The
most notorious terrorist organization of Cental Asia is the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), known since 2001 as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan
(IMT). It is a deeply ideological group, steeped in the theories and techniques
of jihadism, and could be regarded as the Taliban of the Pamirs. It is
characterized by its anti-democratic vitriol and its equally splenetic
condemnation of the Uzbek government. Its cadres are young, violent and
strongly influenced by Salafi-Wahhabi
doctrine. In three campaigns it waged between 1999 and 2001 against Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan, it earned a reputation for ruthlessness and brutality.
Police officers who were kidnapped were beheaded; the Movement's sub-units
were virtually wiped out in pitched battles with the security forces; if
forced to withdraw, they would shoot their own wounded rather than let
them fall into the hands of their enemies; even those among their own ranks
who tried to take advantage of an Uzbek government amnesty were executed.
It is estimated that they and their allies control 70 per cent of the regional
drugs trade to fund their organizations. Despite their violent history,
however, they have suffered major setbacks. Although they once had bases
in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, they were scattered by Operation Enduring
Freedom in 2001. Their 'alumni' have since trying to regroup, making suicide-bomb
attacks in Uzbekistan and issuing new threats, but they have failed to
achieve any of their objectives.1

In September
1998, Tohir Abdoulalilovitch Yuldeshev and Juma Namangani (whose real name
was Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev) announced the formation of the IMU
in the Taliban-dominated city of Kabul. Concurrently, the 1MU was aligned
with the International Islamic Front (m) of Osama bin Laden. Eager to acquire
nuclear material and expert knowledge from disaffected residents of the
former Soviet Union, bin Laden welcomed the 1MU as another element in his
Salafest Wahhabi Al-Qaeda foundation, which is what the m was sometimes
called. The IMU leaders, for their part, were conscious that they needed
the manpower, expertise and, crucially, the funds that Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban could provide if they were stand any chance of fulfilling their
ambitious goals. Yuldeshev outlined the aims of the 1MU as the creation
of an Islamic state by means of a violent overthrow of the secular governments
of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan.

An examination
of the original text of the IMU'S 1998 declaration yields some interesting
details which might otherwise be overlooked. The Islamist agenda, as one
would expect, is a key aspect: 'We declared a Jihad in order to create
a religious system, a religious government. We want to create a sharia
system: However, Yuldeshev referred to the inequalities of power as much
as transgressions against the faith in his claim that the IMU was 'Fighting
against oppression within our country, against bribery, against the inequities
- and also the freeing of our Muslim brothers from prison ... We consider
it our obligation to avenge [those that have died in prison] and nobody
can take this right away from us: Much like their hosts the Taliban, the
1MU sought to establish political and religious justifications for their
attempts to seize power, but it was surprising to find an inherent criticism
of other jihadist movements. Yuldeshev argued, 'We want the model of Islam
which has remained from the Prophet, not like the Islam in Afghanistan
or Iran or Pakistan or Saudi Arabia - these models are nothing like the
Islamic model.' These remarks hint at a long-standing tension between the
Wahhabism of bin Laden and the interpretation of the 1MU leaders and, moreover,
reflect a common set of fault lines that divides all jihadists. Yuldeshev
believed that 'Before we build an Islamic state we primarily want to get
out from under oppression. We are therefore now shedding blood, and the
creation of an Islamic state will be the next problem ... We don't need
foreign contacts because our roots are deep and are located in our homeland.'
The 'deep roots' are a reference to the anti-Communist Basmachi resistance
of the 1920S; Yuldeshev clearly believed that Karimov's regime was merely
an extension of the old Communist order. The comment about foreign contacts
is, however, a curious one, particularly when foreign volunteers (as opposed
to Central Asians) have been a prominent feature 0 fthe movement. The remark
may have been intended for an Uzbek audience, to assert the purity of the
cause and not deter nationalists, but it may also have been intended to
warn other jihadists like Al-Qaeda not to try and direct the organization
(a point that had created some irritation between 'Afghan'-Arabs and mujahedin
in the 1980s). On one point, though, there was no doubt at all. Negotiation
or compromise was not to be considered. Yuldeshev bellowed, 'We do not
repent our declaration ofJihad against the Uzbek government. Inshallah,
we will carry out this Jihad to its conclusion.'

