After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Dunlop Tire Corporation appeals from an order of the district
court denying its motion for a new trial. We reverse and remand.

In February 1997, Dunlop contracted with I.M.E. to rebuild a tire press
Dunlop planned to use on a new production line. The contracted delivery date
was June 23, 1997. On May 20, I.M.E. notified Dunlop it was anticipating delays
in the delivery of necessary parts. Although remaining optimistic that it could
complete the project on time, I.M.E. requested a later delivery date. On June 19,
Dunlop sent I.M.E. a letter invoking the penalty clause of the contract as of
June 27, but giving I.M.E. until July 12 to complete the project.(1) On July 1,
1997, Dunlop terminated the contract in anticipation of I.M.E.'s inability to meet
the July 12 completion date. Dunlop obtained possession of the press and hired
another company to complete the project.

Dunlop then commenced this action seeking the costs it incurred to have
the job completed, as well as liquidated damages. I.M.E. counterclaimed for the
work it had completed but for which it was not paid. The case was tried to a jury,
which found for I.M.E. Dunlop moved for a new trial on the ground that the jury
ignored the overwhelming weight of the evidence and based its verdict on
sympathy, prejudice or issues not before it. The court denied the motion and
Dunlop appeals.

On appeal, Dunlop argues the district court erred in not granting its motion
for a new trial. Dunlop asserts that in order to find for I.M.E., the jury had to
determine that Dunlop was the sole cause of I.M.E.'s failure to complete the
contract on time. Dunlop maintains the evidence shows that it was not
responsible for I.M.E.'s delay.

We review the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial on the ground
that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence for "a manifest abuse
of discretion." Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998);
see alsoGasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433
(1996)
(federal trial judge has "discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to
[the judge] to be against the weight of the evidence."). We will hold that the
district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial where
"the verdict is clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the
evidence." Black v. Hieb's Enter., Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir. 1986).

Relevant Instructions

Each party asserted the other was in breach of the contract.(2)See
Appellant's App. at 55, 56. The jury instructions outlined the competing claims
in some detail. Dunlop's cause of action was explained as follows:

Dunlop claims that it is entitled to damages from I.M.E. due to
breach of contract, because I.M.E. failed to deliver the tire press to
Dunlop as provided in their agreement. Dunlop further claims that as
a result, it cancelled its contract with I.M.E. in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.

Dunlop claims that it was justified in cancelling the contract
with I.M.E. once it concluded that the Defendant was unable to meet
the July 12, 1997 completion date. If you find that Dunlop's conduct
was not the sole cause of I.M.E.'s inability to meet the July 12
deadline, and that it was reasonable for Dunlop to conclude that the
equipment could not be completed by July 12, then you must find for
Dunlop.

Id. at 57 (emphasis added).

I.M.E.'s counterclaim was then explained:

I.M.E. claims that it is entitled to damages from Dunlop due
to breach of contract. In particular, I.M.E. claims that Dunlop
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
contract. . . . This covenant embodies an implicit understanding that
neither party will intentionally do anything to prevent the other party
from carrying out its part of the agreement.

In this case, I.M.E. claims that Dunlop's conduct was such as
to interfere with I.M.E.'s ability to complete the contract in a timely
manner. If you find that the [sic] Dunlop's conduct was the sole
cause of I.M.E.'s delay, then you must find in favor of I.M.E.

Id. at 56 (emphasis added).

As the emphasized passages in the instructions reflect, Dunlop's cause of
action turned on negating the very premise of I.M.E.'s counterclaim, i.e., that
Dunlop's conduct was the sole cause of I.M.E.'s inability to perform on time.
In light of this overlap, the parties agreed to reverse the usual order of
deliberations. Consequently, the jury was instructed that "[b]ecause of the way
the law applies to the facts of this case, it is necessary for you to decide I.M.E.'s
[counter]claim first." Id. at 55.

Evidence

Evidence was adduced at trial that, at least facially, supported I.M.E.'s
basic allegation that Dunlop had breached the contract. Specifically, Dunlop had
been late paying I.M.E. a substantial interim invoice, had been late in providing
necessary approval of certain items (though Dunlop offered evidence in excuse
of this delay), and had terminated the contract prior to the completion date of
July 12. Indeed, this evidence appears to be the focus of the district court's order
denying Dunlop's motion for new trial, in which the court stated "that there was
sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the jury's conclusion that Dunlop
breached the contract. Therefore, the Court concludes that this is not an
exceptional case in which the verdict is clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly
against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 114.

