Question XLIV.
General results of the former doctrine, in some few corollaries, or
straying questions, fallen off the roadway, answered briefly.
Quest. 1. — Whether all governments be but broken governments and
deviations from monarchy.
Ans. — l. It is denied: there is no less somewhat of God's authority in
government by many, or some of the choicest of the people, than in
monarchy; nor can we judge any ordinance of man unlawful, for we are to
be subject to all for the Lord's sake. (1 Pet. ii. 13; Tit. iii. 1; 1
Tim. ii. 1-3.) 2. Though monarchy should seem the rule of all other
governments, in regard of resemblance of the Supreme Monarch of all, yet
it is not the moral rule from which, if other governments shall err,
they are to be judged sinful deviations.
Quest. 2. — Whether royalty is an immediate issue and spring of nature.
Ans. — No; for a man, fallen in sin, knowing naturally he hath need of a
law and a government, could have, by reason, devised governors, one or
more; and the supervenient institution of God, coming upon this
ordinance, doth more fully assure us, that God, for man's good, hath
appointed governors; but, if we consult with nature, many judges and
governors, to fallen nature, seem nearer of blood to nature than one
only; for two, because of man's weakness, are better than one. Now,
nature seemeth to me not to teach that only one sinful man should be the
sole and only ruler of a whole kingdom; God, in his word, ever joined
with the supreme ruler many rulers, who, as touching the essence of a
judge, (which is, to rule for God,) were all equally judges: some
reserved acts, or a longer cubit of power in regard of extent, being due
to the king.
Quest. 3. — Whether magistrates, as magistrates, be natural.
Ans. — Nature is considered as whole and sinless, or as fallen and
broken. In the former consideration, that man should stand in need of
some one to compel him with the sword to do his duty, and not oppress,
was no more natural to man than to stand in need of lictors and hangmen,
or physicians for the body, which in this state was not in a capacity of
sickness or death; and so government by parents and husbands was only
natural in the latter consideration. Magistrates, as magistrates, are
two ways considered, — 1. According to the knowledge of such an
ordinance; 2. According to the actual erection of the practice of the
office of magistrates. In the former notion, I humbly conceive, that by
nature's light, man now fallen and broken, even under all the fractions
of the powers and faculties of the soul, doth know, that promises of
reward, fear of punishment, and the co-active power of the sword, as
Plato said, are natural means to more us, and wings to promote obedience
and to do our duty; and that government by magistrates is natural. But,
in the second relation, it is hard to determine that kings, rather than
other governors, are more natural.
Quest. 4. — Whether nature hath determined that there should be one
supreme ruler, a king, or many rulers, in a free community.
Ans. — It is denied.
Quest. 6. — Whether every free commonwealth hath not in it a supremacy
of majesty, which it may formally place in one or many.
Ans. — It is affirmed.
Quest 6. — Whether absolute and unlimited power of royalty be a ray and
beam of divine majesty immediately derived from God?
Ans. — Not at all. Such a creature is not in the world of God's
creation. Royalists and flatterers of kings are parents to this
prodigious birth. There is no shadow of power to do ill in God. An
absolute power is essentially a power to do without or above law, and a
power to do ill, to destroy; and so it cannot come from God as a moral
power by institution, though it come from God by a flux of permissive
providence; but so things unlawful and sinful come from God.
Quest. 7. — Whether the king may in his actions intend his own
prerogative and absoluteness.
Ans. — He can neither intend it as his nearest end, nor as his remote
end. Not the former, for if he fight and destroy his people for a
prerogative, he destroyeth his people that he may have a power to
destroy them, which must be mere tyranny, nor can it be his remote end;
for, granting that his supposed absolute prerogative were lawful, he is
to refer all lawful power and all his actions to a more noble end, to
wit, to the safety and good of the people.
Quest. 8. — Do not they that resist the parliament's power, resist the
parliament; and they that resist the king's power, resist the king; God
hath joined king and power, who dare separate them?
