First tests rival models of voting turnout using data drawn from the 2001 BES pre- and post-election surveys. Analyses reveal that the general incentives model performs best. Crucial individual-level ...
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First tests rival models of voting turnout using data drawn from the 2001 BES pre- and post-election surveys. Analyses reveal that the general incentives model performs best. Crucial individual-level influences on electoral turnout are calculations of efficacy-discounted benefits and costs of participation, sense of civic duty, and age. A model of the aggregate-level dynamics of turnout between 1945 and 2001 indicate a substantial portion of the sharp decline in turnout that occurred in the 1997 and 2001 general elections was caused by the one-sided nature of the contests, coupled with the perception that the two major parties did not offer a distinctive menu of policy choices. Analyses suggest that the strong relationship between age and civic duty has a sizeable generational component.Less

The Decision (Not) to Vote

Harold D. ClarkeDavid SandersMarianne C. StewartPaul Whiteley

Published in print: 2004-03-25

First tests rival models of voting turnout using data drawn from the 2001 BES pre- and post-election surveys. Analyses reveal that the general incentives model performs best. Crucial individual-level influences on electoral turnout are calculations of efficacy-discounted benefits and costs of participation, sense of civic duty, and age. A model of the aggregate-level dynamics of turnout between 1945 and 2001 indicate a substantial portion of the sharp decline in turnout that occurred in the 1997 and 2001 general elections was caused by the one-sided nature of the contests, coupled with the perception that the two major parties did not offer a distinctive menu of policy choices. Analyses suggest that the strong relationship between age and civic duty has a sizeable generational component.

Traditional understandings of citizenship are facing a number of challenges. Ideas of cosmopolitan and environmental citizenship have emerged in the light of concerns about global inequality and ...
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Traditional understandings of citizenship are facing a number of challenges. Ideas of cosmopolitan and environmental citizenship have emerged in the light of concerns about global inequality and climate change, whilst new models of multicultural citizenship have been developed in response to the dilemmas posed by immigration and the presence of national minorities. At the same time, more particular debates take place about the demands citizenship places upon us in our everyday lives. Do we have a duty as citizens to take steps to reduce the risk of needing to rely upon state benefits, including health care? Does good citizenship require that we send our children to the local school even when it performs poorly? Does a parent fail in his duty as a citizen — not just as a father, say — when he is less involved in the raising of his children than their mother? Should citizens refrain from appealing to religious reasons in public debate? Do immigrants have a duty to integrate? Do we have duties of citizenship to minimize the size of our ecological footprints? This book develops a normative theory of citizenship that brings together issues such as these under a common framework rather than treating them in isolation in the way that often happens. It distinguishes two different ways of thinking about citizenship both of which shed some light on the demands that it makes upon us: according to the first approach, the demands of citizenship are grounded exclusively in considerations of justice, whereas according to the second, they are grounded in the good that is realized by a political community the members of which have equal standing and treat each other as equals not only in the political process but in civil society and beyond.Less

Living Together as Equals : The Demands of Citizenship

Andrew Mason

Published in print: 2012-05-24

Traditional understandings of citizenship are facing a number of challenges. Ideas of cosmopolitan and environmental citizenship have emerged in the light of concerns about global inequality and climate change, whilst new models of multicultural citizenship have been developed in response to the dilemmas posed by immigration and the presence of national minorities. At the same time, more particular debates take place about the demands citizenship places upon us in our everyday lives. Do we have a duty as citizens to take steps to reduce the risk of needing to rely upon state benefits, including health care? Does good citizenship require that we send our children to the local school even when it performs poorly? Does a parent fail in his duty as a citizen — not just as a father, say — when he is less involved in the raising of his children than their mother? Should citizens refrain from appealing to religious reasons in public debate? Do immigrants have a duty to integrate? Do we have duties of citizenship to minimize the size of our ecological footprints? This book develops a normative theory of citizenship that brings together issues such as these under a common framework rather than treating them in isolation in the way that often happens. It distinguishes two different ways of thinking about citizenship both of which shed some light on the demands that it makes upon us: according to the first approach, the demands of citizenship are grounded exclusively in considerations of justice, whereas according to the second, they are grounded in the good that is realized by a political community the members of which have equal standing and treat each other as equals not only in the political process but in civil society and beyond.

