http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0103-863X2012000100013

This paper presents an analysis of the
concept of parenthood based on the psychoanalytical perspective, which allows
the study of both the subjectivity of parents and children. The hypothesis is
that parenthood, characteristically infiltrated by the narcissism of parents
themselves, can be a source of tension. Based on this premise, it is possible
to understand certain responses in the development of a childs ego and which
signals success to a greater or lesser extent in the passage from the principle
of pleasure to the principle of reality. We also stress the importance of
studying effects of this narcissist infiltration of parental love on the
subjectivity of parents. This study contributes both to investigations
addressing psychoneurosis, based on a comparison provided between clinical
practice and psychoanalytical theory, and to the investigation of more complex
social phenomena such as violence and the disaggregation of human communities.

This paper is the result of an
investigation concerning the marks of narcissism on parenthood and
relationships that can be established between such marks and a childs psychic
development (Veludo, 2009). Our initial hypothesis is that parenthood marked by
narcissism interferes in the passage from the principle of pleasure to the
principle of reality, thus, influencing child development. We highlight the
importance of the concept of a good-enough environment (Winnicott, 1975, 1977)
and the freudian theories concerning drives and the state of helplessness,
characteristics of the first years of life, to support this study.

We present a concept of parental
function developed by Algarvio, Leal, Maroco and Serra (2008) to initiate this
discussion. The authors define parental function as a satisfactory balance
between narcissistic and objectal investment in children. Such a definition has
the merit of establishing a relationship between parenthood and narcissism,
even if it does not allow us to, ultimately, state what function it would be.
In other words, it indicates the libidinal basis of parenthood, without
however, clearly defining what the terms balance and satisfactory mean.
This impasse, however, will not create major difficulties for the reflection
concerning the concept of parenthood, especially if we follow the direction of
the authors concerning the theoretical references that guided them in the
construction of their thesis. And, if we do, we will find an indication of how
determinant some notions proposed by Winnicott are for this concept, especially
those that refer to the role of the family in child development.

Good-Enough Parenting

When Winnicott (1975) developed the
theme of transitional phenomena, he proposed a thesis concerning the role of
parents when he stated that:

In the early stages of the
emotional development of the human infant, a vital part is played by the
environment, which is in fact not yet separated-off from the infant by the
infant. Gradually the separating-off of the not-me from the me takes place, and
the pace varies according to the infant and according to the environment. The
major changes take place in the separating-out of the mother as an objectively
perceived environmental feature. If no one person is there to be mother, the
infants developmental task is infinitely complicated (p. 153).

Some points merit attention in this
excerpt. First, we see a conception in which the human infant is clearly
defined by his/her complete connection with the environment receiving him/her,
which characterizes a state of total fusion with this means. It is based on
this fusion at the beginning of life that, according to Winnicott (1975),
something of unique importance to human development happens, that is, the baby starts
to look around and sees the mothers face, a time when, ordinarily, what the
baby sees is himself or herself (p. 154). This mirror role, however, is not
always performed by the mother, that is, babies do not always receive back what
they are giving. When it occurs, what is reflected is the mothers own mood
or, worse still, the rigidity of her own defenses (p. 154). Babies exposed
for too long to such a situation would have their creative capacity atrophied
and would look for other ways of getting something of themselves back from the
environment (p. 155), such as aggressiveness, illness, or any other situation
that may end up generating difficulties and annoyance for the parents.

This aspect of environmental function
performed by the parents is extremely important for considerations concerning
clinical practice. If we observe carefully, we will be able to notice a close
connection, proposed by Winnicott (1975), between the performance of parental
functions and certain problems that will lead the child to the clinic in the
future. We mention parental functions, not maternal functions, because even
though the mother receives special attention in winnicottian theory, the author
himself always stresses the importance of the father in childrens development.
In this regard, it may be enough to remember Winnicotts own opinion, who at
various times, includes the father in his thesis, though he asks their
permission to continue using the term maternal in the definition of the
good-enough attitude in the care provided to babies:

The term paternal must
necessarily come a little later than the maternal. Gradually the father as
male becomes a significant factor. And then follows the family, the basis of
which is the union of fathers and mothers, sharing responsibility for what they
did together, that we call a new human being, a baby (p. 191).

