GENERAL
DEFINITION OF MEANINGThe Interrelationships of the Individual Dimensions
of Meaning

Relying upon what we have said
thus far, a general definition of meaning may be expressed in the following
variations.

(A) When a group of conscious
beings, witnessing the appearance of a material object, is disposed to think
of an object (or experience any other mental state whose external correlate
is an object), and that thought (experience) may be expressed objectively using
some means which all the members of the given social group can understand and
use, we may say in that case that the given material object is a sign and that
it has a definite meaning.

(B) Meaning is a complex of
relations of a sign toward

(a) the mental state it expresses,
(b) the object it designates,
(c) other signs of the given system, and
(d) practical operations necessary to the creation, alteration, or identification
of the designated object.

(C) The meaning of a sign is
a function of the mental state of a subject, other signs by which that state
may be described, the object designated by them, and the practical operations
by which the object is created, altered or defined.

(D) Definition (C) may be expressed
symbolically in the following manner:

Me (Si) = f(M,
S, P, O),where Me (Si) = meaning of a sign,M = the mental
state of one or more subjects,S = a set of signs
or symbols,P = a set of relevant
practical operations, andO = the designated object.

Aside from the last two definitions
(in which only the vocabulary has been changed), these definitions are not identical
to one another. The differences arise from the fact that our detailed analysis
of the dimensions of meaning has not been accompanied by an analysis of their
interrelationships, allowing us to enumerate them in varying order and to place
varying emphasis upon different aspects of their mutual determination.

The problem of defining the
interrelationships of the various elements of meaning may be divided into the
following three questions:

1. How do the other elements vary when one of them changes?

2. Can two of the elements be joined (in other words, do all four elements
have to stand independently in order for us to say that a sign has a definite
meaning)?

3. Can the enumeration of the four elements side by side be replaced by the
more precise determination of their structure?

1. Regarding the first question,
mental meaning may vary in two basic ways: (a) according to the degree of social
involvement, and (b) according to the type of mental experience.

(a) With respect to the degree
of social involvement, mental meaning may vary from the purely subjective to
the highest possible interpersonal leveluniversal meaning. In the former
case mental meaning cannot be described in terms of the signs of any existing
social language. Linguistic meaning exists here only to the extent that the
given subject has constructed a personal language in which the given sign occupies
particular relationships with respect to other signs. Such a language cannot
be translated (otherwise it is not completely personal and the mental states
associated with its signs are not completely subjective).

In this case one may speak about
objective meaning only to the extent that the designated object is independent
of the consciousness of the given subject at a particular point in time, although
it is not independent of the consciousness of the given subject generally. Let
us say, for example, that 1 have imagined, experienced, and described in terms
of personal symbolism love among the Martians. This is an object for me to the
extent that it exists even when I am not thinking about it at a particular moment.
As soon as I turn my attention once more to my symbols I can re‑experience
that object. But since my experience is unique and subjective and my symbolism
is incommunicable, with the disappearance of myself and my consciousness, this
imagined object similarly disappears. This is not an object in the sense in
which we have always defined it: on the subjective‑objective continuum
this is something that would fall in the sphere of the subjective. In this instance
practical meaning can be only a set of subjective mental operations by means
of which an imaginary entity is synthesized of elements of the real world. If
there existed even a single physical operation relevant to the given sign that
would at least imply that we are dealing with an object forothers (since
an object measured, produced, or modified by the activity of bodily organs is
accessible, at least in principle, to the observation of others).

To the extent that mental meaning
has intersubjective character its linguistic meaning is communicable and objective
meaning is constant and independent of human consciousness. As a rule real objects
are more constant and enduring and more universal in character than ideal and
imaginary objects, although there are exceptions. The home of a Belgradian of
the nineteenth century could be the objective meaning of a symbol only for a
few decades and for a very small number of people. The imaginary personality
of Zeus (and God in general) has occupied the conceptual world of millions of
people for thousands of years. Such exceptions are possible primarily because
there have existed very enduring universal spiritual and emotional needs calling
for the construction of certain unreal objects. (This will probably always be
true in art.) But in the sphere of cognition, particularly with respect to scientific
language, relationships are simpler: the increase in the intersubjective nature
of mental meaning is matched be a progression of objective meaning from fictive
objects to social objects and from social objects to natural objects that are
increasingly widespread, more frequently manifest, and of longer duration.

