NEW! By Barry Rubin

“There have been many hundreds of books for and against Israel but no volume presenting the essential information about its domestic politics, its society, as well as its cultural life and its economy. This gap has now been filled.”—Walter Laqueur, author of A History of Zionism

"[An] essential resource for readers interested in learning the truth about the Zionist project in the 20th and 21st centuries."—Sol Stern, Commentary

“Offering in-depth perspectives with encyclopedic breadth on the makeup of the Jewish state, focusing only briefly on Israel's struggle for self-preservation. The section "History" provides a masterful summary of Israel's past from its socialist beginnings before independence to the modern struggles with the Iranian regime. . . .”—Publishers Weekly

“A well-written portrait of a vibrant nation at the center of turmoil in the region.”—Jay Freeman, Booklist

"It is indeed just a starting point, but Israel: An Introduction, if disseminated among our universities to the extent it deserves, will at least allow students of the Middle East and of Jewish history to start off on the right foot. A glimpse into the real Israel may do more for the future of U.S.-Israeli relations than any amount of rhetoric ever could."—Daniel Perez, Jewish Voice New York

Written by a leading historian of the Middle East, Israel is organized around six major themes: land and people, history, society, politics, economics, and culture. The only available volume to offer such a complete account, this book is written for general readers and students who may have little background knowledge of this nation or its rich culture.

About Me

Barry Rubin was founder of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center--now the Rubin Center--and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. See the GLORIA/MERIA site at www.rubincenter.org.

Recent Rubin Reports

Thursday, November 29, 2012

UN: Palestine is Now a Non-Member State; Reality: Palestine Will Continue to be a Non-Existent State

By Barry Rubin

Twenty-four years ago, almost to the day, in 1988, I stood in a large hall in Algeria and saw Yasir Arafat declare the independence of a Palestinian state. And that was forty-one years, almost to the day, after the UN offered a Palestinian state in 1947. Twelve years ago Israel and the United States officially offered a Palestinian state as part of a compromise at deal in the Camp David summit of 2000.

Arguably, despite all their errors, the Palestinian movement has made progress since those events, though it is not very impressive progress. Yet in real terms there is no real Palestinian state; the movement is more deeply divided than at any time in its history; and the people aren't doing very well.

Now the UN will probably give Palestine the status of a non-member state. The only thing that will change is to convince people even more that they are following a clever and successful strategy. They aren't.

There are two ways to respond to the General Assembly’s likely vote to so designate a state of Palestine. One of them is outrage at the absurdity of how the international system behaves. The other would be to dismiss the gesture as meaningless, even more than that, as something that will even further delay the day that a real, functioning state comes into existence.

Certainly, there are threats and dangers, for example the use by Palestine of the International Court. Or one could look at this as another step on the road to a final, I mean comprehensive, solution to the issue. Yet over all, I’ll go for disgusted and cynical as the most accurate responses.

Let’s start with disgusted. In 1993, the PLO made an agreement whose very basis was that a Palestinian state would only come into existence as a result of a deal made with Israel. Instead, the Palestinian side refused to make such a compromise and broke its commitments repeatedly. The ultimate result was Yasir Arafat’s refusal to accept a Palestinian state with its capital in the eastern part of Jerusalem both at the 2000 Camp David meeting and a few months later when President Bill Clinton made a better, and final, offer.

I have just this minute come from an interview with a very nice journalist who asked me, “But doesn’t Israel want everything and offer nothing in return.” What was most impressive is the fact that he had no personal hostility or any political agenda. (You’d understand if I identified the person and his newspaper but I’m not going to do that.) This conclusion was simply taken as fact. He was astonished to hear that another perspective even existed.

My first response was to point down the street two corners to the place where a bus was blown up in 1995 and right next to it where a suicide bomber had killed about a dozen pedestrians around the same time. This was the result of risks and concessions that Israel had voluntarily undertaken in trying to achieve peace. And, I added, it was possible to supply a long list of other examples.

So despite Israel taking risks and making concessions, the Palestinian Authority rejected peace. Today the same group is going to be recognized by the UN as a regime governing a state. Moreover, this is a body that is relentlessly begging Hamas, a group that openly calls for genocide against both Israel and Jews, to join it.

Hamas, of course, ran for office without accepting the Oslo agreement (a violation of it) and then seized power in a coup. Since then it has rained rockets and missiles on Israel. In other words, although it is unlikely to happen, in a few months Hamas might become part of the official government of this non-member state of the UN.

