Thomas Buell, "The Warrior Generals," pp. 359-60:
"The Federal army that assembled [before Dalton in the spring of 1864]
- and particularly the Army of the Cumberland - was the most modern of
the Civil War, so advanced was it in technology and
organization....Sherman's plans were predicated in large measure on
information gathered by Thomas' intelligence service. His spies were
everywhere, including Johnston's headquarters, giving Thomas access to
to Johnston's correspondence and message traffic....Sherman relied
entirely on Thomas, not only for the combat power of of the Army of the
Cumberland, but also for the staff work and coordination of the
campaign....Thomas continued his practice of traveling comfortably with
the amenities, and Sherman and his staff soon joined Thomas' mess."Thomas Buell, "The Warrior Generals," :
pg. 361: "The Atlanta campaign began early in
May and would have ended in a week if Sherman had listened to
Thomas."

Dispatch of 27 June
from Schofield to Stoneman <ar75_622> "Thomas and
McPherson have failed in their attack and have suffered
heavy losses. Our little success on the right is all that has been
gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step
toward the next important movement." [Italics added]

It is time to begin to wind down our story, as the Civil War
began to wind down. The outcome had been sealed by the final battle for
Chattanooga on 25 Nov. 1863. The South,
gripped by the Götterdämmerung psychosis which befalls most
losing sides of a war, struggled on for while.

After the battle of Chattanooga Thomas built up the supplies and
supply system which would underly and make possible the coming drive to
Atlanta. Sheridan went off for a while to Meridian, Miss. (3 Feb. - 5
March 64) where he rehearsed for his cakewalk (or in his own words
"winter excursion") to the sea, neglecting,
however, to keep regular contact with Grant who, in typical fashion,
panicked. He ordered Thomas, in eery anticipation of Nashville, to make an improvised attack on
Johnston's fortifications at Dalton in order to keep Johnston from
sending reinforcements to Mississippi. Grant sent Thomas a flurry of
messages, such as this one of 27 Feb.:

<ar58_480>
"It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full
belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended until
the fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of
supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between
Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga,
yours, and General Howard's wagons. These can be replaced temporarily
by returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to
draw re-enforcements constantly to your front. Can you not also take a
division from Howard's corps? General Schofield is instructed to send
General Granger to you the moment it is safe to be without him."

Thomas conducted some reconnaissance and sent Grant the results.
Johnston hadn't sent any troops anywhere and wasn't about to. On this
occasion Thomas first suggested the possibility of outflanking the
Dalton fortifications by sending troops through Snake Creek Gap. Grant
calmed down, at least publically, and called off the frontal attack
while rejecting the flanking manoeuver. In private he slandered the
"lethargic" Virginian and wished he had Sherman there to promptly obey
his orders, no matter how chimerical.

Back from his wild goose chase to Meridian (Forrest escaped),
Shermanon 18 March 1864
was made commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi
instead of being hauled before a military court of inquiry. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland was
incorporated into Sherman's command. The ensuing campaign to approach
Atlanta is a story of missed opportunities and official fudging on the
part of Sherman as he tried to explain to Grant
and the world why he wasn't able to eliminate the smaller and
relatively impoverished army of Joseph Johnston who had replaced Bragg
on 27 Dec. 64. In his reports and letters Sherman cited many other
people (Thomas, Hooker, et al.) as being
responsible for this, but never himself. Still, for some reason Grant
preferred Sherman's style of conducting affairs over that of Thomas,
and that was that. Of little consequence to the strange duo was the
fact that all of the enormous amount of staff work (engineering,
reconnaissance, railroad management, intelligence gathering, logistics,
pay, etc.) for all
three armies was carried by Thomas' staff. Thomas' solid competence
and professionalism may indeed have occasionally provoked Sherman
(under the strict control of Grant) to show Thomas who was really the
boss there. Yes, Atlanta was taken on 2 Sept., just in time to
influence the fall elections in the North. Had Thomas
been in charge, or had Sherman been able to overcome his jealousy and
accept Thomas' sound advice on at least 3 occasions (if indeed he had
been allowed to), Johnston's Army of Tennessee would have ceased to
exist long before 2. Sept. Grant's absentee conduct of the Dalton to
Atlanta campaign lengthened the Civil War by at least a year.

Sam Watkins refers to the "Hundred Days"campaign, by which he meant
that it was all one continuous conflict. I prefer to geographically
designate this phase of the drive to take Atlanta. For convenience and
study we are forced to divide both this and the subsequent phase into
separate battles, some of which are arbitrarily named. In the following
where I refer to battles I really mean high points. These high points
of the first phase (Dalton to Atlanta) were, as I understand them: 1)
Rocky Face Ridge (Dalton or Dug Gap) 7-13 May 64; 2) Resaca 13-15 May
64;3 ) New Hope Church 25-28 May 64; 4) Kolb's Farm 22 June;
5) Kennesaw
Mountain 27 June 64; and 5 ½) Chattahoochie River 4-9 July 64. I
have
chosen to end this first phase of the overall Atlanta campaign on 17
July 63 when Hood contrived to replace Johnston and assume command of
the Army of Tennessee.

1) "The Atlanta campaign began early in May and would have ended
in a week if Sherman had listened to Thomas"(Thomas
Buell, The Warrior
Generals, pg.
361). On 7 May 64 Sherman kicked off his
spring offensive against Johnston at Rocky Face Ridge (within sight of
today's battle park Tunnel Hill Georgia). Long before this, Thomas'
scouts had reported that the low pass Snake Creek Gap about 15 miles to
the southwest of Dalton was not or only lightly defended. Thomas
proposed that he go through this pass with his entire army of 60,000
men and put them behind Johnston astride the railroad at Resaca and
attack Johnston from behind. Instead, Sherman (perhaps following orders
from Grant) watered the plan down, called it his own for a while, and
sent McPherson with 25,000 men, more than enough to do the job if
McPherson hadn't gotten cold feet. After breezing through the gap
McPherson encountered minor entrenchments at Resaca manned by 4000
Confederates, whereupon he withdrew back to Snake Creek Gap and called
for reinforcements. Meanwhile Sherman ordered a fruitless and fairly
costly frontal demonstration at Rocky Face Ridge. Later he sent most of
his forces through Snake Creek Gap anyway, but Johnston had prudently
retired to Resaca, out of the bag. McPherson's instructions had been
explicit enough, but afterward Sherman made them even more explicit in
his search for a scapegoat. Is it possible that Thomas's original plan,
if successful, would have reflected too well on Thomas to suit Grant's
taste? Sherman didn't report his casualties.

2) On 13 May 64 Sherman "felt" Johnston at Resaca who had been
reinforced by Polk, bringing his strength up to about 60,000. Sherman
still had twice the manpower, without counting the enormous
support services at his disposal. The next day there was a
general engagement (with Hooker fighting well), but the Confederates
held, except on their right flank, where Sherman did not exploit his
advantage and thus wasted yet another opportunity to decisively defeat
Johnston. On the 15th Sherman began a large scale flanking movement
toward the railroad, and Johnston withdrew to Cassville and intrenched.
Estimated casualties: 5,547 total (US 2,747; CS 2,800)

3) In a series of partial engagements at New Hope
Church on 25-26 May, Pickett' Mill on 27 May, and Dallas on 28
May Sherman attempted a flanking movement to the southwest in order to
avoid the last of the mountains between him and Atlanta and reach the
railroad at Marietta. On the 26th Sherman mistakenly surmised that
Johnston had a token force on his right and ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph
Hooker’s corps to attack there at a point which was later called
"Hell's Hole." Hooker's troops were severely mauled, and later Sherman
blamed Hooker for not attacking soon enough. Johnston retired to
positions on and in front of Kennesaw Mountain. Estimated casualties:
US 1,600; CS unknown.

4) Mudfest at Kolb's farm 22 June 1864. A lot of rain. Hood, up
to his usual stuff, trusts his gut and not someone else's
reconnaissance, and attacks Hooker behind fortifications. Hooker has an
easy time of it. Union casualties 300 - 500, Confederate casualties
1,300-1,500.

5) Once upon a time on 27
June 1864, after weeks of rain and
relative inactivity, a battle in Sherman's style was fought at Kennesaw
Mountain. Actually it was fought mainly on the flatlands south
of the
mountain. Sherman, morose and insecure, ordered a frontal attack
against sophisticated breastworks and intrenchments. In a military
career of nothing but low points, this was the lowest.

Wilbur Thomas (no relation) writes on pg. 476 of his Thomas
biography that Thomas, upon receving Sherman's order, said to Whipple,
his chief of staff, "This is too bad." Thus began the only battle of
this sort the Army of the Cumberland ever fought.

Click to enlarge. McPherson
demonstrated
starting at around 8:30 AM at Pigeon Hill (#2). The heaviest fighting
took place under Thomas at Cheatham Hill (#3). Schofield east of Kolb's
Farm (#4) did almost nothing.Well, he did carry out a
tentative scouting operation around Hood's left flank.(yellow dots
added to a map from the USMA collection) on the right.

Schofield writes in his memoirs that he
and all of the other top commanders including Thomas protested against
Sherman's plan. When Schofield, again according to his memoirs,
intimated privately to Sherman that he did not feel that he could
succeed in piercing the Confederate defenses, Sherman replied that "it
was not intended that I should attack in front, but to make a strong
demonstration..." (Forty-Six Years in the Army,
pg. 144). His role in the battle was minimal, and he did not
report his losses for that day because an exact return would have made
this fact all too evident. His division commander Gen.
Hascall made only an approximate return (also an indication of
dishonesty and lack of respect for his men's sacrifice), reporting
"total losses of about 100, including several valuable officers"
suffered in "demonstrations" against the works in front of him
(ar73_570).

But Schofield was not entirely passive at Kennessaw. We
learn from his exchanges of the 25th, 26th, and 27th with Sherman that
he, in
accordance with Sherman's directive of the 25th (ar75_592),
extended his line to the south by pushing one division under Cox
across Olley's Creek, with "little loss" (ar75_620)
as Cox reports without specific numbers. Maybe he fired some
cannons. In doing so,
Schofield checked with
Sherman every step of the way via telegraph to make sure that he
exposed the division neither too little nor too much. In one such
dispatch to Sherman, sent at noon on the 27th, we find excuses for not
doing more to relieve the pressure on Thomas to his left:

<ar75_617>
"General Cox has just reported in person. He has advanced to the crest
of the main ridge, a mile or so beyond Olley's Creek, and within a mile
of the main road running to the mill on Nickajack Creek. The ridge is
extremely rough and densely wooded. There is no
hope of moving a force along it so as to reach the flank of the enemy's
main line to-day. To go by the road would throw Cox three or four miles
from Hascall's right, much too far for a single division. The enemy's
works can be distinctly seen, running up the slope of the ridge at
least a mile beyond Hascall's right. I cannot hope to reach the enemy's
flank without separating my division much farther than I deem at all
prudent."

It is odd that he felt compelled to justify his conduct when he
had positive instructions to do what he did and no more. Perhaps he was
aware that some observers might fault his lack of initiative. Or was he
making doubly sure that Sherman understood that he wasn't about to risk
the displeasure of Hood which, forgive my lack of piety, might actually
draw some Confederate defenders away
from the center where Thomas was attacking?

The
ridge Schofield referred to was lightly defended by cavalry (Jackson)
and
could not have
been very high, as the land in that area is gently rolling. One
might ask, where were their axes? Cox had sent one brigade
accross the creek the evening before, and his other brigades crossed
very early in the morning of the 27th, so Schofield had hours to make
some gesture around Johnston's flank or make a threatening advance
toward Marietta in order to relieve the pressure on Thomas to his left,
but he stayed put.Here, as earlier during the approach to
Altanta, as well as later at the battles of Peachtree Creek,
Atlanta, Jonesboro, and Nashville,
he either kept himself out of major operations or was kept out of them.
As the result of his error at Columbia he got into his
one real scrape at Franklin, and even there he left the management of
the defense to Stanley. However, his circumspection in the field didn't
make him timid when it came to claiming credit, as we can see in his dispatch
of the evening of the 27th to Stoneman:

<ar75_622>
"Thomas and McPherson have failed in their attack and have suffered
heavy losses. Our little success on the right is all that has been
gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step
toward the next important movement." [italics added]

He neglects to mention that his "little success" was achieved
against a thinly spread cavalry screen.

