Archive/File: orgs/german/foreign-office/soviet-relations-documents.009
Last-Modified: 1997/10/19
Page 325
IX. THE FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE, APRIL 15-JUNE
22, 1941
*****
Frames 113314-113315, serial 104
The German Charg in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, April 15, 1941-9:34 p. m.
Received April 15, 1941-11:45 p. m.
No. 899 of April 15
Reference our telegram of the 7th, No. 823. [14]
The Secretary General of the Office of the Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, Sobolev, summoned me to his office today and
stated that, by order of Molotov, he had a communication to
make on the demarcation of the section of the German-Soviet
boundary from the Igorka River to the Baltic Sea. The
Secretary General first went briefly into the previous
negotiations, in which connection he pointed out that the
Soviet proposals had been based on decisions of the
Conference of Ambassadors of 1923, while the German side
advocated a boundary line corresponding to the one actually
existing at present. The Secretary General then declared that
the Soviet Government did not wish to delay further the
solution of the problem and was accordingly prepared to
undertake a drawing of the boundary corresponding to its
present course, in conformity with the proposals contained in
the memorandum of the Embassy of March 6, 1941. [14]
The Secretary General added that all other proposals
thereby lapsed; he requested that his communication be
transmitted without delay to the German Government; he hoped
the matter would now be brought to a speedy conclusion.
The communication made by Sobolev means the
unconditional acceptance of the German demand, as postulated
at the end of the memorandum composed by Minister Saucken and
transmitted to Molotov through the Ambassador on March 6.
Considering the pressure for the view heretofore held by
Molotov in this matter, the compliant attitude of the Soviet
Government seems very remarkable. Since the
[14] Not printed.
Page 326
Soviet Government doubtless expects that its attitude will
meet with proper appreciation on the part of the Germans, any
delay in giving our consent would produce the greatest
mistrust in the Soviet Government, as you have already
rightly suspected was the case in connection with the delay
in the formation of the sub-commission. (See telegraphic
instruction No. 456 of March 6 and telegraphic report No.
508, of March 7.) [15]
I request telegraphic instructions.
TIPPELSKIRCH
[15] Neither printed.
*****
Frames 84989-84991, serial 177
The German Charg in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, April 16, 1941-12:37 a. m.
Received April 16, 1941-3:10 a. m.
SECRET
No. 902 of April 15
Reference our telegram No. 884 of the 13th.
The Japanese Ambassador, on whom I called today, told me
that the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
had created a very favorable atmosphere on the part of the
Soviet Government, of which he was convinced by Molotov, who
today had asked him to call immediately in order to continue
the negotiations regarding a commercial treaty. The
conclusion of the treaty had caused disappointment and
anxiety in America, where Matsuoka's journey to Berlin and
Rome had been followed with interest.
Members of the Japanese Embassy here maintain that the
Pact is advantageous not only to Japan but also to the Axis,
that the Soviet Union's relations with the Axis will be
favorably affected by it, and that the Soviet Union is
prepared to cooperate with the Axis.
Stalin's manner toward the Ambassador at the railroad
station when Matsuoka left is also interpreted in the same
way by the diplomatic corps here. The view is frequently
expressed that Stalin had purposely brought about an
opportunity to show his attitude toward Germany in the
presence of the foreign diplomats and press representatives;
this, in view of the persistently circulating rumors of an
imminent conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, is
considered to be especially noteworthy. At the same time the
Page 327
changed attitude of the-Soviet Government is attributed to
the effect here of the success of the German armed forces in
Yugoslavia and Greece.
TIPPELSKIRCH
Marginal Note: Transmitted under No. 1196 to the special
train.
Telegram Control. April 16, 1941.
*****
Frame 113391, serial 104
Protocol
on the outcome of conference between the plenipotentiaries of
the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to inquire into the
observance of the Commercial Agreement between Germany and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940
The plenipotentiaries of the Government of the German
Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics acting in pursuance of article 10 of the Commercial
Agreement between Germany and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940, have, on the basis
of their inquiry into the observance of the above-mentioned
agreement as of February 11, 1941, agreed as follows:
According to Soviet calculations, the Soviet deliveries
on February 11, 1941, amounted to 310.3 million Reichsmarks.
The Germans will by May 11, 1941, make deliveries from
Germany in at least this amount.
Two original documents executed, each in the German and
Russian languages, both texts having the same validity.
Done in Berlin, April 18, 1941.
For the Government of the German Reich
K. SCHNURRE
By authority of the Government of the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics
A. KRUTIKOW
Page 328
*****
Frames 113335-113336, serial 104
The German Charg an the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, April 22, 1941-12:05 a. m.
Received April 22, 1941-3:30 a. m.
No. 957 of April 21
The Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs summoned me to his office today and delivered to me a
note verbale in which the urgent request is again made that
we take measures against continuing violations of the
U.S.S.R. boundary by German planes. Violations had increased
considerably of late. From March 27 to April 18, 80 such
cases had occurred. The note verbale, to which is attached a
detailed statement of the 80 cases mentioned, refers to the
case of a plane that landed near Rovno on April 15th, in
which were found a camera, some rolls of exposed film, and a
torn topographical map of the districts of the U.S.S.R., all
of which gives evidence of the purpose of the crew of this
airplane.
The note verbale continues verbatim as follows:
"Consequently the People's Commissariat deems it
necessary to remind the German Embassy of the statement that
was made on March 28, 1940, by the Assistant Military Attach
of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Berlin to Reich Marshal
Gring, according to which the People's Commissar for Defense
of the U.S.S.R. made an exception to the very strict measures
for the protection of the Soviet border and gave the border
troops the order not to fire on the German planes flying over
Soviet territory so long as such flights do not occur
frequently."
At the end, the note verbale again emphasizes
particularly the expectation of the Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs that the German Government will take all the measures
necessary in order in future to prevent violation of the
national boundaries of the U.S.S.R. by German planes.
The Secretary General asked me to transmit the contents
to Berlin, which I promised to do.
In view of the fact that the Soviet note verbale refers
to previous memoranda on similar border violations by German
airplanes, and also reminds us of the statement of the
Assistant Military Attach, it is very likely that serious
incidents are to be expected if German planes continue to fly
across the Soviet border.
TIPPELSKIRCH
Page 329
*****
Frames 352987-352988, serial 1337
The High Command, of the Armed Forces to the German Foreign
Office
WFST/Abt. L (1 Op)
Field Headquarters, April 23, 1941.
Nr.:00 731 a/41 g Kdos.
Secret Military Document [Geheime Kommandosache]
Subject: Soviet-Russian border violations.
Attention of Ambassador Ritter.
Reports coming in almost daily of further border
violations by Soviet Russian planes confirm the view of the
High Command of the Armed Forces transmitted to the Foreign
Office by letter of March 1, to the effect that it is a
matter of conscious provocation on the part of Soviet Russia.
On April 11, two 2-motor planes of the type SB 2 flew
over the city of Belz at a great height. On April 11, one
plane each was sighted at Malkinia and Ostrow-Mazowiki. Also
on April 14, a Soviet-Russian plane was reported over
Langszorgen. On April 15, several planes flew over the
demarcation line in the Dynow-Lodzina area-south of Losko. On
April 17 alone, eight planes were identified over German
territory-four each near Deumenrode and Swiddern; on April
19, two planes over Malkinia; another at an altitude of 200
meters (!) over Ostrowice.
