The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of
the record of proceedings of the second day of the
examination until such time as it shall be reported ready,
and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination
were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was
informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows:
Admiral Smith, I am directed by the Secretary of Navy to
record testimony pertinent to the facts attending the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. My precept
states that this is for the purpose of having on record
testimony which eventually might be lost due to death or any
cause which might make a witness unavailable when the time
comes. There is possibility that this testimony will be used
in future legal proceedings. Now, in such testimony as you
give us, I ask that as far as you can, you speak from your
knowledge which you had prior to 7 December and from facts
which presented themselves to you before that date. I realize
that that is a long distance back, and if at any time you
have means of refreshing your memory from documents, or
otherwise, we will stop and permit you to do so.

3. Q. On what date did you assume the duties of Chief of
Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet?

A. On February 1, 1941, the date on which Admiral Kimmel
became Commander-in-Chief. I might add that I served a year
and a half, prior to that date, as Captain of one of the
Admiral's cruisers

Page 42

when he was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet; and before
that date I don't recollect having seen him.

4. Q. As the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific or United States Fleet, did you supervise all the
divisions of the Staff?

A. Yes, everything.

[33]

5. Q. Then everything that transpired between the Staff
members and the Commander-in-Chief passed back and forth
through you?

A. Yes, it did. The Commander-in-Chief very frequently
would have certain members of his Staff in his office, and
spent a great deal of time down in the War Plans Office, and
I had other things to do, but nothing was ever completed
without my knowledge. I was in his confidence all the time.

6. Q. Did this relate only to matters of major
importance?

A. To everything. The usual thing in the morning was to
look over the dispatches and talk with him, and then the
Fleet Intelligence Officer would come in with his later
information. Then, the members of the Staff would be called
together at least once a day, not always a full conference,
but the people concerned.

7. Q. Were you shown all confidential, secret
intelligence concerning the Japanese, both from the Navy
Department and from the Staff organizations on Oahu?

A. Yes. My recollection is, we got very little on Oahu
except Fleet Intelligence, which was more on the possibility
of sabotage than on the war, but we had radio intelligence,
and every time the three Force Commanders were in port, or
even one or two of them, as a matter of fact, the
Commander-in-Chief would have them over, and his Type
Commanders who were in port, and have the Intelligence
Officer point out on the chart his estimate, by radio
intelligence, of where all units of the Japanese Fleet were,
at the time.

8. Q. Were you present at such conferences?

A. Yes, all of them.

9. Q. What other members of the Staff were fully informed
of all intelligence in this manner?

A. Always the War Plans Officer, who was Captain, now
Rear Admiral, McMorris; and the Operations Officer, Captain
DeLany, now Rear Admiral DeLany; the Fleet Intelligence
Officer, and the Fleet Communications Officer, and as many
others as the Commander-in-Chief thought necessary, but those
four were always in on it.

10. Q. By "Fleet Intelligence Officer", do you
mean Layton?

A. Yes, sir; Commander Layton.

11. Q. You don't include Rochefort?

A. No, sir. Rochefort was Combat Intelligence Officer
under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and
was not brought into these conferences at all.

12. Q. Do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief kept you
fully advised as to his thoughts and reactions to all such
intelligence information?

A. I do. The Commander-in-Chief showed me every letter he
wrote, or received-wrote to or received from the Chief of
Naval Operations. These letters were usually personal letters
because the Chief of Naval Operations had used that form of
correspondence for long before Admiral Kimmel took over, and
these papers had to be considered

Page 43

as official papers and they were filed, although they
were personal letters. The Commander-in-Chief numbered them
all, and I saw everything that he wrote or received.

13. Q. Do you know where that file is, at present?

[34]

A. So far as I know, it is still in there with the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It was there when Admiral
Nimitz took over, as are also the letters of Admiral
Richardson, who preceded him; he left his personal file
there, too, because he said it was official business.

14. Q. Were you afforded an opportunity to express your
views to the Commander-in-Chief concerning matters of major
importance?

A. Yes, sir; always. I might add that that was one of the
first things the Commander-in-Chief told me when he took
over, that he had had experiences in the past where people
were not kept informed and he wanted me to remind him to keep
his Force and Type Commanders informed of everything that was
going on.

15. Q. What members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff messed with
him?

A. Only the Fleet Operations Officer, who was Assistant
Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff, i. e. Admiral Kimmel,
DeLany, and myself. When McMorris, War Plans Officer, was
with us at sea, he also was a member. Now, when he moved
ashore the mess was increased to include the War Plans
Officer, Captain McMorris; the Fleet Aviator, Captain A. C.
Davis, now Rear Admiral Davis-and I think that is all.

16. Q. The Staff conference-was it a daily routine
matter?

A. No, sir. There was no set hour for it. He had a
conference practically every day, and he would send for the
people that he wanted. He would usually have over there
officers from the Fleet at the same time. He also very
frequently, at his conferences, would send for Admiral Bloch
and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye. l have known him to
have Admiral Pye over there two or three times a day. Admiral
Pye was important.

17. Q. Admiral, would you please advise us as to the
organization of the Pacific Fleet just prior to Pearl Harbor,
both as to the Type Organization and the Task Force
Organization, as you recall it?

A. The Type Organization had existed for considerable
time. That is, the Commander Battleships, Commander
Destroyers, Commander Cruisers, and the Commander Scouting
Force, who was Admiral Brown. One of the first things that
Admiral Kimmel did was to split them up into three task
forces, exclusive of submarines. Admiral Pye, who commanded
the battleships, had one task force consisting of battleships
and destroyers; Admiral Halsey had a task force of carriers,
cruisers, and destroyers; and Admiral Brown-Wilson Brown-had
the third task force, in which he had a carrier, cruisers,
and destroyers; and for operation or exercise purposes,
battleships would be transferred to those task forces. One
task force was always at sea and very often two, and they
held exercises against each other. Sometimes all three would
be at sea.

