By Afro-Middle East Centre The refugee crisis currently affecting Europe has elicited comparisons to the refugee crisis resulting from the Second World War. This comparison, while worthwhile insofar as it…

]]>jeenahshira@gmail.com (AMEC-SJ)Middle East GeneralThu, 10 Sep 2015 00:00:00 +0200Remaining and expanding: Measuring the Islamic State group’s success in its current phasehttp://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1402-remaining-and-expanding-measuring-the-islamic-state-group-s-success-in-its-current-phase.html
http://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1402-remaining-and-expanding-measuring-the-islamic-state-group-s-success-in-its-current-phase.html

By Afro-Middle East Centre Since its declaration of a ‘caliphate’ on 29 June 2014, the Islamic State group (IS), the brutal successor to al-Qa'ida, has gone from strength to strength.…

By Omar Shaukat With the release of another video showing the beheading of American journalist Steven Sotloff, held hostage by the Islamic State (IS, also variously known as Isil, or…

Consider, for example, IS’s dramatic and symbolic bulldozing of a section of the Syria-Iraq border, either side of which is now under the group’s control. It was widely interpreted as IS’s rebuke of the Sykes-Picot arrangement, a major British and French agreement that, after World War II, bestowed upon the Middle East its current geographical and national boundaries.

Thus, IS’s gesture (at that moment it was known as Isis/Isil – the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or Levant) – was understood as an anti-Western statement, an explicit “no” to the shape of the world as decided and controlled by Western powers, along with a reassertion of some kind of indigenous Muslim identity and being in the world.

Yet this is too simplistic of a reading of IS’s dramatic rise in the global public imagination. Most of its gestures are, in fact, first and foremost directed against its detractors within the Muslim world, especially other jihadis who do not agree with IS’s programme (manhaj) of jihad.

Therefore, in the case of the Syria-Iraq border, IS’s erasure of that boundary, along with signifying something intended for Western powers, contained a simultaneous message for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda, under the current leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, deeming itself the leader of global jihad, had earlier demanded IS to, instead of expanding its presence into Syria, restrict itself to operations within Iraq.

But this, in turn, elicited a sharp response from IS leadership. It criticised al-Qaeda for remaining beholden to artificial national boundaries, and IS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, even suggested that al-Zawahiri was in violation of God’s command for assuming the Sykes-Picot arrangement and organising jihad around this principle.

Thus, in demolishing the border, IS did not just engage in an anti-Western gesture but also threw a slap in the faces of its fellow jihadis.

This is just one example of the kind of divisions that plague the jihadist world. Others would include IS’s killing of the official mediator – appointed by Ayman al-Zawahiri himself – Abu Khaled al-Suri, who was tasked with reconciling IS and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. Further examples might also include the frequent and strong denunciation that literature produced by IS engages in when refuting the positions taken by its opponents, whether from mainstream Muslims or the more fringe jihadist circles.

Such facts are important to keep in mind, because all too often radical groups like IS are viewed only in relation to their opposition to the West or some other configuration that supposedly belongs to the West: Christianity, Judaism, liberalism, capitalism, or democracy.

That in turn serves as an occasion to ignore and pass over in silence the Muslim blood that these organisations are willing to shed in order to achieve their goals.

This manner of understanding IS is not only entirely counterproductive and alienates the greatest resource that the world has against IS, namely, its Muslim opponents. It also, unfortunately and much more dangerously, reproduces the same logic that IS lives by.

For IS is unable to see an individual as such. It must view individuals as necessarily filtered through social, political and theological categories.

Consider, for example, the impassioned online plea that Sotloff’s mother sent al-Baghdadi’s way, asking him to pardon and release her son, and not hold him accountable for sins committed by the US government, actions over which Sotloff had no direct control.

Nonetheless, not only was she met with silence from al-Baghdadi but she also found that Sotloff’s executor could not see Sotloff as anything other than a US citizen, the member of a polity whose president authorised the killing of members belonging to the executor’s group.

It is in this way that IS’s way of imagining the world and the people that dwell in it is tribalistic at its core. And neither is it a doctrine that certain members of IS are shy of admitting.

In fact, one of its ideologues not only admitted it but also tried to defend this manner of thinking in a recent issue of IS’s premiere publication in English, a magazine called Dabiq.

Thus, viewing IS and its members only through the anti-Western lens would in some ways resemble IS’s way of looking at the world. IS can see people only through the Muslim or anti-Muslim (or in language that IS employs, dar al-islam and dar al-kufr) lens, with many ostensible Muslims often thrown into the anti-Muslim camp. However, in our place, we must not make the similar mistake of viewing IS operatives, especially the non-ideological rank and file within it, only through the Western or anti-Western lens.

This point is not just meant as a vague ethical exhortation. Rather, it comes packed with serious policy implications, especially for non-Muslim majority countries that might be grappling with some section of its disaffected Muslim youth migrating to territory under IS’s control.

The UK and Australia are two countries that are dealing with this phenomenon much more so than the rest, and are actively debating how to deal with those former residents who have now become IS “citizens”.

The knee-jerk demand has been to strip all of them of their citizenship and permanently disbar them from returning to their countries of origin.

While one can certainly sympathise and understand how this might be appealing, rooted as these ideas are in a sense of self-preservation and fears over domestic threats, this thinking does not take into account the lived reality of many returning migrant (muhajirun) jihadis.

Research performed by the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation suggests that transnational jihadis do not always return to their home countries in order to carry out further terrorist operations and/or recruitment.

Sometimes, and more often than not, they return repentant, driven away by the horror and disillusionment of what they have witnessed and/or in order to start a new and better life.

Allowing these repentant returnees into the home countries, with the requisite processes of judicial and security reviews, would not only decrease the chances of future terrorism and help prevent the next generation of wannabe migrant jihadis, it would also allow for better intelligence on the terrorist groups that continue to be active at the moment.

Nonetheless, admittedly, it is not an easy step to take, for the predominant desire is to view a jihadi as permanently beyond the pale of civilisation, and forever irredeemable.

And such a step would not only have ramifications for the philosophy that underlies the criminal justice system of a country but also its citizenry’s ability to rehabilitate the devious within its midst.

Other than the logistical issue of developing efficient monitoring and assessment programmes, and the relational requirement of creating dependable and trustworthy ties between communal and governmental organisations, among various additional factors it would also require the ability to think beyond the Western/anti-Western tropes through which jihadis are typically understood.

These repentant jihadis will need to be viewed as candidates for reconciliation rather than as sites for revenge or bodies to discipline. Challenging as it might be, it could be one way through which the West/Islam divide could be transcended, which is after all the basic premise upon which stands the polarised world views of IS-like organisations.

As the examples of Steven Sotloff and James Foley remind us, IS does not seem capable of taking such a step. Yet can one still hope that, when the time comes, their enemies would act better than them?

By Basheer Nafi’ A truism that is valid for almost all revolutions – including the English, French, and the European revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century, the Iranian Revolution and east…

After the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan uprisings successfully collapsed their respective governments – and Yemen and Syria seemed to be following suit – hardly any of the revolutionaries in these countries had prepared themselves to confront the forces of counterrevolution. Because there is only a single regional order that encompasses the Arab world – which, in terms of language, history and culture, transcends even the official regional framework represented by the Arab League, and because revolutions broke out in only a few Arab states, the clouds of counterrevolution gathered rapidly and immediately after the first wave of the 2011 uprisings. Since 2012, strong bonds have developed between, on the one hand, the social and political forces in each country that were opposed to revolution and democratic transition, and, on the other, the Arab states that assumed a leading role in the counterrevolutionary movement.

The counterrevolutionary camp – with its businessmen, groups of youth acolytes, foundations and organisations, media networks, political parties, social factions and state institutions linked to the old regime – was no less capable, comprehensive in its objectives and influential than the revolutionary camps. The past three years – since the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions – witnessed a mobilisation of political funding whose scale has been unprecedented in Arab history, with a concomitant mobilisation of weaponry, and the establishment of relationships and alliances that had previously been unimaginable. These processes resulted in a coalescence of the princes of monarchical states with liberal and nationalist intellectuals and activists; military and security officers with investors with western backgrounds; and gangs of thieves, smugglers, murderers and security officials with revolutionary activists.

