/

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF

TftE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
August, 1961

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
3'llililillillllllllllll

3 1262

08552 5425

FOREWRD

A knowledge of enemy strength and activity has always been
essential to the formulation and execution of successful plans for

military operations.

After centuries of war in Europe cavalry

reconnaissance evolved as the principal means of obtaining this
strategic intelligence.
It was always a difficult mission to perform

and became even more arduous after the rise of mass armies and the
increase of fire power at the time of the French Revolution.
By a curious coincidence, man-carrying balloons appeared

during the era of the French Revolution.

Military leaders, conscious

of the importance but mindful of the difficulty of obtaining satis-

factory reconnaissance. Initially hailed these remarkable spheres as
the solution to their problem. The experience of military aeronautics

in the following century revealed, however,

that balloon detachments

lacked the mobility necessary to participate in the war of movement.

A contempt for the technique of aerial observation developed among
general staffs because of conspicuously inaccurate reports from aero-

nauts who

vrere

often free-lance adventurers with more courage than
Interest in aerial

training or knowledge in military science.

surveillance waned and In most armies balloons were subordinated to
the use of cavalry reconnaissance.

Failing to dissolve the fog of war, commanders sought some
system which would Insure victory in spite of their blindness.
11

This

"

was the basis for the doctrine of the offensive a ou trance -the headlong offensive.
It was a simple and attractive formula: a

determined advance at all costs to impose a commander* s will on
the enemy, making the latter's movement of little importance.

This doctrine lessened the army's dependence on its reconnaissance

branches such as the cavalry or aeronautics.
The soldiers that settled into the trenches of western Europe

after a few disastrous months of open warfare in 1914 were the victims
of the attempt to wage the offensive a outrance with massed armies and

devastating fire power.

The awful results of this fighting have
The poverty of their strategic doctrine

become familiar to us all.

was clearly demonstrated to the generals on both sides and the

following years of the war were spent in a halting search for weapons
and techniques of achieving victory.

Machine guns, poison gas, and
On the sea, the

tanks were some of the developments in land warfare.

submarine proved to be an extremely effective weapon.
became a battleground In World War
I.

Even the air

This study presents a detailed narrative and analysis of one of the aspects of aerial warfare which the United States Air Service

performed during World War

I— observation

aviation.

While bombardment

and pursuit aviation of the American Expeditionary Forces caught the
public fancy and subsequently have received substantial amplification
by "air power" enthusiasts, it was the use of airplanes for liaison

purposes and for close-support observation and reconnaissance that was
the most significant in terms of achievement.

This achievement, albeit

iii

limited In

tline

and scope, has often been overlooked and deprecated in

an effort to substantiate arguments of "Air Force" versus "Army" or
tactical (fighter) versus strategic (bombardment) aviation doctrines.
This study is a consideration of the "Air Service" concept of Vtorld War
I.

It does not attempt to present a case for or against the "Air

Force" concept which maintains that military aviation should be a
separate, independent, and co-equal establishment.
V?hile lengthy

considerations of present developments in aerial

reconnaissance such as were highlighted by the American U 2 Incident
of May, 1960, may be difficult, a study of aerial observation during
the war when it was first significantly effective may be of interest and

value.

In an age when supersonic speeds are limiting further progress

in fighter aviation and when guided missiles are threatening to replace

piloted bombers, perhaps the study of observatlon--one of the original
goals of man's quest for flight--ls not without purpose.
The author has not dealt with all phases of America's military

aviation effort in World War

I,

The Navy's achievement in the air is The Lafayette Escadrille, that color-

beyond the scope of this study.

ful band of American adventurers who, along with French aviators fought

the Germans in the skies of western Europe even before the United

States entered the war, made little contribution to the development
of American aerial observation during World War
I.

Also omitted are

the activities of the Americans who served in pursuit or bombardment

organizations with the British Royal Air Force or the Italian Air
Service, This work is not simply a chronicle of United States Army

aviation units.

Although Air Service organizations are mentioned
iv

from time to time, their function in the narrative which follows is to

distinguish the activities of the men who seirved in then.

Indeed, the

focus of this study lies in the role played by aerial observation in

shaping the developments of the war.
It is a premise of this work that observation was the moti-

vation for the first employment of airplanes and

tliat in

World War

I

other branches of aviation grew from this central theme.

Pursuit and

bombardment aviation were never so completely separated from obser-

vation as to discontinue performing reconnaissances while carrying
out their specialized assignments.

While most of the narrative is

concerned with the operations of observation squadrons the activities
of these other units as well as those of balloon companies is also

presented.
The writer has tried to make his narrative intelligible to

those who, like himself, are outsiders to military aviation,

T^ie

overly teclinical and obscure dialect of military aviation has been

avoided as much as possible.

Changes of rank and assignment were

rapid during the war, so that the prefixes to officers' names varied
from month to month.

When describing a particular event, the rank
Wlien

held at the time has been given,

speaking more generally, the

highest rank attained by the individual is used.
Perhaps no two writers would make the same choice of events
or of chronological limits in telling this story.

Primarily concerned

with a well-knit and comprehensive account,

I

have chosen to begin with

the development of aerial observation prior to the entry of the United

States into World War

I,

In describing this experience it seemed

v

worthwhile to carry the narrative back briefly to the evolution of
aircraft.
In several

Instances, when It was felt that such an analysis

would contribute to a better understanding of the central theme,
considerable detail has been lavished upon the discovery of a

particular technique.

Oftentimes, on the other hand, developments

that do not reveal the basic trends in aviation have been omitted or

referred to only in passing.

If pursuit and bombardment

developments

appear neglected, it is because this study is not intended as an

exhaustive account of all types of aerial activity, and throughout
such activities have been relegated to their proper relationship to

observation operations.
This study is an attempt to tell the story of the tool of

aerial observation used in World War

I.

For a fuller comprehension of

the subject it seeks to explain the development of the means and

doctrine of observation aviation prior to and during this conflict. Throughout the countless millenia in \7hlch men have implemented their

unfriendly Impulses, military Intelligence has been of decisive
Importance in making command decisions of strategy and tactics.

Without minimizing other Important factors affecting warfare, such as

morale and logistics, a disregard for the intelligence aspect of the
art of war might lead to disaster.

With this much in the nature of explanation
confess a sense of inadequacy.

I

must nevertheless
this

In so vast and complex a field,

work must be regarded in the nature of an experiment.

Despite

intensive reading in the source materials and representative xrorks It

would not have been possible for me to undertake this study had
vl

I

not

been unusually fortunate in securing the assistance of many people.
I

am under especially heavy obligation to Dr. John K. Mahon,
[^'.Ided

who served as chairman of ny supervisory cormittee and
study.
Dr.
I

this

To Dr. Franklin A. Doty, Dr. Frederick

li.

llartmann,

Rembert W. Patrick, Dr. Samuel Proctor, and Dr. Oscar Svarlien,

wish to express my appreciation for their help in the preparation
Tlieir

of this dissertation.

scholarly advice has been an encourage-

ment throughout my studies and they have contributed to the solution
of many of the difficult problems involved in this work,
I

owe particular thanks to the historians and archivists at
Dr. Maurer

the United States Air Force Historical Division Archives.

Maurer was particularly helpful during the earliest stages of
investigation.

Allied Aircraft Used in World War Allied Aircraft Used in World War German Aircraft Used in World War

I

IV.

MAPS
Figure Figure Figure Figure
4.
5. 6.

417

7. 8. 9,

Figure

Figure

Figure 10.

Situation at 8:00 A. M. August 23, 1914 Situation at 4:00 P. M, August 23, 1914 Quiet Sectors in the Spring of 1918 Situation on the Mame Salient on July 14, 1918 Situation on the St, Mihiel Salient on September 12, 1918 The Mcuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army, September 26-November 11, 1918 Major Offensive Operations A. E. F.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

424

xi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

1.

Allied Aircraft Used In World War Allied Aircraft Used In World War
German Aircraft Used in World War Situation at 8:00 A. M. Situation at 4:00
P.

I

414
415 416
418 418 419
.

2.
3.

I

I

4.
5.

August 23, 1914

M.

August 23, 1914

6.

Quiet Sectors in the Spring of 1918

7. 8.

Situation on the

Mame Salient

on July 14, 1918

,

,

,

420

Situation on the St. Mihiel Salient on September 12, 1918
The Mcusc-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army, September 26-November 11, 1918

421

9.

422

10.

Major Offensive Operations A,

E,

F.

423

xii

PART

I

AERIAL OBSERVATION PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES
INTO

WRLD WAR

I

CHAPTER

I

DEVELOHieJT OF BALLOONS

AIH)

AIRPLANES

Introduction

Shortly after noon on July 22,

1S12, a British scneral.

Sir

Arthur \-fellesley, not yet the Duke of Wellincton, stood with nienbers of
his staff on a windy hill near Salamanca, Spain,
He was munchins on a

chicken les and 3 lancing now and then throush a telescope at the

amy

of his French adversary. Napoleon's illustrious Marshal Auguste de

Mamont, maneuvering on the plain

belov; as

Wcllincton later \Jrotc, "in
Marshal Marmont

the usual French style, nobody Icncw with \7hat object."

was unwittingly marching his army across the front of Wellesley's entire
cotimand.

Behind the crest on which the British staff stood, and hidden

from the French, were three divisions vjaiting for the order to emerge

and pounce upon their unsuspecting enemy.
General Vtellesley was quite pleased \;ith the situation on this

particular afternoon and glovred with the first warm food

tliat

he

liad

had in several days, for his army had been following the French so

closely that there had been no opportunity for cooked rations.

He

turned to one of the Spanish officers on his staff, and, after noting
the importance of a general's knowing what the enemy on the other side

of the hill is doing, cheerfully concluded:

"Men cher Alava

.

.

.

Marmont est perdu,"

Tossing his chicken bone over his shoulder,
2

3

Wellesley mounted his horse and galloped off to c^ve his attack order
to his brother-in-law.

Sir Zdward Packenhan.

(It was this same

Packenham who, three years later, leading veterans of this day near
Salamanca against Andrev; Jackson's militia, net his death in the swamps

south of New Orleans.)

Packcnhan's attacic, launched from behind the
tliat

hill, struck Marmont with such force

the French were badly defeated

and the poxxjr of Napoleon destroyed in Spain.

Marmont had not

Iaio\vn

what was on the other side of the hill.
Wellington's remark to Alava is, however, by no means the

earliest recorded statement of a great military leader regarding the

desirability of Icnowing the situation beyond the horizon.

Down through

the centuries soldiers have been concerned with gaining high ground

from which they might observe the actions of their enemy, and on the
basis of this intelligence develop plans for action.
Cliiefs and

4
the hills inproved upon the ancients by constructing novable tourers

from wliich they looked over the battlements of walled towns.

On the day

before the Battle of Salamanca an incenious British captain of Marines

sought an audience with Wellington to demonstrate a device that he

called "an artificial hill," designed for observation.
tliat

In the years

folloxjed,

the cavalry's traditional role in military operations

was that of the eyes of the amy.

From Wellington's day to our own,

there has been no change in the principle of warfare which requires a

comnandcr to possess that information of the enemy sufficient to
determine his capabilities. Despite the fact that it is as important to armies of today as
it was to the legions of Caesar, we are not concerned here with

terrestrial observation, but rather with the history and development
of that type of observation which only within the last century has

broadened the vistial perspective of the military corxiander--aerial
observation.
Vte

shall treat the instruments of aerial observation in
first, the balloon; and

the chronological order of their development: later, the military airplane.

Lightcr-than-Air Craft

The mythology and folklore of nearly all nations have accounts

of winged monsters and of mortals who defied the gods in attempts to
fly.

The Greek legend of Daedalus and Icarus, his son, belong to a
3

period prior to 300 B.C.
3

The flying carpet fantasy of the Arabian

Ernst Sclinabel, Story of Icarus (New York: and Co., 1960).

llarcourt.

Brace

5

Niglits is probably the relic of a story of the desire for aerial flight.

The first recorded efforts of man to soar above his mountains, towers,

and "artificial hills" were accounts of experiments with balloons, and

until the end of the last century most of the attempts to solve the

riddle of flight uere concentrated upon this medium.

Accordins to various historians sometime during the fourteenth
century when belligerents in western Europe
x-jcre

loackino at each other

with battlcaxcs and broadswords and peeklns over castle walls from
towers covered with oxhides, the Chinese wore deftly disposing of their

enemies with gunpowder, and sending up fire balloons fashioned from
paper, a substance that was all but unlmovai in Europe,
There are no
4

records, hoxrevcr, to indicate that these balloons carried passengers.

During the later middle ages, churchmen began to manifest an
interest in aeronautics.
One priest, noting that empty egg shells were

very light and

tliat

the dew rose from the grass in the early morning

sunlight, suggested that if egg shells filled xjith dew ucre heated by
the sun's rays, all that was necessary to raise any weight was to

collect enough egg shells and dew.

Another cleric,

Jolin

Wilkins, Lord

Bishop of Chester during the middle of the seventeenth century, gave
it as his fixed opinion that men might achieve flight in any of the

God would not suffer such an invention to take effect, by reason of the disturbance that it would cause to the civil sovernnent of For who sees not tliat no city can be secure against attack, nen. since at any tir.ic our ship may be placed directly over it, and descending doim may discharge soldiers; that the sane it v;ould happen to private houses and ships on the sea; for our ship, descending out of the air to sails of seaships . . . nay overset then, kill their nen, burn their ships by artificial fireworks and fire-balls. And thus they nay not only to ships but to great buildings, castles, cities, and with such security that they which cast these things down fron a height out of gunshot, cannot be offended by those fron below.
On June 5,
1733, the Montgolfier brothers, Joseph and Jacques

Stienne, duplicated the feat tliat the Cliinese had reputedly achieved

nearly 500 years earlier, and kept a small balloon in the air for a few
minutes.
Four months later they sent up a sheep, a rooster, and a duck
Tlic

by a larger balloon,

Montgolfier balloons, which the French called

globes aerostatiques and later simply montgolf iers , were raised by hot air produced by burning straw, rags, and chopped wood,
Tlie

inventors

and their contemporaries thought

tliat

they had discovered a new gas,

which

tiney

called for themselves.
\ras

It was only a short time before the

error of this claim

proven,
J. A. C,

A French physicist,

Giarles, discovering that the

rarefied air of the montgolf iers was only one half as heavy as cold air,
hit upon the use of hydrogen, vjhich recent English experiments had
found to be only one fourteenth as heavy.
v;as
Tlie

envelope v;ith inuskets and pitchforks they tied the shrinking bag to a

horse's tail and sent the beast gallopinc across the country until the
balloon was torn to shreds,
Tlie

French Govcmnent took steps to prevent

such action in the future by publishinc a lengthy explanation assuring
the countrymen that the bags tjore

ham less

and "night soncday prove

serviceable to the wants of Society,"
For Jean Franjois Pilatre de Rozier the Montgolficrs built a

bag over six feet high to x^hich they suspended a basket three feet
square.
To sustain flight they placed an iron grate under the bag in De Rozier*

which a fire was to be kept burning during the flight.

friends protested against his offering hinself to science and suggested
that two condenned criminals be sent up in his place (this had been

done previously when a man

V7as

given the choice of being hanged or of
De Rozier

jumping from the top of Notre Dame cathedral in a glider),

protested that such a suggestion was highly improper for no criminal
should be permitted the honor of being the first human to fly,
De Rozier' s first flight, which took place on Octolser 15,
1783,

lasted

only four and one

lialf

minutes.

The balloon, anchored by a rope, rose

to a height of 84 feet.

During the next few weeks he made a number of

captive flights with Andr^ Glraud de Vilette, who, it is of interest to
note, was concerned with balloons primarily as an Instrument of military

reconnaissance,

Txto

months after his first captive flight, De Rozier,

accompanied by the Marquis d'Arlandc, an officer of the Army, made the

first free flight In history over Paris,
Tlie

next step in aerial transportation was the crossing of the
In June,

EhClish Channel.

1735, De Rozier and a companion ascended

fron France in a conbination heat-supported envelope and hydrogen sphere, They had been vraiting for nonths for favorable winds but unhappily the

winds during their voyage shifted and blew them back over the French
coast.

At a height of C,000 feet the hydrogen balloon exploded,

probably aggravated by the hot air balloon, and the aeronauts vrere

dashed to the ground.

,

8

Jean Pierre Franjois Blanchard, financially backed by an
Anerican, designed and flew a balloon across the English Channel in
1785.
Dr. John Jeffries, a physician fron Boston, paid 1700 to build
9

the balloon and an additional hlOO for the privilege of riding in it.
In their flight fron Dover to Calais the fliers had to jettison all

their ballast, their navigational instruments, food, water, all their

clothing, and finally, to quote Dr. Jeffries:
I felt the necessity of casting av/ay soncthing to alter our course; happily (it alnost instantaneously occurred to nc, tliat probably we night be able to supply it from within ourselves), fron the recollection that we had drunk ouch at breakfast; and not having had any evacuation . . . tltat probably an extra quantity had been secreted by the kidneys, which vre night now avail ourselves of by

The event fully justified iny expectation . . . . . . and we were enabled to obtain, I verily believe, five or six pounds of urine; which circvmistances, however trivial or ludicrous it may seem . . . was of real utility to us.
dischargin,!.

This was the first aerial Channel crossing; others followed, and free

ballooning became an accepted fact.

The successful passage of this

important bit of water has for centuries been the hallmark of success,
as witness the Romans, the Normans, and in 1785, the balloon.
Loss than a year after his successful crossing, Blanchard

opened a "Balloon and Parachute Aerostatic Academy" near London and

began to give instruction in ballooning.

An attempt to let down a

sheep in a parachute before a paying audience proved so unsuccessful
that to avoid being mobbed Blanchard was forced to refund the admission
fees.

This disgusted

hitn

with Eiigland and he moved to Germany and

later to America,
The military balloon made its first appearance on June 2,
1794,

shortly before the Battle of Fleurus, when the French Revolutionary

Army under General Jean Baptiste Jourdan opposed the Austrians.

Captain

Jean Marie-Joseph Coutelle, the pilot, had been experimenting with balloons for some time at Meudon, and his reconnaissance over Maubeuge
appears to have been effective not only as a means of observation, but

also as a morale factor In its disturbance of the Austrians,

Other

balloons were built for Coutelle during the Revolutionary Wars and
these balloons were still in use when Napoleon came to power.

Napoleon was initially enthusiastic about the balloon for

John Jeffries, A Narrative of the Two Aerial Voyages of J. Robinson, 1786), Doctor Jeffries with Mons, Blancloard (London:
p,

86,

10

military reconnaissance and gave Coutelle ample support in developing
his service.
In 1797 he directed the organization of a balloon company

for service in his ejqjedition to Egypt.

At the naval battle of Aboukir

Bay most of Coutelle's equipment was destroyed, and use of balloons in

The old balloons, ho^jever, were used occasionally Gaily decorated balloons used during

in exhibition flights about Paris.

the celebration marking Napoleon's coronation as emperor were subse-

quently turned over to Joseph Gay-Lussac, who employed them in his

researches in physics and electricity.
Later, on several occasions, attempts were again made to

Interest Napoleon in balloons.
a plan

In 1808 Major Nicholas Lhomond submitted

which called for the construction of a fleet of balloons, each

capable of transporting a thousand troops, two cannon, and twenty-five

horses across the English Channel.

A few years later, during the retreat

from Moscow, it was proposed to speed the Einperor on his way by the use
of a balloon.

Napoleon would have nothing to do with any of these

schemes.

The balloonlsts that he disbanded following his Egyptian

campaign might have been quite valuable to him.

The Battle of Waterloo

was lost due to Napoleon's inability to find out where his reinforce-

ments were, and what had become of the Prussians that Wellington was
expecting.
By a strange coincidence, Waterloo, a word that now denotes

more than a place name, was fought on the same battlefield as the

11

Battle of Fleurus, just 21 years after Coutelle made his reconnaissance

over the Austrians.

After Coutelle, nothing important occurred in

military aeronautics in France for 50 years.
In the 1320»s military ballooning in Europe entered an era of

unspectacular research and development.

The use of balloons as aerial

platforms for reconnaissance and signaling was altered to provide also
for the dropping of bombs and propaganda.

Interest in the use of

balloons with armies was revived in 1855-1856, during the Crimean War,
The English discussed the feasibility of employing balloons for

reconnaissance and bombardment, and at the scige of Sevastopol the
Russian forces had a balloon which made several ascensions.
Little is

recorded of the role played by balloons in this conflict; their contribution to the outcome of the seige seems to have been slight.

Napoleon III engaged the services of two leading French aeronauts in
1859, Louis and Eugene Godard, during the Italian campaign against

Austria,

Reconnaissance ascensions were made at Possuoli, at

Castenedolo, from the Castiglione Hills, and at the Battle of Solferino,
but they had little or no effect on
tlie

campaign.

During the 1860's, the British conducted some minor experiments

with balloons for obsei^ation and reconnaissance at Aldeshot under
Henry T. Coxwell, a civilian instructor.
Interest in the projects

died in the British War Office and Coxwell went to Germany in 1870 to
train the German Balloon Corps,
12

The Germans used balloons in only

John F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence upon History (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), II, 492-542.
Henry T, Coxi^ll, My Life and Balloon Experiences (London: Allen and Co., 1887), I, 52-79.
12

W, H,

12

one operation against the French, but interest was stimilated in their

development.

Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, who had been an observer

with the Union Army during the American Civil War and had made his
first ascent in a balloon at St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1863, served

during the Franco-Prussian tor as a cavalry officer, but was instru-

mental in maintaining interest in aerial flight in Germany.

In the

Franco- Prussian War Felix Nadar formed an organization named the

Ballon Poste, for floating mail and passengers out of beseigcd Paris,
"The entire Government escaped by balloon when the fall of the city

seemed imminent."

13

In 1884 Captains Charles Renard and A.

C.

Krebs of the French

Army, xrorking on designs of their own and financed by an Army appro-

priation of $40,000, constructed a torpedo- shaped airship weighing

4,000 pounds and povrcred by a nine horsepower motor,
patterned his balloon after a model that
French Academy almost 100 years before.
liad

Renard had

been submitted to the

But he added a motor that

permitted his airship to fly by its
point.

o\jn

power and return to its starting

In contrast to earlier balloons which could not carry observers

to a definite destination, Renard's ship could maneuver in any

direction.

Subsequent developments led to the dirigible, of which one of
the first was devised in 1897 with "an Internal lattice framework and
13

the development of observation aviation it was in the llghter-than-air

field that progress was nost consistent and most productive up to the

besinnins of the present century.
During the middle ages when men interpreted ancient
instead of eimcrimenting, they
\<rrote
x^ri

tings
less

boldly about flying.

A

fc\7,

wedded to exegesis, studied the mechanism and flight of birds.
Bacon,
in the thirteenth century, vnroto of

Roger

instruments to flie x.'ithall so that one sitting in the midst of the instrument, . . . doe tume an engine, by which the wings, being artificially con-.posed, may beat the ayre after the manner of a flying bird.^^
In succeeding centuries there came an increasing group of

aerial enthusiasts, with more optimism than method, who learned at

painful cost that flying requires more than paddles and other airbeating devices attached to

ams

and legs.

Early in the sixteenth century, the incredible Leonardo da Vinci took leave of his painting long enough to invent a tank, design

artillery, and build movable bridges.

In addition to this, he designed

an omithoptcr (a flying machine powered by flapping wings) and a

helicopter (a machine which rises by the action of a horizontal rotating
fan),
iind

a much less complicated device which he felt might be useful He was successful in

In connection with either machine--the parachute.

flying models of his helicopter, and left in his notebooks plans for a

machine 96 feet in diameter, with a frame of bamboo and iron and a
covering of starched linen.
He devised also a propeller for use on his

N.Y.!

As quoted in James R. Nev»nan, The Tools of Mar (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1%2), pp. 268-269.

15

ground vehicles and studied the flight of birds and the resistance of
air to their flights.

About the same time that Leonardo began his aeronautical
researches, one of his countrymen, Baptiste Dnnte, announced to the

world

tl-iat

he

liad

nade a successful glider flight in northern Italy,

No one was looking x;hen Baptiste took to the air and his contemporaries

Gcoffingly suggested that he and his glider might do well to join the

other Dante,
Inferno,

\7ho

t\jo

centuries before had recotmted his travels in the

Joseph Addison, the Eiiglish essayist, objected to flying and in
1713, writing in response to a letter from "Daedalus," he declared that

flying

would fill the v;orld with innumerable Immoralities and give such occasions for intrigues as people cannot meet with, who have nothing but legs to carry then. You should liave a couple of lovers make a midnight assignation upon the top of the monument, and see the cupola of St, Paul's covered with both se:;cs like the outside of a pigeon house. Nothing v7ould be more frequent tlxan to see a beau flying in at a garret v7indow, or a gallant giving cliase to his mistress, like a hawk after a lark, ^8
Tlie

Marquis de Bacqucvillc decided to use the roof of Notre
One

Dame in Paris, instead of the cupola of St, Paul's cathedral.

morning in 1742, after attaching paddle-shaped wings to his wrists and
ankles, he atteiipted to fly across the Seine River,

Unfortunately, he

flew only as far as a washerwoman's barge a few feet from the bank and

working in opposition to each other, to juggle out the resultant force,
and then to build a glider x^ich could fully utilize that force in
order to retnain aloft.
The air was a strange,

intangible, and unpre-

dictable medium, difficult to observe and to understand.

Yet Cayley,

bom

in an age when the scientific method had largely replaced ancient
tloat

catechisms, so thoroughly mastered aerodynaraic principles

competent

engineers believe that only the absence of a suitable motor prevented
him from achieving powered flight.
19

Cayley's "noble white bird," sailing majestically from the top
of a hill to any given point on the plain below with perfect steadiness
19

Pierce, Air War; Itr. Psycholor.lcal, Teclinical, and Social Implications , pp. 269-270, For a fuller account of Cayley and his work see Jolm L, Pritchard, Sir George Cayley (London: Max Parish,
1961).

17

and safety, fired the imagination and throughout the nineteenth century

experimentation
and elsewhere.

xjent

fonjard vigorously in England, Germany, France,

Some of the leading names were J, Stringfellow, who in

1848 built the first successful airplane model powered by a tiny steam

adjudged them capable of flight and Langley* s pianos at xjorst must be
considered magnificent failures.
20
21
21

The Langley-Manly airdrcsnes,

"Aeronautics," Encyclopaedia Britannica , 1960,

I,

242-243,

Langley got $50,000 from Congress at the time of the SpanishAmerican War to conduct experiments for the War Department, He \^s fortunate in getting the cooperation of Charles Manly, Manly' s engines, weighing 125 pounds, developed 52 horsepower and were far in advance of anything Imo\m at his time, Che of his best machines, weighing only 2,4 pounds to the horsepower, was built in spite of the assurances of all the eminent engineers consulted tliat no machine could do as well as 8 pounds per horsepower, Tlie engine was five cylindered and liquid

18

piloted by Manly, were launched In 1903 from Langley's houseboat in
the Potomac River.
In the words of one of the onlookers, his full-

sized ship "slid into the v^atcr like a l\andful of mortar."

All seemed

well in the test until the moment of take off.
An Instant later there was a crash, the after part of the ship fell upon the deck of the houseboat, while the forward part in which Prof, Manly was seated, rose slightly, then turned completely over and dropoed into the water a few feet axray, without having floxm a foot.22
*

During the same year as Langley's fiasco, Wilbur and Orville
Wright, who oTjned a bicycle shop in Dayton, Ohio, installed an engine
in a glider with which they had been experimenting.

Their contemptible

patch box of wood and linen, held together by glue and wire and powered
by a wheezing, four-cylinder engine,
x^^as

little more than a witch's
1903,

broomstick, but it could fly.

On the morning of December 17,

at the desolate beach of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in a halting,

erratic flight of 120 feet,

modem

flying, as we know it, was born.

Only five people watched this 12-second performance against a 21-mile

wind.

Four successful flights were made that day, the longest lasting

59 seconds and covering a distance of 852 feet.
The Wrights' great advance was not only in constructing a

suitable engine, for Manly had done that before then, but in their idea
of achieving balance and steering in flight by means of a few wires

which twisted and warped the wings of their biplane In any manner they

cooled; it was run in a test for ten hours without stopping at a time when the average automobile had all it could do to keep from bubbling over after 15 or 20 miles on the road. Indeed, Manly*s motor was one which was to be unequalled by airplane engines for many years to come.
22

Now York Times , December 9, 1903, p.

1.

19

wished,

Tlieir flight

was no accident, for they had prepared with the

utnost care.

In constructlns their propellers they learned to avoid In buildins

Langley's mistakes and even built themselves a wind tunnel.

their prclininary gliders they learned from the contributions to aero-

dynamics made by Otto Lilienthal and Octave Chanutc, pioneers in glider
. experiments,

23

Meanvjhile, flying machines were being constructed in France,

England, and elsewhere In Europe.

Louis Bleriot, Alberto Santos-IXimont,
v7ho

Henri Farman, and H, Latham were among those

contributed to the
I.

rapid development of aviation which preceded World War

They flew

astounding distances, and to amazing heights in their rickety and
capricious crates.
They stunted, but they also studied the peculiar

properties of the strange medium to which they were entrusting their
lives,

Alberto Santos-Dunont, the wealthy sportsman who in 1901 had

sailed one of his cigar-shaped airships around the Eiffel To\jer,

experimented with planes and built the first airplane to fly in Europe.
He also built a tiny monoplane, weighing only 250 pounds, called the

Demoiselle , vjhich could easily be taken apart and carried around the

country in his autoriobilc.

On July 25, 1909, Louis Bleriot crossed the

Channel, landing in a meadow behind Dover Castle, not far from the spot

from which Blanchard and Jeffries had ascended in their balloon for the
0/

first llghter-than-air crossing 120 years before,
23

Lillentlial, a German, who made over 2,000 glider flights, is credited with the discover^' of the advantages of curving flat wing surfaces. Chanute, in the United States, designed, constructed, and

flew aircraft with movable surfaces.
24
p.

Johnston, Horizons Unlimited;

A Graphic History of Aviation ,

276.

20
By 1914 airplanes had gone as fast as 127 miles an hour, floxm as hich as 25,000 feet, and sustained flight

United only by the

capacity of the plane's fuel tanks.
fuselace uncovered by fabric.

No longer was the plane a skeleton

Instead of belns precariously perched

on a rickety scat, nishtnarishly exposed, the pilot was partially

enclosed in a cockpit v;ith a V7indshield to protect his head.

The

fonjard-nounted controllable elevator

vjas

found to be too sensitive,

and the rear tailplane, with hinged flaps to serve the function of
elevators, becane cotrmon.
The predominant type was the biplane, because

it was found more stable and structurally safer.

Monoplanes at that

time had a disconcerting liabit of falling apart in mid-air when the

pilot tried anything besides level flight.
World
Ifar

Thus, at the onset of

I,

aircraft had reached a stage of development where they

could be employed effectively for military use.

2

CHAPTER II

UTILIZATION OF AERIAL OBSERVATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The forejolns survey of the history of aeronautics, touching

upon its proposed use in war, was synonymous with the history of

observation aviation, for initially all nilitary flying, both In
balloons and in airplanes, functioned primarily as the eyes of the

conmandcr and not as an offensive weapon.

In fact,

in 1898 the Hague

Peace Conference sought to prohibit all types of aerial missions but

innocent reconnaissance.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905

The first combat use of aerial observation in the twentieth

century came during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Writing at

the selge of Port Arthur in 1904, Sir Ian Hamilton, a British observer

with the Japanese armies, declared:
The Russians are sending up balloons to our front, and in front of the 12th Division. Judging by maneuvers and our South African experiences, they should now obtain a lot of misleading infor-

mation.

See note number 25 on page 35 for a fuller account of the efforts of the Hague Peace Conferences to limit the use of airplanes, Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer* s Scrap Book During the RussoJapanese War (London: E, Arnold, 1905), I, 273. At Gallipoll in 1915 Hamilton was forced to postpone his initial landings because of his lack of even misleading intelligence,
21
2

22
In August,

190A, during the Japanese advance on Russian-held

Llaoyang, a Russian captive balloon which was not mobile was the only
one to appear in combat.

Early in December, 1904, a provisional

balloon battalion arrived at the front and a gas plant was established

near the railroad at Mukden,

This unit was equipped with two 5,000
During

cubic foot spherical balloons, each capable of carrying two men.

the Battle of Chentanpu a balloon was taken to a point about 15 miles

southwest of Mukden but was not used, as the battle occurred during
a blinding snov/storm. 4

During the Battle of Mukden in March, 1905, the Russians had
one balloon in the air for three days.
It always ascended at least two

and a half miles to the rear of the advanced infantry line.

The

observer reported his findings by means of a teleplione whose wire was
in the anchoring cable.

An Anerlcan officer travelling with the

Russian staff reported that the Russians found the balloon of little
, value.

5

At Vladivostok on nearly every clear day an Inflated balloon
3

Report No. 3 of Capt, Peyton C. March, United States General Staff Observer with the Japanese Army, dated October 5, 1904, U,S. War Department, Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria Durinr. the Russo-Japanese War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), I, 29.
It is of interest to note that during the Battle of Chentanpu a Russian general, commanding a battery of about 200 seige guns near the railroad, proposed to direct his fire from a balloon. The inclement weather, however, made this Impracticable,

4

Report of Capt, William V. Judson, observer with the Russian forces In Manchuria. War Department, Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Amies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War , 1907, V, 184,

23

was taken onto a large tug which was provided tdth a large square-sail

wind screen.

The tug then proceeded out of the harbor to the mine

field, where two officers ascended to a height of 400 to 800 feet.

As

the tug cruised about slox;ly, subnarine mines could be clearly seen and

their positions verified.

Hostile mines were sought out and the
This use of balloons by the

horizon

v;as

searched for Japanese vessels.
array

Russians impressed one American

observer who ^^rote that

Doubtless a balloon ship would be of great value for naval use under many circumstances, to enable observations to be made of the interior of a hostile harbor, with a view to ascertaining the , vessels there, and for the purpose of studying the mine field.

The Italo-Turkish War.

1911-1912

The Italo-Turkish

Wt

of 1911-1912

furnished the airplane with

its first opportunity of participating in military operations under war

conditions.

The TXirks, hoxrevcr,

load

no planes to employ in any of the

campaigns.

The flying machines used by the Italians were mostly single-

seated craft powered by 50 horsepower Anzanl motors.

These planes, of

which there was a variety of types, were capable of attaining an altitude
of only 3,000 feet and were limited to flights of less than two hours

duration.

In spite of the difficulties of servicing these crude craft,

reconnaissance missions were flown during the desert campaign and the
information secured was of use to the Italian forces,

^Ibid., p. 185.
The popular name for this war is somewhat misleading; it might better be known as the l-Jar for Libya. The name "Russo-Japanese War" is also a misnomer. Most of the fighting of this conflict took place at sea. Manchuria played host to the amies of Japan and Russia i-7ho brought considerable devastation to the land they sought to occupy.

24 At the onset of operations, the Italian commander was not
inclined to put much confidence in aerial photosraphs and relied upon

inaccurate and obsolete maps.
the most part, discounted,
TIae

Reports from aerial observers were, for
enemy assault of October 28, 1911, on

the Italian positions broke do\jn completely because of redeployments

based on the reports of Italian fliers in the days immediately preceding
the attack.
In December of the same year, at the battle of Ain Zara, Italian

forces sained a decisive victory which snapped the backbone of hostile

resistance.

Before the battle, concentrations of enemy troops were

located and sketches of the terrain indicating the routes of enemy

advance were made by the Italian fliers.
was reported to the Italian commander.

Even the retreat of the enemy

Unlike many earlier belligerents the Italians kept the results
of their combat reconnaissances a secret.

area of military Gmployment of aircraft disappeared durins the Balkan
Wars of 1912-1913. Both the Turks and the Qallcan Allies seem to have
9

realized the value of aerial observation.

Having no aviation

orsanization of their ovm, they purchased foreign aircraft, chiefly
French and Italian, and hired foreign pilots, French, Russian, and
Swiss, to fly tlien.
Tlae

results obtained were practically negligible,

A lack of trained observers or of reliable maps, the absence of any
ground organization to support the aerial operations, all contributed
to the meager results.

Many military leaders tliroughout the v7orld
tl-ian

continued to regard the airplane as little more

a plaything and of

little value even as a means of securing information,
\i;Iio

A German officer,

had served as part of the training mission to Turkey, criticized

the Turks for using aircraft instead of horses for reconnaissance

transportation.

He concluded:

Recent experience confirms In an irrefutable manner, the opinion always held by authorities on higher strategy that if victory is to be rendered not merely decisive but complete, then a large .„ force of cavalry v;ith its convenient nobility is indispensable.

referring to a race then In progress:
army the aeroplane is worthless,"

"Tliat is

good sport, but for the

General Joseph Jacques C. Joffre, who was appointed Chief of
the General Staff in 1912, served as the tool for the proponents of the

offensive a ou trance .
reconnaissance.

The nev; doctrine

v/as

blunt in its disregard of

Like the German authorities, the French General Staff

was of the opinion that intelligence vjould alvjays be incomplete,
inaccurate, and tardy,
Tliey v/ere

candid in pointing out the wealcness

of contenporary aircraft and under their attack French military

aeronautics sank to the levels of its German counterpart.
Hie publicity given to the German militarj' dirigibles induced

some French authorities shortly before the war to believe that there was
some value in this type of aircraft,

A construction program
Tlie

xras

launched and a diri-^ible boom began,
it liad an opportunity of

war interrupted this before
superficial Impression on

making more

tlxan a

the attitude of the military authorities. The offensive a outrance theory appealed to the Russian

commanders just as it did elsewhere, \rtth the usual adverse effect on

Basil H, Liddell Hart, Foch; Little, BroTjn and Co., 1932), p, ^,

The Man of Orleans (Boston:

Tlie myth of France's superiority in military aviation over Germany at the beginning of World War I is continued by many authors. Statistics showing the number of pilots, airplanes and observers in the French air service rarely go beyond the year 1912, the year marlcing a downward turn in the development of this arm of the French military establishment. For an example of this mistake sec Ilans Speier's article on "Ludondorf f : Tlie German Concept of Total War," in Edx^ard M, Earle (ed.), Makers of Itodem Stratcf;y; Military Tliou^^ht from Machiavelll to Hitler (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1943), For a comparison of the air strcngtli of the belligerents at p. 312, the beginning of the war see pp, 33-34 infra.

Russian military aeronautics.

If alloxgances are

made for Russia's

general bacla/ardness in nilltary teclinology, the development of its air
arn
xjas

similar to that o£ France.

By the boglnnins of 1913 there was

evidence of an effort to set up an effective organization. introduction of the offensive
set in,
\lhen the

With the

n

outrancc doctrine, hoxjcvor, a decline

war broke out Russian connandcrs neither sought nor

received any assistance from the air,
Tlie

British amy's conception of the proper enployncnt of the
one of reconnaissance.
It

air arn
vjcll be

v;as

was thought

tliat

planes night

sent out to reconnoitcr the eneny positions prior to the battle,

Just as its

amy
force

was snail in conparison to the European masses, the
\7az

British

air

likewise smaller.

Its stage of development was

about the sane as elsewhere.

It had not suffered the sudden fall from

popularity of the French air service, however, and its morale was very
high.
In a majority of the alrpljines employed during the earliest

phases of Vforld Uar

I,

the observer sat in the front cockpit,
\;as

Ch

either side his view of the ground

partially cut off by either the
wing.

monoplane's wing or the biplane's

lov7er

Ahead of him was a

projecting engine and erdiaust pipe and sometimes a radiator,

A naze

of wires and braces and the engine exliaust were added impediments when he attempted to peer over the various obstacles.
Tlie

cockpits

\i;ere

narrow and the movements of the observer
17

x^erc

severely restrained,

The r.'icholas N, Golovlne, The Russian Campnign of 1914: Beginning of the War and Operations in ^st Prussia , trans, A. B, S, Hunts (Fort Lcavenvjorth, Kansas: Command and General Staff School Press, 1933), p, 61,

32

Many of the airplanes In use

\«:re

outdated by August, 1914, and even the

norc recent types were slou and carried fuel enough for a flight of only
a
fcx-J

hours.
The nilitar^' airplanes employed by the Germans in 1914 were

divided into two groups,
by the Rumpler, Gotloa, and

Tlie

"A" class consisted of monoplanes nadc

Fok!-.er

aircraft manufacturers,

Tlie

"B" class

included biplanes chiefly of Albatros, Aviatiic, and Otto manufacture.

With the exception of the Otto pusher, both monoplanes and biplanes
\jere

tractor models (v;ith the propeller mounted on the nose of the
Pox^ercd by 100 horsepower Mercedes engines,

fuselage),

the machines

had a flight endurance of four hours, a cruising speed of 55 to 60

miles per hour, and a load-lifting capacity of two persons and their
specialized equipment.
Shortly before the war the Gcrrian

amy

proposed to build

standardized two- and three-place machines but the commencement of

hostilities caused the program to bo dropped.

At that time the indisarr.iy

criminate purchasing of all available airplanes gave the
1

a collec-

o

tion of almost every type ever built in Germany.
Tlie

first of the English military planes, built in 1912,
it had o::poscd seating

crossing the Channel, fighting for prizes and new records.
Hiere were neither bomb racks nor bomb sights, first because it

was thought

tliat

that type of warfare was not feasible and tliat most

were satisfied with the thought that their planes might be useful for
limited scouting and observation; second, because if they had had the
idea, their machines were doing well enough to get up into the air

without carrying a load of bombs also.

Defensive armor did not exist;

a well-directed pistol shot which landed in the fuel tank would have

been sufficient to send the best plane dovm in flames.

That, then,

was the picture of military aviation when the war opened in August,
1914.

There v^ere less than 200 airplanes in all of Europe fit to cross

the Clxannel,
In regard to the number of aircraft available In 1914, France,

with several hundred planes, had more than any other nation.
had, however, a more standardized air force.
19

Germany

The Belgians had the The

best types, but their entire force totalled but 30 airplanes.

Russians had 80 airplanes, but only 40 pilots, and the types of planes

were so different

tliat

unless a pilot had flown

a

great deal he had
Italy had a total

considerable trouble with a new type of airplane.

of about 200 airplanes, half of which were French and British built,

and half of which
19

vrere

slow, heavy ships of the pro-Capronl type.

At the outbreak of the war Germany had about 254 military pilots and 271 observers. After the units at the front were supplied, however, there v;as little left over for reserves or training cadre. Georg P. Netnaxin (ed.). Pic Dcutschen Luftstrcitkryf te im Weltkrle;^ (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Solin, 1920), p. 62. The Allied powers had even fewer military flying personnel.

34

At the onset of hostilities Germany had a nominal strength
of 180 airplanes on the western front.
21

20

This force was faced by a

force of approximately the same strength.

With the units figured at
22

nominal strength, the British had 48 airplanes,
and the Belgians 24
24

the French 136,

23

making a total of 208.

The Belgian air force

accomplished little of value so that if it is omitted the Allies had
184 airplanes to the Germans'
ISO.

On the eastern front the Germans had a nvnerical superiority

because the Russians apparently concentrated their small air service

opposite the Austro-Hungarlan armies.

In the light of prewar German

military aviation development it is not surprising that this initial
superiority In numbers did not play any decisive role In the initial
conflicts.
20

Probably it is impossible to give the air strength accurately In numbers of machines. Obviously specific figures are exact for only a certain period of tine. Nominal strengths are approximations based on the number of planes authorized for the aviation units at the front. Authors often fail to state whether their numbers are actual strength at a given date, whether they are describing front-line strength or

grand totals including training and experimental machines,
21

zu Lande (Berlin:
22

Der Weltkrieg, 1914 bis 1918: Reichverlag, 1925),

Die milit^rischen Oocrationen
I,

66/>-&o6.

Walter Raleigh, The War in the Air; Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), I, 411. This figure given by Raleigh Includes some training planer; which were still at the aviation parks in England, This work, and the later volumes by Henry A, Jones, is hereafter cited as The War in the Air .
France, Minlstere de la Guerre, ftat-najor de I'armee, Les armees francajscs dans la grande guerre (Paris: Imprlmerie natlonale,
1922),
I,

The British Royal Flyin3 Corps, as it existed during the surmer
of 1914, was divided into a Military and a Naval Wing.

Tne division

betxjecn their functions was, hoirever, a V7ide one, with the result that

the Naval Wing quickly became kno^m as the Royal Naval Air Service and

then the title Royal Flying Corps came to stand for the Military Wing

alone.

The growth in each case was less rapid in numbers than in design
By August, 1915, the British Expeditionary Forces had

and amamcnt.

increased from 4 to 30 divisions but the Royal Flying Corps from
25

The pronouncements of international lav; on aerial warfare were vague. In 1899 at the First Hague Peace Conference a declaration was signed stating that the high contracting parties agreed to prohibit launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or other aerial vessels for a period of five years, Tliis prohibition vras extended in 1907 at the Second Hague Conference until the Third Peace Conference (which was never held) but this declaration was signed by only 27 of the 44 powers represented. Of the nations involved in World War I, Belgiun, Great Britain, and the United States v;ere signers of this declaration. None of the other belligerents v;ere obligated to these restrictions. It was obviously no restraint as it contained a provision that it xjas not binding when, in case of war between the contracting powers, one of James B. Scott the belligerents V7as joined by a non-contracting power. (ed,), The IIa".ue Conventions and Declarations of 1399 and 1907 ( 2d ed. Oxford University Press, 1915), pp. 220-222. rev,; New Yorl^: Article 25 of the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of l-Iar on Land forbade the bombardment "by whatever means" of undefended toiais, villages, houses, or dwellings. The quoted phrase was expressly inserted to cover aerial attacks. Tlxere was no definition, hox^ever, of "undefended." All of the major belligerents of World \4ar I ratified this convention. Ibid ., pp, 100-129. The indef initencss of international law allowed all nations concerned to insist tliat they alone observed the rules and that the others violated then. Actually, both sides v;ere anxious to secure all possible advantages and only military' and teclinical factors limited their aerial attacks.

36

4 to only 11 squadrons.

Under its peacetinc organization German military aviation

consisted of

5

battalions:

4 under the Prussian War IJlnistry and

1

under the Bavarian War Ministry.

From these, 33 field aviation sections

and 8 fortress aviation sections uere formed when mobilization was
ordered.
Each army comnand and each army corps (except reserve corps)
The Oberste Herresleltun3 (O.H.L,) had
27

had a field aviation section.

no aviation units under its direct control.
Tlte

French set up aeronautics as a separate branch of the army

as early as 1912 and this policy remained in use until after the war
began. The pilot and observer, however, ^Jcre under separate connands.
In each

Aerial observation was within the domain of the army staff.

army there was a staff officer designated 'Chief of Air Reconnaissance

Service,"

He and his observers (all staff officers) were attached to
28

the IntclllGence Section at army headquarters.

The observers even

lived with the staff at

amy

headquarters, going to the airdromes only
The air sections of an army were under

to carry out their asslgments.

^^Raleigh,
27

Xltc

\tor

in the Air .

I,

331; 434-435.

John R, Cunco, Wln.'^.ed Mars (Harrisburg, Pa,: Military Service Publishing Co,, 1942), I, Appendix XI. The 0,11, L, was the German field command. The Kaiser's General Headquarters, the Grosses Hauptquartier, exercised a vague control over land, air, and '-.^^ forces, TI-jc French counterpart of O.H.L, was the Grand Quart 1 or G<?neral (G.Q.G,); the British, General Headquarters (G,H,Q. ),

Having staff officers as observers meant that the French observers had a better conception of the situation than their German counterpartn. On the other hand the lack of ties xjith the pilots and their air corps had its obvious drawbacks. See Paul F, M, Armengaud, Lc rescigncncnt acrien, sauvcgardc dcs armccs (Paris: Librarie aeronautlquc, 1934), pp, 62 ff.

37

an aviation officer called the "Director of Aviation Service,"
his role to furnish the airplanes.
He had no control over the

It was

observer G,
It was

not unusual for airncn to land in search of information
It V7as a

during the early days of the war.

vestige of the custom of
One

the cavalry to question inhabitants of a locality being scouted.

British observation crew

on August 20, 1914, wliile on a search nission landed their machine in order to query
30

in the Brussels-Charleroi area,

the countrymen about the presence of Germans,

During that same

month a German plane landed between two hostile forts during the attack
on Liege and reported the combat situation at this point to its
commander,
ho\7 it

31
Tlie

sources do not indicate what of value was seen and
Such use of airplanes as a sort of taxi

influenced the battle.

service for observers, although perhaps interesting, hardly represented
the most effective utilization of flying machines.

During the German advance through Belgium and northern France

under the strategy of General Helmuth von Moltke's version of the
Schlieffen Plan, the Germans, by not taking advantage of information
furnished them by their aerial observers, lost an opportunity to

destroy both the French Fifth Army and the entire British Expeditionary
Force, On August 23, General Charles L, M, Lanrczac, commanding the
29

French Fifth Army, was holding a position southwest of Nanur at the
junction of the Sanbre and Meuse Rivers.
The German Second Army, under

General Karl von Bulow, had crossed the Sanbre at Charleroi during the

preceding day and during the following norning had forced General
Lanrezac's left flanlc back about four miles.
The Meuse xras crossed by

the German Tliird Army, under General Freihcrr von Hausen, near Dinant

during the afternoon of the 23d.

Lanre2ac began to withdraw his rear

elements during the morning of August 23 and at nine o'clock that night
he ordered a general withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the British Expeditionary Force was holding a line
from Givry to Hons and to the west along the Conde Canal facing the

German First Army under General Alexander von Kluck,

About 11:30 P.M.

August 23 General Sir Joseph French, the comander of the British
troops, received xrord that Lanrezac was withdrawing.
32

At 10:00 A.M. on the 23d the aviation units of the German

Third

Amy

reported that Lanrezac was beginning to withdraw to the
A German division in the vicinity of Givet
vjas

southxjcst,

ordered to

proceed to the south^rest, crossing the Meuse near Fumay to intercept
the French movement.
It planned to push forx^ard towards Phillipevllle

in pursuit of the main force as soon as the Meuse had been crossed.
Tlie

execution of this plan was held up, hoxgever, when a staff officer

of the Second Army appeared and reported that the latter force was

attacking the French at daybreak, for General von Billow believed that
32

Joseph French, 1914 (London: Constable and Co., 1919), pp, 64-65. For a map showing the situation on the morning of August 23, 1914, see Figure 4 on page 418.

39

Lanrezac was holding his position in force just south of the Meuse,

with his east flank

north of

Mettet,

General Ernst von Iloeppner, who was

then Chief of Staff of Von Hausen's Tlilrd Army, later wrote:
So it happened that a quick decision had to be made as to t/hether we should trust to the air intellisence given on August 23 or believe in the urgent requests frcxn the Second Army, Tlie latter prevailed . . . the Coi:Tmander-in-Chief gave orders for the advance of the greater portion of our army toward the x^est,^^

"eanwhlle, Lanrezac was noving rapidly to the southwest, and
on the morning of August 24 occupied a line from Mazee to Chlmay and

northwest toward Maubeugc, with his left about 16 miles in rear of
Sir John French's right,
Tlie

British began their withdraxjal early that

same morning and closely pressed all the way by Von Kluck, reached the
line La Longueville-Bavai-La Boiserettc by nine o'clock that evening.
34

The combined effort of the German Second and Third Armies

proved to be a blow struck at shadows.

