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entitled 'Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting and
Communication on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities'
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
May 2013:
Defense Infrastructure:
DOD Should Improve Reporting and Communication on Its Corrosion
Prevention and Control Activities:
GAO-13-270:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-270, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of
facility maintenance and the expected service life of DOD facilities.
While corrosion is not always highly visible, it can lead to
structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental
damage. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed DOD’s
corrosion prevention and control program for facilities and
infrastructure. In this report, GAO assessed the extent that DOD (1)
met reporting requirements, (2) maintained accurate return-on-
investment data in its records, and (3) fully informed relevant
officials of its corrosion-control efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies
and plans, met with corrosion-control officials, and visited and
interviewed officials at 32 installations.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $68 million in
80 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new
technology addressing infrastructure-related corrosion, but project
managers have not submitted all required reports on the results of
these efforts to the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion
Office). The DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan
requires project managers to submit a final report when a project is
complete, and submit a follow-on report within two years after the
military department implements the technology. As of November 2012,
GAO found that project managers had not submitted final reports for 50
of the 80 projects (63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through
2010. Also, project managers had not submitted follow-on reports for
15 of the 41 projects (37 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through
2007. GAO found that the Corrosion Office’s tracking system lacks key
information to help ensure that project managers meet reporting
requirements. Furthermore, the Corrosion Office is not fully
exercising its authority to identify and implement options or
incentives to address funding and other reasons given for not meeting
reporting milestones. Also, GAO found inconsistency among the military
departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives’ (Corrosion
Executives) in holding project managers accountable for submitting the
required reports. Without effective actions to ensure timely
submission of final and follow-on reports, decision makers may be
unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion.
The Corrosion Office maintains records on its infrastructure-related
corrosion projects, including initial and reassessed return-on-
investment estimates, for internal and external reporting, such as in
DOD’s annual budget report to Congress. GAO found that the Corrosion
Office’s records showed updates to the initial estimates for the
proposed projects, but the office has not consistently updated its
records to show the reassessed estimates included in the follow-on
reports. Specifically, GAO found that the Corrosion Office did not
update data in its records for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) with
completed follow-on reports. Federal internal control standards
require agencies to use internal controls to provide assurance that
they have reliable financial and other reports for internal and
external use. Without accurate and timely data, Congress and DOD
managers may not have reliable information on the estimated return on
investment as they oversee corrosion projects.
DOD’s Corrosion Executives use mechanisms, such as briefings and site
visits, to collect and disseminate information on corrosion-control
activities in their departments; however, GAO found that slightly more
than half of public works officials interviewed at 32 installations
were unaware of DOD’s corrosion-related offices and resources. Under
federal statute, Corrosion Executives are tasked with coordinating
corrosion activities in their departments. GAO found that many
relevant service officials interviewed did not receive key corrosion-
control information because their Corrosion Executives do not have
targeted communication strategies and accompanying action plans.
Without a strategy and action plan, managers of facilities and
infrastructure may not have access to all available information on
efficient methods for corrosion prevention and control.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends five actions to improve DOD’s project reporting and
tracking, the accuracy of its return-on-investment data, and its
communication with stakeholders on corrosion-control activities for
facilities and other infrastructure. DOD partially concurred with
three recommendations and did not agree with two. DOD plans to
implement a web-based tracking tool to improve data timeliness and
standardization, among other actions. GAO continues to believe that
its recommendations to improve project reporting are warranted, that
the Corrosion Office should use its existing authorities to identify
and implement other incentives for project managers to meet reporting
milestones and that DOD should revise its guidance so that Corrosion
Executives would assist with the oversight of project reporting.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-270]. For more
information, contact James R. McTigue Jr. at (202) 512-7968 or
mctiguej@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the Results of
Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects:
Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately Reflect the
Return-On-Investment Estimates in the Military Departments' Follow-On
Reports:
Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate Information, but
Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service Officials Receive Key
Corrosion-Control Information:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and
Other Infrastructure:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD's Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010:
Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007:
Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had
Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-on-Investment Estimates in
the Follow-on Reports and the Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office
Records:
Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD Facilities
and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance Categories for Fiscal Year
2008; $ in Millions):
Table 5: Military Departments' Original Return-on-Investment Estimates
in Project Plans Compared to Return on Investment Shown in Follow-on
Reports:
Figures:
Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions:
Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached Various
Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012):
Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities and
Other Infrastructure Officials:
Abbreviation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
May 31, 2013:
The Honorable Robert Wittman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
House of Representatives:
In 2013 the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated
cost of corrosion was about $20.8 billion annually to prevent and
mitigate corrosion of all of its assets, including military equipment,
weapons, and facilities and other infrastructure.[Footnote 1] While
the vast majority of these costs are related to corrosion issues on
military equipment and weapons, the cost of corrosion at DOD
facilities and other infrastructure[Footnote 2] was estimated to be
about $1.9 billion annually.[Footnote 3] The vast size of DOD's real-
estate portfolio of more than 555,000 facilities--including barracks,
commissaries, data centers, office buildings, laboratories,
maintenance depots, storage tanks, and piers--and linear structures,
such as pipelines, roads, and runways, on more than 28-million acres
provides additional challenges for DOD in preventing and repairing
damage from corrosion of its infrastructure. Corrosion is defined in
Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code as the
deterioration of a material or its properties due to a reaction of
that material with its chemical environment.[Footnote 4] Corrosion is
not always highly visible; nevertheless, it can lead to structural
failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental damage.
Congress has taken a series of legislative actions aimed at enhancing
DOD's ability to effectively address corrosion prevention and
mitigation and provide the Congress with greater transparency over the
department's efforts. In 2002, Congress passed legislation that led to
the creation of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight
(hereafter referred to as the Corrosion Office) within the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics. The Corrosion Office is responsible for the prevention and
mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure.
[Footnote 5] Among other things, Section 2228 of Title 10 of the
United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and
implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of
corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the
department, including, among other things, (1) expansion of emphasis
on corrosion prevention and mitigation to include infrastructure; (2)
uniform application of requirements and criteria for testing and
certifying new technologies for equipment and infrastructure with
similar characteristics, missions or operating environments; and (3)
implementation of programs to ensure a focused and coordinated
approach to collect, review, validate, and distribute information on
proven corrosion prevention methods and products. Additionally, the
statute requires the Secretary of Defense to annually submit, along
with the defense budget materials, a report to Congress on corrosion
funding, including funding requirements for the long-term strategy,
and including the returns on investment[Footnote 6] for corrosion-
control technology demonstration projects.
In 2008, section 903 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Departments of
Army, Navy and Air Force to each designate a Corrosion Control and
Prevention Executive (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executive) to
be the senior official in each military department with responsibility
for coordinating department-level corrosion prevention and control
program activities.[Footnote 7] Section 903, among other things,
assigned responsibility to the three Corrosion Executives for (1)
coordinating department-level corrosion prevention and control
activities (including budget programming) with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers of the military
departments, and relevant major subordinate commands of each military
department; (2) ensuring that corrosion prevention and control is
maintained in each department's policy and guidance, including
military infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance; (3)
identifying the funding levels necessary for accomplishing certain
corrosion-related priorities in each department, and (4) submitting an
annual report to the Secretary of Defense with recommendations
pertaining to the corrosion prevention and control program of each
department. Section 903 also designated each military department's
Corrosion Executive as that department's principal point of contact
with the Director of the Corrosion Office.
To carry out its responsibilities, the Corrosion Office took a number
of actions, including the development of an instruction to establish
policy, assign responsibilities and provide guidance for corrosion
prevention and control within DOD; and development of a strategic plan
to describe policies, strategies, objectives and plans aimed toward an
effective DOD-wide approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure. Additionally, the Corrosion
Office and military departments have identified and funded corrosion
projects in which the military departments demonstrated new technology
to address corrosion, and the Corrosion Office has required military
departments' project managers to submit periodic reports on the status
and outcomes of these projects.
We have examined DOD's corrosion issues for a number of years and this
is our first report focusing on DOD's corrosion-control activities for
DOD facilities and other infrastructure, including projects to
demonstrate new technology that can prevent or mitigate corrosion.
[Footnote 8] In response to your request, GAO reviewed DOD's corrosion
prevention and mitigation program for facilities and other
infrastructure. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the
military services have met DOD requirements to submit reports on
corrosion technology demonstration projects; (2) the extent to which
the return-on-investment data submitted by the military departments is
accurately reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office;
and (3) the extent to which DOD's corrosion-control officials have
fully informed relevant officials within each department about efforts
to prevent and mitigate corrosion of facilities and other
infrastructure. We also provide information on the results of the
Corrosion Office-sponsored cost-of-corrosion studies of DOD facilities
and other infrastructure (see appendix I).[Footnote 9]
To address our first objective, we obtained project information on 80
infrastructure-related corrosion projects proposed by the military
departments and approved for funding by the Corrosion Office for
fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote 10] We reviewed project
documentation--project plans, bimonthly or quarterly status reports,
final project reports, and project follow-on reports--to determine if
reports were submitted and the data met the Corrosion Office's
reporting requirements. To assess the reliability of the data, we met
with Corrosion Office officials to identify the process by which DOD
generated and tracked project data, and we reviewed the documents for
any missing data, outliers, or other errors. If the military
departments did not provide the required information, we interviewed
the Corrosion Executives and the military departments' research and
development officials (project managers)--who were the principal
authors and points of contact for the facilities and other
infrastructure projects--to determine their rationale for not
completing the required reports. According to the DOD Corrosion
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, a final report must be
submitted when each demonstration project is completed. According to
Corrosion Office officials, each demonstration project typically is
completed within two years after the receipt of funding. For the
purposes of our work in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005
through 2010, we considered a final report to be submitted if the
Corrosion Office had a copy of the report in its records system. We
did not consider the timeliness of the submitted reports.
Additionally, the DOD strategic plan requires that follow-on reports
be submitted for completed projects within two years after the
projects have been completed and transitioned to use within the
military departments According to Corrosion Office officials, the
transition period to implement the demonstrated technology in a
military department can be up to one year. As a result, for follow-on
reports, we could assess only the projects funded in fiscal years 2005
through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects). For completed projects, we
documented the initial return-on-investment estimates shown in the
project plans and the resulting change, if any, shown in the follow-on
reports. We determined that the project reporting data was
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to
which the military departments met the Corrosion Office's reporting
requirements, but we did not determine the timeliness of the reports
or assess elements of reports.
The DOD strategic plan uses the phrase "return-on-investment
validation" to describe how project managers recompute the return-on-
investment estimate included in a project's follow-on report. This
recomputation is based on revised cost data after the project has been
completed and the new technology has been transitioned to the
services' use and tracked for two years. We are using the terms
"reassessment" or "reassessed" rather than "validation" or "validated"
because they more closely describe the process that the project
managers are to use to review and update, if necessary, the
assumptions used to recompute the initial return-on-investment
estimate. Additionally, Corrosion Office officials told us that they
are planning to use the term "reassessment" in the revised DOD
strategic plan. The reassessment is not an update based on actual
results of the cost savings achieved by the project.