The uncompromising
attitude of the IMU can be traced back to the months immediately after
Uzbeksitan's independence. Yuldeshev, a fiery mullah, had led a protest
delegation at Namangan in the Ferghana Valley in December 1991 against
the town's mayor.3 The dispute centred on the mayor's refusal to grant
permission to build a new mosque, fearing the radical purpose to which
Yuldeshev and his followers would put it. Yuldeshev and others stormed
the local Communist Party of Uzbekistan (cpu) offices and occupied them.
Unsure of the intentions of this apparent fringe group, the government
took no action. This only emboldened Yuldeshev further. Having already
acquired funding from Saudi Arabia and gathered some 5,000 activists about
him, he imposed strict prayer regimes on local people.4 He insisted that
women give up their traditional colourful scarves and embroidered clothing
in favour of white burqas. Vigilantes enforced these rules and carried
out night patrols to combat crime. Shopkeepers were also subject to spot-checks
to keep prices stable. New madrassahs were opened, each propagating Yuldeshev's
radical brand of Salafi-Wahhabi Islam. In Namangan, his mosque was adorned
with a slogan’overthrow the Karimov regime. After a brief period studying
at an IRP run madrassah in Tajikistan in 1992, he was forced to move on
again by the outbreak of the civil war. Like many IRP leaders, he sought
refuge in Afghanistan and assisted in leafleting, but he soon realized
that he would have to establish more extensive networks of support if he
was ever going to realize his aim of seizing power in Tashkent. He travelled
to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, picking
up information about the ideology and methods of Islamist groups. Perhaps
the most important organization he made contact with, however, was Pakistan's
IS1. They gave him funds and allowed him to establish a base at Peshawar,
the city that stands as the gateway of the lawless North-West Frontier
Province. Between 1995 and 1998, Yuldeshev was able to make contact with
a variety of jihadist groups. The Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami, the organization
that provided funds for the Taliban, also raised cash for Yuldeshev and
helped move his followers into Pakistan's radical madrassahs. Critically,
the Arab-Afghans, who were allies of the Taliban, provided him with an
introduction to bin Laden.s Uzbek volunteers were also able to train in
terrorist tactics in Afghan or at frontier bases through their madrassah
contacts. These international contacts helped Yuldeshev build even wider
networks.

Although unconfirmed,
it is likely that Yuldeshev received funds from Islamist 'charities' and
front organizations, some of which concealed official intelligence services.
Uzbeks exiled to Saudi Arabia in the 1920S, many of whom had become Wahhabis,
may have been an obvious point of initial contact, but Saudi businessmen
also channelled funds into Yuldeshev's organization, and there may have
been contacts with the chief of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki al-Faisal.
A more certain aspect of his odyssey is that Yuldeshev travelled to Chechnya
during the first war; from there he advocated a militant-spiritual and
armed Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan. This platform was carefully chosen.
Apparently speaking from the heart of the Islamic struggle against infidels,
he was aiming not just to broadcast the anguish of fellow Muslims but to
establish himself as the leading spokesman of the wider Central Asian cause.
His audience was clearly the one that lay across the Caspian to the east,
but some Chechens would later join the IMU and fight in the hills of Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan to assist their former friend and ally. This sort oflinkage
was also evident in Yuldeshev's visits to Turkey. Here he made contact
with Islamists and argued that a pan-Turkic caliphate in Central Asia would
directly assist a similar grouping in Turkey itself. Meanwhile, funds were
secretly carried into Uzbekistan to help establish sleeper cells which
would provide crucial support to a future insurgency.

The other important
exile from Uzbekistan in 1992 was Juma Namangani, the former Soviet paratrooper
and Afghanistan veteran who had undergone a radical 're-conversion' to
Islam after fighting the mujahedin.6 N amangani had been involved in the
storming of the CPU offices in his hometown and, like Yuldeshev, was on
the run because of Karimov's crackdown. He had arrived in Kurgan Tyube,
a southern province of Tajikistan, with a following of 30 militant Uzbeks
and a handful of Arabs who had been funding Adolat, Yuldeshev's radical
party. Gradually more Uzbeks joined Namangani's group, as well as foreign
volunteers who had grown disillusioned with the Afghan Civil War. Arab
fighters saw in Namangani's movement a chance to project the international
jihad beyond the squalid and desultory struggles in Afghanistan. His expertise
in Soviet army weaponry, explosives, tactics and drills made him particularly
valuable, but it was his desire for action that was attractive to a growing
body of militant men. The IRP made use of his experience and skills in
the Tajik Civil War, directing him to the Tavildara Valley as a base of
operations in 1993. IRP men also joined his band, and, although he twice
lost Tavildara, his personal daring and successful ambushes against Tajik
government forces in Gorno- Badakhshan and the Karategin Valley earned
him a glowing reputation. N amangani directed one critical action at the
Haboribot Pass and gained the respect and gratitude of the entire IRP,
a fact that was later to protect him from the wrath of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz
authorities. The Tajik Minister of Emergencies, Mirzo Ziyoyev, was once
the IRP'S chief of staff and therefore Namangani's commander. Namangani
called him 'brother' and Ziyoyev acted a key negotiator with the IMU in
the late 1990S, producing bitter criticism from Karimov. Given these close
contacts, Karimov believed the Tajik government was colluding with the
jihadist terrorists.

