Carlos Bocanegra went to sleep on the evening of Feb. 5 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, expecting to play his 111th game for the U.S. national team the following afternoon.

Entering his seventh year as captain, the 33-year-old center back had been training with most of the projected starters and was by far the most experienced defender at U.S. coach Jurgen Klinsmann’s disposal.

The afternoon sun would be blazing for the World Cup qualifier, and the Estadio Olímpico Metropolitano would be raucous. The two-time World Cup veteran, who was so familiar with the treacherous conditions typically associated with road qualifiers, had every reason to believe he’d soon be leading his teammates onto the field to face high-flying Honduras.

The next morning, however, Klinsmann announced a starting 11 that, according to one source, left Bocanegra in “disbelief.”

Geoff Cameron and Omar Gonzalez, who never had played together, would partner later that day in central defense. Fabian Johnson and Timmy Chandler, two German-born defenders with minimal World Cup qualifying experience, would man the flanks with scant support in front of them.

Bocanegra’s omission wasn’t the only surprise (starters Cameron and forward-turned-midfielder Eddie Johnson had been training with the reserves), but it was the most dramatic. The squad was unsettled.

“It was one of those things where Jurgen woke up the next day and wanted to try something we weren’t familiar with,” a player said.

According to multiple sources, Klinsmann appealed to Bocanegra—now relegated to the bench—for his support during the pregame pep talk. It was described as an awkward, tone-deaf move that surprised several U.S. players and deeply hurt the long-time captain.

Building a case

Sure enough, the U.S. played like a team lacking leadership and an appropriate, coherent plan throughout an ugly 2-1 loss to Honduras.

It wasn’t the defeat itself that proved so troubling—the U.S. always loses two or three matches during the 10-game qualifying gauntlet known as the Hexagonal. It was the manner in which the Americans capitulated. The final score flattered a U.S. squad that spent the majority of the afternoon on its heels, devoid of the energy, possession and ideas Klinsmann intended to deliver.

The performance that day, as well as a lack of obvious improvement during his 19 months in charge, has alarmed the American soccer community and unearthed considerable discontent. The U.S. might have just set out on the road to Brazil, but confidence is on the wane on both sides of the locker room door as the Americans prepare to face Costa Rica (Friday) and Mexico (March 26) in a pair of critical qualifiers.

Over the past several weeks, Sporting News has spoken to 22 individuals with ties to the U.S. national team or its members—including 11 current players based in MLS or abroad. The remaining sources make their living in American soccer and have reliable relationships with players, coaches and executives. Sources were offered anonymity in exchange for their anecdotes, observations and opinions. Those identified by name are Klinsmann and three players who spoke shortly before Sporting News commenced reporting this story.

What emerged over the course of these discussions was near unanimity regarding the players’ flagging faith in Klinsmann, his staff and his methods, along with the squad’s absence of harmony.

In conversation after conversation, the same themes emerged:

— Klinsmann and chief assistant Martin Vasquez either lack the tactical acumen and game-day chops to successfully lead the team or fail to communicate their wishes effectively.

— Too much time and too many resources are spent on initiatives that don’t translate to the field.

— Constant lineup changes and building resentment over the perceived importance and attitude of the German-born players are harming team chemistry.

This group isn’t on the same page with its coach or each other, and the World Cup campaign might be in peril unless that changes. Sources painted a picture of a coach whose big ideas might not fit a team he could be in danger of losing.

Sporting News reached out to U.S. Soccer for comment and spoke to Klinsmann at length Sunday.

The former World Cup champion, who then managed his native Germany to a bronze medal at the 2006 tournament, wasn’t shocked by the fact his players are struggling or confused.

“These comments are just normal to me,” he said. “This team is in a transition. Between two World Cup cycles, faces change. We’re doing that, and you also kind of mix up the chemistry. There will be a new group of leaders coming through that process, and that will be responsible for molding everything together.”

Klinsmann emphasized that he respects predecessor Bob Bradley and the work he did during his five-year tenure but is convinced that progress requires change.

“It’s not the same routine they were used to before we came on board. And my job is to elevate the program and I can’t do that by doing the exact same of what they did before me,” Klinsmann said. “I can only get to another level by bringing in new players and challenging the older players. By challenging them in every training session, by giving them uncertain feelings here and there—‘Do I play or not play?’—and so on.”

