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Report on the World Social Situation 2011

The Report on the World Social Situation 2011: The Global Social Crisis, published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), finds many governments did not pay sufficient attention to the social implications of the global economic crisis. The report says economic policies considered in isolation from their social consequences often create dire results for people’s nutrition, health and education, which, in turn, adversely affect long-term economic growth.

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iii The Global Social CrisisPrefaceOver the period 2008-2009, the world experienced its worst financial and economiccrisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 2009 global output contractedby 2 per cent. Since then, the global economy has bounced back, due mainly tounprecedented coordinated actions by leading economies with fiscal and monetarymeasures. But this recovery has been uneven and still remains fragile. Global unemployment rose sharply from 178 million persons in 2007 to205 million in 2009. The rapid rise in unemployment has triggered an increasein vulnerability, especially in developing countries without comprehensive socialprotection. Estimates suggest that between 47 million and 84 million more peoplefell into, or remained trapped in, extreme poverty because of the global crisis. The economic crisis was preceded by the food and fuel price hikes in 2007 and2008. According to the FAO, the number of people living in hunger in the worldrose to over a billion in 2009, the highest on record. These multiple crises have setback the progress many countries have made towards achieving the internationallyagreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. This Report on the World Social Situation explores the ongoing adverse socialconsequences of the crisis. The global economic downturn has had wide-rangingnegative social outcomes for individuals, families, communities and societies,and its impact on social progress in areas such as education and health will onlybecome fully evident over time. During times of financial and economic crisis,households often adopt coping strategies, such as making changes in householdexpenditure patterns; however, these can negatively influence education, healthand nutrition outcomes, which may lead to lifelong deficits for the childrenaffected and thus perpetuate the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Given the fragility of the economic recovery and the uneven progress inmajor economies, social conditions are expected to recover only slowly. Theincreased levels of poverty, hunger and unemployment will continue to affectbillions of people for years to come. Meanwhile, austerity measures in response to high government debt in someadvanced economies are also making the recovery more uncertain and fragile.Increased pressure for fiscal consolidation and new pressures in response to suchdebt have severely limited fiscal and policy space in developed economies, andmany developing countries, especially those under International Monetary Fundprogrammes, are also under pressure to cut public expenditure, undertake austeritymeasures, reduce the scope of government action and further liberalize labour markets. A key conclusion of this Report is that countries need to be able to pursuecountercyclical policies in a consistent manner. Such policy space should

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iv The Global Social Crisisbe enabled by changing the fundamental orientation and nature of policyprescriptions that international organizations impose on countries as conditionsfor assistance. It is essential that Governments take into account the likely socialimplications of their economic policies. It has been shown, time and again, thateconomic policies considered in isolation from their social outcomes can have direconsequences for poverty, employment, nutrition, health and education, which,in turn, adversely affect long-term sustainable development. The disconnectbetween economic policies and their social consequences can create a vicious circleof slow growth and poor social progress. Universal social protection systems andactive employment generation programmes should become permanent measures,not merely temporary components of national crisis response measures. At the same time, social progress, one of the three pillars of sustainabledevelopment, is particularly important as governments and stakeholders gear upfor the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio + 20). AsSecretary-General for the Conference, I understand the need for social investmentsto be accorded priority in recovery strategies and development policies. Increasingexpenditures to expand social protection and improve access to education andhealth services will help ensure more inclusive development with strongerdomestic demand and a more solid foundation for future growth. This Report on the World Social Situation identifies the immediate and long-termsocial impacts of the current crisis and strongly underscores the need for inclusivesocial policies. As challenging as it may be, the crisis offers an opportunity forachieving social progress by making universal social protection a reality, revisitingthe social aspects of globalization and ensuring more inclusive and sustainedgrowth, very much in line with sustainable development’s commitment toachieving economic development, social progress and environmental sustainability. SHA ZUKANG Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs

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v The Global Social CrisisAcknowledgementsThe Report on the World Social Situation, prepared biennially, is the flagshippublication on major social development issues of the Department of Economicand Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. This 2011 issue of the Report on the World Social Situation was prepared bya team from the Division for Social Policy and Development led by Donald Leeunder the direction of Assistant-Secretary-General for Economic Development,Jomo Kwame Sundaram. The core team included Lisa Ainbinder, SarangerelErdembileg, Astrid Hurley, Lisa Morrison, Marta Roig, Amson Sibanda andWenyan Yang. Anisuzzaman Chowdhury provided significant inputs andfeedback at various stages of the preparation of the report. In addition, Simone Wilson provided research support; Bibi Sherifa Khanprovided research and desktop publishing support; Sylvie Pailler providedresearch and knowledge management support; and Nimali Ariyawansa providedsecretarial and administrative support. Ying Zhang, an intern, provided researchassistance. The editing of the Report was undertaken by John Loftus. The analysis benefited from a background paper prepared especially for theReport by Professors C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh of the Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi, India. In preparing the Report, we received extraordinaryco-operation from a number of United Nations entities, including the regionalcommissions, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development andthe International Labour Organization, who generously shared their data andreports. The Report has also benefited from positive feedback from colleagues withinand outside the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. We are grateful to all for their contributions.

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xii The Global Social CrisisExplanatory notesThe following symbols have been used in tables throughout the Report: Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. A dash (—) indicates that the item is nil or negligible. A hyphen (-) indicates that the item is not applicable. A minus sign (-) indicates a deficit or decrease, except as indicated. A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. A slash (/) between years indicates a statistical year, for example, 1990/91. Use of a hyphen (-) between years, for example, 1990-1991, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years. Annual rates of growth or change, unless otherwise stated, refer to annualcompound rates. Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals, because ofrounding. Reference to dollars ($) indicates United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. When a print edition of a source exists, the print version is the authoritativeone. United Nations documents reproduced online are deemed official only asthey appear in the United Nations Official Document System. United Nationsdocumentation obtained from other United Nations and non-United Nationssources are for informational purposes only. The Organization does not makeany warranties or representations as to the accuracy or completeness of suchmaterials.The following abbreviations have been used: AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ECA Economic Commission for Africa ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FDI foreign direct investment GDP gross domestic product GFSR Global Financing Stability Report GNI gross national income GNP gross national product HIPC heavily indebted poor countries HIV human immunodeficiency virus ILO International Labour Organization

