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Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 31 Fall 2013

page 39

Review of George Santayana's
Philosophy of Religion
George Santayana's Philosophy of Religion: His Roman Catholic Influences and
Phenomenology
Edward W. Lovely (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012)
Last December a welcome new book on Santayana's philosophy was
published, George Santayana's Philosophy ofReligion: His Roman Catholic
Influences and Phenomenology by Edward W. Lovely (Lexington Books,
2012). Lovely's book invites a dialogue with philosophers of religion, as well
as established Santayana scholars. He argues for an un-proclaimed but evident
"phenomenological method" in Santayana's philosophy, and thoughtfully highlights
its uniquely naturalistic account of spirituality that speaks more than ever to today's
religiously inclined. Outside of contemporary fundamentalist religious factions
(which, as Lovely acknowledges, Santayana's thinking wisely and justifiably
condemns), Santayana's philosophy speaks to two crucial groups of the religiously
inclined in contemporary life: those "disillusioned" by the mockery made of religion
by political culture wars, and those religiously committed "who would find spiritual
solace by drawing closer to the symbols and discipline of organized religion"
(212). These features alone make Lovely's book worthwhile, and yet there are
other respects in which his book ought to invite fruitful critical consideration from
Santayana scholars.
As stated, Lovely's main objective in the book is to make a case for Santayana's
"phenomenology," regarding which he provides interesting comparative suggestions,
ones that offer many interesting possibilities for future consideration. The book's
third chapter, in which the case is made, cautions that it is "only a beginning" and "a
[future] more extensive scholarly effort is required (and invited) to rigorously define
the nature of Santayana's phenomenological bent" (83). Lovely is careful to note
that the evidence for phenomenological aspects in Santayana's thinking is "subtle
. . . abbreviated," but is willing to submit the bold conclusion that Santayana's
mature philosophy is an "unstructured phenomenology of the spirit" (118). Lovely
reaches this conclusion by way of comparative associations between Santayana's
conception of essence and of what he views to be kindred conceptions in the work of
Whitehead, Peirce, Heidegger, and James. These interesting comparative exercises
build into a fairly in-depth cross comparison of the thinking of Santayana and
Husserl, wherein Lovely identifies the important differences and similarities in their
respective treatments of the "intentional object" of consciousness. At one important
point Lovely cites a passage from SAF that reflects Santayana's understanding of
knowledge and intentional signification as it relates to the intuition of essences.
Santayana's claim, readers of his philosophy will appreciate, is that there can never
be "two givens" or two distinct essences present to intuition — intuition is pure in
its solipsistic reduction of consciousness to the present moment, to a complete, bare
present; any relational move on the part of consciousness that involves "comparisons
of givens" is a move in the direction of intent—that is, in the direction of knowledge.

Review of George Santayana's
Philosophy of Religion
George Santayana's Philosophy of Religion: His Roman Catholic Influences and
Phenomenology
Edward W. Lovely (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012)
Last December a welcome new book on Santayana's philosophy was
published, George Santayana's Philosophy ofReligion: His Roman Catholic
Influences and Phenomenology by Edward W. Lovely (Lexington Books,
2012). Lovely's book invites a dialogue with philosophers of religion, as well
as established Santayana scholars. He argues for an un-proclaimed but evident
"phenomenological method" in Santayana's philosophy, and thoughtfully highlights
its uniquely naturalistic account of spirituality that speaks more than ever to today's
religiously inclined. Outside of contemporary fundamentalist religious factions
(which, as Lovely acknowledges, Santayana's thinking wisely and justifiably
condemns), Santayana's philosophy speaks to two crucial groups of the religiously
inclined in contemporary life: those "disillusioned" by the mockery made of religion
by political culture wars, and those religiously committed "who would find spiritual
solace by drawing closer to the symbols and discipline of organized religion"
(212). These features alone make Lovely's book worthwhile, and yet there are
other respects in which his book ought to invite fruitful critical consideration from
Santayana scholars.
As stated, Lovely's main objective in the book is to make a case for Santayana's
"phenomenology," regarding which he provides interesting comparative suggestions,
ones that offer many interesting possibilities for future consideration. The book's
third chapter, in which the case is made, cautions that it is "only a beginning" and "a
[future] more extensive scholarly effort is required (and invited) to rigorously define
the nature of Santayana's phenomenological bent" (83). Lovely is careful to note
that the evidence for phenomenological aspects in Santayana's thinking is "subtle
. . . abbreviated," but is willing to submit the bold conclusion that Santayana's
mature philosophy is an "unstructured phenomenology of the spirit" (118). Lovely
reaches this conclusion by way of comparative associations between Santayana's
conception of essence and of what he views to be kindred conceptions in the work of
Whitehead, Peirce, Heidegger, and James. These interesting comparative exercises
build into a fairly in-depth cross comparison of the thinking of Santayana and
Husserl, wherein Lovely identifies the important differences and similarities in their
respective treatments of the "intentional object" of consciousness. At one important
point Lovely cites a passage from SAF that reflects Santayana's understanding of
knowledge and intentional signification as it relates to the intuition of essences.
Santayana's claim, readers of his philosophy will appreciate, is that there can never
be "two givens" or two distinct essences present to intuition — intuition is pure in
its solipsistic reduction of consciousness to the present moment, to a complete, bare
present; any relational move on the part of consciousness that involves "comparisons
of givens" is a move in the direction of intent—that is, in the direction of knowledge.