The bottom line is this : either we as a society try to maintain order through the implementation and enforcement of laws based on moral
consensus or we simply let everybody do as they choose regardless of the consequences and without any notion of personal accountability

Just because morality is in a constant state of evolution and cannot be universal or objective or absolute does not mean anarchy should
prevail instead for that would be the worst possible option. Instead we adopt the alternative and proceed accordingly in full realisation
that it is always going to be a work in progress regardless of how much effort is made to make it as effective and as rigorous as possible

The bottom line is this : either we as a society try to maintain order through the implementation and enforcement of laws based on moral
consensus or we simply let everybody do as they choose regardless of the consequences and without any notion of personal accountability

I wouldn't say so. Historically, what's done the job is force -- force of arms, force of indoctrination, force of peer pressure, force of tradition, or some other such force. So I think we needn't fear that society will go to pieces instantly -- the (less than rationally legitimate) means of control are likely to remain, at least for a time. But force isn't itself a moral agency. It's just force. So eventually, people question it. Then either order goes to pieces, or force increases.

What's a more interesting question is how long a society can go on believing there's no deep substance to morality, and survive its dissolution into self-interested groups trying to dominate, manage, bully or kill each other. We do see some of that these days; along with the usual agencies of power trying to forcibly reassert the order they want. The problem is that as society dissolves in moral anarchy, the temptation to accept totalitarian domination -- so long as order will be restored -- increases. And people look more and more for political fiat to do what their belief in subjective "morality" simply could not preserve for them, such as securing social order, guaranteeing property, protecting personal rights, and so on.
.

Total anarchy cannot actually persist so it is inevitable that some order would be restored as that is simply the way of things
One reason for this is that a total state of collapse is completely impractical as that would start to threaten self preservation
Unless one actually wanted to die [ always a possibility in a dystopian society ] there would be some effort to try to stay alive

[S - ...the present observer is merely reporting on their various arguments, to show that there is no single objective truth. ]
That's a self-defeating claim.

If it's true that there is no single, objective truth, then the single, objective truth is that there is no single, objective truth -- which means there IS a single, objective truth...and so on.

No. The observer's report places no truth-value on any moral claim. Shifting a statement to another topic doesn't change the facts. There may be any number of objective truths, on any number of topics, but none of them make one moral precept more viable than another.

It's epistemological relativism

Again, no. The observer simply states: "many claims are made to an objective morality; non of the claims are proven". That observation doesn't require a theory of knowledge.

[ X is correct...For that advocate and his faction]
This mistakes the question, "IS THERE a single, universal X?"

That question was never asked. X was your example of a morality that is supposed by its followers to have been handed down by a supernatural authority. X was no more than one possible answer to the question "Is there is a single, universal moral system?"

for the question, "Does everyone know or believe the single, universal X?"

No, that wasn't asked, either. You did attempt to substitute that question, as did the advocates of all the claimants to absoluteness. Yes, the claimants do exist; yes, they do believe (well, some of them believe; some just make the claim without actually investing themselves in the moral precepts), but since everyone doesn't share their belief, their system does not supplant the rival claimants.

The answer to the first could be yes, and to the second, no, with no contradiction between them at all.

It could be, if the questions were asked, but there is no observable indication that it is or that they are.

There were once many theories about the configuration of our solar system. One was right.

To date. And the advocates of that one offered a large amount of repeatable and testable evidence of its correctness. If/when any moral belief system does the same, it will almost certainly be treated the same. (Lynch the first three advocates; imprison and threaten the next hundred; deride and ostracize the next thousand; then turn around and say, "Well, of course. That's obvious. What's so great about Kepler?")

[60,000 years, and they were not "searching": they were making suggestions, constructing arguments and putting forth contenders.]
Not that long. All morality of all cultures started out in some version of the "Divine Command" mode.

That's a claim. Is there substantiation anywhere? Is there any point in the annals of anthropological research that can be designated as the starting point of moral systems and codes of social conduct? Last I heard, there were some early burials that may have religious significance.

