Category Archives: Iran

Last week, a Georgian-American chess world champion, Nazi Paikidze-Barnes, went on social media to express her disapproval and subsequent boycott of the 2017 Chess World Championship that is to take place in Iran on the grounds of Iran’s religious law that would require her to wear a hijab. As she posted on her Instagram:

I think it’s unacceptable to host a Women’s World Championship in a place where women do not have basic fundamental rights and are treated as second-class citizens.

It is difficult not to have a knee-jerk reaction and jump on the Paikidze-Barnes bandwagon, and fully support her boycott. After all, it is true, women are treated as second-class citizens in Iran from the policing of their dress by the state, their ban to attend male sporting events in Iran, to inheritance and custody laws just to name a few. However, in light of the position, many Iranian women have taken to news outlets and blogs to express their concern and disapproval of Nazi’s stance. They argue that boycotting such a major competition actually hurts progress for Iranian women. As one Iranian international master put it:

This campaign against the tournament is against Iranian women and it doesn’t help at all…It’s the first time we are hosting a world championship [for women], not only in chess but [in any] sport, and I think it’s very important for Iranian women to have this chance to hold such major events.

In a New York Times op-ed, Azadeh Moaveni asked Jila Baniyaghoob, a journalist and activist in Iran who had spent some time in prison, on the matter:

[S]he said it was crucial to take the long view…While she herself opposes mandatory hijab, she points to the athletic wear Iranian female athletes wore in the 2016 Olympic Games, outfits that 30 years ago would have been inconceivable. “Women’s progress goes step by step here, and the route forward isn’t a boycott,” she said. “When a woman shines in a sports competition it boosts women’s rights in all areas, it reverberates everywhere, beyond those games.”

In Ms. Baniyaghoob’s words is where we find the strategic nougat of women’s rights and progress in Iran. The strategy of showcasing talent and championing the abilities of women on the international stage not only benefits women in Iran, but benefits the entire country as a whole.

In chess, it is important to not become distracted by nonsense movements of an opponent or easy attacks that can put your overall strategy out of position. Fighting Iran’s mandatory hijab dress code for women seems like a valiant, immediate crusade (indeed, it is). It is visual. It directly attacks a nonsense law that imposes the state’s will on women (although, nobody in the West seems to care too much about the mandatory dress code for men). And it “feels” like it is the right course of action to make a backward system backpedal.

Iranian women are taking the approach of showcasing their talent and abilities – both domestically and internationally; no matter how small the event – as the means to gain support and empower their voices when fighting against laws that oppress them. By entering the halls of Iranian sport champions and heroes, Iranian women gain greater leverage through their newfound status of Iranian heroes to fight oppression. Therefore, when that ability to showcase their ability is marred or covered by tabloid like media coverage, it takes away the very achievements that Iranian women are fighting for every day.

It is important to remain resolute in the long approach of Iranian progress. The long approach, in this case, meaning Iranian women showcasing their ability on the world’s stage and being international contenders in every world competition that is available to them. With each success, the country increasingly rallies behind Iranian women to succeed and, through this increased support, a culture of championing Iranian women is erected and widely accepted. This also has a trickling affect into other areas of Iranian society whether in employment, politics, or other areas in which Iranian women are currently shut out. Iranian women understand this nuance and urge their Western counterparts to come halfway by keeping this long term strategy in mind. When enough opportunities are won and they outnumber the men in key positions (which they will), the veil will come off; at which point it is no longer a symbol of oppression, but just a simple headscarf. It’s only a matter of time.

So Israel and Palestine are at it. Again. I know this because Facebook told me. Perusing through various hashtags (#standwithIsrael, #prayforPalestine, and various other combinations of “slacktivism“) I came across an article regarding Ahmed al-Jabari, a senior commander of Hamas’ military wing. According to the article, Ahmed al-Jabari received a “draft of a permanent truce agreement with Israel [and Hamas], when his car was blasted by the Israeli strike that killed him, Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin told Haaretz.”

