Before
the Court is Defendant First Student, Inc.'s Motion to
Dismiss. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons stated below,
Defendant's motion is GRANTED, but Plaintiff may amend.

I.
Background

The
following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint,
(Doc. 1 Ex. A (“Complaint”)), her letter to the
Court dated May 17, 2017, requesting leave to amend the
Complaint, (Doc. 12 (“May 2017 Letter”)), her
letter to the Court dated June 13, 2017, detailing her demand
for each claim, (Doc. 14 (“Demand Letter”)), and
her brief opposing Defendant's motion to dismiss, (Doc.
22 (“P's Mem.”)).[1]

Plaintiff
Dorine R. Watkins is a White woman who began working as a
school bus driver for Defendant, a student transportation
business, in or about January 2009. (Complaint ¶¶
2, 3; May 2017 Letter ¶ 1.)[2] During the course of her
employment, she drove buses and vans and worked out of New
Rochelle, New York and Mount Vernon, New York. (Complaint
¶¶ 3, 15; see Demand Letter ¶ 3.) She
was also a member of a union, Local 338 (the
“Union”). (Complaint ¶ 6.)

A.
Allegations Regarding Defendant's Pay Practices

Plaintiff
points to a number of problems with Defendant's pay
practices. First, she describes a problem with the
application of pay rates to certain hours. The collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Defendant
and the Union provided four pay rates for
operatives[3]: regular pay, trip pay, non-driver pay,
and safety meeting pay. (Demand Letter ¶ 4.) The regular
pay rate applied to mandatory driving tasks such as
performing routes, fueling the bus, or returning the bus to
the garage for repairs. (Id.) The non-driver pay was
“$8.00 per h[ou]r less” and applied to tasks such
as performing “lot work” or attending safety
meetings.[4] (Id.)

Plaintiff
filled out exception forms indicating extra work incurred
outside of the regular schedule. (Complaint ¶ 4; Demand
Letter ¶ 4.) Such work could include spending time in
traffic and transporting buses to and from the garage.
(Complaint ¶ 4.) It is not clear which pay rate applied
to work shown on an exception form. Regardless, Plaintiff
noticed some sort of a discrepancy between the hours she
worked and her exception forms dating back to when she began
working for Defendant, but did not “make a big deal out
of it.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also noticed
that many of her exception forms were denied and that the
non-driver pay rate was applied to her exception form time.
(Demand Letter ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff
next takes issue with the lack of compensation for certain
time during her workday. Specifically, she takes issue with
not receiving compensation for the time she spent waiting for
a safety meeting to begin or waiting between school runs and
trips. (Id. ¶ 5.) She also criticizes the
method for counting regular pay time - based on the time the
operative's bus was moving according to a GPS system -
because it did not include the time spent walking to the bus,
inspecting the bus before a trip, or waiting for other
drivers to exit the lot. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that she never received an additional hour of
compensation for days where she started at 6:00 A.M. and
worked until 9:00 P.M. (Id. ¶ 6.)

In or
about September 2013, Plaintiff placed a bid to become a
“tripper, ” an assignment that requires
availability at all times. (Complaint ¶ 5.) Plaintiff
does not allege when she became a tripper but her allegations
suggest she received the assignment sometime between
September 2013 and February 2014. The demand placed on
trippers caused Plaintiff to work many overtime hours.
(Id.) Early in the school year, Plaintiff noticed
that she was not receiving the correct compensation for her
overtime hours - many of the hours were “going into
categories not known to [Plaintiff], [and] being paid at many
different rates of pay.” (Id.) The May 2017
Letter identifies four workweeks - specifically,
“12/15/13, 01/05/14, 01/12/14, -1/26/14” - in
which Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours but was not paid
overtime wages. (May 2017 Letter ¶ 4.) And the Demand
Letter identifies another 36 workweeks - different from those
alleged in the May 2017 Letter - in which Plaintiff
“was not appropriately compensated for [her]
overtime.” (Demand Letter ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
identified those 36 workweeks based on a review of her
checking account. (Id.)

