“We have a dysfunctional organization, whose value for our member states is limited, which has little credibility with our international partners, and in which our citizens do not trust” Paul Kagame (http://lemde.fr/2oGV5nP). This observation by the Rwandan president is a severe diagnosis of the functioning of the African Union (AU). WATHI chose this report because it clearly outlines the main weaknesses of the continental organization and presents deep reform proposals. For years, the AU has been criticizing its modus operandi, in particular its bureaucratic burdens, and its heavy financial dependence on international donors such as the European Union, the United States, China and the World Bank. The problem of implementing the decisions of the continental organization remains a major challenge. It is imperative to overcome these obstacles to enhance the effectiveness and role of the African Union.

WATHI chose this document because it reveals the institutional flaws of the AU characterized by chronic failure in the implementation of decisions, excessive reliance on partner funding, limited management capacity, inefficient Organizations and institutions due to poorly defined mandates or chronic under-funding, an unclear division of labor between the African Union Commission, RECs, other regional mechanisms (RMs) and Ineffective working methods in the Commission and the Assembly.

What lessons for the countries of the WATHI zone?

The recommendations of this report concern all citizens of the AU member countries and all regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS. The need for restructuring of African organizations is clear in the sense of rationalization in the definition of missions and in the use of limited human and financial resources. Among the recommendations of the Kagame report, three (3) lines of action should be given special attention for regional organizations in West Africa.

Foreign funding should not exceed the level established by the Assembly of the African Union in 2015. Member States committed themselves to 100% funding for the operational budget, 75% for budget implementation and 25% for the budget for peacekeeping operations.

Penalties for non-payment of contributions should be assessed and strengthened in accordance with the new sanctions regime. In particular, Member States could be temporarily removed from the institutions of the institution for non-payment of their contributions after 18 months. The reinstatement of members will require the payment of additional arrears and charges.

Implementation of the reforms and the Change Management Group should be carried out at the level of the office of the President of the Commission, in order to implement the reforms on a daily basis in accordance with the agreed timetables.

The recommendations made in President Kagame’s report can be extended to regional organizations in West Africa. Funding for organizations remains a strategic issue. In 2015, Nigeria drew attention to the institution’s cash-flow problems and the irregularity of state contributions (http://bit.ly/2qmvGSU). The deferred contributions of the member countries constitute a check on the functioning of the regional institutions.

The community intended to generate resources to finance the activities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) must be incentivized so that Member States can meet their financial obligations.

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As unprecedented challenges multiply and spread across the globe at a dizzying pace, new vulnerabilities are increasingly laid bare, in rich and poor nations alike.

Every country must adapt, but the distinctive feature of recent developments is that even the wealthiest and most technologically advanced nations cannot hope to deal with the changes alone.

The cost of inaction will be borne by our citizens, and measured in shortened lives and frustrated ambitions.

Without an African Union that delivers, the continent cannot progress, and we face the likelihood of yet another decade of lost opportunity.

But proof that we can do it is right in front of us. For example, ECOWAS and the East African Community have already made freedom of movement a reality within their regions. Therefore, there is no technical obstacle to extending this principle more widely, as we have agreed to do.

Honesty requires us to acknowledge that the root problem is not primarily technical, but rather the result of a deeper deficiency.

In this context, in July 2016, as an outcome of the successful adoption of the Kigali Decision on Financing the African Union, the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State determined that there was an urgent need to accelerate the ongoing reform of the African Union, and decided to entrust the task of preparing a report on the proposed way forward to President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

Out of this review emerged a number of key findings, which shaped the proposed recommendations.

The chronic failure to see through African Union decisions has resulted in a crisis of implementation

A perception of limited relevance to African citizens

A fragmented organisation with a multitude of focus areas

Overdependence on partner funding

Underperformance of some organs and institutions due to unclear mandates or chronic underfunding

Limited managerial capacity

Lack of accountability for performance, at all levels

Unclear division of labour between the African Union Commission, the regional economic communities (RECs), other regional mechanisms (RMs), and member states

Inefficient working methods in both the Commission and the Assembly

Honesty requires us to acknowledge that the root problem is not primarily technical, but rather the result of a deeper deficiency.

Reform does not start with the Commission. It starts and ends with the leaders, who must set the right expectations and tempo. The effectiveness of the African Union, after all, is our business and responsibility.

As a result, we have a dysfunctional organisation in which member states see limited value, global partners find little credibility, and our citizens have no trust.