To address our second objective, for all 105 infrastructure-related
corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we
compared the return-on-investment estimates found in the project plans
with the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion
Office's records to determine if any inconsistencies existed in the
data. When we found inconsistencies between the return-on-investment
estimates in the project plans and the Corrosion Office's records, we
asked the Corrosion Office to explain the inconsistencies and provide
additional information to help reconcile the differences in the
estimates. Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates
maintained in the Corrosion Office's records for projects funded in
fiscal years 2005 through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates
contained in the military departments' follow-on reports to check for
any differences between the two sets of records.
To address our third objective, we reviewed related guidance,
documents, policies, and procedures regarding the management of DOD's
corrosion prevention and mitigation program. We interviewed officials
at various levels within DOD--Corrosion Office officials, Corrosion
Executives, the military services' installation management commands,
and facility and infrastructure managers within the services' civil
engineering and public works components--to discuss their corrosion
prevention and control efforts, including challenges and successes in
implementing new corrosion technologies. We selected a nonprobability
sample of 32 installations; conducted site visits with 6 of these 32
military installations[Footnote 11] and completed semistructured
interviews via conference calls with the other 26 military
installations to collect information and views from facility and
infrastructure management officials about their corrosion management
efforts. In selecting the 32 installations for our nonprobability
sample,[Footnote 12] we limited the installations for selection to
those active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by
the federal government and ensured a range of locations were selected
from each of the four military services and across the geographic
regions of the United States.[Footnote 13] Our selection criteria also
included the selection of installations with different environmental
conditions,[Footnote 14] some joint bases, and installations that
participated in the Corrosion Office's corrosion technologies
demonstration projects. The purpose of our semistructured interviews
was to understand how the installation officials (1) use policies,
plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2) address
corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their maintenance
and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate
information on relevant corrosion topics.[Footnote 15] We determined
that the data used to select the installations included in our review
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of selecting our
nonprobability sample. We provide more details about installation
selection methodology and data-collection efforts in our scope and
methodology section in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD's Strategic Planning and Guidance for Corrosion Prevention and
Control:
DOD submitted the first version of its long-term corrosion strategy to
Congress in December 2003. DOD developed this long-term strategy in
response to direction in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003.[Footnote 16] In November 2004, DOD revised
its long-term corrosion strategy and issued its DOD Corrosion
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. DOD strives to update its
strategic plan periodically, most recently in February 2011, and
officials stated the next update in planned for 2013. The purpose of
DOD's strategic plan is to articulate policies, strategies, objectives
and plans that will ensure an effective, standardized, affordable DOD-
wide approach to prevent, detect and treat corrosion and its effects
on military equipment and infrastructure.
In January 2008, the department first issued DOD Instruction 5000.67,
Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and
Infrastructure, which was canceled and reissued with the same title in
February 2010.[Footnote 17] The stated purpose of the instruction is
to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide guidance for
the establishment and management of programs to prevent or mitigate
corrosion of DOD's military equipment and infrastructure. This
instruction describes legislative requirements and assigns the
Corrosion Executives responsibility for certain corrosion prevention
and control activities in their respective military departments. It
requires the Corrosion Executives to submit information on proposed
corrosion projects to the Corrosion Office with coordination through
the proper military department's chain of command, as well as to
develop support, and provide the rationale for resources to initiate
and sustain effective corrosion prevention and mitigation programs in
each military department.
Corrosion Office Operations:
According to statute and DOD guidance, the Director of the Corrosion
Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion
of DOD equipment and infrastructure. The Director's duties include
developing and recommending policy guidance on corrosion control,
reviewing the corrosion-control programs and funding levels proposed
by the Secretary of each military department during DOD's internal
annual budget review, and submitting recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense regarding those programs and proposed funding levels. In
addition, the Director of the Corrosion Office periodically holds
meetings with the DOD Corrosion Board of Directors and serves as the
lead on the Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team.
[Footnote 18] The Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product
Team includes representatives from the military departments, the Joint
Staff, and other stakeholders who help accomplish the various
corrosion-control goals and objectives. This team also includes the
seven Working Integrated Product Teams which implement corrosion
prevention and control activities. These seven product teams are
organized to address the following areas: corrosion policy, processes,
procedures and oversight; metrics, impact, and sustainment;
specifications, standards, and qualification process; training and
certification; communications and outreach; science and technology;
and facilities. Appendix A of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and
Mitigation Strategic Plan contains action plans for each product team,
including policies, objectives, strategies, planned actions and
results to date.
To accomplish its oversight and coordination responsibilities, the
Corrosion Office has ongoing efforts to improve the awareness,
prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and
infrastructure, including (1) hosting triannual corrosion forums; (2)
conducting cost-of-corrosion studies; (3) operating two corrosion
websites; (4) publishing an electronic newsletter; (5) working with
industry and academia to develop training courses and new corrosion
technologies; and (6) providing funding for corrosion-control
demonstration projects proposed and implemented by the military
departments. According to the Corrosion Office, these corrosion
activities enhance and institutionalize the corrosion prevention and
mitigation program within DOD.
To receive funding from the Corrosion Office, the military departments
submit project plans for their proposed projects that are evaluated by
a panel of experts assembled by the Director of the Corrosion Office.
The Corrosion Office generally funds up to $500,000 per project, and
the military departments generally pledge matching funding for each
project that they propose.[Footnote 19] The level of funding by each
military department and the estimated return on investment are two of
the criteria used to evaluate the proposed projects. Appendix D of the
DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes
instructions for submitting project plans, along with instructions for
submission of final and follow-on reports. For the project selection
process, the military departments submit preliminary project proposals
in the fall and final project proposals in the spring, and the
Corrosion Office considers the final proposals for funding. Projects
that meet the Corrosion Office's criteria for funding are announced at
the end of the fiscal year. Figure 1 provides additional details of
the project selection process for a given fiscal year.
Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
Within fiscal year:
Early October:
Corrosion Office data call to military departments for preliminary
projects and cost estimates to help the Corrosion Office determine its
funding requirements for its annual budget materials report.
Late October to late December:
Military departments deliver preliminary projects input with cost
estimates to the Corrosion Office.
February:
DOD submits its budget; Corrosion Office's budget materials report due
to Congress.
Early April:
Corrosion Office data call to military departments for actual project
proposals.
Early to mid-June:
Military departments submit project plans to Corrosion Office.
Mid-June to mid-August:
Project submissions go through various levels of review by DOD.
Early September:
Corrosion Office announces approved projects.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
As part of the project selection process, DOD's strategic plan states
that the estimated return on investment, among other things, must be
documented for each proposed project. The total cost for each project
is based on both the funding requested from the Corrosion Office and
the funding provided by the military departments. DOD records reflect
varying estimated returns on investment and savings for each proposed
project submitted by the military departments. According to the
Corrosion Office, a senior official within each military department
reviews the proposed projects, including the estimated return on
investment, before the project plans are submitted to the Corrosion
Office. Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires
the Secretary of Defense to include the expected return on investment
that would be achieved by implementing the department's long-term
strategy for corrosion, including available validated data on return
on investment for completed corrosion projects and activities, in his
annual corrosion-control budget report to Congress.
Reporting Requirements:
DOD's strategic plan stipulates three reporting requirements for
approved projects. According to Corrosion Office officials, the
project managers typically are responsible for completing the
reporting requirements. The requirements are to: (1) provide bimonthly
or quarterly project updates until the project is completed,[Footnote
20] (2) submit a final report as soon as each project is completed,
[Footnote 21] and (3) submit a follow-on report within two years after
a project is completed and the technology has transitioned to use
within the military department.[Footnote 22]
Figure 2 provides a breakout of the number of projects that have
reached various reporting milestones as of November 2012. There were
105 infrastructure-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years
2005 through 2012, in which:
* 41 projects had reached the milestone for submitting final and
follow-on reports, including return-on-investment reassessments;
* 39 projects had reached only the milestone for submitting final
reports; and:
* 25 projects were not yet complete, thus they have not reached the
milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports.
Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached Various
Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012):
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Infrastructure-related demonstration projects: Fiscal years 2005-2012:
105 funded projects:
* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+;
* 39 projects: FY 2008-2010; Years 3 and 4;
* 25 projects: FY 2011-2012; Years 1 and 2; 25 projects had not
reached the milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports.
80 projects had reached milestone for submitting final reports:
* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+;
* 39 projects: FY 2008-2010; Years 3 and 4.
41 projects had reached milestone for submitting follow-on reports:
* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Prior GAO Work on DOD's Corrosion Prevention and Control Program:
In September 2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office performs an
analysis to determine the average return-on-investment estimates for
projects that it cites in its annual corrosion-control budget report
to Congress.[Footnote 23] Additionally, we reported that the Corrosion
Office did not use the most up-to-date data for the projects' returns
on investment or provide support for the projects' average return on
investment that was cited in its fiscal year 2013 corrosion-control
budget report to Congress. We recommended that DOD provide an
explanation of its return-on-investment methodology and analysis,
including the initial and, to the extent available, the reassessed
return-on-investment estimates. However, DOD did not agree with our
recommendation. In its written comments, DOD generally restated the
methodology in its strategic plan, which the military departments use
to estimate the projected return on investment of each project. DOD
did not provide any additional reasons why it did not use current
return-on-investment estimates in its report to Congress.
Additionally, in our December 2010 review, we recommended that DOD
update applicable guidance, such as Instruction 5000.67, to further
define the responsibilities of the Corrosion Executives to include
more specific oversight and review of corrosion project plans before
and during the selection process.[Footnote 24] However, DOD did not
agree with our recommendation and stated that DOD-level policy
documents are high-level documents that delineate responsibilities to
carry out the policy and that specific implementing guidance is
provided through separate documentation. Further, in some of our
earlier work, we reported that the secretaries of the military
departments did not have procedures and milestones to hold major
commands and program offices accountable for achieving strategic goals
to address corrosion regarding facilities and weapons systems.
[Footnote 25] DOD agreed with our recommendations to define and
incorporate measurable, outcome-oriented objectives and performance
measures into its long-term corrosion mitigation strategy that show
progress toward achieving results. Additionally, in May 2013 GAO
issued a separate report assessing DOD's and the military departments'
strategic plans.[Footnote 26] All the related GAO products are listed
at the end of this report.
DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the Results of
Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects:
DOD has not ensured that all final and follow-on reports on the
results of its infrastructure-related corrosion projects were
submitted as required by its strategic plan. As of November 2012, our
review found that project managers had not submitted the required
final reports for 50 of the 80 projects (over 60 percent) funded from
fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, for 41 of the 80 projects that
were funded from 2005 through 2007, we found that the project managers
had not submitted the required follow-on reports for more than a third
of the projects (15 of the 41 projects). DOD's Corrosion Office, the
military departments' Corrosion Executives, and the military
departments' project managers cited various reasons for not meeting
reporting milestones. DOD's Corrosion Office has not effectively used
its existing authority to hold project management offices accountable
for submitting required reports at prescribed milestones and the
office lacks an effective method for tracking reports submitted by the
project managers. Moreover, DOD has not provided clear guidance to the
military departments' Corrosion Executives on their responsibilities
and authorities for assisting the Corrosion Office in holding their
project management offices accountable for submitting reports for
their infrastructure-related corrosion projects.
Project Managers Have Not Submitted Many Final and Follow-On Reports:
DOD has invested more than $68 million in 80 infrastructure-related
corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, but
project managers have not submitted all of the required reports on
whether the corrosion-control technologies are effective.[Footnote 27]
DOD's strategic plan[Footnote 28] states that project plans should
include a milestone schedule for reporting, including quarterly status
reports, final reports and follow-on reports. According to Corrosion
Office officials, if a project is approved, a quarterly status report
is required starting the first week of the fiscal quarter after the
contract award and every three months thereafter until the final
report is submitted.[Footnote 29] Also, DOD's strategic plan requires
a final report at project completion, and requires a follow-on report
two years after project completion and transition to use within the
military departments. According to Corrosion Office officials, these
reports provide valuable information on the results of corrosion
projects and in planning future projects.
Over 60 Percent of Final Reports Have Not Been Submitted:
Corrosion Office officials stated that project managers must submit
final reports at project completion, which is typically within two
years after the receipt of the funding of each project. As stipulated
in DOD's strategic plan, final reports should include certain content,
such as an executive summary, lessons learned, recommendations, and
conclusions. However, we found that 50 of the 80 required final
reports (63 percent) for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through
2010 had not been submitted. Table 1 shows the status of final reports
submitted by each service for infrastructure-related projects.
Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010:
Military department: Army;
Total number of projects: 55;
Number of submitted final reports: 21;
Number of outstanding final reports: 34;
Percent of outstanding final reports: 62%.
Military department: Navy;
Total number of projects: 24;
Number of submitted final reports: 9;
Number of outstanding final reports: 15;
Percent of outstanding final reports: 63%.
Military department: Air Force;
Total number of projects: 1;
Number of submitted final reports: 0;
Number of outstanding final reports: 1;
Percent of outstanding final reports: 100%.
Military department: Total;
Total number of projects: 80;
Number of submitted final reports: 30;
Number of outstanding final reports: 50;
Percent of outstanding final reports: 63%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Data as of November 2012.
[End of table]
More than a Third of Follow-On Reports Have Not Been Submitted:
DOD's strategic plan also requires that follow-on reports be submitted
within two years after a project is completed and transitioned to use
in the military department. According to Corrosion Office officials,
this transition period includes up to one year to implement the
technology in a military department. Corrosion Office officials also
told us that they expected the follow-on reports to be submitted
within five years of a project's initial funding. Therefore, follow-on
reports for 41 completed projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through
2007 were due on or before the end of fiscal year 2012. We found that
project managers had not submitted 15 of the 41 required follow-on
reports (37 percent). DOD's strategic plan states that the follow-on
reports should include an assessment of the following areas: project
documentation, project assumptions, responses to mission requirements,
performance expectations, and a comparison between the initial return-
on-investment estimate included in the project plan with the new
estimate. Table 2 shows the status of follow-on reports submitted by
each service. In Appendix III of this report, we provide details of
the returns on investment for all follow-on reports that were
submitted.[Footnote 30]
Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007:
Military department: Army;
Total number of projects: 28;
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 15;
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 13;
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 46%.
Military department: Navy;
Total number of projects: 12;
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 11;
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 1;
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 8%.
Military department: Air Force;
Total number of projects: 1;
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 0;
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 1;
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 100%.
Military department: Total;
Total number of projects: 41;
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 26;
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 15;
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 37%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The total of 26 submitted follow-on reports includes one Army
project that did not warrant the completion of a follow-on report,
according to its final report. Data as of November 2012.
[End of table]
According to officials in the Corrosion Office, final and follow-on
reports are used to assess the effectiveness of the corrosion projects
and determine if continued implementation of the technology is useful.
As Corrosion Office officials review project managers' final reports,
they stated that they focus on any lessons learned, technical
findings, conclusions and recommendations, and whether the results
from the report should trigger follow-on investigations of specific
technology and a review for broader applications of the technology.
Officials stated that they review follow-on reports to assure that
necessary implementation actions have been taken and to review changes
in the return-on-investment estimates.
Corrosion Office and Military Departments Cited Various Reasons for
Project Managers Not Submitting Reports:
The military departments and Corrosion Office provided various reasons
to explain why project managers did not complete and submit mandatory
final and follow-on reports within expected timeframes. For example,
officials at the Army Engineering Research Development Center,
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory--who are the project
managers for Army infrastructure projects--stated that funding
challenges, problems with contractor performance, and personnel issues
contributed to delays in completing the final reports, but
acknowledged that it was their responsibility to reduce their
longstanding backlog. Additionally, according to the Navy's Corrosion
Executive, officials of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(Engineering Support Center)--who are the project managers for Navy
infrastructure projects--did not have sufficient funding to complete
and submit all required reports. Finally, according to a Corrosion
Office official, the final report for the one Air Force fiscal year
2005 project was not submitted because the project manager did not
complete it before retiring.
Additionally, Corrosion Office officials cited other reasons that a
project manager may be late in completing the required reports, such
as lengthy coordination processes and the lack of priority that
military departments' officials place on completing required reports.
The officials stated that they expect the military departments'
project managers to complete final reports within two years after
receipt of funds, and it is the military departments' responsibility
to plan so that funding is available to complete all required reports.
To assist the military departments with their responsibility, the
Corrosion Office in fiscal year 2011 offered personnel and funding
resources to the military departments to conduct the return-on-
investment reassessments needed to complete follow-on reports.
According to the Corrosion Office, only the Navy accepted the funds to
complete all but one return-on-investment reassessment. According to
an official in the Army Corrosion Executive's office, he informed the
project managers about the additional funding, but no one accepted the
offer. We found at least four fiscal year 2006 projects where Army
project managers did not use the available funding to complete and
submit the required reports. Officials from the Army's project
management office told us that the project managers did not accept the
additional funding to complete the 2006 projects because they had some
work performance issues with the contractor assigned to complete the
return-on-investment reassessments. In April 2012, these officials
told us that follow-on reports for three projects were written but
have not been submitted to the Corrosion Office, and the remaining
follow-on report was still under development. As of November 2012, we
found that these reports, which were due by the end of fiscal year
2011, still had not been submitted to the Corrosion Office. Further,
the Air Force did not complete the follow-on report for its one
corrosion project funded in fiscal year 2005. According to Corrosion
Office officials, they did not require the Air Force to complete the
follow-on report for this project because the demonstration was
successful and the technology was implemented elsewhere within DOD.
Corrosion Office's Tracking System Does Not Ensure That Project
Managers Submit Required Reports:
Corrosion Office officials told us that they track each corrosion
project's progress and review submitted final and follow-on reports
for findings and broad application of corrosion-prevention techniques
and approaches, including changes in the project's initial and
reassessed return-on-investment estimates. However, the Corrosion
Office's tracking system is limited and does not record the reason for
late reporting or set new reporting deadlines. According to Section
2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense
is required to report specific information including the expected
return on investment that would be achieved by implementing the
department's long-term strategy for corrosion, including available
validated data on return on investment for completed corrosion
projects and activities, in his annual corrosion-control budget report
to Congress. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government require federal managers to establish internal control
activities, such as controls over information processing, segregation
of duties, and accurate and timely recording of transactions and
events--including pertinent information to determine whether they are
meeting their goals--to help ensure that management's directives are
carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective
stewardship of public resources.[Footnote 31]
Specifically, the Corrosion Office employs a contractor to maintain
electronic records about all corrosion projects. Corrosion Office
officials stated that project managers submit copies of their reports
to the Corrosion Office and to the respective Corrosion Executive. On
a monthly basis, the contractor checks each project's records to
determine if the project managers have submitted the required reports.
If a project manager has not submitted a required report, the
contractor notifies the Corrosion Office and that office contacts the
relevant project manager and that manager's Corrosion Executive. At
that point, a Corrosion Office official encourages project managers to
submit the report as soon as possible, but the Corrosion Office does
not record a reason for late reporting and does not set a new
reporting deadline. Also, the Corrosion Office officials stated that
they elevate discussions about late filers in the three forums held
each year that include meetings between Corrosion Office officials and
Corrosion Executives. However, the Corrosion Office's tracking system
does not require that the project managers include certain
information, such as stating reasons for missing a reporting deadline
and identifying a revised deadline for submitting their reports.
Additionally, the format developed by the Corrosion Office for
completing the follow-on reports does not include a data field that
would document when the project managers submitted their follow-on
reports to the office. By not adopting an enhanced tracking system
that includes revised deadlines, among other things, the Corrosion
Office is unable to effectively monitor whether project managers are
working toward new timeframes to complete overdue reports. Without
effective tracking, the Corrosion Office will allow a number of
project managers to continue the practice of not submitting the
required reports and project managers will not fully inform decision
makers of the latest outcomes of the corrosion-control projects.
Corrosion Office Uses Routine Communication Methods to Encourage
Project Management Offices to Submit Required Reports, but Has Not
Employed Other Options:
Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term corrosion
strategy that should include, among other things, implementation of
programs to ensure a focused and coordinated approach to collect,
review, validate, and distribute information on proven corrosion
prevention methods and products. In response to this requirement, the
Corrosion Office oversees corrosion projects and uses routine
communication methods and follow-up to encourage the project
management offices to submit the required reports, but the office is
not employing other options that would hold project management offices
accountable for reporting milestones. For example, Corrosion Office
officials stated that they have initiated telephone conversations and
e-mails to project managers to reemphasize reporting requirements and
have had limited success in obtaining some of the outstanding reports.
However, there are other options beyond routine communications that
the Corrosion Office could take to make project managers accountable
for submitting timely reports, such as using funding incentives or
changing evaluation criteria for project selection. Corrosion Office
officials told us that they considered holding back funding for future
projects from project management organizations that missed reporting
deadlines, but they chose not to implement this action because it
could delay progress in addressing corrosion control within the
department. Although the Corrosion Office in 2011 offered the military
departments additional funding to complete and submit follow-on
reports, Corrosion Office officials stated that they would not set
aside a portion of its annual funds in the future to assist project
management offices in the completion of outstanding reports due to
uncertainty in annual funding.
