Wednesday, August 22, 2012

There is little reason to believe that the present pattern of disputes is
likely, in the near future at least, to degenerate into something more
serious. But the unresolved issues between the two countries represent by
far the most serious danger in the region. The dispute is often likened to
that over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, which
involves the competing territorial claims of China and various South East
Asian countries including Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.

This
dispute, too, concerns largely unoccupied islands in seas which are believed
to be rich in mineral deposits. But clashes between China and Vietnam or,
for that matter, the Philippines, do not carry anything like the same threat
as those between China and Japan, because of the incendiary nature of the
historical bitterness between the latter.

Look at the prospects of war in strictly military terms,
as a contest between Chinese and Japanese sea power. In raw numerical terms, there is no
contest. Japan'snavy boasts 48 "major
surface combatants," ships designed to attack enemy main fleets while taking a
pounding themselves. For the JMSDF these include "helicopter destroyers," or
light aircraft carriers; guided-missile destroyers equipped with the
state-of-the-art Aegiscombatsystem, a combination
radar, computer, and fire-control system found in frontline U.S. Navy warships;
and an assortment of lesser destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. A squadron of
16 diesel-electric submarines augments the surface fleet. Juxtapose this
against the PLANavy's 73 major surface
combatants, 84 missile-firing patrol craft, and 63 submarines, and the bidding appears
grim for Japan. China's navy is far superior in sheer weight of steel.

Raw numbers can be misleading, for
three main reasons. First, as strategist Edward Luttwak has observed, weapons
are like "blackboxes" until actually
used in combat: no one knows for sure whether they will perform as advertised.
Battle, not technical specifications, is the true
arbiter of military technology's value. Accurately forecasting how ships,
planes, and missiles will perform amid the stresses and chaos of combat thus verges
on impossible. This is especially true, adds Luttwak, when conflict pits an
open society against a closed one.

Open societies have a habit of debating
their military failings in public, whereas
closed societies tend to keep their deficiencies out of view. Luttwak was referring
to the U.S.-Soviet naval competition, but it applies to Sino-Japanese
competition as well. The Soviet Navy appeared imposing on paper. But Soviet warships
on the high seas during the Cold War showed unmistakable symptoms of decay,
from slipshod shiphandling to rusty hulls. The PLA Navy could be hiding
something as well. The quality of the JMSDF's platforms, and its human
capabilities, could partially or wholly offset the PLA's advantage of numbers.

Plus a sexyfull variable in conflict variable in
warfare - material and human factors. The latter is measured in seamanship,
gunnery, and the myriad of traits that set one navy apart from others. Mariners
hone these traits not by sitting in port and polishing their equipment but by
going to sea. JMSDF flotillas ply Asian waters continually, operating solo or withothernavies. The PLA Navy is
inert by comparison. With the exception of a counter-piracy deployment to the
Gulf of Aden that began in 2009, Chinese fleets emerge only for brief cruises
or exercises, leaving crews little time to develop an operating rhythm, learn
their profession, or build healthy habits. The human edge goes to Japan.

And three, it's misleading to reduce the
problem solely to fleets. There will be no purely fleet-on-fleet engagement in Northeast
Asia. Geography situated the two Asian titans close to each other: their landmasses,
including outlying islands, are unsinkable aircraft carriers and missile firing
platforms. Suitably armed and fortified, land-based sites constitute formidable
implements of sea power. So we need to factor in both countries' land-based
firepower.

Japan forms the northern arc of the first island chain that
envelops the Asian coastline, forming the eastern frontier of the Yellow and
East China seas. No island between the Tsushima Strait (which separates Japan
from Korea) and Taiwan lies more than 500 miles off China's coast. Most,
including the Senkakus/Diaoyus, are far closer. Within these cramped waters,
any likely battleground would fall within range of shore-based firepower. Both
militaries field tactical aircraft that boast the combat radius to strike
throughout the Yellow and East China seas and into the Western Pacific. Both
possess shore-fired anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and can add their hitting
power to the mix.

There are some asymmetries, however. PLA conventional ballistic missiles
can strike at land sites throughout Asia, puttingJapaneseassetsatrisk before they ever
leave port or take to the sky. And China's Second Artillery Corps, or missile
force, has reportedly fielded anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) able to
strike at moving ships at sea from the mainland. With a range estimated at more than 900 miles,
the ASBM could strike anywhere in the China seas, at seaports throughout the
Japanese islands, and far beyond.

Consider the Senkakus, the hardest assets
to defend from the Japanese
standpoint. They lie near the southwestern tip of the Ryukyu chain, closer to
Taiwan than to Okinawa or Japan's major islands. Defending them from distant
bases would be difficult. But if Japan forward-deployed Type 88 ASCMs --
mobile, easily transportable anti-ship weapons -- and missile crews to the
islets and to neighboring islands in the Ryukyu chain, its ground troops could
generate overlapping fields of fire that would convert nearby seas into no-go
zones for Chinese shipping. Once dug in, they would be tough to dislodge, even
for determined Chinese rocketeers and airmen.

Whoever forges sea, land, and air forces
into the sharpest weapon of sea combat stands a good chance of prevailing. That
could be Japan if its political and military leaders think creatively, procure
the right hardware, and arrange it on the map for maximum effect. After all,
Japan doesn't need to defeat China's military in order to win a showdown at
sea, because it already holds the contested real estate; all it needs to do is
deny China access. If Northeast Asian seas became a no-man's land but Japanese
forces hung on, the political victory would be Tokyo's.

Japan also enjoys the luxury of
concentrating its forces at home, whereas the PLA Navy is dispersed into three
fleets spread along China's lengthy coastline. Chinese commanders face a
dilemma: If they concentrate forces to amass numerical superiority during
hostilities with Japan, they risk leaving other interests uncovered. It would
hazardous for Beijing to leave, say, the South China Sea unguarded during a
conflict in the northeast.

And finally, Chinese leaders would be forced to consider how
far a marine war would set back their sea-power project. China has staked its
economic and diplomatic future in large part on a powerful oceangoing navy. In
December 2006, President Hu Jintao ordered
PLA commanders to construct "a powerful people's navy" that could defend
the nation's maritime lifelines -- in particular sea lanes that connect Indian
Ocean energy exporters with users in China -- "at any time." That takes lots of
ships. If it lost much of the fleet in a Sino-Japanese clash -- even in a
winning effort -- Beijing could see its momentum toward world-power status
reversed in an afternoon.

Here's hoping China's political and military
leaders understand all this. If so, the Great Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012
won't be happening

wHoA!

h0t!

~hEy Y"all! DoN"t MiSs GsGf~!

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