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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003179
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015
TAGS: MARRPRELCANORAD
SUBJECT: CANADA: NORAD AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND I
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
¶1. (U) On September 21, 2005 in Ottawa, a U.S. negotiating
team led jointly by the Departments of State and Defense met
with Canadian counterparts in the first round of discussions
to renew the Agreement for the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), due to expire on May 12, 2006.
U.S. delegation (USDEL):
Terry Breese, Director, WHA/CAN, State
James Townsend, Principal Director, OASD/ISP/European and
NATO Policy, DOD
Felix Hernandez, WHA/CAN, State
David Sullivan, L/WHA, State
COL(P) Frederick S. Rudesheim, USA, J-5, DOD
CDR Stephen McInerney, USN, OASD/ISP, DOD
Lt Col Patricia Dees, USAF, J-5, DOD
Col Robert Leary, USNORTHCOM
Patricia Jacubec, OASD/Homeland Defense, DOD
Patricia Kim-Scott, Embassy Ottawa (notetaker)
Canada delegation (CANDEL):
Paul Chapin, Director General (DG), International Security
Division, FAC
RAdm Drew Robertson, DG, International Security Policy, DND
Janet Graham, Director, Continental Defense Division, FAC
Barbara Martin (ADD TITLE)
Michael Bonser, Defense & Security Relations (IDR), FAC
Sabine Nolke, Legal Affairs Bureau (JLH), FAC
Col Mike Hache, Western Hemisphere Policy, DND
CDR Mark Chupick, Western Hemisphere Policy, DND
Claude LeBlanc, Policy Development, DND
Kelly Anderson, Canadian Embassy in Washington
NORAD observers:
Col Marc Dippold, USAF
Col Eric Stevens, Vice Director of Plans
¶2. (C) Both sides agreed that completion of NORAD renewal in
a timely fashion was the first priority; the future of the
Bi-national Planning Group (BPG - co-located with but not
part of NORAD) needed to be addressed because its expiration
was coterminous with the NORAD Agreement; and discussion of
broader defense cooperation should proceed in parallel, but
would require more time. Additionally, Canadian negotiators
indicated that they wanted to reach agreement on NORAD no
later than the end of October. They had tentatively
scheduled a Cabinet review for the new agreement for
mid-November and have further Cabinet time reserved in
mid-December. The next round of talks is set for October 12
ahead of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense meeting in
Winnipeg. The U.S. delegation volunteered to prepare a
"draft Agreement" drawing on the day's discussions, as well
as a discussion paper to address raising defense relations to
the next level. END SUMMARY.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND POSITIONS
¶3. (C) In opening remarks, DG Chapin noted the transformed
security environment in the United States as a result of the
9/11 terrorist attacks. While changes in Canada might not be
as "dramatic," he said, they were "cumulatively close" to
those that took place in the U.S. Chapin cited Canada's
first-ever national security policy, released in
2004; C$9 billion in expenditures covering new
security-related structures in the Prime Minister's Office
(PMO) and elsewhere; the active engagement of Canadian Forces
in Operation Enduring Freedom, sustained in subsequent ISAF
deployments; and "indirect" support for Iraq, notably through
aid contributions and elections support. Moreover, he said,
a great deal had been achieved collectively by the U.S. and
Canada, including the Smart Border Declaration and related
action plan, the 2002 launch of the Bi-national Planning
Group (BPG) as an adjunct to NORAD, a joint statement last
year by President Bush and Prime Minister Martin to pursue an
agenda on border, economic and security and defense issues,
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of last March.
¶4. (C) Chapin said that the United States and Canada faced
three tasks: renewal of the NORAD Agreement, incorporating
any changes deemed necessary; deciding the future of the BPG;
and exploring and recommending additional ways to enhance
U.S.-Canada security and defense cooperation. The Canadian
Cabinet had given a negotiating mandate with a view to all
three of these tasks.