Besides these, a number of other planes were reported,
the nationality of which, however, could not be identified
with certainty because of the altitude at which they were
flying. There is no doubt, however, from the direction of the
flight and the evidence obtained from the German task forces
stationed there, that in these cases also, border trespass
flights by planes of the U.S.S.R. are involved.
The High Command of the Armed Forces now finds that the
steadily mounting number of border trespass flights can only
be regarded as the deliberate employment of the air force of
the U.S.S.R. over the sovereign territory of the Reich. Since
more German units had to be brought up for security reasons
because the forces on the other side of the German eastern
border were strengthened, we have to reckon with increased
danger of grave border incidents.
The orders of the High Command of the Armed Forces for
the exercise of the utmost restraint nevertheless continue in
force.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
By order: JODL
Page 330
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Frame 218002, serial 426
The Naval Attach of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Baumbach) to the Naval High Command
[Telegram]
No. 34112/110 of April 24
April 24, [1941.]
For the Navy.
1. Rumors current here speak of alleged danger of war
between Germany and the Soviet Union and are being fed by
travelers passing through from Germany.
2. According to the Counselor of the Italian Embassy,
the British Ambassador predicts June 22 as the day of the
outbreak of war.
3. May 20th is set by others.
4. I arm endeavoring to counteract the rumors, which are
manifestly absurd.
Naval Attach
*****
Frames 314-320, serial F 15
Conversation of the Fhrer with the Ambassador Count von der
Schulenburg, on April 28, 1941, From 5:15 p. m. to 5:45 p. m.
STATE SECRET
The Fhrer commenced with the question whether I would
be back in Moscow by May 1, which I answered in the
affirmative since I wanted to be present at the review.
The Fhrer then mentioned that I had been present in
Moscow during the visit of Matsuoka, and asked what was the
opinion of the Russians of the Russo-Japanese agreement. I
replied that the Russians had been very pleased at concluding
it, even though they had to make concessions.
The Fhrer thereupon asked me what devil had possessed
the Russians to conclude the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia.
I expressed the opinion that it was solely a matter of the
declaration of Russian interests in the Balkans. Russia had
done something each time that we undertook anything in the
Balkans. Then, too, we had probably been obligated by the
consultative pact to consult the Russians. Russia, to be
sure, had no special interest in Yugoslavia, but certainly
had in the Balkans, in principle. The Fhrer said that upon
conclusion of the Russo-Yugoslav Friendship Pact he had had
the feeling that Russia had wanted to frighten us off. I
denied this and repeated that the Russians had only intended
to serve notice of their interest, but had nevertheless
behaved correctly by informing us of their intention.
Page 331
The Fhrer then said that it was not yet clear who had
pulled the strings in the overthrow of the Yugoslav
Government. England or Russia? In his opinion it had been the
British, while the Balkan peoples all had the impression that
Russia had been behind it. I replied that, as seen from
Moscow, there was nothing to support the theory that Russia
had had a finger in the pie. As an example, I cited the lack
of success of the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, Gavrilovitch,
whose attempts to interest the Soviet Union in the Yugoslav
cause were abortive until the last moment. The Yugoslav-
Russian agreement had only become a reality when Yugoslavia
seized the initiative after the Putsch and sent officers to
request the agreement. Russia had then concluded the
agreement on the principle that an instrument of peace was
involved. Now, Russia was very apprehensive at the rumors
predicting a German attack on Russia. The Fhrer insisted
that the Russians had been the first to move, since they had
concentrated needlessly large numbers of divisions in the
Baltic States. I replied that this was a matter of the well-
known Russian urge for 300 percent security. If for any
reason we sent one German division, they would send 10 for
the same purpose in order to be completely safe. I could not
believe that Russia would ever attack Germany. The Fhrer
said that he had been forewarned by events in Serbia. What
had happened there was to him an example of the political
unreliability of states.
The Fhrer went on at some length about the nations
misled by England, particularly about the development of its
political endeavors in Yugoslavia. England had hoped for a
Yugoslav-Greek-Turko-Russian front in the southeast and had
striven for this broad grouping of powers in memory of the
Salonika front in the World War. He regretted exceedingly
that-because of these efforts of England-he had now been
forced to move against poor little Greece also. It had been
repugnant to him to have to strike down, against his natural
impulses, this small, plucky nation. The Yugoslav coup d'tat
had come suddenly out of the blue. When the news of it was
brought to him on the morning of the 27th, he thought it was
a joke. When one had gone through that sort of thing one was
bound to be suspicious. Nations today allowed hatred and
perhaps also financial interests to determine their policy
rather than good sense and logic, and so it had happened that
as a result of the promises and the lies of the British, one
after another, the Poles, to whom he had offered the most
favorable terms; France, which had not wanted the war at all;
Holland and Belgium; Norway, and now Greece and Yugoslavia
had plunged to disaster. It
Page 332
might be said that the masses could not help it, but he dealt
not with the peoples but with the governments. And Greece had
decidedly not been neutral! Its press had been impudent.
Greece had always been sympathetic to England and had, above
all, placed its shipping and its submarine bases at the
disposal of England. Turkey, too, had very nearly taken the
same road. He did not, it was true, believe that Russia could
be bought to attack Germany, but strong instincts of hatred
had survived, nevertheless, and, above all, Russian
determination to approach closer to Finland and the
Dardanelles was unchanged, as Molotov had allowed clearly to
be seen on his visit. When he considered all this, he was
obliged to be careful.
I pointed out that Cripps had not succeeded until 6 days
after the conclusion of the Russo-Yugoslav Treaty in even
speaking to Molotov's deputy, Vishinsky. I further reminded
him that Stalin had told Matsuoka he was committed to the
Axis and could not collaborate with England and France, as
well as of the scene at the railroad station, which Stalin
had purposely brought about in order to demonstrate publicly
his intention to collaborate with the Axis. In 1939 England
and France had taken all conceivable means to win Russia over
to their side, and if Stalin had not been able to decide in
favor of England and France at a time when England and France
were both still strong, I believed that he would certainly
not make such a decision today, when France was destroyed and
England badly battered. On the contrary, I was convinced that
Stalin was prepared to make even further concessions to us.
It had already been intimated to our economic negotiators
that (if we applied in due time) Russia could supply us up to
5 million tons of grain next year. Citing figures, the Fhrer
said he thought that Russian deliveries were limited by
transportation conditions. I pointed out that a more thorough
utilization of Russian ports would obviate the difficulties
of transportation.
The Fhrer then took leave of me.
The original of the enclosed memorandum with two carbon
copies was sent to Vienna today at 3 p. m. via air courier.
Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary, for his
information.
ADEMANN
BERLIN, April 29, 1941.
Page 333
*****
Frames 311-312, serial F 15
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
Teletype
BERLIN, April 28, 1941.
To the Reich Foreign Minister.
