The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM)

The Youth

Unity of Islamic Youth

Youth Wing

Muhajiroon brigade (division made up of foreign fighters)

Executive Summary:

Al-Shabab, or “the Youth,” is al-Qaeda’s formal affiliate in East Africa. Established in the late 1990s, the Somali-based terror group seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in the country that it hopes will ultimately expand to encompass the whole Horn of Africa. Al-Shabab controls much of the southern Somalia region and small pockets in Kenya and Ethiopia along the Somali border. In areas under the group’s control, al-Shabab imposes its strict version of sharia (Islamic law), prohibiting activities like listening to music or shaving one’s beard. The group predominately conducts attacks targeting the Somali government and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

Following the group’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012, al-Shabab began executing a score of violent attacks in Somalia’s neighboring countries, including the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, which left 68 people dead and 175 wounded. The group is also responsible for the April 2015 Garissa University attacks, wherein five al-Shabab fighters stormed the Kenyan university, killing nearly 150 people. Since then, the group has continued to attempt and conduct terrorist attacks outside of its stronghold in Somalia. In al-Shabab’s first attempt to attack Western targets, an assailant detonated a concealed laptop bomb on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu for Djibouti City on February 2, 2016. The explosion, which killed only the attacker, was not strong enough to down the plane. Al-Shabab reportedly killed more than 4,200 people in 2016, making it the deadliest Islamic terror group in Africa. In October 2017, al-Shabab was credited with the worst terror attack in Somalia to date––a truck bomb that killed over 300 people in Mogadishu.Jason Burke, “Mogadishu truck bomb: 500 casualties in Somalia’s worst terrorist attack,” Guardian (London), October 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia; Jason Burke, “Mogadishu bombing: al-Shabaab behind deadly blast, officials say,” Guardian (London), October 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/mogadishu-bombing-al-shabaab-behind-deadly-blast-officials-say.

Under al-Shabab’s strict brand of sharia, stonings, amputations, and beheadings are regular punishment for criminals and apostates. The group violently persecutes non-Muslims and clashes frequently with humanitarian and international aid workers.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Out of an estimated 6,000-12,000 fighters as of March 2016, only a small handful are believed to be ethnically non-Somali.Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Abdihakim Ainte, “The Return of al-Shabaab,” Daily Beast, March 15, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/15/the-return-of-al-shabaab.html.

The precursor to al-Shabab is Somali rebel group al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI), which targeted the Siad Barre military regime during the Somali Civil War in the 1990s. After the Barre regime fell, a younger, more hardline group split from the AIAI, seeking to extend AIAI’s mission and establish a “Greater Somalia” ruled under sharia. This group of youths—in Arabic, “al-Shabab”—joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in an attempt to enforce sharia throughout Mogadishu. In December 2006, U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and drove the ICU out of the capital. Though the majority of the ICU fled to neighboring countries, al-Shabab retreated southward and began organizing attacks against the Ethiopian forces. In this way, al-Shabab transitioned from a rebel group into a guerrilla movement and began seizing territory in central and southern Somalia.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Al-Shabab grew from a few hundred fighters in the 2006 to thousands by 2008, as Islamist-nationalist fighters sought to drive out the Ethiopian occupation.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Since the end of the Ethiopian occupation in 2008, al-Shabab has continued to its efforts to establish sharia domestically and attack government representatives and African Mission forces, while also adapting its foreign targets from Ethiopia to Kenya following a brief Kenyan invasion in 2011. Al-Shabab views the AMISOM, as well as the Somalia Federal Government, as its primary enemies since they are purportedly influenced by Western countries.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.

Al-Shabab formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012, though ties between them existed since 2008, when the American-born al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) cleric Anwar al-Awlaki released a statement praising al-Shabab for fighting against the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion. In 2010, AQAP deputy leader Said al-Shihri also released a statement encouraging al-Shabab to work with his group in its fight against the United States.Ty McCormick, U.S. Attacks Reveal Al-Shabab’s Strength, Not Weakness,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/u-s-attacks-reveal-al-shababs-strength-not-weakness-somalia/. Following the pledge of allegiance, some al-Qaeda fighters who trained at camps in Afghanistan moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabab. The two groups continue to cooperate closely, on everything from indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced explosives and assassination training. Al-Shabab and AQAP partake in the transfer of fighters and weapons between Yemen and Somalia. Al-Shabab fighters have been able to obtain new weapons and develop new tactics from AQAP, including the use of laptop explosives and more destructive car bombs.Ty McCormick, U.S. Attacks Reveal Al-Shabab’s Strength, Not Weakness,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/u-s-attacks-reveal-al-shababs-strength-not-weakness-somalia/. Al-Qaeda reportedly plays an important role in al-Shabab’s leadership, with one count reporting that foreigners comprise over half of al-Shabab’s executive council and that the group has embraced globalized rhetoric and propaganda.

Analysts cite the early militant Salafi extremist group al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI, a.k.a. Unity of Islam) as the precursor to al-Shabab and the incubator for many of its leaders. AIAI peaked in the 1990s after the Siad Barre military regime fell and civil war broke out.Jonathan Masters, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified September 5, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. A younger, hardline group split from the elder AIAI, seeking to establish a “Greater Somalia” ruled under sharia. This group of youths joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of sharia courts, to serve as a governance alternative once they overtook Mogadishu. The combined group was eventually pushed out by Ethiopia. Much of the ICU fled to the south of Somalia and al-Shabab emerged and continued asymmetrical attacks on Ethiopian targets.

This context is important in understanding a key characteristic of the group—it is not monolithic and is prone to internal fissures over strategy and tactics. These conflicts became particularly significant when whole clans broke from al-Shabab in 2008. Reports highlighted increased leadership conflicts over tactics, clan interests, affiliations with al-Qaeda, and policies toward international aid agencies.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf.

Ahmed Abdi Godane eventually triumphed over internal opposition with a series of purges in 2011 and a particularly bloody internal battle in June 2013. One of the implications of Godane’s victory is that the core group’s doctrine and affiliation seem to have been settled. Though al-Shabab has always had a Salafist jihadist orientation, the group’s leadership was once heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures like Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow. The al-Shabab that triumphed arose from the extreme fringe, steeped in the takfiri ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims and a recommitment to global jihad and restoration of the Caliphate. Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

Godane, no longer faced with internal opposition to aligning with al-Qaeda, officially pledged al-Shabab’s allegiance to that group in 2012. Afterward, some al-Qaeda fighters who trained at camps in Afghanistan moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabab. The two groups continue to cooperate closely on everything from indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced explosives and assassination training. Al-Qaeda reportedly plays an important role in al-Shabab’s leadership, with one count reporting that foreigners comprise over half of al-Shabab’s executive council and that the group has embraced globalized rhetoric and propaganda. Fred Dews, “Al Shabaab: Background on the Somalia-based Terrorist Group that Attacked a Nairobi Mall,” Brookings Institutition, September 23, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/al-shabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack. Out of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 fighters, 200 to 300 are non-Somali, with a number coming from the Somali diaspora.Fred Dews, “Al Shabaab: Background on the Somalia-based Terrorist Group that Attacked a Nairobi Mall,” Brookings Institutition, September 23, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/al-shabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack.

Financing:

Al-Shabab has had several sources of income throughout its history, including varying degrees of support from the Somali diaspora, locals, sponsors, and sustained dawa (proselytizing).

