Chapter XIIIThe May Attack on the Shuri Defenses

Although by 20 May the American troops
were still short of the line set by Tenth Army as the point of departure for
a general offensive, there was no time to spare in launching this offensive.
Admiral Turner was somewhat impatient because of the heavy naval losses, particularly
in picket ships. On 4 May Brig. Gen. Elwyn Post, Tenth Army Chief of Staff,
had declared that the situation was serious and that immediate action was
imperative.1
After the failure of the Japanese offensive, General Buckner felt that the
moment was opportune because the enemy had used almost all his fresh reserves
in the counterattack; both his divisions were in the front lines and the
4th Independent Mixed Brigade also had been partly
committed.2
Accordingly, General Buckner on 9 May ordered a coordinated Tenth Army attack
for the 11th.

With both corps now on the line, Tenth
Army on 7 May assumed direct control of operations on the southern front for
the first time. By 11 May the III Amphibious Corps in the north (consisting
of the 6th Marine Division and Corps troops) had been relieved by the 27th
Division and had moved into position on the right of the southern front. The
Corps assumed control again of the 1st Marine Division, which had been attached
to XXIV Corps since the latter part of April. The XXIV Corps' zone of action
now extended eastward from the 1st Marine Division boundary to Yonabaru. From
west to east, the 6th Marine Division, the 1st Marine Division, the 77th,
and the 96th occupied successive positions on the line. The 7th Division was
in XXIV Corps reserve, enjoying a period of rest and rehabilitation.

The plan of attack called for Tenth
Army to renew the assault on the Shuri defenses with its two corps abreast,
III Amphibious Corps on the right, XXIV Corps on the left. The initial scheme
of maneuver was an envelopment of Shuri by the Marine divisions on the west
and the Army divisions on the east, while a

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strong holding attack was maintained
in the center.3
The Tenth Army staff believed that the Japanese positions were weaker on the
right and that the fresh Marine divisions had a chance for a quick break-through
on that flank. Moreover, the terrain was more favorable along the western
coast. The wide flanking maneuver around Shuri that later developed was not
projected in the original plans. General Buckner explained on 10 May that
there would be nothing spectacular. He added:

It will be a continuation of the type
of attack we have been employing to date. Where we cannot take strong points
we will pinch them off and leave them for the reserves to reduce. We have
ample firepower and we also have enough fresh troops so that we can always
have one division resting.4

The initial order for the attack provided
for a 30-minute general preparation by the artillery just before the ground
attack. This provision was revoked two days later in favor of pinpointing
of targets. The new order stated that "the maximum practicable number
of known enemy guns and strong points will be destroyed or neutralized"
prior to the infantry assault. This change resulted, in all probability, from
recognition of the failure of the mass preparation for the attack of 19 April.
The elaborate system of Japanese underground positions across the entire front
made it necessary to use precision fire, hitting each cave
entrance.5

In preparation for a renewed American
attack the Japanese bolstered their Shuri defenses. Ready at last to commit
almost all his reserves to action, General Ushijima ordered that "the
Army will immediately move its main strength into the Shuri area." He
established a central defense zone with his front lines running from a point
north of Asato on the west coast, through Wana and the high ground near Ishimmi,
to the east coast just north of Conical Hill. Aware of the entrance of the
6th Marine Division on the west, he shifted his forces

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Map No. 40: Tenth Army Advance

for an iron defense on both his flanks.
General Ushijima ordered roads and bridges to be destroyed east of Naha. His
continued fear of an attack behind Japanese lines by American parachute troops,
however, restrained him from bringing all available forces up to
the front.6

The attack launched on 11 May, although
coordinated initially along the entire front, soon broke down into a series
of intense battles for particular points with the western, central, and eastern
sectors presenting relatively distinct situations. At many places the American
efforts were merely an intensification of assaults that had begun on previous
days. For ten days of continuous fighting, from Sugar Loaf on the west coast
to Conical Hill on the east, the Japanese, except for local and relatively
minor retreats, held tenaciously to their long-prepared positions. Finally,
on 21 May, after some of the bitterest action of the battle of Okinawa, the
American forces were to seize the eastern slope of Conical Hill, close to
the east coast, and thereby to make an opening in the enemy lines which permitted
an attempt at envelopment.

The Attack in the West

On 8 May the 22d Marines, 6th Marine
Division, relieved the 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, on the bluffs north
of the Asa River. The enemy held positions south of the Asa, which was too
deep to ford at the mouth and which had a bottom too soft to support any type
of vehicle. The enemy-held ground rose gently to the horizon 2,000 yards away.
To the west barren coral ridges formed a barrier to the sea; to the south
a long clay ridge dominated the road to Naha; to the southeast a group of
low grassy hills, set close together, commanded the ground between the Asa
River basin and the Asato River corridor. On the east were the rough folds
of Dakeshi Ridge, Wana Ridge, and Wana Draw, positions toward which the 1st
Marine Division was driving.7
(See Map No. 40.)

Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
commander of the 6th Marine Division, had warned his troops that the battle
in southern Okinawa would be different from anything they had previously encountered
in the Pacific. In a training order read twice by every platoon leader to
his men, he described the enemy's intelligent

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use of artillery, his ample
supplies, his defensive line "which cannot be breached by simple frontal
attack without heavy losses," and his willingness to counterattack by
every available means. General Shepherd urged his commanders and troops to
take advantage of cover and camouflage, to use maneuver in outflanking the
Japanese rather than to try to "outslug" them, and to keep driving.
"Your enemy can't think as fast as you can and he is no match for a determined
aggressive Marine who has confidence in himself and
his weapon."8

6th Marine Division Advances in the West

The 22d Marines began crossing the
Asa estuary in the early hours of 10 May over a footbridge completed during
the night. An enemy suicide squad destroyed the bridge with satchel charges
after the first three companies had crossed, but other marines reached the
south bank by wading. During the morning the troops advanced into the town
of Asa against steadily increasing resistance. Movement west of the town was
difficult in the confusion caused by heavy fog and smoke. Direct fire from
self-propelled 105-mm. howitzers and LVT's supported the attack. Despite heavy
enemy artillery fire and strong local counterattacks on the infantry, the
22d Marines had established by dark a "beachhead" 350 yards deep
and almost a mile wide.
(See Map No. 39.)

The Drive Along the Coast

During the night of 10-11 May the
6th Marine Division engineers, working under fire, laid across the Asa a Bailey
bridge which enabled tanks and other heavy weapons to support the attack.
The marines advanced under almost continual artillery fire delivered from
the western face of Shuri Heights, where the enemy had excellent observation
of the coastal area. Japanese infantry opposition was well coordinated with
this fire. A company commander of the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, led a squad
up to the summit of a strongly defended hill 800 yards south of Asa, but all
his troops were killed or wounded in the assault except the flame-thrower
man. A concentration from the main battery of a fire support ship broke loose
great blocks of coral from the top of the hill and rolled them down the face,
but without much damage to Japanese positions. An infantry charge by Company
C, closely supported by tanks, finally won the hill. Although Company C was
now reduced to eighty men, the marines clung to the hill in the face of counterattacks.

On the regimental right (west) the
3d Battalion seized a cliff on the coast north of the town of Amike
by a tank-infantry-flame-thrower assault late in

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WEST FLANK ZONE, where the 22d Marines, 6th Division, crossed Asa
River toward Naha. (Photo taken 5 May 1945).

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SUGAR LOAF AND HORSESHOE HILLS, photographed after the battle had
moved on into Machisi and almost to Naha. Between Sugar Loaf and
the hillock in foreground, where Marine attack centered, 10 knocked-out
American armored vehicles can be seen.

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the afternoon. This advance placed
the Marines on the northern outskirts of Amike overlooking the devastated
city of Naha, capital of the Ryukyus. Had this city, the largest in the islands,
been the objective of Tenth Army the 6th Marine Division would have held an
excellent position from which to capture it. Since Naha was not their objective,
however, the marines who reached the north bank of the Asato near its mouth
simply consolidated their position during the next two weeks, sending patrols
into Naha, while the marines to the east continued to press in on the flank
of Shuri.

