MINTURNO
TO
THE
APPENNINES85TH
INFANTRY DIVISIONPUBLISHED BY INFORMATION - EDUCATION SECTION - MTOUSAPRODUCED BY HEADQUARTERS - 85TH
INFANTRY DIVISIONPassed by Field Press Censor and may be mailed home.

"Minturno
to the Appennines" was a 88-page booklet published by the 85th
Division during the last months of the war for distribution to the
soldiers
and their families. This booklet gives a good overview of the history
of
the 85th Custer
Division.
It contains information on places and events without going into
specific
detail. I plan to post this entire history with sufficient maps to go
along
with the narrative. Refer to monthly Operational
Reports of 328th Field Artillery Battalion for comparison of
events
in this supporting unit.

The booklet abruptly
ends with the fighting at Formiche and Monterenzio on November 22, 1944
--- I guess so it could be published and given to the soldiers.
My
brother obtained a copy of a "supplement"
to this booklet, that continues with the history to the end of the war
in May 1945. This supplement was never published. The
author
and origin of this unofficial supplement is not known but it
follows
the same writing style as the booklet.

This
88-page
booklet contains maps or a photo on almost on every other page.
The
photos are poor quality as the booklet was printed on newsprint.
The maps contain good information of troop movement as it relates to
towns
and landmarks. As my digital drafting improves, I hope to
duplicate
some of the maps to go along with the text.

LEGEND - In
the
following text, the names of units are color coded. My comments are in
{brackets}.American
Units
=
American, British and Allied units are highlighted in dark blue.
Since this is about 85th Custer Division, all references to regiments
and
units are not color coded. The exception to this is
the
companies are in bold to allow ease of reading.German Units=
Enemy units are highlighted in Prussian blue.Gothic Line=
Enemy defense lines, towns, and geographical places are in deep red.{ My comments}=
My notes and comments in blue brackets.

CONTENTS

FORWARD -
Major General
John B. Coulter (Not Included)INTRODUCTION -
General
Mark Clark (Not Included)EARLY HISTORY -
A
Brief history of WW1TRAINING FOR THE SECOND WORLD WARTHE GUSTAV LINE-
Minturno, May 1944THE SECOND PHASETHE DRIVE ON ROME AND TO THE NORTH
- May, June, July 1944BETWEEN ATTACKSTHE GOTHIC LINE
-
September 1944MORE MOUNTAINS

"SUPPLEMENT"THE LUCCA
PLAIN
AND THE SILLARO VALLEYTHE LAST
ATTACK
THE PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN
WINDING UP

It
was in another war against the Germans that the Division was first
established
as part of the National Army, on August 25, 1917. Organized at Camp
Custer, Michigan it became known as the Custer Division.

After nearly a year's training, the Division
embarked
for England. From here the 339th Infantry Regiment, with
attached
engineer and medical units, was shipped to Russia where it participated
in bitter fighting against the Bolshevik Revolutionary Army. The
remainder
of the Division was moved to France where individual organizations
supported
the IV, V, and VI Corps. In France the Division served primarily as a
replacement
depot division, furnishing some 20,000 replacements to other
organizations.
Several units, however, remaining intact---the 160th Field Artillery
Battalion,
the 310th Field Signal Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 310th Engineers
and
the 310th Ammunition Train - saw action on the Western Front, in
Lorraine.
in the St. Mihiel operation, and in the Meuse-Argonne sector.

At the close of the war parts of the Division served
in Germany in the American Army of Occupation. By August 1919, however,
the last elements of the Division had returned to the United States.

Shortly after this the Division was
inactivated.
During the years of peace that followed it continued to exist in the VI
Corps Area as a Reserve Division with Reserve Officer personnel.

WW1 Uniform of a 'Custerman'.Originally, WW1
patches
were sewn into a square piece of khaki.

TRAINING FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In
January, 1942 the War Department ordered the reorganization of the 85th
Division as a triangular unit{*}. The
Division
was reactivated at Camp Shelby Mississippi on May 15th.
Brigadier
General Wade H, Haislip was designated as the Commanding General,
becoming
Major General Haislip shortly before assuming command. The Official
Mobilization
Training Program was begun early in June. In January, 1943, the first
programs
were undertaken in the training of Combat Teams, as the next step in
developing
the coordination of all the elements of the Division in preparation for
combat. {* A triangular unit meant the
divisin
had 3 regiments; 337th, 338th, & 339th. Each regiment had
three
battalions, consisting of four companies, each.}

On February 21st {1943} Major
General Haislip became the Commanding General, XV Army Corps, and
Brigadier
General John B. Coulter, the Assistant Division Commander,
succeeded
him as the Division Commander. On March 12th Brigadier General Coulter
was promoted to the rank of Major General. On March 18th Colonel Lee
S. Gerow was promoted to Brigadier General, and became the
Assistant
Division Commander.

A publicity shot of
General John
Coulter, commander of 85th Division throughout
the
War.

Early in April the Division began its
move
to the maneuver area near Leesville,
Louisiana.
Here for 2months the conditions of combat were simulated,
division
fighting against division much of the time. In June the Division had
completed
its training in this area, and then moved to Camp
Pilot Knob, California, where it began still more arduous
training
in the Desert Training Center. In August the Division was moved to Camp
Coxcomb, California where desert training was continued
until
October. This training was brought to an end by orders transferring the
Division to Fort Dix, New Jersey,
the
last move before shipment overseas. At Camp Coxcomb, Brigadier General Pierre
Mallett became Division Artillery Commander, succeeding
Brigadier
General Jay W. MacKelvie, who had been with the Division since
its
activation but was now transferred to the command of XII Corps
Artillery. {The
Division
went desert training because the Allies were still fighting the Germans
in North Africa. Go toDesert
Training Centerfor
Map of these camps & history & photos.}

At {Fort}Dix
{NJ}
the final preparations were made for entrance into combat. On December
16th the Advance Detachment of the Division set sail for Africa. A camp
was established south of St. Denis Du Sig on the northern coast of
Algeria,
near Oran. The remainder of the Division sailed in December and
January.
By mid-January the entire Division had been assembled and was
undertaking
a program of intensive training in mountain warfare. Early in February
the Division moved to Port-Aux-Poules for a period of amphibious
training.
While here the first orders were received to alert the units of the
Division
for movement to Italy. The 339th Regimental Combat Team was
the first to be moved. Arriving in Italy on March 14th, it was attached
to the 88th Infantry Division
and became the first regiment of the Division to see combat in the
present
war. Shortly afterwards the other units of the Division reached Italy,
landing at Naples, and the final
preparations
were made for the Division to go into the line near Minturno,
about 40 miles to the north.

At
8 o'clock on the morning of April 10th {1944}the
Division was committed to action as a unit for the first time in its
history.
In the left sector of II Corps zone the Division took up position a few
miles north of the Gargliano River along a low ridge of hills facing
the
Gustav Line. The front extended from the Ryrrhenian Sea on the sough,
north
along the low hills beyond Minturno to the Ausente River. The 339th
Infantry (with Companies L and M of the 338th
attached) moved up first to hold a front extending 5500 yards in from
the
sea, with 3 battalions abreast. By April 14th the 337th Infantry
had taken over a 4000 yard front, on the right of the 339th,
extending to the Ausente River. One platoon of the 85th Reconnaissance
Troop was placed as a guard over the bridge across the Gargliano, about
2 miles southeast of Minturno on the site of the ancient town of the
same
name. All the traffic to our forward areas was obliged to use this
bridge,
which thereby became a point of vital importance to the Division. The
remainder
of the Troops patrolled the coast, on the watch for any attempts by the
enemy to encircle the Division flank by an amphibious operation and to
apprehend agents landing by boat. While holding these positions the
Division
prepared for the May offensive.

The Tyrrhenian Coast runs west from Minturno
and
Scauri to Formia. About a mile beyond Scauri is the Croce Road Junction
where the road south from Cassino joins Highway 7 about 6 miles above
the
Minturno Bridge. West of the Junction the Highway for 5 miles crosses a
narrow plain, dominated by Monte Campese, to Formia where the mountains
come down to the sea. At Formia the Gaeta Peninsula juts off to the
south,
but the Highway cuts sharply northwest across the mountains to Itri and
Fondi, at the northern limit of the Fondi Plain. At Fondi the road
turns
southwest, crossing level plains for 5 or 6 miles. Then, skirting the
mountains,
it continues some 5 miles more to Terracina, built between high rocks
and
the sea.

The Gustav Line
was anchored on the beaches near Scauri and in the low hills rising
from
the Capo D'Acqua at the base of the Aurunci Mountains. Once the Gustave
Line should be broken the efforts of the advance would ultimately be to
secure Highway 7 as far as Terracina.

The enemy -- consisting cheifly of elements of
the German 94th Infantry Division
--
was dug in along the western anchor of the Gustav
Line. His positions extended from the coast near Scauri,
north
across the low hills of Colle San Martino, then northeast across the
Solacciano
Ridge to Santa Maria Infante. Between ours and the enemy's lines was a
narrow grassy valley which was less than a half mile wide.

Our troops were dispersed in fox-holes, behind
rocks, and in buildings. Outposts were established a few hundred yards
ahead of our forward positions. Some of these were used as waystations
for the patrols as they went out and came back. Some had names --
"Ferdinand's,"
"Snuffy's", "Mother's Place."

Every night for a month each battalion sent
over
one or more patrols, and on the basis of the patrol reports and aerial
photographs taken from Cub planes and P-38s, we learned the location of
many enemy positions. On this sector of the Gustav
Line most of the enemy positions were on the reverse slopes
of the hills. On the forward slopes there were minefields and wire
barriers,
placed in such a way that men advancing up the hills, feeling out the
unobstructed
passages, would come to points on the crest where they would be met by
interlocking bands of fire from the machine guns in their positions on
the reverse slopes. From the higher hills behind the first ridges the
artillery,
mortars and self-propelled guns were in position to blast at any of our
troops coming down to attack the dug-in positions.

Minturno, the Bridge, Tufo, and Tremensuoli
received
harassing fire regularly. The main street of Tremensuoli was nicknamed
"Purple Heart Alley," and it is reported that troops stationed in
Tremensuoli
had figured out that a man could appear on that street for no more than
20 seconds before drawing fire.

The important fact concerning the enemy's
defenses
in the coastal sector was that he expected an attack from the water.
Along
the beaches there were thousands of mines, dense barriers of concertina
wire, concrete posts to block landing barges and tanks, and elaborate
concrete
pillboxes. Along the entire Gaeta Peninsula were batteries of coastal
guns.
Many of these defenses had been erected by the Italians and the Germans
had added their improvements. But although the enemy's preparations to
meet an attack from the sea were elaborate, it was soon to be found
that
the defenses of the Gustav Line
were
equally formidable.

Through April and the early part of May the
artillery
supporting the Division fired constantly against enemy movements and
artillery
positions. From the very beginning the policy was established of firing
about 5 rounds for every German shell. Our superiority in thei respect
compelled the Germans to remain in their dugouts througout the day,
restricting
all their movements to the hours of darkness.

The weather was fine. On the steep crags of
the
Petrella Mountain Mass to the north there was still snow, but around
Minturno
the valleys and hills were green with new growth.

Mist sometimes settled down, and sometimes at
night fog came in from the sea. But already the white dust was thick on
the roads, not to be laid by rain till another autumn.

On April 24th the 338th Infantry relieved
the 339th along the coast, while that regiment took a short
rest. Then, as plans for the attack matured, the 339th returned
to the line to take the left half of the 338th sector in from
the coast with 2 battalions in the line. Two battalions of the 338th
now held approximately one half of their former regimental sector. The
337th Infantry was meanwhile relieved by elements of the 88th
and became the Division reserve in an area southwest
of Tremensuoli, except for the 3rd Battalion which was attached at this
time to the 339th Infantry. Attached to the Division now
were
the 756th
Tank Battalion, the 776th
Tank Destroyer Battalion,
and the 5th
Italian Mule Pack Group. The artillery remained under
Division
control and received direct support of the big guns of the Corps
Artillery, as well as the entire 36th
Division Artillery.

Along
the Division front the night of May 11th {1944}
there was no moon and enough layers of mist in the upper air to obscure
the stars. In the dark, along the entire line, from the Tyrrhenian Sea
through Cassino to the Adriatic, men waited to attack.

At 11 o'clock{pm}
the great artillery barrage began. Long Toms, the great 240mm guns,
75mm
pack howitzers, cannon, British 6 and 25 pounders, 105's, 155's,
everything
let go at that moment. For a full half-hour shells were poured into the
German positions, tens of thousands of them. Almost nothing could be
heard
but the thunder of guns, and the air was lit up by the flashes of the
powder
charges. From the Minturno Hill, Scauri could be seen as it by daylight
and in flashes they valley and the enemy's hills came into clear view
out
of the darkness.

The infantry moved up to the edges of the barrage. As the
guns
ceased firing, companies, platoons and squads advanced slowly into the
fire that immediately met them.

On the right, the 338th moved out to attack the
Solacciano Ridge. The 339th on the left attacked the
Domenico
Ridge, the low hills extending to its left, and Celle San Martino, made
up of Hills 66 and 69.
The enemy apparently did not expect an attack at this time, but after
the
initial surprise he recovered from the shock of the bombardment and
held
firm.

What was beginning now was a bitter up-hill
fight
across exposed slopes, almost every move made under the eyes of the
enemy.
There could be no let-up in the assault once it had begun, and as we
came
to grips with the enemy in his closely-crowded positions the fighting
went
on without pause day and night. It took time to get through the
minefields
before the dug-in positions could be reached, and in that time the
enemy
let go with his machine guns and mortars, covering every approach. A
small
stream, the Capo D'Acqua, proved one of the most bitter obstacles.
Troops
struggling through its current and up the steep banks which tanks could
not climb advanced into the direct fire of machine guns and mortars
"zeroed
in" on them.

Attacking towards the Solacciano Ridge, the
338th
ran into fire from thick-walled farm houses the enemy had fortified,
and
in approaching these the troops made their way through the most densely
laid minefields of all. Troops of I company drove the enemy from
one of these houses, and waited while the artillery leveled a
neighboring
house occupied by the enemy. Then they took over the fortified
positions
in time to meet the reinforcements the Germans sent to take the houses
back. Attacking in the draws a platoon of A Company lost man
after
man to machine gun fire until it was able to close in and destroy the
enemy
with hand grenades and bayonets.

The 339th was meeting the same kind
of fierce resistance. Advancing along the low hills of the Domenico
Ridge,
one platoon lost several of its members in the minefields and still
others
to machine gun fire. When the rest reached their objectives and dug in,
the enemy counterattacked. Word was received by radio that our men were
surrounded, and after that no messages came back. When the hill was
recaptured
2 days later, the bodies of the leader and 5 of the men were found. At
another point the bodies of most of the members of a platoon of B
Company were found surrounded by 35 dead Germans.

In the bitter fighting several companies were
reduced to 50 or 60 percent of their strength. The reinforcement coming
up through the minefields, which could be cleared only slowly and in
the
dark, suffered heavily from the mines and from artillery fire the enemy
laid down to cut them off. The first ridges were to be taken only at
heavy
costs.

The
fighting was as brave as it was fierce. Company G, 339th
Infantry was cited the the President for its outstanding performance of
duty during this period. In advancing towards its objective, the
Company
took advantage of the artillery barrage to seize part of a hill before
the barrage ceased. The 2 assault platoons, closing with the enemy
before
he could recover, killed 60 and captured 40 of their defenders,
demolished
8 bunkers, reduced 7 pillboxes, and captured 25 automatic weapons. The
objective taken, the company immediately used the enemy weapons to
assist
the assaults of adjacent companies. Meanwhile the company's own
positions
were pounded by artillery and mortar fire for 48 long hours. The enemy
counterattacked 3 times, and was repulsed each time though our
casualties
were increasingly heavy and no reinforcements could be brought up. For
36 hours the men were without food or water, but they held out until
the
advance on other parts of the line made their position secure.

It was in the first day's fighting that Lieutenant
Robert T. Waugh, leader of the first platoon of this company{G},
engaged in the beginning of a series of actions that was to win him the
Congressional
Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry. He reconnoitered a
minefield before entering it with his platoon, and then directing his
men
to fire against 6 bunkers, he advanced alone against one position after
another. Reaching the first bunker, he threw phosphorous grenades into
it, and as the defenders came running out he killed them with a burst
from
his tommy gun. Then he passed on to each of the remaining 5 bunkers,
killing
or capturing all of their occupants.

The attack of the 3rd Battalion of the 339th
Infantry
against Hill 66 and Hill 69,
the Colle San Martino, met perhaps the fiercest resistance of all. At
the
very beginning a squad of L Company was destroyed by artillery
as
it passed through Tremensuoli towards Hill 113 East. Following the
trail
out of the town still another squad was wiped out by the enemy
artillery.
But the remainder of the company and the battalion pushed on across the
Capo D'Acqua to the slopes of Hill 69. Bitter fighting raged through
the
night as platoon after platoon moved up, but by 5 o'clock next morning
the hill was captured.

