Western Front

Three Giant Draft Picks

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Brian Sabean doesn't always get the credit he deserves. The Giants GM has been lampooned for his tendency to sign players who are past their prime (outgoing skipper Felipe Alou complained upon being dismissed after the 2006 season that, “I don't believe one manager enjoys having players die in their hands”) and for being out of touch with the hippest trends. Early in his tenure, Sabean went on record as saying “I am not an idiot” in defense of a trade that sent popular third baseman Matt Williams to Cleveland for four players, the most notable of which was future MVP/“Survivor” contestantJeff Kent.

All of which I'm sure is fine with Sabean, who gets results while those that would criticize him must settle for dismissing his success as a fluke or some such. The man and his team have played in three World Series in the past 11 years and won two of the last three. Clearly he is doing something right.

One of the things Sabean and his staff have done well is draft players. While his counterparts in the National League West have been collecting talent of varying utility, Sabean has been tabbing stars. Pitchers Matt Cain (2002), Tim Lincecum (2006), and Madison Bumgarner (2007) all were taken in the first round. All played key roles in 2010 and now again in 2012. Same with Buster Posey (2008).

As a thought exercise, while the Giants wait for their rings, let's consider what the NL West might look like had Sabean's counterparts been better at procuring amateur talent. We'll skip 2008 and Posey because the Giants picked fifth overall that year, giving them an advantage over the competition. Focusing on 2002, 2006 (which I've examined briefly in the past), and 2007, what actually happened and what—given the benefit of hindsight—should have happened?

In rewriting history for the purpose of this exercise, we'll make a few assumptions:

Only NL West teams get a “do over” on their first pick in the draft; all others remain as is.

Players stay with their drafting team, i.e., there are no trades, free agency, etc.

Value is determined by career WARP to date and/or common sense, e.g., Matt Moore gets the nod over Darwin Barney and Jonathan Lucroy because I would rather have Moore on my team going forward despite the slight edge in WARP enjoyed by the latter two right now.

For the Rockies, this is their good pick. Francis reached the big leagues and, although he never developed into a star, has had a solid big-league career. The same cannot be said of their picks in 2006 and 2007. Still, it's hard not to fantasize what might have been had Granderson played half his games at Coors Field.

This repick has additional repercussions. Granderson never ends up with the Yankees, Austin Jackson and Max Scherzer never get to Detroit, and Edwin Jackson and Ian Kennedy don't go to Arizona. (Kennedy, as we'll see, has another reason for not joining the Diamondbacks in this scenario.) Do the Tigers face Sabean's Giants in this year's World Series without Jackson and Scherzer? That is a whole other level of butterfly effect, but I'm thinking no.

The Padres have their choice of “catchers” in Votto and McCann (or pitchers in Cain, Johnson, and local product Cole Hamels). With the benefit of hindsight, they take McCann because he doesn't move off the position after seven games in Rookie League. Votto has provided more value as measured by WARP but would have been blocked by Adrian Gonzalez, which is a nice problem to have but which ruins my next joke.

A secondary effect is that, without Greene, the Padres never acquire Luke Gregerson. This is a small price to pay for landing McCann.

The Diamondbacks take Johnson. This eases the sting of never having acquired Jackson and Kennedy in the Granderson trade that didn't happen. Without Santos, Arizona doesn't acquire Orlando Hudson, who plays a key role on the 2007 NL West champion squad.

San Diego's pick of Kennedy also ruins the 2011 season for the Diamondbacks, who never acquire him from the Yankees. But then, we already knew that because of the whole Granderson not being drafted by the Tigers thing.

I don't know about you, but I find the idea of Granderson, Longoria, and Stanton in Colorado rather titillating. More titillating than Francis, Reynolds, and Weathers, anyway. The Rockies picked ahead of the Giants in all three of the drafts we've examined and came away with the worse player every time. Again, we're conducting this exercise with the benefit of hindsight, but the Rockies could have been a force by now instead of a team that overpays Michael Cuddyer to play like Scott Hairston.

Arizona ends up with an interesting right-field situation. One of Heyward or Justin Upton moves to the other corner, or maybe to another organization. Given that Upton is the only Diamondbacks first-round pick between 2002 and 2008 who hasn't been traded, I'm betting on the latter.

Also, Parker never ends up in Oakland as part of the haul for Trevor Cahill. Both pitchers enjoyed similar success, although the A's also got Ryan Cook in that deal. In a division that was decided on the season's final day, Cook's absence could have been enough to tip the scales in favor of Texas.

Sabean nailed it. Again. He's 3-for-3. You could make a case for Zimmermann over Bumgarner in a Devil's Advocate kind of way, but whatever.

