Koperski, Jeffrey. The Physics of Theism: God, Physics, and the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 2015). The book is due out next month. Here's the blurb:

The Physics of Theismprovides a timely, critical analysis of the ways in which physics intertwines with religion. Koperski brings clarity to a range of arguments including the fine-tuning argument, naturalism, the laws of nature, and the controversy over Intelligent Design.

A single author text providing unprecedented scope and depth of analysis of key issues within the Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophy of Science

Critically analyses the ways in which physics is brought into play in matters of religion

Sorry, I've been meaning to put this up for a while, but it got set aside due to work. Here they are. I haven't seen them all yet, but the one's I've seen are terrific.

Note the comment under each video: "In late 2014 or early 2015, there will be an opportunity for the speaker to respond to selected comments and questions. Comments (which can be made in the box below) will be moderated and will not appear immediately."

The organizers of the first annual Theistic Ethics Workshop encourage abstract submissions for our inaugural meeting at the Graylyn Conference Center (www.graylyn.com) on the campus of Wake Forest University. The workshop will be held on October 8-10, 2015, and details can be found here:

Authors of accepted abstracts will have all their expenses covered, including travel. This workshop is being supported by generous funding from the Thomas J. Lynch Funds of the Wake Forest University Philosophy Department. Please direct any questions to millerc@wfu.edu.

Call classical theism the view that there is
a personal god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, and call the classical view of creation the view
that consists in the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from
the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural
world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo. Finally, call classical
theismcvc any version of classical theism that includes the
classical view of creation.[1]
In this paper, I argue that the classical view of creation conflicts with our evidence
that objects with an originating or sustaining cause require a material cause,
and that since classical theismcvc includes the traditional doctrine
of creation, classical theismcvc is called into serious doubt.

2. The Argument

The argument I’ll
defend can be expressed as follows:

1. All concrete
objects that have an originating or sustaining cause have a material cause of
their existence.

2. If classical
theismcvc is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has
an originating or sustaining cause without a material cause of its existence.

