Pakistan: Pariah, prevaricator or pragmatic problem?

The Trump administration has cut-off all aid to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan could no longer be trusted in the fight against the Taliban and the home-based Haqqani network. The next step could well be revoking Pakistan’s status as a “major, non-NATO ally.” In any event, Pakistan reacted predictably, vociferously rejecting the president’s accusations. No doubt, Pakistan will close the land route to Afghanistan on which the U.S. depends to supply its forces deployed to that land-locked state.

It is also clear that Pakistan will turn to China as a surrogate for American aid. China is already investing heavily in Pakistan and in developing the port facility at Gwadar. America will be the target of greater Pakistani animosity. And Pakistan will continue building its nuclear weapons arsenal against India as Washington and New Delhi grow closer.

In the current course, Pakistan will become a pariah in Washington’s eyes. Pakistan has long been accused of flagrantly lying to the United States over having a nuclear weapons program in the 1980’s and 1990’s. After September 11th, Washington became more dependent on Pakistan supporting the war on terror and the intervention into Afghanistan. But the last three administrations have been critical of what was viewed as Pakistani reluctance or support regarding Afghan Taliban who have used the Northwest territories as a sanctuary and against the Haqqani network. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen went so far to declare that this newtwork was a “veritable arm” of Pakistani intelligence services.

Many people confuse the word “prevaricate” with denying or lying. In fact, it means delaying or deferring. In many ways, Pakistan had delayed or deferred confronting the truth regarding its links with certain terrorist groups. And no doubt Pakistanis officials are physically fearful of what these groups can do in retaliation.

A former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. once told me that if “we attack the Haqqanis, they would burn my house down.” The murders of two of my closest Pakistani friends and colleagues, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Punjabi Governor Salman Taseer, are not easily forgotten by those holding high office. But these conditions did not occur overnight.

When Benazir’s father Zulfikar was president and prime minister, he nationalized the economy in essence ending its viability and competitiveness. Bhutto’s former military secretary and later President General Zia al Haq who hanged his boss for treason radicalized the country while dramatically increasing the number of madrassas which taught the more radical or conservative forms of Islam. And Pakistan, still very much a feudal-like society, has been governed throughout its seventy years by three and a half families: principally the Army; the Bhutto-Zardaris; the Sharifs; and the half family, the Chaudrys.

Over time, the collective consequences have produced the current political, economic, social and religious conditions of turmoil in Pakistan. And the U.S. has no choice but to understand these realities and respond accordingly. That is not the case.

The murders of two of my closest Pakistani friends and colleagues, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Punjabi Governor Salman Taseer, are not easily forgotten by those holding high office. But these conditions did not occur overnight

First, no solution to the violence and instability in Afghanistan can be found without Pakistan’s support and assistance no matter how distasteful that will be to Washington. Second, with Pakistan as a pariah, the Indo-Pak conflict will persist and could well be exacerbated. Third, Iran and China will seek to fill the vacuum created by American punitive actions against Pakistan.

This week’s Economist featured two articles on Pakistan. One reported on the feudal nature of Pakistan. The other more important article focused on the establishment of private schools largely in Punjab that are increasing educational opportunities for young Pakistanis. Headed by the chief minister of Punjab, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s younger brother Shabaz, the story was one of good news.

What to do? First, the U.S. needs to remain engaged in Pakistan. Both economic and military aid to Pakistan should be conducted on an entirely transactional basis. Pakistan will never do exclusively what the U.S. wants unless it is in its interests or it agrees. The U.S. can no longer delude itself about Pakistan’s interests.

Second, the U.S. should investigate supporting these educational opportunities that hopefully will ultimately erode the influence of the madrassas.

Third, in a few places, “walls” can work. The Afghan-Pakistan border is huge. But only about 500 km needed to be patrolled and fenced to prevent free access. This idea was presented to Pakistan a decade ago. But now is the time to implement this scheme on both sides of the Durand line separating the two states.

If no action is taken, Pakistan will continue on its path to further radicalization. No matter how frustrating Pakistan has been, it is everyone’s interest that a pragmatic solution be found.

Dr. Harlan Ullman is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished columnist; Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, Business Executives for National Security; chairman of two private companies; and whose current book is Anatomy of Failure–Why America Loses Every War It Starts. He is reachable at @harlankullman on Twitter