Agreeably to your request and my promise I sit down to
give you my ideas of the defects of our present system,
and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may
perhaps be the reveries of a projector rather than the
sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and
make what use you please of them.

The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress.
It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it
seems to be universally acknowleged, or to point out how
it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it.
It may however be said that it has originated from three
causes--an excess of the spirit of liberty which has made
the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in
their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise
a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended
by Congress, and of acting according to their
own opinions of their propriety or necessity, a diffidence
in Congress of their own powers, by which they have been
timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly making
concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left themselves
the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at
their disposal to answer the public exigencies and of vigor
to draw forth those means; which have occasioned them to
depend on the states individually to fulfil their engagements
with the army, and the consequence of which has
been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to
establish its dependence on each state separately rather
than on them, that is rather than on the whole collectively.

It may be pleaded, that Congress had never any definitive
powers granted them and of course could exercise
none--could do nothing more than recommend. The
manner in which Congress was appointed would warrant,
and the public good required, that they should have considered
themselves as vested with full power to preserve the
republic from harm. They have done many of the highest
acts of sovereignty, which were always chearfully submitted
to--the declaration of independence, the declaration
of war, the levying an army, creating a navy, emitting
money, making alliances with foreign powers, appointing
a dictator &c. &c.--all these implications of a complete
sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been
a standard for the whole conduct of Administration. Undefined
powers are discretionary powers, limited only by
the object for which they were given--in the present case,
the independence and freedom of America. The confederation
made no difference; for as it has not been generally [Volume 1, Page 151]
adopted, it had no operation. But from what I recollect
of it, Congress have even descended from the authority
which the spirit of that act gives them, while the particular
states have no further attended to it than as it suited their
pretensions and convenience. It would take too much time to
enter into particular instances, each of which separately
might appear inconsiderable; but united are of serious import.
I only mean to remark, not to censure.

But the confederation itself is defective and requires to
be altered; it is neither fit for war, nor peace. The idea of
an uncontrolable sovereignty in each state, over its internal
police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and
make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances
without number, where acts necessary for the general
good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress
must interfere with the internal police of the states,
and there are as many instances in which the particular
states by arrangements of internal police can effectually
though indirectly counteract the arrangements of Congress.
You have already had examples of this for which I
refer you to your own memory.

The confederation gives the states individually too much
influence in the affairs of the army; they should have
nothing to do with it. The entire formation and disposal
of our military forces ought to belong to Congress. It is an
essential cement of the union; and it ought to be the policy
of Congress to destroy all ideas of state attachments in the
army and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose
all appointments promotions and provisions whatsoever
ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended
that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears
more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk
of having a weak and disunited federal government, than
one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the
people. Already some of the lines of the army would obey
their states in opposition to Congress notwithstanding the
pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army--if
any thing would hinder this it would be the personal influence
of the General, a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our state constitutions must always give
them great weight in our affairs and will make it too difficult
to bend them to the persuit of a common interest,
too easy to oppose whatever they do not like and to form
partial combinations subversive of the general one. There
is a wide difference between our situation and that of an
empire under one simple form of government, distributed
into counties provinces or districts, which have no legislatures
but merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws
of a common sovereign. Here the danger is that the sovereign
will have too much power to oppress the parts of
which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed
of confederated states each with a government completely
organised within itself, having all the means to
draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself--the danger
is directly the reverse. It is that the common sovereign
will not have power sufficient to unite the different members
together, and direct the common forces to the interest
and happiness of the whole.

The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a
proof of this. They were continually at war with each
other, and for want of union fell a prey to their neighbours.
They frequently held general councils, but their
resolutions were no further observed than as they suited
the interests and inclinations of all the parties and at
length, they sunk intirely into contempt.

. . . . .

Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the
difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country and
inducing the states to combine in equal exertions for the
common cause. The ill success of our last attempt is striking.
Some have done a great deal, others little or scarcely
any thing. The disputes about boundaries &c. testify how
flattering a prospect we have of future tranquillity, if we
do not frame in time a confederacy capable of deciding
the differences and compelling the obedience of the respective
members.

The confederation too gives the power of the purse too
intirely to the state legislatures. It should provide perpetual
funds in the disposal of Congress--by a land tax, poll
tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be
laid by Congress and appropriated to their use, for without
certain revenues, a government can have no power;
that power, which holds the purse strings absolutely, must
rule. This seems to be a medium, which without making
Congress altogether independent will tend to give reality
to its authority.

