Abstract: The 2011
Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Research Meeting, hosted by the American
Society for Microbiology, will bring together researchers working to fight
bioterrorism and decision makers who shape the future of the biodefense
research agenda.

The meeting will be at the Omni
Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C. between February 6 and 9 and will address
concerns that emerging infectious diseases will be a major factor in the public
threat of bioterrorism.

Scientists, policy makers and
public health researchers will come together to learn about the latest
scientific developments during the meeting, which will include a series of
keynote addresses by leaders in the field of biodefense. There will also be
poster sessions that present the latest research on vaccines, biothreat agents,
diagnostic and detection procedures, plant and animal pathogens, global
surveillance and more.

There will be a featured
lectured by D.A. Henderson of the Center for Biosecurity of the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center titled "The Eradication of Smallpox: A
Continuing Saga" on the first day of the conference.

Other sessions include
"New Interventions and the Challenges of Emerging Infections,"
"Emerging Plant Diseases and Agricultural Biodefense," and
"Medical Countermeasure Development in the U.S. Government."

The American Society of
Microbiology has 40,000 members worldwide. Its mission is to gain a better
understanding of the basic processes of life and to promote applying that
knowledge to improved health and environmental and economic well-being(Bio
Prep Watch, 2011).

Issues presented concerned the development of clear
governmental focal points; the challenges faced by local, state, regional and
national agencies; and the importance of prevention, detection and response. A
particular emphasis was placed on retooling inner and outer communication
practices, which is what occurs between governmental bodies and what occurs
between governmental bodies and the public.

Henrich Hololei, head of cabinet for European Union
Transportation Commissioner Silim Kallas, spoke about several challenges he
faces, some of which are endemic to the E.U structure itself.

Hololei said that Europe faced transportation challenges
in the wake of Iceland’s volcanic ash cloud. An individual nation could not
open its own airspace without consent from the larger group, complicating
efforts to jumpstart what then was a badly damaged economic reality.

“It is a complicated jigsaw,” Hololei said. “Issues in
Europe are specific and multi-layered, yet at the end of the day, we want safe
transportation systems. We want ways to stop bioterrorism, and, if something
does occur, we want to save as many people as possible”.

How that might be done, and what should be avoided in the
process, was Randy Larsen’s focus. A retired colonel who served in the Air
Force for 32 years, Larsen is a commentator and adviser on national security
issues, particularly large-scale threats like biological warfare.

Larsen said that rigorous cooperation between the public
and private sector is needed. Citing the 27 percent of all cargo in America
that travels on private airplanes as an example, he said that the notion of a
government-only effort ignores private and public sector overlap. Focusing on
approaches like these will save more lives in the long run, he said.

Terrorists are also less likely to attack nations with
better emergency-capable infrastructures, Larsen said.

“The holes are too great, the dangerous elements to be
smuggled in too small, those who wish us harm too many," Larsen said.
"It’s a difficult pill to swallow, but one that will save this country
millions – millions that can be better spent on things that really will work.”

Jerry Hauer, a former director of the Office of Emergency
Management under Rudy Giuliani, and later an assistant secretary within the
Department of Health and Human Services, referenced the need for new
communication patterns among agencies and new communication outreaches to the
public. He expressed concern that local and national governmental agencies
often presented overly confident approaches to the complicated demands that
arise after a grave emergency.

Hauer described the difficulty in communicating directly
to those underground in the event of a biological attack as a transportation
issue that can be fixed. He also warned of a more enigmatic problem.

“Even now, just a decade after 9/11, our level of
vigilance has decreased," Hauer said. "Complacency is a problem.
Hopefully it won’t take another event to remind people to be alert and
watchful.”

The event, hosted by Emergent BioSolutions, Inc.,
reflects the company’s involvement in matters of government policy and disaster
preparedness. Emergent BioSolutions, Inc., is the manufacturer of BioThrax, the
only FDA-licensed vaccine for Anthrax (Bio
Prep Watch, 2011).

Abstract: With a
significant portion of America’s food supply being imported, consumers are
vulnerable to tainted food and intentional bioterrorism attacks, according to
experts gathering at this year’s International Symposium on Agroterrorism in
Kansas City.

Approximately 600 delegates
attended the three day conference, sponsored in part by the FBI and the Heart
of America Joint Terrorism Task Force, KansasCityStar.com reports. The main
mission of the event is to protect the food supply worldwide while illustrating
the importance of a coordinated effort.

U.S. food and agricultural
product imports have been rising for decades, increasing from $41 billion in
1998 to $78 billion in 2007, according to the USDA. An estimated 50 percent of
U.S. food is now imported.

“There are more firms
registered with the Food and Drug Administration to supply food to the U.S.
from outside the country than there are inside the country,” Shaun Kennedy,
deputy director of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense at the
University of Maryland, said, according to KansasCityStar.com.

The CDC estimates that, each
year, roughly one in six Americans, or approximately 48 million people,
contract a food-borne disease.

To counter these threats,
Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed into law the Food Safety Modernization
Act of 2011 in January. This initiative aims to ensure the U.S. food supply is
safe by shifting the focus of federal regulators from responding to
contamination to preventing it.

Seen as an important first
step, many health officials suspect it will take a great deal of vigilance to
protect the American food supply, KansasCityStar.com reports (Bio
Prep Watch, 2011).

Abstract: Dozens of
public health officials and emergency responders recently attended a two day
symposium put on by the Nebraska Center for Preparedness Education on the
subject of how to prepare for a bioterror attack.

The symposium, which took place
in Norfolk, Neb., is meant to cover illness outbreaks, helping victims in a
disaster and how to respond to acts of terrorism. The organizers of the event
said that education on this subject is an important part in helping personnel
plan and prepare for such an attack, KTIV.com reports.

"It gives us ideas for
areas where people feel like they may have gaps in their disaster planning,”
Sharon Medcalf of the NE Center for Preparedness said, according to KTIV.com.
“And then, we build programs based on some of the needs assessments they would
get, and often it's feedback from this conference itself."

Nebraska Lt. Governor Rick
Sheehy was also on hand to speak about a number of issues, including a new
national watchdog program called “See Something, Say Something.”

"It's primarily for
citizens,” Sheehy said, according to KTIV.com. “If they see suspicious
activity, if they see suspicious packages…just something isn't what it should
be or is out of the ordinary, that they report that."

In addition, Norfolk Fire Chief
Shane Weidner discussed how his team of firefighters dealt with a December 2009
propane fire at the former Proteint Foods plant.