Progress of the other troops of the
22d Marines during 12 and 13 May was slow. The 1st and 2d Battalions were
now moving into the rough ground a mile east of Amike-ground which the Japanese
had been ordered to hold as a key point in the defense of Shuri. This area
was occupied by the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment,44th Independent
Mixed Brigade, supported by the 7th Independent Antitank Battalion,
a Navy mortar company, and an independent battalion of approximately 700 men
formed from a Sea Raiding Base Battalion. These forces were well supplied
with light mortars; machine guns, and light arms. As the battle developed,
reinforcements streamed in from the rest of the
44th Brigade.9

Closing In on Sugar Loaf, 12-13 May

The first encounter of the Marines
with the Japanese guarding Sugar Loaf came on 12 May, almost inadvertently.
Company G, 22d Marines, advanced southeast with eleven tanks toward the Asato
River. Heading directly toward Sugar Loaf, which was known to be a strong
point, the infantry and tanks met increasing rifle fire but pushed ahead.
When the Marines reached Sugar Loaf, a number of Japanese soldiers fled from
their positions. It was not clear whether this action was a ruse or resulted
from panic at the sudden arrival of the Americans. Four men on the crest of
Sugar Loaf and the company commander frantically radioed battalion for reinforcements.
Because of his many casualties, the commander was ordered to withdraw. As
the Americans withdrew, the enemy opened up with heavy fire. Three tanks were
quickly knocked out. Slowly the troops pulled back, suffering more casualties
in the process. By evening Company G's total strength was down to seventy-five.

The 6th Marine Division now planned
an attack in force on the Sugar Loaf area. The hills there were so small that
they did not show up on the

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standard military map with its 10-meter
contour interval. Sugar Loaf and the other hills supporting it were formed
in such a way, however, as to offer exceptionally advantageous positions to
the enemy. The crest, running generally east-west, curved back slightly at
each end, affording the Japanese weapons on the reverse slope excellent protection
from American flanking fire as well as from frontal attack. Supporting Sugar
Loaf on its right rear was Crescent Hill, also known as Half Moon Hill; on
its left rear was the Horseshoe, a long curved ridge harboring many mortar
positions. These three hills supported one another, and any attack on Sugar
Loaf would bring fire from the others. The Japanese here had excellent fields
of fire to the northwest, obstructed only slightly by several tiny humps of
ground which had their own reverse-slope defenses. Japanese on Shuri Heights
commanded most of the ground.10

On the morning of 13 May the 3d Battalion,
29th Marines, entered the battle east of the 22d Marines. The day was spent
in slow costly moves in an effort to seize the high ground overlooking the
upper reaches of the Asato. The Marines made advances of several hundred yards
on the division left, but resistance steadily increased. By the evening of
13 May the 6th Marine Division had committed the 29th Regiment for a renewed
attack. Supporting aircraft made many sorties during 13 May against artillery
positions, buildings, and storage areas, using rockets and hundreds of 100-
and 500-Pound bombs. One battleship, four cruisers, and three destroyers also
supported the attack. This heavy fire power was available to the ground troops
throughout the attacks.

The enemy's skillful use of his remaining
artillery greatly handicapped the Marine advance from the Asa to the Asato.
Artillery of the 44th Brigade consisted of eight 100-mm. howitzers and four
mountain guns, and these were supplemented from time to time by artillery
and heavy mortars of adjacent units. Having excellent observation, the Japanese
used their weapons singly or in pairs with great precision against marines
and tanks. On one occasion a shell landed squarely amid several men at an
observation point; the commander of the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, 3 radio
men, and 2 tank officers were killed, and 3 company commanders were wounded.

"Banzai Attack" on Sugar Loaf, 14-15 May

The plan for 14 May called for the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, commanded
by Lt. Col. Horatio C. Woodhouse, to seize high ground west and north of

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Map No. 41: Sugar Loaf Hill

Map No. 42: Sugar Loaf Hill

Sugar Loaf, and from this ground to launch an assault against Sugar Loaf.
(See Map No. 41.)
The marines were
able to seize the forward slopes of the protecting hills north of Sugar Loaf,
but intense fire met them whenever they tried to move around or over these
hills. Of fifty men who made an attempt to advance, only ten returned, and
most of the morning was spent in evacuating casualties on amtracks. Nevertheless,
the marines launched a successful attack on Queen Hill which protected Sugar
Loaf to the north. The first attack on Sugar Loaf stalled under heavy fire.
One platoon, consolidated from the remnants of two platoons, made another
attempt at dusk. By 2000 the platoon leader was dead and most of the platoon
had been killed or wounded as a result of intense mortar fire, but the survivors
clung to the slope. The executive officer of the 2d Battalion then rallied
the available members of Company G, 22d Marines, numbering twenty, and twenty-six
marines from supply elements for an attempt to reinforce the survivors. He
and his men moved across the little valley and advanced up the slopes of Sugar
Loaf. About forty feet up the hill they set up two machine guns with fire
teams to support each. Twenty replacements arrived from the shore party with
two officers who had never seen combat. Grenades and knee mortar shells were
falling among the troops so heavily that the executive officer moved his force
to the crest of the hill. "The only way," he declared, "we
can take the top of this hill is to make a Jap banzai charge ourselves."

The small Marine force on Sugar Loaf
was now so close to the reverse slope that the enemy could not effectively
throw grenades, but the mortar shelling increased. The executive officer,
crouching in his foxhole, was killed instantly when a fragment hit him in
the neck. One of the platoon leaders on the hill was also killed, and another
was wounded as he was bringing up reinforcements. Four or five men grouped
together for a moment froze as a shell dropped among them.

Mortar fire and infiltration steadily
cut down the small force, until at dawn on 15 May the position on Sugar Loaf
was held by only one officer and nineteen exhausted men. Daylight made the
situation even more precarious, for now the enemy entrenched on the Horseshoe
and on Crescent Hill could put accurate fire on the Americans. Orders arrived
from Battalion at 2000 stating that relief was on the way. The marines had
already given some ground; the enemy was now massing fire on the crest and
Japanese infantrymen were creeping up the hill from their caves on the reverse
slope. The relief was exceptionally difficult because of the heavy fire. A
platoon of Company D, 29th Marines, attempting to

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reach the crest, quickly discovered
that an effective relief would require an attack against the Japanese who
were trying to retake the crest of the hill. The platoon leader, 1st Lt. George
Murphy, ordered an assault with fixed bayonets. The marines reached the top
and immediately became involved in a grenade battle with the enemy. Their
supply of 350 grenades was soon exhausted. Lieutenant Murphy asked his company
commander, Capt. Howard L. Mabie, for permission to withdraw, but Captain
Mabie ordered him to hold the hill at all costs. By now the whole forward
slope of Sugar Loaf was alive with gray eddies of smoke from mortar blasts,
and Murphy ordered a withdrawal on his own initiative. Covering the men as
they pulled back down the slope, Murphy was killed by a fragment when he paused
to help a wounded marine.

Captain Mabie advanced his company to protect the survivors as they withdrew.
He at the same time notified Colonel Woodhouse: "Request permission to withdraw.
Irish George Murphy has been hit. Has 11 men left in platoon of original 60."

Two minutes later Colonel Woodhouse replied: "You must hold."

In five minutes the answer came from Mabie: "Platoon has withdrawn.
Position was untenable. Could not evacuate wounded. Believe Japs now hold ridge."

By now the Japanese were shelling the area around Sugar Loaf and were
attacking the left sector of the 6th Marine Division in at least battalion strength.
By midmorning the enemy effort had spread over a 900-yard front.
As a result of the bitter fighting for Sugar Loaf and in front of Crescent Hill
the entire left sector of the division was weak. The 2d Battalion gave up
the ground immediately north of Sugar Loaf, but the enemy did not press
through with his advantage. By 1315 his attack had lost momentum.
Later in the day the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, was withdrawn from the action;
it had suffered 400 casualties during the preceding three days.

Attacks on Sugar Loaf Continue, 16-17 May

Another attack, more heavily supported, was made on 16 May, but this was also a failure.
(See Map No. 42.)
At 0800 five companies on a 1,000-yard front advanced on the Sugar Loaf-Crescent
Hill area. Affairs went badly from the beginning. Support planes were half
an hour late, delaying the attack, and several tanks lost their way in the
approach. Two platoons reached the crest of Sugar Loaf after moving up the
steep north slope under mortar, grenade, and automatic weapons fire. Immediately
the difficulties of the previous days presented themselves again. The Japanese
on the reverse slope could not be

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Map No. 43: Sugar Loaf Hill

dislodged by mortar or artillery fire;
tanks were unable to creep around the west slope of Sugar Loaf because of
antitank fire from several directions; and infantrymen accompanying the tanks
were helpless under that fire. The integration of the Japanese position was
fully evident; marines on Sugar Loaf could not advance over the crest because
of fire from adjacent hills; marines fighting for those hills were held up
by fire from Sugar Loaf. Maneuver was impossible. After savage close-in fighting
around the crest of Sugar Loaf, the marines withdrew to their positions of
the previous night.