Ans. — 1. If the parliament abuse their power, we may resist their
abused power, and not their power parliamentary. Mr Bridges doth well
distinguish (in his Annotations on the “Loyal Convert”) betwixt the
king's power, and the king's will, 2. The resisters do not separate king
and power, but the king himself doth separate his lawful power from his
will, if he work and act tyranny out of this principle, will, passion,
lust; not out of the royal principle of kingly power. So far we may
resist the one, and not the other.
Quest. 9. — Why, if God might work a miracle in the three children's
resistance active, why doth he evidence omnipotence in the passive
obedience of these witnesses? The kingdom of Judah was Christ's
birthright, as man and David's son. Why did he not, by legions of men
and angels, rather vindicate his own flesh and blood, than triumph by
non-resistance, and the omnipotence of glory to shine in his mere
suffering?
Ans. — Who art thou that disputest with God? He that killeth with the
jaw-bone of an ass, thousands, and he that destroyed the numberless
Midianites by only three hundred, should no more put the three children
to an unlawful act in the one, if they had by three men killed
Nebuchadnezzar and all his subjects, than in the other. But nothing is
said against us in a sophism a non causa pro causa; except it be proved,
God would neither deliver his three children, nor Christ from death, and
the Jews from bondage, by miraculous resistance, because resistance is
unlawful. And if patient suffering is lawful, therefore, is resistance
unlawful? It is a poor consequent, and a begging of the question: both
must be lawful to us; and so we hold, of ten lawful means, fit to
compass God's blessed end, he may choose one and let go nine. Shall any
infer, therefore, these other nine means are unlawful, because God chose
a mean different from those nine, and refused them? So may I answer by
retortion. The three hundred sinned in resisting Midian, and defeating
them. Why? Because it should be more honour to God, if they had, by
suffering patiently the sword of Midian, glorified God in martyrdom. So
Christ and the apostles, who could have wrought miracles, might have
wrought reformation by the sword, and destroyed kings and emperors, the
opposers of the Lamb; and they did reform by suffering; therefore, the
sword is unlawful in reformation. It followeth not. The mean Christ
used, is lawful; therefore, all other means that he used not, are
unlawful. It is vain logic.
Quest. 10. — Whether the coronation of a king is any other thing but a
ceremony.
Ans. — In the coronation there is, and may be, the ceremony of a shout
and an acclamation, and the placing of a sceptre in his right hand who
is made king, and the like; but the coronation, in concreto, according
to the substance of the act, is no ceremony, nor any accidental
ingredient in the constitution of a king. 1. Because Israel should have
performed a mere ceremonial action on Saul when they made him king,
which we cannot say; for as the people's act of coronation is
distinctive, so is it constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all
Israel, and did constitute him in a new relation, that he was changed
from no king to be a king. 2. The people cannot, by a ceremony, make a
king; they must really put some honour on him, that was not put on him
before. Now this ceremony, which royalists do fancy coronation to be, is
only symbolical and declarative, not really dative. It placeth nothing
in the king.
Quest. 11. — Whether subjects may limit the power that they gave not to
the king, it being the immediate result (without intervening of law or
any act of man) issuing from God only.
Ans. — 1. Though we should allow (which in reason we cannot grant) that
royal power were a result of the immediate bounty of God, without any
act of man, yet it may be limited by men, that it over-swell not its
banks. Though God immediately make Peter an apostle, without any act of
men, yet Paul, by a sharp rebuke, (Gal. ii.) curbeth and limiteth his
power, that he abuse it not to Judaising. Royalists deny not, but they
teach, that the eighty priests that restrained Uzziah's power “from
burning incense to the Lord,” gave no royal power to Uzziah. Do not
subjects, by flight, lay restraint upon a king's power, that he kill not
the subjects without cause? yet they teach that subjects gave no power
to the king. Certainly this is a proof of the immediate power of the
King of kings, that none can fly from his pursuing hand, (Psal. cxxxix.
1-3; Amos ix. 1-4,) whereas men may fly from earthly kings.
