Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part III, Sheikh Ahmed Sattar Al-Rishawi Abu Risha

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was not the first in Anbar to
challenge Al Qaeda in Iraq’s hold upon the province, but he was the most
successful at it. He proposed the Anbar Awakening in 2006, which eventually
helped re-take the governorate away from the militants. It was a dramatic
transformation for a place that the American forces had almost written off. Abu
Risha had far more goals than that, but he wasn’t able to see them come to
fruition as he was assassinated a year after he formed the Awakening. His
brother, Ahmed Sattar al-Rishawi Abu Risha took over the movement after his
brother’s death. He followed through with Abdul’s plans and transformed the movement
into a political organization. To Ahmed Abu Risha the Awakening was an
initiative that only Iraqis could have come up with, as only they had the
ability to sway others away from the insurgency and transform Anbar.

Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha foresaw his Awakening movement as a
way to enter Iraqi politics (AP)

Anbar went from good to bad in Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s view
after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, sheikhs negotiated a deal for U.S. forces to enter the province, and they set up a new local government. Abu Risha claimed that things were going fine, until some started talking about
fighting the Americans. They condemned those who cooperated with the occupation,
and slowly but surely gained more followers as the insurgency began. It quickly
moved from attacking the Americans to the Iraqi government and police.
Eventually Al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters arrived, and they intensified
the violence by going after schools and teachers and anyone involved in
politics. Many professionals ended up fleeing the province as a result going to
places like Jordan and Syria. Eventually the militants had free reign in Anbar,
and seized control of institutions such as the Ramadi hospital, the
governorate’s Education Department, universities, and others. Abu Risha claimed
that his tribe was not involved in any of these activities at this time, but
there are plenty of other accounts that would say otherwise. Most claimed that Abdul Abu Risha cooperated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, and even tried establishing
his own nationalist armed group in 2005, but failed. Either way, his
account is a common one where Anbar became a hotbed of anti-American and
anti-government sentiment, which quickly turned violent. Al Qaeda and other
foreign groups took advantage of this situation, and eventually gained control
of large sections of the province. The hope for a normal life ceased as a
result.

The tribes in Anbar went from accepting this situation to
challenging it. According to Ahmed Abu Risha many sheikhs set up their own
local security around their compounds, but did little else as their province went
up in flames. The insurgency then began challenging the tribes to usurp their
power. This affected Abu Risha personally as his father and three brothers were all killed by Al Qaeda in Iraq for disagreeing with it. The tribes were
split over what to do. At first, they blamed each other, but then some decided
to stand up to the militants. Abu Risha acknowledged that the Albu Mahal tribe
had risen up against Al Qaeda before the Awakening in 2005, but there were
several others. Those included the Albu Nimr who fought the Islamists along the Syrian border in, and elements of the Dulaimi tribe in Ramadi. The Abu
Rishas like to take credit for the tribal revolt, but they were following in
the footsteps of several others who had made a decision to challenge the
militants the year before. They each had their own motivations ranging from
coming under attack by the Islamists to having their businesses taken over to
disagreeing with their extremist views, but the point was by 2005 there was a
steady change in opinion amongst some sheikhs and clerics that they had enough
of the chaos in their governorate, and they needed to do something about it.

Abdul Abu Risha decided to lead his own revolt against Al
Qaeda in 2006. Abdul had run a construction and import-export business, but
he was also involved in criminal activities such as smuggling. In the fall
of 2006, he decided to talk to other tribes to get them organized against the
insurgents. In September several sheikhs held a meeting where they announced
the formation of the Anbar Awakening. It included 25 of the 31 tribes in Anbar,
with around 30,000 armed men. The main plan was to take on the militants,
gain American assistance, be accepted by the central government, and then
assume power in Anbar through control of the local security forces and the
provincial council. These bold ideas showed that Abdul Abu Risha was thinking
far ahead of just securing Anbar, and had aspirations to become a national
leader in Iraq.

