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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05796821 Date: 01/07/2016RELEASE IN PART
B6
From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com >
Sent: Friday, January 4, 2013 10:59 AM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov
Subject Fw: H: HIGHLY IMPORTANT! Comprehensive Intel Report on Libya. And drink 8 glasses
of water. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo Comprehensive Intel Report on Libya 010412.docx
Fyi. Worth distributing.
From: Sidney Blumenthal B6
Sent: Friday, January 04, 2013 10:23 AM Eastern Standard Time
To: H
Subject: H: HIGHLY IMPORTANT! Comprehensive Intel Report on Libya. And drink 8 glasses of water. Sid
CONFIDENTIAL
January 4, 2013
For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Comprehensive Intel Report on Libya
SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels
of European governments and Western intelligence and security services.
1. In reviewing the events of the past year, as well as their plans for 2013, Libyan President Mohamed
Magariaf and Prime Minister Ali Zidan discussed their frustration over the pace of efforts to define
the relationship between the legislature and the interim government, establish the authority of this
national government throughout the country, and deal with security issues that have lingered since
the fall of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in late 2011. Speaking on condition of absolute
secrecy, a source with access to the Office of the President stated that during late December 2012
Magariaf and Zidan agreed that they must move quickly to deal with these problematic issues before
they can address their long term strategy of developing productive diplomatic and business
relationships with their neighboring states in North Africa, Western Europe and the United States.
2. (Source Comment: According to this source, while Zidan and Magariaf often disagree on the
mechanics involved in establishing the authority of the government, they are making a concerted
effort to avoid allowing their political differences to complicate their efforts to govern the country.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05796821 Date: 01/07/2016
This individual notes that the two men opposed each other in the August 2012 presidential election
and they have not yet addressed the issue of how best to work together in the next national election,
scheduled for mid-2013. However; they realize the fragile nature of the current Libyan government
and are determined, for the present, to work together on the large national issues, leaving the day to
day political infighting to the members of the General National Council--GNC. This individual
believes these structural problems cannot be addressed in a serious manner until the President and
Prime Minister are able to define their specific roles.)
3. For his part Zidan believes that the government and the National Oil Company (NOC) can
eventually establish new relationships with Western oil firms, allowing Libyans to be trained to fill
jobs at all levels of that industry, including positions previously reserved for foreign experts during
the Qaddafi regime. The Prime Minister stated that this program will cement his popularity with the
Libyan people and allow him to consolidate the role of the government across the country. Zidan
realizes that he does not have enough time to make significant progress on this matter before the next
round of national elections, however; he believes that positive steps in this direction will be popular,
and allow him to gain enough support to establish a basis for a more effective administration.
In the opinion of this individual Magariaf supports Zidan in this matter and is particularly
4.
interested in resolving the ongoing issues regarding the federalist movement in the Eastern Cyrenaica
region (Barqa in Arabic). The President is convinced that finding a reasonable solution to the
demands of the Eastern political and tribal groups will allow the current government to move to
complete its program of disarming the independent militia units left over from the 2011 revolution. At
the same time this will allow the National Libyan Army (NLA) and police forces to deal with militia
units that have established contacts with opposition Salafist groups, as well as Al Qai'da in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM). Magariaf continues to cite the development of Ansar al Sharia as an example of
how a militia or group of militias can establish a relationship with AQIM and other radical
organizations, eventually turning to attack Western interests in the Benghazi region. Magariaf bases
his concerns on the best information available and while he believes that the NLA has made progress
against Ansar al Sharia and similar groups the Army is still limited by the relative weakness of the
government.
(Source Comment: Also in December Zidan, Oil Minister Abdulbari al-Arusi and Italian oil firm
5.
ENI's CEO Paolo Scaroni met at the Prime Minister's office to discuss ENI plans for developing new
operations in Libya. According to an extremely sensitive source, these talks went very well. After the
meeting Zidan noted that Scaroni was obviously extremely anxious to develop a new, special
relationship with the post-revolutionary Libyan government and intended to gain an advantage on
other Western firms looking to do business in the country. This source added that, according to
Zidan's staff, Scaroni proposed a plan calling for an $8.5 billion investment in both ongoing
production and new exploration spread over 10 years. Later, in discussing the meeting, Zidan and his
aides agreed that Scaroni had the full backing of the Italian government in this matter. Zidan added
that his contacts in Rome report that the Italian administration believes this investment in Libya will
help them deal with the long term economic problems they are facing during the current European
debt crisis.)