Political Choice in Britain uses data from the 1964 to 2001 British election studies (BES), 1992 to 2002 monthly Gallup polls, and numerous other national surveys conducted over the past ...
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Political Choice in Britain uses data from the 1964 to 2001 British election studies (BES), 1992 to 2002 monthly Gallup polls, and numerous other national surveys conducted over the past four decades to test the explanatory power of rival sociological and individual rationality models of electoral turnout and party choice. Analyses endorse a valence politics model that challenges the long-dominant social class model. British voters make their choices by evaluating the performance of parties and party leaders in economic and other important policy areas. Although these evaluations may be largely products of events that occur long before an election campaign officially begins, parties’ national and local campaign activities are also influential. Consistent with the valence politics model, partisan attachments display individual- and aggregate-level dynamics that reflect ongoing judgements about the managerial abilities of parties and their leaders. A general incentives model provides the best explanation of turnout. Calculations of the costs and influence-discounted benefits of voting and sense of civic duty are key variables in this model. Significantly, the decline in turnout in recent elections does not reflect more general negative trends in public attitudes about the political system. Voters judge the performance of British democracy in much the same way as they evaluate its parties and politicians. Support at all levels of the political system is a renewable resource, but one that must be renewed.Less

Political Choice in Britain

Harold D. ClarkeDavid SandersMarianne C. StewartPaul Whiteley

Published in print: 2004-03-25

Political Choice in Britain uses data from the 1964 to 2001 British election studies (BES), 1992 to 2002 monthly Gallup polls, and numerous other national surveys conducted over the past four decades to test the explanatory power of rival sociological and individual rationality models of electoral turnout and party choice. Analyses endorse a valence politics model that challenges the long-dominant social class model. British voters make their choices by evaluating the performance of parties and party leaders in economic and other important policy areas. Although these evaluations may be largely products of events that occur long before an election campaign officially begins, parties’ national and local campaign activities are also influential. Consistent with the valence politics model, partisan attachments display individual- and aggregate-level dynamics that reflect ongoing judgements about the managerial abilities of parties and their leaders. A general incentives model provides the best explanation of turnout. Calculations of the costs and influence-discounted benefits of voting and sense of civic duty are key variables in this model. Significantly, the decline in turnout in recent elections does not reflect more general negative trends in public attitudes about the political system. Voters judge the performance of British democracy in much the same way as they evaluate its parties and politicians. Support at all levels of the political system is a renewable resource, but one that must be renewed.

Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, ...
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Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. This book challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens—in fact, it argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. The book shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well—or not vote at all. This book explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, “How to Vote Well,” the book provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.Less

The Ethics of Voting

Jason Brennan

Published in print: 2012-04-29

Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. This book challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens—in fact, it argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. The book shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well—or not vote at all. This book explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, “How to Vote Well,” the book provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.

This chapter details the spread of republican religion. The concept of civil religion spread within republican cities' culture and customs through the treatises on government. But even more effective ...
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This chapter details the spread of republican religion. The concept of civil religion spread within republican cities' culture and customs through the treatises on government. But even more effective were the images that embodied those concepts. Whereas the concepts expounded in the treatises spoke first and foremost to reason, paintings struck the eyes, and from the eyes touched the passions. The rulers of republics were aware of the images' strength, especially when they were accompanied by clear words, written in large, legible characters, preferably in the vernacular. For this reason, rulers commissioned skilled artists to produce a great number of works explaining the principles of republican good government to the magistrates and citizens. The message conveyed by the walls of the city government's most important halls was at once political and religious. That is, their imagery taught people to view civic duties as if they were real religious duties—God's and Christ's commandments, not just human advice.Less

Images of the Civil Religion

Maurizio Viroli

Published in print: 2012-09-09

This chapter details the spread of republican religion. The concept of civil religion spread within republican cities' culture and customs through the treatises on government. But even more effective were the images that embodied those concepts. Whereas the concepts expounded in the treatises spoke first and foremost to reason, paintings struck the eyes, and from the eyes touched the passions. The rulers of republics were aware of the images' strength, especially when they were accompanied by clear words, written in large, legible characters, preferably in the vernacular. For this reason, rulers commissioned skilled artists to produce a great number of works explaining the principles of republican good government to the magistrates and citizens. The message conveyed by the walls of the city government's most important halls was at once political and religious. That is, their imagery taught people to view civic duties as if they were real religious duties—God's and Christ's commandments, not just human advice.

