Thursday, March 31, 2016

States (colored red) in which Stop and Identify statutes are in effect as of February 20th, 2013.

"Stop and identify" statutes are statute laws in the United States that authorize police[1]
to legally obtain the identification of someone whom they reasonably
suspect has committed a crime. If the person is not reasonably suspected
of committing a crime, they are not required to provide identification,
even in states with stop and identify statutes.
The Fourth Amendment (Amendment IV) to the United States Constitution is the part of the Bill of Rights that prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires any warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1
(1968) established that it is constitutionally permissible for police
to temporarily detain a person based on reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been committed, and to conduct a search for weapons based on a
reasonable belief that the person is armed. The question whether it is
constitutionally permissible for the police to demand that a detainee
provide his or her name was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S.177 (2004), which held that the name disclosure did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Hiibel
Court also held that, because Hiibel had no reasonable belief that his
name would be used to incriminate him, the name disclosure did not
violate the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination; however, the Court left open the
possibility that Fifth Amendment right might apply in situations where
there was a reasonable belief that giving a name could be incriminating.[2]
The Court accepted the Nevada supreme court's interpretation of the
Nevada statute that a detained person could satisfy the Nevada law by
simply stating his name. The Court did not rule on whether particular
identification cards could be required, though it did mention one
state's law requiring "credible and reliable" identification had been
struck down for vagueness.[3]

Police–citizen encounters

In the United States, interactions between police and citizens fall into three general categories: consensual ("contact" or "conversation"), detention (often called a Terry stop, after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968)), or arrest. "Stop and identify" laws pertain to detentions.
Different obligations apply to drivers of motor vehicles, who
generally are required by state vehicle codes to present a driver’s
license to police upon request.

Consensual

At any time, police may approach a person and ask questions. The
objective may simply be a friendly conversation; however, the police
also may suspect involvement in a crime, but lack "specific and
articulable facts"[4]
that would justify a detention or arrest, and hope to obtain these
facts from the questioning. The person approached is not required to
identify himself or answer any other questions, and may leave at any
time.[5] Police are not usually required to tell a person that he is free to decline to answer questions and go about his business;[6] however, a person can usually determine whether the interaction is consensual by asking, "Am I free to go?"[7][8]

Detention

A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave.[9]
Police may briefly detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion
that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime. Many state laws explicitly grant this authority. In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court established that police may conduct a limited search for weapons (known as a "frisk") if they reasonably suspect that the person to be detained may be armed and dangerous.
Police may question a person detained in a Terry stop, but in general, the detainee is not required to answer.[10] However, many states have "stop and identify" laws that explicitly require a person detained under the conditions of Terry to identify himself to police, and in some cases, provide additional information.
Before Hiibel,
it was unresolved whether a detainee could be arrested and prosecuted
for refusing to disclose his name. Authority on this issue was split
among the federal circuit courts of appeal,[11] and the U.S. Supreme Court twice expressly refused to address the question.[12] In Hiibel, the Court held, in a 5–4 decision, that a Nevada "stop and identify" law did not violate the United States Constitution.
The Court’s opinion implied that a detainee was not required to produce
written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by
stating his name. Some "stop and identify" laws do not require that a
detainee identify himself, but allow refusal to do so to be considered
along with other factors in determining whether there is probable cause
to arrest. In some states, providing a false name is an offense.[13]
As of February 2011, the Supreme Court has not addressed the validity
of requirements that a detainee provide information other than his
name, however some states such as Arizona have specifically codified
that a detained person is not required to provide any information aside
from their full name.

Arrest

A detention requires only that police have reasonable suspicion that a
person is involved in criminal activity. However, to make an arrest, an
officer must have probable cause
to believe that the person has committed a crime. Some states require
police to inform the person of the intent to make the arrest and the
cause for the arrest.[14]
But it is not always obvious when a detention becomes an arrest. After
making an arrest, police may search a person, his or her belongings, and
his or her immediate surroundings.
Whether an arrested person must identify himself may depend on the
jurisdiction in which the arrest occurs. If a person is under arrest and
police wish to question him, they are required to inform the person of
his Fifth-Amendment right to remain silent by giving a Miranda warning. However, Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking.[15][16]
It is not clear whether a "stop and identify" law could compel giving
one’s name after being arrested, although some states have laws that
specifically require an arrested person to give his name and other
biographical information,[17] and some state courts[18][19]
have held that refusal to give one’s name constitutes obstructing a
public officer. As a practical matter, an arrested person who refused to
give his name would have little chance of obtaining a prompt release.

