Featured Author: McKenna

04/29/2013

Hi All, This post is related to my last post, although only
indirectly. As most everyone is aware, in theories of moral
responsibility there is a divide between two different approaches. (Of
course, I do not mean to suggest that these categories exhaustively capture all
contenders.) The Strawsonian, interpersonal approach treats moral
responsibility's nature as essentially interpersonal. To understand it,
we must do so in terms of fitting responses by others standing prepared to hold
responsible. Philosophers in this camp, as I see it, include P.F.
Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, Gary Watson, R. Jay Wallace, Paul Russell, Stephen
Darwall, and me too (in my recent book *Conversation and
Responsibility*). Ledger theorists, by contrast treat moral responsibility's
nature as most fundamentally about the independent facts constituting an
agent's being responsible, and the conditions for holding responsible must
first satisfy conditions of veracity regarding whether an agent is responsible
(was she free? did she know what she was doing?). The responsibility facts,
on this view, can be fully accounted for without the need to make any reference
to the standpoint or norms of holding morally responsible. Philosophers in this
camp include Jonathan Glover, Joel Feinberg (I think), Michael Zimmerman, and
Ish Haji, among, I suspect, many others. (John Martin Fischer and Mark
Ravizza have suggested that the views might not be exclusive. That might
be correct, but set that aside here.)

One thing that has come to worry me about my own defense of an interpersonal
theory, and something that, I suspect will infect other versions of
interpersonal theories, is that my theory seems ill suited for certain ways of
thinking about a morally responsible agent's relation to God. I intended for
my theory to be neutral as between different accounts of free will's nature
(compatibilist or incompatibilist, for instance). But it seems not
neutral here. The reason is simple: Views like mine, or instead, say,
Darwall's, are views in which the one who is responsible and, for example,
blameworthy, stands in a relation to those holding morally responsible, as
co-deliberators in a moral community. The members of the moral community
are, in a sense, moral equals or co-participants, and one's standing as a responsible
agent warrants one to engage with others under the presumption that she too
could hold them to account. But this seems ill-suited for one's relation
to God, doesn't it? Doesn't it seem that a more natural picture of the
person who is blameworthy and liable to be held to account by God is better
captured on the Ledger model? On this
model, God first knows the independent facts about the agent's responsibility,
and the further judgments regarding the suitability of reward and punishment
flow from these, but not, as my view would have it, as part of a conversation
wherein the one blamed is in some manner entitled to or warranted in responding
to those blaming her.

04/25/2013

Look, my time as guest blogger is winding down, and this time of year many of us are caught up with final exams, dissertation defenses, and all that stuff. Lots of deadlines, and little time for blogging. So I thought I'd wrap up with a series of lighter observations and invitations for discusssion.

Here is one: When we all get together over a few cold beers at various APA sessions and what not, it often comes up in conversation that there is a striking sociological fact about our field: most incompatibilists currently working in our area tend to be theists. It's not also often remarked that most compatibilists tend not to be theists, but I take this to be implied. I myself, a compatibilist, am not a theist; I'm an atheist. Now of course, there are not hard categories here. But I am curious as to why this is. Is it mere sociology? Or do the arguments for compatibilism generally tend to favor a denial of theism while the arguments for incompatibilism generally tend to favor theism?

04/16/2013

I defend a reasons-responsive theory of free will. As a compatibilist, I am committed to showing
that an adequate account of such freedom can be advanced without at any point
requiring the falsity of determinism. Roughly,
reasons-responsive theories account for free will in terms of an agent’s responsiveness
to an adequate spectrum of reasons. In
my estimation, reasons-responsive theories have several advantages over what
are known as mesh theories, theories that are also often offered in the service
of defending compatibilism. Again, speaking
only roughly, mesh theories account for free will in terms of a harmoniously
functioning mesh of psychic subsystems collectively generating action.

