Carbon monoxide poisoning victims should be treated on the
basis of the following ten principles.

1. Physical examinations should be provided for all
workers immediately after they have come out of the mine.

2. Correct information on each of the workers should be
gathered so that there are data on location during the
accident, the degree of consciousness, the condition of the
location where the worker was, and the manner in which the
worker escaped.

3. Workers should be reassured and kept quiet.

4. Good ventilation and warmth should be provided.

5. Emergency treatment should be provided for the
seriously injured.

6. Immediate action should be taken to give blood
transfusions, etc.

7. Individual examinations and treatment should be
provided relative to the condition of each patient.

8. Regular observations should be provided for a certain
length of time.

9. Appropriate treatment should be provided for mental
conditions, especially in the early stages.

10. Families should be given guidance in the care of
patients.

Even though the situation after the explosion was confused,
the response of the Mitsui Mining Company was far from
appropriate as far as these ten principles are concerned. It is
not a question as to whether the victims came out of the mine on
the same day or were rescued the next day. The point is that 939
people reached the entrance to the mine and, even with
differences in the concentration of the carbon monoxide gas, all
were carbon monoxide poisoning victims; however, they were not
treated as such. The company ordered the hospitalization of only
412 workers and 572 were made to walk home.

The company management made judgements as to who should be
hospitalized and who should not on the basis of whether workers
could walk or not. They did not ask questions as to the condition
of the location from which a worker had come, whether the worker
had felt the explosion or not, or how the worker got out of the
mine. They paid no attention to workers who were conscious but
complained about headaches and nausea, hospitalizing only those
who were unconscious or who seemed in a serious condition.

Figure 5.2 shows the conditions of the workers coming out of
the mine as criteria for hospitalization. Among the workers who
were directed to go home on foot, over 20 per cent were suffering
from dizziness or faintness. For those who have any knowledge of
carbon monoxide poisoning, it is easily understood that allowing
victims to walk home is a very dangerous policy.

Management gave only a shot of vitamins to workers who had
lost consciousness and mandarin oranges to those who appeared to
be well. Absolutely none of the essential principles for treating
carbon monoxide poisoning were maintained. Instead of allowing
530 of the workers to go home immediately, these workers should
have been kept still and given appropriate medical treatment, and
then the families should have been given guidance on how to
handle the effects of monoxide poisoning. If this action had been
taken, there would have been fewer cases of worsening health.

After the victims had gone home, they were kept busy meeting
family and friends who were overjoyed to discover that they were
alive. Furthermore, they also had to attend the funerals of those
who had died in the disaster and visit their sick friends in
hospital. In the meantime, they drank alcoholic beverages freely,
which is the worst possible thing for a monoxide poisoning victim
to do. Therefore, the basic rule of keeping quiet was very
difficult to maintain. Most of those who went home were at a
stage in the poisoning that needs very careful handling.

The monoxide poisoning victims who were hospitalized were also
not treated according to the rules pertaining to this type of
poisoning. They were not allowed to remain quiet because of the
noise and confusion in the hospitals, and thus were subject to
constant agitation. The company's hospital had 384 beds, but on
the day of the mine explosion there were only 83 available.
Against this backdrop, a very large number of unconscious
patients were carried in and placed in operating rooms,
preparation rooms, doctors' examination rooms, and waiting rooms.
All of the floor space available was used to house victims, but
no more than 361 additional patients could be taken in. The rest
of the victims were divided among the other hospitals in the
city.

Fig. 5.2. Conditions
of Surviving Victims at and following the Time of Rescue (after
Kyoto Kenkyuukai Hen, Kyuuen dankai ni okeru
mitsui kozan no fuho sekinin no tsuikyuu,
p. 76).

After coming out of their comas, many of the patients would go
into wild shouting spasms, start crying, or become violent.
Patients would look around the hospital in search of their
relatives, and this would cause agitation that resulted in
inter-family feuding. The rooms were filled with tobacco smoke.
The conditions in the hospitals were of the worst possible kind.

There was no treatment available, no medical examinations, and
no medicine. Most of the victims were left to fend for
themselves, as the doctors were too busy taking care of the
seriously ill patients and disposing of the corpses.

