Archives for November 2018

Florida struggles with elections like an alligator struggles to swallow a moose. This was established in 2000 and re-affirmed with a vengeance in 2018. As this is being written, the race between Rick Scott and Bill Nelson has gone into a recount. To make matters even more theatrical, Rick Scott has, without evidence, accused Nelson of trying to commit fraud. Trump and his Grima Wormtongue Lindsey Graham have also been, also without evidence, making accusations of voter fraud.

At last, proof of voter fraud!

To be fair to those worried about voting shenanigans in Florida, Broward Country (the epicenter of the controversy) has a long history of election issues, including an incident in 2012 in which 1,000 uncounted ballots were found a week after the election. In another incident in 2004, 58,000 mail-in ballots were not sent to voters who requested them; although the matter was eventually addressed. As such, voters are right to be worried about whether their votes will be properly counted or not. But, the situation in Broward seems to be more a matter of incompetence as opposed to a brilliant Machiavellian plot to rob Scott of the election. At the time I am writing this, no evidence of fraud has appeared—but that could change.

While I certainly hope Rick Scott loses, I believe in American democracy and hold that a legitimate election requires two conditions be met. First, that every citizen has the opportunity to vote and that the vote is properly counted. As such, I oppose voter suppression and disenfranchising felons (although I do support disenfranchising those guilty of treason). I am also obviously for competently run elections. The denial of the right to vote is an attack on the foundation of democracy and destroys political legitimacy, as I have argued in other essays. Second, that those who are not legitimate voters are not permitted to vote. As such, I am obviously opposed to voter fraud. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the methods used to combat fraud must be directed at actual fraud, must be effective against fraud and must not deny legitimate voters their right to vote. Based on the best available evidence, voter fraud is like the harms of excessive exercise—it does occur but is incredibly rare. In contrast, efforts to suppress and deter voting are like obesity—a real and prevalent problem. As such, I worry far more about voter suppression than fraud—but I do worry about both.

The situation in Broward, as of this writing, does not seem to involve any fraud on the part of voters. However, the history of this county and the current situation both provide grounds for worry. As such, I have no opposition to an objective investigation of the counting of votes to ensure that there are no shenanigans. While I hope Scott loses, I do not want this loss to come through voter suppression or fraud. While a utilitarian argument could be made against my view, I would rather Scott win a completely aboveboard (no suppression and no fraud) election than lose due to fraud committed against him. I do, of course, think that Scott has, as governor, been suppressing voters (the most offensive and egregious example is his arbitrary and Kafkaesque tribunal for restoring voting rights to felons). As such, there would be a certain poetic injustice in his finding his suppression efforts defeated by fraud. One could make the argument that if the Republicans are already engaged in voter suppression, gerrymandering and other shenanigans, then the Democrats would be justified in engaging in their own shenanigans. The Republicans cannot, obviously enough, argue for any principles about fair elections and the will of the people—they do all they can to rig the elections in their favor. To use an analogy, the Republicans are cheating at cards and crying because they might lose despite the cheating and claiming this is because the other person is cheating.

The moral problem is, of course, that fighting suppression with fraud would derange the electoral system even more—though, as noted above, a utilitarian argument could be made in favor of using morally problematic means to achieve the desired consequences. One could also argue that without voter suppression in Florida, Scott and other Republicans would almost certainly have lost—there are about 1.5 million voters who have been disenfranchised for being felons and, as the Republicans know, they would tend to vote for Democrats if they could vote. As such, whatever the Democrats might be doing, they would at worst merely be making the game “fair” by offsetting the voter suppression with voter shenanigans. While this does have some appeal, it is also morally problematic—it is not known for sure how those votes would have been cast, so “voting” for them through fraud would not be counting their votes. The morally correct solution is, obviously enough, to prevent both suppression and fraud.

From a legal standpoint, Scott has the clear advantage in this situation: voter suppression is, in general, perfectly legal. For example, while disenfranchising felons was developed as a weapon against black suffrage by white supremacists in response to the 15th Amendment it is still the law in Florida and some other states. Likewise for other shenanigans like gerrymandering, voter ID laws, restricting polling locations and days and so on. It, of course, helps that the Republicans, in general, write the laws that make these legal. In contrast, voter fraud and election fraud are (and should be) illegal. So, if Scott can find evidence of voter or election fraud in Broward, he can use this to his advantage. This leads to the matter of why he is already crying fraud without any evidence.

