A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe

Transcription

1 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe Proposals for a new European Union strategy towards Russia Edited by Javier Morales Working Paper Opex Nº 78*/2015 May 2015

2 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe Working group * Javier Morales Hernández (coord.), Russia and Eurasia Coordinator, Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), Fundación Alternativas, Lecturer in International Relations at the Universidad Europea, and co-editor of Eurasianet.es. Morales Hernández was awarded a PhD in International Relations from the Complutense University of Madrid for his doctoral dissertation focusing on Yeltsin s and Putin s security policies. He has been a Senior Associate Member of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Antony s College, University of Oxford ( ) as well as a visiting researcher at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), the Carnegie Moscow Center and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES), University of Birmingham. Jesús de Andrés Sanz, Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Director for the East and Centre of Spain at the National University of Distance Education (UNED). Jesús de Andrés Sanz holds a PhD in Political Science from UNED. His doctoral dissertation analysed the political transition from the USSR to the Russian Federation. He has been a visiting researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences and the University of Glasgow s Institute of Russian and East European Studies and has served as lead researcher for the projects Authoritarianism and Neo-Patrimonialism in the Post-Soviet Space: Internal Dynamics and External Influence and Post-Electoral Revolutions in Eurasia: A Comparative Analysis of Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, both of which were funded by the Spanish National Research Programme. José Enrique de Ayala Marín, Brigadier General, Spanish Army (ret.), member of the European Affairs Council and the Advisory Board of the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), Fundación Alternativas. Ayala Marín holds Army Staff and Joint Staff diplomas as well as a diploma in Advanced International Studies from the International Studies Society. He has served as Eurocorps Chief of Staff and Military Attaché to the Spanish Embassy in Germany. As an international political analyst specialising in the European Union, he is a regular contributor to publications such as El País and Política Exterior. Carlos Carnero González, Managing Director, Fundación Alternativas. Carnero González has served as a Member of the European Parliament ( ), Ambassador-at-Large for European Integration Projects ( ), Vice-President of the Party of European Socialists ( ) and a member of the Convention that drafted the European Constitution. * As the product of an exchange of ideas of members of the working group, this document does not necessarily reflect the opinions of individual members or their respective organisations. 1

3 Javier Morales, coord. He is a co-author of several books including Construyendo la Constitución Europea: crónica política de la Convención, Manual de instrucciones de la Constitución Europea, Europa en la encrucijada, La diplomacia común europea: el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior and Gobernanza común de la Unión Europea y salida de la crisis. He is a member of the Scientific Board of the Elcano Royal Institute. Rafael Fernández Sánchez, Senior Lecturer in Applied Economics, Complutense University of Madrid, co-director of UCM s Political Economy of Globalization Research Group and Researcher at the same institution s Institute of International Studies (ICEI). Fernández Sánchez was awarded a PhD in Economics from the Complutense University of Madrid for his doctoral dissertation on the structural crisis within Ukraine s industrial sector. He teaches a course on the Russian economy for UCM s Master s degree programme in International Economics and Development and has written articles related to his main research areas (the political economy of Russia and energy trade between the European Union and Russia) for scholarly journals such as Europe-Asia Studies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies and Post-Communist Economies. Natividad Fernández Sola, Senior Lecturer in Public International Law and International Relations and Jean Monnet professor, University of Zaragoza. Fernández Sola holds a PhD in Law from the University of Zaragoza and a Diploma in EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from the European Security and Defence College. She has been a visiting professor at the Department of World Economy and International Relations of the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, a visiting researcher at Georgetown University and Area Coordinator for the Division of Strategic and Security Affairs of the Spanish Ministry of Defence. She is currently lead researcher of the International and European Studies Group (ZEIS). Ruth Ferrero Turrión, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of International Studies (ICEI), Complutense University of Madrid. Ferrero Turrión is a member of the International Migrations Studies Group (GEMI) and the European Network of Labour Migration Experts (LINET-IOM) as well as co-editor of Eurasianet.es. She holds an MPhil in Political Science from UNED and a Diploma in Constitutional Law and Political Science from the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (CEPC) and has been a visiting researcher at Columbia University s Department of Political Science, the London School of Political Science, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and Cluj- Napoca University in Romania. Her research is focused on migration and minorities in Eastern Europe. 2

4 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe Vicente Garrido Rebolledo, Director of the International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute (INCIPE) and Secretary General of the Spanish Russian Council Foundation. Garrido Rebolledo holds a PhD in Political Science and Sociology from the Complutense University of Madrid. He is currently Senior Lecturer in Public International Law and International Relations at King Juan Carlos University. His main research areas are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and arms control. He is a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to the UN Secretary General, the Board of Trustees of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the EU Non- Proliferation Consortium. Diego López Garrido, Chairman of the European Affairs Council, Fundación Alternativas. López Garrido is a member of the Spanish Congress of Deputies and Socialist Group Leader of the Congressional Defence Committee. Member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, he serves as Vice-Chairperson of that body s Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group and General Rapporteur for its Economics and Security Committee. He has been Leader of the Socialist Group in the Congress of Deputies, Secretary of State for the European Union and co-ordinator of the Spanish Presidency of the EU in He was a member of the Convention that drafted the European Constitutional Treaty. His latest book is La Edad de Hielo. Europa y Estados Unidos ante la Gran Crisis: el rescate del Estado de bienestar. Manuel Morato Ferro, Colonel, Spanish Army. Morato Ferro served as Deputy Commander of the Multinational Task Force West and Commander of the Spanish Contingent of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) during 2008 and From 2004 through 2008 he was Military Attaché to the Spanish Embassy in Moscow, a post that covered Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. He has also held positions at the Directorate-General for Defence Policy (DIGENPOL) of the Spanish Ministry of Defence, the Spanish Verification Unit and NATO Political Affairs Division ( ). He holds a Master s degree in International Relations from Ortega y Gasset University Institute. During the period he was a Senior Associate Member of the Russian and Eastern European Studies Centre of St. Antony s College, University of Oxford. Vicente Palacio de Oteyza, Deputy Director of the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), Fundación Alternativas. Palacio de Oteyza has coordinated reports for the Socialist Group of the Spanish Congress of Deputies, the Executive Office of the President of the Spanish Government and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. He holds a PhD from the Complutense University of Madrid. He has been an Associate Professor of International Relations at Syracuse University and a Visiting Fellow and Researcher at the Department of Government, Harvard University. Palacio de Oteyza is author of 3

