Valuing Form Over Substance In Iraq by Ken Sanders
www.dissidentvoice.org
August 6, 2005

Based
on the Bush administration's recent public statements, one could be
forgiven for thinking that everything in Iraq will be fine so long as the
August 15 deadline for drafting a constitution is met. In his speech to
the nation on June 28, President Bush emphasized the importance of Iraqis
staying on schedule with respect to drafting and voting on a constitution.
During his "surprise" visit to Iraq on July 27, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
was more blunt. "We don't want any delays," Rumsfeld warned Iraq's
constitutional committee.

Iraq's constitutional process is so
important to the Bush administration because it is one of two requirements
that must be met before the U.S. can begin to bring its occupation of Iraq
to an end. As explained by the senior U.S. commander in Iraq, General
George Casey, continuing Iraq's constitutional process and improving
Iraq's security forces are integral to the U.S. military's plan to pull
out of Iraq in the summer of 2006. (Although it is becoming increasingly
clear that Bush plans to pull out of Iraq in 2006, no matter what.)

While it is frequently helpful, even
necessary, to have deadlines, it is generally unwise to emphasize the
deadline over the quality of the work. Nevertheless, this is precisely
what the Bush administration is doing in Iraq.

Let's assume that the Iraqis do meet the
August 15 deadline and get a constitution written. The constitution must
still be approved by Iraq's voters, but (thanks to the Bush
administration's lack of foresight) may be vetoed by two thirds of voters
in any three governorates. As it happens, there are three Sunni Arab
governorates and three Kurdish governorates. Inasmuch as the insurgency in
Iraq is a Sunni Arab insurgency at heart, do you think it's likely the
Sunni Arabs will pass up the chance to veto Iraq's constitution? Neither
do I.

The Kurds' approval of the constitution
isn't exactly a lock either.

Notwithstanding the fact that the current
president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, is a Kurd, Iraq's Kurdistan Region has
little use for Iraq. The flag of Iraq, chosen by Saddam's Ba'ath Party to
signify the union of Arab lands, does not fly anywhere in Kurdistan. At
the inauguration of the Kurdistan National Assembly in July, the
assemblymen swore loyalty to Kurdistan, not to Iraq. Kurdistan maintains a
military consisting of around 50,000 peshmerga, which may not be deployed
elsewhere in Iraq without the assembly's approval. By the same token,
non-Kurdish military forces are prohibited from entering Kurdistan.

While Iraq's Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims,
they are secular and, having suffered at the hands of Sunni Arabs under
Saddam's regime, hold no allegiance to Iraq's Sunni insurgency.
Nonetheless, they don't feel particularly loyal to Iraq's Shiite Arabs
either. In fact, as evidenced above, the Kurds don't really think of
themselves as Iraqis and would be more than happy to secede from Iraq
entirely. This would be bad news for the rest of Iraq since nearly all of
the effective fighting units in Iraq's fledgling security forces are
former Kurdish peshmerga. These units would not hesitate to return to and
fight for Kurdistan, leaving greater Iraq virtually defenseless.

The secularism and independence of Iraq's
Kurds pose an additional obstacle to the constitution's ratification. The
Shiite majority's draft of the constitution would make Iraq a "federal
Islamic republic." Under the Shiite draft, women's rights would be all but
eliminated and Islamic law would govern matters such as inheritance,
divorce, and child custody. The Shiite draft is also overtly anti-Semitic,
denying Iraqi Jews equal rights and protections. The Kurds, in addition to
being secular, have also made significant progress toward women's equality
during their 14 years of autonomy, and bear no grudge against Iraq's Jews.

The Kurds also refuse to surrender Kirkuk to
Arab Iraq. Rich in oil reserves, Kirkuk is also considered by the Kurds to
be the heart of Kurdistan. Understandably, the Kurds resent having been
expelled from Kirkuk by Saddam and replaced with Arabs, thereby increasing
Kirkuk's importance to the Kurds. Any constitution that does not make
Kirkuk part of Kurdistan won't stand a chance of surviving a Kurdish veto.
Indeed, even if Kurdistan's leaders accept a Shiite-written constitution,
the Kurdish governorates could (and likely would) veto it.

Curiously, the Bush administration never
mentions the various reasons why the failure of Iraq's constitution is all
but certain, regardless of whether a particular deadline is met. Either
our hayseed of a president fails to appreciate the complexities at issue
in Iraq or he simply hopes to keep the American public in the dark for as
long as possible. While it's a close call, in light of this
administration's abhorrence of truthfulness and openness, particularly
regarding Iraq, the latter seems more likely.