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entitled 'Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response
Capabilities Could Be Strengthened' which was released on September 21,
2006.
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
September 2006:
Combating Nuclear Terrorism:
Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened:
GAO-06-1015:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1015, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological
threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is
heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or
radiological device in a major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the
capabilities and assets DOE has to prevent and respond to potential
nuclear and radiological attacks in the United States, (2) the physical
security measures in place at DOE’s two key emergency response
facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3)
the benefits of using DOE’s aerial background radiation surveys to
enhance emergency response capabilities.
What GAO Found:
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include
specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or
radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear
or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE’s
two key emergency response facilities—the Remote Sensing Laboratories
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and
radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are
not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of
critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to
quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or
radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not
been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be
sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been
surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting
these surveys, and there are no plans to conduct additional surveys.
Figure: DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation
Survey:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: DOE.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) DOE review the physical
security measures at its two key emergency response facilities to
determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the
facilities and (2) DOE and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of making greater use of
aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. DHS agreed and DOE
neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. DOE raised
concerns about our finding on security measures.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1015].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States:
DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities:
Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table :
Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack:
Figure:
Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
Radiation Survey:
Abbreviations:
AEC: Atomic Energy Commission:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:
DOE: Department of Energy:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
NEST: Nuclear Emergency Search Team:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration :
NYPD: New York City Police Department :
RAP: Radiological Assistance Program :
September 21, 2006:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Energy (DOE) has maintained an emergency response
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological
threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is
heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or
a radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a
major U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have serious
consequences for our national and economic interests, including
potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens'
confidence in the government's ability to protect the homeland.
To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise
to search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in
U.S. cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a
radiological incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of
contamination. After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its
emergency response capabilities across the country. However, a number
of critical capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two
key facilities, known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis
Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two
facilities house, among other things, specialized search teams that
locate and identify nuclear and radiological devices; planes and
helicopters used to measure contamination; and research and development
laboratories that design specialized equipment. DOE requires that these
facilities be adequately protected with security measures to defend
against potential terrorist attacks.[Footnote 1]
One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial
background radiation surveys. These surveys are conducted by using
helicopters or planes equipped with radiation detectors to fly over an
area and collect information on existing background radiation sources,
such as granite statues in a city or medical isotopes located at
hospitals. This can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels
against which future radiation levels can be compared in order to more
easily detect new radiation sources that may pose a security or public
health threat.
DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear
and radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to
detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials
at U.S. points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is
also responsible for helping state and local governments improve their
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological
materials. If DHS cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or
radiological materials into the United States, it relies on DOE's
emergency response capabilities to search for and locate the materials.
In this context, this report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets
DOE has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological
attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in
place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they
are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's
aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response
capabilities.
To address these objectives, we collected and analyzed documentation
related to DOE's emergency response capabilities and assets and the
physical security guidelines and plans for its two key emergency
response facilities. We interviewed officials from DOE's Office of
Emergency Response and the Office of Independent Oversight. We also
interviewed program managers and security officials from the Remote
Sensing Laboratories at Nellis and Andrews Air Force Bases, and we
received a tour of these facilities to view the physical security
measures and obtain a demonstration of their radiation detection
equipment. In addition, we analyzed documents and interviewed officials
from DOE's national laboratories at Brookhaven (in New York), Sandia
(in New Mexico), and Savannah River (in South Carolina), where
emergency response assets have been dispersed. To obtain information on
aerial surveys, we analyzed documents and interviewed officials from
the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department who
requested an aerial background radiation survey of New York City. We
also collected documentation and interviewed officials from DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of Grants and Training to
obtain information on DHS's role in conducting and funding aerial
background radiation surveys. We conducted our work from January to
August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include
specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or
radiological devices and to help minimize the consequences of a nuclear
or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's
two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
DOE also draws upon the technical expertise of scientists, engineers,
and technicians from the national laboratories, including Los Alamos,
Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore. To prevent an attack, search teams use
a variety of clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of
radiation sensors carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and
helicopters, to detect and locate radiological sources. In fiscal year
2005, DOE conducted about 30 search missions to address potential
radiological threats or to assist local and state officials in
monitoring large public events such as the Super Bowl and the State of
the Union address. DOE officials cautioned, however, that it may be
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
materials. In order to deploy teams more quickly, since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond the
Remote Sensing Laboratories to include eight other emergency response
sites across the country. In the event of a nuclear or radiological
attack, DOE also maintains capabilities to minimize the consequences.
