Ten:
Reconcilable Differences

A
decade ago, the Carleton
University school of journalism
asked 1,300 voting age persons
across the country, "Where
does your first loyalty
lie -- with Canada or with
the province in which you
live?" Approximately 74
percent of them said Canada,
while 26 percent chose their
province. The percentages
for the Atlantic region
were 66/34; for Québec,
53/47; for Ontario,
90/10; and for Western Canada
80/20. Roger Gibbins, a
University of Calgary professor,
conducted a national survey
on the same topic in April,
1983. Nationally, 73 percent
of the respondents said
that they thought of themselves
first as Canadians; 17 percent
first as provincial residents.
Eight percent refused to
choose or stated an equal
preference, and two percent
did not have an opinion.

Again
in late 1989 a Decima/Maclean’s
magazine survey of 1,500
adults in all provinces
on whether they considered
themselves first as Canadians
or as citizens of their
province, gave the following
results:

Percentage
of respondents who indicated
first loyalty to:

Canada

Province

All
Canada

73

26

British
Columbia

83

17

Alberta

74

24

Saskatchewan

83

16

Manitoba

84

15

Ontario

90

9

Québec

44

55

New
Brunswick

75

25

Nova
Scotia

63

37

Newfoundland

47

53

Few
Outer Canadians would be
surprised that Ontarians
were the most loyal to their
country; many would say
that Ottawa’s close and
continuous attention to
Ontarian interests since
1867 is responsible for
this attitude. An equally
plausible interpretation
of the Carleton survey,
of course, is that Ontarians
make no real distinction
between their province and
the country as a whole.
This might explain why they
have the strongest sense
of being Canadians and have
little sensitivity to inter-regional
tensions.

On
the other hand, the reply
of Québec and Newfoundland
residents alike suggested
a greater loyalty to their
province than to their country.
Sixty per cent of the Quebeckers
surveyed thought it likely
that their province would
choose to separate if the
Meech Lake accord failed
to be accepted. With its
collapse on June 23, 1990,
there are increasing indications
that French-speaking Québeckers
see themselves as rejected
by "English Canada" as a
federal partner.

Being
attached to one’s province
or region need not reduce
allegiance to Canada; dual
loyalties should be complementary;
never should there be conflict.
Québeckers and Newfoundlanders
unfortunately now appear
for various historical,
cultural, linguistic and
constitutional reasons to
have exceptional provincial
loyalties not typical of
other Canadians. In my experience,
Canadians who are the most
sensitive to provincial,
multicultural and language
diversity often hold the
strongest sense of being
Canadian.

Canada
is among the world’s longest
practitioners of federalism.
A unitary form of government
would never meet the needs
of a country as geographically,
linguistically and culturally
diversified as ours. Yet,
regional differences and
priorities require much
better public expression
in Parliament if the central
institution of our national
government is to reflect
all parts of the country.
Regional voices are frequently
suffocated by rigid party
discipline and the entrenched
habit of all three national
caucuses to maintain a close
eye on what opinion leaders
in Toronto-Ottawa-Montréal
regard as the national interest
on any issue. The constant
priority of most MPs in
our House of Commons is
to defend or attack the
government of the day. Therefore,
regional concerns usually
fail to be expressed because
it might fracture the unity
each party wants to project
during the partisan wars
waged daily in the House.
Nor can one consider the
Senate in its present form
as a forum where legitimate
regional interests can be
voiced. No one in the Senate,
except Stanley Waters, today
represents anyone except
him or herself. In practice,
the loyalty of most senators
today is to the prime minister
and political party through
which they gained virtually
life-time membership in
the best-paid club on earth.

Neither
chamber of the Canadian
Parliament today encourages
the articulate expression
of regional concerns that
the national legislature
of a federation must provide.
Accordingly provincial governments
years ago assumed the task
of defending regional aspirations,
not only on areas of provincial
constitutional responsibility
but in relation to matters
such as interest rates,
federal procurement policy
and tariffs, which are squarely
within Ottawa’s jurisdiction.
In doing so, the provincial
governments discharge no
constitutional responsibility:
they are elected to deal
with problems within the
provincial jurisdiction,
not to be regional voices
in the formulation of national
policy. This function should
be provided in the Parliament
of Canada, probably most
effectively by a reformed
upper chamber.

In
the United States a host
of factors, including economic
diversification in most
regions, an enormous mobility
of population, and a gradual
weakening of the financial
and legislative powers of
state governments, have
"nationalized" the thinking
of most Americans. Conversely,
regionalism is an enduring,
and probably now ascendant,
fact of Canadian life. Opinion
leaders in Inner Canada
who say that Canadians should
stop being so attached to
their province or local
communities misread the
nature of Canada. They thereby
probably contribute to a
significant degree to the
reduction of national cohesion
across Outer Canada. Our
country is far more than
Joe Clark’s "community of
communities," but trivializing
provincial attachments doesn’t
enhance the building of
a stronger national unity.

