NORAD Timeline presented by Col. Scott (ret.)
Col. Alan Scott
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Commissioners. It is my pleasure to be
here with you today. General Arnold and I worked together that day
on September 11th. What I will walk you through here is a chronology
of the attacks and I presented it in a matrix form. And the only
thing I lay claim to is having studied all of the attacks and how
they were interwoven together. This was not a linear sequence of
events where one attack began and ended and then a second attack
began and ended. This was a coordinated, well-planned attack. We
had multiple airplanes in the air. The fog and friction of war was
evident everywhere in the country both on the civil side as well as
the military side.
And this hopefully will show you how those interwoven events came
about. I will tell you that the times on this chart come from our
logs. The time on the chart is the time that's in the log. It may
not be the exact time the event happened. It may be the time when
the log keeper was advised or became aware of the event.

The first thing that happened in the morning, related to, related to
the events at 9:02, or I'm sorry, 8:02 A.M., EST, is when American
Airlines 11 took off out of Boston. American Airlines 11 was a 767
and it was headed, I believe, to Los Angeles

Fourteen minutes later, also coming out of Boston Logan, United
Airlines 175, a 757, also headed to Los Angeles, took off out of
Boston and initially took roughly the same ground track as American
11. Three minutes later American Airlines 77 took off out of Dulles
here in Washington, also headed to Los Angeles and also a 757 and
proceeded westbound towards the West Coast. So now the first three
airplanes are airborne together.

The first time that anything untoward and this was gleaned from FAA
response and anything out of the ordinary happened was at 8:20 when
the electronic transponder in American Airlines 11 blinked off, if
you will, just disappeared from the screen. Obviously, the terrorists
turned that transponder off and that airplane, although it did not
disappear from the radar scope, it became a much, much more difficult
target to discern for the controllers who now only could look at the
primary radar return off the airplane.
That was at 8:20. At 8:40, in our logs is the first occasion where
the FAA is reporting a possible hijacking of American Airlines Flight
11. And the initial response to us at that time was a possible
hijacking; it had not been confirmed.

At that same moment, the F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base,
Massachusetts, about 153 miles away were placed immediately on battle
stations by the Northeast Air Defense Sector Commander.

At 8:43, as this is going on, the fourth airplane, United 93 takes
off out of Newark, New Jersey. It's a 757; it is headed for San
Francisco.

At 8:46, our next log event, we get the last and by the way, much of
this radar data for these primary targets was not seen that day. It
was reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron
and other agencies like it who are professionals at going back and
looking at radar tapes and then given that they are loaded with
knowledge after the fact, they can go and find things that perhaps
were not visible during the event itself.

At 8:46, the last data, near the Trade Center. 8:46, the first
impact on the Trade Center.
At that minute is when the Otis F-15s were scrambled and, again, they
are 153 miles away. And that scramble came and Gen. Arnold, I'm sure
can address this, based on the conversation between the Northeast
Sector Commander and himself.

Those F-15s were airborne in six minutes. That is well inside the
time that is allowed for them to get airborne. But because they were
on battle stations, the pilots were in the cockpits ready to start
engines, that scramble time was shortened by a significant amount of
time.

At 8:53, that's a minute later, in the radar reconstruction, we are
now picking up primary radar contacts off of the F-15s out of Otis.

At 8:57, which is seven minutes after the first impact is according
to our logs when the FAA reports the first impact. And about this
time is when CNN coverage to the general public is beginning to
appear on the TV, not of the impact, but of the burning tower shortly
thereafter. So, you can see what in the military, I'm sure you have
heard us talk to the fog and friction of war. And as the intensity
increases, the lag tends to also increase for how quickly information
gets passed.

At 9:02, United 175, the second airplane, which by the way, never
turned off its transponder before impact, crashes into the North
Tower, at 9:02. The distance of those fighters which had been
scrambled out of Otis, at that particular point they were still 71
miles away, about 8 minutes out and going very fast.

At 9:05, FAA reports a possible hijack of United 175. Again that's 3
minutes after the impact in the Tower. It's how long it is taking
now for the information to flow through the system to the command and
control agencies and through the command and control agencies to the
pilots in the cockpits.

At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations just based on
the general situation, and the breaking news and the general
developing feeling about what's going on. And about that same time,
kind of way out in the west is when American 77, which in the
meantime has turned off its transponder and turned left back toward
Washington, appears back in radar coverage. And my understanding is
the FAA controllers now are beginning to pick up primary skin paints
on that airplane and they don't know exactly whether that is 77 and
they are asking a lot of people whether it is, including a C130
that's westbound toward Ohio.

At 9:11, the FAA reports a crash into the South Tower. You can see
now that lag time has increased from 7 minutes from impact to report,
and now it's 9 minutes from impact to report and you can only imagine
what's going on on the floors of the control centers around the
country.

At 9:11, I just mentioned that, 9:16, now FAA reports a possible
hijack of United Flight 93, which is out in the Ohio area. That's
the last flight that is going to impact the ground.

At 9:24, the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77. That's some time
after they had been tracking its primary target. And at that moment
as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.

At 9:25, American 77 is reported heading toward Washington, D.C., not
exactly precise information, just general information, across the
chat log.

9:27, Boston FAA reports a fifth aircraft missing, Delta Flight 89.
And you people have never heard of Delta Flight 89. We call that the
first red herring of the day because there are a number of reported
possible hijackings that unfolded over the hours immediately
following the actual attack. Delta 89 was not hijacked. It enters
the system. It increases the fog and friction, if you will, as we
begin to look for that. But he lands about 7 or 8 minutes later and
clears out of the system.

At 9:30, that Langley F-16s are airborne. They are 105 miles away
from the Washington area.

At 9:34, through chat, FAA is unable to precisely locate American
Airlines Flight 77.

At 9:35, F-16s are reported airborne. And many times, reported
airborne is not exactly when they took off, it's just when the report
came down that they were airborne.