Further, a senior Corrosion Office official stated that the office has
considered but not adopted criteria for new projects that would
include a project management office's past reporting performance as an
indicator for assessing corrosion project plans. DOD's strategic plan
refers to factors that are used by the evaluation panel to assess
project plans and determine which to approve and fund. The evaluation
factors, among other things, include whether the proposed project can
be completed within a two-year timeframe, the risk associated with the
project, and the estimated return on investment. The senior Corrosion
Office official told us that the office has considered including a
factor that would assess a project management office's history of
reporting performance as a criterion for deciding whether to approve
and fund the office's future projects; however, the office decided not
to do so. The official stated that a successful project is one that
reduces the impact of corrosion on weapon systems and/or
infrastructure, and a project's report in and of itself does not
contribute to the success of the project. However, late submissions of
reports could delay communication of project outcomes as planners are
considering funding new projects, as well as limit key information
that should be included in the annual corrosion-control budget report
to Congress. The Corrosion Office has not implemented other options to
better ensure that project managers consistently submit required
reports. Internal control standards emphasize the importance of
performance-based management to ensure program effectiveness,
efficiency, and good stewardship of government resources. Without
using its existing authorities for oversight and coordination to
identify and implement possible options or incentives for addressing
the various funding, personnel, or other reasons cited by project
management offices for not meeting reporting milestones, the Corrosion
Office may be missing opportunities to effectively reduce the number
of outstanding reports, enforce requirements, and ensure that the
valuable information in past projects is known and appropriately
documented.
Corrosion Executives Have Not Taken Consistent Actions to Ensure
Timely Submission of Required Reports:
The three military departments' Corrosion Executives work with project
managers for the infrastructure-related corrosion projects to ensure
that the reporting requirements are being met; however, they have not
taken effective actions to ensure that all project managers submit
their required reports on a timely basis. DOD Instruction 5000.67
describes responsibilities for Corrosion Executives, such as being the
principal points of contact for each military department to the
Director of the Corrosion Office, developing, supporting, and
providing the rationale for resources for initiating and sustaining
effective corrosion prevention and control in the department,
evaluating the effectiveness of each department's program, and
establishing a process to collect information on the results of
corrosion prevention and control activities.
While DOD's strategic plan and other guidance--such as its corrosion
instruction--identify the Corrosion Executives' overall role in the
management of each military department's corrosion prevention and
control program, the Corrosion Executives do not have clearly defined
roles for holding their project managers accountable for submitting
required reports. During our discussions with the military
departments' Corrosion Executives, we found that each executive varied
in describing the extent of his work with corrosion project managers
to ensure that the required reports are completed. For example,
officials within the office of the Army's Corrosion Executive told us
that they are involved in all aspects of the corrosion demonstration
project and receive updates and reports from the Army's project
managers. Also, these officials stated that they are in the process of
developing additional policy on facilities and other infrastructure to
improve the corrosion project process and provide an Army funding
mechanism to cover costs of reporting after expiration of initial
project funding. However, for the infrastructure-related corrosion
projects, the other two military departments have not been as involved
as the Army in ensuring that project managers submit required reports.
For example, the Air Force's Corrosion Executive stated that he
coordinates with the Corrosion Office to track outstanding reports and
can task the project managers to complete the required reports by
going through the appropriate chain of command. Also, the Navy's
Corrosion Executive told us that he maintains a level of awareness on
the status of projects' reports, but does not play an active role in
the submission of project reports because project managers have the
responsibility to submit reports to the Corrosion Office.
DOD's strategic plan and instruction assign specific responsibilities
to the Corrosion Executives; however, these documents do not clearly
define a role for the Corrosion Executives in ensuring that all
project managers submit mandatory reports. Without clearly defined
responsibilities for the Corrosion Executives to help ensure required
reporting, the Corrosion Executives may not take a leading role in
holding project managers accountable for completing and submitting
mandatory reports. If a number of project managers continue to be late
in completing mandatory reports, decision makers are unlikely to be
fully informed about whether implemented projects used effective
technology to address corrosion issues and whether this technology
could have broader uses throughout the military departments'
installations.
Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately Reflect the
Return-On-Investment Estimates in the Military Departments' Follow-On
Reports:
The Corrosion Office maintains data for its infrastructure-related
corrosion projects, but the office has not updated all of its records
to accurately reflect the return-on-investment estimates that are
provided in the military departments' follow-on reports. The data
maintained by the Corrosion Office includes the financial investments
provided by the Corrosion Office and the military departments, the
estimated savings expected, and the calculated return-on-investment
estimates for all of the military departments' funded and unfunded
corrosion projects. Additionally, for each project, the Corrosion
Office maintains data on whether the project managers have completed
and submitted the required follow-on report and the value of the
reassessed return-on-investment estimate in that follow-on report. The
follow-on report shows, among other things, a comparison of the new
estimate and the initial return-on-investment estimate included in the
project plan. According to Corrosion Office officials, the data
contained in its records system are used for reporting purposes, both
internally and externally, such as the stated estimated returns on
investment that are summarized in DOD's annual corrosion budget report
to Congress. According to Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government,[Footnote 32] agencies should use internal controls
that provide a reasonable assurance that the agencies have effective
and efficient operations, and have reliable financial reports and
other reports for internal and external use. Further, this guidance
requires, in part, controls over information processing, and accurate
and timely recording of transactions and events, to help ensure that
management's directives are carried out and managers achieve desired
results through effective stewardship of public resources.
During our review, we found differences between the initial return-on-
investment estimates included in project plans and the initial
estimates in the Corrosion Office's records for 44 of the 105 projects
(42 percent). The Corrosion Office provided reasons for correcting
data. Specifically, according to the Corrosion Office officials, there
were two main reasons for these differences: (1) funding-level changes
between the estimate included in initial project plan and funding
provided when the project was approved; and (2) incorrect computations
of the estimated returns on investment by the project managers that
required the Corrosion Office to recalculate the estimate to ensure
consistency and accuracy. However, when comparing the reassessed
return-on-investment estimates included in the projects' follow-on
reports with the reassessed estimates in the Corrosion Office's
records, we found that the Corrosion Office had not updated all of its
records with the return-on-investment estimates from the follow-on
reports. Specifically, we found that for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent)
funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the Corrosion Office had not
updated its records to reflect the reassessed return-on-investment
estimates included in the projects' follow-on reports. The return-on-
investment estimates for these 5 projects were from outdated sources,
such as project plans and final reports.[Footnote 33] Specifically,
the return-on-investment estimates for 3 Army projects were taken from
final reports that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in June
2007. Also, the return-on-investment estimates for one Army and one
Navy project were from the project plans that had been submitted to
the Corrosion Office in June 2004 and October 2004, respectively.
Table 3 identifies the 5 projects funded in 2005 that had
discrepancies in data.
Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had
Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-on-Investment Estimates in
the Follow-on Reports and the Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office
Records:
Army:
Funded project: Leak Detection for Pipes and Tanks;
Project number: AR-F-313;
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from
the military departments: 7.3;
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's
records: 10.42.
Funded project: Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft Hangars, Flight
Control Towers, etc.;
Project number: AR-F-320;
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from
the military departments: 6.96;
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's
records: 11.8.
Funded project: Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems;
Project number: AR-F-321;
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from
the military departments: 13.5;
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's
records: 14.41.
Funded project: Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage Tanks Using
Ceramics;
Project number: AR-F-322;
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from
the military departments: 8.56;
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's
records: 10.11.
Navy:
Funded project: Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red Hill Tunnel
Fuel Lines;
Project number: N-F-222;
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from
the military departments: 10.78;
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's
records: 6.86.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Data for projects funded in fiscal year 2005, as of November
2012.
[End of table]
While the Corrosion Office has created records to track the estimated
returns on investment of infrastructure-related corrosion projects, we
found that the office has not adopted a best practice to maintain
reliable data with accurate and timely information throughout its
records. The Corrosion Office may use this return-on-investment data
in its reporting, both internally and externally, such as in DOD's
annual corrosion budget report to Congress. Additionally, in September
2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office did not use current data
for the projects' returns on investment or provide support for the
projects' average return on investment.[Footnote 34] Without accurate
and timely return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion
Office's records for corrosion projects, Congress and DOD corrosion-
control managers may not have sufficient and reliable information
about returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects.
Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate Information, but
Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service Officials Receive Key
Corrosion-Control Information:
Corrosion Executives Use Various Mechanisms to Collect and Share
Corrosion-Control Information:
All the military departments' Corrosion Executives use mechanisms--
such as product team meetings, briefings, conferences, and site
visits--to collect and disseminate information on infrastructure-
related corrosion activities within their departments. Additionally,
the Corrosion Executives host information sessions during the
triannual DOD corrosion forums to discuss their corrosion-related
issues. However, in our interviews with installation officials who
were involved with corrosion work, slightly more than half of the
officials were unaware of DOD's Corrosion Office, their respective
Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and other resources
available through the related offices. According to the Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 903,
[Footnote 35] the Corrosion Executive at each military department is,
among other things, responsible for coordinating corrosion prevention
and control activities with the military department and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers, and relevant
major subordinate commands. Additionally, DOD Instruction 5000.67
directs each Corrosion Executive, in coordination with the proper
chain of command, to establish and maintain a process to collect
information on the results of corrosion-control activities for
infrastructure within its department. Further, the DOD Corrosion
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes a communications
goal to fully inform all levels of DOD about all aspects of corrosion
work[Footnote 36] and states that the rapid and reliable exchange of
information is the core of DOD's new corrosion-control culture. Also,
each military department developed documents for corrosion control and
prevention that acknowledged the importance of communication on
corrosion control. Likewise, internal controls have shown that
organizations benefit from communicating timely information to
management and others to help them achieve their responsibilities.
[Footnote 37]
During this review, we found that the military departments' Corrosion
Executives use various mechanisms to collect and disseminate corrosion-
related information within each department's chain of command.
Additionally, we learned that the Corrosion Executives have
encountered challenges in ensuring that information about their
infrastructure-related corrosion-control initiatives reaches all
relevant service-level officials. Specifically, each military
department identified the following mechanisms and challenges:
Army--In the 2012 U.S. Army Corrosion Prevention and Control Strategic
Plan, the department established an Army Corrosion Board and an Army
Corrosion Integrated Product Team to address corrosion issues.
According to officials in the Corrosion Executive's office, the board
has held its first organizational meeting and the integrated product
team meets as needed, often virtually. Additionally, the officials
explained that they communicate key information on corrosion of Army
facilities and other infrastructure through the relevant Army offices
in the chain of command for installations, using data calls. However,
one Corrosion Executive official stated that the Army does not have a
formal process to communicate directly to officials in the field about
lessons learned or best practices for addressing corrosion of
facilities and other infrastructure. The Army's strategic plan
includes the goal to address poor communication and outreach that may
hinder corrosion-control solutions from being implemented in the field.