Concerning Count Schulenburg's memorandum on German-
Russian relations:
I can summarize in one sentence my views on a German-
Russian conflict: If every Russian city reduced to ashes were
as valuable to us as a sunken British warship, I should
advocate the German-Russian war for this summer; but I
believe that we would be victors over Russia only in a
military sense, and would, on the other hand, lose in an
economic sense.
It might perhaps be considered an alluring prospect to
give the Communist system its death blow and it might also be
said that it was inherent in the logic of things to muster
the Eurasian continent against Anglo-Saxondom and its
following. But the sole decisive factor is whether this
project will hasten the fall of England.
We must distinguish between two possibilities:
a) England is close to collapse: if we accept this
[assumption], we shall encourage England by taking on a new
opponent ["We shall" is deleted, but the words written in
above are illegible.] Russia is no potential ally of the
English. England can expect nothing good from Russia. Hope in
Russia is not postponing England's collapse. [In handwriting
:] With Russia we do not destroy any English hopes.
b) If we do not believe in the imminent collapse of
England, then the thought might suggest itself that by the
use of force, we must feed ourselves from Soviet territory. I
take it as a matter of course that we shall advance
victoriously to Moscow and beyond that. I doubt very much,
however, whether we shall be able to turn to account what we
have won in the face of the well-known passive resistance of
the Slavs. I do not see in the Russian State any effective
opposition capable of succeeding the Communist system and
uniting with us and being of service to us. We would
therefore probably have to reckon with a continuation of the
Stalin system in Eastern Russia and in Siberia and with a
renewed outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1942. The
window to the Pacific Ocean would remain shut.
A German attack on Russia would only give the British
new moral strength. It would be interpreted there as German
uncertainty as to the success of our fight against England.
We would thereby not
Page 334
only be admitting that the war was going to last a long time
yet, but we might actually prolong it in this way, instead of
shortening it.
WEIZSCKER
This position is drafted in very brief form, since the
Reich Foreign Minister wanted it within the shortest possible
time. Weizscker.
*****
Frame 365359, serial 1448
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Tgb. Nr. A/g/229/41
MOSCOW, May 2, 1941.
SECRET
Subject: Rumors of German-Russian military showdown.
Reference instruction Pol. V 1490g of April 16, 1941.
[16]
I and all the higher officials of my Embassy have always
combated rumors of an imminent German-Russian military show-
down, since it is natural that rumors of that kind constitute
a great hazard for the continued peaceful development of
German-Soviet relations. Please bear in mind, however, that
attempts to counteract these rumors here in Moscow must
necessarily remain ineffectual if such rumors incessantly
reach here from Germany, and if every traveler who comes to
Moscow or travels through Moscow not only brings these rumors
along, but can even confirm them by citing facts.
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
[16] Not printed.
*****
Frames 218003-218004, serial 426
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 878 of May 3
BERLIN, May 4, 1941-5:45 a. m.
Received Moscow, May 4, 1941-10 a. m.
Secret. To be decoded only by the officer in charge of
State Secret documents. Reply via courier or secret code. For
Military Attach. Secret Military document No. 602/41 G.
Kdos. Att Abt O Qu 4, for Herr Osten, Military Attach,
Moscow . . . OKW Wf St/ Abt. L, advises on May 3 under No.
902/41g Kdos., as follows: Re: Telegram Naval Attach of
April 24, No. 34112/110. [17]
[17] Ante, p. 330.
Page 335
Instruction on No. 1: The same war rumors are current
here as in Russia so we suspect a renewed attempt on the part
of England to poison the wells. Reports that are without any
foundation-as, for example, stories about extensive map
making (the Ukraine) in Prague, or about the landing of more
than 12,000 German soldiers in Finland-confirm these
suspicions. Moreover, currency is given to such rumors by
substantial Russian troop concentrations near the border,
especially since they are without military justification,
since on the German side, only such forces are posted at the
border as are absolutely necessary as rear cover for the
Balkan operations.
On No. 4: The quashing of rumors by the German officials
there is very desirable, in which connection use can be made
in suitable form of the fact that German troop transports are
being carried out from east to west, which in the first half
of May will reach considerable proportions (added only for
personal information: (8 divisions). General Staff of the
Army, Attach Division T. No. 602/41 G. Kdos.
KRAMARZ
*****
Frames 113418-113419, serial 105
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, May 7, 1941-2:02 p. m.
Received May 7, 1941-3:10 p. m.
SECRET
No 1092 of May 7
Stalin has taken over the chairmanship of the Council of
People's Commissars in place of Molotov and thereby has
become head of the Government of the Soviet Union. Molotov
received the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars and will remain People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs. This change is being explained by the
pressure of work on Molotov, but it actually means a
considerable abridgment of his former authority. The reason
for it may be sought in the recent mistakes in foreign policy
which led to a cooling off of the cordiality of German-Soviet
relations, for the creation and preservation of which Stalin
had consciously striven, while Molotov's own initiative often
expended itself in an obstinate defense of individual issues.
In his new capacity as Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars, that is, as Prime Minister of the Soviet
Union, Stalin assumes responsibility for all acts of the
Government, in both the
Page 336
domestic and foreign fields. This will put an end to the
unnatural situation wherein the position of the recognized
and undisputed leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union was
nowhere established in the Constitution. The centralization
of all the powers in the hands of Stalin means a
consolidation of governmental authority in the U.S.S.R. and a
further advancement of the position of Stalin, who obviously
felt that, in a situation which he considered serious, he
personally had to assume full responsibility for the fate of
the Soviet Union. I am convinced that Stalin will use his new
position in order to take part personally in the maintenance
and development of good relations between the Soviets and
Germany.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 365383-365388 serial 1448
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Tgb. Nr. Ag/259/41
Moscow, May 12, 1941.
SECRET
Subject: Appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars.
With reference to telegram No. 1092 of May 7 and also to
Nos. 1113 of May 8, 1124 of May 10, 1115 of May 9, 1120 of
May 9, and 1137 of May 12. [18]
The present political position of the Soviet Union is
illustrated by the appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars. Stalin's decision to take
over this office, which V. I. Lenin was the first to fill
after the Bolshevist Revolution, gains especial significance
from the fact that Stalin had previously avoided taking a
government post. Stalin won his position of power in party
and state solely by his personal authority and by the aid of
men devoted to him. No problems of domestic or foreign policy
had heretofore been able to induce Stalin to abandon this
characteristic attitude. Even when the Stalin constitution,
his personal work, went into effect, he had apparently
deliberately refrained from occupying the highest government
post by allowing himself to be elected chairman of the
presidium of the Supreme Soviets.
The reasons that now caused Stalin to make this decision
cannot be ascertained, for example, by direct questioning of
competent Soviet officials, because of the peculiar
conditions here. The new French
[18] No. 1113. 1115, 1120, 1124, and 1137 not printed.
Page 337
Ambassador, who was ignorant of this situation, attempted to
do so nevertheless, and asked this question on the occasion
of his initial visits to First Deputy Foreign Commissar
Vishinsky, Secretary General of the Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs Sobolev, and Division Chief Kusnetzov. The three
gentlemen interrogated expressed themselves spontaneously and
unanimously to the effect that the appointment of Stalin to
the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars was
the greatest historical event in the Soviet Union since its
inception. Asked as to the reasons for this appointment, the
three gentlemen declared after brief hesitation that the
appointment of Stalin had been occasioned by the all too
heavy burden carried by Molotov. When the disparity between
cause and effect was pointed out to them, the gentlemen
consulted could make no further reply.
