Pope Francis told worshippers in a mosque in the Central African Republic that “Christians and Muslims are brothers and sisters.”

He put out the case for people from both faiths to work for interreligious understanding and peace.Pope Francis was speaking to Muslims who had sought shelter in the capital Bangui after nearly three years of violence between Christians and Muslims.Research clearly shows that interfaith understanding and religious freedom are foundations upon which peace can be built and sustained.

This understanding is one that many Muslim scholars, activists and thinkers understand and argue for.

Follow this link to a number of resources that make this case from a Muslim perspective.

Are Muslim countries receptive to religious freedom? The short answer is "yes, some are," according to an analysis by Notre Dame scholar Daniel Philpott, in a recent Washington Post article.

Click: more Weekly Numbers on Islam

Philpott argues that comparative political science can offer helpful perspective on one of the most challenging issues of our time - the rise of ISIS and the ongoing rhetoric of groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, whose name itself means Western education is forbidden. Philpott states that "an aggregate, satellite view does indeed show a dearth of religious freedom in [Muslim-majority countries]." Indeed, based on research by Brian Grim and Roger Finke, Muslim-majority countries clearly have considerably lower levels of religious freedom than the rest of the world and Christian-majority countries. In “The Price of Religious Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century,” Grim and Finke show that 78 percent of Muslim-majority countries have high levels of government restrictions on religious freedom, compared with 43 percent of all other countries and 10 percent of Christian-majority countries. Philpott asks whether these aggregate scores prove that Islam is indeed generally inhospitable to religious freedom, then? His answer is "No. Zooming in from a satellite view to a more fine-grained view reveals far greater diversity." He notes that:

Twelve out of 47 Muslim-majority states (about a quarter) fall into the category of “low restrictions on religious freedom,” meaning that they are essentially religiously free. Philpott argues that these include Kosovo, Djibouti, Albania, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone – most of them noticeably outside the Arab world.

In tracing the roots of why these are toward the freer end of the scale, Philpott notes that "for some, the roots of freedom may lie in a particular form of Islamic theology or culture that embodies tolerance. In others, freedom may have arisen through a modus vivendi between Islam and other religions at some point in the country’s history. All of these cases, though, show that Muslim populations can, under certain circumstances, prove hospitable to religious freedom."

Among the other 35 Muslim-majority states, which have moderate, high or very high levels of restriction, there are significantly different patterns of repression, which yield different conclusions about Islam.

“Islamist” regimes are present in 21 of these countries, including, according to Philpott, Saudi Arabia the other Gulf Cooperation Council members, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, Malaysia [arguably for strict versions of Islamic law applied to the Muslim population], Indonesia [not nationally, but in Ache] and Nigeria [in the north, especially under Boko Haram]

“Secular repressive” are present in the other 14 of these countries (including, according to Philpott, Uzbekistan, pre-Arab Spring Egypt, pre-AKP Turkey, Algeria and pre-revolutionary Tunisia.

Philpott notes that the Iranian Revolution may serve as inspiration for Islamist states, while the French Revolution may be a model for the secular-repressive pattern, in which the power of government is used to manage religion.

According to Philpott, the standard bearer of restrictive secular regimes is the Republic of Turkey, founded by Kemal Ataturk in 1924, and after World War II, many Arab states followed this model as well.

Daniel Philpott is Professor of Political Science and Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and Director on Administrative Leave at The Center for Civil and Human Rights. His research focuses on religion and global politics and on reconciliation in politics. He has pursued an activist dimension of his work in reconciliation in Kashmir and the Great Lakes region of Africa. He is the author of “Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation” (Oxford University Press, 2012). He also publishes a regular blog, Arc of the Universe, devoted to resurfacing justice – examining the day’s headlines from the deep commitments of ethical traditions.

Weekly Number author, Brian Grim, discussed the rising fear in Europe of the growth of Islam in an interview this month with the Associated Press. Grim concludes that the fear of “Eurabia” – the demographic dominance of Europe by Muslims – is unfounded, based on a global study he previously led at the Pew Research Center.