Yet complaining about the unfairness of international behavior or the treatment of Israel, like complaining about one’s personal fate, doesn’t get you anywhere. It is cathartic to do so but then one must move on to more productive responses.

The second issue is whether it will really matter. Yes it entails symbolism, yes it will convince the Palestinians they are getting something when the course they have followed ensures they get pretty close to nothing. But, to use a Biblical phrase, it availeth them not. On the contrary, to coin a phrase, this move “counter-matters,” that is it is a substitute for productive action that actually detracts from the real goal.

To the extent that “President” Mahmoud Abbas convinced West Bank Palestinians that they have achieved some great victory it takes off the pressure for violent action or support for Hamas there. Of course, there is no popular pressure for a negotiated solution. Indeed, I’m not aware of a single Palestinian Authority official who has even claimed for cosmetic purposes that the reason for this move at the UN move is to press Israel to compromise or a deal. Its purpose is to make Abbas’s regime look good and be a step forward toward total victory, a Palestinian state unbound by commitments that could be used as a base for wiping out Israel.

But that doesn’t mean it will work. The next morning, the residents of the Palestinian Authority will still be exactly where they are now. Hangovers wear off even after non-alcoholic celebrations.

You should also understand that in Israel there are no illusions about this whole charade. Few think that a real deal is possible with either of the current Palestinian leaderships—those who do have already all written op-ed pieces in the New York Times—and the UN action will make the public even more opposed to concessions.

Incidentally, people on both sides in other countries make a serious mistake in assessing Israel. Its enemies think it evil; many of its friends think it stupid. Both are wrong. There are real constraints in the international system, including the current government of the United States.

The solution is not to rail against this fate verbally but to assess the best course in the context of these conditions. There are many who don’t comprehend the implications of this situation. They either think Israel should endlessly make concessions or that it should win total victory by ignoring the surrounding reality. It’s amusing to see those of various political hues who are thousands of miles away pulling theories from their heads that have nothing to do with the actual events.

At any rate, the UN General Assembly’s action neither contributes to peace nor is a just decision. Nevertheless, once again we have a case of symbolism over substance. This is the same General Assembly that received Yasir Arafat as a man of peace in 1974 at the very moment he was masterminding terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians and the following year voted for a resolution that Zionism was racism. Can one really say things have gotten worse?

During the period since then, Israel has survived and prospered. Its enemies in the Middle East have undergone constant instability and economic stagnation (except for those small in population and large in oilfields). The supposed springtime of democracy has quickly turned into just another authoritarian era of repression and disastrous policies that ultimately weaken those countries and make their people poor and miserable. What else is new?

Ignoring that history and the contemporary reality, some Western countries are voting for this resolution or abstaining for a variety of reasons: cheap public relations’ gain among Arabs and Muslims; a belief that this will shore up the Palestinian “moderates” against the radicals, or that it will encourage the non-existent peace process.

What it will do, however, is to sink the Palestinian leadership even deeper into an obsession with intransigence in practice and paper victories that mean nothing in the real world. And, yes, that’s what the result of this UN vote will be. And of course no matter what is said publicly about unity between the Fatah-ruled Palestinian Authority and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip there will be no change on that front either.

In 1939, the British offered the Arab states and Palestinian leadership a deal in which they would be handed all of the Palestine mandate as an Arab state if they accepted a few simple conditions, including a ten year transition period. Despite the pleas of some Arab rulers, the Palestinians said no, believing a German victory would give them everything soon. Almost precisely 65 years ago the UN endorsed the creation of a Palestinian Arab state. The Palestinians said no believing that the military efforts of themselves and their allies would give them everything soon.

The Palestinians’ leaders have long believed that an intransigent strategy coupled with some outside force—Nazi Germany, the USSR, weaning the West away from Israel—will miraculously grant them total victory. They aren’t going to change course now but that route leads not forward but in circles.

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Suddenly, I received all of these phone calls from journalists asking me to talk about who murdered the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. The news peg is that he’s being dug up to see if someone poisoned him. Guess who?

I tell them that in a sense Arafat was murdered. Excited, they ask who did it. And I respond: Fatah, the PLO, and the Palestinian Authority, all organizations that Arafat headed. I don’t mean literally that they set out to kill Arafat but they were the ones really responsible for his death. Let me elucidate.

