'Top Dog' and a Vengeful Harpy: The US Is Betting on Putin

'Top Dog' and a Vengeful Harpy:The US Is Betting on Putin

By Uwe Klußmann

The US is well informed in Moscow -- which is why Washington is skeptical that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has much of a future. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, diplomatic cables make clear, is 'in the driver's seat.'

dpa

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev: The US thinks it knows who is pulling the strings.

The report that the US ambassador to Moscow, John Beyrle, sent to Washington on Aug. 9, 2008, did not contain a lot that was flattering about the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev. Beyrle, a diplomat who had been an expert on Russia since Soviet times, got his charges d'affaires to describe the reaction of Medvedev to the beginning of the war with Georgia the previous night. "A pale and hesitant Medvedev, with none of the bravado of Putin, was pushed forward into the limelight on Saturday morning," the report said.

According to the US Embassy, Medvedev's performance "has been lackluster, with potential implications for his longevity in office." Six days later, in another memo, the diplomats summed up the situation in the following way: "Medvedev Main Headliner, but Putin Top Dog."

The US diplomats in the Russian capital had no doubts about who was setting the country's course. And the embassy documents reveal that informants inside the Kremlin helped the diplomats to get a clear picture of the situation. According to a secret message sent to the State Department on Aug. 26, 2008, Medvedev had the "status as junior member of the tandem." The conclusion: "Putin, not Medvedev, set the tone and tenor of Russia's war policy."

The US Embassy was sure about this assessment because German ambassador Walter Schmid had informed them of something he had heard from one of Putin's advisers. The man had told the ambassador that "that Putin was deeply concerned by the failure of Medvedev to take immediate actions" against the Georgian attacks on South Ossetia. According to the US Embassy report, Medvedev "was unprepared for the Georgian war."

'Political Uncertainty'

The conflict in the Caucasus ended speculation inside the US Embassy that had first been mooted shortly before by Beyrle's predecessor, William Burns, who went on to become under-secretary of state. "The question remains as to how far Medvedev is willing to go, particularly under Putin's watchful eye," Burns cabled to the State Department on March 25, 2008. A month later, he complained about a lack of "hard information" from the Moscow leadership and of "political uncertainty about the shape of the Medvedev-Putin tandem."

The lack of information only increased the eagerness of the American representatives in Russia to feed the State Department with gossip from inside the Kremlin -- to Medvedev's chagrin. On April 30, 2008, the diplomats reported to Washington that "the role of Medvedev's wife, Svetlana, in generating tensions between the camps remains the subject of avid gossip." In a secret dispatch, one man who was close to Medvedev, but who also acted as an informer to the US Embassy, had hinted at "Svetlana's reputation for aggressive social climbing."

According to the embassy, another informant was "less discrete" about Russia's first lady, describing her as a vengeful harpy. The diplomats promptly reported to the State Department that the informant called her "a 'stupid and ambitious' woman, who purportedly had already drawn up a list of officials who should 'suffer' for their betrayal of Medvedev." That was during the weeks when another Putin confidant was still being tipped as a presidential candidate.

'Lacked the Levers'

Russian strong-man Putin, by contrast, commanded respect from the American diplomats. "Putin has been master of the political surprise over the past year," the embassy staff wrote at the end of April 2008. A month earlier they had written that "under Putin, Russians have seen an improvement in their lives and the stabilization of the political sphere."

1. (C) Summary: President Dmitriy Medvedev's high-profile
campaign to modernize Russia appears designed to give Russia
modest, mostly long-term, economic benefits without altering
the basic economic and political structures that Medvedev
inherited from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. To the chagrin
of some experts close to the President, the proposed changes
are tactical in nature. If specific measures in Medvedev's
agenda like enforcement of the rule of law, decreasing
corruption, increasing transparency, building basic
infrastructure, and protecting intellectual and property
rights could be implemented, broad based growth could take
place. Medvedev's desire to possibly run for re-election may
be partially responsible for his push to modernize Russia
and, unlike Putin, hold officials accountable for their
actions in the aftermath of recent tragedies. Nonetheless,
Medvedev's modernization drive provides US officials another
potential hook for cooperation. End Summary.