Gershon Baskin – a co-chair of the Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information and chief negotiator of the secret back channel negotiations for Gilad Shalit‘s release – wrote a NYTimes Op-Ed piece regarding the assassination:

I believe that Israel made a grave and irresponsible strategic error by deciding to kill Mr. Jabari…Passing messages between the two sides, I was able to learn firsthand that Mr. Jabari wasn’t just interested in a long-term cease-fire; he was also the person responsible for enforcing previous cease-fire understandings brokered by the Egyptian intelligence agency…On the morning that he was killed, Mr. Jabari received a draft proposal for an extended cease-fire with Israel, including mechanisms that would verify intentions and ensure compliance. This draft was agreed upon by me and Hamas’s deputy foreign minister, Mr. Hamad, when we met last week in Egypt…

In the draft, which I understand Mr. Jabari saw hours before he was killed, it was proposed that Israeli intelligence information transmitted through the Egyptians would be delivered to Mr. Jabari so that he could take action aimed at preventing an attack against Israel. Mr. Jabari and his forces would have had an opportunity to prove that they were serious when they told Egyptian intelligence officials that they were not interested in escalation. If Mr. Jabari had agreed to the draft, then we could have prevented this new round of violence; if he had refused, then Israel would have likely attacked in much the same way as it is now…

Instead, Mr. Jabari is dead — and with him died the possibility of a long-term cease-fire. Israel may have also compromised the ability of Egyptian intelligence officials to mediate a short-term cease-fire and placed Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt at risk.

This was not inevitable, and cooler heads could have prevailed. Mr. Jabari’s assassination removes one of the more practical actors on the Hamas side.

If that nugget does not blow your mind, here is something “better”: Ahmed al-Jabari – paranoid about his own security – rarely carried a cell phone with him or any other electronic device that was tracable and rarely made public appearances. So how was he found? According to George Joffé, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, Israel used a combination of technology and informers in order zero-in on al-Jabari’s location. He also opines that it must have been months in the planning, which seems to be the case, especially with the heavy aerial assault that followed, which destroyed strategically important targets. Therefore, if months of planning, following, and intelligence gathering were being consolidated, surely al-Jabari’s secret dealings were also exposed? If they were (which seems to be the case as non-military, non-secret parties were privy to the dealings), wouldn’t Israel have welcomed such negotiations and agreements to take root?

Sadly, the timing, planning, and precision of his assassination, which subsequently launched a full scale escalation by Israel, seems to hint at a different agenda. An agenda that doesn’t fall solely at the footsteps of Israel for it also falls at the footsteps of some strange bedfellows.

“Once upon a time, there were the Gaza Hamas and the Damascus Hamas. In the lead at the time was the Damascus Hamas, while the Gaza Hamas was subordinate to the former. The hierarchy was quite clear and the leaders had faces and names. The spiritual, religious Hamas leadership had its headquarters in Gaza. Sheik Ahmed Yassin set the tone then. Everyone knew his place, and each one knew what he had to do. However, Yassin was killed, the Damascus Hamas disintegrated and a leadership vacuum was created, but not for long. In walked Ahmed Jabari. Under his command, the Hamas military wing took over, pushing aside the political wing, something that could not have happened under Sheik Ahmed Yassin.

The chaos in Hamas and the lack of leadership capable of making tough decisions have led to a crisis in the organization. Under these circumstances, in the absence of control, anarchy reigns. It’s every man for himself and each does as he sees fit. Every armed militant is a hero. Every operative launching a Qassam rocket is a king. The Islamic Jihad raises its head and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) follow suit. These are relatively small organizations; however, the damage they cause is not in proportion to their size.”

