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I woke up this morning, the first day of the Salvation Year “Greece in Haircut” with some voices in my ear. I had fallen asleep on the couch, watching television. People were arguing on TV about the “50% Greek Haircut”. While I was sleeping, people I don’t know and never voted for them took decisions for my future and that of my family, my relatives, my friends. That is the price I pay for been an Eu supporter for over 30 years. The EU leaders took in Brussels at 5 o’clock in the morning with the Greek government in the role of a passive watcher, unable to strike good deals.

Three hours later, at 8 am Greeks were still trying to find out what exactly the ‘haircut’ means for our lives. As early as 8 am nobody can give a clear picture as to whether this historical day is good or bad. Not only because the EU decision has not worked out all the details, not only because EU and bankers will still have to fine tune to voluntary participation on the haircut of the Greek bonds. But also because we’d like to hide our head in the sand and pretend the country has been saved instead of openly accept “Yes, Sir! We’re bankrupt. Broke. Unable to pay our obligations.” This is a national humiliation that no Greek can easily digest.

State officials chew the government jelly candy “We take a debt breath. Debt relief. We saved the country from bankruptcy”. Lines we’ve heard after July 21st Agreement, after the first Memorandum of Understanding (May 2010), after the Mid-Term Fiscal Plan (June 2011). The majority of Greeks are fed up of ‘being saved’ on their way to the world of economically dead.

Hardly a government official dared to appear on Greeks’ television screens this morning. Those who did it, they reassured that pensions and bank saving are guaranteed – a burning question on the lips of all Greeks; the average Greeks.

Greek debt, greek crisis, greek bond "haircut", greek bankraptcy etc.
Everybody is talking about what Greece (Hellas) owes, but nobody is
talking about what is owed. And what Greece (Hellas) is owed is much,
much more! It is estimated that Germany owes Greece (Hellas) war
reperations from WWII about 1,3 trillion euros (7 billion dollars prices
1938, according to the Paris peace treaties, today estimated 108
billions without the interests, the forced occupation loan -3,5 billion
dollars prices 1938- today 54 billion dollars without the interests.
With a 3,5% interest, the amount that Gemany owes Greece (Hellas) rises
to 1,3 trillion euros!).

As mr Albrecht Richl (professor of history of economy in the London
school of economics) stated in an interwiew of his, in the greek
magazine EPIKAIRA (issue 104 October 13 2011), that, if Germany pays war
reparations to Greece (Hellas) it will immediately (Germany) go
bankrupt. Not to mention the compensations to the Nazi victims in Greece
(Hellas).

Professor Jacques Depla in an interwiew of his in the french newspaper
"Les Echos" stated that Germany owes Greece (Hellas) €575b.

In October 3rd 2010 Germany paid France and Belgium nearly £60m final world war I reparations after 92 years! This gives a strong argument to
the greek side, to insist on claiming the war reperations from Germany.
The international law, also makes clear that reparation and
compensation dues never expire!

Today the european leaders are discussing the percentage of the greek
bond "haircut". In other words the greek bankruptcy. Greece (Hellas)
goes bankrupt for a (odius) debt of nearly €400b at the same time that
Germany owes (Greece) €1,3t. Instead of having Germany going bankrupt,
the opposite happens!

This is due to mr Papandreou's governance -mainly- and the corrupted
greek political system in general. Pasok is so corrupted and dependent by Germany and german companies such as Siemens that there is not a
chance this goverment say no to the imperialistic (and fascistic)
desires of the German goverment and whoever is behind it. This is also
the reason why Papandreou is still in governance. He is the wiling boy
and he must be kept in governance at least until the "job" is finished!
He has lost the confidence of greek people as he has taken the hardest
austerity measures ever in any country with zero results.

Well, it is crystal clear that this man will never bring up the war
reparations issue because he serves anything but the greek interests.

The good thing is that everything he did is against the greek
constitution and the one to erase all of his actions i am sure will come
(definately not from this parliament). Then mr Papandreou and his gang
along with the representatives of the fourth Reich in Greece (Hellas)
will have to stand in front of the greek people. Then Germany will have
to face bankraptcy because the war reparations will be paid!

