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IMPORTING DEMOCRACY The Role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, & Argentina

J U LI E F I S HER

IMPORTING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY The Role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, & Argentina

DEDICATION To my late father, David Hawkins, gentle genius, philosopher, and, with my mother’s help, advocate for the curiosity of children. His infinite patience with the long-term human enterprise extended even to politics.

THE HIGHLIGHT OF MY EIGHT YEARS as a program officer at the Kettering Foundation was talking with people who came to our international meetings from all over the world. Some of them later returned to the international fellows program, where I had the privilege of teaching a seminar on democracy, public deliberation, and civil society. Before coming to the foundation, I had published two books that dealt broadly with NGOs in the third world.1 My first book focused on their role in sustainable development. My second book focused on the general impact of all kinds of NGOs on political development. At Kettering, in contrast, I kept meeting people who worked for a particular type of NGO with a more specialized, self-conscious mission— to strengthen democracy. These organizations engaged in a wide range of activities, from women’s rights to election monitoring to reforming the police to strengthening civil society as a whole. Despite the wide range of their activities, these NGO leaders were drawn to Kettering by its focus on deliberative democracy. Sometimes I struggled with the theoretical contrasts between deliberative and representative democracy, and I often wondered how “public politics” could possibly have a positive impact on larger political systems. Yet

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our international colleagues seemed to have fewer problems integrating these ideas into practice, despite the difficult political arenas in which they operated. I also learned these organizations were remarkably similar to each other, despite their different national contexts. Shortly after I began to consider making these democratization NGOs the subject of a third book I would write in retirement, I told John Dedrick, Kettering’s program director, about my plans. The next day he told me that David Mathews, president of the Kettering Foundation, wanted me to begin the book immediately. If David Mathews saw the need for immediate action, I fear that the long, drawn-out process of traveling to three countries, conducting more than 100 interviews and integrating all of this with written materials has not met the immediacy of the challenge. Indeed, since I began this research at the end of 2005, the idea that democracy can be exported militarily has lost its appeal. Still around, however, are the assumptions that we in the developed world know what democracy is, that elections define democracy, and that it can be exported. More worrisome, the failure to establish democracy through military means has only increased political cynicism about “these countries.” Although the Arab Spring raised hopes for democracy in the developing world, subsequent events in Egypt and elsewhere have shown that democracy is never built in a day, with one election. Indeed, the people interviewed for this book all understand that the road to democracy is a long, hard slog and that they must play a part in building it, piece by piece. They also understand that although democracy cannot be exported, democratic ideas can be imported and democracy can also be reinforced through the recovery of relevant local traditions. They are the heroines and heroes of the democratic enterprise and I thank them all most profoundly. Four of them—Ivor Jenkins in South Africa, Shamsiddin Karimov in Tajikistan, and Guillermo Correa

PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | ix

and Roberto Saba in Argentina were instrumental in the research for this book. With their help I was able to interview more than 100 people, most of them representing democratization NGOs. Without them, the interviews would not have been possible. Ivor Jenkins and Yvette Geyer (both of IDASA), Shamsiddim Karimov, and Guillermo Correa also read, corrected, and helped me update the chapters about their countries. I owe particular thanks to Parviz Mullojanov for his guidance in Tajikistan and to Paul Graham, Leslie Adams, and Mpho Putu in South Africa for their contributions to the research. Elida Cecconi of GADIS in Argentina provided wisdom, support, and friendship. David Mathews provided intellectual support for the research, and my debt to him is incalculable. John Dedrick, my chief contact as the work proceeded, was an important source of support and advice. Hal Saunders of the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue and the Kettering Foundation read my Tajikistan chapters and corrected my errors on the history of the Sustained Dialogue that ended the civil war in that country. My daughter-in-law, Kathleen Fisher, compiled the bibliographies and subsequently designed my website. In the final stage, Tony Wharton, my wonderful editor, contributed important insights. I also want to thank Eric MacDicken, whose cover design so accurately reflects my conceptual vision of the book, and Lisa Boone-Berry and Joey Easton O’Donnell who promptly and meticulously did the copy editing. Two other people made important contributions to the book. Informal discussions with my friend Jim Scarritt, professor emeritus from the University of Colorado, about South African politics and theories of social action were particularly helpful. My friend Donna Schlagheck, chair of political science at Wright State University, read the revised first chapter of the manuscript and gave me great encouragement when I needed it. In the end it was my husband, Ed Melton, who saw me through what often seemed an endless task. He not only believed in me and encouraged me but also advised me on the histories of the three countries

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and served as an extra Russian interpreter in Tajikistan. In addition, he brilliantly edited my numerous drafts. To him I owe unbounded thanks and love. For more on democratization and civil society, see my blog on the Importing Democracy website at www.importingdemocracy.org.

Endnotes 1

See Fisher 1993 and Fisher 1998.

CHAPTER

1

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INTRODUCTION “Democracy is never a thing done, it is always something that a nation must be doing.” —Archibald MacLeish

“If the instinct of hostility is one of the sources of opposition, it has a twin, the other side of the coin, namely the instinct for freedom.” —Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga1

“Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” —Winston Churchill

NOTHING HAS SO DISCREDITED the attempt to export democracy militarily as the Iraq and Afghan wars.2 Both Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that democracy must be built from within. Even peaceful efforts to export democracy, undertaken with the best of intentions, can founder on the reefs of simplistic Western visions of other societies. A common response to this failure is to assume that many countries are simply not suited to democracy, at least for the foreseeable future. This book is about the people of three countries—South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina—who refuse to be so easily dismissed and who have already started the long, arduous process of democratization from

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within. They have done this, first, by “importing” democratic ideas from abroad and, second, by rediscovering indigenous democratic traditions. The Arab Spring of 2011 has highlighted the weakness of democratic protests and revolutions not based on strong civil societies. South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina, in contrast, all have viable civil societies. Within these civil societies, there are some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) laboring in the vineyard of democracy. Because of their focus, these democratization NGOs can serve as a comparative lens for observing wider processes of democratic political change. Some NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs), with a direct programmatic focus on issues like economic development, the environment, or health care, may impact democratization indirectly, particularly at the grassroots level. The necessity of meeting economic and resource challenges is often highlighted and dramatized by the intermediary NGOs and CBOs that comprise the majority of civil-society organizations (CSOs) in most countries. Such advocacy can strengthen government accountability (Fisher 1998, 187). Informal, apolitical organizations, also part of civil society, can strengthen democracy indirectly as well. Putnam’s 1993 groundbreaking study of the role of civil society in promoting democracy in Northern Italy included sport clubs and choral societies as well as civic organizations. Businesses, such as cooperatives and microenterprises, promoted by poverty-focused NGOs, have a similar indirect effect. When women participate in cooperatives or become the owners of microbusinesses, they often become more politically active in their local communities.3 Larger businesses sometimes promote nonprofit organizations (Fisher 1998, 12-13)—under apartheid, the business sector was the major backer of NGOs in South Africa (Lee 1992, 97). Media outlets, too, can contribute to what Perez Diaz (1993, 56) calls “the sphere of public debate.” However, democratization NGOs play a unique role. Without the cultural roots and institutional building blocks of democracy, fledgling democratic regimes are unlikely to survive. Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that elections, even if they can be made relatively honest, do not

INTRODUCTION | 3

equal democracy or guarantee its survival. Indeed, history is replete with examples of democratically elected leaders being easily overthrown by authoritarian rulers. Although democratization NGOs have little shortterm ability to help shaky elected governments survive, they are immersed in the task of strengthening the taproots of democracy. In South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina they are engaged in everything from setting up community radio stations to teaching local police about human rights to fortifying the broader civil society as a potential loyal opposition. The purpose of this book is to focus specifically on the activities of democratization NGOs and to assess, to the extent possible, their impact on the democratization process. Even in nations with a healthy civil society, democracy building is daunting. Despite progress in advancing human rights and civil liberties since the end of the Dirty War (1976-1983), Argentina is a flawed democracy, based on institutions that are often dysfunctional and corrupt. South Africa struggles to emerge from the legacy of apartheid and maintain a multiethnic democracy under conditions of dire poverty and a horrendous AIDS crisis. Tajikistan, with more personal freedom than most other countries in Central Asia, remains authoritarian, still confronting the consequences of the civil war that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. To be sure, democratization NGOs are part of a larger global trend, with considerable momentum. On a worldwide scale the well-documented expansion of civil society since 1975, the so-called “global associational revolution,” has coincided with an increase in the number of countries that can be called democracies.4 As of the end of 2010, there were 87 “free” societies in the world according to Freedom House, based on both political and civil rights.5 This had declined slightly from 90 in 2007. Although the democratic tide seemed to have slowed in the first decade of the 21st century, the Arab Spring of 2011 has been called the “fourth wave” of democracy.6 Despite the coincidence between the growth of civil society and the increase in democracies, the causal connections between the two are

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neither automatic nor easy to analyze. A single CSO can represent a narrow or even a destructive interest group. A formerly independent newspaper may become the tool of an unscrupulous politician. Organizations based on ethnic identity sometimes promote conflict rather than ethnic reconciliation (Fowler 2002). Some CSOs make demands on the state that ignore political institutions or the constitutional order (Whittington 2001, 3). Weimar Germany’s rich associational life, for example, lacked liberal democratic values (Berman 1997). It is also true that some democratic countries ( Japan, France, and Spain) have relatively weak civil societies. Nevertheless, Carothers’ (1999/2000) argument that a robust civil society is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democracy downplays the high level of civic engagement that characterizes most developed democracies as well as the unrelenting civic struggle for democracy almost everywhere else. Indeed, the link between the growth of civil society and democratization is a demonstrable phenomenon throughout the world (Diamond 1997; Fisher 1998; Florini 2000, 219; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Heinrich 2001). Civil society as a whole, including “markets, associations, and a sphere of public debate,” generally strengthens democracy, at least to some degree.7 (See Box 1.A.) Despite exceptions, such as the Weimar Republic, civil society generally organizes itself in opposition to governmental abuse, more or less effectively.

Box 1.A Definitions 1) Civil society includes markets, associations, and spheres of public debate. Public debate is based on media as well as participatory processes, such as public deliberation (Perez Diaz 1993, 56).8

2) CSOs include labor unions, interest groups, foundations, professional groups, and religious organizations, as well as intermediary NGOs and CBOs. 3) Democratization NGOs are a subcategory of intermediary NGOs. They work on a wide range of activities that can strengthen democracy.9

INTRODUCTION | 5

Granted, many other factors enhance the prospects for democracy. The first is an educated population. As Diamond (2007, 99) observes, “More educated people tend to be more tolerant of differences and opposition, more respectful of minority rights, more valuing of freedom, and more trustful of other people.” A second one, relevant to developing countries, is size of population and landmass. Before the democratization trend that began with the overthrow of António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal in 1974, many of the world’s democracies were small islands with tiny populations. A third factor, particularly important to democratic sustainability, is the level of development. Przeworski and his colleagues (2000) showed through extensive statistical analysis that in richer countries democracy never breaks down, with the sole exception of Argentina. On the other hand, in the poorest countries, democracy has an average life expectancy of only eight years.10 Democratization is not, however, wholly dependent on fortunate economic circumstance.11 A few countries with strong democratic records have relatively low per capita incomes.12 Despite these contextual variables, a strong civil society is vital to building and maintaining democracy.13 How does civil society relate to democracy, at least in theory? The answers to this question are based on three categories: 1) civil society as a whole; 2) intermediary NGOs and CBOs as part of civil society; and 3) democratization NGOs, the type of intermediary NGO addressed in this book. Civil society as a whole, including associational life, business, media, and the voices of citizens, increases pluralism and organizational diversity. Pluralism increases participation in decision making. Organizational diversity can provide new channels of interest representation for people who are politically marginalized. In much of the third world, intermediary NGOs, also called Grassroots Support Organizations (GRSOs), are closely tied to CBOs, or grassroots organizations (GROs) (Fisher 1993; 1998). Civil society also has the potential to broaden a culture of holding government accountable for its actions, and, in the process, bolster its

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own accountability and change the balance of power between the state and society (White 2004). The sphere of public debate (media, political talk, and so on) can strengthen governmental accountability directly. Civil society also provides a training ground and recruitment pool for government, with at least the possibility of enhancing its democratic capacities (Fisher 1998; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Heinrich 2001). Conflict and interactions between civil society and governments over time increase governmental respect for organizational autonomy (Fox 1994). Respect for autonomy is a necessary condition for developing a loyal opposition. In addition to supporting the rights of opposition political parties, civil society can play or strengthen the role of the loyal opposition and provide, in the words of one South African theorist, “substantive uncertainty.”14 The next step is to consider and describe the more specific “vanguard role” within civil society for development NGOs, including CBOs and intermediary NGOs, or GRSOs (Fisher 1998, 13-17). These organizations, which have proliferated dramatically in the last 30 years, focus on people left out of the political system. They do this by: • increasing the density of civil society through the formation of networks that provide CBOs with outside support;15 • creating vested interests among the poor through programs that create microenterprises and community banks; • influencing other types of CSOs, such as churches, hospitals, businesses, and media outlets, to become more engaged at the grassroots level (Fisher 1993); • mitigating hierarchy and broadening local political activity geographically through participatory programs (Fisher 1993; 1998). In the chapters that follow we will test two specific assumptions: 1) that a democratic political context enables democratization NGOs to have a stronger impact, through a positive feedback relationship; and 2) that democratization NGOs can strengthen the ability of the larger civil society, including other NGOs and CBOs, to advance democratiza-

INTRODUCTION | 7

tion. Indeed, we assume that democratization NGOs have the potential to contribute to both the impact of the larger civil society and the impact of intermediary NGOs and CBOs on democracy. For example, in all three countries they are strengthening a potential loyal opposition by strengthening the larger civil society. While acknowledging the indirect democratic role of both the broader civil society and participatory development NGOs, this book focuses on those organizations that directly, deliberately, and self-consciously promote democracy. Just as some CSOs are better than others at promoting microenterprise development, so also are some “better at generating civic engagement and promoting healthy democracies . . . because of the specific attitudes and values they self-consciously promote” (Foley and Edwards 1997, 552). However, as yet there have been few attempts to measure the advocacy role of civil society in promoting democracy (Heinrich 2005).16 This is surprising, since CSOs of all kinds are usually committed to liberal democratic values, even in the most authoritarian societies.17 Indeed, according to Fowler (2002), “NGOs promoting democracy adopt enlightenment values deliberately.” Or, as Cohen and Arato (2003, 283, 286) point out, “[This] new terrain of democratization [is based on] the idea of self-limitation . . . learning in the service of democratic principle. . . . Paradoxically, the self-limitation of just such actors allows the continuation of their social role and influence.”18 The many specific ways in which democratization NGOs advance the democratic agenda in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina are explored in detail in the chapters that follow. The empirical research was focused on 103 field interviews and 5 meetings with leaders or staff of national and local NGOs that focus on a wide range of programs to strengthen democracy.19 (See Appendix IV: Research Methods.) These NGOs work on everything from elections to public deliberation, from human rights to prison reform, and some even strengthen the broader civil society itself.20 While these deliberate attempts at democratization are at best part of a fragmented, long-term journey, their wide scope has

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achieved tangible democratic advances within both societies and governments. Although not all of these organizations are powerful, they are all advocates for democracy and most are reasonably democratic in the way they operate.21 And, as Nelson Kasfir (2004, 130) observed, “Identifying those organizations within civil society that encourage democracy is a distinct improvement over the argument that civil society as a whole promotes democracy.”

Defining Democracy The meaning of democracy has been discussed, debated, and revised for at least two millennia. Although free elections continue to be seen as a necessary, if insufficient, ingredient of democratization, the rise of civil society has led scholars to extend and deepen definitions of democracy. One older definition, however, designed around stricter political boundaries and more formal institutions, is particularly useful for this discussion, because it focuses on democratic processes as central components of democracy. These processes also happen to be crucial to institutionalizing democracy and protecting it from hostile forces. Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy (what he calls “polyarchy”) includes three dimensions—political opposition, public participation, and law-based civil liberty.22 A fourth dimension, a democratic political culture, was defined by March and Olson (1995) as the increasing capacity of the political system to adapt to change and to deepen democracy. Although adaptability is related to opposition, public participation, and law-based civil liberties, a democratic political culture is a crucial asset in sustaining democracy once it develops.23 These four dimensions are used in this book to explore the work of democratization NGOs. By comparing the impact of civil society as a whole with the impact of democratization NGOs, this approach addresses a missing piece of the research puzzle.24 It also explores the indirect causal pathway between democratization NGOs and democracy that runs through civil society by strengthening its role as loyal opposition. Finally, it compares the ways that democratization NGOs deal with strength-

INTRODUCTION | 9

ening democratic processes in different national contexts and thereby explores the varieties and meanings of democracy. These differences do not undermine the strong overall case for democracy, which is linked to stability, socioeconomic development, and security (Halperin et al. 2005). (See Box 1.B.) Still, a comparison of these three countries highlights the different paths taken by democracy activists.

Box 1.B The Case for Democracy • Democracy may make catastrophes less likely, or at least help to mitigate their scale. No democracy with a free press has ever experienced a famine (Sen 2003).25 • Terrorism most often emerges out of closed societies, such as Pakistan.

• Between 1980 and 2001, the coefficient of variability in economic growth was lower for democracies at every income level. “Ninetyfive percent of the worst economic performances over the past 40 years were overseen by non-democratic governments” (Halperin et al. 2005, 13). • Life expectancies averaged 8-12 years longer in democracies. • Secondary school attendance is double in democracies. • Cereal yields are one-third higher in democracies.

• “Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other” and are less likely than autocracies to engage in war with autocracies (Halperin et al. 2005, 94-95; Sen 2003).

In some ways, democracy activists in South Africa and Argentina operate in similar contexts. Freedom House describes both countries as electoral democracies. Indeed, they have identical 2008 ratings of 2 on political rights and 2 on civil liberties (where 1 is a perfect democracy and 7 is the most dictatorial regime).26 Tajikistan, on the other hand, described as “unfree” by Freedom House, has a 2008 rating of 6 on political rights and 5 on civil liberties.

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While democracy ratings are useful as a starting point, however, they may also conceal as much as they reveal. South Africa may have sturdier, more capable, and less corrupt political institutions than Argentina, but the dimensions and challenges of poverty and HIV/AIDS in South Africa are greater and more dangerous for the future of democracy than similar challenges in Argentina. Tajikistan is authoritarian but has some strong participatory traditions at the local level. One NGO leader observed that the Tajiks have “more freedom than democracy.”27 The multiple pieces of the democratic puzzle are intricate and complex. Sustained democratization, as a deliberate agenda, is long and hard even in so-called “electoral democracies.” For democratization NGOs, fitting the pieces of the puzzle together may be even more difficult without positive political changes in the larger context. The long-term question posed but not answered by this research is whether a feedback relationship can develop between democratization NGOs and the larger process of democratization, which can in turn strengthen the impact of these organizations. A strong civil society makes democracy more likely, but democracy, in turn, can enhance “the enabling environment” for civil society.28 This book is organized around three chapters for each country. The first chapter of each country’s section begins with the historical, political, and economic context and continues with a discussion of the general contours of civil society. The second chapter in each section deals with the role of democratization NGOs in promoting both loyal opposition and law-based civil liberties. The third chapter focuses on their role in promoting political culture and political participation. Loyal opposition and law-based civil liberties help define democratization at the national level, whereas changes in political culture and increased political participation often occur throughout society. Although the order of the chapters is meant to set the stage for 1) changes at the national level and then 2) societal change, the causality and feedback of the relationships among these four indicators is far more complex, and often proceeds, for example, from changes in culture to changes in national politics. Follow-

INTRODUCTION | 11

ing the nine country chapters, the book concludes with a comparative overview and implications for international policy.

Endnotes 1

Ionescu and Madariaga, 14.

2

After World War II, military occupation led to democratic transitions in Germany, Japan, and Italy. Diamond (2007, 133), however, points out that the Axis had been totally defeated and the US occupation had “broad international legitimacy.” 3

My own field research for Technoserve, Save the Children, and Trickle Up has reinforced this observation, often made by other scholars. 4

See Salamon 1994.

5

www.freedomhouse.org.

6

There were approximately 50 democracies from the 1770s to the 1970s, which had increased to 58 by 1990. For a recent account of the worldwide status of democracy, see Diamond (2007). While tracking the gains made in the late 20th century, he also documents what he calls a “democratic recession” in the last 8 to 10 years. The recent “fourth wave” of democracy follows the first wave in the 18th and 19th centuries, the second following the end of World War II, and the third when the Portuguese and Spanish overturned dictators and inspired their former colonies in Latin America to do the same. It continued in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan and reached Eastern Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall (Hanley 2011, 1). 7 The definition is from Perez Diaz (1993, 56). The wide range of civil society definitions is not a new phenomenon. Hobbes’ meaning was similar to civic, whereas Hegel focused on the division of labor. However, Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to describe civil society in America in relation to democracy. 8

Markets should be included in the definition of civil society in developing countries because of the close connection between NGOs and economic-development initiatives, such as microcredit. 9 As with any such categorization there are intermediary NGOs and even CSOs, such as the labor federation in South Africa (COSATU), that sometimes work on democratization. These are included in the interviews. 10

There is also evidence that authoritarian countries, such as Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea, became more democratic as they developed economically. According to a British economist, the exceptions to this are low-tax city-states, such as Singapore, and low- or no-tax oil exporters (Charles Robertson, Letter to the Financial Times, March 2, 2010, 8).

11

A study of USAID evaluations found that democracy assistance was statistically significant in raising a country’s democracy levels as measured by Freedom House and Polity data sets. (See chapter 12, p. 3.) In addition to economic performance,

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the “neighborhood effect,” or the level of democracy in surrounding countries, also contributed to democratization (Sarles 2007). 12

An example is Botswana. Costa Rica, a middle-income country, was a democracy when it was still poor.

13

Perez Diaz 1993, 56; Shils 2003; Walzer 2003, 306. For an excellent collection of both the classical and contemporary literature on civil society, see Foley and Hodgkinson 2003. See also Putnam 1993.

14

Habib interview.

15

A comparison of NGO density and democracy in 87 developing countries concluded that countries with high democratic ratings, as measured by Freedom House, were unlikely to be paired with a low density of NGOs. Yet although high NGO density may be a necessary condition for civil society to impact democracy, it is surely not a sufficient one. If NGOs are dependent on rather than autonomous from government, high density may coexist with authoritarian rule, as in Egypt under Mubarak (Fisher 1998, 161, 187).

16

An exception to this was Stepan (1988, 3-4) in his work on military politics in the Southern Cone countries. He defines political society as the politicization of CSOs for the specific purpose of constructing a democratic state. Another suggestion for further research was made by Ann Florini (2000, 200) in crediting the human-rights movement within civil society, linked with transnational civil society, for “enduring human rights improvements” in Poland, the Czech Republic, South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Morocco.

17

Foley and Hodgkinson 2003, xix; Sen 2003.

18

Such liberal democratic values are, in Tuozzo’s (2004) assessment, Anglo Saxon, based on the values of the Enlightenment. This was echoed by one of the Argentine interviewees, who, more critically, characterized a question about the general status of civil society in Argentina as “a very US question.” Rizzotti and Mallea interview. In contrast, many “non-Western” governments have, according to Zakaria (2002) embraced the French model of democracy, which empowers the state rather than a Madisonian constitution based on ambition checking ambition.

19

The 108 interviews and meetings included more people, since 7 interviews were with 2 or more staff members and leaders from the same organization. Also included in the total are two workshops in South Africa and a round table and two group meetings in Tajikistan, involving larger numbers of people.

20

The interviews were conducted over three months in December 2005 (Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, South Africa); June 2006 (Dushanbe, Qurghonteppa, and Kulob, Tajikistan); and December 2006 (Buenos Aires and Tucumán, Argentina). Interview research was supported by a number of academic studies and websites. The research was a collaboration with the Kettering Foundation, which has strong ties with NGOs that work on public deliberation in those countries.

INTRODUCTION | 13

21

Some of the NGOs studied, particularly in Tajikistan, are extremely small, involving one or two people, so the question of internal democracy is a moot point. Management issues relating to internal democracy are not infrequent in NGOs, including democratization NGOs, but I found no obvious cases where this affected their agendas. 22

Dahl (1972, 2-3). Dahl’s generic definition is similar to the central definitional questions about democracy asked by two South Africans: How much control do people have over the actions of their government? (political opposition); How advanced is popular self-government? (participation); and How equal are people in the processes of controlling the actions of their government? (law-based civil liberties) (Calland and Graham 2005).

The definition of civil society used here is “markets, associations, and a sphere of public debate” (Perez Diaz 1993).

25

It has been difficult, however, for India to generate public support to combat endemic malnutrition. 26

The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance has a combined participation and human-rights ranking that places South Africa 5th among 53 countries, with a ranking of 71.

27

Karimov interview.

28

This is the central point in Perez Diaz’s The Return of Civil Society (1993).

C HA P T ER

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SOUTH AFRICA: History, Politics, & Civil Society History SEVENTEEN YEARS AFTER the transition from apartheid and the election of President Nelson Mandela, South Africa has become, despite its problems, a vibrant democracy. Although most thoughtful South Africans condemn apartheid’s continuing legacy of poverty and inequality, they are also buoyed by an optimism and sense of possibility that could only have emerged from the end of terrible repression and the avoidance of a violent racial cataclysm.1 Responding to a question about the sustainability of democracy, former archbishop Desmond Tutu observed, “We have the Constitutional Court, we have the Human Rights Commission, we have the Public Protector, and, I think that more than anything else, we have a lively civic society.”2 This chapter focuses first on South Africa’s history, providing background for its civil society today. Chapters 3 and 4 will deal with the role of democratization NGOs in strengthening democracy. When Jan van Riebeeck’s Dutch ship anchored at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, he and his followers mistook the tribal chiefs for absolute rulers, intensifying their own desire to conquer. In fact, the chiefs’ powers

SOUTH AFRICA | 15

were heavily circumscribed and the systems they presided over incorporated a considerable degree of grassroots democracy (Sparks 1990, 3, 5).3 Three bloody events in the 19th century helped define South Africa. First, the Great Trek of the Afrikaners (voortrekkers) into remote areas of South Africa intensified the displacement of tribal populations.4 Second, the chieftain Shaka transformed the Zulu minority into an agressive military power that ruled over two million subjects until their defeat at the hands of the voortrekkers. Finally, although the British defeated the Afrikaners in the Boer War at the end of the century, the Afrikaners were able to extend their policy of black exclusion to the whole of South Africa. Rapid urbanization, accompanied by compulsory segregation, further oppressed blacks, while the Land Act of 1913 abolished the tenant and sharecropping systems—which had supported an emerging stratum of more prosperous black families—and prohibited them from owning land.5 Elections in the 19th century familiarized the white minority with electoral procedures and party politics, and although democracy was limited to whites, it did rest on parliamentary law (Nupen 2004).6 This small, white-dominated democracy coexisted with the inhuman oppression of the non-white majority. Indeed, even poor Afrikaners were excluded from political power until the National Party won the elections in 1948. Until then, South Africans of English descent had “almost exclusive access to political power, to government, and its control, and most importantly, to . . . economic opportunity” ( Jenkins 2001). Then, as Afrikaners gained power for the first time, they tightened the exclusion of non-white groups and instituted the policies known as apartheid. Apartheid intensified and institutionalized the traditional exclusion of non-whites from politics and society. By 1952, only blacks born in urban areas were permitted to work in the cities, families were split up, and blacks arrested for not carrying their official “passes” numbered up to 2,000 per day.7 Arbitrary arrests and torture were routine. Moreover, huge disparities in educational spending worsened, prohibiting blacks from attending the major South African universities.

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By 1959, the Progressive Party had emerged as the first antiapartheid opposition within Parliament. However, African voters had been removed from the rolls in 1936, while “coloured,” or mixed-race, voters were removed in 1957.8 Executive decrees often bypassed Parliament, and the regime shackled the independent press. Interrogations without trial enabled the police to bypass the judiciary. Increasingly isolated from the international community, South Africa declared independence from the British and withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961. Outside the apartheid regime, the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, built on the success of Mohandas Gandhi in using civil disobedience against discriminatory legislation. Although ANC leaders were exiled or imprisoned, their cause was furthered by the emergence of the black trade union movement in the 1960s and the school children’s revolt against the compulsory teaching of Afrikaans in 1976. Although the apartheid system was a powder keg, through many years of struggle and international sanctions the white minority was forced to accept peaceful reform. In 1990, President F. W. de Klerk repealed the ban on the ANC and released Nelson Mandela from his imprisonment on Robben Island. The Transition to an inclusive democracy nevertheless began years before 1990. As Alistair Sparks (1990, 375) observed, “We can now see that the 1970s witnessed the death of apartheid ideology, fatally wounded by the failure of the black tide to turn and make the multistate solution [the creation of separate Bantustans within South African borders] viable, then given the coup de grace by the [1976] Soweto uprising.” The voters approved separate coloured and Indian parliaments in August 1983, leading to a massive revolt and the establishment of the United Democratic Front (UDF), comprised of 1,200 organizations. A year of political organizing led to a spontaneous countrywide revolt that lasted three more years, leading the government to respond with a combination of violent repression and economic concessions. Throughout this long pre-Transition, civil society played an increasingly important role. In 1955, the ANC, allied with the Indian Congress,

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the Coloured People’s Congress, the white Congress of Democrats including the Communist Party, and the nonracial Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), drafted the Freedom Charter containing the core principles of the anti-apartheid movement.9 CBOs, called “civics” began organizing at the local level to oppose apartheid.10 Emblematic of the growing role of civil society was a meeting in Dakar in 1987 between the ANC and anti-apartheid Afrikaners who had organized an NGO called the Institute for a Democratic Alternative (IDASA).11 IDASA sponsored more face-to-face meetings, as did others in and out of government. The coming of democracy to South Africa “wasn’t a miracle,” says IDASA executive director Paul Graham, “it was a lot of hard work.”12 Alex Boraine and the late Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, IDASA’s founders, believed they could do more by resigning from Parliament, generating discussion and promoting the idea that politics can be a civilizing activity.13 (See Box 2.) When Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994, his charisma, fame, and nearly universal support helped secure a peaceful Transition. Another major political accomplishment of the 1990s was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, essentially a tribunal that heard the testimonies of victims of violence during the struggle against apartheid. One study concludes that all ethnic groups have accepted the TRC’s version of the truth. By convincing citizens that no group was without dirty hands, the TRC created a collective national memory (Everding 2004). By subsequently publishing its own massive, objective record of the atrocities committed during the anti-apartheid struggle, it solidified the common historical ground necessary for national reconciliation.14

After Mandela When Thabo Mbeki was elected president in 1999, four groups dominated the ANC—the foreign-educated intellectuals who were suspicious of civil society’s watchdog role on issues from AIDS to Zimbabwe, the “elders” whose more consensual style had emerged during years of

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Box 2. IDASA’s History In February 1986, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the

parliamentary opposition, and Alex Boraine, chair of the Federal Council of the anti-apartheid Progressive Federal Party, founded

IDASA to generate discussion and political engagement and to work

with the forces for change. As followers of British political theorist

Bernard Crick, they emphasized the civilizing potential of politics and the central role of citizenship.15

During the Transition, IDASA staff focused on citizen education by helping train local leaders. They also opened a dialogue leading to a

secret meeting between ANC leaders and white military commanders. With the end of apartheid, IDASA changed its name to the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. By 1993, IDASA was increasingly

focused on strengthening elections, empowering voters, strengthen-

ing government capacity and providing a nonpartisan space for civil society.

After the 1994 elections, IDASA’s Parliamentary Information and

Monitoring Service (PIMS) began submitting reports on transparency,

accountability, and other democratic processes to Parliament. IDASA received contracts to facilitate public participation in hearings and to provide legislative analyses and information to other NGOs and the media. After 1997, IDASA began refining its current focus on the

centrality of citizenship for deepening and strengthening democracy

(Boyte 2004a; London 2004; Triwibowo 2005). As of 2008, IDASA had a staff of 125 and a budget of approximately $15 million. In recent years, IDASA has become an international, as well as a national NGO, working on democratization on the African continent.

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imprisonment on Robben Island, the inziles or internal South Africans who experienced years of struggle within the townships, and a military wing established in exile camps outside the country (Gumede 2005).16 This diverse partnership has had little influence since the Transition on the government’s overall adherence to neoliberal economic policy in response to globalization.17 Although COSATU and even the Communists have had some influence on social policy, and elements of Mandela’s policies remain, including promoting affirmative action and allowing labor unions to invest in the private sector, progress in addressing poverty and inequality has fallen far short of expectations. The socioeconomic challenge is not new. During its last years in power, the apartheid government responded to increasing political opposition with attempts to address South African poverty and inequality. Roelf Meyer, who described himself as part of the first Afrikaner generation to attend university, was Deputy Minister of Police in the apartheid government in the 1980s. Meyer described his own growing realization that the solution “did not lie in social and economic reform, but was political.”18 Now that dramatic political progress has been achieved, however, South Africans view socioeconomic stagnation as the most serious threat to the sustainability of democracy.19 The ANC government inherited a huge debt, crippling educational inequalities, a high crime rate and an economic recession. Even today, half of all South Africans live in poverty, while unemployment is at least 40 percent (Habib and Schulz-Herzenberg 2005). The ANC has ambitious land-redistribution goals, but by the end of 2010, little had been achieved in this area.20 Twenty-five percent of African children are malnourished and whites still earn ten times as much as blacks (Ballard et al. 2005, 10). Despite improvements in housing, sanitation, and education, Alistair Sparks’ (2003) comparison of South Africa to a double-decker bus remains accurate.21 The top deck is comprised, for the first time, of coloured, blacks, and Indians as well as whites. The bottom deck, however, which dwarfs the upper deck, remains poor and black.22 By 2008, South Africa ranked

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only 125th of 179 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index.23 Recent reports indicate that provincial government corruption has had a huge impact on the effort to address inequality (Polgreen 2012, 1). A related threat is violent crime. Although overall crime rates have stabilized since 2000, the murder rate remains one of the highest in the world.24 Organized crime, ignored by the apartheid regime during its struggle with the ANC, planted deep roots in South African society in the 1980s. Drugs, prostitution, and money laundering continue, according to Peter Gastrow, then the outspoken head of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS): “One of our biggest exports is South African organized crime, which pre-dates Transition.”25 Along with poverty and violent crime, South Africa also copes with a major HIV/AIDS epidemic and the near collapse of the public health system, due to inadequate support. President Mbeki’s incomprehensible refusal to use anti-retroviral treatment undermined prevention as well. By 2007, an estimated 6.6 million South Africans were HIV positive (13.6 percent of the population) and there were 1.4 million orphans under the age of 15 (WHO 2008).26 In 2009, it was estimated that 310,000 South Africans died of the disease, more than in any other country.27 Despite recent improvements in government policy that include providing antiretroviral drugs to prevent HIV transmission from mothers to newborns, South Africa is paying for years of official denial and neglect. All this occurs in a country with a developed infrastructure, a GNP per capita over $3,000, a life expectancy over 60, a well-developed banking system, and a tax system with good compliance. South Africa also has the lowest malnutrition rate in Africa and the highest (80 percent) literacy rate.28 In addition, some socioeconomic progress has taken place since Transition. South Africa’s female primary school completion rate is now estimated at 100 percent.29 Access to sanitation reached 93 percent of South African households by 2011, although this figure masks regional and rural-urban differences. Electrical connections reached 70 percent of the population by 2004, but only about half of rural inhabitants by 2011

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(Brackenbury 2004).30 Eighty percent of the elderly poor receive a state pension that also benefits their families, and almost two million lowincome houses have been built. Overall, 14 million South Africans benefit from social-assistance programs.31 Yet these accomplishments have only begun to address the interwoven challenges of poverty and HIV/AIDS that threaten democratic progress. Many of the NGO leaders interviewed criticized Mbeki for the $4.8 billion spent on an international arms deal in 1999 and the neoliberal Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy.32 Despite its attempt to “play the game” of global economic orthodoxy, South Africa has proved unable to attract significant foreign or even domestic investment. Indeed, some on the left accused South African corporations of engaging in an “investment strike.”33 Andrew Feinstein (2007, 69) argues that job protection and conditions of service provisions have severely limited the number of jobs that can be created by the private sector, while public works schemes have been poorly implemented. Policymakers have, in effect, reduced employment with one hand and failed to create it with the other. The election of ANC heavyweight Jacob Zuma to the presidency in 2010 did not change South Africa’s odd political architecture. A nominally left-wing coalition tainted by neoliberal economic policies is still opposed by small right-wing parties, grouped into the Democratic Alliance.34 Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance was mayor of Cape Town from 2006 to 2009, then became premier of the Western Cape, and the party did increase its national share of the vote to 24 percent in the 2011 municipal elections. In addition, a young woman, Lindiwe Mazibuko, became the first black leader of the party’s parliamentary caucus in October 2011. A new party, Congress of the People (COPE), broke away from the ANC in November 2008 and has some cross-racial appeal.35 However, COPE received only 8 percent in the April 2009 elections, due to political infighting.36 Given the weak and still uncertain character of the partisan opposition, civil society has partially assumed an oppositional role.37 Trade

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unions and the Chamber of Commerce have both played a huge role in parliamentary reform and, along with the media, managed to retain their independence.38 This role may be fragile, however.39 According to Vincent Williams of IDASA, who grew up in a Cape Town melange of coloured, white, and Asian people, “The ANC works on the principle that if you are not with us, you are against us. Civil society should take a role in the opposition, but it is very hard to do so.” His colleague Ivor Jenkins, who joined the ANC as a young man after observing the horrors of apartheid as a train conductor, is more sanguine, arguing that there has never been “a style or place in which we have felt restricted. If others feel that way, then it is self-imposed” [emphasis added].40 Certainly, civil-society activists are right to complain about the lack of an enabling environment (tax benefits, easy registration, and so on) for civil society. At the same time, the role of a loyal opposition is still uncharted political territory for South African NGOs. Even the concept of a loyal opposition, let alone its functioning, requires political maturation on all sides. As of the end of 2011, there were ominous signs that the ANC regime was becoming increasingly impatient, not only with South Africa’s independent press, but even with its independent judiciary.

The Contours of Civil Society What is civil society? Many observers equate civil society with the associational sphere of life between the family and the state, while other describe it as an alternative to the existing political and economic order.41 As already noted here, however, we use Victor Perez Diaz’s (1993, 56) broad definition, which views civil society as “markets, associations, and a sphere of public debate.”

Civil Society in South Africa: Markets Many international corporations are active in South Africa, and thanks largely to the Sullivan Code, enacted by the United States Congress during the apartheid years, international companies operating in

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South Africa had to introduce triple bottom-line reporting and add public affairs staff, putting pressure on South African companies to do the same (Everett et al. 2005).42 Almost a fourth of the funding for a CIVICUS study of 213 CSOs came from the business sector and many businesses requested copies of the report.43 South Africa’s corporate responsibility programs are “among the best in the world” and, adjusting for population size, are equal to those of the United States (Everett et al. 2005).44 Because of limits on tax deductibility, however, private donations to NGOs are lower than this positive assessment of corporate responsibility would suggest. Support from South African foundations is also weak, because most, with the exception of the Mandela Foundation and the Shuttleworth Foundation, are tied to rich families with pet charities and are run by law firms.45 A South African donors association called Interfund closed in 2004 and the Southern African Grantmakers’ Association (SAGA) was downsized and then closed in 2006 for lack of funding.46 A second challenge is the need to build more connections between business and professional associations on the one hand and CSOs on the other. Businesses often fail to perceive themselves as part of civil society, even though they might benefit from the alliance.47 Although this topic clearly merits further research, this discussion will focus more intensively on the other two components of civil society: 1) associations and 2) a sphere of public debate, including both the media and the voice of citizens.

Civil Society: Associational Life Three forces shaped associational life in South Africa. The first was the corporatist tradition of Dutch settlers, who created civic associations to deliver services and were active in Dutch Reformed churches.48 At a later stage, in reaction to the struggle against apartheid, the Dutch Reformed churches and the Federaton of Afrikaans Cultural Associations were used to promote Afrikaner nationalism as a civic religion. The second force was British colonialism, which not only opened space for foreign charities and missions, but also permitted them to

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develop in different ways. For example, in the late 19th century the Ethiopian church movement branched off from the Wesleyan Church. The third, and most important, force was the traditional self-help spirit of indigenous peoples at the community level (Swilling et al. 2004). This was translated into the national level in the 1880s, when the first African political organizations, Kllasso Imbumba Yama Afrika and the Native Electoral Association, were organized. After 1910, black South Africans were excluded from political life and the South African Native National Congress (which later became the ANC) was organized. After 1948, exclusionary policies against blacks led to the vigorous growth of traditional burial societies, rotating credit associations (stokvels), labor unions, professional associations, ratepayers associations, and sports clubs. Some of these CBOs joined CSOs, such as COSATU, the National Education Union, the South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and, later, the UDF during the anti-apartheid struggle.49 This not only blurred divisions between political action and civil society, it also promoted mass mobilization against apartheid, as activists were arrested and their offices bombed by the regime (Gerhart 2004). This broad civic movement, often led by township women and young people, gained allies with the founding of IDASA and a handful of other democratization NGOs in the 1980s.50 With the end of the Government of National Unity of de Klerk and Mandela, political conciliation and a peaceful transfer of power took precedence over political advocacy. Local and regional peace committees organized under the National Peace Accord monitored political rallies, investigated instances of violence, calmed tensions, and enhanced communication among different organizations. The peace committees sometimes suffered from gender and racial imbalance, yet without them the Transition would have been more violent.51 Citizens and CSOs also mobilized in massive numbers to ensure wide participation in a free election, utilizing tens of thousands of trainers in community centers. The Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, IDASA, and

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the Matla Trust printed millions of pamphlets, produced numerous radio and television programs, and launched a secondary school program on democratic citizenship.52 Traveling theater groups performed plays about democracy and voting in eight languages. Elections were staffed and monitored by 100,000 South Africans with 4,000 international observers, coordinated by a United Nations Observer Mission, with NGOs given specific electoral tasks (Diamond 1997; Sisk n.d.). Ironically, the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 led to a temporary crisis for CSOs. International donor support, generous during the Transition, shifted to the new government; those donors that continued placed new accounting and reporting requirements on civil society recipients.53 Hardest hit by the funding crisis were CBOs and intermediary NGOs that had provided services not supplied by the apartheid state.54 Many CSOs experienced an identity crisis as to whether they were partners or opponents of the new government, magnified by unfulfilled government promises of financial support for civil society. (See p. 31.)55 In contrast, democratization NGOs, such as IDASA, whose programs had not filled the governmental void, were less affected, as were those that had already focused on their own organizational capacities.56 Even more damaging to CSOs, while a natural consequence of greater democratic enfranchisement, was the loss of key civil-society leaders, many of whom were drawn to government or the private sector by affirmative action policies. Up to 60 percent of NGO staff of intermediary NGOs and other CSOs of the anti-apartheid era left after 1994 to take government posts, although many have subsequently left government.57 Nevertheless, while many organizations dissolved, new organizations took their place and the number of intermediary NGOs held constant. After 2000, funding for civil society began to increase.58 As of 2001, a study sponsored by Johns Hopkins found that there were approximately 98,000 CSOs, of which 52,000 were CBOs and 20,000 were intermediary NGOs, mostly involved in development, with the remainder being CSOs,

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such as churches and unions (Everett et al. 2005).59 In 2011, the Department of Social Affairs of the South African government reported that there were 65,633 registered nonprofit organizations in South Africa.60 By the middle of the decade, civil society had moved beyond the crisis of the 1990s and had begun to redefine itself.61 Unions and churches are among “the most active groups in civil society,” Roelf Meyer said, and “lawmakers regularly accept input from NGOs on pending legislation.”62 Moreover, “the AIDS crisis reactivated civil society,” because of increased international funding and AIDS activism.63 CSOs also play an important role in South Africa’s economy. They employ 4 percent of the economically active population, or 7.6 percent of the total non-agricultural economy, a larger workforce than mining. In economic terms, South Africa has the second largest civil-society sector of 36 transitional countries, second only to Argentina (Swilling et al. 2004).64 According to a study of 12 countries, South Africa’s civil society ranked second only to New Zealand’s in size and diversity and ranked the highest of all the countries studied in terms of the “space” accorded it by progressive constitutional and legal frameworks.65 Nonetheless, participants in the study called for a more “enabling environment” for registration and tax deductions for donors.66 South African civil society also suffers from a growing cynicism within its ranks, although this doubtless reflects the more sober mood characteristic of post-Mandela South Africa (Camay and Gordon 2001).

Intermediary NGOs Although the brain drain to government has subsided in recent years, experienced leaders schooled in the anti-apartheid movement have been replaced with less experienced staff. Another structural weakness is the relative scarcity of women’s organizations, although there are exceptions.67 One of these exceptions is the Self-Employed Women’s Association in Durban, with more than 2,000 members. Modeled on the Self-Employed Women’s Association of India, it lobbies for recognition of the infor-

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mal economic sector. Another is Black Sash, originally founded by white women opposed to apartheid, who had successfully navigated their own transition to multiracial membership. Still another structural weakness of intermediary NGOs is that international funding is increasingly contingent upon programs focused on the southern African region as a whole.68 As a result, NGO activity in South Africa itself may decline. Several large NGOs in Pretoria and Cape Town have become international NGOs in other African countries.69 IDASA’s Governance and AIDS Project (GAP), for example, organizes political leaders throughout the southern African region. According to Vincent Williams, only 20 percent of IDASA’s total work was focused on South Africa by late 2005.70 Although this shift may strengthen the ability of South African NGOs to work on regional issues, such as crime and immigration reform, it poses a serious challenge for intermediary NGOs. Intermediary NGOs with a self-conscious and deliberate interest in promoting democracy are the subject of the next two chapters. However, a much larger group of CSOs are political advocates, usually on socioeconomic issues. According to one source, as many as 7 percent of all CSOs (11,500) are involved in issues that relate in some way to “advocacy and politics” (McGrath Gumbo 2008, 4).

CBOs Whether they date to the apartheid era or are newer, CBOs use volunteers and provide community services, such as crèches for young children.71 Rotating credit associations facilitate increased entrepreneurial activity in black communities. Understandably, half of all CBOs are now focused on AIDS, and although many of these are simply taking care of HIV-positive members of their communities, some are more overtly political.72 Other political CBOs are linked to churches in poor neighborhoods that have borrowed from the ideas of liberation theology in Latin America, which emerged in response to Pope John XXIII’s focus on social justice.73

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Rural areas, where the population is more dispersed, have fewer organizations than urban areas. The prevalence of traditional leaders in rural areas hampered mobilization by CBOs engaged in participatory development or care of AIDS patients. Also, most donors are in major metropolitan areas and are less accessible to rural CBOs, or even NGOs.74

Social Movements Broad horizontal social movements linking more than one neighborhood or community have grown in numbers and importance since 2001. Faith-based networks among low-income church communities in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and elsewhere create public goods, such as clinics and cooperatives, and provide scholarships to low-income students (Boyte 2004a, 63).75 Some of them are conservative, ultra religious, or even vigilante in orientation, mixing religion with other agendas, while others mix religion with protest agendas. (In Wentworth, anti-pollution activists tie their cause to the Holy Ghost.76) Greenstein (2003, 17) argues that this “uncontrolled untidiness” of social movements strengthens pluralism, self-organization, and resistance to forced unification. Social movements, however, tend to be dependent on larger organizations, such as COSATU or even the ANC, for service delivery, leading to tensions and resentment.77 As Ashwin Desai of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal observed, COSATU and the social movements “cannot find a meeting ground.”78 Many social movements are better at protest marches than political action and more focused on problems than solutions.79 A study of the Landless People’s Movement concluded that it had many internal conflicts and that many of its strongest leaders have died of AIDS (Xeswi 2005). This is a reminder that the costs of this disease are political as well as humanitarian, economic, and financial. Both social movements and CBOs do, however, raise the visibility of issues that lie beneath the national radar, such as electricity or water connections for poor communities (Barchiesi 2004). As Peter Gastrow said,

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“The mobilization within communities plays a significant role in shaping the views of ordinary South Africans that civil society organizations have a role to play.”80

Civil Society: The Sphere of Public Debate Although civil society includes both organizations and the public voice, the two can be connected. IDASA staff members, for example, write newspaper articles on a regular basis.81 The public voice also includes citizens, be they presidents of large NGOs, journalists writing political columns, members of CBOs expressing their opinions, people writing letters to newspapers, people deliberating in neighborhood discussions, or even government officials expressing their political opinions. The public voice depends on citizens willing to “support, defend and sustain democratic practices” (Mattes, Davids, and Africa 2000, 1). The modest (60 percent) support for democracy voiced in this South African survey should be weighed against the 65 percent who see democracy as better than the alternatives (Logan, Fujiwara, and Parish 2006, 15-16).82 Generally, however, South Africans are more likely to emphasize the importance of socioeconomic outcomes than democratic processes, such as regular elections or free speech (Bratton and Mattes 2000). Most of the CBOs are, understandably, focused on socioeconomic issues and not, in the first instance, on building democracy. As Mpho Putu, a former community leader who worked for IDASA observed, “When you ask people at the CBO level what they think about democracy, they often give strange answers since they are organized around [socioeconomic] issues.”83 Still, 60 percent of South Africans ranked civil liberties uppermost in their definitions of democracy, among the highest figures in a 12-country study (Bratton and Cho 2006, 19-21). Although support for a multiparty system declined slightly, South Africans in 2006 expressed more support for democracy than other African populations.84 Public talk can also lead to citizen action, such as an NGO staff member initiating a network with other NGOs, a church-based CBO raising

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money for scholarships, or a woman wrongly disinherited who challenges traditional inheritance law enshrined in the remnants of apartheid legislation through a court case. Public talk and public action have the potential to strengthen the associational structures of civil society as well. Increased ties between CSOs and the media could broaden opinion and coverage. Although 57 percent of the CIVICUS respondents said the media came to them “very often” (17 percent) or “occasionally” (40 percent), 40 percent said they themselves needed a more proactive media strategy (Camay and Gordon 2001). The more formal expression of the sphere of public debate is the media. As of 2006, there were 20 daily and 13 weekly newspapers in South Africa. More than 14 million South Africans buy urban dailies, while community newspapers have a circulation of more than 5 million.85 Three-fourths of the population have access to television (Camay and Gordon 2001). Moreover, independent journalists, who had been censored or arrested under apartheid, emerged from the struggle with a “fierce commitment” to independence.86 Despite suspicion at all levels of government—which often stonewalls the media—freedom of the press is real and the quality of journalism high in South Africa. In 2010, the Press Freedom Index, compiled by Reporters Without Borders, ranked South Africa 38th out of 175 countries.87 Although some worry about the revolving door between journalists and the president’s public relations office, a more serious threat to narrowing the range of opinion is the concentration of media ownership. During apartheid, there were four media giants; now there are only two. Much of the alternative press closed after 1994. Although there were already independent black-owned papers at the end of the 19th century, the media today represents “the privileged,” and the shift to black ownership has actually enhanced business control of the media (Harber 2004/2005, 5). There are now approximately 100 community radio stations, but they generally lack the technical capacity to reach beyond the local level.88 Many local radio stations don’t even have e-mail. Local media is some-

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times reluctant to criticize the government because it provides them with advertising revenue.89

Civil Society and Government During the early years of the new regime, official relationships between civil society and government followed a narrow corporatist pattern, based on representation from labor, selected CSOs and business ( James and Caliguire 1996).90 Although NGOs deemed to be involved in politics were prohibited from receiving foreign funds, NGOs began petitioning the government to repeal or reform repressive laws from the old regime. The government established the Transitional National Development Trust to support civil society and replace declining international support, but little money was disbursed at first. The trust was soon replaced by the National Development Agency (NDA), which one NGO leader called “a disaster. . . . They strangle an organization to death before they give it money.”91 Nor has NDA followed up on the millions of rand provided to cooperatives.92 Lottery revenues, also designed to assist CSOs, are usually delayed and the tax system provides only modest relief (Reitzes and Friedman 2001).93 As of 2010, a group of NGOs was conducting research on the funding practices of both NDA and the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF), designed to improve funding practices and understand the scarcity of NGO applications.94 Despite some improvements in recent years, the government remains uncomfortable with civil-society criticism and seems to prefer, in IDASA training expert Marie Strom’s words, “NGOs that clap and cheer.”95 President Nelson Mandela himself made some negative comments about civil society’s critical views of government, and government officials are edgy about civil society’s watchdog role (Kihato 2001).96 According to Paul Graham, whose calm is grounded in a mastery of South African politics, “Anti-civil-society rhetoric comes and goes but if you meet Mbeki he says, ‘I am not talking about you.’ I’ll get scared only if the rhetoric turns to action.”97

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Official attention to CBOs is often defined on government terms. Although “ingenious systems to combine spatial, economic and development planning with democratic deliberation” have been enacted, ANC ward committees are privileged over other forms of local input (Pieterse 2002, 126-127).98 Even when some local stakeholders are included, others, such as the Landless People’s Movement, are not (Pieterse 2002, 127). Often, according to Janine Hicks, a lively young woman from the Center for Public Participation in Durban, citizens are drawn in too late and become rubber stamps: “It is not deliberative.” The government can also be intolerant of human-rights NGOs working at the community level.99 Perhaps the most complex dimension of their relationship with government is for CSOs to play the role of a loyal opposition. This is especially crucial, given the lack of a multiparty system. As Marcella Naidoo, the warm and outgoing but intense head of Black Sash, said, “The organs of state should be respected and challenged.”100 Vincent Williams of IDASA calls this “critical loyalty.”101 Yet there are tensions between those who want civil society to fill the vacuum left by a weak partisan opposition and those who are uneasy about this role and would prefer to limit civil-society advocacy to particular policy issues. The next chapter will explore this issue, which includes civil society strengthening itself and promoting a better “enabling environment.” The Non-Profit Act defines nonprofit organizations, registration procedures, and an elaborate system of tax exemptions aimed at facilitating donations. Although a law passed in 2000 allows the Minister of Finance to determine a list of “public benefit” activities, it is still limited in scope (Kihato 2001).

Conclusion South Africa has strong assets that can be utilized to build democracy—democratic traditions, national pride in the peaceful end of apartheid, and a strong civil society. These assets have the potential to increase the positive feedback between the political context and the

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work of democratization NGOs. The democracy agenda, however, is burdened with formidable social and economic challenges. The next two chapters describe the democratizing potential of civil society as a whole, with a specific concentration on democratization NGOs. Chapter 3 focuses on the creation of a loyal opposition and lawbased civil liberties. Although South Africa’s legal building blocks are in place, the ongoing challenge of building a loyal opposition remains. Chapter 4 deals with political participation and a democratic political culture.

Endnotes 1

Steven Friedman, Centre for Policy Studies, observed, “We were convinced that this system would never change or would implode into cataclysm.” Friedman interview. 2

Gumede 2005, 237.

3

Sparks also points out the original Stone Age peoples, the Khokhoi and the San, had already been gradually invaded by black Africans pushed out by the advent of cultivation and a population explosion in the northern sector of black Africa. This later provided the architects of apartheid with justification for conquering peoples who were not “native” and therefore had little claim to their land. 4 Sparks (1990, 42) argues that the isolation of the Afrikaner ancestors, “froze them in time,” and they developed few institutions. 5

Ibid., 133.

6

Meyer interview.

7

Non-whites were required to carry passes at all times under apartheid.

8

Meyer pointed out that opportunities for lower-income whites expanded under apartheid. Meyer, unlike his older brother, was able to attend the university. Before his gradual but complete conversion to the anti-apartheid cause, “I grew up and never questioned what had been good for me.” Meyer interview. 9

Crick, who died in December 2008, was a founder of the civic-education movement and the author of numerous books about politics.

16

Roelf Meyer agreed with Gumede about the consensual style emerging from exile, as well as imprisonment, which “made leaders more reflective and gave them international experience.” Meyer interview. 17

Friedman interview. Ashwin Desai also pointed out that unions have lost members because of job losses. Desai interview.

18

Meyer interview.

19

This conclusion emerged from 32 interviews with 35 people, as well as many informal conversations.

20

www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/landreform.php.

21

As of 2008, the Senior Certificate Pass rate was 62.2 percent, compared to only 53 percent in 1990 (Lapper 2010).

22

The World Cup in 2010 in Nelspruit dramatized these tensions, as local people asked how there could be money for a 46,000-seat stadium while many of them live without electricity or toilets (Bearak 2010).

23

This was almost identical to Tajikistan (124), but significantly below Argentina’s ranking of 46. The Human Development Index now includes adult literacy; life expectancy at birth; gross enrollment ratios at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education; and GDP per capita. See www.hdr.undp.org. Overall, according to recent (2008) figures, South Africa ranks third in Africa after Mauritius and the Seychelles Islands.

24

Makue interview. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance gives South Africa a rating of .61 out of 100 on safety and security, a number that did not change between 2000 and 2006 (www.moibrahimfoundation.org). See also Lapper 2010, who cites data showing that the murder rate per 100,000 declined from 66.9 in 1994 to 37.3 in 2008/2009.

25

Gastrow interview.

26

Another source indicated that HIV prevalence among adults was 11.6 percent by 2008 (Lapper 2010).

27

www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm.

28

Meyer interview.

29

See www.moibrahimfoundation.org. Female primary completion rate is a much stronger indicator of educational progress than gross or even net enrollment ratios, because girls are more likely to drop out of school in many countries.

30

www.mbendi.com.

31

www.SouthAfrica.info.

32

For a detailed account of the corruption embedded in the arms deal, which has led to the upcoming trial of recently elected ANC president Jacob Zuma, see the absorbing discussion in Feinstein (2007, Chapter 13). Rather than implying some sort

SOUTH AFRICA | 35

of negative African exception to international rules of behavior, he describes the rules of the international arms trade as “wired for corruption,” with Mbeki and the ANC behaving like the elites of the developed countries. Mandela, in these terms, was the positive African exception. 33

Coleman interview.

34

By 2010, divisions within the ANC seemed to be increasing, propelled by new scandals over Zuma’s fathering an illegitimate child.

35

There are some reasons for this. In 2008, ANC “thugs” broke up some COPE meetings.

36

Financial Times, April 23, 2009.

37

Faull interview.

38

Ibrahim Fakir, Fakir and Edighi interview.

39

Gastrow interview.

40

Williams interview. Ivor Jenkins, Jenkins and Putu interview.

41

Edwards, Foley, and Diani (2001) describe this as Gramscian, because it echoes the early 20th-century Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci.

42

Ahmed Motala of the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) observed that corporate philanthropy in South Africa is often linked to corporate needs, such as early childhood education for employees. Motala interview. Brett Davidson of IDASA pointed out that corporate support is usually small, focusing on, for example, a handicapped basketball team in a township. Davidson interview.

43

It may be that the CIVICUS questionnaire did not give them this field of choice. See Camay and Gordon 2001.

44

Graham interview.

45

Graham interview.

46

Brewis interview. See also Milner and Hartnell 2006.

47

Camay and Gordon 2001. One benefit might be increased access to government. The ANC has been criticized for charging fees for access to government. (Freedom House, “Freedom in the World—South Africa [2009].” www.freedomhouse.org.)

48

As many theorists have pointed out, CSOs do not always promote positive goals.

49

The UDF was created in 1983 as a multiracial umbrella organization that included unions, civic associations, and SACC. Interestingly, Beyers Naude, who headed SACC, was an Afrikaner expelled from the Dutch Reformed Church because of his opposition to apartheid. Makue interview. See also Camay and Gordon 2002.

50

On the role of women, see Cronin 2005. Eddie Makue, then general secretary of SACC, argued that it was the township women who “carried the heaviest load” in the struggle. Makue interview. However, there were also many small towns and rural areas where social capital was extremely weak before Transition, as exemplified in a study of the town of Dullstroom. Social capital in both white and black areas was extremely weak in the 1990s. More recently the business chamber, community chest,

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and a Tourism and Transformation Committee have been organized. “Once people started to recognize the potential of town, community, and self-development ... it was as if the people started to awaken from a long sleep” ( Jenkins 2001, 26). 51

IDASA continues to use conciliation to build democracy within both government and civil society, ensuring that there is a bridge between them, “since democracy needs a strong civil society and a strong state—interacting with each other all the time.” Ivor Jenkins, in 2006 comments on the first draft of this chapter.

52

The Institute for Multi-Party Democracy has closed its South Africa office, and the Matla Trust is no longer traceable.

53

Jonathan Faull of IDASA observed that much of the earlier international funding had gone to what he called “forgiveness factories,” working on mediation and conciliation strategies between different groups. Faull interview.

54

Williams interview. IDASA, for example, was able to build on earlier organizational support as well as funding provided by a German foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung.

55

Comments by Ivor Jenkins on the first draft of this chapter, 2006.

56

Graham interview.

57

Dawood interview.

58

Habib interview. According to a Centre for Civil Society Study cited by Habib, international money, which reached $50 million between 2000 and 2005, has focused on HIV/AIDS.

59

There are difficulties in estimating numbers of CBOs. Fowler (2002) estimated that 52 percent of the associations South Africans belong to are not officially registered. According to data from the Department of Social Development, the number of registered NGOs in South Africa (presumably of all types) tripled between 2000 and 2005, from 13,282 to 36,981. See Milne and Taylor 2006.

60

See Report from the National NPO Database, Department of Social Development, April 2011 (www.usig.org/countryinfo/SouthAfrica.asp). The earlier figure is probably larger because so many CBOs are not registered.

61

That civil society was at a new stage was the almost universal conclusion from my interviews in South Africa. According to Roelf Meyer, this was enhanced when people began to be self-conscious that they were part of civil society. A 2001 conference sponsored by his organization, the Civil Society Initiative and IDASA, with Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton as speakers, increased this awareness. Meyer interview. There were more differences among interviewees over the mission of civil society.

62

Meyer interview. Some churches, however, benefit from owning huge tracts of land and have “almost feudal” relationships with tenant labor committees (Greenstein 2003). The second quote is from Freedom House, Freedom in the World—South Africa 2008, 3 (www.freedomhouse.org).

63

Faull and Meyer interviews. Meyer estimated that there were approximately 10,000 AIDS organizations of all kinds in South Africa.

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64

According to Swilling et al. (2004), South African CSOs had expenditures of more than $1.7 billion in 1998 and 64,000 equivalent workers, including a relatively high level of volunteers equivalent to 3.4 percent of the workforce. This compared to 7.4 percent in developed countries and 4.8 percent in Argentina.

65

www.civicus.org.

66

Impact was below the mean for the 11 countries studied, and participants complained that they had no way to evaluate it. 67

Graham interview. This point was emphasized by several of those interviewed. According to Pottie and Hassim (2003, 85) the political profile of the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) faded as activist women entered the government after the Transition. During a follow-up meeting at IDASA in February 2008, several staff members pointed out that gender issues have been “mainstreamed by the government,” thus reducing the likelihood of NGO action. Women politicians created a national women’s network in 2006, for example. However, putting women on the party list for elections is still a top-down approach. 68

Many interviews.

69

In contrast, the Nelson Mandela Foundation does not limit its activities to southern Africa and recently hosted an Iraqi delegation. Although IDASA’s activities are primarily focused on southern Africa, it has hosted both the head of the Constitutional Convention and the president-elect of Bolivia.

70

Williams interview. This has been reinforced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has working relationships with governments at all levels. The Southern African Migration Project, for example, founded in 1996, includes SADC, Canada, and South Africa, represented by IDASA.

71

Benjamin interview.

72

Habib interview. HSRC is a parastatal research organization, but Adam Habib told me that more than half of his research money comes from outside the government.

73

Makue interview.

74

The workshops were conducted with the assistance of the Cooperative for Research and Education (CORE) and IDASA and excluded parastatals, known as “Chapter 9 organizations,” as well as other CSOs, such as political parties, universities, GONGOs, and local and international grantmaking foundations.

75

Jenkins and Putu interview.

76

Desai interview.

77

Social movement protests over provision of water and other services were widespread in the late 1990s. See Bond 2004. 78

Desai interview.

79

Williams interview; Graham interview. See also Barchiesi 2004.

80

Gastrow interview.

81

Faull interview.

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82 www.afrobarometer.org. This was lower than in four other counties, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi (Mattes et al. 2000, 4). 83

Jenkins and Putu interview.

84

www.afrobarometer.org, Briefing Paper No. 40. Afrobarometer is an independent research program that measures the social, economic and political conditions in Africa. It has three core partners—IDASA, the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana, and the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin. It is funded by bilateral donors from the developed countries.

85

www.southafrica.info.

86

Ironically, when some of those same journalists criticize the current South African government, they receive more attention than Afrikaner newspapers that are below the government’s radar (Harber 2004/2005).

87

www.rsf.org. Meeting of All Media Group, convened by Brett Davidson, IDASA, Cape Town, November 28, 2005. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance gave South Africa a ranking of 93.9 on press freedom for 2006, although this had declined slightly from 97.9 in 2000 (www.moibrahim foundation.org).

88

Media Workshop at IDASA.

89

Ibid.

90

This was mainly done through the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a research and consultative body of government officials, with some representation from labor, business, and the other members of civil society, including the National Co-Operatives Associations of South Africa and the National Women’s Coalition (www.nedlac.org.za).

91

This was a sentiment expressed by many of those interviewed, although, for obvious reasons, the particular source will remain anonymous.

92

Desai interview.

93

Most benefits reach a small number of organizations concentrated in provinces with the most NGOs, such as Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape (Greenstein 2004; and IDASA 2001). As in most countries, NGOs focusing on political advocacy are less likely to get support than service agencies, however, this is also likely to strengthen their autonomous political role.

94

www.ngopulse.org/node/13480.

95

Boyte and Strom interview.

96

Still, relationships between a given NGO and government are not consistent. Peter Gastrow of the ISS, which works on some democratization issues, observed, “Everyone here is linked to individuals in government, and it all depends on the individual contacts.” ISS’ relationships with the Department of Social Welfare are good, relationships with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “blow hot and cold,” and relationships with the National Police Commissioners are poor. Gastrow interview. 97

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA: Building a Loyal Opposition & Law-Based Civil Liberties TO ADVANCE THE IDEA and the reality of a loyal opposition, democratization NGOs depend on ties and coalitions within the larger civil society, including the media and other NGOs. Democratization NGOs build a loyal opposition by strengthening the capacities of other organizations within civil society while also bolstering civil society advocacy. While democratization NGOs have worked effectively with media, and some are housed at universities, they have been less effective in strengthening political parties and reaching out to business groups. Nevertheless, they often play a direct advocacy role on issues related to political process.1 The bedrock of this focus on political process is law-based civil liberties. Because South Africa has a modern, functioning legal system, our discussion here focuses on the efforts of democratization NGOs to strengthen freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of information, as well as becoming advocates for socioeconomic rights

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and broader access to justice. We will also look at how they address legal inequities, human-rights violations, and criminal-justice reform through advocacy coalitions. Chapter 4 will turn to the role of NGOs in enhancing the democratization process through nurturing a democratic political culture and promoting political participation.