As I see it, one striking advantage of reasons-responsive theories over
mesh theories, such as Harry Frankfurt’s, is that the former are not plagued by
a difficulty that seems endemic to the latter.
The problem is just that mesh theorists characterize acting freely in
terms of action flowing from a harmonious mesh.
On Frankfurt’s view, for instance, it is when one’s will (one’s
effective first-order desire) is aligned with what, at a higher-order of
desires, one, by way of identification, wants one’s will to be. The mesh here is a meshing of higher-order
desires working in harmony with lower-order desires. The problem, however, for views with a mesh structure
is that they seem handicapped in their ability to distinguish between acting
unfreely because of acting from an unharmonious mesh as opposed to freely
acting from an unharmonious mesh. To use
a case of Frankfurt’s as an example, recall the unwilling addict, who does not
act freely and is not responsible, and now consider instead a weak-willed
non-addict, who freely takes the drug and is responsible for doing so despite
instead judging it best that she not take the drug, and despite identifying
with her desire not to do so. Frankfurt,
it seems, cannot readily explain the difference between these agents. The problem is not unique to Frankfurt’s mesh
theory, so far as I can tell. Other mesh
theorists like Gary Watson and Michael Bratman also face a similar problem. (For my money, Bratman has the most promising
mesh theory, but that is the subject for another post.)

The reason that I describe the above problem for mesh theorists as a
striking advantage for reasons-responsive theorists is because, where mesh
theorists have a hard time accounting for these sorts of problems, for
reasons-responsive theorists, this is a cake walk: The weak-willed non addict
is responsive to a richer spectrum of reasons for not taking the drug, and takes
it from causal sources that are suitably sensitive to that richer spectrum of
reasons. The unwilling adduct is not
responsive to as rich a spectrum of reasons and takes the drug from causal
sources that are not suitably sensitive to that spectrum.

Not long ago, John Martin Fischer posted on our Flickers site and
developed this criticism for mesh theories.
Now it might well be that mesh theorists can overcome this criticism,
and showing why I think they cannot requires far more space than I have
available here. But what I am interested
in at present is, so to speak, the flip side of this criticism. Mesh theorists might put to
reasons-responsive theorists the criticism that there is a lacuna in their reasons-responsive
accounts, a serious short-coming that ought to force them to take on at least some
of the features of a mesh theory so as to avoid the charge that they simply
fail to capture an important dimension of free and responsible agency. The lacuna in their account, the mesh
theorists might argue, is precisely that reasons-responsive theories do nothing
to capture the internal features of our agency, and that this is not merely one
further element that ought to be explained among others in a theory of freedom,
but concerns the most fundamental features of our nature as (free) persons.

To develop this criticism of reasons-responsive theories, consider
again Frankfurt’s famous 1971 paper “Freedom and the Will and the Concept of a
Person.” On his view, only a person is
able to adopt attitudes about her own motivational states as they bear upon her
agency in the world. Being so structured,
only a person, Frankfurt essayed, is in a position to face a certain problem
about her own will in that it might not be as she herself wants it to be. Now Frankfurt executed this view in a
particular way (by, among other things, reference to an ability to form
volitions). And I have ignored these
details here. I am more interested in
the general structural features of mesh theories that seem to me to get at
something quite deep about our agency as free persons. We could instead theorize, as Watson does, in
terms of the relation between one’s motivational and her evaluative systems and
the way that a person might adopt certain evaluative attitudes towards the “forces”
moving her to action. Alternatively, ala
Bratman, we might do this by way of higher-order planning policies that structure
for us our commitments and guide our preferences but yet can be foiled by
haywire forces that gum up he works and lead to defects of agency.

In general, I believe that these mesh theories capture something right,
something deep and important about our free agency as persons and candidates
for moral responsibility. And from what
I can tell, we reasons-responsive theorists have just not built into our
theories features of agency that pay adequate attention to the internal psychic
structures that give rise to these problems.
Mesh theorists might quip back, then, at the likes of Fischer, Haji, me
and numerous other reasons-responsive theorists (I would include in our camp
Dana Nelkin, David Brink, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Kadri Vihvelin,
Susan Wolf, and numerous others), that with no more than the resources of
responsiveness to reasons, we cannot showcase the special place of the unique
internal structure of a person’s will (as Frankfurt would put it), since all we
have are sets of reasons to which an agent must be responsive. Of course, reasons-responsive theorists could
simply contend that the spectrum of reasons to which a free agent must be
responsive must include reasons she has presented by her own internal
psychology. (This is how I have always
imagined that I could solve this problem.)
But in fairness to the mesh theorists, this just seems inadequate. My relation to my own internal states and the
problems of agency posed by my complex nature as a person is not like my
relation to the reasons afforded to me by the world as I find it. I have some ideas here, but I’ll not show my
hand, at least not now. I’m curious as
to what all of you think.

