With the possible
exception of Genesis 1:1, this verse is the most striking opening of any
book of the Bible. Often missed in the various discussions about
what John means by this elegant and deceptively simple sentence, is the
fact that this verse is poetic. Many commentators have noted
the poetic form of the first 18 verses of John's Gospel - the so-called
"Prologue." Some see in the Prologue an early Christian
hymn; others argue against that view. But few, if any, deny that
John is writing beautiful, rhythmic prose. John captures our
attention with both style and content. He wants to create questions
in the minds of his readers - questions that his Gospel will answer in
full measure. If this verse is poetic in nature, and if the writer
intends to arrest his audience - to grab their attention from the outset
with a striking and consciously enigmatic statement - is it little wonder
that so much has been written about the ultimate meaning of this verse,
and the final clause in particular?

The opening phrase, "In the beginning," is an allusion to
Genesis 1:1. The same phrase in Greek appears in the Greek
translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, which John and his
audience would have been intimately familiar. But whereas Genesis
opens with "In the beginning God," John opens with
"In the beginning was the Word." In the place where
"God" occurs in Genesis, John substitutes "was the
Word" in his Gospel. This juxtaposition of God and the Word -
the interplay between the Word with God and the Word as God - is
one of the primary themes of the Prologue, and the Gospel as a
whole. From the outset, John challenges his audience by introducing
the Word - the Son of God - into places and activities where they would
have expected God to be. The Word never replaces God,
however, but rather is always there beside Him.

The "beginning" is the beginning in Genesis - the first act
of creation, when God made the heavens and the earth. There is
little evidence that Jews in the Second Temple period held a common belief
in an undefined period prior to the creation in Genesis, during which God
created things other than the heavens and the earth. John's audience
would have understood his meaning quite easily, though it would have
surprised and intrigued them: In the beginning, before all creation,
the Word already existed. The Greek word translated "was"
signifies continual existence (see Grammatical Analysis, below).
There is no more hint here of the creation of the Word than there is of
the creation of God.

The Greek for "Word" is LOGOS. Much speculation has
surrounded John's source for this term. Many have suggested Philo as
a likely source. However, recent scholarship has focused more on
Jewish Wisdom tradition, which spoke of God's Word in a metaphoric sense
as having personal attributes. The discovery of a native Jewish
origin for LOGOS has caused most scholars to abandon the notion that
John's Gospel represents an early Gnostic text (championed by Bauer and
others). If John's audience was familiar with the use of LOGOS as a
personified attribute of God, it must be asked whether they would consider
John's LOGOS to be a separate being, or still in some way a
"part" of God - either literally or still an exaggerated
personification. It is impossible to tell with certainty, of course,
but it seems likely that their prior understanding of the term would lead
them to consider the LOGOS primarily a "part" of God, though in
what sense, they could only wait for John to explain. This seems
particularly likely, given that the Wisdom tradition was also poetic in
nature. Thus, John audience would have understood that in the
Beginning, God has with Him His creative Word - the Word by which He spoke
the universe into existence. They would, at this point, perhaps have
more readily thought of the Word as yet another poetic personification of
an attribute of God; it is unlikely they would have assumed that the Word
that was intimately with God was another god, a secondary created being,
whose creation appears nowhere in this passage, and whose existence
stretches back before the beginning of creation.

"The Word was with God." The personal distinction
between God and the Word is clearly expressed. The words
"Word" and "God" in the Greek are both preceded by the
article, specifying a personal reference. This phrase presents
significant difficulties to Modalists.
The word behind "with" denotes an intimate, personal
relationship. It might almost be translated "toward," an
idea echoed in verse 18, where Son is said to be "in the bosom of the
Father." John's audience would now be confronted with a clear
statement that the LOGOS is more than a mere
personification of a divine attribute: The LOGOS
is a personal being, just as the Father is.

"And the Word was God." Here we have what are
certainly the most widely discussed five words in the Bible. Is John
here declaring that the Word is God the Father? A secondary, lesser
god? Or One who possesses Deity in the same measure as the Father,
but is also distinct from the Father? The word "LOGOS" is,
again, preceded by the article. But the word "God" is
not. While Greek possesses the definite article ("the"),
it does not have an indefinite article ("a, an"). In
Greek, the absence of the article usually signifies indefiniteness;
however the grammar here makes that unlikely (see Grammatical Analysis,
below). Definiteness is also a possibility, and indeed, many
commentators and some grammarians see "God" here as a definite
noun. There is a third option: Qualitative. Qualitative
nouns occur in sentences like John 1:1c throughout the NT. They signify
neither definiteness ("the God"), nor indefiniteness
("a god"), but rather attribute all the qualities or attributes
of the noun to the subject of the sentence. If "God" is
qualitative, here, it means that all the attributes or qualities of God -
the same God mentioned in the previous clause - belong to the Son.

