NOTES FROM HERE AND THERE

Lewis Dolinsky

Published 4:00 am, Friday, April 28, 2000

HOW MUCH MISSILE DEFENSE IS TOO MUCH?

It's hard to hit a bullet with a bullet, says physicist
Richard Garwin
. That is one reason the planned national missile defense, known as NMD or Son of Star Wars, makes no sense except as a video game. Tests of the system are like playing chess with yourself; you ought to be able to win. Even in a "successful" test, a missile hit the target by mistake while aiming for a decoy. If a rogue state wants to destroy Baltimore, it may not follow our program. It could even walk its nuclear bomb or biological weapon across our border, or use Fed-Ex.

Garwin, a frequent adviser to the State and Defense departments, has helped design nuclear weapons. His credentials are longer than this column. He was on the nine-member Rumsfeld Commission, which concluded that there is a potential missile threat from North Korea, Iran or Iraq, given five years of serious effort. But the report did not say biological or nuclear weapons are likely to arrive via intercontinental missiles. Even if that were so, Garwin says, protective measures could be taken that require only minor changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (or just Russian acquiescence). And China would not be forced into an arms race in which Pakistan and India follow.

The Russians stuck it to us last week when they passed the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty but made START II and all previous bilateral arms agreements void we violate the ABM treaty. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan is concerned about a new arms race. So are our allies. They also wonder whether we'll neglect them while we're constructing a nuclear shield for our 50 states.

But aren't we allowed to protect ourselves from a threat (from rogue states) that was not envisioned in 1972? The ABM pact has been modified before, so what's the big deal?

The ABM treaty allows the United States and Russia to protect either its capital or one collection of missiles, but not both. The United States could take out a Russian city or Russia itself, and vice-versa, but neither side would fire first, knowing the consequences. Son of Star Wars could be the worst of both worlds, lulling us into a false sense of security while encouraging fearful adversaries to hit our missiles while they can. And if someone attacks a city and this high-tech defense doesn't work, we're sunk. Or at least Baltimore is. The main quarrel within the scientific community is about whether this NMD will never work or might work eventually after zillions are spent. (The bill so far, starting with the Reagan years, is estimated to be $60 billion.) Scientists do like those research and development dollars, and some knowledge is bound to come from them. Figure a half-cent return on the dollar. Republicans demand a massive system. The administration has talked of 100 interceptors in Alaska. Dean Wilkening, director of the science program at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, says that the latter is something the Russians could live with and that it might even work. But he thinks it's unwise because we already have effective deterrence and the new technology isn't quite ready. Save the ABM treaty no matter what, he says, especially since the real threat is from shorter-range missiles hitting our interest zones, not our territory. Missile defense against those is legal and effective.

Garwin opposes the Alaska plan because we may have to defend against bomblets, not one big device. The way to stop them is at the booster stage, before they spread out; hitting one target is easier than hitting hundreds. Our missiles could go on land (Turkey, Russia, Kazakstan) or sea (Caspian, Gulf of Oman, off Korea). Russia might cooperate, gladly, since this system would not be effective against its missiles. And China wouldn't feel as threaf defending against rogue states, it wouldn't suit some GOP Senate leaders: It doesn't give defense industries a blank check, thumb our nose at Russia or force China to ruin itself with military spending. It doesn't kill the "antiquated" ABM treaty.

President Clinton can opt for no missile defense, limited defense or the whole enchilada. He usually splits the difference. He doesn't need a national missile defense deployment to get Vice President Gore elected; he needs (as Garwin says) an anti-Republican deployment. The Alaska plan looks reasonable and limited, but it's the thin edge of the wedge: A second phase is envisioned. So we browbeat, cajole or bribe the Russians into giving us what we don't need.

At the World Affairs Council's Asilomar conference next weekend, retired General Lee Butler (who opposes all nuclear weapons) and two former secretaries of defense, William Perry and Robert McNamara, will thrash this out. Perry, a pragmatist, will argue for the best bad solution. McNamara is a dove. Someone is bound to declare that we are about to destroy our national security in order to save it.

THANK YOU, HOLLYWOOD

Yemen's ambassador to Washington, Abdulwahab Al-Hajjri, has been trying to build up his country's image, and along comes the movie "Rules of Engagement" to smash it. In this box office hit, Marine Colonel
Samuel L. Jackson
orders his men to attack civilians after Yemeni women and children fire rifles at them. This never happened in real life, nor would it, but the screenwriter needed an Arab country. The ambassador told
John Donnelly
of the
Boston Globe
, "I have a friend going to Yemen, and his mother just called him, saying she was worried."

The worst thing that happens to foreigners in Yemen is kidnapping -- their equivalent of baseball. Usually, the victims get khat to chew and are released unharmed. There are unfortunate exceptions.

As Al-Hajjri watched the movie a second time, he said, "This is completely unrealistic." Well, of course. It was filmed in Morocco.