On June 15, 1995, the House of Representatives passed its
version of the Defense authorization bill for fiscal 1996 (H.R.
1530). The Senate passed its version (S. 1026) on September 6. The
two bills contain important provisions for deploying defenses
against short- and long-range ballistic missiles. They differ,
however, in significant ways. These differences will have to be
reconciled in a conference between representatives of the House and
Senate military oversight committees. The conferees should not
settle for a weak bill that postpones deployment or takes the U.S.
ballistic missile defense program down a dead-end road. They should
demand a strong bill that advances the goal of deploying, as
rapidly as possible, effective defenses against ballistic
missiles.

Statements of PolicyBoth missile defense bills state that it is necessary to
develop and deploy theater missile defense systems. The Senate bill
calls for the "development for deployment" of a national missile
defense system by 2003, while the House bill mandates deployment of
national missile defenses but gives no target date. The conference
should establish fixed dates for the deployment of both theater and
national missile defense systems. Both the House and Senate bills
call for building more capable defenses against cruise missiles.
However, the House bill's cruise missile defense section is
separate from its ballistic missile defense section. The Senate
bill's policy statement on improved cruise missile defense is
included in its ballistic missile defense (BMD) section, and
therefore addresses the missile threat more comprehensively. The
conference report should accept the Senate's position on defenses
against cruise missiles so that it addresses the entire range of
missile threats, including ballistic and cruise missiles.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD)The House bill provides no detailed requirements for a theater
missile defense deployment plan. The Senate bill, by contrast,
defines the upgraded Patriot missile, the Navy Lower Tier
system, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and
the Navy Upper Tier system as "core" programs and establishes
interim and initial deployment dates for them. (Interim deployment
refers to the fielding of systems still in development; initial
deployment refers to the fielding of the first completed systems.)
Further, the Senate bill would insure that TMD systems are capable
of working together so that several systems could be used against
the same missile attack. The Senate bill also ensures that TMD
systems can use external sensor data, such as targeting information
collected by sensor satellites, to make the systems more capable.
Finally, the Senate bill would terminate the Boost-Phase Intercept
program, which is designed to destroy ballistic missiles shortly
after launch by intercepting them with air-to-air missiles mounted
on fighter aircraft.

The more detailed deployment plans found in the Senate bill are
preferable. Further, the conference should consider the Senate
recommendation to terminate the Boost-Phase Intercept program
because the current concept is not likely to be effective. There
is, however, a need to develop another system capable of destroying
theater-range missiles shortly after they are launched (that is, in
the "boost phase"). Missiles in a future conflict may carry
multiple nuclear warheads, or chemical or biological warheads.
Intercepting them in the boost phase will destroy the entire
payload before individual weapons can be released from the missile
booster. In terminating the existing Boost-Phase Intercept program,
Congress should be careful not to suggest there is no need for an
effective boost phase intercept capability in the future.

National Missile Defense (NMD)Both bills envision a first-phase national missile defense
system consisting of ground-based interceptors, fixed ground-based
radars, space-based sensors, and a battle management system. As
with TMD systems, the Senate bill provides more detailed program
guidance. This includes deploying the interceptors at more than one
site, establishing both interim and initial deployment dates, and
setting forth specific options for upgrading existing radars and
streamlining acquisition procedures to achieve the earlier interim
deployment date.

The House bill provides no such guidance, other than to prohibit
directed energy weapons and space-based interceptors in the
first-stage deployment plan. The more detailed guidance provided in
the Senate bill is the better approach. Without a specific
deployment date and deployment plan, nothing will ever be deployed.
The Clinton Administration, which opposes deployment of a capable
national missile defense system, will use the lack of a specific
timetable to put off deployment indefinitely.

The Future of the ABM TreatyThe Senate bill calls for a study of the ABM Treaty's
compatibility with the nation's security requirements. The House
bill merely observes that the ABM Treaty may have to be changed to
allow for deployment of more than one ground-based ABM site and
unrestricted use of data collected by space-based sensors. The
Senate version is preferable. The most critical question to be
addressed is whether the U.S. will move beyond the ABM Treaty in
establishing a post-Cold War strategic policy. Such a move is
certainly needed. Therefore, the entire ABM Treaty, not just some
provision of it, needs to be reexamined.

Interpreting the ABM TreatyOn a related issue, both bills express support for excluding
TMD systems from the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. They do this
by establishing a demarcation line between theater missile defense
systems and defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The ABM
Treaty was never intended to restrict theater missile defense
systems in any way, but it is ambiguous about which systems are
defined as theater missile defenses and which are strategic.

