Friday, September 5, 2008

Some folks are getting the wrong idea that the SPO-7 passive millimeter wave technology used at Denver and Minneapolis-St. Paul airports during the recent conventions is a mobile Millimeter Wave portal and can see through clothing. That’s not the case. These are two separate technologies that look for threats in different ways.

The Millimeter Wave portal - the booth you walk into at checkpoints in certain airports - penetrates garments and provides an image. The SPO-7, which uses passive millimeter wave technology to detect threats from a distance, produces an image, but it’s simply the type of image you would see on a video camera. Images are not stored.

The SPO-7 unit consists of two separate sensors and a monitoring location. By simultaneously comparing the illumination levels from two locations on an individual’s body, the SPO-7 detects potential threats such as suicide vests and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are hidden under individuals’ clothing. On the screen, it produces a light, using a red-to-green scale, that suggests anomalies such as the presence of explosives. That's why the screen and the officer viewing the screen doesn't need to be in a remote location.

Security officers operating the SPO-7 will work closely with Behavior Detection Officers. The teams will be equipped with wireless headsets to communicate with each other about possible concerns. TSA also partners closely with local law enforcement who will respond if called.

Unlike the stationary (and large) millimeter wave portal, the SPO-7 is mobile and only requires a few hours of training for use. This comes in handy to provide an additional layer of security in specific areas, in both the aviation, mass transit and maritime environments.

In crowded public areas such as ferry terminals, mass transit stations and most recently, airports, the SPO-7 works without breaking passengers’ stride.

And lastly, to address safety and privacy concerns, the SPO-7 does not shoot X-rays or any other type of radiation at people. It merely measures energy that emanates from the human body. Signage is prominently displayed where the SPO-7 is used to notify the public. SPO-7 enables TSA to add an unpredictable security measure without adding inconvenience to passengers.

The SPO-7 pilots will continue at the Denver and Minneapolis-St. Paul airports for 60-90 days.

"Since January, more than 2,300 TSA officers have supported Secret Service activities at more than 180 campaign events from coast to coast. In Denver, TSA is providing approximately 100 Transportation Security Officers to assist the Secret Service with screening at convention venues. In Saint Paul, TSA will provide approximately 50 officers to fill the same need."

So are you using your machines to remotely search people at the airport, like this post suggests, at the venue, like the DHS fat sheet states, or both?

If you're doing it at the venue as the DHS fact sheet states, can you tell us all how that fits with TSA's mission of protecting the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce?

Boy we sure do give you TSAs a lot of grief. I want you to know that though I find it my civic duty to give you a hard time (freedom at what cost, and all of that), I do appreciate the effort you folks put into making us feel (and be) safe. I certainly don't think that any of YOU personally have ulterior motives- I just feel we must be cautious about what we allow to become the 'norm' for safety's sake. Don't take it personally. I also appreciate you giving us the opportunity to vent our feelings and frustrations. Your latest blog seems to imply that you even read the comments :)

In October 2007, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced that it would award $52.3 million in contracts to deploy security technology piloted at airports and mass transit facilities. One of these technologies, passive millimeter wave from QinetiQ North America, McLean, Va., brings enhanced screening equipment to the nation's travelers.

For $3 million, TSA purchased 12 SPO-7R Standoff Suicide Bomb Detector threat detection units from the international defense and security company. The technology started as a solution in the United Kingdom, and according to Wally Miller, managing director of transport security for QinetiQ, this product is an offshoot of that development. The passive technology measures the natural waves emitted by the human body from up to 22 feet away and determines any anomalies detected on an individual. “It can be described as a differential radiometer,” Miller says. “It does not transmit anything at you — it just looks at you.”

The tripod-mounted detector is integrated with visible pan/tilt cameras, but does not create an image. The operator looks at the subject of interrogation and is notified if something is detected as “cold” on the body. This “cold”-like perception is given when metal objects reflect the source. Objects such as plastics and ceramics also have reflective properties and can also be distinguished. Clothing is made largely transparent by the system, allowing for detection of highly concealed items.

Once an anomaly is detected, a threat bar indicator will turn red, giving a degree of strength it found on the individual, thus prompting the operator to search the individual.

“It does not determine what is on him, but it says that something is on him that allows for that individual to deserve more attention,” Miller says.

Because of the pass/fail system on the SPO-7R, Miller says training only takes a couple of hours. And since the passive system is combined with software algorithms to screen one person at a time, passengers are not asked to slow their pace, thus allowing for a smooth-moving transportation environment.

TSA has recently deployed test trials of QinetiQ's SPO-20 at the Staten Island ferry terminal and Pier 90 in New York City. The SPO-20, which has a detection range of about 65 ft., was originally part of a development in the U.K. and was further developed under contract to the U.S. Navy's explosive ordnance detection effort.

Though both the SPO-20 and SPO-7R are robust and have all-weather functionality, TSA is acquiring the SPO-7R. Because the SPO-7R is a great deal smaller, weighing in at 279 lbs. less than the SPO-20, the portability of the product provides a more rapid deployment capability for transportation facilities. These facilities will use the SPO-7Rs in a wide range of both permanent and semi-permanent installations, including mobile checkpoints and building entrances.

Miller believes that the threat detection system will offer a great deal in providing security into the nation's transportation infrastructure. “This is the first deployment, that I am aware of, that provides standoff detection. It trades distance for time,” Miller says. “And importantly, it offers significant advantages in a layered security environment.”

TSA Administrator and Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley says the purchase of this system and others will enhance the suite of technologies while improving security. “Better technology leverages the skills of our officers more efficiently and improves our ability to adapt in real-time to changes in the threat environment.”

I still do not understand the hidden screeners for the portals. If the images they see are pre-school friendly, as you say they are, there is no reason for them to be hidden away. If the images are not that friendly, we definitely need to see the person doing the screening, or I, for one, won't feel comfortable going through it. The British have it right: they screen the person in private, in front of the same sex officer viewing the image. No other form of full body scan is acceptable.

As for these new "protables", let us see the green and red image they show, and let us know who is being screened, and please tell us you are warning people they are being screened, and not scanning persons who are not flying.

I can't find anything on the manufacturer's site about an SPO-7. They do have an SPO-7R. The brochure for that one says, "Clothing is largely transparent." Yet it also says, "Privacy protection - no image". The SPO-20, which is pictured above, has specs that include resolution and video format.

I'm curious as to what the operator actually sees, which model is actually in use, and what gives the TSA the right to conduct surveillance on people not attempting to access the secured portion of a transportation hub.

Your phrasing is a little off in the following sections, even though I think I understand what you were trying to say.

Quote:The SPO-7, which uses passive millimeter wave technology to detect threats from a distance, produces an image, but it’s simply the type of image you would see on a video camera.

So the SPO-7 is the image displaying version of the SPO-20? By simultaneously comparing the illumination levels from two locations on an individual’s body, the SPO-7 detects potential threats such as suicide vests and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are hidden under individuals’ clothing...

So the SPO-7 is able to electronically "see" under an individuals clothing, but not in such an intrusive way as the active MMW scanners. Anything that isn't MMW transparent will change the signal received.. - Corset 'boning' - MP3 players, cellphones, pdas - Insulin Pumps - Arm/Leg/Back/Neck braces - Are Cosmetic Implants MMW transparent?The SPO-7 cannot see through your clothing.

Actually, the SPO-7 can see through your clothing, it just can't do it in a 'entertaining' way that shows of the contours of your body. This is because the system is reading a 'passive' signal instead of an 'active' one.

These 12 (yes, 12 for $3M.. $250K each, from Planning Systems/QinetiQ) SPO-7 sensors are basically passive millimeter wave video camera systems. They don't transmit anything at all. Similar in structure/design to theQinetiQ SPO-20 (click on the 'Learn More' image) they most likely have a range of around 20 meters. According to a related website at maspro:Quote (emphasis/added mine): All natural materials including Human (bodies) always radiate thermal noise in Millimeter-Wave range. Especially, the thermal noise from the Human Body, which has the body temperature is stronger than the other object thermal noise. So this system is to do image-processing by forming images corresponding to power distribution of Millimeter-Wave.

Millimeter-Wave can propagate through clothes, paper, or even fire and smoke. This feature differentiate from Infrared camera, which detects only the surface temperature of Objects, and this system can identify concealed threat objects.

Great! If this technology can detect threats without "breaking a passenger's stride", then why don't you guys just operate in the background and dismantle the metal detectors so that I don't have to waste my time standing in line at your checkpoints.

Actually, the SPO-7 can see through your clothing, it just can't do it in a 'entertaining' way that shows of the contours of your body. This is because the system is reading a 'passive' signal instead of an 'active' one.

Wrong. The resolution is lower (grainier picture) and the screening distance is much reduced when using the passive system. The SPO-20 has a bit longer range due to it having a larger antenna (antenna gain = better range). TSA purchased both the SPO-7R and SPO-20R systems.

Found this in a web search for "passive milimeter wave"***********************************

Defense & Security

Passive millimeter wave imagers for safety and security

Neil Salmon

Flat panel lightweight sensors can detect hidden weapons and threats to aircraft.Passive millimeter wave (PMMW) imaging technology offers great potential for modern sensing, scanning, and security needs. In security screening equipment, PMMW can see through a variety of clothing and baggage materials and is effective in detecting both metallic and non-metallic threats, such as plastic and ceramic weapons. PMMW can also provide all-weather imaging capabilities for air vehicles because the problems associated with atmospheric obscurants are negated at millimeter wavelengths.

The millimeter wave band extends from approximately 30 to 300GHz, and a wide range of prototype imagers have emerged in this band over the past 10 years. However, none have dominated the market due to high technology costs, poor sensitivity and image resolution, and the large physical volume of the necessary lenses, mirrors, and mechanical scanners. Furthermore, the small number of users of this spectral band means that a decrease in the cost of this technology is unlikely in the near future.

Aperture synthesisThe implementation of novel aperture synthesis techniques1 and the falling cost and improving performance of high-speed digital signal processors and microwave communication receivers offer an opportunity to break the deadlock in the development of passive imaging technologies operating below 40GHz.