18. Q. Were there task forces, other than those you have
mentioned, which were composed of the combatant ships?

A. No, sir; except the submarines and the service force,
there were only those three major task forces. Patrol Wing
Two was organized as a task force to operate with the Fleet.

Page 44

19. Q. How about the forces ashore, sir?

A. Well, with the exception of the Fourteenth Naval
District, the Navy had no forces ashore. Of course, they had
Marines and an offshore patrol of destroyers, under Com 14.

[35]

20. Q. Was the Fourteenth Naval District a Task Force, a
subdivision of Admiral Kimmel's command?

A. Yes, the Fourteenth Naval District was under Admiral
Kimmel's command, and it was listed as a Task Force under his
command. I have forgotten just exactly what it was called,
but the Fourteenth Naval District has always been under the
command of the Commander-in-Chief.

21. Q. How did Patrol Wing Two fit into this Task
organization?

A. Patrol Wing Two was under the Commander-in-Chief,
based on land, and furnished planes-was used mostly for a
constant patrol of the areas in which the Forces were
operating. There was a daily patrol at all times, regardless
of whether the Fleet was operating south of Oahu or north,
the operating area was always protected by planes, against a
possible submarine attack, and, of course, Patrol Wing Two
also had planes at Midway, and made trips to Midway and Wake.
The Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Admiral Bellinger, was very
often brought over to the Commander-in-Chief's and assigned a
task in connection with the operations that were projected.

22. Q. Did the Commander of Patrol Wing Two come under
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, he did.

23. Q. Would you explain just how that relationship
works?

A. You see, he was based on Ford Island and was within
the Commandant's jurisdiction, but both were under the
Commander-in-Chief, and he was subordinate to the Fourteenth
Naval District, but Admiral Kimmel very frequently would
assign him a task, without going to Admiral Bloch.

24. Q. Was the organization of the Pacific Fleet by
Forces and Types a published document?

A. My recollection is that it was issued monthly.

25. Q. Was the Task Force organization similarly
published?

A. Yes, it is all a matter of record.

26. Q. Admiral, would you please explain the relationship
between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, in
Hawaii?

A. Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two
before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken
over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see
him, both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the
problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations
between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than
those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an
admiral, either there or in other places. They were together,
I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with
their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We
always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and
then developed a relation such that Army planes would use
Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was
found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the
other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army
and the Navy out there were excellent.

27. Q. Under the official set-up, Admiral Bloch, rather
than Admiral Kimmel, was the opposite of General Short, was
he not?

Page 45

A. No, sir. Admiral Kimmel never looked upon it that way.
He felt that he was General Short's opposite.

[36]

28. Q. Was it not the case that the War Plans, and other
official documents, were based upon the probability or
possibility that Admiral Kimmel would be absent from Pearl
Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and in the book known as "Joint Army
and Navy Action", the chart shows Admiral Bloch as the
one, and the diagram leads to units of the U. S. Fleet, if
present; but Admiral Kimmel felt that when he was present, he
was the man who should deal with the Army and with everything
else. He took that responsibility.

29. Q. But nothing in the way of official arrangements on
paper to that effect, was ever drawn up, was it?

A. To my knowledge-no, sir.

30. Q. That seems to have been an arrangement which might
have left Admiral Bloch in some state of uncertainty as to
his own relationship with the Commanding General. Do you
recall any difficulties incident to that?

A. No, sir, I do not. As I have said before, Admiral
Kimmel sent for Admiral Bloch very frequently and I never saw
anything in Admiral Bloch's attitude indicating that he
resented that. I have known occasions when Admiral Kimmel
went to Admiral Bloch's house at night, on receipt of
information, to talk things over and ask his advice. He had a
great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch.

31. Q. Admiral, under the provisions of the Joint Action
Army and Navy, what method of command as between the Army and
Navy was in effect at Hawaii?

A. My recollection is that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, had the predominate interest, and I think
General Short recognized that fact.

32. Q. Although the mutual cooperation method was
actually in effect, was it not?

A. Yes, sir. You see, when Admiral Kimmel took over, the
first thing that I did before assuming the duty as Chief of
Staff, was to inquire all of the means of defense of Oahu.
Pearl Harbor had no defense whatever, in itself. I was
informed that the Army had no airplanes less than six years
old-six years, in design. The Army had some 36 portable
3-inch guns that could be thrown around Pearl Harbor for the
air defense. We were not very much impressed with that and
realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by
the Fleet, itself, which it was.

83. Q. Returning to this Kimmel-Bloch-Short relationship,
the War Plans, Joint Action Pamphlet, and all, very
definitely put the Navy's part of the responsibility for the
security upon Bloch, did it not?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Was the reason that the Army and Navy business was
between Kimmel and Short, instead of between Bloch and Short,
duo to the fact that Bloch had practically no force, or was
it due more to the physical presence of Kimmel in Pearl
Harbor during those months?

A. Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command
and that when he was in port he had the responsibility and he
dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he
had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that
Bloch was his subordi-

Page 46

nate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army.
Usually however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had
anything important to say.

[37]

35. Q. Then the primary reason was Kimmel's physical
presence at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and, of course, when he moved ashore, which
was in the summer of 1941, after he moved ashore and was
there all the time practically, he just assumed that
responsibility of a permanent nature.

36. Q. In speaking of responsibility, do you include
responsibility for the Fleet units' safety, as well as for
the installations, themselves at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. The plan put out by the Admiral, fifteen days
after he took over, directed the Fourteenth Naval District,
as well as the Fleet units, what to do in case of an air
attack or a submarine attack. The ships' moorings were
changed so that they were moored in sectors where each ship
would have a clear arc of fire, and all the moorings would be
covered, and if one task force was out, the moorings were
shifted to maintain that arc of fire; and if one area was not
occupied. the one task force coming in was told where to
distribute their ships and where to tie them up so that every
arc of fire could be covered It was realized that the only
defense was by the Fleet. There was no defense ashore, except
the net or the gate.