DOE can deploy teams that use radiation-monitoring equipment, including
sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure
radiation contamination levels and provide information to state and
local officials on what areas need to be evacuated. DOE can also
coordinate federal activities related to monitoring contamination
levels and mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from
radiation exposure.
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across
the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE
policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in
November 2005, DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of
physical security if their capabilities and assets exist at other
locations and can be easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we
found that there are a number of critical capabilities and assets that
exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and their loss would
significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent or respond to a
nuclear or radiological emergency. Specifically, the capabilities and
assets that are located only at the laboratories include, among other
things, the most highly trained teams that help manage and minimize the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or
radiological devices and measure contamination levels after a
radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets have not been
fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be
sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors
but no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence,
vehicle barriers, or any other protective measures around the building,
but DOE has determined that it meets physical security requirements.
Furthermore, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with
federal government identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff
gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of
their identification. Security officials told us that the laboratories
are not designed to withstand certain types of terrorist attacks.
However, officials have not taken any steps to strengthen security
because of DOE's assumption that their capabilities and assets are
fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has not developed contingency plans
that would identify capabilities and assets that would be used in the
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked.
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey
of a major U.S. city because neither DOE nor DHS has mission
responsibility for conducting the surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, if a city had a completed survey, DOE could then conduct a new
survey and compare baseline radiation data from the previous survey to
identify locations with new sources of radiation. Focusing their
attention on these new locations, law enforcement officials may be able
to locate a nuclear or radiological device more quickly. In addition,
using baseline information from a prior survey, DOE could assess
contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist cleanup
efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from the surveys
could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts
could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other areas up to
pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing all traces
of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys, law
enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating pre-existing
sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time and cost
of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE officials
explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it is
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed
may also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices.
Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of
the survey--about $800,000--was funded through DHS grants. NYPD
officials indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because
it identified more than 80 locations with radiological sources that
required further investigation to determine their risk. In addition to
identifying potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us that a
secondary benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public
health. While investigating the 80 locations, they found an old
industrial site contaminated with radium--a radiological material
linked to diseases such as bone cancer--and used this information to
close the area and protect the public. Despite these benefits, neither
DOE nor DHS have embraced mission responsibility for funding and
conducting surveys or notifying city officials that such a capability
exists. DOE officials told us they are reluctant to conduct additional
surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that are
needed for emergency response functions, and told us that it is DHS's
mission to protect cities from potential terrorist attacks. DHS
officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the expertise or
capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a program to help
state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and radiological
materials, and in fiscal year 2006, approximately $2.5 billion was
available in grant funding to state and local governments for terrorism
preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are
no plans to conduct additional surveys, in part, because DOE and DHS
are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys.
We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DHS for comment. DHS
agreed with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which
we incorporated, as appropriate. DOE neither agreed nor disagreed with
the report's recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our
findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that
physical security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be
sufficient to protect them against terrorist attacks. While we
recognize that DOE is complying with physical security requirements,
the Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
physical security, even though the laboratories have unique
capabilities and assets that exist at no other location and cannot be
easily and quickly reconstituted. DOE also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated, as appropriate.
Background:
DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies
in 1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device
in Boston unless he received $200,000.[Footnote 2] Even though the
threat turned out to be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the
capability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. To
address this deficiency, AEC established the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team (NEST) to provide technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State, which is the lead
federal agency for terrorism response outside the United States. Under
the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for investigating illegal
activities involving the use of nuclear materials within the United
States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program was designed to
assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and deactivating nuclear and
radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams were
large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to
threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device.
With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11,
2001, DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to
nuclear and radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent
terrorists from detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the
core mission, DOE's emergency response activities have expanded to
include actions to minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
radiological incident. For example, DOE maintains an aerial capability
to detect, measure, and track radioactive material to determine
contamination levels at the site of an emergency. DOE has used this
capability to conduct background radiation surveys of most nuclear
power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident at a
nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to help
determine the location and amount of contamination.
There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians
from the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories
dedicated to preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological
threat. In fiscal year 2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for
emergency response activities. Under the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's
efforts to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern
that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials
into the United States. These materials could be used to produce either
an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known
as a dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb
made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation
experts estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have
yields in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to
20,000 tons of TNT). A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the
yield of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart
of a medium-size U.S. city and result in thousands of casualties and
radiation contamination over a wider area.
A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
radioactive material,[Footnote 3] using explosive force to disperse the
radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks.