In aperture synthesis, electric fields are sampled over an aperture and then processed electronically into an image. Eliminating focusing lenses, mirrors, and scanners can reduce the imager volume by orders of magnitude, and the PMMW imager is essentially reduced to having only planar (two) dimensions (see Figure 1).

Interest in aperture synthesis began in the 1940s, when large collection apertures were used to create images for radio astronomy at tens of megahertz, which required many hours of signal integration.2 The technique has since dominated radio astronomy, and more powerful technology has enabled more channels, better image resolution, and higher frequencies to be used, as well as shorter operating times. Furthermore, digital technology can offer greater versatility to the technique, but until recently the technology to build a real-time PMMW imager using aperture synthesis was not available.

Figure 1. A mechanical scanning imager has a quasi-optical beam former before the receiver electronics (left), while the aperture synthesis imager has a digital beam former after the receiver electronics (right). As the antennas, receivers, and digital beam former can be packaged into a thin electronic substrate, the aperture synthesis imager offers a massive footprint reduction and can be integrated into walls for security screening and the skins of air vehicles for poor weather operations.PMMW imaging Aperture synthesis involves distributing an array of antennas and receivers over an aperture and correlating electric fields at each of these locations with the field at every other location. This is done at a rate of twice the radio frequency bandwidth (satisfying the Nyquist criterion) and the results are accumulated for an integration time. Therefore, for an array of n antennas distributed over an aperture, there are n(n-1)/2 correlations, forming a 2D spatial function.

In classical aperture synthesis, the far-field image is generated by taking the Fourier transform of the accumulated correlation function. In near-field PMMW imaging, the transform is more general and is described by a matrix multiplication, whereby a calibration matrix is evaluated by sweeping a noise source in front of the imager.

For security screening, the technique simultaneously creates a number of image planes, which means that all objects, regardless of their position in front of the imager, will be in focus. This is effectively voxel (analogous to pixel) imaging, which enables a 2D image of the subject to be created from any direction by collapsing one dimension of the voxel image. This approach offers a significant advantage over conventional quasi-optical imaging, where the depth of field (typically 5cm) requires subjects to remain motionless for several seconds during image acquisition. The closeness of the subjects to the imager also means they can be imaged with a spatial resolution sufficient for security screening, typically ∼1cm at low frequencies (<40GHz), significantly minimizing hardware costs. Furthermore, a moving subject can be imaged without blurring, as the electronic beam-forming process takes place on a time scale faster than that of physical movement, greatly improving the flow of people through the security screening portal.

Imager sensitivityThe radiometric sensitivity of passive millimeter-wave imagers needs to be in the region of 0.1–1K to enable the detection of non-metallic threats for security screening and a range of obstacles for all-weather flying aids. The sensitivity of an aperture synthesis system is given by equation 1, where TA is the scene radiation temperature (close to ambient at 300K), TN is the receiver noise temperature (typically ∼200K below 40 GHz), BRF is the radiation frequency bandwidth, tF is the integration time, and F is the fraction of the aperture which is filled with receiving antennas. The fraction F is given by equation 2, where n is the number of antennas, AANT is the effective collection area of a single antenna, and ASYN is the total aperture area over which the antennas are distributed.

(1)

(2)

For indoor use, the scene contrast is typically 15K, which is the approximate radiation temperature difference between the building interior (set by air conditioning, for example) and the human body. For outdoor use, contrast is typically 150K in the lower frequency part of the millimeter wave band, which is the difference between ambient temperature and the cold sky.

Outdoor contrast often falls with increasing frequency as the atmospheric absorption rises. Understanding these sensitivities and contrasts for particular scenarios enables effective systems to be designed for specific applications.

Number of image pixelsThe number of Nyquist-sampled pixels in an aperture synthesis image ranges from n2 for a zero redundant array of n antennas to 4n for a fully filled aperture (F=1). A zero redundant array is a highly sparse array that uses the smallest number of receiver channels possible to reproduce, alias-free spatial information in the scene up to the diffracted limit allowed by the aperture size. The fully filled array uses the highest number of receiver channels that can be fitted into the aperture and offers the highest radiometric sensitivity. In practice, the choice of array geometry and its filling fraction will depend on the radiometric sensitivity and spatial resolution required for the particular application.

Demonstrator system overviewWe developed a real-time aperture synthesis PMMW demonstrator to investigate the optimal calibration, operating trade-offs, and stability of this type of imager.3 Satisfying the Nyquist criterion on the temporal sampling in the receiver channels requires the rate of mathematical operations in the correlator to be 2n2BRF. However, as radiometric emission is essentially broadband noise, digitization and correlation can be completed in single bits, and so these tasks can be performed using commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).

A diagram of the complete demonstrator system is illustrated in Figure 2. The sparse antenna array, designed from 32 individual 2×2 patch antennas on a hexagonal grid to minimize aliasing associated with sampling across aperture, is illustrated in Figure 3.

We also developed waveguide horn antenna arrays so that comparisons could be made between the two antenna types. The receivers are sensitive at 22.5GHz with a 300MHz radiation bandwidth and are packaged in dual-channel slimline modules, as illustrated in Figure 4. An antenna array with a filling factor of 34% delivers a 20×20 pixel image and has a 0.5K sensitivity at video frame rates of 25 frames per second. In-phase and quadrature digitization at several hundred megahertz is achieved using two stages of heterodyne down-shifting. The system has flexibility to investigate different array geometries, ranging from those with a sparsity of less than zero redundant arrays in two dimensions to fully filled arrays in one dimension.

Figure 3. The sparse antenna array for the demonstrator made up of 32 individual 2×2 patch antennas. Each patch antenna is only 2mm thick.

Figure 4. Pairs of the 32-channel receivers are integrated into slim-line (5mm thick) dual receiver modules. A circuit board of one of these shown here is 1.5mm thick and 6cm long with two sockets for antennas as illustrated on the left.Exploiting new technologies for an old technique The opportunity now exists to develop a PMMW imager architecture that is based on the new aperture synthesis technology and occupies a fraction of the volume of conventional quasi-optical imagers. Our demonstrator project represents a test-bed for the optimization of receivers, antennas, and their array geometries. Prototype imagers based on this architecture are likely to follow, typically with 300 receiver channels, replacing the FPGAs with application-specific integrated circuits and using monolithic microwave integrated circuits in the receivers to minimize volume and power consumption.

Furthermore, the antenna array, receivers, and digital electronics can be integrated into a substrate, a centimeter or so thick, using production techniques to minimize costs borrowed from the mobile communications and computer industries. Imagers can then be integrated into confined spaces to form security screening portals, developed into hand-held wands for proximity screening of people and baggage, or, as depicted in Figure 5, integrated into the skins of air vehicles for all-weather flight.

Figure 5. Examples of PMMW imaging systems using digital aperture synthesis technology. The financial support for this work is gratefully received from the United Kingdom Technology Strategy Board.

Neil SalmonQinetiQ Ltd. Malvern, United Kingdom Neil Salmon, PhD, has developed the technology of passive millimeter wave imaging for a wide range of defense and security applications since 1994. He previously developed microwave and terahertz diagnostics for nuclear fusion plasma research for 10 years and is a fellow of the Institute of Physics.

And lastly, to address safety and privacy concerns, the SPO-7 does not shoot X-rays or any other type of radiation at people. It merely measures energy that emanates from the human body. Signage is prominently displayed where the SPO-7 is used to notify the public. SPO-7 enables TSA to add an unpredictable security measure without adding inconvenience to passengers.

This paragraph says zero about "privacy" concerns. Under what authority do you claim that you can search us -- yes, it's a "search" by anyone's definition -- without our consent in public areas of an airport?

Perhaps Francine can do some research and review the court case in California a few years ago involving use of a passive IR sensor. The cops used it to detect heat coming from a house. The conclusion was that the occupants were using heat lamps to grow pot inside the house. Using this evidence, obtained without a warrant, the cops conducted a raid and arrested the occupants. Guess what? The court ruled that this was an illegal search.

Tell me how this device is different and under what authority you can conduct the same type of warrantless and non-consensual search of citizens in public areas of an airport.

For those wondering under what law TSA can surveil people not gaining access to the secure or sterile areas of an airport, please refer to the ATSA and many local state and municipal ordinances. The warning that you or your property may be subject to search at any time while in or on any part of the airport predates the TSA by at least 10 years. This is nothing new.

As to the term "search"... PMMW technology could be seen as simply a different kind of video camera, albeit one operating in a not often used spectrum. As Google will happily tell you, there is no law that prevents someone from taking your picture or videotaping you in a public venue (IE, look at StreetView). Further, your image is not your property; a photographer taking your picture in a public place does not legally require your consent and owns all rights to any image he acquires in that way.

"Search" as a term does not normally apply to video/photography, no matter who is engaged in performing it. Audio... that's something else entirely, which is why nearly all surveillance cameras for public or law enforcement use do not include microphones or normally record audio.

Just walked past one of these yesterday at Denver. No signs that I could see, and I really had no idea what the three TSA folks were doing huddled behind the device. I figured it was a passive scanner of some sort, and with all of the security related to the recent Democratic National Convention, I figured it was a leftover.

From a security standpoint, however, it clearly wasn't an attempt to perform any kind of serious work. It was placed in a blind corner of one of the main exitways between security and baggage claim, having a lot more chance to look at the people heading to baggage claim than people going to a flight. Because people walk quickly there (especially with a machine and three attendants in a roped-off area in the middle of the choke point), a second or two is all it has to acquire and scan.

It's overwhelmed at rushes (like, most of the time). It mostly scans the wrong set of people. And, if they don't move it, it's going to be repeatedly run into by people who don't see it as they head around the blind corner.

And what happens if it detects a threat as someone walks past? There weren't any response people that I could see, and deploying teams of agents to run up behind you as you walk away and grab you for further screening seems like the sort of thing that could go really, really wrong.

I think it's a real step backwards for TSA. It gave the image of a bunch of kids huddled over their secret toy. Placed where it was (to scan people leaving the airport), it reinforced the "we can scan you anywhere we want, any time we want, and we don't have to have a reason" mentality that everyone else accuses TSA of having. Frankly, it's a PR own-goal.

