1. Under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of theRepublic of the Philippines, like any member of thejudiciary, must be of proven integrity. Cognizant of thiseligibility requirement, the Judicial and Bar Council in 2012directed all applicants for the position of Chief Justice tosubmit inter alia all statements of assets and liabilities filedprior to their application. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.Sereno did not do so, although she began her governmentservice as a professor at the University of the PhilippinesCollege of Law from 1986 to 2006. The Report to the JBCnevertheless mistakenly stated “complete requirements”opposite Sereno’s name. This misled the JBC into includingher in the shortlist; she was subsequently appointed to theRepublic represented by Solicitor General Calida v. SerenoPetition for Quo Warrantox-----------------------------------------x

highest position in the Judiciary notwithstanding her failure

to prove her integrity.

2. The Solicitor General has to address this

anomaly. He is, after all, duty bound to advocate a uniformand consistent compliance with the Constitution, the laws,and the JBC rules: there can be no special treatment forSereno no matter how impressive her credentials may be.The principle of equal protection of the laws demands thatall aspirants to the judiciary pass the test of integrity. Thiscannot be done if some are given a pass and others aresubjected to strict scrutiny to hurdle that criterion.

3. In the present petition, the Republic through

Solicitor General Jose C. Calida asks that this HonorableCourt exercise its original jurisdiction to oust Maria LourdesP.A. Sereno from the office of the Chief Justice, inobeisance to the Court’s solemn constitutional duty to applythe law without fear or favor. She is unlawfully holding theposition of Chief Justice; the Court cannot, therefore, shirkits responsibility to declare the position vacant.

NATURE AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

4. This is a petition for quo warranto under Section

5(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 66 ofthe Rules of Court seeking the ouster of Respondent asChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of thePhilippines. The suit is being filed with this Honorable Courtas an exception to the application of the doctrine ofhierarchy of courts because the issues raised are oftranscendental importance.1 This is a case of firstimpression: it is unprecedented, involving as it does thehighest position in the Judiciary. Plainly, no tribunal canbest resolve it than the Court.

5. The suit is seasonably filed. To be sure, Section

11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that “a petitionfor quo warranto against a public officer or employee shallbe filed within one year after the cause of his ouster, or the1 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose.”

This limitation, however, does not apply to the petitioner.It has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warrantopetition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi whichmeans, “no time runs against the king.”2

6. Assuming arguendo that the one-year bar

applies to the Republic, this petition is filed within thereglementary period.

7. An exception to the statute of limitations in quo

warranto is when “there was no perceived acquiescence toor inaction on the part of Petitioner which amounted toabandonment of his right to the petition.”3 Petitioner onlycame to know of the disqualification of Respondent duringthe hearings conducted by the House of Representative’sCommittee on Justice on the impeachment complaintagainst Respondent in December 2017. During thehearings, the appointment of Respondent as Chief Justicewas put into question because she failed to submit herstatements of assets, liabilities and net worth, showing thatshe did not pass the test of integrity.

8. The Republic is exempt from filing fees pursuant

to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

THE PARTIES

9. Petitioner Republic is a sovereign entity with

capacity to sue and be sued. It has the authority tocommence a quo warranto proceeding under Section 1,Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. It is represented in thispetition by the Solicitor General who has the mandate to“represent the Government of the Philippines, its agenciesand instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in anylitigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring theservices of a lawyer.”4 The Solicitor General’s authority toinstitute a quo warranto petition on behalf of the Republic

is provided under Section 2, in relation to Section 7, Rule

10. The Solicitor General may receive the writs,

11. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno may be

served with the writs, orders, and processes of the Courtat 31 Hunt Street, Filinvest East, Antipolo City, through theOffice of the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of thePhilippines, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila.

THE SUBSTANTIVE FACTS5

12. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was

appointed as a permanent faculty member of the Universityof the Philippines College of Law in 1986.6 She continuedteaching in UP until June 1, 2006.7

13. While employed with UP, Respondent submitted

her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth as ofDecember 31, 2002.8 She also submitted to the Office ofthe Ombudsman, on December 16, 2003, her SALN endingin December 1998.9

