South Carolina Appellate Law Blog

Saturday, December 13, 2008

Well, I have left private practice and have taken a job with the US Attorney's Office. In light of my career change, this blog is shutting down. Thanks to everyone who dropped by for the latest SC legal news.

Monday, December 01, 2008

"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."

Clinton was in the Senate when a pay increase passed for Secretary of State. Thus, under this clause, she is not eligible for the office. This situation has come up in the past and Congress has simply passed a law reducing the salary to what it was before.

William W. “Billy” Wilkins successfully argued against a motion in a shareholder suit against South Financial that asked for a temporary restraining order barring retirement payments to retired CEO Mack Whittle as part of a an agreement that the suit alleges is “unconscionable” and could threaten the company’s solvency if carried out.

The agreement would pay Whittle $10 million following his retirement in October, attorneys said in court Tuesday during a hearing before Circuit Judge John Few, who denied shareholder Vernon Mercier’s request for the restraining order.Not surprisingly, Wilkins's stock as an advocate is rising.

Monday, November 17, 2008

Last week, the United States Supreme Court issued its first opinion of the new term: Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. This case concerned the Navy’s use of mid frequency active sonar, which transmits sound waves at various frequencies. This type of sonar is used in Naval exercises, including training and tracking of submarines. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction imposing restrictions on the Navy’s sonar training, even though the record contained no evidence that marine mammals have been harmed by the activity. In arguing against the injunction, the Navy emphasized that it had used sonar during training exercises off the coast of California for forty (40) years, without a single documented injury to a marine mammal.

The injunction issued based on the Navy’s alleged violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires federal agencies to the fullest extent possible to draft an environmental impact statement for every major federal action affecting the quality of the human environment. The areas of the injunction that were in contention required the sonar to be shut down when a marine mammal was spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel, and the requirement that the sonar be powered down during significant surface ducting conditions, in which sound travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences in adjacent layers of water.

In reversing and vacating the injunction, the Supreme Court noted that the District Court and Court of Appeals held that when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm. The Supreme Court held that the preliminary injunction standard requires plaintiff seeking relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. The issuing of a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the court’s characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may be awarded upon a clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to such relief.

The Supreme Court went on to note that even if the plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury from the training exercises, such an injury was outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. The court cited testimony from several Naval officers who emphasized that realistic training cannot be accomplished under the two challenged for civic restrictions imposed by the District Court.

Tuesday, November 04, 2008

In Drury Development v. Foundation Insurance, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the following certified question: whether a judgment against a corporation is a prerequisite to an alter ego claim. This question has come up often in South Carolina. Frequently, plaintiffs attempt to demand many financial documents of a corporation early in discovery on the basis of an alter ego claim. Defendants often counter that this discovery is premature and improper because no judgment has been entered against the corporation and therefore the issue of veil piercing cannot come up.

Noting that veil-piercing is a form of equitable relief, the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to impose "rigid rules of law to seek substantial justice." The court ultimately held that "so long as the plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss as to the corporate liability claims and the alter ego claim, the trial court should move forward to determination of both matters."

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

In McCrea v. Gheraibeh, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the denial of a Batson Motion and remanded the case for a new trial. This case arose out of an automobile accident. When three of six potential black jurors were struck, a Batson Motion was made. During the hearing, the lawyer striking the jurors stated that he struck one man with dreadlocks because he was uneasy about him. In accepting counsel’s explanation, the trial court stated that he knew both of the attorneys, was aware of their reputations in the community, and that he did not believe that the attorney would engage in racially high motivated conducted. Therefore, the trial judge accepted the “uneasiness” argument regarding the dreadlocks.

In reversing on grounds of Batson, the Supreme Court held that uneasiness over dreadlocks was not a race-neutral reason for striking someone. Regardless of their gradual infiltration into mainstream American society, the court stated that dreadlocks retained their roots as a religious and social symbol of black culture. Hence, no race-neutral reason for striking the juror was offered.