Japanese businesses seldom have non-Japanese CEOs, and where a non-Japanese does have the top job it's often under unusual circumstances.

The country's automakers are emblematic.

Brazilian-born Carlos Ghosn took over in 1999 as COO, and later as CEO, of Japan's Nissan Motor. It was nearly broke at the time, and he now is heralded for saving the foundering company. (Related: Sony breaks with tradition)

Nissan wouldn't have picked him on its own, though. Even though the company was sinking, it stuck to its Japanese executives.

Ghosn was dispatched to save the Japanese company by French automaker Renault, which had bought 36.8% of Nissan for $5.4 billion in March 1999. That's a big-enough share to give Renault management control.

Ghosn took Nissan from near-bankruptcy to black ink in just a year, but he did it according to a theme that outraged many Japanese: "No sacred cows, no taboos, no constraints."

Though tough times have forced changes that have Japanese businesses rethinking and reorganizing, they have for years been structured almost exactly opposite the Ghosn model. They have relied on, not eliminated, sacred cows, taboos and constraints.

In Japan it has been common for banks, suppliers and manufacturers to have significant investments in each other and to have exclusive business agreements in which they promise to deal only with one another.

The result is reluctance to let any company, no matter how troubled, go broke because its problems would ripple so far through the business world and the embarrassment would be so widespread.

Some Japanese auto businesses, as have others, base promotions on seniority. Ghosn had to introduce at Nissan the principle of promotion according to merit, not according to time served. He also took previously unthinkable actions: He closed five factories in Japan and eliminated 16,500 Nissan jobs, mostly in Japan. He transferred another 5,000 off Nissan's books by spinning off operations into independent units that had to live or die by themselves. The moves horrified many in Japan, but they were tolerated because there was no other way to save Nissan.

In a rare move, Ghosn is scheduled to become CEO of Renault, too, if the French automaker's shareholders approve next month. He will remain CEO of Nissan, but will appoint a Japanese president to run Nissan.

Japanese automakers, much like other Japanese industries, simply hate to let go of control if they are not forced to, as Nissan was.

Toyota, selling cars and trucks in the USA since 1958, only now is letting its U.S. unit fully develop products for the U.S. market — and even then is still holding some strings.

For instance, the redesigned 2005 Avalon is a big sedan that Toyota calls its "most American" car "developed by Americans for Americans." Nevertheless, the American engineers needed Japan's OK for the car's distinctively American dual exhausts.

Toyota Motor Sales, USA, the U.S. sales and marketing unit, is overseen by a Japanese; an American is No. 2.

Honda, selling cars in the USA since 1970, just this year will launch a U.S.-specific product, the Ridgeline pickup, that it says is almost entirely the work of units of American Honda Motor- which is run by a Japanese; an American is the No. 2 man in the USA.

An exception is Mazda Motor. The Japanese company has a Japanese CEO, even though Ford Motor in the USA owns 33.4% of Mazda and can exercise management control. The CEO of Mazda's chief U.S. unit is an American.