United Nations
General Assembly
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4.
Distr.: General
26 May 2010
Original: English
Human Rights Council
Fourteenth session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including
the right to development
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston*
Addendum
Follow-up to country recommendations – Brazil**
Summary
This report analyses the progress made by Brazil in implementing recommendations
made by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
following his visit to the country from 4-14 November 2007 (A/HRC/11/2/Add.2). During
his visit, the Special Rapporteur documented widespread killings by on-duty police, by offduty police participating in death squads and militias, killings in prisons, and pervasive
impunity.
The Government deserves significant credit for implementing a number of important
reforms since 2007 to address these issues. Federal ministries have endorsed a set of human
rights guidelines (“Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos 3”), which incorporate some
of the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations, demonstrating the commitment of the
federal Government to bring human rights into the core of the State’s planning and to
productively engage with special procedures. In addition, the federal Government has
specifically stated that it is committed to reducing deaths resulting from police actions.
Tangible measures taken by the federal or state Governments include increasing police
salaries, investigating militias, arresting death squad members, promoting a sustained
police presence in some favelas, and creating a task force in Rio de Janeiro to address
prison overcrowding, a major cause of prison violence. In São Paulo, an important proposal
has been made that, if passed, would permit a special group of prosecutors to investigate
* Late submission.
** The summary of the present report is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself is
contained in the annex to the summary and is being circulated in the language of submission only.
GE.10
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
police killings.
However, no concrete action has been taken on many of the Special Rapporteur’s
other recommendations. In fact, extrajudicial killings remain widespread, and the numbers
of killings by police continue at unacceptably high levels. Police officers are responsible
for unlawful killings of suspected criminals and others, through the use of excessive force
or targeted killings in poorly conceived and counter-productive police operations. Militias
and death squads continue to operate with the participation of both current and former
members of the police, and sometimes with links to senior officials and politicians. Overall,
the norm remains that citizens, especially residents of favelas, remain hostage to violence
from gangs, militias and the police. Few of the perpetrators are prosecuted or convicted,
especially when they are police officers. In addition, gangs reign supreme in the prisons,
leading to continued violence and deaths in penitentiaries throughout the country.
2
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
Annex
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
Follow-up to country recommendations – Brazil
Contents
Paragraphs
Page
I.
Methodology ..............................................................................................................
1-4
4
II.
Introduction ...............................................................................................................
5-8
4
III.
Extrajudicial executions by police .............................................................................
9-39
5
A.
Killings by on-duty police .................................................................................
12-24
6
B.
Killings by off-duty police ................................................................................
25-39
9
IV.
Killings in prisons ......................................................................................................
40-44
12
V.
Impunity.....................................................................................................................
45-61
14
VI.
A.
Police investigations and forensic evidence ......................................................
46
14
B.
Public Prosecutor’s Office.................................................................................
47-49
14
C.
Judiciary and court processes ............................................................................
50-51
15
D.
Witness protection .............................................................................................
52-57
15
E.
Ombudsman offices...........................................................................................
58-61
16
Conclusion .................................................................................................................
62-64
17
Appendix
Summary of follow-up to each recommendation
A.
Policing strategies .............................................................................................
1-5
18
B.
Police involvement in organized crime .............................................................
6-7
18
C.
Police accountability .........................................................................................
8-14
19
D.
Forensic evidence ..............................................................................................
15-17
20
E.
Witness protection.............................................................................................
18
20
F.
Public prosecutors .............................................................................................
19
21
G.
Judiciary and legal framework ..........................................................................
20-22
21
H.
Prisons ...............................................................................................................
23-24
22
3
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
I.
Methodology
1.
In accordance with established practice, this follow-up report was prepared on the
basis of all available information. The Special Rapporteur requested information from the
Government and from other actors on the steps that had been taken to implement his
recommendations. Information on the non-implementation of recommendations was also
sought. In addition, information was sought on the current situation concerning
extrajudicial executions in the country, and particularly on whether and how the situation
had improved, deteriorated or remained static since the Special Rapporteur’s visit. The
Government of Brazil provided information to the Special Rapporteur, which he has
reviewed closely and taken into full account in the preparation of this report. Extensive
consultations were also undertaken with domestic and international civil society groups.
2.
This follow-up report is an important component of one of the principal working
methods of the Special Rapporteur – conducting country visits to investigate allegations of
violations of the right to life. Country visits provide an opportunity to ascertain the facts on
a first-hand basis, to analyze in detail the forms and causes of unlawful killings, and to
engage in constructive dialogue with the country concerned. Following the visit, the Special
Rapporteur prepares a detailed report on his findings, including recommendations directed
at reducing unlawful killings and promoting accountability. Country visits can only achieve
their full potential if governments give careful consideration to these recommendations.
Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights requested States to carefully examine
recommendations and to report to the Special Rapporteur on actions taken on the
recommendations (2004/37).
3.
In order to assess the extent to which States had implemented recommendations, in
2006, the Special Rapporteur initiated follow-up reports on visits conducted. The first
follow-up report (E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.2) concerned the recommendations made by his
predecessor, Asma Jahangir, on her visits to Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica, and the Sudan. In
2008, a follow-up report (A/HRC/8/3/Add.3) was issued on the first two missions
conducted by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston to Sri Lanka and Nigeria. In 2009, followup reports were issued on Guatemala (A/HRC/11/2/Add.7), and the Philippines
(A/HRC/11/2/Add.8). The present report accompanies a follow-up report on the Central
African Republic (A/HRC/14/24/Add.5).
4.
The Special Rapporteur is especially grateful to Sarah Knuckey, as well as to Erika
Sasson and Nishant Kumar, from the Project on Extrajudicial Executions at the Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, for their excellent
assistance in the preparation of this report.
II. Introduction
5.
The Special Rapporteur visited Brazil from 4 to 14 November 2007, and his final
report was published on 23 March 2009. His report highlighted killings by the police,
militias and death squads as well as killings committed in prisons.
6.
In his original report, the Special Rapporteur documented the high rate of killings by
police officers while they are on duty, and analysed the causes behind such behaviour. The
Special Rapporteur also analysed the involvement of police officers in death squads and
militias, which are especially prevalent in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco.