Loyal Opposition and Advocacy Loyal opposition means that people can support a democratic constitution and political system, while opposing a particular political regime.2 Two South African analysts argue that although “institutional uncertainty” (dysfunctional bureaucracies, corruption, inability to implement) leads to instability, the “substantive uncertainty” (on, for example, policy) that is produced by a loyal opposition is good for democracy (Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg 2005). Substantive uncertainty makes governments more accountable, and forces them to think carefully before undertaking unpopular or self-serving policies. Without a loyal opposition, as Adam Habib observed about Mbeki, “He was . . . never forced to look over his left shoulder.”3 Substantive uncertainty, however, requires law-based civil liberties and political participation. It also promotes a democratic political culture. Substantive uncertainty emerges as citizens are free to speak out, organize themselves in opposition to government policies, and rule themselves at the local level. More specifically, substantive uncertainty requires viable opposition parties, fluid governing coalitions, a free press, and a diverse civil society, including interest groups like labor and business.4 While South Africa has most of these prerequisites, it lacks a viable partisan opposition. Though it is “nowhere near a one-party state,” (Gumede 2005, 236) and elections are fair and often contested, the dominance of the ANC coalition makes the traditional role of a partisan opposition exceedingly difficult. Although the junior partners in the coalition, COSATU and the Communist Party, do not always agree with the ANC, their inclusion in the government mutes their opposition, thus hindering

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the development of a viable opposition and thereby reinforcing ANC hegemony and patronage (Karume 2003).5 The ANC, however, is not entirely to blame for the feebleness of the partisan opposition. Indeed, there is some validity in former President Mbeki’s characterization of the opposition as “Mickey Mouse parties.” All of the parties go into hibernation between elections, local branches are poorly organized and the best leaders tend to move to the national level. In addition, only 10 percent of people surveyed in one study belonged to any party at all (Mafunisa 2004). Both the ANC and the opposition parties have a single list of candidates at all electoral levels. This blocks challengers from within each party, since party leaders select all of the candidates, resulting in parties that are “impressively inclusive in their membership but . . . very remote from ordinary citizens” (Barchiesi 2004, 142; Nupen 2004). Including the maximum number of parties in Parliament also weakens the power of individual members, because civil servants owe their appointments and advancement to party bosses, rather than to the national parliament or provincial legislatures. Not surprisingly, ANC members of parliament (MPs) typically follow the party line rather than thinking independently. Legislative weakness is further reinforced by proportional representation. Indeed, Eddie Makue, a former general secretary of SACC, which has a long history of battling apartheid, argues that the “number one imperative is to reform the legislative process.”6 Given that South Africa is a relatively new democracy, the lack of reform is understandable. But the ANC’s reluctance to reform also stems from the history of apartheid and the desire to avoid further political conflict. The price paid for the lack of reform has been that, despite the protection of small parties, Parliament does not fully represent the range of political ideas in South Africa. Most of the opposition, with the exception of a few intellectuals, is to the right of the ANC and represents financially privileged whites, although the Democratic Alliance under Helen Zille has begun to broaden its appeal.7 In May 2011, the Democratic Alliance gained in municipal elections throughout the country, but

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remains weak at the national level. The newer Congress of the People has a racially diverse base, but its poor showing in 2009 means it is unlikely to emerge as a leftward opposition. Given the strong ANC dominance in the electoral arena, “substantive uncertainty” in South African politics has to come from other sources, including the government itself. Although the judiciary is not usually described by political scientists as part of the opposition, Gumede (2005, 237) calls it “fiercely independent.” Democratization NGOs promoting law-based civil liberties understand, however, that for the courts to strengthen democratization, they must become more accessible to ordinary citizens. A parastatal organization called the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) conducts research on public policy and sometimes functions as an independent if not oppositional voice through its reports. With 60 percent of its budget coming from foundations and corporations it is no longer state dominated, despite its parastatal status.8 Former NGO leaders entering government also challenge existing policies. Those in the Department of Land Affairs have implemented new laws in ways that benefit the poor through close relationships with CBOs (Camay and Gordon 2002). Nonetheless, because the concept of civil society emerged from the struggle against a monolithic regime, people in government “tend not to consider themselves as [autonomous] citizens.”9 In the absence of strong opposition parties, it is civil society that plays the strongest oppositional role in South African politics. Although businesses, the media, and other types of NGOs are part of civil society and sometimes oppose the government on particular issues, democratization NGOs are most often the coalition builders or catalysts of ongoing loyal opposition within the larger civic arena that they inhabit. Not only do they possess a political understanding of the role of the loyal opposition, they are also willing to build on socioeconomic advocacy initiated by others to advance their cause.

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The Oppositional Role of Civil Society As Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga once observed, “Political opposition . . . is the most advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict” (1972, 16). Fortunately, civil society often functions as a loyal opposition in South Africa, and when it does, it can have a direct impact on democratization. Most CSOs, however, including the media, are not particularly aware of this role or else focus on single-issue advocacy campaigns, rather than challenging the government on issues of political process. Democratization NGOs, in contrast, are more conscious of the need to play a role in forging a loyal opposition. A major problem, however, is the issue of government contracts, which are granted to numerous NGOs. Most NGOs support the idea of civil society as a loyal opposition, but find it difficult to reconcile this idea with their financial dependence on government.10 Given the difficult budgetary challenges faced by most South African CSOs, this is a serious deterrent to independent political activity. Nonetheless, Gumede’s (2005, 237) characterization of civil society as “energetic, gutsy and bold” remains accurate. The business sector has political power and connections, and sometimes joins coalitions, such as the Civil Society Network against Corruption. (See p. 80.) Chambers of commerce and labor unions also have played a “huge role in parliamentary reform,” even though other CSOs, including democratization NGOs, often lack these connections.11 Even COSATU, a member of the governing coalition, plays an “on and off” oppositional role, based on its well-developed ties to members at the grassroots level. COSATU also has reached out to Solidarity, a predominantly white trade union, and has had many meetings with Afrikaner groups and the Inkhata Freedom Party in KwaZulu-Natal. Still, it is difficult to oppose from within a governing coalition. Even COSATU’s parliamentary opposition on particular issues rarely translates into policy, except in the case of labor issues, such as the right-to-strike amendment to the labor law (Ballard et al. 2005; Reitzes and Friedman 2001).

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The press, suitably, has become another arm of civil-society advocacy. In addition to politically independent newspapers and journalists, the most powerful link between South African citizens and the media is the network of community radio stations, supported at a cost of $1 million per year over 10 years by the Open Society Foundation of South Africa (OSFSA).12 Community radio’s vitality and outreach help democratize political culture and promote political participation, as well as serving as an oppositional voice, particularly at the local level. Although there were a handful of opposition newspapers under apartheid, few community radio licenses were granted, except to right-wing stations.13 Concerned South African citizens are potentially another part of the sphere of public debate. According to Marcella Naidoo, head of Black Sash, “Large numbers of people are interested [in politics], shopkeepers, taxi drivers. . . . It’s back and forth talk. Now that is our strength. The culture of talk.”14 Very little of this potential for public mobilization has been realized, however. Gumede (2005, 306) laments, “Large numbers of black and progressive white intellectuals in South Africa have, to all intents, withdrawn from public debate, and society is the poorer for their silence. The greater danger is a decline in intellectual self-reflection both within the state and among its critics, about what is actually happening on the ground.” Moreover, “The [national] human rights conversation is under funded,” according to Jacob van Garderen of Lawyers for Human Rights.15 CSOs not focused on democracy often challenge the government on socioeconomic rights. Most common are demands relating to service delivery and “negative rights,” such as not being evicted or cut off from water or electricity. However, some organizations take on the more massive challenges of poverty and inequality that most threaten South Africa’s democratic future. The Lamosa Land Access Movement of South Africa supports landless farmers, most of whom live in dire poverty since 85 percent of agricultural land is owned by 60,000 white farmers (Greenstein 2003).16 More prosperous black farmers would, of course, result in a larger middle class, almost universally considered essential

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to democracy. Another socioeconomic advocacy campaign is for the Basic Income Grant (BIG), a proposal focused on putting a floor under poverty through government grants. BIG exemplified “a successful NGO/ COSATU coalition,” but had, according to Paul Graham, lost traction by 2005.17 (As of early 2011, BIG had still not been achieved.) The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) offers one of the best examples of a broad civil-society coalition acting as a loyal opposition on HIV/AIDS policy.18 As a coalition of social movements, churches, media, unions, CBOs, and NGOs, including democratization NGOs, TAC assigned roles to coalition members and made room for both cooperation and opposition to the government (Gumede 2005). In this case, COSATU’s participation, with its 1.8 million-member base, was a key element in TAC’s success.19 Among past examples of civil-society coalitions was the Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR-SA) that challenged the constitutionality of the international arms deal in 1999.20 The South African Campaign to Ban Land Mines was another loose network of more than 100 NGOs coordinated by the Ceasefire Campaign, an antimilitarization group. According to Wixley (1998), the land-mine network probably sped up South Africa’s commitment to the international land-mines treaty. Despite inconsistent policy outcomes, advocacy coalitions on socioeconomic or military issues have been able to engage a wide range of CSOs and some have sustained their efforts. Given the laserlike focus of most South Africans on socioeconomic inequality, some of the civil-society leaders interviewed, who were not affiliated with democratization NGOs, were reluctant to talk directly about democratic processes, even though they have joined policy advocacy coalitions that include democratization NGOs.21 Leaders of democratization NGOs, however, see the connection very clearly. As Melanie Tambo of IDASA observed, “Deepening and broadening democracy may have long-term, indirect [positive] consequences” that further socioeconomic goals.22 Not surprisingly, coalitions relating directly and self-consciously to democratic process, to be described on page 78, have been smaller and tend to be limited to democratization NGOs.

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More worrisome, some CSOs are afraid to address any political issue. The South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), the formal NGO umbrella organization founded in 1995, has close ties to the ANC. When a civil-society coalition was formed around the issue of violence against women, for example, SANGOCO’s silence was “deafening” (Gerhart 2004, 2).23 Other organizations take their limited political role in stride without being self-conscious about democratization. For example, the National Community Radio Forum, founded in Soweto in 1993, has more than 100 community radio station members. The forum has succeeded in getting reduced licensing fees and has contributed to progressive changes in broadcasting law (Fairbairn 2004).24 Whatever their understanding of the role of civil society in democratization or loyal opposition, all CSOs face the legal barriers described in Chapter 2. The law passed in 2000 includes organizations focused on HIV/AIDS, children, and schools, but the scope of the list is still narrow, excluding many activities that relate even indirectly to democratization (Kihato 2001). Once registered, budgetary challenges, including the weakness of other sources of income, such as local philanthropy and international assistance, often lead NGOs toward government contracts rather than policy advocacy.25 In addition, some NGOs “do not have the tools to work with the state—which is highly sophisticated.”26 Other organizations, however, can influence government behavior or policy, because the line between subcontracting and autonomous collaboration is not always clear.27 This “loyal” part of the concept of loyal opposition is easy to overlook, especially by those frustrated by the inequitable balance of political power. Indeed, the right kind of collaboration with NGOs of all types “improves the capacity of government.”28 COSATU’s independent analysis and lobbying have had some influence on policy even though it remains a member of the ruling coalition. Ties between NGOs and local governments have also increased since Transition, even though many of the best civil-society leaders have moved up to the national level.29 A CIVICUS study found that 92 percent of CSOs interact or work with local government, 90 percent with provin-

The Role of Democratization NGOs Democratization NGOs play a more specific role than other CSOs in strengthening South Africa’s loyal opposition. They do this by: • strengthening civil society, • strengthening advocacy on the part of other NGOs, • strengthening partisan opposition, and • self-consciously playing the role of a reform opposition through broad-ranging advocacy.

Strengthening Civil Society Some democratization NGOs contribute to the potential for a loyal opposition by strengthening the media, both on organizational viability and democratic content.30 A regional democratization NGO, the Media Institute of Southern Africa, works on media diversity, public access to media, and the problem of censorship.31 It also lobbies the South African Broadcasting Company and Parliament on legislation, especially licensing as it pertains to the viability and independence of community radio. The Institute for the Advancement of Journalism (IAJ) trains and assists journalists and media managers from disadvantaged backgrounds.32 The All Media Group within IDASA trains the staffs of both community radio stations and local commercial stations in Limpopo, Western Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal on objective reporting about local government. One problem is that many radio stations don’t even have e-mail. Another is that local government advertising inhibits criticism. The All Media Group also promotes the idea of citizens as stakeholders, by using 15-minute shows that are sent to stations. The audience for community radio is mostly young people, some of whom have been trained by the program to become announcers.33 IDASA has found that local listeners respond positively to community-mapping exercises that increase awareness of community assets.34

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Democratization NGOs also focus on other NGOs or CSOs. Although CSOs in South Africa are independent of the government and, as observed above, sometimes engage in advocacy, they face major challenges—weak internal management, cumbersome registration procedures, and the lack of favorable tax breaks.35 Some democratization NGOs help other CSOs confront these challenges. Several democratization NGOs provide managerial support to CSOs.36 The Foundation for Human Rights addresses the divide between well-financed, technically proficient urban NGOs and more isolated rural organizations by providing grants to CBOs and local NGOs. These grants focus on organizational sustainability combined with human-rights training and an online Human Rights Directory.37 Inyathelo (The South African Institute for Advancement) focuses on governance and NGOs’ codes of conduct.38 CORE provides training on policy analysis and conflict resolution.39 Democratization NGOs are also trying to improve the external environment for CSOs, even though funding crises have plagued this area of activity. SAGA, for example, had 86 members and received funding from the Ford, Kellogg, Mott, and South African Liberty Life foundations. Until it closed due to lack of funding in 2006, SAGA supported regional grantmaking networks, lobbied for better tax treatment for the nonprofit sector with the Department of Trade and Industry, and supported community foundation start-ups (Gerhart 2004; Milner and Hartnell 2006). In response to the demise of SAGA, Inyathelo founded the Philanthropists Network in 2008, focused on peer learning for reporting, evaluation, and grant-administration skills.40 The Non-Profit Consortium (NPC) in Cape Town, an organization similar to SAGA, pioneered legislative advocacy and enhanced the enabling environment for civil society until it shut its doors in 2008. The NPC concentrated on nonprofit law, which many CBOs find difficult and time consuming. According to NPC director Tessa Brewis, a lively and innovative young lawyer, the organization’s focus on CBOs, strongly supported by their international donors, was going well, despite complex legal

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obstacles. As of late 2005, the group had hosted 400 CBO workshops in 9 provinces that included management training, governance, drafting by-laws, tax law, official registration, and accessing funding from the National Lotteries Board and NDA. In addition, NPC’s “how to” guides were widely distributed. In the Western Cape, NPC sponsored an ongoing legal clinic for CBOs. NPC also confronted the topic of registration requirements, particularly cumbersome for CBOs. Organizations must first register with the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO), then with three separate offices within the Department of Social Development and then with the South African Revenue Service (SARS). In other words, organizations must first establish themselves as trusts, voluntary organizations, or “Section 21” entities with requirements designed for businesses. Next they must register as a nonprofit organization and, finally, apply for tax status. In addition, “Each year nonprofit organizations must report to each of the three governmental entities,” Brewis said, “and so do CBOs, and we have to explain this to them. . . . To explain the legal environment to CBOs is often nearly impossible [and] feels like an insurmountable task.”41 Nonetheless, NPC made definite progress in challenging the more onerous restrictions of nonprofit law in South Africa. Two staff members of NPC and two from the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) (see below) were named to the Research and Advisory Committee for the South African Company Law Review. NPC chaired the Non-Profit Working Group for the government and was a member of the Parliamentary Sector Network, sponsored by the National Council of Provinces, which reports on public participation and tracks policymaking. NPC was also an advocate for reforms in tax legislation, complaining publicly, for example, that “a small CBO feeding 50 children per week has to register as a taxpayer.”42 Before it closed in 2008 because of financial difficulties, NPC moved important pieces of the democratization puzzle into place, and the work has not ended. One staff member, Ricardo Wyngaard, addressed the lack of outside funding by creating a law firm specializing in nonprofit law,

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which carries on many of the same activities as the NPC, including registration, legal compliance, contract reviews, seminars, tax advice, and a free online newsletter for nonprofit organizations. Wyngaard is also a senior coordinator for Inyathelo, which has a policy unit on legal requirements for the nonprofit sector. Another democratization NGO, LRC, has a Non-Profit Organisation Support Project that provides materials on nonprofit law, critical legal skills, and legal services to both NGOs and CBOs.43 Five changes proposed by LRC were included in the National Development Act. LRC has also lobbied to adjust the expensive requirement that nonprofits compile a manual and publish it in the Government Gazette.44 A related LRC focus is on good governance and accountability within the nonprofit sector, including internal financial controls and the legal obligations of boards. Despite these efforts, the advancement of individual rights in South Africa has not led to increased associational rights. The demise of the NPC, in spite of its effectiveness, illustrates the steep challenges confronting South Africans who want to strengthen civil society as a potential loyal opposition.

Strengthening NGO Advocacy In contrast to management support, IDASA’s role in strengthening civil-society advocacy is more directly political. Its monthly briefing on parliamentary politics is read by many other NGOs and PIMS analyzes the politics of the governing coalition.45 IDASA also uses its Budget Information Services (BIS) publications to create a wider oppositional role for civil society in relation to Parliament, particularly those NGOs focusing on socioeconomic rights. BIS is based on innovative research that tracks the relationship of policy to budget as a key to advocacy. BIS also has an organizational database organized by sector and each organization receives information on the overall budget picture and the implications for their sector. The Children’s Budget Project, for example, provides information and analysis for children’s advocacy groups and is funded by Save the Children, Sweden and the Norwegian Institute for Human Rights. Accord-

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ing to the Isandla Institute’s Mirjam van Donk, an immigrant with an MA in urban planning from the Netherlands, IDASA’s work in tracking budgets is “good, well established, and resourced,” and builds on strong children’s rights networks.46 IDASA also plays the leading role in training local leaders for advocacy. IDASA’s Community Safety Unit and the Local Governance and AIDS programs in Gauteng and the Eastern Cape are pilot projects that record interactions of local organizations with provincial legislatures. A number of other NGOs are focusing on support for community advocacy as well as capacity building in relation to local or provincial governments, and most of them are members of the Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN), established by IDASA. (See p. 55.) CORE provides other organizations with general advocacy skills. Their Guide to Lobbying for Civil Society includes definitions of lobbying, key professional skills, sample letters using the media, building a support base, international lobbying, ethical guidelines, and risks and limitations.47 A third approach, adopted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), brokers discussions between opposition groups and the government. “We bring the unions and the Ministry of Finance together, for example, and sponsor labor-business discussions on unemployment,” said Charles Villa-Vicencio, the founder of IJR and a veteran of the antiapartheid struggle.48 He observed that this approach makes sense because other approaches are often “a bit naïve. . . . It is now much harder, without apartheid, to take on the government.”49 Given these efforts to provide training and information on advocacy, SANGOCO might be expected to also provide advocacy support. Instead, by all accounts, the national SANGOCO headquarters has itself suffered in recent years from management problems that have hindered its mission of facilitating NGO coordination and providing a forum for consultation.50 On the regional level, however, SANGOCO can sometimes be more effective. The SANGOCO office in Durban spearheaded a constitutional initiative of members working on democracy.51

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Although SANGOCO has not led a national advocacy campaign since the poverty hearings of 1998, The People’s Budget Coalition, comprised of SANGOCO, SACC, and COSATU, published a report in 2008 aimed directly at the political process that included proposals to strengthen Parliament by increasing its amendment powers and research capacities. Another recommendation was to strengthen the ability of civil society to participate throughout the legislative process, not just after legislation is proposed.

Strengthening Partisan Opposition Only a few democratization NGOs work on strengthening the South African political party system. Among them is the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). EISA avoids being labeled as partisan by training staff from all of the political parties as poll watchers. Between elections, EISA also provides technical support to parties through its publication, The Journal of African Elections.52 Among the topics covered are internal management, gender representation, leadership, and public outreach. Another programmatic focus is intraparty democracy and this includes helping parties, including the ANC, run internal elections. As of 2010, EISA was implementing a project on political party benchmarks and internal party elections in South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho, with support from the Embassy of Finland. Denis Kadima of EISA commented that South African political parties have authoritarian internal structures, an observation that would not surprise generations of political party scholars, beginning with Robert Michels.53 Two NGO members of the GGLN also work with political parties. The Democracy Development Programme (DDP) in Durban will work with “any party that has a legitimate constituency.”54 DDP has a program of multiparty dialogues as well as training sessions for individual political parties.55 In 2007 and 2008, DDP hosted multiparty training for young leaders of six parties in KwaZulu-Natal. The Center for Public Participation (CPP), also in Durban, was founded by the Dutch-based Institute for Multiparty Democracy and has a program focused on the youth wings of political parties.56

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Other democratization NGOs focus on exposing dysfunctional practices that weaken parties over the long run. The Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) has conducted research on innovative methods for party funding, so that people seeking financial information “don’t need to run to the courts all the time.”57 In 2005, IDASA initiated a constitutional challenge to the four largest parties regarding secret donations and the need for transparency. As Calland and Graham (2005, 16) point out, it is “testimony to the maturity and robustness of South Africa’s democracy that an NGO could contemplate suing the ruling party.” In 2009, IDASA published the Corporate Guide to Political Donations in South Africa to encourage best practices for corporate political donations, including proposals designed to appeal to corporate boards.58 To summarize, the democratization NGOs that focus on political parties have had either a strictly local impact (DDP or CPP) or else, like IDASA and EISA, have focused on holding political parties to account. Even the few democratization NGOs that work with parties are determined to maintain their nonpartisan image, and this is unlikely to change since contacts between the ANC government and democratization NGOs, with the exception of discussions and meetings with IDASA and EISA, are rare.59 Because democratization NGOs don’t get government contracts, the “uncertainty principle” remains strong, according to Adam Habib.60 In the absence of a strong party system, democratization NGOs, in conjunction with the larger civil society, may continue to perform the role of a loyal opposition. However, the lack of a strong partisan opposition has limited the oppositional role of civil society in general and democratization NGOs in particular. Here, the political context limits, rather than reinforces, the work of democratization NGOs.

Becoming the Loyal Opposition There is a difference between strengthening other CSOs as a potential opposition and playing the loyal oppositional role directly. NGO leaders comfortable with filling the role of the loyal opposition, although quick to identify policy differences, do not usually see themselves as opponents of government. One significant exception is IDASA, which

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Jonathan Faull, IDASA’s parliamentary analyst, has described as “part of the center-left social democratic agenda.” This is a step beyond strategic oppositional issue alliances, which are already “part of the political culture.”61 IDASA is also acutely aware of the “loyal” part of opposition, however, and as Ivor Jenkins observes, “We never offend them [just] for popularity’s sake.”62 One reason for IDASA’s strong oppositional role is that its financial support is diversified and includes fees for service and domestic philanthropy as well as international funds. Its international donors include Danida, Save the Children, Finland, the Ford Foundation, Ireland Aid, the Swiss Development Agency, Michigan State University, and Oslo University, among many others. Its undesignated endowment further cushions it from dependence on the state.63 IDASA’s other advantages— high organizational capacity and access to government—allow it to remain a consistent advocate for democracy, while collaborating in other civilsociety advocacy campaigns.64 Because of IDASA’s reputation for independent policy analysis, it has the capacity to influence parliamentary debates by commenting on current issues (Pieterse 2002). The organization’s “diverse relationships with various ministries” cause the government to read “every word that comes out of IDASA.”65 At the regional level, the 15 NGOs that are members of the GGLN (founded by IDASA) also play this role. One member organization, CPP, originally founded with support from IDASA, has been able to tie local and provincial governments in KwaZulu-Natal to community-based training efforts. The provincial government response to these efforts has been “overwhelming,” according to Janine Hicks of CPP.66 The speaker of the provincial legislature has been extremely supportive and told CPP that to succeed they needed “champions within the government.”67 At the local level, CBOs can also become de facto contributors to the loyal opposition. Three-way partnerships that link CBOs with both municipalities and democratization NGOs are common and have strengthened local government, particularly through the GGLN.

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Other democratization NGOs have acquired clout through their expertise, particularly on issues relating to political process or, as described next, on human rights. As Denis Kadima, who heads EISA, observed, “We have acquired credibility. The government wants to know what we think.”68 The government also courts Black Sash, one of the few NGOs focusing on consumer rights.69

Law-Based Civil Liberties Background In South Africa, systemic-level legal reforms may not be necessary, simply because the country already has a reasonably fair and honest legal system. This leaves democratization NGOs free to focus on: 1) implementation and enforcement of law; and 2) greater accessibility to the courts. In addition, democratization NGOs, including those that emerged during the struggle against apartheid, provide constant vigilance against violations of human rights. The Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, for example, continues to investigate political violence and trains local community members in investigatory and forensic skills and is often more capable than the local police (Agbakoba and Carver n.d.). Civil liberties in South Africa are solidly based in law, but not always applied. Also, the survival of some apartheid laws permits the government to legally suppress publication of information on prisons, mental institutions, the police service, and the South African National Defense Force. Other apartheid laws have been used, albeit rarely, to shield the arms industry from public scrutiny (Friedman 2004; Habib and SchultzHerzenberg 2005). Surviving apartheid laws also enshrine customary or traditional law promoting unequal treatment of women on inheritance and marriage practices. A second gender-related challenge is the criminalization of gay sex. Equality courts were created in October 2003, but few complaints have been filed (Govender 2005; Murray and Pillay 2005).70 As of 2009, the Atlantic Philanthropies were collaborating with LRC to build support and ties with lesbian and gay organizations.71

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South Africa also faces human-rights challenges related to immigration. An estimated 2.5-5 million illegal immigrants were residents of South Africa as of 2009, with a majority coming from Zimbabwe.72 A police raid on the Methodist Church in Johannesburg in 2008, in which refugees were abused, led to calls for a major investigation, although the government was slow to respond (Rossouw 2008). Moreover, both crime and police violence threaten South Africans, particularly poor South Africans, on a daily basis. Although deaths in police custody have greatly declined since apartheid, complaints against police violence and prison conditions have increased dramatically.73 Another problem is the enforcement of legal rights. For example, a freedom of information law passed in 2000 has only begun to be implemented. In one study, 42 percent of respondents who work in public institutions said their agencies had no internal guidelines for compliance with the law (Murray and Pillay 2005).74 While the South African government unconditionally supports the rule of law, it is inconsistent in applying it to its own agencies. Even though the Mbeki government generally adhered to strict legal procedures, it excluded Judge Willem Heath’s special investigative unit from probing a controversial international arms deal, thus weakening the legal system’s investigative capacity (Gumede 2005, 237). At the same time, South Africa’s robust judicial independence has enabled successful challenges to many laws from the apartheid era, to lax enforcement of laws on the books and, perhaps most important, to existing social policies.75 This positive feedback relationship between the judicial context and civil society permitted the courts, for example, to require the government to prevent mother-child AIDS transmission through antiretroviral drugs in response to a legal suit initiated by TAC. This decision not only changed HIV/AIDs policy, it also reinforced government accountability, conformity to the constitution, the right of judicial review, and children’s rights, and thus stands as a vivid example of the impact of a broader civil-society coalition that included strong democratization NGOs (Greenstein 2003). TAC’s success has been described as “not just

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about AIDS, but about the role of strong leadership and the [legal] role of citizens.”76 Such victories also have the potential to help promote a democratic political culture, discussed in the next chapter. In addition to the courts, South Africa has four parastatal agencies, established by the 1997 Constitution, which promote and protect human rights: the Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Independent Electoral Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Public Protector, as well as the Constitutional Court. Former activists from CSOs often lead these organizations.77 The HRC documents political violence and state repression, lobbies at all levels of government, and disseminates its reports with the support of foreign donors.78 Because the HRC has replaced the human-rights programs of some NGOs, there may be less positive feedback between state and civil society than before the commission was established.79 However, these parastatal agencies benefit from public support and are generally acknowledged to have strengthened civil liberties (Khosa 2005).

The Legal Role of Civil Society Under apartheid, the legal system and its protections extended only to whites. During Transition, the legal system expanded dramatically, although many socioeconomic barriers remain on the road to fair and equitable justice. CSOs and NGOs not focusing directly on democratization most often collaborate with democratization NGOs on socioeconomic rights. COSATU, for example, worked with ODAC on a whistle-blowing statute to protect workers when they disclose irregular or unlawful conduct by third parties, passed in 2000 (COSATU 2003, 18). The media also cooperates with democratization NGOs like IDASA and the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) on issues like women’s rights, sometimes with an impact beyond what either the media or the NGO could have done alone. When a television program called Soul City told a fictional story of women banging pots and pans outside the house of a neighbor who was beating his wife, viewers began doing the same in their own communities.80

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The Legal Role of Democratization NGOs Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of assembly Collaboration with other CSOs on socioeconomic issues is the strategic cornerstone of the FXI, a network of lawyers focused on advancing freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of assembly. Before the 2004 elections, FXI supported the right to assemble by defending 60 members of the Landless People’s Movement arrested for organizing a “no land, no vote” protest (Kimani Ndung’u 2004). When the government arrested leaders of the Anti-Eviction Campaign in a low-income township in 2006, FXI financed legal counsel, which secured their release on grounds of freedom of speech. Because of its court cases on freedom of association and freedom of speech, FXI has been able to gain the support and collaboration of social movements, academics, the mainstream media, and even local and national government authorities. Although freedom of the press is reasonably secure in South Africa, a partnership with the International Federation of Journalists has enabled FXI to deal with occasional censorship threats through the Southern African Journalists’ Association, currently chaired by an FXI staff member.81 Freedom of information The main NGO focusing on freedom of information is ODAC. Formerly a part of IDASA, the two organizations separated when ODAC could not acquire the legal licenses required to practice as part of another organization.82 The organizations remain close, however, and IDASA’s executive director, Paul Graham, is on the ODAC board.83 Given the difficulties of obtaining funding for its small, but crucially important, mission, ODAC relies heavily on strategic networking with other democratization NGOs.84 Using freedom of information as its major mission and core litigation strategy, ODAC plays a unique role in linking political to socioeconomic rights. As ODAC deputy executive director Mukelani Dimba, a brilliant

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young lawyer, explained, “We let people know how much money is in a government department and for what purpose and how much is being spent. CBOs can use the law to find out why they are not getting services.”85 As of 2004, ODAC had handled nine requests for communities to access both local and national government information on HIV/AIDS statistics, water provision, local government budgets, and housing. They had also handled 159 similar requests on behalf of Black Sash, TAC, and other organizations. In 2005, they prevailed in court against state use of legal mechanisms to frustrate the work of social movements. As of 2011, they were focused on 15 community requests to open up the records of local governments on service provision.86 When the Sustainability Institute at Stellenbosch University challenged 13 public-funding agencies for not disbursing money for development and poverty-related projects, ODAC wrote an amicus brief, requesting their audited financial statements. It also collaborated with TAC to obtain HIV/AIDS treatment plans from the Health Department. One of the techniques used by TAC was the widely advertised slogan, “Right to Know, Right to Live.”87 ODAC’s evaluation of its own work concluded that 52 percent of its requests to government agencies at all levels met with “mute refusal” and only 23 percent obtained the requested information. This led to a revised goal to increase the number of community interactions, provide more facilitation on the basic process and spend less time promoting the intricate mechanics of the Promotion of Access to Information Act. As Dimba observed, “Good laws gather dust if not used, people are not aware of them.” ODAC also lobbies for an official information ombudsman and, in a creative bid to heighten awareness of government secrecy, in 2008 began awarding the “Rusty Padlock Award” for the most “unresponsive, secretive, chronically noncompliant public institution.”88 A second, related ODAC mission is to promote administrative justice within bureaucracies by securing the rights of whistle-blowers (protected by law since 2000). The protection of whistle-blowers is important,

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especially since South Africans often view them negatively as informers (Calland 2004). In 2005 alone, ODAC advised almost 600 whistleblowers through a helpline and in three cases won protracted legal battles. One case involved the legal protection of medical staff at the Pollsmoor Prison, after they blew the whistle on poor clinical conditions. ODAC also submitted legal amendments to the Law Reform Commission that included whistle-blower immunity from prosecution, the inclusion of ordinary citizens as whistle-blowers, identity protections, and provisions for payment of legal assistance. ODAC’s third mission is to lobby Parliament and develop jurisprudence around low-income litigants’ access to information. In one case, ODAC challenged an apartheid-era law aimed at poor people called the Protection of Information Act, which stood in direct contradiction to the Promotion of Access to Information Act. By November 2011, opponents had succeeded in removing the most pernicious provisions of the secrecy bill. A recent proposed replacement law, The Protection of Personal Information Act, under consideration by Parliament as of 2011, has ODAC support despite some opposition from the press (Currie 2011). A fourth ODAC brief is the anti-censorship program, which acts in cooperation with media associations, community media, and international NGOs. It targets South African laws that hamper freedom of expression and promote the unlawful use of police power to disperse peaceful gatherings.89 Socioeconomic rights and access to justice While ODAC is unique in its focus on freedom of information, other NGOs also focus on empowering poor South Africans to gain equal access to justice. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), for example, first organized an AIDS project in 1983 in Pietermaritzburg. The project includes lobbying and advocacy, media awareness, legal research, policy development, and client services. LHR provides legal training in preventing discrimination for hospital social workers, schools, legal-advice clinics, private

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companies, and unions. LHR also has an online information network focused on the security of farmworkers threatened with eviction.90 Among the other democratization NGOs focused on socioeconomic and land rights is LRC, established in 1979. In addition to providing fellowships to teach attorneys about socioeconomic rights, LRC focuses on enforcing basic service provision, the right to public participation in environmental decisions, and safety and personal-injury litigation. Its land-reform program includes litigation, restitution, redistribution in collaboration with government, law and policy reform, and “building civil society” by sharing their information and research widely. The workload of both LHR and LRC has shifted away from their original focus on legal aid because of the creation of government Advice Offices. However, this has enabled both organizations to be more selective in supporting individuals whose cases will impact large numbers of people. LRC also has increased its ties to CBOs that lack telephones, faxes, and even stationery.91 Legal support for victims of past and current human-rights violations Victims of violence are frequently denied legal protection. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) has projects focused on violence related to racism, xenophobia, and the police. Because the government’s Victim Empowerment Programme has failed to provide reparations to apartheid victims who testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CSVR has set up a trauma clinic that trains, counsels, and aids victims of violence. CSVR is also involved in bringing victims into the legal processes pertaining to apartheid perpetrators. In a 2009 case, CSVR and seven other NGOs argued in court that the testimony of victims should be included in the official pardon process for apartheid perpetrators.92 The judge enjoined President Kgalema Motlanthe from granting pardons during consideration of the case and ordered the Minister of Justice to provide a list of prisoners recommended for release.93 Much of CSVR’s work is done through capacity-building partnerships with CBOs in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and East Rand. CBOs provide

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feedback to the research process and engage in joint presentations to potential donors. CSVR also raises money through fees for service, levied on a sliding scale, and through consulting for the government and other NGOs, such as IDASA. Unfortunately, South Africa remains a violent place, particularly for women, children, and other “disempowered victims,” such as refugees.94 South Africa has one of the highest rates of rape in the world, which gives extraordinary urgency to the cause of women’s rights. The most significant players in women’s rights are NGOs housed within universities. For example, the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape has a gender project that concentrates on research and training leading to legislation on domestic violence, the rights of commercial sex workers, reproductive rights, and gender equality under religious and customary law. The center played an active role in the 1997 legislation on domestic violence and distributed national directives for prosecutors and an explanatory booklet for victims.95 The Gender Research Project at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of Witwatersrand was founded in 1992 and immediately became involved in negotiating gender issues within the new constitution. Since then, CALS has become involved in challenges to gender equality embedded in traditional tribal law. Traditional leaders (chiefs), for example, do not typically allow women to register customary or common law marriages. By using participatory research at the community level and by collaborating with the Rural Women’s Movement and the government, CALS was able to secure reforms and benefits from both the traditional and the mainstream legal systems.96 Another landmark case on gender was the LRC victory in a case that allowed the only surviving (female) child to inherit her parents’ house, which under customary law would have gone to her male cousin. The litigation lasted nine years and was finally settled by the High Court in 2003. It enhances the inheritance rights of hundreds of thousands of black women.

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Still, the organizational resources required to address women’s rights remain inadequate. Despite the promotion of women’s rights by these and other democratization NGOs organized into an Africa-wide network called FEMNET, a South African network of NGOs focusing on women’s rights sponsored by SANGOCO has become inactive.97 Children’s rights While organizational challenges have often hampered NGOs working on women’s rights, the organizations specifically committed to the cause of justice for children exhibit a “sense of cohesion and common purpose” (Muntingh 2008). CORE, which lobbies against child labor, brought many of these organizations together.98 The Community Law Centre (CLC) focuses on marginalized children, the reform of child-care and childprotection laws, and the reform of juvenile justice. The project was instrumental in the passage of the Child Justice Bill by the National Assembly in November 2008 and subsequently helped spearhead a successful judicial challenge to the requirement for minimum sentences for 17- and 18year-olds.99 LHR also focuses on juvenile justice, but targets other problems as well, such as sexual exploitation, street children, foster care, education, domestic violence, and adoption. LHR produces training manuals on children and the law and has helped draft successful legislation on child care, used by the Ministry of Education to create and maintain facilities. It is also tied to other government departments, NGOs, and CBOs that deal on the grassroots level with AIDS orphans and child-headed households. The Children’s Rights Project of the LRC, in contrast, responds directly to numerous demands by schools for better facilities, including running water. For example, LRC drafted a letter that included an application for exemptions to municipal cutoffs of water to 14 schools because the provincial government hadn’t paid money owed to the municipality. If schools withhold grades or otherwise punish children who are refugees

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when parents can’t pay the fees, the threat of legal action by LRC often prods an out-of-court settlement. Refugees Refugees are vulnerable to South African xenophobia. Thus, many Zimbabweans who escaped human-rights violations there have faced chauvinist hostility in South Africa. LHR provides legal services and detention monitoring for refugees and trains government employees, social workers, police, and refugee communities.100 Following a police raid on a refugee shelter in January 2008, LHR and a number of private attorneys publicized the problem and began organizing to get the 1,300 refugees released from police custody, with the help of the TAC network.101 The South African chapter of Amnesty International (AI) has been given special permission to work on internal refugee rights in South Africa, even though most national chapters of AI are required to confine their activities to other countries. The small paid staff, headed by Olajobi Makinwa, a Nigerian, relies heavily on volunteers. As Makinwa pointed out, most South Africans have never traveled outside the country and are especially prone to xenophobia. There is thus a need for NGOs that will educate both the government and the public. When an Ethiopian woman had her children taken away because she did not have a place to live, and she was told that as a foreigner she had no rights, Amnesty referred her to LRC and they were able to get the decision reversed. Makinwa said, “People look at us as an international organization, but we tell them our members are from the community, and they are citizens.”102 Crime and criminal justice In 2008, a report of the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CISPRI) concluded that 21 CSOs were working on diverse and often innovative reintegration and prisoner-support projects (Muntingh 2008). CSVR, for example, focuses on youth in prisons in relation to the criminal-justice process.103 LHR has a penal-reform project focusing on complaints and

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the right to legal services. LHR is also a member of the Penal Advocacy Network (PAN) and the Community Reintegration Project with other NGOs that sponsor prisoner workshops. The CLC at the University of the Western Cape trains CSOs of all types to improve awareness of prisonrelated issues, including human rights, alternative sentencing, and improving reintegration services. One problem with all this activity is fragmentation. With small professional staffs (averaging four each), only four organizations were able to reach 1,000 prisoners per year while 6,000 prisoners are released each month (Muntingh 2008).104 Support from the Department of Correctional Services is inadequate and CSOs may be reluctant to report rights violations for fear of being denied official access. On a wider scale related to criminal justice, the ISS researches organized crime, money laundering, corruption in government, and terrorism, throughout the South African region. ISS also played “an important role during and after Transition in integrating the military” into the postapartheid structures of law and governance.105

Conclusion Although CSOs do not always acknowledge their oppositional role, they help to fill the gap created by the lack of a strong multiparty system in South Africa. In their role of promoting a loyal opposition, democratization NGOs are aware that they need to strengthen civil society as a whole, even if only a few reach down to CBOs or out to business organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce. In addition to NGOs that strengthen civil society itself, advocacy coalitions like TAC that work on socioeconomic issues have helped smaller NGOs of all kinds to add their voices to advocacy giants like IDASA. Other advocacy networks, however, regardless of their composition, struggle to retain coherence and unity. The GGLN, which ties IDASA to local democratization NGOs, offers a more successful model for advocacy networking. Although IDASA and a few other NGOs are self-consciously playing the role of a loyal oppo-

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sition, efforts by democratization NGOs to strengthen political parties remain an unmet challenge. The dual strategy of democratization NGOs, not always clearly articulated, is to build a loyal opposition as part of a democratic political process, on the one hand, and as a means for addressing the socioeconomic crisis on the other. It is clear that the leaders of democratization NGOs understand the frightening challenges to democracy posed by poverty and inequality. The tendency of other South Africans to view democracy through the lens of socioeconomic challenges has, on the other hand, limited their understanding of the power of using democratic processes for socioeconomic development. Democratization NGOs need to educate the leaders of NGOs focused on socioeconomic issues or programs. They can do this, in part, through promoting citizen participation and nurturing a democratic political culture, as described in the next chapter. In contrast to their views on democracy, South Africans generally understand the need for strengthening what is already a reasonably honest legal system. Democratization NGOs played a crucial role in the transition from legal justice for whites to legal justice for all and continue to confront remaining injustices with remarkable breadth and vigor. Despite the enormous socioeconomic and political challenges posed by the legacy of apartheid, attempts to expand a functioning legal system to all has proven to be a more straightforward task in South Africa than, as we shall see, in Tajikistan and Argentina.

Endnotes 1 CBOs in South Africa and elsewhere typically lack the administrative infrastructure for undertaking democratization projects, although their connections with intermediary NGOs are essential for sustaining and deepening democratic processes crucial to the democratic agenda. In some cases, such as in Cape Flats, gangs are replacing them (Habib interview). 2 Loyalty to a constitution is particularly important to this concept, because it is not linked to a particular regime. In the case of South Africa, a new NGO, the Council to Protect and Advance the Constitution is headed by Mamphela Ramphele, former vice

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chancellor of the University of Cape Town. The organization has received suppport from Atlantic Philanthropies (www.atlanticphilanthropies.org, August 18, 2009). 3

Habib interview.

4

In an informal conversation, Paul Graham of IDASA observed, “Everyone thinks he has discovered it [the uncertainty principle]—but it is really old hat. We have been using it . . . since the Transition.” 5 A 1997 act that denies allocations of public money to parties not represented in Parliament also reinforces ANC dominance (Southall 2000, 142). 6

Makue interview.

7

The New National Party is weak, with most of its support coming from local business. The Freedom Front is narrowly based on Afrikaners, while the Inkatha Freedom Party, weaker than in earlier years, is still tied to the Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal. An attempt by former Transkei homelands leaders Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer to create a new party failed after Meyer quit politics and Holomisa moved to the left. 8 Habib interview. Habib also serves on the boards of two NGOs focused on democracy, CPP and the Center for Policy Studies. 9

Boyte and Strom interview.

10

See Camay and Gordon 2001; Habib interview.

11

Ibrahim Fakir, Fakir and Edighi interview. This is important because Parliament has fewer contacts with civil society. At the national level, 68 percent of CIVICUS respondents interacted with government departments, but only 23 percent with the cabinet and 26 percent with Parliament. One CIVICUS respondent pointed to an HSRC finding that less than 15 percent of South Africans said they understood the legislative process and added, “Ignorance counts against us” (Camay and Gordon 2001, 44). This may be changing, however. Both IDASA’s Political Governance Programme and the Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office were active as of 2008 (McGrath Gumbo 2008, 9).

12

The Open Society Foundation of South Africa is a member of the Southern African Community Media Fund’s Forum that meets 4 times a year and includes 10 donors plus umbrella bodies for the southern African region.

13

As of fall 2010, Zuma government proposals to place more government controls on the press were being met with open defiance.

14

Naidoo interview.

15

Van Garderen interview.

16

This situation, by all accounts, had not changed by 2010.

17

Coleman interview.

18

Opinion among those interviewed varied, but almost all agreed that government AIDS policy has only changed partially. Eddie Makue of SACC, for example, pointed out in his interview that the South African National AIDS Council had not had one meeting in two years and that the government had appointed the Catholic nuns on the council. Several members of a panel of journalists speaking at the Constitutional Court on November 24, 2005, mentioned that the Minster of Health continues to talk

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about nutrition as a way of preventing HIV/AIDS. As of 2011, however, the Zuma administration was covering the treatment of newborns with HIV-positive mothers and had ceased to deny that the HIV virus causes AIDS. 19

Coleman interview.

20

The alleged corruption surrounding the arms deal remains central to the opposition to Jacob Zuma as the leader of the ANC and the successor to interim President Motlanthe.

21

This is often coupled to a paradoxical tendency, identified by Steven Friedman, for civil-society leaders to claim that everything they do is related to democracy. Friedman interview. 22

Melanie Tambo, IDASA group interview.

23

Several 2011 accounts complained that President Zuma has rarely addressed violence against women. 24

Dawood interview. Dawood’s positive opinion was confirmed in one respect by research done with 123 civil-society researchers who ranked the South African government in terms of public participation in the budget process, accountability, and openness. Among 85 countries, South Africa ranked second only to the United Kingdom, with a score of 87 (the United States was 82) (www.openbudget.org/index, 2008). 27

Organizational autonomy is more clearly related to policy impact, including policies relating to democracy, based on evidence from a number of countries. Ironically, governments tend to listen more carefully to organizations not under subcontracting arrangements with them (Fisher 1998, 76).

28

Camay interview.

29

Ibid.

30

One example is the Media Monitoring Project, discussed in Chapter 4.

31

www.misa.org.

32

As of 2005, there were 61 media-development projects run by South African NGOs. See Milne and Taylor 2006; “Conclusions,” www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust.

33

IDASA also trains two journalists for an entire year, rather than, say, 60 for a week, but has had trouble getting donor support. Among the other NGOs that use radio programming to support core functions are the Labour Research Service in Cape Town and the Environmental Justice Forum on Workers Rights (Fairbairn 2004). The Labour Research Service assists unions and NGOs to set up study circles, among many other activities (www.lrs.org.za).

34 35

Meeting of IDASA All Media Group; Davidson interview.

Although laws passed in 2000 and 2006 provide tax exemptions and donor tax breaks for “public benefit organizations” registration to obtain this status is not easy.

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36

PACT, an international NGO funded by USAID, organized an NGO-strengthening project in the early 1990s that was handed over to the Sedibeng Centre for Organizational Effectiveness by the late 1990s. PACT continued to support the grantmaking capacity of South African NGOs, including the management of umbrella grants until 2001, when it closed its doors. It reopened with a project on community rapid response to HIV/AIDS. Its most recent work, in partnership with IDASA, centers on strengthening CBO partnerships with local government. Other organizations work to strengthen particular types of NGOs, which may have only an indirect impact on democracy. An example is the Thembani International Guarantee Fund, which works with grassroots lender organizations, such as community banks, to increase their financial self-sufficiency and ability to work with clients. (See www.sharedinterest. org.)

37

www.fhr.org.za.

38

www.inyathelo.co.za; www.ngopulse.org/node/13700.

39

Camay interview.

40

As of 2009, the network was expanded to include the CEOs and leaders of foundations and trusts with less than six staff members. The nonprofit sustainability program includes an extensive donor database. The six participating human-rights organizations are Black Sash, LRC, Nkuzi Development, Probono.org, Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute, and the Transkei Land Services Organization.

41

In addition to all of the above, the Nonprofit Organization Act creates burdensome duties for organizational publicity, similar to those defined in the Promotion of Information Act. Yet nonprofit organizations must comply with both pieces of legislation. Brewis interview.

42

Ibid.

43

These include tax and registration law.

44

Black Sash also provides legal advice to the nonprofit sector.

45

Faull interview.

46

Van Donk interview. Parliamentarians who lack research resources have positive opinions about this service. Davidson interview.

47

The National Human Rights Trust in Cape Town has also produced a lobbying guide. www.hsrc.ac.za.

48

Villa-Vicencio interview.

49

Villa-Vicencio interview.

50

Management challenges are common to NGO federations in many countries; SANGOCO is no exception. Most of those interviewed agreed that internal stress and rapid staff turnover have prevented SANGOCO from utilizing member feedback since the late 1990s. Informal collaboration among NGOs and CBOs interviewed by CIVICUS was considerable, however. Of those interviewed, 48 percent said they cooperated regularly, 39 percent occasionally, and only 12 percent rarely (Camay and Gordon 2001, 24).

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51

A 2011 check showed that although the website of the national organization was under construction, another regional branch of SANGOCO in the northwest has a sophisticated website and 600 member organizations.

52

Among the other NGOs providing regular information to political parties is CORE. CORE produces a clipping service and newsletter delivered to 1,700 subscribers, including political parties. Camay interview.

53

Kadima, Tip, and Nkwinika interview. (See Michels 1959.)

54

Naidu interview.

55

Hicks interview.

56

The institute now works through the Institute for Policy Studies, although it still had its own office in South Africa until the last few years.

57

Dimba interview.

58

These include limiting social responsibility donations (including party contributions) to a percentage of the company budget to protect companies from excessive party demands, and limiting donations to clearly defined projects. The proposal excludes hard cash payments and the use of intermediaries.

59

Interestingly, the DDP has received support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, tied to the German Christian Democratic Party. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, tied to the German Social Democrats, collaborates with the ANC.

60

Habib interview.

61

Faull interview.

62

Discussion with Ivor Jenkins.

63

Graham interview.

64

Discussion with Ivor Jenkins. For a more general discussion of this point, see Hadenius and Uggla 1996.

65

Davidson interview.

66

Hicks interview.

67

Quoted by Janine Hicks, Hicks interview.

68

Kadima, Tip, and Nkwinika interview.

69

Naidoo interview.

70

A panel of lawyers at a DDP forum in 2005 agreed that the judiciary had been slower than any branch of the government to diversify its judges in terms of race and gender (www.DDP.org.za).

71

www.atlanticphilanthropies.org, 18 August 2009.

72

Estimates vary widely. This one, from 2009, while wide in scope, does not differ dramatically from earlier ones.

73

This can also be seen as a positive indicator of public confidence in its ability to challenge the police (Frank and Tait 2005).

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74

Haugen and Boutros (2010) describe the dramatic ways in which the poor are left out of legal systems throughout the developing world. The South African legal system is somewhat more inclusive than most, but the major challenges they describe persist.

75

South Africa’s scores on “judicial independence,” while high, declined from 92.9 in 2000 to 85.7 in 2006, according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (www. moibrahimfoundation.org).

76

Boyte and Strom interview.

77

Makue interview.

78

These include the European Union, OSFSA, the Royal Netherlands Embassy, and Norwegian Church Aid.

79

Denis Kadima, Kadima, Tip, and Nkwinka interview.

80

A feminist journal, called Agenda, published a manual on gender-sensitive programming, while a number of women’s magazines have worked to empower women in both the home and the workplace.

81

Government threats against activists as recently as 2011 suggest that censorship may become more than an occasional problem. FXI also holds workshops on censorship for community radio stations, thereby expanding the number of citizens able to defend the freedom of expression (www.fxi.org.za). FXI’s Community Media Policy Research Unit conducts research on media diversity, delays in community radio licensing, and ownership and control of the broadcast media (Gumbo 2008, 17).

82

Black Sash and the University of Cape Town, Department of Public Law were co-founders of ODAC with IDASA (www.opendemocracy.org.za).

83

Dimba interview.

84

The board has a representative from Black Sash, Marcella Naidoo, and two from IDASA (www.opendemocracy.org.za).

85

Dimba interview.

86

www.ODAC.org.za.

87

Ibid.

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid. ODAC is also on the steering committee of the International Freedom of Information Advocates Network.

90

However, according to Jacob van Garderen, “a period of bad management” and declines in outside support led to staff cutbacks. By 2008, LHR’s smaller staff was collaborating with other organizations and volunteer lawyers from the private sector to make up for this. Van Garderen interview.

91

www.lrc.org.za.

92

The other NGOs were the International Center for Transitional Justice (an international NGO, or INGO), the Khulumani Support Group, IJR, the Human Rights Media Centre, FXI, LRC, and the South African History Archives. (See www. csvr.org.za.)

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93

CSVR also has a unique project focused on democratic decision making within CSVR itself. Motala interview. (See also www.csvr.org.za.)

94

Motala interview.

95

www.communitylawcentre.org.za.

96

http://web.wits.ac.za/academic/centres/CALS.

97

South African Men for Change and the Gender Training and Education Network are part of an African regional organization, called FEMNET. 98

Camay interview.

99

www.communitylawcentre.org.za.

100

LHR’s refugee work has been funded by UNHCR, the Foundation for Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, and Save the Children, among others. According to van Garderen, LHR had fewer staff members in 2008 than previously, when they had 120. This was due to “funding declines and bad management.” LHR had been receiving government support for its legal aid work, but the government now implements legal aid through its own justice centers. “They are good on criminal law, but poor on civil,” according to van Garderen. Van Garderen interview. (See also www.lhr.org.za.) This has probably also reduced the legal aid work of other NGOs, such as Diakonia in Durban, which was providing paralegal services through 14 local centers. 101

Van Garderen interview.

102

Makinwa interview.

103

Among international donors, OSFSA has been particularly supportive of efforts to reform police accountability and prison overcrowding. Dawood interview. 104

None of the 21 organizations worked in all 3 of the areas designated by the author of the report—capacity building for prison staff, rights education for prisoners, and release preparation with post-release support. 105 Meyer interview; Gastrow interview. ISS has a staff of 65 in the entire southern African region, with 13 in the Cape Town office.

C HA P T ER

4

p

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA II: Nurturing a Democratic Political Culture & Deepening Political Participation THIS CHAPTER EXPLORES two of the other tasks faced by civil society in general and democratization NGOs in particular—nurturing a sustainable democratic political culture and deepening political participation. These two tasks are related, because the emergence of a democratic political culture includes and encourages the rise of autonomous citizenship.

Political Culture South Africans are burdened with two inherited political distortions— the siege mentality of the apartheid state on the one hand and the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle for liberation, which sometimes left little room for dissent (Greenstein 2003, 13). Sisulu (2005, 11), for example,

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highlights the contrast between the ANC’s long struggle against apartheid and its equivocal response to human-rights issues in Zimbabwe: In this region we had settler governments and we have had liberation movements which have taken on the mantle of government but have not changed the political construct. I think South Africa has gone a little further in changing that construct than [other] countries, but even in South Africa it is a contest.

The lack of public trust has been further accentuated by the gulf between a modern democratic state, on the one hand, and an extremely inequitable division of wealth.1 One result is a strong preference for socioeconomic over political change. When asked whether they would be willing to live under an “effective” authoritarian regime that was able to resolve the problems of crime, joblessness, and homelessness, 62 percent of respondents said yes, with only minor racial differences. Only 15 percent of respondents agreed with this answer in a similar South American sample (Bratton and Mattes 2000).2 This suggests a particular challenge, enunciated by Vincent Williams: “South African democratic institutions are very strong. But if you ask what kind of policies are appropriate? How do we craft them? Then we are not doing so well.”3 Public mistrust also affects attitudes about particular institutions. Elected bodies enjoy less public trust than state bureaucracies and trust is even lower for courts, the police, unions, and political parties. Although trust in government increased between 2004 and 2006, it declined dramatically between 2006 and early 2008.4 As of the 2009 elections, only 38 percent of those surveyed thought that the country was going in the right direction, compared to 73 percent in 2004.5 Again, however, in the African context, South Africa looks much better. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, South Africa receives the best rating in Africa.6 Despite a focus on socioeconomic conditions and lackluster support for formal democratic institutions, South African traditions are a strong

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potential asset for democratizing political culture and deepening democracy through a strong citizenry. Traditional words, such as letsema (cooperative village work) in Sotho, ilimo in Zulu, and saamspan in Afrikaans, also express this idea (Boyte 2004a, 16). Although traditional chiefs still preside over 45 percent of the population, citizens surveyed by one study pointed out that chiefs have power only if they are “with the people.” Chiefs have also helped communicate electoral rules, mobilize voters, and reassure community members about outsiders (Williams 2004). A related positive factor is the central role political discourse plays in South African political culture. Moreover, time is not a major consideration in traditional dialogue, with communities “prepared to continue . . . for as long as it took . . . and bring the last dissenter into a consensus agreement including local governments.”7 Discourse also is tied to the value placed on community, expressed by the Nguni word ubuntu, which means that each person’s humanity depends on relationships with others and the recognition of common humanity. It is not surprising, therefore, that more “Western” democratic attitudes may be spreading among the non-white population. In 1995, white South Africans were more likely than other groups to see freedom of speech, regular elections, and multiparty competition as essential to democracy. By 2000, this pattern had reversed, with black South Africans more likely (37 percent) to describe freedom to criticize the government as essential, compared to 27 percent of whites, 31 percent of coloured, and 35 percent of Indians (Mattes et al. 2000). Only 30 percent of whites gave the present system better overall ratings than the apartheid regime.8 Although 75 percent of South Africans believe that the ANC regime has increased freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to vote, whites remain ambivalent (van der Westhuizen 2005). Before turning to the democratization NGOs that focus on promoting democratic culture, it is important to assess the impact of all intermedi-

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ary NGOs, and whether their internal political culture helps or hinders their potential. Evidence on the internal governance of NGOs is, at first glance, contradictory. One view, based on the CIVICUS study of 270 NGOs, asserts that a democratic internal structure is not necessarily related to the successful role of NGOs as “schools for democracy” (Heinrich 2001, 2). Another view (Robinson and Friedman 2005) is that democratic internal governance in South African NGOs has helped galvanize “citizen voice” and participation, even though it has had little direct influence on policy. It may be that internal democratic practices help to strengthen local participation, arguably the most central democratic process for eventual changes in policy.9 In addition, the ethnic diversity of South African NGO staff provides a counterweight to political mobilization based on ethnic identity. The CIVICUS study revealed that NGOs have 72 percent black staff. This mirrors closely the ethnic composition of South African society (77 percent). However, there is less diversity at the leadership level. Of 33 NGO professionals interviewed, individually or in groups, almost half (15) were white, and 3 of the 8 blacks interviewed were from foreign countries.10 Twelve women were interviewed, of whom four were white, three were Indian, three were South African blacks or coloured, and one was from Zimbabwe. Although the growth of an autonomous civil society usually strengthens pluralism and diversity, NGOs face huge challenges in promoting grassroots participation on a wide scale. Promoting a democratic political culture, however, has the potential to influence large numbers of people at less cost. Although community radio has promoted grassroots participation, its potential impact on political culture is much greater, based on its low cost.11 With Mott Foundation support, ABS Ulwazi, a nonprofit radio training and production house, established listeners’ associations in 10 communities that include ordinary citizens as well as local opinion leaders (Richards n.d.). Democracy Radio, linked to 30 community stations throughout the country as of 2009, was working on

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2 main projects—1 that enlists young people to tell their own stories as audio dramas and another to train local journalists to become watchdogs in covering local issues and government. The opportunity to change political culture appeals to NGOs not previously focused on democratization. Marcella Naidoo of Black Sash, for example, observed that she was “not sure if NGOs intervene sufficiently to educate people about their right to run [for office] and the structures that choose candidates. . . . We are adding a governance angle . . . it is about people asking for this [political rights] for themselves.”12

The Role of Democratization NGOs A major cultural challenge for democratization NGOs is to change public perceptions of democracy. As Paul Graham pointed out, the political climate has become more charged in the last few years because of growing prejudice

and skepticism towards NGOs. Democracy promotion is seen as international—something people do to you. . . . The gloss is

gone and not all problems are solved. There must be something wrong with democracy because of George Bush. . . . We remind people that democracy is about what they aspire to.13

Democratization NGOs have been aware of the need to collaborate with each other on education about democracy for some time. In 1999, an NGO network called the National Forum for Democracy and Human Rights Education was organized to influence the national school curriculum. Members included IDASA, EISA, Street Law (an NGO housed at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban), and the South African Human Rights Commission. It was also tied to Kids Voting, a nonprofit organization from Dayton, Ohio. Collectively, these organizations focused on voter education, human rights, election observation, electoral staff training, electoral conflict management, capacity building, and democratic education in schools. Without funding, however, it fell apart when Marie

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Strom of IDASA, the initial organizer, went on sabbatical and no successor could be found.14 IDASA’s future plans, however, include the establishment of a national democracy school aimed at the training of citizen and community leaders as well as ordinary citizens. The curriculum will focus on the roles, responsibilities, rights, and duties of community organizers as advocates for democratic freedoms.15 A few democratization NGOs focus on the role of the media. The Media Monitoring Project, for example, has developed training courses on balance and impartiality (Agbakoba and Carver n.d.; Sparks 2003, 89). Established in 1993, it also does in-depth research on the coverage of human rights in the media and educates the media on human-rights issues. This is done through a small paid staff, supplemented by student volunteers.16 Education about human rights is more widespread than general education about democratization. Indeed, according to Omano Edigheji, a Nigerian legal scholar at the Centre for Policy Studies, “South Africa has the best human-rights education in the world.”17 A major reason for this is the tradition of academic centers for the study and teaching of human rights that become quasi-NGOs. As one of the few South African universities to admit blacks under apartheid, the University of Fort Hare is the alma mater of most of the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement and the home of the Oliver Tambo Chair of Human Rights, funded by UNESCO. The program is currently developing an MA in human rights and trains police, lawyers, and paralegals, as well as traditional and religious leaders. It is affiliated with a legal aid clinic and has exchange programs and internships with seven other South African universities as well as liberal arts colleges in the United States. It also maintains a directory of organizations, experts, meetings, training programs, and case law.18 Democratization NGOs not based at universities that focus on human-rights education include the Community Law and Rural Development Centre in Durban, which promotes a culture of human rights

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by encouraging policy innovations. Its research and training on constitutional rights is tied to 56 rural paralegal offices. LHR, in collaboration with EISA, the National Community-Based Paralegal Association, and the National Paralegal Institute, conduct paralegal training. LHR also provides courses for attorneys on public interest and constitutional law, while its Litigation Unit works on studying and disseminating humanrights precedents.

Corruption Democratizing a political culture also depends on breaking down negative attitudes and behaviors that sustain corruption and violent conflict. While those interviewed believe that progress on enhancing people’s understanding of democracy and human rights can impact corruption and violence, they also understand that these issues cannot be put off until the political culture becomes more democratic. In March 2005, a National Anti-Corruption Forum was convened, including business, government, and civil society. This had little impact, although pressure from the religious community on the president led to a new anti-corruption initiative spearheaded by the Minister of Public Service and Administration. By October of the same year, the Civil Society Network Against Corruption (CSNAC) was set up by IDASA, with support from USAID and PACT. One of its purposes was to promote investigative journalism about corruption through a course at the University of Witwatersrand. According to Paul Graham: We worked hard to coalesce this network and to enable it to develop a vision and a modus operandi. We also found it some funds to establish a secretariat and convenor. But all

the members were busy and a number were prima donnas so they could never agree on a common identity and program.…

I suspect it will not continue to exist—and probably does not need to.19

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As a result, IDASA shifted its focus to the broader topic of good governance, including fighting corruption.20 This is reinforced by IDASA’s research on parliamentary ethics with key parliamentary players and institutions. More recently, IDASA, in partnership with ISS, has set up a website called Money in South African Politics.21 While acknowledging problems with the CSNAC, Peter Gastrow pointed out that an anti-corruption statement distributed to 80 venues “had more of an impact than statements by single CSOs, especially since it includes the Council of Religious Leaders, as well as SANGOCO, itself a network.”22 As an attendee of a CSNAC meeting the day before his interview, Gastrow argued that even without a formal structure, “This represents a constituency and real value added.”23 An example of “value added” was the network’s legal suit, spearheaded by IDASA and ODAC, to require disclosure of funds received by political parties.24 ODAC also works with other NGOs on the implementation of Transparency International’s recommendations for South Africa, including the protection of whistle-blowers. The Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) is the one of the most significant local NGOs battling corruption (Holloway 2008). Based at Rhodes University in the Eastern Cape, PSAM works with the Provincial Legislature to track executive agency responses to allegations of financial misconduct and corruption identified in the auditor general’s reports. PSAM organized a public campaign that led to stronger financial management practices within provincial government agencies. The PSAM has processed 537 cases of corruption since 1996. However, with a staff of four people, only seven percent have been resolved through corrective action.25 More difficult to measure is whether such organizational activism can actually prevent corrupt acts or increase public awareness.

Combating Violent Conflict Many NGOs working on conflict resolution are based outside the major cities. For example, the Community Peace Programme near Cape Town

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trains and pays community members for successful individual dispute resolution. The money earned is then used for community facilities or local entrepreneurial activity. By 2004, this program had convened 9,000 community “gatherings” and had raised more than $400,000 for community-development projects, with assistance from local district councils, foreign governments, and foundations (Gordon 2006).26 At the national level, the effort to replace a culture of violence with peaceful conflict resolution grew out of the struggle against apartheid. As Ahmed Motala of CSVR observed, “It is our view that South Africa’s dramatic transition to democracy began rather than ended with the historic election of April 27, 1994.”27 As the largest of the pre-Transition NGOs working on conflict resolution, CSVR focuses on the potential for conflict activated by the delivery of new services in divided communities. Among the other NGOs that gained prominence through publicizing issues of political violence is IJR (Doxtader 2005). In addition to its economic transformation audit, IJR is best known for its “Reconciliation Barometer” for South Africa. An education for reconciliation project focuses on curriculum development so that other subjects are taught within a context of social inclusion and democracy.28 IJR’s Memory, Arts, and Culture projects draw on folktales and songs of marginalized communities. An online network of former anti-apartheid activists does community healing through storytelling.29 As with its many other approaches to democratization, IDASA has undertaken community-based action research to deal with community conflict.30 IDASA’s long-term interest in understanding the politics of division led to collaboration on “Sustained Dialogue” with Hal Saunders of the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (IISD) in Washington, DC.31 In 2005, IDASA carried out a Sustained Dialogue pilot project on democracy and governance in a township (Nemeroff and Adams 2005). Because Sustained Dialogue focuses on changing human relationships, it begins with consulting local officials, instead of asking their permission. A second step is to ask people to join as individuals rather than as representatives with specific mandates. Teddy Nemeroff, an

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American law student, and Leslie Adams, a young staff member at IDASA with an MA in political science, worked together to seek a compromise between individuals and stakeholder group representatives by asking each group to make nominations, out of which 20 were selected. At first the process drew on “visioning” and “appreciative inquiry” methods to avoid frustration over the topic of local government transparency. By the end of the Dialogue, the attendance of local officials positively affected participant belief in their ability to make change. IDASA also has added a more explicit focus on being careful not to exclude certain groups in communities. As Paul Graham said, “Those excluded come back to act like the social problem you expect them to be” (Boyte 2004a, 12).32

Participation: Deepening and Strengthening Democracy Political participation ranges from voting in national elections to lobbying a provincial legislature to organizing a local community development group. The meaning of participation can also vary dramatically. Giovanni Sartori (1970) described a continuum, with participation mobilized by an authoritarian regime at one end and what he called “selfmotion” or individual political activism at the other. The solitary active citizen can be empowered by public talk or communication that pushes people into acting together. Voting, because it can be either mobilized or autonomous, and involves only minimal activism, lies somewhere in the middle of this continuum.

