David Irving, Holocaust Denial, and his Connections
to Right Wing Extremists and Neo-National Socialism
(Neo-Nazism) in Germany: Electronic Edition,
by Hajo Funke

4.3 Günter Deckert's radicalized NPD.

4.3.1. The NPD was particularly affected by the radicalization of the neo-Nazi movement. After the relative electoral successes of the Republicans and the DVU, for example in Hesse in 1989, the NPD began to wane as a RWE party. According to the 1992 VSB new hopes pinned on the leadership of Günter Deckert failed to materialise. Deckert's activism and his sympathy for radical revisionism were not welcomed by parts of the NPD. Also the NPD youth organization JN failed to gain influence, although it underwent a process of radicalization in the 1990s.

4.3.2. It was only after several neo-Nazi organisations were banned that the JN gained more influence. According to the 1992 VSB their agitation became much more radical, citing a JN sentiment 'We should persist! Ethnically pure collectivism is the alternative to a multicultural and multinational society; the "blood of the Germans" is very special stuff and is different to "evil smelling slime."'139 The 1993 VSB stated 'Each NPD anti-Semitic action is combined with playing down Nazi crimes.' The JN and their leader Andreas Storr were more radical. Storr stated that the JN was fighting for a new system, that of a nationalist people's state and describe the JN as the avantgarde of a new Reich. The 1993 VSB further observed that the JN had intensified their connections and co-operation with neo-Nazis groups like the FAP, the NL and the Viking Youth (another Neo-Nazi organization).140 JN leaflets advocated the neo-Nazi concept of the so-called free national zones, where the party exercises de facto power in an area or town, a concept implemented by violence and terror.

4.3.3. The JN thus became the most influential organization within the neo-Nazi and militant camp in the second half of the 1990s, especially in east Germany where the JN swallowed a lot of the other tiny neo-Nazi organizations and its members.141 This dangerous success was the result of deliberate radicalization of the party orchestrated by Günter Deckert, Andreas Storr, and others.

4.3.4. The relative successes of radical RWE and the neo-Nazis movement is the result of the social and political crisis that accompanied the reunification process, and of the internal radicalization of the RWE network itself in terms of ideology and action. Thus the neo-Nazi network in Germany intensified its influence from the late 1980s onwards and especially during the early 1990s. The influence of these groups spread so quickly and was so politically alarming that Ministers of the Interior decided in 1992 and 1993 to ban several of these organizations, at the same time as Irving was expelled from entering the country.

4.3.5. As will be discussed below Irving had strong and consistent connections with many of these neo-Nazi organizations between 1990 and 1993. He repeatedly and systematically co-operated with and supported the most radical elements within RWE, i.e. the neo-Nazi network around the GdNF, Kühnen, Worch, Dienel, and others. He sometimes even co-operated with organizations that were officially blocked or even banned later in the same year, such as the NO. Even before their banning considerable portions of this network were prone to physical violence, often terrorist, against their alleged enemies like foreigners. Between 1990 and 1993 more then 70 people were killed in political racist violence in unified Germany. In 1993, for example, officially 10,561 criminal acts were committed with proven or suspected right-wing motives.142 This third RWE wave has been the most bloody seen since 1945.