1.
To mention only two of these intermediate positions: van Fraassen (1980)
accepts a realist semantics for scientific statements but contests
that science is aiming at true theories. Dummett's antirealism
suggests replacing the notion of truth by provability or warranted
assertibility (Dummett 1978; Wright 1993). This alternative to
realist semantics has never been worked out for scientific theories
in due detail, however.

2. An important difference
between Przelecki (1969, Ch. 6) and Andreas (2010) is that only the
former requires those sentences that indirectly interpret a symbol
to be analytic. This requirement is not in line with Carnap's (1958)
view that the analytic-synthetic distinction is not applicable to
the single axioms of a scientific theory. Przelecki's (1969)
account, however, is more general than that of Andreas (2010) in
that it does not assume a complete interpretation of the basic
language L(V-o). The merits of both accounts can
easily be combined.