newly disclosed internal al-Qaeda communiqué reveals a divided
organization with only a fragile foothold in Iraq, hoping U.S. troops
will stay long enough to give it time to build alliances with
often-antagonistic Iraqi insurgents and other Sunni leaders.

The
letter, dated Dec. 11, 2005, amounted to a warning from a senior al-Qaeda
operative known as “Atiyah” to the then-leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq,
Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The letter faulted Zarqawi for
attacks on fellow Muslims that had alienated key elements of the
Sunni-led opposition to the U.S. occupation.

Atiyah told Zarqawi that “the most important thing
is that the jihad continues with steadfastness and firm rooting, and
that it grows in terms of supporters, strength, clarity of
justification, and visible proof each day. Indeed, prolonging the war
is in our interest.” [Emphasis added.]

Atiyah’s assessment that “prolonging the war is in
our interest” flies in the face of President George W. Bush’s argument
that a prompt U.S. military withdrawal would amount to a major victory
for al-Qaeda.

Indeed, the “Atiyah letter” – like a previously
intercepted message attributed to al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman
Zawahiri – suggests that a U.S. military pullout in 2005 or earlier
could have been disastrous for al-Qaeda’s terrorist bands, which are
estimated at only about 5 to 10 percent of the anti-U.S. fighters in
Iraq.

Without the U.S. military presence to serve as a
rallying cry and a unifying force, the al-Qaeda contingent faced
disintegration from desertions and attacks from Iraqi insurgents who
resented the wanton bloodshed committed by Zarqawi’s non-Iraqi
terrorists.

The “Zawahiri letter,” which was dated July 9,
2005, said a rapid American military withdrawal could have caused the
foreign jihadists, who had flocked to Iraq to battle the Americans, to
simply give up the fight and go home.

“The mujahaddin must not have their mission end
with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their
weapons, and silence the fighting zeal,” said the “Zawahiri letter,”
according to a text released by the office of the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence.

‘Still Weak’

The “Atiyah letter,” which was discovered by U.S.
authorities at the time of Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006, and was
translated by the U.S. military’s Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, also stressed the vulnerability of al-Qaeda’s position in Iraq
and the need to mend fences.

“Know that we, like all mujahaddin, are still
weak,” Atiyah told Zarqawi. “We have not yet reached a level of
stability. We have no alternative but to not squander any element of the
foundations of strength or any helper or supporter.”

The letter strongly cautioned Zarqawi “against
attempting to kill any religious scholar or tribal leader who is obeyed,
and of good repute in Iraq from among the Sunnis, no matter what. …

“The long and short of the matter is that the
Islamic theologians are the keys to the Muslim community and they are
its leaders. This is the way it is, whether you like it or not. … If you
appear before the community in the guise of a pariah to the class of
religious scholars, contradicting them, disrespecting them, and
insulting them, then you will lose the people and you will fail in any
call [to religion] or political act. …

“It is highly advisable
to be polite and to show complete respect, regret, compassion, and mercy
and so forth. You must incline yourself to this, and be humble to the
believers, and smile in people’s faces, even if you are cursing them in
your heart, even if it has been said that they are ‘a bad tribal
brother,’ and what have you.”

Beyond the significance of Atiyah’s wish for a
“prolonged” war, the letter underscores how tenuous al-Qaeda’s position
in Iraq has been, especially when contrasted with Bush’s alarmist
rhetoric about a smashing al-Qaeda victory if the U.S. military
withdraws.

Indeed, the “Atiyah” and “Zawahiri” letters suggest
that one of al-Qaeda’s biggest fears is that the United States will pull
out of Iraq before the terrorist organization has built the necessary
political infrastructure to turn the country into a future base of
operations.

The Mythic Caliphate

Zawahiri was so concerned about the possibility of
mass desertions after a U.S. withdrawal that he suggested that al-Qaeda
leaders in Iraq talk up the “idea” of a “caliphate” along the eastern
Mediterranean to avert a disintegration of the force.

To Zawahiri, the rhetoric about a “caliphate” was a
case of making empty promises to gullible followers, but President Bush
has seized on al-Qaeda’s references to a “caliphate” to justify an
expanded war against Islamic militants.

Even with the two fretful al-Qaeda letters in hand,
Bush has continued to warn Americans about al-Qaeda’s intent to follow
up a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq by turning the country into a launching
pad for a vast Islamic “empire” that would spell the strategic defeat of
the United States.

In a Sept. 5, 2006, speech, Bush declared, “This
caliphate would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all
current and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to North Africa,
the Middle East, and Southeast Asia,” Bush said. “We know this because
al-Qaeda has told us.”