I'm normally very supportive of TSA (see my previous posts). Not only do I understand the mission and the problems, but I've been continually impressed by the professionalism and decency of the individual TSOs I've encountered. Because of the way this was placed and the spectacularly poor communication around it, this wasn't up to standard.

Since the SPO-07R is used in conjunction with behaviour detection officers to find potential suicide bombers, could the use described at Denver airport be to scan persons going to a particularly congested area? Suicide bombers worldwide, every day, target confined, crowded places where they can achieve the most harm.

Could it also be that the system operators at Denver airport were in wireless or radio contact with behaviour detection officers, who might then observe any persons of interest for hostile intent behaviours?

And, finally, since any passive system, such as the SPO-07R which uses CCTV-like images, refreshes images in real time, wouldn't the operators also be able to scan in real time? This would allow the operators more time than was mentioned.

"Search" as a term does not normally apply to video/photography, no matter who is engaged in performing it. Audio... that's something else entirely, which is why nearly all surveillance cameras for public or law enforcement use do not include microphones or normally record audio..............................................A normal camera, still or video, cannot see under my clothing. Once the operators activate this machine and it takes any information from under my clothing a search has happened. It seems without warrant in the case of TSA.

I have not submitted to a search of any kind if I am just walking through the unsecure parts of the airport.

Now if they desire a nice8x10 of my smiling face then that is altogether a different matter. I'm sure TSA and its employees will not have a problem of me taking photos of them since as you say no laws have been broken.

Phil said...If you're doing it at the venue as the DHS fact sheet states, can you tell us all how that fits with TSA's mission of protecting the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce? September 5, 2008 5:26 PM

See my answer in the other post about how it ties in with our mission.

Anonymous said... Great! If this technology can detect threats without "breaking a passenger's stride", then why don't you guys just operate in the background and dismantle the metal detectors so that I don't have to waste my time standing in line at your checkpoints. September 5, 2008 8:30 PM

Keep on dreaming. :)

Anonymous said... Is it true that people with a prosthesis are being stopped and fined for setting off the system? I understand a TSA fine is up to $10,000 without any way to protest it. September 6, 2008 6:41 PM

I'm not sure where you heard this, but it's not true. It would be all over the news as well as this blog if it were true.

Bob Eucher said... Not so fast. The TSA does not allow YOU taking photographs. Although this is from their laptop bag manufacturers test days: All photography, video recording, tape recording, audio recording, digital recording, etc. is prohibited at the security checkpoint during appointments. September 6, 2008 8:52 PM

Unless there is a test going on as you mentioned, you can film and take photos at our checkpoints as long as you do not interfere with the screening process or film any of the monitors.

A normal camera, still or video, cannot see under my clothing. Once the operators activate this machine and it takes any information from under my clothing a search has happened. It seems without warrant in the case of TSA.

Looking at it another way then... The sensors are gathering radiation that is constantly coming from your body. The data gathered is then processed via (likely) patented algorithms and combined with a regular CCTV image to produce a combined image which is the result of software manipulation. This may legally be considered the end product of a software product, which may be covered by civil law, patent law, and criminal law. A mess. Depending on the license agreement, TSA may not even own the images (which are not kept). What this device is doing is almost identical to the "WarCart" developed by students at MIT to showcase the lack of security on many radio frequencies, albeit in a different portion of the spectrum.

I have not submitted to a search of any kind if I am just walking through the unsecure parts of the airport.Research the doctrine of implied consent, and observe that the doors to nearly EVERY airport in the United States include verbage which, essentially, says "If you enter this location, you are consenting to the security measures in place. You or your belongings may be subject to search at any time."

Under that legal theory, it is not up to the 4th Amendment because you can easily avoid such searches by choosing not to enter. Now, things like use at the DNC or RNC... that's something I don't quite follow.

You can be fined 'til the cows come home so you'd better smile and get along with the TSOs. 'Specially if you go through Manchester, NH. Those folks just just loves the fine. Puts you citizens in your place, y'know.

It's not my intent to continue flagellating a deceased ungulate, but can I request an outline of the steps planned, and progress made on implementing those steps, by which the TSA intends to attempt compliance with the 9/11 Commision Act of 2007 requiring the screening of cargo shipped on passenger aircraft?

For those of you unfamiliar with the 9/11CA2007, here is a quote from an article in a recent Aviation Week & Space Technology issue:The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires that half the freight in the bellies of U.S. passenger aircraft must be screened by technologies and procedures approved by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). By August 2010, all cargo on passenger aircraft must be screened. The level of security is required to be equal to that for passengers' checked baggage.

Quote from Cat: "Research the doctrine of implied consent, and observe that the doors to nearly EVERY airport in the United States include verbage which, essentially, says "If you enter this location, you are consenting to the security measures in place. You or your belongings may be subject to search at any time."

Under that legal theory, it is not up to the 4th Amendment because you can easily avoid such searches by choosing not to enter. Now, things like use at the DNC or RNC... that's something I don't quite follow."

Lot of problems here Cat.

First off, courts have only held that implied consent starts once the bags are placed on the conveyor for screening per US. v. Aukai.

Secondly, please list which airports have such things posted. I can tell you I haven't seen these at BWI, IAD, DCA and SLC.

Third, there's also the legal term unconscionable. I think "searches" in public area based on "consent" just by going into a building could be considered unconscionable that one even has to give up 4th amendment rights to enter a building and use a service. A reasonable person would accept that screening needs to be done to enter a sterile area. A reasonable person would not see walking thru the doors of a public building as a waiver of all rights.

Additionally, I have yet to see any legal basis for TSA claiming authority to do this outside a checkpoint or sterile area.

Implied consent generally works based on an affirmative action showing that someone agrees to something. Consent is granted at the checkpoint by placing ones bags upon the conveyor for inspection. For DUI's, states list that as part of a condition of receiving a license that you consent to breathalyzer tests if an LEO has probable cause. I really think you'd be hard pressed that walking into a PUBLIC area in a PUBLIC building to show as granting conset, implied or otherwise.

I have a general question that I would like to ask that has nothing to do with this specific post.

The limitation on the size of bottles was described as being in place primarily because the larger the surface are of the bottle the larger the explosion could potentially be.

So for example a 2 ltr bottle might produce an explosion twice as deadly as a 1 ltr bottle.

What I don't understand is this... You limit the size of the bottles but then I can enter the secure area and BUY larger bottles.

What is stopping someone from placing dangerous compounds amongst multiple smaller bottles, buying a larger bottle within the secure area and then constructing the device in the airport toilet before boarding an aircraft?

Note: I started this post on Friday but got busy and stayed busy, so if any of my points are dated that is why.

Welcome back Blogger Bob, we missed you. I hope the family is doing great and you and your wife are getting some rest. (feel free to brag a bit about the baby)

I was all set to tell my tales of woe about how a TOLL-FREE call to the DHS OIG magically turned into a long distance call billed back to me. I will post all about that later because it seems we have more important issues to deal with than a $4.68 long distance screwing by DHS.

Does anyone at the TSA have any concept of Constitutional precepts?

Does anyone in the legal department actually look into the Constitutional or legal constraints that will effect new technology or new procedures, or do you guys just implement things and hope to hell that the citizens are too afraid to challenge the almighty TSA?

If that wasn't enough the TSA has decided to roll out this mobile scanner. We are and will be fed the same B.S. lines of how "we FEEL it is important" and "the TSA has broad powers to implement security".

Of course as we all know those B.S. lines won't hold up to the scrutiny of even a casual observer.

The Supreme Court has already ruled on a case that should cover this quite nicely. KYLLO v. UNITED STATES is the sad tale of the Government overstepping its Constitutional limits and violating a pot grower's 4th Amendment right.

The Court ruled that using technology that merely measured temperature radiating from a wall without a warrant violated the 4th amendment. The Court ruled that because the technology is not in general public use, like a camera, and revealed details that "could not otherwise have been obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" constitutes a search."

(summarizing so please read the ruling yourself)

If the amount of heat coming off my walls is protected because it may reveal some "intimate" detail of the activities in my house, then surely the amount of MMW radiation bouncing off or being generated by me is protected because it may reveal some "intimate" detail of activities in my pants.

Robert Johnson said... Quote from Cat: "Research the doctrine of implied consent, and observe that the doors to nearly EVERY airport in the United States include verbage which, essentially, says "If you enter this location, you are consenting to the security measures in place. You or your belongings may be subject to search at any time."

Under that legal theory, it is not up to the 4th Amendment because you can easily avoid such searches by choosing not to enter. Now, things like use at the DNC or RNC... that's something I don't quite follow."

Lot of problems here Cat.

First off, courts have only held that implied consent starts once the bags are placed on the conveyor for screening per US. v. Aukai.

Secondly, please list which airports have such things posted. I can tell you I haven't seen these at BWI, IAD, DCA and SLC.

Third, there's also the legal term unconscionable. I think "searches" in public area based on "consent" just by going into a building could be considered unconscionable that one even has to give up 4th amendment rights to enter a building and use a service. A reasonable person would accept that screening needs to be done to enter a sterile area. A reasonable person would not see walking thru the doors of a public building as a waiver of all rights.

Additionally, I have yet to see any legal basis for TSA claiming authority to do this outside a checkpoint or sterile area.

Implied consent generally works based on an affirmative action showing that someone agrees to something. Consent is granted at the checkpoint by placing ones bags upon the conveyor for inspection. For DUI's, states list that as part of a condition of receiving a license that you consent to breathalyzer tests if an LEO has probable cause. I really think you'd be hard pressed that walking into a PUBLIC area in a PUBLIC building to show as granting conset, implied or otherwise.

Robert

September 8, 2008 12:03 AM

Robert,

Then how does one explain searches at; courthouses, sporting venues, nightclubs etc.

They are all public facilities and people are searched entering some of these as well and to my knoweledge they do not contain sterile areas.

"Unless there is a test going on as you mentioned, you can film and take photos at our checkpoints as long as you do not interfere with the screening process or film any of the monitors."

Bob, thanks for the tip, but it's still hearsay until we see it in writing. Where has TSA published rules restricting photography at its checkpoints? We need to see all of them -- in writing -- so that when we're at a checkpoint and someone from TSA who is in a position of stopping us from going about our business but who is unfamiliar with the rules he is charged with enforcing can be shown that we are in compliance with those rules.

