2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered on a continuing basis over the
past several months the matter of the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC).
On those occasions in which this subject has been addressed directly (references
1a through 1d), the response has dealt with separate but related aspects
of the problem. In view of the bearing of this matter on other programs under
consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to state their views as to
the justification for a DUCC and as to the military requirement therefor.

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a DUCC as a military
command center cannot be justified and it is not recommended for inclusion
in the National Military Command System (NMCS) program for the following
reasons:

a. It would not, in their opinion, permit top military leaders to operate
as effectively as would be possible through use of other survival means.
Specifically, it would involve their operating without adequate staff or
support in a "buttoned-up" environment from which communications and egress
would be uncertain following a nuclear attack.

b. The adverse effect of the DUCC on the NMCS program, planned to establish
an effective and survivable system of command and control facilities, is
exemplified best when viewed in relation to the long-term aspects of the
program. The proposed funding for the Five-Year Program (FY 1965-69) indicates
that approximately $860 million may be committed to the NMCS. The cost estimate
for a 300-man DUCC is approximately $310 million which represents over 36
per cent of the total budget proposed for the NMCS. The $310 million basically
provides for only construction costs, and does not include in-house or entrance
communications equipment or operational support systems essential to the
realization of initial operational capability. If the DUCC were to be included
in the NMCS program, there are indications that it would absorb in future
years considerably more than 36 per cent of the total NMCS funds now programmed
for the NMCS, and, unless additional funds were provided, would thereby force
severe reductions in other NMCS programs, such as deferral of the First
Generation National Military Command Center, limitations in number and degree
of enhancement of the more desirable mobile alternate command centers, and
curtailment of communications and other support systems.

c. The weakest link in a hardened communications system is the antenna. In
view of limited progress to date in the design of hardened antennas, the
probability of survival of DUCC communications depends primarily on redundancy
of antennas. Various means of communications have been considered as possible
solutions to this problem. One such means particularly suited for use in
a DUCC installation is the substrata earth transmission of electromagnetic
waves. However, research on this project has not progressed to the point
where operational feasibility can be determined nor can reliable operational
use be predicted with any degree of confidence.

d. An examination of the functions to be performed by the National Command
Authorities, which include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicates that for
this decision group to operate within the isolated environment of a DUCC,
adequate space and facilities to house sufficient staff personnel and to
provide appropriate supporting data would require that the facility be
considerably larger in size and scope than the 300-man DUCC estimated to
cost $310 million. To meet the demands of nuclear war, it will be of vital
importance that a tremendous volume of actions be performed swiftly by trained
and experienced people.

e. An austere size (50-man) DUCC would be totally inadequate to accommodate
the decision element of the National Command Authorities together with minimum
essential staff support and housekeeping support. It is clearly evident that
a 50-man DUCC is essentially a survival facility. As a follow-on step, it
is highly probable that immediate expansion to a 300-man DUCC will be required
to provide a minimum national command facility. However, such an expanded
DUCC would be inadequate for military purposes.

4. A deep underground facility could be useful as an emergency shelter to
safeguard the President for continuity of government, provided escape and
survivable communications can be assured. The following factors are considered
germane to the issue:

a. It would be a facility affording improved protection to which the President
and a minimum number of selected advisors could rapidly relocate in times
of international tension.

b. The minimum amount of time would be lost during the relocation process,
and confusion, disruption of operations, and adverse public impact would
be minimized.

c. Studies indicate that a deep underground facility could be designed to
permit relocation within the time period now described as "tactical warning"
due to its ready accessibility to the President and selected advisors.

d. Escape and survivable communications from a DUCC would be problematical
in case of a direct attack on Washington with large-yield nuclear weapons.

5. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the DUCC would be
too small, and its communications too uncertain, to serve as a military command
center. They recommend against the allocation of resources to such a facility
at the expense of existing and currently planned elements of the NMCS. They
consider that it is a question for executive decision as to whether the DUCC
would be worth its cost as a safe shelter for the President and a minimum
number of selected advisors, from which he might or might not be able to
communicate in case of attack.

Harold Brown and I discussed the matter of the DUCC this morning. In view
of the problems between the Secretary and the
JCS,/2/ we agreed that the best way to handle
the matter was to create a limited interdepartmental committee to study the
problem from the point of view of the civilian top level of Government; and
at the same time suggest to the Secretary of Defense that he request the
Joint Chiefs to give their views on the nature of their relations with both
the President-Secretary of State-Secretary of Defense level and the CINCs
in a crisis situation toward the end of the sixties. The target date for
this is the 15th of March.

The purpose of this would be to get the Chiefs to deal explicitly with their
view of the relations between the top civilian level and the operational
commanders during the period of crisis, and make clear both their ideas of
what kinds of crisis situations they are thinking of and the amount and character
of communication they would expect in both directions from and on location.

