MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

CHAPTER XII.

MEMPHIS TO ARKANSAS POST

JULY, 1882, TO JANUARY, 1883

When we first entered Memphis, July 21,1862, I found the place dead;
no business doing, the stores closed, churches, schools, and every thing
shut up. The people were all more or less in sympathy with our enemies,
and there was a strong prospect that the whole civil population would
become a dead weight on our hands. Inasmuch as the Mississippi River was
then in our possession northward, and steamboats were freely plying with
passengers and freight, I caused all the stores to be opened, churches,
schools, theatres, and places of amusement, to be reestablished, and
very soon Memphis resumed its appearance of an active, busy, prosperous
place. I also restored the mayor (whose name was Parks) and the city
government to the performance of their public functions, and required
them to maintain a good civil police.

Up to that date neither Congress nor the President had made any
clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the different
generals had issued orders according to their own political sentiments.
Both Generals Halleck and Grant regarded the slave as still a slave,
only that the labor of the slave belonged to his owner, if faithful to
the Union, or to the United States, if the master had taken up arms
against the Government, or adhered to the fortunes of the rebellion.
Therefore, in Memphis, we received all fugitives, put them to work on
the fortifications, supplied them with food and clothing, and reserved
the question of payment of wages for future decision. No force was
allowed to be used to restore a fugitive slave to his master in any
event; but if the master proved his loyalty, he was usually permitted to
see his slave, and, if he could persuade him to return home, it was
permitted. Cotton, also, was a fruitful subject of controversy. The
Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Chase, was extremely anxious at that
particular time to promote the purchase of cotton, because each bale was
worth, in gold, about three hundred dollars, and answered the purpose of
coin in our foreign exchanges. He therefore encouraged the trade, so
that hundreds of greedy speculators flocked down the Mississippi, and
resorted to all sorts of measures to obtain cotton from the interior,
often purchasing it from negroes who did not own it, but who knew where
it was concealed. This whole business was taken from the jurisdiction of
the military, and committed to Treasury agents appointed by Mr. Chase.

Other questions absorbed the attention of military commanders; and by
way of illustration I here insert a few letters from my
"letter-book," which contains hundreds on similar subjects:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
Memphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1862

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

Sir: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion
of the cotton question.

I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to
listen to trifles. This is no trifle; when one nation is at war with
another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other: then the
rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortunately, the war
in which we are now engaged has been complicated with the belief on
the one hand that all on the other are not enemies. It would have been
better if, at the outset, this mistake had not been made, and it is
wrong longer to be misled by it. The Government of the United States
may now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South are
enemies of all in the North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all
who can procure arms now bear them as organized regiments, or as
guerrillas. There is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go
beyond the sight of the flag-staff without being shot or captured. It
so happened that these people had cotton, and, whenever they
apprehended our large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in
the belief that, of course, we world seize it, and convert it to our
use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it.
It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged
government, and was therefore lost to their people; and could have
been, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either as
absolute prize of war, or for future compensation. But the commercial
enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents would buy a
pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents would take it to
Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was
too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here they discovered that
salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps, etc., etc., were
worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this traffic was not only
permitted, but encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it,
hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of salt and millions of dollars had
been disbursed; and I have no doubt that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and
Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without
which they could not have moved their armies in mass; and that from
ten to twenty thousand fresh arms, and a due supply of cartridges,
have also been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to
Memphis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as to
my own command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband
of war, and should not go into the interior, where all were hostile.
It is idle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear war
and its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent government,
and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent
for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged for bank-notes
and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, and are taken in
ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton to be paid for in
such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of the war, or by a
deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee, viz., the United
States Quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained about
as fast as by any other process, and yet the enemy receives no
"aid or comfort." Under the "gold" rule, the
country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and
who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take
Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that the
trade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will
be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use of gold than
they can of their hidden bales of cotton.

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my
views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war because
we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't employ and
feed her own people, to send them here, where they cannot only earn an
honest living, but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are
not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to fight the
South for burning that cotton, than us for not shipping it. To aid the
South on this ground would be hypocrisy which the world would detect
at once. Let her make her ultimatum, and there are enough generous
minds in Europe that will counteract her in the balance. Of course her
motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and
manufactures, that threatenes even to usurp her history. In twenty
more years of prosperity, it will require a close calculation to
determine whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the
Continent of America or the Isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us in
a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy
both parts in detail.

Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the
alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in exchange
for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept no other
mediation, because she knows full well that in Old England her slaves
and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in New England.

France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her
equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respect
consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel assured
the French will not encourage rebellion and secession anywhere as a
political doctrine. Certainly all the German states must be our ardent
friends; and, in case of European intervention; they could not be kept
down.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, July
23, 1862

Dr. E. S. PLUMMER and others, Physician in Memphis, Signers to a
Petition.

GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, and
assure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument of
adding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war.

On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) had
issued an order permitting the departure south of all persons subject
to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy. Many applications
have been made to me to modify this order, but I regarded it as a
condition precedent by which I was bound in honor, and therefore I
have made no changes or modifications; nor shall I determine what
action I shall adopt in relation to persons unfriendly to our cause
who remain after the time limited by General Hovey's order had
expired. It is now sunset, and all who have not availed themselves of
General Hovey's authority, and who remain in Memphis, are supposed to
be loyal and true men.

I will only say that I cannot allow the personal convenience of
even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to
make Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all people
who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such
direction as I may hereafter indicate.

Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but they
should not reside within the lines of an army which they regard as
hostile. The situation would be too delicate.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, MEMPHIS, July 24, 1862

SAMUEL SAWYER, Esq., Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.

DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at once with
the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered to
command; which means, to control for the interest, welfare; and glory
of the whole Government of the United States.

Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, though
you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make
more than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as I
don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It is enough
for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound to obey the
orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to venerate its
Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, I shall exercise
it wisely and account to my superiors.

I regard your article headed "City Council--General Sherman
and Colonel Slack," as highly indiscreet. Of course, no person
who can jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less
exercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfied that
injustice be not done.

If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact should not
be published, to put them on their guard and thus to encourage their
escape. The evidence should be carefully collected, authenticated, and
then placed in my hands. But your statement of facts is entirely
qualified; in my mind, and loses its force by your negligence of the
very simple facts within your reach as to myself: I had been in the
army six years in 1846; am not related by blood to any member of
Lucas, Turner & Co.; was associated with them in business six
years (instead of two); am not colonel of the Fifteenth Infantry, but
of the Thirteenth. Your correction, this morning, of the acknowledged
error as to General Denver and others, is still erroneous. General
Morgan L. Smith did not belong to my command at the battle of Shiloh
at all, but he was transferred to my division just before reaching
Corinth. I mention these facts in kindness, to show you how wrong it
is to speak of persons.

I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Aldermen, and
policemen, all in good time.

Use your influence to reestablish system, order, government. You
may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect internal
safety, or to guard against external danger; but to do right requires
time, and more patience than I usually possess. If I find the press of
Memphis actuated by high principle and a sole devotion to their
country, I will be their best friend; but, if I find them personal,
abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at a blind venture, and
looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and fame, then they had
better look out; for I regard such persons as greater enemies to their
country and to mankind than the men who, from a mistaken sense of
State pride, have taken up muskets, and fight us about as hard as we
care about. In haste, but in kindness, yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1882.

JOHN PARK, Mayor of Memphis, present.

Sir: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all
similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful
consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law,
courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to restore them
to their proper use, viz., the protection of life, liberty, and
property.

Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and
necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to the
civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civil courts
and executive officers should still exist and perform duties, without
which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass into disrespect--an
end to be avoided. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal
authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important
functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals
for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which the
military have neither time nor inclination to interfere with. Among
these, first in importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and
quiet, within the jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep
a strong provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to
guarding public property held or claimed by the United States, and for
the arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are
disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard ought
not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This should be
done by the city police. I understand that the city police is too weak
in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend
that the City Council at once take steps to increase this force to a
number which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your
ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; so that any change in our
military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave your people
unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost guard to assist the
police force when any combination is made too strong for them to
overcome; but the city police should be strong enough for any probable
contingency. The cost of maintaining this police force must
necessarily fall upon all citizens equitably. I am not wilting, nor do
I think it good policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes
belonging to the State and County, as you recommend; for these would
have to be refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on
all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper
municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your police
force, and for raising the necessary means for their support and
maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of the
tax. Of course, I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid, but I
think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real estate,
and personal property, including money, and merchandise.

All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion to
the interests involved. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, MEMPHIS, August 7, 1862.

Captain FITCH, Assistant Quartermaster, Memphis, Tennessee.

SIR: The duties devolving on the quartermaster of this post, in
addition to his legitimate functions, are very important and onerous,
and I am fully aware that the task is more than should devolve on one
man. I will endeavor to get you help in the person of some
commissioned officer, and, if possible, one under bond, as he must
handle large amounts of money in trust; but, for the present, we most
execute the duties falling to our share as well as possible. On the
subject of vacant houses, General Grant's orders are: "Take
possession of all vacant stores and houses in the city, and have them
rented at reasonable rates; rent to be paid monthly in advance. These
buildings, with their tenants, can be turned over to proprietors on
proof of loyalty; also take charge of such as have been leased out by
disloyal owners."

I understand that General Grant takes the rents and profits of this
class of real property under the rules and laws of war, and not under
the confiscation act of Congress; therefore the question of title is
not involved simply the possession, and the rents and profits of
houses belonging to our enemies, which are not vacant, we hold in
trust for them or the Government, according to the future decisions of
the proper tribunals.

Mr. McDonald, your chief agent in renting and managing this
business, called on me last evening and left with me written
questions, which it would take a volume to answer and a Webster to
elucidate; but as we can only attempt plain, substantial justice, I
will answer these questions as well as I can, briefly and to the point

First. When ground is owned by parties who have gone south, and
have leased the ground to parties now in the city who own the
improvements on the ground?

Answer. The United States takes the rents due the owner of the
land; does not disturb the owner of the improvements.

Second. When parties owning houses have gone south, and the tenant
has given his notes for the rent in advance?

Answer. Notes are mere evidence of the debt due landlord. The
tenant pays the rent to the quartermaster, who gives a bond of
indemnity against the notes representing the debt for the particular
rent.

Third. When the tenant has expended several months' rent in repairs
on the house?

Answer. Of course, allow all such credits on reasonable proof and
showing.

Fourth. When the owner has gone south, and parties here hold liens
on the property and are collecting the rents to satisfy their liens?

Answer. The rent of a house can only be mortgaged to a person in
possession. If a loyal tenant be in possession and claim the rent from
himself as due to himself on some other debt, allow it; but, if not in
actual possession of the property, rents are not good liens for a
debt, but must be paid to the quartermaster.

Fifth. Of parties claiming foreign protection?

Answer. Many claim foreign protection who are not entitled to it.
If they are foreign subjects residing for business in this, country,
they are entitled to consideration and protection so long as they obey
the laws of the country. If they occupy houses belonging to absent
rebels, they must pay rent to the quarter- master. If they own
property, they must occupy it by themselves, tenants, or servants.

Eighth. When houses are occupied and the owner has gone south,
leaving an agent to collect rent for his benefit?

Answer. Rent must be paid to the quartermaster. No agent can
collect and remit money south without subjecting himself to arrest and
trial for aiding and abetting the public enemy.

Ninth.. When houses are owned by loyal citizens, but are
unoccupied?

Answer. Such should not be disturbed, but it would be well to
advise them to have some servant at the house to occupy it.

Tenth. When parties who occupy the house are creditors of the
owner, who has gone south? Answer. You only look to collection of
rents. Any person who transmits money south is liable to arrest and
trial for aiding and abetting the enemy; but I do not think it our
business to collect debts other than rents.

Eleventh. When the parties who own the property have left the city
under General Hovey's Order No. 1, but are in the immediate
neighborhood, on their plantations?

Answer. It makes no difference where they are, so they are absent.

Twelfth. When movable property is found in stores that are closed?

Answer. The goods are security for the rent. If the owner of the
goods prefers to remove the goods to paying rent, he can do so.

Thirteenth. When the owner lives in town, and refuses to take the
oath of allegiance?

Answer. If the house be occupied, it does not fall under the order.
If the house be vacant, it does. The owner can recover his property by
taking the oath.

All persons in Memphis residing within our military lines are
presumed to be loyal, good citizens, and may at any moment be called
to serve on juries, posses comitatua, or other civil service required
by the Constitution and laws of our country. Should they be called
upon to do such duty, which would require them to acknowledge their
allegiance and subordination to the Constitution of the United States,
it would then be too late to refuse. So long as they remain quiet and
conform to these laws, they are entitled to protection in their
property and lives.

We have nothing to do with confiscation. We only deal with
possession, and therefore the necessity of a strict accountability,
because the United States assumes the place of trustee, and must
account to the rightful owner for his property, rents, and profits. In
due season courts will be established to execute the laws, the
confiscation act included, when we will be relieved of this duty and
trust. Until that time, every opportunity should be given to the
wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance to the
Constitution of their birth or adoption. I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, August 26,1862

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Mississippi.

Sir: In pursuance of your request that I should keep you advised of
matters of interest here, in addition to the purely official matters,
I now write.

I dispatched promptly the thirteen companies of cavalry, nine of
Fourth Illinois, and four of Eleventh Illinois, to their respective
destinations, punctually on the 23d instant, although the order was
only received on the 22d. I received at the same time, from Colonel
Dickey, the notice that the bridge over Hatchie was burned, and
therefore I prescribed their order of march via Bolivar. They started
at 12 m. of the 23d, and I have no news of them. since. None of the
cavalry ordered to me is yet heard from.

The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one
at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel to
and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge over Wolf
River, by which we can reach the country to the north of that stream;
but, as the Confederates have burned their own bridges, I will hold
them to my order, and allow no trade over any other road than the one
prescribed, using the lower or Randolph road for our own convenience.
I am still satisfied there is no large force of rebels anywhere in the
neighborhood. All the navy gunboats are below except the St. Louis,
which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo,
I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a
fleeter boat not iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river,
to break up ferry-boats and canoes, and to prevent all passing across
the river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is
carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace,
buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the
interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on this
point, which will enable us to control it better.

You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here.
There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and
orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and
assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis,
Cincinnati, or New York.

Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons, there was
as much whiskey here as now, and it would take all my command as
customhouse inspectors, to break open all the parcels and packages
containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where
soldiers get liquor just as we would in St. Louis.

The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a
charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee carry
off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have good
hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals are in
the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than in the
general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the regimental
surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted, take away our
entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up here, but usually no
nurses; and it is not right that nurses should be taken from my
command for his sick. I think that, when we are endeavoring to raise
soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad policy to keep them at
hospitals as attendants and nurses.

I send you Dr. Derby's acknowledgment that he gave the leave of
absence of which he was charged. I have placed him in arrest, in
obedience to General Halleck's orders, but he remains in charge of the
Overton Hospital, which is not full of patients.

The State Hospital also is not full, and I cannot imagine what Dr.
Derby wants with the Female Academy on Vance Street. I will see him
again, and now that he is the chief at Overton Hospital, I think he
will not want the academy. Still, if he does, under your orders I will
cause it to be vacated by the children and Sisters of Mercy. They have
just advertised for more scholars, and will be sadly disappointed. If,
however, this building or any other be needed for a hospital, it must
be taken; but really, in my heart, I do not see what possible chance
there is, under present circumstances, of filling with patients the
two large hospitals now in use, besides the one asked for. I may,
however, be mistaken in the particular building asked for by Dr.
Derby, and will go myself to see.