The extent of contamination would depend on a number of factors,
including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive
material used, and weather conditions. While much less destructive than
an improvised nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could
cause radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic
costs and psychological and social disruption associated with the
evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no
terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists
placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-
1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no radioactive
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have
the capability and willingness to use radiological materials as weapons
of terror.
DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States:
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include
specialized teams and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate
nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of
a nuclear or radiological attack. To prevent an attack, search teams
use a variety of clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of
radiation sensors carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and
helicopters, to detect and locate radiological sources. In the event of
a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE would, among other things, use
radiation-monitoring equipment, including sensors mounted on aircraft
and vehicles, to detect and measure radiation contamination levels and
provide information to state and local officials on what areas need to
be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE's capabilities and assets to
prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack.
Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack:
Capabilities: Search;
Mission: Search for and identify nuclear or radiological devices with
radiation detectors mounted in backpacks, vehicles, and helicopters;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X;
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty].
Capabilities: Deactivation;
Mission: Deactivate and dispose of nuclear or radiological devices by
viewing the components of a bomb with specialized equipment,
deactivating booby traps, and packaging the devices for safe transport;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X;
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty].
Capabilities: Recovery of U.S. nuclear weapons;
Mission: In the event of an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon,
assess the damage, stabilize internal components, and package the
weapon for safe transport;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X;
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty].
Capabilities: Radiological Assistance Program;
Mission: First responders to search for devices with radiation
detectors mounted in backpacks and on vehicles or to measure
contamination levels after an attack or accident with environmental
sampling and specialized devices;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X;
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X.
Capabilities: Aerial detection;
Mission: Planes and helicopters with radiation detection equipment and
sophisticated onboard computers to search for devices, conduct
background radiation surveys, or measure contamination after a nuclear
or radiological incident;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X;
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X.
Capabilities: Computer modeling of radiation release;
Mission: Prediction of the extent of contamination with advanced
computer modeling of wind, topography, and atmospheric conditions;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation:
[Empty];
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X.
Capabilities: Consequence management;
Mission: Monitor and assess contamination from a large-scale nuclear or
radiological attack and set up an operations center to coordinate
response activities in the field;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation:
[Empty];
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X.
Capabilities: Medical support;
Mission: Quickly mobilize medical personnel to provide advice and
assistance for treating injuries resulting from radiation exposure;
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation:
[Empty];
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X.
Source: GAO analysis of DOE information.
[End of table]
DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and Equipment
to Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack:
To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams
to search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These
teams are manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on
either civilian or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing
Laboratories within 4 hours of notification from the FBI. To detect and
locate nuclear or radiological devices, the teams use a variety of
clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of radiation
detectors carried in backpacks that silently transmit information to
the searcher's earphone and radiation detectors mounted in vehicles and
helicopters.
While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify
devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation
detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of
time--which is particularly important when the exact location of a
device is unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once
deployed, the searchers can also send information they are collecting
from radiation detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and
technicians at the national laboratories to help them identify nuclear
or radiological material and determine whether the material poses a
threat. If the search teams need additional support to cover a large
area, they can train and equip local responders, such as law
enforcement and firefighters, to conduct search missions. Up to 16
people can become proficient in basic search techniques in less than an
hour.
Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons
scientists, technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories
as well as the FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be
deployed to deactivate the device and prepare it for safe transport
away from populated areas to the Nevada Test Site.[Footnote 4] This
would involve, among other things, clearing booby traps and separating
the high explosives from the nuclear material. It also would involve
the use of specialized equipment, such as a portable X-ray machine, to
peer under a bomb's outer shell and view the bomb's components,
identify the device, and determine the best way of deactivating it.
This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of nuclear and
radiological weapon design information for identifying and properly
deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely transported,
scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site would
disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances, the
team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be
necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential
spread of radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a
nylon tent around the device and filling it with thick foam.
Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond
the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other
emergency response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the
country.[Footnote 5] These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams
traditionally have assisted state and local governments with responding
to facility or transportation accidents involving radioactive material
that may cause contamination and affect public health. Since these
teams have experience and expertise in responding to nuclear
emergencies--and are located in different regions across the country--
their mission was expanded to include searching for nuclear or
radiological devices. The RAP teams can drive to most cities in their
geographic area and do not have to rely on air transport. In addition,
since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are located on the East and
West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster response to cities
located in the center of the country.