3. Therefore, classical
theismcvc is false.

The argument is
valid[2].
What can be said on behalf of the premises? Premise
1 expresses a causal principle, which I’ll call the principle of material causality, or PMC for short. PMC asserts
that concrete objects have a material cause whenever they have an originating
or sustaining cause.Before I defend the
premise, some preliminary remarks about terminology are in order. First,
concrete object denotes at least the
sorts of entities classically individuated by the category of Substance, and distinguishes
them from those of other categories (e.g., property, relation, event, trope,
etc.). Examples include atoms, stars, rocks, planets, trees, animals, and people.
They are thus distinguished from concrete entities in other categories (shapes,
surfaces, events, and the like) and abstract objects (propositions, numbers,
sets, and the like). The
next two key terms are originatingcause and sustainingcause. The
former denotes an efficient cause of the temporal beginning of a thing’s
existence[3],
and the latter denotes an efficient cause of a thing’s continued existence. Thus,
matches and lighter fluid are at least partial originating causes of a flame,
and the oxygen that surrounds it is at least a partial sustaining cause of a
flame.Finally,
material cause aims to capture
(roughly) Aristotle’s notion of the term,
and to individuate it from the other three distinguished by Aristotle, viz.,
formal, efficient, and final causes. By ‘material cause’, then, I mean ‘the
things or stuff from which another thing is made’.Thus, the material cause of a penny is the
parcel of copper from which it was made, and the material causes of a water
molecule are the hydrogen and oxygen atoms from which it was made.Two
points about PMC merit special emphasis. First, PMC is restricted to concrete
objects as we’ve defined them. It is therefore neutral about whether entities
in other categories require a
material cause. Second, PMC restricts the requirement of a material cause
further to just those concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining
cause. It therefore allows for the possibility of concrete objects that lack a material cause, viz., those that
lack an originating and sustaining cause. The premise thus allows that the universe
may lack a material cause if it’s beginningless and also lacks a sustaining
cause. It also allows that a universe with a beginning may lack a material
cause, if it also lacks an originating and sustaining cause. An example of the
latter sort of case might be a temporally finite, four-dimensional “block”
universe. To sum up: PMC is neutral as to whether all concrete objects begin to
exist, and to whether all concrete objects that begin to exist have a material
cause. The causal premise only rules
out concrete objects that have an originating
or sustaining cause, but lack a
material cause. Is
PMC plausible?It certainly seems so. Here we can prime our intuitions with a few thought experiments.[4]
Thus, suppose we were told that a certain log cabin had the following special
characteristic: it popped into existence out of nothing without any cause
whatsoever. Most, I imagine – including most of those who have read their Hume
-- would find such a claim strongly counterintuitive, if not absurd. But suppose
instead we were told the cabin was special for another reason: a lumberjack created
it without any materials whatsoever. I imagine most would likewise find such a
claim absurd or strongly counterintuitive. A similar intuition obtains when we
consider any other concrete object arising from an originating cause without a
material cause. Perhaps such intuitions aren’t enough to demonstrate the impossibility of an originating cause without a
material cause, but we ordinarily take such seemings to be at least defeasible,
prima facie evidence for what can or
cannot be the case. We
have similar grounds for thinking that concrete objects that depend upon a sustaining causehave a material cause. Thus, the continued existence of a flame
depends upon a sustaining cause for its continued existence. But here we find
that the flame’s sustenance also
crucially involves a material cause,
viz., reacting gases and solids. Furthermore, our intuitions in support of the
causal principle are triggered when we attempt to imagine the flame’s continued
existence without the presence of
reacting gases, solids or some other material cause. The intuition doesn’t
diminish when we imagine the flame to be past-eternal. In
addition, it doesn’t require a full-blown Aristotelian metaphysic to find the
materials for a powerful argument for PMC in the apparent relationship between
what actually exists and what merely has the potential to exist. Thus, the
possibility of the origination or sustenance of an object requires the prior
potential for its existence. But it seems that this potential must “reside” in some
actually existing thing or stuff. Thus, the potential existence of a penny “resides”
in a parcel of copper. By contrast, nothingness lacks the capacity or potential
for becoming anything, since nothingness has no capacities or properties
whatsoever. Prima facie, then,
concrete objects can’t come into being from nothing, but only from other
concrete things or stuff.Finally, PMC enjoys abundant
empirical support. For our uniform experience is such that whenever we find a
concrete object with an originating or sustaining cause, we also find it to
have a material cause.Furthermore,
there seem to be no clear counterexamples to PMC in our experience. What
explains this? PMC is a simple hypothesis, which, if true, would best explain this
data. Experience thus provides significant abductive support for PMC.That
leaves premise 2. Why should we accept it? Premise 2 follows from our partial
stipulative definition of ‘classical theismcvc’. It’s therefore an analytic truth. This causes no
trouble for the argument’s significance, for the partial definition captures
several theses that are prima facie essential
to classical theism.Such theses are
among those that individuate theism from neighboring views about God, such as
pantheism, panentheism, demiurgic theism, Berkeleyan idealism, and Spinozistic
monism. They’re also among the theses about God that have been accepted by most
prominent philosophers within the theistic tradition, including Augustine,
Anselm, Aquinas, (and, more recently) William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard
Swinburne. Indeed, it’s safe to say that most contemporary analytic
philosophers of religion would consider them essential theses of any account of
classical theism worthy of the name. I therefore think it’s safe to say that the
stipulative truth of the premise won’t undermine its relevance for evaluating
classical theism’s epistemic merits.We’ve
seen that the argument from material causality is valid, that premise 1 (i.e.,
PMC) enjoys strong prima facie justification,
and that premise 2 is an analytic truth. It therefore looks as though the
argument poses a formidable problem for classical theism.How
might the classical theist respond? Premise
2 is non-negotiable, as we’ve seen that it’s an analytic truth. That leaves open
only two types of response for the classical theist: a non-concessive response,
which involves providing a defeater for premise 1, and a concessive response,
which grants the soundness of the argument, but rejects classical theismcvc.
In the rest of the paper, I’ll briefly consider both sorts of response.