On the Union left wing McPherson carried out some feints toward
the northern end of the mountain, which resulted in 210
casualties (ar75_631), and an attack at Pigeon Hill (# 2 on the
map above left) which made little progress and was not pressed, judging
from the fact that it cost him only 317 casualties out of about 5500
men engaged(see Gen. Morgan Smith's dispatch , ar74_179).
Thomas made the main effort at two points in the center with
about 8000 men. The result was a failure with 1580 casualties (see
Thomas' report, ar72_151). The Confederate line there
was heavily fortified and manned by 2 divisions under Cheatham and
Cleburne, Johnston's two best generals. Not satisfied with
Thomas' effort, Sherman ordered Thomas to attack again late in the
afternoon, and Thomas responded as follows:

"The Army of the Cumberland has already made two desperate,
bloody and unsuccessful assaults on this mountain. If a third is
ordered, it will, in my opinion, result in demoralizing this army and
will, if made, be against my best judgment, and most earnest protest."
(Piatt, Life of Thomas, p. 545)

The third assault was not made. Sherman's first report to
Halleck was sent the evening after the battle:

<ar75_607>
"Pursuant to my orders of the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank
of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a.m. General
McPherson attacked at the southwest end of Kenesaw, and General Thomas
at a point about a mile farther south. At the same, time the
skirmishers and artillery along the whole line kept up a sharp fire.
Neither attack succeeded, though both columns reached the enemy's
works, which are very strong. General McPherson reports his loss about
500, and General Thomas about 2,000; the loss particularly heavy in
general and field officers. General Harker is reported mortally
wounded, also Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade; Colonel Rice,
Fifty-seventh Ohio, very seriously. Colonel Barnhill, Fortieth
Illinois, and Captain Augustin, Fifty-fifth Illinois, are killed. The
facility with which defensive works of timber and earth are constructed
gives the party on the defensive great advantage [italics added].
I cannot well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my
railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as
much as the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no
supplies of any kind here. I can press Johnston and keep him from
re-enforcing Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more
lives than we can spare. McPherson took today 100 prisoners, and
Thomas about as many, but I do not suppose we inflicted heavy loss on
the enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets."

One could conclude from this dispatch, that Sherman, after 2 and
a half years of war, was just learning how effective fortifications can
be. Better late than never, as they say. However, on 9 July 64 Sherman
resorted to blaming others in order to explain away the failure:

<ar76_91>
"The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it. The enemy and our
own army and officers had settled down into the conviction that the
assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy
was found behind anything like a parapet, why everybody would deploy,
throw up counter-works and take it easy, leaving it to the 'old man' to
turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more
vigor, mathematically, I would have put the head of George Thomas'
whole army right through Johnston's deployed lines on the best ground
for go-ahead, while my entire forces were well in hand on roads
converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been
struck down so early the assault would have succeeded, and then the
battle would have all been in our favor on account of our superiority
of numbers, position, and initiative."

Or this from his report:

"Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire
responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated
to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly."

In other words, Sherman ordered a play up the middle in order to
show Johnston that Sherman didn't make only end runs, and if the
attempt was a bloody failure, it was Thomas' fault for not having
assaulted "with one-fourth more vigor." So what if about 600 Union
soldiers died that day for no military purpose? No other passage taken
from Sherman's writings displays his moral corruption better than this
one, unless it's the following passage about Kennesaw from his Memoirs:

"An army to be efficient must not settle down to a
single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which
promises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect[italics
mine], to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his
breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success
would give the largest fruits of victory."

Boatner states that overall Union losses on the 27th were 2051
out of estimated 16,226 engaged, against 442 Confederate losses out of
estimated 17,733 engaged. The numbers alone demonstrate the
futility of this battle, but the following dispatch from Sherman to
McPherson of the 28th puts a truly sinister cast on the entire
proceedings:

<ar75_631>
"Is there any news on your flank? How long will it take you to load up
and be ready to move for ten days, independent of the railroad?"

Major James Connolly,
then tropp inspector on Thomas's staff wrote this about the aftermath:
"I heard a conversation between Sherman, Thomas, Hooker, and Palmer
this morning, and while I shouldn't dare to here what I heard, yet I
may say that something else will now be done, and if it's what I think
it is, it will will be one of the bold moves of the war."
("Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, pg. 229)

Giving us a hint at the tenor of this conversation, McKinney ("Education
in Violence," pg. 341) quotes Thomas: "When
Sherman queried his army commanders about another
assault, Thomas bluntly replied, '. . . One or two more such
assaults would use up this army.'" Or on pg. 342: "During
the interchange of these messages Sherman asked Thomas what he
thought about cutting loose from the railroad, capitalizing
Schofield's gain on the right flank and making the attempt to get on
the railway in Johnston's rear at a point four or five miles north of
the Chattahoochee River. Thomas thought it would be decidedly better
than 'butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly
abatised."'

Sherman had thus, on the very next day at the latest, arrived at
the solution which had apparently eluded him for weeks, namely bring
McPherson down from the Union left flank and send him south and
east past Schofield and around Johnston's left flank. Did he
have a sudden inspiration, or had he decided upon this beforethe battle? The facts that he ordered Schofield to put a division
accross Olley's Creek the two days before the battle (3
days if we count his Special Field Orders, no. 28 of 24 June 63
<ar75_588>), then micromanaged the
crossing, and wrote the above dispatch to McPherson, indicate that he
already had his flanking maneuver in mind before the battle was fought.

On 1 July, McPherson began leaving his positions on the north end
of
the Union line and moved south to go around Schofield and Johnston's
left flank. That very evening, after the first hint of this movment,
Johnston
began his
withdrawal from Marietta to positions at the Chattahoochee
river, just
10 miles away, the last natural barrier protecting Atlanta.
On 3 July the Federals marched unopposed past Kennesaw Mountain.

To see more extensive treatment of the exchange of dispatches
between Sherman and Schofield on 25, 26, and 27 June 64) see my article
"Sherman's worst day of the war."

Since every frontal attack which Sherman had ordered during the
Civil War had failed, why did he attempt it again here? McKinney writes
in Education in Violence
on page 338: "It is possible that Sherman's jealousy of Grant drove him
to the assault." Two years before his death, Gen. Logan told Gen.
Boynton a story under the condition that it be kept secret until he
died. He and McPherson had tried to talk Sherman out of the attack, but
Sherman was obsessed with all the coverage Grant's army was getting in
the newspapers while his army was stalled before Atlanta. Sherman felt
that "it was necessary to show the country that his troops could fight
as well as Grant's" (Piatt and Boynton, pg. 548). Sherman may well have
had and expressed such feelings, as he was ambivalent towards everyone,
but this does not exclude the possibility that Sherman attacked with
Grant's approval. The question arises: How might Grant have given
Sherman advice without leaving record of it in the official
communications? We get a hint from Schofield's memoirs Forty-Six
Years in the Army which came out in 1894 while he was
Commander in
Chief of the Army. On page 223 he writes that, during the
Vicksburg campaign, he received in his headquarters in St. Louis a
dispatch from Grant, but Schofield's telegrapher couldn't decipher it.
The commander of the Army of the Frontier and former physics instructor
then rolled up his sleeves:

"My staff officer at once informed me that it was in
some key different from that we had in use. So, I took the thing in
hand myself...Commencing about 3 P.M., I reached the desired result at
three in the morning."

So, Grant had his own code, and perhaps in the person of
Schofield his messenger to Sherman. How many other such dispatches from
Grant to Schofield were sent in the following years? When was Halleck's
hand hovering over Schofield's head replaced by Grant's? How is the
rise within a few months of an obscure administraot avoiding battle in
Missouri to army command under Sherman to be explained? Later during
the battle of Nashville, Schofield would
endeavor to make himself very useful to Grant, and again after the war
during the dispute between Johnson and Stanton (whom Schofield would
replace as Secretary of War).

Sherman's battle demonstrated yet again the
futility of frontal attacks against prepared positions, let alone those
against "breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised" (Thomas
to Sherman, ar75_612), without prior destruction of at least one
of the flanks. It also demonstrated who was not
the boss in that army. Yes, I am suggesting that one of Sherman's
motives may have been to put Thomas in his place. Consider the
following passage from Sherman's letter of 18 June 1864 to "Dear
General" Grant:

<ar75_507>
"My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which
is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the
whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried
to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the
offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army of the Cumberland is so
habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the
lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads. I came out without
tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a headquarters
camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth; every aide and orderly with a
wall-tent, and a baggage train big enough for a division. He promised
to send it all back, but the truth is everybody there is allowed to do
as he pleases, and they still think and act as though the railroad and
all its facilities were theirs. This slowness has cost me the loss of
two splendid opportunities which never recur in war."

If you are inclined to discount such intemperate language as
being the expression of momentary ill humor by man under the pressure
of campaigning, then consider the festering resentment demonstrated in
the following quote. In November 1863, Sherman encountered
Rosecrans in Cincinatti and, according to Rosecrans, said to him:

"I think Grant had no hand in it [Rosecrans' replacement],
for on the arrival of my corps I said to him, 'Why in the devil did you
have Rosecrans relieved and Thomas placed in command of the Army of the
Cumberland? Rosecrans is a better soldier than Thomas could ever be.'"
(Lamers, pg. 406; Rosecrans Papers, Document B)

If you think that Sherman was just attempting to ingratiate
himself with Rosecrans, then consider this passage from a letter which
Sherman wrote half a year later, on 27 April 1864, to former
U.S. Senator Thomas Ewing - his childhood guardian and
father-in-law and an early backer of Lincoln:

"At Chattanooga Grant was with Thomas in person—he held back
Thomas' troops till Hooker got into position—we were delayed by
Chattanooga Creek impassable that day without a Bridge to construct
which took time, 4 hours. If we were to dispose of such men as Thomas
summarily who would take his place? We are not masters as Napoleon was.
He could make & unmake on the Spot. We must take the tools provided
us, and in the order prescribed by Rank of which the Law judges."
(Thomas Ewing and Family Papers)

According to this letter, Sherman would have gotten rid of Thomas
if he had he the power he attributed to Napoleon to "make & unmake
on the spot." If Sherman could be honest to anyone, it was to Ewing, so
we can accept this passage as being an exposition of his deepest
feelings toward Thomas. How it must have rankled Sherman that
the honors reserved for him at Chattanooga had been carried off by
Thomas, and with a (prepared) frontal charge no less. Worse still,
Thomas kept on offering him sound advice when he wanted only
subservience. Not even his bogus Thanks of Congress, awarded to him on
19 Feb. 1864 with the help of Senator John Sherman (his younger
brother), could erase the knowledge that he had made a fool of himself
at Chattanooga.

If either theory about Sherman's motivation for ordering the
attack - i.e. out of jealousy of Grant and/or resentment of Thomas - is
correct, then Sherman did not value the lives of the soldiers very
highly, and we have plenty of evidence for that already from other
battles which Sherman fought. To those who object that I am too hard on
Sherman, I reply that, in the light of the evidence presented here, "it
is hard to overstate the case against him" (Robert Meiser). The general
then,
now, or any time who does not consider the lives of the least of his
soldiers as being as precious as his own is a criminal. He is also
short-sighted, because that is the only path to true military
greatness, the path which Thomas took.

In other battle summaries I have tried to build a case for
Thomas' uncommon professionalism and military talent. This battle
illustrates another essential element of Thomas' character, namely his
ability to subordinate his feelings to the goal of winning the war as
quickly as possible. He knew that Sherman could not take Atlanta
without him, and he also knew that Sherman, in his sickness, would get
rid of him if sufficiently provoked. So Thomas obeyed the order, albeit
with only 2 divisions. His suffering as he watched his men die in front
of impregnable fortifications, probably suspecting why he had been sent
on this mission impossible, must have been beyond measure. For this
reason, our debt to him is also beyond measure.