Consider the sentence: "Homo Erectus was Man."
Here "Man" is neither definite ("the Man") nor
indefinite ("a man"), but rather qualitative. If I made
this statement to an evolutionist, I would be asserting that our ancient
ancestor possessed all the qualities or attributes of humanity. I am
saying he is truly human. Similarly, John is saying that the LOGOS
is truly God - not the same Person mentioned in the previous clause - but
possessing the same attributes or qualities.

The majority of grammarians who have written on this subject view
"God" in 1:1c as qualitative, though some older grammarians did
not use this term. Some grammarians and most commentators regard
"God" in 1:1c as definite, though their interpretations of this
verse are much the same as those who see it as qualitative. Ultimately, grammar and
context must determine John's intention, and both, it will be argued
below, point conclusively to this verse being accurately paraphrased as
follows:

"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in
existence. The Word was intimately with God.
And the Word was as to His essence, fully God."

"In the beginning" recalls the opening words of

Genesis
1:1: "In the beginning God created the heavens
and the earth." The expression does not refer to a particular moment
of time but assumes a timeless eternity. "Word" is the Greek logos,
which has several meanings. Ordinarily it refers to a spoken word, with
emphasis on the meaning conveyed, not just the sound. Logos,
therefore, is an expression of personality in communication. Scripture
also tells us that it is creative in its power: "By the word [logos,
LXX] of the Lord were the heavens made, their starry host by the breath of
his mouth" (Ps 33:6). This
verse clearly implies that the expression of God had creative power and
called the universe into being. To the Hebrew "the word of God"
was the self-assertion of the divine personality; to the Greek the formula
denoted the rational mind that ruled the universe. John is asserting that
the "Word" is the source of all that is visible and antedates
the totality of the material world.

The use of logos implies that John was endeavoring to bring
out the full significance of the Incarnation to the Gentile world as well
as to the Jewish people. He does not adopt the Greek concept in its
entirety, but he uses this term to indicate that Jesus had universal
rather than local significance and that he spoke with ultimate authority.
He was preexistent, involved in the act of creation, and therefore
superior to all created beings. This presentation lifts Christ above the
materialistic, pagan concept of deities just as the Incarnation brings the
Hebrew concept of God into everyday life.

The preposition "with" in the phrase "the Word was
with God" indicates both equality and distinction of identity along
with association. The phrase can be rendered "face to face
with." It may, therefore, imply personality, coexistence with the
Creator, and yet be an expression of his creative being. The position of
the noun God in the Greek text marks it as a predicate, stressing
description rather than individualization. The "Word" was deity,
one with God, rather than "a god" or another being of the same
class. This is the real meaning of the phrase. Unity of nature rather than
similarity or likeness is implied. The external coexistence and unity of
the Word with God is unmistakably asserted (EBC).

In the beginning—the beginning before all
beginnings, prior to the beginning of Genesis 1:1. The phrase could be
rendered "from all eternity." The expression in Greek
"characterizes Christ as preexistent, thus defining the nature of his
person" (Dana and Mantey). was the Word—Greek, ho logos,
signifying primarily "the Expression"—God expressed, God
explained, God defined (see 1:18). The Greek term logos in
philosophical terminology also denoted the principle of the universe, even
the creative energy that generated the universe (Morris). Thus, Christ as
the Logos is the agent of and the personal expression of the
Creator God. the Word was with God—The preposition translated
"with" is pros. In Koine Greek pros (short for prosôpon
pros prosôpon, "face to face") was used to show intimacy in
personal relationships (see Matt. 13:56; 26:18; Mark 6:3; 14:49; 1 Cor.
13:12; 6:10; 2 Cor. 5:8; Gal.1:18). Thus, for John to say "the Word
was with God" was for him to mean "the Word was face to face
with God" (see Williams’s translation) or "the Word was having
intimate fellowship with God." This speaks of the preincarnate Son’s
relationship with the Father prior to creation—in fact, prior to
everything (see 1:18; 17:5, 24). the Word was God—The Greek
clause underlying this clause stipulates, according to a rule of grammar,
that "the Word" is the subject and "God" is the
predicate nominative. Another particularity of the Greek is that the
article is often used for defining individual identity and often absent in
ascribing quality or character. In the previous clause ("the Word was
with God"), there is an article before "God" (ton theon),
thus pointing to God the Father; in this clause, there is no article
before "God." The distinction, though a fine one, seems to be
intended. In the previous clause, John indicates that the Son was with
God, the Father; in this clause, John indicates that the Son was himself
God (or should we say, deity) but not the God (i.e., God the Father).
Therefore, some translators have attempted to bring out these distinctions
by rendering the last clause as follows: "and what God was the Word
was" (NEB) or "and he was the same as God" (TEV). Thus, we
see that John presents the Word as being eternal, as being with God (the
Father), and as being himself God (or, deity). This is the One who became
flesh and dwelt among men on earth (JFB).