The interdepartmental study group would try to answer four questions, against
the background of some likely scenarios of crisis in which a thermo-nuclear
war is either imminent or has actually begun.

A. What would the utility of the DUCC be in this situation in the late sixties?

B. How big would the facility have to be in terms of the number of people
it could hold to provide this utility?

C. Are there any unresolved technical problems which would have to be dealt
with to make the installation effective?

D. What would its relation be to the other elements of the National Military
Command System (NMCS)?

Harold and I think the committee should be chaired formally by you, and that
its members might be himself, Andy Goodpaster, Alex Johnson, Walt Rostow
and Ray Cline. Spurgeon and I would join to represent you on the committee,
and I could convene the meeting and act as Chairman in your absence. The
main staff of the committee who would be available for full-time work would
be furnished by Harold Brown's office. In addition, Jim Clark of BOB who
is knowledgeable on these problems, might serve on its staff.

E. Secretary McNamara might prefer to deal with this purely as an internal
problem within the Department of Defense. However, the arguments for the
other arrangement are convincing to Harold Brown and me. First, if there
is to be a fight with the Congress, the President himself must be convinced
of the need for the proposed facility, and this can best be done through
the participation of his own staff. Second, there is not within the Pentagon
the kind of experience that the White House-State-CIA are likely to have
that is requisite to a thorough examination of the issues. While nobody has
the relevant experience, the suggested group would come closer to having
a basis for speculation about it than any other we can think of.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
dated 21 August 1964, subject as above./2/

/2/Vance's August 21 memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff summarized
JCSM-446-64, "Proposed Deep Underground Command Center," May 25; went on
to express some views on the proposed center; and concluded by asking the
JCS to advise OSD of the "functions they believe the facility must be capable
of performing and the number of people they believe the facility must house
in order to perform those functions and to support the facility." Copies
of JCS-446-64 and Vance's August 21 memorandum are ibid.

2. Within the context of the reference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested
to advise the Secretary of Defense as regards what functions they believe
the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) should be capable of performing,
and the number of people they believe the facility must house in order to
perform these functions and to support the facility.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed
as an element of the National Military Command System (NMCS), it should be
capable of performing those functions which support the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in their role as principal military advisors to the President. If the President
and his civilian and military advisors are to relocate to the DUCC, the facility
must have the capability of performing the following pre-attack military
functions as they pertain to international crisis situations and general
nuclear war:

a. To maintain a minimum data base on the world-wide status of forces, Single
Integrated Operational Plan, and force generation levels to ensure that the
President will have adequate information to support a decision to authorize,
if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons.

b. To maintain a capability to receive from external sources pertinent
information on surveillance and analysis of the world situation, and
indicator/warning data and current intelligence; and to maintain minimum
facilities to conduct intelligence briefings on information and data received.

c. To provide an effective means of: (1) communications with the commanders
of the unified and specified commands; and (2) negotiations with allied and
foreign governments and the United Nations.

d. To receive, process, and use, as available and as necessary, information
from the National Military Command Center and existing Alternate Command
Centers and Command Posts of the NMCS and other government agencies.

e. To maintain a state of readiness, including a current data base, to translate
during the period of tactical warning from a standby condition to a fully
capable primary Command Center to the extent permitted by the facilities
provided, and prescribed by pertinent directives.

4. During the trans-attack and post-attack periods of a general nuclear war,
a DUCC may be required to operate independently with information received
directly from sources external to the Washington complex. In order to provide
for this contingency, the DUCC must have the capability, within the context
of a minimum facility, of performing the following functions in addition
to those specified in the above paragraphs:

a. To receive and display information on the military and political situation
in order to determine as quickly and accurately as possible the time, magnitude,
and objective of the attack.

b. To disseminate decisions, orders, and instructions as to the appropriate
action to be taken in response to an attack or threat of attack.

c. To communicate, by the surest and most effective means possible, with
the major elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.

5. Communications requirements vary considerably between critical international
crises and general war. A need exists for an extensive world-wide network
of reliable communications during crisis situations. After general war begins,
the emphasis would then switch to survivable communications among the major
command centers of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System primarily
for the strategic direction of the military forces. However, there would
remain a need for communications with the principal civil defense centers,
and for negotiations with the principal adversary. Therefore, it appears
that the functions of command communications would require that the DUCC
be equipped with communications which approximate the capability now planned
for the Alternate National Military Command Center.

