on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the third circuit

[June 29, 1992]

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

The joint opinion, following its newly minted variation on
stare decisis, retains the outer shell of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but beats a wholesale retreat from the
substance of that case. We believe that Roe was wrongly
decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in
constitutional cases. We would adopt the approach of the
plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), and uphold the challenged provisions of
the Pennsylvania statute in their entirety.

In ruling on this case below, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit first observed that "this appeal does notdirectly implicate Roe; this case involves the regulation of
abortions rather than their outright prohibition." 947 F. 2d
682, 687 (1991). Accordingly, the court directed its attention to the question of the standard of review for abortion
regulations. In attempting to settle on the correct standard,
however, the court confronted the confused state of this
Court's abortion jurisprudence. After considering the
several opinions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
supra, and Hodgson v. Minnesota,497 U.S. 417 (1990), the
Court of Appeals concluded that Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" test was controlling, as that was the
narrowest ground on which we had upheld recent abortion
regulations. 947 F. 2d, at 693-697 (" `When a fragmented
court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds' " (quoting Marks v. United States,430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Applying
this standard, the Court of Appeals upheld all of the
challenged regulations except the one requiring a woman to
notify her spouse of an intended abortion.

In arguing that this Court should invalidate each of the
provisions at issue, petitioners insist that we reaffirm our
decision in Roe v. Wade,supra, in which we held unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime to procure an
abortion except to save the life of the mother.
[n.1]
We agree
with the Court of Appeals that our decision in Roe is notdirectly implicated by the Pennsylvania statute, which does
not prohibit, but simply regulates, abortion. But, as the
Court of Appeals found, the state of our post-Roe decisional
law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confusing and
uncertain, indicating that a reexamination of that line of
cases is in order. Unfortunately for those who must apply
this Court's decisions, the reexamination undertaken today
leaves the Court no less divided than beforehand. Although
they reject the trimester framework that formed the
underpinning of Roe, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter adopt a revised undue burden standard to analyze
the challenged regulations. We conclude, however, that
such an outcome is an unjustified constitutional compromise, one which leaves the Court in a position to closely
scrutinize all types of abortion regulations despite the fact
that it lacks the power to do so under the Constitution.

In Roe, the Court opined that the State "does have an
important and legitimate interest in preserving and
protecting the health of the pregnant woman, . . . and that
it has still another important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life." 410 U. S., at 162
(emphasis omitted). In the companion case of Doe v.
Bolton,410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court referred to its
conclusion in Roe "that a pregnant woman does not have an
absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand."
410 U. S., at 189. But while the language and holdings of
these cases appeared to leave States free to regulate
abortion procedures in a variety of ways, later decisions
based on them have found considerably less latitude for
such regulations than might have been expected.

For example, after Roe, many States have sought to
protect their young citizens by requiring that a minor
seeking an abortion involve her parents in the decision.
Some States have simply required notification of the
parents, while others have required a minor to obtain the
consent of her parents. In a number of decisions, however,
the Court has substantially limited the States in theirability to impose such requirements. With regard to
parental notice requirements, we initially held that a State
could require a minor to notify her parents before proceeding with an abortion. H. L. v. Matheson,450 U.S. 398,
407-410 (1981). Recently, however, we indicated that a
State's ability to impose a notice requirement actually
depends on whether it requires notice of one or both
parents. We concluded that although the Constitution
might allow a State to demand that notice be given to one
parent prior to an abortion, it may not require that similar
notice be given to two parents, unless the State incorporates
a judicial bypass procedure in that two parent requirement.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra.

We have treated parental consent provisions even more
harshly. Three years after Roe, we invalidated a Missouri
regulation requiring that an unmarried woman under the
age of 18 obtain the consent of one her parents before
proceeding with an abortion. We held that our abortion
jurisprudence prohibited the State from imposing such a "blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent."
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). In Bellotti v. Baird,443 U.S. 622 (1979), the
Court struck down a similar Massachusetts parental consent statute. A majority of the Court indicated, however,
that a State could constitutionally require parental consent,
if it alternatively allowed a pregnant minor to obtain an
abortion without parental consent by showing either that
she was mature enough to make her own decision, or that
the abortion would be in her best interests. See id., at
643-644 (plurality opinion); id., at 656-657 (White, J.,
dissenting). In light of Bellotti, we have upheld one
parental consent regulation which incorporated a judicial
bypass option we viewed as sufficient, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,462 U.S. 476 (1983), but have invalidated another because of our
belief that the judicial procedure did not satisfy the dictates
of Bellotti. See Akron v. Akron Center for ReproductiveHealth, Inc.,462 U.S. 416, 439-442 (1983). We have never
had occasion, as we have in the parental notice context, to
further parse our parental consent jurisprudence into one parent and two parent components.

In Roe, the Court observed that certain States recognized
the right of the father to participate in the abortion decision
in certain circumstances. Because neither Roe nor Doe
involved the assertion of any paternal right, the Court
expressly stated that the case did not disturb the validity
of regulations that protected such a right. Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S., at 165, n. 67. But three years later, in Danforth, the
Court extended its abortion jurisprudence and held that a
State could not require that a woman obtain the consent of
her spouse before proceeding with an abortion. Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 69-71.

States have also regularly tried to ensure that a woman's
decision to have an abortion is an informed and well considered one. In Danforth, we upheld a requirement that
a woman sign a consent form prior to her abortion, and
observed that "it is desirable and imperative that [the
decision] be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences." Id., at 67. Since that case, however, we
have twice invalidated state statutes designed to impart
such knowledge to a woman seeking an abortion. In Akron,
we held unconstitutional a regulation requiring a physician
to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the status of her
pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of
possible viability, the complications that could result from
an abortion, and the availability of agencies providing
assistance and information with respect to adoption and
childbirth. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,supra, at 442-445. More recently, in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,476 U.S. 747 (1986), we struck down a more limited Pennsylvania regulation requiring that a woman be informed of the
risks associated with the abortion procedure and the
assistance available to her if she decided to proceed withher pregnancy, because we saw the compelled information
as "the antithesis of informed consent." Id., at 764. Even
when a State has sought only to provide information that,
in our view, was consistent with the Roe framework, we
concluded that the State could not require that a physician
furnish the information, but instead had to alternatively
allow nonphysician counselors to provide it. Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S., at 448-449. In
Akron as well, we went further and held that a State may
not require a physician to wait 24 hours to perform an
abortion after receiving the consent of a woman. Although
the State sought to ensure that the woman's decision was
carefully considered, the Court concluded that the Constitution forbade the State from imposing any sort of delay. Id.,
at 449-451.

