South Pacific: Pillager continues reinforcing Japanese flak LCU in the SW/South Pacific area. Sigint entry for 8/18 reports Jap 22 Field AA Machine Cannon Co now located in Rabaul – this unit transferred here from Manchuria. Not a huge surprise.

Indian Ocean: US sub in transit to assigned patrol area in unexpected encounter with Jap PB in open sea area south of Sumatra. The Jap PB appears to be operating alone and could be acting as a picket ship. AAR follows.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sub attack near Sinabang at 33,77 (SSE of Sabang)

China: Detected statuses of Chengtu and Chungking now show likely results of Allied strategic bombing raids on heavy industry – the raids appear to have re-destroyed about 50% of the heavy industry capacity Pillager had rebuilt in the two cities since their capture.

Japanese Home Islands, Western Pacific area: Unusually high level of Japanese LBA patrol activity in many locations south of the Home Islands, also near Formosa – many US patrol subs reporting contacts with Jap air patrols. Most Jap air patrols flown by Ki-49 Helens, two Helens reported hit by flak. No US subs hit or damaged.

The main US carrier force has formed with completion of all applicable ship upgrades through 8/43. As now formed, the main carrier force includes 10 CV, 3 CVL organized in ten air combat TF – all TF with 1 CV or 1 CV/1 CVL, all TF to the maximum effective 15 ships. Total flak value of ships in each air combat TF is in the 6000-6500 range, hopefully this amount of flak will be of value. Basically as good as it gets given what I set up.

A number of British ships are attached to the US main carrier force (BB Prince of Wales plus most newer British & ANZAC CA and CL with no withdrawal dates). The British and ANZAC ships had been in an air combat TF with CV Victorious. CV Victorious had entered the game at Panama and operated from the US west coast, this carrier now off-map and enroute to Capetown via Panama for its scheduled 10/15/43 withdrawal date.

The only unresolved issue at this point is the command structure – how the two US carrier fleet HQ LCU’s (Third & Fifth Fleets) can be used with the carrier force and exactly what value these two HQ LCU have in relation to air carrier TF operating at sea. My initial plans for these HQ deviates slightly from their historical use – carrier operations in the SW/South Pacific under HQ Fifth Fleet (now in Auckland), HQ Third Fleet (not yet in the game) doing the same in Central and North Pacific areas. Which HQ has the carriers depending upon where the carriers are currently operating.

If these fleet HQ LCU are used with the carrier force, current plans will assign air combat TF to the appropriate fleet HQ (Third/Fifth) depending on geographical area the carrier force is operating.

The big question here is what would be the value of assigning Halsey or Spruance as commanders in Third/Fifth Fleet HQ LCU’s – compared to putting them in command of the lead carrier TF’s. Does using these two HQ actually influence carrier operations? If not, it would be a terrible waste putting Halsey and Spruance ashore in these LCU. I’m researching this now but readers are still welcome to chime in.

South China Sea: US patrol sub operating off Hong Kong torpedoes Jap TK. I had stationed this patrol sub off Hong Kong with the intent of intercepting Japanese troop transport convoys departing Hong Kong with LCU transferred out of China to the DEI or Pacific theatres. AAR follows.

Central Pacific: Large Jap transport convoy spotted and attacked by US patrol sub E of the northern Marianas. The Jap convoy is the same transport TF engaged by US sub Grunion near Iwo Jima on 8/17. Projected destination of the Jap convoy’s current movement path appears to be Truk. SS Sailfish also attacked by a B5N2 Kate air patrol, this plane likely based aboard a carrier attached to the Jap convoy – no land bases within range of the hex location where B5N2 Kate attacked the sub. AAR follows.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sub attack near Pagan at 116,91 (E of Pagan)

Sigint entries for 8/20 report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Baker Is and Jaluit. Detected status of Baker Is shows unidentified Japanese planes based there, otherwise no visible Jap forces or activity observed.

The only unresolved issue at this point is the command structure – how the two US carrier fleet HQ LCU’s (Third & Fifth Fleets) can be used with the carrier force and exactly what value these two HQ LCU have in relation to air carrier TF operating at sea. My initial plans for these HQ deviates slightly from their historical use – carrier operations in the SW/South Pacific under HQ Fifth Fleet (now in Auckland), HQ Third Fleet (not yet in the game) doing the same in Central and North Pacific areas. Which HQ has the carriers depending upon where the carriers are currently operating.

If these fleet HQ LCU are used with the carrier force, current plans will assign air combat TF to the appropriate fleet HQ (Third/Fifth) depending on geographical area the carrier force is operating.

The big question here is what would be the value of assigning Halsey or Spruance as commanders in Third/Fifth Fleet HQ LCU’s – compared to putting them in command of the lead carrier TF’s. Does using these two HQ actually influence carrier operations? If not, it would be a terrible waste putting Halsey and Spruance ashore in these LCU. I’m researching this now but readers are still welcome to chime in.

Hi wneumann,

From reading Alfred's (or maybe it was someone else, witpq?) guides there is no advantage to having a good Naval HQ commander. They contribute diddly divided by squat.

The only unresolved issue at this point is the command structure – how the two US carrier fleet HQ LCU’s (Third & Fifth Fleets) can be used with the carrier force and exactly what value these two HQ LCU have in relation to air carrier TF operating at sea. My initial plans for these HQ deviates slightly from their historical use – carrier operations in the SW/South Pacific under HQ Fifth Fleet (now in Auckland), HQ Third Fleet (not yet in the game) doing the same in Central and North Pacific areas. Which HQ has the carriers depending upon where the carriers are currently operating.

If these fleet HQ LCU are used with the carrier force, current plans will assign air combat TF to the appropriate fleet HQ (Third/Fifth) depending on geographical area the carrier force is operating.