Along with this, practical meaning,
too, varies from exclusively mental operations to increasingly simple bodily
operations. Symbols such as 'air,' 'fire,' 'water,' etc. have universal mental
meaning, are highly communicable, and refer to natural objects people have encountered
every day from their birth; very simple practical operations are associated
with them: air is what one breathes, fire is what one cooks with, water is what
one drinks, etc.

(b) In accordance with the type
of mental experience, mental meaning may vary from representations and concepts
to feelings and desires. Accordingly the sign that expresses such meaning may
have a cognitive, emotive, or prescriptive character. This sign occupies a particular
relationship toward the other signs of the system of which it is part; it may
be replaced by them, but they must be of the same character.

We have already seen that the
objective meanings of cognitive symbols are known objects. The correlates of
representations are chiefly individual objects, while concepts refer to their
general relations and structures, and judgments refer to real or imagined (assumed)
facts. The designated object of emotive symbols always is a structure of human
feelings, whereas prescriptive symbols refer to a desired type of human action.

Various types of practical operations
correspond to various types of representations and concepts. Here the following
distinction is of essential importance: all representations and concepts which
successfully serve some practical activity in the sense that they are associated,
at least indirectly, with rules of bodily behavior that lead us successfully
to the realization of desired goals are said to have a real content and
to refer to real objects. Many commonsense ideas we utilize in everyday
life have such a character. The concepts and judgments associated (at least
indirectly) with such successful physical operations are said to have a scientific
character. Ideas and concepts that lack any even indirect connection with material
practice are treated like metaphysical, mythical, religious, artistic concepts
and ideas.

The connection between emotive
symbols and practice is extremely variable and often indeterminate. Someone's
cry of pain may cause people in the immediate environment to react in very different
ways in different situations, depending upon the various reasons for the pain.
In other words social, practical meaning is greatly dependent upon context.
Extremely great theoretical significance is attached to value symbols, whose
meaning is largely emotive. The practical meaning of such symbols is comprised
of ordinary operations that lead to the satisfaction of a need or the attainment
of an ideal that all the members of a particular community wish to attain.

Typically the practical meaning
of prescriptive symbols refers to operations which the given subject does not
perform spontaneously or voluntarily, but rather at the direction of another.
It thus entails an element of coercion.

We thus have outlined the basic
functional relations between the variation of the elements of meaning, taking
mental meaning as an independent variable. We obtain similar correlations if
we take as an independent variable any other element of meaning.

2. With respect to the second
question about the elements of meaning, in many cases the meaning of a sign
cannot be sharply divided into the four components we have dealt with thus far.

Our entire mental life, and
particularly thought, is inescapably linked with various systems of signs and
symbols. The elements of experience and thought assume identity and objectivity
only after they are linked to the appropriate words or other symbols. Accordingly
the mental meaning of a sign becomes effectively formed and identified (so as
to be able to be described and analyzed) only when the sign is implicitly correlated
with the other signs of the given system (language). And conversely, the definition
of use of a sign in a particular context reveals the meaning of the sign only
on the condition that there exists at least one conscious subject capable of
interpreting the entire process of using signs. Otherwise it remains an ordinary
material process, without any particular meaning.

