In 1957, Canada and the United States
(US) agreed to establish the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD) as a binational command for air defense against the
Soviet bomber threat. In fact, the antecedents of defense
cooperation between the two countries extended back to World War
II, when the threat of German and Japanese incursion into Alaska
and the Maritime Provinces brought Canada and the US together for
mutual defense. In August 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Mackenzie King issued the "Ogdenburg
Declaration." It voiced the concept of joint defense and
sanctioned the establishment of an apparatus to carry it out. The
Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), a binational
working group for continuous high level consultations on common
defense matters, was formed. At war's end, collective security
for continental defense remained of vital interest to both
nations. In February 1947, Ottawa and Washington announced the
principles of future military cooperation including consultation
on air defense issues.

The Origins of NORAD

The growth of Soviet long-range aviation
in the late 1940s, and the test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949,
brought Canada and the US for the first time under direct threat
of nuclear attack, and hastened closer cooperation in continental
defense. In the early 1950s Canada and the US agreed to construct
a series of radar stations across North America. The first
undertaking was the Pinetree Line of 33 stations built across
southern Canada and completed in 1954 at the cost of about $50
million. The Pinetree Line provided continuous warning and
intercept control from coast to coast. However, low altitude gaps
in the line and its shallow coverage remained major system
defects. To correct these deficiencies, a joint Canada-US
Military Study Group recommended in 1953 that two more radar
networks be built. By 1957, a Mid-Canada Line, or McGill Fence,
was completed about 300 miles north of the Pinetree Line,
generally along the 55th parallel. The Mid-Canada Line consisted
mainly of Doppler radars which created a microwave radar fence
for detection, but not tracking, of low-flying aircraft. This
second line, financed entirely by Canada, cost about $227
million. The third and most challenging joint air defense
undertaking of the 1950s was the construction of a
transcontinental line along the 70th parallel about 200 miles
north of the Arctic Circle. The network of 57 stations, completed
in July 1957, was called the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW
Line). The US paid the approximately $350 million construction
costs.

Completion of the three-tiered radar
defense line gave the population centers of the US and Canada two
to three hours warning of bomber attack, sufficient time to
identify and intercept the enemy aircraft. Should the enemy have
attempted to circumvent the three lines and approach from either
the Pacific or Atlantic oceans, they would have encountered
offshore barriers composed of airborne early warning aircraft,
Navy picket ships, and offshore radar platforms called
"Texas Towers." Since the operation of this extensive
and complex network required daily coordination on tactical
matters and the merging of plans to a greater extent than ever
before, the logical next step was to establish a formal structure
for operational control.

Joint planning had already been put into
practice by the two air defense establishments. In 1949, the
Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee prepared an outline plan
for emergency defense that included provisions for more detailed
plans by the air defense commands in the two countries. Early in
1951, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) placed a liaison group
at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, home of the USAF's Air Defense
Command (ADC), to facilitate such planning work. Working
cooperatively, they produced a detailed air defense plan in 1952
and updated it every year thereafter. However, it became
increasingly obvious that the most effective air defense required
common operating procedures, deployment according to a single
plan, the means for quick decision, and authoritative control of
all weapons and actions. In the spring of 1954, the RCAF Chief of
the Air Staff, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, and the head of the
USAF Air Defense Command, General Benjamin Chidlaw, met to
discuss the best means for providing defense for North America.
On the basis of these talks, their staffs prepared a plan which
called for a combined air defense organization under a single
commander. In late 1954, General Earle E. Partridge, commander in
chief of the newly formed joint US Command, Continental Air
Defense Command (CONAD), directed another detailed study of North
America defense issues. The results again pointed to the
establishment of a combined air defense organization.

Over the next two years, there were
consultations between the military leaders of both countries. On
1 August 1957 these talks culminated in an announcement by US and
Canada of the establishment of an integrated command that would
centralize operational control of all air defense. On 12
September, NORAD operations commenced at Ent AFB, Colorado with
General Partridge named as commander in chief and Air Marshal
Slemon as his deputy. A formal NORAD agreement between the two
governments was reached on 12 May 1958. NORAD commanded both US
and Canadian air defense forces which included Canadian Air
Command, USAF Air Defense Command, Army Air Defense Command, and
Naval Forces CONAD/NORAD.