Federal
System

Our
federal system, to the regret
of many Inner Canadians
and of some Outer Canadians
as well, evolved in the
opposite direction from
that of our southern neighbour.
In 1867, the northern model
was intended by its founders
to be a blend of the British
and American models with
a very strong tilt in favour
of Ottawa dominating the
provinces. Most Fathers
of Confederation, including
John A. Macdonald, saw a
strong central government
as necessary for political
and economic survival. As
the Toronto political scientist,
Donald Smiley, has pointed
out, "the provinces were
to be in precisely the same
constitutional relation
to the federal government
as the individual colonies
of British North America
had been to the Imperial
authorities." The BNA Act
rejected the earlier American
constitutional model with
its emphasis on a comparatively
weak national government
and stress on the rights
of individual states. Without
the determination of earlier
Québeckers, for example,
provincial legislators might
not even have gained jurisdiction
over education, language
and property rights.

The
re-shaping of Canadian federalism
distinctly away from the
preferences of its architects
began with the successful
campaign for greater provincial
rights waged by Oliver Mowat,
Liberal Premier of Ontario
between 1872 and 1896, and
continued with the election
in 1896 of the Liberal party
led by Wilfrid Laurier on
a policy of provincial rights.
Until his defeat in 1911,
Laurier enjoyed a harmony
in his relations with provincial
governments that has probably
never existed before or
since. Subsequently, during
both World Wars and the
Great Depression, Ottawa
massively reasserted its
dominance. After 1945, it
began using its unlimited
spending power to encroach
at will on areas of provincial
jurisdiction. An exception
was the case of Québec:
for many years, Premier
Maurice Duplessis refused
to allow provincial universities
to accept Ottawa funds for
post-secondary education.
Canada’s federalism in these
decades closely paralleled
what was happening in the
United States, but by the
1960s, in the words of Roger Gibbins, Canada’s "national
government, unlike its American
counterpart, was in rapid
retreat across a broad jurisdictional
field, as provincial governments
began to remake the face
of Canadian federalism."

Macdonald’s
dream of a triumphant Ottawa
government began to unravel
due to a series of decisions
taken by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in
Britain. Until 1949, the
Judicial Committee was Canada’s
final court of appeal in
civil matters. It took the
view that the undoubted
intention of Canada’s founders
to form a national Parliament
and government dealing with
subordinate provinces was
irrelevant. The late constitutional
expert Frank Scott detected
twenty-one additional provincial
powers created after 1867
by judicial decision. Ottawa’s
constitutional right to
regulate trade and commerce
(which in the U.S. was inflated
by federal courts to the
point of swamping state
legislative authority) was
eventually divested of substance.
Most federal social legislation
passed by Parliament during
1935 in the spirit of the
New Deal was also struck
down by the Judicial Committee.
Since 1949, under the influence
of centralizing personalities
like Chief Justice Bora Laskin, the Supreme Court
of Canada, now having the
final constitutional word,
moved briskly to strengthen
the remaining federal authority.
By then, however, the die
was cast in favour of strong
provincial prerogatives.

A
second influence favouring
the strengthening of our
provincial legislatures
and governments resulted
from another factor: a great
number of extra-constitutional
practices have developed
outside the reach of our
Supreme Court, most notably
in the realm of federal-provincial
tax spending arrangements.
In the fiscal year 1989-90,
federal transfer payments
to provincial territorial
and municipal governments
exceeded $34.4 billion,
including $7.3 billion in
equalization payments or
transfers from wealthier
to poorer provinces, and
more than $19 billion for
provincial health care and
post-secondary education,
$4.8 billion for the Canada
Assistance Plan under which
provincial and municipal
governments assist needy
persons for certain welfare
and health services, and
$10.5 billion in unconditional
tax grants. Since most shared-cost
programs fall in areas within
provincial jurisdiction,
Ottawa’s ability to have
a say over them has been
limited. Due to differing
provincial priorities, there
is a considerable variety
in the nature and cost of
these programs.

In
1964 the government of Jean Lesage, determined to reinforce
provincial authority as
part of Québec’s "Quiet
Revolution," mounted major
pressure to exclude Ottawa
from spending money in areas
within provincial jurisdiction.
The first Québec-Canada
agreement permitting the
province to opt out of such
programs with compensation
was signed in the mid-1960s.

A
different situation arose
in Québec in 1976: the Parti
Québécois took office with
an overwhelming majority,
determined to withdraw the
province from Confederation.
For more than a century,
most Québec premiers had
sought vigorously to defend
their provincial autonomy,
particularly in the areas
of language and culture,
by protecting from Ottawa
encroachment any powers
assigned by the BNA Act
to the provincial jurisdiction.
This status quo vanished
with the advent of René
Levesque as premier. Overnight,
the colonial constitutional
model of 1867 had fewer
supporters amongst Outer
Canadians, who felt that
the national government
functioned primarily by
and for Inner Canadians.
In the face of a mounting
provincial resurgence, Ottawa’s
legislative and financial
power was waning again in
something of an uneven retreat.
In the mid- 1970s, Ottawa
was making large fiscal
transfers to the provinces
without any conditions attached.
The best known exception
to this federal retreat
was the National Energy
Program of late 1980 which
evoked little enthusiasm
among Western Canadians
for the restoration of a
strong central government
in Ottawa.

