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Back when Barack Obama was a Senator, he had high expectations for a new
kind of U.S. foreign policy. The "United States still lacks a coherent
national security policy," Obama wrote in his 2006 book The Audacity
of Hope. "Instead of guiding principles, we have what appear to be a
series of ad hoc decisions... Without a well-articulated strategy that
the public supports and the world understands," he wrote, American
actions lack "legitimacy" at home and abroad.

Now that Obama is President, he's the one being graded for clarity. "I
don't think there is an Obama doctrine," said Newt Gingrich, a likely
2012 presidential contender, on March 21. "His current policy is so
incoherent and so confused that it is literally indefensible." (Gaddafi Drives Out The Rebels.)

But Obama defended his policy with a March 28 speech explaining his
decision to intervene militarily in Libya and offering his criteria for
using military force when there's no imminent threat to America. But a
full-blown "doctrine" it was not. Obama didn't explain whether any
larger principles have guided him through the historic convulsions of
the 2011 Arab Spring. Nor does he care to. The word doctrine
"suggests a rigidity that you're going to apply in every country," says
National Security Council aide Ben Rhodes. And Obama's recent actions
have at times seemed to reflect the kind of ad hoc decisions he
complained about in 2006. He has vocally denounced crackdowns on
protesters in some countries (Libya, Egypt) but been quieter about
others (Bahrain, Yemen). He was initially hesitant to intervene in Libya
 then acted with surprising force. (Is Libya really a top priority?)

Still, three themes stand out as Obama confronts this moment of promise
and risk in the Middle East:

Make them like us. Obama has long emphasized the importance of
restoring America's tattered image in the Muslim world; hatred of the
U.S., after all, is a rich fertilizer for terrorism. That's one reason
Obama has tried to close Guantánamo Bay (thus far without success)
and made a show of addressing the Muslim world from Cairo in June 2009.
It's also why Obama dismissed the advice to support Hosni Mubarak when
the Egyptian people revolted. In Libya, the pleas from rebels and other
Arab states offered Obama a chance to demonstrate that America can use
force on behalf of Muslims, not just against them. (Unfortunately, polls
show that Muslims abroad still largely distrust the U.S., perhaps
because American troops remain in Iraq and Afghanistan.)

It's not all about America. Obama took office convinced that the
U.S. needed to show some humility after the Bush Administration's global
swagger. Prior to the Arab Spring, Obama didn't forcefully promote
democracy in the region, lest he seem to be imposing a U.S. agenda. He
also has kept his distance from the popular uprisings. "The best way for
the United States to support change is to not dictate it," Rhodes says.
The same goes for the use of force. Obama has always said military
action should involve broad coalitions that share both the political and
combat burdens  as has been the case in Libya.

Contain Iran. Obama's concern that Iran will exploit the Arab
Spring to extend its anti-American influence helps explain why he has,
some say, been overly tolerant of crackdowns against Shi'ite protesters
in Bahrain. (Obama officials believe Shi'ite Iran is fomenting unrest
against Bahrain's Sunni monarchy and fret it might extend to U.S. ally
Saudi Arabia.) Bombing Libya shows Tehran that Iraq hasn't exhausted
America's will to use force, the threat of which is a lever to make Iran
quit its nuclear program. And the sight of an international coalition
bombing a repressive regime makes Iran's rulers sweat: One White House
official says antiregime Iranian activists report that "Libya is being
watched" carefully in Tehran. Meanwhile, a change of regime in Syria
could deprive Iran of a key ally  a prospect tempered by the
potential for sectarian chaos.

Other important factors drive Obama's decisions, naturally including oil prices (a reason to tolerate Saudi Arabia's repressive
monarchy) and the threat of al-Qaeda (a reason to be wary of sudden
political change in the terrorist haven of Yemen). Nor are these
principles likely to satisfy demands for clarity from Obama's 2012
rivals. Of course, "no foreign policy grand strategy is ever perfectly
implemented," explains Daniel Drezner, a Tufts University professor of
international politics. "There are always hypocrisies and
inconsistencies."