Logic

Many of Trump’s defenders have tried to demonize
key witnesses in the impeachment hearings.
Demonizing is a rhetorical strategy that aims at casting the target as
evil, corrupt, dangerous or threatening. Demonizing can also be used to fuel or
intensify other fallacies. My aim is to provide a discussion of demonizing to
help people recognize and, I hope, exorcise it.

By its very nature demonization is a deceitful
strategy—one does not need to demonize those who are evil. The level of
deception used to demonize does vary considerably. The least dishonest approach
is selective demonizing. This method involves making true negative claims but
is a dishonest strategy because it involves cherry picking negative aspects of
a person or group and emphasizing them without context. For example, if a
person is killed by the police those trying to defend the officer might assert
that the person “was no angel” and focus intently on, for example, the fact
they were once arrested for possession of marijuana. As another example, those
trying to demonize a corporation might focus on one bad thing the company did. Selective
demonizing grants its user the advantage of being able to claim that what they
are saying is true—although they are engaged in deception by omission.

The problem with selective demonizing is that it
ignores the full story of the person or group in favor of focusing on the
negative, which is unfair. To use an analogy, it would be like a teacher
selecting only your worst grades to determine your grade in a course. It is
certainly fair to consider the negative aspects of a person or group, but they
must be taken in context. The defense against selective demonizing is to
consider the broader context.

Hyperbolic demonization involves a greater level
of deceit than selective demonization, but still has some connection to truth.
This is because it involves hyperbole, which is an extravagant overstatement or
exaggeration. Hyperbole differs from an outright lie in that it does have a
foundation in truth—but the house built on that foundation is a lie. This
allows those using it to claim that what they are saying has some basis in
fact. The problem is, obviously, that what they are saying is not true. For
example, a person trying to demonize migrants might take the true claim that
some migrants commit crimes and explode that into a hyperbolic demonization
about how masses of migrants are coming to the United States to rape and
murder. The defense against hyperbolic demonization is to learn the facts and
resist being manipulated by the exaggeration.

Fictional demonization involves simply making up
negative claims about a person or group. This is sometimes done more subtly
with innuendo (a rhetorical device in which one suggests or implies something
deprecatory) or by using a weasler (a rhetorical device in which one protects a
claim by weakening it). For example, defenders of Trump tried to suggest that
Lieutenant Colonel might be disloyal to the United States—perhaps even a spy or
traitor. In other cases, the demonizing involves directly making false extreme
negative claims about a person or group. For example, someone might demonize
minorities by claiming that they are engaged in a white genocide. The defense against fictional demonization is
being critical of claims and only accepting them when they are backed by
credible evidence—especially in cases involving strong emotional appeals.

While demonization is psychological effective, it
has no logical weight. Also, by definition, it involves deception: selected
truths, exaggeration or outright lies. As such, it is wise to be wary of
demonization. There is also the moral
concern that demonization is typically employed in the service of evil ends.
After all, the good do not need to demonize the evil. In the upcoming essays I
will look at some fallacies associated with demonization.

After the White House released a damning transcript
of Trump’s conversation with the leader of Ukraine and Trump and his fellows
essentially confessed on television to their misdeeds, Trump’s defenders
continue to rally around him. A key part of his early defense was claiming the
whistle blower did not directly hear the conversation, therefore their
assertions are but hearsay. This defense has been torpedoed as first-hand
witnesses have begun testifying. One of these is Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Vindman.

Given what the transcript already reveals, it is
hardly surprising that Vindman’s testimony would be damaging to Trump. In
response, Trump’s defenders have rushed to discredit Vindman. Addressing the
credibility of a witness is a legitimate tactic, provided that the assessment
is on relevant grounds. These include such factors as the witness’ knowledge
and objectivity. In the case of Vindman, his expertise is not in question, so
the focus is on his objectivity.

It is at this point that a Two Sides Problem
arises. Trump’s defenders are one side, his foes on the other side. In this
situation, the manifestation of the problem is that Trump’s side is concerned with
winning; that is defending Trump regardless of what he has done. These
defenders will certainly paint their opponents with the same brush, seeing them
as concerned only with defeating Trump by any means necessary.