Cause for concern

The players felt uncertainty in San Pedro Sula, starting from the moment Bocanegra was benched and continuing into the Olímpico locker room.

“(Klinsmann) didn’t really say how we were going to play. It was a quick turnaround,” one U.S. player recalled. “He just basically said, ‘Guys, we know the importance of the game. We know it’s going to be a tough game down here. They made it a national holiday. They’re going do everything they can.

“ ‘They’re going to bite, kick and scratch. They’re going to do everything to take you out of your game. But at the end of the day, it’s a game. The ball doesn’t change. The way we play doesn’t change. So just go out there and represent yourselves well.’ ”

Honduras certainly did kick—around and through a ponderous U.S. team hoping to survive with an inexperienced back four, a lack of width and the absence of a midfield playmaker who might help possess the ball and alter the tempo.

It looked so much like the September setback in Jamaica that one source said, “You’re judged as a coach based on what he learned from the first round of qualifying. Nothing.”

Immediately after the loss, Klinsmann focused on his team.

“We gave away too many opportunities to this Honduras team, and they took advantage. Too many players didn’t reach their usual potential,” he said. “Too many players kind of were underneath their usual performance.”

Others focused on Klinsmann.

“Several things about the lineup didn’t work,” one of the players told Sporting News. “Sometimes a coach’s biggest mistake is trying to get in who he sees as the best 11 players on the field. But they don’t have to be. You have to have 11 players on the field who are going to work well with each other and be good for each other.”

It was a miserable day that highlighted the disconnect between the team and its manager.

Speaking to reporters immediately following the game, both midfielder Michael Bradley and goalkeeper Tim Howard offered comments that a pair of former national teamers told Sporting News amounted to “cries for help.”

“I think we need to find a way to get a better rhythm,” Howard said. “It’s OK if you have to sit in and form a shell. That’s OK. But even when you do that, you still need to get about the ball, close it down and get out to the flanks.”

Regarding the makeshift defense, Howard told New York’s Daily News, “They never played together in any game, let alone a Hex. The back four is all about jelling. It’s a frying pan. We don’t have time to learn.”

When asked what the U.S. might do better, Bradley said, “I think at times, knowing how to tactically get a little smarter as a team and to know that in different types of games, to stay disciplined and to stay connected without running crazy, but in a smart, solid way, control situations.”

The big questions

It’s not all doom and gloom. Klinsmann has enjoyed some good results. The U.S. was a program-best 9-2-3 last year, finally beat Mexico at the Estadio Azteca and finished atop its semifinal round World Cup qualifying group.

But the record papered over the fact the soccer often left something to be desired. There was a lack of consistency and a lot of ugly wins, which matters when the coach talks so frequently about style. Klinsmann’s decisions came under scrutiny.

Most observers agree that the combination of physical fitness, technical precision and proactive play Klinsmann targeted so publicly and passionately remains elusive. Meanwhile, after more than a year and a half in charge—and as that game in Honduras suggests—his lineups and tactics still confound.

On the surface, the frustration has been tempered by reasonable mitigating factors. First and foremost, the sort of cultural shift Klinsmann hopes to spark can’t happen overnight.

Teaching players to challenge their assumptions and to consider new approaches to their sport, their careers and in some cases their lifestyles is a tall task, especially when a national team gathers for only a few days at a time. Injuries, problematic club situations, deep-seated player development issues far beyond Klinsmann’s control, rough road trips and his effort to broaden the U.S. talent pool have added to the growing pains.

It’s also important to note, as multiple sources stressed, that no team is completely happy and harmonious—especially after a tough loss.

“Every team I’ve been on, there have always been guys who don’t buy in,” one national team player said, echoing several others. “There’s always been trouble with adjustments as far as applying what the coach has to say. That’s nothing new.”

But the trouble with the national team goes beyond a disgruntled player or two. According to sources, there is a lack of understanding and confidence in Klinsmann’s message and method, even among those who get regular minutes, which is worthy of concern considering what’s at stake for American soccer. That disconnect can be boiled down to two fundamental questions: How long should the transition take and who is expected to conform to whom?