The veterans of the 6th Marine Division
who fought in this action later called 16 May their bitterest day of fighting
during the Okinawa campaign. Two regiments had attacked with all their available
strength and had failed. Intelligence officers reported that the Sugar Loaf
defenses had been greatly strengthened in the previous twenty-four hours.
Marine casualties continued to be heavy.

The plan for 17 May called for a flanking
attack on Sugar Loaf from the east. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 29th Marines,
were to assault Crescent Hill, then to hold there and support the 2d Battalion,
29th Marines, in an attempt to seize Sugar Loaf. A heavy bombardment by 16-inch
guns, howitzers, and planes carrying 1,000-pound bombs preceded the attack.
At 0830 elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions attacked the western end of
Crescent Hill. Tank-infantry teams supported by artillery destroyed many fortified
positions. As this advance uncovered the east side of Sugar Loaf, Company
E of the 2d Battalion began a flanking attack around the left of that key
terrain feature.

While the attack on Crescent Hill
was still going on, elements of the 2d Battalion moved toward Sugar Loaf.
The first effort was a wide movement attempting to employ the railroad cut,
but this proved unsuccessful because of fire received from the left. An attempt
at a close flanking movement failed because of the precipitous slopes. Then,
using the northeast slopes of the hill, two platoons of Company E gained the
top. On reaching the crest the attacking force was struck by a heavy enemy
charge which drove them back off the hilltop. A platoon of Company F also
tried to advance along the ridge toward the west, but the leader was killed
and the platoon withdrew under heavy mortar fire. Three times more Company
E drove to the hilltop. Twice they were thrown back after hand-to-hand fighting.
The third time the marines beat off the Japanese, but in doing so they exhausted
their ammunition. The company was forced to withdraw, relinquishing the position
for which 160 marines had been killed or wounded during the day.

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Capture of Sugar Loaf, 18-19 May

Throughout the four seemingly fruitless
days of battle for the Sugar Loaf area the tedious work of destroying Japanese
positions had been proceeding everywhere in the area. Progress in this work
steadily reduced the amount of fire which the Japanese could place on Sugar
Loaf. On 18 May a skillful, coordinated attack by Company D, 29th Marines,
took advantage of the progress of the past days and succeeded in reducing Sugar Loaf.
(See Map No. 43.)

Captain Mabie, commanding Company
D, maneuvered his company onto the edge of the low ground north of Sugar Loaf
on the morning of the 18th. Artillery and mortars placed a heavy preparation
on the objectives. Immediately afterward three tanks moved around the eastern
slope of Sugar Loaf and fired into the reverse slope as the Japanese swarmed
out of their caves to repel an expected attack. The tanks retired, shooting
down two satchel teams that dashed out of caves. Then Captain Mabie opened
up with a rocket barrage; trucks carrying rocket racks came over a saddle,
loosed their missiles, and raced away to escape artillery fire. Field pieces
opened up again as the troops moved forward.

One platoon climbed the vest nose,
peeling off fire teams to keep a continuous line from the base of the hill.
Another platoon drove directly up the northeastern slope. The two parties
reached the summit at about the same time, then moved on to destroy positions
on the reverse slope. The position was secure by 0946. A few minutes later
Captain Mabie received word to "send up the PX supplies." The rest
of Company D soon followed to the crest. By noon the wounded had been evacuated
and a line firmly established. Meanwhile Company F seized part of the Horseshoe,
thereby decreasing fire from that point and enabling positions to be consolidated
on the north slopes of Crescent Hill.

That night 60-mm. mortars of three
companies on and behind Sugar Loaf shot up flares every two minutes to illuminate
the area. At 2300 the marines heard yelling and jabbering southwest of Sugar
Loaf, and enemy mortar fire increased. At 0230 the full force of a Japanese
attack hit the marines on Horseshoe. Enemy troops along the road cut west
of Sugar Loaf set up a machine gun that could enfilade the Marine lines. Marine
machine gunners knocked out this gun, but the Japanese manned others. Two
platoons pulled back to the forward (north) slope of Sugar Loaf, and fire
teams, using their own reverse-slope tactics, killed thirty-three Japanese
as small groups attempted to reoccupy the hill. The counterattack was stopped
by dawn.

On the next day, 19 May, the 4th Marines relieved the exhausted 29th Marines.
During the 10-day period up to and including the capture of Sugar

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Loaf the 6th Marine Division had lost
2,662 killed or wounded; there were also 1,289 cases of combat fatigue. In
the 22d and 29th Marines three battalion commanders and eleven company commanders
had been killed or wounded. On 20 May the 4th Marines gained more of the Horseshoe
but were still unable to reach the crest of Crescent Hill. An attack by an
enemy force estimated as of battalion strength was repulsed by the combined
fire of six artillery battalions and infantry weapons. Although forced to
commit part of its regimental reserve, the 4th Marines broke up the attack
and inflicted on the enemy more than 200 casualties.

On 21 May the 4th Marines continued
the attack toward the Asato River line. Troops advanced 250 yards into the
Horseshoe but were unable to complete the seizure of Crescent Hill because
of intense enemy artillery and mortar fire. Much of this fire came from Shuri
Heights. The next moves of the 6th Marine Division would depend on the outcome
of the fierce struggle for those heights that was still being waged by the
1st Marine Division.

Attack of the 1st Marine Division on Shuri Heights

While the 6th Marine Division was
advancing slowly toward the Asato River from 11 to 20 May, the 1st Marine
Division was making vigorous efforts to seize Shuri Heights. The key Japanese
positions in this area were built into Dakeshi Ridge, Wana Ridge, Wana Draw,
and the towns of Dakeshi and Wana, all protecting Shuri on the northwest.
Although other ground around Shuri was higher and even more precipitous, the
term "Shuri Heights" was used by III Amphibious Corps to denote
the Japanese positions in this area which afforded a view of almost the entire
Marine front.
(See Map No. 40.)

The ridges, draws, and ruins of Shuri
Heights gave the enemy a perfect combination for his type of defensive warfare.
Dakeshi Ridge, which the marines had reached by 10 May, had typical reverse-slope
defenses supported by many positions in the town of Dakeshi. The Japanese
had exploited this situation as fully as they had capitalized on the relationship
of the town and ridge of Kakazu and on that of the town of Maeda and Urasoe-Mura
Escarpment. Another ridge, Wana, lay directly south of the town of Dakeshi.
West of these positions steep declivities of from 50 to 100 yards protected
the Japanese against a flank attack from their left. South of Wana Ridge was
Wana Draw, which began as a narrow, rocky defile just north of Shuri and widened
out broadly to the west, giving its defenders a full view of the
ground below.11

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CRESCENT HILL held out until 21 May. Troops of the 4th Marines, 6th
Division, crossing open ground to Crescent were under constant observation
and fire from Japanese positions on Shuri Heights to the east.

FIGHTING AT SUGAR LOAF cost the Americans many armored vehicles.
They are shown wrecked and abandoned in this photo taken from a Japanese gun
position after fall of Sugar Loaf 18 May.

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These positions in the Dakeshi-Wana area were considered by General Ushijima
a vital sector of the Shuri perimeter, which his forces were to "hold without fail."
The 62d Division, which by 11 May had seen continuous action for five weeks,
still held this area. The entire 12th Independent Infantry Battalion
and most of the 21st and 23d Battalions had been destroyed.
Only 800 troops remained of the original division. General Ushijima transferred
the survivors of the 64th Brigade to the 63d Brigade and
reconstructed the latter by assigning to it airfield construction troops,
a machine cannon unit, and a suicide boat group, bringing the 63d
up to a strength of 6,700. He bolstered the Dakeshi sector with elements of
the 44th Brigade, whom he ordered to defend the ridge to the
last man.12

Capture of Dakeshi Ridge, 10-13 May

In the Tenth Army attack of 11 May the part played by the 7th Marines,
1st Marine Division, represented an intensification of the attack on Dakeshi Ridge
begun on the previous day. The regimental attack of 20 May had been abortive.
The enemy had put intense mortar and machine-gun fire on the attacking marines
from his positions on and behind the long ridge. By nightfall the 7th Marines
had been forced back to its original lines.13

The plan for 11 May was designed to take advantage of the natural formation
of Dakeshi Ridge, which was shaped roughly like a horseshoe, with the prongs
extending north along the boundaries of the 7th regimental sector.
The bowl between the ends of the ridge was impassable because of enemy fire;
the routes of attack were along the extensions of the ridge. The 2d Battalion
attacked the western end of the ridge on the regimental right,
while the 1st Battalion attacked on the left. Both battalions had to move over rough ground.

