Causes of War — Defence of person and property — What are
called justifiable causes of war — Justifiable causes of War are Defence,
recovery of one's property or debt, or the punishment of offences committed War
for defence of life, justifiable, and lawful — This kind of war lawful
against an aggressor only — The danger must be present and real, not an
imaginary danger — Lawful to kill any one attempting to maim one's person,
or violate one's chastity — Occasions where this right may be lawfully
waved — This right to be waved particularly with respect to the person of
the Sovereign, which is sacred and inviolable — Homicide in defence of
one's property allowed by the law of nature — How far homicides permitted
by the law of Moses — Self-defence in public war — Not lawful to
attack any power solely on account of its increasing greatness — The
hostile measures of an aggressor, not to be justified on the plea of
self-defence.

I. THE causes of war by
which are meant the justifiable causes, are now to be considered. For in some
cases motives of interest operate distinctly from motives of justice. Polybius
accurately distinguishes these motives from each other, and from the beginning
of the war, or that which gave occasion to the first acts of hostility; as was
he case when Ascanius wounded the stag, which gave rise to the war between
Turnus and Aeneas. But though here is an actual distinction between the
justifiable causes, he pretexts, and the beginning of war; yet the terms used
to express them are often confounded. For what we call justifiable causes,
Livy, in the speech which he as put into the mouth of the Rhodians, calls
beginnings. he Rhodian deputies said, "You Romans profess to believe that
your wars are successful, because they are just: or do you boast so much of
their victorious issue, as of he just principles, upon which you make
them." In which sense Aelian styles them arcaiopol and Diodorusiculus, in speaking of the war of
the Lacedaemonians against the Eleans gives them the name of
profaneiV and arcaV.

The principal drift of our argument rests upon these justifiable causes, to
which the sentiment of Coriolanus in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, particularly
applies, he says, "in the first place, I beseech you to consider how you
may find pious and just pretexts for the war." And Demosthenes in his
second Olynthiac, makes a similar observation, "I think, says he,
that as in a ship, or house, or any other fabric, the lowest parts ought to be
the strongest; so in all political measures the motives and pretexts ought to
be laid deeply in the principles of truth and justice." The following
language of Dion Cassius is no less applicable to the question. "Justice
must be made the principal ground of our actions. For with such support there
is the best hope of success to our arms. But without that, any point which may
be gained for the moment has no firm ground to rest upon." To which may be
added, the words of Cicero, who maintains those wars to be unjust, which are
made without sufficient cause. And in another place, he reproves Crassus for
having intended to pass the Euphrates, when there was no cause of war. Which is
no less true of public than of private wars. Hence come the complaints of
Seneca, "Why do we restrain homicide, and the murder of individuals, but
glory in the crime of slaughter, which destroys whole nations? Avarice and
cruelty know not any bounds. By decrees of the Senate, and of the people cruel
acts are authorized, and measures, which are pursued by order of the state, are
forbidden to individuals." Wars indeed undertaken by public authority are
attended with certain effects of right, and have the sanction of opinion in
their favour. But they are not the less criminal, when made without just cause.
For which reason Alexander was not improperly styled a robber by the Scythian
ambassadors, as may be seen in Quintus Curtius. Seneca and Lucan give him the
same appellation; the Indian sages call him a madman; and a pirate once
presumed to rank him with his own class. Justin speaks of Philip in the same
terms, who, says he, in deciding a dispute between two rival kings,
stripped both of their dominions with all the treachery and violence of a
robber. Augustin has a pertinent remark on this subject. He says, what are
unjustly acquired dominions, but the spoils of robbery? In the same strain,
Lactantius says, "Men, captivated with the appearances of vain glory, give
the names of virtues to their crimes." Injury, or the prevention of injury
forms the only justifiable cause of war. "And, in the language of the
same Augustin, all the evil consequences of war are to be laid at the door
of the aggressor." Thus the Roman Herald in a declaration of war makes a
solemn appeal against the aggressor, as having violated the laws of nations,
and refused proper satisfaction.

II. The grounds of war are as numerous as those of judicial actions.
For where the power of law ceases, there war begins. Now there are methods in
law to prevent intended injuries, as well as actions for those actually
committed. For CIVIL INJURIES various methods of
redress, or prevention are appointed by the law; and by the same power
securities are provided to prevent the commission of crimes and misdemeanors.
In civil cases, the party aggrieved may recover damages for the injuries
sustained; and in crimes, which are offences against the public, the aggressor
must submit to actual punishment. Plato, in his ninth book on laws, very
properly makes the same distinction, as Homer had done before him.