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1OverviewBeyond recovery: addressing the social crisisOver the period 2008-2009, the world suffered the worst financial and economiccrisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The rapid global economicdownturn severely disrupted economic growth worldwide and caused significantsetbacks in the progress made towards achieving the Millennium DevelopmentGoals and the other internationally agreed development goals. According toUnited Nations estimates, the annual growth rate in global output fell fromabout 4 per cent during the period 2006-2007 to 1.6 per cent in 2008; the rateof growth in output dropped even further in 2009, to -2 per cent, when ninety-five countries experienced declines in average per capita income. Unemployment rose sharply to 205 million people in 2009 from 178 millionin 2007. According to the latest estimates by the International Labour Organization(2011), global unemployment remained high and unchanged in 2010. Increasedunemployment has been the dominant social impact of the crisis in developedeconomies, but the employment situation in developing countries has been lessobvious. While the informal economy and peasant agricultural sector have absorbedmuch of the impact of formal sector job losses, much larger numbers of workers arenow subject to more vulnerable employment in developing countries. The loss of jobs means not only loss of incomes but also an increase invulnerability, especially in developing countries without comprehensive socialprotection. Various estimates suggest that between 47 million and 84 million morepeople fell into, or were trapped in, extreme poverty because of the global crisis(United Nations, 2010b, table I.3).1 The global financial crisis came immediatelyafter food and fuel prices had risen sharply. As a result, the number of people livingin hunger in the world rose to over a billion in 2009, the highest on record. Although the financial crisis did not originate in the developing countries,their economies, especially those more integrated into international financialmarkets, were not immune to the financial turmoil. They were hurt through avariety of channels, including collapsing trade and commodity prices, capital flowreversals, higher costs of borrowing, declining remittance incomes and strains onofficial development assistance. The countries were affected to different degreesdepending on their economic structure and vulnerability to shocks. 1 These estimates refer to people living on less than $1.25 per day and are similar to those of the World Bank, which estimated that about 64 million additional people had become poor by 2010 compared with the situation that would have existed had the crisis not taken place. See World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2010).

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2 The Global Social Crisis Box 1 Blinding optimism The global financial and economic crisis came as a surprise for many international organizations. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which monitors global macrofinancial developments, maintained an optimistic view, and took some time to realize that the crisis would soon engulf the whole world. A month before the first tremors of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States of America were felt, the IMF noted: “The strong global expansion is continuing, and projections for global growth in both 2007 and 2008 have been revised up…” (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 1) . This failing has been acknowledged by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF. Even as late as April 2007, the IMF’s banner message was one of continued optimism within a prevailing benign global environment. Staff reports and other IMF documents pointed to a positive near-term outlook and fundamentally sound financial market conditions. Only after the eruption of financial turbulence did the IMF take a more cautionary tone in the October 2007 WEO (World Economic Outlook) and GFSR (Global Financial Stability Report) (International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Office, 2011). Other leading organizations also failed to see the crisis coming. For example, three months before the implosion of the financial sector began with the United States subprime market collapse in August 2007, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) took the view that: the US slowdown was not heralding a period of worldwide economic weakness, unlike, for instance, in 2001. Rather a ‘smooth’ rebalancing was to be expected, with Europe taking over the baton from the United States in driving OECD growth.... Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: a soft landing in the United States, a strong and sustained recovery in Europe, a solid trajectory in Japan and buoyant activity in China and India (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007, p. 7). Together with the Bank for International Settlements led by its then economic adviser of William White, the United Nations did raise concerns before the crisis hit. In its World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006, the United Nations issued the following warning: The possibility of a disorderly adjustment of the widening macroeconomic imbalances of the major economies is a major risk which could harm the stability and growth of the world economy…A reversal in house prices…will heighten the risk of default and could trigger bank crises... A sharp fall in house prices in one of the major economies could, then, precipitate an abrupt and destabilizing adjustment of the global imbalances (United Nations, 2006, pp. v-viii). Even after the advent of the crisis, lessons were learnt too slowly. The United Nations and the IMF underestimated the impact of the underlying risks for the global economy: the IMF was projecting global growth of 2.2 per cent for 2009 in November 2008, while at the same time, the United Nations (2009a) projected a baseline growth rate of 0.9 per cent. As it turned out, the global economy contracted by -2.0 per cent in 2009. The impact of the crisis was further influenced by the capacity of Govern-ments to cope with and counteract its consequences, which has depended on theefficiency and strength of their counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy mechanisms,social protection systems, regulatory frameworks, governance structures and

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3 The Global Social Crisispolitical stability. These factors in turn influenced how different social groups havebeen affected by the crisis. The poorest countries have become the most vulnerableto the vicissitudes of the global economy and are generally heavily dependent onexternal finance, including aid, and trade. Their foreign-exchange earnings andgovernment revenue tend to rely on only a few commodities, and with little fiscalspace, they have weak social protection systems. A key conclusion of the present Report is that countries need to be ableto pursue counter-cyclical policies in a consistent manner. Such policy spaceshould be enabled by changing the fundamental orientation and nature of policyprescriptions that international organizations impose on countries as conditionsfor assistance. International financial institutions—despite having declaredchanges in their policy prescriptions—continue to attach pro-cyclical conditionsto the financial assistance packages they extend to countries in need and havepaid insufficient attention to the social implications of such policies. The relative success of some Asian and Latin American Governmentsin mitigating the economic and social impacts of the recent crisis stronglyunderscores the need for Governments to be consistently counter-cyclical and thewisdom of conserving fiscal resources during boom periods to support counter-cyclical measures in times of need. In fact, universal social protection systemsand active labour market programmes should become permanent measures, notmerely temporary components of national crisis response. It is essential that Governments take into account the likely social implicationsof their economic policies. It has been shown, time and again, that economic policiesconsidered in isolation from their social consequences can have dire consequencesfor nutrition, health and education, which, in turn, adversely affect long-termeconomic growth. The disconnect between economic policies and their socialconsequences can create a vicious circle of slow growth and poor social progress.The continuing social crisisThe full impact of the financial and economic crisis on social progress in areas suchas education and health are not immediately discernible and will only becomefully evident over time. However, initial estimates show that the effects havebeen sharp, widespread and deep. Given the fragility of the economic recoveryand uneven progress in major economies, social conditions are only expected torecover slowly. The increased levels of poverty, hunger and unemployment due tothe global crisis will continue to affect billions of people in many developed anddeveloping countries for years to come. Meanwhile, austerity measures in response to high government debt in someadvanced economies, such as Greece and Spain, are not only threatening publicsector employment and social expenditure, but are also making the recovery