Before the day was over, the

leading elements of both armies, confused in the converging routes of

advance, were so mixed up that Lanrezac

vjas

able to continue his \rtth-

drawal that night almost xdthout interruption.

Evidence that, during these critical days of 1914, the German

comanders did not have much confidence in their aerial observation
found in the German official history which, xjhen commenting on this

40
the retreat of the English and French out of Belglun to the . . . south and southwest was recognized by our aviators in every case, and especially on the fronts of the Second and Third Amies, as a planned and orderly moveinent, and not as we vjlllinaly believed, a disordered flight, 35

Durlns Vtorld

'.tar

I,

before the entrance of the United States

into the conflict, air power was used prinarily to support ground

operations.

The air

ams

uere subordinate elements of the army in each

country and therefore ^rere responsive to the demands of those services.
Since the greatest concentration of effort was on land v;arfare, army

commanders came to regard the flying machines as the "eyes" of the
ground forces with the primary missions of observing
tlie

disposition of
It

enemy forces and of spotting the emplacement of his artillery.
becatic apparent,

even before the end of 1914, that measures would have

to be taken to prevent enemy planes from carrying out their observation

missions.

For this purpose, planes with great speed, fire power, and

maneuverability were necessary, and both sides set to work to develop
them,
Tliis v;as

the genesis of the fighter plane, whose mission was to

destroy other planes and gain control of the air over the battlefield.

Although the contending air forces

Ixad

been trained and equipped

primarily for observation, airplanes \iere soon dcsigiied for other

military roles.

As the primitive aircraft on hand at the beginning of

the war demonstrated, more specialized types of aircraft would have to

be developed to perform as fighters and bw.ibers.

Airplanes grev;

steadily larger and heavier.
altitude, fire power, range
35 p. 555.

The performance characteristics--speed,

— improved

greatly.

Tae clvinging fortunes

Hans Arndt, Per Luftkricg (Leipzig:

Johann A. Barth, 1923),

41
of the air
\7ar betircen

1914 and 1917 verc largely the result of aero-

nautical developments, with first one side and then the other gaining
a temporary advantage because of sonc new and advanced type of plane

or iten of equipment.

No nation entered the war prepared for aerial combat.
tine,

At the

the Germans believed that the French had airplanes equipped with
Tlie

machine guns soon after the hostilities began."*
to one reliable French source,

fact, according

is that at the beginning of the \«ir the
37

entire French air force possessed only two machine guns.

One French "We viere

airman later \7r0te the exact opposite to the German claims;
not armedi
time.
Tliey

A simple carbine, a cavalry musket firing one shot at a
(and we knew it) often had machine guns." 39
38

Actually,

neither the Germans

nor the French, nor the British Royal Flying
40
One

Corps had machine guns on their planes when the war began.

enterprising airraan of the Royal Flying Corps mounted one on his machine
during Autust, 1914, but was ordered to remove it because it added too

Charles F. Snovjdcn Gamble, Tlic Air Weapon, Being Some Account of the Growth of British .Military Aeronautics From the nGp.inningr: in the Year 17^3 Until the i:nd of the Year 1929 (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 257. Tliis work cited hereafter as n-ie Air Weapon .

42
Tlic

French alnicn

secsn

to have been more ass^csslve thnn the

fliers of the other air forces.
of factors.

This probably was due to a conbination

A great many of

tlie

French airplanes

\-7ere

pusher models.

The pilot and observer sat in front of the wings with a clear forward

field of fire unloampercd by engine, propeller, or wires.

Both the

British and Gcrnans had more tractor types in which the observer sat
in the fon;ard cockpit surrounded by wires and wings and with his

potential field of fire fonjard restricted by the engine and propeller.
The French aviators, moreover, wore flying in defense of their ovm

territory, which may have made them more inclined to seek combat rather
than merely to cooperate with the ground forces by air scouting.
The total number of French air victories in 1914 appears to

have been small but the Germans xjcre convinced

tliat

all French airplanes

carried machine guns.

There were also widely publicized pictures of

French Nieuports v;hose observers stood up through a hole in the wing
to fire over the fonrard propeller.
\rcre

Actually, this and other models

simply oqjerimental projects but even a German author admits
42
Tliis

that by February, 1915, ••German airmen fled precipitately."

may

only have been evidence of the low state of the German air service,

which needed nothing more than the e:!agscrated threat of French aerial
machine guns to show the effects of the strain caused by six months of
combat.

Within a few weeks, planes of all sides seem to have begun to
carry into combat a variety of weapons apparently limited only by the
42

dragged on the end of a long cable to strilce a hostile machine), steel
arroxjs (originally designed for attacking ground forces), and snail

bombs.

Even sinulated x7capons V7ere carried aloft to awe the eneny.
The Germans secured the advantage in the summer of 1915 when

they succeeded in mounting in a Fokker monoplane a fixed machine gun

which could be fired fort^ard through the v;hirllng propeller.
43

Tliis

One of the more amusing early dueling encounters in the air took place between a German and a British flying crew. "When the combatants had e::haustcd all their rifle and revolver amr^Tunition, they blazed away with their Very [signaling] pistols, with which they made very poor shooting. After a vjhile both pilots realised that the only chance of scoring a hit was to get close up, but V7hen they laid their machines alongside, the humour of the situation struck . , , [the German pilot] so forcibly, so that he roared with laughter at the sight of the t\Jo observers solemnly loading up and taking deliberate ain, a green light ansvxiring a red one. Evidently the observers xrcre also too tickled to shoot straight, for neither got an>'where near his mark," Louis A. Strang, ?vCCol lections of An Airman (London: J, Hamilton, Ltd., 1933), p, 21G.

Mtony Fo!c!ccr, the Dutch inventor, tells this graphic story of the first tine he x«:nt up to try out his new device. "Wiii le I was flying around about six thousand feet high, a Farman tvjo-seater biplane , . • appeared out of a cloud t\m or three thousand feet below. This was my opportunity to show wliat the gvm would do, and I dived rapidly toward it. The plane, an observation type with a propeller in the rear, was flying leisurely along, . , . Even though they had seen me, they vTould have no reason to fear bullets through my propeller, ^^lile approaching, I thought of what a deadly accurate stream of lead I could send into the plane. . . , I had no personal animosity toward the French; I was flying merely to prove tl-iat a certain meclianism I Iiad invented would work. By this time I V7as near enough to open fire and the French pilots were watching me curiously, wondering, no doubt, why I was flying up behind them. Suddenly I decided that the vihole job could go to hell. It was too much lik.e 'cold meat* to suit pc, I Iiad no , , , v;ir:h to kill Frenchmen for the Gemans. Let them do their o\7n Icilling." Basil II. Liddell Hart, A History of the World \ibr, 1914-1919 (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1934), ). 281.

44

44
revolutionary
f lying

gun quickly gave the

Gcmans

a superiority In the

air V7hich spurred the Allied powers In their search for a still better
plane.

Until they could natch the Fokker, the British and the French
At one tine

resorted to formation flying and sought safety in nunbcrG.

in 1916 the British used no less than 12 fighters to escort one

observation plane,*

The Allies also developed their o\m interrupter

gear to fire their nachinG guns through the blades of the propellers.
The
tv;o

45

best Allied machine guns used in World War I were the
Hie Lewis machine gun, which weighed less than

Lewis and the Vickers.

20 pounds without the xjater jacket (the Lev/is was designed to be cooled by water, but experience at high altitudes proved that the difficulty

was not in cooling the gun, but in keeping it from freezing), was fed

amunition by magazine.
of the anniinition

After 47 or 97 shots, depending on the size
the eripty magazine had to be removed and replaced

dnn,

with a loaded one.
45

A good part of this weapon's efficiency came from

By concentrating on fighter tactics the Allies were able "to seek out their opponents behind the opposing front, thus enabling their o\m reconnaissance and artillery machines to ^^?ork undisturbed," Ibid ., 2G2,
In February, 1915, Roland Garros, a famous French aviator, developed a means of firing machine guns through airplane propellers which antedated Foicker':; invention. A metal plate clamped to the propeller served to deflect bullets V7hlch failed to pass through the \jhirling blades. After the Germans captured Garros and his plane, they learned the secret of the French successes and adapted this invention to their ovai use. The French countered xjlth ncvj types of aircraft and tried a number of ingenious schemes to regain aerial superiority. One desperate effort involved a small cage holding a gunner and his weapon which was fastened in front of the propeller. George M, Clilnn, Tl\c riachino Gun; History, Evolution, and Development of Manual, Automatic, and Airborne Repeating Weapons (Washington:

47
by virtue of their bettGr-tralned pilots.
The Allies sonctimcs sent
then, trere some of the

out their pilots vnretchcdly trained,

Tliese,

reasons for the inability of the Allies to establish and sustain air

superiority for any length of tine,

43

Durinc 1917 the air uar crev; steadily more intense, individual
air battles sorietines involving as nany as 100 planes.

Operations
caric

against eneny air units, cither in the air or on the ground,

to

be a dominant feature of the air war, uith both sides striving to achieve

aerial superiority.

Fighter pilots became popular heroes in the warring

covintrics as their exploits were reported colorfully by the press.

Outstanding among these fliers were George Guynener, Rene Fonck, and
Cliarles Mungessor of France; Baron Manfred von Richthofen,

Oswald

Boelcke, Max Irmelnann, Vtemer Voss, and Herman Gffrlng of Germany;
Edxjard ilannocl: and Albert Ball of Great Britain; and William A.

Bishop

of Canada,

49

Although the fighter plane continued to dominate the air war
and the fighter Aces c^taired the imagination of the public, progress also was made in bonbardnent, especially during 1917,
Army conmanders

began to sec the tactical advantages to be gained by bombing enemy rail
48

Cunoo, Winged Mars .

II,

280-281,

Accounts of the c:q)loits of these fliers make up the bulk of the popular literature available for the study of World War I aviation. Although the public seemed pleased V7ith the development of offensiveminded aeronautics, most military conmanders xjore linimpressed, I!oreover, all of the famous fighter pilots seem to have sliared a common attribute. Along with their courage, daring, and initiative there \ms invariably a lack of military discipline, a virtue which the commanders demanded. For a list of books dealing vjith this subject sec the section in the bibliography on mcnoirs, biographies, and personal accounts.

49

48
centers and supply depots behind the lines, but it
for
thctri

v;as

norc difficult

to appreciate the strategic advantages to be coined fron

bonbardncnt of transportation and industrial centers farther renoved
from the battle arcan,
Tlie

Allies, in particular, steadily expanded

their bonbin^ operations, orjanizins special bonbardncnt units and

developing larger bonbs.

In lar3e neasure, of course,

this v;as made

possible by the air superiority enjoyed by the Allied air forces during

nost of 1917.
In January,

1915, Kaiser VJilheln II gave permission to his

forces to attack London and other British targets,

A few strikes

against England had been nade by German planes in December, 1914, and
there xjcre a few more during 1915, but most of the raids during 19151916 xTOrc made by Zeppelins,
Cri

January 19, 1915, Zeppelins dropped
In the

bombs on villages in Norfolk, England, and killed five people.

first raid on London, May 26, 1915, a single airship dropped a ton of
bombs, I'.illing seven people and injuring 35,

London was bombed four

more times in the latter months of 1915.

During 1915-1916, Zeppelins

dropped 154 tons of bombs on England, inflicting 1,725 casualties

compared with only
In 87 casualties.

t\JO

tons of bombs dropped by German planes, resulting

To meet these attacks the British adopted a variety of measures: 346 planes vrere assigned to defensive patrol duty; anti-aircraft guns

and searchlights were Installed around vital centers; and a blackout

was adopted in the East Anglica area,

Hiese defenses, however, had

Tlie

Engliind is llenry A. Jones,

best source of information about the German air raids on Tlic \jar in the Air , III,

49

little success aj^ainst the Zeppelins during most of 1916,

The vreather

proved to be the most effective defense. naval 2Leppelins attacked targets in
Shrewsbury, Englaiiu,
tijc

On January 31, 1916, nine

Midlands, killing 59 people at

Four more attac!:s on Scotland and England during
Tac first really effective defense against
3,

April caused G4 deaths,
these airs'.iips
ca:.iG

on Scptcnbcr

1916, when the first airship uas
tliat

shot do^jn by a British airplane.

More were shot dovm

sane nonth,

and by 1917

t!ie

2k}ppelin threat had been ninlniscd,
tlie

With the develop-

ment of incendiary bullets,
diminished in inportance.

huge, vulnerable gas bags sharply

At the beginning of the war the British had no special artillery for use against hostile aircraft.
During the next year their

troops in France, unable to \Jard off encny airplanes, felt this defi-

ciency

I'.eenly,

At the sane tine British planes

\^7ere

suffering more

fron ground fire than fra-; hostile aircraft.

By 1916 the 3-inch field

gun
V7ar

Iiad

been converted to anti-aircraft use and until the end of the

it renaincd the standard

mobile gun in the zone of operations.

52

In France e::perincnts and discussions about anti-nircraft

defense dated from 1906,

As early as 1910 an anti-aircraft gun had

appeared at the annual nancuvors.
1914 when the war began.

Yet there

xjas

only one such gun in

To fill the gap, field guns xrcre set on

improvised bases \/alGh first permitted an elevation of only 40
later (1915) 70°,
Tlie

but

75 mm.

field guns, stripped of splinter shields

and wheels,

vjere

mounted on pedestals, but loading them on trucks for
^^

^4bid., 231.

Ibid ., 270-233,

50
tnovenent to the front vas laborious v;ork,

France

Icept

the sane caliber

(75 mn.) throushout the v/ar and did not vary the types to any n^cat

extent,

TotJardc the end of the conflict one nodcl V7as

mounted on a

trailer and to\x;d by truci:.
At the onset of hostilities, Gcmany had 13 anti-aircraft gu^s:

six vrere mounted on trucks; four were mounted on mobile pedestals and
drawn by horses; and cisht xjcre mounted on travcrsins carriaces and kept
in the rear to defend
tlie

which in turn was subordinate to the General Inspector of Military
Transport,
All of these connandors were stationed in Berlin.
the war cane, there was no cliange except in the division
Tliese

\7Iien

of the troops into noblle units to operate at the front.

sections

were placed under the various corps and amies, but no air officers were
detailed to go to the front on the various staffs,
Berlin,
Tlie

Tlicy

stayed in

Inspector of Aviation Troops had no connection with the

field or fortress aviation sections,
Tlic

lack of any staff officers for aviation at the various

conmands under which the flying sections operated undoubtedly contributed
r.iuch

to the failure of German air reconnaissance to achieve greater

results in 191A,

No particular officer had the responsibility of

assuring the regular issuance of orders and aclcnowledging the receipt
of reports from the airmen,
Tliere

i^rc no trained men to collect.

52

interpret, nnd intesrate the air intclllQCnce and to assure its

dissenination to all units affected by the infomation.

No one at
No

headquarters understood the capacity and llnitations of aircraft.

one curbed the indlviduallon of the loaders of the various flying units

which sonetines did

r,ore

harn than Good,

Ttiorc

vas no intelligent
Hiis

cooperation bct\7ecn the comnanders and the aerial observers,
could have been attained if the fomor had seen to it
\7cre
tliat

the airnicn

familiar with the general scheme of maneuver taken by the

supporting forces and Xidth the details of the operations.
The defects in the organisation were obvious. The General
55

Staff had proposed a retnody in 1912 and 1913 but with no results.

During the first month of the

xrar

the Inspector of Aviation Troops

subnitted a proposal to create a centralized cconand of all aviation
sections at the Oberste Ilerrcsleitung,

Although the War Ministry

initially necned inclined to approve this suggestion, it met the oppo-

sition of both the Inspector of Military Air and Motor Transport and
the General Inspector of Military Transport,
Tac old policy was

continued.
In Octolx3r, 1916, the German air service vjas reorganized to

place all air fighting and defense forces of the army under one
authority,
55
Tlie

entire construction, preparation, and employment of

Cuneo, Winged Mars .

I,

104-106,

Possibly the general expectation of a short war played a role It was believed that the imriediate needs of materiel and personnel could be relieved by simpler remedies tluin a reorganization, Erich von Falkcnh^ayn, ^ncrnl Headquarters, 1914-191G, and Its Criclcal Docisions (London: Hutchinson and Co,, 19I9T, '. 4., Fall:cnha>'n V7as the German Minister of War.
in this decision.

53

aerial units

x/as

placed under the General Conmandlns the Air Forces,

General Ernst von Iloeppncr, a cavalry officer, was naned to this new
post, and \:lth the assictance of an e::cellcnt staff, he moved the

Geman

air force to a position of renewed visor.
As lon^ as the British air services continued to do vjcll at
the front,

there

\:as

little effort for reorf^anisation.

Proposals for

the cstablislmcnt cf an Air ::inistry subnitted In 1914 and 1915 failed
to arouse nuch interest.
In the fall of 1915,

the Zeppelin air raids

culninatcd in a strike at London by five dirigibles on the ni^ht of
October 13-14,
Tliis

attack killed 47 people, woxindcd 102 others, and

caused $400,100 worth of dana^c, but no Zeppelin was brought down.
The
Fo!:!;cr

menace during the xjinter of 1915-1915 marked the bcclnnins

of a novenent x;hich finally established the Air Ministry and the

Royal Air Force.
Vac British Joint Air Cornittee, char-^od x^ith the responsibility
of coordinating the activities of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal

Haval Air Service, ceased to ncet after the vwr beoan and all central
control disappeared.
T!ic t\jo
"^

services fell into an unseemly scranble
In !iay,

for supplies and personnel,

1916, an Air Board, headed by

"lie took up his appointment at the nonent when the Geman air force was recoverins its morale, and his foresight \7as to ensure tliat the Gerr.i3n airmen x;ere never again to suffer such a spirit of hopelessness as \:as their fate in the first weeks of the struggle on the Sonrne," Jones, Tlie VJar in the Air , II, Appendix VII,

Raleigh, Tlic VJar in the Air , I, 472 ff, "[The Chief of Italian Army Aviation] said one thing that struck in my mind, and which made me laugh a good deal internally although I kept an absolutely grave countenance, He said: •'I'Jhat I am going to say to you Xi7iH be absolutely unintelligible and unthinl:able to you as Jiiglishmen, but I regret to say tlxat here, in Italy, it is a fact t'lat there exists • , •

5S

54
Lord George N, Curzon, uas established.
solely
ill

Tlils

orsanization served

an advisory capacity for although it had cliarse of orsanizlng

and coordinating the supply of materiel and of prevcntins competition,
it iiad no

The second report of the Prime Illnister's Committee on Air Organization and Ilar.e Defence /vgainst Air Raids, dated August 17, 1917, in "nirth of the Royal Air Force," Air Potror nistorian Ill (July,
.

General Organisation and Direction of the Air Service" set up a new
systen,
Tlic

amy
tlie

aviation directors became chiefs of the air service

and

Iiad

all

amy

aviation under their conmand including the

observers,

Tne staff officers vrcre allured to join the air service to

obtain a united systeni.
The chiefs of the air service suffered a decline in importance
V7hen

escadrilles began to be attached to corns rather
liad

tlian

amy

headquarters and

virtually no authority or control over units
r ^

serving under these connands,

Tlie

experience of a few nonths of
As division after

conbat brought out sone defects in this policy.

division and corps after corps was

thro\<rn

into the battle and the
tlie

replaced units xrcrc withdravm from the front,

aviation units

ordered back and forth often did not have sufficient time at the front
to bccone familiar with the terrain and the situation.

As a result of the problems raised by this decentralization,
a

new organization was proposed x/hlch separated the air service from
Tlie

the ground forces,
61

zone of operations of each army was divided into

The separation of aviation from the Intelligence Section at army headquarters uas in sone cases too conploto, Tlie close liaison that should have continued often evaporated.
i"

O

German field aviation units were assigned either to army or corps headquarters. Tlie British organizations tended to follovj the pattern of the Frcncli and assigned air organizations to lox/er echelons such as corns or divisions.

56

air sectors,
front.

\rtilch

usually corresponded to the corps sectors at the

Each of these nir sectors was under a comandont of corps aerov7ho \7as

nautics

subordinate to the coamandant of
ari^iy

amy

aeronautics.

In cacli

the air service was under the connandant of army

aeronautics,

Tliis

officer regulated the distribution of all air units,

\;atched over their tcclinical and tactical training and equipment, and

assured the concerted action of all the air units of the

amy.

He

directly controlled the tactical cnployraent of only the escadrilles
and balloon detachr.ients attached to the

amy

headquarters,

Tlie

rcnainins air sections, which performed the duties formerly assigned
to corps or division escadrilles, vjere under the cortnandant of corps

aeronautics,
Tlie

conmandant of corps aeronautics possessed his o^m staff.

It

consisted of a balloon officer, a tactical officer, an intelligence
Tlie

officer, and a photogrqihy officer,

balloon officer advised the
Tlie

commandant on the performance of balloon units in the zone.

tactical officer assisted the conmandiint in issuing orders for aviation

brought out relief features and helped interpreters to estinato helsht
and depth.

Unless he xrerc only a few hundred feet high, the aerial

observer could toll nothing about the relief of objects on the sround—
for exanple, the depth of trenches.

Neither did a regular photograph

indicate much about depth.

A stereoscopic photo3raph--two pictures of

the sane object taken side by 5idc--brought out the missing facts.

At the outbreak of the war Germany and Austria

v;ere v;ell

equipped for photography; none of the Allies \7ere prepared to perform
this specialty,
Tlie

Germans were first to
Tliey

Icam

v-liat

sort of aerial

photographs

liad

value,

soon realized that while 6,000 feet was
the telephoto lens could
Tliey

a high altitude for visual reconnaissance,

take pictures beyond the range of the best anti-aircraft gions.

were not handicapped, as were the Allies, in securing camera lenses;
Indeed, before the war Germany and Austria
liad

supplied the world with

optical glass.

In order to establish her first photographic sections,

Britain had to advertise for privately owned lenses and to pay top

prices for them,

T.ie

first British aerial photograph was taken in

November, 1914, at Ncuve Chapelle,

France did not establish her

system of allotting one photographic unit to each army until December,
1914; and Britain was a month later in putting the photographic service

on an efficient basis.

During the first month of operation of a

British photographic section In France only 40 negatives were developed.
The French Air Service soon demonstrated that a photograph

could be taken over enemy lines, brought back to the airdrome, developed,
printed, interpreted, and forwarded to the artillery in as short a time
as 15 minutes.
This, of course, was a special stunt; but the two hours

64

regularly required to fonrard this valuable intelligence was considered
satisfactory.
By the end of the war,

one airplane out of every four on

the western front was there solely for photographic service.

CHAPTER III

THE Pr>E-WAR MILITARY AVIATION EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ARW

Historical Br-Ck^round of the Ancrlcan Air Service

Benjanin Franklin witnessed the first successful free-balloon
flight of hunan boincs when he was United States Minister to France
in 1783.

Fascinated by this

cind

subsequent ascensions, Franklin
Later he

reported his observations to his scientific friends.
suggested some uses for this "new

bom

baby," including the eraploynent
2

of balloons as a means of troop transportation.

During the spring of 17S4, a Paris newspaper reported the

ascension of a balloon in Philadelphia on Decenber 23, 1733.
Wllco::, a

rkipasinc of History and niography , IIXXV (January, 1911), 51-58; George E. IIastin3s, "Notes on the Beginnings of Aeronautics in America," American Historical Review , XXV (October, 1919), 68-69,

65

s

66

Peter Games, an anatcur balloonist of Baltlnore, toppled from the

basket as his hot air balloon bcjan to rise.
The first successful ascension of a balloon in the United States

was made on January 9, 1793, at Philadelphia by the daring French aero-

naut Jean Pierre Blanchard.

A substantial fund had been subscribed to

provide for the oidiil^ition; George Uashin^ton, President of the United
States, \7as one of the foremost patrons of the affair,

Blanchard'

hydrosen balloon rose fron the yard of the Walnut Street Prison in
Philadelphia and was carried by the wind to land in Deptford Tovmship,

New Jersey, 46 minutes later.

His initial welcome by the citizens of Had Blanchard not been armed

Deptford was not particularly cordial.

with a passport furnished him by President Washington it mlsht have
been fatal, for none of the Deptford people spoke French and Blancliard
spoke no English.
Blancliard, however, quickly returned to Philadelphia

to be received by President Washington at the Executive Mansion,

Some other Americans were also interested in these early

experiments with balloons.

As early as February, 1784, Tliomas Jefferson

was concerned x;ith the problems of military defense and maritime trade

which the development of balloons might present,
friend, Francis Hopkinson,
v;ho

flyin2 sphere to a ponpous politicianfull of hot air . , . driven along by every current of Wind, and thone who suffer thcriselves to be carried up by then run a ^rcat Risk that the Bubble may burst and let them fall fron the Height to which a principle of Levity has raised them,"

balloon fever and joined his friends in experiments v:ith hot air
balloons;
Tlie

Jefferson, too, was fascinated with the novelty,
use of the military balloon by the United States Army was
1-Jar,

first proposed during the Seriinole
Jolin
II,

On September 5,

1340,

Colonel

Sherburne, who had first-hand ejqjcrience in Florida, v/rote to

the Secretary of War, Joel Poinsett, that the protracted effort to

ferret out these Indians for
the use of balloons,
Tlie

rer.ioval

to the

^-tent

might be expedited by

scmitropical jungles and wilderness terrain

of Florida made it most difficult to surprise, surround, and defeat the

Indians,
o

A sk.ctch and simple plan of nocturnal ascensions and

Letter from Francis Hopkinson to Tliomas Jefferson, dated March 12, 17S4, ibid ,, VII, 20.
"The ilar.e of Concrcss is almost forgotten, and for one Person that will mention tliat Respectable body a hundred will talk of an Air balloon, I Ixave a singular Regard for Congress and will therefore ask an unfashionable Question, Wlien may we hope to sec Congress that Way, Ikit I grow saucy and Ivive not Time now even and ivliat arc they doing? for that," Letter from Francis Hopkinson to Thomas Jefferson, torch 31, 1734, ibid ,, p. 57,
9

1734,

Letter from Francis Hopkinson to Thomas Jefferson, May 12, ibid ., p, 246.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, dated May 21,

1784, ibid., p. 280.

68

reconnaissance follovred by daylight assaults
of the
Ifer

vjas

presented.

The wheels

Departnent turned sloxjly and although the matter was
aiTiount

subjected to a considerable

of consultation and coordination,

nothinc In the

vjay

of final decision or ne\7 action took place before
12

the war xjas brought to a close.

In 1846, durins the Mexican VJar, Jolin Wise of Lancaster,

Pennsylvania, proposed the use of a captive balloon secured to a v;arship
as a means for the aerial bombardrient of Fort San Juan de Ulua, v;hich

guarded the harbor of Vera Cruz,

13

During the latter part of the year

the War Departnent was Involved with the

fomulation of a plan of attach

on this formidable point.

VJise

sought to show how the use of an aerial
The War Departnent

weapon xjould reduce costs in noney and liven.

pigeonholed his suggestion and even neglected to answer it.
it was decided to tal:e Vera Cruz by landings

Finally

near the port and land

assaults on the city rather
invade from the sea.

tlian

attempt to Imock out the fortress and

In 1859 Jolm Wise and some conpcinions flew from St, Louis,

Missouri, to Henderson, New York, a distance of 1,100 miles, in less
tlian 20

hours.
12

Other long-distance flights were not always so

Frederick S, Ilaydon, "First Attempts at Military Aviation in the United States," Journal of the American Military History Foundation, II, No, 2 (Summer, 1938), 132-135.
John Wise, System of Aeronautics (Philadelphia: 1850), p, 257,
14 13

Joseph A,

Speel,

Co,,

1919), I,

Justin H. Smith, 349-355,

Tlie

\far

With Mexico (New York:

Macr.iillan

This established a record not equalled until 1910,

69

successful.
VJatcrtot.Ti,

Later that sane year two balloonlsts took off
Net; Yor!:,

fror.i

and xicrc blo'.m In their balloon 300 unscheduled
Tlicy

nilcG into the icildcrncss of Canada.
nearly a
v;cc!;

were lost in the forest for

but were finally rescued by a party of lumbcrncn.

Balloonlsts \«;re Interested in an aerial crossing of the Atlantic
Ocean throushout the nineteenth century.
In 1844 Edgar Allen Poc,

in a

celebrated hoax printed in a
pllslment of this enterprise.

llc\7

Yorl; noiw'snaper,

announced the accon-

A nunber of aeronauts announced their

intentions of undertaking the voyage and prevailed upon Congress to

appropriate funds for a trans-Atlantic flight.

No Federal funds,
In 1858 the

hovrever, \^re set aside for these visionary schemes.

completion of the laying of a tranE-Atlantic telegraph cable by Cyrus
Field initiated
nc\^

interest in transoceanic flights.

Some large
18

balloons

vTerc
Tiic

built and tested but none of then made the flight,

Union armies adopted the balloon early in the Civil War,
in 1861,
Tliaddeus S,
C,

using it at the First Battle of Bull Run,
Lox«;,

a civilian employed by the Army of the Potomac, made a free

balloon flight after the defeat of the Uhion Army and was able to

observe and to report the Confederate advance.
tion of the Union Army following Bull
I^jn

19

During the reorganizadaily ascensions to

he

r.iade

^

New York Herald , September 29, 1859;

p,

1;

Octolxjr 6,

1859,

p. 9.
^^
18

Ncw York Sun . April 13, 1844,

p.

1,

Some balloon enthusiasts persisted in their ambition to cross the Atlantic to Europe, Samuel A. King, "How to Cross the Atlantic in a Balloon," Century Jlagazinc . LXII (October, 1901), 356-359.

naut, orsanlzod the first American Balloon Service, responsible only to
riajor General Georse McClellan,

with one Army captain, 50 noncoiranis-

sloncd officers and privates, and a nunbcr of volunteer civilian

observers to assist hin.
two horse-drawn
rjas

21
Ills

equipment consisted of four balloons,

generators, and an acid cart for cliarjinQ the c^s

generators.
In the

Peninsular Canpai-^n against

Iliclimond

in loG2, obser-

vation balloons were used cr.tonsively, with varyins success.

Aside

from reports of cner.y deploytnent and activity, another function of the

balloon service was the direction of artillery fire,

22

Durin?> tlic

siege of Yorlttoxm, the holdins cable snapped x^hilc Major General Fltn-

John Porter, an adventurous Union corps commander,

x;as

engaged in his

observation, and but for a favorable wind he would have come doxm

behind the Confederate linos.
In
tlie

23

canpaign around Riclmond in the spring of 1862 the Union
On the first day of the
talccn up

Amy

made effective use of its balloons.
\jas

attack at Seven Pines a telegraph key

in one of Lowe's

balloons and a cable dropped to a ground telegraph line.

For some

reason, however, the connection was placed not in the cortnand post, but

^°Ibid., pp. 204-205, ^^Ibld., pp, 322-324.

^^Ibid,, pp, 280-303,

War Department, War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the 'Jnion and Confederate Armies (Wasliington: Government Printing Office, 1399), Scries 3, Volume III, p. 274. Hereafter cited as Offi-lal r;ecords \Jith the scries number preceding the title.

23

71
in the Wnr Dennrtncnt office in Washinston.

Tic concrcssncn and senators

assembled there were thus privileged to set battlefield reports fron the
front before the Connanding General received then.

What value this

particular arrangcnent
renains a nystcry,

\jaG

to Conj^ress or to the prosecution of the war

A copy of a report cf one of McClcllar.'s observers, Jolm La
Ilountain, who on August 10,

1861, made

tv70

ascensions to 3,500 feet

over an area over the Yorktoim peninsula in Vir-^inia is of Interest,
His sketch shows several Confederate bivouacs, near Hanpdcn, Nev;iDort
Nev7s,

and Pic Point and reports the nunber and type of ships near
25

Norfolk and in the James River,

An observation nission from a modern

airplane could hardly have s^ven better information, and La Mountain's

reconnaissance report must have been most welcome to McClellan's staff.
On June
1,

believlns erroneously that over half of Lcc'g
distance fron Fredericksburg,
of the Union balloons.
Tlie

amy

was at a considerable

Confederates exhibited little fear

As the special correspondent of the London

Tines noted at Frcderlclcsburs, "Tlie experience of tirenty months* warfare has taught then how little fomidable such engines of war arc."
In the sane wooded terrain si:; months later 27

Mo less than tlirco captive balloons, in charge of skilled observers looked do\ffi upon the Confederate earthworks, Si,gnal stations and observatories had been established on each cormandin" height; a lino of field telegraph had been laid from Falnouth [General Joseph Hooker's comnand post] to United States Ford, and the Cliief of Staff, [Dan] Duttcrficld, rcrnained at the former village In cor.munlcation with General Sedgxjic!;, . . , It seemed impossible that a single Confederate battalion could change position . • • without both Hooker and Sedgvdck being at once advised, ^8

But in the early morning of May

1,

1863, river mists rose over the

Chance llorsvi lie battlefield. Hooker's observation was blinded, and
the next day Stonex/all Jaclcson made his famous flank march to strike

Hooker's right and gain one of the outstanding Confederate victories
of the war.

The story of Greely 's experiences in the arctic during the first International Geophysical Year are vividly recounted in A, L, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), Todd, Abandoned (New York:

Russell J, Parkinson, "United States Signal Corps Balloons, 1371-1902," Military Affairs . XXIV (February, 1961), 197,
an ironic name for the balloon in view of the 1863 recormendation of Col, Albert J, Meyer that the United States Army discontinue the use of balloons. This
TiJas

31

32

74

his men and equipment and embarked for Cuba on the Rio Grande .

Maxfleld was not -ranted permission to unload his troops or
supplies £or six days after the invasion force had disembarked at
Daiquiri,
Once ashore it was discovered that the balloon had been

danased by heat, moisture, and rou^h liandlin^.
tliat

Re3ardless of the fact

the balloon

i.'as

unfit for safe operation, three ascents vTcre
Tlie

carried out on June 30, 1393,

presence of Admiral Cervera's fleet

in Santiago harbor v;as definitely confirmed and information on the

terrain

xjas

supplied to the commander of the ground force. General

William Shafter.
On the next day, July
1,

1890, against Maxficld's advice, the

balloon, carrying Lieutenant Colonel George Derby, Shatter* s chief

engineering officer, was hauled to an open field in the rear of troops

waiting to assault San Juan Hill, The cotxianders benefited from the
reports of the
observer.'-..
Tlie

reopening of artillery fire

x.'as

suggested

and routes of advance were spotted.

Infantry troops, hovjcver, did not

x^elcone the extra attention given their area of tiie battlefield by the

Spanish gunners
short
ti-.ne

v/ho

directed a stream of fire at the balloon.

In a

the balloon was so riddled by Spanish shot that it cane

floating doxm. with its passenger. Colonel Derby, never receiving a
scratch,
33
Tlie

Grcely and Janes Allen, who succeeded Greely as Chief Signal Officer in
1905, maintained an active interest in military aeronautics.

Not only

did the Signal Corps seek to promote the observation balloon but it also

encouraged Dr. Samuel

P.

Langley in his aeronautical research.

The

leaders of the Signal Corns called attention to developments alone this
line at
hoi:ie

and abroad, and ur^^ed the adoption of appropriation measures
array to take

which would enable the

full advantage of aeronautical
34

experimentation as related to military reconnaissance.

At the turn of the century Interest in military aeronautics was

enhanced somewhat by the experimentation of Lanjlcy and the Wright
brothers and the rise of balloonins as a sport,
Tlie

latter was evidenced

by the activities of the newly orsanized Aero Club of America tJhich,
ho^jcver, was interested as well

in the more serious business of helping

to promote the progress of aviation in general,

A small balloon
i/as

detaclmcnt took part in the
34

arriy

maneuvers in 1902, but

discontinued

A general substantiation for the summary statements about the military aviation e;qperience of the United States before her entry into World War I may be found in the annual reports of the Chief Signal Officer. For more specific references see: Clayton Bissell, Rricf History of the Air Corps and Its Latest Developments (Fort Monroe, Va, Coast Artillery School Press, 192C), pp, 3-9; Chandler and Lahn, llov; Our Army Grew Wings , pp. 12-173; Arthur Swcctscr, Tl-ie iVicrican Air Service: A Record of Its Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its Final Achievements (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1919), pp. 1-11 (hereafter cited as Tlie American Air Service ); and Lloyd Ilorrls and Kendall Smith, Ceiling Unlimited: Tlie Story of American Aviation From Kitty Hawk to Supersonics (rJew York: NaCTilllan Co., 1953), pp. 145-159 (hereafter cited as Ceiling Unlimited ). Brief accounts accompanied by appropriate pictures are found in A Chronicle of the Aviation Industry in America, 1903-1947 (llarrisburg. Pa,: J. Horace McFarland Co., 1943), pp. 7-18; Historical Office of the Army Air Forces, The Official Pictorial History of the AAF (New York: Due 11, Sloan and Pearcc, 1947), pp, 21-35; and Alfred Goldberg (ed.), A History of the United States Air Force, 1907 1957 (Princeton: D, Van Nostrand Co., Inc, 1957), pp. 2-11.

76

shortly thereafter.

During the sprins of 1907 the Signal Corps

purchased a balloon fron the Louis Godard firm in Paris, and in June

detailed two enlisted men to aeronautical duty.
On August
1,

1907, General Janes Allen, Chief Signal Officer

of the United States

Amy, announced

the creation of an Aeronautical

Division within the Signal Corps,

Tliis

unit

v;as

set up to handle all

natters relating to "nilitary ballooning, air nachinos, and all !:indrcd
subjects,"
Captain Charles Cliandlcr, who had long been interested in
xjas

military aeronautics,
Captain Thonas

appointed as head of the new division.

35

S.

BaldtJin built the first dirigible balloon

for the United States Army.

During its testing in 1908 its average
tv;o

speed

V7as

19,6 miles per hour in a

hour flight,

Tliis

dirigible

iras

used for exliibitions and training for four years, before it was sold.
In 1903 balloon detachnents were set up at Fort Mycr, Virginia, and

Fort Chaha, Nebraska.

During that sane year Major Edgar Russell,
Laltm

Captain

C.

f),

Wallace, and First Lieutenant Fran!: P,

cxperinented

with radio and received messages at altitudes up to 3,500 feet.
Influenced by the vjork of Samuel Langley and the Vfright brothers,
the

Amy's interest

in aeronautics turned chiefly to the hcavicr-than-

air machines and controlled povrcred flight.

The first flight for the

United States
1908,

Amy

todi place at Fort Myer, Virginia, in the fall of

Hic machine, for which the VJrlghts had been alloi7ed but $25,000,
It flew faster than 40

successfully under official auspices, the Fort Myer tests, v;hlch at the
tine ijcre considered to Iiave been rather rljid, created much more of a

stir than the flight at Kitty Hawk five years earlier.

Enthusiasm was

aroused to

a

hysterical pitch and the newspapers could scarcely find
vrar

sufficient praise for the new
tests came a tra3ic awakening.

tool.

A few days after the first

On Septenbcr 17, 1908, Orvillc VJrijht

took off fron Fort Myer with First Lieutenant Tliomas S. Selfridje as a

passenscr, and as a result of a guy wire foullnc a propeller the plane
crashed, killins Selfridge and injuring Wright severely.
It was

evident that although flying was an accomplished fact, aviation was in
its rude beginnings and the men who
\-rent

into the air had to face grave
tliat

risks.
V;ar

It was

not until after the final test in August, 1909,

the

Department acquired its first airplane.
As part of their original contract with the War Department,

the Wrights had agreed to teach two officers to operate the machine.
In October,

1909, Wilbur Wright trained Lieutenants Frank P.
Ihimphries at a field at College Park, Maryland,

Lahn and

Frederic

E,

Shortly

after pcrforning solo flight, both of these officers \«;re ordered to

return to their regular duties, Lahm to the cavalry and Humphries to
the engineers,

leaving the Signal Corps with no qualified pilot.

First Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois, who had received some

unofficial flying training from Wilbur Wright,

x^as

placed in charge of

the Army's plane, which was moved to Fort Sam Houston, Tejas, where
the v/inter weather would allow more flying,

Foulois learned to fly by

a bit of training, by correspondence vjith the \'?rights, and by trial and

78

error.

Until 1911 Lieutenant Foulois was the only pilot in the United

States

Amy.
The Aeronautical Division

Aviation School at College Park,

Maryland, under the command of Captain Charles Cliandler, began Its

training operations in the surxier of 1911,
learned to fly at this school.
an airplane were also conducted.

A number of officers

Experiments in aerial photography from During the
Xizintcr

months the school

operated at Augusta, Georgia, and in the winter of 1912-1913 part of
the aviation school iTcnt to San Diego, California, for further training.
In addition to this detachment two overseas training schools were

established; one in the Philippines, and one In Hawaii,

Between

f-Iarch,

1913 and 1914, Lieutenant Frank P, Lalxi trained several pilots at a

successful school at Fort William McKinlcy near Manila,

Lieutenant

Harold Geiger was less successful In his efforts to operate a pilotInstruction center at Fort Kameliameha in Hawaii.

During the latter
V7ith the

months of 1913, the lack of facilities and difficulties

wind-

swept terrain added to the problems he had with his seaplanes caused

Lieutenant Geiger to give up his enterprise.
In December,

37

1913,

the Signal Corps decided to consolidate its

training activities cmd established the Signal Corps Aviation School on

North Island near San Diego, California,

In addition to pilot training

the Army initiated ground training for the nonflying specialists needed

Report of the Chief Signal Officer in U.S. War Department, Annual Report, 1914 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914),
I,

524.
•^^Ibld.

79
to operate airplanes.

Distinguished aviation scientists

frorn

the

Smithsonian Institution, skilled enGineers fron private industry, and

netcoroloGists from the United States Weather Bureau were brought in to
supplement the instruction conducted by this school.
38

On July 18, 1914, Consrcss established the Aviation Section of
the Signal Corps xjith an authorized strength of 60 officers and 260

enlisted men.

It was

charged with the duty of operating or supervir.ing the operation of all military aircraft, includin3 balloons and aoDplanes, all appllancor pertaining to said craft; also with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation. -^^
Tlie

act limited officers to unmarried lieutenants of the line, provided

for flying pay, and established the aeronautical ratings of Junior

Military Aviator and Military Aviator,

40

Ercperience in Acrinl Observation

Tlie

first artillery direction missions to be flovm by United
Tao.

States Array airplanes were performed in November, 1912.

planes

ordered the fire of the batteries to the targets, located the hits, and forwarded the necessary corrections,
Tlie

aerial observers connunicated

with the ground batteries by radiotelegraphy, by dropped messages, and
by smoke signals.

Although the signaling tecliniques were crude and

subject to error, it was found that planes flying at 2,000 feet could
locate targets that could not be found in any other way.
38
39

Ibid ., p. 517.
;tar

Ibid., p. 514.
I,

40

Ibid ., p. 515.

41

Department, Annual Report, 1913 .

731-782.

80

Airplanes flown by a small detacliment of pilots from Collese
Parle,

Maryland, took part in the nancuvcrs conducted In the vicinity of

Bridgeport, Connecticut, in August, 1912 and 1913.

Although fliers were

ordered to perform aerial reconnaissance from a height of over 2,000
feet, tliey \rcrc fairly successful except when the inclement xjcather

United visibility.

It was impossible to carry observers

in the old
vias

machines used er.cept under the most favorable conditions and it
necessary for most pilots to perform their
V/Iicn

o\7n

observation.

42

the United States did not recognize the revolutionary

government which General Victoriano Iluerta had set up when he seized
poxrcr on February 22,

1913, a tense situation developed between America

and Mexico,

Later that same month, the 1st Aero Squadron (Provisional),
v/as

under the command of Captain Charles Chandler,
to Texas City, Te>uis,

ordered to report

for service with the 2d Division of the United

States Army,

In Tc;3S,

Captain Chandler assembled his small force of

seven airplanes, seven pilots, and a handful of adinlnistrativc personnel

and neclianlcs, and early in March, 1913, began to prepare his unit for
action.
For throe and a half months the Ist Aero Squadron trained with

ground forces, gained valuable experience in liaison and reconnaissance,
and made a number of long-distance fllghtc. Fortunately, hostilities

did not break out with Mexico and aviation was not put to the test of
combat.

United States relations xjlth Mexico again became strained
following the Tamnico incident in April, 1914.
42
The 1st Aero Squadron,

War Department, Annual Rcnort .

1912,

I,

963,

43

Aiicrlcan sailors landing in the town of Tampico xrere

81

no longer a provisional orsanizatlon, imdcr the cotmand of Captain Bcnjanin Foulois, sent a detaclment of five officers and three airplanes
to Galveston,
Te>:aG,

to join the United States expedition against Vera
£ind

Cruz,

Tiie

transports sailed before the dctacliment arrived

the

planes, never unpacked, returned with the dctaclTment in July, 1914,

During 1915 Pancho Villa and his Mexican bandits engaged in a

number of across-the-border raids into Te>as and New Mexico.

Another

dctachncnt, again fron the 1st Aero Squadron, was sent to Brownsville,
Texas, in April, 1915,

Lieutenants

Tlior.ias

Milling and Byron

Q,

Jones,

the pilots of this detacliment, flew over the border area and were fired

on by Villa's men,

A number of reconnaissance missions were flown but

the planes suffered meclnanical difficulties and were mostly undependable.

Early on the morning of March 9, 1916, a band of Pancho Villa's

Mexican desperadoes raided Columbus,
American soldiers and civilians,
command of Brigadier General
border and capture Villa,

Nev;

Mexico, hilling a number of

A punitive e:<pedition under the
Pershing was ordered to cross the

Jolin J.

Vac 1st Aero Squadron, under the command of
In May, 1916,

Captain Foulois, arrived at Columbus on March 15, 1916,

when it reached Its maximum strength, this unit was made up of 16
officers and 122 enlisted men.

temporarily taken into custody. Though they were released 'Vith regrets," their commanding officer asked for an apology in the form of a 21-gun salute, ihierta refused and thus became the champion of Mexican sovereignty against the foreign aggressor. Unable to get arms In America to fight his northern ener.iics, iluerta xras dealing with The German agents at a time %vrhen XTOrld opinion was anti-German, and United States, of fended by the refusal to salute in apology, dcter-iined to prevent the delivery of a cargo of guns from a Gcman vessel, occupied Vera Cruz harbor.

82 On a flight from Columbus, Now Mexico, to an advanced base at

Casa Grandes, Mexico, on March 19,

1916, one airplane turned back, one

cracked up in a forced ni^ht landing, and the other six were forced down in the dar!:nesG,
Tliis

first mission was symptomatic of the trend

toward failure that doGgcd the 1st Aero Squadron throughout the Mexican

expedition.

Tlie

soaring heights of the Sierra Madrc Mountains, gusty

gales, dust, and heat kept the rickety airplanes fron being useful

machines during the

sunr>icr

of 1916,

On one occasion. Captain Foulois,

who had landed at Chihuahua City to deliver dispatches to the American
consul,
xras

arrested and jailed.

He was released but meanwhile a

cro\i7d

of Mexicans had mutilated his plane, burning holes in the vjings xjith

cigarettes, slashing the fabric, and removing some of the nuts and
bolts,

Foulois was able to fly back to his landing field.

44

By j'^ril 20, only two of the original eight airplanes were

still operational.

Tliey

were taken to Columbus, condemned, and destroyed

Mot one of the 12 replacement planes proved to be any more serviceable

than the earlier ones.

45

Short flights in good vrcather, with mail and
Tlie

dispatches, appeared to be about all that could be expected.

1st

Aero Squadron continued to be based at Columbus until early 1917, but
its operations over Mexico diminished after the summer of 191'.

The commander of the American punitive expedition to Mexico,

Brigadier General John J, Pershing, was not pleased with the aviation
44

Squadron, fully organized, was located at Columbus, New Mexico; the
2d Sqviadron was divided between San Diego, California, and the

Philippines,

The 3d, 6th, and 7th were being organized at San Antonio,

Texas, Hawaii, and Panama, respectively.

The t\m remaining squadrons,

the 4th and 5th, were in the process of being organized, but were

being used as detachments in operating the flying schools.

2

The Signal

Corps Aviation Schools at Mineola, Long Island, New York, and San
Diego, California, \XTe in operation as primary flying schools of the

Regular Army,

A school at Essington, Pennsylvania, had just been

Sweetser, The Anerican Air Service , p. 54; George W, Mixter and n, H. Ehimons, United States Army Aircraft Production Facts, Com piled at the Request of the Assistant Secretary of War, January, 1919 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 5, Hereafter cited as United States Army Aircraft Production Facts .
U.S., War Department, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), III, Part 2, pp. 998-999, Hereafter cited as War Department, Order of Battle ,
2

85

86
opened for National Guard instruction, and Glenn Curtiss was operating

civilian schools at Ne\^ort News, Virginia, and Miami, Florida, for the
Instruction of 125 reserve aviators.
It is difficult to determine
3

how many planes

\<7ere

in the

service on April 6, 1917, but on the previous January 5, there were 73

planes on order but not yet delivered.

The

Amy

had only 55 training

planes in service at the outbreak of the war, all of them entirely

without war equipment and valueless for service at the front.
55 planes,

Of these

the National Advisory Cotmittee for Aeronautics, v;hich was

conducting a scientific study of the problems of flight, advised that
51

were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.
4

There were no bombers,

no fighters, and no service planes.

None of the Army pilots had received any training that would
fit them for combat duty.
Only six Aeronautical Division officers had

any experience in the organization of personnel and materiel, or in the
tactical employment and coordination of aerial units with ground troops.
Five aviation officers
liad

been given technical training as aeronautical

engineers.
The balloon personnel of the Aeronautical Division at the

Ibid . , Part 1, p, 93. The National Guard contained no aviation units although the 1st Aero Company, New York National Guard, organized in 1916, had received provisional recognition as the 1st Reserve Aero Squadron before it was disbanded in May, 1917, A second New York National Guard squadron was in the process of organization before the outbreak of the war, but no Reserve Corps units proper had been created. Ibid ,

outbreak of the xmr consisted of approximately six officers and 50
enlisted men.
The United States Army possessed three serviceable free

balloons and tuo captive balloons.

The only facilities for balloon

training were at a balloon school at Fort Onaha, Nebraska.

Advisory Orf^anizations

Several teclmical boards, conmittees, and councils furthered
the development of the United States Air Service by their investiga-

tions, research, and advice.