One obvious explanation is that this is a stock talking point for the Republican party and is used as a justification for voter suppression. By crying fraud and scaring people, he builds support for policies and laws that suppress voters. Another explanation is that he is hoping to turn public opinion in his favor as part of a strategy to deal with the possibility that he lost the vote. If he can cast enough doubt on the election, he could win in the courts what he could not win at the ballot box. Unfortunately, the history of Broward does lend his accusations a degree of credence. But, by making accusations without evidence, he is also damaging democracy and potentially undermining the already weak faith in the electoral system in America.

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In my critical thinking class, I warn students that videos can easily be modified and weaponized as persuasive devices. While my past examples involved the usual conspiracy sites and oppressive states, the Trump administration has provided me with my first example of the White House making use of such a dishonest and deceitful tactic.

During a press conference, CNN’s Jim Acosta attempted to ask President Trump a question that Trump did not want to answer. In response, a White House employee was sent to take the microphone from Acosta. As she tried to take it from him, Acosta’s arm contacted her arm. The interaction was as awkward as one might expect—the woman probably expected Acosta to politely hand it over and Acosta probably didn’t expect her to try to grab it. The contact appears to be accidental on his part—he is gesturing as she reaches for the microphone. The matter would have been simply yet another awkward and surreal press conference at Trump’s White House were it not for the fact that Sarah Sanders tweeted what seems to be a modified version of the video of the event. This edited video seems to have been first distributed by Paul Joseph Watson who shares videos on Infowars.

In addition to the fact that the original event was witnessed by people present and on live television, the edited video has also been analyzed and shows clear evidence of alteration. To be specific, Acosta’s “pardon me, ma’am” was deleted from the audio and the motion of his arm was speeded up to make it look like a chop rather than accidental contact. As such, the video is an intentional deception designed to support the false narrative that Acosta “manhandled” the woman and thus was justly treated by the White House. This sort of deceit is to be expected from conspiracy sites that create their own deranged counterfactual tales of alternative realities to push questionable products upon the gullible. While the Trump administration gushes untruth like Niagara Falls pours forth water, the use of an altered video is another new low.

From a moral standpoint, the assessment of this action is easy: such deceit is morally wrong. In addition to the moral problem of lying, there is also the fact that the ongoing efforts to destroy truth are doing considerable damage. Since George Orwell and others have written at great length about the dangers of such distortions of reality, I am content to simply ride along on their wagon in this matter. What was done also seems stupid, given that the original event was witnessed, and the fakery is easy enough to discern. That said, there is a certain low cunning at work at the White House that serves them well.

The Trump administration and its allies have taken up the ancient banner of the Greek sophists—and under this banner there is no objective truth and all that matters is success. Or, as Trump likes to say, winning. Success is, of course, not defined in the moral sense that someone like Socrates or Aristotle would use—that is, achieving virtue and contributing to a virtuous society. It is, rather, success in the crude state of nature sense discussed by Thomas Hobbes—individual profit as the measure. But, one might say, surely everyone can see that such a altered video is a deceit and that it contradicts the objective facts of the matter.

One obvious problem is that some embrace the “value” system of Trump—all that matters is winning, and this means damaging the “other side” by any means necessary. It does not matter whether the video is accurate or not, what matters is its value as a weapon in the war against “them.” Another obvious problem is that there are those who will believe the lie as the truth. They will dismiss the analysis as the work of the enemy—thus attributing the deceit to them. They will also reject the statements of witnesses who disagree with the White House’s narrative and reject the unedited original video as being edited to hide the truth. There might also be those who do care about truth but are willing to take an ends justifies the means approach and accept that Trump needs to damage the media in order to do his “good works.”

It might be objected that I am part of the conspiracy and pushing the false narrative about the video or that I have been duped by the media. Being well-versed in classic skepticism, I am aware that there could be a massive media conspiracy to lie about Trump. However, accepting this would be to embrace an extremely dubious position—after all, Trump and his fellows routinely lie in the face of objective and unbiased evidence.

It could also be objected that I would forgive or defend Democrats for engaging in similar sorts of deceit. My obvious reply to this is that I would also condemn such deceit on the part of the Democrats, should they engage in doctoring videos and lying from official channels. I am not simply against deceits by Republicans, but against all deceits. And you should be, too—regardless of your party affiliation.

