JANUARY 6, 1921
We have naturally followed the con-
troversy relating to the future of our
Controversy Naval shipbuilding policy with more
than a little interest, but the more
we read the more are we reminded of the proverb
which asks: " Who shall decide when doctors
disagree ? " It is practically impossible for the
lay mind to arrive at anything like a settled opinion
after reading the columns of print which are con-
tributed to the daily Press by distinguished retired
admirals and senior officers of the Navy, each one
of whom appears to have his own ideas and con-
ceptions of how the future sea wars will be fought
and won.
The worst of it all is, from the point of view of the
outsider who strives for enlightenment, that every
letter he reads seems to smack of special pleading,
an impression which is very often strengthened
when the record of the writer is looked up and it is
found that he is a distinguished specialist in the
particular branch of the Service upon which he
apparently pins his faith. Naturally, it is expecting
a great deal when we ask the submarine specialist
to admit that the future of naval war lies in the
hands of the big ships. Nor is it logical to expect
an officer whose principal service has been in battle
ships to agree with the school which avers that the
big ship cannot put to sea in the face of the sub-
marine menace, and cannot even remain safely in
harbour because of her vulnerability to attack by
torpedo-carrying aircraft.
Hence the only way to arrive at conclusions is
by a careful reading and weighing of all that is said
on every aspect of the question, and a careful elimina-
tion of all that seems biassed by the known service
and inclinations of the witness. The tendency we
have in mind is well demonstrated by the fact, to
which Admiral S. S. Hall draws attention in a letter
to The Times, that the controversy has largely been
reduced to a discussion of the respective merits of
the battleship and the submarine. The share which
aircraft are likely to take in the naval battles of the
future, he points out, is ignored or dismissed with
little more than a reference. Admiral Hall, after
pinning his faith to " thoroughly efficient air, sub-
marine and mining services," concludes his views
with the very emphatic pronouncement- : "It is
air mastery alone that can give us the power of a
vigorous offensive."
General Brancker sums up the case quite well
when he says—also in The Times—after reviewing
the claims made by all sides: " Some writers have
stated that the duty cA the Fleet is to destroy the
enemy's sea bases, coaling stations, fortifications
and commercial haibours, and others have contended
that submarines have rendered such enterprisfs
impossible. But they will not be impossible to
aircraft, and I am .certain that, in the future, the
Air Force must become par excellence the arm of
offence against hostile commerce and territory.
If this is admitted, then the proportion of the money
available for armaments allotted to the Air Force
as compared to the other services must be very
high. If this high allotment to the Air rendeis
the allotment to the Navy insufficient for the con-
struction of capital ships, then they must go. No
nation can neglect power in-the air in order to preserve
a form of defence so expensive in its maintenance
and so problematical in its utility."
Naturally, we incline very much to the endorse-
ment of Admiral Hall's and of General Brancker's
views, and we believe that before many decades
there will be few who. will not be of the same way
of thinking.
By way of a last" view " of the future the following
sentence from a New Year's article in the German
paper Die Woche should give food for reflec-
tion :—
" The capability of ships to submerge marks
a new era in the waging of warfare which is of the
highest importance. It can never again be left
out of calculation, any more than can the masteiy
of the air by airships and aeroplanes."
It would really seem to us that the matter has
now arrived at a stage when it can best be judged
by an able civilian committee, capable of sifting
the whole of the evidence, etc., free from professional
bias, and qualified to arrive at reasoned conclusions,
which must be forced upon the professional seamen
whether they agree with those conclusions or not.
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE ENSIGN
THE design for a Royal Air
Force ensign has been approved
by His Majesty the King. It
consists of a flag of Royal Air
Force blue, one-fourth of which
is occupied by a Union flag as
in the maritime ensigns. The
fourth below the Union flag
bears no device, whilst centred
in the remaining half of the
ensign is the Royal Air Force
identification mark carried by all
British Service aircraft.
The Union flag in the corner
of the ensign denotes its
nationality, whilst the colour and
the marking serve to identify it
as the ensign of the Royal Air
Force. The inclusion of the
Royal Air Force marking, which
has become so familiar to all as
the recognition mark on British"
Service aircraft, is appropriate The new R.A.F. ensign. The ground is R.A.F.
in that it is the symbol under blue, and the rosette has the outer circle in
which many thousands of gallant Royal blue, the inner, white, and the centre, red.
actions have been fought in the
air, and many thousands of
British flying officers have been
wounded or have met their
death.
The ensign will be flown daily
from morning parade till sunset
at the Headquarters of the Force,
of areas and independent com-
mands and at Royal Air Force
Stations, Hoisted with due cere-
mony, it will be flown at the
peak of a mast and gaff, at the
masthead of which the dis-
tinguishing flag of the command-
ing officer will also be hoisted
whenever the ensign is flown,
except on those occasions when
the Royal Standard or the
personal Standard of a Member
of the Royal Family takes the
place of the distinguishing flag of
the commanding officer, indicating
that the King or a Member of the
Royal Family is present.