37. Q. Was this letter that you referred to subsequently
revised?

A. It was revised about the middle of October, 1941.

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination.
Could you identify that?

A. Yes, that is the one, revised. The original issue was
the 15th of February. This was revised the 14th of October.

39. Q. Does this document, Exhibit 4, contain all
instructions that Admiral Kimmel issued with respect to the
defense of the base at Pearl-the security of the base at
Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my recollection-it is a long time ago,
of course- everything is in that letter. I don't recall
anything else

40. Q. This letter, Exhibit 4, prescribes certain tasks
in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, to be
performed by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
Many of these tasks involved coordination with the Army. Was
it Admiral Kimmel's intention that Admiral Bloch operate
directly, or cooperate directly, with the Army in this
connection, or through him?

A. I think, directly; I am quite certain, directly. You
see, the Commander-in-Chief occasionally went to sea for
tactical exercises and Admiral Bloch had to carry on directly
with the Army

41. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief apprised of all the
plans that were adopted between the Army and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Were you familiar with the Joint Defense Plan
which was signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaii
Department, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, as Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I don't remember it.

43. Q. This is Exhibit 5 before this examination, and is
that plan?

A. Frankly, I do not remember having seen that document
before.

Page 47

[38]

44. Q. Admiral, was the status of the Fleet, with respect
to materiel and personnel, satisfactory to Admiral Kimmel at
the time he assumed the command thereof; that is, of the
Pacific Fleet?

A. No, it was not; he demanded such things as radar-at
the time he took over, to my knowledge, there were only
radars on four cruisers and on the carriers. He asked for it
on all ships. He asked for additional aircraft guns. He asked
for self-sealing tanks for airplanes, and when he finally got
them, they had to be installed at Pearl Harbor. He
continually asked for men. He demanded them so many times
that some members of the Staff advised him that he was only
boring the Department with it, because he usually got an
answer back that the men were not available. He would ask for
20,000 men; 10,000 to fill vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000
for more training, because he knew that men had to be sent
back for new construction, and the answer he invariably got
was that, "The men are not available. They are needed in
the Atlantic." In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor,
we received an official letter stating, "I know that you
would like to have 20,000 men, and we would like to give them
to you." As I remember the exact wording: "The war
is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are
sitting pretty in the Pacific." That letter was actually
received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written
before, of course.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter
mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a
personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, file No.
FF12/MM(55), and copy is now on file in the
Secret-Confidential File Room of the Bureau of Personnel,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

A. (Continued.) The letters from the Chief of Naval
Operations were usually personal letters, but they were along
the same line, such as, "I have seen the President and I
am sorry but he will not give you any more men." And
while talking along that line, I might say that in-I think it
was towards the end of May, 1941, while at sea, we issued
orders by calling destroyers alongside, and detached the
YORKTOWN; Battleship Division Three, which was then the
strongest division of the Fleet; Cruiser Division Eight, of
four modern cruisers; and, I believe, two squadrons of
destroyers, which sailed under sealed orders, went through
the Panama Canal and into the Atlantic. Those ships were all
returned after war was declared, and they were equipped with
all of the modern devices that we had tried to get for them
while they were in the Pacific Fleet.

46. Q. What was the result, in your opinion, of these
personnel and materiel shortages on the training program-the
efficiency of the training program of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific
Fleet. As a matter of fact, the complements had just been
revised and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily
large. The Fleet was adequately manned, and I considered the
ships very efficient and the efficiency of the Fleet was not
harmed by this; but, the Commander-in-Chief was looking into
the future when he would have to send these men home for new
construction.

46. Q. Did that condition ever develop, prior to the 7th
of December, whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers
to new construction?

Page 48

A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

47. Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of
the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of
materiel?

[39]

A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly
before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of
Commander-in-Chief for degaussing and the installation of
armor-what do you call it-splinter armor around the decks and
anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a
year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed
docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect
when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The materiel
condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to
the Commander-in-Chief.

48. Q. Were you able to keep abreast of the program of
alterations as laid down by the materiel bureaus of the Navy
Department?

A. Yes, sir; pretty well.

49. Q. Did it interfere with the operations and training
of the Fleet to carry out this program

A. No, it did not.

50. Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined
have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the
personnel of the Fleet?

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the
Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in
April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet
problem, and was held out there indefinitely. The morale of
the Fleet did not suffer. In the summer of 1941, we arranged
a schedule whereby small task forces of one or two
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would proceed to the
coast of California and remain there for a period of
approximately ten days, and return. The force was never large
enough to weaken the Fleet, and this step was not taken until
at a conference with his Flag Officers, the
Commander-in-Chief discussed the question and it was decided
by all that it would be a very good thing for the Fleet to
keep some of them constantly going back to the coast. About
this time, we had completed a stadium which seated about
5,000 men. That took care of the morale of the men pretty
well. There may have been a question in the minds of the Flag
Officers, and some Captains, as to why they were being kept
out there-I had heard discussions of that,
unofficially-knowing that part of the Fleet had been moved to
the Atlantic Coast. A great many felt that the Administration
was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no
danger of war in the Pacific. The movement of part of the
Fleet to the Atlantic Coast undoubtedly had some effect on
the minds of the personnel in the Fleet. The health of the
officers and men of the Fleet was never impaired by remaining
in Pearl Harbor, in fact, it was excellent.

51. Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl
Harbor, rather than on the mainland, affect the materiel
conditions and the materiel readiness of the Fleet?

A. No, it did not.

52. Q. For war?

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement,
that he often discussed the question of the condition of the
Fleet, and we felt that it was better out there than when it
had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the
Commander-in-Chief making the statement that we had been
wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for

Page 49

the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was
for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day
and night.