This chapter considers elaborations of republican religion in Quattrocento political thought. Politicians, prophets, historians, and philosophers explained that the men who serve the common good ...
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This chapter considers elaborations of republican religion in Quattrocento political thought. Politicians, prophets, historians, and philosophers explained that the men who serve the common good render themselves godlike. Salutati, for instance, stated several times that a good Christian has a duty to serve his fatherland with all his energies. He also noted that charity toward the fatherland must comprise as well as surpass any other affection, bond, and interest. Bruni, who served as chancellor of the republic from 1410 to 1411, and again from 1427 until his death in 1444, also thought that the good Christian should be a good citizen, ready to serve his fatherland, because Christ's word does not conflict with a love of country.Less

A Religion That Instills Virtue

Maurizio Viroli

Published in print: 2012-09-09

This chapter considers elaborations of republican religion in Quattrocento political thought. Politicians, prophets, historians, and philosophers explained that the men who serve the common good render themselves godlike. Salutati, for instance, stated several times that a good Christian has a duty to serve his fatherland with all his energies. He also noted that charity toward the fatherland must comprise as well as surpass any other affection, bond, and interest. Bruni, who served as chancellor of the republic from 1410 to 1411, and again from 1427 until his death in 1444, also thought that the good Christian should be a good citizen, ready to serve his fatherland, because Christ's word does not conflict with a love of country.

Chapter 6 asks, to whatever degree responsiveness motivation compels people to change their party identity, what is the root of this motivation? Do partisans change their identity because they wish ...
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Chapter 6 asks, to whatever degree responsiveness motivation compels people to change their party identity, what is the root of this motivation? Do partisans change their identity because they wish to identify with the party that offers them the most policy benefits, or do people update their identity in order to conform to norms of civic duty? In other words, is partisan updating instrumental to the attainment of policy benefits, or does partisan updating result from the need to appear unbiased? Theory and results from analysis of data from the 2005 General Social Survey and a national experiment both suggest the latter. Norms of civic duty entailing pragmatism and open-mindedness motivate partisans to change their identity to reflect disagreements. On the other hand, consideration of the policy stakes has no such effect.Less

The Paradox of Partisan Responsiveness

Eric W. Groenendyk

Published in print: 2013-08-15

Chapter 6 asks, to whatever degree responsiveness motivation compels people to change their party identity, what is the root of this motivation? Do partisans change their identity because they wish to identify with the party that offers them the most policy benefits, or do people update their identity in order to conform to norms of civic duty? In other words, is partisan updating instrumental to the attainment of policy benefits, or does partisan updating result from the need to appear unbiased? Theory and results from analysis of data from the 2005 General Social Survey and a national experiment both suggest the latter. Norms of civic duty entailing pragmatism and open-mindedness motivate partisans to change their identity to reflect disagreements. On the other hand, consideration of the policy stakes has no such effect.

Party identification is generally considered the most powerful predictor of voting behavior. Yet, after 50 years of research, scholars continue to disagree over the implications of this well-known ...
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Party identification is generally considered the most powerful predictor of voting behavior. Yet, after 50 years of research, scholars continue to disagree over the implications of this well-known finding. Some argue that party identification constitutes a stable affective attachment that voters are motivated to defend, whereas others argue that party identification constitutes a running tally of voters’ objective evaluations. Thus, party identification may serve as a pervasive source of bias that undermines accountability or as an indispensable shortcut that makes it easier for voters to hold government accountable. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind seeks to advance the literature beyond this impasse by relaxing the motivational assumptions underlying the literature’s two dominant models. The books’ dual motivations model allows partisans to act like loyal fans who are motivated to maintain allegiance to their team and also like good citizens who are motivated to hold parties accountable. The nature of party identification and its implications for democracy hinge on the interplay between these two motivational forces. Results show that when people disagree with their party’s issue positions, they attempt to develop justifications for maintaining their party identity. This allows them to fulfill their motivation to remain loyal without appearing to be bad citizens whose judgment is clouded by partisan bias. Of course, identity justification requires cognitive resources, and these resources are not distributed equally across the electorate. As a result, those citizens who are best equipped to hold parties accountable also tend to be most successful at maintaining their party identity despite disagreements. Still, hope is found in norms of civic duty. When salient, these norms motivate partisans to adjust their party identities to reflect disagreements.Less

Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind : How Loyalty and Responsiveness Shape Party Identification and Democracy

Eric Groenendyk

Published in print: 2013-08-15

Party identification is generally considered the most powerful predictor of voting behavior. Yet, after 50 years of research, scholars continue to disagree over the implications of this well-known finding. Some argue that party identification constitutes a stable affective attachment that voters are motivated to defend, whereas others argue that party identification constitutes a running tally of voters’ objective evaluations. Thus, party identification may serve as a pervasive source of bias that undermines accountability or as an indispensable shortcut that makes it easier for voters to hold government accountable. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind seeks to advance the literature beyond this impasse by relaxing the motivational assumptions underlying the literature’s two dominant models. The books’ dual motivations model allows partisans to act like loyal fans who are motivated to maintain allegiance to their team and also like good citizens who are motivated to hold parties accountable. The nature of party identification and its implications for democracy hinge on the interplay between these two motivational forces. Results show that when people disagree with their party’s issue positions, they attempt to develop justifications for maintaining their party identity. This allows them to fulfill their motivation to remain loyal without appearing to be bad citizens whose judgment is clouded by partisan bias. Of course, identity justification requires cognitive resources, and these resources are not distributed equally across the electorate. As a result, those citizens who are best equipped to hold parties accountable also tend to be most successful at maintaining their party identity despite disagreements. Still, hope is found in norms of civic duty. When salient, these norms motivate partisans to adjust their party identities to reflect disagreements.

This chapter develops a third argument for why Americans should care about poverty: active involvement and concern for those experiencing misfortune is an important (but often neglected) aspect of ...
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This chapter develops a third argument for why Americans should care about poverty: active involvement and concern for those experiencing misfortune is an important (but often neglected) aspect of citizenship. As members of communities larger than simply themselves as individuals, Americans share an obligation and responsibility to alleviate grievous ills, such as poverty, that befall other members of their community. This position is based on the assertion that the concept of citizenship necessitates a sense of shared responsibility and stewardship. Such obligations become particularly binding when it can be demonstrated that a specific problem is largely the product of structural inequities. Part of Americans' civic responsibility lies in addressing such inequities. In addition, by alleviating the blight of poverty, Americans are exerting wise stewardship over their communities. Such stewardship is also an essential component of the concept of citizenship.Less

Essence of Citizenship

Mark Robert Rank

Published in print: 2004-04-22

This chapter develops a third argument for why Americans should care about poverty: active involvement and concern for those experiencing misfortune is an important (but often neglected) aspect of citizenship. As members of communities larger than simply themselves as individuals, Americans share an obligation and responsibility to alleviate grievous ills, such as poverty, that befall other members of their community. This position is based on the assertion that the concept of citizenship necessitates a sense of shared responsibility and stewardship. Such obligations become particularly binding when it can be demonstrated that a specific problem is largely the product of structural inequities. Part of Americans' civic responsibility lies in addressing such inequities. In addition, by alleviating the blight of poverty, Americans are exerting wise stewardship over their communities. Such stewardship is also an essential component of the concept of citizenship.

This chapter focuses on Awolowo's participation in military and civilian politics after his release from prison. After Awolowo failed to win the elections at the national level despite growing ...
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This chapter focuses on Awolowo's participation in military and civilian politics after his release from prison. After Awolowo failed to win the elections at the national level despite growing political support for his redistributive rhetoric, he turned increasingly towards the assertion of self-reliance and civic duty outside the realm of the state government. This included the fostering and support of development associations in Remo, whose activities reflected both a growing local disillusionment with the state and an attempt to pull the region up through institutionalised self-help and communal solidarity.Less

Self-Reliance, Development and Civic Pride in Remo

Nolte Insa

Published in print: 2009-06-15

This chapter focuses on Awolowo's participation in military and civilian politics after his release from prison. After Awolowo failed to win the elections at the national level despite growing political support for his redistributive rhetoric, he turned increasingly towards the assertion of self-reliance and civic duty outside the realm of the state government. This included the fostering and support of development associations in Remo, whose activities reflected both a growing local disillusionment with the state and an attempt to pull the region up through institutionalised self-help and communal solidarity.