The counterrevolution reached its climax in 2013, after the abortion of democracy in Egypt, faltering steps of political transition in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, and the success attained by a sectarian alliance in halting the progress of the Syrian revolution and the abortion of the popular uprising in Iraq. Because Turkey decided, in the first year of the Arab uprisings, to align with the camp demanding change and democratic transition, because a broad spectrum of Arab opinion viewed what had become known as the ‘Turkish Model’ with admiration, and because Qatar played a visible role in granting financial, media and moral support to the revolting countries, both Turkey and Qatar were targeted together with the Arab revolution countries. The rapid and easy victory of the 2013 coup in Egypt puffed up the Arab counterrevolutionary movement with arrogance, confirming the belief in its main centres that it was capable of achieving miracles and in re-establishing the status-quo ante in the Arab world. The counterrevolutionary forces acted without any reservations, made no attempts at subtlety or discretion, and did not bother to consider the immense destruction, countless victims and the amount of blood spilt as a result of the tumultuous suppression of the will and aspirations of the people.

Hundreds of millions of dollars, and convoys of weaponry were pumped into Libya, where various factions linked to the former regime had hastily aligned themselves with adventurous officers, ambitious technocrats and tribal forces, all aiming to uproot the forces and institutions of the Libyan revolution. Large amounts of money were pumped into Tunisia to revive groups loyal to the regime deposed in 2011, and to establish a united opposition front that would include a range of elements from the extreme right to the extreme left, in order to confront the Islamist democrats and their leftist allies. The Tunisian counterrevolution had no qualms about compromising the country’s security, and employed the tools of character assassination and bloody assassination in equal measure.

Yemen was not spared similar efforts to reverse the movement of change, and to force it to submit to the will of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In Syria and Iraq, sectarian camps supported by Iran were more zealous in their attempts to extinguish the revolutionary movement, forcing the peaceful mass popular mobilisation for just governance, freedom and democracy into a brutal civil war that has resulted in the destruction of vast areas. Because one of the most prominent facets of the coup against the people and their will was the open war against the democratic, reformist-inclined Islamist forces, and because Hamas was viewed as part of this category, an extremely vile incitement campaign was launched against the Gaza Strip, with intensive Arab-Israeli coordination, to undermine the influence of political Islam.

Arab counterrevolutionary forces – intoxicated with the confidence and arrogance of their victory – were blissfully unaware of the complexity of the Arab political sphere, and did not realise that the Arab revolutionary movement was not initiated just by immediate pressing circumstances in individual countries, but was a consequence of more than a century of ferment. The Arab counterrevolution unleashed its onslaught like an unbridled storm, and it seemed as if Arabs would be blown back to an era even darker than the one they had revolted against. However, the counterrevolutionary ascent did not last long; a year after it claimed its Egyptian prize, the capitals of the Arab counterrevolution find themselves living through a state of depression.

Gaza was subjected to a major Israeli onslaught that served both Israeli and Arab counterrevolutionary objectives. However, the tiny, besieged territory remains steadfast in the face of the violent onslaught – in spite of the large number of civilian casualties and the catastrophic damage inflicted on it, and the Israeli military machine has failed to weaken the capacity of the Gaza resistance, or to attain any of the political objectives of its operation. The Islamist resistance in Gaza has emerged from this battle stronger, more committed, and with more popular support among Palestinians and Arabs in general.

Libya was also subjected to another attack, the full details of which are yet to be revealed. However, the Libyan faction that attempted a coup against the revolution has been defeated, even if it not yet totally effaced, and Libyans wait to see if the 3 July coup regime in Egypt will intervene militarily in their country, which is already overburdened by external interference. Despite transition processes in other Arab revolution countries proceeding slowly, it seems clear that the counterrevolutionary forces will not succeed in replicating the July 2013 Egyptian experience. Even in Egypt, people are still taking to the streets, the dream of stability remains distant, and it is uncertain that the economic decline will not lead to total economic meltdown. The Syrian revolution has successfully slowed the progress of the regime’s forces and its sectarian allies, while the same sectarian camp finds itself helpless in the face of the challenges it created in Iraq. The attempt to isolate Qatar within the Gulf collective has failed, and those that attempted to isolate it themselves face isolation. Similarly, the delusion of intervention in Turkish affairs has dissipated, and those who have been wishing for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s speedy exit from the political sphere have to live with the prospect of his presidency for the next ten years.

No place on the globe compares with the Arab world in its cultural and historical cohesion, or in its political divisions. In spite of the similarities in the general patterns of modern popular revolutions, there are indications that the Arabs are creating a unique paradigm, and that the intense struggle for the Arab soul and the future of its people will continue for a while. Attempts to overthrow revolutionary movements and to subvert the will of the people have sometimes been successful, and sometimes not. One cannot, therefore, be certain about when this movement will reach its desired destination; what is certain, however, is that the movement of history and the prospects of change have returned to the path they had been deviated from.

By Zeenat Adam ‘When women are violated like men who but for sex are like them – when women’s arms and legs bleed when severed, when women are shot in…

The suffering of women and children in times of conflict is often generalised, or masked and left unspoken; and statistics are often manipulated to minimise the focus of the devastating effects of war on women.

With the Syrian conflict having escalated into a full-blown war, the impact on women and girls has been catastrophic and is wreaking chaos on the social fabric. When men make war, women become the collateral victims. Syrian women and girls are growing increasingly vulnerable to sexual exploitation as the war rages on, forcing them into exile or displacement. Once thriving communities become impoverished, and women are driven to prostitution, survival sex, teenage marriages, or, out of desperation, striking up sexual relationships with men who can provide rent or food. Sexual harassment is rampant. Even some aid workers have become sexual predators. Child marriages are increasing as young girls seek to escape poverty, or because their families believe it will protect teenagers from rape and sexual exploitation, only to find that the girls are ill-prepared for marriage, lack sexual education and often wed men much older than them. The greater the age difference, the more likely girls are to be disempowered and vulnerable to violence, abuse or exploitation, becoming victims of domestic violence and marital rape. Measures of the extent of sexual exploitation are difficult to access since women are reluctant to complain about abuse for fear of stigma and secondary abuse.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), displaced women escaping violence are at increased risk of rape, particularly in remote rural areas. Some are sold into sexual slavery, others forced into marriage. Gang rapes have become instruments of humiliation for individual women, and genocide of rival groups. Women are systematically raped based on their ethnic, racial or national bases during war. In the CAR, low literacy rates leave women particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Reconciliation efforts have been sporadic and have yet to address rape as a tool of genocide. Donor funding either targets broad initiatives to end the conflict, or are completely absent, leaving women at the bottom of the funding ladder.

Recently, after visiting CAR, former South African deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, now executive director of UN Women, appealed to the UN Security Council about the plight of women and girls. She urged the UNSC to ensure that gender issues were addressed from the outset in peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives in CAR, and to elevate women’s participation and leadership in reconciliation efforts. She also called for an increase in medical and psycho-social support for internally displaced persons, particularly those who were victims of rape. Mlambo-Ngcuka described sexual violence against young women and girls in CAR as ‘violence [that] has taken place in house-to-house searches, unauthorized road blocks, military camps, and as part of sectarian violence’.

Peacekeeping troops deployed to conflict regions such as CAR have also been known to perpetrate sexual violence against women. The violation of a population by peacekeeping troops who are supposed to protect civilians is an ironical perversion.

In South Sudan, the hope of a peaceful new nation deteriorated despite international support and financial injections after independence. With the outbreak of internal conflict last year, there has been an alarming increase in reports of sexual violence along ethnic lines.

A few weeks ago, South Sudanese in the diaspora gathered in Washington DC to consider solutions to the impasse in that country’s political process. Interestingly, the case of the state of Western Bahr el Ghazal was put forward as a positive story on peacebuilding and peacekeeping, because this region had remained relatively peaceful, despite violence elsewhere in the country. This was attributed, in the meeting, to the leadership role of women in Western Bahr el Ghazal. The state finance minister, Lilian Riziq, noted that the state governor had two female advisors out of nine, fifteen women in the state assembly, and two female state ministers. She hailed the role of women in negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, and subsequent peace-building initiatives. Women leaders, she said, were emerging at various levels of governance, and South Sudan should elect a woman president.

Like the South Sudanese, Palestinian women have been active participants in political struggle since the Balfour declaration of 1917. The General Union of Palestinian Women was established in the 1960s. Women later became more politicised during the height of the Arab nationalist movement, and during the first Palestinian intifada. Leila Khaled and Hanan Ashrawi became household names in Palestine and across the world. They continue to inspire the newer generation of women to lead in their struggle for justice.