6. It appears that the concept and capability reflected in the National Emergency
Airborne Command Post would represent the minimum capability required in
a DUCC to serve as an emergency command post for decision-making by the
President. It is envisioned that the decision group, which would relocate
to the DUCC, would comprise the National Command Authorities with a minimum
number of advisory personnel, and that they would remain in the DUCC in a
post-attack situation only until the National Command Authorities could be
relocated to a site from which the functions of government could more adequately
be discharged. Basically, however, advisory information would be provided
the DUCC by existing and surviving alternate command facilities equipped
with larger data bases. A minimum data base would be maintained in the DUCC
and staff support, to the extent feasible, would be provided to the decision
group.

7. The determination of the precise number of people the DUCC must house
in order to support the total mission of the facility, including the operation
of the national government in crisis situations as well as the conduct of
general nuclear war, would necessitate considerable liaison with the White
House, and other departments and agencies of the national government. However,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that approximately 50 military personnel
would be required to perform their part of the above functions in the manner
described in the preceding paragraph. The figure does not include personnel
for facility maintenance, communications, security, and housekeeping support
for which about 175 additional people can be identified at this time. Additional
functions and personnel possibly would be required to operate the national
government in accordance with the desires of the President, and to the extent
outlined in the reference. These latter requirements should be provided by
the appropriate Departments and Agencies concerned, in order that the composite
functional and personnel requirements, and hence the optimum size of the
facility, may be established.

2. Reference 1 a requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views
on a report, subject: "Department of Defense Command and Control Support
to the President."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in broad general agreement with the principles
and concepts developed in the study (see Appendix A hereto) and believe that
the study provides an excellent basis for furthering rapport and understanding
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and other governmental agencies concerned with planning for command and control
at the national level. The first assumption in the terms of reference states
that it is extremely unlikely that the President would leave the Washington
area during a crisis situation. It is noted that the study nevertheless advocates
the principle of multiplicity of centers for Presidential protection and
infers that the likelihood of Presidential relocation would significantly
increase as a crisis intensifies, even if the crisis is short of general
war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these points to be valid both prior
to and after construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC); however,
continued improvement of national command and control capabilities depends
on a better understanding between all principals of the conditions under
which the President might seek protection.

4. With regard to the alternate command centers of the National Military
Command System (NMCS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The study's recommendation prejudges the conclusions of a separate study
currently being undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the optimum
number of National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA) ships required for
the NMCS.

b. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) program, in which
one or more of three EC 135 aircraft are maintained on continuous ground
alert status, represents the minimum acceptable airborne command post posture.

c. There is firm need to assure, to the extent feasible, the survival of
the Presidency during any future conflicts; and the circumstances of a future
crisis or conflict may be such as to preclude the relocation of the President
to one of the existing alternate facilities. In this light, the proposed
DUCC represents a potentially effective means for assuring survival of the
Presidency to an extent not now provided by the NMCS.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Concur in the study's comments on the NEACP.

b. Agree in principle on the NECPA as an important element of the NMCS. In
this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently addressing the optimum
posture for the NECPA and upon completion will forward their recommendations.

c. Consider that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed, the study's detailed
concepts and principles regarding the DUCC generally provide a basis for
determination of detailed functional requirements, concept of operation,
and detailed design.

d. Are in general agreement with much of the detailed discussion in the body
of the report regarding the role of the Alternate National Military Command
Center (ANMCC). However, as indicated in Appendix B hereto, they do not feel
that the study recognizes that the ANMCC is fully as valuable as the other
alternates of the NMCS when its unique capabilities for supporting all levels
of crisis and war are considered. Moreover, they have previously noted that
it is essential to continue the ANMCC in its current role for the foreseeable
future.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The study be forwarded to the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the Office of Emergency Planning, the Department of State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency for comment regarding the principles
and concepts underlying those parts of the study particularly applicable
to their operations (see Appendix A).

b. They participate in any evaluation of the comments received by the Secretary
of Defense from other agencies and in the identification of subsequent steps
to clarify the conceptual approach to command and control.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/6/Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.

Appendix A

Based on their analysis, it is the interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that the following constitute the underlying principles and concepts
developed in the Study:

a. For all levels of crisis and war, the President needs utmost flexibility
in many aspects of crisis management including centers to be used, immediate
advisors, other staff elements to be informed, and options for military action.

b. In crises short of general war, the constitution of the Presidential advisory
staff support (support which is estimative analytical, and advisory) is highly
dependent upon the nature of the crisis. In contrast, capabilities for
information support (defined by the study to include watch, monitoring,
communications, decision implementation functions, and emergency action
procedures) of the President and his advisors must be developed insofar as
possible in advance of a crisis and can be developed more independently of
a particular type of crisis. Advisory staff support and information support,
although they must work closely together, can be somewhat separated both
functionally and organizationally.

c. During intense crises and general war, protection of the President as
an individual is as important or even more important than protection of the
Presidency through use of legal successors. Although Alternate Decision Groups
might be established and relocated, it is doubtful that the principals forming
the groups will be named before the crisis and it is doubtful that more than
one group will be formed./7/