Another
reason for the decreasing
support among Outer Canadians
for a strongly centralized
national government was
the insensitivity of our
federal institutions to
regional interests. Most
notably the House of Commons
and the Senate have not
provided effective regional
representation to Outer
Canadians. The American
federal system developed
towards centralization partly
because its Senate took
to heart the interests of
residents of smaller states.
With two senators from Alaska
(with approximately 534,000
residents) and two from
California (with 29.3 million
residents), the American
Senate is seen as providing
political clout to states
that lack weight in the
House of Representatives.
There the large states dominate
because its composition
is based merely on population.
Not so in the Senate: long-serving
Senator Quinten Burdick
from tiny North Dakota,
for example, is chairman
of an important legislative
committee and is seen as
someone who fights effectively
for his voters every day
of the year. It is also
important to note that on
issues involving inter-state
rights, U.S. senators promote
the interests of their voters,
not those of their state’s
governments.

Components
of the CF-18 aircraft are
reportedly manufactured
in 42 of the 50 states.
The resulting American perception
of regional fair play is
understandable. Similarly,
Washington’s mammoth Super-Collider
project was awarded last
year to a community in rural
Texas. No Canadian anywhere
would believe that the Mulroney
government would award a
project of comparable importance
to a location outside the Toronto-Ottawa-Montréal
triangle. Every Outer Canadian
knows that the Mulroney
cabinet awarded the CF-
18 maintenance contract
to Canadair of Montréal
despite a better and lower
bid by Winnipeg’s Bristol
Aerospace. It has also postponed
both the polar ice-breaker
contract for Vancouver and
the promised construction
of a natural gas pipeline
to Victoria.

Congress

Congressmen,
representing single member
geographical districts after
1842, became important vehicles
for injecting local interests
into their national government
in both its administrative
and legislative branches.
The first loyalty of every
congressman is to his or
her district just as that
of senators is to their
state. In the words of one
political analyst, "The
first concern of every congressman
seems to be how to get as
much as he can out of the
nation for his own state."
Such an assertion could
hardly be made of Canadian
Members of Parliament.

In
turn, successful American
presidents, being elected
by voters everywhere, seek
to reflect in their person
the diversity of their entire
nation by shaking off all
personal regional colouration.
In our own country, there
is a serious question today
as to whether a resident
of other than our three
officially favoured cities,
Toronto, Montréal and Ottawa,
could lead any political
party to a majority in a
general election.

The
constitutional separation
of powers between the executive
and legislative branches
and the weakness of party
discipline in congressional
voting behaviour greatly
enhance effective regional
representation in Washington.
Presidents and congressmen
are elected for fixed terms
and none resign if a particular
measure is voted down in
the Senate or House of Representatives.
The congressional system
also provides the freedom
for effective territorial
representation when an issue
has clear state implications.
Congressmen depart frequently
from party lines to represent
state interests; elected
persons in the American
capital don’t hesitate to
place their state or district
interests ahead of their
respective party line when
voting.

Even
the definition of ‘a party
unity vote’ in The Congressional
Quarterly is astonishing
to Canadian Members of Parliament:
"when at least 51 per cent
of the members of one party
vote against more than 51
per cent of the other."
Between the years 1975 to
1982, during much of which
the Democrats controlled
the White House and both
Houses of Congress, the
Quarterly notes that
party unity votes occurred
in only 44.2 per cent of
all recorded Senate votes
and in only 39.8 percent
of votes in the House of
Representatives. Weak party
discipline in Washington
enhances the continuing
importance of regional influences
in the American capital.

My
own experience with our
House of Commons since 1979
is that MPs from all three
parties vote in solid blocs
on almost every issue. Government
members do so from fear
that a lost vote on a measure
will be deemed by their
prime minister as a loss
of confidence. This stems
from the early to mid-nineteenth
century British concept
that a government falls
if it loses the support
of a majority in the Commons
on any vote. It has now
been largely abandoned in
the UK and other Commonwealth
countries.

Canadian
MPs have represented, on
average, about 87,000 individuals
since the 1988 election.
In practice, few of them
have any real opportunity
to put their constituents’
interests first in votes
in the House of Commons.
Real power is concentrated
in the hands of the three
party leaderships. Canadian
democracy itself would benefit
substantially if we put
our present mind-numbing
party discipline where it
belongs -- in the history
books.

Another
feature of the congressional
system in the U.S. that
fosters effective regional
input in national policy
making is territorial bloc-voting
-- something quite unknown
in Canada’s House of Commons.
The weakness of party discipline
in Congress is one of several
factors encouraging the
formation of regional voting
blocs that cross party lines.
Thus legislation detrimental
to regional interests can
be opposed without fear
of the government being
defeated, and an early election
being called. Representatives
from the two political parties
of the Mountain states,
Sun Belt states, New England
states and others vote en
bloc or work together in
committees to advance common
constituency interests.

A
good example of how regional
representatives can influence
the geographic location
of federal government procurement,
which affects the geographic
distribution of the manufacturing
sector, is the Southern
congressional influence.
It played a major role in
the post-war concentration
of federal military and
space expenditures in the
South and in the general
economic revival and growth
of the Sun Belt. If bloc-voting
occurred in our House of
Commons, possibly through
the enactment of a fixed
four year term in office,
we might see some measures
detrimental to Outer Canadians
voted down when MPs would
cross party lines to put
the interests of their regions
first.

