Vincent's
Ridge

The 20th Maine&15th Alabama

On July 2nd, the 20th Main held the far left flank of the Union
position against the 15th Alabama on the far Confederate right. The
traditional account of this fight lauds Colonel Chamberlain for
brilliant leadership. While Chamberlain's courage and competence
should not be slighted, the following version emphasizes the fog of
war, and the role of the individual soldiers.

Vincent's Spur
Rocks are in brown, with terrain lines in red-brown.
Union in blue, Confederates in Gray

Vincent's spur is not far from Devil's Den. While the rock
formations are not quite as spectacular, there was no lack of hard
cover available for both sides, trees as well as rocks. The terrain
was also shaped by cattle. The Gettysburg farmers allowed cattle to
forage their woodlands. Thus, there was no underbrush, and no leaves
on the trees within reach of a cow. While the trees blocked vision
high, if one hugged the ground one could sometimes see the feet of
one's enemies sooner than anything else.

The rock strewn slope in front of the 20th's
right.
Both sides used this cover, and exchanged fire at
short range.

The fight was shaped in large part by two missing regiments. The
47th Alabama started the fight to the left of the 15th Alabama. Their
colonel was hit by one of the first volleys from the 20th Maine. The
47th Alabama left the field, leaving a gap to the left of the 15th
Alabama. This left the right side of the 20th Main lightly opposed.
They suffered far fewer casualties than their left flank, and were
able to hold the Confederates at considerable distance.

The other missing regiment was the 16th Michigan. As the 20th went
into line, they expected the 16th to be on their left. At last
moment, Colonel Vincent shifted the 16th Michigan to his brigade
right flank, leaving the 20th unexpectedly holding the extreme left
flank. Colonel Chamberlain sent out Company B to act as skirmishers,
to go forward, find the enemy, and warn of their approach. As Company
B moved forward, the kept shifting to the left, trying to link up
with the skirmishers of the 16th Michigan, skirmishers who were not
there. In their quest for the missing 16th, they shifted so far left
that the 15th Alabama got between Company B and the rest of the 20th
Maine.

Chamberlain is sometimes credited for brilliantly dispatching
Company B as a reserve flanking force. This was entirely an accident.
Company B was a skirmish line that failed to find the enemy, and was
isolated from their unit. They linked up with a similarly detached
unit of US Sharpshooters, and observed the battle from the
distance.

Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama led from the right side of his
regiment. His orders were to find the Union's far left, and turn it.
He did so, finding the 20th's left, and sweeping a large portion of
his regiment around to hit the unprotected flank. He did not move his
troops far enough away from the Union positions, however. By taking
positions low to the ground, the northerners were able to see the
flanking movement. Chamberlain "refused" his flank, changing his
formation from a straight line to a corner. The southerners charged
the hill, expecting to turn Chamberlain's flank. Instead, the ran
into a well defended line with high ground and good cover. The first
Union volley shattered the charge, forcing Oates back. Oates made
several subsequent attacks, leading small groups forward, but none of
these strikes had the force to break the Union position.

Oates took his time, and better organized one last effort. This
last charge bent the Union position back, but at the cost of heavy
casualties. Oates lost his brother and best friend within seconds at
the peak of the attack, at which point he pulled back. He had had
enough. He passed word to his regiment that on the signal, they
should run up the big hill.

Chamberlain was equally desperate. His people were nearly out of
ammunition. He gave the order to fix bayonets. With the noise and
confusion of battle, only a few men heard him, but others followed
the example of the first few.

The center company, holding the corner, was desperate for a
different reason. One of their men was badly wounded, and had fallen
just forward of the main position. The company commander of the
center unit requested permission to move forward to recover this man,
who was screaming desperately from help. Chamberlain didn't answer
this request, saying he was too busy, he was about to order a
charge.

The Union left started at right angles to the
right,
was pushed back by the last Rebel charge,
but soon launched a charge of its own.

It is not precisely clear what happened next. In some accounts,
one reads that the formal order for a right wheel forward charge with
bayonets fixed was given. Another version has the center company
moving forward to pick up its wounded member. The center company had
the flag. The soldiers on the left flank, after having fixed their
bayonets, responded to the flag moving forward by charging. They 15th
Alabama, having been told to run away on the signal, but not being
clear what the signal was, may have decided that a bayonet charge
might be the signal. On running to the rear, they encountered "two
regiments" firing into them. These were Company B (wearing blue) and
the US Sharpshooters (wearing green). Neither group was anything near
regimental strength, but the Sharpshooters had breech loading rifles.
They could fire quite rapidly, providing a sufficient imitation of a
regiment to men who had already been ordered to run.

The Alabamans could no loner run north, into the bayonet charge,
nor east, into the two suddenly appearing 'regiments.' They then ran
west. The bayonet line followed the fleeing Confederates, executing
(by accident) a right wheel that had never been ordered, but was what
had to be done to maintain the chase. By Chamberlain's account, he
never did give the order to charge. However, as his men ran headlong
into a mass of surrendering Alabama infantry, he followed his men
rapidly enough. The 20th was soon guarding prisoners using empty
guns.

The older accounts of the battle emphasizes courage and the
competence of the commanders. The newer accounts center on the fog of
war, confusion, and the accidents that sometimes turn a battle
around. Both accounts are true. The role of the officers, and the
men, shouldn't be diminished by the fog and confusion. However, the
nature of war is not understood if the desire for glory wipes clean
the fog. What happened? At bottom, Oates had decided his best effort
had failed, had cost too much, and ordered a retreat. Chamberlain,
seeing each attack push further, and out of ammnition, was equally
desperate, but ordered an attack. Had Oates retreated before
Chamberlain attacked, Chamberlain would have little doubt have been
happy to let him go. As it played out, one is left wondering if glory
can come by accident.

The above owes much to former Gettysburg park ranger, Thomas
Desjadin, both for his book Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine, and
for a tour of Little Round Top given to the Gettysburg Discussion
Group Muster in July of 2000. It is hard to both give full credit to
Tom for an excellent book and presentation, and appologize for
condensing it so much into a single web page sized byte, and for
adding my own spin.