Now reparation or indemnity relates to what either does or did belong to us;
which gives rise to real and personal actions. These ascertain our right to the
damages, which are our due, either from an agreement, or from an injury
received. A right which is termed in law a right by contract, or injury.
Crimes, which are offences against society, are prosecuted by indictment, that
is by an accusation in the name of the sovereign.

The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three, defence,
indemnity, and punishment, all which are comprised in the declaration of
Camillus against the Gauls, enumerating all things, which it is right to
defend, to recover, and the encroachment on which it is right to punish.

There is an omission in this enumeration, unless the word recover be taken
in its most extensive sense. For recovering by war what we have lost, includes
indemnity for the past, as well as the prosecution of our claim to a debt.
Plato has not omitted to notice this distinction, for he has said, "that
wars are made to punish not only oppression or robbery, but also fraud and
deception." With whom Seneca agrees; for to command payment of what you
owe, he calls, "an equitable sentence, stamped with the authority of the
law of nations." Indeed the form which was prescribed for the Roman
heralds to use in declarations of war, bears exactly the same import. For
therein the aggressor is charged with having neither given, paid, nor done what
was due. Sallust in one of his fragments, has made a Tribune, in his harangue
to the people, say, "As a final settlement of all discussion; I demand
restitution according to the law of nations."

St. Augustin, in defining those to be just wars, which are made to avenge
injuries has taken the word avenge in a general sense of removing and
preventing, as well as punishing aggressions. This appears to be his meaning
from the following sentence of the passage, in which he does not enumerate the
particular acts, which amount to injury, but adds, by way of illustration, that
"the state or nation, which has neglected to punish the aggressions of its
own subjects, or to make reparation for the losses occasioned by those
aggressions, is a proper object of hostility and attack." Prompted by this
natural knowledge of right and wrong, the Indian King, as we are informed by
Diodorus, accused Semiramis of having commenced war against him without having
received any injury, Thus the Romans expostulated with the Senones, that they
ought not to attack a people who had given them no provocation. Aristotle in
the second book and second chapter of his Analytics, says, war generally is
made upon those who have first done an injury. Quintus Curtius describes the
Abian Scythians, as the best acquainted with the principles of justice of any
of the Barbarians. For they declined having recourse to arm; unless provoked by
aggression. A just cause then of war is an injury, which though not actually
committed, threatens our persons or property with danger.

III. It has already been proved that when our lives are threatened
with immediate danger, it is lawful to kill the aggressor, if the danger cannot
otherwise be avoided: an instance, as it has been shewn, on which the justice
of private war rests. We must observe that this kind of defence derives its
origin from the principle of self. preservation, which nature has given to
every living creature, and not from the injustice or misconduct of the
aggressor. Wherefore though he may be clear of guilt, as for instance a soldier
in actual service, mistaking my person for that of another, or a madman in his
frenzy, or a man walking in his sleep, none of these cases deprive me of the
right of self-defence against those per. sons. For I am not bound to submit to
the danger or mischief intended, any more than to expose myself to the attacks
of a wild beast.

IV. It admits of some doubt, whether those, who unintentionally
obstruct our defence, or escape, which are necessary to our preservation, may
be lawfully maimed or killed. There are some, even Theologians, who think they
may. And, certainly if we look to the law of nature alone, according to its
principles, our own preservation should have much more weight with us, than the
welfare of society. But the law of charity, especially the evangelical law,
which has put our neighbour upon a level with ourselves, does not permit it.

Thomas Aquinas, if taken in a right sense, has justly observed, that in
actual self-defence no man can be said to be purposely killed. Indeed, it may
some times happen that there is no other way for a person to save himself, than
by designedly doing an act, by which the death of an aggressor must inevitably
ensue. Yet here the death of any one was not the primary object intended, but
employed as the only means of security, which the moment supplied. Still it is
better for the party assaulted, if he can safely do it, to repel or disable the
aggressor than to shed his blood.

V. The danger must be immediate, which is one necessary point. Though
it must be confessed, that when an assailant seizes any weapon with an apparent
intention to kill me I have a right to anticipate and prevent the danger. For
in the moral as well as the natural system of things, there is no point without
some breadth. But they are themselves much mistaken, and mislead others, who
maintain that any degree of fear ought, to be a ground for killing another, to
prevent his SUPPOSED intention. It is a very just
observation made by Cicero in his first book of Offices, that many wrongs
proceed from fear; as when the person, who intends to hurt another, apprehends
some danger to himself unless he tool, that method. Clearchus, in Xenophon,
says, I have known some men, who partly through misrepresentation, and partly
through suspicion, dreading one another, in order to prevent the supposed
intentions of their adversaries, have committed the most enormous cruelties
against those who neither designed, nor wished them any harm.