For many months before he was rushed to Paris for medical attention, everyone who followed him closely knew Arafat was sick. It was the subject of extensive discussion among Israelis and Palestinians. Anyone who saw him give a speech, whether live or on television, could see he was in bad shape. My mother-in-law, a doctor, saw him in one broadcast and easily rattled off a list of symptoms.

I was told the following story--in far more detail--not long after by a very reliable person who witnessed the conversation. One of Arafat's Palestinian doctors and a leading Israeli physician were chatting at a conference. An Israeli reporter noted for his left-wing ideology and remarkably inaccurate story came up to the Palestinian and asked if Arafat was ill. "Definitely not," he told the reporter who, well-pleased, rushed off to write up his scoop. The Israeli turned to the Palestinian and said, "But ____, you know he's very ill." The Palestinian medico responded, "Of course!"

Yet despite this fact, Arafat did not receive serious or competent treatment. It was no secret that the individuals who served as his medical staff were not very good doctors but chosen for political reasons. The biggest problem, however, was that the Palestinian leadership could not face the crisis honestly.

Remember, Arafat was their leader for as long as they could remember. He was well-known for making every decision, even the most minor, for the movement and for the institutions then governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinians in the know frequently pointed out that when Arafat was travelling literally nothing could get done.

So how could they face or admit the potential demise of the man on whom their fortunes and indeed the entire movement seemed to rest? Dictatorial movements or countries are like that. The courtiers all live in fear that the fearless leader will be no more. What will become of them?

And so if they had taken better care of Arafat he would have lasted longer. Of course, Arafat was never known for being solicitous of his own help. He was overweight, ate unhealthy food, and didn’t exercise. The mere thought of Arafat trying to jog makes the last point effectively. He had been severely injured in a plane crash several years earlier.

Arafat himself refused to rest or to leave his headquarters despite its being under siege by Israel after all the terrorism he had ordered during his post-Camp David summit war against the peace process. It was not hard to see that this 75-year-old man was a mortality waiting to happen.

Just as Arafat’s cronies and lieutenants could not face his sickness, a good portion of the Western leftist, media, and intelligentsia refuses to face their own sickness. Only against the Jews would the modern-day version of ritual murder become credible, especially when it is based on a ridiculously obvious fabrication.

The current Arafat-was-murdered meme began when very large amounts of radioactive material were “discovered” on his clothing. This substance is scientifically known to break down on a very regular schedule. For such a quantity to be found there would have meant there would have been a gigantic amount—was he hosed down with radioactive poison?—when he died eight years ago. In other words, the stuff had been planted only hours at most before it was found, no doubt by the same people who put it there. In short, the accusation makes no sense but it is being treated seriously.

Such is the way Israel is dealt with on many things by respectable people in the West. The accusation is made by anti-Israel propagandists who spew out the most vicious antisemitic hatred and lies yet are given a large measure of credibility. Such is the way Israel is dealt with on many things by otherwise respectable people in the West nowadays.

In the case of any other alleged perpetrator, the kind of claim being made against Israel in this case would have been ridiculed. Yet part of the world seems to believe that the Jews are capable of anything.

There is even a special name for such tales, blood libel, and its echoes can be found in the fabricated or exaggerated tales about Israel deliberately murdering children, most recently just now in the war with Hamas. Stories of Jews murdering people out of religious hatred—often to use their blood allegedly to make Passover matzos—go way back. One example is in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, published first in the late fourteenth century. About 130 years ago, one of my ancestors living in Czarist Russia was accused on the basis of no evidence of the ritual murder of a teen-aged Christian. The local peasants rioted, wrecked the Jewish workshops and stores, and beat up several Jews. Fortunately no one was killed. According to then-prevalent tales in the region, the Jews had a barrel whose inside was studded with nails so as to extract the blood efficiently.

The perennial Syrian defense minister, Mustafa Tlas, wrote a book entitled Matzoh of Zion in 1983 in which he drew on a ritual murder story from an incident in 1840s' Damascus, promoted by local Christian clerics, to claim that this was a generalized Jewish practice. This kind of thing has also been the subject of recent Egyptian, Iranian, and Turkish films. It is also a staple story in the Saudi media.

Of course, Arafat is in the category of political assassination not culinary religious practice. And Israel certainly did assassinate such senior PLO leaders as Abu Jihad who had blood on their hands from organizing terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. But, you might say, aren't these things completely different because we are now in the realm of politics and Israel does, however unintentionally, kill children. And there was the case of an attempted poisoning of a Hamas leader in Jordan.