These militias seek out neighbourhoods to control in order to extort money from citizens,
and commit murder to maintain their territorial control. Citizens in certain parts of Brazil
live in fear of police violence and militias just as much as they fear violence from drug-
4
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
trafficking gangs and criminals. The Special Rapporteur also examined deaths in prisons
and the lack of necessary oversight and protection of persons in custody. Impunity for most
killings was rampant because of deficiencies throughout the criminal justice system,
including with respect to police investigations, forensic analysis, prosecutors’ powers, the
judiciary, witness protection, and ombudsman offices. The Special Rapporteur proposed a
range of recommendations to address these issues.
7.
The state and federal Governments have since made noteworthy improvements in
certain areas. There have been new efforts towards community policing in some of the
favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and the federal Government has promised increased salaries to
improve security in anticipation of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016.
The State of Rio de Janeiro also conducted in-depth investigations into militias, which
brought the reality of the problem into sharp focus and led to the arrest of many militia
members. There have been similar arrests in São Paulo as well as Pernambuco with respect
to death squads.
8.
Despite these improvements, some of the problems identified by the Special
Rapporteur following his visit continue largely unabated. In particular, the numbers of
killings by on-duty police officers remain at unacceptably high levels, with perpetrators
continuing to enjoy impunity. From 2003 to 2009, police in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
alone killed over 11,000 individuals, and the evidence suggests that many of these killings
were unlawful. Gangs continue to dominate the prisons, with few meaningful reforms to
address violence. Few measures were taken to improve the criminal justice system or
accountability.
III. Extrajudicial executions by police
9.
In his 2007 report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the police forces in Brazil
all too often contributed to the problem of extrajudicial executions, rather than its solution.
He described two general types of police killings: (a) on-duty police using excessive force
in a purported effort to combat crime; and (b) off-duty police forming criminal
organizations that also engage in killings.
10.
Most of these killings occur in favelas – slum areas of major cities where
concentrated populations are grossly economically disadvantaged and largely left without
any state services. Predictably, poverty and years of state neglect made favelas ripe for the
unfettered growth of violent street crime and the formation of criminal organizations. Those
organizations, in order to maintain control of favelas and continue their unlawful activities
(extortion, drug and weapons trafficking), engage in extensive violence – mostly against the
residents of favelas, but also against residents in other areas of the cities, and against police
and other officials. Brazil’s homicide rates have been notoriously high for years, and the
victims are mostly young, male, black and poor. Between 1980 and 2002, the homicide rate
(per 100,000 residents) nearly tripled – to a peak in 2002 of 30.4. The figures dropped in
1
the following years, to 28.3 (2004), 27 (2005), and 25 (2006).
1
The homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro was significantly higher. In 2007, it was 37.71 (per 100,000, or
6,122 homicides); in 2008 it was 34.5 (5,717), and in 2009 it was 34.36 (5,794). It is important to note
that police killings are excluded from these Government figures, and thus the actual rate is even
higher. In his report on his 2007 mission, the Special Rapporteur noted that the number of homicides
in São Paulo fell from 12,638 in 2000, to 6,057 in 2006. Since his visit, the numbers have been 5,153
(2007), 4,621 (2008), and 4,778 (2009). In Pernambuco, homicides have fallen over the last few
years, from 4,592 (2007), 4,531 (2008), to 4,012 (2009). See Pernambuco State Social Defense
Secretariat, “Boletins Trimestrais,” 2007, 2008, 2009. The Government credits the programme “Pacto
5
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
11.
In this context, the police have an unenviable and daunting task in attempting to
promote security. However, a background of extreme criminal violence does not authorize
or justify unlawful killings by state officials.
A.
Killings by on-duty police
12.
In his 2007 report, the Special Rapporteur explained that on-duty police killings
2
At that time, the Special
formed a significant proportion of all killings in Brazil.
Rapporteur found that police were killing criminal suspects instead of investigating and
arresting them, and that a high number of suspected criminals and bystanders were being
killed during brief large-scale war-style police operations in favelas. His report addressed
two central issues: the practice of registering police killings as “resistance” killings, and the
policing methods adopted in favelas.
1.
“Resistance” killings
13.
One of the most significant issues at the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit was
the way in which police classified and registered killings. It is standard practice across
3
Brazil for the police to label killings they commit as “resistance” killings.
The
classification indicates that a person was killed while committing the crime of resisting
arrest or disobeying other lawful orders of police. It is intended to signify that the police
used lawful (necessary and proportionate) lethal force against a suspect.
14.
However, during his 2007 visit, the Special Rapporteur gathered strong evidence
that many of these killings were, in fact, unlawful killings, and that the practical effect of
the “resistance” classification was to prejudice and limit objective follow-up inquiries into
killings by police. He recommended that reducing unlawful killings by the police must start
with abolishing this classification, and that police killings should be registered in the same
way as any other killings and thoroughly investigated.
15.
The submission from the Government to the Special Rapporteur for this follow-up
report states that the federal Government is committed to working with relevant institutions
to “combat” the practice of classifying police killings in this manner, that reducing police
killings was a “fundamental objective” of the Government, and indicated that it intended to
conduct a performance review with the Rio de Janeiro Government of the police with
4
regard to such cases. These are very welcome announcements.
16.
In 2010, however, the police continue to register cases as “resistance” killings. In
São Paulo, such cases have actually increased since 2007. Government statistics record 543
5
“resistance” cases in 2009, 397 in 2008, and 401 in 2007. In Rio de Janeiro, government
numbers indicate a decrease from 1,330 resistance killings in 2007 to 1,048 in 2009. In an
interview reported in January 2009, the State Security Secretary of Rio de Janeiro, José
pela Vida”, in which the Government pledged to significantly improve security in the state through
138 different programmes in conjunction with civil society. See the Government of Pernambuco
“Pacto Pela Vida” website, available at: http://www.pactopelavida.pe.gov.br/pacto-pela-vida/.
2
A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, para. 9.
3
The terminology differs from region to region. In São Paulo, the term used is resistência seguida de
morte (resistance followed by death). In Rio de Janeiro, the term is autos de resistência (acts of
resistance).
4
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up report,
paras. 34-35.
5
See São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Estatísticas trimestrais,” 2007, 2008, 2009.