As the Israeli onslaught on Gaza unfolded in the past weeks, we witnessed some of the gravest conflict-related atrocities. Women and children suffered the most horrendous effects of the bombing of Gaza. Shockingly, Israeli Knesset member Ayelet Shaked, from economics minister Naftali Bennett’s ultra-right Jewish Home party, called for murdering the mothers of Palestinian ‘terrorists’ so that they could not give birth to more ‘little snakes’. ‘They have to die and their houses should be demolished so that they cannot bear any more terrorists,’ she said. ‘They are all our enemies and their blood should be on our hands. This also applies to the mothers of the dead terrorists…[They] are all enemy combatants, and their blood shall be on all their heads. Now this also includes the mothers of the martyrs, who send them to hell with flowers and kisses. They should follow their sons, nothing would be more just. They should go, as should the physical homes in which they raised the snakes. Otherwise, more little snakes will be raised there.’

Mordechai Kedar, a lecturer on Arabic literature at Bar Ilan University, believes the sisters and mothers of Palestinian ‘terrorists’ should be raped. ‘The only thing that will deter them is if they know that either their sister or mother will be raped if they are caught. What can we do? This is the culture that we live in,’ he said.

Viewed through the Bosnian lens these openly racist and genocidal pronouncements echo the mass slaughter of non-Serbs. In the words of one Bosnian woman: ‘I do not fear the shells and bombs that may fall on my house. They do not ask for my name. I fear the foot soldiers who come to my house and kill and wound in a very personal way and commit atrocities in front of my children.’

Women in conflict zones are usually objectified and portrayed as vulnerable victims in need of rescue. Apart from the continued threat of gender-based violence, women’s voices calling for social, economic or political rights are silenced, especially when they have been displaced. Women assume greater responsibilities in times of conflict, especially as primary caregivers. Rather than these roles garnering respect, false patriarchal assertions, coupled with cultural stigmatism, relegate women to domestication with little regard to their abilities to meaningfully contribute to peacemaking and conflict transformation. Their resilience and resourcefulness in maintaining and sustaining their communities is underestimated, despite their natural leadership qualities. They are marginalised from key political negotiations and decision-making that has an impact on conflict transformation and reconciliation. The marginalisation is extended after the conflicts end, as the agendas are already determined during negotiations, from which women are often absent. Gender-based war crimes usually go unpunished or unaddressed in post-conflict reconciliation processes. Legal recourse takes ages to be obtained; war crimes often go unpunished and guilty parties refuse to sign the Rome Statute, thus rendering the International Criminal Court impotent, and delaying justice for victims.

The historic Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) addresses the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women, and recognises the contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Security Council Resolution 2122 (October 2013), highlights the inherent societal inequalities that exacerbate the impact of conflict on women. It also regards gender equality and women’s empowerment as critical to international peace and security, underlining that women’s economic empowerment greatly contributes to stabilising societies emerging from armed conflict.

Although these resolutions are hailed as ground-breaking, they fail to institute mechanisms of accountability and implementation, and have little or no impact on the ground. Women are still denied access to justice and protection from gender-based violence. The resolutions fail to institute mechanisms of accountability and implementation. In order to translate the decisions to workable solutions, the myth that women are uneducated and incapable of participating in international summits to resolve conflict must be debunked by women themselves. Apart from UN appointed gender investigators, who are supposed to be assigned to conflict zones, local women need to empower themselves and be empowered to address gender-based violence within social networks at grassroots level, both through psycho-social support, as well as improved healthcare. Sustainable funding must be dedicated to women’s development and special courts should be created to ensure legal recourse and justice. UN member states must be encouraged to introduce domestic laws that comply with these resolutions, and international monitoring instruments should be established to ensure compliance.

By Afro-Middle East Centre The severing of Hamas’s relationship with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s government, which saw its politburo relocate from Damascus to Doha and Cairo in early 2012, would…

The realignment further highlights two divergent currents within Hamas: one, predominantly located in its Gaza wing, that favours armed resistance and an alliance with Iran and Hizbullah; and the second, predominantly its wing in exile, that is looking to lessen Hamas’ diplomatic isolation, and which sees its ideological closeness with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Qatar as an important driver. The currents are far more complex, however, than an internal-external binary. This was underscored when Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas leader and prime minister in Gaza, unequivocally threw Hamas’ weight behind the Syrian rebels in February 2012.

Although Hamas’s initial shift from Iran and Hizbullah might seem to have sectarian undertones, in light of reconciliation moves currently underway between Hamas and Hizbullah, as well Iran, it would be a gross oversimplification to read the schism that emerged between Hamas and Hizbullah through a solely sectarian framework, as some commentators have. Such a reading plays into simplistic readings of regional sectarianism, and ignores the nature of a deep-rooted political relationship which transcends sectarian differences and is based on a common opposition to Israel.

Hamas’s response to the Syrian crisis: Pragmatism, ideology or principles?

After its expulsion from Jordan in 1999, Hamas found refuge and support in Syria. The latter’s support was premised on the organisation being part of the ‘axis of resistance’. Hamas’s base in Syria would also allow for better coordination with Hizbullah. Hamas was critical to Iran, Hizbullah and Syria’s attempt to de-emphasise the Shi’a character of the axis, and its assertion instead of a Muslim and resistance identity. To the more secular Asad, whose privileged Alawi sect is an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, Hamas further helped in positioning the Syrian government as holding a non-sectarian character.

However, even before the Syrian conflict, which began in March 2011, spiralled into a brutal civil war, Hamas had found the state’s repression against the initial, relatively peaceful, protests untenable. After much internal wrangling, Hamas subsequently took what it viewed as a principled position, and broke ranks with Damascus; a move that would provoke Iran’s ire. Hamas took this step knowing well that, were Asad to be ousted, this could have serious ramifications for Iran’s and Hizbullah’s regional influence, as well as Hizbullah’s clout in Lebanon. It would spell, at the very least, a weakening of the ‘axis of resistance’, and, with Syria serving as a crucial source and conduit of weapons to Hizbullah, it would also severely impede Hizbullah’s ability to operate militarily, and to act as a counterbalance to Israel’s regional military dominance.

The rise to power of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood through Egypt’s first democratic election on 24 June 2012, and Qatar’s outreach to Hamas under the recently-retired emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, seemed to offer a viable, alternative axis for the Palestinian resistance movement. An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s shift further underscored its gravitation towards states with a shared religious ideology, and states that could potentially lessen Hamas’ international isolation. Hamas has managed, for a long time, to juggle multiple loyalties, whilst facing the challenges of trying to govern a besieged territory with much of its leadership forced into exile across the Arab world. Hamas, however, found itself in a dilemma because of the situation playing out in Syria. Facing pressure from the Syrian regime to publicly support it, the organisation finally decided to back the uprising.

In February 2012, Ismail Haniyeh called for support for the Syrian opposition against its (former) host, Asad. Significantly, pointing to Hamas’s new alliances, this call was made at al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo. The move angered Iran, which felt that Hamas was moving in the same direction as Fatah. That is, that Hamas was giving up its resistance identity in favour of diplomacy that has only served to further disempower the Palestinian people. In response, Iran began reducing its funding to the movement and the Gaza government. However, considering the importance of Hamas to Iran’s ambitions in extending its influence in the Sunni world, Iran could ill-afford the strategic cost of severing an alliance with the Palestinian movement despite this rupture in its relationship with Hamas.

The schism between Hamas, and Iran and Hizbullah was foregrounded when, on 17 June 2013, a senior Hamas leader, Mousa Abu Marzouq, publicly ‘demand[ed] of Hizbullah to withdraw its forces from Syria’ and accused Hizbullah of ‘increasing sectarian mobilisation in the region’. Despite Hamas’s public attack on it, Hizbullah, issued no public response. Within days, however, Hamas leaders met with members of Hizbullah’s political leadership to seek a way to ease the growing tensions between the two movements. Hamas was represented by Abu Marzouq.

Reconciliation

For Hizbullah, whose popularity has managed to transcend sectarian divisions in Lebanon, Hamas was a crucial partner in its own identity as a resistance movement fighting Israel. With the deepening of sectarianism in Lebanon, Hizbullah also needed Hamas in its continued appeal to Sunni Lebanese citizens. Furthermore, Hizbullah, aware of the pressures that had faced Hamas, had believed that Hamas, despite its shift away from the Syrian-Iranian-Hizbullah axis, would ultimately return to that alliance. One reason for Hizbullah’s confidence in this regard came from Israel’s attacks on Gaza in November 2012 during ‘Operation Pillar of Defense’. Tehran’s support for Hamas was underscored by the movement’s firing Iranian Fajr missiles deep into Israel. Hamas had built a reputation as a movement that was able to alter the psychological balance against Israel among Palestinians. Its ability to fire rockets deep into Israel during that operation saw it gain enormous popular support in Gaza and the West Bank. While Doha and Cairo would be able to offer certain types of support to Hamas, Iran and Hizbullah were convinced that neither Qatar nor Egypt would be willing to arm the movement. Hizbullah also believed that, with Hamas’s popular support based on its resistance identity, the Palestinian movement would not move away from its posture of resistance, or remain permanently alienated from the ‘resistance axis’.