Domestically, al-Shabab drew significant revenue from racketeering after seizing the southern port city of Kismayo in 2008. The charcoal trade was essential to the city’s economy and the group was able to receive proceeds from exporting charcoal, totaling an estimated $35-50 million annually.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Although AMISOM was able to take back Kismayo in October 2012, the United Nations has reported that al-Shabab’s illicit charcoal trade has continued in areas under the group’s control, such as Barawe, and estimates that profits from this city alone amount to millions of dollars monthly.“Letter dates 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) ad 1907 (2009) concerning Somalis and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, July 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413. The United Nations banned charcoal exports from Somalia in 2012. In October 2014, as part of an effort to target al-Shabab’s funding, the U.N. Security Council authorized the inspection of ships suspected of carrying Somali charcoal.Edith M. Lederer, “UN authorizes ship inspections for Somali charcoal,” Associated Press, October 24, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e8fe2a9961754c3b80c00f68c550dc6e/un-authorizes-ship-inspections-somali-charcoal.

After the June 2013 purge of Godane’s opposition within the leadership, al-Shabab shifted its attention toward “taxation”—specifically, collecting funds through voluntary support, extortion, and partnership with businesses, humanitarian agencies, and other non-governmental organizations that operate in south-central Somalia.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf.According to the United Nations, al-Shabab has generated up to $100 million per year, from fees levied at ports of entry, taxes on goods, taxes on domestic produce, “jihad contributions,” checkpoint fees, and extortion for payments of religious obligation. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916,” United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433.

Central to al-Shabab’s taxation and extortion practices is the use of roadblocks between Baidoa and Mogadishu as well as between Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. Each roadblock along these paths earns al-Shabab $5,000 a day extorting merchants. This money largely comes from money distributed to internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the United Nations and associated aid agencies. The United Nations issues IDPs living in refugee camps in Baidoa cash cards of $80 to $90 a month, which allows them to purchase necessities from merchants traveling from Mogadishu. On their way to and from Baidoa, these merchants are stopped and taxed at al-Shabab roadblocks, thereby unwillingly transferring U.N. funds to the terror group. While the regional Somali government and the United Nations have confirmed these practices, the U.N.’s head of country, Michael Keating, has insisted that most of the aid still reaches IDPs.Sam Kiley, “Funding al-Shabaab: How aid money ends up in terror group's hands,” CNN, February 12, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/12/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-foreign-aid-intl/index.html.

Staying true to its name, which means “The Youth,” al-Shabab seeks to recruit Somali adolescents and young adults. Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, 2, 6, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf. Boys as young as 9 years old have been forced into al-Shabab’s ranks. Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somali Children Flee Al-Shabab Recruitment,” Voice of America, August 7, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-children-seek-refuge-al-shabab-coastal-town-adale/3975825.html. In January 2017, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres estimated that more than half of al-Shabab’s fighters may be children. A Somali taskforce recorded the recruitment of 4,213 children—almost all boys—into al-Shabab between April 1, 2010, and July 31, 2016. According to a 2017 U.N. report, children “recruited and used by al-Shabab were victims of or were exposed to other grave violations including killing and maiming during military operations and air strikes targeting al-Shabab, and subjected to arrest and detention by Somalia security forces.”Edith M. Lederer, “UN alarm that most of al-Shabab’s force in Somalia are kids,” Associated Press, January 20, 2017, https://apnews.com/85093315baa644a6bee802b13fc343e5/un-alarm-most-al-shababs-force-somalia-are-kids.

According to Somali officials, al-Shabab needs younger recruits to replace aging fighters. The group has kidnapped children from schools, forcing others to flee al-Shabab-controlled areas to avoid conscription. In early August 2017 alone, more than 100 children fled from al-Shabab-controlled areas of Somalia for the safety of government-controlled areas of the country. Officials have estimated that more than 500 children have fled their homes to escape conscription into al-Shabab.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somali Children Flee Al-Shabab Recruitment,” Voice of America, August 7, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-children-seek-refuge-al-shabab-coastal-town-adale/3975825.html.

Al-Shabab uses children in combat and reconnaissance roles, according to the U.N. “Somalia,” United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, May 15, 2014, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/somalia/. A 14-year-old Somali recruit, interviewed by the Institute for Security Studies in September 2014, said, “[W]hen you join, they give you a mobile phone and every month you get $50. This is what pushes a lot of my friends to join.” Another member recalled how during his recruitment experience “[P]reachers delivered sermons for hours about destiny and the sweetness of the holy war. They distributed leaflets on Islam [and] showed video recording from other jihadist [sic] in the world.” Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, 2, 6, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf.

Al-Shabab has attempted to influence Somali families toward Islamism. The group’s Education and Youth Engagement released its own curriculum in early 2017, focusing only on Quran, math, history, and geography. Ludovica Iaccino, “Al-Shabab Urges Parents to Send Their Children to Islamic Schools to Avoid Western Influences,” Newsweek, April 21, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabab-somalia-islamic-schools-militants-al-qaeda-587260. That April, the group released a statement instructing Somali parents to shun public schooling and send their children to Islamic schools. The group warned of “consequences” for parents and teachers who embrace secular education.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Al-Shabab Warns Against Western Education,” Voice of America, April 20, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-warns-against-western-education/3818654.html.

Within Somalia, recruiters infiltrate remote, rural areas and approach potential recruits. There have been accounts of recruiters threatening the lives of Somali Muslim men who initially resist joining the group.Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, p. 8, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf.

“They are given quotations from the Koran, the Hadiths, but they do not have the benefit of a critical mind to look at it in any other context and they trust the people driving them to this. Advantage is taken of the person’s feeling of desperation and that is dangerous enough to drive them over the top. They are given the feeling that they are a very important person and that martyrdom is something to aspire to - the anger over their deprivation is lowered to a feeling of comfort, to a point where the only thing they aspire to is a collective action. Whether that action leads to their survival or death that doesn’t really matter any more [sic].”“In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?” BBC News, last modified October 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24379013.

Al-Shabab recruiters radicalize young Kenyan Muslims—often converts to Islam— with extremist sermons. Personal accounts reveal that recruiters use psychological manipulation to increase enrollment in the terror group. A disillusioned former recruit said that deceased al-Shabab member and radical Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed “used to tell us: ‘Instead of sitting in the slum doing nothing, it’s better to go to Somalia and fight for your religion, you’ll go straight to heaven.’”Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline,’” BBC News, September 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24263357.

Once the recruits are prepared to join al-Shabab, they travel to remote islands off of Kenya’s coast, which are only a couple hours away from Somalia by boat. From these islands, radical preachers guide them to their final destination, Somalia.Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline,’” BBC News, September 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24263357.

Americans began traveling to Somalia to join al-Shabab in 2007 when the terror group stepped up its insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government. Most American fighters for al-Shabab have been radicalized in Minneapolis, Minnesota, home to the largest Somali diaspora in the U.S.

The FBI contends that al-Shabab has made an “active and deliberate attempt” to recruit American fighters in person and over the Internet. A 2011 U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security investigation found that al-Shabab recruiters have used mosques and cafes as meeting places to radicalize and recruit.House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Investigative Report: Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland, 112th Congress, July 27, 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Investigative%20report.pdf. Alabama native Omar Hammami appeared in several online videos in which he urged foreigners in English to “live the life of a mujahid.” Al-Shabab has released a host of other online recruitment videos depicting American foreign fighters.

Today, al-Shabab recruits undergo a six-month training process.Jamal Osman, “Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp,” Channel 4, December 16, 2013, http://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda. According to the FBI, training includes “reading and interpreting the Koran, physical exercise, and weapons handling.” Such weapons include AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.Ian Duncan, “Accused al-Shabaab fighter came from heart of Baltimore's African-American Muslim community,” Baltimore Sun, January 17, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-maalik-jones-al-shabbab-20160117-story.html. At one graduation ceremony open to media, 300 trainees became members. The new graduates were able to choose which sector of al-Shabab to join. Graduates can sign up for a combat unit, become bomb-makers, or work for the group’s security network, the Amniyat. Standout recruits have the special opportunity to join the years-long waiting list for the Istishhadyin unit, the group’s suicide brigade.Jamal Osman, “Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp,” Channel 4, December 16, 2013, http://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda.