In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote
Sensing Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search
missions. Most of these missions involved assisting local and state
officials in monitoring large public events, such as the Super Bowl and
the State of the Union address, to provide assurance that no devices
were hidden in the stands or inside the building before the event. A
number of these missions also involved intelligence-driven searches to
address potential radiological threats in U.S. cities. Despite the
teams' expertise and specialized equipment, DOE officials cautioned
that it may still be difficult to detect nuclear or radiological
devices. Radiation detection equipment may not detect nuclear materials
with relatively low levels of radioactivity or radiological materials
that are well-shielded. In addition, without good intelligence on the
location of the device, search teams may not have time to find the
device.
In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also
responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear
weapon. A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians,
health physicists, and safety professionals from the national
laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to
respond within 4 hours of notification of an accident, such as the
crash of a military airplane transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a
scenario, the team would assess the damage, if any, to the weapon by
using, among other things, radiography to examine the weapon's internal
structure, and how best to recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons
contain chemically reactive materials and radioactive elements, great
care must be taken in gaining access to them. For damaged weapons, the
team has special techniques to stabilize the internal components. After
weapons are safe to move, they can be packaged and prepared for
transport.
DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the Consequences of a
Nuclear or Radiological Attack:
DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to
respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from
a terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine
different parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the
situation and determining what additional resources would be necessary
to manage the emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site
of an emergency within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological
assessment of the area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial
assistance to minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property,
and the environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use
radiation detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination
and help state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination.
Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would
require the deployment of consequence management teams from the Remote
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are
responsible for setting up an operations center near the site of the
emergency to coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment
activities, conduct monitoring and assessment activities with
specialized equipment, and collect and analyze data from the field on
the type, amount, and extent of radiological release. This information
would be used by state and local governments to determine what areas
should be evacuated and how to properly respond to the emergency and by
other federal agencies involved in decontamination and other cleanup
activities. These teams would monitor the area where radioactivity was
released until the area was fully evaluated and the effects known.
In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would
collect information on the extent of contamination, using not only
planes and helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also
sophisticated computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and
helicopters at the Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure,
and track radioactive materials to determine contamination levels. The
aircraft can provide real-time measurement of low levels of ground
contamination. They can also provide detailed imagery analysis of an
accident site. The planes are deployed first to determine the location
and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters are then used to
perform detailed surveys of any ground contamination.[Footnote 6] This
information is used to decide where to send ground monitoring teams.
Based on information from the aircraft, scientists are able to develop
maps of the ground hazards. In addition to their ability to track
radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the aircraft have also
been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material and to locate
medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as occurred in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not endanger the
public.
Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences of a
radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes.
Based on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions,
the model can predict the extent to which the material can spread and
estimate the amount of the release. As technicians receive information
from field teams, they can update the model.
Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting
from radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours
a day and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and
local governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts
also track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct
medical follow-ups.
DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities:
DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories.
However, we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities
and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose
loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond to a
nuclear or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets
have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may
not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist
attack.
DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest
Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under DOE Guidance Because
Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed:
DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest
level of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance
for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005
required a review of facilities protected at the lowest level of
physical security to determine whether they were "mission critical."
Mission critical facilities have capabilities and assets that are not
available at any other location and cannot be easily and quickly
reconstituted. Under DOE guidance, facilities designated as mission
critical must be protected at a higher level of physical security. For
example, DOE Headquarters was designated as mission critical because
the loss of decision makers during an emergency would impair the
deployment and coordination of DOE resources. As a result, DOE
strengthened the physical security measures around DOE Headquarters by,
among other things, adding vehicle barriers around the facility.
In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the
capabilities and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found
that they were not mission critical because if either one or both
laboratories were attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily
reconstitute their capabilities and assets to meet mission
requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has dispersed some of the
assets and capabilities once found exclusively at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search mission to
include the RAP teams that are located at eight sites across the
country. These teams receive training and equipment similar to the
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation
detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also
participated in a number of search missions, including addressing
potential threats at sporting events and national political
conventions, or assisting customs officials with investigating cargo
entering ports and border crossings.
DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These
Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to
Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats:
Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories'
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would
significantly undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or
radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist
only at the laboratories include (1) the teams that help minimize the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) the planes and
helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search
teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a
sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location
of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP
teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or
radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams.
The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote
Sensing Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized
equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of
contamination. They are responsible for establishing an operations
center near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE's
radiological monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze
information coming from the field, including aerial survey data
provided by helicopters, planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation
levels. Without this capability, state and local governments would not
receive information quickly about the extent of contamination to assess
the impact on public health and private property and how best to reduce
further contamination.
