It’s
Time for a U.S.-Israel Defense Treaty

Israeli-Syrian negotiations
drag on, but the result is already
predictable, Israel will withdraw from
some or all of the Golan Heights in
exchange for a peace treaty that requires
Syria to normalize relations with the
Jewish State. An agreement to engage
in trade and tourism, and to exchange
ambassadors is a necessary condition
for Israel to make territorial concessions,
but the sine qua non is security guarantees.
Thus, much of the discussion revolves
around water rights, early warning
stations and troop deployments. One
contribution the United States has
made to the negotiations has been to
suggest the deployment of U.S. troops
as “peacekeepers” on the Golan Heights.
Since that proposal emerged, however,
the idea of a broader U.S. commitment
has been raised by the Israeli side,
specifically, the possibility of a
formal defense pact. This would, in
fact, be a far more effective deterrent
not only to Syria but other potentially
hostile forces.

Though the Clinton
Administration has not publicly approved
the idea, the sense in Washington is
that the most pro-Israel President in
history would be receptive. Moreover,
President Clinton’s main rival for the
presidency, a man not noted for his sympathy
toward Israel, Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole, said in a speech last year
to the National Jewish Coalition that
the United States and Israel should jointly
explore a full-fledged alliance.

The reaction of most
Israelis, on the other hand, has been
decidedly negative. Abba Eban said the
maxim, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it,” applied to the idea of a defense
treaty. He and most other critics argue
that a treaty would compromise Israel’s
independence and undermine its self-reliant
image in the United States.

Early Flirtation
With A Treaty

The idea of a U.S.-Israel
alliance is hardly new. It dates back
almost to Israel’s birth. Ironically,
Eban was Ambassador to the United States
in 1954 when Israel requested membership
in NATO and was turned down. Israel also
sought a mutual defense treaty to counterbalance
the Western-Arab alliance that eventually
became the Baghdad Pact. According to
Eban, it was the U.S. that raised the
idea of a defense treaty as a lever to
persuade Ben-Gurion to accept territorial
concessions in the Negev. Nevertheless,
it was Eban, again, three years later,
who suggested institutionalizing the
American Doctrine in the Middle East
and considering some informal relationship
with NATO, similar to what Turkey and
Greece enjoyed before formally joining
the alliance. Other discussions that
year involved more subtle hints that
NATO’s security umbrella be extended
to the Middle East. Usually, broad references
were made to countries in the region
rather than specifically to Israel, such
as Ben-Gurion’s suggestion of “a need
for concrete discussions with Middle
East countries of various security contingencies,
with the view to reassuring those countries
that if they were attacked there would
be help available.”

Two decades later,
Moshe Dayan proposed a defense treaty.
In a memo to Prime Minister Begin in
1977, the Foreign Minister said he doubted
the United States was ready to enter
into a firm, long-term agreement, but,
“if she were, I would regard it as an
achievement of the utmost importance
for the State of Israel.” Later, however,
he says he thought Israel, like the nations
of Europe, only needed a guarantee against
Soviet aggression. “We could manage with
the Arabs ourselves.” As was the case
in 1954, Dayan understood that American
hints of the possibility of a defense
pact were related to the Carter Administration’s
hopes of winning territorial concessions
from Israel.

It is not surprising
that the treaty idea would resurface
at this time. Once again the State Department
is in a rush to achieve a foreign policy
success, specifically a peace agreement
with Syria. After failing to play more
than a token role in the agreements Israel
achieved with Jordan and the Palestinians,
the Clinton Administration would like
the opportunity to take credit for an
accord with Syria, which is viewed as
the last step in the long sought comprehensive
Middle East peace (never mind that Iraq
and Iran remain belligerent). Consistent
with longstanding State Department attitudes,
the prevailing view is that the impediment
to this achievement is Israel’s reluctance
to yield territory. By dangling the prospect
of an American troop deployment, the
Administration hopes to make an Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Hafez
Assad’s prerequisite for an agreement,
saleable to the Israeli public. Perhaps
in deference to the vocal, though weak,
opposition by some Americans to a U.S.
troop deployment, Peres floated the treaty
idea, which could accomplish the primary
objective of deterring the Syrians without
forcing President Clinton to place more
GIs in a foreign, possibly dangerous,
environment.

Motivations aside,
the question is whether a formal defense
treaty would be good for either Israel
or the United States. Clearly, both sides
have something to gain, but not without
some risks.