A
related feature of the congressional
system in the U.S. is the
committee system. Congressional
committees and their investigative
staffs, together with congressional
control over departmental
programs and budgets allow
Congressmen to fulfil their
responsibility of supervising
the executive branch with
a vigour that is virtually
unknown in Canada. Canadian
parliamentary committees
are, in practice, mostly
still dominated by party
whips and the committee
chairmen mostly government-chosen
for their obedience rather
than for any ability or
special knowledge as independent
policy-makers. Approximately
300 American House, Senate
and Joint House-Senate committees
and sub-committees provide
real clout to their members.

It
is really at committee meetings
rather than on the floor
of the House or Senate that
American legislators play
major political roles. Full
regional representation
is also provided directly
in the composition of committees
because on the House side
almost 40 per cent of committee
seats are reserved for members
of specific states. In the
discharge of their important
oversight role over the
executive branch, Congressmen
and Senators have numerous
tools -- some say too many
-- to promote regional and
local causes, including
large personal staffs and
large numbers of investigative
personnel who work directly
for committees. American
public officials can be
summoned to committees on
short notice -- and in practice
must reply to most questions.
Their federal counterparts
in Canada can be called
through subpoena, but are
still not compelled to provide
information which came to
them in their official capacity.
In theory, at least, a Canadian
Deputy Minister can still
refuse to say anything of
substance to a Commons or
Senate committee.

The
American oversight function,
which has opened up the
national administration
to territorial representation,
is really only effective
because individual congressmen
have weight in their own
right. Some American analysts,
Roger Gibbins notes, have
concluded "that federal
agencies are, if anything,
too sensitive to state desires
rather than not sensitive
enough. No such charge could
be levelled at federal agencies
in Canada." Again, one remedy
for the Canadian disease
in this area might be fixed
term parliaments for, say,
four years. A reformed and
elected Senate is also vital
here. Its elected members
could attack and defend
the government on grounds
other than party loyalty
if they were not under the
thumbs of party whips. If
the Canadian cabinet were
not responsible to a reformed
Senate this would also boost
Senate independence.

House
of Commons

The
House of Commons in Ottawa
correctly reflects the nation’s
majority will on a representation
by population basis. Yet
few Members of Parliament
have provided effective
regional voices in it since
the dawn of the twentieth
century when voting in party
blocs became de rigeur
for all MPs. In our
present political culture,
if a government or opposition
MP’s loyalty to his province
clashes with the instructions
of his party whip, putting
constituents’ or regional
considerations first in
his way of voting implies
considerable risk to his
prospects for party advancement.
Regional or state cross-party
voting, as exists in the
American Congress, is virtually
non-existent in our House
of Commons. The situation
is only a little better
in House committees because
they are too weak and too
much lacking in publicity
to have any real impact
on policy. That the committees
are essentially impotent
in policy-making is illustrated
by the fact that, since
1969 to the best of my knowledge,
only one $10,000 item of
proposed Ottawa spending
has ever been deleted by
any of numerous committees
considering the annual budgetary
estimates. The sum in issue
had reportedly already been
spent when the committee
rejected it.

In
short, Canadian MPs, in
Leon Epstein’s devastating
phrase, today "function
in effect as members of
an electoral college that
is in more or less continuous
session between general
elections." The respective
party leaders require only
the brute votes of their
MPs; in consequence they
are essentially passive
observers in the formulation
and administration of most
national policy. Backbench
MPs in Canada are far less
able to represent regional
interests effectively than
are their counterparts in
Washington where the congressional
system provides the freedom
for effective regional representation
when an issue has clear
regional implications. The
heretical but serious question
is whether a model closer
to the congressional one
would not serve Canadians
generally better at the
end of the twentieth century.
Defenders of "British Parliamentary
Democracy" have been numerous
over the years: suggestions
that the model itself might
be part of the problems
of Outer Canada have rarely
even been made.

There
are, of course, major flaws
in American Congressional
government, including unnecessary
log-rolling, mammoth delays
in committees, and vast
costs associated with enhancing
interregional harmony. The
best solution to problems
of representative democracy
in Canada might be to adopt
attractive features from
various systems. In Britain,
the matter of Parliament
itself has evolved significantly
away from some of its earlier
twentieth century practices
still followed slavishly
in Canada. As the Regina
political scientist, John
Courtney, points out, backbench
government members since
the mid- l960s have shown
an increasing willingness
to defy their party whips.
Between 1974 and 1978, for
example, the government
of the day was defeated
123 times on its own legislation,
an average of one defeat
per government bill. Courtney
attributes this trend to
a changed sociological mix
in the British Parliamentary
parties. "The older, largely
subservient backbenchers
of the past have gradually
been replaced by younger,
more independent-minded
MPs... The goals and political
ambitions of these new members
in the parliamentary system
were soon matched by their
frustrations with Parliament,
and they have defied their
party’s leadership in increasing
numbers. The change has
been welcomed because it
introduced a healthy tension
into British parliamentary
politics and gave new credibility
to the role of the parliamentary
backbencher."