The big question here is what would be the value of assigning Halsey or Spruance as commanders in Third/Fifth Fleet HQ LCU’s – compared to putting them in command of the lead carrier TF’s. Does using these two HQ actually influence carrier operations? If not, it would be a terrible waste putting Halsey and Spruance ashore in these LCU. I’m researching this now but readers are still welcome to chime in.

Hi wneumann,

From reading Alfred's (or maybe it was someone else, witpq?) guides there is no advantage to having a good Naval HQ commander. They contribute diddly divided by squat.

Cheers, Guy

Correct. You want your worst commander to fill the Naval HQ spots. Put them at a base that you will be repairing a lot of ships.

No offensive intended, but can anyone provide a link to Alfred`s post on this. or one of the devs. post please ? I never considered the Naval HQ structures just "Chrome", and spend PP`s for better HQ leaders. It`s always been conventional wisdom in WITP & AE to install Nimitz as CO of Pacific Fleet ASAP.

quote:

ORIGINAL: guytipton41

quote:

ORIGINAL: wneumann

Summary of Operations 8/21/43

The only unresolved issue at this point is the command structure – how the two US carrier fleet HQ LCU’s (Third & Fifth Fleets) can be used with the carrier force and exactly what value these two HQ LCU have in relation to air carrier TF operating at sea. My initial plans for these HQ deviates slightly from their historical use – carrier operations in the SW/South Pacific under HQ Fifth Fleet (now in Auckland), HQ Third Fleet (not yet in the game) doing the same in Central and North Pacific areas. Which HQ has the carriers depending upon where the carriers are currently operating.

If these fleet HQ LCU are used with the carrier force, current plans will assign air combat TF to the appropriate fleet HQ (Third/Fifth) depending on geographical area the carrier force is operating.

The big question here is what would be the value of assigning Halsey or Spruance as commanders in Third/Fifth Fleet HQ LCU’s – compared to putting them in command of the lead carrier TF’s. Does using these two HQ actually influence carrier operations? If not, it would be a terrible waste putting Halsey and Spruance ashore in these LCU. I’m researching this now but readers are still welcome to chime in.

Hi wneumann,

From reading Alfred's (or maybe it was someone else, witpq?) guides there is no advantage to having a good Naval HQ commander. They contribute diddly divided by squat.

No offensive intended, but can anyone provide a link to Alfred`s post on this. or one of the devs. post please ? I never considered the Naval HQ structures just "Chrome", and spend PP`s for better HQ leaders. It`s always been conventional wisdom in WITP & AE to install Nimitz as CO of Pacific Fleet ASAP.

quote:

ORIGINAL: guytipton41

quote:

ORIGINAL: wneumann

Summary of Operations 8/21/43

The only unresolved issue at this point is the command structure – how the two US carrier fleet HQ LCU’s (Third & Fifth Fleets) can be used with the carrier force and exactly what value these two HQ LCU have in relation to air carrier TF operating at sea. My initial plans for these HQ deviates slightly from their historical use – carrier operations in the SW/South Pacific under HQ Fifth Fleet (now in Auckland), HQ Third Fleet (not yet in the game) doing the same in Central and North Pacific areas. Which HQ has the carriers depending upon where the carriers are currently operating.

If these fleet HQ LCU are used with the carrier force, current plans will assign air combat TF to the appropriate fleet HQ (Third/Fifth) depending on geographical area the carrier force is operating.

The big question here is what would be the value of assigning Halsey or Spruance as commanders in Third/Fifth Fleet HQ LCU’s – compared to putting them in command of the lead carrier TF’s. Does using these two HQ actually influence carrier operations? If not, it would be a terrible waste putting Halsey and Spruance ashore in these LCU. I’m researching this now but readers are still welcome to chime in.

Hi wneumann,

From reading Alfred's (or maybe it was someone else, witpq?) guides there is no advantage to having a good Naval HQ commander. They contribute diddly divided by squat.

High Land Skill - This influences the Amphibious Landings in that units will land faster, with less disruption and fewer losses

The job of the Amphib force ends at the beach. Their job is to coordinate the ships unloading and waves of landing craft so that beaches are not overloaded and the craft do not come in gobs and bunches. For this, high Naval skill is important. Check the stats on the Guru of Amphib Landings - Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

I would think high admin skills as well. As a side note, Alfred once posted skills best suited for commanders, I can't find my copy but would be interested if anyone has it.

I searched the WITP-AE forum for posts by Alfred about leaders. I only found three, dealing with aggression in TF vs Ship commanders, with some reference to Air Unit leaders. There was no overall treatment of the subject by Alfred.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

I would think high admin skills as well. As a side note, Alfred once posted skills best suited for commanders, I can't find my copy but would be interested if anyone has it.

I searched the WITP-AE forum for posts by Alfred about leaders. I only found three, dealing with aggression in TF vs Ship commanders, with some reference to Air Unit leaders. There was no overall treatment of the subject by Alfred.

Hi Folks,

That was my false canard saying that Alfred had a guide, mea culpa. It was Mike Wood's guide I was thinking of - see up stream link. Note that JWE (in the linked thread) said that Mike Wood's insight and analysis was as detailed as the Devs were willing to release.

Update on US Fifth/Third Fleet HQ’s (not to be confused with a bank of similar name)

Thanks to all who posted. Both the responses posted here as well as my own research in the forums is leaning in the direction that (at least) these particular fleet LCU have little or no value in terms of supporting operations at sea and limited value elsewhere.