The more Important of these organizations
the Aircraft

were:

the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics;

Production Board; the Aircraft Board; the Joint Army and Navy Technical

Aircraft Board; the National Research Council; and the War Industries
Board,
Tlie

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was estab3,

lished by the Naval Appropriation Act of March
vrar

1915,

During the

the Committee investigated the condition of the aircraft industry;
Vfeir

made reconncndations to the

and Navy Departments for Increasing
tlie

the quality production of aircraft; recommended the creation of

Aircraft Production Board; made available to that Board information
acquired by the Cotimittee from a census of the production facilities
of manufacturers of airplane engines; and took the initiative in

organizing ground schools for aviators.

It acted as a clearinghouse

for inventions submitted to the Army and Nav>', and as a source of

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports. 1913 . I, 1389,

88
general information for the aircraft Industry,
The first step toward the formation of the Aircraft Production

Board was taken on April 12, 1917, x^hen the liational Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics urged the Council of National Defense to appoint such a

Hudson tlotor Car Company, was made chairman and organizer of the nex*
board.

Brigadier General George 0, Squier, Chief Signal Officer of the
and Admiral David
V,',

Amy,

g

Taylor, Chief of the Construction and Repair

Bureau of the Navy Department, were chosen to represent the Army and
Navy,

Three prominent civilian industrialists, Edward A, Deeds,

Report of tlie Chief Signal Officer in War Department, Annual Reports, 1917 , I, 838; Claussen, ''Mat(?riel Research and Development in the Army Air Am, 1914-1945," USAF Historical Study No, 50, 1946, chap, i, in USAF HD Archives.
U,3., National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Third Annual Report of the National Advisory Comnittec for Aeronautics (Washington! Government Printing Office, 1918), n. 17.
o
7

Squier, one of the few officers to have taken a Ph.D. degree after graduating frosn Ifest Point, was a distinguished scientist and an air enthusiast. He flew in the Wright aircraft during the Army's acceptance test in 190S, Early in \k>Tld War I he served as military attache with the British Amy and returned to America full of enthusiasm for employing airplanes in combat. He was appointed Chief Signal Officer on February 14, 1917,

89

President of the Delco Company; Robert L. Montgomery', a nember of a

Philadelphia financial concern; and Sidney D,

\'Ialdon,

former Vice

President of the Packard Motor Car Company, completed the membership
of the board.
9

It considered matters relating to quantity production

of aircraft and cooperated with the Army and Navy in the advancement
of their aviation programs.
It was discontinued on October 1,

1917,

and its functions were taken over by the Aircraft Board,
The Aircraft Board
xras

created on October

1,

1917, and

consisted of nine menbers, Including the same representatives of the
War and Navy Departments as the Aircraft Production Board,
It acted

in an advisory capacity for the Chief Signal Officer and the Naval

Aviation Officer relative to the purchase and production of aircraft,

made recommendations as to contracts for aircraft and the distribution
of contracts, and served as a clearinghouse for aeronautical

information for the Army and Navy,
In April,

1917, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
Nex^rtion

proposed to Secretary of War

D,

Baker the organization of a

Joint Army Navy Technical Aircraft Board, for the purpose of stan-

dardizing designs and general specifications of all aircraft except
"Zeppelins,"
9

Daniels nominated for membership Lieutenants Arthur K,

U,S., War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service! Study of Their Expansion in the U.S,, 1917«1913 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp, 36-37.

A

Exploitation of the Irving B. Hoi ley. Ideas and Weapons: Aerial Weapon by the United States Diirinr. World '.tar I. A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons (Ncxj liavcn: Yale University Press, 1953), p, 68, This worlc hereafter cited as Ideas and Weapons ,

90

Atkins, John H, Towers, and Assistant Naval Constructor Jerome

C,

Hunsaker, Jr., all of the United States Navy,

On May 5, 1917,

Secretary Baker agreed to the formation of such a board, namins Captains

Virginius E, Clarke, Benjanin D, Foulois, and Edgar S. Gorrell as

Amy

members.

Although this board was constituted as an advinory agency,

its authority was strengthened tremendously on ^5ay 29, when the Chief

Signal Officer announced that no aircraft specifications iTOuld be

Issued until approved by the Joint Army Navy Technical Aircraft Board;

no specifications for aircraft would be sent to any manufacturer for

comment until the board had sanctioned then.

12

The National Research Council was originated in 1916 by the

National Academy of Sciences.

13

Membership comprised the chiefs of the

technical bureaus of the War and Navy Departments, the heads of other

Government bureaus engaged in scientific research, and representatives
of educational institutions, research foundations, and engineering and

industrial research.

This body conducted some investigations in

aeronautics.

The Science and Research Division of the Signal Corps was
14

established upon its recommendation,

Archibald D. TurnbuU and Clifford L, Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 110.
William F. Willoughby, Govemncnt Organization in Wartime and After; A Survey of the Federal Civil Agencies Created for the Prose cution of the \^^ar (New York; D, Appleton and Co., 1919), chan, xiv.
^^Ibid., p. 22.
12

A vice-chairman of the National Research Council, the distinguished physicist Robert A. Millikan, accepted a commission as lieuteniint colonel and took command of the Science and Research Divisicn
in 1918.

14

91

The War Industries Board

x^as

created by the Council of National

Defense on July 28, 1917, as a clearinghouse for government industrial
needs.
On May 28,
1918, the Board was made a separate agency by

Executive Order Number 2868.

This Board, headed by the shrev;d and

forceful Bernard M, Baruch, was responsible for maintaining a balance

between industry and government while expediting the production of all
things needed to fight the war.

Under circumstances which made

materials scarce, used up the limited supply of machine tools, and
restricted the labor market, the delays that slowed the war effort

would have been far more serious if the "Baruch Board," as it was
Icnown,

had not shortened them by prompt decisions and vigorous
The Board assisted the Air Service by the coordination

pronouncements.

of all government needs, adjustment of prices, establishment of

priorities with respect to commodities required, and the solution of
industrial problems.

Initial Steps

Within the War Department the General Staff, which had no real
experience in aerial warfare, was busy with more familiar problens,
Tlic

Signal Corps, under pressure to produce results, expanded the Aero-

nautical Division quickly and reorganized it into a number of divisions.

See U.S., War Industries Board, American Industry in the War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 12-45.

The divisions operated by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in World War I included: Air, Aviation, Construction, Engineering and Research, Equipment, Executive, Finance and Supply, Land, Military Aeronautics, Photographic, Procurement, Purchases, Radio,

R

92

all of which «ere responsible to the Chief Sisnal Officer, General

George 0, Squier,
of supervising
tvra

Tliis

officer found himself in the unenviable position
signals and aviation, of which the

najor prosrams:

air arm

xjas

by far the larger.

As one nernber of General Squier's staff

later recalled, "Until the spring of 1918 our situation, despite

constant ninor changes, was inore a state of affairs than a chain of

events."
Wlien the

United States entered World War

I

the Aeronautical

Division, which had replaced the Aviation Section on November 4, 1915,

was one of three subdivisions of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.
On May 21,
1917,

the Construction Division was created and charged

with the preparation and maintenance of flying fields as one of its
duties.
Tliree

days later, the Aircraft Engineering Division was also
2 the

established and on August

Equipment Division, each of which
In August, a Wood

assumed control over certain aviation interests.

Section was established in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer to
place contracts for airplane lumber, the demand for which
all expectations.
IS
liad

exceeded

On October 1,

1917,

the Aeronautical Division was redesignated

the Air Division, with functions limited to the conduct of aviation

Science and Research, Special Service, Spruce Production, Supply, and Supply and Accounts. Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their Records. 1917-1921 (Washington; National Archives, 1943), n, 521.

aircraft, and to the training of officers and men in natters relating
to military aviation.
19

On October 22, 1917, the Aircraft Ensinecring Division was

replaced by the Science and Research Division.
Spruce Production Division
vras

20

On November 15, the

formally established (superseding the

Wood Section) to increase the output of timber needed in airplane

construction.

By the latter months of 1917, aviation matters were the

direct concern of five divisions:

Air, Construction, Equipment,
21

Science and Research, and Spruce Production,
Oi January lA,
1918,

the Construction Division was reorganized

as the Supply Division, and it was charged with securing and distrib-

uting clothing, equipment, and all ordnance necessary for aviation
troops in the United States; with the distribution of all spare planes,
spare engines and their parts; with motor transportation; and with all

other materiel and supplies necessary in the maintenance of flying
fields, flying schools, and concentration Ccjmps within the United States

On March 20, 1918, a Conservation Section was created to conserve and

reclaim all material of every nature purcliased with Signal Corps funds.
In the spring of 1918 it was recognized tliat the existing

first step, which rearranged the duties in the Office of the Qiief
Signal Officer, was taken by the War Department,

This action reserved

to the Chief Signal Officer the administration of signals and created

a Division of Military Aeronautics as \jell as a Division of Aircraft

Production.

The exact division of functions in the matter of designing

and engineering was to be worked out between the two agencies.
On May 27,
1918, President Woodrow Wilson formally transferred
tv;o

aviation from the Signal Corps to
Secretary of

independent agencies under the

Wan

the Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Division

(Department) of Military Aeronautics.

The latter, under Major General

William

L.

Kenly, who had just returned from France, was responsible
Tlie

for training and operations.

new Bureau of Aircraft Production,

formed from the old Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, was

assigned "full and exclusive jurisdiction and control over production
of aeroplanes, engines, and aircraft equipment" for the Army,
its head, John D. Ryan,

Since

former president of the Anaconda Copper Company,

was also chairman of the civilian Aircraft Board, a close and helpful

connection e:cisted between the t\m agencies.

Although the War

Department

load

officially recognized the Division of Military Aero-

nautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production as constituting the Air
Service, It did not choose to appoint a Chief of Air Service to

coordinate the activities of the two agencies.
22

22

A special announcement was made that a Chief of Air Service would not be detailed so long as the Bureau of Aircraft Production was operating as a separate organization; and that the duties assigned to the Chief of Air Service by Army Regulations 1913 not specifically

95
Tlie

anomaly of creating the Air Service as an organization

designed to coordinate the Division of Military Aeronautics* activities

with the efforts of the Bureau of Aircraft Production and falling to
designate a responsible head for the agency continued throughout most
of the summer of 1918,
On August 28,
1918,

the President appointed

John D, Ryan as Director of the Air Service and Second Assistant

Secretary of War,

As Director of the Air Service, Ryan was responsible

for procuring and furnishing to the American Expeditionary Forces all

materiel and personnel required by the Air Service.

To accomplish this

mission, he ims given supervision, control, and direction over both the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production,

with authority to coordinate their activities and to develop their
programs.
23

The position of Second Assistant Secretary of

Iter

was

designed to give Ryan enough prestige to make his voice heard in the
higher echelons of government.
24

While the appointment was a step

towards the representation of aeronautics at a higher level, it may

also have been designed to forestall the creation of a separate

department of aeronautics for which there was a good deal of sentiment
In Congress and among the American public,
25
Tlie

United States Air

delegated to the Director of Airplane Production by executive order would be performed by the Director of Military Aeronautics, A copy of the War Department announcement is found in War Department, Annual Reports. 1918 , I, 1382-1383,
23 24

General Order Number 81, War Department, August 28, 1918,

As Second Assistant Secretary' of War, Ryan replaced Edward R, Stettinlus, who was then a special representative of the War Department in France, See editorial, "Second Assistant Secretary of War, John D, Ryan, Given Full Charge Over All Aircraft Work," Flying , VII (September, 1918), 720.
n3ne widely read service periodical credited the appointment

96

Service as a constituted part of the Anerican military establlshnent

emerged late in World War

I,

x^cn many of the worst difficulties had

already been, or VTere about to be, overcome.
For some \7eeks after the declaration of war little was

accomplished tox^ards increasing the strength of the air arm.

Tlie

Chief

Signal Officer, General Cksorge Squier, called in a number of civilian

experts, scientists, engineers, and businessmen

to assist him in

meeting the problems of e:q5ansion which were certain to come.
Scsme

At the

time, the Allied nations were asked to send to the United States

officers, pilots, and aeronautical engineers who were familiar with

conditions at the front.
There were only a few officers on duty in the Office of the
Chief Signal Officer who had had practical ejqperience in aviation,
Wliile

civilian experts

\tcve

most capable in their own lines, they were
Because of this lack of knowledge of the

ignorant of air problems.

practical problems to be encountered, the plans and programs draxm up
by committees of experts V7ere based on previous I^iowledge of production

obtained in established industries, and this did not necessarily apply
to the production of aircraft.
In May,

1917,

the enlargement of the Signal Corps to full

strength under the National Defense Act of 1916 was authorized, and on

May 12 a congressional appropriation of $10,300,000 was made to the
Corps.

On June 15 another appropriation of $43,450,000 was voted; and

an even larger amount of money was set aside for aviation in the next

to President Wilson's desire to forestall a movement for the creation of declaring that Wilson was opposed to creating any additional cabinet offices at tliat time. Army and Navy Journal , August 31, 1918, p. 2021.
a Department of Aeronautics,

97

month. Meanwhile, the Signal Corps was taking the preliminary step for
the enlistnent and training of men for the air service, but it was

acting with no fully authorized plan on which to base the number of
squadrons or airplanes.
An important step In this direction was made
1917, when

by the Joint Army Navy Teclinical Aircraft Board on May 23,

it presented a report dealing with the training of troops for aviation.

This report specified not only the nisnber but the types of airplanes

and engines required for the use of the American Army for training
purposes.
In addition, it estimated the number required in the event

the United States should be called upon to train foreign air troops as

well.

It

recommended that the Aircraft Production Board of the Council

of National Defense make a survey of the industrial situation to deter-

mine not only the country's ability to meet the demands about to be
made upon it, but also to foster airplane industries and to strengthen
them to meet the nation's future needs.

Furthermore, there was also a

plan for obtaining from the Allies certain types of planes and engines
to serve as models for the manufacturers.

The Joint Army Navy Technical

Board estimated that 7,050 planes and 15,100 engines would be required
for the training of American personnel alone; if foreign fliers also

were to be trained
19,800 engines.

tlie

overall requirement would be 9,900 planes and

This program did not cover service (i.e. combat)

planes for use in the war area.

The program was approved by the

Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and thereupon became the

Edgar S. Gorrell, "America's First World War Appropriation," U.S. Air Services , XVIII (May, 1933), 24-27.

98

basic program for the production of training planes.

27

T!iG

Dolling Mission

In June,

1917, a special comnission headed by Major Raynal C,

Bollins was sent to Europe to keep the authorities in IJashington
informed of the cloan^ing conditions in the manufacture and equiinncnt
of airplanes and engines and of their performance in active service

and to make recommendations as to the planes and engines to be reproduced in the United States,
The comission included Captains Edgar S,

The nembers of the Bollinc Commission x^ere most likely unaware that the

order of priorities inferred from their report v7ould have such a great
influence upon the evolution of ytaerican aerial doctrine,
Tlie

opinion

of Boll ins expressed in other correspondence shov/ed that he had a

stronger appreciation of the strategic role of air povjcr than this

report would suggest.
One recent student of the history of American military aviation
XTTites that the members of the Boiling Commission were responsible not

only for their technical decision but for their decision on aerial

doctrine as well, even if the latter were implicit, Incidental, or

unintentional.
Tlie Boiling Mission had a remarkable opportunity to shape the content of and give direction to the doctrine of air power in the United States, To say that the mission failed to make the most of this opportunity is to cast no discredit upon the individuals in the group, Tlieir assigned objective was to determine the best possible types of aircraft for production in the United States, The mission accomplished this objective. At a meeting of 31 July 1917, it selected four major types of allied aircraft for use by the American Expeditionary Forces. The British DI!-4 was selected as the best plane for observation and day bombardment available for quantity production, the British Bristol and the French Spad v;ore chosen for fighters, and the Italian Caproni and British Handley Page were designated as the long-range bombers. 32

As early as June 29, 1917, Boiling had reported on the views of Gen, Sir David Henderson of the British Air Board, Gen, Henderson believed that observation aircraft should be provided on a troops basis; fighters should be provided in quantities great enough to drive the enemy from the air (probably a three to one superiority would be required); and bombers should be procured in a quantity limited only by the nation's ability to produce. Later Boiling vTrote tl\at he thou^t that both the French and British had overemphasized fighters at the expense of bombers and that the Italian bombing operations gave proof of the profitable results to be derived from a strategic bomber force. Hoi ley. Ideas and Weapons , p. 55.
•^^

31

Ibid ., pp. 59-50.

101

Some of the meclvmics vrho had accompanied the Bollins Conmlsslon

were sent back to the United States from time to tine, taking to the
Aircraft Production Board the lessons they had learned as well as samples
of aeronautical material.
By October 24, 1917, only about 32 of the

original 93 civilian mechanics remained in Europe,

Most of these
33

experts V7ere later commissioned in the American Air Service.

Forcifpi Missions

Tlte

entry of the United States into the

v;ar

was, of course,

greeted with much enthusiasm by its European Allies,

Great Britain,

France, and Italy had closely guarded the teclinical information about
the development and use of their airplanes since 1914,

After America's

entry into the conflict, hoxrovcr, they began to give all the advice and

detailed data in their power.

In response to a request from the Chief

Signal Officer, these nations sent commissions to advise the Americans

on the xThole subject of military aeronautics.
they rendered was invaluable,

The assistance which

Natiurally there was a lack of unanimity

of opinion among the professional aviators of the different countries

on many points concerning the relative merits of foreign planes, and

much divergent counsel
33

x;as

received, but much was learned from them,

34

"History of Civilian Motor Mechanics Group in Airplane Construction Service of United States Signal Corps," 1917; History of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, Series A, Vol, 2, Tliis work cited hereafter as pp, 20-8G, in the National Archives, series designation preceding, Hy AS AEF with the
1/

Report of the
Report.
1918 .
I,

Cliief

Signal Officer in War Department, Annual

1074,

102

The French were of the opinion that Anerican support could take
tlie

most effective shape by reinforcing Inmediately the Anslo-French air
The French believed the need for this to

forces on the western front.

be niost urgent and pointed out that America's vast resources in naterial

and her mechanical industries peculiarly fitted the United States for
this undertaking.

This opinion found official expression on May 23»

1917, in a cablegram from the French Prime Minister Alexandre F. Ribot.
It is desired that in order to co-operate with the French Aeronautics, the American Government should adopt the following program: The formation of a flying corps of 4,500 airplanespersonnel and materiel included--to be sent to the French front during the campaign of 1918, The total number of pilots, including reserve, should be of 5,000 and 50,000 mechanics, 2,000 airplanes should be constructed each month, as well as 4,000 engines, by the American factories. That is to say, that during the first six months of 1913, 16,500 planes (of the last type) and 30,000 engines will have to be built. The French Government is anxious to know if the American Government accepts this proposition, which would alloxj the Allies to win supremacy of the air,-^^

These few sentences laid the foundation for American aviation in World

War

I.

The program suggested by the French was far greater than

anything heretofore contemplated, and this request was referred to
35

Translation of cablegram. Premier Ribot of France to the French Ambassador in Washington, J. J, Jusserand, dated May 23, 1917, as printed in Pershing, My Experiences in the World War , I, 28, In July, 1917, William G, Sharp, the American Ambassador to France, cabled the Secretary of State in Washington to report that the Ribot message as originally drafted in France also mentioned that the 4,500 aircraft should consist of "half bombers and half fighters" and that the "other necessary types" (presumably observation aircraft) should be reckoned in addition to this total. Whether this significant portion of the message was omitted on purpose or by accident and whether the deletion took place in France or in the United States is not known. For some Interesting observations on the alterations of the Ribot telegram which were not discovered until after the war, see Holley, Ideas and Weapons , p, 44,

103
the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board,

The report of this

board, prepared by Major Benjamin D. Foulois and presented on May 29,
1917, stated that in order to comply with the \^dshes of the French, the

United States Army would require in Europe 9,000 airplanes for the
fighting line and 3,000 in reserve, making a total of 12,000 service
planes and 24,000 engines.
The report further stipulated that 3,000

of the aircraft were to be reconnaissance or obsei-vation, 5,000 \;ere to be fighters, and 1,000 were to be bombers, with a reserve of 1,000,
1,667, and 33 in the last three categories respectively.

This

equipment was to be produced before June 30, 1918,

Combined with the

9,900 training planes (which included the estimate for training foreign

fliers) the two reports comprised a program for building a total of

almost 22,000 planes.

The number of engines required for these planes

was estimated at 43,800.

Plans, Programs, and Projects

On June 13, 1917, the Chief of the War College Division of the

General Staff requested a statement from the Council of National Defense
as to the practicability of effecting the production as estimated by

the Signal Corps, without vindue interference with or disorganization of the industries of the United States.
37

A prompt answer was received in
What

which the American industrial situation was analyzed at length.

War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Servicei of Their Expansion in the U,S,. 1917-1918 . pp. 42-43.
37

A Study

Memo from Chief of War College to the Council of National Defense, June 13, 1917, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 1, p. 27.

lOA

had already been accomplished by the Signal Corps as a tentative

beginning was recited, and the manufacturing resources that could be

relied on were specified In detail.

The report stated that the

program submitted to the Aircraft Production Board was a gigantic one,
but capable of being accomplished as outlined, provided funds were

quickly appropriated and no delays permitted.
The War College Division was not entirely satisfied that the

plan could be fully realized within the specified time, but assumed
that the specialists of the Council of National Defense and the Aircraft

Production Board, who \jere also consulted, were best qualified to
judge the manufacturing capacity of the country.
It was decided that

the importance of pre-eminence In aviation was so great that the

United States should not be deterred by the magnitude of the problems
presented, and that even though the plans might not be realized in
their entirety, they would constitute a project which would inevitably

contribute to the establishment and maintenance of aerial supremacy.
The War College Division therefore recommended the adoption of the

proposed aviation plan.

39

Officials of the General Staff feared that the enormous amount
of material required for such a program would affect all other

production in the United States.

(There was some reason for their

concern, as the subsequent industrial mobilization was to demonstrate.)

Letter from the Council of National Defense to the Chief of War College, June 17, 1917, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, pp. 33-34.
War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service! of Their Expansion in the U.S.^ 1917-1918 , p. 43.
39

A Study

105
In any event, mulling over the problem took time, and any long delay in

reaching a decision threatened to wreck the program.

General George 0.

Squier, who was in charge of the Signal Corps and responsible for the

Aeronautical Division, took the problem over the heads of the General
Staff, directly to the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker,

Secretary

Baker formally approved the program and issued a statement on June 18,
1917, announcing that "the War Department is behind the aircraft plans

with every ounce of energy and enthusiasm at its command,"

40

In the light of Anerica's unpreparedness the magnitude of

this program was most impressive.

Not only must 22,000 airplanes be

constructed within a year but for each airplane there must be provided

approximately 80 per cent additional spare parts.

Al

Thus the 22,000

airplanes really became 39,600 without counting replacements or the
725 airplanes needed for home and insular services.

Each of the
In addition it
tlie

22,000 airplanes must have approximately two engines.

was necessary to provide the flying personnel to operate

planes.

It was necessary for thousands of additional officers and enlisted men,

executives, instnactors, and skilled mechanics to be available to
support and train the 5,000 pilots and to care for their airplanes,
40
41 42

Sweetser, The A^ierican Air Service , pp. 69-79,

The need for spare parts was not fully realized. One Air Service officer, speaking with the Director of the Bureau of Aircraft Production Hovxard E, Coffin about the flood of aircraft to be constructed in the next few months, asked,** 'How many spare parts have you ordered, Mr, Coffin?* 'Spare parts?' he asked, apparently startled, 'What do you need spare parts for?' " Arnold, Global Mission , pp, 67-68,

War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service; of Their Expansion in the U,S., 1917-1918 , p, 44,

42

A Study

106

Just how difficult a task France had given the United States

can be seen when it is realized that France herself had not produced in
the period of almost three years preceding America's entry into the war

as many planes as she was asking the United States to build in one year.
In view of the fact that Anerlca's aviation industry was still

in its

infancy and the dearth of American aeronautical engineers,

it was small

wonder that the Air Service was never able to catch up with its
schedules.

Evidently the American press was unaware (or ill-advised) of
the problems involved, for immediately following the approval of the

aviation program suggested by the French, the public was informed through
an intensive newspaper campaign that the United States' s contribution
to the defeat of Germany was to be mastery of the air.

Unfortunately,

many misleading statements appeared in newspapers and magazines.
The New York Herald of June 18, 1917, carried the headline,

"Greatest of Aerial Fleets to Crush the Teutons," and in a subhcadline,

"$600,000,000 for Flying Fleet to Drive Prussians from Air Backed by
War Department,"
It announced that the United States was to become an

aviation training base for all the Allies,
York Times stated that:

43

Two days later the New

The United States Government is making plans to turn out engines for battle planes at the rate of 2,000 a month, and will be prepared to deliver the first consignment by November, according to Information obtained today from representatives of the Aircraft Production Board, The article irent on to say that:

"^•^

Ncw York Herald ,

Jme

18,

1917, p,

1,

107

training planes will be turned out in great numbers to • • • supply the camps in Europe and the United States, ... Within a comparatively short time, if Congress grants the proposed appropriation of $600,000,000, it is hoped to relieve the British and French factories fron all work except the making of highly specialized fast fliers. ... Factories in this country, eventually, will also turn out that type of machine.^
Congress appropriated $640,000,000 for aviation late in July,
1917.

This bill was the largest appropriation ever authorized by the
tliat

United States Congress up to
The legislation
vras

time for a single specific purpose.
tiro

enacted by both houses of Congress in about
45

weeks and was signed by President Wilson on July 24, 1917,

Despite the fanciful enthusiasm of some of the American

military leaders (including the Secretary of War),

46

and the generous

allocations of funds by Congress, aircraft production in the United
States moved ahead slothfully.
By February, 1918, the disturbingly

unimpressive total of but nine observation aircraft (modified versions
of the British De Havilland DH 4) had been produced.

During the
A full

following month only four more came off the assembly line.
year after the declaration of
xjar

only 15 aircraft had been produced
47

and none of these were of the fighter or bomber type,

44
45

New York Times , June 20, 1917, p.

1,

Mooney and Layr.ian, "Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935," USAF Historical Study No, 25, 1944, p, 28; Crowell, America's Munitions. 1917-1918 . p. 240,
One widely circulated magazine featured an illustrated story describing the facility with which aircraft could be mass produced. See Waldemar B, Kaempffert, "The Eagle Spreads His Wings: How 23,625 American Airplanes Will Be Built at the Rate of 3,500 a Month to Crowd the Germans Out of the Air," Popular Science ?!onthly , IX (December, 1917), 894-898.
47
Mi::ter and Qimons, United States

Amy

Aircraft Production

Facts , p, 48,

108
In the spring of 1918, as news of the failure of American air-

craft production becane known, a storm of controversy erupted,
CXir airplane production, heralded as record-breaking and soon to give Americans control of the air at the front, has Ixjen a mirage Tlie reality has undeceived even those vjho of iridescent ants, xTere least credulous, ^'^

In the heat of criticism a number of investigations, official and

unofficial, were undertaken to quell the rising tide of irate public
indignation.
In August,

1918, a Senate committee (assisted by its special

investigator Charles Evans Hughes) wliich had been appointed to
investigate aircraft production made its report.
Though it found no

evidence of fraud, the committee charged that there had been waste and

unnecessary delay in aircraft production and placed considerable blame
on the policy of adapting all tactical aircraft to the Liberty engine

rather

tlian

mfinufacturing exact copies of the European models.

49

Late in October the report of the Hughes Committee was made
public.
It attributed delays and waste in aircraft production to

inadequate organization and to lack of competent direction by officers
of the Signal Corps,
The Committee reconmended that Colonel Ed\«ird A,

Deeds be tried by court-martial and that several other officers be

prosecuted because of transactions on behalf of the government with
corporations.
Colonel Deeds was never tried, largely because of his

valuable work in aviation, nor were the other officers prosecuted,
48 49
See editorial in the New York Times , March 20, 1918, p, 12,

organizational deficiencies of the air arm as had the reports of other investigating groups.
The Hughes report was received with a feeling

of relief by the public, which had been led to believe that grave

charges of fraud and corruption would result from the Inquiry.
Included in the first Increment of 1,800 men authorized by the
War Department were five aviation school squadrons.
52

The 1st Aviation

School Squadron was located near San Diego, California, the 2d near

Mineola, New York, the 3d near Memphis, Tennessee, the 4th near
Chicago, Illinois, and the 5th near Hampton, Virginia,
53

These

squadrons were organized in addition to the first seven aero squadrons

which had already been formed or were in the process of being formed
at the beginning of the war.

On May

1,

1917,

the Chief Signal Officer recommended that the

following additional organizations be authorizedt

six aero squadrons

(the 8th through the 13th) to be formed at San Antonio, Texas, each to

be comprised of 150 men; the 1st and 2d Balloon Squadrons to be formed

at Fort Ctnaha, Nebraska, each to be composed of 150 men; the 6th

Aviation School Squadron of 150 men to be organized at San Diego,
California; the 1st Balloon School Squadron of 150 men, to be organized
at Fort Omaha; and a temporary aviation station composed of 20 men to

The report of the Hughes Committee was published in Air Age Weekly , November 7, 1918, p. 1,

An aviation school squadron was an organized unit of the Signal Corps Aeronautical Division employed in training or experimentation,
53

52

War Department, Order of Battle. Ill, Part 2, 1101-1102,

110
be located at Esslngton, Pennsylvania,
in the second increment. 54

This made a total of 1,520 men

On May 5, 1917, however, the Adjutant

General wrote that the plan of organizing the remaining increments

would not be put into effect until Congress had acted on the legislation
proposed by the War Department for raising additional forces.
The only one of the first seven aero squadrons organized which

reached France was the 1st Aero Squadron.

This organization, which

was the first American aero squadron in France, sailed from New York
on August 9, 1917, under the command of Major Ralph Royce, and became an observation squadron in the American Expeditionary Forces.
It was

almost constantly in active service at the front from April through
November, 1918,

"Regular Army Increase," Correspondence, 1917, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Box 584, File No. 320.2 in the National Archives.
^^Ibid.
^*^"Hlstory of the 1st Aero Squadron," 1918, E, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 1, 1-107. The problems involved in transporting the 1st Aero Squadron pp. were symptomatic of the delay and confusion which pervaded to France so much of the military establishment during the early months of the war. The Squadron was ordered to accompany the 1st Infantry Division overseas. "By the end of May, the Squadron was all packed up, ready for transportation from the Mexican Border to the Port of Embarkation. The 1st Division sailed in June, and in so far as the theoretically secret details of that troop movement were known by the General Staff, the 1st Aero Squadron was with it. But according to plaintive messages received from the 1st Aero Squadron itself, it was with nobody it was still left behind, with all its goods and chattels packed and crated and on the railroad sidings and platforms--at Nogales, Arizona, It had nothing to do and was getting bored. The Commanding Officer sent in one telegram after another about its plight, but it required several to convince those of our General Staff in charge of the movement of the 1st Division that the 1st Aero Squadron was not in France." Arnold, Global Mission , p. 59,

—

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Early Organization In France

On May 26, 1917, while still in Washington, Major General

John J. Pershing assumed his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the

American Expeditionary Forces,

On the following day, General

Pershing received instructions defining his authority and mission from
the War Department,

The establishment of the Anerican Expeditionary

Forces Air Service as an organization separate from the Signal Corps
In the overseas theater began with the appointment of the first

"aviation officers" to General Pershing's staff.

Major Townsend F,

Dodd, who had been Department Aviation Officer at San Antonio, Texas,

was assigned to Pershing's staff on May 26, 1917, while in Vteshington,
D.C,
2

Major Dodd appointed First Lieutenant Blrdseye

B.

Lewis, who

had been serving with him on the Mexican border, as his assistant.

General Order Number 1, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, Washington, D.C, dated May 26, 1917, U.S., Department of the Army, Historical Division, United States Army in the World War. 1917 1919 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), KVI, 1. Gen. Pershing's orders appear in a number of documents collections; this particular compilation was used for this dissertation. All footnotes citing general orders from AEF headquarters have been draxm from Volume 16 of this set,
^
3

Memo for the Chief of Staff from William Mitchell, dated June 13, 1917, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, p, 17.
Special Order Number 11, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, Paris, June 19, 1917, A, Ily AS AEF, Vol, 12, p. 36.

9

115
Tlie

board prepared copies of its recomnendations for Pershing's

sisnature in the form of cables to the War Department.

Apparently the

cables never left France,

The conposition of the Air Service, American

Expeditionary Forces, remained unsettled until July, 1917, when the
General Organization Project was drafted.
The General Organization Project, a comprehensive plan for the

American Expeditionary Forces as a whole, was drafted by General
Pershing's Operations Section and approved by him on July 11, 1917,
This project provided for 59 Air Service squadrons to operate with five army corps.
The Air Service was to be made up of 39 squadrons

for observation, 5 for bombing, and 15 for pursuit.

Strategic aviation

was allotted a low priority in the initial program of the American

Expeditionary Forces,

Tlie

General Organization Project was intended

only as a preliminary draft outlining the desired tactical organization
of the overseas forces.
In the meantime the first air squadron program was prepared in

Washington by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer and was approved
by the Chief of Staff on August 9, 1917,
In this project there were

The cables are reproduced along with Mitchell's account of his role in the early planning of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I (New York: Random House, I960), pp. 135-137,

"General Organization Project," Headquarters, AEF, Paris, July 10, 1917, G-3, Folder 748A in the National Archives as printed in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 , I, 93; lOC-101; 104,

12

116

service squadrons vere for duty in the United States and 8 for Panama

and the islands of the Pacific, leaving 263 for duty in France.
In order to conform to the War Departncnt plan,

13

the Anerican

Expeditionary Forces began work on a detailed squadron project.
program, contemplating an overseas

This

amy

of 20 combat and 10 replacement

divisions together with the necessary corps, arny, and service of suppV
troops, provided for 386 aero service squadrons, 264 park squadrons,

and 69 observation balloon squadrons.

Of the aero service squadrons,

260 jjere for the Service of the Front as differentiated fron the

Service of the Rear, which included only those for training and

replacement.
In addition to a strategic force of 59 aero squadrons, a

tactical force of 201 squadrons was envisioned:
55 for bonbardnent, and 105 for pursuit.
Tliiis

41 for observation,
plan, after a
fexj

changes, became the first official aviation program in the Anerican

Expeditionary Forces.

Program Number One, as it was later called,
120 pursuit, 80 observation,

represented a total of 260 squadrons:
and 60 bombardment.
Tliis

program was Incorporated in the Service of
1917.

the Rear Project approved by General Pershing on September 18,

The formation of an organization capable of carrying on all

^^"Air Service Program" August 9, pp. 78-85.
14

1917, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol.

1,

Patrick, Final Report , p. 23. See also the plans for the Air Service in the Zone of Advance in Report, Conmander-in-Cliief , AEF Folder 1, dated Febniary 12, 1919, in Department of the .\rmv. United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . I, 134-137. Patrick, Final Report , p. 10.

117

the necessary American aviation projects in Europe seemed a hopeless

task in the becinnins.

Few Americans trained in aviation activities
in the United

were already overseas, and the necessity of retalninc

States the snail handful of e:q)ericnced men limited the possibilities
of assistance from that source.

There

;ras

a deficiency of clerical

assistants, supply officers, and men with technical training.

Practically all technical comrnuni cat ions and most current correspondence

were in a forcisn language, requiring interpreters and stenographers
capable of taking dictation in and xjritlng in both French and English.
France, England, Italy, and the American Eicpeditionary Forces vrere
1

combed for the needed people.

6

By the beginning of August,

1917,
xjas

the aviation organization

for the American Expeditionary Forces

clearly defined.

Major

Raynal C, Boiling, with his loiowledge of production, was put in charge
of the Zone of Interior and Colonel William Mitchell, still with his

title of Aviation Officer, American Expeditionary Forces, was given

jurisdiction and control over the Zone of Advance,

The Zone of

Advance was concerned with the choice of airdrome sites and the initiation of construction in preparation for future activities at the
front.

The Zone of Interior was concerned with the development of the

supporting organizations, such as supply, training, and technical
matters.
cind

This organization, with one officer in charge at the front

another officer in charge at the rear, resulted in divided respont\vro

sibilities, and these

divisions wore brought under one head on

Ibid.

,

p.

26,

118

August 28, 1917, by the appointment o£ Colonel WilHan L. Kenly as
Chief Aviation Officer, American Expeditionary Forces, On September 3,

1917, Kenly, who had been promoted to Brigadier General, was made Chief
of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. ^

Colonel Boiling

was appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Service and Director of Air
Service Supplies, with headquarters in Paris,
Colonel Mitchell became

Air Conmander, Zone of Advance, and early in September his office and
that of the Caief of Air Service were moved to Chaumont, where Pershing

had established his headquarters.
In Paris, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E, Carberry was made Chief of Training, and Lieutenant Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell was appointed

of the Zone of Interior branch had been chan3ed to Lines of Communicatiai.
Tlie

departments of administration, production, finance, transportation,

and the teclinical section wore now under the control of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Lines of Communication.
Tiie

Director of Air Service

Instruction, under the Assistant Chief of Air Service, Lines of

Communication, was in c!iar3e of personnel, materiel, instruction, and

transportation assigned for his use.

The Air Ca-xiander, Zone of

Advance, maintained a staff composed of officers in charge of administration, operation,

information, and materiel departments.

He was

charged with the organization and equipment of units formed in the
Zone of Advance and with the actual preparation for their employment
in combat,

Tacsc branches of the Air Service cornmunlcated directly
but all matters of policy were controlled by the
20

V7ith each other,

Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces,

During the fall of 1917, there \jcre no American air squadrons

available for duty at the front except the 1st Aero Squadron, which had

arrived in Europe in September and after a period of training at Avord
had been located at /\manty near the
I

Corps School.

21

Hence, the main

problems of the Zone of Advance consisted of the study of tactics and
20

General Order Number 46, Headquarters, American E:q>editionary Forces, France, October 10, 1917, Mitchell was designated the Air Commeinder, Zone of Advance.
Col. La Roy S, Upton was named Cotmandant of 1st Army Corps Schools, with i!aj. Ralph Royce of the Ir.t Aero Squadron as the Director General Order Number 35, Headquarters, of the Aeronautical Schools, American Exi^editionar^/ Forces, France, October S, 1917,
2

120

strategy in the Britiiih and French air services, the selection of

suitable sites for airdromes and supply depots, and the preparation for
the deplo^TT^ent of conrbat units.

The construction of the 1st Air Depot

and airdrone at Colonbey-les-Belles was begun In October, 1917,

This

installation

v:as

to be used as a receiving and distributln:^^ point for

personnel, materiel, and supplies, and as a site for minor repairs to
engines, airplanes, and motor transport,"

Activity in the Lines of Communications consisted of mal:ing
preparations for putting combat units in the front lines and providing
for their training, equipment, and maintenance.

Schools and training
By

centers had to be provided for American Air Service personnel.
late November,

1917, flying training had begun in a school at Issoudun,
'^

near the French schools of Avord and Chatcauroux,
Aviation School at Tours had been taken over for

The French

prir.^ary

training and

that at Clermont-Ferrand was about to be turned over to the United

States for bombardment instruction.

In addition,

several detachments

of cadets had been sent to other French schools and one detaclment had

gone to Italy for primary training.

"Organization of the Air Service, American E:q)editionary Forces," 1917, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, p. 1,
General Order Number 60, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, ftovember 13, 1917, Lt, Col. Thomas Milling was the first commandant of the school.
24

22

23

Training in Europe is fully discussed in Cliapter VII of this

study.

121

Reorganization and Later Developments

On November 27, 1917, Brigadier General Benjamin D, Foulois

became Qilef of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces,

relieving Brigadier General William L. Kenly.

25

Before going to

France, General Foulois, who was well aware of the limitations of some
of the young air service officers, had selected a staff of 112 officers
to take to France with hiri. In view of the limited number of expe-

rienced e>:ecutive officers among the trained fliers, most of these men
were nonflying officers of administrative ability, chosen for their

experience and skill in various fields.

Some had been General Staff

officers (few, if any, aviation officers had ever served on the General
Staff up to this time); some
1-iad

experience in military organization,
V7ere

administration, training, and discipline; some

experienced in the

supply and maintenance of balloon and aviation equipment; while others,
\7hen civilicins, had had experience in industry.

26

General Foulois and his party arrived in France on November 12,
1917,
In the two xjeeks prior to his assignment as Chief of the Air

Service, Foulois made a thorough inspection of all Air Service activities
in France,

As a result of this inspection, on December

1,

1917, he

reccomcnded to the Giief of Staff that a priority schedule of materiel
be authorized,
tliat

certain areas be assigned as concentration depots
tliat

for Air Service personnel and materiel,
25

the Supply Division remain

General Order Number 66, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, November 27, 1917,

Navy Aircraft Cornnittce be established in Paris and that construction
for Air Service be placed under the Engineers.
27

Foulois further

reconnended that a conprchensive

plfin

of air operations be authorized

as soon as possible and that conbat operations in cooperation with the

French and British niaht be inaugurated at the earliest practicable
date.

During his inspection trip, General Foulois also noticed that
there was a lack of cooperation between Colonels Boiling and Mitchell,

each of whom wanted control of supply,

Foulois agreed with Boiling

that supply should be under the jurisdiction of the Lines of Conmunlcation, but he felt tliat these
t\TO

men, both of wlion wore strong willed,

were not going to get along; therefore, on Decenber 12, 1917, he put
Colonel Robert 0, Van Horn in cliarge of all Air Service projects in
the Zone of Advance not actually under the control of combat troops,
thus relieving Mitchell of any responsibility for location and

construction of airdrones, training and supply of units until they
\7crc

officially conmitted to conbat.

He also relieved Colonel Boiling

from his position as Assistant to the Chief of Air Service in the Lines
27

Col. Boiling and the Engineers had liad difficulty in getting along and Foulois used this recommendation as a means of stopping further trouble. See enclosure A, "Lack of Co-operation between Col, Raynal C, Boiling , , , and Headquarters, Lines of Communications," in Benjamin D, Foulois, "Tlie Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918," 1924, p. 5, in Foulois Collection, USAF HD Archives,

Memo to the Chief of Staff, AEF, from General Foulois, December 1, 1917, in Benjamin D. Foulois, "Personal Service Record, 1898-1919," 1919, pp. 11-12, in Foulois Collection, USAF HD Archives.

123
of Conrmmication to take over the duties of Chairnan of the Joint

Amy

and Navy Aircraft

Comr.iittee, V7hich

had been created on October 22, 1917,

by the Aircraft Production Board in Uashinston,

Authority for the

fornation of this committee in the Anerlcan Expeditionary Forces was
later Given by Pershing's headquarters.
29

The Canmittee was composed

of Colonel Boiling (chairman). Colonel Sidney D. Waldon, Lieutenant

Colonel Edgar S. Gorrcll, Captain A, C, Cable, and two Navy officers.
It operated under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, American

Expeditionary Forces, for Army natters and through the Commander, United
States Naval Forces in European Waters, for Naval matters.
Tlie

purpose

of the Committee was to coordinate industrial and military activities
in Europe and the United States and to constitute the proper official

channel for communications with the European nations relative to

aircraft materiel.

During the early months of 1913, while the most

strenuous development of the Anerican Air Service was being undertaken,
this committee assisted greatly in the allocation of aircraft products.
30

With the arrival of raw material from the United States, it became necessary to allocate and distribute it.
It was evident that

foreign aviation, based on a system of unregulated private manufacturers,

was greatly laclcing in standardization.
29

This was particularly serious

General Order Number 80, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, December 24, 1917.

order to bring about standardization the Interallied Aircraft Board was created and it did valuable vjork in brln^ins toaether the French,
British, and Italian Air Services on this vital natter.
31

Difficulties arose in the Joint

Amy

and Navy Aircraft Cotnmittee

when

Array

members

\«;re

not alloxjed to deal directly v;ith the Aircraft

Production Board in Washington, \jhile the Navy was given this povrcr.
Dolling felt that the Committee should be abolished since it would not
be a •useful instnjraent for any purpose" under these conditions because

communications

vjero

too slow, and the foreign nations could get the

information they needed from their own missions in the United States

more quickly than they could from the Joint Army and Navy Aircraft
Committee.

Because Boiling was so openly critical of this arrangement,
32

General Foulois removed him from the chairmanship on January 19, 1913.

Although Foulois thought it necessary to keep the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces informed, the conflict
over direct access to the Aircraft Production Board in Washington
lessened when a pemanent Interallied Advisory Committee for Aviation

was formed as a subcommittee of the Interallied Aircraft Board.
31 32

This

Patrick, Final Report , pp. 26-28.

After being relieved of his job as Chairman of the Joint Army and Navy Aircraft Committee, Col. Boiling requested an assignment at the front in a combat orrjanization. He was given another staff job as a roving investigator. In March, 1913, he and his driver inadvertently approached too close to the German lines near Amiens. His car was fired on and he and his driver took refuge in a shell hole. Several German soldiers rushed up and ordered them to surrender, but Boiling drew his pistol and fired at them. They returned the fire and killed hltn. His driver was taken prisoner and was not released until after the Armistice. PatricI:, T\^c United States in the War , pp. 10-14.

125

subconmittee could not communicate vjith Washinston at all, but under
Colonel llalsey DunxTOody,
v<;ho

succeeded Bollins as Air Service spokesman,

the reconimondations of this subconmittee became binding on the respective

Allied Services and virtually supplanted the Joint Army and Navy
Aircraft Committee.
33

General Foulois's headquarters

xras

located at Chaumont until
liad

February 17, 1918, v/hen It and the other Air Service offices which been operating in Paris transferred to Tours.

Since much of the materiel

which was purchased in Europe came from French factories located in or
near Paris, the Supply Section returned to Paris where it began its
functions later in April, 1918.
34

The organization of the Air Service on April 30, 1918, provided

for the Chief of Air Service (Foulois) to function directly under the

General Headquarters, American Esq^cditlonary Forces,

Exercising the

Air Service Chief's authority as deputies x^ere the several Assistant
Chiefs of the Air Service in administrative functions, and the

Comptroller in matters of property and accountability.

35

The folloxdng divisions of functions were made:

Training

Section,

headed by Lieutenant Colonel Walter

G,

Kilner, was in charge

of all aviation schools; Personnel Section, headed by Lieutenant Colonel

Gonzales S, Bingliam, was In control of the Air Service Replacement
33

Concentration Barracks at St, flaxicnt; Transportation Section, headed
by NJajor George A. Robertson, took charge of all transportation;

Supply Section, headed by Colonel Ilalsey Dunwoody, operated the various

warehouses, depots, and parks which VTere in the process of devclopncnt
in the Services of Supply

(fomerly designated the Lines of Connuni cation;
\1,

Assenbly, Salvage, and Repair Section, headed by Major

C.

Allen

(later was designated I'roduction and Maintenance Division and combined

with Supply); and the Balloon, Radio, Photographic, and Infomation
Sections, operated under one head. Colonel Cliarles Chandler,
Tlie I

Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, was organized on

January 15, 1910, to provide adninistrative direction for all American
troops then on the French front.
It was connanded by Major General

Hunter Liggett (one of the fev air-tninded officers in the American

Expeditionary Forces),
of Air Service,
I

Colonel VJilliam Mitchell was appointed Chief

Corps, and set up his headquarters at Neufcliateau, in
37

the Department of Vosgcs, later that same month.

When the first American aero squadrons were sent to the front
in April,

1013,

they went initially to the quiet Toul sector; Colonel

Mitchell then moved his headquarters to Toul where the Air Service of
the I Corps operated under the tactical command of the French Eighth

Army and under the administrative cormand of the American

I

Corps,

Memo, Headquarters, Services of Supply, Office of the Cliief of Air Service, AEF, April 30, 1918, in Benjamin D, Foulois, "The Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918," 1924, p, 26, in Foulois Collection, USAF HD Archives,

General Order Number 9, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, January 15, 1918.

37

127

The French assigned to the I Corps Air Service a sector of the front

for which the Americans ircre to be responsible.

At this time, since

the Ar.icrican Air Service xras so snail, pursuit in addition to the

observation aviation was assigned to the

I

Corps Air Service.

38

On May 29, 1918, Brigadier General Mason M. Patrick was

appointed Chief of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces,

relieving General Benjamin D, Foulois, who
Service, First Army,
39

x^as

appointed Chief of Air

From June, 1918, until the end of the war the

function of the divisions and sections of the aviation command were

prescribed by memoranda issued from the Office of the Chief of Air
Service, American Expeditionary Forces,
The organization first
CTiief of

prescribed by General Patrick was as follows:

Air Service,

In charge of all activities. General Mason M. Patrick; Chief of Air Service, First Army, in cliarge of operations. General Benjamin D,

Foulois; Assistant Cliief of Air Service at General Headquarters,

Colonel Wilson B, Burtt; Assistant CTaief of Air Service at Tours,

Headquarters of the Services of Supply, Colonel Henry

C,

Whitehead;

Assistant Chief of Air Service, Advance Section, Services of Supply,
cliargcd with selection of airdromes, parks, and depot sites.

Colonel

Robert 0. Van Horn; Assistant Chief of Air Seirvicc, Paris, in charge
3" "^••History of the Dcvelonment of Air Service Command at the Front," C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, p." 3.

General Order ^}umber 81, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, May 29, 1913; "Resume, Office of the aiief of Air Service, Tours," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 16, p. 64. Gen, Patrick v;as an experienced administrator, having served many years In the Corps of Engineers. He had never floim in an airplane prior to his appointment as Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces,

Officer in Charce of Training, Lieutenant Colonel Walter G. Kllner;
Officer in Charge of Balloon, Radio, and Photography, Colonel Charles
Chandler; Coordination Section, to assist the Chief of Air Service in plans, estimates, and prograns, Major Harry A. Toulnin, Jr.; and a

Strategic Section, conoosed of the Chief of Air Service, Chief of Air
Service

First

Amy, Assistant Chief

of Air Service General Headquarters,

Officer in Charge of Supply, Officer in Charge of Training, Officer in
Cliarge of Balloons,

General Staff representative to the Air Service,
x/ho

and the Officer in Charge of the Coordination Section,
secretary.
40
Two more sections were added later:

acted as

Assembly, Salvage,

and Repair, headed by Major William H. Allen; and Transportation,
headed by Major George A, Robertson,
In

view of the fact that the American First Army was not

officially created until August 10, 1918, General Foulois's assignment
seems a little premature.

Nevertheless, after being appointed Chief

of Air Service, First Army, Foulois proceeded to Toul to take over the

command of the front from Colonel William Mitchell.

There was some
tliat

disagreement between these two officers, and Foulois recommended
Mitchell be relieved and be returned to the United States.
Pershing, who
\>7as

General

impressed by Colonel Mitchell's ability to get things

Memo fJumber 17, Office of the Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, June 10, 1913, in A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 9, pp. 101102.

40

The sources do not indicate just what position Mitchell held at this tine. Presumably he v/as Commander of Air Service, I Corps. See General Order ^Jumber 31, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, May 29, 1918.

