1. The case originated in an application (no.
184/02) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Konstantin Nikanorovich Kuznetsov
and one hundred and two other Russian nationals whose names are listed
in the schedule (“the applicants”), on 17 December 2001.

2. The applicants were represented before the
Court by Mr A. Leontyev and Mr J. Burns, lawyers practising in St. Petersburg
and Mr R. Daniel, a barrister of the Bar of England and Wales. The Russian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, a violation
of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction
with Article 14 of the Convention, in that their meeting for religious
worship had been unlawfully disrupted. They further complained under
Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that they had been denied a fair
hearing and an effective remedy for their grievances.

4. A hearing took place in public in the Human
Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 9 September 2004 (Rule 54 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government
Mr P. Laptev, Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights,
Mr Y. Berestnev, Counsel,
Mr D. Yuzvikov, Adviser;

5. By a decision of 9 September 2004, following
the hearing on admissibility and the merits, the Court declared the
application partly admissible.

6. The applicants, but not the Government, filed
further written observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

7. The applicants are Jehovah's Witnesses. The
applicant Mr Konstantin Nikanorovich Kuznetsov is a representative of
the Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia. The other
applicants are members of the Chelyabinsk community of Jehovah's Witnesses.

A. Background of the case

1. Registration of the Chelyabinsk community

8. Between 1997 and 2001 the Chelyabinsk community
of Jehovah's Witnesses filed twelve applications for State registration
with the regional Department of the Ministry of Justice. Their applications
were refused on 17 May 1996, 20 June and 3 November 1997, 21 January,
30 April, 28 June, 15 July and 16 December 1999, 30 June and 17 August
2000, 11 May and 24 September 2001. Each refusal was justified by reference
to alleged formal defects in the registration documents.

9. The applicants complained to a court. On 24
July 2002 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk ruled that the
refusal of 24 September 2001 had been unlawful. On 28 October 2002 the
Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld this decision and ordered the registration
of the Chelyabinsk community of Jehovah's Witnesses. On 31 March 2003
the community was officially registered by the Chief Directorate of
the Ministry of Justice for the Chelyabinsk Region.

2. Criminal investigation into the local
community of Jehovah's Witnesses

10. In the applicants' submission,
Ms Yekaterina Gorina, appointed by the Chelyabinsk Regional Governor
as Chairwoman of the regional Human Rights Commission (“the Commissioner”),
had attempted on several occasions to initiate criminal proceedings
against the Chelyabinsk community of Jehovah's Witnesses on the ground
that the community had “lured” young children into their “sect”.

11. On 25 May 1999 a senior investigator with
the Chelyabinsk town prosecutor's office found no indications of a criminal
offence and decided not to open a criminal investigation into the activities
of the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses' community.

12. Following the Commissioner's intervention,
the decision of 25 May 1999 was reversed and an additional inquiry was
ordered.

13. On 3 March 2000 the deputy
Chelyabinsk town prosecutor again dismissed the allegations against
the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses' community on the ground that
no evidence pointing towards a criminal offence could be found.

3. Negotiation of the lease agreement

14. On 6 February 1999 Mr Z., a member of the
local community of Jehovah's Witnesses, acting on behalf of the Administrative
Centre of the Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, negotiated
a lease agreement with Mr U., principal of vocational training college
no. 85 in Chelyabinsk, in respect of the college auditorium and associated
facilities. According to Article 1.1 of the lease agreement, the premises
were rented for the purpose of holding religious meetings on Tuesdays
between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. and on Sundays between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m.,
outside the normal college teaching hours.

15. The lease agreement was intended to run from
7 February to 31 December 1999. It also contained a provision that it
would be automatically renewed on the same terms and conditions and
for the same period unless either side gave one month's advance notice
of its intent to terminate the agreement. No such notice appears to
have been given by either party. Thereafter the agreement continued
to run for the extended one-year period, but with the lessees only authorised
to terminate it subject to two months' notice in writing. There was
no reciprocal power for the college to terminate the agreement during
the extended period.

16. By April 2000 the applicants had been using
the college facilities for fourteen months and had paid their rent on
time and in accordance with the terms and conditions. As a means of
raising additional revenue for the college, its principal entered into
similar lease agreements with four other organisations.

4. Attempts to terminate the lease agreement

17. On 31 March 2000 the Chief Directorate for
Vocational Training and Science of the Chelyabinsk Regional Administration
issued an order prohibiting all educational establishments in the Chelyabinsk
Region from renting out their premises for religious services, meetings,
and so forth.

18. On 12 April 2000 the Commissioner, together
with an unidentified senior police officer, visited Mr U., principal
of college no. 85, and attempted to persuade him to terminate the lease
agreement with the applicants. The principal refused the request. The
Commissioner demanded to see the agreement and took a photocopy of it.
She then asked a number of detailed questions about the days and times
of the Jehovah's Witnesses' meetings. The principal provided the information.

B. Alleged disruption of a religious meeting
on 16 April 2000

19. On Sunday 16 April 2000, in accordance with
the lease agreement, the Jehovah's Witnesses used the college facilities.
Two consecutive meetings were on the agenda. The first meeting ended
without incident.

20. The second meeting, from 1.30 to 3.30 p.m.,
was of a group with special needs; most of the participants were profoundly
deaf. Many of those in attendance were elderly and also had impaired
vision. A person trained in sign language provided interpretation at
the meeting, the purpose of which was to study the Bible and join in
public worship. The meeting was open to the general public: attendants
were positioned near the entrance to the meeting place to greet newcomers
and assist with seating.

