It is he that saith not Rismet ; it is he
that knows not Fate. It is Richard, it is Raymond, it is Godfrey
in the gate! ' - 'Lepanto,' G. K.
Chesterton.

(416) IT was not with
Exmouth's approval that Napoleon was taken to Elba. He was always
resolutely in favour of executing the tyrant. So that, if annoyed
in a general way at Napoleon's escape, he had the satisfaction of
seeing his prophecies fulfilled. He was still, apparently, at
West Cliff House in January 1815, when the Order of the Bath was
extended. The extension, while making him a K.C.B., and shortly
afterwards G.C.B., put for ever beyond his reach the coveted
title of K.B. Soon after he received this honour his duties as a
member of the House of Lords brought him to London. It was from
there that he wrote to Sir Richard Keats on the subject of
Napoleon's escape.

Harley
Street 23rd March 1815

MY DEAR FRIEND
As you may
not hear all that's going forward I sit down to give you the
general feeling of Official People. Your intensive and reflecting
Mind will not be filled with alarm as all people are here on the
extraordinary Events which are pafsing. We have lived through
wonderful times and when they will end is not to be foreseen. But
no Person So years hence will credit what we have to relate of
the escape of this Monster from Elba, or the extreme folly of not
securing him in the first instance from the power of doing
Mischief. I am not myself without great hopes that France will
awaken to her dreadful situation and of her own accord drive this
Waster from her Soil, particularly when she sees the Allies
entering the Country and exposing it to all the sad events of War.
It is generally thought we must begin again and Lord M[elville]
has given me two strings, meaning I shall go to my old Station if
we arm or relieve Bickerton if we remain at Peace. I do not know
how I shall like to be harnefsed as Port Admiral or if (417)
there will
be more to do than I shall find pleasant, but if it is, I shall
cut, and at once, give up Public pursuits and fix myself at
Teignmouth for the remainder of my term, for it is time to rest
and make the most of the few Years left to me ....

Exmouth was
not destined to rest at this time. He received his reappointment
as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean on the day after that
on which this letter was written. Hoisting his flag in the Boyne (98), he proceeded at once to his station. Penrose was the flag-officer
he came to supersede, an efficient man who had made a very proper
disposition of the fleet before Exmouth arrived. The south of
France was inclined to remain loyal to the Bourbons, so that
Exmouth did not expect to encounter the Toulon fleet. He went
straight to Sicily and Naples with a view to assisting in the
downfall of Murat.

On the
commencement of the Hundred Days, Murat, who had been left in
possession of the kingdom of Naples, made a wild attempt to
conquer all Italy. He was beaten by the Austrians and threatened
by a force under Bentinck, who was preparing to attack Naples
from the southward. The city of Naples itself was watched by a
squadron Penrose had sent there as soon as the war began, and was
only saved from bombardment by Murat's wife, Caroline, who
surrendered the Neapolitan navy to the English. On returning to
Naples, utterly defeated, Murat found that the populace was on
the brink of rising against him. He accordingly set out secretly
for France on the evening of May 19th, leaving his wife to ask a safe-conduct from the English. Captain Campbell, commanding the
squadron before the town, not only granted her the protection of
his flag but also agreed to convey her and her suite to France.
Exmouth arrived on the evening of the 2oth and promptly annulled
the agreement. He would allow her to go to England or Trieste,
but not to France.

Naples
contained at this time a number of English pleasure-seekers,
including the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Oxford. It was the
former who, on the gist, urged Exmouth to land his marines to
keep order in the city until the Austrian troops should appear.
The queen was already on board H.M.S. Tremendous. The marines
were duly landed and remained in possession until the Austrian
advance-guard marched in on the 23rd. Now, it seems that Queen
Caroline had made herself extremely pleasant to the English
visitors, for a number of them now began to (418)
champion her
cause, accusing Exmouth of brutality in refusing to take her to
France. The Duke of Bedford announced his intention of proceeding
home in order to attack Exmouth in the House of Lords. The Earl
of Oxford made similar threats. The Countess of Oxford went
further. Accompanied by her daughters, she forced her way into
his cabin and besieged the startled admiral with tearful
entreaties. For perhaps the first time in his life, Exmouth was
at a loss what to do. Luckily, that invaluable man John Gaze came
to his rescue. His entry was apparently accidental, but it was
extremely apt. He came in to find the scene at its climax, with
Lady Oxford kneeling with dishevelled hair before the embarrassed
admiral. On catching sight of his faithful follower, Exmouth
muttered something about urgent business and fled. Captain
Brisbane was then sent to see the lady over the side. One
pictures his lordship cautiously emerging from the after-hold and
asking. whether she had really gone.

From Naples
Exmouth sailed to Genoa where be embarked Sir Hudson Lowe and a
part of the garrison. These troops were landed at Marseille -
which had risen for the Bourbons and expelled Marshal Brune. At
the time of the landing Brune was marching on the city with a
body of troops from Toulon. The 4,000 troops, marines, and seamen,
however, joined by as many of the National Guard of Marseille,
marched out to meet this attack, led by Lord Exmouth himself on
horseback. Whereupon Brune went back to Toulon, which presently
surrendered in its turn. A notable feature of this campaign was
the friendly relationship between Exmouth and his military
colleague. In writing to Sir Hudson, Exmouth assured him: ` I
have never heretofore met a man with whom I could more cordially
and pleasantly make war.' But there was very little war to make
and Sir Hudson was presently appointed as jailer at St. Helena.

While still
at Marseille, Exmouth wrote to Lord Sidmouth and congratulated
him upon the ending of the war.

Boyne,
Marseilles
27th Sept.
1815

MY DEAR LORD
If I had not
expected to have paid you a visit before this, I should certainly
have made you acquainted with our progrefs since the
happy change in Public affairs, which brought me and my Fleet
here. It is now too late to attempt anything (419)
more than
exprefs my Congratulations and Satisfaction that your Lordship
has borne so large a share in the good and wise Councils which
have saved our Country from the Grasp of that base Usurper; and
at last doom'd him to be secured, I hope, from all power to do
further mischief. I wish most heartily his life had been made to
answer for all the Murders and Misery he has Entail'd upon the
World, and I did hope that such a Sentence would have overtaken
him, well knowing the firmnefs of your enlightened Mind. I may
venture to believe you would not have shrunk from your share of
responsibility, or have impeded so just a retribution; I profefs
myself quite ready and willing to have lent my feeble voice to
such a decision; as it is, we must hope he is Secure ....

I have
received orders to send Home great part of my force. But I dont
know when I am to return myself ....

The reason
why the Admiralty did not recall Exmouth at once at the
conclusion of the war soon became apparent. Orders arrived
directing him to conclude certain treaties with the Barbary
States. This meant remaining in the Mediterranean throughout the
winter, for it was not thought possible to conduct operations on
the Barbary Coast during that season. This intention of visiting
Barbary was kept secret for the time being, but Exmouth made
preparations for his mission by sending Gaze ashore to consult
such books and maps as Marseille contained. Then he took his
squadron to winter at Leghorn.

Before
describing his further proceedings, it seems essential to give
some account of the Barbary States. In particular is it necessary
to explain the object of the intended mission, the reasons for
undertaking it at that particular time, and the reasons why it
was not undertaken sooner.

The north
coast of Africa, the ribbon of habitable land dividing the Sahara
from the sea, became a province of Europe as a result of the
Punic Wars. A part of Europe it remained until the fall of the
Roman Empire, when a Vandal invasion produced a state of anarchy
which lasted, with negligible interruption, until the seventh
century, when the Arab raids began to bring about a general
conversion of the inhabitants to Islam. Christianity and European
culture had long since been more or less completely extinguished
in the province, and the Arabs met with no coherent resistance
either to their arms or doctrines. The inhabitants, although
white men, became, in effect, Orientals. North Africa became, in
the eighth century, the base for Islamic raids on Spain; while
fresh Arab invasions still further secured (420)
the
conquered province in the course of the Middle Ages. The tide,
however, had turned, and the end of the fifteenth century saw the
return to Africa of the Islamic invaders of Spain. These brought
with them a strong disinclination for productive labour combined
with a taste for warfare, or at any rate for successful warfare.
They also brought with them the Spaniards, in hot pursuit of
their late guests. This Spanish counter-attack was not of long
duration. By the middle of the sixteenth century Christendom and
Islam faced each other across the Mediterranean and warfare
between the two forces became chiefly naval.

One set of
savages is like another, and the course of events by which North
Africa came under the rule of the Turks is of no particular
interest. Nor need their political institutions detain us. It is
sufficient to say that the various states of Barbary, as North
Africa was then called, were now ruled by bands of Turks, largely
of Greek extraction, who made it their business to wage perpetual
warfare against the commerce of the Mediterranean. Of these
pirate states the chief was Djezair, usually known as Algiers, a
town built on the ruins of the ancient Icosium.

Now, where
Europe, or any possession of Europe, has on its borders a hostile
uncivilized state, divided in spirit from the sources of our
culture, there are three policies open to the Europeans. The
first and best policy is that of conquest. The next in order of
preference is that of localization. The last is that of
negotiation, which must as a rule take the form of menace and
bribery. As examples of these three possible courses of action,
one might take the Roman treatment of England, the medieval
treatment of Wales, and the modern treatment of Afghanistan. Or
one might instance the Cromwellian, the Roman, and the
Elizabethan treatment of Scotland. To write a history of the
relations between Europe and Barbary would be to relate how the
kingdoms of Christendom adopted now one, now another of these
policies. Such a history would include Charles V's attempt to
achieve conquest and the modern French achievement of it; the
Spanish attempt to confine the corsairs by seizing their ports ;
the Dutch attempts to punish and to bribe. But the strangest part
of the story would be that played by England. For, between
England and Barbary there was a long-standing alliance.

The reason
why seventeenth-century English pirates and naval officers found
it convenient to be on good terms with Barbary is sufficiently
clear. Ever since the Reformation, (421)
the English
could never depend upon having a Christian ally in the
Mediterranean. Catholic France was as unfriendly as Catholic
Spain or Catholic Italy. The English seaman, therefore, who
entered the Straits, turned to the Barbarians for water and
provisions. There were frequent sources of dispute. On one
occasion a special mystery-ship was designed to sink the corsairs
without prejudice to the alliance. But, in the main, friendly
relations were preserved. A formal treaty existed long before the
end of the seventeenth century, and a consul was appointed to
reside at Algiers.

In the
eighteenth century there were additional reasons for avoiding any
serious quarrel with the Barbary States. For, while France and
Spain were still likely to be hostile, the provisioning of
Gibraltar made a new problem. In order to secure food for the
garrison, which could only come from the African coast,
numberless insults were overlooked and countless presents made.
With the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, the need for procuring
supplies in Barbary became intensified as the English forces in
the Mediterranean grew in numbers. It will be remembered that
Midshipman Easy had hardly joined the Mediterranean fleet before
he was sent to fetch bullocks from Tetuan. The fact is symbolic.
Fetching bullocks from Bona or Tetuan was a service to which
special vessels and officers were permanently dedicated. The
Peninsula War rather intensified than lessened the demand for
supplies from Africa, and to the very end of the war the English
Government would make any sacrifice to preserve the alliance with
Algiers, Tunis and Morocco. With the end of the fighting, the
situation altered. Troops and ships were withdrawn from the
Mediterranean, and there was no longer any need for supplies.
England had, besides, a variety of allies from whom future
supplies could be obtained. The Algerines had, without knowing it,
suddenly ceased to be useful. It was not long before they were
made to realize the fact.

France, at
Algiers, stood on much the same footing as England. Both French
and English shipping enjoyed almost complete immunity from
outrage. France, like England, treated the Barbary States with
alternate threats and bribes; but, in her case, the bribes were
less essential in that a sound instinct made the barbarians
careful to avoid angering such near neighbours. The French had no
particular motive for encouraging piracy-beyond the advantage
their merchants derived from sharing with England a monopoly of
safety - but neither had they any particular (422)
motive for
suppressing it. Could the pirates have been destroyed with ease,
the French would probably have destroyed them at an early date.
But the destruction of Algiers was unlikely to be either easy or
profitable and was certain to be expensive. The altruism of the
French stopped short of such an enterprise, and the pirates were
allowed to prey on the commerce of all nations other than England
and France.