Surely your word, expressed on this blog, is not authoritative. If I'm stopped at one of your agency's checkpoints and one of your security guards threatens to stop me from traveling if a photograph part of the screening area, I doubt that telling him, "You are mistaken, sir. Bob, your TSA blogger guy, said such photography was okay. I'm going to continue to photograph here," is going to go over very well.

Once again, it seems that there is confusion over what rules we are required to follow in order to avoid having our right to travel restricted by TSA. In order to clear this up so that everyone passing through your checkpoints can do so in compliance with the rules, please tell us where TSA has published a list of all the rules and regulations that TSA will subject someone to if that person wishes to cross a U.S. Government checkpoint at an airport en route to the gate from which his domestic flight will depart, not including laws that the person is required to abide by outside of the airport checkpoint (i.e., just those rules and regulations that apply specifically at the checkpoint). Please provide a URL or name of the government publication.

I'm not looking for tips, clues, luggage packing suggestions, a pointer to your entire Web site, the law that called for creation of TSA, or your hidden-from-the-public-but-not-from-thousands-of-airport-baggage-checkers secret operating procedures. I'm not looking for anonymous tips from people claiming to be TSA baggage checkers, and I'm not looking for well-intentioned but legally-meaningless suggestions from someone who posts to the TSA blog. I just want to see the rules you require us to follow in order to avoid having our freedom of movement restricted by your staff.

"Since January, more than 2,300 TSA officers have supported Secret Service activities at more than 180 campaign events from coast to coast. In Denver, TSA is providing approximately 100 Transportation Security Officers to assist the Secret Service with screening at convention venues. In Saint Paul, TSA will provide approximately 50 officers to fill the same need."

"are you using your machines to remotely search people at the airport, like this post suggests, at the venue, like the DHS fat sheet states, or both?"

Bob did not answer this question, but implied that TSA is in fact conducting operations not only at the airport as his post misleadingly suggested, but also at the convention venues.

I went on to ask:

"If you're doing it at the venue as the DHS fact sheet states, can you tell us all how that fits with TSA's mission of protecting the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce?"

Bob responded:

"See my answer in the other post about how it ties in with our mission."

"As far as the recent conventions, we are used as a force multiplier. We are outstanding at what we do and by working with the Secret Service and Law Enforcement; we can help make these events much safer. Whether it’s screening somebody at a checkpoint or deploying our Behavior Detection Officers to watch the crowd, we are a welcome addition to these events and our DHS components appreciate the help."

Bob then went on to describe the mission of TSA's parent organization, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Bob, you never explained how searching people at political party rallies fits with TSA's mission. I think going up the tree to reference DHS's mission in order to justify the Transportation Security Agency's practice of searching people in manners completely unrelated to our transportation infrastructure is not helpful. If it was, you could justify almost any action on the part of your agency by citing some broad aim of the U.S. Government as a whole.

We want TSA to explain how searching people at political campaign rallies is in any way related to protection of our nation's transportation infrastructure to ensure freedom of movement and commerce. We put up with the warrantless searches at airports because many of us are convinced that there is sufficient need to ensure that certain things are not carried onto commercial flights. But now you're using the "transportation infrastructure protection funds" we gave you not to protect transportation infrastructure, but to search people in arbitrary locations. It sounds to me like things are getting out of hand.

Please go back to protecting our transportation infrastructure and leave the screening of people at political party events up to the political parties.

Bob, does your agency feel its authority has any bounds? If not, why not set up these remote search machines on our highways and search everyone who comes near an airport? If you had sufficient resources, would you set up your remote-search machines at every highway entrance? How about just putting them out on the sidewalks and scanning everyone who passes? Would any of those scenarios be any further outside your duties than is searching people at political party events?

The TSA can levy fines of up to $10,000 based on the severity of the incident. These fines can be appealed, but they can only be appealed where they were levied (so if you live in Los Angeles and the fine was levied in Boston you cannot easily contest. If you call the TSA and ask about contesting or appealing the fine, you risk doubling of the fine.

It's nice that the TSA is giving us so much technical information with regards to these new cameras every time we ask for the constitutional basis of scanning people not attempting to gain access to the secure or sterile areas.

So without giving us technical information about the capabilities of this machine, would the blog team care to give us legal and constitutional answers about the use of those capabilities?

Research the doctrine of implied consent, and observe that the doors to nearly EVERY airport in the United States include verbage which, essentially, says "If you enter this location, you are consenting to the security measures in place. You or your belongings may be subject to search at any time."

Under that legal theory, it is not up to the 4th Amendment because you can easily avoid such searches by choosing not to enter. Now, things like use at the DNC or RNC... that's something I don't quite follow.

NO, NO, NO. Your rights do NOT vanish because a Government entity posts a sign.

The courts have repeatedly held that common areas of an airport are indeed public spaces and as such all rights are upheld.

The area that this abomination operates in is a public space. As you have pointed out most of the time you have no expectation of privacy in a public space.

As a photographer I can take your picture in a public space without your consent and use it as I wish without your permission as long as I use the image in a way that does not imply endorsement by you or places you in an untruthful light.

If I were to use a standard Sony Nightshot video camera and an IR pass through filter to see past your clothes, even though you are in that same public space, I would be violating you right to privacy and would be subjected to the legal penalties associated with that crime.

By the TSA using this MMW device to "see" past my clothing violates my reasonable expectation of privacy. Because this person is using the device under the color of law or pretend color of law, in order to detect contraband and to act on said contraband, the use of the device violates the Constitutional protection of the 4th Amendment.

If TSA is not storing images (from either passive or active millimeter wave devices), then how do they plan to prosecute individuals caught with prohibited items?

Claiming you can't store images is a farce. To be able to use the images in internal reports (like the one's generated when a passenger false-alarms the ETD), to use them for non-checkpoint managers to dole out administrative fines (like the one's generated when a passenger brought her wedding-cake cutter to the checkpoint), or to use them for criminal arrest or prosecution (like when TSA referred a woman for arrest for carrying a leather bookmark) essentially requires image-storage capability.

"But the jury failed to reach verdicts on the most serious charges, of a conspiracy to have suicide bombers armed with soft-drinks bottles filled with liquid explosives destroy seven airliners headed for the United States and Canada on the same day.

The failure to get convictions on the charges of a plane-bombing plot represented a major setback for counterterrorism officials in London and Washington, who had described it as potentially the most devastating act of terrorism since the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States seven years ago this week. British and American experts had said the plot had all the earmarks of an Al Qaeda operation and said the death toll could have been in the thousands."

Unless the machine is completely incapable of storing images in any way, claiming it cannot store images doesn't mean anything.

A technician from TSA headquarters can come around to the various machines (both this and the one for passenger screening), make a few adjustments, and suddly and without telling the public the machine can store images.

"We want TSA to explain how searching people at political campaign rallies is in any way related to protection of our nation's transportation infrastructure to ensure freedom of movement and commerce."

Simple: It isn't. We are there as part of the DHS efforts to protect the evet. We'll do it for other events, like the Superbowl, too. I worked it, and we did get complements from the Secret service for our efforts, especially screening. They figure as we do it day after day, we're better at it than they are!

"But now you're using the "transportation infrastructure protection funds" we gave you not to protect transportation infrastructure, but to search people in arbitrary locations."

No, it's paid for out of the Secret Service budget, not the TSA's. As for arbitrary locations, I don't think the DNC or RNC is arbitrary. Both have high profile people attending and people who require protection from the Secret Service. Such events are known well before they happen. The TSA, as well as a whole alphabet of agencies, worked under their supervision to protect these events. Don't like it? Take it up with them. Or your Congress reps. I wouldn't excpet much sympathy, as they are probably the ones being protected. TSO-Joe

By the TSA using this MMW device to "see" past my clothing violates my reasonable expectation of privacy. Because this person is using the device under the color of law or pretend color of law, in order to detect contraband and to act on said contraband, the use of the device violates the Constitutional protection of the 4th Amendment.

In response to my questions about why TSA is searching people at political party rallies, TSO Joe confirmed that this happened, stated that TSA also performs searches at the Superbowl, and wrote:

"it's paid for out of the Secret Service budget, not the TSA's."

Are TSA screeners working overtime, or is the time they spend searching people at public/private events like football games and campaign rallies time that they would otherwise have spent working on securing our transportation infrastructure?

Joe, could you please cite the source of your information about the Secret Service's budget so we can confirm your claim in order to avoid spreading inaccurate information based on an anonymous comment on some blog?

"Joe, could you please cite the source of your information about the Secret Service's budget so we can confirm your claim in order to avoid spreading inaccurate information based on an anonymous comment on some blog?"

I'll try. I was told by my supervisor that my timecard code will be different than if I worked at the airport to reflect where the money is coming from. I still get paid the same, though. I'll try to get the email that states this nad more importantly, where the money is coming from. TSO-Joe

Phil wrote:Are TSA screeners working overtime, or is the time they spend searching people at public/private events like football games and campaign rallies time that they would otherwise have spent working on securing our transportation infrastructure?

Usually when something like that happens, the TSOs involved work on what would ordinarily otherwise be their regular time off. TSA (like any business with face-service to the public) operates on a finely-balanced system of scheduled workers, and too great of a stress on it (i.e.; too many people calling out sick, too many people off on vacation time, too many people off... I don't know, screening campaign rallies and conventions~) adversely impacts screening operations in terms of passenger throughput time as well as screening efficiency.

Whether they get paid overtime for it, or it's purely a volunteer basis, I don't know.

And the only reason I even mention that is because of the recent HSV air show. Granted, we didn't do any screening, per se, but public safety asked for volunteers to help with perimeter patrols around the air show. It was certainly a non-paid gig, and involved a lot of walking around out in the sun telling people to stay on the public side of the barricades. TSO-Joe says that the monies for it were paid for by the Secret Service, so I'm guessing it'll probably be considered overtime pay (more's likely the case, TSA paid for it and the Secret Service compensated TSA for it, rather like how worker's compensation operates. DoL pays, TSA compensates DoL)

"Are TSA screeners working overtime, or is the time they spend searching people at public/private events like football games and campaign rallies time that they would otherwise have spent working on securing our transportation infrastructure?"