The Dodgers took Withrow with a compensation pick from Boston for their signing of Julio Lugo. While Lugo produced 0.2 WARP in two seasons and change for the Red Sox, Withrow has been stuck at Double-A for the better part of four years. Zimmermann would fit well on this team.

Sabean also picked Charlie Culberson in the supplemental first round, which is interesting because:

The pick was compensation for the departure of free agent Mike Stanton (not to be confused with the Giancarlo formerly known as Mike).

Culberson was used to acquire Marco Scutaro this past July. Scutaro played out of his head for the Giants over the final two months of 2012 and then drove home the championship-winning run against Detroit.

The Padres, who haven't picked a star in the first round since Derrek Lee in 1993 (and haven't had one get more than a cup of coffee with them since Andy Benes in 1988), take Moore instead of Schmidt. This keeps them from acquiring Huston Street and extending his contract. Well, it keeps them from using Schmidt to acquire Street. I'm not sure the Rockies were interested in acquiring Schmidt so much as ridding themselves of Street.

Conclusion
In our make-believe scenario, here is a before-and-after comparison (and again, forgive the gross oversimplification of a player's value as represented by a single number; this is just shorthand):

The Diamondbacks and Dodgers need to “fix” two of their picks, while the Padres and Rockies need to fix all three. The Giants—thanks to Sabean and his brain trust—need no such revisions.

What impact might all this have had on the NL West over the past few years?

2007: Granderson (.303 TAv, 6.6 WARP) is a huge upgrade in center field over Willy Taveras (.254, 1.6); would it be enough to push Colorado past the Red Sox? Maybe not, but it would be enough to keep them out of a controversial Game 163 against San Diego.

2008: Would Votto (.293 TAv, 3.3 WARP) help the Dodgers get past Philadelphia and into the World Series? Not unless he could pitch, something Loney (.263, -0.3) was better equipped to do according to scouting reports of him as an amateur.

2009: It's frightening to think what the Rockies might have done with Granderson (.273 TAv, 3.3 WARP) over Dexter Fowler (.262, 1.6) and Longoria (.293, 6.5) over Ian Stewart (.260, 1.0). They finished three games back of the Dodgers (who would upgrade from Loney's .271, 0.8 to Votto's .326, 4.3) in the NL West but won the wild card. Colorado lost to the Phillies in reality, but it was a tight series; the added firepower of Granderson and Longoria might have pushed the Rockies over the top.

2010: With McCann (.294 TAv, 4.5 WARP) over Yorvit Torrealba (.269, 2.3) and Kennedy over Correia (discussed above), the Padres hold off San Francisco before losing to Philadelphia in the first round, which makes up for the Phillies falling to Colorado a year earlier. Through no fault of his own, Sabean is denied a World Series. Good thing in reality he is better at drafting than are his counterparts.

2011: As noted earlier, the Diamondbacks are a very different team without Kennedy and Daniel Hudson (acquired in a trade for Edwin Jackson that no longer occurs in our scenario thanks to the Rockies drafting of Granderson). Granted, they have Heyward, but he suffers a sophomore slump (.257 TAv, 0.2 WARP) and is a significant downgrade from Gerardo Parra (.275, 3.0) this season. Johnson is brilliant but makes only nine starts due to injuries.

2012: The Tigers probably don't win without Jackson, Scherzer, and Porcello. Maybe Jim Tracy stays with a Rockies team that doesn't constantly lose while trying to overcome a series of bad free-agent signings.

Is this exercise without flaws? No. Does it make a lot of sense? Um... Is it fun to consider? Yes.

And if you're a Giants fan celebrating your team's second world championship in three years, be grateful that Sabean knows what he's doing on draft day. Also, be grateful that the Padres didn't take McCann in 2002 or Kennedy in 2006. Or Jered Weaver in 2004 instead of Matt Bush, which is a story for some other day.

It's always easy to make people look like idiots when you're working with perfect hindsight. Moreover, you've made the Giants look brilliant by cherry-picking the three drafts where they took guys who became stud starters.

What if you looked at just the 2003-05 drafts? Now I'm guessing the Giants would rank near the bottom.

Yes, this exercise involves working with perfect hindsight, which we all agree is an unreasonable assumption. What I find interesting is that most teams don't take three guys in six years who become stud starters.

"I don't know about you, but I find the idea of Granderson, Longoria, and Stanton in Colorado rather titillating."

I would've found that impossible. Granderson would've platooned with Spillborgh, meanwhile Holliday would've been in left and Hawpe in righ. Then the Rockies wouldn't have retained him as a free agent (just as they let Hawpe, Spillborghs, Seth Smith, etc go) by the time Stanton was in the majors.