(1) In
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court held that the "clear probability" of persecution standard employed for withholding of deportation under
section 243
(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), does not converge with, and may not be equated with, the "well-founded fear" of persecution standard used for asylum under section 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
Matter of Acosta
, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), is therefore overruled insofar as it held that the two standards were not meaningfully different, and in practical application converged.

(2) The well-founded fear of persecution standard used in
section 208
of the Act is significantly different from the clear probability standard used in
section 243
(h).

(3) An applicant for asylum under
section 208
of the Act has established a well-founded fear if a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.

(4) A reasonable person may well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than clearly probable.

(5) An alien's own testimony in an asylum case may be sufficient, without corroborative evidence, to prove a well-founded fear of persecution where that testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear.

(6)
Matter of Acosta's
requirement that an applicant for asylum

show, inter alia, that the potential persecutor "could easily become aware" that the applicant possesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome by some punishment is changed by omitting the word "easily."

In a decision dated August 16, 1985, an immigration judge found the respondents deportable as charged and denied their application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Three months' voluntary departure was granted in lieu of deportation. The respondents appealed from the denial of asylum and withholding of deportation. The respondents' appeal will be sustained, and the application for asylum will be granted. Oral argument before the Board is denied.

The respondents, husband and wife, are both natives and citizens of Iran. Both respondents were admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant students on or about September 8, 1978. The female respondent's status was subsequently changed to that of a spouse of a nonimmigrant student. The respondents were authorized to remain in this country until February 27, 1982, but they remained beyond that time. Orders to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Forms I-221) were issued against them on August 28, 1984,
charging them with deportability as overstays under
section 241(a)(2)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). At a joint deportation hearing begun on November 5, 1984, and concluded on July 2, 1985, the respondents conceded their deportability. The only issues at the hearing, and the only issues on appeal, concern the male respondent's application for asylum and withholding of deportation.
1/

An alien who is seeking withholding of deportation from any country must show that his "life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in as particular social group, or political opinion."
Section 243
(h)(1)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). In order to make this showing, the alien must establish a "clear probability" of persecution on account of one of the enumerated grounds.
INS
v.
Stevic
, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). This clear probability standard requires a showing that it is more likely than not that an alien would be subject to persecution.
Id
. at 429-30. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, withholding of deportation is mandatory. Thus, once an alien has established that he qualifies for that relief, and that he is not ineligible under the provisions of
section 243
(h)(2)
, it must be granted, and he cannot then be returned to the country where he would face persecution. He can, however, be sent to another country under certain circumstances. In this important regard, withholding of deportation differs from asylum, which may be denied in the exercise of discretion to aliens who establish statutory eligibility for the relief.

In order to establish eligibility for a grant of asylum, an alien must demonstrate that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of
section 101(a)(42)(A)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
See
section 208
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). That definition includes the requirement that an alien demonstrate that he is unwilling or unable to return to his country because of persecution or a "well-founded fear" of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The meaning of the term "well-founded fear" has been the subject of considerable controversy and litigation. The Board previously took the position that, as a practical matter, the
showing required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum purposes was the same as that required to establish a clear probability of persecution for purposes of withholding of deportation.
Matter of Acosta
, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). However, the Supreme Court has recently rejected this approach. In
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Court held that the clear probability and well-founded fear standards do in fact differ, and that it was Congress' intent that they differ. The Court found it reasonable to assume that Congress intended to make it more difficult to establish absolute entitlement to withholding of deportation under
section 243
(h)
than to establish mere eligibility for asylum under
section 208
.
Id
. at 443-44. In so ruling, the Court rejected that part of our decision in
Matter of Acosta
,
supra
, wherein we held that the "clear probability" standard and the "well-founded fear" standard are not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge.
Id
. at 229. That portion of our decision in
Matter of Acosta
has therefore been effectively overruled.

In
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
,
supra
, the Court reiterated the rule in
INS
v.
Stevic
,
supra
, that in order to establish a clear probability of persecution under
section 243
(h)
of the Act, an alien must prove that it is "more likely than not" that he will be persecuted. However, the Court held, such a probable showing of persecution need not be made in order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under
section 208
of the Act. The Court specifically declined to attempt a detailed definition of "well-founded fear," or an explanation as to how that term should be applied. Noting that there is "obviously some ambiguity" in the term, the Court left a more concrete definition to the process of case-by-case adjudication.
Id
. at 448.

