The amphibious landings of 15 September 1950 at
Inchon were General MacArthur's masterstroke. As Eight Army struggled to maintain
fighting room in the southeast of Korea, he had his thoughts fixed upon a
possible landing in the enemies rear to reverse the war. The biggest logistical
challenge was to have all units, their equipment and supplies, as well as
transports, landing ships and craft, and other ships, ready in time for
D-day.

Preparations for a strategic landing

Of several extraordinary features of Operation
Chromite, the speed with which it was mounted is particularly remarkable. In less
than three weeks, a planning study was turned into the details of operation
orders, the ships were assembled, and the forces prepared - as far as possible -
for the landing.

Inchon was taking a risk, even with superiority
in the air and supremacy at sea. One of them was Inchon's thirty- two-foot tidal
range who was one of the greatest in the world. Only on three plausible dates -
15 and 27 September and 11 October - would the tides be high enough to give the
big landing craft three brief hours inshore, before the coast became once more
an impassable quagmire of mud. In addition, the landing force had to pass trough
a narrow channel, the Flying Fish Channel, which easily could be mined. Sea walls
meant a hazard to the initial assault and the disembarkation of vehicles and
stores.

In early July a number of people who had had
experience in the port of Inchon were interrogated in an attempt to gain all
available information. An army warrant officer attached to the Second
Transportation Medium Port of Yokohama, had operated medium landing ships for a
period of about a year at Inchon. He was obtained for the planning and the
execution of the landing. Commander Amphibious Group One in his Action Report
regarded the information furnished to the Attack Force and the Landing Force
after the landing, as "substantially correct". Two civilian aerial photo experts
were flown over to Japan from Wright Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Trough their
and other persons effort with thousands of aerial photos, valuable information in
the variations of the tide, and the enemy defenses, were gathered.

Before Inchon was chosen as the target for
Operation Chromite, other ports had been assessed and rejected. Of the other
possible ports, Kusan was considered to be to close to the besieged Pusan
Perimeter, Chinnampo (Pyongyang's port) was to far north, and Posung-Myon south
of Inchon offered inadequate scope for a breakout inland.

The conclusive meeting for Inchon was held at
GHQ FEC, Tokyo, 23 August
1950 between MacArthur and America's foremost commanders in the Far East.
Rear Admiral James H. Doyle summarized the navy's attitude, concluding
bleakly: "The best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible." MacArthur
answer was a great theatrical performance concluding with the words: "We
must act now or we will die... We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush
them." On 28 August MacArthur received the formal consent of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Inchon landings.

MacArthur's Chief Of Staff, Lieutenant-General
Edward M. Almond, was given the command of the Inchon landing force, designated X
Corps. Two divisions were grouped in this new formation, the 1st Marine Division
and the 7th Infantry Division. X Corps was given additional artillery, engineers,
signals and administrative elements. A total of 70.000 men with their fighting
equipment and supplies were to be put ashore.

The 1st Marine Division - totaling 20.000 men -
were to be first ashore. A small fleet of cargo ships and landing ships were
gathered to move the 1st Marine Division and their supplies from Kobe, Sasebo and
Pusan to Inchon. This fleet consisted of six Attach Transport Ships, eight Attack
Cargo Ships, three High Speed Transports, one Medium Landing Ship, three Landing
Ships Dock, 17 U.S. Landing Ship Tank, and 31 Japanese Landing Ship Tank.
The Japanese Landing Ships were former U.S. ships from World War II
transferred to the Japanese merchant service after the war. They were recalled to
duty with their Japanese officers and supplemented with personnel flown in from
the United States. According to the British historian Max Hastings these ships
"smelt vividly of fish". He also says:

There was much wisecracking speculation about the
personal histories of their inscrutable deck officers.Everybody believed, in the words of a Marine, that he was being
ferried to Inchon by a Japanese who had been an admiral at Midway.
There were constant breakdowns of aged machinery: The whole thing was a rusty travesty of World War II amphibious
operations.

The 7th Infantry Division in Japan was to follow
the Marines in the landing. But by early August, there were not much left of the
division, which had posted almost 10.000 of its officers and men to the divisions
in Korea. MacArthur had already directed General Walker to draw Koreans in to
reinforce the Eight Army. Over eight thousand Koreans were sent to the 7th in
Japan in August. Also American infantry and artillery reinforcements from the
U.S. were allotted to the division during the last week in August and the first
in September. The divisional strength rose to nearly 25,000 soldiers, though less
than half of these were effectively trained for battle.