The next several years saw a dramatic
growth in air defenses. By the early 1960s, a quarter of a
million Canadians and US personnel operated a multi-layered and
interlocking complex of sites, control centers, manned
interceptors, and surface- to-air missiles which constituted a
formidable defense against a potential bomber attack.

NORAD and The Changing Threat

During the 1960s and 1970s the character
of the threat changed as the Soviets focused on creating
intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles, and
developing an anti-satellite capability. The northern radar
warning networks could, as one commentator put it, "...not
only (be) outflanked but literally jumped over." In
response, a space surveillance and missile warning system was
constructed to provide worldwide space detection and tracking and
to catalog objects and activity in space. When these systems
became operational during the early 1960s, they came under the
control of Commander-in-Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD). The evolving
threat broadened NORAD's mission over the years to include
tactical warning and assessment of a possible air, missile, or
space attack on North America. The 1975 NORAD Agreement
acknowledged these extensions of the command's mission and the
1981 NORAD Agreement changed the command's name from the North
American "Air" Defense Command to the North American
"Aerospace" Defense Command.

The ballistic missile threat prompted
policy makers to reassess the effectiveness of the air defense
system. Economy moves begun in 1963 reduced aircraft
fighter-interceptor forces and closed portions of the land based
radar network. There were some efforts at improvements, however,
which helped reduce the vulnerability to ICBM attacks. Two
hardened underground combat operations centers were set up; one,
inside Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, and an alternate
Combat Operations Center at North Bay, Ontario. These facilities
became the nerve centers for integration and assessment of data
gained from the broad network of early warning systems being
established.

By the early 1970s, as a result of
changes in US strategic policy which had come to accept the
concept of mutual vulnerability to ICBM attack, the need to spend
about $1 billion a year on air defense was challenged. In 1974,
US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated the primary mission of
air defense was to ensure sovereignty of air space during
peacetime. This shift in mission was accepted by Canada and
confirmed in the 1975 NORAD Agreement. There followed further
reductions in the size and capability of the air defense system
and delays in its modernization. By the late 1970s, the remaining
components--some 300 interceptors, 100 radars and eight control
centers--had become obsolete and uneconomical to operate.

Modernization and the Evolving Threat

In May 1978, at the recommendation of
the Canadian Minister of Defence, the two nations undertook a
Joint US-Canada Air Defense Study (JUSCADS) to determine the air
defense threat through the end of the 20th century and what
resources might be available to meet that threat. The study,
completed in October 1979, identified the weaknesses of the
existing system and emphasized the need for incremental
improvements. As a follow-up to the JUSCADS study, the US
Congress in 1979 directed the USAF to prepare an air defense
master plan (ADMP). The ADMP, modified and upgraded, became the
US administration's blueprint for modernization of air defenses
and the basis for cost-sharing discussions between Canada and the
United States.

The main features of modernization
programs which followed upon the heels of the issuance of the
JUSCADS and the ADMP were: the replacement of the DEW Line radar
system with an improved arctic radar line called the North
Warning System (NWS); the deployment of Over-the-Horizon
Backscatter (OTH-B) radar; the assignment of F-15s, F-16s, and
CF-18s to NORAD, and the greater use of Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft. On 18 March 1985, President
Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, at the Shamrock Summit in
Quebec City, concluded a memorandum of understanding on air
defense modernization which contained most of the recommendations
of the previous studies.

The Reagan-Mulroney 1985 summit
established the foundation for a continued Canadian-US
partnership in North American air defense, particularly with
regard to the bomber and cruise missile threat. Cooperation in
the increasingly important area of space-based surveillance,
warning, and defense against ballistic missiles was also under
review. Binational discussions and concerns about space defense
and ballistic missile defense were addressed during the formation
of the new United States Space Command (established in September
1985). The new command would provide NORAD missile warning and
space surveillance capability, but would not be a component of
NORAD. The activation of US Space Command, however, in no way
diminished CINCNORAD's responsibility to provide the national
command authorities of both Canada and the United States warning
and assessment of an aerospace attack on North America.