1 John has the phrases
"that which was from the beginning" (1:1) and "he who
was from the beginning" (2:13-14) for the Logos who has become
perceptible to the disciples but is eternally preexistent, since it is
God himself who here gives himself to us. "In the
beginning" in Jn. 1:1 says this specifically of the Logos; the
Logos is before all time, so that no temporal statements can be made
about him. Eternal preexistence is plainly implied (TDNT).

ÊN ("was")
is the indicative imperfect active form of the verb EIMI,
signifying continuous or linear existence in past time. The
contextual contrast is between ÊN and
EGENETO ("to become"),the
continuous preexistence of the LOGOS (v. 1)
and the LOGOS becoming flesh at a specific
point in time (v. 14). "In the beginning, the LOGOS
already was."

The
preexistence of the Word is strongly brought out by the phrase en
arch hn`o logoV(en arche en ho logos, "in the
beginning was the word"). Arch(arche)
according to H. Bietenhard "is an important term in Gk.
philosophy," which means, among other things, "starting point,
original beginning" (DNTT, 1:164). By itself, this may not seem
too significant, for few would debate that we are dealing with the
"original beginning." It is the presence of the verb hn
(en, "was") that brings out the importance of this
phrase. Literally, it could and should be rendered "When the
beginning began, the Word was already there." This is the sense of en
which is in the imperfect tense and implies continuing existence in the
past. So before the beginning began, the Word was already in existence.
This is tantamount to saying that the Word predates time or Creation (EBC).

PROS

with the acc[usative] of a
person, after verbs of remaining, dwelling, tarrying, etc. (which
require one to be conceived of as always turned towards one)...after EIMI...Jn
i.1 (Thayer).

a marker of association,
often with the implication of interrelationships...'the Word was with
God' Jn 1:1 (Louw & Nida)

Some commentators, such as JFB,
above, see PROS in this verse as shorthand
for the idiomatic expression PROSÔPON PROS
PROSÔPON (literally "face to face", RWP,
cf., Moulton). This seems
view is given weight by the context, in which the Son is said to be
"in the bosom of the Father" (v. 18), and thus in the ideal
position to declare the Father to the world.

TON THEON,
literally "the God," is in the accusative case, which makes this
the direct object of the second clause (hO LOGOS
is in the nominative, and is thus the subject). There is no
difference in meaning between THEON here and THEOS
in the next clause; they are the same word in different cases. The
article TON (accusative form of hO)
indicates a personal distinction. As Karl Rahner and others have
noted, the articular form of THEOS
in the New Testament usually refers to the Father (Rahner,
p. 146; Harris, Jesus, p.
47). Thus, saying "the Word was with (the) God" is the
same as saying "the Word was with the Father."

THEOS ÊN
HO LOGOS. The first task of the translator faced with this
clause is to determine the subject. In most sentences or clauses
(such as John 1:1b), the noun in the nominative case is the subject.
The noun in the accusative case is the direct object. However, in
Greek, "copulative" verbs (generally a form of "to be"
or "to become") take the nominative case, not the
accusative. Technically, a copulative verb does not ascribe an
action, but predicates something about the subject. The
"object" of a copulative verb, therefore, is called the "Predicate
Nominative (PN)," not the direct object. As we have seen, ÊN
is a form of the verb "to be." Therefore, both THEOS
and LOGOS are in the nominative case - one is
the subject and the other the PN. In such cases, if one noun has the
article and the other does not, the noun with the article is the subject
(see Dana and Mantey, p. 148; McGaughy,
p. 50; etc.). Thus, hO LOGOS is the
subject of the sentence; THEOS is the PN.
"The Word was God," not "God was the Word."
While the latter is not impossible from the standpoint of pure grammar, McGaughy's
study makes it highly unlikely.

So, John is telling us
something about the LOGOS - that He is THEOS.
The $64,000 question, then, is what does John mean by this? Since THEOS
is anarthrous, does he mean that
the Word was "a god" (indefinite)? Or does he mean that
the Word is God (definite)? Or does he mean that the Word has all
the qualities and attributes of God (qualitative)? To answer this
essential question, we will need to review how several prominent
grammarians have viewed this issue.

