Judiciary

The government operates courts in the regions, districts, and
subdistricts that make up the local administrative system. The judges in these courts are appointed
by the president through the Ministry of Law and Justice or the Ministry
of Home Affairs. Most cases heard by the court system originate at the
district level, although the newer subdistrict courts experienced an
increased caseload in the late 1980s. Upon appeal, cases may go up to
the Supreme Court, but litigation may be very slow; in 1987 there were
29 Supreme Court judges dealing with 21,600 pending cases. The Supreme
Court, as of June 1988, had permanent benches--called the High Court
Division-- in Dhaka, Comilla, Rangpur, Barisal, Sylhet, Chittagong, and
Jessore. It hears appeals from district courts and may also judge
original cases. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Dhaka
reviews appeals of judgment by the High Court Division. The judges of
both divisions are appointed by the president.

At the grass-roots level, the judicial system begins with village
courts. An aggreived party may make an official petition, which requires
a fee, to the chairman of the union council (the administrative division
above the village), who may call a session of the village court with
himself as chairman and two other judges nominated by each of the
parties to the dispute. The parties may question the impartiality of the
chairman and have him replaced. The majority of cases end at the village
court level, which is inexpensive and which hands down judgments that
reflect local opinion and power alignments. There are occasions,
however, when the union council chairman may reject an official petition
to constitute a village court or when one party desires a higher
opinion. In these cases, the dispute goes to a government court at the
subdistrict level. Cases may wind their way up from district courts to
permanent benches of the High Court Division. Once cases leave the
village courts, they become expensive affairs that may last for years,
and few citizens have the financial resources to fund a lengthy court
battle.

Rapid political changes in independent Bangladesh have compromised
the court system. The Constitution originally stated that the president
could remove members of the Supreme Court only if two-thirds of
Parliament approved, but the Proclamation (Amendment) Order of 1977
included a clause that eliminated the need for parliamentary
involvement. The clause set up the Supreme Judicial Council, consisting
of the chief justice and the next two senior judges. The council may
determine that a judge is not "capable of properly performing the
functions of his office" or is "guilty of gross
misconduct." On their advice, the president may remove any judge.
In addition, executive action has completely eliminated judicial
authority for long periods. For example, under martial law regulations
enacted in 1982, the Supreme Court lost jurisdiction over the protection
of fundamental rights, and all courts operated under provisions of law
promulgated by the chief martial law administrator; special and summary
martial law courts handed down judgments that were not subject to review
by the Supreme Court or any other court. Furthermore, the Fifth
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment placed martial law proclamations and
judgments outside the review of the court system. In these ways, the
courts have been forced to serve the interests of the ruling regime,
rather than standing as an independent branch of government.