¶5. (C) Chapin referred to Canada's May 2005 non-paper on
enhanced defense cooperation, which was intended to provide a
frame of reference for discussion, and drew on the work of
the Bi-national Planning Group. He noted that there was no
arrangement between the United States and Canada to ensure
coordinated responses between Navies and Coast Guards, no
training of fleets for mutual defense, and added that the
land operations order (OPORD) was not up to date. Canada, he
said, valued the U.S.-Canada defense relationship, of which
NORAD was the cornerstone. NORAD was uniquely bi-national,
enabled combined responsiveness in a critical timeframe, and
was fundamental to a layered defense of the continent.
¶6. (C) Bi-nationally, Chapin proposed that NORAD be expanded
to include maritime surveillance and warning, and the
Aagreement should be of no fixed term. Additionally, the BPG
planning function should be maintained. Bilaterally, he
noted, the United States and Canada should: discuss how to
enhance maritime defense, explore how to develop bilateral
military-to-military support for civil authorities, and
explore training opportunities to test and evaluate existing
plans for defense of the continent.
¶7. (C) Admiral Robertson stated that he and Rear Admiral
Sullivan, USN, Joint Staff Vice Director for Policy and
Planning, had met in July to look at military-to-military
cooperation. Robertson said that bilateral plans needed to
be revised and that there was a need to review maritime
threats. He noted that military-to-military assistance after
Hurricane Katrina was coordinated through NORTHCOM. A lot of
work was yet to be done at the national level, including
development of a national operations plan. The creation of
Canada Command (CanCom) would bring dedicated staff to Ottawa
to address these issues. He added that the existence of
CanCom had not been anticipated in the Cabinet mandate for
NORAD negotiations.
¶8. (C) In his introductory remarks, WHA/CAN Director Breese
reaffirmed the USG view that NORAD remained a vital component
of the common defense of North America and said that the U.S.
had taken essentially the same approach as Canada in
preparing for negotiations. Exploring defense support to
civilian authorities (DSCA) was particularly relevant in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; moreover,
military-to-military support to civilian authorities was an
excellent example of U.S.-Canadian cooperation and
interoperability. Breese reiterated President Bush's
gratitude for Canada's generous outpouring of assistance.
The U.S. agreed, Breese continued, that the future of the BPG
must be addressed in timely fashion, though what that future
might be remained unclear. Other issues needing resolution
included the future of the Military Cooperation Committee,
and how the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) fit into
the continental defense equation. The evolution of U.S.
Northern Command and the birth of Canada Command had changed
the equation and created new realities.
¶9. (C) In brief remarks, OSD Director Townsend expressed
appreciation for Canadian assistance in dealing with the
devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The U.S.-Canada defense
agenda was "huge" -- more than NORAD and more than
continental defense. He shared his view that the United
States and Canada must take their security relationship "to
the next level." The two countries were natural allies
beyond the continent, and could "do more, in a stronger way."
NATO, he said, had a Pacific view. The United States and
Canada had Pacific interests; however, Europeans did not
necessarily see this yet.
¶10. (C) While he acknowledged that Canada had not consciously
paid attention to the defense of Canada in the past, Chapin
stated that Canada had been given a "bum rap" on defense. He
noted that Canada had been "coming back for five to seven
years." Canada, he stressed, was ready to play a substantial
role abroad.
THE RENEWAL PROCESS
¶11. (C) Discussing the renewal process and related timelines,
the U.S. side clarified that its mandate was for negotiation
only, and that separate Circular 175 authority would be
required to "conclude" the Agreement. The U.S. noted that
because the NORAD Agreement was not a treaty, U.S. Senate
approval would not be required. However, congressional
consultations might be desirable.
¶12. (C) Graham stated that, in Canada, an exchange of notes
containing legally binding obligations had the "effect" of a
treaty and thus Canadian Cabinet approval of a draft text
specifically was required. The uncertain status of the
"minority" government notwithstanding, negotiators had
anticipated a Cabinet review for mid-November. This would
require negotiations to be concluded by the end of October.