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4 The Global Social Crisismore uncertain and fragile. Increased pressure for fiscal consolidation and newpressures in response to such debt have severely limited fiscal and policy spacein developed economies, restricting their options as the crisis continues. Manydeveloping countries, especially those under IMF programmes, are also comingunder pressure to cut public expenditure and undertake austerity measures. Although the massive stimulus packages adopted by major economies wereable to halt the downslide and thus prevent a prolonged recession, in many cases,the recovery has been job poor, with unemployment and underemploymentremaining at unacceptably high levels. Evidence from recent recessions suggeststhat the lag between output and employment recovery has grown. The longer-term adverse employment consequences of the current crisis are already visibleand, in most countries, youth unemployment has reached alarming levels. Indeveloped as well as developing countries, unemployment and underemploymentrates are very high among young people 15 to 24 years of age: at the end of 2009,there were an estimated 79 million unemployed young people, and the rate ofyouth unemployment stood at 13.0 per cent globally. The share of long-term unemployment has increased significantly in mostdeveloped countries since 2007. For example, the share of workers unemployedfor 27 weeks or more in the United States rose at an alarming pace during 2010;about half the workers without jobs have been unemployed for at least half a year.The unemployment situation is equally worrisome in many European countries. In developing countries, most job losses have occurred in the dynamicexport sectors. Of great concern has been the rise in vulnerable employment andthe number of working poor, as people who lost their jobs in the formal economyhave increasingly moved to the informal economy where jobs are poorly paid andoffer little or no protection. Labour market conditions in developing countries are expected to remain achallenge for at least two reasons. First, most of the 47 million new workers whoenter labour markets worldwide each year are searching for jobs in developingcountries. According to the United Nations (2010b), an estimated 51 millionadditional jobs will be needed in Asia alone to absorb the growing labour forceduring the period 2010-2011. Second, as in developed countries, employmentcreation in the formal and industrial sectors in developing countries is also expectedto lag behind output recovery. For example, in the aftermath of the 1997-1998Asian financial crisis, job recovery took at least three years to complete. In view ofthe global nature of the current crisis, job recovery may take even longer. The global economic downturn has had wide-ranging negative socialoutcomes for individuals, families, communities and societies. Poverty andunemployment have been linked to crime, gender-based violence, substanceabuse and mental illness, including depression and suicide. During times offinancial and economic crisis households often adopt coping strategies, such as

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5 The Global Social Crisis Box 2 The social pathology of crises The full social impacts of economic crises, especially on public health and education, become known only after a long gestation period. However, one can draw lessons from past financial and economic crises, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. For example, a 30 per cent drop in income between 1929 and 1932 led to a 40 per cent rise in suicide rates and a 10 per cent rise in deaths from all causes in the United States (Stuckler and others, 2009a, b). Similarly, between 1997 and 1998, suicide rates among males rose by 39 per cent in Japan, 44 per cent in Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China, and 45 per cent in the Republic of Korea. Suicide rates among males also rose in Thailand. In Hong Kong, SAR, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the economic crisis was associated with 10,400 more suicides in 1998 than in 1997. After the collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, life expectancy in that country fell steeply, and it fell again with the ruble crisis of 1998 (Chang and others, 2009). Economic downturns have also produced adverse impacts on public health. Brenner (1971) found that economic downturns were associated with increased mortality from heart disease in New York State and in the United States of America over the period1900-1967. Short-term increases in alcohol consumption at least partly reflect the social-psychological stresses related to economic recession (Brenner, 1975). If an economic recession is prolonged, increased alcoholism is likely to lead to increased mortality due to liver cirrhosis, as Brenner (1979) found for England and Wales during the period 1936-1976. Adverse health effects are mostly found among the “lower socio-economic classes” without economic security. The lack of economic security is often stressful: social and family structures break down and habits harmful to health are adopted. These effects may be manifested in a psychopathological event, such as suicide, or, after a time lag of a few years, in chronic diseases. Brenner’s findings are consistent with those of Dooley, Catalano and Wilson (1994) who found that losing a job leads, in the short term of a year or less, to increased symptoms of depression. They also cite evidence of increased alcohol abuse among those losing their job.making changes in household expenditure patterns; however, these can negativelyinfluence education, health and nutrition outcomes, which may lead to lifelongdeficits for the children affected and thus perpetuate intergenerational poverty. The impact of volatile and high food prices, diminishing incomes and risingunemployment are slowing progress towards reducing hunger and improvingnutrition. The sharp rise in global food and energy prices in 2007 and 2008further undermined the welfare of the world’s poor, forcing more families torely on underfunded public food assistance programmes, skip meals, consumeless or substitute nutritious foods with cheaper, less healthful alternatives. Food-importing countries saw their import bills increase as a result of higher prices andhigher transport energy costs passed on to consumers (Mittal, 2009). Food prices started rising once again in 2009, primarily because of persistentproblems with global food production and supply (Johnston and Bargawi, 2010),exacerbated by the demand for bio-fuel production and greater speculation in

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6 The Global Social Crisiscommodity futures and options markets. The continuing food crisis has seriousimplications for political and social stability in poor food-importing countries.Outbreaks of food riots have been related to the continued impacts of highfood prices on the poor and other vulnerable groups. The Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations (FAO) recently warned of a “worryingrise” in food prices which would affect millions of people following unexpectedshortfalls in major cereals caused by bad weather, floods and fires in 2010.Addressing the crisis: the way forwardRole of governmentThe initial multilateral response in October 2008 to the financial crisis promisedcomprehensive approaches that emphasized cooperation and coordination(United Nations, 2009a). Many government stimulus measures furnished theessential impetus to drive global recovery. However, as these stimulus measureshave given way to fiscal austerity, there is the danger that government-led recoveryin some countries may stall or even be reversed. Given the continuing fragilityof the economic recovery in many countries, it is imperative that policymakersresist pressures to cut spending too much and too soon if they are to avert thepossibility of a relapse. Counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy measures have clearly worked tomitigate the impacts of the crisis. Both the recession and its social impacts havebeen less severe than initially feared, thanks to the prompt policy responses bymany countries, including emerging economies in the developing world. TheInternational Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that counter-cyclicalmeasures implemented by the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries saved orcreated 21 million jobs in their economies (International Labour Organizationand Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010). This highlights the importance of timely State intervention in response toa crisis. Yet, the sustainability of these policy responses has been threatened byexaggerated claims of the deleterious effects of the fiscal burdens and other relatedconsequences that the crisis has placed on Governments. Undoubtedly, the fiscalburdens on Governments have grown as the economic slowdown has reduced fiscalrevenues available in line with the contraction of tax bases. As chapter V shows, theprimary cause of budgetary deficits is the decline in revenues associated with drasticoutput and income contractions, not stimulus measures and social spending. Thesedeclining tax revenues, combined with the increased need for social programmes,have exacerbated the impact of the crisis on social development. The growing pressure for austerity measures, ostensibly for reasons of fiscalconsolidation, is putting at risk social protection, public health and educationprogrammes, as well as the economic recovery measures. Reductions in social