She
broached the issue of overtime pay with John Polomino, the
operations manager, but he would tell her that her pay was
correct. (Complaint ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also complained to
her union representative, Christine Ciprianno, about the
discrepancies in her pay, and Ciprianno would tell Plaintiff
that she would speak to Polomino. (Id. ¶ 6.)
And then, days later, either Polomino or Ciprianno would tell
Plaintiff that her pay was correct. (Id.) In
February 2014, Plaintiff went to the New York State
Department of Labor (“NYSDOL”) in White Plains,
New York for help, only to find that the Department could not
do anything because she was represented by a union.
(Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff does not specify when she
spoke with Polomino or Ciprianno but it is reasonable to
infer that these conversations occurred between September
2013 (when she placed the bid to become a tripper) and
February 2014 (when she went to the NYSDOL).

Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff's hours were reduced drastically
and her bus was denied necessary repairs. (Id.
¶ 8.) In or about February 2014, Plaintiff was asked to
cover what are known as “shapper runs, ” which
were usually done by experienced drivers that have basic
knowledge of all of the runs. (Id.) Shapper run
drivers were paid a flat salary for 35-40 hours per week.
(Id.) Plaintiff was forced to perform these duties
for 25-30 hours per week and was assigned only a few trips.
(Id.) For unspecified safety reasons, Plaintiff
returned to a “regular run of 23 hours [per
week].” (Id.)

Plaintiff
says she called Defendant 200 times and Ciprianno 30 times
asking to file a grievance, to no avail. (Id. ¶
9.) In or about March 2014, Plaintiff filed some sort of
charges against the Union and the Defendant. (Id.
¶ 10.)[5] Three months into the investigation of
Plaintiff's charges, the field investigator asked
Plaintiff to drop her charges because the government would
not take her case any further. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff eventually filed complaints with the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) in April 2014 and
September 2014 alleging improper payment of overtime wages.
(P's Mem. at 2-3.)

B.
Allegations of FMLA Violations, Discrimination, and
Hostile Work Environment

In May
2014, Plaintiff “begged and pleaded” with
Defendant for leave time to be with her sons, both of whom
were set to have surgery in Florida. (Complaint ¶ 13;
May 2017 Letter ¶ 3.) Polomino denied the request for
leave and told Plaintiff that there was no one to cover her
runs. (Demand Letter ¶ 1; May 2017 Letter ¶ 3.)

That
same month, on May 20, 2014, the fuel tank of Plaintiff's
bus was punctured. (Complaint ¶ 13.) She was on her way
to pick up students for an extracurricular activity when she
noticed the bus had no fuel. (Id.) After refueling,
she picked up the students and drove them to their activity.
(Id.) While she was waiting for the students to
return, a bystander told her that the bus was leaking fuel.
(Id.) She confirmed the leak, and called the
“go-to person, ” Nathaniel Martin, to let him
know, but he told her that nobody was going to bring her
another bus. (Id.; see P's Mem. at
3.)[6]
As a result, she drove the bus back, students and all, even
though the fuel tank had a leak. (Complaint ¶ 13.) She
reported the issue to Defendant later that evening but
Defendant was dismissive and failed to take any action.
(P's Mem. at 2.) Defendant instead claimed that the
problem was an overflow of antifreeze. (Complaint ¶ 13.)

In
October 2014, Plaintiff began helping Stan Outerbridge start
up the vehicles every morning. (Id. ¶ 15; May
2017 Letter ¶ 1a.) When Defendant learned that Plaintiff
was helping Outerbridge, an unidentified lot worker began to
lock the doors of many of the vehicles, forcing Plaintiff to
access them from the back. (Complaint ¶ 15; May 2017
Letter ¶ 1a.)

