Plaintiffs, Darren and Shannon Estes, appeal a jury decision which
found no liability on the part of defendant, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. (Wal-Mart), and dismissed plaintiffs' slip and fall lawsuit.
For reasons that follow, we affirm.

Plaintiffs filed this slip and fall action against Wal-Mart to
recover damages for physical injuries sustained by Mr. Estes
in a fall in the pet department at Wal-Mart. Mrs. Estes asserted an
action for loss of consortium, service and society
with her husband. After a three day jury trial, the trial court
entered a judgment in accordance with the answers to jury interrogatories
which found in favor of Wal-Mart and dismissed plaintiffs' actions.
After a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
in the alternative, a new trial was considered and denied by
the trial court, plaintiffs filed this appeal.

At trial the jury heard testimony from Mr. Estes. He stated that
he went to Wal-Mart on the day of the incident to purchase glass
cleaner for his aquarium. Because he was unable to find the product,
he approached an employee to ask for assistance. He waited a
short time while the employee helped another customer and then
obtained directions.

Mr. Estes testified that as he stepped off the mat on which he
was standing, he began to slip. He attempted to regain his balance
by reaching out for a shelf to his right, to no avail. He landed
with great force on his left lower back. Mr. Estes testified
that there was a clear liquid on the floor when he fell. When
he attempted to get up after the fall, his shoulder was wet from
the substance, which smelled like aloe vera. Mr. Estes testified
that he returned to the store about two months after the accident
to identify the substance and decided it was Stress Coat. On
cross-examination, Mr. Estes admitted that he did not mention
his shoes, which he described as
"flip flops",
being wet in a deposition because he felt that he slipped
in the liquid on the floor. He explained that he did not
know the mat on which he was standing prior to the fall
was wet until an employee of Wal-Mart stated that fact
in a deposition. Mr. Estes testified that there was no
warning or sign to inform customers that the mat in front
of the fish tanks was wet.

A Wal-Mart employee, who Mr. Estes later learned was Dwayne Hill,
came over immediately after the fall and told Mr. Estes not
to try to move until he got back with help. When Mr. Hill
returned with a manager, Mr. Estes tried to get up. When
he did he felt a sharp, burning pain in his back.
Someone called Mr. Estes's wife and an ambulance, and Mr. Estes
was taken to Kenner Regional Medical Center.

Dwayne Hill, who was employed in the pet department of Wal-Mart
for about one week on the day of Mr. Estes's fall, testified
that there was a mat in the aisle in front of the fish tanks
which was about four feet wide. The purpose of the mat was to
collect and contain any water which might spill out of the tanks.
Mr. Hill stated that he witnessed Mr. Estes's fall. According
to Mr. Hill's account of the incident, Mr. Estes came up to ask
for assistance in finding a certain product. Mr. Hill, who was
assisting another customer at the time, directed Mr. Estes to
the correct location. During the conversation between Mr. Hill
and Mr. Estes they were both standing on the mat, which Mr. Hill
described as "damp." Mr. Estes, who was wearing "flip-flop" shoes,
walked off in the direction indicated by Mr. Hill. When Mr. Estes
was about ten feet away, off the mat and walking on the tile
floor, he slipped. Mr. Estes made an attempt to regain his balance
by grabbing onto a shelf to his right. The attempt was unsuccessful
and Mr. Hill fell onto his back, knocking several items from
the shelf. Mr. Hill immediately notified a manager and an investigation
was conducted. Mr. Hill testified that he had "zoned" the area
shortly before the incident and did not find anything on the
floor. Mr. Hill thought is was possible that Mr. Estes's wet
shoes caused him to slip.

Delores Numnum, a maintenance worker at Wal-Mart, testified that
the store was cleaned thoroughly every morning at 7:00 a.m. During
the rest of the day, she walks around the store making certain
that it is clean. Occasionally, a spill will be reported, and
she is directed to it by a supervisor. Ms. Numnum further explained
that when a spill is discovered by an employee, the employee
stays at the site to insure the safety of the customers until
the maintenance worker arrives to clean it up. Signs and cones
are put up around the area to warn customers of the hazard.

Ms. Numnum testified that on the day of the accident, she had
completed a safety sweep of the pet area and had gone to the
toy department and then to the hardware department when she heard
a call of "code 40 and code white" in the pet department announced
over the intercom system. She explained that those codes indicated
there was an injury and a manager was required. Ms. Numnum estimated
that her safety sweep of the pet department occurred about thirty
minutes before the fall. She testified that in her sweep of the
pet area, she was looking for spilled birdseed on the mat in
the pet department because that was a frequent problem. However,
she saw nothing on the mat and it did not appear to be wet. She
further stated that she did not see anything in the aisles leading
up to the aquarium area. She also explained that on the occasions
when the mat was wet, it required only a paper towel to clean
it up. Ms. Numnum testified that the employees of the pet department
also help to keep the area clean.