From this perspective, the roles of
fathers and mothers, in terms of providing good-enough care to their babies
should be so closely imbricated that it would be difficult to clearly define
the boundaries of one and another and even more complicated to state who would
be more important, mothers or fathers. Obviously, we usually observe that the
mother plays a more prominent role in providing care to the baby in our society.
This more prominent role is explained, in part, by the practice of
breastfeeding and other basic care that usually are under the mothers
responsibility. It does not seem so obvious, however, to assume that during
this period of more intense interaction between mother and child, the father
figure does not influence the child or does it in a very incipient way, or yet,
only indirectly.

It is worth noting that we are not
proposing that the father and mother functions are equivalent, saying that both
would be the same, or that it would be indifferent for the baby if fathers and
mothers exchanged functions with each other. We will also avoid a gender
discussion, not because we consider it lacks utility, but simply because it
would take us very far from our objectives.

If we agree with the position defended
by Winnicott (1975), we will have to accept that the development of children is
influenced primarily by what the mother has to offer, and then by what the
father has to offer, and it would occur in such an adamant manner that the
author categorically states that there is no possibility whatever for an
infant to proceed from the pleasure principle to the reality principle or
towards and beyond primary identification, unless there is a good-enough mother
(p. 25).

In another work, however, Winnicott
(1977) is less emphatic in announcing the role this (parental) influence exerts
on a childs formation, because he states that every baby is an organization
in motion (p. 29), possessed of an innate spark of life that drives
forward his/her growth and development, regardless of the parents. He later
concludes saying that if the mother accepts this perspective from her baby, she
will be able to be free enough to observe the childs development while
deriving pleasure from satisfying his/her needs (p. 30)

First, Winnicott (1975) is clear in
considering motherhood to be an essential element in the constitution of the
childs subjectivity. Then, Winnicott (1977) himself states something
apparently different, that is, that the baby would not need his/her mother to
the same degree because the infant was born with the thrust needed to move
forward, and motherhood would be merely a reactive function. In addition to the
fact that his work from 1977 was reportedly directed to the lay public, a minor
conceptual concern could arise if we ask, while the one published in 1975 would
be more finished technically, how should we interpret this dubious direction
Winnicott seems to give to the function of parents in the constitution of
children?

Perhaps we find a way out of this
ambiguity if we see both propositions as complementary and not exclusionary. By
stating that the baby does not depend on the mother to grow and develop,
Winnicott (1977) aims to circumscribe what he recognizes as innate to the human
being, that is, a tendency to life and development (p. 29). This tendency by
itself would be capable of producing the spark needed to boost growth,
regardless of parental actions. A tendency, however, does not mean a guarantee of
realization; perhaps it is in this sense that Winnicott (1975) states the
indispensability of the good-enough mother for the baby to overcome the
principle of pleasure.

On the one hand, we have the child with
what would be innate to his/her biological and psychic apparatus, but on the
other hand, we are faced with the early exposure of this apparatus to the outer
and inner world. Such a configuration is the basis of the state of helplessness
in which the organism is at the beginning of life: when one cannot cause a
specific action capable of putting an end to tension resulting from the influx
of endogenous excitations (requiring) the aid of an outside person (food
supply, for instance) (Laplanche & Pontalis, 2001, p. 531). That is, the
premature organism unable to provide for his/her own needs depends on the
environment to play this role.

Can we accept that this vital innate
spark indicated by Winnicott (1977) corresponds to instinctive drive,
characteristic of the human species? Additionally, would it be correct to state
that the infant psyche becomes susceptible to the subjective influence of an
adult  parents, in particular  due to the effect of biological and
psychological immaturity inherent to the state of hopelessness? We consider to
be possible to answer both the questions affirmatively and, if we are not
mistaken, we find an excellent opportunity to establish a dialogue concerning
certain Freudian concepts  especially the theories concerning drives and the
state of helplessness  and the Winnicottian thesis of the good-enough
environment as a prototype of parenting capable of helping the child to pass
from the principle of pleasure to that of reality.