5 Javier Morales, coord. numerous articles on Spanish and EU foreign policy, transatlantic relations and EU- Latin America relations. He is a regular contributor to El País and a frequent guest on CNN en Español. Pilar Requena del Río, Reporter for Spanish Public Television (TVE) news since 1987 and Lecturer in International Relations at the Complutense University of Madrid. Requena del Río was TVE s Berlin correspondent for Central and Eastern European from August 1999 through August She served as that network s special correspondent in Jerusalem during the Gulf War and has covered other conflicts in Georgia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine, where she reported on the Euromaidan in Kyiv and the Russian annexation of Crimea. She is recipient of the King of Spain International Journalism Prize (2003), the European Civis Prize (2006) and the Salvador de Madariaga European Journalism Prize (2007) and author of the book Afganistán. Francisco José Ruiz González, Commander, Spanish Navy. Ruiz González teaches at the Department of Strategy and International Relations of the Higher Staff College of the Spanish Armed Forces (ESFAS) and has been a Senior Analyst at the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE). He was awarded a PhD in International Security from the UNED for his dissertation The Architecture of European Security: An Imperfect and Unfinished System and holds a Diploma in Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. His area of expertise is security and defence in the post-soviet space, a subject on which he has written extensively for specialized publications and given numerous conference presentations. Rubén Ruiz Ramas, Research and Teaching Fellow in Political Science at the National University of Distance Education (UNED), coordinator of Eurasianet.es and participating researcher in the projects Authoritarianism and Neo-Patrimonialism in the Post-Soviet Space: Internal Dynamics and External Influence and Post-Electoral Revolutions in Eurasia: A Comparative Analysis of Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, both of which were funded by the Spanish National Research Programme. Ruiz Ramas has been a visiting researcher at Kyiv-Mohyla and Donetsk Universities (Ukraine), the American University of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) and the University of Warwick (United Kingdom). His main area of research is the political dynamics of the post-soviet space with a focus on Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia. Antonio Sánchez Andrés, Senior Lecturer in Applied Economics at the University of Valencia. Sánchez Andrés holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Valencia, where he presented a doctoral dissertation analysing economic reforms in the Soviet Union during perestroika. His main areas of research are post-communist economic transitions, 4

6 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe defence industry transformation and the Russian energy sector. A contributing author to books, journals such as Política Exterior, Economía Exterior, Información Comercial Española, Revista CIDOB d Afers Internacionals and Europe-Asia Studies and the publications of think tanks such as the Elcano Royal Institute, he has also been a frequent visiting researcher at Russian institutions such as the Peoples Friendship University and the Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Nicolás Sartorius Álvarez de las Asturias, Executive Vice-President and Director of the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (Opex), Fundación Alternativas, lawyer and journalist. Sartorius Álvarez de las Asturias was imprisoned for his political convictions for several years during the Franco dictatorship and later served as a member of the Spanish Congress of Deputies for several terms up until He is a regular contributor to newspapers such as El País, the author of a number of books including Un nuevo proyecto político, Carta a un escéptico sobre los partidos políticos, La memoria insumisa: sobre la dictadura de Franco, El Final de la Dictadura: La conquista de la libertad en España and co-author of Una nueva Globalización: propuestas para el debate. Francesc Serra Massansalvador, Lecturer in International Relations, Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). Serra Massansalvador frequently collaborates with the CIDOB Foundation and the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI) and was a researcher at the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (OPEE) and the University Institute for European Studies (IUEE). He was awarded a PhD in International Relations from UAB for his dissertation on relations between Russia and the European Union. Serra Massansalvador has held visiting professorships at a number of universities around the world including Saitama University (Japan), University of Miami (United States), Marmara and Bogazici Universities (Turkey) and University of Buenos Aires (Argentina). Author of the book Rusia, la otra potencia europea and editor of Chechenia, rompamos el silencio, he also writes journal articles on foreign policy, ethnic conflicts and human rights in Russia. The chapters contained in this document reflect the personal points of view of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Fundacion Alternativas. All rights reserved. According to the law, you may not copy, modify, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication. Any other uses require the prior written permission of the owners of the Copyright. Fundación Alternativas Javier Morales, coord. Maquetación: Estrella Torrico ISBN: Depósito Legal: M

7 Contents Abstract Executive summary.. 8 Introduction. 10 I. The Ukrainian crisis: international context and lessons learned The international context.. 13 Lessons learned from the Ukrainian crisis 16 II. Interdependence between the EU and Russia. 21 Politics, society and security 21 Economy and trade Energy.. 24 III. Recommendations for the future.. 28 A negotiated settlement of the Ukrainian conflict A pan-european dialogue at the institutional level to ensure global security. 30 Strengthening the EU-Russia economic and trade partnership A better understanding between the societies of the EU and Russia