We have not allowed States much leeway to regulate even
the actual abortion procedure. Although a State can
require that second trimester abortions be performed in
outpatient clinics, see Simopoulos v. Virginia,462 U.S. 506
(1983), we concluded in Akron and Ashcroft that a State
could not require that such abortions be performed only in
hospitals. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, supra, at 437-439; Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,supra, at 481-482.
Despite the fact that Roe expressly allowed regulation after
the first trimester in furtherance of maternal health, " `present medical knowledge,' " in our view, could not justify
such a hospitalization requirement under the trimester
framework. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
supra, at 437 (quoting Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163). And in
Danforth, the Court held that Missouri could not outlaw the
saline amniocentesis method of abortion, concluding that
the Missouri Legislature had "failed to appreciate and to
consider several significant facts" in making its decision.
428 U. S., at 77.

Although Roe allowed state regulation after the point of
viability to protect the potential life of the fetus, the Courtsubsequently rejected attempts to regulate in this manner.
In Colautti v. Franklin,439 U.S. 379 (1979), the Court
struck down a statute that governed the determination of
viability. Id., at 390-397. In the process, we made clear
that the trimester framework incorporated only one
definition of viability--ours--as we forbade States from
deciding that a certain objective indicator--"be it weeks of
gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor"--should
govern the definition of viability. Id., at 389. In that same
case, we also invalidated a regulation requiring a physician
to use the abortion technique offering the best chance for
fetal survival when performing postviability abortions. See
id., at 397-401; see also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,supra, at 768-769 (invalidating a similar regulation). In Thornburgh, the Court
struck down Pennsylvania's requirement that a second
physician be present at postviability abortions to help
preserve the health of the unborn child, on the ground that
it did not incorporate a sufficient medical emergency
exception. Id., at 769-771. Regulations governing the
treatment of aborted fetuses have met a similar fate. In
Akron, we invalidated a provision requiring physicians
performing abortions to "insure that the remains of the
unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary
manner." 462 U. S., at 451 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Dissents in these cases expressed the view that the Court
was expanding upon Roe in imposing ever greater restrictions on the States. See Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 783 (Burger,
C. J., dissenting) ("The extent to which the Court has
departed from the limitations expressed in Roe is readily
apparent"); id., at 814 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
majority indiscriminately strikes down statutory provisions
that in no way contravene the right recognized in Roe").
And, when confronted with State regulations of this type in
past years, the Court has become increasingly more divided:the three most recent abortion cases have not commanded
a Court opinion. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota,497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,492 U.S. 490 (1989).

The task of the Court of Appeals in the present case was
obviously complicated by this confusion and uncertainty.
Following Marks v. United States,430 U.S. 188 (1977), it
concluded that in light of Webster and Hodgson, the strict
scrutiny standard enunciated in Roe was no longer applicable, and that the "undue burden" standard adopted by
Justice O'Connor was the governing principle. This state
of confusion and disagreement warrants reexamination of
the "fundamental right" accorded to a woman's decision to
abort a fetus in Roe, with its concomitant requirement that
any state regulation of abortion survive "strict scrutiny."
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S.

We have held that a liberty interest protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be
deemed fundamental if it is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937). Three years earlier, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,291 U.S. 97 (1934), we referred to a "principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental." Id., at 105; see also Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(citing the language from Snyder). These expressions are
admittedly not precise, but our decisions implementing this
notion of "fundamental" rights do not afford any more
elaborate basis on which to base such a classification.

In construing the phrase "liberty" incorporated in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have
recognized that its meaning extends beyond freedom from
physical restraint. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,268 U.S. 510 (1925), we held that it included a parent's right to send
a child to private school; in Meyer v. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390 (1923), we held that it included a right to teach a
foreign language in a parochial school. Building on these
cases, we have held that that the term "liberty" includes a
right to marry, Loving v. Virginia,388 U.S. 1 (1967); a
right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,316 U.S. 535 (1942); and a right to use contraceptives.
Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird,405 U.S. 438 (1972). But a reading of these
opinions makes clear that they do not endorse any all encompassing "right of privacy."

In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized a "guarantee of
personal privacy" which "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U. S., at 152-153. We are now of the view
that, in terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe
read the earlier opinions upon which it based its decision
much too broadly. Unlike marriage, procreation and contraception, abortion "involves the purposeful termination of
potential life." Harris v. McRae,448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
The abortion decision must therefore "be recognized as sui
generis, different in kind from the others that the Court has
protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy and
autonomy." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra, at 792 (White, J., dissenting). One cannot ignore the fact that a woman is not
isolated in her pregnancy, and that the decision to abort
necessarily involves the destruction of a fetus. See Michael
H. v. Gerald D., supra, at 124, n. 4 (To look "at the act
which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in
isolation from its effect upon other people [is] like inquiring
whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun where thecase at hand happens to involve its discharge into another
person's body").

Nor do the historical traditions of the American people
support the view that the right to terminate one's pregnancy is "fundamental." The common law which we inherited from England made abortion after "quickening" an
offense. At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, statutory prohibitions or restrictions on
abortion were commonplace; in 1868, at least 28 of the
then 37 States and 8 Territories had statutes banning or
limiting abortion. J. Mohr, Abortion in America 200 (1978).
By the turn of the century virtually every State had a law
prohibiting or restricting abortion on its books. By the
middle of the present century, a liberalization trend had set
in. But 21 of the restrictive abortion laws in effect in1868 were still in effect in 1973 when Roe was decided,and an overwhelming majority of the States prohibited
abortion unless necessary to preserve the life or healthof the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 139-140; id.,at 176-177, n. 2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On this
record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted
tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history
supported the classification of the right to abortion as "fundamental" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We think, therefore, both in view of this history and of
our decided cases dealing with substantive liberty under the
Due Process Clause, that the Court was mistaken in Roe
when it classified a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy as a "fundamental right" that could be abridged
only in a manner which withstood "strict scrutiny." In so
concluding, we repeat the observation made in Bowers v.
Hardwick,478 U.S. 186 (1986):

"Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view
of our authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacywhen it deals with judge made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution." Id., at 194.

