This essay presents a new way of conceptualizing the problem of politicalobligation. On the traditional ‘normativist’ framing of the issue, the primary task for theory is to secure the content and justification of political obligations, providing practically applicable moral knowledge. This paper develops an alternative, ‘pragmatist’ framing of the issue, by rehabilitating a frequently misunderstood essay by Hanna Pitkin and by recasting her argument in terms of the ‘pragmatic turn’ in recent philosophy, as articulated by Robert (...) Brandom. From this perspective, the content and justification of political obligations cannot be determined in a way that is in principle separable from their application. This casts ‘politicalobligation’ not as a problem to be philosophically resolved, but as a political predicament that calls for a kind of practical engagement. The merit of this perspective is to draw our attention toward the conditions under which the problem appears as a lived predicament. (shrink)

The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for politicalobligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of politicalobligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and politicalobligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of (...) preempting the citizen‟s liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko‟s account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. (shrink)

Rawls's theory of politicalobligation attempts to avoid the obvious flaws of a Lockean consent model. Rawls rejects a requirement of consent for two reasons: First, the consent requirement of Locke’s theory was intended to ensure that the liberty and equality of the contractors was respected, but this end is better achieved by the principles chosen in the original position, which order the basic structure of a society into which citizens are born. Second, "basing our political ties (...) upon a principle of obligation would complicate the assurance problem." Instead, Rawls offers a duty-based account, whereby we are duty-bound to support and comply with just institutions that apply to us. A. John Simmons argues that Rawls cannot meet the particularity requirement of establishing politicalobligation to only one state. I assess the response that this requirement can be met by the political constructivist element of Rawls's theory. I conclude that there are fatal flaws in this response. (shrink)

In this article I criticize a theory of politicalobligation recently put forward by Christopher Wellman. Wellman's “samaritan theory” grounds both state legitimacy and politicalobligation in a natural duty to help people in need when this can be done at no unreasonable cost. I argue that this view is not able to account for some important features of the relation between state and citizens that Wellman himself seems to value. My conclusion is that the samaritan (...) theory can only be accepted if we are ready to give up either the traditional notion of politicalobligation as a prima facie duty valid for every citizen, or the current view of the relationships that should exist between states, citizens and foreigners (the view according to which states should have special concerns for their own citizens). (shrink)

Interpreters disagree on the origin that Francisco Suárez assigns to politicalobligation and correlative political subjection. According to some, Suárez, as other social contract theorists, believes that it is the consent of the individuals that causes politicalobligation. Others, however, claim that for Suárez, politicalobligation is underived from the individuals' consent which creates the city. In support of this claim they invoke Suárez's view that political power emanates from the city by (...) way of "natural resultancy". I argue that analysis of Suárez's less studied De voto and De iuramento reveals that, for Suárez, consent causes both the city and the citizen's politicalobligation. Moreover, close inspection of the notion of causation by natural resultancy within Suárez's metaphysics shows that what emanates from the body politic in this fashion is not, as claimed, political subjection and politicalobligation, but rather the city's right to self-mastership. Because for him politicalobligation does originate in consent it is not incorrect to regard Suárez as a social contract theorist. (shrink)

P.J. Markie tries to solve the so-called particularity problem of natural duty accounts of politicalobligation, a problem which seems to make natural duty accounts implausible. I argue that Markie at best “dissolves” the problem: while his own natural duty account of politicalobligation still does not succeed in ensuring particularity, this is not an implausible but an entirely plausible implication of his account, thanks to the weakness of his concept of politicalobligation. The (...) price for this, however, is that his approach has little to do with politicalobligation and the particularity problem as discussed in the literature. (shrink)

Among the most popular strategies for justifying political obligations are those that appeal to the principle of fairness. These theories face the challenge, canonically articulated by Robert Nozick, of explaining how it is that persons are obligated to schemes when they receive goods that they do not ask for but cannot reject. John Simmons offers one defense of the principle of fairness, arguing that people could be bound by obligations of fairness if they voluntarily accept goods produced by a (...) cooperative scheme. Simmons, however, thinks that such a theory will do little work in justifying political obligations, since virtually no one voluntarily accepts state goods. This paper attempts to advance just such a theory by arguing that states are in fact genuine cooperative schemes and that Simmons is overly pessimistic in his appraisal of whether the majority of citizens accept the goods provided by their states. (shrink)

