"To attribute to others the identical sentiments
that guide oneself is never to understand others."  Gustav Le Bon

Over the past several decades, quietly, without media attention, many Americans in diverse
fields of activity have been pressured into silence, and failing silence, have been
removed from their positions or excommunicated from a chosen profession. These men range
from historians in Department of State, top level officials in Department of Commerce,
engineers working for IBM, to academics in America's leading universities.

In each case threats and pressures which led to censorship, firing, and
excommunication track back to the deaf mute blindmen, and their associates in political
Washington.

Who are the deaf mute blindmen?

The Russian revolutionary Vladimir Ilych (Ulyanov) Lenin coined the
phrase, and whatever we think of Lenin's revolutionary philosophy, we cannot deny his
genius in the analysis of capitalists and their motivations. Here is Lenin on the
"deaf mute blindmen."

The Capitalists of the world and their governments, in pursuit of
conquest of the Soviet market, will close their eyes to the indicated higher reality and
thus will turn into deaf mute blindmen. They will extend credits, which will
strengthen for us the Communist Party in their countries and giving us the materials and
technology we lack, they will restore our military industry, indispensable for our future
victorious attacks on our suppliers. In other words, they will labor for the
preparation for their own suicide.1

The Suppressed Higher Reality

What is this "higher reality" that Lenin identifies? It
is simply that the Soviet system cannot generate sufficient innovation and technology to
become a world power, yet Soviet global ambitions demand that its socialist system
challenge and surpass the capitalist systems of the West. Lenin deduced just before he
died in 1923 that Soviet communism had an Achilles heel, a fatal defect. In a remarkable
about-face Lenin then introduced the New Economic Policy, a return to limited free
enterprise and a prelude to a long-lasting cooperation with Western capitalists  the
deaf mute blindmen. This policy was repeated by Communist China in the early 1980s.

It is knowledge of this "higher reality" that has been
ruthlessly suppressed by successive Administrations under political pressure from
internationalist businessmen. The State Department, for example, has a disgraceful record
of attempting to black out information and present a false picture of historical events.
Under John Foster Dulles, Dr. G. Bernard Noble, a Rhodes scholar and an enemy of any
attempt to change the Establishment's party-line, was promoted to take charge of the
Historical Office at State Department. Two historians, Dr. Donald Dozer and Dr. Bryton
Barron, who protested the official policy of distorting information and suppressing
historical documents, were railroaded out of the State Department. Dr. Barron, in his
book, Inside the State Department,2specifically
charged the State Department with responsibility for the exportation of military
technology to the Soviet Union, and listed four examples of highly strategic tools whose
export to the USSR was urged by officials of the State Department.

1. Boring mills for manufacture of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and the
atomic reactors used in submarines.

2. Vertical boring mills for manufacture of jet engines.

3. Dynamic balance machines used to balance shafts on engines for jet
airplanes and guided missiles.

It should be evident that we cannot trust the present personnel of the
Department to apply our agreements in the nation's interest any more than we can trust it
to give us the full facts about our treaties and other international commitments.

Breathtakingly inaccurate are the only words that can describe State
Department claims regarding our military assistance to the Soviet Union. The general State
Department line is that the Soviets have a self-developed technology, that trade is always
peaceful, that we have controls on the export of strategic goods, and that there is no
conceivable relationship between our export to the Soviet Union and Soviet armaments
production·

An example will make the point. Here is a statement by Ambassador
Trezise to the Senate:

Ambassador Trezise: We, I think, are sometimes
guilty, Senator, of a degree of false and unwarranted pride in our industrial and
technological might, a kind of arrogance, if you will · . . we are ahead of the Soviet
Union in many areas of industry and technology. But a nation that can accomplish the
scientific and technological feats the Soviet Union has accomplished in recent years is
clearly not a primitive, mudhut economy .... It is a big, vigorous, strong, and highly
capable national entity, and its performance in the space field and in other fields has
given us every indication that Soviet engineers, technicians, scientists, are in the
forefront of the scientists, engineers, technicians of the world.

Senator Muskie: So that the urge towards
increased trade with Eastern European countries has not resulted in a weakening of the
restrictions related to strategic goods?

Ambassador Trezise:I think that is an accurate statement,
Senator.

Now we have, we think, quite an effective system of handling items
which are in the military area or so closely related thereto that they become strategic
items by everybody's agreement.

In fact, at the very time Trezise was making the above soothing
statement, critical shipments of strategic materials and equipment were going forward to
the Soviet Union. The so-called Export Control laws were a leaky sieve due to outright
inefficiency in Departments of State and Commerce.

Censorship has enabled politically appointed officials and the
permanent Washington bureaucracy to make such unbelievably inaccurate statements without
fear of challenge in Congress or by the American public.