There can be no doubt that the assumption of the
chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars by Joseph
Stalin constitutes an event of extraordinary importance. That
this event was brought about by problems of domestic policy,
as was first asserted here, especially among correspondents
of the foreign press, I do not consider correct. I do not
know of any problem that could have been raised as a result
of domestic conditions in the Soviet Union of such importance
as to necessitate such a step on Stalin's part. It can rather
be stated with great certainty that if Stalin decided to take
over the highest government office, it was done for reasons
of foreign policy. In order to clarify the specific
circumstances that must have influenced Stalin's decision,
one must refer to some occurrences that took place in the
days previous. It was generally noticed that at the great
review of May 1 the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Dekanosov,
stood directly next to Stalin, on his right, on the
Government reviewing stand. This prominence given to
Dekanosov must be regarded as a special mark of confidence on
the part of Stalin. Also, a remarkably large number of
generals and admirals of the Red Army and the Red Fleet
participated in the review and the large reception in the
Kremlin that followed. Finally, on May 5, the graduation
exercises of the War Academy were the occasion of a rather
large ceremony, at which Stalin made an address of some 40
minutes' duration. Since the appointment of Stalin was
announced by the Kremlin on May 6, the obvious assumption is
that the conversations with the Soviet Ambassador to Germany
and the mingling with representatives of the staff of
generals precipitated Stalin's decision to take over the
Chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars. No other
reason for this action could have applied than a revaluation
of the international situation on the basis of the magnitude
Page 338
and rapidity of German military successes in Yugoslavia and
Greece and the realization that this makes necessary a
departure from the former diplomacy of the Soviet Government
that had led to an estrangement with Germany. Probably, also,
conflicting opinions that were noted among the party
politicians and high-ranking military men, confirmed Stalin
in the decision to take the helm himself from now on.
If one reviews the pronouncements and decrees that have
been promulgated since Stalin's assumption of office, insofar
as they enter into consideration, one can state that the
point of the matter was undoubtedly missed by the version
originally circulated by foreign correspondents, especially
by the Japanese Domei agency, to the effect that the
appointment of Stalin legalizes an existing condition and
that everything otherwise remains the same. The
pronouncements and decrees in question are all in the realm
of foreign policy The matters involved are:
1. The Tass denial of alleged strong concentrations of
military forces on the western border of the Soviet Union,
etc.
2. The decree regarding the restoration of diplomatic
ranks (Ambassador, Minister, Charg).
3. The decision regarding the closing of the Embassies
of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia, and
4. The government decision regarding the opening up of
diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq.
These manifestations of the intention of the Stalin
government are calculated in the first place, while
safeguarding its own interests, to relieve the tension
between the Soviet Union and Germany and to create a better
atmosphere for the future. We must bear in mind particularly
that Stalin personally has always advocated a friendly
relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union.
It is self-evident that in the diplomatic corps here
there is a great amount of guess-work being done as to what
could have induced Stalin at this time to take over a
government office created by the constitution. It is
remarkable that groups representing the most divergent
opinion agree in the presumption that Stalin is pursuing a
policy of rapprochement with Germany and the Axis.
In my opinion, it may be assumed with certainty that
Stalin has set himself a foreign policy goal of overwhelming
importance for the Soviet Union, which he hopes to attain by
his personal efforts. I firmly believe that, in an
international situation which he considers
Page 339
serious, Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the
Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 113434, serial 105
The German Consul at Harbin (Ponschab) to the German Foreign
Office
Telegram
URGENT
HARBIN, May 13, 1911-12:50 a. m.
Received May 13, 1941-10:30 a. m.
SECRET
No. 39 of May 13
Reference my telegram No. 37 of the 11th. [19]
Circular instructions from Moscow of May 9:
Although German-Russian negotiations are proceeding
normally, it has become imperative for the Soviets. in view
of Germany's dictatorial attitude, to warn Germany that the
Soviets are prepared to protect their interests, if (this
group missing in the original telegram) they are violated.
Under the circumstances it is very important to learn the
attitude of all other countries in the event of a German-
Russian conflict. It is necessary to proceed with the
greatest caution. A survey of the situation and prompt report
are requested.
PONSCHAB
[19] Not printed.
*****
Frames 24524-24527, serial 34
Foreign Office Memorandum
Ha Pol 294/41 g RS
STATE SECRET
SECOND MEMORANDUM ON THE STATUS OF GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE
RELATIONS*
1) The discussions concluded a few days ago with
Krutikov, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade
of the U.S.S.R., were conducted in a notably constructive
spirit by Krutikov. It was therefore possible to settle
satisfactorily difficult points in the Trade Agreement of
January 10, 1941, such as delivery of oil seed, nonferrous
metals, petroleum, and transit of raw rubber from East Asia
through the territory of the U.S.S.R. Despite his
constructive attitude, Kruti-
* My first memorandum on the same subject, of April 5, is
attached. [Footnote in the original. For this memorandum, see
ante, p. 318.]
Page 340
kov's stand when defending Russian interests was firm. He
showed no extreme willingness to give way which might have
been construed as weakness.
2) Difficulties arose, as in the past, regarding the
execution of German delivery commitments to the U.S.S.R.,
especially in the field of armaments. We shall not be able to
adhere to the more distant delivery dates. However, the non-
fulfillment of German commitments will only make itself felt
after August 1941, since until then Russia is obligated to
made deliveries in advance. Difficulties arose especially
with respect to the execution of certain contracts covering
supplies for the air force, as the Reich Ministry for Air
will not release the aircraft promised and already sold.
Krutikov brought up these questions, without too great
insistence, however. Construction of the cruiser L in
Leningrad is proceeding according to plan, with German
supplies coming in as scheduled. Approximately seventy German
engineers and fitters are working on the construction of the
cruiser in Leningrad under the direction of Admiral Feige.
3) The status of Soviet raw material deliveries still
presents a favorable picture. Of the most important items of
raw materials, the following deliveries were made in April:
Grain 208,000 tons
Petroleum 90,000 tons
Cotton 8,300 tons
Nonferrous metals 6,340 tons; copper, tin, and nickel.
With regard to manganese ore and phosphates, deliveries
suffered from the lack of tonnage and transportation
difficulties in the Southeast area.
The transit route through Siberia is still operating.
The shipments of raw materials from East Asia, particularly
of raw rubber, that reach Germany by this route, continue to
be substantial (raw rubber during the month of April, 2,000
tons by special trains, 2,000 by regular Siberian trains).
Total deliveries in the current year amount to:
Grain 632,000 tons
Petroleum 232,000 tons
Cotton 23,500 tons
Manganese ore 50,000 tons
Phosphates 67,000 tons
Platinum 900 kilograms
4) Great difficulties are created by the countless
rumors of an imminent German-Russian conflict. Official
sources are in large measure
Page 341
responsible for the persistence of these rumors. These rumors
are causing grave anxiety to German industry, which is eager
to withdraw from its engagements with Russia and in some
cases already refuses to dispatch to Moscow the personnel
needed for the execution of the contracts.