/7/A handwritten note reads: "V.P.--I think 2 groups at least."

d. For crises less than general war, the President and his advisory group
do not need an elaborate, national command center permanently staffed by
representatives of several agencies; however, the direction of the Armed
Forces will be exercised through the National Military Command System (NMCS).

e. During an intense crisis, protection of the President depends on his seeking
protection prior to the onset of general war. He will only occupy a protected
center if he can manage the intense crisis as well as he could from the White
House Cabinet Room./8/ (For Washington level support
during the intense crisis, the Presidential advisors located with the President
will primarily depend on their soft centers and their staffs in Washington.)
For managing the general war, it would be highly desirable for the President
to be collocated with his general war advisory staff support and the related
information support. In light of these needs for both intense crises and
general war, the Alternate Command Centers of the NMCS and other centers
that the President might occupy must be capable of operating as national
(versus departmental) command centers.

/8/Next to this sentence is written: "True."

f. The basic missions of the alternate command centers of the NMCS have the
following priority:

(1) Support the President (located at the Center) during the intense crisis
and the strategic exchange phase of a general war.

(2) Support the President or an alternate decision group (located at the
Center) during the strategic exchange phase of general war.

(3) Locate the President after the onset of general war.

(4) After onset of general war, provide military information and advisory
staff support to the President or a legal successor located elsewhere.

(5) Protect information and advisory staff capability for the follow-on phase
of general war.

In assigning the above missions and priorities, the study concludes that
direction of the strategic exchange phase of a general war should be directly
from the Presidential location to the commanders of unified and specified
commands, their alternates, or successors.

g. Under a "no warning attack" at a time of international calm, only marginal
protection can be provided to the President or his designated successors.

h. An alternate command center should be evaluated with respect to the following
criteria: survivability, accessibility, endurance, staff support, communications
support, flexibility, and cost. The study heavily emphasizes survivability
and accessibility for individual centers and a multiplicity of centers of
comparable capability.

i. For the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the President and the
Presidential Group will be directly and primarily concerned with military
operations, civil defense, diplomacy and negotiations, and informing and
leading the public. The President can extensively delegate responsibility
for nonmilitary resource allocation, economic mobilization, and maintenance
of local law and order. Accordingly, during this phase, the advisory and
information support to the Presidential Group should be preponderantly military.

j. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) should provide information
support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, non-Department
of Defense officials, and their attendant advisory staffs. Under certain
circumstances, the NMCC will provide advisory support. The NMCC must have
the capability to "get information" from many sources (such as CINCs and
Service Headquarters) and should not attempt to store all possible information,
but only that essential for its primary mission, in its data base.

k. The NMCC and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising strategic
direction of the Armed Forces. They should also support the President and
his advisors in detailed monitoring and control of selected military actions
when such actions may have grave national significance. A system built to
satisfy only one of these roles will not necessarily be adequate for the
other.

Appendix B

With regard to the Fort Ritchie Complex and the Alternate National Military
Command Center (ANMCC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous
position that these facilities are essential to our command and control
capabilities in the foreseeable future. They concur with much of the analysis
relating to the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) and the ANMCC
and with many of the conclusions regarding their capabilities, functions,
and relationships within our over-all national command and control capabilities.
However, they are concerned that the study does not support these facilities
strongly enough. Specifically:

a. The value of the ANMCC as one possible relocation site for the President
or an alternate decision group is recognized (pages V-35, 36 and VI-36) but
its capabilities for the strategic exchange phase are equated to [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This conclusion seems contrary
to two principles in the study. First, survivability is stressed and the
ANMCC is significantly harder than [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. More important, the study stresses collocation of the
President and his principal advisors with their supporting military staff.
Such collocation could be achieved much more effectively at the ANMCC than
at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or Camp David.
The study correctly proposes a multiplicity of sites available for relocation.
If the individual sites for Presidential or alternate decision group relocation
are compared, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would rate the effectiveness of the
ANMCC as somewhere between that of a National Emergency Command Post Afloat
ship and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

b. There is not sufficient stress within the study on the potential value
of the ANMCC in supporting a decision group on board the National Emergency
Airborne Command Post during the strategic exchange phase after Washington
has been destroyed.

c. The study correctly recognizes the unique value of the ANMCC for the follow-on
phase of a general war. However, since the dividing line between the initial
and follow-on phases would be blurred at best, the study does not point out
the great advantage of conducting both of these phases from the same location.

d. The study implies that a functional and technical analysis of the ANMCC
would indicate potential savings. Such analyses are continuously taking place
and they may equally indicate that, if the principles and concepts in the
study are approved, additional investments in the AJCC would be warranted.