6
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
Beltrame stated that police killings fell from around 80 per month at the start of 2008, to 36
in September 2008. He was quoted as saying, “There’s been a big fall – show that to Mr
6
Alston.” While the dramatic recorded fall from January 2008 to August and September
2008 was a significant positive development, the monthly “resistance” rate jumped back up
to the prior numbers in the following months. In October 2008, for example, there were 74
“resistance” deaths, in January 2009 there were 94, in June 2009 there were 107, and in
January 2010 there were 77. In fact, after October 2008, the monthly rate never fell below
71 killings per month.
17.
Some concerns have been expressed about the integrity of Rio de Janeiro
Government statistics on resistance killings, and homicides more generally. Evidence
suggests that incidents are being classified under different statistical categories in order to
demonstrate a reduction in, for example, the homicide rate. Whether or not there has been
an intentional manipulation of the statistics, the allegations highlight the need for
independent statistics gathering. The Government should ensure that the statistics agency
remains independent of the Security Secretariat, which currently oversees police statistics.
An independent statistics agency should have access to police records in order to
independently oversee the gathering of vital statistics regarding the police killings and the
types of categorizations used to explain the incidents.
18.
In the preparation of this report, the Special Rapporteur was provided with credible
evidence that many of the reported “resistance” killings continued in fact to be unlawful
killings covered up by the police. In one recent study, an examination of autopsy and police
7
reports indicated that at least 51 “resistance” killings were in fact unlawful killings. In 17
of those cases, there was evidence of point blank shots to the head, contradicting the police
claim that the victims had been killed in “shootouts”. The Special Rapporteur was provided
evidence of the various methods by which police attempted to cover up their killings,
including by disrupting crime scenes and taking deceased victims to hospital for
8
“treatment”. The very disproportionate numbers of killings by and of police also suggest
that claims of shootouts may often be false. In 2009, for example, Rio de Janeiro recorded
1,048 resistance killings, and 31 on-duty police killed. This is a ratio of 34:1, far greater
than would normally be expected if police were shooting in self-defence in
“confrontations” with armed criminals. The study provided to the Special Rapporteur
compares police killings between Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, South Africa, and the United
States of America. Particularly concerning is comparative data on the number of police
killings compared to the general homicide rate. According to this study, for every 100
homicides in 2008, the Rio de Janeiro police killed 19.89 people. The São Paulo police
killed 8.46. The rates in South Africa (2.58) and the United States of America (2.62) were
9
dramatically lower.
6
Stuart Grudgings and Rodrigo Viga Gaier, “Interview – Expanding Rio slums seen worsening crime
risks”, Reuters, 12 January 2009.
7
Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and São
Paulo (December 2009).
8
Idem.
9
Ibid., p. 33. Further cause for concern comes from a comparison of the number of arrests to that of
police killings. In the United States of America, police arrested 37,751 people for every one person
they killed. In Rio de Janeiro, the police arrested 23 people for every one person killed; in São Paulo,
the rate was 348. Ibid., p. 34.
7
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
2.
Large-scale police operations in favelas
19.
In 2007, the Special Rapporteur documented unlawful killings committed during
brief large-scale police operations involving hundreds of police, armoured vehicles and
attack helicopters “invading” favelas. These brief “war”-like operations, while
appropriately aimed at dismantling gang control of favelas and promoting security for
residents, have proven to be both ineffective and counterproductive. Confiscations of drugs
and arms and arrests of gang members are often minimal, and because police forces
withdraw quickly, the gangs simply re-establish themselves and punish residents who were
seen as helping the police. One of the best-known examples was the Complexo do Alemão
operation in June 2007. Despite the use of over 1,400 police, the operation was a failure
10
from a crime-control perspective, and resulted in the deaths of 19 people.
20.
The Special Rapporteur detailed in his original report the reasons for the failure of
such operations, and recommended that the Government eschew large-scale “mega”
operations in favour of a planned and sustained police presence, coordinated with the
11
provision of social services.
21.
Since the Special Rapporteur’s mission, the Rio de Janeiro Government has
introduced Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs, “Pacifying Police Units”) into a small
number of favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro. These units are a sustained police presence
in each favela, and aim to re-take control from gangs, and promote security in the long
12
The officers
term. The UPP experiment is currently under way in seven favelas.
deployed are given special training, including human rights training, and increased salaries.
The Rio de Janeiro Government plans to have some 3,500 police in 15 UPPs by the end of
2010, and intends to ultimately extend UPPs to 100 favelas, at a rate of at least 10 new
favelas per year.
22.
This new strategy is largely to be commended. Where it has been implemented, it
represents a significant departure from the “war” approach of the brief, large-scale, violent
operations. The UPP approach avoids the “shoot-out” scenarios that so often result from
rapid, heavily armed police incursions into the favelas. According to information provided
to the Special Rapporteur, for those favelas under UPPs, the Government has made real
progress in preventing gangs from re-asserting their presence. There is also strong evidence
13
to date of community support for the UPPs. Residents have reported that they feel safer,
and that relationships with police have improved. In some areas, there have also been
improvements to the provision of basic services.
23.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, concerns have been expressed about
the way in which the UPPs have been conducted. The government language used to
describe UPPs is heavily laced with warlike terminology – they “invade” a favela, and
maintain an “occupation”. Some civil society members expressed concerns that this policy
will continue to criminalize favela residents who will be living under de facto militarized
police control. There has been concern about harassment of residents, through increased
10
A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, paras. 27-29.
Ibid., para. 78.
12
The most recent to be “occupied” was Providência, in Rio de Janeiro’s city centre. “UPP arrives at
Brazil’s oldest Favela,” UPP Repórter, 23 March 2010.
13
A 2010 poll by the Brazilian Institute of Social Research found that 93 per cent of people resident
in UPP areas feel safer. According to that poll, 70 per cent of residents of communities without UPP
would like to have UPP. Another study, by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, indicated that 66 per cent
of those surveyed in 2009 in the Santa Marta and Cidade de Deus favelas approved of the UPP.
“UPP: I want one too!” UPP Repórter, 23 February 2010.