Both bills would establish the following demarcation line: If a
missile defense system has been tested against a ballistic missile
with a speed greater than 5 kilometers per second or a range
greater than 3,500 kilometers, it is a strategic missile defense.
If it is tested against a target below that threshold, then it is a
TMD system and not covered by the ABM Treaty. The Senate bill would
prohibit the use of any fiscal 1996 money to enforce a stricter
demarcation standard adopted by the Administration in negotiations
with Russia and other countries. The House would enforce the
demarcation standard by establishing it in law. The House approach
is better. Establishing the demarcation line in law will free a
number of TMD systems from ABM Treaty restrictions, including THAAD
and Navy Upper Tier. The Senate approach would allow the
Administration to continue to impose these restrictions
unilaterally, at least until an agreement with Russia and other
countries of the former Soviet Union is reached on what TMD systems
are allowed under the Treaty.

Reporting RequirementsBoth bills require the Secretary of Defense to submit
deployment plans for theater and national missile defense early
next year. Detailed information is required in both reports, but
the Senate would mandate that the Secretary of Defense examine
options for augmenting the national missile defense system of
ground-based interceptors with additional ground-based
interceptors, sea-based defenses, and space-based defenses, or for
substituting sea-based and space-based systems for ground-based
systems. This critical provision is not found in the House bill,
which merely requires annual follow-up reports on major missile
defense programs. The reporting requirements established by the
Senate bill are preferable. The additional annual reports required
by the House bill should not be needed. The Senate reporting
requirement will force the Pentagon to examine the advantages of
sea-based and space-based NMD systems over more expensive
ground-based systems.

Funding for Missile DefenseThe House bill provides a higher level of funding for missile
defense than does the Senate bill. The Senate version, however,
gives more detailed instructions to the Administration on how the
money should be spent. The conference report should draw upon the
House funding levels and the spending instructions adopted by the
Senate. The higher overall spending level in the House bill will
move the nation toward deployment of missile defenses more rapidly.
The more detailed spending instructions in the Senate bill will
limit the ability of the Clinton Administration to waste the money
and foreclose options for deploying specific missile defense
systems.

Conclusion

Both the House and Senate bills move the nation toward deploying
missile defenses. However, as with most bills, they differ in their
approaches. The job for the House-Senate conferees is to preserve
the best provisions in each bill. Since the Clinton Administration
does not agree with this goal, Congress cannot afford to give the
Administration much leeway in managing the nation's vital missile
defense program. In the final version of the bill, the conferees
must spell out the requirements for the Administration clearly,
concisely, and in detail. As they do so, the conferees should be
mindful of the need to move as quickly and as efficiently as
possible toward the goal of building a national missile defense
system. Otherwise, the nation will continue to remain needlessly
vulnerable to the growing threat of ballistic missiles.

Michelle L. Spencer, an intern at The Heritage Foundation from
Southwest Missouri State University, contributed to this study.

Develop an affordable and operationally effective multiple-site
national missile defense system that is effective against limited
ballistic missile strikes on U.S. territory and can be augmented to
provide a layered defense.

Require that all core theater missile defense programs are
interoperable and fully capable of using external sensor data.

Terminate the Boost Phase Intercept (BPI)
program.

III. National Missile Defense

Senate:

The first-stage national missile defense system for development
includes the following elements: 1) ground-based interceptors
capable of being deployed at multiple sites and providing
protection of U.S. territory, including Alaska and Hawaii, against
limited missile attacks; 2) fixed ground-based radars and
space-based sensors; and 3) a battle management system.

The national missile defense system shall be capable of
attaining an interim operational capability by 1997 by taking steps
including but not limited to using developmental hardware, upgraded
radars, space-based sensors, and streamlined acquisition
procedures. The national missile defense system under development
should be capable of attaining an initial operating capability by
2003.

The Secretary of Defense is to examine the following cost-saving
measures in developing the national missile defense system: 1) use
of existing facilities and infrastructure; 2) the use of existing
or upgraded systems and technologies (but not including Minuteman
missiles boosters); and 3) the use of systems and components that
are easily transported.

House:

The national missile defense system for deployment shall include
the following elements: 1) up to 100 interceptors at a single site
or a greater number of interceptors at a number of sites; 2) fixed,
ground-based radars; 3) space-based sensors; and 4) a battle
management system.

The first-phase national missile defense system shall not
include ground-based or space-based directed energy weapons or
space-based interceptors.

Recommended Conference Outcome:1

The first-phase national missile defense system for deployment
shall include the following: 1) ground-based interceptors capable
of being deployed at multiple sites and providing protection of
U.S. territory, including Alaska and Hawaii, against limited
missile attacks; 2) fixed ground-based radars and space-based
sensors; and 3) a battle management system.

The national missile defense system shall be capable of
attaining an interim operational capability by 1997 by taking steps
including but not limited to using developmental hardware, upgraded
radars, space-based sensors, and streamlined acquisition
procedures. The national missile defense system under development
should be capable of attaining an initial operating capability by
2003.