While Wisconsin statutes allow law enforcement officers to "demand"
ID, there is no statutory requirement to provide them ID nor is there a
penalty for refusing to, hence Wisconsin is not a must ID state. Case
law cited in Wisconsin's Stop and Identify statute does, however, state
"The principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose
his or her name in the course of a Terry stop and allow imposing
criminal penalties for failing to do so".
Neither is Illinois, since the Illinois Supreme Court Decision in
People v. Fernandez, 2011 IL App (2d) 100473, which specifically
states....... that section 107-14 is found in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, not the Criminal Code of 1961, and governs the
conduct of police officers. The fact remains that there is no
corresponding duty in the Criminal Code of 1961 for a suspect to
identify himself or herself.
By contrast, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,
542 U.S. 177, 181 (2004), a Nevada statute (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123
(2003)) specifically required that a person subjected to a Terry stop
“shall identify himself.” The Supreme Court held that the statute was
constitutional.
The Illinois statute does not specifically require a suspect to
identify himself or herself. Because defendant could not be convicted of
obstruction for merely refusing to identify himself and refusing to
provide identification,
As of February 2011, there is no U.S. federal law requiring that an individual identify himself during a Terry stop, but Hiibel
held that states may enact such laws, provided the law requires the
officer to have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
involvement,[20] and 24 states have done so.[21] The opinion in Hiibel implied that persons detained by police in jurisdictions with constitutional[22] "stop and identify" laws listed are obligated to identify themselves,[23] and that persons detained in other jurisdictions are not.[24] The issue may not be that simple, however, for several reasons:

The wording of "stop and identify" laws varies considerably from state to state.

Noncompliance with a "stop and identify" law that does not
explicitly impose a penalty may constitute violation of another law,
such as one to the effect of "resisting, obstructing, or delaying a
peace officer".

State courts have made varying interpretations of both "stop and identify" and "obstructing" laws.

Variations in "stop and identify" laws

Fifteen states grant police authority to ask questions, with varying
wording, but do not explicitly impose an obligation to respond:

In Montana, police "may request" identifying information;

In Ohio, identifying information may be required "when requested";
an obligation exists only when the police suspect a person is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a criminal offense, is
witness to a felony offense, or is witness to an attempt or conspiracy
to commit a felony offense;

In Colorado, police "may require" identifying information of a person.

Identifying information varies, but typically includes

Name, address, and an explanation of the person’s actions;

In some cases it also includes the person’s intended destination,
the person’s date of birth (Indiana and Ohio), or written identification
if available (Colorado). Ohio does not require the person's intended
destination. Ohio requires only Name, Address, or Date Of Birth. Date of
birth is NOT required if the age of the person is an element to the
crime (such as underage drinking, curfew violation, etc...) that the
person is reasonably suspected of.[25]
Indiana requires either name, address, and date of birth, or driver's
license, if on the person's possession, and only applies if the person
was stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation.[26]

Arizona’s law, apparently written specifically to codify the holding in Hiibel, requires a person’s "true full name".

Nevada’s law, which requires a person to "identify himself or
herself", apparently requires only that the person state his or her
name.

Texas’s law requires a person to provide their name, residence
address and date of birth if lawfully arrested and asked by police. (A
detained person or witness of a crime is not required to provide any
identifying information, however it is a crime for a detained person or
witness to give a false name.)

In five states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island), failure to identify oneself is one factor to be considered in a
decision to arrest. In all but Rhode Island, the consideration arises
in the context of loitering or prowling.

Seven states (Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Ohio, and Vermont) explicitly impose a criminal penalty for
noncompliance with the obligation to identify oneself.