Political Participation in South Africa Ultimately, democratization depends on the degree to which large numbers of people, including the poor, have access to government. In describing the lack of a strong mass-based civil society in South Africa, Neil Coleman, COSATU’s legal counsel, noted, “The whole character of our democracy is shaped by who is participating and driving that democracy. Contestation is driven by the powerful. Macroeconomic policies are driven by big business. The government is hostage.”33

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Nonetheless, the constitution provides for consultative forums of various types and the government has implemented “Integrated Development Planning” (IDP) at the local level (Khosa 2005). Although such mobilized participation is not the same as mass demonstrations in support of a regime, few people attend local IDP meetings because publicity is often limited to the local press or ANC ward committees. Almost a third of the ward committees are ineffective, according to surveys conducted by HSRC.34 As in many other countries, therefore, civil society needs to play a more active role in deepening and strengthening democracy at the grassroots level. Electoral participation can be impressive in South Africa—everyone remembers the long lines of voters who brought Nelson Mandela to power. After 1994, however, registration and voter participation declined. The steepest decline was among youth, despite a youth-centered registration drive sponsored by the Electoral Commission. One result is that subsequent ANC victories have not been based on a majority of eligible voters. During the 2004 elections, lower income communities had the lowest turnout (Barchiesi 2004; Fick 2005).35 This decline, while troubling, still leaves South Africa with the highest electoral participation in Africa. Indeed, South Africa scored first on several measures of electoral participation compiled by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance in 2008 and third in overall levels of political participation in the expanded 2011 index in political participation.36 Women vote in large numbers and almost one-third of the MPs are women. There were 3 women in the cabinet in 1994; by 2008, there were 11 out of 28; and President Zuma’s 2009 cabinet included 14 women out of 34 members.37 Beyond voting, the wider participatory role of women, however, remains the “real litmus test of South Africa’s ability to engender its new democracy” (Beall 2005). Although some CBOs press for more equality in the delivery of services, others still exclude women. Women’s participation has increased in ward committees, but local governments and some legal statutes leave women out. Social movements

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often capitalize on women’s organizational abilities without addressing their gender interests (Mafunisa 2004). Overall, non-electoral participation is reasonably strong, based partly on high public trust in civic associations, churches, the media, business, and the Independent Electoral Commission (Bratton and Cho 2006; Mafunisa 2004; Mattes et al. 2000). One study concluded that 57 percent of South Africans have a fairly strong sense of efficacy and 54 percent had given to a cause or charity, although only 26 percent attended groups doing something for the community. Interestingly, the poorest provinces had the highest levels of volunteering (Everett et al. 2005, 283, 289). Volunteering may or may not translate into political participation, however. On the one hand, only two percent of South Africans in one study described their political party as their most deserving cause (van der Westhuizen 2005).38 Although one-third of the sample had attended an election rally, only 11 percent talked politics with friends, 8 percent had worked for a political candidate, and 6.2 percent had interacted with a public official.39 On the other hand, blacks in the survey were more than twice as active as whites in all forms of political participation, except for letters to the editor. Not surprisingly, given South Africa’s history, 24 percent of the respondents in the survey had participated in protests (van der Westhuizen 2005). Between 2000 and 2005, citizens who had attended a community meeting at least once increased from 40 percent to 60 percent (Bratton and Cho 2006). In summary, the terrain for participation is fertile. Cultivation of the terrain, however, depends on civil society’s role in relation to both the grassroots level and the government.

Participation: The General Role of Civil Society Although the South African business sector is not involved in promoting political participation, privately owned media groups at the national level cover politics extensively and in depth.40 At the local level, South Africa’s community radio stations have a more direct potential for strengthening participation (Davidson 2002). Founded by volunteers, usually women, these stations often receive media grants focused on

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working with local organizations and training other community members. Twenty-seven radio stations, for example, have partnerships with the feminist journal Agenda, supported by OSFSA. Reporters from grassroots women’s organizations write news bulletins on women’s rights in English, Sotho, Zulu, Afrikaans, and Xhosa. One major commercial station pays to use Agenda’s bulletins. Agenda’s workshops for partner stations include difficult topics, such as domestic violence and the use of condoms to prevent AIDS. However, volunteers tend to leave once they obtain a job, which often weakens local radio boards over time (Fairbairn 2004). Most discussions of the impact of NGOs or other CSOs on participation focus on their ties or lack of ties to CBOs. (See Chapter 2.) As Smith (2001, 8) writes, “The question of numbers is far less important than the kinds of NGOs . . . that support and nurture small, community-based and other less formal social structures.” This capacity to foster participation is the most crucial capacity of NGOs, whether or not they focus primarily on democracy. Thus, NGOs focused on local economic development may strengthen democratic decision making in a community as a spin-off of their major activity. South Africa’s large CSOs can have a significant impact on participation. Despite its role as a member of the governing coalition, for example, COSATU has strong grassroots ties based on both representative and other forms of local chapter participation (Pieterse 2002). As a labor union federation, it also has a political culture that places a high premium on accountability and lively membership participation (Mackay and Mathoho 2001). COSATU’s grassroots ties reflect its origin. Founded in 1985 during the state of emergency, it initially represented half a million workers in 33 unions. By 2011, membership reached two million.41 Among the largest member organizations are the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATUWU), and

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the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU). When SADTU joined COSATU it brought in many of its white members. Local participation in COSATU has been reinforced by elections at the regional and local levels conducted by EISA. COSATU has 30,000 elected workers and shop stewards, including both activists with 20 years experience and younger “born frees” who cannot remember apartheid.42 Active member participation is reinforced during national congresses, held every three years. One congress included a protest against the presence of the Minister of Labor. A second factor reinforcing the power of the base is that affiliate fees are the basis of COSATU’s budget, with the exception of a small percentage from European unions. COSATU does not rely on the ANC financially.43 On the other hand, a focus group study of each of the major unions found that mass participation had been eroded by their contacts with top-down organizations such as the National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), the Millennium Council (a nonstatutory forum for business and labor), and even through interactions with parliamentary committees (Mackay and Mathoho 2001). Although the locals were engaged in community-based struggles, they complained about inadequate financial support. Member participation in meetings had declined, perhaps because employers subtracted from wages the time workers spent participating in protest marches (Ballard et al. 2005). During the fight against apartheid, “civics” were the leading organizational edge of the movement at the community level. The South African National Civics Organization (SANCO) was organized in 1992 to build on this local anti-apartheid momentum. Like COSATU, SANCO still has close ties to the ANC, but unlike COSATU, it has lost much of its organizing potential. However, focus groups in three provinces identified active local civics, and some regional level organizations provide conflict mediation services with governments. Other local civics oppose ANC political dominance and have supported independent candidates in elections

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(Heller and Ntlokonkulu 2001; Reitzes and Friedman 2001). Purportedly, the national organization was revived in 2005, at ANC’s request.44 However, as of 2008, far from promoting participation, it was embroiled in defending itself over accusations of bribery from a Swedish arms company and ties to xenophobic attacks on foreigners. Although other national CSOs play an advocacy role on issues, such as AIDS, they cannot always depend on a strong active base. SACC has 26 member denominations, but a majority of the local churches are poor. Eddie Makue observed that despite SACC’s powerful historical role in opposing apartheid, “Our leadership has realized they are estranged from communities.”45 Because of funding problems, a staff of 200, with 24 regional offices has shrunk to a staff of 30, with 9 provincial offices.46 Paul Graham described SACC as not having enough local penetration: “If you rely on them, the cascade approach doesn’t happen. . . . The louder voices [at the local level] are often quite conservative.”47 Those that work for democratization NGOs see a gap between the high priority given to grassroots connections by almost all CSOs and NGOs on the one hand, and their weak actual ties with CBOs. Graham, for example, is concerned that civil society does not go deep enough.48 Given that the needs of CBOs and local communities in a country of more than 43 million clearly outweigh even a generous estimate of the capacities of all CSOs, including democratization NGOs, there is merit to his argument. In other words, these organizations are simply not thick enough on the ground. This observation also applies to the quality of grassroots connections. During the 1990s, NGOs pushed mortgage finance for the poor, but it took a decade to learn that the poor didn’t want mortgages because they feared repossession. In other words, poverty and shallow participation reinforced each other (Friedman 2005, 7). Participation based on the opinions and voices of the poor could help avoid such policy errors, particularly on the socioeconomic issues central to survival.

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Democratization NGOs, like other intermediary NGOs, are criticized for their inadequate ties to the grassroots. Ashwin Desai calls IDASA “Janus-faced, part beast and part holy,” because of his perception of its elite origins and lack of grassroots ties.49 Ivor Jenkins, however, rebuts this criticism: “IDASA is training hundreds of people at the grassroots level and there are typically only 15 people in our Pretoria office. Everyone else is gone [to the field].”50 Moreover, as Graham said, “We . . . have an advantage because voices not represented in civil society come to us, . . . such as amorphous groups of citizens who consider themselves disenfranchised.”51 Others who work for democratization NGOs also defend their organizations. Ibrahim Fakir, an articulate social scientist, contends that not even researchers like he and his colleagues at the Centre for Policy Studies are separated from the people. “Our role is to research and in the process of research we work from a substantial amount of field work.”52 CSVR, according to Ahmed Motala, has partnerships with CBOs in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and East Rand, introduces them to donors through joint presentations, and holds CBO workshops to get feedback on its research.53 Democratization NGO practitioners, in other words, describe their own connections in detail and even those of partner NGOs, while decrying weak CBO ties in the sector as a whole. Building deep grassroots ties is, in any case, a difficult task for all intermediary NGOs. How does one define grass roots? Teddy Nemeroff of IDASA observed that the complex layers within communities make it almost impossible to discern what is truly “grass roots.”54 Even if NGOs locate grassroots organizations, knowing how to build connections is complicated. Charles Villa-Vicencio of IJR observed, “There are amazing small CBOs working in rural areas and urban townships—but they are not well funded. You can’t say to them, ‘let me help you do it better’ because then you destroy it.”55 However, some democratization NGOs with specialized legal skills such as the Non-Profit

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Consortium (now replaced by Inyathelo) and ODAC have a potentially easier entrée to collaboration because they focus on narrow but clearly defined issues—CBO registration and freedom of information.56 Grassroots connections cannot, in any case, survive without strong CBOs that mobilize local voices and interests. Despite his own organization’s strong base, Neil Coleman (COSATU) is realistic about South Africa’s lack of a “mass-based civil society.”57 CBOs lack reach and scope on the issues they deal with.58 Many CBOs interviewed by CIVICUS said their members were not very active and only 36 percent required dues. Many rely more on stakeholders and clients than members (Heinrich 2001). On the other hand, more than half of the sampled CSOs (mostly CBOs) use democratic procedures, including meetings, consultations, and member assemblies. For example, almost all of the sample organizations consulted with other groups or representative structures within their communities and over half of the beneficiaries were involved in community planning (Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Heinrich 2001).59 Participation at the grassroots level can also be assessed by the volunteer activities that engage nine percent of the adult population, often in their own communities.60 Almost half of the 600,000 full-time equivalent workers in the nonprofit sector are volunteers, well above the international average (Swilling et al. 2004). Clearly, more is needed to engage civil society in what Edigheji (2005) calls a “democratic development state.” In criticizing the “gatekeeper” role of intermediary NGOs, he also argues that CBOs must not only be internally democratic, they must also be based on collective deliberation of public issues, linked together by strong community and cross-community networks that can create public goods and services. (See Box 4, p. 95.) He thereby links associational life to a public voice, or Perez Diaz’s (1993) “sphere of public debate,” as well as to the horizontal networks among neighboring community organizations in many developing countries.61 Democratic procedures within CBOs, volunteerism, and public deliberation—all of these expand participation by using a robust view of

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citizenship, particularly at the local level. What remains to be addressed is what Harry Boyte, a professor at the University of Minnesota who also works for IDASA, calls “public work” (Boyte 2004a, 15-16). “Public participation is weak language. Public space is diminishing because of dependence on the government.”62 Public work can be self-help or it can build on interactions with governments.63 An analogous inclusive definition of political participation is “Behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods . . . [which] can be supplied by governments or by local communities themselves” (Booth and Seligson 1978, 6). Intermediary NGOs that focus on local development undoubtedly encourage such activity, in South Africa, as elsewhere (Fisher 1993). The role of democratization NGOs, however, may be more focused in extending and deepening participation, particularly if they are able to place the participatory piece into the larger democratic puzzle.

The Role of Democratization NGOs Electoral Participation EISA is the largest and most important NGO focusing on electoral participation.64 The organization coordinates election observation missions in South Africa and other countries and provides technical support for elections. Its panel of electoral experts and officials are located throughout the country. The institute also provides support for internal elections in a wide range of corporations and CSOs, including pension funds, political parties, universities, and CBOs, based on sliding fees. It has helped monitor elections for COSATU and other unions, including those representing the police and prisons and the National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa (NUMSA). In addition to its election work, EISA has published a participatory guide to active citizenship. The Enabling Active Citizen Participation Workshop is based on needs analysis, “how government works,” decision making, community participation, strengthening ward committees,

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financial accountability, balloting, and electoral services. Workshops begin with naming problems, followed by brainstorming and strategizing, including lists of steps to take and resources available. EISA’s overall objective is to promote a cadre of trained people throughout South Africa who know how to organize, manage, and monitor elections as part of a wider culture of democratic decision making. As of 2009, EISA’s local community training between elections also included democratic governance and sustainable service delivery for local government officials and CSOs.65 Among the locally based NGOs contributing to increased electoral participation are CPP and Diakonia in Durban. CPP holds community workshops on elections and published a guide for establishing ward committees.66 Diakonia’s 14 local centers provide voter education.67 The CLC at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town helps women get elected to local councils and monitors elections for governmentsupported community-development workers.

Beyond Elections Beyond elections, IDASA dominates the field of citizen participation. This is not so much because other players are small or insignificant. Rather, IDASA has been instrumental in creating or assisting smaller democratization NGOs that focus on participation. This is not just outreach, but also an indicator of “IDASA’s DNA.”68 Despite criticisms of IDASA’s white, elitist origins, “its past is actually its strength,” according to Harry Boyte:69 Van Zyl Slabbert was the conceptualizer of the idea that democratization could not be done through parliament. He was a Purist. Alex Boraine had the parallel recognition that cultural change and reconciliation were needed. They were more radical than the ANC and their DNA was the concept that democracy is not state centered.70

IDASA’s outreach includes founding and obtaining funding for other NGOs with a central focus on participation. Many of these are members

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of the GGLN, which concentrates on participatory democracy, as well as advocacy. Funded by the Ford Foundation, it includes 18 member organizations and 6 associate members.71 Some are national democratization NGOs—IDASA itself, Black Sash, the Centre for Policy Studies, and EISA—that lend support to local members. Others are locally based NGOs in different fields that share an interest in participation as it relates to strong, accountable local governance. The member organizations of the GGLN work with citizens to maintain interest between elections and help them gain awareness of the relationship between rights and responsibilities. Programs on integrated development planning, municipal finance, and performance management are based on the notion that the public needs power in order to set agendas, determine priorities and flesh out planning. Members and governments in 10 local municipalities developed a matrix of participatory governance indicators. A member NGO in East London, Afesiscorplan, developed a performance measurement tool that assesses the relationship between local civil society and its respective municipality, including interface with the public, service delivery, and performance management. By 2004, the use of this tool had spread to four other member organizations, including IDASA.72 An example of a member project, carried out by the Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR) in the Waterkloof municipality, focuses on job creation. It includes government departments, a private company, and a CBO consisting of the most vulnerable women-headed households.73 The GGLN depends on its ties with the National Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), official municipal forums, ward committees, and the IDP. The problem is that many poor people, especially women, are unable to take part in such activities because they live too far away.74 Municipal forums are also unable to attract local businesses and farmers, and ward committees, perceived as vehicles for ANC patronage, have difficulties persuading local governments that they

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should play an active role in monitoring municipal performance. Ward committees themselves are remote from their constituencies. Sometimes they use citizens as rubber stamps, often too late, so government-built roadside market stalls are unrelated to taxi routes.75 The message that these institutions, including IDP, belong to everyone, is central to the GGLN, lobbying for grassroots participation in municipal planning. The GGLN and its member organizations also make a distinction between such “official spaces” on the one hand and “popular spaces” on the other, defined as places where people come together on their own initiative. Most popular spaces are transient protests, but sometimes CBOs create regular venues, often supported by the GGLN. Although officially promoted participation can improve service delivery, popular spaces are, according to the GGLN, more effective in addressing citizen concerns about poor local government capacity and accountability. CPP in Durban, for example, uses workshops to disseminate information ahead of time, and sponsors round tables for CBOs based on deliberative policymaking. It then convenes forums at public spaces, helps communities reach common ground, showcases best practices and promotes “the context behind issues” that enables people to reflect on their situations, analyze the status quo, and plan and implement solutions. At a higher political level CPP works through 10 KwaZulu-Natal districts, each of which encompasses 60 municipalities and links rural CBOs to the provincial legislature by getting them to identify successful past advocacy strategies.76 DDP, also based in Durban, works in three outlying districts suffering from poor municipal services. DDP trains ANC ward committees because “the government responds to them” but also trains large numbers of CBOs.77 Many of these do far more than the ward committees, according to DDP director Rama Naidu, but the government “doesn’t look to the best CBOs because it would require a huge amount of work.” DDP collaborates with CPP, IDASA, and the GGLN and also uses deliberative public forums as part of an overall process of “public politics.” According to Naidu, “People who name their own issues get much more involved with them.”78 (See Box 4.)

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Box 4. Public Politics Public politics begins with a community meeting or forum that names an issue in public terms. By giving an issue a name that resonates with local concerns, citizens can then frame the issue into three or four policy choices, each with its own pros, cons, trade-offs, and possible ways citizens and governments can act. The third step in public politics is for the group to deliberate about the choices and come to a common ground, based on one of the choices or a combination of the choices. Finally the group begins the process of planning for public acting.79 With IDASA’s support, the GGLN has become an effective network, rare anywhere in the NGO world, based on a strong common purpose— tying participation to government accountability. Training people in poor communities to generate public wealth and solve problems depends on acknowledging the limits of any organizational structure, even at the grass roots, to solve complex problems, and focusing on citizens themselves (Boyte 2004a, 11-13). This also has been the approach in IDASA’s work with the government–created AIDS Councils (Strom 2005). Despite its successes, IDASA has changed its training methods, recognizing that “the way you train is more important than what you teach.”80 According to Marie Strom, “There has been frustration here [at IDASA] about teaching ideas about democracy but not democratic skills.”81 In response to some of these frustrations, IDASA lengthened their leadership course from two to four weeks and developed methods for working with people who are illiterate. The four-week course at IDASA headquarters focuses on organizing skills for people in townships and informal settlements. The curriculum includes specialized workshops devoted to problems, such as the abuse of women and children. More in-depth training for selected community leaders is provided through a one-month internship at IDASA.

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Melanie Tambo, of the famous anti-apartheid family, heads the internship program. Another staff member is Yoemna Saint, who uses deliberative methods based on the Swedish Study Circles.82 Many CBO leaders are unemployed, however, and after training they may be more likely to find a job and move away from the community.83 IDASA also has a wide reach in encouraging community dialogue and deliberation as a form of participation. The Community Participation Unit, for example, worked with four towns in Highlands, a municipality in the Mpumalanga province. Facilitators were selected in each community, given a small stipend and provided with a two-week training course in community leadership. On returning, they were asked to hold weekly meetings with 15-20 members of the community to talk about local needs. A process of reflection used in conjunction with literacy training helped people express their needs and successfully mobilized a number of communities ( Jenkins 2001). IDASA staff also adapted public deliberation research from the Kettering Foundation.84 (See Box 4.) Enough Sishi, former international fellow at the Kettering Foundation, wrote an issue book with three choices on the problem of community policing. When he returned to South Africa, blacks and whites attended a forum on this issue in Ficksburg in the Eastern highlands. The police participated in the forum as a way to build legitimacy, while other participants demanded better service. This influenced the style of policing and made the department more responsive.85 One of IDASA’s most innovative uses of deliberative politics began at the market next to a train station in the eastern part of the Tshwane metropolitan area. The post-apartheid regulations controlling trader access to the market excluded newcomers. IDASA use of issue framing, coupled with the identification of overlapping interests, helped forge more cooperative forms of participation among the competing traders and shopkeepers. New local elections facilitated a more inclusive use of the market, and the lessons learned are now being used in other transportation hubs (Nemeroff 2009).

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This emphasis on deliberative citizenship has deepened IDASA’s involvement with local organizations through the Community and Citizen Empowerment Programme. IDASA chose 45 CBOs based on “their willingness to open up . . . enabling IDASA to track their organization and their leadership. We got them to register, to get on the local government lists.”86 IDASA’s use of community dialogue and CBO management enables CBOs to use public spaces for participation.87 Although a number of other NGOs have participatory connections with CBOs, few are tied to social movements. An exception is the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. Richard Pithouse, a staff member who happens to be white, “is so close to the social movements in this area that 3,000 people showed up when he entered one settlement recently,” according to director Ashwin Desai.88 Projects to promote the participation of women are more widely supported by democratization NGOs. LRC, IDASA, LHR, and CSVR all have women’s participation projects. LRC works with members of Parliament and brings women from CBOs to meet with them. IDASA’s South African Women’s Budget project includes representatives from other NGOs and targets rural and informal settlements, single mothers, and unemployed women. The Gender Advocacy Programme (GAP), a Cape Town NGO, encourages women to join CBOs and then help the CBOs meet with parliamentarians. Although the effort has gained parliamentary respect, GAP is trying to strengthen the idea by enlisting other types of organizations as well.89 Overall, the efforts of democratization NGOs to deepen democracy are creative and widespread. However, the task of enlisting more than 50 million people, a majority of them poor, into active citizenship, remains daunting.

Conclusion Legal reforms can change political culture fairly quickly. Supported by a strong legal system, democratization NGOs have been able to strengthen the legal rights of hundreds of thousands of people. Some

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of the most successful NGO networks specialize in legal issues, such as children’s rights or open government. Not surprisingly, the impact of these organizations on changing political culture by increasing awareness of human rights has been stronger than on increasing public understanding of democracy. Although community radio offers some promise for promoting a wider understanding of democracy, attempts to educate the public about democracy through networks of democratization NGOs have not always succeeded. Building a loyal opposition and promoting widespread participation are long-term, difficult challenges, even more in need of successful networking than promoting legal rights or changing political culture. Although advocacy coalitions are often short-lived, the GGLN has managed, through ties to both CBOs and local governments, to focus strategically on a highly relevant connection for any democratization network— the connection between participation and government accountability. South African democratization NGOs have had a significant impact on building a loyal opposition, with the exception of political parties, particularly when they have been able to work with other intermediary NGOs and CSOs. However, although electoral participation is already well established, deepening and extending democracy through grassroots participation is a Sisyphean task. To succeed, they will need increased international support for innovative approaches, such as public deliberation, as well as partnerships with local governments, such as those promoted by the GGLN. Deepening and extending participation can also, of course, begin to change South Africa’s political culture. It is a generally accepted assumption that democracy and civil society are in some way related. These three chapters on South Africa refine this assumption, arguing that: 1) a democratic political context enables democratization NGOs to have a stronger impact on democracy, through a positive feedback relationship and 2) democratization NGOs strengthen the ability of the larger civil society to advance democratization.

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The first assertion is true in South Africa, particularly with respect to law-based civil liberties. South Africa’s democratization NGOs support and are supported by a young democracy with a legal system that is stronger than Argentina’s, and far stronger than Tajikistan’s. Although the South African political context is less supportive of the need to build a loyal opposition, efforts to strengthen political culture and political participation would be more difficult under an authoritarian government. In addition, South Africa’s traditional political culture, based on discourse, local community organizations, and limits on the power of chiefs, is a powerful advantage. Were democratization NGOs more consistently able to build ties with local CBOs and promote ties among CBOs, they could extend and deepen a democratic political culture, as well as political participation. It is also true that democratization NGOs in South Africa strengthen the ability of other CSOs to advance democracy. This is most clearly evident in their still inadequate linkages with CBOs and in their attempts to create a loyal opposition. Although efforts to strengthen political parties are rare, EISA, by linking parties to the organization’s electoral work, has pioneered a new approach. Yet South Africa’s socioeconomic context, in contrast to its political one, greatly hinders attempts by democratization NGOs to bring the majority of South Africans into the political arena.90 So long as South Africans are confronted with the challenges of economic survival on a daily basis, it is hard to see how the efforts of democratization NGOs to promote a democratic culture, free from corruption and violence, can succeed. Poverty and inequality also increase popular frustration, even though the legitimacy of the political and legal system remains a cultural asset. So long as most South Africans must struggle constantly for survival, it will be difficult for them to combat corruption and violence or to see the relevance of democracy. Socioeconomic inequality is reflected within democratization NGOs themselves, since blacks and women are less likely to move into leadership and management.

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A related challenge faced by all intermediary NGOs is the need to strengthen their ties to grassroots CBOs. It may be that democratization NGOs already have picked the low-hanging fruit.91 Tensions within the sector may increase as civil society in general and democratization NGOs in particular get closer to the participatory core of robust democratization, a daunting task in any society. Also needed are CBOs that promote the local public voice and build horizontal networks with other CBOs. On the other hand, the local democratization NGOs in the GGLN have invented strong participatory tools to enhance the government accountability that they share with each other. And NGO leaders remain hopeful. As Mpho Putu of IDASA explained, “I grew up on politics, to smell and taste the tensions in the street. . . . People in the government are my uncles, friends, etc. Gradually people [will] understand the limits of government and the increased gap between the government and the people.”92 Despite a wealth of creativity and optimism, democratization NGOs themselves lack the resources needed to promote political participation and a democratic political culture for 50 million people. Their efforts to strengthen a loyal opposition and law-based civil liberties remain strong, but are under constant financial pressures. Even highly effective organizations like the Non-Profit Consortium have closed because of a lack of funding. The efforts of democratization NGOs to enlist the wider resources of the South African public, as well as local and national governments, are promising but still fragile. If civil society is to play a more transformative role in deepening and extending democracy, it must confront these resource challenges. One specific challenge is the increasingly regional approach of international donors, who focus on the whole of southern Africa. This provides opportunities for large NGOs, such as IDASA, which as of 2011 had programs in 30 countries, but may threaten even the survival of smaller organizations. It may also dilute democratization efforts in South Africa or increase competition over international funding.93

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A related resource challenge concerns the ways in which democratization NGOs collaborate or do not collaborate with each other. There are trade-offs of money and time inherent in networking, beyond the obvious competition for funding.94 IDASA, for example, considered a joint publication program with CSVR but gradually realized, “We have different, distinct organizations. And we recognized that we have different organizational cultures. [Now] collaboration tends to be informal.”95 To be sure, IDASA’s DNA is a powerful force among democratization NGOs. IDASA played an active role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Network of Independent Monitors. Later it helped create or strengthen the many NGOs within the GGLN, the network itself, and ODAC. It also had an impact on the creation of the Open Society Foundation of South Africa. However, the resource most lacking among democratization NGOs is not money, but shared thinking. The GGLN and the informal collaboration of NGOs working on children’s rights show what is possible, but NGOs that work on different pieces of the democracy puzzle do not reliably communicate with each other regarding possible spin-offs, synergies, or lacunae, such as the weakness of attempts to strengthen political parties. Thus, for example, education about democracy does not interface very often with education about human rights in South Africa. A wider challenge is the inadequate connections between democratization NGOs and others working on parliamentary reform—COSATU, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Council of Provinces, for example. According to Ivor Jenkins, one reason for all of these missing connections is that political scientists, scarce in South African academia, are even less likely to be employed by democratization NGOs.96 The large number of NGOs housed at universities could provide greater possibilities for shared thinking about democratization, particularly if combined with at least one strong academic program to educate political scientists. Given the widespread concern about connecting with the grassroots level, a crucial topic for shared thinking could be the relationship between

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the diverse grassroots connections of NGOs and democratization at the national level.

Endnotes 1

South Africa has one of the highest GINI indices of inequality in the world.

2

Paul Graham believes that US foreign policy increased South African skepticism about democracy. He has heard people say, “There must be something wrong with democracy if George Bush favors it.” Graham interview. 3

Williams interview. He also pointed out, however, that every department of government has to have a website that provides quarterly reports. 4

Meeting with IDASA staff, February 2008. Staff members quoted a study done by IJR. 5

Several newspaper accounts, including the Financial Times.

6

Bratton and Cho (2006) found that only 36 percent of South Africans in 2005 perceived corruption among national government officials, although this is an increase from 27 percent in Afrobarometer’s 2002 data. In 2006, a combined rating by Transparency International and the Internet Center for Corruption Research found South Africa to have the second lowest perception of public corruption in Africa, next to Botswana (www.moibrahimfoundation.org).

7

Sparks 1990, 14, 16.

8

A white South African farmer on a plane told us, however, “You will not meet a white South African who does not say, ‘Thank God for Nelson Mandela.’” 9

One of the conclusions of a 1999 meeting of 24 civil-society activists from 14 countries was that organizations, including businesses that have a democratic impact on the outside world, may or may not be internally democratic (author’s internal memo, Kettering Foundation). Vincent Williams of IDASA observed that employees are not always comfortable with internal democracy or with IDASA’s expectation that they define their own jobs, with little direct supervision. Williams interview. 10

Eleven were Indian or coloured.

11

Although community radio is part of the media that comprises the broader civil society in South Africa, it is analogous to democratization NGOs, because of its role in directly promoting democracy. 12

Naidoo interview.

13

Paul Graham interview, 2005.

14

Boyte and Strom interview. A network of teachers called Shikaya focuses on civic education. See www.myggsa.co.za.

CORE’s (2000) publication on elections includes eligibility, registration details, the importance of democratic elections, how to decide whom to vote for, citizen participation, equality, rule of law, and political tolerance—in six pages! The booklet ends with a list of participatory activities, illustrating that democracy is about more than elections. These included building strong communities, taking group actions through CSOs or political parties, and even paying taxes and fees for services. 17

Omano Edigheji, Fakir and Edigheji interview. A strong example is the law school of the University of Pretoria. Heyns interview. 18 www.ufh.ac.za/otchr. Street Law, another important NGO based at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, spread to 17 of the 21 law schools in South Africa while it was active. The organization is no longer operating, however, due to a loss of funding. Under this program, law students visited over 500 schools per year, taught children about their legal rights and produced teacher manuals and textbooks on human-rights issues. The center also visited prisons and CBOs and used role-playing, street theater, and mock trials (Agbakoba and Carver n.d.). 19

Paul Graham, e-mail memo to the author. As of 2009, CSNAC had become part of the National Anti-Corruption Forum. 20

Jenkins and Putu interview.

21

2011 video interview with Paul Graham on www.IDASA.org.za.

22

Among the NGOs are IDASA, ISS, ODAC, and PSAM.

23

Gastrow interview. Gastrow also commended the role of Hassan Logart, a SANGOCO staff member, in promoting the network. 24

According to Judith February, prominent party donors to the ANC are more selfconscious about being transparent, but regulation has stalled. Shortly before leaving office, President Mbeki assigned Kgalema Motlanthe to shepherd partisan finance reform through Parliament. This assignment was obviously sidetracked when Motlanthe became interim president. 25

www.intosaijournal.org/technicalapr2007a.html.

26

As of 2006, the Faculty of Development Studies at Mbarara University and the University of the Western Cape were administering the program. The Community Peace Programme is also linked to the Foro de Convivencia in Villa Banana, Rosario, Argentina. 27

Motala interview.

28

www.ijr.za.

29

Villa-Vicencio interview.

30

Ivor Jenkins’ (2002) study of Black–Indian conflict in KwaZulu-Natal used a bus tour to visit the problem areas fueling the conflict with members of both groups. 31

See pp. 112-113 for more about this approach, used to help end the civil war in Tajikistan.

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32

The second Sustained Dialogue was with the Student Representative Council at the University of South Africa. However, they were unable to get enough white students, because they were fearful of the process. Other community-based approaches may not involve conflict or even the potential for conflict, but—as with the deliberative approaches explored on p. 95—focus on a more communicative democratic culture. The Isandla Institute conducts ongoing dialogues with 20-30 urban professionals around issues like “culture and inclusion in the city”; public memory; the creation of public space, trade unions, and democratization; the second economy; and race. The dialogue includes NGOs and local and provincial members of the government. Van Donk interview. 33

Coleman interview.

34

www.hsrc.ac.za.

35

This may also result from the ANC belief that it can take black voters for granted. According to Ibrahim Fakir of the Centre for Policy Studies, “Our electoral analysis found that voting patterns follow racial identity. If you are black, you vote ANC.” Fakir and Edighi interview. Among other reasons for low turnout was the electoral boycott called by the Landless Peoples Movement. 36

www.moibrahimfoundation.org.

37

www.southafrica.info.

38

Trust is generally higher among the 60 percent of South Africans actively involved in at least one social, political, or cultural organization. They were also more likely to vote, to participate in collective action, or to protest (Khosa 2005, 132; Klandermans et al. 2001). 39

This lack of contact with public officials also extends to lack of knowledge about possible government benefits, according to Lesisa (2005). 40

A stellar example is the Mail and Guardian.

41

www.cosatu.org.za.

42

Coleman interview.

43

A union investment vehicle was worth almost 132 million rand in 2000 (Mackay and Mathoho 2001). 44

Meyer interview.

45

Makue interview.

46

As of January 2012, the council was composed of 27 different denominations.

47

Graham interview.

48

Graham interview.

49

Desai interview. Brett Davidson pointed out that Paul Graham sits on a panel trying to save SANGOCO, one of the organizations that criticized IDASA. 50

Jenkins and Putu interview.

51

Graham interview.

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52

Ibrahim Fakir, Fakir and Edighi interview.

53

Motala interview.

54

Informal conversation with Teddy Nemeroff at IDASA, December 2005.

55

Villa-Vicencio interview.

56

Dimba interview; Brewis interview.

57

Coleman interview.

58

Graham interview. He observed that leaders of CBOs are often unemployed and give up their community work when they find a job. 59

The planning figures compared to 36 percent for government beneficiaries and 26 percent for donors (Heinrich 2001). 60

Boyte and Strom interview. Boyte described how Bernard Crick’s Defense of Politics influenced IDASA’s founders. In terms of citizen activism, it is related to black consciousness and the South African Communist Party, even though the ideology was different.

71

In addition to Ford, the GGLN’s international ties include the Learning Initiative on Citizen Participation in Local Governance, based at the Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University in the UK; the Mott Foundation; and GTZ, the German aid agency. Associate members include the Centre for Municipal Research and Advice; Community Connections, which strengthens the capacities of community workers in Cape Town; Participation Junction that assists communities in negotiating with governments; Black Sash; ODAC, and Nkosinathi Sotshangane, an individual member who is a senior associate at the Research Resource Centre, Walter Sisulu University in Mthatha (www.ggln.org.za). 72

Ibid. Afesis-corplan has also developed a financial accountability project in partnership with PCRD, another GGLN member. 73

FCR has also produced a guidebook in several languages on how to create such partnerships elsewhere.

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74

In the late 1990s, the government initiated a Community Development Workers Program to bridge the gap between government and communities. Offices of the premiers in each province were made responsible for coordination with local governments (Agbakoba and Carver n.d.). 75

Ibid.

76

Hicks interview. As of 2008, the CPP had signed a contract with the National Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). Both the head of the Public Participation and Empowerment Unit of DPLG and the donor partner (Gesellschaft fur Technische or GTZ) country representative championed CPP’s commitment to public participation policy. However, the draft policy stayed within the department after the government champion of participation was transferred to another department (Hicks and Buccus 2009). 77

Naidu interview. There are 300 CBOs in the area called Komboko alone.

78

Ibid. In addition to the GGLN, the Participative Development Initiative in Durban, part of an Indian INGO, includes lawyers, facilitators, mediators, and trainers who work on local development, natural resources, social crime prevention, HIV/ AIDS, and institutional capacity building through local support groups for victims, registration of cooperatives, and hands-on assistance for emerging entrepreneurs. Training simultaneously focuses on human rights and democracy and includes ward committee advocacy skills (www.PDI.org.za). 79

See www.kettering.org.

80

Quote from Marie Strom; Boyte and Strom interview.

81

Ibid.

82

Much of IDASA’s work has now expanded to the southern African region. The Centre for Governance in Africa focuses on selected CSOs, enabling them to increase their participation in legislative processes. 83

Ibid.

84

Staff members Ivor Jenkins, Mpho Putu, and Enough Sishi, who were international fellows at the Kettering Foundation, strengthened IDASA’s interest in public deliberation. Sishi and Putu have left IDASA. The author coordinated the international fellows program at the foundation. 85

E-mails to the author from Enough Sishi.

86

Graham interview.

87

The other two programs in Pretoria are the Governance and AIDS Program and the Local Government Centre. IDASA is collaborating with PACT, an international NGO working with local governments on improved policy development and service delivery (www.PACT.org). 88

Desai interview.

89

www.gender.co.za.

90

Coleman interview.

91

Faull interview.

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92

Group meeting at IDASA, November 21, 2005.

93

Graham video interview, 2011.

94

Although socioeconomic coalitions seem to be easier to organize in South Africa, they are not necessarily more durable than democratization coalitions. 95

Williams interview.

96

Jenkins and Putu interview.

C HA P T ER

5

p

TAJIKISTAN: History, Politics, & Civil Society TAJIKISTAN, for the first time in its long and varied history, is taking halting steps toward democracy. They are, however, small and easy to miss, and it remains an open question whether this fractured, impoverished nation will stay on the road to a free society or slide back into totalitarianism. This is an instance where the notion of civil society and NGOs as shepherds of democracy is most severely tested. The challenges to democratic practices in Tajikistan are rooted in its past as an Islamic nation at the crossroads of commerce, conquered by one international power after another, eventually spending most of the 20th century under Soviet rule.

History Tajikistan first emerged in the 6th century BC as part of the Central Asian territories conquered by the Persians and organized into the satrapy of Soghdiana. In 327 BC, Alexander the Great united Soghdiana with Bactria (now Afghanistan) and married Roxana, a Tajik princess. In antiquity, the Tajik lands lay astride the Silk Road and were thus a crossroads of religious diversity that included Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam.

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The Arab conquests that established Islam as the dominant religion by the second half of the seventh century also incorporated Zoroastrian traditions, such as sacred places for learning (Chatterjee 2002; Niyazi 1999). At the same time, Sufi charitable organizations—tariqats—gained legitimacy among the common people. Persian traditions were strengthened in the 10th century when the Saminid dynasty reestablished the old Persian literary language, a move that proved essential to the survival of local tradition during the Mongol conquests in the 10th-12th centuries (Karimov 2002, 4). Under Mongol rule, the Tajiks established semi-autonomous urban republics called Sarbardors, which, like the urban republics in medieval and Renaissance Italy, promoted civic life and trade (Karimov 2002). This civic autonomy proved short lived, however, and although local communal networks survived, regionalism and clan dominance rendered communities less open to outside influences.1 During the 19th century, the Tajik lands were contested in the “Great Game” between the British Raj and Imperial Russia over influence in Central Asia.2 Russia finally conquered Tajikistan in the late 19th century, and by the early 1920s, it had become a division of Soviet Turkestan, and then, in 1929, a separate socialist republic. The Soviet leaders, while not insensitive to cultural traditions, wanted to avoid creating nationstates based on uniform ethnic identities. They therefore divided the Tajik peoples between two states, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, each with both Uzbek and Tajik populations. The primary Tajik cultural centers, Bukhara and Samarkand, became part of Uzbekistan, while the newly created city of Stalinabad (now Dushanbe, or “Monday Market”) became the capital of Tajikistan. The loss of its ancient centers of culture and learning hindered Tajik state building and encouraged the growth of localism (Karimov 2002). Soviet rule penetrated the countryside only indirectly, however, since the kolkhoz (collective farm) directors were often clan elders. The leaders of the Leninabad (Khujand) collective farms were particularly good at guarding their hegemony through connections with key national govern-

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ment ministries.3 Patronage at the regional level was reinforced through Soviet devolution of authority to provincial governors. Soviet leaders found that clans were essential in reducing transaction costs and providing social goods and services, and thus allowed them to survive. Traditional irrigation hierarchies also reinforced clan power, while overreliance on cotton production, poor management of land and water resources, and a demographic explosion plagued the Soviet period (Hickson 2003; Starr 1999). Tajik Communist elites were often corrupt and repressive, legal development was inadequate, and one observer called the overall Soviet legacy a “lack of stateness.”4 Despite its subsidized position within the Soviet Union, Tajikistan had the lowest GDP of all Soviet republics (Karimov 2002, 145). There were positive aspects to Soviet rule, however, including development of an economic infrastructure and the spread of universal education and basic health care, which dramatically improved at the community level. Although the kolkhoz displaced some traditional economic networks, other traditional civic practices were allowed to continue. These included mahallas (local councils), Islamic waqfs that helped maintain schools, and zakat (the Muslim practice of charitable giving). Tajikistan’s non-fundamentalist Islamic traditions also survived, despite the rule of a secular elite.5 The mountainous communities in the large, autonomous Kuhestone Badakhshon region are home to a diverse Islamic community, many of whom are members of the Ismaili creed.6 In February 1990, Russian and Uzbek support for the governing coalition, coupled with a crackdown on the opposition, led to violent riots and the banning of opposition participation in the March 1990 elections. The elections produced a parliament dominated by the Communist Party, and after President Qahhor Mahkamov backed the coup attempt in Moscow in September 1991, the Tajik Supreme Soviet declared independence from the crumbling Soviet Union.7 The collapse of Soviet power led immediately to a prolonged civil war in Tajikistan during most of the 1990s. The conflict was rooted in part in the legacy of Soviet economic and political favoritism towards the

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Northern city of Khujand (formerly Leninabad). Regional divisions also were fortified by the emergence of the Islamic Renaissance Party, organized around secular issues, such as unemployment and wasteful use of resources (Niyazi 1999, 191). The opposition also included supporters of democracy.8 Once the civil war started, both sides fragmented into small clan-based factions, and anarchy prevailed in many regions. As the nation split into regional factions, the clans took advantage of the power vacuum, and in May 1992, a violent clash with remaining Russian military units fueled more fighting and widespread hoarding of weapons. The new opposition-led government under Akbarshah Iskanderov of the Islamic Revival Party was overthrown in 1993 by troops under the control of tribal networks from Kulob, who then installed their leader, Emomali Rahmon (at that time known as Rahmonov), as president.9 The civil war continued, however, and by the time a UN peace agreement was signed in 1997, 60,000 people had lost their lives, 55,000 were orphaned, 25,000 were widowed and 1 million more had been displaced (Erturk 2009; Hickson 2003). More than 70 journalists were killed, and many professionals fled abroad, mostly to Russia, Germany, and the United States. More than half of them never returned.10 Although communities and regions “privatized” the means of production, and community organizations (mahallas) provided provisions and recruits, funding the war came at a terrible economic cost. The civil war caused a sharp decline in the GNP. One important division underlying the civil war, peculiar to Tajikistan, was the long-standing tension between mountain and valley peoples. More than nine-tenths of the country is mountainous—generally less developed than the valleys, lacking sufficient land and infrastructure, and tending to be more strongly Islamic. Second, mountain people are usually Tajik, whereas valley people are ethnically Uzbek and typically better educated. During the Soviet era most of the high officials were from the Northern valleys, where people are traditionally “Russianoriented.”11

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The road to peace was initiated from the civil-society sector, albeit with international support. In 1993, three Americans and three Russians from the Dartmouth Conference Task Force on Regional Conflicts, led by Harold (Hal) Saunders of the Kettering Foundation, explained the important role of the Dartmouth Dialogue during the Cold War to non-official representatives of the warring factions and invited them to talk about the Tajik conflict.12 The objective of the task force was not to mediate, but to engage all sides in designing a peace process for their own country. The first two 3-day meetings of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD) were full of recriminations, but during the third meeting the participants decided to work together to negotiate the return of refugees. According to Saunders, “At that point, they could go no further; it was too frightening to have agreed with the enemy on a common purpose.”13 By late 1993, the opposition factions had organized the United Tajik Opposition and brought an opposition platform to the ITD. After the fifth ITD meeting, the pro-government participants reported to the government that the two sides had reached a basis for negotiation. Three weeks later the government accepted an invitation to join UN-mediated peace talks. The UN negotiations, which began in April 1994, included three members of the ITD.14 The official negotiators produced a peace treaty in June 1997 that included a National Reconciliation Commission representing both sides, a major recommendation of the ITD. Five members of the ITD became members of the commission. By 2004, when the Dialogue ended, its work had been taken over by the Public Committee for Democratic Processes (PCDP).15 With the return of internal refugees, governmental and international agencies such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) supported the peace process by working through mahallas to prevent new conflicts, particularly in the south where the fighting had been most intense. This had a positive cumulative effect on hostilities and in 1997, the last wave of refugees returned from Afghanistan. Partly because the UN settlement supported a regime based on the Kulob clans, however, violence continued in 1998 and 1999.

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Although the official settlement stated that the opposition would be allowed to compete openly for power, Rahmon effectively crushed the opposition and imprisoned its leaders, establishing a dictatorial rule based on the control of elections that continues to this day. Members of the small secular opposition, as well as Islamic moderates, are excluded from the appointments process.16 In Isfara and elsewhere, mosques have been closed, imams have been removed, and women who refused to remove headscarves have been denied internal passports, even though support for Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Jihadist movement, is mainly confined to Uzbeks in the north. The regime also has banned women and children from attending mosques. In May 2003, Shamsiddin Shasiddinov, deputy chair of the Islamic Renaissance party, was arrested near Khujand, charged with organizing criminal activity and given a 16-year sentence. Other former opposition leaders who have been arrested, however, have been released after paying a bribe. As Parviz Mullojonov of PCDP observed, “Corruption softens repression.”17 The regime’s intermittent campaign against regional factions, including the Kulob-based Front of Tajikistan, is not always easy to distinguish from repression. Even some of the regional bosses who helped put Rahmon in power have not fared well. The powerful deputy chair of the Dushanbe Customs Committee was convicted in 2004 of kidnapping, extortion, polygamy, and marrying a minor and was sentenced to six years in prison.18 In January 2004, Rahmon, feeling increasingly secure against the “warlords,” fired General Ghaffor Mirzoev, the former field commander from Kulob who had amassed a fortune as the head of Tajikistan’s Olympic Committee. Dozens of others also were dismissed, but when 200 officers of the presidential guard threatened to resign amid rumors of a coup, Mirzoev was reappointed to head the State Narcotics Control Agency. Although Rahmon has faced challenges to his leadership, vivid memories of the civil war have strengthened his regime. Despite the democratic changes that started in the Baltics at the end of the 1980s, some Tajiks blame democracy as the reason for the outbreak of the civil war.19

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Current Situation Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics, with a GDP per capita of $1,202 (Boone 2008).20 Despite modest economic growth based on the export of cotton and aluminum, the economy is sapped by corruption. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Tajikistan 154th out of 180 countries in 2010. Several of the NGO leaders interviewed estimated that more than half of the government budget obtained from foreign assistance and taxes disappears into the pockets of the kleptocracy and 15 percent of the profits of small businesses go for payoffs. Not surprisingly, the president has not signed the OSCE Convention on Combating Bribery, and the arrest of 800 people on corruption charges in 2006 was probably a convenient way to eliminate rivals.21 By 2009, with Dushanbe “awash with drug money,” the city could boast of a new presidential palace and five new luxury hotels.22 At the same time, the IMF revealed that the Tajik government had been misreporting for years and ordered it to pay back $48 million in loans (Boone 2008). According to Transparency International, however, there has been some improvement in the banking sector. A second economic challenge is Tajik dependence on Russia and Kazakhstan. Almost a million Tajiks work outside the country, according to the IOM, with remittances reaching $250 million per year.23 Tajik workers often send their remittances back to their parents. This leaves communities empty of young males, with wives and children dependent on their in-laws.24 Some women and children find themselves without a home or source of income (Erturk 2009, 9). Labor migration has fueled a long-term dispute with Russia over the lack of protection of Tajik workers. A 2008 layoff of migrant workers in Russia led Rahmon to order the entire population to remove the Slavic suffix -ov from their last names (Gorst 2008). Some NGO leaders allege that Vladimir Putin has financial interests in Tajikistan, while others believe that Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs planned a coup d’etat in 2004 in order to control Rahmon and that Russia threatened to

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rescind its payoff of the $800 million Tajik debt if Tajikistan asserted too much independence. Despite Russia’s hegemony over Tajikistan, China is asserting her influence also. One international observer asserted, “This country does not have true sovereignty. China will control the economy within a generation.”25 A third problem is the weakness of the market economy. Heavy industry remains under state control, while a massive lack of capital has impoverished the population, especially in rural areas. The district governments (hukumats) spend most of their time collecting arbitrary property taxes and there have been many recent complaints about local governments illegally seizing houses and other private properties (Muhutdinova 2008).26 Finally, two-thirds of the population live in poverty and inequality is increasing.27 Although unemployment is estimated at 33 percent, child labor is common. The situation worsened in 2003, when a pyramid investment scam collapsed, leaving thousands destitute and leading to the first spontaneous street demonstration in Dushanbe in a decade. In 2007-2008, Tajikistan ranked only 122nd of 177 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index.28 Although the older generation benefited from an advanced educational system under the Soviets, educational opportunities declined dramatically with the civil war and the subsequent lack of governmental commitment.29 The large number of internal refugees resulting from the civil war worsened the situation. Tajikistan ranks higher on the status of women and children than Egypt and Turkey, but lower than Ecuador, El Salvador, and Paraguay.30 Studies estimate that between one-third and one-half of Tajik women regularly encounter some form of domestic violence and child abuse is also extremely common (Erturk 2009, 10). In rural areas the dropout rate of young girls is twice that of boys. On the other hand, Tajikistan now benefits from at least a partial rule of law and a bicameral parliament.31 The suspension of the death penalty and the abolition of exit visas in 2005 were steps forward. Freedom of expression and individual rights are somewhat stronger than the

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rule of law or associational rights.32 In 2011, Freedom House gave Tajikistan a rating of 5 on civil liberties and 6 on political rights, a score that remains unchanged since 2004.33 One of the NGO leaders interviewed confirmed the partial advance in individual rights in describing how the secret police arrived at his office and asked him numerous questions about a friend of his in the opposition: “In Uzbekistan, they would have not only harassed me, they would have arrested me.”34 Another NGO leader observed, “We are free, but not democratic.”35 Still, individual rights are at risk. Long pre-trial detentions and torture are linked to the ties of police and security forces to organized crime and corruption.36 Nor is there any record of a court nullifying confessions obtained under torture (Muhutdinova 2008). Fifty-six constitutional amendments have weakened legislative and judicial systems that lack trained personnel. Whether the transfer of what is widely considered to be a terrible prison system from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice will have a positive impact remains unclear. In 2007, the government rebuffed a Red Cross request for access to detention centers and prisons (Muhutdinova 2008). Among other human-rights issues is the frequent abuse of refugees, particularly those from Afghanistan. In terms of associational rights, people can be arrested if they have not obtained a permit for a strike or protest, even though they are not illegal. Nonetheless, public protests continue to break out. In June 2008, more than 500 people in Badakhshan province demonstrated against troop movements connected with an impending presidential visit. More protests occurred in the same region in 2009 (Boone 2008).37 All religious communities must register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs, and a new law aimed at Protestant missionaries further restricts religious freedom.38 One of the more bizarre new restrictions in the same law limits participants in ceremonies and celebrations to 150 and permits only family members to attend birthday parties (Muhutdinova 2008). Ninety percent of workers belong to a giant, officially supported labor federation with little political independence. There is some freedom of assembly in universities, but a 2007 law bans univer-

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sity students from owning cell phones. By 2011, the regime was trying to compel students studying abroad to return home. The political rights of even potential opposition groups remain shaky at best. A restrictive election law has kept democratization NGOs in legal limbo by excluding NGOs from election observation and has enabled the regime to close down opposition papers.39 Recently there has been some loosening of press restrictions, but it remains to be seen how long it will last. (See p. 128.) Opposition parties remain cautious, given continuing government oversight. At the same time, the government has tried to create the appearance of pluralism by sponsoring new parties.40 A further limitation is that the constitutional amendment authorizing political parties requires that they declare themselves either secular or religious.41 According to Rahmatillo Zoirov, the leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT), this was drafted to legalize the Islamic Renaissance Party, but had the unfortunate side effect of implying that “Democratic parties [of all kinds] are only a small part of a much larger universe of parties.”42 The government has been particularly harsh on the weak secular opposition. The crackdown on the opposition that followed the 2005 elections was fueled by the events in Kyrgyzstan that ousted President Askar Akayev. By 2006, Zoirov claimed, despite official denials, that the government was holding 1,000 political prisoners.43 Although Tajikistan remains the only country in Central Asia with a “legal” Islamic opposition, the fortunes of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) have declined in recent years. IRPT support is centered in the Ferghana Valley, where it is active among ethnic Uzbeks.44 In the 1970s and 1980s, the party was focused on the reform of Islam, including women’s rights. Although a somewhat more radical faction led by Abdullo Nuri was weakened by the civil war, in 2002-2003, some party members accepted tours to Iran.45 This helped the official People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) discredit the IRPT and hurt the moderate wing of the party.46 Party activist Sadullo Marufov was mur-

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dered on May 4, 2006, in police custody and the IRPT claims that illegal detentions of party activists are continuing in the Soghd province. As of 2007, ironically, the IRPT was facing accusations that the authorities had corrupted it. In addition to the repression of opposition parties, the PDPT assured its control by ignoring international election standards and opposing the electoral reforms proposed by the informal working group nominated by the parliament. In June 2003, the decision to give Rahmon two more terms was monitored by only about 24 international observers for 2,800 polling stations. Six parties registered for the parliamentary elections in 2005, but the opposition parties had trouble getting their candidates on the ballot (Ahmedova 2005).47 Opposition candidates were arbitrarily removed from election lists, and it was difficult for them to gain media access. Not surprisingly, the official party took 52 of 63 seats in the lower house.48 The regime responded to post-election protests by jailing two members of the Democratic Party on charges of hooliganism (Ahmedova 2005).49 In 2006, the Islamic Renaissance Party, the Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party boycotted the elections but held rallies that the police broke up.50 On November 6, Rahmon won a third term with 79 percent of the vote over four unknown opponents. Because they failed to criticize the president during the campaign, it is likely that the authorities had sponsored them. That these unknowns got 20 percent of the vote was very strange, even for Tajikistan, according to several observers, particularly amid accusations of fraud and ballot stuffing.51 Meanwhile, the prospect that Rahmon could stand in the next two elections and thus remain in power until 2020 caused Zoirov to go to court and challenge the legality of the 2003 referendum as the basis for the election.52 Between 2004 and 2008, Tajikistan’s Freedom House rating on electoral process worsened, from 5.75 to 6.5.53 The February 2010 parliamentary election resulted in a landslide for the official party, amid reports of official fraud.54 Complicating this electoral picture are the two “parties” controlled by the president, the official party, and the government apparatus, which

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has the real power. The president himself chooses the heads of the local party election committees, but they must follow local government authorities, who sometimes contradict the party program.55 A further complication is that Rahmon has strictly controlled the press and has resisted Russian pressure for a “well managed” liberalization.56 To its credit, however, the tiny opposition continues to confront the regime in Parliament. PCDP, organized at the end of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, hosts an ongoing roundtable discussion among parliamentarians and government officials. In May 2006, the subject of the round table was the role of the opposition in Parliament. (See p. 146.) Overall, Tajikistan ranked 1.8 out of 5 on a study of democracy and governance in Eurasia done by USAID (Swedborg and Sprout 2008). Its score was lower than Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, but along with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, and Azerbaijan, close to the Eurasian average of 1.96 and above the ratings for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. (The comparable ratings for Argentina and South Africa were 3.11 and 3.69, respectively.)

The Contours of Civil Society Civil Society: Markets The business sector in Tajikistan is less developed than either NGOs or the sphere of public debate. Businesses tend to advertise through state media, even though some independent outlets are struggling to survive, and this distorts the development of a private market, diminishes the marketplace of ideas and limits freedom of information.57 Businesses are also burdened with the need to pay bribes at the borders, in government offices, and everywhere business is transacted.58 Local businesses maintain a low profile to avoid harassment, and thus avoid partnerships with NGOs (USAID 2009). Nevertheless, according to Gulchehra Nosiriova, a businesswoman, former Inter-Tajik Dialogue participant, and NGO leader, “The government is no longer able to push people around the way they could 10 years ago.”59 Local governments have begun to include both NGOs and

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local businesses on their ministerial boards and Nosiriova herself is on the government board that deals with the business sector. Local businesses in the northern city of Khujand established a community foundation that supports NGOs.60 The Law on Public Associations, adopted in 2007, allows business corporations to take a tax deduction of up to five percent of their profits for donations to NGOs. In 2009, amendments increased this to 10 percent. Because few businesses are aware of this benefit, however, the Aga Khan Foundation conducted a workshop on corporate philanthropy in 2008. As a result, some banks and telecommunications companies began supporting local NGOs.61 The Babilon Company, for example, provides some NGOs with free Internet services (USAID 2009). In December 2010, however, 59 new amendments were introduced into the tax code, causing “profound concern” in the NGO community, according to Shamsiddin Karimov, head of the Tajik National NGO Association.62 Some of the onerous provisions were repealed as a result of NGO lobbying, and a working group of four businesses has been appointed by the government. Although a set of NGO recommendations has been forwarded to the working group, Tajik NGOs continue to pay a 25 percent “social payment” to the government. Despite Tajikistan’s lackluster progress in democratization and its still weak business sector, it has seen slow but steady progress on sustainability for both NGOs and the media.63

Civil Society: Associational Life Community-Based Organizations Despite the lack of effective democratic institutions in Tajikistan, traditional civil society continues to survive, often at the local level in the form of centuries-old Tajik traditions. Before Soviet rule, the hashar system of community labor, as well as mahallas, and choikona (teahouses) served as places for shared work and local discussion. Informal meetings and small-group conversations around common dinners in mosques, where men brought the food, supplemented meetings of mahallas. Mahal-

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las still have accurate information on each household and they collect money and sometimes organize work groups. Mahallas are not councils of elders, but they have real coercive power to solve conflicts and often organize in apartment buildings as well as traditional villages.64 Although these civic habits survived the civil war, they were limited to male heads of households, with little incentive for interregional cooperation.65 A “narrow circle of relatives, neighbors, and community members” contingent on business, regional, or ethnic connections, shaped decisions (Mullojanov 2001; Slim and Hodizoda 2002, 179). However, women have begun to enter mahallas in recent years. The hashar system of joint community work also has survived, at least in some communities (Karimov 2002). In the Gharm rayon (district), several communities built a 75-meter suspension bridge across the Surkhob River, with the local government providing materials. The jamoat, or wider community organization, in Khojaborak repaired 19 kilometers of highway, following a traditional deliberation or mashvarat that decided to use hashar because the local authorities had no funds available (Karimov 2002). In 2008, a new Law on State Social Orders provided a legal basis for governmental outsourcing of social-service contracts to local nonprofit as well as for-profit organizations (USAID 2009). Among other civic customs are the gap and gashtak (gatherings) of men, the mushkilkusho (conversations among women), the mehmonkhona (guesthouse), the alavkhona (fair house or house of fire), as well as the choikhona. Fair houses existed before the seventh century under the Soghdian dynasty as public spaces for festivities and dining. Young males had their own meetings around meals. The pirs (religious teachers) helped people make decisions in many of these settings. Other traditional community groups are more strictly ethnic. There are 12,000 avlod (kinship or patriarchal groups), representing more than 60 percent of the population, with significant economic, religious, and legal powers. Despite mahallas, local governance depends on business networks and clans to reduce transaction costs and provide goods and services (Hickson 2003, 457).

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During the early Soviet Period (1918-1924) the Communist Party promoted literary, artistic, and musical groups as well as networks of trade associations.66 Although such official groups sometimes replaced the mahallas, they were not completely extinguished ( Jahangiri 1998). According to Mullojanov (2001), mahallas actually became more important under the Soviets because the state-sanctioned professional associations were unable to mediate local conflicts. Later in the Soviet period, however, the policies of perestroika initated by Gorbachev allowed professional associations, such as the Union of Journalists, to become more influential (Mullojanov 2001).67 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, civic movements emerged in the cities, often founded by the intelligentsia (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 19). However, the 1991 elections and the ensuing civil war “broke off [all this] political activity at the root” (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 20). Intermediary NGOs Intermediary NGOs emerged during the civil war under conditions of near anarchy. By 1997, there were an estimated 275 in the country, some of which grew out of cultural and intellectual groups (Karimov 2002; Mullojanov 2001). According to Watters (1999, 91), “NGOs, surprisingly, have been able to gain a solid and relatively influential foothold in society and . . . have flourished in ways not possible in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan.” Unlike many developing countries, where intermediary NGOs are heavily concentrated in cities, fully half of all Tajik NGOs were registered in rural areas between 2003 and 2005 (Yusufbekov et al. 2007). One reason for the rapid rise of Tajik NGOs was their interest in environmental issues ignored by governments. During the civil war, Tajik and Russian NGOs worked together to stop the bombing of Tigrovaya Balka (Tiger Hollow), turned it into a nature reserve and achieved biosphere status through an international campaign. An NGO coalition called the Citizens Council on the Environment worked with the government and advised them on a 1996 environmental education law and the ratification of the International Convention on Desertification (Watters 1999). Dialogues among NGOs in the environmental field have continued through the Public Independent Environmental Council.68

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During the transition period after the civil war (1997-2000), the Dushanbe office of the OSCE trained hundreds of NGO personnel through seminars focusing on civic, gender, and human-rights topics. Counterpart Consortium, a USAID-funded international NGO, trained a network of 13 NGOs in conflict resolution. Hickson (2003) considers that these programs were critical to the establishment of a nonviolent civic culture. By 1999, the Judicial Consortium, itself an NGO, estimated that the 30,000 people working in the third sector had an impact on the lives of one-third of the adult population.69 Granted, this figure included volunteers, paid staffs are very small, many people were probably employed part-time, and impact is an elastic word.70 The public profile of NGOs is extremely low. When asked whom they trusted to help solve their problems, 30 percent of those contacted in a 2005 sample survey said their clans, with their families in second place. NGOs were not even mentioned.71 NGOs continue to have many other problems. Few can sustain themselves financially, even with foreign assistance. Moreover, foreign assistance entails its own problems. The “donor-driven model” typically includes funds for workshops but meager funding for staff training, organizational issues, or computers.72 In some cases NGOs bribe international donors to get grants, or locally based international NGO staff sometimes run programs.73 Some of the Civil Society Support Centers (CSSCs) established by USAID in the late 1990s have shut down. Also, NGOs or groups of NGOs may be tied to one clan and cover only their own territory. Most important, NGOs were founded and continue to be run by Russian-educated intellectuals with few ties to mahallas and the other traditional bases for civil society (Hickson 2003; Mullojanov 2001). Many NGOs still reflect Soviet era top-down management (Zainiddinov 2004). Boards of directors often do not exist and few NGO leaders have experience in local fundraising. A recent (2009) comparison of NGO sustainability in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia ranked Tajikistan in the middle of the five

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Central Asian countries, below Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and above Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (USAID 2009).74 However, NGOs with a focus on women’s issues are particularly important, both because of the high numbers of women professionals trained under the Soviets and because of the impact of the civil war, when women lost confidence in government’s ability to provide for basic needs or deal with gross violations of women’s rights (Chatterjee 2002, 118). Women were active in conflict resolution after the civil war, including the Sustained Dialogue (Yusufbekov et al. 2007). (See pp. 128-131.) Of the 200 active NGOs, 60 work on issues of gender equality, and onefifth of all women’s NGOs are in small rayons and towns, while others work in rural areas.75 In addition, approximately one-third of NGOs that work on related issues are headed by women.76 Of the 29 interviews done with Tajik NGOs working on democracy in 2006, 16 were with women. NGOs sustain themselves through e-mail networks, even on issues that challenge government policies.77 Many NGOs have close ties to newly organized Community Development Councils or more traditional grassroots organizations.78 After a 2007 law forced Tajik NGOs to re-register, the estimated 2,700 NGOs declined to 1,500, despite the help of volunteer lawyers. Moreover, fewer than 400 of these have the skills and funding to engage in strategic planning and project design.79 Others may get sporadic funding to do short-term training, but lack of funding is the “number one problem,” even for the active NGOs.80 Most of those interviewed, however, were not discouraged. As Shamsiddin Karimov, a scholar of Tajik civil society and now the leader of the Tajikistan National NGO Association, observed, “Participation intensity in the civil society is more important than breadth of organizations.”81 Dilbar Khaililova, who heads a support NGO that helps strengthen other NGOs in Qurghonteppa, observed that despite their weaknesses, NGOs are “much better than 10-15 years ago . . . and more focused.”82 Another NGO leader said that despite the weakness of Tajik civil society, “it is

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more developed than the political parties. We are also ahead of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan”83 The NGO leaders interviewed generally divided intermediary NGOs in Tajikistan into three groups: 1) those created by donors, primarily motivated by grants; 2) those created by local or national government, often called GONGOs; and 3) those that “would really like to do things, often created by citizens.”84 Another way to classify Tajik NGOs is, of course, between those that work on socioeconomic or environmental issues and those that work on democracy. There are more organizations in the first group, but they have less impact than those working on democratic issues, even though some informants observed that these other NGOs are quite independent.85 A lawyer who heads an NGO that provides legal assistance to NGOs, businesses, and political parties said that democratization NGOs “have pushed for good and useful laws. . . . The initial barrier of fear has been overcome.”86 An international NGO representative added that democratization NGOs are “not in anyone’s pocket and are influential if they are not working on politically sensitive issues.”87 Both CBOs and NGOs take on social issues involving violations of human rights and thus have an impact on democracy. The leader of a Kulob NGO that works on AIDS prevention said, “We try to inject democratic processes and practices into the solution of these problems.”88 NGO work also has changed opinion, even within the government. NGO work with drug users, for example, has helped to change government perceptions that drug users are merely criminals.89 NGOs focusing self-consciously on democracy, plus those that have an indirect impact, have only begun to network with each other.90 As in South Africa, democratization NGOs tend to rely on informal, ad hoc collaborations. For example, Bakhtovar, which established reconciliation centers in former civil war areas, uses a database of people trained in democratization established by PCDP.91 But Tajik NGOs as a whole lack strong networks, even though international donors have funded NGOs, providing technical and managerial

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assistance to other NGOs.92 One of the first of these, the Foundation to Support Civil Initiatives, began assisting local NGOs and governments in 1995 with the establishment of a library and information bulletin called “Civil Society.”93 A National NGO Forum, convened in May 2008, reflects progress in this area. Delegates adopted the Tajikistan National NGO Development Program and a Code of Conduct. After a series of regional meetings, 10 NGOs founded the Tajikistan National NGO Association.94 In 2009, the network created a national Internet portal that provides space for NGOs without websites, still the majority. The second meeting of the association in December 2009 included 40 NGOs and focused on the need for national recognition of the importance of NGOs. Guests included representatives from international organizations, parliamentary deputies, and representatives from the president’s office. It remains to be seen whether the association can overcome the financial, organizational, and political issues that confront similar umbrella organizations in South Africa and other countries. More serious than the weakness of intermediary networks has been the lack of grassroots ties. Despite the rich tradition of local associational life in Tajikistan, democratization NGOs (with the exception of some women’s organizations) lag behind their environmental counterparts in this respect.95

Civil Society: Sphere of Public Debate Unlike South Africa, Tajikistan’s independent media outlets struggle to survive. Private media pay heavy taxes, up to 30 to 50 percent of revenue, and new media applications often languish in administrative limbo.96 National television stations are not able to reach the whole country, and there are only 10 regional newspapers.97 In 2005, unsettled by the uprising of democratic elements in Kyrgyzstan, the government closed a private television channel in Kanibadam and shut down the only private channel in Dushanbe. By September, many journalists and even one editor had been arrested and all major newspapers were

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shut down.98 Even in Khujand, which has a livelier independent media, the state-run printers refused to publish an article alleging Ministry of Internal Affairs complicity in international human trafficking.99 This restrictive climate, strengthened by memories of journalists killed during the 1990s, often leads to self-censorship. Asia Plus, a private Tajik news agency, became more cautious after printing an interview with Khurinisso Ghafforzoda, head of a regional NGO support center in Rasht, who spoke of the desperate economic plight of women and denounced interference with opposition parties and NGOs. Local governments throughout Rasht accused her of undermining the peace. Paradoxically, the beginning of 2006 saw both the suspension of the BBC FM radio and the launch of a new English language weekly, supported by the British Embassy. A new Tajik language weekly news program was being broadcast on eight independent regional television stations 100 Asia Plus provided stories for international news services and while they are cautious in their choice of themes, their latitude seems to have widened. Their founder, Umed Bobokhonov, noted, “Earlier I wrote an article about the opposition and was threatened with prison. Now I can write about opposition leaders.”101 At the same time, Bobokhonov observed, “There are zero radio and TV stations that are independent, although some are privately owned. . . . [Government] owned stations issue licenses to their competitors and it is therefore hard to get a license. . . . Two weeklies last year criticized the government and were shut down.”102 One small television station was shut down during the November 2006 elections, although no radio stations were closed. While all media outlets were required by law to re-register in 2007 and two journalists were sentenced to two years in prison for libel, official pressure lessened and no media outlets were closed. Reporters Without Borders, as of 2008, actually considered Tajikistan to have a freer press than Russia and the freest press in Central Asia. Journalists became bolder, without repercussions. As of 2008, there were 30 radio and television stations, mostly private, although none were permitted in Dushanbe.