At MSP, we were asked who would like to work this event. About 50 people were chosen. We (the MSP airport) also had a number of TSO's from our NDO (National Deployment Force) force come to help us. At MSP, these NDO's augmented out numbers so we could have all our checkpoint lanes open and all the CTX machines used. I'm not sure how many NDO's actually came. The NDO's also went New Orleans to cover the TSO's who had to secure their home before Gustav hit them. All of this was coordinated by the Secret Service, so they may have more information as to why they needed only 50 of us. I met a number people from our FAM's, Coast Guard, FBI, and Fema. Some where fairly tired after working both conventions.

I'll let you know if I get overtime for this, as I worked on my days off. I would imagine I will.

I see in Sandra's haste to point out the failure to convict the Heathrow defendants on all charges she conveniently left out that three of eight defendants were indeed found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. As I say over and over again, I'm all for dismantling TSA, but the critics never have any better ideas other than "just accept the risk" or vague assurances that private security would get it right this time. Please.

Dean, Joe: When TSA baggage screeners are out searching people and "helping with perimeter patrols" at political rallies, football games, and air shows, are you in uniform? Do you make it clear to people what, if any, authority you wield over them outside of an airport checkpoint, or do you just let them assume (wrongly) that you are some sort of law enforcement officer? How will do you suppose your new uniforms affect such misperceptions?

With each piece of information that comes out, here, I'm more amazed by the reach of the Transportation Security Agency.

"I see in Sandra's haste to point out the failure to convict the Heathrow defendants on all charges she conveniently left out that three of eight defendants were indeed found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder."

WRONG!! My first post on the subject read, in part:

"OK, TSA, only 3 of the 8 defendants in the "liquid bomb" trial were found guilty and none found to be guilty of planning to bomb airplanes."

"Dean, Joe: When TSA baggage screeners are out searching people and "helping with perimeter patrols" at political rallies, football games, and air shows, are you in uniform?"

We were in uniform at the RNC.

"Do you make it clear to people what, if any, authority you wield over them outside of an airport checkpoint, or do you just let them assume (wrongly) that you are some sort of law enforcement officer? How will do you suppose your new uniforms affect such misperceptions?"

I think you are really stretching to imply something that isn't there. At the RNC, my fellow TSO's were screening people coming into the Excel. The "Authority" was the Secret Service there with them, as well as armed Peace Officers. I was stationed at another feeder airport with TSI (the one's who levy civil fines) and Peace Officers (the one's who arrest.) I screened; they watched.

And exactly how to I prevent anyone from assuming anything? "Excuse me sir, I'm not a cop but I may look like one, even though my uniform color matches that of the local McDonlad's." "Go away, bub, I'm watching the air show."

If anything, we're another set of eyes to alert the Peace Officers if anything is amiss. If you are trying to belittle our contribution to the overall security mission, I would suggest you take your concerns to the Secret Service, as they were in charge of security of entire event. TSO-Joe

anonymous wrote:I see in Sandra's haste to point out the failure to convict the Heathrow defendants on all charges she conveniently left out that three of eight defendants were indeed found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. As I say over and over again, I'm all for dismantling TSA, but the critics never have any better ideas other than "just accept the risk" or vague assurances that private security would get it right this time. Please.

"Conspiracy to commit murder" can amount to a bunch of guys standing around a bar planning how they are going to kill people using magic beans. It doesn't make the threat serious or credible.

We are now over 2 years into TSA's absurd ban on an entire state of matter. The liquid explosives TSA is hyping the fear of either are too unstable to be carried onto an airliner (in which case, 3.4-1-1 is unncessary) or are stable enough that multiple 3.4-oz quantities could be combined airside to make a viable bomb (in which case, 3.4.-1-1 is ineffective). The Japanese have deployed closed-bottle liquid scanners for years, yet TSA continues with a crude and burdensome ban that inconveniences millions of travelers and redirects their effort away from what should be their core mission--detecting guns, large knives, and credible explosives. TSA touts all kinds of exotic new technologies like passive millimeter-wave scanners and virtual strip searches, yet fails to deploy existing technology (including ETD, which is capable of detecting nitrates in liquid explosives on the outside of the bottle or near the cap) to mitigate the liquids "threat" and make life easier for passengers.

TSA's absurd liquids ban now forces passengers to pay extra fees to check luggage on many airlines. And it recently caused me to lose several bottles of wine in breakage in checked luggage that would have been just fine in my carry-on. Wineries in Europe and on the US West coast have probably lost over $1000 of my business due to TSA's liquid ban. I'm sure I'm not the only one.

That the London plotters weren't all convicted of the maximum charge pokes holes in the seriousness and credibility of the threat hyped by DHS/TSA. (Recall that the Brits wanted to continue investigating because the plot was only half-baked, but DHS/TSA insisted on immediate action in Britain and reaction at the airport.) But regardless of that, 2 years is plenty of time for TSA to have fixed this problem.

TSO Joe, I am not trying to belittle you and your colleagues' contribution to the overall security mission.

I do not believe that government agents should provide security services for private events. Such a situation amounts to people of sufficient means being allowed to purchase (if they even have to pay you for it) special treatment from the government that we all share.

I do not believe that people employed as government checkpoint agents should wear their official uniforms while doing security work on the side (not the old ones that look like airport security uniforms, and not the new ones that look like police uniforms). We entrust you with special privileges while you're doing your job for us, the public, and we should not entrust you with those privileges while you are doing a job for someone besides the public. Your uniform in that situation implies greater authority that you are actually granted. If I smuggle a knife through the airport checkpoint where you work, I'm in violation of the law. If I smuggle a beer into private event where you work, I'm simply going against the wishes of the private entity who organized the event. And if you, in the course of searching people at a private event, find or hear something incriminating, I have little doubt that the information will be used against that person. Finding criminals is always a worthy goal, but in the United States, we just do not search all the innocent people in order to find the few guilty ones. We have this policy for good reason, and I'm not ready to give it up.

Worse, wearing your uniforms outside the small area where we have granted you the privilege of doing what would otherwise be unconstitutional -- conducting warrantless searches and restricting freedom of movement -- you condition the public to think that the searches and interrogations that you conduct -- on rather shaky ground -- at airports is just part of everyday life. I don't want to live in a place where government agents routinely stop people to search and interrogate them, but with one or two generations of people exposed to the conditioning your are providing, we might just get that. Already, it is difficult to convince people that they do not have to provide their paperwork on demand and that police officers cannot search them or there belongings without good reason to suspect they have done something wrong.

My unease with what you are doing is similar to yet much stronger than my unease with off-duty police officers providing private security services while in uniform. In both cases, it is a misuse of the authority you wield in your trusted position as a TSA bag checker or police officer. When we see someone in your uniform, we should know that he or she is working for us not for some private entity, and we should know that he or she has the special legal authority that we grant to people we hire to do your job.

"Since January, more than 2,300 TSA officers have supported Secret Service activities at more than 180 campaign events from coast to coast. In Denver, TSA is providing approximately 100 Transportation Security Officers to assist the Secret Service with screening at convention venues. In Saint Paul, TSA will provide approximately 50 officers to fill the same need."

So Bob, what have these 2300 TSA agents been doing at 180 campaign events?

Also, since when does TSA answer, as TSO Joe suggests, to Secret Service?

49 CFR § 1542.219:Supplementing law enforcement personnel.(a) When TSA decides, after being notified by an airport operator as prescribed in this section, that not enough qualified State, local, and private law enforcement personnel are available to carry out the requirements of § 1542.215, TSA may authorize the airport operator to use, on a reimbursable basis, personnel employed by TSA, or by another department, agency, or instrumentality of the Government with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or instrumentality to supplement State, local, and private law enforcement personnel.

[...]

(6) A statement acknowledging responsibility for providing reimbursement for the cost of providing Federal personnel.

[...]

(c) In response to a request submitted in accordance with this section, TSA may authorize, on a reimbursable basis,the use of personnel employed by a Federal agency, with the consent of the head of that agency.

______________________________________

It's not an exact situation like what happened at the conventions or the air show (though still, remember, we weren't "screening" there at the air show. We were just keeping people out of the AOA; we were, to answer your question from way above, in uniform), but it does at least set the precedence that TSA personnel can, and possibly have, be used elsewhere than the security checkpoints, so something more specific than that probably exists buried in the CFR.

Like I said, I found this entirely by accident though. What you want in particular, this list of rules, does not exist. And will likely not exist. Even the TSA SOP is built more like a guideline than actual rules, and if someone with enough patience wanted to, they could sit down and make a whole enormous flowchart based upon it, using an "IF, THEN, ELSE" framework. The only time it really gets all that specific is when it's referring to particular items, such as medicinal devices or braces or support appliances or parachutes - uncommon things that don't happen all the time.

The TSA SOP is based off of 49 CFR 1500. The whole thing. I can't point you at any particular article in 49 CFR 1500, because I don't have twenty years to pick through it all. The actual rules enforced at any checkpoint is done based off of the TSA SOP. Sometimes, interpretation varies wildly airport to airport on just what, specifically, something means.

And then there are local policies and procedures that have nothing to do with the TSA SOP. One very good example was someone talking about the airport requiring them to keep their bins approximately four inches apart from one another as they go into the x-ray. This is likely so that they get an accurate "bags screened" count for the x-ray operators, but that's still just a local policy that has nothing to do with TSA as a whole.

THEN there is the deal with FSDs having a whole heck of a lot of power to make their own procedures and policies up as they go. Here at HSV, for example, our FSD does not allow us to verify LEO credentials, even though TSA says we're supposed to. The FSD has good reasoning for that, too, and that's the way it's been done now for years. If a FSD says to not allow unlabeled bottles of liquids and gels through the checkpoint, despite TSA's website stating that bottles of liquids and gels don't have to be labeled, and the FSD has authority to use his or her discretion in implementing local policy to that effect (I'm not entirely 100% sure what authority the FSDs have in regard to these things, but I do know that if the FSD tells us to do something, we do it) then the TSOs would be trained to not allow unlabeled bottles of liquids and gels through the checkpoint, and it doesn't matter what the TSA website says at that point. The measuring stick I've always understood it to be is that the FSD cannot implement local policies that are less restrictive than what is required in the SOP, but can make policies that are more restrictive.