Abstract: The 18th
Biodetection Technologies Conference, an internationally recognized event for
experts in detection and identification of biological and chemical threats,
will be held on June 24 in Washington, D.C.

The event will explore the
latest R&D developments and ready-to-market systems for major biothreat
identification, biothreat detection and analysis both at the point-of-care and
in the field.

The conference will be held at
the Marriot Wardman Park and will feature Dr. Peter Emanuel as the keynote
speaker.

Emanuel is the bioscience
division chief at the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.

During his address, Emanuel
will discuss the results of a 2011 biosurveillance hardware systems survey. The
survey targeted systems that have applicability in assessing human exposure to
chemical, biological and radiological agents. It focused on information on
commercially available and maturing diagnostic and identification/detection
products that have technology readiness levels from TLR 4 to TLR 9, not
including basic research concepts.

Emanuel will examine the
findings of the survey and what it might mean for interagency needs for the
purchase of technology in the future.

Other topics that will be
discussed at the conference include bioinformatics for biodefense; challenges
for rapid, early, specific and sensitive detection; and technological advances
in detection and identification of biological threats (Bio
Prep Watch, 2011).

Abstract: Panel of current and former members of Congress discusses the biological threats that keep them up at night at GW event.

When Frank Cilluffo,
director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute and associate vice
president for homeland security, noted that the event at 1957 E Street
featured “the titans of national security,” he wasn’t kidding.

The latter two are chairman and vice chairman of the WMD Center, which cosponsored the event with the Homeland Security Policy Institute.

One topic that the panelists and Mr. Cilluffo, who moderated the
event, kept returning to was what keeps them up at night, which was
mostly a biological terrorist attack on the U.S.

Rep. Rogers added Iran and North Korea to the list of sleep-threatening dangers.

One of the most important sentences of the 9/11 Commission Report was
the claim that the attacks occurred because of a failure of U.S.
imagination, Sen. Lieberman said, interpreting the failure as an
inability or refusal to imagine what al-Qaeda was plotting.

“We know that the intent to hurt us continues,” he said. “It doesn’t
take a very aggressive imagination … to believe that groups that are
venomously anti-American would be considering biological attacks on us.”

Part of the legislation Sen. Lieberman is working on now is creating a
national bio-defense strategy. “I don’t like to be kept up at night, so
to whatever extent I can reduce the causes of the sleepless nights, not
just for myself but also for other Americans, I’d like to do so,” he
said.

Former Sen. Talent explained why the prospect of a biological attack
was so terrifying. Whereas the 9/11 attacks killed about 3,000 people,
conservative estimates say a biological attack could claim 10 to 100
times that number of lives, and it would be easy for the terrorists to
“reload and hit another city.” The attacks would also leave residue that
would make it tough to rebuild.

“The American economy would just stop,” he said.

Former Senators Talent and Graham also discussed the annual report
cards their center gives for U.S. efforts to protect itself from
terrorist attacks.

Sen. Graham said his background working in higher education taught
him about the importance of issuing something like a report card. “If
you don’t evaluate a particular subject it’s not likely to be taught or
not likely to be taught well,” he said.

Out of 18 items on last year’s report card, the U.S. government
received four grades of F. The most significant F was for being
unprepared to respond to an act of bioterrorism. “We think this is a
serious national security risk,” Sen. Graham said.

Sen. Talent said the pair hadn’t realized the significance of
biological threats at first, but after conducting hundreds of interviews
as part of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which was tasked with following
up on the 9/11 Commission Report, they realized a biological attack
would be the most dangerous threat to the country.

The U.S. knows that al-Qaeda wanted to build biological weapons in
the 1990s, it would not need to undergo intense organizational
realignment to construct such a weapon and biological weapons are
relatively easy to create and stock pile, he said.

“This is not a next generation threat. This is now.”

Rep. Rogers said elements of a national bio-defense strategy, like vaccines for Anthrax, are “something you hope you never use.”

“Everyone is always mad at the firefighters around budget time, but
you love them when you pick up the phone and they show up and protect
your house,” he said. “When you need them, you need them. Same with
these vaccines. This is not something you can go back and say, ‘We’ve
had an event. Oh, by the way, where do we go buy 8,000 doses of Anthrax
vaccine.’ It’s not going to happen” (George Washington University, 2011).

Abstract:The
2009 H1N1 pandemic makes thisESWI conference more relevant than ever
and is driving EU efforts to improve pandemic preparedness. Science has a
major role to play in addressing unanswered questions.

“It’s
quite timely that we’re having this meeting now, just after the first
pandemic of the 21st century,” said Dr. A.D.M.E. Osterhaus, ESWI Chair,
as he opened the Fourth ESWI Influenza Conference in Malta. Osterhaus
was referring, of course, to the swine flu outbreak of 2009. He noted
that the pandemic provided the opportunity to explore lessons learned
and prepare for the next one.

According
to Osterhaus, this conference is also special because young scientists
will present new data and all the scientific sessions will be co-chaired
by a young scientist. “We’re cultivating the next generation of
scientists,” said Osterhaus.

EU prepares to update pandemic preparedness across EuropeOsterhaus’
opening remarks were followed by a video message from John Dalli,
European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy. Dalli recalled
that back in December 2009, EU Member States agreed that by 2014, 75% of
healthcare workers and people at risk would be vaccinated against
influenza. He said that the EU is encouraging Member States to meet
their commitments and suggested that “the time has come to update
guidance on influenza pandemic preparedness across Europe.” Dalli
described EU efforts to ensure equitable access to vaccines for all
Member States by developing a mechanism for joint procurement.

Dalli
concluded his message by underlining the important role of science. “It
is only by combining the latest scientific knowledge with effective
policy planning, that we will succeed in addressing influenza,” he said.

Nobel Laureate says “there’s still a lot to be solved”Dr.
Peter C. Doherty of St. Jude Children’s Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee
and the University of Melbourne in Australia delivered the keynote
address. Doherty gave a wide-ranging talk that presented influenza
research performed over the past several decades. He summarized research
findings, added his own conclusions and raised questions requiring
further scientific investigation.

According
to Doherty, the real problem with the influenza virus is that it’s
highly contagious but the infected don’t necessarily feel sick while
they’re infectious. On the plus side, unlike HIV, influenza infections
are “self-limiting” provided one can limit the damage. “We just need to
get people through the acute phase,” said Doherty. For this purpose,
Doherty ended his keynote with a challenge: “Can we make a universal vaccine?”

Scientists provide strong evidence for pandemic threat Scientists have shown that H1N1 isgeographically mobile and can reassort,and they have identified influenza virusstrains that could mutate into the nextpandemic virus. Experimental researchhas shown that with few mutationsH5N1 can become airborne.