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The weaponization of ecological issues entails that it is very difficult to have a rational approach to regulation. When the left puts forth regulation, they can be cast by the right as aiming to destroy jobs because of a deranged preference for snail darters over humans. When the right opposes regulation, they can be cast by the left as willing to kill us all out of a preference for corporate profits over the well being of other humans and the planet. This is problematic and can easily result in a seesaw of regulation as each party takes and loses power. While there is no one solution to this problem, a rational approach would be to try to de-weaponize ecological issues by endeavoring to develop solutions that allow for benefits to both business and to the inhabitants of the ecosystem. As an example, I will use the matter of seabirds.

While sea food is delicious and nutritious, modern fishing techniques kill hundreds of thousands of seabirds each year. For example, albatrosses will take the bait used in longline fishing and be pulled under the water to drown. As another example, penguins can get caught in gill nets and drown. These dead birds have no value—they are merely an unfortunately bycatch whose carcasses are garbage rather than profit.

Fortunately for the birds and those who would hug them, there are various techniques that can reduce the death toll. For example, long line fishing can be made safer for birds with streamers to scare them away or by weighting the lines so that they sink out of reach of diving birds. As would be suspected, methods of protecting birds tend to involve some expense and can make things more difficult for the crews. As such, regulations requiring that fishing vessels use these protective devices and measures impose costs on the industry which, in turn, can impact the pay of the fishing crews and the cost of seafood. Because of this, it would be rational of the industry to oppose such regulations in order to avoid these costs.

While some might be tempted to dismiss this as mere obsession with profit in the face of an avian genocide, simply attacking the industry means that the industry will double down on its opposition and use financial resources to lobby against regulations—thus making it even harder for the environmentalists to get their desired regulations in place. It is also worth noting that aggressive opposition by industry will motivate the environmentalists to double down as well, thus making it harder for industry to get what they want. In this scenario, the big winners are the lobbyists and those profiting from the propaganda campaigns; although either industry or environmentalists will also win, albeit at great expense. But this also means that one side will lose and thus a “victory” of this sort would seem to be a less than ideal result. It would be preferable for everyone (but the lobbyists and agents of propaganda) if a proposal could be developed that would be beneficial to both sides—that would protect the birds while also benefiting the industry.

On the face of it, it seems hard to imagine that protecting birds would be beneficial to the seafood industry in any significant way. After all, they would be required to purchase and deploy equipment as well as to adopt methods to protect birds. There seems to be no profit and only loss in this.

One possible advantage is that protecting birds can pay off in public relations—a company can tout that it is bird safe and perhaps make up for the cost of this though improved sales and by increasing prices that guilty liberals are willing to pay. However, it would be even better if protecting birds was also profitable or at least offset the cost of protecting them. One example of where this can occur is longline fishing.

An estimated 160,000 albatrosses and petrels are killed each year when they get hooked on longlines. While this is obvious bad for the birds, it is also costly to the industry. First, they must waste time removing dead birds from their lines. Second, and more importantly for them, each bird they hook is a fish they are not hooking. As such, keeping birds off their lines means that they can catch more fish and this means more profits. As such, regulations that protect birds can be a win for the bird lovers and the industry. This does lead to an obvious objection.

Those who oppose regulations can make the sensible point that if such methods of bird protection are advantageous to the industry, there is no reason to impose regulations—out of rational self-interest industry will do it anyway. So, why create and impose regulations when there is no need?

Since I favor minimal state intrusion, I find this appealing: why impose by law what people would do anyway? Especially when such an imposition might motivate people to be contrary and not do it, simply because they are being told to do so. To use an analogy, think of seat belt laws. Wearing a seat belt is a good idea and people should do so, but some people refuse to wear them because there is a law requiring them to do so. It makes more sense to inform people of the benefits of seat belts and let rational self-interest motivate them.

The obvious counter is that people generally do not seem to operate in accord with rational self-interest. If they did, everyone would eat as well as they could and exercise as often as they could. As such, to follow Aristotle, people must often be compelled to do what is best. So, while protecting seabirds would be in the interest of industry, they are unlikely to do so just because it is in their interest. As such, there is the need for regulation that would compel them to act in their own interest and to do the right thing by not killing birds needlessly. To use another analogy, while it is rational for people to learn how to drive properly before driving a car, there seems to be a need for the state to compel people to do this and to control drivers’ licenses. That is, the state must compel people to do what is in their rational self-interest.

While I do favor freedom, I also hold that freedom can be justly limited on moral grounds—that is, when allowing liberty creates significant harms. So, for example, while people should be free to have pets, I am fine with regulations that forbid people from walking around in public with lions, tigers or bears on leashes. The challenge, as always, is balancing liberty against harms.