I did find several forum strings related to Fleet HQ LCU (my primary search) – the most noteworthy titles including “Fleet HQ” (vettim89 - early 2009) and “Fleet Commanders?” (Gunner98 – early 2010). There is some risk information in these threads could be obsolete, though a fairly good chance the information in them may still be accurate. The overall conclusion in both the two threads above is that US fleet HQ LCU do not impact friendly TF during their operation at sea and only influence shore-based activity. From this it can also be concluded top naval commanders should be assigned to front-line TF’s appropriate to their ratings rather than assigned to these HQ.

I also examined the various US fleet and theatre command LCU – my findings covered here as well. Excluding HQ for air and ground forces, US headquarter LCU’s relevant to naval activity fall into two categories. This would also apply to HQ LCU for other Allied nationalities though I'm not covering these here.

1) Theatre HQ (Pacific Ocean Areas, North Pacific, South Pacific, SW Pacific) – Only the four US HQ LCU’s above contain naval support elements. These four HQ (alone) would have a significant effect on ship repair.

2) Fleet HQ (US Fifth and Third Fleets, also US Asiatic and Seventh Fleet) – None of these HQ contain naval support, they only have regular support elements. Based on their composition of only regular support elements, it appears these HQ have a lesser degree of influence on naval operations if any at all. The most significant usefulness of these Fleet HQ is likely mainly related to activities that can be done with the large number of regular support elements in them.

This appears to be the bottom line…

Ghormley is my current US Fifth Fleet HQ commander – with his high admin rating (70) probably the most suitable choice for this posting (Ghormley also being a less inconvenient loss had Pillager sank the transport ship bringing HQ 5th Fleet to Auckland). My conclusion is similar commanders with high admin ratings (and relatively low in other areas) will eventually go into the other US fleet HQ. For the moment I’m leaving Kinkaid ashore at US Seventh Fleet HQ at least until I begin placing more emphasis on surface naval combat operations in the main Pacific theatres – Kinkaid is fine here for now and not needed elsewhere at this time.

Update on US Fifth/Third Fleet HQ’s (not to be confused with a bank of similar name)

Thanks to all who posted. Both the responses posted here as well as my own research in the forums is leaning in the direction that (at least) these particular fleet LCU have little or no value in terms of supporting operations at sea and limited value elsewhere.

I did find several forum strings related to Fleet HQ LCU (my primary search) – the most noteworthy titles including “Fleet HQ” (vettim89 - early 2009) and “Fleet Commanders?” (Gunner98 – early 2010). There is some risk information in these threads could be obsolete, though a fairly good chance the information in them may still be accurate. The overall conclusion in both the two threads above is that US fleet HQ LCU do not impact friendly TF during their operation at sea and only influence shore-based activity. From this it can also be concluded top naval commanders should be assigned to front-line TF’s appropriate to their ratings rather than assigned to these HQ.

I also examined the various US fleet and theatre command LCU – my findings covered here as well. Excluding HQ for air and ground forces, US headquarter LCU’s relevant to naval activity fall into two categories.

1) Theatre HQ (Pacific Ocean Areas, North Pacific, South Pacific, SW Pacific) – Only the four US HQ LCU’s above contain naval support elements. These four HQ (alone) would have a significant effect on ship repair.

2) Fleet HQ (US Fifth and Third Fleets, also US Asiatic and Seventh Fleet) – None of these HQ contain naval support, they only have regular support elements. Based on their composition of only regular support elements, it appears these HQ have a lesser degree of influence on naval operations if any at all. It's likely the most significant usefulness of these Fleet HQ appears to be mostly activities that can be done with the large number of regular support elements in them.

This appears to be the bottom line…

Ghormley is my current US Fifth Fleet HQ commander – with his high admin rating (70) probably the most suitable choice for this posting (Ghormley also being a less inconvenient loss had Pillager sank the transport ship bringing HQ 5th Fleet to Auckland). My conclusion is similar commanders with high admin ratings (and relatively low in other areas) will eventually go into the other US fleet HQ. For the moment I’m leaving Kinkaid ashore at US Seventh Fleet HQ at least until I begin placing more emphasis on surface naval combat operations in the main Pacific theatres – Kinkaid is fine here for now and not needed elsewhere at this time.

Sea of Japan: Several unidentified Japanese TF visible on the game map in the Sea of Japan – none of these contacts observed in Sigint or other reports. No US patrol subs are currently operating in the Sea of Japan area. My estimate is these TF are likely transports moving cargo between the east coast of Korea and ports on the northern coast of Japan. Pillager could be using these routes to avoid interception by US patrol subs operating in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and west of Tsushima.

Central Pacific: Two damaged xAK reached Pearl Harbor after ship collision at sea in transport convoy WP-76 east of Christmas Is – the ships detached from the convoy for a long, slow journey northward to Hawaii at 5 kts. The two xAK delivered intact cargoes of supply and fuel to Kona, then arrived in Pearl Harbor for shipyard repair. Convoy WP-76 arrived in New Zealand since the collision. .

Sigint entries for 8/21 report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from several locations – Tabiteuea, Roi-Namur and Jaluit. Detected status at Tabiteuea and Roi-Namur show unidentified Japanese planes based there, also ship(s) in port in both locations. Otherwise no visible Jap forces or activity observed.

Sigint entries for 8/21 are reporting that elements of Jap 4 Air Defense AA Rgt are loaded as cargo aboard at least three xAK in the large southbound Jap transport convoy intercepted last game turn by SS Sailfish near Pagan. All 8/21 Sigint entries referring to 4 Air Defense AA Rgt are indicating this LCU is bound for Ndeni. Previous location of 4 AA Rgt was Yokohama/Yokosuka in the Japanese Home Islands.