8 Abstract The conflict in Ukraine, which has caused more damage to relations between the West and Russia than any other event since the end of the Cold War, is a focal point of instability that threatens the wellbeing of the EU. The time has come to renew the Union s strategy towards Russia, an effort that will entail not only the thorough analysis of long-term European objectives needed to make EU policy more efficient and bring it into line with European interests and values, but also a recognition of diplomatic blunders made at the onset of the Ukrainian crisis. Rather than entering into a new Cold War focused on Russian containment, the EU should accept Moscow as the great power that it is and a potential partner in the construction of a space of shared security. The best way to ensure long-term continental security and stability would be for Russia to increasingly feel and become more a part of Europe and for Europe to make a sincere effort to get to know its Russian neighbour better. 7

9 Executive summary This document provides a summary of our recommendations to political decision makers regarding what can be done to make the European Union s strategy for EU- Russian relations more effective and coherent with the EU s interests and values. Our strategy proposal includes short-, medium- and long-term measures organised around four key points: a) A negotiated settlement of the Ukrainian conflict Implement the Minsk II agreement effectively and verify its fulfilment by all parties involved: Ukraine, separatist factions and the Russian Federation. Recognise that a military solution is not viable and that priority must be given to a de-escalation that will permit a speedy resolution to the humanitarian crisis and the initiation of reconstruction in affected areas. Mitigate the social impact of Ukraine s entry into a free trade agreement with the EU and the reduction of that country s social expenditure stipulated by international institutions as a requisite for financial assistance. Promote good governance and the rule of law in Ukraine with a focus on anticorruption initiatives, the reconciliation between the country s diverse political standpoints and cultural identities and minority rights. b) A pan-european dialogue at the institutional level to ensure global security Ensure that the OSCE s role as the main pan-european security organisation is respected. The OSCE should play the main role in the resolution of this conflict in accordance with the Minsk II agreement. Make the European Neighbourhood Policy flexible enough to accommodate the aspirations of countries that constitute a shared neighbourhood between the EU and Russia and seek to coordinate this policy with the EU strategy for relations between the EU and Moscow. 8

10 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe Reach a common position amongst Member States regarding relations with the Russian Federation that allows the EU to move beyond the format of the Minsk negotiations, in which only Germany and France officially took part. Establish an EU-Russia dialogue on security that could serve as a platform for raising concerns that both parties may have and identifying common threats that they should work cooperatively to resolve. Establish permanent institutional level dialogues between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union and NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation that will foster mutual trust. Work to build a consensus on the future of European security architecture within the framework of the OSCE to pave the way for a common, indivisible security zone within Europe. c) Strengthening the EU-Russia economic and trade partnership Gradually repeal sanctions against Russia on the basis of verification of fulfilment of each successive phase outlined in the Minsk II agreement. Maintain and strengthen the economic interdependence between the EU, Ukraine and the Russian Federation as a means of ensuring the long-term stability of relations between them. Diversify the EU s sources of energy, ensure that no Member State relies excessively on Russian gas and work towards a new energy model that will make the EU less reliant on gas and oil. Support the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline project from Azerbaijan to the EU (which does not cross Russian territory) and also ensure supply via this route from other producers such as Turkmenistan. Effectively and constructively manage the political impact that a reduction of European imports of Russian gas and an increase of Russian exports to China will have on EU Russia relations. d) A better understanding between the societies of the EU and Russia Foster direct dialogue between Russian and EU counterparts, from companies and social organisations to average citizens, putting a focus on encounters between young people. Relax visa policies so as to foster people-to-people encounters and build mutual understanding through tourism and educational and cultural contact. Strengthen cooperation agreements between universities in EU countries and the Russian Federation by increasing the number of exchange programmes and scholarships available to students and academics. 9

11 A more European Russia for a more secure Europe Edited by Javier Morales Introduction 1. The Ukrainian conflict has provoked the worst deterioration in relations between the West and Russia to occur since the end of the Cold War. In reaction to the Euromaidan s ouster of Ukraine s democratically elected president Viktor Yanukovych a turn of events accepted and supported by the United States and the European Union Russia illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula and supported separatist revolts in Donetsk and Luhansk. These regions, which are collectively referred to as the Donbass, continue to be the site of armed confrontation. 2. The EU cannot accept the existence of this focal point of instability in its eastern neighbourhood. However, a peaceful resolution to the conflict will only be possible if parallel progress is made on two points. The first is establishing and maintaining a direct dialogue between the parties currently involved in a military standoff (Ukraine, the pro-russian separatists and the Russian Federation) geared towards reaching a political agreement that will pave the way for a definitive military deescalation. The second entails a rethinking of the EU s global strategy towards Russia so as to avoid repeating errors committed to date and foster a successful dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. 3. This document lays out our recommendations to political decision makers regarding what can be done to make the European Union s strategy for EU-Russian relations more effective and coherent with the EU s interests and values. As such, it reflects our conviction that any review of current strategy must be grounded in an analysis of the EU s long-term interests regarding its relations with Russia rather than merely the present situation. 4. Our approach rests on the following arguments: 4.1. We reject the pursuit of a new Cold War strategy that would affect relations in every sphere. In today s globalised world, disagreements on given issues however grave they may be must not constitute stumbling blocks that prevent joint cooperation between Western countries and Russia on shared 10