May 12th and 13th passed in an unceasing
struggle.
The gains were small, and fiercely won. Wherever we moved the enemy
threw
in heavy, accurate fire, and every break we made in his lines he tried
to repair, counterattacking with all the strength he could collect. K
Company of the 337th came up on the 12th to attack Hill 66, but by the
time it reached the base of 69 it had suffered such heavy losses that
it
could not continue. It then dug in to reinforce the troops of 69.
And at 9 o'clock that morning the nemy sent down 200 men and a tank to
drive us out. He failed. But it was certain that still other attacks
were
being prepared and the need to capture Hill 66 became more urgent. So
the
1st Battalion of the 337th was brought up under cover of a smoke screen
to pass through the exhausted 3rd Battalion of the 339th. {For
more details of the fighting and casualties on Hill 69, go to webpage
on Biography
of Private Patterson;
a member of Company K, who was killed in action during this combat.}

The fresh battalion pushed on slowly over Hill
69, and began its attack on Hill 66 at 4:30 the afternoon of
the 12th. The enemy who had seen our troops advancing met them with
such
heavy fire that they were soon driven back. But the withdrawal was made
only in order to reorganize. Twelve battalions of II Corps Artillery
now
laid down a barrage on 66, and the infantry moved out again at 6:30.
The
opposition was still stubborn, but the enemy soon had all he could
take.
Colle San Martino was captured, and our troops immediately consolidated
their newly won positions.

The next morning the enemy counterattacked.
Fifty
men firing machine pistols stormed the hill. They came within 50 yards
of our positions unopposed. Then the order to fire was give, and every
man of the enemy group was killed. Later others tried it again, and met
the same results. Company C of the 337th Infantry received a
Presidential
Citation for its performance of duty in this action.

On the 13th the enemy was counterattacking
everywhere,
and all along the line the men fought bitterly to hold their gains. And
they continued to push slowly ahead. Gradually the sum of the gains
became
more important. By the morning of the 14th we held Hills 79 and 69 and
several positions on the Solacciano Ridge. Troops were ready to move
into
Scauri. It now remained to reorganize for the final breakthrough. The
2nd
Battalion of the 337th came up to attack between the 338th
and 339th. On the afternoon of the 14th supported by tanks,
they attacked Hill 108, overrunning it and taking more than 80
prisoners
and the 338th was clearing the last enemy resistance on the
Solacciano Ridge.

By noon of the 15th the 339th was holding
Hills 66, 79
and 58; the newly committed 2nd
Battalion
of the 338th had captured the Cave D'Argilla area; and the
337th
was on 108. The last
counterattacks
had been beaten off. The Gustav Line was broken. The drive which was to
secure Highway 7 to Terracina was now to begin.

THE SECOND PHASE

The
coordinated Division attack began on the afternoon of May 15th.
The enemy had a secondary line between Castellonorato and Scauri, and
the
Division prepared to attack before the enemy had time to get set. The
338th
Infantry was ordered to strike wet to seize Monte Penitro, then
to drive southwest to the Croce Road Junction and on to Highway
7. If successful this attack would by-pass Scauri and Monte
Scauri on the jut of land west of the Highway. On the right the 337th
Infantry was ordered to seize Castellonorato, and then push
west
along the mountain road to Maranola, a distance of about 5
miles,
prepared to turn south there, following the road leading to Highway 7
just
below Formia.

By this time the 88th
Division on the right, with the assistance of the 338th
Infantry, had reduced the important enemy strong-point in Santa Maria
Infante.
In order to coordinate the advance of the 2 division the 349th
Infantry Regiment of the 88th
Division was now attached to the 85th. Attacking
west form La Civita, on the mountains north of Castellonorato, this
regiment
was ordered to strike due west across the roadless mountains parallel
to
the advance of the 337th.

The enemy apparently relied on the extremely
rugged,
mountainous country to hold up our advance. He had neglected to
construct
any considerable number of defenses, though hasty positions served him
well, and from the positions on Monte Campese and with the support of
guns
on the Gaeta Peninsula he was attempting to cover the withdrawal of his
troops to Formia. Guns on Monte Penitro and Tripoli were being used to
delay the advance of our troops on Castellonorato and beyond. {
My father reported he obtained the German camera in Formia on
May
15th. Refer to Photos
from the Italian Front
for photos and story about this camera.}

There was little attempt to defend the first
hills.
The 3rd Battalion of the 337th Infantry, relieved
from attachment to the 339th, and shifting over to take up positions
on the left of the 2nd Battalion, came under fire from Monte
Penitro, but they went on, the companies in lines of squad columns, and
Castellonorato was captured by dark. The enemy was now withdrawing all
along the line. He abandoned Monte Scauri when our seizure on the 16th
the 339th moved into the town of Scauri and cleaned out a
few
delaying positions on Monte Scauri.

Advancing from Penitro towards the Croce Road
Junction the 338th Infantry washeld up by the last counterattack
in this area. The enemy was trying to save the remnants of his forces
now
deeply outflanked by the 88th
Division
driving west across the mountains north of the Formia corridor. By this
time the 94th Division
had
been reduced to approximately 1200 men and to save these the enemy
threw
in a battalion of impressed foreign laborers and some troops from the 274th
Grenadier Regiment, attacking from the banks of the
Aquatraversa
stream. He also brought to bear concentrated artillery fire from Monte
Campese and Gaeta. This held the
regiment
up during the 16th, but by the end of the day that resistance was also
overcome.

On the 16th, the 2nd and
3rd Battalions of the 337th advanced to the west
beyond Castellonorao, crossing the Aquatraversa, and moving towards
Maranola.
One company of the 3rd Battalion, as it came close to Monte
Campese, received heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire. Its troops
then
dug in at the base, awaiting the arrival of the remaining companies who
also dug in before renewing the attack. But next morning they found
that
the bulk of the enemy had withdrawn. It only remained for the 3rd
Battalion to clear the pillboxes and sniper posts on the heights while
the 2nd went on to capture Trivio and Marnola.

The
enemy resistance had now cracked everywhere. The enemy had neither the
fores nor the time to establish a line in front of the Division.
Elsewhere
he had also been defeated. The last desperate resistance on the central
Italian front at Cassino was to be
wiped out on the 18th, and on the west the final push was
under
way to join with the forces from Anzio
Beachhead.
On May 16th the 85th Division was placed on a
72-hour
alert, prepared to move to Anzio by water, but is soon appeared that
the
joining of the forces would be achieved sooner than had been originally
expected. The final decision was that the Division would continue its
drive
towards Terracina. {The
amphibious
landing at Anzio
in January 1944 was supposed to relieve the pressure off the Cassino
front.
However, the Germans resistance kept the British and Americans confined
until spring. The Allied commanders came close to pulling the
troops
out of Anzio.}

Now that Campese was taken, the last major
obstacles
in the advance of the 338th on Formia had been
removed.
On the 17th the regiment advanced into the town,cleaning out
the little remaining resistance the next day. Late in the night of the
18th the regiment moved out of Formia to capture Monte
Conca.
In doing this they opened the road to Itra, and arrived at positions in
the rear of the enemy defenses on the Gaeta Peninsula. On the 19th
the 338th Infantry and the 85th Reconnaissance
Troop
cleared out a few pockets of resistance in the Peninsula with little
difficulty,
and troops entered the town unmolested. The enemy's next refuge was the
so-called Hitler Line, anchored at
Terracina.

The 339th Infantry had now come up
from the vicinity of Scauri along the Highway to Formia, where it began
to advance along the Highway to Itri.
Seizing mountains on the left of the road--Monte Cefalo and Monte San
Onofino--the
regiment was for a time harassed by fire coming from Itri. The 2nd
Battalion was dispatched to clear the enemy forces from a section of
the
town, and accomplished its mission in short order.

In Formia, Gaeta and Itri the enemy had left a
large amount of valuable equipment behind, and it was apparent that he
had been forced to withdraw in haste. Along the roads there began to
appear
the debris of a defeated enemy --unpacked boxes of ammunition, unlaid
mines,
discarded gas masks. Later there was to be the much more impressive
litter
of a rout, but now ere the first signs of a serious defeat.

At
this time a pursuit force was organized to hound the retreating
Germans.
The 2nd Battalion of the 337th Infantry was
motorized,
operating with a company of tanks, a platoon of the 85th
Reconnaissance
Troop and a platoon of engineers. This force detrucked at Itri, and
moved
over to the base of Monte Cefalo where it prepared to attack Monte San
Biagio which descends to the northern edge of Highway 7 at the Fondi
Plain.
The remainder of the regiment went into a reserve status for a brief
period.

The 339th Infantry now began an
arduous
advance from the vicinity of Fondi, lately captured by elements of the 88th
Division, crossing steep, almost trailless mountains north
to
Sonnino, a distance of 12 miles. The troops struck out across this
rocky
country, following the compass, and their supplies were brought to them
by mules and by men carrying rations and ammunition on their backs.

The regiment possessed almost no knowledge of
the enemy's dispositions in this area, and contact with the Germans was
temporarily lost. The 94th Division
was nevertheless known to be in desperate need of reinforcement as it
retreated
in to the mountains north of Fondi and along the Highway to Terracina.

Between San Biagio and Sonnino there were 3
mountains
in a direct line, each more than 1500 feet high. The 1st
Battalion
moved ahead first in the advance on Sonnino. The 2nd
following
the 1st was obliged to clear out several enemy bands as it
climbed
the high ground overlooking Highway 7, and its advance went slowly. It
was not before the morning of the 23rd that all these
pockets
had been cleaned up. Shortly before noon of that day the 1st
Battalion had come into positions for the attack on Sonnino, but before
the 2nd Battalion had come abreast of it enemy anti-aircraft
guns opened up on both battalions. As our own artillery had been
outdistanced
it could not lend support to our infantry. Nevertheless, preparations
for
the attack continued, the 2nd Battalion took positions on
high
ground from which it could lend supporting fire, the 3rd
Battalion
by now had joined the 1st, and the attack jumped off at
half-past
four. The advance went ahead steadily, and after 2 hours' fighting the
town was ours. In addition to killed, the enemy lost 73 men as
prisoners.
One of these was the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 15th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment who said that our troops had not
been
expected to cross over the mountains and that the first intimation he
had
had of our presence was when he suddenly received a message that he
Americans
were on both flanks and that retreat was impossible. {Typo?
Maybe 16th Panzer Greadier Regiment.}

Meanwhile, on May 21st, the 337th
Infantry had been recommitted, and, passing to the rear of the 339th,
advanced on the left flank of that regiment to take Monte San Biagio,
where
it found little resistance though it captured a considerable number of
prisoners.

The 338th had enjoyed a short rest
after mopping up Gaeta. Billeted briefly in what remained of the villas
along the coast, the troops had a chance to swim in the salt water, get
a change of clothes, and replace damaged equipment. On May 21st,
however, orders were received to move on to take positions west of
Fondi
to begin the advance on Terracina.

Highway
7 is the single road serving several of the II Corps units, and from
the
Croce Road Junction on there was a solid mass of traffic. The long
lines
of supply trucks and artillery, the battalions of foot troops, the
tanks,
the reconnaissance cars, the liaison jeeps, all created the picture of
a great military action and its vast momentum. Partly to avoid delays
caused
by the road traffic, the 1st Battalion of the 338th
moved by water in DUKW's (two-and-a-half ton amphibious trucks) to
Sperlonga,
about 12 miles west of Gaeta. They were prepared to find enemy on the
beach,
but when they arrived they discovered that the Germans had already
pulled
out, and the battalion proceeded immediately by DUKW and on foot to
join
the remainder of the regiment near Fondi.

In the meantime the 337th Infantry
was crossing the mountains and following the highway southwest towards
Terracina. Along the entire Division front the enemy resistance
stiffened
as the strength of th eGerman reinforcements made itself felt. Both the
337th and 339th Regiments were now encountering
troops
of the 29th Panzer Grenadier
Division
and still other forces hastily withdrawn from Anzio and thrown into the
defense of Terracina.

Pushing over the mountains northwest of that
city
the 337th Infantry captured Monte Autone and Monte Copiccio
on
May 21st after much weary climbing. By taking these
positions
they cleared a long stretch of Highway 7 and the 1st
Battalion,
with strong armor support, now moved down the Highway until they ran
into
heavy fire covering the defile between San Angelo and the sea. Several
truckloads of enemy troops had been rushed to the end of the Terracina
Aqueduct, where they occupied prepared positions. Here the fire from
small
arms and mortars stopped further passage along the road.

Troops and trucks were lined up in the bright
daylight waiting for the artillery to be brought up to wipe out the
resistance.
The enemy guns had already been pulled out as had most of his mortars,
and the advancing forces halted just out of range of small arms fire,
where
the enemy could see them but could do little. When heavier guns were
brought
up, the Germans were put to flight and the advance continued.

Further, more serious opposition was met on
the
outskirts of Terracina. The point of the march column was within 500
yards
of the city when the enemy opened up on it with automatic small arms
fire.
The beach on the left of the road was known to be mined and on the
right
the enemy had dug in on the steep bluffs. Tanks were sent ahead, but
these
were halted by a crater road block. There was nothing to do for the
moment
but withdraw, and the battalion now took up positions on the northern
and
forward slopes of Monte Croce.

When the sun came up in the morning the troops
discovered that the crest of the mountain was held by large groups of
enemy.
Throughout most of the day the battalion was pinned down by fire from
here
and by numbers of roving snipers with machine pistols. The snipers were
disposed of by patrols, and in the late afternoon the battalion moved
to
the reverse slopes of the mountain where the enemy in his fixed
positions
could not reach them. A rolling barrage was called for, covering the
crest
of the mountain yard by yard, and in a short time the positions on
Croce
were wiped out.

The 3rd Battalion, coming up along
the right of the 1st, had also been troubled by fire coming
from Monte Croce. Climbing through heavy brush on the steep slopes of
Monte
Stefano, they were supplied only by mules and hand carry. But during
the
night of the 22nd and the early morning of the 23rd
the heavy weapons elements were brought up, and the battalion moved
forward
over the rocks, firing every weapon it possessed against the strong
points
on the slopes of Croce opposite them. When the enemy was finally wiped
out by the artillery, the 3rd Battalion had reached
positions
from which it could overlook Terracina. Meanwhile the 2nd
Battalion
had moved through the 1st, prepared for a coordinated attack on
Terracina
with the 3rd Battalion on the morning of the 23rd.

The
battle for Terracina developed into a battle for the cemetery
on
the outskirts of the city. This cemetery was on high ground and the
approaches
were rocky and steep. A light rain had made the slopes slippery and
this
hindered the tanks, bu texcellent close support was rendered the
infantry
by several battalion of self-propelled 105's*
belonging to the 6th Field
Artillery
Group. In the cemetery the enemy had dug in beneath the
tombs.
Machine guns, mortars and snipers were using the monuments for cover.
The
battle raged the entire day, but just before dark the last enemy
resistance
had been overcome, and by midnight the 2nd and 3rd
Battalions had taken up positions on the edge of the town. *{105's
- This self-propelled gun was a 105-mm howitzer mounted on a mobile,
armored
car. The term, "self-propelled gun", generally refered to an
artillery
gun mounted on a tank chasis that didn't have a transversing turrent. }

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had
reorganized
and moved over on the right to the northwest of Terracina. All during
the
night our artillery fired into the roads leading to the north, and what
was left of the once beautiful city crumbled. After dawn the battalions
moved easily into the town. The bottleneck, Terracina, was captured,
and
the road to the Anzio Beachhead was opened.

To assist the fighting around Terracina the 338th
Regiment had been ordered on the 22nd to move out and
capture
the mountains on the right of the 337th in order to outflank
that city. At the beginning of the advance a brief encounter occurred
at
the southern end of a 5-mile long railroad tunnel. The Germans used
this
tunnel as a protected route of supply and evacuation and through it had
been coming some of the badly needed reinforcements. Emerging from the
tunnel and preparing positions these troops were surprised by our
advancing
forces. After our supporting air units had blocked the northern end of
the tunnel by bombing, tank destroyers and reconnaissance troop weapons
fired directly into the mouth of the tunnel. Stories of what happened
here
spread everywhere, and were multiplied in the telling. The essential
point
was that the tunnel was no longer of any use to the Germans. After this
initial engagement the 3rd Battalion of the 338th
Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 776th Tank
Destroyer
Battalion, remained on guard near the tunnel to make certain
that none
of the enemy escaped, and other elements of the regiment went on to
capture
Monte Leano and Monte Nero with little difficulty.

The enemy was now withdrawing from Terracina
along
the Highway on the edge of the Pontine Marshes, which he had flooded,
and
beyond Sonnino he was withdrawing northwest across the Amaseno River.
The
pursuit continued.

Our advancing troops now saw more and more of
the results of the work done by the artillery and the air forces. The
Germans
had been compelled to give up their policy of moving only at night, and
in their need of getting out they had taken to the roads in daylight
despite
our overwhelming air superiority. This decision perhaps saved them from
complete destruction, but it was nevertheless a ruinous escape. Burnt
out
trucks and tanks were everywhere, abandoned spiked artillery,
ammunition
dumps, and the bodies they had not had time to bury.

The problem now was to keep contact with the
enemy.
Dismembered and defeated, his organization fell apart, and the signs of
confusion spread everywhere. By May 26th it seemed that
almost
all traces of a coherent organization had disappeared. Instead of
fighting
by platoons, companies and battalions, the enemy now threw together
so-called
"Battle Groups," miscellaneous troops gathered wherever they could be
found,
put under an officer or an NCO and thrown into the line. Since May 22nd
the enemy had had almost no artillery support. His scattered foot
troops
received only the occasional aid of self-propelled guns and a few
machine
guns hastily dug in in pockets of hills. Contact was consequently
maintained
only with a few delaying forces.

The Division now pressed forward with all
possible
speed in the hills north of the Pontine Marshes. During the 25th
and 26th it had advanced west of the Abbe di Fossanuova and
Priverno. At this time the 338th was marching in a column of
battalions, meeting practically no resistance until it arrived at an
impromptu
enemy line in the hills east and northeast of Sezze. Monte Trevi was
quickly
seized, and the last resistance in Sezze was mopped up by elements of
the
regiment after the town had been entered by troops of the 117th
Reconnaissance Squadron. The 338th Infantry was
advancing
northwest towards Monte San Angelo, when on the 27th it was
relieved by the 351st Infantry
Regiment
of the 88th Division.