Central Pacific: Intercepted radio transmissions from what is likely the large Japanese transport convoy attacked by US subs on 8/17 and 8/21 reported in an 8/22 Sigint entry. Position of the contact is at hex location 117, 102 (NE of Truk) – this contact visible on the game map as one or more unidentified Jap TF(s). One US patrol sub (SS Snapper) remains in the movement path between the Jap TF location and Truk.

Unidentified Jap TF(s) visible on the game map in a second contact due S of Truk (hex location 112, 112). One US patrol sub is near this contact – no reported actions between the US sub and the unidentified Jap TF, also no reported contacts between the US sub and Japanese air patrols. At this point, not a major cause of concern but it will have to be watched and identified. Three additional US subs are in patrol zones south of this contact.

US Escort Carrier force is now forming. Current composition of the escort carrier force is six CV Escort TF’s (CVE Divisions 1-6) with 13 CVE total – each CVE division with 2-3 CVE and a small DD escort.to provide mainly ASW cover. Air groups on carriers in Divisions 1-4 are operating CAP fighters only. CVE Divisions 5 and 6 have air groups with both CAP fighters and a small VT squadron – these two divisions set up to also allow their possible use as a small “Baby KB“ force. Fighter aircraft aboard most CVE are F4F Wildcats with one VF squadron of F6F Hellcats, all VT squadrons in the escort carrier force have TBF-1 Avengers. Planned employment of the Escort Carrier force will mainly be direct cover of amphibious landings and follow-up transport operations.

Central Pacific: Actions this game turn involving both Jap TF contacts reported near Truk on 8/23.

South Pacific: Sigint entry for 8/23 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from dot hex base at Tassafronga. Detected status of the base still shows it as a dot hex, no visible Japanese forces or activity, though it could be concluded Japanese construction activity is very likely underway in Tassafronga. Available intelligence data has one Jap LCU (Kure 5 SNLF) located in Tassafronga since 4/05/43 – other Jap LCU could be there as well.

Southwest Pacific: USAAF 2E bombers from NE Australia launch skip bombing attack on Japanese transport TF in Milne Bay – the Jap TF also spotted by Catalina I naval search prior to the air strike. This action is the second successful naval skip bombing strike by 5th USAAF 2E bomber squadrons specialized for this mission. Currently five 2E bomber squadrons in 5th USAAF are now operating in this role – pilots in these squadrons fully trained in NavB, LowN and NavS (at least 65-70 ratings in naval bombing if not all three skills). All available B-25D1 (eight .50 cal MG) and B-25G (75mm cannon) planes are being allocated for use in specialized 2E skip-bombing squadrons. Several additional USAAF 2E skip-bombing squadrons are being prepared in the Pacific theatres. Two Australian 2E torpedo bombing squadrons with Beaufort VIII planes are operating with the 5th USAAF bombers.

This is proving a highly successful experiment – anticipated weaknesses to skip bombing at this point include vulnerability to Japanese fighter CAP, also this type of naval air strike is expected to prove less effective against carriers and surface naval warship targets. AAR follows.

Eastern US: Transport convoy EX-48 (22 ships) departing for Australia via Capetown. Cargo aboard the convoy includes 61K supply and 37K fuel, no LCU or air units. No LCU or air units for SW Pacific theatre currently remain in the mainland US – all units for this theatre have already reached Australia or are now enroute. For the moment, additional supply and fuel cargoes to Australia will continue to be pushed out of Eastern US as quickly as ships returning to Eastern US are turned around.

The relatively small quantity of cargo aboard EX-48 is due to a number of AK and xAK in the convoy with fuel cargoes (the convoy having no TK or AO) – this reflects a long-standing general policy I established with all transport convoys where the total fuel points loaded as cargo aboard each convoy includes at least as much (preferably more) fuel as the convoy’s ships require for minimal refueling at the convoy’s destination to complete its round trip. The policy ensures that arrival of each convoy at its destination leaves a net gain of fuel points in the convoy destination’s stockpile after unloading and refueling.

Central Pacific: An elusive Jap E sunk by a US patrol sub (the second E sinking in 3 days) – another blow to the “urban legend” among US sub commanders in this PBEM that this Japanese ship type could evade torpedoes at will. AAR follows.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sub attack near Truk at 111,112 (S of Truk)

Sigint entry for 8/25 reports heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio signals from Kwajalein. Detected status of Kwajalein shows unidentified Jap planes based there, ship(s) in port and LCU(s) – no other visible Japanese forces or activity.

South Pacific: A detachment of transport convoy WP-78 (7 ships) arrives in Suva from the mainland US – the main body of WP-78 due in Auckland shortly. Cargo arriving in Suva includes 43K supply and 3500 fuel, no LCU or air units.

Australia: Transport convoy EX-41 (BB Pennsylvania, 1 AD, 29 transports) arrives from the Eastern US via Capetown. Cargo aboard the convoy includes one LCU (183 USAAF Base Force), 2 USAAF air transport squadrons, 109K supply and 41K fuel. BB Pennsylvania had been sent to Eastern US after 12/07/41 for repair of attack damage plus ship upgrades – the BB was attached to the convoy after completing its repair and upgrades. The AD and BB Pennsylvania will remain in Australia on reserve for future operations.

Earlier in the campaign I was drawing replacements into LCU on a large scale when building units in the mainland US to full TOE strength before shipping them out. During this time I had given priority in drawing replacements to LCU entering the game in front-line theatre commands and LCU transferrable (and planned for transfer) to a front-line command. In doing this practice, I had set replacements in non-transferrable LCU in the mainland US “off” to prioritize LCU bound for front-line commands. An end result of this became visible (about 2-3 months ago) as the last aviation support LCU for front-line theatres departed the mainland US – aviation support LCU staying behind in the mainland US did not have a sufficient number of aviation support squads to handle the number of planes in pilot training squadrons. White this scenario does not bring pilot training to a halt, it does leave damaged planes in pilot training squadrons unrepaired. Though not a major crisis, it is still an inconvenience.