At 9:37, we have the last radar data near the Pentagon and 9:40,
immediately following that, is when 93 up North turns it transponder
off, out in the West toward Ohio and begins a left turn back toward
the East.

At 9:49, FAA reports that Delta 89, which had been reported as
missing, is now reported as a possible hijacking so again, he is....
I'm sorry 9:41. Again he is in the system. He is kind of a red
herring for us.

Now the only thing that I would point out on this chart is that this
says 9:43, American Airlines 77 impacts the Pentagon. The timeline
on the impact on the Pentagon was changed to 9:37. 9:43 is the time
it was reported that day. It was the time we used. And it took
about two weeks to discover in the parking lot of the Pentagon this
entry camera for the parking lot, which happened to be oriented
toward the Pentagon at the time of impact. And the recorded time is
9:37. And that's why the timeline went from 9:43 to 9:37 because it
is the best documented evidence for the impact time that we have.

Getting toward the end now, 9:47 is when Delta 89 clears the system
by landing in Cleveland. So he is not a hijack. Lots of things are
going on now in the system as the Sectors begin to call both units
that are part of First Airforce and NORAD as well as units that have
nothing to do with us. We are beginning to call everyone now and the
103rd Air Control Squadron, for instance, stationed in Connecticut is
an Air Control Squadron, a radar squadron, and they got their radar
online operational and begin to link their radar picture into the
Northeast system. They are not normally part of NORAD. This is
really the initial part of a huge push the rest of that day to link
as many radars in on the interior as we can, and to get as many
fighters on alert as we can.

At 10:02, United 93, last radar data and the estimated impact time
for United 93 is 10:03.

At 10:07, FAA reports that there may be a bomb on board 93. That's
four minutes after the impact.

At 10:15, they report that it's crashed and you can see now the fog
and friction lag time has increased from 7 minutes to 9 minutes to 15
minutes because of the level of activities that are going on.

And there are notations here about other airplanes as we begin to
divert other airplanes that are just out intended for training that
day. We're picking up the phone, calling Syracuse the Air National
Guard. They are beginning to get flights airborne. They are
beginning to arm those aircraft with whatever weapons they have handy
so we can posture that defense.

That is how the timeline unfolded. As you can see, there is a fabric
of interwoven actions, which is not just a linear event. So lots of
things going on, lots of activities, lots of CQ centers. Sir, that
concludes my piece

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Mr. Chairman, we thought, right up front, we'd put that on the record
so that we could have that as a departure point for your questions.
I again caveat by saying that this is the North American Aerospace
Defense Command and Continental NORAD Region timeline. Other
agencies may have other logs that may have different times. But this
is the best and most accurate data that we could piece together for
your Commissioner, sir. With that, I open up to questions.

Thomas Kean, Chair
Thank you very much. Commissioner Ben-Veniste

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Good morning Gentlemen. First I would like to personally commend
each of you and the dedicated men and woman who serve our nation
through NORAD. I'd like to explain to you what you probably know
already and that is that our mandate as the Commission is to provide
the most detailed and accurate exposition in our final report of what
occurred leading up to the 9/11 tragedy and the events subsequent
thereto. And so, please understand that our questions may be very
pointed. We mean no disrespect but we have our mission, as well.
Now, Gen. McKinley, is it fair to say that the mission and the
primary responsibility of NORAD is to defend our homeland and our
citizens against air attack?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
On the day of September 11, 2001, our mission was to defend North
America, to surveil, to intercept, to identify and if necessary to
destroy those targets, which we were posturing were going to come
from outside our country. In fact, that tracks originating over the
landmass of the United States were identified friendly by origin.
Therefore, those alert sites that were positioned on the morning of
September 11th, were looking out, primarily on our coasts at the Air
Defense Identification Zone which extends outwards of 100 to 200
miles off our shore. So that was the main focus of NORAD at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
I asked you about your responsibility, Sir. And I ask you again
whether it was not your responsibility as NORAD to protect the United
States and its citizens against air attack?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It is and it was and I would just caveat your comment by saying that
our mission was, at that time, not designed to take internal FAA
radar data, to track or to identify tracks originating within our
borders. It was to look outward as a Cold War vestige, primarily
developed during the Cold War to protect against Soviet long-range
bomber penetration of our intercept zone.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well I think Sir, you have used a good term  not good for the United
States but accurate, in terms of the vestigial mandate operationally
to look outward toward the borders rather than inward. And by
vestigial, you mean I'm sure, as a result of our decades of
confrontation with the former Soviet Union.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Correct, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
And so, on the day of September 11th, if you can see these dots, I
know it may be difficult to see, NORAD was positioned in a perimeter
around the United States but nothing in the central region, nothing
on the border with Canada.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
That's correct, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Now let me ask you sir, whether the concept of terrorists using an
airplane as a weapon was something unknown to the intelligence
community on September 10th, 2001?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Very good question...