Almost all ancient cultures were polytheistic and a few were monotheistic: but none that we have ever found was atheistic or agnostic.

Does this validate a) none b) any c) some d) many e) most f) all of their beliefs?

It was never thought that morality had to be, or even could be "neutral" until the appearance of the idea of scientific objectivity.

And it still isn't, by the majority of people in the majority of societies.

The search for secular morality on a rational basis only appeared in the West, and relatively recently.

You keep saying "search", as if somebody had lost something. Moral codes are never absent from human societies as we know them throughout recorded history and as we surmise of prehistory.

It may be more than 300 years, but not much more.

That particular bugaboo may be only 300 years old, but there were plenty of moral systems before, and all of their chroniclers made some claim to absoluteness. The fact that their proponents didn't try to convince one another that each system was based in reason made no difference to their effectiveness, or methods of enforcement.

Rational, yes - all of the contenders are rational in their own context - even the God hypothesis. ]
Ah, yes. Now you're onto the point. Quite so.
'Rationality" is a thing that kicks in to work with premises that have to be taken as given.

Rationality operates at all times, and tries to make sense of data input, direct (as sensory impression) or deduced (as pattern-recognition), stored (as memory of previous experience) or received (as communication). Have to be taken? Why would you think that? The advocate may set forth some "givens", on which his system depends, but nobody else has to accept them. The missionary may posit a hirsute, vain and blood-thirsty Jewish patriarch burning commandments on stone tablets, and he can devise a code that seems completely rational in that context, but the Buddhists and Incas who hear him can readily see that his whole system is built on empirical quicksand - just as he can see that their internally consistent rationalizations are malarkey.

There is no such thing as neutral rationality.

There is no such thing as partisan rationality, either. Rationality doesn't require adjectives, since it only comes in the one type: it's what the normally functioning brain does for a living.

Most people still seem to believe that one day "rationality will tell us" all what morality requires.

Where are these people? Most of the people I'm aware of seem happy enough to live in their received 'wisdoms', which they only bother to rationalize when some unbeliever (or external event) challenges them. The rest of the time, they employ their rational brain to the demands of survival.

Rationality, rightly understood,

!!? Where is the authority for the right understanding?

contains no substantive premises of it's own.

It contains nothing at all. It's a data-processing function.

It depends on substantive content that must come from outside of rationality itself, from empirical data, from observation, from experience, or from somewhere else.

Where? Where?

Rationality is terrific stuff -- far better than alternatives;

There are no alternatives. There are other faculties, with different functions.

[Final and objective moral truth doesn't exist.]
That, we do not have reason to say.

Perhaps you have no reason to say it. My reason for saying it is that no such thing has manifested so far. Thousands of claims for its discovery or receipt or invention have failed the test of application. They all work, to some degree of efficacy, for some period of time, in some limited setting, then break down or are supplanted by a different ethos.

We do have reason to say, "The human race is not unanimous on its base assumptions, so if such a thing as an objective morality exists, it is currently known (if at all) only by some minority, and not the majority (since the majority have diverse opinions that contradict each other). But that's all we know.

We can always claim a deeply held belief is a fact - and we're strongly inclined to do so. But that doesn't make it a fact. It isn't our beliefs that make assertions facts. The fact / value barrier is insuperable. And in ethical or moral discourse, an 'is' never logically entails an 'ought'. That's just the way it is.

And the irony is, that if there were moral facts, their source would be irrelevant, as it is for all factual assertions. There is no authority that can dictate what counts as a fact: this is a fact because I say it is. So moral objectivism precludes a god's moral authority, along with anyone else's. 'This is good because I say it is' doesn't wash.

And another irony is that moral subjectivism, which is correct, is entirely compatible with theism anyway. So a theistic insistence on objectivism is not only incorrect, because morality is subjective, but also a peculiar case of unwitting intellectual self-harm.

No. The observer's report places no truth-value on any moral claim. There may be any number of objective truths, on any number of topics, but none of them make one moral precept more viable than another.

That depends on what we mean by "objective truths."