Aside from the geographical significance of a shared border between Egypt and Gaza, it was expected that the ascendance to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would facilitate a relationship between Egypt and Hamas, which has its roots in the Brotherhood. Hamas had also hoped that with the Brotherhood in power, the siege that Egypt had helped maintain on Gaza would be alleviated. The relief for Gaza that Hamas had hoped for, however, never materialised. That, together with Iran’s punitive response to Hamas and the Gaza government, placed further pressure on the movement also to reconsider its relationship with Iran and Hizbullah.

Additionally, the 3 July 2013 coup that deposed President Mohammed Mursi, and the recent abdication of the Qatari emir in favour of his son, Tamim bin Hammad al Thani, whose position on Hamas remains uncertain, left the movement with very few state allies.

Thus, despite the difficulties in their relationship, when the danger of Hamas’s political isolation increased – as the Muslim Brotherhood’s position in Egypt was becoming precarious – Hizbullah was eager to reconcile.

The rapprochement currently underway between Hamas on the one hand, and Hizbullah and Iran on the other, suggests that dynamics in the region cannot be reduced to neat alliances and allegiances.

This rapprochement was initiated in mid-June – about two weeks before the coup in Egypt. At a meeting sponsored by the Iranians in Beirut, high-level members of Hizbullah’s leadership, headed by Hassan Hoballah, met with members of Hamas’s politburo, including Abu Marzouk. The most significant sign of a return of Hamas to the Hizbullah-Iranian fold was a subsequent meeting, which reportedly included Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Discussions to restore relations touched on the following issues:

A re-emphasis on Israel as the common enemy;

Acknowledgment ‘that each side understands the other’s position regarding areas of difference’, that is, Syria;

Reopening direct channels of communication between the two organisations, with particular focus on keeping Palestinian refugee camps out of the rising sectarian divisions in Lebanon; and

A resumption of Iranian funding to Hamas. This funding, however, has not yet been restored to the same levels as it was before Hamas’ move from Damascus.

Although reconciliation talks have stalled, on 23 September Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran publicly reaffirmed their resistance pact. Khaled Mish’al, the Doha-based leader of Hamas’s politburo, and one of the movement’s leaders that had favoured the Brotherhood alliance, will be travelling to Tehran to discuss reconciliation between Hamas and Iran. The high-level trip is also an attempt at restoring trust between Hamas and Iran.

The Hamas decision to move away from the Iran-Syria axis to the Egypt-Qatar-Turkey axis gave rise to suggestions that it had placed sectarian Sunni motivations above political considerations. The current reconciliation process, however, underscores the pragmatism of all parties, and challenges such sectarian readings. This is not to ignore sectarian fault lines that are woven into the regional political landscape, but is an attempt to avoid reductionist and orientalist sectarian readings. Such readings often ignore the way in which sectarianism has been manipulated, the different schools of thinking within both Sunni and Shi’a Islam, pragmatic political motivations and deep-rooted political-ideological leanings that have transcended sectarian differences. It also ignores how different readings of political Islam intercede and find important spaces for convergence.

Partners in resistance

Despite their religious-sectarian differences, Hamas and Hizbullah had always found common political cause in their resistance approach to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands and southern Lebanon. The shared common enemy, Israel, and anti-Zionist ideology helped forge a political alliance. Their resistance to Israel was seen as a restoration of Arab dignity and a source of pan-Arab pride, with Hizbullah’s popularity, in particular, peaking in 2006 when it survived a thirty-four day invasion by Israel and forced Israel to end the attack without achieving any of its objectives. Hassan Nasrallah was also considered the most popular Arab leader. Hizbullah’s direct involvement in the Syrian civil war, however, has done much to damage its reputation across parts of the Arab world, and has also highlighted its Shi’a character over its Muslim identity. Reconciliation with Hamas, then, can also have the effect of winning back some of that Arab support for Hizbullah.

Conclusion: Political Islam and the implications for Hamas and Hizbullah’s relationship

The coup in Egypt that toppled the Mursi government, the purges against the Brotherhood by the Egyptian military, and the new junta blaming Hamas for Egypt’s woes, not only left Hamas in a precarious position, but also underscored the attack on political Islam across the region. This has ramifications for the future of both Hizbullah and Hamas. The common threat has encouraged reconciliation between the movements; allowing them to recognise their differences, most particularly around Syria, while uniting on commonalities, especially their resistance to Israel. Their détente also suggests the possibility that a common unified Islamist position has the potential to attenuate sectarian fault lines and allow for reconsiderations of power blocs.

By Elham Fakhro Two years after the launch of Bahrain’s national dialogue, government and opposition representatives have failed to arrive at a settlement over the future direction of the country.…

The run up to dialogue The most recent chapter in Bahrain’s political history began with the advent of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) uprisings, when a coalition of anonymous online activists calling themselves the ‘February 14 Youth’ issued a call for protests to take place on 14 February 2011. The date marked the tenth anniversary of the National Action Charter, a document promulgated by Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa which promised the reintroduction of constitutional life in Bahrain after twenty-five years under a national state of emergency. Instead of reintroducing Bahrain’s suspended 1973 constitution, Hamad promulgated a new constitution behind closed doors that diluted the powers of Bahrain’s elected lower chamber of parliament, by forcing it to share power with an upper chamber, an appointed Shura Council. Gerrymandering of electoral districts also diluted the electoral power of Bahrain’s Shi’a population, leading to dissatisfaction amongst civil society organisations about the direction of the reform project. Between 2001 and 2011, incidents of appropriation of public lands by high-level government officials and evidence of corruption fuelled calls for reform. The beginning of the MENA uprisings further energised government critics, providing a fertile environment for the rise of an opposition street movement.

In response to the online call for protests, groups of scores of people gathered in villages across Bahrain on 14 February 2011, demanding greater reforms. The security forces’ killing of a protester prompted thousands to attend his funeral, marking the beginning of a month-long sit in at a traffic junction called the Pearl Roundabout. On 17 February, security forces cleared the roundabout of all demonstrators, killing three civilians. In response, a coalition of seven Islamist and leftist opposition political groups, including the largest Shi’a Islamist organisation, al-Wefaq, announced their withdrawal from parliament. The next day, Bahrain’s crown prince invited representatives of opposition groups to enter into dialogue over the future of the country. Opposition groups responded by insisting on the implementation of certain demands, including the election of a popular committee to redraft the constitution, as preconditions to the talks. Groups aligned with the February 14 Youth rejected any dialogue with the government, insisting that their aim was its downfall. Loyalist groups also organised several large counterdemonstrations in support of the government.

On 14 March 2011, following a general deterioration in the country’s security, troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council, in a force called Peninsula Shield forces, entered Bahrain in support of the government and to crush the protests. Troops from the Bahrain Defense Force cleared the roundabout of protesters, while Hamad declared a three-month state of national safety. Over 4 500 workers were fired from their jobs on suspicion of having participated in protests, and hundreds of civilians were sentenced to jail by military courts. An independent commission of inquiry appointed by Hamad to investigate the February and March events found evidence of a ‘culture of impunity’ among security forces, which led to widespread abuse and the deaths of five detainees from torture. It also detailed the destruction of several Shi’a mosques by security forces. The commission also confirmed the killings of three members of the security forces by protesters. A special round of parliamentary by-elections held in September 2011 was boycotted by opposition groups, resulting in a parliament dominated by loyalist and independent candidates. The February 14 coalition reaffirmed its aim to bring down the monarchy, marking a growing rift with more mainstream opposition groups such as al-Wefaq, which insisted on non-violent methods to pressurise the regime to reform. Groups of youths associated with the February 14 Youth began adopting increasingly violent strategies, including the use of Molotov cocktails in confrontations with security forces and detonations of small explosives.

The first dialogue: The National Dialogue

Following the lifting of the national state of emergency, King Hamad announced that a national dialogue would take place beginning 2 July 2011 between different segments of Bahraini society to discuss demands for reform. The dialogue brought together over 300 representatives from Bahraini civil society. These included seventy ‘public figures’, all forty members of the Shura Council, representatives of five newspapers and eight trade unions, and thirty-one representatives of professional societies. The dialogue also included representatives of nineteen political parties. Opposition groups were awarded a total of thirty-five out of over 300 seats, prompting criticism that they were widely under-represented. Al-Wefaq, in particular, complained that its five seats did not reflect the fact that it had held forty per cent of the seats in the elected chamber of parliament before its withdrawal.