3. Non-Concessive Responses

As mentioned
above, a non-concessive response involves providing principled grounds for
resisting premise 1. This requires principled grounds for thinking the
principle of material causality is false or without adequate justification. I can
think of three main ways in which one might attempt to do so, which I shall
consider below.First,
one might appeal to God’s omnipotence as a way of defeating premise 1. The
basic line of reasoning is as follows: If the god of classical theism exists,
then God is omnipotent. But if so, then since omnipotence entails the ability
to do anything that’s metaphysically possible, it follows that the god of
classical theism has the ability to create concrete objects ex nihilo, without a material cause.
However, this reply is inadequate. For the very point at issue is whether ex nihilo creation of concrete objects is
metaphysically possible, and we’ve seen that there are at least prima facie grounds for thinking that it
isn’t metaphysically possible. Bare appeal
to God’s omnipotence in this context is therefore question-begging.Another
possible criticism of premise 1 is one heard from some in the field of quantum
cosmology, viz., that there are plausible models of the origin of the universe
according to which the universe arose from nothing. However, such claims don’t
bear out as counterexamples upon further scrutiny. For upon closer inspection, what
one finds instead are much weaker claims, e.g., that the universe arose from a random
fluctuation in a quantum vacuum[5],
or that it arose from a universe of zero radius, which subsequently tunneled
through an energy barrier and inflated into the universe as we know it.[6]
But a randomly fluctuating, energy-rich quantum vacuum is not nothing in any
relevant sense. Nor is a zero-radius universe that tunnels through an energy
barrier and then inflates the same thing as a universe that arises from nothing.
As such, they’re not counterexamples to PMC as expressed in premise 1.Finally,
the theist might resist premise 1 by appeal to agent causal views of the self.
Thus, they might argue that there are good reasons to think that (i) humans possess
libertarian free will, that (ii) this is best explained on the assumption that
the physical realm isn’t causally closed, that (iii) the agent can thus cause
things via energy from “outside” the natural causal order[7],
and that (iv) this is sufficient justification for the existence of genuine creation
ex nihilo, in which case premise 1 is
false. This reply won’t work, however. For even if (i)-(iii) could be
adequately supported – contrary to the opinion of the majority of analytic
philosophers[8]
– the falsity of the causal closure of the physical wouldn’t require positing
the creation of concrete objects ex
nihilo. Rather, at most, it would require the transfer of pre-existing
energy from the agent (who acts from “outside” of the natural causal order) to
the physical realm.[9]

