Appendiks 7

The situation after the 11th round of talks in the Norwegian
channel is somewhat unclear and it appears that it is read
somewhat differently by the two sides. I have neither the
mandate nor information to adjudicate conflicting perceptions,
but I thought it would be useful for your own deliberations if I
shared with you some of the main impressions and perspectives
conveyed to me by the Palestinian side. I met for about 45
minutes with Abu Ala upon his return from the conference site
about midnight 26/27 July. He was obviously somewhat tired, but
in good spirit.

He said the negotiations had been difficult. I interjected that
we must exepect the end-game to be difficult and produce
set-backs. However, so much had been achieved that it would
border on the irresponsible to surrender to the pressure from
last minute complications. He agreed and assured me that he
would try very hard to bring the talks to a successful
conclusion.

Abu Ala claimed that the Israeli side has broken the continuity
of the negotiations in the next-to-last round by putting forward
a lot of new propositions and demands. He claimed that the PLO
came back with their counterproposals during the last
meeting. The implication was clearly that he perceived the move
and counter-move as bargaining tactics.

He claims that the PLO have made substantial concessions towards
the Israeli position during the last round of talks and
mentioned apply constructive ambiguity and delay thorny issues;
the issue of access to Jericho, and the issue of arbitration
where they had also retreated into ambiguities which essentially
made the issue inoperative.

Abu Ala referred to a tete-á-tete with Uri Savir bridging
differences and swapping concessions on a series of issues
contained in the draft DOP. He hope to have them accepted by
Chairman Arafat and claimed he would work hard to persuade
him. However, he also expressed the view that the elements of
the package could be subject to further agreed changes through
communication via Oslo.

According to Abu Ala four major issues remained to which a
solution must be found:

The role of the SCR 242. The PLO sees the transitional phase
as preparation for the full implementation of the
242. According to him Israel will not openly commit itself
to its implementation, but make it a part of the foundation
for the lasting solution. He indicated that on this issue he
was hamstrung and had little to give.

The final settlement. Here he claimed that the PLO wanted a
prior commitment to raise all relevant issues including
Jerusalem in connection with the “final settlement”, while
Israel allegedly wanted to keep open the question of which
issues could be raised in that connection.

Security. Here he claimed that Israel was claiming to
maintain “overall security” in the interim phase, also
following Palestinian empowerment in Gaza, and Jericho. I
inquired if that meant external security, but Abu Ala stated
it implied an Israeli right to maintain internal security
from a position where under Palestinian police forces would
become subordinate to those of Israel also in their
autonomous areas. This was not acceptable. They accepted
that external security was an Israeli responsibility.

Limited jurisdiction during the interim period. He asserted
that Israel wanted to control roads and power grids. I
observed that they in any event would have to be treated as
common goods which should be subject to common management
and control. Israel would inevitably control the source. He
stated that this set of issues are clearly soluble.

Abu Ala claimed that at formula could be found for issuing the
reassuring statements concerning the PLO charter and terrorism
and that a statement by Arafat could be made public immediate
prior to signing of the DOP and issuing a joint statement on the
PLO-Israeli negotiations. That statement would have to be
cleared and agreed by the two parties beforehand. Arafat could
make his statement in Tunis or Cairo. The signing in his view
should take place in Norway.

In response to my question Abu Ala confirmed that PLO now
employs lawyers to work out their texts. This was the response
to the Israeli use of lawyers. I asked whether the Palestinians
were very concerned with the alleged danger of Israeli
cleverness and being tricked. He responded
affirmatively. According to Abu Ala the lawyers tended to
complicated matters by creating controversy around simple
issues. The lawyers wanted to score points and despair of being
outsmarted by the lawyers on the other side. Hence a competition
of lawyers may overshadow and transform the substantive issues
involved. Abu Ala claimed that he would have preferred a
political document. “When it is signed it will be forgotten by
everyone.” “It will be the facts and actions on the ground
constituting the implementation which will attract attention,”
according to Abu Ala. He observed that he agreed with me that
the interim period would be a period of confidence building and
cooperation between Israel and the PLO. That would transform the
basic conflict.

Abu Ala did not give any clear expression of his expectations
concerning the response from PLO on Friday. The response would
be communicated through Mr. Larsen. I expressed the hope that it
would not be an “unconditional no.” Israel wanted a clear
answer. It is necessary to demonstrate an ability to make
decisions, also those which will cause opposition. I also stated
that we were willing to offer good offices, transmit messages
and even mediate specific differences in order to bring the
negotiations back on track. Abu Ala expressed appreciation but
did not go beyond that.

He did express the view that substantial progress has been made
through the channel and that both he and Arafat were committed
to seeking an agreement. I observed that they must not openly
seek it, but also be ready to conclude it and to deal with the
opposition to such an agreement. Abu Ala said he agreed.

I said that the Norwegian channel was unique because it
constituted the only venue for direct negotiations between
Israel and PLO. It was my view that such direct negotiations
constituted a necessary condition for reaching a sustainable
agreement. However, it was not a sufficient condition. In
addition both sides had to be willing to “bite the bullet” to
make decisive controversial and difficult choices. He agreed,
but expressed the view that Israel were not acting wholly
independently, but tended to reflect also American interests and
views. This assertion came up in several contexts, particularly
with respect to the interpretation of SCR 242 and its
implications of Jerusalem. This theme was new in the sense that
he had not in previous conversations brought it up so
clearly. The implication was not, however, the Israel sought
American support, but rather that USA has its own agenda and
that it remains irrevocably hostile to the PLO.

Another theme which he emphasized was that Israel seemed to
make, and wanted to make, a distinction between PLO and the
Palestinian people. In his view, no such distinction existed and
an agreement certainly could not be predicated on that
distraction. In this connection as well references were made to
Americas views.

He explicitly said it would be desirable to have the DOP
initialed prior to Mr. Peres’ visit to Norway.

In response to my question about the impact of recent fighting
in Lebanon he volunteered the view that it would not affect the
talks. The PLO was not involved. Syria was behind the challenge
to Israel. The Syrians sponsor the spoilers of the peace
process, the Hizbollah and the PFLP-GC, but will not seek open
confrontation with Israel.