41

129
done, retained Mitchell in his post but asked
tell
hitn

hltn

to 30 to Foulols and

tlaat

he

\«is

anxious to cooperate.
tlian

Tlie

Comrnander-ln-Chief also
v;ay«

requested Foulois to meet Mitchell more

half

Foulois connlied

with Pershing's wishes by aslcing Mitchell to serve on his staff in the

most important post

— that

of operations assistant.
tliat he

Colonel Mitchell

accepted the position but adnitted frankly
tactical command.

would rather have a

Foulois granted Mitchell's v;ish on June 27, 1918,

by organizing on a tentative basis the 1st Brigade Air Service, to be

composed of both observation and pursuit squadrons, and putting Mitchell
in command,

42

A few days later the movement of American troops from the Toul
Sector to the area around Chateau Tliierry began, and Colonel Mitchell

was ordered to proceed to that area for duty in connection with the
tactical and teclinical supervision of all Air Service units designated
for service there.

Immediately there were reports of friction between
tlie

Mitchell and the officers of

I

Corps.

It seems that

Mitchell

Iiad

tried to assume control of tactical Air Service units which xjere

directly under the command of the Commanding General, an investigation, Foulois upheld Mitchell's decision.

I

Corps,

After

Meanwhile, the

Inspector General of the American Escpeditionary Forces had reported
the undesirability of the brigade organization as then constituted,

42

See Enclosure D, "Lack of cooperation between , , , Mitchell (while serving as Air Service Commander, I, Corps) and , , . Foulois (xjhilr serving as Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary . . , Forces, 1917-1918," 1924, pp, 49-58, in Foulois Collection, USAF HD Archives, For Mitchell's version of this episode, cf. letter from Mitchell to Foulois, dated July 19, 191S, in Mitchell, Memoirs of World Mar I . pp, 223-231,

130

The 1st Brigade Air Service continued to exist on paper only, for it

was not abolished until July 24, 1913.

On the follov.'ing day General

Foulois comr.iendcd Colonel Jiltchell to the Conrnander- in- Chief of the

Anerican Expeditionary Forces, General Pershing, and recommended that
Mitchell be given his o\m post of Chief of Air Service, First Army,

43

On the sane day, Foulois requested that he be relieved from his duty as Chief of Air Service, First Army, and be assigned to duty as

Assistant Chief of Air Service, Operations, Ainerican Expeditionary
Forces.
His reasons for this action x^cre to demonstrate effectively

to Colonel Mitchell that in spite of their previous difficulties,

Foulois appreciated and recognized Mitchell's good qualities and
efficiency; to show his loyalty to Pershing by cooperating to the

fullest extent with Mitchell, regardless of his own personal desires
and ambitions; and to put his knov;ledge and experience at General

Patrick's disposal.

A short time later, t!itchell

vjas

given Foulois's
v;as

job as Chief of Air Service, First Army, and Foulois

directed to

report to the Chief of Air Service, American Ejq>editionary Forces,
General Patricl., for duty as his assistant.

44

On August

5,

1918, General Patrick ordered Foulois to proceed

to Colombey-les-Belles and to supervise and expedite Air Service

activities in the Zone of Advance. 43

Foulois carefully studied the

Letter, to the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, from the Chief of Air Service, First Army, July 25, 1918, as printed in ibid ., p. 25.

General Order Number 120, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, July 24, 1918; the First Army x^as organised on August 10, 1913,

44

131

battle plans for the St, Mlhiel operations and quickly recognized that
these plans envisaged conbincd Air Service operations on a scale never

before equalled at any time during the war,
first action in which conpletc

St, Mihiel was to be the

amy

control rested in the liands of the

Ancricans,

Tae success of Anerican Air Service units in this operation

depended on a continuous supply of materiel and personnel to bring then
up to full strength and keen then there.

Foulois recomncnded the steps
45

necessary to ineet this emergency to General Patric!:,
Ch August 27,

1918, Foulois was appointed Assistant Cliief, Air

Service, Zone of Advance, vjith all tactical Air Service units in the

Zone of Advance not otherwise assigned placed under his command.
V7as

This

made possible by the establishment on the same day of the General
V7ere

Headquarters Air Reserve, to which all new units
going to the front.

assigned before

Consequently all Air Service units ready to be

sent to the Zone of Advance were assigned by Foulois and deficiencies
in personnel and materiel were talccn care of by him.

Requests for
This cllminatDd

personnel and equipment also tJere submitted to Foulois,

difficulties between Air Service units and Air Service Section, Servioes
of Supply.

Reserve supplies of personnel and materiel xrere concen-

trated at the 1st Air Depot, Colombcy-les-Belles, from v/hich all Air

Service units in the Toul and Verdun areas could be supplied on a
hours' notice,

Chief (General Pershins) for the orgrinizatlon, training, materiel, and

all other matters affecting the efficiency of the Air Service,

Tlie

official headquarters of the Air Service
in Paris,

vxis

at General Headquarters

48

and

v/as

under the immediate supervision of Colonel Henry C,
The Cliief of Air Service, For

^^itehead, the Chief of Staff, Air Service.

American Expeditionary Forces, established all general policies.

the administration of matters not affecting policies there were two

Assistant Chiefs of Air Service:

General Foulois at the Headquarters,

Services of Supply, at Tours; and Colonel Halsey Dunuoody in Paris,
There were also representatives of the Air Service in London and Rome,

Colonel Clarence

R.

Day was charged V7ith the responsibility for Air

Service matters in the United Kingdom, \jhile Major Robert Glendinnlng

had similar duties in Italy.

The Paris office maintained liaison \7ith

the Allies and with the Air Service of the United States Mavy,

49

General Foulois, the Assistant Chief of Air Service at Services
of Supply headquarters,
liad

charge of all personnel records, the super-

vision of training, and the administration of the Balloon Division and
of the Air Service centers in the Services of Supply,
Tlie

most

important sections of this staff were the Training Section headed by
Colonel Walter G, Kilncr; the Balloon, Photographic, and Radio Section

headed by Colonel Charles Chandler; the Personnel Section under
48

Ifeadquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, was redesignated General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces by General Order Number 11, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, January
17,

supervised the American night bombardment program and xjorked in close

accord with the other Air Service sections concerned in this project.
Its London office was charged with training flying and mechanic

personnel in England and with assembly in British plants of Handley-Pag2

airplanes built in the United States,

Ibid,, p» 5,

Ibid ., p, 4,

135

Hie American Expeditionary Forces First Army, organized on

August 10, 1918,
10,

52

increased in size to such an extent

tliat

on October

1913,

the Second

Amy

xjas

created

frorn

sone e:q5erienced units of
5-1

the First Array aujnented by a number of newly arrived organizations.

General Pershing advised General Patrick

tlvat he

wanted Brigadier

General William Mitchell to command the aerial fighting on the front,

and Patric'u designated Mitchell Chief of Air Service, Army Group, on October 14, 1918.
Barrois and
vjas

54

Mitchell established his office at Ligny-en-

prepared to handle the Air Services of both the First
In order tliat there night be an authorization of

and Second Amies,

Mitchell's

ne\j

office, a suggested Table of Organization for the Office

of the Chief of Air Service, Army Group, was submitted to the General

Staff for approval,

Tlie

General Staff refused to aclaiowledge the

correctness of the principle of an Air Service Commander for an Army
Group and the suggested Table of Organization
xjas

never approved,

Mitchell, hoxJGVcr, continued in charge of the Air Service on the front.
On October 10,
1918, Colonel Thomas Milling was appointed Chief of Air

Service, First Army.

55

Four days later Colonel Frank P. Lahn became

Chief of Air Service, Second Army, with headquarters at Toul,

52Gcneral Order Number 120, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, July 24, 1913.
General Order Number 175, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, October 10, 1918.
Special Order I^fumber 237, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, October 14, 1913.
54

53

General Order Number 175, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, October 10, 1918.

55

Front,"

C,

"History of the Development of Air Service Command on the Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, pp. 3-4,

"Historical Account of the Organization and Functioning of the VII Corps Air Service," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 23, pp. 2-3,
"Roster of Officers of Headquarters, 1st Pursuit Wing, Air Fron the Time of Its Organization to the Present Date," Novemlier 18, 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 7, p, 3.
Service:

Squadron from the IV Corps Observation Group, and the newly arrived
354th Observation Squadron.
The French II Colonial Corps Observation

Group, commanded by Major Delanncy of the French Army, stationed at
St, Mihiel airdrome, V7as composed of the 2Sth, 47th, and 277th French

Observation Squadrons.
The 2d Day Bombardment Group, located at Ourches airdrome and

*In January, 1919, the Qaief of Air Service in the First and Second Amies traded positions. Col. Lahm became Chief of Air Service, First Amy, and Col. T'lllinc Chief of Air Service, Second Amy.
Tlac nev7ly organized 85th Observation Squadron was later assigned to the Second Army Observation Group after making only two fliShts over the lines with the IV Corps Observation Group.

65

66
\kiT

Department, Order of Battle .

I,

151.

139

comnanded by Major George E, A. Reinburg, was conposed of two recently

arrived squadrons, the 100th and I63d Bombardnent Squadrons, iThich had
not taken part In
iuiy

conbat operations by November 11, 1918,

Tlie

4th

Pursuit Group, stationed at Toul, was made up of two new squadrons,
the 141st and 25th I.\irsuit Squadrons,
In November the 17th and 143th

Pursuit Squadrons (organizations which had been \;or!:ing with the
British) joined the 4th Pursuit Group which was cormandcd by Major

Charles J, Blddle,
16,

Tlie

5th Pursuit Group, not formed until November

1918, was conmandcd first by Captain D, L, Hill and later by Major
It was composed of the 41st,

Ma:well Kirby.

138th, and 633th Pursuit

Squadrons, all of xjhich were under orders to advanced positions when

hostilities ceased,

Tlie

6th Pursuit Group, which was to have been in
li^d

the Second Army Pursuit Wine,

not been orsanlzed when the war

ended on Noveriber 11,

TTic

Second Army Observation Group, iThich was not

organized until November 19, 1918, consisted of the 35th and 278th
Observation Squadrons,
The Balloon Wing of the Second Army, commanded by Major Jolin H, Jouott, included the IV Corps Balloon Group commanded by Captain Paul

Patterson, which included

tlic

15th,

16th, and 69th Balloon Companies;

the VI Corps Balloon Group made up of the 10th Balloon Company and

commanded by Major

Jolin G,

Tliomcll; and the French II Colonial Corps

Balloon Group under Captain Call lot consisted of the French 20th and

^^"Second Army Air Service," 1918,
pp, 2-4;

C,

Hy AS AEF, Vol. 5,

10-13.

140

52d Balloon Companies

68

Balloon Organization

Major Frank

P,

Laltn,

who arrived in France in Scptenbcr,

1917, was the first American balloon officer to reach Europe,
Lahrn itnnediately

Major

bejan to secure infomation about the orsanization and
Based on the

cnployment of balloons fron the British and Fren:h.

advice of these Allied sources and on his
of preparing

ovai

study of the problcn
t\ro

for the arrival of Anerican balloon troops, he raade

reconnendations to the Headquarters, Anerican Expeditionary Forces.
The first proposal-- to establish a balloon personnel depot at Toul,

using the buildings of the French balloon service not occupied at that

time— was disapproved

by Pershing's staff.

A reconmendation for the

establishnent of a balloon school near the French balloon training
grounds at Vadenay was approved and carried to conpletion.
69

Colonel Cliarles Cliandler, who had been in charge of the Balloon

Division in Itashington, arrived in France v;ith General Foulois on Novenber 12, 1917, and was put in cliargc of the Balloon Section in Paris,

Assisted by Major John

!I.

Jouctt, Colonel Chandler planned the

procurement and delivery of balloons and equipment from the French and
initiated the construction of a balloon repair depot at Is-sur-Tille,

moved from Paris to Colombey-les-Bclles on February 23, 1918, when he
became balloon representative for the Air Service, Advance Section,

Services of Supply,

Tliis

assignment save hin supervision over the

combat training of balloon companies, which would be done in a quiet

sector before assignment to tactical units on the front.

71

The 1st, 2d, 3d, and Ath Balloon Companies, under the command

of Ilajor Jolm A. Paegelovj, arrived in France on December 28,

1917, and

were immediately put into training,
France \«;nt up on January 23, 1918,

Tlie

first Americans to ascend in

tx^Jo

balloons sharing the honor.

The 2d Balloon Company became the first American Air Service xmit to

operate with American troops on the front in France,
to the I Corps on February 26,

The Unit reported

1918,

By April,

the 1st and 4th Balloon

Companies v;ere at the front.

Ilajor Paegeloxj connanded the

Balloon

Group assigned to the First Army Headquarters; later when he became

Wing Corr.iander of the First Army he was relieved of the group command
by Captain Allan P. IfcFarland, who occupied this position at the end
of
tlie

war.

On February 20, 1918, the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Balloon

Companies arrived in France under the command of Major Arthur Doettcheer.
These companies received training at artillery firing centers in the

Services of Supply and vrcnt to the front in July, 1918.

72

On August 10, 1918, Col, Lalm was assigned to General Staff "Review Later he became Cliief of Air Service, Second Army. duties. of Balloon Activities," 1917-1913, 0, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 6, p. 43.
^^Ibid., pp. 43 ff.

142

The American E^qiedltionary Forces Balloon School was

established at Cupperly, France, In January, 1913.
advance took place in March, 1913, the school
v;as

\^en the Gennan

moved fron Cupperly

to Mari^ny, where it remained for about a month, and then was moved
to Camp Sou^e.

73

Shortly after the Second

Amy

V7as

orsanized. Major

Jolin

II,

Jouett was assigned as Wing Commander of the Army Balloons,

Upon the

organization of the Tliird Army for the occupation of Germany, the 1st
Balloon Company
x^as

assigned to the III Corps and the 2d Balloon

Company to the IV Corps v/ith Lieutenant Colonel Jolin A. Paegelow as

Wing Commander of Balloons, Third Amy.

74

At the end of the war there vicre 35 balloon companies in
France:
33 had been sent from the United States;
2 liad

been organized

in France from casuals.

Since 10 of these companies did not arrive
3,

from the United States until November

1918,

there were actually 25

balloon companies serving troops at the front, working with artillery
firing centers in the Services of Supply and operating the balloon
schools.
Tlie

25 companies vrere assigned as follows:
vrere

17

companies (1st

through 12th, the 15th, 16th, 42d, 43d, and 69th)

actively engaged

at the front; 8 \x:re on duty at the firing centers and at the balloon

school.

In addition to the balloon companies mentioned,

the 101st

Balloon Replacement Company and Wing Companies D, E, and F provided

administration for units on detached service and balloon casuals in the
73

Service activity, including the selection, training, and organization
of flying forces, developed into an educational system on a scale much

larger and more diverse than anyone anticipated.
to send messages by wireless,

Teaching men to fly,
to

to operate machine guns in the air,

knov artillery fire by its bursts, and to travel hundreds of miles by
compass; teaching other men to detect enemy strategy from aerial photographs, and still others to repair airplane Instruments, ignition
systems, propellers, wings, and motors required a network of flying

fields and schools, a large Instructional force, and a maze of

equipment

find

curricula*
liand

None of these, practically speaking, was on

at the outbreak

of the war, and most serious of all was the lack of meaningful

experience to show what was needed.

The United States Army had never

trained an aviator sufficiently to meet the demands of overseas aerial

warfare and It had only a limited knowledge of the instruction necessary
for radio, photography, and the other specialized skills needed for the

proper utilization of military aircraft.
The Air Service called upon many outside organizations to aid
145

146
In the development of its training progran.

The National Advisory

Conmittee for Aeronautics, several joint Army and Navy boards, and
other agencies added their energies to the solving of training problems.
Great Britain, France, and Italy established aviation missions which

brought their years of experience to help solve problems confronted
in Washington for the first tine.

The French and British military advisors who came to the

United States in April, 1917, reported the German mastery of the air.
Of course, the air forces of the Allies had not been aanihilated; but

German observation flights could not be prevented, and Allied

observation planes seemingly were unable to penetrate the outer lines
of the enemy.

France and Britain were reaching down to their last

reserves of manpo\>7er, but they both had splendidly efficient systems
of training.

The United States had an abundance of manpower, but it At first glance, it appeared as though the combiThe Allies urged the Air Service

had no experience.

nation could not have been better.

to send overseas officers who would learn something about aviation at

close range, but for months only a few were sent.

Consequently, when American pilots and observers arrived overseas they needed additional training.

A large part of their instruction
Rirthermore, they had been

had been out of date when they received it.

trained far from artillery and Infantry units, so that in action

neither ground troops nor aviators

Icnew

what to do next.

To be sure,

conditions at the front were changing so rapidly that it was almost
impossible to keep any system of training up to date, but at least
there could have been some sort of training exercises with ground troops.

147

France, the pioneer In aerial observation, had attained the highest

decree of efficiency in this area of tralnins.

Because the war was

staged chiefly on French soil, was fought in accordance with French

topography and under French artillery practices, France should have
been the example.
The training program developed for the United States
cind

was a sort of compromise between the British
training.

French systems of

Perhaps the Air Service compromised because the Americans

could understand the British officers without borrowing an Interpreter,
The tables of organization for an Air Service observation

United States, American Expeditionary Forces, Tables of Organization , Scries F, Air Service , September 8, 1918, Table 606, Observation Squadron, Air Service, as printed in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War , 1917-1919, I, 398,

148

worked on belialf of aviation, although not always attached to the Air
Service, Indicates that for every nan In the air, approximately 50 men

were required on the ground,

^-Jhilc

the Training Section played no role

in the instruction of the medical, ordnance, and chenical specialists

from other branches of the service that supported the work of aviation
units, the diversity of training which came under the purvlexj of the

Air Service

xras ein

unprecedented challenge to its leaders.

Orf>anization

Since aviation

V7as

such a highly technical field, it was

obvious that an enormous amount of instruction would be necessary for
the men who were to enter this service from civilian life.
To provide

the planning, execution, and supervision of this educational program the Training Section of the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps

was formed.

This later became the Training Section of the Division of
2

Military Aeronautics and eventually the Air Service Training Section.
The responsibility for training flying and ground officers and

particular training was confined to Cornell, Princeton, the University
of California, and the University of Texas; the other schools were
Mt. Clemmens, Michigan, July 14, 1917; Souther Field, Americus, Georgia, June 1, 1918; Taliaferro Field, Fort Vferth, Texas, December 1, 1917; Taylor Field, Montgomery, Alabama, May 1, 1918; and Wilbur Wright Field, Fairfield, Ohio, July 14, 1917. War Department, Order of Battle , III, Part 1, 814-931.

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports, 1918 , I, 1386,

151

utilized for the training of ground officers in specialized work such
as radiotelegraphy, photography, engineering, squadron supply work,

and squadron adjutants.
Tlie

actual flying Instruction was divided into two phases:
The former course, which averaged about eight

prinary and advanced.
vreeks,

included a thorough introduction to the skills of operating air-

planes.

A demonstration of the cadet's ability to execute the simpler

aerial maneuvers and to complete cross-country flights led to a second

lieutenant's commission and the right to

irear

the reserve military

aviator's wings.

By June 30,

1918, 4,980 men had been graduated as

reserve military aviators and were ready for final training; about 400
cadets had been disqualified as incapable of becoming fliers.
The advanced training, however, presented infinitely more

difficulties.

It was not nearly so simple to teach the more ccmiplex

stunts, formation flying, and aerial gunnery.

Moreover, the highly

specialized equipment necessary for this advanced training required
considerable time for manufacture.
Nevertheless, towards the end of

1918 three types of advanced schools were opened with what equipment

was available, and by the end of the war they had graduated a total
of almost a thousand observers, army corps pilots,
6 Army

and pursuit pilots,

and Navy Journal . April 19, 1919, p. 1151.

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports. 1913 . I, 1386.
To be completely accurate, all pilots connected with observation squadrons were not army corps pilots. Hils, ho^jever, was the original title, and is used here to avoid reoctition of the terra "observation pilot."
g

There \7ere 464 observers, 3S9 army corps pilots, and 131 pursuit pilots graduated. Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports^ 1918 . I, 1386.

9

152

An observers' school was opened at Post Field, Fort Sill,
Oklahona, early In Septenber, 1917,
The school was capable of

Instructing 315 students, but its capacity was never attained.
Candidates for the observers* school xjere obtained solely fron volunteers attending ground schools.

Even If the observers' school had

been filled, or even half filled, there would not liavc been enough

planes for Instructional purposes.
into the
xjar

On the date of Ancrican entrance

the entire United States Arny had but 55 planes.

They

looked efficient, and they photographed beautifully; they could do

almost anything but fly well.
In October,

1917, the War Department tried to inveigle Mational

Guardsncn Into applying for observation training, but their response

was not enthusiastic.

Their lack of interest may xrell have been due

to the high requirenents and to the low grades of commissions offered.

The Guardsmen, who were never told, convincingly, what an observer's

work was like, continued to share the public impression that observers were unimportant, and quite naturally they preferred to remain with
their
o\m.

regiments.

The failure to popularize the observers' course led eventually
to the acquisition of personnel by arbitrary methods.
1917, the
Ifar

In December,

Department directed that 25 officers from the various

divisional camps be sent each week to the Artillery Observation School
at Fort Sill, Oklahona, and be indefinitely attached to the Signal

War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service i of Their Expansion in the U,So« 1917-1918 . pp. 49-50.

prevailing winds, to plot the course, allox7in3 for the drift of the
plane in the wind, and to hold a compass course on every leg of the
journey.
By the spring of 1918 the Air Service hoped to train all pilots

and observers in the United States where the necessary facilities and
supplies could be obtained easily.
Plans were formulated to organize

provisional squadrons, wings, and brigades in the United States and
give training to the larger units with their ovm administrative officers

and enlisted perscMinel,

After their arrival in France, they would then

be able to go immediately to the front as combat-ready units of the

American Expeditionary Forces,

20

Training of Ground Personnel

Besides the pilots and observers, a variety of nonf lying
personnel, absolutely essential to the operation of Air Service units,

could be secured only after a detailed course of instruction.

The

first training school for ground officers was opened at Kelly Field,
San Antonio, Texas, on September 1, 1917.
Of the 892 candidates for

ground officers' commissions enrolled during the continuance of the
school, 415 were commissioned, 37 were discharged, and 21 were returned
to their organizations.
21

On January 17,

1918, when the school closed,

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in Department, Annual Reports. 1918 . I, 1386-1387,
21

20

I-Jar

"Schools Established for the Air Service Training Program, 1917-1920," 1920, p. 62, in USAF HD Archives.

159
the rcanalnder were sent to the Supply Officers' School at Massachusetts

secure as much Icnowledge and experience as possible about the following:

ignitions, magnetos, propellers, welding, instruments, sail-making,

cabinet work, copper work, machine guns, and motors.

While about 2,000

men were being graduated from

17

courses at 34 different schools of

this type, courses were established at five northern flying fields

closed for flying during the winter.

With 2,500 graduated here, still

more detailed courses nere opened at four large meclianics* schools,

which added another 5,000 men.

By the end of the war,

two large and

complete schools were in operation at Kelly Field, Texas, and St. Paul,

Minnesota, capable of graduating 5,000 men every three months.

27

Balloon Training

After the United States entered the war, the conmandant of the

Balloon School at Fort Omaha, Major Charles Chandler, along with a few

other experienced balloon officers, was ordered to Washington to
organize a balloon service.

Representatives were sent abroad and the

foreign missions sent to America included balloon officers whose

advice was of great assistance to Major Cliandler.

28

The first program for balloon squadrons (later designated

companies) drawn up in August, 1917, called for only 69 balloon

squadrons at home and abroad.
27

29

By September,

1917, however,

it was

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports, 1918 , I, 1388.

Charles Chandler, "Balloon Section Report," HD Archives.
29

I,

1-8,

in USAF

War Department, Order of Battle ,

III,

Part

1,

127.

162

decided that a total of 200 balloon companies should be organized.

30

The number of men authorized for a balloon company was changed from

time to time but was always betx;?een 90 and 180.

31

The general procedures for training balloon officers were about

the sane as those used to train pilots and observers.
tlie

The nature of

Instruction and the methods of organization for the balloon service
however, somewhat different.

\jere,

A policy of keeping them separate

and distinct was pursued in matters relating to equipment, training, and personnel.
The method of organization and assignment of observaticai

companies to tactical units, which was the basis for the training

program in the United States,

xras

one group of five companies to each

corps, and one wing of three groups to each army.

Candidates for canmissions in the balloon service after passing

an examining board were sent to balloon schools for five weeks of basic

military training.

Tlie

next step was a four-week elementary course

which included the theory of ballooning, topography, meteorology,
perspective, and communications.
Those who successfully completed this

course \rcnt on to become balloon observers or balloon maneuvering
officers.

Observer cadets received an eight-week ground and air course
in which they continued several of the subjects they had already started,

and

ijere

also given instruction in observation of infantry combat as

30lbid.

United States American Expeditionary Forces, Tables of Organization . Series F, Air Service . September 8, 1918, Table 609, Balloon Company, Air Service, in Department of the Army, United States Amy in the World War. 1017-1919 . I, 401.

31

163

assisted by the infantry, artillery, and other arms.
the cadet was rated as an "aerial observer (balloon)"
conimissioned a second lieutenant.

Upon graduation
32

and vas

Further training of observers

included additional field exercises in conjunction with artillery and

infantry units and instruction in securing and interpreting aerial

photographs.

Balloon conpany conrianders were selected from the

graduates of observers* school and \jere given the instruction received
by maneuvering officers. 33

The maneuvering officer's chief duty was to move the balloons

from place to place.

This required considerable skill and training
The "ground and

since the balloons \^Te frequently moved inflated.

air course" given the maneuvering officers lasted four weeks and included
the study of rigging, winch, telephone, machine guns, aerostatics, and

field maneuvering.

Upon satisfactory completion of this course, the
This system of

student was commissioned as a second lieutenant.

training was developed in 1917-1918 and was greatly influenced by the

experience of the British and French balloon forces.

34

In the summer of 1917 the only balloon school in the United

States was located at Fort Omaha, Nebraska,

It had been recently

reopened after complete abandonment the previous November,

Acconino-

dations for 15 officers and 400 men and the balloon shed, gas plant,
32

Tliis rating was provided for in General Order Nvinbcr 38, War Department, April 18, 1918,

War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service; A Study of Tlieir Expansion in the U,S.. 1917-1918 , p, 89; Iter Department, Order of Battle . III. Part 1. 127,
War Department, The Si.-^ial Corps and Air Service: of Their Expansion in the U,S., 1917-1918 , p. 89,
34

The kite type of balloon was called the "Caquot" by the The Germans, who also employed this type of balloon, called

166

fashion, and xrere so pitched about by stiff breezes that there was
little opportunity for the observer to conduct effective reconnaissance.

Furthermore, the wind would often push a spherical balloon down low to
the ground, whereas the kite balloon was pushed up by the wind in the

sane way that a Iclte is pur>hcd up,
Tlie

first Air Service parachute jump was nade on October 19, fron a balloon at a height of 1,500

1917, at Fort Cbalia, Nebraska,

feet.

41

The parachute was packed in a canvas bag attached to the

balloon basket and the weight of the jumper pulled out the silk canopy.
Free type parachutes, the faniliar harness and pack outfits later worn
by aviators, were not used by American flying personnel during
\<torld

War

42
I,

Some free type parachutes were tested with duimios at Fort

Omaha, but these xrcre not equipped with the

modem

rip cord.

Instead,

a small pilot chute pulled the big chute free of the pack.

Training

with the attached type of parachute became a routine part of the
balloon course in the United States.
Tlie

enlisted personnel of balloon companies also received their
Besides instruction in

specialized training in the United States,

regular military duties, 50 per cent of the enlisted men of balloon
companies were given special training as mechanical engineers, riggers,
41

^5oore,

U.S. Airpower , pp, 62-63.

Although the attached type of parachute was widely used by Air Service balloonists in World War I, American aviators were not equipped with them. Pilots and observers considered the attached type chutes too dangerous to use from a plane. Free type chutes had not been perfected, German pilots, hoiTcver, were using the attached type parachute in the latter part of the V7ar, Their chutes were attached under the planes so that they vrould not foul on the wings. Arnold, Global Mission , p, 49.

42

167

telephone repcir men, welders, radio ncchanics, and draftsmen.

43

Conclusion

By the end of VJorld War I, the United States Air Service load

developed an education system complete in all the details necessary to

meet its intricate needs.
equipment were on

Fields, curricula, instructors, and

liand for the

most diverse courses, and thousands of

men trained to deal

V7ith the

difficulties of operatins airplanes and
The development of the Air Service

balloons were bcinc graduated.
training program
v;as

carried out under sizable difficulties.

Training

and production schedules were not properly coordinated.

Time was lost

in obtaining the authority necessary to build nev; airfields and in

securing additional funds and personnel.

Moreover, work had to be

done vjhile the offices in Washington were being moved half a dozen
times and while personnel xoere being shifted between Washington, the

training fields, and overseas.
The total flying and ground personnel, both commissioned and

enlisted, who received technical instruction in schools established in
the United States by the Air Service's Training Section x^ere:

flying

officers, 13,144; ground officers, 3,245; enlisted men, 24,512; total,
40,901.
This figure is exclusive of the men instructed in special

courses conducted by commanding officers of Air Service installations.
In November,

1913, an additional 20,976 students were enrolled In the

Each balloon company liad its own anti-aircraft unit attached War Department, The Signal Corps and Air Service; A Study of Tlieir Expansion in the U.S.. 1917-1918 , pp, 89-90.
to it.

168

more than 50 schools In the United States,
tliat

44

Wien it is considered
slied,

schools for training nearly 41,000 men had to be establl

equipped, and staffed with instructors, the magnitude of the achievc-

ment of Air Service training in the United States can be appreciated.

45

Despite the impress iveness of the Air Service training statistics, the

expansion and dcvclOTment was much more complicated and much less rapid than expected.
The total enrollment of cadets who had been candidates for

commissions as flying officers in all the schools was 22,689.

Of this
\}cre

number 15,628 entered flying schools In the United States; 1791

sent overseas directly from ground school and trained in the flying

schools of England, France, and Italy; 5,149 were discharged or transferred from ground schools. 46

disciplinary actions, and the reduction of cadet pay In torch, 1913,
from $100 per month to $33 per month.
The signing of the Armistice

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics in War Department, Annual Reports, 1913 , I, 1390. In addition to the men trained In the United States and Ei!ro;ic, 79 cadets from ground schools and 86 cadets from the officers' training camps were assigned to the British Royal Flying Corps in Canada for flying training, the first cadet reporting to Toronto on July 9, 1917. Jone^ The War in the Air , V, 464467, 45 When the United States entered World War I there were 131 officers in the Air Service; at the end of hostilities there were 14,23a Similarly, the enlisted strength jumped from 1,087 to 124,766, The number of men in or awaiting flying training increased from less than 100 to over 18,000, Indeed, by November 11, 1918, the Air Service alone was larger than the United States Army had been at the outbreak of the war. "Training In the United States," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 16, p. 113,

44

Report of the Director of Military Aeronautics In War Department, Annual Reports, 1913 , I, 1390.

46

169

was also responsible for the resignation of a great number of cadets.
At this time the Air Service gave candidates the option of asking for discharge or continuing their training until they
reserve military aviators.
47
\rere

qualified

From the beginning of flying instruction in the United States

up to and including November 11, 1918, the statistics on fatalities were as follovjn:
total fatalities, 264; total hours floxm, 811,072;

hours flo\m per fatality, 3,072,24; number of trained reserve military

aviators per fatality, 32,81.

48

For every training fatality a distance

equal to seven times the earth's circumference was travelled.

Regret-

table as the accidents were, the Air Service felt that, considering the

poor condition of the planes, the inexperience of the instructors, and
the necessity of teaching rather dangerous stunts, this number of

fatalities

v;as

not large.

As a matter of fact, fatalities in American

training vere less than half those incurred by trainees in Allied
countries.
Both France and Britain thought that the American schools

were too safe for the proper development of combat aviators,
lost one man to every 2,808.2 training hours.

Britain

But when the Uhlted

States Air Service got to the front, it lost three men while Britain

and France

^^ere

losing one.

American fliers would probably have

profited from more simulated combat in their training programs.
On June 4, 1918, American Escpedltionary Forces Headquarters,
In setting forth the quotas of trained Air Service personnel required

Special Order Number 98, Headquarters, Air Service, Washington, November 17, 1913.

lar^e order, inordinately largo when it is realized that in May, 1918,

only 266 students of observation were actually under instruction in the

United States.

Although a few hundred men had been sent to France

for training, practically all of them waited at least three months

before they could even begin their training; many of then waited six

months, and a few of then waited a year.

By November 11,

1918, only

907 officers had been graduated from observation schools in the United

States and only 509 of them had been sent to France,

•'Schedule for the Production of Observers in the United States," Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, June 4, 1910, J, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 2, p. 29.
50

49

"Statistical Sumnar7 of Training, Observers," 1918, J, Hy AS

AEF, Vol. 3, ^. 7.

"Observation Training, 1917-1918," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF,
Vol.
16,

p.

103.

CHAPTER VII

TRAINING FOR AERIAL OBSERVATION IN EUROPE

Orr.anlzatlon

Tlie

Training Section of the Air Service, American Expeditionary
The Training Section as It

Forces, was created on July 2, 1917.

existed in the sumner and fall of 1917 had been granted jurisdiction
over both personnel and training although in fact its authority over
the former was never exercised.

On December 12, 1917, after Brisadier

General Benjamin D, Foulois became Chief of the Air Service in the

American Expeditionary Forces, a memor£mdum announced that:
all matters relating to training and organization of personnel In France, England, and Italy will be under the control and direction This section will be of the Training and Organization Section. responsible for the personnel of organized units requiring training, and for their pay, training, subsistence, and accommodations from the time they cone under the jurisdiction of this section until they are transferred to another section.^

This gave the Chief of the Training Section even more authority and

responsibility for training matters.

The Training Section's assumption

of administrative control of the training schools did not proceed

smoothly.

Subsequently it was decided that the Chief of Air Service

^Special Order Number 2, Office of the Aviation Officer, American Expeditionary Forces, July 2, 1917,
Tieraorandum, Office of the Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, December 12, 1917, in J, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 1, p. 12,
171

172

alone would exercise control over the schools and that the Training
Section would be regarded simply as a part of his staff. Section
\<ras

The Training

ordered to confine Itself to supervising and coordinating
In April,

training and was relieved of all conflicting duties.
ho\jever,

1918,

the Training Section again assuned cornmand over all aviation

schools when the Chief of the Training Section was designated as the

Director of

Amy

Aeronautical Schools, the Gaief of the Air Service
3

being the Conmandant,

Flyina Training

It was evident from the

beginning

tliat

as much as possible of

the enormous training program would have to be conducted in the United

States.

At first, hoiTOVcr, only primary training could be given there

because in the United States no airplanes and no qualified instructors

x^re available for advanced training.

Consequently, it was necessary

to establish large schools and training centers in Europe for advanced

and specialized training.

Until this was accomplished. Allied schools

had to be used to the fullest extent possible.
In the spring of 1917 there were no American officers in Europe

qualified to take charge of the higher phases of aviation instruction
such as pursuit, bombardment, observation, and aerial gunnery,
Tlae

officers assigned to special instruction loiew little or nothing about
the subjects they were called upon to teach; therefore, they had to

educate themselves vith wliatevcr means were at hand*
By the svtnner of 1917 it had become apparent that a sufficient

number of aviators t;ith even primary training could not be expected from
the United States in time to meet the program that was contemplated, and
that it xrould be necessary to call upon the Allied schools In Europe

for primary as \7cll as advanced training.

The Allied Air Services

assured the United States that it would be possible to Qive primary
training to a large number of men, and General Pershing accordingly

requested that 100 cadets a month be sent to Europe beginning in July,
1917.
4

A number of eligible Americans in Europe who had served with

either the French or British \^re ejcamined and enlisted for flying
training.
In all, approximately 2,300 cadets, without primary flying

training, were sent to Europe or enlisted in France.
The primary training of these men did not proceed as had been

planned.

The Allied governments, which had offered to train the cadets,

had expected them to arrive during the summer of 1917.

Although a few

cadets did arrive in August and September, the majority of them did not

reach Europe until October, November, and December.

By this time the

weather was not favorable for training, the Italians had suffered a
setback, the Germans
oxTn

liad

advanced, and the Allies had increased their

training programs and were using their own schools to full

capacity--all of which combined to frustrate the plans for early primary
training abroad.
4
The American schools had not been completed, but the

age of these planes, this training was not the best, but it was better

than nothing, and it materially lightened the burden of primary

training in the A:ierican Expeditionary Forces.
By the autumn of 1917, it was realized that European school

installations would he wholly inadequate to give full courses in

advanced and specialized training to the number of pilots and observers
required to meet the needs of the American Expeditionary Forces.
If

the number of men necessary for this program were to be passed through

the schools in Europe, all that could be accomplished with the men and

materials available would be to give them lecture courses and to
provide them with superficial flying experience in planes other than
the type of machines they would use in combat.

On November 23, 1917, the Air Service, American Expeditionary
Forces, advised the War Department in Washington that the burden of

complete training of all aviators sent abroad would have to be assumed
by the training resources in the United States,
It

was estimated

that the advanced schools of the United States would begin to turn out

fully trained pilots and observers during June and July, 1918,

Cables

received from the United States verified the estimate, but the output
of trained personnel from the schools in the United States was greatly

delayed, and the schools of the American Expeditionary Forces were

required to bear a much larger portion of the training load than had
been contemplated.
In fact, only eight corps (observation) pilots

Cable from Headquarters, AEF, France, to the War Department, Washington, November 23, 1917, in Department of the Army, United States Anny in the World War, 1917-1919 . Ill, 6-7.

177

completely trained in the United States reached the front before the

cessation of hostilities.

12

By the middle of July, 1918, the prinary training of aviation

cadets in Europe had been nearly completed,

Primary training was

continued only for deserving enlisted men who had volunteered for the

Air Service with the idea of learning to fly and who

liad

already

applied for flying training.
Forces
xras

Each squadron in the Anerican Expeditionay

authorized to recommend one or two qualified enlisted men

for flying training as a reward for the excellence of their service. The men selected in this manner made an excellent showing in the

flying schools and later as pilots in units at the front.

13

Training was carried on in such airplanes as could be spared
by the French.

These machines were not only antiquated and ill-

adapted to the purpose, but they introduced into the schools a multiplicity of types which made the procurement of spare parts extremely
difficult.
use,
14

At Issoudun alone more than 30 types of machines were in

and large numbers of airplanes were forced out of service

because of the impossibility of procuring the particular parts required.
In the fall of 1917, when it was decided to enlarge the

Ralph E, DeCastro, "Notes on Observation Pilots," 1918, J, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 3, p. 356, Most American-trained pilots liad never flown British or French combat-type machines until they reached France, It took several weeks to become used to flying these machines. It was late in the war before sufficient aircraft for complete flying training became available in the United States,
^•^••Training in French Schools," 1918, A,
p.

American schools in France, orders for airplanes were Increased but
the Training Section was never given any authority for obtaining supplies.

Tools and equlpraent which vrore needed at the schools were kept In

reserve for squadrons which did not naterialize for possible demands
at the front.
To add to these difficulties, early in 1918 the Mar

Department in Washington set up an embargo on Air Service personnel and
materiel.
It was

necessary to Increase the shipment of infantry and

machine gun units to France to meet the enemy advance but there were
not enough ships to take care of both the ground troops and the air

personnel and materiel,
June,

Tlie

result of this embargo, which lasted until

1913, was an extreme shortage of personnel, both enlisted and

commissioned, in all Air Service schools, none of which could operate

near its capacity.

Moreover, the needs for flying units for operation

xjith troops in the front had to be met;

consequently Air Service depots,

assembly areas, and repair plants in the Services of Supply were stripped of experienced personnel to such an extent
tliat

the rcsult£mt

loss in efficiency was not overcome in most instances for months and In

some cases it was never overcome.

Memorandum, "Revision of Priority Schedule," Office of Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, AEF, April 9, 1913, Department of the Army, United States Army In the World Mar, 1917-1919 . II, 293,

During the spring of 1918, Britain and France pressed Gen, Pershing to increase American shipments with an exclusive priority on Infantry and machine gun units. The American Commander-in-Chief, eager to get his forces organized on a self-sufficient basis, wanted artillery and service troops as well. Arguing with the same determination that he had maintained regarding the preservation of the identity and Integrity of United States forces, Pershing finally secured Allied concessions permitting the transportation of some American artillery and service troops. Pershing's persistence xjas most distasteful to Allied leaders. Although America finally succeeded in building up a

179

Initially the prospective pilot was put through a course of

prinary training which entitled him to the reserve military aviator
rating.
Pilots trained by the French wore given the French brevet,

which was regarded as the equivalent of the reserve military aviator
rating.
The practice arose of permitting the foreign authorities to
to the American Air Service for the reserve military

certify a student

aviator rating upon completion of the work required by their respective
schedules.
In the beginning the airfield at Tours was a French school for

primary flying training, but later it became the center of training
for all aerial observers in the American Expeditionary Forces,
Tlie

first class of 47 candidates arrived at Tours on August 15, 1917.

Tlie

field at Tours was turned over to the Americans on November 15, 1917.

During the intervening period the first class was succeeded by the
second, third, and fourth classes, all recruited fron Americans who

enlisted in Paris for flying training.
The output of trained pilots during the early period fell far

short of the anticipated number of 100 graduates per month.

The best

previous record of the French, who had operated a school there, was 82
in a month.

During the first four months of American supervision the
vjas

average output per month

less tlian 40 pilots; but there V7cre only

50 to 60 Caudron G-3 planes available and since it was impossible to

obtain

nev;

machines, most of these had been extensively repaired.

By

large force, it was too deficient in artillery to be a well-balanced offensive organization.

other observation training centers before their asslgnnent to the front,
Tlie

course given to observers at Tours was Intended to cover

everything necessary to qualify the observer for front line duty except
practical e>q>erience in the control of artillery fire, which was given
by supplencntary instruction at Cliatillon, Souge, Coctquidan, and other

American -owned Nleuport planes arrived at Cazaux, 30 more were delivered
later, and toward the end of the instruction four Avion Renault tow-

target planes were flo^^n in,

Cazaux was the central gunnery training

station for American pilots and observer gunners from April until
October, 1918, V7hen the gunnery school at St, Jean-de-Monts opened.
The French instructors at Cazaux trained 225 artillery observers, 118

bombardment observers, 495 pursuit pilots, and more than 200 antiaircraft balloon company gunners.
This was one of the most important
29

contributions made by the French to American Air Service training.

Numerous sites for a second gunnery school, to be operated by
the Air Service, \jere considered but none v/ere found satisfactory until

a place suitable for shooting over water was finally discovered on the

west coast of France:

the village of St, Jean-de-Monts, midway between

St. Nazaire and La Rochelle.

Although the site at St. Jean-de-Monts

was decided on in February, 1918, it was not approved until the middle
of May,

Training began with 51 students on August

1,

1918,

Aerial

gunnery sections at Tours and Clermont-Ferrand relieved St. Jean-de-

Monts of the responsibility of handling all observers; the plan was to

concentrate pilot gvinnery training at St, Jean-de-Monts.

The courses

ranged from three weeks for a complete aerial gunnery course to four
to six days for refresher courses.

The original plans called for the

instruction of from 200 to 300 students each month, but since the school
was still in its infancy when the Armistice was signed there were only

29

Patrick, Final Report , p, 47,

186

266 graduates: 54 pursuit pilots,

157 corps (observation) pilots,
30

20 artillery observers, and 35 pursuit observers.

The trainlns of artillery aerial observers in the American

Expeditionary Forces began in the fall of 1917, following the arrival
in France of the first artillery brigades.

Officers were detailed

from these brigades, sonetlnes against their wishes, and given training
as aerial observers.
The first aerial work was given at Lo Valdahon

with French instructors, flying personnel, and equipment.

The primary

training given at the brigade centers was supplemented by Instruction
at the I Corps School at Ananty and by the assignment of the observation

personnel to French squadrons for a period of actual field training.

At least 50 observers a month could have been trained in this manner,
but the number of observers arriving in the Zone of Advance became

insufficient to keep the Air Service sqtiadrons up to strength and the
training had to be discontinued.
31

The artillery at this time detailed only a few officers for

training in observation by the Air Service; it was deemed necessary for

most officers to remain with their units during their artillery
training period in order to become familiar with French artillery
practices,
Tliis

during the winter of 1917-1918 without any formal record being sent to
the Training Section at American Expeditionary Forces headquarters.
The candidates, selected from the artillery brigades stationed there,

were trained by a French observation squadron.

It had been planned to
v;ay

continue primary observation training at tiailly in the sane done at Coetquidan.
Tliis

it was

intention was altered to comply with the

Training Section's attitude, which described the method of conducting
this school as
a "matter of temporary expedience" and "not a normal

procedure."

37

Plans vrere drafted to provide for the location of

American Air Service units at Mailly to cooperate with the artillery
in reglage practice and to give advanced training to observers in long-

distance artillery work and reconnaissance.

An aviation detachment

consisting of

3

officers and 149 men was on duty there in April, but

because Mailly was evacuated during the German advance in the spring
op

partly trained at the schools in Canada and the United States, received
the rest of their training in England; and 162 officers from the

American Expeditionary Forces schools received some training.

Tlie

total of 542 included 6 observers and 83 officers who were returned to

stations in France where they were used as instructors.

In all, 216

pilots were sent to the front, where they operated either with the

British or in the American squadrons.

(The 17th and 148th squadrons

were completely trained and equipped by the Royal Air Force.)

46

Plans were made to conduct night flying training in England;

during the spring and sunmer of 1918 approximately 20 pilots and

6

observers were selected for training as instructors and sent through
British schools and then to the British front for further experience.
These were the only officers fully trained in England in night

operations.

In the latter part of September,

1918, an American school

for night operations was opened near Chester, England, but delays in

receiving equipment prevented any effective instruction being given up
to the cessation of hostilities when the center was evacuated and

personnel returned to the United States.
The assistance given by the Royal Air Force to the Training

Section of the Air Service was invaluable.

While the contribution of

completely trained pilots delivered to the American Expeditionary Forces
x<?as

small, the value of training given to instructors in methods of

teaching day and night flying, observation, gunner>', and navigation
46

G. M. P. Murphy, "Recapitulation of United States Air Service Work in Great Britain and Ireland," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 16, pp. 4243

47

Patrick, Final Report , p. 50.

195

was substantial.
During the sunmcr of 1917, arrangements were made with the
Italian soverruncnt for the training of American Air Service personnel
in Italy.

The first students, a detacliment of 46 cadets from the 1st

Aero Squadron in Frtmce, arrived at Foggla, Italy, on September 26,
1917.

About the middle of October, 1917, the second detachment of

American cadets arrived under the command of Captain Fiorello H,
La Guard ia, a New York Congressman of Italian extraction who had been

active in military preparedness before the United States entered the
war.
In a letter written immediately after his arrival at Foggia,

Captain La Guardia stated;

"Facilities for training are excellent,

and there is no reason in the world why we cannot turn out men as

quickly and efficiently as the most exacting and fastidious legislator

would demand,"

49

The optimism of La Guardia' s judgment was not

rewarded xjith a rich harvest of trained fliers.

Although the original

agreement contemplated the speedy training of 500 American students,
the sum total of students graduated up to November 11,
1918, was only
50

406, and much difficulty was experienced in getting this number through.

Although the living quarters xjerc excellent, conditions were not
pleasant, for there were almost no sanitary facilities
vjas a
£ind

the valley

breeding place for mosquitoes.
43

In the suriimer and fall it was so

G, M. P, Murphy, "Recapitulation of United States Air Service Work in Great Britain and Ireland," 1913, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 16, pp, 50-55.

mechanics.
One of the first agreements which the American Expeditionary

Forces entered into vith the French government was for the loan of
12,000 Ancrican mechanics.
Early in the war France had suffered heavy

losses in the ranks of her skilled mechanics then fighting with the

combat forces and in 1917 she requested American assistance in meeting
her needs.
In November,

1917,

15,000 skilled mechanics

\<iere

organized

into four regiments at Kelly Field, Texas,

The first mechanics regiment,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Joy, a former president of the
Packard Motor Company, arrived in France on February 25, 1918, Fourteen companies of this regiment were assigned to the French and the

remaining six companies were assigned to the American Expeditionary
Forces Motor Transport Corps, which was badly in need of mechanics.
The second regiment, x^hich arrived in France in March, 1918, assigned

fourteen companies to the French and to the American E:q>edltionary
Forces Railway Treinsportation Service, the other six companies being

assigned to the Air Service.

Both the third regiment, which arrived

In France in July, and the fourth, which arrived there in August, 1918,

Memorandum from General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, to General Pershing, Commander-inChief of the AEF in France, December 29, 1917, in Department of the Army, United States Arr.iy in the World War, 1917-1919 , II, 127-130,
^^'History of the Meclianics Regiments," 1913,
Vol. 1, pp. 7-26.
H,

Hy AS AEF,

200

number of trained mechanics assigned to then were used for construction
work, others vrere used as chauffeurs, and two xrere drowned while

worklns in a French laundry.

Only a few vere actually used for the
59

mechanical work for which they were trained.

On September 7, 1917, the Air Service and the managers of

several airplane factories in the vicinity of Paris entered into an

agreement v^hich called for placing a small number of men in the Blerlot,
Breguet, and Nieuport factories for a course of from two to three x^eeks. As it turned out, a total of seven factories near Paris \jcre used

instead of the three originally contemplated; the four additional

factories were the Brasicr, Hi spano- Suiza, Renault, and Gnwrie.

Seven

mechanics companies were trained in the factories near Paris,

American

civilian experts, who had accompanied the Boiling Mission to Europe,
proved invaluable as instructors.
four to six weeks,
eind

The courses of training lasted from

as soon as one group was finished it was sent
In

out to one of the schools and its place filled by another group.

February, 1918, this system of training was discontinued because

sufficient men had been graduated.

Mechanics

\rere

sent also to Pau for a period of from five to

seven weeks for instruction in September, 1917,
59

Officers and men were

Ibid , , pp, 42-AC, General Foulols tried to get these men for the Air Service, but on May 16, 1918, he was informed that the United States had pronisod to send 60,000 skilled worlonen to the French, and these mechanics were being sent to them as partial fulfillment of t'lat promise. Benjamin D. Foulois, "The Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1913, •• 1924, p, 24, In Foulols Collection, USAF HD Archives.

country flying or training with Infantry and artillery units.
in the use of the compass,

Training

in formation flying, and In aerial gunnery

had been Inadequate in the United States,

These deficiencies, together

vith the two-nonth period of inactivity while being shipped overseas,
made it necessary to give fliers more training after they arrived In
Europe,
One of the chief difficulties arose in changing from training

planes to combat-type machines (it was not until late in the war that

DH 4*s in any quantity were available at the flying schools in the United States), Sometimes the transition training took longer than
By the end of the war, however, a great

learning to fly originally.

many of these defects in training had been corrected.
Morale was discovered to be one of the most Important elements
in the success of the flying schools.
To keep morale at its best,

it

was necessary to select willing and able Instructors of the highest
caliber, and to eliminate undesirable students promptly, and to avoid
all possible delays in training.
It was also

necessary to keep the
The variety

flying schools and fields well equipped and up to date.

of planes was reduced to a minimum in order to limit the amount of

supplies and spare parts.