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Thank you.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
And I asked our staff to provide me some data on what they had that
morning. As I said, Gen. Arnold was at the helm that morning. But
basically, the comments I received from my staff was that there was
no intelligence indication at any level within NORAD or DOD of a
terrorist threat to commercial aviation prior to the attacks. And
information from the daily Joint Chiefs Intelligence Report on the
morning of September 11th indicated no specific dangers or threats
within the country.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
My question Sir, and I mean no disrespect but we will save time if
you'll listen to what ask you. My question is: the concept of
terrorists using airplanes as weapons was not something which was
unknown to the U.S. Intelligence community on September 10th, 2001.
Isn't that fair to say?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I would like the Intelligence community to address that. I would
find it hard to believe that they hadn't speculated against that.
But it was unavailable to us at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, let's start for example with September 12th, 1994. A Cessna
150L crashed into the south lawn of the White House barely missing
the building and killing the pilot. Similarly, in December of 1994,
an Algerian armed Islamic group in Paris hijacked an Air France
flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower.
In October of 1996, the Intelligence community obtained information
regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and
crash it into Tel Aviv. In August of 1998, the Intelligence
community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs
planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into
the World Trade Center. The information was passed on to the FBI and
the FAA. In September of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained
information that Osama bin Laden's next operation could possibly
involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport
and detonating it. In August 2001, the Intelligence Community
obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy
in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. In
addition, in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and
the Dept. of Justice and my colleague Jamie Gorelick were involved in
planning against possible terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which
included the potential of an aircraft flying into the stadium. In
July 2001, the G8 Summit in Genoa, attended by our President - among
the measures that were taken, were positioning surface-to-air
missiles, ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport and restricting
all airspace over Genoa. Was not this information, Sir, available to
NORAD as of September 11th, 2001?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It's obvious, by your categorization that those events all took place
and that NORAD had that information. I would only add, Sir, that the
intelligence data that we postured our forces for and the training,
and the tactics, and the procedures that we used to prepare our
missions for support of the Combatant Commander of NORAD, had
hijacking as a primary intercept tactic. And we have some of the
finest fighter pilots as you know in the world who are some of the
best people in the world, who can do their mission extremely well.
But we had not postured, prior to September 11th, 2001, for the
scenario that took place that day.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, obviously, it would be hard to imagine posturing for the exact
scenario but isn't it a fact, Sir, that prior to September 11th,
2001, NORAD had already in the works, plans to simulate in an
exercise, a simultaneous hijacking of two planes in the United
States.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Col. Scott, do you have any data on that? I'm not aware of that,
Sir. I was not present at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
That was operation Amalgam Virgo.

Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir. Specifically, operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was
involved in before I retired, was a scenario using a Third-World
United, not United, uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue
freighter in the Gulf of Mexico. General Arnold can back me up, at
the time, one of our greatest concerns was the proliferation of
cruise missile technology and the ability for terrorists groups to
get that technology and get it close enough to our shores to launch
it. In fact, this exercise, in this exercise we used actual drone,
MQM 107 drones, which are about the size of a cruise missile to
exercise our fighters and our radars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
You are referring to Amalgam '01, are you not?

Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
I'm referring to Amalgam '02, which was in the planning stages prior
to September 11th, 2001, Sir. Is that correct?

Col. Alan Scott
That was after I retired and I was not involved in '02.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Will you accept that the exercise involved a simultaneous hijacking
scenario?

Col. Alan Scott
I was not involved in '02.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, I do have some information on '02, if you would allow me to read
it for the record?

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Please.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Amalgam Virgo, in general, '02, was an exercise created to focus on
peacetime and contingency NORAD missions. One of the peacetime
scenarios that is and has been a NORAD mission for years is support
to other government departments. Within this mission falls
hijackings. Creativity of the designer aside, prior to 9/11, hijack
motivations were based on political objectives, ie: asylum or release
of captured prisoners or political figures. Threats of killing
hostages or crashing were left to the scriptwriters to invoke
creativity and broaden the required response for players.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, isn't that a bit fatuous given the specific information that
I've given you? It wasn't in the minds of scriptwriters when the
Algerians had actually hijacked a plane which they were attempting to
fly into the Eiffel Tower and all the other scenarios which I've
mentioned to you. I don't mean to argue with you but my question is,
Sir, given the awareness of the terrorists' use of planes as weapons,
how was it that NORAD was still focusing outward in protecting the
United States against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere and
was not better prepared to defend against the hijackings scenarios of
a commercial jet, laden with fuel, used as a weapon to target
citizens of the United States? When you say, our training, our
mission was vestigial, I think you said it in capsulated form but
would you agree that on the basis of the information available, that
there could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet this
threat?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
In retrospect, Sir, I think I would agree with your comment.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
With respect to the bases that were available for protecting the East
Coast, and Col. Scott has gone through the scrambling of aircraft, I
want to focus just on one flight, Flight 77, and then, Secretary
Lehman will ask you some more specific questions. With respect to
Flight 77, Sir, you testified previously before the House Armed
Services Committee and you were  I'm sorry, General Eberhart was
questioned. You are familiar with his testimony, Sir?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Yes Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Okay. He was questioned about Flight 77 and because of the use of
Langley Airbase, which is 105 miles from our Capitol, as opposed to
say Andrews Air Force Base, which is in the neighborhood, the
question arises again about the positioning and the thought behind
the positioning of fighter planes to protect our Capitol in an
enhanced terrorist threat situation, such as existed on September
10th, September 9th, 2002. Let me ask you about Flight 77 again.
The question was, the timeline that we've been given is that at 8:55
on September 11th, American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east,
away from it's intended course and at 9:10, Flight 77 was detected by
the FAA radar over West Virginia, heading east. That was after the
two planes had already struck the Trade Center towers. Is that
correct Col. Scott?

Col. Alan Scott
Yes Sir

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Now, 15 minutes later at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD, according to
the statement, that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington. (reading
from the record)

"Was that the first notification at 9:25 that NORAD or DOD had that
Flight 77 was probably hijacked? And if it was, do you know why it
took 15 minutes for the FAA to notify NORAD?"

General Eberhart said, "Sir, there is one minor difference, I showed
it as 9:24 which you do as well that we were notified and that's the
first notification that we received."

"Do you know if that was the first notification to DOD?"