Senate
Reform

Many
Outer Canadians regard reform
of our upper house as an
issue whose time has finally
come after 123 years of
Confederation. An Angus
Reid-Southam poll completed
in the spring of 1990 found
that Senate reform was a
constitutional priority
to 53 per cent of British
Columbians, 64 per cent
of Albertans, 62 per cent
of residents of Saskatchewan!
Manitoba, and 46 per cent
of Atlantic Canadians. Among
Ontarians and Québeckers
surveyed in the same poll,
however, only 43 per cent
of the first and 37 per
cent of the second held
the same view.

All
premiers of the outer eight
provinces now appear to
support the concept of a
Triple E Senate. Since the
death of the Meech Lake
accord, moreover, the Vander
Zalm government, taking
the view that its ability
to have input on Senate
appointments is now gone,
has introduced legislation
to fill future senate vacancies
from British Columbia by
elections. There is also
pressure on the Getty government
to proceed once again to
the election of an Alberta
candidate to fill the next
senate vacancy anticipated
in Alberta.

The
case for a Triple-E Senate
is especially strong because
our country has a large
concentration of population
in two provinces. Following
the 1980 federal election
which returned Pierre Trudeau
as prime minister, Western
Canadians knew that none
of Ottawa’s important institutions
--the House of Commons,
the Senate, the prime minister
and the cabinet-- would
take their side on any issue.
Similarly, since the 1988
election many Atlantic Canadians
consider they have been
abandoned by the Mulroney
government. As to Northerners,
they have the feeling of
having been neglected by
every single government
in Ottawa.

The
legitimate interests of
the eight smaller provinces
and territories are rarely
afforded much attention
by the institutions of our
present national government.
Arguably, they continue
to demonstrate less sensitivity
to regional perspectives
on issues than is the case
for any other democratic
federation on earth. This
is probably why federal
politicians from Inner Canada
have successfully blocked
substantial change in Ottawa’s
institutions continuously
since 1867.

Virtually
all other federal democracies
entrench legislative protection
for smaller provinces through
an upper house. Ours was
fatally flawed from the
beginning. It is unelected
and therefore illegitimate
in democratic terms. A second
defect was its being unequal
in the representation from
each province. Any role
for the Canadian Senate
as an effective legislative
voice of Outer Canada thus
quickly atrophied. During
the l980s, setting the Ottawa
agenda on a host of issues
-- patriation of the constitution,
wage and price controls,
the Charter of Rights, the
National Energy Program,
free trade with the U.S.
-- became the exclusive
preserve of the House of
Commons, dominated both
numerically and psychologically
by MPs from Ontario and
Québec. Representation according
to population is essential
for the Commons, but our
long national experience
persistently calls for equal
representation from each
province in an upper house
that is urgently in need
of reform.

In
the American government
system, the Senate was established
as the primary vehicle for
regional representation
in the national government.
When conflicts occur between
Washington and the states,
senators defend the interests
of their states, playing
the role they were elected
to perform. In a more recent
development, many U.S. Senators
have become national political
figures, probably at the
expense of defending their
respective state interests
as was traditionally the
case. Our political system
still provides no mechanism
for effective representation
from Outer Canada. Canadian
senators provide no effective
representation from a regional
perspective because most
attempt to represent the
"national view" of the country
by transcending provincial
and regional interests.
More than a century of appointments
by Prime Ministers of mostly
party war-horses, hacks
and fund raisers from both
major political parties
has cumulatively delivered
a mortal blow to our Senate
as an institution.

Since
Senate reform is above all
designed to minimize the
obvious centre-periphery
cleavage in Canadian politics,
it has increasingly become
an Outer Canadian cause.
It was an important part
of the Alberta government’s
package of constitutional
reforms in 1987. Premier
Don Getty has so consistently
promoted the concept that
it is now perceived by the
public as a Western issue.
Despite numerous studies
and an estimated twenty-four
different proposals since
1967, Senate reform remains
a pipe dream, itself probably
the clearest indication
of the essential impotence
of Outer Canadians among
Ottawa policy circles. The
Prime Minister’s promise
of a fresh set of public
hearings by a House Committee
if the Meech Lake accord
had passed was only another
indication of how little
he understood or cared about
the issue.

The
Saskatchewan-raised Gordon
Robertson, a fellow-in-residence
at Ottawa’s Institute for
Research on Public Policy,
has a Western perspective
on reform of the upper chamber.
"If it was important, as
it was in 1968, to recognize
that the federal arrangements
and balance of 1867 were
no longer acceptable to
Québec and French Canada,
it is equally important
now to recognize that the
failure of the BNA Act to
give proper weight and representation
to the West in our national
Parliament is no longer
acceptable to that region.
As I see it, it is not simply
a matter of equity and justice,
although those are both
important. It is also the
fact that, until we remedy
this defect, our national
governments -- no matter
what their party basis may
be from time to time --
will have to govern in a
climate of western discontent
and against the pressures
of western governments that
speak for that discontent."

