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From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The measured Israeli reaction to the
latest flurry of problematic diplomatic activity reflects Jerusalem’s
more central security imperatives, as well as its newly-discovered sense
of being a significant regional player rather than a besieged small
state in a hostile sea.

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 342, May 31, 2016

The loss of EgyptAir 804 on its way from Paris to Cairo – suspected
to be an act of terror – happened to coincide with efforts by both
France and Egypt to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. No
causal connection should be imputed. But for both countries, their
perceptions of broad regional security considerations play a significant
role in driving their diplomatic initiatives. That insight should, and
apparently does, inform Israeli policy responses.

Policymakers in Israel have ample reason to be apprehensive about
French peace initiatives. For many reasons, most notably the pressure
exerted by a large and vocal Muslim minority, French leaders have shown
themselves ever more eager to endorse schemes in support of Palestinian
demands. At moments of crisis, such as the internal EU debates during
the Gaza fighting in 2014, it was France that took the lead in driving
through to EU endorsement a position on permanent status that reflected
Arab demands on borders, Jerusalem, and the interpretation of UN
resolutions. This drive to impose "parameters" is inimical to Israeli
interests.

France is planning to convene a conference on the Middle East peace
process in Paris on June 3, to be attended by assorted international and
regional players – though not by the protagonists themselves. Israeli
reactions to this initiative have been subdued, and recent visits to
Jerusalem by the French prime minister and foreign minister were
amicable. To account for this, it is necessary to take a broader look at
regional dynamics and at French policy responses, which tend to align
closely with Israeli positions on the issue that truly matters: the need
to face up to the threat posed by radical Islamist totalitarianism.

On more than one occasion, French positions and actions on this
subject have been more reassuring from an Israeli point of view than
those of our American ally. For example, France served as the hard-line
anchor of the P5+1 (or, as they prefer to count it, the E3+3). It was
France that raised questions about reliability and implementation (even
as it was French business interests that were among the first to bang on
Tehran's doors).

In terms of action against Islamist terror groups, French forces have
done more than most, including a dramatic campaign in Mali. Equally
important is the French reluctance to buy into the illusion that the
Muslim Brotherhood could be a stabilizing partner, as well as the
ongoing relationship between France and the current regime in Egypt.

It is against this background that Israeli leadership has taken a
cautious line in response to the French peace initiative. Israel did
make the point repeatedly that the French initiative would prove
counterproductive, insofar as it would move Palestinian leadership even
further away from compromise at the negotiating table. But the point was
not made aggressively, and French motives and friendship with Israel
were never subject to question. The tempered Israeli response reflects,
above all the importance of broader regional imperatives in Israel's
current diplomatic calculations.

The same applies to Egypt, which on May 28 led the Arab League in
endorsing the French initiative. From an Israeli perspective, there is
little in recent history to commend Egyptian intervention in the
Palestinian negotiations. Citing their "expertise" (khibra) in diplomacy
with Israel, Egyptians have all too often helped harden Palestinian
positions and demands. Egypt’s role in the last territorial adjustment,
the Hebron Agreement of 1997, was so problematic that King Hussein of
Jordan had to be pulled in to mitigate the consequences of its
involvement.

However times change. The regional realities in 2016 have generated a
very different relationship between Israel and Egypt. The countries
both face the same threats to their security – Iran, IS, and the Muslim
Brotherhood – even if the Egyptian order of priorities is the reverse of
the Israeli. The level of security cooperation is unprecedented, and
President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has said so explicitly to foreign
visitors.

Energetic cooperation, including economic, is within reach,
particularly in view of the easing of friction following the December
2015 release of Israeli Beduin Odeh Tarabin after a long and unjustified
incarceration. Egyptian forces have acted vigorously in Sinai and have
executed a systematic campaign to eradicate the tunnel system supplying
Gaza, operating well above treaty specifications and with Israel’s
explicit consent. Those forces have become an important part of Israel's
security equation in the south.

In this context, it is easier to understand why Egypt's recent forays
into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have been greeted warmly by
Israel. Sisi went so far, in a speech on May 17, as to openly intervene
in Israeli politics, calling (upon request?) for the center-left to join
a broad unity government. This move generated a strikingly positive
response in Jerusalem. In explaining the choices he made in his recent
cabinet reshuffle, Netanyahu spoke of intensive efforts underway for
some time to revive peace efforts with the help of key regional players.
This was a thinly veiled reference to Sisi, and probably also to the
Saudis, whose close association with Sisi was recently cemented by the
Egyptian decision to return the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi
sovereignty.

In short, the measured Israeli reaction to the latest flurry of
diplomatic activity reflects its security imperatives, as well as its
newly discovered sense of being a significant regional player rather
than a besieged small state in a hostile sea.

As to the forthcoming peace conference, there is little reason to be
sanguine. As expected, Palestinian positions have been hardening in
response to the diplomatic effort (and to what Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas views as cleavages within Israeli society, as
his latest speech at the Arab League indicates).

The concept of compromise, raised once again by John Kerry in recent
weeks, remains alien to Abbas’s negotiating posture. Hence, Abbas’
rejection of any recognition of Israel's identity as the embodiment of
the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, and of any interim
step short of "a Palestinian state on all of the land taken in 1967
with its capital in Jerusalem".

However, the true interests of France (and other Europeans) and Egypt
(with her regional allies and sponsors) are not necessarily focused, at
this stage, on permanent status. They are more interested in a
practical mechanism that might engender eventual progress, as well as a
sense of movement that will sap energy from the prevailing hostility and
reduce the prospect of escalating violence.

Their broader agenda requires that regional and international
attention not be diverted by Israeli-Palestinian violence, which always
commands intense media coverage and prompts disproportionate emotional
reactions. On this point, Jerusalem is in agreement with Paris and
Cairo, and is therefore more willing to seek ways to work around their
diplomatic positions rather than confront them directly.

Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is a senior research associate at the
BESA Center, and former deputy for foreign policy and international
affairs at the National Security Council.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler FamilyCol. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman - (Ph.D. London School of Economics) Member of Faculty, Shalem Academic
Center. Former deputy for foreign policy and international affairs at
the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office.
Held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence for over 20 years. Also
served as Israel director of the American Jewish Committee.
Source: http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/342-between-paris-and-cairo/ Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.