From Israel’s point
of view, the primary benefits of a treaty
would be to significantly enhance its
deterrent capability and to upgrade its
level of cooperation with the United
States. The costs would be some reduction
in its freedom to take preemptive or
retaliatory action and the possible erosion
of its image as self-reliant.

The United States would
primarily enhance its dominance in the
region, improve its overall defense of
vital Middle East interests, gain greater
leverage over Israeli behavior and facilitate
the finalization of something approaching
a comprehensive peace. The costs would
likely be increased financial support
for Israel, possible introduction of
troops in harm’s way and angering Arab
allies.

Enhancing Israel’s
Deterrent

In a speech to the
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council February 11, Foreign Minister
Ehud Barak, a former Chief of Staff,
said Israel’s goal in talks with Syria
is to devise security arrangements that
will “render a surprise attack practically
impossible, significantly reduce the
temptation to launch a full-scale war
and prevent daily border clashes from
deteriorating into full-scale collision.”
These objectives might be accomplished
with U.S. troops stationed on the Golan;
however, a defense treaty with the United
States would strengthen the deterrent
and reduce, if not eliminate, the need
for an American deployment.

One of the keys to
Israeli security after any withdrawal
from the Golan will be early-warning.
In addition to any arrangements Israel
directly negotiates with Syria, as a
treaty partner Jerusalem could count
on American warnings of aggressive Syrian
movements. This can be done with satellites
and other technology.

Israel might still
want the United States to deploy troops
as a monitoring force because they can
provide additional, immediate information
about Syrian activities. An American
presence would also raise the stakes
of a Syrian attack. Before any deployment
on the Golan, the Syrians should be told
that a direct attack on American forces
would be considered an act of war and
merit certain retaliation. This would
exponentially increase the cost to Syria
of any aggression. From Israel’s perspective,
no other nation or combination of countries
could provide as reliable a peacekeeping
force.

Critics argue that
neither U.S. troops stationed on the
Golan nor a treaty would deter a Syrian
attack. It is difficult to think of a
recent instance where American interests
have been challenged when our response
has been clearly articulated. The U.S.
commitment to its NATO partners has served
as an effective deterrent for half a
century. And, despite claims by some
that a massive troop commitment would
be required to protect Israel, the U.S.
has proven quite capable of deterring
attacks without large deployments. In
fact, for most places in the world, the
mere threat of U.S. intervention is sufficient.
This is perhaps best exemplified in the
Persian Gulf, where the sheikdoms refuse
to allow large deployments of U.S. troops
and yet their neighbors understand the
consequences of an attack. Iraq invaded
Kuwait mistakenly believing the U.S.
did not consider its interests to be
vital in that country. It did not attack
Saudi Arabia, however, despite having
no American military opposition (prior
to the buildup).

The argument above
assumed that a treaty and troop deployment
was tied to a peace agreement between
Israel and Syria. A treaty would be even
more valuable for Israel if the negotiations
fail. Israeli defense strategists have
long feared that Syria might be tempted
to make a lightning thrust to retake
the Golan Heights and then sit on them
expecting international opposition to
prevent Israel from mounting the war
that would be required to recapture the
territory. A U.S. treaty commitment,
however, would make such a move far more
dangerous for Syria. Hafez Assad undoubtedly
learned a lesson from the Gulf War and
knows the U.S. can quickly put more than
enough troops in the theater to bring
ruin to his country. Moreover, by formally
committing itself to support Israel against
aggression, the United States would send
a powerful message that it would not
allow Assad to achieve any “political
victories.” Thus, a treaty should encourage
Assad to pursue negotiations as the one
avenue to regain the Golan.

Dore Gold, of Tel Aviv
University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies, asks why an effort should be
made to persuade Syria to redeploy its
army if the U.S. is committed to come
to Israel’s rescue. Well, Israel still
does not want anyone to have to rescue
it and therefore, defense treaty or not,
it will try to negotiate the most secure
border possible and that is likely to
require a Syrian redeployment. No treaty
will be a substitute for defensible borders
and security arrangements; however, the
U.S. commitment will give Israel more
flexibility in the negotiations to take
greater risks for peace.

Syria alone could not
defeat Israel; however, a combination
of Arab states would pose a formidable
threat. In the worst-case where Syria,
Iran, Iraq or some other coalition of
forces attacks Israel, the conventional
wisdom holds that Israeli forces are
superior and could ultimately repel the
aggressors. Nevertheless, given Israel’s
small population, any conflict would
be extremely costly and a modern war,
potentially waged with nonconventional
weapons, could impose such a high price
that a victory on the battlefield might
still be viewed as a defeat (as was the
case in 1973). A defense treaty with
the United States would be a powerful
deterrent to the creation of any such
coalition. Even with Soviet backing,
the Arabs were reluctant to take on Israel.
Now, lacking that superpower support,
they would have no chance of winning
a military or political victory against
a U.S.-backed Israel.