We have done nothing so far to show whether or not there are transcendent truths or moral truths. I agree with you completely that Materialist or Physicalist cosmology would rule them out; but since Materialism and Physicalism are gratuitous postulates taken a priori, there isn't a way to certify them as more true than alternatives, and at least good indicative evidence to suggest they are insufficient ways of looking at the universe.

So the question remains to be answered there. A gratuitous ruling in their favour isn't going to be an argument for anything.

It's epistemological relativism

Again, no. The observer simply states: "many claims are made to an objective morality; non of the claims are proven". That observation doesn't require a theory of knowledge.

If he's not extending his relativism from morality to epistemology, then you are correct. But he misspoke, in that case. I took him at his word.

[ X is correct...For that advocate and his faction]
This mistakes the question, "IS THERE a single, universal X?"

for the question, "Does everyone know or believe the single, universal X?"

No, that wasn't asked, either. You did attempt to substitute that question, as did the advocates of all the claimants to absoluteness. Yes, the claimants do exist; yes, they do believe (well, some of them believe; some just make the claim without actually investing themselves in the moral precepts), but since everyone doesn't share their belief, their system does not supplant the rival claimants.

It actually doesn't matter how many people share a belief. The truth value of that belief depends on other things. That's my simple point.

There were once many theories about the configuration of our solar system. One was right.

To date.

No, I mean one absolutely. The same would be quite true even if we don't presently possess the right theory. Some one thing will turn out to be true about the configuration of our solar system, in any particular respect. For example, it will either be true or not that it's geocentric. I think we all know it's not geocentric.

Again, the question, "Do we know the real configuration of the universe?" is not the same as "Does the universe have an actual configuration?" Just so, the question, "Do you know the objective moral truth?" or "Do most people know the objective moral truth?" is not the same as the question, "Is there an objective moral truth?" The last one cannot be answered merely by referring to the former two. So it's well that we separate the sociological-epistemological from the genuinely ontological question there.

If I understand the main question here, it's ontological. The OP is not asking "Who believes that morality is objective?" But "What shows or makes it objective, if anything?"

If you think I'm wrong, then please feel free to paraphrase the OP better for me.

[60,000 years, and they were not "searching": they were making suggestions, constructing arguments and putting forth contenders.]
Not that long. All morality of all cultures started out in some version of the "Divine Command" mode.

That's a claim. Is there substantiation anywhere?

Yep. Every archaeological dig on any ancient civilization has turned up evidence of religious and ritual practices, and they're ordinarily polytheistic or animistic in configuration, though in at least one case, the Hebrews, monotheism's not unknown. So far, we've found no ancient declarations of atheistic faith.

Almost all ancient cultures were polytheistic and a few were monotheistic: but none that we have ever found was atheistic or agnostic.

Does this validate a) none b) any c) some d) many e) most f) all of their beliefs?

No, but that's not my point. My point is that morality was understood by mankind from the beginning in a religious context. (Eliade made this point well.) So when we throw out that context, we can't be too surprised if morality itself seems to disappear as well.

It was never thought that morality had to be, or even could be "neutral" until the appearance of the idea of scientific objectivity.

And it still isn't, by the majority of people in the majority of societies.

Right.

The search for secular morality on a rational basis only appeared in the West, and relatively recently.

You keep saying "search", as if somebody had lost something. Moral codes are never absent from human societies as we know them throughout recorded history and as we surmise of prehistory.

Right. And hence the "search." There was no known prerequisite for an entirely secular conception of morality. Such a thing would have to searched out, and a rationale for it would have to be found, because in human history we had not seen such a thing before.

Rational, yes - all of the contenders are rational in their own context - even the God hypothesis.

Ah, yes. Now you're onto the point. Quite so.
'Rationality" is a thing that kicks in to work with premises that have to be taken as given.

Rationality operates at all times, and tries to make sense of data input, direct (as sensory impression) or deduced (as pattern-recognition), stored (as memory of previous experience) or received (as communication).

You need some sensory inputs, data, or patterns. My point is that "rationality" isn't a mill that works without any grist.