Pre-Colwell

Before E.C. Colwell wrote his
landmark study (see below), many scholars viewed THEOS
in John 1:1c as qualitative:

"It is necessarily
without the article (qeoV not`o
qeoV) inasmuch as it describes the nature of the WOrd and does
not identify His Person. It would be pure Sebellianism
to say 'the Word was o qeoV" (Westcott).

"`o
qeoV hn`o logoV (convertible terms) would have been pure
Sabellianism.... The absence of the article here is on purpose and
essential to the true idea" (Robertson, Grammar, pp.
767-768).

"QeoV
must then be taken as implying God, in substance and essence,
not`o qeoV ,'the Father,' in Person....as
in sarx egeneto [John 1:14], sarx
expresses that state into which the Divine Word entered by a
definite act, so in qeoV hn, qeoV
expresses that essence which was His - that He was very
God. So that this verse might be connected thus: the Logos was
from eternity, - was with God (the Father), - and was Himself
God" (Alford).

It is important to note that
these scholars did not use the term "qualitative" to describe
their view of THEOS in John 1:1c. Prior
to Phillip B. Harner's study of qualitative anarthrous predicate nouns
(see below), "qualitative" nouns were viewed more or less as
indefinite nouns. These scholars would probably have described THEOS
as definite, but not as a convertible term with hOTHEOS in John 1:1b. Indeed, Julius
Mantey, in his famous letter to the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society,
cites Colwell's study as 'proving' that THEOS in 1:1c is definite, though
it is clear from what he wrote in his Manual Grammar several years before
that by this he does not see definiteness as requiring convertibility.
Convertible terms are 100% equivalent, such as "Jesus" and
"Son of God" in this sentence: "Jesus is the Son of
God." We can reverse the terms without changing the
meaning: "The Son of God is Jesus." If THEOS
in 1:1c is convertible with hOLOGOS, John would be teaching that the LOGOS
is 100% equivalent to the hOTHEOS
of 1:1b,
which would be conducive to some form of Modalism.1

These scholars all argue that
the anarthrous PN preceding the copulative verb stresses the nature of THEOS.
As we will see, this is precisely the way later scholars described a
"qualitative" noun - one that stresses the qualities,
attributes, or nature of the noun.

In 1933, E.C. Colwell published
his now famous study of the use
of the article with PNs occurring both before and after the verb.
Colwell began by identifying a number of PNs that he believed were
definite by virtue of the context. He then performed a statistical
analysis of their occurrence - either before or after the verb - and with
the article or without. He found that 87% of definite PNs before the
verb occurred without the article. He "tentatively" offers
a rule that, in part, stipulates: "Definite predicate nouns which
precede the verb usually lack the article" (Colwell,
p. 20). Colwell reasons:

But it is in the realm of
translation and interpretation that the data presented here have their
most valuable application. They show that a predicate nominative
which precedes the verb cannot be translated as an indefinite or a
"qualitative" noun solely because of the absence of the
article; if the context suggests that the predicate is definite, it
should be translated as a definite noun in spite of the absence of the
article (IBID, p. 20).

Thus, Colwell's study indicates
that THEOS in John 1:1c should not be
translated as an indefinite noun solely on the basis of the absence
of the article. Colwell, like most grammarians prior to Harner (see
below), considered "qualitative" nouns to be more or less
equivalent to indefinite nouns. Recall, though, that Colwell studied
only nouns that he had identified as definite based on the context - he
did not study all nouns in the New Testament. Thus, some scholars
have questioned Colwell's further application of his rule:

Loosely speaking, this study
may be said to have increased the definiteness of a predicate noun
before the verb without the article, and to have decreased the
definiteness of a predicate noun after the verb without the article.

The opening verse of John's
Gospel contains one of the many passages where this rule suggests the
translation of a predicate as a definite noun. Kai
qeoV hn`o logoV looks much more like "And the Word was
God" than "And the Word was divine" when viewed with
reference to this rule. The absence of the article does not make
the predicate indefinite or qualitative when it precedes the verb; it is
indefinite in this position only when the context demands it. The
context makes no such demand in the Gospel of John, for this statement
cannot be regarded as strange in the prologue of the gospel which
reaches its climax in the confession of Thomas (IBID,
p. 21).

Based on his data gathered from
known definite nouns, Colwell extrapolated that more or less the same
statistical balance would prove true with nouns that were exegetically
questionable. As we shall see below, subsequent studies have called
this extrapolation into question, particularly those that emphasize
qualitativeness as a semantic force independent of definiteness or
indefiniteness.