Several measures to clear up the situation have since been taken –

(1) Movement of training squadrons and aviation support LCU in the mainland US to properly match planes and aviation support elements

(2) Some air squadrons currently in pilot training mode that were planned for conversion to front-line operations were shipped from the mainland US to forward theatres. These squadrons will continue pilot training in the forward theatre area until their current compliments of pilots are mostly or all trained for use in front-line missions.

(3) Aviation support LCU in the mainland US began drawing replacements – replacements being drawn at least to bring the number of aviation support elements in these LCU to full strength (numbers of other element types in these units not as significant). In most cases, I turn replacements “off” in these LCU once they reach full TOE strength in aviation support squads.

I’m stating this not so much as a problem but (rather) to point out a precaution that may need to be considered.

The second item is related to training of USN pilots (especially fighters) for carrier squadrons. Until recently, I had most carriers (of all types) engaged in some amount of pilot training, this practice most heavily done with CVE’s. Given that I was (for the most part) keeping my carriers out of harms’ way, I had the luxury of using my carrier flight decks for training pilots. No more….

Even with using carriers for pilot training, numbers of available fully-trained USN fighter replacement pilots were coming up short – not an immediate crisis but one that needed a solution before it does. Air groups aboard new US carriers entering the game (in many cases) contain pilots that need additional training. Most pilots in these carrier air groups have usable skill levels but can still use additional pilot training – my practice being to transfer these pilots from the carrier squadrons to the Reserve pool for additional training as openings come up in pilot training units and replacing them with fully-trained pilots from the Reserve pool. The highest demand for trained US Navy pilots is in (VF) fighter squadrons as they exist aboard all CV, CVL and CVE – not all carriers having dive bombing or torpedo squadrons. With reorganization of both US main and escort carrier forces for front-line operations, available capacity for US Navy pilot training has dropped considerably in the short term.

Some actions taken to resolve this situation include the following –

(1) USN dive bombing and torpedo air squadrons aboard replenishment CVE have been put ashore (at least temporarily) as pilot training squadrons. Numbers of planes in these squadrons were not increased to allow their return to the CVE if or when desired.

(2) Several large land-based US Navy VF fighter squadrons arrive in the game (starting 8/43) as reinforcements – these squadrons come into the game equipped with F6F Hellcats. Since I have a sufficiently large force of USAAF and US Marine LBA fighter squadrons in front-line service, the new USN land-based VF squadrons are readily available for training replacement carrier fighter pilots. I “upgraded” plane types in these VF squadrons from F6F Hellcats to F4F or FM-1 Wildcats – in the process releasing 100+ F6F planes into the pool as replacement planes for front line carrier squadrons. The land-based VF squadrons are proving invaluable as a tool for producing fully-trained USN fighter pilots for the carrier fleet. Three land-based VF squadrons are now actively training USN fighter pilots – one additional VF squadron due to enter the game some time in 9/43. Total training capacity of the 4 land-based VF squadrons is 150-160 fighter pilots.

(3) Naval search training for USN carrier dive bombing and torpedo pilots has been switched to USN patrol squadrons in the mainland US already employed in pilot training for naval search. I currently have a rather large contingent of fully-trained USN replacement pilots trained in both naval search and naval bombing skills – these pilots usable either in USN patrol squadrons or as dive bomber pilots in the carrier fleet.

Both items above (plus others not mentioned) have bearing in terms of shifting US pilot training for all branches from an “early campaign” mode (1941-43) to a “late campaign” mode (1943 and beyond). It’s mostly a matter of the available resources an Allied player has and changes that occur between the early and later parts of the campaign.

Central Pacific: A second day of heavy volume of intercepted Jap radio signals from Kwajalein reported in an 8/26 Sigint entry. Detected status of Kwajalein shows no substantial change from last game turn - unidentified Jap planes based there, ship(s) in port, no other visible Japanese forces or activity.

South Pacific: A reception for the long-anticipated arrival of Jap 38th Infantry Division at Luganville from China. A series of Sigint entries had indicated various elements of this LCU were aboard transport ships bound for Luganville (the division departing China via Hong Kong). The Japanese transport convoy being 38 Division to Luganville was intercepted this game turn by a US patrol sub placed along the sea approaches into Luganville. AAR follows.

Plans for a similar reception of Jap 42nd Infantry Division and 4 Air Defense AA Rgt at Ndeni is underway.

A Jap submarine identified as I-4 attacked and hit by PBY Catalina air patrol off Nadi (hex location 130, 161). It is not certain whether I-4 was damaged or sunk – oil slick was indicated in an 8/26 Operations report entry.

China: US patrol sub off Hong Kong attacked by Japanese surface ASW. SS Lapon is attempting to reach Australia through the eastern DEI for repair – while Colombo or Calcutta are closer shipyards, sea passage through the Sunda Straits (between Java and Sumatra) is known to be mined and the sub will easily come under attack by Jap ASW forces if any attempt made to go through Malacca Straits. SS Lapon faces a long, slow journey to safety regardless of destination. AAR follows.