The mechanics and engineering officers had

to be thoroughly trained to supervise properly the care of aircraft.

Training had to be divided among outlying fields to prevent duplication
of high-priced machinery.

centers in the American Expeditionary Forces, 169 were students undergoing instruction and 49 were instructors, testers, and ferry pilots.
Of these accidents, 19 deaths \Jere due to collision in the air, and of
In

the rest, a great many were attributed to engine or pilot failure.

the schools of the American Expeditionary Forces the hours flown per

fatality varied from 2,738 for prinary training to 1,023 for advanced

and pursuit training.

The proportion of fatalities to graduation In

the American Expeditionary Forces shox«;d one fatality to 90 graduates
in primary training, one fatality to 50 graduates in observation

was selected by the Allied conmanders as the place ^^ere American
forces would concentrate and eventually fight.

With British troops

deployed to cover the channel ports and the French armies committed to
the protection of Paris, the transportation systems in these regions

were heavily burdened.

The necessity for the supply and movement of

additional forces made it essential for the Americans to occupy a less-

crowded area where roads and railways were relatively free.

The fact

that there were few troops in Lorraine and that rail facilities,

although extending across the entire width of France, were available
for transporting men and supplies from the French ports south of
Le Havre to the Lorraine Sector, were important considerations in the

selection of this area as the American front.

Another factor which Influenced this decision was General John
J,

Pershing's determination to place his forces where

tliey

would

decisively affect the outcome of the war.

The coal and iron mines near

Met2, the fortress itself, and the railway systems at Sedan and to the
southeast, all made the area protected by the Lorraine front of vital

importance to Germany,

Of the territory within striking distiince of

211

212
the western front, this was the area the enemy could least afford to
lose, because Gennany's ability to maintain her armies irest of the Rhine

River depended upon her retention of this communications link.

The

American Expeditionary Forces in Lorraine would, therefore, be
admirably located to strike at the most Importcint German area near the
battle front,
|_

Tlie

Anerican Air Service began combat operations at the front
The Toul Sector was selected as the place
tliat

in the sprins of 1918,

where American squadrons v/ould be stationed to get experience

would bridge the gap between the training schools and actual war conditions,
\

In this comparatively quiet locality, opposing armies were

facing each other in well-defined positions which had been established
early in the war.
Both sides were using it as a rest area for tired

troops or as a position to be held by units which had not been

thoroughly trained.

In spite of the fact that these conditions gave

the poorly prepared United States troops a false idea of the realities of war, the American Air Service decided to use the Toul Sector,

Fortunately, the area remained inactive until the St, Mihiel offensive
in September,
1918,

Corps Observation

I^The 1st,

12th, and 88th Aero Squadrons made up the

I

Corps

Memorandun for the Chief of Staff (G-3), .American E>q>editionary Forces, fron Benjamin D, Foulois, May 21, 1918, and letter to Benjamin D. Foulois from Maj. Armengaud, Chief of the Aeronautical Section of the French Mission, May 22, 1918, in Department of the Airoy, United States Amv in the Vtorld \far, 1917-1919 . Ill, 299-301.

airdrome xws situated at Ourches about 18 miles behind the front linesT^The installation and equipment of the airdrome v;as practically complete

by the tine the Group was formed.

Hangar and barrack space

xras

ample

and operations were not limited by faulty or Incomplete installations.
The pilots, with but one or two exceptions, had never flown in
combat.
The Group and Squadron commanders were experienced In training

work but none of them had flown more than one or two missions under war
conditions.

Most of the observers, after a course of Intensive

tactical and technical training in observation schools, had spent from
one to two months on active duty as fliers with French squadrons at the
front.

These officers brought to their organizations valuable
The enlisted

practical Icnowledge of the work about to be undertaken.

men, well trained in their specialties, proved qualified for the work
at hand.
3

The 1st Aero Squadron's planes were tx7o-seated Spads

4

equipped

with 235 horsepower Hlspano-Sulza motors; those of the 12th Squadron
were bi-place 190 horsepo\rer Avion Renaults; and the 88th flew Britishbuilt planes of the two-seater Sopwlth type.
General Order tKimber 65, General Headquarters, American Ejqjcditionary Forces, France, April 30, 1918,
2

assigned for the Group's activities extended from Fllrey to Apremont,
a distance of eight miles,\

When the Group arrived, no major operations

were under way nor were any foreseen in the iimediate future.

Defensive

positions were strongly organized by lines of trenches and barbed xjire

entanglements,

Infcmtry units vjcre supported by the usual complement
The

of divisional artillery entrenched in carefully prepared positions.

situation in the air over the Arierlcan lines was satisfactory,

.

Two

American pursuit squadrons stationed at Toul were available for the
aerial defense of the sector.
these were sufficient,
\

Since this front

\jas

relatively Inactive,

The situation of the German forces on the ground was essen-

tially the same as on the Allied side.

Front lines were strongly

organized for defense by means of trenches, barbed wire entanglements,
and artillery.
In the air the enemy was weak although isolated

observation planes were reported from time to time.

No pursuit

formations of more than five planes were operating and the presence of

pursuit planes over the sector even in small numbers was rare,

Tlie

enemy's aerial defense was built around a substantial and efficient

General Order Number 71, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, May 7, 1918,

Intelligence Reports of the 3d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, June, 191G, in Department of the Army, United States Amy in the World War. 1917«1919 , III, 556.
Tlae

94th and 95th Aero Squadrons.

215

mobile anti-aircraft artillery.)
l^The

primary nission of the

I

Corps Observation Group vas to

inform the Allied command of the general situation within the enemy
lines by means of visual and photographic reconnaissance.

Whenever

necessary the Group adjusted artillery fire and remained ready to
accomplish contact patrols in case of attack,
Tliis

meant that it had

to train American ground troops in the use of radio and signal panels,

The
I

I

Corps Observation Group was not expected to produce any important

tactical results or render any great assistance in the conduct of

operations at this time,^ This tour of duty on a quiet front was to
complete the schooling of pilots and observers and make them more
competent to undertake intensive operations elsewhere on a large and

more complete scale.
Major Lewis Brcreton, the Group Commander, organized his headI

quarters as follows:

adjutant, who was responsible for routine
wlio

administration; supply officer,

supervised the technical and supply;

transportation officer, who dealt with the transportation problems

arising in the Group; and operations officer, who was responsible for
the successful conduct of aerial operations.
The operations officer
%irtvat

kept in touch with the comnand posts of combat troops and decided
the Group could do to aid them.
Tlie

responsibility for collecting,

compiling, and distributing all tactical reports, orders, and bulletins,

and for assigning daily missions to each squadron fell on this officer, ^"Tactical History, Air Service, AEF," 1918, D, Hy AS AEF, Vol,
p. 4.

carried out the photosraphlc reconnaissance.
The photographic officer supervised Installation of photo-

graphic apparatus aboard the airplanes of the squadrons and supervised
the printing of photographs.

The radio officer was responsible for

proper functioning of the radio equipment of each squadron and the

establishment of radio liaison between the Group headquarters and the
command posts on the front lines.
He acted as technical advisor and

instructor for the entire Group in matters pertaining to the operation
of airplane and ground radios.

The operations room, an information and intelligence center,

was Installed at the Group headquarters.

Large-scale maps of the Toul

Sector and of the enemy's defensive organization, cliarts, diagrams, and

tabulations of all available tactical and technical information

collected by the operations and Intelligence officers
in this room.

\jere

displayed

Technical books and pamphlets were kept on file for the

individual use of pilots and observers,

A laboratory and shop for minor repairs of photographic
apparatus was Installed under the direction of the photographic officer
to supplement the facilities of the photographic truck and trailer,

A

Group radio station was organized by the radio officer using the radio

equipment of one of the squadrons as its base.

Tills

station was

217

equipped with sending and receiving apparatus and with an artillery
spark-type receiver for short wave nessages from airplanes.
For defense against enemy air raids, the hangars and huts were

widely separated and irregularly dispersed.

Camouflage nets were spread

across liangars, and the roofs of huts were covered with boughs.

Lighted wlndovTS

\x>re

screened after sundown.

Dugouts heavily shored

with logs were constructed, and anti-aircraft machine guns x^re deployed
about the airdrome,
Tlie

administrative staff and tactical staff of each squadron in
a

the I Corps Observation Group \7ere made up of the following:

squadron commanding officer,
commanders,
tiro

tliree

other pilots designated flight

observers designated operations and assistant operations

officers, 15 additional pilots of whom thiree were designated deputy

flight commanders, and 16 additional observers.

A squadron was divided

into three sections of six airplane teams each; each section, known as
a flight, was given an unofficial alphabetical or numerical designation.

Three technical sections, each having an important bearing on

flying activities, formed a part of each squadron.

Tlie

engineering

department was headed by the squadron engineer and was made up of the

motor mechanic personnel of the squadron, including the machine shop
and airplane repair units,
Tliis

department was responsible for the
The armament department,

mechanical efficiency of motors and planes.

headed by an ordnance officer and assisted by a staff of gunsmiths, was
responsible for the maintenance and repair of the airplane machine guns,

"History of the
AEF, Vol, 12, p. 2.

I

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

218
Tills

department was also responsible for the supply of machine gun

ammunition. Very pistols, si^^nal rockets, and metal containers for

dropping messages to the ground.

12

The squadron radio section, headed

by a Signal Corps officer, \ms responsible for the installation and

proper functioning of wireless equipment,
L The group operations officer made these general assignments:

to the 1st Aero Squadron,

long distance photographic missions, adjust-

ment of divisional heavy artillery fire, and long distance visual
reconnaissance; to the 12th Aero Squadron and the 83th Aero Squadron,

short-range visual reconnaissance, short-range photographic missions,

adjustment of light artillery fire, and infantry contact patrols,
The assignment of specific pilots and observers for a

13"!

J
Soon

particular mission was made by the squadron operations officer.
after receiving the squadron's mission assignment from the Group

headquarters, the squadron operations officer prepared a schedule of
the folloxrtng day's work with the assignment, by name, of the pilot and

observer who would comprise the team to carry out the mission contemplated.
Copies of this schedule were posted on bulletin boards in the

operations room, the mess Iialls, and the tent for pilots and observers
located at the flying field; other copies were distributed to the

squadron radio and armament officers and to the group photographic
12

United States, AEF, Air Service, Manual of Initial Equipment and Ctenernl Inforr.iation for Service Squadrons in the Air Service , Ancricnn Expeditionary Forceg . 1918, in I, ]fy AS AEF, Vol. 3, p. 55,
Letter to the Director of Air Service, French Sixth Army from the Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, July 9, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . Ill, 397-398,
13

219

officer for whatever preparation might be required,
(_In so

far as conditions permitted,

it \jas the practice to

assign one flight from each squadron to missions for the current day,

A second flight was held in "alert" (reserve) condition, the members
of that flight to remain available for the performance of any urgent

the accomplishment of necessary work on airplanes and equipment by the

technical officers of squadrons and the group.
The interior comunicatlons of the I Corps Observation Group

consisted of direct telephone lines from Group to squadron headquarters
and to the pilot and observer tent on the field.
Long distance lines

to tactical command posts and to higher Air Service headquarters \jere

also maintained.

Radio liaison between the Group and all points In the
Two pigeon lofts

area was established from the radio station.

stationed at the airdrome made contact from advanced units on the
front possible.
The follo\7lng types of communication between airplanes
\-jere

and ground units

possible:

radio, visual signals (rockets), and

dropped written messages.
14

Arrangements were made xdth Allied artillery

Tlie mission assignments for the 1st Aero Squadron dated May 25, 1913, were typical. The names of the pilots and observers for two visual and one photographic reconnaissance flights and the area to be studied were specified. "Observation Material World War I (largely French, some German)," in USAF HD Archives,

designated artillery batteries to fire upon eneny troop columns on
roads and batteries in action.

Reconnaissance planes were to be
vjork

prepared at all times to call the batteries designated for this
xjhenever suitable targets were observed.

]

A routine schedule of operations for each day included one

close-rance observation flight over the Toul Sector at daylight, one
flight bct\«2cn 9 and 12 in the morning, one between
2

and

5

in the
tI^e

afternoon, and a final flight shortly before sundown.

At dusk

flashes of enemy batteries in action could easily be distinguished and
their location reported.
One observation team remained on duty at the

airdrome ready for immediate departure in case of an emergency.
Special missions, such as artillery adjustments, photographic
I

and long distance reconnaissance, reconnaissance of particular
localities, contact patrols, and training exercises were usually

prepared under the direction of the group or squadron operations officer on the day preceding the date set for the accomplishment of the

mission,

\

The team to execute the work was designated at tliat time.

[The short-range reconnaissance mission required preparation of
only one airplane.^ First the observer was notified of his assignment
to the mission and instructed by the operations officer in the details
of terrain, type of information desired, tactical situation, and in

^^
17

Ibld .. pp. 2 ff.

For examples of this type of mission assignment see "Observation Material World \tor I (largely French, some German)," In USAF HD Archives.

221

connimications data,

Tlie

observer then conferred with his pilot.

The

pilot supervised serviclns of his guns and the testing and tune-up of
the plane.

The observer requested the mounting of radio equipment and

the assignment of a wave length; he then saw to the loading and mounting

of his guns by the armament section.

Both provided themselves with

mans from the operations room.

Before leaving on the mission they

checked out at the assembly tent, signing their names and Indicating
the nature of their mission.

Once in the air over the field, the observer tested his radio

and signaled to his pilot to proceed to the lines only upon receiving
the panel signal "understood" from the radio station.

When the

mission

\ras

under way the observer ordinarily directed the course of
or Inter-phone communication with the pilot.

the plane by laand signals

Observers undertaking short-range reconnaissance missions reported

directly by radio to the division ccnmand posts any unusual developments
in the enemy's area. 20
If the situation warranted and the conditions

Observers sometimes used reins attached to the pilot's arms "Notes on Aviation During the Itorld War, Collected from Various Sources and Issued by Various Countries, 19151919," stencil number 64, dated June 8, 1918, in USAF HD Archives,
to guide him over the target.

Letter to the Director of Air Service, French Sixth Army from the Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps, Ancrican Expeditionary Forces, July 9, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . Ill, 398,

20

222

assembly tent, noting briefly the conditions encountered, any abnormal
Incidents, and the duration of the flight.
The pilot then saw to the

care of the plane, motor, armament, and radio equipment and reported any
faults in the functioning of his equiixnent.
The observer proceeded

immediately to the operations room where he discussed the results of
his mission with the operations and Intelligence officers and prepared
a written report.
Tlie

operations and intelligence officers then

communicated the results of the mission to the tactical authorities
concerned.
The observer's vnritten report was carefully filed for

record; no mission was considered accomplished until a full report had

been submitted,

LLong-range reconnaissance differed from the short-range in that
no radio was employed,
;

_For added security the plane undertaking the

mission was accompanied by two or more protection planes from the same
squadron.

Details of preparation, execution, and reporting \rere essen-

tially the same for both long-range and short-range missions.

LThe photographic mission resembled closely the long-range
I'

reconnaissance.

L

Since aerial photographs vere ordinarily taken at

altitudes which made encounter with enemy pursuit patrols a possibility,
two protecting planes were usually furnished even for photographic

missions near friendly lines,

,

The observer detailed to a photographic

reconnaissance mission studied carefully the maps of the territory to
be photographed and secured the necessary photographic planes.

After

the camera had been mounted in the airplane designated for the flight,
the mission then proceeded in the ordinary way
^-rtth

the photographic

plane leading.

Upon completion of the mission, pl£ines and equipment

223

were checked by the pilots flying the formation, and observers made
the custonary reports.

The observer taklnc the photosraphs helped to

identify the plates after development and assisted the Intelligence

officer in interpreting then.

The mission was not considered complete

until the plates had been identified and the report made to the
tactical units.
21

l>reparations for artillery adjustment missions were similar to

those for short-rance reconnaissance missions.

Tlic

observer, just

before leaving for his mission, announced his departure by telephone
to the artillery battery with which he was about to conduct fire. Upon

return to the airdrome the observer and pilot followed the same routine

prescribed for the ordinary reconnaissance flight.

In reporting, the

observer stated, in addition to any generalizations regarding the
incidents and results of the mission, the number of shots fired and
the number of shots obseirved.
22

After completion of the technical and tactical preliminary
preparations, the
operations.
Tlie

I

Corps Observation Group undertook actual combat

maiden flight over the front lines was accomplished

on April 11, 1918, and the following day the Group's Initial combat

occurred when First Lieutenant Arthur
was attacked by tlircc enemy planes.
21

J.

Coyle of the 1st Aero Squadron

The encounter was not decisive;

The system of notation used on American Air Service aerial photographs was based on French procedures as outlined in General Order Number 52, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, April 5, 1913, Cf, General Order Number 80, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, May 28, 1918,

"History of the AEF, Vol. 12, pp, 23-24,

22

I

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

224

Coyle returned to his base with one bullet hole in his plane.

23^

J

Nuncrous artillery adjustments, neither important In results

nor arduous in e:a3cution, were successfully carried out by the Group,
r''

although it was afforded only one or two opportunities to undertake
close-range photographic missions, long-range reconnaissance, and artillery adjustments,
\ It should be noted that the work of the Group was seldom

hampered by the presence of enemy pursuit aircraft.
experience in canbat was gained."

Practically no

On the other hand the enemy anti-

aircraft fire in the Toul Sector was exceedingly heavy, active, and
accurate,\

Pilots of the Group became adept at evading anti-aircraft
Infantry contact

fire after flying for a month in the Toul Sector.

patrols were attempted during the Seicheprey engagement on April 2021,

1913.

Tills

brief action was planned to demonstrate the readiness

of American troops for offensive operations, but it gave bloody evidence of the difficulties of advancing against mechanized fire power.

Operations Order Number 4, Chief of Air Service, I Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, June 6, 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 12, pp, 37-42. Army artillery units were usually located well behind the lines and took their orders directly from the general headquarters of the army, Tliey xrcre equipped with the heaviest guns available. Most artillery batteries were responsible to divisional commanders.
Operations Order Number 7, Chief of Air Service, I Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, July 2, 1918, in ibid,, p, 49,

232

reconnoitered as frequently and conpletely as possible.

37

This ncthod

of assisnins routine missions for each month was continued through July

and August, and until the separation of the Squadron from French jurisdiction.
The limits of the sector vjere gradually extended to the east
38

and north.

As the attack at St, Ilihiel grew imminent, the northern

boundary was entirely removed and missions carried out to an indefinite
depth. Up to this time there
Iiad

been no systematic investigation of
liad

the Toul Sector, as no specific theater of operations

been

assigned, nor had the e:;act nature of the Squadron's mission been
defined.

Upon receipt of the operations order of June 6, 1918,
Plans for an observers' room
load

intensive studies xierc begun.

been

made previously, and the room was furnished with large-scale maps of
the sector and photographs of towns and military works in the enemy's

territory.

Pilots and observers \7ere instructed to study the Toul
For a few weeks this study
v/as

Sector carefully.

carried out by each
On

man independently, but the results were not entirely satisfactory.
June 21 an exanination was given to determine just how much each man

knew about the terrain and situation, and the results of this evaluation
suggested that more could be gained if future instruction were carried
out in a systematic
37
V7ay,

A course of study was arranged and quizzes

Operations Order Number 4, Chief of Air Service, I Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, June 6, 1918, in ibid , pp. 39-40. William !!itchcll, "Plan of Reconnaissance for the Army Aviation," July 14, 1918, in "Observation Material World War I (largely French, some German)," in USAF IID Archives, Mitchell's plan is quite similar to the French observation aviation programs which are included (in translation and original copies) in this same file.
38

233

were given at frequent Intervals.

These tests x«;re not to grade the

fliers, but merely to enable each uan to detertnlne his o\m deficiencies,
Farniliarity with enemy-held tovjns, supply dumps, and airdromes

was obtained by means of a course of study of aerial photographs posted
on large cards, with
Tlaese
tlie

names of the various places shown under each,

photographs Mere studied for several days, after which the

captions were removed and the towns, dumps, and airfields named from

memory.

The effect of this instruction was apparent not only in the

amount and character of the information brought back by the observers,
but in the work of the pilots as well.

Photographic routes were

covered more accurately; the pilots themselves carried out independent
observation and returned with valuable reports.
39

The initial visual reconnaissance over enemy territory was

carried out late in the afternoon of June 7, 1918,

A formation of

four planes was accompanied by five protection planes from the 1st

Pursuit Group.
feet.

40

This mission was carried out at an altitude of 10,000

Active and accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered, and

practically every plane received some damage from frarjnents of highe>q>losive shells.
It was decided, therefore,

to carry out future

missions at an altitude of 15,000 feet.

41
First,

Flying at this added height had several advantages.
39

"History of the 91st Aero Squadron,"

E,

Hy AS AEF, Vol. 10,

pp, 11-14,

"History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 20, p. 1. "History of the First Army Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 8, p. 43,
41

40

234

danase from anti-aircraft fire was sisnif icantly lessened, due to the

difficulty in ranslns.

Second, visibility was extended, allowing a

greater amount of territory to be rcconnoltered on a given route, on
both visual and photographic missions.
Third, at this altitude the

Salnson plane

v/as

nore than a match for any enemy single-seater in the

matter of speed and unless surprised, could successfully give combat.
At first visual reconnaissances vrere carried out betv;een the
hours of eight in the morning and four in the afternoon.

Experience

soon sho\rod that this practice exposed men and planes to great danger,

without obtaining results commensurate with the risk.

Since the Germans

made practically all troop movements under the cover of darloiess. It
was decided to carry out visual missions during only the early and
late hours of the day.

The early morning reconnaissance proved to be

the most valuable for it was these missions which caught the final

movements of the night's activities.

When the weather was at all

suited for flying, the atmospheric conditions at early morning were
actually advantageous; the air was free from haze, and though there
was usually a certain amount of mist in the Moselle valley, the

remainder of the Toul Sector

v;as

so high tliat visibility was excellent

over practically the whole area,

Aimy observation required almost

perfect

i^reather

conditions as a great deal of the work consisted of
There was no great amount

photography carried on at high altitudes.

of rain during the summer, and therefore the field was In such condition

that the most could be made of every clear day.

Formations of three and four planes were sent out at daylight,
but by the time proper altitude was reached it was too late to obtain

235

information of value.

It was necessary for the planes to be over enemy

territory as soon as it became lisht,
in the dark.

Fornation flying was impossible

Single planes were henceforth used, each covering an
Tliis

independent route and starting out an hour before daybreak,

arrangement proved most satisfactory.

The single planes gained their

altitude and arrived at predetermined points far back in enemy territory
just as it became light enough for observation.
The sector could then

be reconnoltcrcd and the plane well on its way home xjith the informa-

tion before enemy planes could take off, climb to the observer's

altitude, and give combat.
The evening reconnaissance proved to be of little value both

on account of atmospheric conditions and because the enemy rarely

commenced his activity until well after dark.

On the Toul Sector there

was almost always a thick

liaze

which reached a height of 12,000 feet

by afternoon, greatly hindering observation, especially in the

direction of the sun,

cind

intensifying the danger of surprise attacks
Conditions of visibility steadily became

by enemy pursuit planes.

worse during these missions.

Although some indication of enemy

movement might be picked up just as it became dark, it was impossible
for the plane to remain to obtain more data, for the 91st Aero Squadron

had neither the equipment nor the trained personnel for night flying.

Occasionally special visual reconnaissances
during daylight hours, and fomatlons
x/ere

\rere

carried out

employed.

In such cases it

was found advantageous to divide the assignment among the observers,
the observer in the lead plane observing primarily the railroads,

another the ammuntion and materiel dumps, and a third the roads and

236
barracks.
on the

One or more observers in each formation, the number depending

l<no\m.

strength and acgrcssiveness of the enemy, would devote all

attention to the air, watching for hostile craft.
The operations order of June 6,
1913,

stated

tliat

all photo-

graphs
feet.

\«Ere

to be taken with a 52 en, camera, at an altitude of 17,000

It xjas seldom possible to clinb to this altitude and the
Tliese

majority of the photographic work was done at about 15,000 feet,
technical problems were much more easily resolved than were the

tactical difficulties.
Since pursuit planes, because of their limited fuel capacity,

could not be used for protection of photographic missions

x^liich

involved

long distance flights behind enemy lines, formations of three or four

observation planes x«rc employed.
equipped xjith a ca-iera.

At first only the lead plane was

The other planes acted as protection but

maneuvered about to pick up wliatcver information they could. method had two disadvantages:

This

first, if the leading plane developed

motor trouble or could not accomplish its mission for any reason, the
sortie
xras

likely to be a complete failure; second, because of the

limited number of plates carried by one plane, the maximum being 4C,
the area photographed v7ould be comparatively small.

The use of cameras in
tried.

t\;o

planes of the formation

\«is

then

This had the advantage that if one plane was forced to leave

the formation, the other photographic plane could complete the mission.

flew a half mile apart, protected by a formation above them; but this
loose formation proved unsuccessful due to its vulnerability when

attacked by the enemy,

A more satisfactory plan was finally adopted for use on long
photographic reconnaissances.
Every plane in the formation was equipped

with a camera, carried a maxinium number of photographic plates, and had
its regular machine gun armament for pilot and observer.

The flight

commander would lead the formation over the lines and exjjose his
plates while the other planes afforded him protection.
The leader

would then drop out of first place while the next plane took his
position and covered Its particular course, the former leader flying
In the rear.

This maneuver was repeated until the entire mission was

completed.

Although this method gave satisfaction, it was awkward in

that it involved a continual cliange in the formation, and necessitated

flying under a constantly changing leadership.

There was also danger

that the continuity of the photographic mosaic might be lost during the

changes in the flying position at the end of each segment of the mission.
One flight equipped

each machine with a camera, and had the
The

flight commander lead the formation throughout the entire mission.
leading plane photographed a certain portion of the course and just

before the end of his route was reached the observer in the next plane

began to operate his camera.

In this way the integrity of the formation

was preserved and the continuity of the assemblage assured, while

238

protection was given by the planes not actually ensaged in taking
photographs.
These tactical and technical methods were developed slowly

as the result of painful experience.

43

At the beginning of operations, the enemy's aerial activity

was slight.

This was probably due to

tlie

fact that the Toul Sector

had seen no real combat since the beginning of the war, and the great

concentration of the German Air Service was then to the xjest, in the
region of Soissons,
The hostile pursuit planes encountered were mainly

Pfalz and Albatros scouts in patrols of three or four.

They rarely

offered to attack a formation, but contented themselves with remaining
at a distance taking shots at long range or following a flight, ready
to attack any plane which became separated from the formation.

The

Immunity from attack when in close formation was surprising to the

observation teams of the 91st Squadron,

44

Ehjring the summer of 1918

the Germans patrolled their back areas inadequately.

Extended missions

were often carried out to a considerable depth into the enemy back
areas without Interference from or even the presence of hostile aircraft.
The German Fokkcr D
7

first appeared in the Toul Sector in

August, 1913,

The pilots of these machines showed more aggressiveness

than had their predecessors.

They were aided in their work by a
liad

system of anti-aircraft signals, which

apparently been arranged
The enemy

for the purpose of indicating the position of Allied planes.

Imew that the 91st Squadron performed reconnaissances of Metz and

43
Vol.
10,

•M'istorj' of

the 91st Aero Squadron," 1918, E, Hy AS AEF,

pp, 41-54.

44

Ibid .

,

p,

63,

239

Conflans several tines

a'

week.

As soon as a formation of observation

pianos crossed the lines this intelligence would be transmitted to

anti-aircraft batteries near these cities.

Tlie

Germans v;ould fire a

signal salvo and, by the time the formation had arrived, a patrol of

enemy aircraft would be found waiting over the objective.

"^

Beginning on the first day of September, there was a noticeable
increase in the enemy's air forces in the Toul Sector.

Whereas combat

formerly had taken place only deep in the German back areas, strong

patrols

\7cre

now encountered barely across the enemy lines.

Little

danage resulted from the new concentration of German air forces.

Evidently the Germans suspected an attack, and were attempting to
screen their preparations for defense.

the 9th Squadron began active operations in the Toul Sector until the
St, Mlhlel action in September,

1918.

Bombardment

L Air Service bombardment had Its beginning in the Toul Sector
on May 29, 1918, when the 96th Aero Squadron was assigned to Ananty
airdrome.
For months this was the only American bombardment unit
The personnel of this

in active operation against the enemy.

organization had received some training from both the French and the
British.
L

The 96th Squadron was equipped with ten old Breguet 14 B2»8

which constantly needed repairs.

Previously this unit had been

stationed at Clermont-Ferrand where the mechanics had studied
Breguet planes and Renault engines.
They made good use of this study

and during the early months of 1918 when spare parts were not
obtainable, old French farming implements were sometimes used to

repair the Breguets.

r

The Breguet was considered an excellent plane.

It could

carry over COO pounds of bombs to 13,000 feet in 35 minutes, was fast
at high altitudes, and carried enough fuel for almost five hours in the

War,** A,

"Service Squadrons on the Front at the Termination of the See also General Order Number 31, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 6, p. 208. General Headquarters, /Vnerican Expeditionary Forces, France, May 29, 1918, "Lessons Learned by the 2d Day Bombardment Group," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 15, pp. 289-290.

49

3

241

alr.y The planes were well constructed with few exposed controls.
Visibility was good and the pilot and observer were close together,

A

pair of Lewis machine guns stripped of cooling devices was mounted on
a tourelle or turret for the observer's use; a Vlckers gun synchronized

to shoot through the propeller was the pilot's weapon,
|_

The first American Air Service bombardment raid took place on

June 12, 1918, against the railroad yards at Dommary Baroncourt.

Eight

planes of the 96th Aero Squadron led by Major Harry M, Brown, the

commanding officer of the Squadron, took off from Amanty on this mission;
two planes returned because of motor trouble.
The remaining aircraft

dropped their bombs and all returned despite an attack by three enemy
planes,
\

On July 10 a formation of six planes led by Major Brown

headed for the primary target of Conflans; secondary targets were small
towns along the railroad from Conflans to Thlaucourt,
The flight,

which got off to a late start, left after six in the evening because
the weather had been bad all day, lost its way in a windstorm, ran out
of gas, and landed after dark behind German lines.

All of the planes

were captured intact.

It is reported that the Germans dropped a

message on an American airdrome which read, "We thank you for the fine
airplanes and equipment
\>;hich

"Tactical History of Day Bombardment from the Beginning to the St. Mihiel Offensive," 1918, D, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, p. 128.
52

Levine, Mitchell;

Pioneer of Air Power, p. 125,

J

242

Pursuit

The Toul Sector also served as a practice ground for pursuit

squadrons.
in France,

The 95th Aero Squadron, the first American pursuit squadron
liad

arrived there in February, 1918, but was not equipped
^

with planes until the first week in March,

On March 15 pursuit patrol

operations began, using unarmed Nieuport 28 's led by a French pilot in
a Spad,

.These flights were risky undertakings,

Cne American plane

was shot down in flames while on one of these foolish missions,

LLater that same month 16 pilots of the Squadron were ordered to take
a course in aerial gunnery at Cazaux and this organization was even

"53
further delayed in getting into combat,

LMeanwhlle, the 94th Aero Squadron, later to become famous as
the "Hat In the Ring" squadron, had moved to Gengault airdrome near
Toul,
,\

Here it began operations on April 14, 1918, when Lieutenants

Alan

F,

Wilson and Douglass Campbell each shot down an enemy plane.

54

Subsequently, First Lieutenant Campbell became the first American
Ace,

shooting down his fifth enemy aircraft on May 30, 1918.

Shortly

thereafter Campbell was wounded and sent back to the United States,

Harold Hlnton, Air Vlctoryi Harper and Bros., 1948), p, 2S,
54

53

The Men and Machines (New York

Harold

E,

Hartney, Up and at

*Bti

(Harrisburg, Pa,:

Stackpole

Sons, 1940), p, 247,

Edward V, Rickenbacker, Fighting the Flying Circus (New York: Frederick A, Stokes Co,, 19195, p. 126, Although the Air Service declined to sanction the use of the word "Ace" In referring to fliers credited officially with five or more victories over enemy aircraft, it was used In Franco during Worl War I and has been used ever since,
^^Ibld,, pp, 140-144.

—

243

Captain Edxrard V. Rlckenbacker, later commanding officer of the 94th
Squadron, became the second American Ace on May 31, and raised his

score

to 27 victories before the war xaas over to become America's

leading Ace,

'On May

19,

1918, Major Raoul Lufbery, the commanding

officer of the 94th Squadron, was killed in combat against a German

observation plane when he fell from his burning planer) Although he
was third In the nvtmber of enemy planes accounted for, Lufbery is not
included on most lists of American Aces because he downed his 17 enemy
CO

aircraft while fighting in a French organization.

)

(_In May, two more pursuit squadrons were sent to the front and

the 1st Pursuit Group was formed, composed of the 27th, 94th, 95th, and

147th Pursuit Squadrons,

TVo German Rumplers flew over the Toul

airfields on the day the 27th and 147th arrived.

They passed over the

American units at high altitudes and were not disturbed by anti-aircraft
fire or aerial forces,

A few days later an enemy plane scurried across

the lines and dropped a detailed photograph of the airdrome with a

message on it:

"Welcome 27th and 147th,

Prepare to meet thy doom."

59 -^

j

Fortunately some of the pilots had served with the French Air
Service and their experience was invaluable in teaching the new pilots.

Teamwork and formation flying were emphasized.

Enemy planes were

Official confirmation for one of these victories was not granted for thirty years, Maurer Maurer, "Another Victory for Rickenbacker," Air Power Historian . VII (April, 1960), 117-124.
Gene Gumey and Mark P. Friedlander, Jr., Five Down and Glory t A History of the American Air Ace (New York: G, P. Putnam's Sons, Hereafter cited as Gumey, Five Down and Glory , 1958), pp, 46-47,
58

Hartney, Up and at '3rn , p, 150. Hartney was of the 1st Pursuit Group in World War I. officer

59

comandlng

24A

neither numerous nor aggressive and combats were infrequent,

L During

the sumner of 1918, the 1st Pursuit Group concentrated its attacks

against enemy planes which sought to Interfere with British bombing
raids and American observation operations, j On numerous occasions enemy

observation machines

vrere

shot do\jn by American pilots.

The pursuit

squadrons, like the other Air Service squadrons, came out of the Toul

Sector with excellent morale, and although they were far from being

veteran fighting units, they were well equipped for more serious undertakings.

Balloons

The Toul Sector was also used for developing tactics and

organization of American balloon companies.

On February 26, 1913, the

2d Balloon Company, the first American Expeditionary Forces Air Service

unit completely organized and equipped to operate with American troops,
joined the 1st Division which was already in line at the front.
This Company, insufficiently manned and inadequately trained,
vtaa

scheduled to have gone to the training camps in western France for
further instruction but was ordered to the front instead.
"History of the Organization, Development, and Growth of the 1st Pursuit Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 9, pp. 1-6.

This was done through an error but it resulted in a great deal of controversy between Colonels William Mitchell and Frank Lahm as to which one was to have charge over the balloon units. Col. Lahm was the nominal head of the balloon unit but Col, Mitchell as Chief of Air Service, I Corps, took coianand and refused to allow Lahm to issue any orders, Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I. po 182,

245
Two other balloon companies, the 1st and the 4th, reached the

front in April, relieving French companies.

Specialists from the

French units remained with these American balloon companies until the
latter became sufficiently adept.

After the Americans achieved profi-

ciency they undertook the training of newly arrived balloon units.
Their mission was to regulate artillery fire, to locate targets, and
to report all activity within the enemy lines by day and, when possible,

by night.

Although artillery activity was limited in the Toul Sector,
when it was necessary to regulate artillery fire the balloons were
able to do so with dispatch because of the excellent telephone liaison

Letter to the Director of Air Service, French Sixth Army from the Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, July 9, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Array in the World War. 1917-1919 , III, 398.

received notice that orders would be issued shortly for its rnovement
to Flin in the Baccarat Sector, southeast of Luncvllle.

Accordingly,

an advance party of officers and enlisted men went forward to prepare
the airdrome and buildings for the arrival of the Squadron, The

location assigned for the airfield possessed little else than some

newly erected hangars.

Since a construction unit was not available,

most of the 12th Squadron's effort was diverted to the preparation of
the landing field, offices, and quarters. The tactical situation in

the Baccarat Sector at the time, however, was such that the four days

spent In getting the field into flying condition did not affect the

efficiency of the Allied forces,

Tlie

observation operations during

this Interval were carried out by a French squadron which the 12th was
to relieve.
In the 12th

Aero Squadron's endeavors to complete the

airdrome installations necessary to the conduct of flights over the
front, an esprit de corps developed which proved invaluable in the

Elmer Haslett, Luck on the Wing (New York: E, P, Dutton and
Co.,

1920), pp, 50-51.

247

248

months to cone.
After the completion of the building projects, all that was required was to place the radio equipnent in operation, to install the
photographic equlptnent and to ataait the assignment of a branch Intelligence officer from divisional headquarters.
The defense of the

alrdronc was organized along the sane lines as that used in the Toul
Sector,

Carefully prepared plans for defense and evacuation of the

area in case of hostile attack were received fron the Comandant de la
Secteur Aeronautique , VI Corps, French Eighth Army.
These plans were

carefully studied and steps necessary to carry them out were taken.
Telephone lines were constructed connecting the Squadron offices,
barracks, and hangars; long distance telephone lines to divisional
tactical command posts and to higher Air Service headquarters were also secured.

During its first week In the Baccarat Sector, the 12th Aero
Squadron gave up its Avion Renault airplanes and received 18 Salmson
two-seater observation planes equipped with 260 horsepower motors. 4

Although none of the observation airplanes used on the western front up
to the conclusion of hostilities gave all-around satisfaction, the

Salmsons xjcre an improvement over the earlier ones in every respect-they VGTB sounder in construction, faster, and more maneuverable.
The Baccarat Sector was a typical "stabilized" or "quiet"

front-line area.
2

The enemy was strongly entrenched in positions which

Vol. 3, pp.
3

"History of the 12th Aero Squadron," 1918, 124-125.
Ibid ., pp.

E,

Hy AS AEF,

126-129.

A
Ibid ., p. 123.

249 had been in existence for many months.

Barbed wire entanglements and
To the

machine gun strong points reinforced the lines of trench works.

rear the infantry was supported by the usual complement of field and
heavy artillery.
In the air the German forces were considerably more

numerous

tlian

was the case in the Toul Sector,

A rather active obser-

vation air service was supplemented by a pursuit force which carried
out daily patrols over the Sector,

Although the enemy pursuit units

were not equipped with the latest types of aircraft, these patrols were active and aggressive.
On practically all clear nights, German

bombardment squadrons operated against Allied airdromes, command posts,
and the totms and villages adjoining the lines.
Further to the rear,

the enemy had a sizable force of pursuit aviation which devoted its

energies to the attack of Allied bombardment squadrons which were then

carrying out long distance raids into German throughout that area.
The American 42d Division (to which the 12th Squadron was

assigned) occupied the front from Badonvillers to Domevre, a distance
of about seven miles.
As in the Toul Sector, the American infantry

positions were strongly fortified by trench systems, barbed wire

entanglements and machine gun emplacements.

These defenses were

reinforced by two regiments of field artillery and one regiment of
heavy artillery.
Tlie

42d Division operated under the coixiand of the
All aviation forces in the Baccarat

VI Corps of the French Eighth Army,

Sector operating for the VI Corps, French Eighth Army, were conmanded

Intelligence Summary, J!ay 29 to June 14, 191"', Headquarters 42d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, Baccarat, Meurthe-etMosellc, France, June 14, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . Ill, 708,

250
by the Comandant de la Secteur Aeronautigue , whose headquarters was

located at Lun^vllle.

This officer corresponded to the American Air

Service's Corps Chief of Air Service which was developed later.
In addition to the 12th Aero Squadron the aviation forces of

the Baccarat Sector consisted for the most part of French observation

squadrons operating in conjunction with the divisions to the right and
to the left of the 42d Division,
Tliese

squadrons carried out for their

divisions observation operations of the same nature as those to be performed for the 42d Division.
In addition there vjas one French corps

squadron which reported directly to the VI Corps headquarters.

No

regularly assigned Allied pursuit units patrolled that section of the
front; consequently, observation planes had to rely solely upon their

armament to defend themselves against hostile aircraft.
The inlsslons assigned to the 12th Aero Squadron in the Baccarat

Sector were visual and photographic reconnaissance and surveillance of
the enemy; adjustment of artillery fire; cooperation with the infantry

when situations arose requiring infantry contact patrols to locate the
front lines; and training missions with the Infantry and artillery,
Tlie

Squadron

v;aG

also expected to coordinate and complete the training

of its flying and ground personnel under actual war conditions.
The flights over the lines vrere distributed according to a

roster of flying personnel, V7ith exceptions made occasionally in cases

carried out in accordance with the methods developed in
For the most part, the missions performed were

the Toul Sector.

confined to artillery adjustment and visual and photographic reconnaissance.

Infantry contact patrols were attempted on only one occasion:

on June 24, 1918, during a German raid carried out against the American troops at the time of the relief of the 42d Division by the 77th

Division.

The raid took place during the night, and on the following

morning the 12th Aero Squadron was requested to locate the friendly
front lines.
In

attempting to carry out the request, the first plane
The infantry

dispatched returned badly damaged by anti-aircraft fire.

failed repeatedly to respond to the signals of the second observer

requesting them to mark out the front line by panels or bengal flares.
The pilot of the second plane flew so low that the observer was able
to distinguish the uniforms of the infantr>'men and thus was able to get

a rough idea as to the advanced positions.

Unfortunately, this

observer was wounded by machine gun fire from the ground before he had

pinpointed the location of the front line troops.
no better fortune than had the first
t\ro

The third plane had

in receiving a response from

the infantry, but finally the observer was able to report the position
of the troops based on his low-level observations.

For the most part, aside from the visual reconnaissance

9

Haslett, Luck on the Wing , pp. 55-60.

252

missions performed at davm and twilight of each day, and a certain
number of photographic missions requested by the 42d Division and the
Commandant de la Secteur Aeronautigue , practically all of the missions

undertaken vere planned by the squadron officers.

Since the plan of

aerial operations in the Baccarat Sector was primarily concerned with
training, every effort was made to arrange and perform as many

adjustments of artillery as possible.
shortage of artillery ammunition.

This was limited only by a

Artillery batteries were allotted

only a fixed number of shells for firing each day.

During the three weeks which the 12th Aero Squadron spent in
the Baccarat Sector, a great deal of valuable advice was given to the

observers by the Commandant de la Secteur Aeronautigue . VI Corps,
French Eighth Army, and visiting French and American observers
e^qierlenced in combat operations.

Considerable seasoning In aerial

combat as well as In observation techniques was acquired as a result
of attacks from German pursuit forces.
12

Generally speaking, operations were a continuation and further
development of those carried out previously In the Toul Sector,
The

visual and photographic reconnaissance missions, prearranged artillery
fire adjustments, and infantry contact patrols were similar to the

sufficient to acquaint the squadron observers with the general principles
of this form of observation aviation, and to impress them with the

importance of developing it in the future.
From the point of view of
tlie

13

12th Aero Squadron as a combat
tlvit

unit, the experience in the Baccarat Sector proved of value in

the

organization was throxm entirely upon its o\m resources during the
period of operations.
The officers of the 12th Squadron acquired a

seasoning which they probably would not have received had the Squadron
been operating as one of several assigned to a grou;>.
13

This factor

Haslett, Luck on the Wlnp , pp, 65-71,

254

proved of Importance later, during the Air Service operations on the
t-iame

when the need arose for a large number of observers trained in

the principles of liaison \rtth ground troops.

The 3d Flir.ht of the 99th Squadron in the St. Die Sector

Towards the middle of July, 1913, the Anerican 5th Division,

which was holding the line southv^est of Cclles and Frapelle in the St.
Die Sector in the Vosges Mountains, was ordered to advance and capture

Frapelle, an i-.-portant railhead and road junction,

T\\e

5th Division

occupied a raountainous v;ooded area with defenses of the stabilized
x;arfare type:

trenches, barbed wire entanglements, dugouts, and

carefully camouflaged artillery positions.

Frapelle lay within a

salient conforming to the course of a small creek which ran through a

mountainous defile, and it was

V7ell

defended by the Germans,

Tlie

Allies planned to cut off the enemy salient and force the enemy to

abandon Frapelle,

14

The 3d Flight of the 99th Aero Squadron moved f onward from

Lu::euil-les-Bains to the airdrome at Do^neville near Epinal to replace

Escadrillc Ho, 235 and to assist the 5th Division,

Tlie

3d Flight was

assigned to the French XXXIII Corps Observation Group of the French
Seventh Army operating at Dogncville,
To all intents and purposes the

Flight was organized as a self-contained unit and it was administered

along lines similar to those for French units in the Group,
^^"Hlstory of the 99th Aero Squadron, In USAF HD Archives,
^^Ibld., p, 8.

1917-1925," 1925, p. 12,

255
The mission of the 3d Flight of the 99th Squadron according to the plan of attack was as follox^s:
to photograph the enemy defenses

prior to the attack; to ensure effective surveillance of enemy positions previous to and during the attack, carefully noting and reporting any
indication of counterof fenslve or local reactions in preparation; to

adjust artillery fire on sensitive points within the enemy lines; to
report the location of and adjust fire on enemy artillery batteries in
action; and to photograph the positions at the close of the contem-

plated operation.
Immediately upon their arrival at Dogneville on July 24, 1918,

officers of the 3d Flight arranged for airplane cooperations with

artillery and infantry units.

Training exercises

\7ere

carried out

with the 9th and 10th Infantry Brigades of the 5th Division to assure
cooperation from the line troops
contact patrols.
vjlth the

airplanes during infantry

Telegraph, telephone, radio, and motorcycle courier
TIio

conriunications vjcre also established,

3d Flight was equipped with

seven Salmson airplanes.
The missions flown by the 3d Flight of the 99th Aero Squadron,

like practically every sort of aerial observation performed by the

American Air Service in World

\-Jar

I,

except for long-range photographic
tliat

reconnaissance, required the airplane to fly lav!--loveTf
the levels of pursuit patrols.

is,

than

Observation teams, therefore, were
Tney were always in danger of attack,

accounted for the majority of victories in aerial battles; and since
neither the observer nor his pilot was often justified in starting any action himself, they had to accustom themselves to many surprise
attacks.

Technically speaking, the observer commanded the airplane.
Until interrupted by the enemy, the pilot foUovred
tlie

observer's
liad

orders so that the observer could get precisely the information he

been sent for.

If a fight started,

the obseirver, who had two movable

guns, was far more important as a combatant than the pilot, who

generally had but one fixed gun.
verbal orders to his pilot.

Of course, he could hardly give

To signal the approach of another airplane,

he tapped the pilot's head and made a circular or a cross motion in the

air, to identify it as a friend or an enemy.

To change direction, the
To command a

observer sheared the desired direction by pointing.

sharp reverse of direction, he pulled the appropriate shoulder of the pilot.

As soon as an enemy aircraft was sighted, the pilot and the

observer had to decide instantly v/hether to fight or to run.

Tlie

rule

for observation machines was not to fight unless absolutely necessary,

but if unavoidable, to engage the enemy, go at it hard and then when
the battle was over, unless disabled, complete the mission.
In case of

any mechanical disability to the airplane, the pilot was promoted at
once to command,
19

llaslett.

Luck on the Wing , p. 125.

^^

Ibid .

257
In the najority of cases, enemy planes which attacked American

observation craft were mono-place (one-seater) machines, limited to the
use of fixed machine guns.

These guns could fire in only one direction-*

the direction in which the ship itself was travelling.

Unless the

enemy disabled the observation ship or one of Its two passengers during
his dive he no longer had the advantage, except in his speed and

maneuverability.

In addition to a fixed gun or two operated by the
tv/o

pilot of the observation plane, there were the observer's

guns

which could be fired in almost any direction.
c basse

Therefore, a German

(pursuit) plane seldom attacked an Allied observation airplane

without at least two colleagues to assist him.

Occasionally they went

after a single reconnaissance plane with an entire Jadgstaf fel , or
pursuit squadron.
The tactics employed by an observation team under attack

depended to a great extent upon its mission,

A ship on artillery

r^glagc, for instance, was never more than a few miles from its oim
lines, and rarely more than 20 miles from its own airdrome;
it could

get home quickly and it could probably land safely even if slightly
hit.

Allied photographic machines were generally slow and wide open
The famous German Ace, Max

to attack, if they were flying low enough.

Immclmann, gained the greater part of his reputation by his quick

attacks and victories over ships of this class and not, as many
suppose, over Allied
c basse

planes,

20

Eddie Rickenbacker tells at

great length of his struggles on successive days to get at a big
20

Frederick Oughton, The Aces (New York:

G,

P.

Putnam's Sons,

1960), pp. 35-36.

258

German Rumpler which was willing to take its pictures through a telephoto lens at 22,000 feet rather tlvm risk attack from a Nieuport,

whose ceiling was only 19,000 feet.

In this case there was really

nothing to do; the Rumpler was always far out of effective machine gun
range.
21

the friendly advance elements was, however, determined and reported to the command posts at frequent intervals.

These patrols flew at

altitudes low enough to permit identification of the uniforms of troops
on the ground.
In the course of these missions the planes were

subjected to heavy machine gun and rifle fire from hostile forces.

In

several instances planes of the 3d Flight on Infantry contact patrols

fired on enemy machine gunners and scattered groups of German soldiers

caught in the open and in roads.

24

Upon successful completion of the

attack and establishment of a new front line, planes of the 3d Flight

were dispatched and successfully photographed the front lines.
Fortunately, the enemy aerial opposition in the Frapelle operation was

negligible and the Americans were seldom hindered by hostile pursuit
planes,

III Corps Air Service on the Vesle River

By the first week in August,

1918, the French Sixth Army had

advanced to the Vesle River,

The Anerican III Corps (attached to the

Sixth Army) held a portion of the front along the river extending

approximately from Bazoches to Courlandon.

The III Corps -was The usual

organized with two divisions in the line and one in reserve.

complement of artillery which supported the forward divisions was

^^Ibld.

.

260

augmented by a powerful concentration of 155 mm, heavy artillery.

The

mission of the Corps was to consolidate its positions on the south bank
of the river, to exploit favorable opportunities for forcing passage of

the Vesle, and to await a general advance by all Allied armies on the

front
In the air the Allies were comparatively weak.

Although only

one French pursuit unit, the 22d Pursuit Group, was available to patrol
the entire front of the Sixth

Amy, Allied forces

on the right and left
The

of the III Corps had three or more observation squadrons each.

aerial observation units at the disposal of the III Corps were adequate
for the demands of reconnaissance.