According to this sensitive source, the Libyans and Scaroni worked out a rough draft of an initial
6.
Memorandum of Understanding, covering an initial investment of approximately $420 million, which
will be finalized before Zidan's planned visit to Rome in late January 2013. Before the Tripoli meeting
ended the Prime Minister requested that Scaroni consider committing ENI to work on additional
operations in the downstream sector under a new office of the Libyan National Oil Corporation, which
the Oil Ministry plans to establish in Benghazi. Zidan noted that ENI began working in Libya in 1958,
and, in his opinion remains the most important international oil company operating in the country.
When Zidan briefed Magariaf on the meeting with Scaroni, the President agreed that the EM
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05796821 Date: 01/07/2016
proposal is an important matter for the new Libyan government, however; he cautioned that the
recent resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti might complicate the affair. Zidan stated
that his contacts in Rome assure him that the importance of the new ENI proposal for Libya
transcends the ongoing political infighting in Rome. Both the Prime Minister and President agreed
that with the prospect of new ENI operations and personnel in Libya, the Army and police forces must
be able to improve security conditions for Western interests throughout the country.
7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this sensitive source, while Magriaf and Zidan have
established a relationship that allows them to work together for the present, they will be unable to
build an effective government administration until they define clearly the roles of the President and
Prime Minister in the post — Qaddafi era.)
8. During late December 2012 Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan complained in private to President
Mohamed Magariaf that the General National Council (GNC) had placed the interim government in
an awkward position by enacting legislation demanding that National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of
Staff General Youssef al Mangoush move to close the country's borders by deploying his troops, along
with loyal Tripoli based militia units, to patrol the borders, in an effort to prevent external groups
from supporting anti-government forces, including the remaining supporters of former dictator
Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source, speaking in strict confidence, Magariaf assured Zidan
that he had no hand in this decision, and that the GNC had acted on its own initiative based on
internal political considerations. The President added that he continues to support Zidan's recent
efforts to establish security relationships with neighboring states, and acknowledged that the GNC
action would complicate this process.
9. (Source Comment: According to this individual, Zidan believes that the factional/regional parties
in the GNC took this step in an effort to gain a greater voice in foreign affairs. The legislation
complicates the implementation of diplomatic agreements regarding border security arranged by
Zidan during a recent trip to Chad, Niger, Algeria and Sudan. These agreements were established in
coordination with Magariaf's earlier security initiative involving the new revolutionary governments
of Tunisia and Egypt. According to this source, the neighboring states agreed to increase border
patrols and to monitor their shared borders with Mali. Speaking privately, Zidan told his closest
advisors that the GNC plan to seal Libya's southern borders would complicate this process and
confuse the North African states regarding who in the Libyan government is responsible for foreign
affairs and security issues.)
10. In the opinion of this sensitive source Magariaf remains committed to the regional security
agreements he reached with the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, and is working with Zidan to
manage the effect of the GNC on their efforts to prevent foreign assistance from reaching dissident
militia groups inside of Libya. As it now stands, the GNC action requires the NLA to act unilaterally
and seal the entire southern border, create a military district along that border, and assign a military
governor with authority under martial law to arrest or detain wanted criminals and dissidents. In
private discussions with Zidan, General Mangoush acknowledged that the southern region continues
to be used by groups smuggling drugs and arms, as well as human traffickers, adding that his best
troops began operating in the region long before the GNC action. The general pointed out that this
area is also used by groups still loyal to the Qaddafi family. At present many of the NLA's best
mechanized units are deployed along the border with South Sudan in an effort to block the shipment
of weapons and supplies to these groups. Mangoush also added in confidence that, in his opinion,
this GNC decision was driven by political calculation rather than concern over security threats, and
signals a potential crisis where GNC deputies attempt to take advantage of institutional weaknesses in
the government administration to assert a degree of authority over security and foreign policy.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05796821 Date: 01/07/2016
11. (Source Comment: According to this source, Zidan shared his frustration with Mangoush,
assuring him that neither he nor his aides had any role in the GNC action. The general was
particularly angered by the fact that assembly's plan was created without consultation with him or his
staff, and did not include any realistic consideration of the NLA's ability to carry out this expanded
mission. Mangoush also noted that a number of GNC deputies criticized the decision as rushed and
without proper internal discussion. In a separate conversation, Mangoush told a senior associate that
he believes Zidan may still suspect that Magariaf had a hand in the GNC action, in an effort to gain a
dominant position in the government. In the opinion of this source, the fact that the GNC action
came shortly after Zidan's visits to the neighboring states to discuss security issues indicates to
Mangoush that Magariaf may be moving to ensure that the GNC, rather than Zidan and his cabinet
control the vital issue of southern security. Mangoush added that, in his opinion, despite Magariaf s
reassurance, the GNC plan, if left as it stands, effectively removes Zidan as the leading policy-maker
on security matters.