"Yes, Sir, that's the first documented notification that we received"

And I want to focus on the word "documented" because it's very
important for us to know when NORAD actually received notification
given the fact that the planes had already crashed into the World
Trade Center and given, I'm sure, the assumption that these were
terrorist acts and there could be more coming, more planes coming.
Is it, in fact correct Sir that the first notification of any type
that NORAD received was not until 9:24 with respect to Flight 77?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
With your concurrence Sir, I would like to ask Gen. Arnold to address
that. He was on the floor that morning.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
The simple answer to your question is that I believe that to be the
fact. That 9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of
American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus, you've got
to remember, that there is a lot of other things going on
simultaneous here, was on United 93, which was being pointed out to
us very aggressively, I might say, by the FAA. Because our radar is
looking outward and not inward, the only way for us to know where
anything was for the FAA to pass along that information to us.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Is it not the case, Gen. Arnold, that there was an open line
established between FAA, NORAD and other agencies, including CIA and
FBI that morning?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Well, I wasn't on that line at that particular time if that were the
case. In fact, there was an open line established between our
sectors at really the tactical level where they're controlling the
aircraft, talking to the FAA controllers from time-to-time. We did
not have an open line at that time with the FAA. That is not
accurate.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
You did not. You were not, NORAD was not in contact by...

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
The Continental United States NORAD region, my headquarters, we are
responsible for the Continental United States air defense, did not
have an open line with the FAA at that time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Was there some NORAD office that had an open line with the FAA
(crosstalk). Excuse me, let me finish my question, please. Was
there some NORAD office, and you'll forgive us because we had asked
for this information prior to the hearing from FAA and did not
receive it. But we are advised that there was indeed an open line
between either the net or some other name given to a essentially an
ongoing conference, whereunder, in real-time, FAA was providing
information as it received it, immediately after the first crash into
the towers, we are told, with respect to each of the events that were
ongoing of any remarkable nature. I see Gen. McKinley is nodding.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I'd like to, if I may, address this based on my research and review
for this Commission. It's my understanding that the FAA was in
contact with our Northeast Air Defense sector at Rome, New York.
Understanding the relationship of how we defend North America from
threats, NORAD located in Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
our Continental NORAD region, our Air Operations Center located at
Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. That's where the Joint Force Air
Component Commander resides. And then we have three sectors based on
the size and volume of our country that handle that. It is my
understanding from talking with both FAA and our supervisors at the
Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome that those lines were open and
that they were discussing these issues.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
So, is it fair to say that, at least, the NORAD personnel in Rome,
New York had information available to it in real-time - once it saw,
and we were advised that this occurred at approximately 9:02, within
22 minutes earlier, that Flight 77 first was observed deviating from
its course  something which in the context of what was going on that
day, would be quite interesting if not remarkable.

Col. Alan Scott
Sir, I think it is also important to understand that like the CONUS
region, the FAA is also broken down into subordinate command and
control centers, as well. I know that the Boston Center was talking
directly to the Northeast Sector. I don't believe that Flight 77 was
in Boston Center's airspace. They were in Cleveland...

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I think the FAA can report accurately on this but I believe 77 was in
Cleveland Center airspace when it developed the problem where they
lost its radar image. And I believe, and the FAA can again testify
better to this, they would take action based on losing that
identification in Cleveland.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well actually, I think, according to the information that we have,
the first indication was not a loss of radar contact but rather a
course deviation, with respect to Flight 77. Now, I don't mean to
take up anymore time on this because we are going to want to follow-
up on all this information in great detail. But, let me ask whether
there is regularly made a tape recording of these open-line
communications?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Not to my knowledge

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Not to my knowledge

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Does FAA, to your knowledge, keep a recording of these crisis
situations?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I'm unaware but I would certainly direct that to them, please.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
To the best of your knowledge, you don't have anything further to
shed light on when you first learned, you NORAD, first learned of
Flight 77's probably hijack status, prior to 9:24 A.M.?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I can provide that for the record. I do not have any further
knowledge at this time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
We would ask that you do so.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Yes Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will have some other questions after.

Thomas Kean, Chairman
Secretary Lehman

John Lehman, Commissioner
Thank you Generals. I would also like to echo my colleagues
_expression of great admiration for you and your predecessor, your
command and your pilots, even though they might require long runways
to land. (Laughter)

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
We understand.

John Lehman, Commissioner
One of the most serious responsibilities we have in addition to air
security is identifying the real dysfunctions in our intelligence
system that contributed to the tragedy. And we had prior, as you
know, to your testimony Secretary Mineta, who indicated despite the
fact of this long litany of events and intelligence reports of the
growing probability that aircraft would be used as weapons. Nothing
ever got to him and nothing apparently got to you. And I assume,
General Arnold, nothing got to you. This would seem to be a pretty
significant failure of our system because it exists to provide
product precisely to you, the most important users tasked with
defending us. So, I'd to ask, we'll provide you a copy of this which
is from the Joint Inquiry Staff statement, if you could give us your
studied assessment of what went wrong in the way you interact with,
your command interacts with the intelligence community? And why the
product did not get to you? These were pretty dramatic events,
facts, and intelligence reports. It would be very helpful to us to
have your assessment as a customer of the system, to what went so
seriously wrong, that you were still only looking out.

There is another, an issue that I would ask perhaps General Arnold to
address, because there is a great deal of unease and distress, I
think, understandably among many of the families, that somehow those
aircraft could have been shot down if people had not made mistakes.
And, I wonder if you would just take us through each flight, given
the posture that NORAD was in at the time, which was national policy
and not whatever based on erroneous intelligence perhaps. But given
that posture, and given the times that NORAD was notified of the
deviation from, suggesting the possibility of hijacking. Could the
aircraft on alert, for instance, at Otis have intercepted? And then,
if you could also take us through 77 and 93, as well, with the F-16s
which. And if you would, tell us as you take us through what the
armament was on the F-15s and on the F-16s that were scrambled
against 77 and 93.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Thank you, Sir, and I'll try to do that to the best of my ability.
And perhaps, Gen. McKinley has some data that he could shed light on
because I have been retired a little while and don't have access to
the staff for some of the very specifics on that. But I will try to
do my best. As you know through previous testimony from Gen.
Eberhart to Congress, we were in the middle of a NORAD exercise at
that particular time. Which means, that basically our entire staff
was focused on being able to do the air operations center mission,
which was our job to do. We had just come out of a video
teleconference with the NORAD staff and with our folks at that
particular time when I was handed note that we had a possible
hijacking in Boston Center. And it had come from the Northeast Air
Defense Commander Col. Bob Meyer (phonetic) who is commander up there
and he had requested that I call him immediately. And I was upstairs
in our facility. I immediately went downstairs and picked up the
phone, asking on the way to my staff, is this part of the exercise?
Because quite honestly and frankly, we do do hijacking scenarios as
we go through these exercises from time-to-time. But I realized that
it was not  that this was real-life. And I also remember as I went
downstairs before I even talked to him that it had been a long time
since we had had a hijacking but the fact that we'd reviewed the
procedures, what it is that we do for a hijacking, because we were in
the middle of an exercise. So we were pretty well familiar with
those procedures. And, of course, we have our own checklist that we
follow.