It may not
be at first apparent why the conquest of Barbary seemed so
unattractive. But here it must be remembered that the blight of
Islam had rendered that land almost useless to Europeans.
Deforestation had ruined much of the arable land, and teetotalism
had abolished the type of cultivation for which the land was most
suited. The fanaticism of the Moslems promised endless warfare in
the interior. The expense was certain and the profit more than
doubtful. Algeria is now a province of France, but it would be
interesting to know how many generations it took to render the
possession a useful one. It is not to be wondered at that both
French and English shrank from adopting a policy of conquest.

Why, then,
was no effort made to confine the pirates to their own homes by
occupying the few harbours they possessed ? Here again the
question of expense decided the matter. Neither England nor
France was prepared to keep up garrisons for the protection of
Europe as a whole, and England had her own motive for leaving the
pirates alone. The only remaining policy was that of negotiation
intrigue, menace and bribery. And this policy was adopted by both
countries.

France and
England frequently threatened the pirates but only rarely
attempted to punish them. Punishing them was too difficult, and
the effect produced was not sufficiently lasting. Sinking their
ships and bombarding their harbours, even when possible, merely
prevented their doing further mischief for a few months. They
could always find more ships and recruit fresh pirates. As long
as their harbours existed, it was impossible to prevent them
being used for piracy. The Turks knew no other trade and were
bound to return to it. They could be brushed off, like flies;
but like flies they returned.

Even
supposing that any power could have afforded to undertake
periodical raids on the corsair strongholds, there was another
difficulty. For the greatest of these strongholds, Algiers, was
very strong indeed. It was strong by nature (423)
in that it
was impossible to approach in winter-being a dangerous lee-shore;
and difficult to approach in summer because of the frequent lack
of wind. It was strong by fortification because various Europeans
had been bribed or intimidated into building the works. 'Algiers
hath a mould within which Ships ride and great store of singular
good Ordnance' wrote a seventeenth-century English pirate. And
another expert of the period wrote that 'Whoever knows Algiers,
cannot be ignorant of the strength of it.' As for taking an army
there - ' we shall no sooner land, but be welcomed by three or
four score thousand of these ungodly people.' Algiers was thought
almost impregnable.

Throughout
the eighteenth century the Mediterranean was continually harried
by the corsairs. Their activities might have been more profitable
had they ever succeeded in learning their business thoroughly.
The English pirates of the early seventeenth century had taught
them what they knew, but the Moslems never did their teachers
much credit. They were always more or less ignorant of navigation
and shipbuilding. When overtaken by a gale, they were usually
seen' running wildly about the ship, imploring Allah for
protection.' Considering their ignorance, however, they did very
well. The crews of the ships they took were, as a rule, enslaved
and made to work either for the State or for private purchasers -
usually the former. These Christian slaves were sometimes
ransomed. Most, however, were poor fishermen from Sicily Naples,
and Sardinia, or from equally powerless States. These were seldom
released. Many minor Powers, such as Holland, Sweden, Denmark and
the United States, bought immunity for their subjects by paying
annual tribute. Tribute of this kind was generally paid in naval
stores, guns and small-arms. The vessels these stores went to
equip were sometimes captured merchantmen, sometimes old men-of-war
purchased from the English or received as gifts from the Porte.

With the end
of the Napoleonic Wars it was to be expected that the Powers in
Conference would sooner or later consider the problem of how to
deal with the Barbary States. Once raised, however, the question
instantly became a pawn in a diplomatic debate about something
entirely different. This came about through Castlereagh pressing
the ministers of the other Powers to follow England's example in
suppressing the negro slave-trade. Rightly or wrongly, the
ministers of the Powers most nearly concerned saw in this
proposal yet another instance of English hypocrisy. They scented (424)
sharp
practice. When assured that the English attitude was purely
philanthropic, they asked why English philanthropy only concerned
itself with blackslaves ? They wished to know what the
foremost naval power had done to abolish white slavery in North
Africa. To these unkind questions Castlereagh had no immediate
reply. But he was resolved that the questions should not be asked
again when he next returned to the charge.

Now, as we
have seen, the Barbary States were no longer of importance to
England. Their period of usefulness was over. There was no reason
at all why they should not be produced in a slightly mangled
condition as evidence of English altruism. Thus it came about
that Exmouth had his orders to visit them in force. Any violence
used was to have as its object the release of Christian slaves.
He was not instructed to punish the pirates. Castlereagh was not
thinking of them. All that was wanted was an instance of
disinterested conduct which might prove useful in the next debate
on negro emancipation. Such was the background of the crusade.

The battle
of Algiers was not regarded as a crusade by those who fought
there; least of all was it so regarded by the captain of the
Christian host. But the word is used deliberately. For, whatever
men thought at the time, the passage' of a hundred years allows
us to view the matter in a clearer light. To us, the fight must
appear, not as an isolated, accidental, and pointless cannonade,
but as one battle in a great series of battles; as a single
incident in a vast campaign. The campaign of which it forms a
part began at Tours and continued at Roncevaux and at Lepanto;
nor did it end at Gallipoli.

Before
Exmouth could begin to 'battle the watch' along the Barbary
coast, it was necessary for him to order a careful reconnaissance
of Algiers. His first impulse was to send Gaze on this service.
But, on second thoughts, he decided to send some one else. It was
his object as far as possible to take the Algerian's by surprise.
To this end he was careful that no hint of his intentions should
reach McDonnell, the consul at Algiers. Having no very high
opinion of that gentleman's intelligence, he feared that the
consul would arouse the Algerian's suspicions by preparing to
depart. To have sent an avowed expert to survey the
fortifications would have frightened the consul. Instead,
therefore, of sending Gaze, he sent Captain Warde with the Banterer
sloop. Warde was given detailed instructions to take (425)
soundings,
count the batteries, estimate distances - and, above all, avoid
any appearance of curiosity. If questioned, he was to lie. No one
in the fleet knew of this mission except Exmouth and his
secretary, and the Banterer went to Algiers by a
circuitous route to avert suspicion. Warde left Leghorn on
January 23rd, 1816.

At this time
the Princess Caroline, who was living apart from the Regent, was
in the Mediterranean on a pleasure cruise. She had gone to
Palermo in November 1815, in the Leviathan, and proposed
to extend her tour to Greece, Tunis and Constantinople. Exmouth
told her that she could not do so without danger until the
following spring, at the same time detailing a frigate to attend
her. The conduct of the princess was open to criticism in certain
respects. If innocent of the sins imputed to her, she was at once
eccentric and undignified. Two of her suite, for instance, were
seen dressed in bright yellow pantaloons, red half-boots, and
slashed coats in the old Spanish style. The effect of this
raffish attire on naval officers was naturally electrical. But
even had she behaved with extreme propriety, the known wishes of
the Regent prevented her receiving more than mere politeness from
Exmouth and his captains. Exmouth knew that the ice was thin, and
was not at all ready to take any risks. An officer who was seen
with her at a dance - or who was rumoured to have been seen with
herwas deliberately ruined. Exmouth cancelled his promotion, and
he was never employed again. The Regent was searching for
possible co-respondents, and to treat Princess Caroline with
anything more than cold civility meant certain ruin.

Captain
Pechell was the luckless officer detailed to attend the princess
with the frigate Clorinde. He succeeded, however, in
warding off possible danger by making her uncomfortable.

On my
arrival at Mefsina, Captain Briggs having informed me of the
uneasinefs which her Royal Highnefs had expresfed at the prospect
of keeping her own table on board the Clorinde, I requested him
to speak to Her Royal Highnefs in my name, and to say I was ready
to do everything in my power to make Her Royal Highness
comfortable while on board the Clorinde, provided Her Highnefs
would be pleased to make a sacrifice which my duty and feelings
as an officer compelled me to exact, by her not insisting on the
admifsion to my table of a person of the name of Bergemi, who,
tho' he is now admitted to her Royal (426)
Highnefses
Society, was when last Her Royal Highnefs embarked on board the
Clorinde in the capacity of a Footman ....

Eventually
the princess declared that she would rather sail in a transport
than ever go on board the Clorinde again whereupon Pechell
breathed a sigh of relief. The state of cold perspiration in
which she had kept him was ended. Nor did he greatly care when he
received a horribly correct rebuke from Exmouth. The chief
himself had been glad to be able to refuse her a battleship when
she asked for one instead of a frigate. Her hiring an Italian
polacre in the early spring of 1816 was a relief to every one.
But her decision to begin her tour by going to Tunis was
unfortunate, and might easily have been disastrous. For Exmouth
also intended to visit Tunis. Pechell reconnoitred that town just
as Warde reconnoitred Algiers - and with the same object of
preparing for a possible bombardment.

Exmouth left
Leghorn on March 4th, called at Genoa, and arrived at Port Mahon
on the 16th. The squadron finally sailed for Algiers on the 23rd
- five sail of the line and seven frigates and sloops. Sir Israel
Pellew was still with his brother but Admiral Penrose was the
second-in-command, and destined to succeed Exmouth as commander-in-chief.
The squadron appeared off Algiers on the following day and the
Dey was warned that Exmouth had orders to conclude certain
arrangements with him. These arrangements were merely the
ransoming of the slaves of certain nationalities. Three hundred
and fifty-seven Sicilians and Neapolitans were ransomed - 1,000
Spanish dollars being paid for each person by the governments
concerned. Fifty-one Sardinians and Genoese were ransomed at 500
dollars each. Twenty-three men of different nationalities were
released without ransom as under the protection of England at the
time of their capture. In ransoming the slaves Exmouth was merely
acting as mediator for their respective countries - the theory
being that a display of force lessened the expense. It is
doubtful, however, whether Exmouth paid less than the market
price. What he did do was to hasten their release. Those ransomed
were taken at once on board the four transports which accompanied
the squadron for that purpose. Not all the slaves were ransomed.
Perhaps owing to the poverty of the Neapolitan Government, 714 of
the Sicilians and Neapolitans were left in captivity until their
ransoms could be paid. Peace, finally, was made for the kingdom
of the Two Sicilies, for (427)
Sardinia,
and for the Ionian Islands, It is to be noted that the first two
treaties were on a tributary basis and that nothing was said
about piracy in general. An American squadron arrived on April 3rd
- three frigates and two corvettes - and this force was left in
possession of the bay on the 7th, when Exmouth sailed for Tunis.

The squadron
had approached Algiers on this occasion fully prepared to engage
the batteries. On March 31st the ships had been cleared for
action in preparation for an attack on the morrow, and the Algerians had made corresponding arrangements. The peaceful
outcome of the mission was therefore a disappointment to many.
One officer committed his annoyance to paper: 'Barbarians should
be treated with at the muzzles of their guns' he thought. To a
large number of hotheads the message 'All settled' telegraphed
from the flagship was a source of irritation. But Exmouth had won
his spurs before many of them were born, and he quite clearly
knew what he was about. The wind was too light and variable for
the fleet to approach the town; and, as it was, the wind had
dropped as the fleet stood in, with the result that one solitary
frigate had found herself becalmed under the muzzles of the
batteries. Exmouth was not anxious to fight under these
conditions, and the more experienced officers thought as he did.
Penrose, for example, his second-in-command, thought that the
fleet was too small for the task. 'It was well 'he wrote' that
matters were not on this occasion carried to extremities inasmuch
as the impression which could have been made .... would have
been feeble . . .'

Exmouth
reached Tunis on the 12th and instantly made two somewhat
startling discoveries. The Barbary coast had never been properly
surveyed, and it now appeared that the water was too shallow to
allow a ship of the line to approach within range of the Goletta.
This was the source of some consternation. But the second shock,
caused by the sight of Princess Caroline's polacre in the harbour,
must have been infinitely the worse of the two. It was
subsequently found that she was living ashore as the guest of the
potentate the fleet had come to chastise. Fortunately, the Bey of
Tunis was unaware of his advantage in the one respect and too
good a Moslem to make use of his advantage in the other. He was
also hampered by the fact that the envoy from the Porte, bearing
the Sultan's confirmation of his office, was detained at Syracuse
by the Neapolitan Government, pending the result of Exmouth's
mission.

