Wednesday, 18 December 2013

The Factions of Abu Kamal

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi.

Figure 1: Scene from Abu Kamal during a recent period of heavy rain.

When it comes to
reporting on Syria, much is written about fighting on the frontlines
but comparatively little exists on the nature of factions in towns
long since freed of regime control, particularly in the eastern areas
of the country. Here I consider the case of the town of Abu
Kamal (also Al-Bukamal, which is the more accurate
transliteration from Arabic) in Deir az-Zor governorate, along the
Euphrates River and bordering Iraq.

It has been out of regime
hands since last year, as regime forces- aware of the inability to
hold out if spread too thinly- retreated from a number of northern
and eastern localities to concentrate on defending provincial
capitals. The question now arises of who exactly controls or is
present in the town.

In my own research, I have identified a
number of factions operating in the town of Abu Kamal and sharing
power in the local revolutionary coordination committee: namely,
Kata’ib Junud al-Haq, Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, Kata’ib Allahu
Akbar, Liwa Allahu Akbar, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, and Liwa
al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya. So what is the nature of each of these
groups?

Kata’ib Junud al-HaqTranslating to
“Battalions of the Soldiers of Righteousness,” this faction is
the local Abu Kamal affiliate of Jabhat al-Nusra. However, it has not
exclusively remained in the Abu Kamal area but has rather sent
fighters as far afield as the town of ash-Shaddadi in al-Hasakah
province to the north and Sakhna in the desert area of Homs
governorate, besides the major front of the city of Deir az-Zor
itself further up the Euphrates.

Figure 2: Kata’ib Junud al-Haq raid on ash-Shaddadi (the town was taken over by Jabhat al-Nusra) featuring captured regime fighters.

The group is of
particular interest because of its shifts in allegiances on the
question of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham [ISIS]/Jabhat
al-Nusra dispute. When Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the
existence of ISIS in April, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq switched
affiliation to ISIS, changing its emblem to reflect ISIS imagery,
releasing a video in May of an ISIS training camp for Abu Kamal, and
putting out a statement in the name of “ISIS- Deir az-Zor province”
on a failed request to have Abu Kamal students in Deir az-Zor take
their exams in their hometown. At the same time, the group’s
Facebook page continued to put up graphics and material in support of
Jabhat al-Nusra.

Figure 4: Scene from a Kata’ib Junud al-Haq training camp for children: “Cub-Scouts of the Caliphate.” Note the use of the ISIS banner and name. The children also chant a slogan asking God to protect and preserve the muhajireen, indicating, that, like other Jabhat al-Nusra branches, the group has a combination of native Syrians and foreign fighters.

Figure 5: Video released in mid-May while Kata’ib Junud al-Haq was affiliated with ISIS.

Yet after Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri announced that ISIS should be dissolved, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq reverted by late June to Jabhat al-Nusra affiliation, while retaining the new logo it had adopted after Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS. However, by September, the group had reverted to a prior logo indicating explicitly affiliation with Jabhat al-Nusra. However, this reversal of affiliation does not necessarily mean hostility to ISIS, as Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman indicated to me in an interview: “We are all brothers.” Further, when I asked him about whether Kata’ib Junud al-Haq supports ISIS’ jihad in Iraq, he indicated in the affirmative.

Figure 6: A logo of Kata’ib Junud al-Haq prior to the announcement of ISIS.

Figure 7: The logo for Kata’ib Junud al-Haq adopted after the announcement of ISIS.

Figure 8: An old Kata’ib Junud al-Haq logo readopted in September.

Besides these
shifts in affiliations, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq and Jabhat al-Nusra
reinforcements from outside the town also notably clashed with Liwa
Allahu Akbar in mid-September. In the wake of these clashes, Jabhat
al-Nusra released a statement of apology to the people of Abu
Kamal, relevant excerpts of which are featured below.

Figure 9: Copy of jabhat al-Nusra statement released on 16 September for the people of Abu Kamal.

“To our people
in Abu Kamal, we offer an apology for what happened last Saturday…and
we call to witness God- Almighty and Exalted is He- to the fact that
we are not responsible for this fitna…In truth, what happened is
the result of the continued attempts by Liwa Allahu Akbar to attack
people from the distinguished folk of the land and the members of
Jabhat al-Nusra, to the point of launching an attack on the
headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra more than once with arms and
attacking the members [of Jabhat al-Nusra], including a strike on the
Shari’a committee with 23 mm cannon following on from protests
against the Front [Jabhat al-Nusra].