The military capabilities of the Soviet
Union remained a significant concern in the late 1980s. 1987 was
a peak year for Soviet military aircraft testing the peripheries
of the North American continent. The Soviets continued to enlarge
its air-launched-cruise-missile capability. The missiles were
capable of flying over long ranges at low altitude and sub-sonic
speed and could avoid radar coverage. This posed a serious
challenge to the defense of the North American continent. NORAD
air defense fighters could attack aircraft and missiles with
air-to-air missiles, but early detection and successful
interception were critical requirements. In response to the
cruise missile threat, NORAD announced the selection of five
Forward Operating Locations from which to defend against the
air-breathing threat. These austere bases allowed NORAD aircraft
to intercept cruise missile-equipped bombers, or the missiles
themselves before they could strike North American targets.

The End of the Cold War :
Consolidation and Modernization for the 21st Century

The end of the Cold War brought about
major changes for the command. NORAD faced the same reduction in
funding as other US and Canadian agencies. NORAD reassessed its
mission and refocused its resources to meet emerging threats. In
1989, Congress assigned the Department of Defense a role in the
US counterdrug effort. With Canadian ratification of the
counterdrug mission, NORAD operations expanded to include
tracking small-engine aircraft, the primary means of smuggling
drugs. Ground radars, Airborne Warning and Control System
aircraft (AWACS), and Over-the-Horizon, Backscatter radars were
used to detect possible drug smuggling aircraft. The command also
developed procedures to coordinate counterdrug activities with
Canadian and US law enforcement agencies. These efforts demanded
the utmost diplomacy as the command delved into delicate civil
and diplomatic areas normally not included in day-to-day military
affairs.

Several critical upgrades to the
surveillance systems contributing to the NORAD mission of
aerospace warning were well underway by the early 1990s. The
replacement of the older DEW line sites began with the
installation of the North Warning System radars in 1986. While
resource constraints scaled back the original program, approved
in 1985, by 30 March 1995 the North Warning System achieved
initial operational capability. In 1987, the USAF began
replacement of the old BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning)
radars with newer phased array radar technology. The Cheyenne
Mountain Upgrade program since the 1980s installed new technology
in order to modernize the command and control centers located
there. Also, follow-on space-based early warning surveillance
systems were planned to replace the able, but aging Defense
Support Program system which supported NORAD's warning
requirements. Not all upgrade requirements were fully achieved,
however. The planned goal of four Over-the-horizon, Backscatter
radars locations was reduced to only one fully tested site at
Bangor, Maine. In 1994, that site was moved to warm, and later
cold storage.

As part of the effort to consolidate and
modernize its command and control procedures, NORAD also
participated in the US Joint Staff's directions of closer
cooperation among the services. This involved enhancing
connection of its command, control, and communications systems to
those of the US Army and US Navy. Army Air Defense Artillery and
the diverse Navy systems directed radar information to Cheyenne
Mountain as part improved identification of airborne threats to
North American air sovereignty.

The existence of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command for 40 years has provided a model of
international cooperation. The first NORAD Agreement in 1958
cemented the union, and each subsequent renewal has continued to
shape the partnership to meet new challenges. Members from both
armed forces watched over the vast stretches of air space in and
around the continent, while working together in Canadian and US
facilities. Both countries have shown a great deal of flexibility
in carrying out the command's charge. Initially designed to
provide warning against long-range bombers, NORAD later accepted
the duty of sounding the alarm in case of a ballistic missile
attack on Canada or the US. The command has also adapted to
changes in the international arena. The fall of the Soviet Union
in 1989 reduced the threat of nuclear annihilation, but new
threats like drug trafficking and weapons proliferation presented
themselves to NORAD commanders. NORAD's success has shown how two
sovereign nations can coordinate defense needs and maintain
vigilance for the common good of both countries.