December 29, 2017

Why the 2017 idea of the year is the Indo-Pacific

As another year comes to an end, it is perhaps worth
reminding ourselves that political leaders and controversies come and go, but
ideas, concepts, and terminology often have a longer shelf life. What were the
big ideas of 2017?

Some, inevitably, are the product of technological
developments: blockchain (a distributed ledger to ensure secure transactions)
and deep learning by machines (a more sophisticated form of artificial
intelligence) have been around for some time as applied concepts, but have only
recently become a part of popular consciousness. Other notions that have gained
salience are political in nature, such as ‘fake news.’ Some are purely linguistic.
Online searches for the rather archaic word ‘dotard’ spiked after North Korean
leader Kim Jong-Un used it to insult US President Donald Trump.

In the international political realm, I would venture
that the idea of the year is the Indo-Pacific. In 2017, with its official
adoption by the US, it reached a new threshold, and it may now be with us to
stay. The Indo-Pacific is not a new idea, nor is it originally an American one.
It actually arises from the natural sciences, referring to a large bio-geographic
region of warm water in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its evolution as a
strategic concept is a more recent development.

Its origins can be traced to a speech delivered in August
2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Indian Parliament. Abe did
not use the phrase Indo-Pacific, but rather alluded to a book by the Mughal
prince Dara Shikoh in describing the “dynamic coupling” of the Indian and
Pacific oceans as the “confluence of the two seas.” In October 2010, former US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the importance of the
“Indo-Pacific basin...to global trade and commerce.” The term soon caught on
Indian strategic circles. C Raja Mohan, in his book 2012 Samudra Manthan,
argued that “the seas of the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean must be seen
as a single integrated geopolitical theater, the ‘Indo-Pacific’.” The 2013
Australian Defence White Paper led its strategic outlook with an assessment of
the Indo-Pacific. And Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referenced the
Indo-Pacific in a May 2013 speech in Tokyo.

This year, the idea picked up steam, especially in
official circles. Abe’s government outlined a vision for a “free and open
Indo-Pacific.” Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper made numerous
mentions of it. In his January address to the Raisina Dialogue, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi said that India “believe[s] that respecting freedom of navigation
and adherent to international norms is essential for peace and economic growth
in...the Indo-Pacific.” And, somewhat belatedly, the US described the
Indo-Pacific as a priority region in its 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS).
Trump appears personally seized with the idea, and used the phrase Indo-Pacific
numerous times during his November tour of Asia. Thus, Indo-Pacific is now
firmly part of the official strategic vocabulary of India, the United States,
Japan, and Australia. The coming together of these four countries in a dialogue
earlier this year, while still exploratory, also began to cement the idea of
the Indo-Pacific as an operational construct.

A common query is what part of the earth’s surface is
actually covered by the Indo-Pacific? The US NSS defines it as extending from
the west coast of the United States to the west coast of India. Japan’s view is
perhaps the most ambitious, extending to two oceans and two continents (Asia
and Africa). India has not formally defined it, but it is clear that in Indian
conceptions it extends from the east coast of Africa, across the Indian Ocean,
to the western and south Pacific.

But the exact geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific is
almost beside the point. What matters is the shared understanding of the term.
Essentially, it is three-fold. One, it implies that the Indian and Pacific
Oceans are a single, shared strategic space. What happens in one, has
implications in the other. Thus the militarisation of the South China Sea
directly affects India, just as developments in the Indian Ocean have immediate
consequences for Japan or the United States.

Two, it suggests that geopolitical competition in the
broader region will play out primarily in the maritime domain. By defining the
region by its oceans, rather than by any continental features (e.g. Asia), it
automatically elevates the maritime element of our way of thinking about the region.
For India, this means thinking more seriously about maritime trade, the blue
economy, and naval requirements and capabilities.

Three, although the “Indo-” in Indo-Pacific refers to the
Indian Ocean and not India, it is impossible to think about the Indo-Pacific
without considering the role of India. Given its central location, its status
as the largest economy, its long coastline, and its blue water naval
capabilities, India is the geopolitical keystone of the Indian Ocean.
Therefore, the use of the term Indo-Pacific implicitly acknowledges India’s
central role in regional security and commercial dynamics.

This shared understanding - and the full significance of
the adoption of Indo-Pacific by Indian, American, Japanese, and Australian
leaders - has not necessarily been appreciated in capitals around the world,
including in New Delhi. But it has been noted in Beijing. Its adoption and
acceptance in official circles may have been belated, but it is nonetheless a
welcome and important addition to the ideas that shape our thinking about the
world.