11
8
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
searches and seizures, and heavy police control over the daily lives of residents, including
by banning popular music concerts and funk dance parties. Some interlocutors also
expressed concern that the promised social services, including those related to education,
health, and sports activities, were slow to be implemented, and that residents’ associations
were not always consulted on social projects. The Government must ensure that its retaking
of favelas includes both improved security for residents, as well as the provision of basic
services that residents have for decades been denied. In addition, independent reviews of
the UPPs should take place, to provide an unbiased account of their successes, and areas
where improvement is needed.
24.
It is also important to recognize that community policing and a sustained police
presence in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro is the exception, rather than the norm. The UPPs
are only in a small number of the roughly 1,000 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and large-scale
violent operations resulting in deaths continue in non-UPP favelas. For example, it has been
reported that:
• A December 2008 operation in Favela Mare resulted in 4 deaths.
• A February 2009 operation in Coreia, Taquaral, Rebu and Vila Aliança favelas,
involving 300 police, resulted in 9 deaths.
• A March 2009 operation in Aço, Salgueiro, and Duque de Caxias favelas led to 9
deaths.
• An April 2009 operation involving 100 officers led to 8 deaths in Santa Theresa and
Estacio.
• A May 2009 operation in Manguinhos favela involving 170 officers resulted in 4
deaths, and one wounded officer.
• A June 2009 operation in Mare resulted in 7 deaths, including of 2 officers.
• A July 2009 operation in Mangueira involving 100 officers led to 4 deaths.
• An August 2009 operation in Morro do Juramento involving 80 officers, led to 9
deaths and 5 wounded police.
• A September 2009 operation in Morro do Juramento involving 50 police backed by
a helicopter, led to 4 deaths, and the wounding of 2 news cameramen.
• A February 2010 operation in Jacarezinho led to 8 deaths, including that of 1 officer.
B.
Killings by off-duty police
1.
Militias and para-policing
25.
As noted in the Special Rapporteur’s previous report on Brazil, militias are groups
composed of military and civil police, ex-police, firefighters, prison guards, and private
citizens who attempt to “take over” geographical areas, and engage in extra-state
14
“policing”. These groups are responsible for extrajudicial executions and other violent
crimes including torture and kidnapping. As with criminal gangs, their violence is largely
compelled by efforts to exercise geographic control in order to make a profit by extorting
“protection money” from communities and the provision of services such as illegal cable
television, household gas and transportation.
14
A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, para. 34.
9
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
26.
Since the Rapporteur’s visit, militias in Rio de Janeiro have been the subject of
significant and much-needed attention. At the time of his visit in 2007, it was generally
believed that militias were in control of roughly 92 favelas in Rio de Janeiro city.
Following public outrage over the kidnapping and torture of three undercover journalists by
15
a militia in May 2008, two militia members were arrested and the state Government set
up a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate militias in Rio de Janeiro.
27.
Led by state deputy Marcelo Freixo, the Commission published a lengthy report in
16
November 2008.
It concluded that 171 areas in Rio de Janeiro were dominated by
militias, nearly double the number previously thought to exist, and it was able to discover
the identities of militia members, the communities under militia rule and the nature of
profits engendered by militia activities. The Commission uncovered extensive evidence of
official state involvement in militias, including election-related corruption, official
membership in militias, and militias benefiting from the use of public resources (such as
weapons and cars).
28.
In response, the Government took a number of important steps. Two hundred
17
suspected militia members were arrested, including a state deputy Certain militias, such
as the Liga da Justiça (“Justice League”) were particularly hard hit. The Government also
created a task force within the police to specifically investigate militias. According to
information provided by interlocutors, this task force has kept up sustained pressure on key
militias.
29.
Given the extent of militia activity and control, these actions are important, but they
constitute just the beginning. Militias continue to seek control of territory and of state
politics, and remain a major threat to security in Rio de Janeiro. Many militias remain
untouched, and recent examples of militia violence abound. In August 2009, seven
residents of the Barbante favela were shot dead by members of a militia, and one victim
18
was killed for refusing to pay the militia’s security “tax”. In the same month, a member
of Governor Cabral’s personal security detail was arrested on charges of alleged
19
participation in a militia that had recently murdered four people. In a raid on the Rio das
Pedras militia, Brazilian authorities discovered the militia’s plans to assassinate state
20
deputy Marcelo Freixo.
2.
Death squads
30.
Death squads, extermination groups, and vigilante groups are often formed by police
along with others whose goal is to kill, generally for profit. These groups are also known to
21
justify their actions as an extralegal “crime-fighting” tool.
15
“Milícias: politica do terror,” O Dia Online, 31 May 2008; Human Rights Watch, World Report
2009 – Brazil (January 2009)
16
Asembléa legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ), Relatório Final da Comissão
Parlamentar de Inquérito destinada a investigar a ação de Milícias no âmbito do estado do Rio de
Janeiro (November 2008).
17
Amnesty International, Report 2009: State of the World’s Human Rights (Brazil) (May 2009).
18
Idem.
19
Blog da Segurança, “PM acusado de chacina cuidava de filho de Cabral,” O Dia Online, 25 August
2009; Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force, p. 50.
20
“Grupo tramou assassinato de deputado,” O Dia Online, May 29, 2009
http://www2.amnesty.se/uaonnet.nsf/senastezope/495C62E518E8BEB2C12575CA00346135?opendo
cument; Human Rights Watch, supra note 10 at p.51.
21
A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, para. 38.
10
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
31.
The Special Rapporteur’s report focused largely on death squads in Pernambuco.
During his 2007 mission, he was provided with evidence that 70 per cent of homicides in
Pernambuco were committed by death squads. Pernambuco has taken significant steps to
address this problem. On 29 January 2009, the state Government announced that about 30
police operations carried out since late 2007 had resulted in some 400 people being
22
imprisoned for their participation in death squads. The scope of death squad activity is so
expansive, however, that intensive investigations and arrests will need to continue for many
years if it is to succeed.
32.
Efforts to combat death squads have been met with violent resistance. Human rights
activist and former city councilor Manoel Mattos had been active in denouncing deaths
squads in Pernambuco and Paraiba for many years, and, following repeated threats on his
23
life, was shot to death in his home on 24 January 2009.
33.
