EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTSFIRST SECTIONCASE OF ROSELTRANS
v. RUSSIA (Application No. 60974/00)JUDGMENT (Strasbourg,
21.VII.2005)-------------------------------- This judgment
will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.In the case of
Roseltrans v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Mr C.L. Rozakis,
President, Mr L. Loucaides, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mr P.
Lorenzen, Mrs {N. Vajic} ,
-------------------------------- Здесь и далее по
тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными
скобками.Mrs S. Botoucharova, Mr A. Kovler, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in
private on 30 June 2005, Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an
application (No. 60974/00) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by Rossiyskiy Electrotransport, also
known as Roseltrans, a Russian open joint-stock company ("the applicant
company"), on 14 August 2000. 2. The applicant company was represented
by Mr A.A. Pavlov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government ("the
Government") were represented by Mr P.A. Laptev, Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3. The applicant
company alleged, in particular, that a judgment in its favour was quashed in
supervisory review proceedings, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. 4. The application was allocated to the First Section of the
Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber
that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted
as provided in Rule 26 § 1. 5. By a decision of 27 May 2004, the Court
declared the application partly admissible. 6. The applicant company and
the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber
having decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was
required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the parties replied in writing to each other"s
observations. 7. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of
its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First
Section (Rule 52 § 1).THE FACTSI. The circumstances of the case8. The applicant is a Russian open joint-stock company which was set up in
Moscow in 1994 by the Federal Ministry of State Property Management ("the
Ministry") in pursuance of a directive from the President of Russia and a
Government decree. Its purpose was to hold shares of former state enterprises
which produced electrical equipment for the railways. The applicant company"s
initial capital was formed by State property. Various individuals and private
companies also became shareholders at a subsequent point. 9. On 14
November 1995, following a directive to that effect by the President of Russia,
the Ministry adopted a resolution by which the applicant company was liquidated
and a liquidation committee was appointed. 10. The applicant company,
represented by its director general, joined proceedings brought by one of its
minority shareholders before the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow seeking to
have the Ministry"s resolution of 14 November 1995 and a number of follow-up
resolutions declared void. 11. The applicant company asked the District
Court to issue an interim injunction prohibiting liquidation pending a trial and
to strip the liquidation committee of its powers. On 29 October 1998 the
District Court issued the injunction. It also prohibited the liquidation
committee from acting on behalf of the applicant company in legal
proceedings. 12. On 17 May 2000 the District Court found in favour of
the applicant company and its co-plaintiffs. The court noted that the decision
to liquidate the applicant company was one that could be taken only by a general
assembly of its shareholders. The Ministry held less than 50% of the applicant
company"s shares at the material time, and its decision to liquidate the
applicant company ran counter to the law. The court held that the resolution of
14 November 1995 and the follow-up resolutions were void and ordered the
Ministry to annul them. The Ministry did not appeal and the judgment came into
force on 28 May 2000. 13. Some time later the Ministry successfully
applied for intervention in the proceedings by the Moscow public prosecutor. On
10 April 2001 the prosecutor lodged an application for supervisory review
(протест в порядке надзора) of the judgment of 17 May
2000, seeking to have it set aside. 14. On 10 May 2001, further to the
prosecutor"s request, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, which was composed
of five judges, reviewed the case. The court heard submissions from the acting
public prosecutor of Moscow, who supported the request. The applicant company
did not attend the hearing as it had not been informed that it was to be
held. 15. Referring to the outcome of other proceedings before different
courts in 1997 - 1999, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court stated that the
Ministry had been the sole shareholder of the applicant company at the material
time. It was thus empowered to take a decision on liquidating the applicant
company in accordance with the relevant substantive law. The director general
had no authority to bring proceedings on behalf of the applicant company, since
his authority had been ended by the ministerial resolutions in dispute. The
District Court should have ensured that the liquidation committee took part in
the proceedings. Its failure to do so had made it impossible to establish all
the facts which were relevant for the proper examination of the case.