[40]

53. Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any
definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet
at Pearl Harbor should be changed-during 1941, I am speaking
of-and returning to the old way of basing on the California
Coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a
recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941,
he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by
Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it
might have been done at that time, but I think I should have
heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of
his Staff, that the Fleet should return to the Coast,
although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

54. Q. Referring to your statement about feeling within
the command which was promoted by the transfer of certain
powerful units to the Atlantic Coast, do you think that the
mental attitude of the various senior officers in the Fleet
was in any way adversely affected by the long maintenance of
the position in Hawaii?

A. No, I do not. By that statement, I meant that the
danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more
evident to them had the units of the Fleet not been taken
away. There was no dissatisfaction or loss of morale.

55. Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your
opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the
Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early part
of our stay out there, the entire Fleet was anchored at
Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get
war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and
even moved the carriers in-moved everything in, and, of
course, invariably operated without lights.

56. Q. Admiral, you have stated that when you assumed the
duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, you made a survey of the Army's ability to defend
Pearl Harbor. Please state any knowledge you have of
subsequent improvements in the situation m that respect, if
any?

A. The situation was considerably improved after the
arrival of General Short. He had modern planes out there,
modern fighters, before the war broke, P-40's, some Flying
Fortresses, and I have traveled across the Island and seen
the fighters staked out. When the attack came on Pearl
Harbor, after the warnings they had, the Army had assumed, as
perhaps they had been trained to, that if there was to be an
attack, there would be sabotage, and they feared sabotage
more than an attack, and brought them all in the hangars, and
that is why they were all burned up.

57. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of
personnel and materiel readiness of the Army to carry out its
commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to
the Japanese attack?

A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding
Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department,
and General Short had orders from the War Department, to
prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines-off
of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes
in the outlying islands, and replacing them

Page 50

with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember
it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent
with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether
to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that
any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the
duration, in case of war, because they [41] would have to
take off from a carrier and could not come back and we had no
means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and
during the discussion of this, with General Short and his
staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General
Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson
Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I
believe Admiral Bloch Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I
expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin
replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen
miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and
Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn
good to me." The exchange was never made because the war
broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy
over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I
have to man these islands I shall have to command them."
Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army
commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a
ship into one of the ports", or words to that effect,
and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man
these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but
if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to
a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever
saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried
out.

58. Q. This was a definite order issued by the two
Departments?

A. Yes, sir; by dispatch.

59. Q. About what date?

A. To the best of my recollection, about seven days
before Pearl Harbor.

60. Q. What was to be done with the Marines and the
Marine planes?

A. That we did not know. We wondered why-whether they
were needed elsewhere. We thought perhaps that it was planned
to prepare an expedition force and the Marines were needed
elsewhere. No member of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff knew
why that was done, and we still don't understand why it was
not carried out, or what they had in mind-what the Department
had in mind at the time.

61. Q. Had the Army situation with respect to
anti-aircraft artillery been bettered?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

62. Q. Did they have facilities for obtaining early
information of the arrival of enemy forces by water or air?

A. The Army?

63. Q. The Army.

A. No. The Army had just built a radar station, but it
was not in operation. They had a Naval officer named Taylor,
a Reserve, who had had considerable experience in England,
and he was assigned to the Army with the idea of teaching
them how to operate the radar. but it was not in full
operation, and of course the radar of the ships was no good
because they couldn't go through the hills surrounding Pearl
Harbor.

Page 51

64. Q. The fact that the Army radar station was not
functioning was known to Admiral Kimmel, was it not?

A. Yes. It had just been completed and was not ready for
operation. It had been on that morning of 7 December but he
hadn't known it.

[42]

65. Q. Were you familiar with the local defense forces
available to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District
to execute his functions in connection with the security of
Pearl Harbor?

A. I was, at the time. I doubt if I could quote them now,
however.

66. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel also familiar with this
situation?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Was it your belief that the Army and Navy,
operating through the local defense forces, were capable of
furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against
air attack?

A. We thought so at the time. I realize now, we were not.

68. Q. Were you familiar with the plans for
reconnaissance and inshore-off-shore patrol then in effect?

A. Yes.

69. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel take any action, to your
knowledge, to augment the forces of the Army and the
Fourteenth Naval District prior to the Pearl Harbor attack,
at any time, in order to enable them to carry out their
defense functions?

A. He continually asked for more Navy planes. What
recommendations he made for the Army, I don't recall, or what
recommendations General Short made, but I know that they
conferred on it very frequently. I don't believe that Admiral
Kimmel made recommendations for building up the Army-General
Short would make those recommendations to the War Department.

70. Q. Did he augment the local forces with any aircraft
or vessels of the Fleet, to your knowledge, for defense
purposes?

A. Well, he had a destroyer off-shore patrol that was
built up, and, as I say, the operating forces were always
protected by air coverage against submarines. We were very
submarine-conscious and one reason for that was that we had
several sound contacts-perhaps all of them were false. On one
occasion, which was in the month of February, before Admiral
Kimmel had been in command a month, we had a contact by two
destroyers south of Diamond Head, and it moved slowly so that
they had it for 36 hours. It occurred again a month later. We
never found exactly what it was, but we had officers go over
to the Bishop Museum to learn all they could about the waters
around Honolulu, and came to the conclusion that it was two
different water levels, or water temperatures. The destroyers
had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one
time, Admiral Kimmel, about 6 o'clock in the morning, told me
to issue orders to Admiral Draemel to bomb this thing, depth
charge it. Before the order went out, however, he canceled
it, and reported the fact to the Chief of Naval Operations,
saying that he had no authority to do this, except within the
three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor, and the reply he got
was "Thank God you didn't. It might have caused
international difficulties," or words to that effect.
So, we had so many of these contacts, probably all of them
false, that we were submarine conscious more than
air-conscious, and I think every one in the Fleet expected if
an attack came, it would be by submarines

Page 52

rather than aircraft. You will notice that that order
covers both air and submarine attack, but I believe that the
people of the Fleet felt little danger of an air attack on
Pearl Harbor.