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Three newspapers were financially sustainable—Asia Plus, Digest Press, and Reklamnaya Gazieta (Muhutdinova 2008). In addition, the Supreme Court convicted the murderer of Muhiddin Olimpur, a prominent BBC journalist slain in 1995. Yet by 2010, the pendulum had swung back toward repression, with 58 journalists arrested during the year. For example, a journalist in Khujand was jailed in November after he wrote about local government corruption. Tajikistan ranked only 115th of 178 on the index of press freedom compiled by Reporters Without Borders.103 Few media outlets know that they receive the same tax benefit as other businesses for contributions to NGOs and they rarely provide NGOs with free or discounted advertising or broadcast opportunities (USAID 2009). However, in some areas, such as the Zeravshan Valley in the Soghd Oblast, 80 percent of NGOs interviewed in one study cooperated with the mass media (Yusufbekov et al. 2007).

The Legacy of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue In contrast to more or less strict media control, the climate for deliberative talk is more benign, and this may owe much to the contributions of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue in helping to end the civil war. Initiated by Russians and Americans, it was, nonetheless, culturally appropriate to traditional Tajik political culture at the village level. Although the Dialogue was a highly sophisticated process, it grew out of an understanding of the way ordinary people anywhere make decisions, given enough time. In contrast to some other methods of conflict resolution, Sustained Dialogue assumes that outsiders can’t tell participants how to change their relationships because their conflicts are too deeply rooted. During this process the participants first vetted their own grievances and then learned to analyze how their relationships with each other were changing as they spoke to and listened to each other carefully. That enabled them to project what they had learned into the larger political arena to change the patterns of relationships that fuel conflict. Hal Saunders, the American founder of the Dialogue, described it as “a mind at work in the middle of a country making itself” (Saunders 1997, 2).

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The Stages of Sustained Dialogue • Identifying the concerns and grievances of Dialogue participants who are a microcosm of the factions in conflict. • Mapping their concerns and grievances to probe the dynamics of the relationships underlying the conflict. • Coming to judgment on how to transform those relationships. • Designing scenarios of interactive steps to move in the preferred direction. • Acting together or individually to take the design into the larger political arena. Having shown the capacity to move through this process, participants described it as a “multilevel peace process” that included the official peace process, the public peace process or Inter-Tajik Dialogue, and the civil-society arena between the family and government (Chufrin, Imomov, and Saunders 1997, 75; Saunders, 1997, 11). A 1996 memorandum by the participants described the primary obstacle to peace as an “absence of an adequate understanding on sharing power among the regions, political movements, and nationalities in Tajikistan.” It advocated a strong civil society, because “only associations of citizens outside government working within the constitutional framework can enlarge the capacity of citizens to play their necessary role in building new Tajik society” (InterTajik Dialogue 1996, 3). Yet it was the local level of traditional Tajik political culture that the Inter-Tajik Dialogue had the greatest potential to reinforce, even more than ending the clash of clans and warlords directed at higher levels. Despite legal and political barriers, the experience of the Dialogue gave participants the ability to resolve regional and local conflicts. It also reintroduced and built on local political traditions to spread the idea of dialogue and political round tables into the more formal institutions of civil society, such as NGOs. There was also activity at the national level. In 2002, PCDP (registered as an NGO in 2000 by Inter-Tajik Dialogue participants) organized

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a dialogue on “the role and influence of local traditional institutions of decision making.” The participants made it clear that what they were doing wasn’t just something introduced from the West and that dialogue is an element in a nascent democracy, not just a parallel decision-making structure (IISD 2004; Saunders and Mullojanov 2005). Another participant in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, Gulchehra Nosiriova, created a Tajik version of the US National Issues Forums.104 The Tajik Center for Citizenship Education (TCCE) sponsored dialogues on regionalism, mostly among journalists, scientists, and representatives of local organizations from each region. A project with the University of Omaha involved the role of NGOs in conflict resolution.105 Although the TCCE is no longer active, Tajiks who participated in the Sustained Dialogue and the dialogues on regionalism have gone on to leadership roles in other NGOs. The idea of the consciously sustained dialogue and the addition of women participants are the two most important innovations added to traditional Tajik forms of deliberation by the Sustained Dialogue process. According to Ashurboi Imomov, the impressive cochair of PCDP and former Dialogue participant, persistence and constant activity are the keys to success. He also argued that not even Islamic extremists could be excluded.106 Dialogue and deliberation, in other words, depend on the inclusion of all voices around the table (Stewart 2002).

The Relationship between Civil Society and Government According to Latif Hadyaev, the lively, creative founder of a small NGO coalition called Civilization, relations between civil society and government have unfolded in three stages. First, during the civil war, from 1991 to 1997, writers and intellectuals found jobs by creating NGOs. The government paid little attention because, according to Hadyaev, “[It] was happy that these intellectuals could find work. At this point, NGOs were occupied with the problem of refugees and education.”107 The second stage began in 1997 when some NGOs received grants, and, in response, the government began promoting “social partnerships” with NGOs and talking about networking, with support from an INGO called Counter-

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part Consortium. Gradually the government realized what was happening and started creating their own NGOs, while also creating obstacles for NGOs working at the grassroots level. “After 1997 . . . the number of NGOs suddenly increased, from 1,700 to 3,400,” Hadyaev said. “The number of donors was up as well.”108 Then, in the third stage, government harassment of NGOs began in 2002, with the civil-society challenges in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. It was especially targeted at those working on political or democratic issues. What happened to Hadyaev is illustrative: A young prosecutor who used to be my student at the Faculty of Law summoned me to his office, yet continued to call me Mohallim, or teacher. He asked me whether I thought people in power understand democracy. I answered that local officials don’t. I also brought a tape of my interviews and played it for him. He listened and then I showed him the newspaper article on what the president had said about NGOs playing a positive role and asked him if anything had changed. . . . I asked him what I had done wrong and he answered, “Don’t worry, we just invited you in to clarify things. This is just a conversation. You can go now.” After this talk, the government attitude towards me and my NGO changed for the better, but I hear that I am still on the Black List of the Ministry of National Security.

Hadyaev went on to describe the history of his own NGO’s relationship with the central government: We worked in Soghd, where the government began organizing its own civil-society centers. We explained that civil society is autonomous, and they did not like that. After official complaints were lodged in 2004, we had to appear before a national prosecutor. But the president continued to hold monthly meetings with civil-society representatives and said civil society could play a promotional role in society. Now the harassment of NGOs is worse. There are many obstacles in the way of NGOs being in a position to influence political attitudes, especially about citizenship.

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In addition to harassment, both donors and governments have organized their own NGOs. Another NGO leader observed that donororganized NGOs (DONGOs) criticize GONGOs, “but both are helping themselves.”109 Other NGO activists also experienced the crackdown. Kironsho Sharifzoda of the Association of Journalists Social Partnership recalled: Before 2000 a coalition was established including 10-12 NGOs in Dushanbe that conducted meetings in Dushanbe and forums in other areas, often through mahallas. In 2000, the election was more transparent. We want to start networking [but then things changed].110

Despite the crackdown, some aspects of the “social partnership” with the government remain. Monthly round tables sponsored by PCDP have included representatives from the president’s party as well as the opposition and some Tajik NGOs interested in democracy. (See pp. 145-146.) An advisor to the president, Salohiddinov Isomiddin, has journalists and NGO representatives on his advisory board, and has, according to Kironsho Sharifzoda, “changed his opinions about civil society.”111 Although individual staff members sometimes face harassment by the secret police, many NGOs are allowed to operate with little interference, including democratization NGOs that focus on women’s issues. Indeed, 60 NGOs contributed to the National Plan of Action for 1998-2005 to increase the status of women (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 41).112 Other democratization NGOs, however, have faced closer scrutiny since the Rose and Tulip revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. NGO victories, such as retraining the police in human-rights law (see pp. 156-157), have proceeded despite other indicators of continuing authoritarianism and centralization of power around a narrow elite from Khujand and Danghara, the president’s regional power bases. Outside observers frequently underestimate the many issues related to democracy, some of which may be addressed, even under adverse circumstances.113

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Because Tajik NGOs are legally treated the same as political parties, the enabling environment for civil society is poor (Hickson 2003). Beginning in 2005, the International Center for Nonprofit Law (ICNL) has gotten registration fees reduced by repeatedly raising the issue at round tables and seminars and in meetings with government officials. The number of registered NGOs, especially in rural areas, increased significantly each time the fees were lowered.114 However, in 2006, NGO leaders were concerned about a proposed law to complicate NGO registration. According to one NGO leader, “We can make comments [but], regardless, we will not be so free.”115 Another feared, “My NGO will not be allowed to re-register. For NGOs involved in political issues, some will simply not re-register. And they will find fault with the rest of us.”116 Dilbar Khaililova, the outspoken head of the NGO support center in Qurghonteppa, said that the new law has some pluses: “It will clean up the sector.” But she went on to say, “One month is not enough time! Also all national organizations are required to have branches in every region. This is ridiculous! Another stupid thing is that we are supposed to register with local authorities but they lack the capacity to deal with this. We hope we can make some changes in this law.”117 Despite such hopes, the law passed in 2007 was, unfortunately, a carbon copy of a recent Russian law. In addition to requiring reregistration, the law permits the authorities to attend meetings of registered groups. Still, many “paper only” NGOs have been eliminated. Although some active organizations were probably winnowed out, and there were reports of illegal payments made to registration authorities, it is impressive that so many organizations (1,700) actually managed to re-register (Muhutdinova 2008).118 In contrast to the national level, local governments have become more positive towards NGOs, and some provide funding for local projects, such as schools.119 Others work with international NGOs. Perhaps more important to the democratic agenda are collaborations between local governments and CBOs. By creating a network of jamoats

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(semi-official institutions located between mahallas and local governments), “the influence of traditional grassroots organizations on local government has increased considerably” (Mullojanov 2001, 62). Intermediary NGOs can broker these ties. According to Alisher Rahmonberdiev, founder of a women’s rights NGO called Manizha: In Bahkton we learned that a local initiative group wanted to set up a women’s NGO. The [local] government was against it. But the NGO newspaper published an article about it as if it had the full cooperation of the local government, and praised the head of the local government. We gave a copy of the newspaper to the Office of the President and everything changed.120

Nevertheless, NGO relations with local governments are far from harmonious, and local governments also create their own NGOs (GONGOs), thus co-opting autonomous activity.121 According to Latif Hadyaev, “We explained to them that civil society must be from the bottom up . . . [but] the district governments complained and we had to appear before a national prosecutor.”122 Because NGOs that operate in local areas have little access to international funding, there is also a palpable desire among local NGO leaders for government recognition and funding, a desire that does not bode well for the independence of the sector. Outside Dushanbe, NGOs are less likely to be led by the ex-Soviet intellectual elite. International NGOs that work in Tajikistan have their own problems with official sources of funding. The staffs of the international NGOs interviewed complained about the USAID bureaucracy. According to one source, none of the official donors “do their homework.”123 Another observer likened the World Bank and the United Nations to the command style of Soviet rule.124 Although those interviewed favored working through local NGOs and letting them control the process, one departing INGO staff member observed that if she had to do it over, she would move away from grants: “They corrupt the process. For every training we paid per diem

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and plenty of people love this. The question is whether they use or apply it in another setting.”125 She argued that grants should be replaced by technical assistance on a more competitive basis. Katherine Muller of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) observed that INGOs tend to classify local NGOs in black-and-white terms. She argued they should be more discriminating and nuanced. “They should be saying [for example], this one has two good trainers.” Overall, there are only 10 to 15 INGO and official donors in Tajikistan. This scarcity often determines not only what Tajik NGO leaders say about each other but also what they say about donors.126 As in most countries, there are complaints about donor “fads.” One NGO leader claimed that INGOs are less interested in democracy than they used to be.127 More than elsewhere, however, both INGOs and official donors face accusations of bribery levied by the leaders of Tajik NGOs, with Counterpart Consortium, already involved in a publicly aired corruption scandal at one end, and the Eurasia Foundation, and the highly respected Swiss Office for Cooperation at the other. It is impossible to assess the accuracy of these charges, but they may stem in part from the tendency of both INGOs and official donors to focus on CBOs. Some INGOs, for example, have drawn mahallas into conflict resolution. More than 100 CBOs were created over three years by local and international organizations in the Kulob region alone. The Mountain Societies Development and Support Program, funded by the Aga Khan Foundation, focuses on helping existing mahallas and other local organizations in 17 districts in Gorno Badakhshand, the Rasht Valley, and Khatlon to plan local development in collaboration with local governments.128 With financing from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Aga Khan Foundation collaborates with subdistrict development committees linked to local governments and CBOs on local projects like schools and irrigation projects that include monitoring by CBO representatives.129 This resulted in a significant increase in trust between local governments and CBOs. In

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2007, the president signed a law allowing CBOs at the village level to form federations and in 2008, another law gave them legal status (Holloway et al. 2009). The Aga Khan Foundation also has funded the new University of Central Asia in Khorog, home to a number of Tajik NGOs.130 However, NGOs in this region tend to focus on social issues in isolation from political concerns (Chatterjee 2002, 108-109, 115). International donors also work through semi-official jamoat development committees that focus on job creation for vulnerable groups, such as women and ethnic minorities.131 The donor focus on CBOs and jamoats may weaken the ability of intermediary NGOs to build their own grassroots ties. However, the CSSC in Kulob (Shahrvan), with International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) support, was able to train 15 CBO representatives in designing projects and seeking funding as a group. Some INGOs and official donors work directly on democracy. The Open Society Institute (OSI) sponsored 27 small-town seminars and helped create the Association of Small Towns of Tajikistan. Trainers worked with the deputies of local majlis, or legislative bodies, on strategic planning and public policy.132 OSI also collaborates with USAID and the US State Department to send Tajik journalists to the International Center for Journalism. The British embassy supports an independent newspaper in Dushanbe.133 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) met regularly with partner NGOs, sent 6 parliamentarians to the United States, trained 300 district election commission members, and worked on increasing political participation among women. Unfortunately, it was forced by the Tajik government to close down its office in 2008. Despite these and other efforts from the OSCE and The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) and support from the American ambassador for electoral reform, several Tajik and international observers believe that donors place a higher premium on stability than democracy. Ironically, Tajikistan’s relative stability is causing donors to reduce their levels of financial support. In August 2009, UNTOP closed its doors.

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Conclusion The reasonably successful role of women’s NGOs in Tajikistan is only one of the many democratic interventions to be explored in the next two chapters. Although Tajik NGOs are weak, the state also lacks capacity, measured not in terms of repression but in its capacity to implement. This suggests that the influence of civil society, including deliberative talk as well as NGOs, may be stronger than some outsiders assume and that NGOs may increasingly enter into cooperative relationships with the government. On the other hand, helping to formulate and implement state policy can be a double-edged sword. Strategic awareness by NGOs of the need to diversify both government and international support may be difficult in a climate of scarcity, but it is essential, particularly for democratization NGOs.134

Endnotes 1

This extreme localism, according to Karimov (2002), affects the Tajik political mentality, even today. 2

Graetz and Graetz 2007, 1E, 3E.

3

Khujand is today the second largest city in Tajikistan, with 165,000 people. In 1929, Stalin included it in the newly organized Tajik republic, despite its Uzbek population, because full republic status required one million people. Graetz and Graetz 2007, 3E. 4

Hickson 2003, 54.

5

Today Tajikistan is 85 percent Sunni, 5 percent Shi’a, and 10 percent other religions, including the Ismaili. Islam was refueled in Tajikistan when Gorbachev loosened restrictions on religion, but Tajikistan remained less fundamentalist than other Islamic countries. However, recent evidence indicates that the Wahabi fundamentalist movement called Salafia has increased its activities in Tajikistan and its ranks now include 20,000 young people. 6

This area is also the conservator of an endangered Ismaili literary tradition (www. tajikistan.neweurasia.net). 7

Telephone conversation with Eric Sievers, February 2006.

8

Hadyaev interview, May 10, 2006. He argued that one could also divide civil war participants into Islamic supporters, supporters of the old Soviet system and democratic thinkers as well as young people. Only the first two groups had influence and weapons.

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9

Russian and Uzbek troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) assisted them. CIS, organized in 1991, is comprised of the former republics of the Soviet Union. A few states, such as Georgia, have since dropped out. 10

Hadyaev interview, May 10, 2006.

11

E-mail from Shamsiddin Karimov, Feb. 5, 2012.

12

Founded in 1960, the Dartmouth Conference is the longest continuous bilateral dialogue between American and Soviet/now Russian citizens. In 1991, the members of the Dartmouth Conference decided to “First, conceptualize the process of dialogue we had learned; second, to focus on the new Russian-US relationship; third, to apply the process to one of the conflicts that had erupted on the territory of the former Soviet Union. They chose Tajikistan because of 1) its potential strategic importance, 2) the strong connections with academic Tajiks of one member of the conference, and 3) few international organizations were already there” (Saunders 2005, 126). 13

E-mail from Harold Saunders, April 2010.

14

These negotiations also included observers from Russia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan, with the OSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference helping to mitigate the negative impact of neighboring country policies (Saunders 1999; Slim and Hodizoda 2002). 15

During an international meeting at the Kettering Foundation, Tajikistan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdunai Sattorov, observed that the “role of Sustained Dialogue in Tajikistan was critical, it was instrumental in the peace-making process” (Daley 2002, 2). 16

The weakening of the al-Qaeda network has hurt both Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, both of which have been active in Tajikistan. On the use of the Avesta, see Chatterjee 2002. 17

Mullojanov interview, 2005.

18

One major warlord allied with Razhmonov, Suhrob Qosimov, remains as commander of the Interior Ministry’s Rapid Reaction Force. 19

Sharifzoda interview.

20

http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics.

21

Some business owners use allegations of corruption, accurate or not, to eliminate business rivals. 22

The quote is from Donald Bowser, the UN anti-corruption officer in Dushanbe. According to Muhutdinova 2008, Tajikistan, given its 870-mile porous border with Afghanistan, has one of the highest rates of drug trafficking and interception in the world. 23

www.Tajikistan.neweurasia.net.

24

Imomazoraova interview.

25

For obvious reasons, this interviewee is not cited.

26

www.Eurasianet.org.

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27

Olimov interview. A 2008 report, however, claims that the poverty rate declined from 83 percent of the population in 1999 to 55 percent in 2007. Freedom House, Nations in Transit, Tajikistan 2008. The economic growth that made this possible, however, may have been stalled by the worldwide recession. 28

The country’s rank declined to 127th in 2010.

29

Gender disparities in education also have worsened. In 2006, only 39 percent of students in grades 10 and 11 were girls (Erturk 2009). 30

www.SavetheChildren.org.

31

Mullojanov interview, 2005.

32

See www.freedomhouse.org.

33

www.freedomhouse.org. This is on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being highly democratic and 7 being completely autocratic. 34

For obvious reasons, the name is omitted.

35

Sharifzoda interview. The similarities with the Brazilian military regime in the 1970s and early 1980s are remarkable. As Stepan (1988, 6) explained, there is a distinction between liberalization and democratization (although they overlap). And the Brazilian military was relieved that civil society supported liberalization rather than democratization. In contrast, what Stepan calls “political society” (parties, political alliances, electoral rules, and so on) was more threatening to the regime. 36 http://www.amnestyusa.org./news/news-item/tajikistan-torture-unchecked-in-theabsence-of-rule-of-law. 37 www.freedomhouse.org. Tajikistan has four provinces, each with rayons, including Khatlan, Sughd, Badakhshan, and Dushanbe with its surrounding districts. The subdivisions within each district are called rayoni. 38

Sharifzoda interview.

39

Olimov interview.

40

Etulain interview.

41

Olimov interview.

42

Zoirov interview. Moreover, at least one-third of the population either ignores or has no understanding of the role of political parties, according to a Sharq survey. Olimov interview. 43

Zoirov left his post as a presidential advisor in 2003.

44

The valley has three-fourths of the arable land of the country and two-thirds of the GNP (Ahmedova 2005). 45

Abdullo Nuri, described by Freedom House as “widely respected,” died in 2006. Freedom House, Country Report, 2009. 46

Naumkin 2005. According to Troy Etulain, however, the party still has regional offices. Etulain interview. 47

www.freedomhouse.org.

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www.freedomhouse.org.

49

After a Democratic Party split, the regime actually supported the breakaway faction, which did not qualify for the ballot in 2006. 50

www.BBCnews.com.

51

Both the OSCE and the CIS sent election observers. Although the CIS officially certified that the elections were fair and honest, interviews with individual CIS observers revealed that they actually shared the more negative assessments of the OSCE. Even the OSCE is criticized by some Tajiks for not being aggressive enough. 52

Muhutdinova (2008) calls Zoirov’s ongoing challenges “bold and problematic for the regime,” despite his party’s lack of a popular base. 53

www.freedomhouse.org; www.Tajikistan.neweurasia.net.

54

www.freedomhouse.org.

55

www.Eurasianet.org, June 15, 2006. Zoirov interview.

56

www.Eurasianet.org. There were rumors before the 2006 election that the Russians supported Makmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, the mayor of Dushanbe, who has strong ties to Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov was a member of the Dartmouth Dialogue and cochair with Harold Saunders, of the Regional Conflicts Task Force during the 1980s, which later fostered the ITD. 57

Karimov interview. He was then working for the Academy for Educational Development in Tajikistan, an INGO, and helping me organize my research. He was an international fellow at the Kettering Foundation in 1999 and 2005. 58

The data is from the Tajik Legal Consortium, cited in Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 43.

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70

A 2007 study (Yusufbekov et al. 2007) found that 80 percent of 74 organizations had fewer than 6 employees. Unfortunately the surveyed organizations included 26 government institutions and the data was not broken down in the analysis. However, most of the organizations interviewed for this book had very small paid staffs or depended on a mixture of occasional payments through contracts with international organizations. 71

Olimov interview. The survey, done by Sharq, was based on a random sample of 1,000 Tajiks. 72

Imomazoraova interview. She also pointed out that NGO autonomy is also compromised by the rental of office space from local government. 73

Mullojanov interview, 2006.

74

The scores used are comparable to Freedom House’s democracy and civil liberties ratings, with 5-7 representing early transition to sustainability, 3-5 representing mid-transition, and 1-3 representing consolidation. Legal environment, organizational capacity, service provision, infrastructure, and public image in Tajikistan all ranked at 5 or below, with only financial viability and advocacy in the plus five or early transition stage. The scores in all of the sustainability indicators improved significantly from 1998 to 2002, but have leveled off since then. Still, there are many new NGOs in some areas of the country. In the Zerafshan Valley of the Soghd Oblast, 21 of the 25 NGOs interviewed for one study had been founded since 2000 (Yusufbekov et al. 2007). 75

www.vitalvoices.org.

76

www.tajik-gateway.org.

77

Sievers discussion, 2006.

78 www.akdn.org/Tajikistan. In some cases the new law has been used to allow the government to demand “arbitrarily inordinate amounts of information.” Although the new law exempts NGOs from the Value Added Tax, it requires them to pay income tax (USAID 2008, 224). 79

Some of the NGO leaders interviewed estimated that between 200-400 NGOs are active. Jamakhon Alimi of Parallax in Kulob estimated that only 30-40 “function well in the whole country.” Alimi interview. 80

Sharifzoda interview.

81

Karimov interview.

82

Khaililova interview.

83

Gafforzoda interview.

84

Gafforzoda interview; also Hadyaev interview and Kosimov interview. Nuriddin Karshiboev made an additional distinction between GONGOs and those that are too close to government and are listening to them but understand civil society and democracy and are “also in our camp.” Karshiboev interview. See Chapter 6, endnote 36. For a discussion of the legal definitions of Tajik NGOs, see Yusufbekov et al. 2007. 85

Gafforzoda interview.

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86

Mirzoev interview.

87

Whitbeck interview.

88

Saidaliev interview.

89

Karimov interview.

90

Imomov interview.

91

Azimova interview.

92

Khaililova interview. Among development NGOs, the Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (ASTI) has facilitated an informal network on poverty using strategic planning. Assistance groups within the larger network focus on particular areas or issues (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 24).

93

Burkhanova interview.

94

The director is Shamsiddin Karimov, formerly of the Academy for Educational Development, an INGO that coordinated the author’s month-long visit to Tajikistan in 2006. Karimov was also an international fellow at the Kettering Foundation. 95

Whitbeck interview. According to Muazzama Burkhanova, environmental NGOs are also well connected to international environmental networks and NGOs, such as the West-East Ecological Partnership, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, and the Secretariat of the European Eco-Forum. Burkhanova interview. 96

www.cpj.org.

97

Karshiboev interview.

98

In December, a journalist named Jumaboy Tolibov was freed after a visit from Alain Couanon, senior representative in Tajikistan for the Vienna-based OCSE, which monitors human rights. 99

Nosiriova interview. A former Sustained Dialogue participant, she now directs an NGO that does training in English and computer skills and runs a business that imports furniture from China. TCCE also published two issue books for public deliberation, on child criminals and on health care. 105

Nosiriova interview.

106

Imomov interview.

107

Hadyaev interview.

108

Hadyaev interview.

109

For obvious reasons, the person interviewed will remain anonymous.

110

Sharifzoda interview.

111

Sharifzoda interview.

TAJIKISTAN | 143

112

Government funding for NGOs is estimated to comprise only 5-10 percent of their budgets, whereas international support provides 90 percent (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 54). 113

Of course, under even more extreme authoritarianism, as in Uzbekistan, this may not be possible. 114

www.usaid.gov; www.freedomhouse.org.

115

Kuvatova interview.

116

Akhunova interview.

117

Khaililova interview. But Saodat Azimova believed it was too late to make changes. Azimova interview. 118

According to USAID’s 2007 Democratic Sustainability Index, re-registration has caused NGOs to lose interest in advocacy. On the plus side, the minimum number of founders required was decreased to three and there are tax exemptions on grants. However, the 25 percent social security tax and the 13 percent salary tax remain; www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/ dem_gov/ngoindex. 119 Rahmonberdiev interview. There are also differences at the Oblast level in the governmental treatment of NGOs. Treatment is more favorable, for example, in the Soghd Oblast than in the Khatlon Oblast, where the state wants to control NGOs (Yusufbekov et al. 2007). 120

Rahmonberdiev interview.

121

Halimova interview.

122

Hadyaev interview.

123

Halimova interview.

124

Sievers discussion, 2000.

125

Whitbeck interview.

126

There is more fingerpointing at each other in Tajikistan than in South Africa, Argentina, or other countries where the author has interviewed NGO leaders. 127

Tabarova interview.

128

www.akdn.org/tajikistan.

129

The Aga Khan Foundation sponsored the preparation of a directory of local CSOs of all types, which was shared with governing authorities. 130 Graetz and Graetz 2007, 4E. The university’s other two campuses will be in Nayrn, Kyrgyzstan, and Tekeli, Kazakhstan. 131 Many of these were created by UNDP. There are currently, according to Yusubekov et al. (2007), 86 of these in the country. Networking among these began in 2003, with Community Empowerment Network trainings and research round tables with community leaders, local and national government representatives, and the media, most of whom did not know each other. 132

Halimova interview.

133

Etulain interview.

134

Olimov interview.

C HA P T ER

6

p

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TAJIKISTAN: Building a Loyal Opposition & Law-Based Civil Liberties Introduction UNLIKE SOUTH AFRICA, the political impact of Tajik civil society depends mainly on the impact of NGOs, particularly democratization NGOs. Tajikistan has no COSATU, nor even a strong religious sector. Tajik businesses are weaker and far less influential than their larger counterparts in South Africa. “The sphere of public debate,” however, is another story. Although the independent press is fragile and still subject to government controls, it has gained some room for maneuvering since 2006 and several democratization NGOs focus on the need for a free press (see pp. 150, 153, 154, 155, 156). Dialogue and deliberation, used in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue and other round tables, are increasingly important. In essence, a few democratization NGOs have built on traditional modes of civil dialogue, where local institutions, such as the choikhana and the mahalla, provide space for public talk.

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This chapter focuses on the impact of democratization NGOs on building a loyal opposition and strengthening law-based civil liberties. Chapter 7 deals with the impact of democratization NGOs on political culture and participation. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness and long-term impact of democratization NGOs in Tajikistan, even after 42 interviews.1 NGO leaders struggle in an environment of scarcity, where competition for funding often trumps collaboration around a common democratic agenda. This is visible in the weakness of NGOs in general and democratization NGOs in particular.

Building a Loyal Opposition NGO leaders observed repeatedly that Tajiks associate the term opposition with the civil war. In other words, people fear anarchy and violence more than state repression. It is, therefore, not surprising that most NGOs do not criticize the government and are happy to become government contractors. Other NGOs walk a fine line between genuine loyal opposition and co-optation by the government. As Muazzama Burkanova, an ecological economist turned NGO leader observed, “I don’t often criticize, but I am not afraid. You have to discuss questions beforehand with the government.”2 Part of the problem is the weakness of the state itself. Like many strongmen, Rahmon is better at repressing dissent than at making and implementing policy. Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia only accentuates these difficulties. South Africans can more easily afford loyal opposition, because the state is strong, and the country has already had three orderly and democratic transitions; first to Mandela, then to Mbeki, and now to Zuma.

The Role of Democratization NGOs Despite the exclusion of women, Tajikistan’s deliberative traditions provide legitimacy for the concept of an autonomous civil society. PCDP, led by Parviz Mullojanov, was created by the members of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue at the end of the civil war. It has continued to work not only on

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community-level deliberation and development, but also at the national political level. PCDP sponsors a monthly Saturday morning deliberative round table on politics with a varying group of participants, including NGO leaders, government representatives, parliamentarians from several parties, and journalists. Among its other virtues, it is an excellent vehicle for overcoming the natural reluctance of NGOs to interact with political parties. The following description of one round table, observed by the author, illustrates the degree to which this format opens politics up to dialogue and even opposition, not only within the event itself, but also in other venues, such as Parliament. On Saturday, April 29, 2006, the topic of the round table, held at the Ministry of Public Health, was “Rights and Regulations in Parliament.” In attendance were a number of parliamentarians from both the official party and the opposition parties, the head of the official party, as well as several journalists and representatives of NGOs. The chair for this session, Parviz Mullojanov, a key Inter-Tajik Dialogue participant and now head of PCDP announced at the outset that they would publish any papers of members of the dialogue, including those written by people from political parties not officially registered. “We will provide everything to the public on our website, including what emerges from these sessions as common ground.” Reports by several parliamentarians, including opposition members, seemed designed to show those of us who were foreign observers, as well as the other participants, that Parliament is not merely a rubber stamp. One member of Parliament observed that small parties can create voluntary coalitions of five members or more in the lower house and as of 2006 there were eight of these in the lower house. Members of the official party are only allowed to be in one such coalition and the leaders of these groups participate in high-level meetings.3 A parliamentary council prioritizes and coordinates the activities of the coalitions and invites other party representatives to its meetings. “When we see differ-

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ences with another proposal, then the council creates a reconciliation committee to find common ground,” observed an official party leader. These coalitions, according to the press secretary of the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party, allow people to introduce common ideas, despite political differences. Therefore, draft laws usually include more than official ideas. According to another member of Parliament, “The number of changes is increasing. . . . We change about 15 percent of each law.” At the time of the round table, 40 of the 140 laws then under consideration were initiated by Parliament. The official PDPT had initiated 28 of these, with the remaining 12 emerging from other parties or parliamentary committees. To be sure, the process is still like “chess played by one person on both sides,” according to an opposition leader. A proposed election law that all the parties helped draft was not adopted and Parliament cannot override presidential disapproval of a law or legislative change. As one NGO representative observed, “[The opposition] parties don’t even comment on big energy projects. Parliament doesn’t have the capacity to write its own laws.”4 Nonetheless, the subtext of the entire two-and-a-half-hour dialogue seemed to be the importance of a loyal opposition and its relation to government accountability, even though no one talked openly about the concept. Members of the official party talked, predictably, about the negative aspects of a multiparty system; however, A. Muso-Zoda, at that time assistant to the deputy chair of the PDPT, a tall, imposing veteran of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with an unusual reputation for personal honesty, had a somewhat different “official” view: “Other parties want the president not to lead his own party. Yet he has established it. Others should improve their own parties. . . . This pocket party idea hides inefficient activity.”5 Opposition parliamentarians agreed on the need to work on their low levels of representation and small constituencies, but also argued that they lack media access and information about new laws. By the conclusion of the round table, it was clear that everyone was struggling, in different ways, with the need to build

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stronger parties, even if some were ambivalent about the need for a loyal opposition. Educating the public about the concept of loyal opposition may be even more difficult than educating opinion makers. Only 32 percent of respondents to a 2010 survey preceding parliamentary elections said they were likely to vote, and 68 percent believe that the official party represents their best interests, up from 41 percent in 2004. At the same time, only 24 percent believed that the February 2010 parliamentary elections would be fair. The PDPT subsequently won 70 percent of the vote, with 4 other parties clearing the 5 percent threshold.6 A network of seven NGOs called Civilization, however, uses the concept of loyal opposition in their workshops and publications. Latif Hadyaev, a military translator in Afghanistan, returned with a determination to improve education and soon decided to narrow his focus to political education. “Our brochures explain the concept of opposition and whether it is constructive or destructive,” he said. “Some see it as destructive. Many do not understand this concept. Yet it is based on conscientious electoral participation and the idea that the people should be involved in governance.”7

Advocacy and Partisan Opposition Among the opposition leaders in the forefront of the NGO push for democratization is Khurinisso Ghafforzoda, former deputy chair of the Social Democratic Party.8 Ghafforzoda became accustomed to combat, both during the civil war and afterwards. As we walked to a dinner interview at her apartment, she casually observed that we were being followed, but exhibited her toughness by telling us not to worry about it, because she faces it all the time. She described her relations with the government as “normal but not good. . . . I am open with them and they know I am going to run for president. Given the mentality of Tajik men, they think I am not typical of Tajik women, but they know that I am direct and they respect me for that. They also know that I am a reformer.”9 Ghafforzoda argues that even under an authoritarian regime such as Tajikistan’s, political education can lead to advocacy. She organized

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a National Congress for the Development of Democracy and runs two NGOs, Oshti Milli and a CSSC in the Rasht Valley that focuses on political education. The Judicial Consortium conducts two- and three-day training modules for voters that cover all of the political parties and others that cover only the opposition parties. They also train leaders from different parties.10 This nonpartisan approach is particularly noteworthy, because the head of the Judicial Consortium, Rahmatillo Zoirov, is also the leader of the Social Democratic Party. After commanding a Soviet military regiment in Germany, Zoirov studied law, focusing on the protection of ethnic minorities in the Soviet period.11 Katherine Muller of IFES compared Zoirov with the loyal opposition leaders she knew in Costa Rica, her previous posting, explaining that his analytical approach to politics tends to take precedence over his partisanship.12 Indeed, in his interview Zoirov said he had been “interested in politics since childhood.”13 The Judicial Consortium and other Tajik NGOs have collaborated with IFES in promoting political party fairs before elections and in publishing a political party directory.14 The National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan (NAPST), headed by Abdulghani Mamadazimov, takes a different approach to building a multiparty system—through round tables and analytical reports. With a paid staff of 5 and enough international support to permit it to hire its 63 members as consultants, it has convinced the government that its reports are neutral.15 Its political round tables at different regional levels include both the government and the opposition parties. The association also trains political leaders and publishes a number of training modules on parties, opposition parties, and party leadership.16 The few but impressive legal victories on human trafficking and capital punishment suggest that even without a strong multiparty system, NGOs may well play a larger role in future political advocacy, and NGO leaders seem to be aware of this. In 2006, for example, the NGO Chasma in Qurghonteppa began training 50 women leaders on policy advocacy, as well as conflict prevention and resolution. Recent judicial challenges

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spearheaded by the Judicial Consortium also suggest that another way of creating a loyal opposition is to use the courts to strengthen civil society.

Supporting Civil Society Since 2007, the Judicial Consortium has played a direct legal role in support of a broader civil society, including businesses and the media. Now, under Zoirov’s leadership, the Judicial Consortium has initiated nine strategic court hearings relating to disputes between entrepreneurs and government agencies. Although businesses are generally reluctant to litigate against the government, “the Consortium has no qualms,” according to its website, and the state will have to take the court decisions into account in the future. Clients “used to fear going to court, now they ask how to present the case.” A recent case concerned a television station whose license had been revoked for providing airtime to the opposition in the 2005 elections. The Judicial Consortium won the case and the Supreme Economic Court of Dushanbe declared the revocation invalid.17 In addition, the Judicial Consortium has provided legal support and consultation to more than 100 NGOs, 17 of which are its organizational members. Among its individual members are 25 lawyers. Of its 60 projects, 6 have been grant-based (USAID, UNDP, and NDI) and the rest have come from publications, assessments done for businesses, INGOs, and donations from members. Among the other organizations working on the conditions that limit legal protections for civil society is Shafqat, located in Kulob. After attending a local seminar supported by the International Center for Nonprofit Law, Shafqat’s staff helped register 12 local CBOs (economicdevelopment committees) supported by the German NGO, AgraAction.18 At the national level, Intercon assists NGOs with registration and focuses on reforming registration laws. It was founded in 1999 by Matin Mirzoev, a measured, articulate lawyer who formerly worked with the Ministry of Justice on NGO and political party registration. Although Intercon has only 3 paid staff members, Mirzoev has been able to enlist more than 30

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volunteer lawyers. Legal status, Mirzoev said, is “a constitutional right. Our NGO initiated the amendment for the reduction of registration fees. The legal changes in the last six to seven years are positive.” In contrast to others interviewed, Mirzoev’s opinion on the government requiring reregistration of NGOs was that it was “high time. . . . The problem is that NGOs are not well informed on this.”19 Indeed, an Intercon marketing survey found that most NGOs did not know that they are legally allowed to make a profit on activities like commercial services for INGOs.20 As of 2008, approximately 100 local and national centers provided legal consultations to various groups. Still, few lawyers have much experience in noncommercial legislation (USAID 2009, 224). A second approach to civil-society strengthening, through management, is centered on a national network of seven CSSCs, originally founded by Counterpart Consortium, supported by IREX as of 2012. The centers were deliberately located in areas that suffered the most during the civil war. The Kulob CSSC, called Shahrvand, trains the staff of emerging NGOs and CBOs on strategic planning, grant writing, anticorruption campaigns, and promoting dialogues.21 With a staff of 14, Shahrvand publishes a local NGO newspaper and maintains computers and a library for their member organizations. Although new NGOs have emerged out of informal initiative groups of CBOs and citizens that met at Shahrvand and more than 100 organizations are members, only about 12 are active.22 The director of a Kulobi NGO that works on AIDS reinforced the importance of what he called the “NGO club,” which meets weekly at Shahrvand and has sent regular letters to the government on a number of policy issues.23 The CSSC in Qurghonteppa, called Fidokor, works in 15 districts but struggles with maintaining international support. Director Dilbar Khaililova, a slender, decisive middle-aged woman with strong opinions based on her considerable experience, believes that USAID should not have founded seven centers: “They should have done it competitively. Each center has to raise its own funds, USAID doesn’t support them

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enough and there are too many of them.”24 With a staff of 27, Fidokor provides the NGOs of Qurghonteppa with 5- and 10-day training programs (about 8 per year), also attended by local government officials. Fidokor also sponsors roundtable discussions and “cooperates with the Ministry of Justice” to review the status of all NGOs. One local NGO leader, however, demonstrated less than firm support, saying, “They avoid strong NGOs. That is not the right way to support civil society.”25 The Dushanbe Center, with a board made up of the 7 CSSCs and a full-time staff of 13, focused on NGO registration, problem management, and needs assessment, before closing in 2008 due to lack of funding. Its training courses and database, open to city employees and businesses as well as NGOs, led to an annual city action plan on specific urban problems and an integrated municipal grants process, including competition for city tenders among trained NGOs. The Dushanbe Center also collaborated with the city on an online consolidated budget.26 In addition to the Dushanbe Center there is a National Association of Civil Society Support Centers of the Republic, also located in Dushanbe. Its director, Nodira Davlyatova, said the seven centers have “definitely had some impact through advocacy on pre-election issues.”27 Given the complexity of the network, however, it is not surprising that Zuhra Halimova, a young woman with considerable international experience who heads the Soros Foundation, observed, “[The centers] do not give enough attention to changing policies.”28 Similarly, Kate Whitbeck of IREX said, “We (including other INGOs) use local NGOs as contractors, but these NGOs don’t have local constituencies.” She continued, “Some of our centers are okay and others are learning. Kulob [Shahrvand] is good on advocacy. . . . We need flexibility about letting the NGOs control the process.”29 A more comprehensive version of management support emerged in 2007, when the Tajikistan Development Foundation (formerly the Business Initiative Center) received a grant from USAID to organize the Tajikistan National NGO Association with an Internet portal. (See Chapter 5.) This led to intensive discussions among NGOs that lasted several

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days, with follow-up for six months after each session. The association also sponsored round tables and workshops around the country on strengthening NGO management and professional development, internal democracy, accountability and professional development. It is also developing a Code of Conduct for NGOs.30 In contrast to the centers and the National NGO Association, other NGOs focus on a third approach, strengthening civil society through CBOs. Manizha, founded in 1999, conducts leadership training for both NGOs and CBOs. The organization is led by Alisher Rahmonberdiev, an impressive woman whose international experience has led her to be cautious about donors. “From the very beginning we decided not to solicit funding from international organizations. Let them come to us,” she said.31 Parallax, whose participatory work is described in Chapter 7, also trains CBOs. However, Parallax’s director, Jumakhon Alimi, is aware of the larger civil-society context. He noted that INGOs often concentrate on NGOs and forget about unions, political parties, businesses, and the mass media.32 Fourth, democratization NGOs, like PCDP and the National Association of Political Scientists, focus on strengthening civil society through the sphere of public debate. An NGO called Tradition and Modernity “always invites people from NGOs, the media, and the government to our round tables,” according to director Alla Kuvatova, a social scientist formerly employed by the Eurasia Foundation. “A round table on advocacy changed the political attitudes of disabled groups who were invited.”33 Another example is NGO Women Voters, a kind of debating club, with the members representing political parties, several NGOs and one media outlet. Rano Akhunova, the coordinator of the club, is a former banker who told me her professional life was boring until she became interested in NGOs in the mid-1990s after opening bank accounts for them. She explained that the club’s weekly meetings deal with “burning issues, such as labor migration, illness, or poverty. Last week we had a session on ‘Women, Society, and Islam.’ When we started, the issue was to bring any woman in, now it is to invite in a very small number of clever, capable women.”34

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Democratization NGOs also target the more formal sphere of public debate through support for an independent media. The largest NGO focusing on journalism is the National Association of Independent Mass Media of Tajikistan (NANSMIT). In addition to its legal work protecting journalists, NANSMIT lobbies for reforming advertising laws to allow independent media to better support themselves. As of 2006, 60 percent of their policy recommendations had been adopted.35 The association provides journalists with international scholarships, particularly to other Central Asian countries. Both its commitment to training for journalists and partnerships with NGOs and businesses reflect the association’s understanding of the importance of strengthening the wider civil society.36 The other NGOs that work on journalism often lack the financial resources to implement their own ideas.37 However, the Academy of Mass Communications (formerly Internews), a member of NANSMIT, does research on civil society, mass media policy, globalization, and the media role in democratization. Its director, Bahodoor Kosimov, believes there are too few international donors supporting independent media and that they push for private, for-profit rather than “public” (nongovernmental) media outlets.38 Fifth, a few NGOs focus on strengthening the business sector. As Rano Akhunova of NGO Women Voters pointedly observed, the laws that complicate NGO registration are “nonsensical for business as well.”39 Chasma and 23 other NGOs collaborated with the National Association of Small Business Development in 2003-2004 to develop a revised tax code that applies to both NGOs and businesses. By 2008, this had led to a reduction in both the value added tax and income taxes, although not the elimination of taxes for nonprofit organizations.40 Although an NGO called Jahon focuses mainly on training police in human rights (see pp. 156157), it also organized a conference on social responsibility for 50 Tajik banks and businesses with business presenters from Kazakhstan that are already undertaking charitable and civic activities.41 Gulchera Nosiriova, a businesswoman who was part of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, and used to

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head an NGO, stays involved by hosting a monthly meeting with NGOs, businesses, and journalists on the problems of civil society.42 The Association of Business Internet Providers is partnering with the Civil Initiative for Internet Policy, an NGO founded by a “wonderful group of young people” working to ensure that the Internet becomes more accessible.43 Not all attempts to strengthen civil society are aimed at creating, even indirectly, a loyal opposition; many groups are simply motivated by the belief that the government should recognize and support NGOs. The term social partnership is widely used by government advisory panels as well as NGOs as an indicator of communication across sectors, potentially limiting their role in advocacy or loyal opposition. The Association of Journalists Social Partnership, for example, with 40 journalist members and a paid staff of 5, builds partnerships among NGOs, business, government, and the mass media, through media coverage. The association sponsors seminars and round tables and focuses its press coverage on the need for business and government to better understand the role of NGOs. “Without this, civil society can’t develop,”44 said Kironsho Sharifzoda, the head of the organization. However, in 2007, USAID support led to the creation of a public council, with representatives from political parties, religious leaders, local authorities, NGOs, and media, that meets on a quarterly basis to advance projects that explicitly strengthen democracy.45

Law-Based Civil Liberties Although the leaders of democratization NGOs struggle against corruption and the systemic violations of human rights, the challenge is not just to defend victims of abuse, but also to reform the entire legal system.46 Two democratization NGOs that often work together and focus on the whole legal system are the Association of Independent Judges (AIJ) and the National Association of Barristers. AIJ is funded by dues from 360 members. The National Association of Barristers, established in 2003 as a counterweight to state prosecutors, obtains support from Radio Free Europe.47

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Among the other NGOs working to reform the legal system are those organized by women. A new law severely restricting the use of capital punishment, with obvious implications for political dissent, emerged from a series of deliberative public forums sponsored by the Tajik office of the OSI, the League of Women Lawyers, and other NGOs.48 The league was “the leading organization pushing this,” according to Zuhra Halimova.49 One reason that the president signed the bill is that league membership includes lawyers who work for the president and the Supreme Court as well as for prosecutors.50 The League of Women Lawyers grew out of a dialogue, convened by OSI, of lawyers and judges on violence against women. Their indepth research on topics like torture led to legislation. In a 2010 case the league represented an abused women and a court sentenced her husband to prison.51 Freedom of the press also enables wider legal reforms, but news outlets in Tajikistan are under constant assault. NANSMIT focuses on freedom of information and is also a watchdog group that provides legal support when the government closes down media or when journalists are in political trouble. It has made some progress in gaining legal access to governmental documents and in analyzing official information.52 As of 2008, NANSMIT faced a more difficult environment, as government harassment of the media increased, while international support waned. Yet seven organizations have emerged more recently, including the New-Media Alliance. With 35 member organizations, it arranges for the defense of journalists and participates in court hearings.53 Legal reforms also depend on educating government employees. Since 2001, the NGO Jahon has been teaching law enforcement organizations, including police and prison staffs, about international human-rights standards. Jahon was originally a department of an international NGO, Counterpart International, but Shahlo Juraeva, an energetic young lawyer, left the parent organization and took Jahon with her. By constantly testing new ideas, she has built a diverse donor base, thus strengthen-

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ing Jahon’s autonomy.54 Jahon’s five psychologists have worked primarily with the police. “After the civil war the police forces were filled with combatants who were aggressive and psychologically disturbed,” Juraeva said. At first they refused to collaborate with us, but then they agreed to submit a sample of 100 questionnaires to the militia, the lowest supervisory level. When asked, “How do you understand human rights for yourself? Others?” recruits overwhelmingly answered, “I can do what I want” and the leadership realized it had a problem. We have [also] established relationships between women’s crisis centers and the police. Our relations with the police have improved and they now come to us. We have them keep journals and build on discussions with us.

Legal awareness has taken a long time. In 2004, the police asked us to prepare a human-rights textbook and we got EU support. In February 2006, we organized a conference of 80 people from the militia to help the police learn to cope with citizens on domestic violence. . . . The president also ordered more legal education for the police. It was previously impossible to complain about the police but it is now fairly simple.55

Jahon also has strong ties with the human-relations department at the Ministry of Interior and educates their middle managers about law in a democratic society. As Juraeva points out, however: One person at the top is in denial, and in denial of the denial. Harassment directed by that level continues. We hold our seminars, we have opponents and they are allowed to organize. They realize I am not demagoging them, but the people on the top are afraid, they think the opposition means war.56

Although systemic legal reform is a daunting, long-term task, other democratization NGOs that concentrate on human-rights violations against women have had some success. This reflects both the prominent role of women NGO leaders and the unfortunate reality that women

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were disproportionately affected by the fall of the Soviet Union and the civil war. The fall of the Soviet regime fueled female activism because women lost many previously protected rights. The Soviets had ignored patriarchal gender relations, but polygamy, bride price, and marriage without consent were banned, as was child marriage. Since the transition, polygamy and child marriages have resurfaced and “appear to be largely tolerated” (Erturk 2009, 5-6).57 The civil war also increased activism among women. As Alla Kuvatova of the NGO Tradition and Modernity explained: Gender roles changed during the war and women assumed new responsibilities. By the end of the war there were 25,000 widows. Some villages are still without men. The war officially ended in 1996 but it was still dangerous. I worked in the Tashkent regional office of the Eurasia Foundation and provided a lot of people help with proposal writing. People were well educated, and civil society blossomed, particularly women’s groups. There were only 3 in 1995, but they increased to 60 in 1998 and there were more than 100 by 2003. NGOs that work on other subjects are also headed by women, and they tend to be stronger and better able to survive as institutions.58

Women’s Rights

Democratization NGOs have won significant victories for women’s rights. The League of Women Lawyers provided a draft law and space for public discussions that led to passage of a law against trafficking of women.59 As of 2005, 38 sex slaves had been returned from Dubai, out of an estimated 1,000 taken there before 2001.60 In collaboration with IOM, preventive measures have been instituted and perpetrators have been punished. In 2007, authorities reported 12 criminal investigations, 19 prosecutions, and 11 convictions (Erturk 2009, 13). Among the other NGOs that got involved in the issue of trafficking was Modar, which provides hotlines and safe houses for victims, in collaboration with mahallas. Between 2006 and 2008, Modar undertook a major educational effort on trafficking by collaborating with teachers

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and professors in Tajik cities and published a booklet on women’s rights. In addition, Modar helps protect women in prison.61 Other serious violations of women’s rights stem from the massive outflow of male laborers to Russia. According to Sanavbar Imomazoraova of Chasma in Qurghonteppa: When a man leaves for Russia he sends money back to parents and they don’t tell her. If she divorces him, she returns to her parents with nothing. Even if she gets money directly she has to go to his parents. Wives have no individual rights. Sometimes men go to Russia for five years and tell their wives to live in his parents’ household.62

Star of Happiness, another democratization NGO in Qurghonteppa, uses their ties with mahallas to provide legal education to communities whose male residents are in Russia.63 Other women’s NGOs confront human rights through legal education for their beneficiaries and through socioeconomic projects. Chasma, for example, created in 1998 as a women’s center after the civil war, was one of the first NGOs in the region near Afghanistan.64 With UNDP support and training from OSI in writing proposals, it focused on the social problems created by the civil war, particularly among the Tajik refugees coming back from Afghanistan, while educating women about their rights. As with other NGOs working on human rights in Tajikistan, Chasma builds on socioeconomic projects, such as workshops for crafts production and small business development, not only because of the obvious need, but also because this encourages otherwise reluctant women to meet with each other in small groups. These groups address larger issues related to gender and the tensions between mountain and valley people that fueled the civil war. They also provide women with access to psychological counseling.65 Another typical example is Umed in Kulob, which has 10 permanent employees and works on reducing poverty among women through microenterprise development. Umed, dependent on local government support as well as some international assistance, is led by Zulaikho

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Komilova, also a city deputy who had the backing of the mayor.66 Unlike a majority of the NGO leaders interviewed, who tend to avoid close government ties, Komilova seemed to be very happy with her situation. Although Umed’s seminars on women’s legal rights relate to democracy, its major effort activities are reconstructing the main reservoir supporting elementary schools.67 In Qurghonteppa a small NGO, called Rushd, initiated an advocacy camp on divorced women’s property rights and, with IREX support, has published booklets on women’s property rights.68 According to its male director, Jusuf Mahmeder, only 28 percent of the women surveyed by his research study received housing after a divorce; 72 percent received nothing.69

Other Groups Human-rights activists also focus on refugees. Shafqat in Kulob, which began as a chapter of Humanitarian International after the civil war, focuses on the legal rights of Afghan refugees. Shafqat’s initial focus on humanitarian aid has continued but was combined with human rights by Mirali Yuldoshev, a lawyer who is the Tajik director.70 He has a paid staff of five and as many volunteers. Shafqat’s first project in 2002 dealt with the rights of Afghan refugees detained in the Kulob region. Round tables among detainees raised their legal awareness, taught them how to apply for asylum, and informed their embassies, so the embassies could inform relatives.71 Yuldoshev said, “When the Afghan embassy representatives refused to attend our meeting they got a lot of bad publicity for neglecting their own people and the embassy had to close because they were surrounded by so many journalists. Round tables for the staff of detainees centers raised their awareness on how detainees should be treated and we explained the laws about this to them. Regional government bodies also got interested because we were helping them solve a problem.”72 Shafqat has an office in the courthouse and three pro bono lawyers as well as university and secondary school students coached to become

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legal trainers to cover the region. As Oxfam consultants, the leaders of Shafqat also run centers that protect farmers in land conflicts; they have won several cases. Other NGOs can access Shafqat’s legal library and electronic database. According to Yuldoshev, “Society becomes stronger because of the impact of NGOs, particularly those that raise legal consciousness. We raise people’s awareness, and we fight against unfair laws.”73 Star of Happiness works with refugees through their programs on AIDS prevention and the legal rights of AIDS victims. Although AIDS is not a major problem in Tajikistan, 90 percent of Tajikistan’s officially registered 500-plus cases contracted the disease outside the country.74 “In our district we have established a clinic for [foreign] labor immigrants. We have a special mobile group of four people who present a play about AIDS in different mahallas. CBOs play a real role through cooperation with local governments in decision making,” said Monhiniso Shonazarova.75 A much larger human-rights issue concerns the estimated one million Tajiks working in Russia and Kazakhstan, who are often mistreated. A network of NGO centers received support from OSI to protect labor migrants to Russia. According to Zuhra Halimova, “We have some powerful NGOs here working with Russian NGOs about murder and mistreatment of Tajiks. . . . We try to make sure that Tajik migrants know Russian law.”76 A Labor Migrants Rights Project organized by an NGO called Anis included three-day workshops on economic knowledge and legal rights for 2,000 participants and decreased the number of deported migrant workers from Russia by 18 to 42 percent in four rayons (AKDN). Responding to the lack of Tajik NGOs focused on children’s rights, the Children’s Legal Centre (CLC) in the United Kingdom established the Child Rights Centre Tajikistan (CRCT) in 2005. With support from UNICEF, CRCT works on de-institutionalizing children, particularly those in detention centers.77 By 2010, children’s rights had risen in importance, with more than 100 Tajik NGOs working on the issue.78 Fourteen of

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these belong to the NGO Association on Children’s Rights, and even Khatlon Children, a local coalition, has seven members.79 An after-school program on civic awareness organized by the CSSCs, with Ministry of Education support, includes training on children’s rights. Among the other groups needing legal protection are draftees to the Tajik army. The Amparo Young Lawyers Association provides them with legal assistance and advocacy in collaboration with a Russian NGO called Memorial and with support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).80

The Political Context The Tajik government itself, as a signatory to the Helsinki accords, permitted a group of lawyers to establish the Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law in 1999 in conjunction with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Based in part on a Danish prototype, the bureau has an Internet portal, monitors national legislation and human rights, provides legal aid, and has five offices that focus on NGO registration. Financed by the Canadian, Danish, and Swedish embassies, it had submitted 25 individual complaints as of 2009, including torture, to the UN Human Rights Commission, of which 10 have been decided.81 It has published legal reference books, conducts capacity building for human-rights NGOs, and sponsors numerous round tables and seminars with both government agencies and NGOs. One seminar for 17 childprotection NGOs focused on strategies and tactics for human-rights monitoring. An important question is whether its many international sponsors have provided it with some of the semi-autonomous characteristics of a parastatal organization, such as the HSRC in South Africa.82 Despite this hopeful development, the political context in Tajikistan makes life very difficult for NGOs that focus on law-based civil liberties. Because the feedback relationship between government and civil society remains counterproductive, it is remarkable that democratization NGOs, such as Jahon and AIJ, continue to operate with some success.

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Conclusion The leaders of democratization NGOs in Tajikistan do not view their own organizations as playing the role of the loyal opposition and they have, at best, an uneven commitment to strengthening the oppositional potential of civil society. In any case, they are weakened by financial dependence, either on the government or on international aid. Without such aid, however, most democratization NGOs would not exist at all, and, unfortunately, international support has declined since our 2006 interviews. NGO leaders are optimistic, however. In describing a Soros Foundation conference on education, Alla Kuvatova, for example, believes that the younger generation is far less willing to accept authoritarianism and corruption: “They question everything.”83 She also noted that NGOs led by women, a majority of those interviewed, tend to be stronger. Democratization NGOs in Tajikistan struggle with managerial weakness as well as lack of funding as they search for their role in a country that lacks a partisan opposition. Although political party representatives are included in NGO roundtable discussions and dialogues, there are even fewer NGO efforts to strengthen political parties than in South Africa or Argentina. In the absence of viable opposition parties and a broad civil society, however, NGOs are strengthening the sphere of public debate and sustaining themselves and other NGOs for the long haul. Civil society in Tajikistan consists mainly of NGOs and the media. The membership of democratization NGOs in what is only a somewhat larger civil society is, therefore, crucial to building a loyal opposition. NGOs that work on women’s rights have achieved some significant victories and appear to be on the cutting edge of challenges to the entire legal system. AIJ has led on the difficult issue of judicial reform. The Judicial Consortium’s legal advocacy efforts in support of civil society have advanced possibilities for both associational rights and organizational autonomy. However, what these and other NGOs confront in terms of autocratic leadership and corruption dwarfs all of their efforts.

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Endnotes 1

In addition to 29 interviews with Tajik NGOs, we talked with representatives of 4 international NGOs, and 3 news organizations, plus 2 CBOs and 1 round table linked to PCDP. 2

Burkanova interview.

3

Eighty-five percent of the members of Parliament are members of PDPT.

4

Hadyaev interviews.

5

When asked to comment, I talked about this subtext and the idea of the need for an uncertainty principle in democracy enunciated by Adam Habib in South Africa. Most people smiled or nodded. One member of the official party, however, observed that Henry Kissinger was also a political scientist with a more correct “relativist” position on democracy. 6

www.ifes.org.

7

Hadyaev interview, May 4, 2006.

8

Akhunova interview.

9

Ghafforzoda interview.

10

Zoirov interview. Although a member of Civilization, the Judicial Consortium apparently carried out activities on its own as well. 11

The Judicial Consortium is the successor to the National Center for Legal Education, also organized by Zoirov, with 140 dues-paying members. Zoirov interview. A fourth NGO, not interviewed, is Law and Society, headed by Muatta Khaidarova. It provides legal counsel and informational support to NGOs and lobbies on legislative changes. According to Parviz Mullojanov it is “very small,” despite its partnership with the International Center for Nonprofit Law. Conversation, May 3, 2006. 12

Muller interview.

13

Zoirov interview.

14

Muller interview.

15

Soros, UNDP, IFES, UNTOP, the Eurasia Foundation, and the British and US embassies have provided support. Mamadazimov interview. Another political think tank that has done reports on the structure of political parties is Sharq. One international observer, however, expressed skepticism about the way Sharq asks survey questions. 16

One international observer, while admiring NAPST’s “clout,” considers them to be overextended. 17 http://tajikistannews.blogspot.com/2009_04_02_archive.html;www.efcentralasia. org. The project is funded by the Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia and the Dutch government. 18

Yuldoshev interview.

19

Similarly, the head of a women’s NGO in Kulob that is well connected to local government argued that registration is not a concern. Komilova interview.

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20

Mirzoev interview. As of 2006, Intercon was initiating a wider civil-society project on commercial reform and a student-led clinic at Tajik Slavonic University on legal aspects of political parties and on international migration. Intercon belongs to a regional tolerance council sponsored by Climate of Trust, a San Francisco INGO. Originally organized to protect Jews in the Soviet Union, Climate of Trust now works with regional tolerance councils in different parts of the former Soviet Union. 21

Sardaliev interview. The Kulob Center is seeking financial assistance from OSCE and local businesses. 22

Khaililova interview. The seven IREX supported centers, in addition to Qurghonteppa, Kulob, and Dushanbe, were Women of the East in Panjikent, Kalam in Kurog, Rasht in Garm, and Consortium of Initiative in Khujand (www.IREX.TJ). 25

Mahmeder interview. As of 2008, Fidokor was carrying out refugee work in collaboration with UNHCR. 26

Collaboration emerged in part because INGOs used the database. Pirnazarova interview. According to a recent account, however, the center is no longer active, due to budgetary problems (USAID 2008). 27

Davlyatova interview. The association receives support from USAID, UNHCR, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Poland. 28

Halimova interview.

29

Whitbeck interview. According to the 2009 USAID website, more than 1,000 Tajiks used the Internet services of these centers every month. Three no longer need USAID support (www.usaid.gov). 30

www.cso.tj. The director of the association is Shamsiddin Karimov, who coordinated the author’s interviews in 2006. 31

Rahmonberdiev interview.

32

Alimi interview.

33

Kuvatova interview.

34

Akhunova interview.

35

Karshiboev interview.

36

In addition to USAID, NANSMIT receives international support from Rights of Journalists and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Nuriddin Karshiboev, former chief editor of Soviet Tajikistan Republica and director of the Tajik Information Agency, leads the organization. Karshiboev is familiar with academic work done on public journalism. Reconciling the opinion of some that NANSMIT is a GONGO with the organization’s support for freedom of the press may depend on the assumption that there are different factions within the government on this issue. It may also be that the doubts about its autonomy are wrong. Although Karshiboev, NANSMIT’s director,

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is a former government official, he made a three-way distinction between GONGOs, NGOs “too close to the government that, nevertheless, understand civil society and democracy,” and “autonomous NGOs,” such as NANSMIT. Etulain and Karshiboev interviews. Asia Plus, a for-profit news agency, also has a training program for young journalists. Bobokhonov interview. 37

Karimov interview.

38

Kosimov interview. Kosimov alleged that to get grants you have to bribe local program assistants, although he acknowledged that some CBOs are establishing radio stations with international support. Another interviewee alleged that Kosimov himself was in the pay of the government. Among the other internationally supported projects (by the US and UK embassies and OSI) is the Journalist Resource Center, which provides journalists with Internet access and training as well as a library. OSI also has assisted the faculty of journalism at Khojent University. An independent journalism school in Qurghonteppa (for radio journalists), tied to an NGO called Payom, and another school in Dushanbe have received support from NED (http:// iatpnews.typepad.com). 39

Akhunova interview.

40

Imomazoraova interview (www.namsb.tj).

41

The Aga Khan Foundation is cooperating with NGOs on corporate responsibility programs for businesses (www.akdn.org). 42

Nosiriova interview.

43

Halimova interview. Parviz Mullojanov observed that Civilization also has business support. Mullojanov interview, 2006. The Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia has funded some of these efforts and, in 2007, sponsored a conference in Tajikistan on the social responsibilities of businesses. 44

In Khujand and Kulob, the association trained groups of 15-20 people representing government, business, and NGOs to organize partnerships around local issues. One partnership on drug abuse led the government to provide five grants to NGOs working on addiction among young people. Kironsho Sharifzoda, the head of the organization, was previously a journalism professor at the National University. Sharifzoda interview. 45

www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia.

46

Karimov interview.

47

www.rferl.org.

48

Halimova interview. Zuhra Halimova, who heads OSI in Tajikistan, wrote an issue book on capital punishment during a five-month residency at the Kettering Foundation, while the author was in charge of the international fellows program. 49

As of 2009, the league was collaborating with the American Bar Association and an NGO in Khujand (INIS) to create roving rural legal clinics. 51

www.centralasiaonline.com.

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52

Karshiboev interview. NANSMIT was established with USAID support in 1999 and now includes about 70 newspapers and 12 television channels (www.usaid.gov). 53

The other six include the Journalists Union of Tajikistan, the Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media, the Fund for Memory and the Protection of Journalists, the Journalist Association, the Association of Journalism Teachers, the Association of Professional Journalists of the Sogd Region (www.irex.org). 54

Jahon has received support from the Academy for Educational Development (AED), the Eurasia Foundation, the US Embassy, the Swiss Agency for Technical Assistance, UNTOP, and the European community. 55

Juraeva interview.

56

Juraeva interview. In early April 2011, OSCE signed a contract with the Tajik government on police reform, based on democratic principles. NGOs, such as Jahon, are part of the contract. 57

In 2010, the Tajik parliament passed a bill raising the legal age of marriage from 17 to 18, but enforcement remains difficult. 58

Kuvatova interview. Muazzama Burkanova of the Foundation to Support Civil Initiatives mentioned that 80 percent of their institutional members are NGOs headed by women, mostly from rural areas. Burkanova interview. 59

Azimova interview.

60

Shonazarova interview.

61

http://modar.tj.

62

Imomazoraova interview.

63

Shonazarova interview. NGO Women Voters, has also worked on legal education for women in a number of districts, with support from OSCE. Akhunova interview. 64

Imomazoraova interview.

65

Originally funded by UNDP, it is now supported by IREX and Soros.

66

Komilova interview.

67

Donors include USAID, OSCE, the Japanese Embassy, the United Nations, and Oxfam. Tradition and Modernity also focuses on women’s economic and professional skills to achieve gender equality through small-business development and microcredit. Kuvatova interview. 68

Whitbeck interview.

69

Mahmeder interview. One of the causes of weak property rights was the widespread lack of civil marriage (Erturk 2009). 70

Yuldoshev interview.