The State Department files are crammed with information concerning U.S.
technical and economic assistance to the Soviet Union. The author of this book required
three substantial volumes (see Bibliography) just to summarize this assistance for the
years 1917-1970. Yet former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, presumably acting on the advice
of State Department researchers, stated in 1961, "It would seem clear that the Soviet
Union derives only the most marginal help in its economic development from the amount of
U.S. goods it receives." A statement flatly contradictory to the massive evidence
available in departmental files.

In 1968 Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Assistant Secretary of State, made a
statement that was similarly inconsistent with observable fact, and displayed a
fundamental lack of common-sense reasoning:

We should have no illusions. If we do not sell peaceful goods to the
nations of Eastern Europe, others will. If we erect barriers to our trade with Eastern
Europe, we will lose the trade and Eastern Europe will buy elsewhere. But we will not make
any easier our task of stopping aggression in Vietnam nor in building security for the
United States.3

In fact, aggression in South Vietnam would have been impossible without
U.S. assistance to the Soviet Union. Much of the key "European" technology cited
derives from U.S. subsidiaries.

Jack N. Behrman, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs at the Department of Commerce, repeated the same theme on behalf of the Commerce
Department:

This is the old problem of economic dependency. However, I do not
believe that Russia would in fact permit herself to become dependent upon imported sources
of strategic goods. Rather she would import amounts additional to her strategic needs,
thereby relieving the pressure on her economy by not risking dependence.4

In fact, Jack Behrman to the contrary notwithstanding, Soviet Russia is
the most dependent large nation in modern history, for wheat as well as technology.

Here's another statement from former Secretary of Commerce Maurice H.
Stans:

Q: Is there danger of this country's helping the
Russians build a war potential that might be turned against the interests of the free
world?

A: Under the circumstances, we might be very foolish
not to accept business which could create jobs in the United States, when refusing to sell
to the Soviet Union would in no way deter their progress.5

Information suppression concerning Soviet relations with the United
States may be found in all administrations, Democrat and Republican, from President Wilson
to President Reagan. For example, on November 28, 1917, just a few weeks after the
Petrograd and Moscow Bolsheviks had overthrown the democratic and constitutional
government of Russia, "Colonel" House (then in Paris) intervened on behalf of
the Bolsheviks and cabled President Wilson and the Secretary of State in the "Special
Green" cipher of the State Department as follows:

There has been cabled over and published here [Paris] statements made
by American papers to the effect that Russia should be treated as an enemy. It is
exceedingly important that such criticisms should be suppressed...6

Suppression of information critical of the Soviet Union and our
military assistance to the Soviets may be traced in the State Department files from this
1917 House cable down to the present day, when export licenses issued for admittedly
military equipment exports to the USSR are not available for public information. In fact,
Soviet sources must be used to trace the impact of some American technology on Soviet
military development. The Soviet Register of Shipping, for example, publishes the
technical specifications of main engines in Russian vessels (including country of
manufacture): this information is not available from U.S. official sources. In November
1971, Krasnaya Zvezda published an article with specific reference to the
contribution of the basic Soviet industrial structure to the Soviet military power 
a contribution that representatives of the U.S. Executive Branch have explicitly denied to
the public and to Congress.

Even today U.S. assistance to the Soviet military-industrial complex
and its weapons systems cannot be documented from open U.S. sources alone because export
license memoranda are classified data. Unless the technical nature of our shipments to the
USSR is known, it is impossible to determine their contribution to the Soviet military
complex. The national security argument is not acceptable as a defense for classification
because the Soviets know what they are buying. So does the United States government. So do
U.S. firms. So do the deaf mute blindmen. The group left out in the cold is the American
taxpayer-voter.

From time to time bills have been introduced in Congress to make
export-license information freely available. These bills have never received
Administration support. Nonavailability of current information means that decisions
affecting all Americans are made by a relatively few government officials without
impartial outside scrutiny, and under political pressure from internationlist businessmen.
In many cases these decisions would not be sustained if subjected to public examination
and criticism. It is argued by policy-makers that decisions affecting national security
and international relations cannot be made in a goldfish bowl. The obvious answer to this
is the history of the past seventy years: we have had one catastrophic international
problem after another  and in the light of history, the outcome would have been far
less costly if the decisions had been made in a goldfish bowl.

For instance, little more than a decade after House's appeal to Wilson,
Senator Smoot inquired of the State Department about the possible military end-uses of an
aluminum powder plant to be erected in the Soviet Union by W. Hahn, an American engineer.
State Department files contain a recently declassified document which states why no reply
was ever given to Senator Smoot:

No reply was made to Senator Smoot by the Department as the Secretary
did not desire to indicate that the Department had no objection to the rendering by Mr.
Hahn of technical assistance to the Soviet authorities in the production of aluminum
powder, in view of the possibility of its use as war material, and preferred to take no
position at the time in regard to the matter.7

Congressional action in the Freedom on Information Act and
administrative claims of speedy declassification have not changed this basic situation.
Major significant documents covering the history of the past seventy years are buried, and
they will remain buried until an outraged public opinion puts some pressure on Congress.

