Transocean

WASHINGTON -- Transocean, the offshore oil and gas drilling company, has agreed to a $1.4-billion settlement with the Justice Department to resolve civil and criminal claims against the company for its role in the April 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Transocean was the owner of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig leased by BP that exploded and sank after the Macondo well blew out in the Gulf, killing 11 workers and spewing nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the sea. In a statement, Transocean said that as part of the settlement, a "subsidiary has agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA)

WASHINGTON -- Transocean, the offshore oil and gas drilling company, has agreed to a $1.4-billion settlement with the Justice Department to resolve civil and criminal claims against the company for its role in the April 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Transocean was the owner of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig leased by BP that exploded and sank after the Macondo well blew out in the Gulf, killing 11 workers and spewing nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the sea. In a statement, Transocean said that as part of the settlement, a "subsidiary has agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA)

Chevron Corp. and Transocean Ltd. are being sued for $22 billion in environmental damages in Brazil, double the initial claims, after a federal prosecutor filed a lawsuit over a second oil spill off the nation's coast. Chevron committed "a series of errors" that led to the March spill at the Frade project, the federal prosecutors' office said. Prosecutor Eduardo Santos de Oliveira is also seeking to halt operations at the project and block the San Ramon, Calif., oil giant from transferring profits from Brazil.

WASHINGTON - Before the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, BP and drilling rig owner Transocean focused their safety efforts on curtailing worker injury rather than preventing catastrophic well blowouts, all but ignoring critical lessons from two near-misses just before the Deepwater Horizon explosion, according to a new federal investigation of the disaster. The report issued Tuesday by the Chemical Safety Board is the latest in a string of federal and independent inquiries into the blowout of BP's Macondo well, which killed 11 workers in the ensuing blast and spewed nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the sea, making it the country's worst offshore environmental accident.

WASHINGTON - Before the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, BP and drilling rig owner Transocean focused their safety efforts on curtailing worker injury rather than preventing catastrophic well blowouts, all but ignoring critical lessons from two near-misses just before the Deepwater Horizon explosion, according to a new federal investigation of the disaster. The report issued Tuesday by the Chemical Safety Board is the latest in a string of federal and independent inquiries into the blowout of BP's Macondo well, which killed 11 workers in the ensuing blast and spewed nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the sea, making it the country's worst offshore environmental accident.

A stream of evidence shows that "a culture of complacency" rather than a "culture of safety" prevailed at BP, Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton as they worked on the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, according to the chairmen of the presidential commission investigating the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The panel's investigators uncovered "a suite of bad decisions," many still inexplicable, involving tests that were poorly run, alarming results that were ignored, proper equipment that was sidelined and safety barriers that were removed prematurely at the high-pressure well, said William K. Reilly, who is co-chairman of the commission with former Democratic Sen. Bob Graham of Florida.

BP and the two other companies drilling the exploratory Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico all violated federal safety regulations leading up to last year's oil spill, a federal investigation concluded in findings that could be crucial for a Justice Department investigation and numerous lawsuits surrounding the disaster. The report pinned much of the blame on oil giant BP, which was "ultimately responsible" for operations and safety on the rig. But the joint inquiry by the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement was critical of BP's drilling contractors,Transocean and Halliburton.

The night of the massive Deepwater Horizon explosion, few in the crew knew who was in charge or understood the chain of command, and the vessel's captain hesitated before making critical safety decisions, according to testimony Monday before a federal panel investigating the cause of the disaster that killed 11 crew members. The lack of a clear leader contributed to the chaos aboard the ill-fated oil rig on April 20 and was the focus of intense questioning from the panel's lead investigator.

Months before the April 20 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon that killed 11 men, the sophisticated drilling vessel experienced power blackouts, computer glitches and a balky propulsion system, and carried a list of more than 300 deferred maintenance projects. Under withering questioning during Monday's resumption of the Coast Guard- Interior Department investigation into the well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico , the rig's chief engineer revealed the possibility that alarms and other crucial systems were bypassed or not functioning at the time of the explosion.