For this report, the Special Rapporteur was also presented with evidence of
significant death squad activity in São Paulo. According to the São Paulo Police
Ombudsman, in 2008 there were 97 cases of suspected death squad killings, and 61 cases in
24
2009. In January 2008, Colonel Jose Herminio Rodrigues was shot to death on the street
after he began an investigation into death squads in northern São Paulo which appeared to
25
involve over 50 military police. In a positive step, 14 members of the military police were
arrested in 2009 for links to 12 murders committed by the “Highlanders”, a death squad
26
infamous for decapitating its victims.
34.
In another positive move, the Government of Paraiba recently launched an
investigation into a death squad allegedly responsible for some 300 murders over the last
27
decade. The group involved 30-40 active and retired police officers, from regular officers
to a colonel and including corrections officers, who were operating on behalf of the jailed
members of a drug trafficking gang. At the time of writing, none of the police officers has
been arrested, although the investigation is ongoing.
3.
Police salaries
35.
In his report, the Special Rapporteur explained that police participation in organized
criminal activity was at the extreme end of a spectrum of police activity that began with
extortion and the taking of prohibited second jobs, generally in the security sector. Much of
this activity was motivated by the poor pay that police received. It was also easy for police
to take second jobs because of their shift structure, and the reluctance of commanders to
discipline police for doing so. Consistent with this analysis, Rio de Janeiro’s Commission
into militias specifically identified inadequate police salaries as a cause for police
28
participation in militias.
22
Pernambuco: Pacto Pela Vida, “Combate aos grupos de extermínio será intensificado em
Pernambuco,” available on the Government of Pernambuco “Pacto Pela Vida” website,
http://www.pactopelavida.pe.gov.br.
23
Amnesty International, “Human Rights Activist Assassinated in Brazil,” 27 January 2009.
24
Police Ombudsman of São Paulo, “Relatório Anual 2009,” available at: http://www.ouvidoriapolicia.sp.gov.br/pages/RelatAnual2009.htm.
25
U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil; See also Human Rights Watch,
Lethal Force, p. 44.
26
Amnesty International, Report 2009: State of the World’s Human Rights: Brazil (May 2009); see
also Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force, p. 45.
27
”Brazil Death Squad Suspected of 300 Murders,” Latin American Herald Tribune, 7 January 2010.
28
ALERJ, supra note 16, p. 40.
11
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
36.
Since the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the Brazilian Federal Government has taken
some important steps to increase police salaries. In November 2009, President Lula stated
that adequate pay was the key way to prevent officers from accepting bribes and engaging
in other unlawful activity, and he announced a new career plan for the Federal District
whereby the Government would hire 3,000 new officers and would promote 12,000 current
29
In anticipation of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016,
officers.
President Lula also announced an increase in police salaries by providing for a Bolsa Copa
(World Cup Grant) and a Bolsa Olímpica (Olympic Grant). For the Bolsa Copa, which will
be paid to both firefighters and police in the lead up to the World Cup, the increase begins
in 2010 with 550 reais, increasing in 2011 to 665 reais, in 2012 to 760 reais, in 2013 to 865
30
reais and finally to an extra 1,000 reais for 2014. The Bolsa Olímpica will be fixed at
1,200 reais for all civil and military police. In order for any police officer to receive the
grant, the officer must attend one training course per year.
37.
However, the negative consequences of low police salaries also exist outside of Rio
de Janeiro, independently of the upcoming sporting events. Brazilian police staged strikes
in early 2010 in order to protest unequal salary differentials between Federal District police
31
and military police nationwide. In February 2010, the police demanded a national
minimum wage to ensure that police officers across the country receive pay increases.
38.
As part of a strategy to improve the police forces through salary increases,
professional police tactics and human rights training must also be on the agenda. The
Olympic and World Cup Grants described above link increased salaries and advanced
training to a minor extent. However, the training must be serious and of high quality in
order to rectify the systematic use of excessive force. Interlocutors provided information to
the effect that in Pernambuco, for example, training courses for military police officers in
2009 were deficient in a number of respects. The four-month course decreased from 1,246
hours in 2004 to only 800 hours in 2009. Classes were crowded, there was insufficient
training on self-defence techniques and expert training with firearms, just three hours of
training on the preservation of evidence at a crime scene, and no training on dealing with
vulnerable groups in society.
39.
The Special Rapporteur is not aware of any changes having been made to the
policing shift structure.
IV. Killings in prisons
40.
During his 2007 mission, the Special Rapporteur investigated killings in prisons,
which generally take place during riots or gang-related inmate violence. In his report, he
analysed in detail the reasons behind prison violence in Brazil. These include severe
overcrowding and poor conditions, and especially the practice of giving responsibility for
internal prison management to gangs or powerful prisoners. Tasks such as internal
discipline and the distribution of food and medicine are generally left to inmates.
Independent external oversight of prisons is minimal, and prisoners are afraid to report
29
“Brazilian president: Paying good salaries to police is guarantee of tranquillity to society,” Xinhua
News, 7 November 2009.
30
Marianna Jungmann, “Rio Olympics: Lula Creates New Bolsa (Allowance) to Raise Police
Salaries,” BrazzilMag, 22 January 2010.
31
Lourenço Canuto, “Brazilian Police March on the Streets and Threaten National Strike,”
BrazzilMag, 3 February 2010; “Polícia Civil ameaça iniciar greve na véspera do carnaval,”
Nomomento.com, 25 January 2010; see also PEC 300, Constitutional Amendment proposed by police
officers, available at: http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/610200.pdf
12
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
abuses. In all but a very small number of specially designed “neutral” prisons, prisoners are
required by prison administration officials to pick a gang identity upon arrival.
41.
In response to the resulting crisis, the Special Rapporteur made a number of
recommendations, including that gang affiliations should not be forced upon new inmates;
the number of neutral prisons should be increased; prison oversight should take place
regularly and be visible to inmates; prison authorities should reassert control of internal
prison administration; inmate records should be recorded electronically; and overcrowding
should be reduced by, for example, increasing the use of alternative sentences.
42.
Since the Special Rapporteur’s visit there have been some positive developments.