It was decided that the First Provisional Marine
Brigade (5th Marines Reinforced) in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter would be
taken out of the line and sent to sea at the last possible moment. A regiment of
the 7th Division would be kept in Pusan Harbor as a floating reserve to deal
with a possible Eight Army crisis, until it became essential to sail for
Inchon.

The necessary supplies had to be built up to
meet the projected requirements in the operation. As mentioned in the chapter
four, 2nd Logistical Command in Pusan had built up large quantities of supplies
and did not have big problems meeting the logistical requirements for
Operation Chromite. All said in the monthly report for September 1950 about the
landing in Inchon was: "Much coordination within this section, the technical
services, and EUSAK was necessary during the early part of the month when
arrangements were made for the outloading of the 1st Marine Brigade and attached
units for the operation that culminated in the landing at Inchon."

The first Marine Division, less two regimental
combat teams, arrived in Kobe, Japan, in the beginning of September. Their
arrival were from one to five days after schedule. The commercial shipping they
had been embarked upon, had for some reason been delayed. First Marine Division
commenced immediate unloading of the transport ships. Everything unloaded were
together with other provisions, combat loaded onboard the assault ships in Kobe.
It was necessary to make frequent modifications in the original loading plans to
load all assault shipping with the supplies and equipment available. This was
also the reason for Commander Amphibious Group One not to be satisfied with the
coordination of loading plans. He meant representatives from Transport Group,
Landing Force, and Attack Force should have met early in the planning stage, and
prior to the commencement of actual loading. At such a meeting representatives
from the ships had to have with them up to date "ships characteristic pamphlets"
including hold and special stowage diagrams. Nevertheless, due to splendid
cooperation of the Kobe Base Command and Port Command, all supplies, equipment
and troops were embarked 11 September.

Other assault shipping assembled at Pusan for
embarkation and loading of First Provisional Marine Brigade and one battalion of
ROK Marines. The very spearhead of the landing, the Advance Attack Group,
consisting of the Third Battalion, (5th Marines Reinforced) loaded onboard one
Landing Ship Dock and three High Speed Transports. All Marines in Pusan with
their equipment were onboard their ships 12 September.

In order to have a qualified embarkation
officers and assistants on each transport type ship of the Attack Force, a total
of 21 officers and enlisted men were ordered to the Embarkation and Transport
Loading School at Camp McGill, Japan. From 15 August they were given a 10 day
period of instructions.

120 Japanese barges were contracted for,
gathered in Moji, and sent to Pusan. The crews of these barges were not aware of
their ultimate destination of Inchon when they left Japan. When informed, crews
of 28 of these barges refused to proceed from Pusan, and were returned to Japan.
The remaining 92, accompanied by mother and repair ships, were escorted to Inchon
by a Korean Navy light tug and a minesweeper.

Weather played an important part in the
preparations for Operation Chromite. The typhoon "Jane" passed over Kobe 2
September with a resulting interruption of loading for approximately 36 hours.
"Jane" caused minor damage to two assault transports. A second typhoon, named
"Kesia", made trouble in south west Japan from 8 September. It seriously
threatened to delay movement to the objective, while it damaged cranes and cargo
on the docksides, and teared ships from their moorings. Had either storm
necessitated a postponement of D-day, the postponement would not have been
several days but, because of the tidal phenomenon at the objective,
several weeks.

The sources have no sign of any lack of supplies
to meet the requirements for the operation. Also when it comes to any possible
lack of ships for transportation, the sources don't mention it. Even the return
of the 28 Japanese barges to Japan, don't seem to have mattered.

From safe harbors to successful amphibious landing

The amphibious landing at Inchon was in its very
nature an operation as close to logistics as possible. Before the First Marine
Division and the Seventh Infantry Division could take up arms and start fighting
the enemy, they had to be on the "beaches" of Inchon. The operations and the
logistics from the force left Sasebo and Pusan until well established on dry
land, could be looked upon as pure transportation.