This chapter focuses on Young Europe, which has attracted far less attention than Young Italy, Mazzini's other and better-known association from the early days of his political exile. With the ...
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This chapter focuses on Young Europe, which has attracted far less attention than Young Italy, Mazzini's other and better-known association from the early days of his political exile. With the founding of Young Europe in 1834, Mazzini defined the distinctive political and social creed associated with his name. Based on his personal view of the role of religion in private and public life, he called on individuals to regard the fulfilment of civic duties as a social obligation, commit themselves to a world of free and equal nationalities, and work for the attainment of social justice across national and class lines. Young Europe was meant to promote this project through education, propaganda, and revolution.Less

Giuseppe Mazzini and Young Europe

Roland Sarti

Published in print: 2008-09-11

This chapter focuses on Young Europe, which has attracted far less attention than Young Italy, Mazzini's other and better-known association from the early days of his political exile. With the founding of Young Europe in 1834, Mazzini defined the distinctive political and social creed associated with his name. Based on his personal view of the role of religion in private and public life, he called on individuals to regard the fulfilment of civic duties as a social obligation, commit themselves to a world of free and equal nationalities, and work for the attainment of social justice across national and class lines. Young Europe was meant to promote this project through education, propaganda, and revolution.

The claim to be a victim of crime, rather than simply the victim of wrongdoing or misfortune, gets part of its sense from being located within a particular institution. Law, of which criminal law is ...
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The claim to be a victim of crime, rather than simply the victim of wrongdoing or misfortune, gets part of its sense from being located within a particular institution. Law, of which criminal law is a part, is a political institution, through which political communities express the decisions of the community regarding the way people should behave. This chapter concerns the victim’s institutional role and, drawing on an account of crimes as ‘public wrongs’, argues that victims have role-based duties—owed to their fellow citizens including those who have committed the criminal wrongs against them. The chapter argues that these duties are grounded in a civic duty to bear witness to wrongdoing, and that it is at least arguable that such duties should have the force of law.Less

‘It Isn’t Just About You’ : Victims of Crime, their Associated Duties, and Public Wrongs

S. E. Marshall

Published in print: 2014-12-04

The claim to be a victim of crime, rather than simply the victim of wrongdoing or misfortune, gets part of its sense from being located within a particular institution. Law, of which criminal law is a part, is a political institution, through which political communities express the decisions of the community regarding the way people should behave. This chapter concerns the victim’s institutional role and, drawing on an account of crimes as ‘public wrongs’, argues that victims have role-based duties—owed to their fellow citizens including those who have committed the criminal wrongs against them. The chapter argues that these duties are grounded in a civic duty to bear witness to wrongdoing, and that it is at least arguable that such duties should have the force of law.

Drawing on the perspective of democratic theory, this chapter argues that the prospect of Scottish independence provides a realistic opportunity for radical political innovation. It insists that the ...
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Drawing on the perspective of democratic theory, this chapter argues that the prospect of Scottish independence provides a realistic opportunity for radical political innovation. It insists that the hoped-for levels of civic engagement, delivering the fourth principle of power sharing with the people, have not been achieved in Scotland. It also pursues the ideas of popular sovereignty and democratic participation found in the writings of John Stuart Mill and developed by modern theorists of deliberative democracy. The chapter proposes a form of direct political decision-making by citizens akin to that derived from classical Athenian democracy. It also suggests various ways in which bills, after parliamentary deliberation and vote, might be put to randomly selected juries of 10,000 or 20,000 for ‘popular assent’ or rejection. The central idea is that when citizens act as jurors they are trusted to exercise real power on behalf of their fellow citizens; arguably they act above and beyond sectional, party or local interests. In this role, civic duty carries a collective responsibility which transcends partiality and particular identity.Less

Active Citizenship and Sharing Power in Scotland: the Need to Go Beyond Devolution

Kevin Francis

Published in print: 2010-09-09

Drawing on the perspective of democratic theory, this chapter argues that the prospect of Scottish independence provides a realistic opportunity for radical political innovation. It insists that the hoped-for levels of civic engagement, delivering the fourth principle of power sharing with the people, have not been achieved in Scotland. It also pursues the ideas of popular sovereignty and democratic participation found in the writings of John Stuart Mill and developed by modern theorists of deliberative democracy. The chapter proposes a form of direct political decision-making by citizens akin to that derived from classical Athenian democracy. It also suggests various ways in which bills, after parliamentary deliberation and vote, might be put to randomly selected juries of 10,000 or 20,000 for ‘popular assent’ or rejection. The central idea is that when citizens act as jurors they are trusted to exercise real power on behalf of their fellow citizens; arguably they act above and beyond sectional, party or local interests. In this role, civic duty carries a collective responsibility which transcends partiality and particular identity.