Congress has on the other hand investigated and subsequently published
several reports on the export of strategic materials to the Soviet Union. One such
instance, called "a life and death matter" by Congress, concerned the proposed
shipment of ball bearing machines to the USSR.8 The Bryant
Chucking Grinder Company accepted a Soviet order for thirty-five Centalign-B machines for
processing miniature ball bearings. All such precision ball bearings in the United States,
used by the Department of Defense for missile guidance systems, were processed on
seventy-two Bryant Centalign Model-B machines.

In 1961 the Department of Commerce approved export of
thirty-five such machines to the USSR, which would have given the Soviets capability about
equal to 50 percent of the U.S. capability.

The Soviets had no equipment for such mass production processing, and
neither the USSR nor any European manufacturer could manufacture such equipment. A
Department of Commerce statement that there were other manufacturers was shown to be
inaccurate. Commerce proposed to give the Soviet Union an ability to use its higher-thrust
rockets with much greater accuracy and so pull ahead of the United States. Subsequently, a
congressional investigation yielded accurate information not otherwise available to
independent nongovernment researchers and the general public.

Congressional investigations have also unearthed extraordinary
"errors" of judgment by high officials. For example, in 1961 a dispute arose in
U.S. government circles over the "Transfermatic Case"  a proposal to ship
to the USSR two transfer lines (with a total value of $4.3 million) for the production of
truck engines.

In a statement dated February 23, 1961, the Department of Defense went
on record against shipment of the transfer lines on the grounds that "the technology
contained in these Transfermatic machines produced in the United States is the most
advanced in the world," and that "so far as this department knows, the USSR has
not installed this type of machinery. The receipt of this equipment by the USSR will
contribute to the Soviet military and economic warfare potential." This argument was
arbitrarily overturned by the incoming Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Secretary
McNamara did not allow for the known fact that most Soviet military trucks came from two
American-built plants even then receiving equipment from the United States. The
Transfermatic machines approved by McNamara had clear and obvious military uses  as
the Department of Defense had previously argued. Yet McNamara allowed them to go forward.

Yet another calculated deception of the American public can be traced
to the Johnson Administration. In 1966 the U.S. Department of State produced a beautiful,
extravagantly illustrated brochure of American hand tools. This was printed in Russian,
for distribution in Russia, with a preface  in Russian  by Lyndon Johnson.
Requests to the State Department for a copy of this brochure went unanswered. The book is
not listed in official catalogues of government publications. It is not available or even
known to the general public. No printer's name appears on the back cover. The publisher is
not listed. The author obtained a copy from Russia. Here is the preface:

Welcome to the "Hand Tools  USA" exhibit  the
eighth consecutive exhibit arranged for citizens of the Soviet Union.

At this exhibit you will see samples of various hand tools currently
manufactured in the United States  tools that facilitate manual work and make it
possible to produce better-quality industrial goods at a much lower cost.

Since the very early days of the history of our country, Americans of
all ages have worked with hand tools. In industry and at home, in factories and on farms,
in workshops and schools, the hand tool has become indispensable in our lives.

Some of these tools have retained their original simplicity of design;
others have acquired entirely new forms and are now used to perform new functions.

We sincerely hope that this exhibit will lead to a better understanding
of the American people and their way of life.

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Why all the secrecy? Imagine the public reaction in 1966, when the Soviets were supplying
the North Viets with weapons to kill Americans (over 5,000 were killed that year), if it
had become known that the State Department had published lavish booklets in Russian for
free distribution in Russia at taxpayers' expense.

However, the point at issue is not the wisdom of publication, but the
wisdom of concealment. The public is not told because the public might protest. In other
words, the public cannot be trusted to see things in the same light as the policymakers,
and the policymakers are unwilling to defend their positions.

Further, what would have been the domestic political consequences if it
had been known that a U.S. President had signed a document in Russian, lavishly produced
at the taxpayers' expense for free distribution in Russia, while Russian weapons were
killing Americans in Vietnam with assistance from our own deaf mute blindmen? The
citizen-taxpayer does not share the expensive illusions of the Washington elite., The
political reaction by the taxpayer, and his few supporters in Congress, would have been
harsh and very much to the point.

The key party interested in concealment of information about our
export to the Soviet Union is, of course, the American firms and individuals prominently
associated with such exports, i.e., the deaf mute blindmen themselves.

In general, the American public has a basic right to know what is being
shipped and who is shipping it, if the Soviets are using the material against us. The
public also has a right to know about the personal interests of presidential appointees
and previous employment with firms prominent in trade with the USSR.