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7 The Global Social Crisisexpenditure are already taking place in many industrialized countries and inmany developing countries as well (see chap. V). Governments must respondwith caution to pressures for fiscal consolidation and austerity measures, lest theyjeopardize the sustainability of the recovery. Continued support for stimulus andother recovery measures is needed to strengthen the momentum of output recoveryand to protect the economic and social investments that underpin future growth. More importantly, the responses to the crisis have not addressed thefundamental causes of the crisis. For example, financial reform in majoreconomies has not matched initial expectations and exposes the recovery to newabuses, excesses and vulnerabilities. There are signs that this is already happening.Progress in addressing other structural causes of the crisis has also been limited.For example, income inequalities continue to grow, global rebalancing is limitedand global demand remains depressed. The failure to address the root causes ofthe crisis will impede a sustainable recovery.Focus on employment growthEmployment recovery clearly lags behind other indicators of economic recoveryand Governments must continue to focus stimulus measures on job growth.The lag in employment recovery underscores the challenge posed by the globalfinancial and economic crisis for poverty eradication and achievement of theMillennium Development Goals by 2015. Full and productive employmentand decent work for all are critically important for poverty eradication andachievement of the Goals. This was strongly emphasized shortly after the onset ofthe crisis by the Global Jobs Pact to promote a job-rich recovery.2 The September 2010 High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixty-fifth sessionof the General Assembly on the Millennium Development Goals also calledattention to the importance of productive employment and decent workas crucial means to achieve the Goals. In particular, the expansion of decentemployment opportunities enables the benefits of economic growth to reach thebroader population (see United Nations, 2007). Therefore, promoting a job-richrecovery will lay a solid foundation for realizing the goal of sustained, inclusiveand equitable economic growth envisioned in the outcome document.3 2 In April 2009, the United Nations Chief Executive Board launched the “Global Jobs Pact” initiative aimed at focusing the attention of decision makers on employment measures and decent work as the foundation for long-term recovery. The Global Jobs Pact includes a range of crisis-response measures that countries can adapt to their specific needs and situations. It is not a one-size-fits-all solution, but a portfolio of options based on successful examples, and is designed also to inform and support action at the multilateral level. The key component of the Global Jobs Pact is employment promotion and social protection. 3 See General Assembly resolution 65/1.

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8 The Global Social Crisis However, the challenge of employment generation should not beunderestimated because the rate of economic growth needed to restoreemployment to pre-crisis levels has to be sufficiently high to compensate for boththe increases in the size of the working population and the level of productivity.In addition, this growth has to be employment-intensive and, for sustainability,must be driven by productivity growth. This means there has to be widespreadstructural change favouring the dynamic sectors of the economy. Calls to enhance labour market flexibility, a condition which often encourageslower wages and degraded employment conditions, are touted as necessary toaddress rising unemployment levels.4 However, this prescription of deregulatingthe labour market overlooks three key considerations. First, countries with“labour-friendly” regulations are associated with lower wage inequality. Hence,regulations to protect labour rights lower inequality without imposing anysignificant loss in terms of output and employment (Freeman, 2007). Second, the current discourse on labour market flexibility refers to a regimeof employment at will, where Governments impose no restrictions on hiring,firing or employment conditions. Hence, from this perspective, both employersand workers should be free to choose mutually convenient terms of employment.But, in reality, flexibility is meant only for employers. In good times, this may gounnoticed, but in bad times, when firms are allowed to cut wages or fire employeesen masse to reduce costs, this flexibility for employers translates into insecurityfor workers, especially in the absence of adequate universal social protection. Third, the focus on labour market flexibility to cope with the global economiccrisis runs the risk of impairing long-term growth potential if regulatory changescreate an incentive structure in which workers respond by changing theircollective behaviour to induce a “low pay-low productivity trap”. There is an implicit normative message that “any job is better than no job”.Such a view discounts the value of improving job security. In the absence offormal risk-mitigation schemes, workers could be induced to readily accept low- 4 For example, a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) working paper by Brixiova (2009) argued: “More flexible labour markets will be a key adjustment mechanism during the recession as well as in the medium term”. Chowdhury and Islam (2009) referred to The Economist (2009) noting that it had pinned its hopes on a renewed commitment to global labour market flexibility to cope with worldwide job losses and accelerate employment-led recovery. They quoted World Bank (2009) as suggesting that “overly stringent employment protection laws constrain firm hiring and lead to suboptimal level of employment, a feature particularly important during economic downturns”. In fact, many believe that the financial crisis-induced recession provides an opportunity to dismantle labour market regulations. For example, a former Finance Minister and Foreign Minister of Chile argued that the economic crisis provided opportunities to remove labour market protection, stating: “Labor reform is always politically contentious, but the current crisis, by illustrating the dangers of ignoring necessary long-term reforms, has made it easier to reach consensus on the need for action” (Foxley, 2009).

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9 The Global Social Crisisproductivity jobs at low wages. This could propel an economy into a low wage-low productivity trap, with “bad jobs” driving out “good jobs”. A high turnover of workers induced by greater labour market flexibilitymight also reduce incentives for insecure workers to acquire training that wouldenhance labour productivity. In the absence of job security and legal protection,workers pay a premium (in the form of low wages and willingness to accept anyjob) to employers to reduce the risk of being unemployed. In such circumstances,the imposition of higher labour standards and various risk-mitigation schemescould be both efficient (leading an economy towards a “high productivity, highwage equilibrium”) and equitable (enabling vulnerable workers to better dealwith labour market risks).Need for social protectionThe devastating impact of the crisis on so many people underscores the dynamicand multidimensional nature of poverty and the critical importance of socialprotection for reducing vulnerability. Countries that have social protectionsystems can better mitigate the negative impacts of shocks and prevent peoplefrom falling deeper into poverty. Social protection measures can also helpregenerate economic activities and livelihoods.5 In the long term, social protection can help individuals and families buildhuman and social resources, among other assets, and improve their livelihoodprospects,6 thereby reducing poverty and unleashing the productive potential ofthe workforce. Therefore, social protection should not be viewed as a temporarymeasure to cushion the impact of a crisis, but rather as an ongoing investmentto promote sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth. If socialexpenditures are allowed to decline in the wake of the crisis, such a situation islikely to exacerbate and prolong the adverse impacts of the crisis, for example,on levels of malnutrition, school dropout rates and long-term unemployment. Universal access to basic social protection and social services is necessary tobreak the cycle of poverty and reduce inequality and social exclusion. A basicsocial protection floor is affordable; its benefits need to be weighed against thepotentially high human, social and economic costs of not investing in socialprotection. Without schemes that ensure access to health care, adequate levelsof nutrition and social stability, a country cannot unlock its full human, econo-mic and productive potential. A human rights-based development strategy 5 Social protection—which typically consists of social insurance, social assistance, including universal tax-financed transfers, and protective labour market regulations—also functions as an automatic stabilizer through business cycles and supports economic growth. 6 For example, Bolsa Familia, a conditional cash transfer programme in Brazil, has improved the education, nutrition and health of beneficiary families. See International Labour Office (2009).

