Interview transcript

Transcript of part one of Correspondent Brent Sadler's
exclusive interview with Hussein Kamel

September 21, 1995
Web posted at: 11:01 p.m. EDT (0301 GMT)

In his first television interview since fleeing Baghdad six
weeks ago, Hussein Kamel insisted on answering questions
alone, denying access to the other members of his family.

He began by refuting Baghdad's accusations that he was
working for American intelligence. In a CNN interview after
the defection, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz called
Kamel a spy. "He has been doing that for years for years,"
said Aziz. "And this shows that this man has been recruited
by the CIA for a long period."

KAMEL: (responding to the charge) I have not been disloyal to
my country, and Tariq Aziz can not discredit my achievements.
He cannot give to Iraq a fraction of what I have given. How
can a spy give so much. Tariq Aziz knows nothing but empty
words. Tariq Aziz is not there because of his efficiency. He
is in the regime because Saddam Hussein believes the west
will be with him because he is a Christian. If U.N. sanctions
are lifted tomorrow Tariq Aziz will lose his power because he
is a failure and because he is not popular.

SADLER: Can you state here and now -- does Iraq still to this
day hold weapons of mass destruction?

KAMEL: No. Iraq does not possess any weapons of mass
destruction. I am being completely honest about this.

SADLER: You were overseeing the program to produce weapons of
mass destruction were you told to keep secrets away from the
U.N. weapons inspectors.

KAMEL: The order was to hide much of it from the start and we
hid a lot of that information. These were not individual acts
of concealment but as a result of direct orders from the top.

SADLER: Did you try very hard to keep them a secret away from
the U.N. inspections teams?

KAMEL: No, in my opinion this was not a good strategy. If I
thought it was a good strategy, why did I resign from the
ministry of defense?

SADLER: In your position, Mr. Kamel, you must have argued
your
point of a change in strategy with president Saddam himself.
What did the Iraqi leader say when you said to him, 'I think
your strategy is wrong?'

KAMEL: It's not only Saddam who was guilty. But there are
also other officials who are guilty.

SADLER: What officials are we talking about?

KAMEL: Primarily it was Tariq Aziz. And Taha Yassin Ramadan.
They were recently joined by general Amer Rasheed. In my
opinion they do not understand international politics. That's
why they have not solved any problems facing Iraq. This is
what made me leave the country, the fact that Saddam Hussein
surrounds himself with inefficient ministers and advisers who
are not chosen for their competence but according to the
whims of the Iraqi president. And as a result of this the
whole of Iraq is suffering.

SADLER: The Iraqi government admitted that biological weapons
were made at the Al Hakim complex outside Baghdad. But
officials were reticent about the nature of the warfare
agents produced there.

KAMEL: Most important was anthrax, which is a very dangerous
weapon. But there is a problem in delivering it. You can
deliver it by planes or by missiles but it will not have the
impact or coverage of a nuclear weapon.

SADLER: How close was Iraq in your knowledge to producing a
deliverable nuclear weapon?

KAMEL: First we had enriched French uranium that was ready
for a bomb and highly enriched Russian uranium as well.

SADLER: Did Saddam Hussein ever ask his atomic scientists
whether it was feasible to deliver some kind of nuclear
device at the time of the gulf war?

KAMEL: We designed the shell of the weapon. Our first design
was for 12 tons and then it went down to six tons and we
wanted a very small bomb with a 500 kilo warhead. Or even 300
kilos so it could be easily carried by missiles or warplanes.
It would be more powerful. Iraq was working very quickly on
this. We wanted the missiles to carry the nuclear weapons.
But that's all in the past now and Iraq is not going to
repeat that.

SADLER: Do you remember the work that went into the Iraqi
super gun?

KAMEL: (laughter) Of course I remember the super gun. It was
not being prepared against any country. It was a defensive
weapon.

SADLER: Could that super gun have delivered a chemical or
biological warhead?

KAMEL: Of course if it were ready, even nuclear. As I said
before, our atomic scientists were trying to develop a small
nuclear warhead.

SADLER: Was it a viable project?

KAMEL: Yes. It was meant for long range attack and also to
blind spy satellites. Our scientists were seriously working
on that. It was designed to explode a shell in space that
would have sprayed a sticky material on the satellite and
blinded it.

SADLER: You'll remember the weapons inspection team was
camped outside the ministry of agriculture. What secret was
being kept away from the U.N. then?

KAMEL: Of course there were secrets in the Ministry of
Agriculture. We are talking clearly about the past and the
Iraqi team managed to remove documents in boxes. They
concerned chemical and biological weapons and I believe it
also had something to do with nuclear weapons. At that time
we scattered the documents and did not put them in one place.
They were hidden in other ministries, homes and offices. The
inspection teams were not able to find them all until
recently, when Iraq handed them over.

SADLER: So it delayed the uncovering of that information for
more than two years as a result of that trickery.

KAMEL: Naturally if we had declared all our secrets the U.N.
siege of sanctions would not have lasted this long. This
policy also destroyed Iraq's international credibility, which
to me was more important than keeping secrets. No, I have
never regretted leaving Iraq. I am now more confident than
ever that my actions were justified in view of the
government's actions past and present. Despite my close ties
and with president Saddam Hussein, I know there is no turning
back.

SADLER: We'll take a break there. When we return Hussein
Kamel will explain how Saddam Hussein rules Iraq and he'll
assess the measures the Iraqi leader is prepared to take to
ensure he remains in power.