45. What constitutes a minority is not always understood
in the same way in Turkey as it is in western Europe. The Treaty
of Lausanne ascribed special rights to non-Muslim minorities only.
Turks often therefore view minorities as people having special
rights because of their religion, not, for example, because of
their cultural or linguistic heritage. Until recently it was not
uncommon for unassimilated Kurds to be referred to as 'Mountain
Turks', who, it was rather absurdly claimed, had somehow forgotten
their Turkish allegiance, heritage and language. In contrast,
the submission of the Turkish embassy in London recognises "Turkey's
multicultural heritage", although the suggestion that the
Turkish model has involved fostering this heritage is rather hard
to accept.[51] We
conclude that Turkey can only make progress in its EU candidacy
if it guarantees cultural rights for all its citizens, irrespective
of their origin.

46. The real source of resistance to granting rights
of any sort to the Kurdish minority stems from the fact that until
recently a "vicious internal struggle"[52]
was being fought between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist
group demanding independence for Turkish 'Kurdistan', and the
Turkish army, with much of the local population caught in the
middle.[53] As a result,
demanding rights for the Kurds is generally equated in Turkey
with terrorism or abetting terrorists, whether violence or the
threat of violence is used or not. The fear is (or is stated to
be) that allowing free broadcasting or publication in the Kurdish
language would both stir up separatist sentiment and allow separatist
terrorist groups to disseminate propaganda. Even generally pro-European
Turkish politicians have spoken against the provision of education
in Kurdish as an attack on the integrity of the state,[54]
but the main resistance to granting any rights to the Kurdish
population comes from the second largest party in the governing
coalition, the ultra-nationalist MHP.[55]
According to the Financial Times, "the MHP has defended its
stance by arguing that the EU has no intention of admitting Turkey.
It cites as proof of EU 'hypocrisy' a failure to include in the
bloc's recently adopted list of terror groups the PKK and the
left-wing DHKP-C, which have killed thousands of people in Turkey."[56]

47. Both the PKK and the Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party/Front (DHKP-C) have been proscribed by the United Kingdom
as terrorist organisations, which they undoubtedly are. The European
Union, however, has so far failed to designate these groups as
terrorist organisations, even though the British Government has
been pressing it to do so, and even though, according to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, there are no objections in principle
from member states to these two organisations being so designated.[57]
We discovered during our visit the extent to which this is a cause
of mistrust and rancour within Turkey. It is used within Turkey
as a prime example of European double standards in the fight against
terrorism, and it fuels paranoia that European countries are committed
to the break-up of the Turkish state. Even the submission of the
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, which is notably moderate in
tone, states in apparent frustration that "the struggle against
terrorism should not be compromised by selectivity".[58]
As Malcolm Cooper writes, Turkey will only "be willing to
bring its human rights policy closer in line with western norms
as long as western pressure is not seen to be aiding forces that
threaten the integrity of the state itself".[59]

48. We conclude that the failure of the European
Union to designate the PKK as a terrorist organisation provides
fuel for Turkish paranoia about European designs on the territorial
integrity of the Turkish state. This failure also prevents the
EU from being able to act effectively to promote Kurdish cultural
rights and to speak in support of those within Turkey who are
unfairly labelled as terrorists because they promote those rights
peacefully. We recommend that the Government urge its EU partners
to designate the PKK and DHKP-C as terrorist organisations as
soon as possible.At the same time, we recommend that the
Government remind Turkey that an organisation or individual should
only be labelled terrorist if it uses or threatens to use violence
to achieve its ends.

49. Amnesty International writes that "any peaceful
expression of views, even concerning the political structure of
the state and possible secession should be permitted".[60]
Given the recent conflict in the south-east of Turkey, The Turkish
authorities should perhaps be allowed a small measure of understanding
if they are unwilling to permit demands to be made publicly for
a separate Kurdish state, even if these demands are made peacefully.
But Turkey's recent history of terrorism and internal struggle
should not used as a reason to deny the Kurdish population cultural
rights as a minority within the Turkish state.

50. Currently, even the right to demand these cultural
rights is curtailed.[61]
We recommend that the Government suggest to the Turkish authorities
that current legislation denying cultural rights to the Kurdish
minority and preventing peaceful demands for these rights increases
rather than diminishes the risk that these rights will be demanded
by violent means.

51. While the Kurds are by far the best known of
the generally Muslim minorities living within Turkey, they are
by no means the only such minority. It has been a not always helpful
tendency of western European governments and NGOs to demand rights
almost exclusively for the Kurdish minority, with its history
of separatist agitation, while coming close to ignoring other
minorities, such as the Laz and the Alevi, who have a history
of living peacefully within the Turkish state. We recommend
that the Government should take care to insist that the Turkish
authorities grant cultural rights not only to the Kurdish minority,
but also to other minorities without a history of separatist agitation.

52. The Turkish authorities claim that the Kurdish
and other minorities should feel a primary allegiance to the Turkish
state, rather than to their local community. Current policy makes
this less, rather than more, likely. Education is provided only
in Turkish, a language which many Kurds do not understand. Children
whose parents do not speak Turkish are caught in a vicious circle,
which effectively prevents them from having the opportunity to
participate fully in Turkish society. Similarly, the courts, hospitals
and local government are largely inaccessible to those who do
not speak Turkish. We conclude that by providing education
at least of the Turkish language through the medium of local languages,
and by enabling people to access state institutions through their
mother tongue, the Turkish authorities would be enhancing, not
diminishing, the cohesion of the Turkish state.