Using tank-infantry teams, the 1st Battalion slowly pushed up the eastern
slope of Dakeshi under heavy enemy fire and reached the ridge line during
the afternoon. The 2d Battalion also managed to reach the crest of the ridge
in its sector but immediately came under intense fire from Wana Ridge directly
to the south. It was impossible to continue the attack; a marine could hardly
raise his head without receiving fire. Evacuating casualties was extremely difficult.
When one marine was set on fire by a Japanese flame thrower, several of his
comrades tried to cross open ground to put out the flames, but each one was

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wounded in the attempt. The Americans were forced back a short distance but
held most of their gains. The attacking company had lost its commander and
every squad leader in the two assault platoons.

The 7th Marines extended its hold
on Dakeshi during is May. The fighting in the 1st Battalion sector revolved
around a pinnacle on the east end of Dakeshi Ridge. As usual, the enemy occupied
the reverse slope in such favorable positions that flank or frontal assault
attacks were virtually impossible. There was room enough only for a platoon
to maneuver. Well supplied with grenades, four marines tried to occupy the
pinnacle by stealth, but the attempt failed. After a 60-mm. mortar concentration,
twelve marines assaulted the position only to find the enemy waiting unscathed;
they pulled back under a hand-grenade barrage. Then demolitions men put 400
pounds of charges below the position. The blasting was an exciting spectacle
to watch but ineffective.

There was still another trick in the Marine repertory, and this one worked.
The platoon secured a medium tank and two flame-thrower tanks and directed
them through the saddle on the right (west) of the pinnacle to a point where
they could operate against the reverse slope. While the tank put 75-mm. shells
and machine-gun fire into the enemy positions, the flame thrower sprayed fire
over the whole slope. Immediately afterward the infantry assaulted the pinnacle
and won it without much difficulty.

By nightfall the 7th Marines held firmly most of Dakeshi Ridge.
Shortly before midnight the Japanese made a counterattack against the
2d Battalion on the ridge. This was the third counterattack against this
regiment in as many nights. The Americans killed about forty of a force
estimated as of company strength, including two Japanese officers with
excellent maps of the area. Tank-infantry teams secured the rest of Dakeshi Ridge on the 13th.

A savage fight developed on 13 May
when the 2d Battalion tried to move through the town of Dakeshi in preparation
for an assault on Wana Ridge. Dakeshi was a network of tunnels, shafts, and
caves--ideal for a large defending force. Snipers were among ruins, behind
walls, and in cisterns and wells. The forward platoon was caught in the open
by mortar and automatic fire from the front and both flanks. The radio broke
down. Tanks and artillery supported the men and tried to screen them with
smoke, but the Japanese crawled forward through the smoke and grenaded the
platoon. One marine, wounded so badly that he begged to be shot, was being
helped by two comrades when a grenade exploded among them, killing all three.
The platoon pulled back after thirty-two of its original forty-nine had been
killed or wounded.

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DAKESHI RIDGE was attacked by these tank-infantry teams of the 7th Marines,
1st Division, in attempting to reach the eastern slope. Below, 7th Marine troops
closing in on a Japanese-held cave in the Dakeshi Ridge hug the ground as an
enemy mortar shell burst on crest. Cave is in the depression to right of shell burst.

--327--

On 14 May the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion, which had been in the
attack for four days. On the next day the 1st Battalion consolidated ground
already taken, and artillery, naval guns, and air strikes were directed against
Japanese defenses on Shuri Heights. Wana Ridge was the next objective of the
1st Marine Division elements on the high ground. Operations against the ridge
were to be coordinated with the fighting around Wana Draw.

The 1st Marines Advances on the Right

While the 7th Marines fought for Dakeshi
Ridge during 10-13 May, the 1st Marines moved south along the rolling ground
below Shuri Heights. After capturing Hill 60 on 9 May, the 1st Marines found
its zone of action sloping downward and exposed to enemy observation and fire
from Shuri Heights and from Hill 55, which was just below Wana Draw. Immediately
before the regiment lay the low basin drained by the Asa River. On the marines'
right the railroad from Naha ran along an embankment.

When the 1st Marines attempted to
push past the western nose of Dakeshi Ridge on 10 and 11 May, fire from Shuri
Heights was so severe that the advance stalled. Consequently the attack was
reoriented, and the marines, giving Dakeshi Ridge a wide berth, advanced west
of the railroad. Here the 1st Marines made good progress in coordination with
the 6th Marine Division. The farther the troops advanced on the right, however,
the greater was the difficulty in supplying the forward elements; all routes
of approach were under fire. Japanese artillery shelled the area between Dakeshi
Ridge and the railroad. On 15 May it was necessary to use air drops, but these
were only partially successful because some of the parachutes drifted into
areas under enemy fire.

The attack of the 1st Marines on 13
May was coordinated with the moves of the 7th Marines on Dakeshi Ridge. Artillery,
naval guns, mortars, and 37-mm. guns pounded the areas in front of the marines.
By noon the 3d Battalion was near Hill 55. This hill, forming part of the
south wall of Wana Draw, presented to the marines a steep incline. Its defenses
were well integrated with those of Wana Ridge and Draw. One company, supported
by tanks, assaulted Hill 55 during the afternoon but was hit by heavy fire
from the heights. Japanese machine guns, mortars, and 20-MM. automatic guns
forced the company to withdraw under a smoke screen.

The plan for 14 May was an attack
on Wana Ridge in coordination with the 7th Marines. Wana Ridge formed the
northern wall of Wana Draw. The ridge, a long coral spine running out of the
northern part of Shuri, was lined on both sides with fortified tombs, many
of which looked out on the low ground

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below. The 1st Marines was a part
of the way up the ridge by noon of the 14th, but was unable to make contact
with the 7th Marines. The ridge seemed to be swarming with Japanese. Before
dusk the enemy launched a counterattack which for a time threatened to cut
off the forward company. The marines pulled back to lower ground under cover
of smoke.

Fight for Wana Draw

The 5th Marine Regiment relieved the 1st Marines during the evening of 14 May.
The plan now was to attack Wana Draw and the neighboring heights with all
available weapons. Four self-propelled guns and twelve tanks for direct fire
arrived on 16 May. The tanks, working in relays and escorted by infantry fire teams,
moved into the low ground at the mouth of Wana Draw and began firing into
the high ground. The enemy responded almost immediately with 47-mm. antitank fire,
destroying two tanks; he also dropped in mortar shells to kill the accompanying infantry.
The marines pulled back with their casualties. Observers, however, had spotted
two of the Japanese antitank gun positions and main batteries of the Colorado
destroyed both of them later in the afternoon.

The tanks and M-7's (self-propelled
guns) continued to press up into Wana Draw. On the 17th the 2d Battalion attempted
to storm Hill 55, but the attack was premature. Japanese machine guns and
mortars in Wana Ridge stopped the infantry, and 47-mm. guns knocked out two
tanks. The marines were able to hold only the west slope of the hill. On the
next day tanks and self-propelled guns fired more than 7,000 rounds of 75
mm. and 105 mm. into the Japanese positions. Engineers with demolitions and
flame throwers destroyed enemy weapons on the lower slopes of
Wana Ridge.14

Naval guns, field artillery, tanks, and M-7's pounded Shuri Heights and Hill 55
as the marines moved to the crest of the hill on the morning of 20 May.
The infantry destroyed some Japanese on the crest after a brief hand-to-hand encounter.
Tank-infantry teams moved up into Wana Draw and with point-blank fire killed
many Japanese dug in on the reverse slope of Hill 55. Seizure of this position
made possible some further advances on the ground below Hill 55.
Marines overran many spider traps manned by Japanese soldiers equipped with
satchel charges. By 21 May the 1st Marine Division was attacking Shuri Ridge,
the high barrier which was the last natural feature protecting Shuri Castle on the west.

