The decline of religious fundamentalism in Iran

During the past three decades
the rise of militant Islam has in many ways dominated political events in the
region. The consequences of Iranian religious radicalism can be observed in the
Persian Gulf region, in the Arab-Israel conflict, in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Although Iranian Islamic militancy appears to be as dominant as ever, this may
not be the case during the next decade.

The main reason for this conjuncture lies with the present Iranian government
headed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, who came to power in July 2005.
Ahmadinezhad's rise to power was indeed a watershed in post-Islamic revolution
Iran. His presidency marked a new political configuration in the Islamic
republic. Hitherto, although the Iranian regime was described as radical and
Islamic, it was far from a united political group. It consisted of diverse
currents that all described themselves as Islamist. They included hardline
conservatives on the "right", the "left", the pragmatists headed by Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the moderates and those who with some qualification could
even be described as "liberal". During the reign of the late Imam Khomeini the
left had the upper hand. After his death, the pragmatists headed by Hashemi
Rafsanjani held the center stage; then it was the turn of the moderate-liberal
currents headed by the reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. No matter who had
been elected as Iran's president, all the other currents were, albeit to various
degrees, present in the government.

The elections of July 2005 and the rise of Ahmadinezhad to power changed that
political complexion. The conservative hardliners purged almost all the other
currents from power. For the first time since the emergence of the Islamic
republic in 1979, one particular political group dominated the main three
branches of the Iranian political establishment.

This group, which with some justification has become known as the hardliners,
has tried to change much of Iranian domestic as well as foreign policy. At the
international level, Iran's stand on its nuclear program has become much more
uncompromising. The Islamic regime's anti-western and anti-American attitude has
intensified, as has its anti-Israel approach. Instead, Tehran has tried to
establish ties with anti-American regimes in South America and elsewhere.
Internally, the hardliners have intensified the state's role in the economy and
curtailed political freedom and have tried to expand the country's military
capabilities.

We come now to the main point of our thesis: the anticipated demise of militant
Islam during the next decade. Given the widespread grip on power that the
hardliners have maintained since 2005, why should their power decline in the
future? The short answer lies with the performance of the hardliners since they
came to power three years ago. They have alienated much of the country's
intelligentsia. Students, university graduates, professionals, intellectuals,
writers, journalists, artists and many similar social groups have turned
increasingly critical of the hardliners' overall policies during the past three
years. Civil servants, the urban middle class and the politically powerful
bazaar merchants have increasingly turned against the hardliner government of
Ahmadinezhad.

Politically, too, the hardliners have been in retreat. The reformists, the left,
the so-called liberal-religious nationalist groups such as "nehzat azadi",
Hashemi Rafsanjani and his influential political groups, all now oppose the
hardliner government. In fact, Ahmadinezhad's policies have turned many
conservatives as well as more moderate and pragmatist hardliners against his
government. There is yet another powerful and influential group that has become
openly critical of the hardliner president and some of his decisions: during the
past two years, a number of senior clerical leaders have voiced their opposition
to some of Ahmadinezhad's decisions.

Last but by no means least is the Iranian parliament, or Majlis. The 300-member
assembly that was inaugurated in July 2008 elected Ali Larijani by a large
majority as its speaker. Since the conservatives have a considerable majority in
the present majlis, Larijani's election was an implicit message of defiance to
President Ahmadinezhad. Larijani was until last April head of the High Council
of Security Affairs, a powerful body that is responsible for the country's
military and security issues, including conducting negotiations with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Larijani was critical of Ahmadinezhad's
radical approach regarding Iran's nuclear program. He preferred a more moderate
stand, searching for compromise with the West on the nuclear issue. Ahmadinezhad
dismissed Larijani, thereby eventually paving the way for Iran to adopt a more
militant and confrontational approach vis-a-vis its nuclear program.

Here we must address two important questions about the hardline government of
Iran. First, given his formidable internal opposition, where does Ahmadinezhad
get the support to survive and even to contemplate another term? Second, what
are the reasons for so much opposition?

The bulk of Ahmadinezhad's support comes from the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and the various institutions he leads, including the powerful
Revolutionary Guards, the Baseej, the national Iranian Radio and Television and
government-run newspapers, as well as a number of religious and political
leaders close to him. The widespread opposition stems from Ahmadinezhad's
overall poor performance. The country suffers from rampant inflation;
unemployment hasn't come down, nor has endemic corruption and the country's
brain drain continues--witness the queue of Iranian professionals outside
western embassies in Tehran, seeking to emigrate in spite of the fact that the
country's oil revenues have quadrupled during the past three years.