Nevertheless,
Namangani was something of a liability to the IRP even during the civil
war, and the sincerity of his jihadist credentials seemed to be in doubt.
His former comrades described his understanding of Islam as rudimentary.
It was not religion that directed his actions but a desire to take risks
and effect immediate changes. While understanding the importance of strict
discipline to overcome the stress of combat, Namangani was nevertheless
sometimes given to insubordination and tended to act with rashness rather
than think through any careful strategy. His military experience in Afghanistan
had schooled him in the art of guerrilla warfare, but it is likely that
the jihadists simply offered him a sense of purpose, a 'mission', which
made those skills valued. Moheyuddin Kabir, the principal advisor to the
IRP'S leadership in the civil-war period, noted that Namangani was 'easily
influenced by those around him ... shaped by his own military and political
experiences rather than Islamic ideology', and that his hatred of the Uzbek
government 'is what motivates him above all Namangani refused to accept
the compromise peace in Tajikistan in 1997 and became an embittered outlaw
rather than a 'heroic leader' of a jihadlst movement. Ziyoyev had to persuade
him to end the fighting after long negotiations, but even when the renegade
leader agreed, he retained his base in the Tavildara Valley with a small
entourage of Uzbeks and foreign fighters. This bandit-in-waiting eventually
established himself in Hoit near the Kyrgyz border with a community of
40 Uzbeks and Arabs, as well as his Tajik wife and daughter. With a dismal
performance in farming, he turned to running a haulage business between
Dushanbe and Garm. The most lucrative cargo was heroin; Namangani had few
qualms about shipping narcotics in order to feed his followers, who were
growing in number. Essentially, his reputation meant that disillusioned
former fighters drifted to his headquarters, as did a large number of Uzbek
radicals who were the targets of Karimov's regime. Eventually, by 1999,
there were 200 men at Hoit, drawn from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya
and the Middle East, some with their families. They urged Namangani to
lead an international force against the Central Asian regimes. However,
the most critical influences came from two events in 1997. The first was
the fact that the Taliban had taken power in Afghanistan. The second was
the arrival of Namangani's former leader, Tohir Yuldeshev.

Yuldeshev and
N amangani were, in many ways, no further forward in achieving their goals
than they had been in that fateful attack on the CPU offices in 1991, but
they resolved to change the situation. Although Namangani had been well
equipped and had commanded a large force in the Tajik Civil War, he had
lost his manpower and much of his firepower. He and Yuldeshev had lost
their erstwhile allies, the IRP, to a government of national reconciliation
which featured large numbers of former Communists. The remaining base at
Tavildara could be closed under the new Tajik government's pressure. However,
both men knew that the Taliban were likely to be sympathetic to their cause
and that Yuldeshev's networks provided them with an opportunity. However,
there had been some development in Uzbekistan itself. Yuldeshev had ordered
a variety of vicious atrocities against Uzbek security personnel, resulting
in a government crackdown. Eager to snuff out the violence before it gathered
momentum, Karimov's regime condemned the indoctrination of Islamists, made
a number of arrests and passed the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organisations (1998), which demanded registration of mosques and their
ulema.8 Family members of Yuldeshev and Namangani were forced to denounce
them as terrorists, and Namangani's mother was subjected to public humiliation
until she cursed him. The government and police had threatened those who
defied the regime, and there had been accusations of arbitrary arrest,
intimidation and even torture of suspects. The Uzbek government's methods
were undoubtedly strict, but this was precisely because it felt so threatened.
Karimov had been enraged by terrorist attempts to assassinate him and by
the gruesome murder of loyal government employees. The effect of this crackdown,
of course, had been the alienation of many young Muslim men. Corruption,
relative inequalities in wealth and high unemployment added to their anger
or despair. Yuldeshev and Namangani, having provoked a stronger reaction
from the Uzbek government, now saw their chance to capitalize upon growing
internal unrest.

The two leaders
decided to move to Afghanistan as a base of operations against the Uzbek
government. This was, given Yuldeshev's meetings with the Taliban that
year, a natural step. Already the Taliban were offering their newly-won
state as a haven for other terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda,
which had been forced to leave Sudan in 1996. Yuldeshev's brand of Sunni
extremism complemented the Salafest Wahhabi and Deobandi ideologies. The
Taliban regarded the IMU as an ally against Karimov because the Uzbek leader
had already announced his implacable opposition to the Kabul regime. Moreover,
bin Laden was eager to develop Yuldeshev's Adolat as a branch of his own
organization. Consequently, Yuldeshev and Namangani announced the creation
of the IMU in 1998 in Kabul, committed to the destruction ofthe government
in Tashkent.9