Navy--The Navy's Annual Report on Corrosion for Fiscal Year 2011
states that a concerted awareness program is one of the cornerstones
of improving communications about corrosion control and prevention
within the Department of the Navy, which includes the United States
Navy and the United States Marine Corps. The Corrosion Executive
chairs the department's Corrosion Cross-Functional Team, an internal
group of subject matter experts and relevant command officials, to
serve as the primary method for coordinating within the department.
Additionally, the Navy's Corrosion Executive noted that he works
within the department's applicable chain of command for corrosion
issues for facilities and other infrastructure. Further, the Corrosion
Executive stated that the office communicated its roles and
responsibilities through information provided in regular department
communications, such as bulletins, briefings and conferences; and also
through site visits and assessments. However, he noted that the
frequency of opportunities for conferences and site visits will be
limited in the future due to budget constraints. The Navy's strategic
plan for corrosion notes that it will continue to use communications
as a tool in its corrosion-control efforts.
Air Force--In the May 2012 Air Force Enterprise Corrosion Prevention
and Control Strategic Plan, the department acknowledged that
facilities and other infrastructure organizations have not been
integrated into the department's corrosion program. In its strategic
plan, the Air Force highlighted the need to establish lines of
communication, structures, and process to ensure that facilities
incorporate appropriate corrosion control throughout each life cycle.
Also, the Corrosion Executive[Footnote 38] stated that the department
in June 2012 created a Corrosion Control and Prevention Working Group
in which he serves as the lead and meets regularly with the working
group members from the Air Force's major commands and relevant
components. According to the Corrosion Executive, the means for
disseminating and collecting information from the department's
installations are the service organizations within the chain of
command for the affected facilities and other infrastructure. He also
stated that the service's training curriculum will incorporate
important information as needed.
All Relevant Officials Have Not Received Key Corrosion-Control
Information:
During our review, managers and other public works officials at 16 of
31 installations stated that they were not familiar with the Corrosion
Office.[Footnote 39] Officials also told us that their installations
could benefit from the additional information on corrosion control and
prevention offered by these offices. However, Corrosion Executives
stated in interviews that they disseminate corrosion information
through each department's chain of command. In response to our
questions, installation officials provided views in the following
areas:
* Awareness of corrosion offices--In response to our questions of
officials who are responsible for installation maintenance and would
be involved in corrosion-control activities, officials at 16 of 31
installations stated that prior to our work they were not aware of the
Corrosion Office or the relevant military department's Corrosion
Executive.[Footnote 40] In addition, officials at 24 of 29
installations stated they had not contacted the Corrosion Office about
their corrosion work in the last three years.[Footnote 41] Also,
officials at 25 of 29 installations stated that they had not contacted
the respective Corrosion Executive during the same period. However,
officials at 23 of 29 installations stated that they had contacted
their services' installation management command or major commands
about corrosion work in the last three years.
* Knowledge of documents--Officials interviewed at 26 of 29
installations[Footnote 42] stated that they were unfamiliar with the
DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and DOD
Instruction 5000.67, which addresses prevention and mitigation of
corrosion for DOD equipment and infrastructure. Additionally,
officials interviewed at 17 of 29 installations responded that they
were unfamiliar with service corrosion-control plans or strategies.
* Interest in additional information--Many installation officials
stated interest in receiving additional information about corrosion
resources. For example, more than half of the interviewed officials
(17 of 31) stated that the Corrosion Office or the relevant military
department's Corrosion Executive could provide more communications and
enhance awareness about corrosion issues or corrosion-related
resources. An identical number of officials stated that DOD's and the
military departments' corrosion-control offices could support
corrosion-related training as a useful resource for installations.
Specifically, an Army installation official noted that it would be
beneficial for the military services and DOD to disseminate
information about the Corrosion Office and the military departments'
Corrosion Executives, including their roles and responsibilities, and
the assistance they can provide.
* Other suggestions--Officials at installations noted other
suggestions for exchanging information about installations, such as:
holding regular forums and highlighting opportunities for contact with
counterparts at other installations, having a centralized source for
accessing corrosion-related information, disseminating case studies or
best practices relevant to DOD, enhanced use of existing service-
issued newsletters, and planning conferences or communities of
practice. In addition, five respondents suggested providing important
corrosion-related information to the service headquarters, regional
command, or management commands for distribution to the installations.
Additionally, in interviews at the services' installation management
commands, we found officials who stated similar concerns about
communications.[Footnote 43] Officials from installation management
commands stated that they had little contact with Corrosion
Executives. For example, during our interview with one Air Force major
command, a command official stated that the most recent information he
had about the Air Force's Corrosion Executive was from 2008. Another
major command's response did not include the Corrosion Executive as an
organization it interacts with on corrosion issues. Similarly,
officials at three different locations--the Commander of Navy
Installations Command, the Marine Corps Installation Command, and the
Army's Installation Management Command Headquarters--stated that they
had limited or no interaction on infrastructure issues with the
Corrosion Office and their respective Corrosion Executive.[Footnote
44] In addition, the Army official stated that he would like to
receive information on training by the Corrosion Office regarding
corrosion of infrastructure, and that the best channel for the
information would be through the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Installation Management, an office that works with the Army's
Corrosion Executive.
In evaluating communications for corrosion issues for facilities and
other infrastructure, we found that all relevant service officials do
not receive key information because the military departments'
Corrosion Executives do not have a targeted communication strategy for
their military department and an accompanying action plan to ensure
frequent communications between Corrosion Executives and all service
officials involved in corrosion activities for facilities and other
infrastructure. The military departments mention communication in
their strategic plans, but they do not have specific steps for
communicating corrosion-control information for facilities and other
infrastructure at every level. Our prior work on federal organizations
identified key practices and implementation steps for establishing a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report
related progress.[Footnote 45] Without a targeted communication
strategy and accompanying action plan, the Corrosion Executives cannot
ensure that service managers of facilities and other infrastructure
will have access to all information and resources available for
dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and
efficient methods for corrosion control.
Conclusions:
The Department of Defense relies on the outcomes of its corrosion
projects to reduce the life-cycle costs of its facilities and
infrastructure through the timely sharing of information about the
successful projects with all relevant corrosion-control managers.
While the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office)
requires project managers to submit reports on corrosion projects,
many reports have not been submitted when due. In fact, the Corrosion
Office has not adopted methods to enhance tracking, such as recording
the reasons for missed reporting deadlines, new reporting deadlines,
and the submission dates for follow-on reports. Further, although the
Corrosion Office encourages project managers to complete outstanding
reports, it has not exercised its existing oversight and coordination
authorities to identify and implement possible options or incentives
for addressing the various funding, personnel, or other reasons cited
by project management offices for not meeting reporting milestones.
Also, DOD's strategic plan and other guidance do not clearly define a
role for the military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention
Executives (Corrosion Executives), who could assist the Corrosion
Office, in holding the military departments' project management
offices accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in
accordance with DOD's strategic plan. Without effective actions to
ensure timely submission of reports, decision makers may be unaware of
potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. Moreover, the
Corrosion Office is not always updating its records to ensure accurate
information is maintained on reassessed return-on-investment estimates
for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. Without accurate return-
on-investment estimates for corrosion projects, Congress and DOD
corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient information about
returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects.
Finally, slightly more than half of the installation officials (16 of
31 officials) whom we interviewed were unaware of DOD's Corrosion
Office, their respective Corrosion Executive, or the training,
information, and other resources available through the related
offices. Without a targeted communication strategy and accompanying
action plan, the military departments' Corrosion Executives cannot
ensure that managers of facilities and other infrastructure will have
access to all information and resources available for dealing with
corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient methods
for corrosion control.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making five recommendations to improve DOD's corrosion
prevention and control program:
To improve accountability for reporting the results of corrosion-
control demonstration projects affecting DOD infrastructure, we
recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of the Office of
Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take steps to enhance reporting and
project tracking, such as noting the reasons why project management
offices missed a reporting deadline and including any revised
reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports.
To improve the military departments' submission of completed reports
for infrastructure-related corrosion-control demonstration projects at
prescribed milestones, we recommend that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the office's
existing authority to identify and implement possible options or
incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other
reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting reporting
milestones.
Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments
will meet reporting milestones for future projects, we recommend that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics--in coordination with the Director of the Office of
Corrosion Policy and Oversight--revise corrosion-related guidance to
clearly define a role for the military departments' Corrosion Control
and Prevention Executives to assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and
Oversight in holding their departments' project management offices
accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in
accordance with the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic
Plan.
To ensure that Congress, DOD and officials of the military
departments' infrastructure-related corrosion activities have the most
complete and up-to-date information, we recommend that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct
the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take
actions to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely, and
accurate data of the projects' return-on-investment estimates.
To ensure that all relevant infrastructure officials receive pertinent
corrosion information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries
responsible for acquisitions, technology and logistics to require the
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives--in
coordination with their installation management commands and in
consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight--to
develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action
plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key
information to all relevant service officials, particularly to
officials at the installation level, about corrosion-control
activities and initiatives, such as training opportunities and
outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion projects.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written
comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DOD partially concurred with three
of our recommendations and did not agree with two recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to take steps to
enhance the tracking and reporting of its infrastructure-related
corrosion projects. In its comments, DOD stated that it is developing
a web-based tracking tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion
Executives, and project managers to input and extract project-related
data, and DOD expects the change to result in increased timeliness and
standardization of project data to include revised reporting deadlines
for final and follow-on reports. While this system may address our
recommendation, DOD did not state when the new system would be
available for use. In response to our fourth recommendation that DOD
take action to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely and
accurate data on the projects' return on investment, DOD partially
concurred with the recommendation and stated that this new web-based
system would provide data including return-on-investment estimates,
and would be accessible to other parties, including the Corrosion
Office, Corrosion Executives and project managers.
DOD did not agree with our second recommendation that the Corrosion
Office use its existing authority to identify and implement possible
options or incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel,
and other reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting
reporting milestones. In its written comments, DOD disagreed with our
recommendation, but did not state what actions it would take to
improve submission of completed reports from the military services
that DOD's strategic plan requires for infrastructure-related
corrosion projects. DOD stated that prior positive incentives to
complete project reports were largely ineffective. However, as our
report states, there are examples of military departments responding
to incentives, such as the Navy completing 11 of 12 return-on-
investment reassessments after the Corrosion Office provided funding
as an incentive. The reassessments are the main focus of follow-on
reports. Also, DOD stated that its project management offices
occasionally miss reporting milestones and generally have done an
excellent job of meeting their reporting obligations. However, as our
report clearly shows, the project management offices had not submitted
50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) and had not submitted
15 of the 41 required follow-on reports (37 percent) to the Corrosion
Office. Without timely submission of reports, decision makers may be
unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. We
continue to believe that the Corrosion Office could use its existing
authorities to identify and implement other incentives or methods to
address reasons that project management offices cite for not meeting
reporting milestones.