We believe that the sort of constitutionally imposed
abortion code of the type illustrated by our decisions
following Roe is inconsistent "with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking
in general principles, as ours does." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 518 (plurality opinion).
The Court in Roe reached too far when it analogized the
right to abort a fetus to the rights involved in Pierce, Meyer,Loving, and Griswold, and thereby deemed the right to
abortion fundamental.

The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter cannot bring itself to say that Roe was correct as
an original matter, but the authors are of the view that "the
immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution
of the issue, but the precedential force that must be
accorded to its holding." Ante, at 29. Instead of claiming
that Roe was correct as a matter of original constitutional
interpretation, the opinion therefore contains an elaborate
discussion of stare decisis. This discussion of the principle
of stare decisis appears to be almost entirely dicta, because
the joint opinion does not apply that principle in dealing
with Roe. Roe decided that a woman had a fundamental
right to an abortion. The joint opinion rejects that view.
Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be subjected
to "strict scrutiny" and could be justified only in the light of "compelling state interests." The joint opinion rejects that
view. Ante, at 29-30; see Roe v. Wade, supra, at 162-164.
Roe analyzed abortion regulation under a rigid trimester
framework, a framework which has guided this Court's
decisionmaking for 19 years. The joint opinion rejects that
framework. Ante, at 31.

Stare decisis is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as
meaning "to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Black's
Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990). Whatever the "central
holding" of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes
dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle. While
purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion instead
revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a
storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to
give the illusion of reality. Decisions following Roe, such as
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), are
frankly overruled in part under the "undue burden"
standard expounded in the joint opinion. Ante, at 39-42.

In our view, authentic principles of stare decisis do not
require that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be kept
intact. "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal, inexorable
command," especially in cases involving the interpretation
of the Federal Constitution. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Erroneous decisions in such constitutional cases are
uniquely durable, because correction through legislative
action, save for constitutional amendment, is impossible. It
is therefore our duty to reconsider constitutional interpretations that "depar[t] from a proper understanding" of the
Constitution. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U. S., at 557; see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (" `[I]n cases involving the Federal
Constitution, . . . [t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.' " (quoting
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 406-408
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)));Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). Our constitutional watch does not cease
merely because we have spoken before on an issue; when it
becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation isunsound we are obliged to reexamine the question. See,
e. g.,West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
74-78 (1938).

The joint opinion discusses several stare decisis factors
which, it asserts, point toward retaining a portion of Roe.
Two of these factors are that the main "factual underpinning" of Roe has remained the same, and that its doctrinal
foundation is no weaker now than it was in 1973. Ante, at
14-18. Of course, what might be called the basic facts
which gave rise to Roe have remained the same--women
become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending on
medical technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and
women give birth to children. But this is only to say that
the same facts which gave rise to Roe will continue to give
rise to similar cases. It is not a reason, in and of itself, why
those cases must be decided in the same incorrect manner
as was the first case to deal with the question. And surely
there is no requirement, in considering whether to depart
from stare decisis in a constitutional case, that a decision be
more wrong now than it was at the time it was rendered.
If that were true, the most outlandish constitutional
decision could survive forever, based simply on the fact that
it was no more outlandish later than it was when originally
rendered.

Nor does the joint opinion faithfully follow this alleged
requirement. The opinion frankly concludes that Roe and
its progeny were wrong in failing to recognize that the
State's interests in maternal health and in the protection of
unborn human life exist throughout pregnancy. Ante,
29-31. But there is no indication that these components of
Roe are any more incorrect at this juncture than they were
at its inception.

The joint opinion also points to the reliance interests
involved in this context in its effort to explain why precedent must be followed for precedent's sake. Certainly it is
true that where reliance is truly at issue, as in the case ofjudicial decisions that have formed the basis for private
decisions, "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at
their acme." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S., at ---- (slip op.,
at 18). But, as the joint opinion apparently agrees, ante, at
13-14, any traditional notion of reliance is not applicable
here. The Court today cuts back on the protection afforded
by Roe, and no one claims that this action defeats any
reliance interest in the disavowed trimester framework.
Similarly, reliance interests would not be diminished were
the Court to go further and acknowledge the full error of
Roe, as "reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of" this action. Ante, at 14.

The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described as an unconventional--and unconvincing--notion of
reliance, a view based on the surmise that the availability
of abortion since Roe has led to "two decades of economic
and social developments" that would be undercut if the
error of Roe were recognized. Ibid. The joint opinion's
assertion of this fact is undeveloped and totally conclusory.
In fact, one can not be sure to what economic and social
developments the opinion is referring. Surely it is dubious
to suggest that women have reached their "places in
society" in reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of
their determination to obtain higher education and compete
with men in the job market, and of society's increasing
recognition of their ability to fill positions that were
previously thought to be reserved only for men.Ibid.

In the end, having failed to put forth any evidence to
prove any true reliance, the joint opinion's argument is
based solely on generalized assertions about the national
psyche, on a belief that the people of this country have
grown accustomed to the Roe decision over the last 19 years
and have "ordered their thinking and living around" it.
Ibid. As an initial matter, one might inquire how the joint
opinion can view the "central holding" of Roe as so deeply
rooted in our constitutional culture, when it so casually
uproots and disposes of that same decision's trimesterframework. Furthermore, at various points in the past, the
same could have been said about this Court's erroneous
decisions that the Constitution allowed "separate but equal"
treatment of minorities, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), or that "liberty" under the Due Process Clause
protected "freedom of contract." See Adkins v. Children's
Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The "separate but equal" doctrine lasted 58 years after Plessy, and Lochner's protection
of contractual freedom lasted 32 years. However, the simple fact that a generation or more had grown used to these
major decisions did not prevent the Court from correcting
its errors in those cases, nor should it prevent us from
correctly interpreting the Constitution here. See Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, in upholding Washington's minimum
wage law).

Apparently realizing that conventional stare decisis
principles do not support its position, the joint opinion
advances a belief that retaining a portion of Roe is necessary to protect the "legitimacy" of this Court. Ante, at
19-27. Because the Court must take care to render
decisions "grounded truly in principle," and not simply as
political and social compromises, ante, at 23, the joint
opinion properly declares it to be this Court's duty to ignore
the public criticism and protest that may arise as a result
of a decision. Few would quarrel with this statement,
although it may be doubted that Members of this Court,
holding their tenure as they do during constitutional "good
behavior," are at all likely to be intimidated by such public
protests.