Mental and linguistic meaning
differ most distinctly in two types of cases: (1) when the thought (or other
mental experience constituting mental meaning) is very specific or personal
in character so that it cannot be expressed completely with the stereotypical
symbolic apparatus which is available; and (2) when signs are used according
to established rules according to custom, without envisaging objects, as if
by a conditioned reflex. In the former case there is obviously an element of
meaning which more or less transcends the possibility of linguistic expression.
In the latter case one clearly may speak of meaning even in the absence of mental
processes (envisaging or imagining objects, emotions, etc.) which ordinarily
constitute mental meaning. It should nevertheless be pointed out that there
must necessarily exist a minimum of consciousnessat least consciousness
of the rules for the operation of a symbol and consciousness of the type of
situation (context) calling for the application of one rule or another.

The further we travel from such
extremes and approach normal situations in the use of signs, and particularly
in everyday conversation and professional usage, where we are dealing with great
uniformity of meaning, with impersonal, stereotypical thoughts, and conventional
sentiments, the more mental meaning coalesces with language in a single entity.

Mental meaning is clearly distinguished
from objective meaning when the designated object is a material thing or a fact.
But these two components of meaning tend to coincide when the given symbol does
not refer to objects in space and time but rather to collective mental states
and ideal and imaginary objects. In that case the object is an invariant structure
in the experiences of all the subjects of a given social group. Objective meaning
then is to mental meaning as a part to the whole, the general to the individual,
as the identical to the variable. The two coincide completely in the cases in
which mental meaning is a disposition of sufficiently general and schematic
character. This occurs with many symbols of abstract meaning in mathematics
and symbolic logic. For example the mental meaning of the symbol √-1 is
a disposition on the part of all subjects who understand this sign to imagine
a number which, when multiplied by itself, yields that same negative number.
At the same time this same imaginary number is the objective correlate signified
by the symbol √-1. Here in mental meaning there is no element that is
purely individual and subjective, and in objective meaning there is no element
that is not mental. In both cases the content is the same, but in the former
the accent is upon content as the structure of a disposition of thought, and
in the latter the accent is upon the independence of that content from the thought
of any individual subject.

But such instances occur exceptionally
and only with respect to the meanings of artificial, symbolic languages. Ordinarily
the contrast between the world of thought and mental dispositions, on the one
hand, and the world of objects, on the other, is so sharp that philosophers
treat it as a basic epistemological opposition. The human objective world is
so rich, and has expanded and concretized with such speed with the development
of science and human practice that the thought of any individual or social group
can correspond to it only approximately and transposed in accordance with various
subjective prejudices, feelings, desires, and ideals.

One component of meaning that
overlaps with all the others, sometimes identifying with them, is practical
meaning. Both mental processes and language (or any other system of signs) have
their practical side. Ideas and concepts are the results of operations of representation
and conceptualization. A linguistic structure always has a potential use in
speech and writing. One may distinguish only the act of operation from
its result. What we have termed mental meaning is, in effect, the result
of certain mental operations and the point of departure for performing new ones.
Language is what is established by speech and what will be further modified
by future speech.

It is particularly difficult
to distinguish object and the practical operations by which it is created, modified
and identified. We never become conscious of an object prior to practice and
independent of all practice. For precisely that reason the notion of a thing
‘in itself’ is a totally empty abstraction. It is only when we attempt to speak
about an object as something independent of a particular, concrete set of practical
operations, rather than as independent of human practice generally, that we
can distinguish with sufficient clarity what was originally given from
what was created in these operations. Of course what was originally given
is itself the result of certain previous operations, by either ourselves or
other people. But since we always speak about practical meaning in relation
to a particular set of operations P (which may be explicitly indicated in
an operational definition), in most cases we can distinguish it relatively clearly
from objective meaning, which yields us an integral concept of the object (which
includes both the originally given and the modifications instituted by the set
of operations P).

There are two marginal instances
in which the objectively given and practice merge in one so that apparently
one dimension of meaning disappears. The first is the case of fictitious "pure
objects" independent of practiceobjects 'in themselves.' Here, we
are only able to talk about objects without specifying the practical operations
relevant to them in a given context. The result is that we are no longer able
to differentiate the given from the created. Accordingly both dimensions of
meaning merge into one. Anyone who asserts that objects 'in themselves' are
'pure objects' has no more right to say so than someone else who says that objects
'in themselves' are purely the product of our (mental or physical) practice.