It
is also important in a post-Meech
Canada to deal with Western,
Atlantic and Northern causes
of discontent with our federal
balance and to listen to
the grievances of Outer
Canadians everywhere. In
a supplement to the report
of the Macdonald Commission
in 1985, Albert Breton of
Québec advanced a theory
that he calls competitive
federalism. In politics,
as well as in economics,
competition maximizes the
well-being of citizens,
he argued. The so-called
executive federalism with
its intergovernmental partnership
might not be an adequate
prescription for Canadians
in meeting the challenges
of the future. According
to Breton, "responsible
government plus federalism
is extended democracy simply
because there is more competition,"
and a reformed Senate will
work as a natural "monitor"
of this federal-provincial
competition.

The
major role of the reformed
Senate would be to give
prominence to the regional
dimensions of public policies.
It would primarily have
a "monitoring" function,
not only a representative
role. If the competition
over resources and policies
in the national government
is to be efficient, it is
essential that provincial
interests be competing with
each other on an equal footing.
It is no longer enough that
provincial interests be
represented appropriately
in national debates. "They
must be able," argued Breton,
"to vie with each other
on a basis of ‘competitive
equality’. Otherwise, the
checks and balances that
characterize national politics
will be biased against the
weaker provinces, even if
their points of view are
represented. A capacity
to compete is more than
a capacity to talk; it is
also, and radically, a capacity
to exert a real influence
on decisions. That is the
real meaning underlying
the notion of ‘monitored’
competition." The Senate
can only play this monitoring
role if it has legitimacy;
therefore, it must be elected.
With Breton, I favour such
a monitoring function for
a Senate constituted of
equal numbers of senators
for each province elected
at fixed intervals and for
fixed periods.

Australian
Model

The
Australian Triple-E Senate
provides a good model for
Canada today partly because,
like Canada, about two-thirds
of Australia’s population
live in two of its six states.
We also share a tradition
of parliamentary rather
than representative democracy.
The founding fathers from
Australia’s four smaller
states refused during the
1890s any form of federal
union unless it included
a second house representing
all states equally. Initially
in 1901, the Australian
Senate had six senators
from each state, all elected
by statewide ballots. Since
1906, half of them take
their seats on fixed dates
every three years. It still
holds equal powers with
the lower chamber, the House
of Representatives, except
for some limitations on
money bills. Changes in
its legislative authority,
but not the numbers of senators
from each state, can only
be made by a referendum
which produces an overall
majority of votes cast nationally
and majorities in any four
of the six states.

Between
1901 and 1949, however,
the Australian Senate did
not effectively advance
the interests of the smaller
states, overtaken as it
was by the national political
parties. Typically, these
were far more interested
in achieving cabinet dominance
over the business in both
houses than in advancing
regional interests. The
pressure for obedience grew
after 1900 with the rise
of the Australian Labour
party and its stress on
party discipline for its
members of parliament. In
response, two new parties
emerged: the Liberal party
in 1946, and its rural ally,
the National party in 1948.
Eventually the presence
in the senate of a large
majority of senators from
the two party alliances
and their respective whips
ensured that party loyalty
overrode loyalty to one’s
states in most Senate votes.
In consequence of this and
other factors, the upper
chamber had by the 1940s
become a refuge for party
hacks and was widely seen
as a failure.

In
1948, a Labour government,
quite unaware of the radical
consequences to follow,
introduced proportional
voting to elect senators
with grouping by parties
on the ballots. In essence,
the new system, like the
old, required voters to
rank candidates according
to preference. The preferences
were then added by a complex
arithmetical rule. Successful
candidates had to obtain
enough votes so that a party’s
share of the votes cast
corresponded with its share
of the seats won. For example,
the quota for election to
the Senate at a half-Senate
election is 17 per cent
of the votes cast.

As
a startling result, the
defects inherent in plurality
were reduced. (Electoral
systems such as Canada’s
first-past-the-post-wins
model could also benefit
from it.) Minor party and
independent senators suddenly
found themselves benefiting
from the flow of voters’
second or third preferences
on the ballots. By 1955,
a relatively even split
in Senate seats between
the two major groupings
gave independent and minor
party senators the balance
of power for the first time.
No government has had a
majority in the Senate except
from 1975 to 1978. It is
clearly abnormal to have
a majority in both houses.
By 1970, the new coalition
of political forces allowed
the creation of a Senate
committee system with real
clout.

By
the mid-1970s, the Australian
Senate had developed enough
confidence to attempt to
force the lower house into
an election. When the Governor
General, Sir John Kerr,
dismissed the Whitlam Labour
government in 1975, the
authority of the Senate
soared dramatically because
it had successfully affirmed
its right to refuse the
spending of money even to
the point of bringing down
the cabinet. In 1975 it
refused to pass the appropriations
unless Whitlam first agreed
to call a national election.
When he refused, Kerr dissolved
both the House and the Senate
in a double dissolution.
Since 1975, the Senate has
been an autonomous body
in the sense that because
minor parties hold the balance
of power the old line parties
cannot control its daily
agenda.

This
means, in practice, that
Australia’s national Parliament
does not practice responsible
government in the way Canada
and other parliamentary
democracies have done since
enacting reform bills at
different dates during the
nineteenth century. It is
a hybrid which, to many
Australians, is a better
system than responsible
government in the usual
sense. When, to take a recent
example, a majority in the
House of Representatives
prepared to introduce identity
cards for Australians, a
majority in Senate rejected
the measure with no immediate
consequences for the government
of Robert Hawke.