2. (SBU) Medvedev's ability to change Russia is based upon
his concept of modernization, which he and Putin have
publicly defined in different ways. During his annual
address to the Federal Assembly on November 12, Medvedev
described modernization as a broad change of mindset and
business practices, with the focus on developing medical,
energy, and information technology, space and
telecommunications systems, and increasing energy efficiency.
He described Russia as a multi-party democracy (reftel), and
also said that the country needed "comprehensive
modernization," which would result in a more democratic,
market-oriented, competitive country. Medvedev has continued
publicly to discuss modernization and has met with various
committees, government bodies, and the media to push his
agenda.

3. (SBU) In his speech to the United Russia Congress on
November 21, Putin emphasized the economic aspects of
modernization and cited Medvedev's five key areas of focus.
He specifically pointed out the need for modernization of
industrial and defense enterprises, ports, and the pension
system. Putin also noted that Medvedev's call to "overcome
chronic backwardness" and raise the level of Russia's overall
development reflected the mood of all of Russian society.
Putin only mentioned modernization twice during his four hour
televised call-in event on December 3, despite numerous
questions about what the Government would do to improve
Russia's economic situation.

4. (C) Medvedev's tactical measures for achieving success in
the five defined areas could be achieved with minimal
structural changes to the economy. Installing individual gas
meters to promote less-wasteful use of fuel, changing to more
energy efficient light bulbs, studying the effect of
decreasing the number of time zones in Russia, and building
more supercomputers could provide short to medium-term
economic benefits. They would not, however, significantly
change the structure of the economy or the murky political
context in which businessmen and investors operate. Some
contacts with whom we spoke have jumped on terms such as
"comprehensive modernization" to suggest, perhaps
optimistically, that modernization would include wholesale
changes to Russia's economic and political systems.

5. (C) Contacts have noted to us that modernization would
lead to some targeted economic improvements, but, with a few
exceptions, have expressed strong doubts about prospects for
systemic reforms. xxxxx said on December 22 that the President might make
some changes on the edges of the political system, but denied
that Medvedev's reforms would have any major impact on
Russia's political structure, which he said had been
painstakingly formed over the last 15 years. Medvedev might
make some significant reforms in Russia's economic structure,
but would have to "non-violently enforce" modernization on
the business elite, who preferred the status quo and who
wanted to avoid making expensive investments.

6. (C) xxxxx

Moscow 00003109 002 of 003

told us December 7 that while various groups of elites have
competing views on modernization, it was possible for
Medvedev, with the Government's support, to overcome
bureaucratic inertia and push through broad economic and
political reforms. One key institution for Medvedev was the
Commission on Modernization and Technological Growth of the
Russian Economy, de facto led by First Deputy Presidential
Administration Head Vladislav Surkov. Medvedev, xxxxx
added, wanted to add influential elites to the commission,
and meet with it more often in order to give it authority and
provide an impetus to fulfill his modernization agenda. Some
siloviki, however, such as Rostechnologia's Sergey Chemezov,
have reportedly boycotted the commission.

7. (C) Other analysts stated that Medvedev had no chance of
changing the economic or political systems because he did not
have the inclination, power, or buy-in of the bureaucracy to
do so. xxxxx told us December 21 that they see little prospect
for systemic reforms within the President's modernization
agenda. xxxxx said that democratic reforms could be
the spark that helped push through additional large-scale
reforms, but he "unfortunately" did not anticipate Medvedev
making any major improvements in the economic or political
spheres. xxxxx told us that modernization was focused on
economic policies and that Medvedev could make some quality
improvements in the economy. xxxxx agreed, however, that
reforms would have to occur within the current political
system because it was an "illusion" to think that the
President could overhaul the political system.

8. (C) xxxxx told us
December 17 that Medvedev, who he half-jokingly characterized
as Putin's Minister of Economics and Assistant on Cadre
Policies, had no chance of modernizing Russia.
Modernization, he added, was unlikely to increase Medvedev's
public standing or his ability to increase his team's power.