At the same time, the vast
majority of commentators (e.g., Carson)
and some grammarians (e.g., Metzger) have accepted Colwell's conclusions
regarding John 1:1, as has at least one major study (see Lane McGaughy, below). As with their earlier
counterparts, these more recent scholars do not perceive definiteness as
requiring convertibility, but rather emphasize that the nature of THEOS
is ascribed to the Word: "The 'Word does not Himself make up the
entire Godhead; nevertheless the divinity that belongs to the rest of the
Godhead belongs also to Him'" (Tasker, The Gospel According to St.
John, p. 45, quoted in Carson,
p. 117). They are thus not far semantically or exegetically from those who argue for
a qualitative or qualitative-definite semantic force for THEOS
in 1:1c.

Maximilian Zerwick

Zerwick's introductory grammar
first appeared in Latin in 1944. A revised and expanded edition was
published in 1960, and an English translation with further additions
followed three years later. Zerwick admits that Colwell has
presented "not a few persuasive examples" that definite nouns
preceding the verb usually appear without the article, but he cautions:
"[Colwell's] theory has its appeal, but it is not easy to admit that
the reason for this use of the article it to be found in a circumstance
(order of words) which seems to belong to an altogether different
category' (Zerwick, p. 56),
Zerwick echoes other
grammarians in viewing nouns without the article as being primarily qualitative:

The omission of the
article shows that the speaker regards the person or thing not so much
as this or that person or thing, but rather as such a person or
thing, i.e. regards not the individual but rather nature or quality. (Zerwick, p. 55,
emphasis in original).

Zerwick conflates qualitative
and indefinite nouns into a single category and places THEOS
in John 1:1c in that category:

for in the nature of things,
the predicate commonly refers not to an individual or individuals as
such, but to the class to which the subject belongs, to the nature or
quality predicated of the subject; e.g. Jo 1,1 kai qeoV hn`o logoV, which
attributes to the Word the divine nature (`o qeoV
en`o logoV, at least in NT usage, would signify personal identity
of the Word with the Father, since the latter is`o
qeoV ) (IBID).

In fact, this one mention of
"class" is the only time Zerwick may be inferred to understand
indefiniteness to be present in an anarthrous noun at all. His
entire discussion of the non-use of the article centers on the qualitative
aspects ascribed to the subject. Thus, for Zerwick, nouns are either
definite or qualitative, and membership in a class is secondary to the
attributes, characteristics, or qualities ascribed to the subject when the
author omits the article.

Blass, Debrunner, and Funk

The Blass and Debrunner
grammar, translated and revised by Robert Funk, generally endorses
Colwell's study, but notes: "[Colwell] deals only with sentences in
which the verb appears and only with nouns that are unambiguously
definite" (BDF, p. 143).
The latter point will be developed in greater detail by Dixon (see below)
with regard to the application of Colwell's Rule and John 1:1c.
Blass and Debrunner have little to say about predicate nouns that lack
the article, but in reference to Mark 7:15 remark: "the idea which
runs through the whole discourse is that there really is something which
produces this effect, and this given category is now referred to a
particular subject" (IBID). Thus, it may be inferred that Blass
and Debrunner view anarthrous
nouns in much the same was as Zerwick, primarily ascribing qualities or
characteristics to the subject rather than membership in a class (the
category itself is "referred" to the subject - the subject is
not said to be placed in the category).

Lane McGaughy

McGaughy's published dissertation
on the use of the Greek verb EINAI ("to
be") has been widely recognized for its thoroughness. McGaughy
examines Colwell's statistics and finds several of the
"exceptions" to his rule that Colwell noted are, in fact, not
exceptions at all. Thus several scholars have recognized McGaughy as
supporting Colwell's conclusion that THEOS in
John 1:1c is definite (e.g., Carson,
p. 137) or has even given it greater weight (e.g., Grudem,
p. 234, n. 12 ). McGaughy says that John 1:1 "should be
translated 'And the Word was God' rather than 'And the Word was
divine'" (McGaughy, p.
77). He cites Zerwick approvingly: "A noun preceding the verb
and lacking the article should not be regarded as 'qualitative' on the
mere grounds of the absence of the article" (IBID).
Interestingly, McGaughy has not, to my knowledge, addressed Harner's
article (which appeared one year after McGaughy's study), which
distinguishes between a qualitative meaning and the weaker adjectival
"divine" that McGaughy argues against.