Virginia makes it a nonjailable misdemeanor to refuse to identify
oneself to a conservator of the peace when one is at the scene of a
breach of the peace witnessed by that conservator.[citation needed]

As of February 2011, the validity of a law requiring that a person
detained provide anything more than stating his or her name has not come
before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Interaction with other laws

In states whose "stop and identify laws" do not directly impose
penalties, a lawful arrest must be for violation of some other law, such
as one to the effect of "resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace
officer". For example, the Nevada "stop and identify" law challenged in Hiibel
did not impose a penalty on a person who refused to comply, but the
Justice Court of Union Township, Nevada, determined that Hiibel’s
refusal to identify himself[27] constituted a violation of Nevada’s "obstructing" law.[28] A similar conclusion regarding the interaction between Utah’s "stop and identify" and "obstructing" laws was reached in Oliver v. Woods (10th Cir. 2000).

Interpretation by courts

"Stop and identify" laws in different states that appear to be nearly
identical may be different in effect because of interpretations by
state courts. For example, California’s "stop and identify" law, Penal
Code §647(e) had wording[29][30] similar to the Nevada law upheld in Hiibel, but a California appellate court, in People v. Solomon
(1973), 33 Cal.App.3d 429 construed the law to require "credible and
reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its
authenticity. Using this construction, the U.S. Supreme Court held the
law to be void for vagueness in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.352 (1983).[31]
Some courts have recognized a distinction authorizing police to
demand identifying information and specifically imposing an obligation
of a suspect to respond.[32] Other courts have apparently interpreted demand to impose an obligation on the detainee to comply.[33][34]
Wording and interpretation by state courts of "obstructing" laws also varies; for example, New York’s "obstructing" law[35] apparently requires physical rather than simply verbal obstruction;[36][37]
likewise, a violation of the Colorado "obstructing" law appears to
require use or threat of use of physical force. However, the Colorado
Supreme Court held in Dempsey v. People, No. 04SC362 (2005) (PDF)
that refusing to provide identification was an element in the "totality
of the circumstances" that could constitute obstructing an officer,
even when actual physical interference was not employed.[38]
Utah’s "obstructing" law does not require a physical act, but merely a
failure to follow a "lawful order . . . necessary to effect the . . .
detention";[39] a divided court in Oliver v. Woods concluded that failure to present identification constituted a violation of that law.[34]
It is not universally agreed that, absent a "stop and identify law",
there is no obligation for a detainee to identify himself. For example,
as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Hiibel, California’s "stop and identify" statute was voided in Kolender v. Lawson. But in People v. Long,[40] decided four years after Kolender,
a California appellate court found no constitutional impropriety in a
police officer’s demand for written identification from a detainee. The
issue before the Long court was a request for suppression of
evidence uncovered in a search of the defendant’s wallet, so the issue
of refusal to present identification was not directly addressed; however
some cite Long in maintaining that refusal to present written identification constitutes obstructing an officer.[41] Others disagree, and maintain that persons detained by police in California cannot be compelled to identify themselves.[42]
Some courts, e.g., State v. Flynn (Wis. 1979)[43] and People v. Loudermilk (Calif. 1987)[44]
have held that police may perform a search for written identification
if a suspect refuses to provide it; a later California decision, People v. Garcia (2006) strongly disagreed.[45]

Recommendations of legal-aid organizations

Some legal organizations, such as the National Lawyers Guild and the ACLU
of Northern California, recommend to either remain silent or to
identify oneself whether or not a jurisdiction has a "stop and identify"
law:

And in any state, police do not always follow the law, and refusing
to give your name may make them suspicious and lead to your arrest, so
use your judgment. If you fear that your name may be incriminating, you
can claim the right to remain silent, and if you are arrested, this may
help you later. Giving a false name could be a crime.[46]

In a more recent pamphlet, the ACLU of Northern California elaborated
on this further, recommending that a person detained by police should:

. . . give your name and the information on your drivers’ license.
If you don’t, you may be arrested, even though the arrest may be
illegal.[47]

Other countries

Many countries allow police to demand identification and arrest
people who do not carry any. Normally these countries provide all
residents with national identity cards,
which have the identity information the police would want to know,
including citizenship. Foreign visitors need to have their passport
available to show at all times. In some cases national identity cards
from certain other countries are accepted.
In Portugal
it is compulsory to carry the state ID card at all times, and a person
must show it to police every time it is requested. The only case where
this form of ID is not required is for a uniformed member of the armed
forces, in which situation the armed-forces ID card can be presented in
place of the state's ID card.

