At last, an Iraqi government. Now what?

After excruciating delays, Iraq’s parliament has approved a cabinet put forward by the new prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari—though a few key jobs are still unfilled. Will Iraq’s ruling factions now pull together to overcome the country’s huge challenges, not least the continuing insurgency?

THE surge in optimism among Iraqis that followed January's successful parliamentary elections has since turned to frustration, as the political and religious factions that won seats have squabbled endlessly and inconclusively over who gets which job in the new, power-sharing government. Insurgents, dealt a blow by the election's success, have taken fresh heart and launched a new wave of audacious and deadly attacks. But finally, after almost three months of bickering, on Thursday April 28th, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the incoming prime minister, was able to present a list of ministers to the parliament, which voted to approve it.

Thus Iraqis now have their first democratically elected government in 50 years—appointed, as it happens, on Saddam Hussein's 68th birthday. Even so, five cabinet jobs, including that of defence minister, are still being disputed, and will be filled temporarily until final agreement is reached. One of the main hold-ups had been the demands by the Shia-led party of Iyad Allawi, the outgoing, interim prime minister, for a large share of the cabinet seats. Mr Allawi and his allies will not now take part in the government, and are likely to form the main opposition block in the parliament.

The lion's share of the 36 cabinet jobs goes to members of Iraq's Shia Muslim majority, who are about 60% of the population, and in particular to members of Mr Jaafari's Shia List coalition, which won 140 of the parliament's 275 seats. However, Mr Jaafari has offered several key posts in his government of “national unity” to Kurds and Sunni Arabs—the country's two largest minority groups.

Mr Jaafari will double up temporarily as defence minister until agreement is reached on a permanent choice—probably a Sunni. Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shia who is no longer as pally with America as he once was—but still remains highly unpopular among Iraqis—has been made one of four deputy prime ministers. He will also act as oil minister while arguments continue over who should control the government's main fount of revenues—probably another Shia. Permanent ministers for electricity, industry and human rights also have yet to be agreed.

One highly sensitive position that has been filled is that of interior minister, in charge of the Iraqi police and intelligence services. The job has gone to Bayan Jabur, a leading figure in the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a group with close links to the theocratic Shia regime in Iran.

This choice may cause worries, not just among Sunnis but also in Washington. The Bush administration, having at first sought to purge Iraq's security forces of elements of Saddam's Baath party, now believes that the reincorporation of some Baathist officers is helping to build their effectiveness in combating the insurgency. The trouble is that SCIRI, along with some other Shia groups, suspects these Baathist officers of secretly helping the insurgents, and thus says they should be removed. SCIRI's opponents fear this is just a pretext for stuffing the security forces with members of its own militia, the Badr brigade. On a visit to Baghdad last month, Donald Rumsfeld, America's defence secretary, urged the new government not to try to “clean house” while seeking to “defeat a doggone insurgency”.

The revamped security forces, after a very patchy start under American tutelage, have gradually been turned into a more effective force that now often stands its ground in the face of rebel attacks and has begun to conduct its own offensives. Nevertheless, there is no sign that the insurgency is close to defeat. Indeed, as America's military chief of staff, General Richard Myers, said last week, the militants seem to have the same capacity for staging attacks as they did a year ago, launching 50 or 60 of them each day.

Besides killing a parliamentarian from Mr Allawi's party, the insurgents have in recent days introduced a horrific new tactic of double-bombings, aimed at multiplying the number of victims: a second bomb left at the scene of an attack is timed to go off just as rescuers arrive. On Friday, the day after the announcement of the new cabinet, six car bombs exploded in quick succession in Baghdad, killing at least 15 people, and at least nine were killed and 50 injured in attacks north and south of the capital. The following Wednesday, at least 60 people died when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a police recruiting centre in Arbil, a Kurdish city in the north.

The insurgents, mainly Sunnis, have often sought to cause heavy casualties among Shias, hoping to foment a civil war. So far, however, Shias have largely obeyed urgings from their clerics not to be provoked. The rebels also continue to murder members of the Iraqi security forces in large numbers—more than 200 in the past seven weeks. Any renewed turmoil in those forces' ranks, caused by fresh attempts at “de-Baathification”, could be catastrophic.

Daunting challenges

Mr Jaafari's new administration faces many other daunting challenges besides continuing to rebuild the security forces. It must lead the parliament in writing a new, permanent constitution to replace the current, interim one. However, the parliament's factions are deeply divided over such fundamental matters as the role of Islam in Iraqi law and the extent of federalism (the Kurds in the north seek sweeping autonomy; the rest oppose this). The new constitution is supposed to be ready by mid-August so that fresh elections can be held in December. But given the discord, the current parliament may have to invoke a law that allows for a six-month extension of the deadline.

The new government also urgently needs to get to work rebuilding Iraq's shattered infrastructure and lifting its oil output and electricity production—both of which are still below the levels of a year ago. Less than a quarter of the $18.4 billion promised by the Americans for rebuilding the country has been disbursed, because the continuing violence has made it near-impossible.

Bringing more Sunnis on board would undermine support for the insurgency and make such tasks less challenging. Though many Sunnis either boycotted January's elections or were prevented by violence from participating, some now seem to regret not taking part. Recently some 60 Sunni clergymen on the influential Muslim Scholars' Board, which had encouraged the boycott, issued a fatwa urging their co-religionists to join the army and police force, so long as they do not “co-operate with the occupier against the people”.

To a great extent, Iraq's short-term fate now depends on whether the new cabinet manages to contain the factional squabbling and demonstrates that it is a national-unity government in more than just name. If it does, Saddam's 68th birthday will come to be remembered as the day Iraq made a bold step towards becoming a stable democracy. If not, there is plenty of scope for things to get even worse than they are.