9. (C) Longtime expert on political systems xxxxx said on December
10 that Medvedev was trying to make some tactical changes,
but had no levers to implement systemic reforms. Russian
bureaucracy had watered-down, stalled, or hindered reforms
for hundreds of years, and would be successful in preventing
any broad reforms. xxxxx added that while Medvedev's
reforms sounded nice, the President would never significantly
alter the political system and create a "true" democratic
system. According to xxxxx Medvedev has benefited from the
current political system, and any attempts to change the
system would introduce a level of uncertainty reminiscent of
former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. xxxxx also noted that the bureaucracy feared losing
their privileges and would fight change through bureaucratic
measures.

10. (C) xxxxx Public Chamber member, xxxxx bluntly stated to
us December 9 that the President was not able to reform the
political system. Medvedev could not implement his
modernization agenda, which xxxxx saw as a positive
program for Russia, because the President lacked the levers
to make systemic reforms, and because of bureaucratic
opposition. xxxxx characterized Medvedev as a
"Manilov," in reference to 19th century author Nikolay
Gogol's fictional character Manilov, who was known, as they
described, for devising grand schemes, but failing to ever
implement them.

--------------------------------------------- ---------
Modernization Only One Part of Medvedev's Future Plans
--------------------------------------------- ---------

11. (C) With Russia's presidential campaign season
unofficially starting in about a year, many people with whom
we spoke saw the present as pivotal for Medvedev's future if
he wanted to prove that he could become an independent
political leader. xxxxx said that the President needed to

Moscow 00003109 003 of 003

fulfill his promises, such as modernizing the country, to
show all Russians that he can be relied upon to get things
done. xxxxx said that the key question was when the tandem
would divide, and that modernization was only one part of
Medvedev's case to maintain the reins of power. The
President had made other steps that differentiate his style
from Putin's, such as holding senior regional officials
responsible for their duties in the wake of the club fire in
Perm that killed 150 people and the death of lawyer Sergey
Magnitsky while in pre-trial detention, that might elevate
his case.

-------
Comment
-------

12. (C) Modernization may not facilitate the structural
changes to the political and economic spheres that some
experts had hoped, but it could be another tool for Medvedev
to demonstrate his leadership and, depending on his
implementation and governing skills, introduce some
uncertainty into the public and elite over his standing.
Medvedev is finally challenging the low expectations and
assessments of many experts after 19 months in office as
Putin's junior partner. Medvedev has also refrained from
challenging Putin's authority, control over day-to-day
economic matters, or respect with the public and siloviki.
Few currently doubt that the tandem member who will occupy
the presidency in 2012 remains Putin's decision, but as the
presidential campaign season approaches the risks and rewards
for deviating from the tandem's stable relationship
substantially increases for significant groups of elites with
an interest in succession politics.
Rubin

1. (C) Summary: Among some Kremlin-critics and
establishment figures, speculation has grown over the past
month that Putin and his entourage may be laying the
groundwork for a return to the Kremlin, rather than
safe-guarding the transition of President-elect Medvedev.
While our contacts speculate that Putin has kept his
political options open, some point to his self-conceived
"historic mission" to return Russia to its former glory,
concerns over a rapacious and self-devouring elite, and
distrust of Medvedev's long-term ambitions as fueling recent
maneuvers to further entrench the out-going president's
powers. Acknowledging Medvedev's personal loyalty to Putin,
observers point to competition among staff and rumors over
Mrs. Medvedev's ambitions for her husband. Rumors
notwithstanding, little of this speculation has a factual
underpinning, but it does reflect continual nervousness among
the elite about Putin's intentions and the fate of the
tandemocracy. Putin's intentions and actions have rarely (if
ever) been correctly forecast over the past year by Moscow's
political elite. End Summary