I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting the (...) counterfactual condition. For this reason, I suggest that those who reject non-excludable benefits provided by the state have a duty to support their rejection with adequate reasons. Failing that, they can be permissibly treated as if they had fair-play obligations (although in fact they might not have them). Thus, I claim that there is a distinction, largely unappreciated, between the question of whether we have a duty of fairness to obey the law and the question of whether we can be permissibly treated as if we had one. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Aristotle's views on politics have little relevance to the preoccupations of modern political theory with authority and obligation. Andres Rosler's original study argues that, on the contrary, Aristotle does examine the question of politicalobligation and its limits, and that contemporary political theorists have much to learn from him. Rosler takes his exploration further, considering the ethical underpinning of Aristotle's political thought, the normativity of his ethical and political (...) theory, and the concepts of political authority and obligation themselves. (shrink)

Contemporary debates on obedience and consent, such as those between Thomas Senor and A. John Simmons, suggest that either politicalobligation must exist as a concept or there must be natural duty of justice accessible to us through reason. Without one or the other, de facto political institutions would lack the requisite moral framework to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay suggests that both are unnecessary in order to provide a conceptual framework in which obedience to coercive (...)political institutions can be understood. By providing a novel reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan, this article argues that both politicalobligation and a natural duty to justice are unnecessary to ground the ability of political institutions to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay takes issue with common readings of Hobbes which assume consent is necessary to generate obedience on the part of citizens, and furthermore that politicalobligation is critical for the success of political institutions. While the failure of the traditional Hobbesian narrative of a consenting individual would seem to suggest the Leviathan is indefensible as a project, this paper argues that the right of war in the state of nature was more central for Hob- bes’s understanding of political institutions than obligation. Furthermore, Hobbes provides an adequate defense of political institutions even if his arguments about consent, obligation and punishment are only rhetorical. In this way Hobbesian law is best understood as a set of practical requirements to avoid war, and not as moral requirements that individuals are bound to comply with. Thus Hobbesian political institutions are not vulnerable to contemporary philosophical anarchist criticisms about politicalobligation and political institutions as such. To develop this reading, I focus primarily on the Leviathan, including interpretations by Skinner, Kateb, Flathman, and Oakeshott. Ultimately, this argument provides insight into contem- porary political institutions of the state, citizenship, criminality, and the law in a world where politicalobligation has not been adequately justified. (shrink)

This paper attempts to establish that, and explain why, the practice of punishing offenders is in principle morally permissible. My account is a nonstandard version of the fair play view, according to which punishment's permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender gains relative to law-abiding members of the community. Such views (...) struggle, however, to provide a plausible account of this unfairly gained benefit. By contrast, on my account punishment's permissibility follows more straightforwardly from the fair play view of politicalobligation: Specifically, the rule instituting punishment is itself among those rules with which members of the political community are obliged to comply. For criminal offenders, compliance requires submitting to the prospect of punishment. (shrink)

The paper focuses on John Rawls’ theory of politicalobligation. Rawls bases politicalobligation on our natural duties of justice, which are mediated to us by our sense of justice. Therefore the justification of politicalobligation also requires moral justification: the justification of the principles of justice. In the paper I first investigate that part of Rawls’ argument that has the role of justification: the method of reflective equilibrium. This method raises several problems, the (...) most severe of which is that it neglects the fact of pluralism. The second part of the paper deals with this problem. I analyse how Rawls’ theory and his method of justification has changed as a result of taking into account the fact of pluralism. Finally, building on the demands of pluralism and the shortcomings of the Rawlsian answer, I present a possible theory of politicalobligation. This theory is grounded in the interpretation of the community’s political culture while fitting it into a discourse-based theoretical framework. (shrink)

Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation based on individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. I develop a multiprinciple theory of politicalobligation, based on the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the "common good" principle. The three principles interact in three (...) main ways: "cumulation," combining the separate state services that different principles cover; "mutual support," combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The resulting theory is able to satisfy the main conditions for an adequate theory of obligation: demonstrating that all or nearly all inhabitants of society have moral requirements to obey the law, and that these extend to the full range of state services. (shrink)

