This first volume includes background material, reaching from the early
nine-teenth century to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 (Chs. I-III).
The research and development programs, 1919 to 1939, receive special attention
because of their direct effect upon much of the later work. The main emphasis
of the book nevertheless falls upon the period 1939 to 1945.

While endeavoring to examine dispassionately the attitudes of other
agencies within and outside the Army, the authors present the story chiefly
from the point of view of the Ordnance Department. Chapter III gives a
brief account of the financing

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of the department's activities before and during World War II in order
to put the discussion of policies and procedures, accomplishments and failures,
into a meaningful setting. It includes a rapid survey of the consequences
of lend-lease, supplemental to the data in Global Logistics and Strategy.
Chapter IV highlights the framework within which the department worked,
the organization created by the two wartime Chiefs of Ordnance, and the
revisions demanded by Army reorganization and the appearance of new civilian
agencies; it also explains not only the major organizational features but
also the philosophy underlying them and the sources of conflict between
the Ordnance Department and other agencies. Two subsequent chapters (V
and VI) cover recruitment and training of personnel to carry on the expanded
tasks of the department. The rest of the volume deals with research and
development problems.

Much of the section on research and development contains a discussion
of particular items developed to meet particular military needs. It focuses
therefore on the problem of translating combat requirements into feasible
"development requirements" and the steps the Ordnance Department
took to satisfy them. Hence the chapters on ordnance for ground warfare
(X-XIII) deal with the development of equipment designed to embody all
three desiderata of modern warfare: the greatest possible mobility, maximum
firepower, and utmost protection for troops. A chapter (XIV) on weapons
for ground defense against aerial attack constitutes the bridge between
the data on ground and air equipment, while Chapters XV through XVII on
aircraft armament analyze the characteristics of adequate airborne weapons
and the work of the Ordnance Department in endeavoring to develop suitable
airborne guns, rockets, and bombs. Comparisons with German concepts, methods,
and results throw added light on much of the American research and development
program. Finally, in Chapter XVIII, exploration of the difficulties resulting
from the shortage of strategically important raw materials and description
of the means devised to conserve them further explain ordnance quandaries.

Key topics:
1. Relations between the Ordnance Department and higher echelons of the
War Department, other technical services, and civilian research agencies
(Ch. IV, VIII).
2. Decentralization versus centralized control of ordnance activities (Ch.
IV).
3. Problems of the ordnance training program (Chs. V, VI).
4. The relationship of doctrine of tactical use to the development of new
weapons (Ch. IX).
5. The role of technical intelligence and exchange of scientific data with
Allied nations (Chs. VII, IX).
6. The time lag between completion of an experimental weapon and its employment
in combat: German and American views on "battle-testing" (Ch.
IX).
7. Armor and firepower versus lightness, maneuverability, and numbers:
the tank controversy (see Index: "Tanks").
8. For other ordnance items, see index listings for particular types of
materiel.