True, but where does this special edge come from, this quickness to passionate hatred and credulity that one doesn't see when other countries are involved, this abandonment of simple logic and evidence, this willingness to believe proven liars who will seize on any instrument in their desire to commit genocide? It has been shown that there is a virtual industry in anti-Israel fabrications. Yet the exposure of a faked photo or the claim that a baby was killed by Israel when he died of a Hamas rocket intended to kill Israelis seems to have no permanent effect, no reexamination of the assumptions being made and the relative credibility accorded various parties. And one cannot help but see the savage, energetic joy displayed in the bashing of Israel that simply does not exist on any other issue.

On one hand, the media and intelligentsia is most forgiving to, say, the United States when its air attacks accidentally kill civilians. No details and exaggerations of the results of its bombing strikes in Yemen or Pakistan and full explanation of the context. On the other hand, the continuous understating of the violence on the other side, say, in Syria's civil war or Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians which invoke no teach-ins or demonstrations in the West or calls that such and such a country has no right to exist because it does nasty things to others.

A fair-minded observer might start thinking: something different is going on here, some hidden agenda or psychological factor that impels Israel and the Jews being put into a special category with negative implications in today's world. As it once was for so many centuries.

As for the geopolitical aspect, there was a clear Israeli decision not to kill Arafat taken in the 1970s. A much-seen photo of Arafat taken through the scope of an Israeli sniper rifle in southern Lebanon was circulated following Arafat’s 1982 evacuation from Beirut. If Israel had wanted to kill Arafat it had numerous opportunities to do so when it mattered, not at the end of his career when he was largely discredited.

Incidentally, the Israels-poisoned-him theme has been used repeatedly in the case of others whose death obviously had other causes. The Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini and the publishing mogul Robert Maxwell immediately come to mind. This kind of thing is merely a modern-day version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

What about the, one might call it, opposite conspiracy theory, that Arafat died of AIDs? I’ve looked into the Arafat as active homosexual and AIDs stories for many years as well as interviewed key intelligence people in several countries. I have never heard any evidence—or even spoken to those working professionally on Arafat who believed it—that these rumors were true.

Again, for a 75 year old man who took no care of himself, had lousy doctors, overworked himself, was somewhat obese, had severe internal injuries from a plane crash, ate a terrible diet, and lived under poor conditions to die is not exactly a surprising thing that requires a bizarre explanation with the only "proof" being clumsily forged.

The Middle East is, of course, the place where conspiracy theories abound. Yet what can one say of those in the West who swallow every slander on Israel they are fed by Fatah, Hamas, and the new-age ideologues and bloggers whether or not any evidence is provided or even logical sense is made? Would that all of this kind of behavior be buried and never dug up again.

Monday, November 26, 2012

What’s been happening in Egypt this week is as important as the revolution that overthrew the old regime almost two years ago. A new dictator has arrived and while the Muslim Brotherhood’s overturning of democracy was totally predictable, Western policymakers walked right into the trap. They even helped build it.

President Mursi has now declared his ability to rule by decree. The key concept is that he can do everything to protect the revolution. In doing so, he is defining the revolution—as the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 which was made by a broad coalition of forces soon after became defined—as an Islamist revolution.

One could call the Islamist strategy a short march through the institutions. Once Islamists take power—in Iran, the Gaza Strip, and Turkey, perhaps, too Syria—that is only the beginning of the story. They systematically do a fundamental transformation of them.

The media, or at least a large part of it, is tamed. The draft constitution written by the Brotherhood and Salafists allows the government to shut down any newspaper or television station by decree. The courts are made impotent and judges are replaced. Mursi’s decree said he could ignore any court decision.

At a November 18 press conference, a few days before Mursi issued his decree, the leading secular-oriented representatives in the constitution-writing constituent assembly resigned, charging the new document would enshrine Sharia law. The problem was not the statement in Article 2 about Sharia being the main source of Egyptian legislation but rather later provisions making it clear that Islamist-controlled institutions would interpret precisely what that meant. Amr Moussa, former foreign minister and Arab League secretary-general, said the new constitution would bring disaster for Egypt. Abdel Meguid called this combination "Taliban-like."

Scattered secularist forces, Coptic Christians, liberals or the remnants of the old regime, and modern-minded women do not pose a real threat to the regime. They are not violent, not organized, and not flush with cash. They can expect no material international support. There will be no civil war between the moderates and the Islamists the suppression of one by the other. The Salafists are itching for confrontation; the Muslim Brotherhood is patient. But when Salafists harass women or stab secularists or attack churches, the Brotherhood-controlled government will do nothing to protect the victims.