And matters were made
worse by what members of Liwa Allahu Akbar undertook last Friday in
preventing members of the Front from praying in the mosques, so
whenever a member of the Front entered, they prevented him from
entering saying it was an order from Saddam [leader of Liwa Allahu
Akbar]. An apology and treaties follow on their part from all these
incidents of aggression, while we were not responsible for any acts
of harassment and aggression during the course of these months
against Liwa…but because we are a symbol for Islam, we want to
offer an example of forgiveness for the people.

[…]

Where
is Jabhat al-Nusra in all these happenings: a group in Deir az-Zor
fighting and bringing forth martyrs, and a group in rural Homs
attempting to the best of its ability to defend the honor of Muslims,
and when the matter came to our attention regarding the preventing of
us from praying in the mosques and the manifest aggression, it was
thus that we summoned members from the fighting fronts to protect
what remained of our members in Abu Kamal after we saw what Liwa
Allahu Akbar was planning from acts of aggression in preparation to
fight the Islamists and that is because its leadership is in Turkey,
their alliances are well-known; and their ambition to rule Syria and
establish a secular state is not concealed from anyone, and for the
sake of this there has been established what is called the alliance
of Ahfad al-Rasul.”

After describing in-depth the alleged
sequence of events on the Saturday whereby Liwa Allahu Akbar opened
fire on Jabhat al-Nusra and the latter responded in defense of its
members and headquarters in Abu Kamal, the statement documents the
following post-clash conditions:

“1. Embracing a ceasefire
on our part and an end to armed demonstrations on our part in defense
of the souls of the innocent civilians in accordance with the demand
of the wise and judicious of Abu Kamal.

2. Whoever attacks us,
we will respond to him in kind or greater, as this is the path of
God- the Almighty has said: ‘For whosoever attacks you, attack him
just as he attacked you.’

3. Entrusting a committee composed
of the different battalions in Abu Kamal to investigate the
disappearance of Khattab al-Rakheetah as per a request from
Saddam.

In conclusion, we thank all those who stood by us from
the different families and tribes of Abu Kamal and its countryside as
well as its distinguished men not out of love for our members but out
of love for our Islamic program- may God reward them. So we ask God-
Almighty and Exalted is He- to guide the youth of Liwa who are
misguided by their leadership…So we ask the families of the youth
not to offer their sons and their pure blood for the sake of the
glory of this person called Saddam, who will not benefit them in this
world in preference to the Hereafter: a man who pushes them into
battles and wars so that he can attain power, wealth and fame as they
shout: ‘With soul and blood, we defend you oh Saddam!’”

The
relevant text of the ceasefire agreement between Liwa Allahu Akbar
and Jabhat al-Nusra- signed on 13 September by most of the battalions
I listed above- is as follows:

“-Withdrawal of members of
Liwa [Allahu Akbar] and Jabhat al-Nusra to their headquarters, with
no placing of checkpoints and the leaving of protection and
checkpoints to Katiba Amniya [joint security committee with recruits
drawn from all factions], Allahu Akbar and the other kata’ib.

-
No entry of masked men from any front.

-No raid on any home
except by the Shari’a Committee and Katiba Amniya.

-Every
week or more the putting in place of a program for a meeting
gathering the leadership of the battalions and the brigades with
discussion of any incident and accounting for harm on any
side.

[…]

- Withdrawal of the muhajireen since there
is no fighting in Abu Kamal and no need for masked men and armed
demonstrations.”

Figure 11: Scene in Abu Kamal from early September featuring the funeral of Mohammed Rabie al-Mousli, killed in the city of Deir az-Zor. His body was covered by the Jabhat al-Nusra flag.

Figure 12: From a video dedicated to Kata’ib Junud al-Haq martyr Abu Mus’ab Maher al-Tafah, indicating the group’s ideological affinity- as expected from a branch of Jabhat al-Nusra- as the martyr’s photo is featured alongside photos of al-Qa’ida figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.

Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna

Figure 13: Emblem of Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna

The name of this
group translates to “Banners of the Sunna Battalion.” The
battalion- led by one Abdullah al-Habib- describes itself as
independent, but in an interview, the group’s spokesman affirmed to
me that Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna shares the ideology of Kata’ib
Junud al-Haq and supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.
Indeed, it would seem that there is close general affinity between
Kata’ib Junud al-Haq and Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna. However, the
membership of the latter battalion is exclusively native Syrian.

