“By widening the lens to look at views expressed by prominent figures in the decades leading up to the Llewellyn-Pound kerfuffle, we learn that jurists already assumed that law is a means to social ends- indeed it is hard to find anyone who denied it- and many agreed that one must go beyond legal doctrine to understand how law actually functions. They understood that judges subtly change the law through interpretation, thereby making law. Jurists had for decades recognized the manipulability of precedent and understood that judicial decisions were sometimes influenced by the background views of judges. They were aware of what was plain- that high court decisions frequently divided along political lines. We learn, furthermore, that prominent legal figures had advocated the scientific study of law in action and that incorporation of empirical perspectives in legal education. We also learn that genuinely radical critics charged judges with class bias, vehemently, from the mid-1890s through about 1915, voicing skepticisms that make the legal realists look tame by comparison.”