Admiral Struble was in overall command of Task
Force 90. It consisted of the flagship, two escort carriers, the bombardment
force, screening and protective ships, minesweepers, specialist ships, supply and
hospital ships, and the transports and freight vessels carrying the X Corps. This
was an armada of 260 ships according to Max Hastings, 230 ships according to the
American historian Curtis A Utz, and eighty-five warships and more than one
hundred other ships according to an other British historian, Farrar-Hockley. This
inconsistency in the number of ships can be due to boats and crafts loaded
onboard ships like the four Landing Ships Dock.

The first ships to leave for Inchon, were the
Pontoon Movement Unit, designated to produce pontoon causeways at the objective.
They departed Tokyo Bay area as early as 5 September 1950 and proceeded at a
speed of advance of no more than 5 knots. The rest of the force left their ports
from 8 September until 12 September. The screening force consisted of U.S.,
Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch and French ships, combined in Joint Task
Force 7. Wide ranging air reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted.

The earlier mentioned typhoon "Kesia" did not
leave the force proceeding for the landing, but partly joined them on their trip
from Kobe and Pusan towards Inchon. This not only resulted in seasickness, but
also that one of the Attack Transport ships lost overboard two of her landing
boats on a heavy roll in high seas. The ship was unable to recover the boats.
Even if Kesia made some problems, the enemy inflicted no losses to Task Force
90.

Among all the detailed plans for the landing,
there were also a salvage plan. The "Assistant Boat Group" should help landing
craft in the vicinity of the landing points in the need of minor towing
assistance. For other assistance to landing ships and craft, the Commander
Administrative Element would direct the Commander Repair and Salvage Unit. Two
landing crafts were specially equipped as heavy salvage boats with equipment for
fire fighting and salvage pumping duty. Emergency boat repairs and emergency
havens for amphibian vehicles were also prepared.

Air attacks began on 10 September dropping
napalm on the defenses of the island of Wolmi-do. 13 September became the first
of several days of shore bombardment. During the period from 13 to 27 September a
total of 8842 rounds ranging from 5" to 16" inch were fired by Task Force 90. The
same group also fired the impressive number of 140,730 20-mm rounds and 6658
rockets. In one instant a North Korean tank or self-propelled gun had sent some
quick fire toward the invading force, only to be met with no less than 165 rounds
of 5 inch ammunition from one ship. Could there have been any limitations put on
ammunition expenditure? Commander Amphibious Group One reported availability of
all ammunition was adequate to meet resupply requirements, except that
expenditure of eight inch ammunition by heavy cruisers were higher than loading
plans in ammunition resupply ships apparently had contemplated. Overall
performance of ordnance material and equipment was regarded as excellent.

The landing itself was conducted fairly close to
the plan, not meeting more resistance than anticipated. The Advance Attack Group,
supported by naval gunfire and close air support, assaulted and capture the
tactical important Wolmi- Do Island in an operation that lasted an hour and a
half in the morning of 15 September. In the early afternoon the remainder of
the assault shipping arrived on station and the order "Land the Landing Force"
was given as the tide had started to come in. Due to the amount of supplies and
equipment the Landing Force desired to embark, most of the ships in the assault
echelon carried in excess of the amount which was considered to be normal.
Approximately 13,000 troops and their assault equipment were unloaded the first
day.

Improvement of unloading facilities was
initiated as rapidly as possible and general unloading was ordered on 16
September. This was the same day as the second echelon of ships arrived with the
7th Infantry Division. During the period D-1 to D-6 unloading continued as
rapidly as tidal conditions and unloading facilities would permit. Nearly 50,000
personnel, more than 5,000 vehicles, and 22,000 short tons of cargo was brought
ashore in this period.

With the rapidity this operation was planed,
prepared and executed, not everything could be perfect: 7th Infantry Division was
put ashore at Inchon without their 30-day replacement supply of medium tanks. The
21 tanks had not been available at time of departure from Japan. By 25
September X Corps reported ten of 7th Division tanks in- operable due to enemy
action, and no replacements had arrived.

"A Stroke of Genius", is what Farrar-Hockley
calls the landing at Inchon. And he follows up with: "Vain and devious, he
[MacArthur] was besides a man possessing the experience, breadth of vision, and
readiness to take risks necessary to turn defeat into victory." This descriptions
is fairly easy to understand when it comes to operations. Looking at logistics,
the description could be something similar. The logisticians were the ones to
make this operation possible. They did this inside the time limits and had the
necessary slack to absorb delays and bad weather.