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Protectorates and Spheres of Influence - Spheres of influence prior to
world war ii

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The first agreement to use the term "spheres of influence"
was one concluded between Britain and Germany (1885) that separated and
defined their respective spheres in the territories on the Gulf of
Guinea. By its provisions, Britain agreed not to acquire territory,
accept protectorates, or interfere with the extension of German
influence in that part of Guinea lying east of a specified line. Germany
undertook a like commitment regarding Britain and the territory west of
the line. As the terms of this treaty indicate, it is possible for a
nation to have a protectorate within a sphere of influence when the
sphere concept is applied in a broad regional sense.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the
twentieth century, many agreements were concluded recognizing spheres of
influence in Africa, the Middle East, and China. By the Anglo-French
agreement of 8 April 1904, Britain recognized that Morocco was within
France's sphere of influence and France recognized that Egypt was
within Britain's sphere. Britain and Russia signed a treaty on 31
August 1907, specifying that Afghanistan was outside of Russia's
sphere—meaning, of course, that it was within Britain's.
Persia was divided into three zones: a Russian sphere in the north, a
British sphere in the south, and a neutral area in between.

In China, the spheres of influence were initially marked out in
1896–1898. At the beginning of that period, Russia secured from
China the right to construct a railway line across Manchuria that would
provide a short route for the Trans-Siberian Railway to reach
Vladivostok on the Pacific coast. The Russian-owned Chinese Eastern
Railway Company, which was to construct and operate the line, was given
exclusive administrative control of the railway zone stretching across
Manchuria. Two years later, in 1898, Russia secured from China a
twenty-five-year lease on Port Arthur, a naval base site in southern
Manchuria. By this agreement, Russia was also permitted to construct a
north-south railway line between Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Harbin,
thus connecting the naval base with the main line of the Chinese Eastern
Railway running across Manchuria. Russia also secured some mining
concessions in Manchuria.

The treaties between Russia and China did not specifically recognize
Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence, but by the end of 1898,
Russia's rights in Manchuria were so extensive that it was
apparent that the czarist regime would seek to dominate capital
investment and to make its political influence preeminent in that area
of China. An Anglo-Russian agreement in 1899 greatly strengthened
Russia's claim to a Manchurian sphere of influence. Britain
agreed not to seek any railway concessions north of China's Great
Wall, which separated China proper from Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
Russia reciprocated with a pledge not to seek railway concessions in the
Yangtze (Chang) Valley.

While Russia was seeking rights in Manchuria, Germany was gaining a
sphere in China's Shantung (Shandong) province. Using the murder
of two German missionaries as an excuse, Germany landed troops in
Shantung in 1897 and proceeded to extract from China (1898) a treaty
granting extensive rights in Shantung. By its terms, Germany obtained a
ninety-nine-year lease of a naval base site at Kiaochow (Jiaoxian) on
the southern coast of Shantung and the exclusive right to furnish all
foreign capital and materials for projects in Shantung. Added to these
sweeping rights were specific railway concessions and mining rights in
the province. The monopoly on capital investment in Shantung province
gave Germany a claim to a sphere of influence in China stronger than
that of any other power.

The British and French spheres in China that were delineated in 1898
were not granted in such definitive terms. Britain's sphere in
the Yangtze Valley rested primarily upon an Anglo-Chinese treaty
concluded in February 1898, whereby China committed itself not to
alienate any of the Yangtze area—meaning that China could not
cede or lease territory in that area to another power. Britain secured a
lease on a naval base site on the China coast in the same year but not
in the Yangtze area. It was, rather, on the northern coast of Shantung,
across the Gulf of Chihli (Bo Hai) from the Russian base at Port Arthur.
France's claim to a sphere in southern China rested partly upon
specific concessions and partly upon a nonalienation agreement. In 1885,
France began securing railway concessions in southern China, and in
1895, China agreed to call exclusively upon French capital for the
exploitation of mines in the three southernmost provinces. In 1898,
China concluded a treaty with France in which it agreed not to alienate
any Chinese territories bordering French Indochina. Later in the same
year, France obtained a ninety-nine-year lease on a naval base site at
Kuangchow (Guangzhou) Bay, on China's southern coast.

As stated, although advocacy of an open door for trade and investment
has generally led the United States to oppose spheres of influence, it
has occasionally looked upon them with favor. During the Moroccan crisis
of 1905–1906, for instance, the United States vigorously opposed
any compromise that might lead to a German sphere in a portion of
Morocco. At the same time, after receiving assurances that the open door
would remain in effect for thirty years, the administration of Theodore
Roosevelt voiced no opposition to terms of a settlement that obviously
recognized Morocco as being in France's sphere. In fact,
Roosevelt gave every indication that he favored a virtually complete
takeover of Morocco by France.

It is with regard to spheres in China that American policy has been most
thoroughly delineated. When in 1899 the United States enunciated the
Open Door policy for China, it sought only the preservation of equal
opportunity for ordinary trade within the spheres, not the destruction
of the spheres themselves. Equal investment opportunity was not
demanded. Although the Open Door Notes did not formally recognize the
spheres, Secretary of State John Hay accepted the spheres as existing
facts. When Russia militarily occupied Manchuria in 1900 during the
Boxer Rebellion and then proceeded to demand extensive rights there, the
United States was willing to recognize the exceptional position of
Russia in Manchuria if Russia would permit equality of opportunity for
trade. When in 1905, at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan
secured all the Russian rights and concessions in southern Manchuria, it
did so with the full blessing of the U.S. government. President Theodore
Roosevelt even indicated to China that it could not question the
transfer to Japan of either the Port Arthur leasehold or the part of the
Chinese Eastern Railway that was in southern Manchuria.