(428)At Tunis, as
at Algiers, the negotiations were successful; so much so, indeed,
that Exmouth heightened his demands. The Neapolitan and Sicilian
slaves were ransomed at half the price paid for them at Algiers,
while the Sardinians and Genoese were released without ransom.
There were 524 slaves ransomed, and 257 set free unconditionally.
Here, as at Algiers, there were some slaves left in captivity -
some ninety Romans and Tuscans. Either through a mistake of the
interpreter or a stroke of initiative on the part of Exmouth
himself, the Bey was asked to discontinue his practice of
enslaving his captives. After some hesitation, this was agreed to.
Note, however, that no objection was made to piracy as such; the
Bey did not engage to live in peace, but merely promised to treat
Christian captives as prisoners of war. The slavery which was
thus abolished for the future does not seem to have been
particularly oppressive. None of the slaves released on this
occasion looked either ill-fed or ill-clad, and some were known
to have returned as freemen to the service of their masters. At
the same time it must be remembered that their happiness or
unhappiness does not really affect the question. Christian
slavery was, properly regarded, an insult to Europe and the Faith.
It was to be abolished, however well the slaves were treated. It
would have been right to release them even if they did not want
to be released.

Penrose left
an interesting account of the visit he and Exmouth paid to the
Palace of Bardo, where the Bey lived. The two admirals were made
to sit on a commodious divan and were there regaled with coffee
and sherbet.

. . . While we
were enjoying this display of Turkish manners, the Princess of
Wales, who was at this time on a visit to the Bey, was ushered
with two of her attendants through part of the hall, and into a
side door, to take her farewell of the ladies of the harem. The
Princess embarked before our squadron left Tunis, and it was an
odd scene that so considerable a force of ships of the line and
frigates should have to salute the royal standard of Britain
flying at the head of a little hired Italian polacre . . . .

The Bey,
having complained of being subject to the gout, begged that the
physician of the fleet might be sent to him. Doctor Denmark
accordingly attended, and I was much amused when I heard that his
advice was 'temperance and exercise.' The whole delight of the
poor man was gluttony, and he never in his life was known to show
any semblance of exertion, except one night when he got out of
his bed to murder his brother ....

(429)
Reading the
above account, it is difficult not to conclude that the princess
deliberately avoided speaking to Exmouth. He was not one of her
admirers and she probably knew as much. A few years later he was
one of the peers at her trial, and an unpopular man for being on
the side of her husband.

The princess
left Tunis on April 22nd. Penrose left on the 23rd, to take up
his duties at Malta, and Exmouth sailed on the following day. His
next task was to impose on Tripoli the terms he had imposed on
Tunis. Here he found no difficulty. The example of submission set
by the Bey of Tunis had its effect. In return for a present of 50,000
Spanish dollars, 414 Neapolitans and Sicilians were set free. One
hundred and forty Sardinians and Genoese were released without
ransom, and fourteen Romans and Hamburghers were given their
freedom as a personal favour to Exmouth. Seven slaves remained,
who had been taken in an Elbese privateer sailing under Napoleon's
colours; consideration of their case was postponed, as their
plight was not the concern of any existing government.

On leaving
Tripoli, Exmouth sailed for Algiers. This was in accordance with
orders received on the 20th. It appeared that the Americans had
concluded an agreement with the Dey of Algiers which would
clearly lead to infringements of the existing treaties with
England. Exmouth was accordingly directed to protest against the
application of a part of the American Treaty. His instructions
were of so mild a character, and he had already so greatly
exceeded them, that he returned to Algiers resolved to ignore
them and bully that Regency into following the example of Tunis
and Tripoli in abolishing Christian slavery. While on the way
there he wrote to Lord Sidmouth, partly to report progress,
partly to thank him for his promotion from K.C.B. to G.C.B.

Boyne off Tunis Bay 5th May 1816
Adverse wind and bad weather

MY DEAR LORD
I would not permit my last dispatch to depart, altho' blowing a
gale of wind, without giving you a precis of the result of our
late proceedings, but to judge of these you should also know my
orders and instructions, which when you do, I am sure you will
think I have done as much as Man could do; more heartily glad
should I have been to have put down for ever all these States,
had policy so recommended it to our Rulers; but of all Nations on
the Earth we have the least to complain of; in fact therefore His
Majesty's Ministers (430)
deserve
immortal Honor for directing what things have been done and I
shall ever revere them for having stood forward in the cause of
humanity even when Militating against their interest. I sincerely
hope we have finally smoked the horrors of Christian Slavery, and
that it has been attained by pure Conviction and fair reasoning
from a People who have been supposed never to reason or hear
reason. It is a very sensible gratification to me to have been so
employed, and if my efforts meet the approbation of my Employers
my pleasure and satisfaction will be complete. Of your good,
opinion, My Dear Lord, you know I have always been ambitious, and
will never forfeit. We have released 2500 poor Creatures and left
the Dungeons empty - I hope for ever.

My Boy tells
me I am again indebted to your great kindnefs in bringing me to
the recollection of His R.H. ; for the Grand Crofs pray accept my
best thanks, as all I have to offer for this additional proof of
your friendship. We are on our way to Algiers, Gibraltar and
Portsmouth, where I hope we shall arrive between the 10th and 20th
of June, and soon afterwards the pleasure of afsuring you in
Person,

H.R.H. was
at Tunis living in a Palace of the Bey's, the House kept,
Carriages and Horses and Janissaries found. At first it annoyed
me, but upon open explanation and proper understanding all most
correctly. They Embarked the day after me in a Maltese hired Ship
at 100l a Month for Zanta from whence they visit Ali Pacha at
Jonini and proceed by land to Athens and Constantinople. The ship
goes through to meet her. The Ship touch't at Malta from Tunis on
her way - [H.R.H. is] in very good health but grown very large.

The fleet
dropped anchor off Algiers on the evening of June 14th. Exmouth
had with him five sail of the line and seven frigates and sloops.
He went ashore on the following morning and had a long interview
with the Dey. After arranging for the recognition of the flag of
the Kingdom of Hanover, he delivered a formal protest against the
practical application of the eighteenth article of the treaty
between the United States and Algiers. The Dey replied that the
protest was quite needless, as he had already annulled the
American Treaty, and was about to declare war against the United
States. The Americans, he explained, had taken an unfair
advantage of him a year ago, or he would not have made that
treaty.

(431)
Having
settled these two points, Exmouth now told the Dey of the
indignation felt in Europe at his piratical practices and
especially his custom of retaining prisoners in slavery. Only an
alteration of this system could save him from having to meet the
world in arms. If the Dey would sign the same declaration already
obtained from the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli, he could then turn
to promoting the prosperity of Algiers by commercial means.
Exmouth hinted that it would be more honourable to do this
voluntarily than under compulsion. The argument lasted three
hours, at the end of which time the Dey said he would consult the
Divan or Cabinet and renew the discussion on the following
morning. Exmouth left under the impression that he had
practically gained his point. The Dey, Omar Pashaw, had seemed an
intelligent and moderate man; had asked questions as to the
European customs with regard to prisoners of war; and appeared to
be on the point of giving way.

Now, in
thinking well of Omar, Exmouth was altogether justified. The
Pashaw was a remarkable man, a Greek by birth, and probably the
best ruler Algiers ever had under Moslem rule. The admiral's
mistake was in thinking the Dey more powerful than he was. The
throne of Algiers, it must be understood, was theoretically
elective. The ruler was chosen from among the Turkish soldiery
who ruled the town. In practice, however, he almost invariably
took office as a result of a conspiracy and the murder of his
predecessor. No Dey, in short, outlived his popularity with the
troops. This being the case, the power of the. Dey was strictly
circumscribed by public opinion; the opinion, that is to say, of
his pretorian guard. Exmouth did not now it, but his proposals
were fantastic. The Dey was powerless to alter the system under
which he lived. Nothing short of conquest could alter that system.
The Turks had never worked in their lives, and they were unlikely
to begin simply because Omar wanted them to. Their trade was fighting preferably against the unarmed - and they knew no other.
Indeed, they did not know very much about fighting. For Omar to
have asked them to become peaceful traders would have been the
signal for his death.

It is
possible that Omar himself may have forgotten his lack of power
during this interview with Exmouth. If so, the members of the
Divan soon enlightened him. On Exmouth's return, the whole tone
of the discussion seemed to be altered. Omar retracted all he had
said the day before, and a warm argument followed 'in which much (432)
misconception
and difference of opinion was excited.' The upshot was that the
Dey found it convenient suddenly to remember his allegiance to
the Porte. He asked for six months in which to obtain the
decision of the Grand Signior. Exmouth readily agreed to this,
provided he would undertake to abide by the decision when it came.
This the Dey refused to do - 'saying he should do as he pleased
in a tone of voice evidently showing he meant that proposal for
excuse only.' Although Exmouth asserted that 'no offensive
exprefsion had dropped on either Side' it is clear that both men
had lost their temper before the interview ended. The admiral
stumped out of the palace, fuming with rage, and sent the consul
back to inform the Dey of his intention to withdraw him. The
reply was that the consul would not be allowed to leave until he
had settled his accounts. Disregarding this threat, Exmouth took
the consul under his arm and walked towards the wharf,
accompanied by the officers forming his staff. The whole party
was stopped at the gate, where a crowd had collected. The consul
was not allowed to pass, and the Turkish soldiers debated as to
whether Exmouth himself should be allowed to go through. The
evident desire of the crowd to kill him outright made the
situation distinctly ugly. In the end, the naval officers were
allowed to return to their boat, and the consul forced to go to
his house.

If there is
anything in Exmouth's life for which he can justly be blamed, it is this interview with Omar Pashaw. Each disputant had fairly
lost his temper by the end of the argument, and they were equally
to blame for the result. At the moment when Exmouth reached the
street, England and Algiers were neither at war nor at peace. The
whole incident is a proof of the need for diplomats. Two oldish
warriors lost their heads and there was chaos until they had
recovered themselves. It was fortunate for Exmouth that the
effects were no worse than they were. It will be seen that they
were bad enough.

Perhaps
owing to the incident at the gate, which added fuel to the
admiral's wrath, it was the Dey who first regained his common
sense. He made a step towards reconciliation within an hour or
two after Exmouth had left him. Two of the English captains,
Warde and Pechell, had been on a visit to the consul's country
house. When Omar heard that these had been dragged from their
horses, robbed, and brought into the town, he sent for them and
treated them with great courtesy. Their property was largely
traced (433)
and restored
to them, inquiries were made as to why those who had arrested
them had exceeded their instructions, and the two officers were
finally conducted to the beach and allowed to embark. This was
how the Dey behaved as soon as his anger had cooled. But the
damage had been done. During the few minutes of his fury he had
taken it for granted that war had begun. Messengers had ridden
out post-haste to warn the provincial governors. Orders had been
given to detain all British subjects. Before the first two
Englishmen were secured, he had changed his mind, as we have seen.
But those messengers had gone, and the Dey seems for the moment
to have forgotten he had sent them.

Exmouth, for
his part, had hardly gained his own quarterdeck before the signal
was made to clear for action. This signal was instantly followed
by the signal to unmoor, Luckily for the admiral, the wind failed
at that moment and the squadron merely drifted over to the east
side of the bay. Exmouth had to anchor again and felt that his
gesture had failed. For two days he strove to take up a
commanding position, and on each day he had to anchor as far from
the town as ever. Currents, calms, and a persistent off-shore
breeze gave him ample time to recover his temper; and recover it,
in the end, he did. His first thought was to save the consul's
life. After repeated messages had each received the same reply,
that the consul might go as soon as his debts were paid, Exmouth
at last did the sensible thing. He sent an officer ashore to
examine the public accounts. The result was that the Dey
approached this officer and suggested that negotiations should re-open.

Exmouth did
not go ashore in person. He quite rightly sent his brother, Sir
Israel, who had been present at the former meeting. Nothing
happened at the first interview beyond apologies on the Dey's
part. On Sir Israel saying that satisfaction must be given for
the insult received by the consul and the officers before
discussion could be resumed, the Dey said that he would make the
affair his own. The offenders had fled into the country. But they
would not escape him. They would be pursued and punished in
exemplary fashion. The aggrieved parties expressed their
satisfaction, and a meeting was arranged for the following day.