By now forces pushing out from Anzio Beachhead
had joined with other Allied units coming from the east. As a result
the
85th Division had been "pinched out." After 49 days'
continuous
service in the line the Division passed to reserve, moving to Sabaudia,
formerly a resort on the coast below Anzio.

Between May 11th and 28th
the Division had broken the Gustav Line
and driven the enemy before it 45 miles over a long series of rugged
mountains.
It had routed the Germans, destroyed enormous amounts of equipment, and
had taken 1173 prisoners. Victory was in the air.

THE DRIVE ON ROME AND TO THE NORTH

Along
the entire front the advance of the Allies was rapidly accelerating.
The
enemy was on the point of rout, and the pressure of the pursuit needed
to be intensified; Rome and the destruction of the enemy were almost
realized
objectives. Accordingly, orders were now given to move the Division
north.
east to the Lariano-Guilianello sector. The Division took up its new
sector
on May 30th.

In Lariano and the hills to the north the
enemy
still manned a defensive line. In positions here the famous Hermann
Goering Panzer Grenadier Division hoped to delay our advance
sufficiently to permit the escape of other troops along the roads.
While
the positions they held in the vicinity of Lariano, though few, were
well
prepared, beyond that locality the Germans were compelled to erect only
the hastiest kind of field fortifications, hurriedly cutting down trees
to clear fields of fire and to provide tank barriers. {Hermann
Goering Division - an elite panzer division formed from the
Luftwaffe.
In the 1930's, Herman Goering was chief of Police and he formed a
police
brigade that bore his name. As this unit grew, it became an
anti-aircraft
unit for Hitler's Wolf Lair and then a regiment and eventually a panzer
division. The literal translation of their name was 'paratrooper tank
division'.
It served in Sicily and in Italy until its departure in July 1944.}

But now the sense of conquest had grown
stronger
among the troops, and every step meant that Rome was that much closer.
There was still the ugly job of destroying the snipers lurking in the
brush
and woods, the machine guns placed in the railroad cuts, and still at
night
the occasional German planes came over to harass the troops. But miles
now were being covered each day, and the advance was accelerated. The
service
companies and the rear command posts had more and more difficulty in
keeping
up with the troops. The weather continued bright, and clear. Everywhere
the trees were growing greener- poppies were thick in the fields, and
around
Cori the cherries were ripe.

The new Division sector lay between 2 great
highways
leading to Rome. About 5 miles north of Lariano Highway
6, from Cassino, came into Rome from a southeasterly
direction.
About 4 miles west of Lariano was Highway 7,
leading to Rome from the south. The route of the Division advance lay
across
a region crowded with steep rocky hills till it reached the Tiber
Valley,
and Rome itself, some 23 miles distant. Much of the region was heavily
wooded with pines and chestnut trees, and many of the hills bore the
now
familiar terraces on which olive orchards and vineyards were planted.

The 337th and 338th
Infantry
Regiments had relieved elements of the 3rd
American
Division{actually
called
3rd 'Marne' Division}, and the Division
Artillery was brought up to take positions in support of the
infantry. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31st the attack began.
The
1st Battalion of the 337th on the right and the 3rd on the
left
advanced on either side of Lariano, by-passing the town. The 2nd
Battalion
sent a reinforced company into Lariano to wipe out the rear guard
there,
which it accomplished only after a bitter, prolonged fight.

The 3rd Battalion was now moving along a front
slightly less than a mile wide, down the slopes of a ridge thickly
covered
with rows of vineyards. The advance went slowly, but one company in the
early evening had reached the opposite slope and consolidated positions
there.

On June 1st the 338th Infantry,
advancing
north of Lariano, overcame stubborn resistance in the morning but late
in the day the enemy resistance failed, and the signs of withdrawal
were
unmistakable.

That midnight the regiment was relieved by the 351st
Infantry Regiment of the 88th
Division. but when it was seen that the enemy retreat was
about
to turn into a rout the 338th was recommitted immediately to
pursue the badly beaten remnants of the Goering
Division. On the night of June 2nd the battalion entered San
Cesareo and cut Highway 6, killing a large number of Germans who were
trying
to escape along the road. At this point the regiment passed to Division
reserve except for the 3rd Battalion which was attached to the 339th
Infantry to become the reserve battalion for that regiment.

The 339th Infantry, passing through
Giulianello on June 1st, attacked through thickly wooded hills
to
seize Castel D'Ariano, the highest point of the Maschio D'Ariano Hill
Mass.
Progress was steady and quick for several miles, the only resistance
fire
from snipers and an occasional self-propelled gun. But the next day, as
the regiment veered to the northwest, it met resistance from mortars
and
artillery on Monte Fiore, southwest of Rocca Priora. But this
resistance
was reduced in short order, and on June 3rd the regiment seized 2more
hills, Monte Salamone and Monte San Sebastiano.

Just south of Monte Compatri the 85th
Reconnaissance
Troop ran into a heavy fire fight the night of June 3rd, in which they
killed 40of the enemy and took 65 prisoners. The next day
elements
of the Troop cleared Frascati of snipers. The 339th Infantry
occupied the town somewhat later, and went on to advance to within 3
miles
of Rome when it halted for the night.

The 337th Infantry continued to
meet
heavy resistance. Through the thickly wooded draws motorized patrols
and
roving snipers harassed the troops, and several times wedges were
driven
into the exposed right flank of the 1st Battalion. At one time the
infiltrating
enemy completely surrounded the 1st Battalion CP, and it was necessary
to round up every available man to scout out and kill the enemy. Tank
destroyers
were meanwhile brought up to aid the 3rd Battalion, tanks
were
aiding the 1st, and now hill after hill fell into our hands.

In this sector resistance was still stiff. The
enemy did not want to give in. But by nightfall of June 2nd the troops
had pushed through to seize Monte Ceraso, and the 2nd Battalion had
reached
a point only 1200yards south of Highway 6. By this time they
were
more than 2miles in advance of the rest of the line.

On June 3rd new orders changed the direction of the
regiment's
advance from north to northwest. By now contact was lost with the
enemy,
and the 1st and 3rd Battalions, in approach march formations, moved
west
on parallel roads. After an interval the 2nd passed through the 1stto
capture
Monte Compatri without much trouble. Some light resistance was met
before
Monte Porzio Catone was taken, but this was soon wiped out.

Before
us now lay the Tiber, and in the early morning the domes of the
churches
of Rome could be clearly seen, the
first sight of the beautiful prize of weeks of hard fighting. In the
warm
sunlight of May the city seemed to be waiting for the troops to enter
it.

One company of the 3rd Battalion of the 337th,
motorized and reinforced as a task force, supported by tanks, tank
destroyers.
engineers and artillery, was now ordered to advance along Highway 6
into
Rome and to seize and protect 2 bridges across the Tiber west of Rome.
The I and R Platoon, preceding the advance, had reached
the
suburbs of Rome by half-past eight the morning of June 4th, the
first troops of the Division to reach that city.
{ There is much discussion as to which American unit can claim to be
the
first to enter Rome. I agree with accounts that say the Recon
Troop
of the 88th Division was first. The noted time may be a
clue.}

At the city limits the task force was held up
by an armored unit engaged in wiping out an enemy strongpoint along the
road, and while here orders were received again changing the mission of
the regiment. The 337th was ordered to turn south- -west to take up a
defensive
position' astride Highway 7 about 4 miles out of Rome, and to prevent
any
further enemy withdrawal by that route. Pressing ahead through the
traffic
congestion of VI Corp troops
speeding
along the highway into Rome the regiment cut the highway. This move was
in large part responsible for the capture of 743 prisoners taken by the
Division in the 24-hour period from noon to noon 4th - 5th June. In
marching
from Frascati to Rome the 3rd Battalion, 338th Infantry accounted for
300prisoners.

A task force composed of the 2nd Battalion of.
the 338th Infantry, reinforced by tanks, tank destroyers,
and
engineers, was sent into Rome on June 4th to secure 3 ridges across the
Tiber in that city. Preceded by the regimental I and R Platoon, this
force
entered Rome in the middle of the afternoon, and by nightfall had
reached
their objectives, which, however, were already guarded by a Special
Service
Force whom they later relieved.

June 5th saw the advance of the Division through
Rome.
Entry into a conquered capitol must always be one of the greatest
experiences
a soldier may know. Everywhere the people ran out into the streets to
hug
and kiss and shake hands with the marching soldiers, shouting and
cheering.
They ran beside the jeeps and trucks, chattering and laughing
unrestrainedly,
throwing flowers, waving their hands, and some of them pathetically
saluting
in the Fascist manner. It was a spontaneous, happy welcome.

On June 5th the 339th Infantry
passed
through the city and along Highway 2to a bivouac area
northwest
of Rome. The 338th and 337th Regiments followed,
and the pursuit was continued.

Following along Highway
2 to the northwest towards Viterbo and the Lago di
Bracciano
there were more and more of the signs of the routed Germans - burnt out
and abandoned wreckage everywhere - though here it appeared that the
enemy
had had no time to wreck his own equipment. The Germans had fled in
everything
they could lay their hands on, ambulance, trucks, Italian omnibuses,
motorcycles,
and bicycles.

North of Rome Highway 2wound through
gentle
rolling country, rich pasture land, well tended olive vineyards, and a
few patches of woods. At some places a hill or a bluff offered the
enemy
the opportunity to set up a number of delaying positions, and snipers
were
still found in the haystacks. But more often than not contact was lost
with the enemy these first days above Rome. The Germans were now
retreating
towards the Arno as fast as they could travel.

The 339th Infantry had pursued the
enemy beyond Olgiata when it passed to reserve. The other 2regiments
took up the chase, passing through the 339th.
These
were organized as combat teams, each with a company of tanks, a company
of tank destroyers and a platoon of the 85th Reconnaissance
Troop attached. On June 7th the Howze Task
Forcewas
attached to the Division, and this fast armored unit, with the 1st
Battalion
of the 337th Infantry attached, drove ahead to give the
enemy
no chance to pause.

These forces met small groups left behind to
man
a few self-propelled guns, some groups in armored cars and firing
automatic
weapons made harassing raids, and here and there a machine gun made a
short
stand. Near Monterosi the approaches to the village were mined, but
nothing
was more indicative of the enemy's haste and his inability to organize
any substantial delaying action than his failure to lay extensive
minefields.

Each day the prisoners were taken in
droves,
the confused, isolated remnants of the rout. Among these were members
of
a cooks and bakers school the enemy had seen fit to give rifles and
orders
to delay and hinder our advance. In the great mixture of forces left
behind
in the rout were parts of the 20th
German Air Force Division and the4th
Parachute Division, the latter to be our first opponent on
the Gothic
Line. {
20th German Air Force Division was one of 2 infantry divisions made up
of air force personel. By 1943, the Luftwaffe was ineffective and
personel were transferred into twenty-one divisions. The 19th and
20th LFD served in Italy. Officially known as Luftwaffe Field
Division.}

But now the Divisions part in driving the enemy
north
was coming to a pause. On June 10th the Division was relieved from the
line some 46 miles beyond Rome. Since April 10th it had been in action
60 out of 62 days. Since May 11th it had advanced 135miles,
breaking
the Gustav Line, opening the road
to
the Anzio Beachhead, and playing an important part in the capture of
Rome.
It had virtually destroyed the German 94th
Division
and cut up much of the 29th and
the Goering
Panzer Grenadier Divisions. From these units and all the
other
scrambled organizations of the enemy it had taken 2461 prisoners.

Now had come the time for a rest.

BETWEEN ATTACKSShortly
after relief from the line the units of the Division began moving to
bivouac
area a few miles south of Rome, on the grounds of the Castel Porziano,
a large hunting estate belonging to the King of Italy. Here for a
period the troops rested before resuming training, and here they
obtained
their first passes permitting them to visit Rome, and. to enjoy the
city
they had helped to capture.

On June 18th, in recognition of distinguished service
as
Commanding General of the Division from May 11th to June 10th, General
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, presented the
Distinguished
Service Medal to Major. General John B.Coulter.
The
Division remained in the Castle Grounds until July 10th, continuing
training,
and giving special instruction to the replacements who were being
received
at this time. Then began the movement to the vicinity of
Rocccastrada,
about 150 miles to the north, where further training was conducted
preparatory
to whatever new mission might be assigned the Division.

On July 17th the 339th Regimental Combat
Team
together with the 85th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to
move
to the vicinity of Volterra where it was placed in the Fifth Army
Reserve
prepared to resist any counterattacks the enemy might make along the
boundary
between the American Fifth and British Eighth Armies. The
commitment
of the Division, however, waited upon the accomplishments of. other
units
of the Allied Armies and the maturing of.various plans. At one time it
appeared that the Division might take part in the attack on Leghorn and
the remaining elements of the Division were accordingly moved on July
18th
to the vicinity of Rosignano Marittimo, a few miles in from the
Ligurian
Coast below Leghorn. But it soon became apparent, after the capture of
Leghorn, that the Division would take part in the operations farther
east
along the Arno River. On July 28th the Division was ordered to
assemble
in an area between Volterra and San Gimignano, the famous medieval city
which once had 73 towers. In this region. the troops continued their
training
in river crossing and mountain warfare. The 339th Combat{Team}now
returned to Division Control.

At first the Division prepared to take part in an
offensive
operation, that of crossing the Arno and attacking to the norht.
But these plans were changed and between August 15th and 17th the
division
took over the defense of the Arno on a front extending along the south
banks of the river from near Bellosguardo on the east to Capanne on the
west, a distance of about 24 miles. Over this extensive front the
Division set up strong points and outposts. After the 19th of the
month the Division's sector was increased still farther. Since
all
3 regiments were already stretched out along the line, the 85th
Reconnaissance
Troop and the 310th Engineer Battalion were assigned sectors which they
held, functioning as infantry. The division front now extended
2000
yards farther to the east.

The chief enemy forces opposing us at this time were
elements
of the 26th Panzer Division, the 3rd
Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 362nd
Infantry Division. The north bank of the Arno rose
quickly
into hills, and holding these the enemy generally commanded good
observation
of the country to the south. He also continued to maintain a few
strong points on the south side of the river, notably at La Lisca,
Fornaci
and Tinaja. Since our supply routes were generally under
oservation,
most of our traffic during the day the enemy shelled the roads, but
otherwise
his firing was chiefly of a harassing nature. On most days fewer
than 400 rounds fell in the division sector, though that many fell in
one
concentration at the time the 310th Engineers were moving into their
sector.
As it happened, there were no casualties on this occasion.

Our units regularly sent patrols to the banks of the
river,
and some patrols and raiding parties were sent to feel out the enemy
positions
on the opposite bank and to take prisoners. On his part the enemy
conducted even more aggressive patroling since it was his rather than
our
forces expecting to be attacked. From German prisoners taken at
this
time it was learned, and correctly, that the enemy intended to withdraw
in the even of a full-scale attack, but that otherwise he would merely
resist our patroling and infiltration. In order to determine if
and
when we would attack he sent patrols and raiding parties into our area,
mostly at night, and these groups operated very boldly. Stiff
firefights
sometimes developed, but as a whole the period passed quietly.

On August 26th the Division was relieved from the line,
and moved south to assembly areas between Montespertoli and Certaldo,
on
the slopes of the ridge separating the Elsa and Pesa River
valleys.
After 2 days rest the troops resumed training in the well-cultivated
and
beautiful country of mid-Tuscany. While here the expectation of
big
things to come began to grow. The day was not far off when the
Allied
attack on the Gothic Line would get under way, the system of German
defenses
protecting the great ridges of the Appennines and the descent into the
Po Valley. Accordingly the training was pointed more and more
towards
the problesm of mountain warfare.

Occasionally the enemy sent over a few planes to bomb
and
strafe the roads and installations in nuisance raids. Beaufighters were
up to cut him off, but on many nights a solitary German plane, known to
many as "Bed-check Charlie" came over in the bright moonlight, dropping
his flares and bombs and scooting back. Now and in the months to
come this was the usual effort of the German Air Force, accomplishing
not
much more than letting us know he still had some aircraft in Italy.

THE GOTHIC LINE{September
1944}After
the Germans lost Rome they were driven farther and farther north along
the entire breadth of Italy. Withdrawing as fast as possible to the
next
natural barrier, the Arno, they had fought delaying actions in the
hills
to the south of the river, but their next main line of defense was the
Gothic
Line, extending roughly from north of Pisa to Rimini. For
about
a year the Todt Organizationhad
been
constructing a line of defenses over the great mountains of the
northern
Appennines. After the collapse in southern Italy the construction of
these
defenses had been greatly speeded up, and they had now become a
formidable
defense system.

The mountains themselves were difficult obstacles to an
attacking force. Rising steeply to a great ridge whose peaks varied
from
3000 to 5000 feet high, crossed by few roads, these masses offered
difficulty
even in scaling. Beyond the first ridge 20 miles farther north rose
another
high ridge before the descent into the Po Valley began. It was the
first
ridge, the watershed, that the enemy was defending.

The American Fifth and British Eighth Armies in the
first
weeks of September launched a coordinated attack against this line.
Fifth
Army was to attack the western half, and II
Corps
was making the main effort of Army on the right flank. The 85th
Division, when it joined in the attack, was to make the main effort for
Corps on the Corps' right flank. The problem that faced the Division
initially
was to cross the mountains, breaking through that part of the Gothic
Line
defending Il Giogo Pass through which wound the single first-class road
to the north in the Division sector.