Much of the debate concerning politicalobligation deals with the question of which, if any, moral principles could make obedience to the directives of the government a matter of obligation. What makes politicalobligationpolitical has not received attention in the literature on the topic. In this article I argue that the lack of systematic reflection on what makes politicalobligationpolitical is responsible for the failure of a number of influential (...) theories of politicalobligation. I demonstrate this failure using the consent theory of politicalobligation as my major example. I conclude my analysis by formulating some positive conditions that a successful principle of politicalobligation should satisfy. (shrink)

This is the first in-depth study of popular attitudes towards political obligations and how these are viewed by the state. Leading political theorist George Klosko provides a full defense of a theory of politicalobligation based on the principle of fairness, which is widely viewed as the strongest theory of obligation currently available.

University of Calgary, Canada and Tel Aviv University, Israel mkeren{at}ucalgary.ca ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Stacy Nyikos University of Tulsa, USA stacy-nyikos{at}utulsa.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Although questions of politicalobligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. We examine the `self-image of the state' through Supreme Court decisions in (...) the USA, Germany, and Israel. Because moral reasons are expressed especially clearly in cases regarding obligations to provide military service, we focus on these. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, the three states support military obligations along similar lines, though with some differences. In all three countries, appeal is made to obligations of reciprocity. Individuals must serve in order to provide the important benefit of defense. This `service conception' of politicalobligation accords norms of fairness or equality a central role, in order to justify the service of particular individuals. Reasons for less emphasis on fairness in Israeli cases are examined, while we claim that the overall similarities of the three countries provide some measure of indirect support to a theory of politicalobligation based on the principle of fairness. Key Words: politicalobligation  military service  fairness  principle of fairness  liberalism  state. (shrink)

Natural duty theorists of politicalobligation try to base a moral duty to obey the law on some natural duty, such as the duty to promote justice. Their critics say they confront an insurmountable obstacle in the particularity problem: Since natural duties do not bind us to some persons and institutions more strongly than to others, they cannot support a duty to one particular state or society. I solve the particularity problem, by developing a version of the (...) class='Hi'>politicalobligation thesis, giving a natural duty argument for it and showing that the particularity problem does not arise for the argument. I reply to some likely objections to my view. (shrink)

In the first section the problem of politicalobligation is motivated, and in Section 2 the core structure of the problem is laid bare. A recognition ofthis structure prompts reflection that the problem will appear very different to different thinkers, depending on their moral theories. It also invites the speculation that the problem will be incapable of solution on some moral theories while trivial on others. This polarity does reflect the state of much of the literature until fairly (...) recently. However this picture is seen to be too crude, and in the third section it is shown how an interesting solution has been proposed by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’. In Section 4 this theory is evaluated, concentrating particularly on George Klosko’s version, which is, in part, rejected. However it is argued that no version of the theory is able to guarantee universal political obligations. In Section 5 it is argued that this is an unnoticed advantage of the theory, for it may well be that, morally at least, we should allow those who do not benefit from the existence of the state to escape political obligations. The consequences of this view are examined and found not to be as threatening as they might first have appeared. (shrink)

In this paper I criticise an influential version of associative theory of politicalobligation and I offer a reformulation of the theory in ‘quasi-voluntarist’ terms. I argue that although unable by itself to solve the problem of politicalobligation, my quasi-voluntarist associative model can play an important role in solving this problem. Moreover, the model teaches us an important methodological lesson about the way in which we should think about the question of politicalobligation. (...) Finally, I suggest that the quasi-voluntarist associative model is particularly attractive because it manages to combine the main thrust of the traditional associative view with the most attractive feature of transactional theories, while avoiding at the same time the main problems that afflict each of these two approaches. (shrink)

Much has been written about Locke's Second Treatise,[Note 1] but still, I believe, the book's main line of argument has been left unclear . Some concepts need more prominence---the duty to preserve mankind, the right of war, and private judgment; others need less---consent, majority rule, and property. Locke's aim was not to show that politicalobligation rests upon consent: that is assumed without argument.[Note 2] What he set out to prove is that there are certain limits (...) to politicalobligation which not even consent could set aside.[Note 3]. (shrink)