The fort is progressing well, Captain Jenney having arrived.
Sixteen heavy guns are received, with a large amount of shot and
shell, but the platforms are not yet ready; still, if occasion should
arise for dispatch, I can put a larger force to work. Captain Prime,
when here, advised that the work should proceed regularly under the
proper engineer officers and laborers. I am, etc.,

DEAR COLONEL: Please acknowledge to the major-general commanding
the receipt by me of his letter, and convey to him my assurances that
I have promptly modified my first instructions about cotton, so as to
conform to his orders. Trade in cotton is now free, but in all else I
endeavor so to control it that the enemy shall receive no contraband
goods, or any aid or comfort; still I feel sure that the officers of
steamboats are sadly tempted by high prices to land salt and other
prohibited articles at waypoints along the river. This, too, in time
will be checked. All seems well here and hereabout; no large body of
the enemy within striking distance. A force of about two thousand,
cavalry passed through Grand Junction north last Friday, and fell on a
detachment of the Bolivar army at Middleburg, the result of which is
doubtless reported to you. As soon as I heard of the movement, I
dispatched a force to the southeast by way of diversion, and am
satisfied that the enemy's infantry and artillery fell back in
consequence behind the Tallahatchie. The weather is very hot, country
very dry, and dust as bad as possible. I hold my two divisions ready,
with their original complement of transportation, for field service.
Of course all things most now depend on events in front of Washington
and in Kentucky. The gunboat Eastport and four transports loaded with
prisoners of war destined for Vicksburg have been lying before Memphis
for two days, but are now steaming up to resume their voyage. Our fort
progresses well, but our guns are not yet mounted. The engineers are
now shaping the banquette to receive platforms. I expect Captain Prime
from Corinth in two or three days.

I am, with great respect, yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 21, 1862

Editor Bulletin.

SIR: Your comments on the recent orders of Generals Halleck and
McClellan afford the occasion appropriate for me to make public the
fact that there is a law of Congress, as old as our Government itself,
but reenacted on the 10th of April, 1806, and in force ever since.
That law reads:

"All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in
quarters and on the march; and whoever shall commit any waste or
spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses
and gardens, cornfields, inclosures or meadows, or shall maliciously
destroy any property whatever belonging to the inhabitants of the
United States, unless by order of the commander-in-chief of the armies
of said United States, shall (besides such penalties as they are
liable to by law) be punished according to the nature and degree of
the offense, by the judgment of a general or regimental
court-martial."

Such is the law of Congress; and the orders of the commander-in-
chief are, that officers or soldiers convicted of straggling and
pillaging shall be punished with death. These orders have not come to
me officially, but I have seen them in newspapers, and am satisfied
that they express the determination of the commander-in- chief.
Straggling and pillaging have ever been great military crimes; and
every officer and soldier in my command knows what stress I have laid
upon them, and that, so far as in my power lies, I will punish them to
the full extent of the law and orders.

The law is one thing, the execution of the law another. God himself
has commanded: "Thou shalt not kill," "thou shalt not
steal," "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods,"
etc. Will any one say these things are not done now as well as before
these laws were announced at Sinai I admit the law to be that "no
officer or soldier of the United States shall commit waste or
destruction of cornfields, orchards, potato-patches, or any kind of
pillage on the property of friend or foe near Memphis," and that
I stand prepared to execute the law as far as possible.

No officer or soldier should enter the house or premises of any
peaceable citizen, no matter what his politics, unless on business;
and no such officer or soldier can force an entrance unless he have a
written order from a commanding officer or provost-marshal, which
written authority must be exhibited if demanded. When property such as
forage, building or other materials are needed by the United States, a
receipt will be given by the officer taking them, which receipt should
be presented to the quartermaster, who will substitute therefor a
regular voucher, to be paid-according to the circumstances of the
case. If the officer refuse to give such receipt, the citizen may
fairly infer that the property is wrongfully taken, and he should, for
his own protection, ascertain the name, rank, and regiment of the
officer, and report him in writing. If any soldier commits waste or
destruction, the person whose property is thus wasted must find out
the name, company, and regiment of the actual transgressor. In order
to punish there must be a trial, and there must be testimony. It is
not sufficient that a general accusation be made, that soldiers are
doing this or that. I cannot punish my whole command, or a whole
battalion, because one or two bad soldiers do wrong. The punishment
must reach the perpetrators, and no one can identify them as well as
the party who is interested. The State of Tennessee does not hold
itself responsible for acts of larceny committed by her citizens, nor
does the United Staten or any other nation. These are individual acts
of wrong, and punishment can only be inflicted on the wrong-doer. I
know the difficulty of identifying particular soldiers, but
difficulties do not alter the importance of principles of justice.
They should stimulate the parties to increase their efforts to find
out the actual perpetrators of the crime.

Colonels of regiments and commanders of corps are liable to severe
punishment for permitting their men to leave their camps to commit
waste or destruction; but I know full well that many of the acts
attributed to soldiers are committed by citizens and negroes, and are
charged to soldiers because of a desire to find fault with them; but
this only reacts upon the community and increases the mischief. While
every officer would willingly follow up an accusation against any one
or more of his men whose names or description were given immediately
after the discovery of the act, he would naturally resent any general
charge against his good men, for the criminal conduct of a few bad
ones.

I have examined into many of the cases of complaint made in this
general way, and have felt mortified that our soldiers should do acts
which are nothing more or less than stealing, but I was powerless
without some clew whereby to reach the rightful party. I know that the
great mass of our soldiers world scorn to steal or commit crime, and I
will not therefore entertain vague and general complaints, but stand,
prepared always to follow up any reasonable complaint when the charge
is definite and the names of witnesses furnished.

I know, moreover, in some instances when our soldiers are
complained of, that they have been insulted by sneering remarks about
"Yankees," "Northern barbarians," "Lincoln's
hirelings," etc. People who use such language must seek redress
through some one else, for I will not tolerate insults to our country
or cause. When people forget their obligations to a Government that
made them respected among the nations of the earth, and speak
contemptuously of the flag which is the silent emblem of that country,
I will not go out of my way to protect them or their property. I will
punish the soldiers for trespass or waste if adjudged by a
court-martial, because they disobey orders; but soldiers are men and
citizens as well as soldiers, and should promptly resent any insult to
their country, come from what quarter it may. I mention this phase
because it is too common. Insult to a soldier does not justify
pillage, but it takes from the officer the disposition he would
otherwise feel to follow up the inquiry and punish the wrong-doers.

Again, armies in motion or stationary must commit some waste.
Flankers must let down fences and cross fields; and, when an attack is
contemplated or apprehended, a command will naturally clear the ground
of houses, fences, and trees. This is waste, but is the natural
consequence of war, chargeable on those who caused the war. So in
fortifying a place, dwelling-houses must be taken, materials used,
even wasted, and great damage done, which in the end may prove
useless. This, too, is an expense not chargeable to us, but to those
who made the war; and generally war is destruction and nothing else.

We must bear this in mind, that however peaceful things look, we
are really at war; and much that looks like waste or destruction is
only the removal of objects that obstruct our fire, or would afford
cover to an enemy.

This class of waste must be distinguished from the wanton waste
committed by army-stragglers, which is wrong, and can be punished by
the death-penalty if proper testimony can be produced.

Yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

Satisfied that, in the progress of the war, Memphis would become an
important depot, I pushed forward the construction of Fort Pickering,
kept most of the troops in camps back of the city, and my own
headquarters remained in tents on the edge of the city, near Mr. Moon's
house, until, on the approach of winter, Mrs. Sherman came down with the
children to visit me, when I took a house nearer the fort.

All this time battalion and brigade drills were enforced, so that,
when the season approached for active operations farther south, I had my
division in the best possible order, and about the 1st of November it
was composed as follows

Subsequently, Brigadier-General J. G. Lauman arrived at Memphis, and
I made up a sixth brigade, and organized these six brigades into three
divisions, under Brigadier-Generals M. L. Smith, J. W. Denver, and J. G.
Lauman.

About the 17th of November I received an order from General Grant,
dated:

LAGRANGE, November 16, 1862.