4. Concessive Responses

If one finds the
non-concessive responses implausible, one might finally turn to a concessive
response; that is, one might accept a view of God that denies the classical
view of creation. There are three basic versions of such a response, each one
corresponding to a rejection of one of the three clauses of the classical view
of creation as we have defined it. I will briefly consider each sort of
response below.The
first type of concessive response is to reject thesis (i) of the classical view
of creation as we’ve defined it, thereby denying that God is wholly distinct
from the natural world. According to this sort of response, one allows that the
world is either (a) identical to God, (b) made from the stuff of God’s being,
(c) a mere feature or mode of God’s being, or (d) an idea in the mind of God.
Unfortunately, options (a)-(c) come at the high cost of abandoning classical
theism altogether, as embracing one of these options amounts to embracing
something in the neighborhood of pantheism, panentheism, or Spinozistic monism,
respectively. And while (d) is arguably a version of theism, it requires
embracing something on the order of Berkeleyan idealism. It would take us too
far afield to evaluate the case for such a view, but it’s enough for our
purposes to note that few have found the case for Berkeleyan idealism
persuasive, in which case it seems unlikely that many are likely to accept a
concessive response of this sort.The
second type of concessive response is to reject thesis (ii) of the classical
view of creation.According to this sort
of response, God may or may not be omnipotent[10],
omniscient, and morally perfect. However, he doesn’t play the role of creator
of the universe in any sense. Call this sort of view hands-off theism.It
seems antecedently unlikely that there will be many takers for hands-off
theism. This is for at least two reasons.First, hands-off theism looks epistemically unmotivated. For many standard
lines of evidence for theism depend upon inferences from the natural world to God.
Examples include design arguments from the fine-tuning of the universe to a
cosmic designer, as well as cosmological arguments for a first cause, ground of
being, and sufficient reason for the existence of contingent concrete reality.
But the god of hands-off theism plays none of these roles with respect to the
universe. As such, accepting hands-off theism commits one to rejecting many of
the core arguments of natural theology.It’s also arguable that it causes trouble for religious experience. For
example, in his widely-influential account of the evidential force of religious
experience, William Alston[11]
grants that awareness of certain phenomena (e.g., religious diversity) can
undercut a good deal of the epistemic force of religious experience, and thus
that the justification of theistic belief requires further buttressing with the
help of other evidence, such as cosmological and design arguments. But again,
the hands-off theist is committed to rejecting many such buttressing-arguments
as evidence for her belief.Now perhaps
an adequate case for hands-off theism can be made that doesn’t depend on these
lines of evidence.But for our purposes,
it’s enough to note that the hands-off theist has their work cut out for them.Second,
the god of hands-off theism seems to be of much less religious significance
than the God of classical theismcvc. For on such a view, God is not
responsible for the existence and order of the natural world. He is therefore
not the cosmic architect, first cause, or ground of being upon which all else
depends, let alone Anselm’s greatest conceivable being. Rather, he exists as just
one among the many uncreated concrete objects within the universe, having less
creative and providential control than even Plato’s demiurge. On such a view,
then, the grandeur, preeminence, and otherness of God are severely diminished.
There is also a corresponding loss of the awe that comes from a sense of
ultimate dependence upon a Creator. But perhaps most troubling for many
theistic philosophers of religion today is the fact that such a God seems not
to be the God of traditional Christian theism. For prima facie, the Christian God is described within several
canonical scriptural texts as the creator and sustainer of all things.[12]The final type of
concessive response is to reject thesis (iii) of the classical view of
creation. According to this sort of response, God plays the role of creator and
designer. However, he did not create the world out of nothing, but rather from
pre-existing materials. For obvious reasons, let’s call this sort of view demiurgic theism.Now it seems that demiurgic theism is an
improvement over hands-off theism in terms of epistemic motivation, since on
such a view god plays at least a diminished
role qua creator and designer of the universe, fashioning the universe out of
primordial matter/stuff. Therefore, while standard cosmological arguments cannot
be marshaled in support of demiurgic theism[13],
perhaps an argument from design can be made on behalf of such a view, as well
as (perhaps) religious experience and other sorts of evidence that don’t appeal
to an inference from the sheer existence of the universe to God.However, whatever
the epistemic merits of demiurgic theism, many of the drawbacks of hands-off
theism apply here as well with respect to religious significance. For as with
the latter view, the god of demiurgic theism is not the preeminent first cause
and ground of being for the fundamental stuff of the natural world; nor does he
provide the sufficient reason for its existence. He is therefore not
responsible for the existence of the natural world in the ultimate sense that
is ascribed to the god of classical theismcvc. Rather, he exists
alongside of it as another uncreated concrete object. Therefore, such a view
entails a much weaker view of divine preeminence and uniqueness than what has
been historically attributed to the God of classical theism. Finally, as with
hands-off theism, such a God seems at odds with the God of traditional
Christian theism.For at least these
reasons, then, it’s doubtful that many classical theists will be happy with
this route to resisting the argument.

5. Conclusion

A powerful argument against classical theism
can be constructed from two simple elements: (i) classical theism’s thesis of
creation ex nihilo, and (ii) the well-supported
principle of material causality. The prospects for the only non-concessive
reply to the argument – rejecting the principle of material causality – look
bleak. Furthermore, the concessive replies all leave the classical theist with
a picture of God and creation that they’re likely to find costly and
unattractive, such as pantheism, panentheism, Spinozistic monism, demiurgic
theism, hands-off theism, and Berkeleyan idealism.Little attention has been paid to the
argument to date, but our brief exploration of it suggests that it’s worthy of
serious investigation.