Do people have obligations by virtue of the fact that a given country is their country? Actual contract theory says they do because they have agreed to act in certain ways. Contemporary philosophers standardly object in terms of the 'no agreement' objection and the 'not morally binding' objection. I argue that the 'not morally binding' objection is not conclusive. As for the 'no agreement' objection, though actual contract theory succumbs, a closely related plural subject theory of politicalobligation (...) does not. Plural subject theory may be the truth in actual contract theory and should be explored in its stead. (shrink)

There is a story about the connection between the rise of consent theories of politicalobligation and the fall of natural law theories of politicalobligation that is popular among political philosophers but nevertheless false. The story is, to put it crudely, that the rise of consent theory in the modern period coincided with, and came as a result of, the fall of the natural law theory that dominated during the medieval period. Neat though it (...) is, the story errs doubly, for it supposes both that consent did not play a key role in natural law theories of political authority offered in the medieval period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the view of Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist) and that natural law theory did not play a key role in the consent theories of political authority offered in the modern period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the views of Hobbes and Locke, perhaps the paradigmatic consent theorists).Footnotes* I owe thanks to Pat Káin, Paul Weithman, Bob Roberts, and Henry Richardson for instructive criticisms. John Hare was particularly helpful both in criticism and in conversation. I was supported by a fellowship from the Erasmus Institute while this essay was drafted. (shrink)

Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the law tells me to do? Do I have special obligations to conform to the laws of my own country and if so, why? In what sense, if any, must I fight in wars in which my country is engaged, if ordered to do so, or suffer the penalty for law-breaking the law imposes - including the death penalty? (...) Gilbert's accessible book offers a provocative and compelling case in favour of citizens' obligations to the state, while examining how these can be squared with self-interest and other competing considerations. (shrink)

Though questions of politicalobligation have long been central to liberal political theory, discussion has generally focused on voluntaristic aspects of the individual's relationship to the state, as opposed to other factors through which the state is able to ground compliance with its laws. The individual has been conceptualized as naturally without political ties, whether or not formally in a state of nature, and questions of politicalobligation have centered on accounting for political (...) bonds.Footnotes* For helpful comments on and discussion of earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to the other contributors to this volume, the editors of Social Philosophy and Policy, Colin Bird, Richard Dagger, Joshua Dienstag, Charles Kromkowski, David Mapel, Debra Morris, John Simmons, Vivian Thomson, and Steven Wall. (shrink)

The first question I discuss in this paper is whether we have a duty of rescue to make our organs available for transplantation after our death, a duty we owe to patients suffering from organ failure. The second question is whether political obligations, in particular the obligation to obey the law, can be derived from natural duties, possibly duties of beneficence. Such duties are normally seen as merely imperfect duties, not owed to anyone. The duty of rescue, however, (...) is a perfect one, mainly because it applies to us when we are in a unique position to provide urgent help to a person in need. The basic idea of a natural duty account of politicalobligation is that such unique positions can be artificially created by institutionalized coordination schemes. The remaining problem is how any particular coordination scheme could claim our allegiance rather than any other. This problem can be solved in different ways in the organ donation case, and in respect to a limited set of political obligations, mainly negative ones. A natural duty account is best seen as a constitutive part of a multiple principle theory of politicalobligation. (shrink)