Some of Bush’s neoconservative advisers have
referred to
this coming conflict with militants among the world’s one billion
Muslims as “World War III” and a “clash of civilizations.”

On Sept. 26, 2006, Bush also rejected the
argument that the Iraq War has spurred the growth of Islamic terrorism.

“My judgment is, if we weren’t in Iraq,
they’d find some other excuse, because they have ambitions,” Bush said.
“They kill in order to achieve their objectives.”

But a growing body of evidence, including the
intercepted al-Qaeda letters, appears to undercut Bush’s conclusions
about both the prospects for “a totalitarian Islamic empire” and a
disconnect between the continuing Iraq War and terrorism.

According to a National Intelligence Estimate,
representing the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community in
April 2006, “the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a
coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse.” [Emphasis
added.]

The NIE also concluded that the Iraq War – rather
than weakening the cause of Islamic terrorism – had become a “cause
celebre” that was “cultivating supporters for the global jihadist
movement.”

Foundering Leadership

Still, while the Iraq War may have helped raise the
tide of Islamic militancy in Iraq and around the world, the “Zawahiri”
and “Atiyah” letters suggest that it has done little to lift al-Qaeda’s
boats.

The letters depict a still-foundering movement
whose only real hope for success is that the United States continues to
overreact to the terrorist threat and thus generates a new surge of
recruits to al-Qaeda’s cause.

According to the “Zawahiri letter,” al-Qaeda
remained so disorganized that it even lacked a reliable means for
getting out its messages. Zawahiri complained that six of his audio
statements “were not published for one reason or another.”

The letter also asked if the embattled al-Qaeda
operatives in Iraq might be able to spare $100,000 to relieve a cash
squeeze facing the group’s top leaders in hiding, presumably along the
Afghan-Pakistani border.

The “Atiyah letter” contained similar references to
the weaknesses of the al-Qaeda leadership holed up in Waziristan on the
Pakistani side of the border. “Atiyah” claimed that it was easier for
Zarqawi to send an emissary to Pakistan than it was for al-Qaeda leaders
to dispatch someone to Iraq.

Al-Qaeda’s leaders “wish that they had a way to
talk to you and advise you, and to guide and instruct you; however, they
too are occupied with vicious enemies here,” the “Atiyah letter” said.

Despite these weaknesses and al-Qaeda’s concerns
about desertions in Iraq if the United States withdrew, President Bush
has drawn nearly the opposite conclusions, insisting that a U.S. pullout
would represent a great boost to al-Qaeda. But the facts seem to point
the other way – that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 relieved pressure
on al-Qaeda leaders in hiding and gave them hope by attracting a new
generation of young Muslims to the extremist cause.

By extending the U.S. occupation of Iraq
indefinitely, Bush appears to be continuing to play into al-Qaeda’s
hands.

As “Atiyah” observed, it follows that the longer
the U.S. occupation drags on, the more time al-Qaeda will have to
strengthen ties to indigenous Iraqi insurgents, attract more jihadists
into its fold and harden its new recruits – “prolonging the war is in
our interest.”

In that view, Bush’s strategy is helping al-Qaeda,
both in Iraq and globally. But a prolonged war also has turned out to be
in Bush’s interests.

Bush has skillfully exploited American memories of
9/11 and residual fears of al-Qaeda to strengthen his political position
at home, achieving a one-party Republican government since 2002. Citing
the terrorism threat, he also has engineered an unprecedented rollback
of U.S. constitutional liberties.

In September 2006, the Republican-controlled
Congress granted Bush the authority to ignore habeas corpus – a
right to a trial by jury dating back to the Magna Carta of 1215 and one
of the few rights expressly written into the body of the U.S.
Constitution.

Now, under a new counter-terrorism law, Bush will
have the power to jail indefinitely a person deemed an “enemy combatant”
or an individual “who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States” or its military allies.

Since 9/11, Bush also has used the terrorist threat
to discredit political opponents in the eyes of many Americans. In 2002
and 2004, Bush challenged the anti-terror credentials of Democrats,
paving the way to Republican victories.

With Election 2006 only a little more than a month
away, Bush has fired up the terror rhetoric again, saying Democratic
criticism of the Iraq War has proved that “the party of FDR and the
party of Harry Truman has become the party of cut and run.”

But Bush’s attack line ignores what appears to be
the larger reality, that the policy that is actually serving al-Qaeda’s
interests is a policy of “stay the course.”

Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra
stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from
Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at
secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at
Amazon.com, as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine,
the Press & 'Project Truth.'

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