The Government provided information on a new law that was passed in December 2009 to
establish a new “Department of Monitoring and Oversight of the Penitentiary System.” It is
too early to judge the success of this new department, but its responsibilities are to monitor
32
In Rio de Janeiro, a task force was created to address
and report on prisons.
overcrowding by reviewing inmates’ sentences and status to determine whether any should
33
or could be released.
Separately, in response to over 100 deaths in the Urso Branco
Prison (Rondônia State) in October 2008, the Prosecutor General of Brazil petitioned the
Supreme Court to order federal intervention in the prison. As of the writing of this report,
the case was still pending. In Minas Gerais, a court ruled in favour of the families of 25
inmates killed by a fire arising from a gang dispute in 2007 and ordered the Government to
34
pay damages.
43.
The Special Rapporteur was not provided with any information to indicate that the
authorities had taken steps to regain internal control of prisons from gangs, or to improve
conditions. On the contrary, many riots and killings have taken place since the Special
Rapporteur’s visit. In 2008, the Ministry of Justice reported that 2,000 prisoners were
involved in riots in the federal prison system. In January 2008, in a prison in Minas Gerais,
eight prisoners died in a fire after a guard left his post with the only key, evidence either of
35
gross negligence or complicity. In October 2009 in João Pessoa, Paraiba state, prisoners
protested the transfer of an inmate and set fire to their mattresses, starting a blaze in which
36
7 inmates died and 48 were injured. In December 2009, in Rio Grande do Sul, three
inmates burned to death when members of a rival gang entered their cell and set it alight
37
and prevented their escape. In another case in Rio Grande do Sul, gunmen broke into a
38
prison and executed a specific inmate. In early 2010, in Paraná, gang rivalry in a prison
led to a riot that spanned more than a day, in which 1,200 prisoners (out of 1,600)
participated. In that incident, three people burned to death and two died from physical
39
attacks. A few days later, in Bahia, rioters were demanding to be transferred to the capital
and took a number of hostages, one of whom had been murdered by the time the riot ended
50 hours later.
44.
The situation for inmates in Brazil is dire and requires immediate intervention.
32
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up
report, paras. 57-58.
33
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up
report, paras. 65-66.
34
U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Brazil
35
U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Brazil
36
Emma Rowley, “Seven convicts 'burn to death' in jail riot”, Sky News Online, 24 October 2009.
37
“Prison fight leaves 3 dead, 1 injured in Brazil,” Latin American Herald Tribune, 15 December
2009.
38
“Gunmen burst into Brazil prison, kill inmate,” Latin American Herald Tribune, 31 August 2009.
39
“Brazil prison riot leaves 5 dead,” Latin American Herald Tribune, 16 January 2010.
13
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
V. Impunity
45.
As explained by the Special Rapporteur in his report, the reality is that there is
impunity for most homicides, especially those committed by police officers. Today, as in
2007, the vast majority of extrajudicial killings in Brazil do not result in arrests and
convictions, due in large part to problems with police investigations and forensics,
impediments to the work of prosecutors, the judiciary and court processes, witness
protection, and ombudsman offices.
A.
Police investigations and forensic evidence
46.
During his 2007 visit, the Special Rapporteur found that police investigations,
especially of police killings, were often inadequate. No information has been provided to
suggest that the situation has improved. On the contrary, interlocutors provided detailed
evidence that investigations were delayed, that police investigation records often lacked
basic evidence (including that of eyewitnesses, or forensic evidence from the crime scene),
and police officers involved in shootings were often questioned in a perfunctory manner.
Forensic evidence remained poor in many cases, and the forensic institutes have not been
made independent from the police. Similarly, police internal affairs offices are not
independent and are thus often unable to effectively investigate police killings. In this
respect, the Special Rapporteur welcomes the government plan, described in the
information provided by the Government for this follow-up report, to formulate proposals
to improve internal affairs, including by making them more “professionalized, autonomous,
40
and independent”, and to create a separate career track for internal affairs officers.
B.
Public Prosecutor’s Office
47.
During his mission the Special Rapporteur observed that the Public Prosecutor’s
Office is a widely respected institution and that, where progress had been made against
police impunity, prosecutors had often played a key role. However, their role in
investigations, particularly important with respect to police killings, was impeded in
practice because the Civil Police often did not notify prosecutors of crimes until after 30
days, and because of challenges to prosecutors legal power to conduct investigations. The
Special Rapporteur recommended that the Civil Police consult with prosecutors from the
start of a homicide investigation, that prosecutors conduct independent inquiries where
police were implicated in a killing, and that the right of prosecutors to conduct their own
investigations should be clarified and affirmed.
48.
Today, the Civil Police continue to delay notification of police killings to
41
prosecutors for 30 days, and sometimes even longer, seriously undermining the ability of
prosecutors to gather important evidence. Disputes over the legal power of prosecutors to
investigate are ongoing at the time of this report, although the Special Rapporteur
welcomes comments by the Government that “today the majority of Court decisions
42
favours” investigations by prosecutors.
40
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up
report, para. 39.
41
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force, pp. 101-102.
42
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up
report, para. 52.
14
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
49.
There is currently no specialized prosecution unit dedicated to police killings in
either Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo. Instead, police killings are assigned to prosecutors on a
43
geographic basis, together with other killings. In São Paulo, the State Prosecutor’s office
has a Special Action Group of External Control of Police Activities (GECEP), which has a
mandate for police oversight, but cannot currently cover police intentional killings, or any
44
abuses by the military police.
The Special Rapporteur was informed that the AttorneyGeneral for São Paulo has proposed that the GECEP be given the authority to investigate
police killings, including “resistance killings” in the greater São Paulo region. This would
be a key step in addressing police impunity for killings. It is important that the proposal be
approved by the college of appellate-level prosecutors, and that it have the mandate to
investigate off-duty police killings (including those by militias and death squads), and
killings by both civil and military police. It is also essential that it be given the necessary
resources and staff to function effectively.
C.
Judiciary and court processes
50.
The Special Rapporteur was provided with no information on relevant reforms to the
overburdened judiciary.
51.
His report noted that reforms to allow some cases involving human rights violations
to be transferred from state to federal courts (and to be investigated by federal police) held
promise. However, the general trend has been that cases have not been transferred. An
application to transfer the case regarding the killing of Manoel Mattos, described above,
was pending at the time of this report.