See also

Notes

Although police and police officer are used throughout this article, most "stop and identify" laws use the term peace officer (or sometimes law enforcement officer).
In general, peace officers are state civil officers charged with
preserving the public peace and granted the authority to do so. Peace
officers normally include police officers, sheriffs and sheriffs'
deputies, marshals, constables, and often many other persons; those
included vary among the states.

In upholding Hiibel's conviction, the Court noted,

In this case petitioner’s refusal to
disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable
fear that his name would be used to incriminate him.... As best we can
tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his
name was none of the officer’s business. — 542 U.S. at 190

But the Court did leave open the possibility of different circumstances:

Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that
furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a
link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a
separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the
privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what
remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here. — 542 U.S. at 191

Writing for the Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Justice Kennedy stated,

Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender
had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer "credible
and reliable" identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has
interpreted NRS §171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his
name. — 542 U.S. at 184–185

Justice Kennedy continued,

As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give
the officer a drivers license or any other document. Provided that the
suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by
other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute
is satisfied and no violation occurs. — 542 U.S. at 185

And in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. — 392 U.S. at 21

Our conclusion that no seizure occurred
is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told
by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their
inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her
having been so informed. — 446 U.S. at 555

You can say, "I do not want to talk to
you" and walk away calmly. Or, if you do not feel comfortable doing
that, you can ask if you are free to go. If the answer is yes, you can
consider just walking away. Do not run from the officer. If the officer
says you are not under arrest, but you are not free to go, then you are
being detained.

If
the encounter is consensual, a person approached need not actually
leave to terminate the encounter, but may simply ignore police. In Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.567 (1988), Justice Blackmun
explained the Court’s holding that Chesternut had not been detained,
stating that the police conduct "would not have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business." — 486 U.S. at 569

We conclude that a person has been
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave. — 446 U.S. at 554

In a concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, Justice White
stated that a person detained can be questioned but is "not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest." This opinion, in turn, was cited in many later
cases, including Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.420 (1984).

In Hiibel v. Dist. Ct., the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court declined to address the issue of identification in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.47
(1979), at 53 n.3 ("We need not decide whether an individual may be
punished for refusing to identify himself in the context of a lawful
investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements."); and
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.352
(1983), 361–62 n.10 (holding that a California statute was
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds, but refusing to consider whether
the statute violated the Fourth Amendment).

Texas
does not require a detainee to identify himself unless he has been
lawfully arrested, but does make it a crime to provide a false name.
Texas Penal Code § 38.02 reads, in relevant part,

(b) A person commits an offense if he
intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or
date of birth to a peace officer who has:

(1) lawfully arrested the person;

(2) lawfully detained the person; or

(3) requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal offense.

California Penal Code § 841, states, in relevant part,

The person making the arrest must
inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the
cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it . . .

the questions fall within a "routine booking question" exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the "'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" — 496 U.S. at 601–602

The Fifth Amendment prohibits only communication that is testimonial, incriminating, and compelled; see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S.27 (2000), at 34–38. Hiibel
held that, in the circumstances of the case, a person’s name is not
incriminating, and consequently is not protected by the Fifth-Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. — 530 U.S. at 34–38

A person commits an offense if he
intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of
birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and
requested the information.

Giving false information is a related, and
usually more serious offense (under Subsection [b], noted above), and
applies to detainees as well as arrestees.