Failure to manage the risks of a complex well and to learn from an earlier narrowly missed disaster contributed significantly to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, a panel investigating the BP oil spill said Wednesday. "Numerous decisions" to continue operations despite repeated warnings of problems "suggest an insufficient consideration of risk and a lack of operating discipline," according to a report issued by a committee at the National Academy of Engineering/National Research Council, which was convened at the request of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar.

Chevron Corp. and Transocean Ltd. are being sued for $22 billion in environmental damages in Brazil, double the initial claims, after a federal prosecutor filed a lawsuit over a second oil spill off the nation's coast. Chevron committed "a series of errors" that led to the March spill at the Frade project, the federal prosecutors' office said. Prosecutor Eduardo Santos de Oliveira is also seeking to halt operations at the project and block the San Ramon, Calif., oil giant from transferring profits from Brazil.

The chief executives of Chevron Corp.'s and Transocean Ltd.'s Brazilian units are among 17 executives at the two companies banned from leaving the country pending an investigation into an offshore oil spill. Chevron's George Buck and Transocean's Michael Legrand were on the list of managers that federal prosecutors asked Judge Vlamir Costa Magalhaes to ban from leaving Brazil, according to a copy of the request sent Monday by the prosecutor's office. The judge issued the ban Friday.

BP and the two other companies drilling the exploratory Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico all violated federal safety regulations leading up to last year's oil spill, a federal investigation concluded in findings that could be crucial for a Justice Department investigation and numerous lawsuits surrounding the disaster. The report pinned much of the blame on oil giant BP, which was "ultimately responsible" for operations and safety on the rig. But the joint inquiry by the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement was critical of BP's drilling contractors,Transocean and Halliburton.

The presidential commission examining the causes of the BP oil spill Wednesday laid blame for the disaster on corporate mismanagement, inadequate government regulation and ultimately a lack of political will to ensure proper oversight of the oil industry as it pushed drilling rigs into ever deeper waters. Releasing a key chapter of its final report on the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, the commission recounted what is by now the well-known string of missteps that led to one of the world's largest offshore oil spills.

Failure to manage the risks of a complex well and to learn from an earlier narrowly missed disaster contributed significantly to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, a panel investigating the BP oil spill said Wednesday. "Numerous decisions" to continue operations despite repeated warnings of problems "suggest an insufficient consideration of risk and a lack of operating discipline," according to a report issued by a committee at the National Academy of Engineering/National Research Council, which was convened at the request of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar.

A stream of evidence shows that "a culture of complacency" rather than a "culture of safety" prevailed at BP, Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton as they worked on the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, according to the chairmen of the presidential commission investigating the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The panel's investigators uncovered "a suite of bad decisions," many still inexplicable, involving tests that were poorly run, alarming results that were ignored, proper equipment that was sidelined and safety barriers that were removed prematurely at the high-pressure well, said William K. Reilly, who is co-chairman of the commission with former Democratic Sen. Bob Graham of Florida.

In the days before the Deepwater Horizon exploded, a wide range of workers on the rig expressed doubts, worry or confusion over decisions made by their superiors, but those concerns apparently went unheeded, according to testimony before a federal panel Tuesday. Instead, those in charge made decisions that saved time and money, choices that may have contributed to the surge of natural gas from the oil well into the drilling vessel, where it exploded, killing 11 men and causing the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history.

The road crashes through the jungle like the fevered dream of the indomitable Fitzcarraldo, who schemes to transport a steamship overland through the Peruvian tropics in a cult film celebrating demented ambition. The Transoceanic Highway, evoking engineering marvels such as the Transcontinental Railroad and the Panama Canal, has been talked about for decades, assuming a mythic stature that has led many to question whether the east-west thoroughfare linking Brazil's Atlantic ports with the Pacific docks of Peru would ever come to pass.