The impact of Phillip B.
Harner's study of qualitative
anarthrous predicate nouns on the interpretation of John 1:1 cannot be
overemphasized. Harner noted that "Colwell was almost entirely
concerned with the question whether anarthrous predicate nouns were
definite or indefinite, and he did not discuss at any length the problem
of their qualitative significance" (Harner,
p. 76). Again, Colwell, like most older grammarians, saw qualitative
nouns as more or less the same as indefinite nouns.

Harner argues that
qualitativeness should be considered a semantic force in its own right:

This study will suggest that
anarthrous predicate nouns preceding the verb may function primarily to
express the nature or character of the subject, and this qualitative
significance may be more important that the question whether the
predicate noun itself should be regarded as definite or indefinite (IBID,
p. 75).

Harner says that
qualitativeness may coexist with either a definite or indefinite semantic
force. Though not explicitly stated, a close reading also indicates
that he believed qualitativeness may exist by itself. When considering Mark 12:35, Harner says,
"the predicate noun could be interpreted as defininte, indefinite, or
qualitative, depending on the particular meaning or emphasis which we
understand the passage to have" (IBID,
p. 79).

Harner found that 80% of
anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in Mark and John are qualitative and 20% are
definite. None are exclusively indefinite, which supports
Colwell's conclusion as well. Harner notes that some qualitative
nouns, such as HAMARTÔLOS
("sinner") in John 8:31, though best translated with the
indefinite article due to English idiom, should actually be considered
qualitative:

Again the qualitative aspect
of the predicate is most prominent; they [the Jews] think that Jesus has
the nature or character of one who is "sinner." There is
no basis for regarding the predicate as definite, although in this
instance we would probably use the indefinite article in English
translation (IBID, p. 83).

Harner stresses that when
considering whether a pre-verbal predicate noun is definite, indefinite,
or qualitative, it is important to consider how the writer might have
expressed his intentions using another, and possibly less ambiguous,
syntax as well as what he actually wrote. Thus, with John 1:1c,
Harner notes the following possibilities:

A. hO LOGOS ÊN hO
THEOS

B. THEOS ÊN hO LOGOS

C. hO LOGOS THEOS ÊN

D. hO LOGOS ÊN THEOS

E. hO LOGOS ÊN THEIOS

Clause A, with an arthrous
predicate, would mean that logos and theos are equivalent
and interchangeable. There would be no ho theos which is
not also ho logos. But this equation of the two would
contradict the preceding clause of 1:1, in which John writes that`o logoV hn proV ton
qeon. This clause suggests
relationship, and thus some form of "personal"
differentiation, between the two (IBID,
p. 84-85).

So, Harner, in agreement with
Robertson, Dana & Mantey, and most other scholars cited above, notes
that if both THEOS and LOGOS
were articular, the two terms would be convertible. Since John did
not use this syntax, his intended meaning must be something else.
Harner continues:

Clause
D, with the verb preceding an anarthrous predicate, would probably mean
that the logos was "a god" or a divine being of some kind,
belonging to the general category of theos but as a distinct
being from hotheos. Clause E would be an attenuated
form of D. It would mean that the logos was
"divine," without specifying further in what way or to what
extent it was divine. It could also imply that the logos,
being only theios, was subordinate to theos (IBID).

Thus,
Harner notes that had John wished to express the idea that the LOGOS
was "a god," or a divine being distinct from hOTHEOS,
he had at least two unambiguous ways of doing so. Since he did not,
we may conclude that John in all likelihood chose the syntax he did
because he wished to express something else with regard to the LOGOS.

Clauses
B and C, with an anarthrous predicate preceding the verb, are primarily
qualitative in meaning. They indicate that the logos has
the nature of theos. There is no basis for regarding the
predicate theos as definite. This would make B and C
equivalent to A, and like A they would then contradict the preceding
clause of 1:1 (IBID).

Note
here that Harner equates a definite semantic force in a pre-verbal PN
without the article to an articular noun. He sees both forms as
examples of a convertible proposition. This is the major
point of contention between scholars who regard THEOS
in 1:1c as definite as opposed to those who see it as qualitative.
Scholars on both sides interpret this clause in more or less the same way,
as Harner himself notes: "In many cases their [commentators']
interpretations agree with the explanation that is given above" (IBID).
Those who agree with Harner reject a definite force because they view it
as semantically the same as a convertible proposition, which would present
problems with regard to the previous clause (1:1b). Those who
view THEOS
as definite believe the absence of the article precludes the
possibility of convertibility. Yet both generally agree that the meaning of
1:1c is as Harner himself translates it: "The Word had the same
nature as God" (IBID, p.
87).