Chapin said there was always a small possibility that the
Government might decide that the issue should be debated by
Parliament, and did not rule out the possibility that the
Government might engineer a debate in Parliament of the ad
ref text. It was noted that debates were a way of putting
issues in the public domain and that then Foreign Minister
Axworthy spoke about the 1996 NORAD Renewal text in
Parliament (a "take note" debate). Moreover, in their
current predicament, the Liberals likely were sensitive to
criticism that past Liberal Governments had failed to
adequately "consult" Members about important matters such as
continental defense. That said, Chapin stressed the positive
Canadian attitude toward NORAD.
CANADIAN DRAFT TEXT
¶13. (C) In a discussion document entitled "All Domain NORAD
Draft Text," derived from the 1996 NORAD renewal text, the
Canadians outlined an approach to NORAD that was consistent
with U.S. Circular 175 authority, including addition of
maritime warning to NORAD's mission. Working through the
text USDEL posed a number of questions, indicating several
points where it might seek revisions. For some of these,
USDEL proposed devising a preamble that would provide general
context and thus avert some potentially time-consuming
semantic bartering. Canada accepted the U.S. offer to
prepare a draft text of an international agreement (replacing
the exchange of notes used previously) based on the Canadian
draft.
¶14. (C) In presenting its text, the Canadian delegation
pointed out issues of particular importance. References to
information sharing were included to send an "important
signal" and stress the need for information exchange. On
maritime warning, it was important to develop a complete
maritime picture at NORAD. Responses to maritime threats
would be through bilateral channels. "Land warning" was
added to "flesh out the all-domain awareness concept." It
helped, the Canadians noted, to ensure a "real-time, full
picture" of threats. References to a five year renewal were
removed in this draft to allow for an indefinite term.
Language was added to formalize an amendment process.
Language ensuring the continued existence of the BPG was
added as there was a need to "define modalities for improving
planning." The language was bracketed, however, because the
modalities were open.
¶15. (C) The U.S. delegation raised specific questions about
the draft Canadian text. Breese noted that it was important
to be specific about activities associated with drug
trafficking to ensure they are within NORAD's roles (Preamble
paragraph 4 of the Canadian text).
¶16. (C) Paragraphs I.8 and III.8 of the Canadian text
referred to the need for enhanced "information sharing,"
seeking the explicit commitment of both governments to
"ensuring the effective sharing of information and
intelligence relevant to the defense of North America."
USDEL acknowledged the importance of sharing information
relevant to NORAD's specific mission but voiced reservations
about generalizing a need for information sharing in this
Agreement. Information sharing between the U.S. and Canada
was a major issue that was being handled outside of the
current discussion, and one that political leaders already
had discussed as a field to explore. Chapin noted that the
BPG had told of complications in planning and practice due to
lack of information sharing.
¶17. (C) With respect to the Canadian addition of a "land
warning function" the U.S. delegation asked for clarification
on what that function meant. Breese noted that such a
function could get "very political" in both countries and
asked for more details. He added that it was a subject that
could mature through NORTHCOM and CanCom. Col Hache explained
that Canada added land warning "for completeness" because
Canada did not want a gap in continental domain coverage. He
explained further that the Canadian delegation "automatically
assumed" that land warning referred to defense support for
civilian authorities. Martin added that it was critical to
have a shared picture of threats and suggested that NORAD
could, for example, track the unloading of a container from a
ship to a truck that was headed toward the border. Chapin
responded that land warning got to the issue about the
essence of NORAD in the future. No one wanted a
"blockbuster" NORAD that did everything, but NORAD did need a
broader set of eyes and ears. It was imprudent, he thought,
to go from one plan to another. Rather than worry about
"imposing boundaries" on the mission, the focus should be on
having the ability to sort out the threat. Citing the
absence of "big picture" clarity on 9/11, he said there was
great value in enabling an integrated and shared threat
picture for North America. Breese agreed, remarking however,
that this touched upon transition from NORAD to appropriate
law enforcement entities, i.e. DHS/PSEPC.
¶18. (C) On the maritime warning mission Breese asked for an
explanation of Canadian references to internal waterways
(paragraph II.13 of the Canadian draft). Col Hache answered
that there was a clear delineation here between warning and
"control". He acknowledged that looking at the internal
waterways moved into the realm of law enforcement, but noted
that "appropriate warning would trigger the appropriate
response." If NORAD, he suggested, identified a situation
involving the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Great Lakes, it
could notify NORTHCOM or the appropriate responder. USDEL
sought clarification on definitions of "warning,"
"surveillance," and "control," observing that each held
specific meanings in the U.S. military lexicon.