Until recently, the firms involved could publicly claim ignorance of
the use to which the Soviets put imported Western technology. It is not a good claim, but
it was made. From the 1970's on, ignorance of end-use is not a valid claim. The evidence
is clear, overwhelming, and readily available: the Soviets have used American technology
to kill Americans and their allies.

The claim that publication of license information would give undue
advantage to competitors is not the kind of argument that an honest businessman would
make. It is only necessary to publish certain basic elementary information: date, name of
firm, amount, destination in the USSR, and a brief statement of the technical aspects.
Every industry has a "grapevine" and potential business in an industry is always
common knowledge.

In any event, suppose there was adverse comment about a
particular sale to the Soviets? Is this a bad thing? If our policies are indeed viable,
why fear public opinion? Or are certain sectors of our society to be immune from public
criticism?

Soviet dependency on our technology, and their use of this technology
for military purposes, could have been known to Congress on a continuing basis in the
1950s and 1960s if export license information had been freely available. The problem was
suspected, but the compilation of the proof had to wait several decades until the evidence
became available from Soviet sources. In the meantime, Administration and business
spokesmen were able to make absurd statements to Congress without fear of challenge. In
general, only those who had already made up their minds that Soviet trade was desirable
had access to license information. These were the deaf mute blindmen only able to see
their own conception of events and blind to the fact that we had contributed to
construction of Soviet military power.

In 1968, for example, the Gleason Company of Rochester, New York
shipped equipment to the Gorki automobile plant in Russia, a plant previously built by the
Ford Motor Company. The information about shipment did not come from 'the censored
licenses but from foreign press sources. Knowledge of license application for any
equipment to be used to Gorki would have elicited vigorous protests to Congress. Why?
Because the Gorki plant produces a wide range of military vehicles and equipment. Many of
the trucks used on the Ho Chi Minh trail were GAZ vehicles from Gorki. The
rocket-launchers used against Israel are mounted on GAZ-69 chassis made at Gorki. They
have Ford-type engines made at Gorki.

Thus, a screen of censorship vigorously supported by multinational
businessmen has withheld knowledge of a secret shift in direction of U.S. foreign policy.
This shift can be summarized as follows:

1. Our long-run technical assistance to the Soviet Union has built a
first-order military threat to our very existence.

2. Our lengthy history of technical assistance to the Soviet military
structure was known to successive administrations, but has only recently (1982) been
admitted to Congress or to the American public.

3. Current military assistance is also known, but is admitted only on a
case-by-case basis when information to formulate a question can be obtained from
nongovernment sources.

4. As a general rule, detailed data on export licenses, which are
required to establish the continuing and long-run dependence of the Soviet
military-industrial complex on the United States, have been made available to Congress
only by special request, and have been denied completely to the American public at large.

In brief, all presidential administrations, from that of Woodrow Wilson
to that of Ronald Reagan, have followed a bipartisan foreign policy of building up the
Soviet Union. This policy is censored. It is a policy of suicide.

Persistent pressure from nongovernmental researchers and knowledgeable
individuals has today forced the Administration to at least publicly acknowledge the
nature of the problem but still do very little about it. For instance, in an interview on
March 8, 1982, William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made the
following revealing statement:

We have determined that the Soviet strategic advances depend on Western
technology to a far greater degree than anybody ever dreamed of. It just doesn't make any
sense for us to spend additional billions of dollars to protect ourselves against the
capabilities that the Soviets have developed largely by virtue of having pretty much of a
free ride on our research and development.

They use every method you can imagine  purchase, legal and
illegal; theft; bribery; espionage; scientific exchange; study of trade press, and
invoking the Freedom of Information Act  to get this information.

We found that scientific exchange is a big hole. We send scholars or
young people to the Soviet Union to study Pushkin poetry; they send a 45-year-old man out
of their KGB or defense establishment to exactly the schools and the professors who are
working on sensitive technologies.

The KGB has developed a large, independent, specialized organization
which does nothing but work on getting access to Western science and technology. They have
been recruiting about 100 young scientists and engineers a year for the last 15 years.
They roam the world looking for technology to pick up.

Back in Moscow there are 400 or 500 assessing what they might need and
where they might get it  doing their targeting and then assessing what they get.
It's a very sophisticated and farflung operation.10

Unfortunately, Mr. Casey, who pleads surprise at the discovery, is
still concealing the whole story. This author (not alone) made this known to Department of
Defense over 15 years ago, with a request for information to develop the
full nature of the problem. This exchange of letters is reproduced as Appendix A. Nothing
was done in 1971. In the past 15 years there has been a superficial change  the
Reagan Administration is now willing to admit the existence of the
problem. It has not yet been willing to face the policy challenge. Until the deaf mute
blindmen are neutralized, our assistance for Soviet strategic advances will continue.

10United
States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and
Soviet Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th
Congress Second Session, May 1982, Washington, D.C., p. 55.