Omar Pashaw
began the second interview by explaining that he and Lord Exmouth
had misunderstood each other owing to faulty interpretation. The
interview lasted four hours, by the end of which period the Dey
consented to (434)
refer the
matter to the Grand Signior. Within six months, whether he had
heard from Constantinople or not, he would send an ambassador to
England with full powers to treat on the question of white
slavery. What exactly this meant, it is for the reader to decide.

It was at
this point in the discussion that the fact emerged that those
messengers had been sent to Oran and Bona. The Dey apologized
profusely. The counter-orders were sealed and dispatched
in the presence of Sir Israel and his staff. They were given to
understand that these would arrive in time to prevent anything
unpleasant taking place: 'and at all
events every thing should be immediately restored on the same
footing as before.' Omar had the reputation of an honest man, but
it is impossible not to see in all this a certain anxiety to gain
time. The distance from Algiers to Bona is about 250 miles, that
to Oran something less. The first messengers were sent off on the
16th, those bearing the counter-orders on the 19th. And here we
have a man saying that the second party would overtake the first.
How could that happen ? The journey would take a week or less,
and the first set of messengers had three days' start. There is a
difference, we know, between the speed of one horse and the speed
of another. But there is not as much difference as all that. One
Barbe does not go twice as fast as another over a period of days.
If the English officers saw nothing suspicious in this statement,
they clearly should have done.

At the
earnest request of the Dey, Exmouth went ashore for a parting
scene of reconciliation. He reported the Dey as having said that
'there had been a fire between him and me which had heated us
both and that he regretted exceedingly his warmth of temper had
led him to such violent measures.' As a peace-offering, Exmouth
was offered a horse and also an ostrich. He accepted the gift and
furthermore exchanged swords with the Dey. What he did with the
ostrich does not appear.

The squadron
quitted the Bay of Algiers on the 20th, leaving behind a frigate
destined to convey the Algerian ambassador to Constantinople. At
Gibraltar, where he arrived ten days later, Exmouth heard rumours
of certain happenings at Oran - rumours which he rightly
discredited. He moored his squadron at Spithead on June 24th, and
struck his flag on the 26th. Meanwhile, but three days after he
had gone from before Algiers, the messengers had come to Bona.

(435)
For drafting
the instructions on which Exmouth acted the ministers may have
expected the `immortal honour he said they deserved. If so, they
were disappointed. The news of the admiral's proceedings aroused
so little enthusiasm on the Continent that the ministers soon
came to wish that his instructions had been worded more strongly.
So far from blaming him for exceeding them, they almost blamed
him for not exceeding them sufficiently. Europe as a whole was
not at all impressed by such a demonstration. Newspapers and
pamphlets indicated that public opinion in England was equally
dissatisfied. 'The receipt of the news respecting the
negotiations of the British admiral excited universal indignation,'
wrote the American consul. 'The futility of our proceedings with
the Barbary States, we trust, is now sufficiently evident,'
chorused the opposition papers. The most extreme view was
expressed in a letter to the Independent Whig:

You must
know in England, long before this time, that our Admiral has been
honoured with a mission to the Prince of Ruffians at Algiers, and
that he has patched up a something, which is called a Treaty with
him, as if the ringleader of a banditti of Corsairs would adhere
to any treaty longer than necessity and a superior force
compelled his observance of it. It is quite a farce to talk of a
treaty with this rascal .... Then as to those countries, on which
it was designed by our wise governors to be conferred as a favor,
they are loud in reprobating it. They think the benefit small and
temporary, and the expense burthensome and lasting: and they know
that the execution of the treaty, after all, will be so
capricious, that unless every demand be backed by a British fleet,
it will be very soon a mere dead letter . . . .

To the
laments of those who thought the expedition, peaceful as it had
been, a waste of money, were added the execrations of those who
regarded such trifling with the infidel as wicked. A certain
number of people had caught something of a crusading spirit from
Sir Sidney Smith. Many naval officers, even, would have liked to
see him supersede Exmouth. But, while there were people to whom
Sir Sidney Smith's chivalry appealed, there were more people to
whom it did not. Hisschemes for dealing with the pirates
were regarded by most people as absurd. The schemes were not
absurd. They were unworkable, indeed; and the fact is the
condemnation rather of the age than the schemes. Nevertheless,
those who looked on Sir Sidney (436)
Smith with
the gravest suspicion had often their own remedy for Christian
slavery, and agreed with him in wishing to abolish it. The views
of such men may be represented by the following quotation

Success in
war is not now so much connected with personal prowess as with
scientific combination, and every scheme to rectify abuses by
knights-errant, or otherwise, smacks a little Cervantic. As in
the instance of the unrivalled Don, whenever the world hears of
schemes like those of Sir Sidney Smith, it honours the heart, but
entertains some small matter of doubt with respect to the head.
No, no, it is by the improving sense of the relative duties of
man . . . that the wrongs of the nineteenth century are to be
righted . . . .

The pamphlet
from which this is extracted is based on a letter written by one
of Exmouth's captains 'to a Member of Parliament.' Two woodcuts
serve as illustrations. They depict Christian slaves working in
chains, with Captain Croker making appropriate gestures of horror.
Croker had been in Algiers as recently as July 1815.

In alliance
with those filled with an improving sense of the relative duties
of man, and aroused by the contemplation of the same literature,
were the more extreme Protestants. These were as little
interested in the sufferings of slaves as in the conception of
Christendom. Their chief objection to slavery, white or black,
was that it afforded opportunity for Vice - and especially
unnatural vice. The risk of apostasy was also present in their
minds, but less prominently in that most of the slaves were Roman
Catholics.

However
divergent their views, those demanding stronger measures were
numerous, vociferous, and amply represented in both Houses of
Parliament. Questions were asked in a manner indicating
disapproval of Exmouth's undue leniency. His proceedings found as
little approval in London as in Paris. Such ship owners as there
were who profited by the activities of the corsairs apparently
bowed to the intense respectability of the new era about to dawn.
Or else their voices were lost in the clamour raised by romantics,
philanthropists, and moralists. Public opinion was against the
Government.

Exmouth, as
we have seen, came home half expecting to be blamed for his
temerity. His astonishment at the trend of opinion must,
therefore, have been profound. But it was fully equalled by that
of the Ministers whom he served. Castlereagh was not greatly
concerned with what (437)
people thought in England. His gesture had not been intended for them. What
worried him was the probable attitude of various Powers at the Congress of
Aia-la-Chapelle. The dissatisfaction felt throughout Europe on this occasion
placed him and the Government in an awkward position. What he and his colleagues
eagerly desired was an excuse to order something more spectacular. Their wishes
were granted.

On May 23rd, the Dey's
messengers had reached Bona. That town was the centre of the coral-fishing
industry on the Barbary coast. The natives did no coral-fishing, and the
fisheries were farmed by England. It was the custom for the English consul to
issue licences to the coral-fishermen, who came from Corsica, Sicily and
Sardinia. While on the Barbary coast they were regarded as under the protection
of the country which rented the fisheries. On the 23rd, then, Ascension Day,
some hundreds of these fishermen were on shore for the purpose of hearing Mass.
When the orders arrived for the detention of British subjects, a body of Turkish
troops was sent to arrest the fishermen. Some, it is said. attempted to resist
or escape. The result was that 200 of them were massacred.

News of this event reached
England shortly after Exmouth's return to Portsmouth. The effect produced may be
imagined. The Government was soberly delighted, and the public properly
horrified, and the Press plunged in an orgy of 'I told you so.' All regarded it
as proof of Algerian faithlessness, as a deliberate breaking of the treaty
concluded a few days before the massacre took place. The reader is in a position
to grasp how mistaken this attitude was. In no sense was this outrage a
violation of the recent treaty. On the other hand, those inclined to exonerate
the Algerians on such technical grounds are equally mistaken. The Dey had
committed no new offence since the signing of the treaty, it is true. But a
Government must be held responsible for the conduct of its servants. The phrase
'to resist arrest' may mean several things. Even supposing, however, that the
fishermen really required coercion, it is not to be supposed that they were
armed; and if unarmed, they cannot have resisted effectively. To say, as the
American consul said, that the massacre might have happened anywhere, is
nonsense. But to say that the Algerians were punished on an occasion when they
were, for them, comparatively innocent, is true.

So eagerly did the
Government grasp the opportunity of (438)
dealing with
Algiers in memorable fashion, that Exmouth had hardly reached
Charing Cross before he was posting back to Portsmouth. He had
offered to make an end of the task he had begun, and the
Admiralty had accepted the offer, allowing him to have what force
he thought necessary. He might have what ships he wanted. But the
difficulty was to find the men. He had just brought a squadron
into port and the men had not been paid off. It might be supposed
from this that all he had to do was to put to sea once more. He
was prevented from doing this, however, by the law of the land.
At the conclusion of a war, all seamen were legally entitled to
their discharge. None of the men in his squadron could be
compelled to serve again. It was therefore his first task to
persuade them to volunteer; and for this purpose he was
immediately sent to hoist his flag again in the Boyne.

As five line
of battleships had been, apart from frigates and sloops, the
extent of his demands, he could have completed most of his force
at once, if only the crews of his squadron would volunteer bodily.
But here his lack of popularity stood in his way. It was not that
he aroused any active dislike so much as that he failed to
inspire. There was little about him to appeal to the imagination.
Despite his fifty-nine years he was still impressive in a
somewhat heavy fashion. His appearance aroused a certain respect.
What it did not arouse was enthusiasm. Apart from a handful of
men who were devoted to him, he had few admirers. It must be
remembered that his early reputation had been obscured by the
great sea-fights which had taken place since - battles in which
he had played no part. His gallant record as a frigate captain
was almost forgotten. His last exploit had been an event in the
boyhood of most seamen - many, many years ago. It would have
needed a dazzling personality to persuade those war-weary sailors
to volunteer for fresh service. If the list of flag-officers
contained such a man -which may be questioned it was some one
other than Lord Exmouth.

On July 1st
Exmouth came on board the Boyne and made a speech to the
ship's company. It apparently fell flat. Hardly a man volunteered.
On his other ships, the Bombay, Montagu and Ajax, he
was equally unsuccessful. All four were accordingly paid off. His
flag was then shifted to the Queen Charlotte and strenuous
efforts made to raise a crew. Officers were sent ashore to beat
up the taverns and recruit from among the men who had already
spent all their wages. (439)
A bounty of
two months' pay was offered to seamen who would volunteer for
this particular service. By these and other means the flagship
was manned. The remainder of the squadron was composed of ships
commissioned since the peace, the crews of which had no option in
the matter. Ships intended for other parts of the world were
borrowed for the time being, and at length five sail of the line,
a fifty-gun ship, four frigates and a number of smaller craft
were collected at various ports. All were hastily fitted for sea.

As soon as
the preparations had begun Exmouth seems to have returned to
London to lay his plans before the Admiralty. He was not
altogether successful in convincing their lordships that his
force was sufficient to bombard Algiers with effect. But he had
so completely convinced himself of the fact that he shouldered
the entire responsibility for the result, sending to the
Admiralty a letter acknowledging that all his demands had been
met.

Difficult as
it had been to raise lower-deck men, Exmouth had almost as great
difficulty in resisting the applications of officers. All could
grasp that this was their last chance of distinction. The navy
was quite obviously to endure a long period of peace. The officer
who failed to join the squadron bound for Algiers might never see
any fighting for a lifetime. Exmouth was accordingly besieged
with petitioners of every rank. Thinking the service a dangerous
one, he refused all his relations and most of his followers.
Apart from Gaze, Captain Kempthorne, and a number of young
officers whom he took to oblige their fathers, his squadron was
manned by strangers. Penrose, indeed, who was expected to join
him at Gibraltar as second-in-command, was not exactly a stranger.
But the only other flag-officer, Rear-Admiral Milne, was not even
an acquaintance. Nor was Brisbane, his flag-captain, previously
known to him. Even his secretary was new to the post.

