III. Power to the People:
The Case for a Local Government Collective Bargaining Ban

Up to this
point, we have assumed that some form of collective bargaining between local
governments and employee representatives will at times be desirable for
government employees, because it helps them improve their compensation and
working conditions, and for local governments, because collective
representation and bargaining might improve morale among their employees. This
paper has examined a wide range of proposals intended to allow collective
bargaining, while reining in various abuses of the process that have taken
place under PERA. Any of these proposals would lessen the cost and improve the
effectiveness of local government.

Many of the proposals might
strike labor union advocates as severe, yet all spring from a fundamental
principle of American governance: that government exists to serve the public
and is answerable to the public. Union advocates might argue that the reform
proposals listed above would render government employee unions ineffective. If
that is the case, then we must be prepared to consider the possibility that
public-sector collective bargaining is ultimately incompatible with
representative government and should be prohibited.

As we showed in our earlier
report on PERA, the law has the effect of undermining local self-government,
empowering union officials who are unaccountable to the public. This failure to
maintain the prerogatives of citizens has had profound consequences.

When a union bargains with a
private employer, the cost of wages, benefits or work rules may be passed on to
the company’s customers or be borne primarily by owners and investors, who will
see profits diminished. But whether owners, investors or customers bear the
cost, all are free to sever their relationship with the company and its
unionized workforce. Owners can sell their shares; investors can invest in
other firms; customers can take their business elsewhere.

By contrast, taxpayers must
fund government programs and are unavoidably on the hook for any additional
cost of collective bargaining — at least until they move elsewhere. Collective
bargaining inevitably empowers government employee unions, whose interests can
be directly opposed those of the majority of citizens. Over time, union
interests can take on the force of government mandates. While the same can be
said to some extent of any interest group that successfully lobbies the
Legislature or the executive branch, collective bargaining puts government
employee unions in a unique position to impose their desires on the general
public: Elected officials are expected to negotiate at some length and reach an
agreeable compromise with representatives of government employees, while
retaining the ability to dismiss other interest groups curtly.

The consequences of this
decision to empower union officials can be seen in the wide gap between public-
and private-sector benefits — a gap estimated to cost state taxpayers
$5.7 billion dollars annually, as noted earlier. The consequences also
take the form of public schools that serve many students poorly yet are
remarkably resistant to reforms. They are manifested in a powerful,
institutional, taxpayer-funded lobby that uses union dues to advance an
ideology that values activist government and dismisses the ambitions of
individuals.

It is not clear that government
employee unions improve morale. In fact, the process of collective bargaining
often pushes unions to undermine morale; when employers refuse to meet union
demands, union officials will often seek to portray the employer’s refusal as
rooted in selfishness or scorn for workers’ efforts. In the context of
government, this means a union, legally recognized as a worker representative,
is very likely to use its authority to foster animosity among government
employees toward elected officials or even the public itself.

There is a strong case to be
made that unlike their cousins in the private sector, government employees have
no particular need to collectively bargain in order to protect their legitimate
interests; their positions in government service provide them with unique
opportunities to influence lawmakers. It is widely understood among political
scientists that a lobbyist’s most valuable assets are access to decision makers
and knowledge of how government functions. Government employees have both.

While
government is always prone to disruption as political parties jockey for power
and elections swing control back and forth, workers do not necessarily need
unions to protect them from partisan pressures. State and local civil service
commissions already oversee government employees, create work classifications
and establish compensation schedules. These commissions have effectively
insulated workers from political pressures. Government employee unions, on the
other hand, have taken on a distinctive ideology of their own and are among the
most partisan institutions in the nation, as was outlined in the first part of
this report.[51]

Law enforcement in particular
is an area where union representation is likely to be problematic. Police work
requires a high degree of discipline and judgment; on any shift, a police
officer must be ready to use force effectively but judiciously, and he or she
may be called on to make life-and-death decisions. In such an environment,
strict standards and lines of command are essential. Collective bargaining
complicates those lines of command by adding a third party to the relations
between commanders and patrol officers.

Elected officials, government
employees, taxpayers and union officials should always remember that collective
bargaining in government has never been an inalienable right. As the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees:

The
public employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and
he is protected by the First Amendment from retaliation for doing so. … But the
First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to
listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and
bargain with it.[52]

The Michigan Constitution does
state, “The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes
concerning public employees,” but does not specify what form these laws should
take.[53] The constitution does not mandate that the Legislature
provide for collective bargaining or the recognition of unions. The Legislature
may, for instance, encourage the creation of civil service commissions or
create panels with the authority to adjudicate disputes between government
employees and managers on an individual basis — something akin to a union
grievance process to ensure fair treatment in the workplace. The Legislature
may regulate and limit collective bargaining as it deems necessary to protect
the public interest, or it may prohibit the practice outright.

Given the numerous difficulties
associated with collective bargaining, and the persistent recklessness of
government union officials in Michigan, a legislative ban on collective
bargaining would probably be the safest course of action. This step would have
the advantage of ensuring that the state makes a clean break from an era of
undue public-sector union influence over government.