21. The first part of the meeting was a talk given
from the platform by Mr Kuznetsov, who had a mastery of sign language.
There were 159 persons present, including all the applicants.

22. At some time between approximately 2.10 and
2.15 p.m. the Commissioner entered the foyer which gives access from
the street to the meeting place, holding a child by the hand. The applicant
Mr Setdarberdi Oregeldiev, who is profoundly deaf but has no speech impairment,
was the attendant on duty. He went out into the foyer to greet the Commissioner
and the child and show them to a seat. Realising that the visitor was
not deaf, another applicant, Mr Dmitri Gashkov, who did not have impaired
speech or hearing, went to assist. He invited the Commissioner into
the meeting hall and offered her a chair; she refused and said that
the police were about to arrive.

23. After this brief exchange the Commissioner
left the foyer. The speaker went on with his talk, which ended at approximately
2.25 p.m.

24. The second part of the meeting was conducted
in sign language. This part was in progress, with about 15 minutes left
and 45 minutes to go before the end of the contracted rental time of
4 p.m., when the Commissioner again entered the foyer, this time without
the child. She was now accompanied by Mr Tomskiy, managing director
of the Commissioner-affiliated commercial company Man. Law. Power, and
by two senior police officers, Mr Vildanov, deputy head of the District
Inspectors' Service of the Traktorozavodskiy Police Department of Chelyabinsk,
and Mr Lozovyagin, a senior district inspector with the same department.
Mr Tomskiy was holding and using a camcorder to film.

25. The Commissioner led the way
forward and walked to the threshold of the door into the meeting hall.
Mr Tomskiy was a short distance behind, filming with the camcorder.
One of the applicants, Ms Lappo, who was not hearing-impaired and was
sitting close to the door in a position to observe the events, later
testified before the District Court as follows:

“On 16 April 2000 a woman accompanied by two
police officers and a man in plain clothes came to the meeting. They
stood in the entrance so that I couldn't see the programme. The Commissioner
said to one of the men 'Stop the meeting', but he hesitated and said
'But they are deaf mutes'.

I told one of the congregation to go and get
Konstantin [Kuznetsov]. When Konstantin came out to them there was a
conversation with raised voices. The Commissioner asked if there were
children in the hall and whether they were all with their parents. Then
they asked Konstantin for his passport in an unpleasant manner...

...When I found out who the Commissioner was
I was very displeased. I demand that you fire her from her position
in the Human Rights Commission...”

When asked by the judge what the Commissioner
had said to the police officer, Ms Lappo responded:

“She said: 'You – go up on to the stage and
say that the congregation has to disperse'.”

26. Mr Kuznetsov approached the Commissioner and
the police officers. As he was standing in the doorway with his back
to the meeting hall, the police officer Mr Lozovyagin asked him for
his identity papers. He also asked Mr Kuznetsov whether he had a registered
residence in Chelyabinsk. Mr Lozovyagin testified before the District
Court as follows:

“So I asked him [Kuznetsov] to show me his
passport. It showed that he was registered in the Krasnodar Region.
I told him that he did not have the right to conduct arrangements without
documents”.

Mr Kuznetsov submitted that that statement had
been incorrect; it was true that his registered place of birth was in
the Krasnodar Region, but he also had a properly and lawfully registered
temporary residence in Chelyabinsk.

27. In his testimony before the
District Court, Mr Lozovyagin continued as follows:

“I told Kuznetsov that their organisation did
not have the right to conduct its activities without the appropriate
documents. He promised to bring the documents to the police station.
I asked him to produce the documents. He said 'They exist and are elsewhere',
but which documents and where he did not say. I asked him for a document
confirming his relationship to the organisation...”

Responding to the judge's question about the
violations of law and order that he had observed, Mr Lozovyagin said:

“Yes, to start with a meeting of an organisation
whose activities could not be confirmed by any documents... By law I
had to stop the activities until the documents were produced.”

This was confirmed by the police officer Mr Vildanov
who spoke as follows before the District Court:

“Lozovyagin said that the meeting should no
longer be conducted and that documents should be prepared giving permission
[for services of worship in educational establishments].”

In their written submissions on the admissibility
and merits of the case, the Government indicated that Mr Lozovyagin had
invited Mr Kuznetsov to cancel all events until such time as the appropriate
documents had been produced.

28. Mr Kuznetsov submitted that he had been faced
with authoritarian demands and the intimidating behaviour of the Commissioner
and the police and had thought it best to comply. He described the situation
in the following manner:

“I believe that we were conducting the meetings
on a lawful basis. Pressure was being put on me. Tomskiy gave me an
official warning. I was afraid they would start removing those present
at the meeting by force. Vildanov and Lozovyagin were in uniform. I
understood that they were in a position of authority and must be obeyed...”

29. Mr Kuznetsov went to the platform,
interrupted the Bible discussion and made an announcement in sign language:
“Police. We have to submit”. The attendees offered no resistance.
They gathered their personal belongings and filed out of the meeting
place and the foyer. The Commissioner and the police officers stood
outside the building and watched; Mr Tomskiy was no longer filming.