12 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe security concerns such as international terrorism or instability in the Middle East The EU must regard Russia as a European great power. Although it has not been a world superpower since 1991, Russia nevertheless continues to have the ability to exert its power on both a regional and global scale and thus must be considered what is referred to in international relations as a great power. Regardless of the individual or political party that occupies the Kremlin, Russia will use that power to defend its national interests, which may, or not, coincide with our own. It is therefore an actor on the world stage that must be reckoned with and the EU must have the ability to anticipate Russian reactions to its policies in order to avoid undesirable consequences. Moreover, the role of Russia in Europe s future will not be conditioned by the conflict that broke out in Ukraine last year, but rather by our capacity to build a framework for longterm coexistence acceptable to both sides within which the security interests of each are mutually respected The present situation has grown out of a competition between the EU (in concert with the US) and Russia regarding which will exert more influence over Ukraine. Since the beginning of the Euromaidan movement, both sides have attempted to pull Kyiv in the direction of their foreign policy interests at the price of heightening existing internal divisions within Ukrainian society. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the burden of responsibility for what has happened is equal. Whereas the EU and some of its Member States have limited their backing of Ukraine to diplomatic support and economic and non-lethal military assistance, the Kremlin has resorted to direct military intervention and supplied weapons to pro-russian separatist groups Russia s responsibility for its own actions notwithstanding, the EU should openly recognise its own errors and learn from them, two examples being its inability to foresee that Russia would take advantage of the Euromaidan revolution to occupy Crimea and its failure to act quickly enough to avoid the escalation of armed conflict in the Donbass The EU must maintain an open dialogue with Russia geared towards achieving a negotiated settlement, although doing so does not imply turning a blind eye to illegal actions such as the annexation of Crimea. It was this approach, championed by France and Germany, that paved the way for the Minsk II agreement, which represents the only path towards a resolution of the conflict. In the long run, ongoing negotiation is the only context in which the EU will be able to effectively present demands to Russian leaders, defend its own values and convey to Russian citizens its commitment to the democratic development of their country. An isolated Russia will be more aggressive and less likely to enter into constructive dialogues because it will opt to seek alternative partners on other continents the prime candidates being China and other BRICS rather than working to restore relations with the rest of Europe. 11

13 Javier Morales, coord European strategy towards Russia must include medium- and long-term as well as short-term measures: The first phase must be focused on the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine through the effective implementation of the Minsk II agreement signed on 12 February 2015 by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. This document lays out a road map for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops and weapons as well as a consensual political reform to be worked out between Kyiv and the territories currently under separatist control that will give them autonomous status within the Ukrainian state. The EU must achieve a consensus among its Member States on a unified stance towards Russia that will strengthen the coherence of its external action and put it in the position to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict fulfil the terms of the peace agreement. This common posture must be worked out in dialogue with key EU allies such as the United States, taking care to avoid the adoption of a passive position in discussions with Washington that could hinder the articulation of a true European foreign policy in line with European interests and priorities. In the medium term, the EU must play a larger role in the resolution of frozen conflicts in places such as Transnistria in Moldova that could become flashpoints of tension with Moscow in the future. The long-term goal should be the construction of a common security space for the European continent that guarantees the security and stability of states in the shared neighbourhood, mutual cooperation in the face of common threats such as jihadism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery. Overcoming the factors that have given rise to the current conflict will require sustained effort, political will and adequate resources Instead of crafting a new Russian containment policy, which will only serve to increase that country s feeling of isolation and its incentives for unilateral escalation, the European Union must promote the idea of a shared European identity within which both Russians and citizens of EU Member States perceive and recognise each other as belonging to the same civilisation. A Russia that sees itself as increasingly more European is the best guarantee of a safer and more secure Europe for everyone. 12

14 I. The Ukranian crisis: international context and lessons learned The international context 5. In spite of rhetoric about a new Cold War, the present conflict is not a new version of the confrontation between the West and a Soviet bloc supposedly represented at this point in time by Russia. The Ukrainian crisis has been a revolutionary process that has escalated into an armed conflict. However, it is not by any means a standoff between two irreconcilable political or economic models that represents a threat to the existence of the states involved. 6. The time when Russia, Ukraine and the rest of Europe were separate units sealed off from each other by physical and ideological barriers is far behind us. They are now fully integrated market economies functioning within an international globalised society and interconnected by means of a wide range of information and communications technologies. Although they may have gone through periods of rapprochement and Cold Peace, the web of interdependence that binds them is too intricate for any of them to contemplate a return to the past. 7. Russia has been, and is, a part of Europe without which European culture would not be fully comprehensible. The EU must recognise that Russia and Ukraine form part of a common European civilisation. Denying their Europeanness and by extension their right to participate in political decisions that affect the entire continent serves only to strengthen the Eurasianist arguments of radical Russian nationalists who preach the incompatibility of Russian and Western cultures and assert that Eurasia, rather than Europe, is Russia s natural geopolitical space. 8. Over the last few years we have witnessed a rebalancing of world power. The unipolarity that followed the Cold War, from which the United States emerged as the sole remaining world superpower, is giving way to an increasingly multipolar system in which the difference between Washington s level of power and influence and that of other potential world powers is gradually being reduced. For the Russian people, Russia s rise to a stature similar to that of other world powers such as China and the United States, which has been a part of this shift towards multipolarity, signifies a recuperation from the decline their country suffered during the 1990s as a result of the severe internal crisis that followed the dissolution of the USSR. 13