Something is been cooking on the stove of the Greek political kitchen, with ruling party PASOK ministers to raise their voices and criticizing the prime minister, opposition parties to demand early elections and national unity government, Papandreou to seem unsure about the future of the Greek debt, and citizens to crack down under the heavy load of taxes. Amid this tense situation full of frustration, PM Goergeo Papandreou will hold a meeting with the President of the Republic Karolos Papoulias on Monday, October 17th, 2011, at 12.30 pm.

Officially the purpose of the meeting is that Papandreou will brief Papoulias on his meetings with Juncker and Rompuy and the multi-bill concerning labour reserve, taxes, salary cuts etc that will be discussed in the parliament and will be voted on Thursday.

When the G20 finance ministers gather in Paris they face a stark fact: that nearly a year and a half since Greece received its first bailout, the crisis remains unresolved. Europe's leaders will be asked yet again what they are going to do with Greece.

Sure, the country now looks certain to receive another tranche of bailout money next month. A cool 8bn euros (£7bn; $11bn). But it is a band aid and everyone knows it. For since May 2010 the Greek economy has shrunk and its debt mountain has grown. Next year the debt-to-GDP ratio could reach 172%.

Reliable sources tell me that the troika has drawn a surprising line on the sand: Either the Greek government agrees to force upon the private sector trades unions an immediate reduction in minimum wages with immediate effect (plus the dismantling of all awards regarding dismissal compensation and limitations), or the next instalment (or tranche) of EU-IMF-ECB loans to Greece will be withheld. Noting that even Mrs Thatcher took years before she could impose her iron will on the trades unions, it is clear that the troika is asking the Greek government to commit to a change that it may be both unwilling and unable to effect. If this is true, two questions arise:

QUESTION 1: Why do the representatives of the Greek state’s creditors gamble the progress of their loan agreement with the government of the day on an immediate diminution of wages and awards that concern the private sector? While the IMF has had a long held fixation with lower wages (and has never left an opportunity to dismantle collective bargaining agreements unexploited), it is curious that the troika seems prepared to risk derailing an already hugely expensive Greek bail-out for the sake of such an ideological project. Granted that that the troika may think of the present moment as its golden opportunity to beat a demoralised Greek government into total submission (especially given that no Greek state bonds will mature until well into December), a question remains about the troika’s choice of target: Why aim at the already pitifully low private sector wages when there are so many larger fish to fry elsewhere within the Greek state (e.g. public procurements, pharmaceutical bills, fee-free Universities etc.)?

QUESTION 2: The second question concerns the troika’s very thinking: Can they really believe that a wage reduction for the lowest paid European workers (who are vying for this ‘honour’ with their Portuguese counterparts) will, in the midst of a rampant recession, help boost private sector economic activity? Do they seriously think that entrepreneurs will seize upon such a wage reduction to invest in the Greek economy handsomely enough to generate a modicum of growth? As I am loathe to impute inanity on other parties, I shall assume that they cannot possibly believe this. I shall, therefore, give the troika the benefit of the doubt and presume that they, too, understand that a further reduction in private sector minimum wages will (at a time of falling public sector wages and employment) lead to a further, reduction in aggregate demand which will, undoubtedly, maintain (if not accelerate) the current rate at which Greek national income shrinks and, naturally, generate lower future taxes, thus giving the remorseless wheel of recession another twirl.If my assumptions above are correct, what on earth is the troika doing? Here is a scenario that I think captures nicely, in all its horror that is, much of what is going on at the moment. Three are the main protagonists in my scenario: (1) European bankers (mainly French and German), (2) the German government, and (3) the NYF member-states, where NYF stands for ‘not yet fallen’ (which includes mainly Italy but also Spain and perhaps Belgium). Having established who the players are, it is important to define their objectives and constraints.BANKERS: The bankers know well that their banks are bankrupt. They have known it for some time but have been hoping that the European Central Bank, together with their national governments (made up of politicians who truly value their cosy relation with the bankers), would keep their banks afloat and themselves in control of their banks. Unlike most businessmen/women who labour under the fear of bankruptcy, bankers face a different nightmare (since bankruptcy in fact increases their command of the surpluses produced by others, courtesy of the politicians’ infinite generosity with the taxpayers’ and the ECB’s money): Forced recapitalisation, is their worst-case scenario – of the sort that the American government introduced in conjunction with TARP (the trouble assets relief program). They fear a Euro-Tarp (of the type that we proposed in our Modest Proposal a year ago – see Policy 2) for the simple reason that recapitalisation of ‘their’ banks means that the bankers will lose the part of equity which has hitherto delivered to them control over the banks.NYF member-states: Waiting on the sidelines, unable to utter a world (in case loose talk brings them greater disasters than their current situation), they are holding their breath hoping against hope for some decision from Berlin that might get them off the hook. With the bond markets treating them like the new pariahs, Italy, Spain and Belgium find themselves in a tight corner. They are damned if their do not adopt swinging cuts (since ‘inaction’ will be perceived as fresh evidence that their spreads will rise) and they are damned if they do (since austerity will further erode their nations’ anaemic growth; a development which will also push up interest rates). Deep down, their remaining hope revolves around some scheme that will see their sovereign debt come down in size, if not via a haircutthen at least by means of a reduction of the interest payments due in the coming decade.