71. Q. Was this off-shore patrol maintained at all times,
or intermittently?

[43]

A. At all times.

72. Q. What belt around Oahu did it cover, in distances?

A. The area south of Pearl Harbor. Occasionally we had
destroyers go around the Island at night, but our destroyers
at that time were not equipped with radar, they were equipped
with sound. There was not a constant patrol around the
Island, we didn't have enough destroyers for that purpose,
but there was a constant patrol in the operating area south
of Pearl Harbor.

73. Q. Do you know if any other patrol, either air or
destroyer, was maintained by either the Army or the Navy?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no patrol
maintained by the Army. The patrol maintained by the Navy was
as extensive as Commander PatWing Two felt he could make it.
He claimed that he did not have enough planes to maintain a
patrol, daily patrol, in all directions from Oahu, and for
that reason the air patrol was confined to the operating
areas-the regular patrol.

74. Q. Do you know whether the statement or views of
Commander PatWing Two were based upon the fact that a
continuous air patrol would fatigue personnel and wear out
materiel, or was he referring to his inability to make such a
patrol over short periods of time?

A. Based entirely on materiel.

76. Q. Long-range, every day?

A. Yes. The planes wouldn't stand it.

76. Q. Then the only two types of normal patrol
maintained, say, a month before Pearl Harbor, that you know
of were destroyers offshore, and the air patrol covering the
operating areas?

A. Well, we had a Patrol Wing at Midway. of course, and
the very frequently patrolled back and forth, going by way of
Johnston's Island; and of course we had planes on Wake, but
there was no patrol such as we use today, the long-range,
daily patrol.

77. Q. Would you please explain what action was taken by
the Task Forces while at sea to obtain information of
important enemy movements in the close vicinity of Pearl
Harbor?

A. When the Task Forces were engaged in operations, they
were blacked out at night. They had destroyer protection.
There was no long-range search, however, made by the carriers
with planes, against an enemy.

78. Q. They were not, then, considered as a part of the
reconnaissance facilities for the defense or security of
Pearl Harbor?

A. Not until the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when
Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, was given instructions by
Admiral Kimmel not to return with the Task Force but to take
18 Marine fighters out to within 200 miles of Wake and fly
them off, because the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied
with the defenses of Wake, and of course it was for that
reason that the ENTERPRISE was not lost, because she was due
to be in the port, where the UTAH was tied up, during the
attack. Before he left, Admiral Halsey said "This is a
very secret movement. What shall I do in case I meet

Page 53

Japanese forces?" And Admiral Kimmel said "In
that case, use your own discretion." And Admiral Halsey
replied "Those are the best orders I have ever received,
and to keep my movements secret, if I find even a Japanese
sampan, I will sink it." So that trip I believe Admiral
Halsey had an air search out all the time, in fact, I know he
did.

[44]

79. Q. Under the Army-Navy agreement, responsibility for
the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack, bombardment
from ships, and landing forces, of course is all Army
responsibility. Are you sure that you have conveyed to us all
steps known to have been taken to ascertain the Army's
readiness to meet their commitments on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. About how many Army pursuit planes did you
understand to be available on Oahu?

A. Something in the vicinity of a hundred, I should say.

81. Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency,
particularly as regards personnel?

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That
was based upon our observations during Fleet Operations, when
their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack
level, and showed an utter disregard for possible
anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and
theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, expressed the
opinion that they were not very good.

82. Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or
the Army pursuits?

A. Both.

83. Q. Insofar as you did give thought to the possibility
of a Japanese air raid, what did you consider the most
effective defense against it?

A. The most efficacious defense against it, we felt, was
from our own carrier planes, and when the attack occurred,
our carriers were all at sea.

84. Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of
the efficiency of Army aircraft?

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the
Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy
fliers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw,
were not very complimentary to the Army fliers.

85. Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier
raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give
warning?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air
raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable,
you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire,
there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor,
including the Fleet,-is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having
given any opinions or advice on the matter?

A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

88 Q. Admiral, you were familiar with the basic War Plans
in effect in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, were you
not?

A. Yes.

Page 55

89. Q. Were you familiar with the missions assigned
therein to the United States Pacific Fleet?

[45]

A. I do not recall what the detailed mission of the
Pacific Fleet was, except that we had no orders what to do in
case of war, or where to go.

90. Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the
United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in
their nature?

A. My recollection is-they were defensive.

91. Q. Do you recall whether they called for any
contemplated movement to the westward?

A. I am positive they did not. I am now thoroughly
familiar with the War Plans, but I know that the Fleet had no
orders or plans to move to the far westward, such as to
relieve the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The witness was directed to refresh his memory on the
point in question, and be prepared to answer in more detail
later.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U.
S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.

92. Q. Admiral, what intelligence organizations were
available to the Commander-in-Chief to give him enemy
intelligence, with respect to the Japanese particularly?

A. There was the intelligence organization of the
Fourteenth District, and there was the intelligence officer.
The Fleet Intelligence officer and his assistant, a
Lieutenant Hudson, were both Japanese-language-speaking
officers. Just what intelligence they got from the Army, I do
not recall. We had our dispatches, of course, from the
Department and radio intelligence. The Fleet Intelligence
officer believed he knew where all units of the Japanese
Fleet were and would report them from day to day. Of course,
it turned out he was wrong.

93. Q. The Commander-in-Chief then was given the
intelligence information available in the Combat Intelligence
Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Oh, yes.

94. Q. Were you also acquainted with such
information?

A. Yes, every morning the Fleet Intelligence officer came
to the Commander-in-Chief about nine o'clock in the morning,
after the Commander-in-Chief had read the morning dispatches,
and gave him the latest information. I was always present
when he did.

95. Q. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence provide the
Commander-in-Chief with periodic information as to Japanese
current movements?

