Center for World Conflict and Peace

Monday, June 17, 2013

NATO’s “Smart Defense” imitative came front and center at
the NATO summit in Chicago last year, and has had many supporters and
detractors (one French Senator went as far as to say it was simply an extension
of the American military-industrial complex). The “Smart Defense” initiative,
however, represents an excellent opportunity for NATO. With the Cold War over
for more than twenty years, many have called into question NATO’s relevance, advocating
more ad hoc alliancessuch as the so-called “Coalition of the
Willing” or the conglomeration of nations, led by the UK and France, which
intervened in Libya during the uprising against Colonel Gaddhafi.

Many in Europe fear for their security because of a
perceived turning away by the U.S. from Europe (most notably President Obama’s
“pivot” toward Asia). As global security priorities change from so called
“traditional” to “non-traditional,” and specifically as European security
issues present new and unprecedented challenges, “Smart Defense” may be the
prime opportunity for NATO to adapt to the new era and revitalize its
pertinence in global and Trans-Atlantic security.

Throughout human history, military power has generally been
equated with troop numbers and the related ability to project force en masse. Yet even in ancient times this
was not always the case: at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C., an alliance
of Greek city-states fielded an army against Persian King Xerxes, whose army
was eight times the size of the Hellenic alliance. While the issue of who the
real victor of the battle was is often a matter of historical, even cultural,
perspective, at the end of the day a Greek army was able to hold its own
against a vast military power by which it was outmanned eightfold.

Most Americans generally associate U.S. military
projection abroad with deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are of course
winding down. The U.S. military is, however, actually
deployed in virtually every part of the world, with highly trained, élite units
such as the Special Forces (the “silent professionals”) serving in a training
and advisory capacity to local indigenous forces, imparting expertise in the
fields of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, jungle warfare, etc. While U.S.
troops may not be doing much or even most of the actual fighting, their work is
nonetheless a critically important facet in U.S. military projection and
security.

The premise of the Atlantic Alliance’s “Smart Defense”
initiative is that “each euro, dollar [or] pound sterling counts.” Or, as NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmusen has stated: “In an age of austerity, we
cannot spend more. But neither should we spend less. So the answer is to spend
better.” The top priorities for European security now include financial
security, energy security and conflict prevention/resolution. As such, many of
the new threats that NATO faces and will continue to face in the 21st
century will not require large troop numbers, but rather will emphasize having
a highly skilled, educated and agile core of personnel. As Doug Brooks and
Fiona Mangan point out, there is no sense in having warriors with special
skills and abilities “peel potatoes."

Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation predicted that the
U.S. budget sequester will have negative geopolitical implications for U.S. national
security and the country’s ability to project power abroad. Yet sequestration
was already preceded by NATO’s Smart Defense Initiative, and may simply compliment
the Smart Defense plan. One should hope that the budget sequestration will not
last forever, or even for a terribly long time, but the need to maximize
spending power of every penny should incentivize the West, rather than work to
its defense and security detriment.

It is no secret that of all 28 NATO member states, the
U.S. is by far the largest guarantor of security. Many, in fact, assert that
U.S. military power vis-à-vis Europe’s relative lack thereof has created a
culture of dependence in Europe. Of late, however, many NATO states have shown
a greater willingness to take initiative in military operations abroad. For instance, Canada
under Prime Minister Stephen Harper has made participation in peacekeeping
operations a cornerstone of its defense policy, and France has taken the lead
in combating Islamic militants in Mali. If the U.S. government makes spending
cuts in the defense sphere, it may induce U.S. allies in Europe to strengthen
their own militaries and take more responsibility for their own defense.

As alliance members begin to take more responsibility for
their role in the organization, it’s possible that member states may even
specialize in certain areas. With cyber security as a new and emerging issue,
Estonia, one of the most wired countries in the world, may take the lead in
developing the cyber defense capabilities of the alliance (they would no doubt
be in a position to do so, having been the victim of massive cyber attacks from
Russia). Likewise, France may become the spearhead for force projection in West
Africa, as France has long regarded its post-colonial African territories as
constituting a sort of “near abroad”. The same applies to the field of
intelligence: the secret services of a small nation like Lithuania are often
called upon to fill the intelligence gap for the intelligence services of
larger, more powerful countries vis-à-vis the Baltic States.

Despite the apparent shift in economic, political, and
security priorities to the Asia-Pacific region, the United States still
conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade with fellow NATO allies, and
the infrastructure for defense cooperation and interoperability is already
firmly established, to the tune of nearly seventy years. Those who argue that
NATO is simply a relic of the bipolar, Cold War world should understand that
with a new, multi-polar world with multiple threats and potential challengers,
the U.S. and its allies can even less afford to lose such valuable partners.
Smart Defense should be taken as an opportunity to fortify the organization and
increase its relevance on the global stage.

The biggest challenge for this new program, at the risk
of sounding cliché, is to implement Smart Defense in a smart manner. Each NATO
member should focus on strengthening its military capabilities within its
national defense budget constraints, and should focus on what it, as an individual
country, brings to the alliance as a whole, whether in terms of
technical specialty, soft power projection or even geographical leverage.

Friday, June 7, 2013

A few days ago political scientist and Eurasia Group president Ian Bremmer made an astute point on Twitter: "Hillary/Donilon/Geither to Kerry/Rice/Lew. Lots, lots less Asia focus in 2nd term Obama team. Let's hope Xi Jinping doesn't notice." I think Bremmer's assessment is spot on. Practically all of the most important people who have worked to implement the economic, diplomatic, military-security, and political components of the so-called Pivot to Asia have left the Obama administration. Even (former Defense Secretary) Leon Panetta, who did significant work on the pivot, is gone.

And it's not as if the outgoing personnel are being replaced with a new cast of Asia hands. John Kerry, Susan Rice, Samatha Power, and so on, are most comfortable working on transnational relations, ethno-religious conflicts, genocide, failed states, Africa, and the Middle East. All of these issues are important, to be sure, so is peace and stability in Asia. At this point, it seems the Pivot has quickly become a thing of the past.

Of course, we can debate whether the Pivot was the right set of policies to cope with a rising, confident Asia, a region with much promise and potential pitfalls. I have questioned the Pivot's emphasis on military and security affairs in Asia, believing it risked appearing too provocative to China. That said, if the Pivot wasn't working, if it wasn't achieving it's designed goals, that's not a good reason for America to scrap completely its focus on Asia. Create and execute a different Asia policy. But, alas, apparently that's not the case.

Just look at what John Kerry has spent most of his time on in his new position: the Middle East. He made a quick three-day visit to Japan, China, and South Korea in mid-April, a trip that was narrowly focused on crisis diplomacy involving North Korea. On the other hand, Kerry has already made four trips to the Middle East, as he tries to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives and resolve the ongoing violence in Syria. In fact, those four visits don't include his travels to Russia and Belgium, where he continued his diplomatic maneuvering on Syria.

I fear this is what foreign policy will look like for the rest of Obama's term in office. Team Obama will fixate, as has been the case in American foreign policy, on Middle Eastern politics. Asia will surface from time to time, only when a crisis emerges or when the US coordinates a visit with Asian political leaders, like today's trip to California by Xi Jinping. This is unfortunate.

By again obsessing about the Middle East and downplaying the importance of Asia, the U.S. will, in effect, cede ground to China in the competition for power and influence, especially in Asia. As a result, China can breathe a sigh of relief. Team Obama has probably just relaxed the noose of containment. America's allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, etc., should be very concerned about their status and position in the region. And once again, the U.S. is likely left wanting for a set policies that can protect its interests in Asia.