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Each chapter author was challenged to envision some aspect of the Chinese armed forces into the next century. The goal was to paint a realistic view of how domestic and international pressures would shape both Beijing's and Taipei's security environment.

The authors first describe the ethical, technical, and political components of military professionalism and then address the causes for the decline. They conclude by proposing a set of principles which, if adhered to, will reinvigorate the vision of the officer corps and motivate the corps to selfless service.

Peace arrives only when domestically centered progress is established in a post-conflict environment. As a result, the end of hostilities represents the beginning of a transition to peace--not peace itself.

In an attempt to regain some control of the strategic commodity, Washington developed special relationships with the two foremost oil procedures, Iran (under the Shah) and Saudi Arabia. Dual Containment, promulgated in 1993, was supposed to constrain the two most powerful area states, Iran and Iraq, by imposing harsh economic sanctions on them. But, the author contends, the policy has only antagonized America's allies.

The book is organized as an anthology of the best of a series of excellent symposium presentations, revised in light of the discussions that took place there, and complemented by an explanation of the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America and an overview.

Conventional wisdom portrays the People's Republic of China (PRC) People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a backward continental force that will not pose a military challenge to its neighbors or to the United States well into the 21st century. The author offers an alternative perspective by outlining emerging PLA operational concepts and a range of research and development projects that appear to have b

The following two articles were written during and immediately after the war in Kosovo. The first is an adaptation of an earlier work written after a trip to Asia in 1998. In that essay, I suggested that foreign militaries were beginning to perceive our fixation on a firepower-centered way of war as an exploitable weakness. In fact, some states, armed with experience gained against us in real war, had already begun to evolve a doctrine to counter our superiority in precision.

The author makes it clear that he is not interested in throwing out the old tried and true existing Principles of War, he only wants thought given to their expansion to include a principle of Flexibility. After all, the hallmark of the course of instruction at the U.S. Army War College is the new environment in which its graduates should expect to operate--an environment that we at the War College characterize as vague, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. In such an environment, the author argues, Flexibility must be an operating principle, and it would serve all the services well to recognize it as such.

The papers included in this volume represent just such an effort to lay a firmer foundation for this continuing dialogue and to bring together different points of view. In October 1998, the Strategic Studies Institute, assisted by Pepperdine University, assembled a distinguished group of analysts from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, in Florence, Italy.

It is an anthology of selected presentations that not only portrays the main challenges confronting those who must staff the future force in the face of unprecedented demographic flux, but also provides the attitudes and hopes of women and minorities who are part of today's Army.

Throughout U.S. history the American military services have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready for the next war. Part of the problem has had to do with factors beyond their control: the American policy has been notoriously slow to respond to the challenges posed by dangerous enemies. On the other hand, American military institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighing their preparedness as they embarked on the nation's wars.

There is no doubt that the Middle East can present significant potential threats to the West. The author of this monograph examines these threats in order to put them into perspective--to distinguish between "crying wolf" and "crying havoc." After thorough analysis, he contends that the problems caused by narcotics and organized crime, immigration, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction do not as yet require draconian action by the Western nations.

The United States strategic framework in the Pacific has three parts: peacetime engagement, which includes a forward presence; crisis response, which builds on forward-stationed forces, the "boots-on-the ground" and, if necessary, fighting and winning any conflict that might develop.

The conference sought to focus on Asia-Pacific security issues by opening a dialogue among government policymakers, scholars, and military leaders. The Asia-Pacific region is endowed with a wide variety of unique cultures, diverse languages, multifaceted religions, and complex political systems.

The meeting highlighted the urgency of the Colombian crisis and the need for a comprehensive response by Colombia, the United States, and the regional community of nations. Much of the dialogue developed the principal subthemes of the conference: the sources of violence; the role of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers; the institutional capabilities and responses of the Colombian government and armed forces; and the role of the United States.

U.S. policy is at a critical juncture. Can a strategy based on counter-narcotics be enough and even be separated from counter-insurgency? Authors argue no, that a more robust and comprehensive level of support is necessary, given the gravity of Colombia's problems.

The challenges to the United States and to its armed forces are numerous and highly significant. Moreover, we must begin to address them now even if other institutions cannot or will not do so with us.

The author starts from the traditional American notion that technology might offer a way to decrease the horror and suffering of warfare. He points out that historically this assumption is flawed in that past technological advances have only made warfare more—not less—bloody.

This collection of monographs has been assembled from the 42 Personal Experience Monographs written by the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Class of 1998. The Personal Experience Monograph program was instituted immediately after the Gulf War with the original purpose of capturing first-person histories of various aspects of that war.