As I picked up the phone, Bob told me that Boston Center had called a
possible hijacking within the system. He had put the aircraft at
Otis on battle stations and wanted permission to scramble them. I
told him to go ahead and scramble the airplanes and we'd get
permission later. The reason for that is that the procedure,
hijacking is a law enforcement issue as is everything that takes off
from within the United States. And only law enforcement can request
assistance from the military, which they did, in this particular
case. The route, if you follow the book, is that they go to the duty
officer of the national military command center, who in turn makes an
inquiry to NORAD for the availability of fighters, who then gets
permission from someone representing the Sec. of Defense. Once
that's approved, then we scramble aircraft. We didn't wait for
that. We scrambled the aircraft, told them to get airborne and we
would seek clearances later.

I picked up the phone, called NORAD, whose battle staff was in place
because of the exercise, talked to the deputy commander for
operations. He said, I understand and we'll call Pentagon for those
particular clearances. It was simultaneous almost with that decision
that we'd made that I'm looking at the TV monitor of the news network
and see the smoking hole in the north tower, of what turned out to be
the north tower of the World Trade Center. Wondering, what is this?
And like many of us involved in that, does it have anything to do
with this particular incident? Which, we didn't think it did because
we're talking Boston Center and we are not thinking of the immediate
New York Metropolitan area.

Shortly after that, of course, our airplanes became airborne after
that. It just so happens that Col. Duffy, who was the pilot of that
first F-15, had been involved in some conversation because as the
telephone calls were made, he was aware that there was a hijacking in
the system. And that was kind of interesting because he had
concluded that that indeed might have been that airplane and self-
elected to hit the afterburner and to speed up his way towards New
York. Excuse me.

It was then very shortly thereafter that we saw on television the
second airplane, the United 175 crash into the south tower. And the
first thing that I think most of us thought was this a re-run of the
first event. But then it turned out to be the second event. We had
no warning of that, whatsoever. There was, from my staff a call, in
fact, that airplane was called hijacked or possibly hijacked later
on, which in the, as General McKinley referred to as the fog and
friction of war. It actually caused further confusion because we
were not aware that which aircraft had actually crashed into the
towers. We just knew that by now we had two airplanes that are
crashed into the towers. We have two airplanes that are called
hijacked. Again, we were still minutes away. I think the record
said eight minutes away from New York City with F-15s that are moving
very rapidly in that direction.

Now, we have, before I get to 77 if it were, we get a call of United
Flight 93.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Well, before you go to that, I just wanted to make clear, there was
no possibility, given the lateness with which you were notified from
FAA of a possible hijacking, that those airplanes in full
afterburner, flying supersonic could have gotten there in time to
intercept either of those two planes. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
That's correct. That's correct. The first aircraft, of course,
American 11, crashed before our interceptors were airborne. We
ordered the scramble almost simultaneously; our record shows the same
minute. I'm not even sure which occurred first. But it was almost
simultaneous that we ordered the scramble of the aircraft and the
impact into the north tower had occurred. And so, by the time, even
the pilot accelerating to 1.5 mach, moving pretty fast, was still
eight minutes out by the time the second aircraft had crashed into
the tower. And though, when the second aircraft crashed into the
tower, by now, I think as Sec. Mineta said, "This becomes a
pattern." Certainly, I'd like to tell you that I was absolutely
certain at that time that we were under attack but I was not
absolutely certain that we were under attack at that particular
time. But we knew that this pattern had to be dealt with at that
particular time. And then very shortly thereafter, we got a call on
the United 93 flight being a possible hijacking. And that aircraft,
as you, well, I don't know as you know, but it wandered around. That
aircraft wandered around and flew up over the northern part of
Pennsylvania and Ohio. Mixed in with this was a call about a Delta
flight that was possibly hijacked. So, now our focus is we are under
attack. What are we going to do in order to be in position to
intercept another aircraft should it threaten someplace in the United
States? And that place, of course, we would not know.

In the Northeast, at this particular time, we had no other aircraft
available. The aircraft out of Otis had taken off. We looked at
aircraft that were returning from a Michigan, a Michigan Air National
Guard aircraft, returning from the range. Because at one time, we
thought either the Delta flight or the United 93 might pose a threat
to Detroit. We tried to get airplanes airborne out of the Toledo Air
National Guard, at that particular time. Can you get anything
airborne? Because we had this United 93 and this Delta flight. We
need to intercept it and see what is going on with those particular
aircraft.

Syracuse, New York, its Air National Guard Unit, we inquired with
them their ability to get airborne and ultimately they did, somewhat
later, at that particular time. And so in the record, you see the
time we were notified of the American flight 77 as being possibly
hijacked. I can tell you that I did not know and I don't believe
anybody in our NORAD system knew where that airplane was. We were
advised that it was possibly hijacked. And we had launched, almost
simultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to
put them over top of Washington, D.C.  not in response to American
Airlines 77 but really to put them in position in case United 93 were
to head that way. They were the closest fighters that we had and we
started vectoring them to move toward the Washington, D.C. area.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Did they also go into burner?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
No Sir.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, they, based on their configuration traveled at .98 mach, roughly
575 knots, 660 miles per hour about ten nautical miles per minute.