¶19. (C) Regarding information operations (paragraph II.15 of
the Canadian draft) Breese asked why such this was included
by Canada as a mission for NORAD. Information system defense
was an inherent part of any command's functions and was a
"task" more than a "mission." Lt Col Dees noted that the
Department of Defense was eliminating "defensive information
operations" as a term in draft joint doctrine because the
line between defense and offense was often blurry. The U.S.
delegation noted that it would be desirable to articulate the
defensive nature of information operations and agreed to
include it in the preamble to the Agreement.
¶20. (C) In paragraph III.3 Canada included a statement that
"NORAD shall remain a distinct headquarters with a distinct
chain of command." Breese inquired as to the reason for
insertion of the sentence. Chapin explained that it was
added because NORTHCOM was new since the last Agreement. He
stressed Canada's view that NORAD must be protected as an
institution, referring to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's
testimony to congress in which the Secretary spoke about
NORAD being subsumed (by NORTHCOM). A more difficult
alternative, Chapin said, would be "to explain NORAD in the
context of NORTHCOM and CanCom."
¶21. (C) The Canadian draft included language regarding
potential/prospective "new partnerships for the defense of
North America." The U.S. delegation noted that inclusion of
such language was problematic since it would be inappropriate
to name countries and such broad language might encourage
other countries not viewed as appropriate partners by the
U.S. or Canada to apply for membership. Chapin agreed that
such language was not needed as the NORAD amendment process
would allow for any possible future expansion.
THE BI-NATIONAL PLANNING GROUP
¶22. (C) The U.S. delegation questioned Canadian draft
language affirming that a BPG function would continue to
exist. Col Rudesheim acknowledged the value of the BPG's
contributions but noted that "realities had changed" since
the BPG's inception. Townsend expressed the desire for more
of a strategic focus to the BPG. Breese noted that that
there were several missions for the BPG now: updating
bi-national plans; coordinating global planning; and "big
sky" thinking beyond continental defense. Possible options
for the future of the BPG were: maintain the status quo;
direct NORTHCOM and CanCom to devote resources to conduct
planning cooperatively; and locate BPG functions in a "think
tank" venue, perhaps at the National Defense University in
Washington, D.C., not tied to either Northern Command or
Canada Command, to do "big sky" thinking. The latter would
feed into DoD and DND.
¶23. (C) Chapin said that maintaining distinction between
function and use was critical. The BPG was designed to
achieve modest objectives quickly. It had examined the
current nature of joint plans and found a plethora of
treaties, MOUs, and informal arrangements that were not
necessarily practical. Because of its composition and
mandate, the unit was able to develop and test scenarios that
identified work to be done in joint response. Without the
BPG, both sides would lose the pro-active dimension of its
function for long-term strategic planning. The planning
functions of the BPG meshed well with functions of the PJBD
and MCC. Moreover, if BPG planning functions were to revert
to national commends, bi-national efforts would be vulnerable
to national schedules and tasks. A valuable proactive
dimension in bi-national planning would be lost. Admiral
Robertson asked that the bi-national planning function not be
allowed to be captured by the "commanders' whim-of-the-day"
or other priorities.
¶24. (U) Both sides agreed to hold the next round of talks on
November 12 in Winnipeg, just before the 216th meeting of the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense (November 12-14) and to
brief the Board on the status of negotiations. Additionally,
the U.S. delegation agreed to provide comments on the
Canadian draft by the end of the week of October 3, 2005.
For its part, the Canadian delegation agreed to draft and
share a paper on options for bi-national planning before the
week of October 3, 2005. It was further agreed that the U.S.
delegation, through Mr. Townsend, would prepare a non-paper
on enhanced defense cooperation beyond the NORAD Agreement.
¶25. (U) This message has been cleared by heads of USDEL.
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
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WILKINS