“Pigs
DO fly.” That was the message from Dr.Malik Peiris of the University of
Hong Kong. Peiris was one of two keynote speakers during the plenary
session on Monday. His talk, “’When pigs fly’: Insights on pandemic
emergence”, examined potential pandemic threats, focusing on the 2009
H1N1 pandemic strain.

Dr.
Peiris was well-positioned to study the issue as about half the global
population of pigs is to be found in China and 4,000-5,000 pigs are
slaughtered everyday in Hong Kong alone. He and his team have been
conducting a 14 year surveillance study of swine influenza in China.

Flying pigs?Dr.
Peiris’ aim was to trace the origins and genomic evolution of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic virus. He found that after the triple reassortant strain
became dominant in North America, it did not remain geographically
isolated. Peiris and his team found that swine flu viruses of various

lineages
were repeatedly introduced in China. “These viruses readily moved
across countries and continents, probably through breeder stock,” said
Peiris. Furthermore, the North American strain reassorted in China.
Peiris said that the reassortment events in China gave clues how the
pandemic virus emerged, even though the pandemic virus did not originate
there.

Viral determinants of human transmissionPeiris
next set out to identify viral factors that contribute to transmission
risk for humans. He and his researchers studied tropism in the human
upper respiratory tract in ex vivo cultures, transmission in ferrets and
serological herd immunity. They identified one reassortant strain that
severely infected both the nasopharynx and the bronchial tract. In the
ferret study, this strain was also the only one which displayed any hint
of aerosol transmission, according to Peiris.

On the hunt for a killerGiven
that this reassortant virus shares 7 gene segments of common origin
with the pandemic virus (but does not pre-date it), Peiris and his
colleagues decided it warranted further study. They added to the
reassortant virus the neuraminidase enzyme it was missing as well as 3
polymerase genes that had shown high levels of activity in tests. The
new strain was not more infectious (only one out of three ferrets got
infected) but the severity of the disease was enhanced. “Despite these
results, 915 – the reassortant virus – is the only virus of swine origin
that does infect human tissue ex vivo and aerosol in humans,” said
Peiris. He found that sero conversion is broadening human immunity to
swine viruses but not to avian viruses. Thus, according to Peiris the
biggest danger would be reassortment of an H1N1 virus with an avian
virus such as H5N1. Peiris concluded his presentation with a strong
message: “There’s a need for a step change in surveillance of swine
viruses and animal viruses in general.”

H5N1: a persistent dangerDr.
Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Centre in the Netherlands delivered
a similarly strong message during his presentation that H5N1 continues
to be a pandemic threat. Fouchier has studied H5N1 in Indonesia, one of
countries hardest hit by avian influenza. The island nation of 240
million people has had 178 confirmed cases of avian influenza of which
146 have been fatal.

Vaccine failureIntrigued
by evidence that classical vaccines were failing, Fouchier and his
colleagues used a Hemagglutination inhibition assay to study the
antigenic drift of the new virus strains. “We discovered that only 1-3
substitutions are sufficient to cause large changes in antigenic drift,”
said Fouchier. Moreover, large antigenic differences between and within
H5N1 clades could affect vaccine efficiency and even result in vaccine
failure, warned Fouchier. Indonesia decided to switch to a different
vaccine strain.

A
“stupid” experiment leads to a valuable result Fouchier and his team’s
biggest discovery, however, was based on what he termed a “stupid”
experiment. He and his team introduced mutations, under strict
laboratory safety procedures, by reverse genetics into laboratory
ferrets. They then collected a nasal wash from each infected ferret and
inoculated another ferret after a few days. They repeated this process
ten times. The result? H5N1 had been transmitted to three out of four
ferrets. “This virus is airborne and as efficiently transmitted as the
seasonal virus,” said Fouchier. His research team found that only 5
mutations, 3 by reverse genetics and 2 by repeated transmission, were
enough to produce this result. “This is very bad news, indeed,” said
Fouchier.

Clinical approaches to pandemic preparedness

Early
diagnosis and treatment is the key to stamping out a pandemic before it
peaks and overwhelms the healthcare system. With this in mind,
participants in the session “Clinical impact and diagnostic approaches”
offered their views on ways to improve.

Dr.
Peter Openshaw of Imperial College in London provided a fascinating
inside view of the UK’s efforts to combat the H1N1 pandemic, focusing on
its clinical impact. “The UK had one of the most highly developed
pandemic preparedness plans in the world,” according to Openshaw, “and
the risk of pandemic human disease was considered highest among threats
as far as impact and likelihood, even higher than terrorism.”

The
UK’s plan was centered on blunting the peak of any pandemic outbreak.
“You can tolerate a slow-burning outbreak, but it’s the peak that causes
a breakdown in health services,” said Openshaw. The pandemic hit the
UK’s shores in two waves: the first wave in the summer of 2009 and the
second wave in the winter of 2009/10. During the first wave,
flu-associated bed-days went from 4,163 in 2008 to 33,376 in 2009, a
7-fold rise, and, most alarmingly, the 17-39 year age group was
particularly hard-hit, with bed-days increasing from 169 to 6,253 from
October to December, a 37-fold increase.

Openshaw based his research on two studies:

Flu-CIN,
a study funded by the Department of Health that aimed to collect
clinical information fast; and MOSAIC, a Wellcome/MRC funded study that
focused more on the discovery of pathogenesis. The Flu-CIN study found
that mild asthma increased patient risk, but that it was a risk factor
for admission only, not for severe outcome. The studies’ findings
resulted in several changes including a revision of UK clinical guidance
and a change to the UK’s antiviral, antibiotic and vaccination policy,
away from prophylactic use in the case of antivirals.

To Openshaw perhaps the most important lesson is that “You need to be prepared in peacetime. You have to move very fast during a pandemic.”

Real-time PCR formapping a wholeentire genomesequencesDr.
Martin Hibbard of the Genome Institute of Singapore described recent
advances in Real-time Polymerase Chain Reaction (RTPCR) technology. He
noted that if a physician’s test for H5N1 is negative, RT-PCR could
present an alternative to that process. “Genome sequences can be rapidly
analyzed and sequenced, so the technique can help with the rapid
identification of outbreaks,” said Hibbard.

The
process works by extracting a total nucleicb acid from a clinical
sample. This is then amplified and hybridized onto a micro-array chip.
The result is detection signals for an entire genome sequence which can
then be analyzed using automated bioinformatics. The technology has
already proven itself useful. Singapore’s Ministry of Health used it to
track which viruses were mutating most rapidly during the H1N1 flu
pandemic, and in at least one instance even used it for person to person
recognition.