The results
of the new training facilities afforded to the IMU in Afghanistan were
soon apparent: a wave of car bombings across the Uzbek capital in February
1999. Thirteen were killed and 128 injured. In Kyrgyzstan in May of the
same year, a similar plot was uncovered before it could be initiated. On
2 April, a shoot-out with an alleged jihadist gang outside Tashkent left
eight of the militants dead. Initially, Karimov was convinced that secular
political opponents had orchestrated the attacks, particularly members
of the Erk and Birlik parties. However, among the 2,000 suspects arrested,
there were many Islamists, and it was not long before the Uzbek government
regarded the IMU as responsible. Karimov believed that a coalition of his
foreign rivals had supported the atrocities, including Pakistan, Turkey
and Tajikistan. In particular he referred to the Taliban and Chechen jihadists
in the IMU'S support network. The lack of specific focus probably indicated
just how little the Uzbek government knew a~out the attackers, although
Uzbekistan's intelligence services were not devoid of information. The
government appeared to be concerned that militants and democrats might
forge an alliance and take control of the Ferghana Valley, as in Tajikistan.
As always, conspiracy theorists and cynics argued that the Uzbek security
services were probably behind the attacks themselves, creating an opportunity
for a crackdown against opposition groups.'O In fact, Karimov did not need
the bloody murder of so many to rationalize such a policy. There is plenty
of evidence to show that he was genuinely furious about the attacks since
they undermined the tough, impregnable image he liked to project. Similar
ideas that renegade members of his clan, or those who aimed to separate
the Ferghana Valley from Uzbekistan were behind the attacks lack any substantiating
evidence.

Karimov's first
response was a diplomatic offensive, but this was only partially successful.
He tried to undermine the IMU by deliberately appealing to the Taliban.
However, at a meeting in Kandahar in June, Mullah Omar refused to negotiate
unless Uzbekistan recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban government.
Typically, the Taliban engaged in deception, denying they were assisting
the IMU and refusing to extradite any of their members. Relations with
Turkey were just as fruitless. The Turks, incensed by accusations that
they had assisted the IMU, broke off diplomatic relations. This did not
deter the Uzbek courts from convicting 22 men of terrorism, accusing them
of receiving support from Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan and Chechen trainers.
Karimov also exerted pressure on Tajikistan. He accused Rahmonov's government
of harbouring the IMU; it is true that the terrorists were operating from
a base in the Tavildara Valley. However, Rahmonov's authority was hardly
accepted in some of the more remote parts of the country, and the government
had to rely on former IRP comrades to persuade the IMU to evacuate to Mghanistan.
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan's diplomatic efforts to neutralize the IMU did
not prevent a terrorist offensive against Kyrgyzstan in the late summer
of 1999. It was clear that tougher measures were needed.11

Namangani cultivated
his image as an Islamist freedom fighter by actually avoiding media coverage,
but his campaign was reliant on the myth rather than the reality of his
power. Despite an offensive of kidnapping and murder in southern Kyrgyzstan,
and a declaration of jihad against Uzbekistan in August 1999, he avoided
the limelight. He let his reputation flourish instead. Like bin Laden,
it was the clandestine nature of the man that spread his appeal and allowed
rumours to develop. The real, as opposed to the mythologized, Namangani,
was able to combine his experience of organizing and fighting an insurgent
campaign with this growing reputation to mobilize an increasing number
of men. Some were styled 'sleepers', with instructions to assist the IMU
fighters when needed. While this appears to have been a clever strategy
to enlist the local population, it could also be seen as evidence of the
IMU'S relative weakness. Namangani was unable to command mass support despite
the relative unpopularity of the Karimov regime. He was unable to arm all
of his potential fighters and so relied on unarmed cells to assist his
cause. This weakness was confirmed by his reliance on external support
to maintain his cause. The Taliban provided the bases and weaponry. Osama
bin Laden, Islamist front organizations, Pakistani madrassahs and Saudi
benefactors provided the crucial funding. Drug-trafficking, over which
the Taliban asserted their control, also provided substantial financial
backing. Moreover, the campaign of 1999, far from unseating the Uzbek or
Kyrgyz governments, was a token gesture of futile violence. The killings
achieved nothing. They did not advance the cause of jihad or the caliphate
at all. Like terrorism the world over, such tactics confirm its lack of
mass support and military power or, to put it more simply, the utter weakness
of the movement.

Despite his
links with the Taliban, Namangani's forward base of operations was still
the Sanguor Training Camp in the Tavildara Valley.12 This narrow gorge
provided ample cover against air strikes and could be protected from a
series of defiles. As it was close to the Afghan border, funds and some
logistics could be brought in, but food supplies were also procured from
the local Tajik population. It was not that they were necessarily sympathetic
to the cause, but they needed the revenue from selling their produce. That
said, Namangani cultivated his reputation among local Tajiks, marrying
a Tajik woman who had been widowed during the civil war. This achieved
the dual purpose of cementing Uzbek - Tajik links forthe IMU and marking
N amangani out as a pious Muslim: it is especially blessed to marry, and
therefore support, a woman who has been widowed in a jihad. Namangani also
extended his contacts to create a network of sympathizers into the north
ofTajikistan. To improve relations with the authorities, he promised not
to interfere in Tajikistan's politics, arguing that he was only opposed
to the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments. Although he appeared to be conciliatory,
this was a necessary tactical judgment since he feared the Tajik government
might move against him. In the event, it IMU'S thinking. The kidnappers
demanded another ransom and release of several thousand Uzbeks held in
Karimov's prisons. they did not have it all their own way. The Kyrgyz army
located engaged the IMU detachments. As a major offensive got under way
to sweep them southwards back into Tajikistan, negotiators manage persuade
the IMU to release the Japanese captives and sevi more Kyrgyz.