It
was a signatory to the 13 September ceasefire agreement and like
Kata’ib Junud al-Haq has deployed fighters beyond Abu Kamal, most
notably in the city of Deir az-Zor, where it closely coordinated with
the Fatihun min Ard ash-Sham brigade and Jabhat al-Nusra in
operations in al-Rashdiya quarter during the autumn, consequently
being praised by the former group in October. In November, the
battalion sent a further deployment of fighters to al-Rashdiya.

Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna also distributes weekly da’wah
(faith outreach) pamphlets for the local population in Abu Kamal.

Figure 14: Section of a da’wah pamphlet from April distributed by Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, with sections on interpretation of the Qur’an, “al-Hadith al-Mawḍu’” (i.e. discussion of a hadith weakest in reliability in being attributed to the Prophet or his Companions), “Flags of the Ummah,” “Don’t be Sad,” “From the Life of the Companions” and “It’s not from the Sunna.”

Figure 15: Photo from June of fighters from Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna- “Lions of the Sunna”- in the group’s training grounds.

Figure 16: Photo from Deir az-Zor taken by members of Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna.

Figure 17: Another scene from Deir az-Zor.

Figure 18: From October, vehicle from a Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna convoy on its way to Deir az-Zor. Note the ISIS flag on the vehicle, corroborating the testimony related to me regarding the group’s jihadist ideological affiliations.

The “Allahu
Akbar Battalions”: the group is distinguished by its affiliation
with the eastern branch of the “Jabhat al-Asliya wa al-Tanmiya”
(Authenticity and Development Front), which is a nationwide alliance
of rebel groups that use FSA flags and symbols but do not actually
identify themselves as part of ‘the FSA’: see, for example, this
message from late April directed from Kata’ib Allahu Akbar to
the “Free Army,” urging for unity in the latter’s ranks.

Apparently taking its name from calling Abu Kamal “the
Allahu Akbar town,” it is led by one Khaz’al al-Sirhan (Abu
al-Waleed, who refers to the struggle against “the
immoral Nusayri regime”) and it played a role in the capture of
Hamdan military airport near Abu Kamal in November of last year,
claiming some military defectors in the process. The group also seems
to have a subsidiary military unit-Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin- and has
participated more recently in fighting for Deir az-Zor military
airport.

In May, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar put out a statement announcing the formation of an “Army of the town of Allahu Akbar in Abu Kamal,” consisting of Liwa Allahu Akbar, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, Liwa al-Qadisiya, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, and Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna. However, while the statement appears to bear the relevant leaders’ signatures, there is no evidence to suggest that this formation ever came to exist as something beyond a declaration on paper, and testimony I gathered elsewhere- which I will detail below as regards insistence on independence- also tells against this supposed army existing on the ground.

Figure 25: Statement in May announcing “Army of the town of Allahu Akbar in Abu Kamal.”

As for the
ideology of the Kata’ib Allahu Akbar in line with the wider
Authenticity and Development Front, it was outlined to me in an
interview as follows by the head of the military office of the
Kata’ib Allahu Akbar:

“Of course our ‘aqida like the
rest of the Syrian people is Sunni Islam and we want the rule of
God’s law and the creation of laws derived from the Qur’an and
Sunna of His Prophet- may God’s peace and blessings be upon Him-
with the protection of the rest of the rights for the other sects as
specified for them by the Shari’a.

Our program is moderate
and for justice and we do not declare takfir on anyone from
the Ahl al-Qibla [i.e. those who adhere to the tenets of Islam]…and
our school of thought consists of the great ‘ulama of the Ahl
al-Salf like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Baz.”

The ideological
vision of Kata’ib Allahu Akbar and the wider Authenticity and
Development Front is therefore very much in accord with the Sunni
Islamism that has characterized other major rebel groups like Liwa
al-Tawhid (at least prior to the latter’s joining the Islamic
Front). The most notable overlaps with the recent Salafi-leaning
Islamic Front are the claim to protect minority rights within the
framework of Shari’a and the claim to follow the likes of Ibn
Taymiyya, which partly explains the anti-Alawite sentiment that is
very much mainstream in the insurgency. In any event, the head of the
military office also made clear to me that Kata’ib Allahu Akbar has
good working relations with all factions in Abu Kamal and is
currently participating on the same military fronts where they are
fighting.