A. I can recall only their pamphlets, stuff that they
regularly put out. I don't recall any dispatches from Naval
Intelligence.

96 Q. Are you familiar with their fortnightly summaries
that they provide to the senior command afloat?

A. Yes.

97. Q. What information was furnished concerning Japanese
naval leaders?

A. The best information that we received on Japanese
naval leaders came through Commander McCrea on his return
from a mission to the Commander-in- [56] Chief Asiatic. That
was a week before Admiral Kimmel took over and gave Admiral
Hart's estimate of each one of these Japanese naval leaders
and was the best estimate we ever received. I can not recall
that we ever received one from Naval intelligence or from the
Navy Department.

A. Yes, he and Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, the
War plans officer, and I were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in
the commander-in-chief's cabin when McCrea came through and
we had an all afternoon conference. McCrea read out from this
little book that he carried these comments. They were copied
down and put in the secret file.

99. Q. Did his information include information concerning
Japanese Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Very much so; yes. As I recall the comment on him, he
was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous. I may
have those words wrong but that's the impression I got at the
time.

100. Q. During 1941, was Admiral Kimmel informed as to
the duties being performed by Admiral Yamamoto in the
Japanese Navy, as to his position?

A. I'm quite certain; yes.

101. Q. The Commander-in-Chief was in touch with anything
vital in the way of local intelligence obtained in Hawaii,
was he not?

A. Yes, sir, except that we did not have access to the
files of the cable office. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had
made some effort to get these files. My recollection, it was
taken to Mr. Mackey of the Postal Telegraph, being contrary
to the United States law to divulge a telegraph or cable
message. At that time, there were certain Japanese codes
which we could break and the intelligence officer felt that
if he could get those messages he might learn what was going
on. We didn't get them until three days after Pearl Harbor.
We never got anything from that before the war.

102. Q. Do you know anything of an attempt having been
made to arrest or otherwise segregate suspected Japanese
agents?

A. I remember an incident a few months before the war
where an American came from San Francisco; he had
communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing
so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent out by
the Japanese, by plane. The intelligence officer made contact
with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we
removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the
results of target practice, and gave them to this American
who flew back to the West Coast and, as the result of all
this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant,
I believe a Charlie Chaplin, were arrested. No action was
taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese
Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to
the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the
money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of
the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had
been developed years before that some of the priests were
ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who
had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was
made to deport one of these priests, but is was found nothing
could be done because of an old agreement between the United
Stated and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the
past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the
country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing
could be done about [47] it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew
of that case. In the summer of 1940, when

Page 56

Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to
rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and
a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one
beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were
out. We changed course after dark and stayed at sea for a
week or more, preserving radio silence, and engaged in no
real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have
never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through
Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity
on the part of Japanese communication between Oahu and the
Island of Hawaii trying to learn the whereabouts of our
Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working but, to the
best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the
Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents
were. We suspected all of them.

103. Q. Then you do not recall a discussion between the
Army and Navy at Oahu concerning the rather wholesale arrests
or segregation of some agents?

A. No, sir, I do not. I believe that the Army did have
certain Japanese spotted with the idea of taking them in, in
case of war, but I did not take any active part in
discussions of that.

104. Q. Other than daily reports by Layton, in which he
considered that he knew the location of all important
Japanese naval units, do you recall receiving any other
similar intelligence during the last few weeks of 1941?

A. We had frequent dispatches on the course of events
from the Navy Department. The last of which I believe was the
27th of November. No, sir, all that I received was through
the Fleet Intelligence Office.

105. Q. On or about 1 December '41, where do you recall
that information to have indicated the important Japanese
naval units to be?

A. I can not recall that in detail. One Fleet was
supposed to be at Truk, and, to the best of my recollection,
the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in
Empire waters.

106. Q. What about the carriers?

A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet
Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they
were.

107. Q. Do you recall any difference of opinion between
the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and
Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers?

A. No, sir, I do not.

108. Q. Admiral, you have referred to certain dispatches
received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the
Navy Department with relation to the international situation
in the Pacific. I have here Exhibit 6 before this
examination, dispatch of 16 October 1941, addressed by the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, which I will give to
you and ask whether you are familiar with that dispatch

A. Yes, sir, I remember it.

109. Q. This dispatch was received by the
Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

110. Q. It is noted that this dispatch refers to the
grave international situation and indicates possible action,
aggressive action, on the part of [48] the Japanese. Do you
recall whether the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff made any
estimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of the
contents of this dispatch?

Page 57

A. To the best of my recollection, no specific change of
plan was made because we had received warnings constantly-I
should say weekly-for a period of more than a year; warnings
long before the commander-in-Chief ever took over, or Admiral
Kimmel ever took over. These were in the form of letters,
usually from the Chief of Naval Operations, who frequently
wound up his letters by saying "It may happen
tomorrow." So that the Fleet had been pretty much on the
alert from the time it got out there. I don't recall that
anything was done particularly about that dispatch; the 16th.

111. Q. The dispatch also provides that the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet inform appropriate Army and
Navy District authorities. Do you know that this was
done?

A. Yes. I may get that mixed up with a later dispatch.
Frequently, those dispatches of that nature were taken over
by the Fleet intelligence Officer in person to General Short
and Admiral Bloch was always asked to come over and read them
in the Commander-in-Chief's office. In a later dispatch,
General Short was sent for; a dispatch of that nature which I
think was dated the 27th of November. There were so many of
those that I may confuse one with the other.

112. Q. We'll get to the others shortly and you may have
some comment on them in general. Now I'd like you to confine
your testimony about what you know about the individual ones.
Do you know whether or not any discussion of the meaning and
the possible repercussions which might follow, meaning of the
contents of this dispatch, were discussed by the
Commander-in-Chief with General Short or with Admiral Bloch
or both?

A. I can not recall in this specific case, but I believe
that every one of the messages of that nature were discussed
by General Short, Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch.