5 Petitioner Republic manifests its earnest efforts to secure and to provide this Honorable Court withcertified true copies of all the Annexes appended to its Petition. Inasmuch as petitioner Republic hadless than seven (7) working days from receipt of Mallari’s letter on 21 February 2018, up to this filing,within which to source said certified true copies, there were government agencies which have yet tocomply with petitioner Republic’s requests thereon. Hence some annexes are copies only. Heretofore,the petitioner Republic undertakes to submit, or explain non-submission, of certified true copies ofdocuments, should the same be required by this Honorable Court. (rf. GO vs. SUNBANUN [G.R. No.168240. February 9, 2011.] "The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or order arerelevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner.” and REAL vs. BELO [G.R. No. 146224.January 26, 2007.] “When the CA dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for thereconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents ororder/resolution, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Revised Rules of Court.” alsoQUILO vs. BAJAO [G.R. No. 186199. September 7, 2016.])6 Annex “A,” Personal Data Sheet dated July 2, 2012.7 Annex “B,” Certification dated December 8, 2017 of Angela D. Escoto, Director of Human ResourcesDevelopment Office, UP, attaching SALN of Respondent as of December 31, 2002. The OSG requestedEscoto of the UP HRDO for certified copies of the certification and its attachments on February 28, 2018(Annex “B-1”), but Escoto is yet to grant the request. The OSG undertakes to submit to this HonorableCourt the certified copies as soon as they are available.8 See Annex “B.”9 Annex “C,” certified true copy of the Certification dated December 4, 2017 issued by Julie Ann Garcia,SALN In-Charge, Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman attaching the SALN of

1. June 1, 2000 – May 31, 2001

15. On June 1, 2006, Respondent resigned from the

UP College of Law.11

16. In July 2010, Respondent applied for the position

of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.12 In support ofher application for appointment, she submitted her SALNfor 2006.13 Respondent was later appointed as an AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court in the same year.14

17. After the position of Chief Justice became vacant

in 2012, the Judicial and Bar Council issued anAnnouncement for the opening of the position. In theAnnouncement, the JBC directed that candidates submitthe following requirements, in addition to the usualdocumentary requirements:

1. Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth

(SALN)

a. for those in the government: all previous SALNs

(up to 31 December 2011)

Respondent as of December 31, 1998. The copy was obtained through the OSG’s letter of request datedFebruary 28, 2018 (Annex “C-1”).10 Annex “D,” Letter dated December 8, 2017 from Angela D. Escoto, Director of Human ResourcesDevelopment Office, UP. The OSG requested Escoto of the UP HRDO for a certified copy of the letter8 (See Annex “B-1”), but Escoto is yet to grant the request. The OSG undertakes to submit to thisHonorable Court the certified copy as soon as it is available.11 See Annex “D.”12 Annex “E,” Letter dated December 18, 2017 of Atty. Socorro D’ Marie T. Inting, Chief of the Officeof Recruitment, Selection and Nomination of the JBS to Cong. Reynaldo Umali. The letter attached theSALNs of Respondent for the years 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011 and the Explanation Letter of Respondentdated July 23, 2012.13 See Annex “E.”.14 Annex “F” Oath of Office of Respondent dated August 16, 2010. See also Certificate of Appointmentdated August 13, 2010 (Annex “F-1”).

b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31

2. Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local

and foreign bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency Deposits Act.15

18. On June 5, 2012, the JBC made another

Announcement for vacancies in several positions, includingthat of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In thisAnnouncement, the JBC iterated that applicants to theposition of Chief Justice must meet the followingConstitutional qualifications:

A member of the Supreme Court must:

a. be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

b. be at least forty (40) years of age but not seventy years old or more c. have been for fifteen (15) years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines; and d. be of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.16

19. The announcement emphasized that candidates

for the Chief Justice post must submit “all previous SALNs(up to 31 December 2011) for those in the government orSALN as of 31 December 2011 for those from the privatesector;” and reminded applicants that those with“incomplete or out of date documentary requirements willnot be interviewed or considered for nomination.”17

20. In her application for the Chief Justice post,

Respondent submitted to the JBC her SALNs for the years2009, 2010, and 2011. She also submitted an ExplanationLetter dated July 23, 2012 on why she submitted her SALNonly for the mentioned years.18 In it, she requested that therequirements she submitted “be viewed as that from aprivate sector [sic], before [her] appointment to theGovernment again in 2010 as Associate Justice of the15 Annex “G,” JBC Announcement dated June 4, 2012.16 Annex “H,” JBC Announcement dated June 5, 2012.17 See Annex “H.”18 See Annex “E.”

Supreme Court.”19 It does not appear that Respondent’s

21. On July 2, 2012, Respondent accepted her

nomination for the position of Chief Justice.21 On August24, 2012, she was appointed as the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court.22

22. Five years later, that is, on August 30, 2017,

Atty. Larry Gadon filed against Respondent animpeachment complaint based on the following grounds:culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, highcrimes, and betrayal of public trust. Gadon alleged, amongothers, that Respondent failed to truthfully declare herSALNs.23 Gadon also claimed that Respondent failed todisclose "exorbitant lawyer's fees in the amount of SEVENHUNDRED FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS($745,000.00) or THIRTY-SEVEN MILLION PESOS(₱37,000,000.00), which she received from the Philippinegovernment."24

23. The complaint was endorsed by twenty-five

congressmen.25 Finding the complaint sufficient in form andsubstance, the House of Representatives’ Committee onJustice conducted hearings on the complaint. During theproceedings, the invalidity of Respondent’s appointment asChief Justice was exposed in view of her failure to submither SALNs for several years from 1986 to 2006 when shewas a professor at the UP College of Law. It was discoveredthat aside from her SALNS for the years 2006, 2009, 2010,and 2011 which she submitted in her applications forAssociate Justice and Chief Justice, Respondent only filedSALNs for the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 during hertenure as law professor at the UP College of Law from 1986

I. A PETITION FOR QUO

25. Quo warranto is the proper remedy to question

the validity of Respondent’s appointment.

26. The Latin term, which literally means “by what

authority,” is now recognized as an extraordinary legalremedy whereby the State challenges a person or an entityto show by what authority he holds a public office orexercises a public franchise. The Revised Rules of Courtprovide that the action is brought by either the SolicitorGeneral or by the public prosecutor in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines.28 It is the principal remedy and

an effective method to challenge a claim to public office.

27. Quo warranto was originally used as a writ filed

by monarchs to challenge claims of royal subjects to anoffice or franchise supposedly granted by the crown. Theancient writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ inthe nature of a writ of right by the King against anyone whousurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of thecrown, to inquire by what authority the usurper supportedhis claim, in order to determine the right.29

28. In the Philippines, quo warranto was formalized

into law with the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure inAugust 7, 1901.30 Section 197 of the Code provides:

Usurpation for Office or Franchise, Etc.

SECTION 197. Usurpation of an Office or

Franchise. — A civil action may be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands:

1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into,

or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office or a franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands;

2. Against a public civil officer who does or

suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office;

3. Against an association of persons who act as a

corporation within the Philippine Islands, without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.31

29. The action was incorporated in the 1940 Rules of

Court under Rule 68 which expounded on the procedure.The action was retained in the Original Rules of Court under

Rule 66 and is present in the current Revised Rules of

30. Rule 66 at present lays down the grounds for the

Section 1. Action by Government against

individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

31. The petition for quo warranto against

Respondent should be differentiated from the impeachmentproceedings against her at the House of Representatives.The writ of quo warranto is being sought to question thevalidity of her appointment; in turn, the impeachmentcomplaint accuses her of committing culpable violation ofthe Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office.Stated differently, the petitioner is seeking her ouster fromher office because she did not prove her integrity as anapplicant for the position. The complainant in theimpeachment proceedings wants her removed as thesitting Chief Justice for impeachable offenses.

32. It is beyond cavil that even an impeachable

officer can be subject to quo warranto proceedings, as theCourt itself has shown through its rules and decisions.

33. On May 4, 2010, the Court promulgated A.M. No.

Electoral Tribunal. Under these rules an election contest is

initiated by the filing of an election protest32 or a petitionfor quo warranto33 against the President or Vice-President.34Rules 14, 15, and 16 of the 2010 Rules of the PresidentialElectoral Tribunal reads:

RULE 14. How initiated. – An election contest is

initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. (R13).

RULE 15. Election protest. – The registered

candidate for President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified election protest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner. (R14).

RULE 16. Quo warranto. – A verified petition for

quo warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice- President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the proclamation of the winner. (R16).

34. Although the aforecited rules pertain to the

President and Vice President, said rules may be applied byanalogy. The Court recognizes the availability of quowarranto against an impeachable officer. Hence,Respondent cannot claim that as Chief Justice, she can onlybe removed by impeachment under Section 2, Article XI ofthe Constitution.

32 A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, dated May 4, 2010.33 A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, RULE 16. Quo warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting theelection of the President or Vice- President on theground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic ofthe Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within tendays after the proclamation of the winner. (R16).34 A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, RULE 14. How initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of anelection protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protestshall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an electionprotest. (R13).

35. The ruling of the Court in Funa v. Villar35 also

shows that quo warranto may be resorted to even againstimpeachable officers. In Funa, Villar was designated as anActing Chairman of the Commission on Audit. Later on, hewas appointed as the Chairman. When the Commission onAppointments confirmed his appointment, it indicated inthe appointment papers that he was to serve until theexpiration of the original term of his office as COACommissioner. Funa filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition under Rule 65 to challenge the constitutionalityof the Villar’s appointment. Funa contended that Villar’sappointment is proscribed by the constitutional ban onreappointment under Section 1(2), Article IX(D) of the1987 Constitution. Villar, for his part, initially asserted thathis appointment as COA Chairman is valid up to February2, 2015 or seven years reckoned from February 2, 2008when he was appointed to the position of Chairman.

36. While the Court stated that the petition was

mooted by Villar’s act of vacating his position, itnevertheless resolved the case due to the following: (a)there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) itinvolved a situation of exceptional character and is ofparamount public interest; (c) the constitutional issueraised required the formulation of controlling principles toguide the bench, the bar and the public; and (d) the casewas capable of repetition yet evading review. In upholdingthe position of Funa, the Court ruled:

Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a

statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. There is no in between. He or she cannot split terms. It is not within the power of the appointing authority to override the positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of members of constitutional [bodies shall be seven (7) years.] A contrary reasoning "would make the term of office to depend upon the pleasure or caprice of the [appointing authority] and not upon the will [of the

framers of the Constitution] of the legislature as

expressed in plain and [undoubted language in the law].”

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo

could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.36

37. Funa belies Respondent’s notion that an

impeachable officer, like the COA Chairperson, can only beousted through impeachment. The Court did not dismissthe petition on the ground that the COA Chairperson mayonly be removed by impeachment. In other words, theconstitutional provision on impeachment does not precludethe separation of an impeachable officer for reasons suchas the failure to prove eligibility to the position to whichthat officer was appointed.

38. Respondent cannot claim that Funa is an outlier.

Almost seventy years earlier, the Court ruled in similarfashion in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.37 In that case, theCourt held that a quo warranto proceeding and notprohibition is the proper remedy to inquire into validity ofthe appointment of then Commission on ElectionsChairman Vicente De Vera.

43. The Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council40 in

force at the time of the questioned appointment, citing the1987 Constitution, similarly state:

RULE 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT

SECTION 1. Qualifications applicable to all

Members of the Judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies.- (a) No person may be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court or as Ombudsman or deputy Ombudsman unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (CONST. Art. VIII, Section 7, par. 1; Id., Art. XI, Section 8)….

(c) A Member of the Judiciary must be of

SEC. 2. Additional qualifications for

Members of the Supreme Court. - No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he is at least forty years of age and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (id., id., par 1).

44. During the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission on the Article on the Judiciary, CommissionerJose N. Nolledo (“Commissioner Nolledo”) presentedResolution No. 188 asking the Committee on the Judiciary“to enshrine in the Article on the Judiciary of the newConstitution, ethical rules on qualifications and conductof Members of the Judiciary.”41 In support of his proposal,Commissioner Nolledo explained:

MR. NOLLEDO. If the Commissioner does not mind, I

presented Resolution No. 188, which is not mentioned in the committee report, entitled:

RESOLUTION TO ENSHRINE IN THE ARTICLE ON

THE JUDICIARY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION,

40 Promulgated on November 18, 2000; effective on December 1, 2000.41 IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 440 (July 10, 1986), emphasis and underscoringsupplied.

ETHICAL RULES ON QUALIFICATIONS AND

CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY.

It is unfortunate that the reputation of our judges is not

so good and so, I do not know what is the sense of the Committee. I would like to tell the members in advance that I intend to present this as an amendment for consideration — that in connection with Section 4, perhaps we can add a subsection there which may run like this: THAT NO ONE SHALL BE APPOINTED AS MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY UNLESS HE IS A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY AND INDEPENDENCE and THAT THE ACTUATIONS OF A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY IN OR OUTSIDE THE COURT MUST BE BEYOND REPROACH.

This is similar to a provision in “Canons of Judicial Ethics,”

but history states that those provisions are more honored in breach than in observance.42

45. Four days later, Commissioner Nolledo formally

moved for the amendment of the Article on the Judiciary toprescribe additional qualifications for judicial officers. Theamendment was approved, thus:

The Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, I ask that Commissioner

Nolledo be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). Commissioner

Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

My amendment is to add a new subsection (3) on Section

4 which reads: A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE.

Before the Committee decides on whether or not to

accept the amendment, I would like to explain it first.

Mr. Presiding Officer, this is a moral provision lifted with

modifications from the “Canons of Judicial Ethics.” The reputation of our justices and judges has been unsavory. I hate to say this, but it seems that it has become the general rule that the members of the Judiciary are corrupt and the few honest ones are the exceptions. We hear of justices and judges who would issue injunctive relief to the highest bidder and would decide cases based on hundreds of thousands, and even millions, mercenary reasons.

The members of the deposed Supreme Court, with a few

exceptions, catered to the political likings and personal convenience of Mr. Marcos by despicably surrendering their judicial independence. Why should we resist incorporating worthy moral principles in our fundamental law? Why should we canalize our conservative thoughts within the narrow confines of pure legalism?

I plead to the members of the Committee and to my

colleagues in this Constitutional Commission to support my amendment in order to strengthen the moral fiber of our Judiciary. Let not our Constitution be merely a legal or political document. Let it be a moral document as well.

Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The Chair

commends Commissioner Nolledo for staying within the five- minute rule.

Thank you very much.

What does the Committee say?

MR. ROMULO. First, we wish to make of record that

Commissioner Nolledo has filed with us such a resolution [Resolution No. 188], and we joyfully accept his amendment in the hope that with his amendment the lawyers in heaven will have more than St. Thomas More.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I would like to mention that Commissioners Napoleon

Rama and Crispino de Castro are coauthors of this amendment.

I also thank the Committee.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The

amendment has been accepted by the Committee.

Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears

none; the amendment is approved.43

46. According to deliberations of the 1986

Constitutional Commission cited above, the framers of theConstitution actually intended to expand the qualificationsrequired of judicial aspirants to include what CommissionerNolledo coined as a “moral provision” now appearing asSection 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

47. The 1987 Constitution is not unique in

incorporating a moral provision as a prerequisite for judicialappointments. Generally accepted principles ofinternational law likewise require that only individuals ofintegrity qualify for appointment to the judiciary.

48. The United Nations Basic Principles on the

Independence of the Judiciary (“Basic Principles”) declarethat, “Persons selected for judicial office shall beindividuals of integrity.”44 These Basic Principles wereunanimously adopted during the Seventh United NationsCongress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment ofOffenders in 1985.45 One hundred twenty-four States wererepresented at the Congress.46

49. In addition, the United Nations General Assembly

adopted Resolution 40/146 on December 13, 1985exhorting governments “to respect [these Basic Principles]and to take them into account within the framework of theirnational legislation and practice.” This Resolution47 wasadopted without a vote by the General Assembly,48evidencing consensus among States that their judiciariesare legally bound to abide by these Basic Principles.

50. Seventeen years later, that is, in 2002, these

Basic Principles served as a foundation for the BangaloreDraft Code of Judicial Conduct49 (“Bangalore Draft”),indicating consistency among States in recognizing these

44 Emphasis supplied.45 See UN General Assembly Resolution 40/146, December 13, 1985.46 Report on the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment ofOffenders, p. 102.47 See ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 254–255, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons AdvisoryOpinion of the International Court of Justice where the significance of General Assembly Resolutionswas explained as follows:

The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule. (Emphasis supplied)48 See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/280101/ last accessed February 28, 2018.49 See A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, otherwise known as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, First WhereasClause.

principles as legally binding. Such unanimity cannot be

disputed because even the Court has characterized theseprinciples as having “universal recognition.”50

51. These Basic Principles, having satisfied the

elements of established, widespread, and consistent statepractice, and opinio juris,51 are considered as generallyaccepted principles of international law incorporated intoPhilippine law by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the 1987Constitution. The Basic Principles constitute a binding legalobligation to the Republic of the Philippines, of which theCourt is a part, to ensure that only persons of integrityoccupy its judicial positions.

52. It is ineluctable that a person’s integrity is an

indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary.As will be discussed below, Respondent failed to complywith the requirement of being a person of proven integrity,making her ineligible for any position in the Judiciary. Herunlawful occupation of the position of Chief Justice of theSupreme Court is a continuing violation of the Constitutionand a breach of international law that the Republic of thePhilippines cannot and should not countenance.

III. RESPONDENT ISUNLAWFULLY HOLDINGTHE POSITION OF CHIEFJUSTICE OF THESUPREME COURT OF THEPHILIPPINES.

53. Respondent was appointed as Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court although she did not show that she is aperson of proven integrity, an indispensable qualificationfor membership in the judiciary under Section 7(3), ArticleVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Such ineligibility means thatshe is unlawfully holding the position of Chief Justice of theSupreme Court, although she was ostensibly recommendedby the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8(5), ArticleVIII of the 1987 Constitution.50 Id., Third Whereas Clause; emphasis supplied.51 See Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005.

54. Section 8(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

vests the JBC with the principal function of recommendingappointees to the Judiciary. Pursuant to its mandate, theJBC promulgated JBC-009, the Rules of the Judicial and BarCouncil which should be considered in the selection andnomination of prospective appointees.52

55. The JBC Rules, as administrative regulations that

implement the Constitution, have the force and effect oflaw.53 They are actually “rules implementing theConstitution.”54 In Villanueva v. JBC,55 the Court stated thatthe JBC has the authority to set the standards or criteria inchoosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary:

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is

mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and

selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to

act in performing its duties.56

56. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC’s role is to

determine whether an applicant possesses thequalifications of competence, integrity, probity, andindependence as dictated by Section 7(3), Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitution.57 The JBC is accordingly empoweredto require documentary and other evidence from all judicialaspirants which the JBC believes tend to prove theirsatisfaction of these qualifications.58

57. Under Rule 4 of the JBC Rules, the JBC laid downthe guidelines on how it will verify an applicant’s integrity:

RULE 4 INTEGRITY

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council

shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.59

58. In Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria

Lourdes P.A. Sereno,60 the Court, citing guidelines issuedby the JBC, stated that integrity “is closely related to, or ifnot, approximately equated to an applicant’s goodreputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethicalstandards.”61

61. The New Code of Judicial Conduct, in turn, is

based on the aforementioned Bangalore Draft. According tothe New Code of Judicial Conduct, the following principlesof integrity must be observed in the judiciary: CANON 2 INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of

the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their

conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must

reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate

disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

62. In its Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of

Judicial Conduct (“Commentary”),62 the Judicial IntegrityGroup explained the concept of integrity, as follows:

Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness.

The components of integrity are honesty and judicial morality. A judge should always, not only in the discharge of official duties, act honourably and in a manner befitting the judicial office, and be free from fraud, deceit and falsehood, and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in character. There are no

degrees of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the

63. As with the test applied by the Court in Jardeleza,

the Judicial Integrity Group affirmed that “scrupulousrespect for the law is required”63 of all Members of theJudiciary. The Group was emphatic that “[a] judge isobliged to uphold the law.”64

64. The reason for this facet of integrity is self-

evident. As explained by the Group, “[w]hen a judgetransgresses the law, the judge may bring the judicial officeinto disrepute, encourage disrespect for the law, and impairpublic confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.”65

65. There is no quibbling that both the New Code of

Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics wereadopted pursuant to this Honorable Court’s administrativeand disciplinary jurisdiction over judges of lower courts.66 Itmay thus be contended that these codes of conduct operateonly during the incumbency of judges, and find noapplication in the determination of whether a person isqualified for appointment to a judicial position.Nevertheless, the canons, principles, and rules containedin these codes demonstrate the Court’s contemporaneousconstruction67 of the term integrity as a quality expected ofthose applying as magistrates.

66. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that

Commissioner Nolledo referred to the Canons of JudicialEthics as the basis for his proposal that no one shall beappointed to the judiciary unless he is a person of provenintegrity.68

63 Commentary, p. 76, emphasis and italics in original.64 Id.65 Id.66 See 1987 PHIL. CONST., Article VIII, Sec. 6 and 11.67 See Lim Hoa Ting v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-10666, September 24, 1958 citingEdwards Lessee vs. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210, where this Honorable Court held that, “In theconstruction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who are calledupon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very greatrespect.”68 IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 440 (July 10, 1986); p. 484 – 485 (July 14, 1986)

67. Besides, it cannot be reasonably argued that

standards less exacting than those found in the New Codeof Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics applyto a person seeking appointment as the Chief Justice of thehighest court of the land. The Chief Justice, above anyoneelse, must serve as an exemplar of integrity in theJudiciary.

68. Unfortunately, Respondent – in her bid for

appointment as Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justiceof the Supreme Court – failed to show that she is a personof proven integrity, an indispensable qualification forappointment to the Court.

69. “Proven” is the operative word effectively

requiring Respondent, as candidate to the office of theChief Justice, to demonstrate the truth or existence of herintegrity by evidence. In the proceedings before the JBC,the burden is on “an aspiring judge or justice [to justify][his/her] qualifications for the office when [he/she]presents proof of [his/her] scholastic records, workexperience and laudable citations.”69

70. The JBC is conscious of the need to establish an

applicant’s integrity. In an Announcement dated June 5,2012, the JBC required all applicants for Chief Justice tosubmit their SALNs:

Candidates for the Chief Justice post must

submit, in addition to the foregoing, the following documents:

All70 previous SALNs (up to 31 December 2011)

for those in the government or SALN as of 31 December 2011 for those from the private sector; and (2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign currency bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency Deposits Act.71

71. The JBC also announced72 that “[a]pplicants with

incomplete or out of date documentary requirements willnot be interviewed or considered for nomination.”73

72. Respondent’s failure to fulfill the requirement of

complete filing of SALNs means that her integrity remainsunproven. That the JBC nominated Respondent for theChief Justice post does not extinguish the fact that shefailed to comply with the SALN requirement under theConstitution and relevant laws. As the filing of the SALNs isa constitutional and statutory requirement, the existenceof her previous SALNs for the years 1999, 2000, 2001,2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 precisely would havefurnished the evidence to prove, among others, that she ismeticulous in complying with the law.

73. The JBC cannot waive the filing of SALNs with

respect to Respondent but demand compliance from theother applicants because it would amount to a violation ofthe equal protection clause. All persons or things similarlysituated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferredand responsibilities imposed.74 In any case, the apparentwaiver cannot bind the State inasmuch as the State is notestopped by the mistakes of errors of its officials.75 In short,Respondent is unlawfully holding the position of ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court because she did not complywith the requirements that would have shown whether shemet the integrity test.

74. In the context of quo warranto, there is “unlawful

holding” when the public officer did not meet all the legalqualifications for the office. The basis in resisting theauthority of an unlawful holder has been explained in thiswise:

The right to resist an unlawful holder of authority

arose from the absence of a legal basis for that authority. Such an “invader of authority” (invasor imperii) could,

under certain circumstances, be resisted.76

75. In Topacio v. Paredes,77 the Court ruled that the

Where it is claimed that such an [sic] one

unlawfully holds an office by reason of his lack of a legal qualification therefor, his right should be determined by information in the nature of quo warranto in the name of the people of the State.

76. Ineligibility, therefore, does not only affect a

candidate’s qualification but necessarily affects the right tohold the office. This is the thrust of the ruling of the Courtin Maquiling v. Commission on Elections:78

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest

number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.79

77. Pursuant to Maquiling, Respondent has no right

to hold the office of the Chief Justice because of herineligibility. She did not qualify at the outset as a propercandidate for the position of Chief Justice.

78. The submission of SALNs is not an empty

requirement. It is a mechanism devised by law to test theintegrity of a person already in the government service.

79. Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

cannot be any more categorical on the need for all pubicofficers and employees to declare their assets, liabilities,and net worth. The provision states:

SECTION 17. A public officer or employee shall,

upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

80. The SALN requirement in the Charter recognized

what has already been in the statute books. As early as1960, Congress imposed that requirement in R.A. No.3019. Section 7 of the law accordingly states:

Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every

public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed

and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,

including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.

81. Under Section 2(b) of the same law, the term

“public officer” includes elective and appointive officials andemployees, permanent or temporary, whether in theclassified or unclassified or exempt service receivingcompensation, even nominal, from the government.

82. After the Charter took effect, Congress passed

Republic Act No. 6713. It amended R.A. No. 3019 bychanging the manner and frequency of a public officer’ssubmission of her declaration of assets, liabilities, and networth. The new law also made it a duty of public officialsand employees to accomplish and submit declarations,under oath, of their SALNs, to institutionalize a highstandard of integrity in public service.80

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public

officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and

Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

The documents must be filed:

80 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, §8.

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of

office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year

thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from

the service.

83. Respondent was a faculty member of the

University of the Philippines from 1986 until her resignationon June 1, 2006.81 As a faculty member of the stateuniversity,82 she was considered a public officer occupyinga closed career position in the career service.83 Shenevertheless failed to regularly file her SALN in accordancewith the provisions of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, andR.A. No. 6713.

84. The UP Diliman Human Resources Development

Office (UPD-HRDO), in its Letter dated December 8, 2017to the Committee on Justice of the House ofRepresentatives, certified that “only the SALN forDecember 31, 2002 can be found in the 201 file” ofRespondent.84

85. The UPD-HRDO likewise stated that Respondent

had no SALN in her 201 file for the years 2000, 2001, 2003,2004, 2005, and 2006.85

86. The UPD-HRDO letter is corroborated by the

Office of the Ombudsman Central Records Division in itsCertification dated December 4, 2017 which states that“there is no SALN filed by MS. MARIA LOURDES A. SERENOfor calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN endingDecember 1998 which was submitted to this Office onDecember 16, 2003.”86

81 See Annexes “A,” and “B.”82 See Act No. 1870, as amended by Republic Act No. 9500, otherwise known as the University of thePhilippines Charter of 2008.83 ADMIN. CODE OF 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 7.84 See Annex “D.”85 Id.86 See Annex “C.”

87. While the UPD-HRDO noted that Respondent was

on official leave from the University during intermittentperiods,87 such fact did not excuse her from complying withthe constitutional and statutory requirement of regularlyfiling her SALNs.

88. Respondent resigned only on June 1, 2006. It

was only on that date that her employment relationshipwith the government was severed. In fact, Respondent,despite being on leave from June 1, 2001 to May 31,2002,88 filed a SALN for that year.89 She cannot thereforeexcuse her failure to file her SALNs on the ground that shewas on leave.

89. Of course, in her Letter dated July 23, 2012

addressed to the JBC in relation to her application for theChief Justice position, Respondent intimated that UP hadalready cleared her of all academic and administrativeresponsibilities, money and property accountabilities, andfrom administrative charges in the University as of June 1,2006.90 To her mind, “this clearance can be taken as anassurance that [her] previous government employerconsidered the SALN requirement to have been met.”91

90. Respondent’s assumption is gratuitous. The fact

that a public officer filed her SALN can readily be proved bythe existence of such SALN, a written document with anindication that it was received by the appropriategovernment office. Stated otherwise, the determination ofwhether a public officer has complied with the Constitutionand R.A. No. 6713 cannot be made to depend on theclearances issued by her employer or any othergovernment agency, but on her actual showing that theSALN exists.

91. The legal implication of Respondent’s failure to

file her SALNs to prove her integrity cannot be downplayed.As the SALN filing is a constitutional and statutory87 See Annex “D.”88 Id.89 Id.90 See Annex “B” and attachments.91 Id.

requirement for public officers and employees, she was

bound to submit her SALNs.

92. By submitting SALNs less than those required by

the JBC of other applicants for Chief Justice, and withoutlawful justification for her non-compliance, Respondent wasunable to prove her integrity. As it now appears, her Letterdated July 23, 2012, wherein she requested that she be“treated as a private sector,” is but a subterfuge to hideher non-compliance with the law.

93. As Respondent’s unlawful omissions transpired

prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice and, lateron, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines,it cannot be said that, at the time of her appointment tothe positions, she possessed the integrity demanded ofaspiring members of the Judiciary. The failure to complywith the SALN requirement in Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 ispenalized with fine, or imprisonment, and is consideredsufficient cause for the removal or dismissal of a publicofficer. Even without the penalties being imposed onRespondent, her violation of the SALN requirement meantthat she did not pass the requirement of integrity.

V. RESPONDENT IS A DEFACTO PUBLIC OFFICERWHO CAN BE OUSTEDTHROUGH A QUOWARRANTOPROCEEDING.

94. Respondent is a de facto public officer whose

appointment is void ab initio.

95. A de facto public officer is one who acts under a

color of authority, unlike a mere usurper or one who hasneither title nor color of right of an office:

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an

officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the

office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a

mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an

office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority. State vs. Babb, 124 W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d) 683. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra footnote No. 11, p. 383.92

96. In contrast to an officer de jure who exercises

the powers of an office as a matter of right because of avalid election or appointment, the Court held:

A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully

invested with all of the powers and duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right. A judge de facto may be said to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law — that is, there exists some defect in his appointment or election and in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. King vs. Bedford Level, 6 East [Eng. Com. Law Rep.] 356; Petersilea vs. Stone, 119 Mass., 465; 20 Am. Rep., 335; State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn, 449; Am. Rep., 409.

A judge de facto is one whose acts, though not

those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be; (b) under color of a known or valid appointment or election, where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, for example, a failure to take the oath or give a bond, or similar defect; (c) under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible,92 Codilla, et al. v. Martinez, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14569, November 23, 1960.

or because there was a want of power in the electing or

appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under color of an election, or appointment, by the same is adjudged to be such. State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N. Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case 122 Mass., 445; 23 Am. Rep., 323. 93

97. Because a de facto officer holds a colorable title

of authority, his or her title cannot be collaterally orindirectly assailed. For instance, a petition for the issuanceof a writ of prohibition to prevent a de facto officer fromdoing an act or a suit enjoining the enforcement of ajudgment cannot be used to question a de facto officer’stitle.94 Such title may be questioned only in a quo warrantoproceeding.95

PRAYER

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines consequently

prays that this Honorable Court: (1) DECLARE as voidMaria Lourdes P.A. Sereno’s appointment on August 24,2012 as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of thePhilippines; and (2) OUST Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno fromthe position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of thePhilippines.