5) I am under the impression that we could make economic
demands on Moscow which would even go beyond the scope of the
treaty of January 10, 1941, demands desired to secure German
food and raw material requirements beyond the extent now
contracted for. The quantities of raw materials now
contracted for are being delivered punctually by the
Russians, despite the heavy burden this imposes on them,
which, especially with regard to grain, is a notable
performance, since the total quantity of grain to be
delivered under the agreement of April 10 of this year and
the Belgian and Norwegian agreements, amounts to over 3
million tons up to August 1, 1942.
6) For the end of May or beginning of June, the Trade
Agreement of January 10, 1941, provides for new negotiations
in Moscow regarding settlement of balances. Such negotiations
would, however, only make sense if they were used to present
specific German demands. If this is not to be the case, I
intend to procrastinate with regard to the date of the
negotiations.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, May 15, 1941.
*****
Frame 217951 serial 426
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 938 of May 14
BERLIN, May 15, 1941-6:27 p. m.
Received Moscow, May 15, 1941-10:30 p. m.
Confidential material. Secret. To be decoded only by
officials authorized to handle confidential material. Reply
via courier or secret code.
In reference to telegraphic report No. 957 of April 21,
and written report No. A: 1408 of April 22, 1941. [20]
Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that
the seventy-one cases mentioned of border violations by
Germans are being investigated. The investigation will
require some time as the
[20] Latter not printed.
Page 342
air force units and crews concerned will have to be
interrogated individually. Please effect the early release by
the Soviet Government of the plane that made the emergency
landing near Rovno on April 15.
RITTER
*****
Frame 217944, serial 426
The German Minister in Sweden (Wied) to the German Foreign
Office
Telegram
Pol. I M 3378 g
STOCKHOLM, [May 16, 1941.]
No. 534 of May 16
I have learned that the Soviet Russian Minister here,
Frau Kollontay, said recently that at no time in Russian
history have there been stronger troop contingents assembled
on Russia's western border than now.
WIED
*****
Frame 113436, serial 105
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Nr. 340
BERLIN, May 17, 1941.
Ambassador Oshima asked me today in the course of a
conversation on Japanese-American negotiations whether an
"easing of tension" had occurred in German-Russian relations.
I replied that German-Russian relations were unchanged. We
were observing Russia carefully. Russian concentration at our
border was a matter of common knowledge. That we had also
sent German troops to the East in reply, was natural. We had
not exactly liked everything the Russians had been doing in
the last few months. I would not, however, call it a state of
"tension."
In the diplomatic corps, the subject of Russia is much
discussed. I recently told the Swedish Minister, in reply to
a direct question, that developments between Germany and
Russia depended on Stalin's conduct.
WEIZSCKER
Page 343
*****
Frame 217949, serial 426
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
No. 1193 of May 18
Moscow, May 17, 1941.
Reference your telegram No. 938 of May 14.
The case of the German plane that made the emergency
landing near Rovno, with which the liaison staff of the Red
Army and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs are already
occupied, was also brought up today with Secretary General
Sobolev, with the request for early release of the airplane.
At the same time, the communication ordered by you regarding
the investigation of border violations by the Germans was
made. S[obolev] countered that the Soviet Government awaited
the German reply, and referred gravely to the fact that
border violations by German planes were continuing and were
still frequent.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 24480-24482, serial 34
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, May 24, 1941.
Reference your telegram No. 1192 of May 17. [21]
I. BY Sobolev's reply, our wishes regarding the final
demarcation of the boundary from the Igorka River to the
Baltic Sea have been satisfactorily met. Since, however, the
settlement of our claims under the treaty of January 10,
1941, has been protracted for months due to no fault of ours,
both Minister von Saucken and Departmental Counselor Conrad
had to be employed at other urgent tasks and are therefore
not available at this time. We are trying to release them as
soon as possible in order that they may resume their work in
the Central Boundary Commission and we will shortly make a
proposal for another date.
Since, under the circumstances, Assistant Wieber would
have to remain idle there for some time, while he is urgently
needed here, please arrange for his return.
[21] Not printed.
Page 344
II. The instrument of ratification for the treaty of
January 10, 1941, has been executed by the Fhrer. Kindly
notify the Soviet Government so that preparations for the
exchange of documents can be made.
WOERMANN
*****
Note for the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister, Fuschl
Berlin, May 24, 1941.
The intent of the attached telegram to Moscow is a
further effort to treat in a dilatory manner the matter of
the boundary commission, since otherwise the next step would
be a survey of the boundary by a Mixed Commission.
On the other hand, Soviet wishes are deferred to, in
that we have now declared ourselves prepared to exchange
instruments of ratification for the boundary treaty of
January 10, 1941.
WOERMANN
*****
Frame 113450, serial 105
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
MOSCOW, May 24, 1941-3:45 p. m.
Received May 24, 1941-6:15 p. m.
SECRET
No. 1223 of May 24
Reference my telegram No. 1099 of the 7th.
On May 22 I called on Molotov to discuss with him
current negotiations on cultural questions, release of
prisoners, etc. Molotov received me in the same study that he
had formerly, surrounded by his usual staff in the Kremlin.
He was as amiable, self-assured and well-informed as ever.
The only difference was the name-plate at the entrance,
bearing the new inscription "Molotov, Deputy Chairman,
Council of People's Commissars." There was nothing to
indicate that his position with Stalin was shaken or that his
influence as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs had
suffered any diminution.
This and other observations made here since Stalin took
over the supreme power of the state, show that the two
strongest men in the Soviet Union-Stalin and Molotov-hold
positions which are decisive for the foreign policy of the
Soviet Union. That this foreign policy is, above all,
directed at the avoidance of a conflict with Germany, is
proved by the attitude taken by the Soviet Government during
the last few weeks, the tone of the Soviet press, which
treats all
Page 345
the events which concern Germany in an unobjectionable
manner, and the observance of the trade agreements concluded
with Germany.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 113497-113499, serial 105
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
Moscow, June 14, 1941-1:30 a. m.
Received June 14, 1941-8 a. m.
No. 1368 of June 13
People's Commissar Molotov has just given me the
following text of a Tass despatch which will be broadcast
tonight and published in the papers tomorrow:
Even before the return of the English Ambassador Cripps
to London, but especially after his return, there have been
widespread rumors of "an impending war between the U.S.S.R.
and Germany" in the English and foreign press. These rumors
allege:
1. That Germany supposedly has made various territorial
and economic demands on the U.S.S.R. and that at present
negotiations are impending between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
for the conclusion of a new and closer agreement between
them;
2. That the Soviet Union is supposed to have declined
these demands and that as a result Germany has begun to
concentrate her troops on the frontier of the Soviet Union in
order to attack the Soviet Union;
3. That on its side the Soviet Union is supposed to have
begun intensive preparations for war with Germany and to have
concentrated its troops on the German border.
Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumors,
responsible circles in Moscow have thought it necessary, in
view of the persistent spread of these rumors, to authorize
Tass to state that these rumors are a clumsy propaganda
maneuver of the forces arrayed against the Soviet Union and
Germany, which are interested in a spread and intensification
of the war.