But the joint opinion goes on to state that when the Court "resolve[s] the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases," its decision is
exempt from reconsideration under established principles ofstare decisis in constitutional cases. Ante, at 24. This is so,
the joint opinion contends, because in those "intensely
divisive" cases the Court has "call[ed] the contending sides
of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,"
and must therefore take special care not to be perceived as "surrender[ing] to political pressure" and continued opposition. Ante, at 24-25. This is a truly novel principle, one
which is contrary to both the Court's historical practice and
to the Court's traditional willingness to tolerate criticism of
its opinions. Under this principle, when the Court has
ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented from
overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was
incorrect, unless opposition to the original decision has died
away.

The first difficulty with this principle lies in its assumption that cases which are "intensely divisive" can be readily
distinguished from those that are not. The question of
whether a particular issue is "intensely divisive" enough to
qualify for special protection is entirely subjective and
dependent on the individual assumptions of the members of
this Court. In addition, because the Court's duty is to
ignore public opinion and criticism on issues that come
before it, its members are in perhaps the worst position to
judge whether a decision divides the Nation deeply enough
to justify such uncommon protection. Although many of the
Court's decisions divide the populace to a large degree, we
have not previously on that account shied away from
applying normal rules of staredecisis when urged to
reconsider earlier decisions. Over the past 21 years, for
example, the Court has overruled in whole or in part 34 of
its previous constitutional decisions. See Payne v. Tennessee, supra, at ----, and n. 1 (slip op., at 18-19, and n. 1)
(listing cases).

The joint opinion picks out and discusses two prior Court
rulings that it believes are of the "intensely divisive"
variety, and concludes that they are of comparable dimension to Roe. Ante, at 19-22 (discussing Lochner v. New
York, supra, and Plessy v. Ferguson, supra). It appears to
us very odd indeed that the joint opinion chooses as
benchmarks two cases in which the Court chose not to
adhere to erroneous constitutional precedent, but instead
enhanced its stature by acknowledging and correcting its
error, apparently in violation of the joint opinion's "legitimacy" principle. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
supra; Brown v. Board of Education, supra. One might also
wonder how it is that the joint opinion puts these, and not
others, in the "intensely divisive" category, and how it assumes that these are the only two lines of cases of comparable dimension to Roe. There is no reason to think that
either Plessy or Lochner produced the sort of public protest
when they were decided that Roe did. There were undoubtedly large segments of the bench and bar who agreed with
the dissenting views in those cases, but surely that cannot
be what the Court means when it uses the term "intensely
divisive," or many other cases would have to be added to
the list. In terms of public protest, however, Roe, so far as
we know, was unique. But just as the Court should not
respond to that sort of protest by retreating from the
decision simply to allay the concerns of the protesters, it
should likewise not respond by determining to adhere to the
decision at all costs lest it seem to be retreating under fire.
Public protests should not alter the normal application of
stare decisis, lest perfectly lawful protest activity be
penalized by the Court itself.

Taking the joint opinion on its own terms, we doubt that
its distinction between Roe, on the one hand, and Plessy
and Lochner, on the other, withstands analysis. The joint
opinion acknowledges that the Court improved its stature
by overruling Plessy in Brown on a deeply divisive issue.
And our decision in West Coast Hotel, which overruled
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, and Lochner, was
rendered at a time when Congress was considering President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to "reorganize" thisCourt and enable him to name six additional Justices in the
event that any member of the Court over the age of 70 did
not elect to retire. It is difficult to imagine a situation in
which the Court would face more intense opposition to a
prior ruling than it did at that time, and, under the general
principle proclaimed in the joint opinion, the Court seemingly should have responded to this opposition by stubbornly refusing to reexamine the Lochner rationale, lest it lose
legitimacy by appearing to "overrule under fire." Ante, at
25.

The joint opinion agrees that the Court's stature would
have been seriously damaged if in Brown and West Coast
Hotel it had dug in its heels and refused to apply normal
principles of stare decisis to the earlier decisions. But the
opinion contends that the Court was entitled to overrule
Plessy and Lochner in those cases, despite the existence of
opposition to the original decisions, only because both the
Nation and the Court had learned new lessons in the
interim. This is at best a feebly supported, posthoc
rationalization for those decisions.

For example, the opinion asserts that the Court could
justifiably overrule its decision in Lochner only because the
Depression had convinced "most people" that constitutional
protection of contractual freedom contributed to an economy
that failed to protect the welfare of all. Ante, at 19. Surely
the joint opinion does not mean to suggest that people saw
this Court's failure to uphold minimum wage statutes as
the cause of the Great Depression! In any event, the
Lochner Court did not base its rule upon the policy judgment that an unregulated market was fundamental to a
stable economy; it simple believed, erroneously, that "liberty" under the Due Process Clause protected the "right
to make a contract." Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S., at 53.
Nor is it the case that the people of this Nation only
discovered the dangers of extreme laissez faire economics
because of the Depression. State laws regulating maximum
hours and minimum wages were in existence well beforethat time. A Utah statute of that sort enacted in 1896 was
involved in our decision in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898), and other states followed suit shortly afterwards.
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). These statutes were indeed
enacted because of a belief on the part of their sponsors
that "freedom of contract" did not protect the welfare of
workers, demonstrating that that belief manifested itself
more than a generation before the Great Depression.
Whether "most people" had come to share it in the hard
times of the 1930's is, insofar as anything the joint opinion
advances, entirely speculative. The crucial failing at that
time was not that workers were not paid a fair wage, but
that there was no work available at any wage.

When the Court finally recognized its error in West Coast
Hotel, it did not engage in the post hoc rationalization that
the joint opinion attributes to it today; it did not state that
Lochner had been based on an economic view that had
fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be overruled. Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion for the Court
simply recognized what Justice Holmes had previously
recognized in his Lochner dissent, that "[t]he Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract." West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S., at 391; Lochner v. New York,
supra, at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] Constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez faire"). Although the Court
did acknowledge in the last paragraph of its opinion the
state of affairs during the then current Depression, the
theme of the opinion is that the Court had been mistaken
as a matter of constitutional law when it embraced "freedom of contract" 32 years previously.