30. According to the applicants, the Commissioner
came up with several conflicting and mutually exclusive versions of
her role in the events. Initially she maintained that the visit had
been purely for the purpose of fact-finding; that neither she nor the
police had done anything to cause the meeting to be stopped; and that
Mr Kuznetsov had stopped the meeting entirely of his own free will.
As the case progressed and more evidence was heard from eyewitnesses
who testified to the part played by her and the police, the Commissioner
eventually admitted that steps had indeed been taken to stop the meeting;
however, she blamed the police. She insisted that she had made no demands
to Mr Kuznetsov as the operation had been organised and carried out
by the police officials. At the trial, however, she was pressed to say
that she had agreed with and supported the police decision. Finally,
in explaining her agreement with the police decision and when pressed
as to why, as Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission, she had given
her agreement, she gave the following answer:

“I still consider these actions to be lawful
– I was defending the rights of all the children who study at college
no. 85.

[Question:] In which documents is information
about the danger of Jehovah's Witnesses to the neighbourhood contained?

[The Commissioner:] As far as I'm concerned,
the reports in the press are sufficient.”

C. Termination of the lease agreement

31. On 17 April 2000, the day after the disruption
of the religious meeting, the principal of college no. 85 informed Mr
Z. that the lease agreement between the college and the community of
Jehovah's Witnesses would be terminated as of 1 May 2000 “because
of certain irregularities committed by the college administration at
the time of its signing”.

D. The applicants' complaints and judicial
proceedings

1. Complaint to a prosecutor's office

32. On an unspecified date the applicants complained
to the Chelyabinsk town prosecutor about the actions of the Commissioner
and the police officers. They requested a criminal investigation into
the officials' actions.

33. The prosecutor's office put
questions to the Commissioner, Mr Lozovyagin and Mr Vildanov. In their
written statements of 3 May 2000 the officials claimed that they had
investigated a complaint by a 15-year-old girl who had been “lured”
into the Jehovah's Witnesses “sect”. The Commissioner stated that
“Lozovyagin and Vildanov [had] decided to halt the event, which was
being held by an unknown organisation in sign language”. Mr Lozovyagin
did not deny that he had asked Mr Kuznetsov for documents and told him
that the event would be halted until such time as they had been produced.
Mr Vildanov testified in the same vein. As to the lawfulness of their
actions, all three officials claimed that, as it was not registered
with the State as a legal entity, the Chelyabinsk community of Jehovah's
Witnesses had no right to hold religious services and that the lease
agreement with the college principal had been null and void.

34. On an unspecified date the prosecutor's office
decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the Commissioner
and the police officers.

2. Proceedings before the courts

35. On 11 July 2000 the applicants filed a civil
complaint with the Sovietskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk alleging
unlawful actions on the part of the Commissioner.

36. On 13 November 2000 the applicants amended
their complaint and joined Mr Tomskiy, Mr Lozovyagin, Mr Vildanov and
Mr Kuryshkin, deputy head of the Traktorozavodskiy police department,
as co-defendants. The applicants alleged violations of their rights
to freedom of religion and freedom of association, as guaranteed both
by the Russian Constitution and the Convention.

37. During the trial the presiding judge did not
consent to the use of audio-recording equipment provided by the applicants'
lawyers. However, this injunction applied only to advocates and one
of the applicants was able to record the trial on a personal audio recorder.

38. On 25 January 2001 the Sovietskiy
District Court of Chelyabinsk gave judgment. It found it established
that the Commissioner, Mr Tomskiy, Mr Lozovyagin and Mr Vildanov had
arrived at college no. 85 on 16 April on a fact-finding mission to check
whether a religious meeting had been taking place there. However, as
it had been Mr Kuznetsov who had got up on the stage and announced,
in sign language, that the meeting was to end, the District Court found
that the applicants had failed to show that the religious meeting had
been terminated on the defendants' orders. As regards the assessment
of the evidence given by the applicants, the District Court held as
follows:

“Assessing the statements given by certain
plaintiffs, and in particular by Ms Lappo and Ms Kadyrova, who claimed
that they had heard Ms Gorina giving the police officers the instruction
to halt the meeting and that they, in turn, had relayed it to Mr Kuznetsov...
the court takes into account the fact that these individuals are interested
in the outcome of the proceedings and, for that reason, the court views
their submissions critically ...

During the trial, none of the State officials...
admitted to taking action to halt the meeting; their position concurs
with the witness statements given by many of the plaintiffs, who confirmed
that they had not entered the hall but remained in the foyer”.

The District Court dismissed the applicants'
complaint for their failure to prove that the early termination of the
meeting had been brought about by the Commissioner and her aides.

39. The applicants filed a statement of appeal.
They pointed to multiple admissions by the Commissioner and the police
officers, before the District Court and in their statements to the prosecutor
dated 3 May 2000, that they had instructed Mr Kuznetsov to terminate
the meeting. They also submitted that the concordant statements of fifteen
applicants could not be rejected as those of “interested witnesses”
and that the District Court had not specified what the applicants' “interest”
had been, given that no claim for damages had been filed.

40. On 28 June 2001 the Chelyabinsk
Regional Court, ruling on an appeal by the applicants, upheld the judgment
of 25 January 2001. The Regional Court repeated verbatim the reasoning
of the District Court. It did not address the arguments set out in the
statement of appeal.

3. Complaint to the Ombudsman

41. The applicants also complained about the actions
of the regional Commissioner to Mr Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian
Federation.