The Uzbeks also
participated in the counterattack. Uzbek aircraft made strafing runs into
Tajikistan as far south as Garm and Tavild resulting in civilian casualties.
Further air raids in southern Kyrgyzs in Batken and ash, led to the deaths
of twelve Kyrgyz farmers. Tl attacks suggest that the Uzbeks wished to
tackle the IMU at a dist;] to prevent further bomb attacks against their
capital. They also re the eagerness of the Uzbek government to project
their power by their own borders.14 However, although the deaths of Tajik
and KYJ civilians suggested a disproportionate response, it is now clear
that some cases, impoverished Kyrgyz and Tajik herders joined the IMU for
cash. In Batken, unemployment stood at between 60 and 90 per c Agriculture
ruined by salination, shortages of electricity, the closed factories and
a fundamental shortage of food, decent standard living and prospects served
to drive some young men towards ranks of the insurgents. However, it is
also true that the majoril Kyrgyz fled the IMU onslaught, fearful that
the mountains would become a war zone, as has happened in Tajikistan during
the civil Overwhelmed by the flood of IDPS, the government struggled to
cope with the crisis.

The IMU campaign
was short-lived, and, with winter threatening to close the passes, their
units were withdrawn to the Tavildara Valley reorganize. Understandably,
the Tajik government was keen to move the IMU out of its territory. IRP
leaders who knew or had fought with Namangani during the civil war were
therefore sent to persuaded IMU to continue their withdrawal into Afghanistan.
Consequently helicopter fleet of Russian aircraft, 600 fighters and their
families, extracted from Tavildara to Afghanistan, where they received
a warm welcome from the Taliban.15 Clearly Rahmonov was eager to a restarting
the civil war, which would, undoubtedly, have mean" Taliban making attacks
across the Amu Daria and would possibly have brought down his government.
The Tavildara base was also a strong position and would have meant considerable
military and financial effort at a time when the government was still insecure.
Nevertheless, while Tajikistan may have purchased some time, the IMU was
also now in a position to recruit more men, refit and retrain for a fresh
campaign the following summer. A new base was opened for them at Mazar
by the Taliban in return for an assurance that the IMU would agree to attack
the forces of Ahmed Shah Masoud.

The military
results of the IMU'S campaign were disappointing, but they were in a position
to make their campaigns more effective, particularly using drugs revenue.
Their attacks on the Kyrgyz had not resulted in any political changes,
but timing their assault with the convening of the Shanghai Five meeting
(the forerunner of the sea; China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and
Russia) had attracted international attention. They had exposed the deficiencies
of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency techniques in the Kyrgyz army,
even if the amount of physical damage they could inflict was limited. To
make improvements, the IMU'S co-operation with the Taliban and AlQaeda
increased over the winter of 1999. There was detailed planning of the next
campaign, the securing of arms and ammunition, and the acquisition of more
funds, much derived from drug-trafficking. The UN estimated that drug production
increased in Afghanistan between 1998 and 199916, from 2,750 tons to more
than 5,000 tons. This production was taxed, but the IMU was making more
money by charging for its smuggling across the borders of Central Asia.
Namangani exploited the contacts he had built up in the years after the
Tajik Civil War, and, employing his links through the Taliban, he used
Chechens to expand the smuggling operations. Conscious of the potential
damage being done to Afghans, the Taliban decided to ban poppy cultivation
in 2000, but, even with a drought, Afghanistan still produced 3,400 tons.
Namangani's operations were unaffected. He and his associates had stockpiled
240 tons at Mazar and Kunduz, and some of this was ferried across into
Tajikistan, where it could be refined. This is supported by the fact that
raw khanka opium was sometimes intercepted by Russian and Tajik border
guards. Inside Tajikistan, some of the drugs were in the world, the IMU
and other groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda may use the ideology of jihadism
to justify their cause, but their operations depend on the techniques of
organized crime. The response of the Central Asian states to the IMU'S
campaign of 1999 was weakened by divisions. The Uzbeks accused the Tajiks
and Kyrgyz of doing too little to tackle the IMU, but they refused any
meaningful co-operation. Instead, they increased their own border security,
even to the extent of sowing minefields along their frontiers. Crossborder
trade was severely affected, as was agriculture, particularly where grazing
and irrigation channels had crossed political boundaries. Despite an increase
in border posts and personnel, drugsmuggling and terrorist infiltration
continued.