54. However, the situation on the ground has not
improved. As the European Commission notes in its Regular Report:

"Both the Penal Code (notably Articles 159
concerning insults to parliament, army, republic and judiciary
and Article 312, concerning incitement to racial, ethnic or religious
enmity) and Article 7 and 8 of the anti-terrorist law (disseminating
separatist propaganda) continue to be widely used by public prosecutors
and judges to restrict freedom of expression".[64]

We heard during our visit to Turkey of students who
had been detained in January by a state security court on charges
of "promoting separatism and inciting racial hatred"
by presenting a petition calling for an optional Kurdish language
course at their local university. Amnesty International notes
that "individuals who have denounced rape in custody ...
have been charged with insulting the security forces".[65]

55. Freedom of association also remains strictly
limited, not only by law, but also by the actions of the judiciary
against organisations which they perceive as a threat. In Turkey
we met officials of HADEP, the only legal political party to advocate
Kurdish minority rights. They told us that multiple charges had
been filed against the party and its officials, as a blatantly
partisan way of trying to prevent the party from operating effectively.
Similar action is taken against parties perceived as linked to
political Islam, four of which have been banned by the Constitutional
Court since 1983.

56. Once again, it is not just a question of laws
needing to be changed. Much of the problem appears to be the attitude
of the judiciary and law enforcement authorities, who view themselves
as responsible for protecting the Kemalist nature of the state
above and beyond any responsibility for protecting individuals'
human rights.[66] There
appear to be signs of a "fundamental change of attitude"
as demanded by Amnesty International in at least some areas of
Government.[67] But the
judiciary's view seems to remain that laws should be interpreted
to protect the nature of the state rather than the rights of the
individual. We conclude that Turkey is unlikely to meet the
Copenhagen political criteria regarding freedom of expression
and freedom of association until there is a fundamental change
in the way that the Turkish judiciary and law enforcement authorities
act and think.

57. Another example of how reactionary political
forces can hide behind legal technicalities is the saga of the
BBC World Service's right to use FM rebroadcasting facilities
in Turkey. As the World Service explains,[68]
in November 2001 the Turkish broadcasting regulator, RTÜK,
decided for the second time in two years that rebroadcasting was
illegal. We discovered in Ankara, however, that it was less a
matter of legality, than of a battle between politically moderate
and reactionary forces within RTÜK, which had led to the
bizarre situation in which the chairman of RTÜK was taking
his own organisation to court. We recommend that the Government
continue to urge the Turkish authorities to enable the BBC World
Service to recommence FM rebroadcasting within Turkey as soon
as possible.

59. This is an issue which may take some time to
resolve because of Turkish internal politics. It is currently
being argued out within the Turkish political establishment whether
the exception for terrorist crimes can be removed without constitutional
amendment (and hence by a simple parliamentary majority) or only
with such an amendment (requiring a two-thirds majority, which
the Government would be unlikely to achieve). We conclude that
it may take some time before the Turkish Government is able to
carry through legislation to abolish capital punishment for terrorist
crimes. We therefore recommend that until such legislation is
passed, the British Government should concentrate on seeking to
ensure that the Turkish moratorium on carrying out the death penalty
is maintained.

61. In Istanbul we held a fascinating discussion
with Dr Gareth Jenkins, an expert on the role of the Turkish military
in domestic politics. He argued that the military did not actually
make policy, but rather set the parameters within which politicians
could act. In his view, the military is both committed to Atatürk's
policy of Europeanisation and uncertain that the changes demanded
of Turkish society by the Copenhagen political criteria are consistent
with protecting the Kemalist nature of the state. The paradox
for the military is that if it commits itself to Turkey's EU candidacy,
it must also commit itself to passing under civilian control.

62. There is little or no accountability as far as
the Turkish military is concerned. It is happy to advise the Government
on most areas of domestic and foreign policy, and it is happy
to make its views known to the press. What the military will not
do is discuss its role in domestic politics or its views on particular
policies at an official level. When we asked to meet a representative
of the armed forces during our visit to Turkey, we were told that
the armed forces would only meet their military counterparts from
abroadcounterparts, however, who in the case of European
countries have no equivalent role in domestic politics.[71]
Human Rights Watch has recommended that "the EU should ask
that the [Turkish] government include the military in a discussion
of how the Copenhagen Criteria can be met without risking the
instability the military and nationalist politicians fear".[72]
But to date, the military has been unwilling to hold such discussions.

63. The European Commission also seems unwilling
to countenance such contacts. Michael Leigh has told us:

"where we have nothing against, in principle,
informal contacts with, for example, civilian administrative staff
working on the National Security Council ..., given the decision-making
structure of the country and its own constitutional structures,
I think it is most appropriate for the Commission to have contacts
with the government, with the parliament, with the judiciary while
being aware of the context in which this democratic system is
functioning".[73]

We conclude that the military is a factor in domestic
politics which the Government and the EU cannot afford to ignore.
As the Turkish military is clearly not yet prepared to withdraw
from domestic politics, we recommend that the Government use what
contacts it has to encourage the military to engage in open debate
on the political reforms required of Turkey by the EU.