In People v. Quiroga
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, the Court held that refusal to disclose
one’s identity following a felony arrest constituted obstructing an
officer:

These statutory provisions lead to the
conclusion that a refusal to disclose personal identification following
arrest for a misdemeanor or infraction cannot constitute a violation of
[California] Penal Code section 148. . . . Section 148 can reasonably be
construed as applying to nondisclosure of identity following arrest for
felonies, but not minor offenses, if this exception applies to the
provisions cited above dealing with arrests for minor offenses. — 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 970

Similar refusal following arrest for a misdemeanor or infraction did not
violate the statute because the Legislature had "established other ways
of dealing with such nondisclosure".

In Burkes v. State
(Fla. 2d DCA 1998), Case No. 97-00552, the Court, in affirming the
appellant’s conviction for violation of § 843.02, Florida Statutes,
"Resisting officer without violence to his or her person", stated:

The most compelling argument we discern
for answering this question in the affirmative is that the right to
remain silent means just that and has no exceptions. We, nevertheless,
conclude that after an individual has been lawfully arrested, he must
provide his name or otherwise identify himself when asked by law
enforcement officers.

The Hiibel Court held, "The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop." — 542 U.S. at 187

The opinion in Hiibel
included a list of 21 states with "stop and identify" laws. For some
reason, the Indiana law was not included in the list; the Arizona and
Ohio laws have been enacted since Hiibel was decided. The Texas law only applies to arrested persons.

"Constitutional"
means that the law requires the officer to have reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. See Hiibel.

Writing for the Court in Hiibel, Justice Kennedy stated, "the source of the legal obligation [to identify oneself] arises from Nevada state law". — 542 U.S. at 187

In Hiibel, Justice Kennedy stated, "In other States, a suspect may decline to identify himself without penalty.″ — 542 U.S. at 183

The
opinion noted that Hiibel was asked to provide identification, which
the Court understood as a request to produce a driver’s license or some
other form of written identification, 11 different times; however, it
did not indicate that Hiibel was ever asked simply to identify himself.

NRS
§199.280 provides a penalty for a person who "willfully resists, delays
or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge
any legal duty of his office"

California's
stop-and-identify law in Penal Code §647(e) was repealed several years
after 1983 and the sub-sections re-lettered, so the current Penal Code
§647(e) is what used to be Penal Code §647(f). Also, do not confuse
Penal Code §647(e) with Penal Code §647e.

(voided in Kolender v. Lawson), read, in relevant part,

Every person who commits any of the
following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: . . . (e)
who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to
account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do,
if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands such identification.

Section 647(e), as presently drafted
and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for
determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement
to provide a "credible and reliable" identification. As such, the
statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police
to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute. — 461 U.S. at 358

The State next argues that the
officer’s order was a justifiable means of compelling defendant to state
his name pursuant to section 107-14, which provides that an officer
making a Terry stop may "demand the name and address of the
person and an explanation of his actions." 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West
1992). However, while section 107-14 states that an officer may "demand"
the defendant’s name, it does not provide that the officer may compel a
response. Further, the United States Supreme Court has stated in the
context of a Terry stop: "[T]he officer may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to
obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond." (Emphasis added.) Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984).

Noting Berkemer v. McCarty (and Justice White’s concurring opinion in Terry that Berkemer quoted), the Hiibel Court stated, "We do not read these statements as controlling" (542 U.S. at 187), so Love is probably weakened to the extent that it relies on Berkemer.

In Cady v. Sheahan (7th Cir. 2006), the Court stated,

In Hiibel, the Supreme Court held that states are permitted to statutorily authorize the demand for identification during a Terry
stop, and to require compliance with such demand. 542 U.S. at 188, 124
S.Ct. 2451. Cady’s identity was relevant to the purpose of the stop and
the officers did not exceed the scope of the stop by requesting
identification. [footnotes omitted]

Section 76-8-305 does not require the
use of force; mere refusal to perform any act required by a lawful order
necessary to effect the detention is sufficient to constitute a
violation of § 76-8-305. Moreover, an individual who merely refuses to
refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or
detention violates this section. . . . Thus, Officer Woods gave a lawful
order when he told Mr. Oliver to present identification and to remain
in the parking lot while he conducted the investigation. By refusing to
present identification, Mr. Oliver refused to perform an act required by
lawful order, necessary to effect the detention.