All American squadrons were

experienced.

Opposite the front of the III Corps the defense along the
heights north of the Vesle xws well organized.

German infantry units

were supported by heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns.
No Immediate aggressive actions on the part of the enemy were foreseen;
it was presumed that the Germans would confine their operations to

purely defensive movements.

27

Dense concentrations of enemy pursuit squadrons opposite this

sector furnished continuous patrol action from daylight to dark.
25

The

Preface to the Olsne-Aisne Operation August 7-November 11, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War , 1917-1919 , VI, 1,
1918,

Patrol Report, III Corps, AEF, August 14, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 . VI, 87.

pilots of these flights were aggressive, experienced, and determined to

prevent observation of German activity at all cost.

Although the enemy

completely dominated the air, his observation force was apparently
Inconsequential.
The III Corps Air Service was made up of the American 88th Aero

Squadron flying Salnson aircraft; the French 284th Squadron equipped

with Spads; and the French 237th Squadron with Breguets.

The units

operated under the command of Major Kenneth P. Littauer, Chief of Air
Service for the III Corps.
No group conmander or headquarters was

assigned.

The III Corps Chief of Air Service and his staff were

stationed at the Ferme des Greves airdrome.

A French aviation officer

had been assigned to assist him in directing the work of French units

assigned to the III Corps Air Service,

29

The Ferme des Greves alrbase was situated on the heights over-

looking the left bank of the

Mame

River, about six miles east of

Chateau Thierry and roughly 20 miles behind the front lines.

Prepara-

tions made for the American units by the French Sixth Army included

tent hangars, which were adequate for housing the 38 planes of the

three squadrons; huts and billets for the various headquarters offices

and for quartering the squadron personnel; and bomb shelters in the
form of abandoned trenches and dugouts constructed by troops who had

recently fought over the ground.
28

The airdrome had no defenses against

106th Report (Events from July 18 to August 7, 1918), Office of the Chief of Staff, German Supreme Headquarters, August 14, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917 1919 , V, 676,

establish an effective surveillance of the enemy and report all of his
activity, making certain the detection of either a retreat or an attack
in preparation; to make a thorough photographic reconnaissance of

enemy defenses opposite the front of the III Corps; to locate enemy

batteries in action and assist reaction by Allied artillery; to inform
the command of the location of advance elements during aggressive

action (contact patrols); and to advance the training of infantry and

artillery troops in the use of the aerial arm.

31

The following assignments of squadrons and missions were

directed by Major Littauer:

to the 88th Squadron, artillery adjust-

ments, sector reconnaissance, and contact patrols for the division on
the right; to the 28Ath Squadron, artillery adjustments, divisional

sector reconnaissance, and contact patrols for the division on the
left; and to the 237th Squadron, the corps artillery adjustments.

Telephone communications connecting all Air Service units

through a central switchboard were established at once.

A direct

telephone line was also strung from the Air Seirvlce headquarters to
III Corps headquarters.

An efficient system of personal liaison was

developed.

One observer from the 88th Squadron, stationed at the III

Corps message center, kept in touch with the III Corns staff and

Ibid ,, p, 4,
31

1918,

in ibid ,, pp, 32

Operations Order Number 4, Headquartersi III Corps, August 4, 161-162.

Memorandum, Office of the III Corps Chief of Air Service, France, August 6, 191S, in ibid ., p. 134.

263

informed the Air Service headquarters of the tactical situation and the needs of the front line units.
33

From time to time III Corps Air Service

observers of the various squadrons were designated to visit and confer

with the divisional and artillery staffs and unit commanders in the
line.
34

All III Corps field orders, operations orders, plans of liaison,

Intellisence summaries, and other bulletins were sent to the office of
the III Corps Chief of Air SGrvice.

Tactical and technical orders and

bulletins emanating from the French Sixth Army Air Service were also forwarded to this office.
In this v;ay, a complete file of data was

secured and kept up to date.

Information directly affecting flying
Complete

operations was posted conveniently in the operations room.

information on the tactical situation was thus maintained within easy

reach of pilots and observers.

35

The III Corps Chief of Air Service prescribed that all requests

for special observation missions should emanate from the G-2

(Intelligence) Section of the III Corps Staff.
the divisions
x^rcre

Orders originating in

communicated directly from divisional headquarters

to the III Corps Chief of Air Service or his representative who directed

commanders with the features of the enemy terrain immediately opposite
the III Corps front.

42

From time to time, special missions were dispatched to

reconnoiter the passages of the Vesle River,

Planes detailed for these

missions flew at low altitudes so the observers could note accurately
the location and number of vehicular and foot bridges still intact.

When crossings of the Vesle River were attempted, infantry contact

planes ^^re dispatched to stake the line of Allied troops.

These

missions met with little success.

Troops appeared to be either

ignorant of the use of panels in communicating their positions or too
busy with the enemy at hand to respond to the observer's signals.
In

any case, panels were rarely shown and It was extremely difficult to

distinguish individual soldiers in wooded terrain, even when observations were carried out at minimum altitudes.
To improve communication with the ground forces, the III Corps

Chief of Air Service established an infantry contact school for the

troops in the Vesle Sector,

Training groups of 200 men each were drawn

from the rifle companies, machine gun battalions, and headquarters

detachments of each division and sent for three days to the airdrome at
Ferrae des Greves,

These groups brought with them sets of command post

^^Ibld., pp. 236-237,
"Report on Operations, III Corps Air Service," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 13, pp. 55-56. Tlie German aerial observers also reported a lack of Infantry response in staking the front line. Report, German 236th Infantry Division, September 1, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . VI, 318.

use of airplane observation and the importance of determining the
posltioixs of advance units during an attack or retreat.

Practical

maneuvers were accomplished in which airplanes called for the line by
rocket signals; it
vjas

staked out by troops using individual panels.

The troops were instructed to spread the information acquired at the

school and subsequent contact patrols were much more successful.

44

Ordinarily, the observer assigned to the prearranged artillery

adjustment mission visited the battery on the day prior to the flight.
Details of the shoot and the method of adjustment were agreed upon in advance by the observer, the battalion radio officer, and the battery
commander.
Even when careful preliminary liaison of this sort was
The difficulty

undertaken, failure rather than success was the rule.
in most cases was traced to faulty radio communication.

Artillery

radio personnel were often ine:<pert and inexperienced and particular
care was necessary to assure the proper functioning of radio equipment.

Observers tested their radio equipment before leaving the field and
V7herevcr possible the Air Service radio station followed the calls of

the plane.

Radio operators at the airdrome kept an accurate log of
These records

calls sent by observation planes during the adjustments.

indicated efficient functioning of the planes' equipment and failure of
the battalion wireless station to receive effectively. To clear up

these difficulties, trips were made by observers and radio personnel
to artillery units and repeated panel exercises were conducted to train

offensives by which they hoped to win the war before the American
Expeditionary Forces could take to the field in strength.
The first

of these drives thrust a deep salient Into the Allied lines at the

point of Junction of the British and French armies and seriously

threatened the important railroad center of Amiens.

The lines in that

vicinity had scarcely been stabilized when the Germans launched a
second offensive farther north, driving a salient into the British
lines along the Lys River in the vicinity of Armentleres,
The third

German offensive, which began on May 26, 1918, resulted in a huge

V-shaped salient stretching between Soissons and Reims, with the tip

resting on the

Mame

River at Chateau Thierry.
I

During the last iieek

of June, the American

Corps took up defensive positions on the

western side of the salient in a sector commencing at the village of
Vaux, inriediately to the west of Chateau Thierry, and extending north-

west to Courcliamps.
The Chateau Thierry campaign may be divided into two main

actions:

the first, an Allied defensive; the second, an Allied

offensive.

During the operations of the
273

I

Corps on the front there

274

were three phases:

the first was marked by preparations for a renewed

German attack; the second was the period of enemy offensive and
successful Allied resistance; the third saw the execution of a deter-

mined and successful Allied offensive.

Observation

During the first week of July, Major Lewis H, Brereton,

I

Corps Chief of Air Service, established his headquarters at La Ferte-

sous-Jouarre,

The units under his conmand were the 1st Aero Squadron,

the 12th Aero Squadron, French 1st Squadron (replaced by the American

88th Aero Squadron on July 6, 1918), and the 1st, 2d, and 4th Balloon
Companies.
The three aero squadrons made up the
I

Corps Observation

Group, which retained the same organization established in the Toul

Sector In May.
The
I

Corps Chief of Air Service acted chiefly In an advisory
I

capacity for the

Corps commander and staff.

Since aviation was a

comparatively new branch of the army, the Air Service had to bear in

mind that few of the advisors to the high conmand were well acquainted
with Its possibilities and limitations.
The relationship of the I Corps

Chief of Air Service to the units of his conmand was both administrative

and tactical.
Service of the

He prepared all general plans of action for the Air
I

Corps in accordance with the orders of the

I

Corps

Commander and provided liaison between the imlts of his command and took

"History of the Organization and Functioning of the Office of the I Corps Air Service," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 23, p, 2,

275 all necessary steps to insure close cooperation with the line xinits.
He provided for the replacement of materiel and personnel and reported

any deficiencies in training of personnel to the proper authorities.
The adjutant of the
I

2

Corps Air Service supervised the
I

administration of the units vhich comprised the

Corps Air Service,

It was the duty of the information officer to keep the I Corps Chief

of Air Service and Air Service units supplied with the latest tactical

and teclinical information, including maps, photographs, and tactical
orders, technical and general information.
the consolidated Intelligence report of the
He was also responsible for
I

Corps Air Service, which

was published nightly.

The operations officer directed and coordinated
He prepared and

the operations of all I Corps Air Service units.

forwarded all orders concerning operations and supervised their execution. report.
He also prepared the daily
I

Corps Air Service operations

It was the duty of the liaison officer to establish and main-

tain a close personal liaison with the conmanding officers, intel-

ligence chiefs, and operations directors of the

I

Corps headquarters

and all subordinate staffs.

He had to Inform himself on matters

necessary to the conduct of operations, to study this information, and
to transmit it to the operations departments of the group and squadrons. He also
liad

to ascertain the amount of training acquired by the artillery

and infantry units and make plans for any supplementary instruction to
be carried out.
It

was his duty to arrange for all necessary telephone
I

and radio communications between the
2

Corps Chief of Air Service,

General Order Number 81, General Headquarters, AEF, France, May 29, 1918.

276
I

Corps Observation Group headquarters,
It

1

Corps staff, and line conKnand

posts.

was his duty to arranse plans for artillery adjustments by

airplanes, designation and use of certain batteries for fire on fuoitivc targets upon call fron aerial observers, and exercises v/lth
the infantry to increase proficiency in ground troop cooperation with

contact patrol airplanes.

3

The plan of communications dra^m up for the I Corps Air Service

was as follows:

direct telephone communication with the I Corps

Observation Group, observation squadrons, and higher headquarters;
radio conmunlcation with all line units; personal liaison through

visits made by the

I

Corps Chief of Air Service and his staff, corps
4

headquarters and all corps units; and motorcycle courier service.

The I Corps Observation Group was organized along the lines that had been followed in its original organization at the Ourches

airdrome.
I

During the last \^ek of June, orders were received from the

Corps Observation Group headquarters, and the 1st and 12th Aero

Squadrons proceeded to the

Mame

Sector.

Tliis

move began on June 28,

1918, and by noon of the following day all the airplanes of both

squadrons had been flown from Ourches and Vathenenil airdromes to the

new field at Saints, three miles south of Coulommiers,

Advance parties

from each squadron arrived by automobile and completed the arrangements
for quarters.
By the evening of June 29, most of the I Corps Obser-

vation Group's men and equipment had arrived at the new base and it
"History of the Organization and Functioning of the Office of the I Corps Air Service," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 23, pp. 2-3.
4
AEF, Vol.
3

"History of the 12, pp. 28-30.

I

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

277

was ready to begin operations.

One French squadron, temporarily

assigned to the Group, was already Installed at the airdrome,
Tlie

landing strip

V7as

situated on a large, level wheat field
Large canvas hangars had been
The enlisted men were quartered

which had recently been harvested.

erected and camouflaged by the French,

in a group of farm buildings which bordered the flying field, and the

commissioned personnel were billeted in the nearby villages of Saints
and Maupertuis,
6

The sector of the front to be patrolled by the

I

Corps

Observation Group extended from Chateau Thierry to Courchamps, a

distance of about 10 miles.

The distance from the airfield to the

front lines varied from 25 to 30 miles.

The location of the airplanes

at such a great distance from the front lines was a tactical necessity,

dictated by the impending enemy offensive in the direction of Paris.
TWO divisions \fcre assigned to the American
I

Corps:

the 2d

Division, which was deployed on a sector which extended from a short

distance

xjcst of

Chateau Tliierry to Torcy; and the French 167th

Division, which occupied the front from Torcy north to Courchamps,
Tlie

their aircraft v;ere practically at the mercy of hostile
In event of attack,

pursuit patrols attacking from above.

they

immediately ceased to be of value as direct protection for the

observation teams occupied with taking photographs.

Observation teams

often found it difficult to rendezvous with friendly pursuit forces
before proceeding to the lines.
The result was an eventual adoption

of the policy of sending a num1>er of observation airplanes out on each

photographic mission; the lead plane of the formation was equipped

with a camera and the others acted as bi-place (t\^o-seated aircraft)
protection.
Due to the confidence inspired by the presence of pursuit

escorts during photographic missions, pursuit protection was not

entirely abandoned, and as frequently as possible arrangements were

made to have escorts accompany the photographic plane.

21

Nightly meetings were held in the G-2 (intelligence) section
of the
I

Corps headquarters to discuss the developments of the day,

new Intelligence concerning the general situation, and new plans, or
changes in existing plans,
Tlae

I

Corps Air Service was represented at

these meetings by the I Corps Chief of Air Service or a member of his
staff, by the I Corps Observation Group intelligence officer, and as

often as possible by the group and squadron cotntaanders.

Enemy positions

to be photographed and instructions as to the particular information
to be noted by obervers during the next day's visiial reconnaissance

missions were assigned at these meetings,
^

22

4bid ..

p,

S,
I

22

"History of the

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

AEF, Vol, 12, p, 46,

284

A few prearranced fire adjustments vgtq carried out for the

artillery batteries.
cross roads,
cind

The regulation of artillery fire on supply dumps,

entrenched positions was about all that was attempted.

Aerial spotting of artillery fire was quite limited because of the
small amount of training in such work given the artillery units before

they took their positions.

Artillery units were often untrained in

the proper choice of locations for the display of signal panels and in

panel manipulation.

Consequently, observers encountered great

difficulty in locating and reading the ground signals necessary for

proper execution of adjustments.

Artillery radio crews possessed

little or no experience in receiving and transmitting wireless

messages.

In one instance, men assigned to listen for radio calls for

fugitive target firings had been put on kitchen police.

The sergeant

responsible for this felt that the men would have just wasted their
time since the airplanes called them only once every two or three days.
23

Due to the distance which separated squadrons from artillery command posts, the rapid communications usually employed in a stabilized

sector were not available.

As a result a great deal of time was lost,
The

many failures
I

\TOnt

uncorrected, and many misunderstandings arose.

Corps Air Service attempted to improve its operations with the

artillery through personal liaison, but with the squadrons so far
removed from the artillery positions it was impossible to instruct the

artillery in cooperation with aviation.

Often the artillery was so

occupied in routine operations, and in perfecting its preparations to defend the sector in the event of a renewed large-scale enemy offensive.
23
Ilaslett,

Luck on the Wing , p, 112,

285

that it

x^as

virtually inpossible to devote sufficient attention to

training.

On the part of the Air Service, failures in attempted artillery

adjustnents arose on account of persistent attacks made by hostile
patrols; others were due to the Impossibility of notifying the

artillery posts in cases where airplanes could not be dispatched at
the prearranged hour,

either because of equipment failures or

unfavorable iTeather.
inspected
£ind

Many of the replacement airplanes had not been

it xras often necessary to overhaul these planes completely

before permitting them to fly over the lines.

Other machines were

totally lacking In radio equipment.

Only a few of the adjustment

failures x^hich occurred were the fault of insufficiently trained
observers.

Flying officers designated for artillery missions were

well fitted for their assignments, both in respect to training and
through experience with French squadrons In operations over the front.

During the first

tt«)

weeks of operations in the Chateau

Thierry Sector, it became increasingly apparent that great efforts

would be required from the Air Service to guard against failures likely
to result from the insufficient training of ground troops in the proper

use of aerial observation.

As a consequence, an intensive system of
I

personal liaison was Inaugurated betxrcen the

Corps Air Service
As an

squadrons and the command posts of the line organizations.

initial effort in this direction, an experienced observer was detailed

from each of the squadrons to be stationed at the headquarters of the

divisions to which the squadrons were assigned for operations.

It was

the duty of those liaison officers to investigate matters connected

286

with the proposed operations and to forward Information necessary for
Air Service cooperation in such operations. officer from the office of the visits to
I

In addition,

the liaison

I Corps

Chief of Air Service made daily

Corps headquarters, to the comnand posts, and to the head-

quarters of each division.

There he Interviewed the responsible

officers concerning operations for the ensuing day.

As It became more

difficult to send messages between the divisions and the group, the
custom developed of sending one officer from every squadron to the

division and the command posts each day for the purpose of returning

with new information, plans, and requests for missions.

The inauguration

of this personal liaison system improved the cooperation of the Air

Service units with the line organizations, but it could not surmount
the difficulties raised by insufficient training.

24

The main value of the operations of the I Corps Air Service on
the

Mame

before the opening of the German offensive on July 15 lay In

the Information concerning the activities of the enemy obtained by

visual and photographic reconnaissance.

The results accomplished in the
On the

regulation of artillery fire were of comparatively little value.

other hand, the experience gained by the members of the staff of the
I

Corps Air Service during these operations was invaluable; it gave

them a basis upon which to plan future operations in this sector.

During this early period, mechanics of the 1st and 12th
Squadrons became accustomed to repairing Salmson airplanes, and pilots
and observers of all three squadrons became thoroughly oriented to the
24

"History of the AEF, Vol. 12, pp. 47-48.

I

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

287

new sector.

Frequent combats during missions over the lines prepared

the flying personnel to carry out their missions relying mainly on

their own guns and flying skill.

Plans to insure the personal liaison
The

necessary for success in future aerial operations were developed.

experience of this preliminary phase showed that in an active zone of
combat, little confidence could be placed on the telephone as a means
of coimunlcation. The second phase of the

Mame

campaign extended from July 15 to

July 18, 1918.

During these three days the last German offensive was

launched, spent its full force, and was completely checked by the

Allied defense.

The plan of employment drawn up for the I Corps Air

Service outlined procedures for coping with whatever tactical situations

might arise and for an orderly withdrawal from FrancheviUe to an alrdrome further to the rear.
25

Throughout the enemy offensive,

surveillance planes operating for the infantry and artillery were in
the air during the daylight hours.

Infantry contact patrols for
I

marking the line were not necessary in the

Corps sector.

The duration

of the entire enemy offensive was so short that no real tactical

problems developed.
Late in the afternoon of July 17, plans for the Allied counter-

offensive scheduled to open the following day were received at the
oc

I

Corps Observation Group headquarters.

The Air Service contacted all

corps and divisional command posts immediately and arranged to conduct

^^Ibid,. p, 50.

Field Order Number 9, Headquarters I Corps, July 17, 1918, Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 .
V,

36.

288

Infantry contact patrols at prescribed Intervals during the next day.

Continuous surveillance over the fronts during daylight was planned.
The area of artillery fire was plotted on a special map, and copies of

this map were prepared for the squadron observers.

When an observer

located an enemy battery in action he would then signal this information
to the artillery and immediately place the target under fire.
If in

the course of further surveillance the observer noted that the artillery

fire was not properly directed, he would transmit the necessary correc-

tion to the artillery battery.

Certain batteries of each brigade were
27

specifically designated to fire on fugitive targets.

The third and last phase of the Marne campaign began on the

morning of July 18, 1918, with the opening of the Allied coionteroffenslve between Soissons and Chateau Thierry,
Marshal Ferdinand Foch,

the Allied Commander-in-Chief, had moved several American and French

divisions by night to the vicinity of Soissons, the dormant northern
flank of the enemy salient.
To mislead German aerial observers, troops

were sent during daylight hours in the direction of Reims to simulate

reinforcements being rushed there and to divert attention from the concentrations being sent to the opposite flank.
Soon after the forces at Soissons began their assault of July
18,

the Allied command needed to know whether the Germans were making

a stand and holding their positions or whether they were retreating.

Major Lewis Brereton, Chief of Air Ser-vlce,
27

I

Corps, was ordered to

Letter, "Air Service Plans with Reference to Field Order 9," from Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps to Commanding General, No. I Army Corps, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . V, 417.

289
find out what the Germans were doing.

Major Brereton and his Chief of

Operations, Captain Elmer Haslett, agreed that the losses would be too

great to risk sending out a squadron of observation planes so they

themselves flew over the German lines unescorted, with Major Brereton
as pilot and Captain Haslett as observer.
28

They discovered that the

Germans were in full retreati
had collapsed.

the enemy defense in the

Mame

salient

Observation operations of the
until August 12, when the
Corps and the
I I

I

Corps Air Service from July 18

Corps was relieved by the Anerican III

Corps Air Service was withdrawn from the sector, can

most easily be seen by describing the activities undertaken from the
point of view of each type of mission performed.

During the advance of the

I

Corps, the execution of frequent

infantry contact patrols in order to inform the commands of the

location of advancing infantry units became a matter of daily routine.
There were two methods of requesting such missions. At first the

division commander notified the

I

Corps Chief of Air Service during

the previous day that he desired contact patrols to be performed at

specific times on

tlie

following day,

Tliis

custom had two serious

disadvantages.

In the first place,

there were only certain clrcxm-

stances during which an infantry contact patrol was likely to attain
the desired results.

Flights were best executed shortly after the

first or later stages of an Infantry attack when the troops were

momentarily resting and were sufficiently free to devote their attention
to what was going on in the air above them.
OQ

At such times they would

Haslett, Luck on the Wlng ^ pp. 89-97»

290

more than likely see and recognize their infantry contact patrol plane
and note its request for them to mark out a line.
On the other hand,

if they vere in the midst of hotly contested combat,

they had little

time or inclination to give attention to the air and in all likelihood
the signal of the infcintry contact plane went unheeded.

The second

disadvantage lay in the fact that no connander can fully predict the
tactical situation for the following day.
Even when the front lines

were already known to the commander and there was no need for execution
of the prearranged infantry contact patrol,

the unnotified infantry

plane often proceeded with its task with all of the attending risks.
The second method of requesting infantry contact patrols was
to send word directly to the squadron or through the office of the I

Corps Chief of Air Service one or

tv70

hours beforehand.

From most

points of view this was the better method, but it depended solely on
the available means for transmitting messages to the squadrons.
a few days after the beginning of the Allied offensive, it became

Within

impossible to rely upon telephone, telegraph, or radio for communication

between the command posts and the Air Service units.

Consequently, the

hours for the execution of infantry contact flights tjere perforce

fixed the day before and these, together with all information as to the

The most serious difficulties encountered in the performance
of infantry contact patrols resulted from the lack of training on the

part of the infantry.

Although both the 26th and the 42d Divisions
1913) had been given
it was not

(the latter relieved the 26th Division on July 25,

a lltnited amount of training In Air Service cooperation,

sufficient to insure uniform success in keeping the command informed
as to the location of the infantry by the infantry airplane.
In some

cases infantry regiments were not equipped with the proper supply of
infantry panels and flares for marking out the line.
In one instance

panels were not issued to the infantry division on the front because
the officer in charge thought they might get dirty.
30

Less fastidious

doughboys used these panels to clean their shoes and wipe grease from

machinery.

The result was that in the majority of infantry contact

patrols the observer was forced to descend to anywhere from 1,000 to
200 feet, face the machine gun and rifle fire that invariably met him

when flying at such altitudes, and locate the front line troops by
distinguishing their uniforms.
Infantry men often shot at all airplanes
31

because they did not know one from another.
30

Despite attempts to

Philip J, Roosevelt, "Air Service in the Chateau Thierry Campaign," 1913, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 1, p, 26,
The familiar star insignia carried on all Air Service airplanes in the United States was never used in Europe, Tlie Allied insignia consisted of concentric circles of red, white and blue; the British concord had the red in the center, the French had the blue, and the Americans had the white. Five Air Service planes bearing this marking were shot up one morning by American troops which had just come to the front and still supposed that the star insignia used in America was also used in France, Maj. llaslett reported innumerable conversations with American Expeditionary Forces officers who claimed never to have seen an American plane in flight. They were still looking for the wrong markings. llaslett, Luclc on the Win.", , pp. 102-106.
31

<v

292
Instruct Infantry units in recognition of Allied aircraft and in

marking the line, at no tine during the

tome offensive

did inffuitry

contact flights readily accomplish their missions.

During the first two xreeks of the offensive, troop movements

were so rapid that it became impossible to photograph all the territory
in the line of advance.

Photographic missions were therefore directed

to certain areas chosen by the I Corps staff.

Although weather

conditions frequently hampered these missions, many useful pictures

were obtained.

During this action, taking oblique views at low

altitudes, varying from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, became customary; such

photographs proved invaluable to the ground commanders in planning
advances.
Until this time, most photographs had been vertical shots.

Visual reconnaissance missions were carried out regularly at

dawn and twilight each day.

Other reconnaissance missions were

dispatched whenever the tactical situation made it necessary to secure
particular information about enemy activity.

A good deal of visual

reconnaissance was carried out by artillery surveillance planes during
periods of inactivity on the part of the enemy artillery.
The routine

procedure was to signal all Information to the appropriate command
post by radio, later confirming it by dropped written messages. 32

During the opening days of the offensive the artillery

surveillance planes met with considerable success in signalling their
reports on the activity of hostile batteries in accordance with the
plan made July 17.
32

295
at the command posts of the divisions and the corps artillery, working
in conjunction with other liaison officers who made daily trips from the squadrons to these command posts, to supply the I Corps CTiief of Air

Service and the

I

Corps Observation Group with the information which in

ordinary circumstances would have been transmitted by telephone, telegraph, or radio.

This system had obvious drawbacks, but it helped to

establish a closer understanding on the part of line organizations as
to the proper use and limitations of the Air Service,

Many diffi-

culties and misunderstandings which had arisen previously on account
of failures to distribute properly the Air Service operations codes to

both artillery and infantry were eliminated.
Until about July 23, American observation planes
xvrere

able to

fly over the lines with little opposition from enemy aircraft.

About

that time the brigade of British pursuit planes left this portion of
the front,

leaving the American observation planes with insufficient
By this time the front lines had advanced so far
tliat

pursuit aviation.

from the fields of the Anerican pursuit squadrons

their planes

spent the greater part of their time in the air going to and from the
lines.

As a result there were many losses of American observation air-

craft and airmen in this sector.

Replacements of pilots and observers

was slow and far from satisfactory, and difficulty was also experienced
in procuring replacement planes.

Consequently, it became increasingly

difficult to carry out the assigned missions and it was not infrequent
that from six to eight pilots and observers in each squadron executed
the missions scheduled for the day.

This sometimes necessitated two

296
or three missions per team In a single day.
35

On July 22, 1918, Che 1st and 12th Aero Squadrons were moved

from the airdrome at Franchevllle to the airbase at Morass Farm east of
La Fertc-sous-Jouarre.

The 88th Aero Squadron, re-equipped with

Saloson aircraft on July 20, continued operations from Franchcville
until July 25 when the French 167th Division
x^as

withdrawn from the
37
Ttie

sector and the 88th Squadron assigned to the III Corps,

26th

Division was relieved by the 42d Division on

tliat

same day and the

ATierlcan sector V7as narrowed to a one-division front.

Early in August

the 42d was relieved by the American 4th Division,

All subsequent

observation and photographic missions in this sector were carried out
by the 1st and 12th Aero Squadrons.

Adjustment of artillery fire was
I

given to a French squadron assigned to the

Corps Observation Group.

On August

2 the I

Corps Observation Group moved to the airdrome

at May-en-Multien, north of Meaux, and August 10 it removed to an old

German airdrome at Colncy, southwest of Fcre-en-Tardenois.

Two days

later the

I

Corps Air Service was relieved from duty in the sector and
38

moved to Chai lly-en-Brle, near Coullonlers, to await further orders.
35

The status of materiel and personnel section of the I Corps Air Service operations report for July 16, 1918, Department of the Arr.iy, United States Amy in the World War. 1917-1919 . V, 48-49.

297 The Allied counteroffenslve at Chateau Thierry changed the role
of the observation squadrons.
In the war of movement It was more

difficult for ground and air units to keep In touch.

Contact patrols

became more Important, photography decreased in Importance, and the

regulation of artillery fire on enemy batteries became more and more
difficult.
The campaign on the

Mame

River demonstrated the necessity of

developing radio cotmunl cat Ions between command posts and flying units
because In a rapid advance little reliance could be placed upon the

telephone and telegraph.

The method of distributing codes and assigning

call letters and panel numbers produced a great deal of confusion,

misunderstanding, and failure during the first few weeks of the
operations on the Mame,
Probably the most valuable lesson of the entire campaign was
the knowledge that neither the artillery nor the Infantry had sufficient

training or experience in the proper use and limitations of observation
aviation.

With this one exception, these American divisions were among

the most thoroughly trained and ejqjerienced American Expeditionary

Forces organizations in France,

Recognition of their lack of proper

instruction in the use of the Air Service forewarned observation units
as to what to expect in the future so that they could devote a signi-

ficant portion of their efforts to solving this problem.

Bombardment

There were no American bombardment units assigned to the Air

298

Service at Chateau Thierry, but American aero squadrons did participate
In bombardtnent operations.

When the Germans began their attack on the

night of July 14-15, 1918, the Allies wore still ignorant of precisely

where the main blow would be struck.

Colonel William Mitchell, who as

Chief of the 1st Air Brigade (which existed only on paper) was in

charge of American aviation at the front, talked the situation over

with the French and decided that a reconnaissance mission was necessary.
Colonel Mitchell took off on this mission alone just before daybreak on
the morning of July 15.
He first flew north but saw no unusual troop

movements near Cliateau Thierry,
up the

Then Mitchell turned east and flew

Mame

where all the bridges had been destroyed; at Dormans he

saw five new pontoon bridges spanning the river and German troops

pouring across the Marne.

39

The Germans were attacking from the head

of the salient, the base of which was formed by Solssons on one side

and Reims on the other.

Believing that the Germans could not be stopped by frontal
attacks, Colonel Mitchell proposed that all available Allied aviation

units attack the enemy's main supply base at Fere-en-Tardenois.

Although the Germans, who had numerically superior air service, still
had control of the air within their lines, it was hoped that if this

target were struck by planes from both sides of the salient the raid

would be successful.

Mitchell's plan was approved.

The British were

asked to send bombers, for the American Air Service had almost none

39

Levine, Mitchell. Pioneer of Air Power , pp. 120-121,

40

Mitchell, Memoirs of World War

I.

pp. 212-213.

299

and the French were busy In their own sector.

The British obliged with

three squadrons of DH 9*s and two squadrons of pursuit, one of which

was equipped with Sopwith Camels and the other with SE 5's,

These

British units, together with the four American squadrons of the Ist
Pursuit Group, attacked Fere-en- Tardeno is on July 16,
The Germans,

although taken by surprise, managed to assemble a large aerial force
and to shoot doxjn 12 of the British bombers.

Allied pursuit pilots

shot do^m more than this number of German planes with small loss to

themselves.

41

The largest number of Allied planes ever to operate

together participated In this raid, the first combined air offensive
action.
It

demonstrated the potential power of a numerically inferior
Further, it forced the Germans to hold back additional

air force.

planes to guard their supply base instead of sending them over Allied
lines.

Pursuit

The 1st Pursuit Group, made up of the 27th, 94th, 95th, and

147th Squadrons, began operations in the Marne Sector early in July,
1918, as a part of the French Sixth Army Air Service,

42

It faced

considerably different conditions than those encountered in the Toul
Sector.
The airdrome at Ormeaux, which the 1st Pursuit Group occupied,

was twice as far from the front as the one it had left.

Communication

^

4bid .

"History of the Organization, Development and Growth of the 1st Pursuit Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 9, p, 10.

42

300
by telephone was nearly impossible, since the lines were constantly

formations cruising at three flight levels became the rule.
The mission assigned to the pursuit units was threefold:
to

enable Allied observation to operate freely, to interfere with enemy
observation, and to inflict damage on the enemy.

Occasionally the

French Sixth Army called on the 1st Pursuit Group to perform special

reconnaissance missions since there were no army reconnaissance units
per se at Cliateau Thierry.
^

44

Close protection of observation planes

was not too successful, but it had a great morale value because obser-

vation planes escorted by pursuit were not as likely to be attacked as

were unescorted planes.

Close protection, however, was costly and

could be afforded only when the support to morale justified the losses.
The difference in speed between the pursuit and observation planes made
It difficult for them to keep together.
It was necessary'

to fly at the

same low altitude at which observation machines operated, thus giving
the enemy the advantage of altitude. This, together with the fact that

The Germans liad superior numbers of pursuit planes at all times at Chateau Tliicrr:--. Tlie French intelligence service estimated the odds at one period to be 4 to 1, "Tactical History of the Air Service, AEF," 1918, D, Ily AS AEF, Vol, 1, p. 8.
Letter, "Qnployment of American 1st Pursuit Group," from Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces, to Commanding General, I Corps, June 23, 1913, in Department of the Array, United States Army in the VJorld War. 1917-1919 , V, 228.

43

44

301

the pursuit airplanes
to attack,

liad

to stay in

fomatlon, nade them vulnerable
The basic

since the pilot could shoot only to the front.
tliat the

trouble was

pursuit aircraft were built for the speed and
Unfortunately, there

maneuver of combat, not for protective work.

were not enough Allied pursuit planes available to drive the enemy
from the skies, which would have been a more effective way of protecting
the observation planes.
In order to intercept enemy two-seater observation planes, it

was necessary to cruise at altitudes of over 10,000 feet.
that had the higher altitude had the advantage.

The plane

It was therefore

necessary for patrols at intermediate heights to be covered by a flight
above then for protection.
When enemy aircraft uerc sighted the

patrol was warned from above,

American pilots carried the war into

the enemy's territory; the majority of aerial combats took place well

within the enemy's lines.

There was very little ground strafing In the

Chateau Thierr>' operation, although when a particularly good target

presented itself and the French asked that it be strafed, it was done.

45

On July 11 the British 9th Air Brigade arrived at Ormeaux, and
the 1st Pursuit Group moved to a small field near Saints,
The move

was made without interruption of operations.

46

On the morning of

July 14, the 1st Pursuit Group furnished protection for a photographic

excellent photographs indicating that the Germans would probably attack

within 24 hours.

While engaged in protecting this mission, First

Lieutenant Quentin Roosevelt of the 27th Pursuit Squadron, son of
former President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, was shot
down behind enemy lines.
47

For two \reeks after the beginning of the attack on July 15,
the 1st Pursuit Group worked almost continuously.

During this time

its pilots changed from Nlcuoort to Spad S7 aircraft,

A short loss of

time in the air resulted from the change to the new planes; while they
\rere l>ettcr than the

old ones, they were more difficult to keep in

commission and both pilots and mechanics had to get used to them.

48

When the Allied advance came to a halt, the 1st Pursuit Group

was 45 miles from the front, and an advanced landing field for refueling
had to be established at Coincy.

Many planes were damaged while

landing to refuel and the losses of the 1st Pursuit Group were heavy.

Although replacement pilots were received they were inexperienced;
instead of being broken in gradually they were immediately put into
combat.

After the departure of the British 9th Air Brigade on July 23
Those that

there were not enough pursuit planes in the Allied sector.

were left were based so far back that they spent much of their time

flying to and from the lines, and consequently they accomplished
little.

49
-^

Operations Order Number 36, 1st Pursuit Group, July 14, 1918, In Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 19171919 , V, pp. 43-44.
Philip J, Roosevelt, "Air Service in the Chateau Thierry Campaign," 1913, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 1, p. 10.
48

47

^^

Ibid ., pp. 12-13.

303

Althoush the 1st Pursuit Group was under the French Sixth Army
for tactical orders. Colonel William Mitchell as commander of the 1st

Air Brigade was in command of all American aviation units at the front
and he, too, javc orders to the Ist Pursuit Group.
It was impossible

for the Group to obey orders from both Colonel Mitchell and the French,

At Chateau Tliierry Mitchell began the unfortunate policy--which reached
its peak in the handling of American Air Service units in the St, Mihiel

and Meuse-Argonne opcrationr,--of harassing group commanders with

telephone calls for information and orders all day long.

It was never

understood whether the 1st Air Brigade's function

v;as

tactical or
On

administrative; evidently Mitchell considered it to be both.

August 10 the 1st Pursuit Group was detached from the

I

Corps and
sar.ie

assigned to the American First Army which was organized that

day.

Balloons

The 1st, 2d, and 4th Balloon Companies v/ere the only American

balloon units on the front in July, 1913,

The 2d Company received

orders about the first of July to proceed to the Cliatcau Thierry Sector

where it worked v/ith the 1st Division until the Division was relieved
from that sector.
50
Wliile the Ist Division

was advancing to cut the

"History of the Development of Air Service Command on the Front," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol.' 1, pp. 2-7. Mitchell probably got hin ideas of what an air brigade should be from the British 9th Brigade which was stationed near his headquarters in July. In a letter to his immediate superior. Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, Mitchell outlined what he thought his authority was, Mitchell, Memoirs of Vtorld War I , pp. 228-231.
Headquarters, Chief of Air Service, First Army, "Report of Operations," August 9, 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 2, p. 16.

304

Soissons-Chateau Thierry road, the 2d Ccxnpany

teas

obllsed to prepare

six different balloon beds and set up corresponding telephone connections durins a period of 10 days.
52

The 1st Balloon Company arrived in

the area of the 2d Division about July 18.

The 4th Company got into

action before the Allied advance; it was assisned to the 3d Division
until relieved in the latter part of August,
TIic

53

balloons follov/ed the front line Infantry units at a
They located targets, re^^istcred One of the most

distance of about three miles.

artillery fire, and fonrardod general intelligence.

important needs of divisional staff was reliable information as to the

advance positions reached by Allied infantry; this was often disclosed

accurately

to balloon observers by grenade fighting.

Aerial obser-

vation assignments were sometimes given to airplanes when balloons
vjere

out of position and could not identify the front lines or artillery
54

. targets.

The change to open v/arfare which occurred at Chateau Tlilerry

modified somewhat the balloon observer's duties.

During trench v;ar»

fare, troop movements were ordinarily made only at night so that in

daylight the observer's principal tasks

x^ere to

report the location of

enemy guns seen firing and to observe the results of Allied artillery
fire.
Tills

sufficient troops v7ere available, and to reduce the Geman salient
there as a preliminary to a more decisive operation in the same

vicinity was proposed by General Jolm
of the American Expeditionary Forces,

J.

Pershins, Cormander- in- Chief

General Petain agreed to this

at their first conference shortly after the arrival of the Anerican
contnand in France,

General Pershing constantly kept this pl£in in mind

and early in 1918 the battle area near St, !lihiel was used to give
front- line experience to Anerican units and to acquaint them with the

region in which they would later attaci:,
Tlic

succession of German drives in the spring of 1918 made it

necessary to postpone the original plan, as all available troops were
urgently needed at other places on the front.
Consequently, although

there v7erc more than 1,200,000 Anerican soldiers in France in July,
the Anerican combat units were widely distributed along the entire front, either serving in line with the French and British armies or

undergoing training in rear areas.
After the American divisions had completed their part in the
Cliateau Thierry emergency and load assisted in the subsequent

307

308

counteroffcnsivc which turned the tide in favor of the Allies, General
Pershing, despite renexred opposition on the part of the Allies, again

insisted upon their assembly into one force.

The American First

Arr,iy

was orsanlsed on August 10, 191S,

and inmediatcly started preparations
the reduction of the St. Mihiel
I

for its first large offensive action:

salient.

Tliis

\ms the first operation in World War

carried out by a

complete American army under the separate and independent control of
the American Commander-in-Chief.
Tlie

value of the St. Mihiel salient to Germany lay in the fact

that it protected the strategic centers of Metz and the Briey iron
basin; interrupted traffic on the main Paris-Nancy railroad; cut the

Verdun-Toul railroad; and threatened the Allied territory in its
vicinity, especially \^st of the Mouse.
Its reduction was Imperative

before any great Allied offensive could be launched against the Briey and Metz region or northward between the
I-5euse

River and the Argonne

Forest toward the general area around Sedan.
The St, Mihiol campaign may be divided into two periods: the

period of preparation, August 10-September 11; and the period of attack,
September 12-16, 191C.
Early in August, 1918, the situation of the

front lines in the St. Mlhiel sector from Port-sur-Seille to a^atiUon-

sous-les-Cotes was practically the same as it
three and a
lialf

liad

been for the past

years.

American preparation for the St. Mihlel

offensive began on August 10, 1918, and from then until the first week
In Septer.iber new units, supplies, and mvinitions were brought to the

General Order Number 120, General Headquarters, AEF, France, July 24, 191S.

309

front.

Preparations for the attack against the salient

x^«re

well along

when on August 30 Marshal Foch, the Allied Connander-in-Chief , suggested
to General Pershing that the offensive be reduced greatly in scope,

that most of the divisions be used for an attack about September 15

between Verdun and Reims and that in

tlie

new offensive some of the

American divisions be assigned to operate under larger French commands.
General Pershing felt that the St. Mihiel offensive should be

carried out as planned and definitely stated that the American
divisions would fight in the future only as part of an independent

American amy.

After a series of conferences with Marshal Foch it was

finally agreed on September 2 that the St. Mihiel attack would be

carried out, but

tliat

its objectives would be limited so tliat the

American First

Array

could undertake another major offensive about ten

days later on the front between the Mouse River and the Argonne
Forest.
2

This agreement put a great burden on the American Expeditionary

Forces for under it the First Army was called upon to carry to a

conclusion an important offensive at St. Mihiel which was scheduled to
start on September 12, to concentrate an enormous force on the Meuse-

Argonne front, and to Initiate a still greater operation there, all

within the brief space of two \^eks.

In other irords, at the time the

agreement was made with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the Americans

undertook the mission of launching within the next 23 days

txio

great

An account of this heated excliange between Pershing and Foch is found in Pershing, My Experiences in the World War , II, 243 ff.

2

,

310

offensives on battlefields 40 miles apart,
Tlic

imbalance in the American forces which

liad

resulted from

earlier Allied dcnands for infantry and machine ^un troops was

rectified by the French and British.

The American First

Amy

finally

had about 250 French-built light tanks available, 150 of them manned
by Americans.
vjerc

About 3,000 pieces of artillery (British and French)

used and approximately 3,300,000 rounds of artillery ammunition

were brought into the area in preparation for the St. Mihiel campaign.

More than 550,000 American and 110,000 French soldiers were involved
in the offensive.

General Pershing*s force greatly outnumbered the

Germans
The order of battle of the First Army at the beginning of the
St. Mihiel offensive placed the American V Corps on the left of the

line, with its left flank joining the French Second Army at Chati lion-

sous- les-CStes.

On the right of the V Corps was the French II Colonial

Corps, near the point of the salient; and on the south side of the

salient were the United States IV and I Corps.

The right flank of the

First Army joined the French Eighth Army at Port-sur-Seille.

4

The First Army Air Service, commanded by Colonel William

Mitchell, was organized at La Fertc-sous-Jouarre and began to function

August 10.

On August 26 Colonel Mitchell moved his headquarters to

Ligny-en-Barroi5, in the vicinity of the St, Mihiel salient, whore
3

McSntee, Military History of the World War , n. 525.

4

War Department, Order of Battle .

I,

pp. 99-107.

General Order Number 120, General Headquarters, AEF, France, July 24, 191G.

311

plans vjcre developed for the attac!:.

On August 23, 1918, Lieutenant

Colonel Thomas Milling was appointed Chief of Staff, First Army Air
Service; Major Paul F, M. Armensaud, Chief of the French Mission

attached to the American Air Service, was appointed Assistant Chief of
Staff,

Lieutenant Colonel To^msend F, Dodd supervised the Information
These

Section; Major Jolin A. Paegelou cornmanded the Balloon Section,

officers xjith their assistants formed Colonel fiitchell's staff during
the St, Mihiel operations.

By September,

1918, the American Expeditionary Forces Air

Service was made up of one army observation squadron, seven corps

observation squadrons, one day bombardment squadron (later supplemented
by two others), and fourteen pursuit squadrons (the 17th and l4Sth

Squadrons \jere serving with the British Expeditionary Force),

g

In

anticipation of the St. Mihiel offensive, the French placed an Air
Division consisting of a large number of pursuit and day boml>ardment squadrons at the disposal of the Americans and under the command of
Colonel Mitchell,
Tliis

force

v/as

augmented by one other French pursuit

group and one French army artillery flying group for the adjustment of long-range artillery fire.
9

Diagram of First Army Flying Squadrons at the Front, September 12, 1918, C, lly AS AEF, Vol. 3, p, 449.
Letter from Jolin J, Pershing to Marshal Foch, dated August 15, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World Vtar , 1918, 1917-1919 . VIII, 12, See also letters from Foch to Pershing, August 24, 1918, and August 27, 1918, ibid,, 32-33, 160,
9

312

British Royal Air Force VTere to cooperate with the American First

Amy

Air Service V7henever the tactical situation nade such action eiq^edient.
This concentration of Ancrlcan, French, and British air forces

night bombardnent airplanes, taakins a total of 1,481 nachines.
was the larsest a^srecation of air forces to ensage in a single

This

operation on the

\rc stern

front during the entire

vrar.

The concentration of these forces prior to the attack posed

quite a problen.

Any increase In aerial activity would be noted

instantly by the Germans, since every airplane approaching the lines was tracked by b6th sight and sound.
It was necessary, therefore for

Allied aviation to prevent enemy reconnaissance of rear areas.

There

was also a great demand for photographs of the terrain to be covered
in the attack.
12

Thin, too, caused an increase in the number of flights

over the sector, as did the adjustment of Allied artillery fire on

sensitive points in the enemy's lines.

In addition, a propaganda-

dropping campaign began on August 28 and continued until the end of
the war.

Letter from Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the Independent Force, RAF, to John J, Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, AEF, dated September 9, 191", ibid ., 58.
There were 30,000 officers and men to liandle the planes which were deployed on 14 main flying fields, Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I , pp, 238-239,
^^••Photography at St. Mlhlel,*' 1913, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 3, p. 1.

Propaganda leaflets \rere prepared under the supervision of the American Expeditionary Forces Director of Intelligence. The campaign actually reached its greatest intensity in the month Immediately preceding the Armistice. Its purpose V7as to contribute to the general

13

313

On the morning of Scptcanbcr 12, 1918, after a four-hour

artillery bombardment, the Allies launched their attack on the St,

Mlhlel salient.

Aerial reconnaissance had indicated that the salient

was about to be evacuated by the Germans.

Although the enemy was
Tlie

expecting an attack, he had hoped to retire before It occurred,

Allied assault came as a surprise, and the Germans, virtually

decline of German morale, to break the fighting spirit of enemy troops, and to bring about desertions. Self-preservation, 3ood treatment of prisoners, and the inevitable defeat of Germany were the chief arguments. See copies of these pamphlets In La\»rence Stallings (ed.), Tlic First World 1-Jart A Photo.^raphic History (Hev^ York: Simon and Schuster, 1935), p. 251. Apparently the propaganda was effective. Prisoners In increasing numbers surrendered X'7ith leaflets In their liands or concealed on their person. Many of the German prisoners captured in October were convinced that the war was lost, German commanders tried to coTjntoract the effect of the leaflets by paying the troops for turning them in, by punishing them for reading the leaflets, and by conducting lectures to offset the effect of the leaflets. Proclamations against the leaflets, including one by Hindcnburg, were promulgated in increasing numbers in the enemy press. Letters of German officers named the leaflets as a principal factor in the loxrering of morale, Tlie American conrianders reasoned that although the effects of the leaflets Mere uneven they did contribute substantially to an atmosphere of defeat which permeated the German Army at the time of the Armistice, Herbert Blankenhom, "AEF, Air Service, and Propaganda Against the Enemy," 1913, M, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 8, pp. 16-13, If this judgment V7as correct, the principal credit for success should go to the individual fliers who voluntarily accepted this auxiliary assignment, loaded their planes V7ith leaflets, and while observing or regulating artillery fire, showered the Germans with propaganda. Of 5,000,000 copies of 13 original leaflets, more than 3,000,000 xrere dropped over the enemy lines by the American Air Service, In view of the fact that the Germans had proclaimed that they vrould shoot or liang any aviator caught carrying propaganda, the actions of these filers were even more commendable, Britain subsequently forbade her pilots to carry propaganda, while the French paid a bonus to her fliers for every pack of leaflets throim overboard. Early in October, Austria threatened hanging for captured pilots who carried propaganda. In spite of these threats American aviators continued to improvise and experiment with methods of broadcasting leaflets so they would fall individually and not tangle in their machines. One flier even invented a propaganda "bomb" which accurately distributed leaflets. Shortly before the Armistice the British rescinded their order against carrying leaflets. Ibid ,,
pp.

19-20.

314
linmoblllzed, vere forced to interrupt their withdrawal and meet the

attack as best they could.

The main thrust was directed against the

face of the salient bet^^een Richecourt and Fey-en-Haye, on a ten-mile front.
The American First Army, made up of the 1st, 2d, 5th, 26th,

42d, 39th, and 90th Divisions, accompanied by the French 15th Division,

took part in the attack and advanced to a point north of Thiaucourt,

forcing the Germans to retire completely from the St. Mihiol salient
and retreat to the Hindenburs Line.
14

Since Allied arr.ies vjere again attacking an enemy salient,

Mitchell used his numerically superior air forces in much the same way
he had successfully gambled with a smaller force in the Chateau Thierry

campaign.

One third of his almost 1,500 planes were committed to

support of ground operations; the remaining force was divided into two

Jacques A, Chambrun and Charles Marcnches, The Amor lean Army in the European Conflict (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1939), pp. 263-276,
For a summary of Mitchell's proposals for employing his •vlatlon units see his memorandum to the Commanding General, First Army, dated August 20, 1918, as printed in Mitchell, Memoirs of \torld War I , pp. 235-237.

14

Morris and Kendall, Ceiling Unlimited , pp. 181-182,

315

Corps Observation

The Air Service orsanlzation for each corps operating under the

American First Army was

inade

up of one squadron for each division and
The II Colonial Corps Air Service consisted

one squadron for the corps.

entirely of French squadrons, the 28th and 236th.
group
corps,
TTiade

An observation

up of French and American squadrons
units
x^jere

vras

assigned to each

Tliese

component parts of the corps to which they

were assigned and were under direct orders of the corps commanders.
The I Corps Observation Group, commanded by Major George

Puslfer, Jr., was composed of the American 1st, 12th, and 50th Aero

Squadrons and the French 208th and 214th Squadrons.

