I

Report on Talks with Dukizonin

The full text of our talks with Dukhonin has been printed, so I
can confine myself to a few remarks. It was clear to us that we
were dealing with an opponent of the people's will and an enemy
of the revolution. Dukhonin resorted to all manner of shifts and
dodges to delay matters. Doubt was expressed as to the
authenticity of our message, and the query was not addressed to
Krylenko but to General Manikovsky. Thus, the generals have
stolen at least one full day in this important and vital matter
of peace. General Dukhonin came to the apparatus only when we
said we would refer the matter to the soldiers. We told Dukhonin
of our demand that he should start armistice negotiations
immediately, and nothing more. Dukhonin was not empowered to
conclude an armistice. Not only was the conclusion of an
armistice outside Dukhonin's competence, but his every step in
the matter of the armistice negotiations was to have been under
the control of the People's Commissars. The bourgeois press has
accused us of offering a separate armistice and of ignoring the
interests of the Rumanian Army. That is a lie. We propose that
the peace talks should be started immediately, and an armistice
concluded with all countries, without exception. We have
information that our wireless messages have been reaching
Europe. Thus, our message about the
victory over Kerensky was monitored and relayed by the Austrian
wireless telegraph. The Germans, on their part, tried to jam
it. We can contact Paris by wireless, and when the peace treaty
is drawn up, we shall be able to inform the French people that
it can be signed, and that it is up to them to have the
armistice concluded within two hours. Let's see what Clemenceau
will have to say then. Our Party has never said that it could
produce a peace all at once. It said that it would make an
immediate offer of peace and would publish the secret
treaties. That has been done—the fight for peace is on. It
will be an uphill fight. International imperialism is mobilising
all its forces against us, but despite its great strength our
chances are quite good in the revolutionary struggle for peace,
in which we shall combine revolutionary fraternisation with the
struggle for peace. The bourgeoisie would very much like the
imperialist governments to combine against us.

2

Concluding Speech

Comrade Chudnovsky said here that he had "taken the liberty" of
making some sharp criticisms of the Commissars’
actions. There can be no question at all as to whether or not
sharp criticism is to be allowed, for it is a revolutionary's
duty to engage in such criticism, and the People's Commissars do
not claim to be infallible.

Comrade Chudnovsky said we could not accept an indecent peace,
but he failed to cite a single word or fact to show that this
peace was unacceptable. We said: peace can be concluded only by
the Council of People's Commissars. When we began our talks with
Dukhonin we were aware that we were about to negotiate with an
enemy, and we cannot procrastinate when dealing with an
enemy. We could not foretell the outcome of the talks. But we
were fully determined. We had to take a decision on the spot,
without leaving the line. We had to act against an insubordinate
general there and then. We could not get the Central Executive
Committee together on the line; that was in no sense a violation
of the Central Executive Committee's prerogatives. You don't
wait for the outcome in a war, and it was a war we were fighting
against the counter-revolutionary generals, so we turned to the
soldiers. We removed Dukhonin but we are not formalists or
bureaucrats, and we are well aware that it was not enough to
remove him. He opposed us and we appealed over his head to the
army masses. We authorised them to enter into armistice
negotiations. But we did not conclude an armistice. The soldiers were warned to keep an eye on the
counter-revolutionary generals. I think any regiment is
disciplined enough to maintain the necessary revolutionary
order. In the event of betrayal during the soldiers' armistice
negotiations or an attack during fraternisation, it is the
soldiers' duty to shoot the traitors on the spot, without more
ado.

It is monstrous to allege that we have now weakened our front in
the event of the Germans starting an offensive. Until Dukhonin's
exposure and removal, the army was never sure that it was
conducting an international policy of peace. It now has this
assurance: the only way to fight Dukhonin is to appeal to the
sense of discipline and initiative of the masses of
soldiers. Peace cannot be concluded only from above. Peace must
be won from below. We put no trust in the German generals, but
we have faith in the German people. A peace concluded by the
commanders-in-chief, without the active participation of the
soldiers, would be precarious. I do not object to Kamenev's
proposal as a matter of principle but because it is inadequate
and too weak. I have no objections to a commission but I suggest
that we keep an open mind on its functions; I dislike
half-measures and propose that we should be given a free hand in
this respect.