In vivo imaging: a superior approach?Koet
Stittelaar of Viroclinics Biosciences in the Netherlands presented a
very different diagnostic approach. Using CT imaging on ferrets, he and
his group overcame the limitations of current analytical approaches.
Current preclinical animal models examine the severity of disease
(necropsy) at a single fixed point in time. But antiviral efficacy, for
example, depends greatly on when treatment was begun. Moreover, with in
vivo imaging, Stittelaar and his colleagues can compare data from a
single animal rather than from several different animals.

Seasonal influenza and acute myocardial infarctionDr.
Charlotte Warren-Gash’s study of UK primary care data sought to see
whether myocardial infarction might be triggered by respiratory
infections. For her doctoral thesis at University College in London, she
linked data from the General Practice Research Database of 5 million
active patients with data from the Myocardial Ischaemia National Audit
Project, adjusting the data for seasonality and other factors. “We found
an increased risk of myocardial infection following acute respiratory
infections,” said Warren-Gash, “but there was no strong evidence that
the effect on myocardial infarction was greater for influenza than for
otherinfections.”

Vaccination: history proves itworks, whatever the disease!

Does
the world’s long history of vaccination justify – despite the
associated risks – its use in reducing the burden of disease? For all
panel members of ESWI’s final workshop on Day 1, the answer was a
resounding “yes”.

From
Chinese variolation techniques against small pox in the 1600s to
today’s efforts to eradicate polio, “the history of vaccines in the
fight against infectious diseases has been a success story,” Dr. Ab
Osterhaus, ESWI chairman told the group, pointing to today’s
near-eradication of diseases that were once the scourge of humanity such
as measles. “We have the tools to fight these diseases with vaccines.”

Yet
public fear and mistrust about the safety of vaccines often stand in
the way of high vaccination rates. These obstacles can only be overcome
by delivering the right information at the right time to those who
communicate directly with the public: the media and other stakeholders.

“You
have an opportunity every year to educate your media about the benefits
of influenza vaccination: in the autumn when seasonal flu preparations
begin,” Dr. Marc Van Ranst, researcher at Belgium’s University of
Leuven, told his audience.

“The
knowledge you can impart to the media and thus to the public can
influence them and prepare them for a pandemic whenever it hits.” Public misperceptions about vaccination are rampantand can work heavily against the best efforts of science, however.

“Conspiracies
of all kinds have always been there—even in Jenner’s time,” said
Osterhaus, referring to the 18th English scientist who developed the
first the smallpox vaccine. “Today I’m most concerned with
pseudo-scientists who say it is good to be exposed to disease in
childhood to strengthen the immunological system! This has got to be
fought. However, we as scientists have got to package our message in a
different way if we want more effective communication with the public.”

Japanese
health officials know that by direct experience, as panelist Dr. Masato
Tashiro, told the group. Noting that Tokyo shifted away many years ago
from mandatory flu vaccination for young children partly due to a
hostile press that called the policy a violation of children’s rights,
the government has since embraced voluntary vaccination and seen uptake
rise – and mortality fall – among children since 2002. The reason? “The
government simply did a much better job of promoting the positive
effects [of vaccination] for children,” said Tashiro (ESWI, 2011).

Abstract: Charting the Future of Biosecurity: Ten Years after the Anthrax Attacks
was held in Washington, DC, on October 4, 2011. Jointly hosted by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, this
invitational meeting brought together thought leaders from the federal
government, the policy community, think tanks, academia, and media
outlets. The meeting provided a forum
for leaders in the biosecurity community to reflect on progress made
since 2001 and to consider priorities for the biosecurity policy agenda
in the years ahead. This meeting was made possible by the generous support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

.Opening Remarks by Thomas V. InglesIn
his remarks, Thomas Inglesby, Director of the Center for Biosecurity
emphasized the importance of preparing for the future of biosecurity
given the looming threats of bioterrorism, pandemic flu, and other
emerging infectious diseases. He acknowledged the difficulty of the
mission but noted that there are reasons for optimism—including the
breadth and depth of knowledge, experience, and dedication among those
now in the field; the strength of American science and technology
industries and the robust government programs now working to develop
biodefense; and the notable progress to date. Dr. Inglesby also
highlighted some significant gaps, such as early disease outbreak
detection capabilities, post-event decontamination plans, and medical
countermeasures. He emphasized that these pressing needs must be
addressed regardless of growing budget constraints. Dr. Inglesby closed
by urging all present to remain persistent and persuasive in their
efforts to draw attention and resources towards biosecurity.

Challenges of Reporting on the 2011 Bio-attackJeanne
Meserve, former CNN Homeland Security Correspondent, presented a video
montage of news coverage from the 2001 anthrax attacks. She recalled the
difficulties of acquiring accurate information about the events
surrounding the attacks, which she characterized as both a public health
and a communications disaster. She described the press as feeling “whip
sawed” by conflicting information from government and law enforcement
representatives, and she noted that the unknowns and confusion about
risk created fear among the public and among members of the press, who
had trouble determining whether they were putting themselves and their
families at risk by covering the events. Ms. Meserve recommended a
policy of frank and proactive communication from government officials,
and she suggested that members of the press improve both their
communication skills and their scientific knowledge so they are better
able to convey facts and evidence responsibly. She also emphasized that
the press has an obligation to strike a tone that informs people without
inciting fear.

Present & Future BiothreatsColonel
Randall Larsen, D. A. Henderson, and Dr. Richard Danzig engaged in a
discussion of present and future biothreats. As moderator, Col. Larsen
first acknowledged that the panelists were visionaries in the field, and
he asked them to comment about their experiences and to suggest
priorities for the future.

Dr.
Henderson replied by emphasizing the importance of continually asking
and answering this question: “What would we do if there were a
bio-attack tomorrow?” Dr. Henderson expressed concern that what he
perceives as a lack of strong leadership in the federal government would
hinder the nation’s ability to coordinate and marshal an effective
response. He noted that the responsibility for a federal response to a
biological attack is dispersed across a number of agencies, and he
worried that a long interagency process could be slowing decisive
decision making. Dr. Henderson called for a response plan that will have
broad public support so as to avoid conflicting advice.

