07ASTANA3302, KAZAKHSTAN: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-DRUG CHECKPOINTS

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 003302
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL (SNYDER, BUHLER); SCA/CEN (OMARA), ISN/ECC
(HARTSHORNE), SCA/RA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNARKCRMKZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-DRUG CHECKPOINTS
¶1. Summary: From November 24 through December 4, a joint UNODC/INL
team and an independent expert assessed six internal ("Rubezh")
checkpoints. The international expert will provide a report with
recommendations to the donor community and the GoK in January,
including proposals for training and equipment. End Summary.
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BACKGROUND
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¶2. INL provided a grant to UNODC in July 2007 to support the
Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) efforts to strengthen controls
on primary narco-trafficking routes and to help improve national and
regional law enforcement capacities along these routes through the
provision of communications and other equipment. As part of its
Counter Narcotics Strategy, the GOK provided 1.5 billion tenge
(approximately $12.5 million) for first-stage implementation of the
strategy from 2006 to 2008. With a portion of the funding, the
MVD's Committee on Combating Drugs established seven internal
checkpoints ("Rubezh-Narkotiki") including the Ulken post in the
Almaty oblast, Syrdarya post in the Kyzylorda oblast, Kyzyltu post
in the South-Kazakhstan oblast, Kargaly post in the Aktobe oblast,
Ayagoz post in the Eastern Kazakhstan oblast, and Leninskiy post in
Pavlodar in 2005. The Sary-Arka post was established in the
Karaganda oblast in November 2007. MVD provided infrastructure and
drug identification equipment. INL will provide training of
officers working at the Rubezh checkpoints.
¶3. In 2006, MVD seized a total of 126 kilos of narcotics at all
seven posts, and approximately 125 kilos in the first 10 months of
this year. The Ulken post has had the best results with 115 kilos
seized during the first 10 months of this year. MVD seized 21.119
kilos of heroin in 2006, including 15.504 kilos at the Kyzyltu post,
five kilos at Ulken in the Almaty oblast and 1.804 kilos at Syrdarya
in the Kyzylorda oblast. In the first ten months of this year,
7.678 kilos of heroin were seized at all posts.
¶4. Hardy Roehlung, an international expert from the EU Border
Management in Central Asia Program, was contracted by UNODC to
assess the internal checkpoints to determine checkpoint capacity,
assess needs for specialized technical equipment, and recommend
needed training programs. Representatives of the Embassy's INL
Office, the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC), and the MVD joined
the assessment mission.
¶5. Generally, the posts are independent subdivisions of the
Committee on Combating Drug Trafficking and are directly subordinate
to the oblasts' Divisions on Combating Drug Trafficking. They have
the same organizational structure as the divisions, which include
counter-narcotics operations officers, migration police, canine
specialists, and road police. There are usually two officers who
patrol the area adjacent to the post to counter the threat of drug
couriers bypassing posts. Though posts are theoretically located in
areas without detour roads, the assessment showed that there are
possibilities to avoid the posts by driving on secondary roads or
off-road. On average there are 18 officers working in two or three
shifts. Some posts have satellite phones, some have trunk telephone
lines, and the rest use their own cellular phones. There is not
appropriate infrastructure and equipment to communicate with the
regional MVD offices or between checkpoints at longer distances.
While some posts have access to the MVD databases, some are limited
in their functions and others do not even have electricity. The
assessment team also found that there are not sufficient personnel
assigned to the checkpoints. Some officers are working for 24 hours
straight.
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ULKEN
-----
¶6. The first post visited is located in Almaty oblast, 371
kilometers from Almaty on the main road to Astana. The post
received INL-provided inspection equipment and a hangar for
searching vehicles in 2005-2006. The GOK provided infrastructure.
The local rural district administration provides assistance to the
post because the work of the post and the presences of police ensure
security in the area. The post is well equipped, but living
conditions for the officers should be improved.
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SYRDARYA
--------
¶7. The post is located 8 kilometers from Kyzylorda on the main road
between Shymkent and Samara. The post focuses on trucks and buses
coming from Uzbekistan. Post personnel have a very good
ASTANA 00003302 002 OF 003
relationship with other agencies, including Customs, Border Guard
Service and the local police. During its visit, the assessment team
saw several border guards at the post who were sent from the closest
border guard posts to strengthen the post's work during Operation
Barrier. The Committee for National Security (KNB) first launched
the operation in 2003 with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Customs
Control Committee, Financial Police and Border Guard Service. The
operation proved to be effective and has since been conducted
several times each year. The officers working at the post use drug
profiling techniques and canines. Twenty minutes before the
assessment team arrived, a canine detected eight kilos of hashish on
a bus and officers arrested the courier.
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KYZYLTU
--------
¶8. The checkpoint is located 58 km from Shymkent on the main road
from Almaty to Tashkent and Termez, Uzbekistan. During the