Nebuchadnezzar, as royalists teach, might justly conquer some kingdoms,
for conquest is a just title to the crown, say they. Now, the conqueror
then justly not only limiteth the royal power of the conquered king, but
wholly removeth his royalty and unkinqeth him; yet, we know, the
conqueror gave no royal power to the conquered king. Joshua and David
took away royal power which they never gave, and therefore this is no
good reason, — the people gave not to the king royal power, therefore
they could not lawfully limit it and take it away. 2. We cannot admit
that God giveth royal power immediately, without the intervention of any
act of law; for it is an act of law, that (Deut. xvii.) the people
chooseth such a king, not such a king; that the people, by a legal
covenant, make Saul, David, and Joash, kings, and that God exerciseth
any political action of making a king over such subjects, upon such a
condition, is absurd and inconceivable; for how can God make Saul and
David kings of Israel upon this political and legal condition, that they
rule in justice and judgment, but there must intervene a political
action? and so they are not made kings immediately. If God feed Moses by
bread and manna, the Lord's act of feeding is mediate, by the mediation
of second causes; if he feed Moses forty days without eating any thing,
the act of feeding is immediate; if God made David king, as he made him
a prophet, I should think God immediately made him king; for God asked
consent of no man, of no people, no, not of David himself, before he
infused in him the spirit of prophecy; but he made him formally king, by
the political and legal covenant betwixt him and the people. I shall not
think that a covenant and oath of God is a ceremony, especially a law-
covenant, or a political paction between David and the people, the
contents whereof behoved to be de materia gravi et onerosa, concerning a
great part of obedience to the filth commandment of God's moral law, the
duties moral concerning religion, and mercy, and justice, to be
performed reciprocally between king and people. Oaths, I hope, are more
than ceremonies.
Quest. 12. — Whether or no the commonwealth is not ever a pupil, never
growing to age, as a minor under nonage doth come not to need a tutor,
but the commonwealth being still in need of a tutor, a governor, or
king, must always be a tutor, and so the kingdom can never come to that
condition as to accuse the king, it always being minor.
Ans. — 1. Then can they never accuse inferior judges, for a kingdom is
perpetually in such a nonage, as it cannot want them, when sometimes it
wanteth a king. 2. Can the commonwealth, under democracy and
aristocracy, being perpetually under nonage, ever then quarrel at these
governments and never seek a king ? By this reason they cannot. 3. The
king, in all respects, is not a tutor — every comparison in something
beareth a leg; for the commonwealth, in their own persons, do choose a
king, complain of a king, and resist an Uzziah, and tie their elective
prince to a law. A pupil cannot choose his tutor, either his dying
father, or the living law doth that service for him; he cannot resist
his tutor, he cannot tie his tutor to a law, nor limit him, when first
he chooseth him. Pupillo non licet postulare tutorem suspecti, quamdiu
sub tutela est, et manet impubes. (I. Pietatis 6, in sin. C. de susp.
Tutor. l. impuberem. 7, and sect, impuberes. Just. eod).
Quest. 13. Whether or no subjects are more obnoxious to a king than
clients to patrons, and servants to masters, because the patron cannot
be the client's judge, but some superior magistrate must judge both, and
the slave had no refuge against his master, but only flight; and the
king doth confer infinite greater benefits on the subjects, than the
master doth on the slave, because he exposeth his life, pleasure, ease,
credit, and all for the safety of his subjects.[1]
Ans. — 1. It is denied, for to draw the case to fathers and lords, in
respect of children and vassals, the reason why sons, clients, vassals,
can neither formally judge, nor judicially punish, fathers, patrons,
lords, and masters, though never so tyrannous, is a moral impotency, or
a political incongruity, because these relations of patron and client,
fathers and children, are supposed to be in a community, in which are
rulers and judges above the father and son, the patron and the client;
but there is no physical incongruity that the politic inferior punish
the superior, if we suppose there were no judges on the earth, and no
relation but patron and client; and, because, for the father to destroy
the children, is a troubling of the harmony of nature; and the highest
degree of violence, therefore one violence of self-defence, and that
most just, though contrary to nature, must be a remedy against another
violence; but in a kingdom there is no political ruler above both king
and people, and therefore, though nature have not formally appointed the
political relation of a king rather than many governors and subjects,
yet hath nature appointed a court and tribunal of necessity, in which
the people may, by innocent violence, repress the unjust violence of an
injuring prince, so as the people injured in the matter of self-defence
may be their own judge. 2. I wonder that any should teach, That
oppressed slaves had of old no refuge against the tyranny of masters,
but only flight; for, (1.) The law expressly saith that they might not
only fly but also change masters, which we all know was a great damage
to the master, to whom the servant was as good as money in the purse.[2]
(2.) I have demonstrated before, by the law of nature, and out of divers
learned jurists, that all inferiors may defend themselves by opposing
violence against unjust violence; to say nothing that unanswerably I
have proved that the kingdom is superior to the king. 3. It is true, Qui
plus dat, plus obligat, as the Scripture saith, (Luke vii.,) He that
giveth a greater benefit layeth a foundation of a greater obligation.