John Lehman, Commissioner
If they had gone into burner, could they have gotten there in time to
get 77?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I think if those aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, if we were
operating under something other than peacetime rules where they could
have turned immediately for Washington, D.C., and gone into burner,
it is physically possible that they could have gotten over
Washington, D.C.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Why did they head out to sea first?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Our standard, we have agreements with the FAA. And by the way, we
are looking outward, this is an advantage to us. And so we have
agreements for clearance. When we scramble an aircraft, there is a
line that's picked up and the FAA and everyone is on that line and
the aircraft take off and they have a predetermined departure route.
And, of course, it's out over water because our mission, unlike law
enforcement's mission is to protect things coming towards the United
States. And I might even add in all of our terrorist scenarios that
we run, the aircraft, if we were to intercept an aircraft, it is
usually always from outside the United States coming towards us. So,
our peacetime procedures are (garbled) to de-conflict with civil
aviation so as to not have, endanger civil aviation in any particular
way.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Secretary Lehman, also if I may add, the complexity of the air
traffic over the Northeast corridor is so complex that to just launch
fighters, as you know Sir from your background, into that air traffic
system can cause potential damage or mid-air collisions. So we rely
on the FAA to de-conflict those corridors. And that is another
reason why it vectored east originally.

John Lehman, Commissioner
The armament on the F-15s and the F-16s was?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
The armament, as I recall and Gen. McKinley can correct me on that,
we had full-up armament on all those aircraft with both radar and
heat-seeking missiles, as well as guns.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
(garbled)

John Lehman, Commissioner
So to continue with 77, it's fair to say that if you had got a more
timely notification from FAA and particularly with regard to where it
was heading, that those F-16s launched from Langley could possibly
have gotten there before they hit the Pentagon?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It is certainly physically possible that they could have gotten into
the area. And the speculation as to whether we could actually
intercepted the aircraft by that time  because everything we were
doing remember was being relayed from the FAA. We have no visibility
on those aircraft, couldn't see, we had no radars, couldn't talk to
our pilots. FAA did a marvelous job during that period of time in
doing radio relays and assisting us in being able to.....

John Lehman, Commissioner
Now, if 93 had not crashed, would it not have been possible for the F-
16s to have intercepted 93? And do you think they would have?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It was our intent to intercept United Flight 93. In fact, my own
staff, we were orbiting now over Washington, D.C. by this time and I
was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do. And our
intent was to intercept it. But we decided to stay over Washington,
D.C. because there was not that urgency and, if there were other
aircraft coming from another quadrant, another vector, we would have
been pulled off station and we would not have been able to  there
might have been an aircraft that popped up within the system closer
that would have posed a larger threat to the Washington, D.C. area.
So we elected to remain over D.C. until that aircraft was definitely
coming towards us. And as you know, the brave men and women who took
over that aircraft prevented us from making the awful decision which
the young men that were flying those aircraft would have lived with
for the rest of their lives if they had had to do that.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Now, in a short answer, why with the previous attempt of a light
plane to hit the White House wasn't Andrews Air Force Base with F-16s
and marine F-18s available part of the alert? And I understand, I'd
also like to have you comment on what the role of the Secret Service
was in scrambling those F-16s?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Are you talking about..

John Lehman, Commissioner
the Andrews airplanes

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
the Andrews airplanes. It is my understanding that the Secret
Service  obviously they worked with the 113th because the President,
Air Force One, is located out at Andrews Air Force Base, so they had
personal knowledge of those, of the people out there and the
telephone number, and I cannot speculate whether they knew what we
were doing or not. But in the urgency to get something done, they
made a phone call to the 113th, I learned later. I did not know that
at the time. And asked them to get anything they could airborne.
And I think the quote was: "To protect the House."

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
And the 113th is the 113th Fighter Wing at Andrews, the District of
Columbia Air National Guard F-16 Wing.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
And not part of NORAD.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Now you said that the clear delineation was you were looking outward
and to do anything inward, you had to get authorization from a law
enforcement agency. And that is covered, as I understand it, by JCS
Instruction 3610 on Aircraft Piracy. In that instruction, as I read
it, which I believe is still in effect...

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
That's correct, Sir.

John Lehman, Commissioner
You don't have any delegated authority to interdict. In fact, there
is no mention of interdiction in that it's purely an escort
function. This is still in effect. Now, presumably, you are not
following it to the letter and I would like you to speak to what the
chain of command is now. Who has authority to interdict, to shoot
down and where is it delegated and are there published rules of
engagement as to what criteria apply to make that decision?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, I'd be happy to answer that. And I thank Gen. Arnold for his
comments about the actual day. I appreciate him being here today.
Quite frankly Sir, since September 11, 2001, the Dept. of Defense,
United States Air Force has put a lot of resources into what we call
Operation Noble Eagle. As President Bush said, it's the second front
in the war on terrorism. And as I said in my opening remarks, we
flown 30,000 sorties. In fact, overhead, today, here, our Noble
Eagle pilots are flying, in addition, to being supplanted with ground-
based air defense artillery. A lot of effort has gone into taking a
look at the things that were not done right prior to, to prepare
ourselves for the aftermath. And it is an honor for me to represent
the men and women who do that. Quite frankly, our relationships
began at 9/11 and the aftermath with Gen. Arnold and our staff to
work with the Federal Aviation Administration, to bring in those
radar facilities so that our controllers at our Northeast, Southeast,
and Western Air Defense Sectors have visibility internally now. And
that has been completed. In addition to seeing internally to the
United States, we must be able to communicate to the pilots who fly
our interceptor missions so that we can have clear lines of control
back to our command element, Gen. Eberhart, in Colorado Springs.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Just to interrupt, on the radar visibility, are you dependent on the
FAA radars which have very little capability in a non-transponder
environment or can you, do you have the better air defense radar?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, we try to put the best radars in effect for the mission. Most
of those are FAA radars. Most of them are old radars but they've
been maintained properly and we are actually putting Dept. of Defense
people out to make sure those radars are calibrated for our
missions. So, therefore, we are using their radars. We are using
air control squadrons, both active duty, Guard, and Reserve to
supplement those. We, in fact, use the United States Navy every
chance we can because their Aegis cruisers are so capable that we
link their pictures into our air combat command center at Tyndall.
So we are doing the absolute best job with the resources we've been
given to make sure that internal picture now is transparent to our
air battle managers. So that military controllers when asked now
can pinpoint immediately an aircraft in distress, that we can find
the nearest suitable fighter location, which I can say is substantial
today. In open testimony I'd not like to go into the details of the
numbers of alert facilities but it goes up and down depending on the
threat. But it is internal now to the United States, which it wasn't
on the 11th of September. So this capacity, this Operation Noble
Eagle which gives the military far more responsibility and latitude
to do this mission now has allowed us to be far more capable. And we
have been involved in every airline incident that we have been asked
to perform with, with the Federal Aviation Administration, subsequent
to 9/11, whether there be a disturbance on board, whether it be an
aircraft emergency, whether it be to protect critical infrastructure
or major population centers, we are there.