Meet me at Columbus, Kentucky, on Thursday next. If you have a good
map of the country south of you, take it up with you.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I started forthwith by boat, and met General Grant, who had reached
Columbus by the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee. He explained to me
that he proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on a line
behind the Tallahatchie River below Holly Springs; that he would move on
Holly Springs and Abberville, from Grand Junction; that McPherson, with
the troops at Corinth, would aim to make junction with him at Holly
Springs; and that he wanted me to leave in Memphis a proper garrison,
and to aim for the Tallahatchie, so as to come up on his right by a
certain date. He further said that his ultimate object was to capture
Vicksburg, to open the navigation of the Mississippi River, and that
General Halleck had authorized him to call on the troops in the
Department of Arkansas, then commanded by General S. R. Curtis, for
cooperation. I suggested to him that if he would request General Curtis
to send an expedition from some point on the Mississippi, near Helena,
then held in force, toward Grenada, to the rear of Pemberton, it would
alarm him for the safety of his communications, and would assist us
materially in the proposed attack on his front. He authorized me to send
to the commanding officer at Helena a request to that effect, and, as
soon as I reached Memphis, I dispatched my aide, Major McCoy, to Helena,
who returned, bringing me a letter from General Frederick Steele, who
had just reached Helena with Osterhaus's division, and who was
temporarily in command, General Curtis having gone to St. Louis. This
letter contained the assurance that he "would send from Friar's
Point a large force under Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey in the direction
of Grenada, aiming to reach the Tallahatchie at Charleston, on the next
Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday (December 1st) at furthest." My
command was appointed to start on Wednesday, November 24th, and meantime
MajorGeneral S. A. Hurlbut, having reported for duty, was assigned to
the command of Memphis, with four regiments of infantry one battery of
artillery, two companies of Thielman's cavalry and the certain prospect
of soon receiving a number of new regiments, known to be en route.

I marched out of Memphis punctually with three small divisions,
taking different roads till we approached the Tallahatchie, when we
converged on Wyatt to cross the river, there a bold, deep stream, with a
newly-constructed fort behind. I had Grierson's Sixth Illinois Cavalry
with me, and with it opened communication with General Grant when we
were abreast of Holly Springs. We reached Wyatt on the 2d day of
December without the least opposition, and there learned that
Pemberton's whole army had fallen back to the Yalabusha near Grenada, in
a great measure by reason of the exaggerated reports concerning the
Helena force, which had reached Charleston; and some of General Hovey's
cavalry, under General Washburn, having struck the railroad in the
neighborhood of Coffeeville, naturally alarmed General Pemberton for the
safety of his communications, and made him let go his Tallahatchie line
with all the forts which he had built at great cost in labor. We had to
build a bridge at Wyatt, which consumed a couple of days, and on the 5th
of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten miles from Oxford,
whence I reported to General Grant in Oxford.

On the 8th I received the following letter:

OXFORD MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862--Morning

General SHERMAN, College Hill.

DEAR GENERAL: The following is a copy of dispatch just received
from Washington:

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1862--12M

General GRANT:

The capture of Grenada may change our plans in regard to Vicksburg.
You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the great
object in view. You will retain, till further orders, all troops of
General Curtis now in your department. Telegraph to General Allen in
St. Louis for all steamboats you may require. Ask Porter to cooperate.
Telegraph what are your present plans.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in.-Chief.

I wish you world come over this evening and stay to-night, or come
in the morning. I would like to talk with you about this matter. My
notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis, and fix upon a day
when they should effect a landing, and press from here with this
command at the proper time to cooperate. If I do not do this I will
move our present force to Grenada, including Steele's, repairing road
as we proceed, and establish a depot of provisions there. When a good
ready is had, to move immediately on Jackson, Mississippi, cutting
loose from the road. Of the two plans I look most favorably on the
former.

Come over and we will talk this matter over. Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I repaired at once to Oxford, and found General Grant in a large house
with all his staff, and we discussed every possible chance. He explained
to me that large reenforcements had been promised, which would reach
Memphis very soon, if not already there; that the entire gunboat fleet,
then under the command of Admiral D. D. Porter, would cooperate; that we
could count on a full division from the troops at Helena; and he
believed that, by a prompt movement, I could make a lodgment up the
Yazoo and capture Vicksburg from the rear; that its garrison was small,
and he, at Oxford, would so handle his troops as to hold Pemberton away
from Vicksburg. I also understood that, if Pemberton should retreat
south, he would follow him up, and would expect to find me at the Yazoo
River, if not inside of Vicksburg. I confess, at that moment I did not
dream that General McClernand, or anybody else, was scheming for the
mere honor of capturing Vicksburg. We knew at the time that General
Butler had been reenforced by General Banks at New Orleans, and the
latter was supposed to be working his way up-stream from New Orleans,
while we were working down. That day General Grant dispatched to General
Halleck, in Washington, as follows:

OXFORD, December 8, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi.
He will have a force of about forty thousand men; will land above
Vicksbnrg (up the Yazoo, if practicable), and out the Mississippi
Central road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they
cross Black River. I will cooperate from here, my movements depending
on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force now at my command,
I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the
Tallahatchie and Yalabusha; and, when an opportunity occurs, make a
real attack. After cutting the two roads, General Sherman's movements
to secure the end desired will necessarily be left to his judgment.

I will occupy this road to Coffeeville.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I was shown this dispatch before it was sent, and afterward the general
drew up for me the following letter of instructions in his own
handwriting, which I now possess:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
OXFORD, Mississippi, December 8, 1862.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Right Wing Army In the
Field, present.

GENERAL: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable to
Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present
command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the
troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present
east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and
divisions in your own way.

As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity
of Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under
command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place
in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary
to take, will be left entirely to yourself.

The quartermaster in St. Louis will be instructed to send you
transportation for thirty thousand men. Should you still find yourself
deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the
deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis put yourself in communication with Admiral
Porter, and arrange with him for his cooperation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will
embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces
here in readiness to cobperate with you in such manner as the
movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient
officer and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the
siege-guns, and what ever cavalry force may be there.

One regiment of infantry and at least a section of artillery will
also be left at Friar's Point or Delta, to protect the stores of the
cavalry post that will be left there. Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I also insert here another letter, dated the 14th instant, sent
afterward to me at Memphis, which completes all instructions received by
me governing the first movement against Vicksburg:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 14, 1862

Major-General SHERMAN, commanding, etc.,
Memphis, Tennessee

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting
uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you no difficulty
about retaining the troops on this side the river, and Steele to
command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, with the twelve
thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemy are as yet on
the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, but so as to keep up
the impression of a continuous move. I feel particularly anxious to
have the Helena cavalry on this side of the river; if not now, at
least after you start. If Gorman will send them, instruct them where
to go and how to communicate with me. My headquarters will probably be
in Coffeeville one week hence.... In the mean time I will order
transportation, etc.... It would be well if you could have two or
three small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become
necessary for me to look to that base for supplies before we get
through....

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

When we rode to Oxford from College Hill, there happened a little
circumstance which seems worthy of record. While General Van Dorn had
his headquarters in Holly Springs, viz., in October, 1862, he was very
short of the comforts and luxuries of life, and resorted to every
possible device to draw from the abundant supplies in Memphis. He had no
difficulty whatever in getting spies into the town for information, but
he had trouble in getting bulky supplies out through our guards, though
sometimes I connived at his supplies of cigars, liquors, boots, gloves,
etc., for his individual use; but medicines and large supplies of all
kinds were confiscated, if attempted to be passed out. As we rode that
morning toward Oxford, I observed in a farmer's barn-yard a wagon that
looked like a city furniture-wagon with springs. We were always short of
wagons, so I called the attention of the quartermaster, Colonel J.
Condit Smith, saying, "There is a good wagon; go for it." He
dropped out of the retinue with an orderly, and after we had ridden a
mile or so he overtook us, and I asked him, "What luck?" He
answered, "All right; I have secured that wagon, and I also got
another," and explained that he had gone to the farmer's house to
inquire about the furniture-wagon, when the farmer said it did not
belong to him, but to some party in Memphis, adding that in his barn was
another belonging to the same party. They went to the barn, and there
found a handsome city hearse, with pall and plumes. The farmer said they
had had a big funeral out of Memphis, but when it reached his house, the
coffin was found to contain a fine assortment of medicines for the use
of Van Dorn's army. Thus under the pretense of a first-class funeral,
they had carried through our guards the very things we had tried to
prevent. It was a good trick, but diminished our respect for such
pageants afterward.