71

Relatives are now permitted to visit detainee centers during limited periods.

72

Yuldoshev interview.

73

The proposal had been submitted to UNICEF and had not yet been accepted as of the date of the interview. Yuldoshev interview.

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74

Shonazarova interview.

75

Shonazarova interview.

76

Halimova interview.

77

Shamsiddin Karimov, who now leads the Tajikistan National NGO Association, provided this update, e-mail to the author, January 22, 2010. Halimova interview. As of 2009, the CLC had started the Girl’s Support Service to focus on sexual abuse and girls at risk for trafficking. Over 3 years, the project will train 200 local authorities, law enforcement, and NGO representatives, who are mandated to care for girls in the target group. Capacity training also includes local judges, police, and prosecutors (www.childrenslegalcentre.com/International+programs/Countries/Tajikistan.htm). 78

An NGO called Mairam, not interviewed, which focuses on the rights of women and children, particularly orphans, was part of the civil-society movement against human trafficking and was one of the founders, in 2008, of the Tajikistan National NGO Association (www.cso.tj). 79

Davlyatova interview.

80

www.ned.org.

81

It also has support from the Danish and Swedish aid agencies, DANIDA and SIDA. For a comparative overview of similar National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in Denmark, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, and Germany, see Mertus 2009. 82 http://hrt.tj/eng. In addition, the Council of Justice of Tajikistan (CJT), a government agency, the Tajik Bar Association, and OSI are jointly supporting a one-year ongoing scholarship for an MA in human rights at Essex University in the United Kingdom. Although it will probably have only a long-term impact, this supports OSI’s capacity building of CJT itself. Halimova interview. See also www.Tajik-gateway.org. 83

Kuvatova interview.

C HA P T ER

7

p

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TAJIKISTAN II: Nurturing a Democratic Political Culture & Deepening Political Participation The Democratization of Political Culture Introduction THERE IS A PARADOX embedded in Tajik political traditions. On the one hand, the mahalla and the choikona embody public talk or what could be called “organic” or “historical” deliberation (Fisher and Marin 2006). On the other hand, these traditions excluded women and were based on clan loyalties rather than civic individualism (Hickson 2003). This aspect of Tajik political culture discourages local observers. As Kironsho Sharifzoda of the Association of Journalists notes, “We uphold traditional values and respect for elders even if they are wrong, whether we are talking about a chief, a commander, or the head of a household. Households typically have eight members and everyone thinks they should defer to the elder. He tells them who to vote for.”1 Clan-dominated

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voting, according to Rahmatullo Zoirov, favors the regime because the Jamoat heads are all members of the president’s party.2 Such top-down traditions were strengthened under Soviet rule, and they often eclipsed and weakened the more democratic aspects of local practices. According to Parviz Mullojanov, “Actually, we lost our tradition . . . our ability to talk to each other, to discuss problems and to look for appropriate solutions. Therefore, probably, people started to fight— although there were a lot of other ways to solve the conflict.” (Brown and Thomas 2007, 88).3 The weakening of local political traditions, coupled to the collapse of the Soviet Union, created the conditions that led to the civil war, and the war itself further damaged the political culture. A journalist named Bahodoor Kosimov observed: The civil war changed people’s psychology and behavior. It had a negative influence on understanding . . . reality. It immunized us against new ideas, and left us afraid to deal with problems because of the fear of conflict. There is also a fear of changing leaders. Rahmonov [Rahmon] understands this.4

However, Jumakhon Alimi believes that the civil war also “had a positive side. It led to new thoughts.”5 And at the same time, the political innovations that emerged from the Inter-Tajik Dialogue were built on earlier traditions of public talk. The first topic chosen for public deliberation by leaders of PCDP after the peace settlement was the “role and influence of local traditional institutions of decision making” because they wanted to assert that what they were doing wasn’t just Western (IISD 2004). This sent a message to the authorities that Sustained Dialogue and public deliberation are not designed to create a separate decision-making structure, but rather to become an important element in Tajikistan’s fledgling democracy.6 The next three sections explore efforts by NGOs to build on and also change Tajik political culture and thus make nascent democratic ideas more sustainable. Whatever else is done, sustainability depends on tack-

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ling corruption and its ties to authoritarianism, patronage, and violence. Following a discussion on civic education are two sections on corruption and a more in-depth exploration of the possibilities for continuing dialogue and deliberation to lessen violence.

Civic Education Rather than focusing on elections, many of the pioneer NGOs founded after the civil war concentrate on more general political or legal education because, according to Latif Hadyaev, “We had strong cultural and aesthetic traditions, but were not politically savvy.” One of the organizations he heads, Mehr, published 70,000 brochures on democratic political culture and other publications on the rights of women, children, and youth. The Judicial Consortium published a primer for local political leaders. Several of those interviewed, however, questioned the efficacy of such efforts. According to Rahmatullo Zoirov: Theoretical training is not effective in Tajikistan. . . . Interactive methods are more effective. Our experience is that voters know much more about violations of legislation because they see them directly. . . . We also have to focus on changing attitudes [which is difficult in a one-day workshop]. Many husbands decide how their wives and children will vote. So we have to have discussions about equality, and only after that do the men understand equal rights.

Tying training to ongoing programs is one effective, interactive approach. NGO Women Voters works with women to improve basic services, such as gas and electricity, but in the process explains the benefits of a democratic state and legal system and how women can found a CBO or benefit from elections.7 Sudmand in Kulob trained secondary students to organize a club for their peers that meets once a week to talk about democratization, rights, and responsibilities. The clubs developed their own training modules on leadership and human rights. They also have organized three “initiative groups” to raise political awareness.

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Sudmand’s other civic-education programs often attract up to 600 people, including local government leaders.8 Other democratization NGOs work through the schools. As of June 2006, Orzu was implementing a World Bank-funded project in 70 schools in 4 districts near Dushanbe that builds the capacity of parent-teacher organizations to identify needs and conduct school elections. With IFES support, they also organized visits by school children to local governments for one day per week.9 An IFES collaboration with Civilization led to the creation of a summer camp for 100 children on democratic culture.10 The camp lasted 10 days in 2001 and 2002 and then expanded to 3 groups of 100 each in 2003. Each camp had 20 teachers and the curriculum included mock elections as well as analysis on electoral outcomes.11 Although the camps are no longer held, Latif Hadyaev said, “We keep up relationships with the students and they drop in to see us. . . . Ninety to ninety-five percent of them entered the university, and usually they specialize in journalism, political science, or sociology. Many are now studying abroad.”12

Corruption Most NGO leaders interviewed complained about government corruption in particular, and the culture of corruption in general. They contended that as much as two-thirds of government revenues are siphoned off by corrupt officials and their patronage networks. As one leader observed, “Whenever I talk at the Round Table, I argue that the whole governmental system is corrupt. Everyone is appointed by the president, and each position has its price.”13 Kironsho Sharifzoda talked about government officials who allege that NGOs are corrupt because they have more international contacts than does the government: “They should deal with corruption in government before criticizing NGOs.”14 But as Katherine Muller of IFES observed, transparency is a two-way street and INGOs in particular need to increase transparency. “We show

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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs our reports and plans and get presidential approval,” she said. She also noted that the lack of transparency in the internationally sponsored CSSCs have enabled the secret police to plant informers in the network. Some international NGOs are supporting the efforts of local organizations to address the official corruption issue. In 2006, OSI organized a conference on economic corruption in collaboration with the General Prosecutors office and other international donors.15 OSI has been publishing weekly articles on corruption since 2002 to raise public awareness and, according to its head, Zuhra Halimova, “Now it is possible to talk about it. The people in higher education discuss it openly, as do people who work for international financial institutions. We also collaborate with the Association of Students against Corruption.” She went on to explain that there are serious economic issues underlying the problem, because the economy is depressed and salaries have not increased.16 One NGO, Shahrvand, with support from the Aga Khan Foundation, arranged a roundtable discussion about corruption among representatives of the Dushanbe city government, mass media, and the political parties. It was reviewed extensively in the press.17 Halimova also pointed out, however, that Transparency International has no chapter in Tajikistan and that NGOs lack access to data that could expose corruption. In addition, “Journalists have to be trained to write about corruption. Those naming names need protection.”18 Despite such international support, there is little evidence that democratization NGOs in Tajikistan have much impact on corruption. Given their funding problems, it is also hard for NGOs to address the problem of corruption in their own ranks. Although Transparency International could have an impact, their financial support for local affiliates is often minimal. (See p. 256, on Argentina.) Thus, instead of focusing on corruption, Tajik NGOs pin their hopes on the possibility that civic education, as well as dialogue and deliberation, can produce a new political culture to crowd out the old one.

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Dialogue, Deliberation, and Nonviolence The democratization of political culture, like participation, is also being promoted through dialogue and deliberation in Tajikistan. Although one NGO leader expressed skepticism because “our oriental mentality is to keep quiet,” Dilbar Khaililova of Fidokor talked about the importance of “building dialogue, conflict resolution, and decision making into the political culture.”19 Some NGO leaders gained their experience in dialogue and conflict resolution during the civil war and the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. One example is Khurinisso Ghafforzoda, former deputy chair of the Social Democratic Party and head of an NGO called Oshti Milli. As she explained: Our NGO was set up in 1994, when government troops were bombing our region and my daughter was wounded. I worked in the hydroelectric station, and I started women’s refugee groups to open a dialogue between the two sides. The purpose was to get the government to stop bombing. Negotiations continued from 1992 to 1996. Sometimes we were successful and sometimes not. Both the opposition and the UN had heard about us by 1995. I also tried to start a dialogue in Gharm, but women hold such a low place there that it was very difficult. People did hear about the work, and in 1995 I was invited to work with Relief International, although the civil war was going on. . . . I have been cooperating with the Kettering Foundation on this work since 1999.20

Since September of 2005, when she resigned as deputy chair of the Social Democratic Party, Ghafforzoda, through Oshti Milli, has been organizing a National Congress for the Development of Democracy with the CSSC in the Rasht Valley. It is a measure of the moderate characteristics of the Islamic Renaissance Party that Ghafforzoda continued to maintain ties with the Islamic opposition after the end of the civil war. However, she argues that the Rasht Valley, where she works, is “still too fundamentalist and violent.”

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Oshti Milli has done a study, with Swiss support, on the dangers of weapons in former combat zones.21 With 11 full-time paid staff and 9 part-time field mobilizers, Oshti Milli cooperates with CBOs, local political and religious leaders, local NGOs, and other women’s NGOs, such as Orzu and Gender in Development. “We have an NGO database of 100 in our region at the moment,” she said.22 Other NGOs led by women also focus on conflict resolution. Tradition and Modernity applies the tools of conflict resolution to the problem of domestic violence.23 In 2003, this NGO helped found the Association of Women’s NGOs, which collaborates with the League of Women Lawyers and has crisis centers in Dushanbe and Khujand, with a database on men who commit crimes against women.24 Tradition and Modernity also belongs to the Coordinating Committee on Violence against Women, which includes both government and NGO representatives. Public hearings sponsored by several NGOs led to a new law against domestic violence.25 Women also are beginning to report domestic abuse to mahallas, which now have female members (Erturk 2009, 22). These changes probably resulted, in part, from a course on genderrelated violence offered to more than a thousand people, mostly women, by the Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights in 2005.26 It was implemented through a mahalla-based network and funded by UNTOP, the US embassy, and the Dutch Embassy in Almaty.27 Staffed by 40 lawyers and human-rights specialists, the center’s mahalla network is based in areas where the civil war violence was the worst. Among the other NGOs working on conflict resolution are Manizha and the Dialogue Center. Manizha has considerable experience working on interethnic and family-conflict resolution (Slim and Hodizoda 2002).28 The Dialogue Center focuses on “mid-level” dialogues between religious and secular groups and collaborates with PCDP.29 PCDP, as the major NGO that emerged out of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, has taken the educational lead at the national level on dialogue and deliberation. PCDP reached agreement with the Ministry of Education in 2005 to work with three professors from each of eight universities

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to develop curriculum, a textbook, and other teaching materials on resolving conflict and peace building that uses both traditional and modern methods (PCDP 2006; Saunders and Mullojanov 2005).

Participation Elections Given the repressive political atmosphere in Tajikistan and past instances of official fraud, one might easily conclude that efforts to strengthen the electoral process are beside the point. However, democratization NGOs believe that they can confront some electoral challenges, despite Tajikistan’s authoritarian regime. Among these are 1) election monitoring, 2) bringing electoral issues into clearer focus through educating voters and even local governments, and 3) increasing women’s participation in the electoral process. In spite of past instances of official election fraud, democratization NGOs in Tajikistan continue to focus on fairness and election monitoring.30 Their concern is focused on the future—if and when a credible opposition somehow emerges, civil society will have the tools, skilled workers, and international contacts needed to confront electoral manipulation.31 Training election monitors is the most common electoral activity of democratization NGOs. In the 2005 elections, Parallax worked with IFES, UNTOP, and the Central Election Committee of Tajikistan to establish 80 voting stations in Kulob. They also trained election monitors in electoral transparency and neutrality. After the elections they sponsored a large conference with the political parties, mass media, and other NGOs in Kulob to prevent conflict in the 2006 elections.32 It is also common for NGOs to sponsor general civic education about elections. At the national level, the Judicial Consortium has been educating observers and campaign workers since 1999. By 2003, their training of trainers approach had produced 12,000 trainees from different parties, 8,000 of whom became campaign workers and election observers.33 According to Rhamatillo Zoirov, “We prepared lists of voters. We identify

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local leaders and get them prepared. In the last two years [2004-2006], we have been developing election technology. But the work has not progressed since then.”34 Sometimes election monitoring has a deeper educational impact. In 2004, seven NGOs comprising Civilization proposed an amendment to election law (Article 8) to allow independent observers. The staff of Civilization traveled across the country and generated 1,500 letters in support. They also met with all of the political party leaders and gained their endorsement. “Then we monitored the election . . . and NGOs were involved in the election and provided people with information. . . . [The election] would have been worse without [the NGOs].”35 Unfortunately, the government deleted the amendment. Although the amendment was described as a “very modest attempt,” its deletion “hinders further democratization.”36 This negative pattern continued into the 2010 parliamentary elections, when international observers, who later noted “serious irregularities,” were allowed to observe, but trained national observers were not.37 Ironically, many of the NGO leaders interviewed were hired and trained by international organizations, such as OSCE, to become international observers in other countries. Others trained by seven regional representatives of Civilization for the 2006 elections with support from NDI, did manage to observe the Tajik elections.38 A second, more innovative, type of electoral education, sponsored by an NGO called Ma’rifat in Qurghonteppa in 2005-2006, brought all of the political parties and the local authorities into a political seminar. Although local authorities were initially alarmed, their participation reassured them that they could still exert some control over the process even though they were thrust into political dialogue with other parties. A thousand people, including local election commissioners, leaders of political parties, local authorities, and ordinary voters participated in 47 two-day seminars. The seminars advanced legal knowledge and practical electoral skills as well as cooperation among the participants (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 62).

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Among the other continuing educational projects are Jahon’s courses on electoral law for local governments, mahallas, youth, women, and ethnic minorities in 800 areas of the country.39 As of December 2008, IFES’ Election Law Working Group, with representatives from government and civil society, had completed its legal recommendations, although its success was in doubt, thanks to a lukewarm government response.40 Because voting has traditionally been seen as the purview of male heads of households rather than a universal right, a third electoral focus is for NGOs to encourage women to run for office. The Judicial Consortium has been training women to become parliamentary candidates since 1994 and Tradition and Modernity trained eight women parliamentary candidates, of whom two were elected in 2002, with four more elected to local parliaments. Roziya Tabarova of Orzu, who also works on getting women elected to Parliament, observed, however, that “there are more women in Parliament than we expected but the quality is not good. Most of them were not really elected.”41 Orzu has proceeded, nonetheless, with 17 district projects where local parliamentarians and deputies of local councils meet with their women constituents in round tables. NGOs also pushed President Rahmon to reintroduce quotas for women in elected bodies. The percentage of women elected officials in Parliament increased from 2.8 percent in 1998 to 17 percent in 2004, and from 8.7 percent to 13 percent in local governments in the same period.42 Given the extensive election-related activity of Tajik NGOs, supported by donors, the impact on a political system dominated by a single party and one man has been slight. Political participation, however, is about more than elections.

Citizen Participation As in South Africa, NGO-CBO relationships are the key to nonelectoral participation. Although one INGO employee observed that Tajik NGOs lack an understanding of the need for a constituency, at least some of the democratization NGOs interviewed have community-based ties.43

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Parallax in Kulob, for example, with a paid staff of six, focuses on teaching CBOs about a central community issue—public health. As a result of their intensive work on clean water and infectious disease with CBOs in 3 villages, Parallax fielded requests from 22 other CBOs for assistance in proposal writing, locating donors, and financial reporting. This has enabled their donor, the Eurasia Foundation, to organize six businesses and two development committees. Sometimes CBOs are created by NGOs. For example, Bakhtovar and the CSSCs identify successful women, help them share their achievements with other women, and provide small project grants.44 Tradition and Modernity’s work with local communities in Kulob and Qurghonteppa led to the creation of new CBOs. One useful approach was to videotape women giving practice speeches, which helped make them comfortable with public appearances. Often, however, the communities themselves develop these organizations, first focusing on the government and only gradually realizing that the government will not provide services and that they have to develop self-help projects and look to other sources for support and funding.45 Although some NGOs work with local youth, ethnic minority, or refugee groups, most support more broadly representative CBOs, such as mahallas, the traditional village councils.46 Manizha developed 40 training modules on democracy for mahallas and other CBOs on democracy. In Khatlon, their training of 30 district-level CBOs included research, defining priorities, and developing proposals. Once CBOs obtain support, Manizha assists with management training that includes conflict resolution with local governments. Interestingly, the support culminates in projects that help groups of CBOs set up their own intermediary NGO to provide continuing technical assistance without Manizha’s support.47 A Kulob NGO called Rushd helped one mahalla reconstruct an impassable road that had isolated 500 people and assisted another in inducing the local government to provide electricity without charging a fee.48

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Similarly, when NGO Women Voters began working on legal education for women in 1999, Rano Akhunova said, they soon realized the need to work with mahallas. Until you move to the grassroots you may not understand the problems they have. At first we worked with ordinary women. . . . When we moved on, we added the 18 mahallas as local authorities. Then we added female leaders and other communal leaders. Many housewives were very isolated. This also involved men, starting in Dushanbe. It was an exercise in self-government, with two parallel tracks, ordinary women and leaders.49

Graduates of this same legal education course in the Ayni District of Dushanbe began networking with the local mahalla, developed a joint work plan, invited men in, and then jointly created a local CBO, on their own initiative. Because their efforts coincided with several local government initiatives, the mayor of Dushanbe encouraged this new local council to develop a website and establish a bank account.50 Arguably the NGO with the most innovative grassroots network is PCDP, which grew out of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue and also sponsors the weekly political round tables described in Chapter 6. Registered as an NGO in 2000, it is chaired by Ashurboy Imomov, a constitutional law professor and Sustained Dialogue participant. Initially PCDP organized community dialogue groups in six regions and set up a network of public issues forums, based on deliberative forums convened in 2000-2003. Moderators trained by the Russian Center for Citizenship Education, a partner of the Kettering Foundation, held four citizen forums in each region of the country on education, drugs, and poverty, for a total of 96 forums. Following the forums, PCDP established Economic Development Committees (EDCs) in Shahritus, Buston, Kofarnihon, Dahana, and Qurghonteppa.51 The government apparently liked this economic approach, especially because it implied that there would be no opening of old wounds from the civil war (Saunders and Mullojanov 2005). Imomov explained, “The government knows its weak points and doesn’t want

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NGOs snooping around them.” Although PCDP is not, according to Imomov, a political organization, it is, despite its focus on economics, a “democratization organization—we explain democratic principles to people.”52 EDCs use deliberative methodology based on naming, framing, and weighing the choices available on community issues. (See Box 4, p. 95). Each EDC has two to three trained moderators, includes influential citizens, and is tied to the officially recognized jamoat, encompassing several mahallas. All but the EDC in Qurghonteppa were still operating as of 2009 (Mullojanov 2009). Unfortunately, the mayor controlled the EDC in Qurghonteppa and attendance was poor from the beginning. In describing the plan to further spread these ideas, however, Imomov observed, “We first contact local government. Without local governments an EDC can’t exist and economic development is not possible.” Because the Shartuz EDC on the Afghan border brings Afghans, Uzbeks, Arabs, and Gharmis together, it took a long time to find common economic ground. However, the Shartuz EDC organized a community garbage-collecting business as a way of ensuring political sustainability. The Buston EDC is located in the northern Sughd province along the Uzbek border and has developed a revolving microcredit fund. The Kofarnihon and Dahana EDCs are described in more detail below, based on site visits.

The Kofarnihon Economic Development Committee Kofarnihon is a riverside city of 43,000, just 18 miles east of Dushanbe. During the 1950s thousands of Tajiks were forcibly moved there, disrupting the economy. Later, the civil war nearly destroyed the local economy, even though the city endured fewer atrocities than other areas. Kofarnihon still suffers from high unemployment, with many local men working in Russia.53 The EDC manages a revolving microloan fund that had increased to almost $9,000 by 2006. In addition to receiving support from PCDP, it is able to meet in the offices of a local NGO called Madadgor that pro-

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vides legal services to the poor and is funded by the Swiss government. Most of the leaders of the UNDP-sponsored jamoat-level development committee are from the Kofarnihon EDC, and the EDC has other outside connections as well as the Swiss government and PCDP.54 The political process used to create the revolving fund was as important as the fund itself, as described by Bahriddin Rahimov of Madadgor: In 2000 we created the EDC. . . . [After] conducting interviews with public leaders and local authorities . . . I worked as moderator, and initially had several meetings with the local jamoat. The committee [EDC] meets once a month, with smaller meetings in between. [The people elected are local] . . . and include mahalla leaders, public leaders, members . . . from the financial community, and other respected members of the community. We differ in economic strata, ethnicity, and professional background . . . [and this helps] resolve conflicts. We also have protocols or rules of behavior. But it is economic and social development that creates trust and confidence. First we identified the most acute problems . . . and the roots of each. This is a kind of research. Moderator training in Dushanbe at PCDP and at the Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio, helped us develop skills. Yet the inspiration for the work is really within the community. We provide local members with . . . training on proposal writing [three days], . . . project proposals, and ideas for local businesses.55

The Kofarnihon EDC supports the idea that the sustainability of CBOs depends on engaging the vested interests of the poor, even though interest rates are high because the prevailing market rate is even higher (Fisher 1998, 13). According to a local union leader, who is also the volunteer responsible for the loan fund, many people attend meetings because they are interested in the loan fund. It may be more difficult, however, to engage the larger group politically (Saunders and Mullojanov 2005). The EDC also tests new ideas before having meetings with the wider community and the local government. Nuhovanna Norirova, an active

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member who also heads the local chapter of the trade union of government officials, observed that many committee members know how to write proposals. “At general meetings we look for ways to improve our programs or analyze why an idea is not supported and should be changed,” Norirova said. “This was very difficult at first. We didn’t know each other. We had to create a working atmosphere of trust.”56

The Dahana Economic Development Committee The Dahana EDC has a huge advantage over the vast majority of CBOs in the world—most of the 13 members are college-educated engineers, teachers, and doctors, selected from 22 applicants in 2004. One member is a midwife who develops donor connections and another is the chief agronomist for the village, paid by the local government. A member who teaches mathematics observed that the best thing about the committee are the partnerships that develop. Every member collaborates with a subgroup of other people. “We are always going back and forth with other citizens in the 23 villages we represent,” the math teacher said. “The jamoat has 19 schools, 7 cultural centers, and 14 clinics. People come to subcommittee meetings, and bring their problems, but it is not always necessary to have a formal subcommittee meeting. Our members go to weddings or other big gatherings and talk to people.” The Dahana EDC’s efforts could be a case study in the power of community organizations to solve community problems. First, EDC members surveyed hundreds of citizens, who raised 86 separate community problems. After clustering, they came up with five problems and then three. They wrote one proposal for each of the three problems.57 The first problem was that almost all the women suffered from anemia (women are more prone to anemia than men because of pregnancy and monthly menstrual cycles), and vegetables were not obtainable locally. The group obtained funding and built a large greenhouse, where tomatoes, rich in iron, are grown.58 A member drew up the plan for the greenhouse. A second problem lay in the lack of seed, fuel, and fertilizer. The group decided to provide these in advance, with members repaying them

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in kind. At the beginning they thought about microcredit, but decided that it would be better to buy in bulk. This had not yet been funded but every member of the committee is now able to write a proposal to donors. A third crucial problem identified was the lack of transportation. Because the district has a population of 24,000, the EDC wanted to buy two minibuses and provide transportation for the community. However, because of vehicle licensing requirements, this would depend on officially registering the EDC, which is prohibitively expensive.59 In reflecting on the EDCs, Ashurboy Imomov said, “Economic development is important, but it is not our number one priority. Our number one priority is political—to replicate the Inter-Tajik Dialogue . . . [using dialogue to advance political decision making].” In referring to the citizen forums he observed, “Six years ago we were already doing this in Khujand, Qurghonteppa, and Rasht. The old financing is running out and the government has provided grants to enable these CBOs (EDCs) to continue working. But they must look for new money as well.”60 One problem with obtaining support, according to Parviz Mullojanov, is the lack of coordination between INGOs and traditional civic networks. International donors, Mullojanov said, focus on local organizations that “empower individuals in the private domain on rights and gender” but neglect those that “try to increase public participation through training to strengthen local institutions.”61 An exception is the Aga Khan Foundation, which collaborated with Sudmand in Kulob to provide funds for 10 “local initiative groups” to establish revolving loan funds. Sudmand teaches CBOs about proposal writing, identifying projects, and finding donors, as well as providing technical support on water projects.62 In contrast to INGOs, Tajik NGOs focus more consistently on strengthening citizen participation, and they often take advantage of traditional organizations, such as the hashar and the mahalla. Indeed, Tajik democratization NGOs have more grassroots ties than might be expected, given their overall weakness. Missing, however, are consistent

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and creative partnerships between Tajik NGOs and international donors, based on spreading grassroots participation more widely in Tajikistan. Essential to such efforts is the promotion of a wider democratic political culture to sustain citizen participation.

Conclusion Despite the weakness of many Tajik NGOs, there is evidence that they do well when they concentrate on Tajikistan’s strongest local democratic traditions and institutions. Ashurboy Imomov clearly believes it is worthwhile to proceed on this participatory track, regardless of the low short-term impact: People are confused not because it is complicated, but because, like government officials, they think we are not quite ready for democracy. . . . Dialogue participants, including me, think that regardless of the government, the people should strive for democracy. . . . Democracy is not a governmental affair.

Particularly noteworthy is the Tajik strategy of strengthening democratic skills and awareness through socioeconomic development projects. PCDP not only develops deliberative and participatory skills at the local level, it also supports EDC ties with local governments. Among the other examples are Chasma, which uses small business development because this encourages otherwise reluctant women to meet with each other. NGO Women Voters works with women to improve basic services while explaining the benefits of a democratic state and legal system and helping them found CBOs. Although NGOs like PCDP are successfully using dialogue and deliberation to strengthen democracy at the level of ordinary citizens, and to build on Tajik traditions, the impact of other democratization NGOs, such as it is, is national. Abdulgani Mamadazimov of the National Association of Political Scientists supports the idea that the realm of democratic ideas can have a national impact: “Those NGOs that lobby democratic values have found their space at the national level. . . . The government [at least]

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realizes the importance of democracy in resolving the social questions and has started providing grants.”63 Rano Akhunova added: Dissemination of knowledge about democracy and its benefits is important. . . . NGOs should be thanked, even just for organizing round tables [such as PCDP’s] that provide a platform for opinion, especially with political parties. This is a sign that democratization is proceeding. They always make recommendations and these are even on the government radio and television. This influences NGO party relations. Two to three years ago it was not even possible to discuss problems with the government.64

Democratic innovations developed by NGOs may also spread from locality to locality, thus having a different kind of national impact. According to Shahlo Juraeva, Jahon’s ideas about educating the police about human rights have been replicated by other local NGOs. “The country is small and ideas have impact,” Juraeva said. “Political cultural change is difficult and many don’t realize that the opposition can contribute.” Much remains to be done in a country where husbands tell their wives how to vote, but the role of women in Tajik civil society is particularly encouraging.65 Women led 16 of the 29 democratization NGOs interviewed. They often focus on issues like domestic violence and international trafficking, which are essential to nurturing a democratic culture.66 Most of the NGO leaders who were interviewed agree that civil society is gaining strength, despite the government’s reimposition of new registration requirements, restrictions on the media, and civil society’s incomplete understanding of the role of loyal opposition. Internal democracy is less of an issue in Tajikistan than in South Africa because most Tajik NGOs are very small and rarely pay staff without an international contract. NGOs operate with fewer restrictions than the media and, as Matin Mirzoev observed, “The development of civil society has led to good and useful laws. . . . Political parties are not seriously restricted, and [although] there is some regulation of human rights . . . the initial barrier

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of fear has been overcome.” The media, however, remains under tight control and, despite some loosening of press restrictions, newspapers that were shut down haven’t yet reopened.67 The interviews also reveal a striking lack of strong ongoing ties between intermediary NGOs and CBOs, not only because of inconsistent international support, but also because the CBOs themselves, the bedrock of civil society, are weak.68 Intermediary NGOs, like the government, lack skills in strategic planning and implementation, even though they seem highly motivated to establish ties and do so whenever they can.69 Given Tajikistan’s local institutional traditions, one can only hope that international donors will begin to focus on the connections between the two levels of civil society as a way of supporting democratization from the bottom up.70 The evidence that they will do so is not encouraging, however. One outside observer has likened World Bank and UNTOP efforts in Tajikistan to the command style of Soviet management in terms of lack of democracy and violations of their own rules.71 He also claims that the international community has failed to check the self-serving behavior of local elites. The continual complaints by Tajik NGO leaders about the corrupt local representatives of most international NGOs hardly soften this assertion. Still, Tajik NGO leaders exempt some INGOs from criticism and acknowledge that they learned a great deal about democracy from the trips to conferences in other countries sponsored by international NGOs. For their part, international NGO representatives complain about corruption among local NGOs, and their tendency to take on too many projects and do a poor job. One representative observed, “All of us have agents of the secret police working in our offices,” and said that more transparency vis-a-vis government would lessen their impact. Civil society in Tajikistan also confronts the country’s dependence on Russia. According to Zoirov of the Judicial Consortium, Vladimir Putin has personal financial interests in Tajikistan and has pressured Rahmon to reduce the Western presence. “Given Putin’s crackdown on INGOs

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[in Russia], such actions are likely to spread,” Zoirov said.72 Moreover, there are rumors that the Russian military is involved in drug trafficking, a growing problem in Tajikistan.73 Still, Tajiks enjoy a degree of personal freedom and there is a strong potential for democratic development rooted in local deliberative traditions and religious tolerance. Tajikistan has huge water resources, and its beautiful mountains and historical location on the Silk Road could become the basis for a tourist industry. The successes of some Tajik NGOs—on human trafficking, training the local police on human rights and strengthening dialogue and deliberation, for example—suggest that there are substantial possibilities for developing civil society and democracy that international donors could support. What does the future hold for Tajikistan? With Tajikistan on the border of the revived Taliban insurgency in Kunduz, Afghanistan, the potential for Tajik instability has increased. Between January 2008 and the end of 2009, 3,600 Afghan refugees entered Tajikistan. The Tajik security forces also have clashed with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, tied to alQaeda and drug trafficking (Gorst 2009). Although some believe that these events may push Tajikistan towards violent conflict, moderate Islam also is gaining strength. In the summer of 2009, Tajikistan adopted a new law allocating a special role for Hanafi, the moderate Sunni school of Islam, in the nation’s religious life (Gorst 2009). Dennis de Tray of the Center for Global Development calls Tajikistan “one of few post-conflict success stories in the world” (De Tray 2007). The economy has grown rapidly since the end of the civil war, although the growth rate slowed to 3.4 percent by the end of 2009, due to the world recession.74 Tajikistan has at least a stated commitment to democracy, and recent positive signs include increased press freedom. Beginning in 2009, OCSE began supporting a National Human Rights Commission that coordinates monthly interagency Human Rights Sector Meetings. Roundtable participation from civil society and government led to the creation of an official ombudsman.75

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These recent developments provide grounds for cautious optimism that Tajikistan may slowly move in a more democratic direction. It has a tradition of deliberative talk and educated women. Whether these assets can even partially and slowly advance democratization may depend, despite their weakness, on the work of democratization NGOs.

Endnotes 1

Sharifzoda interview

2

Zoirov interview.

3

Mullojanov interview, 2005.

4

Kosimov interview.

5

Alimi interview. And at least one international observer thinks the impact of the civil war on political culture is declining. Etulain interview. 6

The Tajik participants were offered a chance to foster a Sustained Dialogue in Afghanistan but decided against it until they made it work in more parts of Tajikistan. 7

Akhunova interview.

8

Saidaliev interview.

9

Tabarova interview. Between 2001 and 2006, 1,000 teachers were trained to teach more than 50,000 high school students in civic education, with support from USAID and IFES. The role of Tajik NGOs in this effort is not clear from the websites. IFES also funds Student Action Committees (with a total membership of 3,000 in 140 schools) that work with dropouts, “adopting” an orphan, playing with children, doing community research, and making school improvements. One hundred eighty students in three universities near Dushanbe are involved in weekly “conversation clubs” focused on democracy and current events, with a planned expansion to six other universities. Muller interview. 10

Katherine Muller observed that it was too short. Muller interview.

11

Hadyaev interview, May 4, 2006.

12

Hadyaev interview, May 4, 2006. According to USAID, the camps continued through 2007 (www.usaid.gov/Tajikistan). 13

For obvious reasons, the person quoted is not identified. Yet the observation was echoed repeatedly in the interviews. The Round Table is a forum of NGOs and parliamentarians and government officials, sponsored by PCDP. 14

Sharifzoda interview.

15

The other sponsors were OSCE, USAID, the American Bar Association, and the Academy for Educational Development.

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16

Halimova interview.

17

www.akdn.org/publications.

18

Halimova interview.

19

Burkanova interview; Khaililova interview.

20

Ghafforzoda interview.

21

It has conducted more than 300 training sessions on conflict resolution with local women in Afghanistan. Although the training sessions vary in length, the training of trainers lasts five days and includes discussions of legislation pertaining to women’s equality. “Now 17 percent of the [Afghan] Parliament are women.” Ghafforzoda interview. 22

Its donors are USAID, IREX, the Global Fund for Women, and the Aga Khan Foundation. Ghafforzoda interview. 23

According to Kuvatova, “We give women tools to predict it and resolve it.” Kuvatova interview. 24

Kuvatova interview.

25

Rusht in Qurghonteppa also works on domestic violence. Mahmeder interview.

26

The center, founded in Croatia in 1991, has more than 150 members from many countries. It is an example of an INGO not founded in the developed world. 27

Azimova interview.

28

Sharq, the think tank mentioned in Chapter 5, has been monitoring networks on conflict resolution. They were part of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. 29

Imomov interview.

30

One of the few NGOs working on increasing registration is Sharq, which carried out a study of voter participation among labor migrants to Russia, with support from the IFES. They found that only about one-tenth of the respondents voted by absentee ballot, an important statistic, since half of Tajik households have at least one labor migrant. Rano Akhunova of NGO Women Voters worked on registration with support from Counterpart International in the 1990s. Akhunova interview. Jahon has also worked on increasing voter participation. Juraeva interview. 31

Olimov interview. Sharq is registered as a scientific institute rather than an NGO.

32

Alimi interview.

33

Zoirov interview. The effort was supported by IFES. Muller interview. Muller noted that in some districts the government election coordinators hired those who had been trained. 34

Zoirov suggested that things had slowed down with the impending end of Putin’s term and his need to shore up his personal economic investments in Tajikistan. However, both the Judicial Consortium and Sharq have published manuals for election observers. 35

Hadyaev interview, May 4, 2006.

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36

Olimov interview.

37

www.osce.org/odhir/elections/Tajikistan/141627.

38

Hadyaev interview, May 4, 2006. The NGO members of Civilization are Mehr, NGO Women Voters, the Judicial Consortium, the Democracy Foundation, Sitona Audat Mamiova, and Khovar Public Center. According to Parviz Mullojanov, “Civilization’s ties with NDI are strong, but NDI made a mistake and did not re-register their field office. The government used this and created trouble.” Mullojanov interview, 2006. 39

Juraeva interview. Presumably, the 800 areas have been counted over a number of years, yet Jahon has had one of the most ambitious programs and successful fundraising efforts of any NGO interviewed. 40

Jahon focuses on ethnic minority groups and youth committees, holding meetings in several localities each week. At the time of the interview, Jahon had a paid full-time staff of five, a rarity in Tajikistan. Juraeva interview. Mehr has organized refugees, many of whom had fled to Dushanbe during the civil war. Saidaliev interview. 47

This pattern of CBOs creating NGOs from below is one of the most interesting and successful patterns of NGO development in developing countries. See Fisher 1993, 65, 71; Fisher 1998, 85. However, this was the only example found in Tajikistan. 48

Mahmeder interview.

49

Akhunova interview.

50

Akhunova interview.

51

These areas were chosen because they are still prone to violence, despite the end of the civil war. 52

Imomov interview.

53

This discussion is based on a May 3, 2006, site visit to Kofarnihon with Parviz Mullojanov, including interviews with eight members of the EDC, including two women. 54

Among the many outside connections are the American Embassy’s training center on small business, the Eurasia Foundation, Mercy Corps, and Gender and Development. The Swiss Embassy supports Madadgor, which was originally a kind of charity, according to Rohimov. 55

Bahriddin Rohimov from the NGO Madadgor during the EDC discussion, May 6, 2006.

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56

One entrepreneur at the meeting described a start-up business in video photography for local events that received 25 orders in May 2006 alone. Another was a potato, rice, and vegetable farmer who previously lacked any access to credit. A second farmer complained that the credit should be extended beyond six months and that the interest rate is too high. A fourth is now a computer consultant who writes advertising for other businesses. 57

This description represents the words of several members, because we were listening to a real conversation, rather than the words of one prominent member. 58

The greenhouse cost $5,000, with the funding obtained from IISD out of a grant from the Hewlett Foundation. 59

At the time of the interviews, the cost was 400 solomi, too much for a community, where the average wage was only 2,400 solomi per year. 60

Imomov interview.

61

Mullojanov interview, 2006.

62

Saidaliev interview.

63

Mamadazimov interview.

64

Ahkunova interview.

65

Juraeva interview.

66

This total does not include Zuhra Halimova, a Tajik woman who heads the OSI office in Dushanbe, nor Kate Whitbeck and Katherine Muller who worked for IREX and IFES, respectively. 67

Mirzoev interview.

68

Halimova interview.

69

Halimova interview. Through the local majlis trainings, OSI is planning to create an independent center of Public Policy in Tajikistan, in collaboration with the Institute for Professional Development. 70

As the evaluator of a democracy support project that used village organizations in Tajikistan observed, “Democracy support at the community level offers the only sound, nonconfrontational approach to improving conditions for the many, in the presence of authoritarian rule at the national and local level or where formal democratic institutions have long been emptied of their democratic content” (Mirimanova 2007, 213). 71

Telephone interviews with Eric Sievers, 2000, 2006.

72

Zoirov interview.

73

Etulain interview.

74

http://ocse.gov/index.

75

www.osce.org/Tajikistan; www.neweurasianet/category/Tajikistan.

C HA P T ER

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ARGENTINA: History, Politics, & Civil Society

History SINCE THE CONGRESS of Tucumán in 1816, when Argentina emerged from the break-up of the Spanish empire in Latin America, the themes of freedom vs. authoritarianism and regionalism vs. centralism have played decisive roles in the country’s history. In 1819, provincial caudillos (strongmen) and gauchos (cowboys) unseated the first “Supreme Director,” Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, because he tried to establish a dictatorship. Following a period of chaos in the 1820s, a reform-minded president, Bernardino Rivadavia, initiated a policy of modernization, founding the University of Buenos Aires, curtailing the financial and legal power of the church, and establishing hospitals and orphanages. Unfortunately, he neglected the provinces, leaving the oligarchy free to consolidate its control of public lands, thus delaying the development of democracy. Following the war with Brazil (1825-1828), disaffected veterans incited a period of chaos and revolt that led to the emergence of the strongman Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829. Rosas ruled Argentina as undisputed

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dictator for the next 23 years, involving Argentina in futile wars with her neighbors while promoting an inflexible centralism that eventually led to his overthrow in 1852. Rosas’ militaristic authoritarianism, including his insistence that civilians wear red ribbons as a sign of loyalty, presaged 20th-century dictatorships, while his agricultural policies strengthened the rural oligarchy. The second half of the 19th century saw rapid economic development as well as the transfer of power from regional caudillos to an economic elite made up of landowners and merchants. A national constitution based on both the Philadelphia constitution of 1787 and the works of a brilliant political theorist from Tucumán named Juan Bautista Alberdi, emphasized the need to balance a strong federal government with a degree of provincial autonomy. At the same time, this new constitution, ratified in 1853, gave the central government the right to intervene in any province where “republican government” was threatened by disorder. This would become an instrument of tyranny in the hands of subsequent presidents. President Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868) introduced modern institutions, building a postal service, a telegraph system, a national bank, a judicial system, and a modern system of public education. Most important, he encouraged European immigration, and at least 100,000 Europeans settled in Argentina during his term. Although patient with rebellious regional caudillos, Mitre did not hesitate to use force when necessary. Persistent conflicts over regionalism preoccupied politicians for many decades, retarding democratic developments and hindering the establishment of an effective state (Peruzzotti 1997). While authoritarian leaders used regionalism to distract the public from fundamental political reform, rebellions in the provinces undermined the policies of the more democratic leaders. The Paraguayan War (1865-1870), which led to Mitre’s downfall, ushered in the enigmatic reformer Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-1874). Despite his many personal flaws, Sarmiento proved to be a capable mod-

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ernizer. He initiated the first census, built the first railroads, encouraged immigration, and liquidated the military power of the regional caudillos. He also established a national public library system and doubled school enrollment to more than 100,000. Sixty-three women teachers from the United States, chosen by Horace Mann’s wife, started normal schools. Through the late 1800s, authoritarian leaders continued to degrade Argentina’s democratic capacity. Corrupt patronage networks undermined public confidence and landownership became increasingly concentrated in the hands of speculators, motivated by Argentina’s new role as the principal exporter of meat to Europe. The nation was changing, however. European immigration continued unabated, and by 1890 Buenos Aires had 300,000 people and a vocal middle class. In 1889, a mass meeting of largely unknown young men led by Leandro Alem demanded free suffrage and a political housecleaning—thus creating a movement that became the Civic Union and, later, the anti-clerical Radical Party. The enigmatic and erratic temperament of Radical Party president Hipólito Irigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) undermined his political programs and made him vulnerable to corrupt subordinates. Though sympathetic to the poor and the force behind several social reforms, Irigoyen’s troops fired into a crowd during a general strike. And, although he personally inclined towards democracy, he imposed dictatorial restraints. He (and later Perón) bears heavy responsibility for weakening the institutions that make constitutionalism possible and for advancing individual civil liberties without building strong representative institutions and a balance of power (Peruzzotti 1997). Democratic agitation did not lead to political reform. Successive regimes continued to rely on dictatorial methods and corrupt policies that favored oligarchic interests. Continuing political instability led to an increasing military role. In 1943, President Ramón Castillo was overthrown by military coup, which brought to power Colonel Juan Domingo Perón (1943-1955), whose legacy is still felt in Argentina today. Perón combined tradition-

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al Argentine authoritarianism with populist programs that appealed to the working class, which became the basis for his powerful political machine. Buttressed by the well-publicized charitable work of his wife, Evita, Perón forced landowners to sell their products to the state at greatly reduced prices. This provided the working class with affordable food, but also bred economic chaos. Although phony budgets concealed state-subsidized industrialization, Perón, in a rough and self-serving way, managed to modernize the class structure of Argentina by supplanting agrarian elites with urban constituencies dominated by labor unions and industrialists. Perón ruled dictatorially, suppressing opposition from both the army officers, who led a coup attempt in 1945, and from the progressive intellectuals, who demanded freedom of speech. Nevertheless, after the death of Evita in 1952, Perón began to lose popular support, and a massive revolt that included both the church and the military led to his resignation in 1955. It would be hard to overestimate the long-term impact of Perón on the political development of Argentina. By strengthening clientelism, he undermined the development of independent democratic institutions, and his political machine remains powerful, despite the constitutional and human-rights advances of recent years. Indeed, as one NGO activist argued, “People in the Peronist Party really don’t have a sense of human rights and democracy.”1 Political dialogue still revolves around support or rejection of Peronism and opposition to Peronism diverts attention from important policy issues. At the same time, the factions within Peronism distort normal left and right alignments. Another NGO leader observed, “All of our politics is really within the Peronist Party.”2 After the fall of Perón, Argentina entered a long period of military rule, punctuated by intervals of civilian government. In 1958, Arturo Frondizi from the Radical Party was freely elected. Although he stabilized the economy, he was overthrown by the military. Feuding military factions weakened the regime, however, and another elected president

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from the Radical Party succeeded it, but was also overthrown by military coup in 1966, supported by the Peronist opposition.3 In the early 1970s, urban riots and political assassinations further undermined stability and paved the way for the return of Perón, who was reelected in 1973, with his third wife, Isabel, as vice president. She assumed power after his death the next year, but, by 1975, prices were up almost 400 percent and strikes and demonstrations continued. In March 1976, another military junta seized power, led by General Jorge Videla. This military regime, which ruled Argentina until 1983, was the most brutal in Argentine history.4 Its initiation of what is widely called the “Dirty War” led to the “disappearance” (murder) of more than 30,000 people. In one small province, Tucumán, 10,000 people were killed. According to Dario Abdhala of ANDHES, a Tucumán NGO, “My generation has no [political] fathers, . . . the generation of our grandfathers killed our fathers. We don’t have guidance or a generation to advise us. Ninety percent of the politically active 18-35 year olds were killed by the military [in Tucumán].”5 The military regime also proved to be economically and militarily incompetent. After Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands led to her defeat by Great Britain, military rule was completely discredited, and the regime collapsed in 1983, leaving Argentina with an $8 billion debt. Unfortunately, the newly elected civilian leaders were slow to confront the disastrous consequences of the dictatorship. Raul Alfonsín, leader of the Radical Party, defeated the Peronists for the first time in a free election in 1983, but failed to prosecute the perpetrators of the Dirty War. One of the perpetrators, General Antonio Bussi, retained the governorship of the province of Tucumán until 1999 and was actually reelected while facing a prison sentence. According to a Tucumán human-rights activist, “[Even] families of the disappeared voted for him [out of fear].”6 Meanwhile, runaway inflation, coupled with high unemployment, led to the victory of right-wing Peronist leader Carlos Menem in 1989. Menem privatized state-owned industries and utilities, instituted economic aus-

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terity, and made the peso convertible, which sparked a deflationary spiral that led to massive economic misery. This in turn revived clientelism, which became for many the only means for obtaining food, clothing, and medicine (Rock 2005, 234). Another Menem policy, the privatization of the railroads, turned many local communities into ghost towns.7 Although Menem protected civil liberties, reformed the constitution, and introduced some political reforms, he also tolerated corruption. Moreover, his failure to punish perpetrators of the Dirty War and his disastrous economic policies cost him the support of the masses that had helped elect him.8 Subsequent elected governments also failed to deal with Argentina’s financial and economic crisis. Fernando de la Rua, a Radical, introduced tough economic measures and obtained over $13 billion in emergency aid from the IMF, but this did not prevent a severe panic in which bank depositors withdrew over $5 billion. By the end of 2001, Argentina was in economic collapse, defaulting on $155 billion in foreign debt. Massive protests led three consecutive presidents to resign within two weeks.9 The Peronist regime that came to power after the collapse also proved corrupt and incompetent. Devaluation of the peso by 75 percent wiped out middle-class savings, while unemployment reached an astounding 50 percent, galvanizing massive popular mobilization in the form of protests and open discussions in the streets. In an atmosphere of political paralysis, huge masses of people organized neighborhood assemblies, staged protests, and took control of shutdown factories. Although this proved to be the worst social and economic crisis in Argentine history, it did not lead to military intervention. With the military totally discredited, civil society emerged in the fault lines of the crisis.10 Most political protests since 2001 have focused not on replacing democracy, but on making it more accountable. Unfortunately, the crisis produced neither democratic reforms within Peronism, nor a viable pro-democratic non-Peronist party. Both the Radical Party and the Front for Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), a non-Peronist party alliance, soon splintered into factions (Levitsky and Murillo 2003).

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Nestor Kirchner, a left-wing Peronist and former governor of Santa Cruz province, was elected in 2003 on the second ballot after a high (78 percent) turnout. Kirchner fired his police chief for the embezzlement of $5 million, shouldered aside the right-wing Peronists, and tackled bureaucratic corruption (Hinton 2005; Peruzzotti 2004). On the economic side, he paid off the remaining IMF debt and revived the economy, which grew 8 percent per year while he was in office. Kirchner also reformed the tax system to limit the influence of provincial governors and created new state enterprises while nationalizing privatized ones, such as the post office and the Buenos Aires water company. Most important, Kirchner purged the military elite and began prosecuting the perpetrators of the Dirty War, based on a Supreme Court decision declaring the blanket amnesty laws passed in the 1980s unconstitutional.11 In addition, Kirchner ordered SIDE (the intelligence agency) to open its secret files on the bombing of two Jewish sites, although the courts later acquitted the accused perpetrators (Feinberg 2004; Freedom House 2006). The Kirchner regime also signed 11 international humanrights treaties, which are now part of the constitution.12 Kirchner’s term was also marked by occasional abuses of power, and many NGO leaders have described him as better at prosecuting past human-rights violations rather than violations during his own presidency.13 These violations ranged from inhuman prison conditions to occasional “disappearances.”14 Despite his reforms, Kirchner continued the Peronist tendency to rule first by decree and only then to consult the congress (Marsal and Toth 2007).15 Despite his earlier attacks against corruption, Kirchner’s last years in power were marked by scandal. In October 2007, Kirchner was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, an influential Peronist senator. Although her opponent, Elisa Carrió, lost heavily, Carrió’s campaign against corruption and patronage drew heavy support from middle-class voters.16 In June 2008, Cristina Kirchner faced demonstrations by thousands of farmers over rising inflation and taxes on soybeans and grain. She also had to face allegations of illegal campaign contributions from the Ven-

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ezuelan government (Barrionuevo 2008). A takeover of private pensions accelerated a run on the currency and debt levels ($144 billion) were higher than before the 2001 economic meltdown. By 2009, the worsening economic situation for ordinary Argentines highlighted the Kirchners’ wealth and the perception that they had their influence over local authorities for personal financial gain.17 In the June 2009 parliamentary elections, the president’s Partido Justicialista (Peronists) lost seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and Nestor Kirchner resigned as head of the party.18

Current Situation The Argentine economy, both before and after the 2001 collapse, could only be described in terms of continual missed opportunities. The economic collapse of 2001 accelerated the growth of poverty. Hundreds of thousands lived without modern sanitation, while the richest Argentines lived in luxury (Marsal and Toth 2007, 16-17 fn 1).19 Nonetheless, by 2011, the Argentine economy had grown 94 percent, compared to 2002, admittedly a low point.20 Argentina’s Human Development Index in 2010, at 46th in the world, was higher than any other Latin American nation except Chile and has been increasing modestly since 1980.21 Infant mortality decreased from 59 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 16 in 2004, and literacy is almost 100 percent. With a population just under 39 million, the total fertility rate fell from 2.9 to 2.3 in the same period (Llamazares 2005).22 Overall, poverty fell dramatically from almost half the population in 2001, to one-seventh of the population by early 2010, based in part on a Universal Child Allowance for 1.9 million low-income families, with the amount depending on school attendance.23 Despite some problems with inflation, the generally positive economic picture led to Cristina Kirchner’s reelection with 50 percent of the vote in October 2011. Politically, the picture is also mixed. There is some evidence suggesting a deepening of Argentine democratic culture. The years endured under one of the cruelest military dictatorships in history forced Argen-

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tines to take seriously the long-neglected concepts of human rights and constitutional government. The Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, for example, started with 14 women whose children had disappeared and is now a major international human-rights movement. In Argentina, they exposed many of the worst perpetrators of the Dirty War to the glare of public scrutiny (called escrache) (Feinberg 2004). Popular demonstrations against human-rights violations accelerated during the 1990s and memories of the Dirty War helped overcome threats to the constitutional order (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000).24 The military remains discredited, not only by its crimes, but also by its disastrous economic record. Despite its turbulent history, Argentine democracy also survived the economic collapse of 2001. More than a quarter century has passed since 1983—the longest uninterrupted period of democracy in its history.25 In part this stemmed from the new constitution, which abolished provisions allowing for arbitrary presidential powers (Oxhorn 2002; Schamis 2002). More important, however, has been the rising strength of civil society. A recent (2011, 51) GADIS/CIVICUS study confirms Argentina’s political health in terms of political rights, pluralism, and governance. In Misiones in October 2006, a Peronist governor attempting to subvert the constitution so that he could be reelected was defeated by an electoral coalition led by an elderly Catholic bishop and a group of NGOs. The coalition included political parties, immigrants from Northern Europe, Jewish groups, and small landowners (Gambarotta 2006, 3).26 Elida Cecconi of GADIS, an NGO coalition, called the vote “a miracle.”27 When GADIS had conducted focus groups in Misiones in January 2006, “The people didn’t even want to give us their names. The poor were even afraid to go for medical treatment.”28 The political influence of civil society extends beyond the concern for constitutional order and human rights. According to Roberto Saba of the Asociación de Derechos Civiles (ADC), “NGOs have become more and more professional and responsible. We are now engaged in actual politics, writing bills, making alliances. . . . We are . . . political actors. . . . We do consciousness raising for a purpose, to be able to change things.

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This did not happen 15 years ago.”29 Even the executive director of an openly partisan, opposition NGO observed, “Argentina is developing a more democratic political culture.”30 However, the growing strength of civil society has not yet been translated into resilient democratic institutions. Argentina offers an extreme example of the distinction between formal political institutions (rules of the game) and organizations (players). Formal institutions are stable, yet weak in enforcement and implementation capacities. Indeed, some formal rules are stable only because they are not consistently enforced. Uncertainty about enforcement also heightens uncertainty about the political behavior of other players (Levitsky and Murillo 2005).31 The most serious consequences of Argentina’s weak political institutions include ongoing human-rights violations, such as the indiscriminate arrests of young people living in poor neighborhoods.32 Despite the growth of civil society, many Argentine observers argue that Argentina’s political culture, still authoritarian, overrides democratic institutions and is at the root of Argentina’s political problems.33 If so, then the human-rights movement and civil society’s anti-corruption campaign, to be discussed in the next two chapters, offer some grounds for long-term optimism. Still, according to Elida Cecconi, cynicism continues to define Argentine political culture and “trust is even lower than before.” With the political parties and the labor movement based on clientelism, too much power remains concentrated in provincial elites, who support the president in exchange for federal funds.34 Only 20 percent of parliamentary incumbents win reelection, not because of voter rejection, but because provincial party chiefs drop them from party lists, often arbitrarily. Voters reward those most capable of extracting resources from the federal government, and thus the provinces pay a relatively small fraction of taxes while absorbing a disproportionate share of revenues (Spiller and Tommasi 2005). By most standards, Argentine political parties are inefficient and dysfunctional. Incredibly, as of 2002, they were spending 440 times more than the Chilean political parties (Escude 2002). After 2001, the Radical

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Party collapsed and factionalism accelerated within the Partido Justicialista. The Radicals, according to Fabian Perechodnik of Conciencia, “are the only structured party, but they don’t vote!”35 This suggests that rank and file Radical voters are disaffected from the party. The Partido Justicialista (Peronist) has lost much of its labor union base and has survived by becoming a patronage machine (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). The smaller parties remain semi-personalist vehicles for politicians, such as Elisa Carrió (ARI) and Lopez Murphy (Recreate for Growth).36 Still, the weakness of the party system has allowed civil society to step into a political vacuum.37

Contours of Civil Society Civil Society: Associational Life Authoritarian regimes in Latin America have coexisted with “an astonishing array” of voluntary, internally democratic associations, and Argentina is no exception.38 There is little evidence from Argentine history, however, that civil society directly promoted democracy. During the colonial period, the Catholic Church created hospitals and orphanages, often staffed by volunteer women from high society. In 1823, the provincial government of Buenos Aires created a Sociedad de Beneficiencia managed by women that was autonomous, particularly with respect to fundraising. Waves of immigrants in the late 19th century created mutual benefit associations, social clubs, sports clubs, and community libraries. By the early 20th century, many of these associations had evolved into labor unions and welfare organizations. Some were integrated into the state after World War II and became the base of the Peronist movement. The more autonomous groups fell victim to periodic official repression between 1955 and 1983. Only a few human-rights organizations with international support survived and gained public recognition because of the high political profile of their activities. They were later joined by nonprofit research centers established by some of the scientists and intellectuals forced to leave the universities in the 1970s and 1980s (Levy 1996). A recent GADIS/CIVICUS survey of public perceptions of the impact of

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civil society found that over 70 percent linked it to human rights, the highest of 10 policy areas, including poverty alleviation (GADIS et al. 2011, 93). This emerging civil society, though slower to develop than in many other Latin American countries, is nonetheless more professional and policy oriented than its Argentine antecedents (Fisher 1993; GADIS 2006; Roitter, List, and Salamon 1999). By the time the evolution of Argentine civil society caught up with the rest of Latin America (around 2000), it already had a $12 billion impact on the economy, with its workforce accounting for almost 5 percent of total economic activity. By 2004, volunteers made up 40 percent of the sector’s workforce (GADIS 2004-2005; Roitter, List, and Salamon 1999).39 And as of 2004, Argentine CSOs were less dependent on financial support from philanthropic and multilateral organizations (7 percent) than their civil-society counterparts in 33 other countries. One reason for this is that CSOs in Argentina are highly dependent on fees for service (73 percent).40 Remarkably, the 2001 economic crisis accelerated the expansion and diversity of CSOs ( Jacobs and Maldonado 2005). According to Mario Roitter, “Civil society in Argentina . . . has many actors, and is one of the liveliest in Latin America. The unions have had a long-term influence, environmental organizations are strong, and so are neighborhood organizations.”41 A national consumer’s organization (The Union de Usuarios y Consumidores) has become powerful, as has the Federación Agraria Argentina, representing landowners ( Jacobs and Maldonado 2005). The Catholic Church has been less involved, perhaps in response to the murder of left-wing priests during the Dirty War.42 Between 1993 and 2003, CSOs of all types grew by 53 percent (March 2003).43 As of 2004, there were approximately 105,000 CSOs of all types in Argentina, although only 10,000 were registered (GADIS 2006).44 These figures represent 2.9 organizations per thousand people, above most of Latin America, but below the United States (4.3), the United Kingdom (5.1), or France (12.1). Thirty percent of the population says they are or have been involved with a CSO, and CSOs mobilize 2.5

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million volunteers (GADIS 2006; March 2003).45 To be sure, as in other countries, many CSOs exist only on paper and some federations compete with their member organizations. Based on a Johns Hopkins study, which measured civil society according to capacity/scale, sustainability, and impact, Argentina ranked just under 13 European countries, the United States, and Australia (Salamon, Sokolowski, and Associates 2004).46 A CIVICUS study, using a different index, also concluded that the impact, values, and environment for civil society were at a moderate level of development. On the plus side were local participation, the survival of civil liberties, and autonomy of action in relation to the state. Although mitigated by a high degree of commitment, Argentine CSOs are weakened by a lack of resources (GADIS 2006).47 CSO resources are constrained by problems with registration and taxation. For example, a monetary deposit is required before a CSO is permitted to receive donations and not all organizations can get tax exemptions (GADIS 2006). In January 2005, onerous new legal criteria for tax-exempt status led to the disappearance of previously exempt organizations (Marsal and Toth 2007, 20). The most developed provinces, such as Córdoba and Buenos Aires, have the highest rates of participation in CSOs, but Jujuy, which is much less developed, nevertheless ranked 5th of 23 provinces in GADIS’ (2004) civil-society index, because of strong CBO growth and the tendency for intermediary NGOs to be stronger than political institutions. Intermediary NGOs dominate civil society in other provinces. Santa Cruz has fewer CBOs per capita than most provinces, but has strong intermediary NGO networks. Mendoza’s NGOs already have developed considerable experience in participatory development. Intermediary NGOs in Tierra del Fuego have high prestige, are growing in numbers, and generate high rates of citizen participation.48 In contrast, CBOs are actually stronger than intermediary NGOs in Catamarca, where numerous community libraries are integrated into a strong federation. CBOs in Entre Rios emerged from a rich history of ethnic

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diversity. La Rioja’s strong CBOs depend on high citizen mobilization and are financially autonomous. Regions where civil society is less “dense” do not necessarily lack autonomous political activity, however. Misiones, where a heterogeneous popular movement triumphed over the governor in 2006, does not have large numbers of CSOs, but those that exist are active and well organized (GADIS 2004, 23).49 In contrast, San Luis has large numbers of CSOs, with little political impact.50 Moreover, organizational dynamism may or may not translate into autonomy. In Chubut, NGOs have an unusually strong impact on provincial legislation, but are also heavily dependent on the provincial government. What most provincial CSOs do have in common is that they are poorly funded and inadequately staffed (CIPPEC 2003). More than half of both volunteer and paid professionals also work for government in some provinces, which limits their civic activism.51 Although the close ties of provincial democratization NGOs to their national counterparts strengthens them considerably, this also may be a liability.52 As the Argentines are fond of saying, “Dios vive en las provincias pero su oficina esta en Buenos Aires” (“God lives in the provinces, but his office is in Buenos Aires”). Another measure of civil society is public perception. In 1999, a survey conducted by Gallup and Poder Ciudadano found that 60 percent of the Argentine public had no opinion about the honesty of NGOs. And those who did rate them found them in the middle of the honesty scale. This compared, however, with ratings of only 9 percent for politicians and 17 percent for the judicial system.53

CBOs Although some CBOs—community libraries, for example—date back to the late 19th century, many others have a history of connections to the Partido Justicialista. Despite social unrest in the provinces in the 1990s, ruling Peronist elites successfully co-opted or marginalized many

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new grassroots movements, and the local political bosses of urban street movements continued to be tied to the Peronist party.54 But this may be changing. A growing number of provincial CBOs and social movements attacking poverty or the lack of governmental accountability trace their roots back to the work of democratization NGOs, such as Fundación Compromiso, which has trained community leaders for many years.55 In Buenos Aires the 2001 crisis simply overwhelmed the capacity of the old Peronist welfare networks, which were thus unable to co-opt the emerging social movements (Roberts and Portes 2006). The neighborhood assemblies that arose in response to the 2001 crisis have also maintained some autonomy. By 2003, there were 50 neighborhood assemblies in Buenos Aires, some of which administered public land and organized communal food production. However, only about one-third of citizens in these neighborhoods had attended their meetings, and their influence has waned with the resurgent faith in national institutions (Hari 2003). The factory movements are another intriguing example of new grassroots associations. Beginning with the 2001 crisis, workers who had not been paid took over factories. Some of these collaborated with local hospitals, schools, barter clubs, homeless groups, students, and squatter organizations (Dinerstein 2003). The factories that have continued to do well tend to be in niche markets and have low infrastructure costs.56 Despite legal threats from former owners, more than 200 of these factories remained under worker control as of 2011, employing 10,000-15,000 workers.57 Between 2005 and 2007, the Recovered Factories Movement, a federation of worker-controlled factories, doubled its membership (Carroll and Balch 2007; Klein and Lewis, 2007; Marcuse 2007).58 Also indicative of grassroots activism are 4,500 barter associations and swap clubs with more than half a million members and the many soup kitchens and housing cooperatives (GADIS 2006; Liikala 2002; Roy 2003). Although some have retained their autonomy, others that are no longer formally tied to Peronist trade unions continue to operate like

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patronage networks (Roberts and Portes 2006, 74). Overall, social and economic organizing at grassroots level expanded significantly after 2001, supported by poverty-focused government initiatives. This not only led to the creation of new cooperatives, recuperated factories and microcredit institutions, it also increased advocacy, based on mutual aid (GADIS et al. 2011).

CBO Networks Urban CBOs are often members of networks, such as the Red de Empresas Sociales (social enterprises) or the Federación de Comedores Comunes (soup kitchens). An urban network of CBOs in Tucumán has a bakery and a poultry factory.59 Neighborhood organizations also cooperate with each other around issues of police violence. Among the strong rural networks are Fogón Andina, an indigenous federation of 89 community organizations in Tucumán, supported by university students and professors.60 In San Fernando del Valle, Catamarca, another network (Bienaventurados Los Pobres) has 36 CBO members representing more than 500,000 people and is loosely tied to the Catholic Church.61 It organizes domestic workers and promotes exchanges among its member organizations. Some of them, such as community libraries, have become “meeting places for training in democracy.”62 The CBO federation in Santiago del Estero focuses on agricultural technology and improved labor negotiation (CIPPEC 2003).

Intermediary NGOs Estimates of the number of intermediary NGOs vary between 25,000 and 70,000, with the higher estimate more likely to be accurate, based on CIVICUS’ wider access to data (GADIS/CIVICUS 2006; Roy 2003, 71). Associations, including NGOs, are easier to launch than foundations, which, as of 2006, were required to pay 4,000 pesos to register.63 NGO professionals, like their counterparts in South Africa, often criticize the weakness of ties between NGOs and CBOs. According to

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Roberto Saba, formerly of ADC, this weakness is partially due to a “legal curiosity” that bans foreigners working for international donors or INGOs from teaching and, therefore, assisting Argentine NGOs to establish such ties.64 The human-rights movement is evolving, however, and is increasingly working with CBOs, on socioeconomic and women’s rights.65 Although only one-third of intermediary NGOs in Argentina belong to networks, they often have “strong glue on short-term issues.”66 For example, Mediadores en Red (“Mediators in Network”) unites more than 200 community mediation centers and has trained 10,000 mediators. NGOs also lend support to each other in Buenos Aires through regular dinners.67 In addition, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other common websites have increased NGO networking (GADIS et al. 2011, 74). Still, umbrella organizations, as in other countries, have the potential to siphon off resources of time and money from their members. Even a “good meeting” of only five democratization NGOs that use public deliberation did not lead to the creation of a network, because the economy was “so poor” that struggling NGOs could not justify the expenditure.68 Moreover, as Fabian Perechodnik observed, “Civil society can’t escape the logic of the Argentines, and NGOs are very individualistic, especially in the interior.”69 For example, even though NGOs in Mendoza have “vast experience in participatory development,” only environmental NGOs maintain strong ties with each other (CIPPEC 2003). As in Tajikistan and South Africa, Argentine NGO leaders also point out that international funding promotes competition rather than networking among NGOs.70 It is also true that international donors may define civil society too narrowly. The World Bank, for example, has moved from policies aimed at strengthening government to a focus on NGOs, and extends some support to unions and cooperatives. At the same time, however, it still focuses on what Tuozzo (2004) calls an “Anglo-Saxon concept of civil society” that privileges management over citizenship. NGOs are typically rewarded for efficient management or “capacity” rather than the strength of their grassroots ties. A study of 22 US foundations that supported 70 Argentine NGOs

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found that grants were based on English proficiency, management expertise, and board representation.71

Democratization NGOs The major human-rights NGOs—CELS, Madres y Abuelos de Plaza de Mayo, Conciencia, and the Asamblea Permanente de Los Derechos Humanos, were created by victims of the dictatorship and their families while the military was still in power.72 After the end of the Dirty War, awareness of broader needs for democracy and a democratic culture that could buttress human rights led to the creation of many more democratization NGOs, “devoted to problems such as ... political transparency, and the strengthening of citizen rights.”73 As of 2005, there were approximately 20 major national democratization NGOs, with real programs and budgets, including human-rights organizations.74 Many of these organizations struggle to survive, however. Poder Ciudadano, one of the most prominent democratization NGOs, routinely runs a yearly deficit.75 Democratization NGOs also struggle to become powerful political actors. For one thing, security issues still dominate the public agenda and can be “counterdemocratic,” because they can be used as excuses for repression.76 Second, an increase in registration fees since the 1990s has made it harder to create new organizations.77 Finally, democratization NGOs that grew out of university activism have suffered from declining financial support for higher education. According to Dario Abdhala of ANDHES in Tucumán, “Universities were centers of democracy, and even the janitors voted. Today higher education lacks that earlier investment. And things are just beginning to come back.”78 Only 22 percent of the public in the CIVICUS/GADIS survey mentioned the role of civil society in strengthening democracy, compared to more than 40 percent who recognized the role of NGOs in environmental protection. At the same time, when asked about the importance of civil society, Argentines were more likely to specifically mention human rights than social policy. A major reason for this was the successful civil-society

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pressure to have the pardon laws, passed by Alfonsín and Menem, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005, as well as the continuing progress in prosecutions of the Dirty War perpetrators since then.