Klinsmann made his opinion clear Sunday. He believes the U.S. will qualify for the World Cup and that his job is to identify the players with the talent, fortitude and commitment to meet the standard set by the sport’s elite nations. Catching up requires extra work and a ton of motivation. Comprehension and chemistry start from within.

“This is what we’re trying to tell them. This is what we’re trying to introduce to them. They’re challenged,” he said. “Some guys are out of their comfort zone, absolutely. It’s not actually the coach that has to adjust to the players, to kind of think about it, ‘How do I communicate it perfectly (and) correctly to the players?’

“It’s actually the players’ job to take the information from the coach, with whatever personality the coach has and let it kind of sink into his own system. ... Now, I have to implement it in my own way. It’s a learning process, and that’s fine.

“It’s never going to happen if you don’t start doing it.”

Troubling tactics

“Have you read Philipp Lahm’s book?”

That was the response from a U.S. national team player when asked about the tactical issues the U.S. is experiencing under Klinsmann and Vasquez.

Lahm, the German national team captain, wrote an autobiography two years ago in which he criticized several former coaches, including Klinsmann. The pair worked together when Klinsmann managed Germany from 2004 to 2006 and Bayern Munich in 2008-09.

“We practiced little more than fitness (at Bayern). Tactical things were neglected. The players had to get together before (games) to discuss how we wanted to play,” Lahm wrote. “After six or eight weeks, all the players knew it wouldn't work with Klinsmann. The rest of the season was damage limitation."

Klinsmann, with Vasquez in tow, failed to last the 2008-09 season at Bayern and didn’t coach again until hired by U.S. Soccer president Sunil Gulati in the summer of ’11. He responded to Lahm’s criticism shortly after taking the U.S. job, telling ESPN, “It's basically a player's perspective that never has the coaching perspective. He doesn't see the big picture.”

Klinsmann’s perspective is a wide one. Curious, humble and thirsty for knowledge, he leaves no stone unturned while working tirelessly to forge the next generation of American soccer player.

Not only is his commitment to fitness on the cutting edge—the U.S. now travels with a fully stocked, portable gym and the players undergo routine tests and screening—he is willing to try just about anything if there’s a chance it might offer his team an edge. From yoga, meetings with a full-time nutritionist and field trips to historic sites to media training, motivational speakers and “aptitude tests, like an IQ test,” Clint Dempsey told Sports Illustrated last year, Klinsmann’s players work long hours in pursuit of holistic, 24/7 excellence.

There usually are two practice sessions a day, along with additional physical activity like bike work and yoga. Blood tests are common. There are meetings and team meals and little freedom to head out in the evenings.

All of which might build better men. But the players are starting to wonder if it has anything to do with building a winning team. Lahm’s words could have been a cheap shot. But they resonate.

“We do all this stuff. OK, it’s good for us and it’s scientifically proven. But in the end it’s a round ball. The Pelés and the Maradonas in the world weren’t doing all these things,” a U.S. player said. “I think we spend more time worrying about gyms and nutrition, and we don’t do enough of what we need to do on the field.”

Another source said the players are “overtrained and undercoached.”

It’s no secret that when Klinsmann was revitalizing the German national team ahead of the ’06 World Cup, it was assistant coach Joachim Löw who deserved a significant part of the credit. Klinsmann said so himself, telling Der Spiegel, “If Joachim Löw is better at noticing wrong positioning strategy, I can't cut him off just because I'm the head coach. I have to hold myself back and observe why and how Jogi does and explains things.”

Germany’s swashbuckling style earned plenty of admirers en route to the bronze medal in ’06 and Die Mannschaft has continued its winning ways under Löw, who took over when Klinsmann resigned following the World Cup. Meanwhile, Klinsmann hasn’t enjoyed the same acclaim working with Vasquez, a Mexican native who moved to Los Angeles as a child. The pair met after the German immigrated to California around a dozen years ago.

Vasquez, the first man to play for both the Mexican and U.S. national teams, is a friendly, soft-spoken coach who worked as an assistant with both the L.A. Galaxy and Chivas USA before joining Klinsmann in Munich. After Klinsmann was fired, Vasquez returned to the U.S. and earned his first opportunity to run a team.