GERMAN GOVERNMENT: Berlin’s main concern is how to manage this crisis by means of minimal European integration. It disdains the idea of any type of continental consolidation which threatens the Principle of Perfectly Separable Debts (PPSDs, as I call it). After a long eighteen months during which Germany’s political elite struggled to remain in denial of the systemic nature of this Crisis, Mrs Merkel now seems resigned to the idea that the banking sector of Northern Europe (including of course Germany’s) is in tatters and in urgent need to capital infusions. German politicians seem to have grasped the importance of the fact that the liabilities of the eurozone’s banks is more than 300% the eurozone’saggregate GDP (Nb. the relevant ratio in the United States, in 2008, was ‘only’ 200%). After a lot of huffing and puffing, Mrs Merkel and Mr Schaeuble have accepted the inevitable: About one trillion notional euros must be set aside for the banks. While they have not swallowed, as yet, that this must be done at the central EU level (as opposed to a government by government level), they are getting there, kicking and screaming of course. Two are sticking points for Germany: It does not want to refloat the banks (for the second time in three years) and have to pay Greece the money that Greece owes to the banks. In short, a Greek default is a political prerequisite for what is becoming a serial bailout of the Franco-German banks. The second sticking point is Italy and, more generally, the NFY member-states: Germany fears that if the NFY member-states see that Greece is allowed to diminish its debt mountain through a default that still allows it to remain within the eurozone, they may get ideas that a similar solution may be in the offing for them.

THE EMERGING STRATEGY: Germany knows that the banks will resist recapitalisation as long as Greece is being kept afloat by the troika. To gain leverage over the recalcitrant bankers, Berlin must push them over the edge with a Greek default....

The Greeks - Crucible of Civilization, Part 1 of 10

COMMENTS

i watched this from begining to end 2 times!!!! everything we have and know in the modern world we owe to the ancient greeks!!! science, philosophy,﻿ the arts, theatre,DEMOCRACY, the olympics, modern architecture, naval warfare, medicine, i mean the list goes on and on!!! what a time to have been alive!!! OH TO BE IN ATHENS AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS GLORY!!! the 150 years from 550 BC to 400 BC is the mostimportant time period in human civilization!!!! THANX AGAIN!! FASCINTING!!!

THE ISSUE of the German wartime compensation has now been put
on the table. As we have already analysed in the Athens News, on 13
December 2010 the Greek government officially accepted in parliament
that the relevant compensation claims of the Greek state involving
Germany amount to a total of 162 billion euros without interest, 108bn
of which concerns war reparations and 54bn the forced occupation loan.

The forced occupation loan was imposed by the occupying German and
Italian forces on Greece under the terms of a unilateral decision which
they took in Rome on 14 March 1942, and which was subsequently notified
to the collaborationist government in Athens.