As the Division moved up through Florence in the second
week of September the mountains facing it appeared a solid wall. After
the ascent began the growth thinned out. At the top there was little
but
great splintered rocky masses and steep cliffs.

Here and there along the lower slopes a cart road wound
to a solitary stone farmhouse, beyond these mule and goat trails
climbed
a short distance into the scrub and vanished, and then there was
nothing
but ragged rock. The highway, which passed through Il
Giogo (Pass), was bordered by stands of pine and hemlock,
but
most of these before and during the attack were reduced to stumps and
torn
branches by the terrific concentrations of artillery fire.
Lacking
road, mules and men brought up supplies on their backs. Approximately
1000
mules supported the operations.

The fall rains had begun in the first days of
September,
but these had let up before the attack. The weather was now often clear
and bright, though in the evening and early morning, mist settled in
the
ravines and draws. The autumn chill had begun, but there was no frost.

At the beginning of the attack the 1st
Battalion
of the 12th Parachute Regiment
of the4th
Parachute Division composed the chief forces opposing the
Division.
Later, elements of the 3rd Battalion were thrown in when it
was evident that a main effort was being made here.

Altuzzo,
immediately
to the right of Il Giogo Pass,
dominated
the road passing over the mountains to Firenzuola, and from his
positions
on this mountain and on Monticelli, in the 91st
Division sector on the left, the enemy denied our forces the
use of the road. East of Altuzzo the next mountain, Verruca, was also
strongly
fortified, and from this the enemy not merely protected the ridge but
was
also able to fire upon troops attacking Altuzzo.

Approaching Altuzzo from a low ridge, the ground sloped
steeply to a narrow stream. Beyond its steep banks a gradual slope
fanned
out for a few acres in pastureland and cultivated fields. This slope
was
inclosed on 3 sides by a fringe of woods and brambles until the slopes
and ravines of the mountain itself were reached. Troops moving up from
the stream into the fields along the bordering woods were exposed to
view
from 2 and sometimes 3 sides of the arms of Altuzzo. The ridge leading
to the southern crest of the mountain, Hill
926,
included 3 hills 578, 624 and 782. The formation of Verruca was
similar,
the advance leading up steep ascents and ravines. The approach followed
by the forces attacking the summit, Hill 930,
led along the ridge including Hills 591, 732, and 724.

The enemy bunkers were on the forward slopes. Dug 20 to
30 feet into the ground and rock, covered with great piles of enormous
logs and boulders, with the fire slits opening through rocks of fallen
trees, these bunkers were vulnerable to artillery only if hit directly.
The infantry would be obliged to clear them individually. Machine gun
nests
and connecting trenches were protected by logs and slabs of rock.

A view of the
approach to Monte Altuzzo. The 338 Regiment started from the gulley in center of this photo and advanced
along the ridge do the left.

The
Division attacked at 6 o'clock on the morning of September 13th.
To begin with, 2 regiments were on the line, each with 2 battalions
abreast.
On the left the 338th Infantry attacked towards Altuzzo, and
the 339th, on the right towards Verruca. During the early
hours
of the morning a tremendous artillery barrage had been laid upon the
enemy
positions by the Division Artillery and the supporting II Corps
artillery
units. The barrage was not concentrated in such a short period of time
as that proceeding the Minturno push, but the total number of rounds
fired
was even greater. The great 240's, now and during the entire attack,
were
an especially important factor in the smashing and gradual
demoralization
of the enemy. The air force also sent over planes to bomb and strafe
the
roads and the supply installations in the rear as well as the
emplacements
on the crests.

The 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry
attacked on the left of the regimental sector in a column of companies.
The 2nd, on the right, attacked with 2 companies abreast.
All
were immediately met by intense mortar barrages and small arms fire
that
increased in intensity as the day wore on. The 1st Battalion
moved from south of La Rocca and in the midst of this storm of fire
attacked
towards Hill 926. By dark, however, it had made little substantial
progress.
The 2nd Battalion met no better fortune.

The 339th Infantry, with the 1st
Battalion on the left and the 2nd on the right, advanced
towards
Verruca, moving up Hill 617 and the Poggio Rotto Ridge. Their advance
was
quickly blocked by severe artillery concentrations and grazing machine
gun fire. This was so intense that the troops had no opportunity to
improve
the positions they had won initially. Tank destroyers of the 805th
Tank Destroyer Battalion began firing on the 3 fortified
house
on Hill 591 that blocked the way to Verruca, and during the day and
night
the resistance here was gradually beaten down. One company of the 2nd
Battalion succeeded in coming within 150 yards of the Verruca crest,
but
as yet no permanent progress was assured.

The first day's attack, in short, had made little
headway.
Though the difficulties of the attack were becoming clearer, there had
been no expectation that this would be an easy battle. What was called
for was a constant hammering. Accordingly, while the troops dug in, the
artillery kept up intermittent fire throughout the night, and in the
early
morning let go with another tremendous barrage before the infantry
jumped
off again.

This time the 1st Battalion of
the 338th made somewhat better progress. Company B,
spearheading
the attack, reached a point within 75 yards of one of the crest of
Altuzzo.
Company E of the 2nd Battalion tied in with
the
left of B Company to keep abreast of the advance. But the gains
they made were not to be easily held.

B Company, advancing over rocky, exposed
slopes,
came to a point where it had little cover and where it soon found
itself
fired upon from 3 sides by machine guns. Even while it attempted to
prepare
itself for defense the enemy began counterattacking, in a repetition of
the same, long-tried German tactics, and the Germans were repulsed each
time. For its action on Altuzzo, B Company received a
Presidential
{Unit}
Citation.

For
conspicuous gallantry in the attack on Altuzzo on September 14th,
Staff
Sergeant George D. Keathley, B Company, 338th Infantry,
was posthumously awarded the Congressional
Medal
of Honor. When the leaders of the 2 forward platoons were
wounded,
Staff Sergeant Keathley, platoon guide of the supporting platoon, took
over the command of the other 2 platoons. The enemy was
counterattacking
fiercely, and after 3 of these attacks only 20 men remained from the 2
platoons. Staff Sergeant Keathley reorganized these, placing each man
in
a position where he could best defend the badly exposed position on the
hill. Ammunition was running low, and Staff Sergeant Keathley,
while
directing the defense, passed among the killed and wounded, collecting
ammunition from men who could no longer use it, and distributing it to
the remaining defenders.

A fourth enemy counterattack by 2 companies almost
overran
the position. The Germans charged, firing machine pistols and throwing
hand grenades, and the fight now became a bitter hand-to-hand struggle.
One grenade shattered Staff Sergeant Keathley's abdomen, but he
fought on, holding his entrails in with his left hand. He continued to
direct his men and to fire his rifle effectively for 15 minutes till,
with
the help of artillery fire, the counterattack was driven off. After the
enemy had retreated, Staff Sergeant Keathley was led to a
sheltered
place where he died. The example he had set, and the skill of his
direction,
were largely responsible for the repulse of the enemy.
{The Keathley
Dorm at Texas A & M University is named after S/Sgt George
Dennis
Keathley, class of 1937. There was also a cruiser and an Army
Reserve Center named after Sgt Keathley.}

Heavy resistance met the 339th Infantry on
September
14th. Three battalions were now committed, the 3rd
having come in between the 1st and 2nd. Company L
made the initial attack of the 3rd Battalion on Hill 591.
The
houses at the top were captured only after hard fighting. A tank
destroyer
and a 57mm anti-tank gun aided the attack. But at this time the advance
of the regiment was being retarded by fire coming form the right rear,
and in order to even the lines the 1st
British Division, on the right, made a strong attack in the
early afternoon of the 14th, and the 339th
prepared
to resume its attack that night.

Two hours before midnight the artillery concentrated
fire
on Hill 732 and the fortified houses that composed the chief enemy
fortifications,
but the enemy still held on. One company of the 3rd
Battalion
succeeded in reaching the saddle between Hill 732 and 724, but the 2nd
Battalion could still make no headway in the draws leading on to Poggio
Rotto and Signorini. When the 3rd Battalion, on the morning
of the 15th, again attacked towards Hill 723, they were
again
repulsed.

By now it was clear that 2 regiments were not
sufficient
to effect the breakthrough of the enemy defenses in the desired time.
The
337th Infantry was brought forward to add weight to the
attack,
taking positions on the right of the 339th. It was decided,
in conjunction with the attacks to be continued on Altuzzo and Verruca,
to send forces to the Signorini Mass,
east of Verruca, and to Mone Pratone,
the next high mountain to the northeast. The plan was for the 339th
Infantry to continue the advance in its zone, but K Company
would
move east to seize Signorini. The 66th
Infantry Brigade of the 1st
British Division would meanwhile cut northwest into the zone
of the 85th Division to seize Pratone. The advance of the 66th
Infantry Brigade towards Pratone would be followed by the 337th
Infantry, which would continue on from that mountain.

While the 337th Infantry was moving to
forward
assembly areas the other 2 regiments continued their attacks and the
British
moved over the mountains towards Pratone. These attacks were again
preceded
by artillery barrages, but again each move by the attacking troops
brought
down heavy mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. Though the 1st
Battalion of the 339th made some slight advances, the 3rd
was repulsed each time in the 3 separate attempts it made to capture Hill
732.

Three days had passed, and the enemy still held the
line
and was still able to summon his strength to repel our slightest
advances.
It was nevertheless apparent from the handful of prisoners we had taken
that the enemy was short of supplies and in need of replacements. Other
elements of the 12th Parachute
Regiment
had been brought in to strengthen the defense, but more help than these
could give was desperately needed.

On the 16th the fighting on the left
continued
to be fierce, but it became clearer that each small gain meant a
definite
deterioration of the enemy's strength. More and more of his positions
were
knocked out, and he could no longer spread his fire so effectively and
widely, nor was he able to counterattack as consistently as at the
beginning.
Throughout the day our forces advanced slowly until by dark elements of
the 338th were within a short distance of the peak of Altuzzo.
For the final push the 3rd Battalion now came up to pass
through
the tired 1st.

Meanwhile, the 339th was continuing its
attack
on Hill 732 without success. K Company's advance
towards
Signorini was very slow, and during the night 2 additional companies, G
and F, were sent to Hills 887 and 918, also part of the Signorini
Mass, to accelerate the attack in that area.

By mid-morning the British were still 1000 yards short
of Pratone, and to accomplish the plan now in effect it was imperative
that Pratone be seized as quickly as possible. To assure this, the 3rd
Battalion of the 337th was sent ahead to pass through the 2nd
Royal Scots, with orders to attack towards Pratone
immediately.

Advance elements met heavy sniper and mortar fire, and
in mid-afternoon were held down by heavy machine gun fire from high
ground
to their right. But in sending a platoon of K Company to the
east
of Hill 885 the route for a successful advance was discovered. Company
L
followed to exploit the advance, and continued to push ahead rapidly
during
the night.

Finally
the breakthrough appeared imminent. The strength of the Altuzzo
defenses
was greatly diminished, the fortifications on Verruca had been largely
reduced, and the way had been found to push on to Pratone. As the
troops
closed in for the kill, the prisoners they took showed more and more
the
strain and exhaustion of the 4 days' fighting. Many of them had been
without
food or water for more than 2 days. As a result of our steady harassing
of their supply lines our artillery effectively prevented their service
units from supplying them. Among the prisoners, however, were newly
arrived
reinforcements from units of the 735th
Grenadier Regiment and the 305th
Reconnaissance Battalion. But there had not been enough of
these
to prevent the breakthrough, and many had come too late. Moreover,
reinforcements
coming down through Frienzuola had been shelled by our artillery. This
had caused them a great number of casualties, and scattered most of the
rest. Whole units were confused and lost, and many were taken prisoner
before they could join their organizations.

One of the last efforts of the enemy in the 339th
sector was the recapture of Hill 591. Information was at this time
received
of the relief of the 3rd Battalion, 12
Parachute Regiment by the Lehr
Brigade
the night of September 16th. Accordingly, the artillery
increased
its shelling of the sector. A pre-dawn attack by the 3rd
Battalion
was planned to catch the Lehr Brigade
in as disorganized a state as possible, and by 8 o'clock the morning of
the 17th, the 3rd Battalion had seized Hills 724
and 732. Company A helped Company L retake Hill 591.
The
1st Battalion seized Verruca, and by 5 o'clock in the
afternoon
the 2nd Battalion had seized Hills 918, 802, 1031, and 1036,
and the 3rd Battalion had joined the 1st on
Verruca.
It was now apparent that the 339th had breached the Gothic
Line
in its zone.

Meanwhile, on the right troops of the 337th
Infantry had climbed along the ridges towards Pratone and through Rampolli
draw. In this sector the resistance was also weakening, but heavy
mortar
concentrations were still being laid down in the path of the advance
and
a few bunkers were still being manned. But before midnight the entire
3rd
Battalion had occupied Pratone and was organizing the mountain for
defense.

The final attack on Altuzzo had been delayed
briefly
to allow the elements of the 91st
Division
on the left to seize Monticelli. In the early morning of the 17th
the positions on the crest of Altuzzo were consolidated. Fonte
Freddo, a high point across the road and northwest of
Altuzzo,
was still holding out and fire from this area was harassing our troops,
but during the night the remaining high points were seized. The Gothic
Line had now been conquered along the entire Division front.

Towards the end more and more of the enemy gave
themselves
up--some because they knew they were surrounded and cut off from help;
some because they had run-out of ammunition and food. By noon of the
18th,
231 prisoners had been taken, and in the next 2 days as many more was
captured.
The number of casualties was even greater. The enemy dead were
scattered
over the mountains.

After fighting 5 days against a wall of defenses, it
was
with a solid sense of accomplishment that the troops prepared to
continue
the attack. For weeks they had heard about the Gothic
Line, and their thoughts and feelings had been intent on
breaching
it. They now had satisfaction in the knowledge that they had taken part
in the conquest of another of the enemy's most carefully planned
defensive
systems.

Beyond
the Gothic Line the Germans had no line of prepared defenses to fall
back
on before the Po Valley. But between Il Giogo and the Valley were
nearly
40 miles of mountains, including a ridge in itself as formidable as the
watershed. As time went on and the Appennines began to appear endless,
it seemed tbat the entire mountain range to the north might be called
the
Gothic Line. Whatever the name, it blocked the way to the Po Valley,
and
it was towards that region that the Allies were now attacking.

In pleasing contrast with the first days, the advance was
now
progressing with what seemed remarkable speed: the gains were measured
in thousands instead of single yards, and as much as 2 miles were
covered
in one day. The enemy was at first disorganized, but soon he began to
make
use of nearly every advantage the terrain offered, and reinforcements
were
coming down. Elements of the 362nd
"Greiner" Division now made their appearance on our front,
as
well as miscellaneous units of the 715th
Infantry Division. During the rest of the month the chief
resistance
was to be offered by the 362nd
Divisionand
the Lehr Brigade. The Parachute
unit
that had first opposed us was not now encountered in this sector. {German
715th Infantry Division was formed as a security and costal defense
unit
in May 1941. It arrived in Italy in January 1944 and participated
in the defense of Anzio. In September 1944 it was assigned
to the X Army, oposing the British 8th Army. In February of 1945, the
division
was transfered to the Eastern Front.}

As the 338th moved towards Firenzoula 6 miles to
the
north, they were subjected to more and more artillery and mortar fire,
but they pushed steadily ahead across the hills and down into the
Santerno
Valley. Firenzuola was captured on the 21st after the
Santerno
River had been crossed to the east. When our troops entered it,
Firenzuola
was already a badly shelled and bombed town. For several days further
it
was to receive heavy shelling from the enemy, and when it was finally
left
by the war the once attractive town was almost uninhabitable. Beyond
Firenzuola
there were no other towns any size in the Division sector south of the
Po Valley.

Beyond
the Santerno the first severe resistance was encountered on Monte
Coloreta,
on the right. This mountain, more than 3000 feet high, sprawled over a
large area. The 339th Infantry advanced towards this objective on
September
20th, supported by tanks and tank destroyers. Elements of the 1stt
Battalion
were the first to reach its slopes, digging in on the night of the
21st,
but the enemy was not cleared from the mountain till the next the day.
On the left the 338th was meeting small, persistent attacking groups,
and
it was in an engagement in this region that First Lieutenant Orville
E. Bloch performed actions that earned for him the Congressional
Medal of Honor. On September 22nd E Company of
the
338th Infantry was held up by heavy machine gun fire from
the
crest of Hill 733, northeast of Firenzuola. Lieutenant Bloch
asked for 3 volunteers from his platoon to provide him covering fire
while
he went forward to engage the enemy singlehanded. In and near several
houses
beyond the crest of the hill the enemy had placed machine guns.
Advancing
from behind a rock near the crest Lieutenant Bloch engaged one
enemy
position after another, killing and capturing several Germans. The
prisoners
he sent back by the men covering his assault. In all he silenced 5
machine
guns, killed an unknown number of the enemy, wounded 6, and took 19 as
prisoners. When this had been accomplished, his company was able to
continue
its advance, and without the losses that might otherwise have been
suffered.

The Division now moved steadily ahead over the
increasingly
rugged hills towards Monte La Fine, on the right, and Monte
Canda,
about 4 miles to the northwest of Coloreta. Instead of attacking
towards
the steep, south slopes of Canda, the drive was to be made to the
north,
past the eastern slopes of the mass, to seize the mountain to the
north,
Tre Poggioli (Hill 966), including the Zanobi rock. From here forces
would
be sent southwest to clear the by-passed Canda.