Of critical importance for Egypt is control over the religious infrastructure: the ministry of Waqf that supervises huge amounts of money in Islamic foundations; the office of qadi, the chief Islamist jurist; al-Azhar University, the most important institution defining Islam in the Muslim world; which clerics get to go on television or have their own shows; and down to appointments of preachers in every public mosque in the country.

Many clerics are not moderate but most are not systematic Islamists. Soon they will be or at least talk as if they were. Revolutionary Islamism will become in Egypt merely normative Islam. Thus is the endless debate in the West about the nature of Islam—religion of peace or religion of terrorism?--short-circuited and made even more irrelevant. The real power is not what the texts say but who interprets them. And the Islamists will do the interpreting.

While the judges are still holding out bravely only the army has real power to counter the Islamist revolution transforming the most important country in the Arabic-speaking world into the instrument of the leading international anti-Western, anti-American, and antisemitic organization. It doesn't matter how nicely Mursi spoke to Obama any more than say how Lenin--who moderated Soviet policy in the 1920s to consolidate the regime and get Western help--did in his day.

What is going on inside Egypt’s army, the last remaining institution that could offer resistance? We don’t really know but there are certainly some important indications. In theory, the army is the only force that can challenge the Muslim Brotherhood’s drive to transform Egypt into an Islamist state. But why should we believe the officers want to engage in such a battle?

Under the leadership of a secret society called the Free Officers, Egypt’s army overturned the monarchy in 1952 in a virtually bloodless coup. Yet while Egypt was for decades thereafter ruled by the resulting regime, the military government soon became a military-backed government. Officers either moved over to civilian offices or if they opposed the regime were purged.

Aside from doing its professional duties, the new generation of officers turned to money-making. The Egyptian army became a vast economic enterprise, with its own farms, factories, and housing estates. It was not a political interest group, and certainly not an ideological organization, but an economic enterprise.

During the more recent revolution, the army’s main concern was its own corporate interests—especially control over the military budget, the choice of its leaders, and those business activities. Over and over again the Western mass media and governments spoke as if they were dealing with a South American army that wanted to rule the country. It was portrayed as repressive and potentially tyrannical. By definition, all civilians—especially the Muslim Brotherhood—were good guys against the supposed military would-be dictators.

This was far from the truth. The military was eager to get out of power as long as its narrow interests were preserved. One of its biggest fears was becoming unpopular. That’s why it didn’t crack down in 2011 on behalf of the Mubarak regime and didn’t do so very much when it was in the transitional military council. To put it bluntly, the army wasn’t the bad guys but, relatively speaking, among the good guys.

Now, however, that moment is past. Partly under international pressure, it gave power to an elected president without securing a single one of its demands. So much for the tyrannical generals. Scores of top officers resigned and they are now being replaced by the choices of one man, the president.

Who is Mursi going to appoint to head the new Egyptian army? Given the lack of Islamist sympathizers at the top—there is much debate over how many there are among more junior officers—he needs to put in place opportunists. These would be men who in exchange for their rank and privileges will do his bidding. That is what’s happening now; the Islamist high command should come later.

Lacking any ideological orientation against revolutionary Islamism; without charismatic leadership, not at all united, and in a sense fat and greedy, without any foreign encouragement, and not wanting to shoot down its own people and set off a civil war, the Egyptian army is not a bulwark against the country becoming an Islamist dictatorship. If the Islamists could overcome a far more coherent and ideologically anti-Islamist military in Turkey so easily, there’s no reason to think a similar process won’t happen in Egypt, too.

What are the red lines for the army? First and foremost, that nobody touch their economic empire and cuts their budget. Mursi isn’t stupid enough to get into trouble on that issue.

Second, those who attack the military with guns must be dealt with harshly. Mursi is willing to crack down on those extremely radical Salafist groups—notably in the Sinai—who shoot Egyptian soldiers rather than just restricting themselves to attacks on Israel.

Third, the preservation of U.S. military aid. No worries though, there, it would take a lot for the Obama Administration to cut off this assistance. The regime can go far toward suppressing women and Christians, making clear it is helping the forces seeking to wipe Israel off the map, subvert other Arabic-speaking countries, and setting up a dictatorship without having to worry about losing the aid.

