36 THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 29, 1996 tomers whose credIt-card numbers were stolen.) But what about CompuServe and America Online, Littman asks Mit- nick. Aren't the really big on -line services secure? No, Mitnick says. This answer is especially alarming in the light of Shimo- mura's insistence that Mitnick shows no extraordinary technIcal competence. Fortunately, Mitnick never took ad- vantage of the opportunity to inflict large-scale damage on the on -line ser- VIces he infiltrated. Littman successfully deflates Markoff's report in the Times that "hours before his arrest" Mitnick "delivered a last electronic blow that nearly destroyed the Well and the elec- tronic community it served." Still, the alarming tone of Markoff's article on Internet security was not off key. Mit- nick, explaining why the F eds are "scared of me," says it's "not because of what I've done, but because I have the capability to wreak havoc." The very structure of the Internet turns out to be alarming. All computers plugged directly into it-an estimated seven million "nodes" -are conduits for its traffic As the traffic passes by, they are supposed to snatch only the data ad- dressed to them and forward the rest. But the operator of any of these computers can engage in "packet sniffing" -read passing messages without leaving signs of intrusion. For that matter, a hacker who penetrates any of these computers can do the same. As even the avowedly anti- hype Littman observes, "the Internet is . h " SWISS c eese. What to do? There are at least three options. (1) Police. Pass new wiretapping laws and other measures that make it easier for officials to monitor cyberspace. Un- fortunately, this approach tends to replace one source of paranoia with another. Whether you'd worry more about having your E-mail read by some indiscreet hacker or by the Feds depends on your taste and your E-mail But there is cer- tainly some similarity in the kinds of anxiety the two prospects Induce. Note the difference between this and tradi- tional civil-liberties dilemmas. Typically, wiretaps have been a way to catch mob- sters, drug dealers, and spies. Thus the trade-off inherent in wiretapping laws was between your privacy and your physi- cal security. But when Kevin Mitnicks are the criminals the "privacy-security" trade-off is essentially between one kind of threat to privacy and another kind. The solution in some ways defeats its purpose. (2) Privatize. Let the on-line services, banks, and other computerized institu- tions get shamed by Mitnick and his ilk into doing a better job of policing their own turf This solution won't necessarily escape the trade-off between one threat to privacy and another threat. Though the on -line services can do a lot of ship- tightening just by plugging technical holes and building better "fire walls " some may choose to monitor cybertraffic more closely-for example, by keep- ing better records of where you travel on -line and when. At least, though, these measures won't be imposed on you. You can choose your preferred degree of oversight by choosing your on-line service. Already, America Online seems to be seeking a high-security profile in its unabashed coöperation with fed- eral child -porn investigations and the like. In contrast, the management of the WELL, mindful of its sizable liber- tarian constituency, was ambivalent about coöperating with the Shimomura investigation. (3) Encrypt. When E-mail and credit- card numbers are in secret code, snatch- ing them doesn't do Kevin Mitnicks any good. The beauty of this solution is that it escapes the trade-off between one kind of paranoia and another, by making it hard for anyone to read your E-mail- Mitnick, the Feds, or the people who run your on-line service. As it happens, strong sentiments about the relative merits of these three options have lately been coursing through the computer near the hot tub-the same Internet node that on Christmas in 1994 was, like the hot tub itseJL softly hum- ming with illicit activity. For Julia's then boyfriend John is John Gilmore, a well- known cyberspace-privacy activist. He is a leading member of the "cypherpunks," an amorphous group that gets its name from its militant devotion to the widespread use of encryp- tion. Gilmore's computer is the home of the Internet cypherpunk discussion group. Since "Takedown" was published, various denun- ciations of Shimomura and of the book he wrote with Markoff have bubbled up from that discussion group. And the reason is not, as you might imagine, that Gilmore harbors rampant hostility toward Shimo- mura (though in a recent denuncIation of Shimo- mura-for allegedly devel- oping an "evil" software tool, intrinsically prone to 7 : !f I' I \' I i \ 1 I I f I 1 ''It's a good location. Two blocks north of Kissinger and across the street ftom Cuomo."