D.
Witness protection
52.
In his report, the Special Rapporteur noted the need for an effective witness
protection programme in order to combat impunity. He observed that many witnesses
feared police, militia, or gang reprisals, and thus refused to come forward.
53.
Some reports have indicated that detainees have been permitted to leave detention in
45
order to threaten or kill witnesses to their crimes. In August 2008 in Pernambuco,
indigenous leader Mozeni Araújo de Sá – a witness to two murders of Truká people – was
46
shot to death in broad daylight. Similarly, in March 2009, a military police officer was
convicted for organizing a militia to kill seven people. Three months after the trial, four
47
relatives of the main witness were reported missing.
54.
The most significant witness protection programme in Brazil is the Programa de
Assistência a Vítimas e a Testemunhas Ameaçadas (PROVITA). As the Special Rapporteur
observed, PROVITA is a model for witness protection in many respects, but requires some
improvements. The Special Rapporteur recommended that state governments provide
adequate, timely and reliable funding and that they ensure the police cooperate in escorting
witnesses to court. The Special Rapporteur also recommended that the federal Government
43
Ibid., p. 102.
Ibidd., p. 103.
45
Amnesty International, “Brazilian politician at risk of assassination by militia groups” (4 June
2009).
46
Amnesty International, Report 2009: State of the World’s Human Rights (Brazil) (May 2009)
47
U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report (Brazil)
44
15
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
conduct a study to determine the appropriateness of the use of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as implementing partners for the programme.
55.
To date, most state governments have disbursed fewer funds than the federal
Government had committed to PROVITA, except São Paulo, Ceará and Espírito Santo,
which maintain adequate funding levels. These funding deficiencies undermine the ability
of NGOs to fulfil their mandates, and ensure protection for witnesses. The states have also
been slow in setting up systematic relocation programmes, which further weakens the
objectives of PROVITA.
56.
In Santa Catarina, the authorities have set up specialized training for police officers
responsible for the protection of witnesses. These police squads have become an asset to
PROVITA as they are actively concerned with issues of relocation, risk assessment, and
protection at court appearances. In those states that do not have specialized protection
police officers, the effect remains predictably poor. Police officers are unfamiliar with the
needs of the programme, and are unable to carry out its mandate most effectively.
57.
The federal Government has not pursued a national study to assess the viability of
NGOs as implementing partners. In some regions of Brazil, the refusal by the federal
Government to engage civil society in a meaningful discussion about the structural issues at
the heart of PROVITA has led to NGO dissent. At least one NGO has unilaterally cut ties
with PROVITA because the Government did not address its concerns.
E.
Ombudsman offices
58.
In his report, the Special Rapporteur recognized the important role for police
ombudsman offices in contributing to police oversight, and he encouraged the Government
48
to strengthen the institution through more resources, powers and independence.
59.
Since the Special Rapporteur’s visit, the São Paulo office has taken some important
proactive measures to address police accountability. The office has started a project to
quickly send information on suspected unlawful police killings to the Attorney-General,
who forwards them to the relevant prosecutor. In this way, reporting delays by the Civil
Police can be circumvented, and prosecutors’ work can be focused on suspect cases. The
office also makes data on police killings available on its website.
60.
Generally, however, all police ombudsman offices continue to have restrictive
mandates, independence and budgets. The Rio de Janeiro Police Ombudsman is still
selected by the State Secretary for Security (who is also responsible for the police), and
neither the Pernambuco or Rio de Janeiro offices appear to publicly disseminate data on
police killings.
61.
The Special Rapporteur notes the positive announcement in the information
provided by the Government for this follow-up report that one of its strategic targets
(within the PNDH-3 framework) is to “establish independent police ombudsman units” for
49
the federal police departments.
48
A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, paras. 75, 90.
Information provided by Brazil to the Special Rapporteur in the preparation of this follow-up
report, para. 22.
49
16
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
VI. Conclusion
62.
Brazil has taken a number of very important steps to address unlawful killings
since the Special Rapporteur’s November 2007 visit. In particular, Rio de Janeiro’s
major inquiry into militias – which are often composed of police and have ties to
officials – led to a comprehensive and wide-ranging report, as well as a number of
arrests and prosecutions. Similarly, Pernambuco has made progress in investigating
and arresting death squad members. In a small number of favelas in Rio de Janeiro,
violent and counter-productive police operations have been replaced with a sustained
police presence and the introduction of some basic services. Increases have also been
made to some police officers’ salaries, and the São Paulo Police Ombudsman has
taken important steps to promote accountability for police.
63.
The Special Rapporteur has been greatly encouraged by Brazil’s willingness to
receive Special Rapporteurs, to engage in dialogue with the international community,
and its willingness to implement reforms to improve respect for human rights.
64.
However, extrajudicial executions remain pervasive. Almost no steps have been
taken to address the grave problem of on-duty police killings, or to reduce the high
numbers of so-called “resistance” killings. Most of the killings are still never
investigated in any meaningful way. And little action has been taken to reduce prison
violence. Key reforms to address these problems are listed in the Appendix to this
report.
17
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
Appendix
Summary of follow-up to each recommendationa
A.
Policing strategies
1.
State Governors, Secretaries for Public Security, and Police Chiefs and
Commanders should take the lead to make publicly clear that there will be zero
tolerance for the use of excessive force and the execution of suspected criminals by
police.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
2.
The state Government of Rio de Janeiro should eschew large-scale, or “mega”,
operations in favour of systematic and planned progress in reasserting a sustained
police presence and government authority in gang-controlled areas. Present policies
are killing large numbers of people, alienating those whose support is needed for
potential success, wasting precious resources, and failing to achieve the stated
objectives. Designing policing strategies solely with electoral objectives in mind does a
disservice to the police, the communities affected, and society at large.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
3.
The use of armoured vehicles should be monitored by equipping them with
audio and visual recording equipment. The results should be regularly monitored in
cooperation with community groups.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
4.
In the longer term the Government should work towards abolishing the
separate system of military police.
This recommendation has not been implemented, although it is presently being discussed by
officials.
5.
The federal Government should implement more effective measures to tie state
funding to compliance with measures aimed at reducing the incidence of extrajudicial
executions by police.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
B.
