Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War

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military weakness in the UNC, that this was not the case and that further combat wouldresult in the UNC gaining ground, not losing it. The period between Communistindefinite suspension of the peace talks and the resumption of these talks had resultedonly in more lives lost and less Korean soil behind Communist lines. (The Fall Offensivehad gained had gained approximately fifteen more miles of ground in the X Corpszone.) One tenet of Sun Tzu is to attack one's enemy's weakness, and the Communistsprobably saw the weakness of the Americans (the chief belligerent on the UN side) tobe in negotiating.50Furthermore, one point Americans had stressed was that the demarcation line,when reached, should be the actual line of contact, not the 38th Parallel, which wouldhave resulted only in the status quo antebellum. Resuming the talks would make theAmericans back off their offensive movement (they probably hoped - it had the first timethe talks had been held) before more ground was lost, showed the prolongation ofactive warfare to be to the American's advantage, and that negotiating was theinstrument whereby the most advantage could be had against the Americans inpropaganda victories, technique, and will. The Communists had great faith that theirnegotiators were far batter than any the UN could send. Furthermore, dealing moredirectly with Washington and its State Department (even though it was still indirect vianegotiators who were military officers) would produce more gains for the Communistcause than bullets would in facing the Department of Defense's fighting forces.51One conclusion is inescapable. At least from the Marine perspective, theapplication of its forces in the Inchon/Seoul operation on the one hand, and the advanceso Burton Kaufman, The Korean War, Chapter Five.51 Ibid.