The Pew study projects that Europe’s Muslim population will almost grow to 58 million by 2030, nearly double the figure of about 30 million in 1990. While that is a large numeric increase, it would only be an increase from 4.1 percent to 8 percent of Europe’s population (669 million are projected to be non-Muslims in 2030).

The Pew study also suggests that the period of greatest growth in Muslim populations is already past (see chart) as the initial large waves of Muslim immigrants begin to slow. Also, as Muslims become more integrated, they tend to have fewer children.

The cultural dimensions of a growing - but slowing - European Muslim population include having greater visibility, as most Muslims are immigrants or children of immigrants, often with distinctive dress and customs. Perhaps, however, the greatest recent impact is in the radicalization of young Muslims, including European converts to Islam.For a way forward in countering extremist radicalization, the Religious Freedom & Business Foundation is proposing that the problem of some in society becoming radicalized should be tackled by building relationships with those at risk, including through business and diverse faith communities. This approach capitalizes on one of religious freedom’s greatest assets — setting people of faith free to do radically good things.For more on this initiative, see:

Hostilities toward religious minorities in Europe are especially widespread. The share of countries in the region where Muslims and Jews are harassed is double and triple the rates in the rest of the world, according to a new Pew Research study.*

Jews and Muslims faced harassment in a similar share of European countries, 76% and 71% respectively in 2013, according to Pew. By contrast, in the rest of the world, Jews and Muslims were harassed in 25% and 34% of countries.

Harassment, as measured in the Pew study, takes many forms, including physical assaults, the desecration of holy sites, and discrimination against religious groups in employment, education or housing. Harassment also includes such things as verbal assaults on members of one religious group by other groups or individuals in society.

Sharing the same rocky boatNegative European attitudes toward Jews are associated with negative attitudes toward Muslims, according to separate research I previously carried out with Richard Wike.**

Our analysis found that negative views about Muslims are part of a larger structure of negative attitudes towards "outgroups" generally. This suggests that negative views of Muslims are part of a broader set of xenophobic attitudes. So, to fully understand how Westerners think about Muslims or Jews, it is important to consider both perceptions individuals have related specifically to minorities in general.

The Wike-Grim study identified a number of attitudes that are likely drivers of negative attitudes toward Muslims, which may indirectly help fuel tensions toward other minorities. First, threat perception perhaps the single most important predictor of ingroup attitudes toward outgroups. People who feel threatened by Muslims are more likely to associate negative characteristics with them. As the reality of violent extremism of the sort that struck Paris in January and Copenhagen in February continues, the sense of threat is likely continuing to rise.

Second, both security threats and cultural threats have discernible effects on negative attitudes. Consistently, across all five countries in the Wike-Grim study, the perception of security-related threats was the strongest predictor of negative views regarding Muslims, while cultural threats concerning integration and the compatibility of Islam with life in the West are a contributing factor. The study suggests that security concerns are the true drivers of negative views toward Muslims, or using terms other researchers have employed, ‘‘realistic’’ or ‘‘existential’’ threats are the most significant determinant of Western public opinion regarding Muslims.

Third, the Wike-Grim study finds that higher socio-economic status is associated with positive views of Muslims, although again this relationship is generally indirect. Individuals with more education and higher incomes are less likely to say Islamic extremism threatens their country or that a large number of Muslims support extremist groups; and in turn, they are less likely to hold negative opinions of Muslims.

* For more on the Pew Research study, see an interview by David Masci of researcher Peter Henne on the methodology, and additional discussion of the findings on Europe by researcher Angelina Theodorou.

A Pakistani court has upheld the death penalty against Asia Bibi, a Christian woman, accused of blasphemy. She is the first woman to be sentenced to death under Pakistan’s blasphemy law.

Asia Bibi

Pakistani nationals have killed at least 60 people following blasphemy allegations since 1990. There have been over 327 blasphemy cases filed in Pakistan, after amendments were made to the blasphemy law in the 1970’s and 80’s (see chart below).

Prior to this there were only 7 cases filed between 1851-1947. Currently here are at least 17 people convicted of blasphemy on death row, and an additional 19 serving life sentences. Accusations of blasphemy are filed against both Muslim and non-Muslims, and while the rate of against non-Muslims is higher when measured against the religious minorities representation in Pakistan, more overall accusations are made against Muslims.