The Awakening started operating in Abu Risha’s home of
Ramadi, but then spread across central Iraq. By November 2006, the group had gained control of much of Ramadi. By the summer of 2007 it was sending units to Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil, and Baghdad to organize groups there, as
well as the south as many Iraqi tribes have both Shiite and Sunni members. The U.S. began pushing the government to accept the tribesmen in the army and
police, and made sure they were trained, armed, and paid on time. In Ramadi for
example, the number of police went from around 150 before the Awakening to
1,500 by December 2006, to 3,000 by February 2007. The Awakening
eventually broke the back of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar, which was one of its
main bases in the country. They played upon the public’s increasingly hostile
view of the Islamists who were pushing their foreign ideas and using violence
against anyone that opposed them.

When security was restored in Anbar, the Awakening then
moved to become a political party. First, Abdul Abu Risha tried to prove his
bona fides with Baghdad by meeting with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki three
times, and getting the premier to visit Anbar and see the success of the Awakening. They then began challenging Anbar Governor Mamoum Sami Rasheed al-Alwani and the Islamic Party that ran the province, claiming that it was working with the insurgents. By 2007, Abu Risha got some of his followers onto the
provincial council, started considering candidates to run in the next elections, set up offices across the country, and registered 400,000
members. Unfortunately, Abdul Abu Risha was killed in September 2007 by Al
Qaeda, and was succeeded by his brother Ahmed. In the 2009 vote, he led his
party to victory, winning the most seats in Anbar. By that time, the Awakening
had men throughout the local security forces, was recognized by both the
Americans and Baghdad, and now had control of its home governorate. This was
all part of Abdul Abu Risha’s vision to assume power, and spread his influence
throughout Iraq. Unlike the Sons of Iraq, which the Americans put together
during the Surge, the Awakening was accepted by the central government, because
it was seen as an indigenous movement. Baghdad had no problem with them joining
the security forces or running in elections. The Abu Rishas emerged as a
success story in Iraq, rising up from a minor tribe to being a force in
politics.

Ahmed Abu Risha told the Americans that the Awakening could
have only come from Iraqis. He rejected the idea that it could have originated
with the U.S., because it would not have been accepted. Only locals in Anbar
understood the situation, how the tribes and insurgents worked, and could convince
others to join them in challenging the militants for power. Abdul Abu Risha
also had an expansive vision. He did not just want to rid Anbar of Al Qaeda in
Iraq, he wanted that to be his springboard to gain national acceptance into the
country’s elite. The Abu Rishas were able to gain power in Anbar, but only
found a small voice in Baghdad. In the 2010 elections he joined the Iraqi Unity List along with former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party. It only won four seats in parliament, and eventually joined with the Iraq
Accordance Front in the Centrist Alliance, which then became part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement (INM) in 2011. That series of events
showed that the Awakening had lost much of its standing after the 2009 vote. Its
alliance with the INM didn’t work out either as it came out on the losing end
of its long running battle with Premier Maliki. By 2012 Ahmed Abu Risha joined
the Anbar protests, and became one of its main leaders. That has now run its
course with few results, so Abu Risha will have to find a new way to fulfill
his aspirations of transforming his local movement into a national one.

11 comments:

Anonymous
said...

If Iraqi central government with all resources that had and offer by US and other countries ar not able to stop the cycle of daily killing for the last 10 years, each time still hearing Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ba’athists with all that grape every day disputed the continuing news that Iraqi special polices arrested the TOP leaders of Al-Qaeda in \Iraq (Al-Qaeda's minster of defence!!, AL Qaeda’s minister of finance!!...etc..) The question how Northern Regional Government have the ability to secure her place and cities from terrorist & Al-Qaeda attacks without Awakening style gorilla which shouldn’t been designed as far as their slogans to attach just Arab Iraqis from both factions?

Despite the central government have had all the resources and support and help from US.

You have to remember that the KDP and PUK controlled their areas in Kurdistan since 1991. They'd already established security in their area years before the 2003 invasion, and made it easier for them to maintain it afterward. The central government on the other hand disintegrated after the fall of Saddam, the U.S. disbanded the military, the police fled, and the U.S. rebuilding effort was an initial failure and took years to straighten it out. Even then, the U.S. was starting almost from scratch, plus the security forces were split between all the different ruling parties. Finally, after Ansar al-Islam got kicked out of Kurdistan during the 03 invasion militants hardly targeted the region. It's pretty easy then to understand why the KRG was secure and the rest of the country was not.

The problem as you said generated by US with the dismantling Iraqi police and forces, There is no question that was a recipe of dissertator and chaos., however US miss of creating new Iraqi police units in addition Bremer accepting Badar and other militia as police forces was also a big mistake.