But, 1. If benefit be compared with benefit, it is disputable if a king
give a greater benefit than an earthly father, to whom, under God, the
son is debtor for life and being, if we regard the compensation of
eminency of honour and riches, that the people putteth upon the king;
but I utterly deny that a power to act tyrannous acts, is any benefit or
obligation, that the people in reason can lay upon their prince, as a
compensation or hire for his great pains he taketh in his royal
watchtower. I judge it no benefit, but a great hurt, damage, and an ill
of nature, both to king and people, that the people should give to their
prince any power to destroy themselves, and therefore that people do
reverence and honour the prince most, who lay strongest chains and iron
fetters on him, that he cannot tyrannise.
Quest. 14. — But are not subjects more subject to their prince, (seeing
the subjection is natural, as we see bees and cranes,) to obey him, than
servants to their Lord?[3] (C. in Apib. 7, 9, 1, ex Hiero. 4, ad Rustic.
Monach. Plin. n. 17.) For jurists teach, that servitude is beside or
against nature, (l. 5, de stat. homi. sect. 2, just, et jur. pers. c. 3,
sect. et sicut Nov. 89, quib. med. nat. eff. sui.)
Ans. — There is no question, in active subjection to princes and fathers
commanding in the Lord, we shall grant as high a measure as you desire.
But the question is, if either active subjection to ill and unjust
mandates, or passive subjection to penal inflictions of tyranny and
abused power, be natural or most natural; or if subjects do renounce
natural subjection to their prince, when they oppose violence to unjust
violence. This is to beg the question. And for the commonwealth of bees
and cranes, and crown and sceptre amongst them, give me leave to doubt
of it. To be subject to kings, is a divine moral law of God; but not
properly natural to be subject to co-action of the sword. Government and
subjection to parents, is natural; but that a king is juris natureć
strictim, I must crave leave to doubt. I hold him to be a divine moral
ordinance, to which, in conscience, we are to submit in the Lord.
Quest. 15. — Whether king Uzziah was dethroned by the people?
Ans. — Though we should say he was not formally unkinged and dethroned,
yet if the royal power consist in an indivisible point, as some
royalists say, and if Uzziah was removed to a private house, and could
not reign, being a leper; certainly much royal power was taken from. It
is true, Arnisćus saith,[4] he neither could be compelled to resign his
power, nor was he compelled to resign his royal authority; but he
willingly resigned actual government, and remained king, as tutors and
curators are put upon kings that are mad or stupid, and children, who
yet govern all by the authority of lawful kings. But that Uzziah did not
denude himself of the royal power voluntarily, is clear. The reason (2
Chron. xxvi. 21) why he dwelt in a house apart, and did not actually
reign, is, because he was a leper; for, “He was cut off (saith the text)
from the house of the Lord; and Jotham, his son, was over the king's
house, judging the people of the land." Whereby it is clear, by the
express Law of God, he being a leper, and so not by law to enter into
the congregation, he was cut off from the house of the Lord; and he
being passive, is said to be cut off from the Lord's house. Whether,
then, Uzziah turned necessity to a virtue, I know not: it is evident,
that God's law removed the actual exercise of his power. If we obtain
this, which God's word doth give us, we have enough for our purpose,
though Uzziah kept the naked title of a king, as indeed he took but up
room in the catalogue of kings. Now, if by law he was cut off from
actual governing, whether he was willing or not willing to denude
himself of reigning, is all one. And to say, that furious men, idiots,
stupid men, and children, who must do all royal acts by curators and
tutors, are kings jure, with correction, is petitio principii; for then
hath God infused immediately from heaven (as royalists teach us) a royal
power to govern a kingdom, on those who are as capable of royalty as
blocks. I conceive that the Lord (Deut. xvii. 14-17) commandeth the
people to make no blocks kings; and that the Lord hath not done that
himself in a binding law to us, which we have no commandment from him to
do. I conceive that God made Josiah and Joash kings typical, and in
destination, for his promise sake to David, while they were children, as
well as he made them kings; but not actu completo ratione officii. to be
a rule to us now, to make a child of six years of age a king by office.