Thomas Van Horne's treatment of the Atlanta
campaign, taken from his 1882 biography "Life of Maj. Gen. George H.
Thomas"

Page 220

CHAPTER XI ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
ADVANCE TO BUZZARD'S ROOST-TURNING OF DALTON-ACTION AT RESACA, MOVEMENT
ON DALLAS-ASSAULT OF JUNE 27TH, AT KENESAW MOUNTAIN FLANK
MOVEMENT-ADVANCE ON ATLANTA-BATTLES OF JULY 20TH AND 22nd
-SIEGE-TURNING MOVEMENT-ACTION AT JONESBORO’.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S armies moved forward from their respective
positions on converging roads towards Tunnel Hill and Snake Creek Gap,
on the 5th of May. The Army of the Cumberland advanced on the direct
roads, the Army of the Ohio on the road from Cleveland to Dalton, and
the Army of the Tennessee by Lee and Gordon's mill through Villanow to
the northern entrance to Snake Creek Gap, a route that the enemy was
not observing.

The tenacious adherence of General Thomas to his plan of turning
Dalton, first suggested to General Grant for execution by the Army of
the Cumberland alone, is evinced by the following extract from the
report of General Thomas to the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

Shortly after his assignment to the command of the
Military Division of the Mississippi General Sherman came to see me at
Chattanooga to consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan
for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sherman
that if he would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate
on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through Buzzard
Roost Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole
force through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded; fall upon
the enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning
his position completely, and force him either to retreat towards the
east through a difficult country,

Page 221 - SHERMAN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY

poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a
strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack me,
in which latter event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently
strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his
communications before he could be made aware of my movement. General
Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to
form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point
for the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to
operate from. *

In rejecting General Thomas' suggestions General Sherman lost the
supreme opportunity of the Atlanta campaign. He adopted Thomas' plan so
far as to send a smaller army through Snake Creek Gap, but with a
different object from that proposed to him. His policy of holding the
great army as a reserve for the smaller ones, might have been effective
in a region which gave freedom of motion to his forces, but was not
suited to the mountain region of Northern Georgia. In a direct advance
the main army would necessarily encounter the enemy's strongest
positions, while the smaller armies in independent movement could
produce no decisive results.

General Sherman made provision for about eighty thousand men to move
directly against Johnston's position in the mountains before Dalton, in
feint or positive attack, as circumstances might determine, and for
twenty-three thousand to pass through Snake Creek Gap to frighten the
enemy into retreat, and then to strike him in flank and rear as he
should run from Dalton to Resaca to save his communications. Thomas
would have led his army of more than sixty thousand men through that
Gap to seize and hold Resaca or the railroad north of that place, while
leaving fifty thousand men to cover the more important movement by
feigning a direct attack at Buzzard's Roost.

* Report to Corn. on Conduct of War, pp. 201-2.

Page 222 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Seldom have mountains and a long, secluded gap offered such aid to
generalship. But the topography prescribed only one plan, a feint upon
the enemy's position before Dalton, and the movement of an army strong
enough to plant itself firmly on his communications. The practicability
of this plan was demonstrated by the operations of the combined armies
on the 8th, 9th and 10th of May.

The views of General Sherman as to his plan of operations were
expressed in his communications to General Halleck and his army
commanders. On the 8th he said to Halleck:

I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain
range through whose gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night
McPherson will be in Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca, and to-morrow
all will move to the attack. Army in good spirits and condition. I hope
Johnston will fight here, instead of drawing me far down in Georgia.

On the 9th he telegraphed to Washington:

We have been fighting all day against precipices and
mountain gaps to keep Johnston's army busy whilst McPherson could march
to Resaca to destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up
to 2 P. M., when he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. After
breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake
Creek Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats
south. I will pitch in again early in the morning. Fighting has been
mostly skirmishing, and casualties small. McPherson has the Army of the
Tennessee, twenty-three thousand, and only encountered cavalry, so that
Johnston did not measure his strength at all.

The day following, at 7 A. M., he telegraphed to General Halleck:

I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost
Gap, and make this despatch that you may understand that Johnston acts
purely on the defensive. I am attacking him on his strongest points,
viz., west and north, till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I
will swing round through Snake Creek Gap and interfere between him and
Georgia. * * * Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching
against McPherson; to-day I will be more easy, as I believebelieve McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered
to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against
Johnston's flank when he does start.

Page 223 - McPHERSON FAILS TO TAKE RESACA

But General McPherson did not take Resaca, nor destroy the railroad
north of that place. He advanced to the vicinity of the town, posted
his army on the south and west for a little time, and then withdrew to
the mouth of Snake Creek Gap and fortified. In the advance from the gap
a small force of cavalry was brushed away, but no other resistance was
offered by the enemy.

At this time Resaca was held by two brigades, comprising about three
thousand men, and there were no supporting forces nearer than Dalton.
These facts demonstrate the practicability of the march of the Army of
the Cumberland through Snake Creek Gap before the enemy " could become
aware of the movement." And had General Thomas been permitted to
execute his own plan, his army would have been firmly planted on
Johnston's communications at Resaca, before either the whole or a part
of his army could have marched from Dalton. General Thomas was as
sanguine that he could have whipped Johnston's entire army with his own
as that he could have moved through Snake Creek Gap without his
knowledge.

In the afternoon of the 9th, General Johnston was
informed by General Canty, commanding at Resaca, that the Army of the
Tennessee had passed through Snake Creek Gap, and thereupon he sent
Hood with three divisions to Resaca. But on the l0th General Hood
reported that the enemy had retired, and he was then ordered to leave
two divisions at Tilton, one on each road, and to return to Dalton with
the third. Tilton is nearly half-way from Resaca to Dalton, and these
two divisions were disposed for a quick movement to either place, as
circumstances should require.

The reasons which have been assigned for the fruitless advance of
the Army of the Tennessee through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, are that
Resaca was strongly fortified

Page 224 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

fied and manned, and that the valley north of that place was a
forest. General Sherman stated, in his official report, that "nothing
saved Johnston's army at Resaca, but the impracticable nature of the
country which made the passage of troops across the valley almost
impossible." When at the time General Thomas heard that the woods north
of Resaca were considered a barrier to an advance upon the railroad, he
simply asked: "Where were their axes?" On the 13th his own army and
Schofield's moved through these woods to form a line of battle before
Resaca. When Sherman learned that McPherson had not broken the railroad
at Resaca, he sent the following letter to Thomas:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.

GENERAL :--I think you are satisfied that your troops cannot take
Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws
of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us.

Two plans of action suggest themselves :

1st. By night to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's
cavalry which, should be near at hand and rapidly move your entire
army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill Creek road
to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson while the wagons are moved to
Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson to move from Sugar Valley on
Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton. Could your
army and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston?

2nd. I cast loose from the railroad altogether and move the whole
army on the same objective point leaving Johnston to choose his course.

Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days'
provisions and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from
McPherson and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near
approach of Stoneman. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is apprized
of the necessity for haste. Do you think any danger to McPherson should
make us delay one day?

Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Present.

Page 225 - PROPOSES TO SUPPORT MCPHERSON

But on the same day General Sherman said to Halleck:

I must feign on Buzzard Roost but pass through Snake
Creek Gap, and place myself between Johnston and Resaca, where we will
have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary move. Certain that
Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no hurry.

This modification of plan did not bring the two generals into much
nearer accord. The appearance of the Army of the Tennessee at Resaca on
the 9th, and its quick retirement to Snake Creek Gap, had given
intricacy to General Sherman's problem. As the town had not been
attacked nor a demand made for the surrender of the troops holding it,
and as no attempt had been made to seize or break the railroad north of
the place, McPherson's movement was equivocal in Johnston's view,
indicating danger to his communications, or a feint to cover direct
operations against Dalton. While, therefore, in doubt as to the real
significance of this movement Johnston was more watchful against the
advance of Sherman's forces on the direct road to his position as well
as on 'the one to his rear through Snake Creek Gap.

On the 10th, General Thomas addressed the following letter to
General Sherman:

"How do you like the idea of leaving General Schofield where he is,
placing General Howard in front of the gap to entrench himself to hold
the gap: Palmer's corps in reserve, with ten days provisions and full
supply of ammunition, to reenforce General McPherson, if necessary, and
send General Hooker's corps at once to support General McPherson? I
make this proposition simply because I think General Hooker's corps
will be sufficient to enable General McPherson to whip any force that
Johnston can bring against him. Not knowing what your plans may be I
submit this for your consideration.

" I am General very respectfully your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. V. Commanding

Page 226 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

This letter is seemingly a reply to General Sherman's of the same
day, and yet the last sentence warrants the inference that it was
independently suggestive. It answers directly or indirectly, the
questions proposed by Sherman, and yet at the time Thomas was evidently
ignorant of the plans of the former which were to follow the failure of
McPherson to change the situation. This letter, therefore, as
anticipating General Sherman's questions, evinces a persistent
thoughtfulness and a wonderfully clear apprehension of possibilities.
The practicability of his original plan had been demonstrated by
McPherson's movements, although the great object proposed by Thomas had
not been attained. The instructions of Sherman to McPherson named a
different object, and yet the situation at Resaca demonstrated so
plainly the practicability of achieving all that Thomas had promised,
had he been permitted to lead his army through Snake Creek Gap, that
General McPherson was subsequently censured for not departing from the
course prescribed by his orders.

Some of General Sherman's questions were indirectly answered by
General Thomas whether his letter was an answer to Sherman's or written
before that letter was received. He had previously asserted that with
his own army he could whip Johnston, and in his letter he assumed that
reenforced by Hooker's corps, McPherson could whip any force that
Johnston could "bring against him;" and he did not express his
conviction that it was useless to attempt to carry Johnston's mountain
fortress, because he had previously asserted that that position if well
defended could not be carried by assault.

In this letter of the 10th, General Thomas virtually made a
re-statement of his original plan, with this difference however, that
General McPherson was to be given the vital movement with Hooker's
corps added to his army. His suggestions, if adopted, would have
divided Sherman's forces into two nearly equal parts, one-half to

Page 227 - SNAKE CREEK GAP

advance on Resaca or on the railroad north of that place, and the
other to maintain the feint on the north of Dalton. He was not in favor
of withdrawing any of the forces from Buzzard Roost under the
observation of the enemy. But as Hooker had already moved towards Snake
Creek Gap, that corps could have joined McPherson unnoticed by the
enemy. Thomas suggested the fortification of Howard's position to
strengthen the feint rather than to neutralize it altogether by the
withdrawal of the forces from Buzzard's Roost. And had his second plan
been promptly tried with troops disposed as he recommended all the
circumstances gave assurance of success. From the return of General
Hood to Dalton on the 10th, to the evening of the 11th, Resaca was held
by Canty's troops. McPherson could have moved against Resaca or to the
railroad between that place and Dalton, with a larger army than General
Johnston had at hand and at the same time he could have cut off from
the enemy the two divisions of Folk's corps, one of which arrived at
Resaca from the south on the evening of the 11th. This
coincidence of plan with circumstances assuring successful execution,
is one of the marvelous, oft-recurring proofs of the generalship of
Thomas. And seldom has a general been so generous and patriotic. He had
been forbidden to carry out a plan of his own devising, and yet he
offered a corps of twenty thousand men to another commander to execute
that plan.

But General Sherman decided to move his entire force through Snake
Creek Gap on the 12th, except Howard's corps and McCook's and
Stoneman's cavalry, and gave orders accordingly. On the 12th,all his
infantry except Howard's corps moved through Snake Creek Gap. Early on
that day General Johnston reconnoitred his front before Dalton to
ascertain the number of troops at Buzzard's Roost and other points, and
early on the following morning he retired his army to Resaca, General
Folk's corps covering the

Page 228 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps in line of battle before the
town. A large army could have advanced to the railroad north of Resaca,
at any time between the 9th, and evening of the 12th.