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Deadlock at Wana Ridge, 16-21 May

Despite the advances of the 5th Marines
in the Wana Draw and Hill 55 area and the firm grip of the 7th Marines on
Dakeshi Ridge, the Japanese continued to hold Wana Ridge. Their positions
on this ridge overlooked both regimental sectors. On the 16th the 1st Battalion,
7th Marines, sent patrols to probe around the west nose of Wana Ridge. When
infantrymen moved up behind the patrol, the Japanese launched a series of
counterattacks which drove the marines back to the northern base of Wana Ridge.

After relieving the 1st Battalion on the morning of 17 May, the 3d Battalion
attacked up Wana Ridge on three successive days; each time it was forced to
fall back to its positions on the southern edge of Dakeshi town.
The attackers were usually able to reach the top, but were subjected immediately
to intense mortar and automatic fire from front and both flanks,
making the crest untenable. On 19 May the 7th Marines was replaced by the 1st Marines.
The 7th, which had lost more than 1,000 killed, wounded,
and missing since 10 May, was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation
for its participation in the battle for Shuri Heights.

By the time the 1st Marines took over, progress in the Wana Draw-Hill 55
area was beginning to make itself felt in the Wana Ridge fighting.
Tanks, M-7's, and artillery had been pounding the northern wall of Wana Draw,
which was the reverse slope of Wana Ridge. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery
and lighter weapons that were "zeroed in" on Wana Ridge from Shuri town
still controlled the craggy ridge line. Some Japanese positions were
built into the sheer, 200-foot walls of the upper part of Wana Draw
and were almost unassailable.

The 1st Marines opened a two-pronged assault on Wana Ridge on the morning
of 10 May. The 3d Battalion was to attack southeast up Wana Ridge,
while the 2d Battalion was to advance against 100 Meter Hill,
the eastern extension of the ridge. Supported by tanks, self-propelled guns,
and 37-mm. guns, the 2d Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 100 Meter Hill.
Three forward platoons were stopped on the slope by fire from Wana Ridge
and from the south, but another company passed through them and continued
the attack. By dusk the 2d Battalion held part of the ridge but not 100 Meter Hill.
In heavy close-range fighting the 3d Battalion gained only 200 yards on the west slope.

The attack continued on 21 May, but
progress was even slower than on the day before. Like so many previous attempts
on Okinawa, the attack faltered as troops were forced to make the most strenuous
efforts to destroy particular

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REVERSE SLOPE OF WANA RIDGE as it appeared from
slope of Wana Draw. High, treeless point on right side of photo is 100
Meter Hill. Below appear remains of a Japanese 47-mm. antitank gun and
a crewman burned by flame-throwing tank.

--331--

positions with shell fire, grenades,
and demolitions. The 2d Battalion poured napalm into Wana Draw and then ignited
it; this drove some of the enemy into the open, where they were exposed to
mortar fire. Bazookas, rifle grenades, and hundreds of white phosphorus and
fragmentation grenades were used against the caves on the reverse slope of
Wana. Japanese mortar and sniper fire was intense, forcing the marines to
take cover in native tombs and coral formations. The 3d Battalion advanced
seventy-five yards through the broken ground on Wana Ridge, but then had to
pull back to previous positions for the night. The 2d Battalion had been stopped
short in another attempt to take 100 Meter Hill.

Shortly after midnight of 21 May an
enemy force of about 200 troops tried to drive the 1st Marines off the forward
slope of Wana Ridge. After climbing the steep reverse slope by means of ropes,
picks, and ladders, the Japanese surged through a small cut on the ridge and
charged the Marine positions. Company C, holding a thin line between the 2d
and 3d Battalions, used automatic and rifle fire, but the most effective weapon
at such short range was the grenade. The marines threw them until their arms
ached; at the same time, mortarmen put heavy concentrations on the reverse
slope of Wana. The Japanese attack was checked. Company C lost 4 killed and
26 wounded in the attack, but counted 140 dead Japanese in its sector in the morning.

The Attack in the Center

In the 77th Division's sector the
Tenth Army's attack of 11 May marked a resumption of the snail-like frontal
advance on Shuri. The division's two regiments, fighting on opposite sides
of a long open valley southeast of Route 5, had to coordinate more closely
with neighboring divisions than with each other. The progress of the 305th
on the 77th's right (west) was dependent largely on the advance of the 1st
Marine Division on Dakeshi Ridge; the 306th, on the division left, worked
closely with the 96th Division along high ground west and southwest of Kochi Ridge.
(See Map No. 40.)
Enemy forces facing the 77th consisted of two battalions
of the 32d Regiment, 24th Division, supported by elements of four independent
battalions, including a Shuri guard unit.15

The sector of the 305th Infantry was a jumble of ground extending south
from Hill 187 toward Shuri. In contrast to the bold terrain features east and

--332--

northwest of Shuri, this area was
a rough plateau pitted with innumerable knolls, ravines, and draws. By the
middle of May the ground was even more broken by shell holes, trenches, and
gaping cave mouths. Hardly a living plant was visible. The 305th pressed on,
although every advance of a few yards uncovered more positions to be destroyed.
The attack took a steady toll of Americans; by 15 May the 305th was fighting
at about one-fourth strength.16

Ordinarily on Okinawa the Americans
attacked in the morning, dug in on the new position late in the afternoon,
and held a tight perimeter defense during the night. On a few occasions, however,
the 77th Division made night attacks. Such an attack was made on 17 May by
the 307th Infantry, which had relieved the 306th on the division left on 15
May in an attempt to capture Ishimmi Ridge, lying west of the town of Ishimmi.
This attack, which developed into a desperate effort to hold a position surrounded
by the enemy, was typical of the ordeal that many infantrymen had to go through
on Okinawa to register even minor gains.

Through the Japanese Lines to Ishimmi Ridge

Shortly before dark of 16 May 1st
Lt. Theodore S. Bell, commanding Company E, 307th Infantry, took his platoon
leaders up to the 2d Battalion observation post atop a coral pinnacle, pointed
out Ishimmi Ridge, dimly visible in the dusk, 1,200 yards to the south, and
announced that Company E had been ordered to make a surprise night attack
on the ridge. In the few minutes remaining before dark the officers studied
the lay of the land. A heavy machine gun section from Company H and a reinforced
rifle platoon from Company C were attached to Company E for the attack. The
members of the reinforced company, many of them replacements without previous
combat experience, were ordered to load and lock their weapons and to fix
bayonets.17

Company E moved out in the dark at
0300, 17 May. Going down through the west part of the valley, the troops at
0400 reached the line of departure, where they were joined by the platoon
from Company C. Fifteen minutes later the reinforced company was silently
picking its way along low ground. Several gaunt trees on Ishimmi Ridge, showing
dimly in the light of the frequent flares, served as guide points. Although
Japanese controlled the ground, the Americans were not detected. Troops froze
in their tracks whenever flares exploded overhead.

--333--

The sound of battle--rifle and
automatic fire and the whir of artillery shells--was always around them.

The company reached Ishimmi Ridge
just before dawn and began taking up positions along a 125-yard sector of
the flat crest. Digging in was difficult because of the coral and rock formation.
The crest of Ishimmi was hardly ten yards wide at the center but flared out
on either end. The 3d Platoon moved to the left, the 2d Platoon formed the
center, the platoon from Company C took the right flank, and the 1st Platoon
protected the rear. Lieutenant Bell established his command post in a pocket
twenty yards north of the narrow part of the ridge.

By dawn the men were in position but
the enemy was still unaware of their presence. A Japanese officer and his
aide, talking and laughing as they emerged from a tunnel, were killed before
they noticed the Americans. The 2d Platoon found a dozen sleeping Japanese
in one trench and dispatched them with bayonets and rifle fire. By 0530, however,
the enemy was fully alerted. Japanese troops began to pour out of tunnels
in a ridge south of Ishimmi and tried to cross the intervening valley. American
machine-gun fire cut them down. Soon enemy artillery, mortar, machine-gun,
and rifle fire was sweeping the bare crest, forcing the troops to lie flat
in their shallow holes. The Japanese were firing from all directions, including
the rear, and were delivering mortar fire even from tunnel openings along
the lower slopes of Ishimmi Ridge itself.

The First Day

The Japanese quickly spotted Company
E's automatic weapons. One heavy machine gun was blown to pieces as its crew
was setting it on the tripod; the other heavy was destroyed before it had
fired one box of ammunition. Almost all the members of the crews were killed.
Both light machine guns had been knocked out by 0700, one being completely
buried. All but one of the light mortars were out of action by 1000. Lieutenant
Bell's communications with Battalion were also a target. Of five radios brought
along by his company and by the artillery forward observer, one was smashed
by mortar shells, another was set on fire, and two had their aerials shot
off. Only one remained intact.