15 Javier Morales, coord. 9. The EU has failed to adequately assess the political, economic and security interests of an increasingly assertive and nationalistic Russia that has not only recuperated its position as a great world power but also its willingness to defend that position. Strong public support for Putin s presidency is closely linked to his commitment to make Russia once again a major power. However, reluctance on the part of the EU and the US to recognise Russia s return to the world stage has made it difficult to establish a mutually acceptable framework of coexistence within which Russia could feel that its rising status was properly respected. 10. The growing rivalry between Russia and certain Western countries has been exacerbated by Russia s perception of being the weaker party as well by the signs of Western influence in other countries of the former Soviet Union. The EU, for its part, has focused primarily on political and economic issues and paid much less attention to underlying security concerns. 11. Mutual mistrust between the EU y Russia has now become structural. Institutional encounters and contacts maintained between them to date have not been of the strength or calibre needed to overcome a legacy of prolonged confrontation. Nevertheless, there have been recent periods of détente one example being the Medvedev presidency the end of which owed more to internal Russian political affairs than any real enmity between that country and the EU. Although recuperating this positive climate in the short run will be difficult as long as the Ukrainian conflict remains unresolved, such periods of peaceful coexistence demonstrate that Moscow and the EU are not natural enemies and, in fact, have interests in common and are capable of working towards common goals. 12. Although Russian mistrust of the West did not begin with the Ukrainian crisis, this situation has certainly aggravated it. NATO s intervention in Kosovo in support of KLA separatist guerrillas, which paved the way for Kosovo s declaration of independence in 2008 recognised by the majority of Western countries was interpreted by Russia as a violation of the principle of the territorial integrity of states. Although the International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo s declaration of independence was in line with international law as a sui generis case that would not serve as a precedent for other territories, Moscow continues to consider it as having been an illegal act that nevertheless, from its point of view, would give legitimacy to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea and its current intervention in support of Ukrainian separatists. 13. The main bone of contention between Russia and the West over the past few years has been Russia s intervention in the war in Georgia, which Russia claims was necessary to protect its own troops and civilian populations in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from offensives launched by a pro-western government of Georgia under the leadership of Saakashvili anxious to gain membership in NATO. 14. The United States illegal invasion of Iraq, the implementation of an antimissile defence system in Europe, the ongoing expansion of NATO and its recent intervention in Libya have also contributed to Russia s perception of the West as a untrustworthy rival willing to isolate and weaken Russia as part and parcel of its pursuit of global hegemony. 14

16 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe 15. The failed reset in relations between Obama and Medvedev caused by the reluctance of elites in both countries to contemplate an enduring partnership was a lost opportunity to restore this confidence. Opposition protests on the increase since 2011 which have been described by the Kremlin as being instigated by Western fifth-columnists have also provoked a negative reaction. 16. The EU and Russia have both regarded their exertion of regional influence in Eastern Europe as a zero sum game in all facets of which the other must be excluded. The EU has focused on drawing the countries of the Eastern Partnership into its sphere of influence but has failed to appropriately take into account these countries historical, social and economic relations with Russia. For example, its Association Agreement with Ukraine did not adequately plan for the impact that the accord would have on industry in eastern Ukraine, which was heavily reliant on export trade to Russia. 17. The fact that EU policy towards former Soviet states especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia has never been based on a long-term strategy that contemplated the future of these countries has caused Russia to perceive all such cooperation initiatives as mere attempts to undermine its regional influence. Moreover, as Russia views these countries as being of great importance to its own national security, Moscow has been much more willing than the EU to take risks and mount a proactive defence of its presence in this region. 18. The weight of recent history in the minds of all the actors implicated has been a decisive factor. Poland and the Baltic countries continue to view Russia as an aggressor state, and they have done their best to not only represent it as not sharing a European identity but on occasion asserting that its identity is diametrically opposed to that of its European neighbours. This mindset has conditioned their attitude towards Russia, which they perceive as a latent threat that must be contained by NATO, and caused them to frequently assume the role of an anti-russian lobby within the EU. Given that this strategy of isolating Russia has only served to heighten Moscow s feelings of impotence and by extension its aggressiveness, it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 19. The interests of certain Member States aside, the EU cannot be said to have acted in a united fashion towards Russia; it lacks of a coherent, long-term strategy that would enable it to foresee changes down the road or balance its rivalry with Moscow by means of measures that would strengthen mutual interdependence and avoid the escalation of confrontations. Russia, in contrast, has maintained a much more defined and stable strategy and employed all the means necessary to defend its interests. Russia s foreign policy preference for bilateral agreements with individual Member States rather direct institutional dialogue with the Union has fostered the proliferation of contradictory positions on certain issues within Europe. 20. The differences between the language and style of these two foreign policies has also made mutual understanding more difficult. Putin s Russia takes a much more direct approach to foreign policy than the EU, which it occasionally perceives to be a vague and contradictory counterpart. The EU has not been very realistic in mapping out its policy towards Moscow, hoping for domestic political changes in Russia at moments when the necessary conditions are not in place. The Union must be realistic and learn to negotiate with Russia such as it is. 15

17 Javier Morales, coord. 21. The Kremlin finds the European discourse grounded in values not always borne out in actual fact difficult to swallow, given that it bases its own foreign policy on traditional ideas of sovereignty and national interests and considers concepts such as democracy and human rights as no more than terms trotted out by other great powers to justify their interference in the domestic affairs of third countries. Russia has appropriated these same arguments to legitimise its interventions in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea and the Donbass, citing the precedent of Western humanitarian interventions as a means of warding off criticism of its actions. 22. Although Russia used the protection of Russian minorities as one of the excuses for its intervention in Ukraine, there have been precedents of discrimination against these groups. EU Member States such as Estonia and Latvia have denied and continue to deny citizenship to ethnic Russians. The groundswell of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment that surfaced with the Euromaidan protests has needlessly deepened inter-ethnic divisions in that country. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Russian speakers constituted ousted Ukrainian president Yanukovych s base of electoral support. 23. The EU must recognise the difference between its own declared values and those of Russia while keeping in mind that it also has other neighbours that do not share these values and that this difference is actually an incentive to strengthen its relationship to Russia with an eye to influencing how that society evolves going forward. Nevertheless, the EU has neither the means nor the legitimacy to impose a transformation of Russia s political system; it can only support the right of the Russian people to freely choose their country s model of coexistence. 24. On the other hand, the EU must impede the commission of illegal acts against Russian citizens or citizens of other nationalities within our territory similar to those committed the past, the case of Alexander Litvinenko being one example, and whenever necessary, demand the extradition of those responsible for these crimes. 25. We must convey the message that the EU does not enjoy a monopoly on democratic values and that they are a universal right to which all the peoples of the world may aspire regardless of their origin or place of residence. The most effective manner in which to reduce the values gap that currently exists is to vigorously promote the contact between citizens of Russian and EU member states needed to create a deeper mutual understanding, a long-term process that must maintain a special focus on encounters between young people. Lessons learned from the Ukrainian crisis 26. Ukraine has historically been, and continues to be, a country wracked by deep internal divisions regarding national identity traceable to the various ways in which it has been configured as a state over time. These conflicting souls were not taken into account at the beginning of the Euromaidan revolution, which first took the form of civil, pro-european public protests but quickly devolved into a violent confrontation in which minority ultranationalist groups assumed a leading role they should never have been allowed to play. 16