Civil Society: The Sphere of Public Debate Another challenge faced by democratization NGOs relates to a different part of civil society, the media. When the president of Poder Ciudadano publicly denounced certain government expenditures, the Nestor Kirchner government retaliated by launching an official investigation of Poder Ciudadano.79 President Kirchner also favored certain media by buying space.80 A study of 400 journalists found that more than half had received coercive phone calls from public officials, and nearly half complained about dependence on official information.81 Moreover, according to Mariana Lomé of the Fundación Compromiso, the media does not consider itself part of civil society. One recent study of journalists at 10 newspapers found that few had even written about the economic crisis of 2001. Less than 10 percent of their stories came out of communities, while the rest were tied to powerful authorities.82 “Public” television is run by the state and lacks diversity in funding, even though commercial pressures are low (Peruzzotti 2002).83 Still, in a broader sense, the sphere of public debate has grown in strength since the end of the military dictatorship. As Martin Epstein of Amnestia Internacional observed in relation to the victims of the Dirty War, “The public debate is their real memorial.”84 The dialogue on human rights has been described as a “maximalist” response to President Raul Alfonsín’s decision in 1986 to implement amnesty or a “full stop law” regarding atrocities committed under the military regime. By 2009, this had led to a resumption of criminal proceedings. Indeed, this dialogue sometimes includes the media. It is based not so much on the delegitimization of authoritarianism as the relegitimization of democratic institutions. Initiated by networks of NGOs working on legal aid, human rights, and police violence, the “real novelty is not the continuation of clientelism, but civil society’s awareness of it. . . .

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The politics of human rights as a catalyst plus inquisitive journalism . . . has restored the authority of the constitution” (Peruzzotti 2002, 86).85

Civil Society: Markets Unlike the media, businesses do not generally play a prominent role in civil society. Still, at least one large democratization NGO, Fundación Grupo Sophia, depends on business support and uses more than 300 business professionals as volunteers.86 Fundación Compromiso has attempted to broaden the base of civil society by sponsoring breakfasts, called Encuentros de Voluntarios Corporativos, for business leaders. However, there are few such “shared spaces” and businesses do not generally view themselves as part of civil society.87

Civil Society and Government Although Argentine civil society is autonomous and not dependent on the state, awareness of the pitfalls of clientelism is generally higher among intermediary NGOs than among CBOs (GADIS 2006; Waisman 2002). Clientelism also varies by region. Community leaders in Salta and San Luis were afraid to offend the local government and denied any conflict between the government and civic groups. In San Luis, Governor Adolfo Saa went so far as to create a nominally “independent” organization to guide civic groups, with his wife as director (Liikala 2002). In Buenos Aires and in the major provincial capital of Córdoba, however, local leaders publicly express the view that government can and must change.88 Nevertheless, even democratization NGOs based in Buenos Aires find it discouraging to have to cooperate with the government, while being doubtful about the long-term implications for autonomy. As Rodrigo Kon of Fundación SES wryly observed, “The tango is very pessimistic.”89 Ironically, partisan interests often govern state funding and only 15 percent of the organizations surveyed by GADIS had received support from the governments at any level (GADIS 2004; GADIS/CIVICUS

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2006).90 The NGOs that do have government contracts usually offer a particular expertise. Fundación SES, for example has an expertise in youth programs, and, despite his pessimism Rodrigo Kon observed, “They call us all the time. . . . There are many . . . spaces to have a dialogue with the government.”91 A recent (GADIS et al. 2011, 95) study using the CIVICUS index of civil society found that two-thirds of surveyed organizations were involved with public policy and almost half of those were capable of describing at least one example of sucessful political impact.92 However, according to Juan Martín Vezulla of Fundación Ambiente de Recursos Naturales (FARN) “[Some] NGOs stay away from politicians because they have low status.”93 His own organization, on the borderline between an environmental organization and a democratization NGO, works with and continually challenges the Buenos Aires provincial government. The day before the interview, FARN had received a letter from a government official inviting them to submit an amicus curiae brief on an environmental case.

Conclusion As in South Africa, democratization NGOs rarely receive government support, yet they can and sometimes do influence governance. Although this topic will be explored more specifically in Chapters 9 and 10, the change in public attitudes towards human rights since the dictatorship and the rejection of politics-as-usual since 2001 are generally acknowledged to be due to the work of NGOs (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). The CIVICUS respondents, for example, rated the impact of NGOs as high on human rights, moderate on social policy, and low on the national budget.94 The next two chapters explore in more detail the role of democratization NGOs in strengthening opposition, law-based civil liberties, a democratic political culture, and political participation. In contrast to most of their counterparts in South Africa and Tajikistan, some democra-

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tization NGOs in Argentina also recognize that directly strengthening the capacity of the state may be equally important. As Carlos Acuna (2003, 11) has written: There is no historical experience that shows a strong democratic civil society unless it articulates this strength in relation to a state that is also strong. . . . Strategies to promote increased equity and participation require the simultaneous construction of improved laws and institutions such as the building of more inclusive and just socioeconomic conditions. Endnotes 1

Garcia Araóz interview. Araóz heads the local, all-volunteer chapter of a national human-rights NGO. Several of those interviewed made similar points, although Peronism is a broad category, including different factions and individuals. 2

Kon interview. The acronym stands for Sustainability, Education, and Solidarity.

3

Levitsky and Murillo (2005) observe that Argentina, at this point, was the wealthiest country in history to experience a military coup. 4

Emilio Masera, the navy’s representative in the junta, died on November 8, 2010, and escaped prosecution because of dementia. He was the dictatorship’s theorist and chief executioner, turning a naval mechanics school in the center of Buenos Aires into the worst concentration camp and torture chamber. 5

A politician allied with the military junta was governor of Tucumán until 1998. People whose family members disappeared voted for him because “fear is still strong here.” Abdhala interview. ANDHES stands for Northeastern Argentine Lawyers for Human Rights and Social Studies. 6

Garcia Araóz interview.

7

Altschul interview.

8

The reforms included direct election of the president and senators, the requirement that one-third of all candidates on each party list be women, the establishment of a national ombudsman, and the elimination of the requirement that the president be Catholic (Levitsky 2000). 9

Escudé (2002) points out that Argentina had twice the total debt of India, whereas India has 28 times more people. 10

Altschul interview; Piqué interview. PENT was a social science think tank, which closed due to lack of funding shortly after the interview. According to Santiago Mariani of the Asociación Civil Democracia Representativa, the military is so weak

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that it cannot even play the roles it should, such as arresting international drug lords. Mariani interview. 11

Roberto Saba pointed out that Argentina is the only country that has openly tried former dictators. The Chileans did not publicize names, and “Alex Boraine came here and said he liked trials but couldn’t do it in South Africa.” Saba interview, December 1, 2006. 12

Saba interview, December 1, 2006.

13

Police have been accused of a large number of extrajudicial executions. In Buenos Aires the provincial police have been involved in drug trafficking and other crimes (Freedom House, 2009). 14

Epstein interview. Several of those interviewed referred to the more recent disappearance of Julio Lopez. They do not blame the government for these disappearances, but for not adequately going after the perpetrators of such disappearances. 15

This has also had an ironic effect on social policy. Although the state under Kirchner reversed Menem’s lack of social policy, it has failed to work with NGOs to make these new policies more effective. See Marsal and Toth 2007, 20. 16

www.cippec.org.

17

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep29/argentina-president-cristina-nestorkirchner. 18 www.globalvoicesonline.org. Nestor Kirchner died unexpectedly of a heart attack on October 27, 2010. 19

Although the GDP shrunk 5 percent in the first quarter of 2002, the economy has rebounded since then, with an IMF-projected growth rate of 8 percent for 2011. Weisbrot et al. (2011, 10) suggest that a massive increase in social investment by government has increased demand, despite declining foreign investment. 21

Compiled by UNDP, this is an equally weighted measure of a life-expectancy index, an education index, and GNP per capita. The 2007 figure is from the 2009 report (www.undp.org). 22

http://hdr.undp.org 2009, 2011.

23

Weisbrot et al. 2011, 1. See also Mount 2011.

24

Anderson (2002) observes that the beginnings of change in the political culture may be more difficult to study than its “outward manifestations,” such as elections. 25

Nieves Tapia interview.

26

Piqué interview. Piqué noted that Elisa Carrió, the opposition leader who obtained more than 30 percent of the vote against Cristina Kirchner in the 2007 elections, was instrumental in organizing the coalition in Misiones. Ironically, Kirchner succeeded in making similar changes to the constitution of Santa Cruz when she was governor. Di Nucci interview. A number of the other NGO leaders interviewed mentioned Misiones and were amazed by what has happened there.

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27

Cecconi interview.

28

Cecconi interview.

29

Saba interview, December 1, 2006.

30

Reussi interview.

31

According to Schamis (2002, 88) “democracy” is only one of many coexisting political games, including rent seeking, plotting, capital flight, and emigration (Schamis 2002, 88). 32

Kon interview.

33

Piqué interview.

34

As Dario Abdhala of ANDHES observed, “Clientelism is a necessity of the system. They all use clientelism.” Abdhala interview. 35

Fabian Perechodnik interview.

36

As of 2003, Duhalde, with almost no electoral support still had 40 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (Levitsky and Murillo 2003). ARI stands for Afirmación para una Republica Igualitaria. Recreate for Growth has a coalition with PRO (Republican Proposal), led by Mauricio Macri. See pp. 222-223. 37

Piqué interview.

38

Carlos Forment, cited by Encarnación, 365. A recent study (GADIS et al. 2011, 83) described internal democracy as one of the strongest and most positive indicators of the health of Argentine civil society. 39

A GADIS (2004) study concluded that civil society contributed about 2.6 percent of the GDP and 75 percent of workers were volunteers. The differences with the Hopkins data are probably based on different definitions. 40 However, if the value of volunteer labor is included in the calculation, this figure is 23 percent for Argentina (Salamon, Sokolowski, and Associates 2004). 41

Roitter interview.

42

Epstein interview.

43

March estimated there were more than 80,000 CSOs, a more conservative figure than the Hopkins study indicates. 44

Saba interview, December 1, 2006. GADIS has a database of 105,000 organizations, with information on diversity, citizen participation, and human and financial resources. More recently, a GADIS and CIVICUS supported study (GADIS et al. 2011, 81) found there are now 13,800 registered CSOs, of which 2,870 are international NGOs. 45

Alicia Cytrynblum cited a Gallup poll figure of 5.5 million volunteers, 60 percent of whom volunteer at least once a week. Cytrynblum interview. The 60 percent figure corresponds more closely to the figures cited by GADIS. 46

Capacity was based on paid employment, volunteer employment, charitable contributions, and degree of diversification. Sustainability was based on self-generated income, government support, and popular support measured by volunteers as well as the legal environment. Impact was measured by economic value added (labor

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inputs); human-service contribution; popular commitment based on membership; and performance of key roles measured through in-depth field studies. 47

On a composite rating of 0-3, environment and values were both 1.7, and impact was 1.9, but structure was only 1.4 (GADIS 2006). 48

According to Constanza Di Nucci, this is due to the lack of a caudillo culture in Tierra del Fuego. Di Nucci interview. 49

Alonso interview.

50

www.compromiso.org.

51

Di Nucci interview.

52

Among the examples are the Asociación Civil Participacion Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego with Poder Ciudadano and ANDHES in Tucumán with ADC. ADC was already working with five to six NGOs in Buenos Aires and one to three NGOs per province in 2005. Saba interview, 2005. 53

Cytrynblum interview.

54

Salvucci interview and Correa interview, 2006.

55

Fundación Compromiso has received support from the Drucker Foundation.

56

Some worker-controlled factories have received loans from an Argentine NGO called Working World. 57

www.studentworkerproject.com.

58

http://workerscontrol.blogspot.com. Some have been taken over more recently, such as Cortidos Unidos Limitada, a wool and leather factory with 44 workers outside Buenos Aires. After bankruptcy, it was given a year’s grace by the courts to prove the cooperative viable (Carroll and Balch 2007). 59

There are more than 300 soup kitchens, mothers clubs, and neighborhood centers in the provincial capital of Tucumán. 60

Salemi, Lacano, and Vallve interview. The three founders—respectively, a physician, an agronomist, and a musician—work with community organizations on preserving indigenous culture and human rights, as well as health and poverty issues. Fogón is both an informal NGO and a federation of CBOs. See Fisher 1993, 57-70. There also are federations of indigenous organizations in other provinces. 61

The name means “Blessed are the Poor.”

62

Cecconi interview.

63

Perechodnik interview.

64

Saba interview, 2005.

65

Saba interview, 2005. See also the discussion on participation in Chapter 9, pp. 234236. 66

Di Nucci interview. According to Guillermo Correa, the dinners include the “20 most important NGOs that work on human rights, anti-semitism, and the environment.” Conversation with Guillermo Correa, Kettering Foundation, Fall 2005. 68

Barcat and Ferraraza interview. While a program officer at the Kettering Foundation, the author had worked with them to support this meeting. 69

Perechodnik interview.

70

Maurino interview. Maurino observed, “Given the way international foundations organize, they create incentives not to cooperate.” 71

See Marsal 2005. The study was based on 113 grants totaling $11 million. The average grant grew from $68,000 in 1999 to $94,000 in 2001. 72

Saba interview, December 1, 2006. CELS stands for Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. The other NGOs mentioned are the Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo and the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights. 73

Altschul interview.

74

Correa conversation, 2005. Correa estimates that there may be as many as 1,000 “paper only” or minimal budget democratization NGOs. The local intermediary NGOs in the CIPPEC directory are usually in this category (CIPPEC 2003). 75

Alonso interview.

76

Roitter interview.

77

Fees had increased to 10,000 pesos by 2006. Several organizations working on women’s rights were created in the 1990s. Altschul interview. 78

Abdhala interview. Constanza di Nucci also mentioned the decline in comparison with the political activism of the 1990s. She was the principal editor of the NGO directory produced by CIPPEC in 2003. Di Nucci interview. GADIS et al. (2011, 45) observe that although NGOs tied to universities are “not completely isolated,” they are “somewhat apart from” the rest of civil society. 79

Di Nucci interview.

80

Lomé interview.

81

www.fopea.org.

82

Cytrynblum interview.

83

Periodismo Social did the study. Cytrynblum interview. There are 15 newspapers in Buenos Aires alone. 84

Epstein interview.

85

New forms of communication, including the extensive use of Twitter by media outlets and citizens, influenced the September 2009 elections. Hashtag provided immediate information on the tabulation of votes and was used by major media outlets (www.globalvoicesonline.org/2009/Argentina). 86

Stanley interview.

87

GADIS et al. 2011, 75.

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88

Di Nucci interview.

89

Godáy and Robledo interview; Kon interview.

90

This may change over the long run. One of the first moves of the Kirchner government in 2003 was to open up to NGOs in designing policy (Veiras 2003). The previous version of NGO legislation was both more limited and more controlling than similar legislation in Brazil (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). 91

Kon interview. The Ministry of Education probably has the most extensive contacts with NGOs and CBOS through its large program of support to schools in local communities. More than 12,000 institutions are involved in local forestation campaigns, community libraries, local technical training, preventive health, and the installation of windmills and solar panels for isolated communities. Forty-five NGOs were sponsors of a national educational forum in 2006 sponsored by the Ministry of Education. Nieves Tapia interview. 92

This compared with 58.4 percent for Latin America as a whole.

93

Vezzulla interview.

94

The study concluded that NGOs may have an indirect impact on governments through training local officials (GADIS 2006).

C HA P T ER

9

p

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ARGENTINA: Loyal Opposition, Strengthening the State, & Law-Based Civil Liberties “There is no Argentine word for accountability, much less legal accountability.” —Gustavo Maurino1

DEMOCRATIZATION NGOs IN ARGENTINA are more likely than their counterparts in South Africa and Tajikistan to help strengthen government institutions at both the local and national levels. This does not weaken efforts to strengthen a loyal opposition, rather it enables civil society’s advocacy to begin to focus on the capacity to implement changes in policy. This chapter, therefore, includes a second section on building political capacity in governmental institutions. This carries through to the last section, which deals with the reform of legal institutions, among other topics. In all three countries, of course, government includes the legal system. In South Africa, the legal system is already very strong, described

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by some as a kind of built-in opposition. In contrast, Tajik NGOs mainly pressure legal institutions to respond to immediate issues, and legal reforms will be long in coming. In Argentina, however, NGOs are trying to change how institutions function. It may be that strengthening loyal opposition, executive governance, and legal institutions represent the beginning of an overall democratization strategy.

Strengthening the Loyal Opposition “There is no word in Spanish for advocacy.” 2 “The more articulate and diversified the society, the greater the need for elaborate agreements on how to disagree.” 3

Background The concept of a loyal opposition is “absolutely central” to the building of democracy, even though the default position of all political regimes is suspicion and fear of the opposition, according to Fabian Perechodnik of Conciencia. Yet he observed that Argentines have “no understanding of the concept. . . . We are not accustomed to dialogue.”4 This weak understanding is curious, considering that Argentine politics, in contrast to South Africa and Tajikistan, has been defined by partisan competition for almost 100 years. In the Argentine context, however, partisanship has meant being for or against charismatic leaders, such as Irigoyen or Perón. This type of political immersion tends to bypass both substantive policy discussion and the concept of loyal opposition. Although the 1983 elections overturned the “iron law” that Peronism could not be defeated in a free election, most non-Peronist parties have since grown weaker than the Peronists. When the Radicals proved unable to oppose the gross mismanagement of the Carlos Menem presidency in the 1990s, they lost further strength and legitimacy.5 Although the FREPASO coalition, including the Radicals, gained almost 46 percent of the vote and surpassed the Peronists in 1997, the coalition’s strength was short-lived (Torre 2005).6 Both Peronists and Radicals continued to promote entrenched, often corrupt, leadership. As Bowen and Ackerman

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(2003) observed, the prize is control of the apparatus, even if it doesn’t function well. A survey of party members was asked how often the selection of candidates was related to substantive debate. Of those surveyed, 81 percent of the Peronists, 79 percent of the Radicals, and 50 percent of other party members replied “hardly ever” (Llamazares 2005). The April 2003 presidential elections led to the end of the longstanding two-party system, with the collapse of the Radicals and the splintering of the Peronist Partido Justicialista into three factions (Sanchez 2005, 454). FREPASO denounced Peronism but offered few concrete proposals, and the new political parties that emerged were also personalist. Ricardo Lopez Murphy, head of the center-right Partido Recrear para el Crecimiento, based on University of Chicago economics, won Buenos Aires province. However, Nestor Kirchner, the left-of-center Peronist, ultimately prevailed in the second round. The net result of all this partisan turmoil was to replace a dysfunctional two-party system with a fractured Peronist movement and a splintered opposition. Peronism’s three major factions have proven unable to organize electoral coalitions with each other and the Partido Justicialista has no national bureaucratic structure. As one party official observed, “We use the party statutes when they are useful” (Levitsky 2005, 185). Peronism continues to be an effective patronage machine based on provincial governors, even though its popular base in the labor movement has declined. Despite recent challenges, such as the rebellion against the Peronist governor of Misiones (see p. 201), it would be a mistake to discount Peronism’s continuing importance. As Peron himself is reputed to have said, “We Peronists are like cats on the roof; it seems like we are fighting when in fact we are reproducing” (Sanchez 2005, 473).

Parties and NGOs Fewer NGOs are now connected to political parties than in the 1990s, when, according to Juan Mallea, “They were not real NGOs.”7 However, two party think tanks, the Fundación Creer y Crecer and the Fundación Civico Republicana (FCR), may be increasing the strength and effective-

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ness of the center-right.8 Fundación Creer y Crecer is openly connected to a small but growing center-right party called Compromiso para el Cambio founded after the 2001 crisis by Mauricio Macri, a wealthy businessman and Italian immigrant who was elected mayor of Buenos Aires in 2007 and 2010.9 Fundación Creer y Crecer focuses on policy research that challenges clientelist institutions tied to provincial dominance. Creer’s executive director Maria Reussi said, “We are a political party think tank, trying to gain Christian Democratic status internationally. We have strong feelings against poverty, but the press puts us on the right. This is a different way for a party to emerge, based on research.”10 The party has increased its representation in both the city legislature and in the national Chamber of Deputies.11 Despite their local electoral victories, this and other right-of-center parties coalesce around charismatic individuals, in the Peronist tradition if not commitment, rather than around ideas and policies. Unlike IDASA, EISA, and a few other South African NGOs that play the role of the loyal opposition, FCR and Creer are overtly partisan. On the left, however, there is little innovation within or outside the Peronist factions, except for the 2007 gubernatorial election in Tierra del Fuego, won by nonPeronist Fabiana Rios, the first woman ever to be elected a provincial governor.12 The most widespread popular movement, the piqueteros, who have utilized street blockades for numerous causes since the mid1990s, has remained independent of all political parties ( Jacobs and Maldonado 2005). With the exception of the party think tanks, most prominent democratization NGOs eschew partisan politics.13 Indeed, nonpartisanship, as in South Africa and Tajikistan, is seen as an indicator of NGO legitimacy. According to Gustavo Maurino of the Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y Justicia (ACIJ), “We [NGOs] define our identity by opposing political parties.”14 Although Poder Ciudadano held a workshop for six political parties in four districts in 2005, it had difficulties persuading them to attend because party officials worried about which other parties might

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attend. In fact, Poder Ciudadano was itself ambivalent about the effort.15 Nonetheless, the purpose of Poder Ciudadano’s ongoing database on candidates, based on a questionnaire, is to push political parties to increase wider citizen participation among those representing parties on local commissions. Some NGOs that would like to work with parties fear official reprisal. CIPPEC is cautious because of the official “investigation” of Poder Ciudadano that followed a report critical of government expenditures.16 Other NGOs, such as Centro para la Apertura y Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL) and Ciudadanos por el Cambio collaborated in training the Partido Recrear para el Crecimiento and provided support for an internal election, but did not receive support to move on to other parties.17 The Instituto de Investigacion sobre Gobernabilidad, Economia y Calidad Institucional, one of the few NGOs that had political parties in its mission statement, lacked funding and has apparently closed its doors (CIPPEC 2003).18 Lelia Godáy of Fundación Cambio Democratico summarized her frustrations after working with Poder Ciudadano and Conciencia on training political parties in Buenos Aires province: “It is hard for NGOs to work with parties. We have to work on public issues, but our sector doesn’t have policies. . . . We Argentines are too individualist.”19 Given the societal debate over Peronism, the reluctance of democratization NGOs to work with political parties may be even more understandable in Argentina than in South Africa or Tajikistan. However, NGO competence in policy and in working with government have some potential for changing the terms of partisan discussion over time.

Civil Society Because Argentine political parties cannot cope with increased civic activism and demands for representation, political advocacy tends to emerge within civil society. As we have seen, only a few democratization NGOs work with political parties or become party think tanks, and most of those interviewed describe the broader civil society as the real or

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most important loyal opposition. Both development NGOs and democratization NGOs have two advantages over parties. First, they are free to behave like reformers because they don’t have to win elections. Second, most stand above the Peronista/anti-Peronista debate that continues to plague partisan politics. NGOs that focus on socioeconomic or environmental policies often become policy advocates and may indirectly strengthen civil society. However, they are less likely than democratization NGOs to focus on strengthening political processes.20 Because democratization NGOs are a part of civil society, some become democratization advocates, others develop programs to strengthen civil society itself, and still others undertake both activities.

Advocacy on Democratization and Political Process Advocacy by democratization NGOs is not confined to the legal and human-rights issues described below. Other kinds of advocacy related to political process are particularly visible at the provincial level. In Rosario, Ejercicio Ciudadano (“Citizen Practice”) sponsored a group of 40 citizen volunteers who monitored the Municipal Council for a year. With the initial support of Poder Ciudadano and other NGOs and universities, Ejercicio Ciudadano’s activity led to a transparency agreement with the municipality, still in effect as of 2009.21 In Tierra del Fuego, NGOs are actively monitoring government as part of the officially established Deliberative Council. (See pp. 268-269.) In Chubut, NGOs are responsible for almost 25 percent of the legislative proposals, including successful constitutional amendments on popular consultation, popular initiatives, and the power to reverse legislative mandates.22 The all-volunteer Asociación Cívica Transparencia in La Plata has, according to one report (GADIS 2004), changed the way politics is done, without even its own budget. Some efforts cross provincial lines. Espacio NOA, a network run by the Asociación Civil Centro Nueva Tierra, works in six provinces on educational advocacy and “deepening democracy.” It helps NGOs, CBOs, and

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others transform social demands into public policy proposals and works against organizational fragmentation through joint actions (Borri 2006).23 National democratization NGOs often support local counterparts that work with provincial or local governments. Poder Ciudadano provides support on freedom of information while other national NGOs have assisted local partners in civic monitoring and the implementation of new penal codes in Chubut, Neuquén, and Buenos Aires provinces (CIPPEC 2003). Although human-rights organizations have increasingly been able to reverse policies and laws protecting violators of human rights at the national level, advocacy aimed at other political processes within the federal government has been less successful. One reason for this is that provincial interests are powerful within the parliament and use available resources for purposes of patronage. In response to this situation, national democratization NGOs tend to concentrate on research and training. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), for example, focuses on the design and implementation of public policy, or, as we shall see below, training for government ministries.24 An exception to this pattern is Centro de Implementación de Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento (CIPPEC), which provides policy advice to officials, promoting citizen access, and best democratic practices (CIPPEC 2003).25 Some democratization NGOs have tried to increase their impact by organizing national NGO networks, but these are often narrowly focused or ad hoc. A network called Iniciativa Popular, for example, concentrates on initiative and referendum reforms that would allow Argentine citizens to propose legislation at the local and national levels. Supported by the Ford Foundation, it is codirected by CELS, FLACSO, and the University of San Andres and cooperates with other NGOs and networks.26 An ad hoc collaboration on transparency and freedom of information includes eight NGOs and several major newspapers.27 However, a more broadly focused national advocacy network with substantial international support, Reforma Politica Ya!, disbanded after three years because of the costs of networking.28

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Strengthening Civil Society: Businesses and Nonprofit Associations One of the few democratization NGOs working to strengthen the business sector as a part of civil society is Fundación Compromiso, also the largest national NGO specializing in NGO management and networking.29 In Mariana Lomé’s words, Compromiso’s goal is “to professionalize the [civil society] sector.”30 One large Compromiso program, called Empresa y Comunidad (industry and community), provides technical assistance to businesses on social responsibility.31 This program encompassed 30 projects in 2004-2005, including 602 executives and 149 enterprises through breakfasts and seminars. There were 900 trained corporate volunteers paired with 100 CBOs to provide technical assistance in evaluating social impact and understanding the use of volunteers.32 And 120 other NGOs also participated by providing spaces for experience exchange, technical assistance, and implementation and evaluation of corporate social responsibility in 12 provinces and Buenos Aires.33 Fundación Compromiso also sponsors a yearly collection of workshops at both the national and regional levels called the “Jornada Argentina,” which specializes in themes like business and community and institutional assessment.34 The participants include people from businesses, schools, and NGOs. By the end of 2005, more than 10,000 people had participated in the Jornada (Fundación Compromiso 2006). The 480 people who participated in the Jornada in 2009 set up regional cooperative networks through YouTube.35 Fundación Compromiso is also a leader in civil-society management. The community leaders trained by the foundation in the 1990s were “regarded as a threat by political and bureaucratic leaders” and were often co-opted or marginalized; some of them, however, developed expertise on issues like low-income housing (Liikala 2002). By 2005, 300 NGOs and CBOs comprised of more than 3,000 people participated in local diagnostic investigations that included municipal offices in strengthening citizenship practices. The wide span of Fundación Compromiso’s organi-

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zational focus and its support for CBOs has increased financial support from many donors.36 GADIS is another prominent organization whose focus is strengthening civil society.37 In collaboration with the World Bank, GADIS has worked to improve life in poor communities by promoting cooperation between different organizations and sectors. Its database of more than 100,000 organizations has information on diversity, age, citizen participation, and human and financial resources, including corporate and grantmaking foundations. Its course for NGOs covers citizen participation, strategic planning, and technical assistance for regional coordination.38 As of the end of 2006, GADIS was collaborating with religious groups, multilateral organizations, networks, the justice and education ministries, and 50 NGOs on the Mesa Dialogo Ciudadano, a UNDP pilot project on governmental decentralization in three provinces.39 Yet despite its strong international connections, GADIS, like many other Argentine NGOs, struggles to pay its bills.40 A third, newer organization, Asociación de Graduados en Organizacion y Dirección Institucional (AGODI) is composed of university professionals who are directors of intermediary NGOs or work on nonprofit management.41 Its goal is to professionalize the management of the sector (Marsal and Toth 2007). Despite the support of some national NGOs for their provincial counterparts, Argentina lacks a national network of democratization NGOs that would support and strengthen CSOs at both the federal and provincial level.42 Notwithstanding the efforts of Fundación Compromiso and GADIS, national democratization NGOs need to support each other more effectively as well. The largest national NGO network (the Foro del Sector Social) has 220 members, but with some exceptions focuses mainly on social-service NGOs.43

Strengthening the Sphere of Public Debate In contrast to the limited efforts to strengthen the business sector, the efforts of a few NGOs to strengthen the sphere of public debate are strong in Argentina. Periodismo Social (PS) builds ties between the

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media and NGOs and assists other NGOs to “optimize the social dialogue” by monitoring media stories about civil society. It also trains journalists to include CBOs in their stories about local communities and teaches NGOs about the press.44 According to unpublished materials, PS has trained 850 journalists, more than 15,000 university students, and 2,000 members of NGOs. Their website has almost 50,000 hits per month.45 Periodismo Social has also organized networks of journalists concentrating on a range of political issues, such as citizen participation and violations of the human rights of children and immigrants. In the largest villa miseria (squatter settlement) in Buenos Aires, PS helps publish a neighborhood newspaper focused on what the community itself is doing about its problems.46 Alicia Cytrynblum, the founder of Periodismo Social, described how her family, who arrived in Argentina just before World War II, had gotten interested in public journalism. “My earliest memories are of sitting in my father’s lap after he had become editor-in-chief at Clarín [a Buenos Aires daily]. . . . I tried films, and then directed a magazine called Tercer Sector (Third Sector) . . . started by my father in 1994. . . . He realized NGOs were growing. And this was not covered in the press, not even in Clarín. It was an underground world. At first I didn’t want to be a journalist but then I worked on eight supplements about NGOs that ran in La Nación. In Argentina there are [at least] two publics, NGOs and journalists, that didn’t know about each other.”47 Among the other NGOs focusing on the media is the Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA), which developed a code of conduct for journalists and offers courses on journalistic ethics.48 Representatives from the World Bank and Poder Ciudadano attended a FOPEA seminar on the role of investigative journalism in exposing corruption. FOPEA’s website can be used to report threats, political pressure, and proposed restrictive laws at all levels of government. FOPEA released a study on official publicity that favors certain media and another on media selfcensorship.49 FOPEA also publicizes Argentina’s little-used freedom of information law.

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Both PS and FOPEA collaborate with other NGOs and with the Asociación de Entidades Periodisticas Argentinas (ADEPA), which provides legal services for its members.50 In 2008, ADEPA was focused on the official threats and harassment of the staff of Clarín, which has been critical of the Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner administration.51 As the sphere of public debate not dependent on the media, public deliberation is more widely used by NGOs in Argentina than in South Africa or Tajikistan, in part because of repeated exposure to the Kettering Foundation’s research through visits by NGO staff. Six national democratization NGOs use or have used public deliberation in their programs, including Poder Ciudadano, Conciencia, Fundación Ciudad, Cambio Democratico, ADC, and GADIS, which uses it in its outreach to other organizations. The work of NGOs in fostering public deliberation and thereby deepening participation will be covered in the next chapter.

Strengthening the Capacity of the State The other side of the coin of loyal opposition is a state capable of implementing changes in policy. Interaction between state and society is extremely difficult if the state itself is both weak and arbitrary. In contrast to judicial advances and progress on human rights in recent years, Argentina has made little progress in training public officials who are capable of distinguishing between public and private interests. As late as 2008, the World Bank ranked Argentina’s quality of governance as “below acceptable.”52 Democratization NGOs in Argentina have focused more directly on strengthening the institutional capacity of the state than do their counterparts in South Africa, where government is stronger, or in Tajikistan, where NGOs are too weak. Fundación Grupo Sophia, for example, conducts management training for teams of government workers within one department.53 CIPPEC focuses on building state capacity by helping civil society increase its participation in official policymaking and implementation. CIPPEC’s budget briefs and budget guides are distributed to govern-

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ment legislators, the media, and other members of civil society and focus on fiscal and substantive policy research. These materials are used to foster debates and dialogues in target organizations.54 One example is The Institute for the Comparative Study of Penal and Social Sciences (INECIP), which provides training for government ministries. With support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, CIPPEC also has developed indices to assess public management; 1,900 city counselors from cities with 20,000-100,000 inhabitants who participated in a 4-day training program were subsequently provided with an online support network. Both CIPPEC and Fundación Grupo Sophia collaborate with the municipality of San Nicolas on program-based budgeting.55 A number of other national NGOs work on reforming the courts, as described below, or on combating government corruption, as described in the next chapter. Similar NGO efforts at the provincial level include the Public Strategies Group in Santa Fe, which trains young researchers in public management and has conducted management diagnoses and trainings for several cities. In the province of Jujuy, the Fundación Condor conducts strategic participatory planning with business, civil society, and the local government through five community-development projects.56 Many of the participatory initiatives described in the next chapter also focus on the municipal level. Despite such efforts, Argentine public administration at the local level will be difficult to reform because it is often dependent on patronage networks. Many of these efforts could dovetail with the efforts of an emerging loyal opposition to challenge governmental accountability, as described above.

Law-Based Civil Liberties As in South Africa and Tajikistan, reform of the Argentine legal system is the basis for the emergence of a loyal opposition, political participation and the democratization of political culture. The legal system in Argentina was historically more inclusive than that of South Africa before the Transition, and more democratic in theory than that of Tajikistan.

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However, legal reformers in Argentina confront an historical legacy of corruption and institutional weakness in the face of both dictatorial assaults on due process and self-serving behavior by politicians.

Human Rights The battle for basic human rights was almost the only focus of an opposition struggling to survive during the military dictatorship. And it has continued to dominate the political agenda since the end of the Dirty War. Human-rights NGOs have had an enormous impact on Argentina, even though they comprised only 5 percent of all NGOs as of 2004 (GADIS 2004, 8). A measure of the dramatic change since 1982 was visible in Tucumán, the center of the worst military repression in previous decades, during a warm December evening in 2006.57 Amnesty International, with the collaboration of several local organizations, organized a Latin rock concert attended by thousands in the central provincial plaza. Although Tucumán suffered until 1999 under Governor Antonio Domingo Bussi, a supporter of the military regime, the crowds were no longer protesting against the provincial government. Indeed, the government buildings surrounding the square were decorated with huge banners proclaiming “Nunca Mas” (Never Again) and the human-rights office of the provincial government was a cosponsor of the concert. Under the dictatorship, it would not have been possible to hold any outdoor concert. Indeed, it was not even possible for people to meet in public spaces. Given that it had only been seven years since the fall of Bussi, the air of euphoria was not surprising. Human-rights advocacy grew in the mid-1970s in response to repression. It was supported by what Keck and Sikkink (1998) have called the “boomerang” pattern whereby an initial push for human rights at the national level is strengthened and supported by international activism, which in turn supports increased national activism. Given the horrors of the military regime and the personal and political and survival imperative, it is not surprising that once civilian rule was restored, the movement concentrated its efforts on the past. The crimes committed by

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the military regime were so horrendous that they absorbed a huge share of the reformers’ attention and energy. Even today there are conflicts between human-rights NGOs that continue to focus on the crimes of the Dirty War, and those organizations that want to target current violations. Recent court decisions that have overturned the pardons granted in the 1980s may partially resolve these differences, but only after the current prosecutions and sentencing of the worst offenders have ended. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), the major democratization NGO pushing successfully for Dirty War prosecutions, did so by dramatizing the conflict between the pardon laws and the international human-rights treaties signed by Argentina. CELS also organized a group of NGOs supporting public protests against the pardon laws and obtained the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior in prosecuting the perpetrators of the Dirty War (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). Cases were opened against 700 people, but it took 3 years for the first of the accused to be sentenced, in 2006. The lumbering pace of prosecutions gained momentum after 2008. By December 2010, former dictator Jorge Videla had been convicted along with more than 200 other former officials.58 In April 2011, Argentina’s last dictator, Reynaldo Bignone, was given a life sentence for crimes against humanity along with several other defendants.59 Still, those convicted, in trial or awaiting trial, comprise less than half of all suspects, 445 of whom have been detained in prison or are under house arrest (Ferguson 2009).60 CELS’ larger purpose is to establish precedent-setting human-rights cases before both national and international tribunals, thus anchoring increasingly powerful international precedents into advances in Argentina. As of the end of 2006, CELS and CEJIL were working on 20 cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, supported by the John Merck Fund, to promote the use of international human-rights law by local courts.61 With the help of international partners, such as Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Association of the Bar

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of the City of New York, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, CELS also provides legal assistance to the families of the disappeared and thousands of torture victims ( Jacobs and Maldonado 2005).62 Although CELS is notable for its focus on the Dirty War, it also undertakes cases focused on institutional violence, immigrant rights, and access to economic, social, and cultural rights. One such project involves violations against children and adolescents in the province of Buenos Aires.63 Several observers (cf. Encarnación 2006; Jacobs and Maldonado 2005) have pointed out that the Argentine human-rights movement is not only divided between past and present violations, it also suffers from internal mistrust, lack of grassroots ties, and isolation from political parties. Although the movement’s isolation from partisan activity continues, there are at least three signs of its increased political maturity. One indicator of maturity is that small, local human-rights organizations, as with other democratization NGOs in the provinces, are being supported by large NGOs based in Buenos Aires or by international donors. ANDHES in Tucumán, for example, is closely tied to ADC. In Córdoba, the Centro de Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente has obtained international funding and supports a program of access to justice for people whose livelihoods or homes have been damaged by environmental degradation (CIPPEC 2003). Several national networks also support and help unify the humanrights movement nationally and at the grassroots level. With international support, CELS maintains a database accessible to universities and other NGOs containing information on police, security, penitentiary services, and the judicial system, plus a research team of journalists, anthropologists, and lawyers. Among the related legal networks are the Red Nacional de Abogados de Derechos Humanos and the Red Argentina de Abogados para la Defensa del Ambiente (RADA), which includes organizations defending the victims of environmental degradation.64 All this activity has spurred local networking as well. The Human Rights Commission of the Colegio de Abogados (College of Lawyers) of Tucumán, for example, invites both

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NGOs and representatives of the provincial Ministry of Security to its meetings.65 A second indicator of maturity is that NGOs, which have to avoid high profile national prosecutions because they cannot afford them are, nonetheless, able to focus on current human-rights violations or increasing the rights of particular groups, such as women, children, indigenous peoples, or prisoners.66 The women’s movement in Argentina has a solid history of organizing and legislative accomplishment that depends on everyone from leaders of grassroots organizations to the wives of politicians (Viladrich 1998). In 2006, civil-society pressure helped push the Argentine government to ratify the International Women’s Human Rights treaty, and as of 2009, there were two women on the Supreme Court.67 Another of its victories was the successful push to increase the number of women hired by the government.68 An important national organization working on women’s rights, Mujeres en Igualdad, has a national electronic network of 2000 organizations and individuals, and sponsors regular breakfasts in Buenos Aires province on litigation and advocacy. In 1999, the organization secured a major precedent through a court case in collaboration with the legal clinic of the University of Palermo against a large ice cream company that was not hiring women. One of its provincial partners, the Fundación Redes in La Pampa, focused on the role of female legislative deputies and other laws relating to sexual and reproductive rights (CIPPEC 2003). Monique Altschul, president of Mujeres, observed in an interview that most NGOs tend to keep women’s issues “corralled off” and that Mujeres en Igualdad has therefore encouraged other women’s NGOs to move beyond traditional “women’s issues.”69 Some NGOs, such as the Instituto de Estudios Juridicos de la Mujer in Santa Fe, combine women’s and children’s rights by concentrating on family violence (GADIS 2004). Among the other provincial groups addressing the human rights of children is ANDHES in Tucumán, which focuses on legislation and has worked with the provincial Secretariat of Human Rights.70 ANDHES also collaborates with a local network on

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adolescent and children’s rights that includes the Tucumán branch of the Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos. The Asamblea, an all-volunteer organization, gives teenagers ID cards with a phone number they can call if they are arrested.71 The Asamblea also works with grassroots groups of illiterate women who want to protect their children from violence, drugs, and the police. In Neuquén, a number of NGOs and churches are able to play a very different role since they help administer a city ordinance on children’s rights as part of the Municipal Council on Childhood and Adolescence. Networks that include social-welfare organizations and foundations, as well as democratization NGOs, are especially important for the rights of children and adolescents. The Colectivo de Derechos de Infancia y Adolescencia de Argentina, for example, includes 25 organizations— democratization NGOs, such as Practica Alternativa del Derecho (PRADE) and ANDHES, as well as local and national NGOs and foundations directly involved in providing child protective services.72 The equally diverse members of another NGO network, the Foro del Sector Social, focus on prosecuting military traffickers of children and force the state to talk about the issue (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). NGO activity focused on the rights of indigenous peoples is concentrated in the northern provinces and Patagonia, where indigenous populations are greater.73 In Tucumán and Jujuy, ANDHES trains paralegal volunteers to represent indigenous groups in cases of police violence and legalization of land tenure. ANDHES also succeeded in getting the rights of indigenous peoples written into the Tucumán constitution and criminal law code. The Tucumán NGO, Fogón Andina, struggles with the complexities of protecting indigenous land rights. “Indigenous peoples’ territory is not registered,” said Ama Salemi. “The legal processes created by government agencies were very poorly designed. . . . Whose property rights are you going to recognize? Community or individual property?”74 A third indicator of increased political maturity is that both humanrights organizations and other democratization NGOs are involved in the larger project of legal and institutional reform. This requires both

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pressure from outside the system (bottom up) and an effort within the system (top down). The most obvious way to expand bottom-up reforms is through free legal services. The Center to Implement Public Policies for Growth and Equality (CIPPEC) “bottom-up judicial reform” includes lawyers, law professors, law students, NGOs, and CBOs and the distribution of its manuals to 800 community libraries.75 Poder Ciudadano coordinates a network of 500 volunteer pro bono lawyers and has partnerships with NGOs in Mendoza and Jujuy that use legal extension to promote human-rights awareness. Its partnership with PRADE in Santiago del Estero works with a peasant movement to provide campesinos (literally, “peasants”) with access to the legal system.76 Among the more innovative approaches to legal aid is an alternative justice mechanism in Tucumán, where lawyers, mediators, and psychologists connected to ANDHES set up a community-based Casa de Justicia, or “House of Justice.” By 2005, it had handled over 2,000 consultations and 1,387 cases, even though, according to Dario Abdhala, “Some of our paralegals that we have trained didn’t even finish secondary school.”77 The Centro de Comunicacion Popular y Asesoramiento in Córdoba uses a radio program staffed by 70 volunteers to educate people in poor urban neighborhoods about their legal rights.78 ACIJ undertakes class action lawsuits against government agencies that fail to provide promised services to the poor. According to Director Gustavo Maurino, “The Instituto de la Vivienda is very strange, they are not building any houses. We don’t know where the money goes. . . . There is no word in Argentina for accountability, much less legal accountability.”79 Although the Argentine human-rights movement emerged as a powerful response to the military dictatorship, it has evolved into something bigger and more consequential. The movement unites local and national democratization NGOs, pursues current and not just past violations of human rights at the local and national levels, and places human rights within the larger context of legal and institutional reforms that advance democracy. This includes not only bottom-up, but also top-down reforms of judicial systems.

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Top-Down Reforms of Judicial Systems In theory, the legal system in Argentina is universal, enlightened, and egalitarian; but in practice corruption and patronage often render it dysfunctional, even as it becomes more inclusive. Ironically, the judicial system in South Africa has proven to be more amenable to reform. Under apartheid, the system functioned honestly and fairly, if only for the white minority, and its expansion has brought reasonably honest justice to the entire population, although challenges, such as expanding freedom of information, remain. One comparative study on the rule of law in Latin America ranked Argentina much lower than Chile (Llamazares 2005). Because legal precedents are not binding in civil law, decisions of judges can be arbitrary or even corrupt. Argentina also lacks a general code of administrative procedure. Requirements for hearings are usually added to particular laws as concessions to powerful groups rather than for the public good.80 Still, as one observer said, “Opposition to judicial reform is not strong enough, so it may happen.”81 The potential for future reforms is buttressed by clinics for law students sponsored by Poder Ciudadano and other NGOs, which often include judicial reform in their more general focus on law-based civil liberties.82 The reform of legal institutions has, indeed, accelerated in recent years.83 ADC led a successful coalition of NGOs that opened parliamentary hearings for Supreme Court Justices to the public.84 As Roberto Saba of ADC pointed out, “Kirchner’s narrow victory in 2003 led him to fish for ideas. . . . In response to a call from the Ministry of Justice, we decided to . . . change the way justices are appointed.” As a result of the NGO campaign led by ADC, the president must provide for public scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees. This includes televised Senate hearings, questions from the public, and briefs from NGOs and others. One result of this and other reforms (on gender balance) was that four justices from the Menem period resigned.85 ADC’s strategy, illustrated by this example, is to select cases that change the system of justice and, in the end, society.86

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Judicial reform at the provincial level was spearheaded by a preparation course for judicial nominees developed by PRADE for the provincial government of Santiago del Estero. The first course, held in April 2008, was monitored by PRADE and democratization NGOs from five other provinces.87 Within one year, oral exams were taking place for justices of the peace in Santiago del Estero, and judicial selection, previously controlled politically, is now under the Council of Magistrates, monitored by the NGO group. The Foro de Estudios sobre la Administración de Justicia (FORES) in Rio Negro trains judges, judicial employees, and court officers on judicial process, best practices, benchmarking, and change management.88 Also at the provincial level, a network of 51 community radio stations (Foro Argentino de Radios Comunitarios), focuses on judicial transparency with help from Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego and Alternativa Popular in Rio Negro.89 An indirect way of reforming Argentine justice is to concentrate on the human rights of another marginalized group—detainees and prisoners. According to Martin Epstein of Amnesty International, “The prison system is terrible,” with thousands of prisoners subject to official violence. INECIP works on implementation and civic monitoring of several new provincial penal codes and trains federal officials in two federal ministries.90 INECIP also collaborates with the Center on Studies of Restorative Justice (CEJUR) to reintegrate both victims and offenders back into the community. In Tucumán, the Asamblea Permanente and ANDHES held public hearings and introduced a legal suit against arbitrary detentions. In response, a Tucumán court made it unconstitutional to hold anyone incommunicado for more than 48 hours.91 In Santiago del Estero, CBOs led protests against police violence (CIPPEC 2003).

Freedom of Information Some democratization NGOs also focus on legal and administrative transparency, even though five years of NGO work on a strong freedom of information law were reversed when then-senator Cristina Kirchner (now president) withdrew her support after her husband was elected

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president in 2003.92 Because the government does not enforce existing law, which mandates administrative reports to Congress, ACIJ, ADC, and Poder Ciudadano have made joint efforts to reinforce discussion and deliberation among federal agencies. Poder Ciudadano’s anti-corruption program, in collaboration with other NGOs and businesses, includes public hearings on the conditions needed by contracting authorities (Arcidiácono, Arenoso, and Rosenberg 2006).93 In addition, CIPPEC targets the lack of transparency in fiscal management and promotes public participation in budgeting. And NGOs like FARN continue to push for giving citizens access to public information about environmental issues.94 One push for transparency involves the federal government itself. ACIJ is collaborating with the Auditoria General de la Nación (AGN), part of the executive branch, in an effort to expose the congressional audit committees to public scrutiny. In 2007, ACIJ filed a successful lawsuit to obtain the minutes of the congressional committee responsible for reviewing public audits and used these records to highlight the government’s failure to require corrective actions and to provide information about ongoing investigations.95 The overall failure to reform freedom of information laws at the federal level, however, has led NGOs to shift their efforts to provinces and localities, tied together by the Argentine Budget Watchdog Program, with significant results.96 The small and largely volunteer Asociación Civil Democracia Representativa tested and studied the freedom of information law in Buenos Aires province and took on a case about radar at the Buenos Aires airport solicited by air traffic controllers, who alleged that the Ministry of Defense provided them with incomplete information.97 In 2000, Poder Ciudadano initiated a major transparency intervention in the municipality of Moron. At the request of the mayor, the NGO used public hearings about city contracts, which led to “integrity pacts” with contractors that included provisions against bribery. Sanctions include 10 percent of the value of a contract and five years of blacklisting. As a

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result, the average cost of city contracts declined 35 percent. Monitoring created a forum for bidders, the public, and external experts. Contracting now includes environmental concerns, such as recycling.

Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press Democratization NGOs in Argentina pay less attention to institutional guarantees of freedom of speech than to freedom of information. This is not surprising, since the Argentine government has generally respected freedom of speech since the end of the military regime.98 Freedom of speech is also, however, “seen as bourgeois” by some Peronists, according to Guillermo Correa. “We [Poder Ciudadano] are called right wing because we work on it.”99 This may be because Peronism’s authoritarian slant gets covered by its working-class veneer. Less than enthusiastic attitudes about freedom of speech may also be linked to Catholicism. In Tucumán, for example, Catholicism is taught in the state schools, and when Andrea Garcia Araóz of the Asamblea Permanente stood up against it, a high church official denounced her: “After that, people backed away from me.”100 Freedom of the press is more fragile than freedom of speech in Argentina. On the Reporters Without Borders Index, Argentina ranked only 55th of 175.101 Criticism of the government is possible, but often results in official accusations. Official publicity includes inaccuracies and is distorted by politicians, according to Roberto Saba.102 The ADC has repeatedly challenged such “indirect censorship” in court.

Conclusion The human-rights movement has fundamentally changed the face of Argentine politics and expanded its reach from the violators of the past to the protection of people in the present. Indeed, human-rights networks linking the national and provincial levels are stronger and more diverse than other policy advocacy networks among national NGOs. It is unclear, however, whether the positive pressures placed on courts by

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challenges on behalf of women, children, and indigenous peoples, as well as increased legal access for the poor, will be matched by reforms of judicial structures and performance. As in South Africa and Tajikistan, Argentine NGOs are reluctant to work with political parties. In Tajikistan it may be unrealistic to expect this, and although South African parties could benefit from enhanced skills, such as constituency building, it is unlikely that this would bring major changes to the party system. Democratization NGOs in Argentina, however, are among the few political actors outside the Peronist/ anti-Peronist straitjacket. By focusing on a multiparty approach to building constituencies, they could use their nonpartisan credentials to become advocates for democratic processes. They can also help the public participate in policy discussions and deliberations that transcend polarization. (See Chapter 10.) Still, as in South Africa and Tajikistan, democratization NGOs in Argentina help build a loyal opposition by strengthening civil society. One of the missing pieces of the puzzle in Argentina is a focus on reform of the legal environment for NGOs. However, the role of NGOs in strengthening the media is particularly noteworthy and Fundación Compromiso stands out as the most active NGO in any of the three countries strengthening the civil-society role of the business sector as well as other CSOs. Buenos Aires still dominates Argentine politics, even though provincial political bosses retain huge clout and the ability to corral federal resources. Despite the city’s economic, educational, and cultural dominance, however, democratization NGOs located in Buenos Aires have demonstrated a consistent understanding of the need to strengthen and even nurture their local and provincial counterparts. This is one of the most promising patterns of democratization in Argentina, since it is up to civil society at the local level to break the stranglehold of local political bosses. Indeed, national democratization NGOs appear to understand that, given the provincial power in Parliament, the key to reform at the national level lies with local and provincial reformers.

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Also promising is the recognition by many NGOs of the importance of building the capacity of state institutions. NGOs that strengthen the capacities of the state are, in effect, the “loyal” part of a loyal opposition. State capacity is somewhat higher in South Africa, and only a few NGOs focus on strengthening local governments. Such efforts may be impossible for the foreseeable future in Tajikistan. In Argentina, however, a few democratization NGOs, from Fundación Grupo Sophia and CIPPEC at the federal level to local NGOs that monitor the accountability and performance of city governments, are undertaking this challenge. The numerous NGOs that focus on freedom of information also push governments at all levels to improve their own performance. Loyal opposition, strengthening government accountability and promoting both bottomup and top-down legal reforms have a combined potential greater than the sum of the parts in Argentina. The question is when these activities will reach a critical mass and begin to fit into the larger democratization puzzle.

Endnotes 1

Maurino interview.

2

Tapia 2004.

3

Ionescu and de Madariaga 1972, 187.

4

Perechodnik interview.

5

Argentine partisanship is almost minutely fractured. According to a study done by PENT in 2006, there are 37 parties in Buenos Aires province alone and 514 in the country. Forty-one of these are considered national parties (Leiras 2006). 6

The coalition was hurt by accusations of bribery in the Senate.

7

Rizzotti and Mallea interview.

8

Lopez Murphy’s party is also loosely tied to Fundación Grupo Sophia. Reussi interview. The Fundación Civica Republicana is tied to the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the United States. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), established with the IRI in 1983 with US government funds through the NED, has no program in Argentina. 9

Compromiso was, until 2008, in a coalition called Propuesta Republicana (PRO) with the Partido Recrear para el Cambio, founded by Ricardo Lopez Murphy, along with FCR. As of 2010, after an internal party fight over whether to stay in the PRO

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alliance, Murphy left his own party and joined a new coalition called Acuerdo Civico y Social with Ricardo Alfonsín, son of the former president, Elisa Carrió and Julio Cobos (www.wikipedia). Murphy continues to head FCR, however. 10

Other socioeconomic policy research focuses on a wide range of topics, including dairy production in Argentina, studies on how to restructure the 23 hospitals in Buenos Aires to provide primary health care, and inequities within the management of soup kitchens. As Reussi asked in my interview, “Who decides what children in a neighborhood will eat?” 11

The June 2009 parliamentary elections in the province of Buenos Aires resulted in a plurality for the Union PRO, an alliance between Peronist dissidents and the PRO coalition, which by 2009 was led by Macri. 12

She is a member of Afirmacion para Una Republica Igualitaria (ARI), led by Elisa Carrió. Although Carrió came in second in the 2007 presidential elections, the ARI was weakened by a splinter group that organized another party called Solidaridad e Egualdad in 2008. 13

Rizzotti and Mallea interview.

14

Maurino interview.

15

Correa and Alonso interviews, 2006. Topics covered included party and campaign finance, information and publicity, dialogues with unions and civic organizations, and synergy between civil society and parties as a transmission belt for good internal practices, such as transparency. 16

Di Nucci interview. CIPPEC is, apparently, involved with Prolid, the Programa de Formación de Lideres Públicos para la Democracia, which trains and brings different party members together in dialogue, funded by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. 17

Salvucci interview. CADAL is connected to an international network of NGOs promoting “economic liberty” as well as political rights. It may be that such NGOs are less fearful of charges of partisanship in their affiliations with center-right parties. 18

Some NGOs, of course, have both a socioeconomic and a political agenda. SES, which trains young people in both vocational and leadership skills, is a good example. 21

See CIPPEC 2003 and www.ejerciciociudadano.org.ar.

22

The Fundación para una Democracia Participativa has been particularly important in Chubut, despite its small budget (CIPPEC 2003). Its website, however, has not been updated in several years (www.fundepa.com.ar). 23

www.nuevatierra.org.ar.

24

Roitter interview.

25

Di Nucci interview. She was the main author for the CIPPEC national directory of NGOs with political and policy interests (CIPPEC 2003). She traveled with a team all over the country to compile it. It includes hundreds of small volunteer organizations.

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26

Advocacy on social and economic issues by other types of NGOs can also be important, but is not covered here. See, however, Bombarolo (2003), who describes the impact of civil society, over the Internet, on a successful national tax reform that cut indirect taxes and tripled direct taxes. An intersectoral group in Misiones that included civil-society sponsored legislative hearings with Latin American experts on issues surrounding the production and commercialization of tobacco and Yerba Mate. 27

Several newspapers, including La Prensa, published a practical political guide for citizens in May 2008. 28

A meeting on management and environmental sustainability in June 2010 attracted over 200 business people and representatives of chambers of commerce (www. compromiso.org). 34

The Jornada has received support from the Peter Drucker Foundation.

35

www.compromiso.org.

36

Another NGO that focuses on CBOs is the Asociación Civil Centro Nueva Tierra (see p. 225), which has built an online CBO network. 37

GADIS served as the Argentine contributor for both the Johns Hopkins and the CIVICUS comparative studies on civil society and developed an index of citizen participation for the Inter-American Democracy Network. Until 1995, GADIS was tied to the Inter-American Foundation and was part of the civic-education program of the UNDP (CIPPEC 2003). CIVICUS’ study of civil society in 58 countries depended on national collaborators, such as GADIS. GADIS, in turn, worked through 60 local groups that each held six focus groups. Cecconi interview. 38

www.GADIS.org.ar.

39

Cecconi interview.

40

In 2009, GADIS was collaborating with a CBO in a poor urban barrio to train youth in online technology so they could then work with the entire neighborhood (www. GADIS.org.ar). 41

AGODI was organized in 1999, when the Universidad Hebrea Argentina, BAR-ILAN, went through a severe financial crisis affecting the graduates of it organizational leadership program. The program subsequently moved to the Universidad Nacional

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de San Martín. AGODI is linked to several Argentine universities, the Argentine Institute for Social Entrepreneurship, and the government’s National Center of Community Organizations (CENOC). Among it international partners are CIVICUS, the International Society for Third Sector Research, Independent Sector, and the Foundation Center (www.agodi.org.ar/bases/quiensomos.html). 42

Cecconi interview.

43

www.forodelsectorsocial.org.arg.

44

Cytrynblum interview.

45

Unpublished materials provided by Cytrynblum.

46

www.periodismosocial.org.

47

Cytrynblum interview.

48

Forum of Argentine Journalism.

49

FOPEA receives financial support from the Adenhauer Foundation.

50

Among the other NGOs are Poder Ciudadano, whose newsletter on democracy is sent to thousands of journalists, and Fundación Ciudad, which held a seminar on public journalism, jointly sponsored by ADEPA, Conciencia, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and a Córdoba newspaper called La Voz del Interior. Barcat and Ferrarazo interview. La Voz del Interior has a “civic journalism” program, and in 2005 a meeting on “alternative journalism” was held in Neuquén. Abdhala interview. 51

This project is supported by the Tinker Foundation. See Holloway 2008, Case Study 6. 55

www.CIPPEC.org.

56

CIPPEC 2003. Two other such efforts in Jujuy include the Instituto de Perfeccionamiento de la Administración Publica (IPAP), which works on IT quality, conflict resolution, strategic planning, and “logical goalposts” for state actors. IPAP is a partner of Doctors of the World, the Inter-American Foundation, and AVINA. Fundación El Otro collaborates with 10 city governments in Buenos Aires province on honest public purchasing, social responsibility, and effective dialogues with interest groups, such as consumers, NGOs, schools, workers, and businesses (www. redpuentes.org). 57

It has been estimated that 10 percent of the 30,000 disappearances during the Dirty War occurred in this tiny, densely populated province. Tucumán has 1.3 million people. 58

www.euronews.net/2011.

59

www.infolatam.com/2011; http://ijrcenter.org/2011.

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60

There have been a string of suicides of indicted former military officers, three in 2009. According to CELS, 176 suspects have died and 40 are fugitives. CELS’ total number of people suspected of state terrorism is 1,129 (www.realclearworld.com/ articles/2009/07/20). 61

Indigenous peoples represent 3-5 percent of the population and are “largely neglected by the government.” Seventy percent lack title to their lands, even though a few land disputes have been settled. Freedom House, 2009. 67

The women’s movement is also supported by the Argentine government and the Latin American Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM), which monitors women’s rights treaties. Its two NGO members are the Institute for Gender, Development and Law and the Lys Center for Human Development and Sexology (www.cladem.org). 68

Epstein interview. The national office of Amnesty International collaborated with NGOs in Tucumán in 2006 to do a five-month study of human-rights violations against women. Both in South Africa and in Argentina, local chapters seem to have moved beyond Amnesty’s injunction to concentrate on violations in other countries. The Supreme Court information is from newspaper accounts in Clarín, October 10, 2009. 69

Mujeres has also been successful in fundraising. Of 122 proposals funded by the grant program of the Inter-American Development Bank, 8 had gone to Mujeres en Igualdad as of the end of 2006. Altschul interview. Women are also important in democratization NGOs. Of the 34 Argentines interviewed for this book, 22 were women. 70

Abdhala interview. ANDHES wrote a Provisional Law on Children, which passed the provincial legislature and was then vetoed by the governor. 71

Garcia Araóz interview.

72

www.colectivoinfancia.org.ar.

73

www.serpaj.org.ar. Serpaj Argentina, the sponsor of the network, is part of an international NGO headed by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1980, that has six offices in Argentina, as well as offices in nine other Latin American countries. 74

Salemi, Lascano, and Vallve interview. The quote is from Ama Salemi.

75

www.cippec.org.

76 77

www.infocivica.org.ar.

ANDHES also has offices and similar programs in Jujuy and Santiago del Estero. Abdhala interview. Fortalecimiento Institucional (FORINS) in Jujuy trains students to run Consultorios Vecinales (“Neighborhood Clinics”) to settle disputes.

The constitutional reforms of 1994, which provided autonomy for the province of Buenos Aires, included local provisions for public participation, oversight, and freedom of information (Bowen and Rose-Ackerman 2003). 81

Piqué interview.

82

Correa interview, 2006.

83

Saba interview, December 1, 2006.

84

Supreme Court tenures have been short since the 1940s, when Perón impeached sitting justices, with what Roberto Saba called a “lasting impact.” Saba interview, December 1, 2006. 85

Saba interview, December 1, 2006. ADC’s extensive legal research is often based on the work of volunteer lawyers who work short-term for modest expense reimbursement. Saba interview, 2005. 86

The NGOs included were Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego, ANDHES in Jujuy and Tucumán, the Asociación Practica Alternativa del Derecho, Alternativa Popular in Rio Negro, and Convocatoria Neuquina in Neuquén. Among the other purposes of the course was strengthening the Consejo de la Magistratura. 88

See Elena and Chayer 2007. FORES’ role combined implementation and participatory evaluation. 89

Abdhala interview. Abdhala observed that the police were lobbying against this decision, but that the legislature, unable to ignore the courts, has backed it up. The opportunities for police reform are greater in Argentina than in Chile because the media is more diverse, the police are less unified, and the transition from dictatorship strengthened civilians at the expense of the police, even though the level of police violence may be higher than in Chile (Pion-Berlin 2005). In Santiago del Estero, for example, neighborhood CBOs focus on protesting police violence (CIPPEC 2003). 92

Di Nucci interview; Saba interview, December 1, 2006.

93

Open Budget ranks Argentina as 56 of a possible 100 (www.openbudgetindex. org).

The program costs approximately $100,000 per year and is supported by the Tinker Foundation and the Inter-American Development Network. It is run by CIPPEC (Holloway 2008). 97

Mariani interview.

98

Freedom House gives Argentina, like South Africa, a 2 rating on freedom of speech (www.freedomhouse.org). 99

Correa interview, 2005. He pointed out that at that time 11 NGOs were working on freedom of information. 100

Garcia Araóz interview.

101

www.rsf.org.

102

Saba interview, December 1, 2006.