113. Q. What was the nature of such discussions?

A. Well, usually we would call in members of the Staff
and, as I said before, Admiral Pye, if in port, and would
exchange ideas and information on it.

114. Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts
to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General
or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon
Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

115. Q. Was there any discussion as to the availability
of the proper means on the part of any of the Services to
carry out its functions in protecting Pearl Harbor in the
light of the warning?

A. The warning was not made that Pearl Harbor would be
attacked. The warning indicated that the attack would go
elsewhere. We never received a warning about an attack on
Pearl Harbor.

116. Q. Was there any contemplation by any of the parties
that conferred of an attack on Hawaii by air, any time that
you recall?

[49]

A. No, I do not, except, as I stated before, the ships
were so berthed that they had a clear arc of fire for
anti-aircraft guns in all four sectors, and that when a task
force came in, the senior officer of a sector invariably
reported that he had taken over command of that sector. I
believe that's laid out in that October 15 letter.

117. Q. Do you ever recall that General Short asked for
any assistance from Admiral Kimmel in providing for the
defense of Pearl Harbor should it be attacked by air?

Page 58

A. No.

118. Q. Do you ever recall Admiral Bloch asking for
assistance from the Fleet carrying out the functions assigned
him by the security letter, Exhibit 4?

A. No, never.

119. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 6, further provides that
the Commanders-in-Chief addressed, including
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, should take precautions,
including preparatory deployment as will not constitute
strategic intention or constitute provocative action against
Japan. Do you recall the action taken by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to this
directive?

A. My recollection is that in each one of those cases,
including the one you mentioned, his alert was sent to the
forces in the operating areas and, on those occasions, the
training exercises were halted and the ships assembled with
their destroyer screen and placed, until further orders, as a
Fleet and still kept at sea. The ships in port however, were
not moved out. Conditions of readiness were prescribed for
ships in port.

120. Q. You speak of the task forces being alerted. Do
you mean that a prescribed state of readiness was designated?

A. I believe the October 14 letter told what to do. The
message was sent out: Task force operating at sea. Dispatch
striking unit. Make appropriate defense disposition of heavy
ships and remaining surface forces at sea. Dispatch destroyer
attack unit if circumstances require. Keep
Commander-in-Chief, Naval Defense Officer and Senior Officer
embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks
or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

121. Q. It is your belief then that after receipt of this
dispatch of October 15 and its further promulgation to the
forces afloat, that the action-preparations were made to take
the action contemplated by the security letter?

A. On several occasions that was done.

122. Q. Was this concentrating of ships intended as a
protective measure for the task force or for offensive
action, or as a protection to the base?

A. Not for the protection of the base. For the protection
of the heavy ships in the task force and to organize a
striking force if the enemy were sighted. There was no idea
of protecting the base with the Fleet.

123. Q. Are you familiar with any movements of forces
other than those incidentally at sea which resulted from
action taken as a result of this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. That's not quite clear.

[50]

124. Q. Are you familiar with any other deployment made
or movement of ships or aircraft or personnel in compliance
with the directive contained in this dispatch, other than the
concentration of task forces incidentally at sea?

A. No, I'm not.

125. Q. I show you here a dispatch from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic,
Pacific Fleet, and certain Naval District Commandants,
Exhibit 7 for this examination. Are you familiar with that
document?

Page 59

A. I recall it vaguely. It does not stand out in my
memory. As I say, it was one of several. I may confuse one
with the other, but I notice that it speaks of attack on the
Philippines or Guam.

126. Q. Do you know whether this dispatch was received by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not swear to it; no.

127. Q. I have here Exhibit 8 before this examination
which is a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic and
Pacific Fleets for action. Are you familiar with that
dispatch?

A. Very much. This is the one that I remember above all
others. This was received somewhere in mid-afternoon of the
27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and
the conference was held and by six o'clock that evening the
Army was on the march. Unfortunately, what they did was to
station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, the
bridges-in other words, they alerted against sabotage;
sabotage because it was the consensus from this dispatch that
the attack would, as it states, be against the Philippines or
Thai or Kra Peninsula, possibly Borneo. What was considered
most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces
at sea and, by the Army, sabotage from the enormous Japanese
population in the Islands. At that time, we had two of the
three task forces at sea and one of these returned on the 5th
of December, which placed two in port, 1 at sea, but the
carrier of the task force returning on 5 December remained at
sea to deliver planes to Wake.

128. Q. Admiral, at the conference with General Short,
was this dispatch carefully considered by the assembled Army
and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning,
insofar as it could be determined?

A. I should say yes, certainly.

129. Q. Was the study made in the nature of an estimate
of the situation?

A. No. But remember this is only one of a great many
warnings.

130. Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated
action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of
Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor,
in the light of that warning, was never raised except the
danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the
Islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

131. Q. Did the question of possible attack by air arise?

A. No.

[51]

132. Q. Was the Navy fully apprised at that time of the
contemplated action of the Army; I mean the alert against
sabotage only?

A. I was not. I don't believe the Commander-in-Chief was.

133. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District present at this conference?

A. Yes. He got there before General Short did.

139. Q. Were measures to be taken by his task force-that
is the Commandant's Task Force-discussed?

A. I don't recall.

135. Q. Was any action taken in the light of this
dispatch to augment the forces of either the Army or the
Commandant of the Four-

Page 60

teenth Naval District, so as to assist them in defense
from air attack? A. Not that I recall, although a squadron of
B-17's took off from the Coast a few days later and actually
arrived on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Whether that was
instigated by the Commanding General or by the War
Department, I do not know. They arrived with machine guns
mounted and no ammunition, during the attack.

136. Q. Were the task force commanders at sea apprised of
this warning?

A. Yes, they were apprised of all warnings received

137. Q. Were they given any specific directives with
respect to action to be taken by the task forces in the light
of the warning?