The enemy had prepared positions to thwart such a move. The
small
village of Sambuco and the Ravignana Heights to the north had been
chosen
as the center of resistance to block an advance on Tre Poggioli.
Sambuco,
a cluster of small, thick-walled stone houses, lay in a pocket among
several
hills and gullies, reached by only the poorest roads. The village was
encircled
by machine guns, which were well dug in, and machine guns in the town
were
placed to fire from the windows of barricaded houses. Only after 2 days
of repeated attacks, and close-in fighting supported by tanks, was the
village captured by reinforced elements of the 2nd Battalion
of the 338th Infantry. While the fight for Sambuco was
raging,
other forces were gathering for an attack on the Ravignana Heights to
the
north and on Tre Poggioli. From the vicinity of La Fine, which had been
occupied by the 337th, the advance towards these objectives
began on the 25th. After the 3rd Battalion of the 338th had
run into difficulties, the 1st Battalion of that regiment joined with
the
1st Battalion of the 339th to continue the attack.

The enemy was resisting from Tre Poggioli and from high
ground
to the west and south. His 75mm and 105mm self-propelled guns were
concentrated
against our supporting tanks. But after climbing over the barren,
shelterless
terrain the tanks moved across the path of the advancing infantry and
cut
the road leading southwest to Canda. This move compelled the enemy on
Canda
to begin withdrawing to the north immediately. Meanwhile, the 3rd
Battalion
ofthe 339th had seized the Ravignana Heights, and the way was
clear
for the final attack on Tre Poggioli.

The tanks moved up behind an artillery barrage, and the
infantry
came abreast of them, fired on by the enemy artillery still remaining
on
Canda. On Tre Poggioli machine guns and snipers commanded unobstructed
fields of fire over the bare slopes. But by noon our first troops had
reached
the crest, and shortly afterwards the enemy was cleared from the entire
mass.

The mud bad recently been hampering operations
considerably,
and conditions were no better in the area between Tre Poggioli and
Canda.
As the 3rd Battalion of the 338th moved up from Casa Buraccia to attack
Canda from the northeast, the march through the dark and mud and
chilling
rain was dreary and difficult. It turned out that the greatest
resistance
was offered by the terrain. As the battalion moved towards Canda on the
morning of the 28th, it met only light resistance on the beginning
slopes.
The enemy had left a few troops on the northeast of the mountain, but
these
were quickly cleaned out. The crest, which our troops reached at noon,
was deserted.

The
last ridge of the Appennines had been conquered, and the Division now
began
the advance across the range of lower hills eventually descending to
the
Po Valley 20 miles to the north. The Division sector included the ridge
of hills between 2 mountain streams, the Torrente Sillaro on the east
and
the Torrente Idice on the west. For a considerable distance it also
included
the slopes rising from the east bank of the Sillaro and a somewhat
wider
section of the ridge sloping down to the Idice from the west. The
streams
were now rivers rushing with water drained from the barren hills.

In the operations to come the infantry was to attack across
hills
and ridges overlooking these valleys, slowly clearing the enemy from
the
villages on hill crests or in pockets in the bills. In a few miles they
would reach several mountain masses - - - Bibele, Formiche, and
Monterenzio
- which dominated the smaller, nearby hills and the valleys. About 5
miles
beyond these the last range of dominating hills before the Po Valley
stretched
across the Division sector - Monte Fano, Castelvecchio and Monte
Castellaro.
Later, when the direction of the attack shifted northeast, other masses
of this range would be included among the Division's objectives.

Valley roads followed the Idice and Sillaro Torrents,
winding
back and forth. These were normally good roads, but in this season they
were deep in the mud that was sliding down from the hills.

The bridges crossing the rivers were usually demolished by
the
time we reached them, and the engineers were constantly called on to
construct
new bridges. In one stretch of less than 7 miles it was necessary to
throw
9 Bailey Bridges across the Idice. The valley roads were served by a
few
connecting toads and trails, but in the greatest part of these hills
there
were no roads of any use to the troops. Mules, usually with American
leaders
and Italian skinners, made the advance possible. As it was, in many
places
it proved necessary to bring up supplies on the backs of men.

The enemy continued his delaying tactic, fortifying
houses and villages, digging in machine gun positions on dominating
points.
From concealed positions his self-propelled guns and tanks fired
against
our advancing troops and against positions we had recently won, ready
to
join in the counter-attacks which he continued to make regularly. At
the
end of September the German forces opposing the Division included
elements
of the 44th Infantry Division on
the
east, and elements of the 362nd Infantry
Division
and the Lehr Brigade to the west.
Later
on these units were replaced by other, fresher troops. {German
44th Infantry Division participated in the invasions of Poland, France
and Russia. At Stalingrad in 1942, it ceased to exist. It was
reformed
with the honorary title, "Reichs-Grenadier-Division Hoch und
Deutschmeister"
in recognition of its "heroic performance" in combat. In February 1945,
the division left Italy for Hungary.}

After the capture of Canda on September 28th rain in
downpours
temporarily delayed the advance. Patrols were sent out ahead to
maintain
contact with the withdrawing enemy, and on September 30th orders were
issued
for the continuance of the attack at 6 o'clock on the morning of
October
1st, the 337th Infantry on the right, the 339th on the left. The 338th
was ternporarily in reserve. At this time the 85th Reconnaissance Troop
was attached to the 337th Infantry, and from now until October 14th it
held positions protecting that regiment's right flank.

The 337th's first objectives were Casoni di
Romagna
near the summit of Hill 751 and the hill itself, about 2-1/2miles
to the northeast, and the Villa di Sassonero, a mile farther north and
just west of the Sillaro. The 339th was to cut northwest to advance
along
both sides of the Idice Torrent towards Monte Bibele, rising from the
west
bank of that river 4 miles to the north. Both regiments soon ran into
stiff
resistance. Tanks could not climb through the mud and up the steep,
cliff-like
slopes on the extreme right, and on the left the enemy had fortified a
succession of small villages to block our way to the Idice Valley road.

Moving to another sector our tanks made their way to engage
the
enemy's armor, and the Spedaletto Ridge was captured by F Company,
337th
Infantry after infantry riding a platoon of tanks had gone ahead to
clear
the way. Some of the heaviest fighting in the 339th sector centered
about
the village of La Martina. The enemy was already sending down more
troops
and tanks to reinforce his garrisons in the fortified villages. The 3rd
Battalion was attacking on the right of the 2nd, supported
by
6 tanks and 8 tank-destroyers. This action pierced an enemy defense
line
which included La Martina, and whose existence was learned from a
captured
enemy document.

In
the mud and rain the advance went slowly ahead. Casoni di Romagna fell
to a surprise attack by the 337th on October 2nd, and once the Idice
Valley
road was gained the 339th progressed steadily along both sides of the
river
until by October 4th it had reached positions from which it could begin
the attack on Monte Bibele.

From the southwest a ridge led from the village of
Quinzano
to the summit of Bibele, and this offered the most suitable approach.
From
Quinzano, whose row of houses stretched along high ground, the enemy
dominated
the village of San Benedetto di Querceto to the southeast, as well as
the
junction of a network of cart roads and trails leading to the valley
road.
A half-mile northwest of Quinzano another village, San Martino, facing
the western slopes of the mountain, dominated the ridge ascending to
the
crest. In preparation for the attack the artillery had been softening
up
the enemy s fortifications, and on October 3rd 5 TOT's had been laid
down
on Bibele in less than an hour. On the 4th the 2nd Battalion moved up
for
the assault.

The plan of attack was first to reduce the enemy positions
in
the villages. B Company attacked Quinzano while G
Company
moved over to the northwest to attack San Martino. Quinzano fell by
early
afternoon, but San Martino held out. Tanks in San Benedetto were
meanwhile
firing against the enemy on the mountain, F Company was moving up to
climb
through the ravines on the east, and B Company started up the ridge to
the summit. The fighting went on throughout the night against
resistance
that gave no signs of slackening. The fight for San Martino was still
raging
in the morning, but B Company began to make steady progress up the
ridge,
slowly forcing the enemy back, and by midafternoon of October 5th it
had
occupied the crest. F Company too was making progress clearing the
enemy
from the northern reaches. San Martino was finally subdued by dark, and
the mountain was entirely cleared of the enemy by midnight. The first
of
the important hill masses dominating the Idice Valley had been
captured.

On the right, the 337th Infantry had gone on from Casoni di
Romagna,
along the steep ridges, on the 3rd and 4th forcing the enemy back
beyond
the Villa di Sassonero to within 2 miles of Monterenzio. By now the
regiment
had advanced well beyond the units on both flanks, and as a result was
receiving fire from self-propelled guns on the east and west as well as
to the north. An intense counter-battery program was now undertaken by
the Division Artillery and plans were made to continue the attack.

From
Monterenzio, 1800 feet high, the enemy commanded the entire
intermediate
area between the Sillaro and Idice Torrents. A narrow ridge led from
Hill 528, nearly a mile south of the crest, through the
village of
Scaruglio
to the summit. A church, a cemetery, and 2 or 3 small buildings
occupied
a level space at the foot of a large mound. The sides of the ridge fell
off in steep, rocky ravines to mountain streams winding through tangled
brush 400 feet below. The eastern side of the mountain fell off in
cliffs,and
the western side formed the wall of a ravine.

To the south and southeast the enemy held 2 mountain
villages,
Palmona and Zello, from which he was attempting to block any advance
towards
Monterenzio. Scaruglio was at the apex of defenses extending along the
east of the mountain to Poggiolo, and along the west to the Liano
Ridge.
A single road led northwest to Baccanello, and the enemy now sent down
numerous reinforcements to man his positions here as our attack became
imminent.

For 4 days the regiment made local advances, sent
out
patrols to feel out the enemy's outpost line, and constructed trails to
enable tanks to come up to join in the attack. The cold rain came down
intermittently, and the fields were almost quagmires. But the final
preparations
were completed and meanwhile the units on both flanks were gradually
straightening
out the line. To strengthen the assault the 1st Battalion, 338th
Infantry
was now attached to the 337th.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of October 9th the attack
jumped
off. The 1st Battalion was making the main effort in the center, the
3rd
Battalion was on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry was
on
the left. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve. Artillery was firing
against
the strong points, and now as earlier planes were bombing and strafing
Monterenzio.

At the very beginning the attacking forces met bitter
resistance.
The 1st Battalion alone made good progress, advancing 400 yards.
Elsewhere
the attacking forces were held down during the day and in the fighting
that continued into the night, but finally the 1st Battalion of
the338th
began to make headway. It seemed that the enemy was weakest on our
left.
He was apparently depending too much on the ruggedness of the terrain
to
discourage a strong effort in that direction. Accordingly, the 2nd
Battalion
moved up to the left of the 1st Battalion of the 338th in order to
exploit
the enemy's weakness.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 10th the attack was
renewed
with 4 battalions. The mud was now so heavy that no tanks could move up
to give direct support, and the attack continued without their help.
The
2ndBattalion's advance had been unobserved for some time, and before 10
o'clock it had captured an important hill southwest of Monterenzio.
Company
A of the 1st Battalion of the 337th had meawhile by-passed the
strongpoint
of Palmona and succeeded in taking Hill 528, leading to the
Monterenzio
crest, so surprising the Germans manning the defenses that the position
was taken before the enemy could fire a shot. The first important
successes
had been won, and as if to acknowledge this the enemy's artillery fire
was intensified.

The
other attacking units were making steady progress now, though
throughout
that night and the 11th the enemy was fighting bitterly. But in the
Zello
area, 50 prisoners had been taken, and next day more were to be
captured.
On the 12thtroops reached the church below the Monterenzio
mound
only to be trapped, but meanwhile tanks had come up through the mud to
add their support, and the attacking forces began to close in from all
sides.

Troops of the 1st Battalion now advanced directly
against
the strongpoints on the crest, while others moved to the right and
left.
On the night of the 12th troops of the 3rd Battalion moved north to
seize
Poggiolo, and cut off the enemy's only route of withdrawal and
reinforcement.
Now against the last bitter resistance our troops began to converge on
the remaining defenders. Three companies had been defending the
hill---the
3rd Company, 117th Grenadier
Regiment
and the 1st and 3rd Companies, 147th
Grenadier Regiment. On the 13th, 23 Germans gave themselves
up. Most of the rest were dead.

Early in the morning of October 14th, the 339th Infantry
relieved
the 337th, passing through the forward elements to continue the attack
north. As long and bitter and sustained as the battle for Monterenzio
had
been, there was more to come.

While the attack on Monterenzio was getting under way, the
forces
advancing along the Idice were meeting comparable resistance. After our
capture of Monte Bibele on the 5th the enemy fell back to ridges
extending
west of the Idice. Here he planned other delaying, engagements before
another
major stand on Monte delle Formiche, a 2000-foot mountain rising from
the
west bank of the Idice, about 2 miles northwest of Monterenzio. As long
as he held these 2 features he effectively blocked our passage through
the Idice Valley and denied us the use of the valley road to the north.

After the capture of Bibele the 338th completed
the
relief of the 339th and continued along both sides of the
Idice.
Several small villages were captured in the advance that went on slowly
day by day. Castelnuovo di Bisano was taken after a sharp fight, and on
the 10th the regiment had reached positions from which to begin the
attack
on Formiche. The objective was especially formidable because of the
steep
cliffs which fell from all sides except the south. It was doubly
important
to the Germans to hold Formiche since it commanded Highway 65, in the
sector
of the Division on the left, as well as the Idice Valley road.

The 2nd Battalion moved up for the final assault on the
mountain.
Two villages at the foot, Casa del Monte and Maceratoio, were cleared
only
after a day's heavy fighting. G Company worked its way to the
crest
on the afternoon of the 11th. Company F came up to reinforce the first
troops, and strong enemy counterattacks were repulsed. One other
village
to the east of the mountain still stubbornly resisted elements of the
3rd
Battalion, but when the enemy had been cleared from the cellars of
houses
he had fortified, and when the northern approaches to Formiche were cut
off, it remained only to reduce several fortified positions west of the
mountain.

Tanks were now supporting the attack when conditions
permitted, and on both sides of the river the regiment pushed ahead. It
proved necessary to clear some villages in house to house fighting, and
one village, Baragazza, was attacked under cover of a smoke screen
since
the approaches afforded no concealment whatever.

In this phase of the advance elements of the 34thInfantry
Division began to relieve elements of the 338th
Infantry;
and by October 15th the part of the regimental sector west of the Idice
River had passed to that division. The 338th then moved
along
the east of the river to areas near Fiumetta and Savazza, south of
Baccanello,
prepared to continue the attack northwest of Monterenzio.

The
capture of Formiche and Monterenzio had thrown large
group
of the enemy into confusion. Among the prisoners now captured were many
who came into our lines when they were separated from their units. In
the
month since the initial attack on the Gothic Line the Division had
captured
more than 2000 prisoners, and this in itself had strained the enemy's
organization.
But severe as his losses had been, replacements were still arriving and
in enough strength to meet the demands of constant counterattacks.

The 339th Infantry captured Hill 622, just east
of
Santa Anna; and held it against counterattacks. The enemy was defending
stubbornly, but the regiment pushed through the fog to capture several
important objectives--Hill 602, and Castelvecchio, which overlooked the
area to the north for many miles. Hill 532, the Vignale ridge, was
taken
only after strongly fortified positions were reduced.

The 338th infantry was gradually advancing through rough
country
towards Monte Fano, which it captured on the 20th. The 337th had been
recommitted
that day, taking up positions on Monte Cuccoli, and the 339th was
moving
along the ridge east of Castelvecchio, in a move coordinated with the
advance
of the 88th Division on the right
towards
Monte Grande. On the 22ndfurther orders were received for the
coordinated
attack. Other elements of the 337th moved up to Farneto on the ridge
east
of Cuccoli. The 339th went on to attack Hill 459 north of the
Parrocchia
di Vignale, and the 338th prepared to move forward from Fano towards
the
strongpoints of Pizzano and Orbega to the northwest. We were now
attacking
towards the last dominating range of hills in front of the Po Valley.

The fighting on Hill 459 was fierce. The enemy had just
brought
into this sector the fresh troops of the 42nd
Light Infantry Division, and these fiercely counterattacked
our first forces to reach the hill, overrunning their positions, and
killing
or capturing most of the advance elements of two platoons, but the
339th
continued to hold Hill 532, north of Castelvecchio. On the 22nd and
23rd
the 337th infantry seized Monte Castellaro, and in doing so
occupied positions well in the lead of the Fifth Army push towards
Highway
9 and the Po Valley.
{42nd Light Infantry Division or 42nd Jaeger Division served as a
security
force behind the front lines until assigned to the front in November
1944.}

On the 24th they pushed ahead again to attack Monte
Mezzano. The first attack made from the south was met half way up
by
a strong counter-attacking force which was repulsed, but heavy
artillery
and mortar concentrations falling on the exposed ridge forced the
advance
elements to withdraw. The next night the attack was resumed from the
draws
southwest of the mountain, and this was more successful. By dawn of the
25th there was a heavy fog, and the enemy counterattacked behind an
intense
barrage. Two or perhaps three companies overran our outpost positions,
but the defenders held out against heavy odds until reinforcements
drove
the enemy off and brought the situation under control.

Holding positions on Mezzano, the Casetta di Vignale (north
of
Castelvecchio) and Monte Fano, the Division was within striking
distance
of the Po Valley. The artillery was already firing on objectives north
of Highway 9. But it was now evident that the final push into the
Valley
and beyond would require time for the recuperation of losses and the
building
up of supplies. Accordingly, on October 26th the Division received
orders
to establish a defensive line in this sector while preparations were
completed
for a resumption of the offensive.