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10 The Global Social Crisismust advance the full realization of social and economic rights, and should also,for example, advance and protect gains in social development during times ofcrisis. The right to social security contained in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights requires universal social protection to ensure the basic well-being of all individuals, including people living in poverty and those at risk ofbecoming poor.Poverty and food securityThe effects of the current financial and economic crisis were compounded byfood price hikes in 2007 and 2008. With global food production growing moreslowly and food stuffs increasingly used to produce animal feed and biofuels, it ishighly unlikely that, there will be an early return to the earlier period of decliningfood prices. Recent supply problems attributed to weather, fires and floods havealso exacerbated uncertainties. The food price hikes were partly due to speculationin the commodities markets as financial investors fled traditional financialmarkets. Clearly, higher food prices have adversely affected efforts to reducepoverty and hunger. Fundamental problems in the global food production and trading systemmust be addressed to ensure sustained food security. Developing countries needto shift from predominantly export-oriented agricultural policies in order tostrengthen domestic food production to better meet local needs for affordablefood and to cushion the impact of international price shocks. Such a shiftpresupposes a stronger supportive role for the State, improved internationalcooperation and greater investment in food and agricultural development, withpriority for small farming and sustainable environmental resource management.Rethinking social policyThe crisis offers an opportunity to rethink the role of social policy and socialinvestment in transforming policy responses to the crisis into opportunitiesto strengthen social development and to achieve more sustained, inclusiveand equitable development. It presents an opportunity to reshape the globaleconomic, social and development agenda. There is renewed realization thatsocial policy considerations, especially productive employment, should be givengreater importance within macroeconomic policy, rather than being viewed asresidual assistance to poor people and disadvantaged groups who have beenadversely affected by macroeconomic policies aimed only at lowering inflation oreliminating budget deficits. The economic crisis has served as a reminder that it is essential for peopleto be healthy, educated, adequately housed and well fed to be more productiveand better able to contribute to society. In other words, social policy in general,as well as measures to end poverty in all its dimensions, should be an integral

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11 The Global Social Crisispart of macroeconomic policy to promote development. Approaches to povertyreduction should, therefore, be developmental and holistic, integrating economicand social policies to achieve people-centred development outcomes. In the context of the crisis, a job-rich recovery requires incorporation of socialobjectives into economic recovery strategies and policies. In fact, macroeconomicpolicy measures to promote sustained recovery should support policies foremployment growth and poverty eradication. Social investments should beaccorded priority in recovery strategies and development policies. Social investment invariably contributes to long-term growth anddevelopment. In developing countries, increasing expenditures to expand socialprotection and improve access to education and health services will help ensuremore inclusive development with stronger domestic demand and a more solidfoundation for future growth. The crisis also provides an opportunity to re-examine approaches to socialpolicy. The fact that populations in rich and poor countries alike have beennegatively affected by the global food, financial and economic crises underscoresthe case for a universal approach to social policy that does not focus only onpeople already in poverty. Universal social provisioning should be the goal ofsocial policymaking and will also ensure broader and more sustained supportthan narrowly targeted policy measures which risk significant albeit inadvertentexclusion of many of the deserving. The Social Protection Floor Initiative promotes universal access to essentialsocial transfers and services. More than 75 per cent of the global population donot enjoy social guarantees that would enable them to cope with livelihood risks.Ensuring a social protection floor for people struggling to survive should be anecessary first step to address the multifaceted nature of poverty. This may requirespecial, targeted measures—within the commitment to universal provisioning—to ensure that the most vulnerable are reached. For many poor developing countries, such programmes would require atleast medium-term support from the international community. Ensuring asocial protection floor for the entire global population represents a considerablechallenge, but various United Nations agencies have shown that a basic floor ofsocial transfers is affordable in all countries at virtually any stage of economicdevelopment. History has shown that during moments of crisis leading to social andpolitical unrest, strong political leadership can be the key factor in realizingimportant social change. The current crisis offers such a window of opportunityfor achieving social progress; it is important to seize the opportunity by takinginitiatives that will make universal social protection a reality.

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Chapter IThe global economic crisis: causes andtransmissionImpact, response and recoveryThe recent financial and economic crisis—the worst since the Great Depressionof the 1930s—originated in the United States and quickly spread throughmultiple channels to other industrialized countries, low- and middle-incomecountries, as well as economies in transition. The result has been the still-unfolding global financial, economic and social crises now often referred to asthe “Great Recession”. The global economy contracted by 2 per cent in 2009 in sharp contrastto the several preceding years of high growth in excess of 3 per cent annually(United Nations, 2010c; 2011). While many rich countries experiencedeconomic contraction, the rate of economic growth in developing countriesslowed significantly to 2.4 per cent for 2009. In 2009, 52 countries experienceddeclines in per capita income. In the same year, output in economies in transitionas a group contracted sharply by 6.7 per cent as Russian output declined byalmost 8 per cent. Also in 2009, economies in Latin America and the Caribbeancontracted by 2 per cent, as Mexican output fell by 6.5 per cent. Western Asiawas the other developing part of the world experiencing negative growth (UnitedNations, 2011). Global trade volumes fell from the end of 2008 through the first half of 2009as a result of declining imports by developed countries, especially in the UnitedStates which accounted for 15 per cent of the global total (United Nations,2009a; 2010b). At the height of the crisis, between July 2008 and April 2009, thevalue of imports of the European Union, Japan and the United States plummetedby almost 40 per cent and triggered a worldwide collapse in international trade.7Despite the gradual recovery of the past two years, the value of imports of thethree largest developed economies was still about 25 per cent below pre-crisispeaks by August 2010. Global trade is expected to grow by about 6.5 per centin 2011 and 2012, significantly less than the 10.5 per cent rebound in 2010(United Nations, 2011). 7 The volume of imports of the three major developed economies fell by about 18 per cent during that period, a situation which was compounded by a decline of about 24 per cent in import prices.