18 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe 27. The bottom line that Moscow has aspired to is a peaceful coexistence with Ukraine that would permit the continuity of bilateral trade and guarantee that the culture and language of Ukraine s ethnic minorities is respected. It also has a vital interest in maintaining Sevastopol as a Russian naval base and avoiding the establishment of a NATO base there. The decision to annex Crimea was greatly influenced by the adoption of a pro-atlantic alliance stance by the Euromaidan revolutionary movement. 28. Moscow initially preferred to seek a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Its subsequent military involvement was a response to a turn of events that Russian leadership perceived as a threat to their country s vital interests: the political change in Ukraine in the wake of the Euromaidan revolution, whose leaders considered Russia to be Ukraine s number one enemy. The unilateral violation of the agreement on the resolution of the crisis by opposition leaders, who had signed it on 21 February 2014 in the presence of European mediators and a Russian special envoy, convinced Moscow that it must respond with an equally unilateral show of force. 29. The EU committed two errors, the first being its failure to condemn the violence of the most radical elements of the Euromaidan movement and the second being its decision to recognise the new Ukrainian government instead of insisting that constitutional procedures for presidential impeachment be followed. The unconstitutional removal of Yanukovych triggered unrest among Russian-speaking citizens in the Donbass who felt abandoned by a Kyiv government they perceived as catering to the most radical elements of Ukrainian nationalism. This state of affairs provided the Kremlin with what it saw as a pretext for its annexation of Crimea and its subsequent intervention in the Donbass. 30. Although Russia considered the possibility of Ukraine entering NATO untenable, it has not demonstrated open opposition to other EU initiatives towards Ukraine that have not posed a threat to its historic relations with that country. The EU made the mistake of attempting to draw Kyiv into an Association Agreement that entailed the creation of a free trade zone between them without calculating either the negative impact that such an accord could have on bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia or subsequent reprisals on the part of Moscow. Furthermore, the agreement was presented to the Ukrainian public as a zero sum game in which the EU and Russian were framed as incompatible options between which Ukraine was forced to choose. 31. Although sanctions have had a real impact on the Russian economy, they have not brought an end to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Putin enjoys the domestic support he needs to hang tight for as long as these measures last. On the other hand, Russia s embargo on agricultural and food imports from the EU is hurting the European economy. 32. Sanctions will only be useful as an incentive for Russia to cooperate in the effective implementation of the Minsk II agreement insofar as the gradual withdrawal of these measures is clearly linked to the fulfilment of the following steps laid out in that document: 17

19 Javier Morales, coord The implementation of the ceasefire cited in the agreement, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the establishment of a security zone between combatant forces followed by the verification of these actions by OSCE observers The release of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons and the extension of an amnesty on the part of Ukraine to those who have participated in the separatist insurrection Unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict zones under international supervision and the restoration of public services, payment of pensions and other social benefits, supplies, banking services and other communications between the zone of conflict and the rest of Ukraine The withdrawal of all armed formations, military equipment and foreign combatants The organisation of local elections in the territory under dispute in accord with Ukrainian legislation and under OSCE supervision The granting of special autonomous status to separatists territories within the Ukrainian state by means of constitutional reform The restoration of full Ukrainian government control over its borders by the end of At the outset of the conflict, Ukraine refused to modify its constitution so as to give autonomous status to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within a new federal, or at least decentralised state, which was one of the demands articulated by Moscow and the self-proclaimed people s republics. Kyiv s refusal to give an inch on this issue at the negotiating table impeded progress towards a mutually acceptable solution and contributed to the escalation of the armed conflict. The Ukrainian government finally agreed to negotiate autonomy for regions held by separatists during talks in Minsk in exchange for these regions renunciation of their unilateral declaration of independence and declared willingness to remain a part of the Ukrainian state. 34. The following four goals must be met in order to ensure the fulfilment of the peace agreement: (a) the establishment of a definitive end to the armed combat that has continued at certain areas although the ceasefire is generally respected throughout the conflict zone; (b) the guarantee of the obstacle-free access needed by OSCE observers to properly verify the withdrawal of weapons; (c) the successful negotiation of local elections in territories to be held by separatists; and (d) the clear definition of the degree of autonomy these territories will have within the Ukraine, a key point that was not resolved during the Minsk talks. A failure to reach a consensus between all parties regarding these issues could lead to a new military escalation. 35. Should the Minsk II agreement fail, the current standoff is set to become a frozen conflict that could last for an indeterminate period of time, given that Ukraine lacks the military superiority necessary to win back territory under separatist control and Russia continues to control the border and by extension is in a situation to provide both supplies and combatants to rebel areas. Western military aid would not be 18