In July 2000,
the IMU had returned to the Tavildara Valley and begun the process of infiltrating
across the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Their strategy was twofold:
first, to launch attacks against the security forces of the two republics,
and second, to smuggle weapons and ammunition to their sleepers so as to
orchestrate a terror campaign from within Uzbekistan. If co-ordinated,
this would result in the IMU being able to maintain a year-round resistance
rather than relying on a summer campaign alone. By August, they had initiated
a series of surprise attacks with units between 100 and 200 strong in southern
Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan's Sukhandarya Province. Once again, Sukh and
Vorukh provided useful staging posts to attack targets in the Ferghana
Valley.

The foray into
south-eastern Uzbekistan was a new departure but one that was ultimately
doomed. The 170 insurgents initially contented themselves with the establishment
of a small base before making an attack on local Uzbek forces. They executed
an ambush against a newly trained Special Forces unit with particular effectiveness,
killing ten men. However, they were pursued with vigour and were eventually
besieged in their base. After a month of bombardment and sniping, the position
was stormed and only a handful escaped alive. No prisoners were taken.
The incident revealed that, as with many jihadist fighters, there can sometimes
be a preference for a sacrificial stand as opposed to classic guerrilla
tactics. Once pinned to a position, they were vulnerable to the heavy weapons
of regular Uzbek forces and were destroyed. It was clear from this episode
and other aspects of the 2000 campaign that the IMU killed its own wounded
rather than letting them fall into the hands of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments,
to whom they might have 'talked'.

The treatment
of local people by the Uzbek authorities reveals that hearts and minds
are not high on their list of priorities. Uzbek herders from Sukhandarya
Province alerted the security forces to the presence of the IMU unit, but
the authorities were slow to react and accused the herders of selling produce
to the insurgents. Destroying their flocks, they forcibly moved the locals
into camps where the conditions were so bad that some died of the cold.
A few who spoke out about their plight were beaten up, and, the following
year, 73 were arrested on the charge of subversion or assisting terrorists.19

One IMU unit
had been dispatched deep inside Uzbekistan to attack the holiday resort
of Bostanlyk some 100 kilometres north of Tashkent. When fifteen insurgents
attacked and killed four soldiers and took four hostages, there was panic.
No fewer than 4,000 civilians were evacuated. After pitched battles with
the insurgents, the Uzbek security forces eventually wiped them out. Once
again, this incident revealed some limitations in the Uzbeks' ability to
offer security to the population, but it also indicated that even the most
daring raids by the IMU were vulnerable if they fixed themselves to a location.
There is no evidence that they made any attempt to win the support of the
people, and yet, as Mao posited so succinctly, any guerrilla war is absolutely
dependent upon insurgents being able to move among a supportive civilian
population as 'fish through water'. For all the dedication of the jihadists,
this fundamental failure to understand the practice of successful guerrilla
warfare condemned them to failure.

Other operations
in 2000 revealed further weaknesses. In Kyrgyzstan's Batken Province, inept
IMU attacks on army outposts left 25 insurgents dead and inflicted only
24 casualties. The inexperienced if enthusiastic volunteers were then hunted
by us-trained Special Forces. On 11 August, one IMU team managed to ambush
a Kyrgyz army patrol and killed 22 men (although it is possible that the
wounded were murdered). The following day they kidnapped members of a climbing
expedition, including four Americans and a Kyrgyz soldier. While being
pursued by Kyrgyz Special Forces, the kidnappers murdered the soldier but
gradually released their captives. Intercepted by 130 troops, the IMU detachment
tried to fight it out: six of them were killed and two captured. One of
the prisoners confessed to being a rapist on the run from the police, while
the other claimed that he had only enlisted for the money. Of the survivors
who fled to the Tajik border, their leader, Sabir, was shot by Tajik border
guards. Among the IMU equipment that was captured was a video of the insurgent
group. Many of the volunteers, some of whom now lay dead, were very young,
and they were clearly drawn from across Central Asia. The fact that some
were Chechens may help to explain the tactics, but the profile of the fighters
in the video also suggests that simply being 'a fighter' may be as important
as any ideological justifications. For all the rhetoric, jihadist recruits
reflect common patterns of enlistment around the world.