Eldar goes on to articulate Hamas’ difficulty in keeping the smaller political groups such as Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) in check and dealing with its own political vacuum and restructuring, which made it difficult for Hamas to impose to establish order in Gaza. This came to a head when the Secretary-General of the PRC was assassinated in March 2012, when Hamas’ muted reaction was seen as weakness to the PRC and Islamic Jihad’s “uncompromising ideal for armed struggle against Israel.” Eldar concludes that if Hamas do not re-radicalize, they risk being sidelined to the more radical groups or simply never being able to control Gaza, but:

“Under the current circumstances, disarming the militants and restoring law and order are far more difficult tasks than they were several years ago. And as matters now stand, there does not seem to be anyone in Hamas who can or wants to take such a brave step. There is no strong enough figure in Hamas these days endowed with genuine leadership skills and enjoying the unprecedentedly wide support required to make such a move. There is no one in Hamas today who is ready to pay the price of what is bound to be branded by the other organizations in Gaza as no less than infidelity and betrayal.”

Enter conflict analysis theory. In his book, The Functions of Social Conflict, Lewis Coser argues that in times of weak internal solidarity, despotism rises in order to meet the demand of war or external threat. By facing an external enemy, internal cohesion increases and through the reinforcement of ideals and norms and the purging of deviant ideals and members, control is established over the group. With these axioms in mind, I take Eldar’s conclusions a bit further and argue that certain political factions within Hamas desired to reestablish themselves as the very banner of Palestinian resistance (especially under an Islamic flag). In order to do so, they hung al-Jabari out to dry to purge any remnants of looking soft, gained a martyr in the process, and used al-Jabari’s death as a symbol that Israel has no intention of negotiating by killing Hamas’ chief negotiator between Israel and Gaza.

In other words, Hamas leaked that information intentionally to Israel, and Israel bit. But why would Israel comply in striking such a target and starting a major offensive? It’s argued that it’s an election year in Israel, and Netanyahu wants to show that he will not be idle as Hamas fires rockets into Israel’s south. He had been criticised for being a lame duck, but it seems for political points he has chosen to launch an offensive. However, it still doesn’t explain al-Jabari as a target even if Israel wanted to launch an offensive. His killing has no impact other than putting a halt to a peace treaty, and knowing that may put everything into perspective. Quite frankly, the evidence seems to support that factions at the top of Israel do not want to see this conflict to end for similar reasons as Hamas. They can maintain their stranglehold on power by scaring up votes when their national security is at risk. And so, Israel selectively targets those who are willing to broker a treaty (al-Jabari’s case) or cause harm and pain that will reinforce their enemy to continue to hate them, thus maintaining the cycle.

About a couple of months back, I had the opportunity to meet former CNN reporter Rudi Bakhtiar. She had returned from the Syrian-Turkish border region doing an investigation on the Syrian Civil War’s effect on Syrian children. She happened to be already speaking to my cousin when I had arrived, and when I came to introduce myself, my cousin casually mentioned my background in conflict analysis and resolution. She asked me what I thought about the civil war and what could be done about. I replied, “Nothing,” which seemed to startle the group that was presently speaking with her.

She responded, “Why?”

I answered, “It’s an election year.”

She smiled her million-dollar smile and she agreed, “Precisely.”

While the cute little exchange holds truth, it is only one factor that contributed (temporarily) to the U.S. government doing “little” to actively stop the conflict. Even with the elections out of the way, the United States is (and will be) quite hesitant in raising the Syrian government as a top foreign policy issue. Why? Because Syria isn’t Libya and, more importantly, al-Assad isn’t Ghaddafi.

This is politically significant because the fallout from Bosnia and Kosovo changed the UN Charter to include a “Right to Protect” (R2P) clause. The clause states:

“[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

Another game changer would be whether the Syrian military can keep the weapons secure or if the Assad government is overthrown, what kind of government would take its place. If an unstable or radical government were to take over, the seizure of the weapons can prove to be particularly destabilizing without outside intervention. It is hard to imagine the U.S., Israel, or Russia for that matter not intervening and destroying the weapons in a military strike.