Cato in his speech for the Rhodians, says, "Are we to prevent them by
doing first, what we say they intended to do to us?" On this subject there
is a remarkable passage in Aulus Gellius, "When a Gladiator prepares to
enter the lists for combat, such is his lot that he must either kill his
adversary, or be killed himself. But the life of man is not circumscribed by
the hard terms of such an over-ruling necessity, as to oblige him to do an
injury to prevent him from receiving one." Quintilian has quoted a passage
from Cicero, wherein the orator asks, "Whoever made such a decision, or to
whom could such a point be yielded without the most imminent danger, that you
have a right to kill the person, by whom you say, you fear that you shall
afterwards be killed yourself?" To which this passage of Euripides, may be
applied, "If your husband, as you say, intended to have killed you, you
ought to have waited, till he actually did make the attempt." Conformably
to which Thucydides, in the first book of his history, has expressed himself in
the following terms, " The issue of war is uncertain, nor ought we to be
so far transported by our fears, as to engage in immediate and open
hostilities." The same writer too in his luminous description of the
dangerous factions, that had arisen in the Grecian states, condemns the
approbation bestowed on the person, that injured or destroyed another from whom
he himself apprehended injury or destruction."

Livy says, "Men, to guard against their alarms, make themselves objects
of terror; averting the danger from their own heads, by imposing upon others
the necessity of either doing or suffering the evil which they them. selves
fear." Vibius asked a person, that appeared armed in the forum, " Who
gave you permission to shew your fear in this manner?" A question not
inapplicable to the present subject, and much commended by Quintilian. Livia
also in Dion says, that great infamy redounds to those, who by anticipation
perpetrate the criminal act, which they fear.

Now if any one intend no immediate violence, but is found to have formed a
conspiracy to destroy me by assassination, or poison, or by false accusation,
perjury, or suborned witnesses, I have no right to kill him. For my knowledge
of the danger may prevent it. Or even if it were evident that I could not avoid
the danger without killing him; this would not establish my right to do so. For
there is every presumption that my knowing it will lead me to apply for the
legal remedies of prevention.

VI. and VII. The next thing to be considered is, what must be
said upon the mutilation of a limb. Now, as the loss of a limb, especially that
of a principal limb in the body, is a grievous detriment, and nearly equal to
the loss of life, to which may be added the probability of death ensuing from
such a calamity; the lawfulness of killing any one, who makes such an attempt,
if the danger cannot otherwise be avoided, scarce admits of a doubt. Neither is
there any more difficulty in allowing the same right for the personal defence
of chastity, the preservation of which, both in the common estimation of men,
and by the divine law, is deemed of equal value with life itself. We have an
example of this in Cicero, Quintilian, and Plutarch, in the person of one of
Marius's tribunes, who was killed by a soldier. Among the actions of women, who
have defended themselves. Heliodorus records that of Heraclea, which he calls a
just defence of her injured honour.

VIII. Though some, as it has been already said, admit the lawfulness
of killing the person, who attempts with open violence to destroy one's life,
yet they deem it more commendable to spare the life of another, even at the
hazard of one's own. Yet to persons, in whose preservation the public interest
is involved, they will grant an exemption from this rule of forbearance. Indeed
it seems unsafe to impose upon ANY, whose lives are of importance to others, a
rule of forebearance so contrary to all the principles of all law. This
exemption therefore must be allowed to all vested with any public office, which
makes them responsible for the safety of others; as the generals who conduct
armies, or the rulers of the state, and many others in similar situations; to
whom may be applied the lines of Lucan — "When the lives and safety
of so many nations depend upon yours, and so great a portion of the world has
chosen you for its head; it is cruelty to expose yourself willfully to
death."

IX. On the other hand it may happen, that the aggressor may be one
whose person is rendered sacred and inviolable by all divine, human, and
natural laws; which is the case with respect to the person of the Sovereign.
For the law of nature regards not only the principles of STRICT
JUSTICE, but comprises other virtues also, as temperance, fortitude, and
discretion, making the observance of them in certain cases, binding as well as
honourable. To observe these we are bound also by the law of charity.