Jan Wetzel from Amnesty International notes "While purporting to protect Islam and the religious sensitivities of the Muslim majority, Pakistan's blasphemy laws have in fact fostered a climate of religiously motivated violence, and are used indiscriminately against both Muslims and non-Muslims." Further, "They violate the basic human rights of freedom of religion and thought. These laws are often used to make unfounded malicious accusations to settle personal scores in land and business disputes [and] are also arbitrarily enforced by the police and judiciary."

A Pakistani court has upheld the death penalty against Asia Bibi, a Christian woman, accused of blasphemy. She is the first woman to be sentenced to death under Pakistan’s blasphemy law. Two Muslim women brought the allegation against Bibi after they objected to her sharing water with them, because she was a different faith. The charges were brought against her in 2010. Two prominent politicians, the governor of Punjab Salman Taseer, a Muslim, and the Minority Affairs Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, a catholic, were killed after supporting Bibi in 2011. The governor was killed by his own bodyguard; who was then showered with rose petals by supporters at his murder trial.

In Pakistan, a blasphemy conviction carries a maximum penalty of death, and yet has an almost non-existent standard of proof. There is no punishment for false allegations of blasphemy, and an accuser may even refuse to tell the court exactly what the blasphemous comment was, so as not to blaspheme themselves. It is enough simply to accuse someone of blasphemy for them to either receive punishment through the judicial system, however more often punishment is meted out by members of the public. Pakistan’s anti blasphemy law also does not account for the accused’s mental state. For instance, currently British citizen, Mohammed Asghar, a paranoid schizophrenic, is awaiting a death sentence in Pakistan. Asghar’s tenant accused him of blasphemy after they had a disagreement.

Confounding any attempt to mediate the affect of the law, are incidents such as the recent killing of Rashid Rehman, a dedicated human rights attorney. Rehman was killed after taking on the case of Junaid Hafeez, a university professor accused of blasphemy by a group of students in 2013. Attorneys in Pakistan have expressed frustration with how Pakistan’s legal system is responding once a blasphemy case gains traction in the public sphere. An attorney for Asghar notes, "There are two kinds of judges in this blasphemy field. [There are] those who genuinely have their hands tied behind their backs, because there is a threat to their lives. But there's a fair amount of lawyers, prosecutors and judges who are making a name for themselves by … sentencing blasphemy convicts."

Religious hostilities are sweeping the globe, despite efforts by governments, religious groups and non-governmental organizations to hold them back.

According to the Pew Research Center, religious hostilities reached a six-year high in 2012, with a third (33%) of countries in the high category, up from 20% just six years earlier.

The Islamic world is disproportionately affected. More than one-in-two (57%) Muslim-majority countries have high religious hostilities, more than double that of other countries (25%), as shown in the chart to the left.

Although religious hostilities affect countries throughout the world experience, Muslim-majority countries consistently have higher levels of a range of religious hostilities than other countries and by wide margins. For instance, Muslim-majority countries are more than three times more likely than other countries to have religion-related war, terror or sectarian violence, as shown in the chart below.

These religious hostilities disrupt markets, trade and development in numerous parts of the Islamic World. This leads the talented young as well as risk-averse investors to look elsewhere for opportunity, compounding socio-economic conditions that contribute to the hostilities.

By contrast, research indicates that economic competitiveness is stronger in countries where religious freedom is respected by governments and societies.

Causes & SolutionsThe typical government response to religious hostilities is to tighten restrictions on religion. But, contrary to common perceptions, a solid body of empirical and historical research shows that piling on additional restrictions does not ensure peace and stability, but rather can fuel additional grievances. Indeed, research shows that the price of denying religious freedoms is far higher than protecting them.

Specifically, as social hostilities involving religion rise, government restrictions on religion rise, leading to more violence, setting up a religious violence cycle that become difficult to break, with direct adverse effects on business, foreign investment and world economies. Two examples help demonstrate how religious restrictions and hostilities are bad for business:

(1) Blasphemy Laws. Pakistan’s speech-restricting blasphemy laws often sow discord rather than the purported aim of promoting peace, as two high ranking government officials were recently assassinated for merely questioning the laws. These laws also have a direct negative impact on businesses. There are “recorded instances of business or personal rivals accusing each other of blasphemy to extract revenge for a past grievance. The blasphemy laws in Pakistan have not only been used in cases where individuals have been accused of specific blasphemies, they have also been used to ban websites like Facebook, YouTube, and Wikipedia because of content that would be considered sacrilegious” (Tarin and Uddin 2013, p. 19).

(2) Egypt: Religious Violence Cycle & the Economy. The religious violence cycle is playing out today in Egypt in the back-and-forth social and political struggle between the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the coalition opposing them. Of course, this struggle directly impacts the important tourist industry, but it also drives away foreign investment. And this has adverse effects on foreign economies.

To end the cycle of religious violence and its negative impact, observers of post-Mubarak Egypt concluded that all factions in society – including Islamists – must feel that their voices are heard and that “special attention should be paid to the economy …” (Shaikh and Ghanem 2013, p. 2).

Also, as the role of women is debated within Islam and between Muslims in Egypt and countries ranging from Morocco and Iraq to Pakistan and Indonesia, religious restrictions on women also impact economic outcomes as the future health of economies is related to the economic opportunities afforded women. Furthermore, not only do religious restrictions have adverse effects on the economy, but a poor economy can reinforce religious intolerance, adding to the religious violence cycle. And perhaps most telling, as Egypt’s religion-related tensions have grown, Egypt’s young entrepreneurs desire to move outside the country rather put their hopes in their home.

The most popular weekly number blog of 2013 was my Global Religious Futures talk at Oxford University, followed by my TEDx Talk at the Vatican, and the blog, "10 things you might not know about Muslims (but should), as Pope Francis made a rare Ramadan gesture." Here they are in brief. Best wishes to all for 2014! - Brian

The prospects for continued growth of religious populations appear strong as they are younger on average than the world’s religiously unaffiliated population.

Moreover, Pew Research studies show that religion continues to shape the attitudes, actions and beliefs of people, particularly in non-Western countries. While these studies have revealed much about the impact of religion on politics, societies and people today, much more still needs to be learned.

#2 TEDx Talk at the VaticanApproximately three-quarters of the world's people live in countries with high or very high restrictions on religion coming either from governments or groups in society.Social hostilities involving religion are 3.5 times higher in countries with very high government favoritism of religion than in countries with low levels of biased favoritism.

Government restrictions can also cross borders and be enforced by governments thousands of miles away, as was the case when Saudi journalist Hamza Kashgari was extradited by Malaysian authorities to Saudi Arabia to face charges of blasphemy, which carries the possibility of the death penalty.

My blog summarized ten basic things to know about Muslims - followers of Islam - gleaned from recent Pew Research reports. The first 5 are Muslim beliefs and practices; the second 5 are Muslim demographics and findings from recent studies of global restrictions on religion.

Fertility rates have fallen in most Muslim-majority countries in recent decades. Yet they remain, on average, higher than in the rest of the developing world and considerably higher than in more-developed countries, according to a study by the Pew Research Center. This is one of the main reasons that the global Muslim population is projected to rise both in absolute numbers and in relative terms, as a share of all the people in the world.

The overall trends in fertility, however, mask a considerable amount of variation from country to country according to the Pew Research study. Among Muslim-majority countries, the highest Total Fertility Rates currently are found in Niger, Afghanistan and Somalia, where the average woman has more than six children during her lifetime. The lowest TFRs are in Iran (1.7) and Tunisia (1.8), which are well below replacement levels.Taken as a whole, the world’s more-developed regions – including Europe, North America, Japan and Australia – have Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) below their replacement levels of about 2.1 children per woman, the minimum necessary to keep the population stable (absent other factors, such as immigration). Fertility rates in these more-developed nations are projected to rise slightly over the next 20 years but to remain, on average, well below replacement levels.

In non-Muslim-majority countries in less-developed regions – including all of Latin America, much of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia – fertility rates have dropped in recent decades. They are projected to continue to drop, reaching or even falling below replacement levels in these developing countries as a whole in 2030-35.

In many Muslim-majority countries – including Indonesia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Turkey and Tunisia – the Pew Research study finds that fertility rates also have dropped substantially. The average Total Fertility Rate for all 49 Muslim-majority countries has fallen from 4.3 children per woman in 1990-95 to an estimated 2.9 children in 2010-15. Over the next 20 years, fertility rates in these Muslim-majority countries as a whole are expected to continue to decline, though not quite as steeply, dropping to 2.6 children per woman in 2020-25 and 2.3 children in 2030-35 – approaching and possibly reaching replacement levels.

If current trends continue, fertility rates in Muslim-majority countries eventually may converge with fertility rates in other developing countries and in the world’s more-developed regions. But complete convergence is not projected to occur in the next two decades, as the trend lines in the above graph shows.

In Russia last week, the threat of U.S. missiles targeting Syria in retaliation for the regime's alleged use of chemical weapons weighed heavily on world leaders meeting for the G-20 summit n St. Petersburg, eclipsing economic battles that usually dominate the summit.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin has been a vocal critic of U.S. plans to intervene in the affairs of Syria, an ally of Russia, and home to a Russian naval base - Russia's last remaining military facility outside the former Soviet Union.

Though religious connections between Russia and Syria are not central to the dispute, several commentators have noted the connection between faith communities in the two countries. Though Syria is predominantly Muslim, it has a substantial number of people belonging to the Christian Orthodox Church, the majority faith of Russia, and a church with considerable influence in the government. Walter Russell Mead notes in a recent blog post:

Russia’s concern for Syrian Christians is also nothing new. Although the Communists were more interested in hounding and enslaving religious believers than protecting them, under the czars Russia was officially recognized by the Ottoman sultans as the protector of Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish empire. In the 18th and 19th century Russian concern for these Christians (married to a concern for its geopolitical ambitions) frequently shaped Russian policy towards the Ottomans and the West. The Crimean War at one point brought Russia into war with Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire over a quarrel between Russia and France over their rights to represent and protect Ottoman Christians in the Holy Land.

Here are 2 things to know about religion in Russia from recent Pew Research studies.

1. Straddling Europe and Asia, Russia could be considered the most populous Christian-majority country on both continents.

But for the purposes of a recent Pew Research report, Russia is considered a European nation. Its 105 million Christians constitute the world’s fourth-largest Christian population (and the single largest outside the Americas). About 5% of the world’s Christians live in Russia. Moreover, Russia is home to the largest autocephalous (or ecclesiastically independent) Eastern Orthodox Church in the world, the Russian Orthodox Church.

Byzantine monks first introduced Christianity into Russia in the 9th century. Following his baptism in 988, Vladimir I, the prince of Kiev, led his people into Christianity. The Eastern Orthodox Church has remained the largest religious institution in Russia despite monumental changes in the country’s political system, from monarchy, to Soviet communism, to the current parliamentary and presidential system. Today, a little more than 70% of Russia’s population identifies as Orthodox.

While Orthodox Christianity is still the dominant religion in Russia, other Christian traditions have grown in recent decades. Outside of the Orthodox Church, Protestants constitute the largest Christian group, with nearly 3 million adherents. A large segment of the Russian population does not identify as Christian, including many who are unaffiliated with any particular religion. According to a 2011 Pew Forum report, Russia has the largest Muslim population in Europe (in absolute numbers).

2. Russia has the largest Muslim population in absolute numbers in all of Europe.

According to a report by the Pew Research Center, the number of Muslims in Russia is projected to increase from about 16.4 million in 2010 to about 18.6 million in 2030. The Muslim share of the country’s population is expected to increase from 11.7% in 2010 to 14.4% in 2030.

The growth rate for the Muslim population in the Russian Federation is projected to be 0.6% annually over the next two decades. By contrast, Russia’s non-Muslim population is expected to shrink by an average of 0.6% annually over the same 20-year period.