DOE's emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect,
measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or
radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a
limited number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at
the Remote Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a
sophisticated radiation detection system to gather radiological
information and produce maps of radiation exposure and concentrations.
It is anticipated that the planes would arrive at an emergency scene
first and be used to determine the location and extent of ground
contamination. The helicopters would then be used to perform more
detailed surveys of any contamination. According to DOE officials, the
planes and helicopters can gather information on a wide area without
placing ground teams at risk. Without this capability, DOE would not be
able to quickly obtain comprehensive information about the extent of
contamination. The helicopters can also be used by search teams to
locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities. The helicopters
can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time than teams on foot
or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct secondary
inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels identified by
the helicopter.
The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses
this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of
contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to
quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response
capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear
or radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help
find nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are
detonated.
DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that
are unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's
ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local
governments would not receive information--such as the location and
extent of contamination--that they need in a timely manner in order to
manage the consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public
health and property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and
assets, DOE has not developed contingency plans identifying
capabilities and assets at other locations that could be used in the
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked.
Specifically, DOE has not identified which RAP team would assume
responsibility for coordinating contamination monitoring and assessment
activities in the place of the consequence management teams from
Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly defined roles may
hamper emergency response efforts.
DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and
assets of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could
mobilize and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or
national laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories,
such as Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure
contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing
Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national
laboratories would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large-
scale contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do
not have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and
analyze data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In
April 2006, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible
for independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of
DOE's programs, reported that the RAP teams, during performance tests,
could not quickly provide state and local governments with
recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public's
exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate contaminated
areas.[Footnote 7] In addition, DOE officials told us that, based on
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous
nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to
manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence
management teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple,
simultaneous attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a
nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered.
DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked,
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless
the aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However,
DOE policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed
at Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top
government decision makers and other key government assets. During a
nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited
airborne capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if
there were multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable
delay in providing information to state and local governments about the
extent of contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a
time.
Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available
to provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it
with radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that
DOE would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not
designed for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE
has a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and
other federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes
for transport and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely
that DOD or any other agency would provide them with aircraft during an
emergency because those agencies' priority would be to carry out their
own missions, not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with
helicopters, DOE does not have spare radiation detectors like those
found on its own helicopters, and even if it did have spares, it would
not have time to mount radiation detectors on the exterior of the
aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation detectors, like those
found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an airplane or
helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.
Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that
all of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of
consequence management teams and the planes and helicopters from the
Remote Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it
would be able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities
and assets of the Remote Sensing Laboratories.
Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching
for nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have
the most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams
trained to conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate
potential nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at
a U.S. port. The search teams can also repair radiation equipment for
search missions in the field. Furthermore, these search teams are more
prepared than the RAP teams to enter environments where there is a
threat of hazards other than those associated with radiological
materials, such as explosives. If there is a threat of explosives in an
area where a search mission would be conducted, these teams have
specialized equipment to detect explosives and can more quickly request
FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to complete their search
mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent Oversight reported
that the RAP teams did not always complete their search missions when
there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team members
from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams refused to
perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device was
removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety
criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams
had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team
members against their ability to complete the search mission because
there was a lack of guidance on how to respond.
Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect the
Facilities against Terrorist Attack:
Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in
the lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences,
walls, and doors.[Footnote 8] According to DOE officials, a facility
can have, at a minimum, walls and doors and be in compliance with the
guidance. Adding additional measures, such as fences and vehicle
barriers, are under the discretion of the security officer in charge of
the facilities. According to DOE security officials, the Remote Sensing
Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base exceeds current physical security
requirements because DOE placed a fence around the facility and a
vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These additional measures were
taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing Laboratory was built,
these measures were required.
In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base
does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located
along the executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries
when they land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this
route must meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of
certain physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these
limitations, DOE security officials told us that the laboratory still
meets the minimum security requirements. According to these officials,
the Office of Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing
DOE's emergency response capabilities, would have to classify the
facilities as mission critical before more stringent measures would be
required.
While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE
guidance and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of
classified government documents, these measures may not be sufficient
to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Security
officials told us that current physical security measures at the Remote
Sensing Laboratories have not been hardened or designed to withstand
certain types of terrorist attacks. Security officials told us that the
physical security measures protecting these facilities have not been
strengthened because, if there were credible intelligence that the
facilities faced the risk of terrorist attack, DOE could take
additional measures to protect the facility, such as deploying
protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access to the
parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials would
have to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In
addition, under DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or
substantial quantities of special nuclear material that could be used
in nuclear weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other
protective measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have
nuclear weapons or special nuclear material, additional security
measures are not required unless the facilities are classified as
mission critical.