Putin: Once and Future President?
---------------------------------

2. (C) Some Moscow politicians and Kremlin watchers are
reading post-electoral and pre-inaugural political maneuvers
(ref a) as signs of the possibility that Putin could return
to the Kremlin, either at the end of Medvedev's term or -- in
the event of underperformance or disloyalty -- before. As
xxxxxxxxxxxx told the Ambassador, Putin's
continued domination of political life, the focus on his
transition to the White House (rather than on Medvedev's
shift to Putin's Kremlin office), the possible creation of a
Cabinet-like host of Deputy Prime Ministers, and Putin's
decision to take up leadership of the ruling party, has
fueled theories that Putin could be keeping his options open
to return as President. Putin's xxxxx and
others have stressed, is how to override the political
predisposition that leads Russians to look to the Kremlin
(whether to the Tsar or the General Secretary) for authority.
As president, xxxxx argued, Medvedev's stature will be
enhanced both constitutionally and psychologically.

3. (C) Acknowledging today's shift in political speculation
away from the hypothesis that Putin would serve a limited
period as Prime Minister in order to safeguard Medvedev's
transition, xxxxxxxxxxxx
argued that Putin's decision to lead United Russia was about
protecting his own interests, and not those of Medvedev.
Absent a pre-existing gentleman's agreement with the
President-elect, xxxxx characterized Putin's choreography
of the last several weeks as a "humiliation" of his
successor. xxxxx
told us that, based on blowback from Kremlin ideological guru
Vladislav Surkov over critical xxxxx articles, it was clear to
him that "Putin wants to be the leading guy." As an example
of Kremlin sensitivities, xxxxx pointed to Surkov's quick
intervention in the wake of an NG article that described
Medvedev's prospective rule as a period of liberal thaw.
Because the term "thaw" connotes Khrushchev's initial reign,
xxxxx noted, it begged the question of "who was Stalin"
and implied that change was needed, rather than the
continuation of Putin's course.

4. (C) Pointing to Putin's sense of historical mission in
returning Russia to its previous world power status, analysts
tell us that intra-elite divisions remain too poisonous and
the prospect for elite conflict too great for Putin to remove
himself from a power construct that he (and not a system of
checks and balances) polices.xxxxxxxxxxxx questioned why Putin sought
"dictatorial powers" over the party, given his preexisting de
facto command of United Russia. His decision was "alarming,"
xxxxx claimed, because it demonstrated the uncertainty
that exists in Putin's entourage over the political
transition, despite the fact that "all executive powers will
be shared between Putin and Medvedev" and the government
machinery will be "as focused on Putin, if not more."
xxxxx separately suggested that Putin's party leadership
was an additional layer of protection should Medvedev become
too confident with the presidential perquisites and seek to
modify Putin's imprimatur.

Moscow 00001215 002 of 003

5. (C) As a long-time advocate of a third presidential term
for Putin, xxxxx editor xxxxx told us
that Putin had been hemmed in by his desire for international
legitimacy, even though amending the Russian constitution to
remove term limits would have been "easy and understandable
in the context of Russia's stage of political development."
xxxxx speculated that the de facto rejiggering of power
between the Kremlin and White House was awkward, but
necessary, given Putin's self-imposed requirement of
respecting the Russian constitution. While xxxxx argued
that the concentration of power was a "temporary phase" in a
"long, very long" evolution to more democratic institutions,
liberal critics like former Duma deputy xxxxx see
the accumulation of power -- with Putin in "de facto and de
jure control over the club of the top administrative and
economic nomenclature" -- as an end in itself. As xxxxx
noted, the flurry of presidential orders shifting Kremlin
staff to White House positions in advance of Putin becoming
Prime Minister on May 8 were an interesting reflection of
Putin's mentality: rather than have "little Dima" sign the
presidential decrees authorizing the transfer of cadre, Putin
continued to dictate the terms of his premier-ship, revealing
how lopsided this partnership will be at the outset.

6. (C) Amidst the political uncertainty, the idea of Russia
evolving into a parliamentary republic is batted around, but
mostly batted down. While both xxxxxxxxxxxx were at a loss to
explain Putin's decision to head United Russia absent a
strategy based on constitutionally reconfiguring Russia's
political system, each conceded Putin's public opposition to
the idea. Given Putin's domination of politics since
Medvedev's March 2 electoral win, many viewed his comments at
the one-year memorial of former President Yeltsin's death,
that the presidency would "continue to serve the Russian
people and protect (Russia's) sovereign interests," as
significant. xxxxx confirmed to us that during the course
of his xxxxx with Medvedev,
the President-elect was insistent that Russia required a
presidential system and dismissive of public speculation over
the "tandem."