A person is guilty of obstructing
governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other governmental function, or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an
official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or
interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act

An essential element of the crime of
obstructing governmental administration, to be charged in an
information, must be an act of either (1) intimidation or (2) physical
force or interference or (3) an independently unlawful act.

Plainly, ignoring an officer’s request
for identification is not a crime, nor does that act supply any such
element. Though it is clear that such conduct risks pursuit and arrest,
no crime has been charged here. — 96 Misc.2d at 150

A person commits obstructing a peace
officer . . . when by using or threatening to use violence, force,
physical interference, or an obstacle, such person knowingly obstructs,
impairs, or hinders the enforcement of the penal law or the preservation
of the peace by a peace officer, acting under color of his or her
official authority.

Utah’s "obstructing" law, Utah Code §76-8-305, reads as follows:

Interference with arresting officer.

A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a
lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with
the arrest or detention by:

(1) use of force or any weapon;

(2) the arrested person’s refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:

(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and

(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or

(3) the arrested person’s or another
person’s refusal to refrain from performing any act that would impede
the arrest or detention.

In People v. Long (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 77, Judge Agliano wrote,

The voluntary display of identification
is a routine experience for most of us. Measured against the obvious
and substantial need for police recording the identity of a person
suspected of having committed a crime, we find reasonable the minimal
intrusion involved here in requiring the production of identification.
In addition, defendant’s oral statement of his name was suspect when he
insisted he had no identification while appearing to carry a wallet and,
in addition, he seemed intoxicated.

Unlike Nevada and 20 other states, California does not
have a statute mandating that a detainee identify himself, and that
obligation cannot be read into Penal Code Section 148. (Rev. 1/08,
p. 2.14a)

In State v. Flynn (1979) 92 Wis.2d 427 [285 N.W.2d 710, 718], cert. den. 449 U.S. 846, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Terry
limitation of a search "to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the
police officer." (392 U.S. at 29) was limited to the specific
circumstances of Terry. Chief Justice Beilfuss wrote,

It is clear from the language itself that the court’s holding in Terry
was limited to the precise situation before it. The court did not say
that the sole justification for any search on less than probable cause
is the protection of the police officer and others, but that that was
the sole justification of the search in the situation then before it.
The situation before us is significantly different.

In People v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, Judge Low stated,

Neither case [Kolender v. Lawson or Brown v. Texas] could be interpreted to prevent a police officer from demanding that a Terry
suspect produce proof of identification. Further, nothing in those or
other cases cited by defendant prevents an officer from seizing a wallet
found during a lawful patdown search after that suspect has lied to the
officer that he had no identification. — 195 Cal.App.3d at 1003

Judge Low noted the similarity to Flynn, and continued,

We must emphasize that we do not hold that a suspect may be detained
and searched merely because he either refused to identify himself or
refused to produce proof of identification. Nor do we hold that each
time an officer conducts a Terry stop he may immediately conduct a
search for identification. The rule we announce does not provide
officers with unfettered discretion and does not open citizens to
harassment. — 195 Cal.App.3d at 1004

We need not look to other jurisdictions
to decide this case. We would have to indulge in legal legerdemain to
justify a patdown search for identification. In fact, it would require a
rewriting of Terry v. Ohio, supra, which we could not and
would not undertake even if we were so inclined. Here, the record is
devoid of any concern that appellant was armed and dangerous. The sole
reason for the patdown was to gather evidence of identification.

A fair reading of Terry v. Ohio, and its reference to the lower court opinion in State v. Terry
show that the "frisk" allowable upon a proper showing was " ‘. . . only
a "frisk" for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search
for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of
reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is
essential.’ " (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 16, fn. 12 [20 L. Ed. 2d at p. 903, fn. 12.) Our own Supreme Court has unanimously so held. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 161 [pat-down search "only" for weapons].) If stare decisis means anything (and it does) and if the word only means only (and it does), the trial court was required to grant this suppression motion as a matter of law. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450.) — 145 Cal.App.4th at 788