Parenthood from a Freudian Perspective

Laplanche and Pontalis
(2001) highlight the importance of the state of helplessness for the Freudian
theory of anguish, stating that this state would be the prototype of a
traumatic situation (p. 112). It in fact seems to be a perspective made
explicit by Freud (1915/2004b), when he postulated that the nervous system is
an apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach
it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were
feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition (p.
147). We have listed both the principle of zero or nirvana, which later will
support the elaboration concerning drive death, and the principle of constancy,
which is based on the definition of pleasure and displeasure, that is, a
decrease or increase of stimulation, respectively, over the nervous system.
From this meta-biological point of view, a trauma would be an event triggered
by a stimulus, which due to the long period of time during which the young of
the human species is in a condition of helplessness and dependence (Freud,
1926/1996d, p. 151), it does not find the means necessary for a motor discharge
that generates a satisfying life.

Thus, the state of helplessness also
seems to be a key concept in our reflection on parenting because it outlines an
important foundation on which we will try to sustain the link between the
childs psychological functioning and parental subjectivity. Hence, we realize
that the shortening of womb life causes a human baby to arrive in the world in
a much less finished state when compared to other animals. As a result

the influence of the real
external world upon it is intensified and an early differentiation between the
ego and the id is promoted. Moreover, the dangers of the external world have a
greater importance for it, so that the value of the object, which can alone
protect it against them and take the place of its former intra-uterine life is
enormously enhanced. The biological factor, then, establishes the earliest
situations of danger and creates the need to be loved, which will accompany the
child through the rest of its life (Freud, 1926/1996d, p. 151).

That is, we believe it to be possible
to find in this passage a window through which we can grasp a relationship
among the subjectivities of a child and her/his parents. The need to be loved,
which emerges as a byproduct of biological factors, would force the child to
accept the restrictions imposed on his/her sexual drives by the object capable
of satisfying his/her needs. Thus, keeping the love of this object would become
an essential task for this child. The foundations of this relationship would be
established early on from the moment the baby realizes, from experience, that
when his/her mother is present, she satisfies all its needs without delay
(Freud, 1926/1996d, p. 136). Winnicott would perhaps add that it would occur
only if the mother were good-enough for her baby, which, strictly speaking,
does not seem to be any different from what is proposed by Freud.

It is important to note, however, that
Freud does not issue a definitive opinion concerning this relational point we
are now exploring. To be precise, there are times in his work in which he
strongly positions himself in favor of the idea that the development of psyche
is driven by forces whose sources would reside inside the body, while external
stimuli would influence little of this process. On the other hand, it is
possible to find passages in which the relational aspect seems to emerge with
much strength, being able even to determine the configuration of drives.

This duality is expressed, for
instance, in Instincts and their Vicissitudes, even though at this point
it is difficult not noticing the more determined position of Freud (1915/2004b)
concerning the decreasing importance of external stimuli. At a certain point in
the text, during a discussion of the development that drives require from the
nervous system, he concludes that the true engines of progress that led the
nervous system to its current level of development are drives and not external
stimuli, though nothing prevent us from seeing drives as precipitates of the
effects of external stimulation, which in their course have brought about
modifications in the living substance (p. 148).

In this same text, however, when Freud
describes how the beginning of life would be, he seems to abandon ambiguity and
is more incisive concerning this issue as he presents us an ego taken by drives
and capable of satisfying them, at least in part, within itself. In this
narcissistic state of autoerotic satisfaction, the ego would not be interested
in the external world, which would be irrelevant in terms of
drive-satisfaction. Hence, Freud concludes that the self-subject coincides with
everything that signals pleasure and the outside world, with all that is
irrelevant (and possibly as a source of stimuli, with what is unpleasant)
(Freud, 1915/2004b, p. 158).

In other words, the ego, at this point
would not need the outside world, as it would obtain all the satisfaction is
requires in an autoerotic manner. Hence, the relational issue becomes
insignificant and it configures one of the interpretations, which, according to
Laplanche (1998), permeates the entirety of psychoanalytical thinking, that is,
the idea that narcissism is a type of closed circuit, of self-sufficient monad,
where a subject and an object are distinguished (primordial self-sufficient
state, close on itself) (p. 304). There is, however, another interpretation
within psychoanalytical thinking that defines narcissism as love directed to
the ego (therefore, already a kind of internal topical distinction) constituted
in a direct relationship with another (Laplanche, p. 304). The author suggests
the need to imagine a type of original relationship that would be, at the same
time, love and identification.