Think of it like mathematics. Mathematics is wonderful stuff. But equations don't achieve anything except formal elegance, without specific values being plugged in for "X" or "Y". Likewise, logic doesn't yield rationally valid results without at least two known and secure premises that precede its formal operations.

There is no such thing as neutral rationality.

There is no such thing as partisan rationality, either.

In a sense, true. But in a sense, not. Like maths, "rationality" itself has no partisanship. But without given premises, ("partisanship," if you like: at least, advocacy of a couple of truths already believed) it does no work either. It has nothing at all upon which to work its mechanics, then.

So you could say this: rationality is a process that operates without respect to partisan considerations. Syllogistic forms have no content. But without a given content , set of taken-as-certain premises (or "partisanship" if you will) rationality itself is no more than an empty set of algebraic forms.

Rationality doesn't require adjectives, since it only comes in the one type: it's what the normally functioning brain does for a living.

Only if by "rationality" we mean to make it a mere synonym of "thinking." Everybody thinks. That's what the brain does for a living. But not all thoughts are rational.

Being genuinely rational takes more. It entails that the brain operations are logical and formally correct. If they're not, then it's just one of the other brain operations, like imagining, guessing, hoping, dreaming, inventing, aspiring and so on. It's not rationality unless it's also rational.

Most people still seem to believe that one day "rationality will tell us" all what morality requires.

Where are these people?

Kant, for one (or at least I should say "Kant as the Neo-Kantians tell his story"; I think they're wrong). Also Habermas, Rawls, and so on. But such aspirants also include any moral philosopher who holds out hope that a legitimated morality that is devoid of ontological premises could be found. When this hope is fully gone, there will be no field of secular moral philosophy left, because the hope of its project's success will be gone.

Rationality, rightly understood,

!!? Where is the authority for the right understanding?

contains no substantive premises of it's own.

It contains nothing at all. It's a data-processing function.

We're agreed on that.

But note again: if there's no "data," there is no "data-processing" going on, and no "data-processing function" being practiced. i.e. no rationality. From whence comes that data? Not from rationality itself, but from at least two premises taken to be true already.

Rationality is terrific stuff -- far better than alternatives;

There are no alternatives. There are other faculties, with different functions.

Oh, sure there are alternatives. People have used things like imagination, tradition, aspiration, and so on -- undisciplined processes, to be sure; but they also sometimes end up right. They're just nowhere near so reliable and predictable as rationality.

Final and objective moral truth doesn't exist.

That, we do not have reason to say.

Perhaps you have no reason to say it. My reason for saying it is that no such thing has manifested so far. Thousands of claims for its discovery or receipt or invention have failed the test of application. They all work, to some degree of efficacy, for some period of time, in some limited setting, then break down or are supplanted by a different ethos.

Were that true, you would still not warrant the claim that because of it you know that objective truth doesn't exist. You'd only be able to say that a lot of people you know have failed to find it, and perhaps that on that indicative basis, you don't expect you will either. And that might be fair enough, but it doesn't warrant dismissal of the existence of objective moral truth.

Somebody you DON"T know might have it, or it might still exist outside of the present stock of human knowledge, just as the non-geocentric universe existed when nobody believed in it at all. It might simply be awaiting discovery.

Last edited by Immanuel Can on Tue Jul 17, 2018 2:37 pm, edited 1 time in total.

...the problem is very simple.
Objectivists must show why a moral assertion, such as slavery is wrong...

Very easy to do. But you have to grant the major premise, which you do not, apparently.

Premise 1: God judges mankind individually.
Premise 2: The making of individual choices requires freedom.
Conclusion: Depriving people of this essential freedom (i.e. the definition of "slavery") is contrary to the purposes of God (and therefore, is "wrong").

This is John Locke's argument for a primary human right to freedom, actually. Premise 2 is analytically true, so not debatable. It's a sine qua non. Premise 1 is contrary to any ontology you accept, Peter. So you will not accept the argument. Nevertheless, it is valid in syllogistic form, and if Premise 1 is true, the argument is sound. QED.