Under the laws of war in force at the time, in particular the 1907
Hague Convention, an occupied country had to bear the costs of its
occupation. So the Germans and Italians forced the collaborationist
government to pay them 1.5bn drachmas per month in occupation costs.

However, the Germans, in order to fund Rommel’s war operations in North Africa, imposed on Greece a forced occupation loan.

Accordingly, the Bank of Greece was obliged to open an
interest-free loan account in drachmas for each of the occupying powers.
Germany stated that it would repay the loan later. The original, forced
occupation loan agreement was amended later and was also signed by the
collaborationist Greek regime.

The amount of the loan received by the German side during the occupation was estimated in 1947 to amount to 135.8m dollars.

It is worth noting that the German side already paid, during the
occupation, two loan repayment instalments. The subsequent refusal to
pay the loan instalments has since converted the loan into an
interest-bearing one due to arrears. Finally, it should be noted that
after the war Italy acknowledged its debt resulting from the occupation
loan and proceeded to a settlement with Greece for its repayment in
conjunction with the payment of related war reparations.

The issue of the occupation loan was raised by the Greek side in
1955 when it was noted to the Germans that the occupation loan was still
due since it was comprised of “normal credits that should be paid”.
Then the question of the occupation loan was informally raised by Greece
in 1964 through professor Angelos Angelopoulos.

However, the issue of the occupation loan was formally raised for
the first time by Andreas Papandreou, then a member of parliament, when
he visited Bonn in 1965.

This is attested by the report submitted by Papandreou on 23
February 1965 to then prime minister George Papandreou, in which, inter
alia, he referred to the occupation loan.

Then, on 24 February 1965, Andreas Papandreou submitted to the
director-general of the ministry of finance of West Germany, a Mr
Kaizer, a relevant statement regarding the loans granted, during the
war, by the Bank of Greece to the German occupation authorities, in
conjunction with the application for a longterm development loan to
Greece.

Stop blaming Greece!

Commentary: Blaming Greece fails simple reality check

Not only that, if you believe the financial headlines, Greece is responsible for almost every financial ill that has beset the investment arena over the last 18 months.

I say it’s time the headline writers came up with a new story to “explain” what’s happening to the stock market.

Consider last week, for example, when investors’ concern about a possible Greek default supposedly caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average DJIA-0.18% to lose 738 points and the combined market capitalizations of all publicly traded stocks in the U.S. to lose $865 billion.

Markets seeing new hazards

Rather than focus solely on Greek debt, European banks and the U.S economy, many investors have begun to wring their hands about a new set of indicators.

How could Greece have been the cause of that, when Greece’s total sovereign debt (counting both government debt and from the country’s monetary authorities) amounts to $393 billion, according to the International Monetary Fund? It doesn’t make sense, even if Greece’s debt were completely owed to U.S. banks — which it most definitely is not.

Blaming Greece makes even less sense when we focus on more than just the last week. Since the stock market high this spring, for example, U.S. stocks have lost approximately $2.5 trillion in market cap. Once again, the prime suspect is concern over Europe’s debt situation.

Yet the $2.5 trillion loss is more than twice the total debt (from both the government and the monetary authorities) of Greece, Spain and Portugal combined — the three PIIGS countries considered to be most in danger of default.

Why, then, do so many investment commentators persist in telling the story that Europe’s debt situation is to blame? Because it’s a convenient and easy explanation to fall back upon, especially in the face of a market that is otherwise acting so inscrutably.

How many of us have the guts to say that we don’t really know why the market went up or down? Rather than admitting that, we instead tell stories — akin to Rudyard Kipling’s “Just So” stories, such as the one about how the leopard got his spots.

Blaming Greece is only the latest example of this. My perennial favorite is the oft-used explanation that the market went up (or down) on a given day because there were more buyers than sellers (or more sellers than buyers). This is just intellectual laziness, of course: During any trading session there are always the same number of buyers and sellers.

Investors need to let Greece rest in peace. That country has enough problems of its own without being asked to take responsibility for ours as well.