Partly
because of peculiar features in the action likely to take place,
and partly because it was a last opportunity for experiment,
various new devices were fitted in the ships of the squadron.
After-bitts were made for the ships of the line, to enable them
to anchor by the stern. Chain-cables were issued for the first
time. Carronades of a new pattern were introduced for the Queen
Charlotte's quarter-deck. New gun-sights were fitted on all
the guns.

On July 10th
the squadron moved to Spithead, and Exmouth arrived to take
command ten days later. The (440)
following
letter was written by an officer who took part in the expedition.

H.M.S. Albion, Spithead,
July 20, 1816

We have been
beating about in the Channel for the last week against heavy
gales of wind, and arrived here yesterday. We are to be one of
the ships employed in the holy war, or crusade, to proceed
against the infidels of Algiers to abolish Christian slavery, and
to chastise those barbarians for the outrages they have been
committing in the Mediterranean . . . .

As soon as
every thing is settled, Lord Exmouth returns to England; and we
remain in the Mediterranean as flag-ship of Admiral Penrose. Lord
Exmouth arrived from London thus morning, and the Queen Charlotte,
his flag-ship, is now under weigh. There is a vessel now
alongside with 4000 cannon shot for us. We expect to go out to St.
Helen's this evening, to-morrow morning we start for Plymouth,
where I suppose we shall only stay a few hours, and then proceed
to the Mediterranean.

Portsmouth July 20

Had not the
wind blown so unseasonably violent, Lord Exmouth would have
cleared the Channel 'ere this: but it was not until today that
his Lordship's hopes of sailing had any prospect of being
realized - He embarked at noon, intending to proceed to St. Helen's
with the following ships: Queen Charlotte, Minden, Albion,
Britomart, Cordelia, Infernal, Fury, and Hecla: the Albion and
Hecla only joined his Lordship last night, from the River: and he
now waits to be joined by the Severn and Glasgow, whose arrival
is hourly expected. Rear-Admiral Milne, who hoisted his flag on
Wednesday, in the Leander 50, Captain Chetham, sailed to-day for
Plymouth, for the purpose of shifting into the Impregnable, and
getting ready to join Lord Exmouth, with the ships at that port,
on his arrival off there.

Exmouth
seems to have embarked on this expedition with the greatest
confidence of success but with some idea that he himself would be
killed. In case that should happen, he asked Sir Richard Keats to
break the news to Lady Exmouth; and, on the day he embarked, he
wrote a letter which was to be sent to his eldest son, should the
occasion arise.

Charlotte 20th July 1816

MY VERY DEAR
POWNOLL

When this
reaches you the Father who loves you will be no more - I depart
with the sweet reflexion that my Life has been (441) useful - to
my children -respect my Memory and above all respect and honour the best of Mothers.

Be a protector to your family and may God's blefsing attend you.
I trust you will all be united in the closest bonds of love and
friendship, united you will all be invulnerable, Divided ruined.

I have left you Nothing Until your Mother Dyes because I conclude
the pension will be yours. After her Death I hope you will find
something considerable, besides the house etc. at Teignmouth -
and altho you will not be Rich you will not be poor. Stick by
your profefsion, you are not tramelled as I was by weight of
obligation and will be able to make your own way in Politicks. Loyal
you must ever be.

I afsure you My dear Pownoll
you are all alike dear to me.
Your Mother will do all She can for you and I hope you will enjoy
her confidence and afsist her affairs. She will be able to do
much for you and you know how deeply she feels for you all.
I believe I have been basely & vilely BELIED but Truth
will at last prevail for I am innocent.

God blefs you, My Dear Pownoll, be virtuous and you will be happy,
so prays

Your affectionate Father
EXMOUTH

On the 21st,
Exmouth wrote to thank Sir Byam Martin, the comptroller of the
navy, for the speed with which the squadron was equipped.

Many thanks
for your care of my wants; I think you have completely equipped
us, and with a rapidity which does you and the Country honour. I
hope I shall make good use of the means I am entrusted with. I
have no doubt of success, although I will [not] despise my enemy.
We shall work hard to learn the use of our arms, and I hope this
horrible foul wind and bad weather will give us a short voyage to
Gibraltar. The Queen C. are in good spirits and I like their
looks at quarters.

[N.R.S. Vol. xxiv.]

Originally
there had been some mild attempt to keep Exmouth's destination a
secret. He was officially supposed to be going ` on a particular
service.' Actually, the secret was known to every one in England,
and very rapidly became known to most people in France. As the
news would soon spread from France to Algiers, Exmouth was
naturally anxious to get to sea before all element of surprise
should have been thrown away. He had no expectation of finding (442) Algiers
unprepared for battle, for his last visit had resulted in a very
complete repairof the fortifications. The Dutch, moreover,
had been threatening the place since, so that there was no chance
of finding half the garrison out of town. What he did hope to do
was to save the consul's life. If he could send a ship to Algiers
before the Dey had news of his coming, there would be some chance
of bringing the consul away. Otherwise, he might be held as a
hostage - he and his family. This was the chief reason for
Exmouth's impatience.

Throughout
England the general feeling with regard to the expedition was one
of complete confidence. His force was regarded as overwhelming.
In curious contrast to this feeling was the opinion of the
experts. At the Admiralty it was thought that five sail of the
line was insufficient. Memories of Copenhagen made most naval
officers very doubtful of the result - those who knew Algiers
were especially dubious. Throughout the wars, the navy had always
been rather afraid of land batteries behind stone walls. In the
squadron itself this feeling was rife. In after years, the
officer of engineers, Major Reid, said that he spent most of his
time on the voyage trying to convince the naval officers that
they were not on their way to certain defeat. 'Wooden walls
against stone' was the catch phrase they used, and it was
afterwards said that Exmouth had been alone in expecting a
victory. Even he qualified his expectations: 'All will go well,'
he wrote, but added: 'as far at least as it depends on me.'
Results amply justified the qualification.

It was July
24th before Exmouth managed to put to sea. On that day he sailed
with ten men-of-war and two transports, heading for Plymouth,
where the rest of the squadron awaited him. On the way there his
ships were seen from Teignmouth, where he was already the local
hero. Eleven more vessels joined his flag in Plymouth Sound, and
the whole fleet sailedat noon on the 28th. The Minden (74)
was sent on ahead to make arrangements at Gibraltar.

Napier, the
author of the 'Letters from a Post Captain to Lord Melville' was
convinced that the squadron at Algiers was exceptionally well
trained in gunnery. In his opinion, the re-manning of the ships
was a distinct advantage.

Had Lord
Exmouth gone to Algiers direct from Toulon, with five ships, the
chances are, he would have been beat. I believe the squadron he
took to Algiers, though fitted out in a hurry, (443)
knew more
about their guns than ships that had been in commission all the
war: they knew they were going to fight, and took pains to
qualify themselves: the fleet in the war never expected it, and
never were prepared, and the officers generally were too old to
exert themselves without a stimulus. The Government also were not
without their share of blame, for allowing so small a proportion
of powder and shot for exercise . . . .

The
immediate prospect of a battle probably had less to do with the
improvement in gunnery than the increased allowance of ammunition
for practice. Exmouth issued a general order on the subject as
soon as the fleet left Plymouth. There was to be gunnery exercise
twice a day and firing practice twice a week, six broadsides to
be fired from each ship at every practice. The passage to
Gibraltar was short, lasting less than a fortnight, but the crews
improved daily during that period.

On board the
Queen Charlotte, a genius was found in the person of
Lieutenant Crichton, who introduced target practice while the
fleet lay at Gibraltar. The details of his invention for
producing accuracy of fire may be read in their proper place. But
he claimed afterwards to have increased the rate of fire. How he
did this does not appear. As events turned out, no great
precision of aim was possible in the battle. So that the new
sights and target practice did not matter very much. If he had
found some method, however, for ensuring rapidity of fire, his
discovery was very important. It must be noted, however, that he
only trained one ship, and that the rest of the fleet fired
exceedingly well. Practice may have had more to do with the
results than gadgets.

Exmouth came
into Gibraltar Bay on August 9th, to find a Dutch vice-admiral
waiting to co-operate with him. The Baron Van de Capellan had
with him five frigates and a corvette. The reinforcement was
especially welcome in that Admiral Penrose and his squadron had
not appeared. As matters stood, the Dutch made up the deficiency
as regards ships. What they could not make up for was the absence
of Penrose himself - for the absence, that is to say, of an
efficient second-in-command. Milne, who now became second-in-command,
was a Scotch nonentity whom Exmouth had never seen before. It may
be well at this point to explain why Penrose did not arrive.

Penrose was
stationed at Malta, a frigate bearing his flag until the Albion
should arrive from England. The Admiralty (444)
wished to
send him news of Exmouth's coming so as to enable the two
admirals to join forces. It was obviously useless to send him a
dispatch by sea, as the vessel carrying it could not sail much
faster than Exmouth, and so could not arrive in time. The
intelligence was accordingly sent overland to the various
diplomatic representatives in order that some of them could find
means of sending to Malta. By this arrangement it fell to the
English minister at Florence to request the captain of an English
frigate to take the news to his commander-in-chief. What happened
then is so wildly improbable that many historians would hesitate
to repeat the story. Truth, however, should not be suppressed;
least of all when it goes to confute the ideas of those who
ignore the accidental in history.

When the
captain of the Euphrates had read the dispatch from
Florence, he remarked simply: "Is this all ?" and
handed it to his first lieutenant. "I thought," he
continued, "it might have come from Corfu. What have I to
do with fleets and admirals ?" The captain, it should be
explained, was insane. Further urgent messages resulted in his
proceeding to Marseille. The eccentric behaviour of his frigate
culminated in her entering that devotedly royalist port to the
strains of Napoleon's coronation march, and saluting in such a
way as to break all the windows in one of the streets. The
captain died in a raving fit of lunacy very shortly afterwards.
Penrose did not hear the news until it was too late.

Djezairi-gharb
(Algiers of Barbary), also known as Elmahroucet (well-guarded)
and Dar-el-djihad (the warlike city), takes its name from the
little island which forms the old harbour. Indeed, it was the
island which brought the town into existence. The stretch of
shore behind the island, sheltered by it from the Levanter, is
one of the few natural harbours on the Barbary coast. The place
is sheltered from the west by its position, facing east, on the
west side of the bay; from the east by the island. It only
required a breakwater connecting the island with the shore to
make a tolerably secure harbour, open only to the south. The town
existed, however, for many centuries before the breakwater was
built. In the sixteenth century the Spaniards took and fortified
the island, in order that the corsairs might be deprived of the
harbour. The Castle, or Peñon of Algiers, was besieged and taken
by Khair-ed-din in 1529. Don Martin de Vargas, the knight who
defended it, was put to death. The pier joining the island to the
mainland was (445) the outcome
of this siege. It was perfected with the original intention of
preventing another occupation of the island. Once made, a
sheltered and fortified harbour had come into existence. The
fortifications intended to make the anchorage useless were, as it
were, made to face the other way and make the anchorage more
secure. The well guarded city had come into being.

The hills
rise steeply from the shore at the. place where Algiers was built,
so that the whole city is tipped forwards towards the sea, every
part being visible from the bay. At the time of which we are
speaking, it was a walled town of whitewashed houses, huddled
together in narrow winding lanes. From the sea, it was said to
resemble, in shape and

in colour, a
ship's topsail spread out in a green field. The place was roughly
triangular, a mile of coastline forming the base, a citadel on
the landward side forming the apex. The population may have been
about fifty thousand, but no reliable figures existed at that
time. The garrison of Turks was thought to number about eight
thousand, but auxiliaries and sailors probably brought the total
nearer fifteen thousand. An unknown number of Arabs could be
gathered when need arose from the surrounding district, and the
whole male population of the town was expected to join in its
defence. No purpose would be served by repeating the guesses made
as to the number of armed men at the Dey's disposal. No one knew
how many there were, least of all the Dey himself. There were, at
any rate, more than was needed to man the batteries. And, as
Exmouth had no intention (446)
of fighting
a land-battle, it is with the batteries that we are concerned.