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14 The Global Social Crisis The extent as well as manner in which a country is integrated into the globaleconomy has determined the severity of the crisis in different countries. The effectsof the crisis spread to developing countries, primarily through declines in tradeand commodity prices and reduced access to credit, as lower demand in developedcountries hurt the export sectors and slowed growth in developing countries. Theplight of many developing countries heavily dependent on the export of primarycommodities was especially worsened by falling commodity prices. At the sametime, international bank loans and foreign direct investment (FDI) declined.While some of these flows have since recovered, the cost of finance is still highand access to bank loans remains especially tight with stringent implementationof the regulations introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.The effects of the crisis also spread through secondary transmission channels,such as lowered remittance flows to some countries and reduced earnings fromtourism, of particular importance for many small island States. Sub-Saharan Africa has not been immune to the effects of the crisis despiteits marginal role in the global economy. That region has experienced significantslowing of economic growth and poverty reduction but the impacts were less severethere than elsewhere. Although parts of the Asian region have led the recovery,the crisis has reduced the region’s remittance inflows and export earnings. Somecountries in Latin America with strong ties to crisis-affected Spain and the UnitedStates have suffered quite badly, although overall the region has proven quiteresilient (United Nations, 2010b; World Bank, 2010a). Central Asian countrieswere also relatively less affected, except for Kazakhstan which had fuelled its rapidgrowth with heavy private sector external borrowings from foreign capital markets.The crisis spread through the operations of the banking subsidiaries in Kazakhstanto other countries in that subregion. The other channel of contagion was the dropin remittances of migrant workers, mostly from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, workingin Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The worst affected area was EasternEurope, which suffered heavily because of its exposure to toxic assets in the UnitedStates. Almost all countries in that part of Europe experienced declines in realgross domestic product (GDP) in 2009. The most severely affected countries wereEstonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where real GDP fell by 15 to 18 per cent in 2009and did not recover in 2010. The unemployment rate in Latvia rose to 22.5 percent in 2009 and to 15 per cent in the other two Baltic countries. In 2010, theunemployment rates were 20 per cent in Latvia, 19 per cent in Estonia and 17.3per cent in Lithuania (Eurostat, 2011).International response averts deeper recessionThe leaders of major economies came forward and took unprecedentedcoordinated actions, adopting stimulus packages and furnishing resources toboost the lending capacity of the IMF and multilateral development banks. Theseactions succeeded in averting a deeper recession. The global recovery has proven

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15 The Global Social Crisisto be stronger than had been initially forecast, though it is still uneven and thepotential for volatility remains high. The policy response has weakened since2010, and many Governments, particularly those in developed countries, haveshifted to fiscal austerity. Partly as a result of these policy shifts, global economicgrowth started to decelerate in mid-2010. Government policies are expected to bemuch less expansionary in the near term, especially as widening fiscal deficits andrising public debt have undermined support for further fiscal stimulus measures.Therefore, slower growth is expected to continue into 2011 and 2012.Recovery: tepid, uneven and uncertainThe global economy grew by about 3.6 per cent in 2010. Asia has led therecovery among developing regions, while Europe and the Commonwealth ofIndependent States are still lagging behind. The United Nations estimates thatthe global economy will grow by 3.1 per cent in 2011 and 3.5 per cent in 2012.The recovery may, however, suffer setbacks and slow to below an annual rate of2 per cent, while some developed economies may slip back into recession shouldseveral downside risks materialize (United Nations, 2011). Many fundamental causes of the crisis have not been addressed, such asinsufficient financial sector regulation, unrealistically high executive compensation(salaries and bonuses), stagnating real wages and consequently rising inequalityand debt-financed consumption. Some countries have continued, or evenintensified, expansionary monetary policies (low interest rates and “quantitativeeasing”) to support economic activities while fiscal stimulus measures are beingphased out and to help financial sectors return to normalcy. However, theseactions have created new risks such as greater exchange-rate volatility among majorcurrencies and a surge of volatile capital flows to emerging economies. Thesedevelopments have already become a source of economic tension and weakenedthe commitment to coordinate policies at the international level to deal with theglobal imbalances and other structural problems. This could harm recovery in thenear term and make it difficult to respond to more challenging emerging issues.BackgroundIn the years preceding the crisis, most economies experienced high rates of growth,low inflation and monetary stability. Many countries, particularly in Africa, grewat historically high rates not seen for decades, largely as a result of the boom incommodity prices. Developing countries became increasingly integrated into theglobal economy as liberalization, deregulation, trade and financial globalizationspread, with the encouragement of the international financial institutions. This relatively long period of economic growth with low inflation gave rise toa number of dangerous illusions. First was the notion of a “great moderation” in

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17 The Global Social Crisis The second pernicious notion was the so-called decoupling of developed anddeveloping economies. As economies have become more intertwined throughtrade and finance, the proponents of this belief argued that globalization orinternational economic integration and decoupling can coexist. This is possiblebecause the opening up of economies not only boosts the trade of poor countries,but also spurs rapid productivity growth, which helps to raise their domesticincomes and spending. Thus, developing countries can continue to grow evenwith a slowdown in developed economies. The so-called decoupling argumentignored the fact that much of the pre-crisis growth in developing countries,especially those in Africa, was due to booming commodity exports, withhardly any productivity growth or rapid structural change. The idea seducedpolicymakers in developing countries into believing that there was no need forindustrial, investment or technology policies to diversify their economies or todynamically induce productivity growth. Their collective complacency favouredliberalization of trade and finance, privatization and deregulation. There was also the presumption that growth is good for the poor.9 This allowedpolicymakers to ignore rising inequality, both within and between countries, whichmany observers believed was due to globalization and deregulation.10 The collectivecomplacency about inequality and globalization can be gleaned from a remark by thethen President of the United States, William Clinton, at the 2000 World EconomicForum at Davos: “We have to reaffirm unambiguously that open markets are the bestengine we know of to lift living standards and build shared prosperity”. The epicentre of the financial collapse was the United States, the world’slargest economy. Despite relatively higher economic growth rates before thecrisis, the wages and purchasing power of most Americans were stagnating. Thebenefits of the country’s growth largely accrued to the wealthiest Americans, aswealth and income inequality worsened. The globalization of labour markets—including through outsourcing jobs from developed countries to lower-wageeconomies, the weakening of unions and collective bargaining power, increasingreturns to capital relative to labour and a falling minimum wage11 —in effectcontributed to wage stagnation in real terms. Despite static wages for more than two decades among middle-classAmericans and growing inequality, consumer spending remained at levels whichkept the United States economy growing. This was possibly due to the country’slow-interest monetary policy which kept credit relatively cheap. The easy accessto credit increasingly fuelled consumption, and household debt increased from48 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to nearly 100 per cent just before the crisis. 9 For details of this hypothesis see Dollar and Kraay (2001). 10 United Nations (2005) drew attention to the predicament of rising inequality. 11 Since the minimum wage has not kept pace with inflation, its real value has fallen.