On 17 July 2011, just two weeks before the dialogue could begin, al-Wefaq announced its withdrawal, saying it was vastly underrepresented and marginalised in the dialogue. The party said that it had ‘tried without success to make it a serious dialogue’ and that such a process ‘would not lead to a radical political solution to the crisis but would, instead, complicate the political crisis’.[1] Al-Wefaq also complained about the absence of any representatives from the executive branch in the dialogue, arguing that a dialogue between various segments of society would not lead to the required reforms.

After the talks ended on 25 July 2011, the government announced that the parties to the dialogue had made progress in five areas, including political, economic, social, and human rights reforms, in addition to expatriate rights. The government subsequently announced the formation of a commission made up of nine government officials to implement the dialogue recommendations. On 3 May 2012, Hamad announced changes to Bahrain’s constitution in line with the recommendations. The new changes required the king to consult with the heads of both parliamentary chambers before dissolving the legislature. The new changes also granted the lower house of parliament the right to vote to withhold its cooperation from the prime minister, and refer its decision to the king, who would act as the final arbiter on whether to dismiss the prime minister. In response to the changes, an al-Wefaq member commented, ‘The amendments fall short of the demands of the opposition, which has been pushing for an elected government and scrapping of the appointed upper chamber in accordance with the 1973 Constitution.’[2]

Take Two: The second round of dialogue

The first round of dialogue proved unsuccessful in initiating the reforms demanded by Bahrain’s political opposition. They continued to call for non-violent demonstrations against the regime, and tens of thousands of people responded. At the same time, violent confrontations continued between security forces and supporters of a coalition aligned with the February 14 movement. Bahrain’s international allies, primarily the USA, continued to exert pressure on the regime to instate further reforms. On 14 June 2012, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Michael Posner, said: ‘The government of Bahrain needs to take action on the full range of recommendations [from the commission of enquiry] including prosecuting officials responsible for the violations identified in the report, dropping charges against all persons accused of offenses involving political expression. Above all, we call on all parties in Bahrain to help each other move towards a comprehensive political dialogue.’

Early 2013, King Hamad announced a second round of dialogue. It was chaired by the minister of justice, Sheikh Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa, and followed an ‘8-8-8’ format that saw eight representatives from a coalition of loyalist ‘national’ groups, eight from the two chambers of parliament, and eight from opposition political societies. The dialogue also included three government ministers, including the minister of electricity and works, the minister of education, and the minister of justice.[3]Pro-government expatriate groups lobbied extensively for their inclusion in the dialogue but were not granted any seats.

Prior to the commencement of the dialogue, representatives of opposition groups addressed a letter to the minister of justice requesting the inclusion of the king’s representatives in the dialogue. The government, they argued, was responsible for the ongoing arrests and violations of rights, and thus could not be an independent arbiter in the dialogue. The minister denied the request.

Dialogue participants met in twenty-four sessions over the course of seven months, but did not move beyond discussing the mechanism of the dialogue. Opposition groups insisted that any resolutions agreed to by the parties should be put to a popular referendum, and submitted to parliament for implementation. Other parties did not agree, resulting in a stalemate. During this period, the government also passed a number of laws restricting opposition activities. These included a ban on protests in the capital city, Manama, after a group calling itself ‘Tamarrud’ announced a day of national rebellion, and after the introduction of a new anti-terrorism law that allowed the government to strip away the nationality of those calling for what the government called ‘terrorist crimes’. The victims of this law included two former parliamentarians from al-Wefaq. The minister of justice also announced that political groups were prohibited from meeting with foreign governments, or foreign organisations without official approval. The new regulations also required a government representative to be present at such meetings. Opposition groups protested the new rules by boycotting a dialogue session. In May, opposition groups also suspended their participation in the dialogue following raids by security forces on the home of the spiritual leader of Al Wefaq, Sheikh Isa Qassim.

On 17 September 2013, the head of public prosecutions announced that a parliamentarian from al-Wefaq had been detained and charged under the new terrorism law. Charges included ‘inciting and advocating terrorism, and using his leadership position in a legally organised political society to incite crimes’.[4]The following day, all representatives of opposition parties announced the suspension of their participation in the dialogue, stating that ‘opposition parties have made efforts for seven months to turn the dialogue into a meaningful negotiation, without success’.[5] The opposition also announced that it would subject its decision to review, in light of future political and human rights developments. Following this announcement, the USA urged all parties to return to the negotiating table. Government representatives insisted that dialogue will continue without the opposition.

As negotiations in Bahrain stall, and as trust between the various parties weakens, prospects for a political resolution to the country’s protracted divide appear increasingly slim. As Bahrain’s allies insist on the need for the government to implement deeper reforms, the country’s future rests on whether negotiations can indeed lead to the kinds of reforms required to steer the country away from its current path.

Opening Remarks by International Relations and Cooperation Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim at the International Conference of the Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC) on MENA: A transforming Region and its impact on…

Developments in the Middle East-North Africa region have been dominating international discourse for some time and it is necessary that we as Africans have a clear understanding of the unfolding events and the implications thereof in order to respond appropriately. This afternoon I had the privilege to interact with a few speakers who will participate later in this conference and it was most valuable to listen to their views and opinions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, like the rest of the international community, the South African Government is hugely concerned about the loss of life and the utter destruction of property that we are witnessing across the MENA region. From our own history we know that oppressive action by governments will eventually spark discontentment and lead to unrest. South Africa believes that sustainable peace can only be reached through inclusive dialogue and negotiations and not by force.

It is for this reason that South Africa's foreign policy calls for a commitment to peace, stability, socio-economic development and human rights. We wish to work with other African countries towards a peaceful Africa and with the rest of international community to contribute to global peace. With the recent election of Dr Dlamini Zuma as Chairperson of the AU Commission, Africa is now in a better position to play a more powerful role in this regard.

Although South Africa prefers that countries resolve their own problems and without interference from outside, there is often a need for the international community to play a meaningful role in an impartial manner when countries are unable to resolve their issues peacefully. We must always assume a multilateral approach and avoid unilateral action by one or a few countries that have a vested interest in a particular unstable country.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Arab Uprising and the consequences of hasty regime change left us with various challenges. The question for South Africa and the continent is how to encourage the new North African governments to look southwards and reinforce an African identity. While Syria is destabilised, we have seen elections in Libya and Egypt and we have to focus on strengthening our engagement with these new governments, ensuring the sustainability of their political transitions and democracy and deepening linkages with the African Union and the continent.

The African Union needs to rebuild its image in the region. The non-functioning of the Arab Maghreb Union as a regional bloc of the African Union was an obstacle to African Union engagement with the region during the Arab Uprisings.

It should also be mentioned that the destabilisation of Libya has further had a knock-on effect on the security of the entire Sahel region. The Arab Uprising has therefore precipitated the attention of the African Union beyond the Maghreb.

South Africa has a role in getting the African Union to support ECOWAS initiatives in Mali as well as linking AU Peace and Security Council decisions to UN Security Council action. As mentioned before, the election of Dr Dlamini Zuma paves the way for a greater role of the African Union in resolving African problems through African solutions.

It is clear that the events of the Arab Uprisings are still unfolding across the region. Syria is in the throes of a civil war, and Yemen and Bahrain have been deeply affected. South Africa needs to ensure that it has a policy to adapt to any regime change in the region, especially if these changes are imposed by great or regional powers.

South Africa continues to explain its position of dialogue and African solutions to African problems as a sustainable solution to transitions. The West was caught by surprise by the Arab Uprisings but has reacted rapidly to cement economic relations with the new regimes. South Africa is trying to assist in reducing the dependency on the traditional powers and must facilitate economic engagement with the neighbours in the Maghreb and the rest of Africa in order to support the African agenda of regional integration.

Given our past experience in healing a divided nation through instruments such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa could play a critical role in sharing best practices for peaceful transitions and constitution drafting in the MENA region. Furthermore, our country is well suited to serve as best practice to Fatah and Hamas for reconciliation and nation-building. It is clear that the current developments in the Arab world also have a bearing on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. We must not lose sight of the broader regional question to which Palestine is inextricably linked.

Ladies and Gentlemen

The "Arab Uprisings" and the events that have now unfolded across the MENA region caught the world largely unaware. South Africa, the African Union as well as the rest of the world have been dealing with the rapid changes and developments in a reactive fashion. This conference and similar academic discussions could assist us in formulating a more proactive approach to the region.

I am confident that the contributions of the high caliber speakers and participants in this conference would lead to a better understanding of the transformation process in the MENA region and its impact on the African continent, but also on South Africa in particular.