During this period Johnston had no forces there, or near there, that
could not have been shut up in the town or driven back to Dalton. But
when on the 13th, Sherman's armies debouched from the
southern opening of Snake Creek Gap, Johnston had at least fifty
thousand infantry and artillery, in part behind defenses, but all in
front of his communications. But had the Army of the Cumberland instead
of the Army of the Tennessee -- sixty thousand men in room of twenty
three thousand -- passed through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th,
or had the latter army strengthened by Hooker's corps advanced on
Resaca on the 11th , General Johnston in all probability
would have lost his communications if not his army.

Sherman's armies were put in array before Resaca on the 13th,
and on the next day there was an indecisive battle. On the night of the
15th, to avoid being shut up in Resaca, and a retreat with
exposed flanks, General Johnston retired with his army and his
material. In shunning a general engagement he gave up Rome and Kingston
and the railroad to the Etowah River. Here General Sherman halted for
three days to give rest to his troops, repair the railroad and
accumulate supplies.

Despairing of bringing on a battle by direct pursuit, he resolved to
cut loose from his communications and move past Johnston's left flank,
and if possible reach his line of supply at Marietta or the
Chattahoochee River. His forces having supplies for twenty days in
wagon crossed the Etowah on the 23rd , and moved upon
various railroads leading to the southwest. In this movement the Army
of the Cumberland was in the centre, the Army of the Tennessee on the
right and the Army of the Ohio, on the left. McCook's cavalry, in front
of the central army, skirmished

Page 229 - NEW HOPE CHURCH

with cavalry and infantry at Stilesboro’ on the 23rd. The
day following indications multiplied that General Johnston had
discovered the movement of Sherman's armies to his left and was making
efforts to defeat it.

On the 25th, the Army of the Cumberland advanced upon
four roads under orders to converge on Dallas. As it progressed,
resistance was offered by the enemy on the road leading to New Hope
Church. And it soon became evident that Johnston had thrown his army
across Sherman's line of march, in a strong position about four miles
from Dallas. As soon as General Geary's division in advance began to
meet strong resistance, General Thomas apprehended the situation and
sent from him all the members of his staff, bearing messages, looking
to the quick concentration of his army before the enemy.

In emergencies no general was more prompt, or wise, in his
dispositions. At the time, his own army was scattered, and the other
two armies were not near for quick support. The purpose of the enemy
was not known, and an offensive blow was not improbable. Sherman
believed that he had struck Johnston's right flank and proposed to turn
it. Thomas perceiving the danger to his scattered forces, should
Johnston take the offensive with his concentrated army, addressed
himself to supporting the troops that first engaged the enemy, so as to
hide the condition of his army and ward off offense until his troops
should be gathered together.

The operations near Dallas were very much like those at Resaca in
form and issue. General Sherman made effort to break Johnston's line
and turn his flank, and finally after heavy loss solved the problem, by
moving his army by the left flank to the railroad at Ackworth, leaving
his foe free to take position on his communications further south.

Page 230 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

The operations of the month of May cost the Army of the Cumberland
nearly nine thousand men, of whom eleven hundred and fifty-six were
killed, and six thousand seven hundred and fifty-two wounded. And there
had been no general engagement, and no success beyond pressing the
enemy back by turning movements.

From the 10th of June to the 21st , the
combined armies advanced slowly towards Marietta, by attacking
entrenchments and turning the enemy's flanks. Incessant rain greatly
retarded operations, and gave great discomfort to officers and men.

At the beginning of the campaign General Sherman had prescribed
shelter tents for his armies and had taken one for himself. But General
Thomas had been so far insubordinate as to provide better appointments
for himself and his staff Suffering from the injury to his spine,
received in 1863, he deemed it necessary to make himself as comfortable
as might be in such a campaign. One evening he observed that General
Sherman, who had stopped for the night was seemingly in destitution of
the usual comforts of a commanding general, and almost without
attendants. He thereupon sent a company of sharp-shooters* from his own
headquarters, to pitch tents, and devote themselves in other ways, to
the comfort of the commander-in-chief. This company and their service
were accepted by General Sherman for the remainder of the campaign, and
the shelter tents and other self-imposed privations were thrown aside.

On the 21st of June, Johnston's army was covering
Marietta, with his lines upon the two Kenesaw Mountains, and the ground
on the east of the greater the approach to the town from the north. The
day following Sherman made effort to advance the right of his line, so
as to threaten the enemy's communications between Marietta and the
Chattahoochee River. The forces making this advance, were Hooker's
corps, and the Army of the Ohio. This movement caused Johnston to
transfer Hood's

* 7th Independent Co. Ohio sharp-shooters, Lieut, McCrory
commanding.

Page 231 - KULP’S HOUSE

corps from his right to his left. In the afternoon, Hood attacked
Hooker, when the latter had advanced to the vicinity of Kulp's house.
The conflict resulted in the enemy's repulse.

At this juncture the Army of the Tennessee, recently reenforced by
nine thousand men, under General Blair, was in line of battle on the
east of the railroad, touching the left flank of the Army of the
Cumberland near the base of the greater Kenesaw. As shown by the
following despatch from Sherman to McPherson, Thomas suggested the
advance of the Army of the Tennessee, to attack Marietta from the
north.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.in
the field. Big Shanty, June 22nd, 1864

GENERAL :-General Hooker, this p.m. advanced to
Kulp's house two and a half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports
finding three corps. He was attacked twice and successfully repulsed
the enemy. General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics,
and that you ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but I
judge the safer and better plan to be the one, I indicated, viz: for
you to leave a light force and cover that flank, and throw the
remainder rapidly and as much out of view as possible to your right.

You may make the necessary orders and be prepared
for rapid action to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of
Kenesaw will do you as little mischief as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

MAJOR-GENERAL MCPHERSON,Commanding
the Army of the Tennessee.

General Sherman had the alternative of a turning movement on right
or left, or a direct attack on the enemy's strong position on the
mountains. General Thomas expressed a decided preference for a movement
on Marietta from the north. And when he made the suggestion the
approach in that direction had just been uncovered by the transfer of
Hood's corps to Johnston's left flank. General

Page 232 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Johnston thus mentions this transfer in his official report:

"On the 21st , Hood's corps was
transferred from right to left, Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the
position which it left." It was manifestly impracticable for Johnston
to cover his communications securely and protect Marietta on the north
with a corps or any strong force of infantry."

There was danger in uncovering the rear of his troops on the
mountains, but it was not so great as in leaving his communications
open to the advancing right of Sherman's armies. And Johnston hoped
that this movement would be maintained, and that his exposure on the
north would not be observed. But had Thomas' plan been adopted and
carried out, the enemy would have been taken at great disadvantage.

Had the Army of the Tennessee advanced on Marietta on the 23rd
, the confused flight of Johnston's army, or a battle for which he was
in no way prepared, would certainly have resulted. McPherson, with more
than thirty thousand men, would have been in rear of the mountains, and
Johnston could have made no dispositions to meet him that would not
have exposed his left flank and his communications to the Armies of the
Cumberland and the Ohio. General Johnston acted upon a probability that
would not have become actual if General Thomas had been in supreme
command. He would have thrown an army upon the enemy's most vulnerable
point, and this would have precipitated a general engagement where
Johnston had no defenses, or necessitated his retreat in daylight,
involving a peril that he most strenuously guarded against throughout
the campaign. If he had retreated, the Army of the Tennessee would have
been upon his rear and the

two other armies upon his flank. When, however, Hood's corps was
taken from the front of the Army of the Tennessee, the attitude of
Wheeler's cavalry induced General McPherson to believe that the enemy
was massing against him. This belief, or other reasons, caused General
Sherman

Page 233 - KENESAW MOUNTAIN

to order his armies to move by the right flank until the Army of the
Tennessee confronted the mountains. This movement was followed by the
disastrous effort to break through Johnston's line, where nature and
art had rendered his position exceedingly strong. If Thomas had been in
command Johnston would not have been on the mountain.

In his Memoirs General Sherman makes the following statements:

During the 24th and 25th of
June General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to
compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the
intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would
give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas,
McPherson and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with
prudence stretch out any more, and there was no alternative but to
attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that time. I
reasoned, if he could make a breach anywhere near the rebel centre, and
thrust in a strong head of column, that with the one moiety of our army
we could hold in check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with
the other sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half. *

It is explicitly stated in this extract that General Sherman and his
army commanders agreed that it would not be prudent to attenuate the
line any further, but is not made clear whether the conclusion that
"there was no alternative but to attack ' fortified lines' " was drawn
by General Sherman alone, or with the concurrence of the other
generals. It is certain that a flank movement was not precluded by the
situation before the assault of the 27th, since such a
movement was successful afterwards. The testimony of several of General
Thomas' staff officers is explicit as to his opposition to attacking
the fortified lines before Marietta. Five days before the assault he
had suggested the advance of the Army of the Tennessee on that town
from the northeast. He opposed a second assault most positively, and
was quick to approve the movement of the armies by the

* Memoirs, Vol. II,, page 60.

Page 234 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

right flank when it was first proposed by General Sherman. It is
clear, therefore, that General Thomas did not deem it wise to attempt
to carry the enemy's strong positions.

On the 24th, General Sherman directed the army commanders
to make preparations to attack the enemy in force on the 27th.
Thomas was instructed to attack a point of his own selection near his
centre, and McPherson, after feigning a movement on Marietta from the
north, to make his real attack south and west from Kenesaw. Each
attacking column was to endeavor to break a single point and make a
secure lodgment beyond, and to follow it up toward Marietta and the
railroad, in the event of success.

The required assault was made early on the 27th, and the
following despatch tells the result:

Thomas to Sherman, June 27, 10.45 A.M.:-

Yours received. Harker's brigade advanced to within
twenty paces of the enemy's breast-works, and was repulsed with
canister at short range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner'sbrigade of Newton's division, supporting General
Harker, was so severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. Col
Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division captured one line of the rebel
breastworks. which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also severely
handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. It is compelled
to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all too much exhausted to
advance, but we hold all that we have gained.

The failure of the assault rendered imperative the consideration of
some other movement. The views of General Thomas appear in the
following despatches.

At 10.30 P. M. General Sherman asked Thomas,

"Do you think you can carry any of the enemy's line?

In answer the latter telegraphed:

From Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

Your dispatches of 11.45 A.M. and 1:30 P.M.
received. Davis' two brigades are now within sixty yards of the enemy's
entrenchments. Davis reports that he does not think he can carry the
works by assault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can
hold his

Page 235 - KENESAW MOUNTAIN

position, put in one or two batteries to-night, and
probably drive them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the
same. Their works are from six to seven feet high, and nine feet thick.
In front of Howard they have a strong abattis. Davis' loss in officers
has been very heavy. Nearly all the field officers of McCook's brigade,
with McCook, have been killed or wounded. From what the officers tell
me, I do not think we can carry the works by assault at this point
to-day, but they can be approached by saps and the enemy driven out.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

Your despatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all
the ground we have gained, and the division report their ability to
hold. They also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong, in fact,
so strong that they cannot be carried by assault, except by an immense
sacrifice, even if they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the
best chance is to approach them by regular saps if we can find a
favorable approach to batter them down. We have already lost heavily
today, without gaining any material advantage. One or two more such
assaults would use up this army.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27 - 6 P.M.:-

"The assault of the enemy's works in my front was
well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work with the
greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only
to the strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well
manned, thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against the
assault. We have lost nearly two thousand officers and men, among them
two brigade commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade in
Newton's division, and Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade in
Jeff. Davis' division, both reported to be mortally wounded, besides
some six or eight field officers killed. Both General Harkerand Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks,
and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the enemy
from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer think that they can
find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries for
enfilading the enemy's works. We took between ninety and one hundred
prisoners.

His proposition to approach the enemy's fortifications by saps, was
simply a substitute for a second assault, but he undoubtedly preferred
a flank movement.

Page 236 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In the evening Sherman suggested a flank movement, and to this
Thomas eagerly acceded.