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18 The Global Social Crisis Rising income inequality in the United States and elsewhere also contributedto the financial crisis. In the United States, in the mid-1970s, the richest 1 per centof the population captured about 8 per cent of national income; by the 2000s,this group received double that proportion, or 16 per cent. The income share ofthe bottom 90 per cent of the population declined from 65.4 per cent in 1980to 51.8 per cent in 2008 (Johnston, 2010). Such high income concentration inthe hands of so few had not existed since 1929, just before the start of the GreatDepression. This massive wealth accumulation sought profitable investmentopportunities and increased the pressure on the financial sector to makeincreasingly risky investments in more unregulated environments.12 Insufficientregulation, despite the emergence of many new financial instruments, enabledfinancial institutions to become overleveraged as overconfident investors movedinto riskier assets, presuming the continuation of high economic growth rates(Milanovic, 2009; Rajan, 2010).United States crisis becomes globalRecent globalization has been characterized by widespread trade and capitalaccount liberalization, either voluntarily or as a condition for receiving loans or aid.The dominant view, at least prior to the current crisis, had been that freer marketswould enhance economic efficiency. That view held that trade liberalizationand economic openness should enable countries to maximize resource use andcomparative advantage, attract FDI and increase capital formation. The benefitsof the ensuing growth would then trickle down to the majority of the population.This approach, however, did not achieve the promised results in many countries,and in fact worsened the effects of the crisis (van der Hoeven, 2010). The global crisis was, in part, precipitated by the lack of internationalregulatory coordination. Globalization of financial markets has meant that muchcredit and capital are no longer under the jurisdiction of national regulatorybodies. Existing national regulation also proved insufficient to protect investorsfrom excessive risk. Governments’ failure to more effectively regulate banksand other financial institutions allowed those institutions to take advantage ofloopholes in their search for greater profits, ultimately causing them to becomeoverleveraged (United Nations, 2010b) Globalization in the years prior to the crisis accelerated the broad economicintegration that facilitated the spread throughout the world of the repercussions ofunsustainable overleveraging in the United States. The crisis spread through financialmarket interlinkages across Europe and quickly extended to the real economy asneeded loans and investment finance became increasingly unavailable. While theimpact of the crisis on economic growth and employment has been most severe in 12 For details refer to Torres (2010) and van der Hoeven (2010).

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19 The Global Social Crisis Box I.1 The Community Reinvestment Act and the United States subprime crisis The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act was intended to stop discriminatory lending practices—known as redlining—against individuals in low-income and ethnic minority neighbourhoods by requiring lending institutions to apply the same conditions to all borrowers. Some critics attribute the rise in subprime loans and the subprime mortgage crisis to implementation of that Act. They argue that it required banks to lower their credit standards and offer higher-risk mortgage products in order to make loans to lower-income applicants. Subprime loans are high-risk loans intended for people who do not qualify for other loans owing to their low income or poor or limited credit histories. Such loans typically have higher interest rates than do prime loans along with more or higher fees and penalties. The subprime market experienced many abusive lending practices, including the steering of borrowers who would be eligible for prime loans towards taking subprime loans and pushing loans with low “teaser” rates that would rise sharply over time. Only 9 per cent of subprime loans made to low-income borrowers or to those in low- income neighbourhoods were compliant with the Act’s regulations (Park, 2008). This argument against financial inclusion overlooks several important facts. Subprime loans generated higher revenue for mortgage companies, so the incentive structure encouraged lenders to push these loans towards potential borrowers. However, 60 to 70 per cent of so-called subprime loans went to borrowers at middle- or higher-income levels and with good credit who should have been eligible for prime loans (Aalbers, 2009). Additionally, the Act could not exercise regulatory control over non-bank lenders. Independent mortgage companies had been the source of the majority of subprime loans in the United States. Easy access to home loans contributed to a “housing bubble” in the United States, and this situation was at the heart of the crisis. With home ownership long part of the “American Dream”, the idea that all Americans, including those with low incomes and poor credit histories, should be able to own their own homes became increasingly prevalent. Inadequate financial regulation and lax monetary policy encouraged lending to applicants not qualified to obtain such loans. Low interest rates, lack of information, poor judgment and predatory lending practices – encouraged by commission-based mortgage sales – led many home buyers to take risky mortgages. The regularity with which home values increased yearly led to overly optimistic assumptions, as home owners borrowed and spent against inflated home values. By 2006, 48 per cent of all mortgages were subprime (Verick and Islam, 2010). In the same year, interest rates began to rise and borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages or low introductory “teaser” rates were soon faced with the stark reality that they could no longer afford their monthly payments; the delinquency rate on home mortgages subsequently rose. As house prices fell, owners found that they owed more than their homes were worth, further fuelling the delinquency rate. Of all subprime loans issued in 2006, at least 40 per cent were delinquent by the end of 2008 (United Nations, 2009a). As lenders spread the risk around, exposure broadened more than ever.1 1 “Mortgages were sold on by the originators to third-parties, which were then repackaged as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sold to investors. This enabled lenders to take the loans off their books. In particular, special investment vehicles (SIVs) were pressed into service and kept off the balance sheet, which allowed financial institutions to increase leverage and returns on their investments. Thus, mortgages that were in the past the domain of the traditional banking system could now be traded in open markets both within the US and outside its borders, beyond the scope of regulatory measures (because they were conducted as an over-the-counter transaction thus avoiding the regulations pertaining to the stock market)” (Verick and Islam, 2010).

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20 The Global Social Crisissome high-income countries, there have also been negative impacts on developingcountries. Declining global trade and commodity prices hurt export sectors, as thecredit squeeze spread to developing countries and transition economies.TradeTriggered by a collapse of import demand in major developed countries andmuch less trade finance, trade flows fell between 30 and 50 per cent in mosteconomies in late 2008 and early 2009, with East Asian economies experiencingthe sharpest decline. The financial crisis also abruptly reversed the upward trendof oil and non-oil primary commodity prices experienced since 2002. Oil pricesplummeted by as much as 70 per cent from their peak levels in 2008 beforerebounding. In the same period, metal prices declined even more sharply toabout a third of their peak levels. Prices of agricultural products, including basicfood grains, also declined significantly (United Nations, 2010b). As a result, many developing countries suffered strong swings in their termsof trade. In particular, net exporters of oil and minerals felt very strong adverseexport price shocks on top of declines in global demand due to the recession.Although net importers of food and energy saw their import bills fall during thecrisis, the related terms of trade gain was more than offset by the steep drop indemand for their exports at the nadir of the recession (United Nations, 2010b). As noted in the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2010,trade protectionism increased as the crisis evolved. A good number of developedand developing countries raised tariffs and introduced new non-tariff measures. Thefiscal stimulus packages and bail-out measures also contain protectionist elements,such as direct subsidies and support for domestic industries, or restrictions on theuse of these resources to buy foreign products. Some countries also reintroducedpreviously eliminated export subsidies for some agricultural products.13 Yet, world trade continued to recover in 2010 mainly due to strong importdemand from the emerging economies, and grew by about 10.5 per cent. However,there is considerable doubt whether emerging economies can continue to act as theengines of world trade growth particularly as the dynamics of the initial phase of therecovery seem to be fading and as growth in developed countries remains sluggish.According to the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2011world trade is expected to moderate to about 6.5 per cent in both 2011 and 2012. 13 For details see Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009).