John Lehman, Commissioner
To follow-up on that, General Arnold, did you have authority to shoot
down 93 when it was heading towards Washington and where did you get
it?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
A lot of discussion on that. Our intent on United 93, the simple
answer is to my knowledge, I did not have authority to shoot that
aircraft down. We were informed after that airplane was already, had
hit the ground. The simple answer.....

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner
I'm sorry, could you say that again, you were informed of what after
it hit the ground?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
We were informed of Presidential authority some five minutes after
that aircraft had hit the ground, according to our records.

John Lehman, Commissioner
So you were given it after the fact  Presidential authority to shoot
it down.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
To my knowledge. Now I can tell you that in our discussion, in our
discussion with the NORAD staff at that particular time, that we, we
intended to intercept that aircraft at some point in time and attempt
to deviate that aircraft away from the Washington, D.C. area. There
was discussion at that particular time whether or not that aircraft
would be shot down. But we, I did not know of Presidential shoot-
down authority until after that aircraft had crashed.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Uh-huh, and General McKinley can you take us to the present and where
those authorities lie now.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Yes, Sir. Subsequent to 9/11, the President delegated to the
Secretary of Defense, delegated to the Combatant Commander of NORAD
and now United States Northern Command has the authority to declare a
hostile target. Our fighter interceptors will be in position to
accept that hostile declaration and the clearance authorities will be
passed up to the highest authority. We've improved our
communications equipment. We have secure telephones that allow us to
contact, immediately, the powers in the chain of command and I, as
the the Joint Force Air Component Commander, have delegated emergency
authority. In the very rare occasion where either a telephone fails
or we cannot get authority and under emergency powers, can exercise
that authority. So the clearances now in place. Gen. Eberhart is in
place in Colorado Springs or his designated representative. We
exercise this in real world, not exercise, probably between 8 and 15
times a week. So it's been well documented. Any national security
event will bring together the forces and those lines of communication
are open now. Clearances are there.

John Lehman, Commissioner
Thank you. As you know, our rules of engagement are many (tape swap)

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
From what source did you receive the shoot down authority?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I did not receive shoot-down authority.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
You say it was received subsequent to the crash of 93?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Yes, that's correct.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
From what source was that received?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It was passed down to us from the NORAD, from Cheyenne Mountain, that
they had received shoot down authority. Then, the time frame escapes
me at the moment, but you know for example over the Washington, D.C.
area, it was declared a no fly zone. And just by the fact that any
aircraft was present, if we could not determine if that aircraft was
friendly, then we were cleared to shoot that aircraft down.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
When was the declaration of no fly zone authorized?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I don't know. It was shortly during that timeframe.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
So, are you saying that that declaration gave you shoot down
authority?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It gave us, that particular declaration that I'm referring to is a
Class Bravo airspace within the Washington, D.C. area was shut down
to aviation, except for military or for law enforcement, emergency
response aircraft, at that particular time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
So, help me understand, does it mean once that condition exists, that
unless you are able to determine that this was a friendly aircraft,
which under the circumstances I suppose means under the control of
the terrorists at that time, making it unfriendly aircraft, that you
had authority, by whatever means to bring it down?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
That's true. Yes.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
At what time during this process was that order issued and who issued
it?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I do not know who issued it. It's my understanding it was issued by
the President or the Vice President, in his stead, that that order
was issued. And it was issued around the time that we decided to put
all the aircraft on the ground as Mr. Mineta, or Secretary Mineta,
had referred to, at that particular time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
We would ask you to supplement your testimony today with specific
information about that. At what point was, to the best of your
knowledge, any order received from either the President or the Vice
President of the United States with respect to action to be taken by
the military in connection with the on-going situation?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It was my understanding that that occurred, the direct communication,
to me, I can't answer if it was done at a higher level at some point
in time, around 5 minutes after the United 93 has crashed into
Pennsylvania.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commission
And so you would be able to check the records of NORAD generally, or
the DOD generally, to find out when a Presidential directive was
issued.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I'm sure Gen. McKinley will do that for me.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Thank you. And if I understand the context of what you've said about
closing the perimeter around Washington, the President's directive or
the Vice President's directive would have been moot because of the
prior order which would have enabled you to shoot down an unfriendly
plane in that sector.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Well, you know, we develop a certain, I guess the short answer again
is correct. But it's very specifically in the Washington, D.C. area
by presence, that aircraft was hostile unless we could determine that
it was friendly.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Let me go to the issue, again to revisit Flight 77 because as we
understand it, tragically it appears that that was the only plane
which reached its intended target which might have been interdicted
that day, if everything had gone right. Are you in agreement with
that?