When people focus solely on winning, they are not following
on any principle beyond victory for their side. Because of this, they are often
willing to use whatever means will help them achieve this goal. Considerations
of truth, morality, and justice often seem to have no weight. People caught up
in this Two Sides situation also accept claims offered by their side and reject
those presented by the other side simply because of their origin rather than
their merit.

Naturally,
a utilitarian moral argument could be used to try to justify this approach—the
good generated by the Trump presidency warrants all means to keep him in
office. Or the evil generated by the Trump presidency warrants any means to
remove him from office.

It is worth noting that to simply assume that
because there are two sides that both must automatically fall into this Two Sides
trap would be an error. People can resist the psychological and pragmatic
appeal of sticking to their side in the face of the truth and goodness. Also, it
would be an error to infer that because there are two sides with a stake in the
matter, that they must be equally bad or in error. One side can be better, although
both could be bad.

In this case, Trump’s defenders seem to be the
worse side—the facts, law and morality are against them. Naturally, a clever
Trump defender will assert that I must be a victim of the Two Sides problem and
infer that I am therefore wrong. This logic would look like this:

Premise 1. Person A says X.

Premise 2. Person A is on the other side (not mine).

Conclusion: X is false.

This is simply a variant of an ad hominem and thus
a fallacy. What would be needed is more than pointing out I am on the non-Trump
side; evidence is needed to show that I am wrong.

While Duffy is correct that many Americans with
foreign heritage have an affinity for these countries, it is quite a leap from
that to the notion that most would prioritize these countries over the United
States. If Duffy were right that Americans with foreign heritage (which would
include Trump’s wife and children) should be regarded as likely traitors, then
it would follow that nearly all Americans are likely to be traitors. To his
credit, Duffy seemed to be making that very point about himself.

Accepting that America is a nation of traitors
seems to be a high price to pay to discredit Vindman. But when victory for
one’s side is all that matters, there seem to be few limits on the means
employed. Fortunately, Duffy is relying on an inductive generalization from a
sample of one (himself) to make this point. Since the strength of an inductive
generalization depends on the size and representativeness of the sample,
Duffy’s argument here is extremely weak. Even if he harbors treasonous thoughts
in favor of Ireland over the United States, it hardly follows that others do.

Duffy could also be seen as making an argument by
analogy. He seemed to be asserting that he would pick Ireland over the United
States because of his Irish heritage and inferring from this that Vindman would
do the same for his country of origin. Being an argument by analogy, this would
be assessed in terms of the similarity between the two men. Vindman is a
Lieutenant Colonel who received a Purple Heart in combat and has served his
country well. Duffy’s claim to fame is his time served on MTV’s The Real
World and Real World/Road Rules Challenge. As such, the two men are
not that alike, and it would be a poor argument to draw an inference about
Vindman’s loyalty to America from Duffy’s apparent profession of a lack of
loyalty.

It must be noted that it is legitimate to consider
the objectivity of a witness. If there was actual evidence that Vindman was
biased or had dual loyalty, then this would undermine his credibility. But the
attacks against him simply assert that because he has a foreign origin, he must
be biased or have a dual loyalty. As noted above, this attack would discredit
almost all Americans if it worked. As such, until evidence that specifically
shows that Vindman is biased or has dual loyalty, then these attacks are
baseless.

These attacks against Vindman show how those
trapped in the Two Sides Problem can quickly cast those they present as heroes
as villains whenever the need suits them—that is, when they believe doing so
will help their side win. Republicans and Trump are happy to exploit the troops
and rush to use them for political purposes (such as in Trump’s attacks on Colin
Kaepernick), but when a soldier shows true patriotism by doing what is right
and putting country over Trump, then Trump and many Republicans rush to cast
him as a villain.

Like this:

Humans have a natural tendency to divide each other
into “us” and “them”, which provides the foundation for the two sides problems.
If one side has a power advantage over the other and elects not to be overly
constrained by law or morality, this can be very bad for the weaker side. Paradigm
examples include American slave owners and their slaves, Nazis and their
victims, and Stalinists and their victims. If the two sides are roughly equal in power
and are willing to abide by certain limits, this division can provide benefits
to both—or at least to the elites of each group.

When people are divided into us and them, the
usual course is for the us group to see itself as good and superior to the them
group. This helps cement group identity and serves various psychological needs.
In times of identity stress or fear, people in the us group quickly accept the
demonization of the them group.