Fuad Mohamed Qalaf (a.k.a Shongole)

Ibrahim Haji Jama Mead (a.k.a. Ibrahim al Afghani)

Omar Hammami

History

Violent Activities

As al-Shabab lost control of urban centers, its tactics shifted to asymmetrical attacks, with greater reliance on suicide bombs, IEDs, hit-and-runs, political threats, assassinations, and grenade attacks.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. The group’s new tactics emphasized collaboration with its historical enemies in Somalia, resulting in alliances and deals that make it difficult for external actors to dismantle the group.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. Godane’s suppression of internal opposition allowed him to drive al-Shabab towards more indiscriminate modes of violence similar to al-Qaeda’s.

Al-Shabab was reportedly responsible for more than 4,000 fatalities in 2016, according to the U.S. Department of Defense-affiliated Africa Center for Strategic Studies, based on data collected from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). As a result, al-Shabab reportedly overtook Boko Haram as Africa’s deadliest terror group. ACLED attributed 3,499 fatalities to Boko Haram in 2016, while ISIS killed 2,350 people.Farah Abdi Warsameh, “How Al-Shabab Overtook Boko Haram to Become Africa’s Deadliest Militants,” Newsweek, June 2, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/isis-africa-al-shabaab-boko-haram-619010. A Washington Post analysis disputed the findings, however, claiming that al-Shabab actually killed 432 people in 2016, while Boko Haram killed 790. The Washington Post explained the discrepancy because ACLED included all acts of violence without specifically labeling which were acts of terrorism. The Post also counted only incidents where al-Shabab was the primary actor involved.Salem Solomon and Casey Frechette, “No, al-Shabab is not deadlier than Boko Haram. Here are better numbers,” Washington Post, July 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/21/no-al-shabab-isnt-more-deadly-than-boko-haram-here-are-better-numbers/?utm_term=.3c5036798b7d.

The majority of the group’s attacks are retaliatory against perceived injustices against Muslims and against al-Shabab’s mission in Somalia. Targets includes the U.S. and other Western countries, as well as those states, such as Uganda and Kenya, who have contributed to troops to AMISOM.

In April 2017, new Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on al-Shabab while offering al-Shabab fighters a 60-day amnesty period. The government offered to provide employment and education to fighters who surrendered during this period. The group formally rejected the offer and the declaration of war the following day. On April 9, an al-Shabab suicide bomber killed at least 15 people in an attack near a military base in Mogadishu.“Al-Shabab fighters offered amnesty as new Somali president declares war,” BBC News, April 6, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39513909; Hussein Mohamed, “Somalia’s President Declares War on Shabab Militants,” New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/africa/somalia-shabab.html; “Al-Shabab dismisses Somali president war declaration,” BBC News, April 7, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39527226;

As outlined below, al-Shabab has engaged in both guerrilla and terror tactics since its inception. A key differentiator and contributor to its sustainability as an organization is al-Shabab’s adaptability. This military and political flexibility is assisted by the leadership’s lack of direct accountability to a constituency,International Crisis Group, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab -- It will be a Long War,” Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 99, June 26, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b099-somalia-al-shabaab-it-will-be-a-long-war.pdf. enabling them to carry out any number of attacks on whatever targets they choose. One of the major developments within the organization has been its tactical shifts and hybridization of violent attacks, combining both suicide bombers and suicide infantry.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.. According to Matt Bryden at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Westgate Mall attack was the culmination of successfully tried and tested tactics, techniques and procedures honed back home in Somalia.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.. Specifically, al-Shabab understood from past experience that breaching the perimeter of the mall would be necessary to overtake it, so their typical suicide-bombing tactic would not work there. Consequently, the group used hand grenades to penetrate the structure.

Timeline of Violent Activities:

October 29, 2008: The first known American suicide bomber for al-Shabab, Shirwa Ahmed, is part of attack in Hargeisa that kills 24 people. Ahmed was a Somali-American from Minnesota who trained with al-Shabab.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.

February 2009: Al-Shabab successfully uses explosive vests in a sophisticated attack against African Union (AU) military bases in Mogadishu. They employ a mix of person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), followed by indirect fire. Similar tactics were used in a September bombing at an AU military base.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 19, 2009: Somalia National Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden is killed in a large-scale suicide car bomb attack in Beletwyne. Over 30 people are killed in the attack. The group seeks to intensify its strategy to strong-arm the Somali-population, focusing on high-target assassinations and clan elders.United Nations Security Council, “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Security Council Resolution 1844,” March 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/1844_cons_list.pdf.

July 11, 2010: Al-Shabab claims responsibility for several near-simultaneous bombings that kill dozens of people in sports bars in Uganda. The three coordinated blasts, which detonate just seven minutes apart, kill 76 people watching the World Cup in Kampala. In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?” BBC News, last modified October 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24379013. A fourth bomb left at a discotheque fails to go off. This is the group’s first attack on foreign soil. The group’s spokesman proclaims, “We are sending a message to every country who is willing to send troops to Somalia that they will face attacks on their territory.” Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. This attack brought together several of the elements from the 2009 bombings—near simultaneous attacks, employing PBIEDs, VBIEDs, and mobile-phone trigger.

August 24, 2012: Al-Shabab attempts a complex attack, targeting the Muna Hotel in Mogadishu. Al-Shabab gunmen, disguised as government security personnel, lay siege to the building and a two-hour gun battle ensues before one of the assailants detonates an explosive vest. The attack kills 32 people, including several members of parliament. Although the attack was deemed successful by al-Shabab, the group does not attempt another operation of such complexity until two years later, when they attempted to kill Somalia’s newly elected president at Mogadishu’s Jazeera Hotel.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

March 28, 2013: Al-Shabab detonates a car bomb aimed at Somali intelligence chief Kahlif Ahmed Ereg near the National Theater in Mogadishu. The bomb kills 10 civilians and injures 15. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

April 14, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the Supreme Court using a VBIED to breach the main entrance. Gunmen, some wearing explosive vests, then enter the building to carry out a killing spree. All of the attackers are reportedly killed and more than 35 people are killed in the attack. Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 19, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the U.N. compound in Mogadishu. The attack follows a similar pattern as the Supreme Court plans, with a VBIED exploding at the main entrance, allowing a small team of gunmen to enter. A total of 22 people are killed, including four U.N. international personnel, four local security guards, and all attackers.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 2013: Al-Shabab’s bloodiest internal battle ever destabilizes the group, leading to a major purge. The purge is thought to have removed 200 members. Top leaders who opposed Godane meet varying fates, with Ibrahim al-Afghani and Maa’lim Hashi executed, Mukhtar Robow escaping, and Hasan Dahir Aweys fleeing but being captured by government militias and handed over to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. Godane consolidates control over the weakened, smaller group and implements a hardline strategy and tactics.

July 12, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks an AMISOM convoy en route to Mogadishu International Airport. The group publicly admits they had tried to target U.S. intelligence officers.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

July 27, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the Turkish embassy housing complex in Mogadishu using a car bomb and small weapons, killing eight and injuring 13. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 3 and 4, 2013: Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy strikes a roadside bomb as he travels to Merka, Lower Shabelle. No casualties are reported, though one Somali soldier is injured.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 7, 2013: Eighteen civilians are killed at the popular Villa Restaurant in Mogadishu. Al-Shabab employs a two-part VBIED and suicide attack.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 12 and November 5, 2013: Al-Shabab twice targets the convoy of Interim Juba Administration President Ahmed Madobe with a car bomb outside of Kismayo’s airport. Madobe is slightly injured in the first attack. Civilians are killed in both attacks. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 21 - 24, 2013: Al-Shabab militants, including a Norwegian citizen of Somali origin and three Somali nationals, raid Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. In the deadliest attack in Kenya in 15 years, the attackers kill 67 people and wound more than 200 over four days. The victims include six Kenyan security personnel.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

November 8, 2013: The group attempts to detonate a sophisticated IED embedded in a laptop at Maka al Mukarama, a popular hotel in Mogadishu frequented by high-level government and security officials. The attack kills six and injures 15. A secondary VBIED detonates in the parking lot.=“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

November 19, 2013: Al-Shabab insurgents launch a complex attack against the central police station in Beledweyne, killing 24 Somali police officers and one Djiboutian AMISOM soldier, and injuring several others.United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,” S/2014/140, March 3, 2014, http://unsom.unmissions.org/Portals/UNSOM/SG%20Report%20March%202014.pdf.