As the winter
of 2000 approached, Namangani's men once again pulled out of Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan, having lost at least 150 of their fighters. The IMU was
no nearer its goal of toppling the governments or of creating their beloved
caliphate. If they congratulated themselves for defying the republics as
they pulled back into Afghanistan for a second time, then they failed to
acknowledge that the campaign of 2000 had merely hardened the resolve o{
the governments. Indeed, the IMU operations had only succeeded in convincing
other powers of the urgent need to assist the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz against
terrorism. The us, for example, which had no particular affection for Karimov's
regime, felt compelled to condemn the IMU as a terrorist organization because
of the kidnapping incident, and it stepped up its assistance programme.
The Clinton administration had already taken military action against AI-Qaeda
in Sudan and Afghanistan, and the IMU'S links with bin Laden reinforced
its concerns. Russia, Turkey, France and China all sent counter-insurgency
equipment; China donated night-vision equipment and sniper rifles. Russia
offered Uzbekistan $30,000,000 in weapons, including 30 armored personnel
carriers, Mi-8 helicopters and radios. Russia also convened a joint strategy
meeting although this was marred by suspicions between the Central Asian
governments.

In the winter
of 2000, the IMU continued to co-operate with the Taliban and integrate
its efforts with Al-Qaeda. Reinforced with more recruits, the organization
rose to a strength of 2,000 men including Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Arabs,
Afghans and Uighurs from Xinjiang. Six hundred fighters were deployed in
support of the Taliban, which itself was in the region of fifteen thousand
strong. A third of these were 'foreign', including 4,000 from Pakistan
and 600 members of bin Laden's 055 Arab Brigade. Backed with heavy artillery,
armour and aircraft, and assisted by Pakistan's ISI and Special Services
Group, the Taliban made a concerted effort to defeat Masoud decisively
in the north-east of Afghanistan. Taloqan, Masoud's headquarters, had fallen
on 5 September after a siege lasting one month, and his resistance was
now pushed into the very fringes of the country. The Taliban and their
foreign allies were delighted: eager to prove that the strength of their
Muslim brotherhood was irresistible, they convinced themselves that no
force could stand in their way. Some argued that, having beaten the Soviet
Union and the United Front (or Northern Alliance, as it was known in the
West) in the Afghan Civil War, and having humiliated America in Somalia,
they could proceed to defeat Russia in Chechnya and destroy the us. The
seeds of 9/n were thus already being sown. This contact with extremists
in Afghanistan further radicalized the IMU: some Pakistanis and Arabs,
eager to gain more jibadist credentials, offered to serve alongside Namangani's
men, but many members of Sipah-i-Sabah and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi who joined
up had reputations for atrocities and massacres that would do the IMU'S
cause no good at all.

As Al-Qaeda
gained greater publicity for its global terrorism, there was a corresponding
growth of interest in the plight of the anti-Taliban resistance. Tajikistan
was particularly alarmed by Masoud's defeat. The us and Russia imposed
sanctions against any supply of arms to the Taliban in January 2001, and
there was growing pressure on Mullah Omar to surrender bin Laden. China
demanded that its ally Pakistan should insist that Uighur fighters be expelled
from radical madrassahs and from the Taliban. Thus prompted by Islamabad,
the Taliban simply moved its Uighur contingents over to the 'independent'
IMU. Equally, when Musharraff insisted that the members of Sipah-i-Sabah
and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi be extradited for crimes and murders inside Pakistan,
the Taliban moved them to the IMU too. A Russian demand to have Chechens
handed over was dealt with in the same way.

Intelligence
reports that Namangani had returned to Tajikistan in November 2000 prompted
Uzbek demands for his extradition, and they reinforced the diplomatic pressure
by cutting crucial gas supplies in the depths of winter. They also insisted
that Tajikistan create a land corridor to Sukh. Meanwhile, mining and wiring
of the border areas continued, while Tajik nationals, suspected of terrorist
sympathies, were deported, even though they were ethnically Uzbek. The
Tajik government responded with some hostility, expressing irritation that
Tajik dissidents such as Col. Makhmud Khudoyberdiev (who had led a raid
into the country in 1998) remained at large in Uzbekistan. The spat over
extraditions was resolved when the Tajik government persuaded Namangani
and his fighters to withdraw to Afghanistan for the third time. The Uzbeks
nevertheless believed that, not only were the Tajiks actually in league
with the IMU (through IRP contacts) but that Russia too was secretly supporting
the IMU against the republics. Karimov perhaps did not acknowledge the
fragility of the Tajik government and the limits of its authority. Not
did he appear to appreciate the strained relations between factions in
Tajikistan caused by the presence of the IMU. The use of Russian aircraft
was not evidellce of a conspiracy against Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan either.
Russian-Tajik border units did not want to engage the IMU or spark an unnecessary
conflict with their allies the Taliban. However, Uzbek concerns that Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan might be backing the group as a means of gaining greater
influence in Central Asia was not so far-fetched. At least, that had been
the original intention. The problem for both of these countries was that,
not for the first time, they had lost control of their protégés.