As the American fire power was reduced,
the Japanese tried to close in to destroy the beleaguered force. The 3d Platoon,
occupying an exposed position on the eastern part of the ridge, repulsed three
bayonet charges on its left. The Americans suffered many casualties from grenades.
Japanese in the ridge south of Ishimmi took a heavy toll of the 2d Platoon,
occupying the center. Two knee mortars, firing in unison 100 yards off either
flank, systematically swept the

--334--

ISHIMMI RIDGE, extending from right foreground almost to spinner
of airplane from which this picture was taken, rises out of flat ground
northeast of Shuri. Immediately behind the ridge is the village of Ishimmi
and the draw before Okinawa's ancient capital. From these positions the
enemy could pour mortar fire into the small group of the 307th Infantry,
77th Division, on the hill.

--335--

American positions from one end to
another. The dead lay in pools of blood where they fell, or were pushed from
the holes to make room for the living. An aid man, although wounded himself,
continued his work until his supplies were exhausted.

During the day the 307th Infantry
could not reinforce the company over the fire-swept approaches, but supported
the force with artillery and self-propelled guns. Cannon company weapons put
direct fire on Japanese trying to storm the hill. Many American shells landed
so close to the encircled troops that the men were showered with rock. The
one remaining radio enabled Lieutenant Bell to pinpoint targets for support
fire. Mortars and heavy machine guns also helped to break up enemy charges.

The combined fire piled up the Japanese
on the slopes of Ishimmi, but their attacks continued. By midday the 2d and
3d Platoons were at half strength and the rest of the company also had suffered
heavily. Realizing that he could not possibly hold his extended positions
during the night, Lieutenant Bell ordered the 2d and 3d Platoons late in the
afternoon to pull into the command post and form a perimeter around it. Withdrawal
was difficult, for the 2d Platoon had six badly mangled men in its sector.
These were placed on ponchos and dragged out sled-fashion. One casualty was
killed by machine-gun fire on the way out.

During the night a rescue force tried
to get through to Company E, but the Japanese ambushed it and the survivors
turned back. The Americans on Ishimmi Ridge, bombarded during the night by
artillery, mortars, and "buzz bombs," repelled several attempts
at infiltration. Flares kept the area well lighted and enabled Company E to
see the approaching Japanese. Sleep was impossible. The tired, tense men hunched
in their foxholes and waited for the dawn.

The Second Day

The order came by radio in the morning
of 18 May to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay."
The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted
and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every
clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles
were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily
during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from
hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding
the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off
the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which
were well protected.

--336--

The moans of wounded men, many of
whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added
to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless,
battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements,
who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation,
some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking
a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another
shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay
in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled
the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of
the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans.

During the afternoon the 307th attempted
to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open
ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company
E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through
the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of
the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in
the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through
in the evening.

Enemy fire slackened after dark, and
the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started
back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers
moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through
splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and
a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water
and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before.
The second sleepless night on the ridge passed.

The Third Day

On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify
his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether
his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched
several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support
of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with
precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making
an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One
enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire
and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar
fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day.

--337--

A message arrived during the morning
that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become
so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day
wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward,
however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At
2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried
out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement
reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge
at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be
evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white
tape to the rear and arrived safely.

Of the 204 officers and men of the
reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been
killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and
2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent
in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13.
Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had
spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with
the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi.

During the battle to hold Ishimmi
Ridge, the 305th Infantry had continued its attack along Route 5. The enemy
held tenaciously to his positions in the finger ridges running west from the
highway. Fierce fire fights flared up, often holding up the advance for a
substantial time. The network of small hills and ridges afforded the Japanese
almost complete interlocking fire; many positions were covered by five or
six others. Even though the 305th utilized all its supporting arms, including
medium tanks, self-propelled howitzers, antitank guns, and armored flame throwers,
it was almost impossible to keep all the supporting strong points neutralized
at the same time. The 306th Infantry relieved the 305th on 21 May, as the
troops were reaching the northern outskirts of Shuri.18

The Reduction of Chocolate Drop Hill

Of all the strongly defended terrain
features that made up the concentric ring of defenses around Shuri, Chocolate
Drop Hill was undoubtedly the most insignificant in appearance. Its name,
which was coined by 77th Division troops while headquarters was still calling
it Hill 130, was aptly descriptive. The hill,

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a bare, brown hump of earth with a
slightly peaked crest, rising abruptly from a flat expanse of ground, did
indeed resemble a chocolate drop resting on a slightly tilted
saucer.19

Several circumstances made the "Drop"
an almost impregnable position. Movement across the saucer was extremely difficult.
Except for low scrub growth in a few spots there was no cover on the surrounding
ground. The west part of the saucer, near Route 5, was low and marshy--unsuited
for tanks and other heavy weapons. Near Chocolate Drop was one of the largest
mine fields on Okinawa. This area was covered by fire from Flattop Hill on
the east, from Ishimmi Ridge on the southwest, and from other heights the
entire way around the circle except to the north where the Americans were
advancing. The Japanese also had the usual reverse-slope defenses on Chocolate
Drop and on Wart Hill, a knob 500 yards east of Chocolate Drop on the long
ridge running southwest between Flattop and Chocolate Drop.

At 0700 on 11 May, immediately after the 31-minute
artillery preparation, the infantry moved out. The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry,
was to make the main effort on the left (east) of the 77th Division sector.
The troops had advanced a little more than 200 yards when they were stopped
by a hail of artillery and mortar fire. Fields of crossed machine-gun fire,
converging just north of Chocolate Drop, also barred the way. By 0900 one
company was engaged in close-in fighting near the north base of the hill.
Other troops tried to advance on the left but were stopped by enemy entrenched
around the base of Wart Hill.20

Tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery,
mortars, and other infantry heavy weapons supported the attack, but no weapon
seemed capable of reaching the Japanese dug in on the reverse slope of the
Drop. Japanese weapons on Flattop took a heavy toll. One platoon, exposed
to Flattop, sustained eleven casualties in the first few minutes of its attack.
Japanese 4.7-mm. antitank guns raised havoc with tanks attempting to cross
the open ground. Two tanks were destroyed and six others damaged by this fire.
Another tank threw a track and was later destroyed by a Japanese satchel charge.
After sustaining fifty-three casualties during the day, the battalion was
withdrawn to the previous night's positions.

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CHOCOLATE DROP HILL under attack 13 May from the
west by tanks and armored flame thrower. Tanks which moved through the
draw (below) between the "Drop" and Flattop were knocked out
by fire from reverse slopes of these hills.

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On the following day, 12 May, the
306th held its position and aided the advance of friendly forces on both flanks.
The 2d Battalion, 306th, supported by a platoon of tanks, anchored the right
flank of the 96th Division. The 1st Battalion, 306th, supported the advance
of the 305th Infantry. This regiment was having extremely hard going in the
broken ground west of Route 5. Japanese here held positions in large, well-protected
caves. One such cave had two Japanese 2 1/2-ton trucks parked end-to-end inside it.

The plan for 13 May was a combined
attack on Flattop Hill and Chocolate Drop. After a short but intense artillery
preparation, the 306th renewed its attack on the Drop. The 2d Battalion led
the assault, moving down the high ground on the northeast. The leading company
reached the hill in thirteen minutes, only to stall at its northern base under
intense artillery and mortar fire. An effort to swing left into the area between
Chocolate Drop and Flattop was stopped quickly: there the troops were more
exposed than ever. The infantry managed to secure part of the slope of Chocolate
Drop but was soon forced back to the base of the hill. At 1400 the enemy scored
twenty hits with 150-mm. artillery in the area just north of Chocolate Drop.
Supported by all available artillery pieces, tanks, and self-propelled guns,
the battalion made a third attempt to seize the hill. The troops, however,
could not gain a tenable position, and they withdrew 300 yards to a fold of
ground north of the hill. Two American medium tanks, one of them equipped
with a 105-mm. howitzer, were destroyed during the day.

Some troops managed to dig in at the
base of Wart Hill and to hold their position despite withdrawal of the forces
on Chocolate Drop. Japanese who occupied trenches on the other side of Wart
attacked this small group during the night. The fight was so fierce that the
Americans were driven out of their holes. In the dark they did not dare to
shoot for fear of hitting comrades. With grenades, bayonets, and entrenching
tools, the men stormed back to their holes, now occupied by a dozen Japanese,
and quickly regained their position.