Jap Divisional LCU Transfers: A number of Sigint report entries have been reporting movement of Jap infantry divisions Pillager is transferring from China and the Japanese Home Islands to various forward locations in the Pacific theatres. Identified Jap LCU include 17th Division (Tarawa), 38th Division (probably now arriving in Luganville), 42nd Division (Ndeni), 47th Division (Milne Bay), 1st Guards Division (Rabaul). The first two divisions above are transfers from China (both veterans of the battle at Chungking), 42 and 1 Guard divisions from the Japanese Home Islands, and 47 Division recently formed from combining its sub-units. This is of little surprise given the fall of China. The intelligence data does provide a good picture of what Pillager is doing with IJA units freed up from China for employment elsewhere. What‘s less clear at the moment is what and how many IJA units Pillager may be moving to Burma – there has been little or no information on this area to date. I have been able to track fairly well Japanese LCU movements within China from Chungking mainly to ports and some coastal locations in China

Sigint entries for 8/27 report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Canton Is and Maleolap. Detected status of Canton Is shows unidentified Jap planes based there. No other visible Japanese forces or activity observed at Canton Is or Maleolap.

SW Pacific: Dutch patrol sub operating off eastern tip of New Guinea intercepts what is probably a surviving DD from the Japanese transport TF attacked in the skip bombing naval air strike last game turn. AAR follows.

Southern China: Two unidentified Japanese LCU detected on the Tsuyung-Paoshan road by Chinese “spotter” LCU in mountain hex adjacent to the road. The spotted Jap LCU may possibly be units from the China army in transit to Burma.

Central Pacific: US patrol sub intercepts Japanese transport TF south of Truk – identified ships in this TF same as in the Jap convoy tracked and intercepted N of Truk by other US subs since 8/17. As this Jap TF is almost definitely moving southward, possible destinations include Lunga/Tulagi, Luganville, Ndeni, Noumea. Luganville could be eliminated from this list as another large Jap transport TF (10 ships) is now at Luganville and likely disembarking Jap 38 Infantry Division. Given previously known information on this Jap TF, my most likely estimate is this convoy is bound for Ndeni with Jap 42 Infantry Division and 4 Air Defense AA Rgt (both LCU transferred to the Pacific from the Japanese Home Islands). AAR follows.

Intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Maleolap reported in two 8/28 Sigint entries. Detected status of Maleolap shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.

South Pacific: Jap transport TF (10 ships) remains in Luganville base hex, spotted again by PBY Catalina naval air search. My estimate is the Jap TF is probably now disembarking 38th Infantry Division known to be enroute to Luganville from China.

An 8/29 Sigint entry is reporting radio signals intercepted from one or more unidentified Jap TF(s) visible on the game map SW of Kwajalein at hex location 122, 106. Movement information on the Jap TF(s) was not available. Beyond curiosity and the opportunity to pick off one or more Japanese ships from the TF(s), there appears to be no great cause for alarm or concern (at least for the moment).

Intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Jaluit reported in two 8/29 Sigint entries. Detected status of Jaluit shows no visible Japanese forces or activity.

Sigint entries for 8/29 also report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Nikunau and Abemama in the Gilbert islands. Detected status at Nikunau shows unidentified Jap planes based there, airfield size 2(2), port size 1(0). One Jap LCU (Ichiki Detachment) is identified on Nikunau from available intelligence data. Detected status of Abemama shows airfield size 2(2), port size 2(1), no visible Japanese forces or activity. Current intelligence data has one identified Jap LCU (24 Naval Garrison Unit) on Nikunau, though there is also some evidence here of construction activity so it’s possible undetected Jap engineering units may also be on Nikunau or had been there in the past.

Transport convoy EX-42 (9 ships) arrives in Australia from Eastern US via Capetown. Cargo aboard the convoy includes US 1st Cavalry Division, 21K supply and 15K fuel. With the arrival of 1 Cavalry Division, all available US divisional LCU for SW Pacific theatre currently in the game have now reached Australia.

CAP engaged: 5th Sentai with Ki-45 KAIc Nick (0 airborne, 7 on standby, 5 scrambling) 0 plane(s) not yet engaged, 0 being recalled, 3 out of immediate contact. Group patrol altitude is 10000, scrambling fighters between 5000 and 8000. Time for all group planes to reach interception is 48 minutes

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Intercepted Jap radio signals again reported from Nikunau in another 8/30 Sigint entry. No visible change in status of Nikunau from last game turn.

South Pacific: US patrol sub S-42 attacked and damaged in attack by B5N2 Kate air patrol outside Ndeni. My estimate is that the B5N2 is probably LBA as by this date in the campaign it is very likely Pillager has replaced (almost if not entirely so) the B5N2 Kate in front-line carrier service in the KB – the main Japanese carrier TB in KB service at this point almost certainly the B6N1 Jill. Reported damage to S-42 is system 49, float 14, engine 6 – the sub now returning to base at 11 kts.

8/30 Sigint entries report intercepted Jap radio transmissions from several locations – Ndeni, Lunga and Port Moresby. Detected statuses of all three bases show unidentified Jap planes at each location, ship(s) in port at Lunga – none of this any surprising revelation. No other visible Japanese forces or activity at any of the three bases.

Thailand: Sigint entry for 8/30 reports first known Japanese LCU transferred from China into Southeast Asia. Jap 39th Infantry Division is now reported in Bangkok, this unit a veteran of the Chungking battle. Bangkok is an unexpected location for Jap LCU’s from China, my expectation being these units would enter the theatre from southern China via Lashio. It’s possible Pillager is routing at least some Jap LCU transfers from China into Southeast Asia/Burma through Indochina – this not the most direct land movement route into Burma but perhaps 39 Division’s final destination may not necessarily be Burma.

China: Unusually large number of Sigint report entries involving Japanese infantry LCU located in China. These reports include a variety of units (mainly RGC and NCPC units, only one regular IJA unit) in scattered locations. My initial estimate is Pillager could be re-arranging garrison forces for an unknown purpose.