Chivas USA appeared to be the ideal fit, but after a disastrous 2010 season that remains the struggling club’s worst since its inaugural year (’05), Vasquez was cut loose. His performance was panned in domestic soccer circles. When Klinsmann reached out to his old friend for help with the national team, Vasquez was working with kids as the director of Real Salt Lake’s academy in Arizona.

Only one source said Vasquez was up to the job as Klinsmann’s primary tactician. Whether it was Vasquez’s basic and repetitive training sessions, his inscrutable explanations or simply a lack of command, responsiveness or charisma, plenty of other sources had at least one comment referencing Vasquez as a decent guy who’s in over his head.

There also is the feeling that Klinsmann’s deputy should act as a foil. That sentiment was echoed by a player who, when asked about Vasquez, simply said, “Jurgen could use an assistant who doesn’t just say ‘yes’ all the time.”

Klinsmann stressed Sunday that he had “100 percent confidence” in Vasquez. “He’s an outstanding coach and we’re thrilled to have him,” he said.

To add to the confusion, multiple sources reported that Klinsmann’s training camps often are conducted in a “manic” fashion, with the manager frequently altering the schedule on short notice.

“He’s just scatterbrained,” a player said.

“He coaches based on feeling,” another source said.

And therein lies that disconnect. Players value rhythm and predictability. They don’t want to wait until the morning of the game to learn who’s starting, which one former national teamer called “the worst thing you could possibly do.”

In 2007 or ’08, several players went to Bob Bradley and asked him to announce his lineup on the night before a match rather than the day of, and he complied. Athletes prefer to prepare for the opponent and the task at hand. They want to practice how they’re going to play.

One U.S. regular, when asked how frequently Klinsmann deploys a lineup or formation that wasn’t practiced before the game, answered “70/30.”

So 30 percent of the time, they take the field feeling confused. And that’s just the beginning of the players’ struggle to get the information they need.

Klinsmann is a masterful communicator in many ways. He’s brilliant with both fans and media and is more accessible and outgoing than any national team predecessor. He’s the face American soccer needed and, according to several players, is readily available for feedback and counsel.

“In past camps I’ve been to, I never got any feedback whatsoever,” Davis said prior to the exhibition against Canada. “I went up to (Klinsmann) and kind of explained the way things had gone in the past with myself, personally, and said, ‘If you have any feedback before the end of camp, to know what you guys think about where I stand. ... He was like, ‘Oh, absolutely. We’ll have a sit-down interview. Things have been going well so far. We’ve been impressed.’ This kind of casual conversation, how they run things, was a good sign.”

But that give-and-take seems to end on game day, when the players often feel unsure of their roles and responsibilities. Klinsmann insisted, “The specific guidelines and specific information that they need, they always get them very, very accurately from us.”

But Lahm’s claim that he was forced to work through tactics with teammates rings true with the men now taking the field.

One player said a typical pregame instruction will be something like, “Go express yourself,” while another source recalled that players returning from Honduras claimed, “He just threw guys out there and played.”

A different player said that at halftime of the qualifier in San Pedro Sula, with the U.S. fortunate to be level at 1-1, Klinsmann, “Didn’t really say that much. Just, ‘C’mon, we’ve got to win this game. They scored an unbelievable (tying) goal, and we can’t do anything about that. We’re going to win this game.’ It was never, ‘We need to do this. We need to change this.’ ”

That same player continued, “It’s always motivational. He’s a great motivator. He can make you feel you’re better than what you are.”

But that wasn’t good enough in Honduras, and there has been a bit of locker room whiplash since Klinsmann took over for Bob Bradley. The 2010 World Cup coach lacked the German’s charm and big-picture ambition, but Bradley was a meticulous tactician who constructed a coherent system that made the most of the talent at his disposal.

“Bob was better at getting his message across. There was more of an identity,” a player said. “We’re still coming to terms with that (under Klinsmann). ... Sometimes the message they’re trying to get across isn’t relayed the best, or as players we don’t apply it. It’s just different.”

Whether it’s the message or the interpretation, players now feel unprepared. They have questions.