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While we all live on earth and suffer from environmental degradation and climate change, these matters have become political weapons. On the left, the outer edges engage in attacks on the existing political and economic systems. They tend to characterize business as willing to harm or even kill us to stack up more profits. This allows conservatives to cast those concerned with the environment as radicals who are out to destroy jobs. As such, those on the right often regard any concerns about the environment or extinction of species as leftist plots to destroy their beloved capitalism. In many cases, this view has been manufactured and fed by economic interests to a degree that results in an outright rejection of scientific evidence and empirical experience.

Since environmental issues have become intensely political and baked into the tribal identities of the political parties it is very difficult to discuss environmental concerns rationally in the public arena. After all, if many of those in power are dedicated to denying that problems even exist, it becomes extremely difficult to work on solutions. This is analogous in some ways to trying to address drug addiction when the addict refuses to accept that there is even a problem.

In some cases there are those who have a clear economic interest in denial or opposition. For example, the heads of industry tend to want to avoid health and safety regulations that would cost them profits. It must be admitted that some regulations are needlessly burdensome, but this fact does not prove that all regulations are bad. There are regulations that are clearly just, such as those that aim at protecting people from serious health threats. These are also regulations that are just in the sense that they aim to put the burden of the costs on the industry rather than allowing them to shift costs onto others. For example, restrictions on dangerous pollutants put the cost of dealing with them on industry, rather than shifting them onto the people in the contamination areas in the form of damage to their health.

Even in cases in which regulations would impose minimal costs or even provide benefits, companies tend to fight them. This might be due to mere ignorance of the benefits. For example, the railroad owners initially opposed safety equipment for trains on the grounds of cost—but it turned out that this equipment advantageous. There is also the possible influence of ideology—that the market should be free of state regulation. Of course, this ideology seems rather tolerant of restrictive regulation that benefits the established companies (think, for example, of the effective cable monopolies). There is also a strategic advantage in opposing all regulation—if one yields nothing (even to beneficial regulation), then it is easy to hold off any other regulations. Individuals also oppose regulations for similar reasons, often under the influence of the companies that dislike those regulations.

It would, obviously enough, be wrong to try to force regulations onto companies that would be ineffective or harmful. It is equally obvious that just and beneficial regulations would be morally acceptable. Aside from those who oppose (or love) all regulations, these two claims are quite plausible. It is also obvious that people disagree about where particular regulations fall; that is, whether they are beneficial or harmful. Matters are also complicated by the obvious fact that regulations tend to involve a mix of harms and benefits and sorting them out is challenging.

While I am sometimes cast as an anti-business leftist, I do recognize the importance of companies in human civilization. I rather like living in a technological society with computers, supermarkets and airlines. That said, I also recognize the importance of having a healthy ecosystem. So, I hold that there needs to be a careful balance between our technological civilization and the ecosystem of which we are a part. Unfortunately, the various sides have tended to weaponize these matters and demonize each other, thus making it rather difficult to create and implement rational solutions to real problems. The gist of the problem is that even reasonable proposals get made into straw men and are often attacked savagely with well-funded ad campaigns. This, obviously enough, is not conducive with creating and implementing rational and just solutions.

Since I teach philosophy professionally, I am aware of what Aristotle said long ago: reason is the weakest form of persuasion. Having taught critical thinking for decades, I know that people are best swayed by fallacies (logically defective arguments) and empty rhetoric (no argument at all). As such, the best way to motivate acceptance of rational and just regulation would be to avoid logic and use the tools of rhetoric and fallacies to get people to accept them for the wrong (or no) reasons. This can, of course, be justified on utilitarian moral grounds. However, a philosopher should feel some shame (as a philosopher) for using such methods. But, perhaps, it is possible to win people over with reason. This will be discussed in the next essay.

One of the key questions explored by political philosophers like Hobbes and Locke was that of the foundation of legitimate political authority. When the 13 colonies revolted against the rule of the king, they also sought a foundation on which to ground political authority. While there are many ways to solve this problem, the founders of the United States elected to adopt a philosophy shaped heavily by John Locke. The basic idea is that legitimate political authority requires the consent of the governed and that the majority should rule. Being aware of what Mill later called the tyranny of the majority, the founders put in place constitutional protections against possible oppressive incursions by the majority (and the state).