I conceive children are to us only kings in destination and appointment;
and for idiots and tools, I shall not believe (let royalists break their
faith upon so rocky and stony a point, at their pleasure) that God hath
made them governors of others, by royal office, who can scarce number
their own fingers; or that God tyeth a people to acknowledge stupid
blocks for royal governors of a kingdom, who cannot govern themselves.
But far be it from me to argue with Bellarmine, (de pśnit. l. 3, c. 2,)
from Uzziah's bodily leprosy to infer that any prince who is spiritually
leprous and turned heretical, is presently to be dethroned, Nothing can
dethrone a king but such tyranny as is inconsistent with his royal
office. Nor durst I infer that kings, now a-days, may be removed from
actual government for one single transgression. It is true, eighty
priests, and the whole kingdom, so serving king Uzziah (their motives, I
know, were divine) proveth well that the subjects may punish the
transgression of God's express law in the king, in some cases even to
remove him from the throne; but as from God's commanding to stone the
man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath-day, we cannot infer that
Sabbath-breakers are now to be punished with death; yet we may well
argue, Sabbath-breakers may be punished, and Sabbath-breakers are not
unpunishable, and above all law; so may we argue here, Uzziah, though a
king, was punished; therefore kings are punishable by subjects.
Quest. 16. — Whether or no, as the denial of active obedience in things
unlawful is not dishonourable to the king, as king, he being obliged to
command in the Lord only, so the denial of passive subjection to the
king using unjust violence, be also no dishonouring of the king.
Ans. — As the king is under God's law both in commanding and in exacting
active obedience, so is he under the same regulating law of God, in
punishing or demanding of us passive subjection, and as he may not
command what he will, but what the King of kings warranteth him to
command, so may he not punish as he will, but by warrant also of the
Supreme Judge of all the earth; and therefore it is not dishonourable to
the majesty of the ruler, that we deny passive subjection to him when he
punisheth beside his warrant, more than it is against his majesty and
honour that we deny active obedience when he commandeth illegally; else
I see not how it is lawful to fly from a tyrannous king, as Elias,
Christ, and other of the witnesses of our Lord have done; and,
therefore, what royalists say here is a great untruth, namely, that in
things lawful we must be subject actively, — in things unlawful,
passively. For as we are in things lawful to be subject actively, so
there is no duty in point of conscience, laying on us to be subject
passively, because I may lawfully fly, and so lawfully deny passive
subjection to the king's will, punishing unjustly.
Quest. 17. — Whether the prince may make away any part of his dominions,
as an island, or a kingdom, for the safety of the whole kingdoms he
hath; as if goods be like to sink an over-burthened ship, the seamen
cast away a part of the goods in the sea, to save the lives of the whole
passengers; and if three thousand passengers being in one ship, and the
ship in a storm like to be lost, it would seem that a thousand may be
cast over board, to save the lives of the whole passengers.