...the problem is very simple.
Objectivists must show why a moral assertion, such as slavery is wrong...

Very easy to do. But you have to grant the major premise, which you do not, apparently.

Premise 1: God judges mankind individually.
Premise 2: The making of individual choices requires freedom.
Conclusion: Depriving people of this essential freedom (i.e. the definition of "slavery") is contrary to the purposes of God (and therefore, is "wrong").

This is John Locke's argument for a primary human right to freedom, actually. Premise 2 is analytically true, so not debatable. It's a sine qua non. Premise 1 is contrary to any ontology you accept, Peter. So you will not accept the argument. Nevertheless, it is valid in syllogistic form, and if Premise 1 is true, the argument is sound. QED.

Thank you. At last - an honest answer. Your moral objectivism rests on the following claims - some of them only implicit in your syllogism.

1 There is a god.
2 That god morally judges each of us.
3 That god wants each of us to be free to make choices - including moral choices.
4 Anything that limits a person's freedom to make choices - such as slavery - goes against what that god wants.
5 Anything that goes against what that god wants is morally wrong.

Your syllogism is invalid, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, which don't establish a criterion for what is morally right or wrong. The 'purposes of [a god]' is no such criterion. What makes a god's purposes morally right?

And your syllogism is unsound, because claims about the existence, actions and purposes of a god are objectively unjustifed - leaving aside questions about which god, which scripture or other revelation, and which religion is relevant That may not mean the claims are false. But it does mean that to believe the claims are true is irrational.

So this argument provides no justification for the claim that morality is objective. QED.

"Valid," in philosophy, refers specifically to the form of the argument, not to any of the content. The syllogism given follows the correct structure for a categorical syllogism, such that IF the premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows by logic: and so is rightly said to be "valid." Only its "truth value" and final "soundness" are debatable, in this case. "Validity" is not. It is observably valid.

...don't establish a criterion for what is morally right or wrong. The 'purposes of [a god]' is no such criterion. What makes a god's purposes morally right?

You would simply need to understand the word "God" conceptually correctly in order to solve that question. If God is the Creator of the world itself, and hence the Creator of all in it, then any genuine, objective morality is also His construction. To define it is to understand "right" as meaning, "that which is harmonious with the character and purposes of God," and "wrong" as "that which is disharmonious with the same."

So that answer is available analytically.

And your syllogism is unsound, because claims about the existence, actions and purposes of a god are objectively unjustifed...

This is not necessary to the question you posed.

You offered the challenge that (and I quote) "theistic objectivists must show why there being a god makes morality objective." Asked and answered, then. If an objective Authority that defines and authorizes morality exists, then that morality is objective. It's obvious and quite clear. The contentious part can only be Premise 1, which I already told you you would not accept, so your objection is utterly unsurprising.

The problem for you, again, is Premise 1: the ontological claim that God exists. As you deny it, no logic that produces a rationale for objective morality can convince you. But that's been your choice. It bears not at all on questions of the validity or even the truth of the argument. It only tells people you don't like the first premise.

Not so. You misunderstand validity. The conclusion must be entaiied by the premises. And your premises don't establish that the purposes of a god are necessarily morally right or good. In the conclusion, you introduce the claim that to go against the purposes of a god is to be morally in the wrong - which is not what the premises say. So you introduce an unjustified assumption in your conclusion, which makes the inference invalid. Logic 101.

You have two problems:

1 Establishing that there is a god - and which god is the god.

2 Establishing that a god's - or anyone's - moral opinions can be objective - factually true, independent of opinion.

So your argument boils down to a hypothetical: If there is a god, that god's moral opinions are factually true.

Have a go at defending that claim. It comes from a misunderstanding of the fact-value distinction which you've clung to from the start - to which misconception you add the absurd idea that an action is good because someone says it is - the argument from authority.

Tell you what - instead of rushing to show that I'm wrong, why not for once spend some time thinking it through with an open mind? Give it a few days to mull and sink in. There's no shame in doing that - it's the honest and rational thing to do.