Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag

miles-verlag@t-online.de

Parameters, Autumn 2015, Vol. 45, Nr. 3

War Without Fighting? The Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan Seen Through the Lens of Strategic Thought By Uwe Hartmann Reviewed by Daniel J. Glickstein, Corporal, US Army National
Guard, Research Analyst, and National Security Education Program (Boren) Scholarship recipient

War Without Fighting by German officer Uwe Hartmann emphasizes the primacy of reintegration in resolving protracted conflicts. Reintegration here is defined as “the process by which ex-combatants
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”(9) Hartmann’s work nestles within the existing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration field, but adds a key twist by
insisting policy-makers pursue reintegration during a conflict, instead of waiting until hostilities have ceased. His additional expertise on Carl von Clausewitz and a chapter devoted to
civil-military relations are welcome bonuses in his book. Counterinsurgency, Reintegration, Kinetic Operations? Hartmann asserts the failure to connect counterinsurgency (COIN) with a broader,
overarching political strategy has been a critical shortcoming in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Reintegration should not be a means to COIN, but instead COIN should be a means to
support reintegration. Reintegration, in order to be successful, must be seen as the overall political concept that directs COIN.” (70) This line of thinking echoes similar COIN-phrases such as
the importance of connecting military and political aims, and the idea that you “can’t kill yourself out of an insurgency.” But Hartmann’s work shines when fleshing out subtler concepts within
the reintegration process. Moving beyond catchphrases and mantras, Hartmann devotes careful attention to the social science underpinning support or mistrust in insurgencies. Beginning at the
basic level, he discusses how government legitimacy and capability (or lack thereof) can make or break popular support. He then moves further into detailing the side-effects of negative
capability and legitimacy. These detract from popular perception and create skepticism and lead to hedging. Perception is my preferred term for the much-maligned “hearts and minds” phrase. Put
simply, how populations perceive the ruling govern- ments will directly impact their actions. This phrasing is also useful in clarifying the chain of action here; positive or negative government
actions dictate the population’s perception. It is an input-output rela tionship, and trying to bolster community relations without changing the actual government will do nothing to solve
underlying problems.

Hedging is tackled later: when a new government is faltering and its stability is unclear, “the buy-in of local leaders may remain limited, so long as they perceive a need to hedge their
communities against insurgents.” (23) This is a logical thought, and one seen especially often in Afghanistan (the example cited in the book is of an Afghan family who has one son in the Taliban
and one in the Afghan National Army), yet it has garnered hushed discussion at best. This hedging behavior explains the tug-of-war between insurgents and government forces, and is a topic
well-worth further study. But there is no “critical mass” within a specific area for insurgents to win or lose. Every case is subjective, and there is no mathematic formula to predict when
popular support will shift. For example, rural Afghan villagers in a region with a limited Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence are at high-risk of being intimidated and harmed at
night by insurgents. Hearts and minds are irrelevant here; when civilians are facing mortal danger on a regular basis they are unlikely to unfurl an Afghan flag and proclaim full support for the
government. Filling in the Blanks Given the situational nature of low-intensity conflicts and reintegration processes, developing universal laws and guidance can be stumbling blocks. As seen with
American counter-insurgency doctrine, theorists can develop broad statements, but no one can write standard operating procedures for one thousand different situations with guarantees of
appropriateness and success. Thus, Hartmann’s work leaves us with a sturdy platform to conduct further thinking, research, and writing. His overall thesis is the primacy of reintegration is
useful and correct. Yet the devil is in the details, and future practitioners will have to forge ahead themselves and discover unique approaches; for example, how to pursue transitional justice
regarding human rights violations while reintegrating enemy forces into a new government.