East China Sea: US patrol sub hit and damaged in attack by Ki-49 Helen air patrol W of Kyushu (hex location 99, 59). Reported damage to the sub is system 43, float 14, engine 1 – the sub returning to base at 17 kts movement.

North Pacific: Unidentified Jap submarine detected in the Aleutians east of Umnak Is (hex location 166, 51). My estimate is this Jap sub’s primary assignment is mainly recon plus sinking a ship or two if the opportunity presents itself. The sub is known to be moving E and operating a floatplane. No Allied naval forces or transport shipping currently in the sea area near the Jap sub.

Central Pacific: Intercepted Jap radio transmissions reported in a number of 8/31 Sigint entries from several locations.

Baker Is – Detected status showing unidentified Jap planes based there, port and airfield sizes both 1(0). Available intelligence data has 4 Jap LCU located on Baker Is – 61 Naval Gd, 1 Naval Construction Bn, 7 and 29 JNAF AF Units. I estimate the information received in my AE reports is likely underreporting both the port and/or airfield sizes at Baker Is. Japanese construction activity has to be at least underway if not completed. If there is no airfield or port facilities on Baker Is, then fortifications.

The pattern I’m beginning to see is that Pillager could be building a 2-layer Japanese outer perimeter in the Pacific theatres. The first layer including the outermost Japanese controlled bases is likely a “crust” – bases in this layer mainly operating naval air search, probably more lightly defended in many cases, and functioning as an “early warning system”. Amphibious assaults entering this zone will definitely give Pillager a good idea as to the direction and strength of an Allied offensive. This outer “crust” also provides a second benefit – Japanese bases in the main perimeter line are (at least initially) beyond the effective range of most Allied LBA. If true, Baker Island is probably a part of this “crust” zone. Farther west, Noumea and its surrounding islands as well as Port Moresby and much of eastern New Guinea (except Milne Bay) could be within the “crust” area.

The second layer of the Japanese outer perimeter is the probable main line of defense, these bases being the most heavily defended in terms of troops and fortifications, also containing the main forward Japanese LBA air bases. If true, Tarawa is within the main line of defense in the outer perimeter. Other Japanese bases identified as possibly or probably in this main line of defense include Tabiteuea, Luganville, Ndeni, Lunga/Tulagi and Rabaul. Available intelligence is indicating the main Japanese outer defense line could include the entire length of the Solomon island chain – larger bases in the Solomon islands are all occupied by Jap LCU(s) with evidence of construction activity in many cases.

My estimate has Nauru Is as an interior area base completely inside both layers of the estimated Japanese outer perimeter line.

South Pacific: Unidentified Japanese sub spotted by PBY Catalina naval search NW of Nadi (hex location 130, 158). The sub is reported moving on a SW heading but appears to be stationary – no visible movement from its position last game turn.

A detected Jap TF (type unknown) is visible on the game map at Ndeni. The Jap TF reported to contain 10 ships (1 CV, 4 CVE, 5 AK) with 12 planes total including 10 bombers. My estimate is the Jap TF is likely transports now arriving at Ndeni with LCU reinforcements (42 Infantry Division and/or 4 Air Defense AA Rgt) – it is easily possible Pillager escorted this TF with one or more CVE but it is unlikely to be the KB. US patrol sub S-46 is in Ndeni base hex but had no reported contact with either the Jap convoy or Japanese air patrols. Any further southward movement of this Jap TF toward Suva would likely bring it into contact with multiple US patrol subs operating to the S and SE of Ndeni.

North Pacific: Unidentified Jap submarine detected in the Aleutians last game turn remains – current position at hex location 169, 52 (adjacent hex SW of Umnak Is). The sub is operating a floatplane and there's little question the sub is dispatched on a recon mission that will more likely than not find nothing beyond some depth charges if caught.

Detected Jap TF remains at Ndeni. Reported composition of the Jap TF now appears to be a transport TF as originally estimated, The Jap TF does contain at least one CVE operating B5N2 Kate aircraft which attacked US sub S-46 also located in Ndeni base hex.

A slight modification of pilot training practices: This was something I came upon and applies specifically to USN pilot training for naval attack bombing and patrol squadrons. I had unintentionally created a surplus of specialized USN pilot training squadrons training in Naval Search and Naval Bombing skills. Result being a substantial number of pilots in the Bombing and Patrol Reserve pilot pools fully trained (skill level 70+) in either Naval Search or Naval Bombing only. The number of trained pilots in Naval Search also considerably exceeds current or anticipated needs for USN patrol squadrons.

This situation presented an opportunity to do some quick large-scale cross training of pilots where many USN pilots would be fully trained in both Naval Search and Naval Bombing, producing a large pool of replacement pilots suitable for assignment in either USN patrol or dive bombing squadrons (both carrier and LBA). The two actions (below) done to implement this are temporary and easily reversed. It also uses my existing USN pilot training structure without any significant modification required. It should be noted while these changes are in effect, USN pilot training squadrons for Naval Search, ASW, and Naval Bombing skills are no longer drawing rookie pilots - all pilots entering these squadrons coming from the Reserve pool.

(1) Pilots entering USN training squadrons for ASW and naval bombing skills are now being drawn from the reserve pool of USN pilots fully trained in naval search only. USN pilots passing through this process would become usable in both patrol and dive bombing squadrons - in the case of bombing squadrons either carrier or LBA. I may later opt to expand this practice to also use this group of pilots as input to USN pilot training squadrons for torpedo bombing.

(2) USN pilots in the Bombing and Patrol Reserve pilot pools already fully trained for naval bombing skills (skill level 70+) are now becoming input to USN pilot training squadrons for naval search. This too could be expanded to include USN torpedo pilots.