While the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to
provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews
Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal
government identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards
do not inspect every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air
Force security guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should
be searched. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple
times with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their
vehicles were never searched.
Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them:
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can
later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect
radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce
the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a
survey of only one major U.S. city. Since neither DOE nor DHS has
mission responsibility for funding and conducting surveys, there are no
plans to conduct additional surveys or to inform cities about their
benefits.
Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect
Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the
Event of a Radiological Attack:
DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the
location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing
radiation levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from
a variety of sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in
buildings, statues, or cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals;
and areas treated with high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf
courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted with external radiation detectors
and equipped with a global position system to fly over an area and
gather data in a systematic grid pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a
helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting information on
radiation sources in a city.
Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
Radiation Survey:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians
and scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses
helicopters rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and
lower speed permits a more precise reading. While conducting the
baseline survey, DOE ground teams and law enforcement officials can
investigate these hot spots to determine whether the source of
radiation is used for industrial, medical, or other routine purposes.
DOE officials told us that this baseline information would be
beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials could
immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or
radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an
emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts.
For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in
Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law
enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.
Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with
new sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a
nuclear or radiological device would focus their attention on these new
locations and might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources
and potential threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device
more quickly. Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training
opportunity for DOE personnel. DOE officials told us that regular
deployments helped to keep job performance standards high for pilots,
field detection specialists, and the technicians who analyze the data.
DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004,
DOD funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern
Virginia in order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or
radiological attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup
costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that
cleaning up after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological
device may cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE
officials estimated that information from background radiation surveys
could save several million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup
efforts could be focused on decontaminating buildings and other areas
to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a baseline radiation
survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to which they would
have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely clean areas with
levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings or
hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.
DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have
limitations and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or
radiological devices. Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain
nuclear or well-shielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and
the type of building being surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness
of detection systems. Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good
intelligence to find a device. Law enforcement officials would need
intelligence information to narrow the search to a specific part of a
city. Lastly, according to DOE officials, baseline background radiation
surveys may need to be conducted on a periodic basis because radiation
sources may change over time, especially in urban areas. For example,
new construction using granite, the installation of medical equipment,
or the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a city's radiation
background. Despite these limitations, without baseline survey
information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre-
existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time
consuming.
DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City:
In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to
conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were
aware that DOE had the capability to measure background radiation and
locate hot spots by helicopter because DOE used this capability at the
World Trade Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS
provided the city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a
regional radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to
spend part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five
boroughs. DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of
2005, requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about
$800,000.
According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey,
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological
sources. Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and
technicians investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether
they posed a danger to the public. While most of these were medical
isotopes located at medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD
officials, awareness of these locations will allow them to distinguish
false alarms from real radiological threats and locate a radiological
device more quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained in
investigating hot spots and they have real-life experience in locating
radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now have a baseline
radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts in the
event of a radiological release.
In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of
the over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park
that was once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD
officials, the survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by
large quantities of radium.[Footnote 9] Brush fires in the area posed
an imminent threat to public health because traditional fire mitigation
tactics of pushing flammable debris into the middle of the park could
release radiological contamination into the air. Investigating
locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by the
aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this
threat, and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material.
Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to
get a better understanding of how and to what extent background
radiation changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue
identifying radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant
training to their officers.
Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility
for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both
Agencies from Informing Cities about the Surveys:
Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and
conducting surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city
officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a
capability exists. According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is
the only city where a background radiation survey has been completed.
DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of
additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters
that are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological
emergencies. Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient
funding to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year
2006, the emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was
approximately $11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft
maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on
federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys.
However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New
York's case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include
costs associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters.
Furthermore, the extra costs could not be completely recovered by
increasing the charges to the city because, according to DOE officials,
DOE cannot accumulate money from year to year to pay for future lump-
sum repairs. In addition, DOE officials view background radiation
surveys as part of the homeland security mission to prepare state and
local officials against terrorist attacks, not as part of their
emergency response mission. However, DOE officials told us that because
they possess the assets and expertise, they would be willing to conduct
additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost of the surveys and
covered the wear and tear on DOE's equipment.
DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability.
DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have
the expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are
DOE's responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state
and local governments' efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear
and radiological materials and to develop mobile detection systems.
DNDO has not evaluated the benefits and limitations of background
surveys and does not plan to conduct background surveys as part of this
effort. DHS officials also told us that it is DHS's responsibility to
advise cities about different radiation detection technology and to
help state and local officials decide which technologies would be most
beneficial. However, DNDO does not currently advise cities and states
on the potential benefits of background surveys.
DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic
events, including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year
2006, there was about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state
and local governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding
could be used for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However,
according to DHS officials, the agency has not received any requests
for funding other than the 2005 request by New York City. While it is
DHS's responsibility to inform state and local governments about
radiation detection technology, it has neither an outreach effort nor
does it maintain a central database for informing cities and states
about background radiation surveys. DHS maintains a lessons-learned
information-sharing database, which is a national online network of
best practices and lessons learned to help plan and prepare for a
terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of state and local
governments to enter information into this database, and DHS officials
told us they were not aware if New York City officials had added any
information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS
officials, it is DOE's responsibility to inform cities and states about
the surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them.
In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to
conduct additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in
part, because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits
of these surveys.
Conclusions:
Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or
injure many people and severely disrupt the nation's economy depends,
in part, on DOE's ability to search for and deactivate a device with
little or no warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure
and the spread of contamination in the event of a nuclear or
radiological explosion also depends, in part, on DOE's capability to
determine what parts of a U.S. city have been contaminated and provide
this information to local and state governments to help evacuate
citizens that are at risk of exposure and to administer medical aid. A
number of critical capabilities and assets for preventing and
responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at DOE's two
Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to disperse emergency
response capabilities and assets to other regions, the Remote Sensing
Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE's ability to search for
and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and
assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence
management teams that provide information to state and local
governments about the extent of contamination; the planes and
helicopters used to locate lost or stolen nuclear or radiological
materials and measure contamination levels; and a sophisticated mapping
system that contains information on the locations of radiological
sources in U.S. cities. In addition, the Remote Sensing Laboratories
house specialized teams that are highly trained in clandestine search
techniques and can conduct physically demanding search missions, such
as maritime boarding. Despite the importance of the assets and
capabilities located at these facilities, the Remote Sensing
Laboratories are protected at DOE's lowest level of physical security.
If DOE's emergency response capabilities were fully dispersed, then
providing only minimal security may be sufficient. However, since
several DOE emergency response capabilities remain unique to the Remote
Sensing Laboratories, we believe that the physical security measures
around those facilities may not be sufficient to protect their
capabilities. We recognize that physical protection measures may be
costly and that DOE security officials must prioritize where to spend
limited resources in a fiscally constrained environment. However, in
our view, a modest improvement in security at the Remote Sensing
Laboratories, such as installing vehicle barriers, would significantly
enhance the protection of highly valuable assets against a terrorist
attack.
In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on
all of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that
remains underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These
surveys establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to
more quickly detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure
changes in contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to
better focus and reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and
relatively low cost, there has been a survey of only one major
metropolitan area. Since neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission
responsibility for performing the surveys, they have not evaluated the
costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting the surveys for
metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist attack.
While DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the department is
reluctant to encourage cities to request the surveys because it has a
limited number of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally
reserved for emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for
assisting state and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or
radiological attack and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve
state and local governments' capacity to do so, has not considered
aerial surveys to be part of its efforts to protect cities against such
an attack. With no agency assuming responsibility for informing cities
about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an
opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and
used to prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or
radiological attack, we are making the following three recommendations:
* The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response
program within DOE, should review the physical security measures at the
Remote Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional measures
should be taken to protect the facilities against a loss of critical
emergency response capabilities or whether it is more cost-effective to
fully disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the
country.
* The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security
should evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting
aerial background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially
those that are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack;
determine whether they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or
radiological attack; and report the results to the Congress.
