NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This study was supported by Contract No. W911-NF-11-C-0099 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.

Front cover photograph courtesy of U.S. Army

International Standard Book Number -13: 978-0-309-28453-0
International Standard Book Number -10: 0-309-28453-8

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.

This study resulted from recognition by the U.S. Army that a great disparity exists between the decisive overmatch capability, relative to prospective adversaries, of major U.S. weapon systems (such as tanks, fighter aircraft, or nuclear submarines) and the relative vulnerability of dismounted soldiers when they are operating in small, detached units (squads). The increased reliance in recent Army deployments on soldiers operating in these tactical small units (TSUs), as well as the expanding responsibilities of ground forces in the future for missions that go beyond traditional combat, provided the incentive to ask what could be done to give dismounted soldiers and TSUs a credible degree of decisive overmatch in any of the anticipated future operational environments.

I would like to thank the Committee on Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields for its tenacity and dedication in interviewing numerous experts (including recently deployed Army enlisted soldiers and officers), assessing the pertinent issues, and developing recommendations to address the many demands of its statement of task from the Army sponsor (see Summary of this report). The committee in turn is grateful to the many Army and Department of Defense personnel, both civilian and military, who provided much of the information on which this report is based. We particularly thank the veterans of recent combat deployments who shared with us their hopes for those who will follow them, as well as their insights, frustrations, and triumphs in the trying circumstances of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The committee and I also greatly appreciate the support and assistance of the National Research Council (NRC) staff, which ably assisted the committee in its fact-finding activities and in production of the report. In particular, I thank the staff of the NRC’s Board on Army Science and Technology (BAST), who successfully organized the attendance of committee members and guests at major meetings in multiple locations and maintained a secure Internet forum for the members to accumulate study information, collaborate on report inputs, share expertise, and develop the consensus for the report we present here.

The study was conducted under the auspices of the BAST, a unit of the NRC’s Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, established in 1982 at the request of the United States Army. The BAST brings broad military, industrial, and academic scientific, engineering, and management expertise to bear on technical challenges of importance to senior Army leaders. The BAST is not a study committee; rather, it deliberates on study concepts and statements of task for the expert committees that are formed under rigorous NRC procedures to conduct a particular study. The BAST discusses potential study topics and tasks, ensures study project planning and execution in conformance with NRC

procedures, and suggests candidate experts to serve as committee members or report reviewers.

Although the Board members are listed in the front pages of the report, with the exception of any members who were nominated and appointed to the study committee, they were not asked to endorse the committee’s findings or recommendations or to review final drafts of the report before its release. The findings and recommendations are those reached by unanimous consensus of the Committee on Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields. The NRC’s approval of this report likewise does not indicate a position on the substance of the findings and recommendations but rather certifies that the study was conducted in accordance with its procedures.

Hank Hatch, Chair
Committee on Making the Soldier Decisive
on Future Battlefields

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:

Ruzena K. Bajcsy (NAE/IOM), University of California, Berkeley

Nancy J. Cooke, Arizona State University

Gilbert F. Decker, Consultant

William P. Delaney (NAE), MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Richard Dempsey, U.S. Army

Charles B. Duke (NAE/NAS), Xerox Corporation (retired)

Harry W. Jenkins, U.S. Marine Corps (retired)

Roger L. McCarthy (NAE), McCarthy Engineering

Stewart D. Personick (NAE), New Jersey Institute of Technology

Dennis J. Reimer, U.S. Army (retired)

Robert H. Scales, Colgen, Inc.

Daniel P. Siewiorek (NAE), Carnegie Mellon University

Judith L. Swain (IOM), National University of Singapore

Michael R. Thompson, Scitor Corporation

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Robert A. Frosch, NAE, Harvard University. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

The U.S. military does not believe its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines should be engaged in combat with adversaries on a "level playing field." Our combat individuals enter engagements to win. To that end, the United States has used its technical prowess and industrial capability to develop decisive weapons that overmatch those of potential enemies. In its current engagement—what has been identified as an "era of persistent conflict"— the nation's most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating in small units. Today's soldier must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in Iraq and Afghanistan show that, while the U.S. soldier is a formidable fighter, the contemporary suite of equipment and support does not afford the same high degree of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms—yet it is the soldier who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability.

Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields establishes the technical requirements for overmatch capability for dismounted soldiers operating individually or in small units. It prescribes technological and organizational capabilities needed to make the dismounted soldier a decisive weapon in a changing, uncertain, and complex future environment and provides the Army with 15 recommendations on how to focus its efforts to enable the soldier and tactical small unit (TSU) to achieve overmatch.

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