Centuries of bombardments and threatened bombardments, wars and
rumours of wars, had made the waterside of Algiers exceedingly
strong. The city itself was not walled towards the sea, but
depended for its defence on the batteries; and, above all, on the
fortified island which covered the harbour. Actually, its first
line of defence was the climate, as we have seen. But the second
line, composed of cannon, was formidable enough. Nearly two
hundred guns were disposed along the coast outside the town, and
along the waterside within the walls. An unknown number of guns
in the landward forts could be brought to bear on the bay by
firing over the town. Over two hundred cannon were massed on the
island, arranged in tiers ; sixty-two of these formed the
lighthouse battery and 112 formed the batteries to the south and
west of it. The lighthouse battery and the guns on the mole were
the core of the defence. The guns were mostly 18 or 24-pounders
with a certain number of heavier cannon in the lower tiers. Those
on the upper tier, the top of the mole, fired through embrasures;
these below fired through casemates - arched openings in the five-foot-thick
stonework. Altogether, there may have been as many as four
hundred and fifty cannon able to bear upon an attacking squadron.
Of these a great proportion fired through masonry and were
therefore very difficult to silence. The guns on the mole were at
about the same height from the water as those of a line of
battleship ; some of those in the lighthouse battery, and all of
those on the landward side of the town, had some advantage from
their descending trajectory. All the batteries were well provided
with shot, and the powder supply was said to be ample.

Within the
mole lay the Algerian navy, laid up in ordinary. There were three
large frigates, two small ones, three large corvettes, one small
corvette, a brig, a schooner, and an old galley. With these were
between twenty and thirty gunboats. Of the whole squadron only
the gunboats were fit for action. The other vessels were mainly
unarmed, their guns being on shore.

Before
closing this account of the town and referring the reader to the
accompanying plans and diagrams, it is proper to explain that the
rule of Islam had deforested the whole of Barbary, with the
result that none of the houses in Algiers were roofed with timber.
The inhabitants had (447)
inherited
from the Romans the art of making concrete, and it was with this
material that they made their roofs. The Romans had used it for
certain specialized purposes, such as the lining of cisterns.
Their pupils, as befitted savages, used it for building. Not only
were the roofs made of concrete, but also many of the walls. This
characteristic of the city, while it stamped it as Barbarian, had
one advantage, from the point of view of the inhabitants. The
houses would not burn.

The fleet
under Exmouth's orders consisted of the following vessels: Queen
Charlotte (100), Impregnable (98), Superb (74), Minden (74),
and Albion (74) - five sail of the line, including two
three-deckers. Half-way between these and the frigates must come
the Leander (50). There were four frigates: Severn (40),
Glasgow (40), Granicus (36), and Hebrus (36).
The sloops apparently numbered seven, some of eighteen, some of
ten guns. The bomb-vessels were four in number. The Dutch
squadron consisted of five frigates and a corvette: Melampus (40),
Frederica (40), Diana (4o), Amstel (40), Dageraad
(30), and Eendragt (18). Three transports came with
the fleet to carry the slaves it was hoped to liberate. One of
the sloops was fitted as an explosion vessel, in case it should
be needed. Five gunboats hastily fitted out at Gibraltar brought
the total number of vessels up to thirty-five. But the departure
of a sloop with dispatches for England lessened the total by one
before Algiers was reached.

Certain
special arrangements were made in the hope that an opportunity
would arise for occupying the mole. The marines of the fleet, a
thousand in number, were divided into two battalions and
elaborate plans made for landing them. A rehearsal of the landing
took place at Gibraltar, and launches were fitted with carronades
from which to give covering fire. To co-operate with the marines,
the flagship carried a company of Royal Sappers and Miners under
the command of Major Gossett and Captain Reid. A supply of
Congreve rockets was brought, to be used from flat-boats and
carried by the marines, in the event of a landing.

Although
circumstances greatly modified the strength of the force sent on
this service, it would be a mistake to suppose that no
calculations had been made as to the force necessary. Exmouth
probably asked for five sail of the line, five frigates, five
sloops and five bomb-vessels. It will be seen that the force he
had with him corresponded closely to these figures. No doubt,
however, he was allowing for (448)
the
reinforcement he expected Penrose to bring. Taking this into
account, it is clear that he had -that he had designed to have -
a force exactly equal to the work it had to perform. It was
afterwards said that the bombardment of 1816 fixed the minimum
force required for an attack on Algiers. With as good reason it
might have been said that it fixed the maximum of force necessary.
A smaller number of ships would have been beaten, a larger number
would not have had room to fight. Exmouth knew how many ships he
wanted because he knew the place he was going to attack. He had,
to begin with, ordered a thorough survey to be made. Warde had
secretly gone over the ground and reconnoitred every obstacle. He
had explored the harbour by night, sounding with a boat-hook. He
had carelessly wandered about the mole by day and counted the
guns. Then again, the commander-in-chief had known the town ever
since his boyhood, and had quite recently been ashore there
himself. It is not to be wondered at that he knew what he was
doing.

For a proper
appreciation of any action, the first thing to know is what the
respective commanding officers were trying to do. In this case
the part played by one side was purely passive, so that only
Exmouth's intentions need concern us. It is not known what verbal
instructions he may have been given, but it seems probable that
he was ordered, in effect, to fight a battle. The ministers who
sent him knew that the Dey had not violated the treaty. They were
not seeking vengeance for an imaginary offence. They were merely
playing to the (Continental) gallery. For this reason, any kind
of battle would suit their purpose equally well. So it is
unlikely that they hampered Exmouth with instructions.

Left to his
own devices, Exmouth's wishes may be reduced to three. He wanted
to liberate the remaining slaves. He wanted to punish the Dey for
past offences. He wanted to convince the Algerians that their
fortifications were not impregnable. To attain his first object,
it was necessary to frighten the inhabitants into seeking terms.
This was a simple matter. By itself, this object was easily to be
gained. All that was required was to knock down some of the
houses and kill a few of the inmates. The town was not to be
injured by shot. To damage it, bombs would be needed. Hence his
demand for bomb-vessels. These could smash the town from a safe
distance of two thousand yards or more. This operation could have
been performed without any fighting at all.

(449)
To attain
his second object, it was necessary to inflict a loss on the
government as such. His only method of doing this was to burn the Algerian navy. There was nothing else in the town which would
burn. But here his difficulties began. His mortars were not
weapons of precision. They could hit a town but they could not
hit a ship at long range. To destroy the ships, he had to place a
man-of-war in the harbour mouth. A single ship was sufficient,
but she had to be there and nowhere else because the mole was
too high to fire over.

of the
batteries. Nothing smaller than a ship of the line could hope to
do this. Bomb-vessels protected by frigates could have tortured
the town into releasing slaves. Frigates alone could have burnt
the Algerian navy at its moorings. But the batteries were a different
matter. They were so nearly impregnable that it was exceedingly
difficult to prove that they were not impregnable. This object
could only be attained in a carefully planned attack by well-trained
line of battleships.

Impressing
the Algerians with the vulnerability of their port was the
essential object of silencing any batteries. The batteries to be
dealt with had therefore to be those on the mole. These were,
besides, the only ones it was possible to engage at close
range. Now, the advantage enjoyed by (450)

men
defending fortifications is the security, or the feeling of
security, derived from the strength of the works. The advantage
enjoyed by men attacking fortifications is that they know where
the enemy is. By reconnoitring Algiers, Exmouth knew how many
guns there were, and he also knew where to find them. Guns which
are embedded in masonry can be relied upon to stay where they are.
Exmouth was accordingly able to attack the mole at Algiers as
Nelson attacked the French fleet at Aboukir - but with even
greater certainty that his opponents would remain in position. He
could, in short, throw all his force on one point. As he had a
choice in the matter, he naturally chose the weakest point.

The diagrams
will give the reader some idea of the general position. The rough
sketch may suffice to show how the strength of the mole centred
on the lighthouse. Only in the lighthouse battery itself, and in
the battery immediately to the south of it, are there three tiers
of cannon, as in Fig. C. Throughout the stretch of fortifications
on the left, there are only two tiers, as in Fig. B; and this
part of the mole is lower than the quarter-deck of a three-decker.
The mole batteries are all closed in the rear, but Fig. B shows
the system of smoke-vents.

In attacking
the mole, it was clearly best to avoid the fire of the lighthouse
and the three-tiered battery. Fig. A shows how this was to be
done. Here the most formidable works are marked in black, and
their arcs of fire indicated by shading. It will be seen that
there is a central triangle of water on which the heavy batteries
will not bear. The same is true of the area marked Z; but the
water there is shallow, and a line of storehouses on the pier
prevents firing into the harbour. Therefore, it is at X that the
attack must be made. The position at X has several advantages,
one being a sufficient depth of water close inshore, and another
being that the mole itself is high enough to protect a ship from
all the batteries above the town. Exmouth saw that there was only
room for three sail of the line in the patch of 'dead-ground' at
X. In case these three should fail to overpower the batteries, he
arranged to make assurance doubly sure. The southern end of the
mole could be outflanked. A fourth line of battleship at V could
destroy the upper tier of guns from the flank and rear. A three-decker
would be needed for this post. By the fire of these four ships
the weaker batteries could be silenced. Exmouth asked for five
sail of the line because (451)
he wanted a
fifth to deal with a fort to the south of the town.

For the
destruction of the Algerian navy, it would be necessary to place
a heavy frigate at Y, to fire into the harbour. At this point
there arises the difficulty of the fish-market battery, and the
other batteries along the waterside. These all bear on, and some
enfilade, the positions at Y and V. Exmouth provided for this
difficulty in the only possible way. To stop the guns in the
direction

of W firing
on Y and V, he had merely to give them something else to fire at.
For this purpose, he asked for three or four more frigates. There
were several more batteries further to the south, but he relied
upon Penrose bringing enough ships to keep these fully occupied.
In Penrose's absence, this task was allotted to the Dutch. The
sloops were required to act as tenders to the ships of the line.

Here then,
is the explanation of Exmouth's demands on the Admiralty, and his
obstinate refusal to take a larger force. The numbers of ships he
asked for were the exact numbers which his plan of attack
implied. Fig. D represents the (452)
attack, as
planned. By keeping to the left of the line B - D, the Superb,
Impregnable and Albion were to concentrate their fire on the
mole between A and B, while the Queen Charlotte raked the
fortifications from the flank. The lighthouse battery and the
battery at B - C were to be left without a target. The Leander was to be warped
still nearer the Queen Charlotte, so as to destroy
everything in the harbour. The Glasgow and Severn were to engage the
batteries along the waterside. The bomb-vessels were to be far
out in the bay towards the north and east. The Dutch were to find
occupation for the forts to the south.

One flaw in
this scientific scheme, a flaw which was painfully patent to
every one in the fleet, was the need for passing through the
danger zone on the way in; and again, on the way out. The
positions assigned to the various ships were relatively safe. But
would the ships ever reach them ? It seemed to many that the
ships of the line, at any rate would run a grave risk. They might
be dismasted. Indeed, they might be blown out of the water.
Exmouth alone denied the probability of this. He had the best of
reasons for doing so, but probably kept them to himself. The fact
was that Omar Pashaw would not fire the first shot. He had said
as much at the end of that stormy interview in June. He may even
have sworn it. Exmouth knew him to be a man of his word, and was
ready to act accordingly. He did not incidentally, mean to fire
the first shot himself. His belief was that the Algerians would
eventually lose their heads and fire without orders. He was not
worried by the prospect of retiring through the danger zone
because his withdrawal was likely to be at night, and because he
hoped to leave the town in no condition to speed his departure.
There was, for that matter, no need to retire at all until the
Dey came to terms -so long as the batteries on the mole were
silenced.

. . . every moment
of my time and indeed that of every Soul in the Fleet is occupied in making
arrangements for the Service we have to perform, which I know to
be arduous and demanding all our attention that no advantage may
be afforded our Enemy for want of due precaution, as I hold it
good to treat your Enemy, however ignorant, with respect and not
hold his efforts too Cheap.