[1] Berkeleyan idealism
arguably fails to satisfy clause (i) of the classical view of creation as
defined here. As such, while it may count as a version of classical theism, it
fails to count as a version of classical theismcvc.

[2]Let: ‘T’= ‘classical theismcvc is true’; ‘Ox’ =’x has an originating
cause of its existence’; ‘Sx’=’x has a sustaining cause of its existence’;
‘Mx’=‘x has a material cause of its existence’; ‘Cx’=’x is a concrete object
(or collection of such)’; and ‘u’=our universe. Then we have:

1. (x)[Cx & (Ox v Sx)] -> Mx Premise

2. T -> [Cu & ((Ou v Su) & ~Mu)] Premise

3. T Assumption
for indirect proof

4. [Cu & (Ou v Su)] & ~Mu 2,3
MP

5. [Cu & (Ou v Su)] -> Mu 1 Universal Quantifier Elimination

6. ~Mu 4 &E

7. ~[Cu & (Ou v Su)] 5,6 MT

8. Cu & (Ou v Su)4 &E

9.[Cu & (Ou v Su)] & ~[Cu & (Ou v Su)]7,8 &I

10. ~T3-9 ~I

[3] Consider any arbitrary
carving up of the stretch of time of a given object’s existence into equal
intervals of finite, non-zero duration, and ordered according to the ‘earlier
than’ relation. As I’m using the expression, an object has a temporal beginning
of its existence just in case any such carving up includes an earliest temporal
interval.

[4]The following illustration is inspired by the one found on p. 29 Wes
Morriston’s paper, "Creation
Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang”, Philo 5:1 (2002), pp. 23-33.

[5] See, for example,
Krauss, Lawrence. A Universe From
Nothing: Why There is Something Rather than Nothing (Atria, 2013).

[6] See, for example,
Vilenkin, Alexander. Many Worlds in One:
The Search for Other Universes (Hill and Wang, 2007).

[8] According to a recent
poll (http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl), only 13.7% of
philosophers answered with “accepting or leaning toward libertarianism”. At
least 71.3% of philosophers polled stated that they think we don’t have
libertarian free will, with 59.1% answering with “accepting or leaning toward
compatibilism”, and 12.2% answering with “accepting or leaning toward no free
will” (14.9% answered with “accepting or leaning toward ‘other’”).

[10] Perhaps one will object
that a god of this sort cannot be omnipotent if he cannot create or sustain the
natural world. However, there is a long and established tradition of theists
who claim that there are lots of things that an omnipotent god cannot do (e.g.,
make a round square, change the past, act contrary to his nature, know future
free acts, etc.).One standard
justification for such restrictions is to say that such things are
metaphysically impossible, and that omnipotence doesn’t include the power to do
what is metaphysically impossible. But the same sort of justification seems
available here. For the hands-off theist can say that creating or sustaining
the universe with out a material cause is metaphysically impossible, and thus
his inability to create or sustain a universe ex nihilo doesn’t count against his omnipotence.

[12] Examples include (i)
John 1:1-3: “In the beginning was the Word,and the
Word was with God,and the
Word was God.He was
with God in the beginning.Through
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made”;
(ii) Romans 11:36: “For from him and through him and for him are all things.To him be the
glory forever! Amen”; (iii) Colossians 1:16-18: “ For in him all things were
created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether
thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created
through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all
things hold together”; and (iv) 1 Corinthians 8:6: “yet for
us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things
came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ,
through whom all things came and through whom we live.” (All passages are
from the NIV version of the New Testament)

[13] I suppose a
cosmological argument for an unmoved
mover is still a possibility, although few have found arguments of this
sort convincing since at least the dawn of Newtonian physics. Perhaps, though,
the argument can be revitalized.We’ll
see.

