The applicant, Mr Suku Phull, is a United Kingdom
national who was born in 1953 and lives in Britain.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant,
may be summarised as follows.

The applicant is a practising Sikh and is thus
required by his religion to wear a turban. He stated that in October
2003 he travelled to Strasbourg on a business trip; on the return journey
on 10 October 2003 he was compelled by security staff at Entzheim Airport
to remove his turban for inspection as he made his way through the security
checkpoint prior to entering the departure lounge.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 9 of the
Convention of a violation of his right to freedom of religion by the
airport authorities. He argued that there had been no need for the security
staff to make him remove his turban, especially as he had not refused
to go through the walk-through scanner or to be checked with a hand-held
detector.

The applicant also complained under Article 2
of Protocol No. 4 of a violation of his right to freedom of movement.
In his submission, as a national of one of the member States of the
European Union, he should be exempted from security procedures of this
type on the territories of the member States.

THE LAW

The applicant complained of a violation of his
right to freedom of religion by the airport authorities. He argued that
there had been no need for the security staff to make him remove his
turban, especially as he had not refused to go through the walk-through
scanner or to be checked with a hand-held detector. He relied on Article
9 of the Convention, which provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The applicant also complained under Article 2
of Protocol No. 4 of a violation of his right to freedom of movement.
In his submission, as a national of one of the member States of the
European Union, he should be exempted from security procedures of this
type on the territories of the member States. He relied on Article 2
of Protocol No. 4, which provides:

“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of
a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.

3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise
of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security
or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.

4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also
be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance
with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.”

The Court notes that the applicant has not raised
these complaints in the French courts. However, it considers it unnecessary
to verify whether or not domestic remedies were available to him within
the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as, in any event, the
application is inadmissible for other reasons which are set out below.

With regard to the first complaint, as the Sikh
religion requires its male followers to wear a turban, the Court is
prepared to work on the premise that the disputed measure constituted
interference with the applicant’s freedom to manifest his religion
or beliefs. It further notes that the applicant did not allege that
the measure was not “prescribed by law” and finds that it pursued
at least one of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of
Article 9 (guaranteeing public safety).

The Court must therefore determine whether the
interference was “necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of public safety” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
9.

In X v. the United Kingdom (no. 7992/77, Commission decision of
12 July 1978, Decisions and Reports 14, p. 234), the applicant, a practising
Sikh, was ordered to pay fines for failing to comply with a regulation
requiring motorcyclists to wear a protective helmet. He alleged a violation
of Article 9, arguing that, as his religion required him to wear a turban,
it was not possible for him to wear a helmet. The Commission found that
the obligation to wear a helmet was a necessary safety measure and that
any resulting interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion
was justified for the protection of health by virtue of Article 9 §
2.

The
Court reaches a like conclusion in this case. Firstly, security checks
in airports are undoubtedly necessary in the interests of public safety
within the meaning of that provision. Secondly, the arrangements for
implementing them in the present case fell within the respondent State’s
margin of appreciation, particularly as the measure was only resorted
to occasionally. This part of the application is therefore manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.

As
to the second complaint, the Court finds that, in themselves, the security
checks to which passengers are subject in airports prior to departure
do not constitute a restriction on freedom of movement. This part of
the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and
must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4.