Nor is the truth of this argument at all weakened by what Vasquez has
advanced, who maintains that the Sovereign who attempts the life of an
individual loses, in reality, the character of Sovereign: a doctrine fraught
with equal absurdity and danger. For sovereignty cannot any more than property
be forfeited by any particular act of delinquency; unless it has been
previously and expressly so enacted by the fundamental laws of the state, For
such a rule of forfeiture, which would be productive of universal anarchy and
confusion, never has been, or ever will be established among any civilized
people. For the maxim, "that all government is framed for the benefit of
the subject and not of the Sovereign," which Vasquez and many other
writers lay down as a fundamental law, though it may be generally true in
theory, is by no means applicable to the question. For a thing loses not its
existence, by losing some part of its utility, Nor is there sufficient
consistency in his observation, that every individual desires the safety of the
commonwealth on his own account, and therefore every one ought to prefer his
own safety to that of the whole state. For we wish for the public welfare not
on our own account alone, but also for the sake of others.

The opinion of those who think that friendship arises from necessity alone,
is rejected, as false, by the more sound Philosophers; as we feel a spontaneous
and natural inclination towards friendly intercourse. Charity indeed often
persuades, and in some instances commands us to prefer the good of many to our
own single advantage. To which the following passage from Seneca is very
applicable. "It is not surprising that princes, and kings, or whatever
name the guardians of the public welfare may bear, should be loved with a
veneration and affection, far beyond those of private friendship. For all men
of sober judgment, and enlarged information deem the public interest of higher
moment than their own. Their attachment therefore must be warmest to the person
on whom the well being and prosperity of the state depends." And to the
same effect, St. Ambrose in his third book of Offices, says, "every man
feels a greater delight in averting public than private danger." Seneca,
the writer already quoted, produces two instances, the one of Callistratus at
Athens, and the other of Rutilius at Rome, who refused to be restored from
banishment thinking it better for two individuals to suffer hardship, than for
the public to be plunged into calamities.

[Translator's note: The tenth section is omitted in the translation,
as the subject of Christian forbearance of which it treats, has already been
discussed in the preceding book.]

XI. The next object to be considered, relates to injuries affecting
our property. In strict justice, it cannot be denied that we have a right to
kill a robber, if such a step is inevitably necessary to the preservation of
our property. For the difference between the value of life and property is
overbalanced by the horror which a robber excites, and by the favourable
inclination felt by all men towards the injured and innocent. From whence it
follows, that regarding that right alone, a robber may be wounded or killed in
his flight with the property, if it -cannot otherwise be recovered. Demosthenes
in his speech against Aristocrates, exclaims, "By all that is ,sacred, is
it not a dreadful and open violation of law, not only of written law, but of
that law which is the unwritten rule of all men, to be debarred from the right
of using force against the robber as well as against the ,enemy; who is
plundering your property?" Nor is it forbidden by the precepts of charity,
apart from all consideration of divine and human law, unless where the property
is of little value, and beneath notice; an exception, which some writers have
very properly added.

XII. The sense of the Jewish law on this point is now to be
considered. The old law of Solon, to which Demosthenes, in his speech against
Timocrates, appeals, agrees with it. From hence the substance of the TWELVE TABLES, and Plato's maxim in his
ninth book of laws were taken. For they all agree in making a distinction
between a thief who steals by day, and the robber, who commits the act by
night; though they differ about the REASON of this
distinction. Some think this distinction arises from the difficulty of
discerning by night, whether an aggressor comes with an intent to murder or
steal, and therefore he ought to be treated as an assassin. Others think the
distinction is made, because as it is difficult to know the person of the
thief, there is less probability of recovering the goods. In neither case do
the framers of laws seem to have considered the question in its proper light.
Their evident intention is to prohibit the killing of any one, merely on
account of our property; which would happen, for instance, by killing a thief
in his flight in order to recover the goods he had stolen. But if our own lives
are endangered, then we are allowed to avert the danger, even at the hazard of
another's life. Nor is our having run into the danger any objection; provided
it was done to preserve or to recover our goods, or to take the thief. For no
imputation of guilt can attach to us in any of these cases, while we are
employed in doing a lawful act, nor can it be said that we are doing wrong to
another by exercising our own right.