Carbon monoxide poisoning is a condition in which there is an
extreme lack of oxygen in the bloodstream and the body owing to
the fact that carbon monoxide (CO) combines with blood
haemoglobin (Hb) more readily than oxygen; with the oxygen
replaced by monoxide in the body, the nerve cells of the brain,
which need oxygen more than any other cells, begin to degenerate
rapidly and within a short time are destroyed. Once the brain
cells are dead, even if bodily health returns there are certain
functions associated with the brain which never return. This is
fully understood in medical circles. In serious cases, the brain
is destroyed to the extent that the personality is lost and the
patient becomes a living vegetable. In lighter poisoning cases,
such as those seen in the Miike mine disaster, patients would
regain their health but the poisoning problem would remain
dormant until triggered by some change in the balance of forces
in the body; they would then suffer convulsions' vomiting,
headaches, dizziness, loss of the sense of balance, loss of
concentration, loss of memory, and other personality changes.
These facts are well known to the medical profession.

From table 5.5 it can be seen that the mine workers had been
exposed to the extent that they had a 30 to 40 per cent
concentration of CO-Mb in their blood. However, if oxygen levels
in the blood are reduced because of carbon monoxide, and patients
are then taken from the gas-polluted area and given oxygen,
gradually the carbon monoxide in the blood will be replaced by
oxygen so long as this oxygen is not being consumed by other
forms of bodily activity. This is the most effective way of
dealing with monoxide poisoning in its early stages.

Therefore, the most basic rule in mine rescue work is to
prohibit walking and other bodily exercise, and this means that
very careful attention must be given to people who look as if
they are perfectly healthy. A good supply of fresh air is another
basic form of treatment in the early stages of poisoning. In
reality, however, no suitable treatment was provided for several
hundred workers and these workers suffered various degrees of
brain damage because of the misjudgements of mine management.

Table 5.5 Symptoms Resulting from Various Levels of CO-Mb
in the Blood

CO-Mb %

Symptoms

0-10

No symptoms except shortness
of breath after physical labour

10-20

Slight headache with
feelings of pressure toward the front of the head.
Shortness of breath with medium exertion

20-30

Bad headaches, feelings of
emotional excitement, insecurity, increase in the number
of mistakes made, loss of memory, and rapid tiring

The loss of life and health cannot be compensated with money
or other material goods. But for those who are victimized by the
system, it is necessary to provide living expenses and to
guarantee medical treatment. In the case of the Mitsui Miike
coal-mine explosion the victims received very poor compensation.

For the 458 deaths, compensation was set at 500,000 yen
($1,400 at an exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar) or 400,000
yen ($1,120) for condolence money and 100,000 yen ($480) for the
funeral costs. The initial proposal by the company was 100,000
yen ($480) per death, but the Miike mine labour union demanded
one million yen ($2,800), and the negotiations concluded at the
400,000 yen ($1,120) level.

Up to that time the mining companies had not paid any money to
victims' families when a death occurred. This common
understanding among mine-owners was brought into question when
the Miike mine union demanded compensation. The executives of the
union thought that the one million yen ($2,800) demand was rather
high, as did the Sohyo (National Organization of Labour Unions),
and in this regard the Miike mine workers were heavily criticized
even by their own union organizations. This is a reflection of
just how cheap life is when it comes to the profit-oriented use
of working people.

On the same day as the Miike coal-mine explosion, there was a
double train crash that took place at Tsurimi on the Tokaido Line
in the Yokohama area. The families of the 161 people who lost
their lives in this accident received 5 million yen ($14,000) per
person, with a baby being compensated to the tune of 2 million
yen ($5,600). Against this background the labourers at the mine
would say that if one is to die it is better to die in a plane or
train accident than in a coal-mine explosion, simply because the
level of compensation is higher. The women who lost their
husbands realized that the lives of their men were valued at much
less than the baby who died in the double train accident.

Of those killed in the mine accident, 163 were members of the
Miike mine labour union, 242 belonged to a second union called
Shinro, 25 were members of the Shokuin union and 28 were from a
supply of day-labourers. Only the Miike mine union demanded
compensation for the families who lost their menfolk. However,
even this union was unable to get the company to cover medical
expenses for those suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning, as
opposed to simple compensation for the family.

Not only those who lost sons and husbands. but also many of
the families of the 839 living victims, had to endure great
suffering. Of the latter, 744 victims received notices that they
were considered recovered and that their medical payments would
end on 26 October 1966, just three years after the incident. Only
26 people were entitled to long-term medical cover, and 59
depended on company decisions as to whether their medical
payments would continue or not. Ten people were still missing.

Most of the 744 victims who had been declared
"recovered" by the Ministry of Labour were. in fact,
still suffering from the after-effects of carbon monoxide
poisoning, showing such symptoms as mental disorder or physical
weakness. However, the Mitsui Mining Company sent back-to-work
orders to these people after their medical treatment had been
terminated. Under these circumstances the 744 had to return to
work in the mine or be forced to quit their jobs.