Tass declares that:
1. Germany has addressed no demands to the Soviet Union
and has asked for no new closer agreement, and that therefore
negotiations cannot be taking place;
2. According to the evidence in the possession of the
Soviet Union both Germany and the Soviet Union are fulfilling
to the letter the
Page 346
terms of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact, so that in
the opinion of Soviet circles the rumors of the intention of
Germany to break the Pact and to launch an attack against the
Soviet Union are completely without foundation, while the
recent movements of German troops which have completed their
operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northern parts
of Germany, must be explained by other motives which have no
connection with Soviet-German relations;
3. The Soviet Union, in accordance with its peace
policy, has fulfilled and intends to fulfill the terms of the
Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact; as a result, all the
rumors according to which the Soviet Union is preparing for a
war with Germany are false and provocative;
4. The summer calling-up of the reserves of the Red Army
which is now taking place and the impending maneuvers mean
nothing but a training of the reservists and a check on the
operations of the railroad system, which as is known takes
place every year; consequently, it appears at least
nonsensical to interpret these measures of the Red Army as an
action hostile to Germany.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 103716, serial 93
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Minister in Hungary
(Erdmannsdoff)
Telegram
STATE SECRET
VENICE, June 15, 1941-9:40 p. m.
Received Berlin, June 15, 1941-10:15 p. m.
No. 552 of June 10
Transmitted to Budapest under No. 1021
For the Minister personally.
Please inform the Hungarian Minister President as
follows:
In view of the heavy concentration of Russian troops at
the German eastern border, the Fhrer will probably be
compelled, by the beginning of July at the latest, to clarify
German-Russian relations and in this connection to make
certain demands. Since it is difficult to foretell the
outcome of these negotiations, the German Government
considers it necessary for Hungary to take steps to secure
its frontiers.
The above order is of a strictly confidential nature.
Please also mention this fact to the Hungarian Minister
President.
RIBBENTROP
Page 347
*****
Frames 113558-113562, serial 105
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, June 21, 1941.
STATE SECRET
BY radio
For the Ambassador personally.
1) Upon receipt of this telegram, all of the cipher
material still there is to be destroyed. The radio set is to
be put out of commission.
2) Please inform Herr Molotov at once that you have an
urgent communication to make to him and would therefore like
to call on him immediately. Then please make the following
declaration to him.
"The Soviet Ambassador in Berlin is receiving at this
hour from the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum
giving in detail the facts which are briefly summarized as
follows:
"I. In 1939 the Government of the Reich, putting aside
grave objections arising out of the contradiction between
National Socialism and Bolshevism, undertook to arrive at an
understanding with Soviet Russia. Under the treaties of
August 23 and September 28, 1939, the Government of the Reich
effected a general reorientation of its policy toward the
U.S.S.R. and thenceforth adopted a cordial attitude toward
the Soviet Union. This policy of goodwill brought the Soviet
Union great advantages in the field of foreign policy.
"The Government of the Reich therefore felt entitled to
assume that thenceforth both nations, while respecting each
other's regime and not interfering in the internal affairs of
the other partner, would arrive at good, lasting, neighborly
relations. Unfortunately it soon became evident that the
Government of the Reich had been entirely mistaken in this
assumption.
"II. Soon after the conclusion of the German-Russian
treaties, the Comintern resumed its subversive activity
against Germany, with the official Soviet-Russian
representatives giving assistance. Sabotage, terrorism, and
espionage in preparation for war were demonstrably carried
out on a large scale. In all the countries bordering on
Germany and in the territories occupied by German troops,
anti-German feeling was aroused and the German attempt to set
up a stable order in Europe was combated. Yugoslavia was
gladly offered arms against Germany by the Soviet Russian
Chief of Staff, as proved by documents found in Belgrade. The
declarations made by the U.S.S.R. on conclusion of the
treaties with Germany, regarding her intention to collaborate
with Germany, thus stood revealed as deliberate
misrepresentation and deceit and the conclusion of the
treaties themselves as a tactical maneuver for obtaining
arrangements favorable to Russia. The guiding principle
remained the weakening of the non-Bolshevist
Page 348
countries in order the more easily to demoralize them and, at
a given time, to crush them.
"III. In the diplomatic and military fields it became
obvious that the U.S.S.R.-contrary to the declaration made at
the conclusion of the treaties that she did not wish to
Bolshevize and annex the countries falling within her sphere
of influence-was intent on pushing her military might
westward wherever it seemed possible and on carrying
Bolshevism further into Europe. The action of the U.S.S.R.
against the Baltic States, Finland, and Rumania, where Soviet
claims even extended to Bucovina, showed this clearly. The
occupation and Bolshevization by the Soviet Union of the
sphere of influence granted to her clearly violated the
Moscow agreements, even though the Government of the Reich
for the time being accepted the facts.
"IV. When Germany, by the Vienna Award of August 30,
1940, settled the crisis in Southeastern Europe resulting
from the action of the U.S.S.R. against Rumania, the Soviet
Union protested and turned to making intensive military
preparations in every field. Germany's renewed effort to
achieve an understanding, as reflected in the exchange of
letters between the Reich Foreign Minister and Herr Stalin
and in the invitation to Herr Molotov to come to Berlin,
brought demands from the Soviet Union which Germany could not
accept, such as the guarantee of Bulgaria by the U.S.S.R.,
the establishment of a base for Soviet Russian land and naval
forces at the Straits, and the complete abandonment of
Finland. Subsequently, the policy of the U.S.S.R. directed
against Germany became more and more obvious. The warning
addressed to Germany regarding occupation of Bulgaria and the
declaration made to Bulgaria after the entry of German
troops, which was of a definitely hostile nature, were as
significant in this connection as was the promise to protect
the rear of Turkey in the event of a Turkish entry into the
war in the Balkans, given in March 1941.
"V. With the conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of
Friendship of April 5 last, which was intended to stiffen the
spines of the Yugoslav plotters, the U.S.S.R. joined the
common Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front against Germany. At the
same time she tried rapprochement with Rumania, in order to
induce that country to detach itself from Germany. It was
only the rapid German victories that caused the failure of
the Anglo-Russian plan for an attack against the German
troops in Rumania and Bulgaria.
"VI. This policy was accompanied by a steadily growing
concentration of all available Russian forces on a long front
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, against which
countermeasures were taken by Germany only later. Since the
beginning of the year this has been a steadily growing menace
to the territory of the Reich. Reports received in the last
few days eliminated the last remaining doubts as to the
aggressive character of this Russian concentration and
completed the picture of an extremely tense military
situation. In addition to this, there are the reports from
England regarding the negotiations of Ambassador Cripps for
still closer political and military collaboration between
England and the Soviet Union.
Page 349
"To sum up, the Government of the Reich declares,
therefore, that the Soviet Government, contrary to the
obligations it assumed,
1) has not only continued, but even intensified its
attempts to undermine Germany and Europe;
2) has adopted a more and more anti-German foreign
policy;
3) has concentrated all its forces in readiness at
the German border. Thereby the Soviet Government has
broken its treaties with Germany and is about to attack
Germany from the rear, in its struggle for life. The
Fhrer has therefore ordered the German Armed Forces to
oppose this threat with all the means at their
disposal."
End of declaration.