Finally, will the Egyptian military constantly refuse to take steps that might entangle it in a war with Israel? Here is the most likely hope of restraint though Mursi isn’t eager for such a direct conflict either. The danger, however, is not so much an executive decision to go to war but a slow slide into conflict. Along the way, Egypt can be permissive toward those staging cross-border attacks on Israel; allow Egyptian volunteers in large numbers to go to the Gaza Strip to fight; and allow lots of weapons in the Gaza Strip. Small-scale border clashes or a future Israel-Hamas war could move things in that direction.

For the time being, however, as indicated by the ceasefire, Egypt’s new regime doesn’t want a conflict either. After all consolidating its power within the country and creating a new order that will last for decades is a big task. All the institutions must be transformed, a constitution finalized and adopted, billions of dollars of foreign aid begged, oppositions tamed. As an indication, the radical nationalist regime in the 1950s spent three years at that task before turning toward an attempt to dominate the region.

Patience and a practical sense of how to proceed to accomplish radical objectives should not be mistaken for moderation. The Middle East will still be there to Islamize, Israel to destroy, and American influence to eliminate when Mursi is ready.

Sunday, November 25, 2012

Naturally the question of who won
any given war preoccupies people’s minds. And I’m amused by those who think
that Hamas won the recent conflict. Winning has to mean something real, not
just bragging to reassure oneself.

Let’s begin by examining the causes
and goals of each side. Hamas’s goal was to be able to attack Israel as much as
it wanted without significant retaliation. This time, as in late 2008, the war
began because Hamas escalated the level of its attacks on Israel to
unacceptable levels (more on that phrase in a moment). The same might be said
of Hizballah in 2006.

Israel’s goal was to force Hamas to
the lowest possible level of attacks and to make such attacks as ineffective as
possible. Incidentally, that was also Israel’s strategy in dealing with the
PLO. Attempts to “solve” the problem once and for all, varying from the 1982
invasion of Lebanon to the Oslo peace process of the 1990s didn’t work too well.

Nevertheless, Israel was able to
achieve its more limited aim against Hamas in the later 2008-early 2009 campaign to gain four years of relative quiet. With Hizballah, this goal has now held for six years. That’s not bad
given the reality of contemporary international politics and the Middle Eastern
situation, both of which keep Israel from gaining a “total victory.”

Ideally, of course, there is no good
reason that the world ensure the survival of a terrorist, totalitarian,
illegal, and genocide-oriented regime in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, that is
the reality. If the idea of Israel going in on the ground into the Gaza Strip
provoked so much international horror, imagine the reaction to Israel
overthrowing Hamas altogether.

And for Israel to overthrow Hamas it
would either have to govern the Gaza Strip itself, restarting the whole
post-1967 process and facing daily gun battles there or to turn over
the territory to someone else. Since the Palestinian Authority isn’t interested
in such an arrangement and is incapable of even making a serious effort to
overthrow Hamas nobody else is going to do so or take power there.

So Hamas’s survival as ruler of
the Gaza Strip was not some victory in a war that lasted a little over a week
but is guaranteed in effect by the international and regional order. Can Hamas continue to violate the ceasefire? Of course, because Israel's only way of enforcing it is military retaliation and now, as has been true for the last five years, Israel has to consider how to do each one without being blamed for a breakdown in the ceasefire. That won't stop Israel from hitting back with the goal of minimizing Hamas's attacks.After these two significant factors--which both existed beforehand--it’s all downhill for Hamas. Given the destruction of its weaponry, Hamas is less able to attack than it had been and while every Hamas leader denies it, the vision of their colleagues getting killed does have a deterrent effect on their boldness.

The amount of regional support Hamas
received during the recent war was remarkably low. The anti-Islamist Arab
states wanted Hamas to lose. Iran cheered and sent missiles which is quite
significant but only gets you so far. The Arab street didn’t do much; Syria’s
regime is busy with the civil war; Iraq is for all practical purposes out of
the conflict. Whatever lip service it gives, the Shia Islamist Hizballah didn’t
lift a trigger finger to help Sunni Islamist Hamas.

It was these factors that led Fareed Zaharia, the
influential American commentator—no friend of Israel—who has Obama’s ear
to write a Washington Post piece entitled, "Israel
dominates the new Middle East."

As for Egypt, while the Muslim
Brotherhood regime is 100 percent pro-Hamas, it isn’t going to be dictated to
by its much smaller brother. The Egyptian government has bigger fish to fry. It
is busy consolidating its dictatorship and reeling in almost $10 billion in
foreign aid.

