Historically, territorial dispute has been the single most contentious issue over which states fight. This project investigates the related questions of whether and under what circumstances an alteration of international borders---that is a territorial change that takes the form of a state-to-state territorial transfer, partition of a single country, or unification of two or more countries---can prevent future violence, and in that sense manage the underlying territorial dispute. A model linking territorial changes and future militarized conflicts between the participant countries is developed. The model posits that the decision to use force to alter the outcome of the preceding change depends (1) on the combination of relative power and the (still) disputed land's tangible (strategic, economic) or intangible (ethnic, religious) value and (2) on the process of territorial change (peaceful, violent). The first part of the model evaluates the likely benefits of using force to pursue further territorial revisions; the second part notes the potential costs of such actions. The model applies to both territorial winners and losers, that is countries that have gained and lost the land, respectively, through the change. The roles of foreign policy similarity and domestic constraints are also considered. The model is empirically assessed on all 20th century territorial changes. Results show that while most participant countries do not fight one another after the change, those countries that fight do so at explosively high rates. Moreover, the results largely support the proposed theoretical connection, explaining the variation in the changes' aftermath.