The joint opinion also agrees that the Court acted
properly in rejecting the doctrine of "separate but equal" in
Brown. In fact, the opinion lauds Brown in comparing it to
Roe. Ante, at 25. This is strange, in that under theopinion's "legitimacy" principle the Court would seemingly
have been forced to adhere to its erroneous decision in
Plessy because of its "intensely divisive" character. To us,
adherence to Roe today under the guise of "legitimacy"
would seem to resemble more closely adherence to Plessy on
the same ground. Fortunately, the Court did not choose
that option in Brown, and instead frankly repudiated
Plessy. The joint opinion concludes that such repudiation
was justified only because of newly discovered evidence that
segregation had the effect of treating one race as inferior to
another. But it can hardly be argued that this was not
urged upon those who decided Plessy, as Justice Harlan
observed in his dissent that the law at issue "puts the
brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of
our fellow citizens, our equals before the law." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is
clear that the same arguments made before the Court in
Brown were made in Plessy as well. The Court in Brown
simply recognized, as Justice Harlan had recognized
beforehand, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
permit racial segregation. The rule of Brown is not tied to
popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a
judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit
racial segregation, no matter whether the public might
come to believe that it is beneficial. On that ground it
stands, and on that ground alone the Court was justified in
properly concluding that the Plessy Court had erred.

There is also a suggestion in the joint opinion that the
propriety of overruling a "divisive" decision depends in part
on whether "most people" would now agree that it should be
overruled. Either the demise of opposition or its progression to substantial popular agreement apparently is
required to allow the Court to reconsider a divisive decision.
How such agreement would be ascertained, short of a public
opinion poll, the joint opinion does not say. But surely even
the suggestion is totally at war with the idea of "legitimacy"
in whose name it is invoked. The Judicial Branch derivesits legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but from
deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of
the popular branches of Government comport with the
Constitution. The doctrine of staredecisis is an adjunct of
this duty, and should be no more subject to the vagaries of
public opinion than is the basic judicial task.

There are other reasons why the joint opinion's discussion
of legitimacy is unconvincing as well. In assuming that the
Court is perceived as "surrender[ing] to political pressure"
when it overrules a controversial decision, ante, at 25, the
joint opinion forgets that there are two sides to any controversy. The joint opinion asserts that, in order to protect its
legitimacy, the Court must refrain from overruling a
controversial decision lest it be viewed as favoring those
who oppose the decision. But a decision to adhere to prior
precedent is subject to the same criticism, for in such a case
one can easily argue that the Court is responding to those
who have demonstrated in favor of the original decision.
The decision in Roe has engendered large demonstrations,
including repeated marches on this Court and on Congress,
both in opposition to and in support of that opinion. A
decision either way on Roe can therefore be perceived as
favoring one group or the other. But this perceived dilemma arises only if one assumes, as the joint opinion does,
that the Court should make its decisions with a view
toward speculative public perceptions. If one assumes
instead, as the Court surely did in both Brown and West
Coast Hotel, that the Court's legitimacy is enhanced by
faithful interpretion of the Constitution irrespective of
public opposition, such self engendered difficulties may be
put to one side.

Roe is not this Court's only decision to generate conflict.
Our decisions in some recent capital cases, and in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), have also engendered
demonstrations in opposition. The joint opinion's message
to such protesters appears to be that they must cease their
activities in order to serve their cause, because theirprotests will only cement in place a decision which by
normal standards of stare decisis should be reconsidered.
Nearly a century ago, Justice David J. Brewer of this Court,
in an article discussing criticism of its decisions, observed
that "many criticisms may be, like their authors, devoid of
good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism
at all." Justice Brewer on "The Nation's Anchor," 57 Albany
L. J. 166, 169 (1898). This was good advice to the Court
then, as it is today. Strong and often misguided criticism
of a decision should not render the decision immune from
reconsideration, lest a fetish for legitimacy penalize freedom
of expression.

The end result of the joint opinion's paeans of praise for
legitimacy is the enunciation of a brand new standard for
evaluating state regulation of a woman's right to abortion--the "undue burden" standard. As indicated above,
Roe v. Wade adopted a "fundamental right" standard under
which state regulations could survive only if they met the
requirement of "strict scrutiny." While we disagree with
that standard, it at least had a recognized basis in constitutional law at the time Roe was decided. The same cannot
be said for the "undue burden" standard, which is created
largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint
opinion. It is a standard which even today does not
command the support of a majority of this Court. And it
will not, we believe, result in the sort of "simple limitation,"
easily applied, which the joint opinion anticipates. Ante, at
13. In sum, it is a standard which is not built to last.

In evaluating abortion regulations under that standard,
judges will have to decide whether they place a "substantial
obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Ante,
at 34. In that this standard is based even more on a judge's
subjective determinations than was the trimester framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent "judges from
roaming at large in the constitutional field" guided only by
their personal views. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at
502 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Because theundue burden standard is plucked from nowhere, the
question of what is a "substantial obstacle" to abortion will
undoubtedly engender a variety of conflicting views. For
example, in the very matter before us now, the authors of
the joint opinion would uphold Pennsylvania's 24-hour
waiting period, concluding that a "particular burden" on
some women is not a substantial obstacle. Ante, at 44. But
the authors would at the same time strike down Pennsylvania's spousal notice provision, after finding that in a "large fraction" of cases the provision will be a substantial
obstacle. Ante, at 53. And, while the authors conclude that
the informed consent provisions do not constitute an "undue
burden," Justice Stevens would hold that they do. Ante,
at 9-11.

Furthermore, while striking down the spousal notice
regulation, the joint opinion would uphold a parental
consent restriction that certainly places very substantial
obstacles in the path of a minor's abortion choice. The joint
opinion is forthright in admitting that it draws this
distinction based on a policy judgment that parents will
have the best interests of their children at heart, while the
same is not necessarily true of husbands as to their wives.
Ante, at 53. This may or may not be a correct judgment,
but it is quintessentially a legislative one. The "undue
burden" inquiry does not in any way supply the distinction
between parental consent and spousal consent which the
joint opinion adopts. Despite the efforts of the joint
opinion, the undue burden standard presents nothing more
workable than the trimester framework which it discards
today. Under the guise of the Constitution, this Court will
still impart its own preferences on the States in the form of
a complex abortion code.