A. Only that as laid down in the directive of 15th of
October.

138. Q. Was any action taken to change the condition of
readiness of the vessels at Pearl Harbor in the light of this
warning?

A. It is very difficult for me to recall that because I
get confused between that period and the period immediately
afterwards when we shifted from Condition 1, 2, and 3 so
frequently. I believe that we did before the war, but I may
possibly be in error on it.

139. Q. You mean the condition of readiness of the ships
in the Harbor were changed during that period?

A. Yes, they were frequently done for drill purposes
also, before.

140. Q. But you do not know what condition of readiness
was taken following the receipt-

A. (Interposing) No, I do not. It should be shown in the
files however, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet.

141. Q. Admiral, you will note in the dispatch a
directive concerning a deployment. State what you considered
that directive to mean when you saw it.

A. It was impossible to keep the entire Fleet at sea at
all times and had we put the entire Fleet at sea, every time
we got a warning, the Fleet would have been worn out. As it
was, we were fueling our task forces at sea. As I remember
the decision was made to take the precautions that we had for
months laid down in case of one of these warnings, but to
make no change in the disposition of the forces in port. As I
say, at the time of this warning, two of the three task
forces were at sea. It was at this time, however, that the
Commander in-Chief sent the ENTERPRISE task force to deliver
planes to Wake and that Force was fully prepared to take
offensive action against anything it might meet. There was no
disposition made by the Fleet for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, because I believe that no one on the
Commander-in-Chief's Staff or his force believed that an air
attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.

[52]

142. Q. Was what the dispatch says concerning a
preparation for doing something else a consideration when it
was decided not to change any movements?

A. We had sufficient forces at sea to do what the war
plan called for.

143. Q. Do you recall what ships were returned to Pearl
Harbor between the receipt of this dispatch and 7
December?

A. Yes, sir, the task force-I believe it was Admiral
Pye's Task Force that returned on the 5th of December, two
days before Pearl Harbor, with the battleships, cruisers, and
destroyers; also part of Admiral Halsey's Task Force.

Page 61

144. Q. Did that considerably increase the number of
ships that were in the Harbor?

A. Very considerably. When that task force entered
Admiral Brown's Task Force departed, I think on the 4th of
December, and that Task Force had no battleships in it. He
had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers in his
Task Force. So the result was we had two of the task forces
in port when this thing happened; two of the task forces,
with the exception of the ENTERPRISE, Admiral Halsey-and
accompanying light forces of Task Force Two.

145. Q. Then, in effect, rather than a deployment
involving movement outward, there really was a movement of
ships inward after the receipt of the war warning?

A. Yes, but not as a result of the war warning. This was
our planned operations for the month. It may very well be
that these plans were known to the Japanese and that they
chose their time when we had scheduled two task forces in
port. They were operating on schedule. It was not changed as
a result of this.

146. Q. In other words, the operating schedule made and
printed weeks previously was not departed from?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct, with the exception of the
one outfit going to Wake.

147. Q. This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8)
is different from all other warnings received previously in
that the words "War Warning" were used. What was
your own reaction to those particular words?

A. My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still
going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we
were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. Kurusu's
plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at
night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I
said, "No, it may be that the plane was told by the
Administration to break down. They know more what's going on
than we do. Let him stay there."

148. Q. Didn't that happen considerable time previously?

A. Not very long previously, to my recollection. Previous
to this dispatch, yes.

149. Q. But this dispatch states that negotiations have
ceased.

A. As a matter of fact, they had not ceased, Admiral.

150. Q. Then the use of the words "War Warning"
did not impress you as requiring any increase in security
precautions or any departure from the scheduled routine
deployment?

A. No, sir, with the exception of the protection of ships
at sea as laid down in our October 15 directive. They did not
impress me that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[53]

151. Q. And in your recollection, all others with whom
you were officially associated had reactions similar to
yours?

A. Yes, sir

152. Q. After the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral, is
it not true that you realized that a greater part of the arc
of approaches to the Pearl Harbor area were not covered by
any air or surface forces to give information as to the
approach of any possible enemy?

A. Yes, sir.

153. Q. Was this matter discussed at the conferences,
either with the Army or by Admiral Kimmel?

Page

A. The danger of ever having an attack on Pearl
Harbor?

154 Q. The fact that so much of the arc was not covered
by any means.

A. No, sir. That is the last warning that I recall,
except that we got one about 5:30 p.m. on the 7th of
December, through the Army. It had originated the day before
and was sent by cable. It was delivered by General Short's
Aide to us some ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

155. Q. I have here Exhibit 9 before this examination,
Admiral, which is a dispatch transmitted by the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief-to certain
Frontier Commanders, with copy to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet. It is dated November 28, 1941. Are you
familiar with it?

A. I don't recall this message. I probably saw it at the
time but I don't recall it. I note that it states that this
WPL will not be placed in effect in the Pacific.

156. Q. Admiral, I have here a dispatch, Exhibit 11
before this examination, addressed by the Chief of Naval
Operations to Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific
Fleets, and Commandants Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval
Districts, dated December 3, 1941 Are you familiar with that
dispatch, sir?

A. Yes, I remember that.

157. Q. Upon seeing this, did you not consider that the
steps being taken by the Japanese were extremely significant
as point out future action?

A. I did.

158. Q. Did it leave much, if any, doubt in your mind
that they were about to make a hostile move?

A. No. In fact, as I recall, we had, by that time,
received word from the Asiatic Fleet that heavy Japanese
movements were on the way to the southward. It did not occur
to us, however, that the attack was coming in our direction.

159. Q. That is, your reaction was that the Japs were
about to go to war with someone but it, in no way, conveyed
to you any increased imminence of danger of an attack against
Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir. I believed, from previous warnings that we
had had, that the attack was going to be possibly against the
Philippines but toward the Malay Peninsula.

160. Q. And within your remembrance, was the reaction of
the others with whom you were associated at Admiral Kimmel's
Headquarters quite similar to yours?