The 1st Aero

Squadron was assigned to the 2d Division and the 12th to the 5th
Division; the 50th Squadron, recently arrived at the front and

and French 42d Squadrons under the conmand of Major Arthur R, Christie.
All of this Group's squadrons
liad

Salinson planes.

Due to bad weather,

the 104th Squadron pilots v7ere not able to ferry all their planes to

SouiUy when the V Corps Observation Group noved there; some of the
fliers sliared 99th Squadron planes.
20

On September 15, too late to

be in the offensive proper, the 88th Squadron, also equipped \7ith

Salnsons, arrived from the Vesle and was attached briefly to the V

Corps Observation Group.
Tlie

21

German lines on the front from St. Mlhiel north to

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes were organized In approximately the same

manner as on the Toul and Cliateau Thierry Sectors.

The German forces

were favored by the terrain, which offered many natural positions of
great strength; these positions had been
defense.
i^rcll

organized for a prolonged

Some intimation of an impending Allied offensive in this

sector had reached the enemy, and imediately preceding the attack of

September 12 he redistributed his forces.

As far as was

Icnoxai

at the

time, enemy strength in the St. Mihiel sector remained about the same

as it had been throughout the surxier months.
In the air the strength of the enemy cnntinued to be the same

as it had been since the previous spring.

A few pursuit patrols of

Fokker airplanes were reported but it was quite probable that these

20

"History of the V Corps Air Service," 1918,
13-14.

C,

Hy AS AEF,

Vol.

14, pp.

"Organization and Functioning of the Office of the Chief of Air Service, Army Corps," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 12, pp. 2-17.

21

317
v/ere

new planes received as replacenents for the Albatros and Pfalz
Individual observation and photography planes

aircraft fomerly in use.
sometimes
flexj

over the lines, but no unusual number of hostile aircraft

was reported before the opening of the St, Mihiel offensive.

Observation units for each First Army corps were organized
along the sane lines as those of the
I

and III Corps Air Services.

In

the I and IV Corps, the offices of the Corps Chief of Air Service v;ere

located at corps headquarters.

In the V Corps Air Service, assembled
tiad

for the first tine, only one of the three squadrons

had any signi-

ficant experience in active front-line operations; therefore, the Corps
Chief of Air Service and his staff remained at the flying field.
r.ie I

22

Corps Observation Group was located on

tx7o

airfields

near Toul,

The 1st, 12th, and 50th Squadrons were stationed at

Dommartin-les-Toul, the airdrome east of Toul which had formerly been

occupied by the 1st Pursuit Group in the spring of 1918.

The French

203th and 214th Squadrons occupied a newly constructed airdrome at
Bicqucley, just south of Toul,
The entire IV Corps Observation Group The French squadrons of the II

occupied

tlie

airdrome at Ourches.

Colonial Corps were located at Rumont, to the northeast of Bar-le-Duc.
TX\e

V Corps Observation Group occupied a flying field at Souilly,

23

Major Lewis H, Brercton

vias

appointed Wing Comraander of Corps

Observation for the First Army on August 28, 191", and established his
office at Toul on September
1,

He and his staff were

^^"History of the V Corps Air Service," 1918,
Vol,
14, p.

C,

Hy AS AEF,

14.

^^"Tactical History of the Air Service, AEF," 1910, D, Hy AS
AEF, Vol.
1,

p.

14.

318

charged with the instruction and inspection of all observation squadrons or observation croups assigned to army corps. He coordinates their duty and exercises technical supervision over TIils includes the method by which all amy corps aviation units, duty is performed, the supply and proper care of materiel, the supply and instruction of personnel, the location of airdromes, the handling and care of transportation, the state of the telephonic, radio, and other signalling appliances, and methods, the photographic sections, the operations offices, the preparation and forti7arding of order r., reports, and messages, the maintenance of liaison V7ith contiguous troops, and the reporting to the Chief of Air Service of the An:iy any irregularities observed in methods of performing duty either tactical or technical. 24
The Wing Caxiander and his staff had been through the operations on the
riarnc ^7ith the I Corps,

and tlieir experience proved Invaluable in

preparing newly formed squadrons for the St. Mihicl offensive.
Profiting by the lessons learned on the Marne, they took measures to

guard against recurrence of the conditions which had there hindered

observation aviation.

Preparations for the coning offensive

\rere

explained i7lth great care and detail in bulletins prepared in the
office of the VRng Commander and distributed to Air Service units of
each corps.
The plans made by each corps Air Service in preparation for
the St, Mihlel offensive \7ere for the most part essentially the same

as those made to meet the tactical situation at Diatcau Tliierry,

Tlie

corps Air Service commanders assigned the squadrons of their groups to
care for the corps and divisional needs.

Under the direct guidance of

the group comanders, officers of the groups and squadrons working in

conjunction vjith the staffs of the corps chief of Air Service collected
and compiled the data necessary for the coming operations.
24

Particular

Letter from Chief of Air Service, First Army, to the Command, Corps Observation Wing, First Army, dated August 20, 1918, N, lly AS AEF, Vol. 22, p. 43.

319

attention was ^iven to the assignment of liaison officers from each
croup to the corns command posts and the headquarters of each division.
In addition,

the flying officers of the squadrons and the operations

officers of the groups and squadrons made daily trips to the various
command posts of the corps and divisional troops in order to insure a

thorough understanding on the part of all line officers of the elements

necessary to bring about successful cooperation bet^/een the corps Air
Service and the cox^ps ground troops.
In the brief tine at their

disposal, they instructed the infcintry and artillery in the details of

Infantry contact patrols and artillery fire adjustments.
Tlie

25

plan of cotmunications between the office of the Wing

Commander, the various corps Giiefs of Air Service, the corps obser-

vation groups, and the command posts of each corps was the same as
tluit

used at Cliateau Tliierry.

In addition to the custom of assigning

an c>qierienced observer to artillery connand posts and the headquarters
of each division, an Air Service officer was also sent to the head-

quarters of the corps operating on either flank of the American First
Army,
26

During the period of preparation, visual and photographic
reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and training exercises with

artillery and infantry

\7ere

carried out.

Visual reconnaissance of the

corps and divisional sectors was performed routinely at dawn and
25

Plan of Employment of Air Service Units, Annex Number 3, Field Order Number 9, Headquarters, AEF, September 7, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 , VIII, 215-216,
Plan of Liaison, Annex Number 4, Field Order Number 9, Headquarters, AEF, September 7, 1918, in ibid., pp. 218-219.

320

twilight of each day.

A few special visual reconnaissance missions were
Visual reconnaissance was

dispatched to secure particular information.

valuable only in tl^t It kept the connand informed of the situation in
the German lines opposite each corps.

Due to the inactivity of the

enemy at this period most of the information secured in this manner was
of a negative nature, but it assured
tlie

staff

tliat

there were no new

developments in the general tactical situation.

On photographic recon-

naissance during the period of preparation, oblique views were taken
of the enemy territory immediately opposite the front lines of each

corps.

Tliis

type of photosraphy proved of great value in the prepara27

tion of detailed attack plans.

Due to the necessity of veiling all preparations for the

offensive, there

\ras

little attempt to adjust artillery fire.

Only a

few rounds to register the fire of new batteries on certain points were

spotted by aerial observers.

Training exercises to prepare infantry

and artillery units for cooperation with airplane observers v;ere

conducted as frequently as possible.

All aerial operations conducted

in preparation for the St, Mihiel offensive were limited by the

unfavorable iroathcr which prevailed during the early days of September.
On the morning of September 12, IQIT, when the attack was
launched, a heavy mist, low-lying cloud banks, and inter-;ittent rain

combined to make aerial observation extremely difficult.

Notwith-

standing this fact, infantry contact patrols and artillery surveillance
planes performed their respective missions throughout the daylight
Graphs of the Photographic and Visual Reconnaissance Ilade by the I Corps Observation .:^oup, August 31 to September 16, 1918, in A, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 29, p, 12.
27

321

hours.

Thus the command was kept informed of the general prosress of

the battle and at periodic Intervals was given the location of

advancing troops.

Artillery planes were able to regulate artillery

fire on fugitive targets only by taking advantage of momentary gaps in
the clouds and mist, vhcn they could observe and report the location
of such targets.

Aerial observation operations accomplished on the

following day, September 13, were virtually a repetition of the pre-

vious day, for the sane unfavorable weather conditions continued.
On September 14, the one day during the offensive which was

favorable for the conduct of aerial operations, missions of every type

were dispatched throughout the hours of daylight.

Infantry contact

patrols and visual reconnaissance missions kept the connand well
informed as to the progress of the attacking troops and of the situation

within the German lines to a depth of five miles.

Photographic

missions produced a large number of useful photographs of the enemy's
front line positions and some successful artillery adjustments irere

accomplished against fugitive targets located in the enemy lines.
Early on the morning of the 14th, there was a noticeable
increase of hostile pursuit flights.
Some of the best German fliers
\jcre

atmospheric conditions made novcnent on the n^oijnd vlr.iblc, observation
teams were in the air in numl>ers sufficient to
follox.--

movement of

German and Allied troops.

The information thus procured, except in a

few instances, was speedily transmitted to advanced infantry and

artillery command posts; It was first sent from the plane by radio and
later was confirmed by xnrltten messases dropped at the appropriate

command post.
As information agents the airplanes operating in cooperation

with artillery units were not all that could be desired.

There were

several things xjhich contributed to the lack of success In adjusting

artillery fire on fugitive targets.

Although some of the squadrons

which took part In the St, Mlhiel operation had had experience
operating over quiet sectors, many squadrons
vrere

totally inexperienced

and none of them had participated in large-scale offensive operations.
As a consequence, some of the observers failed to report directly to

artillery batteries the fugitive targets which they located during

missions over the German lines.
^^Ibid., pp. 20-21.

They noted the information and sent

323
It to the corps cormand posts but failed to realize that their first

duty was to convey this intelligence to the proper artillery units where
it could be given immediate attention. In a few instances when repeated

radio calls to artillery command posts did not elicit a response, the

observer then neglected to drop a

\>nritten

message.

On the other hand,

the artillery battalions, and in particular those assigned to fire on

fugitive targets, repeatedly failed to respond to radio calls from the

airplanes assigned to cooperate with them.

30

The same problems which had plagued air-to-ground contact at

Chateau Thierry reappeared In the St. Mlhlel offensive.

In some cases

the trouble was a matter of faulty installation, but the majority of

failures could be traced to the insufficiently trained and Inexperienced
crews assigned to artillery communications stations.
It was also

found that dropped \«ritten messages were often lost because search

crews at the panel stations failed to be alert for airplanes seeking
to communicate with the

comand post.

The Air Service was not always

notified of clianges made In the location of the batteries and battalion
radio stations, and mfiny failures of the artillery to respond to radio
calls from the airplanes resulted.
In one instance six adjustments

had been prearranged for the next day; during the night all six

batteries were moved and although the artillery knew

tliat

an Air Service

liaison officer was on duty at division headquarters, the Air Service
was not advised of the cloange in location of these units.
30
31
31

In some

Haslett, Luck on the

Wln.i .

pp.

113-114,

"History of the
12,

I

Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS

AEF, Vol,

p.

76.

324

cases where It was necessary to move batteries designated to fire on
fugitive targets, comnanders neglected to assign other batteries to

replace

thera

during their movement.

Without better cooperation on the

part of the artillery In forwarding information necessary for the

conduct of operations to the Air Service, little success could have
been expected.

During the greater part of the time in which the observation
units had operated over the western front, the weather had been

excellent for aerial operations.

In the short spells of poor weather

which had occurred during the late spring and sunner, Air Service
operations were seldom undertaken; occasionally, low clouds had forestalled photographic flights.
\rere

At St. Mihiel for the first time missions
Only a downpour or a
The flying

sent out almost irrespective of weather.

thick fog was allo\«5d to impede the conduct of operations.

personnel learned to carry out reconnaissance and infantry contact

patrols at extremely

lov?

altitudes, trusting in occasional breaks in

the clouds and mists to make the ground visible.

Furthermore, they

achieved considerable success in securing general information as to the
positions of friendly infantry lines under such conditions.
The

knowledge that some success could be achieved in this manner was

utilized in great measure during the operations conducted from that
time on,

Low-lcvcl infantry contact patrol and visual reconnaissance

missions conducted even during lonfavorable weather became an accepted
pattern of aerial observation during the St, Mihiel offensive.

325

Army Observation

The First Army Observation Group, coramanded by Major John W.

Reynolds, was formed around the 91st Aero Squadron to which the 9th

Night Reconnaissance and 24th Aero Squadrons were added.

Due to the

inexperience of the flying personnel, the 24th Squadron was unable to

participate to any great extent.

The 9th Squadron could not function

at all because of lack of equipment and training.

Four French

Squadrons regulated army artillery fire.

32

The operations order issued by the Chief of Air Service, First

Army, on September 10, 1918, made the First Army Observation Group

responsible for the reconnaissance of the enemy's back area opposite
the entire sector of attack.

The First Army General Staff was to be

supplied with information concerning the disposition and movement of
eneriy forces, and the

enemy sector was to be kept under constant

surveillance.

The Chief of Staff, First Army, submitted a map on

which were indicated the various artillery objectives to be photographed on every day of the attack.
33

Beginning at daybreak, formations of three planes were
scheduled to leave the airdrome at two hour intervals to reconnoiter
the enemy's rear areas.

Formations of at least three planes were

necessary, as there was no pursuit protection available; pursuit

escorts could not penetrate German lines to the depth that army
32

"History of the First Army Observation Group," 1913, AS AEF, Vol. 8, p. 202,
33

C,

Hy

"History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, pp. 12-14,

326

reconnaissance planes \jerc required to so.
the

It was alnrost certain tlmt

amy
34

observation planes would be vigorously attacked by enemy alr-

craft,

Metz and Conflans were artillery objectives to be photographed;

both points were far behind German lines and were especially well guarded by enemy pursuit planes.
It

was considered necessary to send

as many protecting planes as possible with each photosraphic plane so

that the mission could be accomplished in spite of enemy opposition.

35

Planes unfit for service over the lines \»ere kept ready to carry

messages between the airdromes and the First Army headquarters dropping
ground located near Ligny-en-Barrois,
Tlie

36

attack began the morning of September 12 at five o'clock.

At dawn heavy banks of dark rain clouds fanned by a strong southwest

wind were racing across the sky.
conditions,
t\<io

In spite of these adverse weather

planes left the airdrome shortly after daybreak to
One plane found a rift in the clouds

carry out visual reconnaissance.

through which it descended and gathered valuable information; the

other was less fortunate and returned to the airdrome after an

On the afternoon of September 7 three airplanes of the 91st Squadron on a photographic mission vere attacked by five enemy machines who broke up the American formation, forcing one of the Air Service planes to land north of Conflans, Cablegram Number 116, from General Headquarters, /"ttnerican Expeditionar>- Forces to Washington, September 7, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army In the World War , 1917-1919 , XIII, 315-316.

"Methods of Protecting Observation Aeropleines," 191S, A, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 29, p. 10,
Field Order Nimber 9, First Army, AEF, September 7, 1918, In Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917 1919, VIII, 206,

35

327

unsuccessful attempt to find an opening in the clouds and fog.

37

Because of the prevailing adverse weather conditions, schedules

prepared the preceding day were disregarded, for the low clouds made
formation flying impossible. Photography was out of the question.

Single planes were dispatched whenever the weather pemitted.

During the first day the enemy territory was successfully

reconnoitered to a depth of from 35 to 50 miles.
carried out at altitudes exceeding 3,000 feet.

No missions were

These flights were

accomplished without the loss of a single plane or even a single
casualty.
38

This success was due largely to the fact that during the

months preceding the attack, the pilots and observers had gained a
thorough Icnowledge of the entire sector, both through experience and
because of extensive training given them during earlier operations.
spite of occasional heavy rainstorms, the excellent condition of the
In

flying field occupied by the First Army Observation Group made it

possible for planes to take off and land without breaking propellers.

39

Successful reconnoitering of German back areas became extremely

difficult due to the rapid increase in number of enemy pursuit planes
as the battle progressed.

Nevertheless, the First Army Observation

Group was able to furnish the First Army General Staff with complete and

accurate information regarding movement and disposition of enemy forces,
September 14 was marked by a decided change in the weather; the
sky was clear and visibility was excellent.
Two airplanes from the

that morning several photography missions dispatched by the Group were

only partially successful because each formation was repeatedly attacked
by superior numbers of German pursuit planes.

These planes attacked

the American fliers with a determination and persistence never before

encountered in this particular sector.

40

In the course of the after-

noon several photographic missions were successfully accomplished in
spite of enemy opposition.
The American Expeditionary Forces concluded their attack on the St. Mihiel salient on September 16,
1918,

Reconnaissance flights

were made throughout the day.

Though there was a certain degree of

enemy aerial opposition, no difficulty was experienced in carrying out
any of the missions.
41

During the next three days, missions were dispatched only for
the purpose of keeping up a general light surveillance of the enemy

sector.

On September 20 orders were received directing the removal of

the First Army Observation Group in accordance with the general plan of

the transfer of the First Army to the sector west of Verdun.

The Group%

new airdrome was located at Vavincourt, Meuse,
40

The advance echelon

The only German pursuit planes encountered in the St, Mihiel sector prior to September 1, 1918, were Pfalz and Albatros scouts. At the high altitudes at which the 91st Aero Squadron cruised, the Salr.son plane had a decided speed advantage over these enemy planes, both in climbing and in level flight. The reinforcing enemy units were equipped with the Fokker D 7 scout plane, which had a considerable advantage in climbing speed over the Salmson. At high altitudes, however, the Salmson was much faster than the German aircraft. "History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, pp. 21-23.

^^IMd,,

pp. 25-2S.

329

was sent out Immediately upon receipt of the order, and by the 22d of

September the move to the new station was completed.

42

Despite the prevailing Inclement weather, which greatly

hampered flying, the First Army General Staff was supplied with
necessary Information of the enemy during the reduction of the St.
Mlhlel salient.
Only three planes were lost, two of them flown by

inexperienced teams of the 24th Aero Squadron,

Against this loss, the

records show a total of five enemy planes destroyed by First Army

Observation Group fliers during this campaign.

43

During the entire period of operations of the First Army

Observation Group on the front there was a deficiency of intelligence
forwarded to this command.
The nature of the duties performed by this
If

organization were such that it could work almost independently.

there had been closer relations among the various units within the

First Army, better results might have been obtained.
St, Mlhlel offensive, which lasted only a short time,

Throughout the
the First Army

Observation Group had little information regarding the progress of the
ground troops or anything else that was taking place except the reports
brought back by observers of their own organization,

Bonibardment

The 1st Day Bombardment Group, composed of the 11th, 20th, and

"History of the First Army Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. (3, p. 226.
"History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, p. 25.

42

43

330

96th Squadrons and commanded by Major James L, Dunsworth, was formed
two days before the St. Mlhiel offensive opened.

Some of the pilots

of the first two sqioadrons had served with French units at the front

but most of them t«!re inexperienced.

The two new squadrons were

equipped with DH 4 airplanes with Liberty motors made in the United
States; the 96th still flew Breguets,
The French made available a

force of day and night bombardment planes and for the coming offensive
the British Independent Air Force put a number of bomber squadrons at

the disposal of the American First Army,

44

It is desired to utilize bombing squadrons assigned or attached to the First Army for the purpose of cooperating in the general mission of the Air Service, in defeating the enemy's aviation,

interfering with his concentration of troops and materiel on the ground, taking part in combat against his fighting troops, and exploiting their defeat. . . . Beginning at once, it is desired to have night bombers, British and French attack: (a) Enemy airdromes and parks and endeavor to crijTple his Air Service by destroying planes, hangars, aviation materiel and personnel on the ground. . . (b) Railroad centers and lines, . . (c) Concentrations of troops and supplies. . , ,^
These general remarks from the First Army Assistant Chief of Staff
Colonel Robert McCleave to First Army Chief of Air Service Colonel

William Mitchell outlined the activities for the period of preparation
for the attack.

No airdromes seem to have been hit, however, until

September 26, the opening day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.
the daylight hours were rainy and foggy, the nights
x^^ere

While

clear, making

possible nightly attacks by the British Independent Air Force on
44
D,

Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, pp,

"Tactical History of Day Bombardment at St, Mlhiel," 1918, 132-133,

Letter from the First Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to the Chief of Air Service, First Army, dated August 25, 1913, in Uhm
Collection, USAF HD Archives.

45

331

Longuyon, Conflans, Metz, and other rail points which the enemy was

using to bring up reserves.

46

The French night bombardment group,

augmented by one Italian squadron, also attacked these points as well
as enemy posts of conmand and concentration centers nearer the front.

Qiemy bombers were also active by night and the French night bombard-

ment group was used for keeping watch over the enemy's nocturnal
activity as well as for bombing.
47

The primary targets of the 1st Day Bombardment Group during the St. Mihlel offensive were hostile troop concentrations Immediately

with traffic or reinforcements and supplies from the sector east of the
Moselle River,
x^as

The main object of day bombardment during the offensive

to confuse and to destroy enemy troops narchlng into, or retreating

from, battle.

48

During the days of exploitation, the bombers

continued to hamper as much as possible the enemy's withdrawal of
personnel and materiel.
,

49

Because of unfavorable flying weather throughout the entire

campaign together with the shortage of airplanes and the muddy airfield,
46
47

Jones, The

VJar

in the Air .

VI,

148-149,
I.

Mitchell, Memoirs of World ^ar

pp. 239-241.

Memorandum from First Army Chief of Staff to Chief of Air Service, First Army, September 11, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . VIII, 240-241.
"Tactical History of Day Bombardment at St, Mihlel," 1918, D, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 1, pp, 132-133.

48

49

332
the bomber formations which crossed enemy lines were to small to cope

with the German aerial opposition,

A closed V formation of 14 or 16

bombers was self-protected against ordinary attack, but a formation of

six bi-place planes did not have sufficient armament to withstand an

organized attack by 20 to 30 airplanes.

Ehemy pursuit would break off

combat with Allied pursuit to attack the bombers, making every effort
to wipe them out. By operating deep within the German lines, Allied

During the preparation period from late in August to September
12 the 1st I'ursult Wing,

flying over the front between the Meuse and

"History of the Organization, Development, and Grov;th of the 1st Pursuit Group," 191S, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 9, p. 37.
^"^••History of the First Pursuit Wing,

St, Mlhlel," 1918,

C,

Ity

AS AEF, Vol.
53

7,

p.

163,

Letter from Chief of Air Service, First Army, to Chief of Staff, First Army, September 7, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . VIII, 227,
Special Order Number 163, First Army, AEF, September 8, 1918, ibid ., p. 228,
54

was in the air from daylight to dark, with the loi«?r patrol flying at
from 8,000 to 12,000 feet and the hi;^her patrol from 12,000 to 16,500
feet; the patrols overlapped each other by 15 minutes.

They were not

authorized to penetrate the enemy lines more than about three miles.
The 1st Pursuit Group moved quietly into Rembercourt airdrome

west of the Meuse and took up duties similar to those of the 1st Pursuit
Wing, preventing enemy reconnaissance of the V Corps area and pro-

tecting Allied observation planes, using as few planes as possible In
order to preserve the secrecy of its location.
Before the offensive

got under way, the headquarters staff of the 1st Pursuit Group spent

most of its time perfecting liaison with other organizations while the
pilots acquainted themselves with the new territory.
Several advance

landing fields were spotted for possible use during the Allied offensive.

High winds, low clouds, and intermittent rain prevailed on

September 10, 11, and 12, but on orders from the First Army, both the
1st Pursuit Wing and the 1st Pursuit Group performed valuable individual

reconnaissances as deep as Stain, VigneuUes-les-Hattonchatcl, and
Tliiaucourt,
Tliese

missions, made in foul \jeather, against heavy anti-

aircraft and machine gun fire, and at altitudes of 1,400 feet or less, disclosed that the Germans were preparing to withdraw from the salient.
"History of the First Pursuit Wing, St. Mihlel," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 7, p. 171.
"Tactical History of American Pursuit Aviation, St. Mihlel," 1, pp. 98-100.
Ibid .. pp. 94-98.
55

down on a group of German soldiers and opened fire, killing six
His plane was forced down behind enemy lines

men and v;ounding others.
near Murvaux.

He was quickly surrounded by German troopers.

Luke

refused to surrender, pulled out his pistol, and fought until he himself

was killed.

He vjas the first flier to be awarded the Congressional

Medal of Honor, although it was granted posthumously.

Balloons

Fifteen American and six French balloon companies, all of them
under American command, took part in the St, I'ihiel campaign.
Each

front line division and each corps was assigned a balloon unit to

regulate artillery fire and six balloon companies
army artillery.

vjere

assigned to the

Tliroughout the four days of the offensive the balloon

companies were assigned and deployed as follows:

with the

I Corps,

the

1st Balloon Company at Doncvre-en-Hayc, the 2d at Griscourt, the 5th

at Dieulouard, and the 42d at ViUe-au-Val; with the IV Corps, the 3d

Balloon Company at Villers-sur-Mcuse, the 7th at Somnedieuc, the Cth
at Dieue-sur-Meuse, and the 12th at Rattentant; and with the French II Colonial Corps, the 20th Balloon Company at r.iillombois, the 52d at
64

Edv7ard V. Rickenbacker received the Congressional Medal of Honor for action on September 25, 1918, while Luke's was for action performed on September 29, Rickenbacker was not presented the medal until years later, \(rtiile Luke's father received his son'j award soon after his son's death, U.S., Department of the Army, Medal of Honor of the United States of Ar.icrlca (Washington: Government Printing Office, 194G), pp. 254, 258.

338

Bannoncourt, and the 53d at Vijpiot (all French units).

Assigned to

the army artillery were the 10th Balloon Company at Ansauvllle, the

nth

at Cezpucourt, the 16th at Toul (all American units); and the 39th

at Minorville, the 41st at Gironville, and the 93d at Genicourt-surc ^

Heuse (all French units).
In so far as the proximity to the front permitted,

German

positions ^^re thoroughly reconnoitered from balloons before the attack,
TTic

ideal observation position for balloons was an altitude of one mile
The territory beyond the front

and about four miles behind the lines.

line was carefully studied from maps and photographs.

Definite

itineraries of advance x^ere planned and the positions beyond the lines
so determined tliat each balloon could mantain its approximate place

during the offensive.

Hydrogen for the balloons was distributed from

the depots at Chandcney and Rattentant and baskets and other accessories

were procured from air depots at Paris,

No shortage in equipment was

encountered to limit l>alloon operations.

Telephone connections between

balloons and artillery and associated ground units were adequate and
efficient.
Each balloon company kept one officer at the headquarters

to \jhich it was assigned.

On September 12, after the initial assault, the infantry

advanced according to schedule to the first phase line.

Resistance was

weak and ineffective and by 4 o^clock that afternoon all divisions had

unfavorable for aerial observation, the Air Service was able to
cooperate successfully with the advancing divisions and
\-ilth

tue corps,

keeping them informed as to the position of the front, giving accurate
information as to what opposition they V70uld meet, and having the
enemy sector constantly under surveillance to preclude any surprise

counteroffensive.

Roads and to\ms in rear areas x^re carefully

watched and suspicious Indications of German activity were noted and
reported Immediately.
Photographs taken were invaluable to
tlie

advancing troops and to the First Army General Staff directing the
operation.
In many instances the Air Service aided advancing infantry

by strafing enemy troops on the ground, and on several occasions Allied

planes forced German soldiers to abandon their posts.

A significant measure of the degree of tactical surprise
attained at St. Mihiel was the over\jhelaing numerical superiority of
the American and French aerial forces at the beginning of the action

almost 1,500 against an estimated 300 German airplanes.

For the first

time the Americans had greater strength in the air than the enemy.

They

were able to capture and maintain the initiative in spite of increasing
opposition from the Germans, who brought in some of their best pursuit

343

units from other parts of the front. Taken as a whole the operation at St, Mihiel was a success
for the Air Service,
It stimulated the confidence of the line troops

toward the Air Service and demonstrated to the other branches of the

First Army, including the General Staff, that if properly employed,
the Air Service was a useful arm of the service.

The St. Mihiel

campaign was invaluable in instructing various line organizations In
the proper utilization, possibilities, and limitations of aerial

observation.

do\jn 12

American aviators kept ccmmand of the air. They brought balloons and more than 60 German planes, while losing less than a third of that number. See Cablegram Number 137 from General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces to Washington, September 28, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War . 1917-1919 . XIII, 335,

CHAPTER XII

OPERATIONS IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE CAtlPAIGN

Introduction

One of the most far-reaching effects of the rapid increase of

American troops in Europe, and the subsequent Allied and American
successes during the summer of 1918, was that it became possible to

undertake in September a gigantic convergent offensive against the
German forces on the western front.
Plans for this movement were

agreed upon and as a formality of coordination were promulgated by

Marshal Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on September

3,

1918,

Under these plans, the American forces were to advance northward

between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on the left
by the French Fourth Array west of the Argonne,

Northeast of Paris the

French armies were to renew their efforts to force the Germans back
from the Alsne River, while farther north the British vrere to continue

operations in the direction of St. Quenton and Cambrai,

The Allies

also planned to attack near Ypres to free the Belgian coast.
The significance of the American part in the general plan lay
In the fact that its attack was to be directed against a most vital

point in the German system of railroad conmunl cations.

An attack in

the vicinity of the Meuse River, if carried far enough to gain control
of these railways, would divide the German armies.

Once this was

344

345

accomplished, Germany would be uxiable to maintain her forces In France
and Belgium because communications would be practically impossible

except by the long and circuitous route through Liege and the Rhine

River Valley,
When the decision was made to attack In the Meuse-Argonne

region the American First Army was busily engaged in preparations for
the St, Mihiel offensive, planned for September 12.

Because of the

limited time available, however, the assembly of American divisions

not scheduled for the St, Mihiel attack was begun inmcdiately and
detailed plans for the larger battle
\rere

prepared at once.

The movement of men and materiel was made entirely under cover
of darkness, all activity being suspended and the men kept in conceal-

ment during daylight hours.

Consequently, the roads leading into the

area were scenes of activity at night as troops and artillery, ammunition, and supplies moved steadily forward.
On most of the Meuse-

Argonne front French soldiers remained in the outpost positions until
the last minute to prevent the Germans from seeing or otherwise securing

information of the presence of large nimbers of American soldiers in the

region and thus receiving advance warning of the Impending offensive.
In all, about 220,000 Allied soldiers were moved out of the area and

approximately 600,000 Americans were moved into it.
Finally on the night of September 25-26 the First Army stood
on its new front, ready for the momentous battle that was to begin at dawn.
The III Corps was on the right, the V Corps was In the center,

and the I Corps was on the left.
the German Third and Fifth Annies,

Opposing the American First Army were

346

On September 26, 1918, after a three-hour artillery bombardment,
the Meuse-Argonne offensive,
the final campaign of World War
I,

was

launched.

The action in this campaign performed by American forces

supported by French units may be divided into three distinct phases.
The first phase, taking place in late September, included an initial

attack and successful advance.

The second phase, covering the month

of October, was one of bitter fighting, during which American troops

advanced slowly, wearing out the enemy and enlarging the front of the
attack.
The third and last phase, beginning in November, \Jas a general

assault by the American Expeditionary Forces, who advanced and forced
the enemy back until hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918.
In this offensive,

the Allies were operating from a salient

which made them vulnerable to aerial attack because of the transportation congestion of both men and supplies.

Brigadier General William

Mitchell's forces struck first, gained ascendency in the air and bombed
German supply centers, forcing the enemy to hold back some of his
planes to defend his rear areas.
The number of aircraft under Mitchell's

command was much smaller than it had been in the St, Mihiel campaign,

consisting initially of only 800 planes, of which almost 600 were
assigned to American Air Service units.
Before the beginning of the

Meuse-Argonne offensive the French had withdrawn nearly three quarters
of their planes which had taken part in the St, Mihiel operations.

Hlorris and Kendall, Ceiling Unlinited , p, 182.

Letter from Chief of Staff, French Armies of the North and Northeast to the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, dated September 18, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the VJorld War, 1917-1919 .
IX,

2

37-38.

347

Corps Observation

Shortly after the conclusion of the St, Mihiel offensive a

redistribution of units took place betv/een various Air Service organizations In preparation for the operations planned for the fall of 1918,
The IV Corps front was to be enlarged to Include the sector occupied
by the I Corps during the St, Mihiel campaign.
The IV Corps, the

French II Colonial Corps, and the French XXXIII Corps remained in
place and did not take part in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.
The 90th

Aero Squadron was relieved from the IV Corps Observation Group, leaving
the American 8th and 135th Squadrons and French 218th Squadron in the
IV Corps Group at Ourches,
3

The Air Service organization of the

French II Colonial Corps was composed of the same squadrons as had

participated in the St, Mihiel offensive.

The Air Service of the French

XXXIII Corps was made up of French squadrons with headquarters at
Beauzee.
The American
I,

III, and V Corps were to take part in the next

main offensive.
J,

The III Corps Air Service, headed by Captain William

Schieffelin, Jr,, with its units deployed at SoulUy, Vadelaincourt,

and Beauzee, was composed of the 88th and 90th Aero Squadrons and the
A

French 205th and 284th Squadrons,

The Air Service of the V Corps,
F.

under the cormand of Major Martin

Scanlon, Included the American

99th and 104th Squadrons and the French 214th and 215th Squadrons.
•^••History of the

of artillery immediately to the rear of Infantry positions there was a

formidable concentration of heavy artillery located throughout the

area to the west of Verdun,

With the exception of the French aerial

forces, which had been relieved, the other branches of the First Army

Air Service remained approximately at the same strength as had fought
in the St, Mihiel campaign.

The Germans occupied positions of great strength along the

entire front of the First Army,

Intricate trench systems and well-

organized strong points protected by barbed wire entanglements were

occupied by enemy Infantry units supported by a sizable array of artillery.

Here as in the St, Mihiel salient the heavily wooded terrain

gave the enemy the advantage for a prolonged resistance to attack.
Since September 14, 1918, when the comparatively negligible

hostile pursuit forces of the St, Mihiel sector were augmented by the
arrival of some of the best German squadrons, the enemy air forces had

been greatly Increased in the area opposite the Meuse-Argonne sector
by the addition of pursuit, observation, and bombardment units.
The

success of the Allied offensives further west had made it increasingly
Important to the enemy that no advance be made by the Allied armies in
the Meuse-Argonne sector.

As a consequence, a large number of his best

aerial units were sent to operate in the latter region.
The necessity for complete secrecy during the preparation of
the Meuse-Argonne offensive prevented all operations on the part of

350

new Ancrlcan observation units brought into the sector until the day
set for the besinning of the offensive.

Only the French squadrons

which

Ivid

been working In the sector for a considerable tine were

allovred to carry out their routine reconnaissance, photography, and

artillery adjustment missions.
Detailed plans of employment of aerial units under their

command i;ere prepared by the commanding officers of each corps obser-

vation group.

Newly arrived observers of the Arierican squadrons were

to fly V7ith pilots of the French squadrons already operating at the

front so they could familiarize themselves with the new sector before
the day of attack.

Observers

x/ho

were to act as liaison officers were
Other liaison officers

sent to the comniand posts In each division.

were stationed with the corps to the right and left of the First Army.

Measures were taken to procure the detailed information necessary to
carry out each type of observation mission and to insure the rapid

transmission of such information to observation units after the opening
of the offensive.

Careful plans of the precise methods to be employed

in cooperating with artillery were dravm up and were discussed with

artillery officers during visits made by Air Service officers to
artillery command posts. Particular attention vas given to training

infantry units in marlcing the front line by panels during infantry

contact patrols.

Personal visits were made to many radio stations by
bctx-zeen

squadron radio officers to Insure comnuni cat ions and command posts.

the Air Service

Whenever possible, exercises were conducted with

artillery and infantry units before they entered the lines.
Soon after the two American squadrons of the III Corps

351

Observation Group arrived at Soullly, an Infantry contact school was established and operated under the same general plan as the one
o

organized by the III Corps Observation Group on the Vcsle,

Soon

thereafter similar schools were established at the airdromes of the I

and V Corps Observation Groups,

9

Steps were taken to s^ard against repeated radio failure

between the airplane and grotind stations.

When an airplane (whose

radio set had been successfully tested over the field before departure)

called and failed to receive a response from a ccmraand post radio
station, a memorandum noting the instance was forwarded to the corps

chief signal officer for proper action to prevent a recurrence.
In assigning missions to squadrons, general plans developed in

earlier campaigns were used.

In each corps observation group there

was one French heavy artillery squadron to \7hlch all surveillance and

adjustment of fire for heavy artillery was assigned.
vrere

Other missions
In

more or less evenly divided among the remaining squadrons.

cases V7here It was impracticable to furnish protection by observation

planes from the group Itself, arrangements \rere made for protection of

photographic missions by pursuit escorts.

The plan consisted of

"History of the III Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS ABF, Vol. 13, p. 217,
"History of the I Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 12, p. 83, and "History of the V Corps Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 14, p. 122.
Letter from Chief of Staff, French Armies of the North and Northeast to the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, dated September 18, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Amy in the World War. 1917-1919 ,
IX,

g

37.

352

diverting a pursuit patrol from its regular barrage patrol at the hour
desired.
All arrangements as to the exact time and place of rendezvous,

the course to be pursued, and other such matters were left to the

photographic and pursuit patrol leaders.
Each type of observation mission carried out by the American
Air Service during the Meuse-Argonne offensive will be discussed

separately rather than attempt to narrate the activities of each unit
In turn.

The unfavorable weather encountered during the St, Mihiel

offensive continued the greater part of the time between September 26
and November 11, 1918,
There were occasional days ideal for flying

but for the most part atmospheric conditions were poor to impossible

and proved a great handicap in carrying out aerial operations.

Haze

and fog obscured the ground to a great extent in the early morning and
late afternoon during the last four weeks of the offensive.
In

considering the work performed by the observation units these weather
conditions should be kept in mind as an element which affected the

execution of each type of mission.

In the matter of reconnaissance

and infantry contact patrols they produced some radical departures
from the methods ordinarily used.

Most of the photographic missions undertaken from September 26
to November 11 were confined to well-defined areas specified by the

intelligence sections of the corps staff g.

Atmospheric conditions

were so infrequently favorable for taking photographs that the missions
were necessarily directed to cover areas of the most immediate interest.

Operations Order Number 11, Chief of Air Service, First Army, September 28, 191S, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 12, p, 56.

353

Elaborate preparations were made to have airplanes ready to take off at
the slightest prospect of success.

All photographic missions vjere

ordered by the intelligence section of the corps general staff; they

were carefully prepared by the squadron observers working in conjunction

with the branch intelligence officer of the group, and at the first
sign of the approach of favorable atmospheric conditions the missions
left the airdrome.

As had been the case during the preparation of the

St. Mihiel offensive, oblique photographs were particularly useful in

making plans for the advance of infantry units.

At other times it was

necessary to photograph certain sensitive points in the German lines.
These missions were generally assigned to flying teams who were

thoroughly familiar with the exact locality to be photographed so that
no mistake would be made In securing photographs of the exact points.

Unfavorable weather prevailed to such an extent that It was
never practical to attempt to photograph all the area of the front
lines as fast as the troops advanced.
The most hoped for was a col-

lection of photographs of the areas most important in view of the tactical situation.

At certain times during the offensive, when the need

for photographs became imperative, missions of this nature were dis-

patched even when atmospheric conditions made their failure almost
certain.

This was done in the hope of seizing advantage of a momentary
It is interesting

break in the clouds or fog after reaching the lines.
to note that considerable success met these efforts.

At times when the

weather was comparatively favorable in the vicinity of the airfields,
the sky might be a mass of clouds over the front lines.

At other times

when fog and mist made it quite difficult to take off at the airdrome.

354

missions operating over the lines to a depth of five miles over enemy
territory were able to secure a number of useful photographs.
12

In the Meuse-Argonne offensive, as had been the case on the

Mame, photographic missions were invariably given protection against
hostile pursuit planes.
The large number of enemy pursuit flights

operating in the sector made it practically a certainty that a photography plane would be attacked during the course of a mission.
escorts were utilized to a large extent by photographic missions

locating front line units inspired these lines set to the tune of
••When You Come to the End of a Perfect Day," a

nostalgic song written

by Carrie Jacobs Bond, popular during World War I:

When you sit on the edge of your bunk all day. With a map of France in your hand; And you search for a spot out in no-nan's land. Not so very far away; And you know that the archies are bursting fine. And the 50th is on its way. And you Imow that our pilots have found the line. That's the end of a perfect day.^^
On October 6, 1918, a plane from the 50th Aero Squadron was

sent out to drop supplies to the isolated 2d Battalion, 308th Infantry
Regiment, 77th Division, with whora contact had been lost.
The wrong

coordinates had been given for the "Lost Battalion,"

20

and no panels

were displayed when called for.

First Lieutenant Harold E, Goettler,

the pilot, and his observer. Second Lieutenant Eruin R. Bleckley of the 130th Field Artillery, discovered as they were flying close to the ground that they were dropping food, ammunition, and medicine to

German soldiers who were firing at them.

On a second trip they flew

still lo\Jcr and their plane was brought down by enemy rifle and machine

The battalion was not really lost but had been enveloped by German forces. For several days it was fired upon by Allied artillery Pinned in by superior German because its er^act location was unkno\m. forces, this decimated unit was caught up in a situation not unlike The that of the American soldiers at Bastogne in World War II. but Maj. Charles W, Whittlesey Germans demanded that the 2d surrender, reportedly answered, "Go to Hell," instead of Brig. Gen, Anthony C, MacAuliffe's famous reply, "Nuts." Thomas M, Johnson and Fletcher Bobbs-MerriU Co., 1938), Pratt, Tlie Lost Battalion (New York:

358 the Gongresslonal Medal of Honor,
21
Tlte

2d Battalion finally displayed

its panels, the correct coordinates were marked, and the "Lost

Battalion" was rescued the following day.

22

After the establisluaent of infantry contact schools at the
airdromes of each observation group, there was an improvement in the
performance of infantry contact patrols.
While there were a large

number of instances in which the observer was forced to fly at extremely
low altitudes to locate the front lines by distinguishing the uniforms
of the ground troops, on the whole, marking out the line by the infantry

was far better than it had been in any previous campaign.

23

Many ground troops thought that American airplanes were to be

recognized by a star painted on the bottom surface of the lower wings,
an Insignia which had been used in the United States. Even as late as

October, 1918, the red, white, and blue concentric circle insignia

used by Anerican airplanes at the front was practically unkno\-m.
Failures of infantry units to respond to airi)lane signals were often
due to their mistaken assumption that the airplanes they
sax^

A copy of one of the Air Service information sheets dropped to the doughboys Is printed In Mitchell, Memoirs of Vtorld Mar I , pp. 262-263.

27

360
of the terrain immediately In front of advancing Allied Infantry,

After

locating hostile machine gun nests, strong points, and other defenses
likely to retard the attack, this information, together vith the

location and strength of enemy rear guards, was transmitted to frontline troops by dropped written messages.

In this way infantry units

were kept informed of developments in the area Inmedlately ahead.
These "cavalry reconnaissance" patrols frequently machine gunned concen-

trations of German soldiers who xjere impeding the progress of Allied

infantry units.

28

Although large numbers of Gterman pursuit planes were present
throughout the Meuse-Argonne offensive, they were generally Ineffective
in hindering American Air Service operations.

Pursuit squadrons of

the First Army, maintaining a continuous aerial barrage along the

front, were largely responsible for this favorable situation.

Many

combats between Air Service observation planes and hostile pursuit
forces did occur during this protracted campaign, but comparatively
small losses were suffered by Anerlcan observation squadrons during

such combats.

By the adoption of novel tactics, observation planes

proved their ability to defend themselves while successfully executing
their assigned missions.

Losses inflicted upon attacking enemy pursuit

forces were considerably larger than those suffered by the American Air
Service.
One observation pilot. Captain
^71

111am P, Erwin, who flew

with a number of different observers, was officially credited with the
2fi

"Cavalry Reconnaissance Patrols," 1918, A, Hy AS AEF,
17-18.

Vol. 29, pp.

361

destruction of nine enemy aircraft during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.
On October 8 First Lieutenant Arthur E, Easterbrook with

29

Captain Erwin as pilot, successfully carried out a inisslon of locating

advancing Infantry units despite five encounters with enemy planes.
During these engagements Lieutenant Easterbrook broke up a formation
of three planes, sending one down out of control; killed or wounded an

observer In an encounter with another formation; and sent a biplane
crashing to the ground, besides driving away a formation of two planes

and several single machines.

30

The command structure of the American Air Service corps obser-

vation organizations was not changed during the offensive.

Under the

unfortunate conditions of confusion following the rapid organization
of the Air Service of the four corps observation groups from new and

largely inexperienced units, the Corps Observation Wing headquarters
as it functioned during the St. Mlhlel and Meuse-Argonne offensives

failed to justify its existence.

31

Even under normal conditions this

headquarters would probably have been unnecessary.
29

General Order Number 15, Headquarters, First Army Air Service, October 10, 1918, J, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 3, p. 463.
General Order Number 15, Headquarters, First Army Air Easterbrook Service, October 10, 1918, J, Hy AS AEF, Vol, 3, p. 463. xras the only American observer rated an Ace in World War I, Qumey, Five Do^jn and Glory , p, 279.
In a memorandum written shortly after the war, Lt, Col. Lewis H, Brereton said that "The observation wing, as organized, has no reason for existing," He went on to suggest that the functions of the Corps Observation Wing could be performed more effectively by someone in the office of the army Air Service headqiiarters . Lewis H. Brereton, "History of Observation Wing, Air Service," January 21, 1919, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 7, pp. 1-2. 31

30

362

A review of the operations conducted by the American Air
Service corps observation units during the Meuse-Argonne offensive
shows a prevalence of conditions ftltnilar to those appearing in earlier

campaigns.

Unfavorable weather throughout the offensive proved a

hindrance in the execution of photography and artillery missions.
Here again, the greatest difficulties encountered arose through insuf-

ficient training of infantry and artillery units in the use and limitations of the Air Service,

Cooperation with artillery batteries was
faulty radio communication

unsatisfactory.

In practically every case,

was the cause of the failure to adjust artillery fire.

Reconnaissances

were carried out with consistent success; whenever aerial operations were possible, the general staff was apprised of the situation along
the front by complete and accurate reports.

Cavalry reconnaissance

patrols developed during this offensive proved valuable to advancing
front-line ground troops.
Patrols of this kind and infantry contact
The infantry

missions kept commanders informed throughout the advance.

contact schools and steps taken to improve the cooperation of the Air
Service with the infantry resulted in a marked improvement In Infantry contact patrols during the later stages of the offensive.
The marked

success attained In the development of low-flying patrols during

adverse weather was the outstanding feature of the Anerlcan Air Service operations during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Army Observation

The 91st and 24th Squadrons of the First Army Observation

363

Group moved from Gondreville to Vavincourt, west of Verdun, on the
21st and 22d of September,
32

Due to a shortage of pilots, two days
The 9th

were required for ferrying the planes to their new base.

Squadron, equipped for night reconnaissance, had been transferred to

this new field on September 20,

33

The airdrome at Vavincourt left much to be desired.

It x^as

located near a prominent crossing of two roads, making it an easy

target for enemy bombers, and the landing strip was uneven.

At the

beginning of the operations the field was about 25 miles from the
front.
It is

worth noting that in spite of the constantly increasing

distance to the lines, missions were performed without difficulty
throughout the whole offensive.
34

After arriving at their new station, flying teams of the First
Army Observation Group acquainted themselves with the terrain and situation by flights over the lines in French airplanes already

stationed in

tliat

sector.

Thus they familiarized themselves with the

area without indicating their presence to the enemy.

Weather conditions

remained more or less unfavorable during the period of preparation for
the Meuse-Argonne campaign, with low clouds and fog obscuring the

ground almost every morning and afternoon.

In bad weather photographic

missions x^re sent out to cover only the most important points, but in

"^^"History of the 91st Aero Squadron,

1917-1934, • p. 3, in

USAF ID Archives.
^•^••History of the 9th

Aero Squadron," 1918, E, Hy AS AEF,

Vol. 2, p. 7.

"History of the First Army Observation Group," 1918, AS AEF, Vol. 8, pp. 227-228,

34

C,

Hy

364
the brief periods when the weather was clear, many aerial photographs

were taken.

35

Pursuit aircraft on patrol furnished some cover for

photographic planes, but their primary mission was to attack the enemy.
The plan of employment, giving the duties to be performed by

the Group during the coning offensive, was issued by the First Army on

September 17th.

The sector assigned to the Group was bounded on the

east by a line through Verdun and Lamorteau, and on the west by a line

through Vouziers and Mezicres,

Missions were to be carried out to an
the eastern boundary did not exist,

Indeterminate depth.

In practice,

for orders were constantly received for missions In the area of the

American Second Army,

In general, the First Army Observation Group

was responsible for the reconnaissance, both day and night, of the
entire First Army sector.
The artillery objectives for the first part

of the offensive, indicated on a map, were to be photographed both

before and after firing.

Four planes, with pilots and observers,

were to be stationed at the First Army Air Service headquarters for
the purpose of carrying out conmand missions on orders from the Chief of Air Service, First Army,

Upon receipt of the above orders. Major John N, Reynolds, the
Group Comnander, formulated his plans for carrying them out.
Four

teams from the 9th Squadron ^rere immediately sent to First Army Air

Service headquarters for special missions requested by the staff there,
35

"History and Report of Operations of the First Array Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, pp, 31-37.

Annex Number 4, Field Order Number 20, Headquarters, First Ligny-en- Barrels, September 17, 1918, Department of the Army, United States Army in the \4orld War. 1917-1919 . IX, 99-100.
Array, AEF,

365
Tlie

night reconnaissance squadron was to conduct reconnaissances from
Bombs were to be carried on these night
37

early evening until dayllsht.

missions and used against enemy convoys, troops, and military works.
The attack began on the morning of September 26 with ideal

weather conditons prevailing.

On the four days previous, low clouds

and rain had prevented the completion of any successful reconnaissance
flights.
This
liad a

decided effect on the first day's work; the lack

of familiarity with the terrain, coupled with the activity of hostile

air forces, interfered in securing photographs of artillery objectives and to some extent limited visual surveillance.
38

Generally speaking, the weather was poor throughout the entire

Meuse-Argonne campaign.

Only ten days out of the whole period

\-7ere

suitable for long-range reconnaissance, but the most was made of the
small amount of good x^ather.
The last three days of October gave

ample opportunity for important flights in preparation for the November
1st attack.
In spite of intense opposition by hostile aircraft,

the

areas opposite the American front were reconnoitered and photographed
thoroughly.
39

One of the most valuable missions carried out during the last

three days of October was photographing the army artillery objectives
37

"History of the First AS AEF, Vol, 3, pp. 230-249.
38

Amy

Observation Group," 1913,

C,

Hy

"History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Army, AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, pp. 4041.
39

Operations Report, First Army, AEF, Souilly, October 28, 1918, in Department of the Array, United States Army in the World War . 1917-1919. IX, 352.