Hamas didn’t consult Cairo over the
escalation that led to this war. Equally bad, Hamas has become entangled with
small jihadist groups that attack both Egypt and Israel. Naturally, the Cairo
government doesn’t care if Israel is the only target but reacts strongly to
being hit itself. So before the escalation the Egyptian government was angry at
Hamas.

There will be times in future when
Cairo will give Hamas full backing but this wasn’t one of them. Moreover, it
seems that the Egyptian government has committed itself to crack down more on
arms’ imports across the Egypt-Gaza border. Of course, that promise might well
not be kept—if only for the bribes paid to Egyptian military officers by smugglers—but retaining the status quo is hardly a victory for Hamas.

The supposed greatest military
achievement of Hamas was sending missiles in the direction of Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem. Yet this was accomplished by taking out most or all of the
explosives in order to extend the range. The Iron Dome system shot down most of
these and little damage was done.

By the end of the war, Hamas was
apparently out of missiles (though not shorter-range rockets). It had lost a
lot of cadre and needs to rebuild part of its infrastructure and most of its
arsenal. Israel faces no such problems. In addition, Israel continues to prosper and advance while the Gaza Strip, in part thanks to Hamas's own strategy, continues to stagnate.

Of course, Hamas did manage to
terrorize a million Israelis in the south and close down normal life there. This is an accomplishment but something Hamas also did in 2008-2009 with more effectiveness since there was no real
anti-missile defense. Everyone knows that Hamas can do this.

How does that
advance Hamas’s cause of wiping Israel off the map?

And Hamas is no closer to taking over the West
Bank than it’s been in the past, in no small part because of Israel’s behind-the-scenes
efforts. Also of tremendous significance is the fact that the war did not
increase Hamas’s legitimacy with the West. If anything, the opposite is true. While one can find plenty of
objectionable Western media coverage, it was less hostile to Israel than in
2006 or 2008-2009. Part of the gain is due to the fact that the Israeli
government and military have finally learned how to use social media
effectively.

At any rate, no one in the West is
rushing to have diplomatic relations with Hamas or help it out beyond letting
it continue to exist and, of course, terrorize the people of the Gaza Strip and
teach children to grow up to be terrorists. It is a disgusting situation but
not one amenable to change by Israeli action.

So Israel won the war. The problem
is that the word “won” has limited significance and “winning” doesn’t remove
the problem and bring long-term peace. That, however, is in the nature of the situation and not in the war itself.This inability to obtain total victory is characteristic of Israel's strategic situation for reasons totally extraneous to Israel and which virtually everyone in the country understands, though many foreign observers don't. Israel's big victories in the 1967 and 1973 war did not end the conflict or stop attempts by terrorists to attack into the country. The goal is to discourage them and make it harder for them to succeed. As a result, Israelis can go about their lives and the country can prosper. Sixty-four years of effort have devastated Israels enemies but brought them not one step closer to wiping it off the map.

The danger regarding the Gaza Strip is longer-term. As the
Brotherhood consolidates control over Egypt and if a Muslim Brotherhood regime
comes to power in Syria, there might come a day when Hamas has real support
from two powerful Arab states plus Iran. The situation might then resemble that which
Israel faced from Arab nationalist governments in the 1950s-1980s period. Israel's goal, then, is also to deter even the most hostile, hate-filled Egyptian Islamist regime from going too far in trying to implement the Muslim Brotherhood's genocide program. Its cheering Hamas is not the problem. The issue is how much it will help Hamas and, even more important, whether it will some day fight alongside it. Has this deterrence been increased by the recent war? Apparently, yes, and that is a very important outcome. Israel has reminded Egypt of its own power; Hamas has showed its Egyptian sponsor that it was not a good team player. Perhaps
the better way to put it is that Israel won the battle but the war goes on, as
indeed it has for our entire lifetimes.

Friday, November 23, 2012

The French press agency headline says it all: “Egypt's [President] Morsi assumes sweeping powers, branded new pharaoh.” Mursi has issued a decree giving himself virtually dictatorial powers and contradicting the assumption that he—and his Muslim Brotherhood organization—intend to rule democratically. Opposition forces said this constituted a coup.

Mursi’s spokesman explained the decree in these terms: the president can issue any decree he wishes to protect the revolution. "The constitutional declarations, decisions and laws issued by the president are final and not subject to appeal."