So what will happen or what can be done? It is difficult to say. Syria’s opposition is a far cry from uniformity in comparison to Libya’s opposition, which is an egregiously low standard in and of itself. The U.S. and various Arab nations have just put together a new opposition bloc that they hope can recognized and legitimized by all the different Syrian opposition groups. They have already been recognized by the Arab League, but it remains to be seen if they can get all parties to work with them. If they can secure a majority of oppositional political and paramilitary parties then perhaps they stand a chance at entering negotiations with the Syrian government. However, what unites them is at odds with a segment of the international community. The fundamental question revolves on whether Assad should step down from power. For Russia and Iran, this is a no. For the West and the Syrian opposition, this is a yes.

In the meantime, R2P remains dormant due to Russia, while lives continue to be lost as Syria’s Civil War continues its slow burn.

As Ben Ali and Mubarak eventually conceded to “their people” with reverberations being felt in other Arab countries, Iran swelled with courage and excitement to join in the democratic wave after its own momentum had abated since a year and a half ago. Pro-Democracy Iranians took to the streets to co-opt the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution to make their grievances heard. The diaspora flooded the various waves of technology to show support and make viral the pictures and videos that document the oppression and injustice the Iranian people are subjected to. However, while I do not like to be a “debbie downer”, the Iranian people do not face an oppressor like the one’s found in Tunisia, Egypt, or many other Arab countries in upheaval. They face something worse.

This might seem to be a “duh” thing to say, but what I want to point out is that the Iranian people are fighting a very, very different beast. Iranians face an oppressor on two fronts. One front includes the formal institutions of the Islamic Republic that include the President, the Majlis (Parliament), the Velayat-e-Faqih (Supreme Leader), Guardian Council, you know what, just see this picture here. The other front is the zealots, which include the Basij whom blend in with the general Iranian society and “tip off” authorities on opposition members and use indiscriminate violence to keep the Iranian people “in check”.

Unlike Iran, the governments of Ben Ali and Mubarak (and most of the other Arab countries) ruled their countries through a strong, organized, and vicious security apparatus. The strength of its power relied upon a swift cracking down upon dissidents and relied very little on having “popular support”. Sure it has the well-to-do, and they put up a fight as the pro-Mubarak forces did alongside the military, but they were egregiously outnumbered and have a lot more to lose should they get injured—most pro-Mubarak demonstrators/supporters hail from the upper classes of Egyptian society. Therefore, in every sense of the phrase, they did not have popular support.

Iran on the other hand has one too many experiences with “revolution”. In fact, you could say that the current Iranian regime wrote the handbook on modern revolutions. The key players that brought the Islamic government into power knew all too well that if they wanted to dethrone the more financially and militarily powerful Shah, they would need every man, even the most mendicant. Not to say that joining forces with the poor was a novel idea, as the French have immortalized, but Islam being built on the foundation of helping the poor, encouraging an austere lifestyle, and equality before God regardless of class produced a much greater symbiotic relationship that the poor could rally behind.

This relationship not only brought the Islamic government into power, but it has maintained their power through the Basij–a volunteer paramilitary organization used to intimidate, abuse, and rape dissidents, with their downtime hobbies including study of the Qur’an and various recreational activities like soccer, cards, and slapping each other in the face.

The Basij are primarily comprised of the poorer demographics of Iranian society, where many of them receive financial support and health services through membership (akin to how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt operates). I want to clarify by saying that all those who are poor are NOT Basij, for many who are poor are on the side of the opposition. Instead, those who are members and receive benefits from the system find they have a lot to lose if the Islamic regime were to go. Their very identity lies with the organization, the Islamic Republic, which results in them laying their lives down for the Supreme Leader.

This is not to say that the Iranian people don’t stand a chance. They will emancipate themselves for the regime cannot sustain its current discourse not only politically and socially, but also economically. Yet, I believe that “emancipation” will come at the heavy price of going through years of protracted conflict. While the demonstrations after the 2009 presidential election were nonviolent and peaceful (on the opposition’s side of course), this time around the opposition is fighting back. As the government further cracks down on the opposition, it systematically radicalizes the opposition to take more extreme and potentially violent means in acquiring their rights. You add that to the resolve of the Iranian regime and the Basij who readily accept martyrdom, the conflict can escalate into something that would make Francisco Franco nostalgic.