I therefore congratulate the Afro Middle East Centre for arranging this very important event and wish you fruitful deliberations as we grapple with the challenge of bringing lasting peace to a volatile region.

Thank you

]]>naeemjeenah@gmail.com (AMEC-NJ)Middle East GeneralSat, 08 Sep 2012 02:00:00 +0200China and the Middle East: Features of a new approachhttp://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1206-china-and-the-middle-east-features-of-a-new-approach.html
http://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1206-china-and-the-middle-east-features-of-a-new-approach.html

By ‘Izzat Shahrour The use of China's veto over the Syrian crisis demonstrates that it no longer needs to sit on the fence on such international issues. In other words,…

China is now on the threshold of a new phase of geopolitical and strategic transformation and it has put into place new rules for its dealings with other major powers. It has also affirmed its presence on the regional and international stage, especially in the Middle East which includes the entire Arab region and Iran, from China's perspective.

China's strategy in the ‘Middle East’

China has tended to use the term ‘West Asia and North Africa’ as an alternative to the term ‘Middle East’ in its definition of the region. In accordance with this geographical division it has a structure of involved, partisan, governmental establishments to manage its relations with the many states in the region. It is known that the Chinese generally - including some party and government officials - do not differentiate much between nationalities, people, small minorities and sects in the Middle East. Usually many of them confuse Islam (as a religion) and Arabism (as an identity or nationalism). They consider Iran an Arab state and its differences with its regional neighbours are, as a whole, differences with religious roots.

Despite the deeply-rooted historical relations that date back centuries, the Middle East was never as central to China’s foreign policy strategy as it is today. Similarly, the countries of the region for their part did not consider China to be a global player that could be relied upon. China's role remained limited and marginal, confined to trade and cultural exchanges. Beijing did not seek to establish a physical or political presence in the region similar to other international forces.

China has always looked at the Middle East in terms of its resources and strategic location, yet as a region entangled in a raging and sustained conflict between competing international forces and their respective spheres of influence in the region.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's interest in the Middle East focused on the search for legitimacy and diplomatic recognition in a region where the majority of countries recognised the legitimacy of Taiwan. For this reason China's diplomacy at the beginning concentrated on attempting to enter the region by supporting the national liberation movements and to prevent the overwhelming hegemony of foreign forces in the region. Chinese conduct has continued to be based on the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’, launched by its late leader Chuan Lai. Beijing remained committed to the belief that ‘the problems of the Middle East must be resolved by the people of the region and not by any foreign interference.’

The understanding of Chinese national security has not, until recently, included protection of its political or economic interests outside of China. For many decades, since the founding of the Republic, it abided by a deep-rooted belief which was limited to protecting its borders. China calls this the theory of the ‘Great Wall of China’, a metaphor to indicate that China has remained confined within its borders and had withdrawn from playing any vital role outside its walls. But with recent developments it seems that China has begun to expand its definition of the concept of national security, taking into account the rapid growth of its economy and the expansion of the terrain of Chinese interests abroad. Another development is the emergence of energy security - which guarantees that the wheel of the Chinese economy keeps spinning - as one of the most important aspects of national security. It appears that China's interest in the Middle East will be greater than it has been in the past but without its active involvement in the political issues of the region, taking into account the foundations that govern its foreign policy. Its interest is based on the fact that the Middle East is the most important source of energy in the world just as it is one of the most important consumer markets. It is now possible to say that, from the standpoint of the Chinese, the balance of trade exchange with any country is the only measure of the level of relations required. Economic relations dominated most of China's movements and its diplomatic conduct in the Middle East thus far, affirmed by the priorities of the country's decision-makers.

Whenever Beijing was compelled under stressful regional and international pressure to define a clear position, it did do so either through prudent steps or through a combination of concern and confusion. China has on many occasions invited concerned parties in a crisis to engage in dialogue and negotiation without going into any details or presenting any initiatives itself. The region - according to China’s vision – was filled with religious and ethnic contradictions and was a dangerous centre of international conflict and competition. Any engagement with this region was fraught with challenges which necessitated many political, military, security, economic, cultural and media resources that Beijing did not have and even if Beijing possessed some of them it would not have known how to employ them skilfully enough in the context.

China and America: Partners

As mentioned earlier, China did not, at any point in time, attempt to compete with the major players in the region. It recognised the limitations of its role and evaded the issue. Yes, it tried at different periods to block the influence of some of the international powers in the region. Interestingly, it was more robust in preventing Soviet influence than in resisting American influence. That was at the height of revolutionary fervour until China began weaving relations with more regimes hostile to communism and closer to Washington. It had distinct relations with the regime of the Shah of Iran, Numeiri in Sudan, Siad Barre in Somalia and with North Yemen in its confrontation with South Yemen which was aligned to the Soviets. China’s relations extended as far as Sadat, the national hero who liberated Egypt from foreign influence when he decided to expel the Soviets and open up to Washington.

Here one must point out an important observation that is sometimes overlooked: there is a lack of significant difference between the USA and China's vision regarding regional issues in the Middle East. China was and still remains on Washington’s side in its war on so-called terrorism. It did not strongly oppose the US occupation of Iraq and immediately acknowledged its findings and subsequent outcomes. China also contributed to a great extent to reconstruction projects in Iraq.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict China believes that negotiation is the only solution that will result in a settlement that will satisfy all the parties concerned. China refused to sign the document that regarded Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state during the Sino-Arab Cooperation Conference in Tianjin in 2010. This was considered an abdication of its previous positions. It also refused to recognise the Hamas government after it had won the elections and was quick to contribute by sending troops to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy. China’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue is compatible in principle with that of Washington, which wants to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Beijing recently responded - relatively obediently - to American pressure by reducing its dependence on Iranian oil and increasing its imports from the Gulf.

In short, Beijing's policy toward the Middle East in the past has been directed at cooperating with Washington and avoiding a clash or competition. Indeed many of its positions did not go beyond this tactical framework nor did they fall within China’s broader strategic framework.

Chinese concern for Washington

Subsequently, China directly sought to increase and prolong American involvement in the Middle East as much as possible to gain more time to build its own capacities and spheres of influence away from the ‘vexing Americans and their interference in its internal affairs.’

However, President Obama's decision to withdraw from Iraq and the announcement of his new strategy to shift focus to the Asia-Pacific region as one of the top priorities of US foreign policy has aroused deep apprehension in Beijing. This has upset China’s calculations and imposed on it the need to review its strategies and to adapt its strategic vision, which partly involves its partner on the international stage, Moscow.

This comes at a time when there is an increasing and unprecedented stranglehold on Beijing within its own region. China's relations with most of its neighbouring countries are at their worst in decades. This includes relations with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Australia, South Korea and Thailand and even with traditional allies like Burma. This is aside from the abrupt departure of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il. Furthermore, tension has returned to areas like the disputed islands in the South East China Sea in light of calls for the creation of an international mechanism to resolve the issue of the disputed Spratly Islands. This is not to mention the security and social stability challenges China faces domestically where there has been an increase in the number of demonstrations and protests. During the last year more than a 100 000 cases have been recorded, the latest being the bloody events in the town of Wu Kang in the Guangdong province in south China. The protests were against the lack of social justice, rampant corruption, unemployment and the widening gap between rich and poor, in addition to ethnic tensions in several regions like Tibet and Xinjiang (East Turkistan).

All these issues constitute real challenges for China at a critical and delicate juncture. China is on the threshold of transferring power to a new generation whose leadership is characterised by intense conflict between the centres of power and influence within the ruling party. This will continue until it is resolved at the General Conference of the Party in October. All these reasons combined have resulted in pressure on Beijing essentially with its back against the wall. They have imposed on Beijing the search for new horizons, as well as made it line-up alongside the major powers, share common concerns and agree on tactics even if these differed with its own strategy. This probably explains China aligning itself to Moscow in the Security Council regarding Moscow’s geopolitical and strategic importance with respect to the Syrian issue, in the hope that Moscow will return the favour and stand with Beijing equally on issues that enjoy geopolitical and strategic importance for China. These issues are urgent and inevitable, and perhaps will materialise in the near future.

Iran's strategy in China

The written history on Sino-Iranian (Persian) relations goes back about 2 500 years and specifically to the second century BC. These relations continued to grow within the commercial and cultural framework through two paths – the silk route and at sea. The relations between these two Asian cultural powers did not witness any military confrontation throughout their history and are considered to be among the most established, stable and consistent relations. Similarly they have neither influenced nor have they been affected by each other’s intellectual or cultural influence, possibly due to the strong nationalism that each country displays, in addition to the natural geographical distance between them.