Ans. — The kingdom being not the king's proper heritage, it would seem
he cannot make away any part of his kingdom to save the whole, without
the express consent of that part, though they be made away to save the
whole. In things of this kind, men are not as the commodities of
merchants, nor is the case alike; as when one thousand, of three
thousand, are to be cast into the sea to save all the rest, and that
either by common consent, or by lots, or some other way; for it is one
thing, when destruction is evidently inevitable, as in the casting so
many men into the sea to save the whole and many passengers, and when a
king for peace, or for help from another king, maketh away part of his
dominion. The Lord is here to be waited on in his good providence, and
events are to be committed to him; but far less, can it be imaginably
lawful for a king to make away a part of his dominions without their
consent, that he may have help from a foreign prince to destroy the
rest: this were to make merchandise of the lives of men.[5]
Quest. 18. — Whether or no the convening of the subjects, without the
king's will, be unlawful.
Ans. — The convention of men, of itself, is an indifferent thing, and
taketh its specification from its causes, and manner of convening,
though some convention of the subjects without the king, be forbidden;
yet ratio legis est anima legis, the reason and intent of the law, is
the soul of the law. Convention of the subjects, in a tumultuary way,
for a seditious end, to make war without warrant of law, is forbidden;
but not when religion, laws, liberties, invasion of foreign enemies,
necessitateth the subjects to convene, though the king and ordinary
judicatures, going a corrupt way to pervert judgment, shall refuse to
consent to their conventions. Upon which ground, no convention of tables
at Edinburgh, or any other place, (an. 1637, 1638, 1639,) can be judged
there unlawful; for if these be unlawful, because they are conventions
of the leagues, without express act of parliament, then the convention
of the leagues to quench a house on fire, and the convention of a
country to pursue a wolf entered in the land to destroy women and
children, which are warranted by the law of nature, should be lawless,
or against acts of parliament.
Quest. 19. — Whether the subjects be obliged to pay the debts of the
king.
Ans. — These debts which the king contracteth as king, in throno regali,
the people are to pay. For the law of nature and the divine law doth
prove, that to every servant and minister wages is due. (Rom. xiii. 5,
6, compared with verse 4, and 1 Cor. ix. 9-12; 1 Tim. v. 18.) If the
prince be taken in a war, for the defence of the people, it is just that
he be redeemed by them: so the law saith, (tit. F. et C. de negotiis
gestis, et F. et C. Manda.) But, Ferdinandus Vasquez (illust. quest. l.
1, c. 7, n. 6, Vicesimo tertio apparet, &c.) saith, if the prince was
not doing the business of the public, and did make war without advice
and consent of the people, then are they not to redeem him. Now certain
it is, when the king raiseth war, and saith, “God do so to me and mine,
if I intend any thing but peace,” yet maketh war not only against his
oath, but also without consent of the parliament, and a parliament at
that time convocated by his own royal writ, and not raised, and
dissolved at all, but still sitting formally a parliament; if he borrow
money from his own subjects, and from foreign princes, to raise war
against his subjects and parliament, then the people are not obliged to
pay his debts, 1. Because they are obliged to the king only as a king,
and not as an enemy; but in so raising war he cannot he considered as a
king. 2. Though if the people agree with him, and still acknowledge him
king; it is impossible, physice, he can be their king, and they not pay
his debts; yet they sin not, but may, ex decentia, non ex debito legali,
pay his debts, yet are they not obliged by any law of God or man to pay
his debts. But though it be true, by all law the king is obliged to pay
his debt, (except we say, that all the people's goods are the king's: a
compendious way, I confess, to pay all that any voluptuous Heliogabolus
shall contract,) yet it may easily be proved, that what his subjects and
foreign princes lent him to the raising of an unjust war are not
properly debts, but expenses unjustly given out under the reduplication
of formal enemies to the country, and so not payable by the subjects;
and this is evident by law, because one may give most unjustly monies to
his neighbour, under the notion of loan, which yet hath nothing of the
essence of loan and debt, but is mere delapidation, and cannot properly
be debt by God's law; for the law regulateth a man in borrowing and
lending, as in other politic actions. If I, out of desire of revenge,
should lend monies to a robber to buy powder and fuel to burn an
innocent city, or to buy armour to kill innocent men, I deny that that
is legally debt. I dispute not whether A. B., borrowing money formally,
that thereby he may waste it on debauchery, shall be obliged to repay it
to C. D. under the reduplication of debt; or if the borrower be obliged
to pay what the lender hath unjustly lent. I dare not pray to God that
all our king's debts may be paid; I have scarce faith so to do.