As a result, we have a dysfunctional organisation in which member states see limited value, global partners find little credibility, and our citizens have no trust.

Strengthening the African Union will require us to do the following four things:

Focus on key priorities with continental scope

Realign African Union institutions to deliver against those priorities

Managethe African Union efficiently at both political and operational levels

Finance the African Union ourselves and sustainably

Reform rationale and Recommendations

FOCUS the African Union on key priorities with continental scope

The African Union should focus on a fewer number of priority areas, which are by nature continental in scope, such as political affairs, peace and security, economic integration, and Africa’s global representation and voice.

Accordingly, there should be a clear division of labour between the African Union, regional economic communities (RECs), regional mechanisms (RMs), member states, and other continental institutions, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

REALIGN the structure of African Union institutions to deliver on key priorities

The Commission’s structures should be re-evaluated to ensure they have the right size and capabilities to deliver on the agreed priority areas

An audit of bureaucratic bottlenecks and inefficiencies that impede service delivery should be conducted, and acted upon, without delay

In alignment with the agreed priority areas, other African Union organs and institutions, such as the following, should also be reviewed and updated:

NEPAD should be fully integrated into the Commission, possibly as African Union’s development agency, aligned with the agreed priority areas and underpinned by an enhanced results-monitoring framework.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) could be strengthened to track implementation and oversee monitoring and evaluation in key governance areas of the continent.

The roles of the African Union’s judicial organs – the Court of Justice of the African Union, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Pan-African Parliament should be reviewed and clarified, while assessing progress to date.

Peace and Security

A thorough reform of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) should be initiated. This reform could include (a) reviewing the PSC’s membership, in line with Article 5(4) of the PSC Protocol, (b) strengthening the PSC’s working methods, and (c) strengthening the PSC’s role in prevention and crisis management.

Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)

The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) rules and procedures should be in line with the mandate provided in the Constitutive Act. The PRC should facilitate communication between the African Union and national capitals, and act as an advisory body to the Executive Council, rather than a supervisory body of the Commission.

Specialised Technical Agencies (STAs)

The specialised technical agencies (STAs) should be reviewed and streamlined. Only those that fall within the recommended priority areas should be maintained.

Increase the Africa Union’s relevance to citizens

Establish women and youth quotas across African Union institutions, as well as for private sector representatives, where appropriate

Making the African passport available to all eligible citizens as quickly as possible, in line with the Assembly decision

MANAGE the African Union efficiently at both the political and operational levels

Political

Reform the working methods of the Summit

Partnership Summits convened by external parties should be reviewed with a view to providing an effective framework for African Union partnerships. Rather than all countries, Africa could be represented by:

Chairperson of the African Union

Previous Chairperson of the Union

Incoming Chairperson of the Union

Chairperson of the African Union Commission

Chairperson of The Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

Operational

In fulfilling its mandate, the AUC is faced with a number of management challenges, many of which have been identified in previous assessments but remain unaddressed. These include poor leadership accountability, inadequate supervision and coordination, weak staff recruitment and performance management systems, and an inadequate selection process for top Commission leadership.

FINANCE the African Union ourselves and sustainably

The African Union’s programmes are 97 per cent funded by donors. By December 2016, only 25 out of 54 member states had paid their assessment for the financial year 2016 in full. Fourteen member states paid more than half their contribution and 15 have not made any payment.

The African Union’s programmes are 97 per cent funded by donors. By December 2016, only 25 out of 54 member states had paid their assessment for the financial year 2016 in full.

This level of dependence on external partner funds raises a fundamental question: How can member states own the African Union if they do not set its agenda?

The Committee of Finance Ministers should develop a set of ‘golden rules’ setting out clear financial management and accountability principles and these written into the African Union Commission Statutes and Financial Rules and Regulations. These could include, but should not be limited to, the following:

External financing should not exceed levels established by the 2015 African Union Assembly decision. This calls for African Union member states to finance 100 per cent of the operating budget, 75 per cent of the programme budget and 25 per cent of the peace support operations budget.

Penalties for failure to honour assessed contributions should be reviewed and tightened, in line with the new enforceable sanctions regime. In particular, membership could temporarily lapse after failure to meet full obligations within 18 months, and resuming members required to pay outstanding arrears plus additional charges.

IMPLEMENT for results and Impact

A Reform Implementation and Change Management Unit should be established in the office of the Chairperson of the Commission to drive the day-to-day implementation of the reforms in line with agreed timelines