Monday, August 4, 2008

Here are the top ten questions we received from our recent request. We tallied the number of times we received each question or a similar version of it and noted the total for each question below. Thanks to the Office of Chief Counsel, Privacy Office and Kip for helping us provide you with the answers.

10) What immediate measures can a person take when encountering a less than friendly TSA agent? 12 of our readers asked this question.

First, you can request a lead or supervisor. If you're not satisfied after speaking with a lead or supervisor, you can request a manager. If you're in a hurry and don't have time to talk, or if you are not comfortable making your complaint in person, you can visit our new Got Feedback? web page. "Got Feedback?" is a new program that allows passengers to contact us via e-mail with very specific questions, comments, complaints, etc. Rather than your e-mail being sent to a single mail box where it sits in the queue waiting for a response, it is actually sent directly to the TSA Customer Support Manager at the airport your feedback concerns. Upon request, the Customer Service manager will contact you. Click here to read more about the "Got Feedback?" program.

Our officers have a tough job, and they are there to protect you and your family. Everyone at TSA appreciates the support of the traveling public, including those who express their support with their courteous behavior and words of support.

9) Do any members of the Blog team actively perform screening functions? 12 of our readers asked this question.

Not currently. When Bob joined the blog team, he was a Behavior Detection Officer based out of Cincinnati and a former Transportation Security Officer who performed screening duties. Bob eventually came to headquarters as a full-time blog team member. So, while Bob has 5 ½ years experience in various screening functions, he is no longer a TSO/BDO.

There are currently many TSOs and other field employees actively involved commenting on the blog, and we appreciate their participation.

We will continue to invite members of the workforce to weigh in on the blog to keep it relevant to what is happening in airports. The blog will improve as we add new folks with various areas of expertise.

8) Why do you have access to my political affiliation? 13 of our readers asked this question.

Perhaps you're asking this question because of a recent story about a person who said that their identity was verified at a checkpoint by asking their political affiliation. Early on, there was a case where the operations call center ran a passenger's information through their database (which includes commercial data) for a passenger without ID, and found no significant information to verify their identity. One thing that did come up was political donations for a person with the same name. Political donations are a matter of public record and accessible to anyone with basic Internet search skills. As a last ditch effort to help the passenger, a decision was made to ask them about their political affiliation. It was a mistake.

7) Why has TSA restarted the pointless gate screening? If the sterile area is in fact sterile, there's no need to screen those who have already been screened. 13 of our readers asked this question.

In reality, we do very little screening of bags at gates. We do, however, conduct a great deal of additional security in the sterile area. For instance, we have Behavior Detection Officers and K-9 teams on regular patrols as well as undercover Federal Air Marshals throughout the sterile area. Not to mention video coverage. We want to pick up on people who may be doing surveillance or attempting to prepare for a later attack. We are interested in activity around gates, but also restaurants, Duty Free shops, and other common areas.

As to gate screening itself, we have special purpose checks for specific items and behaviors. We may also have a particular interest in different flights. We layer in some random activities so as not to raise attention when we do have a specific interest. You may see our inspectors with new portable explosives detection devices that go onboard an aircraft ahead of boarding and check employees with access to the aircraft, including catering.

TSA’s overall strategy is to incorporate mobile, unpredictable, intelligence-driven security measures in ways that frustrate a terrorist planner seeking to engineer attacks against an easier, stationary target. We do not, as the question suggests, do gate screening of bags merely to re-do what we already did at the checkpoint.

6) I had a TSA agent tell me that each airport is free to implement security standards beyond those listed on the TSA site -- meaning that they could restrict items from being allowed in carry-on baggage that are explicitly allowed according to the TSA site. 14 of our readers asked this question.

There is a standard list of prohibited items that is available on our Web site to anybody with an internet connection, including terrorists. Clearly we have to pay attention to those items, since they are obvious tools of would-be attackers.

We cannot, however, fixate on those items and think that if we stop them, we're safe. Terrorists know TSA's standard operating procedures and work on how to engineer around them. Look no further than the August '06 London bomb plot with liquid sports drinks. If those terrorists had made it to the checkpoint, many of the items they were bringing would have been extremely hard to identify.

TSA is moving the focus of our officers from a checklist mentality to an empowered environment where officers use their experience and training -- and trust their instincts. The TSA workforce has screened more than 3 billion people, about half the population of the earth. We have a good handle on what "normal" looks like. Anything out of the "normal" range may get additional scrutiny, whether or not it is on the prohibited items list. That could mean a variety of things from a more thorough physical search to a seemingly casual conversation. It depends on what the anomaly might be. We know that with many layers of security the thinking, engaged and experienced TSO will be the one to stop an attack.

TSA is committed to using the judgment and experience of our officers to keep the security advantage. TSA is embarking on a two-day training for all officers that will tie together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with passengers in a way that promotes a calmer environment and better security result. It uses the physical checkpoint to our advantage to improve security.

5) Why doesn't TSA consider items being stolen from checked bags a security threat? Dangerous items could just as easily be ADDED to luggage. 15 of our readers asked this question.

We do! We consider every opportunity for someone to get a weapon or a bomb onto a plane and use a variety of methods to ensure there's something in place to mitigate that threat.

Specifically, there are video monitoring systems in places where individuals have access to checked bags, both airline baggage handling areas and TSA inspection stations.
Beyond that, we have a multi-layered approach to security, because if one layer gets breached, another layer or layers can step in to fill the gap. Let's focus on layers that directly affect your question.

TSA does background checks on and issues credentials to all employees who work in the secure area of the airport – which includes people handling baggage. TSA also conducts random employee screening every day in airports to ensure only people with proper and valid credentials get into the secure area.

TSA initiates internal investigations or ‘stings’ if we have a concern. When caught, arrests are made and serious federal charges are brought. Also, behavior detection officers are trained to spot suspicious behavior anywhere in the airport.

It's also important to note that employees who work in the airport often see the same people day in and day out, and know when something doesn't seem right. While they don't always work for TSA, they are another set of eyes and ears keeping watch for your safety.

4) Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints? 15 of our readers asked this question.

The Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, that covers the information collection and handling associated with identity verification is the Operations Center Information Management System PIA. Identity verification is one of several types of information associated with airport security efforts that fall within the coverage of this PIA.

For bonus points, we'll answer another question that some have asked: whether the form itself requires an OMB control number. Since the form entails no burden beyond identifying the individual and home address, it is exempt from Paperwork Reduction Act requirements pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1).

3) Given that it's trivially easy to forge a boarding pass, how does presentation of validated IDs do anything to ensure that people on selectee/no-fly lists don't enter the sterile area? 16 of our readers asked this question.

An excellent question. TSA's document checkers are looking at IDs and boarding passes. They are aware of the techniques that forgers use and are looking out for them. We are working with the airlines both in the U.S. and world-wide on this issue. There are encryption and other methods of validating a boarding pass. Some are sophisticated, some are very low-tech and simple. Some airlines are now using encrypted electronic boarding passes that appear on a passenger's cell phone or PDA. The International Air Transport Association, which secures international cooperation and uniformity in aviation regulations and standards, is moving all of its members to use this technology by the end of 2010.

Even so, it is important to remember that the different layers of security work together. We're not only checking IDs and boarding passes at the checkpoint, we have measures throughout the airport, at the gate, and on the aircraft, that identify someone who may be dangerous.

Lastly, one of the other Top Ten questions dealt with random gate screening, which is another way of closing the loophole. The random check can also be used to ensure additional security measures when our information suggests it is warranted.

2) In the context of ensuring air travel safety, what is the difference between two people, both of whom are willing to cooperate with TSA's invasive interrogations, one of whom politely declines to show ID, the other of whom claims he lost or misplaced his ID? 20 of our readers asked this question.

Bottom line is identity matters. We need to verify who is getting on the plane.
The best and quickest way for us to assure identity is with a photo ID issued by a federal or state government. We work with passengers who have something less than that, including no ID. Most passengers in that situation help us quickly resolve the matter by sharing whatever information they have, sometimes verified through our Ops Center in Virginia. Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front. It is only when someone refuses to identify themselves or attempts to use fake ID that we would deny entry to the sterile area based on ID.

Ever since airport security started decades ago, it was based on "things" – making sure a bad thing like a gun or a bomb didn't get on a plane. Problem is, terrorists kept finding new ways to disguise their tools to be almost identical to ordinary objects; most recently, bottles of sports drinks and batteries with explosives inside. They will continue to find more novel threats. That is why the additional layer of identity verification matters more now than ever. Watch lists are a valuable tool in keeping people with known ties to terror plotting off planes.

1) TSA cites 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 and 1540.105(a)(2) as the law giving them authority to demand identification as a condition of granting access to a sterile area of an airport. 49 C.F.R § 1540.5 appears to limit such passenger screenings to searches for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries as the only requirement for granting access to the sterile area. How does TSA reconcile this conflict? 27 of our readers asked this question.

There is no conflict to reconcile. It is true that 49 C.F.R Section 1540.5 describes screening functions and screening locations in terms of the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries. However, 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.105(a)(2) doesn't use the word 'screening' at all. Section 1540.105(a)(2) simply states that persons may not enter the sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to that area. TSA's identification requirement is one such system, measure or procedure that is used to determine who is permitted to access the sterile area.

By citing 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 in our original post, we were trying to illustrate one of the ways (and indeed, the most visible way) in which TSA has used its statutory authority to establish security procedures at airports. But, it's important to note that TSA's responsibility for aviation security is not just limited to checkpoint screening. TSA has broad authority to develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with the changing threats to aviation security. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(d) and (f) (addressing TSA functions, duties, and powers); id. § 114(h) (addressing notification procedures concerning persons who may pose risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to the airline or passenger safety). This authority is in addition to TSA's responsibility for the screening of passengers and property. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e) (addressing screening operations), 44901(a) (addressing screening of passengers and property).

Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front.

And this is where I think the government (in this case, the people speaking on behalf of the TSA) and me and others differ. I don't consider it "not much of a point" to have to show our papers to get on a private airliner and go from point A to point B.

Your response was completely dismissive of those of us who believe that fighting for what we believe in (i.e. our rights under the U.S. Constitution) is really "not much of a point."

There we have it in black and white for all the world to see. You simply won't give any credence to the fact that some of us genuinely and sincerely care a lot about our Constitution and about how the current administration would just rather not be bothered by quaint notions like law and rights and the like all in the name of safety.

Finally, you still haven't answered the question directly: what is the difference between someone who lost and ID and someone who refuses to show ID? Attitude? Making your job a little less pleasant? Someone being a jerk? Last time I checked, you didn't have to be a model citizen or humanitarian to invoke your Constitutional rights.

But then again, the TSA is an arm of the current executive branch which has so little respect for the Constitution and the rule of law, so I can't say I am entirely surprised by your non-answer to the question.

Re: the question about some TSA stations making their own arbitrary additions to the prohibited items list.

Why can't you just come out and say that doing so is wrong, is theft of private property, and will not be tolerated?

You and I both know the question wasn't about "empowered environment" and "judgement," it was about power-tripping screeners stealing non-prohibited items from passengers and frequently using intimidation to do so. (i.e., the recent battery case at JAN)

TSOs should not be empowered to confiscate (or in your PR terms "voluntarily" surrender) items that are not either on the prohibited items list or an actual weapon, explosive, or incendiary.

As to the ID thing, I've finally concluded you guys just don't get it. You really believe it is OK to have a secret blacklist of people who are denied air travel with no due process without remotely enough evidence to convict them in a court of law. The "papers please" mentality and loss of Constitutionally protected anonymity is scary, but what it really comes down to is that you think the blacklist is OK. If or when we escape the current climate of fear-mongering and paranoia, history will judge you for these beliefs.

Besides the issues I have regarding the extent or severity of security checks, I have a larger problem with the general attitude of the personnel I've encountered at the checkpoints.

I understand that they are supposed to be keeping us safe, but I see no reason why they can't do this with good customer service guidelines. If the TSA wants to place these checkpoints at airports, they need to realize that they will always be an extremely visible part of the airline experience. As such, I feel that job requirement #1 should be good service skills.

For examples, I feel no need to be yelled at because I inadvertently did something they don't agree with. Stay calm, and explain what you'd like me to do rather than barking orders, and so much of the pain would be alleviated. Please treat us as paying customers (which we are), and not as enemies or cattle.

Thanks for the answers, Blogger Bob, I know folks are going to take you to task for some of them, just remember it is the answer, not you they are attacking. :o)

I'll take a little simple shot at two that bug me, and leave most of the rest to others:

To Question 5 you answered in part..."...there are video monitoring systems in places where individuals have access to checked bags, both airline baggage handling areas and TSA inspection stations."

If that is the case, and if anyone actually bothers to monitor what those video cameras see, how it is possible that passenger property is stolen on a regular basis.

It sounds like a non-answer because so long as items are stolen from checked baggage, items could be added to checked baggage, and security is compromised by the failure to detect the thefts.

(In addition, TSA and the airlines tacitly agree that anything checked is less than secure but repeatedly instructing passengers to carry on-board with them anything of value - unless it is on the prohibited list.)

"Bottom line is identity matters. We need to verify who is getting on the plane."

You keep saying this, and then you utterly fail even to attempt to justify this statement. Why does identity matter? The truth is it doesn't, and you know it, and as a citizen who pays your salary, I'd really like you to stop lying about it.

"Look no further than the August '06 London bomb plot with liquid sports drinks. If those terrorists had made it to the checkpoint, many of the items they were bringing would have been extremely hard to identify."

That would have been something, considering that none of them had airline tickets or even passports. Oh, and their plot wouldn't have worked, because the only "liquid explosives" are too volatile to make it to the cab to the airport, let alone onto a plane in the first place.

They're not needed now. Hardened cockpit doors and noncompliance with hijackers are the only things that have made air travel more secure since 9/11. Everything else TSA does is sound and fury signifying, and securing, nothing.

I goofed on my last post and only included one of the two items I wrote about. :o(

Here's the other:

To Question 6 you answered in part..."The TSA workforce has screened more than 3 billion people, about half the population of the earth."

The is not the first time that claim has been made, and likewise this is not the first time I have responded that TSA has NOT screened more than 3 billion passengers, but some much smaller number of passengers over 3 billion times. May seem a minor quibble, but TSA's claim is just plain false and places into question anything else they say.

To quote one of my favorite authors...

"What are the facts? Again and again and again - what are the facts? Shun wishful thinking, ignore divine revelation, forget what "the stars fortell", avoid opinion, care not what the neighbors think, never mind the unguessable "verdict of history" - what are the facts, and to how many decimal places? You pilot always into an unknown future; facts are your single clue. Get the facts!" --Robert Anson Heinlein

Anonymous said,"That would have been something, considering that none of them had airline tickets or even passports. Oh, and their plot wouldn't have worked, because the only "liquid explosives" are too volatile to make it to the cab to the airport, let alone onto a plane in the first place."

I don't want to argue over whether or not the "London Liquid Bombers" planned Liquid bombs would have been successful or not; but I would like to point out that liquid explosives have been used in the past aboard aircraft. Look into the Bojinka Plot; Liquid Nitroglycerin was used in an aircraft bombing. There is a basis for screening based upon liquid explosives being used aboard aircraft. Now if your argument is that liquids are vigorously screened while other methods of bomb smuggling are not, then we have an entirely different discussion.

TSA is committed to using the judgment and experience of our officers to keep the security advantage. TSA is embarking on a two-day training for all officers that will tie together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with passengers in a way that promotes a calmer environment and better security result. It uses the physical checkpoint to our advantage to improve security.