Quest. 20. — Whether subsidies be due to the king as king.
Ans. — There is a twofold subsidy; one debitum, of debt; another,
charitativum, by way of charity. A subsidy of debt is rather the
kingdom's due for their necessity than the king's due, as a part of his
rent. We read of customs due to the king as king, and for conscience
sake, (Rom. xiii. 5, 6,) never of a subsidy or taxation to the kings of
Israel and Judah, at any convention of the states. Augustus Cćsar's
taxing of all the world (Luke ii.) for the maintenance of wars, cannot
be the proper rent of Augustus, as emperor, but the rent of the Roman
empire; and it is but the act of a man. Charitative subsidies to the
king, of indulgence, because, through bad husbanding of the king's
rents, he hath contracted debts, I judge no better than royal and
princely begging. Yet lawful they are, as I owe chanty to ray brother,
so to my father, so to my politic father the king. See Ferd. Vasq.
(illust. quest. l. 1, c. 8) who desireth that superiors, under the name
of charity, hide not rapine, and citeth Cicero, gravely saying, (offic.
l.1,) “Nulla generi humano et justitić major pestis est, quam eorum,
quidum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut boni viri esse videantur,” &c.
Quest. 21. — Whether the seas, floods, roadways, castles, ports, public
magazine, militia, armour, forts, and strongholds be the king's.
Ans. — All these may be understood to be the king's in divers notions.
1. They are the king's, quoad custodiam, et publicam possessionem, as a
pawn is the man's in whose hand the pawn is laid down. 2. They are the
king's, quoad jurisdictionem cumulativam, non privativam. The king is to
direct, and royally to command, that the castles, forts, ports,
strongholds, armour, magazine, militia, be employed for the safety of
the kingdom. All the ways, bridges, and public roadways, are the king's,
in so far as he, as a public and royal watchman, is to secure the
subject from robbers, and to cognosce of unknown murders, by himself and
the inferior judges; yet may not the king employ any of these against
the kingdom. 3. They are the kings, as he is king, quoad officialem, et
regalem, et publicam proprietatem; for he hath a royal and princely
propriety to all these, as his own, in so far as he useth them according
to law. 4. And thus they are the king's also, quoad usum, in regard of
official use. But, 1. They are the kingdom's, quoad fructum, in regard
of the effect and fruit. 2. They are the kingdom's, finaliter, being
destinated for the safety and security of the kingdom. 3. They are the
kingdom's, quoad proprietatem propriam, et legalem stricte sumptam,
according to the proper and legal propriety; and are not the king's
proper heritage as he is a man: 1. Because he may not sell these forts,
strongholds, ports, magazine, bridges, &c. to a stranger, or a foreign
prince. 2. When the king is dead, and his heirs and royal line
interrupted, these all remain proper to the kingdom; yet so as the state
cannot, as they are men, make them away, or sell them, more than the
king; for no public persons, yea the multitude cannot make away the
security, safety, and that which necessarily conduceth. to the security
of the posterity. “The Lord build his own Zion, and appoint salvation
for walls and bulwarks!”
THE END.
[1] Arnisćus de authorit. princip., c. 3, n.. 6.
[2] Servi indigne habiti confugiendi ad statuas, et dominum mutandi
copiam habent, 1. 2. De bis qui sunt sui. Item, C. de lat. Hered. toll.
[3] Arnisćus de authorit. princip. in popul c. 3, n. 7.
[4] Arnisćus de jure Pontif. Rom. in Regna et Princ. c. 5, n, 30.
[5] Ferdinan. Vasquez illust. quest. l. 1, c. 3, n. 8, juri alieno
quisquam nec in minima. parte obesse potest. l. id quod nostru. F. de
reg. jur. 1. jur. natu. cod. titul. 1.