One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `politicalobligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates politicalobligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a politicalobligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning (...) class='Hi'>political matters . Despite this agreement about the general nature of what is being searched for, a broad division has arisen between politicalobligation theorists - there are some who take political obligations to actually exist and there are some who take there to be no general politicalobligation . While there is debate within the camp defending politicalobligation about what it is that generates the obligations, the common core of all "defender theories" is the fundamental idea that one has a moral requirement to support and obey the political institutions of one's country. Despite utilitarianism's status as one of the major ethical theories, historically, it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with politicalobligation. Within the contemporary debate it is generally accepted that utilitarianism cannot adequately accommodate a robust theory of politicalobligation. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to challenge this general dismissal of a utilitarian account and to build upon the two accounts which have been developed in offering a robust utilitarian theory of politicalobligation which can be considered a competitor to the other contemporary theories . However, as this utilitarian account of politicalobligation develops, the possibility will also emerge for a non-antagonistic relationship between the utilitarian theory on offer and the contemporary politicalobligation debate. The moral reasons posited by the traditional theories of politicalobligation can be included in and accommodated by my utilitarian account. The utilitarian account of politicalobligation can accept that there are many types of reasons explaining why broad expectations concerning individual and group behavior are created, and each type of reason can be understood as supporting the utilitarian claim that there are moral reasons for following the laws and supporting legitimate political authorities. Taken all together, my arguments will take the form of a three tiered response to the prevailing opinion that any utilitarian attempt to account for political obligations is doomed. The first tier contends that the utilitarian can consistently claim that there are moral reasons to follow the law. This is not a particularly strong claim, but it is one which has been denied by the vast majority of political theorists. The second tier of my argument addresses this apparent issue by contending that even the traditional deontological accounts of politicalobligation are not offering more than this. Lastly, it is contended that, given the contingent features of humans , the strength of the utilitarian political obligations is comparable to other accounts' analyses of the obligations. (shrink)

The most important moral question concerned with the problem of politicalobligation relates to the limits of obedience of a citizen owed to the state. The problem of politicalobligation raises the questions such as – (1) To what extent the citizen has an obligation to obey the laws of the state? (2) Is the citizen of a state, whether democratic or otherwise, under an obligation to obey the unjust laws of the state? There (...) are two different viewpoints concerning the character of obligation to obey the laws of the State. (1) The first position states -- “one has an absolute obligation to obey the law and therefore disobedience to the state law is never justified”. (2) The second position asserts -- “one has a prima facie obligation to obey the law, but this obligation can be overridden by conflictingobligations. Hence disobedience to the state law can be justified in the presence of outweighing circumstances”. (shrink)

The example of a political leader who has to decide whether he would allow the torture of a suspect in order to get information about a ticking bomb has become notorious in ethical discussions concerning the tension between moral principles and political necessity. The relation between these notions must be made as clear as possible before a sincere moral evaluation of ticking bomb situations can be given. The first section of this article considers whether the concept of (...) class='Hi'>politicalobligation is different from moral and legal obligations or whether it is a special kind of moral obligation. In the second section, the idea that the dirty hands problem confronts us with the ambiguities of moral life is rejected because it would imply an untenable moral paradox. The thesis that is developed is, namely, if there is such a thing as political necessity, it must be some form of moral obligation. The third section analyses the concept of political necessity and concludes that it cannot overrule basic moral principles and that the international legal prohibition of torture must be considered to be a categorical imperative. In the last section, these ideas concerning political and moral necessity are brought in against the defence of torture, which should be tolerated in the ‘War on Terror’. There it will be argued that the use of the ticking bomb argument not only supports a highly hypocrite political practice but is also deceptive as a moral and political argument. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a limited defence of “fairness” or “fair play” arguments for politicalobligation by focussing on one important critique of such arguments, that offered by A. John Simmons. I isolate Simmons's concentration on the idea of “accepting” benefits and argue that, among other difficulties, his criteria for when we can be said to accept a benefit from our political communities are too restrictive. While the scope of the discussion is narrow, I try to (...) sketch ways in which the failings of Simmons's critique are symptomatic of deeper problems with his libertarian approach. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(3) 2004: 282-291. (shrink)

Politicalobligation is concerned with the clash between the individual’s claim to self-governance and the right of the state to claim obedience. It is a central and ancient problem in political philosophy. In this authoritative introduction, Dudley Knowles frames the problem of obligation in terms of the duties citizens have to the state and each other. Drawing on a wide range of key works in political philosophy, from Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume and G. (...) W. F. Hegel to John Rawls, A. John Simmons, Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin, PoliticalObligation: A Critical Introduction is an ideal starting point for those coming to the topic for the first time, as well as being an original and distinctive contribution to the literature. Knowles distinguishes the philosophical problem of obligation - which types of argument may successfully ground the legitimacy of the state and the duties of citizens - from the political problem of obligation - whether successful arguments apply to the actual citizens of particular states. Against the anarchist and modern skeptics, Knowles claims that a plurality of arguments promise success when carefully formulated and defended, and discusses in turn ancient and modern theories of social contract and consent, fairness and gratitude, utilitarianism, justice and a Samaritan duty of care for others. Against modern communitarians, he defends a distinctive liberalism: ‘the state proposes, the citizen disposes’. (shrink)