Please do not enter into any discussion of this
communication. It is incumbent upon the Government of Soviet
Russia to safeguard the security of the Embassy personnel.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 038-031 [sic], serial F 20
Letter From Hitler to Mussolini
June 21, 1941.
DUCE!
I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months
of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting
are ending in the hardest decision of my life. I believe-
after seeing the latest Russian situation map and after
appraisal of numerous other reports-that I cannot take the
responsibility for waiting longer, and above all, I believe
that there is no other way of obviating this danger-unless it
be further waiting, which, however, would necessarily lead to
disaster in this or the next year at the latest.
The situation: England has lost this war. With the right
of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in
her imagination might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless,
some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic.
England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from
the Continent. The destruction of France-in fact, the
elimination of all west-European positions-is directing the
glances of the British warmongers continually to the place
from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia.
Both countries, Soviet-Russia and England, are equally
interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate
by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North
American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since
the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet-Russia
a consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously,
is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old
Page 350
Bolshevist tendency to expansion of the Soviet State. The
prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be
achieved by tying up German forces in the East, so that-
particularly in the air-the German Command can no longer
vouch for a large-scale attack in the West. I declared to you
only recently, Duce, that it was precisely the success of the
experiment in Crete that demonstrated how necessary it is to
make use of every single airplane in the much greater project
against England. It may well happen that in this decisive
battle we would win with a superiority of only a few
squadrons. I shall not hesitate a moment to undertake such a
responsibility if, aside from all other conditions, I at
least possess the one certainty that I will not then suddenly
be attacked or even threatened from the East. The
concentration of Russian forces-I had General Jodl submit the
most recent map to your Attach here, General Maras-is
tremendous. Really, all available Russian forces are at our
border. Moreover, since the approach of warm weather, work
has been proceeding on numerous defences. If circumstances
should give me cause to employ the German air force against
England, there is danger that Russia will then begin its
strategy of extortion in the South and North, to which I
would have to yield in silence, simply from a feeling of air
inferiority. It would, above all, not then be possible for
me, without adequate support from an air force, to attack the
Russian fortifications with the divisions stationed in the
East. If I do not wish to expose myself to this danger, then
perhaps the whole year of 1941 will go by without any change
in the general situation. On the contrary. England will be
all the less ready for peace for it will be able to pin its
hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must
naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the
Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of
war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.
Aside from this, Duce, it is not even certain whether we
shall have this time, for with so gigantic a concentration of
forces on both sides-for I also, was compelled to place more
and more armored units on the eastern border, and also to
call Finland's and Rumania's attention to the danger-there is
the possibility that the shooting will start spontaneously at
any moment. A withdrawal on my part would, however, entail a
serious loss of prestige for us. This would be particularly
unpleasant in its possible effect on Japan. I have,
therefore, after constantly racking my brains, finally
reached the decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn
tight. I believe,
Page 351
Duce, that I am hereby rendering probably the best possible
service to our joint conduct of the war this year. For my
over-all view is now as follows:
1) France is, as ever, not to be trusted. Absolute
surety that North Africa will not suddenly desert does not
exist.
2) North Africa itself, insofar as your colonies, Duce,
are concerned, is probably out of danger until fall. I assume
that the British, in their last attack, wanted to relieve
Tobruk. I do not believe they will soon be in a position to
repeat this.
3) Spain is irresolute and-I am afraid-will take sides
only when the outcome of the war is decided.
4) In Syria, French resistance can hardly be maintained
permanently either with or without our help.
5) An attack on Egypt before autumn is out of the
question altogether. I consider it necessary, however, taking
into account the whole situation, to give thought to the
development of an operational unit in Tripoli itself which
can, if necessary, also be launched against the West. Of
course, Duce, the strictest silence must be maintained with
regard to these ideas, for otherwise we cannot expect France
to continue to grant permission to use its ports for the
transportation of arms and munitions.
6) Whether or not America enters the war is a matter of
indifference, inasmuch as she supports our opponent with all
the power she is able to mobilize.
7) The situation in England itself is bad; the provision
of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult.
The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on
hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions:
Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America.
But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The
elimination of Russia means, at the same time a tremendous
relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of
a much stronger threat to American activities through
Japanese intervention.
I have decided under these circumstances, as I already
mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical performance in
the Kremlin. I assume, that is to say, I am convinced, that
Finland, and likewise Rumania, will forthwith take part in
this conflict, which will ultimately free Europe, for the
future also, of a great danger. General Maras informed us
that you, Duce, wish also to make available at least one
corps. If you have that intention, Duce-which I naturally
accept with a heart filled with gratitude-the time for
carrying it out will still be sufficiently long, for in this
immense theater of war the troops cannot be assembled at all
points at the same time anyway. You, Duce, can give the
decisive aid, however, by strength-
Page 352
ening your forces in North Africa, also, if possible, looking
from Tripoli toward the West, by proceeding further to build
up a group which, though it be small at first, can march into
France in case of a French violation of the treaty; and
finally, by carrying the air war and, so far as it is
possible, the submarine war, in intensified degree, into the
Mediterranean.
So far as the security of the territories in the West is
concerned, from Norway to and including France, we are strong
enough there-so far as army troops are concerned-to meet any
eventuality with lightning speed. So far as the air war on
England is concerned, we shall, for a time, remain on the
defensive,-but this does not mean that we might be incapable
of countering British attacks on Germany; on the contrary, we
shall, if necessary, be in a position to start ruthless
bombing attacks on British home territory. Our fighter
defense, too, will be adequate. It consists of the best
squadrons that we have.
As far as the war in the East is concerned, Duce, it
will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second's
doubt as to its great success. I hope, above all, that it
will then be possible for us to secure a common food-supply
base in the Ukraine for some time to come, which will furnish
us such additional supplies as we may need in the future. I
may state at this point, however, that, as far as we can tell
now, this year's German harvest promises to be a very good
one. It is conceivable that Russia will try to destroy the
Rumanian oil region. We have built up a defense that will-or
so I think-prevent the worst. Moreover, it is the duty of our
armies to eliminate this threat as rapidly as possible.
If I waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this
information, it is because the final decision itself will not
be made until 7 o'clock tonight. I earnestly beg you,
therefore, to refrain, above all, from making any explanation
to your Ambassador at Moscow, for there is no absolute
guarantee that our coded reports cannot be decoded. I, too,
shall wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador
informed of the decisions reached.
The material that I now contemplate publishing
gradually, is so exhaustive that the world will have more
occasion to wonder at our forbearance than at our decision,
except for that part of the world which opposes us on
principle and for which, therefore, arguments are of no use.
Whatever may now come, Duce, our situation cannot become
worse as a result of this step; it can only improve. Even if
I should be obliged at the end of this year to leave 60 or 70
divisions in Russia, that
Page 353
is only a fraction of the forces that I am now continually
using on the eastern front. Should England nevertheless not
draw any conclusions from the hard facts that present
themselves, then we can, with our rear secured, apply
ourselves with increased strength to the dispatching of our
opponent. I can promise you, Duce, that what lies in our
German power, will be done.
Any desires, suggestions, and assistance of which you,
Duce, wish to inform me in the contingency before us, I would
request that you either communicate to me personally or have
them agreed upon directly by our military authorities.