* If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security
determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear
or radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop
a strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing
this strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1)
the costs and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing
grant program for state and local governments or through other means
and (2) ways to inform state and local government officials about the
benefits and limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that
these government officials can make their own decision about whether
they would benefit from the surveys.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their
review and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither
agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns
about one of our findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with
our finding that the physical security of the Remote Sensing
Laboratories may not be sufficient to protect them against terrorist
attacks. According to DOE, physical security measures at these two
facilities are sufficient because (1) two senior-level managers
diligently reviewed the physical security measures around the
facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2) the
laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these
rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge
that current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing
Laboratories are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are
protected at the lowest level of physical security. This means that a
facility can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but no
other physical security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing
Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence or any
vehicle barriers, but security officials told us that it still meets
the minimum security requirements. Further, DOE's justification for
protecting the laboratories at the lowest level of physical security is
that their emergency response capabilities and assets have been
dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the
laboratories. However, although we found that DOE had dispersed some of
its emergency response capabilities and assets, a number of critical
emergency response capabilities and assets still exist only at the
laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully
dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for
protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
Second, the security officials responsible for developing security
plans for the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force
personnel to protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we
reported, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and any person
with a federal government identification may gain entry. Furthermore,
guards at these installations do not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as
discussed in our report, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple
times with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their
vehicles were never searched.
In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in
performing additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE
was concerned that existing mission requirements may limit DOE's
ability to conduct aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has
limited resources to conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency
does have the expertise and that there is funding potentially available
under DHS's grant program for state and local governments. If neither
DOE nor DHS assume mission responsibility for conducting the aerial
surveys and do not inform cities about the benefits of these surveys,
U.S. cities will miss an important opportunity to be better prepared
for a terrorist attack.
DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have
limitations. For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-
shielded radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in
our report. However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey
information from an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose
valuable time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by
investigating pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful.
In addition, if there were a nuclear or radiological attack, the lack
of baseline radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly
and time consuming.
DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE's NNSA are
reprinted in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the
Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy :
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington; DC 20585:
August 31, 2006:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director,
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report, "Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond
to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response
Capabilities Could be Strengthened." We understand that this work was
done at the request of the House's Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform to determine our capabilities to prevent potential
nuclear attacks, the physical security measures at two of our
facilities, and the benefits of conducting background radiation
surveys.
While NNSA appreciates the work performed by GAO, we categorically
reject the contention that physical security at two of our facilities
may not be sufficient for protecting against terrorist attacks. The
reason for this rejection is twofold. (1) The physical security posture
for the two facilities (and everything related to that posture) was
reviewed and approved by two senior level managers-the Associate
Administrator for Emergency Operations, the overseer of one of only two
mission operational elements within NNSA, and the Chief, Defense
Nuclear Security/Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
Both of these senior managers and their respective staffs performed all
due diligence related to the current security posture of the facilities
in question and believe that both have sufficient physical security.
(2) The facilities are tenant organizations aboard major military
installations that have significant security arrangements of their own.
Regarding the discussion related to background surveys, NNSA agrees
that there may be value in performing background surveys. However, the
tempo of our operational requirements may preclude us from developing
an effective schedule of such services. Additionally, with or without a
background survey, the probability of finding a low activity
radiological source or highly shielded source from the air is very low.
Equally, with or without a background survey, the probability of
finding a high activity source from the air is high.
We appreciate GAO's acknowledgment that NNSA has a unique capability.
We recognize that capability and take special care to manage and
protect our assets judiciously.
NNSA recommends to GAO that since NNSA is a separately organized
agency, albeit within the Department of Energy, the report and
corresponding recommendations be directed to the Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration. Should you have any questions
related to this response, please contact Richard Speidel, Director,
Policy and Internal Controls Management.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
cc: Tom D'Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Joe Krol,
Associate Administrator for Emergency Response William Desmond,
Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security Karen Boardman,
Director, Service Center:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]
loisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath,
Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea,
and Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.
(360657):
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its
facilities. The levels of protection are specific to the type of
security interests and the significance of the targets. They are
provided in a graded fashion in accordance with potential risks.
[2] DOE was established in 1977.
[3] Different types of radioactive material that could be used by
terrorists for a dirty bomb include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium-
238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.
[4] The Nevada Test Site is approximately 1,375 square miles--larger
than the state of Rhode Island. Since it is isolated and far from
populated areas, DOE uses the site for, among other things, hazardous
chemical spill testing, emergency response training, conventional
weapons testing, and waste management and environmental studies.
[5] The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams are located in nine
different parts of the country, including one at the Remote Sensing
Laboratory at Andrews and eight additional emergency response sites.
[6] These helicopters are the same ones used by the search teams to
find nuclear or radiological devices in urban areas.
[7] Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, Independent Oversight Inspection of the Radiological
Assistance Program (Washington, D.C., April 2006).
[8] DOE Order 470.4-2, Physical Protection (Aug. 26, 2005).
[9] According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term
exposure to radium increases the risk of developing diseases such as
lymphoma, bone cancer, and leukemia.
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