The American political system is a Two Sides
system of the more equal sort and one of increasing demonization. While the
Republicans have gained the upper hand in many states through being better at
gerrymandering and voter suppression than the Democrats, the two parties are
still roughly on par. While this does have some negative consequences for the
party elites, it also confers many important advantages. On the minus side, a
politician from one party is unlikely to win over voters from the other party,
unless they can create another us-them paradigm. This is something Trump managed
to do. While doing this initially caused some splits in the Republican party,
most Republicans quickly accepted the situation and Trump’s embrace. As such, almost
all Republicans are on Trump’s side. On the positive side, the us-them
situation means that the party elite can use the various cognitive biases,
rhetorical devices and fallacies that are fueled by the Two Sides Problems.
Another advantage is that the party elite can expect that their misdeeds will often
be defended by fellow party members—even when these misdeeds are a clear
violation of professed principles. This is because group identity and political
advantage are accepted as more important than almost any professed principle—although
some people do have limits even within the upper reaches of the parties.

One unfortunate consequence of this aspect of the
Two Sides Problems is that an American elite can commit misdeeds that damage
the norms of the country and still count on their fellows to defend them. One
excellent example of this occurred when NPR’s
Lulu Garcia-Navarro interviewed Indiana Rep. Jim Banks about Trump’s decision
to pull U.S. troops out of northern Syria. In a rare break with Trump, some
Republicans were quite critical of his action. This is, in part, because Trump’s
base tends to not care about foreign policy, but it is also a case in which
Democrats and Republicans form an us group against another them group.

Prior to the interview it had been announced that
Trump would be committing a crime and violating the emoluments clause by
hosting the G-7 at one of his Florida resorts. Garcia-Navarro asked:

When we look at something like this – the president’s resort –
for many people, it speaks to sort of a larger issue with this president about
him blowing through every acceptable norm of behavior. And so I wonder for you,
what happens when you want to object to something a Democratic leader does
someday? Don’t you worry that this sets a precedent that will make that very
difficult?

Banks replied, as politicians
are wont to, by using a Red Herring. He switched the issue and avoided the questions:
“Again, the president decided to retreat from the position of holding it at his
property. And I appreciate that the president made that decision. Whether that
sets any norm moving forward, it shows that the president is taking the advice
of his advisers to do so. And I appreciate that type of leadership.”
Garcia-Navarro’s question about Trump’s plan to profit from the G-7 and inquiry
about future consequences shifted Banks back into the two sides mode involving
Republicans and Democrats rather than the two sides of Americans and foreign
foes.

Garcia-Navarro raises excellent
questions that should be asked whenever Democrats or Republicans refuse to act
against one of their own party members when they are clearly doing wrong. This
matter splits into a logical part, a practical part, and a moral part. I will
address the practical part because that is the easiest.

Obviously enough if a
Democratic president commits misdeeds in the future, then the Republicans will rush
to criticize them—even if they rolled over like chubby puppies when Trump did
the exact same thing. This is because doing so will be advantageous—it will
hurt the Democrats and they know that only a few people, like NPR reporters and
philosopher professors, care at all about consistency. If anyone brings up how
they rolled over for Trump, they will deny it—and then John Oliver will do a
show juxtaposing Republican chubby puppies for Trump turning into rabid pit
bulls when President Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez pushes to hold the G-7 at her
vegan-hipster coffee bar (co-owned with vice-president Corey Booker). The
simple matter is the political elite and their followers do not really care
about principles; it is all about their side winning and the other side losing.
Witness how the Republicans were so focused on the deficit and the Constitution
when Obama was president; now they are happy to hemorrhage money and rarely
talk about the Constitution.

From a logical standpoint,
the way the Republicans roll over like chubby puppies for Trump has no bearing
on the merit of future criticisms they might advance against President Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to an ad hominem
fallacy. So, suppose that a chubby puppy
Republican goes full pit bull when President Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez tries to
hold the G-7 at that vegan hipster coffee bar. They would be right that she
would be in the wrong—even though they refused to criticize Trump on this
matter. Their past actions and words have no bearing on the truth (or falsity)
of his future criticisms of President Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.