e. The report does not explicitly recommend continuation of a continuously
manned ANMCC. The summary paragraphs discussing the AJCC (pages VI-72 and
VII-10) are not consistent with the analyses and conclusions in the body
of the report. For example, they indicate that "the ANMCC is not suited to
use by the President or an alternate decision group during an intense crisis
or the initial stages of a general war." If the report is rewritten, the
body of the report should incorporate the above points and these summary
paragraphs should be made consistent.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department
of Defense, Command and Control Support to the President, Box 20. Top Secret.
The Introduction to the study indicates that it was prepared in response
to a February 27, 1964, memorandum by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance,
which is included at the end of the study as Annex A. The Introduction also
identifies Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chief of the Joint Command
and Control Requirements Group, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as chairman of the study; the other Defense members who prepared it; members
of an advisory group and working group; and consultants (pp. i-iii).

Washington, undated.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

[Here follow the Introduction and Chapters I-VI.]

Chapter VII

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

The President increasingly becomes the focal point of crisis management as
a crisis intensifies. He devotes more time to the crisis and considers selected
operations in greater detail. The President needs and operates with extreme
flexibility--flexibility in constituting his immediate decision group; in
defining alternate courses of action that must be considered; in determining,
to the extent feasible, the timing of the U.S. responses and therefore the
time allowable for staff inputs; flexibility in seeking detailed information
on selected military operations; in establishing and employing the organization
and operational command chain including reducing the number of echelons of
command; flexibility in determining the sensitivity of selected information
relating to the crisis; in communicating with allied, neutral and enemy heads
of state; and in establishing constraints or accepting risks in conducting
the crisis.

The President will select the Presidential Group that will assist
him in directing a given crisis. This has invariably been true in the past
and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue to be so in the future.
Since the Presidential Group will include personal advisors, and statutory
advisors and their subordinates, it will reflect military, political, diplomatic,
intelligence and other such interests that might be relevant to the crisis.
As a crisis develops, the composition of the Presidential Group will normally
grow and alter.

So far the U.S. has experienced only a very few of the infinite number of
crisis situations with which command and control support arrangements must
be prepared to cope. Crisis situations, far more intense than any yet
experienced, but nevertheless short of a large scale intercontinental nuclear
exchange, are possible. These should be given more consideration in the
development of U.S. command and control arrangements. For example, as indicated
below, consideration of intense crises can have a significant impact on plans
for presidential protection.

During a crisis the President and the Presidential Group will probably use
mission-oriented interagency groups to assist them in estimating the present
situation, and in developing and evaluating alternate courses of action.
These groups may be asked to consider broad or narrow aspects of the crisis.
The President and the Presidential Group expect that such support has melded
military, political, domestic and diplomatic factors. Accordingly, the
constitution of the Presidential Group and their need for staff support implies
the need for interagency staffing before estimates and advice are advanced
to the Presidential Group.

For severe crises, the composition and extent of the advisory staff support
to the President will be uniquely determined at the time of the crisis by
the nature of the crisis including such factors as timing, areas and
participants, scope of conflict, the opportunity and the need for secrecy,
escalatory potential, and diplomatic constraints. On the other hand, the
routine information support capabilities needed to support these individuals
are much more predictable. These capabilities include communications and
message distribution, provision of factual data on force status and plans,
routine staff support in implementing and promulgating decisions, conferencing
and display facilities, and the staff which operates and provides these
capabilities. Accordingly, it is desirable and feasible to separate conceptually
and organizationally the problem of providing the advisory staff support
from that of providing the routine information support. It is difficult to
improvise information support during a crisis and it is possible to anticipate
the requirements for this support before the crisis. The reverse is true
for staff advisory support.

Presidential councils are informal and consultative in nature. The President
receives his information support through his advisors and, accordingly, crisis
management would not be enhanced by establishment at the national level of
an elaborate "National Command Center" manned by a large, permanent interagency
staff.

Many avenues are available that would improve interagency effectiveness in
crisis anticipation and management. The following are recommended: increased
attention at all levels of the Joint Staff with crisis management, freer
interaction at all levels between members of the Joint Staff and their
counterparts in other agencies, greater interagency review of military and
political contingency plans, increased inter-agency participation in war
gaming and exercising, and increased attention within the Joint Staff on
nonmilitary factors affecting crisis anticipation and management.

Within the military establishment the concept of handling crises within command
posts or operations centers is well established. The NMCC is similar to,
but both narrower and broader in its scope than the conventional operations
center. It is narrower in that its support to decision makers is rendered
through the medium of their staff advisors, and ordinarily it does not itself
provide advisory staff support except when an emergency does not permit referral
to such advisors. It is broader in that the principal users of NMCC information
support are not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, but also
various elements of OSD and authorized persons in the White House, State
Department and CIA.