Another defect in our system is want of method and energy
in the administration. This has partly resulted from
the other defect, but in a great degree from prejudice and
the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the
power too much into their own hands and have meddled
too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly a
deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to
play the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous
as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient
decision, or with system. Two thirds of the members, one
half the time, cannot know what has gone before them or
what connection the subject in hand has to what has been
transacted on former occasions. The members, who have
been more permanent, will only give information, that
promotes the side they espouse, in the present case, and
will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business
must distract, and the proneness of every assembly to debate
must at all times delay.

Lately Congress, convinced of these inconveniences,
have gone into the measure of appointing boards. But this
is in my opinion a bad plan. A single man, in each department
of the administration, would be greatly preferable.
It would give us a chance of more knowlege, more activity,
more responsibility and of course more zeal and attention.
Boards partake of a part of the inconveniencies of larger
assemblies. Their decisions are slower their energy less
their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the
same abilities and knowlege as an administration by single
men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage
in them, because they will be less cospicuous, of less
importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves. [Volume 1, Page 152]
The members of boards will take less pains to inform
themselves and arrive to eminence, because they
have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to
give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive
departments of the state in the hands of individuals. As
these men will be of course at all times under the direction
of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy
and republic in our constitution.

A question has been made, whether single men could be
found to undertake these offices. I think they could, because
there would be then every thing to excite the ambition
of candidates. But in order to this Congress by their
manner of appointing them and the line of duty marked
out must show that they are in earnest in making these
offices, offices of real trust and importance.

I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrangements,
as though they would lessen the importance
of Congress and leave them nothing to do. But they would
have precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore,
happily disencumbered of the detail. They would have to
inspect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon
their plans, originate others for the public good--only observing
this rule that they ought to consult their ministers,
and get all the information and advice they could from
them, before they entered into any new measures or made
changes in the old.

A third defect is the fluctuating constitution of our
army. This has been a pregnant source of evil; all our military
misfortunes, three fourths of our civil embarrassments
are to be ascribed to it. The General has so fully
enumerated the mischief of it in a late letter of the [20th
August] to Congress that I could only repeat what he has
said, and will therefore refer you to that letter.

The imperfect and unequal provision made for the
army is a fourth defect which you will find delineated in
the same letter. Without a speedy change the army must
dissolve; it is now a mob, rather than an army, without
cloathing, without pay, without provision, without morals,
without discipline. We begin to hate the country for its
neglect of us; the country begins to hate us for our
oppressions of them. Congress have long been jealous of
us; we have now lost all confidence in them, and give the
worst construction to all they do. Held together by the
slenderest ties we are ripening for a dissolution.

The present mode of supplying the army--by state purchases--is
not one of the least considerable defects of our
system. It is too precarious a dependence, because the
states will never be sufficiently impressed with our necessities.
Each will make its own ease a primary object, the
supply of the army a secondary one. The variety of channels
through which the business is transacted will multiply
the number of persons employed and the opportunities of
embezzling public money. From the popular spirit on
which most of the governments turn, the state agents, will
be men of less character and ability, nor will there be so
rigid a responsibility among them as there might easily be
among those in the employ of the continent, of course not
so much diligence care or economy. Very little of the
money raised in the several states will go into the Continental
treasury, on pretence, that it is all exhausted in providing
the quotas of supplies, and the public will be without
funds for the other demands of governments. The
expence will be ultimately much greater and the advantages
much smaller. We actually feel the insufficiency of
this plan and have reason to dread under it a ruinous extremity
of want.

These are the principal defects in the present system
that now occur to me. There are many inferior ones in the
organization of particular departments and many errors of
administration which might be pointed out; but the task
would be troublesome and tedious, and if we had once
remedied those I have mentioned the others would not be
attended with much difficulty.

I shall now propose the remedies, which appear to me
applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extricate
our affairs from their present deplorable situation.

The first step must be to give Congress powers competent
to the public exigencies. This may happen in two
ways, one by resuming and exercising the discretionary
powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them
for the safety of the states and resting their conduct on
the candor of their country men and the necessity of the
conjuncture: the other by calling immediately a convention
of all the states with full authority to conclude finally upon
a general confederation, stating to them beforehand explicity
the evils arising from a want of power in Congress,
and the impossibily of supporting the contest on its present
footing, that the delegates may come possessed of
proper sentiments as well as proper authority to give to
the meeting. Their commission should include a right of
vesting Congress with the whole or a proportion of the
unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising
a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the states by
whom they are granted.