From a moral standpoint,
Garcia-Navarro is right to be concerned that tolerating bad behavior because
your side is doing it will erode norms and prove harmful for the country. While
the Republicans will certainly go back to their righteous stances when a Democrat
is in office, their past tolerance of misdeeds will rob them of the moral authority
to criticize Democrats. Democrats will be able to point, correctly, to Republican
moral inconsistency and hypocrisy. While this will not impact the truth of Republican
claims, they will be devoid of moral authority—they will be seen, rightly, as hypocrites
who pretend to play at virtue when doing so is convenient. They will be the
opposite of the boy who cried wolf; they said nothing too many times.

Democrats will, of course,
tend to defend their fellows when they commit such misdeeds and they can engage
in their own fallacious reasoning by dismissing Republican criticism because
the Republicans defended Trump in his misdeeds. And with each cycle it will get
worse—whoever is in power can say that the other side has no moral authority to
be critical now since they tolerated such misdeeds when it was their guy.

The Soviets might not have invented Whataboutism,
but they effectively weaponized it. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians
continued to use it effectively. Like other Russian tools, it has now become
entrenched in American political discourse. While anyone can use it, it is a
favorite of Fox News and Donald Trump. While Whataboutism has many forms, the
most common versions used in the defense of Trump has the following general
form.

1. Premise 1: Person A of affiliation 1 is accused
of X by person B of Affiliation 2.

This is a fallacy because whether C did X is
irrelevant to whether or not it is true that A did X. One example of this is when Trump and his
defenders bring up the alleged misdeeds of Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton. The specific
flawed logic can be seen as concluding that Trump did not do anything, because “what
about Hillary’s emails?”

Alternatively, one could grudgingly admit that Trump
did something that might seem wrong, then use Whataboutism to try to “prove”
that it is not wrong:

1. Premise 1: Person A of affiliation 1 is accused
of X by person B of Affiliation 2.

Clearly, even if C did X it does not follow that A
doing X was not wrong. As noted above, Trump and his defenders try to defend Trump
by asserting that Democrats, especially Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, have
done bad things. As a specific example, when pressed about Trump trying to
exploit his office for personal gain, his defenders will say “what about Joe
Biden?” and conclude that Trump did not do anything wrong. But this does not
prove that—even if Joe and Hillary did terrible things, this does not prove
that Trump did nothing wrong.

It must be noted that if two sides are being compared,
it is obviously relevant to consider the flaws of both sides. For example, if
the issue is whether to vote for candidate A or B, then it is reasonable to
consider the flaws of both A and B in comparison. So, if Biden is up against
Trump in 2020, one should consider the flaws of both men.

However,
the flaws of Biden do not show that Trump does not have flaws and vice versa.
Also, if the issue being discussed is the bad action of Trump, then bringing up
Biden’s allegedly bad action does nothing to mitigate the badness of Trump’s
action. Unfortunately, Whataboutism is quite effective from a psychological
standpoint, despite being logically vacuous. One reason for this is a general
problem I have been considering which I call, for obvious reasons, the Two
Sides Problem.

Put in broad terms, the Two Sides Problem is that
the psychological impact of having two sides with strong emotional influence on
their members has a huge impact on people’s willingness to accept empty rhetoric
and fallacies that favor their side and harm the other side. As would be
expected, this impact is routinely exploited, thus making the problem worse. While
the Two Sides impact does affect all fallacies, it can throw gasoline on the
illogical fires of many of them. Whataboutism is, quite obviously, one of
these.

As noted above, Whataboutism is about defending
one’s side by pointing out (or making up) bad things about the other side. This
bad reasoning is powered by the target’s positive view of their side and their
dislike of the other side. The most obvious effect is that a target accepts a
fallacy as good reasoning because of how they feel about the sides. Another effect
is that Whataboutism can cause an erosion of principle: For a person to defend
bad behavior by “justifying” it with Whataboutisms (or other fallacies) they must
be willing to tolerate that bad behavior on the part of their side. If a person
has a principle that they stick to consistently, they would condemn bad behavior
regardless of whether it was done by their side or the other side. For example,
I condemn Trump’s children for cashing in on the family name to secure
underserved positions and I condemn Hunter Biden for cashing in on the family
name to secure a job he had not earned. I will not defend Hunter Biden by
saying “what about the Trump children?” I will be writing more about the two
sides problem in the future, but the series on Trump’s tyranny is concluded.