The NMCC performs the functions of (1) warning and alert, (2) information
support, and (3) implementation. Its principal suppliers of information to
the NMCC are the operating forces, the service operations centers, and the
DIA through the Intelligence Support and Indications Center.

The fundamental character of the NMCC is that of a DoD information support
facility operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the DoD as a whole. In
the performance of its functions the NMCC should exchange information freely
with analogous information centers elsewhere within the Government.

The management arrangements under which the NMCC operates should preserve
its close working relationship with the Directorate for Operations in the
Joint Staff and also should reflect its essentially informational character
and DoD-wide scope.

Future development of the NMCC should emphasize evolutionary improvement
as opposed to sweeping change. Such evolution will be helped by increased
efforts to evaluate NMCC performances both in actual crises and in exercises.
The establishment of suitable performance standards for the NMCC will also
be helpful in its development.

Exercises of a variety of types and scope are necessary not only for the
improvement of the NMCC but also to familiarize participating decision makers
with its facilities and with command problems. For some of these exercises,
senior members from all affected agencies and their staffs should participate.

At any stage of crisis or general nuclear war, enemy options range from a
deliberate heavy attack against national command centers to strenuously avoiding
these targets. In addition, there are a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable
events that could lead to nuclear strikes on Washington or to Washington
remaining completely undamaged. In providing for command and control support
to the President, all of these contingencies must be considered. In providing
survivability for the President, the worst cases must be planned for.

There are many factors militating against presidential relocation during
crises short of general war. However, if the enemy decides to escalate a
crisis to general war, he can easily destroy unprotected national centers
without the President's receiving tactical warning. If tactical warning of
an attack is received, it is not clear that the President's wisest course
would be to seek immediate protection. Accordingly, capabilities should be
provided for presidential protection in a highly survivable command center
during any phase of crisis. This center must allow the President and
the Presidential Group to manage intense crises short of general nuclear
war as well as these can be managed from the White House.

The unique value of the President required that all possible measures be
taken to insure his personal survival of an attack on the U.S. However, provision
for a successor is also necessary. Accordingly, capabilities should allow
relocation to a highly survivable center of an alternate Presidential Group
headed by a presidentially designated alternate Commander-in-Chief. The command
and control support for this alternate group could be much more austere than
those for a relocated President.

It is important to recognize the national-level character of those alternates
that might be used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group as contrasted
with the DoD-level role of the NMCC.

A DUCC in Washington would be the only facility that could adequately satisfy
the presidential needs for accessibility combined with survivability and
adequate staff support. However, since a DUCC cannot be operational for at
least five years, in the interim only the NECPA ship and a National Mobile
Land Command Post (NMLCP) come close to approximating the requirements of:
adequate staff support; high volume (not necessarily survivable) communications
between the alternate and soft Washington centers; continuous operation for
a period of days or weeks; and high survivability of the alternate itself.
The NEACP falls short of meeting the first three criteria: the ANMCC fails
on the last.

For the time period before a DUCC could be operational, the study developed
the following three different configurations of alternates ranging from most
austere to the most adequate:

a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships

b. Three NEACP aircraft, plus (a) above

c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat less than an NECPA, plus (b) above.

The Study recommends alternative (b) above. An NMLCP is not recommended unless
greater emphasis is placed on providing flexible capabilities for presidential
relocation during intense crises short of general war.

The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study that develops
plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECPA
element. This study should: i) detail the functional needs and criteria for
support of the Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic
exchange phase; ii) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving
the Northampton or obtaining a replacement hull; and, iii) consider
operating concepts with the current or new ships.

The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA and the NEACP should
be revised to provide for greater endurance, survivability and accessibility.
For the NECPA, this planning should include increased protection from various
forms of attack, larger and faster transportation capability between Washington
and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during crises.
For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial refueling, permanent
dispersal of the aircraft, capability for post-strike use of several bases
that have prelocated logistics and communications support, and plans for
locating the aircraft closer to Washington during severe crises.

Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is not suited to use
by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during an intense crisis
or the initial stages of a general war. The AJCC should be continued with
primarily the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site
in the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up to
Washington communications; and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day
operations and crises. A detailed functional and technical analysis of the
current and planned AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better
understanding of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each
of these functions. The study should indicate potential savings.

I have attached two JCS papers that you might like to scan. I have not heard
any more about the command system study since I spoke to you about it in
February.

JCSM 129/2/ indicates the Chiefs' general agreement
with the study with the exception that they felt it underrates the Alternate
Command Center at Fort Ritchie. At that time the Chiefs deferred judgment
on the Command Post Afloat.

/2/JCSM-129-65, February 26, "Conceptual Approach to the National Military
Command System"; not printed.