DOD did not agree to our third recommendation to revise guidance to
clearly define the role of Corrosion Executives to assist the
Corrosion Office in holding departments' project management offices
accountable for submitting reports in accordance with DOD's strategic
plan. DOD stated that further guidance is not necessary as the
requirements are clearly stated in the strategic plan. DOD also stated
that Corrosion Executives are given the freedom to manage their
programs in the most efficient and effective manner. However, DOD's
strategic plan and guidance do not define a role for the Corrosion
Executives in assisting the Corrosion Office in the project reporting
process. Our recommendation was intended to fortify the role of
Corrosion Executives in ensuring that project management offices
within the Corrosion Executives' respective military departments
submit project reports as required in the strategic plan. We continue
to believe that the Corrosion Executives could provide the additional
management oversight necessary to strengthen corrosion project
reporting.
DOD partially concurred with our last recommendation that the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force direct the relevant
assistant secretaries to require the military departments' Corrosion
Executives--in coordination with their installation management
commands and in consultation with the Corrosion Office--to develop a
targeted communication strategy and an action plan for their
departments to ensure the timely flow of key information to all
relevant service officials about corrosion-control activities and
initiatives, such as training opportunities and outcomes of
infrastructure-related corrosion projects. DOD commented that
information flow to installations follows the chain of command to
ensure that appropriate individuals receive information necessary for
successful mission completion. The department further stated that the
Corrosion Office would ensure that training information and project
outcomes would be available to all relevant officials via publication
in appropriate media; also, DOD stated that during the next review
cycle the Corrosion Office would evaluate the military department
corrosion prevention and control strategic plans to determine if they
adequately address the flow of information. However, we continue to
believe that each military department should have a targeted
communication strategy, developed in consultation with the Corrosion
Office and coordinated with the installation management commands
within the military departments, and that strategy should go beyond
the publication of information in appropriate media and provide
specific steps for communicating corrosion-control information to all
relevant service corrosion officials. Such a strategy is important
because, as our report states, we found that all corrosion officials
within each military department, particularly at the installation
level, were not receiving relevant corrosion prevention and control
information. Also, we continue to believe that without a targeted
communication strategy and action plan, Corrosion Executives cannot
ensure that service managers of facilities and other infrastructure
will have access to all information and resources for dealing with
corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient methods
for corrosion control.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; Director of the DOD Office of
Corrosion Policy and Oversight, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. In addition, this letter will be made available
at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
James R. McTigue Jr.
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and
Other Infrastructure:
DOD's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office)
sponsors a series of studies to assess the cost of corrosion
throughout the department, including three studies--two completed and
one ongoing--to determine how much money DOD spends on corrosion
activities for its facilities and other infrastructure. These studies
are conducted by LMI using a method approved by the Corrosion Office's
Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team.[Footnote 46]
According to LMI, its estimation methodology includes construction
costs and actual maintenance expenditures for sustainment,
restoration, and modernization that are known or can be identified,
and focuses on tangible, direct material and labor costs as well as
some indirect costs, such as research and development and training. In
its studies, LMI noted that although corrosion maintenance costs are a
subset of sustainment, restoration, and modernization costs, the tools
and analysis methods used by planners to estimate sustainment,
restoration, and modernization requirements do not specifically
identify corrosion.
In its first report in May 2007, LMI determined that spending on
corrosion prevention and control for DOD facilities and other
infrastructure for fiscal year 2005 was $1.8 billion.[Footnote 47] In
its second report in July 2010 report,[Footnote 48] LMI found that
spending on corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure
decreased from $1.8 billion to $1.6 billion between fiscal years 2005
and 2007,[Footnote 49] and then increased to $1.9 billion in fiscal
year 2008.[Footnote 50] In its 2010 report, LMI reported that spending
on corrosion as a percent of spending on maintenance dropped from 15.1
percent in fiscal year 2005 to 10.7 percent in fiscal year 2007 and
increased to 11.7 percent in fiscal year 2008.
Further, in its 2010 report, LMI reported that DOD spent more on
corrosion-related maintenance for facilities and other infrastructure
than it did on corrosion work related to military construction.
Specifically, LMI reported that spending on corrosion for maintenance
is three to four times higher than corrosion spending associated with
construction, even though overall construction expenditures were
nearly double that of overall maintenance expenditures. LMI provided
two main reasons for this occurrence: (1) corrosion is rarely
identified as a justification for the construction of a new facility;
and (2) if estimated construction costs need to be reduced to obtain
funding of the project, measures to prevent corrosion are among the
first costs to be removed from the estimated costs. Additionally, LMI
reported that DOD spent almost twice as much on corrective measures to
address corrosion ($1,263 million) as it did on preventive measures to
avoid corrosion ($640 million).
LMI's 2010 report shows installations' estimated expenditures in eight
categories of corrective and preventive maintenance for facilities and
other infrastructure. Table 4 shows information from that 2010 report
about the estimated expenditures for facilities and other
infrastructure by maintenance category for fiscal year 2008.
Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD Facilities
and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance Categories for Fiscal Year
2008:
Category: General building maintenance;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $285 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $306 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $591 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $3.232 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $410 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $3.642 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 16%.
Category: Exterior plumbing;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $82 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $47 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $129 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $737 million;
All Preventive maintenance: $87 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $824 million;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 16%.
Category: Interior plumbing;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $106 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $39 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $145 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $1.208 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $93 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.301 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 11%.
Category: Fuels;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $12 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $6 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $18 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $151 million;
All Preventive maintenance: $17 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $168 million;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 11%.
Category: HVAC;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $157 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $58 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $215 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $1.946 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $136 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $2.082 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%.
Category: Exterior electric;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $101 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $60 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $161 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $1.494 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $126 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.620 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%.
Category: Roads and grounds;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $86 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $56 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $142 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $1.345 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $142 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.487 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%.
Category: Interior electric;
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $51 million;
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $48 million;
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $99 million;
All Corrective maintenance: $1.623 billion;
All Preventive maintenance: $129 million;
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.752 billion;
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 6%.
Source: LMI.
[End of table]
In August 2012, LMI began its third study of the cost of corrosion at
DOD facilities and other infrastructure to analyze corrosion-related
spending for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011. For this
report, the LMI official told us that the methodology for classifying
the environmental conditions of the installations that are included in
their cost-of-corrosion studies would be the major difference between
the 2012 assessment and the prior reports. LMI also acknowledged that
there are some challenges and limitations to the methodology and data
used in its analysis. These challenges and limitations include, but
are not limited to: (1) limited quality controls in the services'
facilities and other infrastructure work order data in which
approximately 25 percent of the records obtained from the military
services' maintenance systems could not be used due to missing key
data elements that could not be recreated; (2) the lack of tracking
and maintaining of asset availability data for facilities and other
infrastructure; and (3) the three-year period between the cost of
corrosion studies, which means there will be a significant period
before data can be updated.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To address our first objective to determine the extent that project
managers submitted required reports to the DOD Office of Corrosion
Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Office), we
reviewed the February 2011 DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation
Strategic Plan and used the reporting milestones outlined in the plan
to identify types of reports required for each project. We obtained
project information for the 80 infrastructure-related corrosion
demonstration projects funded by the Corrosion Office for fiscal years
2005 through 2010.[Footnote 51] We requested and reviewed the project
documentation--project plans, bimonthly or quarterly reports, final
reports and follow-on reports--to determine if the data and related
reports met the Corrosion Office's reporting requirements. We reviewed
the corrosion project documentation for these projects for missing
data, outliers, or other errors, and documented where we found
incomplete data and computation errors. For the purposes of our work
in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010, we
considered a final report to be submitted as required if the Corrosion
Office had a copy of the report in its records system. We did not
consider the timeliness of the submitted reports. Additionally, for
follow-on reports, we could assess only the projects funded in fiscal
years 2005 through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects) because the DOD
strategic plan's milestone requires that follow-on reports be
submitted for completed projects within two years after the projects
have been completed and transitioned to use within the military
departments. For completed projects, we documented the initial return-
on-investment estimates shown in the project plans and the resulting
change, if any, shown in the follow-on reports. We determined that the
project reporting data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
determining the extent to which the military departments met the
Corrosion Office's reporting requirements, but we did not determine
the timeliness of the report or assess elements of the actual report.
After identifying the projects that required further review because
the project managers had not completed and submitted the required
reports, we interviewed and obtained documentation from the Corrosion
Office, the military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention
Executives (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executives) and the
respective project managers to determine why the required reports were
not submitted at the prescribed deadlines. Also, we determined what
actions, if any, they planned to take to complete the reports.
Specifically, to complete this task, we met with corrosion-control
officials from the following organizations: the Corrosion Office, Army
Corrosion Executive, Navy Corrosion Executive, Air Force Corrosion
Executive, Army Engineering Research Development Center, Construction
Engineering Research Laboratory, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(Engineering Support Center), Office of the Air Force Logistics,
Installations and Mission Support, and the Air Force Civil Engineer
Support Agency. We also reviewed prior GAO work on DOD's corrosion
prevention and control program.
To address our second objective to assess the extent to which the
return-on-investment data submitted by the military departments is
accurately reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office,
for the 105 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration projects
funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we reviewed the return-on-
investment estimates found in the project plans and the return-on-
investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion Office's records. We
then compared the data from these two sources to determine if any
differences existed in the estimated return on investment. Upon
completion of this comparison, we provided a list of projects with
discrepancies in the estimated return on investment to the Corrosion
Office and asked the officials to explain why the inconsistencies
existed and requested that they provide additional information to
reconcile the differences in the two estimates. Further, we compared
the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion
Office's records for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007
with the return-on-investment estimates contained in the military
departments' follow-on reports to check for any differences between
the two sets of records.
To address our third objective to assess the extent to which DOD's
corrosion-control officials have fully informed all relevant officials
within each department about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion
of facilities and other infrastructure, we reviewed relevant
legislation and guidance, DOD policies and publications, and the DOD
and the military departments' strategic plans to obtain information on
the management of DOD's corrosion prevention and control program. In
addition, we interviewed officials at all levels within DOD--Corrosion
Office officials, Corrosion Executives, the military services'
management commands for installations, and facility and infrastructure
managers within the services--to discuss their corrosion prevention
and control efforts, including challenges and successes in
implementing new corrosion technologies. We interviewed officials
across each of the military services and reviewed relevant service
documentation to gather information about corrosion prevention and
control programs within the services. We spoke with each military
department's designated Corrosion Executive as well as officials in
the Corrosion Executives' offices to discuss corrosion control and
prevention activities for facilities and other infrastructure across
the departments. We also interviewed officials from the installation
management commands of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, including the
Office of the Army Chief of Staff for Installations Management, the
U.S. Army Installations Management Command, the Commander of Navy
Installations Command, and the U. S. Marine Corps Installations
Command. We also interviewed officials within the civil engineering or
facilities branches at two Air Force major commands--Air Mobility
Command and Air Combat Command. We reviewed relevant service
documentation, including each military department's strategic plan for
corrosion control and prevention, to identify efforts related to
facilities and other infrastructure. During our review, we also met
with the manager of a Defense Logistics Agency program for cathodic
protection and corrosion control of submerged or underground steel
structures. Other defense agencies were not evaluated as part of our
work.