As this was being written, it was announced that
the G-7 summit would be held at Trump’s
Miami golf resort. Once again, his defenders have been tasked with
explaining why this obvious exploitation of his office and clear violation of
the emoluments clause is actually perfectly normal and fine. This adds yet another
example in support of the claim that Trump is a tyrant. Trump will simply
enrich himself and his family at the expense of the public while providing
nothing for the public good. This is a clear case of tyrannical behavior. Now
back to the discussion of fallacious responses to the argument by definition
that Trump is a tyrant.

Since the Red Herring fallacy is so common, it is
no surprise that Trump’s defenders press it into service. A Red Herring is a
fallacy in which an irrelevant topic is presented in order to divert attention
from the original issue. The basic idea is to “win” an argument by leading
attention away from the argument and to another topic. This sort of “reasoning”
has the following form:

1. Topic A is under discussion.

2. Topic B is introduced under the guise of being relevant to
topic A (when topic B is not relevant to topic A).

3. Topic A is abandoned.

This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because
merely changing the topic of discussion hardly counts as an argument against a
claim. This fallacy is often used in conjunction with the similar Two Bad
fallacy. This fallacy has the following form:

1. Premises 1: A has done X, which is bad.

2. Premise
2: A (or a defender of A) points out that B has also done X.

3. Conclusion: A doing X was not bad.

This reasoning is fallacious because the fact that
someone else has done the same thing does not make it not bad. This fallacy is like
Two Wrongs; in Two Wrongs the “reasoning” is that something wrong is not wrong
if someone else would or has done it to you. The difference is that this
fallacy does not require that the other person would or has done the action to
you. It is also somewhat like Common Practice, which justifies something by
asserting it is commonly done. The difference is that Two Bad does not involve
saying that the practice is common, just that someone else did it as well.

So, how do Trump and Trump’s defenders use these
fallacies to try to defend Trump? To illustrate, I will use the famous Obama
Netflix example. Trump is understandably enraged at the Mueller Report—it details
his many crimes and misdeeds while carefully asserting that a sitting president
cannot be indicted. While the report had but little impact beyond enraging
Trump, he has endeavored to distract attention from it to someone else—specifically
he has called for an investigation
of President Obama for his book deal and Netflix deal. Looked at as a Red
Herring, this is simply an effort to switch the subject from Trump’s massive
self-enriching corruption to Obama’s profiting from his time in office.

While it is true that Obama has profited nicely
from the book deal and will presumably profit from his Netflix deal, these are
irrelevant to the issue of whether Trump is engaged in corruptly enriching himself.
Trump’s approach can also be seen as a False Equivalence as well: while Obama is
profiting from his book deal and will profit from the Netflix deal, both of
these are legal and within the moral norms (Bush also signed a book deal). More
importantly, while Obama is profiting from being president, he is doing so
while he is no longer in office. While there are moral concerns with exploiting
past office in this manner, these concerns pale in comparison with corruption
while in office. Hence, this is just another attempt at a False Equivalency.

Trump and his defenders can also be seen as
attempting a Two Bad here as well; by pointing to Obama’s deals, Trump can try
to assert that his financial exploitation of the office for his and his family’s
enrichment is not bad. His “logic” would be that his deals are not bad because
Obama also did deals that were bad. Even if Obama’s deals were morally wrong,
it would obviously not follow that Trump’s corruption is not bad. As such,
trying to defend Trump against a charge of tyranny by asserting that other
people do bad things as well would commit either a Red Herring or a Two Bad (or
both). Thus, this defense has no logical merit. This is not to deny that other
people do bad things or assert that there is nothing wrong with people
exploiting their office after they leave—but those are utterly different
matters.

As this is being written, the House has started its
impeachment investigation of President Trump. While this is a matter of great
importance, there is also an interesting question about Trump’s moral and political
legitimacy. From a Lockean perspective, this is largely the question of whether
Trump is a tyrant. A rather reasonable way to address this issue is to make use
of an argument by definition.

This method of argumentation involves argue that a
thing belongs to a general class because it fits the definition for that class.
The goal of this method is to show that the thing in question adequately meets
the definition. This method can be used to argue that Trump is a tyrant by
showing he meets the conditions set by the definition of the term. Alternatively,
it can be argued that he is not a tyrant.

The method involves the following steps:

Step 1: Present definition D.