Dr.
Danzig expanded on that notion to remind the audience that, in the face
of catastrophe, the public often looks to leaders outside of government
to validate recommendations, and he noted the need to reach and educate
known leaders outside of government in advance. He also discussed what
he considers systemic issues that hinder our response capabilities, the
most serious of which, he argued, is our federalist system. That the
federal role in preparedness and response must overlay and complement
state and local response systems complicates planning. Another systemic
problem is that government planning frameworks are often too narrowly
focused on the immediate and acute phase of a disaster. He argued for an
expanded perspective on planning and response—one that accounts for the
extended period of time and long term effort that will be required
after an attack to restore normal functioning. Danzig contended that
those working in biosecurity and biodefense should think beyond the
casualty component of a biological attack, explaining that he has come
to think of bioweapons not so much as weapons of mass destruction, but
as weapons of mass disruption.

Both
Drs. Henderson and Danzig acknowledged the uncertainty that attends the
field of biosecurity, given the inherent difficulty in sound
predictions about soundly predicting the outcome of a bio-attack. They
encouraged the audience to acknowledge the potential threat of synthetic
biology and other new pursuits in the biological sciences in preparing
our defenses, noting in particular that our current focus on a finite
set of threats may soon be an obsolete approach. Dr. Henderson closed by
stressing the need for more biologists at high levels in the federal
government who can raise awareness and help guide development of
sensible, strategic defense strategies.

Looking Ahead in U.S. Health SecurityAs
moderator of a panel discussion among Nicole Lurie, Andrew Weber, and
Thomas Frieden, Richard Besser opened the discussion by asking panel
members what threats keep them up at night. Dr. Lurie described the
recent events in Japan as what haunts her—multiple, serial disasters
coalescing to wreak unprecedented devastation. Dr. Frieden worries about
unknown and unplanned-for disasters against a backdrop of shrinking
public health infrastructure and resources. Mr. Weber’s concern, from
his DoD vantage point, is terrorists’ stated interest in biological
weapons and the advances in the biological sciences and technology that
are making the tools needed to make bioweapons increasingly accessible.

Mr.
Weber suggested that efforts to strengthen interagency and
international partnerships have made our capacity to detect and respond
to threats more robust, and he cited as an example a recent drill that
DoD conducted with the Republic of South Korea that included both South
Korean authorities and senior members of DHS and CDC. Mr. Weber said
that in more than 20 years in the federal government, he had never
witnessed interagency coordination as strong as the coordination in
effect in the current administration.

Dr.
Besser then asked the panelists to address what he described as a
popular perception that federal agencies spend too many resources on
low-probability events and that they may even overreact to emerging
biological threats, such asH1N1. In response, Dr. Lurie indicated that
the H1N1 response underscored the need for a fully functional public
health infrastructure capable of responding to all types of events, an
assertion confirmed by Dr. Frieden, who also noted that a strong public
health system is essential to both chronic disease response and
emergency response. Cautioning that it is always better to overreact to
emerging threats, Dr. Frieden pointed out that the H1N1 flu strain had
probably been spreading in Mexico for months before it came to the
attention of the United States, and that the lesson from H1N1 is that we
could be more proactive in identifying infectious disease threats. Mr.
Weber followed by adding that no country has a big enough “moat” to
protect them from a communicable disease, and that a robust global
disease surveillance system is an urgent need in the effort to improve
biosecurity.

Dr. Besser pressed the
panel members to explain international response efforts and their
connections to homeland security. Pandemic and avian flu, according to
Dr. Frieden, have catalyzed a partnership between the U.S. and Chinese
CDCs, which now post weekly online updates about circulating flu strains
in an effort to provide better awareness and advanced warning for
emerging threats to homeland security.

Concluding
with a discussion of domestic health security, panelists identified
countermeasure distribution and resource allocation as pressing
near-term challenges. Dr. Lurie promoted a federal approach that meshed
with state and local infrastructures, but she cautioned that federal
budget policies limit the ability to reallocate funds for immediate
emergency use on the local level. Dr. Frieden pointed out that there is
no broad plan for medical countermeasure acquisition and distribution
and he suggested that a “quick and simple” answer to these complex
problems is probably impossible. Instead, he suggested, the answer may
be different strategies for different populations and circumstances.

Special Taped Interview of Tom DaschleIn
a taped interview prepared for this meeting, Senator Tom Daschle,
former U.S. Senate Majority Leader, shared a few of his memories from
the morning of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of October 2001. He also
offered his thoughts on what is needed to better educate America’s
leaders about the threat of bioterrorism.

Transformative Science in BiosecurityDr.
Inglesby returned to the conference stage to moderate a discussion
about advances in the life sciences and implications for biosecurity
among Margaret Hamburg, George Poste, Tara O’Toole, and Craig Venter.
Drs. Venter and Poste opened with their visions for the future: Dr.
Venter asserted that automation of labor- and time-intensive processes
would reduce the timeline for producing vaccines to days, if not hours.
He cited his lab’s recent experience in working with BARDA and Novartis
to create a synthetic flu vaccine virus strain in 10 hours as a sign of
medical countermeasure progress to come. Dr. Poste added that, in the
future, proteins would be manufactured synthetically from cell-free
systems, including vaccines, which would make regulating the vaccines
significantly less burdensome. Dr. Poste also suggested that biosecurity
challenges would expand in the coming years due to antibiotic
resistance and as population growth creates added pressure on
agriculture production due to population growth. He contended that
synthetic biology would play a crucial role in revolutionizing the
industrial ecology of modern society as it will help to secure food and
energy resources.

While acknowledging
that advances in the life sciences are “imbued with potential to lessen
human suffering,” Dr. O’Toole cautioned that advances in science are
dangerously outpacing the government’s ability to organize and regulate
to ensure that biology and new technologies are not being applied to
dangerous purposes. She explained that the concepts described by Drs.
Venter and Poste are complex and difficult to translate to government
officials and members of Congress who do not have years of training and
experience in the field. Dr. Hamburg described how the FDA is working to
change its processes and the ways in which it engages with the
scientific community; she noted in particular her efforts to undo long
held perceptions of the FDA as an agency bogged down by bureaucracy (see Dr. Hamburg’s remarks from the Center’s March 2011 conference on the growing role of the life sciences for greater detail).
Dr. Hamburg encouraged her colleagues in the scientific community to
think about not only science, but also about the tools regulators will
need to evaluate science.

Dr.
Inglesby asked the panelists if they thought the U.S. is losing its
competitive edge in math and science. Drs. Venter and Poste suggested
that, although we have not yet lost our edge, there are problems in both
our educational system and our immigration policy that threaten to
degrade the pool of talent available to the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries.

The panel
concluded with an overall assessment of the threat posed by synthetic
biology. Dr. Venter cautioned that there are many other threats, such as
naturally occurring agents, which call for immediate attention. Dr.
Poste contended that the beneficent potential of synthetic biology
outweighed its destructive potential. The scientists’ optimism was
shared by Drs. O’Toole and Hamburg, but they reiterated that the threat
potential certainly should not be ignored.