As soon as I was in possession of General Grant's instructions of
December 8th, with a further request that I should dispatch Colonel
Grierson, with his cavalry, across by land to Helena, to notify General
Steele of the general plan, I returned to College Hill, selected the
division of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to return with me to
Memphis; started Grierson on his errand to Helena, and ordered Generals
Denver and Lauman to report to General Grant for further orders. We
started back by the most direct route, reached Memphis by noon of
December 12th, and began immediately the preparations for the Vicksburg
movement. There I found two irregular divisions which had arrived at
Memphis in my absence, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General A. J.
Smith and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan. These were designated the
First and Third Divisions, leaving the Second Division of Morgan Z.
Smith to retain its original name and number.

I also sent orders, in the name of General Grant, to General Gorman,
who meantime had replaced General Steele in command of Helena, in lieu
of the troops which had been east of the Mississippi and had returned,
to make up a strong division to report to me on my way down. This
division was accordingly organized, and was commanded by
Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, constituting my Fourth Division.

Meantime a large fleet of steamboats was assembling from St. Louis
and Cairo, and Admiral Porter dropped down to Memphis with his whole
gunboat fleet, ready to cooperate in the movement. The preparations were
necessarily hasty in the extreme, but this was the essence of the whole
plan, viz., to reach Vicksburg as it were by surprise, while General
Grant held in check Pemberton's army about Grenada, leaving me to
contend only with the smaller garrison of Vicksburg and its well-known
strong batteries and defenses. On the 19th the Memphis troops were
embarked, and steamed down to Helena, where on the 21st General Steele's
division was also embarked; and on the 22d we were all rendezvoused at
Friar's Point, in the following order, viz.:

Steamer Forest Queen, general headquarters, and battalion Thirteenth
United States Infantry.

With this I hand to each of you a copy of a map, compiled from the
best sources, and which in the main is correct. It is the same used by
Admiral Porter and myself. Complete military success can only be
accomplished by united action on some general plan, embracing usually
a large district of country. In the present instance, our object is to
secure the navigation of the Mississippi River and its main branches,
and to hold them as military channels of communication and for
commercial purposes. The river, above Vicksburg, has been gained by
conquering the country to its rear, rendering its possession by our
enemy useless and unsafe to him, and of great value to us. But the
enemy still holds the river from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, navigating
it with his boats, and the possession of it enables him to connect his
communications and routes of supply, east and west. To deprive him of
this will be a severe blow, and, if done effectually, will be of great
advantage to us, and probably, the most decisive act of the war. To
accomplish this important result we are to act our part--an important
one of the great whole. General Banks, with a large force, has
reinforced General Butler in Louisiana, and from that quarter an
expedition, by water and land, is coming northward. General Grant,
with the Thirteenth Army Corps, of which we compose the right wing, is
moving southward. The naval squadron (Admiral Porter) is operating
with his gunboat fleet by water, each in perfect harmony with the
other.

General Grant's left and centre were at last accounts approaching
the Yalabusha, near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear, by which he
drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged. This may
disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line of
operations. At the Yalabusha General Grant may encounter the army of
General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on the line of
the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but, as he will not
have time to fortify it, he will hardly stand there; and, in that
event, General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge
between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on the
Yazoo and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and which he
knows we carry along. Parts of this general plan are to cooperate with
the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg; to secure possession
of the land lying between the Yazoo and Big Black; and to act in
concert with General Grant against Pemberton's forces, supposed to
have Jackson, Mississippi, as a point of concentration. Vicksburg is
doubtless very strongly fortified, both against the river and land
approaches. Already the gunboats have secured the Yazoo up for
twenty-three miles, to a fort on the Yazoo at Haines's Bluff, giving
us a choice for a landing-place at some point up the Yazoo below this
fort, or on the island which lies between Vicksburg and the present
mouth of the Yazoo. (See map [b, c, d], Johnson's plantation.)

But, before any actual collision with the enemy, I purpose, after
our whole land force is rendezvoused at Gaines's Landing, Arkansas, to
proceed in order to Milliken's Bend (a), and there dispatch a brigade,
without wagons or any incumbrances whatever, to the Vicksburg &
Shreveport Railroad (at h and k), to destroy that effectually, and to
cut off that fruitful avenue of supply; then to proceed to the mouth
of the Yazoo, and, after possessing ourselves of the latest and most
authentic information from naval officers now there, to land our whole
force on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the
Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad crosses the Big Black (f); after
which to attack Vicksburg by land, while the gun-boats assail it by
water. It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before
attacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Haine's Bluff first, so
as to enable some of the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the
Yazoo and communicate with General Grant. The detailed manner of
accomplishing all these results will be communicated in due season,
and these general points are only made known at this time, that
commanders may study the maps, and also that in the event of
non-receipt of orders all may act in perfect concert by following the
general movement, unless specially detached.

You all now have the same map, so that no mistakes or confusion
need result from different names of localities. All possible
preparations as to wagons, provisions, axes, and intrenehing-tools,
should be made in advance, so that when we do land there will be no
want of them. When we begin to act on shore, we must do the work
quickly and effectually. The gunboats under Admiral Porter will do
their full share, and I feel every assurance that the army will not
fall short in its work.

Division commanders may read this to regimental commanders, and
furnish brigade commanders a copy. They should also cause as many
copies of the map to be made on the same scale as possible, being very
careful in copying the names.

The points marked e and g (Allan's and Mount Albans) are evidently
strategical points that will figure in our future operations, and
these positions should be well studied.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

The Mississippi boats were admirably calculated for handling troops,
horses, guns, stores, etc., easy of embarkation and disembarkation, and
supplies of all kinds were abundant, except fuel. For this we had to
rely on wood, but most of the wood-yards, so common on the river before
the war, had been exhausted, so that we had to use fence-rails, old dead
timber, the logs of houses, etc. Having abundance of men and plenty of
axes, each boat could daily procure a supply.

In proceeding down the river, one or more of Admiral Porter's
gunboats took the lead; others were distributed throughout the column,
and some brought up the rear. We manoeuvred by divisions and brigades
when in motion, and it was a magnificent sight as we thus steamed down
the river. What few inhabitants remained at the plantations on the
river-bank were unfriendly, except the slaves; some few
guerrilla-parties infested the banks, but did not dare to molest so,
strong a force as I then commanded.

We reached Milliken's Bend on Christmas-day, when I detached one
brigade (Burbridge's), of A. J. Smith's division, to the southwest, to
break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg toward Shreveport,
Louisiana. Leaving A. J. Smith's division there to await the return of
Burbridge, the remaining three divisions proceeded, on the 26th, to the
mouth of the Yazoo,. and up that river to Johnson's plantation, thirteen
miles, and there disembarked Steele's division above the mouth of
Chickasaw Bayou, Morgans division near the house of Johnson (which had
been burned by the gunboats on a former occasion), and M. L. Smith's
just below. A. J. Smith's division arrived the next night, and
disembarked below that of M. L. Smith. The place of our disembarkation
was in fact an island, separated from the high bluff known as Walnut
Hills, on which the town of Vicksburg stands, by a broad and shallow
bayou-evidently an old channel of the Yazoo. On our right was another
wide bayou, known as Old River; and on the left still another, much
narrower, but too deep to be forded, known as Chickasaw Bayou. All the
island was densely wooded, except Johnson's plantation, immediately on
the bank of the Yazoo, and a series of old cotton-fields along Chickasaw
Bayou. There was a road from Johnson's plantation directly to Vicksburg,
but it crossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by bridges, which had
been destroyed; and this road debouched on level ground at the foot of
the Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts, well prepared and defended
by heavy artillery. On this road I directed General A. J. Smith's
division, not so much by way of a direct attack as a diversion and
threat.