"Night Reconnaissance in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive," 1918, An interesting study of the 9th Aero Squadron's night observation operations in World War I was made by a student attending the Air Corps Tactical School at Montgomery, Alabama, in 1928, Tills student's analysis, based on the Squadron's operations reports, states tlxat during the last few weeks of the v;ar the great increase in the a-nount of useful Information obtained under unfavorable visibility conditions was due to the experience gained by the observation teams. He concludes that the night surveillance flights were a success, for not only was an accurate estimate of the German activity gained but the presence of planes made the enemy immediately take steps to prevent aerial observation of his activities, with a corresponding Interruption of his o\m operations, Harrison H, C, Richards, •'The Use of Observation at Night," May 15, 1928, pp, 5-13, in USAF HD Archives,
A,

43

Hy AS AEF, Vol, 29, p. 18,

368

such that a plane could not even attempt to leave the gi^ound although
25 miles away at the front it nisht be perfectly clear.

Because of

inadequate conriuni cat ions, these conditions v/ere not kno^m by the
Group,

44
The French De Ram 52 en, automatic cameras proved to be

unreliable.
tested.

These cameras, received in September, vere irounted and

They vjorked fairly well at first but later when on missions

they wore continually janming.

When the plates did not jam they were
45

either une:rposed or unevenly exposed.

The Chief of Staff of the First

Amy

forwarded his orders to

the Group through the branch Intelligence officer and General William

Mitchell, the Chief of the First Army Air Service, transmitted his
orders direct to the Group,

Having orders come through two separate

channels and from two different authorities was a constant problem.
By the time of the Armistice all operations orders for aviation units

came directly from General Mitchell,

46

Bombardment

Under the command of Major James L, Dunsx^orth, the 1st Day

Bombardment Group showed great Improvement In the Meuse-Argonne
offensive.
The early history of Air Service bombardnent units had

"History of the First AS AEF, Vol, 8, p, 265,
45

44

Amy

Observation Group," 1918,

C,

Hy

"History and Report of Operations of the First Army Observation Group, First Amy,' AEF," 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 20, pp, 79-82,
"History of the First Army Observation Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 8, pp. 272-274,

46

369

been marked by heavy losses, and steps uere taken to prevent a recurrence
of this.

Aerial gunnery and formation flying were practiced and
Tight formations meant safety; an airplane that left

improved greatly.

the formation was almost certain to be lost.

Objectives were attacked

by the whole group rather than by a single squadron and these flights

were coordinated with pursuit escorts.

The 1st Day Bombardment Group

operated under the control of the 1st Pursuit Wing,

The combination

of all these factors reduced American losses and increased those of the

enemy.

47
In preparation for the Meuse-Argonnc offensive, the 1st Day

Bombardment Group moved to Maulan airdrome, near Llgny-en-Barrois, on
September 23, 1918, and began bombing objectives east of the Moselle
River,

This was done to give the impression of an impending attack on

Metz, thus diverting the enemy's attention from the real point of

attack,

German air forces were concentrated around Metz, where aerial

encounters were severe and persistent.
The 166th Squadron, equipped with DH 4's, was added to the 1st

Day Bombardment Group but was not ready to operate before the third

week in October,

Meanx^hlle, the forces of the 96th Squadron were

supplemented with enough flying teams from other squadrons to make one
large formation of Breguets,

The remaining teams of the 11th and 20th

John Vtentworth, "Plan of Bnployment of Pursuit and Day Bombardment Units, First Pursuit Wing," September 25, 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 7, pp, 231-232.

47

Annex Number 4, Field Order Number 20, Headquarters, First Army, AEF, Ligny-en-Barrois, September 17, 1918, Department of the Army, United States Amy in the World War. 1917-1919 , IX, 99-100,

48

370

Squadrons made up one large DH 4 formation.

In this way bombardment

flights secured greater safety, for earlier missions of the offensive

were carried out by formations of 12 to 18 airplanes.
been some improvement in flying equipment.

There

had also

Armored seats, more

reliable machine guns, and detachable fuel tanks were provided for the
Breguets; the tanks could be released in case of enemy attack.

Even

with these improvements, the 1st Day Bombardment Group continued to
suffer heavy losses until techniques of pursuit protection were better

developed.

49

On September 18, in spite of poor visibility and heavy clouds,
17

DH 4«s took off to bomb the railroad yards at Mars-la-Tour.

One

bomber crashed near the airfield and ten others failed to reach the
objective, although five of these bombed Conflans Instead.
six airplanes that reached Hars-la-Tour, only one came back.
Of the

Three

planes

\<rei\t

down in flames when the formation was attacked by ten American planes, flying at low altitudes because of

enemy aircraft.

bad weather, x^re at a disadvantage and were easy prey for German

pursuit pilots.
and nist, but
X7as

Tlie

one plane which escaped was hidden by the clouds

encumbered by the bombload it had not been able to
Only one enemy

drop because of failure of the bomb release mecluinism.

aircraft was shot down in the flight.
On September 26, the opening day of the Meusc-Argonne offensive,

Dun-sur-Meuse was bombed by all three squadrons of the 1st Day Bombard-

was possible during the remaining nights of September because of bad
weather.
October.
These same railways, however, were heavily bombed again In

Pursuit

About September 20, 1918, Major Bert M. Atkinson, the
commanding officer of the 1st Pursuit Wing, moved his headquarters
from Toul to Chaumont-sur-Alre; but operations were still carried on

over the front created by the St. Mlhiel battle.

The 1st Pursuit

Group, commanded by Major Harold E. Hartney, remained on its airdrome

at Rembercourt but it, too, confined its operations to the sector east
of the Meuse.

The 2d Pursuit Group, headed by Major Davenport Johnson,
The French

moved from Toul airdrome to Li gny -en- Barrels airdrome.

Groupe de Combat No, 16 was relieved from duty with the 1st Pursuit

Operations Report, Headquarters, First Army Air Service, September 27, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 . IX, 143.
Jones, The War in the Air . VI, 149-152.

"History of the 1st Pursuit Wing Headquarters from the Time of Its Organization to the Present Date," November 18, 1918, N, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 7, p. 3.

374
Wing.
The 1st Pursuit Wing established liaison with the other Air

Service organizations and with the armies to the right and left of the
First Army.
In the period of preparation for the Meuse-Argonne attack

the mission of pursuit aviation was to prevent enemy reconnaissance

flights over the new American area.

At the same time. It was Important

that no display of increased aerial strength be shown over the new

sector.

German air forces were concentrated around Conflans and from
58

September 14 to 26 there were many severe combats.
During the last
tvra

months of World War I, the 1st Pursuit Wing

used large forces to strafe and bomb deep In the German lines to combat
the enemy's flights of low-flying battle planes.

At dawn on September

26 the first sortie made by the 2d Pursuit Group destroyed eight enemy

planes.

A similar sortie by the 3d Pursuit Group led by Its commanding

officer, Major William Thaw, that same afternoon resulted In the

destruction of three more German aircraft.

59

One of the most successful operations carried out by the Ist

Pursuit Wing took place on October 18, 1918.

Two squadrons of the

2d Pursuit Group armed with light bombs flew at a low altitude; two

squadrons of the 3d Pursuit Group flew between 6,500 and 10,000 feet;
all four squadrons of the 1st Day Bombardment Group flew at about

13,000 feet; and two more squadrons of the 3d Pursuit Group flew at 17,000 feet.
58

All units met at the rendezvous at Bayonvllle late in

Annex Number 4, Field Order Nhiraber 20, Headquarters, First Army, AEF, Ligny-en-Barrois, September 17, 1918, Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 , IX, 99.
••History of the 3d Pursuit Group, Army,** 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 11, p. 9.

59

First Pursuit Wing, First

375 the afternoon.

After the ground targets were hit, 30 or 40 enemy
The Gorman formation was broken up by the Allied

planes appeared.

force and at least nine enemy planes were destroyed.
In addition to Its offensive activities,

the 1st Pursuit Wing

also carried on the more conventional protective patrols with obser-

vation planes, which had been provided for in the original plans for the
campaign.
The necessity of close cooperation with observation squadrons
In October, observation

in carrying out these missions was emphasized.

planes landed at the airdromes of the pursuit organizations Just before

going out on their missions for a last-minute coordination of the
flight.^^
In October during the

limited scale in the St. Mihlel offensive, necessitated more dangerous
low-level flights.
General Mitchell thought that enemy aviation should

be destroyed in full sight of advancing troops.

American innovations on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne
offensive, \Aien ten enemy balloons were shot down, took the Germans by

surprise and to a certain extent upset their plan of operations.
During the remainder of the offensive, few German balloons were able to
function, especially those east of the Meuse.
Had the balloons been

allovred to operate they might have been able to direct enfilading fire

on advancing Allied troops.

The continuous liarassing and destroying

of German balloons by Allied pursuit forces caused the enemy to detail
a protection force to patrol the front lines whenever his balloons vere

aloft,

German planes sought to trap Allied pilots attacking balloons;

this resulted in several new Allied tactics which brought do\m not only

balloons but enemy airplanes as well.

Furthermore, the Genman

diversion of planes for the protection of balloons represented a partial
easing of their aerial effort against Allied observation operations.
64

"History of the Organization, Development, and Growth of the 1st Pursuit Group," 1918, C, Hy AS AEF, Vol. 9, p. 7.
^^Ibld.
Fire directed against a line of troops or other target may be delivered most effectively from a point on or near the prolongation of its longest axis. This is sometimes called raking fire,
66

Mitchell, Memoirs of World War
6S

I

.

pp. 253-254.

Telegram, to the Groups of Armies on the Western Front from German Supreme Headquarters, November 1, 1918, in Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . IX, 597.

378 The employment of large concentrations of pursuit was developed
to a great extent In the Meuse-Argonne operations.

Since the weather

In France In October and November seldom permitted patrols at high

altitudes, American comnanders marshalled their machine and pilot

resources until good weather, when they could send them all out in

well-disciplined formations.

These missions were conducted under the

direction of competent flight leaders.

Competitive spirit was developed

among the flight leaders by choosing capable men to lead formations and

permitting them to maneuver their forces as they chose.
some skillful aerial combat maneuvers were developed.
69

In this way

Balloons

Thirteen American and two French balloon companies took part
In the MeusG-Argonne offensive under the command of Captain Allan P.

McFarland of the American First Balloon Wing.

At the opening of the

Meuse-Argonne offensive the assignments of balloon companies were:

with the

I Corps,

the 1st at Clermont-en-Argonnc, 2d at Loch^res, and

5th at Au2eville; with the III Corps, the 3d at Feme-de-Choi sel, the

4th at Fromercville, the 9th at Thierville, and the 42d at Bois-desSartelles; with the V Corps, the 6th at Ravine Jouy-en-Argonne, 7th at
Bois Bcthelainville, Sth in the Bois Foys (near Brabant-en-Argonne),

During the Meuse-Argonne campaign 21 balloons were lost, 15 burned by enemy planes and 6 destroyed by shell fire.
One balloon

observer made three parachute jumps within 24 hours, and two others
were gas casualties.
72

On September 26, 1918, First Lieutenant Cleo J.

Ross of the 8th Balloon Company and a student observer were performing
a general surveillance when their balloon was attacked by enemy plcines,

Charles Chandler, "Report of the Balloon Section, Air Service, AEF," December 31, 1918, p. 138, in USAF HD Archives.
On November 11, 1918, the balloon companies had advanced and were deployed in the following places: with the I Corps, the 1st Balloon Company was at Apremont, 2d at Les Petites Armolses, and the 5th at Le Besache; with the HI Corps, the 3d at Montfaucon, 4th at Peuvillers, 9th at Damvillcrs, and the 42d at ViUers-devant-Dun; with the V Corps, the 6th Company at Montfaucon, the 7th at Sasse-surMeuse, the 8th at Laneuville-sur-Meuse, and the 12th at Letanne; with the First Army artillery the 11th Balloon Company at Fontaines and the Ibid . 43d at Nouart.

They remained at their post until the balloon burst Into flames; Lieutenant Ross, as senior officer, did not leave the balloon until his

companion had jumped and his parachute had opened.

While the balloon

was falling in flames, Ross Jumped and although his parachute opened,
parts of the burning balloon fell on the silk canopy and destroyed it
at a height of about 800 feet.
Ross was daslied to the ground and

killed instantly.

73

Balloon anti-aircraft machine gunners drove off many enemy
attacks.
The 6th Company brought down two enemy planes within 24 hours

and the 2d Balloon Company brought down one enemy aircraft.

74

The

balloon observers kept in close contact with divisional headquarters and were quite useful in directing artillery fire.
Sometimes carrier

pigeons were used to transmit messages, for regular telephone and
radio cotimuni cat ions were difficult to maintain with the daily

commanded by Major Harry B, Anderson, consisted of the 8th, I35th, and
168th Observation Squadrons, all using DH A's, and was later augmented
by the 258th Squadron.

(The 258th, however, did not begin combat

operations before the Armistice went into effect.)

The newly

organized 85th Squadron was assigned to the IV Corps Observation Group
on November 4, 1918, and had made only two flights over the lines when
its orders \jere revoked and It was reassigned to the Second Army

eleven planes of the IV Corps Observation Group, protected by seven
pursuit planes of the 4th Pursuit Group, dropped 20 bombs on Chambley,
This raid was a diversionary action to assist the First

Amy

wliich was

then advancing.

On this same mission these planes also did some low-

altitude strafing of enemy positions.
The versatility and skill of the IV Corps Observation Group

was demonstrated by the fact that it carried out visual and photo-

graphic long distance reconnaissance, conducted several bombing raids,
and assisted in a number of cavalry reconnaissance patrols.

During

these flights planes of this organization engaged in 24 combats,

during which five enemy planes and one Gerncin balloon were destroyed

with a total loss to the IV Corps Observation Group of five men wounded
and one killed.
81

On October 22, 1918, the 8th Aero Squadron was relieved from duty with the IV Corps Observation Group and transferred to Saizerals
airdrome, where it was reinforced by the 354th Squadron on October 25.

These American squadrons, together with the French 28th, 47th, and 277th
Squadrons, completed the VI Corps Observation Group consnanded by Major
79

Although the VI Corps Observation Group's aviators vere less e3q)erlenced than those of the IV Corps Group, they aided materially in gaining Information about the enemy by both visual and photographic
reconnaissance.
Two adjustments of artillery fire were successfully

carried out and several infantry contact patrols were completed.

Bombs

and propaganda leaflets were also carried by planes of this Group and

dropped on enemy positions.

Two combats were engaged in, during the

course of which one enemy plane was destroyed.

There were no combat

losses but two planes of the 8th Squadron made forced landings in

German territory and the crews were taken prisoner by the enany.

Subsequently the crew of one of these planes escaped and returned to
the Squadron,
82

The French II Colonial Corps Observation Group, coninanded by
I-Iajor

Delanney of the French Air Service, stationed at St. ^5ihlel air-

drome, was composed of the French 28th, 47th, and 277th Observation

Squadrons,

All of these squadrons had had long service and effectively

carried out their reconnaissance and artillery adjustment assignments.
Planes from this Group engaged in four combats during which two enemy

planes were shot down without loss to this organization.

83

The Second Army Observation Group was composed of the 85th and 278th Observation Squadrons, both equipped with DH 4«s, but this
82

opposing armies had reached strategic and tactical decisions which had
a decisive influence on the future course of the war.

Improvised

trenches running from Switzerland to the English Channel left no flanks
for advancing infantry to go around.

When these were reinforced with

barbed wire and concrete, the war in the west became a war of attrition,
one of the longest and bloodiest in history.

Their carefully planned war was ... smashed to pieces by fire... so devastating that there was no choice but to go under the surface . . . like foxes. Then, ... to secure these trenches from surprise, ... each side . • . spun hundreds of thousands of miles of steel web arotind its entrenchments, . . • Armies, through their o\m lack of foresight, were reduced to the position of human cattle. They browsed behind their fences and occasionally snorted and bellowed at each other,
pox^7er

Indecisive, trench warfare still dominated the European War in

April, 1917, when the United States entered the conflict.

In the spring

of 1918 the war of movement returned when the Germans made a series of

efforts to push forward and end the war.

The Allies met this attack

and countered with their own offensives.
The battlefield in the First World War was dominated by artillery and machine guns--weapons which favored the defense.

These

power-

ful machines of war contributed to the peculiar patterns of this

John F, C, Puller, War and Western Civilization. 1832-1932 A Study of War as a Political Instrument and the Expression of Mass Democracy (London" Ducltworth, 1932), pp, 227-228.
387

t

388

conflict; front lines grew to enormous lengths, battles became more

protracted but less decisive.

Although tanks were used In this struggle,

they were few and far betx^en and the doctrine for their employment

with infantry units was not fully evolved,

Shellfire severed tele-

phone and telegraph lines, and radio was not sufficiently developed
to the point that it could be depended upon for communications.

The

airplane had its baptism of fire In the skies over this awful battlefield.

The World War

I

air organizations were first and foremost

collectors of information, and secondarily services of destruction.
As a destructive power, they indulged in the isolated function of bomb

dropping, a spectacular activity which was not as important as many

people believe.

Bombing in World War

I

was an expensive and erratic

undertaking.

Although elaborate plans were developed for an American

bombardment program, the war ended before they could be Implemented,
Only 138 tons of explosives vere "thrown" by American bombardiers
(official records report this achievement In a more impressive

manner—

275,000 pounds) and there appears to be no systematic estimate of the
damage that may have been caused.
War
I

Since the planes employed in World

could carry only a few bombs at a time, and these missiles

weighed only 50 to 100 pounds, the damage was probably not critical. 2
In the early months of World War I the aerial reconnaissance

of air belligerents had been unhampered.
2

As each side realized that

At this point it may be well to point out that many statements presented here are not in agreement with the work of a number of competent scholars. Professor Irving B, Holley, for example, sees more in American bombardment aviation in World War I than this writer detects. Cf. Holley, Ideas and Weapons , Chap, x, especially pp. 161 ff.

389

enemy aerial observation units also must be obtaining useful infor-

mation, hostile observation operations \TOre deliberately interrupted in
the hope of preventing the observers from making intelligence reports
to their headquarters.

Fast, single-seated aircraft, called chasse or

pursuit planes, were employed exclusively for this purpose.

Fliers

were set apart to do nothing but operate these planes either as free
lancers or in organized squadrons.
The mission of a chasse , or

fighting plane, was primarily to bring do^m enemy observation planes.

Eventually

t\TO

opposing chasse planes met and engaged in combat, not

for the sake of the fight, but to clear a path for observation

operations.

There were a few special pursuit flights released from

every duty except to find the enemy's fighters and to engage them in
combat.

Although they were not to trouble themselves about enemy

observers, these flights were certainly there for the benefit of observation.
Except for this, if a chasse plane had the choice of attacking
In

one of its own type or an observation plane, it chose the latter.

no recorded instance did air commanders deviate from this policy. When a fighting squadron met an enemy fighting squadron convoying an

observation plane or planes, it attacked the obsei-vation planes, and
took the resultant skirmish with the escorts as an incidental part of

harassing the observation teams.
The chasse pilot cruised about on his assigned patrol,

performed a few short, sharp actions, and was through for the day; the

observation team had to fly for hours at a time, frequently under
continuous fire from the ground, and was always the attacked, never
the aggressor.

Figures show that more observers and army corps pilots

390

vere killed or x^ounded than were chasse pilots.

Perhaps no task was
His roving commission,

more spectacular than that of the pursuit pilot.

and even his routine patrol, struck a chord of romantic adventure; he

was first to catch the public attention.

Hence, his publicity

increased, and the impression arose that the Air Service was built

around him.

In reality, his relationship to the observer was much

like tliat of the artillery to the infantry.

He was there for
In his final

protection; and protection was a secondary purpose.

report as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces,
General John J. Pershing pointed out
tliat x<7ars

are won by the Infantry

and that all else In the military establishment existed only to assist
the infantry.
3

In the air, observation was similarly the crux of the

matter and pursuit squadrons existed to chase and destroy enemy airplanes in order that observers might continue their work unmolested. Aerial combat purely as an expression of military power is
absurd.
It has no greater significance,

per se, than the maneuvering

of two wily snipers, each of whom hides in his own lines and tries to

stop the other,

A single fighting plane, from a tactical or strate-

gical standpoint, is of little Importance; and a battle between two

opposing single-seaters would be virtually of no consequence unless
the victory of one over the other had a bearing upon the greater

operations of opposing armies.

In World War I the only reasons for

the existence of chasse planes were to prevent the enemy from gathering

information and to provide assistance to aerial observation units.
John J, Pershing, Final Report of the Connander-ln-Chief . American Expeditionary Forces (Vtashington: Government Printing Office,
1919), p, 27.
3

391

Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker, the leading American Ace and
perhaps the best-known Air Service figure to emerge In World War
I,

was

convinced of the paramount significance of observation aviation.

Although he flew with and later connanded a pursuit unit, he wrote:
I believe this function of 'seeing for the army* is the most iriportant one that belongs to the aviation arm in warfare.

Bombing, patrolling, and bringing do\m. enemy aeroplanes are but trivial compared to the vast importance of tcnowing the ejiact positions of the enemy's forces, , . ,^
Ideally, the observer's pilot should have been a man even more

perceptive than the cliasse pilot.

Pilot and observer bunked together,

flew together, fought together, and If they ran out of luck they often
died together.
duty.

When one was ill, the other usually was relieved from
Their

They constituted a crew which demanded superb tefunwork.

reactions, their judgments, their decisions in the air had to be as

carefully coordinated as the fixed machine guns which were synchronized

with the propeller.

The chasse pilot flew alone, fought alone, and in

case of mishap had no one to think about and no one to blame but himself.
To be sure, all three types of fliers had to be able to react

quickly, but only in observation operation teams was such a high level
of mutual confidence necessary,

Georges Guynemer, perhaps France's

most ffimous Ace and one
combats, said:

x^ho

made a legend of personal daring in chasse

What I must tell you is the courage of the observers. When we stop to think that these officers deliver up their lives to a pilot who may make one mistake, be the victim of a moment of dizziness, or of a fainting fit, or even of a mortal wound . . , we cannot admire them too much, I admit that I would not like their profession, I am not afraid, but I accept that danger against
4

Rickenbacker, Fi ^htin^ the Flying, Circus , p, 123,

392

which

can fight, while the observer has to have blind confidence I assure you that an observer . . . has deserved well in his pilot, of his country,^
I

The average observation niachine was exposed to direct fire

many more times and experienced much more actual combat than the
average pursuit plane.
Moreover, the observation machine flew frequently

at low altitudes and under weather conditions which kept chasse pilots on the ground.
The two American pursuit squadrons which fought the

greatest number of combats were the 94th (to which Aces Eddie Rickenbacker, Douglass Campbell, and James Meissner belonged) and the 13th;

they averaged 97 combats apiece.

The two leading observation squadIn addition

rons, the 1st and the 91st, averaged 102 combats apiece.

to Captain William P, Erwin, there were four other American Aces who

were observation pilots; all of these officers served in the 9lst
Squadron,
vinit

In actions incidental to its regular duty,

this observation

brought down 21 enemy planes.

In the Allied air services more

than 50 Aces were observation pilots.

During the early part of the European War, the belligerents
tried to use one type of airplane for all kinds of operations, but
this soon gave way to specialization.
By the end of the war there were

observation nor bonbardment could function unless it was protected
against enemy pursuit.
In a given operation, it was necessary for

each branch to know what the others were doing, so that if they could
not operate over all parts of the line, they could concentrate on the

most important points.

In the event of a rapid advance, all aviation

units had to be notified of changes in troop position, because they

might shoot and bomb their

o%jn

troops instead of attacking the enemy's

artillery, infantry, or trains bringing up reinforcements and supplies.
In the face of strong enemy opposition all branches of aviation had to

act In conjunction with one another.
Tlie

United States had little to do with the development of air
I.

doctrine in World War

She merely followed the patterns of the Allies

who were competing with the Germans in the skies over western Europe,
The invention of the fixed machine gun synchronized to fire through the propeller and the development of formation flying revolutionized
the aerial war.
In spite of the fact that no official American air

doctrine per se was drawn up, a tactical air doctrine was developed by
the United States Air Service during World War
I,

Doctrine and practice

in observation flying developed relatively simply and harmoniously, but

this was not the case with pursuit and bombardment aviation.

By the

end of the war most American plans for employing aeronautics were slanted toward support of ground troops,
Wlten

an operation was projected, a plan of aerial employment

was

dra\v?n

up by the conmander of the Air Service, submitted to the
The plan of

commanding general, and published in the form of orders.

employment usually provided for three stages of operations:

394

preliminary, attack, and exploitation.

In the preliminary stage it was

necessary to find out everything possible about the enemy by photographic and visual reconnaissance.
At the same time an aerial barrage

tration of the enemy's lines as well as the employment of pursuit
planes for protection.
Only about one third of the total number of

aircraft available could be in the air at a given time, for planes
were forced to land every two to four hours for refueling, and a

reserve had to be maintained to meet emergencies.
phase, airplanes attacked
targets:
tlie

In the exploitation

most vulnerable and dangerous enemy

concentrations of supplies; communications, particularly

railroads and bridges; and cities which had been converted to military
use.

These bombardment raids had to be protected by pursuit escorts.
The plan of employment was supplemented by a complete plan of

reconnaissance designed to show

\jhat

must be learned about the enemy.

Aerial observation teams cooperated with military intelligence;
reporting, analyzing, and recommending the targets to be attacked;

noting signs of enemy counterattacks; and suggesting routes best
suited. for movements.

One of the unfortunate results of the First Vtorld War, as far
as the United States is concerned, appears to have been an unmerited

395

sense of accomplishment.

Modesty in military affairs has never been
lias

one of America's characteristics, yet more than once America

asked

a large number of men to spring to arms overnight, and then to wait

six months for the arms.

After their entrance into the war "to make

the world safe for democracy," Americans began praising themselves for

a feat which they never accomplished; this self-adulation began even

before the United States had done anything but make plans.

While

Liberty engines were still cracking as fast as they could be set up on
the testing block, Americans were telling one another that the Liberty

was infinitely better than the Rolls Royce and the greatest single
achievement of the war.
The United States supplied morale and money

to its Allies, and on the day of the Armistice it had almost two

million men in Europe,

9

but few American troops actually participated
Ihe United States supplied

in more than a few days* fighting.

virtually no guns, no ammunition, and only a few airplanes; yet it
spent a million dollars an hour while it was at war.

Testifying before a congressional committee investigating the
Air Service, Major General Mason H, Patrick, the former Chief of Air
Service, American Expeditionary Forces, stated that France, with

1,500,000 men at the front, had 3,321 planes of all descriptions in
operation; that England, with 900,000 men at the front, had 1,758
planes; and that the United States, with 1,250,000 men at the front,
o

New York Times . December 22, 1917, p. 11,
9

Ayres, The War With Germany t

A Statistical Summary , p. 15.

^°lbld., p. 131.

396

had just 740 planes in operation, most of then borrowed planes at
that. To liave been adequately equipped, Cfeneral Patrick testified,
12

the American forces should have had 3,400 serviceable planes.

Some "official" figures claim that the United States produced

over 8,000 planes by November, 1918.

13

The Air Service could fight,
14

observe, and bomb with only the 740 at the front.

The report should

have pointed out that this total included 3,000 condemned Bristols,
J
1

training planes, and other obsolete aircraft.

As a matter of fact,

France actually had a fleet of over 30,000 airplanes; many of them in
reserve, additional aircraft undergoing repairs, and others still at
the factories.

Altogether, the Anerican Air Service procured about
Of this total 527 were

2,500 planes from France and 200 from Britain,
still serviceable on the 11th of November,

According to the records, American pilots shot down 753 enemy
airplanes and 71 enemy balloons; no distinction was made between the
two as far as victory credits were concerned.

All of these were

officially confirmed, but It should be noted that credit for one enemy

On October 31, 191S, there were 17 American observation squadrons at the front; 11 of them were equipped with Salrason airplanes acquired from France, 5 with DH 4's, and 1 with Breguets, another French model. Tliat is, 12 of these squadrons, even at this late date, were equipped with French aircraft.

From time to time we obtained from the French flying corps such planes Without going into a complete discussion as they could provide. of aviation riatericl, it will be sufficient to state that it was with great difficulty that v;e obtained equipment even for training. As for up-to-date combat planes, the devclo;>nient at home was slow, and \re had to rely on the French, who provided us with a total of The first 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bonbing machines. American squadron, completely equipped by Anerlcan production, j^g Including aeroplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918.
In aviation we vrcre entirely dependent upon our Allies,

These American airplanes were DH 4»s, considered obsolete in England

even while they were being brought into production in the United
States,
Tliey

were glaringly unfitted for use as combat planes, and

only fair for emplo^Tiient as observation craft,
France loaned and sold airplanes vrhich were not the best; for

example,

tlie

French provided Americans with Nleuport pursuit planes,

while their own pilots were flying Spads, and for observation they

delivered Avion Renaults, which
aircraft.
19

\7cre

actually their old training
Tliere

Should they have given up their Spads?

was no

reason for France to cripple her oxm efficiency in order to heighten
America's,
The French offered the best they could spare, and Americans

were lucky to be associated with a nation vjhose second-best ships were
as good as Nieuports.
To be sure, Nieuports often shed their wing

fabric on a long, fast dive, and their ceiling (the limit of altitude
vjhich they could reach) was comparatively low,

Guynemer reportedly said that if the Germans had used such poor aircraft he would have guaranteed to shoot down one a day. Falls, The Great I^far. p, 371,

19

399

anything America ever put into production that cricicisu is rather out
of place,

France did the best she could for the United States,

The

Salmsons and Breguets supplied for observation were first-rate ships;

American observers preferred them to the nose-heavy and wing-heavy
DH 4's with the Liberty engine,
20

French fliers gave instruction to

trained but inexperienced American personnel.

Meanwhile, the Anerlcan

Air Service was doing such extraordinary things as sending the 95th
Aero Squadron to the front without planes or a bit of equipment and
before its pilots had been instructed in aerial gunnery.
kept at the front utterly impotent for six \^eks.
The 95th was

Planes finally

arrived, but they i^ere not armed with machine guns.

Captain John

Miller of this Squadron lost his life on his first flight over enemy
lines.
ho\j to

21

Then the pilots V7ent to the gunnery school at Cazaux, learned

shoot, returned to the front in a month, and made a splendid

record.

This episode, which took place in a turbulent war zone, was For every similar piece of adminis-

a waste of energy and personnel.

trative inefficiency at the front there were many more in the United
States,
\"Jhen

the Armistice was signed the Air Service had 744 pilots,
a total

457 observers, and 23 aerial gunners, all completely trained:
of 1,224 fliers at the front.
22

402
he vran easy victories; but the Air Service performed, comparatively, so

little work

tliat

the total casualties vjcre few.

Airerlcan filers x^re

so inadequately prepared, hoircver, that the percentage of casualties

vas inordinately high.

Only 205 American fliers \jere killed in action
liad

because the United States

barely begun to participate in aerial

warfare.

The Anerican Air Service lost these men three or four times

as fast as any other nation lost them at the front in 191o.

Anerican
Ixi

fliers T«2ro not afraid to fighti

they

\-ferc

simply too late*

spoakin-; of actual Ar:erican achievements In the air, one is compelled

to fall back upon s\jeepin3 genera lizat ions, upon the work of lialf a

dozen squadrons, upon the accomplishmentr! of a scattering of indi-

viduals in the St. Hihlcl and Meuse-Argonne offensives.
The Anerican Air Service e:qianded its forces and operations

during the spring; and summer of 1918,

During the Cliatcau Thierry

counterof fensivo, a critical turning point in the war, the /Vnerican

air strength had gro\m to allow participation by four pursuit and three

observation squadrons,
By September,

Tlac

rate of expansion thereafter accelerated.
Iiad

General Pershing

won his bitter battle with the

Allies for a distinctive Anerican effort in the war.
Entrusted with the task of eliminating the St, Mihiel salient,

American Er.peditionary Forces were augmented by five French divisions,
British and French squadrons supplemented the American Air Service,

A total of 1,500 aircraft, an unprecedented number for the war's
duration, was placed under the command of General Mitchell and was

concentrated on bases around the enemy-held salient.

Only about 300

planes of this total represented American air units; the majority of

403
these were flo^m by Inexperienced aviators.
Bad Xi?eather during the

first two days of the four-day offensive Interfered V7ith air operations,
^•/hen

the planes could fly, Allied domination of the air was over-

whelning, but at no tine were the 1,500 planes in the air simultaneously,

nor were any large numbers concentrated in mass flights.

Soon after

the American advance Iialted, most of the Allied units were recalled by

their respective coixianders.

At a critical pliase in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, aerial

observers discovered a vast concentration of German units.
this threat, on October 9,
1918,

To meet

the war's greatest show of airnower

took place.

It was

almost entirely an American effort; more than 350

planes, two thirds of them armed with bombs, struck the enemy and

thwarted his plans for a massive counterattack.

German fighters which
In

arose to oppose this massive force v;ere shot doxm or driven off.

other Allied operations conducted that same day, several enemy targets received an unprecedented number of bombs.
32

The First World War is not of much interest to present-day

Americans; discounting the unrauted trumpets of the American Legion, it

never has been.

Perhaps it was due to the disillusionment which

followed the failure to attain the idealistic, even moralistic, war
goals.

More likely, the Second World War and the Korean experience,

coupled with a tacit recognition of the problems of new types of
warfare, have heightened this disinterest.
32

The big concentration of planes on air bases for the St, Mihiel action and the later mass formation in a single offensive action during the Meuse-Argonne campaign, both commanded by Brig, Gen, William Mitchell, are often confused by historians and other writers.

404
War In the tventleth century has followed a trend toward

mechanization and the increased size of armies; toward the militarization of the entire population and the nationalization of war
effort; and toward the Intensification of military operations.
This

evolution of war has been directed to what Qulncy Vfrisht has called
the •totalitarianizatlon of war."
33

The role of the civilian in time

of war has becane much closer to that of the soldier.

Weapons of mass

destructlon--improved means to unimproved ends-«have blurred the
distinction between battlefield and homefront.
The American has always regarded war as a sort of aberration,

an unnatural state of affairs.

Yet the history of the United States

has been molded by the wars she has fought, even in the way in which
they have been waged.

Traditionally, the A-nerlcan has been reluctant
Once the decision to fight was made,
The citizen-soldier grabbed

to engage in open hostilities.

however, an all-out effort was unleashed.

his weapon and In short order defeated the nation who disturbed his
peace.

Unfortunately, the United States approached World War

I

without recognizing changes In the nature of warfare and the necessity
of adjusting to meet the new developments.

Looking back at the American military participation in World
War I, one is tempted to render severe criticism of a nation which

made so many mistakes by preparing for war only when fighting It.
story of the Air Service in World War
I

The

abounds In lost opportunities
It is

sprinkled with a handful of genuine accomplishments.
33

easy from

Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicagoj Press, 1942), I, 330 ff.

University of Chicago

405 hindsight to pick out these errors.
they were doing what was best.
At the time the leaders thought

Can we be assured that history will

judge our present-day decisions as being as wise as we have found
those of an earlier era?
Finally, it is impossible to study the American Air Service
In the European War without realizing some impression of the human

drama which permeates this entire experience.

All of the story of

the Air Service Is not found in the decisions of commanders or even
In the brave deeds of fliers.

The mass of documents carmot hide the

optimism, frustration, anxiety, despair, and even boredom which was
the lot of most Americans who served in the war.

European War (World War I), 1914-1Q13 General Works 1. Personal Accounts • 2* United States 3. General Vferks a) b) Personal Accounts Aerial Operations 4. General Works a) b) Memoirs, Blosraphics, and Personal Narratives Ancrican (1) Enslish (2) French (3) German (4) Canadian (5) Belgian (6) United States Air Service c) . o . . . Military History Basic Works Bearing on Military Problems 1. United States 2. The Concept of Air Power 3. Aviation History General Works 1. Specialized Studies 2. United States a) b) France Germany c) d) Great Britain e) Italy Military Aviation General Works 1. Special Studies 2. a) United States Great Britain b) Germany c) d) Russia Aerial Reconnaissance 3. Ancillary Sources

...••

.*..

....

«.••

.........

VI.

Articles
A.
B.
C. D.

479 479 480 480 481
482

Aviation History Military Aviation U.S. Air Service, World War Air Power

Mugrldge, Donald H. , and Blanche P. McCrum. A Guide to the Study of the United States of America: Representative Books Reflecting the DeveloiTinent of American Life and Thought , Washington: Library of Congress, I960,

World War

I

Bourne, Henry E, The World War: A List of the Most Important Books . Washington! Library of Congress, 1934-1936.

Lcland, Waldo G., and Nex^ton D. Mereness (comp.). Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Econonic and Social History of the World War . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926.

Meyer, Herman H. B. (comp.) A Checklist of the Literature and Other Material in the Library of Congress on the European War . Washinston: Government Printing Office, 1918.
Prothero, George W, A Selected Analytical List of Books ConceminR the Great War . London: 1923,
Taylor, Lawrence. Subject Index of the Books Relating to the European War 1914-1913, Acquired by the British Muscun^ 1914-1920 . London Oxford University Press, 1922.
:

Handbook of the National Aircraft Collection Exhibited In the United States National Bbseisn Under the Direction of the Smithsonian Institution . Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1928.
List of References on the Air Service of the United States . Library of Congress, 1925.

Washington:

Randers Pehrson, Nils H,, and Arthur G, Renstron. Aeronautic Americana . A Blblior.raphy of Books and Pamphlets on Aeronautics Published In America Before 1900 . New York: Sherman Fairchild, 1943.

United States Aviation Policy: A Selective Bibllogcaphy . . Washin3ton: Library of Consress, 1947.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Civil Aeronautics Administration. Office of Aviation Development. A Selected and Annotated Biblio^^raphy on the Social, Political, and Economic Aspects of Aviation . Revised ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. U.S. National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics.

Aeronautics .
1932.

Washington:

Bibliography of Government Printing Office, 1909-

Miscellaneous Mimeographed Lists
Eherson, William R, A Reading List for European Military History, 15001950. History 81-III Yale University, 1955.
Green, Robert C. Selected Bibliography of the European War. Unpublished manuscript. National \fer College Library, 1934.

The Dictionary of National Stephens, Leslie, and Sidney Lee (eds.). Biography . 21 vols. London; Oxford University Press, 1937. U.S. Department of the Army. The Writing of American Military History Government Printing Office, 1956,
;

A Guide .
.

Washington:

The Medal of Honor of the United States Army. Government Printing Office, 1948,
U,S. National Archives,

Washington:

Washington:

Guide to the Records in the National Archives . Government Printing Office, 1948,

432

A Record The Anerican Yearbook i Wlclcware, Francis G. , et al . (eds.) New York: D, Appleton and Co»^ 1917of Events and Pror.rcss . 1919.
The Young, Gordon R. United States 1959^

Amy Amy

Alnanac; 2d cd, .

A Book o£ Facts Conccmln,^ the Stackpole Co., Ilarrisburg, Pa.:

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE HISTORICAL DIVISION ARCHIVES MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

Including Reports Observation Aviation of Foreign Nations, 1918-1933: on Britain, Italy, France, and Germany. 1933.
Reynolds, C, H. "The Aero Squadron as a Unit, and the Aero Squadron Functioning as Divisional Air Service," November 17, 1920.

Richards, Harrison H. C.
1928.

"The Use of Observation at Night,"

May 15,

Special Collections

A,

Capronl Collection

War Department. "Air Service Activities in Italy, and Anerlcan Pilots on the Italian Front." [Photostat]

Memoranda File, Air Service, First Army, AEF, September, 1918.
Notes on Aviation During the World Mar: Collected From Various Sources and Issued by Various Countries, 1915-1919.

Observation Material World War Observation Squadrons:

I,

(largely French, some German),

1918.

Data from the Army Register . 1938,

437

Outline History of Air Service and Reorganization of Air Corps Units, 1914-1922.
Schools Established for the Air Service Training Program, 1917-1920.
Source Book on Data on Early Military Aviation, 1920.

Maurer, Maurer (ed,). Air Force Combat Units of World War II . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961,
Patrick, Mason M. Final Report of Chief of Air Service, AEF, to the Washington: Coromander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces , Government Printing Office, 1921. Pershing, John J, Final Report of the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919,
U,S, American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe: A History, Guide, and Reference Book . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938,

General Staff, G-2. U,S, Array, AEF, Summary of Air Information , Second Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, March-November, 1918 . Chaumont» 3 vols, France: [n,p.J 1918.
U.S. Council of National Defense, First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30^ 1917 . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.

U.S. Department of the Army. Historical Division. United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919 . 17 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. U.S. Justice Department. Report of the Aircraft Inquiry. October , 1918. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918. U.S. House of Representatives. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 (Aviation) of Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department . 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919.

439
U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Third Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918.
U.S. War Department, Air Service Handbook. Aviation Section. Signal Corps . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918,
.

Air Service Medical Manual . Printing Office, 1918.

Washington:

Government

Annual Reports. 1907"1919 « Office, 1907-1920.
.

Washington:

Government Printing

Official Army Register . • Office, 1901-1921.

Washington:

Government Printing

Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the . World War. American Expeditionary Forces . Vol, I. General Headquarters. Aruies. Army Corps, Services of Supply and Separate Forces , Vol. II, Divisions . Vol, III, Zone of the Interior . Vol, IV. Zone of the Interior: Directory of Troops . Washington; Government Printing Office, 1931-1949.
Records of the World War, Field Orders, . 2d Army Corps . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921,
Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese WarT 5 vols, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906-1907.
_.

A Review of the Nature, Use. Field of Service, and Organization of the Signal Corps of the Amy, With An Outline of Its Methods and Technical Apparatus, and Notes on the Service of Information and the Organization o£ the Aviation Service of the Leading Armies , Washington: Government Printing Office,
1915.

Edmonds, James E, (comp.) History of the Great War; Based on Official Documents, Military Operations . Vol, I. France and Del,^lum . 1914; Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, the Mame, and the Alsne . August-October 19T7I London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd,, 1926.

441

A Short History of World War . University Press, 1951,
Falls, Cyril,
Fay, Sidney B,

I,

New York:

Oxford

The Great Vbtr .

New York:

G,

P,

Putnam's Sons, 1959,
2 vols.

Macmi

Han

The Orir,lns of the Vtorld War , Co., 1930. The Great War,

New York:

Fletcher, Charles R, L. Co., 1931.

1914-1918 .

London:

J. Murray

Frothinghan, Thonas G. A Guide to the Military History of the World War, 1914-1918 . Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1920.
Fuller, John F. 1944.
C.

Watchwords .

London:

Skeffington and Son, Ltd.,

Gooch, George P. Before the War; Studies in Dlplonacy . York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936,

2

vols.

New

Gottlieb, Wolfram W, Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War , London Allen and Unwin, 1957.
:

Handbook of the European War . Wilson Co., 1914-.

2

vols.

White Plains, N. Y.

:

H.

W.

Harper's Pictorial Library of the World War . Harper and Bros., 1920.

12 vols.

New York!

Hayes, Carlton J. H. A Brief History of the Great War . Macnillan Co., 1920.

New York:

Henderson, Ernest F. Gcmany's Fighting Machine: Her Artny^ Her Navy , Her Airships, and Why She Arrayed Them Against the Allied Powers of Europe . Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1914,

Home, Charles

F. (ed. ) The Great Events of the Great War; A Compre hensive and Readable Source Record of the World's Great War , &npliasizing the More L-nportant Events, and Presenting Tlieso as CoiTiplete Narratives in the Actual Words of the Chief Officials and Most Ehlnent Leaders, 7 vols. New York; National Alumni,

Cle., 1920.
The Benlnnlnc of The Russian Campalfyi of 1914: Golovine, Nicholas N. Trans, by A, G, S. the ter and Operations in East Prussia . Command and General Staff Muntz, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School Press, 1933.

Bonasso, Russell P. The Evolution of the Supreme War Council, the Unified Command and the First American Arny In World War I . Goverrment Printins Office, 1951, Washlncton:
Browne, George W. The American Army In the World War: A Divisional History of the A-Tierican Expeditionary Forces in Europe . Manchester, N. H, Overseas Book Co., 1921,
:

a-iambers, Frank P.

The War Behind the War, 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts , New York: Hare our t. Brace and Co., 1939.

Moore, Sanuel T. America and the World VJar; A Narrative of the Part Played by the United States from the Outbreak to Peace . New York: Greenberg Co., 1937.
Ogg, Frederick A. National Progress. Aincrican Nation: A His ton' . Harper and Bros., 191C.

1907-1917 . Vol. XXVII of The Edited by A. B, Hart. New York:

Paul, Alwin (ed.). Tlic United States and the World War . Germany: Velhagen and Klasin, 1943.
(Xir Greatest Battle: Palmer, Frederick, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1924.

Bielefeld,

The Mcuse-Argonne ,

Nex-?

York:

.

America in France.

New York:

Mead and Co., 1918,

Palmer, John M.
1941;;

America in Arms; The Experience of the United States With Military Organization . New Haven; Yale University Press,

Slosson, Preston W, The Great Crusade and After 1914-1928 . Vol. XII Edited by A, M, of The History of Anerican Life Scries . Schlesinger and Dixon R. Fox. New York: Macmillan Co,, 1937,

446

A Complete File of the Stars and Stripes, the The Stars and Stripes; Official Newspaper of the .Anerlcan Expeditionary Forces Printed Minneapolis: in France from February 3, 1918. to June 13. 1919 . A, E« F, Publl shins Assn., 1920,
Strinser, Harry R. (ed.)
Co.. 1919.

Subnarines and Zeppelins In Warfare and Outraae . Hurd, Archibald S. Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, Ltd., 1916. London:
Jones, H, A.
Beinr, the History of Over the Ralkans and South Russia; London: £. Arnold and Co., No. 47~Squadron.' Royal Air ForccT 1923.

Land. Sca^ and Air . Kerr, Hark D. F. Co., 1927.

New York;

Longpans, Green and

Kleman, Reginald

H.

The First War in the Air .

London;

P. Davies,

Ltd., 1934.

Zeppelin, the Story of Li r.hter- than- Ai r Craft . Lchnann, Ernst A. Loncpans, Green and Co., 1937, Trans, by Jay Dratlcr, London:
The Developnent Tlte Zeppelins; Lchnann, Ernst A., and Howard Min3os. of the Airship, With the Story of the Zeppelin Air Raids in Hcvj York: the World War. J. H. Sears and Co., Inc., 1927.

Roberts, E, M. A Flying Fighter: An Ancrican Above the Lines In France . New York: Harper and Bros., 1918.
Rosher, Harold. With the Flying Squadron; Being the War Letters of the Late Harold Rosher to His Family . New York: Macmlllan Co., 1916.

Snowden Gamble, Charles F. The Story of a North Sea Air Station Being Some Account of the Early Days of the Royal Flying Corps (Naval V/ing) and of the Part Played T!-icreaftcr by the Air Station at Great Yarmouth and its Opponents During the War 1914-1918 1 London: Oxford University Press, 1928.
Strang, Louis A, Recollections of An Airman . Ltd., 1933.

Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States Durin^i '.ferld War I. A Study in the Relationship of Tccl-uiolo^^ical Advance, Military Doctrine , and the Dcvelopnent of \feapons^ New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1953.

Koappen, Theodore M. 1920.

Wings of War .

New York:

G,

P.

Putnan's Sons,

Mixter, George W. , and H. Production Facts, Secretary of War . Printing Office,

Emmons. United States Amy Aircraft Conpiled at the Request of the Assistant January, 1919. Washington: Govemnent
H.

1919.

Morse, Daniel P. The History of the 50th Aero Squadron . Privately printed, 1920,
Patrick, Mason M. The United States in the Air . Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1928.

New York:

Garden City, N. Y.

459
Reynolds, Qucntln J. Ttiey Four.ht for tlie Slcyt The Dranatlc Story o£ the First War In the Air . New York: Rineliart, 1957.
Squier, George 0, Aeronautics In the United States at the Sl.^lnr. of the Amlsticcy Ilovcnber 11, 191S . New Yorl:: American Institute of Electrical Engineers, 1919.

Sweetser, Arthur. The Anerlcan Air Service; A Record of Its Problems , Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its Final Achievoncnts , Nev; York: D, Applcton and Co., 1919,

A Discussion of the Role Bush, Vanncvnr, Modern Arns and Free I'cn: New York: Sltnon and of Science In Presorvinn Democracy . Schuster, 1949.
Caesar, Julius,
De Bello Galileo and De Cacsar*s '.?ar Comentarles; Trans, and ed, by John Warrlnston. London Bcllo Clvlll , J, M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1953.

Power of Personality in War . Trans, Harrisburg, Pa,: Military Service

461
Fuller, Jolrn F, C, Armament and History; A Study of the In£luence of Arraarncnt on History from the Da\»jn of Classical Warfare to the Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946. London: Second World Mar ,
Tlie Decisive Battles of the Vtestcm World and Their Influence , From the Earliest Tines to the Battle of on Histor>% Vol, I: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Lepanto ; Vol, II: From the Anerican Civil \tor to Battle of Waterloo ; Vol, III: Eyre and Spottiswoode, London: the End of the Second World War . 1954-1^55.

Albion, Robert G. Introduction to Military History . D. Apple ton- Century Co., Inc., 1929,

Bernardo, C. Joseph, and Eugene H, Bacon. American Military Policy, Its Development Since 1775 . Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1957,
Downey, Fairfax D, Sound of Guns; The Story of American Artillery From the Ancient cind Honorable Company to tlie Atomic Cannon and Guided Missile . New York: D. McKay Co., Inc., 1956.
Dupuy, Richard E, The Compact History of the United States Army . York; Hawthom Books, Inc., 1956.

New

Men of West Point: The First 150 Years of the United States • Military Acadeny . New York; Sloeme, 1951,

Huidekoper, Frederic L, The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: A History of Ancrlcan Land Forces From Colonial Times Until June 1, 1915 . New York: Hacmillan Co., 1915.
Millis, Walter. Ams and Men; A Study in American Military' History . New York: G. P, Putnam's Sons, 1956.

A Study of Our War With Spain . The Martial Spirit: , Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931.

Vol. VII In Defense of Liberty . William, and Ralph H. Gabriel. Edited by Ralph H. Gabriel. New of The Par.eant of A^ierica . Yale University Press, 1928. Haven:

C.

The Concept of Air Power
Af;e .

Alexander, H, M.
Andrews, Marshall.
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Tomorrow's Air

New York:

Rlnehart, 1953.

Disaster Throu?^h Air Power .

New York:

Rlnehart,

Davy, Maurice J. Air Power and Civilization . Un\;in, 1941.
The Conmand of the Air . Douhet, Glullo. York: Coward-McCann, 1942.

London:

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Trans,

Dlno Ferrari.

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