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1864.--9 P. M.:-

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting
loose from our railroad ? It would bring matters to a crisis, and
Schofield has secured the way.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27: -

What force do you think of moving with ? If with the
greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting
against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

How far is Fulton from the crossing of Oiley's Creek
? Will we have to cross any other streams of much size ? When do you
wish to start ?

On the 1st of July, General Sherman ordered his armies to
move by the right flank to compel Johnston to abandon the mountains
before Marietta. Thomas was required to hold his position while
McPherson should march his array to the right to threaten the enemy's
communications at the Chattahoochee River. When this general movement
was fully developed on the 2nd of July, Johnston availed
himself of the darkness of the following night, and covering his rear
with defenses at Ruff's Station, and afterwards in front of the
railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, retreated in safety to the
fortifications before Atlanta.

During the first two months of the campaign Sherman's operations had
a specific relation to General Grant's movements in Virginia, but on
the 28th of June he was freed from the obligation to
maneuver his armies with reference to the retention of all Johnston's
forces in Georgia. Hitherto the great army in the East and the combined
armies in the

Page 237 - THOMAS' INDIFFERENCE TO DANGER

west had been so far cooperative that they were in turn to prevent
Lee from sending troops to Georgia, and Johnston from detaching troops
to Virginia.

The temerity of General Thomas in exposing himself to danger was
illustrated on two occasions during the advance to the Chattahoochee
River. At one time with General Davis and other officers, he went to
the picket line to ascertain whether the enemy was in force in his
front. On the line there was a vacant log cabin, and to this house the
officers repaired, after leaving their horses in a depression in the
rear. The cabin proved to be a poor protection, as there were openings
between the logs, and a volley from the enemy caused all except General
Thomas to beat a hasty retreat to their horses. The general, however,
walked slowly back, although he was plainly a mark for the enemy's
sharp-shooters. At a gate in the rear he stopped and faced the enemy,
and then walked slowly to his horse. He seemed unwilling to retreat
when alone, and consciously a target for the enemy.

At another time he was invited by General Davis to ride in the rear
of Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade which was sent on a reconnoissance.
As the two generals rode in the rear of the column they observed ripe
blackberries by the roadside, and dismounted to pick them. While thus
engaged bullets began to fall thickly around them, from the enemy's
cavalry that had come round the flank of the reconnoitring column, then
out of sight. General Thomas did not even look up, but continued to
pick the berries, remarking playfully, "Davis, this is eating
blackberries under difficulties." General Davis, however, became
anxious, lest his commander should be killed or captured, and urged an
immediate retreat.

While halting his troops on the north bank of the Chattahoochee
River, that his construction corps might bring the cars to his camp,
General Sherman received the following despatches which hastened his
advance on Atlanta:

Page 238 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, July 16, 1864, l0 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN : The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to
give the enemy a firm foothold north, they are now returning with
possibly twenty-five thousand troops. All the men they have here,
beyond a sufficiency to hold their string of fortifications, will be an
element of weakness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable,
therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight reenforcements on
your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if
you get Atlanta, you set about destroying the railroad as far to the
east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the
country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until
help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here
which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If
successful I can detach from here for other enterprises; looking much
to your assistance or anything elsewhere.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1864--4.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN : Lieutenant-General Grant wishes me to call your
attention to the possibility of Johnston's being reenforced from
Richmond, and the importance of your having prepared a good line of
defense against such an increase of rebel force. Also, the importance
of getting as large an amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as
possible.
H. W. HALLECK, Major- General, Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., In the Field,
Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864
GENERALS THOMAS AND MCPHERSON : Despatches from Generals Grant and Halleck to-day,
speak of the enemy having failed in his designs in Maryland, and
cautioning me that Lee may in the next fortnight reenforce Johnson by
twenty thousand men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will
move tomorrow as far as Nancy's Creek.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol.
IV, Yosellof ed., 1956

Originally published in 1887 by Robert Underwood Johnson and
Clarence
Clough Buell, editors of the "The Century Magazine".

PRESIDENT DAVIS transferred me from the Department of Mississippi to
the command of the Army of Tennessee by a telegram received December
18th, 1863, in the camp of Ross's brigade of cavalry near Bolton. I
assumed that command at Dalton on the 27th, and received there, on the
1st of January, a letter from the President dated December 23d,
purporting to be "instructions".

In it he, in Richmond, informed me of the encouraging condition of
the army, which w induced him to hope that I would soon be able to
commence active operations against the enemy, "the men being
"tolerably" well clothed, with a large reserve of small-arms, the
morning reports exhibiting an effective total that exceeded in number
"that actually engaged on the Confederate side in any battle of the
war." Yet this army itself had lost in the recent campaign at least
25,000 men in action, while 17,000 had been transferred from it in
Longstreet's corps, and the two brigades (Quarles's and Baldwin's) that
had been sent to Mississippi; so that it was then weaker by 40,000 men
than it had been when "engaged on the Confederate side" in the battle
of Chickamauga, in the September preceding.

In the inspections, which were made as soon as practicable, the
appearance of the army was very far from being "matter of much
congratulation." Instead of a reserve of muskets there was a deficiency
of six thousand and as great a one of blankets, while the number of
bare feet was painful to see. The artillery horses were too feeble to
draw the guns in fields, or on a march, and the mules were in similar
condition; while the supplies of forage were then very irregular, and
did not include hay. In consequence of this, it was necessary to send
all of these animals not needed for camp service to the valley of the
Etowah, where long forage could be found, to restore their health and
strength.

The last return of the army was of December 20th, and exhibited an
effective total of less than 36,000, of whom 6000 were without arms and
as many without shoes. The President impressed upon me the importance
of recovering Tennessee with an army in such numbers and condition. On
pages 548-9, Vol. II. of his work, "The Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government," he dwells, upon his successful efforts to
increase its numbers and means adequately. After the strange assertions
and suggestions of December 23d, he did not resume the subject of
military operations until, in a letter of February 27th to him through
his staff-officer General Bragg, I pointed out the

Page 261

necessity of great preparations to take the offensive, such as large
additions to the number of troops, an ample supply of field
transportation, subsistence stores, and forage, a bridge equipage, and
fresh artillery horses. This letter was acknowledged on the 4th of
March, but not really replied to until the 12th, when General Bragg
[see note, Vol. III., p. 711] wrote a plan of campaign which was
delivered to me on the 18th by his secretary, Colonel Sale. It
prescribed my invasion of Tennessee with an army of 75,000 men,
including Longstreet's corps, then near Morristown Tennessee. When
necessary, supplies and transportation were collected at Dalton, the
additional troops, except Longstreet's, would be sent there; and this
army and Longstreet's corps would march to meet at Kingston, on the
Tennessee River, and thence into the valley of Duck River.

Being invited to give my views, I suggested that the enemy could
defeat the plan, either by attacking one of our two bodies of troops on
the march, with their united forces, or by advancing against Dalton
before our forces there should be equipped for the field; for it was
certain that they would be able to take the field before we could be
ready. I proposed, therefore, that the additional troops should be sent
to Dalton in time to give us the means to beat the Federal army there,
and then pursue it into Tennessee, which would be a more favorable mode
of invasion than the other.

General Bragg replied that my answer did not indicate acceptance of
the plan proposed, and that troops could be drawn from other points
only to advance. As the idea of advancing had been accepted by me, it
was evidently his strategy that was the ultimatum.

I telegraphed again (and also sent a confidential officer to say)
that I was anxious to take the offensive with adequate means, and to
represent to the President the actual disparity of forces, but without
result. The above is the substance of all said, written, or done on the
subject of Mr. Davis's pages 548-9, before the armies were actually in
contact, with odds of ten to four against us.

The instruction, discipline, and spirit of the army were much
improved between the 1st of January and the end of April, and its
numbers were increased. The efforts for the latter object brought back
to the ranks about five thousand of the men who had left them in the
rout of Missionary Ridge. On the morning report of April 30th the
totals were: 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392
cavalry. This is the report as corrected by Major Kinloch Falconer
assistant adjutant-general, from official records in, his office.*
Sherman had assembled at that time an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns;
but before the armies actually met, three divisions of cavalry under
Generals Stoneman, Garrard, and McCook added 10,000 or 12,000 men to
the number. The object prescribed to him by General Grant was " to move
against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior
of the enemy's country as far as he could inflicting all the damage
possible on their war resources."

The occupation of Dalton by General Bragg had been accidental. He
had encamped there for a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge,
and had

remained because it was ascertained next morning that the pursuit
had ceased. Dalton is in a valley so broad as to give ample room for
the deployment of the largest American army. Rocky-face, which bounds
it on the west, terminates as an obstacle three miles north of the
railroad gap, and the distance from Chattanooga to Dalton around the
north end exceeds that through the railroad gap less than a mile; and a
general with a large army, coming from Chattanooga to attack an
inferior one near Dalton, would follow that route and find in the broad
valley a very favorable field.

Mr. Davis descants on the advantages I had in mountains, ravines,
and streams, and General Sherman claims that those features of the
country were equal to the numerical difference between our forces. I
would gladly have given all the mountains, ravines, rivers, and woods
of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition, proportionally,
as he had. Thinking as he did, it is strange that he did not give
himself a decided superiority of actual strength, by drawing troops
from ments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, where,
according to Secretary Stanton's report of 1865, he had 139,000 men,
fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not
rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the
Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only mountain in sight of
the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federals. The small
military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the
Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than
those on the plain.

During the previous winter Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, had
wisely made an admirable base for our army by intrenching Atlanta.

As a road leads from Chattanooga through Snake Creek Gap to the
railroad bridge at Resaca, a light intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000
men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point
and Dalton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that
purpose.*

On the 1st of May I reported to the Administration that the enemy
was about to advance, suggesting the transfer of at least a par t of
General Polk's troops to my command. Then the cavalry with convalescent
horses was ordered to the front,--Martin's division to observe the
Oostenaula from Resaca to Rome, and Kelly's little brigade to join the
cavalry on the Cleveland road.

On the 4th the Federal army, including the troops from Knoxville,
was at Ringgold. Next day it skirmished until dark with our advanced
guard of cavalry. This was repeated on the 6th. On the 7th it moved
forward, driving our cavalry from Tunnel Hill, and taking a position in
the afternoon in front of the railroad gap, and parallel to Rocky-face
-- the right a mile south of the gap, and the left near the Cleveland
road.

Until that day I had regarded a battle in the broad valley in which
Dalton stands as inevitable. The greatly superior strength of the
Federal army made the chances of battle altogether in its favor. It had
also places of refuge in case of defeat, in the intrenched pass of
Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga; while we, if beaten, had
none nearer than Atlanta,

----------------------------------------------------------
* For maps of the campaign see p. 251 and the paper by
General Howard, to follow.--Editors.
----------------------------------------------------------

Page 263

100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. General Sherman's
course indicating no intention of giving battle east of Rocky-face, we
prepared to fight on either side of the ridge. For that object A. P.
Stewart's division was placed in the gap, Cheatham's on the crest of
the hill, extending a mile north of Stewart's, and Bate's also on the
crest of the hill, and extending a mile south of the gap. Stevenson's
was formed across the valley east of the ridge, his left meeting
Cheatham's right; Hindman in line with Stevenson and on his right;
Cleburne behind Mill Creek and in front of Dalton. Walker's division
was in reserve.

Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th) and
was charged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry
was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap.
Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap,--the remainder in front of
our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of
Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade
who were guarding Dug Gap, and who were soon joined by Grigsby's
brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a
conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send
Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command
there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, and the enemy
was driven down the hill. A sharp engagement was occurring at the same
time on the crest of the mountain, where our right and center joined,
between Pettus's brigade holding that point and troops of the Fourth
Corps attacking it. The assailants were repulsed, however. The vigor of
this attack suggested the addition of Brown's brigade to Pettus's.

