Even an year after the
attack on Parliament terrorists continue to have access to the Capital.
In sharp contrast to the Indian policy, Israel has relied upon use of
maximum force at source in a policy of instant retribution. Israel’s
is a fight for survival. Their soldiers shoot first, most times to kill.
Should India also follow the same policy to end cross-border terrorism
or should it evolve its own response, asks Ashok
K. Mehta.

INDIA
has been the victim of terrorism ever since the invasion of J&K by
tribal raiders in 1947 who perpetrated such barbarity that,
fortuitously, they lost sight of their goal. The difficulty over
defining terrorism has bedeviled the United Nations. Even the 57-member
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), is unable to distinguish
between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The UN General Assembly has
not been able to agree on a comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.

The OIC is stuck over
whether the human bomber is a martyr or a misguided criminal. The moral
of this unending discourse must be to keep the definition aside and get
on with implementing the specifics of various agreements on suppression
of terrorism.

Meanwhile, the USA which
calls the shots any way calls all attacks on civilian targets as acts of
terrorism, even on military targets if these happen to be outside the
zone of conflict like the attack on US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in
October, 2000. It was only after 9/11 that the USA started using
terrorism in place of violence for attacks in J&K. Western double
standards on terrorism therefore predate 9/11.

Terror tactics and
terrorism are both the strategy and tactics of a political objective, a
tool or means of achieving ends. Secessionist groups turn to terror as
it finds resonance in the media. The more horrific the act, the greater
is the oxygen (and romance) provided by the media. There is no way the
two can be separated.

Agreements on countering
terrorism

There are any number of
international and regional agreements on countering terrorism. The very
first was the principal established by the General Assembly resolution
2625 of October 17. It stated that every state had the duty to refrain
from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another state or acquiescing in organised activity within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts.

The more recent was UNSCR
1368 of September 12, 2001, followed by UNSCR 1373 of September 28,
2001. These have not been implemented by many states who are its
signatories as there are no penalties for non-compliance. The European
Union initiated a wide-ranging action plan of September 21, 2001. The
second ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies meeting in
Seoul on November 12, 2002, jointly noted that "the fight against
terrorism requires comprehensive action and pledged its resolve to
strengthen cooperation to face transnational challenges to democracy
such as state-sponsored, cross-border and other forms of
terrorism".

Nearer home, the SAARC
convention on terrorism never took off not even the one on
anti-hijacking. The SAARC summit of February, 2002, in Kathmandu had
pledged the South Asian nations to fight terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations, including by increased cooperation and full
implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to
terrorism and to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts by
criminalising the collection of funds for such acts and refraining from
organising, instigating, assisting or participation in terrorist acts or
acquiescing in organised activity within its territory directed towards
the commission of such acts". However, the event is remembered more
for the Musharraf handshake with Vajpayee than on any action plan to
combat-terrorism. 9/11 highlighted the international dimension of modern
terrorism. Though the hijackers were mainly of Saudi origin, their
network was spread over 50 to 60 countries, coordinated by Al Qaida from
Afghanistan.

Indian experience

The Indian experience in
handling cross- border terrorism as well as internal terrorism amounting
to proxy war and low- intensity conflict culminated in Operation
Parakram, the longest deployment of the armed forces without going to
war in 2002. The origins of the latest round of terrorism can be traced
to 1987 and mushrooming of madarsas in J&K. The proxy war
hotted up in 1994, when the first foreign terrorist invaded J&K.
Since then, of the gene pool of 3000 terrorists, nearly 70 per cent are
foreigners, mostly Pakistanis. In 1995, the government toyed with the
idea of offensive action on both sides of the LoC but political will was
lacking. After Kargil, the ISI upped the ante by introducing the
fidayeen (suicide attacks). The first such attacks was mounted on
August 6, 1999, and till date nearly 47 suicide attacks have been
counted. In these, 75 terrorists and 167 security force personnel have
been killed. The Indian strategy of fighting terrorism entirely on its
own soil has bled the security forces and let Pakistan off the hook for
waging this war without having to pay for it. Parakram ended on October
16, only partially fulfilling its objective. For example, while
infiltration is down by 30 per cent, (not by 54 per cent, as is being
claimed) the strategic stock of terrorists has been maintained. A new
strategy is required to gradually both reduce the entry and the pool of
terrorists. In 1995, the strategy of attacking terrorism at source was
never launched then. L.K. Advani’s new pre-emptive intelligence policy
which took out three terrorists on December 14, 2002, is a case of too
little too late. One year after the attack on Parliament, terrorists
continue to have access to the capital of India.

Israel’s strategy

In sharp contrast, the
Israelis have relied upon use of maximum force at source in a policy of
instant retribution. This policy is just the opposite of India’s.
Israel’s is a fight for survival, not necessarily of the fittest.
Their soldiers shoot first, most times to kill. The logic is: otherwise
you wouldn’t be alive to explain your actions. Despite sanitising
their external border with UN or multilateral forces, the Palestinian
uprising, (Intifada) has only been contained. The first Intifada
from December, 1987, to September,1993 ended with the Oslo accord. But
Oslo died with the second Intifada which began from September 29,
2000, just after the former Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, visited
both Israel and the Palestinian authority. This has been the most
violent phase of the internal war. The Israelis have had to face the
most gruesome suicide attacks by the Palestinian and Hamas human
bombers, a feat replicated only by the LTTE. Up to December this year,
98 suicide attacks (140 were pre-empted) were mounted in which 1800
Palestinians and 620 Israelis have been killed during Intifada II.