Some might argue the
United States has an unspoken commitment
to defend Israel. The precedents from
1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 illustrate
that U.S. support has ranged from nonexistent
to grudging. Even under a treaty, the
U.S. might be reluctant to be drawn into
a conflict (e.g., Lebanon) that does
not threaten Israel’s existence. For
reasons I will elaborate below, this
may actually be in Israel’s interest
because it means Israel would have the
opportunity to defend itself first. A
treaty is not a guarantee of assistance,
but it is the closest one can get in
foreign affairs.

Given such a commitment,
Gold asks, why shouldn’t Israel depend
on United States for its deterrent and
reduce its own capability?

Why not, indeed?

Israel will want to
maintain its own deterrent, just as NATO
countries have retained their own, but
a treaty should allow Israel to reduce
its defense spending and put the funds
to more productive use. The bigger concern
Gold has is that the United States would
try to eliminate Israel’s nuclear deterrent
by forcing it to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It is not clear this would be
a condition for a treaty; nevertheless,
it raises interesting questions on both
sides.

For Israel, the nuclear
card has been of dubious value. On one
hand, the Arabs know that Israel could
play it if its existence was seriously
threatened. On the other hand, this has
not been much of a deterrent. Israel
may have had a bomb as early as 1967,
and certainly had it by 1973; nevertheless,
her Arab enemies have attacked or threatened
her on numerous occasions in the last
three decades. Like the United States,
and other nuclear powers, Israel is constrained
from using its capability by domestic
and international opinion. Furthermore,
Arab states like Libya, Iraq and Syria
have used Israel’s nuclear arsenal as
a pretext for their own nonconventional
weapons programs. I don’t believe for
a minute those states would terminate
their programs if Israel destroyed its
weapons of mass destruction, but their
existence increases the incentive for
Israel’s enemies to pursue their own
counter threat. Given American reluctance
to employ nuclear weapons, it is unlikely
rogue states would be any more inhibited
by the U.S. arsenal. In addition, the
U.S. cannot prevent a nonconventional
attack. That being the case, Israel may
deem it necessary to maintain a nuclear
deterrent and refuse to give that up
even for a treaty.

It is possible, and
I believe likely, that the United States,
under a pro-Israel President like Bill
Clinton, would not force Israel to make
this choice. Nonproliferation advocates
within the Administration, the type who
periodically leak allegations that Israel
is “illegally” transferring U.S. technology
to third countries, will certainly try
to use a treaty as a lever to curtail
Israel’s nuclear program. Successive
administrations have looked the other
way, however, and this one would probably
do the same. After all, officials should
recognize placing constraints on Israel
will have no impact on its enemies’ weapons
programs. Moreover, Israel’s nuclear
deterrent has some value in maintaining
stability in the region and inhibiting
Iran or one of the Arab states from deploying
nonconventional weapons (e.g., the possibility
of a nuclear response may have prevented
Saddam Hussein from using chemical or
biological weapons against Israel in
the Gulf War).

The Image of Self-Reliance

The premise of a treaty
would be that any attack against Israel
would trigger a U.S. response. This,
critics argue, is dangerous because it
represents a dramatic break with the
tradition of Israel defending itself.
Abba Eban asserts, for example, that
“an additional factor in Israel’s exceptional
popularity in America is still the fact
that we do not seek a contingent presence
of American troops. This situation contrasts
vividly with the burdensome need to send
thousands of young American men and women
to the inhospitable Balkans.”

It is true that American
friends of Israel have always used the
fact that Israelis don’t ask Americans
to fight their battles for them as a
talking point, and have assumed it is
appreciated by the U.S. public, but I
don’t believe the issue has ever been
put to a test in a public opinion poll.
My reading of public opinion suggests
that Americans do admire Israeli self-reliance,
but do not believe Israelis really can
go it alone without the help of the United
States. On the contrary, given the disproportionate
amount of foreign aid given to Israel,
the favorable treatment with regard to
military sales, the U.S. government’s
political backing and the charity of
American Jews, the greater sense is that
Israel is heavily dependent on the United
States for its survival.