So when are you going to start confiscating flier's clothing, laptops, watches, shoes, etc? You have the 'right' to do so. What are our recourses do we have when dealing with an out of control agent who just wants to make a traveler's life even more miserable?

Anonymous wrote...So when are you going to start confiscating flier's clothing, laptops, watches, shoes, etc? You have the 'right' to do so. What are our recourses do we have when dealing with an out of control agent who just wants to make a traveler's life even more miserable

Trollkiller wrote:I would like to know who supplied that answer. Bet it was Kip, poor Kip, bless his heart.

Haha~!

To be honest, though, I think the question might've been a bit beyond Kip. With all due respect to the Administrator of the TSA, it's just not his job to understand and spout legalese.

Given the nature of the question to be answered, and the fact that Bob gave kudos to the Office of Chief Counsel, I'm gonna guess it was either Francine or one of her people that pulled this one up.

For those that are new to the Blog or just don't know, Francine is, of course, Chief Counsel for the TSA, and the author of the old thread "And Now, a Word from our Lawyers..." from back in February.

I like my technicality, too. At least it's something a little more tangible than "it didn't use that specific word," though as with many things that Gilmore v. Gonzalez has shown us, little details like that matter in the legal limelight.

Though, just to bring up Gilmore again, I still think they could've had a more compelling decision on the due process complaint other than throwing it out on grounds that it's not their jurisdiction.

Granted, it worked in terms of the government's defense case, but it's not a very inspiring and debate-ending answer like how they addressed the freedom of travel complaint.

Anonymous wrote:So when are you going to start confiscating flier's clothing, laptops, watches, shoes, etc? You have the 'right' to do so.

We have the authority to do a great many things. We just choose not to. Having the authority does not, in itself, mean that the authority is going to be utilized.

To be honest, though, I think the question might've been a bit beyond Kip. With all due respect to the Administrator of the TSA, it's just not his job to understand and spout legalese.

It may not be Kip's job but he did graduate a JD so the legelese should not be foreign to him.

I hope that was not from the Chief Counsel's Office because that was some pretty lame lawyering.

The only way I can see that they came up with that answer, after my very specific questions, is if the Blog Team was prevented from showing the original question.

The rabbit trail of laws they cited did nothing to strengthen their case and the fact that they completely omitted any reference to the definition of the sterile area, the KEY to my argument, leads me to believe they were fed a very sanitized version of the question.

Posted by HSVTSO Dean:We have the authority to do a great many things. We just choose not to. Having the authority does not, in itself, mean that the authority is going to be utilized.

And therein lies the problem. The Constitution and government were structured to protect the citizens from individual government actors that might abuse their authority.

If you truly think TSOs have the authority to confiscate laptops, shoes, watches, etc., and just choose not do do it, then we have a major problem. Because someday, someone will decide to exercise that authority. And then where will the innocent traveler be? Answer: screwed with no hope of redress or due process, just like the no-fly victims. This agency is truly out of control.

That even good TSOs like yourself seem to believe you have the authority to confiscate non-prohibited, non-weapon, non-explosive, non-incendiary items like laptops, shoes, and watches is exactly why I feel there is only one solution to TSA's problems: Disband it; bar the leadership from the assistant-FSD level up from public service and especially security work for life (and charge them with treason and other crimes where appropriate, e.g., the no-fly list architects); and reconstitute it under private contractors with government supervision closely monitored by Congress.

I've posted that part before, but because of your comment regarding authority to confiscate permitted items, I'm adding this: Terminate every single TSO, but give them the option to be re-hired as screeners after they have passed a written and oral exam on Constitutional rights, private-property rights, the limits of their authority as screeners, and customer service.

The 3.4-1-1 rule IS pointless. That small an amount of liquid nitrogen could even be secreted in a body cavity.

Please TSA, stop harboring fear and perpetuating security theater with your absurd 3.4-1-1 rule. It's been conclusively proven again and again and again that it's pointless. I know it helps keep your TSOs gainfully employed, but you're hurting America with it. You're needlessly inconveniencing people, and perpetuating fear. Please, just stop it. We can all see through your nonsense.

These are all non-answers again. After work I'll try to go through them and post rebuttals, but you specifically sidestep the questions ask, for example regarding validating boarding passes. There is NO encryption/authentication process possible of an html boarding pass. As long as the forger is not stupid and gets the date/flight right there is absolutely nothing you can do to spot a fake boarding pass and you know it.

[post-script: Okay. I was a little upset when I wrote this, so I'll go ahead and apologize. To everyone else, I mean - not to Mr. Anonymous.]

Anonymous wrote:That even good TSOs like yourself seem to believe you have the authority to confiscate non-prohibited, non-weapon, non-explosive, non-incendiary items like laptops, shoes, and watches is exactly why I feel there is only one solution to TSA's problems...

Funny, and y'all get onto the Blogger's cases for cherry-picking things.

Let me spell it out for you.

HSVTSO Dean wrote:We have the authority to do a great many things. We just choose not to. Having the authority does not, in itself, mean that the authority is going to be utilized.

Now, where in that did you pick up any shred of the 'fact' that I supposedly believe, according to you, that TSOs have the authority to confiscate laptops, watches, or... anything, really, for that matter, since we do not, as a rule, confiscate anything.

Where in what I wrote do you see me saying that we can take laptops, watches, shoes, et al, just because we feel like it?

Hm?

Let me help you.

You didn't. Because I didn't say anything of that nature in any way, shape, or form.

I said we have the authority to do a great many things. And we do.

Enter the overboard examples: If the Administrator decided to issue a SD saying we would give each and every single passenger that came through the checkpoint a full-body pat-down and cursory cavity search, we'd have the authority to do it. If the Administrator decided to ban laptop computers from going through the checkpoints, or even in checked baggage, we'd have the authority to enforce it. If the Administrator decided to ban carry-on items altogether, we'd have the authority to enforce it. The law that governs what the TSA does is extraordinarily broad and sweeping, and while this has it's intrinsic dangers, there would be nothing technically illegal about either of those two measures provided some form of justification was given in camera to stand up in the face of whatever legal challenge someone gave it, and it'd be considered common law. After all, it's already common law that you do not have the Constitutional Right to travel by any specific means.

The end result would be that people, being screwed with no form of redress, would refuse to fly, choosing instead to take far longer trips with other methods, be it rail or bus or boat or car, or even just buying a horse and getting there on the canter. The system of American commerce would start to slow and drag, given that that it relies so heavily upon the aviation system, and likely would for some time (though I can see a side-effect of this being that telecommuting and internet conferencing gets a lot more popular with businesses).

In order to avoid this kind of end-result, our Administrator has chosen, rightfully so, not to implement overtly-extraordinary, time-consuming, or 100% through screening procedures. It's a balance between security and customer service and good old fashioned common sense (for example, anyone who thinks the full security system of Israel would be awesome in American airports needs a reality check cut to their name).

Ergo, just because we (the TSA) have the authority to do a great many things (in terms of mandating extraordinarily limiting security procedures), does not mean that we will utilize that authority.

Does that clear things up for you a little bit, now, or do I have to use smaller words?

Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front. It is only when someone refuses to identify themselves or attempts to use fake ID that we would deny entry to the sterile area based on ID.

I only quoted part of the answer to question 2, as I specifically want to address it, but the entire answer was, yet again, a non sequitur. The question was "what's the difference?" and the answer was, yet again, "ID is important" with nothing to back that statement up.

What I specifically wanted to address is quoted above, as it is unclear. Either you're saying that Dean was wrong, and the two situations are, in fact, handled differently. Or you're saying that there's no difference, other than the TSA fails to understand why someone would put themselves through the more intrusive process. In lieu of an answer to the actual question, I'd be happy with a little clarity in this part of the non-answer at this point.

BTW, thank you for the answers in general. I maybe shoulda said that up front ;)

"...and reconstitute it under private contractors with government supervision closely monitored by Congress. "

If you think that will be better, you are misguided.

It is very easy to poke shots at TSA, they certainly open themselves up for a lot.

But I hope more people post what they DO want TSA to do, rather than criticizing. Should there be NO airport security? Should there be NO screening? Just let anyone on carrying anything they want?

If your answer is that there should be security then you have to devise systems and methods to deter and prevent, without inhibiting free travel.

Posters here are throwing around the Constitution saying it has been trashed, but I don't see it. The Constitution and the government exist for more than just the individual rights, they also exist to protect our country. If you don't like how that is being done, then vote in a new administration.

I respect that TSA has put up this blog and promotes some good debate. I don't agree with everything they say or do, but they are engaging the citizens. That's better than most federal agencies by a long shot.

@"If you truly think TSOs have the authority to confiscate laptops, shoes, watches, etc., and just choose not do do it, then we have a major problem."

I agree with you that TSA is idiotic and out of control, but not on this particular point.

This is where the "voluntarily surrender" versus "confiscate" distinction becomes important. Their power to not let you fly with the item as carryon ends up depriving you of your property for cheap items (less than 20-100$) that aren't worth the trouble of going back and checking the item with an extra bag fee and spending the extra hour re-queueing.

If TSA does try to confiscate something more valuable, like a laptop, the passenger will take the time to save their property.

@ "There are encryption and other methods of validating a boarding pass. Some are sophisticated, some are very low-tech and simple."

So what if high tech methods exist or are used by the airlines? Your TSA ID screener can only be using a "very low-tech and simple" validation method at that point in the process where they compare it to the ID.

Security theatre, pure and simple: you pretend like you are doing these high tech identity verification procedures when in reality you do not.

Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front. It is only when someone refuses to identify themselves or attempts to use fake ID that we would deny entry to the sterile area based on ID.

That is part of the answer to question two. What I want to know, based upon various ways to interpret the sentences contained therein is whether "refuses to identify themselves" covers those who are willing to go through the more intensive screening and simply are politely refusing to show ID, or whether willingness to go through a more intensive screening but politely refusing to show ID is considered a refusal to identify as a whole.

Where are you placing the line on "refused to identify"? Because someone who is willing to go through all the verification steps except ID could be interpreted on the one hand as willing to identify and on the other hand as unwilling to identify.

Moreover I think, based upon your full answer, that you're substituting one legal challenge for another. You're saying "it isn't because you're making a political point that we're refusing to let you in when you refuse to show ID. It's because it makes a lot of work for us."

Yes, of course refusing to show ID makes more work, but as long as the work is within the scope of your duties should the fact that it makes more work be sufficient to refuse the person entry? It's nice that you've shifted away from the highly constitutionally problematic position of considering such a person a threat, but you've shifted to even shakier legal grounds with the "it's extra work for us" defense of the policy.

In my time in the military, I learned something important: my job is to do my job, and that is my job. It doesn't matter if I was programming communications equipment or digging a hole, it was my job. The breaks from routine are also part of the job. The difficult cases are also part of the job.

So, what this boils down to is how that sentence of your answer is interpreted - do you interpret someone willing to do everything except show ID as refusing to identify?

"But I hope more people post what they DO want TSA to do, rather than criticizing. Should there be NO airport security? Should there be NO screening? Just let anyone on carrying anything they want?"

Roll screenings back to where we were before 9/11 -- you walk through a metal detector, your bag gets X-rayed, you get on your plane. No shoe removal, no 3.4-1-1 nonsense, no secondary screenings without cause. No loaded firearms allowed on board (unless you're a FAM), no knives above a certain length. We would be just as safe as we are now, since none of the additional nonsense TSA indulges in makes us safer anyway.

"If your answer is that there should be security then you have to devise systems and methods to deter and prevent, without inhibiting free travel."

TSA is already inhibiting free travel. They've made the flying experience so ridiculous and unpleasant that fewer and fewer people fly every year, and Americans hate TSA almost as much as they do the IRS.

"The system of American commerce would start to slow and drag, given that that it relies so heavily upon the aviation system, and likely would for some time"

This is, in fact, what is happening now: TSA's nonsense drives people to fly only as a last resort, resulting in fewer flights and a hit on an economy that doesn't need it. Thanks for screwing up the economy, TSA!

re: It's a balance between security and customer service and good old fashioned common sense (for example, anyone who thinks the full security system of Israel would be awesome in American airports needs a reality check cut to their name).

TSA is already inhibiting free travel. They've made the flying experience so ridiculous and unpleasant that fewer and fewer people fly every year, and Americans hate TSA almost as much as they do the IRS.

Yes, It is unpleasant that Radical Islamic terrorists want to kill every single American they can... very unpleasant. We should just go back to watching American Idol. Glad you're not in charge buddy.

the question of how they have your political affiliation was answered. your contributions are public record, so if you donate every year to the republican party (for instance), there is a record of it that is accesible.

"What if you forget your ID? Is your vacation ruined? Are you going to miss your meeting? Are you going to miss the Elvis Costello show this weekend at the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall? Not at all… If you simply state you forgot your ID, we will work with you to verify your ID, you may undergo some additional screening and will be permitted to fly.

On the other hand, if you do not cooperate and state that you’re not willing to show us your ID, you will not be permitted to fly."..................................In response to the non-answer of question #2.

Ok, once and for all, if a peson states they are not willing to show ID will they be given the opportunity of other means of identifying themselves or is this an automatic point of refusal for access to the secure area of the airport?

Is the refusal to show ID defined as not cooperating?

Surely all of your lawyers can answer a question in plain english without all the doublespeak and evasive meanings, can't they?

They question is neither difficult to understand or time consuming to answer.

@Anonymous: "Yes, It is unpleasant that Radical Islamic terrorists want to kill every single American they can... very unpleasant. We should just go back to watching American Idol. Glad you're not in charge buddy."

Yes, they're out there behind every bush (pun intended) waiting to spring on you! Be afraid! Be very afraid!

More people die from violent crime in this country (maybe even in a few select cities like DC) than do from terrorism. For some reason, people seem to accept that but cower in fear of a few random terrorists who don't like us. If we put all the "mechanisms" in place for violent crime that we did for aviation, people would be up in arms.

I'm glad you're not in charge. I'd rather have security based on rational policy and sound principals rather than based on fear. The sky's not falling.

HSVTSO Dean wrote:Now, where in that did you pick up any shred of the 'fact' that I supposedly believe, according to you, that TSOs have the authority to confiscate laptops, watches, or... anything, really, for that matter, since we do not, as a rule, confiscate anything.

We have the authority to do a great many things. We just choose not to.

That certainly implies to me that you think you (and/or TSA) have the authority to take these items.

As for:since we do not, as a rule, confiscate anything.

Please don't insult me, yourself, or the rest of the readers by trying to obfuscate what TSA does. "Voluntary surrender" is a euphemism for confiscation. That kind of PR BS is par for the course among the TSA spokespeople, but I know you're better than that.

If you'd like, I can switch from "confiscated" to "stolen," which is the word I prefer to use when TSA prevents a passenger from carrying a non-weapon, non-explosive, non-incendiary item, particularly one that is not on the prohibited items list. Such as, for example, the batteries taken at JAN recently and originally touted as a success by TSA. (and still partially touted as a success, since no public apology was posted for the confiscation/theft)

And you re-enforce my opinion that you think TSA has the authority with:

If the Administrator decided to issue a SD saying we would give each and every single passenger that came through the checkpoint a full-body pat-down and cursory cavity search, we'd have the authority to do it. ... [or other extreme prohibitions]

As for:

The law that governs what the TSA does is extraordinarily broad and sweeping, and while this has it's intrinsic dangers, there would be nothing technically illegal about either of those two measures provided some form of justification was given

at least we agree that there are intrinsic dangers into giving TSA such broad authority. I would hope that a court would rule against the extreme examples you gave, particularly since they are not necessary to screen passengers for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries, which from what I have seen are the only things TSA has the statutory authority to prohibit from commercial aircraft. But given the climate of extreme fear and irrational paranoia, who knows how the courts would rule? In 2005, no rational person would have believed TSA would ban water. :(

As for:

Does that clear things up for you a little bit, now, or do I have to use smaller words?

so it seems personal attacks against citizens are allowed on the blog but not attacks against government employees? Interesting.

