3.
This scientific analogy is not unique to our exposition. Singer
(1974: 517; cf. 493) understands Rawls’ (1971) method of
reflective equilibrium as “leading us to think of our particular
moral judgments as data against which moral theories are to be tested
…” As Singer (1974: 493n3) notes, Rawls (1951) in an
early paper made the analogy with scientific theory choice explicit.
Though the claim that intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy is
widely accepted (Pust 2000; Sosa 2007), it has recently been
challenged, most notably by Cappelen (2012) and Deutsch (2015). For a
useful overview of this debate, see Nado (2016).

4.
For more on the appeal to the intuitions of philosophical
“experts” see Deutsch (2015: 134–135), Stich &
Tobia (2016: 14–17; 2018).

5.
Authors such as Baron (1994) and Sunstein (2005) have argued that the
distorting influences of “heuristics and biases” uncovered
in the recent psychological literature on reasoning, judgment and
decision making are widespread in everyday ethical reflection. For
overviews of the relevant psychological literature see Nisbett &
Ross (1980), Kahneman et al. (1982), Baron (2001), Gilovich et al.
(2002), and Kahneman (2011).

6.
Rosati (1995) raises analogous concerns with regard to highly
idealized “full information accounts” of the good: the
ideal, fully informed agent, is likely to be so psychologically
different from the actual, very imperfectly informed, agent that there
is little reason to think that the actual agent would be motivated by
what motivates the ideal agent.

7.
There is a wealth of terminological and doctrinal variation here. For
example, Haji uses “authenticity” in the neighborhood
where Kane uses “ultimacy”. Very often, these issues are
couched in terms of “freedom” instead of (or together
with) “responsibility”; indeed, as Kane (2002: 4–5)
observes, the issues are frequently not sharply distinguished. Here,
we focus entirely on responsibility attribution, and will be silent on
the relation (or lack of a relation) between these issues and issues
discussed under the heading of “freedom” or “free
will”.

8.
“Identification” is a troublesome notion, afflicted with
more philosophical complexity than can feasibly be operationalized in
empirical work. Woolfolk et al. attempted to depict behaviors that
could plausibly be construed as manifesting identification, or its
lack, without resolving the conceptual issues. For some discussion of
the unresolved philosophical difficulties surrounding identification,
see Velleman (1992), Bratman (1996), and Watson (1996).

9.
The effect appears to be easily replicable. For example, the Woolfolk
group (unpublished data) obtained consistent results in variations
concerning the positively valenced behavior of kidney donation, and
the negatively valenced behavior of an atrocity committed by a soldier
under orders.

10.
For surveys of the empirical literature, see Doris (2002), Miller
(2013, 2014), and Ross and Nisbett (1991).

14.
The terms “egoism” and “altruism” are used
here for descriptive views about the nature of human motivation. Some
prefer to call these views “psychological egoism” and
“psychological altruism” to distinguish them from
“ethical egoism” and “ethical altruism”, which
are prescriptive views about how people should behave.

15.
Interpretation of historical texts is, of course, often less than
straightforward. While there are passages in the works of each of
these philosophers that can be interpreted as advocating psychological
egoism, scholars might debate whether these passages reflect the
author’s considered option.

16.
For more on the history and philosophical implications of the debate,
see Broad (1930), MacIntyre (1967), Nagel (1970), Batson (1991: Chs.
1–3), Sober & Wilson (1998: Ch. 9), and Dixon (2008).

17.
For surveys of Batson’s work, see Batson (1991) and Batson
(2011).

22.
Recently, some moral realists have denied that moral realism is
committed to convergence. For example, Shafer-Landau (2003: 228; cf.
Moody-Adams 1997: 109; Bloomfield 2001) argues “disagreement
poses no threat to realism of any stripe, and so, a fortiori,
poses no threat to moral realism in particular”. See Doris &
Plakias (2008) for argument to the effect that realists cannot afford
to be sanguine about disagreement.

23.
See Williams (1985: 136): “In a scientific inquiry there should
ideally be convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of the
convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how things
are; in the area of the ethical, at least at high level of generality,
there is no such coherent hope”.

24.
It is plausible to suppose that convergence does not require total
unanimity. However, this plausible qualification raises hard
questions: How much dissent can obtain in ideal conditions before
“substantial disagreement” is a more apt characterization
than “less-than-unanimous-convergence”? As is usual in
philosophy, one can’t be very precise about the percentages, but
one may suspect that the relevant notion of convergence—always
remembering that this is under ideal conditions—should
be thought to allow only minimal dissent.

25.
Brandt is not the only philosopher working in the Anglo-American
“analytic” tradition to produce ethnography. Ladd (1957)
reports field work with the Navaho; his conclusions (e.g., 1957: 328)
about the difficulties posed by disagreement seem somewhat more
sanguine than, though perhaps not radically at odds with,
Brandt’s.

26.
For remarks on situational meaning with affinities to what follows,
see Snare (1980: 356–62). Thanks to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for
pointing us to Snare’s valuable discussion.

27.
For a more detailed discussion of Moody Adams’ view, see Doris
& Plakias (2008).

28.
The last clause is important, since realists (e.g., Brink 1989: 200)
sometimes argue that apparent moral disagreement may result from
cultures applying similar moral values to different economic
conditions (e.g., differences in attitudes towards the sick and
elderly between poor and rich cultures). But this explanation seems of
dubious relevance to the described differences between
contemporary northerners and southerners, who are plausibly
interpreted as applying different values to similar
economic conditions.

29.
The legal scholarship that Nisbett & Cohen (1996: 57–78)
review makes it clear that southern legislatures are often willing to
enact laws reflecting the culture of honor view regarding the
circumstances under which violence is justified, which suggests there
is at least some support among southerners for the idea that honor
values should be universalizable.

30.
In addition to the expedients considered here, realists may plausibly
appeal to, inter alia, requirements for internal coherence
and the different “levels” of moral thought
(theoretical v. popular, abstract v. concrete,
general v. particular) at which moral disagreement may or may
not be manifested. Brink (1989: 197–210) and Loeb (1998) offer
valuable discussions with considerably more detail than offered here,
Brink manifesting realist sympathies and Loeb tending toward
anti-realism.

31.
Nisbett and Cohen will likely fare pretty well under such scrutiny.
See Tetlock’s (1999) favorable review.