For example, and these are just two hypothetical things I yoinked out of my head just now - Can't allow liquids and gels if they're at least under 4oz, because the official TSA regulation is 3.4oz... but can require that all shoes not only have to come off, but that they must all have ETD screening as well. I saw another TSO, I want to say Joe but I might be wrong, say something to the same effect, so I'm fairly certain it's not just how my supervisors and management interpret the SOP.

Is it maddening for passengers? Absolutely. TSA originally tried to squash local policies, actually spelling out in the SOP that no airport was to deviate from it at all, and then the UK Bomb Plot thing happened (argue all you want on merits or flaws about it, the specifics of it aren't important for this particular discussion other than it happened).

Kip Hawley made an announcement that, even if we had followed every rule we had 100% right, then it would have succeeded and breezed past without a problem. This, evidently, was a concern for him. At that point, the kick-start for the Checkpoint Evolution began.

The Evolution has a whole bunch of stuff to it, most of which doesn't matter in the grand scheme of things when it comes to the UK Bomb Plot (i.e.; new uniforms, metal badges, stricter uniform-appearance requirements, mood music and lighting, recomposure benches, etc) except one - the transition from a static, SOP-based security system to a dynamic, threat-based security system.

...And I have no idea what that means at all, as I haven't yet had the training on it.

Either way, the prohibition on local polices, lightly enforced as it ever was so long as it didn't get too grotesque (like the airport that required all electronic items to be removed from bags, period), was abandoned. TSA, judging by it's public statements, now indeed seems to embrace the unpredictable nature of screening. It is "designed," in spirit, to keep bad guys guessing so that they can't learn our procedures.

And yes, this does put you, the passenger, at the "mercy" of the TSOs who's responsibility it is to help guide you through the process. Systems are in place to help deal with abusive TSOs (the compliment/complaint form system), and more systems have been put in place (Got Feedback?) to help deal with any abusive STSOs for when you want to file a complaint about the abusive TSO (such as them requiring ID before they give you a compliment/complaint form).

Besides, I'd be willing to bet that 85% of the entire screening corps are just normal people going to work to get their paycheck every two weeks. The other 10% are diehard freaks that have a compulsion for protecting people and feel that TSA is a duty to their country first, and a steady paycheck second, with only maybe the last 5% of the screener corps actually being abusive and demeaning and bullies.

The difference, however, is that of that 85%? Normal people have a tendency to react badly to someone being hostile or aggressive with them, even when it's just verbally. It is not TSA's policy to have retaliatory screening for when someone becomes difficult or rude to the TSOs at the security checkpoint.

It is very human, though.

Meh. I have more to say, but I have to get ready for work. I'll be back later~

And yes, this does put you, the passenger, at the "mercy" of the TSOs who's responsibility it is to help guide you through the process. Systems are in place to help deal with abusive TSOs (the compliment/complaint form system), and more systems have been put in place (Got Feedback?) to help deal with any abusive STSOs for when you want to file a complaint about the abusive TSO (such as them requiring ID before they give you a compliment/complaint form).

While all of these things are good, and I'm glad they're in place, they're corrective measures, not preventative. If I'm incorrectly instructed to abandon my personal property at a checkpoint because a given TSO doesn't know the rules, being able to fill out a form a couple of days later in order to report the problem doesn't get me my stuff back. Not to mention, of course, the unpleasant experience of the failed screening process in the first place.

There ought to be a way to fix such problems right then and there, rather than waiting for reports to be filed. I'm glad that TSA is working on responding to complaints ... but those complaints should never have to be filed in the first place.

Fines for prosthesis? TSA, can, without letting anyone know, begin banning items from flights. Read some of the regulations. They could ban your expensive laptop from flights. They could ban anything and everything that they wanted to do, and do it without repercussions.

The fines kick in when you begin arguing with the TSOs manning the checkpoint since you're 'interfering' with the security operations. They've pretty much got you either coming or going.

One item that is obviously needed and definitely missing from your main web site is a glossary of definitions and terms.

For example, I wear a metal knee / leg brace on my right leg, and periodically check the TSA site for the latest information. Recently, I came a across a screening manager that decided that I must remove the brace and have it x-rayed. This seems to be a violation of a number of TSA policies. It was also very painful, unpleasant, and demeaning.

Normally, I am offered several options which include a pat down or a visual and explosive trace check.

The web site refers to Mobility Disabilities, Assistive Devices and Mobility Aids, Medical Conditions and Special Situations.

I travel rather frequently, in the US and other countries, and have never been asked to remove the brace for X-ray except in this one incident. Trying to resolve this as a complaint has been reduced to arguments over definitions and semantics. This again gives TSA the "edge" and is causing me a great deal of stress and anxiety in anticipation of my next flight.

Also, it is counter productive to require me to sit down and take off my shoes prior to passing the metal detector, since I trip the machine every time anyway. They can check the shoes at the same time as the brace.

Also, this same manager told me that the TSA website is "always out of date". Is this true? I have been told otherwise by other TSA representatives.

M'hm. No, I don't think so. I doubt any airport has a local policy of mandating retaliatory screening. More likely it's a situation where the passenger said something to put the TSO's back up, and they decided to throw the book at them.

Anonymous wrote:The lack of definitions and better descriptions is giving too much latitude to local TSA managers.

Not to mention headaches for TSOs, since all of the above-mentioned items have different screening requirements. Some are ETD'd, some are only physically inspected, and some others are only visually inspected.

...Well, hell, is it a "support brace" or a "support appliance"? Only God knows, and the definitions as they're written in our SOP to help us in this matter are... vague, at best.

Just from what I know though, your metal leg braces? The official policy as I know it, and as HSV practices it, is that: no, the metal leg braces shouldn't have to ever come off, and the shoes shouldn't either.

Anonymous also wrote:Also, this same manager told me that the TSA website is "always out of date". Is this true? I have been told otherwise by other TSA representatives.

As far as the technical, official, completely vanilla with no-local-adjustments-made policies as listed on the TSA website?

Not really, no. While doing research for an answer for Phil, I did a page-by-page and line-by-line review of the entire TSA website, comparing what I knew to be internal procedures compared with the publicly-released guidelines. About 95% of it was correct and up-to-date.

The only real glaring difference between current policy and the website is that, for reasons unknown, the website prohibited items list of liquids and gels still has the 3.0oz standard instead of the 3.4oz standard - though if you look at that, and that alone, then I suppose you could say it's been out of date for over two years and some change.

The only other stuff that could have been considered inaccurate was only a context issue, where the full story wasn't told on that particular page, but was on another one. The money-in-the-shoes thing comes to mind.

Please post here on this site the airport where this sad experience took place so we can all know and be forewarned.

Should this happen to you again, and if you have the wherewithal, please stand your ground to the point where someone from the TSA calls a LEO over. Or ask yourself for a LEO to be called. That should put an end to the antics on the part of the screener very quickly.

Further, I would advise that you refuse to take your shoes off in the future, claiming a medical issue.

Also, this same manager told me that the TSA website is "always out of date". Is this true? I have been told otherwise by other TSA representatives.

Dean responded:

Not really, no. While doing research for an answer for Phil, I did a page-by-page and line-by-line review of the entire TSA website, comparing what I knew to be internal procedures compared with the publicly-released guidelines. About 95% of it was correct and up-to-date.

Sorry to jump on you about this, Dean ... but that doesn't cut it. Either the website is up-to-date, or it isn't.

If you (as a TSO) fail to detect a prohibited item during screening, and the person being screened is a secret TSA random tester, you've just failed the test. You (probably) can't plead that you caught 95% of the prohibited items that day. You failed the test, and you probably have to suffer the consequences.

If the TSA website is 95% accurate, it's 5% inaccurate, and that means it is not up-to-date. Furthermore, if some TSOs believe that the website is not up-to-date, and they are the sole arbiters of the rules at a checkpoint, then knowing what's on the website doesn't do me much good when I'm asked to know the rules ahead of time.

(Yes, I suppose I could ask for a supervisor, or a FSD, or an LEO, or some other TLA, but at that point the system has already failed.)

Jim, the destroyer of my hopes and dreams at becoming a contractor with my awesome Warcraft-based random selection device, wrote:If the TSA website is 95% accurate, it's 5% inaccurate, and that means it is not up-to-date.

...and, earlier, I wrote:...though if you look at that, and that alone, then I suppose you could say it's been out of date for over two years and some change.

Ahem. I believe I pointed that out.

That's like Phil using his example of the one sign that, while not technically inaccurate, did not give the full and whole story about IDs as proof-positive that all signs are untrustworthy. Nevermind the sign that says shoes have to be removed, or the one that says laptops have to come out of their bags if we can't get a clear shot at it on the x-ray, or the one about jackets having to be removed, or the advisory about film cameras or another advisory about people with pacemakers. That one sign appears to be enough to invalidate our whole network of nineteen signs and a vido.

Phil's sign, where it stated ID must be shown, was accurate - it just didn't give the exceptions for what would happen if someone didn't want to show ID, or didn't have ID. An omission - even a wilful one - does not, in itself, make something a lie. Something that Spock, the Aes Sedai, and a hundred years of politics have shown us.

Jim Huggins also wrote:If you (as a TSO) fail to detect a prohibited item during screening, and the person being screened is a secret TSA random tester, you've just failed the test.

Just like how most things about the screening operations aren't cut and dried, so too is that. I know nobody wants to believe it, but there are covert tests done that are designed to fail, because it's not the TSOs being tested - it's the procedures.

It's easy to just say "You failed the test" ...but there are a lot more layers to it than just that. The TSO doing the screening may have done nothing wrong.

And yeah, there are half-wins when it comes to covert screening. As I understand it, usually the hypothetical scenario ends with us TSA folks being dead from an IED blowing up at the checkpoint, but it's still considered a half-win because it didn't get on board a plane ;)

Phil wrote:Maybe he or she threw the pile of secret memos at the passenger.

Or, even better, just throwing a cloud of electrons at the passenger for the stuff that has no paper hardcopy!

"That's like Phil using his example of the one sign that, while not technically inaccurate, did not give the full and whole story about IDs as proof-positive that all signs are untrustworthy."