While these ideas appeal to me psychologically because of my upbringing, they also stand up well to philosophical scrutiny. As such, I accept that political legitimacy stems from the consent of the governed and that majority rule with proper protection against the tyranny of the majority is a good idea. There are, of course, those who disagree with these views—but that fight goes far beyond the intended scope of this short essay. For the sake of this essay, I will assume that these two basic principles are correct—leaving it open that they could be refuted.

Since the legitimacy of the government depends on the consent of the governed, it is essential to this legitimacy that the governed can provide or withhold their consent. As a practical matter, voting is a key part of this consent. A citizen can also provide consent by not voting—if they are free to vote and elect not to do so. If a citizen is denied the right to vote unjustly, then their consent is not secured. This weakens the legitimacy of the government since the government would be extending its authority beyond the consent provided by the citizens. To avoid a charge of absurdity, I must make it clear that I am not claiming that disenfranchising a single citizen destroys the legitimacy of the state. Rather, each unjustly disenfranchised citizen reduces the legitimacy of the state by a miniscule amount. I cannot, of course, draw an exact line at which a state would lose legitimacy by disenfranchisement—to require this would be to fall victim to the line drawing fallacy. But if the majority of citizens were unjustly disenfranchised, then that would seem to be a clear case in which the state would lack legitimacy. At levels less than this, the legitimacy of the state would be reduced proportionally to the degree of unjust disenfranchisement. Roughly put, the more citizens that are unjustly disenfranchised, the less legitimate the state. Individual citizens who are unjustly disenfranchised can make a good case that they now owe little or no obedience to the state that has disenfranchised them—but this is a matter for another essay. Suffice it to say that the principle of no taxation without representation is well established in the United States.

While we publicly and loudly praise the right to vote, the United States has a long and persistent history of unjust disenfranchisement. While the past is of interest, what is of great practical concern is the present unjust disenfranchisement of citizens.

One standard means of disenfranchising voters unjustly is to use the specter of voter fraud to “justify” various measures that deny citizens their right to vote. While voter fraud does exist, all the evidence shows that it is incredibly rare. To use an analogy, the obsession with voter fraud is like a person who thinks that Americans face a grave danger from excessive exercise and that obesity is not a serious problem. As such, they work hard to impose restrictions and limits on exercise while expressing no concerns about the health effects of being overweight. While athletic overtraining does occur, it is not a problem that afflicts the general population and the focus should be on the greater problem. Likewise for voter fraud and voter suppression: voter fraud does occur, but the real problem is voter suppression.

There is also the fact that the methods put forth as addressing voter fraud are often ineffective against the sort of fraud that has occurred. These methods, however, tend to be effective at disenfranchising legitimate voters, especially narrowly targeted voters. One example is the Republican’s voter ID law in North Dakota that requires voters to have an ID that shows a street address. Many native American voters live in rural areas and have PO boxes rather than street addresses and they are now trying to get new IDs that meet the requirement of the law. In terms of why the law exists, it is not because there was an epidemic of fraudulent voting by people using legitimate government IDs that lack street addresses. Rather, it is because Democratic Senator Heidi Heitkamp won her election by less than 3,000 votes in 2012. 80% of majority-Native counties voted for her, so suppressing their votes could help spell victory for her Republican challenger. This law will also impact other citizens.

Another example of voter suppression, one that is on the ballot this fall in my adopted state of Florida, is restricting felons from voting even after they have served their sentences. Under Rick Scott, Florida has a Kafkaesque system by which felons can attempt to regain their right to vote. If the voters make the correct decision this fall, this could be changed so that most felons have their voting rights automatically restored after the serve their sentence. While felon disenfranchisement impacts Republican and Democratic voters, it is generally seen as impacting Democrats more—which explains why Republicans tend to favor it more than Democrats.

My reply is that I cannot speak for the Democrats; but I can speak for myself. My view is that voter suppression is wrong regardless of who is being unjustly suppressed. As such, if the Democrats engage in voter suppression, I condemn that as strongly as I condemn voter suppression by Republicans. Or anyone, for that matter. While I would generally prefer that a Democrat win (if only from the pure self-interested fact that Democrats tend to be much friendlier to education and more pro-environment than Republicans), I would rather lose an election fairly than win through voter suppression. This is because, as noted above, voter suppression reduces the legitimacy of the state by robbing citizens unjustly of their opportunity to consent. In a nation that professes to be a democracy (yes, I know that it has a republican system at most levels) to rob citizens unjustly of their right to vote is a crime of the highest order. This is because it denies the foundational right of the citizens of a democracy and damages democracy itself. As such, voter suppression is treason, plain and simple.