Furthermore, Eban’s
notion of Israeli self-reliance is greatly
exaggerated. While American GIs have
not fought for Israelis, U.S. backing
has played a critical role in most of
Israel’s wars. Throughout the Cold War,
the threat of U.S. intervention insured
the Soviet Union would not directly intervene
on the side of the Arabs. Since the mid-1960’s,
the U.S. has been Israel’s principal
arms supplier and the 1973 airlift helped
prevent Israel from losing the Yom Kippur
War. During the Gulf War, Israel accepted
U.S.-manned Patriot missile batteries.
In that case, when U.S. troops did “defend”
Israel, no public outcry was heard and
no one began to compare Israelis to the
Vietnamese or Somalis.

It is somewhat odd
that Israelis are concerned that a defense
pact would undermine their self-image
or the American public’s view of them.
After all, the British do not seem to
suffer any such problems because of their
alliance with the United States. Is it
the case that world power Great Britain
needs U.S. protection more than flyspeck
Israel?

In all likelihood,
a treaty would require the U.S. to come
to Israel’s aid, if asked. Should an
attack occur, the Israelis could take
the position the U.S. did in the Gulf,
namely, that they can handle the conflict
on their own and don't need help. If
Israel is willing and able to go it alone,
despite a clear U.S. treaty commitment,
then its image would undoubtedly be enhanced.

One way of increasing
the probability of U.S. involvement,
and American public support for engagement,
would be to station troops in Israel.
If, for example, Syria attacked a peacekeeping
force on the Golan Heights, Washington
would view this as an attack on the United
States, not just Israel. If U.S. personnel
are threatened, the American public would
back defending them.

This raises the obvious
downside of a treaty from the American
perspective. By extending our defense
umbrella to cover Israel, the risks of
being drawn into a war increase. The
U.S. already assumes some risk of war
in defending Israel. The 1973 War demonstrated
the possibility that the U.S. military
could be needed to bail Israel out in
emergency. Troops were put at risk when
they were diverted from primary missions
in Iraq to “SCUD-busting” to try to prevent
missile attacks on Israel during the
Gulf War, and in the deployment of Patriot
crews in Israel. Given the peace process,
however, the threat of war is lower than
it has ever been in the Middle East,
and, given Israel’s current strength,
the probability of needing direct U.S.
assistance has significantly declined.

The Terrorist Threat

A more immediate danger
would be terrorist attacks against U.S.
forces, such as those that led the Reagan
Administration to withdraw American peacekeepers
from Lebanon. If U.S. troops are on the
ground, they would make tempting targets
for terrorists, but the threat has been
exaggerated. The only place where personnel
are likely to be deployed is the Golan
Heights and the Syrians have been very
careful to keep their border quiet to
avoid provoking Israeli retaliation.
Even before 1967, it was the regular
army shelling the valley that threatened
Israel, not terrorists. Since one of
the major reasons for Assad to enter
the peace process in the first place
is to curry favor with the United States,
it would make little sense for him to
allow any provocations. Moreover, the
bombing of the World Trade Center illustrated
that Americans are not immune to terrorist
threats, regardless of our defense relationship
with Israel.

And what about Lebanon?
A peace treaty with Syria would require
the pacification of Lebanon. Israel now
appears prepared to assent to Syrian
hegemony in Lebanon, but the price is
the cessation of terrorism. The expectation
is that an Israeli agreement with Syria
would quickly be followed by one with
Lebanon. Southern Lebanon would then
come under the direct control of the
Lebanese army with the full backing of
Syria. Logistical support for terrorists
should dry up, and even the most determined
attackers would have to risk Assad’s
wrath and penetrate both Israeli and
American defenses.

Enhancing Israel’s
Capability

The simplest way to
describe how a treaty would increase
Israel’s capability is that it would
receive more of everything it already
gets from the United States and, perhaps,
a few new things. In truth, Israel already
receives an impressive amount of U.S.
weaponry, regularly engages in joint
exercises, shares intelligence, is involved
in cooperative research and development
of new weapons systems and has the status
of a Major Non-NATO Ally. The most recent
Foreign Operations Bill passed by Congress,
for example, requires that defense contractors
charge Israel no more than the amount
the Pentagon pays for similar military
items and legislated that Israel receive
“equal-to-NATO” status for the stockpiling
of U.S. weapons.

Still, as one former
Pentagon official put it, being near
the top of the pyramid is not the same
as being at the top. As a full treaty
partner, Israel would get the latest
and greatest technology and participate
in black programs that are still beyond
its reach. It would likely also get more
favorable financial terms on items it
purchases and greater access to excess
goods.