For the record, I hold a doctoral degree from a top-10 institution in my (engineering) field. Use words as large as you'd like. IANAL, but I know how to use a dictionary.

Anonymous wrote:Please don't insult me, yourself, or the rest of the readers by trying to obfuscate what TSA does. "Voluntary surrender" is a euphemism for confiscation. That kind of PR BS is par for the course among the TSA spokespeople, but I know you're better than that.

Regardless of what you feel it to be, there's still a legal difference; ne that's already been discussed on this blog in previous threads. You may not like it, but that doesn't mean that there's not a legal difference between "voluntary surrender" and "confiscate," euphemisms and wishful thinking and personal views not withstanding.

Anonymous wrote:And you re-enforce my opinion that you think TSA has the authority with:

There is no thinking involved. They do. The TSA Administrator was granted, as I said, very broad, very sweeping powers to establish pretty much any screening procedures that they wanted to. That particular argument is academic. The only thing left is sense on their part not to go crazy-overboard with it, and Judicial oversight for when/if it gets a Constitutional challenge. To restrict that authority now would require no less than a literal act of Congress.

Anonymous wrote:so it seems personal attacks against citizens are allowed on the blog but not attacks against government employees? Interesting.

Please don't insult me, yourself, or the rest of the readers by trying to say that the government folks here don't endure personal attacks on this blog.

It's no worse than what I got when I first started commenting here on the Blog, and it's a lot gentler than what most of the public that comment on the blog have to say about the employees of the TSA on any level.

"Jackbooted thuggery" comes to mind for the lower-end, right up there with "goons." Let's not forget the ol' classic "KHIAI" battle cry, and if you want to see a near-constant stream of attacks, go scope out the ID-now-required threads back from last month. Or even my own comment awhile back where I told another screener that they were being an idiot when they stated that they wanted firearms to come with the uniform.

I hardly think you have a leg to stand on by saying that it's 'not allowed' on government employees.

Anonymous wrote:at least we agree that there are intrinsic dangers into giving TSA such broad authority...

Yes. On this we agree. People seem to take my statement of facts to be approvals of them, however erroneous this belief is. I never said it was a good thing that TSA has such broad, sweeping authority; I merely stated that they did, in fact, have it.

regardless of what any of you think or believe voluntary surrender, or voluntarily abandon is just that, just because you don't have the time, patience to do anything about the item in question is your problem. We don't want your junk its useless and time consuming to dispose of.

Fact of the matter is we don't care what you do with it but you cant take it with you on the plane end of story, so if you want to go hide said item in a planter and hope its still there when you get back that's on you. The "options"we give you is not meant to be in all inclusive list but examples of what you can do with your items.

you have options and if you don't utilize them that is not the fault of the TSO holding your item he is doing as he is told. That is why it's referred to as voluntarily abandoned because you CHOSE not do do anything about it and you CHOSE to leave it behind, to abandon the poor item.

There is no conflict to reconcile. It is true that 49 C.F.R Section 1540.5 describes screening functions and screening locations in terms of the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries. However, 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.105(a)(2) doesn't use the word 'screening' at all. Section 1540.105(a)(2) simply states that persons may not enter the sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to that area. TSA's identification requirement is one such system, measure or procedure that is used to determine who is permitted to access the sterile area.

I was going to rebut this "answer" in one all encompassing post. Instead I decided to break down the rebuttal in to smaller chunks for readability.

First let me say I know Blogger Bob did not write this "answer" as it lacks his style, wit and intelligence. On with the show.

(2) Enter, or be present within, a secured area, AOA, SIDA or sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.

Ok I will bite, what is the forced ID verification? Is it a "system", "measure" or "procedure"?

Not that it matters because C.F.R. 49 § 1540.5 describes in very clear language what systems, measures or procedures are to be used to grant access to the sterile area.

C.F.R. 49 § 1540.5

Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by TSA, or by an aircraft operator under part 1544 of this chapter or a foreign air carrier under part 1546 of this chapter, through the screening of persons and property.

This law clearly states access generally is controlled by TSA THROUGH the screening of persons and property.

I find it very interesting that the "answer" failed to address this definition. You can not disregard a portion of the law you don't like.

This definition is a very important part of the law as it defines what the TSA is allowed to do in order to grant access to a sterile area.

The TSA is allowed by this definition to enact any procedure, system or measure that inspects or searches for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries. A forced ID verification does NOT search for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries and therefore is disallowed under this definition.

Please reconcile the forced ID verification in light of THIS definition.

The arrogance of your agency, despite how much we are used to it, continues to astound me, even in your non-answers and obfuscation. Kip, did you really expect us to say, "Thank you, sir, may I have another?"

You and your agency are very lucky that the new president will have to fix FEMA, ICE, and the USCG before even thinking about fixing the TSA.

The best we can hope for is that the new administration will view the TSA as a checkbook to pay for other more important programs -- like health care and poverty.

Been to New Orleans lately, Kip? Take a walk through the Upper or Lower 9th Ward -- a full THREE YEARS after Katrina. Not the French Quarter or the Convention Center -- the Ninth Ward.

Put it in perspective: How dare you rub our noses in the very Constitution you swore to protect? Convince someone living under a freeway bridge (who doesn't even qualify for a FEMA trailer because they don't own property) that the war on shampoo, warrantless searches at airports, train stations, and Greyhound terminals, gate screenings, and ID harassment are making them "safer." Better yet, pick up a hammer, burn some of that use-or-lose leave, and volunteer with Habitat for Humanity for a few weeks. I recall that a former President did that for years.

Absent any initiative from the legislative or judicial branches, rest assured we will fight you in court and fight you at the checkpoints. We want our Constitution back, and we WILL get it back one way or the other.

Anonymous said: "Yes, It is unpleasant that Radical Islamic terrorists want to kill every single American they can... very unpleasant. We should just go back to watching American Idol. "

Yes. This is the correct way to handle it. Lots of "Radical Islamic terrorists" want to kill us. And if you've noticed, they've done a spectacularly bad job of it. In 2001 they managed some hijackings, using a technique that relied on the fact that the victims would not resist (which worked for them in 3 out of 4 hijackings)--a technique which doesn't work anymore.

Since then, their devious plans have involved:- A guy trying to give himself the hotfoot,- Two guys driving a jeep into a security bollard at an airport, then running around their car...on fire!- Plotting to blow up the Holland Tunnel (lacking explosives), assuming water would magically run uphill and flood Wall Street,- Plotting to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch (and presumably lots and lots of patience)- Plotting to break a fuel line near JFK and using magic to cause all the fuel in the fuel bunkers to explode without any oxygen whatsoever- Plotting to drive onto a military base and shoot people, because no one on a base is armed.

Oh gosh, I'm ever so scared! What shall I do? A bunch of dimwits with no resources, experience, expertise, or credible plans are going to...think bad thoughts at me?

Remember: the terrorists don't just have death as their goal; it's about fear. They want to make us afraid. And by giving into them with TSA ridiculous security theater, we accomplish that goal for them.

The best solution would actually be to ignore them. I wouldn't suggest American Idol as part of that strategy, though, because it is a very bad show and will make you stupider if you watch it.

Several times TSA folks have corrected non-TSA folk here on EoS when they have used the term confiscate, and insisted it was all voluntary and simply a "choice" by the traveller to "surrender" their personal property at the TSO's "suggestion."

Please allow me to expand the scenario a bit for better understanding.________________

Let's look more closely at two typical travelers, one a business person on the way to meet with other business persons for a scheduled meeting, conference, or other time-set event, and the other a vacationer, traveling alone or with family, on the way to a wedding, two week vacation, or cruise.

Both of those travelers have likely spent an appreciable amount on their air travel and have a fairly narrow time window at the destination for event times, reservations or connections.

For the business traveler, if they do not make the meeting, conference, or other time-set event, they have failed themselves and their business and likely spent non-recoverable money for travel and accommodations.

For the vacationer, if they do not arrive reasonably on-time, they may loose their accommodations, miss the event, or not make the cruise connection, none of which is easily correctable, most of which is non-refundable.

With the airlines increasingly draconian charges and ever increasing difficulty in making passenger originated changes to travel arrangements (overbooking, massive charges for changes, etc.), missing a flight can mean not going, and not getting any refund of monies spent.

These difficulties could also happen on the return trip, where the traveler is not in their home city, has no confirmed place to stay, and might have to pay excessive costs should they have to stay over.

Using those obvious and incredibly common scenarios, lets again re-examine the "voluntary surrender" of personal property at a TSO's "suggestion."________________

Let's assume, just for discussion, that a traveler has a perfectly legitimate, perfectly legal, perfectly safe item that is not on any prohibited list provided by any government agency, but that some screener doesn't like the look of (for example a $50 non-commercially-made external battery pack for an electronic device they are traveling with).

Let's see how this might play out.

The traveler wishes to use this device on-board the aircraft for whatever reason, so attempts to bring it aboard in their carry-on. In passing through the government checkpoint, the look of this personal property alarms one of the screeners, and they call for assistance.

The senior person responding readily identifies all items in the traveler's tray as being benign and allowed by all current rules, but "suggests" that the traveler not take it aboard because the official conjectures that a random passenger might become nervous on seeing it.

The traveler (either type) has time-critical obligations which are the reason for the flight, and there is absolutely no assurance that the traveler would be able to retrieve the already checked luggage from the airline, put their property in that checked luggage (assuming there is room, and it wouldn't be damaged), return to the checkpoint and make it through the wait and screening a second time and still make their flight.

Let's also assume (especially these days) that trying to change tickets for a later flight is a non-starter for numerous reasons (cost, unavailability, can't make far-end time-critical objective, etc.).

At this point the traveler is looking at totally missing the reason for the trip, facing hundreds (or even thousands) of dollars in losses or extra expense, or "voluntarily surrendering" their personal property at the "suggestion" of a government officer.

It's simply a cost/benefit analysis by the traveler that makes them "voluntarily surrender" their personal property instead of facing even worse results by not being allowed to fly with it.

While legally probably not a "confiscation" of the traveler's personal property by the government, it is effectively the surrender of it under duress, which is morally the same thing. ("You DO want to fly today, don't you?")

Saying it is all voluntary and a "surrender" rather than a "confiscation" is merely word-play to make it seem all is wonderful if looked at through the proper lenses...

I, for one, have had to make similar cost/benefit analysis at the government checkpoint when I accidentally had an item with me (detailed in a comment not allowed by this blog). Luckily I did not lose the $250, numbered, limited edition item to a screener, as it made it through without being noticed.

Overall, I find little difference between "confiscated" and "surrendered" under threat/duress, other than in the legal hair-splitting lawyers are so fond of. The results are identical. Choosing the lesser of two evils is NOT choosing a "good."

"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced that it is suspending Verified Identity Pass, Inc. (VIP) - the company that operates Registered Traveler (RT) programs under the brand name Clear® - from enrolling new applicants in RT due to vulnerabilities discovered in the company's storage of Clear® applicants' sensitive personal information. The vulnerabilities came to light after an unencrypted VIP laptop computer was discovered to be missing from San Francisco International Airport (SFO) on July 26. The computer contained pre-enrollment records of approximately 33,000 customers."

That contractor should NOT be reinstated into the program, as obviously it has already chosen to ignore not only accepted security standards in reference to Customer Proprietary Information, but specific TSA/DHS requirements.

If the Administrator decided to ban laptop computers from going through the checkpoints, or even in checked baggage, we'd have the authority to enforce it (partial quote)

Your wrong Dean. Being told to do something doesn't give you the authority to do it. You are simply doing your job. You assume that when the TSA tells you that you have the authority, its accurate and true. This is true because mostly because they tell you lots of things and combine a nice web of truth half truth and falsehoods in a way that placates everyone. If they told you you had the authority to beat women and children, I doubt you would believe that. Why? Because its not something you would believe they have the authority to do. When your training tells you that the TSA can do just about anything and doesn’t, your more likely to believe that they can. The TSA regularly violates its authority and then when harassed and challenged comes up with some borderline baseless argument for why its okay (and then calls the policy secret and unchallengeable).

To use your example, You do not have the authority to ban laptop computers. The TSA claims to, and you are enforcing it (the fact that the TSA doesn’t is a separate issue). There’s a small but important difference there. That is why people have such a problem with the slight variations from place to place and the (surprisingly common) bad apple TSO that strip searches handicapped people or decides your medication is not valid.

heres my responses to the answers

1)I don’t wan’t to steal TK’s legal eagle style but, your lawyers really need to brush up. The ‘systems’ don’t refer to ID checks, in this context; they would be a procedure if anything at all. (and Dean, that is not common law in fact it was decided against the TSA on the grounds that they allow an option to travel without ID…big detail). Also, when your employees imply that people should say lost vs. chose not to bring (it happens on here and in real life) they are in pretty clearly in violation of section 105a1 themselves, feel free to take corrective action….riiiiight

2)Again how does identity matter? That’s this assumption you keep making with no justification. If I sit next to Osama and he re ads a magazine, exactly what purpose was served by keeping him off the plane. And even if it DID matter, that still doesn’t answer why someone without it can’t fly now but they could earlier. The only change I have noticed is one judge retiring.

3) the correct answer is: It doesn’t. Using the IATA technology doesn’t mean everyone will use it. Or are we going to start getting screened by boarding pass type now?

4)why do you need to retain the information at all? (2.4 of the PIA) you have verified their identification which “Bottom line: is important” what other purpose will it serve other than noting that thee ‘forgot’ their ID

5)your background checks have been shown ineffective. Why is there not a separate form for reporting a stolen item? How often do these stings occur? You say concern, well we have no idea what justifies concern because complaints are secret.

6)So basically your answer is….? You spend four paragraphs talking about how standards evolve but don’t answer the question. To also clarify you have performed 3billion screenings. That however is utterly irrelevant to the question at hand. Your answer seems to tell us that security through obscurity is literally TSA policy is that true? Also: Yes or No can airports implement their own standards beyond the TSA’s?

7)If liquids are such a big deal then how does this possibly work? Your going to throw out the soda I bought from a legal vendor? unpredictable is right…basically your strategy is to help the terrorists achieve their overall goal. And just to clarify their goal isn’t to to kill people, that’s a means to an end. There goal is to disrupt our way of life.

8)Political donations do not make you a member of that party, so it would seem your already making assumptions in your screening. (BTW I love the title “Administrator Hawley” sounds so very fascists  )

9)the answer is…no if you stopped over answering questions some of the answers might seem believable

10)Its really classless to use an ongoing question that has been raised repeatedly as a way of pimping yoru new program. The real root of that question though wasn’t unfriendly, it was TSO’s who break the rules or threaten secondary screenings (re: the memo you mentioned)

9091 wrote...regardless of what any of you think or believe voluntary surrender, or voluntarily abandon is just that, just because you don't have the time, patience to do anything about the item in question is your problem. We don't want your junk its useless and time consuming to dispose of.

Fact of the matter is we don't care what you do with it but you cant take it with you on the plane end of story, so if you want to go hide said item in a planter and hope its still there when you get back that's on you.________________

Yeah, right. If something is so frightening and hazardous that one would be unable to carry it aboard an aircraft, I'm just sure that the security folks would be perfectly happy with you burying whatever it is in an airport planter. What color IS the sky on your planet? :o)

you have options and if you don't utilize them that is not the fault of the TSO holding your item he is doing as he is told. That is why it's referred to as voluntarily abandoned

Sounds no different than the clerk at the local Stop-N-Rob "voluntarily surrendering" the day's cash because it is better than the alternatives.

THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT A CHOICE ANYONE WOULD MAKE IF NOT UNDER DURESS.

Facing the "threat" of "not flying" or "surrendering" one's personal property, one is forced to make the same sort of "choice" as the clerk being robbed.

CBGB wrote:Your wrong Dean. Being told to do something doesn't give you the authority to do it. You are simply doing your job. You assume that when the TSA tells you that you have the authority, its accurate and true.

...Yeah, that just about sums it up.

CBGB wrote:This is true because mostly because they tell you lots of things and combine a nice web of truth half truth and falsehoods in a way that placates everyone.

Probably, though I would also point out that they (usually) tell us more about something than they tell the public. Some things - the absolute requirement for ID verification, for example - isn't anything more than what they tell you folks, and some things - CPAP machines suddenly having to be removed from bags like laptops and explosive-screened - they don't give any justification at all for. They just tell us to do it.

CBGB wrote:9)the answer is…no if you stopped over answering questions some of the answers might seem believable

All too true, that. They seem to either over-answer something, or not use enough words to convey the meaning behind it.

CBGB wrote:To use your example, you do not have the authority to ban laptop computers. The TSA claims to, and you are enforcing it (the fact that the TSA doesn’t is a separate issue). There’s a small but important difference there.

Personally, I thought that's what I wrote. :X Apologies all around if it came out in a different way.

By the way, Bob?

Bob posted:2) In the context of ensuring air travel safety, what is the difference between two people, both of whom are willing to cooperate with TSA's invasive interrogations, one of whom politely declines to show ID, the other of whom claims he lost or misplaced his ID? 20 of our readers asked this question.

You wrote a whole bunch of stuff after it, but you still failed to answer the question.

Given that none of the EoS Bloggers actively perform screening functions anymore, and the FSD seriously doesn't count (no offense to him, and all due respect where it belongs, but it's not been my experience that many FSDs were up-to-date on the finer points of the SOP), allow me to help you in this regard:

There is none.

I swear, man, it'd be a lot easier on everyone involved if you just came out and said that, given that the official policy regarding the specific scenario in which the question is based was changed a few weeks after the original was implemented.

Yes, it causes us more work to do. But that's not what the question is, now is it?

Could someone at the TSA central office please explain how it is possible for an event such as the July 26 SFO CLEAR Laptop "theft" to occur in a 'secure' environment. And could they also comment on just what the flying public is supposed to believe about their private information being secure with the TSA as a result?

See http://cbs5.com/local/tsa.security.clear.2.788083.html to understand the above references.

I regret to inform you that you started your new ID policy on June 21, 2008. You posted your privacy impact statement on the ID verification process on July 7, 2008.

Here is the exact quote from your blog:

4) Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints? 15 of our readers asked this question.

The Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, that covers the information collection and handling associated with identity verification is the Operations Center Information Management System PIA. Identity verification is one of several types of information associated with airport security efforts that fall within the coverage of this PIA.

Kippie, you have committed a felony. As soon as I can find a lawyer who will take this case pro bono for the good of the American people, I intend to prosecute you to the fullest extent of the law. I intend to take down as many of your senior staff with you as possible.

For heaven's sake, don't patronize us like this. The least you could have done was to pencil-whip the PIA to the date before your new ID policy.

Why does TSA refuse to clarify, on this blog, the change to the ID policy which Dean says is now in effect? Given the amount of chest-thumping with which the new rule was announced, the change Dean says is now in effect demands at least as much publicity.

Anonymous wrote...Could someone at the TSA central office please explain how it is possible for an event such as the July 26 SFO CLEAR Laptop "theft" to occur in a 'secure' environment. And could they also comment on just what the flying public is supposed to believe about their private information being secure with the TSA as a result?

It seems from the latest information that the laptop "reappeared" in the locked room 10 days after disappearing.

If that is true, it almost has to be an "inside job" and some employee with access to that secure area not only removed the laptop, but returned it when it got too intense with the feds checking every aspect of the company and its employees...

If that company (Verified Identity Pass Inc.) has an employee taking such liberties with the laptop containing unencrypted Customer Proprietary Information including names, addresses, birth dates and some applicants' driver's license numbers and passport information, AND that company did not, as required, keep that information encrypted, can anyone explain why the company might be allowed to continue collecting information in this government program?

BTW, if the problem should turn out to be that the company, airport security, local police, and federal agents were unable to find a laptop in a locked room, given ten days to look for it, there are even deeper problems in this entire event...

Occam's razor really says this was an actual theft, for whatever reason, of the laptop and it's CPI contents, most likely by an insider. Protestations otherwise must explain how all the folks looking for the laptop couldn't find it in that confined space over a period of ten days.

(I understand that at this point TSA/DHS and all the other alphabet agencies involved probably don't have a clear answer, but please understand also that the public is aware of the problem and will expect updates and results.)

The 3.4-1-1 rule IS pointless. That small an amount of liquid nitrogen could even be secreted in a body cavity."

and Anonymous wrote:"You also left out the part about Bojinka how occured in the Phillipines and in 1995."

I realize both that the Bojinka plot involved an over the 3.4 oz limit and that it was in a container that currently would be considered exempt. I also realize that it was in the Phillipines and in 1995. Nowhere in my statement did I say that I supported the 3.4 ban of liquids and exemptions for oversized items. My statement was directed to the original anonymous that stated that liquid explosives were too volatile to make it onto the plane. The fact that it was was in 1995, in the Phillipines and in a container that would be exempt from the liquid ban does not change the fact that this proves that liquid explosives can and have made onto planes without being so volatile as to make them unusable. I don't pretend to be a proponent of the 3.4 oz rule but I do take exception to someone making statements based upon faulty information.

Quote from Anonymous: "I realize both that the Bojinka plot involved an over the 3.4 oz limit and that it was in a container that currently would be considered exempt. I also realize that it was in the Phillipines and in 1995. Nowhere in my statement did I say that I supported the 3.4 ban of liquids and exemptions for oversized items. My statement was directed to the original anonymous that stated that liquid explosives were too volatile to make it onto the plane. The fact that it was was in 1995, in the Phillipines and in a container that would be exempt from the liquid ban does not change the fact that this proves that liquid explosives can and have made onto planes without being so volatile as to make them unusable. I don't pretend to be a proponent of the 3.4 oz rule but I do take exception to someone making statements based upon faulty information."

Funny thing is, the puffer/ETD would detect nitro. The x-ray would not. Or does putting in the Kippie bag have a magic effect that somehow makes it all safe?

One important reason why I may prefer not to show ID is that I do NOT rispek your authoritay. And there are very, very good and very, very American reasons to NOT rispek your authoritay.

If you don't understand why Americans might not rispek the authoritay of the security apparatus, why don't you take a look at what's been going on for the past 7 years? Torture, detention without trial, warrantless surveillance, and an abundance of idiotic rules that fail to keep us safe. The sooner we all stop rispeking your authoritay, the sooner we might get to once more live in America.

Ergo, just because we (the TSA) have the authority to do a great many things (in terms of mandating extraordinarily limiting security procedures), does not mean that we will utilize that authority.

TSA has shown that it lacks the ability to think on its feet (i.e. confiscation of GI Joe toy accessories). That you claim to have the authority, but choose to not use it tells me that the situation with TSA being an out of control, answerable to no one agency is closer to the truth than anyone dares to admit. I could claim that baggage thefts by TSA are legitimate confiscation of items deemed to be too dangerous to fly (i.e. Medal of Honor = ninja throwing star mindset) and that none of the missing items were stolen, but instead were 'confiscated/detained/surrendered' to further air travel safety. That line of thought belongs with sociopaths who lack a conscience, not with a government agency.

Does that clear things up for you a little bit, now, or do I have to use smaller words?

Dean, you're getting rather testy. Are we getting too close for comfort?

>>We want to pick up on people who >>may be doing surveillance or >>attempting to prepare for a >>later attack. We are interested >>in activity around gates, but >>also restaurants, Duty Free >>shops, and other common areas.

How would you differentiate between a terrorist conducting surveillance versus a non-terrorist conducting surveillance? Believe it or not, there are people who go to the airport simply because they love to watch planes and how airports operate; they take pictures of planes (http://www.airliners.net) and videotape planes (http://www.flightlevel350.com), and just hang out at the airport with their airband scanners listening to transmissions betweens airplanes and air traffic controllers (http://www.liveatc.net). This is a legitimate hobby that is not prohibited by law.

>>We have a good handle on >>what "normal" looks like. >>Anything out of the "normal" >>range may get additional >>scrutiny, whether or not it is >>on the prohibited items list.

The problem that I have with this statement is that the U.S. is a nation of laws, governed by the "rule of law", not by a government agency's notion of what's "normal". That is, if a certain act is not prohibited by law, then it is permissible. Obviously, I can't carry my Smith & Wesson 45 through a security checkpoint; it's against the law. But just because I might be carrying something not considered "normal" doesn't justify the government siezing it or harassing me in the absence of a violation of law. And just because there are people who like to hang out at the airport and conduct "surveillance" might make them odd in the eyes of those who don't participate, that certainly doesn't make them criminals (or terrorists).

>>But, it's important to note that >>TSA's responsibility for >>aviation security is not just >>limited to checkpoint screening. >>TSA has broad authority to >>develop policies, strategies, >>and plans for dealing with the >>changing threats to aviation >>security.

My concern here is that you're rapidly expanding your own authority beyond what the people hired you to do. So much so that you're interfereing with air commerce. You must learn, just like the FAA, how to correctly balance regulating safety with ensuring the freedom of movement.

TSA is embarking on a two-day training for all officers that will tie together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with passengers in a way that promotes a calmer environment and better security result.

A wholetwo days of training on subjects like human phychology and intelligence analysis?!?!? Are you guys joking? It took the government much longer than two days to teach me how to fold a pair of socks and march in a straight line, to say nothing about the more advanced skills I've had to learn.

The U.S. Constitution is a great document, which helps the United States achieve great ideological standards and the best place to live in the world. I continue to read it, yet find nothing of a constitutional right to fly on an aircraft. Each of you that ramble that knowing the ID of individuals flying on an aircraft is not important, would be the first person to stand up and march to congress the day you found out that someone with known terrorist ties, just sat down in seat 3C next to you, your wife and children. Are they here to cause harm or just running a test flight?

And to those who think that improvised explosive devices in the liquid form are too volatile to be able to make it to the aircraft or work once there, think again. You clearly have no knowledge of what can be made with some simple common items, purchased from your local Mega-mart or hobby store. Do some research online, and you would be amazed.

Not that I agree with everything that the TSA does, but some of this banter is clearly founded in misguided thoughts or not even founded at all. Spending a lot of time in different airports, it is clear to me that TSA has evolved since 9-11 and will hopefully continue to do so. Thanks

My last comment seems to have gotten lost in the ether (or the delete-o-meter), so let me try again ...

Again ... kudos to TSA for the thought-out responses. Now, back to the discussion. :)

On question 6 (unannounced security measures) ... I can understand, and approve of, the idea of focusing not on the 99.99% of "normal" activity at a checkpoint, and focusing attention on the "unusual". But as others here have pointed out, there is a tendency for "unusual" to be equated with "suspicious". We don't want to promote a society in which conformity to some standard of "normality" is imposed.

Plus, if you keep arguing that "all you need to do is follow the rules and you won't have any problems", you end up creating the potential for conflict when someone follows all the published rules and is still singled out for additional scrutiny ... say, when they invent a DVD battery pack.

On question 3 (boarding passes): is it fair to say that TSA document checkers are performing (admittedly rudimentary) validation of boarding passes now, and that TSA is trying to move towards more accurate means of validating boarding passes?

On question 2: is it fair to say, then, that a passenger who is unwilling to present an identity card at a checkpoint, but is otherwise completely willing to work with TSA to establish his/her identity (even if that ends up being more invasive than presenting an identity card), will be allowed to proceed through screening?

If so ... some of TSA's own pages that state that identity documents are required (like this one) need to be changed. The difference is subtle ... but important to some folks.

Dean, you're getting rather testy. Are we getting too close for comfort?

August 5, 2008 11:28 PM

Stop right there! Dean of all people does not deserve any such personal attacks.

Dean, I know you're fuming right about now, but take a deep breath, walk away from the computer, and let someone else defend you for once.

That you claim to have the authority, but choose to not use it...

Please don't confuse who you mean by "you" when addressing Dean. If you mean the TSA, say the TSA. When you use the generic "you," it seems like you are criticizing Dean personally.

Dean is NOT the TSA. He is simply one person trying to explain to us his understanding (as a lowly screener, I might add, not as someone in HQ) about how and why the TSA does what it does. Just because he says "The TSA has the authority to..." does not mean that Dean thinks that is a good thing.

So, the comment about "getting too close for comfort" really makes my blood boil. After all that Dean has done for us, how dare you imply that Dean personally is somehow responsible for the horrible mess that is the TSA!!!!!

I'm normally a pretty peaceful person (I'm a Quaker) but this snide remark to Dean almost makes me want to get violent...

"What if you forget your ID? Is your vacation ruined? Are you going to miss your meeting? Are you going to miss the Elvis Costello show this weekend at the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall? Not at all… If you simply state you forgot your ID, we will work with you to verify your ID, you may undergo some additional screening and will be permitted to fly.

On the other hand, if you do not cooperate and state that you’re not willing to show us your ID, you will not be permitted to fly."..................................In response to the non-answer of question #2.

Ok, once and for all, if a peson states they are not willing to show ID will they be given the opportunity of other means of identifying themselves or is this an automatic point of refusal for access to the secure area of the airport?

Is the refusal to show ID defined as not cooperating?

Surely all of your lawyers can answer a question in plain english without all the doublespeak and evasive meanings, can't they?

The question is neither difficult to understand or time consuming to answer.

August 5, 2008 1:17 PM

A very clear follow-up to a question asked and NOT ANSWERED.

Come on Blog Team, try slowing down the spin, stop trying to pump up TSO egos and answer the question as promised.

Posted by TSO John:My statement was directed to the original anonymous that stated that liquid explosives were too volatile to make it onto the plane. The fact that it was was in 1995, in the Phillipines and in a container that would be exempt from the liquid ban does not change the fact that this proves that liquid explosives can and have made onto planes without being so volatile as to make them unusable. I don't pretend to be a proponent of the 3.4 oz rule but I do take exception to someone making statements based upon faulty information.

Well, if you want to be precise, the nitro in the Philippines plot was stabilized in cotton (a typical way of stabilizing nitro), so it wasn't entirely liquid. So if the TSA was concerned about that threat vector, they would need to ban wet clothing/material, not liquids. But they don't.

Pure liquid nitro wouldn't make it through the cab ride to the airport, let alone through the terminal or onto a plane. The peroxide-based non-nitrated-liquid explosives have their own serious issues too.

I'm glad you don't claim to be a proponent of 3.4-1-1 for many reasons. As I'm sure you know, ETD swab or ETP puffer would detect such nitro regardless of if it were in an unstable liquid form or stabilized in some material.

If TSA really wanted to increase security by increasing detection of explosives, they would drop 3.4-1-1 and the entire liquid ban, drop the ID-check nonsense, drop the shoe carnival, and redirect all of the manpower and passenger wait-time that goes to those things into seeing that at least half of passengers go through an ETP puffer, or have one of their items ETD swabbed, or have their liquids scanned with one of the closed-bottle scanners the Japanese have been using for years. If those measures were enacted (and accompanied by a sane privacy and dignity respecting policy for dealing with the inevitable false positives from hand-lotion, medication, etc.), I would wholeheartedly endorse them.