42. On 1 December 2000 the Ombudsman sent a letter
to Mr Ustinov, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The
Ombudsman strongly condemned the use of derogatory terms such as “sect”
and “totalitarian sect” in the documents issued by State officials.
In its relevant part the letter read as follows:

“...In particular, the letter from the deputy
Prosecutor General, Ye.G.Chuganov, to the Chairwoman of the Governor's
Commission for Human Rights in the Chelyabinsk Region, Ye.V.Gorina,
was widely distributed... It recommended using as reference material
on the activity of the Jehovah's Witnesses the book An Introduction to Sectarianism by A. Dworkin, and the handbook New Destructive
and Occult-Related Religious Organisations in Russia, prepared
by the Missionary Department of the Moscow Patriarchate [of the Russian
Orthodox Church]...

The publication referred to in the letter is
highly condemnatory in respect of certain faiths. It reflects the judgment
of one religious organisation about others and its contents serve to
prove the 'authenticity' of one religion and the 'falseness' of the
other(s)...

The situation is further aggravated by the fact
that Chuganov's letter was used in trials where it was portrayed as
reflecting the official stance taken by the Prosecutor General's Office
of Russia. For example, in Chelyabinsk, in the course of examination
of a complaint by the local community of Jehovah's Witnesses against
the Chairwoman of the regional Commission for Human Rights Ms Gorina,
the latter constantly referred to Dworkin's book as a handbook recommended
by the Prosecutor General's Office that contained reliable information
on the activity of so-called destructive sects, including the community
of Jehovah's Witnesses. This was used to justify the extremely heavy-handed
conduct of the municipal authorities towards the Jehovah's Witnesses,
in particular their breaking-up, with the aid of the police, of the
believers' prayer meeting being held on the premises which they had
been renting for an extended period of time.”

II. RELEVANT
DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Statutory provisions

1. Constitution of the Russian Federation

43. Article 29 guarantees freedom of religion,
including the right to profess either alone or in community with others
any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, have
and share religious and other beliefs and to manifest them in practice.

2. Religions Act of 26 September 1997

44. The State may not interfere with the activities
of religious associations provided that they comply with the law (section
4 § 2). State and other public officials may not use their position
to foster any specific attitude towards a religion (section 4 § 4).

45. Religious associations may take the form of
either a religious group or a religious organisation (section 6 § 2).
A religious group carries on its activities without State registration
and without obtaining legal entity status (section 7 § 1). The right
to use rented property for religious purposes is conferred only on registered
religious organisations; religious groups may only use premises provided
by participants (section 22).

46. Services of worship and other religious rites
and ceremonies may be performed without interference in buildings and
structures intended for worship and their adjacent areas, and in other
premises made available to religious organisations for these purposes
(section 16 § 2).

3. Law of 27 April 1993 on complaints
about actions and decisions impinging upon the rights and freedoms of
citizens

47. A court of general jurisdiction
may hear complaints about actions or decisions of State and public officials
which infringe citizens' rights or freedoms or prevent citizens from
exercising their rights and freedoms. It is incumbent on the officials
concerned to demonstrate the lawfulness of their actions or decisions
(section 2).

4. Education Act of 10 July 1992 (as amended
on 16 November 1997)

48. The Education Act prohibits
structural units of political parties, political and religious movements
and organisations from being set up and operated in State and municipal
educational establishments and education management bodies (section
1 § 5).

49. An educational establishment
may lease and rent out property. Rental income must be used for educational
needs (section 39 § 11).

B. Case-law of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation

50. On 30 July 1999 a deputy President
of the Supreme Court ruled on the complaint brought by the local authorities
of Kaluga against an elder of the local community of Jehovah's Witnesses
who had allegedly failed to give notice of a religious meeting to the
local authorities:

“...according to the Russian Law on freedom
of conscience and religious associations, the phrase 'without obstruction'
means that no permission from, or clearing of the matter with, the secular
authorities is required for performing religious ceremonies on premises
provided [for that purpose].”

51. On 14 August 2001 a deputy President of the
Supreme Court ruled on a similar complaint brought by the authorities
of Kislovodsk against a Jehovah's Witness in connection with an allegedly
unauthorised religious gathering:

“According to Article 16 of the Russian Federation
Law on freedom of conscience and religious associations, religious services
and other religious rites and ceremonies can take place without any
interference... in other places made available to religious organisation
for that purpose... Therefore, the local religious organisation was
not required to inform the State authority of its gathering.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES
8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

52. The applicants complained under Articles 8,
9, 10 and 11 of the Convention that on 16 April 2000 they had been prevented
from having a religious meeting without undue interference on the part
of the authorities.

53. The Court notes that the main purpose of the
applicants' gathering on 16 April 2000 was to join in Biblical study
and public worship. In doing so they undeniably exercised their rights
to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly under Articles
10 and 11 of the Convention. That being said, since the nature of the
assembly was primarily religious and the participants belonged to the
religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses (see Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 42, ECHR 2000-IV),
the Court will first examine this complaint from the standpoint of Article
9 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Whether there has been interference

1. Arguments by the parties

54. The Government claimed, firstly, that the
applicants had failed to produce – in the domestic proceedings or
before this Court – any evidence in support of their allegation that
the meeting had been disrupted. In their submission, Mr Kuznetsov, confronted
with the request to produce documents demonstrating the lawfulness of
the community meeting, realised that “the meeting should not be held”
and indicated to the congregation that the meeting should end. The Government
also asserted that the founding documents of the Jehovah's Witnesses
religious organisations did not provide for the forms of worship mentioned
by the applicants – a “worship meeting” or “religious meeting”.