In the second paper, JCSM 364 (17 May),/3/ they
concluded that two command ships are essential, and that the capabilities
of the USS Northampton should be improved. The Chief of Naval Operations
disagreed, and argued that one ship was sufficient.

In the last analysis, the value of any command facility must be determined
to a great extent by the probability that the President will, in fact, make
use of that facility.

RCB/4/

/4/A typed note under Bowman's initials reads: "Please return." Bowman wrote
a note at the bottom of the page: "It is long overdue that we take a positive
hand in this & some other related command control matters. RCB"

The Department of Defense study, Command and Control Support to the
President, transmitted with your letter of March 6,
1965,/2/ contributes significantly to the development
of a comprehensive Executive Branch approach to crisis management. The
President's command and control support requirements are of obvious concern
to the Department of State and to me personally.

/2/For the conclusion of the study, see Document 86. The
letter of March 6 was not found.

I am of the personal view that much of the prevailing thinking about the
problems of conducting essential governmental processes after sustaining
a nuclear attack is inadequate and dated and fails to grapple realistically
with the formidable obstacles which would confront officials surviving such
an encounter. Of necessity, this basic reservation colors and qualifies some
of the comments which follow.

Many of the observations and recommendations contained in this study confirm
the validity of present State/Defense understandings and arrangements which
have enhanced the President's ability to give direction to politico-military
operations. I have in mind particularly the exchange of personnel between
our Operations Center and the National Military Command Center, the monitoring
by one department of the other's significant message traffic, and other machinery
for managing crisis situations at the Presidential level. Moreover, the study
emphasizes the value of such activities as the recently inaugurated
State-Defense-CIA cooperation in politico-military contingency planning and
in the development and conduct of major JCS exercises.

We also note that the current study reinforces the previously advanced
justification for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC).
The National Military Command System's Master Plan and the JCS
Continuity of Operations Plan/3/ contemplate
State Department representation in both the sea and airborne alternates,
as well as the ANMCC. We will give further study to operational concepts
and physical arrangements applicable to State Department functions both at
and in support of such command posts.

/3/Neither further identified.

Under its terms of reference, the DOD study group was instructed to state
projections of Presidential support obtainable from non-DOD sources in "general
terms" only. We concur in the view that a Presidentially directed response
to varying crisis levels, up to and including general war, requires the
marshalling of a wider range of governmental resources than those of the
Department of Defense. Hence we believe that there is a need to explore more
specifically the conceptual requirements for non-DOD command and control
support to the President which will supplement the analysis of Department
of Defense support developed by the DOD study group. Initially, such an
undertaking would appear to call for a careful stock-taking by other key
agencies of their own responsibilities and capabilities in this field. The
Department of State, accordingly, will initiate a study along these lines
at an early date. We hope such a study will contribute to government-wide
understanding of the components of a total "national command" concept.

We shall be giving study to improving our own Command and Control System
in the days ahead. Undoubtedly this work will include consultations between
our respective Departments and joint consideration of pertinent materials,
including the present study. If this exercise results in additional suggestions
or proposals which might be worth your consideration in connection with review
of command and control procedures, we will be in communication with you.

2. (S) The references provide the concept and plans to insure the survivability
of a command and control system and the necessary staff personnel to support
the National Command Authorities (NCA) in the strategic direction of US military
forces throughout the entire spectrum of cold, limited, and general war.
Currently, there is no adequate plan to insure the survivability of the NCA
or their authorized successors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a
credible policy of controlled response requires that such a plan be prepared.
Therefore, the plan outlined herein is submitted for your consideration and
recommendation to the President.

3. (S) As reflected in reference 1c, present continuity planning by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff provides the necessary flexibility to adapt to whatever
relocation action the President may select in an emergency. However, there
is no assurance that such relocation action will be initiated in sufficient
time nor, if initiated in time, that it would ensure survival of the present
NCA. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a plan should be developed
to disperse designated successors to the NCA to existing facilities of the
National Military Command System (NMCS) in the following manner:

a. Based on the established line of succession to the individual offices
comprising the NCA, the following three groups of alternate NCA should be
designated:

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. The proposed alternate command groups have been kept small to improve
their mobility. However, provision would be made for one or two individuals
to accompany each member of the groups, if desired. For example, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense has not been included in any of the groups in this concept
in the event you desire that he accompany you.

c. According to the situation and Presidential desire, the groups of alternate
NCA would relocate during a crisis escalation, one to each of the three alternate
command centers of the NMCS. Command center communications would permit
participation of the relocated groups in national deliberations.