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21 The Global Social CrisisTourismThe effects of the economic crisis have also spread from high- to middle- andlow-income countries through declines in international tourism. According tothe United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), tourism registereda strong growth in developing countries, especially in least developed countries(LDCs) since 2001 until the crisis hit. For example, international tourist arrivalsgrew by 42.5 per cent in LDCs and 30.8 per cent in developing countries asa whole during 2001-2005. Commensurate with this, international tourismreceipts grew by over 50 per cent in LDCs and over 33 per cent in developingcountries during the same period. Tourism is highly reactive to and dependenton economic conditions in tourist-sending countries, so it is not surprisingthat international tourism receipts dropped by $89 billion, from $939 billionin 2008 to $850 billion in 2009. All regions suffered lower receipts, with anaverage decline of 5.7 per cent globally compared with 2008 (World TourismOrganization, 2010a). The biggest losers were the Americas, down 9.6 per cent,and Europe, down 6.6 per cent. Asia and the Pacific saw uneven trends, withSouth and South-East Asia declining by 3.5 and 7.2 per cent, respectively, andOceania and North-East Asia increasing by 5.2 and 0.7 per cent, respectively(World Tourism Organization, 2010b). A slow recovery in global tourism started in the fourth quarter of 2009 andgained speed through 2010, driven by the emerging economies. Internationaltourist arrivals increased by 6.7 per cent in 2010 compared with 2009, withthe Middle East and Asian regions leading increases by 14 and 13 per cent,respectively, followed by the Americas at 8 per cent and Africa at 6 per cent.Europe trailed behind with 3 per cent growth (World Tourism Organization,2011). International tourist arrivals are expected to grow by about 4 per cent in2011 (World Tourism Organization, 2010a).International finance14Net private capital inflows to emerging economies declined precipitously inlate 2008 and early 2009. After peaking at about $1.2 trillion in 2007, inflowshalved in 2008 and plunged further to an estimated $350 billion in 2009. Thesharpest drop was in international bank lending to emerging economies, with atotal net inflow of $400 billion in 2007, which became a net outflow of more than$80 billion in 2009. The economies in transition, especially the Russian Federation,Ukraine and a few other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, experienced themost dramatic reversal in access to bank lending. Non-bank lending flows alsodeclined significantly during the crisis. Large outflows of net portfolio equity wereregistered in the second half of 2008. These flows have recovered markedly since 14 This section draws on United Nations (2010b).

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22 The Global Social Crisis Box I.2 Greek tourism sector adversely affected by crisis Tourism comprises almost a fifth of Greek national income. In 2009, the country’s fiscal deficit was approximately 13.6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), with a total public debt of 115 per cent of GDP (United Nations, 2010d). The country’s debt rating plummeted as it lost investor confidence, putting Greece on the verge of defaulting on its loan obligations. A default was forestalled with assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. However, by mid-2011 it became apparent that further assistance would be necessary to prevent a default. In December 2009, the Government began to implement a series of austerity measures, slashing public spending, raising taxes and raising the retirement age. The public has reacted strongly, with massive—and, at times, violent—protests beginning in February 2010. Major labour strikes further disrupted economic activity, especially in the country’s crucial tourism sector (BBC, 2010). In the first half of 2011 protests against further budget cuts and tax increases escalated in Athens. After two years of sharp decline, there is cautious optimism that Greek tourism revenues could increase by up to 10 percent in 2011 (Melander, 2011). Tourism in Greece, Spain and Portugal has risen in the first half of 2011 as tourists who might have opted for destinations such as Egypt and Tunisia are opting for alternative travel locations (Bawden, 2011).early 2009, but returning portfolio flows may also reflect a renewed appetite forriskier assets. While flows of FDI tend to be less volatile than other components of privatecapital flows, these declined by more than 30 per cent in 2009. External financingcosts for emerging market economies surged in late 2008. As a result, private sectoraccess to credit in emerging markets was curtailed, with this trend continuing well into2009. Outflows of capital from emerging economies, particularly to other developingcountries, which had gathered some momentum prior to the global financial crisis,also moderated during the period 2008-2009. The declines in private capital flows were partially offset by increased officialinflows, particularly from the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions,as their financial resources were boosted significantly at the G20 London Summitand they started to disburse more lending. Emerging Europe received the lion’sshare of these net official flows. Bilateral official, non-concessional flows alsoincreased as central banks arranged foreign-exchange swaps to deal with reducedinternational liquidity. However, net official flows to developing countriesremained negative in 2009 and 2010, continuing the trend of the past decade.The return of net official flows (including ODA) from poor to rich countries wasabout $120 billion per year between 2006 and 2008 (United Nations, 2010b).There are also concerns about the conditionalities of the IMF’s new crisis lending,which will be discussed further in chapter VI.

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23 The Global Social CrisisDevelopment aidDevelopment aid can be an important source of support for economic and socialdevelopment and accounts for as much as 20 per cent of government spending insome developing countries. At the 2002 Monterrey International Conference onFinancing for Development, developed countries once again made commitmentsto providing 0.7 per cent of their gross national income (GNI) as development aid. According to the United Nations MDG Gap Taskforce Report 2010, aidfrom members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reached almost$120 billion in 2009, increasing by less than 1 per cent, in real terms. However,the share of ODA in donor GNI was mere 0.31 per cent, well below the target of0.7 per cent, which has been reached and exceeded by only five donor countries. Aid budgets rose in Belgium, Finland, France, Norway, the Republic ofKorea, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland, but fell in some countries, particularly those experiencing debt crises.Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain all reduced their aid budgets in 2009, alongwith Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands (Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development, 2010). However, based on earlier government aid cuts during previous economiccrises, such as in Finland and Sweden in 2001, the World Bank has predicted thatdevelopment aid may fall by nearly one quarter (World Bank, 2010b). Moreover,even if donors maintain the ratios of their aid to national income, the amount ofaid will decline if national income falls. The aid budget has come under pressureas many donor governments turned to fiscal austerity measures. According tothe United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2011, the fragilerecovery in developed countries and the possible threat of a double-dip recessioncreate considerable uncertainty about the future volume of ODA flows, while aiddelivery is falling short of commitments by the donor community.RemittancesRemittances have become a growing source of income in many developingcountries, reaching a high of $336 billion in 2008. In past crises, remittanceswere counter-cyclical, going up when times were hard in receiving countries, thusfurnishing an important buffer against economic shocks. Overall, remittancesdeclined by 6.1 per cent, from $336 billion in 2008 to $315 billion in 2009(World Bank, 2010). However, in the current crisis, remittances have provenmore resilient than private capital flows and are expected to rise again in 2010and 2011 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal, 2010). The impact of the crisis on remittances varies by region. Remittance flows toLatin America were down by 12 per cent in 2009. In Eastern Europe and CentralAsia, many countries that rely heavily on remittances saw these flows fall by an