On appeal, Estrada argued, among other things, that the
trial court judge erred “in admitting into evidence his mugshot photograph from
his current arrest and a detective's testimony regarding how law enforcement
identified him as a suspect”. People v.
Estrada, supra.

The Court of Appeals began the substantive part of its
opinion by explaining that, in his appeal, Estrada argued that the trial court
judge erred, among other things, “in admitting into evidence his mugshot
photograph from his current arrest and a detective's testimony regarding how
law enforcement identified him as a suspect”. People
v. Estrada, supra. It also went on to explain that

[a]n information charged Estrada with
second degree robbery (count 1), receiving stolen property (count 2), and
possession of methamphetamine (count 3). Before trial on the robbery count and
the firearm use enhancement alleged in the information, Estrada pleaded no
contest to counts 2 and 3. The trial court continued sentencing on counts 2 and
3 until after the trial.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The Court of Appeals went on to explain why, and how, the
prosecution arose:

The robbery victim, Octavia Clemons,
testified she was waiting at a bus stop in Pasadena about 6:30 a.m. on May 18,
2014, when a man (later identified as Estrada) stole her cell phone. Clemons
identified Estrada in court at trial as the man who robbed her. She was not
acquainted with Estrada prior to the robbery.

Clemons was using her cell phone when
Estrada approached the bus stop on a bicycle. He stood face-to-face with her,
straddling his bicycle, and asked to borrow her cell phone. She agreed, and he
started providing a phone number for her to dial. After changing the digits of the
phone number, he demanded, `Bitch, give me your phone or I am gonna blast you
right here.’ He lifted his shirt, revealing what appeared to Clemons to be the
black handle of a nine-millimeter handgun tucked into his waistband. Clemons
had seen nine-millimeter handguns on other occasions prior to the date of this
robbery. She felt afraid, believing Estrada would fire the gun. Estrada
snatched the cell phone from her hand and ordered, `Don't fucking turn around
or I am gonna fucking blast you, bitch.’ He left on his bicycle.

Clemons rode the bus for about five
minutes to the next stop, then walked the half-mile to her home. She dialed 911
and provided a description of the man who had robbed her. The jury heard an
audio recording of the 911 call. Officers responded to her home and interviewed
her.

Later that day, Clemons requested that
her wireless provider disconnect the service to the cell phone Estrada stole.
She purchased a new cell phone and activated it, using the same phone number.
`All night,’ she received calls on her new phone from people asking to speak
with `Jose’ (Estrada's first name) or `Stalker’ (Estrada's admitted nickname).
Clemons photographed the incoming call log on her new cell phone and provided
the photos to the police.

In the evening after the robbery,
Clemons accessed the social media Web site Facebook and was reviewing user
profiles, when she observed a photograph of the man who had robbed her. She
took `screen shots’ of the Facebook photographs and provided them to the
police.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The opinion then explained how local police found and
arrested Estrada:

Detective David Duran, the
investigating officer on this case from the Pasadena Police Department,
testified at trial that he conducted a `records check,’ using the name Jose and
the birth date associated with the Facebook profile Clemons provided. The
results of his search included photographs depicting the same person pictured
in the Facebook photographs. Duran circulated a `wanted persons flier’ with
Estrada's photograph and `his last known address.’ Officers arrested Estrada at
that address on July 7, 2014.

Detective Duran interviewed Estrada on
the day of his arrest, after Estrada waived his Mirandarights.
Estrada told Duran he had used the nickname `Stalker.’ Duran asked if Estrada
recognized one of the phone numbers from Clemons's incoming call log. Estrada
identified the number as Alma Reyes's phone number. Reyes was present with
Estrada when he was arrested.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

At his trial, Estrada

presented an alibi defense through
testimony from his former girlfriend/ mother of his son. She stated Estrada was
sleeping in the room he rented in Highland Park around 6:30 a.m. on May 19,
2014 (the same time as the robbery), when she arrived to bring him food.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The opinion then outlines what else happened at Estrada’s
trial and thereafter:

Prior to reaching a verdict, the jury
submitted a question to the trial court, stating, `In the event that the jury
reaches a verdict on one charge but cannot on another, what happens with the
result of the case?’ The court responded, `Do your best to reach a
verdict/decision on the charge and allegation. Do not be concerned with the
procedure or what happens afterward.’ The jury also submitted a request for
transcripts of Clemons's cross-examination and defense counsel's closing
argument. The court provided a read-back of Clemons's cross-examination and
informed the jury it would not hear a read-back of argument because that is not
evidence.

The jury found Estrada guilty of second
degree robbery and found true the enhancement allegation that Estrada
personally used a handgun in the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)).