Liwa Allahu Akbar

Figure 26: Emblem of the Liwa Allahu Akbar

The “Allahu Akbar Brigade” is an affiliate of the nationwide
Ahfad al-Rasul (“Descendants of the Prophet”) network aligned
with Salim Idriss’ Supreme Military Command (SMC). Like Kata’ib
Allahu Akbar, Liwa Allahu Akbar played a role in many incidents of
fighting against regime forces last year, including the capture of
Hamdan military
airport, but unlike Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, the group not only
uses FSA imagery but also calls itself part of ‘the FSA.’ The
leader of the local Abu Kamal branch was until recently one Saddam
al-Jamal, who was noted above in reference to the conflict with
Jabhat al-Nusra in September.

However, a
video recently emerged showing Saddam appearing in front of an
ISIS flag, claiming his defection from Liwa Allahu Akbar to ISIS.
Saddam goes on to document an alleged conspiracy involving Qatari,
Turkish, Jordanian, Saudi and Western intelligence agencies whereby
the Ahfad al-Rasul movement- originally of non-ideological
orientation and just concerned with bringing the downfall of the
regime- was co-opted as part of the wider FSA to fight ISIS.

It
is of course true that generally speaking, the Ahfad al-Rasul
movement lacks a clear manifesto and political program, and as noted
above in the conflict with Jabhat al-Nusra, this point has made it
the target of criticism for supposedly being only concerned with
profiteering and warlordism.

As for ISIS’ accusation of
collaboration with Western intelligence, this is a charge ISIS has
leveled at Ahfad al-Rasul before during the conflict with the local
Raqqa branch of Ahfad al-Rasul that saw the movement expelled from
the city in August. Like the video of Saddam al-Jamal, ISIS circles
put out a video in August of an Ahfad al-Rasul detainee in Raqqa
purporting to document how the movement received aid from France to
take on ISIS, whence the derisive name ‘Ahfad
Faransa’ (“Descendants of France”) in ISIS circles for
Ahfad al-Rasul.

When I asked Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s
spokesman about the video of Saddam al-Jamal, he confirmed to me that
it is indeed authentic but pointed out to me he did not defect
willingly. Rather, he was kidnapped, though the abduction did not
take place in the town of Abu Kamal itself, but in an “unknown
location.” More recently, rumors have claimed that ISIS has
appointed Saddam al-Jamal as its own local commander for the Abu
Kamal area, but I find no evidence from my local contacts to
corroborate that.

It should also be noted that even after the
ceasefire agreement between Jabhat al-Nusra and Liwa Allahu Akbar,
not everything was harmonious, as Saddam al-Jamal escaped an
assassination attempt in late September.

The “Mujahid
Omar al-Mukhtar Brigade”: its name derives from the Libyan
anti-colonial revolutionary Omar al-Mukhtar. In an interview, the
group’s spokesman Abu Louay emphasized to me that the battalion is
“independent” and while it has no links with “Islamic
extremists,” it also rejects the Syrian opposition-in-exile
coalition (SNC), despite sharing photos and postings of developments
regarding the SNC on Facebook. In fact, Abu Louay indicated to me
that Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar has no ideology or political
program, but is simply concerned with bringing about the downfall of
the Assad regime.

Like most of the other groups documented
above, it was a signatory to the September ceasefire and has played a
role in more recent fighting outside of Abu Kamal, most notably in
the city of Deir az-Zor. For these recent efforts, Liwa al-Mujahid
Omar al-Mukhtar was commended by Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna.
Interestingly, it has also claimed some martyrs from a deployment
sent to aid the wider rebel front in the Qalamoun area of Damascus
province.

As mentioned
above, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya has participated in fighting
outside Abu Kamal in Deir az-Zor province. Having an Islamic name but
lacking a coherent political program, it appears to be one of the
most recent formations in the Abu Kamal area and according to Kata’ib
Junud al-Haq’s spokesman, it does not have a very significant
presence inside the town. That said, the battalion, which is
independent, has also coordinated with Salafist groups Ahrar ash-Sham
and Liwa al-Haq as well as local Abu Kamal ally Liwa al-Mujahid Omar
al-Mukhtar in targeting with Grad missiles Al-Tefur
military airbase in the desert of Homs governorate during the
autumn of this year.

Figure 36: Liwa
al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya vehicle on its way to the city of Deir
az-Zor. Photo taken on 28 October.