Plaintiff
was also driving a van around that time, in the fall of 2014.
(See May 2017 Letter ¶ 1b (discussing pre-trip
inspections of Plaintiff's van).) Plaintiff alleges that
the bus monitor for Plaintiff's van was
“insane” and threatened Plaintiff. (Complaint
¶ 15.)[7] During the colder months - about November
2014 through February 2015 - someone would move
Plaintiff's van without her knowing, thus causing her to
walk all over trying to find it. (Id.; May 2017
Letter ¶ 1b.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had the
van moved but she does not identify who moved it. (May 2017
Letter ¶ 1b.) Someone also wrote
“complainer” in the dust on the back of
Plaintiff's van in or around January 2015 and again in
the spring of 2015. (Id. ¶ 1f; see
Complaint ¶ 16.) At another unspecified time, someone
urinated in the water bottle that Plaintiff stored in her
van, and Plaintiff accidentally drank from the bottle.
(Complaint ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff
was reprimanded ten minutes before a mandatory physical in
2014. (Id. ¶ 18.) In 2015, the safety manager
sent her for a drug test thirty minutes before a mandatory
physical, causing her to experience stress about possibly
missing the physical. (Id.; May 2017 Letter ¶
1g.)

On
April 23, 2015, Plaintiff picked up her son from a hospital
in Florida. (Complaint ¶ 19.) He was seriously ill and
Defendant was aware of his condition because the Florida
hospital had sent an email or fax to Defendant's office.
(Id.)

On May
7, 2015, an unidentified employee crashed a bus into
Plaintiff's car while it was located in front of
Defendant's premises. (Id. ¶ 20; May 2017
Letter ¶ 1d.)[8] Plaintiff first learned of the crash the
next day when Vincent Carpenter, an employee of Defendant,
asked Plaintiff if she had seen the damage to her car.
(Complaint ¶ 20.) Plaintiff inspected the damage and
spoke to the safety manager, who refused to acknowledge that
a school bus had caused the damage despite the yellow paint
all over the car's bumper. (Id.) Carpenter
agreed to give a witness statement but he did not provide
Plaintiff with the form until a union representative arrived.
(Id.) The accident report listed the driver as
unknown and changed the time from 6:15 to 7:00 even though
Carpenter was very clear as to the time.[9] (Id.)
Plaintiff believes that someone changed the time in the
report because few people drive at that time. (Id.)
Plaintiff also believes that Zonar, a tracking device
installed in all of the vans and buses, could have identified
the driver of the bus that crashed into her car.
(Id.) At an unspecified time, three unidentified men
threatened Carpenter to keep his mouth shut and then, a few
months later, a bus hit his car. (Id.)

Plaintiff
alleges that for years Polomino told employees to stay away
from her because he thought she was “nuts, ”
“a liar, ” and “trouble.” (Demand
Letter ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also alleges that Polomino, on
unspecified occasions, whited out, denied, or refused to pay
Plaintiff based on exception forms related to trips she made
to and from Mount Vernon. (Complaint ¶ 14.)

At some
point in 2015, Plaintiff filed at least one complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 23; May 2017
Letter ¶ 2.) The Complaint refers to an EEOC complaint
for discrimination and retaliation filed in September 2015,
while the May 2017 Letter says Plaintiff reported a hostile
work environment to the EEOC in July 2015. (Complaint ¶
23; May 2017 Letter ¶ 2.) Plaintiff believes that 22 of
her buses were intentionally disabled by an unidentified
representative of Defendant during the period September 2015
to September 2016. (Complaint ¶ 25; May 2017 Letter
¶ 2j.) The defects with the buses ran the gamut from
brakes locking up, smoke filling the bus, and brakes catching
on fire to bald tires, slashed tires, and sliced windshield
wipers. (Complaint ¶ 25; May 2017 Letter ¶ 2j.)
Plaintiff also alleges that on September 3, 2015, Russel
Robinson, a lot worker from Mount Vernon, used his car to
block in Plaintiff's bus, preventing Plaintiff from going
on her run. (Complaint ¶ 21; May 2017 Letter ¶ 2h.)
Two weeks later, on September 17, 2015, Robinson tried to run
over Plaintiff with his car. (Complaint ¶ 22; May 2017
Letter ¶ 2i.) A complaint was filed with the New
Rochelle Police Department. (Complaint ¶ 22; May 2017
Letter ¶ 2i.)

C.
Grievance About Irregular Pay Goes Unanswered

In
February 2016, Plaintiff's peers elected her to represent
them as shop steward for the Union. (Complaint ¶¶
24, 26.) The Complaint alleges that the Union ignored
requests to meet about pay practices, (id. ¶
24), but Polomino and Martin did meet with the Union to
discuss irregular pay practices in May 2016, (P's Mem. at
3). Plaintiff alleges that she made her grievances known to
Polomino and Martin at these meetings. (Id.) Some
employees filed a grievance regarding some of the pay
practices but it is not clear if this grievance was sent to
the Union or to Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
the grievance was ignored - five months passed and nothing
was done. (Complaint ¶ 24.) Pursuant to the CBA, it
takes about 40 days before a grievance goes to arbitration.
(Id.)

In or
about September 2016, Plaintiff, in her role as shop steward,
explained to the Union representative that the employees need
representation and the Union was not providing it.
(Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was then relieved of her
duties as shop steward. (Id.) In September 2016,
Plaintiff filed unspecified charges with the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) against the Union.
(Id. ¶ 27.)

D.
The Experience of Other White, Female Employees

When
Plaintiff was first stationed in New Rochelle, she was aware
of only one other White, female operative at that location, a
woman named Renee. (Demand Letter ¶ 3.) Renee left
sometime in 2013. (Id.) While Plaintiff was working
out of Mount Vernon in 2015, Barbara Porier was the only
White, female operative of whom Plaintiff was aware.
(Id.) Porier told Plaintiff that her car was
vandalized and someone slashed her tires. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, office personnel sat by and laughed
at Porier while Plaintiff helped Porier change her tires.
(Id.)

When
Plaintiff returned to the New Rochelle location in September
2015, there were two new White, female employees: Lisa Skiko
and Maria Alleotta. (Id.) Alleotta never spoke to
anyone, quit during the school year, and came back a few
months later. (Id.) Skiko experienced many problems
with her bus and was also missing money from her paychecks,
an issue Plaintiff took up with the Union when Plaintiff
became shop steward. (Id.) Skiko was never properly
compensated and at the end of the school year stopped working
for Defendant. (Id.)

E.
Plaintiff's Termination

On
September 27, 2016, while students were on the bus, the door
to Plaintiff's bus would not close. (Complaint ¶
28.) Plaintiff called Defendant and Maria Poleski, the
Harrison Transportation Director, but nobody answered her
calls. (Id.) The doors eventually closed and
Plaintiff brought the students to school. (Id.)
Plaintiff then called Polomino to tell him that he was
playing a “very dangerous game” and to inform him
that someone needed to cover her run because she was going to
visit Poleski. (Id.; May 2017 Letter ¶ 2q.)
Plaintiff then went to Poleksi and told her what was going
on. (Complaint ¶ 28.) While Plaintiff was in
Poleski's office, Polomino called Poleski and told her
that Plaintiff had had a psychotic breakdown and abandoned
her bus. (Id.) At the time of Polomino's call,
Plaintiff's bus was sitting in front of the middle school
where Poleski's office is located. (Id.)
Polomino fired Plaintiff later that day. (Id.)

F.
Procedural History

Plaintiff
filed this action in state court on November 1, 2016,
(Complaint at 1), and Defendant removed the case on February
28, 2017, (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
the subject of sabotage and retaliation and that she lost
income through illegal pay practices. (Complaint ¶¶
29, 31.)

Defendant
sent a letter requesting a pre-motion conference on May 5,
2017, (Doc. 9), and Plaintiff responded by letter dated May
17, 2017, (May 2017 Letter). Plaintiff requested leave to
amend the Complaint to remedy certain problems pointed out in
Defendant's pre-motion conference letter. (Id.
at 1.) On June 6, 2017, the Court held a pre-motion
conference. (Minute Entry dated June 6, 2017.) At the
pre-motion conference, the Court granted Plaintiff the
opportunity to file an amended complaint by June 27, 2017 and
referred Plaintiff to the Southern District of New York's
pro se legal clinic. Plaintiff did not follow
through on filing an amended complaint, (Doc. 16), so
Defendant moved to dismiss the original complaint, (Doc. 24).

II.
Legal Standard

“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “While
a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks
omitted). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
“marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper
technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In
considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court &ldquo;begin[s] by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth,
&rdquo; and then determines whether the remaining
well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true,
&ldquo;plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.&rdquo; Id. at 679. Deciding whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is &ldquo;a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.&rdquo;
Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
...

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