55. The applicants pointed to the overwhelming
body of evidence submitted to the domestic courts, including statements
by independent witnesses such as the college principal, to the effect
that the meeting of their congregation had been disrupted following
the arrival of the Commissioner and her aides. There was no requirement
in law to demonstrate the lawfulness of the meeting or to show that
it was “necessary” or “should be held”. In any event, Mr Kuznetsov
had never made an admission of the kind alleged by the Government. The
Government's attempts to reverse the burden of proof notwithstanding,
it was incumbent on the intervening authorities to show that the meeting
had been unlawful, which they had been unable and failed to do. As to
the form of the meeting in question, the applicants considered that
its actual form – be it a rite, ceremony, prayer, hymn or other liturgy
– was of no relevance for the legal analysis of the alleged violation.

2. The Court's assessment

56. As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic
society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious
dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity
of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious
asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over
the centuries, depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a
matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one's] religion”. Bearing
witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious
convictions (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 114, ECHR 2001-XII, and Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no.
260-A, § 31).

57. The Court further reiterates that Article
9 of the Convention protects acts of worship and devotion which are
aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised
form (see C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 10358/83, Commission decision
of 15 December 1983, Decisions and Reports 37, p. 142). It is undeniable
that the collective study and discussion of religious texts by the members
of the religious group of Jehovah's Witnesses was a recognised form
of manifestation of their religion in worship and teaching. Thus, the
applicants' meeting on 16 April 2000 attracted the protection of Article
9 of the Convention.

58. The Government claimed that there had been
no interference since the applicants had interrupted the meeting on
their own initiative, once their attention had been drawn to the fact
that they did not have the appropriate documents for holding it. The
Court considers that this claim is not borne out by the materials produced
before it.

59. There is nothing in the parties' submissions
to indicate that the religious meeting would have been wound up ahead
of time had it not been for the arrival of the Commissioner and her
aides. The Government did not furnish any alternative explanation or
reason for the early termination of the applicants' meeting. The Court
therefore considers that there was a causal link between their arrival
at the site and the disruption of the meeting.

60. It is not contested that the
command to halt the meeting was given by Mr Kuznetsov, who had gone
on stage and indicated, in sign language, that the police wanted the
meeting to end (see paragraph 29
above). However, in so doing, he was relaying the demand of the senior
police inspector, Mr Lozovyagin, who had told him that the meeting could
not be continued without the appropriate documents (see paragraphs 27
and 33
above). It further appears that neither Mr Lozovyagin nor any other person
in the Commissioner's team mastered sign language. For that reason they
were unable to communicate directly with the audience, which consisted
mostly of profoundly deaf applicants. The Court notes the testimony
of the applicant Ms Lappo in the domestic proceedings. She is not hearing-impaired
and witnessed an exchange between the Commissioner and one of her aides,
who claimed to be unable to stop the meeting because the participants
were “deaf mutes” (see paragraph 25
above). The Commissioner then told Mr Kuznetsov to disperse the gathering.
The Court finds that in these circumstances Mr Kuznetsov merely acted
as a medium of communication, passing on the Commissioner's order.

61. The Court further recalls that the responsibility
of a State under the Convention may arise for acts of all its organs,
agents and servants, even where their acts are performed without express
authorisation and even outside or against instructions (see Wille v. Liechtenstein, no. 28396/95, Commission decision of
27 May 1997, and Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Commission Report of 25 January
1976, Yearbook 19, p. 512 at 758). In the present case the Government
did not contest the fact that the Commissioner and the accompanying
police inspectors had acted, or pretended to act, in their official
capacity. The police officers wore uniforms and were perceived by the
applicants as law-enforcement officials. It follows that their actions
engaged the State's responsibility.

62. In sum, the Court finds that there has been
interference with the applicants' right to freedom of religion in that,
on 16 April 2000, the State officials caused their religious assembly
to be terminated ahead of time. It will next examine whether this interference
was justified, that is whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether
it pursued one or more legitimate aims enumerated in paragraph 2 of
Article 9 and whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic
society”.

B. Whether the interference was justified

1. Arguments by the parties

63. The Government asserted that the meeting had
been attended by hearing-impaired and disabled children without proof
of the consent of their parents or legal guardians. The Commissioner
asked the police officers to assist her in verifying whether this was
the case. In the Government's view, the suspected participation of children
had been sufficient justification for the interference, which was “prescribed
by law” and necessary for the protection of the health and rights
of others.

64. The Government further alleged that the applicants
had no right to use the rented premises for religious purposes. Firstly,
religious groups which did not have legal entity status could only use
property or premises provided by their members and the lease agreement
between the Administrative Centre of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia
and college no. 85 had therefore been void. Secondly, the Education Act
prohibited religious organisations from being set up or operated in
State or municipal educational establishments, both during and after
school hours, and the lease agreement had therefore been void ab initio because it contravened this absolute prohibition
and because it had been signed by the college principal acting ultra vires.

65. The applicants pointed out that the Government
had not disputed that there had been no police documents or authorisation
for the raid, that the Commissioner and Mr Tomskiy were civilians and
had no legal authority to take part in a police operation and that they
had travelled to the college by private car and filmed the events with
a private video camera.

66. The applicants further submitted that the
Government's assertion about the presence of children without parental
consent was untenable in the light of the facts of the case and unsupported
by any evidence. The Commissioner and police officers had never entered
the auditorium but had remained in the foyer, so they could not see
who was inside. They had only asked Mr Kuznetsov for the documents and
never attempted to establish the identity or parentage of the minors
present or any other information relating to them, either while the
meeting was in progress or after its termination.