Somewhat later the Division was ordered to withdraw from
Mezzano
and certain other forward positions in order to make the line more even
with the positions held by adjacent units. The general line of defense
extended west from Castellaro to Casetta di Vignale and on to
localities
near Pizzano. Other adjustments were made in the weeks that followed,
and
defensive positions were held until November 22nd when the Division,
relieved
from the line, moved to a rest area. {Sgt.
Christos H. Karaberis, Company L, 337th Regiment, earned the Medal of
Honor
for his attack on enemy positions towards their objective of Casoni di
Remagna on November 1. Sgt. Karaberis captured 5 enemy machinegun
positions, killed 8 Germans, took 22 prisoners. He legally
changed
his name to Chris Carr.}

When it passed to reserve the Division had completed 70
consecutive
days of fighting since on 8eptember 13th it first attacked the Gothic
Line.
The advances of October represented an achievement equal to any the
Division
had to its credit. Less spectacular than the attacks on well-publicized
Defense Lines, the incessant drive over the mountains in the heavy,
chilling
rain demanded the most in endurance and resourcefulness. Since Canda
the
Division had advanced to within 8 miles of the Po Valley, driving a
salient
in the enemy's territory as the spearhead of the Fifth Army attack.

Since
May the Division had taken an important part in two great drives
against
the strongest defensive positions the enemy could construct and had
driven
the enemy back through the harsh and barren mountains of the northern
Appennines.
It had defeated several German divisions--the 94th,
the Hermann Goering, the 362nd---and
had cut up the Lehr Brigade and
elements
of the 4th Parachute and 42nd
Light Infantry Divisons. In the course of its progress it
had
taken 4937 prisoners. After less than a year of combat, the 85th
Division
had established itself as one of the best.

As time passed the men of the Division became more
conscious
of the reputation they were establishing, they had a longer history to
look back on, and more and more memories to recall. It is fully
realized
that this story is almost entirely a chronicle of the
infantry-artillery
elements of the Division. Throughout this period the 310th
Medical Battalion, the 310th Engineer Battalion,
the 85th Quartermaster Company, the 785th
Ordnance Company, the 85th Signal Company, and
the 85th
Military Police Platoon have quietly and most efficiently performed
their duties, which have aided the infantry's advance immeasurably.
This
brief account of some of the Division's accomplishments, and of some of
the places we have seen in our fighting in Italy, may serve to
strengthen
memories and be a record of achievements we will not wish to forget.

"THE
SUPPLEMENT"

THE WINTER INTERVAL:
THE LUCCA PLAIN AND THE STILLARO VALLEY

After its relief from the line in the Idice Valley
sector
on November 22nd {1944},
the Division moved to the south for rest, rehabilitation and
training.
The units were assembled in the neighborhood of Gagliano and Scarperia
in the valley at the foot of the original Gothic Line positions, a few
miles south of the Futa Pass. The weather continued rainy and
cold,
but in order to provide the troops maximum comfort, as large a number
as
possible were quartered in houses and the remainder in squad tents
provided
with cots. For further rest and recreation after the past months
of difficult campaigning all the units of the Division moved at various
times to the Montecatini Rest Area, west of Pistoia, where the men were
given four-day passes. Here, Fifth Army had established in the
numerous
hotels and casinos various facilities for recreation. Montecatini
had been a well known resort in peace times, and its sulfur baths were
highly thought of, and now greatly enjoyed. To the men of the
Division,
Montecatini became an oasis in the midst of a dreary land of mud and
ice..

As they returned from the rest area the troops of the
Division
resumed training in the expectation of returning to the line in the
mountains
west of Highway 65, south of
Monterumici
and Monte Adone, a few miles west of the Idice Valley sector. On
December 3rd, the 2nd Battalion, 338th Infantry and the 329th
Field Artilery Battalion moved into this area and were attached to
the 1st Armored Division, taking
up
defensive positions on the left flank. The Cannon Company also
took
up positions in this sector on December 9th. The 2nd Battalion
was
relieved by the 3rd on December 19th, and the remainder of the Regiment
was preparing also to move into this sector. Earlier, the 403rd
Field Artillery Battalion had been attached to II Corps, and on
December
7th had taken up firing positions near Barbarola, in the same vicinity.

The defensive line established at the end of October
was
still being maintained across the Italian front and meanwhile
preparations
were being made for the resumption of the offensive by the Allied
Forces
in Italy. The time of the attack was as yet undetermined.
But
stores of supplies were now being builtup, replacements were being
received,
and the units were being reestablished in full strength.

However, at this time, just before Christmas, there
were
indications that the enemy in the mountains north of Lucca and Pisa
might
be preparing an attack against positions held by IV Corps and the 92nd
Infantry Division. Some local advances made by our
troops
in that sector had been repulsed, and it appeared that the enemy might
be gathering forces to break through to Leghorn, now one of the chief
ports
of supply for the Allies in Italy. In anticipation of such an
attack
the Division was placed on an alert status on December 23rd and the
remainder
of the Division moved to neighboring areas in the succeeding
days.
The 339th Regimental Combat Team, after moving first to
Prato,
then moved to San Marcello on December 26th. The Division was attached
to IV Corps on December 24th, and was in Corps reserve, prepared for
employment
as a counterattacking force in either the sector of the 8th
Indian Division or the 92nd
Infantry Division. During these preparations Christmas
was celebrated with as much ceremony and gaiety as could be contrived.

{1945}

The Division was now preparing for more mountain
operations.
East of Viareggio, on the coast, extended a great chain of mountains,
some
more than five thousand feet high. The plain along the sea and
the
Sorchio Valley, cutting mountains north of Lucca,
offered the enemy the most likely means for attack, and accordingly
most
consideration was given the possible employment of the Division in
these
areas. Careful reconnaissance was made of danger spots, and
several
units of the Division were successively committed. The 339th
Regimental Combat Team was attached to Task
Force
45 near San Marcello, under IV Corps control, on December
27th;
the 329th Field Artillery Battalion supported the
operations
of the 8th Indian Division,
and the 328th and 403rd Field
Artillery
Battalions moved north to support the 92nd
Division.

As the days passed, however, there was no further sign
of increased enemy activity, and it soon appeared that there was little
likelihood of further heavy enemy action in this area. Whether
the
original flare-up was a diversionary move or not, was never
determined.
But when the situation in this sector of the Appennines defenses again
seemed stable, the elements of the Division were gradually relieved
from
the line and returned to Division control. And on January 6th the
Division prepared for a new mission, to relieve the 1st
British Division in the mountains south of Bologna in the
Sillaro
Valley, and to man defensive positions.

The Division was now moving back into an area it
already
knew something of. In the advance down the Idice Valley and
beyond
Monterenzio through the Sillaro Valley in October it had seized some of
the territory it was now to occupy once more. Monte Castellaro
and
Mozzano, west of Monte Grande, had been originally captured by the 337th
Infantry. These mountains, taken at some cost by the Division,
were
now in the enemy's hands. Mozzano was given up in the last of
October
when our lines were straightened out and the defensive line established
for the winter, and the Germans had recaptured Castellaro from the
British.
The long Calderaro Ridge, jutting north from Mount Grande, now was the
advanced position on the Fifth Army front. To the rear,
Monterenzio
and Formiche were the landmarks of our own bitterly won gains.

A part of the new Division sector was east of the
sector
from which we were relieved in November, but on the left it included
features
which had been held by the Division at that time. The Cuccoli
Ridge,
on the extreme left, had been in our right sector when we were
coordinating
our advance with that of the 88th
Division
on Monte Grande. Grande, in the center of the present sector, and
the Calderaro Ridge were exposed on both flanks. The Division
front
extended southeast from Monte Grande along the Corero Ridge a short
distance
beyond the village of Frassineto. The Division positions jutted
pit
in a northeasterly direction from the lines held by the adjoining
friendly
divisions, forming a salient. From southeast to west the line
measured
approximately three and one-half kilometers, but the perimeter of
defenses,
including the line of positions defending Monte Calderaro, measured
about
five kilometers.

This region was, if anything, more forbidding than any
part of the Appennines we had yet traversed. The soil was nearly
barren, the growth sparse and puny. The hills crowding the valley
were wasted with erosion, cut and furrowed with innumerable rains, and
in this season, when they were not covered by snow, the sides of the
hills
were steep, sliding fields of mud. In this waste country few
people
could make a living, but wherever grass could be sown to hold the
ground
in place farms were established, on the crests of hills, or bordering
the
valley. The few villages were smaller and poorer than in the more
rugged mountains to the south. As a result, the troops in reserve
or in the rear installations found few buildings in which they could
take
shelter. And what few there were were to some degree or other
damaged
by the war which had not yet passed by them.

During January this front was covered with snow, not
more
that a foot deep in most places, but in the revines and where the wind
drifted it was frequently more than waist deep. Intermittent rain
and hail brought other trouble, and the roads were often covered with
ice.
Mist settled in spells also and made movement difficult.

The sector was poorly served by roads. The
Sillaro
Valley Road, had been provided with a good drainage system by the
British
troops who formerly held the sector, and this road was adaquate for
motor
traffic as far as it went - for our purposes, not much beyond San
Clemente,
where it turned east. To the north only a few trails ascended the
ridges and mountains where our main line of defense was held.
These
were not even suitable for mules. Wooden and metal ramps were
laid
across them to permit the passage of mules of the 26th
Indian Mule Group, at this time supporting the
Division.
As time went on, some trails were widened and reinforced to permit
jeeps
to use them, and one or two roads were even made practicable for
two-way
traffic. All roads, for a greater or lesser distance, were under
enemy observation. Montecalderaro could only be reached during
darkness.
But despite their failings, these roads proved adaquate - the Boston
By-Way, passing north from San Clemente; the Assian Way,
taking
up where the By-Way left off; and the Western Valley Road,
serving
the left sector.
{These roads
with American names were constructed by the combat engineers. For
more info on these roads and bridges, go to page on 310th
Combat Engineers.}

Units of the Division had begun moving up to the new
sector
on January 8th. The relief of the 1st
British Division was undertaken gradually, and it was not
til
the 17th that the Division had assumed control of the entire
sector.
The 338th Infantry held the right sector, holding
defensive
positions in Frassineto, and manning a line of trenches and bunkers
west
along the Corero Ridge and on the eastern slopes of Monte Grande.
To the left were the positions of the 337th Infantry,
defending the western slopes of Grande and Monte Calderaro, and
extending
along the Cuccoli Ridge west of Marzolina. Elements of the 339th
Infantry had before this been attached for a short time to the 34th
Infantry Division, manning a defensive line north of San
Benedetto
di Querceto, but they were now brought back under Division control to
become
Division reserve.

Positions were fully manned, a few houses were
fortified,
outpost lines were established, and the troops settled down for a
prolonged
period of defense. As the weeks and months passed secondary
defense
lines were constructed to be ready in the event that the enemy should
attempt
to force the salient back.

The enemy facing the Division was the 1st
Parachute Division, reputedly one of the best German
Divisions
in Italy, and as long as it remained in this sector it was necessary to
maintain the most constant vigilance. The enemy's lines were
similar
to ours. These were the defenses he had constructed and
strengthened
after our advance of the past autumn had been halted. While Monte
Grande and Calderaro dominated the enemy territory immediately to the
front,
features the enemy held -- Monte Castellaro, Mezzano, and Vedriano --
commanded
excellent observation of the intermediate area, and from them the enemy
was also able to observe well into our territory down the valleys and
gorges
and lower ridges. Much of our traffic was under his observation,
and the route to the Calderaro Ridge, of course, was in plain
sight.
His lines of defense were similar to ours - lines of trenches, dug-in
machine
gun positions, bunkers with roofs of earth twelve feet or more thick,
and
a few fortified houses -- notably in Casotta, Di Sopra, Penzla,
and
Colle Raggi. {German
1st Parachute Division was known as the "Green Devils of Cassino"
because
of their divisional symbol and their excellent defense during the
Battle
of Monte Cassino.}

The activity on the front was confined chiefly to the
prevention
of enemy movement, and patrolling. On either side the detection
of
movement of any of the opposing troops called forth machine gun and
mortar
fire. Both sides were obliged to lie low. The enemy,
however,
was not apparently able to spend much artillery to harass us or to
interdict
our movement. But our artillery was increasingly active, and
eventually
the allocation of ammunition was generous to permit intense fire
against
enemy positions and the movement of traffic along the roads that served
his forward line. Highway 9 itself was within range at some
points,
and through aerial observation targets on that road were also brought
under
fire. The enemy had to be content with an average of hardly more
than 50 rounds a day. On some days very few rounds were
received
in our sector, but one or two occasions when our especially intense
artillery
fire may have led the enemy to believe an attack threatened he
responded
with what was for him comparatively intense artillery fire.

The chief activity on both sides was patrolling, most
of
it at night. The enemy was always anxious to know if we were
about
to attack, and some of the prisoners we took in February reported the
belief
among their superiors that an attack was to be expected in the early
part
of March. We, on the other hand, were alert to two
possibilities
-- either that the enemy should attack or that he should
withdraw.
This latter possibility was important in view of the enemy's plans for
the future - for it was thought that eventually the enemy would be
compelled
to shorten his lines, and in view of the inevitable Allied offensive
the
Germans might be expected to take the most appropriate steps for
preparing
their strongest possible defense. As it turned out they maintained the
same defensive line to the last -there was in fact no way by which he
could
shorten his lines without giving up more than the cared to.

Patrolling, to locate the enemy outpost positions and
to
capture prisoners for the purposes of identification and interrogation,
was a difficult and hazardous business. Through the remainder of
January and much of February the snow, sometimes covered with a hard
crust,
made silent movement difficult. Moreover, the opposing lines were
close together, in some places not more than two hundred yards
apart.
There were few trees or shrubs for cover, and on every likely approach
to the others' lines there were trip wires to set off flares, barbed
wire,
and mines. During the two months the Division held this line
there
were many clear days, and even when the moon was not full the nights
were
often bright and clear, and it was easy to detect movement across the
snow.
Patrols of both sides wore white garments for camouflage, but those of
course did not provide complete deception. Our patrol
experimented
with the use of war dogs on ambush patrols, when conditions permitted,
but is was found that dogs were not able to work particularly well in
snow
or in deep mud.

The Division held this sector for nearly twelve months,
and during that time the front was relatively quiet. The enemy
patrols
came over with fair regularity, and many of them were detected and
driven
back. Towards the end of the period the enemy began using
long-range
patrols, groups of three of four men sent beyond our lines to observe
our
movements and installations. Several of these men were captured,
and extensive measures were taken to prevent the success of such
missions:
guards and roving patrols covered the entire rear area.

Our patrols, feeling out the enemy positions regularly,
found that his outpost line shifted from time to time - strong points
found
manned on one night, on another found undefended. But there was
no
major change in positions.

The Division Artillery fired a preparation
demonstration
of the afternoon of February 5th in support of the 1imited objective
attack
of the 34th Division on the left, and the enemy reacted to this
immediately
afterwards with sharply increased artillery fire. He was
evidently
sensitive to the threat of an attack. For the rest of the month,
in fact, the volume of enemy fire was consistently greater that it had
been previously. On February 20th, heavy mortar fire caused
severe
casualties when direct hits were made on the Command Post of the 1st
Battalion, 337th Infantry. {On
20 February, the headquarters of the 1st Battalion of 337th Infantry
Regiment
received a direct hit from a 120-mm mortar shell. The Battalion
commander
and 4 others were killed and 12 were wounded. Sgt Cole said he
walked
out of the command post only minutes before the shell hit. (Reference:
"The 85th Custer Division", P. Schultz) } {See details in
Operations
Report}

Towards the end the weather improved greatly. It
was sunny and Spring-like, the snow had largely disappeared and the
ground
had dried. The maintenance of supplies was easier, and life at
the
front was more comfortable. The enemy continued to improve his
positions
constantly, however, since better weather meant to him that an attack
was
more and more likely. On March 8th orders were issued for the
relief
of the Division by the 10th Indian
Division, and by March 13th the relief had been
completed.
The winter was over. For the Division had received large numbers
of replacements in reserve pools, but through a system of rotation they
had been provided with battle experience. Now as all moved back
the
troops knew that they were soon to take part in an offensive. The
winter was over. The Grande front had been an interlude.

THE LAST ATTACK:

THE
PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN {1945}

The
Division now became Fifth Army Reserve while preparations were
completed
for the Spring offensive. The units assembled in the Gagiiano
area
once more, and troops were again given passes to the Montecatini Rest
Area.
Most of the units resumed their normal training, but the Division
Artillery,
minus the 328th Field Artillery Battalion was placed in
support
of the 34th Infantry Division
then holding a sector on both sides of Highway 65. The remainder
of the Division at the end of March moved to training areas south of
Lucca
and West of Pisa to undertake training in river crossing along the Arno
River. The Spring Offensive was being planned and the troops were
being trained to cross the Po, and all the rivers threading the Po
Yalley.
A hard campaign was expected and careful plans and preparations were
made.
It was not yet known in what sector the Division would be committed,
nor
exactly when. But as part of a "Cover Plan" to deceive the enemy
of the whereabouts or future plans of the Division, elaborate
precautions
were taken to conceal the identity of the Division and its locations
and
movements. All identifying markings were removed before the
Division
left Gagiliano, and the troops were carefully instructed not to divulge
their unit to any unauthorized persons. In addition, bivouac
parties
were sent east to the vicinity of Forli, in the Eight Army sector, as
an
indication that the Division might be committed in that area.
These
precautions were apparently successful. Later, when the Division
was committed, prisoners and documents showed that the enemy had no
knowledge
of the whereabouts of the Division during this period.