TSA believes strongly in the theory of compression. BDOs are trained for, like, four or five days or something like that, and it was described as, like, a constant and fast-paced series of training from the time they woke up at around 5am to the time they got to finally go back to the hotel and sleep around 9pm.

...of training on subjects like human phychology and intelligence analysis?!?!?

I really doubt it'll be them teaching us intelligence analysis and human psychology. Most likely it'll be a STI droning at us about the latest couple OI releases about salient issues that we haven't already had drilled into our skulls.

The biggest complaint of passengers on screeners is that the TSOs are rude and generally not very nice.

The biggest complaint of screeners on passengers is that the passengers are rude and generally not very nice.

It's an interesting circle, I think, and one that TSA is trying to derail by trying to change the ways the TSOs act.

Oh, and by the way, these two days happen conveniently whenever our off-days are, here at Huntsville. Sixteen hours of classroom training for which we'll still have to get dressed and come in for eight hours a day to be told all the Thou Shalt Nots about how to properly handle the metal badges and uniform maintenance and teaching TSOs how to use a twelve-inch voice.

Another Anonymous wrote:TSA has shown that it lacks the ability to think on its feet...

True. Something that Kip is trying to change with the new Evolution stuff. The gist seems to be changing from a static SOP-based security process to a dynamic threat-based security process.

It's already happened in one small way in the definition of a security breach. Originally, a security breach was defined as anything that made it into the sterile area without satisfying all applicable security processes (that's paraphrased, obviously). Now, not only does it have to get into the sterile area without satisfying all applicable security processes, but the situation also has to be a clear and present threat to the aviation system.

Anonymous wrote:That you claim to have the authority, but choose to not use it tells me that the situation with TSA being an out of control, answerable to no one agency is closer to the truth than anyone dares to admit.

'Cept me. I think I've said that a couple of times, in the inherent danger of a government agency being granted near-total authority by the Congress to make it's own rules and procedures up with very little oversight. While I disagree that it's "out of control," I do acknowledge the fact that it could go that way very easily.

Anonymous wrote:Dean, you're getting rather testy. Are we getting too close for comfort?

Oh, something else I wanted to say about this before I had to leave the house and skeedaddle off to work, in addition to what I've already written (that hasn't gone up yet anyway):

When I'm commenting here, I'm not an official representative of the TSA. This is not the checkpoint, after all. I am a private citizen who just happens to work for the agency that we're all talking about, and so long as I don't violate the rules regarding SSI, they could probably care less that I'm here at all.

Bob and the others may not be able to respond the way that they want to when they're riled up because of their status as official representatives of TSA here on the blog, and the requirement placed upon them because of that to stay in total and complete control.

I don't act under any such restrictions on the blog.

The rest of my first comment about that line still stands, though. Something I said was taken out of the context under which it was written (either purposefully, or simply by mistake) and the writer decided to get acid about it. I got acidic back.

Well I am glad to see this, and think this Blog is a good thing, and something that more government agencies should engage in.

My issue here is there is all this talk over specific policies, can you do this, why can't you bring that.

However there is no talk, no question, of the very basic fundamental issue: Is any of this worth the cost?

Its an oft used maxim that 20% of the job takes 80% of the effort/cost. Which is to say, you can get 80% of the way there with 20% of the cost, and it makes it important to ask "What do we need?"

So how about these questions:What is the comparison pre-9/11 vs the entire period 9/11 to today in terms of the actual real risk of death as a result of air travel?

What is the risk of death by terrorist attack as compared to plane crash for other reasons? How about as compared to driving in your car?

Why put so much money and effort into something that is so unsual that frankly, I see you banning liquids, making people take shoes off, and I am wondering if even the cost of having someone blog about it is more than the ENTIRE issue is worth.

Frankly, I don't know why the entire DHS exists in the first place, except as someones pet barrel of washington pork.

Each of you that ramble that knowing the ID of individuals flying on an aircraft is not important, would be the first person to stand up and march to congress the day you found out that someone with known terrorist ties, just sat down in seat 3C next to you, your wife and children.

You're presuming to speak for many whom you do not know. I, for one, could care less who is on the flight, as long as they have been properly screened. My bigger fear is a TSO breaking my wife's insulin pump while trying to clear it, because we really cannot afford a replacement but she really needs it to keep her diabetes in check. If a "terrorist" is sitting next to her, oh well. He's presumably been screened for dangerous items, so all he can do is sit there and possibly make small talk. Hope he enjoys his visit with grandma terrorist. Her potential "I sat next to bin Laden on my flight" story would be much more interesting story than my "I sat across from Sean William Scott on a flight to CA once" one.

Quote from Anonymous: "The U.S. Constitution is a great document, which helps the United States achieve great ideological standards and the best place to live in the world. I continue to read it, yet find nothing of a constitutional right to fly on an aircraft."

Read my post at the end of the "Pay for performance" post. I address this. In short, the constitution is not a limit on the people but a limit on the government. The 9th amendment in particular states just because a right isn't specifically spelled out in the Constitution does not mean that a right does not exist. I elaborate further on it there.

Each of you that ramble that knowing the ID of individuals flying on an aircraft is not important, would be the first person to stand up and march to congress the day you found out that someone with known terrorist ties, just sat down in seat 3C next to you, your wife and children. Are they here to cause harm or just running a test flight?"

I'd actually not care if they sat down with me if they're properly screened.

I don't know who you are. How do I know you're not a terrorist trying to cause me harm or just on a test flight?

I don't. That doesn't mean that I think you should barred from flying without due process or redress if you're wrongly barred. As long as you're screened for real prohibited items, I don't care.

I would hope that the FBI would have gotten warrants to keep tabs on such people if discovered and busted if they actually are wanted. The TSA is not here to protect us from terrorism ... that's the FBI and Intelligence Community's job. TSA is there to screen for prohibited items. No more.

And to those who think that improvised explosive devices in the liquid form are too volatile to be able to make it to the aircraft or work once there, think again. You clearly have no knowledge of what can be made with some simple common items, purchased from your local Mega-mart or hobby store. Do some research online, and you would be amazed.

I have. I'll take the word of chemists and explosives experts before I take an anonymous poster's.

I know I can make things that burn from stuff I can buy at Walmart. Those things already aren't permitted on a plane and haven't been for a long time before the liquid lunacy. Funny thing is, planes still weren't falling out of the sky even before then. What changed to make a wholesale ban on liquids that was ok before? If you say it's a few knuckleheads in England, you need to lay off the kool aid.

Not that I agree with everything that the TSA does, but some of this banter is clearly founded in misguided thoughts or not even founded at all. Spending a lot of time in different airports, it is clear to me that TSA has evolved since 9-11 and will hopefully continue to do so. Thanks

Not misguided. Any thinking person can see what's going on and see that it's not helping but harming. If you choose to believe the TSA propaganda, that's your call. I'd seriously re-examine who's misguided in that case.

Will someone at the TSA PLEASE, I am begging here, please reconcile the new forced ID verification with the following sections of 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5? Your original answer is lacking any reference to the definition of a sterile area, the main area of contention.

I would really like help putting this issue to rest.

49 C.F.R. § 1540.5

Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by TSA, or by an aircraft operator under part 1544 of this chapter or a foreign air carrier under part 1546 of this chapter, through the screening of persons and property.

Screening function means the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries.

I realize both that the Bojinka plot involved an over the 3.4 oz limit and that it was in a container that currently would be considered exempt. I also realize that it was in the Phillipines and in 1995……The fact that it was in 1995, in the Phillipines and in a container that would be exempt from the liquid ban does not change the fact that this proves that liquid explosives can and have made onto planes without being so volatile as to make them unusable. I don't pretend to be a proponent of the 3.4 oz rule but I do take exception to someone making statements based upon faulty information.

My point is that even though liquid explosives have made it onto an airplane, Bojikna seems to be the only instance a terrorist group has used them. You’d think that if the method were truly effective to execute there would have been similar attempts since. The only other one was the recent attempt in London and they never even got near the airport. In order to detonate the Bojinka bomb they used two 9-volt batteries as a power source and a Casio watch as the timer. So why not ban passengers from wearing watches in addition to water bottles?

We should be modeling airport security on the Israeli model. Where they rely heavily on security interacting with and observing passengers, they invented the concept of a BDO. Shoes stay on unless the passenger is searched and no restrictions on water bottles. Logan International in Boston and LAX have both retained current and former heads of Israeli airport security to improve their security. Which tells me the TSA still has much to learn and is trying to figure out on their own, at the expense of taxpayers and airplane passengers.

I'm more concerned about the high failure rate of TSA screeners when it comes to identifying obvoius items like guns and soemthing that actually looks like a bomb.

Sorry, there's a bit more I wanted to say. I'll skip the overuse of exclamation marks this time, though.

About this business of how much authority the TSA has: their authority was granted to them by our President and our Congress in the wake of 9/11. This is the same president and congress that passed the Patriot Act, that think torture and illegal wiretapping are OK, etc., all in the name of "the war on terrorism."

If you think, as I do, that the TSA has too much authority, then you need to talk with your congresspeople and the US President about it. Complaining to the TSA (or, even worse, to one "lowly" TSO) about the TSA's authority being too broad is a waste of breath. They didn't grant themselves this authority: our elected officials did.

Here's what Dean said about it on Aug. 5:

The TSA Administrator was granted, as I said, very broad, very sweeping powers to establish pretty much any screening procedures that they wanted to. That particular argument is academic. The only thing left is sense on their part not to go crazy-overboard with it, and Judicial oversight for when/if it gets a Constitutional challenge. To restrict that authority now would require no less than a literal act of Congress.

So, vent all you want about how un-American this is, and how much you hate the TSA's broad reach, but don't expect the TSA to give up any power as a result. We need to reign in our federal government and take back our country.

And, Dean, to respond to one of your comments way back on a different post: when some of us posters complain about the "current administration," this is exactly what we're talking about. We didn't mean to imply that all TSOs are card-carrying Republicans or loyal Bushites. No, we realize that the regular Joe-on-the-line is a normal American and not a political patsy. It's the guys at Kip's level who are political appointees we blame, but even more so, the elected officials who brought all this upon us.

I'm not sure if this is too specific, but as a TSO and a passenger at times, I wonder as to why scissors are allowed on planes. Its nice a swiss army knife with a 1 inch long blade isnt allowed, yet scissors with 3 inch "blades" are allowed. Doesn't make too much sense.

@anonymous who said "Each of you that ramble that knowing the ID of individuals flying on an aircraft is not important, would be the first person to stand up and march to congress the day you found out that someone with known terrorist ties, just sat down in seat 3C next to you, your wife and children."

I don't really give a fig if a person with known terrorist ties sits next to me. What are they going to do? If they start acting up, every passenger is going to give them an unholy beating. We've seen it time and time again since 9/11. When are you people going to get it through your little skulls that we're not afraid of the terrorists! I'm sorry you, and most of this Administration, need to carry around fresh diapers to take care of you soiling yourself every time someone a bit brown gets on a plane. Most of us don't care, and would rather have our essential liberties intact than trade them away for a false sense of security.

Also you said, "You clearly have no knowledge of what can be made with some simple common items, purchased from your local Mega-mart or hobby store. Do some research online, and you would be amazed."

I have done some research, and have a PhD to prove it. You can't really build anything explosive from the stuff at Mega-lo-mart. Maybe McGyver can. But you can't. Oh, you can make something flammable. But explosives are actually fairly hard to do. Nitroethane and nitromethane aren't that easy to come by, and are actually fairly hard to make a decent explosive out of. Personally, liquid explosives would be the LAST thing I'd try to manufacture. There's a ton more solid explosives, and being solids they're harder to detect.

But don't let facts get in the way of what your gut tells you. And make sure you have a clean supply of diapers.

I regret to inform you that you started your new ID policy on June 21, 2008. You posted your privacy impact statement on the ID verification process on July 7, 2008.

Here is the exact quote from your blog:

4) Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints? 15 of our readers asked this question.

The Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, that covers the information collection and handling associated with identity verification is the Operations Center Information Management System PIA. Identity verification is one of several types of information associated with airport security efforts that fall within the coverage of this PIA.

Kippie, you have committed a felony. As soon as I can find a lawyer who will take this case pro bono for the good of the American people, I intend to prosecute you to the fullest extent of the law. I intend to take down as many of your senior staff with you as possible.

For heaven's sake, don't patronize us like this. The least you could have done was to pencil-whip the PIA to the date before your new ID policy.

Have a nice day.

August 5, 2008 7:30 PM

I took this one to the TSA Privacy Office. A big thanks goes out to them for providning this response.

Dave-

Hope we don't dampen your enthusiasm, but the PIA is a requirement of the E-Govt Act of 2002, which requires only that a PIA be conducted. Publication is not a mandate of the Act, and in fact is not done, for example, with classified systems. PIAs typically take months to conduct because of the extensive review of the data flows, policy decisions, and system development. TSA conducted the PIA that covers the system into which this data is entered for months prior to publication, and it was completed and cleared TSA prior to June 21. It was submitted to DHS for review, comment, and ultimately for publication, but the privacy risks were assessed long before the publication date. Finally, just FYI, the E-Government Act does not contain any criminal sanction. ~ TSA Privacy Office

Nice work compiling answers for this and getting to a lot of what people were asking.

However, #6 makes me VERY leery. It pretty much begs for abuse by leaving "discretion" in the hands of individual, possibly biased, possibly naive or ignorant employees. Don't believe me? check how much confusion they had with the simple concept of a MacBook Air. Wow, solidstate electronics!! They've only been mass-market for nearly a decade, and been in use since the 1980s!

It's going to be much too easy for TSA employees to profile, or to do the things that got you so many headlines in 2001-2003, like denying boarding to somebody with an anti-Bush t-shirt or the "wrong" book. Hint: My thinking President Dubya is the incarnation of evil has nothing to do with flight risk.

You're asking for trouble; there are reasons why guidelines and protocols exist. Telling TSA employees to go beyond them will just lead to another wave of illegal, unethical, or improper treatment of our flying citizenry.

jdogg said... Besides the issues I have regarding the extent or severity of security checks, I have a larger problem with the general attitude of the personnel I've encountered at the checkpoints.

I understand that they are supposed to be keeping us safe, but I see no reason why they can't do this with good customer service guidelines. If the TSA wants to place these checkpoints at airports, they need to realize that they will always be an extremely visible part of the airline experience. As such, I feel that job requirement #1 should be good service skills.

For examples, I feel no need to be yelled at because I inadvertently did something they don't agree with. Stay calm, and explain what you'd like me to do rather than barking orders, and so much of the pain would be alleviated. Please treat us as paying customers (which we are), and not as enemies or cattle.

August 4, 2008 9:05 PM***********************************Good point, and very well stated. Customer service is a requirement for TSO's on the PASS system, we are graded on the way we interact with passengers. That being said, I'd like to add that I don't necessarily think it should be termed as "Customer Service" since our job is security. I think the word that best describes how we should be acting is called "professionalism". We should be held to a standard of professionalism that reflects the nature of our duties. Now, I understand that there are rude TSO's out there, and I've seen some of them personally. I'm not a supervisor, so I can't personally correct them, but I can bring their rudeness to the attention of supervisors and leads when appropriate. And no its not always appropriate because there are times when the passenger was rude to the TSO thereby causing a rude response. But two wrongs do not make a right, and TSO's need to have a level head about them and handle tough circumstances with a grain of salt, or simply call a supervisor. I try to smile, and greet each passenger with a friendly tone, although I have to say its not always easy to do so. But for every one passenger that is rude, there are 9 that are polite and understanding of the rules and cause absolutely no problems at all. If you think that experiencing a rude TSO is annoying to you, imagine those of us who have to work with that TSO day in and day out? Its not pleasant, believe me. And hopefully those who are rude will be weeded out, or will leave on their own.