67. In so far as the Government alleged that the
lease agreement had been void, the applicants contended that the Government's
arguments were factually incorrect and inconsistent. The lease agreement
had been signed not by a religious group which did not have legal entity
status but by the Administrative Centre of the Jehovah's Witnesses in
Russia, that is, the umbrella organisation at national level, which
had legal entity status. The Government had failed to specify on the
basis of which facts or law the legally binding lease agreement, the
terms and mutual obligations of which had been fulfilled by both parties
for more than fourteen months, could be rendered void without the intervention
of a judicial authority. Indeed, the validity of the agreement on the
date in question (16 April 2000) was not contested and the notice of
termination had only been served on the following day. Moreover, even
assuming that there was a defect in the agreement, this would be a matter inter partes
and it would not justify the disruption by a third-party civilian such
as the Commissioner of a religious meeting held under the agreement.

68. Lastly, the applicants challenged the Government's
reliance on the Education Act as a misinterpretation of the law. They
pointed out that the community had been lawfully using an auditorium
outside college hours and without involving college students or staff,
whereas the legal provision invoked by the Government referred only
to the setting-up of “structural units” of religious organisations.

2. The Court's assessment

69. The parties disagreed as to whether the interference
had been “prescribed by law”. The Government advanced several legal
grounds for the acts of the Commissioner and her aides; the applicants
disputed that their acts had had any legal basis. The Court will examine
these grounds in turn.

70. In so far as the Government claimed that
the applicants had not had the appropriate documents for holding the
religious meeting, the Court observes that the Government never specified
the nature of the allegedly missing documents. Furthermore, it notes
the consistent case-law of the Russian Supreme Court to the effect that
religious assemblies do not require any prior authorisation from, or
notification to, the authorities (see paragraph 50
et seq.). It is striking that the police officer Mr Lozovyagin only
asked Mr Kuznetsov about his registered home address, but did not specify
what other documents he wanted to see (see paragraph 27
above). Although it is in dispute whether Mr Kuznetsov had a valid registered
address in Chelyabinsk or in Krasnodar, this issue is obviously of no
relevance to the legal ability of the other applicants to hold a service
of religious worship. It follows that the Government's allegation that
the applicants lacked the appropriate documents for the religious meeting
has not been made out.

71. As regards the validity of the lease agreement,
the Court notes at the outset that, contrary to the Government's submission,
it was entered into by the organisation of the Jehovah's Witnesses officially
registered at national level rather than by the local religious group
which did not have legal entity status. The lease had no obvious legal
defect and by the date of the events it had been duly fulfilled by both
parties for at least fourteen months. By 16 April 2000 there had been
no eviction order, no pending court proceedings and no other legal challenges
to the validity of the lease agreement. Nor has it been claimed that
the administrative order of 31 March 2000 prohibiting colleges from renting
out their premises for religious meetings had affected the validity
of earlier leases retrospectively. It follows that the applicants had
a lawful contractual basis for using the college premises on 16 April
2000.

72. The Government also claimed that the holding
of the meeting on the college premises had been contrary to section
1 § 5 of the Education Act (cited in paragraph 48
above). The Court observes, however, that this ground was not relied
upon in the domestic proceedings and that the Government relied on it
for the first time in their pleadings before the Court. In any event,
it appears that the Education Act expressly authorised educational establishments
to rent out their premises (see paragraph 49
above). The provision on which the Government relied did not prohibit
the physical use of college space by third parties, but rather the clericalisation
of schools through the setting-up of religious structures involving
students and/or staff. In the present case the applicants used the college
premises for their meetings on Tuesday nights and on Sundays, that is,
outside normal college hours, and there is no evidence that their activities
interfered in any way with the educational process or involved college
students or teachers. Thus, the Education Act could not serve as a legal
basis for the interference.

73. Finally, the Government alleged that the Commissioner,
assisted by two police officers and one civilian, had come to the meeting
to investigate a complaint about the unauthorised presence of children
at a religious event. The Court observes firstly that no evidence –
such as, for example, a copy of the complaint or materials from a police
investigation – has been produced in support of that contention. Similar
allegations by the Commissioner had been examined previously by the
Chelyabinsk prosecutors, who had found them unsubstantiated and decided
not to institute criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 10-13
above). Furthermore, the course of action adopted by the Commissioner
suggests that her purpose was to disrupt the meeting rather than to
investigate a complaint of that nature. Had there been a genuine attempt
to investigate the matter, the identities of the participants in the
meeting should have been established and the presence of children without
their parents ascertained. However, the Commissioner and the accompanying
officers did neither; they did not enter the hall, but stayed behind
in the foyer; the only person who was asked for documents of any kind
was the applicant Mr Kuznetsov, and no checks were carried out after
the termination of the meeting. Moreover, the only list of participants
in the meeting available to the Court is that compiled by the applicants
(see the schedule), and no person on that list was younger than nineteen
at the material time. It follows that the Government's contention that
the Commissioner investigated a complaint is untenable on the facts.