Talking Biosecurity with the PublicSenator
Jim Talent spoke about the challenges of communicating the biological
weapons threat to the public and to Congress. He acknowledged that it is
difficult to raise consciousness without engendering fear. He also
asserted that we are limited by our 18th century model of bureaucratic
government, which is not well-positioned to respond to rapidly evolving
threats, fast-moving disasters, and the attendant need to make decisions
rapidly and to quickly communicate them to the public.

Senator
Talent agreed with earlier speakers that biological weapons represent
an increasing asymmetric threat, particularly as barriers to weaponizing
pathogens diminish as a result of progress in the life sciences.
Senator Talent described the WMD Center’s efforts to address this
threat, in particular the Bio-Response Report Card
on the state of U.S. preparedness for a biological attack. He
emphasized the need to develop systemic resilience to a biological
attack, which would reduce the high cost of last-minute preparations and
response when a threat is actualized. He concluded by asserting that
under current budget conditions, the U.S. government can no longer rely
on a reactive approach to crisis.

The Next 5 Years of the Biological Weapons ConventionThomas
Countryman discussed the U.S. State Department’s perspective on next
steps in advancing the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), emphasizing
his conviction that this is an influential forum for demonstrating the
constructive potential of the biological sciences while discouraging
destructive applications. The BWC serves as a norm against malevolent
application of the life sciences. He said that maintaining that norm
requires frequent and proactive consultations with relevant government,
academic, and commercial entities. In the future, he noted, the BWC will
include the emergency response community for better understanding of
the resources and capacities that will help to mitigate a disease
outbreak. Acknowledging that these new efforts would cost more, Mr.
Countryman reminded the audience that in order for the BWC to contribute
more to our security, we need to contribute more to the BWC.

Biosecurity Achievement Award Presentation to Paula OlsiewskiThe
meeting concluded with the presentation of an achievement award to Dr.
Paula Olsiewski for her leadership and support of the field of
biosecurity. In presenting the award, Dr. Inglesby outlined the many
accomplishments of Dr. Olsiewski and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and
reminded the audience that the Foundation’s support was in place well
before the anthrax attacks. In accepting the award, Dr. Olsiewski
thanked former Sloan Foundation president Ralph Gomory for his vision,
and thanked current president Paul Jaskow and her colleagues, including
her assistant Yolanda Wolf, for their support as well. Dr. Olsiewski
concluded by thanking all of the grantees for all of their important
work and contributions to the field (Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 2011).

Abstract: U.S. biosecurity policy has made significant progress
since Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks and the anthrax attacks of 2001, but continues
to confront myriad challenges in dealing with future biological hazards, both
natural and man-made.

At a conference of
biosecurity experts hosted by the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center and
the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, progress made over the last 10 years was
reviewed and problems for the future were outlined.

In opening remarks,
Thomas Inglesby, the CEO of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, offered three
main reasons for optimism regarding the outlook for biosecurity.

“The first reason for
optimism is the community in this room," Inglesby said. "A second
reason for optimism is we have U.S. science and technology as our fuel…And a
third reason for optimism is the good work that has already happened.”

Not only has the
community of experts been greatly expanded, as evidenced by the number of
attendees at the conference, but the U.S. science and technology base has been
greatly expanded and a number of programs and policies have been implemented
and refined. Laboratories to quickly characterize and develop vaccines have
been established. The U.S. has greatly expanded capacity and has held field
exercises and coordinated planning on an inter-agency basis. Rapid distribution
channels for the distribution of vaccines have been established and universal
antibiotics may well be on the horizon.

Despite these
advances, however, much of the conference focused on remaining shortfalls that
must be addressed. Most significantly, the lack of an attack over the past 10
years and the loss of personnel in Congress and the executive branch has
resulted in a “out of sight, out of mind” mentality, the experts warned.

“Progress has been
significant but clearly inadequate to the problem,” Richard Danzig, chairman of
the board for the Center for a New American Security, said.

In a panel on
“Present and Future Biothreats,” D.A. Henderson of the UPMC Center for
Biosecurity said that much more needs to be done in terms of how best to inform
cities and states on how to handle biological threats, whether to shelter in
place or evacuate, how to clean up after a biological attack and the necessity
to lay out a coherent plan well in advance of such an event.

Danzig added that
even such rudimentary questions as whether citizens should open or close
windows or whether or not to vacuum remain unanswered.

There is also a
tendency for decision-makers to focus planning and exercises on a one or two
day event while ignoring modeling for much longer incidents and the efforts
that need to be established for handling the clean up associated with a major
biological attack.

According to Danzig,
economic consequences have been minimized and it is probably more accurate to
refer to biological attacks “not as weapons of mass destruction, but as weapons
of mass disruption.”

In that regard, Randall
Larsen of the WMD Center said that the Environmental Protection Agency spends
50 percent less studying how to clean up after a major incident than the
military spends on the Marine Corps marching band.

In a panel on
“Looking Ahead in U.S. Health Security,” Thomas Frieden, the director of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said that what keeps him awake at
nights is the possibility of facing an attack for which we are unprepared. We are “not going to face what we have prepared for,”
Frieden said.

There are 44,000 fewer people
working in state and local health departments today than there were two years
ago,” Frieden said, and, as a result our preparations at the state and local
levels in detection and response are eroding.

Andrew Weber, the assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs,
raised the issue of the potential for a “lone wolf” to cause a mass destruction
event.

"The potential for a lone
wolf bioterrorist to launch such an attack, is not a hypothetical," Weber
said.

Similarly, Nicole
Lurie, the assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department
of Health and Human Services, also expressed concern about facing unanticipated
threats. If our detection systems prove to be inadequate to the task, we could
find out about a biological attack too late to deal with it in the most
efficacious manner, she warned. Globally, efforts to put in place an
international detection system to recognize and respond to epidemics is also
key to safeguarding the public.

For the most part the
conference picked up on and expanded on the work of the 9/11 Commission, which
identified biological threats as “the ultimate asymmetrical threat.”

Former Senator Jim
Talent, vice chairman of the WMD Center, said that the threat environment
remains “dynamic and unpredictable,” and that biological weapons were “the
easiest to develop and deploy.”

The final panel,
“Transformative Science in Biosecurity,” also emphasized Andrew Weber’s point
that “the march of technology, which is a wonderful thing in this area, also
carries with it this very substantial risk. You
cannot say who will pick up these weapons and use them.”