Dean wrote:The biggest complaint of screeners on passengers is that the passengers are rude and generally not very nice.

Maybe we're rude because we don't like people going through our stuff and forcing us to comply with pointless rituals. If you spend your time violating people's privacy and submitting them to pointless procedures that don't keep them safe, don't be surprised if they get testy.

Anonymous posted:"Well, if you want to be precise, the nitro in the Philippines plot was stabilized in cotton (a typical way of stabilizing nitro), so it wasn't entirely liquid. So if the TSA was concerned about that threat vector, they would need to ban wet clothing/material, not liquids. But they don't."

True they used "gun cotton" or nitrocellouse for stability. It is a part liquid explosive.

"If TSA really wanted to increase security by increasing detection of explosives, they would drop 3.4-1-1 and the entire liquid ban, drop the ID-check nonsense, drop the shoe carnival, and redirect all of the manpower and passenger wait-time that goes to those things into seeing that at least half of passengers go through an ETP puffer, or have one of their items ETD swabbed, or have their liquids scanned with one of the closed-bottle scanners the Japanese have been using for years. If those measures were enacted (and accompanied by a sane privacy and dignity respecting policy for dealing with the inevitable false positives from hand-lotion, medication, etc.), I would wholeheartedly endorse them."

You won't find any arguments from me on this. In its current incarnation the liquid ban is very problematic.

You are right. I recommend this anyway. The congresscritters should hear from us more. We should be telling them on NO UNCERTAIN TERMS that they need to defund and disband the entiere DHS, among other things.

They already, regrettably, gave a pass to the telcos who collaberated with the current administrations illegal wiretapping program.

We need them to now make up for that, and pass new legislation which will make sure that if it ever happens again, the people who conspire with illegal wiretapping plans will be made severe example of... we should pull their very buisness licenses. They should lose their existance as a limited liability company.

Then we will see if this sort of simple corruption continues.

Though I disagree that there is no point here. I remember Thoreau (the dead author) wrote of adressing the tax collector and his jailers as men. He explained to them why he refused to pay taxes, and he went to jail gladly for it. He spoke of talking to them as men, because, well, what else is there?

The people who admistrate this blog are not congress, but they do at least have the eyes and ears, on some level, of higherups at the TSA.

Who knows, ideas are like viruses, its not like the TSA doesn't have the power to stop abusing its power. To stop imposing silly rules that just make no sense.

It is well within their power to say "hey. we can reduce security now, because its just not needed. Now we are going to use the rest of our budget to retrain staff and try to move them elsewhere, maybe where they can actually have civil service protection'

We can ask, as people, as rational, reasonable people, that they do it.

And if that doesn't work/.... well... Theres nothing that says we can't, at the same time, ask congress to defund and disband them.

Hope we don't dampen your enthusiasm, but the PIA is a requirement of the E-Govt Act of 2002, which requires only that a PIA be conducted. Publication is not a mandate of the Act, and in fact is not done, for example, with classified systems. PIAs typically take months to conduct because of the extensive review of the data flows, policy decisions, and system development. TSA conducted the PIA that covers the system into which this data is entered for months prior to publication, and it was completed and cleared TSA prior to June 21. It was submitted to DHS for review, comment, and ultimately for publication, but the privacy risks were assessed long before the publication date. Finally, just FYI, the E-Government Act does not contain any criminal sanction. ~ TSA Privacy Office

Rest assured you have not bruised my ego (as another poster asserted) or dampened my enthusiasm. After all, it's not about me. It's about unbridled executive branch power coupled with an impotent legislative branch and a compliant judicial branch that threatens our form of government.

Let's pick this apart one step at a time:

the PIA is a requirement of the E-Govt Act of 2002, which requires only that a PIA be conducted.

Do I really have to say that "conducted" means that you document what you conducted and somebody approves it? How can you say this with a straight face? I'm not a GS-3 who just walked in off the street.

Publication is not a mandate of the Act, and in fact is not done, for example, with classified systems.

Wrong again. Tell me again how you can "conduct" something as complex as a PIA and not write anything down or have your "conduct" approved by anybody? By the way, the only difference between a PIA for an unclassified system and a classified one is the color of the cover sheet.

...and it was completed and cleared TSA prior to June 21. It was submitted to DHS for review, comment, and ultimately for publication, but the privacy risks were assessed long before the publication date.

This is an outright brazen lie. The TSA has no Privacy Official who is the only agency official in any department authorized to approve PIAs. It doesn't matter if Kippie cleared it on June 21. The only official authorized to approve PIAs is Hugo Tueffel, your very own DHS Privacy Officer. Hugo signed the PIA on July 8, 2008. So, you implemented the privacy-protected information gathering before the PIA was approved. My original accusation stands and you just confirmed it.

Show me a delegation letter from Tueffel to Hawley authorizing Hawley to approve TSA PIAs and I might let you off the hook. Before that, show me where the E-Government Act permits delegation.

You violated the E-government Act of 2002. Tell me again why you don't think you did violate the Act? The last I checked, "Act" = "law".

In the interests of full disclosure, I should report that I have forwarded my observations and my conclusion that Administrator Hawley broke the law to my Senator, who just happens to me a member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. I have copied Senator Obama's office. He is also a member of the same committee.

"....there is no talk, no question, of the very basic fundamental issue: Is any of this worth the cost?...

"Why put so much money and effort into something that is so unsual that frankly, I see you banning liquids, making people take shoes off, and I am wondering if even the cost of having someone blog about it is more than the ENTIRE issue is worth."

Although DHS has apparently failed to address this very issue, John Mueller of Ohio State University has done so in his paper entitled The Quixotic Quest for Invulnerability.

It's an excellent read. I suggest that all should read it and then contact their Congresscritters to suggest that they, too, read the document.

Sorry, I can't do a link, but if you Google "Mueller" and "Quixotic" you'll find it.

Stephen wrote:It is well within their power to say "hey. we can reduce security now, because its just not needed...

That's happened several times over the course of TSA's existence, albeit with very little fanfare.

To wit:

When we first started, everybody remembers fingernail clippers being on the prohibited items list. They're not anymore. Neither are scissors (provided they're less than 4" from the fulcrum, and I've seen some big mama-chicken scissors that meet this requirement) or tools (provided they're less than 7" in length). Lighters went up as a result of TSA decided to take the will of Congress a step further than Congress had wanted it, and then later pulled 'em back down.

Several years ago, the TSA scaled back it's workforce of screening personnel from 60,000-65,000 to 40,000-45,000. Since then, I think TSA pretty much has decided it has people where it needs them, for now. With an example from Huntsville, just because one person might go through at 9am and find fifteen guys standing around doesn't mean that at 11am there's not going to be a line a quarter-mile long. TSA tries to correct this, but they only go so far, and with limited success. After all, very few people actually want to work split-shifts and split-off days and the like.

Originally, everyone only got one chance through the WTMD. That was changed to where everyone got two chances through the WTMD. Now, you have an unlimited number of attempts through the WMTD.

Liquids, gels, and aerosols went from everything being prohibited, to only things 3.4oz or more being prohibited.

Selectee passengers went from having to be hand-wanded completely to only having to have the so-called Bulk-Item Pat-Down (provided that they do not alarm), a process that, at the very most, takes about ten seconds. The same goes for passengers that were pulled aside for random additional screening. The only people that (technically; officially) have to be hand-wanding anymore at all are the people who alarm the WTMD.

And, since that was recently relaxed as well, they can take as many times through as they want unless throughput is becoming a problem.

Alarm resolution has been streamlined, no longer requiring to have passengers' home addresses and such on the alarm form.

And, since I don't want to steal the EoS Team's thunder in case they're going to make a thread about it, feel free to look forward to August 16th. :)

Anonymous wrote:You also left out the part about Bojinka how occured in the Phillipines and in 1995.

Not... quite the whole story.

The PAL-434 bombing happened in the Philippines as a test run by Ramsi Yusef (or Ramzi Yousef) for Bojinka, which was supposed to take place much like the UK thing back in 2006, with multiple aircraft flying overseas. The only difference (aside from payload specifics) is that they originated in the US instead of the UK. PAL-434 detonated as planned, but as it didn't have enough explosive content to destroy the plane, only took one soul of the poor Japanese guy that was sitting there in the seat.

Incidentally, and this is just speculation mind you, I think the magic number for our current liquid-gel-aersol prohibition gets it from this particular scheme. It was shown that a 4oz (or so) bottle of gun-cotton wouldn't bring down the plane. Since that's what TSA focused on, the act of the plane staying in the sky, the LGA ban level was set lower than that, to 3oz at first, then raised to 3.4oz.

Hope we don't dampen your enthusiasm, but the PIA is a requirement of the E-Govt Act of 2002, which requires only that a PIA be conducted. Publication is not a mandate of the Act, and in fact is not done, for example, with classified systems. PIAs typically take months to conduct because of the extensive review of the data flows, policy decisions, and system development. TSA conducted the PIA that covers the system into which this data is entered for months prior to publication, and it was completed and cleared TSA prior to June 21. It was submitted to DHS for review, comment, and ultimately for publication, but the privacy risks were assessed long before the publication date. Finally, just FYI, the E-Government Act does not contain any criminal sanction. ~ TSA Privacy Office

------

Bob

EoS Blog Team

August 6, 2008 4:21 PM

..................................

Am I the only one who finds it a bit strange that Bob picked the one post that enabled him and the TSA to belittle a contributor to this blog.

Of all the post with questions or statements that deserve a real answer Bob and the TSA seems happy to belittle a person who would have learned the facts of his claim had he attempted to carry his concerns forward.

Thanks for the reply. Certainly, I don't mean to imply that the TSA never relaxes its policies. Certainly I would like to believe that, even under the worst systems, sense occasionally prevails.

The thing is, it all smacks to me of grossly exaggerated senses of risk, right from the start.

Take the liquid ban. Its not like liquid explosives are new. In fact, the only thing really neat about the plot were some of the technical details. Though, any engineer knows that technical details are guided by requirements and constraints. Nothin really novel there at all.

Essentially, it was an attack that could have been hatched and carried out as easily in 1978 as before the liquid ban. The materials, the technology, the knowhow have all existed for decades now.

The simple fact that it didn't happen before the liquids ban is all the evidence I need to feel pretty confident that there just arn't that many boogeymen out there. All of this effort, is wasted effort... justified by protecting us from people who just don't exist.

We know they don't exist, because, if they did, they would act. Mind you, I mean real boogeymen here. People who sit around on the intardnet talking about how to cause harm, or saying they should cause harm are a far sight from people who are actually skilled and motivated.

The skilled and motivated ones exist in such low numbers...well... that even before all the fascist security flying was safer than any other form of transportation.

You guys were doing a fine job.... back in like the 1980s. Just start rolling back to that as a target level and we should be fine.

You also left out the part about Bojinka how occured in the Phillipines and in 1995.

Not... quite the whole story.

The PAL-434 bombing happened in the Philippines as a test run by Ramsi Yusef (or Ramzi Yousef) for Bojinka, which was supposed to take place much like the UK thing back in 2006, with multiple aircraft flying overseas. The only difference (aside from payload specifics) is that they originated in the US instead of the UK. PAL-434 detonated as planned, but as it didn't have enough explosive content to destroy the plane, only took one soul of the poor Japanese guy that was sitting there in the seat.

Wow. So, to recap, a 1995 attack of limited success results in no visible changes in security protocol, but a much more recent attack that was halted before it could be carried out, and of debatable viability, results in silly restrictions on liquids. IMHO, this helps strengthen the argument against the current policy.

Thanks! Thats a great paper, I am just starting to read it, but I am hooked. It does indeed address exactly what I am talking about!

One of the scenarios is one I posed to some friends a while back. An attacker decides what target to hit, so if you make one target too hard, he just moves to another.

So you make the plane safer, what do you do when the attacker decides that security is too tight to get onto the plane, so he blows up all the people standing in line for the security checkpoint?

Will the TSA respond by putting a checkpoint before the checkpoint? Will the people who die consider it such a win that they died on the ground rather than in the air? Will we create a Checkpoint Security Line Authority?

There is a concept of a "point of diminishing returns". I think it is more than fair to ask where it is, and what the real cost vs benefit is.

Frankly, I would be shocked if the point of diminishing returns hadn't been reached by the very early 90s in terms of airport security.

Thats not to say that all things since have been bad. Its not to say nothing should change... sealed cockpit doors is a real plus, and relatively cheap. Just that...well as this paper points out, total invulnerability is a myth. Where do we draw the line?

What I'd like to know is how does a TSO verifying ID's to the boarding pass, equate to not letting people with known terrorist links on a plane? The TSO doing TDC does not run background checks, they simply check the ID to see if the person they are admitting to the checkpoint is who they say they are. I am a TSO, and honestly find it pointless to check the documents, only thing its going to find are counterfeit ID's and people in the country illegally.

"Its not to say nothing should change... sealed cockpit doors is a real plus, and relatively cheap. Just that...well as this paper points out, total invulnerability is a myth. Where do we draw the line?"

We should be drawing the line at hardened cockpit doors. Nothing else TSA does makes anyone safer.

If you have this great video surveillance system to ensure that no one puts bad stuff in luggage, why can't you use this great video surveillance system to find out what has happened to things that have been stolen from luggage during transport? If the surveillance is so great, that should be a really easy thing to do. Theft is reported, video surveillance tapes are reviewed, thieves are caught and fired, victim gets stuff back. But in reality, a victim of theft just gets blown off by the TSA, has to file a pointless report, gets no restitution, and has to just deal with having their stuff stolen. So, does TSA just not care about stolen stuff, or is the surveillance not good enough to catch the thieves? If it's not good enough to catch the thieves, it's probably not good enough to ensure that nothing bad is put IN the luggage either.

"What I'd like to know is how does a TSO verifying ID's to the boarding pass, equate to not letting people with known terrorist links on a plane?"

The idea is that airlines have already cross-referenced the ticket purchaser's name against the DHS blacklists. However, we currently allow the "suspects" (which is now everyone who flies) print and carry the non-secure boarding pass.

What I'd like to know is what does it mean for someone to have "known terrorist links" and more importantly, what does it mean for someone to be a terrorist?

It's a good question, that goes to the heart of the post-9/11 civil liberties issues.

Who is a terrorist? Any IRA member from the last twenty years? A member of the Irgun (led by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin)? Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for sabotage for 27 years by the South African government? A WTO protester? The US Government killed more Afghani civilians in [2002-2003] than the number of US people killed on 9/11; does that make US soldiers terrorists? Israel and Palestine both claim that the other is terrorist. So do India and Pakistan. So do leftists and rightists in Colombia.

Ultimately the line between "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" is a political one. Our freedom to travel should not depend on a politician's decision about whether they agree with our aims or not. Every "anti-terrorist" measure restricts people based on their politics, not just based on whether they use violence. Violence was already illegal.

In other words, any list of "terrorists" will inevitably contain many individuals that have never committed a terrorist act, and not contain many individuals that have actually committed a terrorist act.

The anonymous reportedly-TSA commenter astutely noted:"only thing [the ID check is] going to find are counterfeit ID's and people in the country illegally.

That's all it has found so far. It does also offer the chance for our government to restrict people's movement within the country based on blacklists.