It's not proof that each sign is untrustworthy, it's proof that TSA's signs as a whole are untrustworthy.

You also wrote:

"Phil's sign, where it stated ID must be shown, was accurate - it just didn't give the exceptions for what would happen if someone didn't want to show ID, or didn't have ID. An omission - even a wilful one - does not, in itself, make something a lie."

First, it's TSA's sign (well, it has their name on it, though it was posted at an airport with private security), not mine. But I know what you meant. Second, it was not accurate. To say that ID must be shown was inaccurate. There was no such requirement, and you just confirmed that by explaining the exception. Jeanne Oliver, Associate Director of TSA Office of the Executive Secretariat confirmed this as well.

Is it accurate to say "no one may fly today" if there is an exception that people may fly under certain circumstances? Of course not.

There was and is no requirement that passengers show ID. The signs were false. Not merely misleading, but false. And TSA doesn't care.

Your agency is out of control.

Today, Bob is memorializing those who died in the WTC disaster by cranking up the censorship, disallowing comment posts that are within the EoS comment guidelines. Nice work, comrades.

Jim, the destroyer of my hopes and dreams at becoming a contractor with my awesome Warcraft-based random selection device ...

Aww, now you sound just like my students ... I crush their dreams all the time ... :)

That's like Phil using his example of the one sign that, while not technically inaccurate, did not give the full and whole story about IDs as proof-positive that all signs are untrustworthy.

I'll admit to getting caught up in the rhetorical flourishes. My apologies. Let me try to get back to the point I was trying to make.

One of TSA's big public-relations points these days is that passengers should know the rules. But (cue Phil ...), TSA's rules aren't publicly available. All I can do, as a member of the general public, is read the TSA website, read the signs posted at the airport, listen to media reports made from TSA press releases, and so on. And I hope that by doing so, I'll "know the rules" and therefore have no problems with the screening process.

But this blog has pointed out numerous times that "knowing the rules" doesn't guarantee a problem-free screening experience.

"Knowing the rules" doesn't help me when I follow a rule posted on the website or on posted signs, but the SOPs have been updated and the rules on the website are now wrong.

"Knowing the rules" doesn't help me when I follow a rule posted on the website or on posted signs, but the TSO performing my screening doesn't know the rules (e.g. the numerous horror stories posted here).

And if I end up in the middle of a dispute between what I think the rules are and what the TSO thinks the rules are, I'm probably going to lose. The power differential at a checkpoint between a TSO and a passenger is substantial.

You know, I'd almost be content if TSA just dropped the whole "know the rules" PR emphasis and just said something honest like this ...

"Here are some of the rules we'll be following at the checkpoint. But we reserve the right to change these rules at any time, with or without notice. Further, we reserve the right to deny boarding to anyone, at any time, for any reason."

When TSA says "know the rules", TSA implies that "if you follow all the rules, we won't stop you". But not only is that not true in practice, I'm not sure it's even true in theory.

Jim Huggins wrote:Aww, now you sound just like my students ... I crush their dreams all the time ... :)

:)

Jim Huggins wrote:"Knowing the rules" doesn't help me when I follow a rule posted on the website or on posted signs, but the SOPs have been updated and the rules on the website are now wrong.

That is something that I noticed a good deal of time ago, around the Top Twenty thread, where I specifically asked if anyone from the Blog team actively (as in, now) served in screening operations. Simply working for TSA does not, in itself, give people access to our SOP (much less the most up-to-date SOP). You still have to have a need-to-know, and there's about sixty thousand TSA employees (a rough number without spending the ten seconds it'd take to look it up on Google; the exact number is irrelevant in regard to this statement) serving in non-screening positions that don't have that need-to-know, and therefore don't have a clue what the screening process is.

Now this is just speculation, but I'd be willing to bet that whoever is in charge of updating the TSA website is not one of those people with access to our SOP. Most likely, he or she works in the Department of Public Affairs, and is told what information to put on the website, or given the information in some way.

This, in itself (if my speculation is true), causes a considerably amount of delay time between what actual policy is, and what the website says - though, as I said, about 95% of it is still true and accurate when you account for the pure vanilla flavor, by-the-book brand of our SOP without any kind of local policies put into place.*

Hell, how long has the liquid and gels information been on the website where it says 3.0oz instead of 3.4oz? Seems like that'd be an easy-enough fix, but someone hasn't been told to do it yet, and that should be considered unacceptable.

Jim also wrote:"Knowing the rules" doesn't help me when I follow a rule posted on the website or on posted signs, but the TSO performing my screening doesn't know the rules (e.g. the numerous horror stories posted here).

Precisely the point I was trying to make earlier, albeit with a bit more subtlety than that. A couple years back, TSA put out an agency-wide request for advice, so to speak, seeking ideas on the best way to implement new training. My own personal choice was to levy time for classes with someone to teach, the old-fashioned way, each and every new change as it happened in respects to the screening process, no matter how minor it may seem, or how uncommon the event is. This isn't cost-effective for over four hundred airports, but it would be very effective in keeping people up-to-date.

Great example of the disconnect in training involved? How many TSOs think US Government-issued credential cards (ala, DoD ID cards and NASA ID cards and our very own DHS ID cards) are acceptable for use as sole and primary forms of ID? They're not, but I bet you dollars to pesos that TSOs all over the place still accept them.

* - Local policies are also not something that's (supposed to be) put into place lightly, by the way. TSA understands that not every single airport can function exactly 100% alike, since not all airport checkpoints are built alike, or have the same resources. Still, FSDs can't make local policy up by fiat - everything has to be justifiable.

Ergo, the one airport that had passengers removing all electronics from bags? Not justifiable, TSA put a smack on 'em.

Ours, who's FSD doesn't allow us TSOs to verify LEO-flying-armed credentials? Justification was given to TSA HQ, the justification was accepted, therefore it is an acceptable local policy, and has been in practice for years.

A local policy of saying that gel packs aren't acceptable for use with keeping breast milk refrigerated can't be justifiable. I would expect TSA to put the smack down on any airport with any kind of official local policy of that nature, which is why I wrote that I doubt very much it's any kind of FSD-driven local policy, and more likely an error on the part of the TSO and STSO.

Phil wrote:Is it accurate to say "no one may fly today" if there is an exception that people may fly under certain circumstances? Of course not.

Is it accurate to say "every one may fly today" if there is an exception that people may not fly under certain circumstances?

By the way, Phil, did you catch that thing about 49 CFR § 1542.219 I put up for yinz?

"[The TSA sign Phil referenced], where it stated ID must be shown, was accurate - it just didn't give the exceptions for what would happen if someone didn't want to show ID, or didn't have ID. An omission - even a wilful one - does not, in itself, make something a lie."

"To say that ID must be shown was inaccurate. There was no such requirement, and you just confirmed that by explaining the exception. Jeanne Oliver, Associate Director of TSA Office of the Executive Secretariat confirmed this as well.

"Is it accurate to say "no one may fly today" if there is an exception that people may fly under certain circumstances? Of course not.

"There was and is no requirement that passengers show ID. The signs were false. Not merely misleading, but false. And TSA doesn't care."

"Is it accurate to say "every one may fly today" if there is an exception that people may not fly under certain circumstances?"

Generally no, but use of the word may leaves that statement rather ambiguous. So let's change "may fly" to "is allowed to fly" in order to avoid confusion over whether you meant to discuss chance or permission. "Everyone may fly today" could mean "everyone might fly today" or "everyone has permission to fly today", and I suspect you meant the latter.

Given that some people are not allowed to fly today under some circumstances, it would be inaccurate to say, "everyone is allowed to fly today."

I know of no such ambiguity with the word requirement. A requirement is something that is required. If that thing is optional -- like showing ID in this case -- then it is not required.

TSA does not and did not have a requirement that passengers show ID before crossing a TSA checkpoint. Showing ID is an option -- not a requirement -- that will usually allow passengers to cross the checkpoint with less scrutiny from security guards. I don't understand how you could consider a checkpoint sign that states that showing ID is required to be anything but false. This is so obvious to me that to have a seemingly-reasonable person like yourself question it makes me wonder if I'm missing something. Does it seem to you that I am?

Thanks for relaying that, Dean. I asked EoS blogger Lynn, who first posted about TSA staff providing security services at political party rallies, and EoS blogger Bob, who also discussed the topic, multiple times why TSA would do such a thing, and neither bothered to respond, other than to say things like "we help each other out" and "we're part of DHS, so any of DHS' responsibility is our responsibility."

For all the reasons I previously provided, I'm still not comfortable with uniformed TSA staff searching people or "helping with perimeter patrols" at private, non-transportation-infrastructure-related events such as political party rallies, football games, and air shows. Additionally, as Robert Johnson wrote in response to the "New Security Technologies Make Airport Debut" post, "a search is consented to on one ground and then TSA expands it from an administrative search to a criminal search." This is bad enough at an airport, and now it seems that we'll be seeing it elsewhere. Soon, Americans will likely be conditioned to think that such un-warranted criminal searches by government agents on private property is the norm. That possibility frightens me, and it should frighten anyone who values freedom.

I sincerely hope that our nation will soon return to focusing on the U.S. Constitution. I have seen no indication that TSA is at all concerned with the constitutionality of its actions.

Just from what I know though, your metal leg braces? The official policy as I know it, and as HSV practices it, is that: no, the metal leg braces shouldn't have to ever come off, and the shoes shouldn't either.

Dean I used to rspect your answers because most of the time you were right on. But when it comes to braces, there is a lot more to consider. If that brace can not be properly cleared by using the less intrusive procedures then the only option is to x-ray or not allow the brace to clear screening. In other words each brace must be taken on a case by case basis. For instance if that brace is manufactured in a way that it caould hide anything under it and a patdown can not properly clear it then what do you do. ETD machines don't pick up everything. By allowing it to clear screening would be a dis-service to all of the other passengers. If a brace comes off during normal daily activities, the brace could be used to hide the very things we are trying to keep off airplanes. So the correct answer to the person who posted the comment should have been unfortunately, that its a discretionary issue. For that passenger I'm sorry about your experience, however when 130 other passengers lives may be at stake, caution on their side would be the best policy.

