Although fact-matching can be
imprecise and unreliable, in the present case our earlier opinions point
decisively and consistently in one direction:� toward a conclusion that the
court's finding here is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.� We
have found, for example, that a threat to blow up the mayor of Portland's house
did not provide sufficient evidence of dangerousness because the threat was
purely verbal, unaccompanied by any evidence of actual intent to follow
through.� Woolridge, 101 Or App at 395.� In R. H., 212 Or App at
482-85, we found that the allegedly mentally ill person did not pose a danger
to others despite the fact that he had verbally threatened to kill his mother
and the police officer who arrested him: �"Nothing in the record indicates
that [R. H.] actually intended to harm [his mother or the officer] in any way.�
None of the actions that appellant took * * * suggests that he intended
to follow through with his threats."� (Emphasis added.)� In State v.
D. R. K., 216 Or App 120, 122-23, 171 P3d 998 (2007), the appellant was seen
stabbing kitchen knives into the ground and then, later, she threatened to maim
and kill her mother; we found that evidence insufficient to establish danger to
others because there was no "evidence of any acts by [the]
appellant suggesting that she would follow through with the threats."�
(Emphasis added.)� The fact that the allegedly mentally ill person is agitated
and aggressive is not sufficient evidence, even when that state of mind
accompanies a death threat.� State v. K. L., 220 Or App 647, 650, 656, 188
P3d 395 (2008) (agitated, angry appellant tells child that "if that dog
and you come up here again, I'm going to kill you").� Further, when an
allegedly mentally ill person resists being taken into custody, that
resistance, even if it is unreasonable, "does not speak to [the person's]
propensity to act on her threats * * *.� Nor does [that] reaction, to the
police, as the only evidence in this record of appellant behaving violently,
form the foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness."� Id.
at 655; accordState v. Miller, 198 Or App 153, 159, 107 P3d 683
(2005).

The very few cases in which we have
found dangerousness based on a threat without subsequent action are also illustrative.�
In Pieretti, 110 Or App at 383, we found that the appellant posed a
threat to others despite no overt violent act because he made repeated and
graphic threats to kill several people and also "acted violently when
faced with everyday frustrations."� And in State v. Lawrence, 208
Or App 212, 214-15, 217, 144 P3d 967 (2006), the appellant was found to be
dangerous because the death threat he made against his estranged wife repeated
a similar threat he had made and started to follow through on in similar
circumstances in the past.

Nothing in the present case
distinguishes it from the typical case involving verbal threats.� Except for
vague references to past "fights" and an apparently physical response
to being arrested by three police officers, B. P. has no history of violence.�
He made no threats to caregivers or others during his confinement.� The only
person who testified at his hearing who knew him outside of the institutional
context, Stewart, felt comfortable in his presence, as did all of the examiners
except Sekiya.� Sekiya, for her part, was disturbed by B. P.'s level of
agitation and verbal aggression; he did not advance on her or explicitly
threaten her.� The threat involving W was not spontaneously delivered; it was
elicited by Richards, as was B. P.'s apparently passing and undeveloped
reference to his access to a weapon.� In short, although the officials who
decided to hold B. P. for observation and evaluation had every reason to be
concerned and properly decided, as Richards put it, to "err on the side of
safety," that caution did not translate into the clear and convincing
evidence of danger to others that was necessary to deprive B. P. of his liberty
for up to six months.