In the last essay it was suggested that although a hologram is not a person, it could be seen as a simplistic virtual person. This raises the question of whether this would be enough to provide a foundation for a moral argument against celebrity holograms. To make this case, I will employ Kant’s classic arguments about the moral status of animals.

In his ethical theory Kant is clear that animals are means rather than ends. They are mere objects. Rational beings, in contrast, are ends. For Kant, this distinction exists because rational beings can (as he sees it) chose to follow the moral law. Because they lack reason, animals cannot do this. Since animals are means and not ends, Kant claims we have no direct duties to animals. They belong with the other “objects of our inclinations” that derive value from the value we give them.

While this might suggest that Kant would have no moral concerns about how we treat animals, he argues we should be kind to them—despite their having no moral status of their own.

While Kant is not willing to accept that we have any direct duties to animals, he “smuggles” in duties to animals in a clever way: our duties towards animals are indirect duties towards humans. To make his case for this, he employs an argument from analogy: if a human doing X would obligate us to that human, then an animal doing X would also create an analogous moral obligation. For example, a human who has long and faithfully served another person should not simply be abandoned or put to death when he has grown old. Likewise, a dog who has served faithfully and well should not be cast aside in his old age.

While this would seem to create an obligation to the dog, Kant uses a little philosophical sleight of hand here. The dog cannot judge (that is, the dog is not rational) so, as Kant sees it, the dog cannot be wronged. So, then, why would it be wrong to shoot the dog?

Kant’s answer appears consequentialist in character: he argues that if a person acts in inhumane ways towards animals (shooting the dog, for example) then his humanity will likely be damaged. Since, as Kant sees it, humans do have a duty to show humanity to other humans, shooting the dog would be wrong. This would not be because the dog was wronged but because humanity would be wronged by the shooter damaging his humanity through such a cruel act. To support his view, Kant discusses how people develop cruelty: they often begin with animals and then work up to harming human beings.

Kant goes beyond merely enjoining us to not be cruel to animals and encourages us to be kind to them. Of course, he encourages this because those who are kind to animals will develop more humane feelings towards humans. So, roughly put, animals are practice for us: how we treat them is training for how we will treat human beings.

In the case of dead celebrity holograms, they clearly and obviously lack any meaningful moral status of their own. They do not think or even feel. They even have no independent existence—they are mere projections of light. As such, they lack all the qualities that might give them a moral status of their own.Embed from Getty Images

While this might seem odd, these holograms seem to be on par with animals—at least in the context of Kant’s moral theory. For him, animals are mere objects and have no moral status of their own. The same is clearly true of holograms.

Of course, the same is also true of sticks and stones. Yet Kant would never argue that we should treat sticks well. Perhaps this would also apply to virtual beings such as a holographic Amy Winehouse. That is, perhaps it makes no sense to talk about good or bad relative to such virtual beings. Thus, the issue is whether virtual being are more like animals or more like rocks.

I think a case can be made for treating virtual beings well. If Kant’s argument has merit, then the key concern about how non-rational beings are treated is how such treatment affects the behavior of the person engaging in this behavior. So, for example, if being cruel to a real dog could damage a person’s humanity, then he should (as Kant sees it) not be cruel to the dog. This should also extend to virtual beings. For example, if creating and exploiting a hologram of a dead celebrity to make money would damage a person’s humanity, then they should not act in that way. If not doing this would make a person more inclined to be kind to other rational beings, then the person should not do this.

If Kant is right, then holograms of dead celebrities can have a virtual moral status that would make creating and exploiting them wrong. This view can be countered by two obvious lines of reasoning. The first is to argue that ownership rights override whatever indirect duties we might have to holograms of the dead. In this case, while it might be wrong to create and exploit such holograms, the owner of the likeness would have the moral right to do so. This is similar to how ownership rights can sometimes allow a person to have the right to do wrong to others, as paradoxical as this might seem. For example, slave owners believed they had the right to own and exploit their slaves. As another example, business owners often believe they have the right to exploit their employees by overworking and underpaying them.

The second like of reasoning is to argue that holograms are just light and this is not a solid enough foundation on which to build even an indirect obligation. On this view, there is no moral harm in exploiting such holograms because doing so cannot possibly cause a person to behave worse towards other people. This view does have considerable appeal, although the fact that many people feel that creating such holograms is creepy and disrespectful does provide a strong counter.