7. (C) xxxxx while discounting the role of opposition
parties at present, warned against GOR policies that created
competition between bureaucrats rather than parties. While
Russia was not a democracy, xxxxx maintained that it was
on a path that could lead to democracy, but only if more
pluralism was built into the system. The problem with the
ruling party's self-conscious imitation of Japan's Liberal
Democratic Party, with its creation of "clubs," he stressed,
was that United Russia lacked intra-party ideological
coherence and competition. At the end of the day, it would
not matter what xxxxxxxxxxxx
thought, but rather how the Kremlin told him to vote that
would determine the outcome of any Duma contest. The
challenge for Medvedev, xxxxx posited, will be to
reintroduce faith in the system among middle class voters,
who stayed home or spoiled their ballot, that their voice
matters. It is that portion of the electorate, xxxxx
stressed, that the government will need to rely upon for
support for economic modernization.

Staff and Spousal Ambitions
---------------------------

8. (C) The maneuvering begs the question of what Putin and
his entourage could possibly fear in the reflexively loyal
Medvedev. Ekspert magazine speculated that the mere
formation of an economic think-tank (ref b) by the
President-elect had been enough to raise concerns of a rival
team and vision. When asked, xxxxx did not dispute the
analysis, acknowledging that between the outgoing and
incoming presidents' staff there were elements of
competition. Even on minor issues, such as extending press
invitations for the inauguration, xxxxx said that
confusion over lines of authority had led to delay. xxxxxxxxxxxx
admitted to us that the transition had produced legislative
and political paralysis, with everyone "waiting for
directions" on how to work with the tandem.

9. (C) The role of Medvedev's wife, Svetlana, in generating
tensions between the camps remains the subject of avid
gossip. xxxxx hinting at Svetlana's reputation for
aggressive social climbing, xxxxx was less discrete, calling her a "stupid and
ambitious" woman, who purportedly had already drawn up a list
of officials who should "suffer" for their betrayal of

Moscow 00001215 003 of 003

Medvedev when First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov was
ascendant.

Comment
-------

10. (C) In the absence of facts, speculation is driving
Moscow political currents. While it will be months before we
get a better sense of the division of labor between Medvedev
and Putin, the sense here is that the pre-inaugural
atmospherics have diminished, rather than buttressed
Medvedev's political stature and fueled nervousness among
Moscow's hyper-sensitive political elite as to whether the
succession question has been definitively resolved. Putin
has been master of the political surprise over the past year
and consistently bamboozled the chattering class and pundits
as to his long-term intentions.
Russell

1. (C) Summary. Unlike Putin, whose leadership during the
Chechen war strengthened his political power, Medvedev's
performance to date has reinforced his status as junior
member of the tandem. Two anecdotal reports suggest that
Putin was displeased with the President's performance at the
start of the conflict; Putin, not Medvedev, set the tone and
tenor of Russia's war policy. The conflict exposed Medvedev's
weaknesses, his lack of a "team" of advisers, and the paucity
of levers that he holds to influence policy, particularly in
foreign affairs. While most Russians have yet to calculate
the long-term consequences of the Georgian war, a near term
conclusion is that the conflict has reinforced Medvedev's
need for a "regent" and validated Putin as the man most
Russians trust to protect their national interests. End
Summary.

Medvedev Stumbles
-----------------

2. (C) The war in Georgia capped Medvedev's first 100 days in
office, and provided him the chance for a defining moment as
the country's military and political chieftain. Yet, two
anecdotal reports suggests that Medvedev blinked when the
Georgian conflict began. xxxxx told the German Ambassador that Putin was deeply
concerned by the failure of Medvedev to take immediate
actions and to show resolve on August 8. Putin intervened
repeatedly from Beijing, where he was attending the Olympics.
Several phone calls took place between the Prime Minister
and Medvedev, with Putin using a meeting with Kazakh
President Nazarbayev to set the initial Russian public
hard-line. Similarly, in either an indiscretion or a
deliberate slight,xxxxxxxxxxxx confided to the French
Ambassador (on the margins of Sarkozy's August 12 visit to
Moscow) that Medvedev had come in for significant criticism
among the ruling party elite for his handling of the initial
hours of the crisis.