Paraphrasing words of The Identity Project: No matter how sophisticated the security embedded into an I.D., a well-funded criminal will be able to falsify it. Honest people, however, go to Pro-Life rallies. Honest people go to Pro-Choice rallies, too. Honest people attend gun shows. Honest people protest the actions of the President of the United States. Honest people fly to political conventions. What if those with the power to put people on a 'no fly' list decided that they didn't like the reason for which you wanted to travel? The honest people wouldn't be going anywhere.

Dean wrote:"Incidentally, and this is just speculation mind you, I think the magic number for our current liquid-gel-aersol prohibition gets it from this particular scheme. It was shown that a 4oz (or so) bottle of gun-cotton wouldn't bring down the plane. Since that's what TSA focused on, the act of the plane staying in the sky, the LGA ban level was set lower than that, to 3oz at first, then raised to 3.4oz."

We were instructed 3.4 oz from day one at our airport but a lot of the signage we recieved had 3 oz on it and this created a fair amount of confusion. Why 3.4 oz? We were told that it was because 3.4 oz equals 100ml and we were falling in with the United Kingdom's ban of 100ml.

I think you make an excellent point. To put it another way, once the apparatus exists, its not just a matter of trusting the poeple in charge, its trusting the future people in charge too.

Think of the cameras in London. Centrally managed, hundreds of cameras, always watching. No big deal with a good police force, with good mandates.

However, all it takes is a few changes of policy, and those cameras can be used for anything. What if the government suddenly decides that gay rights needs to be taken away and we need to hunt these people down?

Well find one, then rewind his life on camera. Cameras weren't a problem for him and his friends yesterday, now they have nowhere to hid, and worst.. all of their movements could have been taped from any point.

The point here is, machines can be used for good or evil. If you build the machinery to control people, it can be used for good or ill.

Lets not forget FISA courts weren't setup because of a theoretical misuses of wiretapping. They were setup because of rampant wanton abuse of wiretapping by people working for the government.

Thats why our government was setup to be open and have checks and balances. Where is the openness in TSA policy? Where can we the people see with our own eyes the checks and balances?

I don't care if its security or fighting terror. The simple fact is, we the people are the final oversight, anything that has to be hidden from us is too dangerous to be allowed to exist. Afterall, how can we, the final oversight, be sure that you are telling the truth even about why it must be hidden until we see it?

Its not that I don't want to trust the TSA or think its full of bad people, far to the contrary. I just don't trust the situation thats being created. I do believe potentials for abuse left unchecked will be abused. Its nearly a fundamental law of nature.

The people today may not abuse the no fly lists, they might not single people out secretly for political agendas or personal gain. However, prove to me that it will never happen, that nobody will ever be in that position.

If you can't, then I can't stop asking congress to defund the DHS and by extension, the TSA. (for all the good it does, sadly)

Also, the answer to #6 is a joke. So no one can pack anything without it potentially being taken away. So the list of prohibited items is a joke, the 3-1-1 policy is a joke, and this web site is a joke. Because the policy can change at any time from airport to airport and screener to screener and there is no way to prepare for it.

Great. Can't wait to fly on Tuesday with my $700 prescription gel mouthpiece. I can't check it, because it's too expensive to lose. I have to fly, because I'm going overseas. It doesn't have a label on it, because then I can't fit it in my mouth. I have a note from my doctor, which the TSA just laughs at.

I'll just hide it in my pockets. It turns out you can pack a lot of gel in your pockets. More than 3-1-1 rules allow.

"For bonus points, we'll answer another question that some have asked: whether the form itself requires an OMB control number. Since the form entails no burden beyond identifying the individual and home address, it is exempt from Paperwork Reduction Act requirements pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1)."

May I ask then why does the PIA itself state:

Section 6.1

In instances where personal information is collected in order to verify identity, the individual is provided an (sic) 5 U.S.C. 522(e)(3) notice prior to the collection of the information. Where PII is collected as part of a criminal investigation, TSA will not provide notices and has previously published a Final Rule after public comment to exempt TSA from the notice requirement in such circumstances.

For those of you who don't know 5 U.S.C. 552(e)(3) reads:

(3) inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which it uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual--

(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by Executive order of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary;

(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is intended to be used;

(C) the routine uses which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection; and

(D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all or any part of the requested information;

So, Blogger Bob, which is it? Are all who fail to present ID considered to be under criminal investigation or is the TSA ignoring the PIA?

Also, Bob-o, Dave Nelson is correct in that Kippie doesn't get to sign off on the PIA. It is Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

The people today may not abuse the no fly lists, they might not single people out secretly for political agendas or personal gain. However, prove to me that it will never happen, that nobody will ever be in that position.

If you can't, then I can't stop asking congress to defund the DHS and by extension, the TSA. (for all the good it does, sadly)

-Steve

Prove to me that no priest will ever molest another child again.

Prove to me that no police officer will never take a bribe ever again.

Prove to me that no politician will never lie or violate their code of ethics.

You can't but I dont see you calling to get rid of their organizations.

Ok, time to comment on the PIA. It's available here for those that want to read it. I suggest keeping a bottle of Maalox handy.

After reading thru it, I found a few interesting nuggets. I want to comment on.

From the intro:The system will store information that it receives about the following categories of individuals: 1) individuals who violate, or are suspected of violating transportation security laws, regulations, policies or procedures; 2) individuals whose behavior or suspicious activity resulted in referrals by Ticket Document Checkers (TDC) to Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) or Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) interview (primarily at airports); or 3) individuals whose identity must be verified, or checked against Federal watch lists. Individuals whose identity must be verified includes both those individuals who fail to show acceptable identification documents to compare to boarding documents and law enforcement officials seeking to fly armed.

Ok, the whole purpose of this shenanigan is stated up front. No real issue with actual violations. However, there's also provisions for referrals to SPOTniks. This seems ripe for abuse. Give a document checker grief, or if they simply don't like you, you could find yourself on the receiving end of a referral. Armed LEOs are understandable too. However, there's confusion over whether information collected is to identify people or check against the list.

My first question is: why is TSA even stating this purpose when they clearly place the airlines responsible for checking the list? We've seen firestorms in the news about this. Is TSA checking the lists or aren't they? If the airlines are doing it and TSA isn't, there's no need for this. If TSA is doing it, they've been lying about it for quite awhile.

The information collected may include the full names of individuals, aliases and nicknames, date of birth, place of birth, age, sex, race, nationality, languages spoken, passport number, driver’s license number, and telephone number, home and business addresses; Social Security Numbers, height and weight, eye color, hair color, style and length, facial hair, scars, tattoos and piercings, clothing (including colors and patterns) and eyewear, description of personal carry-on and/or baggage items.

So guys, if you're just checking me against a watch list (which you say you're not), you're asking for quite a lot of information ... much more than needed to identify a person. Are you going to give me a loan with all this information too?

Paraphrasing section 1.5, TSA is using governmental and nongovernmental information sources. Additionally, TSA can update and add information and also relies on people to be honest.

So which governmental agencies are giving this information out? If not associated with a criminal investigation, where is the privacy notice from these agencies stating that the person has given permission for this information to be shared? What nongovermental resources are used, and how can they be guaranteed to be accurate?

Section 1.7 is a real doozy. Basically, we see that the only real threat is improper dissemination of information. It says nothing about abuse of this information. Like say, Drew Griffin finding himself on the No Fly® List shortly after criticizing TSA.

The real kicker is this though:

"There is also a privacy risk associated with collecting information on individuals who may lack acceptable identification because it was lost or stolen and may not have involved wrong-doing on the individual’s part."

So tell me this: TSA views a person who willfully doesn't show ID as a potential criminal. If the ID is lost or stolen, they'll give the benefit of the doubt to person. However, if the person simply asserts the right to travel anonymously, the person is viewed as a criminal.

Tell me, are you exceeding your authority by making these as criminal investigations? Is TSA being judge, jury, and executioner here and denying the person's right to travel simply for not identifying himself and no other reason, even if the person is willing to undergo additional screening? Does TSA believe in innocent until proven guilty, or is that just an antiquated concept?

Seems to me TSA is specifically targeting people who protest their actions by denying them travel based on no evidence, no due process, and considering them criminal.

Section 2.1: Information collected from individuals who fail to present acceptable identification matching boarding documents will be used to search databases, including commercial databases, in order to present knowledge based queries to verify the individual’s identity. TSA will check immigration databases to assist foreign nationals in verifying identity. TSA may also perform other searches of publicly available data to assist in verifying identity. .. The information is also used for TSA to provide an operational response. It allows users to draw links and patterns that might not otherwise be readily apparent.

Ok, so TSA is here to play Quiz Show to see if you can pass their test. Additionally, it's playing immigration now to "verify" foreign nationals, and probably to check if they're here legally too. Furthermore, TSA will likely use Google, Facebook, MySpace, and more to check you out. Post something stupid on there? Critical of the government? Pictures of you shooting a gun? Seems like these things can all be used against you. Seems likely considering Chertoff recently stated that border searches are being used to look for reasons to deny people entry. Why couldn't these be used to look for reasons to deny Americans the ability to travel?

Additionally, with all this information being collected into this system, is there a PIA on this system and how this information is being collected to include what systmes, both governmental and not, are being used to create this database? If you're using publicly available information and information given to the government that's not from a classified source, surely that should be disclosed.

Bottom line: TSA is using this as a fishing expedition in addition and any information given to them by people will be retained and used for such purposes. This goes WAY beyond just identification. How come you guys didn't come clean about that? You even admit that that will be used for this purpose thoughout section 2, specifically 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

In section 3, it states that MOST information will be kept for at least years. What is the definition of most? Doesn't say. They leave themselves an out to keep it longer. Furthermore, they state that this is a reasonable amount of time to keep the information. Is 3 years REALLY needed to keep all this invasive info simply to identify someone?

From Section 4.1: In order to respond to complaints from individuals, the information may also be shared with the Office of Privacy Policy and Compliance, the Ombudsman, or the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. To respond to congressional inquiries, the information may be shared with the Office of Chief Counsel and the Office of Legislative Affairs. Where access to sensitive information, such as personal information, is determined to be necessary, access will be based on a need to know. All information will be shared in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

Where is the information that we can contact such offices? Where is this Ombudsman that we can contact? Why aren't people informed that they can complain about such things?

From Section 4.3: Employees authorized to access the data receive appropriate privacy and security training and have necessary background investigations and security clearances for access to sensitive or classified information. Privacy protections include strict access controls, including security credentials, passwords, real-time auditing that tracks access to electronic information, and mandated training for all employees and contractors."

So if this system has been in the works and has been in the operational phase (per section 9.2) for awhile now, how come no one can seem to find information on where abuse occurs, like in Drew Griffin's case?

From Section 5.1: "Because the purpose of the system is to increase information sharing for homeland security purposes, users may be government officials, law enforcement personnel, non-government organizations, and private sector individuals whose professional duties and interests make them stakeholders of the DHS mission."

While previously TSA states that the information will be shared with DHS, this section seems to leave an out for them to wideband this information to those who are "stakeholders of the DHS mission." This can arguably extend to intelligence agencies, the FBI and more ... any agency trying to protect "the homeland."

Additionally, SORNs were noted. Have these been updated to included the systems that are being deployed with this PIA?

Looking at section 5.4, we see that the risks are based on improper dissemination. Does TSA not think misuse is a risk?

From Section 6.1: Where PII is collected as part of a criminal investigation, TSA will not provide notice and has previously published a Final Rule after public comment to exempt TSA from the notice requirement in such circumstances. In instances where TSA receives personal information as part of suspicious activity reports, the individual is unlikely to have knowledge that his/her information has been submitted to the system and there is no opportunity for TSA to provide notice."

Criminal investigations, huh? Can you tell me where TSA, as a civil agency, gets its authority to conduct law enforcement operations and criminal investigations? If it had this authority, why are airport LEOs even needed? I see this having a limited scope within the Federal Air Marshal System (FAMS), but TSA seems to be implying that this has a wider scope which is why PA notices are not provided. So please tell me where your authority to conduct criminal investigations come from.

From 6.2: "In some instances, an individual has the right to decline providing personally identifiable information. By way of example, individuals whose identity TSA must verify may decline to provide the information; however, failure to furnish the requested information may result in an inability to grant the individuals access beyond the TSA screening checkpoint."

In other words, "Do you want to fly today?" Additionally, 6.3 states that any information given or collected can be used how TSA sees fit ... you can't provide limited consent.

From 6.4: "In instances where personal information is collected in order to verify identity, the individual is provided an 5 U.S.C. 552(e)(3) notice prior to the collection of information. Individuals will be aware of the collection of information, even without notice, in all cases except suspicious activity reports in which there is no opportunity to provide notice."

In other words, assume TSA is trying to conduct a criminal investigation unless a notice is given (do they even have this authority?). A good time to use your 5th amendment right to remain silent as they will try to use this information against you.

Section 7.1 states that we can request the information TSA has on file about us under the FOIA. Section 7.3 states that much of the information is sensitive. In other words, TSA has an out not to disclose what information is being kept by hiding behind SSI. Additionally, while individuals may submit a request to correct erroneous information (per 7.2), TSA does not say that it will even acknolwedge or correct such information.

Accurate information seems to be a goal, but at the same time, information is compared against what is supplied by the individual against what's collected by law enforcement and intelligence. The implication seems to be that the latter will have more creedence. After all, if high profile people like Ted Kennedy can't get information corrected without pretty much an act of God, what hope does the average American have?

Section 8 I'm going to gloss over largely as it's technical about the information security aspects of it. Having a background in that field, practices seem to be pretty standard. However, it does beg the question: if such systems are in place to audit and track changes and to detect unauthorized access and abuse, how come no one can say how Drew Griffin and other political opponents have ended up on the No Fly List and Secondary Screening Lists? Sounds like Chertoff should have been able to answer these questions when Congress asked him.

From Section 9.1: "The WebEOC system is a commercial off-the-shelf major application which has been purchased and adapted for use by TSA to develop a database which will allow for prevention, mitigation, response or recovery activities in response to an actual or possible security event. It was purchased by TSA and installed and maintained by TSA contractors at an off-site hosting center."

So, are there updated records about what system is being used as to comply with the Privacy Act? If a COTS program is being used (although customized), is the information about the base platform available for public inspection?

From Section 9.2: The system is currently in the operation and maintenance phase of the systems development lifecycle. The project used for development and implementation of system was the TSA systems development lifecycle model."

Ok, big problem here. This program was already in operation BEFORE Mr. Tuefel signed off on this. Clearly, this program has been in the works for quite awhile. Why was this not submitted BEFORE deployment? I've worked on big IS projects before. These aren't something thrown together. There is NO reason that this PIA should have been deployed until AFTER this PIA was submitted. I think Dave's right that TSA broke the law here. Not that it matters much as TSA won't be held accountable anyway.

From 9.3: "The system does not employ additional technology that may raise privacy concerns."

Aside from data mining techniques systems that are used to help identify trends, links and so forth that may or may not be true. Again, I think TSA is trying to weasel it's way into the IC with a "me too" effort and exceed the scope of its charter.

All in all, I think this PIA is pretty alarming. It contains a lot of answers to questions we've been asking but TSA wouldn't come clean about. It pretty much shows that TSA is on a fishing expedition, is trying to conduct criminal investigations and conducting intelligence operations. Wow. Quite the leap from just securing planes from pointy objects and bombs ... what the TSA was created for.

Quote from Sec. Chertoff: "Particularly with respect to Americans, the number of people that are on the list that are not false positives are not that large a number. And if they do raise an issue, we will take a look at what the basis is. And sometimes we will make adjustments.

But if you are asking if we would do a court process where we litigate it, I mean, that effectively would shut it down."

Is Sec. Chertoff implying that if the NoFly List were to be challenged in court that a judge would find it to be illegal and/or unconstitutional?