In the summer
of 2001, the Taliban went on the offensive against Masoud and the IMU resumed
their attacks on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Batken region of southern
Kyrgyzstan bore the brunt American assistance encouraged the IMF to offer
its support, having pulled out earlier in the year because of the country's
economic crisis. When the American-led Coalition forces swept the Taliban
out of power, and the United Front opposition, including Uzbekistan's favored
warlord, Dostum, took control of Afghanistan, the Russians and the Uzbeks
were relieved. Namangani had chosen to fight alongside the Taliban, hoping,
no doubt, to replay the war against the Soviets. But the IMU leader miscalculated
the Americans' military power, with apparently fatal results. It is thought
he was killed in one of the devastating American air strikes that characterized
the three-week conflict.20

For a time,
Namangani's movement was clearly defeated. The remnants of the IMU fled,
like many other Taliban fighters, into the tribal border areas of Pakistan
where they could be sure of support from hard-line Pushtuns. However, Operation
Enduring Freedom had scattered the movement and broken down its finance,
smuggling, and command-and-control networks. Some of its members ended
up in Kashmir (hosted by the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba), others
made their way back to Tajikistan (particularly Khushad, Khevaspor and
Ayvanj in Gorno-Badakhshan), while the sleeper cells remained in existence
in the Ferghana Valley. In late 2001, the IMU was re-titled the IMT in
a gesture designed to widen its appeal, demonstrate its solidarity with
non-Uzbeks, and clarify its aim to remove the national borders in Central
Asia. The movement remained hors de combat until December 2002, when bombs
were detonated in the Oberon market of Bishkek. The choice of target suggests
that the IMT was not strong enough to penetrate the security of the border
or take on the government. Indeed, the relative isolation of the incident
illustrated that, despite their desire to keep resistance alive, this was
a shadow of their strength in 19992000, when they had launched so many
attacks. On 8 May 2003, there was another bomb attack in Kyrgyzstan, this
time outside Bakay Bank in the city of Osh. It was thought that the perpetrators
were two Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley.

Since 2003,
the Taliban and the IMT have been able to recover some of their strength
and organization. In the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province,
an Islamist coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, governs the area. One
of its constituents is the Jamat-i-Ulema Islami, a Deobandi ideological
movement that backed the Taliban and the IMT. With detachments still in
Kashmir, Afghanistan and eastern Tajikistan, the Pakistan border area represents
its most secure haven. Already hard pressed to track down Al-Qaeda and
jihadist Pakistani groups, the authorities in Pakistan do not have the
resources to devote to locating IMT members as well. Using narcotics contacts
built up in the late 1990S, the IMT has been able to re-establish some
of its networks. Uzbekistan was subjected to a wave of terrorist attacks
in the spring of 2003, including gun battles with Uzbek police. Then, in
a new departure, fifteen suicide bombers attacked at several locations
around the country. Thirty-three other IMU fighters were killed." In July
2004, the American and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General's
office in Tashkent were also attacked by suicide bombers. Three guards
were killed and nine others wounded. The Uzbek security forces sealed off
the capital with roadblocks and vehicle searches, but, in parallel with
events in Afghanistan, the advent of suicide bombing was a clear indication
that tactics employed elsewhere in the Middle East and promoted by Al-Qaeda
had finally been imported to Central Asia. A group calling itself the Islamic
Jehad of Uzbekistan claimed responsibility for the attacks, but this may
be a front name for the IMT'S foreign personnel or IIF allies. These foreign
elements include Chechen fighters, Arabs and Pakistani jihadists from the
Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami.

In a predictable
statement in September 2006, Yuldeshev announced that the IMT remained
strong. He threatened revenge against Russia as well as the Central Asian
republics, using the rhetorio usually associated with Al-~eda, but there
was a reference to the Andijan shootings of 2005 which involved Uzbek security
forces. Yuldeshev claimed the IMT was committed to bringing to an end the
oppression of ordinary Muslims, thereby trying to make a specific link
between the people of Central Asia and the fighters. Despite the presence
of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics
still lack the means to combat terrorists, and co-operation between the
republics remains limited, although China agreed to assist Tajikistan in
training exercises in September 2006. Two Americans have been killed in
Afghanistan by the IMT, and kidnapping for ransom is still a favoured tactic.
It is also alleged that, now that Iran feels encircled by Western forces
in Afghanistan and Iraq, its intelligence services have been secretly supporting
insurgent groups, from Muqtada al-Sadr's Shia militia in southern Iraq
to the IMT in eastern Tajikistan. The discovery of Iranian-made explosives
and bombs by British forces in Iraq would appear to confirm these suspicions.
It may also be true that, having found a common cause in Iraq, the exchange
of expertise and a flow of funds and logistics may follow. Nevertheless,
the IMT still has a chance to win support from the Uzbek public if the
government fails to deliver economic improvements or political concessions.
Karimov believes that Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamist organizations simply
recruit for IMT by indoctrinating young men with their extremist interpretation
of Islam. There may be some truth in this fear, but critics of the regime
argue that, until the government ceases to suppress or muzzle the voice
of the opposition, the situation will not improve.