The first plan, I expect will be thought too bold an expedient
by the generality of Congress; and indeed their
practice hitherto has so rivetted the opinion of their want
of power, that the success of this experiment may very well
be doubted.

I see no objection to the other mode, that has any weight
in competition with the reasons for it. The Convention
should assemble the 1st of November next, the sooner, the
better; our disorders are too violent to admit of a common
or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I require
them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority are that
the business may suffer no delay in the execution, and
may in reality come to effect. A convention may agree
upon a confederation; the states individually hardly ever
will. We must have one at all events, and a vigorous one if
we mean to succeed in the contest and be happy hereafter.
As I said before, to engage the states to comply with this
mode, Congress ought to confess to them plainly and
unanimously the impracticability of supporting our affairs
on the present footing and without a solid coercive union.
I ask that the Convention should have a power of vesting
the whole or a part of the unoccupied land in Congress,
because it is necessary that body should have some property
as a fund for the arrangements of finance; and I
know of no other kind that can be given them.

The confederation in my opinion should give Congress [Volume 1, Page 153]
complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police,
which relates to the rights of property and life among
individuals and to raising money by internal taxes. It is
necessary, that every thing, belonging to this, should be
regulated by the state legislatures. Congress should have
complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace,
trade, finance, and to the management of foreign affairs,
the right of declaring war of raising armies, officering,
paying them, directing their motions in every respect, of
equipping fleets and doing the same with them, of building
fortifications arsenals magazines &c. &c., of making
peace on such conditions as they think proper, of regulating
trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried
on, granting indulgencies laying prohibitions on all
the articles of export or import, imposing duties granting
bounties & premiums for raising exporting importing and
applying to their own use the product of these duties, only
giving credit to the states on whom they are raised in the
general account of revenues and expences, instituting Admiralty
courts &c., of coining money, establishing banks on
such terms, and with such privileges as they think proper,
appropriating funds and doing whatever else relates to the
operations of finance, transacting every thing with foreign
nations, making alliances offensive and defensive, treaties
of commerce, &c. &c.

The confederation should provide certain perpetual
revenues, productive and easy of collection, a land tax,
poll tax or the like, which together with the duties on trade
and the unlocated lands would give Congress a substantial
existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of finance.
What more supplies were necessary should be occasionally
demanded of the states, in the present mode of
quotas.

The second step I would recommend is that Congress
should instantly appoint the following great officers of
state--A secretary for foreign affairs--a President of
war--A President of Marine--A Financier--A President of
trade; instead of this last a board of Trade may be preferable
as the regulations of trade are slow and gradual and
require prudence and experience (more than other qualities),
for which boards are very well adapted.

Congress should choose for these offices, men of the
first abilities, property and character in the continent--and
such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted
with the several branches.

. . . . .

These offices should have nearly the same powers and
functions as those in France analogous to them, and each
should be chief in his department, with subordinate
boards composed of assistant clerks &c. to execute his orders.

In my opinion a plan of this kind would be of inconceivable
utility to our affairs; its benefits would be very speedily
felt. It would give new life and energy to the operations
of government. Business would be conducted with dispatch
method and system. A million of abuses now existing
would be corrected, and judicious plans would be
formed and executed for the public good.

. . . . .

And, in future, My Dear Sir, two things let me recommend,
as fundamental rules for the conduct of Congress--to
attach the army to them by every motive, to maintain
an air of authority (not domineering) in all their measures
with the states. The manner in which a thing is done has
more influence than is commonly imagined. Men are governed
by opinion; this opinion is as much influenced by
appearances as by realities; if a Government appears to be
confident of its own powers, it is the surest way to inspire
the same confidence in others; if it is diffident, it may be
certain, there will be a still greater diffidence in others,
and that its authority will not only be distrusted, controverted,
but contemned.

I wish too Congress would always consider that a kindness
consists as much in the manner as in the thing: the
best things done hesitatingly and with an ill grace lose
their effect, and produce disgust rather than satisfaction
or gratitude. In what Congress have at any time done for
the army, they have commonly been too late: They have
seemed to yield to importunity rather than to sentiments
of justice or to a regard to the accomodation of their
troops. An attention to this idea is of more importance
than it may be thought. I who have seen all the workings
and progress of the present discontents, am convinced,
that a want of this has not been among the most inconsiderable
causes.