Morgan was to move to his left, to reach Chickasaw Bayou, and to
follow it toward the bluff, about four miles above A. J. Smith. Steele
was on Morgan's left, across Chickasaw Bayou, and M. L. Smith on
Morgan's right. We met light resistance at all points, but skirmished,
on the 27th, up to the main bayou, that separated our position from the
bluffs of Vicksburg, which were found to be strong by nature and by art,
and seemingly well defended. On reconnoitring the front in person,
during the 27th and 28th, I became satisfied that General A. J. Smith
could not cross the intervening obstacles under the heavy fire of the
forts immediately in his front, and that the main bayou was impassable,
except at two points--one near the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in front of
Morgan, and the other about a mile lower down, in front of M. L. Smith's
division.

During the general reconnoissance of the 28th General Morgan L. Smith
received a severe and dangerous wound in his hip, which completely
disabled him and compelled him to go to his steamboat, leaving the
command of his division to Brigadier. General D. Stuart; but I drew a
part of General A. J. Smith's division, and that general himself, to the
point selected for passing the bayou, and committed that special task to
his management.

General Steele reported that it was physically impossible to reach
the bluffs from his position, so I ordered him to leave but a show of
force there, and to return to the west side of Chickasaw Bayou in
support of General Morgan's left. He had to countermarch and use the
steamboats in the Yazoo to get on the firm ground on our side of the
Chickasaw.

On the morning of December 29th all the troops were ready and in
position. The first step was to make a lodgment on the foot-hills and
bluffs abreast of our position, while diversions were made by the navy
toward Haines's Bluff, and by the first division directly toward
Vicksburg. I estimated the enemy's forces, then strung from Vicksburg to
Haines's Bluff, at fifteen thousand men, commanded by the rebel Generals
Martin Luther Smith and Stephen D. Lee. Aiming to reach firm ground
beyond this bayou, and to leave as little time for our enemy to
reenforce as possible, I determined to make a show of attack along the
whole front, but to break across the bayou at the two points named, and
gave general orders accordingly. I pointed out to General Morgan the
place where he could pass the bayou, and he answered, "General, in
ten minutes after you give the signal I'll be on those hills." He
was to lead his division in person, and was to be supported by Steele's
division. The front was very narrow, and immediately opposite, at the
base of the hills about three hundred yards from the bayou, was a rebel
battery, supported by an infantry force posted on the spurs of the hill
behind. To draw attention from this, the real point of attack, I gave
instructions to commence the attack at the flanks.

I went in person about a mile to the right rear of Morgan's position,
at a place convenient to receive reports from all other parts of the
line; and about noon of December 29th gave the orders and signal for the
main attack. A heavy artillery-fire opened along our whole line, and was
replied to by the rebel batteries, and soon the infantry-fire opened
heavily, especially on A. J. Smith's front, and in front of General
George W. Morgan. One brigade (DeCourcey's) of Morgan's troops crossed
the bayou safely, but took to cover behind the bank, and could not be
moved forward. Frank Blairs brigade, of Steele's division, in support,
also crossed the bayou, passed over the space of level ground to the
foot of the hills; but, being unsupported by Morgan, and meeting a very
severe cross-fire of artillery, was staggered and gradually fell back,
leaving about five hundred men behind, wounded and prisoners; among them
Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward Governor of Missouri. Part of
Thayer's brigade took a wrong direction, and did not cross the bayou at
all; nor did General Morgan cross in person. This attack failed; and I
have always felt that it was due to the failure of General G. W. Morgan
to obey his orders, or to fulfill his promise made in person. Had he
used with skill and boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of
Blair's, he could have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have
opened the door for our whole force to follow. Meantime the Sixth
Missouri Infantry, at heavy loss, had also crossed the bayou at the
narrow passage lower down, but could not ascend the steep bank; right
over their heads was a rebel battery, whose fire was in a measure kept
down by our sharp-shooters (Thirteenth United States Infantry) posted
behind logs, stumps, and trees, on our side of the bayou.

The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their hands
caves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of the enemy,
who, right over their heads, held their muskets outside the parapet
vertically, and fired down So critical was the position, that we could
not recall the men till after dark, and then one at a time. Our loss had
been pretty heavy, and we had accomplished nothing, and had inflicted
little loss on our enemy. At first I intended to renew the assault, but
soon became satisfied that, the enemy's attention having been drawn to
the only two practicable points, it would prove too costly, and
accordingly resolved to look elsewhere for a point below Haines's Bluff,
or Blake's plantation. That night I conferred with Admiral Porter, who
undertook to cover the landing; and the next day (December 30th) the
boats were all selected, but so alarmed were the captains and pilots,
that we had to place sentinels with loaded muskets to insure their
remaining at their posts. Under cover of night, Steele's division, and
one brigade of Stuart's, were drawn out of line, and quietly embarked on
steamboats in the Yazoo River. The night of December 30th was appointed
for this force, under the command of General Fred Steele, to proceed up
the Yazoo just below Haines's Bluff, there to disembark about daylight,
and make a dash for the hills. Meantime we had strengthened our
positions near Chickasaw Bayou, had all our guns in good position with
parapets, and had every thing ready to renew our attack as soon as we
heard the sound of battle above.

At midnight I left Admiral Porter on his gunboat; he had his fleet
ready and the night was propitious. I rode back to camp and gave orders
for all to be ready by daybreak; but when daylight came I received a
note from General Steele reporting that, before his boats had got up
steam, the fog had settled down on the river so thick and impenetrable,
that it was simply impossible to move; so the attempt had to be
abandoned. The rain, too, began to fall, and the trees bore water-marks
ten feet above our heads, so that I became convinced that the part of
wisdom was to withdraw. I ordered the stores which had been landed to be
reembarked on the boats, and preparations made for all the troops to
regain their proper boats during the night of the 1st of January, 1863.
From our camps at Chickasaw we could hear, the whistles of the trains
arriving in Vicksburg, could see battalions of men marching up toward
Haines's Bluff, and taking post at all points in our front. I was more
than convinced that heavy reenforcements were coming to Vicksburg;
whether from Pemberton at Grenada, Bragg in Tennessee, or from other
sources, I could not tell; but at no point did the enemy assume the
offensive; and when we drew off our rear-guard, on the morning of the
2d, they simply followed up the movement, timidly. Up to that moment I
had not heard a word from General Grant since leaving Memphis; and most
assuredly I had listened for days for the sound of his guns in the
direction of Yazoo City. On the morning of January 2d, all my command
were again afloat in their proper steamboats, when Admiral Porter told
me that General McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo in the
steamboat Tigress, and that it was rumored he had come down to supersede
me. Leaving my whole force where it was, I ran down to the month of the
Yazoo in a small tug boat, and there found General McClernand, with
orders from the War Department to command the expeditionary force on the
Mississippi River. I explained what had been done, and what was the
actual state of facts; that the heavy reenforcements pouring into
Vicksburg must be Pemberton's army, and that General Grant must be near
at hand. He informed me that General Grant was not coming at all; that
his depot at Holly Springs had been captured by Van Dorn, and that he
had drawn back from Coffeeville and Oxford to Holly Springs and
Lagrange; and, further, that Quinby's division of Grant's army was
actually at Memphis for stores when he passed down. This, then, fully
explained how Vicksburg was being reenforced. I saw that any attempt on
the place from the Yazoo was hopeless; and, with General McClernand's
full approval, we all came out of the Yazoo, and on the 3d of January
rendezvoused at Milliken's. Bend, about ten miles above. On the 4th
General McClernand issued his General Order No. 1, assuming command of
the Army of the Mississippi, divided into two corps; the first to be
commanded by General Morgan, composed of his own and A. J. Smith's
divisions; and the second, composed of Steele's and Stuart's divisions,
to be commanded by me. Up to that time the army had been styled the
right wing of (General Grant's) Thirteenth Army Corps, and numbered
about thirty thousand men. The aggregate loss during the time of any
command, mostly on the 29th of December, was one hundred and
seventy-five killed, nine hundred and thirty wounded, and seven hundred
and forty-three prisoners. According to Badeau, the rebels lost
sixty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, and ten
prisoners. It afterward transpired that Van Dorn had captured Holly
Springs on the 20th of December, and that General Grant fell back very
soon after. General Pemberton, who had telegraphic and railroad
communication with Vicksburg, was therefore at perfect liberty to
reenforce the place with a garrison equal, if not superior, to my
command. The rebels held high, commanding ground, and could see every
movement of our men and boats, so that the only possible hope of success
consisted in celerity and surprise, and in General Grant's holding all
of Pemberton's army hard pressed meantime. General Grant was perfectly
aware of this, and had sent me word of the change, but it did not reach
me in time; indeed, I was not aware of it until after my assault of
December 29th, and until the news was brought me by General McClernand
as related. General McClernand was appointed to this command by
President Lincoln in person, who had no knowledge of what was then going
on down the river. Still, my relief, on the heels of a failure, raised
the usual cry, at the North, of "repulse, failure, and
bungling." There was no bungling on my part, for I never worked
harder or with more intensity of purpose in my life; and General. Grant,
long after, in his report of the operations of the siege of Vicksburg,
gave us all full credit for the skill of the movement, and described the
almost impregnable nature of the ground; and, although in all official
reports I assumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that had
General Morgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank
Blair's brigade on that day, we should have broken the rebel line, and
effected a lodgment on the hills behind Vicksburg. General Frank Blair
was outspoken and indignant against Generals Morgan and De Courcey at
the time, and always abused me for assuming the whole blame. But, had we
succeeded, we might have found ourselves in a worse trap, when General
Pemberton was at full liberty to turn his whole force against us. While
I was engaged at Chickasaw Bayou, Admiral Porter was equally busy in the
Yazoo River, threatening the enemy's batteries at Haines's and Snyder's
Bluffs above. In a sharp engagement he lost one of his best officers, in
the person of Captain Gwin, United States Navy, who, though on board an
ironclad, insisted on keeping his post on deck, where he was struck in
the breast by a round shot, which carried away the muscle, and contused
the lung within, from which he died a few days after. We of the army
deplored his loss quite as much as his fellows of the navy, for he had
been intimately associated with us in our previous operations on the
Tennessee River, at Shiloh and above, and we had come to regard him as
one of us.

