06ASTANA712, KAZAKHSTANI OPPOSITION FIGURES SKEPTICAL ON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000712
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA/CEN FOR M. O'MARA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOVPRELKZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI OPPOSITION FIGURES SKEPTICAL ON
CHANCES FOR POLITICAL REFORM
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with the Ambassador on
November 27, opposition figures Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay stated that they do not expect near-term
political reforms in Kazakhstan. Neither could predict
whether President Nazarbayev will alter Kazakhstan's current
political system. Despite his skepticism, Tuyakbay said that
his party, the Social Democrats, will attend the last meeting
of Kazakhstan's Democratization Commission. Zhakiyanov
suggested that Nazarbayev is losing touch with the views of
ordinary citizens, pointing to three recent proposals that he
categorized as mistakes - banning right-hand drive cars,
restricting gambling to two provincial cities, and shifting
the Kazakh language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.
End summary.
¶2. (C) In separate meetings with the Ambassador on November
27, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and Zharkmakhan Tuyakbay, leader of
the Social Democrat Party, expressed their doubts that
President Nazarbayev will fulfill recent promises of
democratic reform. Zhakiyanov believes that the GOK will
feel no pressure to press for reforms if it fails in its bid
to chair the OSCE in 2009. Tuyakbay warned that each time
President Nazarbayev travels to the U.S., he makes promises
that he does not keep. According to Tuyakbay, Kazakhstan's
Democratization Commission has also proven a failure. He
told the Ambassador that most suggestions made by the
Commission's working group have been rejected. He expects
minimum reforms will result, but he did add that the
Commission should not be disbanded and that his party will
attend the group's final meeting (Comment: Among the
opposition, only Alikhan Baymenov of Ak Zhol has participated
in previous sessions of the Democratization Commission. End
comment)
3.(C) Both Zhakiyanov and Tuyakbay were uncertain as to
whether President Nazarbayev will seek to alter Kazakhstan's
political system. Tuyakbay believes that Nazarbayev merged
the pro-government parties to provide them time to develop
and in order to manage them more effectively. He thinks that
Nazarbayev may choose to create a party-list system similar
to Russia's, believing that the ruling coalition will be able
to take 80 to 90 percent of the seats. Zhakiyanov feels that
Nazarbayev will wait for results of elections in Russia
before proposing any reforms, and that any changes will
mirror those made in Russia. Both mentioned Singapore as a
political model attractive to Nazarbayev.
¶4. (C) Tuyakbay discussed the status of the Social Democrat
Party, which recently had its registration suspended by the
Ministry of Justice soon after submitting a party list with
127,000 supporters (and another 50,000 waiting to join,
according to Tuyakbay)(Note: 50,000 signatures are required).
The Ministry claimed it could take longer to verify the
signatures. Tuyakbay said he had an additional 20,000
signatures ready to submit to overcome the disqualifications
of the ones he had submitted. He also reported that
President Nazarbayev promised to register the party if
Tuyakbay promised not to criticize him personally.
Nevertheless, Tuyakbay believes the party will ultimately be
registered. The party's support is strongest in southern
Kazakhstan and in the country's regional centers, he said,
but the party has activists and an established network
throughout the country. (Comment: Tuyakbay stated that one of
the party's principal goals is to improve the standard of
living of ethnic Kazakhs. This emphasis is likely to lessen
the party's popularity in northern Kazakhstan. End Comment)
¶5. (C) Tuyakbay believes that Kazakhstan needs a unified
opposition, and he told the Ambassador he may seek to create
a union of opposition parties. The future of "For a Just
Kazakhstan," however, is unclear, he said. The group "lacks
unity" and he is undecided as to whether it should be
disbanded. He does not believe that the death of
Sarasenbaiuly affected the block, as he sought its
dismantlement and favored the strengthening of individual
parties.
¶6. (C) Zhakiyanov told the Ambassador that President
Nazarbayev has made three decisions that indicate that he
lacks "sufficient contact with the people." First, he
proposed limiting all gambling to two provincial cities,
Kapchagay and Shchuchinsk, as of January 1, 2007. (Note:
Kazakhstan currently has 132 casinos and 2,000 other gambling
parlors, slot halls, and bookmakers.) Next, he banned the
import of right-hand drive cars from the beginning of 2007
and the use of such cars from 2010, setting off organized
protests in Almaty and in other regions of the country.
Finally, he has advocated shifting the Kazakh language from
the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Zhakiyanov believes that
these decisions, which he called mistakes, demonstrate that
President Nazarbayev is not receiving adequate information.
¶7. (C) Comment: Zhakiyanov and Tuyakbay's skepticism is
shared by many in the opposition and pro-government camps.
There are clearly various groups within the elite
pushing for
and against reform. President Nazarbayev has not yet tipped
his hand, but most observers expect him to make a major
announcement early next year on the country's political
future. End comment.
ORDWAY

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Kazakhstan) database..

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