This second perspective, which
Laplanche (1998) himself confirms having found in Freud, especially in the
paper Morning and Melancholia, is essential for our discussion, considering
that we seek foundations that allow us to talk about parenthood as a structure
that influences child subjectivity. We see a certain limitation from the
perspective of a closed and self-sufficient monad, at least on what aspects of
such understanding are radical and exclusivist. Thus, it is not about a simple
choice based on preference or convenience, because it is essential to seek
meaning and the importance of each of these interpretations. If on the one
hand, treating psyche as this self-sufficient monad can limit the relational
aspect highlighted by Laplanche, on the other hand, it can help us understand
the importance of instinctive forces that are the basis of the phenomena
studied here, enabling us to go beyond a merely phenomenological analysis,
which would drive us away from understanding the psychological processes and
structures already at work. Likewise, an excessive structural emphasis that
does not seek the influences that contribute to the constitution of the subject
in the historical and cultural context can also leave out elements that are
important for the analysis.

As previously mentioned, Laplanche
cites the paper Mourning and Melancholia as an important source of this
Freudian perspective, less focused on the conception of human psyche as an
independent monad. However, in his paper addressing narcissism published a few
years before, Freud (1914/2004a) already manifested certain ideas that could
strengthen this interpretation concerning an original relationship capable of
influencing the childs subjectivity. When discussing the genesis of the ego
ideal, the author states that:

For what prompted the
subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman,
arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium
of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and
taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in
his environment  his fellow-men  and public opinion. (p. 114).

The voice is the instrument emphasized
by Freud. It is the voice of the parents, prior to any other influence, that
appears as a critical and formative function of the ego ideal to which the
narcissistic libido can then flow. The basis of this critical function is the
childs development of subjectivity, precisely the helplessness condition in
which he/she is and that makes him/her hostage to parental love. Little remains
but to try, in every possible way, to ensure such love, and therefore, fight
against everything that may jeopardize this feeling so important for survival.
Few things can pose more risk to the child at this point than the incessant
stimuli of his/her own instinctive life, especially when they clash with what
parents indicate as appropriate or proper. Hence, love imposes a barrier to
infantile narcissism, acting as a civilizing factor (Freud, 1921/1996c) and
since the consciousness of deserving this love, later experienced by the adult
with great pride, refers us to very old childhood experiences concerning safety
and satisfaction linked to instinct, it is abnegation for the love of parents
(Freud, 1939/1996e).

Based on the valuable study of Freud on
narcissism, we perceive how the development of ego is closed linked to the
narcissistic confrontation of libido during childhood, which perhaps enables us
to talk about an innate human tendency to act in an egoistic and hostile
manner, especially when ones desires and needs are not met. Fourteen years
before the publication of Editio princeps on narcissism, Freud
(1900/1987) was already attentive to this tendency to egoism, even stating that
children are completely egoistic ( ) they feel their needs intensely and
strive ruthlessly to satisfy them, especially against rivals, other children,
and first and foremost as against their brothers and sisters (p. 264).

This tendency can either be intensified
or repressed and it seems possible to state that both are closely related to
psychological processes based on parental subjectivity that are expressed with
a greater or lesser desire on the part of parental figures, to restrict or
nurture certain values and normal behavior in children. It is not uncommon to
find clinical cases in which parents complain of certain behaviors of children,
but which are at the same time, accepted and even encouraged by them, even if
unconsciously. The analysis of these cases leads us to the issue of the
narcissistic revival that characterizes the love dedicated to children (Freud,
1914/2004a), love that, from this perspective, is much more directed to oneself
than to ones children.

Narcissism Marks Parenthood

Let us now recall the concept of
helplessness, the two principles of psychological functioning, and the
good-enough environment, aiming to confront them with this idea of the critical
influence of parents on the development of child subjectivity to classify
parenthood, through a synthesis, as a factor determining the development of
children in terms of the complex and almost always disturbing passage from the
principle of pleasure to the principle of reality.