Finally, in the 2nd week of April, the first moves
forward
were made and the time had come for the Division to join in the final
Allied
Offensive. First the Eight Army
jumped off, in intense bitter fighting against the enemy, driving
towards
Ferrara and along the Adriatic coast eventually towards Venice.
The
Fifth Army attack began a few days later and by April 14th the entire
front
was attacking. On that day the 10th
Mountain
Division jumped off to drive through the last hills into the
Po Valley, supported by the 85th Division Artillery (minus
the
329th Field Artillery Battalion). This was the
offensive
the enemy had been expecting, but he did not apparently expect the main
effort to come in the mountains southwest of Bologna.
Nevertheless,
when it came he used all his strength to hold it. During the
winter
he had improved his defenses, and among the most effective of these
were
mine fields several thousand yards deep. Outguessed on the area
of
the concentrated attack, he was unable to bring up all the reserves
necessary
to stop our forces, and as a matter of fact he had comparatively few
reserves
available. The most he could have done was to delay his
defeat.
In the Idice and Sillaro Valleys he gave way comparatively slowly, but
along Highway 64, to the west, the 10th
Mountain
and the 1st Armored Division had
forced
the enemy back by Aril 17th. It was in this sector that the 85th
was now committed, to exploit the success thus far gained, to drive
into
the Po Valley, and to disorganize and destroy the enemy. But the
bitter experience of the campaign in Italy gave the troops no reason to
expect that the enemy would collapse, and every reason to believe that
he would fight fanatically and skillfully, disregarding his inevitable
destruction.
{The
10th Mountain Division, who trained to fight in the snow, arrived at
the
front only 2 weeks before the last snow melted.}

The Division had moved past Lucca and through Pistoia
to
Vergato, in the Reno Valley, over the last ridge of the Appennines into
hills as high as Monterenzio and Formiche, but less rugged and better
covered
with trees and pasture land. The weather was Spring at its best,
bright sunlight in the day and not too cool for comfort at night.
After weeks of unusually dry weather, there was the dread that the
stored-up
rain would come down now, but it held off, and as a matter of fact, no
rain fell until just before the enemy's surrender.

Advancing through the last of the minefields the
Division
entered the attack on April 17th, across the hills and ridges west of
the
Reno River. The first and highest hills were about 1800 feet
high.
The ridges were sharp, their eroded wastes sloping steeply into the
valley.
Those descending directly to the valley resembled the barren country of
the Idice Valley, but farther west the hills were rather thickly wooded
or else long stretches of pasture land. Highway 64, following the
Reno, was a first class road, but elsewhere there were only crude wagon
trails, winding in innumerable sharp curves over the last hills.
Everywhere bridges and culverts were blown, and mines were found on
some
of the most obscure trails. And while there were many farmhouses,
though few villages, the enemy for once had neglected to fortify them
as
strong points. This as much as anything indicated his lack of
preparation
for the attack in this sector.

When the Division took up the fight, the front was
fluid.
Ordered to relieve the 1st Armored Division
and elements of the 10th Mountain
Division
the: two regiments initially committed, the 337th and the 338th,
moved forward without at first making contact with the enemy.
Through
the night of the 17th and part of the 18th the troops moved up into
territory
the enemy had already abandoned. Past the ruins of Vergato and
along
the Reno Valley the Division attacked north arid northeast towards the
dominating hills, Monte Luminasio and Monte Torrenera. The
Division
was advancing on a front about six kilometers wide, in the last effort
to break through the Appennines and enter the Po Valley, to cut off
Bologna
and to destroy the enemy in Italy. The Po Valley itself was some
nine miles away.

The 338th was on the right, the 337th
on the left. The troops advancing on the valley road found
progress
slow as engineers went ahead to clear mines, repair culverts, and
construct
by-passes for the blown bridges. On the left troops marched
through
dusty winding trails, meeting a few remnants of the enemy who had
already
fallen back under the IV Corps attack. The troops now opposing us
included elements of the German 94th
Infantry Division on the left, and the 8th
Mountain Division on the right. The coordinated
Division
attack began at nine-thirty the morning of April 18th. Monte
Luminasio
was taken without a shot being fired by either side, but the unresisted
advance did not last long. First, some light sniper fire was
encountered.
And then as the troops went on they met the first strong points.
On the afternoon of the 18th the 337th met stiff opposition.
Monte Torrenera had been taken without much difficulty, but the next
terrain
obstacle - the Laguno Ridge - was being firmly held, and the fire from
the enemy's positions here threatened to hold up the advance. The
2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 337th Infantry moved against these
positions from two directions, and after tough fighting were just
closing
in on the enemy shortly before dawn when the Regiment was ordered to
shift
over to the west - a change in boundary just effected placed the Laguno
Ridge to the east of the Division right boundary. {8th
Mountain Division was previously the 157th Mountain (Training)
Division.}

Moving along west of Highway 64, with the 85th
Reconnaissance Troop moving along the Highway to protect its flank, the
338th Infantry was advancing easily, picking up a few
stragglers
on the 18th, and from them and from the unopposed capture of the town
of
Luminasio learned that the enemy was already badly disorganized.
This advance went steadily, several small villages were taken, but
before
Lama the troops ran into densely laid minefields. They succeeded
in passing beyond these, and then prepared to shift over beside the
337th
Infantry which had resumed its attack on the morning of April 19th. At
this time the Regiment met its first fierce resistance, from houses
used
by the enemy as strong points at La Collina, and at the same time they
were receiving fire from the enemy still on the Laguno Ridge.

In the day's bright sunlight and through the night the
troops slowly drove the enemy back with the help of tanks and anti-tank
guns. A few enemy troops holding out on the hills forced our
troops
to attack in short rushes, to bring up the tanks, and to call down
artillery
fire on the enemy's positions, and in the crowded hills the going was
slow.
But in the valley progress on the 20th was accelerated. There,
the
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, reinforced with tanks and
mounting
machine guns on jeeps, was steadily moving into the van of the entire
Fifth
Army. This force passed down the Lavino Valley Road, the tanks in
front, capturing Gesso at the very entrance into the Po Valley at eight
twenty five the morning the 20th. Then they began to move towards
Casalrecchio, a large town on the outskirts of Bologna, where there was
a bridge vital to the enemy in the supply, and now the evacuation of
Bologna.

At this point the Po Valley was not quite a level
plain.
But passing down the road through hedges bordering the gently swelling
fields the troops had begun the great advance through the Po Valley,
meeting
almost the last stiff resistance they were to encounter in the European
war. The tanks moved slowly ahead, the jeeps following, the
riflemen
in files on either side of the road went slowly, not knowing what they
were to meet in the way of resistance. From the hills to the rear
and sides sniper fire and a few artillery and mortar rounds drove them
occasionally into the ditches beside the hedges. But when this
sporadic
fire ceased the advance along the road was taken up again.

After a mile or so the troops came to a small village,
and in the road an enemy half-track which the tanks set on fire.
Then suddenly two Germans on a motorcycle turned into the road from the
side and fled to the north. The village was searched, but no
other
enemy was found. And the advance resumed. Ceretoto was the
next village, and here there was some stiff fighting. Enemy
machine
guns were firing from nearby, and some few of the enemy had sought
refuge
in houses where they had to be cleaned out. When the tanks
destroyed
the most serious resistance, the infantry in the uncertain technique of
village-fighting, killed the remaining enemy and took some
prisoners.
And then another village Riale, was entered, but before the outskirts
of
the village were left suddenly concentrations of enemy anti-tank and
artillery
fire halted the forward troops. From a couple of hills outside
Casalrecchio
the enemy could see us advancing, and he zeroed his fire in.. The
tank drew back to shelter where the stone houses offered protection,
but
two of the jeeps were knocked out. The enemy's fire was very
accurate,
and now machine gun fire was received from points not to be
successfully
attacked by the small reconnaissance force. Reinforcements were
called
for, and the 2nd Battalion, 337th Infantry came up in the
middle
of the afternoon. The fighting was heavy now, and the fire from five
artillery
battalions was called down upon Casalrecchio. Finally the job was
done. An outpost line was established by midnight, extending west
from the high ground overlooking Casalrecchio to the Communale Bridge
across
the Lavino River and the exit into the Po Valley was secured. Troops of
the 6th South African Armored
Division
had meanwhile entered Casalrecchio, and now plans were made for our
advance
across the Po Valley.

The fact was that the enemy resistance in Italy had
collasped.
After the breakthrough of the 17th he had been unable to
reorganize.
Here and there groups still in the hills held out, and the well
prepared
positions in front of Bologna were still being bitterly defended.
But from the 20th on the main effort of the enemy was to get out of our
way. First he had to cross the Po, some forty miles away, and all
the network of rivers and canals threading the valley. But our air
force
had long since destroyed all the Po Bridges, and the enemy needed to
get
there fast if he hoped to cross before we caught up with him. He
was fleeing now, and his condition was desperate. He no longer
took
to the open roads only at night, but in the full daylight, regardless
of
attack from the air. As the route got out of hand, any kind of
organization
vanished. There was no enemy front line. All the units got mixed
up, and as the days passed the Division was taking prisoners from
nearly
every German unit in Italy.

And day by day the prisoner count mounted, a few
hundred
each day, more than three thousand on another day. As the enemy's
confusion increased, he lost heart. He came to give himself
up.
Here and there were die-hards, and at the few points some commander
summoned
enough strength to offer a delaying action. But all the
resistance
amounted to very little. And there was no enemy air force.
Now and then a solitary plane came up, dropping a few bombs, or
strafing
the roads, but his best attempts were feeble.

Now the Division was advancing through terrain it had
never
had the fortune to fight in before. The area north of Rome was
rugged
in comparison with this. Long Fields of wheat and rice stretched
out in miles before us, not to end until we reached the foothills of
the
Alps, north of Verona. Innumerable roads, many of them
hard-surfaced
and all of them good in the dry weather, allowed us to advance where we
would. No hills, no high ground at all rose from the valley to
offer
the enemy any point of control over our advance. The canals had
not
been breached to flood the plains, and the narrow irrigation ditches
offered
no serious obstacles to tanks, if they had been required, as they were
not, to advance cross-country. A few rivers, however, might have
been serious hindrances, confined as they were by levees twenty feet or
so high. But the Sammoggia River, the first, was crossed without
difficulty, and the advance proceeded towards the last important water
barrier before the Po; the Panaro.

On the 20th the 337th Infantry had been
passed
through by the 338th and had gone into reserve. As the
advance proceeded, the Division began to leap frog the two assault
Regiments.
Tanks and reconnaissance elements would go out ahead, the regiment
would
follow, motorized more often than not, and after two days or so, the
other
assault regiment would pass through to continue the attack. This
was no hard-fought battle in which units pushed slowly ahead abreast of
each other. The 339th Infantry was still in reserve, though
on the 20th and 21st it had been attached to the 1st Armored Division, as a reserve unit to
protect the advance of
that division.

By April 22nd the 338th had advanced rapidly
beyond Santa Agata Bolognese and to
the banks of the Panaro near Bomporto,
to find the north bank of the river already held by friendly
troops.
They had met a little scattered resistance along the way, and some
artillery
fire, but it all amounted to hardly more than token resistance.
On
the 22nd it was the 338th's turn to go into reserve, and the
337th moved up to cross the Panaro at Campesanto,
meeting there the last serious resistance the Division was to
encounter.

The Panaro River
defenses
were extensive. Trenches and machine gun positions were dug in
everywhere
to cover the approaches to the river, and if they had been manned a
heavy
fight would have been inevitable. They were unoccupied, however,
except in the village of Camposanto, on the north bank of the river,
and
from here their guns covered the stone bridge which was as necessary to
our rapid advance as it had been to the retreating enemy. The
enemy
had managed to bring troops from south of Bologna to defend this
crossing
and he had meanwhile set charges to blow up the bridge. As the
troops
of the 3rd Battalion, 337th Infantry approached the bridge
they
were pinned down by very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, and fire
from
at least two Tiger Tanks in protected positions in the village.
Meanwhile
there was the great danger that the stone bridge into the village,
prepared
for demolition, would blow up. It was obviously necessary to save
the bridge; the banks were too steep for vehicles to scale. In
the
midst of the cross fire an engineer, Corporal Anthony J. Augustine,
rushed
down the bank and dove into the water. Lieutenant Thomas E. Buck,
of the 85th Reconnaissance Troop, worked his way to a
position
where he could to some extent cover the actions of Augustine.
When
Augustine reached the north bank he found himself immediately beneath
an
enemy guard in the prone position. This man wan then killed by
Lieutenant
Buck, and Augustine proceeded to cut the wires to the demolition
charges,
and saved the bridge for us.

The fire-fight across the river now became intense, and
the enemy still prevented our crossing the bridge in force.
Troops
of K Company swam across the river to gain an insecure foothold
on the north bank and troops of I Company attacked from the
east.
But the enemy was now using 4Omm anti-aircraft guns in direct fire, and
also some light artillery. The struggle continued into the late
afternoon,
and the enemy still denied us the bridge. The decision was now
made
to outflank him from the west. The 2nd Battalion crossed the
Panaro
over the Bomporto Bridge and then advanced along the north bank towards
Camposanto. The enemy now made his last effort to delay us.
About one hundred men counterattacked the troops across the Camposanto,
and were driven back only when met by fire from tanks of the 6th South African Armored Division, which
were then in our locality,
as well as heavy mortar and artillery fire. They then withdrew,
badly
beaten, leaving behind their wrecked guns and tanks.

The advance to the Po was now almost unimpeded, and the
orders were to go ahead with all possible speed, by-passing towns and
occupied
places. The reconnaissance elements went ahead and the infantry
was
motorized to the fullest possible extent. For some time now the
troops
had been benefiting by vehicles the enemy had abandoned in good
condition,
some even with gasoline in them, and these were put to service as the
race
to the Po continued. In contrast with the conditions found in the
advance on Rome and beyond, there was a surprisingly small amount of
wrecked
German equipment along the roads. There was not much evidence
that
the Germans had been heavily engaged by our air force, and there was
also
the equally surprising failure of the enemy to carry out his usually
thorough
destruction of the equipment he had been forced to leave behind.
But one feature of the retreat at least served in some measure as a
delaying
action. These were the hundreds and thousands of Germans who were
now being taken prisoner. Forward patrols were frequently
embarrassed
by the large groups of the enemy whom they had captured and were
obliged
to dispose of in order to continue their mission. Temporary
stockades
were sometimes set up, and at other times partisans were called on to
escort
the prisoners to the rear. The Division as a whole was hard put
to
it to find transportation to evacuate the Germans to the rear.
Use
was made of captured German vehicles, and any available vehicle was
impressed,
to get the Germans out of the way and not to leave them loose in the
countryside
where, however poor in spirit, they might have contrived some damaging
acts.

After the seizure of Camposanto the 337th
pushed
ahead, the 3rd Battalion on the right, the 2nd on the left, moving out
at midnight of the 22nd. They over ran numbers of abandoned
installations,
by-passed some groups of the enemy, but others, who were determined to
surrender, they could not avoid. After dawn of the 23rd more and
more Germans sought them out in order to give themselves up. By
ten
forty-five that morning the advance elements of the 3rd Battalion had
reached
the Po above Quingentole, and shortly afterwards the troops of the 2nd
Battalion came up to the river. An outpost line was established
from
Chiavica to Revere and west to Brode, a distance of about twelve
kilometers.
And now the prisoner hauls became enormous: the trap was tightly
closed.

While the 337th Infantry had been making its
remarkable progress, the 339th had been following in its
advance,
clearing up the by-passed pockets of the enemy, crossing the Panaro
without
difficulty, and liberating towns and villages one after another.
In its own way this was a triumphal procession, and on a small scale
the
troops were receiving the same kind of welcome they had been met with
months
ago when they passed through Rome. The peasants, the young and
old,
came out to greet them, and in the villages they had stands loaded with
bread and cheese and flowers and wine. They ran out to give these
to the troops, eager to stop jeeps and trucks to give them
hospitality.
For the time being at any rate, an abundance of food, and it was
pleasant
to receive. And so it went to the very banks of the Po - the
procession
through Bomporto, Modolla, Mirandola, Poggio Rusco, to Revere.
Only
once was there any kind of skirmish, and this ended quickly with the
surrender
of 150 Germans. At one point enemy troops rushed to man a
defensive
line, and as our troops came closer immediately sent an emissary
forward
to negotiate their surrender -which was arranged without firing a
shot.
Other villages to the west were being captured quickly as the 2nd
Battalion
of the 339th moved into Cavozzo, San Possidonio, Concordia and
Quistello. In this last town a complete German hospital was
captured,
fully staffed and in operation. By nightfall of the 23rd the
339th
Infantry had established a defensive line along the south banks of the
Po west of the 337th and plans were completed for the river
crossing.

The initial assault crossing was to be made by the
337th
Infantry, and meanwhile the divisions to the right and left of the 85th
were also preparing to cross the river. Now ocurred another one
of
those boundary changes which was characteristic of the Po Valley
campaign.
The crossing point at Revere was now incorporated into the zone of the
88th Division, and that Division
accordingly took over the sector
of the 3rd Battalion, 339th Infantry from Revere west to the
71st Easting, and a little later it also took over the banks of the
river
as far west as the 68th Easting, relieving the 1st Battalion of the
339th
Infantry. The 337th Infantry was now assembling near
Quingentole.
The 338th was scheduled to cross shortly after the 337th, and
the 339th was now assembling in the vicinity of Quingentole
and preparing to follow the 338th.