Estrada waived his right to jury trial
on the prior prison term enhancement allegation set forth in the information,
and the trial court found true that he had served a prior prison term within
the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced
Estrada to eight years and eight months in prison: the midterm of three years
for robbery (count 1), plus a consecutive four-year term for the firearm use
enhancement and a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term
enhancement; and a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the midterm) for
receiving stolen property (count 2) after the pretrial no contest plea. On
count 3 for possession of methamphetamine, to which Estrada also pleaded no
contest, the court imposed a one-year concurrent term.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The Court of Appeals then took up Estrada’s argument
concerning the admission of his “mugshot.” People
v. Estrada, supra.It explained that

[o]ver Estrada's Evidence Code section 352 objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce
Estrada's `mugshot’ or booking photograph for purposes of depicting Estrada's
appearance at the time of his arrest. Apparently his hair was longer by the
time of trial, a point he conceded in making his objection. Estrada argued the
photograph was `very prejudicial’ because (1) it was titled `mugshot,’ (2) he
appeared to be `glowering and angry’ in the photograph, and (3) his overall
appearance had not changed sufficiently by the time of trial to warrant the
photo's introduction. The court overruled Estrada's objection (and later
admitted the photograph into evidence), finding the evidence was more probative
than prejudicial.

During direct examination, Detective
Duran described the photograph as a `booking photograph of Mr. Estrada’ and
testified the photograph accurately depicted Estrada's appearance on the date
of his arrest in this case. We review the trial court's admission of evidence
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 734, 767)
California Court of Appeals – Fourth District 2015) [`The admission of photographs
lies within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion’].)

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The court began its analysis of Estrada’s objection by
explaining that he

contends the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the mugshot photograph into evidence because (1) it revealed he
had a prior criminal record, (2) it removed the question of identity from the
jury, (3) it was not relevant to any material issue at trial, and (4) it was
cumulative because Clemons, the victim, already had identified Estrada as the
robber before the prosecution introduced the photograph. We reject each of
these arguments.

The mugshot photograph did not disclose
Estrada's prior criminal record to the jury. As the trial court explained in
overruling Estrada's objection to this evidence, `This is the booking photo
from this case. I mean, they [the jurors] know he was arrested. He is here in
court. He was arrested and charged.’ (Compare People v. Cook (1967)
252 Cal.App.2d 25, 29 [error to admit mugshot taken seven years before
trial, indicating the defendant had a prior criminal record].)Estrada notes there are three different
identification numbers on the photograph (an `FCN,’ a `CII,’ and an `OCA’
number), but he does not explain how these numbers would have revealed his
prior criminal record to the jury.

The fact the mugshot photograph
identified Estrada by name does not mean it removed the question of Estrada's
identity as the robber from the jury. The mugshot, coupled with Detective
Duran's testimony, merely identified Estrada as the man arrested for the
robbery of Clemons. It was for the jury to decide if Estrada, in fact, was the
man who had committed the robbery.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that the

mugshot photograph was relevant to the
material issue of identity. Clemons provided the police with copies of
photographs she had obtained from Facebook, depicting the man she claimed had
robbed her. The purpose of the mugshot was to show the jurors Estrada's
appearance at the time of his arrest so they could compare his appearance with
that of the man in the Facebook photographs. Because Estrada's hair was longer
at the time of trial, the mugshot presented a more accurate comparison. (See People
v. Peralez (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 368, 377 [p]olice photograph of the
defendant taken at the time of his arrest `was relevant to the identity of
the [defendant] because of the change in his appearance between the time of
booking and the time of trial’.)

Estrada asserts the mugshot photograph
constituted cumulative evidence because the prosecution introduced the Facebook
photographs and Clemons identified Estrada as the robber in court, before the
prosecution introduced the mugshot. We disagree. The mugshot photograph was the
only evidence depicting Estrada's appearance at the time of his arrest—less
than two months after the crime—that the jury could compare to the Facebook
photographs Clemons obtained the same day as the crime, and which she claimed
depicted the robber. The trial occurred more than nine months after the crime,
and Estrada's hair had grown longer.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

The Court of Appeals then articulated its ruling on the
issue of whether the trial court judge acted properly in admitting the mugshot:

The trial court acted within the bounds
of its discretion in admitting into evidence the mugshot photograph. The
probative value of the photograph—Estrada's appearance closer in time to the
crime—was not `substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
[would] (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’
(California Evidence Code § 352).

Regardless of whether the trial court
erred, we would not reverse Estrada's conviction because it is not reasonably
probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to him absent the
mugshot photograph. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 838, 836; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1114, 1170-1171 [`Under the Watson standard, the erroneous
admission of a photograph warrants reversal of a conviction only if the
appellate court concludes that it is reasonably probable the jury would have
reached a different result had the photograph been excluded’].)

Clemons unequivocally identified
Estrada in court as the man who robbed her. Other substantial evidence
corroborated her identification (e.g., the fact a woman who was present with
Estrada at the time of his arrest made multiple calls to Clemons's cell phone
number after Clemons reported her cell phone stolen). We have no reason to
believe the jury based its true finding on the firearm use enhancement on its
response to the mugshot rather than Clemons's testimony regarding her
observation of a gun, as Estrada suggests.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals held that
the

judgment is modified to reflect the
sentence the trial court imposed on count 3, possession of methamphetamine, a
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a): a
one-year concurrent term. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

People v. Estrada,
supra.

(If you're wondering whose mugshot is included with this post, it's Al Capone.)