Release of Iraq report bares harsh realities

There is little comfort in analysis prepared by intelligence experts, but it is a point of departure for a newly realistic approach.

President George W. Bush has been pulling out all the stops of late in
an effort to reverse his falling approval ratings. And, thanks to such
developments as the universally welcomed drop in fuel prices, he has
regained some ground.

However, like the ghost at the banquet, the punishing and not
particularly successful war on terror casts a shadow over the
administration and its hopes for a dazzling comeback.

Driving home that point is the much-discussed analysis by federal
intelligence specialists of the war in Iraq and the impact that it has
had on Washington's efforts to combat, contain and ultimately defeat
extremist Islamic groups. Those groups have made it their business to
target U.S. interests - and U.S. allies - throughout the world, and
while they have experienced setbacks, they remain maddeningly elusive
and highly motivated.

The president had vigorously resisted publication of the reportt,
but finally agreed to its release after some of the material was leaked
by parties as yet unknown.

The report does not make for pleasant reading. Far from representing
a punishing blow to Islamic extremists, the U.S. military intervention
in Iraq has provided them with what the intelligence experts described
as a "cause celebre" - a rallying cry and a highly effective recruiting
tool. As a result, the jihadist threat to the West has actually
intensified.

There were a few hopeful notes in the document, to be sure. The
intelligence experts noted that the jidadists have liabilities of their
own: their unpopular insistence on the establishment of ultra-strict
fundamentalist Islamic regimes in all Muslim countries, and their
reliance on a handful of leaders who - like the late Abu Musb
al-Zarqawi - might be assassinated.

What emerges from the document is singularly bleak. But, despite the
cries that immediately went up from the left, it does not add up to an
argument for the United States and its allies to cut and run. That is
not a viable option, however much we might wish otherwise. It would
hand victory to the terrorists, and shred Washington's credibility.

What we must do is get beyond the happy talk and the chipper
assurance to the reality of Iraq and the terror war. We must deploy our
resources more realistically, plan more imaginatively, and accelerate
the empowering of Iraq's fledgling democratic government to establish
at least a measure of stability. That's a long way from "mission
accomplished," but unless we address these challenges head-on, a
ruinous reckoning could await us and those we are trying to help.