December 5, 2013: A suicide car bomber hits a convoy of the Puntland security forces in central Boosaaso, killing three police officers and four civilians, while injuring several others. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,” S/2014/140, March 3, 2014, http://unsom.unmissions.org/Portals/UNSOM/SG%20Report%20March%202014.pdf.

February 21, 2014: Following a series of suicide bombings over a few weeks, al-Shabab attacks Somalia’s presidential palace with a combination of car bombs and engages in a gun battle with palace guards. Fourteen people are left dead, including five Somali officials and soldiers and nine attackers. The interior minister confirms that two government officials are among the dead.“Al-Shabab attacks Somali presidential palace,” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/somali-presidential-hq-attacked-al-shabab-201422112586270319.html.

December 2, 2014: After identifying non-Muslim workers at a quarry in Kenya, al-Shabab massacres 36 people, most of whom are reportedly “lined up, and shot in the head, at close range” while others are beheaded. “Al-Shabab massacres non-Muslims at Kenya quarry,” BBC News, last modified December 2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30288137.

December 12, 2014: Al-Shabab kidnaps and beheads Quran teacher Mohamed Hussein near the central Somali city of Bulo Berde because Hussein reportedly refused to obey al-Shabab’s order to leave his village. His headless corpse is later found dumped close to his home. Omar Nor, “Al-Shabaab blamed for five beheadings,” CNN, December 15, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/15/world/africa/somalia-violence/.

December 25, 2014: Eight al-Shabab militants storm an African Union (AU) building and kill three Ugandan peacekeepers and a civilian contractor. Al-Shabab claims that it killed 14 peacekeepers, explaining that it “targeted the enemies at a time they were celebrating Christmas…”Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Islamist gunmen attack African Union base in Somalia,” Reuters, December 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/27/us-somalia-security-idUSKBN0K503C20141227.

December 26, 2014: In claiming responsibility for the African Union attack on December 25, al-Shabab state that it is in retaliation for a U.S. strike that killed its leader, Ahmed Godane.mar Nor, Mohammed Tawfeeq, and Susanna Capelouto, “Al-Shabaab: Attack on base was revenge for U.S. airstrike,” CNN, December 26, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/26/world/africa/somalia-violence/.

July 15, 2015: Al-Shabab militants launch coordinated attacks on a stadium housing peacekeepers, as well as two hotels, in Mogadishu. According to police, six civilians and five militants are killed in the attacks.Robyn Kriel, “Al-Shabaab says it is responsible for three Somalia attacks,” CNN, July 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/10/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-attacks/.

April 11, 2016: A car bomb detonates outside the Mogadishu mayor’s office, killing five people and wounding five more. Al-Shabab claims responsibility.Feisal Omar and Abdirahaman Hussein, “Mogadishu car bomb kills five at local government HQ,” Reuters, April 11, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKCN0X8109.

April 14, 2016: Suspected al-Shabab militants attempt to assassinate a Somali member of parliament in the town of Balad Hawo near the Kenyan border using explosive devices, injuring four people.“Four people injured in bomb attacks on residential house of Federal MP in Balad Hawo town,” Goobjoog News, April 15, 2016, http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=27775.

December 2016: Al-Shabab militants kill several government officials in Bosasso in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. On December 15, gunmen shoot Colonel Jama Sahardiid, second deputy commander of Puntland Police forces, outside a restaurant in Bosasso. Sahardiid dies from his wounds the following day. On December 20, militants shoot and kill Aden Huruse, an aide in Puntland’s presidential palace, at a restaurant in Bosasso. On December 25, gunmen kill military prosecutor Abdikarim Hassan Firdiye as he is getting out of his car outside a restaurant in Bosasso.Abdiqani Hassan and Feisal Omar, “Al Shabaab militants shoot prosecutor dead in Somalia's Puntland,” Reuters, December 25, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-attacks-idUSKBN14E0BJ.

May 9, 2017: Al-Shabab fighters attack a military base in Goofgaduud, killing at least seven soldiers. Al-Shabab claims it killed 16 soldiers and captured the entire town of Goofgaduud, which the Somali government does not immediately confirm. Aaron Maasho, “Al Shabaab militants attack Somali army base, killing several soldiers,” Reuters, May 9, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-idUSKBN185132.

May 16, 2017: Four Al-Shabab gunmen break into the house of Kenyan government official Dekow Abbey Sirat and shoot him dead. The group claims it also killed several of Sirat’s bodyguards and took their weapons. Humphrey Malalo, “Al Shabaab gunmen kill official in northern Kenya: police, group,” Reuters, May 16, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-security-idUSKCN18C11V.

May 24, 2017: A car bomb in Mogadishu kills five people and wounds six. Eight Kenyan soldiers are killed in two separate roadside bombings on the Kenyan side of the border. Al-Shabab claims responsibility for all three attacks. Feisal Omar, “Al Shabaab bombing in Somali capital kills five, injures six,” Reuters, May 24, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKBN18K2AJ.

June 5, 2017: A bomb planted at a police station in the southern Somalia city of Kismayu kills one policeman and wounds several others. Al-Shabab claims responsibility and alleges the bomb killed four policemen and wounded 27.“Al Shabaab claims bomb attack on Somali police station,” Reuters, June 5, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKBN18W1NL.

August 4, 2017: Al-Shabab seizes the Somalia town of Leego after the Somali military and AMISOM peacekeepers withdraw from the town. Al-Shabab military spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab tells Reuters, “The town is now under our control.”Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Al Shabaab militants seize town in south of Somalia: residents,” Reuters, August 4, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-border-idUSKBN1AJ1TP.

March 2, 2018: Al-Shabab militants launch three separate attacks across Somalia killing at least 16 AU and Somali soldiers. Militants drive an SVBIED into a military camp near the town of Agooye, killing at least five Somali soldiers. At the same time, an IED kills six more soldiers on the road from Afgooye to Mogadishu. Separately, militants briefly capture the southern town of Bal’ad and kill five Burundi peacekeepers just north of it.“Somalia: Five AU soldiers among 16 killed in al-Shabaab attacks,” Garowe Online, March 3, 2018, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-5-au-soldiers-among-16-killed-in-al-shabaab-attacks.

April 21, 2015: The Department of the Treasury designates Ahmed Diriye as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on April 21, 2015.https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150421.aspx.

The United Nations Security Council Committee designated Al-Shabab on April 12, 2010. “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Security Council Resolution 1844,” United Nations Security Council, March 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/1844_cons_list.pdf.

“Avenging the death of our scholars and leaders is a binding obligation on our shoulders that we will never relinquish nor forget no matter how long it takes. By the permission of Allah, you will surely taste the bitter consequences of your actions.”“Al-Shabab names new leader after Godane death in US strike,” BBC News, September 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29093200.

“We thank the mujahideens that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbra too.”“Uganda: Somali militants claim bomb attacks,” Afronline: The Voice of Africa, 13 July 2010, http://www.afronline.org/?p=6657.