Several factors contribute to the projected growth of Russia’s Muslim population. For instance, Muslim women generally have more children than other women in Russia (an estimated 2.3 children per woman, compared with a national average of fewer than 1.5 children per woman). Higher Muslim fertility is directly related to the fact that Muslim women marry in larger numbers and divorce less often than other women in Russia. This means they spend longer periods of their lives in unions where childbearing is more likely. And although the abortion rate in Russia is still among the highest in the world, research suggests that Muslim women have fewer abortions on average than other women in Russia.

Another reason the Muslim population in Russia is expected to increase is that nearly half of the country’s Muslims are under age 30, according to an analysis of data from Russia’s 2002 census. By comparison, about 40% of ethnic Russians are in this age group. Nearly a quarter of Russia’s Muslims (22.8%) are under age 15, compared with roughly one-in-six ethnic Russians (15.9%).

On the older end of the age spectrum, about 27% of Russia’s Muslims are age 45 and older, compared with about 38% of ethnic Russians. And 13.1% of Muslims in Russia are age 60 and older, compared with nearly a fifth of the ethnic Russian population (19.1%).

The Muslim population in Russia is geographically concentrated in a few regions. As of 2009, four-in-five Muslims in Russia resided in two of the seven federal districts, the Volga and Southern districts. Among the 89 sub-regions of Russia in 2009, Muslims were concentrated in five traditionally Muslim homelands: Dagestan (16.3% of all Muslims), Bashkortostan (14.6%), Tatarstan (13.5%), Chechnya (7.4%) and Kabardino- Balkaria (4.7%). Smaller numbers of Muslims lived in three other Muslim homelands: Ingushetia (3.0% of all Muslims), Karachaevo-Cherkessia (1.9%) and Adygea (0.8%). Altogether, about two-thirds of all Muslims in Russia (62.3%) resided in one of the traditionally Muslim homelands.

Moscow has become a migration magnet for people from elsewhere in Russia, as well as beyond Russia. More than 600,000 Muslims reside in Moscow (3.7% of all Muslims in Russia) and an additional 517,000 live in the oil-rich Tyumen region (3.0%), which borders Kazakhstan to the south.

For a discussion of global social hostilities involving religion and government restrictions on religion, with Russia's place in relation to other countries, see my TEDx Talk.

As U.S. outposts in Yemen and Pakistan remain closed after terror scares resulted in the closure last week of 19 embassies and consulates, a recent Pew Research study finds that religion-related terrorists are active in more than one-in-three countries worldwide.

President Obama, at a press conference last week, stated that "al Qaeda and other extremists have metastasized into regional groups that can pose significant dangers." For instance, following a report in May by an Argentinian prosecutor, the State Department is reevaluating its own assessment of Iran’s infrastructure to support terrorist activities in Latin America.

Just how widespread are religion-related terrorist activities? Five findings from recent Pew Research studies provide some answers.

1. Religion-related terrorist activities are more widespread than you might imagine

A recent Pew Research study finds that religion related terrorist are active in more than one third (36%) of countries worldwide as of 2011, carrying out acts of violence in nearly one-in-five (19%). While religion-related terrorists were most likely to be active in countries of the Middle East and North Africa (85%), they were active in each major world region (see chart): Asia-Pacific (44% of countries), Europe (31%), sub-Saharan Africa (25%) and the Americas (17%).

Religion-related terrorists were most likely to carry out acts of violence in the Middle East and North Africa (50% of countries), followed by Asia-Pacific (22%), sub-Saharan Africa (21%) and Europe (11%). They were least likely to carry out violent attacks in the countries of North and South America (3%).

The April Boston Marathon bombing is an example of such terror. CNN reported that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev told investigators that his brother, Tamerlan, was motivated by jihadist thought and the idea that Islam is under attack. He has recently pleaded not guilty to charges against him.

2. Religion-related terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, are not popular among Muslim publics

Al Qaeda is widely unpopular among Muslim publics. A poll by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, conducted March 19 to April 13, 2012, finds majorities – and mostly large majorities – expressing negative views of al Qaeda in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey and Lebanon.

In Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy Seals, 13% of Muslims hold a favorable view of al Qaeda, 55% an unfavorable view, and roughly three-in-ten (31%) offer no opinion, according to the Pew Research survey.

Muslims around the world strongly reject violence in the name of Islam, according to a separate survey by the Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. Asked specifically about suicide bombing, clear majorities in most countries say such acts are rarely or never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies. In most countries where the question was asked, roughly three-quarters or more Muslims reject suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians. And in most countries, the prevailing view is that such acts are never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies. Yet there are some countries in which substantial minorities think violence against civilians is at least sometimes justified. This view is particularly widespread among Muslims in the Palestinian territories (40%), Afghanistan (39%), Egypt (29%) and Bangladesh (26%).

A 2012 Pew Research Center analysis found that religion-related terrorist groups reportedly engaged in cross-border attacks or drew on international connections for support in a total of 51 countries (26%) between 2009 and 2011.

According to the sources coded for that analysis, religion-related terrorism contributed to social hostilities involving religion in 43 of the 51 countries (22% of all the countries studied). For instance, the Lord’s Resistance Army, a militant group that originated in Uganda in the late 1980s, reportedly committed cross-border attacks and abductions in various African countries, including South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In addition, religion-related terrorism reportedly influenced government restrictions on religion in 25 of the 51 countries (13% of all the countries studied). In Russia, for instance, the government has banned 18 Muslim groups for alleged ties to terrorism, according to a 2010 U.S. State Department report.

Regionally, cross-border religion-related terrorist activities were most prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where 13 of 20 countries (65%) in the region were affected. Current events suggest that the pattern is continuing and, in some instances, has sectarian dimensions. In June, for instance, Hezbollah - a Shia Muslim group designated as a terrorist organization by several governments - reportedly crossed into neighboring Syria to join the ongoing civil war on the side of the regime led by President Bashar al-Assad Assad, who is also affiliated with a Shia Muslim group, the Alawites. The coalition of rebel forces seeking to topple the regime, however, is largely Sunni Muslim.

By contrast - as shown in the fourth row of the table below - cross-border religion-related terrorist activities affected a smaller share of countries in other regions (see fourth row in table below). However, in some regions, cross-border activities occurred a larger number of countries than in the Middle East and North Africa: Asia-Pacific region (15 of 50 countries), sub-Saharan Africa (14 of 48), Europe (6 of 45 countries) and the Americas (3 of 35).

4. Religion-related terror is part of a larger pattern of social hostilities involving religion

On average between mid-2006 and mid-2010, social hostilities involving religion (as measured by the Pew Research Center's Social Hostilities Index*) are 5.2 times higher in countries where religion-related terrorist violence resulted in 10 or more casualties than in countries where religion-related terrorists were not active at all.

This means that religion-related terror does not occur in a social vacuum. It most often occurs in a context where other forms of social hostilities are present. For instance, religion-related acts of terror occur on an almost daily basis in Iraq. And, as noted in my recent TEDx Talk, sectarian violence - another form of social hostility - also occurs on an almost daily basis. * The Social Hostilities Index (SHI) measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities.

5. High government restrictions on religion are part of the context for religion-related terror

The flip side to the previous point is that religion-related terror is also more likely to occur in countries that have high government restrictions on religion. Indeed, religion-related terrorism has among the strongest associations with the Pew Research Center's Government Restrictions Index.*

On average between mid-2006 and mid-2010, government restrictions on religion are 2.5 times higher in countries where religion-related terrorist violence claimed 10 or more lives than in countries where religion-related terrorists were not active at all.

This means that just as religion-related terror does not occur in a social vacuum, neither does it occur in a political vacuum. It most often occurs in a context where governments are highly restrictive of religion. For instance, religion-related acts of terror occur on an almost daily basis in Pakistan. Government restrictions on religion are very high in Pakistan. And, as noted in my recent TEDx Talk, blasphemy is legally punishable by imprisonment or death in Pakistan – in other words, the government can put you to death for remarks or actions considered to be critical of God. (Also see my recent blog post for more on Pakistan.)

* The Government Restrictions Index (GRI) measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups.