Russia’s military diplomacy in Africa

Many African countries this year participated in the International Military-Technical forum dubbed «ARMY-2018» organised by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in Kubinka, located approximately 280 km from Moscow.

The «ARMY-2018» received about 120 official delegations from foreign countries and featured nearly 150 events as part of its scientific business programme. The annual games allow the different world forces to improve their efficiency, knowledge and friendship. The army extravaganza, billed the Olympics of the Military World, now in its fourth year.

There were more than 26,000 exhibits on display especially the latest weapons aimed at attracting more foreign customers. The show featured Russia’s latest fighter jet, the Su-57, the Kinzhal hypersonic weapon and the Armata battle tank among other new weapons. It also had robotic systems and flyovers by the air force’s aerobatic squadrons.

President Vladimir Putin said in an address to the «ARMY-2018» that it reflected the huge potential of Russian military industries and would serve as a platform for military cooperation with interested foreign countries.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu emphasised that most new weapons at the show have proven their worth during the Syrian campaign. “They demonstrate the latest achievements of our industries and science,” he asserted.

During the event, General Director of ROE, Alexander Mikheev noted: “By tradition, it gives the RosOboronExport maximum monetisation of all exhibition events in the world. It gathers the largest number of foreign delegations in Moscow.”

He noted the increasing special demand from African countries. “We will see a real African breakthrough. In addition to our traditional partners from North Africa, we are waiting for representatives from 16 countries of the sub-Saharan continent at our booth and meeting rooms,” Mikheev said.

For example, as gathered at the forum, it became clear that Niger was interested in buying Russian helicopters and small arms, including grenade launchers. Several agreements reviewed and signed with a number of participating African countries including Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Central African Republic.

“Today (at the Army-2018 forum), we signed an intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation, the implementation of which will contribute to strengthening ties in the defense sector in a number of African countries,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said during talks with the Minister of National Defense of Central African Republic, Marie Noel Coyara.

The Ministry reported on its website that “Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Alexander Fomin met with Ivory Coast Defense Minister, Hamed Bakayoko on the sidelines of the forum. During the meeting, the sides discussed military and military-technical cooperation projects and exchanged opinions on key regional security issues facing the African continent.”

The parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening friendly relations between the armed forces of the two countries further, it said. According to Fomin, there were many interested foreign customers including Asian and African countries, which works well for the Kremlin.

“The Soviet Union poured resources into the African continent for ideological reasons. Putin will not do such thing. We know that the African continent has a great potential and it can be market-oriented and based on mutual interest,” he finally stressed.

Still, the Kremlin’s larger aims are political and geostrategic. Putin’s overall military moves in the Middle East but also North Africa limit the West’s ability to maneuver.

North African countries on the Mediterranean’s southern coast can potentially gain Russia, a traditional land power, access to additional warm water ports – something Russian leaders coveted since Peter the Great. Such access would allow Russia to project military power into Europe, Middle East and North Africa.

On top priority are Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola. East and Southern African countries are also Russia’s market focus while recently concluded agreements with Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi and Chad.

Algeria has long been in Moscow’s camp and remained a top buyer of Russian arms throughout the 2000s. But in 2014, the two countries signed a $1 billion arms deal which a Russian military expert in business-oriented Vedomosti financial newspaper described as “possibly the largest export contract for main battle tanks in the world.”

“Several financial arrangements were also made to ensure financing of developments and production of modern military equipment samples. Firm orders from countries in Asia and Africa, and the CIS became part of Rostec’s portfolio of orders,” according to the document released August 26.

Over recent years, Russia has considerably expanded its arms sales, both in terms of the number of African countries involved in the deals and the types of weapons and military equipment being sold, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

By estimation, Russia shipped US$357.1 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2017. This included African countries. Africa accounted for 13% of Russian arms sales over the last five years.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided huge quantities of arms to a number of African governments such as Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. But, now ideology is not a significant factor, according to analysis by both foreign and local policy experts.

As Anna Borshchevskaya, an Ira Weiner fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explicitly observes that military has been part of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, and Russian authorities have been strengthening military-technical cooperation with a number of African countries.

“A major driver for Moscow’s push into Africa is military cooperation more broadly. These often include officer training and the sale of military equipment, though the details are rarely publicly available,” she also acknowledges in her discussion for this news report.

Dmitri Bondarenko, Deputy Director of the African Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told me: “With African countries, the primary aim now for Russian business is to regain a competitive edge in the global arms trade, and what’s interesting is that the approach is not ideological but very pragmatic – you pay, we ship. It’s simply business and nothing more.”

Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), founded in 1997 as a leading Russian defense industry and arms trade think tank, explained to me that Russia has revived contacts with African comrades that used to be traditional buyers of Soviet weaponry.

He pointed out that although much has changed in the sense, “Russia is using military diplomacy in order to gain stature and influence in Africa.”

Nikolai Shcherbakov, an Analyst at the Center for African Studies of the Institute of General History, indicated that Moscow is steadily seeking to strengthen its position as a major arms supplier to the African continent, and further explained that “Russia’s military technology was top-notch while the weapons were priced very good to be competitive on the market.”

In his assessment, Dr Richard Connolly, Associate Fellow at Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, noted that Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the US, and is seeking to strengthen its position in new markets.

“Asia is the most important foreign market for Russian arms producers, accounting for 70 per cent of their exports since 2000. The Middle East and North Africa is the second-most important market, but competition from other suppliers is much more intense there. Latin America and Africa are of relatively modest importance,” he concluded.

Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics. He wrote previously for African Press Agency, African Executive and Inter Press Service. Earlier, he had worked for The Moscow Times, a reputable English newspaper. Klomegah taught part-time at the Moscow Institute of Modern Journalism. He studied international journalism and mass communication, and later spent a year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He co-authored a book “AIDS/HIV and Men: Taking Risk or Taking Responsibility” published by the London-based Panos Institute. In 2004 and again in 2009, he won the Golden Word Prize for a series of analytical articles on Russia's economic cooperation with African countries.

Why We Should Not Expect Russia to be Welcomed Back into the G7

The history of relations between Russia and the G7 can
be compared to a multi-act play with a convoluted storyline, magnificent
scenery, a number of vivid characters and unexpected plot twists.

Objectively, such a play more looks like an epic
tragedy or, at worst, a sentimental melodrama. But, personally, I liken the
misadventures of the “Group of Seven,” which has not become a full-fledged
“Group of Eight,” to Moliere’s famous comedy Le
Bourgeois gentilhomme.

This comedy tells the story of a French “bourgeois” of
the 17th century, Monsieur Jourdain, who dreams passionately of being accepted
into noble society. Everybody who can take advantage of this obsessive idea of
the naïve Jourdain, including toadies from among the impoverished aristocrats,
numerous tutors of how to act correctly in “high society” and even his closest
relatives do just that. In the end, Monsieur Jourdain’s dream almost comes
true: during a pompous and fanciful ceremony, he is awarded an imaginary
Turkish high rank of Mamamouchi. The initiation ceremony, of course, turns out
to be a complete deception and a swindle.

I will dare state that, like Monsieur Jourdain, who
never turned into a real nobleman, Russia, even after formally joining the G7
in 1998, never became a full member of this group. Some of the issues –
especially those related to economics and finance – were still discussed in the
G7 format, and the annual G8 summits turned Russia into an object of criticism
and mentoring edifications more often than any other member of this club.
Mutual grievances, frustrations and claims had been accumulating for many
years, and the sad reality of 2014 was either a historical inevitability or at
least a completely predictable ending to a protracted play.

When President Yeltsin first submitted an application
for Russia’s membership in the G7 back in 1992, there were simply no other
alternative associations in the world where Moscow could try to squeeze in.
Structures such as the G20, BRICS or SCO did not exist at the time, and
Russia’s membership in NATO and the European Union seemed unrealistic even
then. Therefore, joining the “Group of Seven” not only pursued situational
tasks (access to financial and technical assistance from the West,
restructuring Soviet debts, combating discrimination of Russian goods), but
also had symbolic political significance (a kind of compensation for Moscow’s
loss of its “superpower” status).

The Western “Group of Seven” also set quite specific
situational goals: the accelerated military drawdown of Moscow in Central
Europe and the Baltic states; the prevention of leaks of Soviet nuclear
technologies; and the consolidation of the results of economic reforms of the
early 1990s. However, political considerations played an important role both
for Western heads of state and for the Russian leadership. Russia’s integration
was to confirm the global aspirations of the G7 and the universalism of Western
values. It is curious that the task of including China or even India as the
“largest democracy in the world” had never been posed to the G7 members in
practical terms – Russia was clearly seen as the preferred, if not the only,
candidate for accession.

Despite all the difficulties, awkwardness and
inconvenience associated with the integration of the not quite stable, not
quite democratic and not quite “western” Russia of the 1990s into the “Group of
Seven,” this process was stimulating for the group as a whole. The
participation of a new non-standard partner contributed to the emergence of new
ideas, strengthening the discipline of the old members, and enhancing the
overall tone and ambitions of the group. Appointing a rude and awkward rough
man as a new gym teacher to a female high school teaching team that had refined
their working partnerships and become a close-knit group after many years of
joint work has a similar stimulating effect.

But such idyll lasts only until the gym teacher begins
to actively meddle in the work of the teachers’ council and cast doubt on the
wisdom of the school principal. And this is exactly what happened in the G8 at
the beginning of the century. Whereas for Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s membership in
a privileged western club remained mainly a matter of the country’s symbolic
status in the world, Vladimir Putin considered the G8 primarily as a tool for
the practical realignment of the world order, in both the security and
development spheres. Moscow has challenged Washington’s previously unquestioned
hegemony in the G8 by raising the issue of American-led intervention in Iraq.
Moscow insisted on including non-traditional challenges and security threats in
the agenda of the G8 summits. Moscow called on partners to strengthen G8
institutions by increasing the number of regular meetings of ministers of
natural resources, science, health, and agriculture.

The increased activity of the Russian neophyte faced
growing resistance on the part of the G8 veterans. The new initiatives of the
“high school gym teacher” no longer moved, but rather irritated the
conservative teachers’ council, not to mention the authoritarian American
principal. After the triumphant G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of
2006, an ever more obvious sabotage of the Russian agenda began: the G8 took the
annoying gym teacher down a peg. It turned out that no G8 declarations on
global energy security had been perceived by EU officials as a guide to action.
The G8’s common positions on international terrorism and nuclear
non-proliferation do nothing to dampen the desire of United States for the
further expansion of NATO eastwards. And recognizing Russia as a member of the
“Western Club” does not signify that the West refuses to try to weaken Russia’s
influence in the post-Soviet space.

The catalyst for the decline of interest in the G8
format from the Russian leadership was, of course, the creation of the G20. A
significant part of the issues of global governance that were of great interest
for Moscow moved to this platform. Russia felt more comfortable in the G20
compared to the G8: in a more representative association, Russia had new
partners and additional opportunities to form tactical coalitions and advance
its interests. It is no coincidence that since the expulsion of Moscow from the
G8 in the spring of 2014, the Russian leadership has been constantly
emphasizing the obvious defects in this structure compared to the G20.

Is Moscow’s return to the “Group of Seven” realistic
in the foreseeable future? This question has been raised more than once over the
past five years by certain Western leaders, including Angela Merkel, Donald
Trump and Emmanuel Macron. Common sense suggests that this return will never
take place. The play was performed, the curtain fell, the audience whistled and
applauded, and the critics are scribbling their comments and reviews.

There will be no return, if only for the reason that
there is still no unity regarding the conditions for this return among the
“Group of Seven.” While the current German position connects the reconstruction
of the G8 with the progress in implementing the Minsk agreements on Donbass,
Canada is ready to welcome Russia to the updated G8 only if it comes there
without Crimea. Historically, the G7 never had any formal procedures and
mechanisms for accepting new members, but most likely, a decision on such an
important issue will be taken by consensus. And reaching a consensus at the
moment seems impossible.

The G7 itself is in the process of deep transformation
and a thus-far not very successful search for a new identity. Donald Trump
confronts the rest of the club in a harsh manner, being quite provocative at
times in that confrontation. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has many
fundamental disagreements with French President Emmanuel Macron, and with the leadership
of the European Union as a whole. Italy in its current state is hardly capable
of taking on any serious international obligations. As a result, the G7 looks
like a suitcase without a handle – one can neither carry it nor leave it
behind.

Does this mean that Russia should not deal with the G7
at all? Absolutely not. The history of the “Group of Seven” knows many
countries, non-permanent members of the club, who participate in the work of
the Group. The recent summit in Biarritz, France, was attended, among others,
by the leaders of India, Egypt, Australia and even Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif, who had come under personal sanctions from the
United States literally the day before the meeting.

Returning to the “G7+1” formula may be a better
solution for Russia than restoring the G8. Provided, of course, that the
Russian side will not find itself in the position of a suspended gym teacher
invited to the teachers’ council only to get another portion of reprimands from
stiff colleagues.

It is clear that the leaders of the “Group of Seven”
are most interested in discussing current issues of international security with
Russia, including the situation surrounding Syria, Ukraine, North Korea and
Venezuela, as well as arms control and strategic stability. But most of these
issues are already being discussed at other time-tested platforms. However,
joining the G7 discussion on the problems of digital economy, international tax
reform, fighting trade protectionism and eliminating global inequality would
certainly be nice.

The stakes in this game are not as high for Russia as
they were a quarter of a century ago. The G7 is no longer a unique or even the
main laboratory where the components of the new world order are being developed
and piloted. And the repertoire of Russia’s foreign policy is not limited to
the part of the self-confident, but at the same time diffident and arrogant
Monsieur Jourdain from Moliere’s comedy.

Related

Troubled Partners: What Russia and Turkey are Dividing Up in Syria

“Turkey is our close partner, our ally,” said
Presidential Spokesperson and Turkologist Dmitry Peskov on the eve of the
meeting in the town of Zhukovsky near Moscow. On August 27, President of the
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin met his Turkish counterpart Recep Erdogan at
the MAKS International Aviation and Space Salon in Zhukovsky, where they held a
working meeting on the bilateral agenda. Regardless of all their differences,
the two countries still need each other greatly.

Although relations between Moscow and Ankara are
developing in many areas, the focus was naturally on the further actions of the
parties in the crisis-affected Syria. Will Turkey conduct another operation in
Syria? And what is Moscow’s opinion?

Several events of importance for Russia–Turkey
relations took place a week before the presidents met. On August 21, the first
creditor was selected for the company building the Akkuyu NPP strategic facility.
On August 27, deliveries started on the second S-400 battalion to Mürted Air
Base in Ankara. As the United States removed Turkey from the F35 project
following the purchase of Russian-made S-400 missile systems, analysts believe
that Turkey might look at Russia’s Su-35 or Su-57. These are the aircraft the
Turkish President saw at the MAKS Salon.

But the meeting took place against the backdrop
of the escalation of the situation in the Syrian Idlib province and the
announcement of the establishment of a Joint U.S.–Turkey Operation Centre.

And it was the desire to overcome contradictions
over Syria and prevent a crisis in the bilateral relations that led the
presidents to hold an unplanned meeting in Zhukovsky following an urgent
telephone conversation on August 23.

At the press conference held after the meeting, Vladimir Putin noted two key elements in Russia’s approach to the Syrian settlement: the
priority of working within the Astana format and the launch of the the Syrian Constitutional
Committee “that, as we hope, will be able to start its
activities in Geneva in the very near future.”

Ankara had previously expressed its discontent
with the Syrian government forces taking control of towns in the north of Hama
Governorate and in the south of Idlib Governorate, including the town of Khan Shaykhun.
Approximately 200 Turkish soldiers are still surrounded in the town of Murak,
which makes the situation extremely uncomfortable for Ankara. This Turkish
contingent served as an observation post established under the Turkey–Russia
Memorandum on Idlib signed in Sochi on September 17, 2018 as part of
de-escalation in the Idlib zone.

The situation deteriorated following reports
that the Syrian Air Force had carried out an aerial strike on a Turkish convoy.
After a telephone conversation between Putin and Erdogan, reports started to
surface that a Russian military police force had inserted itself between the
Syrian military and the Turkish observation post. Turkey might find a way out
of the situation by withdrawing its observation post from Murak and launching a
new operation in the north of Syria against the U.S.-supported Kurds. Given the
situation, it is desirable for Russia to find a way of advancing the dialogue
between Damascus and the Kurds.

While Ankara supported the Syrian opposition, it
undertook under the Sochi agreements to fight terrorism in Idlib and facilitate
the opening of the М5 and М4 highways leading from Aleppo to Hama and Damascus via Idlib, and from
Aleppo to Latakia via Idlib. Most likely, implementing this provision is the
key objective for Moscow. Once М5 and М4 are secured, the logistics infrastructure might have been put into
operation once again and pathways opened for restoring economic ties between
Syria’s regions. This never happened.

With the support of the Russian Aerospace
Forces, the Syrian military continued intermittent hostilities in the Idlib
Governorate for approximately six months. Following another round of talks in
Nur-Sultan on August 1–2, Damascus announced an armistice. The ceasefire
failed, however, due to attacks perpetrated by the militants in Idlib.
Subsequently, the government forces and their Russian allies significantly
intensified their activity. Offensives were mostly undertaken at night. By
mid-August, the Tiger Forces equipped with Russian-made night-vision devices
and Т90А tanks with thermal imagers succeeded in breaching the defence of the
terrorists and groups that oppose Damascus in the north of the Hama
Governorate.

The Idlib Governorate and its eponymous capital
are largely controlled by the forces of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorist
group (outlawed in Russia), which has managed since January to expand its power
by subsuming other groups, largely labelled pro-Turkish.

Back then, Turkey succeeded in stabilizing the
situation, yet failed to radically change it in favour of Turkey-friendly
forces such as al-Jabha al-Wataniya Li-Tahrir (the National Liberation Front),
which is in opposition to the government. Russian and Turkish analysts already
appeal to the Sochi agreements, yet each party accuses the other of undermining
their implementation.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation Sergey Lavrov openly stated that the actions of the Syrian government forces in Idlib
are legitimate and do not violate the Turkey–Russia Memorandum. The terrorists
in the area now controlled by the Syrian military had posited a threat to
Syrian territory and the Russian military base in Khmeimim. Turkey faces a
difficult predicament with regard to its domestic audience, and the processes
in Syria could result in escalating tensions between Moscow and Ankara.

However, the ties developed over the recent
years, as well as the strategically important joint projects and Erdogan’s
commitment to increasing mutual trade turnover from USD 25–30 billion today to
USD 100 billion (which he again confirmed at the MAKS opening ceremony)
demonstrate both desire of both parties to avoid a crisis similar to the freeze
put on the relations in 2016.

Erdogan informed Putin about the plans to launch an operation against the Kurds in
the northeast of Syria. One might surmise that Turkey sees the solution in
shifting the emphases in its “Syrian” policies and in concentrating on the
Kurdish threat, since Turkey’s current policy in Syria is conducted in two
areas: Idlib and the Trans-Euphrates region. Unwilling to be tied solely to the
Astana format, Turkey is also building an appearance of collaboration with the
United States. The operation in the Trans-Euphrates region today is the key
point for Ankara. This operation will be the result of the pressure Turkey puts
on the United States, an ally of the Kurds.

Ankara’s main goal is ostensibly to create a
buffer zone in the north of Syria to prevent the Kurds from implementing a
project there.

This will allow Ankara to cut ties between Kurds
in Syria and Turkey and bring Syrian refugees, mostly Sunni Arabs, back to
settle in the new “safe zone.” The United States has even convinced even the
Kurds that the “safe zone” is necessary. The question, however, is how deep the
Turkish military will go into the territory. They want to go more than 30
kilometres into the territory currently controlled by the allies of the United
States from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Judging by the leaked reports,
the United States has proposed only five kilometres. That certainly will not be
enough for Turkey.

Answering a question about the Trans-Euphrates
region at the press conference after the meeting of August 27, Vladimir Putin
said, “We understand Turkey’s concern related to ensuring the safety and
security of its southern border, and we believe these are legitimate interests
of the Republic of Turkey… We proceed from the premise that establishing a safe
zone for the Republic of Turkey at its southern borders will be a good
condition for ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria itself.”

Turkey believes that the threat to its security
comes from the Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the People’s
Protection Units (YPG) controlling the northeast of Syria. Ankara identifies
them with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It should be noted here that Moscow occasionally reminds Turkey of the
1998 Adana Agreement concluded between Ankara and Damascus to resolve the
“Kurdish question.” Back then, Ankara accused Damascus of supporting the PKK’s
leader Abdullah Öcalan. This agreement regulates the provision of security in border areas.

In recent months, the President of Turkey has
repeatedly stated that Turkey had made an earnest decision to launch a new
offensive, the third operation in Syria following Operation Euphrates Shield
and Operation Olive Branch. Turkey has been transmitting these sentiments for
some time now to both the U.S. and the Russian militaries. However, in order to
conduct an operation in the north of Syria, Ankara needs to ensure that certain
conditions are in place. Each element, particularly air support for the
offensive and the involvement of the Syrian opposition forces, is linked to
Ankara reaching a consensus, even if a silent consensus, with Washington and
Moscow.

An agreement with Moscow is important for Ankara
in order to at least temporarily suspend hostilities in Idlib, as it would
allow at least some Syrian opposition forces to be moved to the area of
Turkey’s new operation in the northeast of Syria.

As regards Idlib, Moscow and Ankara could agree
on Damascus taking control of the М4 and М5 highways, while Turkey’s safe area in the northeast would be greenlit.
The question hinges solely on consent to the launch of the operation. How the
parties will conduct their operations and whether they would succeed will be up
to them.

Currently, the question remains open as to how
much the United States is willing to concede to Turkey. However, as Turkey
launches its operation, Russia has an opening to interact with Kurds. If the
United States allows Turkey to go too far, Kurds will realize the former cannot
ensure their safety.

For the Kurds, this setup is fraught with the
risk of possible loss of all their achievements (and territories). Moscow could
work through the question of resuming serious talks between the Kurds and
Damascus, thereby allowing the Kurds to avoid clashes with Turkey.

… A summit of the Astana process guarantor
states, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will be held in mid-September. The launch of
the Syrian Constitutional Committee is expected to be announced at the summit.
Recent developments in the war bolster Damascus’ bargaining positions, yet at
the same time they endanger the continuation of the political dialogue. The
Russia–Turkey context is important as well, as the two countries strive to move
beyond cooperation in Syria, understanding how complicated it is to achieve
agreements.

Should Turkey launch an operation against Syrian
Kurds, it will allow Ankara to “save face” concerning its Idlib losses. It will
also allow Moscow to act as an intermediary and lead the Kurds and Damascus to
an agreement. Much, however, will depend on the capacity in which the United
States will continue its presence in Syria in and on whether the Kurds and
Damascus will be able to move away from their maximalist counter-claims.

Moscow and Ankara understand that their
partnership is difficult, but mutually necessary. Such partners can create
quite a lot of trouble, but they are valuable because they steer an independent
course and understand and recognize each other’s national interests, as well as
the need for coordinating their stances.

Related

Russia Accelerates Construction of a New Black Sea Port

Economic and technological competition between China and the US has
become an obvious fact for world politicians as well as analysts. However, as everyone
pays attention to the ongoing trade war between the two giants and steady
military build-up in the South China Sea, interesting developments are taking
place in the Black Sea basin. Behind this global trend, Russia is slowly
building up its economic position in the region by accelerating the
construction of a new deep-sea port which will endanger Anaklia’s future.

For quite some time Beijing and Washington have been working to increase
their economic and technological competition in or around the Black Sea. The
Anaklia Deep Sea port is a primary example. China has traditionally been
careful in its statements about its views on Anaklia, but the visit of the
Chinese Foreign Minister to Georgia a few months ago was an indication of
Beijing’s interests in the port. Interestingly enough, the visit coincided with
financial problems centered around the Anaklia Consortium.

Currently, as the problems deepen with the withdrawal of the US’ Conti
Group, it is likely and quite logical that China might actually increase its
efforts to get involved in the Anaklia port construction.

Within the light of numerous uncertainties surrounding the US’ position
worldwide, Washington will find it harder to counter potential Chinese
initiatives in and around Georgia. Many in Georgia, particularly in the
analytical community, suspect that the US is experiencing troubles in its
policy towards Georgia and that had not it been so, the current Anaklia issues
would not be happening.

American interest in the Anaklia port is to deny the Chinese use of the
place for their economic activities within the framework of the Belt and Road
Initiative. Moreover, the US calculus might also be that the port, apart from
economic benefits, could potentially be used for military purposes.

Considering this geo-strategic thinking, Washington would not allow any
third party to dominate the Anaklia port project. US Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s statement comes to mind- when he questioned how honest Beijing and
Moscow are being in trying to be Tbilisi’s “true allies.” He also emphasized
that the Anaklia port will be built.

The third power, which has more military power in place in the Black Sea
region, is obviously Russia. Its recent moves in the economic realm, though,
could seriously undermine Anaklia’s future business environment even if the
port is successfully built.

It was reported that Russia has recently sped up solidifying its grip on
the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea. The RMP (RosMorPort) Taman Consortium which is
expected to include five companies, RosMorPort, KuzbassRazrezUgol,
MetaloInvest, Russian Railways (RZD) and SUEK, is set to build the ‘Taman
Port,’ which is strategically located on the Russian side of the Kerch Strait
that connects the Black and Azov seas.

Alongside this quiet battle, the US and China are in purely
technological competition. It has been reported that US National Security
Advisor John Bolton wants to undermine the pending Chinese acquisition of an
important Ukrainian aerospace company. Washington fears that the acquisition will
give Beijing vital defense technology as the Ukrainian military tech giant has
for decades been producing vital parts for the Russian aerospace industry. The
Ukrainian-Russian crisis, a result of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, has, for
the time being, put a hold on Ukrainian sales.

Thus, these various seemingly unrelated events could well be set to complicate Anaklia’s fate. Among them, Russia’s persistence in building a deep sea port at Taman is less problematic: of more serious importance is the unstable nature of the Georgian government and the US’ still-evolving perspective on its position worldwide and particularly in the Black Sea basin.