“You are being enslaved once more with badges & guns. You will never be able to free yourselves with protests. #AntonioMartin #Ferguson.” (Tweet) A. Agron, “The Issue Of Race In The Discourse Of The Islamic State (ISIS) And Its Supporters,” Middle East Media Research Institute, April 16, 2015, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8524.htm.

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Al-Qaeda’s Somali-based branch, al-Shabab, seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. The group has carried out a score of violent terror attacks, including the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM)

The Youth

Unity of Islamic Youth

Youth Wing

Muhajiroon brigade (division made up of foreign fighters)

Executive Summary:

Al-Shabab, or “the Youth,” is al-Qaeda’s formal affiliate in East Africa. Established in the late 1990s, the Somali-based terror group seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in the country that it hopes will ultimately expand to encompass the whole Horn of Africa. Al-Shabab controls much of the southern Somalia region and small pockets in Kenya and Ethiopia along the Somali border. In areas under the group’s control, al-Shabab imposes its strict version of sharia (Islamic law), prohibiting activities like listening to music or shaving one’s beard. The group predominately conducts attacks targeting the Somali government and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

Following the group’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012, al-Shabab began executing a score of violent attacks in Somalia’s neighboring countries, including the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, which left 68 people dead and 175 wounded. The group is also responsible for the April 2015 Garissa University attacks, wherein five al-Shabab fighters stormed the Kenyan university, killing nearly 150 people. Since then, the group has continued to attempt and conduct terrorist attacks outside of its stronghold in Somalia. In al-Shabab’s first attempt to attack Western targets, an assailant detonated a concealed laptop bomb on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu for Djibouti City on February 2, 2016. The explosion, which killed only the attacker, was not strong enough to down the plane. Al-Shabab reportedly killed more than 4,200 people in 2016, making it the deadliest Islamic terror group in Africa. In October 2017, al-Shabab was credited with the worst terror attack in Somalia to date––a truck bomb that killed over 300 people in Mogadishu.Jason Burke, “Mogadishu truck bomb: 500 casualties in Somalia’s worst terrorist attack,” Guardian (London), October 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia; Jason Burke, “Mogadishu bombing: al-Shabaab behind deadly blast, officials say,” Guardian (London), October 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/mogadishu-bombing-al-shabaab-behind-deadly-blast-officials-say.

Under al-Shabab’s strict brand of sharia, stonings, amputations, and beheadings are regular punishment for criminals and apostates. The group violently persecutes non-Muslims and clashes frequently with humanitarian and international aid workers.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Out of an estimated 6,000-12,000 fighters as of March 2016, only a small handful are believed to be ethnically non-Somali.Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Abdihakim Ainte, “The Return of al-Shabaab,” Daily Beast, March 15, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/15/the-return-of-al-shabaab.html.

The precursor to al-Shabab is Somali rebel group al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI), which targeted the Siad Barre military regime during the Somali Civil War in the 1990s. After the Barre regime fell, a younger, more hardline group split from the AIAI, seeking to extend AIAI’s mission and establish a “Greater Somalia” ruled under sharia. This group of youths—in Arabic, “al-Shabab”—joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in an attempt to enforce sharia throughout Mogadishu. In December 2006, U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and drove the ICU out of the capital. Though the majority of the ICU fled to neighboring countries, al-Shabab retreated southward and began organizing attacks against the Ethiopian forces. In this way, al-Shabab transitioned from a rebel group into a guerrilla movement and began seizing territory in central and southern Somalia.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Al-Shabab grew from a few hundred fighters in the 2006 to thousands by 2008, as Islamist-nationalist fighters sought to drive out the Ethiopian occupation.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Since the end of the Ethiopian occupation in 2008, al-Shabab has continued to its efforts to establish sharia domestically and attack government representatives and African Mission forces, while also adapting its foreign targets from Ethiopia to Kenya following a brief Kenyan invasion in 2011. Al-Shabab views the AMISOM, as well as the Somalia Federal Government, as its primary enemies since they are purportedly influenced by Western countries.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.

Al-Shabab formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012, though ties between them existed since 2008, when the American-born al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) cleric Anwar al-Awlaki released a statement praising al-Shabab for fighting against the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion. In 2010, AQAP deputy leader Said al-Shihri also released a statement encouraging al-Shabab to work with his group in its fight against the United States.Ty McCormick, U.S. Attacks Reveal Al-Shabab’s Strength, Not Weakness,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/u-s-attacks-reveal-al-shababs-strength-not-weakness-somalia/. Following the pledge of allegiance, some al-Qaeda fighters who trained at camps in Afghanistan moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabab. The two groups continue to cooperate closely, on everything from indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced explosives and assassination training. Al-Shabab and AQAP partake in the transfer of fighters and weapons between Yemen and Somalia. Al-Shabab fighters have been able to obtain new weapons and develop new tactics from AQAP, including the use of laptop explosives and more destructive car bombs.Ty McCormick, U.S. Attacks Reveal Al-Shabab’s Strength, Not Weakness,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/u-s-attacks-reveal-al-shababs-strength-not-weakness-somalia/. Al-Qaeda reportedly plays an important role in al-Shabab’s leadership, with one count reporting that foreigners comprise over half of al-Shabab’s executive council and that the group has embraced globalized rhetoric and propaganda.

Analysts cite the early militant Salafi extremist group al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI, a.k.a. Unity of Islam) as the precursor to al-Shabab and the incubator for many of its leaders. AIAI peaked in the 1990s after the Siad Barre military regime fell and civil war broke out.Jonathan Masters, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified September 5, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. A younger, hardline group split from the elder AIAI, seeking to establish a “Greater Somalia” ruled under sharia. This group of youths joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of sharia courts, to serve as a governance alternative once they overtook Mogadishu. The combined group was eventually pushed out by Ethiopia. Much of the ICU fled to the south of Somalia and al-Shabab emerged and continued asymmetrical attacks on Ethiopian targets.

This context is important in understanding a key characteristic of the group—it is not monolithic and is prone to internal fissures over strategy and tactics. These conflicts became particularly significant when whole clans broke from al-Shabab in 2008. Reports highlighted increased leadership conflicts over tactics, clan interests, affiliations with al-Qaeda, and policies toward international aid agencies.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf.

Ahmed Abdi Godane eventually triumphed over internal opposition with a series of purges in 2011 and a particularly bloody internal battle in June 2013. One of the implications of Godane’s victory is that the core group’s doctrine and affiliation seem to have been settled. Though al-Shabab has always had a Salafist jihadist orientation, the group’s leadership was once heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures like Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow. The al-Shabab that triumphed arose from the extreme fringe, steeped in the takfiri ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims and a recommitment to global jihad and restoration of the Caliphate. Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

Godane, no longer faced with internal opposition to aligning with al-Qaeda, officially pledged al-Shabab’s allegiance to that group in 2012. Afterward, some al-Qaeda fighters who trained at camps in Afghanistan moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabab. The two groups continue to cooperate closely on everything from indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced explosives and assassination training. Al-Qaeda reportedly plays an important role in al-Shabab’s leadership, with one count reporting that foreigners comprise over half of al-Shabab’s executive council and that the group has embraced globalized rhetoric and propaganda. Fred Dews, “Al Shabaab: Background on the Somalia-based Terrorist Group that Attacked a Nairobi Mall,” Brookings Institutition, September 23, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/al-shabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack. Out of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 fighters, 200 to 300 are non-Somali, with a number coming from the Somali diaspora.Fred Dews, “Al Shabaab: Background on the Somalia-based Terrorist Group that Attacked a Nairobi Mall,” Brookings Institutition, September 23, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/al-shabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack.

Financing:

Al-Shabab has had several sources of income throughout its history, including varying degrees of support from the Somali diaspora, locals, sponsors, and sustained dawa (proselytizing).