The Israeli response to
suicide bombings has been brutal: To get the bomber before he gets to
the target in Israeli cities. Lately, they have gone for the families of
the bombers, demolishing their homes, assassinating leaders and
destroying bomb factories, which they call "the Bombmakers".
Suicide bombings have not taken place for over a month now.

Instead, Palestinian
resistance fighters are infiltrating Israeli settlements, laying
landmines and carrying out random attacks in drive-by shootings. The
Israelis have employed F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters and Markava
tanks to fight terrorism. The Indian security forces cannot think of
such a devastating response. The Israelis face a far more dangerous and
proximate threat than most Indians do. The recent attack in Kenya
against Israelis in the ground and in the air shows that they are
neither secure at home nor abroad against terrorist strikes. The
business of terror in Israel can only end with a political settlement.
Hence, the call for a regime change (Yasser Arafat) in Palestine.

The Sri Lankan
experience

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE
have waged a mix of conventional and guerrilla warfare against the
security forces and civilians since 1984. Their violent struggle can be
divided into four phases: (A) 1984-87 (B) 1988-99: against IPKF (C)
1990-94 (D) 1990-2001. Terrorism or the use of terror as an adjunct of
military operations came easily to the LTTE. Nearly 70,000 people have
been killed in this war. It is estimated that LTTE have lost nearly
17000 fighters. The rest are civilians — Sinhalese, Tamils and
Muslims. One of the greatest military accomplishments of the LTTE was
the capture of Elephant Pass in 2000 which sent shivers down the spines
of the Sri Lankan military. They could not capture Jaffna, otherwise
Eelam would have been a matter of time. There is a ceasefire on the
ground since 2001 and it has held out against the background of the
Norway-facilitated Sri Lankan peace process.

Terrorism has been the
LTTE’s favourite weapon. They have targeted mainly the Sinhalese
civilians. Their suicide squads — Black Tigers including Sea Tigers
and Black Tigresses — are employed on land and at sea. The fine art of
the willingness to die in an act of collective murder was perfected in
the land of Ravana and Ram. No one has forgotten the legendary Dhanu
whose fatal embrace felled Rajiv Gandhi when she detonated the garland
explosives strapped to her body. The LTTE’s record in human bombings
and suicide attacks is unsurpassable. They have accounted for one
president, one former prime minister, two defence ministers, one future
president, one Chief of naval staff, a couple of generals and scores of
rival Tamil leaders. President Chandrika Kumaratunga who lost an eye on
one such attack came within a whisker of death. The suicide attack on
Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh was masterminded by the LTTE. Dhanu is
the one and only case of an exported suicide bombing. By the end of
2001, the LTTE had carried out 173 suicide attacks but only 70 per cent
were successful. Most of these have been filmed. The most stunning and
spectacular was also the most recent against Colombo’s Katunayake
airport last year when they demolished 50 per cent of the country’s
military and 55 per cent of their commercial fleet of aircraft. It was
this attack that convinced the Sri Lankan establishment that LTTE was
not defeatable.

The Sri Lankan military
could never shape an adequate response to the LTTE’s terror war and
suicide attacks though they did check their conventional assaults. Like
the Israelis, they followed the strategy of attacking at source. But
they were unsuccessful, sometimes for political reasons, mainly for
operational inadequacies, despite the creation of covert,
deep-penetration teams to get the LTTE leadership in the Wanni jungles.
Their Special Forces could not penetrate LTTE intelligence networks and,
therefore, failed to prevent the suicide bomber from reaching Colombo
despite saturating it with troops. It was simply violence and terrorism
fatigue faced by both sides, most of all the bombings by the Air Force
and artillery of civilian areas that has led to the ceasefire and peace
talks which are a pre-9/11 event.

The broad sweep view of
the Israeli, Sri Lankan and briefly the Indian experience on combating
terrorism reveals that the approach to dealing with terrorism has to be
holistic — that is broad based and layered.

It should include
international, regional and national linkages and cooperation. An apex
body like National Counterterrorism Agency has to be instituted to
coordinate response at operational and non-operational levels.

In addition, we need a
plan for homeland security such as:

Perimeter security at
the country’s border.

Preventive activities
within the country.

Protection of domestic
sites.

Consequence management
after attacks.

The key lesson from 9/11
is the need for covert military response — dealing invisibly with the
invisible. Effective denial measures are needed to make impossible for
terrorists to hijack or blow up a plane, and in any case, never concede
to their demands. Deny him funds, weapons, recruits, publicity and the
aura of martyrdom — all easier said than done.

The new worry is jehadi
terrorism which is picking up fast. It has to be dealt with at the roots
through psychological war and surgical military operations.

The political, social and
human elements of terrorism have to be redressed through good governance
which must include a tough policy on counterterrorism. Despite the
attacks on Raghunath and Akshardham temples, very little pro-active
action has been noticed. The first time an insurgency localised to
Malaya by Chinese Communists was ended successfully mainly by the use of
force in the 1960s was also the last time. That was 40 years ago by Gen
Gerald Templar — but it was a non-globalised world.