12. According to this individual, Zidan is taking a low key approach in reacting to the GNC action,
choosing not to take any step that might indicate infighting between himself and Magariaf. At the
same time the prime minister continues to focus on preserving the validity of the agreements recently
negotiated with Libya's neighboring states. Speaking in private Zidan noted that foreign and security
policy are his responsibility, rather than that of the GNC. This includes the authority to appoint a
commander to oversee the southern military operations. Zidan did note that his choice for military
governor of the South would have to be approved by Magariaf.
13. According to a very sensitive source, the serious nature of the security situation in Libya was
highlighted in early December 2012, when Mangoush received reporting from the French external
intelligence service (Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure — DGSE) that in early May 2012 in
Northern Mali a mutual cooperation agreement was concluded between terrorist groups operating in
North Africa. The meeting was led by al Qai'da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram of
Nigeria, and al Qai'da in East Africa (primarily al Shabaab of Somalia), and was designed to launch
the final phase of a project intended to establish a "caliphate" along an extended strip stretching from
South Sudan, through Libya to Mauritania. These French officials also warn that subsequent
reporting indicates that this effort to concentrate Islamist forces in the region is meeting with a degree
of success. They also warn that these forces are dedicated to "religious cleansing" aimed at the
governments in that area. The DGSE officials noted that they believe the central figure in this effort is
a Somali associated with al Shabaab; Sheik NUR BARUD.
14. In the opinion of this sensitive source the DGSE report highlights the increasingly complex nature
of the security situation in Libya, particularly as regional security continues to deteriorate. Mangoush
is urging both Magariaf and Zidan to present a united front on the issue of national security, and
avoid being caught up in the political infighting in the GNC.
15. (Source Comment: At the same time, this sensitive source states that the debate over the GNC
security legislation is an excellent example of the difficulty Zidan is facing in establishing a working
government administration and effective cabinet. According to this source, Zidan has done a good job
disguising this problem from foreign diplomats and businessmen, but it will be difficult for him to
properly organize the government until these political issues have been addressed. In addition,
Zidan's efforts are complicated by the ongoing legal problems of former National Transitional Council
(NTC) leader Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, who will be questioned by both military and civilian prosecutors
regarding his role in the July2011 assassination of General Abdel-Fattah Younis, Gadhafi's former
interior minister and one of the first major defectors from the old regime. Jalil and 10 other NTC
officials have been charged with Younis' death, though none have been arrested. This individual notes
that a significant number of the advisors and cabinet officials working with Zidan are also former
associates of Jalil under the NTC. This individual believes that this matter further complicates the
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05796821 Date: 01/07/2016
prime minister's efforts to establish an efficient, respected administration before the mid-2013
national elections.)
16. (Source Comment: At the height of the 2011 revolution against the Qaddafi regime, extremely
sensitive reporting indicated that in July and August 2011 NTC security officers discovered evidence
that Younis was in secret contact with Saif al Islam Qaddafi. In response to this report a sensitive
source stated that Jalil ordered NTC security officers to assassinate Younis while en route to a
meeting at NTC headquarters. Jalil then reported that Younis had been killed by Islamist dissidents
among his troops.)