Police involvement in organized crime
6.
In each State, the State Secretariat for Public Security should establish a
reliable specialized unit to investigate and prosecute police involvement in militias and
extermination groups.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
7.
Off-duty police should under no circumstances be permitted to work for
private security firms. To facilitate such changes:
a
As contained in A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, paras. 77-100.
18
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
(a)
Police should be paid significantly higher salaries;
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
(b)
The shift structure of police work should be reformed so that police cannot
regularly work for large blocks of time and then receive multiple days off.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
C.
Police accountability
8.
Systems for tracking the use of firearms should be established in all states, and
where some procedures already exist, they must be improved and the Government
must ensure they are followed. The weapon and the quantity of ammunition provided
to each policeman should be recorded, and every bullet should systematically be
accounted for. Every instance in which a police officer fires his or her weapon should
be investigated by internal affairs and recorded in a database. This database should
be accessible by police ombudsman offices and used by police chiefs and commanders
to identify police in need of closer supervision.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
9.
The current practice of classifying police killings as “acts of resistance” or
“resistance followed by death” provides a carte blanche for police killing and must be
abolished. Without prejudicing the outcome of criminal trials, such killings should be
included in each state’s homicide statistics.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
10.
The federal Secretariat for Human Rights should keep a detailed database of
human rights violations by police.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
11.
The integrity of work by the internal affairs services of the police should be
ensured by:
(a)
Establishing a separate career path for those working in internal affairs;
(b)
Establishing clear procedures and time limits for investigations;
(c)
Making all information regarding investigations and recommended
disciplinary sanctions freely accessible to ombudsman offices.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
12.
In cases involving police killings and other allegations of serious abuse, internal
affairs services should publicly provide information on the status of individual cases,
including the measures recommended to police chiefs and commanders.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
13.
Police under investigation for crimes constituting extrajudicial executions
should be removed from active duty.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
19
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
14.
Police ombudsman offices, as they exist in most states, should be reformed so as
to be better able to provide external oversight:
(a)
They should report directly to the state governor rather than to the state
secretary of public security;
(b)
They should be provided with the resources and legal powers necessary to
reduce dependence on information from the internal affairs services of the police
forces;
(c)
They should issue regular public reports providing accessible information on
patterns of police abuse and on the effectiveness of disciplinary and criminal
proceedings. This information should be compiled so as to enable meaningful
comparisons across time and geographical areas;
(d)
In order for them to provide more reliable information on the strengths and
weaknesses of existing policing strategies in terms of both respecting and protecting
rights, they should be provided with the resources to conduct or commission surveys
on citizen experiences with crime and the police.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
D.
Forensic evidence
15.
The routine failure of police to preserve crime scenes must end; should
problems persist, the Public Prosecutor’s Office should use its authority to exercise
external control of the police so as to ensure the integrity of its prosecutions.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
16.
Hospitals should be required to report to police precincts and police internal
affairs all cases where the police bring a deceased criminal suspect to hospital.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
17.
State Institutes of Forensic Medicine should be made fully independent from
public security secretariats, and expert staff should receive employment guarantees
that ensure the impartiality of their investigations. Additional resources and technical
training should also be provided.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
E.
Witness protection
18.
In many respects, the existing witness protection programmes constitute a
model, but reforms are also needed:
(a)
State governments should provide adequate, timely, and reliable funding;
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
(b)
State governments should ensure that police cooperate in escorting witnesses to
court appearances in a safe and non-threatening manner;
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
20
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
(c)
The federal Government should conduct a study on whether there are ways to
protect witnesses who are unwilling to comply with the current programmes’ strict
requirements, and on whether the use of NGOs as implementing partners should be
phased out or restructured.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
F.
Public prosecutors
19.
The involvement of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in building criminal cases
must be strengthened:
(a)
State governments should ensure that the Civil Police notify public prosecutors
at the outset of investigations so that prosecutors can provide timely guidance on what
evidence must be gathered in order to obtain a conviction;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(b)
The legal authority of public prosecutors to independently gather evidence
admissible in court should be unequivocally affirmed;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(c)
Public prosecutors should routinely conduct their own investigations into the
lawfulness of killings by the police.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
G.
Judiciary and legal framework
20.
The period of prescription (statutory period of limitation) for intentional
crimes against life should be abolished.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
21.
Recognizing that permitting persons convicted of murder by a trial court to
remain free while their appeal is ongoing facilitates the intimidation of witnesses and
fosters a sense of impunity, judges should give careful consideration to alternative
interpretations of the norm guaranteeing the “presumption of innocence” found in
foreign and international jurisprudence.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
22.
The National Council of Justice and other appropriate bodies should take
measures to ensure that:
(a)
In making docket management decisions, judges do not put off dealing with
cases involving killings by powerful actors, including the police, or prioritize civil
above criminal cases;
(b)
Judges of penal execution conduct prison inspections pursuant to a written
protocol which requires private interviews with prisoners randomly selected by the
judge.
This recommendation has not been implemented.
21
A/HRC/14/24/Add.4
H.
Prisons
23.
While avoiding steps that would further endanger inmates, the Government
should take steps to end gang-control of prisons, including:
(a)
All practices that encourage or require new prison inmates to choose a gang
affiliation should be discontinued. Inmates should be able to identify as “neutral” and
be placed in truly neutral prisons;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(b)
Mobile phones should be eliminated from prisons through the more rigorous
use of metal detectors and through the installation of technology that blocks mobile
phone signals;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(c)
Prison authorities should reassert day-to-day control of internal prison
administration so that prison guards, not inmates, are responsible for internal
discipline;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(d)
All inmates’ benefits and location in the prison system should be recorded
electronically, and prisoners moved from one type of detention to another when they
are so entitled. Inmates and judges of penal execution should be able to access the
digital record of prisoner entitlements;
This recommendation has not been implemented.
(e)
Overcrowding should be reduced through more use of alternative sentences,
open prison regimes, and the construction of new prisons.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
24.
The Government should ensure that this report is disseminated widely to
officials at all levels. The federal Secretariat for Human Rights should take
responsibility for monitoring the progress of the implementation of these
recommendations.
This recommendation has been partially implemented.
22