The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via facsimile:

"[An individual's] badge received 2709 mRem for December 2011, which gave him a yearly exposure of 5609 mRem for 2011. [The individual had] performed radiography for the first fifteen days of December. [During] the second half of December he worked on paperwork before leaving the company. He had left his personal radiation monitoring equipment in the front compartment of the x-ray rig truck during the second half of December."

The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via E-mail.

"During a telephone call on February 29, 2012 with International Testing and Inspection Services, Inc., the company president stated that they had returned a sealed source (QSA Global, Inc., Model Number 87703, Serial Number 70162B) contained in a radiography camera (Industrial Nuclear Company, Inc., Model Number IR-100, Serial Number 4311) after the slide connector on the source assembly would not move.

"On March 1, 2012, two health physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control Program went to the licensee's facility to determine if this met the reporting requirements of 10CFR 30.50(b)(2). The Arkansas equivalent regulation is RH-1502.f.2.

"The Radiation Safety Officer was not available at the time; however, the health physicists were able to interview the radiography crew using the camera during the failure. The radiography crew indicated that upon arrival at a job site on February 20, 2012, while attempting to connect the control assembly cable, they were unable to move the slide connector on the source assembly. They contacted the company president and returned to the office. The company president informed the Radiation Safety Officer.

"After returning to the office the camera and source were removed from service and returned to Industrial Nuclear Company, Inc. (manufacturer of the camera) on February 24, 2012. Leak tests performed on the camera and sealed source upon arrival at INC, Inc. indicated no contamination.

"Since the source assembly was manufactured by QSA Global, Inc.; Industrial Nuclear Company, Inc. indicated to the licensee that a cause was not identified but that the source assembly needs to be replaced.

"The Arkansas Radiation Control Program has determined that this is reportable under 10CFR 30.50(b)(2) and is making this report to the [NRC] Operations Center. The Program [Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control Program] continues to investigate to identify the problem with the source assembly.

"No overexposures to the public or to the radiography crew resulted from this event."

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM

"Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm [was indicated] due to changing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level. Investigation of the event indicates that the reactor vessel head vent spool piece was removed at the time the RCS level started decreasing. A vacuum existed in the RCS at the time of removal of the spool piece which caused air to enter the reactor vessel head. The RCS level decrease was due to this. The charging system was placed in service at 80 gpm to regain the RCS level back to the original level. A walk down of all plant areas where leakage could have occurred has been completed with no leakage found. The charging system has been secured and RCS level is stable at this time."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Minnesota, the State of Wisconsin, and local authorities in both states. The licensee will be issuing a press release.

"NUE [Notification of Unusual Event] CU1.1, unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm that was entered at 0624 [CST] on 3/6/2012 at the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant has been terminated at 1136 on 3/6/2012. The entry criteria for CU 1.1 is no longer met as validated by a stable reactor coolant system level and no leakage found by plant walk downs."

"At 1613 [CST], FCS [Fort Calhoun Station] Control Room was notified by corporate communications that 2 non-adjacent sirens out of 101 total sirens lost communication. These were Siren #1 at 1602 [CST] and Siren #50 at 1609 [CST] due to potential router issues. Required compensatory actions were established at 1630 [CST] for loss of the 2 sirens. Initial troubleshooting revealed radio communication failed at 1543 [CST] and manual testing of the remaining sirens was instituted.

"At 1643 [CST], corporate communications notified the Control Room initial testing on Siren #2 was not responding and indicative that all sirens were lost. Based on that report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed. Local Law Enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties to perform required actions in case of an emergency with the sirens unavailable. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public by local law enforcement in case of an actual emergency.

"Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router dual power supply had failed at 1539 [CST] and has been replaced. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren. As of 1750 [CST], all sirens [were] restored to functional status. The power supply failure resulted in 2.2 hours with the sirens being unavailable. Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured.

"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for, 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'."