(453)
You will be
pleased to hear that, altho' hastily gathered together, I have
found in good will and good heart ample means to produce in our
Young Recruits all the knowledge of their Arms and Duties I can
wish. And I shall enter in our task with more real satisfaction
than I should have with the old and trained People who prefer'd
their Congee to the honor of embracing the Cause of their
suffering fellow Creatures. I have found a good auxiliary in five
good Gun and Mortar boats which in 36 hours we have fitted out
and Equipped. And Marines out of our own Ships to proceed with us.
My only fear is that my friend the Dey will not hazard the chance
of a good beating but give into the terms by which he can be
saved.

I have also
found here, or rather waylaying me, the Dutch Vice Admiral Van
Capelfan with six Frigates, most anxious to join us in this
chosen work, and on his prefsing the point with considerable
eagernefs, and afsuring me it is the wish of his Sovereign and
his Government, I have as I am instructed to do, accepted his
offer, and he very good humoredly afsured me I should have no
reason to find fault with his not fighting close enough, if I
would afsign him a post. We are at this moment all ready to Weigh
Anchor after 48 hours only to prepare and fill up our Water. The
wind is now adverse but I hope will soon change and lead us to
our anchorage under the Walls of our Adversary. A fortunate
breeze when we arrive will I hope present for taking our
situations at once - and the only respite I will give shall be
occasioned by failure of such a wind as will lead us to a chosen
distance, when I trust the Wooden Walls of Old England will be
found a match for all the Walls of Algiers - as to all appearance
we may sail to-morrow, I will close my letter with the strongest
afsurance of my unabated and unceasing friendship,

Exmouth did
not sail on the day following that on which the above letter was
written, for calms and adverse winds kept the fleet at Gibraltar
rather longer than was intended. Much, however, was done during
those few days.

The ships
had, first of all, to be cleared for action. All furniture that
is to say, and baggage was sent below. Livestock was landed,
cabin bulkheads struck and, sent ashore to the dockyard. Then the
five mortar and gunboats were prepared for service, the launches
armed with carronades and the flat-boats equipped for firing
Congreve rockets. The whole flotilla was organized, officered,
trained by target practice, and made to rehearse the intended (454) landing. The batteries on
the Rock carried out an experiment to
determine the effects of shell-fire. The sloop destined to
act as explosion-vessel was crammed with 143 barrels of gunpowder.
Every captain was issued with a detailed plan of the
fortifications to be attacked, with an explanation of the part he
was to play in attacking them. No preparation, no precaution was
forgotten.

Meanwhile,
the sloop Prometheus was attempting privately to remove
the consul from Algiers. Mainly through the consul's
stupidity, the attempt failed. His wife and daughter were
rescued by stratagem, but he himself was confined to his
house under a guard. Some eighteen of the crew of the Prometheus
were made prisoner in the course of this affair, and the Dey's
refusal to release them made it clear that he knew of
Exmouth's coming. Certain Jewish merchants in Algiers had taken
alarm at an early period, and their fears had been fully
confirmed by French newspapers. A French corvette which Exmouth
found off Algiers was thought to have given the Dey the most
detailed information. The Algerians had ample time to
assemble the Moorish chiefs of the interior, who brought, it was
said, 30,000 followers
to reinforce the garrison.

The fleet
sailed on the 14th and encountered the Prometheus two days
later. Captain Blackwood's tale of woe did away with any
particular need for haste, but aroused impatience to avenge
this fresh insult. The wind was adverse, however, and the
fleet made no progress for some days. The seamen, during this
delay, were urged to yet more remarkable feats of gun-laying, and
Exmouth explained his plans afresh to his subordinates. Capellan,
Milne, and the assembled captains of the fleet were all
duly instructed in the need for avoiding the lighthouse battery
until there seemed to be no loophole for error. All knew
what they had to do. It only remained to be seen whether they
would all do it.

The Barbary
coast was first sighted on the evening of the 26th. In spite of
hazy weather, the fleet was seen from the shore as soon as
it made its landfall. Watchers had been posted on the mountains,
and these, when they saw the ships, lit great fires to
warn the city. Alarm guns were fired by the garrison, and before
darkness fell it was known to all that the English were
approaching . The contrary wind died away in the course of
that night, and a light westerly breeze sprang up. The
wind was light, but a strong current swept the fleet to the
east and south, so that the leading ships were within six miles
of Algiers when day(455)
broke. As
the sun rose, the town was seen white and beautiful against the
hills. Many red, and striped, and crimson flags were flying, and
thin columns of smoke rose from the camp-fires of the chieftains
gathered to defend the ramparts.

At a quarter
past five the frigate Severn was detached from the fleet
and sent in under a flag of truce. The fleet lay to, a mile and a
half from the town, while a boat from the Severn approached
the mole. After a brief parley between Salamé, Exmouth's Jewish
interpreter, and the captain of the port, the latter agreed to
take the English ultimatum to the Dey. Salamé demanded an answer
within two hours, but was persuaded to extend the time to three
hours. The terms of the ultimatum included the total abolition of
Christian slavery and the repayment of the money recently paid in
ransoms.

The day was
far spent before the three hours' grace had expired. It was nine
before the boat left the Severn, and eleven before the
ultimatum was delivered. It would be two before the action could
begin. The time which elapsed while the boat awaited the Dey's
reply was not, however, wasted. Exmouth's first concern was to
see that every one fed before fighting. At 10.10 he telegraphed
the signal: ' Cooks & meals may go on as usual, altho Signal
for battle is made.' This was followed, just before midday, by
the signal: 'that ships would have time for dinner.' Soon
afterwards, the bomb-vessels were ordered to take up their
position, rather more than a mile from the Algerian batteries.

An officer
who came on deck after a belated lunch in the ward-room of the
flagship, saw Lord Exmouth standing at the break of the poop - 'attired, as usual, in an undress uniform coat without epaulets,
white cravat and waistcoat, with nankeen trousers, gaiters, and
shoes, having a spy-glass in his hand.' The crew being called aft,
he spoke to them 'in a few clear and expressive sentences,'
which were answered by a short cheer. The men then ran back to
their quarters.

At about 2.30
half an hour after the Dey's answer was due, the boat waiting
near the mole hoisted the signa 'no answer has been given,' and
this was immediately repeated by the Severn. The flagship
at once made the general signal 'are you ready,' to which every
ship replied 'ready.' Exmouth then gave the order 'annul the
truce'; and then 'hoist
the jib.' The Queen Charlotte paid off and stood slowly
towards the mole before a moderate breeze from the north.

Exmouth's
column of five sail of the line went into action (456)
in line
ahead, the Impregnable being the third. The
Dutch frigates formed a separate line, heading farther to the
south. The Leander and the other English ships stood in
independently for their allotted stations. At this prompt
movement the Algerians were thrown into some confusion. It was
clearly not what they expected. Indeed, Exmouth had not expected
it himself. It was only the accident of the wind holding which
made it possible. The Dey, by his own account, was still
considering what reply to make. And whether this be true or not,
he was certainly undecided in some respects. As a result, perhaps,
of his determination not to fire the first shot, he had planned
to allow the English to approach. When they were close inshore,
he meant to board their ships. A crowd of rowing-boats were
collected inside the mole, and it was planned that these should
attack while the English were furling their sails. But either
through his own indecision, or his followers' lack of discipline,
this plan was not strictly adhered to. Apparently to ensure its
success, the cannon on the mole were not loaded. As, however, the
English bore down, the troops took fright or received contrary
orders. They began to load the guns, and were still loading them
long after they had lost their chance of using them with effect
against the Queen Charlotte.

Seeing the
crowd of soldiery on the mole, Captain Brisbane ascended a few
steps of the starboard poop-ladder and asked Exmouth whether the
men should he down at their quarters. "If the enemy do open
any fire, the men can lie down as we run in; however, I don't
think they will." This reply goes far to explain Exmouth's
confidence. Presently there came to him the interpreter Salamé,
who had returned on board to report himself. Although half-dead
with fright, he could not help noticing something he had never
seen before in the admiral's looks. 'I was quite surprised to
see how his Lordship was altered from what I left him in the
morning; for I knew his manner was in general very mild, and now
he seemed to me all fightful, as a fierce lion, which had been
chained in its cage, and was set at liberty.' There was perhaps
more truth in his metaphor than he knew. When Salamé had made his
report, Exmouth muttered, more, probably, to himself than any one
else: "Never mind, we shall see now." Turning then to
his officers, he said "Be ready." The ship was now
close to the batteries.

The breeze
died away as the Queen Charlotte approached the mole-head,
and the great three-decker slid more and more slowly towards its
chosen position. The silence was(457)
tense, every
man awaiting the order to fire. There was a hum of activity on
shore, but the only sound on board the flagship was the flapping
of the idle sails, and, perhaps, the call of the leadsman in the
fore-chains: "By the deep, nine" - "Seven" - "Six." Gaze was conning , the ship nearer and nearer the
rocks on which the batteries stood. There was only two feet of
water under the flagship's keel by the time the anchors were
dropped. The ship brought up by the stern, immediately after
rounding the mole-head, and the cable was veered and checked
without a word spoken, by means of a telegraph operated by a
wheel rigged close to the helm. There was only fifty yards
between the Queen Charlotte and the mole at this
time, but Exmouth had the chain lashed to the hempen-cable and
veered out a few fathoms to protect the latter from shot. The
final position of the ship was perhaps eighty yards from the
enemy's guns.

Men on the
flagship noticed the sudden glow of heat, and wave of stench,
arising from their proximity to the Turks. They could see the
enemies' faces, their eyes, and the frowning muzzles of their
guns. The mole was packed with people. As the Queen Charlotte brought up, the Leander, up
till then on her
larboard quarter, passed her and took up her position just ahead.
The ships in the rear were still under sail. It was just 2.48.

Inside the
mole, some thirty-seven boats, filled with troops, lay on their
oars, ready for the moment when the English should leave their
guns to take in sail. The moment never came. There was so little
wind that Exmouth dropped anchor with sails set. And when he
thought the proper time had come, his sails were not furled, but
clewed up - as had been arranged beforehand. The men never left
their guns at all. They waited until the ship was stationary, and
then gave the enemy three cheers. After that there was silence
until one side or the other should fire. The mole was still
crowded with people, all gaping stupidly at the Queen Charlotte. According to one
observer, they were 'thick as hops.' Exmouth was seen to wave his
hat to them to get out of the way. - Some three hundred of them
paid with their lives for failing to take his advice.

Both Exmouth
and the Dey were determined, as we have seen, to allow the other
to begin. But here the Dey was at a disadvantage. His men were
not well under control. A little before three o'clock there was a
puff of smoke from the fish-market battery, a jarring thud, and
the hiss of a shot passing to starboard of the flagship. Exmouth
had (458)
gained his
point. He would not be the one to commence hostilities. A second
shot boomed past, and one who was watching him intently' saw his
countenance light up (which before was thoughtful), and it
appeared to me that an expression of triumph shone in his face as
he said: "You may fire away now." With that, the Queen Charlotte and
Leander fired their
broadsides simultaneously. There was a deafening roar, and the
battle had begun. It was almost exactly three o'clock.

The
difficulty, in those days, of engaging at anchor - and especially
in a dead calm - was the smoke. A ship like the Queen Charlotte burned more than a
thousand pounds of powder every minute during an action. If there
was no wind, the resulting smoke accumulated between the decks in
a thick fog. After that, the officers might have the guns trained
fore or aft if it pleased them, but they were 'as much in the
dark as to the external objects, as if they were blindfolded.' A
midshipman who fought at Algiers wrote that 'Jonah in the whale's
belly knew as much about a gale of wind, as a Middy in a three-decker does of an action' ; but, in fact, the admiral
himself was little better off. The smoke was too dense for any
one to see anything. It was like 'twenty Vauxhalls at the end of
fireworks on a cloudy night.' This being the case, Exmouth lost
control of the battle soon after it began. An hour, probably,
passed before he knew where every ship was. Before three o'clock
he was presumably too much occupied with the movements of the
enemy to notice what his rear ships were doing, even if they were
visible-which they may not have been. It is therefore doubtful
how soon he began to suspect that something was amiss. His. last
signal was the word 'Infallible.' It soon appeared that Rear-Admiral
Milne was not only fallible but had failed.