By 14 May the 306th Infantry was so
depleted in strength that the remaining riflemen were grouped into one battalion.
Led by five tanks, this composite battalion attempted to advance beyond Wart
Hill. As soon as the assault platoon reached the slope of Wart, a holocaust
of fire from the front and both flanks hit the troops. In a few minutes the
platoon was cut down to half strength, and the platoon leader, a platoon sergeant,
and a squad leader were all casualties. Enemy antitank fire hit six tanks
soon after they appeared on the crest. The line of dead infantrymen at one
place near Chocolate Drop looked to one

--341--

observer like a skirmish line that had lain down to rest.
Further efforts to take Chocolate Drop and the high ground to the east
were fruitless. On the next morning the 306th Infantry, which had suffered
471 casualties since 6 May, was replaced by the 307th.

The 307th Infantry attacked through
the 306th at 0900 on 15 May. The scheme of maneuver was a simultaneous assault
on Flattop on the left (east) and on Chocolate Drop on the right. The troops
moved slowly toward their objectives under heavy fire from rifles, machine
guns, and mortars. Simultaneously elements of the 96th Division were making
progress in their sector east of the 77th, and this aided the 77th's advance.
By noon the 3d Battalion was at the north base of the Drop and was working
up the north slopes of Flattop. The 2d Battalion moved around to the right
of the 3d Battalion and advanced about 500 yards before being held up by intense
mortar and machine-gun fire. But the Americans were still unable to capitalize
on their advances. To move through the saddle between Chocolate Drop and Flattop
was to invite fire from the reverse slope of the Drop as well as from the
entire system of defenses to the south. Several more tanks were disabled before
the advance ended.

For the first time, however, the assault
elements of the 77th Division were able to hold their positions directly north
of Chocolate Drop and just below the crest on the north slope of Flattop.
During the night the enemy tried to break the 307th's hold on the immediate
approaches to Chocolate Drop. From huge caves on the reverse slope of the
hill, groups of Japanese armed with knee mortars attacked the Americans twice
during the dark. These attacks were warded off. During the night, however,
the Japanese discovered in a ditch just east of Chocolate Drop, five men who
had been cut off after the assault company withdrew from the hill on the
previous evening; they killed two of the group and wounded one.

The 307th continued the attack on
16 May, but this was another day of frustration. One platoon of the 3d Battalion
reached the crest of Flattop; then enemy mortar and machine-gun fire forced
the troops back. Four times more during the day the 3d Battalion reached and
attempted to hold the crest, but each time the troops fell back to the north
slope. The 2d Battalion continued to probe around the sides of Chocolate Drop
in an effort to reach the enemy on top and on the reverse slope. One platoon
was forced off Chocolate Drop late in the afternoon, but other infantrymen
were able to hold positions gained during the day on the saddle east of the
hill.

Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing

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Map No. 44: Flattop and Dick Hills

enemy positions bearing on the area
in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the
advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy
weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill
to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field
piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By
nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy
force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill
but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed.

During the next two days the 3d Battalion
consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop. Reducing the
tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south
still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded
Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived.
By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he
was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the
caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake
Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss
of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers,
and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop.

Some days later Tokyo Radio broadcast a message in English to the American troops on Okinawa:

Sugar Loaf Hill . . . Chocolate Drop . . .
Strawberry Hill. Gee, those places sound wonderful! You can just see
the candy houses with the white picket fences around them and the candy canes
hanging from the trees, their red and white stripes glistening in the sun.
But the only thing red about those places is the blood of Americans. Yes,
sir, those are the names of hills in southern Okinawa where the fighting's
so close that you get down to bayonets and sometimes your bare fists. Artillery
and naval gunfire are all right when the enemy is far off but they don't do
you any good when he's right in the same foxhole with you. I guess it's natural
to idealize the worst places with pretty names to make them seem less awful.
Why Sugar Loaf has changed hands so often it looks like Dante's Inferno. Yes,
sir, Sugar Loaf Hill . . . Chocolate Drop . ./ .
Strawberry Hill. They sound good, don't they? Only those who've been there know what they're
really like.21

Flattop and Dick Hills

The right elements of the 96th Division
were still fighting for Zebra Hill when the Tenth Army attack order went into
effect on 21 May. Southwest of Zebra were other formidable positions that
were to engage elements of both

--343--

the 96th and 77th for ten days. These
positions were built into Flattop and into the Dick Hills, east of Flattop.
The Dick Hills and Flattop were so close to one another that their reduction
depended on close coordination of troops of the 96th and 77th across the divisional
boundary. A captured Japanese map showed these hills to be on the perimeter
of the inner core of the Shuri defenses.

The Japanese had a miscellaneous collection
of troops in the Flattop-Dick Hills area. Although heavily reduced during
the past weeks, the 22d Regiment,24th Division, was still
ably commanded and capable of effective defense in the scores of available
positions in the Flattop area. Supporting the 32d Regiment were troops
of the 24th Transport Regiment, the 29th Independent Battalion,
and the 27th Tank Regiment. The remaining six tanks of the 27th
were dug in behind Flattop and used as stationary pillboxes. Engineers from
the tank regiment had mined roads and other approaches and had constructed
bell-shaped foxholes from which satchel charges could be thrown against American
tanks. The Japanese had salvaged a number of 7.7-mm. machine guns from destroyed
tanks to round out their defenses.22

The Dick Hill mass consisted of four
heights, known officially as Dick Baker, Dick Able, Dick Right, and Dick Left.
The highest and most heavily fortified of these was Dick Right (ordinarily
called Dick Hill), which was a companion hill mass to Flattop and lay just
southeast of it. Dick Baker was close to Zebra and just west of the narrow
road running southwest from Onaga along the southeast slope of Zebra. Dick
Able was southeast of Dick Baker. Dick Left, another well-fortified and strongly
defended height, was the southern elevation of the ridge running south from Dick Right.
(See Map No. 44. )

During the night of 10-11 May a fight
raged on the crest of Zebra Hill as the Japanese tried to oust the Americans
from positions occupied on the previous day. Not until 0730 was the enemy
forced off the hill, leaving 122 of his number dead. During the 11th, the
382d Infantry, 96th Division, commanded by Col. M. L. Dill, consolidated its
positions on Zebra. Operating on the reverse slope of the hill was difficult
since Japanese positions in the Dick Hills area commanded that slope. An attempt
to move over open ground to Dick Baker, undertaken later in the day, proved
abortive because of accurate enemy fire. One assault platoon lost all its
noncommissioned officers and a private first class was in command at the end
of the day.23

--344--

Map No. 45: Flattop and Dick Hills

DICK HILLS AND FLATTOP, photographed 23 May 1945, two days after
reduction of these positions. Enemy was still dropping harassing fire
on farther slopes, with battle moving closer to Shuri. American foxholes,
some covered by shelter halves, can be seen in profusion on the hillsides.

--345--

The 382d attacked again on 11 May,
with the 1st Battalion on the right (west) and the 3d Battalion on the left.
Block and tackle were used to haul 37-mm. antitank guns up to the top of Zebra
for direct fire into Japanese positions on heights to the south. Artillery
fire and the 37-mm. fire enabled the attack of the 3d Battalion to get off
to a good start toward Baker Hill. While the tank-infantry teams of the 1st
Battalion cleared out the reverse slope of Zebra, the 3d Battalion advanced
slowly between Zebra and Item Hills. The 1st Battalion attacked toward Dick
Baker but was surprised by fire from its rear. Despite the efforts of the
two battalions, some Japanese on the reverse slope of Zebra had survived.
Nevertheless, assault troops of the 1st Battalion reached Dick Baker and dug
in on the crest under a heavy smoke screen. Heavy fire soon forced them to
withdraw.

In the afternoon Company A attacked
up the east slope of Dick Baker. The troops were halfway to the top when most
of them were pinned down by heavy fire from the south. Lt. Woodrow W. Anderson
and three soldiers continued the assault. Anderson covered two huge caves
on the east face of Dick Baker by fire while Pfc. Amador G. Duran made a dash
between them to the crest. Anderson and the two other men joined him. Suddenly
a terrific mortar barrage descended on the hill. Anderson and Duran were killed
instantly when a shell landed squarely in their foxhole; the two survivors
ran down the north-west slope to friendly territory. No further progress was
made during the day. The regiment's only success of the day was the 3d Battalion's
capture of Baker Hill, 600 yards south of Zebra.