However, I.M.E.'s counterclaim and defense to Dunlop's cause of action,
as outlined in the instructions, clearly required more than a mere breach by
Dunlop. I.M.E. had to prove that Dunlop's conduct had been the sole cause of
I.M.E.'s failure to complete its performance in a timely manner. On this critical
point, even I.M.E. had indicated that its inability to meet the contract completion
date was caused, rather, by the delay of several of its vendors in providing
necessary parts. Indeed, I.M.E.'s vice president and general manager expressly
admitted that no part of the problem it "had in getting the press done was
[Dunlop's] fault." Id. at 236.

We therefore conclude that the verdict rendered in favor of I.M.E. was
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Under the authorities cited
above, the denial of Dunlop's motion for new trial should be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.

Waiver Arguments

I.M.E. attempts to forestall a new trial by arguing that Dunlop waived the
evidentiary deficiency (1) by failing to move for judgment as a matter of law at
the close of the case, and (2) by approving a verdict form which permitted the
jury to find in I.M.E.'s favor on all claims without ever determining whether
Dunlop's alleged breach was the sole cause of I.M.E.'s own nonperformance.

With regard to I.M.E.'s first argument, Dunlop's motion for new trial under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) must be distinguished from a post-trial motion for judgment
as a matter of law (JMOL) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The rules serve
different
purposes, implicate different substantive standards and standards of review, and
involve different procedures. See generally 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's
Federal Practice § 59.05[5] (3d ed. 2000). Most importantly for present concerns,
while the failure to move for JMOL at the close of the evidence bars subsequent
challenges to its legal sufficiency, there is no such prerequisite to a post-trial
motion for new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict is against the weight
of the evidence, see, e.g., Ketchum v. Nall, 425 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir.
1970);
Brown v. Poland, 325 F.2d 984, 985-86 (10th Cir. 1963).

Regarding the second waiver contention, a party may, by acquiescence,
waive objections to a verdict form that "did not contain causes of action [it] had
alleged." Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452, 1455 (10th Cir. 1990).
And the unchallenged form in this case, viewed in isolation, could have permitted
the jury to find against Dunlop on all claims simply by determining that it had
breached the contract, without ever deciding the critical "sole cause" element:

1. Has I.M.E. . . . proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
Dunlop . . . breached the contract?"

Yes ___

No ___

If the answer to number 1 is 'no', please skip number 2 and go to

number 3. If your answer to Number 1 is "Yes", please proceed to

Number 2.

We find that I.M.E. has sustained damages for breach of contract

in the amount of $______.

If you have filled out Number 2, you are finished. Please sign and
date
this form below. Do not complete Numbers 3 and 4 [which relate to
Dunlop's cause of action for breach].

Appellant's App. at 66-67 (italics added for emphasis).

The flaw in I.M.E.'s waiver argument, however, is that verdict forms are
not to be viewed in isolation. On the contrary, arguably incomplete verdict forms
"must be construed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances,
including the court's instructions." Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448,
455 (1st Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1301 (10th
Cir.
1998); Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
As explained above, the jury was instructed at length on the elements of the
parties' claims and the proper procedure for their resolution. Thus, while the
bare-bones verdict form was perhaps inartfully crafted, the overall charge given
to the jury properly put before it the "sole cause" issue that was the focus of
Dunlop's new trial motion. We therefore reject I.M.E.'s contention that by
acquiescing in the verdict form Dunlop somehow waived the deficiency in
I.M.E.'s proof on that issue.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a new trial.(3)

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1. The district court held that this letter
constituted a novation of the contract
setting a new delivery date of July 12. Neither party challenges this legal
determination.

2. The jury instructions stated: "A
contract is breached or broken when
a party does not do what it promised to do in the contract. When one party has
breached a contract, subsequent failure of the other party to do what it promised
under the contract does not constitute a breach." Appellant's App. at 58.

3. As discussed above, we have before
us only the question whether the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. "Ordering a new trial is therefore
the only relief available on appeal." Walker v. AT&T Techs., 995 F.2d 846, 848
(8th Cir. 1993).