The personal blog of Peter Lee a.k.a. "China Hand"... Life is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel, and an open book to those who read. You are welcome to contact China Matters at the address chinamatters --a-- prlee.org or follow me on twitter @chinahand.

Friday, December 13, 2013

Jong’s Execution Might Be Kim Jung Un’s High-Stakes Diplomatic Gambit

Initial
reports on the purge of Jong Song Thaek have understandably focused on his
abrupt, brutal execution and the hysterical denunciation issued by the Korea
Central News Agency.

Terms like “medieval”
and “Games of Thrones” have been bandied about, along with expressions of amused
contempt at the crude and barbaric character of the DPRK regime and its power
and succession struggles.

I enjoy a
bout of condescending sniggering as much as anyone, but perhaps attention
should be paid to the risky geopolitical gambit that might underpin the move
against Jang.

Jang was the
architect of the DPRK’s nascent economic reform movement, which apparently
relied to a significant extent on PRC models, PRC assistance and, we can assume,
acceptance of the idea that a cost of reform was to allow Chinese companies
unfair and resented advantages in exploiting economic opportunities in North
Korean mines, factories, animal products, and electrical power (I wish to pause
here to address the canard that the DPRK is dependent on the PRC for its
energy.True, the DPRK has no petroleum
resources to provide fuel for gas and diesel engines and is desperately reliant
on imports; then again, so is South Korea.North Korea, thanks to its abundant hydropower, is a significant
exporter of electricity to the PRC’s Northeast).

Anyway, Jang
was Beijing’s guy in Pyongyang.His
removal might mean that Kim Jong Un had it up to here with Uncle Jang’s
bossiness, or his way of injecting PRC views and interests into the center of
DPRK decision-making.

But it also
might mean that Kim Jong Un decided to make a bold move to finally obtain
direct U.S. engagement on security and economic talks.

Although it
doesn’t seem to be discussed much in Western reporting, the DPRK has tried for
decades—ever since its security and economic vulnerabilities were mercilessly
exposed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Russian aid in 1990--
to wean the United States from its wholehearted backing of South Korea, and its
willingness to let the PRC act as DPRK’s impatient patron, so Washington would engage with Pyongyang directly as a significant chess piece in the Northeast Asian great game.

One element
of this struggle has been the DPRK’s nuclear weapons gyrations.Given the U.S. preoccupation with hostile states
possessing nuclear weapons, it was considered that developing and testing
nuclear weapons was perhaps the best way to attract U.S. attention and
negotiate concessions.Unfortunately,
this exposed the DPRK to a fatal contradiction, given the absolute U.S.
insistence on nuclear deproliferation: to exploit its leverage and gain
something from negotiations, the only way was to get rid of its leverage.

US-DPRK
diplomacy has been understandably ridiculous since then.

Now, with
the Swiss-educated and Dennis Rodman-entertaining Kim Jong Un in power, the
DPRK desire for direct, productive relations with the US is stronger than ever.

And Kim can
look to two positive developments.

First, Iran,
an indication that the Obama administration will pursue diplomatic engagement
with a nuclear power without insisting on complete deproliferation as a
condition.New guy—Rohani—in Tehran, so
open hand.Kim’s a new guy, too.Maybe he can get some of that open hand.

Second,
Myanmar.It is safe to say that the
United States told Myanmar and is telling the DPRK that it is not going to be
suckered into providing security and economic assistance while its interlocutor
snuggles comfortably in the bosom of the PRC.A clean break with China is, in other words, the price to be paid for
nice words and things from the United States.

In the case
of Myanmar, the government sacrificed the Myitsone Dam, a gigantic
hydroelectric project funded by the PRC that threatened to orient the country’s
power grid permanently toward China in the north and east (instead of west to
Thailand, where we want it).

DPRK,
instead of killing a dam, killed a guy: “Uncle Jang”.

Even so, a
decisive and catastrophic break with the PRC is probably not going to
happen.The PRC’s highest priority is
probably the continued survival of the northern regime and avoiding a scenario
in which the ROK occupies the peninsula, and becomes a world power on the scale
of Japan with troops on China’s border.And if the DPRK can parlay a US tilt into economic growth, then the
transition from basket case to Asian tiger will have knock-on economic benefits
for the PRC that might compensate for the loss of its economic monopoly
(thoughtfully created, as in the case of Myanmar, by a counterproductive US
sanctions regime).

And, it
should be remembered, immediately prior to the purge, the DPRK released
American detainee Merrill Newman as a show of good will.And hapless evangelical Kenneth Bae is still
in inventory to be released if US-North Korean discussions bear fruit.

It will be interesting to see how the U.S. government decides to play this.