Oh, one more thing: I’d like to plug this as a problem for anyone who
wants to advance a positive account of free will, which includes
libertarianism. Why? You libertarians out there should also be
interested in the nature of freedom, aside from the compatibility issue. It is open to you, as Carl Ginet has proposed
in assessing Fischer and Ravizza’s view, to embrace the best compatibilist proposal
of freedom and then just tack on a requirement of indeterminism (suitably
located, of course).

Sorry for the long post. It took
a bit of effort to lay this one out. Hope
you find it interesting!

04/09/2013

Derk Pereboom and I agree that the audience whose intuitions should matter
in our PPR debate over his version of the manipulation argument--his Four Case
argument--is the audience of open-minded and undecided inquirers. These
inquirers are undecided about whether determinism undermines freedom and
responsibility, and they are open to persuasion by further clarifying
considerations. Upon first being confronted with the thesis of
determinism, and reflecting upon the nature and conditions of moral responsibility,
they are willing to acknowledge that determinism might well pose a
threat. But they are neither natural compatibilists nor natural
incompatibilists--that is, they are not prepared to respond to the apparent
puzzle by committing to either of the opposing standard positions. Note,
furthermore, that Pereboom and I are imagining our audience to be
pre-theoretically unpolluted; they've not been influenced by details of and
reflection on the philosophical debate. In this way, their intuitions
about cases provide probative evidence speaking for or against compatibilism or
incompatibilism.

Given this way of framing the debate, Pereboom takes cases like his Case 1
(Plum manipulated moment to moment to satisfy putative compatibilist sufficient
conditions whereby he kills Ms. White) and his Case 2 (Plum manipulated at
birth from a temporal distance to kill Ms. White) to be clarifying
considerations. When presented to an audience of undecided
inquirers, these cases make vivid hidden causes, as Spinoza would wish to
emphasize, and thereby make clear what is going on in the normal deterministic
cases as well. Pereboom contends that, given this audience, and in
response to reflection upon these cases, they will and ought to move in the
direction of assigning greater credence to incompatibilism. So, to cut to
the chase, he wins and I lose. (This is only one of his points against me, but
it is the one I want to focus upon.)

One way I have tied to resist Pereboom is by attending to cases that are
closer to ordinary life cases, cases like Pereboom's Case 3 (Plum exposed to an
indoctrinating environment during his upbringing). And I have dawn
especially on cases like those Nomy Arpaly discusses, cases where something
dramatic happens to a person, but in a way that leaves relevant features of her
agency unimpaired, and causes changes so dramatic that a person then acts very
differently than she otherwise would. Examples she offers are cases of
religious conversion and the overwhelming life-altering love some parents
report when their children are born. These cases, Arpaly and I think, do
not confirm an incompatibilist diagnosis, and I say, in resistance to Pereboom,
should count as clarifying considerations speaking on behalf of compatibilism,
or at least against incompatibilism and so for retention of an agnostic
stance.

Now, here is what I am especially interested in discussing. I believe
that we have good philosophical reason to favor somewhat, or weigh more
heavily, the intuitions elicited from closer-to-life cases as in comparison
with those that are further away. The ones further away are less reliable
guides to testing our conceptual competence and to informing the role of the
pertinent concepts in our properly functioning application of them. So, suppose
cases like Pereboom's Case 1 and Case 2 count as clarifying considerations
moving an undecided audience to up its credence in the direction of
incompatibilism *more strongly* than cases like my preferred Arpaly-cases move
this same audience to lower its credence away from a judgment of
incompatibilism. Should this count as a win for the incompatibilist?
I do not think so, since as philosophers we should look more skeptically at the
evidence elicited from the more bizarre cases when weighed against those that
are closer to real life cases. If I am correct, then I do not think Pereboom
can claim victory in his debate with me.