On the 9th a much larger force assailed the troops at the angle, and
with great determination,.but the Federal troops were defeated with a
loss proportionate to their courage. Assaults as vigorous and resolute
were made at the same time on Stewart and on Bate, and were handsomely
repulsed. The Confederates, who fought under cover, had but trifling
losses in these combats, but the Federal troops, fully exposed, must
have lost heavily--the more because American soldiers are not to be
driven back without severe losses. General Wheeler had a very handsome
affair of cavalry near Varnell's Station the same day, in which he
captured 100 prisoners, including a colonel, three captains, five
lieutenants, and a standard. General Sherman regarded these actions as
amounting to a battle.

Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the
Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General
Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark.
Lieutenant General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions
immediately. The next morning he reported the enemy retiring, and was
recalled, with orders to leave two divisions midway between the two
places. Spirited fighting was renewed in and near the gap as well as on
the northern front. The most vigorous of them was made late in the day,
on Bate's division and, repulsed. At night information was received
from our scouts near the south end of Rocky-face, that the Army of the
Tennessee was intrenching in Snake Creek Gap, and next morning reports
were received which indicated a general

Page 264

illustration

Page 265

movement of the Federal army to its right, and one report that
General McPherson's troops were moving from Snake Creek Gap toward
Resaca. General Polk, who had Just reached that place with Loring's
division, was charged with its defense.

General Wheeler was directed to move next morning with all the
available cavalry around the north end of Rocky-face, to learn if a
general movement of the enemy was in progress. He was to be supported
by Hindman's division. In this reconnaissance General Stoneman's
division of cavalry was encountered and driven back. The information
gained confirmed the reports of the day before.

About 10 o'clock A. M. of the 13th the Confederate army moved from
Dalton and reached Resaca just as the Federal troops approaching from
Snake Creek Gap were encountering Loring's division a mile from the
station. Their approach was delayed long enough by Loring's opposition
to give me time to select the ground to be occupied by our troops. And
while they were taking this ground the Federal army was forming in
front of them. The left of Polk's corps occupied the west face of the
intrenchment of Resaca. Hardee's corps, also facing to the west, formed
the center. Hood's its left division facing to the west and the two
others to the north-west, was on the right, and, crossing the railroad,
reached the Connasauga. The enemy skirmished briskly with the left half
of our line all the afternoon.

On the 14th spirited fighting was maintained by the enemy on the
whole front, a very vigorous attack being made on Hindman's division of
Hood's corps, which was handsomely repulsed. In the meantime General
Wheeler was directed to ascertain the position and formation of the
Federal left. His report indicating that these were not unfavorable to
an attack, Lieutenant-General Hood was directed to make one with
Stewart's and Stevenson's divisions, strengthened by four brigades from
the center and left. He was instructed to make a half change of front
to the left to drive the enemy from the railroad, the object of the
operation being to prevent them from. using it. The attack was
extremely well conducted and executed, and before dark (it was begun at
6 P. M.) the enemy was driven from his ground. This encouraged me to
hope for a more important success; so General Hood was directed to
renew the fight next morning. His troops were greatly elated by this
announcement, made to them that evening.

On riding from the right to the left after nightfall, I was informed
that the extreme left of our line of skirmishers, forty or fifty men,
had been driven from their ground,--an elevation near the river --and
received a report from Major-General Martin that Federal troops were
crossing the Oostenaula near Lay's Ferry on a pontoon-bridge -- two
divisions having already crossed. In consequence of this Walker's
division was sent to Lay's Ferry immediately,, and the order to General
Hood was revoked; also, Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Presstman, chief
engineer, was directed to lay a pontoon-bridge a mile above the
railroad and to have the necessary roadway made.

Sharp fighting commenced early on the 15th, and continued until
night, with so much vigor that many of the assailants pressed up to our

Page 266

intrenchments. All these attacks were repelled, however. In General
Sherman's language, the sounds of musketry and cannon rose all day to
the dignity of a battle.

Soon after noon intelligence was received from Major-General Walker,
that the report that the enemy had crossed the Oostenaula was untrue.
Lieutenant-General Hood was therefore again ordered to assail the enemy
with the troops he had commanded the day before. When he was about to
move forward, positive intelligence was received from General Walker
that the Federal right was actually crossing the Oostenaula. This made
it necessary to abandon the thought of fighting north of the river, and
the orders to Lieutenant-General Hood were countermanded, but the order
from corps headquarters was not sent to Stewart promptly, and
consequently he made the attack unsustained, and suffered before being
recalled.

The occupation of Resaca being exceedingly hazardous, I determined
to abandon the place. So the army was ordered to cross the Estanislao
about midnight,-- Hardee's and Polk's corps by the railroad and trestle
bridges, and Hood's by that above, on the pontoons.

General Sherman claims to have surprised us by McPherson's
appearance in Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, forgetting that we discovered
his march on the 8th. He blames McPherson for not seizing the place.
That officer tried the works and found them too strong to be seized.
General Sherman says that if McPherson had placed his whole force
astride the railroad, he could have there easily withstood the attack
of all Johnston's army. Had he done so, "all Johnston's army" would
have been upon him at the dawn of the next day, the cannon giving
General Sherman intelligence of the movement of that army. About twice
his force in front and three thousand men in his immediate r ear would
have overwhelmed him, making a most auspicious beginning of the
campaign for the Confederates.

General Sherman has a very exaggerated idea of our field-works. They
were slighter than his own, because we had most inadequate supplies of
intrenching tools. Two events at Resaca were greatly magnified to him.
He says that toward evening on the 15th [14th] McPherson "moved his
whole line of battle forward till he had gained a ridge overlooking the
town" [there was no town.-- J. E. J.], and that several attempts to
drive him away were repulsed with bloody loss. The fact is, near night
of the 14th, forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left
were driven from the slight elevation they occupied,* but no attempt
was made to retake it. Sherman also says that "Hooker's corps had also
some handsome fighting on the left,...capturing a 4-gun intrenched
battery."... From our view in the morning

-----------------------------------------------------------------
* In his published "Narrative" General Johnston says:
"On riding from the right to the left, after nightfall, I learned that
Lieutenant-General Polk's advanced troops had been driven from a hill
in front of his left, which commanded our bridges at short range."

And General J. D. Cox, in his volume "Atlanta"
(Charles Scribner's Sons), says:

"Between 5 and 6 o'clock Logan [of McPherson]
ordered forward the brigades of Generals Giles A. Smith and C. R.
Woods, supported by Veatch's division from Dodge's corps. The height
held by Polk was carried, and the position intrenched under a galling
artillery and musketry fire from the enemy's principal lines. During
the evening Polk made a vigorous effort to retake the position, but was
repulsed, McPherson sending forward Lightburn's brigade to the support
of the troops already engaged. The hill thus carried commanded the
railroad and wagon bridges crossing the Oostenaula." (See also p. 282.)
EDITORS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Page 267

of the 15th, Major-General Stevenson advanced four guns some eighty
yards and began to intrench them. General Hood had their fire opened at
once. A ravine leading from the Federal line within easy musket-range
enabled the Federal troops to drive away the gunners; but their attempt
to take off the guns was frustrated by the Confederate musketry. So the
pieces remained in place, and fell into the possession of Hooker's
corps on the 16th, after we abandoned the position.

The Confederate army was compelled to abandon its position in front
of Dalton by General Sherman's flank movement through Snake Creek Gap,
and was forced from the second position by the movement toward Calhoun.
Each of these movements would have made the destruction of the
Confederate army inevitable in case of defeat. In the first case the
flank march was protected completely by Rocky-face Ridge; in the
second, as completely by the Oostenaula. A numerical superiority of
more than two to one made those manoeuvres free from risk. General
Sherman thinks that the impracticable nature of the country, which made
the passage of the troops across the valley almost impossible, saved
the Confederate army. The Confederate army remained in its position,
near Dalton until May 13th, because I knew the time that would be
required for the march of 100,000 men through the long defile between
their right flank near Mill Creek Gap and the outlet of Snake Creek
Gap; and the shortness of the time in which 43,000 men could march by
two good roads direct from Dalton to Resaca; and the further fact that
our post at Resaca could hold out a longer time than our march to that
point would require.

Mr. Davis and General Sherman exhibit a strange ignorance of the
country between Dalton and Atlanta. Mr. Davis describes mountain ridges
offering positions neither to be taken nor turned, and a natural
fortress eighteen miles in extent, forgetting, apparently, that a for
tress is strong only when it has a garrison strong enough for its
extent; and both for get that, except Rocky-face, no mountain is
visible from the road between Dalton and Atlanta. That country is
intersected by numerous practicable roads, and is not more rugged than
that near Baltimore and Washington, or Atlanta and Macon. When the
armies confronted each other the advantages of ground were equal and
unimportant, both parties depending for protection on earth-works, not
on ridges and ravines.

In leaving Resaca I hoped to find a favorable position near Calhoun,
but there was none; and the army, after resting 18 or 20 hours near
that place, early in the morning of the 17th moved on seven or eight
miles to Adairsville -- where we were joined by the cavalry of General
Polk's command, a division of 3700 men under General W. H. Jackson. Our
map represented the valley in which the railroad lies as narrow enough
for our army formed across it to occupy the heights on each side with
its flanks, and therefore I intended to await the enemy's attack there;
but the breadth of the valley far exceeded the front of our army in
order of battle. So another plan was devised. Two roads lead southward
from Adairsville,-- one directly through Cassville; the other follows
the railroad through Kingston, turns to the left there, and rejoins

Page 268

the other at Cassville. The interval between them is widest opposite
Kingston, where it is about seven miles by the farm roads. In the
expectation that a part of the Federal army would follow each road, it
was arranged that Polk's corps should engage the column on the direct
road when it should arrive opposite Kingston,-- Hood's, in position for
the purpose, falling upon its left Hank during the deployment. Next
morning, when our cavalry on that road reported the right Federal
column near Kingston, General Hood was instructed to move to and follow
northwardly a country road a mile east of that from Adairsville, to be
in position to fall upon the flank of the Federal column when it should
be engaged with Polk. An or deat we were about to give battle was read
to each regiment, and heard with exultation. After going some three
miles, General Hood marched back about two, and formed his corps facing
to our right and rear. Being asked for an explanation, he replied that
an aide-de-camp had told him that the Federal army was approaching on
that road. Our whole army knew that to be impossible. It had been
viewing the enemy in the opposite direction every day for two weeks.
General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobedience--as he must
have done had he believed the story upon which he professed to have
acted. The time lost frustrated the design, for success depended on
timing the attack properly.

Mr. Davis conceals the facts to impute this failure to me, thus:
"The battle, for causes which were the subject of dispute, did not take
place....Instead of his attacking the divided columns of the enemy, the
united Federal columns were preparing to attack him." There was no
dispute as to facts.

An attack, except under very unfavorable circumstances, being
impossible, the troops were formed in an excellent position along the
ridge immediately south of Cassville, an elevated and open valley in
front, and a deep one in rear of it. Its length was equal to the front
of Hood's and Polk's and half of Hardee's corps. They were placed in
that order from right to left.

As I rode along the line while the troops were forming, General
Shoup, chief of artillery, pointed out to me a space of 150 or 200
yards, which he thought might be enfiladed by artillery on a hill a
half mile beyond Hood's right and in front of the prolongation of our
line, if the enemy should clear away the thick wood that covered it and
establish batteries. He was desired to point out to the officer who
might command there some narrow ravines vet y near, in which his men
could be sheltered from such artillery fire, and to remind him that
while artillery was playing upon his position no attack would be made
upon it by infantry. to position soon after our troops were formed and
skirmished until dark, using their field-pieces freely. During the
evening Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood, the latter being spokesman,
asserted that a part of the line of each would be so enfiladed next
morning by the Federal batteries established on the hill above
mentioned, that they would be unable to hold their ground an hour; and
therefore urged me to abandon the position at once. They expressed the
conviction that early the next morning batteries would open upon them
from a hill then thickly covered with wood and out of range of brass
field

Page 269

pieces. The matter was discussed perhaps an hour, in which time I
became apprehensive that as the commanders of two-thirds of the army
thought the position untenable, the opinion would be adopted by their
troops, which would make it so. Therefore I yielded. Lieutenant-General
Hardee, whose ground was the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr.
Davis says ("Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 533) that General Hood
asserts, in his report and in a book, that the two corps were on ground
commanded and enfiladed by the enemy's batteries. On the contrary, they
were on a hill, and the enemy were in a valley where their batteries
were completely commanded by ours.