3. (C) At first glance, the interaction between the two
during the Georgia war appeared a confirmation of the
"regency" model of leadership posited by many Kremlin
observers about the tandem, with Putin taking charge when his
protege faltered and then stepping back once he had righted
the ship of state. Putin, not Medvedev, made the first
strong public Russian address on the conflict after his
return from China. His bristling speech in Vladikavkaz on
August 9 set the tone and message of Moscow's approach:
accusations of genocide, promises of aid to mitigate the
"humanitarian disaster," and an explanation of Russian action
as justified and legitimate. In the days that followed, a
pale and tired Medvedev met with various military and
government officials before the television cameras, but he
never addressed the people directly -- in part because Putin
had already done so. xxxxxxxxxxxx characterized
Medvedev's performance during the first days of the war as a
schoolboy who learned his lessons by rote, but without the
vehemence of true conviction. Indeed, at one of the few
public meetings between Putin and Medvedev, the Premier
resorted to "suggestions" that the military prosecutor should
look into evidence of "genocide" in South Ossetia, and
Medvedev duly agreed to give the order.

4. (C) As the conflict cooled down and Medvedev took a
visible role in hammering out a ceasefire agreement with
French President Sarkozy, the public portrayal of the tandem
began to shift back to its "proper" balance, even as the
French told us it was Putin who joined the meeting to broker
the "Medvedev-Sarkozy" agreement. Medvedev moved to the
forefront of Russia's government controlled television stage
and Putin returned to focus on other matters. According to
the newspaper Kommersant, Levada Center polls in August
showed a slight increase in popular perceptions of Medvedev's
position in the tandem, with 14 percent of respondents
agreeing that real power is in the President's hands, up from
9 percent in June, but still far below the near 20 percent
figure at the time of Medvedev's inauguration. Tellingly,
nearly half of respondents saw Medvedev and Putin sharing
power.

5. (C) Few are surprised that Medvedev was unprepared for the
Georgian war. Before the conflict, Medvedev had focused on
domestic issues that had been his forte as Deputy Premier.
He had taken initial steps in his first three months in
office to define himself: promoting the domestic themes of
anti-corruption, economic modernization, and, in foreign
policy, a new European security architecture. He also went as
far as indirect criticism of Putin's attack on the Mechel
coal company in late July. Pro-Kremlin commentators like
lawyer Pavel Astakov and analyst Dmitriy Orlov in recent
weeks penned paeans to what they claimed were Medvedev's
successes in launching judicial reforms, promoting small
business, and tackling the thorny issue of pervasive
corruption.

6. (C) While debates have continued over whether Medvedev is
a "liberal" or a Putin flunky, there is general consensus
that Medvedev remains circumscribed in his ability act
independently. xxxxx conceded
that Medvedev had ambitions and was being pushed by his inner
circle (largely remnants of the Yeltsin team) to be "more
liberal," but he had no capacity to carry them through.
xxxxx attributed this to Putin's shift of Kremlin cadre to
the White House -- a move that left Medvedev largely adrift
in his own administration. Editor/owner of the independent
xxxxx judged Medvedev
politically naive, despite 17 years in the inner circle.
xxxxx who with eight other prominent editors attended a
long, liquid dinner with the President, described Medvedev as
saying the right things, but with no clear ability to
translate them into practice.

7. (C) While Medvedev spoke vaguely of new European security
structures, some argued that Putin remained the real foreign
policy helmsman, who used informal relations and the creation
of new White House entities to forge his own policy team. The
newly appointed Director of the Russian Institute for
Democracy in NY, Andranik Migranyan, judged to us that even
before the Georgia crisis, Medvedev had taken a beating in
foreign policy, with the appointment of Ambassador Yuri
Ushakov to the White House a clear sign of Putin's
encroachment on Kremlin turf. Medvedev lacked a foreign
policy team, and his hesitancy, or "lack of tonality," on
important issues was apparent in the diplomatic mishap at the
G8 over Zimbabwe. Migranyan predicted that Putin would
continue to dominate the policy milieu through his connection
to the intelligence services and deployment of Ushakov.