This derivation of the concept of
parenting, however, should not refer us to an observable state of things or to
a phenomenon that could be described from the characterization of parenthood
styles. It seems more correct to treat this concept not a as a fact of
observation but as a structure, a theoretical construction based on which we
can study the relationships existent between an unavoidable event of
development (Green, 1988, p. 241), that is, the loss of the object and the
instinctive excess that mark parental investment in children, an excess that
refers to the parents narcissistic wounds:

There cannot be much: much
love, much pleasure, much joy, while on the other side, the parental function
is over invested. However, this function is, for the most part, infiltrated by
narcissism. Children are loved as long as they meet the narcissistic objectives
their parents were unable to attain (p. 256).

This narcissistic infiltration, which
according to Green is present in parenthood most of time, would emerge as a
disturbing factor against which the childs ego defense mechanisms need to
fight. In this case, we could ask whether it is plausible to consider a
relationship between parents and children in which the narcissistic objectives
of the first would not be in the background boosting parental over investment.
Probably not. If we agree with the concept of parental function proposed by
Algarvio et al. (2008), we are not presented the option to conceive of the
relationships between parents and children as exclusively composed of
narcissistic or object investments, but rather as a function resulting from the
tension between both types of investment.

That is, if on the one hand, the
narcissistic mark of parental love can be the basis of a series of disturbances
in the relationship between parents and children, on the other hand, it does
not seem correct the attempt to characterize good-enough parenting as the field
of object investment free of narcissistic marks, and which, acting this way,
that is, loving children for themselves and not for the narcissistic objectives
they satisfy, the parents would help the child to overcome helplessness and
loss of object, and submit himself/herself to the designations of the principle
of reality. Less correct would be seeking in this supposed parenthood that is
free of narcissistic marks, the final solution to save the child from the
suffering arising from his/her incompleteness and helplessness. In fact, few
quests would be more marked by narcissism than this.

Put another way, parenthood, the way we
are considering it, should not be treated as an ability to be developed by
parents, to become apt at preventing the child from suffering that arises from
the loss of object or as a way to avoid such suffering. Based on
psychoanalytical theory, we know that this loss is a time essential to structure
human psyche during which a new relationship with reality takes place (Green,
1988, p. 241). Hence, if we intend to defend a structuring function for
parenthood, it would be an unacceptable expectation to use such a concept to
predefine or judge the specific types of conduct parents should develop to help
their children to experience this period in which their psyche is being
structured.

On the other hand, the study of
parental subjectivity can aid the clinician, case by case, by helping the
parents to identify and perhaps develop narcissistic objectives they establish
for their children and identify the extent to which these objectives can
contribute to the configuration of conflicts experienced. If the loss of an
object is inevitable, it does not mean we should abandon all and any effort to
understand the factors that can disturb this already turbulent stage of
development. In this context, parenthood could be seen as the manifestation of
a parental psychic structure that is connected, from the beginning, to the
childs development, a structure that is characterized, on one hand, by
narcissistic objectives that parents seek to attain through their children and,
on the other hand, by the object investment they also establish. It is very
difficult to clearly define the boundaries of each of these two types of
investment.

The idea of a good-enough environment,
as defined by Winnicott (1975), seems to be in agreement with this conception,
as opposed to a conception aimed to identify the parental posture capable of
guessing and realizing all of a childs needs and desires. Such a posture
would, by the way, be more coherent with the rationale of the principle of
pleasure than with the implementation of the principle of reality. The parents
would, in this transition between the principles of the functioning of the
psychic system, occupy a prominent place due to the special investment, which
from the beginning they are apt to receive from their children. The latter are
helpless and still possess very rudimentary psychic constitutions, needing
parental investment to help them to deal with lethal stimuli of endogenous and
exogenous origin. However, this parental help will never be enough, especially
in relation to the childs instinctive life, creating another problem for an
already overloaded child psyche. Even if the parents are successful in
protecting children from external dangers, little can be done about the
instinctive demands that take by assault the child psyche, especially those of
a sexual nature.