In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since I
struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually
free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the
complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final
conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for
in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my
whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am
happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies.
With hearty and comradely greetings, Your
[ADOLF HITLER]
*****
Frames 24545-24548, serial 34
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizscker)
St. S. Pol. No. 411
BERLIN, June 21, 1941.
MEMORANDUM
The Russian Ambassador, who had wanted to call on the
Reich Foreign Minister today and had been referred to me
instead, called on me this evening at 9:30 p. m. and handed
me the attached note verbale. This note refers to a complaint
of the Russian Government of April 21 of this year, regarding
80 cases of flights of German aircraft over Soviet territory
in the spring of this year. In the meanwhile, says the note,
180 more flights of this kind had taken place, against which
the Soviet Border Patrol had each time filed a protest with
the German representatives at the border. Moreover, the
flights had assumed a systematic and intentional character.
In conclusion, the note verbale expresses confidence
that the German Government will take steps to put an end to
these border violations.
I replied to the Soviet Ambassador as follows: Since I
was not acquainted with the details and in particular was not
conversant with
Page 354
the protests allegedly filed at the border between the local
authorities, I would have to refer the note verbale to the
competent offices. I did not wish to anticipate the German
reply. I should like to say only this much in advance,
namely, that I, on the contrary, had been informed of
wholesale border violations by Soviet aircraft over German
territory; it was therefore the German and not the Russian
Government that had cause for complaint.
When Herr Dekanosov tried to prolong the conversation
somewhat, I told him that since I had an entirely different
opinion than he and had to await the opinion of my
Government, it would be better not to go more deeply into the
matter just now. The reply would be forthcoming later.
The Ambassador agreed to the procedure and left me.
As a German interpreter for Russian could not be located
at the time, I had Minister von Grundherr attend the
conversation as a witness.
Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister.
VON WEIZSCKER
[Enclosure]
The Soviet Embassy in Germany to the German Foreign Office
No. 013166
NOTE VERBALE
By order of the Soviet Government, the Embassy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany has the honor
to make the following statement to the German Government:
The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. by note verbale of April 21 [22] informed the German
Embassy in Moscow of the violations of the border of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by German aircraft, which
in the period from March 27 to April 18 of this year amounted
to 80 cases registered by the Soviet Border Guard. A reply to
the foregoing note has not yet been received from the German
Government. On the contrary, the Soviet Government must state
that violations of the Soviet boundary by German aircraft
during the last two months, namely, from April 19 of this
year up to and including June 19 of this year, have not only
not ceased, but are increasing and have assumed a systematic
character, attaining the number of 180 in this period,
regarding each of which a protest was made
[23] For contents, see telegram No. 957 of April 21 from the
German Charg in the Soviet Union, ante, p. 328.
Page 355
by the Soviet Border Guard to the German representatives at
the border. The systematic nature of these flights and the
fact that in several cases German aircraft penetrated 100 to
150 kilometers and more into the U.S.S.R. preclude the
possibility that these violations of the border of the
U.S.S.R. by German aircraft could have been accidental.
In drawing the attention of the German Government to
this situation, the Soviet Government expects the German
Government to take measures toward putting an end to the
violations of the Soviet border by German aircraft.
BERLIN, June 21, 1941.
*****
Frame 113550, serial 105
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 22, 1941-1:17 a. m.
Received June 22, 1941-2:30 a. m.
SECRET
No. 1424 of June 21
Molotov summoned me to his office this evening at 9:30
p. m. After he had mentioned the alleged repeated border
violations by German aircraft, with the remark that Dekanosov
had been instructed to call on the Reich Foreign Minister in
this matter, Molotov stated as follows:
There were a number of indications that the German
Government was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government.
Rumors were even current that a war was impending between
Germany and the Soviet Union. They found sustenance in the
fact that there was no reaction whatsoever on the part of
Germany to the Tass report of June 13; that it was not even
published in Germany. The Soviet Government was unable to
understand the reasons for Germany's dissatisfaction. If the
Yugoslav question had at the time given rise to such
dissatisfaction, he-Molotov-believed that, by means of his
earlier communications, he had cleared up this question,
which, moreover, was a thing of the past. He would appreciate
it if I could tell him what had brought about the present
situation in German-Soviet Russian relations.
I replied that I could not answer his question, as I
lacked the per-
Page 356
tinent information; that I would, however, transmit his
communication to Berlin.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 47072-47075, serial 67
Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign
Minister and Soviet Russian Ambassador Dekanosov in the
Foreign Office at 4 a. m. on June 22, [1941]
Aufz. RAM 37/41
The Reich Foreign Minister began the conversation with
the remark that the hostile attitude of the Soviet Government
toward Germany and the serious threat that Germany saw in the
Russian concentration on the eastern border of Germany, had
forced the Reich to military countermeasures. Dekanosov would
find a detailed statement of the reasons for the German
attitude in the memorandum, which the Reich Foreign Minister
then handed him. [23] The Reich Foreign Minister added that
he regretted very much this development in German-Russian
relations as he in particular had made every attempt to bring
about better relations between the two countries. It had,
however, unfortunately transpired that the ideological
conflict between the two countries had become stronger than
common sense, upon which he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had
pinned his hopes. He had nothing further, the Reich Foreign
Minister said in conclusion to add to his remarks.
Dekanosov replied that he had asked for an interview
with the Reich Foreign Minister because, in the name of the
Soviet Government, he wanted to pose a few questions that, in
his opinion, required clarification.
The Reich Foreign Minister thereupon replied that he had
nothing to add to what he had already stated. He had hoped
that the two countries would contrive a sensible relationship
with each other. He had been deceived in this great hope for
reasons that were explained in detail in the memorandum just
delivered. The hostile policy of the Soviet Government toward
Germany, which had reached its climax in the conclusion of a
pact with Yugoslavia at the very time of the German-Yugoslav
conflict, had been evident for a year. At a moment when
Germany was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, the
attitude of Soviet-Russia, particularly the concentration of
the Russian military forces at the Soviet border, had
presented so serious a threat to
[23] Not printed here.
Page 357
the Reich that the Fhrer had to decide to take military
countermeasures. The policy of compromise between the two
countries had therefore been unsuccessful. This was, however,
by no means the fault of the Reich Government, which had
carried out the German-Russian treaty in detail, but was
attributable rather to a hostile attitude of Soviet Russia
toward Germany, that had existed for some time. Under the
pressure of a serious threat of a political and military
nature which was emanating from Soviet Russia Germany had
since this morning taken the appropriate counter-measures in
the military sphere. The Reich Foreign Minister regretted not
to be able to add anything to these remarks, especially since
he himself had had to conclude that, in spite of earnest
efforts, he had not succeeded in creating sensible relations
between the two countries.
Dekanosov replied briefly that, for his part too, he
exceedingly regretted this development, which was based on a
completely erroneous conception on the part of the German
Government, and, in view of this situation, he had nothing
further to say except that the status of the Russian Embassy
would now be arranged with the competent German authorities.
He thereupon took leave of the Reich Foreign Minister.
MINISTER SCHMIDT
BERLIN, June 22, 1941.
Page 358
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