Title

Presenter Information

Conference Level

Graduate

Start Date

1-4-2017 3:30 PM

End Date

1-4-2017 4:00 PM

Abstract

In this essay, I will attempt a critique of the Badiouan formulation of the event by asking if Badiou’s theory, as formulated in Being and Event, explains the phenomenon of the scientific revolution. While Badiou remains relatively cryptic about the status of science in Being and Event and does not refer to any scientific revolutions explicitly, there are several reasons why it might seem problematic if they are not to be included within his theory of the event. After all, they are called revolutions and the historical narrative surrounding them typically develops, much like the Badiouan event, with the understanding that the scientific revolutions of any given period are foundational for understanding the culture that proceeds from them. In a word, scientific revolutions are taken to be necessary for understanding the structure of the culture responsible for them. Thus it seems like any theory of the event should explain and account for the revolutions of science.

In order to test the compatibility of the Badiouan theory of the event with the phenomenon of the scientific revolution I will turn to Thomas Kuhn’s work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and will ultimately conclude that the two works are not reconcilable: the Badiouan theory of the event does not explain or account for scientific revolutions in the way the Kuhn understands them. The two theories are, in fact, structurally opposed in several ways. This has potentially dramatic consequences for Badiou’s theory if two propositions can be established as true: (1) a theory of the event should account for the phenomenon of the scientific revolution and (2) Kuhn offers a better structural explanation of the scientific revolution than Badiou. If these two propositions are true then a fairly significant failure of Badiou’s theory of the event, as it is expressed in Being and Event, is exposed.

Included in

Share

COinS

Apr 1st, 3:30 PMApr 1st, 4:00 PM

Scientific Revolutions as Events: A Kuhnian Critique of Badiou

In this essay, I will attempt a critique of the Badiouan formulation of the event by asking if Badiou’s theory, as formulated in Being and Event, explains the phenomenon of the scientific revolution. While Badiou remains relatively cryptic about the status of science in Being and Event and does not refer to any scientific revolutions explicitly, there are several reasons why it might seem problematic if they are not to be included within his theory of the event. After all, they are called revolutions and the historical narrative surrounding them typically develops, much like the Badiouan event, with the understanding that the scientific revolutions of any given period are foundational for understanding the culture that proceeds from them. In a word, scientific revolutions are taken to be necessary for understanding the structure of the culture responsible for them. Thus it seems like any theory of the event should explain and account for the revolutions of science.

In order to test the compatibility of the Badiouan theory of the event with the phenomenon of the scientific revolution I will turn to Thomas Kuhn’s work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and will ultimately conclude that the two works are not reconcilable: the Badiouan theory of the event does not explain or account for scientific revolutions in the way the Kuhn understands them. The two theories are, in fact, structurally opposed in several ways. This has potentially dramatic consequences for Badiou’s theory if two propositions can be established as true: (1) a theory of the event should account for the phenomenon of the scientific revolution and (2) Kuhn offers a better structural explanation of the scientific revolution than Badiou. If these two propositions are true then a fairly significant failure of Badiou’s theory of the event, as it is expressed in Being and Event, is exposed.