The crossing of the Po had long been anticipated as a
difficult
operation. The moderately swift river was rather more than a
hundred
yards wide in the Division sector, and no bridges remained after the
long
series of aerial bombardments. It would be necessary to cross by
rafts, barges and DUKW,s, and ultimately to build bridges to enable us
to bring forward the great quantities of supplies and the heavier
guns.
But while these difficulties were great enough, what offered the most
serious
cause for thought was the extensive network of positions the enemy had
been constructing for months to defend the river. Aerial
photographs
and studies had shown a very great number of dug-in positions.
Moreover,
the north bank of the river was steep at many places, and at others it
fell off in bluffs.

However great the hazards, speed in crossing was most
desirable
in order to obtain the greatest advantage from the enemy's confusion,
and
to prevent him from making the best use of his defenses. The
crossing
was originally planned for the night of April 23rd. Pontoon
bridge
equipment was being brought up for the use of the Division, but at the
last moment, on orders from higher headquarters, this equipment was
diverted
to the division on our left, and it was accordingly necessary to plan
to
cross the river without a bridge. The assault crossing was now
put
off till next morning.

Early on the morning of the 24th the 337th
Regimental
Combat Team moved on to sandy beaches and at eight-thirty the attack
began,
after mortars had laid down a dense smoke barrage on the north bank and
after a fifteen-minute artillery preparation by ninety-six guns.
Seventy loaded assault boats pushed into the river, and at eight
forty-four
the first wave hit the north beach. There was no retaliatory
fire.
The first troops pushed ahead, and meanwhile the second wave was
crossing
the river, and had landed at nine o'clock. The bridgehead was secured
and
not a shot had been fired. The defenses were unmanned. The
enemy had fled.

Later in the day the 338th crossed at the
same
points. There was still no equipment for building a bridge in
this
sector, but permission was given to use the bridge at San
Benedetto Po, in the sector of the 10th
Mountain Division, for supplies and some of the heavy
equipment,
including the supporting tanks. And meanwhile the beaches above
Quingentole
were crowded with troops and vehicles and the lighter guns waiting
their
turn to cross on the assault boats, on improvised rafts, launches, and
amphibious trucks. The crowded banks offered excellent targets,
and
the enemy did manage to send up a few planes at night to harass our
forces.
But anti-aircraft guns were well placed, and their heavy fire and the
bright
moonlight prevented the enemy from doing any serious damage.

The 337th Infantry had advanced two miles north
of the river before establishing a defensive line which they held until
the 339th could come up to take over the advance in their sector.
That Regiment crossed the river on the 25th and by noon the forward
troops
had passed through the 337th's lines. The 338th
meanwhile moved up on the right of the 339th.

The goal now was Verona,
the great rail and communications center on the Adige River, some
thirty
miles north of the Po, at the base of the foothills of the Alps, and at
the beginning of the great route leading into Austria through the
Brenner
Pass. Deserting the Po the Germans had fled to Verona and from
there
through the various roads that would give them sanctuary in the
Alps.
There was one last line of defenses they might attempt to man, along
the
Adige above Verona. When our troops reached these they discovered
them to be the most elaborate of all. The firing trenches and the
machine gun positions in hills overlooking Verona and the Po Valley and
the highways leading to the east and west were practically a
continuous,
connecting line. Adequately manned they would have proved a
terrible
obstacle. And while it had been evident for some days that the
enemy
was routed, and that his organization had been reduced to chaos, it was
also clear that we had lost contact with large, perhaps the largest
groups
of the retreating enemy, and in the time available he might be able to
organize some kind of resistance in these defenses, perhaps enough for
a delaying action, to gain time for more thorough reorganization in the
Alps themselves. His failure to use the Panaro and the Po
defenses
for such purposes, however, gave some indication that he was no longer
capable of effective defensive tactics. At any rate, our advance
must still be prosecuted with the greatest speed possible.

The 338th and 339th Regimental
Combat
Teams were motorized to the fullest extent. Reconnaissance
elements,
jeeps mounting machine guns tanks and anti-tank companies moved out
ahead
to reconnoiter the routes of advance. And everywhere the smooth,
straight roads were deserted. More villages and towns turned out
in the celebration of their liberation. Partisans came from
everywhere,
bringing in prisoners, besieging small groups of the enemy till we came
up to take over from them. It appeared that most of the Germans
we
now took prisoner had stomach enough only to resist the Partisans, whom
they feared, and that they looked forward to our arrival for their
safety.
Here and there our troops received fire from scattered automatic
weapons,
a few die-hards firing from farmhouses and villages, but throughout the
25th the advance proceeded almost uneventfully. The weather had
turned
gray and there were some showers. But this did hardly more than
lay
the dust, and did nothing to hinder the operations on the ground.
Nor had the enemy even contrived any considerable amount of
delays.
A few culverts and bridges were blown, a few mines had been laid, one
or
two roadblocks constructed. But it all amounted to very little,
and
the extensive network of roads made it easily possible for us to
by-pass
any even temporary obstacle. And so the towns and villages fell
like
ripe apples into our hands - Fagnano, Gazzo, Castelbelforte,
Sustinento,
Mosedele, Castel D'Ario, Erbe, Trevenzuelo, Vigasio, and early on the
morning
of the 26th our first troops entered Verona.
The city itself had already been occupied by other friendly forces, who
found a very small number of the enemy to harass them, and our troops
immediately
pushed through the city to the north. The 1st Battalion of the
339th
Infantry had reached the city at quarter after eight, and had cut two
important
highways - numbers 62 and 11, leading into Verona from the southwest
and
west.

The Adige wound through the center of Verona, and at
this
season it's current was very rapid. Fortunately, the main
railroad
bridge, while badly damaged by our months of bombing, could still be
crossed
by foot troops, across the rails and their supporting ties, which
sagged
but had not collapsed. Every other bridge across the river was
completely
destroyed, but a few miles west of the city, at Settimo, troops of the
339th discovered a small ferry, big enough for a jeep, which
was carried across the river by the force of the current, and
controlled
by its attachment to a cable. A few assault boats and some
Italian
craft were also available, and by one means and another the Regiment
crossed
the river without too much delay. During the night of the 26th
the
troops moved into the hills and the abandoned enemy defenses of the
Adige
Line. If the enemy meant ever to fight again, he now could hope
only
to fight in the Alps. But in fact, the Alps in his present
confusion
were no more than a temporary refuge. The enemy had been defeated
in the Appennines. After that, one defensive system after another
was useless to him. He had collapsed. The great Po Valley
was
lost once IV Corps had made its breakthrough. After that the
enemy
never had a chance to reorganize.

Troops of the 338th Infantry had also
entered
Verona on the morning of April 26th, and both it and the 339th
now occupied an arc of defenses to the northeast and west of the
city.
There was no contact with the enemy in those localities, but reports
from
partisans indicated that various groups of Germans had just passed
through
here on their way north. A few patrols and small task forces were
sent out to locate any such groups that might yet be nearby, and soon
some
of these troops found themselves in the midst of snow-covered mountains
five and six thousand feet high. Partisans were thick here, and
were
all the time bringing back groups of prisoners, and information of a
few
Germans in the mountains to the north. The Italians compelled one
entire battalion to surrender. And meanwhile great numbers of
prisoners
were surrendering from any number of German units - assault battalions,
alarm companies, truck companies, anti-aircraft battalions, tank
battalions,
bridge companies, sabotage units, and labor battalions. Many
nationalities
were represented, impressed soldiers and slave laborers - Czechs,
Yugo-Slavs,
Turks, Poles, Russians, Austrians, and Italians. Officers of Czech
Labor Battalions surrendered themselves and their entire
units.
The Partisans captured intact an enemy radio station at Castelberto,
twenty
miles north of Verona, and this was turned over to the 339th
Infantry. Troops sent to guard this station reached the farthest
point north in the Division's advance in this sector.

The Division remained in the Verona area until April
30th,
while plans were completed for its use to the east in the final pursuit
of the Germans. On that day the Division was brought under II
Corps
control, and the 337th and 339th Regimental Combat Teams prepared to
move
to the vicinity of Vicenza. The 338th remained in defensive
positions
near Verona under Corps control.

As the enemy scattered in the Alps, II Corps had been
given
the mission of advancing through the Brenner
Pass
to seize Innsbruck, Austria, and thus effect the final blocking of
routes
into Italy from the north. Near Feltre it was known that the
remnants
of several German divisions were seeking to escape along the main roads
into the Dolomites - the 305th,
the65th,
the 278th and the 155th
Infantry Divisions. To pursue and defeat these, the
Division
was now ordered to concentrate in areas along the Piave River near
Belluno,
to seize Innsbruck, meanwhile protecting the Corps right flank, and
maintaining
contact with the 6th British Armored Division
on the right and the 88th Division
on the left. To support this advance the 757th
Tank and the 804th Tank Destroyer
Battalions
were attached to the Division as well as one company of the 100th
Chemical
Mortar Battalion. Infantry Battalions were motorized and
reinforced
by elements of the supporting units. They moved ahead on the
first
of May, striking first for the main east-west highway - 49 - crossing
the
Corps sector.{155th
Infantry Division? - unknown unit.}

The main roads to the north were remarkably good, and
in
the great ranges of the Alps, in which the troops quickly entered, this
made the pursuit practicable. Moreover, the enemy had demolished
few bridges, and while some of the great bridges across the Piave had
been
destroyed by our own aerial bombardment, the river was very dry and it
was almost always possible to ford the river with motor vehicles.

On May 1st and 2nd the enemy offered little resistance.
Occasionally troops met sniper fire from a few troops left behind in
the
retreat, but most inhabited places were undefended. Passing
through
Fener, Feltre, and Sospirolo the advance was unhindered. The 2nd
Battalion Task Force of the 337th Infantry went ahead, followed by the
3rd whose mission it was to mop up any by-passed groups of the
enemy.
The first enemy opposition was met near Mas, where tanks were required
to drive the enemy from that village. North of Mas enemy sniper
fire
picked off several of our men who were riding tanks. Then
proceeding
towards Agordo, in the gorge near Peron, the forward troops caught up
with
a fleeing supply train, which attempted to put up some kind of
resistance
and was slaughtered. Some of the enemy troops attempted to set up
a barricade of burning vehicles, but when the tanks fired upon them
they
were destroyed. The utter confusion, the fires, the milling of
the
crazed and wounded horses and men resulted in one of the most
spectacular
and horrible events in the Division's history.

The 339th Regimental Combat Team, following the 337th,
had meanwhile moved to the east towards Belluno,
and then had taken up the advance to Highway 49 on the right of the
337th.
These troops similarly met only occasional resistance, and continued to
take several groups of Germans who were anxious to surrender. By
nightfall the 339th had reached the junction between Highways 50 and 51
at Ponte Nell' Alpi.

But before this the 337th Infantry had received the
first
inkling of the end of the war in Italy. At noon on May 2nd a
parlementaire
from the enemy forces - a tall, handsome German speaking the best
Cambridge
English - approached our forward troops with a white banner, and asked
permission to pass beyond our lines to inform other German troops in
the
vicinity that hostilities in Italy were to cease at two o'clock that
afternoon.
The Commanding Officer of the 337th Infantry had heard nothing of this,
and the emissary was detained while inquiries were made of higher
headquarters.
And the advance was continued.

The forward troops met a few rounds of sniper
fire.
Then suddenly they came upon a great, crowded tangle of troops and
animals
and vehicles completely blocking their progress. There was no
question
of a fight. The German army had become a roadblock. Our
troops
halted and the Commanding General of the 278th
Infantry Division came forward to present himself to the 2nd
Battalion Task Force Commander. The German general, Hoppe,
stated that his 10th
Army Headquarters had informed him that an armistice had
become
effective at 2 o'clock that afternoon. But no one in the Regiment
or at Division Headquarters had received any such information.
The
General was conducted to Division Headquarters, and then told to
surrender
his forces unconditionally. This he did, and became the first of
the procession of German officers to find their way to the Division for
this purpose.

Before dark the advance elements of the 339th Infantry
were approached by another German emissary who wished to deliver up
certain
units of the10th
German Army. And still the Division itself had
received
no word officially that hostilities in Italy had ceased. But
about
seven o'clock that night we were finally informed of that fact.
The
mass surrender now got under way. The Division received bodily
the
troops of the73rd Corps, the 76th
Panzer Corps, and units of the 10th
Army. In the days to come were to evacuate tens of
thousands
of the enemy. These were the fruits of victory. The war had
ended incredibly. There was little jubilation among the troops,
and
wide skepticism. But at least there were souvenirs by the
carload,
and then there remained the tedious labor of assembling, disarming and
evacuating the defeated enemy.

A photo from YANK
magazine of a column of German PW's beingherded to the rear by
a mounted escort of the "Custer" Division.

WINDING UP

While
hostilities in Italy had ceased, there still remained territory north
to
the Austrian border as yet unoccupied by Allied troops, and the Brenner
Pass and the road to Innsbruck still remained in German
hands.
While the 337th Regimental Combat Team took over control of the area
between
Belluno,
Mas, and Agordo where the surrendered German troops were being
assembled
and disarmed, the 339th was ordered to advance to the Austrian border,
to seal it, and to seize the Brenner Pass.

On May 3rd each battalion of the 339th was reinforced
by
armored, engineer, and artillery elements, and the three separate task
forces moved north in a column of battalions to fulfill this
mission.
The advance continued through mountains that rose more than 10,000 feet
high and deep snow in many places slowed and halted the advance.
The engineers cleared the road, but by four-fifteen the morning or May
4th troops of the 2nd Battalion had reached the Austrian Border east of
San Candide and the 1st Battalion had seized the Brenner Pass.
Here
they were met by troops of the 103rd Infantry
Division who had come south from Innsbruck, and thus
effected
a happy completion of the mission.

The Division now occupied and administered a zone from
just north of Vicenza to the Austrian border, a zone about 140
kilometers
long and about 35 kilometers wide. For most of the rest of May
the
units of the Division supervised the processing and evacuation of the
Germans
in this territory as well as persons of other nationalities. In the
early
days of the occupation several astonishing discoveries were made.
On May 4th, following information they had been given, troops of the
339th
Infantry liberated a group of important persons who had been held by
the
Germans as political prisoners. These had only recently been
brought
from the concentration camp at Dachau to what was expected to be a
safer
place, the Lago de Braes in the Italian Tyrol. More than a
hundred
people were here, some of them famous. They included Leon Blum,
Martin
Niemoeller, Hjalmar Schacht, and Kurt von Schuschnigg.
These people were freed from their German captors and gradually
repatriated.
On the same day another extraordinary find was made. Troops of
the
3rd Battalion, 339th Infantry discovered an extremely important
collection
of paintings and other works of art at Campo Turos. Many of these
had evidently been taken by the Germans from Italian collections to be
transferred to Heman Goering's private collection or to the projected
"Hilter
Museum". And at Fortezza troops of the lst Battalion discovered
the
gold reserve of the Bank of Italy, totaling nearly eighty million
dollars.
Besides these there were, of course, innumerable enemy supply dumps and
installations, enormous stores of ammunition and weapons, great stocks
of liquor - in short, all stock and impedimenta of a modern army.
All to be guarded and disposed of.

When it was relieved on May 28th the Division had
evacuated
in less than a month nearly 50,000 of the enemy - exactly 48,665.
Having completed this task, the Division assembled in the vicinity of Feltre
and Belluno to await further
orders.
For a brief period it was in an alert status, when it appeared that it
might be required in the Trieste area for use in the settlement of the
dispute arising out of the occupation of Trieste
by forces of the Yugo-Slav National Liberation Army. But by the
end
of the 2nd week of July it was apparent that the Division would not be
needed in this area and meanwhile word was received that the Division
would
be returned to the States in the near future to be demobilized.

According to plans being followed out under the
Redeployment
Program only those members of the Division eligible for discharge under
the newly established point system were to return to the
States with the Division. The others were to be transferred to
other
units in the Mediterranean Theater. The Division was furthermore
to be replenished with members of other units eligible for
discharge.
As a result, the Division on its return to the United States would
include
a
comparatively small number of men who had come with it to Italy.
In the early part of July the Division moved to the Volturno
Redeployment
Training Area, near Caserta, where
redeployment was to be completed, prior to moving to the Staging Area.{The
"point system" assigned points to each soldier according to time in
service,
awards, etc. and the GI's that had earned enough points were allowed to
go home first. Originally, the amount required was 90. This
system actually favored the service troops, such as logistics &
supply
personnel, who had spent more years overseas than the soldier who was
at
the front in combat. When Japan surrendered, the point system was
dropped. For an explanation, go to Points.
}

One final group photo
of Company D, 337th Regiment taken at Belluno, Italy.

The
history of the Division in the Second World War was drawing to a
close.
Its men were scattered. It has served its purpose, and performed
ably in more than a year's fighting in difficult country. Many of its
men
and organizations had been distinguished. 5 units received Presidential
Citations: 12 received
Meritorious Service Unit Plaques; 3 members
of the
Division were awarded the Congressional Medal
of Honor; 31 received
the Distinguished Service Cross; 2 Distinguished
Service Medals; 73 Legion of
Merits; 590 the Silver Star; 5883 the Bronze
Star; 125 the Air Medal; 37 the Soldier's Medal; 8985 received the Purple
Heart. It had worked hard, paid heavily for what it gained and
had
done well. It had lost 1,717
dead, and in addition had sustained
7,268 casualties. {See Table below}

Those are merely the outward signs of the
accomplishments
of the thousands of men who served in the Division. There was
much
more involved than the gaining of territory and the defeat of enemy
troops
and official recognition. These men gave their labor and thought
and feeling in order to serve a noble cause honorably. They were
not only America's heroes but the World's.

End of Supplement
to "Minturno to the Appennines".End of "Minturno to the Appennines".