On the 4th of January, 1863, our fleet of transports was collected at
Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, Admiral
Porter remaining with his gunboats at the Yazoo. General John A.
McClernand was in chief command, General George W. Morgan commanded the
First Corps and I the Second Corps of the Army of the Mississippi.

I had learned that a small
steamboat, the Blue Wing, with a mail, towing coal-barges and loaded
with ammunition, had left Memphis for the Yazoo, about the 20th of
December, had been captured by a rebel boat which had come out of the
Arkansas River, and had been carried up that river to Fort Hind

We had reports from this fort, usually called the "Post of
Arkansas," about forty miles above the mouth, that it was held by
about five thousand rebels, was an inclosed work, commanding the passage
of the river, but supposed to be easy of capture from the rear. At that
time I don't think General McClernand had any definite views or plays of
action. If so, he did not impart them to me. He spoke, in general terms
of opening the navigation of the Mississippi, "cutting his way to
the sea," etc., etc., but the modus operandi was not so clear.
Knowing full well that we could not carry on operations against
Vicksburg as long as the rebels held the Post of Arkansas, whence to
attack our boats coming and going without convoy, I visited him on his
boat, the Tigress, took with me a boy who had been on the Blue Wing, and
had escaped, and asked leave to go up the Arkansas, to clear out the
Post. He made various objections, but consented to go with me to see
Admiral Porter about it. We got up steam in the Forest Queen, during the
night of January 4th, stopped at the Tigress, took General McClernand on
board, and proceeded down the river by night to the admiral's boat, the
Black Hawk, lying in the mouth of the Yazoo. It must have been near
midnight, and Admiral Porter was in deshabille. We were seated in his
cabin and I explained my views about Arkansas Post, and asked his
cooperation. He said that he was short of coal, and could not use wood
in his iron-clad boats. Of these I asked for two, to be commanded by
Captain Shirk or Phelps, or some officer of my acquaintance. At that
moment, poor Gwin lay on his bed, in a state-room close by, dying from
the effect of the cannon shot received at Haines's Bluff, as before
described. Porter's manner to McClernand was so curt that I invited him
out into a forward-cabin where he had his charts, and asked him what he
meant by it. He said that "he did not like him;" that in
Washington, before coming West, he had been introduced to him by
President Lincoln, and he had taken a strong prejudice against him. I
begged him, for the sake of harmony, to waive that, which he promised to
do. Returning to the cabin, the conversation was resumed, and, on our
offering to tow his gunboats up the river to save coal, and on renewing
the request for Shirk to command the detachment, Porter said,
"Suppose I go along myself?" I answered, if he would do so, it
would insure the success of the enterprise. At that time I supposed
General McClernand would send me on this business, but he concluded to
go himself, and to take his whole force. Orders were at once issued for
the troops not to disembark at Milliken's Bend, but to remain as they
were on board the transports. My two divisions were commanded--the
First, by Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, with three brigades,
commanded by Brigadier-Generals F. P. Blair, C. E. Hooey, and J. M.
Thayer; the Second, by Brigadier-General D. Stuart, with two brigades,
commanded by Colonels G. A. Smith and T. Kilby Smith.

The whole army, embarked on steamboats convoyed by the gunboats, of
which three were iron-clads, proceeded up the Mississippi River to the
mouth of White River, which we reached January 8th. On the next day we
continued up White River to the "Cut-off;" through this to the
Arkansas, and up the Arkansas to Notrib's farm, just below Fort Hindman.
Early the next morning we disembarked. Stuart's division, moving up the
river along the bank, soon encountered a force of the enemy intrenched
behind a line of earthworks, extending from the river across to the
swamp. I took Steele's division, marching by the flank by a road through
the swamp to the firm ground behind, and was moving up to get to the
rear of Fort Hindman, when General McClernand overtook me, with the
report that the rebels had abandoned their first position, and had
fallen back into the fort. By his orders, we counter-marched, recrossed
the swamp, and hurried forward to overtake Stuart, marching for Fort
Hindman. The first line of the rebels was about four miles below Fort
Hindman, and the intervening space was densely, wooded and obscure, with
the exception of some old fields back of and close to the fort. During
the night, which was a bright moonlight one, we reconnoitred close up,
and found a large number of huts which had been abandoned, and the whole
rebel force had fallen back into and about the fort. Personally I crept
up to a stump so close that I could hear the enemy hard at work, pulling
down houses, cutting with axes, and building intrenchments. I could
almost hear their words, and I was thus listening when, about 4 A. M.
the bugler in the rebel camp sounded as pretty a reveille as I ever
listened to.

When daylight broke it revealed to us a new line of parapet straight
across the peninsula, connecting Fort Hindman, on the Arkansas River
bank, with the impassable swamp about a mile to its left or rear. This
peninsula was divided into two nearly equal parts by a road. My command
had the ground to the right of the road, and Morgan's corps that to the
left. McClernand had his
quarters still on the Tigress, back at Notrib's farm, but moved
forward that morning (January 11th) to a place in the woods to our rear,
where he had a man up a tree, to observe and report the movements.