Anonymous said "Since then, their devious plans have involved:- A guy trying to give himself the hotfoot,- Two guys driving a jeep into a security bollard at an airport, then running around their car...on fire!- Plotting to blow up the Holland Tunnel (lacking explosives), assuming water would magically run uphill and flood Wall Street,- Plotting to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch (and presumably lots and lots of patience)- Plotting to break a fuel line near JFK and using magic to cause all the fuel in the fuel bunkers to explode without any oxygen whatsoever- Plotting to drive onto a military base and shoot people, because no one on a base is armed."

Gee, let’s review what you have listed:

1. A guy trying to give himself a hotfoot.

I will venture a guess that you are referring to Richard Reid. Admittedly he was a less than stellar example of a terrorist, however if it were not for a series of misfortunes he would have succeeded in bringing an airliner down killing several people. IF he had succeeded, the public (perhaps yourself included, I do not know you well enough to comment on that) would have been screaming about where TSA was when he got on the plane, and why were his shoes not examined more closely (even though he was on a flight FROM France)… Say what you want, he was but ONE of the deciding factors behind the shoe screening policy. The simple fact is he was the "schlep rock" version of modern terrorists, unlucky, poorly planned and never quite had it together (BTW did you see the beat down administered to him by the passengers on that plane?).

2. Two guys driving a jeep into a security bollard at an airport, then running around their car...on fire!

Had it not been for the bollards, the success of this attack would have more than likely been more tragic. As it was, some civilians in the airport area near the doorway were still injured. As for what this has to do with TSA in general, I have no idea (which means that it is a nonsensical comparison). This is also a case of less than fantastic planning! It might appear (if you take into account the current events going on in London about 3 days prior to this event) that this was a last ditch attempt by this particular group of terrorists to make SOME kind of an impact and induce casualties to further their cause. As a result of their poor planning (or sad ignorance of the territory they were operating in) they will forever live in ignominy as the knuckleheads that crashed into a doorway and set themselves on fire.

3. Plotting to blow up the Holland Tunnel (lacking explosives), assuming water would magically run uphill and flood Wall Street.

This situation was a perfect example of our intelligence community getting on the ball early in a situation before any casualties were to be had! They had credible information, referred it to local authorities and .... case closed another would-be is a has-been without ever being! Where is the downside of this? Oh, and if you had done some more research, you would have found the following information on this plot as well - "The specific target was the PATH commuter trains that run in a tunnel under the Hudson River into New York City."

“This is a plot that would have involved martyrdom, explosives and certain of the tubes that connect New Jersey with lower Manhattan,” said Mark Mershon, Assistant Director-in-Charge of the FBI New York Field Office. “We’re not discussing the modality behind, beyond that.” NOT the Holland tunnel.

4. Plotting to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch (and presumably lots and lots of patience).

This one, I am inclined to agree with you that this was a lame brained attempt at something so farfetched as to be completely unreasonable under ANY circumstances. I am not a yes man, and never will be, so I have nothing on this one and I admit to being sorely lacking in information on this particular nitwit.

5. Plotting to break a fuel line near JFK and using magic to cause all the fuel in the fuel bunkers to explode without any oxygen whatsoeverI will give you the "knuckleheads of the first order" card on this one too. That being said, they had a plan to disrupt a major transportation sector in the US. No, their plan was not technically feasible, that does not preclude the fact that they had intent to disrupt/destroy infrastructure at JFK. (Just a side note, JFK has approximately 1000 flights daily about half of those are international. They have about 45 million passengers a year and they ship about 1.5 million tons of cargo a year) Even if they had succeeded in just disrupting the normal daily routine for 2-10 days, you are talking about the possibility of knocking 2000-10000 flights out of sync, not to mention any casualties incurred in the actual act. This is a worst case scenario and HIGHLY unlikely, but what if the knucklehead quadruplets had gotten lucky?

6. Plotting to drive onto a military base and shoot people, because no one on a base is armed.

This was a serious plot to do damage to military members and their families. To refer to this attempt in this manner shows an utter lack of decorum. Yes they failed... because authorities received credible information of possible terrorist activity and acted accordingly. To indicate that this is anything other than a serious threat to the citizens of this country (yes soldiers are still considered citizens and yes there are several people on the post that are armed, but just to let you know, approximately 99% of the weapons on any given military base are contained in high security "arms rooms" and would not necessarily be available on immediate notice) is sad and shabby. I hope that if someone plans to attempt something of this ilk near you, that the government is as on the ball as they were in this case. I hope you were not really serious when you posted these (with the one exception of the guy with the torch.... I will give you that one) as part of your arguments AGAINST the TSA. The fact that you followed this up with the following - "Oh gosh, I'm ever so scared! What shall I do? A bunch of dimwits with no resources, experience, expertise, or credible plans are going to...think bad thoughts at me?" shows a terrible lack of understanding as to what type of world you truly live in. This country has porous borders, tons of enemies worldwide and millions of dollars/pounds/whatever currency they are using this week to fill there coffers and you think they will just... think bad thoughts about you. Amazing.

You know what, one could go on to MySpace or Facebook, find someone of similar age and looks, then go to a commercially available db, pay a fee, do a background check on that person to get all sorts of information and after memorizing it, get through your ID process.

BTW, a couple of commercially available databases have me living at an address where I have not lived in 10 years.

Also, the answer to #6 is a joke. So no one can pack anything without it potentially being taken away. So the list of prohibited items is a joke, the 3-1-1 policy is a joke, and this web site is a joke. Because the policy can change at any time from airport to airport and screener to screener and there is no way to prepare for it.

Great. Can't wait to fly on Tuesday with my $700 prescription gel mouthpiece. I can't check it, because it's too expensive to lose. I have to fly, because I'm going overseas. It doesn't have a label on it, because then I can't fit it in my mouth. I have a note from my doctor, which the TSA just laughs at.

I'll just hide it in my pockets. It turns out you can pack a lot of gel in your pockets. More than 3-1-1 rules allow.***********************************Any TSO or supervisor with a little common sense would be able to properly identify this as a medical necessity even though a label is not present. Please note that a label is NOT required on medications. I don't know why we have to keep going over this...all medication including over the counter medication is permitted through the checkpoint. What seems to be the problem with TSO's and STSO's disallowing these items?

Steve said:So you make the plane safer, what do you do when the attacker decides that security is too tight to get onto the plane, so he blows up all the people standing in line for the security checkpoint?***********************************This is exactly why the behavior detection officers are in place. It is their job to identify people with harmful intentions. Remember, the terrorist wants to cause as much havoc and destruction as he can. Blowing up an airport is not as destructive as blowing up a plane in mid air. Yeah the loss of life is there, but the devastation is minimized (theoretically) because it was contained to a relatively small area. The terrorist will rarely be working alone, and will often try to smuggle his bomb in separate bags rather than fully assembled in one bag. After all, the single components of a bomb are much more difficult to detect than a fully assembled bomb. In theory, he could decide that security is too tight and just change plans, thus blowing up those around him in the security line. How many lives? 50 to 150 depending on the type of bomb, and the time of day. Devastating, yes. But not AS devastating as had he actually gotten his bomb through the checkpoint and onto the plane. Bringing down the plane is his goal....not blowing up a few people standing in line.

HuntsvilleThe constitution never gives us use of CARS either!!! It wasn't until LBJ that we had the Interstate system funded! What's your point? I had poorly trained TSA workers that wanted to re-examine my bag because they thought it was a threat ("looks like a laser") I had to tell them verbally YES my camera has a laser for them to let it through. On the return they didn't bat an eye at RDU.

My point is we are not Germany in WWII, or Mother Russia "papers, papers please", but it is sure seeming like it at times. If I had extra time to burn I'd fly by GA to destinations over Commercial. Avoid the headache of security. Only problem is refueling and dealing with towers directing you when you do a LONG cross country flights. 100LL is close to 4.50/gal right now. Not worth it for long hauls.

I can walk into the FBO, meet my pilot, and walk onto the tarmac to the plane. No security, no screening of my bags. Is this a risk? HECK NO. It's the GA world. This is at the same airport that handles Comm flights I've taken. The entry point for Comm they DO have a TSA station. The difference is GA is still slightly a cowboy situation. I've been in a biplane out of there, and in Trike and Tail high wings. Makes you look on commercial in a totally different aspect.

I've been forced to adapt as many. You can't change the rules, so you have to go up to the lines when complying, just don't cross over.

If TSA managers at each airport have the authority to define individually which items to prohibit and which items to allow on board, how can a member of the traveling public get assurance that their personal items will be allowed? Surely, the expectation can't be that the public should show up and give it a shot, right? If I want to bring X on board, and the TSA isn't capable of telling me whether X is allowed or not, who is?

@Anonymous: "Prove to me that no priest will ever molest another child again.

Prove to me that no police officer will never take a bribe ever again.

Prove to me that no politician will never lie or violate their code of ethics.

You can't but I dont see you calling to get rid of their organizations."

Generally, these people have some sort of accountability and arguably add value to society.

If a priest molests a child, he is arrested, tried, and punished if found guilty. Additionally, there is usually a lawsuit for damages. There's accountability here.

If a police officer takes a bribe or is found to have falsified evidence, the policeman is punished. If evidence was falsified, the conviction's overturned and a new trial may result. Again, there's accountability.

If a politician lies or violates ethics or rules, there is usually punishment. Depending on the party, usually at the very least it means a loss of prominence in the party, the official resigns, and/or charges are pressed. Ted Stevens was just indicted for not declaring gifts received from contributors. Again, accountability.

Of course, these actions can only had if the offense comes to light.

Let's take a look at TSA. TSA has numerous complaints and it's dirty laundry is generally aired. Complaints are filed. What happens? Nothing. Same power tripping TSO's are there. TSA fails tests. What happens? Kippie states that failures are supposed to happen because the tests are hard and he's proud of his force. And so on and so forth. Where's the accountability? There is none. Even if something makes the news, most often all a screener gets is retraining (or so TSA says). TSA really doesn't seem to want to change, nor does it seem to care about security. It only cares about it's public image and only reacts if it's forced into a situation where it has to. It either needs to be overhauled or disbanded and replaced with something that works.

So yeah, an unaccountable agency with unaccountable employees needs to be overhauled or disbanded. I can't say that anything you stated won't happen again. I do know that they'll be held accountable. I wish I could hold TSA to that standard.

Corey said... If TSA managers at each airport have the authority to define individually which items to prohibit and which items to allow on board, how can a member of the traveling public get assurance that their personal items will be allowed? Surely, the expectation can't be that the public should show up and give it a shot, right? If I want to bring X on board, and the TSA isn't capable of telling me whether X is allowed or not, who is?

August 9, 2008 7:40 PM***********************************Corey, first of all, the prohibited items list is a list of known items that are not permitted on the plane. That said, there are items that show up at the checkpoint on occasion that after review by a supervisor or manager it is determined they could be used as a weapon. That's not to say that your personal items will be disallowed "just because I have the discretion to do so". Most times, if the item is within reasonable standards, and can not be construed as a potential weapon, it is permitted. There have been very few occasions at my airport that a supervisor has disallowed an item because it could be used as a weapon, but it has happened.

If your tired of getting items taken away, as I was, I did the simple thing and didn't try to bring them on the plane. I took the extra 10 mins to go onto TSA's website and look over the items that were not allowed on.

I got to the airport and believe it or not the TSO was in a bad mood. Wow, I can't believe it! A federal employee having a bad day! That could not be! So, he yelled at me to take off my shoes and other procedures and I did. I went throught the mag and said thank you. He didn't smile, but he stopped yelling at me and let me do what I needed.

Have some respect and compasion, people do have bad days and some people are just plain grouchy. Everyone lives with that wiether they fly or not.

Anonymous said... If your tired of getting items taken away, as I was, I did the simple thing and didn't try to bring them on the plane. I took the extra 10 mins to go onto TSA's website and look over the items that were not allowed on.

I got to the airport and believe it or not the TSO was in a bad mood. Wow, I can't believe it! A federal employee having a bad day! That could not be! So, he yelled at me to take off my shoes and other procedures and I did. I went throught the mag and said thank you. He didn't smile, but he stopped yelling at me and let me do what I needed.

Have some respect and compasion, people do have bad days and some people are just plain grouchy. Everyone lives with that wiether they fly or not.

Thank you for anwsering the questions, it was a good read.***********************************Thank you for recogninzing that TSO's are human too. And thank you for taking the time to check the web site to see what was or was not permitted. I'm hoping you've had better experiences with TSO's too though.

Anonymous wrote:I got to the airport and believe it or not the TSO was in a bad mood. Wow, I can't believe it! A federal employee having a bad day! That could not be! So, he yelled at me to take off my shoes and other procedures and I did. I went throught the mag and said thank you. He didn't smile, but he stopped yelling at me and let me do what I needed.

I remember showing up for work while I was having a bad day. I still had to smile at the customers. Had I yelled at any of them, I would have been fired.

When it comes to how employees are managed (having a significant impact on morale and the general interaction they will have on each other and the traveling public) does the TSA have a policy on addressing conduct issues within a reasonable time period?

For instance, if a performance or conduct issue arises, does the TSA have a standard stating that management has a reasonable period of time (e.g.- 6 months, unless criminal in nature) to address the issue before it is considered outside a “statute of limitations” so to speak?

Or, in a case in which an Officer had some attendance issues that were arguable at the time, is it reasonable for a suspension or any other official (or unofficial) discipline to be administered 3 years after the fact when the employee really has no ability to effectively address the allegations or gather evidence in his or her defense? Or is it considered too late to address unless the individual has a recurrence of the behavior (in which case that incidence would be addressed)?

Or, in the case of allegations made, a standard requiring a fact-finding mission to be conducted in a reasonable period of time to ensure an employees fundamental fairness to effectively give their side of the story (e.g.- initiated within 2 weeks of the initial report)? Would it be reasonable for discipline to be administered in a case in which

• an individual files an allegation of confrontational behavior 3 months after the alleged incident,

• management waits an additional 4 months (7 months from the alleged incident) to get a witness statement (from a known acquaintance of the accuser), and

• waits until 8 months after the alleged incident to allow the accused to give their side of the story (when issuing a pre-decisional)?

Additionally, is it reasonable to issue an LOR using verbiage such as “…long-standing pattern of behavior…” when an individual has only 3 written letters of counsel in their PIF spread out over a 6 year time span (none within 2 years of the other)? Or to write an LOR using language that is clearly erroneous as evidenced from the written statements obtained from all witnesses involved?

Is it not reasonable to assume that, if an issue is not addressed within a reasonable timeframe then, under our Model Workplace environment of collaborative problem solving it should be assumed to be a fault on our part as management and Supervisors to address the issue in an official disciplinary format?

By not assigning some responsibility to Supervisors and Management to address these issues as they arise, we take a confrontational, discipline oriented attitude toward performance and conduct issues by saying, in essence, that we don’t really care whether the actual issue is resolved, but rather whether we are able to administer official discipline, rather than a collaborative approach to resolving conflict and working with people (which would presume that they are, in fact, a valuable resource).

What, exactly, is TSA’s policy on how to effectively and timely address performance and conduct issues in the workplace? Is it a Model Workplace using collaborative problem solving to find the root cause of conflict, or is it a confrontational environment in which “he who accuses first wins” that has been encouraged and supported over 7 years of outdated, discipline oriented management philosophy?

Note the very verbiage we use as an organization to respond to these issues in the first place; “defense”, “allegations”, “evidence”, “fundamental fairness”, “due process”. Is it a wonder that Officers are often in a bad mood and temperamental with passengers?