The difference therefore made between a thief in the night and a thief in
the day, arises from the difficulty of procuring sufficient evidence of the
fact. So that if a thief is found killed, the person who says, that he was
found by him with a destructive weapon, and killed by him in his own defence,
will easily gain belief. For the Jewish law supposes this, when it treats of a
thief in the act of piercing, or, as some translate it, with a stabbing
instrument. This interpretation accords with the law of the twelve tables,
which forbids any one to kill a thief in the day time, except he defend himself
with a weapon. The presumption therefore against a thief in the night is that
he defended himself in such a manner. Now the term weapon comprehends not only
an instrument of iron, but as Caius interprets it is law, a club, or a stone.
Ulpian on the other hand, speaking of a thief taken in the night, says that the
person who kills him will incur no guilt, provided that in saving his property
he could not spare his life, without en. dangering his own. There is a
presumption, as it has been already observed, in favour of the person who has
killed a thief taken in the night. But if there be evidence to prove, that the
life of the person who killed the thief was in no danger; then the presumption
in his favour fails, and the act amounts to murder.

The law of the twelve tables indeed required, that the person who took a
thief either in the day time, or in the night, should make a noise that, if
possible, the magistrates or neighbours might assemble to assist him and give
evidence. But as such a concourse could more easily be assembled in the day
time than in the night, as Ulpian observes upon the passage before quoted from
Demosthenes, the affirmation of a person declaring the danger he was in during
the night is more readily believed. To which an additional observation may be
made, that, even under equal circumstances, the danger which happens by night
can be less examined, and ascertained, and therefore is the more terrible. The
Jewish law therefore, no less than the Roman, acting upon the same principle of
tenderness forbids us to kill any one, who has taken our goods, unless for the
preservation of our own lives.

[Translator's note: Sections XIII. XIV. and XV. of the original are
omitted in the translation.]

XVI. What has been already said of the right of defending our persons
and property, though regarding chiefly private war, may nevertheless be applied
to public hostilities, allowing for the difference of circumstances. For
private war may be considered as an instantaneous exercise of natural right,
which ceases the moment that legal redress can be obtained. Now as public war
can never take place, but where judicial remedies cease to exist, it is often
protracted, and the spirit of hostility inflamed by the continued accession of
losses and injuries. Besides, private war extends only to self-defence, whereas
sovereign powers have a right not only to avert, but to punish wrongs. From
whence they are authorised to prevent a remote as well as an immediate
aggression. Though the suspicion of hostile intentions, on the part of another
power, may not justify the commencement of actual war, yet it calls for
measures of armed prevention, and will authorise indirect hostility. Points,
which will be discussed in another place.

XVII. Some writers have advanced a doctrine which can never be
admitted, maintaining that the law of nations authorises one power to commence
hostilities against another, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As
a matter of expediency such a measure may be adopted, but the principles of
justice can never be advanced in its favour. The causes which entitle a war to
the denomination of just are somewhat different from those of expediency alone.
But to maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future annoyance
from a neighbouring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a
doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity. Such however is the condition
of human life, that no full security can be enjoyed. The only protection
against uncertain fears must be sought, not from violence, but from the divine
providence, and defensive precaution.

XVIII. There is another opinion, not more admissible maintaining that
the hostile acts of an aggressor, may be considered in the light of defensive
measures, because, say the advocates of this opinion, few people are content to
proportion their revenge to the injuries they have received; bounds which in
all probability the party aggrieved has exceeded, and therefore in return
becomes himself the aggressor. Now the excess of retaliation cannot, any more
than the fear of uncertain danger, give a colour of right to the first
aggression, which may be illustrated by the case of a malefactor, who can have
no right to wound or kill the officers of justice in their attempts to take
him, urging as a plea that he feared the punishment would exceed the offense.

The first step, which an aggressor ought to take, should be an offer of
indemnity to the injured party, by the arbitration of some independent and
disinterested state. And if this mediation be rejected, then his war assumes
the character of a just war. Thus Hezekiah when he had not stood to the
engagements made by his ancestors, being threatened with an attack from the
King of Assyria on that account, acknowledged his fault, and left it to the
King to assign what penalty he should pay for the offence. After he had clone
so, finding himself again attacked, relying on the justice of his cause, he
opposed the enemy, and succeeded by the favour of God. Pontius the Samnite,
after restoration of the prizes had been made to the Romans, and the promoter
of the war delivered up into their hands, said, "We have now averted the
wrath of heaven, which our violation of treaties had provoked. But the supreme
being who was pleased to reduce us to the necessity of restoration, was not
equally pleased with the pride of the Romans, who rejected our offer. What
farther satisfaction do we owe to the Romans, or to Heaven, the arbiter of
treaties? We do not shrink from submitting the measure of YOUR resentment, or of OUR punishment
to the judgment of any people, or any individual." In the same manner,
when the Thebans had offered the most equitable terms to the Lacedaemonians,
who still rose higher in their demands, Aristides say, that the justice of the
cause changed sides and passed from the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans.