Hume's disjunctive (useful or agreeable, etc.) account of the grounds of moral approbation of the virtues is wildly--and disastrously--different from the conjunctive account implied by the Aristotelian and Epicurean tradition. It seems that Hume often inclines towards the latter and, thereby, its reliance on the distinctions between the truly useful and agreeable and the merely apparently so, which, in that tradition, are discernible only by the _phronimos<D>. We may regard being the 'good critic' in morals (and, less plausibly, taking up (...) the common point of view) as coextensive with possessing _phronesis<D>, but if so, we should remember that the latter is inseparable from being virtuous. (shrink)

Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterizationof right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would performthat action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawedbecause virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack ofknowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based accountaccording to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agentin a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observerwould deem the (...) action to be right (the belief to be justified). (shrink)

The Scottish sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson and the Chinese Confucianist Mencius give benevolence (ren) a key place in their respectivemoral theories, as the first and foundational virtue. Leaving aside differences in style and method, my purpose in this essay is to underline this similarity by focusing on four common features: first, benevolence springs from compassion, an innate and universal feeling shared by all human beings; second, its objects are not only human beings but also animals; third, it is sensitive to proximity; (...) and finally, it has to be constantly cultivated in order to become a character trait. I will conclude with some brief remarks as to how this understanding of benevolence as rooted in feeling rather than reason, and in personal rather than impersonal relationships, helps to illuminate part of the discussion in moral philosophy today. (shrink)

Contemporary virtue ethicists have attempted to offer a virtue-based account of right action. However, such an account is faced by a daunting challenge, the ‘supererogation problem’ as I call it. Since what a virtuous person would characteristically do is often beyond the scope of moral duty, virtue ethics seems to have difficulty in accommodating the distinction between obligation and supererogation. In the paper, I aim to meet this challenge by recommending a Confucian virtue theory of supererogation.