The frigates
were not all in position when the action began, but the Severn and Glasgow dropped anchor very
shortly afterwards. By comparing Fig. E with Fig. D, it will be
seen that both frigates gained their proper station, and that the
Dutch were equally successful. The bomb vessels had been in
position from the beginning. The sloops were merely to make
themselves useful to the ships of the line; it did not greatly
matter where they placed themselves. There remain to be
considered the line of battleships.

Through a
signalling error, the Superb, the ship astern of the Queen Charlotte, anchored sooner than
she should have done. Had she been making for the exact position(459)
assigned her,
this would have left her about her own length short of it.
Unfortunately, she was too far to port. Exmouth signalled her to
keep further to starboard - but in vain. The result was that the Superb brought up some two hundred yards out of position, and twice
her proper distance from the batteries. She opened fire at about
a hundred and fifty yards range, at the same time as the flagship.
Ekins, who commanded her, was slightly at fault; but all

would have
gone well enough if every ship had been as skilfully handled as
the Superb.

The Impregnable was the third ship in the column, but lagging behind in a
disgraceful manner. The great gap between her and the Superb was
not due to her bad sailing qualities. Milne had taken in his fore
and mizen-topsails at 2.15, with the natural result that he dropped astern.
The ships behind him were forced to do the same. As if this was
not bad enough, he anchored as soon as he saw the flagship anchor
- without making up the distance. The Impregnable was thus
placed on the wrong side of the line Exmouth had drawn on his
chart, more than four hundred yards out of position, and well
within the arc of (460)
fire of the
lighthouse battery. According to Milne, his ship was about three
hundred and fifty yards from the nearest batteries. Judging more
impartially, Exmouth thought the distance nearer four hundred and
fifty.

The official
excuse for this appalling blunder was that the smoke prevented
Milne from seeing where he was. This cannot have been the case.
Although he did not, for some reason, open fire until 3.15, Milne
took in his main-topsail and dropped anchor at 2.50 - ten minutes
before a gun went off. This is the time given in Milne's own
journal.

Captain
Paterson, of the Minden, the next ship astern, saw what
had happened to the Impregnable and promptly deserted his
position in the line. Exmouth had ordered this to be done, if
need arose. The Minden went on and anchored in the wake of
the Superb - well beyond the danger zone. This was
probably at about 3.5. Paterson apparently knew where he was even
after the firing had begun.

Captain Coode, of the Albion,
who brought up the rear, steered
past the Impregnable and anchored just ahead of her, in
the position shown in Fig. E. Finding himself exposed to the fire
of the lighthouse and eastern batteries, he instantly made sail
again, finally bringing up close astern of the Minden. A
cable passed out of the Minden's stern-port dragged him
clear of the danger zone.

The
remaining vessels were, on the whole, well handled. The Hebrus, it is true, took up a bad position. But the
Granicus nobly
tried to fill the gap astern of the Queen Charlotte, and
the sloop Heron earned Exmouth's applause by anchoring
ahead of the Granicus. The other sloops attended their
respective ships of the line, some remaining under sail so as to
present a more difficult target. It was important that the sloops
should keep their rigging intact, in case the ships of the line
should require towing out. Thus, the Martin loyally stood
by the Impregnable, and intelligently took cover behind
her.

To attempt
any explanation of why Rear-Admiral Milne behaved in so
extraordinary a manner is hardly possible. Extreme caution may
have led him to shorten sail while the ships in front of him were
crowding on every inch of canvas they had. Some vague idea of
copying the admiral's motions may have induced him to anchor when
he did. But why did he stay there ? That his captain did not
advise him to any purpose is easier to understand. Milne was an
obstinate man; and Lord Melville considered Captain Brace 'the
most impracticable and unreasonable person in H.M.'s Service.'(461)
The results
of what Milne and Brace succeeded in doing between them were
dreadful. The Impregnable came under a terrific fire at a
range which was all in favour of the batteries. Her starboard
side was almost riddled. Two hundred and thirty-three shot-holes
were found at the end of the action. Most of her spars were
wounded and all her rigging cut to pieces. A dozen guns were
dismounted and half as many put out of action for want of men.
She had almost as many men killed as all the other vessels put
together. Her crew fought magnificently. They double-shotted the
guns and almost silenced the lighthouse battery, after an
expenditure of eighteen tons of gunpowder and 7,000 rounds of
shot-besides canister, shrapnel and case-shot.

Meanwhile,
Exmouth was fighting his battle in comparative safety. He had
placed the Queen Charlotte in a position on which some
five of the guns on the mole could bear. The raking fire from the
fish-market battery could not stop him enfilading the mole from
end to end. After his first broadside had crashed out, the Algerian gunboats made some attempt to run alongside the
Leander and Queen Charlotte.
As Gaze put it: 'they might as
well have endeavoured to board the moon.' The Algerian flotilla
was almost literally blown out of the water. Thirty-three boats
went straight to the bottom.

The smoke
hung so heavily round the ship that nothing could at first be
seen of the mole. One of the Queen Charlotte's officers,
however, saw something of the effect of the flagship's fire by
climbing the mizen rigging. He saw that the guns in the upper
tier were mostly dismounted and jammed in the ruins of the
parapet. Those undamaged were deserted. Two 12-pounders, one in
the main-top and the other in the fore-top, each crammed with
musket balls, had sent the surviving soldiers to seek safety
elsewhere. A few remained hidden behind some coils of cable on
the mole-head, and from there kept up a troublesome fire. 'Lord
Exmouth beckoned to an officer near him to come to the starboard
gangway, where his lordship, fully exposed, very deliberately
said: "You see we are a good deal annoyed by the musketry of
these fellows," pointing to them - "Try if you can
dislodge them with a few eight-inch shells from the howitzer that
is in the launch alongside." ' Nothing came of this
experiment and other means were found for dealing with the
snipers. But the incident shows that Exmouth was not above
displaying his personal courage. He was notable to do so with
complete impunity. Before night (462)
fell he had
been slightly wounded several times. He received a scratch soon
after the fighting began. 'The Admiral had a sore dowse on the
chops, which did not 1 believe draw blood; if it did, he swabbed
it up directly, without saying a word about it, though he must
have had a good deal of jaw of his own, to have been able to
stand such a thump.'

After twenty
minutes' firing, the mole batteries were largely silenced. In
another half-hour they were partly in ruins. At 3.35 Exmouth
ordered the flagship's crew to cease fire. It was probably at
this moment as the smoke cleared away, that he saw what Milne had
done. There was, of course, no remedy for the situation. All he
could do was to console himself with the success of his own
operations. A glance at the mole was enough to show him that one
object of the attack had been gained. The Algerians could, and
did, open fire again from that quarter. But they could no longer
think their fortifications impregnable. He was for the moment
free to turn his attention elsewhere. He had still to burn their
shipping and level their houses.

At about four o'clock a boat from the
Queen Charlotte was sent to
burn the vessel moored across the entrance to the harbour, and
thus enable the Leander to fire more effectively upon the
other ships. At 4.24 the signal was made for the flotilla to
assemble alongside the flagship. All the launches, gunboats and
rocket-boats were then sent to take up their positions for
bombarding the harbour and town. By 7.30 most of the Dey's fleet
was ablaze. An hour later, it was utterly destroyed.

The
bombardment of the town was both a success and a failure. It had
the effect of frightening the inhabitants, but it failed to
destroy the houses. The buildings would neither burn nor collapse.
Although the Congreve rockets mostly missed the town altogether,
and although many of the shells failed to explode, the amount of
ammunition poured into the streets must have been enormous. The
American consul minuted that 'shells and rockets fly over and by
my house like hail;' nor did the consulate escape injury five
shells burst inside it. Should the reader suppose that this was
done purposely, and that most houses suffered less, he would be
mistaken. No less than thirty shots passed through the house of
the English consul - and nine of them entered the room where he
would have been, had not the Dey put him in jail. But the point
to notice about this is that both these houses were still
standing at the end of the day. The fact is that their thin
concrete walls(463)
made no
resistance. Each shot merely made a neat hole as it went through.
Nor were many people killed in the process. All the male
inhabitants had been driven to the batteries, all the women and
children had been sent out of the town, and all the slaves had
been sent inland.

At 7.30 the Queen Charlotte
was hove round with
her head to the south-east, in order to avoid the burning Algerian frigates, which were drifting out of the harbour. In
this new position, her guns bore on the fish-market battery. This
fort had been particularly troublesome because its cannon were
light and could be fired more often than the heavy guns in the
other batteries, some of which could only fire three or four
times in the hour. By 8.30 the cannonade began to slacken, and
men were surprised, on looking up from their guns, to see the
stars and realize that the evening had come.

Milne had
several times sent to inform Exmouth of his plight, and had
finally asked that the explosion vessel should be used against
the lighthouse battery. Wishing to use Vesuvius, since he had
been at the pains of bringing it, and knowing that he would never
be able to send it into the harbour, Exmouth consented. This was
at about eight o'clock, by which time he had done all that he had
set out to do, so that he ordered Milne to haul off as soon as
the explosion had taken place.

At 9.10,
owing to the officer in charge saying 'port' when he meant to say
'starboard,' the explosion vessel had to be fired off opposite
the wrong battery. It did no harm, even to the comparatively
harmless battery near which it exploded; and the Algerians cheered wildly under the impression that they had done it
themselves. After this, the firing began to die away. Nearly all
the Algerian guns had been silenced by ten o'clock, and now the
ships began to cut their cables and haul off. In spite of the
land breeze springing up, the withdrawal was very slow. Few ships
had much rigging left. Warping and towing, they gradually
struggled out into the bay. At 10.15 Exmouth ordered the Minden to cover the
retirement of the other ships of the line. That ship then opened
a brisk fire, which lasted until 11.30, when the gunner reported
that the magazine was empty. The bay was lighted up by the
blazing ships and store-houses about the harbour, and the
retiring fleet made an excellent target for a few guns in a fort
on the landward side of the town. The growling of cannon did not
altogether cease until long after midnight.

(464)
At about 11.30 the interpreter
Salamé came on deck to see how the battle had fared. He presently
found his way aft to the poop in order to congratulate
Exmouth on the victory.

When I met
his Lordship, on the poop, his voice was quite hoarse, and he had
two slight wounds, one in the cheek, and the other in his leg.
Before I paid him my respects, he said to me, with his usual
gracious and mild manner, 'Well, my fine fellow Salamé, what
think you now ? ' In reply I shook hands with his Lordship, and
said, 'My Lord, I am extremely happy to see your Lordship
safe, and I am so much rejoiced with this glorious victory, that
I am not able to express, in any terms, the degree of my
happiness.'

It was
indeed astonishing to see the coat of his Lordship, how it was
all cut up by musket balls, and by grape; it was behind, as if a
person had taken a pair of scissors and cut it all to pieces. We
were all surprised at the narrow escape of his Lordship.

The Queen Charlotte came to anchor out of
range of the batteries at 1.30. As soon as the anchor had been
let go, and the sails furled, Exmouth said to Captain Brisbane: "No officer or man to rest until the middle deck is cleaned
up and every wounded man in his cot." The middle deck
was where the wounded were placed. Some of the crew
attended to this, some secured the guns and magazine,
others knotted the rigging or helped the carpenter to fish
the wounded masts and spars. A few of the officers, with Exmouth,
Gaze, and the chaplain, gathered in the admiral's cabin for
prayers and rendered thanks for the victory. Soon afterwards, Van
Capellan came on board, full of congratulations. Milne arrived,
and was well received. Exmouth was satisfied with what had
been done, and in no mood to ask questions. Neither at this nor
at any other time did he blame any one for displaying incompetence
at Algiers. He was pleased with himself, and ready - perhaps
too ready - to forgive his blundering subordinates. Their
mistakes were never mentioned by him. The conclusion of
the battle of Algiers is thus described by Salamé.

After we had
anchored, his Lordship, having ordered his steward in the morning,
to keep several dishes ready, gave a grand supper to the
officers of the ship, and drank to the health of every brave man
in the fleet.

We also
drank to his Lordship's health, and then every body went to sleep,
almost like dead men.