One asked why the 4-4-2 formation that was so effective against Slovenia in the fall of 2011 hasn’t been used more often. A second player wondered how 14 months later the U.S. could look so disjointed in January’s scoreless draw against Canada after spending nearly three weeks together. Another asked why the U.S. is 1-2-1 in road World Cup qualifiers under Klinsmann, despite taking the lead in all four. And a fourth posed the biggest question of all: Is the U.S. even ready to play the style Klinsmann wants to see?

“They want us to play the beautiful game, but we’re not a technical team like the Germans. We’re not Spain or Brazil,” the player said. “What we’re good at is we work hard, we fight and we compete. We have great athletes and we’re a good counterattacking team. Maybe we need to go back to what we’re good at.”

The confusion persists.

Klinsmann said it’s all by design.

“They all want the safety net. They want to always feel comfortable, but if you want to elevate the program to another level, you need to go to a phase of being uncomfortable out there and then deal with that,” he said.

He doesn’t want players knowing the lineups before game day because he wants them competing hard up until the last minute (and not sharing the information with confidants who might leak it to the press).

As for unexpected changes in tactics or formation, well, dealing with that is part of being an elite player as well.

“On that level that we operate," Klinsmann told Sporting News on Sunday, "and maybe I’m a bit different from whoever was there before, you expect players to adjust right away to different tasks on the training field, to different formations, to different ways of solving problems. That goes back basically to leaving their comfort zone. We do that in training sessions, too. And, yeah, it makes them kind of worried.”

“Now suddenly it’s a higher level. Suddenly I have to adjust in training or suddenly I don’t know if I’m in the starting 11. Or I have to switch (formations) and still I have to solve it on the field. I have to build chemistry with the guy I never see when I come into camp. When all those elements we throw at them now, because if we don’t do it, it’s too late in the World Cup.”

Chemistry calamity

Klinsmann has fielded 23 different lineups in his 23 games in charge. Based upon the qualifying roster he announced Monday afternoon, which excludes Bocanegra, Howard, Chandler, Fabian Johnson and a few more familiar names, it soon will be 24 in 24.

It’s an astonishing statistic and certainly not entirely Klinsmann’s fault. Injuries and club commitments can create depth-chart chaos and are the bane of every national team coach. The upheaval highlights some of Klinsmann’s positive qualities as well—he’s willing to give new or unheralded players an opportunity and is even happy to be wrong about an individual he previously dismissed.

But if the picture Lahm painted applies to the U.S., then that lack of continuity doesn’t bode well. It’s tough enough if players don’t understand precisely what Klinsmann and Vasquez want. It’s even tougher if they don’t understand each other.

“Coming into these camps, certain players aren’t in the same situation and on the same page on the field. It’s frustrating,” a player said.

The divide is clear, deepening and international. For several U.S. born players, the increasing stature of Jermaine Jones, Danny Williams, Fabian Johnson and Chandler (and to a far lesser extent, Terrence Boyd)—all German born sons of American servicemen—is harming team chemistry.

“They stay to themselves. Jermaine is the leader, and the rest of them follow him,” one player said. “I don’t know if they don’t care."

“It’s like they’re here and they enjoy it, but they don’t care as much as you should to play for the national team,” said another player.

It wouldn’t be a shock if the German-born players kept to themselves. Cliques are natural. There are cultural and language issues in play and Jones, the leader, has been a U.S. regular for only two years. But the U.S. natives who spoke to Sporting News were bothered, however, by how those differences manifest themselves on the field.

“We need more guys around who understand what it takes to get through these games, knowing what the meaning of going to Honduras away, where the pitch is going to be (crap), the weather is going to be bad and you have to do everything you can,” a player said.

Such mentality was absent in San Pedro Sula.

“(Klinsmann) isn’t going to bring them all the way from Germany and sit them down,” the same player said. “But Bocanegra, who’s the most capped guy on the team, isn’t playing. Everybody found that a bit disturbing, not having our captain. That guy has the most leadership in the squad and to not have him in a game like that was really peculiar. If you go back and look, when did we get together or have any sort of huddle on the field? It was just everyone on their own terms.

“Everyone was doing their own thing. And it showed.”