Domestically, al-Shabab drew significant revenue from racketeering after seizing the southern port city of Kismayo in 2008. The charcoal trade was essential to the city’s economy and the group was able to receive proceeds from exporting charcoal, totaling an estimated $35-50 million annually.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. Although AMISOM was able to take back Kismayo in October 2012, the United Nations has reported that al-Shabab’s illicit charcoal trade has continued in areas under the group’s control, such as Barawe, and estimates that profits from this city alone amount to millions of dollars monthly.“Letter dates 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) ad 1907 (2009) concerning Somalis and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, July 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413. The United Nations banned charcoal exports from Somalia in 2012. In October 2014, as part of an effort to target al-Shabab’s funding, the U.N. Security Council authorized the inspection of ships suspected of carrying Somali charcoal.Edith M. Lederer, “UN authorizes ship inspections for Somali charcoal,” Associated Press, October 24, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e8fe2a9961754c3b80c00f68c550dc6e/un-authorizes-ship-inspections-somali-charcoal.

After the June 2013 purge of Godane’s opposition within the leadership, al-Shabab shifted its attention toward “taxation”—specifically, collecting funds through voluntary support, extortion, and partnership with businesses, humanitarian agencies, and other non-governmental organizations that operate in south-central Somalia.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf.According to the United Nations, al-Shabab has generated up to $100 million per year, from fees levied at ports of entry, taxes on goods, taxes on domestic produce, “jihad contributions,” checkpoint fees, and extortion for payments of religious obligation. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916,” United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433.

Central to al-Shabab’s taxation and extortion practices is the use of roadblocks between Baidoa and Mogadishu as well as between Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. Each roadblock along these paths earns al-Shabab $5,000 a day extorting merchants. This money largely comes from money distributed to internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the United Nations and associated aid agencies. The United Nations issues IDPs living in refugee camps in Baidoa cash cards of $80 to $90 a month, which allows them to purchase necessities from merchants traveling from Mogadishu. On their way to and from Baidoa, these merchants are stopped and taxed at al-Shabab roadblocks, thereby unwillingly transferring U.N. funds to the terror group. While the regional Somali government and the United Nations have confirmed these practices, the U.N.’s head of country, Michael Keating, has insisted that most of the aid still reaches IDPs.Sam Kiley, “Funding al-Shabaab: How aid money ends up in terror group's hands,” CNN, February 12, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/12/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-foreign-aid-intl/index.html.

Staying true to its name, which means “The Youth,” al-Shabab seeks to recruit Somali adolescents and young adults. Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, 2, 6, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf. Boys as young as 9 years old have been forced into al-Shabab’s ranks. Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somali Children Flee Al-Shabab Recruitment,” Voice of America, August 7, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-children-seek-refuge-al-shabab-coastal-town-adale/3975825.html. In January 2017, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres estimated that more than half of al-Shabab’s fighters may be children. A Somali taskforce recorded the recruitment of 4,213 children—almost all boys—into al-Shabab between April 1, 2010, and July 31, 2016. According to a 2017 U.N. report, children “recruited and used by al-Shabab were victims of or were exposed to other grave violations including killing and maiming during military operations and air strikes targeting al-Shabab, and subjected to arrest and detention by Somalia security forces.”Edith M. Lederer, “UN alarm that most of al-Shabab’s force in Somalia are kids,” Associated Press, January 20, 2017, https://apnews.com/85093315baa644a6bee802b13fc343e5/un-alarm-most-al-shababs-force-somalia-are-kids.

According to Somali officials, al-Shabab needs younger recruits to replace aging fighters. The group has kidnapped children from schools, forcing others to flee al-Shabab-controlled areas to avoid conscription. In early August 2017 alone, more than 100 children fled from al-Shabab-controlled areas of Somalia for the safety of government-controlled areas of the country. Officials have estimated that more than 500 children have fled their homes to escape conscription into al-Shabab.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somali Children Flee Al-Shabab Recruitment,” Voice of America, August 7, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-children-seek-refuge-al-shabab-coastal-town-adale/3975825.html.

Al-Shabab uses children in combat and reconnaissance roles, according to the U.N. “Somalia,” United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, May 15, 2014, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/somalia/. A 14-year-old Somali recruit, interviewed by the Institute for Security Studies in September 2014, said, “[W]hen you join, they give you a mobile phone and every month you get $50. This is what pushes a lot of my friends to join.” Another member recalled how during his recruitment experience “[P]reachers delivered sermons for hours about destiny and the sweetness of the holy war. They distributed leaflets on Islam [and] showed video recording from other jihadist [sic] in the world.” Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, 2, 6, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf.

Al-Shabab has attempted to influence Somali families toward Islamism. The group’s Education and Youth Engagement released its own curriculum in early 2017, focusing only on Quran, math, history, and geography. Ludovica Iaccino, “Al-Shabab Urges Parents to Send Their Children to Islamic Schools to Avoid Western Influences,” Newsweek, April 21, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabab-somalia-islamic-schools-militants-al-qaeda-587260. That April, the group released a statement instructing Somali parents to shun public schooling and send their children to Islamic schools. The group warned of “consequences” for parents and teachers who embrace secular education.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Al-Shabab Warns Against Western Education,” Voice of America, April 20, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-warns-against-western-education/3818654.html.

Within Somalia, recruiters infiltrate remote, rural areas and approach potential recruits. There have been accounts of recruiters threatening the lives of Somali Muslim men who initially resist joining the group.Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2014, p. 8, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf.

“They are given quotations from the Koran, the Hadiths, but they do not have the benefit of a critical mind to look at it in any other context and they trust the people driving them to this. Advantage is taken of the person’s feeling of desperation and that is dangerous enough to drive them over the top. They are given the feeling that they are a very important person and that martyrdom is something to aspire to - the anger over their deprivation is lowered to a feeling of comfort, to a point where the only thing they aspire to is a collective action. Whether that action leads to their survival or death that doesn’t really matter any more [sic].”“In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?” BBC News, last modified October 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24379013.

Al-Shabab recruiters radicalize young Kenyan Muslims—often converts to Islam— with extremist sermons. Personal accounts reveal that recruiters use psychological manipulation to increase enrollment in the terror group. A disillusioned former recruit said that deceased al-Shabab member and radical Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed “used to tell us: ‘Instead of sitting in the slum doing nothing, it’s better to go to Somalia and fight for your religion, you’ll go straight to heaven.’”Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline,’” BBC News, September 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24263357.

Once the recruits are prepared to join al-Shabab, they travel to remote islands off of Kenya’s coast, which are only a couple hours away from Somalia by boat. From these islands, radical preachers guide them to their final destination, Somalia.Peter Taylor, “On the trail of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruitment ‘pipeline,’” BBC News, September 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24263357.

Americans began traveling to Somalia to join al-Shabab in 2007 when the terror group stepped up its insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government. Most American fighters for al-Shabab have been radicalized in Minneapolis, Minnesota, home to the largest Somali diaspora in the U.S.

The FBI contends that al-Shabab has made an “active and deliberate attempt” to recruit American fighters in person and over the Internet. A 2011 U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security investigation found that al-Shabab recruiters have used mosques and cafes as meeting places to radicalize and recruit.House Homeland Security Committee, Majority Investigative Report: Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland, 112th Congress, July 27, 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Investigative%20report.pdf. Alabama native Omar Hammami appeared in several online videos in which he urged foreigners in English to “live the life of a mujahid.” Al-Shabab has released a host of other online recruitment videos depicting American foreign fighters.