Step 2: Describe the relevant qualities of
X.

Step 3: Show how X meets (or fails to meet)
definition D.

Step 4: Conclude that X belongs within that class (or
does not belong within that class).

Since dictionaries conveniently provide a plethora
of definitions it is tempting to use them as the basis for an argument from
definition. However, such arguments tend to be rather weak when addressing
matters of substantive dispute. For example, referring to the dictionary cannot
resolve the debate over what it is to be a person. As another example, looking up “God” in the
dictionary will not settle the questions of God’s nature or existence. This is
because dictionaries just provide the definition that the editors regard as the
correct, acceptable, or as the generally used definition as opposed to what
would be the correct, philosophical definition of such a metaphysical concept.
Dictionaries also generally do not back up their definitions with arguments-the
definitions are simply provided and are not actually defended.

Dictionaries are very useful in terms of learning
the meanings of words. But they are not the way by which substantial conceptual
disputes can be settled. Naturally, an appeal to the dictionary could be taken
as an argument from authority based on the expertise of those involved in the
dictionary. Because of this, arguing about substantial matters requires crafting
or locating a good definition outside of the dictionary. In the case of
tyranny, a good place to look is in the works of great political thinkers like
John Locke. Once a definition has been crafted or located, there is the matter
of determining whether it is good.

When making an argument from definition it is
important to begin with a good definition. In some cases, providing such a
definition will involve settling a conceptual dispute. Resolving such a dispute
involves, in part, showing that the definition of the concept being presented
is superior to the competition and that it is at least an adequate definition.

An acceptable definition must be clear, plausible,
and internally consistent. It must also either be in correspondence with our
intuitions or be supported by arguments that show our intuitions are mistaken
in this matter. Of course, people differ in their intuitions about meanings so
this can be somewhat problematic. When in doubt about whether a definition is
intuitively plausible or not, it is preferable to argue in support of the
definition. A definition that fails to meet these conditions is defective.

An acceptable definition must avoid being
circular, being too narrow, being too broad or being too vague. Definitions
that fail to avoid these problems are defective.

A circular definition merely restates the term
being defined and thus provides no progress in the understanding of the term.
For example, defining “tyrant” as “someone who engages in tyranny” would be
circular. Definitions also go bad by being two narrow or too broad.

A definition that is too narrow is one that
excludes things that should be included-it leaves out too much. For example,
defining “tyrant” as “a ruler who oppresses their people with military force”
would be too narrow since there can be tyrants who do not use the military
against the own people—or even have control over a military.

A definition that is too broad is one that
includes things that should not be included—It allows for the term to cover too
much. For example, defining “tyrant” as “an authority who act in their own
self-interest while in office” would be too broad. This would make any authority
who, for example, sought to get re-elected by doing a good job a tyrant.

While it might seem odd, a definition can be too
broad and too narrow at the same time. For example, defining “tyrant” as “an
elected official who acts in their own self-interest” would leave out unelected
tyrants while including officials who try to get re-elected by doing a good job
in office.

Definitions can also be too vague. A vague
definition is one that is not precise enough for the task at hand. Not
surprisingly, vague definitions will also tend to be too broad since their
vagueness will generally allow in too many things that do not really belong.
For example, defining “tyrant” as “a bad ruler” would be vague and also too
broad.

In a controversial matter, such as whether Trump
is a tyrant, there is bound to be considerable debate about what it is to be a
tyrant. Any definition I present is likely to be challenged—which is perfectly
reasonable. However, there are certain standards for responding to an argument by
definition.

One way is to directly attack the definition used
in the argument. This is done by showing how the definition used fails to meet
one or more of the standards of a good definition. Obviously, since the
argument rests on the definition, then if the definition is defective so too
will be the argument.

A second option is to attack X (the thing that is
claimed to fit or not fit the definition).
This is done by arguing that X does not actually meet the definition. If
this can be done, the argument would fail because X would not belong in the
claimed category.

An argument by definition can also be countered by
presenting an alternative definition. This is using another argument of the same
type against the original. If the new definition is superior, then the old
definition should be rejected and hence the argument would presumably fail. The
quality of the definitions is compared using the standards above and the
initial definition is attacked on the grounds that it is inferior to the
counter definition. In the next essay I
will present Locke’s definition of “tyranny” and make the case that it applies
to Trump.