Tara O’Toole, the Under-Secretary
for Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland Security, worried
that, “The accessibility of powerful technologies to people who aren’t running
an army, who really are just a group of individuals, is a phenomenon that’s
going on…These powerful technologies are becoming more and more available and
can be used even unintentionally to very detrimental effect on a large scale.”

While Craig Venter of
the Venter Institute held out the possibility of synthetic DNA leading to
vaccines in hours instead of days, weeks or months, and George Poste, the chief
scientist at Comples Adaptive Systems Initiative, saw promise in the fusion of
molecular biology with computers as a way to speed vaccines and develop
therapeutics, most shared the concern that the pace of biological sciences is
far outpacing our capacity “to combat malignant uses.”

Perhaps of greatest
concern was Andrew Weber’s fear that “the biggest difficulties associated with
biological weapons is that when we talk about them, we’re not just talking
about terrorist using these weapons like terrorist who might get a nuclear
weapon, we’re talking about the ability to produce these weapons. And that then gives them the ability to repeatedly
attack and reload. The question for our policing agencies is how do we thwart
such an attack?”

While a host of responses were
offered, including the need for research and budget constancy, enhanced
capacity, more realistic planning exercises, the development of balanced
portfolios and knocking down the silos that keep government agencies from
greater levels of cooperation, the conference made clear that much work remains
to be done (Bio Prep Watch, 2011).

FACT SHEET ON THE SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

"We must come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of
biological danger whether it is a pandemic like H1N1, a terrorist
threat, or a treatable disease." President Obama, United Nations
General Assembly, September 22, 2011

Today, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC) are meeting in Geneva for the start of the Seventh
Review Conference (RevCon) of the Biological Weapons Convention to
evaluate the implementation of the treaty and chart a course for the
coming years.

To underscore the importance the United States places on the BWC as a
critical tool to help counter biological threats, the President has
asked Secretary of State Clinton to lead the United States delegation to
the RevCon, where she will deliver the opening statement for the United
States on December 7th.

Part of a Broader National Strategy

The BWC is a critical venue for advancing objectives set forth in the
President's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which
emphasizes the need for multinational collaboration on concrete
activities to help counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism.

The three-week BWC Review Conference presents an opportunity for
countries to promote real action to improve global response
capabilities, reinforce norms against the misuse of biological science,
and to help identify and thwart those who would seek to cause harm.

Revitalizing International Efforts to Reduce Biological Threats

The United States believes the BWC should be the premier forum for
bringing together the security, health, law enforcement, and science
communities to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and how to
best manage them. The U.S. believes that revitalized international
efforts and a coordinated series of actions can help reduce the threat
of biological attacks.

At the RevCon, the United States will seek the endorsement of the BWC
States Parties of a work program for the next five years in three broad
areas of work that will greatly enhance international efforts to
counter biological threats.

1. First, the United States is asking States Parties to establish an
effort to develop constructive ways to strengthen implementation of the
BWC and build confidence that all members are living up to their
obligations. The dual-use nature of biological work simply makes it too
easy to conceal prohibited activities - so the United States has
proposed efforts to promulgate legislative and regulatory frameworks,
safety and security measures, outreach to stakeholders, improved annual
reporting, and options for addressing compliance concerns.

2. Second, the United States is proposing that the RevCon create a
working group that will be tasked with taking concrete actions to make
the BWC a more robust forum for building global capacities for
preventing, detecting, and combating disease outbreaks, regardless of
whether they are natural, deliberate or accidental. We need to be
prepared, both nationally and internationally, to deal with a biological
attack should one occur. The United States seeks to capitalize on
synergies between security and public health communities and to do so
through the sort of international cooperation called for in the BWC.

3. Third, the United States is asking States Parties to establish a
mechanism for assessing developments in science and technology to better
understand their potential benefits to the BWC as well as their
potential misuse by terrorists or others. It is important for BWC States
Parties to have a structured dialogue with the international scientific
community on emerging technologies in order to better address the
potential for their misuse.

In order to meet these goals, the United States will propose that the
BWC RevCon establish a vigorous work program for the next five years
that focuses on the common needs and interests of all States Parties in
combating biological threats.

Pursuing this robust program will help the international community
produce concrete results, thereby enabling successful annual Meetings of
States Parties and a robust Eighth BWC Review Conference in 2016 (All Africa, 2011).

Title: Remarks at the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review ConferenceDate: December 7, 2011Source: U.S. Department of State

Abstract:

Hillary Rodham ClintonSecretary of State

Palais des Nations

Geneva, Switzerland

December 7, 2011

Thank
you, Mr. President. And I would also like to express my appreciation to
all of the delegates and to my colleague, Minister Rosenthal, for his
comments. I want to thank the Implementation Support Unit for all the
efforts to advance the work here.

I want to start by acknowledging that our countries have accomplished
a great deal together under the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. One hundred sixty-five states have now committed not to
pursue these weapons, and I am delighted to welcome Burundi and
Mozambique to the Convention, and I join in urging all states who have
not yet done so to join.

President Obama has made it a top goal of his Administration to halt
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, because we view the risk of a
bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a
foreign policy priority. In an age when people and diseases cross
borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a transnational threat, and
therefore we must protect against them with transnational action.

The nature of the problem is evolving. The advances in science and
technology make it possible to both prevent and cure more diseases, but
also easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological
weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a
small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive
equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology. Even as it becomes
easier to develop these weapons, it remains extremely difficult – as you
know – to detect them, because almost any biological research can serve
dual purposes. The same equipment and technical knowledge used for
legitimate research to save lives can also be used to manufacture deadly
diseases.

So of course, we must continue our work to prevent states from
acquiring biological weapons. And one of the unsung successes of the
Convention is that it has engrained a norm among states against
biological weapons. Even countries that have never joined the Convention
no longer claim that acquiring such weapons is a legitimate goal. But
unfortunately, the ability of terrorists and other non-state actors to
develop and use these weapons is growing. And therefore, this must be a
renewed focus of our efforts during the next 14 days, as well as the
months and years ahead.

Now, I know there are some in the international community who have
their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major
outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either so far, and
conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the conclusion of the
United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious
to ignore.

Terrorist groups have made it known they would want to acquire and
use these weapons. And in the 1990s, the apocalyptic cult, Aum Shinrikyo
unleashed two attacks in Tokyo by spraying a liquid containing anthrax
spores into the air and unleashing sarin gas into the subway. In 2001,
we found evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida was seeking the ability
to conduct bioweapons attacks. And less than a year ago, al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for – and I quote – “brothers
with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass
destruction.”