Today, al-Shabab recruits undergo a six-month training process.Jamal Osman, “Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp,” Channel 4, December 16, 2013, http://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda. According to the FBI, training includes “reading and interpreting the Koran, physical exercise, and weapons handling.” Such weapons include AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.Ian Duncan, “Accused al-Shabaab fighter came from heart of Baltimore's African-American Muslim community,” Baltimore Sun, January 17, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-maalik-jones-al-shabbab-20160117-story.html. At one graduation ceremony open to media, 300 trainees became members. The new graduates were able to choose which sector of al-Shabab to join. Graduates can sign up for a combat unit, become bomb-makers, or work for the group’s security network, the Amniyat. Standout recruits have the special opportunity to join the years-long waiting list for the Istishhadyin unit, the group’s suicide brigade.Jamal Osman, “Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp,” Channel 4, December 16, 2013, http://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda.

History Timeline
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1za4LdNvWhiwnnpUjaeP_GB9CWt89VPz-Z1yjUQy0umc/edit?usp=sharing

Violent History

As al-Shabab lost control of urban centers, its tactics shifted to asymmetrical attacks, with greater reliance on suicide bombs, IEDs, hit-and-runs, political threats, assassinations, and grenade attacks.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. The group’s new tactics emphasized collaboration with its historical enemies in Somalia, resulting in alliances and deals that make it difficult for external actors to dismantle the group.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. Godane’s suppression of internal opposition allowed him to drive al-Shabab towards more indiscriminate modes of violence similar to al-Qaeda’s.

Al-Shabab was reportedly responsible for more than 4,000 fatalities in 2016, according to the U.S. Department of Defense-affiliated Africa Center for Strategic Studies, based on data collected from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). As a result, al-Shabab reportedly overtook Boko Haram as Africa’s deadliest terror group. ACLED attributed 3,499 fatalities to Boko Haram in 2016, while ISIS killed 2,350 people.Farah Abdi Warsameh, “How Al-Shabab Overtook Boko Haram to Become Africa’s Deadliest Militants,” Newsweek, June 2, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/isis-africa-al-shabaab-boko-haram-619010. A Washington Post analysis disputed the findings, however, claiming that al-Shabab actually killed 432 people in 2016, while Boko Haram killed 790. The Washington Post explained the discrepancy because ACLED included all acts of violence without specifically labeling which were acts of terrorism. The Post also counted only incidents where al-Shabab was the primary actor involved.Salem Solomon and Casey Frechette, “No, al-Shabab is not deadlier than Boko Haram. Here are better numbers,” Washington Post, July 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/21/no-al-shabab-isnt-more-deadly-than-boko-haram-here-are-better-numbers/?utm_term=.3c5036798b7d.

The majority of the group’s attacks are retaliatory against perceived injustices against Muslims and against al-Shabab’s mission in Somalia. Targets includes the U.S. and other Western countries, as well as those states, such as Uganda and Kenya, who have contributed to troops to AMISOM.

In April 2017, new Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on al-Shabab while offering al-Shabab fighters a 60-day amnesty period. The government offered to provide employment and education to fighters who surrendered during this period. The group formally rejected the offer and the declaration of war the following day. On April 9, an al-Shabab suicide bomber killed at least 15 people in an attack near a military base in Mogadishu.“Al-Shabab fighters offered amnesty as new Somali president declares war,” BBC News, April 6, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39513909; Hussein Mohamed, “Somalia’s President Declares War on Shabab Militants,” New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/africa/somalia-shabab.html; “Al-Shabab dismisses Somali president war declaration,” BBC News, April 7, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39527226;

As outlined below, al-Shabab has engaged in both guerrilla and terror tactics since its inception. A key differentiator and contributor to its sustainability as an organization is al-Shabab’s adaptability. This military and political flexibility is assisted by the leadership’s lack of direct accountability to a constituency,International Crisis Group, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab -- It will be a Long War,” Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 99, June 26, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b099-somalia-al-shabaab-it-will-be-a-long-war.pdf. enabling them to carry out any number of attacks on whatever targets they choose. One of the major developments within the organization has been its tactical shifts and hybridization of violent attacks, combining both suicide bombers and suicide infantry.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.. According to Matt Bryden at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Westgate Mall attack was the culmination of successfully tried and tested tactics, techniques and procedures honed back home in Somalia.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.. Specifically, al-Shabab understood from past experience that breaching the perimeter of the mall would be necessary to overtake it, so their typical suicide-bombing tactic would not work there. Consequently, the group used hand grenades to penetrate the structure.

Timeline of Violent Activities:

October 29, 2008: The first known American suicide bomber for al-Shabab, Shirwa Ahmed, is part of attack in Hargeisa that kills 24 people. Ahmed was a Somali-American from Minnesota who trained with al-Shabab.Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.

February 2009: Al-Shabab successfully uses explosive vests in a sophisticated attack against African Union (AU) military bases in Mogadishu. They employ a mix of person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), followed by indirect fire. Similar tactics were used in a September bombing at an AU military base.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 19, 2009: Somalia National Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden is killed in a large-scale suicide car bomb attack in Beletwyne. Over 30 people are killed in the attack. The group seeks to intensify its strategy to strong-arm the Somali-population, focusing on high-target assassinations and clan elders.United Nations Security Council, “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Security Council Resolution 1844,” March 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/1844_cons_list.pdf.

July 11, 2010: Al-Shabab claims responsibility for several near-simultaneous bombings that kill dozens of people in sports bars in Uganda. The three coordinated blasts, which detonate just seven minutes apart, kill 76 people watching the World Cup in Kampala. In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?” BBC News, last modified October 4, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24379013. A fourth bomb left at a discotheque fails to go off. This is the group’s first attack on foreign soil. The group’s spokesman proclaims, “We are sending a message to every country who is willing to send troops to Somalia that they will face attacks on their territory.” Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. This attack brought together several of the elements from the 2009 bombings—near simultaneous attacks, employing PBIEDs, VBIEDs, and mobile-phone trigger.

August 24, 2012: Al-Shabab attempts a complex attack, targeting the Muna Hotel in Mogadishu. Al-Shabab gunmen, disguised as government security personnel, lay siege to the building and a two-hour gun battle ensues before one of the assailants detonates an explosive vest. The attack kills 32 people, including several members of parliament. Although the attack was deemed successful by al-Shabab, the group does not attempt another operation of such complexity until two years later, when they attempted to kill Somalia’s newly elected president at Mogadishu’s Jazeera Hotel.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

March 28, 2013: Al-Shabab detonates a car bomb aimed at Somali intelligence chief Kahlif Ahmed Ereg near the National Theater in Mogadishu. The bomb kills 10 civilians and injures 15. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

April 14, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the Supreme Court using a VBIED to breach the main entrance. Gunmen, some wearing explosive vests, then enter the building to carry out a killing spree. All of the attackers are reportedly killed and more than 35 people are killed in the attack. Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 19, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the U.N. compound in Mogadishu. The attack follows a similar pattern as the Supreme Court plans, with a VBIED exploding at the main entrance, allowing a small team of gunmen to enter. A total of 22 people are killed, including four U.N. international personnel, four local security guards, and all attackers.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

June 2013: Al-Shabab’s bloodiest internal battle ever destabilizes the group, leading to a major purge. The purge is thought to have removed 200 members. Top leaders who opposed Godane meet varying fates, with Ibrahim al-Afghani and Maa’lim Hashi executed, Mukhtar Robow escaping, and Hasan Dahir Aweys fleeing but being captured by government militias and handed over to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government.Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (February 2014): 4-9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf. Godane consolidates control over the weakened, smaller group and implements a hardline strategy and tactics.