The army abandoned the ground before daybreak and crossed the Etowah
after noon, and encamped near the railroad. Wheeler's cavalry was
placed in observation above, and Jackson's below our main body.

No movement of the enemy was discovered until the 22d, when General
Jackson reported their army moving toward Stilesboro', as if to cross
the Etowah near that place; they crossed on the 23d. On the 24th
Hardee's and Polk's corps encamped on the road from Stilesboro' to
Atlanta south-east of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope
Church, on the road from Allatoona. On the 25th the Federal army was a
little east of Dallas, and Hood's corps was placed with its center at
New k's on his left, and Hardee's prolonging the line to the Atlanta
road, which was held by its left. A little before 6 o'clock in the
afternoon Stewart's division in front of New Hope Church was fiercely
attacked by Hooker's corps, and the action continued two hours without
lull or pause, when the assailants fell back. The canister shot of the
sixteen Confederate field-pieces and the musketry of five thousand
infantry at short range must have inflicted heavy loss upon General
Hooker's corps, as is proved by the name "Hell Hole," which, General
Sherman says, was given the place by the Federal soldiers. Next day the
Federal troops worked so vigorously, extending their intrenchments
toward the railroad, that they skirmished very little. The Confederates
labored strenuously to keep abreast of their work, but in vain, owing
to greatly interior numbers and an insignificant supply of intrenching
tools. On the 27th, however, the fighting rose above the grade of
skirmishing, especially in the afternoon, when at half-past 5 o'clock
the Fourth Corps (Howard) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer)
attempted to turn our right, but the movement, after being impeded by
the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division
(Cleburne's), and the two brigades of his second line br ought up on
the right of the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its
front did not equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops
were greatly exposed to our musketry--all but the leading troops being
on a hillside facing us. They advanced until their first line was
within 25 or 30 paces of ours, and fell back only after at least 700
men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops
paused in their advance, a color-bearer came on and planted his colors
eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act.
A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot
dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively
fourth bore back the noble emblem. Some time after

Page 270

nightfall the Confederates captured above two hundred prisoners in
the hollow before them.

General Sherman does not refer to this combat in his "Memoirs,"
although he dwells with some exultation upon a very small affair of the
next day at Dallas, in which the Confederates lost about three hundred
killed and wounded, and in which he must have lost more than ten times
as many.

In the afternoon of the 28th Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed
to draw his corps to the rear of our line in the early part of the
night, march around our right flank, and form it facing the left flank
of the Federal line and obliquely to it, and attack at dawn -- Hardee
and Polk to join in the battle successively as the success on the right
of each might enable him to do so. We waited next morning for the
signal -- the sound of Hood's musketry -- from the appointed time until
10 o'clock, when a message from that officer was brought by an
aide-de-camp to the effect that he had found R. W. Johnson's division
intrenching on the left of the Federal line and almost at right angles
to it, and asked for instructions. The message proved that there could
be no surprise, which was necessary to success, and that the enemy's
intrenchments would be completed before we could attack. The corps was
therefore recalled. It was ascertained afterward that after marching
eight or ten hours Hood's corps was then at least six miles from the
Federal left, which was little more than a musket-shot from his
starting-point.

The extension of the Federal intrenchments toward the railroad was
continued industriously to cut us off from it or to cover their own
approach to it. We tried to keep pace with them, but the labor did not
prevent the desultory fighting, which was kept up while daylight
lasted. In this the gr eat inequality of force compelled us to employ
dismounted cavalry. On the 4th or 5th of June the Federal arailroad
between Ackworth and Allatoona. The Confederate forces then moved to a
position carefully marked out by Colonel Presstman, its left on Lost
Mountain, and its right, of cavalry, beyond the railroad and somewhat
covered by Noonday Creek, a line much too long for our strength.

On the 8th the Federal army seemed to be near Ackworth, and our
position was contracted to cover the roads leading thence to Atlanta.
This brought the left of Hardee's corps to Gilgal Church, Polk's right
near the Marietta and Ackworth road and Hood's corps massed beyond that
road. Pine Mountain, a detached hill, was held by a division. On the
11th of June the left of the Federal army was on the high ground beyond
Noonday Creek, its center a third of a mile in front of Pine Mountain
and its
right beyond the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road.

In the morning of the 14th General Hardee and I rode to the summit
of Pine Mountain to decide if the outpost there should be maintained.
General Polk accompanied us. After we had concluded our examination and
the abandonment of the hill that night had been decided upon, a few
shots were fired at us from a battery of Parrott guns a quarter of a
mile in our front; the third of these passed through General Polk's
chest, from left to right, killing him instantly. This event produced
deep sorrow in the army, in

Page 271

every battle of which he had been distinguished. Major-General W. W.
Loring succeeded to the command of the corps.

A division of Georgia militia under Major or-General G. W. Smith,
transfer r ed to the Confederate service by (Governor Brown, was
charged with the defense of the bridges and ferries of the
Chattahoochee, for the safety of Atlanta. On the 16th Hardee's corps
was placed on the high ground east of Mud Creek, facing to the west.
The right of the Federal army made a corresponding change of front by
which it faced to the east. It was opposed in this manoeuvre by
Jackson's cavalry as well as 2500 men can resist 30,000. The angle
where Hardee's right Joined Loring's left was soon found to be a very
weak point, and on the 17th another position was chosen, including the
crest of Kenesaw, which Colonel Presstman prepared for occupation by
the 19th, when it was assumed by the army. In this position two
divisions of Loring's corps occupied the crest of Kenesaw from end to
end, the other division being on its right, and Hood's corps on the
right of it, Hardee's extending from Loring's left across the Lost
Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached as usual, under cover
of successive lines of intrenchments. In these positions of the two
armies there were sharp and incessant partial engagements until the 3d
of July. On the 21st of June the extension of the Federal line to the
south which had been protected by the swollen condition of Noses Creek,
compelled the transfer of Hood's corps to our left, Wheeler's troops
occupying the ground it had left. On the 22d General Hood reported that
Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, having been attacked,
had driven back the Federal troops and had taken a line of breastworks,
from which they had been driven by the artillery of the enemy's main
position.

Page 272

Subsequent detailed the advanced line of' against the enemy's
accounts rove that after the capture of breastworks General Hood
directed his two divisions main line. The slow operation of a change of
front under the fire of the artillery of this main line subjected the
Confederates to a loss of one thousand men --Whereupon the attempt was
abandoned, either by the general's orders or by the discretion of the
troops.

On the 24th Hardee's skirmishers were attacked in their rifle-pits
by a Federal line of battle, and on the 25th a similar assault was made
upon those of Steven son's division. Both " were repulsed, with heavy
proportionate losses to the assailants.

In the morning of the 27th, after a cannonade by all its artillery,
the Federal army assailed the ' Confederate position, especially the
center and right-- the Army of the Cumberland advancing against the
first, and that of the Tennessee against the other. Although suffering
losses out of all proportion to those they inflicted, the Federal
troops pressed up to the Confederate intrenchments in many places,
maintaining the unequal conflict for two hours and a half, with the
persevering courage of American soldiers. At 11: 30 A. M. the attack
had failed. In General Sherman's words:

"About 9 o'clock A. M. of the day appointed [June
the 27th], the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for
ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all
points the enemy met us with determined courage and in great force....
By 11: 30 the assault was over, and had failed. We had not broken the
line at either point, but our assaulting columns held their ground
within a few yards of the rebel trenches and there covered themselves
with parapet. McPherson lost about 500 men and several valuable
officers, and Thomas lost nearly 2000 men." *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In his " Memoirs" Sherman says, in continuation of
the quotation made by Johnston: "This was the hardest fight of
the campaign up to date, and it is well described by Johnston in his
Narrative [pp. 342, 343], Where he admits his loss in killed and
wounded as: Hood's corps (not reported); Hardee's corps, 286; Loring's
(Polk's), 522,--total, 808. This, no doubt, is a true and fair
statement; but, as usual, Johnston over-estimates our loss, putting it
at that entire loss was about 2500 killed and wounded." EDITORS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Page 273

Such statements of losses are incredible. The Northern troops fought
very bravely, as usual. Many fell against our parapets, some were
killed in our trenches. Most of this battle of' two hours and a half
was at very short range. It is not to be believed that Southern
veterans struck but 3 percent of Thomas's troops in mass at short
range, or 1 2/3 percent of McPherson's-- and, if possible, still less
so that Northern soldiers, inured to battle, should have been defeated
by losses so trifling as never to have discouraged the meanest soldiers
on record. I have seen American soldiers (Northern men) win a field
with losses ten times greater proportionally. But, argument apart,
there is a witness against the estimates of Northern: losses in this
campaign, in the 10,126 graves in the Military Cemetery at Marietta, of
soldiers killed south of the Etowah.* Moreover, the Federal dead
nearest to Hardee's line lay there two days, during which they were
frequently counted -- at least 1000; and as there were seven lines
within some 300 yards, exposed two hours and a half to the musketry of
two divisions and the canister-shot of 32 field pieces, there must have
been many uncounted dead; the counted would alone indicate a loss of at
least 6000.

As to the "assaulting columns holding their ground within a few
yards of the rebel trenches and there covering themselves with
parapet," it was utterly impossible. There would have been much more
exposure in that than in mounting and crossing the little rebel
"parapet "; but at one point, seventy-five yards in front of Cheatham's
line, a party of Federal soldiers, finding themselves sheltered from
his missiles by the form of the ground, made a "parapet " there which
became connected with the main work.**

As the extension of the Federal intrenched line to their right had
brought it nearer to Atlanta than was our left, and had made our
position otherwise very dangerous, two new positions for the army were
chosen, one nine or ten miles south of Marietta, and the other on the
high ground near the Chattahoochee. Colonel Presstman was desired to
prepare the first for occupation, and Brigadier-General Shoup,
commander of the artillery, was instructed to strengthen the other with
a line of redoubts devised by himself.

The troops took the first position in the morning of the 3d, and as
General Sherman was strengthening his right greatly, they were
transferred to the second in the morning of the 5th. The cavalry of our
left had been supported in the previous few days by a division of State
troops commanded by Major General G. W. Smith.

As General Sherman says, " it was really a continuous battle lasting

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Many of the burials at Marietta were of soldiers who
died of disease before and after the battle of Kenesaw Mountain, and
the following extract from the report, in 1874, of Colonel Oscar A.
Mack, Inspector of National Cemeteries, shows that Marietta Cemetery
includes dead from widely separated fields, and of other dates:

"The bodies were removed from the National Cemetery
at Montgomery, Ala. (which was discontinued), and from Rome, Dalton,
Atlanta, and from many other places in Georgia. Several burials have
been made, since my last inspection, from the garrison at Atlanta."
EDITORS.

** Surgeon Joseph A. Still well, 22d Indiana
Volunteers,ditors that the point referred to was in front of General
Daniel McCook's brigade, and was seventy-five feet from the enemy, and
commanded by half a mile of the Confederate works.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Page 274

from June 10th to July 3d." The army occupied positions about
Marietta twenty-six days, in which the want of artillery ammunition was
especially felt; in all those days we were exposed to an almost
incessant fire of artillery as well as musketry--the former being the
more harassing, because it could not be returned; for our supply of
artillery ammunition was so small that we were compelled to reserve it
for battles and serious assaults.

In the new position each corps had two pontoon-bridges laid. Above
the railroad bridge the Chattahoochee had numerous good fords. General
Sherman, therefore, directed his troops to that part of the river, ten
or fifteen miles above our camp. On the 8th of July two of his corps
had crossed the Chattahoochee and intrenched themselves. Therefore the
Confederate army also crossed the river on the 9th.