The most important
enhancement would probably be in the
amount of real-time intelligence Israel
would receive. Much of Israel’s intelligence,
particularly satellite imagery, already
comes from the United States. Under a
treaty, Israel would expect greater access
to this material.

The Pentagon might
not want to increase Israel’s capability.
There is already resistance to providing
intelligence. Moshe Arens wrote in his
recent book that during the Gulf crisis
the United States refused to coordinate
its actions with Israel, consistently
withheld vital intelligence and made
it virtually impossible for Israel to
defend itself against the SCUD attacks.
It is possible the United States would
take a similar position under a treaty;
that is, “don’t worry, we’ll take care
of you.” Israel might also worry that
the Pentagon would still withhold intelligence
on America’s Arab allies, some of which
may be of great value to Jerusalem. This
should be less of a problem in the future,
however, because a “comprehensive peace”
would mean Israel no longer would be
threatened by America’s Arab friends.
Even today, the principal threats to
Israel come from America’s enemies, Iraq
and Iran.

U.S. officials might
also prefer to withhold other advanced
technologies. In some quarters, Israel
is distrusted, and has on occasion been
accused of illegally transferring American
technology to countries like China. To
give one specific example of Pentagon
resistance to increasing cooperation
with Israel, pro-Israel members of Congress
have for the last several years been
pushing for the enhancement of Haifa
port and suggesting it as a home port
for the Sixth Fleet. The Navy has consistently
opposed the idea (though Haifa is one
of the most popular ports of call) because
it is too expensive, would divert funds
from higher priority programs and the
creation of “home ports” has generally
not been considered successful elsewhere.

Gold has suggested
that a defense pact might lead to a reduction
in military assistance for Israel. He
says American Jews will be asked: “Why
should the United States continue to
pay for new F-15s for the Israeli Air
Force if Israel’s security is protected
by a treaty?”

A couple of answers
are possible. First, since Israel will
want, and the U.S. will agree, to defend
itself first, it will still be in America’s
interest to provide weapons to maintain
its qualitative edge and deterrent. A
treaty might actually make it easier
to justify assistance, since it can be
viewed as an extension of U.S. capability
in the region. Israel’s military aid
might then be shifted from the foreign
aid budget to the defense budget. One
advantage of that would be that aid to
Israel would no longer appear disproportionate.
Instead of receiving more than 20 percent
of all foreign aid, the ratio would drop
(assuming Congress didn’t then cut the
entire account by a similar amount) to
about 9 percent. Meanwhile, defense assistance
to Israel would be a fraction of 1 percent
of the total defense budget. As such
a small proportion, the prospect for
an increase would be far greater than
it is now. Such a shift would have repercussions
for the pro-Israel lobby, which would
have to lobby different members and compete
for attention with all the defense interests
rather than be the dominant group as
it is now in foreign aid deliberations;
nevertheless, the net impact would probably
benefit Israel.

Shackling Israel

Perhaps the most serious
argument against a treaty is the impediment
it could create to Israel’s desire to
launch preemptive or retaliatory strikes
against its enemies. From the American
perspective (certainly the State Department’s),
inhibiting Israel’s ability to preempt
could be a positive development. The
United States has frequently opposed
Israeli military actions and might use
the treaty to try to insure it was at
least informed of its partner’s plans,
if not given an outright veto. More important,
the treaty would, in theory, improve
coordination to protect the interests
of both nations.

The constraint on Israel’s
freedom of action should be a concern
in Jerusalem. Still, it is not clear
how seriously Israel’s defense strategy
would be affected. Even today, Israeli
leaders know they risk the opprobrium
of the United States if they act without
consultation or in a manner viewed as
harmful to American interests. Israel’s
best friend in the White House, Ronald
Reagan, did not hesitate to suspend the
delivery of arms to Israel when he was
angered by its actions in Lebanon. Still,
if the threat to Israel were deemed sufficiently
serious, it is likely an Israeli Prime
Minister would risk angering the United
States, as Ben-Gurion did in 1956, Levi
Eshkol did in 1967 and Begin did in 1981.

Conclusion

The United States does
not, and should not, make defense commitments
unless it has vital interests at stake.
In the post-Cold War era, nowhere are
those interests at greater risk than
in the Middle East. One of America’s
principal concerns in the region is insuring
the security of Israel. A treaty commitment
will enhance the Jewish State’s capability
and deterrent and can also strengthen
the U.S. capacity to protect its broader
interests in the region. For Israel,
the possible limitations placed on its
freedom to take military action are more
than compensated by having a formal guarantee
of protection from the greatest power
on earth.