Harner
continues:

As
John has just spoken in terms of relationship and differentiation
between ho logos and hotheos, he would imply in B
or C that they share the same nature as belonging to the reality theos.
Clauses B and C are identical in meaning but differ slightly in
emphasis. C would mean that the logos (rather than
something else) had the nature of theos. B means that the logos
had the nature of theos (rather than something else). In
this clause, the form that John actually uses, the word theos is
placed at the beginning for emphasis (IBID,
p. 85).

Thus, Harner says that not only
is John attributing the nature of THEOS to
the LOGOS, but emphasizes that nature by
placing THEOS at the head of the
clause. The emphasis of THEOS would
seem unaccountable if John intended an indefinite nuance, but is perfectly
understandable if THEOS is qualitative,
signifying that the Son's nature is that of God.

Paul Dixon

Dixon's study
is the first of several to challenge the popular application of Colwell's
rule. Dixon notes that Colwell's data begins with definite PNs and
demonstrates that these usually lack the article. However, those
using the rule to "prove" that THEOS
in John 1:1c is definite (including Colwell himself!) are not actually
citing Colwell's rule, but it's converse:

The rule does not say: an
anarthrous predicate nominative which precedes the verb is
definite. This is the converse of Colwell's rule and as such is
not a valid inference....from the statement "Definite predicate
nominatives preceding the verb are anarthrous," it is not valid to
infer "Anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb are
definite" (Dixon, pp.
11-12).

Colwell himself affirmed that
the converse of the rule was as valid as the rule itself, and said that
anarthrous pre-verbal PNs would normally be definite (Wallace,
p. 259). Like Harner, Dixon considers qualitativeness a semantic
force in addition to definiteness and indefiniteness. While Harner
says that qualitativeness may exist either independently or along with
definiteness or indefiniteness, Dixon argues that only one of these three
semantic forces is the author's intended meaning in any given instance:

The whole notion that a noun
can have two or more simultaneous nuances as used in a particular
context is
rather like saying a word can have two or more simultaneous meanings
when used in a particular context. There is no question that a
word can have two or more meanings, but when it is actually used by an
author it almost always has a particular meaning, unless he is
intentionally employing a double entendre (perhaps like KEFALÊN in 1
Cor 11:5). Likewise, we can assume an author has a particular
nuance of a noun being used and is not intentionally being ambiguous so
as to confuse the reader (Dixon, message posted on b-greek discussion
list on the Internet, Friday, March 2, 2001).

Dixon's statistical
methodology, unlike Colwells', was to begin with anarthrous PNs (as
opposed to only examining those PNs that were definite), and determine
the semantic force of each. His statistical analysis substantiates
Harner's findings: "When the anarthrous predicate nominative
precedes the verb it is qualitative in 50 of 53 occurrences, or 94%
probability" (Dixon).
Dixon concludes:

We may conclude three things
about John 1:1. First, Colwell's rule cannot be applied to the
verse as an argument for definiteness. Colwell's rule says that
definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are anarthrous.
The rule says nothing about definiteness. It does not say that
anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are
definite. This is the converse of the rule, and as such is not
necessarily valid. Indeed, our thesis demonstrates just the
opposite, that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb
usually are qualitative, 94% of occurrences. Second, on the basis
of the contrast with 1:14 (where the humanity of Christ is stressed), we
conclude that THEOS in 1:1c stresses quality. Third, this thesis
demonstrates that the statistical probability for THEOS being
qualitative, rather than definite or indefinite, is quite high, 94% (IBID).

Daniel B. Wallace

In his intermediate Greek grammar,
Wallace accepts Harner's definition of the qualitative semantic force, and
provides a number of examples outside of John 1:1. Wallace, like
Harner, advocates qualitativeness as a separate semantic category, either
coexisting alongside definite or indefinite semantic forces or existing by
itself. Citing Harner and Dixon, Wallace concludes that THEOS
in John 1:1 is qualitative, and finds the indefinite semantic force the
least likely for preverbal predicate nominatives. Though Wallace
says that "the Word was divine" may be an acceptable
translation, this is only acceptable if we define "divine" in such a way
that it is only applied to true Deity. The import of the qualitative
force goes well beyond what we commonly would refer to as
"divine" in contemporary usage:

The idea of
qualitative qeoV here is that the Word had
all the attributes and qualities that "the God" (of 1:1b)
had. In other words, he shared the essence of the Father,
though they differed in person. The construction the evangelist
chose to express this idea was the most concise way he could have stated
that the Word was God and yet was distinct from the Father (Wallace,
p. 269, emphasis in original).