About the middle of June Captain Grant of the engineers was
instructed to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta materially, on
the side toward Peach Tree Creek, by the addition of redoubts and by
converting barbette into embrasure batteries. I also obtained a promise
of seven sea-coast rifles from General D. H. Maury [at Mobile], to be
mounted on that front. Colonel Presstman was instructed to join Captain
Grant with his subordinates, in this work of strengthening the defenses
of Atlanta, especially between the Augusta and Marietta roads, as the
enemy was approaching ' that side. For the same reason a position on
the high ground looking down into the valley of Peach Tree Creek was
selected for the army, from which it might engage the enemy if he
should expose himself in the passage of the stream. The position of
each division was marked and pointed out to its staff-officers.

On the 17th we learned that the whole Fcrossed the Chattahoochee;
and late in the evening, while Colonel Presstman was receiving from me
instructions for the next day, I received the following telegram of
that date:

"Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned
to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am
directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed
to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and
express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby
relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee,
which yon will immediately turn over to General Hood.S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector-General."

Orders transferring the command of the army* to General Hood were
written and published immediately, and next morning I replied to the
telegram of the Secretary of War:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received and
obeyed-command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been
transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I
assert that Sherman's army is much stronger, compared with that of
Tennessee, than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet
the enemy has been compelled to advance much

--------------------------------------------------------
* I have two reports of the strength of the army
besides that of April 30th, already given:1. Of July 1st, 39,746
infantry, 3855 artillery, and 10,484 cavalry,--total; 54,085. 2. Of
July 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry,--total,
50,926.--J. E. J.
---------------------------------------------------------

Page 275

more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that
of Richmond and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Virginia
than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not
usually regarded as evidence of competence."

General Hood came to my quarters early in the morning of the 18th,
and remained there until nightfall. Intelligence was soon received that
the Federal army was marching toward Atlanta, and at his urgent request
I gave all necessary orders during the day. The most important one
placed the troops in the position already chosen, which covered the
roads by which the enemy was approaching. After transferring the
command to General Hood, I described to him the course of action I had
arranged in my mind. If the enemy should give us a good opportunity in
the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If
successful we should obtain important, results, for the enemy's retreat
would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should
not succeed, our intrenchments would give us a

Page 276

sate refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised
State troops should Join us; then, placing them on the nearest defenses
of the place (where there were, or ought to be, seven sea-coast rifles,
sent us from Mobile by General Maury), I would attack the Federals in
flank with the three Confederate corps. If we were successful, they
would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where
there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on
their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in
Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely; for it was too strong to be
taken by assault, and too extensive to be invested. This would win the
campaign, the object of which the country supposed Atlanta to be.

At Dalton, the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the
chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten they had a safe
refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of
Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, 100 miles
off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore victory for us could not
have been decisive while defeat would have been utterly disastrous.
Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by
attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only
result of success to us would have been his falling back into them,
while d been our ruin.

In the course pursued our troops, always fighting under cover, had
very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the
enemy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly; and we
could reasonably have expected to cope with them on equal ground by the
time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on the south side of that
river would have been their destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of
refuge in Atlanta -- too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to
be invested. I had also hopes that by the breaking of the railroad in
its rear the Federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position
of our own choosing, or forced into a retreat easily converted into a
rout. After we crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were
successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of
the railroad between Chattanooga and the Etowah. All failed, because
they were too weak, Captain James B. Harvey, an officer of great
courage and sagacity, was detached on this service on the 11th of June
and remained near the railroad several weeks, frequently interrupting,
but not strong enough to prevent, its use. Early in the campaign the
impressions of the strength of the cavalry in Mississippi and east
Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from the command of
that department, gave me reason to hope that an adequate force
commanded by the most competent officer in America for such service
(General N. B. Forrest) could be sent from it for the purpose of
breaking the railroad in Sherman's rear. I therefore made the
suggestion direct to the President, June 13th and July 16th, and
through General Bragg on the 3d, 12th, 16th, and 26th of June. I did so
in the confidence that this cavalry would serve the Confederacy far
better by insuring the defeat of a great invasion than by repelling a
mere raid.

In his telegram of the 17th Mr. Davis gave his reasons for removing
me, but in Vol. II., pp. 556 to 561, of the " Rise and Fall " he gives
many others,

Page 277

most of which depend on misrepresentations of the strength of the
positions I occupied. They were not stronger than General Lee's;
indeed, my course was as like his as the dissimilarity of the two
Federal commanders permitted. As his had increased his great fame, it
is not probable that the people, who admired his course, condemned
another similar one. As to Georgia, the State most interested, its two
most influential citizens, Governor Joseph E. Brown and General Howell
Cobb, remonstrated against my removal.

The assertions in Mr. B. H. Hill's letter [of October 12th, 1878]
quoted by Mr. Davis [" R. and F.," Vol. II., p. 557 ] do not agree with
those in his oration delivered in Atlanta in 1875. Mr. Hill said in the
oration: "I know that he (Mr. Davis) consulted General Lee fully,
earnestly, and anxiously before this perhaps unfortunate removal." That
assertion is contradicted by one whose testimony is above question--for
in Southern estimation he has no superior as gentleman, soldier, and
civilian--General Hampton. General Lee had a conversation with him on
the subject, of which he wrote to me:

"On that occasion he expressed great regret that you
had been removed, and said that he had done all in his power to prevent
it. The Secretary of War had recently been at his headquarters near
Petersburg to consult as to this matter, and General Lee assured me
that he had urged Mr. Seddon not to remove you from command, and had
said to him that if you could not command the army we had no one who
could. He was earnest in expressing not only his regret at your
removal, but his entire confidence in yourself."

Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We
had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the
circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a
tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciated its
strength, for he made no attack, although he was before it about six
weeks.

I was a party to no such conversations as those given by Mr. Hill.
No soldier above idiocy could express the opinions he ascribes to me.

Mr. Davis condemned me for not fighting. General Sherman's testimony
and that of the Military Cemetery at Marietta refute the charge. I
assert that had one of the other lieutenant-generals of the army
(Hardee or Stewart) succeeded me, Atlanta would have been held by the
Army of Tennessee.

Page 284

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.May 3d-September 8th,
1864.

(1) Relieved two co's 10th Ohio Inf, May 20th.
(2) See batteries attached to divisions and corps.
(3) Non-veterans attached to 101st Ohio till June 4th and 9th,
respectively, when regiments rejoined from veteran furlough.
(4) Ordered home for muster-out May 29th and June 3d, respectively.
(5) Transferred to Third Brigade August 16th.
(6) Transferred to Twenty-third Corps Tune 22d.
(7) Transferred to Second Brigade August 16th, and to Second Brigade,
Third Division, August 19th.
(8) See also artillery brigade of corps.
(9) Transferred to Second Brigade May 28th.
(10) Remained at Dalton from May 14th.
(11) Relieved for muster-out June 10th and August 25th, respectively.
(12) See also artillery brigade of corps.
(13) Joined June 6th and relieved for muster-out August 1st.
(14) Relieved for muster-out August 25th and August 26th, respectively.
(15) Joined from veteran furlough June 28th.
(16) Relieved for muster-out August 22d.
(17) Transferred to Fourth Division, Twentieth Corps, July 25th and
August 9th, respectively.
(18) Transferred to Second Brigade, First Division, August 19th.
(19) Ordered to Chattanooga July 25th.
(20) At Cleveland, Kingston, and Resaca; relieved for muster out June
óth.
(21) Joined August 31st.

1 Chief of corps artillery from May 23d.
2 Ordered to Chattanooga July 27th.
3 Ordered to Marietta July 28th.
4 Ordered to Chattanooga August 25th.
5 Joined from veteran furlough and assigned to Third Brigade July 15th.
6 Joined from veteran furlough May 9th.
7 See also artillery brigade of corps.
8 Transferred to Fourth Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, August 20th.
9 Joined from veteran furlough May 15th.
10 Joined June 4th and August 21st, respectively 11 Employed mainly in
guarding trains.
12 Guarding trains till July 20th.
13 See also artillery brigade of the corps.
14 Relieved for muster-out June 9th, June 28th, and June 10th,
respectively.
15 Joined July 10th.
16 Relieved for muster-out May 22d and August 3d, respectivedetached at
Marietta.
18 Detached at Ringgold.
19 See also artillery brigade of corps. [battalion.
20 Organized July 24th; reorganized August 27th into three

1 Assigned August 14th.
2 Relieved August 14th.
3 Ordered to Nashville July 6th.
4 Joined July 21st.
5 Major John A. Reynolds, chief of corps artillery; see, also,
artillery brigade of the corps.
6 Relieved for muster-out June 11th.
7 Relieved for muster-out May 23d.
8 Consolidated with 102d New York July 12th.
9 Transferred to Third Brigade May 29th.
10 Believed for muster-out May 27th.
11 Joined May 31st.
12 To June 17th Colonel Buell commanded the " Pioneer Brigade.".
13 Ordered to ChattaAssigned June 30th.
15 Ordered to Franklin, Tenn., June 29th.

1 Operating in Northern Alabama to June 6th.
2 Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, the commander of this brigade, was
captured July 30th. while in command of a provisional division composed
of the 8th Ind., 2d Ky., 5th Iowa, 9th Ohio, and 4th Tenn., and one
section Battery E, 1st Mich. Art'y.
3 In the field from July 27th.
4 Chiefs of corps artillery: Major C. J. Stolbrand, Major Allen C.
Waterhouse, Major Thomas D. Maurice.
5 Joined from veteran furlough June 16th.
6 Transferred to Second Brigade August 4th.
7 Four companies relieved for muster-out June 16th, and five companies
June 25th, Company K remaining.
8 Joined from veteran furlough May 22d, and transferred to First
Brigade August 4th.
9 Joined from veteran furlough May 10th.
10 Transferred from Third Brigade, Fourth Div., May 12th.
11 The Third Division was stationed at Cother points in the rear of the
army.
12 Transferred to Second Brigade August 4th.
13 Joined June 3d. [Brigade.
14 Discontinued August 4th, and troops transferred to First

Losses: killed, 4423; wounded, 22,822; captured or missing,
4442=31,687. (Major E. C. Dawes, of Cincinnati, who has made a special
study of the subject, estimates the Union loss at about 40,000, and the
Confederate loss at about the same. )

(1)Reorganized August 11th, with Col. Israel Garrard as division
commander, and formed into two brigades. The "Mounted Brigade" was
commanded by Col. George S. Acker except from August 16th tn 23d, when
Col. W. D. Hamilton was in command. It consisted of the 9th Mich.,
Lieut.-Col. W. B. Way; 7th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. G. C. Miner; detachment
9th Ohio Capt. L. H. Bowlus; McLaughlin's Ohio Squadron, Maj. Richard
Rice; and the 24th Ind. Battery, Lieut. Hiram Allen. T he ` Dismounted
Brigade," commanded by Col. Horace Capron, was composed of the 14th and
16th Ill., 5th and 6th Ind., and 12th Ky. The 16th Ill. was detailed as
provost guard Twenty-third Corps from Angust 16th and the 12th Ky. as
cattle guard from August 21st. The 6th Ind. under Maj. William H.
Carter, was ordered to Nashville for remount August 23d. (2) In
command of his own and Lee's corps August 31st September 2d.

(1) Broken up in July and regiments assigned to other brigades.
(2) Discontinued July 24th, Jackson's brigade being consolidated with
Gist's, and transferred to Cheatham's division; Stevens's brigade went
to Bate's division, and Mercer's brigade to Cleburansferred with
General Jackson to Savannah July 3d. 4 Assigned to Jackson's cavalry
division September 4th.

According to the report of Medical Director A. J. Foard (See
Johnston's "Narrative," pp. 576-578), the losses of the Confederate
Army in the Atlanta campaign amounted to 3044 killed, 18,352
wounded=21,996. Tho prisoners (including deserters) captured by the
Union Army (See Sherman's " Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 134), numbered
12,983, which gives 34,979 as the aggregate loss of the Confederate
Army. (Major E. C. Dawes of Cincinnati, who has made a special study of
the subject, estimates the Confederate loss at about 40,000, and the
Union loss at about the same.) For statements relative to the strength
of the Confederate army in the Atlanta campaign see General Johnston's
paper, p. 260, and Major E. C. Dawes's comments, p. 282.