There were, however, limits to the accepting attitude of the Roosevelt
administration. When in 1908 Russia attempted to take over the
administration of Harbin on the ground that it was part of the railway
zone, Secretary of State Elihu Root resisted vigorously. His opposition
was motivated by the desire not only to restrain Russia in its northern
Manchurian sphere but also to forestall Japan from making a similar
interpretation of its railway zone rights in southern Manchuria. U.S.
policy in the Harbin dispute indicates clearly that the Roosevelt
administration did not give either Russia or Japan a free hand in their
respective spheres.

The administration of William Howard Taft, redefining the Open Door
policy to include the demand for equal investment opportunity, launched
a full-scale attack on the spheres of influence in Manchuria. Secretary
of State Philander Knox came forward with a plan to have the major
powers loan China money to purchase the Russian railway line (the
Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Japanese railway (later known as the
South Manchurian Railway). He also proposed, as an alternate plan, the
construction of a new line from Chin-chow (Jinzhou) to Aigun that would
parallel and compete with the Japanese line. Neither of these schemes
was implemented because of lack of support from the other interested
powers, including Britain. The principal result of the Knox program was
to drive Russia and Japan closer together. In 1907 they had signed a
secret treaty recognizing each other's spheres in Manchuria; and
in 1910 they signed another accord, this time agreeing to support each
other in the further development of their spheres. Meanwhile, the
spheres were softening in China south of the Great Wall. In 1909,
Germany, Britain, and France agreed to share in a project for a railway
line stretching from Canton to Hankow and then westward to Chungking
(Chongqing). The following year the United States was admitted to the
project and the Four-Power Consortium was formed by the United States,
Britain, France, and Germany for the purpose of sharing Chinese railway
concessions.

The outbreak of World War I significantly changed the power
relationships in the Far East. Whereas the Taft administration had waged
an offensive campaign against the spheres in Manchuria, the
administration of Woodrow Wilson was forced into a defensive position.
In the first months of the war, Japan seized the German sphere in
Shantung. This was followed in January 1915 by the presentation to China
of the Twenty-one Demands, which included assent to the transfer of
German rights in Shantung and a great increase in Japan's rights
in southern Manchuria. Japan also demanded rights in eastern Inner
Mongolia that would make that area a Japanese sphere. Wilson, Secretary
of State William Jennings Bryan, and Robert Lansing attempted, by making
concessions to Japan, to influence it to observe restraint. In doing so
they made some remarkable statements relating to the Japanese spheres.
In a note to Japan drafted by Lansing and sent over Bryan's
signature, the United States recognized that territorial contiguity
created "special relations" between Japan and the
districts of southern Manchuria, eastern Mongolia, and Shantung.

The attempt to restrain Japan was only partly successful. The Japanese
settled for considerably less than they had sought in the Twenty-one
Demands, but this was probably due more to British than to U.S.
influence. In 1917, Lansing, now secretary of state, made another
attempt to restrain the Japanese. In doing so, he concluded an exchange
of notes with a special Japanese envoy, Kikujiro Ishii, that contained
an even more sweeping recognition of Japan's special interests
than had been given in 1915. It stated that territorial propinquity gave
Japan "special interests" in China, particularly in that
part of China contiguous to Japanese possessions. In return for this
extraordinary statement, Lansing obtained a secret protocol in which the
United States and Japan agreed not to take advantage of conditions in
China to seek special rights that would abridge the rights of other
friendly states. Again, the endeavor to bridle the Japanese met with
only limited success. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Japan won
approval for the transfer of the German rights in Shantung, a gain that
was softened only by Japan's informal agreement to give up the
navy base at Kiaochow.

Many of the goals that the Wilson administration sought in East Asia
were finally achieved by the administration of Warren G. Harding at the
Washington Conference of 1921–1922. By the Nine-Power Treaty of 6
February 1922, Japan and the other signatories pledged to refrain from
seeking new rights in China that would create new spheres of influence
or enhance rights in existing spheres. Furthermore, in bilateral
negotiations with China during the Washington Conference, Japan gave up
all the former German rights in Shantung, retaining only a mortgage on
the Tsing-tao-to-Tsinan railway line that was sold to China. Later in
1922, Japan agreed to the abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii exchange of
notes. Existing historical accounts do not fully explain why Japan
pursued such a moderate policy at the Washington Conference. It was in
any case a moderation that ended with the seizure of Manchuria in
1931–1933. In 1937 came full-scale war with China, and by the end
of 1938, Japan was claiming all of East Asia as its sphere.

Japan's application of the sphere of influence concept to an
entire region of the world was not wholly new. The Western Hemisphere
had often been referred to as being in the United States sphere as a
result of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1940 the sphere concept received
another regional application. The Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy,
and Japan in that year, though not specifically using the term
"sphere of influence," in essence recognized East Asia as
a Japanese sphere and Europe as a German and Italian sphere.

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