July 12, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks an AMISOM convoy en route to Mogadishu International Airport. The group publicly admits they had tried to target U.S. intelligence officers.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

July 27, 2013: Al-Shabab attacks the Turkish embassy housing complex in Mogadishu using a car bomb and small weapons, killing eight and injuring 13. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 3 and 4, 2013: Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy strikes a roadside bomb as he travels to Merka, Lower Shabelle. No casualties are reported, though one Somali soldier is injured.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 7, 2013: Eighteen civilians are killed at the popular Villa Restaurant in Mogadishu. Al-Shabab employs a two-part VBIED and suicide attack.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 12 and November 5, 2013: Al-Shabab twice targets the convoy of Interim Juba Administration President Ahmed Madobe with a car bomb outside of Kismayo’s airport. Madobe is slightly injured in the first attack. Civilians are killed in both attacks. “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

September 21 - 24, 2013: Al-Shabab militants, including a Norwegian citizen of Somali origin and three Somali nationals, raid Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. In the deadliest attack in Kenya in 15 years, the attackers kill 67 people and wound more than 200 over four days. The victims include six Kenyan security personnel.Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

November 8, 2013: The group attempts to detonate a sophisticated IED embedded in a laptop at Maka al Mukarama, a popular hotel in Mogadishu frequented by high-level government and security officials. The attack kills six and injures 15. A secondary VBIED detonates in the parking lot.=“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm.

November 19, 2013: Al-Shabab insurgents launch a complex attack against the central police station in Beledweyne, killing 24 Somali police officers and one Djiboutian AMISOM soldier, and injuring several others.United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,” S/2014/140, March 3, 2014, http://unsom.unmissions.org/Portals/UNSOM/SG%20Report%20March%202014.pdf.

December 5, 2013: A suicide car bomber hits a convoy of the Puntland security forces in central Boosaaso, killing three police officers and four civilians, while injuring several others. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,” S/2014/140, March 3, 2014, http://unsom.unmissions.org/Portals/UNSOM/SG%20Report%20March%202014.pdf.

February 21, 2014: Following a series of suicide bombings over a few weeks, al-Shabab attacks Somalia’s presidential palace with a combination of car bombs and engages in a gun battle with palace guards. Fourteen people are left dead, including five Somali officials and soldiers and nine attackers. The interior minister confirms that two government officials are among the dead.“Al-Shabab attacks Somali presidential palace,” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/somali-presidential-hq-attacked-al-shabab-201422112586270319.html.

December 2, 2014: After identifying non-Muslim workers at a quarry in Kenya, al-Shabab massacres 36 people, most of whom are reportedly “lined up, and shot in the head, at close range” while others are beheaded. “Al-Shabab massacres non-Muslims at Kenya quarry,” BBC News, last modified December 2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30288137.

December 12, 2014: Al-Shabab kidnaps and beheads Quran teacher Mohamed Hussein near the central Somali city of Bulo Berde because Hussein reportedly refused to obey al-Shabab’s order to leave his village. His headless corpse is later found dumped close to his home. Omar Nor, “Al-Shabaab blamed for five beheadings,” CNN, December 15, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/15/world/africa/somalia-violence/.

December 25, 2014: Eight al-Shabab militants storm an African Union (AU) building and kill three Ugandan peacekeepers and a civilian contractor. Al-Shabab claims that it killed 14 peacekeepers, explaining that it “targeted the enemies at a time they were celebrating Christmas…”Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Islamist gunmen attack African Union base in Somalia,” Reuters, December 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/27/us-somalia-security-idUSKBN0K503C20141227.

December 26, 2014: In claiming responsibility for the African Union attack on December 25, al-Shabab state that it is in retaliation for a U.S. strike that killed its leader, Ahmed Godane.mar Nor, Mohammed Tawfeeq, and Susanna Capelouto, “Al-Shabaab: Attack on base was revenge for U.S. airstrike,” CNN, December 26, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/26/world/africa/somalia-violence/.

July 15, 2015: Al-Shabab militants launch coordinated attacks on a stadium housing peacekeepers, as well as two hotels, in Mogadishu. According to police, six civilians and five militants are killed in the attacks.Robyn Kriel, “Al-Shabaab says it is responsible for three Somalia attacks,” CNN, July 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/10/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-attacks/.

April 11, 2016: A car bomb detonates outside the Mogadishu mayor’s office, killing five people and wounding five more. Al-Shabab claims responsibility.Feisal Omar and Abdirahaman Hussein, “Mogadishu car bomb kills five at local government HQ,” Reuters, April 11, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKCN0X8109.

April 14, 2016: Suspected al-Shabab militants attempt to assassinate a Somali member of parliament in the town of Balad Hawo near the Kenyan border using explosive devices, injuring four people.“Four people injured in bomb attacks on residential house of Federal MP in Balad Hawo town,” Goobjoog News, April 15, 2016, http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=27775.

December 2016: Al-Shabab militants kill several government officials in Bosasso in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. On December 15, gunmen shoot Colonel Jama Sahardiid, second deputy commander of Puntland Police forces, outside a restaurant in Bosasso. Sahardiid dies from his wounds the following day. On December 20, militants shoot and kill Aden Huruse, an aide in Puntland’s presidential palace, at a restaurant in Bosasso. On December 25, gunmen kill military prosecutor Abdikarim Hassan Firdiye as he is getting out of his car outside a restaurant in Bosasso.Abdiqani Hassan and Feisal Omar, “Al Shabaab militants shoot prosecutor dead in Somalia's Puntland,” Reuters, December 25, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-attacks-idUSKBN14E0BJ.

May 9, 2017: Al-Shabab fighters attack a military base in Goofgaduud, killing at least seven soldiers. Al-Shabab claims it killed 16 soldiers and captured the entire town of Goofgaduud, which the Somali government does not immediately confirm. Aaron Maasho, “Al Shabaab militants attack Somali army base, killing several soldiers,” Reuters, May 9, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-idUSKBN185132.

May 16, 2017: Four Al-Shabab gunmen break into the house of Kenyan government official Dekow Abbey Sirat and shoot him dead. The group claims it also killed several of Sirat’s bodyguards and took their weapons. Humphrey Malalo, “Al Shabaab gunmen kill official in northern Kenya: police, group,” Reuters, May 16, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-security-idUSKCN18C11V.

May 24, 2017: A car bomb in Mogadishu kills five people and wounds six. Eight Kenyan soldiers are killed in two separate roadside bombings on the Kenyan side of the border. Al-Shabab claims responsibility for all three attacks. Feisal Omar, “Al Shabaab bombing in Somali capital kills five, injures six,” Reuters, May 24, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKBN18K2AJ.

June 5, 2017: A bomb planted at a police station in the southern Somalia city of Kismayu kills one policeman and wounds several others. Al-Shabab claims responsibility and alleges the bomb killed four policemen and wounded 27.“Al Shabaab claims bomb attack on Somali police station,” Reuters, June 5, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKBN18W1NL.

August 4, 2017: Al-Shabab seizes the Somalia town of Leego after the Somali military and AMISOM peacekeepers withdraw from the town. Al-Shabab military spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab tells Reuters, “The town is now under our control.”Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Al Shabaab militants seize town in south of Somalia: residents,” Reuters, August 4, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-border-idUSKBN1AJ1TP.

March 2, 2018: Al-Shabab militants launch three separate attacks across Somalia killing at least 16 AU and Somali soldiers. Militants drive an SVBIED into a military camp near the town of Agooye, killing at least five Somali soldiers. At the same time, an IED kills six more soldiers on the road from Afgooye to Mogadishu. Separately, militants briefly capture the southern town of Bal’ad and kill five Burundi peacekeepers just north of it.“Somalia: Five AU soldiers among 16 killed in al-Shabaab attacks,” Garowe Online, March 3, 2018, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-5-au-soldiers-among-16-killed-in-al-shabaab-attacks.

April 21, 2015: The Department of the Treasury designates Ahmed Diriye as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on April 21, 2015.https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150421.aspx.

The United Nations Security Council Committee designated Al-Shabab on April 12, 2010. “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Security Council Resolution 1844,” United Nations Security Council, March 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/1844_cons_list.pdf.