20 A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe sufficient to tip the balance or raise the cost of Russian intervention to the point that would force Putin, who enjoys a high level of public support, to back down. Such aid would give Ukraine a new incentive to abandon negotiations and resort once more to armed force, an action that would only spark reciprocal escalation on the part of the Russians. It is therefore clear that there is no viable alternative to a negotiated settlement between Ukraine, the separatists and Russia. 36. Although Putin s popularity in Russia began to slump in 2009, it has risen to new heights on the basis of his handling of the Ukrainian crisis (fig. 1). When the Euromaidan protests began, his approval rating stood at 61% quite high for a third-term president, but the lowest registered in public opinion polls since his rise to power in However, his level of public support shot up to 80% in the wake of the ouster of Yanukovych and the Russian occupation of Crimea. One year into the armed conflict, it has risen even further, reaching 85% in March 2015 one of the highest ratings of his entire political career. These results reflect the success of a Kremlin communication strategy based on tight state control of television networks that substantially neutralises the domestic impact of international punitive measures such as economic sanctions. Fig. 1: Russian public opinion regarding Putin s performance as president and the state of the nation (%) Source: Data for this chart has been obtained from Levada-Center, 19

The Foreign Policy of Ukraine One Year After the Orange Revolution PONARS Policy Memo No. 372 Volodymyr Dubovyk Odessa National University December 2005 It has been a year since the Orange Revolution in

Erich Reiter and Johann Frank The European Security Strategy Austrian Perspective The following essay gives the Austrian view on the ESS from a security political perspective and analyses the needs and

Home Security: Russia s Challenges A Russian Perspective Andrei Fedorov * Home security: Russia s challenges Home security and the struggle against terrorism is one of the most crucial issues for the Russian

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 350 EAST 35TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10016 Please Check Against Delivery Statement by H.E. Ambassador Li Baodong Head of the Chinese Delegation at

To what extent were the policies of the United States responsible for the outbreak and development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949? Although the dominant military confrontations of the 20 th century

Russian National Security Policy in 2000 Celeste A. January 2000 PONARS Policy Memo 102 Harvard University Although signing a decree granting the new National Security Concept the status of law in January

Unit 6. The Cold War (1945-1991) Learning Target 23 Summarize how atomic weapons have changed the nature of war, altered the balance of power and started the nuclear age. Following World War II, the United

Dr.Karoly Gruber (Szechenyi Istvan University of Gyor, Hungary): The European Union, Central Europe and Russia: Cooperation and/or containment? Perspectives on Political Transformation in Central and Eastern

Name: Cold War Mr. Baffuto/Mr. LaMar DO NOW Questions 1. Korea Divided at 38th Parallel Hungarian Revolution Crushed Missile Sites Spotted in Cuba The events in these headlines contributed to the 1) development

RUSSIA CHINA NEXUS IN CYBER SPACE E. Dilipraj Associate Fellow, CAPS On May 08, 2015 Russia and China inked an important agreement in the field of cyber security. This bilateral agreement is the latest

UNDERSTANDING NATO THE ORIGINS OF THE ALLIANCE In the aftermath of the Second World War, East and West Europe found themselves separated by the ideological and political divisions of the Cold War. Eastern

17th EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint Statement 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The 17 th EU-Ukraine Summit took place in Kyiv on 27 April 2015. The European Union was represented by President of the European Council Donald Tusk

EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT ~BACKGROUND~ CHINA/00 (initial) February 2005 EU ARMS AND DUAL USE EXPORTS POLICY AND EU EMBARGO ON CHINA 1. The EU embargo on arms exports to China was adopted by the European Council

Management and Economics 307 FINANCING AND PLACE OF THE BULGARIAN ARMY IN THE OPERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT Elitsa PETROVA elitsasd@abv.bg Nikolay NICHEV National Military University, Veliko

The Double Democratic Deficit Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices Hans Born, Senior Fellow, DCAF Geneva Brussels, 29 April 2004 Presentation given at the Book

Brussels, 24 March 2014 140324/01 F A C T S H E E T EU-US Summit (Brussels, 26 March 2014) and EU-US relations The Leaders of the European Union and the United States of America will meet on 26 March 2014

MEPP Master of European Politics and Policies Member of European Master in Public Administration network Parkstraat 45 Box 3609 3000 Belgium KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN TOPICS FOR DISSERTATIONS 2011

INTERVIEW WITH ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN * In this exclusive interview with TPQ, the Honorable Secretary General provides an overview of the major developments of the past two years in Turkey s neighborhood,

Ukraine Document Based Question (DBQ) Central Question: What is happening in Ukraine? Map of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War: Located in Eastern Europe, Ukraine became a part of

European Council Brussels, 20 March 2015 (OR. en) EUCO 11/15 CO EUR 1 CONCL 1 COVER NOTE From: General Secretariat of the Council To: Delegations Subject: European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015)

EU Global Strategy: Role and Engagement of Eastern Partners in European Security Conference Report March 2016 Vilnius, Lithuania The International Security Experts Conference EU Global Strategy: Role and

International Conference CALL FOR PAPERS THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKANS BETWEEN LESSONS LEARNED AND INNOVATIVE WAYS FORWARD 17.06.2015 Bucharest, Romania On July 15 th 2014 Jean-Claude Juncker

Department Head: Professor John T. Rourke Department Office: Room 137, Monteith Building Undergraduate Catalog 1998-1999 POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLS) For major requirements, see the College of Liberal Arts

The codification of criminal law and current questions of prison matters Kondorosi Ferenc Under Secretary of State Ministry of Justice Hungary Criminal law is the branch of law, in which society s expectations

The second World War was a source of big, deep and far-reaching changes in International structure. It ended the traditional power structure in International Relations and ushered in a new power structure

Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 The Security Council, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and

U.S. POLICY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION From the U.S. point of view, NATO is and will remain the premier provider of security for the Euro-Atlantic region, which includes the Black Sea. Far from seeking to

1 Option 1: Use the Might of the U.S. Military to End the Assad Regime The Syrian dictatorship s use of chemical weapons against its own people was terrible. But we must not let it overshadow the larger

1 Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (Kirkenes, Norway, 3 4 June 2013) Prime Ministers and other high-level representatives of the members of the Barents Euro- Arctic

Kozmetsky Center of Excellence The Kozmetsky Center of St. Edward s University will host a forum entitled: International Policy & Academic Perspectives on the Impact of the Ukrainian Conflict: A New Cold

I PRECEDINGS Under the pretext of meeting Recommendation 12/2002 of the Council of Europe, the Spanish Government introduced in 2006, without the desirable consensus, a set of mandatory and graded school

Eurocentrum Praha 4 th October 2007 Portuguese Presidency of the European Union A stronger Europe for a better world A stronger Europe for a better world is the motto of the current Portuguese Presidency.