Chapter 1 lays out the book’s dual motivations theory. This theory posits that two competing psychological forces shape party identification—partisan motivation and responsiveness motivation. On one ...
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Chapter 1 lays out the book’s dual motivations theory. This theory posits that two competing psychological forces shape party identification—partisan motivation and responsiveness motivation. On one hand, partisans are driven to maintain party loyalty, but on the other hand, they are motivated to be responsive to their political environment. Because each voter only has a single vote to cast, voting behavior has essentially zero impact on the policy benefits the voter receives. This means that there are essentially no policy benefits to be gained from adjusting one’s party identity to reflect one’s disagreements. Therefore, responsiveness motivation is thought to be primarily driven the by the desire to see oneself as a good citizen and not merely a biased partisan. To reconcile their competing motives, partisans must find ways to justify their party identity when disagreements arise. Party identification change occurs when a justification cannot be manufactured or when responsiveness motivation is sufficient to outweigh partisan motivation.Less

A Dual Motivations Theory

Eric W. Groenendyk

Published in print: 2013-08-15

Chapter 1 lays out the book’s dual motivations theory. This theory posits that two competing psychological forces shape party identification—partisan motivation and responsiveness motivation. On one hand, partisans are driven to maintain party loyalty, but on the other hand, they are motivated to be responsive to their political environment. Because each voter only has a single vote to cast, voting behavior has essentially zero impact on the policy benefits the voter receives. This means that there are essentially no policy benefits to be gained from adjusting one’s party identity to reflect one’s disagreements. Therefore, responsiveness motivation is thought to be primarily driven the by the desire to see oneself as a good citizen and not merely a biased partisan. To reconcile their competing motives, partisans must find ways to justify their party identity when disagreements arise. Party identification change occurs when a justification cannot be manufactured or when responsiveness motivation is sufficient to outweigh partisan motivation.

Turning to the ideological component of the pre-1952 Egyptian state's modernization project, this chapter shows how nationalist pedagogues employed education to cultivate a consciousness of civic ...
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Turning to the ideological component of the pre-1952 Egyptian state's modernization project, this chapter shows how nationalist pedagogues employed education to cultivate a consciousness of civic duty and Egyptian greatness based on particular interpretations of Egypt's ancient and contemporary history. Key historiographical claims about an elite-focused and ideologically unconcerned state, or the 1930s–40s evolution of nationalist reorientations to the East and Islam, remain untested in a central arena for mass socialization. Yet pedagogical inquiry demonstrates that the state was indeed concerned about reaching the masses, utilizing conscious ideological communication to provide present-relevant lessons from a history which throughout the 1920s–52 period focused most of its curricular time on the pharaonic era and reign of Muhammad 'Ali, the latter serving as the continuator of meta-historic Egyptian glory and whose traits young Egyptians were expected to emulate.Less

Historical Consciousness for Modern Citizenship : Egyptian Schooling and the Lessons of History during the Constitutional Monarchy

Barak A. Salmoni

Published in print: 2005-08-01

Turning to the ideological component of the pre-1952 Egyptian state's modernization project, this chapter shows how nationalist pedagogues employed education to cultivate a consciousness of civic duty and Egyptian greatness based on particular interpretations of Egypt's ancient and contemporary history. Key historiographical claims about an elite-focused and ideologically unconcerned state, or the 1930s–40s evolution of nationalist reorientations to the East and Islam, remain untested in a central arena for mass socialization. Yet pedagogical inquiry demonstrates that the state was indeed concerned about reaching the masses, utilizing conscious ideological communication to provide present-relevant lessons from a history which throughout the 1920s–52 period focused most of its curricular time on the pharaonic era and reign of Muhammad 'Ali, the latter serving as the continuator of meta-historic Egyptian glory and whose traits young Egyptians were expected to emulate.

Two months into 1885, Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky was leading a new life. The most potent change was putting down roots. This was important for the benefits of domesticity and relief from wandering. It ...
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Two months into 1885, Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky was leading a new life. The most potent change was putting down roots. This was important for the benefits of domesticity and relief from wandering. It marked the onset of his civic duty, supporting enterprises still threatened by Nikolay Grigorievich Rubinstein's death. As the leading Russian composer of his time, he decided now to promote his music by conducting, while Pyotr Ivanovich Jurgenson formalized licensing agreements for Tchaikovsky's works in Paris and Hamburg. He also took advantage of imperial favor, requesting that the emperor build a new opera house in Tiflis and engaging Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich in correspondence. No less important was the mentorship of Ivan Alexandrovich Vsevolozhsky, the Director of the Imperial Theaters, who had shown interest in Tchaikovsky's work since coming to the post in 1881 and whose advocacy would rival that of Nikolay Grigorievich Rubinstein.Less

1885–1888

Roland John Wiley

Published in print: 2009-07-30

Two months into 1885, Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky was leading a new life. The most potent change was putting down roots. This was important for the benefits of domesticity and relief from wandering. It marked the onset of his civic duty, supporting enterprises still threatened by Nikolay Grigorievich Rubinstein's death. As the leading Russian composer of his time, he decided now to promote his music by conducting, while Pyotr Ivanovich Jurgenson formalized licensing agreements for Tchaikovsky's works in Paris and Hamburg. He also took advantage of imperial favor, requesting that the emperor build a new opera house in Tiflis and engaging Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich in correspondence. No less important was the mentorship of Ivan Alexandrovich Vsevolozhsky, the Director of the Imperial Theaters, who had shown interest in Tchaikovsky's work since coming to the post in 1881 and whose advocacy would rival that of Nikolay Grigorievich Rubinstein.

This chapter describes the religious festivals and competitions that reward and encourage Islamic performance as an act of civic duty and patriotism. It argues that with the stamp of national ...
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This chapter describes the religious festivals and competitions that reward and encourage Islamic performance as an act of civic duty and patriotism. It argues that with the stamp of national authority superimposed upon a religious system which encompasses aesthetics, ideology, and praxis, agencies of the government and institutions for religious education participate in producing Muslim information and experience, thus legislating, to some extent, both the logos and the pathos of Islam.Less

Celebrating Religion and Nation : The Festivalization of the Qurʼan

Anne K. Rasmussen

Published in print: 2010-08-23

This chapter describes the religious festivals and competitions that reward and encourage Islamic performance as an act of civic duty and patriotism. It argues that with the stamp of national authority superimposed upon a religious system which encompasses aesthetics, ideology, and praxis, agencies of the government and institutions for religious education participate in producing Muslim information and experience, thus legislating, to some extent, both the logos and the pathos of Islam.

This book provides a provocative and original analysis of the intellectual sources of today's powerful judiciary, arguing that Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws, first articulated a new ...
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This book provides a provocative and original analysis of the intellectual sources of today's powerful judiciary, arguing that Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws, first articulated a new conception of the separation of powers and of strong but subtle courts. Montesquieu instructed statesmen and judges to “cloak power” by placing the robed power at the center of politics, while concealing judges behind citizen juries and subtle reforms. Tracing Montesquieu's conception of judicial power through Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville, the book shows how it led to the prominence of judges, courts, and lawyers in America today. But it places the blame for contemporary judicial activism squarely at the feet of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and his jurisprudential revolution—which it is argued is the source of the now-prevalent view that judging is merely political. To address this crisis, the book argues for a rediscovery of an independent judiciary-one that blends prudence and natural law with common law and that observes the moderate jurisprudence of Montesquieu and Blackstone, balancing abstract principles with realistic views of human nature and institutions. It also advocates for a return to the complex constitutionalism of the American founders and Tocqueville and for judges who understand their responsibility to elevate citizens above individualism, instructing them in law and right. Such judicial statesmanship, moderating democracy's excesses, the book explains, differs from an activism that favors isolated individuals and progressive policies over civic duties, communal principles, and constitutional tradition.Less

The Cloaking of Power : Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism

Paul O. Carrese

Published in print: 2003-06-01

This book provides a provocative and original analysis of the intellectual sources of today's powerful judiciary, arguing that Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws, first articulated a new conception of the separation of powers and of strong but subtle courts. Montesquieu instructed statesmen and judges to “cloak power” by placing the robed power at the center of politics, while concealing judges behind citizen juries and subtle reforms. Tracing Montesquieu's conception of judicial power through Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville, the book shows how it led to the prominence of judges, courts, and lawyers in America today. But it places the blame for contemporary judicial activism squarely at the feet of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and his jurisprudential revolution—which it is argued is the source of the now-prevalent view that judging is merely political. To address this crisis, the book argues for a rediscovery of an independent judiciary-one that blends prudence and natural law with common law and that observes the moderate jurisprudence of Montesquieu and Blackstone, balancing abstract principles with realistic views of human nature and institutions. It also advocates for a return to the complex constitutionalism of the American founders and Tocqueville and for judges who understand their responsibility to elevate citizens above individualism, instructing them in law and right. Such judicial statesmanship, moderating democracy's excesses, the book explains, differs from an activism that favors isolated individuals and progressive policies over civic duties, communal principles, and constitutional tradition.

This chapter discusses Jawaharlal’s political evolution. It looks at Jawaharlal’s letter to Devadas Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi’s youngest son, where Jawaharlal narrated the incident that occurred during ...
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This chapter discusses Jawaharlal’s political evolution. It looks at Jawaharlal’s letter to Devadas Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi’s youngest son, where Jawaharlal narrated the incident that occurred during the Ardh Kumbh Mela. It also notes that while Jawaharlal was not familiar with the new communal and factional politics, he was still able to hold high office in the Congress organization. The next section discusses his term as Chairman of the Allahabad Municipal Board, where he took his civic duties seriously. Unfortunately, his efforts proved to be in vain, for most of the Municipal Board were more concerned with securing positions for their friends and families. It then studies Indian politics from 1923 to 1925, as well as some domestic issues that greatly troubled Jawaharlal. The chapter also shows that Jawaharlal’s trip to Europe changed some of his views on Indian politics.Less

Evolution of Jawaharlal

B. R. Nanda

Published in print: 2007-12-06

This chapter discusses Jawaharlal’s political evolution. It looks at Jawaharlal’s letter to Devadas Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi’s youngest son, where Jawaharlal narrated the incident that occurred during the Ardh Kumbh Mela. It also notes that while Jawaharlal was not familiar with the new communal and factional politics, he was still able to hold high office in the Congress organization. The next section discusses his term as Chairman of the Allahabad Municipal Board, where he took his civic duties seriously. Unfortunately, his efforts proved to be in vain, for most of the Municipal Board were more concerned with securing positions for their friends and families. It then studies Indian politics from 1923 to 1925, as well as some domestic issues that greatly troubled Jawaharlal. The chapter also shows that Jawaharlal’s trip to Europe changed some of his views on Indian politics.

This chapter discusses the arrival of the West India Royal Commission and how it was anxiously awaited in the island. It was only the second time in forty-one years that a commission had been ...
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This chapter discusses the arrival of the West India Royal Commission and how it was anxiously awaited in the island. It was only the second time in forty-one years that a commission had been appointed by the imperial government to investigate conditions in the Caribbean colonies. The members of the ten-person commission were excited by the prospect of traveling to the West Indies to do their civic duty. As six members of the commission prepared to depart on October 13, 1938, by boat train from Euston Station in London for Liverpool, where a ship awaited them, no one was bothered by the fearsome reputation of the number 13. “I have no qualms about the number 13 and I don't think any of my colleagues have either,” declared one member. “I don't suppose that the voyage—or for that matter—our mission to the West Indies would be any less eventful if it started on any other day of the month.”Less

Looking Back, Moving Forward

Colin A. Palmer

Published in print: 2014-02-03

This chapter discusses the arrival of the West India Royal Commission and how it was anxiously awaited in the island. It was only the second time in forty-one years that a commission had been appointed by the imperial government to investigate conditions in the Caribbean colonies. The members of the ten-person commission were excited by the prospect of traveling to the West Indies to do their civic duty. As six members of the commission prepared to depart on October 13, 1938, by boat train from Euston Station in London for Liverpool, where a ship awaited them, no one was bothered by the fearsome reputation of the number 13. “I have no qualms about the number 13 and I don't think any of my colleagues have either,” declared one member. “I don't suppose that the voyage—or for that matter—our mission to the West Indies would be any less eventful if it started on any other day of the month.”