Because of the untenability of the situation the Miike labour
union returned the back-to-work orders and the medical treatment
termination notices with a request that the patient victims be
re-examined. Twenty per cent of the Shinro union members and 1
per cent of the office workers' union took the same action. Those
who did not return the back-to-work orders were to receive
training so that they could begin work again. In this situation
there were two possibilities to choose from: to go back to doing
the same mining work as before, or to work outside the mine. Work
in the mine was very dangerous for the victims of the previous
accident; however, work outside the mine, while being less
dangerous, only paid half the income of work inside.

Table 5.6 provides some indication of the status of the
victims as of 1978. A very small number of the total went back to
mining operations, but the number of day-labourers who went back
was greater. The Miike mine union was at loggerheads with the
company over the question of preventing a recurrence of the same
kind of accident in the mine, insisting that people made sick by
the explosion should not have to return to the work they did
before. They insisted that their work should be safe, even if
they had to accept lowered payments, and on this basis the union
was determined to find other avenues for compensation.

Most of the day-labourers who had been accident victims went
back to the mine. In this situation they were placed in the most
difficult and dangerous circumstances. Those who had carbon
monoxide poisoning symptoms walked unsteadily, and had great
difficulty keeping their balance. As a result, more people were
injured. These victims did not have the power of concentration
needed to operate the machines, and some of them were killed or
badly injured in accidents with machines.

The Miike mine labour union demanded a re-examination of the
level of compensation provided by the company, but this demand
was rejected by management. Finally medical expenses were
provided for 737 victims of the disaster, as the company came to
recognize the needs of these people. The Miike mine labour union
continued their efforts to get the company to provide safe
working conditions outside the mine for the victims, with the
idea of rehabilitating them. In 1971, such working places were
provided, and these were called the Manza and Shinko shops. At
the Manza shop there was mainly flower-growing, tree nurseries,
farming, and bamboo work; this was designed to employ the badly
affected victims of the mine explosion. The Shinko shop was for
those less affected and offered work repairing mine equipment.
These programmes were established in order to protect the human
rights of these workers as well as to provide meaningful
employment so as to maintain pride and emotional stability.

Compensation annuity payments were made to victims who had
been so severely mentally damaged by the carbon monoxide as to be
unable to recognize their own wives. In many cases the victims
would offer violence to their family after they had returned home
from the hospital, and it became increasingly clear that they
were often unable to control their own emotions. In these
situations, wives were required to earn the income to support the
family.

These personality changes were seen among the less obviously
affected victims, and for family members this radical alteration
in the sum and substance of personality was difficult to deal
with in the extreme. On 6 November 1972, two families who
included four monoxide poisoning victims took their cases to
court and demanded compensation from the Mitsui Coal Mining
Company. The demand was for 20 million yen ($84,000) per family
and 30 million yen ($126,000) per victim. By April 1973, a total
of four families and eight victims had taken their cases to
court.

On 11 May 1973, 161 families who had lost sons and husbands in
the explosion, along with another 259 victims of the accident,
had also entered the court struggle to seek damage compensation.
The court struggle of the 259 victims is supported by the Miike
coal-mine labour union, while the family cases are being fought
by the particular families involved. The demands made by the 259
victims are 34,500,000 yen ($151,800) per death, 23,000,000 yen
($101,000) for patients requiring long-term hospitalization, and
11,500,000 yen ($50,600) for each of the other victims.

Ten years before, the demands were at the one million yen
($2,800) level for each death, and even this small amount was
criticized by the labour unions as being too much. But with the
changes in the social climate. these demands were more in line
with damage claims made in relation to other forms of death and
destruction emanating from technological civilization.

The court battles being waged in the civil courts are oriented
toward the extraction of compensation funds from the company, but
the real goal of the struggle is to get the company to change the
conditions in the mine that lead to coal-dust explosions. The
court proceedings provide a forum through which it has been
demonstrated that the mine management completely ignored the
safety of the workers, to the extent that conditions in the mine
were dangerous in the extreme. A coal-dust explosion was the
inevitable result of this neglect and irresponsibility.

Another purpose of the court struggle is to clarify the rights
of mine workers in general. Their lives were treated as being of
less value than that of a baby lost in a train accident. The
families of the Miike mine workers, after their long struggle,
have come to realize that the labour union movement should have
as a priority the protection of the lives and health of labouring
people.