Saturday, October 20, 2007

Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has resigned. This is a big deal!

The fact that Larijani had threatened to resign several times was an open secret in Iran; a fact that was even acknowledged by the government spokesman, Gholam-hossein Elham, in his announcement of Larijani's resignation (Al Jazeera has good round up of some of Larijani's conflicts with Ahmadinejad).

What is surprising is Ayatollah Khamenei's agreement to this resignation and the reported replacement of Larijani by Saeed Jalili, a deputy foreign minister for European affairs who actually has very little diplomatic experience (Jalili's experience at the foreign Ministry prior to being assigned as deputy minister by Ahmadinejad was in personnel matters). What Jalili does have is a very close relationship with Ahmadinejad. As such, the move, if it is confirmed, reflects yet another enhancement of Ahmadinejad's fortunes in Iranian politics.

So far the Iranian system seems to be in a state of shock. Larijani was considered a successful handler of the Iranian nuclear file and his agreement with the IAEA regarding a work plan to resolve the remaining outstanding issues over Iran's nuclear program an important step forward.

His announced meeting with Europe's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, for next Tuesday makes the timing of the resignation even stranger and suggests the extent to which this move might have been impromptu and really the result of intense personal as well as policy conflicts between Larijani and Ahmadinejad. The straw that broke the camel's back was probably Larijani's assertion that Putin had a special message about Iran's nuclear file and Ahmadinejad's public rejection of that assertion.

Several important politicians in Iran, including Ahmad Tavkoli, the head of Majles' Research Center, and Mohsen Rezaie, the Expediency Council's secretary, have already expressed their concern and unease about Larijani's resignation as well as his replacement by a novice. The deputy head of Majles' Foreign Relations Committee has promised an investigation.

The most unsettling aspect of this move from the insiders point of view may be questions raised regarding Ayatollah Khamenei's control over the nuclear file. Both of the possibilities - that he has either lost control or decided to throw his support for the most radical elements in the Iranian political system - are bound to unsettle the domestic political scene. For him, to be seen as being in one corner with Ahmadinejad against all the other heavyweights of Iranian politics, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami, Karrubi, Rezaie, Qalibaf, and now Larijani, is a predicament he has tried hard to avoid at least publicly.

Khamenei's reaction to and explanation of why and how this happened will be important for calming nerves inside Iran. But the mere fact that such an open and public split has occurred, as far as I know for the first time on the foreign policy front, will have important ramifications particularly with the nearing of parliamentary elections.

From an Iranian position that seeks no compromise on the rights and privileges contained in the NPT, the timing of Larijani's resignation can be worked to a slight advantage. A new negotiator tips the EU effort off balance. Personal relationships that had been previously established, will now consume added time to build back up, as each side gets reacquainted. Also, it should be pointed out that Larijani, like Jalili, was a relative novice to nuclear negotiation, before assuming that post.

As I've alluded to before, certain political elements wielding actual power in Iran see this as a win-win situation. Continued resistance to the West is seen as attractive, especially as it pertains to rights expressly entitled to signatories of the NPT. It seems important to this regime, this perception of independence and resistance, finding widespread admiration throughout the streets of the Arab Middle East and Islamic South Asia. And in the event of a US attack, these very same political elements have calculated that the result would have a Pearl Harbor effect on the Iranian people, rallying them in the same way as the days of the Iran-Iraq war.

I would caution from reading too much into this resignation. It has been obvious for some time now that while Iran has acted rather cleverly, diplomatically, it has never sought to compromise its rights pertaining to the NPT. And, taken for its face value, the Putin trip seems to have vindicated that resolve- for the moment, at least.

I would just add the fact that Ahmadinejad has already declared before the UN General Assemby that the nuclear issue is closed. It can be readily assumed that Khamanei's position on the matter is one and the same. As such, a resigned nuclear negotiator doesn't, to any great degree, affect Iran's position with the EU and the IAEA. I would expect more of the same from the new Iranian nuclear negotiator.

Well, Ahmadinejad actually does not have much power. He could not have accepted Larijani's resignation without Khameini's approval.

But the Iran experts who say he is a figurehead, while making a true statement are conceding a point they probably shouldn't concede and to some degree ignoring that while Ahmadinejad is not nearly the most powerful figure in Iranian politics the positions he expouses have the support of a broad consensus of Iranian society in Iran and the societies of all of the Muslim countries in the region.

You've come across the controversy about "wiped off the map". Ahmadinejad's actual view, that justice for the Palestinians, including the refugees is more important than there being a Jewish state is agreed with by almost everybody in the Middle East.

Palestinians being allowed to return and then voting for a state that does not have any Jewish advantage it considered the optimal outcome of the conflict by essentially everybody in the Middle East. If that happens, the Zionist regime of Israel will be removed from history the way the Soviet Union and the Shah were.

That's what Ahmadinejad called for. Ahmadinejad does not make Iranian policy, but everyone in Iran, including the Supreme Leader agree with that.

To the Holocaust, Ahmadinejad says that the Palestinians are paying the price and the West won't answer why. He says the Western policy of at least shaming and even imprisoning people who argue against a particular conclusion is unscientific and hypocritical. But he does not say the Holocaust did not happen or that only a small number of people were killed or anything of that sort. Once again, the Supreme Leader and essentially everyone in the Middle East agrees with what Ahmadinejad really believes.

You may believe Ahmadinejad claims or has claimed the Holocaust did not happen. He never did. So while Ahmadinejad does not have the power to impose his view on the Holocaust on Iranian society, Iranian society, like the rest of the Middle East, already agrees with him and has agreed with his position since before he was born.

On to enrichment. Iran believes it has a right to enrich uranium domestically. It has strong legal arguments and there are precedents of a lot of other countries that are allowed to enrich domestically. The clincher is that the US supported the Shah in enriching uranium. Ahmadinejad does not support a moratorium on enrichment imposed by the West. Ahmadinejad does not have the power to make his position the position of the State of Iran, but essentially everyone in Iran already agrees with his position.

It is a true fact the Ahmadinejad is not a critical power in Iran. That without support from his superiors he can accomplish essentially nothing. But people who make that argument miss two points - one that Ahmadinejad's views can be presented as reasonable if the presenter does not have an anti-Iranian or pro-Zionist agenda and two that Ahmadinejad's actual views are somewhere between very popularly and unanimously held in Iran and throughout the Middle East. Including in Iran's true power structure.

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