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, let's go beyond physics, for a moment. And let me ask you
about the planes which were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base.
Now from Andrews Air Force Base by the Secret Service of the United
States, who gave the order to scramble jets, F-16s also, I believe,
out of Andrews?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
It is my understanding that the FAA, that the Secret Service
requested that they launch anything they could to get them airborne.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Of whom did they make that request?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I'm not sure if it was Gen. Worley (phonetic), Dave Worley himself.
Gen. Worley is the wing commander, Gen. Dave Worley. And I think
they actually talked to him and I did not know this at the time, of
course. But just in, they called him up and said what do you have
that you can get airborne? He had some airplanes returning from the
range on the training mission.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
What would be the flight time from Andrews Air Force Base of two F-
16s to the Pentagon?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
From the time they were notified?

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Yes

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Probably 15 to 20 minutes because it takes about 10 minutes to get
airborne. And they are not set up on alert for scramble. In fact,
it could have taken  they didn't have any airplanes immediately
ready to go; it could have taken them 20 or 30 minutes.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
And, under the circumstances.....

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
We already had airplanes airborne, by the time those airplanes were
airborne, we had airplanes over Washington, D.C.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Right, now if the order had been given to Andrews even simultaneously
with the order that you gave to scramble your planes, is it not fair
to say that those planes would have reached the Pentagon sooner?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
They might have but they would have been unarmed.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, yes that would be my comment, sir, is those aircraft are not
prepped or built-up for that mission.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
And in fact, we have received reports that are almost incredible in
terms of the bravery of the two pilots who went up that day in
unarmed aircraft with the mission, I presume, authorized somewhere in
the executive to use their airplanes to bring down Flight 77 or 93 if
they could interdict them. That means to clip their wings, crash
into them, perhaps, the pilots at the risk of their own lives. Is
that correct?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, as I evacuated the Pentagon that morning, as I came out the
river entrance and looked up, virtually simultaneously those F-16s
coming back from the range, had been airborne, had dropped their
weapons, were returning low on fuel, were visible to ten to fifteen
thousand people. And it was a very heartening sight to see United
States Air Force fighters overhead the Pentagon. And it is my
understanding from the review of the records that that was their
guidance.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
And who provided that guidance to them? Was that a decision made
internally by Secret Service or did Secret Service require higher
executive order in order to launch those planes on that mission?

Thomas Kean, Chairman
I've got one question. Suppose for a minute that this weekend, God
forbid that some terrorist got onboard another plane in Boston and
headed for New York, what would be different?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, I'm very proud to say that I think the interagency process has
worked very, very well. The Transportation Security Administration
under the direction of Secretary Ridge has implemented stringent
procedures on the ground. Let's face it, solving this problem before
the terrorists get on the airplane, I think is the most critical step
to protecting commercial aviation because once the airplane is in the
air, then it resolves back to the Dept. of Defense to take the
appropriate action. So, TSA deserves a great deal of credit.
Federal Aviation Administration with their procedures and the way
they are lashed up with us now in the military. And the formation of
the Northern Command, I think is vitally important to the security of
the United States of America. And, I think, those things in context
make it far less likely for this to happen. But, as my boss says, we
are not 100% safe. We can never be 100% safe. I take nothing for
granted when I'm in our Air Operations Center when any aircraft fails
to communicate or fails to make a turn, or fails to do what it's
being  it's flight plan said it was supposed to. So, we are very,
very serious today about what's happening in the skies over America.

Thomas Kean, Chairman
But if it were able to get into the air, headed for New York, would
you be, what procedures exist now that didn't exist then? Would you
be able to intercept it?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It's my understanding and firm belief that the Federal Aviation
Administration would immediately notify us at the first sign of any
impropriety in any aircraft, whether it's commercial, cargo or
civilian. We would immediately take action to get our fighters
airborne from the nearest suitable location. And we have that
location set now where we didn't have it prior to the 11th. We
should be able to protect our critical infrastructure, our major
population centers. But there is, as in any case in the military
effort, there are some risks but we are postured to accept that
responsibility. So the example you gave us out of Boston is the F-
15s out of Otis would be immediately scrambled, they would
immediately intercept the aircraft and we would stand by for further
authorities from those above us.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
I would just point out that if the question were if it happened
today. You have airborne interceptors that would be vectored into
those aircraft, to intercept.

Thomas Kean, Chairman
Commissioner Hamilton

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
I just want to clarify a few things after listening to all this
testimony; it's not all that clear to me. As of September 11th, only
the President had the authority to order a shoot down of a commercial
aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
That's correct, Sir.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
And today, who has the authority?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
We see the President, delegated to the Secretary of Defense,
delegated to the Combatant Commander of Northern Command and the
North American Airspace Command and there are emergency authorities
if that fails.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
So you have authority.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Yes sir and others.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
And how many others?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I'd prefer not to say in this forum sir, but I can provide it for the
record.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
And you do not have to go up the chain of command at all in the event
of an emergency...

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
We certainly will try.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
I know that.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
We will make every effort to try.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
I'm sure you would. But you don't have to.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
In an emergency situation, we can take appropriate action. Yes sir.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
Now one of the things that's curious to me is, General Arnold you
said that you did not learn of the Presidential order until after the
United 93 had already crashed. That was about a little after ten
o'clock in the morning. The first notice of difficulty here was at
8:20 in the morning when a transponder goes off on the American
flight 11. I don't know how significant that is but twenty minutes
later you had notification of a possible hijack. So there is a long
lapse of time here between the time you are initially alerted and you
receive the order that you could shoot that aircraft down. Am I
right about that?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
That's correct.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
In your timeline, why don't you put in there when you were notified?

Col. Alan Scott
For which flight, Sir?

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
(Crosstalk) Well, getting the notification from the President of the
United States that you have the authority to shoot a commercial
aircraft down is a pretty significant event. Why would that not be
in your timeline?

Col. Alan Scott
I don't know when that happened.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
Have you ever received that kind of a notice before?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold
Not to my knowledge.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair
So this is the first time in the history of the country that such an
order had ever been giv<br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)

Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.