C HA P T ER

10

p

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ARGENTINA II: Nurturing a Democratic Political Culture & Deepening Political Participation Democratizing Political Culture Introduction UNDERLYING ARGENTINA’S weak political institutions is a political culture distinguished by low trust and high government transaction costs.1 Argentines’ belief in the ideals of democracy, deeper than you would expect given their recent history, is undermined by a relative lack of confidence in the democratic institutions and practices of their nation. In 2007, only 14 percent of Argentines surveyed believed that they could trust other people, and only 14 percent trusted any political party.2 Less than half of Argentines (47 percent) have trust in the state’s capacity to solve problems and only 21 percent think their tax money is well spent.3 Even worse, Argentines tended to justify dishonest behaviors.4

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On the other hand, Argentines are highly tolerant. The World Values Survey gave Argentines a 0.5, where 0 equals complete tolerance and 5 is highly intolerant.5 They are civic-minded, with 64 percent believing that voting makes a difference, compared to only 54 percent of all Latin Americans.6 While 71 percent of Argentines believe that paying taxes is a requirement of citizenship, only half of Latin Americans as a whole hold this belief.7 Compared with all Latin Americans, Argentines have the highest level (46 percent) of knowledge about their constitution, and half the Argentine population defines democracy in terms of civil liberties (only 42 percent of all Latin Americans).8 Significant majorities of Argentines also believe that cultural liberty (85 percent), the freedom to choose one’s profession (65 percent), the freedom to participate politically (59 percent), freedom of expression (53 percent), and equality among men and women (60 percent) are guaranteed in Argentina. At the same time, however, they have little confidence in social security, aid to the poor, or environmental protection policies. They have little trust in the police. A major dilemma, therefore, is that “normative support for democracy in Argentina coincides with negative views about its functioning. Political institutions have consolidated a resilient political regime, but have not contributed to socioeconomic development” (Llamazares 2005). This may explain why support for democracy has declined among Argentines, from 74 percent in 2006 to 63 percent in 2007. At the same time, however, Argentines have little interest in undemocratic solutions. When asked whether democracy is the best form of government, despite its problems, 83 percent said yes.9 Another dilemma, exploited by Peronism, is that political protest and authoritarian patronage often function as two sides of the same coin, as in the case of protests orchestrated by punteros (street protesters) who also operate patronage networks (Auyero 2005; Jacobs and Mandonado 2005). As Peruzzotti (2004, 88) has observed, the followers of both Hipolito Irigoyen and Juan Domingo Perón have historically promoted a

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populist view of democracy, to the detriment of constitutional checks or accountability. Andrea Rizzotti of FLACSO said: Argentina is a very authoritarian political culture. . . . Our family structure is more like [old] Europe than America. We are a country that works on the cult of personality. De La Rua failed because he lacked charisma. Alfonsín, Menem, and Kirchner [on the other hand] are . . . strong figures.10

Rizzotti’s own family demonstrates the complexity of Argentina’s political culture and history: My parents were in prison during the dictatorship, but their brothers and sisters were linked to the dictatorship. . . . My paternal grandfather was an Italian fascist. He never told us about his past. My father’s sister was a close friend of the military government in Chaco [a northern province near Paraguay]. My mother was a Guarani [indigenous tribe] from Paraguay. My father was a left-wing Peronist. The left is very Peronist here.11

But Rizzotti also observed that family structure is changing. “We have more women than men in the universities. . . . People are discussing the rights of men during maternity. . . . The Argentine family has changed, blended families are more common.” Despite recent declines in support for democracy, Argentine political culture has changed dramatically since the end of the dictatorship. The human-rights movement introduced a “much needed concern for rights and constitutionalism” (Peruzzotti 2004, 88). It reunited democracy and the rule of law, by depending more on legal institutions than officeholders. The “leading actors” in this change were, according to Peruzzotti, the human-rights NGOs, other advocacy organizations, and social movements related to human-rights violations in the provinces. NGOs, such as Serpaj, have also maintained and advanced this process by preserving memories and creating documentation about the dictatorship.12

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Although the FREPASO coalition in the late 1990s did not succeed as an opposition, it helped nurture a democratic political culture (Torre 2005). The 2001 economic crisis turned out to be a milestone, in unexpected ways, in Argentine political history. According to Maria Reussi, it was a “major turning point because it showed that our governmental institutions were unable to function at the most basic level.”13 Not only was the middle class hurt economically, but much of the power of the largely Peronist unions was broken.14 People poured into the streets and began discussing the future of the country. The crisis was not, in other words, “an isolated or circumstantial event, or even the product of failed economic policies. Rather, it is the latest stage in the conflict between civil and political society over what constitutes representative government and can be traced back to the 1983 transition to democracy” (Peruzzotti 2005, 229). A related result of the economic crisis of 2001 is that NGOs talk not only about human rights, but, also very explicitly about changing the political culture. Fundación Ciudad, for example, describes its mission as “creating a different political culture in which the voice of the citizen is taken into account because of its richness, validity and originality on the problems of the city” (Fundación Ciudad 2006, 4).

Civic Education Although human-rights organizations contributed to the altered, if inconsistent, political culture that has emerged in recent years, other democratization NGOs focus more directly on training for citizenship. Conciencia designed school kits about democracy, which are widely distributed. Civitae, a chapter of CIVITAS International, promotes civic education in secondary schools related to security issues, such as drug prevention (CIPPEC 2003). Poder Ciudadano produces its own civiceducation materials and works on civic education with provincial NGOs like Asociación Acción Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego. Another Poder partnership with the University of Mar del Plata teaches students and other citizens about participatory democracy.

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As with public deliberation, civic education may be directed either to specific groups or to citizens in general. In Rosario, Ejercicio Ciudadano runs citizenship schools for leaders of CBOs, based on the idea that Argentina must move away from being a “low-intensity democracy” (Borri 2006). CELS, FLACSO, and the University of San Andres, on the other hand, codirect Iniciativa Popular, which focuses on all Argentine citizens and teaches them how to draft and propose laws to Parliament and to provincial legislatures. Financed by the Ford Foundation, it has the support of numerous other democratization NGOs (CIPPEC 2003). Civic education in Argentina also focuses on law-based civil liberties. CELS, for example, sponsors clinics for law students at the University of Buenos Aires. Among the subjects covered are refugees and immigrants, the battle against legal impunity for perpetrators from the period of the dictatorship, and the use of lawyers to promote a broader human-rights culture. CELS also sponsors human-rights workshops with CBOs in all of the provinces.15 Changing government institutions can begin to change public attitudes, although such efforts are often difficult and prolonged. “Civil rights are not only about law, but also about culture,” said Santiago Mariani of Democracia Representativa. We decided to increase our impact by combining litigation with other strategies. Other NGOs had worked for the freedom of information law [in Buenos Aires province]. But no one had used the law. A political scientist told us to develop a culture of using it. We made a request . . . but had no reply. Our second request got a vague response. Then the Lower Tribunal of Buenos Aires province said the information was not publishable. At the next level three judges ruled in our favor and the press got interested. It took two years of hard work. But having achieved this, we now work with the executive of Buenos Aires province, to educate them and to create access to information at all levels. We did a study about freedom of information with CIPPEC and we are working on making provincial legislation more transparent. We

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also wrote to the provincial deputies and asked them for their income declarations. In 2003, the first time we did this, only one-third replied. This year [2006], with new deputies, about two-thirds have replied.16

More straightforward, but equally long term in its impact on public attitudes, is ANDHES’ police work. With support from the British Embassy, ANDHES researchers found that existing provincial police training was obsolete and authoritarian. In response, they designed and implemented ongoing workshops for the Tucumán police about human rights and democratic values (ANDHES 2006).

Conflict Resolution Conflict resolution offers another approach to changing political culture; it may be direct, as with Cambio Democrático, or indirect, through education. Fundación Compromiso’s conflict resolution unit has spread to more than 200 schools and is centered on “opposition to the idea that democracy is based on groups who fight [each other] to achieve their goals.”17 Another NGO called Comunidad para el Desarrollo Humano lobbies for units on nonviolence in school curriculums. Almost 75 schools had developed or were developing this unit by 2009.18 The Centro de Producciones Radiofónicos has a subnetwork that produces radio programs on nonviolence relating to the rights of women and children, the abolition of hard labor as punishment, the “criminalization of poverty,” and the sustainability of democracy.19 At the provincial level the Permanent Council on Nonviolence in Salta promotes a culture of nonviolence in schools and other organizations. In Mendoza the Fundación Auge promotes multiculturalism in the schools and leads academic workshops on Judaism and multiculturalism. As with their other approaches to democratization, Poder Ciudadano leads the way by supporting provincial NGOs with their conflict-resolution courses. The course had 2,300 graduates in 2007, with parallel courses for city employees and others working on social issues in Rió Mayo, Sarmiento, Rió Senguer, and Chubut.20

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Corruption Just as crucial to changing Argentine political culture is the struggle against corruption. In 2007, Argentina ranked 105th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, along with Albania, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, and Egypt.21 Leaving aside its social and economic costs, corruption engenders negative public perceptions, thus fueling a continuing cycle of public mistrust on the one hand, and bureaucratic opacity on the other. Still, the perception of corruption is significantly higher for political parties and government, including the police, than for religious institutions or NGOs (GADIS 2006). This is partly because watchdog NGOs, such as CORREPI and the Comisión de Familiares de Victimas Indefensas de la Violencia Social (COFAVI), monitor the police and publicize violations (Peruzzotti 2005).22 Some criticize NGOs, however, for not doing enough to convince government that they can benefit from attacking corruption through contract reform.23 Partnering with Transparency International, Poder Ciudadano has taken the lead on corruption, although corruption is only one department at Poder Ciudadano and Transparency International’s financial contribution was only $3,000 in 2005. Nevertheless, Poder Ciudadano has managed to undertake research and publish both a book about the issue and an issue guide used in deliberative forums. In addition, their national petition on the issue of retirement fraud had a million signatures.24 Even more important is their outreach to other NGOs and businesses on governmental corruption. The former director of Poder Ciudadano, Carlos March, still on their board of directors, heads an anti-corruption network, called Reforma Politica, comprised of 23 NGOs, including CIPPEC and Conciencia.25 One of Poder Ciudadano’s strongest provincial partners, Ejercicio Ciudadano in Rosario, used 40 volunteers to initiate a freedom of information campaign. As of 2009, Ejercicio Ciudadano was collaborating with NGOs working on corruption in seven other provinces.26 Such collaboration across provinces has at least the potential to lighten the load of national democratization NGOs like Poder Ciudadano.

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Both Poder Ciudadano and Mujeres en Igualdad have undertaken policy research on corruption. Monique Altshul of Mujeres en Igualdad pointed out that, under Menem, the three women who held high office were corrupt. Mujeres en Igualdad uses workshops with women to ask how corruption affects women’s rights and to research the conditions under which women officeholders are not corrupt.27

Participation Democratization NGOs face significant challenges if they want to encourage political participation beyond voting in elections. Argentina has the highest Human Development Index in Latin America, yet placed nearly last in a study ranking popular participation. Argentina scored 53, compared to Chile’s 83 (Llamazares 2005). Despite grassroots organizing in certain sectors, volunteerism declined after the 2001 economic collapse and less than 9 percent of a sample of Argentines interviewed had participated in community action, even though 19 percent were members of community organizations (GADIS 2006).28 More recently, political participation—defined by “advocacy” to include unions and business organizations as well as NGOs focused on policy issues like equality, nonviolence, and human rights—engaged only 16.4 percent of the population, although individual political activism, such as demonstrating or signing a petition was almost double this figure (GADIS et al. 2011).

Elections National elections are generally fair and competitive in Argentina, and voter participation often exceeds 70 percent.29 National democratization NGOs, therefore, work mainly at the provincial level. Conciencia, for example, carries out voter education through its 27 local chapters, each of which distributes electoral pamphlets and sponsors radio and television programs, local meetings, and candidate forums. Poder Ciudadano collaborates with provincial democratization NGOs on transparent financing of parties and campaigns. GADIS collaborates with neighborhood groups in Buenos Aires province in reforming the provincial electoral law so that all kinds of groups will be able to participate.30

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At the national level, Democracia Representativa does research on electoral technologies and promotes electoral rights for marginalized people. Poder Ciudadano maintains an online database of national candidates and collaborates with the Fundación Creer y Crecer in registering young voters.31

Social Movements, Protests, and Democratization NGOs If political participation ranges from regime-organized mobilization to “self-motion” by citizens, then voting is somewhere in the middle.32 Social movements and protests are more difficult to classify, however, particularly in Argentina, where Peronista factions not affiliated with the government have mobilized thousands of people. In 2001, for example, Peronists organized the mass looting of supermarkets in Buenos Aires as a kind of political protest (Auyero 2005).33 While organized looting is difficult to classify as a form of democratic political participation, many other forms of grassroots mobilization, such as the human-rights movement, are clearly autonomous, with a strong democratic agenda. In Catamarca in 1990, dozens of “silent marches” followed the failure to convict the son of a provincial congressman for murder. The protests spurred the creation of the National Network against Impunity and Cover-up and the Nongovernmental Commission for Truth and Justice as watchdogs of police investigations and judicial proceedings. The commission’s activism gained media coverage and helped lead to a new trial and a conviction (CIPPEC 2003; GADIS 2004). In 2005, the mysterious disappearance of Julio Jorge Lopez after he testified against Buenos Aires police chief Miguel Osvaldo Etchecolatz led to massive and continuing protest marches. In September 2006, the government came out in support of the demonstrators. Massive protests on other political issues can have strong democratic agendas, too. In 1999 in Corrientes, demands by public employees for back wages escalated into protests against official nepotism and corruption. After six months, radio stations covered the action as if it were a soccer match (Auyero 2005). A wide political movement was initiated in

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Córdoba in 2002 after a meeting of 400 citizens at the National University in conjunction with the World Social Forum. This urban social movement, comprised of members of neighborhood assemblies, unions, and political organizations, called itself the Red Ciudadana Principio del Principio.34 Later that year the network organized to promote the impeachment of the mayor, Germán Kammerath. Despite collecting 113,000 signatures, they failed to achieve their objective. However, Kammerath did sign a public commitment to governmental transparency and freedom of information, witnessed by 11 different organizations from other provinces, organized into a Federal Network for Democracy.35 The most massive spontaneous protests, or cacerolazo (literally, “banging of casserole pans”), occurred in December 2001 in response to the economic collapse. The street demonstrations in Buenos Aires organized by community radio stations rapidly evolved into outdoor public dialogues (Peruzzotti 2005). Although the new groups set up soup kitchens and established commissions to deal with neighborhood issues, they proved burdensome to ordinary citizens and soon fragmented and degenerated into conflict, demonstrating the challenges inherent in direct democracy.

Democratization NGOs and CBOs Both national and local democratization NGOs focus on strengthening participation through CBOs, an important component of the larger civil society. GADIS, for example, provides training in strategic planning and community participation for the Argentines who run the estimated 2,500 community libraries throughout the country. Originally founded in the 19th century, community libraries are “training places for democracy,” according to Elida Cecconi of GADIS. Staffed by ordinary citizens, they are grouped into the Confederación Nacional de Apoya de Bibliotecas Populares.36 Conciencia also works with community libraries and other CBOs to help them deal with power, leadership, citizenship, rights and responsibilities, organization, organizational registration, communication, staffing,

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and conflict resolution. In addition to its 27 local offices, Conciencia has 40 working groups, 760 members, and 3,600 volunteers, many of them young people.37 Democratization NGOs that work through CBOs can achieve multiple objectives and scale up more easily. The ACIJ, for example, focuses on the legal rights of the disadvantaged, particularly immigrants, through a network of 20 strong CBOs in the Buenos Aires suburb of Moreno. ACIJ, like ODAC in South Africa, works on freedom of information as it pertains to socioeconomic rights. As Gustavo Maurino said of CBO members, “They may be illiterate, but they know their own interests.”38 In a separate initiative in Moreno, Poder Ciudadano trains CBOs to manage their own projects, such as nursery schools.39 Other national democratization NGOs like Fundación Grupo Sophia, which gets support from the business sector, use contacts with CBOs mainly as an adjunct to policy research. Even so, according to Carolina Stanley: We try to get to know CBOs . . . especially those that deal with children in the villas miserias, such as the local soup kitchens. Neighborhood soup kitchens are everywhere, and those who organize them are the most interesting people . . . but many are being politicized. We use them to improve our understanding of social policy.40

Grupo Sophia has published a guide to help neighborhoods with the preliminary requirements for municipal petitions. At the other end of the ideological spectrum on public policy, the Centro de Políticas Públicas para el Socialismo (CEPPAS) collaborates with the Centro de Produccion Radiofónicas in supporting community radio stations (CIPPEC 2003).41 FLACSO’s research on community participation, in contrast, tends to be nonpartisan and focuses on programs connecting CBOs, NGOs, and the state. One CBO organized its neighborhood around the problem of flooding, and with FLACSO’s help, was able to build ties to government agencies.42

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Collaboration with CBOs can also strengthen participation as a positive spin-off for NGOs that focus mainly on socioeconomic development. Cruzada Patagónica, for example, uses citizen participation to improve local schools.43 A national environmental NGO, Vida Silvestre (Wild Life), has regional offices in Misiones and Mar del Plata that work on water issues with CBOs representing fishermen.44 Another socioeconomic NGO that promotes participation is Fundación SES. In a strategic alliance with UNICEF, SES works with at-risk youth and adolescents in Buenos Aires and gets them to identify their own problems and priorities (SES 2006). According to Rodrigo Kon: Institutional violence is being directed against young people and [we support them in deciding] what to do about it. Some young people work with social movements and some are piqueteros (literally, “picketers or protestors”). We teach them how to monitor the press, and how to analyze data [before] they decide what to do. And then we help them write proposals.45

Provincial democratization NGOs, including those based at universities, are more likely to collaborate with CBOs than their national counterparts. The Department of Humanities at the University of Comahue sponsors the University of the Barrio, a neighborhood network to resolve daily problems in cooperation with neighborhood leaders, cooperatives, unions, schools, community libraries, and neighborhood centers. In La Rioja, the Fundación SER for Human Development started a school on community management for the poorest neighborhoods.46 However, some national NGOs focus on citizen participation at the national level. The Institute for the Development of Micro and Medium Enterprise (IDEMI) specializes in strengthening citizen control of multilateral finance organizations as they relate to public policy (CIPPEC 2003). Control Ciudadano del Medio Ambiente concentrates on reinforcing citizenship and participation in environmental legislation. It brings together environmental groups, neighborhood organizations, and citizen activists ( Jacobs and Maldonado 2005, 168).

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FARN, another environmental NGO, focuses on participation as well. “NGOs don’t have regular and widespread participatory connections, and the state’s capacity to respond is limited,” said Juan Martin Vezzulla.47 Although FARN has connections with 15 neighborhood associations and many other NGOs, its main methodology is to work on environmental problems pertaining to the metropolitan area that can serve as a model for the rest of the country. What is interesting is that this strategy depends on individual citizens helping to select the problem. “An individual calls us with a complaint about his neighbor, and all we do is give him the appropriate phone number,” Vezzulla explained: The middle case is where we help people gain access to public information and petition. But the environmental cases we choose [to work on], also based on complaints, are where people with reduced access to justice are suffering from an environmental problem affecting many people.

Sometimes this work dovetails with international support. Ashoka, a prominent international NGO, supports participation by identifying and supporting social entrepreneurs. Carmen Yolanda Llanquin, an Ashoka fellow, founded an NGO in Neuquén called Unmay, which uses debate and discussion among indigenous groups in 11 communities, as well as training in lobbying and business skills. Unmay blocked an unpopular urban project by convening the Mapuche Confederation, a network of indigenous peoples (Ashoka 2004).48 While Ashoka has successfully supported social entrepreneurs that are already active, international NGOs must tread carefully in the participatory arena. One Argentine observer of the NGO/CBO connection argues that other participatory experiences that result from outside stimulus (national or international) discredit citizen democracy (Bombarolo 2003). People get tired of being pushed, he writes, and complex methodologies are hard for local organizations to understand. Worse, CBOs often remain unconnected to each other, even when there is immense potential for cooperation, as evidenced by a recent experience in Salta, a northern province with a large indigenous pop-

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ulation. The Asociación de Comunidades Aborigenes Lhaka Honat, a network of 40 CBOs tied to CELS and democratization NGOs in Salta, helped unite local populations to complain to the International Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States about deforestation plans, to date not implemented.49 In addition, the network’s radio station, Radio Aborígen, collaborates with the University of Salta on both local democracy and economic-development issues.50

Public Deliberation Whether NGOs work with CBOs or individuals, the most widespread participatory process used in Argentina is public deliberation. At least seven national NGOs use public deliberation in their contacts with citizens and CBOs, and a number of provincial NGOs have embraced it.51 This is due in part to visits by a large contingent of Argentine NGO leaders to the Kettering Foundation, but it is also the result of deliberative workshops sponsored by the Inter-American Democracy Network (IADN) for other activists who do not speak English.52 Public deliberation has taken hold in Argentina, long after people complete their fellowships at the Kettering Foundation or attend meetings of the IADN. Fundación Ciudad has used public deliberation with marked success, sponsoring a series of community-based deliberative forums in two villas miserias along the river Riachuelo, which borders Buenos Aires. Mountains of rotting garbage had created a public health crisis along the bank of the Riachuelo, home to five million people (13.5 percent of the Argentine population).53 The neighboring Villa 21 and Villa 24 communities, not surprisingly, decided that garbage was their biggest problem. Eight successive deliberative forums on the issue were supplemented by informal conversations between the forum participants and their neighbors, with an estimated 700 people participating in the process. After the forums, the participants obtained funding from the Buenos Aires provincial government and technical help from Urbasur, the waste management company, which had previously been unable to even enter the settlement with their trucks.

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Although the provincial government helped clean up the backlog of garbage, the community’s longer-term solution was to hire 17 teenagers to become “guardians of the Riachuelo” and collect garbage daily.54 The “Guardianes” started their work in the fall of 2006 in six neighborhoods after nine months of training provided by Urbasur. Urbasur provided bags, gloves, and clothing, with pay of 400-600 pesos per month for part-time work, with recycling profits returned to the community. By the time of the author’s visit in December 2006, the project was serving 1,000 families, and the political leadership in 14 other upstream communities had requested meetings with Fundación Ciudad to initiate the same program. According to an article in La Nacion, “Villa 21 and 24 have some of the cleanest streets in Buenos Aires.” Once the streets were clean, the environment ministry of the province of Buenos Aires removed 12 tons of old trash along the riverbank in one day.55 By 2007, the Guardianes had begun collecting garbage on vacant land as well and organized a recycling cooperative. By 2008, the residents were collecting 200 tons of garbage per month and had received visits, attention, and support from the Inter-American Development Bank and the US embassy.56 Fundación Ciudad also has published and used elaborate issue books in deliberative forums on other urban problems. One of these concerned the issues surrounding the Tres de Febrero (Third of February) park in Buenos Aires (Fundación Ciudad 2006). Initial forums were based on personal invitation, followed by publicity and public deliberations. The program included training for moderators and community leaders and a heavily visited website providing for virtual forums. Another forum about the Northern Riverfront led to a neighborhood network to monitor government action on their recommendations. Among the other NGOs using public deliberation is Fundación Compromiso. Executive director Mariana Lomé describes deliberative democracy as “a political system in which public policies are decided from the citizenry who support agreements achieved through consensus” and

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describes schools as part of civil society.57 Compromiso has a project called Encuentro Escuelas (“Schools Meeting”) in 220 schools in 23 provinces. Financed by several international foundations, Encuentro concentrates on social responsibility and community engagement and includes parents, children, other community members, and neighborhood organizations. Each school has a team of 20 people who use a manual designed for deliberative evaluation of education by communities. A third democratization NGO, Cambio Democrático, has developed its own deliberative process over many years. Because participatory dialogue is costly in terms of time and money, this organization works with groups ahead of time, helping them to identify common interests (Tapia 2004). Cambio Democrático includes both community representatives and those who know the subject matter. As part of its process, Cambio Democrático combines public deliberation with community mediation tools, including a form of Sustained Dialogue. One of its most notable projects was in Iguazu, in the remote northeastern province of Misiones, where 700 poor families had invaded an environmentally vulnerable area. Cambio Democrático, allied with the church-supported Asociación Misionera de Mediación and the National Park Administration, conducted 60 interviews and helped train stakeholders to clarify interests and negotiate with each other. Then participants focused on the financial and human resources needed to support horticulture, ecotourism, and environmental education projects developed by the participants. Ultimately, the people occupying the land agreed to help preserve soil, trees, and water, while the municipality agreed to suspend evictions and appoint a legal assessor for past complaints. Since then, the poor families who occupied the area have gained their rights to the land.58 In San Pedro, Misiones, Cambio Democrático mediated another conflict between poor residents and environmentalists over the endangered Araucaria trees. When environmental groups refused to participate because previous negotiations with the timber industry had not been transparent, organizers asked them whether they really wanted the trees

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to have no voice. After private negotiations and four public sessions, the group agreed to cut down only dead or dying trees, to limit the use of the wood to public construction and to plant four new trees for each old one cut down (Tapia 2004).59 Cambio Democrático also developed a diagnostic tool to measure the quality of democracy in municipalities throughout Argentina as part of the Citizen Monitor Project, jointly sponsored by UNDP and the Argentine government. The public knowledge gained through deliberative forums was used to design a collaborative planning process and action plan carried out by an informal network of local organizations. Poder Ciudadano used naming, framing, and deliberating as a way of addressing corruption in a number of local communities. Laura Alonso, former director of Poder Ciudadano, contrasted the successful use of deliberative methodology to obtain public input into policies for combating corruption with the “death of political discussion and debate” in the Parliament.60 Ciudadano’s training for political parties (see pp. 223-224) was based on deliberative workshops with each of the eight parties. Designed to achieve common ground on increasing citizen participation within the party system, the results, according to PC staff, were less successful than the deliberative citizen forums. Poder Ciudadano, Cambio Democrático, and Conciencia all have collaborated with GADIS to use participatory dialogue and deliberation in urban neighborhoods.61 Even in largely middle-class neighborhoods, youth and the elderly often are excluded from decision making, even when they are at the center of serious social problems, such as poverty and crime. Public deliberation offers a way to include them, since it depends on a diverse selection process. Neighborhood leaders frequently contact GADIS because of highly controversial issues, such as high-rise development. GADIS has convened stakeholder dialogues, one of which, on governmental decentralization, was sponsored by UNDP and included other multilateral organizations, the Catholic Church, Jewish and Muslim organizations, 50 NGOs, neighborhood networks, and individuals.62 ANDHES in Tucumán is one of several provincial organizations using deliberative dialogue. ANDHES’ goal is to “build a human-rights culture

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in public policies and also for the people themselves.”63 FORINS in Jujuy sponsors both participatory forums and transparent public hearings. In Córdoba, the Fundación Mediterranea, funded by 34 local businesses, focuses on “improving debate on public policies,” and El Agora, tied to UN-Habitat, provides space for conflict resolution (CIPPEC 2003).64 Although many provincial NGOs have received training through the IADN, not all possess the contacts and the resources to use public deliberation as a ongoing participatory tool.65 In 2005, 36 people from democratization NGOs who had studied deliberative politics at the Kettering Foundation met in Buenos Aires. Even with their common interest in deliberative democracy, they had never before met as a group (Arauz, Barcat, and Ferrarazzo 2005). Despite initial enthusiasm during the meetings, staff members of Conciencia, ADC, Cambio Democrático, Poder Ciudadano, and Fundación Ciudad were reluctant to commit themselves to maintaining an interactive network, because of competition for scarce funding, varied donor requirements, and uncertainty about the reactions of their boards of directors.66 Yet even in the absence of a deliberative democracy network, the NGOs that attended continue to use the process, and other organizations use dialogue aimed at specific groups. The Fundación SES sponsors Mesas Comunitarias as spaces for discussion among youth in the Paraguay and Amanecer neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, allowing them to interact with government agencies, other neighborhood groups and health centers (Fundación SES 2006). An organization called Reforma Política uses a monthly panel to discuss democracy itself at a more elite level, among the staff of democratization NGOs. Its panels, including social scientists, journalists, and representatives of the sector under discussion, are followed by deliberative dialogue, with results published online. Topics include everything from political party transparency to strengthening the judiciary. Periodismo Social helps develop linkages between public deliberation and journalists. According to Alicia Cytrynblum, Periodismo Social seeks to “optimize the social dialogue” by working with NGOs to improve the quality of information. ”We only want space for the public and every-

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one wants to participate,” she said. “What unfortunately happens now is that groups start with peaceful interests and the media leaves them aside, and they become more violent and then they are covered.”67

Participatory Engagement with Government In another of its initiatives, Periodismo Social plays an active role in linking local participation and public policy. As of 2009, Periodismo Social had signed agreements with two seaports, Mar del Plata and Mar del Tuyú, to conduct workshops to strengthen civil society’s engagement with government and local government responsiveness.68 Periodismo Social is not unusual, either in its focus on participatory advocacy, or in its focus on local participation. In Córdoba, the Red Ciudadana Principio del Principio developed a participatory budget process with the city government, through its member neighborhood organizations.69 In Mendoza many NGOs work with government and have high visibility and experience in participatory development, even though ties among them remain weak (CIPPEC 2003). The most remarkable example of participatory advocacy at the provincial level is in Tierra del Fuego, at the southern tip of South America, where a deliberative council, supported by Participación Ciudadana, trains citizens in advocacy. Led by Ashoka fellow Guillermo Worman, Participación Ciudadana sponsors Citizens Debate and Information Commissions that draft municipal laws for citizen input and approval through deliberative forums, a weekly radio program and the “dialogue table” in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego’s capital city (Ashoka 2004). As of 2009, it had been able to modify 82 percent of municipal ordinances and had held 81 public hearings.70 Thanks to these efforts, Ushuaia boasts an impressive range of laws and ordinances that enhance citizen participation, including free access to information, initiative and recall provisions, the incorporation of neighborhoods into the electoral board of the municipality, and a participatory budget, tied to the forums and radio program (Ashoka 2004; CIPPEC 2003; GADIS 2004).71 Ushuaia’s NGOs have high prestige and an active

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local network called Foro de Ciudadanos para la Democracia. They also collaborate with NGOs in Rió Grande province, as well as with national NGOs like CELS, Poder Ciudadano, and ADC.72 NGO advocacy at the federal level tends to focus on human rights and legal reforms, as described in Chapter 9, rather than participatory advocacy, which is usually carried out through ties with provincial democratization NGOs. In Rosario, for example, Poder Ciudadano collaborates with Ejercicio Ciudadano, whose volunteers observe city council meetings and report publicly on what they see. Other elements of Ciudadano’s focus on local government include a collaboration with local NGOs on participatory budgeting with city governments, and an online Bank of Good Practices that includes participatory and government monitoring tools.73 Building on a 2001 seminar with IDASA visitors from South Africa, Poder Ciudadano held 51 neighborhood budget forums in Buenos Aires attracting 14,000 people, designed to integrate neighborhood planning into the city budget. By 2004, about one-tenth of the neighborhoods’ priorities had been implemented. As a result of their work with neighborhoods in Neuquén, 300 of 1,700 neighborhood proposals have been adopted (Poder Ciudadano, n.d.). Ciudadano sponsored a successful project in Morón, a city of 35,000 in Buenos Aires province, where it guided public hearings on garbage collection for four years. This initiative led to regulation, quality standards, and savings of millions of pesos. Among the participants in the hearings were representatives of neighborhood CBOs and union members. Based on establishing common rules and objective criteria for bidding, bidders agreed not to bribe or collude, to commit to full disclosure, and to report violations. The mayor and other public officials made similar commitments and agreed to impose heavy sanctions against official or bidder violations, including 10 percent of the contract value and blacklisting for 5 years. By 2006, the Morón coalition included FARN and CIPPEC, as well as Poder Ciudadano and the university. The project ultimately reduced the average cost of contracts by 35 percent.74

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Box 10. The Government Role in Participation Despite the widespread perception of governmental incapacity, the Argentine government sponsors the national CBO network

CENOC. As part of the Consejo Nacional de Coordinacion de

Políticas Sociales, it is directly under the presidency and provides information on government contracts and registration facilities

for community organizations. It also collaborates on legislation

regarding CSOs of all types. As of 2007, CENOC was providing 19 small subsidies for “thematic networks” that reached over 500

CBOs.75 In 2004-2005, CENOC worked with the Foro del Sector Social, an NGO network, on a national volunteerism survey and guide to 98 civil-society networks.76

The National Program for Educational Solidarity of the Ministry of Education is the largest government effort promoting local

participation. Schools are provided with prize money for community involvement. By the end of 2006, 8,000 schools in more

than 2,300 localities were part of the network. Among the projects funded were libraries, windmills, and primary health clinics.77

Conclusion There have been two dramatic democratic advances in Argentina since 1982. First, the fall of the dictatorship led to increased awareness of human rights, even though prosecution of the perpetrators only began in 2008. The second advance in democratic awareness and practice, described by many of those interviewed, followed the economic collapse in 2001, because, as several NGO leaders observed, they had nowhere to go politically but up.

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Although Argentina and South Africa are almost identical in Freedom House’s democracy scores, the Argentine government has less legitimacy, if not always less competence, than the South African government. It is not surprising that only a few NGOs, such as Fundación Grupo Sophia, focus on the capacity of the federal government, a task less urgent in South Africa and less possible in Tajikistan. A second problem, unique to Argentina, is the political distortion caused by the Peronist legacy in grassroots and partisan organizing. As in South Africa, one political movement dominates, yet in Argentina’s case it is both more factionalized than the ANC and less competent. Democratization NGOs could make a major contribution to democracy by strengthening political parties through nonpartisan workshops. Argentina’s recent history of dictatorship and violence weighs people down with pessimism, while South Africans remain proud and optimistic about what they have overcome, despite recent setbacks. On the other hand, democratization NGOs in Argentina can count on a better-educated population than South Africa, and a more open political climate than Tajikistan. As in South Africa and Tajikistan, democratization NGOs have strengthened civil society as a potential loyal opposition. Since 1982, democratization NGOs have made serious progress on civil liberties, legal reform, and participatory processes, particularly public deliberation. Given the traditional dominance of Buenos Aires, national networks that include provincial NGOs, especially those led by Poder Ciudadano, are noteworthy. Collaborations with provincial democratization NGOs also have a positive impact on provincial and local governance. The key to the future of the democratization movement in both Argentina and South Africa is to find ways to share what is being learned by democratization NGOs within each country, without incurring the opportunity costs of networking. Guillermo Worman, the head of Participación Ciudadana in Ushuaia, summarized the challenges faced by democratization NGOs in Argentina:

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It is possible to continue working to become more democratic even in democracy itself so that each group or population constructs the forms it recognizes as its own. . . . Surely a participatory culture will be slower and more expensive than when a small group decides for the great majority . . . but a sustainable democracy based on consensus and participation among citizens has better possibilities for . . . inequalities to continue to decline (Worman 2003, 17). Endnotes 1

Piqué interview.

2

The comparable average figures for Latin America were 17 percent and 20 percent.

3

www.latinobarometro.org.

4

www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Saba interview, December 20, 2006.

5

www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

6

www.latinobarometro.org.

7

www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

8

www.latinobarometro.org.

9

www.latinobarometro.org.

10

One study (Stevens, Bishin, and Barr 2006) found that among six Latin American countries, Argentina was second only to Colombia in level of elite authoritarianism. 11

Rizzotti and Mallea interview.

12

www.serpaj-ar.com.ar.

13

Reussi interview.

14

Rizzotti and Mallea interview.

15

Mona interview.

16

Mariani interview.

17

Lomé interview.

18

www.lacomunidad.org.ar.

19

www.ceppas.org/cpr.

20

www.poderciudadano.org.

21

By this measure, Denmark ranked first, along with Finland and New Zealand. Myanmar and Somalia ranked 179th (www.transparency.org).

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22

CORREPI, Coordinadora Contra La Represion Policial e Institucional (National Coordinator against Police and Institutional Repression), was a human-rights NGO focused on police repression. Because the website is outdated, it is difficult to find out whether it is still active. COFAVI (Commission of Families of Defenseless Victims) was founded by the mothers and fathers of the disappeared. As a small membership organization it collaborates with CELS, CEJIL, and international organizations, such as Amnesty International. 23

Professor Felipe Sanz, Poder Ciudadano panel on corruption, November 28, 2006. Sanz also emphasized the linkage between corruption and the lack of freedom of information. 24

Correa interview, 2006.

25

www.reforma-politica.com.ar.

26

www.ejerciciociudadano.org.ar.

27

Altschul interview.

28

An earlier study from 2001 found that only 3-5 percent of Argentines participated in politics and 1-3 percent in environmental, community, and youth groups, compared to 20 percent in religious groups and 8 percent in sports organizations (Adrogue and Armesto 2001). 29

Voter turnout figures can be found at www.idea.int/countryProfile.

30

Cecconi interview. At the international level, the Observatorio Electoral Latinoamericano, based in Buenos Aires, monitors the reform of election law and has organized an international network of election experts (CIPPEC 2003). 31

In Santiago del Estero in 1993 protesters looted private homes, but ignored those owned by local Peronist leaders. 34

First of the First Citizen Network.

35

The network was comprised of ANDHES in Tucumán, FORINS in Jujuy, Ciudadana Activa in La Pampa, Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego, Foro Ecologista in Parana, Entre Rios, and Nueva Generación Argentina Fundación in Rosario, Favim and Grupo Agora in Mendoza, and the Geos Fundación in Córdoba. The Córdoba group is also a member of the Mercociudades Network of the International Development Research Center, based in Canada. 36

The Ford Foundation, the Inter-American Development Bank, CIVICUS, and the Secretariat of Culture of the Argentine government fund the project. Cecconi interview. 37

Perechodnik interview. Fabian Perechodnik described how the Model United Nations has been used to recruit 500,000 students as volunteers for many organizations, including Conciencia. An estimated 45,000 youth volunteers were active at the time of the interview.

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38

ACIJ’s legal work is based on collaboration with CELS. Maurino observed that most of the CBOs are not libraries, since they are less common in urban than rural areas. Maurino interview. 39

Correa interview, 2005.

40

Stanley interview. The comment about politicization is interesting, since Fundación Grupo Sophia has ties with the center-right Fundación Creer y Crecer. 41

www.ceppas.org/cpr.

42

Rizotti and Mallea interview.

43

Massey interview.

44

Di Nucci interview.

45

Kon interview.

46

www.wiseearth.org.

47

Vezzulla interview.

48

Other former Ashoka fellows, such as Guillermo Worman and Roberto Saba, had already founded democratization NGOs—Participación Ciudadana and ADC (Ashoka 2004; Ashoka 2009). Some Ashoka fellows work directly with local CBOs or create new ones. Marcelo Caldano, for example, has created participatory cooperatives, small industries, and a new community currency based on volunteer labor that can be deposited in a community bank in Córdoba (Ashoka 2004). Dario Witt teaches people about domestic violence through soup kitchens and schools (Ashoka 2009). 49 www.escr-net.org/caselaw. Llaka Honat means “our land.” In 2010, the Supreme Court of Argentina overturned the decision of a Salta court that had not reversed an illegal provincial government takeover of indigenous lands in 1991 (http:// resumendefallos.blogspot.com/2010-/10). 50

Salta has a higher level of CSOs per inhabitant than the average for the Northwest region or the country, based mostly on the number of CBOs (GADIS 2004). 51

These are Poder Ciudadano, ADC, Fundación Ciudad, Fundación Cambio Democrático, Conciencia, GADIS, and FLACSO. A number of other provincial NGOS have been trained in deliberation by Conciencia and Poder Ciudadano (London 1994; London 1997; Ceconni interview; Rizzotti and Mallea interview). 52

The IADN was founded by Partners of the Americas, with financial support from USAID. 53

An Inter-American Development Bank project initiated in 1995 along the Riachuelo cost 30 million pesos; however, 57 percent of the money paid for studies. Conversation with Beatriz Barcat. 54

Site visit by the author with Beatriz Barcat of Fundación Ciudad, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2006. 55 Buenos Aires Herald, December 6, 2006, p. 2. This is the English language newspaper in Buenos Aires.

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56

www.fundacionciudad.org.ar.

57

Lomé interview.

58

www.cambiodemocrático.org; www.partnersglobal.org.

59

www.partnersglobal.org.

60

Alonso interview. In 2009, Poder Ciudadano named a new director, Herman Charosky. 61

Conciencia used public deliberation in its civic-education programs for many years, although the website indicates it is less active than it used to be (London 2004; www. conciencia.org). GADIS’ Mesa de Diálogo operated in three provinces at the time of the Cecconi interview, with three municipalities in each engaging in dialogues on local issues. The results are presented to local legislatures. 62

FLACSO uses deliberation in its community research. According to Andrea Rizzotti, “Public deliberation is good for working with CBOs and NGOs.” Rizzotti and Mallea interview. 63

Abdhala interview.

64

www.elagora.org.ar.

65

The Kettering Foundation programs are conducted in English, which is less commonly spoken in provincial than in national NGOs. 66

After Beatriz Barcat completed her term as an international fellow at the Kettering Foundation, the author, then a program officer, collaborated with her in organizing the meeting. 67

Cytrynblum interview.

68

www.infocivica.org.ar.

69

Another example is CEDES, which has a partnership with the city government of Buenos Aires to develop participatory budgeting. 70

http://pergaminovirtual.com.ar.

71

These were initiated by Participación Ciudadana and another democratization NGO, Fundación Finisterrae. The translation is literally “End of the World Foundation,” but obviously does not mean what it would in English. 72

Guillermo Correa of Poder Ciudadano spent five months as an international fellow at the Kettering Foundation writing an issue book on Argentine democracy that included many of these practices. See Correa 2006. 74

Surprisingly, the project was implemented by only one Podor Cuidadano staff member, Christian Gruenberg. Gruenberg was named an Ashoka fellow in 1999. As of 2009, he worked for CIPPEC. 75

The subsidies ranged from 10,000 to 15,000 pesos, or about $2,000-$3,000 each.

76 77

www.CENOC.gov.ar.

Nieves Tapia interview. More than half of the schools were at the elementary level.

C HA P T ER

11

p

CONCLUSIONS

SOUTH AFRICA, TAJIKISTAN, AND ARGENTINA are not among the poorest countries in the world.1 However, all three suffer from the political ailments that Collier (2007) in The Bottom Billion links to poverty. In Argentina and Tajikistan, this is embedded in a political culture that rewards politicians, not for policies that advance socioeconomic development, but with patronage and bribes. Despite a more positive post-apartheid political culture, South Africa also suffers from corruption. Tajikistan’s democratic journey remains the longest and most arduous of the three countries. South Africa has emerged from apartheid with stronger democratic institutions than would have been expected, yet AIDS and poverty threaten democratic gains. And Argentina’s democratic future is hostage to both provincial strongmen and a political mind-set inherited from Peronism. This chapter highlights how democratization NGOs relate to their political context and then focuses on their innovations, making policy recommendations that could be implemented through strategic networking with each other, within and even between these countries. Wherever they operate, democratization NGOs must play the contextual hand they are dealt; this includes the state, civil society as a whole, and the larger economic and political context that includes both the state and civil society.

CONCLUSIONS | 277

The State The fate of democratization ultimately depends on the state, on civil society, and on the relationship between them. Tajik NGOs must work within or around a weak but repressive state by focusing on issues that do not directly challenge it. This may weaken their impact on democratization, but still lead to some positive results. South Africa has a powerful state—in part the legacy of the apartheid regime’s desperate attempts in the early 1980s to focus on confronting socioeconomic inequality as a substitute for major political reform.2 However, South African NGOs that focus on freedom of information or the rights of immigrants challenge and sometimes improve the way that the government works. IDASA and other NGOs, acting as a loyal opposition, have also had a significant impact on parliamentary budgets and social policy. In Argentina, democratization NGOs have had a huge impact over time on human rights and, more recently, a significant impact on local and provincial government accountability, particularly in Tierra del Fuego and with the easily accessible provincial government of Buenos Aires. Fundación Grupo Sophia works directly to improve the capacities of the state at the federal level. In all three countries, NGOs are focusing on the accountability and capacity of local governments as well as the national legal system, through human-rights enforcement and the tougher battle of promoting legislation that will enhance the environment for civil society. The strength of the South African legal system allows democratization NGOs to focus on issues like criminal justice, human rights, and tribal law reform. Democratization NGOs in Argentina confront a legal system that is unpredictable and sometimes corrupt, but still responsive to pressures from civil society initiatives. Legal advocacy depends not only on national NGOs, but also on a community radio network and democratization NGOs outside of Buenos Aires. Tajik NGOs like the Judicial Consortium, Jahon, and the League of Women Lawyers, have also been able to challenge legal constraints on civil society, police brutality, and abuses against women and children, but face enormous obstacles in reforming a corrupt, repressive legal system.

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Although democratization NGOs in South Africa have the advantage of a reasonably competent state and a functional legal system, socioeconomic challenges get in the way of continuing political progress. Only by expanding creative, autonomous relationships with each other, with socioeconomic NGOs, and with CBOs can democratization NGOs forge powerful but autonomous relationships with the state to address the problems of poverty, education, and AIDS. Democratization NGOs in Tajikistan have had surprising, if limited, success, demonstrating that political advocacy is possible even under an authoritarian state. Their success is in danger, however, given the uneven character of international support. International support needs to address not only the challenges confronting democratization NGOs, but also the rapid declines in education and social services that could unravel political reforms. Democratization NGOs in Argentina have forged creative partnerships that challenge and improve provincial and local governance. Although some NGOs focus on national governance, democratization NGOs as a group need to create strategic national networks that address the Peronist/anti-Peronist dilemma through multiparty workshops and lobbying against the control of parliamentary expenditures by local party bosses.

Civil Society South African civil society grew out of the anti-apartheid movement and is autonomous, strong, and influential, with some ties to CBOs. Within the ANC coalition, COSATU sometimes acts like an opposition party. The media is strong, diverse, and independent, with community radio offering a promising link to the rest of civil society. Coalitions that include CSOs, development NGOs, and democratization NGOs are not uncommon, but most are short-lived. On the other hand, because poverty and inequality are front and center in public debate, discussions about democratic process can be distorted. Whites often exhibit only lukewarm support for democracy

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and other groups describe it instrumentally, mainly in relation to poverty. Democratization NGOs, with the exception of community radio and IDASA’s work with the press, are less centered on enhancing the sphere of public debate than their Argentine counterparts. Despite some strong corporate responsibility programs, connections between South African businesses and the rest of civil society are not strong. Because civil society is big, but not necessarily united, democratization NGOs face a daunting but crucial challenge in spearheading the promotion of a stronger democracy. This challenge is further complicated by the relatively weak role of women within civil society. Civil society in Tajikistan barely extends beyond the world of NGOs and CBOs except for a sometimes independent, but fragile, press. Thus the task of corralling civil society into the democracy arena is easier, but less significant than in South Africa. Most NGOs are autonomous, but at times speak ill of each other. Many suffer from managerial inexperience and a lack of funding. Although the Helsinki accords and OSCE have strengthened Tajik civil society, international financial support has declined since 2000. Still, the Soviet legacy includes educated women as well as authoritarian (mostly male) political leaders. The democratization NGOs interviewed, in contrast, have the highest percentage of female leadership in the three countries. The tradition of deliberative talk, reinforced by the Sustained Dialogue that ended the civil war, has given Tajik civil society another small but important asset. The round tables sponsored by PCDP provide civil society with access to, if not influence over, the government. In Argentina, civil society grew after the defeat of the military dictatorship and again after the 2001 economic collapse. The press is independent and strong, public opinion is more positive about civil society than about politicians, and many NGOs use public deliberation to support a public voice. Ties between NGOs and business are growing, a development fostered by Fundación Compromiso. CBOs, some of which were founded in the 19th century, persist. Grassroots activism has declined since 2001, but is more independent of Peronism than in the

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past. The national dialogue over human rights continues, with civil society taking an increasingly critical stance towards the clientelism that still dominates Argentine political culture. Democratization NGOs display different profiles within civil society, depending on the country. In South Africa, IDASA played a major role during the Transition and continues to play a dominant role in democratization, by, for example, training the staff of community radio stations or reporting on the parliamentary budget process. Its DNA—the focus on robust citizenship—has influenced many other democratization NGOs at both the national and local levels. A major challenge for democratization NGOs is the growing tendency for donors to support programs covering all the countries in the southern African region, leaving less support for South Africa. Tajikistan’s democratization NGOs make up the most important element in what is a poorly developed civil society. These NGOs have won significant gains in national advocacy campaigns focused on human trafficking and the death penalty. Despite a dictatorial context and inconsistent funding, they undertake long-term educational efforts and provide educated women with unique opportunities. Jahon, for example, has built ties between women’s crisis centers and the local police. Democratization NGOs in Argentina also play a prominent role in the national democratic dialogue. They struggle financially, but manage to obtain a good deal of international support. A few national NGOs, such as Poder Ciudadano and ADC, have overcome the traditional dominance of Buenos Aires and have built strong ties with democratization NGOs in the provinces. At least six NGOs use public deliberation at the grassroots level. Democratization NGOs, such as ADC and CELS, have achieved major legal victories, opening up the hearings on Supreme Court justices and pushing the government into the implementation of international human-rights law. What is strikingly similar in the three countries is the prominence of democratization NGOs within civil society. And yet democratization NGOs in all three have unique comparative advantages that their

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colleagues in the other two countries and democratization NGOs elsewhere could import.3 IDASA has vast experience in becoming part of the national dialogue. It also knows how to spread its message to other NGOs though its focus on robust citizenship. Tajik NGOs, such as PCDP, have pioneered the use of socioeconomic issues to engage people in participatory democracy. Democratization NGOs in Argentina have demonstrated the importance of public deliberation at the local level. Like IDASA, they have forged horizontal networks with intermediary democratization NGOs at the provincial and local levels. Democratization NGOs in all three countries have made creative use of the wider civil society to strengthen the potential for a loyal opposition.

The Wider Political Context Democratization NGOs also have to influence the wider political system, which includes—but is not limited to—government, opposition, civil society, and political culture. Are there feedback relationships between democratization NGOs and larger political processes that can, in turn, strengthen these organizations? An essential key for unlocking this feedback relationship in all three countries will be stronger advocacy on the enabling environment for civil society, still weak in South Africa and Argentina despite the strength of their democratization NGOs, and worse in Tajikistan. However, even in Tajikistan, where democratization NGOs are still very weak, the NGO coalition victory against human trafficking unquestionably pushed the government to become more accountable for the problem and thus strengthened possibilities for future NGO advocacy. More recently, the Judicial Consortium has aggressively promoted associational rights through the courts. Previous chapters have shown how democratization NGOs impact the wider polity or political context through promoting law-based civil liberties, strengthening or helping to create a loyal opposition, promoting political participation, and nurturing a democratic political culture. In Tajikistan, where democratization NGOs often lack even modest funding, organizations such as PCDP have been able to build on deliberative

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traditions. In South Africa, ODAC has strengthened freedom of information while IDASA and other NGOs, acting as a loyal opposition, have had a significant impact on parliamentary budgets and social policy. In Argentina, democratization NGOs have had a huge impact over time on human rights and a significant impact on local and provincial government accountability.

Loyal Opposition In Argentina and South Africa, democratization NGOs have used various means to help build a loyal opposition. In Tajikistan, this is much harder. In all three countries, however, democratization NGOs mostly avoid working with political parties, the most obvious basis of a loyal opposition. Indeed, political parties seem to be the orphans of the democratization movement. The complex challenges of building a loyal opposition are difficult, even in a democratic political context.4 Democratically elected regimes often have little interest in supporting a potential opposition. And, in any case, the concept of loyal opposition is not generally understood. It is remarkable, therefore, how important democratization NGOs have become in building a loyal opposition even while avoiding opposition parties. Despite some differences, the four patterns of strengthening a loyal opposition in the three countries are similar. These are: 1) becoming part of or playing the role of a loyal opposition; 2) strengthening civil society’s role as a loyal opposition; 3) strengthening themselves— and, less often, other democratization NGOs—to become advocates for democratization; and 4) (the least common) strengthening political parties. Evidence on loyal opposition leads to 11 specific findings, loosely based on these four approaches. • Loyal opposition depends on a functioning government, or at least parts of government, such as the South African executive.5 When NGOs work to strengthen the state and offer their own expertise, rather than

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acting as subcontractors for government programs, they can strengthen the state. However, except for Fundación Grupo Sophia in Argentina and IDASA in South Africa, this is not a typical activity of democratization NGOs. Democratization NGOs should find ways to strengthen the policy capacity of local and national governments. • Advocacy on socioeconomic issues provides democratization NGOs with more autonomy and policy influence than they have on political issues. In Tajikistan this is their most realistic role, but even in Argentina and South Africa they fill a socioeconomic policy void only partially occupied by small opposition parties. Still missing from most advocacy campaigns, however, are consistent efforts to include CBOs. Because advocacy coalitions on socioeconomic issues seem to face less government opposition than those focused on democracy, democratization NGOs that join them should do more to educate their socioeconomic network partners (NGOs) about democracy and to enlist CBOs in their efforts. • Efforts to strengthen civil society provide NGOs with opportunities for strengthening loyal opposition. Fundación Ciudad in Argentina uses public deliberation to build ties with development NGOs and CBOs. Although both the business sector and the independent media are weak in Tajikistan, greater NGO attention could help them contribute to an autonomous political dialogue. • Democratization NGOs should make more self-conscious and consistent efforts to engage the business sector, the independent media, and CBOs. Fundación Compromiso has the strongest program in the three countries for strengthening corporate management, corporate social responsibility, and tying businesses into the rest of civil society. Democratization NGOs in South Africa have only begun to utilize the potential contributions of businesses to contribute to a stronger civil society and a loyal opposition. By reaching out to the South African business sector, democratization NGOs could gain political allies as well as financial support.

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• While democratization NGOs focused on journalism are rare, they have a strong potential for strengthening loyal opposition in civil society. Periodismo Social in Argentina has strong media ties linked to local participation, and FOPEA provides online education on ethics and investigative journalism. Exchange programs among democratization NGOs could build on innovations focused on journalism, particularly “public journalism.” Second, democratization NGOs could provide support to businesses and media organizations, some of which could pay for training and support. • Civil-society advocacy campaigns become more powerful once they include CBOs. The TAC campaign against HIV/AIDs policy in South Africa is the most obvious example. Among the many other examples, however, are the work of the GGLN in South Africa and partnerships of national and local NGOs in Argentina that use CBOs and ordinary citizens to lobby local governments. Democratization NGOs in all three countries could seek increased international funding for strengthening their support of CBOs as part of civil-society advocacy. • Strengthening management in the entire civil society may be the most powerful way of contributing to a loyal opposition. In Argentina, Fundación Compromiso’s workshops strengthen NGO management and provide them with ties to for-profit corporations. EISA may be the only NGO in the three countries that provides support for democratizing the internal elections of other NGOs and labor unions. Strategic exchanges of management training and advice among NGOs could broaden and strengthen organizational capacity throughout civil society. • Support for individual rights does not usually translate into stronger associational rights. Despite promising efforts to strengthen associational rights in Tajikistan, and the reemergence of the issue in South Africa, few democratization NGOs are focused on associational rights. Democratization NGOs should increase their focus on nonprofit law and an enabling environment for civil society, including local philanthropy—this could attract international support.

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• Given their own budgetary challenges, democratization NGOs are unlikely to have the resources needed to strengthen their colleagues. Local philanthropic support for democracy has some potential in South Africa and Argentina but has barely been tapped. NGOs need, or assume they need, government support but must stay autonomous to maintain their legitimacy. Although most Tajik organizations are beholden to occasional government contracts or the vagaries of international funding, two organizations—the Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan and Civilization—have become partially self-supporting democracy advocates. Democratization NGOs may have to seek outside financial support to undertake extensive management training. • Umbrella organizations are costly in time and money and networks of democratization NGOs are difficult to maintain. Neither umbrella organizations nor the ad hoc model of collaboration allow democratization NGOs to harness new synergies and learn from each other’s successes and failures. An ongoing network, activated when needed, could be based on an online map of democratization NGOs in each country. This could help NGOs that concentrate on one small piece of the democratization puzzle to see the larger picture, including the participatory work of socioeconomic NGOs and CBOs.6 • Vertical/horizontal partnerships between national and local democratization NGOs have been effective because they specialize in participation and local government accountability. Local democratization NGOs also seem to be able to learn from each other when they have the support of a national democratization NGO. More vertical partnerships that encourage action-based research on democratization are needed, including participatory decision making and administrative transparency at the local level. National democratization NGOs in other countries should build stronger ties with their local counterparts and encourage them to build ties with each other. • Democratization NGOs can be effective advocates for democratic political process without being partisan. What happened in Misiones in

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2006 shows that Argentine political parties could enlarge their constituencies and alliances, in collaboration with NGOs. Tajik parties, on the other hand, are small and weak and it is probably premature to assume that NGOs could help strengthen them without additional help. Nonpartisan training of political parties that includes constituency building should become more widespread with support from EISA in South Africa, Poder Ciudadano in Argentina, and PCDP in Tajikistan.

Law-Based Civil Liberties “Without pressure from other powerful actors in society, elites have little or no incentive to build legal systems that serve the poor.” —Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros7

The Argentine human-rights movement, having finally secured prosecutions against violators tied to the military regime, has begun to focus on current violations. Argentine lawyers have been able to use the ratification of the International Women’s Rights Treaty in Argentine courts. Ties between national and local human-rights organizations have been strengthened by an online children’s rights network of 25 NGOs. The expanded Argentine human-rights movement has in some ways eclipsed democratization NGOs that focus on larger legal reforms, in part because it was born and survived under the most repressive possible conditions. Despite the opening up of Supreme Court hearings to public scrutiny, the successful use of international law, and recent signs of collaboration among provincial NGOs on judicial selection challenges, the reform of legal processes remains a daunting task. Given the lack of progress on freedom of information at the federal level, NGOs have shifted much of the focus to the cities and provinces. Local budget watchdog groups reinforce this trend and provide national democratization NGOs with allies in small, manageable arenas. Freedom of speech is not a major concern of democratization NGOs for an encouraging reason— Argentines already enjoy a considerable amount of it. A more worrisome

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reason for the neglect of this topic is that some NGO leaders influenced by Peronism view freedom of speech as “bourgeois.” Thanks to the efforts of the women who lead many NGOs in Tajikistan, democratization NGOs there have achieved two important victories—the passage and enforcement of the statute against international sex trafficking and the ban on capital punishment. It is fitting that women who benefited from the educational opportunities and professional equality provided when Tajikistan was part of the Soviet Union now often lead the charge against the USSR’s authoritarian heritage. Less successful are attempts to reform the legal system, although recent efforts by AIJ and Jahon offer some promise. Shafqat, a Kulob NGO, focuses on legal representation for refugees. Perhaps most promising, the Judicial Consortium increasingly challenges the government in court regarding the need to establish a rule of law for both NGOs and businesses. In South Africa, a government program to provide legal representation for the poor has expanded the reach of the legal system. This has freed up NGOs to focus on legal system reforms addressing the needs of specific groups, such as farm workers, refugees, and prisoners, who are still left out of the legal system.8 As in Argentina, children’s rights organizations have an online network. On the other hand, NGO work on the rights of refugees has been dwarfed by the growing refugee crisis, and women’s organizations remain weak in South Africa. Although some media outlets cooperate with democratization NGOs on civil liberties, socioeconomic rights generally receive more attention. ODAC is unique in that it uses a political right—freedom of information—to call attention to inadequate governmental response to socioeconomic disparities. Evidence from these three countries leads to five specific findings and recommendations about law-based civil liberties: • It is easier to expand than to reform a legal system. Expansion of the legal system to all South Africans has proven easier than changing the way the legal system in Argentina functions. Human-rights advocacy

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and implementation in Argentina needs to continue to reform, not just human-rights law, but also the justice sector. • Focusing on legal reforms at the local level is easier than trying to reform the national level. Poder Ciudadano and ADC, for example, have strong supporting partnerships with local democratization NGOs. Legal reforms are difficult, so democratization NGOs should focus first on easier local tasks and build from there. • Human-rights advocacy is possible in autocratic political systems. NGO protests against the trafficking of women and Jahon’s work on retraining local police are examples. A corollary finding is that considering women’s rights as part of human rights provides additional opportunities for challenging authoritarian systems. AIJ and the Judicial Consortium in Tajikistan have even challenged the legal system itself, with some success. Also worth remembering is that human-rights advocacy began under a military dictatorship in Argentina. Demonstrations like those carried out by the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, escrache, and individual protests are possible, even in the worst political environments. Because such efforts can be dangerous, and the potential benefits of success so great, democratization NGOs should agressively seek international partners for such efforts. Their political support is at least as important as their financial backing. • Democratization NGOs can use international law successfully. Both CELS and ADC in Argentina have been able to do this. Democratization NGOs should seek the support of international legal associations to implement this approach. • Linking socioeconomic and political rights works in many contexts, including dictatorial ones. The Judicial Consortium in Tajikistan focuses on associational rights, and includes socioeconomic NGOs and businesses in this effort. ODAC in South Africa targets government information about social services to strengthen political transparency. Democratization NGOs should: 1) link anti-corruption campaigns to socioeconomic development and 2) build strategic ties with development NGOs.

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Importing Democracy This analysis underlines the similarity of democratization NGOs in three very different countries, where democracy activists are remarkably similar to each other. Many of them have already demonstrated considerable political courage and are acutely conscious of their role in promoting democracy (Fisher 1998, 15). Their central task is to meld indigenous democratic traditions with democratic ideas imported from the past or from somewhere else in the present. A recent challenge to developed country ethnocentrism (and the idea that direct democracy is not practical) is the innovative use of participatory budgeting and deliberative citizenship in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which has spread to Argentina (Spencer 2005). Democratic ideas, in other words, can be imported from anywhere. South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina could all import creative ideas from each other. The GGLN supports the development of local participatory tools that can spread to other communities and other countries. The strategies of PCDP might be particularly useful in South Africa, since participants learn about political processes through socioeconomic development. Fundación Ciudad’s use of public deliberation to enlist outside support and transform a poor urban community provides another innovative socioeconomic approach that could be used in any local community. Although democratization NGOs are relatively new, the mix of indigenous democratic traditions and imported ideas is not. In South Africa, for example, tribal systems already had some elements of grassroots democracy. The Dutch arrived too soon to experience the Enlightenment, but English settlers wove a few strands of imported democracy into the South African tapestry. Apartheid combined an exclusive democracy for whites with repression. Exclusive democracy dramatized the need for inclusive democracy and repression highlighted the need for civil liberties. International support for the anti-apartheid struggle reinforced democratic beliefs and continues to support democratization NGOs.

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The Soviet system had two powerful impacts on Tajik activists. On the one hand it educated everyone, including women. On the other hand, it taught them by negative example what was wrong with authoritarianism and opened their minds to imported Western democratic ideas. A few democratization NGOs are combining this awareness with resurrecting Tajikistan’s indigenous deliberative traditions. Other NGOs, such as Jahon and the Judicial Consortium, have “imported” Western concepts of human rights and an independent legal system. Although Argentine activists could point to their own historical struggles against dictatorship, they are less likely than either the South Africans or the Tajiks to build on their own traditions. Indeed, they understand “imported” democratic values not only as an alternative to their dictatorial past but also as a way of escaping the sterile debates over Peronism that still afflict Argentine politics. With the rise of the global human-rights movement and worldwide advances in democracy and technology, the flow of imported ideas has increased. Indeed, as Ann Florini (2000, 237) observed, transnational civil society may be creating not world government, but rather “a common culture with broadly shared values.” The worldwide growth of civil society also has diversified and broadened the base of the “exporters” of democratic ideas, beyond developed countries (Fisher 1998; see also Appendix III). Among the most challenging but important words representing the “newer” imported democratic ideas are accountability, loyal opposition, and, less commonly, trade-off, used in public deliberation. (See Box 4 p. 95.) These terms are not easily translatable into Spanish or Russian, but Argentine and Tajik democracy activists understand them just as well as English-speaking activists in South Africa do. In all three countries the leaders of democratization NGOs react enthusiastically to the concepts, while emphasizing the difficulties of introducing them into the political culture of their countries. Importing ideas rather than systems provides local activists with more freedom—to blend these ideas with local democratic traditions and to create their own national democratic identities.

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There are remarkable parallels between this generation of democracy activists and the leaders of the Enlightenment. In 18th-century Europe, population growth, increased literacy, and the rise of the middle class led to the creation of what Habermas (1989) calls the “public sphere,” where sociability and business were transacted in new “spaces” like the coffeehouses of 18th-century London.9 Some educated members of the nobility such as Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu wanted to create societies where members of this public sphere would participate in political life. While the idea of a trade-off in 18th-century political discussion may have been visible only in the notion of checks and balances, and the idea of a loyal opposition developed later in England, the French Revolution was fueled by the notion that “the people” (and not just the privileged orders) had the right to be part of politics. Enlightenment ideas have remained powerful, not only because they helped ignite the French and American revolutions, but also because they provided the ideological underpinnings for democratization as a long-term process. Enlightenment values, such as freedom and a belief in progress, depended on ever-larger numbers of people entering into political life. In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries democratic theory in the developed countries had to break with its own internal contradictions as slaves were liberated and women gained the right to vote. Simultaneously, however, as in Latin America, Enlightenment values continued to serve as window dressing for competing oligarchies. Despite this long, tangled history, developed nations’ expectations for democracy in the rest of the world often veer between naive optimism and “realistic” pessimism.10 Both descriptions depend on defining democracy as a kind of instant electoral remedy for political pathologies. Our interviews suggest instead that building democracy is a piecemeal operation, like putting together a complex, vast jigsaw puzzle. Putting the pieces into place requires everyone’s participation—from school children to village women to large NGOs and governmental institutions. Democracy, in other words, is about much more than elections.

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In this long journey, South Africa and Argentina are ahead of Tajikistan in many ways, but the Tajik interviews demonstrate that the process can start even under one-man rule. Tajik NGOs are weak, but so too is the capacity of the Tajik state to repress. The influence of civil society, including deliberative talk as well as NGOs, may be stronger than some outsiders assume. A lengthy democratization process may also offer possibilities for a deeper democracy, with more secure gains. In 2009, Guinea threw off a despotic ruler and has been attempting to quickly establish a democratic regime. It is unlikely, however, that such instant democracy will endure. Democratization is not only a long-term process; it is also intricate and complex, and sometimes requires a broader perspective that is difficult to achieve. It is understandable, therefore, that NGOs do not always coordinate or match the pieces of the democratization puzzle. Despite the value of networking, its costs in time and money are often too high for most NGOs. However difficult, strategic networking between development NGOs and democratization NGOs would be extremely valuable, particularly if it enhanced the NGO/CBO connections essential to citizen participation. Development NGOs often have stronger connections with CBOs and a deep commitment to socioeconomic rights, whereas democratization NGOs are more conscious of a broader democratic agenda. The next chapter will explore how international actors could support a process that would allow NGOs to learn from each other.

Participation It is not a coincidence that PCDP emerged from the Sustained Dialogue, a rare example of international support for something already there—deliberative tradition. Tajik democratization NGOs, especially those led by women, sometimes display surprisingly creative ties to CBOs, perhaps because Tajiks as a whole are reasonably well educated. Nevertheless, these ties are inadequate to the need for mass-scale participation, in a country where elections are often rigged and campaign

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activity is weak.11 Although Tajik NGOs have also played an active role in election monitoring, their impact on a political system dominated by an authoritarian single party has been modest. Electoral participation in South Africa is strong and has become stronger as a result of the work of EISA. However, partisan activism remains weak in relation to social activism in South Africa and only a few NGOs support it. IDASA is the giant among democratization NGOs, with a strong focus on nonelectoral participation. Its outreach extends to many other local and national NGOs, largely through the GGLN. Inspired by the common mission, even the smaller members produce participatory assessment tools used throughout the network that focus on work with CBOs. A major participatory challenge for democratization NGOs in South Africa is the relatively weak role of women in civil society. A second challenge is the inadequate number of strong ties between democratization NGOs and CBOs. Although the spread of both mass movements and community radio stations offer untapped potential, South Africa lacks a mass-based society, including horizontal networks at the community level.12 Argentine NGO activists pay less attention to electoral participation than their counterparts in Tajikistan or South Africa, because turnouts are high and elections reasonably honest. Democratization NGOs, such as Conciencia, Poder Ciudadano, and GADIS, as well as many socioeconomic NGOs, such as SES, work through community libraries, soup kitchens, and other CBOs. Some participatory social movements, particularly those related to human rights, are no longer extensions of Peronist patronage. Still, as in Tajikistan and South Africa, the effort seems monumentally inadequate, despite increased ties to local democratization NGOs. Evidence leads to six specific findings about participation, with policy implications: • NGO activists challenge socioeconomic injustice, but generally belong to the educated elite and are sometimes viewed with suspicion. This makes

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their role in promoting popular participation and their ties to CBOs all the more important. In Tajikistan, PCDP promotes deliberative participation through economic development, an approach that helps bridge class differences.13 This may be particularly important where income disparities are great, as in South Africa, as well as in authoritarian contexts like Tajikistan where, as we have seen, focusing on socioeconomic rights is more acceptable to the government. Democratization NGOs should explore innovative partnerships with development NGOs and CBOs to promote participatory economic and social development. • By placing politics first, Fundación Ciudad achieved stronger socioeconomic results than other NGOs that use local participation as an addon to development projects. Fundación Ciudad’s successful use of public deliberation in a community literally drowning in garbage is particularly noteworthy. Argentina also has at least seven democratization NGOs that use public deliberation. Democratization NGOs should explore public deliberation as a powerful participatory strategy. • Public journalism can also support participation, including public deliberation in communities. An example is Periodismo Social’s work in Mar del Plata and Mar del Tuyú. Other democratization NGOs could integrate participation into programs to strengthen the media as part of civil society.14 • Local democratization NGOs often have stronger ties to CBOs than their national counterparts in the three countries. Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego, for example, has used these ties very successfully to get people to participate in lobbying local government. Local democratization NGOs should be brought into national and international networks that explore innovative approaches to participation. • Local democratic traditions can survive, be resurrected and broaden their membership, to women, for example. PCDP in Tajikistan has used mahallas and other traditional organizations for Sustained Dialogue and public deliberation. And in Argentina, Fundación Ciudad uses the community libraries established in the 19th century for deliberative

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forums. Using traditional democratic organizations and practices should be a research topic explored among national and international networks of democratization NGOs. • As with legal rights, NGOs and CBOs can successfully challenge authoritarian political bosses at the local level through participatory strategies. Among the examples are the civil-society coalition in Misiones, Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego, and the GGLN in South Africa. The lessons learned about participation need to be communicated to far more democratization NGOs. A related finding, that local democratization NGOs in South Africa and Argentina seem to be particularly adept at creating participatory tools, could form the basis of this strategy.