It is clear that to a large degree the meaning of "well-founded fear" can in fact only be determined in the contexts of individual cases. Whatever words may be used in a definition, the approach must still be to assess each case independently on its particular merits. Nevertheless, we think that some guidance can be provided and would be helpful. We do not attempt a definitive statement on the meaning of well-founded fear but rather are setting forth a starting point for use in an ongoing effort to for
mulate a workable and useful definition of the standard in question.

Although, as noted above, the Supreme Court in
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
,
supra
, did not attempt to define "well-founded fear," the Court in dictum in
INS
v.
Stevic
,
supra
, offered this guide for the meaning of well-founded fear: "[S]o long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a
reasonable possibility
."
INS
v.
Stevic
,
supra
, at 424-25 (emphasis added). In
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
,
supra
, the Court noted the "obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs" in assessing whether a fear is well founded.
Id
. at 431. Perhaps more helpful, however, was the direction provided by the Court in
Cardoza-Fonseca
when it compared the well-founded fear standard with the clear probability
standard of
section 243
(h) of the Act. Not only are the two terms not identical, the Court noted, but since two different standards were used in the same Act, they must have been intended to have "significantly different" meanings.
Id
. at 448 n. 31. The Court's view that the two terms are "significantly different" thus serves as a starting point in defining the term "well-founded fear."
2/

As suggested by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca
,
supra
, some guidance regarding the meaning of well-founded fear can be found in decisions of the United States courts of appeals. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cardoza-Fonseca
, and after the Court's decision in
INS
v.
Stevic
,
supra
, a number of the lower courts addressed the issue of the well-founded fear standard and attempted to define that term. The first court of appeals to address the question was the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Carvajal-Munoz
v.
INS
, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). The court there stated its view that the evidentiary burden of proof in asylum cases was not identical to that in withholding of deportation cases, although it found the two standards to be "very similar."
Id
. at 575. The Supreme Court, as just noted, has indicated that the terms are significantly different. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit's view of the showing necessary to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is worth considering. The court held that, in order to establish the well-founded fear of persecution required for asylum,

[t]he applicant must present
specific
facts establishing that he or she has actually been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to fear that he or she will be
singled
out
for persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Id
. at 574. The court also elaborated on the type of evidence necessary to make this showing:

Ordinarily, this must be done through objective evidence supporting the applicant's contentions. Sometimes, however, the applicant's own testimony will be all that is available regarding past persecution or the reasonable possibility of persecution. In these situations, the applicant's uncorroborated testimony will be insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden unless it is credible, persuasive, and points to
specific
facts that give rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds, or, alternatively or in addition thereto, must show through testimony and corroborative objective evidence that he or she has good reason to fear persecution on one of the specified grounds.

Id
. at 574. Thus, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the need for the applicant to be specific in his claims, to show that there is a "reasonable possibility" of persecution, and to show that he has "good reason" for his fear of persecution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after first deciding in
Bolanos-Hernandez
v.
INS
, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984), that the well-founded fear standard is a lesser one than the clear probability standard, turned to the meaning of well-founded fear in
Cardoza-Fonseca
v.
United States INS
, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985). The court accepted the rationale of the Seventh Circuit that an applicant for asylum is required to "present 'specific facts' through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or 'good reason' to fear future persecution."
Id
. at 1453, citing
Carvajal-Munoz
v.
INS
,
supra
, at 574. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of corroborative evidence. Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining documentary evidence to support an asylum claim, the court held that if such evidence is not available, the applicant's testimony will suffice if it is credible, persuasive, and specific. The court rejected the Government's contention that such an approach to the well-founded fear standard rendered that standard wholly subjective and emphasized that applicants

must point to specific, objective facts that support an inference of past persecution or risk of future persecution. That the objective facts are established through the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant does not make those facts less objective. "Mere assertions of possible fear" are still insufficient.
Shoaee
v.
INS
, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983). It is only after objective evidence sufficient to suggest a risk of persecution has been introduced that the alien's subjective fears and desire to avoid the risk-laden situation in his or her native land become relevant.