Abstract [en]

The aim of this study has been that, starting from a marine accident statistics for the groundings, searching dominant risk factors for ships' performance, see the extent to which follow-up is carried out and how it uses and can be drawn from experience developing within military shipping. We have also examined whether it is possible to find some common causal link between the various attributes of the ship groundings/stranding.

The main findings of this study :

risks associated with practical navigation practice in the archipelago should be analyzed further. Skill levels and examination forms are the central parts

risks in connection with reorganization and new organizations have to be clarified

risks from new ship systems or new navigational methods should be analyzed

SMS system in the armed forces may have probably major “non-conformities”

the system does not work fully: capacity gaps in the long term to systematically identify, analyze and take care of important knowledge

the reporting system, DIUS-M, has major shortcomings. Feedback, audit results and reporting of "near misses" within nautical missing almost completely. The handling of the suggestions for improvements is not included in DIUS-M. This has probably given a low overall reporting tendency. The reports are not always the primary data

lacks balance between rules of corrections and "Lessons Learned"

trends cannot statistically shown in relation to the use of the ships and are difficult to visualize

repeated identical audit results for the safety management system (SMS) itself as non-confirmative

lessons learned from the SMS system and are not take care of in the Navy’s nautical lessons-learned process

classification of "performance shaping factors" are missing from the analyses

activity concerning improvement publishers is today unclear and gaping completely in the documents

the introduction of common rules for military shipping has improved the ships ' nautical-technical status and likely minimized casualties.

We have not found any procedures to prevent a sloped plane, so-called “negative inheritance”, concerning practical navigation skills in the arts, after the sea officers training. This is despite the fact that the navy has higher demands on both skill and experience. The learning syllabus needs to be identified, described and better demanded.

The Armed Forces have resources to launch a working SMS and lessons-learned process.

A part result showed that the Navy ship grounds more frequently when any form of navigation training is conducted and that analyses often terminated where they from an evaluation perspective begins to become interesting. Based on the found relations we do attempts to sort out sea going hours and exposure times for risks when training navigation onboard. It was further examined the presence of evaluation models for maritime traffic, as well as the Navy's ability to evaluate its deviation system.

A proposal for adding a Lessons Learned model to the reporting system for meet the skills of the armed forces SMS (FMMS) is shown.