Mrs. Estes testified that she received a call from a Wal-Mart
employee telling her that her husband had been injured and was
being taken to the hospital. When she arrived at the store, she
found her husband lying on the floor in pain. Mr. Estes told
his wife he had slipped and landed on his back. Mr. Hill informed
Mrs. Estes they had tried to get her husband to sit in a chair.
She became angry at this point because she knew from her physical
education background that an injured person should not be moved
until the extent of the injury can be assessed. It was at this
point that the manager called an ambulance. On cross-examination,
Mrs. Estes testified that she did not see or smell a liquid substance
on the floor. However, she did recall her husband saying his
shirt was wet.

Trumell Sykes, who was a stock clerk at Wal-Mart assigned to the
pet department on the day of Mr. Estes's fall, testified that
his duties included restocking the shelves, and making certain
the floors and aisles were clear of debris. He stated that he
walked up the aisle in which Mr. Estes fell about five minutes
before the incident. When he got to the scene of the fall, Mr.
Sykes saw Mr. Estes lying on his back on the floor. There was
"some slimy coat stuff" on the floor and on the back of Mr. Estes's
shirt. After the ambulance removed Mr. Estes, Mr. Sykes and other
store personnel determined that the solution spilled on the floor
came from a near empty bottle of Stress Coat on a nearby shelf.
Mr. Sykes estimated that the fall occurred about twenty-four
feet from the fish tanks. He further stated that Mr. Estes indicated
he slipped on something on the floor. Mr. Estes made no mention
of wet shoes causing the accident. Mr. Sykes photographed the
area of the accident and brought the bottle to personnel, where
it was labeled.

The plaintiffs presented rebuttal testimony from Mrs. Estes. She
stated that she recalled seeing Mr. Hill and a manager named
"John" at the scene. She did not recall seeing Mr. Sykes, or
anyone else taking pictures. She repeated that she did not see
anything on the floor where her husband fell.

After hearing all of the testimony and viewing the exhibits filed
in this matter, the jury returned a verdict finding that Wal-Mart
was not negligent. Plaintiffs appeal.

In brief to this court, plaintiffs assign three errors. Initially,
plaintiffs argue the jury committed manifest error and was clearly
wrong in finding no merchant liability on the part of Wal-Mart.

LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6 as it read in 1995 at the time of this accident
provided:1

B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person
lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of
an injury, death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to
a condition existing in or on a merchant's premises, the claimant
shall have the burden of proving, and in addition to all other
elements of his cause of action, that:

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the
claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable;

(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive
notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the
occurrence; and

(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care.

C. Definitions:

(1) `Constructive notice' means the condition existed for such
a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant
had exercised reasonable care.

For this court to reverse the jury in this matter, there must
be a showing that plaintiffs proved, by a preponderance of evidence,
that Mr. Estes fell due to a hazardous condition which created
an unreasonable risk of harm, or that Wal-Mart either created
or had actual notice of the condition prior to the occurrence.
Franovich v. K-Mart Corp,
94-1039 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/95), 653 So.2d 695.

The issue to be resolved on review is not whether the jury was
right or wrong, but whether the conclusion was a reasonable one.
Stobart v. State, Through DOTD,
617 So.2d 880 (La.1993);
Ganucheau v. Winn-Dixie La. Inc.,
99-432 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 746 So.2d 812,
writ denied, 99-3641 (La. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 972.
Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations
of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be
disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel
that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.
Rosell v. ESCO,
549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).
Thus, where there are two views of the evidence, the
jury's choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong,
Stobart,
supra.
Recently, in
LeJeune v. Union Pacific R.R.,
97-1843 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So.2d 491, 494,
the Supreme Court summarized our mandate in reviewing a
jury verdict as follows:

The court of appeal may not disturb the conclusions reached by
a jury regarding factual matters in the absence of "manifest
error" or unless a particular finding of fact was "clearly wrong."
A two-part test is used in making this determination. The court
of appeal may only reverse the trier of fact if: (1) it finds
from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist
for the finding of the jury, and (2) it further determines that
the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly
erroneous. The inquiry is not whether or not the jury was right
or wrong, but whether its conclusions were reasonable ones. As
long as the jury's factual findings are reasonable, the court
of appeal may not reverse even if it is convinced that it would
have weighed the evidence differently. (Citations omitted)