We used data obtained from Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment to identify all DOD
facilities and other infrastructure by military service and geographic
location. Using a nonprobability sample,[Footnote 52] we limited the
installations for selection to those active-duty installations with at
least 25 buildings owned by the federal government and ensured that a
range of locations were selected from each of the four military
services and across geographic regions of the United States.[Footnote
53] From the 390 installations that met these criteria, we selected
installations with different environmental conditions,[Footnote 54]
some joint military installations, and installations that did or did
not participate in the Corrosion Office's corrosion-technology
demonstration projects. We determined that the data used to select the
installations for our review were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of selecting our nonprobability sample.
From April to October 2012, we conducted semistructured interviews
with management officials of facilities and other infrastructure from
32 DOD installations to gather information and views about their
corrosion control and management efforts.[Footnote 55] Figure 3
identifies the 32 selected installations where GAO interviewed
officials for this review. The purpose of the semistructured
interviews was to understand how the installation officials (1) use
policies, plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2)
address corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their
maintenance and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and
disseminate information on relevant corrosion topics. We visited and
interviewed officials at 6 of the 32 military installations,[Footnote
56] and conducted audio conference calls with officials at 26 of the
32 military installations. Although our findings from the interviews
of officials of the 32 installations are not generalizable to the
entire universe of installations, we feel our findings provide a range
of issues related to corrosion that are experienced at installations.
Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities and
Other Infrastructure Officials:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Northeast:
Hanscom Air Force Base;
Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth;
Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, Navy;
West Point, Army.
South:
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Army;
Fort A.P. Hill, Army;
Fort Bragg, Army;
Fort Campbell, Army;
Hurlburt Field, Air Force;
Joint Base Charleston, Air Force;
Langley Air Force Base;
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort;
Marine Corps Base Quantico;
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi;
Naval Air Station Jacksonville;
Norfolk Naval Shipyard;
Red River Army Depot;
Robinson Air Force Base.
Midwest:
Fort Leavenworth, Army;
Naval Station Great Lakes;
Rock Island Arsenal, Army;
Scott Air Force Base.
West:
Fort Huachuca, Army;
Fort Wainwright, Army;
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Army;
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Navy;
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton;
Naval Base Kitsap Bremerton;
Naval Air Weapon Station China Lake;
Vandenberg Air Force Base;
Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center;
Source: DOD, Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD's Infrastructure-Related
Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects:
As defined by DOD for its corrosion technology demonstration projects,
the estimated return on investment is the ratio of the present value
of benefits to the present value of the project's total cost. In our
December 2010 report,[Footnote 57] we recommended that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics), in coordination with the Corrosion
Executives, develop and implement a plan to ensure that return-on-
investment reassessments are completed as scheduled.[Footnote 58]
Specifically, we recommended that this plan include information on the
timeframe and source of funding required to complete the return-on-
investment reassessments. DOD concurred with our recommendation and
stated that plans were underway to address this requirement. As of
July 2012, DOD had not developed or implemented a formal plan that
addresses this requirement.
During our review, we found that the Corrosion Office required project
managers of 41 projects to submit follow-on reports, and reports were
completed and submitted for 25[Footnote 59] of the 41 projects funded
for fiscal years 2005 through 2007.[Footnote 60] Of the 25 follow-on
reports, 23 contained return-on-investment estimates. We found that
although follow-on reports were completed and submitted for the
remaining 2 projects, return-on-investment estimates were not
calculated for the projects because the respective Army and Navy
reports noted that such a calculation was not required. For the 23
projects that have completed and submitted the required follow-on
reports, Table 5 provides the military departments' return-on-
investment estimates included in the original project plans and the
resulting change, if any, included in the follow-on reports. We did
not review the military departments' calculations or their methods for
estimating the cost and benefits of the estimated returns on
investment.
Table 5: Military Departments' Original Return-on-Investment Estimates
in Project Plans Compared to Return on Investment Shown in Follow-on
Reports:
Military Department: Army;
2005:
Count: 1;
Project number: AR-F-313;
Project description: Leak Detection for Pipes;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 10.2;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 7.3.
Count: 2;
Project number: AR-F-314;
Project description: Non-hazardous Corrosion Inhibitors/SMART Control
Systems for Heating and Cooling;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 8.8;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 13.0.
Count: 3;
Project number: AR-F-317;
Project description: Pipe Corrosion Sensors;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 16.1;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 21.6.
Count: 4;
Project number: AR-F-318;
Project description: Ice Free Cathodic Protection Systems for Water
Storage Tanks;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 20.6;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 11.8.
Count: 5;
Project number: AR-F-319;
Project description: Corrosion Resistant Materials for Water and
Wastewater Treatment Plants;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 15.0;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 14.6.
Count: 6;
Project number: AR-F-320;
Project description: Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft Hangars,
Flight Control Tower, and Deluge Tanks;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 11.6;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 7.0.
Count: 7;
Project number: AR-F-321;
Project description: Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems
and Cathodic Protection System Upgrades for Tanks and Pipelines;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 15.3;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 13.5.
Count: 2006: 8;
Project number: 2006: AR-F-322;
Project description: 2006: Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage
Tanks Using Ceramic Anodes;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2006: 10.1;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2006: 8.6.
2006:
Count: 9;
Project number: FAR02;
Project description: Smart Fluorescent and Self-Healing Coatings for
Severely Corrosive Environments at Vehicle Wash Facilities;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 14.9;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 14.9.
Count: 10;
Project number: FAR11;
Project description: Innovative Thermal Barrier Coatings to Prevent
Corrosive Environmental Effects and Improve Energy Efficiency in Heat
Distribution Manholes;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 9.8;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 72.7.
Count: 11;
Project number: FAR15;
Project description: Development of Corrosion Indices and Life Cycle
Prediction for Equipment and Facilities;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 33.1;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 33.1.
Count: 12;
Project number: FAR16;
Project description: Corrosion Prevention of Rebar in Concrete in
Critical Facilities Located in Coastal Environments;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 12.9;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 12.9.
Count: Navy: 13;
Project number: Navy: FAR20;
Project description: Navy: Ceramic Anode Upgrades and Remote
Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems for Utilities in Severely
Corrosive Environments;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: Navy: 14.7;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: Navy: 14.7.
Military Department: Navy:
2005:
Count: 14;
Project number: N-F-221;
Project description: Self-Priming Cladding for Splash Zone Steel;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 23.7;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 23.7.
Count: 15;
Project number: N-F-222;
Project description: Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red Hill
Tunnel Fuel Lines;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 6.9;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 10.8.
Count: 2006: 16;
Project number: 2006: N-F-229;
Project description: 2006: Integrated Concrete Pier Piling Repair and
Corrosion Protection System;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2006: 1.9;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2006: 1.9.
2006:
Count: 17;
Project number: FNV01;
Project description: Corrosion Protection Utilizing IR Drop Free
Sensors and In-Situ Data Acquisition for Cross Country Pipelines;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 13.3;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 11.4.
Count: 18;
Project number: FNV04;
Project description: Modeling of Advanced Waterfront Metallic Material
Corrosion and Protection;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 6.2;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 1.1.
Count: 19;
Project number: FNV06;
Project description: Wire Rope Corrosion for Guyed Antenna Towers;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 36.6;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 36.0.
Count: 2007: 20;
Project number: 2007: FNV07;
Project description: 2007: Solar Powered Cathodic Protection System;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2007: 3.4;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2007: 3.0.
2007:
Count: 21;
Project number: F07NV03;
Project description: Corrosion Inhibitor Evaluation for Concrete
Repairs;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 16.8;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 16.8.
Count: 22;
Project number: F07NV04;
Project description: Satellite Based Remote Monitoring Systems for
Cathodic Protection Systems in Remote Locations;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 21.0;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 17.4.
Count: Count: 23;
Project number: Project number: F07NV07;
Project description: Low Cost Stainless Steel Reinforcing for Concrete
Structures;
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2.9;
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2.9.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Projects Were Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000
Mr. James R. McTigue, Jr.
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. McTigue,
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
GAO-13-270, "Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting and
Communication on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities,"
dated April 19, 2013 GAO Code (351691).
We have reviewed GAO Draft Report, GAO-13-270 and partially concur
with three of the recommendations and non-concur with two of the
recommendations. Written comments addressing each recommendation are
provided as an enclosure to this letter. We appreciate the
GAO team's engagement and feedback as we are continuously trying to
improve the DoD Corrosion Program.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Daniel J. Dunmire:
Director:
DoD Corrosion Policy and Oversight:
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated April 19, 2013:
GAO-13-270 (GAO Code 351691):
"Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting And
Communication On Its Corrosion Prevention And Control Activities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take steps to
enhance reporting and project tracking, such as noting the reasons why
project management offices missed a reporting deadline and including
any revised reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports.
DoD Response: Partially concur. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight
Office believes that its current processes for project tracking are
sufficient to maintain cognizance and control of required reports but
that enhancements are possible. To that end, the Corrosion Policy and
Oversight Office is developing a web-based tracking tool that will
enable all parties involved in projects (The Corrosion Policy and
Oversight Office, Military Department Corrosion Control and Prevention
Executives, and project managers) to input and extract project related
data. This will result in increased timeliness and standardization of
project data to include revised reporting deadlines for final and
follow-on reports.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the Office's
existing authority to identify and implement possible options or
incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other
reasons cited by program management offices for not meeting reporting
milestones.
DoD Response: Non-concur. Prior positive incentives of additional
funding to complete project reports were largely ineffective. Negative
incentives such as penalizing future project submittals from project
offices that fail to submit on-time reports would be contrary to
program objectives of reducing the impact of corrosion on DoD weapon
systems and infrastructure by deincentivizing potential technological
improvements. While program management offices occasionally miss
reporting milestones, they have generally done an excellent job of
project execution and are committed to meeting their reporting
obligations.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination
with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight,
revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define the role of the
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives-in
assisting the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight-in holding
their departments' project management offices accountable for
submitting infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan.
DoD Response: Non-concur. The Military Department Corrosion Control
and Prevention Executives are given the freedom to manage their
programs in the most efficient and effective manner for their
respective departments. The Corrosion Control and Prevention
Executives know the reporting requirements and are working closely
with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office and the project
managers to ensure reports are submitted in accordance with the DoD
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. Further guidance
is not necessary as the requirements are already clearly stated in the
DoD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direct the
Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take
actions to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely, and
accurate data of the projects' return-on-investment estimates.
