highest level of
professional­ism should those matters be addressed.

Steven Groves is Bernard
and Barbara Lomas Fel­low in The Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered
June 13, 2007, before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Organi­zations, Human Rights, and
Oversight.