An
increasing number of Australians
vote for one of the major
parties in the lower house
but also for one of a number
of minor parties in their
Senate. The presence of
state-wide electoral contests
enhances voter support for
independent and minor party
candidates, albeit more
in some states than others.
The Australian Democrats
are strong in South Australia
and Victoria states. Western
Australia has become a fertile
ground for senators concerned
with single issues, including
the environment, and Queensland
tends to support the National
party. Tasmania has a long
tradition of electing independent
Senators. In short, the
Senate electoral system
in place since 1949 has
accommodated both regional
and partisan diversity well.

Another
advantage of proportional
voting in terms of regional
effectiveness is in the
recruitment of candidates.
The 1949 model has tended
to create two safe Senate
seats in each state for
the candidates at the top
of each major party list
at each half-Senate election.
Accordingly, vigorous competition
for these top spots on the
ballot lists has produced
increasingly good candidates
for party endorsement, further
enhancing the Senate as
a major player in the governing
process. Because the state
branches of the major parties,
rather than the leaders
of national parties, control
their candidate selection
process, prominent men and
women from the various states
have entered the national
Parliament. Today, there
are always talented and
forceful representatives
of state interests in the
Senate -- at least from
the parties other than Labour
-- even if the Australian
Senate is not a states house
in the sense intended by
Australia’s founders.

The
most important role of the
Australian Senate today
is to balance the executive
branch. As in Canada, it
appears that party discipline
has subordinated most activities
in the Australian lower
house to the wishes of cabinets.
The Australian Senate, however,
being powerful in its own
right, can effectively check
a cabinet when it is not
controlled by the party
in office. Even more importantly,
it ensures close scrutiny
of proposed legislation
and provides hearings to
groups otherwise ignored
by the government. All too
often, a cabinet tends to
establish a club-type relationship
with favoured interest groups.
Assuming the Senate is not
controlled by the political
party that forms the government,
the cabinet has to sway
some senators of a different
political complexion or
its proposed legislation
is doomed to fail. Another
area of key Senate activity
is the free-wheeling investigations
of issues of public interest
-- often on matters which
ministries would prefer
to be ignored -- in a manner
free of government manipulation
or control. Australia’s
national government and
democratic spirit have both
improved significantly because
of this interplay.

The
leaderships of both major
Australian political groupings
resent bitterly the loss
of control over the Senate
because they each want to
monopolize the entire legislative
process. Cabinet attempts
to undermine the role of
the Senate have been numerous.
They first attempted to
limit its co-equal legislative
powers. This was blocked
because of the need to have
all constitutional amendments
approved by a referendum
which gain both an overall
national majority of votes
and majorities in four of
the six states. A second
campaign sought to remove
the fixed terms of senators
and to ensure that the elections
for both houses occur simultaneously
(in order to reduce the
likelihood of minor party
successes) and to have all
elections at the time of
a government’s choosing.
Four constitutional proposals
to this end were defeated
by Australian voters, most
recently during 1988. A
third attempt lay in recasting
the number of senators from
ten to twelve with the hope
that calculations of new
quotas would work against
minor party candidates.
In the election of March
1990, the number of minor
party and independent senators
stayed at ten in a Senate
of 76 members.

There
is a constant attack on
the legitimacy of the Senate
in thwarting governments
of the day, employing essentially
nonsensical rhetoric about
British parliamentary democracy
to deny any role for legislators
except to pass all government
proposals. Senators reply
in terms of constitutionalism,
checks and balances, the
need for a division of powers
to offset the absolute control
of the lower house by the
majority of the day, and
the importance of compromise
and consensus.

There
are numerous lessons here
for Senate reform in Canada.
From Outer Canada’s perspective,
the first is the increased
responsiveness coming from
an institutional check on
the present prime ministerial
domination of our House
of Commons. In the words
of Campbell Sherman, a western
Australian political scientist,
this "invigorates the legislature
and greatly increases the
effectiveness of parliamentary
scrutiny of government administration.
It counters the distortions
of the policy process that
flow from the executive’s
attempts to reduce the influences
of rival views of the national
interest, to smother informed
debate of its policies in
the legislature, and to
avoid the necessity of compromise
once a measure has partisan
endorsement." In other words,
effectiveness is a key part
of reforming the Canadian
upper house. Apologists
for the status quo say that
an effective Senate would
collide with our long-established
concept of responsible government.
Canada is not tiny Britain
in the earlier part of the
nineteenth century. An effective
Senate works well in Australia
and we should adapt it to
our conditions in the interest
of a more responsive democracy.

I
agree with Sherman’s view
that for the Senate to be
effective and politically
self-confident it has to
result from the direct election
of senators. With him, I
anticipate that a Canadian
Senate based on equal representation
from all provinces and elected
through a proportional voting
system would frequently
hold a non-government majority.
Two major obstacles for
Canadians to overcome are
our longstanding political
culture, with its increasingly
anomalous notion of letting
governments govern without
restraint, and our fear
of an effective upper chamber.