DoD Response: Partially concur. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight
Office is developing a web-based tracking tool that will enable all
parties involved in projects (the Corrosion Policy and Oversight
Office, Military Department Corrosion Control and Prevention
Executives, and project managers) to input and extract project related
data including return-on-investment estimates.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries
responsible for acquisitions, technology, and logistics to require the
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives-in
coordination with their installation management commands and in
consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight-to
develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action
plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key
information to all relevant service officials, particularly to those
officials at the installation-level, about corrosion-control
activities and initiatives, such as training opportunities and
outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion projects.
DoD Response: Partially concur. Information flow to the installation
level follows the chain of command to ensure that appropriate
individuals receive the critical and authoritative information
necessary for successful mission completion. Neither the Corrosion
Policy and Oversight Office nor the Corrosion Prevention and Control
Executives are in the installation chain of command. The Corrosion
Policy and Oversight Office will ensure that information on the DoD
Corrosion Program, including training opportunities and outcomes of
corrosion projects, is available to all relevant service officials
including the Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives and
installation level personnel via publication in appropriate media.
During the next review cycle the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office
will evaluate the military department corrosion prevention and control
strategic plans and, where appropriate, recommend they adequately
address the flow of key information.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
James R. McTigue Jr. 202-512-7968, mctiguej@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members
made key contributions to this report: Mark J. Wielgoszynski,
Assistant Director; Rebekah Boone; Randolfo DeLeon; Jacqueline McColl;
Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson;
Amie Steele and Michael Willems.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military
Departments' Corrosion Prevention Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-379]. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2013.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Annual Corrosion
Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R]. Washington, D.C.: September
10, 2012.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2012
Corrosion Prevention and Control Budget Request. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-490R]. Washington, D.C.: April 13,
2011.
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,
Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2011.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions
Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-171R]. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion
Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and
Validation of Returns on Investment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84]. Washington, D.C.: December 8,
2010.
Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and Military
Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention and
Control. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-608R].
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense's Fiscal
Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-607R]. Washington,
D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget
Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-732R]. Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD's Analysis of Options for
Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in
the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-694R]. Washington, D.C.: May 29,
2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD's FY 2009 Budget Request for
Corrosion Prevention and Control. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-663R]. Washington, D.C.: April 15,
2008.
Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are
Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-618]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of
Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-709]. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2006.
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of
DOD's Long-Term Corrosion Strategy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-640]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2004.
Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
Increase Readiness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-753]. Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-274]. Washington, D.C.:
February 19, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This cost estimate, which was produced by a DOD contractor and is
based on data from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, is the latest
estimate available on DOD corrosion costs.
[2] Infrastructure is defined in Section 2228 of Title 10 of the
United States Code as all buildings, structures, airfields, port
facilities, surface and subterranean utility systems, heating and
cooling systems, fuel tanks, pavements, and bridges.
[3] The estimate of the annual cost of corrosion for DOD facilities
and other infrastructure was produced by a DOD contractor and is based
on data from fiscal years 2007 and 2008. This is the latest estimate
available on DOD corrosion costs for facilities and other
infrastructure.
[4] Corrosion takes varied forms such as rusting; pitting; galvanic
reaction; calcium or other mineral buildup; degradation due to
ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or other organic decay.
[5] The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 required the Secretary of Defense to designate an officer,
employee, board, or committee as the individual or office with this
responsibility. See Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 1067 (2002) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 2228). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 amended this requirement by designating the Director of Corrosion
Policy and Oversight as the official with these responsibilities. See
Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 371 (2008) (amending 10 U.S.C.§ 2228).
[6] While the statute does not define "return on investment" for its
corrosion-control technology demonstration projects, DOD defines the
estimated return on investment as the ratio of the present value of
benefits to the present value of the project's total cost.
[7] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Pub. L. No.110-417, § 903 (2008).
[8] This review of corrosion issues related to DOD's facilities and
other infrastructure is part of a larger body of work that we are
doing on DOD's corrosion-control program. GAO also has an ongoing
review to examine DOD's corrosion projects involving military
equipment.
[9] DOD's Corrosion Office sponsors a series of studies to assess the
cost of corrosion throughout the department, including how much is
spent on DOD's corrosion activities for facilities and other
infrastructure. These studies are conducted by LMI, a private, not-for-
profit corporation, using a method approved by the Corrosion Office's
Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. We did not,
however, independently review the methodology used by LMI or identify
any limitations of these studies.
[10] There are an additional 25 corrosion projects funded in fiscal
years 2011 and 2012, which were not yet completed.
[11] Site visits to three of the installations were completed prior to
the development of our semistructured interview questionnaire.
[12] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[13] We used the four geographic regions of the United States as
defined by the U. S. Census Bureau.
[14] The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index
level for each installation. The environmental severity index is
derived from a database developed by the research firm Battelle with
the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different
environmental conditions found at military bases throughout the world.
The DOD Corrosion Office, for its fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion
study of DOD facilities and other infrastructure, utilized the
corrosion rates for steel and developed an environmental severity
index on a scale of 1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in
different locations, with 1 being least severe and 20 being the most
severe environmental conditions.
[15] The results of the semistructured interviews are not
generalizable because we used a nonprobability sample to select
participants for these interviews.
[16] Pub. L. 107-314, § 1067.
[17] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.67, Prevention and
Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure
(Feb. 1, 2010).
[18] The Corrosion Executives for each of the military departments are
members of the Corrosion Board of Directors, and they or their
delegates are participants on DOD's Corrosion Prevention and Control
Integrated Product Team. The Corrosion Board of Directors is not
identified in the DOD strategic plan; however, Army and Navy corrosion
documents acknowledge their Corrosion Executives' membership on the
Corrosion Board.
[19] According to officials of the Corrosion Office and the Corrosion
Executives, the military departments' matching funds may be more or
less than 50 percent of total costs.
[20] From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD's strategic plan
required the military departments to provide bimonthly updates for all
incomplete corrosion projects. Since fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion
Office has required updates on a quarterly basis.
[21] Corrosion Office officials stated that these reports typically
are due within two years after each demonstration project receives
funding.
[22] According to Corrosion Office officials, the transition period to
implement the demonstrated technology in a military department can be
up to one year and that they expect the follow-on reports to be
completed within five years of a project receiving initial funding.
[23] GAO, Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Annual
Corrosion Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 10, 2012).
[24] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select
Corrosion Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance
and Validation of Returns on Investment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8,
2010).
[25] GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs
and Increase Readiness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-753] (Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2003).
[26] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve
Military Departments' Corrosion Prevention Strategies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-379] (Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2013).
[27] DOD also invested $13 million in 25 additional corrosion projects
funded in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. These DOD expenditures have not
been adjusted for inflation. We did not review these 25 projects
because their reporting milestones had not occurred.
[28] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Corrosion Prevention
and Mitigation Strategic Plan, Appendix D (Washington, D.C.: 2011).
[29] From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD's strategic plan
required the military departments to provide bimonthly updates for all
incomplete corrosion projects. Since fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion
Office has required updates on a quarterly basis. Our limited review
of the projects that required the bimonthly/quarterly updates found
that the updates were submitted as required.
[30] For its corrosion-control technology demonstration projects, DOD
defines the estimated return on investment as the ratio of the present
value of benefits to the present value of the project's total cost.
[31] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[33] According to the final report for one Army project, a follow-on
report was not warranted due to the nature of the project.
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R].
[35] Pub. L. No.110-417, § 903 (2008).
[36] The DOD strategic plan includes a goal to "use every available
communication channel to receive and convey all aspects of corrosion--
nature, impact, approaches and results--from and to every organization
within the broad Department of Defense and industry sectors as well as
national and international communities." Appendix A of the plan
includes an action plan for the Corrosion Office's Communications and
Outreach Working Integrated Product Team.
[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[38] In April 2012, the current Corrosion Executive filled the
position, which had been vacant for more than a year and a half.
[39] We spoke with the managers of the public works offices and their
staff at 32 installations, representing each military service, and
asked them a series of questions about corrosion and corrosion control
efforts at their locations. For additional information about these
interviews, see appendix II. One installation did not respond to this
question.
[40] One installation did not respond to this question. Officials at
13 of the remaining 15 installations responded that since the
establishment of these corrosion-control offices there was no change
or they were unaware of any related changes at their installations.
[41] We interviewed officials at 32 installations; however, three
interviews took place before development of the semistructured
interview template that included this question.
[42] At least four officials qualified their responses to this
question by stating that other officials might be more knowledgeable
about specific documents due to the nature of their positions.
[43] The term "management commands" refers to the services'
installation commands (Army and Navy) and major commands (Air Force)
responsible for overseeing DOD installations.
[44] The Department of Navy officials noted that the technical experts
from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command may have more
interaction with these offices. For example, the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command is a member of the Navy's Corrosion Cross-
Functional Team. The Army official noted that he works through his
chain of command, specifically the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Installation Management, on infrastructure issues.
[45] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[46] LMI, located in McLean, VA, is a private, not-for-profit
corporation that provides management consulting, research, and
analysis to governments and other nonprofit organizations.
[47] LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense
Facilities and Infrastructure, (McLean, VA: May 2007).
[48] LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense
Facilities and Infrastructure, 2007-2008 Update (McLean, VA: July
2010).
[49] LMI did not assess the cost of corrosion for fiscal year 2006.
[50] Throughout this section, we cite the dollar figures from the LMI
reports published in 2007 and 2010. We did not adjust these figures
for inflation.
[51] We did not review the remaining 25 corrosion projects funded for
fiscal years 2011 and 2012 because their reporting milestones had not
occurred.
[52] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[53] We used the four geographic regions of the United States as
defined by the U. S. Census Bureau.
[54] The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index
level for each installation. The environmental severity index is
derived from a database developed by the research firm Battelle with
the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different
environmental conditions found at military bases throughout the world.
The DOD Corrosion Office, for its fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion
study of DOD facilities and other infrastructure, used the corrosion
rates for steel and developed an environmental severity index on a
scale of 1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in different
locations, with 1 being least severe and 20 being the most severe
environmental conditions.
[55] The results of the semistructured interviews are not
generalizable because we used a nonprobability sample to select
participants for these interviews.
[56] Site visits to 3 of the installations were completed prior to the
development of our questionnaire for the semistructured interviews.
[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84].
[58] According to the DOD strategic plan, the return-on-investment
reassessment is the focus of the corrosion projects' follow-on reports.
[59] There was another Army project in which its project manager
reported that a return-on-investment computation and subsequent follow-
on report was not warranted.
[60] Since follow-on reporting milestones have not occurred for
corrosion projects funded after 2007, we do not have reassessed return-
on-investment data to compare to the initial return-on-investment
estimates for the 64 projects funded in fiscal years 2008 through 2012.
[End of section]
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