Here are four comments on this last paragraph: First, I've got no good
argument for this thing I believe about the relative value of intuitions about
these cases. It's a philosophical hunch. Any ideas? Second,
note that if I am correct, this adds an interesting layer to the work done by
x-phi folks. They'll need to evaluate in different ways the results of
studies involving vignettes that are closer to real life cases as in comparison
with those that are more bizarre. Third, all of this just assumes that we
have a shared notion of what intuitions are and how they help us in
philosophical theorizing. But I suspect we have no shared consensus at
all on what the hell they are (been reading an excellent book on this by Herman
Cappelen). Fourth, Pereboom and I favor the intuitions of the
theoretically unpolluted, but is this just reckless? Consider Mele, who
instead advises that we consider the judgments about cases not of the
uninitiated, but of theorists who are agnostic but who have thought long and
hard about this issue.

04/01/2013

Greetings everyone! Thanks to Thomas
Nadelhoffer for inviting me to host the Flickers of Freedom blog this
month. I know. It’s April Fools’ Day. Don’t think it’s not dawned on why Thomas
would find it especially fitting for me to start officially hosting today. Ha ha!
Very funny, Thomas. Just for
that, and in the spirit of the day, let me briefly propose one especially
delightful (negative) subjective condition on free will that, if libertarianism
is true, I hope is also true. It’s this:
acting freely requires that one does not believe that libertarianism is true. Take
that Peter van Inwagen and Bob Kane!
That goes for you too, Chris Franklin and Patrick Todd!

Having dispensed with those deep thoughts, I’d like to begin by inviting
people to reflect on the source of the free will problem, or as I would prefer
to express it, the sources of free will problems. Let me explain. On various occasions, I have noted that, in
my estimation, I do not think that there is just one free will problem, but
several, and I’ve insinuated that different terminological starting points are
likely the upshot of approaching the philosophical topic in a different
way. Here I am not interested in, for
instance, the expression “free will” (although note how lively that discussion
was!). Here I am interested in different
sorts of puzzles that give rise to slightly different problems that go under
the umbrella of “The Free Will Problem.”
Of course, we are all familiar with one that links it to moral
responsibility and, as some like Derk would have it, basic desert. But here are two others:

1. Begin with a simple observation about deliberation and the
phenomenology of our (well-ordered) agency: When we deliberate, we try to
decide between options. Furthermore,
when we are going about our daily lives faced with options about whether to
order the steak or the tuna, we experience our agency as if it is open to us to
order either. This is so even if we are
strongly inclined toward the tuna and no deliberation or reflection is called
for. Faced with the thesis of
determinism, it appears on its face that we have a threat to an
action-theoretic assumption arising naturally from these simple observations—the
assumption that we are able to do otherwise.
Note these worries have NOTHING to do with moral responsibility, at least
not in any immediate way.

2. Consider the internal psychic struggles involved in being the sorts
of agents we are. Put crudely, we
sometimes struggle between what we most desire and what we think it best to
do. Here, internal passions and
motivations, from simple bodily appetites to refined preferences, compete with
assessments about what is in our own long-term best interests understood purely
prudentially, as well as what morality counsels. Of course, we have here resources for
problems about weakness of will. But
there are also related problems about recklessness. Free will, it seems to me, in realtion to these problems, has
something to do with our being able to master or control our inner lives and the agency
flowing from it. Determinism, and other
worries about naturalism more generally, arise insofar as, one way or another, the
causal origins of our agency make it just a crap shoot whether we can indeed
control these conflicting inner forces, or if, instead , all weakness of will
is, say, really just compulsion, or all recklessness is really just unchecked (uncontrollable)
ignorance or stupidity.

I suspect there are other sources as well—sources
of free will problems. I myself have
always fixed on the problem that arises when we tend to the conditions for
moral responsibility. But I want to be a
pluralist about these issues. What do
you think? And do you think much rides
on any of this?

After a long and sobering month off, Flickers of Freedom is finally ready to once again host the next Featured Author--Professor Michael McKenna, who is Professor and Keith Lehrer Chair in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at University of Arizona. He received his Ph.D. from University of Virginia in 1993 and taught previously at Ithaca College and Florida State University. He is the author of Conversation & Responsibility (OUP, 2012) and has published numerous articles, mostly on the topics of free will and moral responsibility.

Luckily for us, McKenna gave us some morsels of philosopy last month to tide us over as we waited for his stint as Featured Author to begin this month. Now, the wait is over! So, please join me in welcoming McKenna to the fray. I hope everyone else is excited to see what he comes up with this month as I am!

The line-up for the upcoming Featured Authors is below the fold. If you're interested in being featured, please feel free to drop me a line!