Looking Ahead
-------------

8. (C) For those who see Putin as protecting and developing
his successor as "regent" -- including xxxxx and Gleb
Pavlovskiy -- the conflict gave some indication of Medvedev's
strengths and weakness during times of crisis. Medvedev
stills needs Putin, according to Pavlovskiy, as the primary
source of the President's legitimacy. If Putin were to leave
office today, Medvedev would have a tough fight; in the eyes
of half the Russian public, trust of Putin constitutes
Medvedev's writ. xxxxxxxxxxxx argued that Putin cannot
afford to allow Medvedev to lose his legitimacy as president,
in that Putin has staked his reputation on his successor.

9. (C) For others, the war showed that Medvedev is not up to
challenge of leadership. Russian Caucasus experts told DCM
August 21 that Russia could not show weakness in the face of
Georgia's challenge in South Ossetia for fear of both
external and internal security consequences. Putin, not
Medvedev, understood that and orchestrated the required
action to meet the challenge, they argued.

10. (C) While most of our contacts agreed that 100 days is
too short to draw conclusions, xxxxxxxxxxxx
predicted the war could hasten a shift towards a
parliamentary system. xxxxx characterized Putin's public
persona as Russia's CEO, rolling up his sleeves on issues
that matter more to Russians while Medvedev handles the
ceremonial duties of President. He likened the situation to
the German model, which Putin well understands, and posited
that the Premier may aspire to play Chancellor to Medvedev's
German President. xxxxxxxxxxxx likewise sees Putin as
laying the foundation for a parliamentary republic, by taking
the lead of Russia's most politically powerful party and
shifting many formerly presidential functions to the White
House.

Comment
-------

11. (C) After the Georgian conflict, nobody questions Putin's
dominance of the political system. What remains to be seen
is whether he intends to transfer the power mantle to
Medvedev, as the "regency" school predicts, or to further
consolidate his power as Premier. Putin's modus operandi is
to create options and to avoid picking one particular path,
suggesting that we will see him continue to follow both
options as he waits to see how things play out. Among the
populace, there is a sense of national pride and patriotism
as the vast majority of Russians rally around the Kremlin.
The success of Moscow's "short, victorious war" accrues to
the tandem team, although we assess more so to Putin than the
President. The Russian elite, highly attuned to signals from
the Kremlin, are likely to see the Georgian war as evidence
that it is too early to dismiss the influence of the silovik
wing or its captain, Putin. And in light of the Kremlin
wagon-circling we expect to follow the independence
recognition decision, Medvedev's agenda of economic
modernization, anti-corruption, and European security focus
will lose any sense of urgency that it might have had. End
comment.
Beyrle

But the diplomats expected that more liberal projects -- such as reform of the justice system and the modernization of Russian society -- would not come to much. As the embassy reported on Dec. 24, 2009: "Medvedev could not implement his modernization agenda ... because the President lacked the levers to make systemic reforms, and because of bureaucratic opposition."

The US diplomats also noted that "few currently doubt that the tandem member who will occupy the presidency in 2012 remains Putin's decision." Beyrle, a graduate of the National War College, analyzed the reasons for the weak leadership in Moscow in a message dated Feb. 25, 2010: "Medvedev's personal relationship with Putin, lack of a party foundation, and a small pro-Medvedev bureaucratic cadre limit his ability to be re-elected without Putin's consent." Beyrle's conclusion? It is "Putin in the driver's seat."

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Reaction from the US Government

In a statement, the White House has condemned the publication of "private diplomatic discussions" with foreign governments by SPIEGEL and four other international media on Sunday. Click on the link below to read the statement in full.

White House Statement

We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State Department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments.

By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world.

To be clear -- such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal.

By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.