In the instant case there is conflicting testimony as to the cause
of the fall. Mr. Estes could have slipped when stepping off of
a wet mat in front of the fish tanks, or in spilled Stress Coat
further down the aisle. There is conflicting testimony as to
how far away from the mat Mr. Estes was when he began to slip,
and whether the Stress Coat found on the floor and on the back
of Mr. Estes's shirt caused the fall or was spilled during the
fall. Further, given the testimony presented, the jury could
have found that, whatever caused the fall did not give rise to
a finding of liability because the elements of unreasonable risk
and knowledge were not proven. Accordingly, we cannot find that
the jury's determination that Wal-Mart was not liable was manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong.

In the final two assignments of error, plaintiffs assert the trial
court erred in failing to grant a new trial. The plaintiffs filed
a "Motion for Judgment NOV or alternatively Motion for New Trial"
in the trial court in which they assert the jury verdict was
contrary to the law and evidence, and that "the jury foreman
exerted undue outside influence upon the jury in an inappropriate
and biased manner, which tainted the process."

Both grounds asserted by plaintiffs in their motion are peremptory
grounds for the grant of a new trial. LSA-C.C.P. article 1972(1)
provides that a new trial shall be granted, "(w)hen the verdict
or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and evidence."
A trial judge should grant a motion for new trial when the judge's
examination of the record, while exercising his discretion, convinces
him that the judgment would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Perkins v. K-Mart Corp.,
94-2065 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d 725, 731,
writ denied, 95-2085 (La. 11/13/95), 662 So.2d 477;
Zatarain v. WDSU,
95-2600 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/96), 673 So.2d 1181, 1183.
If the verdict is supportable by any fair interpretation
of evidence, a new trial should be denied.
Gibson v. Bossier City General Hospital,
594 So.2d 1332, 1336 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1991);
Zatarain v. WDSU,
supra.

In the discussion of plaintiffs' first assignment, we found that
the verdict of the jury could not be overturned because it is
supportable by a fair interpretation of the evidence. Accordingly,
we find no error in the trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs'
motion on this ground.

In support of the allegation of jury misconduct, plaintiffs offered
an affidavit from Bryan Johnson, a juror, attesting to various
words and actions of the jury foreman. Defendant challenged the
affidavit as improper testimony by a juror as to jury deliberations
pursuant to LSA-C.E. article 606 (b). Plaintiffs argued that
the affidavit shows a pattern of misconduct which began before
deliberations and continued afterward and should be considered
in its entirety. In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that at
least one attestation, regarding pre-deliberation behavior,
should be considered. That attestation was that; "(t)he foreman
whom I sat next to on numerous occasions, during the trial, but
before the judge released us to deliberate, made comments concerning
the evidence which indicated that he had already formed an opinion
in favor of the defendant WalMart (sic) and this was communicated
to me." The trial court ultimately decided that the affidavit
could not be considered. The court also stated; "and even if
there was some misconduct before the jury's deliberations, I
don't consider that affidavit to inform me of misconduct that
would lead to the level of gross misconduct that would warrant
me disturbing a jury verdict...."

Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. article 1972(3), peremptory grounds for
granting a new trial in a civil action exist if it is shown that
"the jury was bribed or behaved improperly so that impartial
justice has not been done." In other incidents the trial court
is granted wide discretion in deciding whether a new trial should
be granted where allegations of jury misconduct are made.
LSA-C.C.P. article 1973.

B. Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror
may testify on the question whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and, in criminal cases
only, whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention. Nor may his affidavit or evidence
of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would
be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

As explained by the Court in
Uriegas v. Gainsco,
supra, 663 So.2d at 170-171:

It is well-settled that affidavits and other testimony by jurors
cannot be used as evidence to impeach their verdict. Furthermore,
invasive scrutiny of a juror's individual deliberation or investigation
of a jury's collective reasoning for reaching a verdict are disfavored
in the law as a matter of public policy. The reason for this
rule is to promote the jury's discovery of the truth by preventing
litigants from invading the privacy of the jury room. (Citations
omitted)

We have reviewed the entire affidavit. It makes no mention of
outside influence, or of threats or bribery by the jury foreman.
Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's finding that impartial justice was done or
in the decision to deny the motion for new trial.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

AFFIRMED

Footnotes:

1.
This statute was amended in 1996 to its current form. However,
those amendments only apply to causes of action which arise as
of the effective date of the amendment and are inapplicable here.
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