This situation is even more complex
when we take into account the consequences the narcissistic mark of parenthood
can imprint on the relationship between parents and children. Such a mark would
point either to the existence of parental objectives of a narcissistic nature,
such as the impossibility of achieving these objectives. In other words, the
narcissistic mark of parenthood defines suffering that arises from the early
experience of losing the primary object of parents. We can use the concept of
the good-enough mother proposed by Winnicott (1975) to understand the
insufficiency of parental postures infiltrated by narcissism as a result of
reacting to the childs particular characteristics that seriously undermine the
parents narcissistic objectives, and thereby revive this primary experience of
loss of the object of parents love. What could occur in these cases is that
the child becomes unable to be a good-enough object for her/his parents, or at
least, not one that can be put in place of the ego ideal (Freud, 1921/1996c,
p. 123).

We note the importance of sexuality as
a traumatic factor. We previously discussed the tension experienced by the
child in the attempt to reconcile instinctive life with the demands from the
outside world, especially the parental voice. Now we see the conflicts that the
experience of parenthood can generate in the parents instinctive economy from
another angle. It should be clarified at once, that such an emphasis on the
disturbing nature of sexual drive is not our invention. We find this reference
in Freud (1940/1996f), when he explains in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis,
how delay in the development of ego promotes failure in the task of mastering
certain sexual excitations in a primitive time of life:

It is in this lagging of
ego development behind libidinal development that we see the essential
precondition of neurosis; and we cannot escape the conclusion that neuroses
could be avoided if the childish ego were spared this task  if, that is to
say, the childs sexual life were allowed free play, as happens among many
primitive peoples (p. 214).

That is, of all the requirements a
childs psyche faces without even having the best resources for such combat,
the subjects own sexual drives are highlighted as well as repression experienced
against these drives. Hence, it seems increasingly difficult to disregard the
importance of understanding the factors that disturb parental subjectivity as a
mechanism able to decisively influence the childs psychosexual development,
especially if we take into account that the defensive reactions that are a way
to deal with the tension generated by the experience of losing the object of
love are marked so intensely for both the childs and the parental psyche, even
if, in the latter we are talking about a revival of the primary loss of object
updated and transferred to the relationship with their children.

One might question how a subject,
repressed in her/his sexuality, narcissistically marked by his/her own
instinctive life, thus, living in endless tension between the two principles of
psychic functioning, can deal with the experience of having under his/her care,
another psyche experiencing similar conflicts? A potential answer would be:
passing repression on to their children. Close observation shows us how parents
are the first individuals responsible for repressing the infants already
thriving sexuality and perhaps with such repression, they raise the first dikes
against the free flow of the principle of pleasure. As previously discussed,
the parents receive a valuable aid from the situation of helplessness as their
children are to perform this task. The weak and immature self, especially in
the first period of childhood, is constantly attacked by tensions against which
his/her efforts are largely ineffective. Children are able to survive because
they are protected against the dangers that threaten them from the outside
world by caring parents; they pay for such security with a fear of loss of
love that would leave them helpless in the face of the outside worlds
dangers (Freud, 1940/1996f, p. 213).

Therefore, parental figures function as
a reference for the child to attempt to realize a great project, that is, to
abnegate the principle of pleasure. Or better yet, not the parental figure, but
love, or the fear of losing the love of this figure, without which the child
would perish in her/his fight for life. Thus, we see a mechanism to repress
sexuality, which from the beginning, ends up being exerted by the parents
toward the child.

However, we may see parenting as a
source of encouragement for the consolidation of the principle of pleasure and
not for its abnegation. In this case, parenting would be a source of
disturbance for child sexuality, not by repressing it, but by offering stimuli
that can contribute to its fixation in early stages of the psychosexual
development. Perhaps we may state that certain narcissistic demands, created
from parental subjectivity, find resonance in the child psyche and, through the
psychic confrontation between parents and children, affects in the way children
are treated, and consequently, the way the childs psychic development unfolds.

Final Considerations

Our objective was to argue for a
concept of parenthood, which from the psychoanalytical perspective, allows us
to study the subjectivity of both parents and children. We understand that a
concept of parenting conceived this way enables the study of infiltration of
parental narcissism in the love dedicated to the children as well as the effect
such an infiltration can cause on child subjectivity. The hypothesis we propose
is that this configuration of the relationship between parents and children,
notably marked by infiltrations of a narcissistic nature, can help us
understand certain reactions that childs ego develop, reactions that demarcate
greater or lesser success in the passage from the principle of pleasure to the
principle of reality.