In
the aftermath of the Meech
Lake failure, it appears
particularly important to
many Outer Canadians that
the Mulroney government
not attempt to confirm the
present Senate by filling
the vacancies with his party
faithful. Until Senate reform
is dealt with properly,
good faith demands that
vacancies either be filled
by elections or left vacant.
Outer Canadians will be
watching Brian Mulroney
very carefully on this issue,
for many believe he and
most of his cabinet and
caucus like the Senate just
as it is, provided it is
henceforth dominated by
a Conservative majority.

National
Interests vs. Regional Concerns

Canada’s
national government should
in both theory and practice
represent the national interest
as distinct from provincial
interests. However, as "national
interest" concepts are usually
elusive, successive federal
governments in pursuing
this concept often act in
ways in accord with the
wishes of one particular
region while forsaking all
the others.

David
Elton and Peter McCormick,
professors of political
science from the West and
prominent advocates of Western
issues, offer an Outer Canadian
view on "national policies":
"There seems to be a strange
convention of federal political
language that when a program
is labelled ‘western,’ it
means the benefits are distributed
fairly evenly across the
country, and when it is
called ‘national,’ it means
the benefits go disproportionately
to Central Canada. The pattern
is clearly exemplified by
the statement of the Prime
Minister in the House of
Commons, in which he explicitly
equated a long-term fighter
aircraft maintenance contract
(in the ‘national’ interest)
with aid to farmers as a
‘western’ policy. The comparison
overlooks the fact that
the aid is for farmers as
such, not just those farmers
who live in the West, and
approximately 20 per cent
of the funds made available
will go to farmers in Central
Canada, while the jobs protected
and created by the CF-18
decision will overwhelmingly
be found in Central Canada."

Discussions
of regionalism in Canada
invariably boil down to
arguments over which should
prevail: regional interests
or "the national interest."
Nobody argues that national
interest should take precedence
when it reflects the aspirations
of a larger number of citizens.
However, by choosing a federal
system of government, Canadians
rejected the notion that
the national majority should
always prevail. Federalism
means that on some issues,
at least occasionally, the
will of the population majority
will be frustrated. If the
biggest battalions of voters
were to prevail over smaller
ones under any circumstances,
we should drop the charade
that we have a federal system
of government that respects
minorities in times of stress.
The notion that the national
majority will prevail has
resulted in much regional
discontent and accompanying
feelings of regional irrelevancy.

In
an increasingly interdependent
world, Canada must imaginatively
create or alter existing
institutions in order that
they represent the interests
of both Inner and Outer
Canadians effectively. Unless
we move away from the notion
that "the national interest"
is merely a code-phrase
for the most populous region
dominating all corners of
the country, frictions between
Inner and Outer Canada will
probably worsen.

Renewed
Federalism

The
year 1989 witnessed spectacular
developments in Eastern
Europe. After forty-five
years of totalitarian rule,
new governments, inspired
by democratic principles
and impulses, redrafted
their constitutions and
introduced sweeping changes
affecting almost every aspect
of daily life. Why has Canada,
a country fortunate to have
been governed since its
beginnings by democratically-elected
governments, taken so long
to initiate an effective
process of reforms? They
would not lead to such revolutionary
changes as in Eastern Europe,
yet they are of comparable
importance to many Canadians,
especially to the residents
of the outer regions of
the country.

Outer
Canadians need to know that
however far from Toronto-Ottawa-Montréal
they live, they matter in
Ottawa as much as their
compatriots in Inner Canada.
National policies and institutions
must begin to reflect their
needs and be targeted to
meet their requirements
and aspirations as well.
They need to know that they
will in future be effectively
represented during the process
of national policy-making
by those elected to defend
the interests of their communities,
provinces or regions. This
role can no longer be subordinated
to other political considerations.
In order for this notion
to become a reality, we
need as a people to renew
our federalism. We need
to do so now as badly, or
perhaps more so, as when
Prime Minister Trudeau promised
"renewed federalism" to
Québec during the 1980 referendum
campaign.

The
first initiative should
be Senate reform, combined
with improved regional representation
in many federal government
institutions, agencies and
wherever policy-making affects
certain regions. There is
also a need for fair and
generous financial assistance
and federal government procurement
funds that might show a
bias this time towards disadvantaged
regions of the country.
The ongoing nation-wide
debates on Senate reform
and the repercussions of
the failure of the Meech
Lake accord have already
started the process of renewing
Canadian federalism. The
impulse is gaining momentum
and cannot be stopped. Nor
should we wish it to be
averted. However, if it
is lost now, future generations
of Canadians will blame
their parents for losing
possibly the last opportunity
to strengthen our sense
of common purpose and unity.

In
1867, the Fathers of Confederation
laid down Canada’s national
objectives as "peace, order
and good government." Principles
chosen by reform movements
or revolutions are somehow
often expressed in threes.
The American Declaration
of Independence set them
out as, "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."
Revolutionary France put
the objectives as "liberté,
égalité, fraternité." Proponents
of our reformed Senate want
it to be, "Equal, Elected,
Effective." A new national
credo for Canada would be
difficult to define in three
catchy words. Descriptive
phrases might help express
the principles towards which
our federal system should
be evolving: effective regional
representation and fairness;
inter-cultural acceptance
and respect; equal economic
opportunity for all Canadians.