The sum of the joint opinion's labors in the name of stare
decisis and "legitimacy" is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort
of judicial Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to
passers by as a monument to the importance of adhering to
precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new methodof analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is
imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws
regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor "legitimacy"
are truly served by such an effort.

We have stated above our belief that the Constitution
does not subject state abortion regulations to heightened
scrutiny. Accordingly, we think that the correct analysis is
that set forth by the plurality opinion in Webster. A
woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may
regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); cf. Stanley v. Illinois,405 U.S. 645, 651-653 (1972). With this rule in mind, we
examine each of the challenged provisions.

Section 3205 of the Act imposes certain requirements
related to the informed consent of a woman seeking an
abortion. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205 (1990). Section
3205(a)(1) requires that the referring or performing physician must inform a woman contemplating an abortion of (i)
the nature of the procedure, and the risks and alternatives
that a reasonable patient would find material; (ii) the fetus'
probable gestational age; and (iii) the medical risks involved
in carrying her pregnancy to term. Section 3205(a)(2)
requires a physician or a nonphysician counselor to inform
the woman that (i) the state health department publishes
free materials describing the fetus at different stages and
listing abortion alternatives; (ii) medical assistance benefits
may be available for prenatal, childbirth, and neonatal care;
and (iii) the child's father is liable for child support. The
Act also imposes a 24-hour waiting period between the time
that the woman receives the required information and thetime that the physician is allowed to perform the abortion.
See Appendix, ante, at 61-63.

This Court has held that it is certainly within the
province of the States to require a woman's voluntary and
informed consent to an abortion. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U. S., at 760. Here, Pennsylvania seeks to further its
legitimate interest in obtaining informed consent by
ensuring that each woman "is aware not only of the reasons
for having an abortion, but also of the risks associated with
an abortion and the availability of assistance that might
make the alternative of normal childbirth more attractive
than it might otherwise appear." Id., at 798-799 (White,
J., dissenting).

We conclude that this provision of the statute is rationally related to the State's interest in assuring thata woman's consent to an abortion be a fully informeddecision.

Section 3205(a)(1) requires a physician to disclose certain
information about the abortion procedure and its risks and
alternatives. This requirement is certainly no large burden,
as the Court of Appeals found that "the record shows that
the clinics, without exception, insist on providing this
information to women before an abortion is performed."
947 F. 2d, at 703. We are of the view that this information "clearly is related to maternal health and to the State's
legitimate purpose in requiring informed consent." Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S., at 446.
An accurate description of the gestational age of the fetus
and of the risks involved in carrying a child to term helps
to further both those interests and the State's legitimate
interest in unborn human life. See id., at 445-446, n. 37
(required disclosure of gestational age of the fetus "certainly
is not objectionable"). Although petitioners contend that it
is unreasonable for the State to require that a physician, as
opposed to a nonphysician counselor, disclose this information, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a State "mayrationally decide that physicians are better qualified than
counselors to impart this information and answer questions
about the medical aspects of the available alternatives."
947 F. 2d, at 704.

Section 3205(a)(2) compels the disclosure, by a physician
or a counselor, of information concerning the availability of
paternal child support and state funded alternatives if the
woman decides to proceed with her pregnancy. Here again,
the Court of Appeals observed that "the record indicates
that most clinics already require that a counselor consult in
person with the woman about alternatives to abortion
before the abortion is performed." Id., at 704-705. And
petitioners do not claim that the information required to be
disclosed by statute is in any way false or inaccurate;
indeed, the Court of Appeals found it to be "relevant,
accurate, and non inflammatory." Id., at 705. We conclude
that this required presentation of "balanced information" is
rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in
ensuring that the woman's consent is truly informed,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 830 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
and in addition furthers the State's interest in preserving
unborn life. That the information might create some
uncertainty and persuade some women to forgo abortions
does not lead to the conclusion that the Constitution forbids
the provision of such information. Indeed, it only demonstrates that this information might very well make a difference, and that it is therefore relevant to a woman's
informed choice. Cf. id., at 801 (White, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ostensible objective of Roe v. Wade is not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing choice"). We
acknowledge that in Thornburgh this Court struck down
informed consent requirements similar to the ones at issue
here. See id., at 760-764. It is clear, however, that while
the detailed framework of Roe led to the Court's invalidation of those informational requirements, they "would have
been sustained under any traditional standard of judicialreview, . . . or for any other surgical procedure except
abortion." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U. S., at 517 (plurality opinion) (citing Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U. S., at 802 (White, J., dissenting); id., at 783 (Burger, C.
J., dissenting)). In light of our rejection of Roe's "fundamental right" approach to this subject, we do not regard Thornburgh as controlling.

For the same reason, we do not feel bound to follow this
Court's previous holding that a State's 24-hour mandatory
waiting period is unconstitutional. See Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S., at 449-451.
Petitioners are correct that such a provision will result in
delays for some women that might not otherwise exist,
therefore placing a burden on their liberty. But the
provision in no way prohibits abortions, and the informed
consent and waiting period requirements do not apply in
the case of a medical emergency. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§§ 3205(a), (b) (1990). We are of the view that, in providing
time for reflection and reconsideration, the waiting period
helps ensure that a woman's decision to abort is a well considered one, and reasonably furthers the State's legitimate interest in maternal health and in the unborn life of
the fetus. It "is surely a small cost to impose to ensure that
the woman's decision is well considered in light of its
certain and irreparable consequences on fetal life, and the
possible effects on her own." Id., at 474 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).

In addition to providing her own informed consent, before
an unemancipated woman under the age of 18 may obtain
an abortion she must either furnish the consent of one of
her parents, or must opt for the judicial procedure that
allows her to bypass the consent requirement. Under the
judicial bypass option, a minor can obtain an abortion if a
state court finds that she is capable of giving her informedconsent and has indeed given such consent, or determines
that an abortion is in her best interests. Records of these
court proceedings are kept confidential. The Act directs the
state trial court to render a decision within three days of
the woman's application, and the entire procedure, including appeal to Pennsylvania Superior Court, is to last no
longer than eight business days. The parental consent
requirement does not apply in the case of a medical
emergency. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3206 (1990). See Appendix, ante, at 64-65.

This provision is entirely consistent with this Court's
previous decisions involving parental consent requirements.
See Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo.,
Inc. v. Ashcroft,462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding parental
consent requirement with a similar judicial bypass option);
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,supra, at
439-440 (approving of parental consent statutes that
include a judicial bypass option allowing a pregnant minor
to "demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an
abortion would be in her best interests"); Bellotti v. Baird,443 U.S. 622 (1979).