Assumed role of India in the international community in the short and medium Daniel Novotný Alice Rezková SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGIC APPROACH OF THE EU TOWARDS INDIA Assessment

Arab revolutions: Why West was caught off-guard In early November, Mondial interviewed Ziad Abdel Samad, Executive Director of the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND, based in Beirut). ANND is a regional

Nr. 32/2006 November 2006 NATO-Enlargement After the Riga Summit Karl-Heinz Kamp Although the subject of NATO enlargement will not take central stage at the NATO Riga summit, the membership question remains

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL MEETING IN SUPPORT OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE The two-state solution: a key prerequisite for achieving peace and stability in the Middle East Moscow, 1 and 2 July 2015 CHECK

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahfzbqyr2fs Russia: Speaker of the House Threatens to Destroy the World with Secret "Tsunami-WMD" This is an interview that Speaker Zhyrinovsky gave to TV station in Georgia.

Standard: History Enlightenment Ideas A. Explain connections between the ideas of the Enlightenment and changes in the relationships between citizens and their governments. 1. Explain how Enlightenment

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MEXICO Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador President For a Stronger and Better Mexico Lopez Obrador believes in the principles of self-determination, cooperation and international peace for

22 ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM RESOLUTION APPF22/RES 01 POLITICAL AND SECURITY MATTERS IN ASIA PACIFIC (Sponsored by Australia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and the Russian

Mr. President Excellencies, I am grateful for this opportunity to address the UN Security Council. The point that I wish to make today is simply put. The UN and the OSCE, as the largest and most inclusive

1 Principles of development cooperation between Estonia and Ukraine 2016 Foreword Ukraine has been a priority partner country for Estonia s bilateral development cooperation since 2006. Ukraine was also

9. Major powers and arms control: a Chinese perspective Li Changhe I. Introduction The major powers play a key role in the process of international arms control and disarmament. Their policies and actions

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Based on the Japan U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan

Energy Security: Role of Regional Cooperation Traian Chebeleu Today s Conference is dedicated to a topic that has deeply preoccupied the governments and the business communities in the Emerging Europe,

Brief overview TURKISH CONTRACTING IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET Construction plays a crucial role in Turkey s economic development, accounting for 5.9% of GDP and employing some 1.8 million people. When

HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUE : THE USSR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN LILY BUTLER INTRODUCTION In the Soviet army it takes more courage to retreat than advance. - Joseph Stalin After the Second World War,

EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 11.12.2013 JOIN(2013) 30 final JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

GREECE S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY By George A. Papandreou 1 Abstract Greece is committed to embracing all those nations who strive for democracy within their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation

20 th Century International Relations Contents 1 Imperialism and the Alliance System part 1 7 slides, 2 Flash activities, 2 worksheets What are alliances? Why were alliances formed? What different national

SOCIAL STUDIES TEST for e-lessons day 2 Name Directions: Use your own piece of paper as your answer document. Do not print off the test. You will need to only turn in your answer document. 29. The Cold

Panel I: Russia & Central Asia Moderator: William Pomeranz, Kennan Institute Jeffrey Mankoff is deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program and a visiting scholar at Columbia University

This article was published in Spanish in the March 2010 issue of Palabra Nueva, the monthly journal of the Archdiocese of Havana. President Obama and Cuba by Philip Peters President Barack Obama entered

m a s t e r o f s c i e n c e i n Global affairs The M.S. in Global Affairs is the flagship graduate program of the Center for Global Affairs (CGA), ranked by the Foreign Policy Association in 2010 and

Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué 30.06.2012 1. On 30 June 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United

1 NATO s relations with the states of the former Soviet Union CIOR, February 4 th, 2013, Isabelle Facon, FRS (Paris) This presentation will deal with the relations between NATO on the one hand, Ukraine,

THE WESTERN BALKANS The EU has developed a policy to support the gradual integration of the Western Balkan countries with the Union. On 1 July 2013, Croatia became the first of the seven countries to join,

1 / 6 29 July 2014 Dear Member of Parliament, Dear Member of EUFORES, Dear energy expert, Following the May elections of the European Parliament, EUFORES is in the process of reestablishing its core group

ZRÍNYI MIKLÓS NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY KOSSUTH LAJOS FACULTY OF MILITARY SCIENCE Military Science PhD School Col. István Kopcsó M.D. The challenges of the military-medical service in the 21 st century,

TEACHING AT SSP The Program s courses what MIT prefers to call subjects are open to all students eligible to attend classes at MIT, including cross-enrollers from Harvard and Wellesley. Most of the subjects

No reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan The United Nations Security Council: Reforms concerning its membership

controversial issues: guidance for schools Conflict and controversy is a fact of life In an age of mass media and electronic communication, children and young people are regularly exposed to the conflicts

Bernd Papenkort DEFENCE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA A LONG WAY TOWARDS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE A. The Current Situation of Defence Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina The current structure and composition

Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) CONTRIBUTION OF THE XLI COSAC Prague, 10-12 May 2009 1. Current Economic and Financial Situation 1.1

Victoria Nuland Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs House Foreign Affairs Committee May 8, 2014 Written Testimony Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, thank you for inviting

SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY INTRODUCTION The School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) at Quaid-i-Azam University is Pakistan s premier institution