74. Lastly, the Court observes
that the Government did not submit any documents relating to the official
powers of the Commissioner and that no such documents were produced
in the domestic proceedings. There are, however, strong and concordant
indications that she acted without any legal basis in pursuance of her
private ends. The involvement of two senior police officers gave her
intervention a spurious authority. However, the police officers were
not formally subordinate to her and she had no authority to give them
orders, such as the one she gave to have the meeting dispersed (see
paragraph 60
above). There was no ongoing inquiry of any kind, nor had there been
any complaint about disturbance of the public order or any other indication
of an offence warranting police involvement. Thus, as the Court has
found above, the legal basis for breaking up a religious event conducted
on the premises lawfully rented for that purpose was conspicuously lacking.
Against that background the Court finds that the interference was not
“prescribed by law” and that the Commissioner did not act in good
faith and breached a State official's duty of neutrality and impartiality
vis-à-vis the applicants' religious congregation (see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 62, ECHR
2000-XI). Since the Court has already found that the interference with
the applicants' right was not “in accordance with the law”, this
finding makes it unnecessary to determine whether it pursued a legitimate
aim and was necessary in a democratic society (see Gartukayev v. Russia, no. 71933/01, § 21, 13 December 2005).

75. There has therefore been a violation of Article
9 of the Convention on account of the disruption of the applicants'
religious meeting on 16 April 2000 by the Commissioner and her aides.
In these circumstances, the Court does not consider it necessary to
examine the same events from the standpoint of Articles 8, 10 or 11
of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
14 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 9

76. The applicants further complained under Article
14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 9, that they
had been victims of discrimination on account of their religious beliefs.
Article 14 reads as follows:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”

77. The Court reiterates that Article 14 has no
independent existence, but plays an important role by complementing
the other provisions of the Convention and the Protocols, since it protects
individuals placed in similar situations from any discrimination in
the enjoyment of the rights set forth in those other provisions. Where
a substantive Article of the Convention or its Protocols has been invoked
both on its own and together with Article 14 and a separate breach has
been found of the substantive Article, it is not generally necessary
for the Court to consider the case under Article 14 also, though the
position is otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment
of the right in question is a fundamental aspect of the case (see Chassagnou and
Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95,
§ 89, ECHR 1999-III, and Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981,
Series A no. 45, § 67).

78. In the circumstances of the present case the
Court considers that the inequality of treatment, of which the applicants
claimed to be victims, has been sufficiently taken into account in the
above assessment that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive
Convention provision (see, in particular, paragraph 74
above). It follows that there is no cause for a separate examination
of the same facts from the standpoint of Article 14 of the Convention
(see Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia, cited above, § 134).

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
6 OF THE CONVENTION

79. The applicants complained under Article 6
of the Convention that they had been denied a fair hearing because (i)
the trial judge had been manifestly biased against them and had overtly
favoured the defendants; (ii) they had not benefited from the equality-of-arms
principle; and (iii) the court had refused to admit their evidence and
made findings that had been perverse and unsustainable in the light
of the facts. Article 6, in its relevant part, provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing ... by [a]...
tribunal established by law...”

A. Arguments by the parties

80. The Government submitted that the judgments
of the domestic courts did not disclose any violations of the procedural
rights of the parties. Both parties had submitted their observations
to the courts and the courts had made an impartial, comprehensive and
thorough examination of the evidence before them.

81. The applicants submitted that the proceedings
had been fundamentally defective in that the judge had rejected crucial
evidence on which they had sought to rely. They pointed out that the
judgment had been silent on the issue of the credibility of key witnesses,
especially the Commissioner, who had given three mutually exclusive
accounts of the events. The judicial decision had not stated any reasons
for rejecting the evidence given by the applicants.

B. The Court's assessment

82. After the prosecutor had decided against initiating
a criminal investigation into the actions of the Commissioner and her
aides, the applicants lodged a civil complaint in accordance with the
procedure for contesting unlawful actions on the part of State officials.
The burden of proof was on the officials concerned to show that their
actions had been lawful (see paragraph 47
above). The domestic courts rejected the applicants' complaint, finding
that they had failed to show that the religious meeting had been terminated
ahead of time on the orders of the Commissioner and/or the police officers
accompanying her. The evidence produced by the applicants to that effect
was rejected as emanating from “interested witnesses” (see paragraphs 38
and 40
above).

83. The Court reiterates that, according to its
established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration
of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state
the reasons on which they are based. Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to
give reasons for their judgments, but cannot be understood as requiring
a detailed answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty to
give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision
(see Ruiz
Torija v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A,
§ 29). Even though a domestic court has a certain margin of appreciation
when choosing arguments in a particular case and admitting evidence
in support of the parties' submissions, an authority is obliged to justify
its activities by giving reasons for its decisions (see Suominen v. Finland,no. 37801/97, § 36, 1 July 2003). A further function of a
reasoned decision is to demonstrate to the parties that they have been
heard. Moreover, a reasoned decision affords a party the possibility
to appeal against it, as well as the possibility of having the decision
reviewed by an appellate body. It is only by giving a reasoned decision
that there can be public scrutiny of the administration of justice (see Hirvisaari v.
Finland, no. 49684/99, § 30, 27 September 2001).