16. The Presidium of the Moscow City Court granted the prosecutor"s request,
quashed the judgment of 17 May 2000 and ordered a fresh examination of the case
by the Lyublinskiy District Court, with a different composition. 17. The
applicant company was not served with either a copy of the prosecutor"s request
or a copy of the decision of 10 May 2001. It learned of those developments in
October 2001. 18. Following jurisdictional changes the case was
transferred to the Commercial Court of Moscow, which examined it on 25 March
2003. That court held that the fact that the proceedings had been brought by the
applicant company, in the person of its director general, was consistent with
the applicant company"s regulations. The director general had never been
relieved of his post through an established procedure. The dispute originated in
the liquidation of the applicant company and concerned, inter alia, the
lawfulness of the liquidation committee"s appointment. That being the case, the
applicant company could not be deprived of its right to a court and its action
ought to be examined. The court further held that the Ministry had not been the
sole shareholder of the applicant company and that it had had no authority under
the legislation to liquidate the applicant company unilaterally. 19. By
a decision of 25 March 2003, the Commercial Court of Moscow found for the
applicant company and its co-plaintiffs. It declared void the resolution of 14
November 1995 and the follow-up resolutions and ordered the Ministry to annul
them. The Ministry did not appeal and the judgment entered into force on 25
April 2003.II. Relevant domestic law20. The Court"s judgment in the
case of Ryabykh v. Russia contains the following description of the relevant
domestic law concerning supervisory review proceedings, which also applied in
the present case (see Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 31 - 42, ECHR
2003-IX): "Under the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force at
the material time, judgments became final as follows:Article 208Coming into force of judgments"Court judgments shall become legally
binding on the expiration of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal if no
such appeal has been lodged. If the judgment is not quashed following a
cassation appeal, it shall become legally binding when the higher court delivers
its decision...." The only further means of recourse was the special
supervisory review procedure that enabled courts to reopen final judgments
(пересмотр в порядке судебного надзора):Article 319Judgments, decisions and rulings amenable to
supervisory review"Final judgments, decisions and rulings of all Russian
courts shall be amenable to supervisory review on an application lodged by the
officials listed in Article 320 of the Code." The power of officials to
lodge an application (протест) depended on their rank and territorial
jurisdiction:Article 320Officials who may initiate supervisory
review"Applications may be lodged by: (1) the Prosecutor General -
against judgments, decisions and rulings of any court; (2) the President
of the Supreme Court - against rulings of the Presidium of the Supreme Court and
judgments and decisions of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court acting as a
court of first instance; (3) Deputy Prosecutors General - against
judgments, decisions and rulings of any court other than rulings of the
Presidium of the Supreme Court; (4) Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court
- against judgments and decisions of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court
acting as a court of first instance; (5) the Prosecutor General, Deputy
Prosecutor General, the President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court -
against judgments, decisions and rulings of any court other than rulings of the
Presidium of the Supreme Court; (6) the President of the Supreme Court
of an autonomous republic, a regional court, a city court, a court of an
autonomous region or a court of an autonomous district, the public prosecutor of
an autonomous republic, a region, a city, an autonomous region or an autonomous
district - against judgments and decisions of district (city) people"s courts
and against decisions of civil divisions of, respectively, the Supreme Court of
an autonomous republic, regional court, city court, court of an autonomous
region or court of an autonomous district that examined the case on appeal." The power to lodge such applications was discretionary, that is to say it
was solely for the official concerned to decide whether or not a particular case
warranted supervisory review. Under Article 322 officials listed in
Article 320 who considered that a case deserved closer examination could, in
certain circumstances, obtain the case file in order to establish whether good
grounds for lodging an application existed. Article 323 of the Code
empowered the relevant officials to stay the execution of the judgment, decision
or ruling in question until the supervisory review proceedings had been
completed. Article 324 of the Code provided that the official concerned
should draft the application and forward it - in sufficient copies for each of
the parties - with the case file to the relevant court. Article 325 read
as follows: "The parties... shall be served copies of the application.
If circumstances so require, the parties... shall be informed of the time and
place of the hearing. The copies of the application shall be served on
the parties by the court [examining the application]. The court shall give the
parties sufficient time before the hearing to submit a written reply to the
application and any additional material." Under Article 328 of the Code,
proceedings on an application for supervisory review were normally oral and the
parties were invited to make comments once the judge concerned had reported to
the court. Courts hearing applications for supervisory review had
extensive jurisdiction in respect of final judgments:Article 329Powers of supervisory review courts"The court that examines an
application for supervisory review may: (1) uphold the judgment,
decision or ruling and dismiss the application; (2) quash all or part of
the judgment, decision or ruling and order a fresh examination of the case at
first or cassation instance; (3) quash all or part of the judgment,
decision or ruling and terminate the proceedings or leave the claim
undecided; (4) uphold any of the previous judgments, decisions or
rulings in the case; (5) quash or vary the judgment of the court of
first or cassation instance or of a court that has carried out supervisory
review and deliver a new judgment without remitting the case for re-examination
if substantive laws have been erroneously construed and applied." The
grounds for setting aside final judgments were as follows:Article 330Grounds for setting aside judgments on supervisory review"...
(1) wrongful application or interpretation of substantive laws; (2)
significant breach of procedural rules which led to the delivery of an unlawful
judgment, decision or ruling..." There was no time-limit for lodging an
application for supervisory review, and, in principle, such applications could
be lodged at any time after a judgment had become final."THE LAW1.
Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention21. The applicant
company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the decision of
the Presidium of the Moscow City Court of 10 May 2001 had set aside the judgment
in its favour by the Lyublinskiy District Court of 17 May 2000. It also
complained that the proceedings before the Presidium of the Moscow City Court
had been unfair in that the decision had been taken in its absence and that it
had not been afforded an opportunity to submit observations in response to the
prosecutor"s request that the judgment be quashed. The relevant part of
Article 6 § 1 reads as follows: "In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing...
by [a] tribunal..." 22. The Government stated that the Presidium of the
Moscow City Court had quashed the judgment in question and ordered a fresh
examination of the case because the substantive law had been wrongly applied and
there had been fundamental breaches of procedural law. That decision had
complied fully with Article 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. The
applicant company maintained its complaint. It submitted, inter alia, that the
proceedings