However if we try to convincing ourselves that the Iraqi parties with tangent militia, they should also have some already established security in their area years before the 2003 invasion, so that should made it easier for who in central government to maintain the security which the forces were belong to most of those parties.

As for Ansar al-Islam, I am talking here Al-Qaeda not branch of it, so one branch Ansar al-Islam, as they determent to destabilised Iraq they should carry their operation.

I am still hold the central government of neglecting the loss of lives every day without any action even use the experts from their northern regional expertise to help them to sort out the security matter.

When the militias entered Iraq or emerged such as the Mahdi Army they did try to secure their own specific areas, but that's not going to work country wide because there's no cooperation, non-protected areas, etc. The U.S. on the other hand had neither the troops nor the tactics to deal with the insurgency until 2007 and the Surge. The Iraqi government was divided as well. The Interior Ministry for example was split between various different parties that didn't like each other. U.S. advisers had to walk through the Interior building in Baghdad with guards because they didn't trust some of the personnel in the Ministry.

What all you said its very obvious for most Iraqis the branches/ Militias that US brought to Iraq with full support of them were they were most interested to secure their own specific goals and leaders then they hold some area to claims were theirs.

As for The Interior Ministry oh give a break, what about those 100 Personal/Consultant in each ministrywho left behind Paul Bremer inside Iraq who hold the power to fire any Iraqi official even minsters

Just recap to the point Why Al-Qaeda in all over Iraq but NOT in Northern Region "Kurdish Area"?

The Awakening forces cleared Iraq from them but here we go Al-Qaeda again on the ground in Iraq?

Is there on Al-Qaeda or different Al-Qaeda?

Who support Who?

Btw, what you said about Kerik was a joke, let tell you not just him the whole bunch of Americans and who worked in Iraq just all jokes, End in today Iraq left in chaos handed to uncompetent, thuggish corrupted gangs.

Anon said "Just recap to the point Why Al-Qaeda in all over Iraq but NOT in Northern Region "Kurdish Area"?"

I already answered that. The KRG had established security more than 10 years before the 2003 invasion. They were therefore more capable and prepared for Al Qaeda's terrorism when it started afterward.

Anon said "Is there one Al-Qaeda or different Al-Qaeda?"

There's Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan/Pakistan and then a whole bunch of groups affiliated with it. Zarqawi was not part of Al Qaeda initially but then allied with it and renamed his group Al Qaeda in Iraq to gain access to its brand and funding. Before that around 100-200 Al Qaeda fighters had fled to Kurdistan and camps run by Ansar al-Sunna after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. They got kicked out of Iraq into Iran by U.S. and Kurdish forces during the 2003 invasion. Today the Islamic State of Iraq is more directly connected to Al Qaeda central than Zarqawi was who was his own leader and not beholden to anyone else.

Anon said "Who support Who?"

Al Qaeda has all kinds of private supporters that contribute money to it. The Islamic State of Iraq also runs criminal enterprises throughout Iraq to fund itself such as extorting money from businesses, taxes on transportation through their areas, etc.

Al Qaeda has all kinds of private supporters that contribute money to it.

Yo stated every one but you covered the major funders?

Is it Your country funding them right now Syria?

What about very US very friendlily Monarchy in Gulf state that Big Fat Amer and Saudis?

If you did see or just in case your memory lost read here:

The gas-rich state of Qatar has spent as much as $3bn over the past two years supporting the rebellion in Syria, far exceeding any other government, but is now being nudged aside by Saudi Arabia as the prime source of arms to rebels.Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms - FT.com

A Veteran Saudi Power Player Works To Build Support to Topple AssadWSJ

No, Obama administration did not authorize military aid to Syrian rebels until this summer, and nothing arrived until September. Its supposed to go Free Syrian Army and only in small amounts because U.S. is afraid some might go to Islamists. That's also reason why U.S. is mostly sending just light weapons like assault rifles and machine guns.

Anon said "What about very US very friendlily Monarchy in Gulf state that Big Fat Amer and Saudis?"

Yes, Gulf states are sending money to the Islamist parties in Syria. That's another reason why the U.S. has tried to stay out of Syria. It's a mess.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com