We encounter the second instance
with all imperatives and linguistic expressions whose sole meaning is to stimulate
us to activity. Such is the case, for example, with the expression 'open the
window.' Its practical meaning is the operation of opening the window. But this
is also its objective meaning: the expression refers (for everyone who understands
it) to an objectively given type of human behavior. Here it is not the case
that a dimension of meaning is simply lacking but that the two dimensions have
merged to the extent that they cannot be distinguished.

The merging of the two dimensions
of social meaning should be contrasted with instances in which one dimension
is genuinely lacking, so as to note the enormous difference. Let us assume that
while listening to Mozart's Requiem someone has been deeply moved and
taken the music as a sign to give up his job, family and other social obligations
and enter a monastery. In this case the music has assumed a practical meaning.
But other people do not interpret Mozart's Requiem in this way, and perhaps
even our friend will not have the same experience the next time he hears the
music. In this instance objective meaning is missingone cannot say that
joining a monastery is the objectively given type of action designated by this
music.

It is an interesting question
whether there are symbols in which all components of meaning have merged into
one. To the extent that one may answer this question in the affirmative, the
best prospects for inclusion in this type of symbol are those imperatives which
are expressed by sufficiently stereotypical terms and which refer to mental
rather than physical practical operations. An example is the expression, "Look!"
In this instance mental meaning is consciousness of a type of behavior: this
consciousness is formu­lated linguistically by means of other symbols which
associate what it means to look and what may be looked at (linguistic meaning).
Objective meaning is that type of behavior as something objectively given in
society. This might also be understood as practical meaning.

But it appears that each such
example may also be interpreted to demon­strate the differences between the
individual dimensions of meaning. Such possibilities exist particularly with
respect to mental and practical meanings that may include various types of things.
Thus for example the mental meaning of the expression ‘Look!' may range from
actual looking to imagining this type of mental process; from a readiness to
obey to feelings of resistance and even revolt. On the other hand the practical
meaning of the expression 'look!' ranges from the act of looking to a set of
all possible actions by which one may test whether others are actually looking.
Everything depends upon the situation, the type of people doing the interpreting,
and their function in the given situation.

On the other hand even if one
may imagine the conditions in which the meaning of a symbol represents an entity
which cannot be broken down into separate components, the fact remains that
in most cases one can easily distinguish various dimensions of meaning: mental,
linguistic, objective, practical.

3. Addressing the third question
and in conclusion of the analysis of meaning, the enumeration of the basic components
of meaning may be replaced by a definition which presents their interrelationships
in precise terms.

The symbol Si has the meaning = Df that there is an object O which is the consequence
of a set of practical operations P and to which there corresponds a disposition
of mental reaction M inherent in a set of subjects (x), and which
manifests itself as a consequence of the appearance of the symbol Si and is
expressed symbolically by the relation of Si
to the set of Symbols Ŝ.

The definition is provided here
using the following eight concepts:

1) object= O.
2) the set of subjects of a particular society = x3) the set of symbols of a particular system = Ŝ4) the disposition of mental reaction (including the imagining of an object
or any other mental experience related to it as well as behavior predicated
upon imagining, wishing or feeling) = M5) the set of practical operations by which the object is defined (created,
altered, measured) = P'
6) the relation 'to be a consequence'
7) the relation of correspondence
8) the relation 'to be symbolically expressed'

The first five concepts represent
the basic constituents of the complex of relations into which the phenomenon
of meaning may be broken down. The remaining three concepts pertain to the most
important relations: (1) the determination of an object by means of practice
and the determination of consciousness by language (the determination process
is in both cases mutual), but in a definition of meaning it has to be stressed
that the objects to which symbols refer are always determined by practice, and
that the mental dispositions in question are shaped by language); (2) correspondence
between mental dispositions and objects, and (3) the set of relations between
the given symbol and other symbols by which the given disposition is shaped
and by means of which it may be expressed.