We all have an interest in ramping up our efforts to prevent
outbreaks and attacks and then to be prepared to respond if they do
occur. The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States killed five people
and sickened 17. More than 10,000 were required to go on to antibiotics.
A mass outbreak could cripple an already fragile global economy by
cutting off the movement of people, goods, and sparking food shortages.
And of course, a victim of an attack could just as easily travel from
one country to another.

So shoring up our domestic and international defenses will make it
easier to detect and respond. We need public health systems that can
quickly diagnose outbreaks, whatever their source, and mobilize the
right medical resources and personnel. By making any one country more
secure, we make the international community more secure at the same
time.

Two years ago, the Obama Administration released our national
strategy for countering biological threats, which is a
whole-of-government approach designed to protect the American people and
improve our global capacity. We support our partners’ efforts to meet
new international standards in disease preparedness, detection, and
response. We are helping make laboratories safer and more secure,
engaging 44 countries in these efforts this year. And since 2007, we’ve
conducted more than a dozen workshops to help train public health and
law enforcement officials.

But there is still more to do, and I want to briefly mention three
areas. First, we need to bolster international confidence that all
countries are living up to our obligations under the Convention. It is
not possible, in our opinion, to create a verification regime that will
achieve this goal. But we must take other steps. To begin with, we
should revise the Convention’s annual reporting systems to ensure that
each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each
all doing to guard against the misuse of biological materials.

Countries should also take their own measures to demonstrate
transparency. Under our new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, we
will host an international forum on health and security to exchange
views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S.
bioresearch programs. We will underscore that commitment by inviting a
few state parties to the Convention to tour a U.S. biodefense facility
next year, as Ambassador van den IJssel and the UN 1540 Committee did
this past summer. And we will promote dialogue through exchanges among
scientists from the United States and elsewhere. In short, we are
intending and our meeting our obligation to the full letter and spirit
of the treaty, and we wish to work with other nations to do so as well.

Second, we must strengthen each country’s ability to detect and
respond to outbreaks and improve international coordination. As
President Obama said earlier this year at the UN, “We must come together
to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger,
whether it’s a pandemic like H1N1, or a terrorist threat, or a terrible
disease.” Five years ago, 194 countries came together at the World
Health Organization and committed to build our core capacities by June
2012, and we should redouble our efforts to meet that goal. We will
support the WHO in this area, and I urge others to join us.

Finally, we need thoughtful international dialogue about the ways to
maximize the benefits of scientific research and minimize the risks. For
example, the emerging gene synthesis industry is making genetic
material widely available. This obviously has many benefits for
research, but it could also potentially be used to assemble the
components of a deadly organism. So how do we balance the need for
scientific freedom and innovation with the necessity of guarding against
such risks?

There is no easy answer, but it begins with open conversations among
governments, the scientific community, and other stakeholders, in this
forum and elsewhere. We have recently had our U.S. President’s
Commission on Bioethics develop ethical principles that could be helpful
in this dialogue, and we urge a discussion about them. Ambassador
Kennedy and the U.S. team look forward to working with all of you for a
strong set of recommendations.

And let me conclude by saying we know the biological threats we face
today are new, but our commitment to face threats together is not. More
than 85 years ago, after the horrors of World War I, the international
community took a stand against the use of poison gases and
bacteriological weapons. And nearly a half-century later, that shared
commitment brought us together to adopt the Biological Weapons
Convention. So in that same spirit, let us move forward to address the
challenges we face together in the 21st century.

Abstract: The seventh review
conference for the Biological Weapons Convention ended on Thursday with a call
for all member states to demonstrate their adherence to the accord's rules, the
United Nations announced (see GSN,
Dec. 7).

Participating states agreed to a revised reporting
document that nations would submit annually as a means of promoting confidence
that their biological research and development activities have no warfare
component.

"The conference recognizes the urgent need to
increase the number of states parties participating in confidence-building
measures and calls upon all states parties to participate annually," BWC
nations said in the final declaration to the 14-day conference in Geneva,
Switzerland. They also called on "those states parties, in a position to
do so, to provide technical assistance and support, through training for
instance, to those states parties requesting it to assist them to complete
their annual confidence-building measures submissions."

A U.N. press. release did not provide details of the
updated reporting forms. In speaking to the conference earlier this month, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the revision should "ensure that
each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing
to guard against the misuse of biological materials."

The 1975 pact bans the development, production,
stockpiling and use of biological materials for nonpeaceful purposes. It has
been ratified by 165 nations, while another 12 states are signatories to the convention.
Review conferences are scheduled every five years to consider the operation of
the convention and possible threats to its strictures.

"In the final declaration, the conference reaffirms
that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons is effectively prohibited by the convention and affirms the
determination of states parties to condemn any use of biological agents or
toxins other than for peaceful purposes, by anyone at any time," the
conference-ending document states.

Delegates agreed to maintain the "intersessional
program" of annual meetings that are held between the five-year review
conferences. A total of 10 days would be allowed each year for separate
gatherings of experts and officials from member nations. "Standing agenda
items" to be discussed annually from 2012 to 2015 are "cooperation
and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and
assistance under Article 10; review of developments in the field of science and
technology related to the Convention; and strengthening national
implementation," according to the final report.

Among the matters to be raised within those agenda items
are advancements in science and technology that could lead to breaches of the
convention, promoting responsible research by the scientific, academic and
industry sectors; and augmenting states' implementation of the BWC rules.

"These are the three areas that the United States
emphasized when Secretary Clinton spoke to the conference on Dec. 7,"
Thomas Countryman, assistant secretary of State for international security and
nonproliferation, said on Friday. "They were adopted not because the
United States pushed them, but because we selected the topics that it is clear
the majority of states party agree are essential for future development."

Nations in Geneva also agreed upon the importance of
achieving universal membership in the convention.

"The conference underlines that the objectives of
the convention will not be fully realized as long as there remains even a
single state not party that could possess or acquire biological weapons,"
they stated. "The conference urges states parties to take action to
persuade non-parties to accede to the convention without delay, and welcomes
regional initiatives that would lead to wider accession and adherence to the
convention."

Participants also approved the creation of a database to
"facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and
cooperation among states parties." The BWC Implementation Support Unit was
designated to produce and operate the system (United Nations Office at Geneva release,
Dec. 22).

"We are happy with the results," Countryman
told reporters during a teleconference. "We think they are
significant for not only the United States, as we move ahead on advancing the
president's national strategy for countering biological threats, but that they
have the same value for all of our partners around the world who share this
concern about potential biological and toxic threats" (Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2011).