The Perils Of Ignoring Neighbors To The South

June 06, 1993|By ALLAN GERSON

There is a new wind blowing in Latin America, but the old one hovers menacingly. The new wind speaks of pragmatism, optimism and, most importantly, self-reliance. The old is marked by fatalism and dependency. The new spirit is characterized by Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Guatemala's Jorge Serrano. But they too are not immune from Latin America's increasingly inward turn to ``Ibero-Americanism,'' and its fatalistic view of U.S.-Latin American relations.

As evidence of this phenomenon, witness the recently concluded ``Vision-Ibero 2000'' conference of over 300 Latin American leaders held in April at Antigua, Guatemala.

It was convened as a follow-up to the first Ibero-American conference of 21 Latin American heads of state, including those of Spain and Portugal, held at Guadalajara, Mexico, in 1991. Nothing was so conspicuous as the absence of the United States.

Although the conference was designed to map the future of Latin America in such critical areas as culture, ecology, the environment and trade - all areas in which the United States plays an important if not critical role - the United States was pointedly not invited as either participant or observer.

The message was clear: The inter-American system was being rejected.

That system, composed of the Organization of American States and its affiliates, boasts of participation by the United States, as well as Canada, as integral members.

But it runs counter to what is becoming a trend in the region: inclusion of Spain and Portugal, and the exclusion of the United States; the rise of a new Ibero-Americanism versus the old inter-Americanism.

There is, to be sure, something to be said for regional Latin American meetings outside the shadow of the Big Brother to the north.

At the first Ibero-American conference it was responsible in part for fostering a more pragmatic atmosphere.

The historic tendency to blame U.S. policies for the ills of the region had less to recommend it when there was no U.S. presence there to take the flak. But ultimately the price of focusing on the Ibero connection at the expense of the North American one is a lack of seriousness.

For Latin America's future is surely more inextricably bound with that of the United States than that of Spain. Spain may supply common cultural roots, as well as a history of exploitation. But the urgent business of preparing the region for the year 2000 lies in open dialogue and interaction with the United States. The list of common concerns is long, but at the top lie stabilization of the new democracies, control of drug trafficking, immigration controls and ecology and protection of the environment.

Despite the urgent need for this dialogue, two factors seem to conspire to prevent its commencement. The first is the Clinton administration's own distraction from anything to do with Latin America by virtue of its obsessions with domestic issues, and, on the foreign policy side, with the plight of Russia and the prospect of intervention in the former Yugoslavia. The second factor preventing genuine dialogue is Latin America's new inward turn and inability to take advantage of its recent gains by seeking to take the initiative in shaping U.S.-Latin American policy. Instead, Latin America's leaders lament the lack of a discernible agenda in Washington: the lack, as they put it, of a Latin American policy. That they themselves are quite capable of setting that agenda, and thus formulating a policy for the hemisphere, is something that seems beyond their grasp.

Yet the truth is that for the foreseeable future North America's hands are tied. Latin America, with the end of the Cold War, is no longer a major concern. Of course, there is the North American Free Trade Agreement. But NAFTA, assuming it goes through Congress, will do little to ease the paradox of Latin America's isolation from the United States. NAFTA is, after all, quite correctly perceived as an economic arrangement to benefit the United States. It is not primarily aimed at greater inter-American cultural and political solidarity.

Its chief aim is to enhance the U.S. advantage with the competing trade blocs of the European Community and the Pacific Rim. For Latin America's leaders this is not enough. They want Washington's embrace, not merely its trade.

The history of U.S.-Latin American relations is a sad one. Often, it has been a tragedy of errors. For, with rare exceptions - the Good Neighbor period during President Franklin Roosevelt's term up until the close of World War II, and John F. Kennedy's short-lived Alliance for Progress - the partners to a North-South dialogue always seemed at odds when one side or the other seemed genuinely interested in dialogue and cooperative action.

It would be a sad commentary if history were to repeat itself at this propitious moment.