Legitimate political authority is often said to involve a “right to rule,” which is most plausibly understood as a Hohfeldian moral power on the part of the state to impose obligations on its subjects (or otherwise to change their normative situation). Many writers have taken the state’s moral power (if and when it exists) to be a correlate, in some sense, of an obligation on the part of the state’s subjects to obey its directives. Thus legitimate political (...) authority is said to entail a general obligation to obey the law, and a general obligation to obey the law is said to entail legitimate political authority. With some version of this idea in mind, many writers attempt to establish full (or partial) legitimate political authority by first arguing for the intermediate conclusion that there exists a general (or partial) obligation to obey the law. This article argues that such a strategy is fundamentally mistaken, because while legitimate authority does indeed entail an obligation to obey the law, an obligation to obey the law does not, in and of itself, entail legitimate authority. This can be referred to as “the reverse entailment problem.” To avoid this problem, a theory of political authority must argue directly for the existence of the appropriate kind of moral power on the part of the state. This article argues for the “value-based” conception of a moral power, which states, very roughly, that one person holds a power over another if there is sufficient value in the former possessing the capacity intentionally to impose an obligation on the latter (or otherwise to change her normative situation). This seemingly simple understanding of a moral power gives rise to surprisingly strong adequacy conditions on what can count as an acceptable theory of legitimate political authority, and these conditions decisively rule out most of the standard theories in the literature. (shrink)

While we generally take it for granted that governments should provide social welfare and other benefits to their citizens, justification of these services depends on special moral requirements people owe to their compatriots, as opposed to inhabitants of other countries, who may be far more needy. While widely discussed defenses of compatriot preferences can be seen to be flawed, the latter may be justified through a public goods argument. Security and other public goods are not only necessary for acceptable lives (...) but are provided through the cooperative activity of compatriots, coordinated and enforced by the state. Because the necessary public goods require general cooperation throughout society, all individuals who are required to comply should have rights to participate in decisions about the form in which they are provided. Because these political rights must be substantive rather than merely formal, they justify requirements of distributive justice and so compatriot preferences. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that citizens of a reasonably just state have a prima facie duty to obey its laws. In recent years, however, a number of influential political philosophers have concluded that there is no such duty. But how can the state be a legitimate authority if there is no general duty to obey its laws? This article is an attempt to explain how we can make sense of the idea of legitimate political authority without positing the (...) existence of a general duty to obey the law. The explanation makes use of a distinction between laws of general application, on one hand, and on the other the particularized, directed efforts by state officials to channel and resolve disputes (including those arising from violations of the law). A state's legitimate authority entails a general duty to cooperate in the latter type of effort, rather than upon a dubious general duty to obey the law. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the terms on which John Simmons rejects all arguments for a moral obligation to obey the law and so defends “philosophical anarchism.” Although I accept his rejection of several criteria on which others might and often do insist, I criticize his reliance on the conditions of “generality” and “particularity.” In doing so, I propose an alternative to his influential conception of legitimacy.

On what basis, and to what extent, are refugees obligated to obey the laws of their host countries? Consideration of the specific case of asylum-seekers generates, I think, two competing intuitions: the refugee has a prima facie obligation to obey the laws of her host country and none of the popularly canvassed substrates of politicalobligation—consent, tacit consent, fairness, or social role—is at all apt to explain the presence of this obligation. I contend that the unfashionable (...) gratitude account of politicalobligation does the best job of accounting for the intuitions. As has been noticed by other commentators, obligations of gratitude are difficult to specify and subject to numerous cancelling conditions. I analyze these conditions in detail and conclude that if one accepts that gratitude is the basis of the politicalobligation of the refugee, then one must face up to just how frangible the obligation is. In particular, the obligation is conditional on the fair and generous treatment of refugees that is consistent with their dignity as human beings. (shrink)