There was a general understanding with Admiral Porter that he was to
attack the fort with his three ironclad gunboats directly by its
water-front, while we assaulted by land in the rear. About 10 a.m. I got
a message from General McClernand, telling me where he could be found,
and asking me what we were waiting for. I answered that we were then in
close contact with the enemy, viz., about five or six hundred yards off;
that the next movement must be a direct assault; that this should be
simultaneous along the whole line; and that I was waiting to hear from
the gunboats; asking him to notify Admiral Porter that we were all
ready. In about half an hour I heard the clear ring of the navy-guns;
the fire gradually increasing in rapidity and advancing toward the fort.
I had distributed our field-guns, and, when I judged the time had come,
I gave the orders to begin. The intervening ground between us and the
enemy was a dead level, with the exception of one or two small gullies,
and our men had no cover but the few standing trees and some logs on the
ground. The troops advanced well under a heavy fire, once or twice
falling to the ground for a sort of rest or pause. Every tree had its
group of men, and behind each log was a crowd of sharp-shooters, who
kept up so hot a fire that the rebel troops fired wild. The fire of the
fort proper was kept busy by the gunboats and Morgan's corps, so that
all my corps had to encounter was the direct fire from the newly-built
parapet across the peninsula. This line had three sections of
field-guns, that kept things pretty lively, and several round-shot came
so near me that I realized that they were aimed at my staff; so I
dismounted, and made them scatter.

As the gunboats got closer up I saw their flags actually over the
parapet of Fort Hindman, and the rebel gunners scamper out of the
embrasures and run down into the ditch behind. About the same time a man
jumped up on the rebel parapet just where the road entered, waving a
large white flag, and numerous smaller white rags appeared above the
parapet along the whole line. I immediately ordered, "Cease
firing!" and sent the same word down the line to General Steele,
who had made similar progress on the right, following the border of he
swamp. I ordered my aide, Colonel Dayton, to jump on his horse and ride
straight up to the large white flag, and when his horse was on the
parapet I followed with the rest of my staff. All firing had ceased,
except an occasional shot away to the right, and one of the captains
(Smith) of the Thirteenth Regulars was wounded after the display of the
white flag. On entering the line, I saw that our muskets and guns had
done good execution; for there was a horse-battery, and every horse lay
dead in the traces. The fresh-made parapet had been knocked down in many
places, and dead men lay around very thick. I inquired who commanded at
that point, and a Colonel Garland stepped up and said that he commanded
that brigade. I ordered him to form his brigade, stack arms, hang the
belts on the muskets, and stand waiting for orders. Stuart's division
had been halted outside the parapet. I then sent Major Hammond down the
rebel line to the right, with orders to stop Steele's division outside,
and to have the other rebel brigade stack its arms in like manner, and
to await further orders. I inquired of Colonel Garland who commanded in
chief, and he said that General Churchill did, and that he was inside
the fort. I then rode into the fort, which was well built, with good
parapets, drawbridge, and ditch, and was an inclosed work of four
bastions. I found it full of soldiers and sailors, its parapets toward
the river well battered in, and Porter's gunboats in the river, close
against the fort, with their bows on shore. I soon found General
Churchill, in conversation with Admiral Porter and General A. J. Smith,
and about this time my adjutant-general, Major J. H. Hammond, came and
reported that General Deshler, who commanded the rebel brigade facing
and opposed to Steele, had refused to stack arms and surrender, on the
ground that he had received no orders from his commanding general; that
nothing separated this brigade from Steele's men except the light
parapet, and that there might be trouble there at any moment. I advised
General Churchill to send orders at once, because a single shot might
bring the whole of Steele's division on Deshler's brigade, and I would
not be responsible for the consequences; soon afterward, we both
concluded to go in person. General Churchill had the horses of himself
and staff in the ditch; they were brought in, and we rode together to
where Garland was standing, and Churchill spoke to him in an angry tone,
"Why did you display the white flag!" Garland replied, "I
received orders to do so from one of your staff." Churchill denied
giving such an order, and angry words passed between them. I stopped
them, saying that it made little difference then, as they were in our
power. We continued to ride down the line to its extreme point, where we
found Deshler in person, and his troops were still standing to the
parapet with their muskets in hand. Steele'e men were on the outside. I
asked Deshler: "What does this mean? You are a regular officer, and
ought to know better." He answered, snappishly, that "he had
received no orders to surrender;" when General Churchill said:
"You see, sir, that we are in their power, and you may
surrender." Deshler turned to his staff-officers and ordered them
to repeat the command to "stack arms," etc., to the colonels
of his brigade. I was on my horse, and he was on foot. Wishing to soften
the blow of defeat, I spoke to him kindly, saying that I knew a family
of Deshlers in Columbus, Ohio, and inquired if they were relations of
his. He disclaimed any relation with people living north of the Ohio, in
an offensive tone, and I think I gave him a piece of my mind that he did
not relish. He was a West Point graduate, small but very handsome, and
was afterward killed in battle. I never met him again.

Returning to the position where I had first entered the rebel line, I
received orders from General McClernand, by one of his staff, to leave
General A. J. Smith in charge of the fort and prisoners, and with my
troops to remain outside. The officer explained that the general was
then on the Tigress, which had moved up from below, to a point in the
river just above the fort; and not understanding his orders, I concluded
to go and see him in person. My troops were then in possession of two of
the three brigades which composed the army opposed to us; and my troops
were also in possession of all the ground of the peninsula outside the
"fort-proper" (Hindman). I found General McClernand on the
Tigress, in high spirits. He said repeatedly: "Glorious! glorious!
my star is ever in the ascendant!" He spoke complimentarily of the
troops, but was extremely jealous of the navy. He said: "I'll make
a splendid report;" "I had a man up a tree;" etc. I was
very hungry and tired, and fear I did not appreciate the honors in
reserve for us, and asked for something to eat and drink. He very kindly
ordered something to be brought, and explained to me that by his
"orders" he did not wish to interfere with the actual state of
facts; that General A. J. Smith would occupy "Fort Hindman,"
which his troops had first entered, and I could hold the lines outside,
and go on securing the prisoners and stores as I had begun. I returned
to the position of Garland's brigade and gave the necessary orders for
marching all the prisoners, disarmed, to a pocket formed by the river
and two deep gullies just above the fort, by which time it had become
quite dark. After dark another rebel regiment arrived from Pine Bluff,
marched right in, and was also made prisoners. There seemed to be a good
deal of feeling among the rebel officers against Garland, who asked
leave to stay with me that night, to which I of course consented. Just
outside the rebel parapet was a house which had been used for a
hospital. I had a room cleaned out, and occupied it that night. A
cavalry-soldier lent me his battered coffee-pot with some coffee and
scraps of hard bread out of his nose-bag; Garland and I made some
coffee, ate our bread together, and talked politics by the fire till
quite late at night, when we lay down on straw that was saturated with
the blood of dead or wounded men. The next day the prisoners were all
collected on their boats, lists were made out, and orders given for
their transportation to St. Louis, in charge of my aide, Major Sanger.
We then proceeded to dismantle and level the forts, destroy or remove
the stores, and we found in the magazine the very ammunition which had
been sent for us in the Blue Wing, which was secured and afterward used
in our twenty-pound Parrott guns.

On the 13th we reembarked; the whole expedition returned out of the
river by the direct route down the Arkansas during a heavy snow-storm,
and rendezvoused in the Mississippi, at Napoleon, at the mouth of the
Arkansas. Here General McClernand told me he had received a letter from
General Grant at Memphis, who disapproved of our movement up the
Arkansas; but that communication was made before he had learned of our
complete success. When informed of this, and of the promptness with
which it had been executed, he could not but approve. We were then
ordered back to Milliken's Bend, to await General Grant's arrival in
person. We reached Milliken's Bend January 21st.

McClernand's report of the capture of Fort Hindman almost ignored the
action of Porter's fleet altogether. This was unfair, for I know that
the admiral led his fleet in person in the river-attack, and that his
guns silenced those of Fort Hindman, and drove the gunners into the
ditch.

The aggregate loss in my corps at Arkansas Post was five hundred and
nineteen, viz., four officers and seventy-five men killed, thirty-four
officers and four hundred and six men wounded. I never knew the losses
in the gunboat fleet, or in Morgan's corps; but they must have been less
than in mine, which was more exposed. The number of rebel dead must have
been nearly one hundred and fifty; of prisoners, by actual count, we
secured four thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, and sent them north
to St. Louis.