We seek support from Winnicott (1975)
to define good-enough parenting such as that capable of helping the child
consolidate the principle of reality. It is valid to note that we do not defend
a dichotomy between the two principles of psychic functioning, because we agree
with the idea that the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure
principle implies no deposing of pleasure principle, but only safeguarding of
it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in
order to gain along the new path, an assured pleasure at a later time (Freud,
1911/1996a, p. 242). Acting this way, the psyche attempts to protect itself
from pressure arising from the instructor need and see itself compelled to
abnegate immediate satisfaction:

The ego finds out that it
is inevitable to abnegate immediate satisfaction, to postpone attainment of
pleasure, bear a little displeasure and totally abandon certain sources of
pleasure. An ego thus educated has become reasonable; it no longer lets
itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle,
which also at bottom seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured
through taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and
diminished. (Freud, 1917/1996b, p. 360).

Therefore, if we defend good-enough
parenthood, it is with the objective of producing a tool to allow us to look at
the relationship between parents and children and research certain processes of
subjectification in children and parents based on psychoanalysis, taking into
account that this step is identified by Freud as one of the most important in
the development of ego, that is, in the passage from the principle of pleasure
to the principle of reality. In this context, we try to show how the strength
of certain narcissistic objectives in parental subjectivity can overshadow the
ability of parents to provide a good-enough environment for the development of
children. When we use the term good-enough child, we try to emphasize
the potential conflict existing among the narcissistic idealizations the
parents try to achieve through the love dedicated to their children and the
outside needs presented daily by children.

It seems possible to suppose that the
narcissistic mark of parenthood signals a more or less irresistible tendency to
elect the inner child, the result of the idealization of parents, and
consequently, the abandonment of the outside child under their care. The
parents strive beyond limits for the idealized child to have better fortune and
need not obey the same imperatives to which they were subject throughout life:

Illness, death,
renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him;
the laws of nature, like those of society, are to be abrogated in his favor; he
is in reality to be the center and heart of creation, His Majesty the baby,
as we fancied ourselves to be (Freud, 1914/2004a, p. 110).

In the meantime, we imagine a scenario
of true abandonment of the external child, especially if his/her demands
diverge from the parents project of perfection, so dear to them. In clinical
practice, we could describe how this desire to repeal the laws of nature and
society can support an extreme permissive posture in relation to the childs
behavior and desires. In other words, the parents would, in the attempt to
preserve their narcissistic objectives, end up encouraging the principle of
pleasure in the childs psychic apparatus.

The potential consequences of this type
of family arrangement can lead us both to the study of a more clinical
investigation of psychoneuroses and to broader investigations linked to social
phenomena. After all, if on the one hand the understanding of psychic
functioning reveals to us important components of psychic conflicts, on the
other hand, we notice the possibility of using this very understanding to study
broader phenomena such as social aggregation or disaggregation, delinquent
behavior, urban violence, among other aspects of human life, which in our view,
can be seen as expressions of the way subjects and communities position
themselves in relation to attainment of pleasure. The forms of pleasure in
question are those immediate forms of pleasure in which one disregards the
consequences to oneself and others in the community, or mediate forms of
pleasure, with significantly reduced satisfaction, though with a lasting gain
for civilization.

Cássio Marcelo Batista Veludo obtained his Masters
Degree in Psychology at the Universidade de Brasília, Brasília (DF), Brazil,
Psychology Institute, Graduate Program in Clinical Psychology and Culture.Terezinha de Camargo Viana is Associate Professor at the Universidade de
Brasília, Brasília (DF), Brazil, Psychology Institute, National Council for
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) Research Fellow.

Received: 30/04/20111st revision: 17/09/2011Approved: 22/12/2011

1 This paper resulted from the Masters thesis of the primary author under the
advice of the co-author, defended in 2009, in the Graduate Program in Clinical
Psychology and Culture at the Institute of Psychology, Universidade de
Brasília.