It seems apparent this means to proceed toward the fundamental transformation of Egypt into an Islamist, Sharia-ruled state. If one views the 2011 revolution as a democratic one, then Mursi is destroying it. But of course he and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists see it as an Islamist revolution, parallel to the 1979 Iranian revolution though in Egyptian terms, of course. Lest there be any illusions about what this means, note that Mursi is one man whose legitimacy is not established in practice--despite having won an election--and who cannot depend on the country's institutions to obey him. The power behind Mursi is not that he is president but that he has the support of the country's strongest group, the Muslim Brotherhood, and can generally count on the Salafists as well.

The timing of this takeover is ironic since it coincides with an all-time high for the Obama Administration’s regard for Egypt, following that regime’s brokering of an Israel-Hamas ceasefire, including a continuous insistence from the U.S. government and mass media that the Brotherhood was now moderate and pro-democratic. In a normal universe, a U.S. president would be furious at Egypt for being made to look foolish after lavishing so much praise on Egypt and insistence that the Brotherhood was moderate and democratic. Of course, that will not happen with this administration.

It is true that Mursi acted “pragmatically” on the ceasefire issue. But what does that mean? He took into account his own regime interests and didn’t just howl, “Alahu Akhbar!” repeatedly. Westerners seem to think that for someone to be a radical Islamist they have to be a wild man. If Usama bin Ladin wore a suit and tie he’d still be alive today.

But of course Mursi wants to stay in power and strengthen his regime. He’s not going to throw away $10 billion in aid (U.S., EU, IMF) for some wild adventure in the Gaza Strip that Hamas began without asking him. He doesn’t yet control the country or the army. There’s no constitution and no functioning parliament. If the Muslim Brotherhood has proven anything it is that it has patience.

“Mr. Obama told aides he was impressed with the Egyptian leader’s pragmatic confidence. He sensed an engineer’s precision with surprisingly little ideology. Most important, Mr. Obama told aides that he considered Mr. Morsi a straight shooter who delivered on what he promised and did not promise what he could not deliver.

“The thing that appealed to the president was how practical the conversations were — here’s the state of play, here are the issues we’re concerned about,” said a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations. “This was somebody focused on solving problems.”

But the main problem Mursi is focused on is how to keep the Muslim Brotherhood in power, how to get lots of money from the West, and how to make Egypt into a radical Islamist state. Enforcing quiet in the Gaza Strip right now is part of that effort.

Being the main sponsor of Hamas, a terrorist group, used to be called that state sponsorship of terrorism, now it is to be admired as being, in the New York Times formulation, Hamas’s “most important international ally.”

Another interesting parallel is that Hamas, like the fellow Brotherhood branch in Egypt, won an election and then seized power completely. Things in Egypt have not yet gone that far but Mursi has taken a big step in that direction.

At home, it has taken only a few weeks for Mursi to return to dictatorship. The decree comes as secular-minded groups demonstrate in the Tahrir Square area while the Islamists call for suppressing them.

Mursi’s offensive seeks to give him the power to purge
existing institutions and put supporters in control.

Perhaps the highest priority is to take over the court
system by appointing Islamist judges. During the late Mubarak regime, judges
were among the most courageous of dissidents, issuing decisions the government
doesn’t like. After the revolution, judges gave rulings against the Brotherhood’s
goals, for example, saying that the election of parliament—which is
three-quarters Islamist—was illegal. Mursi wants to reverse this ruling by
decree rather than face new elections where Islamist vote totals will probably
plummet.

The other key institutions are the armed forces, where
top generals have already resigned, and the religious establishment. While the
chiefs of Egypt’s religious system, including the powerful mosque-university
al-Azhar, are hardly liberal, they are also not systematic Islamists or
Brotherhood supporters. Once such people are replaced with loyalists, the
Brotherhood will have the power to define Islam itself.

Given the international authority of al-Azhar, which trains
clerics for many different countries, Sunni Islam from Morocco to Indonesia
would be closer to becoming thoroughly in line with revolutionary Islamist,
anti-Western, antisemitic thinking. That
is not to say it is open, liberal, and tolerant now. But the situation would be
far worse and destabilizing. For example, mainstream clerics would issue a
stream of rulings justifying terrorism and condemning anyone who cooperated
with the West.

The Egyptian regime’s cooperation on a Gaza ceasefire,
then, was in large part intended to defuse any reaction against its movement
toward dictatorship at home. It is doubtful, for example, that the Obama
Administration will condemn the new decree giving Mursi total power in the
country. And Egypt will get almost $10 billion in aid from the United States,
European Union, and International Monetary Fund, even as it becomes a
repressive, Islamist state.