The Secretary of Defense will examine the following cost-saving
measures in developing the national missile defense system: 1) use
of existing facilities and infrastructure; 2) the use of existing
or upgraded systems and technologies (but not including Minuteman
missiles); and, 3) the use of systems and components that are
easily transported.

IV. The Future of the ABM Treaty

Senate:

Determines that the Senate should undertake a comprehensive
review of the ABM Treaty to determine its "continuing value and
validity," which should be conducted in 1996.

House:

Expresses support for negotiations with Russia to expand the
number of ground-based interceptors and allow the full exploitation
of space-based sensors, which otherwise are restricted by the ABM
Treaty.

Recommended Conference Outcome:

Direct that the Senate and House undertake a joint review of the
ABM Treaty to determine its "continuing value and validity," which
should be conducted in 1996.

V. Interpreting the ABM Treaty

Senate:

Expresses support for an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that
would distinguish between restricted national missile defense
systems and unrestricted theater missile defense systems, based on
whether the missile defense system has been tested against a
ballistic missile with a maximum velocity exceeding 5 kilometers
per second or a range exceeding 3,500 kilometers.

Expresses the view that any agreement that would impose stricter
standards should be subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate.

Prohibits the use of funds in fiscal 1996 for the purpose of
implementing an agreement that imposes a stricter standard.

House:

Establishes by law an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that
distinguishes between restricted national missile defense systems
and unrestricted theater missile defense systems, based on whether
the missile defense system has been tested against a ballistic
missile with a maximum velocity exceeding 5 kilometers per second
or a range exceeding 3,500 kilometers.

Prohibits funds being used for the purpose of enforcing ABM
Treaty restrictions against theater missile defense systems, as
defined above.

Recommended Conference Outcome:

Establish by law an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that
delineates between restricted national missile defense systems and
unrestricted theater missile defense systems, based on whether the
missile defense system has been tested against a ballistic missile
with a maximum velocity exceeding 5 kilometers per second or a
range exceeding 3,500 kilometers.

Prohibit funds being used for the purpose of enforcing ABM
Treaty restrictions against theater missile defense systems, as
defined above.

VI. Reporting Requirements

Senate:

Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on a plan
for deploying theater missile defense systems prior to the
submission of the budget request in 1996, which shall provide
annual funding levels for core theater missile defense systems.

Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on a plan
for developing a national missile defense system which shall
provide: 1) annual funding levels for each element of the system;
2) an assessment of whether deployment is affordable and
operationally effective; 3) an examination of the options for
modifying the national missile defense architecture to include
additional ground-based interceptors, sea-based missile defense
systems, space-based interceptors, and space-based directed energy
systems.

House:

Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan for the
deployment of both theater national defense systems and a national
missile defense system, not later than 90 days following the date
of enactment.

Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report
providing the technical milestones, program schedule milestones,
and estimated cost for each of the following programs: 1) the THAAD
system; 2) the Patriot PAC 3 missile; 3) the Navy Lower Tier
system; 4) the Navy Upper Tier system; 5) the Corps Surface-to-Air
Missile (CorpsSAM) system; 6) the Hawk system; 7) the Boost Phase
Interceptor (BPI) program; 8) the national missile defense system;
9) the Arrow system; 10) the Medium Extended Air Defense (MEAD)
system; and 11) any new missile defense program established after
the date of enactment.

Recommended Conference Outcome:

Require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on a plan
for deploying theater missile defense systems prior to the
submission of the budget request in 1996, which shall provide
technical milestones, program schedule milestones, and annual
funding levels for the following theater missile defense systems:
1) the THAAD system; 2) the Patriot PAC 3 missile; 3) the Navy
Lower Tier system; 4) the Navy Upper Tier system; 5) the Corps
Surface-to-Air Missile (CorpsSAM) system; 6) the Hawk system; and
7) the Arrow system.

Require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on a plan
for deploying a national missile defense system. This report should
provide technical milestones, program schedule milestones, and
annual funding levels for each of the following program elements:
1) ground-based interceptors; 2) fixed, ground-based radars; 3)
space-based sensors; 4) the Navy Upper Tier program; 5) the
Space-Based Laser program; 6) the Space-Based Interceptor program;
and 7) the battle management system. In this report should also be
included an assessment of whether deployment is affordable and
operationally effective and an examination of the options for
modifying the national missile defense architecture to include
additional ground-based interceptors, sea-based missile defense
systems, space-based interceptors, and space-based directed energy
systems.

VII. Funding for Missile Defense Senate:

Allocates a total of $3.403 billion for the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO), of which the following is directed to
specific programs:

The Navy Upper Tier system would provide a more cost-effective
defense for the territory of the United States than ground-based
options. Both the House and Senate bills, however, opt for
ground-based systems to serve as the first-stage national missile
defense. This effectively bars the conferees from proposing the
Navy Upper Tier system for deployment as the first-stage national
missile defense. Congress should revisit this decision next
year.