Other
GroupsWhile the above factions are the ones with
meaningful power in the town of Abu Kamal itself (as corroborated in
my interview with Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman), the overall
area with its surrounding countryside is home to more very small and
generally insignificant factions. Some groups appear to be defunct: a
case-in-point being the Katiba Junud al-Haq (“Battalion of the
Soldiers of Righteousness”), which went by the FSA-label and not
only conducted joint operations in 2012 with Jabhat al-Nusra in the
Abu Kamal area but also released joint statements, such as a claim in
October of that year to have downed a regime fighter jet in a
coordinated operation between Jabhat al-Nusra, a member of Katiba
Junud al-Haq, and Katiba Dhi al-Nurain. The group has since October
2012 otherwise been inactive, and likely evolved into Kata’ib Junud
al-Haq that became a formal Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate. Other groups
like Katiba Saraya al-Tawhid- similarly using FSA imagery- were
announced to be part of some
mergers last year, only never to be heard of again, whether in
separate form or as part of the declared FSA mergers in the Abu Kamal
area.

Figure 37: Emblem of Katiba Junud al-Haq, identified as part of the “Free Army.”

From the active factions of the town of Abu Kamal, can we identify a leading faction in particular? In my view, the answer to this question is yes. The key is to turn to examine the nature of the Shari’a committee of Abu Kamal.

The Shari’a Committee of Abu Kamal

Figure 39: Emblem of the Shari’a Committee of Abu Kamal.

The authority of the Shari’a committee of Abu Kamal is respected by all the factions operating in the town of Abu Kamal, but as indicated to me in an interview with the committee’s spokesman, it is led solely by Jabhat al-Nusra. Even without conducting an interview, it should be apparent that Jabhat al-Nusra leads the committee because the Shari’a institute is named after Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who was a mentor of Osama bin Laden and an influential ideologue behind the foundation of al-Qa’ida (“martyred in Afghanistan,” as the spokesman for Kata’ib Junud al-Haq put it to me). The Shari’a committee regularly releases statements and has worked to crack down on smuggling of sheep, for example, from Syria to Iraq.

Figure 40: Shari’a Committee statement released this month and addressed to “all the fighting battalions and factions in the Abu Kamal area,” announcing a new session of intensive Shari’a learning at the Sheikh Abdullah Azzam Shari’a Institute.

Figure 41: The Sheikh Abdullah Azzam Institute for Shari’a Learning.

Figure 42: A classroom in the Shari’a Institute.

ConclusionThe
town of Abu Kamal defies simple characterizations. Indeed, pace
Elizabeth
O’Bagy’s misleading map in her now infamous Wall Street
Journal op-ed, it would be wrong to think of Abu Kamal as a mere
stronghold for “extremist groups.” The reality is that there are
factions of a range of orientations in Abu Kamal, from
non-ideological (Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar and Liwa Allahu
Akbar) to standard Islamist (Kata’ib Allahu Akbar) and
pan-Islamist/jihadist (Kata’ib Junud al-Haq/Jabhat al-Nusra and
Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna). This kind of arrangement can similarly be
found in a number of towns with an ISIS presence, such as Tel Abyaḍ
in Raqqa governorate, and Idlib towns like Saraqeb, Salqin and
Ma’arat an-Na’aman.

As the September ceasefire agreement
shows, Jabhat al-Nusra cannot simply do as it pleases in Abu Kamal,
but it is not unreasonable to conclude that it is the leading faction
in the town, especially in light of its monopoly on the Shari’a
committee.

From the Iraqi perspective, there is the
additional problem that the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra split does not
really matter in the borderlands- something particularly apparent in
the testimony relayed to me and corroborated by the fact that
Zawahiri insists on cooperation between mujahideen in Syria and Iraq
anyway. The Abu Kamal area is certainly an environment where
cross-border exchange of manpower and resources between mujahideen
can easily take place.

More generally, the number of factions
in the area- considering Abu Kamal’s relatively small size- points
to rampant localism across the rebel-held areas of Syria. Go a little
further up the Euphrates in Deir az-Zor province and you will find a
different set of factions in a town like Mayadeen. It is hard to see
any kind of unifying rebel authority- let alone the unrepresentative
Syrian opposition-in-exile- being able to assert itself over the
expanse of rebel-held lands in Deir az-Zor province any time
soon.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg
Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College,
Oxford University. His website is http://www.aymennjawad.org