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the country maintained good relations with the Shah's regime. Beijing was preparing to welcome him on his historic visit to inaugurate the massive Persian-style embassy, especially constructed to coincide with the Shah's visit had it not been for the Khomeini revolution (1979) that toppled his regime and cancelled the visit. It is worth mentioning that China at the time took a position which seemed closer to the Shah and was opposed to the revolution which it considered to be ‘disturbances and acts of sabotage driven by black external hands’. This position is similar to a large extent to the positions of present-day China towards the revolutions of the Arab Spring. However, as soon as possible, Beijing moved beyond its negative attitude and resumed good relations with the revolutionary regime. This it did in spite of the ideological and doctrinal differences between the two sides and, interestingly, China is trying to repeat the same scenario with the new regimes that have emerged and continue to emerge from the current Arab revolutions.

In any case, Tehran, which adopted the slogan ‘neither East nor West’ (East being the first option and West being the second option), found it necessary to open-up to China, an opportunity the latter optimised. In return, Beijing chose to open its doors to the nascent Iranian revolution although it (Beijing) was in opposition to the hegemony of the two superpowers at the time (the Soviet Union and the United States) with respect to the areas of engagement and influence between them. One of these areas was the Middle East which, according to China’s vision, was the most prominent. These ties strengthened the bond between the two sides on the basis of the considerable similarity of their psychological, formative and shared circumstances. Both countries work with intense secrecy, absolute confidentiality, unlimited patience (both manufacture carpets, miniatures, intricate handicrafts); both do not have confidence in their environment, have a permanent sense of being targeted and plotted against by others and have a strong sense of nationalism. They are independently products of two radical revolutions and have a high degree of sensitivity to the West, resulting from decades of occupation, sanctions, blockades and interference in their internal affairs. In addition, they have a tendency to revive their ‘glorious’ past.

With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, relations between Beijing and Tehran quickly witnessed accelerated growth and China formed an important and essential source of arms for Tehran in its war with Baghdad which lasted eight years. Arms sales are considered to be an important element in the relations between them. It has been estimated that the arms deal with China and its ally, North Korea, at the end of the 1980s constituted about 70 per cent of Iran’s needs. This led to Saddam Hussein ending diplomatic ties with Pyongyang. At the same time Beijing tried - through its official declared position on the war - to appear, as usual, to sit on the fence and equally distant from the sides involved in the conflict. It demanded both the sides to stop the war and to settle their disputes through dialogue and negotiation. China also announced its opposition to any intervention by the major international powers and to the expansion of the conflict which threatened the security and stability of the Gulf region.

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, Iraq succumbed under years of international embargo and wars in the Gulf region. During that period and its concomitant circumstances imposed by shared interest, the suffering of both China and Iran from political isolation and international sanctions constituted a golden opportunity for the unprecedented development and prosperity of relations between them. This was accompanied by the significant entry of Chinese companies into Iran to participate in the reconstruction required after much of the infrastructure had been destroyed by the war. Likewise in rebuilding and developing its military industries.

At that time Beijing was subject to international political isolation and to European and American sanctions in the aftermath of the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Up until that time Beijing had not established diplomatic relations with most of the Gulf States. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the last Gulf country that recognised China and established diplomatic relations with it in 1990. Until then, oil was not yet a priority and of great importance in China's international relations.

Nuclear cooperation formed a new element - among other elements - of cooperation between the two sides in the 1990s and Beijing was considered Tehran's main nuclear partner in 1997. But, very quickly Beijing abandoned Tehran because of American pressure. Iran's cooperation moved to Pyongyang, under the watchful eyes of China. But Beijing remained committed to defending Iran's nuclear program at the Security Council and with international organisations as long as Tehran confirmed the programme’s peaceful purpose and that it (Tehran) would remain bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beijing succeeded several times to prevent the referral of the matter to the Security Council and to keep it within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without having to use its veto.

With the growing geo-strategic importance of Central Asian states Moscow and Beijing sought to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and very soon, in 2005, Iran became an observer member. However, sanctions imposed on Tehran prevented its accession to full membership, in accordance with the constitution of the organisation. In all cases, China sees the growth in the role and influence of Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia as a useful intersection for its security, economic and geo-political agenda.

With escalating international pressure on Iran, economic sanctions – particularly against Iran's Central Bank – began to make an impact. The Iranian currency has lost a large percentage of its value. The suffering of the Chinese companies has increased because of the inclusion of some of them in those sanctions and other companies that have been forced to freeze their projects or to withdraw. Likewise China has been forced to reduce its imports of Iranian oil by approximately 290 000 thousand barrels per day – during last January alone. The Chinese and Iranian sides have entered into a dispute over oil pricing and how to pay the huge past bills.

Iranian statements about closing the Strait of Hormuz have stirred Chinese panic. This caused Beijing to swiftly send its deputy foreign minister to Tehran to warn it against taking such a step.

China’s vision and current shifts

The shifts in the international scene and the increasing intensity of the competition between world powers, on the one hand, and the complexity of their relationships and their intricacies, on the other, demand consideration. Similarly, in light of international, regional and internal challenges facing China, the wait for a new Chinese leadership, the great changes that the revolutions of the Arab Spring produced in the region, the position of China regarding the emergence of political Islam as an important force and the resulting growing concern in Beijing (which has been expressed by most of the Chinese media), all these factors will still not likely lead to radical and essential changes in China's policy towards the region and its issues. But China will certainly need to reformulate its political discourse so that its position becomes clearer. Sometimes Beijing may be forced to step out of the ‘grey area’ depending on current developments. The time when Beijing used to measure its positions and its understanding of the overall issues of the region under the umbrella of the Egyptian position, or the position of what used to be called the ‘countries of moderation’, has changed or is in the process of changing.

Energy security with respect to sources and supply routes will remain the main driver of China's policy toward the region, and therefore it cannot completely abandon Iran's oil and put all its eggs in the basket of the Gulf States. This is mainly because it has discerned that the Gulf States will most likely succumb to American demands when circumstances warrant it. Likewise China cannot rely completely on Russian oil even if it succeeded to extend the pipelines between the two sides - and also for strategic reasons.

China may seek to strengthen its presence in oil productive sectors in different parts of the world depending on their competitive prices and acceptable conditions, which ought to be better than that of Western companies. It is also expected that China will continue to strive for more of a military presence by increasing its participating forces in peacekeeping operations or in combating piracy. At the same time it will seek to establish military bases to protect its oil supplies. It has already started negotiations with Pakistan and with the Seychelles* while at a same time developing its marine capabilities and building an aircraft carrier.

As far as Iran is concerned, it is expected that China will attempt to apply continuous pressure on Tehran to show greater flexibility in its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will also engage in further coordination and rapprochement with Moscow to prevent the occurrence of a catastrophic war, or to delay its occurrence and limit it if it should happen.

Perhaps a comparison of Beijing’s relationship with Tehran to its relationship with Islamabad will clearly reveal in a substantial way Iran's position in China's strategic vision. Relations between China and Iran did not reach the degree of an alliance or even to the point where they can be considered as a ‘spring in all seasons’, as Sino–Pakistan relations have been described. That is an objective issue imposed by many reasons, including the fact that China's diplomacy continues to reject the principle of alliances in its international relations except in the case of relations that are considered "above normal" with some countries, which relations are dictated by geographical, historical and strategic necessities such as the relationship with North Korea, and similarly but to a lesser extent with Pakistan. In addition, Iran has no common border with China, as is the case with Pakistan.

Iran is also in a confrontation with the United States, the international community and its region, while Pakistan is in a confrontation with India, China’s traditional rival. Likewise each of these two countries have different neighbouring regions; India’s neighbours look to China as a regional balance while Iran's neighbours are the Arab countries. This aspect is not contained in the calculations of the Arab countries in that they do not see in Iran a regional balancing power because they have strong relations with Washington.

Therefore, China's relationship with Iran will remain, regardless of how close they become, merely a bargaining chip and will not become in any way a strategic relationship at least in the foreseeable future. As for China's relationship with the region as a whole, in spite of the growing importance of the region with respect to China, it will not accept any threat to its relationship with major powers.

* ‘Izzat Shahrour is a specialist in Chinese affairs and is the director of Al Jazeera's bureau in Beijing.