Anonymous wrote:If a brace comes off during normal daily activities, the brace could be used to hide the very things we are trying to keep off airplanes.

And knives and guns along with non-weapon contraband have long been hidden in prosthetic limbs, yet we have no requirement that they have to be x-rayed. Indeed, it's spelled out quite plainly that we do not require or even ask for or suggest the removal of prosthetics. More to the point, if someone offers to remove their prosthetic, we have to turn them down on the offer, even if it means the passenger can not enter the sterile area.

There is a limit to the level of invasive screening procedures that we are allowed to do, and TSA is very keenly aware of it.

Anonymous also wrote:If that brace can not be properly cleared by using the less intrusive procedures then the only option is to x-ray or not allow the brace to clear screening.

I think we ran into a little bit of a miscommunication here.

What you wrote there, that is true. A passenger doesn't have to remove their shoes, for example, if they have a medical necessity to wear them, but if we have an alarm to resolve? His choice at that point becomes either to take them off for x-ray inspection, or to return to the public area.

Granted, metal leg braces are not in quite the same ball park as a full prosthetic limb, but I was speaking generally, and on the assumption that the gentleman with the leg braces was being asked to remove the braces themselves prior to even entering the WTMD, and also on the assumption that there was no problem with any of them (i.e.; TSO satisfied, no alarm on footwear).

Back to speaking generally - Obviously if the TSO isn't satisfied that no prohibited items are present, and the item in question can not be further inspected (such as an oxygen tank that can not be disconnected from a passenger, a prosthetic limb, or something simply too large to fit into the x-ray), then of course the item should be denied access to the sterile area. To do otherwise would be dangerously negligent to the well-being of the other passengers.

I think we're on the same page, you and I, there was just a little bit of a misunderstanding involved. ;)

"Why would anyone make a nursing mother drink her own breast milk? Why would anyone require a woman to snip off nipple rings? Why are large breasted women humiliated? (Is there a pattern here?)

Why would anyone strip search a Marine Corps honor guard? Why would anyone take the trousers down in public to look at his prosthetic knee?

Looking for sense? When you figure these out, let us know."___________________________________

Why would someone make a woman drink her own breast milk? TSA shouldn't be doing that. If there is some sort of question than the bottle should be tested.If there is an alarm in the breast area than it must be cleared. It could be a nipple ring or it could be a weapon concealed under the breast. Either way the area must be cleared, and if they say it is a nipple ring than they need to get rid of that alarm. TSA can't touch them inapropriatly to clear it. Therefor the ring probably has to come out.Why are big breasted women humiliated? I don't know, you tell me. What is it exactly that you are even talking about?!

No one gets strip searched. That is not part of our job. If we want to look at something, someone could lift up their pant leg or we can pat it down. But we do not make people take their clothes off. And it is sad that a marine must be searched so thoroughly but TSA can not start making exceptions because then they would have to draw the line somewhere.

Anonymous said...And it is sad that a marine must be searched so thoroughly but TSA can not start making exceptions because then they would have to draw the line somewhere.

Ah, but you do make exceptions everyday!Does EVERY concessionaire get searched every time they pass into the sterile area? Does EVERY TSA employee get searched EVERY time they pass into the sterile area?Does EVERY piece of cargo get searched prior to being loaded into the cargo area of the plane?

Dean, we are on the same page now. The individual in question was given his options and told that he was cleared but the brace was not. He was also told the only way the brace could possibly be cleared was for it to go through the x-ray. The brace was too bulky and alarmed, no reasonable patdown could have cleared it. The decision was the Security Managers. Under this situation the manager could not even using good common sense clear the brace. You are absolutly right about prosthetics, we never ask for them to be removed, however, if a brace can be removed for other daily activities such as taking a shower, getting dressed, changing clothes, I think you see where I'm going here, then that brace could be used to hide prohibited items including IED's that the ETD cannot detect. It would be total negligence not to properly clear it. I know for a fact that reasons behind the request were explained to the passenger. The decision for him to remove the brace was his choice. I know some of the readers will say he what were his choices submit or don't fly. But what choice did the security manager have allow the unscreened brace to fly and take the chance of him being a bad guy or even having some one see a loophole in security and using it. This is one of the reasons that it is difficult to come up with that all inclusive list that Phil keeps asking for. Lets use a trophy as an example. Trophies are not on the prohibited items list, but a baseball bat is. Some trophy's are no different than the bat and would not be allowed to be carried on the plane. But having an all inclusive list that would list it as a prohibited item would then make it 100% prohibited. Not listing it allows the Supervisor to make the determination of whether or not it could fall into a club category. This is just like the brace, it depends on the circumstances surrounding it. I hope this help clear up some of the misconceptions about making up rules as we go. Thats not the case. We're trying to use good judgement based on the intelligence we recieve and circumstances. For those of you who have had bad experiences with our officers I sincerely appologize. I can also tell you that at the airport I work at we do discipline our TSO's for bad behavior whether you report it or we see it. It would help if you reported it.

Quote from Anonymous: "Dean, we are on the same page now. The individual in question was given his options and told that he was cleared but the brace was not. He was also told the only way the brace could possibly be cleared was for it to go through the x-ray. The brace was too bulky and alarmed, no reasonable patdown could have cleared it. The decision was the Security Managers. Under this situation the manager could not even using good common sense clear the brace. You are absolutly right about prosthetics, we never ask for them to be removed, however, if a brace can be removed for other daily activities such as taking a shower, getting dressed, changing clothes, I think you see where I'm going here, then that brace could be used to hide prohibited items including IED's that the ETD cannot detect. It would be total negligence not to properly clear it. I know for a fact that reasons behind the request were explained to the passenger. The decision for him to remove the brace was his choice. I know some of the readers will say he what were his choices submit or don't fly. But what choice did the security manager have allow the unscreened brace to fly and take the chance of him being a bad guy or even having some one see a loophole in security and using it. This is one of the reasons that it is difficult to come up with that all inclusive list that Phil keeps asking for. Lets use a trophy as an example. Trophies are not on the prohibited items list, but a baseball bat is. Some trophy's are no different than the bat and would not be allowed to be carried on the plane. But having an all inclusive list that would list it as a prohibited item would then make it 100% prohibited. Not listing it allows the Supervisor to make the determination of whether or not it could fall into a club category. This is just like the brace, it depends on the circumstances surrounding it. I hope this help clear up some of the misconceptions about making up rules as we go. Thats not the case. We're trying to use good judgement based on the intelligence we recieve and circumstances. For those of you who have had bad experiences with our officers I sincerely appologize. I can also tell you that at the airport I work at we do discipline our TSO's for bad behavior whether you report it or we see it. It would help if you reported it."

TSA will NEVER be able to eliminate 100% of risk, but it can mitigate it to an acceptable level. The risk could have been mitigated to an acceptable level without having the poor man remove his leg.

Re-read, his leg was not removed it was an exterior brace thats removed every single day, to include taking a bath. This is where ingnorance shows. You jumped to a conclusion without knowing the facts.

Quote from Anonymous: "Re-read, his leg was not removed it was an exterior brace thats removed every single day, to include taking a bath. This is where ingnorance shows. You jumped to a conclusion without knowing the facts."

They are all public facilities and people are searched entering some of these as well and to my knoweledge they do not contain sterile areas."

No, many of them are private facilities that allow public access. Private organizations don't have the rules that government ones do. Big difference.

Nightclub? Shopping mall? Who owns it? A government or a private person/company? Privately owned, they're free to ask within reason for searches for admittance (i.e. I don't think strip searches would be legal or reasonable).

Again, though, government has different rules. Government can infringe on rights. Private entities can't.

Go thru a search elsewhere on public property. Most of the time, they're conducted by LEOs who know their limits. Funny how those folks can respect the law yet TSA can't.

Pop on over to Flyertalk.com, look around and you will see where amputees did have to remove their prosthetic limb so as to be able to fly. Read about amputees who've pleaded with TSA to leave a shoe on the prosthetic leg and have been told no. Read and read and read and read. I suspect most TSOs are decent people. There are, unfortunately some real corkers working for DHS and some of those corkers are TSOs.

The ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act - fyi a law)mandates certain things when dealing with the disabled. From where I stand DHS and some of its minions in TSA willfully violate the rights of disabled individuals all in an effort to guarantee 'security at any cost' to the American traveling public. "Take your shoes off." Pretty simple right? For most of us it is a routine act. For people with a balance problem they would be better suited to sitting down for shoe removal. When was the last time you saw any seating at the start of the metal detector? There isn't any. Try asking a TSO who is busy with a coworker and you stand to get harsh/retaliatory screening. Better to teach the disabled to not bother you when you're busy, right? "But at xyz airport we don't do that." But the disabled flew out of abc airport, not yours.

DHS, you have a problem with TSA, screening procedures, violations of other federal laws, violations of Constitutional rights, misguided wars on inanimate objects, and the inability to admit when you're wrong. Other countries screen both passengers and their belongings without demeaning the passengers. Why is that hard to do here in the US?

Robert Johnson wrote:The risk could have been mitigated to an acceptable level without having the poor man remove his leg.

And, strictly speaking, threats can't always be mitigated. If it actually was a prosthetic leg and not just a brace or something, and it alarmed like it did here? He would summarily be denied access to the sterile area. There's no way to clear it.

And, strictly speaking, threats can't always be mitigated. If it actually was a prosthetic leg and not just a brace or something, and it alarmed like it did here? He would summarily be denied access to the sterile area. There's no way to clear it.

Sort of like when my son, traveling under orders, in uniform was nearly denied boarding because of explosive residues on much of his carry-on equipment?

Do you know the penalty for a military member to miss a troop movement?

Since the tragic September 11 incident, precautionary methods have understandably significantly increased.

Those who winge about the infingement of rights and privacy have surely got to understand that a minor intrusion into one's privacy is outweighed by the benefits to be obtained by these precautionary methods

I think it's fine it's better to be safe then sorry in my opinion. I did hate it because i lost some hcg diet items because of security but personally I would rather take the small financial loss and remember not to bring them on a plane again as a learning experience then worry about a terrorist. I can see both sides of the line there is a point that is to far but i don't think this is terrible.