The lack of direction from coaches and the “mulligans” some believe have been granted to the German players has damaged the all-for-one camaraderie so evident at the 2010 World Cup. One player talked about how background and self-image can become an issue on the field.

“You play in the Bundesliga. You play in the Premier League. You’re not that player here. Don’t try to be that player here. Come to terms with who you are as a player,” he said. “Nobody should feel that way because they play somewhere. I feel sometimes we try to do too much. This isn’t your club team. We’ve got to find common ground.

“I can’t put it all on Jurgen. When you’re at this level, you should be smart enough as a player and proud enough as an individual to want to do the right thing.”

It could be jealousy or jingoism. Or it could be unfolding exactly as these players describe. Either way, the mere suggestion of a divide, the presence of the smallest shred of doubt when a player takes the field alongside a teammate whose commitment he questions, is enough to turn perception into reality.

Klinsmann claimed adamantly that he has no bias toward players of a certain background or place of employment, and in fact a couple said Klinsmann seems to have more faith in MLS talent than his predecessors. But the coach told Sporting News that it isn’t entirely his responsibility to heal any locker room rifts. He can mix and match roommates, but in the long run it’s up to the players.

“I understand that first there’s always an uncomfortable feeling with every change you bring to a team environment in any industry you work with,” Klinsmann said Sunday, asking, “If any of the players that you talked to said what he can do to solve the problem. ... If they feel that way, which is fair enough, then they can actually do something about it. If the players were to ask a German-American about his background ...”

Looking ahead

Jones and Boyd will be the only German-Americans available for the games against Costa Rica and Mexico, two challenging opponents in four days. Three points at the Azteca are unlikely, and heading into June’s qualifiers at anything less than 1-2-0 surely would increase the tension around the team.

“Things are boiling over,” a source said. “The feeling now is that this is (Klinsmann’s) last chance against Costa Rica.”

The morning of the Honduras qualifier, probably around the same time Bocanegra was seeing his national team career flash before his eyes, Gulati met with a group of reporters at a hotel breakfast. During the conversation, Sporting News asked if he ever spoke with leading U.S. players about Klinsmann or the national team’s direction. Gulati said he did but declined to reveal the content of those conversations.

Even if Gulati is hearing similar concerns, it’s difficult to imagine a coaching change during the Hex. Klinsmann has a mandate and a long-term objective. He also makes a base salary of $2.5 million per year. Financial issues can’t be ignored, and additional upheaval within a team crying out for stability would be counterproductive.

But at some point, if World Cup qualification starts to slip away, there will be calls for change.

A couple of players said Klinsmann might be more suited to the role of general manager or technical director. Perhaps his success with Germany hints he’s more of a visionary who needs a complementary, nuts-and-bolts colleague to handle the day-to-day grind. Perhaps the appointment of another assistant, one with more experience and success coaching American players, would do the trick. Perhaps this team has enough talent to overcome all the aforementioned issues and qualify for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil anyway.

Klinsmann is confident a solution will be found.

“This is not happening overnight,” he said. “I take this conversation, I take it as a positive also with the players, talking more about this process to them. That they really understand that this is not happening overnight. ... The only way we get them to that next level is to run them through this uncomfortable period and they have to learn and they have to swim in the cold water. And we’re going to convince the world later."

He certainly isn’t a lost cause. His commitment to improving individual players and his interest in setting them up for the next stage in their careers is laudable. His desire to lift the U.S. into the sport’s upper echelon represents the sort of ambition for which fans have been dreaming.

But it’s safe to say that a significant number of Klinsmann’s players believe they’re not being put in position to play well and win and that team tactics, rhythm and chemistry have suffered under his watch. Whether such things actually worsened no longer matters. The seed has been planted in the locker room. Klinsmann must find a way to fix it before it takes root.

“I said to Jurgen in New York the night before, ‘You understand right after this press conference is finished, people are going to expect you to walk across the East River,’ ” Gulati said. “That was never going to be the case. We weren’t going to play like Spain the next morning. We don’t have the players to play like Spain.

“But a big part of what Jurgen has tried to do is instill in players the confidence they can do more than they are doing, the confidence in taking risks.”

That confidence has dwindled, replaced by worry. Klinsmann now must win back the locker room. Walking on water might be easier.