assessment team's visit to the post, the head of the post presented
a plan for a model Rubezh post that will include an administrative
building, a hangar, a dormitory, and dog kennels. The model post
also would have an access road to the hangar, sufficient lighting,
barriers, and other necessary equipment. Unfortunately, the present
situation at the post is quite the opposite. The inspection hangar,
which was built with GOK funds, was shoddily constructed and appears
ready to collapse. MVD has complained that none of the six hangars
constructed with their funds in 2006 meet minimal safety
requirements and the MVD is currently taking legal action against
the contractor.
¶9. MVD officers stated that the biggest problem is with trucks
operating under the TIR convention (The Convention on International
Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets), which MVD officers
cannot inspect. If MVD receives intelligence information that a
truck is carrying contraband, officers must ask the driver of the
truck to drive 150 kilometers to a customs checkpoint on the
Kazakhstani-Uzbek border to inspect the truck with a fixed x-ray
machine. Drivers can refuse and claim not to have sufficient fuel or
time. Approximately 150 vehicles pass through the post daily,
including 30 trucks - 25 of which operate under the TIR convention.
The post is the first on the route from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
and must be strengthened. MVD plans to construct an administrative
building and reconstruct the hangar for inspection of vehicles, but
does not have sufficient funds to purchase fixed X-ray equipment.
-------
AYAGOZ
-------
¶10. The post is located 360 km from Semey city on the main road
from Almaty to Semey. The location of the post is not effective
because it is located 90 kilometers from a main route from China to
Almaty. The majority of traffic passing through this checkpoint are
fully loaded cargo trucks, which are difficult to examine. Though
the post has modern equipment, officers are fearful of misusing or
breaking the equipment and continue to use traditional drug
profiling techniques and dogs in searching vehicles.
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KARGALY
-------
¶11. The post is located 4 kilometers from the customs checkpoint on
the main road from Aktobe to Orsk, Russia. One of the officers
believed that a better location for the post is in Karabutak. The
post is ill equipped; there is no infrastructure or buildings; and
the living and working conditions are very poor. The traffic volume
at this post is low.
----------
SARY-ARKA
----------
¶12. The checkpoint is located outside of the city of Karaganda on
the main road from Almaty to Astana. The post was relocated from
the Arasan checkpoint in Atbasar. Due to the implementation of the
"Astana - Drug-Free City" program to reduce demand, treat addiction,
and fight drug trafficking and with the aim of creating a barrier
around Astana, the MVD relocated the post to a city much closer to
Astana. The head of the post pointed out the number of trucks with
a TIR carnet passing through the checkpoint.
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LENINSKIY
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ASTANA 00003302 003 OF 003
¶13. The MVD established the Leninskiy post outside of the small
town of Shiderty in the Pavlodarskaya oblast. The assessment team
did not visit the post because UNODC and INL did not receive an
official request to provide assistance to the post. However, the
MVD colonel accompanying the assessment team stated that this was an
oversight and that the post should be assessed. INL will work with
UNODC and the international expert to arrange an assessment trip in
the future.
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TIR ISSUES
----------
¶14. Post personnel are unable to legally unseal and inspect the
contents of vehicles with a TIR carnet because customs officers are
not present. However, upon receipt of intelligence information,
they do inspect vehicles with an X-ray machine when possible. There
appear to be two possible solutions: the purchase and installation
of X-ray machines or the assignment of customs officials to the
checkpoints.
¶15. Article 5 of the TIR Convention stipulates that goods carried
under the TIR procedure under seal shall not, as a general rule, be
subject to examination at customs offices en route. However,
customs authorities may, in exceptional cases and when irregularity
is suspected, carry out an examination of the goods. There are
clear advantages for the countries which entered this Convention.
TIR trucks avoid long delays at borders and physical inspection of
goods in transit. However, police officers in Kazakhstan suspect
that some of these trucks are carrying contraband goods or
narcotics.
¶16. In addition to the TIR trucks, officers at the checkpoints also
face the difficulty of searching fully loaded trucks. There is not
enough manpower to unload the cargo, search the truck, and reload
the cargo in a timely manner. Such procedures could unduly delay
shipments traveling to, from, and through Kazakhstan.
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NEXT STEPS
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¶17. The issue of strengthening the internal checkpoints will be
raised at the next Counter Narcotics Donor Coordination Meeting in
January, where we hope to find additional funds from other donors.
Currently, INL does not have sufficient funds to cover the needs of
the posts. In addition, the MVD will also receive the assessment
and have an opportunity to address the deficiencies at the
checkpoints. Only by joining forces will it be possible to
sufficiently strengthen these checkpoints.
ORDWAY

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Kazakhstan) database..

We wish to express our gratitude to Julian Assange and his team for making this data available as it is an important public record.

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