We think it beyond dispute that a State "has a strong and
legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens,
whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may
sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S., at 444 (opinion
of Stevens, J.). A requirement of parental consent to
abortion, like myriad other restrictions placed upon minors
in other contexts, is reasonably designed to further this
important and legitimate state interest. In our view, it is
entirely "rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in
most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or
even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and
mature." Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497
U. S., at 520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91(Stewart, J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that the
State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and
advice of her parents in making the very important decision
whether or not to bear a child"). We thus conclude that
Pennsylvania's parental consent requirement should be
upheld.

Section 3209 of the Act contains the spousal notification
provision. It requires that, before a physician may perform
an abortion on a married woman, the woman must sign a
statement indicating that she has notified her husband of
her planned abortion. A woman is not required to notify
her husband if (1) her husband is not the father, (2) her
husband, after diligent effort, cannot be located, (3) the
pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual assault that has
been reported to the authorities, or (4) the woman has
reason to believe that notifying her husband is likely to
result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by him or
by another individual. In addition, a woman is exempted
from the notification requirement in the case of a medical
emergency. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3209 (1990). See Appendix, ante, at 68-69.

We first emphasize that Pennsylvania has not imposed a
spousal consent requirement of the type the Court struck
down in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U. S., at 67-72. Missouri's spousal consent provision
was invalidated in that case because of the Court's view
that it unconstitutionally granted to the husband "a veto
power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no
reason at all." Id., at 71. But this case involves a much
less intrusive requirement of spousal notification, not
consent. Such a law requiring only notice to the husband "does not give any third party the legal right to make the
[woman's] decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining
an abortion should she choose to have one performed." Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra, at 496 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see H. L.
v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 411, n. 17. Danforth thus does
not control our analysis. Petitioners contend that it should,
however; they argue that the real effect of such a notice
requirement is to give the power to husbands to veto a
woman's abortion choice. The District Court indeed found
that the notification provision created a risk that some
woman who would otherwise have an abortion will be prevented from having one. 947 F. 2d, at 712. For example,
petitioners argue, many notified husbands will prevent
abortions through physical force, psychological coercion, and
other types of threats. But Pennsylvania has incorporated
exceptions in the notice provision in an attempt to deal with
these problems. For instance, a woman need not notify her
husband if the pregnancy is result of a reported sexual
assault, or if she has reason to believe that she wouldsuffer bodily injury as a result of the notification. 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3209(b) (1990). Furthermore, because this is
a facial challenge to the Act, it is insufficient for petitioners
to show that the notification provision "might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances." United States v. Salerno,481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987). Thus, it is not enough for petitioners to show that,
in some "worst case" circumstances, the notice provision
will operate as a grant of veto power to husbands. Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 514.
Because they are making a facial challenge to the provision,
they must "show that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [provision] would be valid." Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). This they have failed to do.
[n.2]

The question before us is therefore whether the spousal
notification requirement rationally furthers any legitimatestate interests. We conclude that it does. First, a husband's interests in procreation within marriage and in the
potential life of his unborn child are certainly substantial
ones. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U. S., at 69 ("We are not unaware of the deep and
proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective
husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying"); id., at 93 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S., at 541. The State
itself has legitimate interests both in protecting these
interests of the father and in protecting the potential life of
the fetus, and the spousal notification requirement is
reasonably related to advancing those state interests. By
providing that a husband will usually know of his spouse's
intent to have an abortion, the provision makes it more
likely that the husband will participate in deciding the fate
of his unborn child, a possibility that might otherwise have
been denied him. This participation might in some cases
result in a decision to proceed with the pregnancy. As
Judge Alito observed in his dissent below, "[t]he Pennsylvania legislature could have rationally believed that some
married women are initially inclined to obtain an abortion
without their husbands' knowledge because of perceived
problems--such as economic constraints, future plans, or
the husbands' previously expressed opposition--that may be
obviated by discussion prior to the abortion." 947 F. 2d, at
726 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The State also has a legitimate interest in promoting "the
integrity of the marital relationship." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 3209(a) (1990). This Court has previously recognized "the
importance of the marital relationship in our society."
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, supra, at
69. In our view, the spousal notice requirement is a
rational attempt by the State to improve truthful communication between spouses and encourage collaborative decisionmaking, and thereby fosters marital integrity. SeeLabine v. Vincent,401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971) ("[T]he power
to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family
life" is committed to the state legislatures). Petitioners
argue that the notification requirement does not further
any such interest; they assert that the majority of wives
already notify their husbands of their abortion decisions,
and the remainder have excellent reasons for keeping their
decisions a secret. In the first case, they argue, the law is
unnecessary, and in the second case it will only serve to
foster marital discord and threats of harm. Thus, petitioners see the law as a totally irrational means of furthering
whatever legitimate interest the State might have. But, in
our view, it is unrealistic to assume that every husband wife relationship is either (1) so perfect that this type of
truthful and important communication will take place as a
matter of course, or (2) so imperfect that, upon notice, the
husband will react selfishly, violently, or contrary to the
best interests of his wife. See Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, supra, at 103-104 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making a similar
point in the context of a parental consent statute). The
spousal notice provision will admittedly be unnecessary in
some circumstances, and possibly harmful in others, but "the existence of particular cases in which a feature of a
statute performs no function (or is even counterproductive)
ordinarily does not render the statute unconstitutional or
even constitutionally suspect." Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 800
(White, J., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Legislature was
in a position to weigh the likely benefits of the provi sion against its likely adverse effects, and presumably
concluded, on balance, that the provision would be beneficial. Whether this was a wise decision or not, we cannot
say that it was irrational. We therefore conclude that the
spousal notice provision comports with the Constitution.
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 325-326 ("It is not themission of this Court or any other to decide whether the
balance of competing interests . . . is wise social policy").

The Act also imposes various reporting requirements.
Section 3214(a) requires that abortion facilities file a report
on each abortion performed. The reports do not include the
identity of the women on whom abortions are performed,
but they do contain a variety of information about the
abortions. For example, each report must include the
identities of the performing and referring physicians, the
gestational age of the fetus at the time of abortion, and the
basis for any medical judgment that a medical emergency
existed. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3214(a)(1), (5), (10) (1990).
See Appendix, ante, at 69-71. The District Court found
that these reports are kept completely confidential. 947
F. 2d, at 716. We further conclude that these reporting
requirements rationally further the State's legitimate
interests in advancing the state of medical knowledge
concerning maternal health and prenatal life, in gathering
statistical information with respect to patients, and in
ensuring compliance with other provisions of the Act.

Section 3207 of the Act requires each abortion facility to
file a report with its name and address, as well as the
names and addresses of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated
organizations. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3207(b) (1990). Section
3214(f) further requires each facility to file quarterly
reports stating the total number of abortions performed,
broken down by trimester. Both of these reports are
available to the public only if the facility received state
funds within the preceding 12 months. See Appendix, ante,
at 65-66, 71. Petitioners do not challenge the requirement
that facilities provide this information. They contend,
however, that the forced public disclosure of the information
given by facilities receiving public funds serves no legitimate state interest. We disagree. Records relating to the
expenditure of public funds are generally available to thepublic under Pennsylvania law. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 65,
§§ 66.1, 66.2 (Purdon 1959 and Supp. 1991-1992). As the
Court of Appeals observed, "[w]hen a state provides money
to a private commercial enterprise, there is a legitimate
public interest in informing taxpayers who the funds are
benefiting and what services the funds are supporting."
947 F. 2d, at 718. These reporting requirements rationally
further this legitimate state interest.

"[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's
good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical
condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the
immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death
or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily
function." § 3203.

Petitioners argued before the District Court that the
statutory definition was inadequate because it did not cover
three serious conditions that pregnant women can suffer--preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and prematurely
ruptured membrane. The District Court agreed with
petitioners that the medical emergency exception was
inadequate, but the Court of Appeals reversed this holding.
In construing the medical emergency provision, the Court
of Appeals first observed that all three conditions do indeed
present the risk of serious injury or death when an abortion
is not performed, and noted that the medical profession's
uniformly prescribed treatment for each of the three
conditions is an immediate abortion. See 947 F. 2d, at700-701. Finding that "[t]he Pennsylvania legislature did
not choose the wording of its medical emergency exception
in a vacuum," the court read the exception as intended "to
assure that compliance with its abortion regulations would
not in any way pose a significant threat to the life or health
of a woman." Id., at 701. It thus concluded that the
exception encompassed each of the three dangerous conditions pointed to by petitioners.

We observe that Pennsylvania's present definition of
medical emergency is almost an exact copy of that State's
definition at the time of this Court's ruling in Thornburgh,
one which the Court made reference to with apparent
approval. 476 U. S., at 771 ("It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how to provide a medical emergency
exception when it chooses to do so").
[n.3]
We find that the
interpretation of the Court of Appeals in this case is
eminently reasonable, and that the provision thus should be
upheld. When a woman is faced with any condition that
poses a "significant threat to [her] life or health," she is
exempted from the Act's consent and notice requirements
and may proceed immediately with her abortion.

For the reasons stated, we therefore would hold that each
of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute is
consistent with the Constitution. It bears emphasis that
our conclusion in this regard does not carry with it any
necessary approval of these regulations. Our task is, as
always, to decide only whether the challenged provisions ofa law comport with the United States Constitution. If, as
we believe, these do, their wisdom as a matter of public
policy is for the people of Pennsylvania to decide.

Notes

1
Two years after Roe, the West German constitutional court, by
contrast, struck down a law liberalizing access to abortion on the grounds
that life developing within the womb is constitutionally protected.
Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (translated in Jonas &
Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 605 (1976)). In 1988, the Canadian Supreme
Court followed reasoning similar to that of Roe in striking down alaw which restricted abortion. Morgentaler v. Queen, 1 S.C.R. 30, 44
D.L.R. 4th 385 (1988).

2
The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
appears to ignore this point in concluding that the spousal notice
provision imposes an undue burden on the abortion decision. Ante, at
45-57. In most instances the notification requirement operates without
difficulty. As the District Court found, the vast majority of wives seekingabortions notify and consult with their husbands, and thus suffer no
burden as a result of the provision. 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1360 (ED Pa.
1990). In other instances where a woman does not want to notify her
husband, the Act provides exceptions. For example, notification is not
required if the husband is not the father, if the pregnancy is the result
of a reported spousal sexual assault, or if the woman fears bodily injury
as a result of notifying her husband. Thus, in these instances as well,
the notification provision imposes no obstacle to the abortion decision.

The joint opinion puts to one side these situations where the regulation
imposes no obstacle at all, and instead focuses on the group of married
women who would not otherwise notify their husbands and who do not
qualify for one of the exceptions. Having narrowed the focus, the joint
opinion concludes that in a "large fraction" of those cases, the notification
provision operates as a substantial obstacle, ante, at 53, and that the
provision is therefore invalid. There are certainly instances where a
woman would prefer not to notify her husband, and yet does not qualify
for an exception. For example, there are the situations of battered
women who fear psychological abuse or injury to their children as a
result of notification; because in these situations the women do not fear
bodily injury, they do not qualify for an exception. And there are
situations where a woman has become pregnant as a result of an
unreported spousal sexual assault; when such an assault is unreported,
no exception is available. But, as the District Court found, there are also
instances where the woman prefers not to notify her husband for a
variety of other reasons. See 744 F. Supp., at 1360. For example, a
woman might desire to obtain an abortion without her husband's
knowledge because of perceived economic constraints or her husband's
previously expressed opposition to abortion. The joint opinion concentrates on the situations involving battered women and unreported
spousal assault, and assumes, without any support in the record, that
these instances constitute a "large fraction" of those cases in which
women prefer not to notify their husbands (and do not qualify for an
exception). Ante, at 53. This assumption is not based on any hard
evidence, however. And were it helpful to an attempt to reach a desired
result, one could just as easily assume that the battered women
situations form 100 percent of the cases where women desire not to
notify, or that they constitute only 20 percent of those cases. But
reliance on such speculation is the necessary result of adopting the
undue burden standard.

" `Medical emergency.'--That condition which, on the basis of the
physician's best clinical judgment, so complicates a pregnancy as to
necessitate the immediate abortion of same to avert the death of the
mother or for which a 24-hour delay will create grave peril of immediate
and irreversible loss of major bodily function." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3203 (Purdon 1983).