The pages down the right hand side comprise an essay in defence of panexperientialism and should be read in order.

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Wednesday, 22 April 2015

Am I a p-zombie?

The p-zombie and the
non-p-zombie alike could have the idea of the entirety of the constituents
comprising their "world view", recognizing that some of those
constituents were public (or objective) and some private (or subjective). They
would both use language as they have been trained to use language by
participation in their respective linguistic communities. They could conceivably
both assign the word "mind" or the term "conscious experience"
to that entirety of constituents, and even describe that entirety as the
"what it is like to be me". They could both conceivably recognize the
impossibility of acquiring any evidence via their sense organs (i.e. empirical
evidence) to support or refute the existence of an external world. Any
third-person claim (i.e. a claim from any other p-zombie or non-p-zombie
appearing as part of that totality of constituents) made for metaphysical solipsism
would clearly be mistaken (since the third person is part of the constituents
of at least one other mind), but how might this be taken as an argument for the
existence of an external world (i.e. as a repudiation of metaphysical
solipsism) for the host entirety in which these ideas emerge (i.e. in
the first-person case)? -- only by inductive reasoning. This is sufficient for
me to repudiate metaphysical solipsism, but I must still acknowledge Hume's
argument regarding inductive reasoning (i.e. I must still acknowledge that I
don't have any apodictic proof of the existence of an external world). All
I have is a repudiation of metaphysical solipsism, not a refutation.
But the real question this brings to light concerns the distinction between the
p-zombie and the non-p-zombie: am I really something over and above what the
p-zombie is?