]]>naeemjeenah@gmail.com (AMEC-NJ)Middle East GeneralSun, 08 Jul 2012 02:00:00 +0200US strategy in the Middle East: Will the South China Sea eclipse the Gulf?http://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1214-us-strategy-in-the-middle-east-will-the-south-china-sea-eclipse-the-gulf.html
http://amec.org.za/middle-east-general/item/1214-us-strategy-in-the-middle-east-will-the-south-china-sea-eclipse-the-gulf.html

By Fred H. Lawson United States strategic planners are carrying out a fundamental reconfiguration of America's military presence throughout the world. The shift came to light in November 2011, when…

Building up naval and air forces in the South China Sea marks a sharp turn away from the focus on the Gulf and Central Eurasia that dominated US strategic planning and military operations during the 1990s and early 2000s. US warships undertook more extensive and more frequent operations in the waters of the Gulf and north-western Indian Ocean during the last phase of the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war. Such maritime intervention set the stage for a dramatic expansion of army and air force involvement on the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf war, including the establishment of a constellation of facilities that could be used for pre-positioning arms and supplies, refuelling and repairing aircraft and ships and carrying out joint manoeuvres with local armed forces. Large-scale US military installations spread north to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the months leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, even as long-term training and arms supply arrangements were made with Georgia, Azerbaijan and other former Soviet republics.

Whether Washington's turn toward the South China Sea will supplant the massive military infrastructure that the US has created in the Gulf and Central Eurasia is an open question. American military spending can almost certainly not be sustained at current levels, and the inability of the US Congress to formulate a fiscally sound budget has triggered automatic cuts that some policy-makers complain will severely diminish US capabilities. Nevertheless, the Departments of State and of Defense repeatedly affirm that the US intends to pursue initiatives in the Gulf and South China Sea simultaneously. This ambitious project reflects an underlying convergence of security concerns across these two regions that make it impossible for Washington to choose one over the other.

Expanded US military presence in the South China Sea

Measures to augment the US military presence around the South China Sea can be traced to 2005, when Washington concluded a security pact with Singapore. May 2010 saw the first joint naval exercises between the US and Vietnam and a year later Singapore authorised US warships to operate out of the base at Changi on a routine basis. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convinced Canberra in September 2011 to allow US forces to pre-position military equipment and use training facilities at bases in Australia. Two months later, President Obama announced the stationing of marines in Darwin and added that the US Air Force would enjoy expanded access to air bases in Australia's vast Northern Territory.

In mid-January 2012, the military commander of Palawan Island in the Philippines told reporters that US warships would carry out joint exercises with the Philippines navy in disputed waters west of Palawan. The Washington Post then reported that Manila had approached Washington with an invitation to return to naval and air bases in the Philippines. The overture followed the May 2011 delivery to the Philippines navy of a former US Coast Guard cutter and accompanied negotiations over the purchase of two more cutters and a handful of F-16 fighter planes. State Department officials quickly insisted that the US was only interested in long-term access to docks, airfields and training facilities, not actual bases. Meanwhile, arrangements were being made for a pair of P-3C Orion electronic surveillance aircraft to be dispatched to the Philippines to patrol the South China Sea.

East Asia's salience for US military operations is evident in the budget request that the Defense Department submitted to Congress in early 2012. The draft budget seeks funding for a giant floating staging platform which would carry a contingent of naval Special Forces (SEALS), armed drones, vertical and short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft and attack helicopters; the primary purpose of the platform is to counter the use of mines in congested sea lanes. Also slated for development is a new class of nuclear attack submarines designed to engage other submarines and surface ships. The proposed budget provides for the next generation of long-range bombers, while keeping intact the twenty B-2s, 68 B-1s and 94 B-52s currently in service. Funds for short-range, tactical warplanes, on the other hand, are scaled back, as is funding for the army's conventional infantry and armoured divisions.

Continued US military presence in the Gulf

At the same time that the US is expanding its military presence in the South China Sea, American commanders are constructing a network of bases along the north-western littoral of the Indian Ocean to support operations by armed drone aircraft. One such facility in the Seychelles carried out its first missions in the autumn of 2011. Other new drone bases are planned for Ethiopia and an undisclosed site on the Arabian Peninsula. It was reported in February 2012 that the US Navy had joined the US Air Force in operating drones in this region: an advanced, high altitude drone has started to patrol the southern end of the Gulf around the clock and transmit real-time data to the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

Shortly after President Obama declared that all US combat forces would exit Iraq by the end of 2011, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) released plans to keep a sizable number of troops in Kuwait for the foreseeable future. US officials at the same time set out to persuade Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman to accept 'smaller but highly capable deployments and training partnerships' when the war in Iraq came to an end. In mid-December 2011, the Jerusalem Post reported that several thousand US troops based in Europe would be airlifted to Israel in the spring of 2012 as part of an effort to forge operational links between the US European Command and the Israeli Defense Forces.

CENTCOM confirmed in early January 2012 that two aircraft carriers and their associated task forces will continue to operate in and around the Gulf, despite the withdrawal from Iraq. In addition, two US Army brigades, including one from the elite First Air Cavalry Division, and a squadron of attack helicopters are scheduled to take up permanent positions in Kuwait. There are rumours that facilities on Oman's Masirah Island and Yemen's Socotra Island are being upgraded to accommodate US military personnel. More reliable sources report that CENTCOM has authorised the conversion of an amphibious transport vessel into an Afloat Forward Staging Base for use by US Navy commandos in the Gulf.

On the whole, the military presence in the Gulf that US strategic planners now envisage resembles that of the late 1990s. Gone will be the post-2001 air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; gone too the massive ground forces and cluster of airfields that characterised American-occupied Iraq. Still in place stand sizable army bases in Kuwait, an enlarged naval base in Bahrain and upgraded air bases in Qatar and Oman. It is doubtful that secondary naval and air facilities in Egypt will remain open to US forces in the wake of the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, while US warplanes no longer frequent the two large-scale air bases that the US Army Corps of Engineers built in north-eastern Saudi Arabia.

Converging US interests in the Gulf and South China Sea

US armed forces poured into the Gulf and Central Eurasia during the 1990s in the context of three trends in the international arena.

First, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan were all importing substantial quantities of hydrocarbons from these regions, and projections showed that imports were almost certain to increase. Any state that could oversee the flow of oil and gas out of these two areas would be able to exercise considerable leverage over energy-deprived East Asia.

Second, dynamics of capital accumulation steadily undermined American dominance over the international economy, leaving the US increasingly vulnerable to rival centres of industrial and financial power.

Third, economic and military initiatives on the part of China and Japan in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Central Eurasia threatened to advance the interests of Beijing and Tokyo to the detriment of the US Policy makers in Washington responded to the evident deterioration of America's political-economic position in the world by exercising the one resource in which the US retained a comparative advantage: its armed forces.

Heightened US military involvement in the South China Sea is driven by somewhat different dynamics. Much of the impetus for an expanded and sustained US presence comes from Australia, which has embarked on a major military build-up in the face of China's decision to upgrade a key base of the South Sea Fleet on Hainan Island and deploy nuclear submarines in southern waters. Vietnam and the Philippines – along with Japan in the East China Sea – have engaged in a succession of clashes with Chinese vessels, prompting their governments to pursue closer ties to Washington. Even Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono responded to the news that US Marines were going to be stationed in Australia by remarking that he was 'reassured that the US is committed to maintaining peace' in this corner of the world.

Nevertheless, Washington's interests in the South China Sea broadly parallel the ones that propelled the US military into the Gulf. The Straits of Malacca constitute not only a crucial choke point in the sea lanes that connect the Gulf to East Asia, but also a nexus of rivalry between a rising yet insecure China and an increasingly self-confident and assertive India, whose expanding blue-water navy has turned its attention in the direction of Southeast Asia. In July 2011, warships of the two rising Asian giants clashed off the coast of Vietnam. Such incidents may occur more frequently as China fails to develop alternative overland routes for its burgeoning hydrocarbon imports. US planners are not the only observers to note the growing salience of the sea lanes that pass from the Gulf to the South China Sea. In February 2012, a flotilla of Russian warships, returning from an anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, paid an unexpected call in the Philippines. The visit coincided with joint naval manoeuvres between the Philippine and the US and the Russian commander told reporters that his officers planned to observe the exercises before sailing on to Vladivostok.

Given the pivotal role of the Gulf in the contemporary global economy, it is unlikely that the US will sacrifice its dominant position in that region in order to augment its military presence in the South China Sea. The two regions in fact form a single security complex, in the sense that developments in one have a direct impact on the other. It is more probable that severe fiscal constraints will force the US to adopt measures that reduce the costs associated with ongoing military activities in the Gulf, even as greater resources get devoted to operations in the South China Sea.

* Fred H. Lawson is a Professor of Government at Mills College in the USA

** This article was first published by AlJazeera Centre for Studies and is being republished here in terms of a partnership agreement between AlJazeera Centre and the Afro-Middle East Centre