In a recent decision, the Massachusetts Appeals Court analyzed M.G.L. c. 140, s. 155 – commonly referred to as the Dog-Bite Statute – and the damages available under the statute when a dog causes those damages.

As Parker | Scheer has previously discussed, the Dog-Bite Statute imposes strict liability on the owner or the keeper of a dog, if that dog causes personal injuries or death to a person. In other words, a person harmed by a dog need not prove that the dog’s owner was negligent, or that the owner should have known that the dog was dangerous to others and should have taken protective measures. Unless it is shown that the injured person teased, tormented, or abused the dog, under the statute, the owner is automatically liable for the injuries the dog caused.

In Irwin v. Degtiarov, the Appeals Court examined the statute, and was asked to decide what damages the dog’s owner could be liable for when another dog – not a human – is the victim of a dog attack. There, the plaintiffs’ Bichon Frise suffered severe internal injuries, external bruising, and wounds to the head, neck, abdomen, and chest, when the defendants’ unleashed German Shepherd attacked it on the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs’ dog received emergency surgery, which saved the dog’s life, but at veterinary costs of over $8,000.

Following trial, a district court judge found that the plaintiffs had not teased, tormented, or abused the defendants’ dog to provoke the attack, and found the plaintiffs’ veterinary costs to be both reasonable and necessary, and awarded those damages in full. The defendants appealed, claiming that, because dogs are considered property under the law, the damages should have been capped at the market value of the dog, and arguing that it is unreasonable to spend more to treat a dog than it would cost to replace it.

The Appellate Division affirmed the award, as did the Appeals Court on further appeal. The court noted that the purpose of the Dog-Bite Statute “is to protect all persons, whatever may be their age or condition, who, through no fault of their own, are exposed to attacks from dogs, and to induce their owners and keepers to hold them under proper restraint and control.” However, as the court observed, although the statute extends strict liability to “any damage” caused by a dog, it does not explain how that damage should be measured.

When the claimed damages caused by a dog are to property rather than personal injuries, diminution in market value of the property – a common method of measuring property damage under Massachusetts law – may not, in all cases, be an adequate or satisfactory measure of damages. Thus, the court concluded, if it was reasonable in the circumstances to incur the veterinary expenses that the plaintiffs did incur as a result of the defendants’ dog’s attack on their dog, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover those losses. Because the plaintiffs had proven that those costs were reasonable, as well as necessary to the dog’s life, the Appeals Court affirmed the award of veterinary expenses to the plaintiffs.

Although Parker | Scheer’s personal injury lawyers focus their representation on persons who have suffered injuries or death themselves, rather than injuries to property, personal injuries often occur when a person is attempting to protect their own pets from an attacking dog. This ruling may provide some comfort to such persons, as it implicitly recognizes that the pets they are protecting may have a value greater than just their purchase price.

Earlier this month, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) overruled its decision in a 1999 case, which had interpreted a statute as creating strict liability for violation of the State Building Code if such violation caused injury, only if the provision that had been violated concerned fire safety. Under the recent ruling, strict liability is to be imposed for any violation of the Massachusetts Building Code.

In Sheehan v. Weaver, the plaintiff resided in a third-floor apartment in Beverly that he rented from the defendants. That apartment was the only apartment located on the top floor of the structure owned and managed by the defendants, with two other residential apartments located on the second floor, and a chiropractor’s office on the first floor. The plaintiff accessed his third-floor apartment by ascending an exterior staircase that led to a landing on the second floor level. The plaintiff returned home after an evening of drinking and climbed that staircase. When he reached the second floor landing, he leaned against the staircase guardrail. The guardrail broke, and the plaintiff fell to the pavement below, resulting in serious personal injuries.

At trial, the plaintiff’s expert testified that the structure owned by the defendants had eighteen violations of the State Building Code, including defects in the strength, height, and condition of the guardrail that broke. Although the jury apportioned 60% negligence to the defendants and 40% negligence to the plaintiff, it also determined that the various Building Code violations were the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and thus the defendants were strictly liable to the plaintiff under M.G.L. c. 143, s. 51.

A statute imposes strict liability on a particular party by mandating that the party automatically be deemed liable for injuries caused by violation of the statute, even if he is not found to have acted negligently. Section 51 makes an owner (or other party) in control of “a place of assembly, theatre, special hall, public hall, factory, workshop, manufacturing establishment or building” strictly liable for damages caused by a violation of the State Building Code.

Prior to 1972, Section 51 imposed strict liability for violations of only specifically identified sections of the State Building Code. Those sections each concerned fire safety issues. Thus, in interpreting that earlier version of the statute, Massachusetts courts determined that Section 51 imposed strict liability only when a violation occurred that threatened human life against fire. In particular, in 1965, the SJC held that Section 51 strict liability did not apply to stairways and egresses used for purposes other than to escape from danger from fire.

However, the Massachusetts legislature replaced that version of Section 51 in 1972 with the current version. The new version omits any reference to particular sections of the Building Code, and instead makes “any” violation of the provisions of the Building Code a basis for strict liability.

Unfortunately, in a 1999 case, the SJC inadvertently applied the interpretation of the old version of Section 51, rather than the revised version. Apparently, neither of the parties in that case had noted for the SJC that the statute had changed since earlier rulings. The SJC therefore continued to hold, consistent with earlier decisions, that Section 51 applied only when the violations involved fire safety. Due to the precedential value of SJC decisions, lower courts have applied this same reasoning to cases involving personal injury caused by Building Code violations ever since.

Now, fifteen years later, the SJC has corrected that oversight by recognizing, consistent with the language of the statute, that any violation of the Building Code can result in strict liability under Section 51.

Notwithstanding, the SJC determined that plaintiff in Sheehan was not entitled to a finding of strict liability on the defendants’ part, because the defendants’ structure did not fall within the definition of a “building” under Massachusetts law. According to the SJC, the relevant statutes contemplated that the term “building” would encompass commercial and public structures, but not structures (or portions of structures) used for residential purposes. Although the structure in this case had both residential and commercial qualities, the staircase and guardrail – the portions of the structure relevant to the plaintiff’s injuries – were exclusive to the residential uses of the structure, and were not used by the first floor commercial tenant or its business guests. As a result, the Building Code violations did not fall within the scope of the statute to create strict liability for the defendants.

Because of an apparent oversight in the revisions to Section 51, many Massachusetts litigants and courts have been misguided as to the scope of the statute for fifteen years. Thus, this case not only properly expands the application of strict liability to all violations of the Building Code in premises liability and other personal injury cases, but also demonstrates the importance of thorough legal research when advocating on behalf of personal injury clients.