Don Hartley

One of the possible objections
to Wallace's advocacy of qualitativeness as by far the most likely semantic force
(apart from a concurrent definite or indefinite
nuance) is that most of the examples he provides are "mass" nouns. Mass nouns are those that
cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized (that is, that cannot
be used with the indefinite article, and for which there is no plural
form). "Flesh," is a mass term - we would not say "a
flesh," nor "fleshes." A "count" noun, on
the other hand, is a noun that can be used with the indefinite article and
for which there is a plural form. "Dog" is a count noun -
we can say "a dog," or "dogs." Simply put, a
count noun is something that can be counted; a mass term is one that
cannot. We can count dogs but not flesh. Some have argued that
mass terms differ dramatically from count terms in the semantic force they
can convey (it is sometimes argued that count terms must always be
definite or indefinite and that there is no such thing as a
"qualitative count noun").2
Because it is generally conceded that mass terms can exude a qualitative force,
it has been argued that the statistical
analyses of Harner and Dixon are weighed unfairly towards qualitative
nouns, particularly when applying those statistics to THEOS,
which is a count noun.

Don Hartley, a student of Dan
Wallace's and research assistant on Wallace's grammar,
wrote his Master's of Theology thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary on
the topic of Colwell's Construction and mass / count nouns. He also
published a paper derived from his thesis. Hartley's methodology is
to examine every example of Colwell's Construction in the Greek New
Testament. Hartley purposely leaves controversial or questionable
nouns out of this sample. He then eliminates all factors that would
unfairly weigh the sample towards one semantic force, such as mass
terms. He carefully identifies all potential semantic forces -
following Wallace, Hartley advocates qualitativeness as either a
standalone semantic force, or as one that can coexist alongside definite
or indefinite forces. He notes that all mass terms exude a purely
qualitative force (John 1:14, for example, does not teach that the Logos
became The Flesh or a flesh, but rather "flesh," signifying that
all the Logos possesses all the qualities or attributes of
"flesh"). He therefore concludes that qualitativeness is a
valid semantic category apart from definiteness or indefiniteness, and
argues that this force may be applied equally to mass or count
terms.

Hartley's results demonstrate
that in John's Gospel, a preverbal PN is usually qualitative (56%), as
opposed to definite (11%), indefinite (17%), or qualitative-indefinite
(17%). He concludes that from the standpoint of pure statistical
analysis, THEOS in John 1:1c is most likely
qualitative: "Thus, Jesus is God in every sense the Father
is" (Hartley, p. 40).

Conclusion

While the scholars we have
considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of
Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS
in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding
of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or
nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The
absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove
any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article
signifies a personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view
in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature
or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the
Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars
believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree
that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.

It is my view that those who
argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible
proposition have the best case (but, see note #2, below). The purely qualitative nuance is
well-attested in the Greek New Testament3, as has been demonstrated by
Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its
application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS
in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who
maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless
argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with
those who argue for a qualitative nuance.

Based on the evidence presented
here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:

"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in
existence. The Word was intimately with God.
And the Word was as to His essence, fully God."4

_______________________________

Notes

1.
This objection, raised most forcefully by Harner, assumes a mathematical
precision that cannot always be sustained in the pragmatics of language
use. While convertible propositions usually signify 100% equivalence
between subject and predicate, this need not be the case when they are preceded
by an explicit statement denying 100% equivalence ("And the Word was
with God"). It is doubtful that the 8th Century scribes who
wrote "kai ho theos ên ho logos" in Codex L (Regius)
understood what is grammatically a convertible proposition to be
tantamount to Modalism. Other explanations are certainly possible,
such as understanding theos to be used as a title or proper name,
or taking the entire verse as a paradox.

2.
This line of argument is addressed in the
Jehovah's Witness/John 1:1c section of Other Views Considered (below). It has been
thoroughly debated by
Don Hartley and Jehovah's Witness apologist, Greg Stafford. I had a
brief interaction
with Greg Stafford on this subject as well. See also "Theos
is a Count Noun").

3.
C.f., John 3:6 "He who is born of the flesh is (by nature) flesh; he
who is born of the Spirit is (by nature) spirit

4.
Cf., Wuest's The New Testament: An Expanded Translation: "And
the Word was as to His essence absolute deity;" and the New English
Translation: "and the Word was fully God."Perhaps the most accurate English translation of John 1:1 has been offered
by Robert Bowman: "In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word
was with the Deity, and the Word was Deity" (John,
p. 27). This translation
preserves the use and non-use of the article, and conveys the purely
qualitative nuance of the anarthrous theos. The Dana-Mantey
grammar offers essentially the same translation, sans the capital
letters: "and the word was deity" (p. 148). In Colossians
2:9, Paul uses a different grammatical construction to say much the
same thing about Christ's Deity.