[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that specific procedures should
be established to execute this plan as a means of preventing all legal successors
to the NCA, and their key advisors, from becoming casualties at the same
time. Timely dispersal of designated persons in line of succession to the
NCA to the alternate command centers of the NMCS is believed to be the best
method for assuring that recognized NCA are available for direction of military
operations. The persons designated by law as successors to the NCA should
be briefed on the plan and made familiar with its procedures.

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum substantially
the same as that contained in the Appendix
hereto,/4/ which advocates the development of
such a plan, be forwarded to the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

Despite initial opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during 1964 and
1965 the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense proceeded to develop
plans for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) in
the Washington, D.C., area and continued to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for their views. Regarding this internal debate and the evolving plans on
this issue, see Documents 3, 4,
52, 77, and 92.

The Department of Defense also promoted this project in Congress, and included
funds for further research on the specific size, operations, and functions
and for its construction in the Army's portion of the military construction
authorization bills in early 1964. Aware of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
reservations and believing the issues were too complex and sensitive, the
House Armed Services Committee did not approve funds for the Deep Underground
Command Center but instead created a special subcommittee to study the issue
thoroughly. (Memorandum from Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Eugene G. Fubini to Deputy Secretary Vance, February 25, 1964; Washington
National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 64)
1963 and 64 Papers) The appropriations for FY 1965 as enacted by the Congress
did not include funds for construction or research for this facility, and
the chairmen of key Congressional committees also rejected the Department
of Defense proposal to use other authorized funds for feasibility studies.
(Letters from Vance to Representative George H. Mahon, September 30, 1964,
and to Senator Carl Vinson, October 1, 1964; letter from Vinson to Vance,
October 1, 1964; letter from Mahon to Vance, October 6, 1964; and letter
from Senator Carl Hayden to McNamara, October 9, 1964; all ibid.)

The Department of Defense deferred action temporarily (letter from Vance
to Vinson, October 9; ibid.) but continued to study the cost and configuration
of the proposed facility. In early 1965, for instance, the Office of the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering made tentative recommendations
for possible sites. (Memorandum from James M. Bridges, Special Assistant
(Command and Control), to Harold Brown, March 4, 1965; ibid., 381 1966) A
large map of the Washington, D.C., area outlining proposed layouts for the
DUCC, and a table comparing tunnel length for two DUCC configurations are
attached to a March 8 memorandum to Brown. (Ibid.)

The House Armed Services Committee reduced the Defense Department's FY 1966
request for $26.2 million for the DUCC to $6 million, which would permit
the Pentagon "to more fully develop plans and to again present the actual
construction authorization request" next year. (Letter from Congressman L.
Mendel Rivers to McNamara, May 25; ibid.; FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10
Jan 66) 1965 & 1966 Papers)

In its response, the Department of Defense informed the House Committee that
it proposed, among other things, to dig one shaft to "advance both the design
and construction time and permit research and development efforts associated
with the rock properties at the site to proceed concurrently. This would
permit us to obtain early verification of our current estimates of subsurface
rock conditions (based on preliminary test drillings) which have a direct
bearing upon the cost and technical problems associated with the major
construction of entrance and exit tunnels and the main underground facility."
(Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Paul R. Ignatius to Rivers, June 14; ibid.)

Nevertheless, the Department of Defense's interest in the project gradually
waned. When, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to obtain, among
other things, the President's views "as to the nonmilitary functional and
personnel requirements of those departments and agencies of the National
Government" to be provided for in the DUCC, they were much later informed
that no response would be made to their proposal. (JCSM-985-64 to Secretary
McNamara, November 27, 1964, and memorandum from Maurice W. Roche to the
JCS, August 10, 1965; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 1966)

Moreover, Congress authorized only $4 million for this project in FY 1966,
and letters from four Committee Chairmen told the Defense Department "not
to go ahead with any designs without Congressional approval." (Memorandum
from Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert N. Anthony to McNamara, February
16, 1966; ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 66) 1965 & 1966
Papers) Although McNamara had earlier approved an FY 1967 request to Congress
for $21,898,000 for the DUCC, he expressed "doubt that we should proceed
to spend $4 million until after Congress acts on '67" (handwritten note to
Ignatius, February 18, on Anthony's February 16 memorandum), and he shortly
decided not to seek Congressional clearance for continued planning for the
DUCC project and agreed to divert the Army specialists engaged on the DUCC
to other military construction projects. (Handwritten notation, March 3,
on Ignatius' memorandum to McNamara, February 25; ibid.)

Congress again failed to provide funding for the Deep Underground Command
Center in the Department of Defense budget for FY 1966, but Vance agreed
to ask the Congress to authorize FY 1967 funds for early initiation of work
on the facility. (Memorandum from Ignatius to Vance, April 15, and unsigned
April 15 note from Vance's office to Ignatius; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662,
381 1966) Nothing seemed to come of this initiative, however, and no later
documentation on the Deep Underground Command Center has been found.