I'm projecting the changes above in training practice as short term (a few months or so) - it will likely be returned to the status quo as the available supply of eligible USN pilots in the Reserve pools for input to this process is used up.

US torpedo dud rates: Now that we’re in Sept 43, USN torpedoes have reached their maximum reliability (10% dud rate). It will be seen whether and in what manner the US sub campaign takes a nastier and more ominous turn.

Japanese Home Islands: US patrol sub repeats attack on Jap transport TF engaged last game turn near Torishima, a second large xAP in the TF hit and sunk with elements of what is becoming an ill-fated Japanese LCU. AAR follows.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sub attack near Chichi-jima at 114,71 (NE of Chichi-jima)

Detected status of Roi-Namur shows unidentified Jap planes based there, ship(s) in port, airfield size 4(1), port size 2(0). Current intelligence has four Jap LCU located on Roi-Namur (HQ 24 Air Flotilla, 2 Garrison Unit, 2 Sasebo SNLF Co, 6 Base Force). The theory I posted on Pillager’s possible 2-layer Japanese outer perimeter could be amended to state Japanese perimeter defenses in the central and northern Marshalls sector may be a single layer rather than the two layers I had described elsewhere – this conclusion based simply on the available geography (bases) in this region insufficient to support a 2-layer perimeter line.

Detected status of Tabiteuea shows unidentified Jap planes based there, ship(s) in port, airfield size 4(3), port size 3(1). Four Jap LCU are located at Tabiteuea per currently available intelligence – two HQ (6th Fleet & 4 Air Division, 1 Garrison Unit and 15 Base Force. Troop stacking limits on Tabituea would support garrisoning with a full Japanese division, though I’ve seen no evidence to date that Pillager is doing so. My estimate has Tabituea as one of several Japanese strongholds in the Gilberts along with Tarawa and Abemama, these three bases all within the second (main) layer of a 2-layer Japanese outer perimeter line. Pillager has also likely established Tabiteuea as a naval base – Tabiteuea also the outermost Japanese naval base in the Pacific theatres.

A Minor Epidemic of Ship Collisions: Two incidents occurring this game turn in Pacific transport convoys. One involving a TK and xAK in convoy PW-76A returning to the mainland US from the South Pacific, both ships with minor damage and continuing with the convoy at normal movement speed. The second incident involving two xAK in transport convoy WP-80 outbound to New Zealand – both xAK moderately damaged but with some reduction in speed to 8-10 kts. The two damaged xAK from WP-80 were detached in a separate TF and moving independently to New Zealand, the xAK likely to remain in Auckland for shipyard repair after arrival and unloading. Collisions in the transport convoy system are not frequent but occur occasionally – in nearly all cases a slight inconvenience and simply the cost of doing business. To date in this campaign I have not lost a ship sunk due to collision so the cost is a rather small one.

South Pacific: Japanese sub off Suva now identified as I-4, attacked and hit by PBY Catalina air patrol. Two US light surface ASW TF’s now pursuing the Jap sub. No Allied transport shipping currently at or near Suva.

Burma: Sigint entry for 9/02 reports Jap 32nd Infantry Division now located at Meiktila – this LCU transferred from China, also a veteran of the Chungking battles. This is the first reported Jap army unit transfer from China arriving in Burma.

North Pacific: Unidentified Jap submarine continues moving west, now located SE of Amchitka.

South Pacific: Jap transport TF in Ndeni has departed – this TF no longer detected by US patrol sub S-46 in Ndeni base hex. The same Jap TF (or possibly a second unidentified one) spotted this game turn by PBY Catalina naval search NW of Luganville (hex location 119, 148), moving on a SW heading. Reported composition is 9 ships including 8 CVE, one AK with 29 aircraft (24 bombers) on board – the TF probably does contain at least one CVE though (for now) I’m not estimating this to be the Baby KB let alone the full one. The Jap TF appears to be moving southward and keeping west of the New Hebrides island group, possible destinations of this TF (short of a sortie on Suva or New Zealand) being Luganville or Noumea.

This is a game turn where having ASW ships transferred in quantity from the mainland US to the South Pacific theatre might pay off. An unidentified Jap submarine detected east of Auckland in or very near the movement path of four incoming Allied transport TF (convoys WP-80 & WP-81 from the mainland US, a local transport convoy returning from Suva, plus a separate TF with the two damaged xAK from WP-80 that collided last game turn). A large sortie of 20+ Allied ASW ships have been dispatched from Auckland – separate surface ASW TF’s meeting each of the four transport TF’s above plus additional surface ASW to locate and attack the sub. The four Allied transport TF have been re-routed around the Jap sub’s current position. A small tactical exercise during the quiet before the storm.

CAP engaged: 5th Sentai with Ki-45 KAIc Nick (0 airborne, 5 on standby, 10 scrambling) 2 plane(s) not yet engaged, 0 being recalled, 0 out of immediate contact. Group patrol altitude is 10000, scrambling fighters between 6000 and 12000. Time for all group planes to reach interception is 44 minutes

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Night Air attack on Magwe, at 57,47

Sigint entry for 9/04 reports intercepted Jap radio transmissions from Tulagi. Detected status of Tulagi shows unidentified Jap aircraft based there, port size 3(3), airfield size 3(2). Four Jap LCU are known to be located at Tulagi – 25 Special Base Force, 63 JNAF AF Unit, 15 Naval Construction Bn, Yokosuka 4 SNLF. I’ve held the estimate pointing to Tulagi as part of a key base complex in the second (main) layer of the Japanese outer perimeter – this base complex includes Lunga and Tulagi plus one or more adjacent base hexes. Lunga/Tulagi and Rabaul are the probable strongholds anchoring each flank in the Solomon Islands sector of Pillager’s main Japanese perimeter line.