Political Culture The most difficult, long-range challenge of democratization, changing political culture, is also the most powerful way of sustaining the democratic momentum that began in the late 20th century. Although “path dependence” in politics is often tied to political culture, political culture may, paradoxically, be less confined to the path than political institutions. Indeed, because culture underlies all of the other changes described in this book, it has the potential to become, through deliberate efforts, the leading edge of democratization.15 In all three countries, democratization activists tend to focus on corruption and violence, arguably the two most powerful cultural mechanisms for maintaining politics-as-usual. Sometimes political culture becomes more democratic as a result of catastrophes, such as the Argentine military dictatorship. More often, however, change is the result of self-conscious efforts to alter political institutions and practices. All of the other efforts described above have some connection to the creation of a democratic political culture. An honest, fair legal system increases public trust and can serve as the basis for civic education. Developing the concept and the practice of a loyal opposition promotes accountability and challenges top-down rule.

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Successful participatory experience challenges political cynicism. And in all three countries there are people working with schools and other community organizations to influence political attitudes more directly, particularly among future citizens.16 Despite the dramatic changes in Argentina since the collapse of the military regime, the one word still appropriate to Argentine political culture is cynicism. Argentines are politically tolerant, well informed, and generally supportive of democracy. They remain, however, cynical and pessimistic about political dishonesty and corruption. Targeted, specific, linked changes, described below, could address this. Although more optimistic about politics than Argentines, South Africans are impatient for results. Indeed, the one word that could characterize South African political culture is frustration. Democratization NGOs in South Africa struggle to convey the idea that democracy is not simply a synonym for socioeconomic results. Paradoxically, they can do this only by producing socioeconomic results. Apprehension characterizes the political culture of Tajikistan. Although Tajikistan has more freedom than neighboring Central Asian countries, leaders of democratization NGOs are sometimes afraid of angering the government. This is compounded by the weak financial position of most NGOs. It is encouraging that Tajik NGOs have created the Tajikistan National NGO Association, but changing Tajikistan’s political culture will require increased international support tied to strategic networking from within.

Corruption and Violence In response to a question posed by Transparency International in 2004, 33 respondents from different countries said that if they could remove corruption from a single institution, it would be political parties (Transparency International 2004, 13). This may be one reason why democratization NGOs in all three countries avoid working with them. In the absence of increased international support, democratization NGOs in Tajikistan are unlikely to have much impact on corruption. In

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contrast, some Tajik NGOs are leaders in promoting various types of peaceful conflict resolution, based on the country’s deliberative traditions and the strong impact of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. At the local level, conflict resolution often deals with violence against refugees and women. In South Africa, anti-corruption efforts are not often sustained, but an impressive group of organizations promoting nonviolence grew out of the anti-apartheid struggle. In the sea of violence still common in South Africa, a number of organizations have made significant efforts to create changes in political behavior and values.17 In Argentina, democratization NGOs have been able in some cases to push local governments towards accountability and transparency. Campaigns against political violence may not always be visible but are often tied to the human-rights movement. The Centro de Producciones Radiofónicos, for example, uses radio to link nonviolence with the rights of women, children, and prisoners. Other NGOs, such as Fundación Compromiso, use conflict resolution as part of their civic-education outreach to large numbers of schools. Poder Ciudadano uses its ties to local NGOs to promote a national course on conflict resolution that reaches more than 2,000 local government and NGO leaders per year. Evidence from the 3 countries leads to 10 specific findings about political culture, with policy implications: • Democratic political culture is strengthened by an honest legal system, as in South Africa. South Africans are highly aware of their legal rights, not only because of their recent history but also because university law schools have taken the lead in civic education about the law. Legal education, however, is not always linked to civic education. Legal education should be integrated with education about democracy. In South Africa and elsewhere, ties should be strengthened between NGOs based in law schools and other democratization NGOs. • Political culture is malleable, even though deliberate change is a longterm challenge, as in Argentina. A marketplace of ideas and stories could challenge Argentine cynicism, and, in such an educated country, speed

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up the democratization of political culture. Among the assets of democratization NGOs are the human-rights movement, the widespread use of public deliberation, the legal networks created by ADC, and strong national-provincial linkages. Democratization NGOs should tell positive political stories to the nation. • Continued progress in creating a democratic political culture requires more strategic networking among democratization NGOs. Argentina has a larger number of strong democratization NGOs than Tajikistan or even, arguably, South Africa, where IDASA is dominant. However, in South Africa and Tajikistan, democratization NGOs would also benefit from online networking and maps of who is doing what on democratization. • The lack of socioeconomic progress increases a political culture of frustration, as in South Africa. Many people equate democracy with socioeconomic progress. Democratization NGOs in South Africa and elsewhere should demonstrate the power of democratic processes for achieving socioeconomic results. Democratization NGOs should strengthen ties with each other, socioeconomic NGOs, community radio stations, and CBOs. • Fear of the state is a huge barrier to changes in political culture in Tajikistan and many other countries. However, democratization NGOs are beginning to strengthen civil society as a loyal opposition, even in Tajikistan. Engaging international NGOs as go-betweens with the government through the Tajikistan National NGO Association is another tactic to confront this fear that is beginning to work. Democratization NGOs should enlist their international partners to support democratizing political culture. • Cynicism about all political institutions represents a difficult challenge everywhere, but particularly in Argentina. Civic education should engage students directly in current reforms, such as freedom of information campaigns.

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• Corruption is tied to the lack of policymaking capacity in government. Fundación Grupo Sophia in Argentina uses policy training through joint policy teams to “crowd out” corruption in the federal government; this could be applied elsewhere. • As with other democratization efforts, changing political culture at the local level seems to be easier than at the national level. As of 2009, Poder Ciudadano in Argentina was working with seven provincial NGOs on corruption. And PSAM in the Eastern Cape could have much to teach other democratization NGOs about tackling local government corruption. Exchanges between local democratization NGOs on corruption could strengthen such efforts and could be supported by national democratization NGOs. • The culture of violence is being confronted, but, as with other democratic changes, mainly at the local level. Fundación Compromiso in Argentina and CSVR in South Africa use ties with CBOs to deal with community conflicts. The Project for Conflict Resolution and Development in Port Elizabeth builds the capacities of other CSOs and schools in conflict resolution. Nonviolence and conflict resolution could be linked more strategically to violence at the national level through the use of community radio, which could report on local conflictresolution strategies. • The work of ODAC on freedom of information has had more durability than the national anti-corruption networks in South Africa or national anti-corruption campaigns in Argentina.18 National democratization NGOs should focus anti-corruption efforts in support of freedom of information law and enforcement. • Some Tajik NGOs have expertise gained during and after the civil war. Sustained Dialogue provides a guide, if not a blueprint, for changing the culture of violence and conflict in other countries. Tajiks with Sustained Dialogue experience could be used in Tajikistan and other countries with the support of IISD.

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Two of these recommendations could have multiple impacts. Political change is less difficult at the local than at the national level, regardless of whether the focus is legal reform, networking with other democratization NGOs, strengthening ties to CBOs, or challenging local authorities. Strategic networking among democratization NGOs, the primary recommendation here, needs to focus on both vertical and horizontal connections between national and local organizations. The second recommendation is to focus on the connections between democratization and socioeconomic development, advancing a wide range of human rights, while strengthening the role of civil society as a loyal opposition. Socioeconomic development can be a democratization strategy that strengthens both goals.

Endnotes 1

Tajikistan, like the poorest countries, is landlocked, with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan as troublesome neighbors. South Africa has one of the highest gini-coefficients of income inequality in the world. 2

Meyer interview.

3

See Appendix II.

4

The development of a loyal opposition may not always be the most difficult goal of democratization. Zambia, according to James Scarritt, has made progress in developing a two-party system. Unlike Tajikistan, where there is “more freedom than democracy,” Zambia and a number of other African countries have better Freedom House scores on political process than on civil liberties. Zambia falls between South Africa and Argentina, on the one hand, and Tajikistan, on the other, with a Freedom House score of 3 on political process and 4 on civil liberties. 5

Discussions of civil society sometimes downplay the importance of the state. In addition, as White (2004, 7) observed, “The idea [of civil society] became embroiled in a demonology of the state, functioning often as an idealized counter-image.” 6

Some networks facilitate organizational entrepreneurship more than others, and therefore make “successful coalition building and advocacy more likely,” according to Anheier (2011, 62-63). Among these successful patterns are weak ties at the periphery of the network that allow entrepreneurs to mobilize two networks without integrating them or entrepreneurs within two networks to connect with each other. 7

See Haugen and Boutros 2010, 54.

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8

NGOs, such as Black Sash, continue, as of 2010, to provide legal advice to the rural poor, according to Yvettte Geyer of IDASA. 9

During this period, male literacy increased, even in Russia. Discussion with Ed Melton, March 2009. 10

For a discussion of “realistic” pessimism, see Sen 2003. For further evidence of democratic traditions, see Fisher and Marin 2006, a book of case studies on the organic practices of public deliberation in six countries. The case studies include Albania, Cameroon, New Zealand, Romania, and Russia. 11

As of 2004, the International Women’s Democracy Center was training women to run for office in Tajikistan, but there is little current information on their website. 12

Coleman interview.

13

Imomov interview.

14

This is called “public journalism” in many of the studies published by the Kettering Foundation. 15

I am indebted to James Scarritt, a political scientist who specializes on Zambia, for these insights. Conversation, April 16, 2010. 16

Civic education, particularly in Tajikistan, may be short term (often one day). However, a Tajik NGO, called Sudmand, focuses on training civic trainers, who develop their own training modules. Unfortunately, other examples, including IFES’ summer camp for youth, have lost funding. 17

Yvette Geyer e-mail.

18

As of 2010, it had not updated its website for two years.

C HA P T ER

12

p

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS “Doctors and potato farmers know it’s possible to accelerate indigenous development by providing opportunities for people from different places to learn from one another. If it works for them, there is no reason it shouldn’t work for building democracies.” —David Mathews 1995

“Survey the United States’ long history of democracy promotion successes and failures, and the inescapable lesson, even setting aside recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that less is usually more. Providing aid—as the United States did to the opposition in [some] places . . . or simply setting an example are better means of toppling a dictator than actually doing the toppling.” —Graeme Robertson 20111

DEBATE OVER PROMOTING DEMOCRACY ABROAD is polarized in the United States, particularly in the wake of the war in Iraq. While Republicans may be right that democratic states are less likely to fail or go to war with each other, Democrats are certainly right that democracy cannot be exported militarily.2 As Tom Malinowski wrote about President Barack Obama’s speech to a mostly Egyptian audience in Cairo in June 2009, “I don’t think he was aware that the audience both despised George

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W. Bush [for his military intervention] and [had] desperately wanted Bush’s help in their [democratic] cause.”3 The Arab Spring of 2011 highlighted an important truth—people can build their own democracies. Democratization has accelerated in recent years, whether through coups, mass movements, top-down reforms, or democratization NGOs. The remaining question is whether the peaceful “export” of democratic practices can help that process along. The word export is itself problematic, because it implies that we (in the developed world) can transfer to another nation democratic practices, such as elections, if not an entire democratic system, as we understand it. The premise of this book is that democratic ideas and practices can only be imported, not exported. Still, there are ways international actors can support internal democratic trends. In neither its foreign policy nor its foreign aid has the United States consistently supported democracy in the developing world.4 Indeed, its frequent support of politically convenient authoritarian leaders suggests that US support for democratic regimes has never enjoyed top priority and invites the question of whether, on balance, the United States has more often supported democracy. Foreign policy continues to be determined by multiple interests, of which democracy promotion is only one. Still, as of 2009, the United States was spending $2.5 billion per year on “democracy assistance” for 80 countries.5 Other bilateral, multilateral, and civil-society donors are also engaged in “democracy assistance.” (See Appendix III.) If nothing else, the bewildering array of networks, organizations, and programs shows that the international strategic networking challenge of democracy support is as daunting as the internal networking challenges of democratization NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. An adequate assessment of the success of this assistance would require far more research and analysis than can be presented here. The record, in any case, is decidedly mixed, although one recent study of USAID evaluations boldly states that its democracy assistance programs had “doubled the amount of democratic change that an average country would otherwise have been expected to achieve [per year].”6

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There is no doubt that knowledge of the terrain gained from national partners is an overarching requirement for any kind of effective aid.7 Among the lessons learned, re-learned, and not really learned is that it is important to do homework, preferably based on support for in-country researchers. Like development aid, democracy assistance from abroad can lead to dependency, careerism, and bureaucratization.8 As Dichter (2003, 293) observed about development aid, “We must be light-handed and perpetually experimental. Increasingly, we have been neither.” Onthe-ground knowledge can, at least, make it possible for outsiders to do no harm.9 Doing no harm is difficult, however, even for democratization NGOs with knowledge of their own countries. Outsiders have an even tougher challenge. A study in Bosnia, for example, found that “the more support given to the ‘grassroots’ civil associations by OSCE, the less effective they tend to be.” An unintended consequence of outside aid was that the associations were not forced to build their own support base (Chandler 2004, 236). On the other hand, not knowing the players at all is equally ineffective, particularly at the community level. Hastily chosen Tajik representatives of INGOs in Tajikistan are often accused of corruption by other NGOs. Even the way donors investigate national capacities can cause problems. Often donors presume scarcity and ask, “What do they need?” rather than “What do they have?”—which can, for example, include local democratic traditions (Ngondi-Houghton 2009, 175). Compounding the failure of donors to do their homework intelligently is the tendency for aid to arrive in response to crises.10 Emergencies are, by definition, chaotic, and there is little time for donors and national actors to plan or develop collaborative relationships. Foreign assistance has a greater impact when it reinforces positive internal trends in a country.11 A study of USAID’s democracy and governance assistance evaluations found, “The best investment seemed to be civil society programs . . . in terms of overall impact on democracy” (Sarles 2007, 59). There are many paths through civil society that can lead to democracy—theaters

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(as in Czechoslovakia), mass demonstrations (as in South Korea), and a labor movement with the Catholic Church (as in Poland). Within this larger context, however, the role of democratization NGOs deserves particular international attention. The wide range of organizations and activities explored in the previous chapters provide ample evidence of democratic ingenuity. Moreover, these countries are not atypical. (See Appendix II.) Responding to the challenge of supporting domestic civil societies will require nothing less than a change in both the culture and the governance of foreign assistance. Overwhelmingly, NGO leaders in the three countries criticized donors and INGOs for assuming that they were more capable than those they fund, for pushing NGOs away from policy advocacy by requiring cooperation with governments, and for excluding CBOs from the process of democratization.12 Nor have there been many advances in INGO governance since Lindenberg and Bryant (2001, 245) promoted “the creation of genuine international governance boards with broad representation of stakeholders beyond the Northern industrial countries.”13 To balance the record, however, it is important to point out that some international players are already supporting democratization trends in intelligent, albeit inadequate, ways. International anti-corruption efforts (Transparency International), support for philanthropy (Synergos), and reform of nonprofit law (International Foundation for Nonprofit Law) come to mind. More potentially important are two efforts to empower democratic revolutionaries. Gene Sharp, who heads the small East Boston, Massachusetts-based Albert Einstein Institution focuses on nonviolent ways of overturning dictatorships. His short book, From Dictatorship to Democracy, has been translated into 25 languages, is easy to download, and has spread all over the world. A Serbian youth group, Optor, transferred the lessons they learned in their successful struggle against Slobodan Milosovic, through a necessarily secretive international training program, the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) for democratic revolutionaries.14 Major funders, particularly foundations, should consider how they could increase support for both

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INGOs and nonviolent revolutionary approaches without compromising the integrity and dynamism of such efforts. What follows is a proposed policy outline for international democracy assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as INGOs.

Twelve Steps for Advancing Democracy 1. Strengthen Ties between Global and National Democracy Advocates The convening power of the international community can influence global political culture. Each wave of democratization over the last 200 years has contributed to strengthening “the international democratic context within which individual democracy promotion policies are pursued” (Kegley and Hermann 2002, 15-29). And this web of interaction between national and transnational activists has pressured governments from both above and below to comply with human-rights standards. Part of this is due to “shaming,” or what the Argentines call escrache.15 Although it appeared that the democratic gains from local-global interaction had leveled off in the first decade of the 21st century, the Arab Spring of 2011 took the global community by surprise. Sustained progress there appears to be increasingly difficult, and even progress elsewhere is likely to depend on how well the international community learns to listen to and collaborate with domestic civil societies. Although donors can open up spaces for democratic advocacy, and democratic revolutionaries can topple governments, sustainable democratic institutions will depend on continuing pressure and creativity from within.16 A specific manifestation of this global-national connection is the use of international law for domestic legal reform, as in Argentina. International legal associations should increase support and contacts at the national level to encourage this approach in other countries.

2. Focus on Related Issues and Reward Good Governmental Behavior Foreign assistance should focus less on the democratic puzzle as a whole and more on the pieces that contribute to it. Speaking of President

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Obama’s dilemma in negotiating human-rights issues with Egypt before the Arab Spring, Saad Ibrahim, a well-known intellectual and political activist, made the case for more attention to the “infrastructure of democracy, which to us is the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, free media, autonomous civil society and gender equality. . . . If those five things are emphasized without talking about democracy as such, we democrats in nondemocratic countries would be more than happy” (Slackman 2009). Governments could be rewarded for ending humanrights violations or for passing and implementing freedom of information laws. “There are not enough rewards for good behavior,” suggested Adil Najam.17

3. Become Politically Astute through Collaboration with National Partners Democracy assistance, particularly if focused on governments, may strengthen the very people who undermine democracy. International donors have also contributed to disempowering parliaments (as well as other state institutions) through their predominant engagement with the executive branches of governments (Rocha Menocal 2007, 7). Therefore, this strategy would involve support for reformers within both parliaments and executive bureaucracies. It is also essential to collaborate with groups demanding reform, with particular attention to women, leaders of democratization NGOs, CBOs, journalists, and reformist parliamentarians. Obviously, such collaboration must not endanger their safety, nor provide them with what can only be called the kiss of death, given nationalist sensibilities. Attention to groups of partners, such as vertical networks between national and local NGOs (such as GGLN or Poder Ciudadano and its local partners) may be more effective than support for national umbrella organizations.

4. Make Long-Term Commitments to NGOs that Can Be Tracked as well as Measured In 2000, UNDP sponsored a “justice-sector matrix” in Guatemala, based on continually updated surveys of the current status of justicesector reform, including both Guatemalan and global civil-society

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projects. Its purpose was to track reform, report on what had been accomplished and plan next steps. More common, regrettably, is the “parachute” approach to foreign assistance, which relies on short-term measurements, such as the number of people who attended a workshop.

5. Support Internships and Exchanges among Democratization NGOs within Countries and with Governments In Argentina, most of the NGOs that use public deliberation support other members of the Inter-American Democracy Network through training, sponsored by Partners of the Americas. The power of this approach is also evident in South Africa, where IDASA assisted local NGOs in the GGLN, as well as spin-off NGOs, such as ODAC. Since 2008, ODAC has also been training government officials on freedom of information. Innovative democratization NGOs could be provided with international support to offer internships for staff members from other democratization NGOs or even government employees in their own country, particularly for those outside major cities. For example, in South Africa PSAM is small and focused on the Eastern Cape, where it is highly effective in tracking and exposing corruption in local government. Other democratization NGOs could send an intern or staff member to PSAM for a period of three to six months. Among the other examples of particularly innovative democratization NGOs that could support such an approach are Participación Ciudadana in Tierra del Fuego, Argentina, a leader in participatory governance, and Jahon in Tajikistan, which retrains local police in human rights.

6. Integrate Universities into Strategic Democratization Networks Because democratization is a huge project, and universities have resources that are crucial to success, donors and INGOs should support democratization networks that link NGOs to the human and informational resources within universities. In South Africa and Argentina this might be done through university-based NGOs, particularly those based in law schools. Applied research topics could include indigenous democratic traditions, tracking democratic progress, collaborative synergies among

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NGOs, and avoiding duplication.18 Internships and exchanges for graduate students in political science, sociology, anthropology, and law could advance research and provide field experience.19 These networks could form the basis for strategic democratization networks.

7. Increase International Support for Anti-Corruption Efforts Corruption undermines both political and economic progress, and increased donations to international NGOs, such as Transparency International, should require them to provide more substantial support for their national chapters. The international community should also support NGO partnerships with police and judicial units and encourage increased salaries for anti-corruption efforts (Haugen and Boutros 2010, 59).

8. Support Nonpartisan Training for Political Parties Political parties are the orphans of the democracy movement, and democratization NGOs should begin working with political parties in areas like constituency building, fighting corruption, and emphasizing issues over personality cults, as EISA has begun to do in South Africa. This might be linked to parliamentary support through the Parliamentary Center supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). (See Appendix II.)

9. Increase Support for Stronger Connections among Democratization NGOs, Development NGOs, and CBOs Tied to Socioeconomic Development Democratization NGOs in the three countries are self-critical about their connections with CBOs and would undoubtedly welcome international support for their own efforts to strengthen grassroots ties. In authoritarian countries like Tajikistan, “Democracy support at the community level offers the only sound, non-confrontational approach to improving conditions for the many” (Mirimanova 2007, 213). Even in China, according to Tsai (2007, 260), “At the bottom people are integrated in dense social networks . . . [and] elites cooperate with each other . . . but nothing connects citizens and elites with each other.” Donors should shift their focus to NGOs with strong grassroots connections.

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This approach might also include support for using public deliberation to advance socioeconomic goals at the community level. A second focus could be strategic networks of development NGOs, democratization NGOs, and CBOs. Translocal federations of CBOs have proven to be highly effective in Bolivia, Ecuador, and parts of Africa.20 As an operating foundation focused on citizens’ role in democracy, the Kettering Foundation could increase support for local organizations to advance research through the use of CBOs.

10. Expand the Definition of Civil-Society Assistance beyond NGOs Donors should support unions, small and medium-sized businesses, media, and professional associations that are actively engaged in their communities. They should also support democratization NGOs that strengthen corporate responsibility programs (Rocha Menocal 2007). Key partners might be NGOs, such as Fundación Compromiso in Argentina or the Judicial Consortium in Tajikistan, that strengthen business management and the legal climate for media and business, as well as NGOs.21 This approach also has implications for foreign policy, particularly foreign economic policy. Oil and mining interests often subvert democratic processes in the developing world. Shareholders and consumers in the developed world should pressure oil companies to reform their business practices, their relationships with governments, and their payment of taxes.22 Tax reform and honest tax collection should involve both business and the media, through national NGOs that focus on strengthening business and media as part of civil society (Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 70-72). Strengthening the media is not just about strengthening a sector of society. It is also about strengthening the sphere of public debate. As Zohra Dawood of the Open Society Foundation in South Africa said, “We look for the capacity to help create a public dialogue.”23 Support could increase for research and exchanges that tie NGOs, such as Periodismo Social in Argentina, to CBOs and the media through public journalism. Such NGOs could also be included in exchanges between democratization NGOs in different countries.

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11. Assess and Support Long-Term Benefits rather than Immediate Results Although foreign support for civil-society advocacy campaigns in India and the Philippines has often failed to achieve the desired political goals, it has contributed in some cases to the long-term strengthening of civil society and increased political pluralism. “Perhaps it makes more sense to think about democratization ‘achievement’ rather than immediate campaign ‘success’ as the gauge of civil society advocacy impact. In the end, perhaps it is the experience of ‘doing democracy’ that is really important” (Blair 2007, 189).

12. Walk the Walk This is probably the most difficult recommendation, particularly for bilateral donors, because it involves foreign policy rather than democracy assistance. Although it would be unrealistic to assume that support for democracy should always trump other goals, its long-term impacts on stability, socioeconomic development, and international security should be given greater weight when decisions are made. More specifically, democratic opportunities should be placed front and center, whenever possible. One clear example is support for human-rights advocates in authoritarian countries. International political alliances may be as important to their cause as international financial support.

Conclusion Democratization is a long, hard, piecemeal task. The obstacles confronting the leaders of democratization NGOs are often formidable, if not terrifying. There may, however, be a positive advantage in this slow, iterative process. Systemic models of democracy, be they Western, Islamic, African, Asian, or Latin American, suffer from some of the same problems as blueprints. They predict neither roadblocks nor opportunities. They cannot anticipate learning from failure or learning from the success of others. Most important, they cannot effectively harness the creativity and commitment of ordinary citizens. To the degree that outside assistance can support the ability of democratization NGOs to learn from each other

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and to build stronger grassroots connections with citizens, it will succeed. The international leadership needed on democracy must be truly global and based on creative partnerships among the diverse descendants of the Enlightenment. In the 1970s, thousands of NGOs emerged in the developing world, mainly focused on sustainable development. Even before the collapse of Communism in 1989, human rights became another central international issue and a second wave of NGOs were organized in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In the last decades of the 20th century, democratization spread to more countries. As democratization NGOs emerged, they encompassed the older human-rights organizations, and, in a sense, came full circle. Although democracy brings with it no guarantees, democratization NGOs are responding to the growing global awareness that repressive systems are incapable of implementing any of the socioeconomic or environmental changes essential for the survival of human beings on this planet. Over time, repression must be replaced by robust citizenship. By building on what democratization NGOs are already doing and supporting their efforts to learn from each other, international actors can contribute to what is surely the third wave of a global associational revolution.

Endnotes 1

Robertson’s examples, Ukraine, Serbia, and Georgia, have not been born out by subsequent events; however, the general point remains valid. 2

Halperin et al. 2005.

3

See Packer 2010, 35.

4

For overviews of both, see Spencer 2005; Carothers 1999; and Carothers 2009. See also Halperin et al. 2005, for a discussion of American foreign policy regarding democracy. As early as 1961, Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act linked development to “popular participation.” 5

USAID provided $1.5 billion of this, with the remainder provided by NED and the State Department (Carothers 2009). 6

See Sarles 2007, 59. Change was measured by using Freedom House and Polity data sets.

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7

One critic of US democracy assistance recommends that USAID spend more of its money within the countries being assisted through focusing on US INGOs (Carothers 2009, 35). Indeed, as he states, it is better for IFES rather than USAID to sponsor a training seminar for electoral commissioners. Still, IFES’ real comparative advantage, seen in Tajikistan, is their ability to find effective Tajik partners rather than to try to do the work by themselves. 8

See, for example, a study by Mokhiber (2000) of human-rights and justice-sector assistance in Bulgaria, South Africa, Cambodia, and Guatemala. 9

In the 1990s, International Financial Institutions and the US Treasury pushed developing countries to improve tax collection. The result was that countries began taxing NGOs, 40 percent on their income and 100 percent on imported goods (Mokhiber 2000). 10

Nation-building strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, have included support for building inclusive systems of justice, but sustained support elsewhere has been rare (Haugen and Boutros 2010, 58). 11

I am indebted to Adil Najam of the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future at Boston University for this idea. Conversation, May 7, 2010. His corollary observation was that the international community is “better at shaming than proclaiming those who succeed.” 12

These findings are similar to those of a study of justice-sector and human-rights assistance, based on 150 interviews in Cambodia, Guatemala, Bulgaria, and South Africa (Mokhiber 2000). These respondents urged donors to recognize “indigenous systems,” consult local opinion, and use local intermediaries, even though their reviews of justice-sector assistance were generally positive. Among the other major findings of the study was that donor country consultations were counterproductive and that donor fads are a problem, because they cut up work into small, artificial pieces. 13

Some global and regional networks of NGOs are more diverse.

14

For a recent account of these two efforts, see Dobson 2012, 181-186, 237-251.

15

Keck and Sikkink call this “a spiral of boomerangs,” based on many events that repeatedly cross national borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 16

Pinochet, for example, was accepting visits from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights while continuing to torture his opponents. 17

Najam conversation.

18

This could be particularly important in Tajikistan, where there is a great deal of overlap among democratization NGOs and not enough dovetailing. See Yusufbekov et al. 2007, 70-72. 19

Ivor Jenkins observed that in spite of South Africa’s extensive university system, very few people get advanced degrees in political science. 20

See Fisher 1993, Chapter 3. See also Tsai 2007, 264, for other citations.

21

Among other examples are Jahon and Chasma in Tajikistan, Periodismo Social in Argentina, and IDASA’s media programs in South Africa. 22

We also had numerous conversations about South African politics with Lesley Adams of IDASA, who accompanied us to the interviews. 2

Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews were conducted in Dushanbe.

3

This interview was supplemented by numerous informal conversations.

4

Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews were conducted in Buenos Aires.

5

We also had numerous informal conversations with Guillermo Correa, then of Poder Ciudadano, in December 2006.

A P P E N DIX

II

p

DEMOCRATIZATION NGOS IN OTHER COUNTRIES THIS OVERVIEW of 15 more countries, while not exhaustive, demonstrates that there are many paths to democratization, and that democratization NGOs are a global, if not a universal, phenomenon. The countries selected are geographically diverse, but not necessarily representative of the 196 countries in the world. I selected one developed country, Israel, because it embodies many of the democratic contradictions found in the developed world generally.

Afghanistan The Free Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) was organized as a coalition of 24 other organizations, including the Afghan Civil Society Forum, the Afghan Women’s Network, the Afghan Judges Association, the Afghan NGOs Coordination Body, the Afghan National Participation Association, and the Teachers Union. FEFA has observed elections, published reports on campaign finance, and challenged the recounting and exclusion of ballots from the September 2010 parliamentary elections.1 One of its members, The Afghan Civil Society Forum, sponsors regional consultations on subnational governance, and another one, the Afghan National Participation Association (ANPA), produces radio programs on citizen participation.

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Burma (Myanmar) The beginning of the end of military dictatorship in Burma began in 2007, when tens of thousands of monks led street protests that became known as the “Saffron Revolution.” The end of the regime was further advanced by its failure to respond to Cyclone Nargis in 2008, leading to 138,000 casualties. As this book goes to press in 2012, the reform process has led to significant political liberalization in Burma. Hundreds of political prisoners have been released, although hundreds of others remain in prison. Aung San Suu Kyi, under house arrest for many years, operates openly as an opposition leader, and the opposition party candidates won 43 of the 45 contested seats in the April 2012 parliamentary elections. The regime has reached agreements with 10 of 11 major ethnic groups, although conflicts with groups such as the Kachin Independence Army persist. In addition to protests, the cyclone, and international economic sanctions, civil-society opposition has played a role in this transition. In May 2009, an international conference organized by the International Federation of Human Rights and the Burma Lawyers Council was held in Bangkok. Attending were scores of NGOs and civic associations supporting the Free Burma Movement. Spies attempted, but failed, to abduct the chief organizer, a lawyer in exile from Burma (Dale 2010). Although Burma had expelled most international NGOs by 2011, a number of NGOs operating outside Burma were promoting a UN Commission of Inquiry on war crimes committed by the regime. A border NGO called the Political Defiance Committee provided grassroots human-rights training and worked on preventing the recruitment of child soldiers.2 Another group worked on training people to use nonviolent techniques to improve relations between civil society and rank and file soldiers of the Myanmar military. At the same time, internal civil society had already been energized by the poor government response to the cyclone.3 One internal organization, the Metta Development Foundation, not only provided cyclone relief, but

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also worked with communities to help them recover from decades of civil conflict through peace keeping and development. Although the new constitution, adopted in 2008 after the cyclone, has serious democratic deficiencies, it decentralized political decision making, empowering regional authorities. This has gradually shifted the centers of opposition from the Free Burma Movement, outside the country, to various groups within the country. Artists, as well, used their exhibits to speak out against repression, gender prejudice, environmental deterioration, and poverty (Hammer 2011). In 2011 a group of businesspeople, journalists, and academics formed an NGO called Myanmar Egress (“a way out”) to push the younger generals to “confront how little they understood” (Osnos 2012, 56-57). Although criticized by activists outside the country, one of the founders, a Burmese historian, argued that the top leaders were “deeply cynical of Western rhetoric on human rights. The argument we made that got the most traction was: ‘We’re falling so far behind our neighbors economically—China and India—that, unless we change, politically as well as economically, its going to be diastrous.’ ”4

China Before the 1989 crackdown on dissent, civil society in China included intellectual salons and women’s groups, a kind of “counterculture in waiting.” Now the key role in civil-society expansion belongs to the urban intelligentsia and emerging professional class, “groups whose potential social influence is increasing as they become more integrated with the world of business” (White et al. 2006, 288-289). There are an estimated 3 million CSOs in China, only 1.5 percent of which are officially registered. If they have any direct impact on democratization, it is likely to be local. Indeed, China’s Narada Foundation has made it a top priority to support grassroots organizations.5 Some argue that international donors have helped Chinese intellectuals shift the discourse from describing grassroots CSOs as “a democratic force whose nature is anti-government” to “social organizations that provide useful services” (Brown and Xing 2012, 16).

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A few CSOs are indirectly related to democratization in other ways, however. The China Reform Foundation, an economic think tank based in Beijing, for example, focuses on corruption. In 2010, it estimated that $870 billion in corrupt “gray money” is being hidden by the wealthiest 10 percent of China’s population (Wines 2010). Other NGOs have been able to provide services to nonprofits and foundations, thus strengthening civil society to become a potential loyal opposition over the long run.6 The Nonprofit Incubator works in several cities and, along with the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) offers capacity building and information to a range of CSOs. Among the other examples are the Shanghai NPO Development Center, Shanxi Women Research Center, and CANGO in Beijing (Brown and Xing 2012). Because the Ministry of Civil Affairs requires new organizations to have government sponsors before they can register, some democracyrelated research centers are affiliated with universities.7 The Women’s Legal Aid Center, for example, is affiliated with Peking University, thus increasing government fears that it may stir up injustice. Other organizations have registered as corporations. A new law on charities, now under discussion, may ease government restrictions. China’s rapid economic development has led to the emergence of philanthropy. Between 2007 and 2009, there was a 5-fold increase in philanthropy to 32 billion RMB. Private and corporate foundations increased by 50 percent, to more than 1,900, from 2004 to 2010. However, GONGOs, along with Red Cross units, have absorbed 90 percent of public donations. Some GONGOs, such as the China Human Rights Research Association, were created so China could participate in international dialogues (Brown and Xing 2012, 11).

Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia) In an unusual twist on the typical NGO, nonprofit theaters played an important role in Czech democratization in 1989. The Civic Forum had its headquarters at the Magic Lantern Theatre in Prague and many branches of the Civic Forum were convened at theaters throughout the

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Czech lands. The Civic Forum refused at first to assume power in 1989, even though the Communist regime had capitulated. Although the new government eventually included seven non-party ministers from Civic Forum, the civil society “master-frame” of being above politics contributed to the breakup of the country into the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Glenn 2001). Recent Internet references to the role of Czech NGOs in democracy pertain to participation in external European Union efforts to advance democracy in other countries, such as Georgia.

Egypt The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 undermined a number of assumptions, the most important being the unlikelihood of a secular opposition. “Gone, too,” according to Bremer (2011, 1), “is the idea that building civil society would be a necessary precondition to reform.” Instead, it seemed that new skilled professional organizations linked by technology and dedication provided the spark that ignited popular anger against the Mubarak regime. However, it may be that civil society is necessary over the long run and that the Egyptian government’s long tradition of subsidizing and co-opting NGOs is a serious detriment to continuing democratization (Fisher 1993, 79). Still, some of the organizations crucial to the revolution were affiliated with CSOs like the April 6th Youth Movement, organized around labor issues in 2008 by an NGO called Kefaya (Bremer 2011).8 In Tahrir Square, the Democratic Front Party worked with Kefaya and the National Association for Change. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood and the New Wafd Party, they would not negotiate with the regime (Shehata 2011). In addition, citizens organized dozens of watch groups to guard homes and families when the police melted away. The revolution continues to maintain itself, even though Mubarak stepped down. The rest of “civil society is coming out of its shell,” partly in response to continuing human-rights violations by the military government. Groups such as the Egyptian Association for the Support of Democracy, the Ibn Khaldun Center, and the Egyptian Initiative for

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Personal Rights will play a “huge role,” even though they did not spark the revolution (Bremer 2011, 1, 4; Steavenson 2011). As this book goes to press, there are fears that renewed demonstrations may lead to a reassertion of military authoritarianism. A recent crackdown on international NGOs like Freedom House, NDI, and the IRI (International Republican Institute) seemed to confirm these fears.

Ethiopia Until 2010, democratization NGOs were active in Ethiopia. New restrictive laws, however, have made it extremely difficult for advocacy NGOs to operate unless they obtain 90 percent of their funding from domestic sources. The result has been a severe cut in foreign support.9 Some effective democratization NGOs have been forced to scale down their activities and lay off staff. By one estimate the number of CSOs declined from 4,600 to 1,400 during the first 3 months of 2010. The Center for Research on Civic and Human Rights Education, which works on elections and conflict resolution, has nonetheless survived the loss of most of its staff. The center has worked in southern Ethiopia, where there is conflict between the Somalis and the nomadic Borana peoples. It also focused on mass electoral education for 15 million voters in 2005 and trained 1,200 leaders from different organizations, including Catholic, Orthodox, and evangelical churches (Milofsky 2010).

India Citizen action groups in towns and cities work on corruption, poor service delivery, and bureaucratic inertia (Robinson 2006). A major focus of democratization NGOs in India is freedom of information, which impacts socioeconomic as well as political rights. Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan used government intransigence based on the Official Secrets Act of 1923 to lead a mass movement for the right of access to government information. Eventually, the grassroots struggle led to legislation in nine states and, finally, the Right to Information Act of 2005. The organization’s message

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was that even poor people pay taxes and they have a right to know what is done with their money. MKSS conducted “People’s Audits,” or public hearings, to which government officials were invited. The act already has been used to track progress on punishment for atrocities against women. Civil liberties NGOs use it to ensure policy transparency. To make the act more powerful, a massive “drive against bribe” was held by CSOs in 48 cities. Protests by the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) eventually led to withdrawal of a plan to introduce amendments to legislation without public discussion. NGOs have set up help lines for interactions with government and have done “social audits” on legislation, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. In addition, NGOs sponsor huge numbers of monthly dialogues on socioeconomic legislation. This process includes both the right to participate in drafting laws and monitoring new laws. This process is being used with the Right to Education Act of 2009 and the Forest Rights Act (2006) (on the rights of tribal peoples). Overall, according to Mutatkar (2011), “Civil society in India has been paving the roads to participatory democracy.”10

Indonesia Networks of “democracy promotion NGOs” are important in Indonesia. The Center for Electoral Reform and the Center for Law and Policy, for example, are members of an advocacy coalition on freedom of information called the Civil Society Alliance for Democracy. This coalition also facilitated the Aceh Democracy Network, a coalition of 30 NGOs that pressed for regional autonomy in Aceh and an end to conflict. Two other NGO networks, the Forum for Popular Participation and the Forum for Village Renewal, promote civic participation and democratic village governance. Both have well-educated leaders who emerged from the movement against Suharto in the 1990s and are connected with international democracy donors. An NGO coalition on freedom of information, organized in 2000, has 30 member NGOs. The five core members reinvigorated their advocacy and informal collaboration after the failure

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to pass legislation in 2003-2004. They peppered the media with stories as the debate reached its climax in 2008, and the legislation passed (Antlov et al. 2010, 425). At the local level, 25 NGOs in Madiun address key city issues and uncover discrepancies in city budgets.

Israel Israel has several NGOs working to strengthen democratic processes. The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) focuses on political reform, national security, constitutional law, and religion and the state. It conducts civic education programs in 200 high schools serving all ethnic groups, with support from the Ministry of Education and compiles a yearly Israeli Democracy Index. Despite official support it lobbies against legislation destructive of human rights and as of 2010 was supporting student protests against special privileges for Yeshiva students.11 The Movement for Quality Government (MQG) has achieved major court victories on government transparency, protection of whistle-blowers, and legal liability for misallocation of local government funds. Its hotline, staffed by law students, currently processes about 1,000 calls per year. With a computerized administration system for its 20,000 volunteers, members are active in 60 committees and the executive board and are able to set the agenda.12 The organization is also in touch with MQG movements in Germany and Indonesia and is tied to Transparency International and the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. The human-rights front is equally active. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) focuses on legal advocacy and litigation in Israel and the occupied territories. It supports a legal hotline and trains groups as diverse as security forces and schoolteachers in human rights. ACRI also operates as an international NGO, participating in many international conferences and focusing on raising human-rights awareness. The New Israel Fund (NIF) focuses more specifically on equal rights for both Arab Israelis and immigrants. It successfully argued a recent court case on behalf of Ethiopian immigrant families whose children had been expelled from an Orthodox Jewish kindergarten. Its fellowship

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program helps educate human-rights lawyers. One of its grantees, the Israel Reform Movement Action Center (IRAC) presented a report on gender segregation to the Knesset. The training center of the NIF, Shatil, concentrates on workplace dialogues, training grassroots and national CSOs and building the capacity of Arab-Jewish leadership groups. One project assists Israeli towns in developing “Green Agendas.” It also supports marginalized communities, such as Bedouin women in the Negev and immigrant women from Ethiopia.13 Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, closely monitors and publishes new laws and proposed legislation that discriminate against Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. A case initiated by Abalah resulted in a landmark 2006 decision of the Supreme Court that cancelled a government plan on “national priority areas,” because it discriminated against Arab citizens. In 2009, Adalah represented Arab members of the Knesset and party members disqualified by the Central Elections Committee.14 Hillel Schmidt, a nonprofit sector scholar at the Hebrew University, doubts that these NGOs will have a major impact because they are seen as left wing and anti-government. He observed that most other Israeli NGOs are dependent on government money and don’t want to bite the hand that feeds them.15 In November 2011, the Israeli cabinet voted to limit the support for Israeli human-rights groups from foreign donors (mostly European governments) to $5,000 a year (Bronner 2011, A10).

Kenya “NGOs have played a major role—most visibly in Kenya—in creating space for the democratic project” (Mutua 2009, 36). Between 1970 and 1997, when violations of human rights were especially egregious, a number of human-rights organizations, including citizen and community-based organizations, were established. Kituo Cha Sheria is a membership organization founded in 1973 and focused on access

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to justice through Community Justice Centres. In 2011, Kituo Cha Sheria won a major legal suit against housing evictions directed at the poor. The Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) had mobilized more than 100 NGOs and many grassroots protests for constitutional reform by the late 1990s, which led to violent repression (Kanyinga 2009). By 2003, however, many individuals and groups were participating in negotiations to review the Kenya constitution, at the invitation of the Kenya Review Commission. This initiative included the Institute for Education and Democracy (IED), which focuses on electoral politics, the League of Kenya Women Voters (LKWV), which has extensive grassroots outreach, and the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers (FIDA), which monitors the status of women and has “a deep influence on law reform and works closely with government ministries involved in the administration of justice” (Murungi 2009, 39). According to several observers, Kenyan human-rights organizations generally collaborate well with each other, but need to focus more specifically on their grassroots constituencies and on overcoming ethnic differences (Kanyinga 2009; Murungi 2009). The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), founded in the United States in 1991 by Kenyan exiles, has become an autonomous government watchdog agency, similar to the Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law in Tajikistan (see p. 162), with real legal powers that have been used against government agencies. It has pushed hard to replace projects designed by donors that ignored socioeconomic rights and were “blind to the suffering of the masses” (Ngondi-Houghton 2009, 168). In 1998, KHRC created a funding basket into which donors willing to support its long-term plans could put funds.

Malaysia In Malaysia, “Lawyers and other professionals have attempted to advance concern about civil rights, environmental degradation, women’s rights, [and] corruption.” Prominent independent organizations include the Association of Women Lawyers and the National Council of Women’s Organizations (Rodan 2006).

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The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, comprised of 62 NGOs, organized mass demonstrations in July 2011. The coalition contends that although Malaysia holds regular national elections, they are often subject to manipulation. Their eight demands include marking voters with indelible ink to keep them from voting more than once, purging “phantom” voters, setting up a royal investigative commission on elections, and ensuring opposition parties have access to the media (Gooch 2011).

Nicaragua A study of Nicaraguan NGOs (Chahim and Prakash 2010) concludes that intermediary NGOs are less accountable to communities than in the 1980s and early 1990s and that they have become service providers, dependent on foreign donors. Mass organization membership, encouraged by the Sandinista regime, reached an estimated 500,000 in 1989 (in a country of 3 million), but has declined since then. The Advocacy Coalition (CC), considered a key opposition voice, is dominated by foreign-funded, service-focused NGOs.16 Of CC’s member organizations, only the Movimiento Comunal Nicaraguense (MCN) protested the revolving door between CC leaders and political parties, particularly the Sandinista Renovation Movement. The MCN is also trying to reduce its foreign donor support and has turned to mass community fundraising through selling script that can be exchanged within communities. Dependence on international donors may also push NGOs into assuming state responsibilities, as Chahim and Prakash (2010) assume. They recommend that NGOs instead return to grassroots protest. An alternative path might be for some NGOs to support the state in strengthening its own service provision, thus freeing other NGOs for stronger grassroots ties and advocacy.

Russia The collapse of the Soviet Union did not immediately lead to a civic resurgence. Indeed, some human-rights groups disappeared with the end of the regime. While NGOs such as The Democratic Union, an advocate

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for multiparty democracy, had to endure police raids, other dissidents migrated into “safer” organizations that were advocates for soldiers’ rights. Of the 60 NGOs interviewed by Sundstrom (2006, 8), 10 saw themselves as playing a watchdog role with the state. These were mostly NGOs that dealt with the rights of soldiers. Mothers whose sons had fought in Chechnya often become the founders of soldier’s rights organizations. In 2004, they founded their own political party, the United People’s Party of Soldiers Mothers. Some, such as the Ekaterinburg Movement against Violence, are advocates for the right to refuse military service. They also provide regular support for draftees, soldiers, and those who have refused service and work against violence in prisons. Unlike other human-rights NGOs, they are well known and receive favorable public ratings in polls. In addition to promoting the rights of soldiers, women remain active on their own behalf and have created NGO networks. The largest women’s NGO network offers small grants to its member organizations. The League of Women Voters in St. Petersburg has 80 organizational members. The Russian Association of Crisis Centers for Women, founded in 1994, one of the most effective networks, conducts training on combating violence against women. A possible shift towards more freedom for human-rights organizations may have begun in July 2011. A Moscow court cleared a human-rights campaigner, Oleg Orlov, of defamation charges. Orlov is the chair of Memorial, a human-rights organization that had accused Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Russian Chechnya, of complicity in the murder of Natalya Estemirova, a colleague at Memorial (Schwirtz 2011). Moreover, some NGOs have branched out into other democratization issues. The Indem Foundation is a policy research group focusing on corruption. (Schwirtz 2010, A12). The Russian Center for Citizenship Education, with ties to the Kettering Foundation, was, like the Inter-Tajik Dialogue and PCDP, an outgrowth of the Dartmouth Conference. It has sponsored many communitywide discussions and deliberations in cities like Vologda, Cherepovets, Bryansk, Nizhniy-Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and Rostov-on-Don.

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Donors have trained many Russian NGO leaders and two-thirds of Russian NGOs have foreign funding. As in other countries, networks founded as an explicit condition of foreign assistance are generally less effective. As Sundstrom (2006) points out, “In discouraging environments [there is a] ‘decoupling’ between what NGOs say in private to donors and what they do” (Sundstrom 2006, xv). However, as of the fall of 2012, the Putin government severely restricted foreign funders of all NGOs.

Student movements, labor unions, the Catholic Church, and a growing middle class have all pushed for democracy in South Korea for many years. During the 1980s, several major NGO networks that included representatives of labor, students, and religious (Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant) organizations lobbied for democratic reforms. By 1987, civil and political society collaborated through the Coalition for Democracy Movement and the 25 member National Movement Headquarters for Democratic Constitution (NMHDC), established after a Seoul University student was tortured to death under police interrogation. Since that time, citizens’ movement groups have proliferated, representing interest groups like teachers or peasants, as well as others with a broader democratic focus.18 During the 1990s, for example, the Lawyers Association for a Democratic Society monitored elections and promoted increased political participation. President Kim Dae Jung, elected in the midst of the economic downturn in 1997, depended on the support of NGOs that had emerged from the pro-democracy groups. Although subsequent regimes reduced sub-

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sidies, NGOs have continued to be the subject of political contestation, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and “pseudo” NGOs (Chang and Tang 2011, 1058, 1063). Still, democratization networks have remained important. The Citizens Council for Fair Elections was created in 1991 by seven other CSOs. Citizen Solidarity for the National Assembly Elections, another coalition created in 2000, exposed unfit candidates, based on corrupt or illegal activities. It is a measure of the success of the democracy movement that Presidents Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) preempted many of the political goals of the reformers. Among these reforms are legal measures to consolidate executive and military responsibility, protection of human rights, and increased participation of marginalized groups. As Korea has become more democratic, Korean NGOs have become international players, sometimes working on democracy in other countries. However, the interaction of state and civil society continues to be important in resolving key national issues, in part because of the weakness of political parties and the lack of a strong civic culture.

Tunisia Before the Tunisian revolution of 2011, almost 10,000 nonprofits of all kinds were registered, but most were under the control of the regime. Since January 2011, however, more than 1,000 associations have been created, ranging from women’s and human-rights groups to youth organizations. “Under Ben Ali, nobody was talking,” says Bechir Bouraoui, founder of Generation Tunisia Libre. “Now everyone wants to talk’’ (Dickinson 2011, 13). A woman who works for the UNDP in Tunisia observed, “We had zillions and zillions of civil society organizations just come out of nowhere” (Dickinson 2011, 13). Although obtaining financial support is a challenge for the mostly young leaders of these new organizations, they provide support for democratization that is ahead of Egypt. Since the revolution, Tunisian NGOs have received support for democracy from IDASA.19

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A note on the Arab Spring: Despite the events of 2011, there is a relative lack of autonomous NGOs across the Arab world, in part due to the dominance of Shariah law, which “essentially precludes autonomous self-governing private organizations” and lacks the concept of the corporation that can be used either to make profits or to provide social services (Kuran 2011). In addition, governments have suppressed independent media. Still a “panoply of private organizations are already present,” albeit in embryonic form. And if the current turmoil produces regimes more tolerant of grassroots politics and diversity of opinion, “more associations able to defend individual freedoms will surely arise” (Kuran 2011).

Wines, Michael. “In China, Attitudes on Generosity Are Tested.” New York Times, September 24, 2010, A4.

Endnotes 1

For more on Afghan NGOs, including some focusing on democracy, see www. asiafoundation.org. 2

This is complicated by the fact that some children are recruited for the armies of the opposition. 3

Anonymous interview, supplemented by www.newyorktimes.com.

4

Thant Myint-U, cited in ibid., p. 57.

5

www.NGOChina.blogspot.com.

6

This is my own observation, based on many other countries, not that of Brown and Xing. 7

However, some local governments (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chengdu) have allowed groups to register without government sponsorship (Brown and Xing 2012). 8

By 2012, Kefaya had 70,000 members on Facebook.

9

Some EU support has shifted to “capacity building,” defined as a focus on education, training, and the sustainable use of natural resources, but it will probably not support NGOs with a human-rights focus. 10

NGOs are also training activists from other countries. A Kenyan organization, Muslims for Human Rights, received training from the International Budget Partnership, which included social-audit experts from Indian NGOs. The UNDP is recommending the Indian legislative process to other countries. 11

www.nif.org.

12

www.mqg.org.il/English.

13

www.shatil.org.il.

14

www.adalah.org.eng.

15

E-mail from Hillel Schmidt, December 4, 2010. I am indebted to Hillel Schmidt for suggestions on democratization NGOs in Israel. 16

The CC itself does mobilize citizens for protest marches and has recently begun to reduce its dependence on foreign donors. 17

Kim 2000, 4, 20.

18

These included the Association of Families of Political Prisoners.

19

www.IDASA.org.

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AN OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE1 Bilateral Donors BEFITTING ITS SIZE, the United States is the largest single bilateral provider of democracy assistance. In Argentina AUSAID supports FARN’s efforts to develop decision-making capacity regarding river use among low-income residents in 16 communities. However, the Australian aid agency AUSAID provides the highest percentage of its foreign assistance (50 percent) to “democracy and good governance,” in part through direct support to CBOs (Rocha Menocal et al. 2007). Dutch foreign assistance is unusual in supporting advocacy groups provided they disagree with the government. Another large democracy donor is Japan, which focuses on human rights and the rule of law. Among the other bilateral donors focusing on democracy are Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway. The Danish Institute for Human Rights is linked to both DANIDA (the Danish foreign assistance agency) and SIDA. Its Tajik partners include Society and Law and the Bureau of Human Rights and the Rule of Law. The Norwegian Agency for Development (NAD) focuses on strengthening elections, promoting civic engagement, and funding democratization NGOs. Some governments provide support to semi-autonomous agencies that provide foreign assistance, including programs that could be described as democracy assistance. The Center for Democratic Insti-

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tutions in Australia is supported by AUSAID and focuses on the Asia Pacific region. The Inter-American Foundation, established through a US congressional initiative, since the early 1970s has provided support to CBOs and development NGOs in Latin America focusing on grassroots democracy. NED incorporates NDI, IRI, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, the Center for International Private Enterprise and the Center for International Media Assistance. NDI and IRI have a technical approach to training political parties that includes resource materials, workshops, and seminars.

Multilateral Donors and Networks Among the major regional donors are the Organization of American States (OAS), with its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has supervised Tajik elections. The European Union (EU) funds NGOs in transitional states, as do the regional development banks. The European Partnership for Democracy in The Hague acts as a European portal for democracy advocates outside Europe who wish to access European knowledge and resources, while the European Democracy Caucus in Brussels, tied to the European Parliament, focuses on democracy promotion in the EU’s “neighborhood.”2 The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development has a particularly strong record of “unequivocal support” for democracy in its development lending (Halperin et al. 2005, 210). Still another European initiative is the European Parliamentarians for Africa, with a membership of 1,500 current and former European parliamentarians who support their African peers. Among the multilateral donors are the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Governance and Human Rights, the Centre for International Crime Prevention, the UNDP, the ILO, and the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF). UNICEF sponsors human-rights education. Although the World Bank is not engaged in democracy assistance, its contracts increasingly include NGOs. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), located in Stockholm, is comprised of 25

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member governments and several INGO partners, such as Transparency International. It acts as a catalyst for democracy by providing international knowledge, resources, and a platform for debate. Among the other more specialized governmental networks is the Forum of Federations in Ottawa, Canada, which builds networks and fosters the exchange of experience on federalism.

Philanthropic and Operating Foundations Among the US foundations engaged in democracy assistance are OSI, the Ford Foundation, and the Mott Foundation. OSI operates through autonomous counterparts in 29 countries and three African regions. In South Africa, the Mott Foundation supports technical assistance and training for black community organizations and women’s community leadership programs. As an operating foundation, the Kettering Foundation does not promote democracy, but learns from research conducted by international fellows and others on deliberative democracy in their own countries. IISD works closely with the Kettering Foundation and grew out of the Dartmouth Dialogue and the Inter-Tajik Dialogue. Some German foundations fund political parties or membership federations, such as COSATU in South Africa. Among them are the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Others are tied to the Green Party (Heinrich Boll Foundation) or German labor organizations. There are similar foundations in many other countries, including the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in London and the Arab Democracy Foundation in Qatar. Generally foundations prefer to fund NGOs or CBOs rather than providing overtly political aid. Among the exceptions to this are some of the German foundations, OSI, and the Mott Foundation.

INGOs with Global Programs and Networks Amnesty International and Transparency International are probably the best-known INGOs in democracy assistance, but there are countless

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others with very specific goals.3 One example is the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, supported by Dutch political parties; in 2010 it provided assistance to 150 political parties in 16 countries. Partners for Democratic Change (PDC) is linked to NGOs in 20 countries, including the Fundación Cambio Democrático in Argentina. PDC focuses on civilsociety leadership and conflict management. Another example is the International Center for Non-Profit Law. Among the other INGOS and foundations supporting democracy are IFES (see pp. 149, 172) and the Carter Center.

INGOs Based on Global Networks The Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD) sponsors the Budapest-based International Center for Democratic Transitions. Founded in 2000, CCD has both governmental and nongovernmental members and its steering committee is composed of 25 civil-society leaders from all over the world. CCD lobbied for the creation of the UNDF and established a UN democracy caucus. Among the other global networks relevant to democracy are CIVICUS, which supports civil society and a wide variety of CSOs worldwide, and CIVITAS International, which focuses on civic education.4 The World Movement for Democracy (WMD) includes activists, practitioners, and funders and supports DemocracyLink online.

Small INGOs There are also numerous small INGOs that work on democracy. The International Women’s Democracy Center, for example, builds partnerships with national NGOs to help get women elected to office and has worked in Tajikistan. The Albert Einstein Institution, led by Gene Sharp, focuses on advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolence in defense of democracy. Equally important is the Serbian international NGO Otpor (Resistance) that grew out of the revolution against Slobodan Milosovic. Otpor trains activists in other countries to figure out their own

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creative strategies for promoting nonviolent revolutions against dictators (Dobson 2012). Other small NGOs, such as the California-based Center for Civic Education, are in international networks that have ties with South African NGOs. University-based programs include the Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University; the Center for Democracy and Citizenship at the University of Minnesota; and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford. The University of Birmingham Institute on Local Government does evaluation and assessment in Russia and the Baltic countries.

Regional NGOs and Networks Regional NGOs and networks include CODESERIA—Center for Democracy and Security in Africa, based in Accra—and the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe. Both run regional programs to promote democratic practices and encourage regional transnational networks of local NGOs, election administrators, political parties, and mass media. The African Democracy Forum, located in Abuja, Nigeria, is a network of over 300 democratization NGOs and individuals and is the regional network of WMD. The Inter-American Democracy Network, affiliated with Partners of the Americas and WMD, sponsors online exchange as well as conferences among activists on a wide range of topics, including public deliberation. The Kawakibi Democracy Transition Centre in Tunisia builds capacity on democratic transition with NGOs and experts in the Middle East.

Spencer, Nicole. “History of United States Democracy Promotion: From Policy to Industry.” Unpublished report for the Kettering Foundation, 2005. Rocha Menocal, Alina, Verena Fritz, and Lise Radker. “Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned: How Can Donors Better Support Democratic Processes?” Background note prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy and Development, October 23-25, 2007. http://www.wiltonpark.org. uk.www.ccd21.org/index.

Endnotes 1

This is intended to be illustrative, but is by no means complete. For an account of some of the pressures and varying concepts of democracy within the international NGO community, see Youngs 2004, Chapter 4. Youngs observes that INGOs lobbying developed country governments on human rights has been far more aggressive than on democratization, where there is an underlying NGO reluctance to become too political. It also remains unclear, according to Youngs, how “grassroots democratic participation,” widely espoused by INGOs, can be separable from macrolevel democracy. 2

With the enlargement of the EU, this now extends from Russia to Morocco.

3

In addition to Amnesty International, a very large number of INGOs specialize in human rights, including Rights and Democracy (Canada) and Human Rights Watch. 4

Among the smaller NGOs focused on journalism are the Center for the Protection of Journalism in New York City and the International Center for Journalists in Washington, DC.

A P P E N DIX

IV

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RESEARCH METHODS MY WORK AS A PROGRAM OFFICER at the Kettering Foundation put me in contact with people from democratization NGOs in more than 40 countries. In selecting the countries for this book, I focused on four criteria. First, each has many active democratization NGOs. Second, they cover three continents, important for significant comparisons. Third, these countries had a long tradition of contact with the Kettering Foundation, which made it much easier to schedule interviews. Fourth, all three societies were recovering from major national traumas, which made the task of democratization extremely difficult, but at the same time lent an urgency to the democratic challenge.1 In South Africa, we interviewed staff from 20 democratization NGOs, including an NGO coalition and 2 civil-society coalitions with a significant interest in democracy.2 To gain perspective, I also interviewed one official of a parastatal organization, one former government official, one official from an INGO, and one independent consultant.3 Because one democratization NGO, IDASA, is the dominant player by far, nine interviews, including two group sessions, were with people who worked for IDASA, some of whom had knowledge of other democratization NGOs, particularly local members of the GGLN.4 In all, there were 32 interviews and 2 group meetings. Through the interviews, the Internet, and a literature search, I identified and researched 29 other NGOs, local and national, with some interest in democracy. Some of these are no longer

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active, others are locally based members of the GGLN, and still others have only a partial focus on democracy. Obviously, the line between democratization NGOs and other intermediary NGOs is not always clear. Some organizations, for example, have many programs, not all of which focus on democracy. It seems likely, therefore, that the organizations interviewed comprise a strong plurality, rather than a sample of democratization NGOs in South Africa. For the section on Tajikistan, I conducted 20 interviews with 18 people from democratization NGOs at the national level. I also attended one roundtable meeting on democracy that included NGO leaders, parliamentarians, and political-party representatives. Twelve additional interviews were conducted with local democratization NGOs, of which two were EDCs tied to a national NGO, PCDP.5 Because of the importance of international assistance to Tajikistan, Shamsiddin Karimov, my coordinator in Tajikistan, suggested supplementing these with four INGOs working on democratization, which could provide a different perspective. Three additional interviews with the press and two with press associations were useful in writing the introductory chapter on civil society in Tajikistan. The 39 interviews plus 3 group meetings included a substantial majority of the national democratization NGOs in Tajikistan. Human-rights organizations in Argentina comprise a larger percentage of democratization NGOs than in the other two countries, and in a random sample they would have been overrepresented. I conducted 26 interviews with 23 national democratization NGOs. They represented most of the national democratization NGOs, including the major humanrights organizations with budgets and real programs. I also interviewed four local democratization NGOs: three in Tucumán and one based in Buenos Aires province. Three additional organizations dealt with broader development issues, including democracy (Cruzada Patagonica, PENT, and Fundación SES). As in South Africa, INGOs were less relevant to democracy than in Tajikistan, and only one (FLACSO) was included. One government interview is also included. There were 32 interviews, including several with 2 people.

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IMPORTING DEMOCRACY

The organizations interviewed are not necessarily representative of other kinds of NGOs in each country, even though other NGOS may indirectly promote democratization in the course of pursuing their socioeconomic aims. Initial research on other countries, as well as other contacts made through the Kettering Foundation (see Appendix II), suggest that similar democratization NGOs exist in many other countries.

Endnotes 1

The author was in charge of the KF international fellows program from 2002-2005.

2

One of these was the local chapter of Amnesty International, which I considered national, because they work with Argentine volunteers on Argentine issues. 3

Of the 17, two were in Durban, with the rest nationally oriented. The CSOs interviewed included SANGOCO, the federation of intermediary NGOs, SACC, which has some programs related to democracy and the labor federation, COSATU. The INGO was the Open Society Foundation, which has a significant interest in civil society and democracy. An additional interview was with Adam Habib, then with the parastatal Human Sciences Research Council. The independent consultant was Steven Friedman. 4

Some of these organizations were omitted because they were not active.

5

One interview was with Gulchera Nosiriova, whose organization, which grew out of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, is no longer active.

INTERNATIONAL AED — Academy for Educational Development AKDN — Aga Khan Development Network AUSAID — Australian Aid Agency CCD — Council for a Community of Democracies CIS — Commonwealth of Independent States CIVICUS — World Alliance for Citizen Participation CIVITAS — Institute for the Study of Civil Society CODESERIA — Center for Democracy and Security in Africa DANIDA — Danish Foreign Assistance Agency

LIST OF ACRONYMS | 353

FLACSO — Latin American Faculty for Social Science IADN — Inter-American Democracy Network ICNL — International Center for Nonprofit Law IDEA — International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IFES — International Foundation for Electoral Systems IISD — International Institute for Sustained Dialogue ILO — International Labour Organisation IMF — International Monetary Fund IREX — International Research and Exchanges Board NDI — National Democratic Institute NED — National Endowment for Democracy NHRI — National Human Rights Institution OAS — Organization of American States OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSI — Open Society Institute PACT — Private Agencies Collaborating Together PDC — Partners for Democratic Change SADC — Southern African Development Community SIDA — Swedish International Development Agency TI — Transparency International UNDP — United Nations Development Programme UNHCR — United Nations Refugee Agency USAID — United States Agency for International Development WMD — World Movement for Democracy * Only those organizations mentioned in the text in conjunction with an acronym are listed here. Many Tajik NGOs are not listed, because they use their full name in the Tajik language rather than acronyms. Although Russian is the lingua franca in Tajikistan, it is not used in the names of NGOs. Some South African and Argentine NGOs also use their full names rather than acronyms. ** See Appendix III, more countries and democratization NGOs.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIES

GENERAL EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE to ensure that the URLs in this book are accurate and up to date. However, with the rapid changes that occur on the World Wide Web, it is inevitable that some pages or other resources will have been discontinued or moved, and some content modified or reorganized. The publisher recommends that readers who cannot find the sources or information they seek with the URLs listed here use one of the numerous search engines available on the Internet. Albrow, Martin, and Hakan Seckinelgin, eds. Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. Anheier, Helmut. “Of Ties, Holes and Folds: The Power of Transnational Civil Society Networks.” In Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice, edited by Martin Albrow and Hakan Seckinelgin, 62-63. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. Ashoka. Leading Social Entrepreneurs. Ashoka, 2004. Ashoka. Leading Social Entrepreneurs. Ashoka, 2009. Barber, Benjamin R. “From Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age.” In The Civil Society Reader, edited by Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley, 234-254. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2003. Berman, Sheri. “Civil Society and the Collapse of Weimar Germany.” World Politics 48, no. 3 (April 1997): 401-429. Blair, Harry. “Gauging Civil Society Advocacy: Charting Pluralist Pathways.” In Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences, edited by Peter Burnell, 171-192. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2007. Booth, John A., and Mitchell Seligson. Political Participation in Latin America: Citizen and State. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978.

The following websites were also beneficial but cannot now be accessed: www.realclearworld.com/.../2009/.../20/solving_argentinas_dirty_war_ mysteries.html http://cpr.org.ar/

“IN THIS STUDY­—steeped in history and culture, and filled with detail about the efforts of local and national democratization NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina—Julie Fisher does a masterful job providing a rich tapestry tracing the evolution and political climates in which citizens build democratic practices. Such methods are messy, diverse, and subject to failure, but these democratization organizations are the connective tissue of growing civil societies.”

—VIRGINIA HODGKINSON

President, Mount Vernon at Home

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“DEMOCRATIZATION has been a worldwide phenomenon, yet its theorization has largely been a Western enterprise. This book is one of the few antidotes to this trend, not only by focusing on three distinct developing world contexts­—Argentina, South Africa, and Tajikistan— but also by bringing alive in its reflections and theorization the activities and voices of local actors in civic life within these societies.”

—ADAM HABIB

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Research, Innovation and Advancement University of Johannesburg

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“AT LAST, a book that convincingly demonstrates that civil society has a decisive role in the success of democratization processes.”