First Argument: The Argument from Horrors, Hiddenness, Revulsion, and Inhospitable Environment

1. We’d expect horrors, hiddenness, revulsion, and an inhospitable environment if naturalism were true.
2. We wouldn’t expect horrors, hiddenness, revulsion, and an inhospitable environment if theism were true.
3. If we’d expect this data if naturalism were true, but we wouldn’t if theism were true, then the data confirms naturalism vis-à-vis theism.
4. Therefore, horrors, hiddenness, revulsion, and an inhospitable environment confirms naturalism vis-à-vis theism. (1-3)

Why we’d expect this data on naturalism, but not on theism:
o Horror: Some people suffer to the point where their life is prima facie ruined (e.g., being raped, tortured, dismembered, and driven permanently insane). If God exists, we’d expect that God would allow a person to suffer horrifically only if doing so is required for their deepest good (viz., endless intimate fellowship, giving ever-increasing knowledge of God). But prima facie, God's allowing horrific suffering isn’t required for this deepest good. By contrast, we’d expect horrific suffering if naturalism is true. For on such a view, the universe is indifferent to our welfare. (cf. Schellenberg)

o Hiddenness: If God exists, then we’d expect that God would meet all the prerequisites for all those who would want a voluntary relationship with him. One of the prerequisites is to let others know (or reasonably believe), if they wish, that he exists. But this condition hasn’t been met: there are non-resistant non-believers. One might resist or reject this line of reasoning on the grounds that God might have some outweighing reasons for allowing non-resistant non-belief -- e.g., moral, spiritual, or intellectual development. However, none of these grounds explains the massively uneven distribution of theists and non-theists in the world. For we’d expect the causes of non-resistant non-belief to lead to a fairly even distribution of theists and non-theists. But this isn’t what we find. By contrast, we would expect to find such an uneven distribution if theism were false. (Cf. Schellenberg, Maitzen)

o Revulsion: If theism is true, then we’d expect our cognitive and affective faculties to be reliable, and thus to track the truth about aesthetic properties of the world. Now if theism is true, then God made the world, and it is good. Furthermore, given epistemic reliability, my aesthetic judgments about the repulsiveness of parts of the natural world are prima facie justified, in which case parts of the creation are prima facie repulsive (See this post for examples). But this conflicts with the hypothesis that it is good (at least aesthetically). By contrast, repulsive features of the world aren’t at all surprising on naturalism, since we wouldn’t expect it to aim at aesthetic goodness. (Me)

o Inhospitable environment: The Earth is filled with harmful and lethal flora and fauna. Such flora and fauna are often either undetectable, or look harmless upon first inspection. Theism makes this surprising, as the Earth is supposed to be our home, and not a Hunger Games scenario. By contrast, such a human-inhospitable environment is expected if naturalism is true and life’s history is governed by evolutionary factors. (Me)

Second Argument: The Argument from Material Causality (Me. A draft of the long version can be found here. Comments on the draft are welcome!)

Terminology:

Concrete object denotes at least the sorts of entities classically individuated by the category of Substance, and distinguishes them from those of other categories (e.g., property, relation, event, trope, etc.). Examples: atoms, stars, rocks, planets, trees, animals, and people. They are distinguished from concrete entities in other categories (shapes, surfaces, events, ideas, etc.) and abstract objects (propositions, numbers, sets, etc.)

Material cause denotes the things or stuff out of which a new thing is made (e.g., the material cause of a penny is a sheet of copper).

Classical theism denotes the view that there is a personal god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

The classical view of creation denotes the view that consists of the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world: the world isn’t identical to God or made from the stuff of God’s being. Nor is it an idea in the mind of God or a mere feature or mode of God’s being. Rather, it’s a concrete object that exists in its own right (or an aggregate of such); (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo.

Call classical theismcvcany version of classical theism that includes the classical view of creation.

The Argument:

1. All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining cause have a material cause of their existence.
2. If classical theismcvc is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining cause without a material cause of its existence.
3. Therefore, classical theismcvc is false.

· Support for premise 1: (a) rational intuition; (b) the relationship between what is actual and what is possible; and (c) inference to the best explanation.

· Support for premise (2): It’s a conceptual truth. It follows from the definition of ‘classical theismcvc’.