84. In the present case the applicants repeatedly
– in their oral and written submissions to the District and Regional
Court – pointed to multiple admissions by the police officers Mr Lozovyagin
and Mr Vildanov that they had instructed Mr Kuznetsov to tell the audience
to end the meeting (see, in particular, their oral testimony before
the District Court in paragraph 27
above and their statements to the prosecutor in paragraph 33
above). The judgments of the domestic courts did not address their submissions
on that issue and remained silent on that crucial point. Neither the
District nor the Regional Court explained the reasons for rejecting
the evidence given by those applicants who had been witnesses to the
exchange between the Commissioner, the police officers and Mr Kuznetsov
and who had given concordant testimonies on the matter. The Court is
struck by the inconsistent approach of the Russian courts, on the one
hand finding it established that the Commissioner and her aides had
come to the applicants' religious meeting and that it had been terminated
ahead of time, and on the other hand refusing to see a link between
these two elements without furnishing an alternative explanation for
the early termination of the meeting. Their findings of fact appear
to suggest that the Commissioner's arrival and the applicants' decision
to interrupt their religious service had simply happened to coincide.
That approach permitted the domestic courts to avoid addressing the
applicants' main complaint, namely that neither the Commissioner nor
the police officers had had any legal basis for interfering with the
conduct of the applicants' religious event. The crux of the applicants'
grievances – a violation of their right to freedom of religion –
was thus left outside the scope of review by the domestic courts which
declined to undertake an examination of the merits of their complaint.

85. In these circumstances, the Court finds that
the domestic courts failed in their duty to state the reasons on which
their decisions were based and to demonstrate that the parties had been
heard in a fair and equitable manner. There has therefore been a violation
of Article 6 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

86. The applicants further complaint that they
did not have an effective remedy for a violation of their rights, as
required by Article 13 which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

87. The Court reiterates that the role of Article
6 § 1 in relation to Article 13 is that of a lex specialis, the requirements of Article 13 being absorbed
by more stringent requirements of Article 6 § 1 (see, among other authorities, Brualla Gómez
de la Torre v. Spain, judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, § 41). Consequently,
it is unnecessary to examine the complaint under Article 13 separately.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION

88. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

89. The applicants claimed 750 euros (EUR) for
each victim of the alleged violations, or an overall amount of EUR 75,000,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, representing the suffering resulting
from the premeditated violation of their rights by a prejudiced State
official advancing her own political ends to the detriment of a disadvantaged
minority, namely the deaf Jehovah's Witnesses. They authorised Mr Kuznetsov
(the forty-seventh applicant and the community elder) to receive the
sum awarded and to apply it to the benefit of all the applicants.

90. The Government claimed that the amount was
excessive and “not proved by the circumstances of the case”.

91. The Court has found that the applicants' religious
meeting was disrupted through unlawful interference by the State officials
and that the applicants did not benefit from a fair hearing. These events
affected a significant number of individuals, many of whom suffered
from a physical disability. The Court considers that the finding of
violations would not constitute sufficient compensation for the distress
and frustration the applicants must have endured. However, it finds
the particular amount claimed excessive. Making its assessment on an
equitable basis, it awards the applicants a global amount of EUR 30,000,
plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount, to be paid into
the bank account of Mr Konstantin Kuznetsov on behalf of all the applicants.

B. Costs and expenses

92. The applicants were represented in the domestic
proceedings by three Russian lawyers at a rate of EUR 50 per hour and
one paralegal at a rate of EUR 30 per hour, and in the Strasbourg proceedings
by Mr Daniel, a member of the English Bar, at a rate of EUR 200 per
hour. The nature of the applicants' disability made it necessary to
employ specialist translators qualified in Russian, English and deaf
signing. It was also necessary to prepare a verbatim transcript of the
domestic hearings.

93. The applicants claimed EUR 91,059 in respect
of costs and expenses relating to their legal representation. This included:

·EUR 15,290 for the preparation of the domestic trial;

·EUR 12,700 for their representation by two Russian lawyers
during seventeen days' trial before the District Court;

·EUR 1,190 for a deaf signing translator during the trial;

·EUR 2,428 for other trial disbursements (meals, travel, etc.);

·EUR 2,200 for the costs of appeal to the Regional Court;

·EUR 1,736 for the preparation of the trial transcript;

·EUR 10,657 for the preparation of the application to the Court
and exchange of observations;

·EUR 5,711 for attending the oral hearing;

·EUR 39,147 for Mr Daniel's fees and travel expenses.

94. The Government did not dispute the details
of the calculations submitted by the applicants, submitting that any
reimbursement should be reasonable and cover only real and necessary
expenses.

95. The Court notes that this case was rather
complex, in view of the number of the applicants and their particular
disability, the length of the domestic proceedings, the seriousness
of the violations alleged and the considerable number of documents involved.
There was an oral hearing before the Court which required additional
preparation of documents and oral submissions. The Court, however, considers
excessive the amount of time spent by counsel on the case. Having regard
to the materials in the case file, it awards the applicants the entire
amount claimed in respect of the domestic proceedings, that is EUR 35,544,
and EUR 25,000 in respect of the Strasbourg proceedings, plus any tax
that may be chargeable on these amounts. The total amount of EUR 60,544
is to be paid into the bank account of Mr Konstantin Kuznetsov on behalf
of all the applicants.

C. Default interest

96. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention;

2. Holds that no separate examination of the same issues under
Articles 8, 10 or 11 of the Convention is necessary;

3. Holds that no separate examination of the complaint under Article
14 of the Convention is necessary;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention;

5. Holds that no separate examination of the complaint under Article
13 of the Convention is necessary;

6. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
Mr Konstantin Kuznetsov on behalf of all the applicants, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(ii) EUR 60,544 (sixty thousand five hundred
and forty-four euros) in respect of costs and expenses;

(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on
the above amounts;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 11 January 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.