The effort of 13 May was closely coordinated
with the advance on the right made by the 306th Infantry, 77th Division. The
1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, pushed off shortly after 1100. The plan was
for Company A, leading, to attack Dick Baker while Company B swung out to
the left toward Dick Able. For a time everything went smoothly. Both companies
reached the crests of their objectives, meeting little fire, and they promptly
began blowing up caves and pillboxes. But Japanese gunners were waiting. Suddenly
a storm of explosives hit the forces on Dick Able. Over 200 rounds of 90-mm.
mortar fire, together with 150-mm. artillery rounds and knee mortar shells,
fell on the small, exposed crest. The commander of Company B and all but one
or two of the fourteen men with him were killed. Company A was able to hold
its position on Dick Baker.
(See Map No. 45.)

The Japanese reinforced their positions
in the Dick Hills area during the night of 13-14 May. On the next morning
enemy fire was so strong that tanks

--346--

Map No. 46: Flattop and Dick Hills

had to be used to transport supplies
to the forward troops. It was a risky procedure to leave a foxhole on Dick
Baker even to receive supplies from tanks at the base of the hill. In the
afternoon, after coordinating with the 306th Infantry on his right, Colonel
Dill launched an attack on Dick Able and Dick Right. Supported by Company
A on Dick Baker, Company B managed to reach the crest of Able without difficulty.
The heavy pounding of support weapons during the morning had evidently knocked
out many of the mortars covering this position. A platoon of Company C then
attacked Dick Right from the north. Five infantrymen advanced halfway up the
slope, but the first three were killed by rifle fire. The enemy also opened
up on the platoon with mortars, and the Americans were forced to withdraw.

The 3d Battalion also attacked Dick
Right, advancing from the Baker Hill area toward the east fingers of Dick.
Company K managed to reach the military crest on the north slopes of the fingers.
As Company L, supported by a platoon of tanks, started up a draw leading to
Dick Right, a barrage of mortar shells descended on it. Some of the rounds
hit the tanks and had the same effect on the accompanying foot troops as air
bursts. All but two of the twenty-three men in the leading platoon were killed
or wounded. Despite the continuing mortar fire, the company commander rallied
his remaining men and led them to the military crest on Dick Right, where
they tied in on the right of Company K. In obtaining this precarious hold
on Dick, the 3d Battalion had lost six killed and forty-seven wounded.

During the night heavy rain fell,
adding to the difficulties the troops already were having with the steep terrain.
Before the rain the soft earth had made climbing much like scaling a sand
dune; now the hillsides were slick with wet clay. During the morning the 3d
Battalion, 382d, was able to consolidate its position. It was still difficult,
however, to move from the military crest to the topographical crest of Dick
Hill; one platoon made seven attempts to seize and hold positions on the skyline
but each time was forced back just below the crest. Troops were able only
to extend their hold westward along the north slope of the long ridge. These
attacks brought the 382d Infantry into close conjunction with the fighting
around Flattop on the west, toward which the left elements of the 77th had
been driving for several days.
(See Map No. 46)

Seen from the north, Flattop resembled what its name implied--a long,
tabletop ridge, dropping abruptly to narrow saddles at both ends.
It stood on the right flank of the rugged hill masses extending southeast
to Conical Hill and constituting the eastern defenses of Shuri.
Flattop dominated the Kochi Valley

--347--

for 1,300 yards to the north, including
Chocolate Drop on the northwest. Just to the east, on the other side of a
saddle deepened by a road cut, was Dick Hill, objective of the 96th Division.
Flattop had a fairly steep reverse slope with the usual profusion of enemy
defenses.24

Flattop was one objective of the 306th
Infantry, 77th Division, when that regiment moved out in the Tenth Army attack
of 11 May. Chocolate Drop was the other objective. Flattop commanded both
Chocolate Drop and the west slopes of Dick Hill, and only after Flattop was
taken could the others be entirely reduced. On it May elements of the 3d Battalion
started to work slowly along the extended swell of ground north of Flattop.
On the 12th, tank-infantry teams tried to reach Flattop but failed. Japanese
fire power prevented the troops from coming within range of the height. Similar
efforts on the 13th and 14th were frustrated, but each day artillery and other
support weapons heavily pounded the hill. The 307th relieved the 306th Infantry
on the morning of 15 May.

Throughout the rainy night of 14-15
May, artillery pounded Flattop and the neighboring hills. The 3d Battalion,
307th Infantry, attacked at 0900 in the morning. Troops moved up the slippery
face of Flattop with grenades, satchel charges, and portable flame throwers.
Tanks put direct fire on the crest and face of the hill. The troops spent
the afternoon in a grenade battle with the enemy and dug in for the night
just below the crest. On the next day a platoon reached the top of the hill,
but shortly afterward a heavy mortar concentration from enemy positions on
Tom Hill, 1,000 yards to the south, forced the Americans off the crest. Meanwhile,
support tanks had quickly knocked out the six enemy tanks dug in around Flattop.
A member of the Japanese 27th Tank Regiment, amazed by the accuracy of American
tank fire, described it as "100 shots-100 bulls eyes." The destruction
of these tanks with their 37-mm. guns scarcely affected the Flattop fighting.
The real trouble was with mines and 47-mm. anti-tank fire, which together
knocked out three American tanks during the day.

On the 17th another bitter struggle
raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest
of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen
infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top.
Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but
two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut
was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes
to remove the mines. The infantry continued its close-in

--348--

fighting with the enemy on 18 May
while more tanks tried to move through the cut. A 47-mm. antitank gun destroyed
one of the first tanks to emerge from the cut, but it was knocked out in turn
by an American 105-mm. self-propelled gun. Other tanks of the 77th and 96th
Divisions came up in support.

Now for the first time the Americans
could place direct fire on the reverse slopes of Flattop and Dick Hill. This
was to prove decisive. Tanks and assault guns put destructive fires on Japanese
positions throughout the next day, 19 May. Bayonet charges by the enemy from
southwest of Flattop were dispersed by artillery and mortar fire. On 20 May
the final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A
chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the
troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could
pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the
reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks
along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had
fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the
hill.

In the zone of the 382d Infantry,
96th Division, the bitter struggle for Dick Hill continued from 15 to 20 May.
All attempts to move over the crest of the hill were met by grazing machine-gun
fire from Oboe Hill to the left (east) and from Flattop to the right. The
2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on the morning of the 16th. During
the previous night the American lines had been pushed back down the south
slope of Dick Hill; thus a part of the work had to be done over again. There
seemed to be no decrease in Japanese resistance, and the battle raged into
the night. Efforts to hold the crest of Dick Hill on the west exposed the
men to fire from Flattop. The 382d made little more progress on the 17th.

The seizure of the road cut between
Flattop and Dick Hill on 18 May was the turning point in the Dick Hill fighting
as it had also been in the struggle for Flattop. On 19 and 20 May the hold
of the 382d on the reverse slope of Dick Hill was steadily enlarged. Despite
continuing heavy antitank fire from enemy positions to the south, tank-infantry
teams methodically destroyed Japanese strong points in the immediate Dick
Hills area. On one occasion an armored flame thrower flushed fifty Japanese
out of a cave; all fifty were cut down as they fled. Pockets remained to be
cleaned out as late as 21 May. By that time, however, the 382d was involved
in another grinding effort to take Oboe Hill on the regimental
left.25

--349--

ADVANCE AROUND DICK HILLS AND FLATTOP was difficult.
Above appear troops of the 382d Infantry, 77th Division, on Dick Baker
supporting advance to Dick Right. Below, Flattop is seen receiving American
tank fire.

--350--

Map No. 47: Conical Hill

Colonel Nist, XXIV Corps G-2, summed up the action along the Shuri front
during the first week following the attack of 11 May in these words:

During the past week's action, as
our troops continued to fight their way into the enemy's main defenses, the
Japanese demonstrated a complete willingness to suffer annihilation rather
than to sacrifice ground. There was no variation in this pattern during the
period.26

Opening the East Coast Corridor

When an opening was finally made in
the Shuri line it was on the extreme left, along Buckner Bay. This opening
was made by an advance up Conical Hill on 13 May which, in the opinion of
General Buckner, who watched it, was the most spectacular of the campaign.
The break, when it came, was a twofold surprise. General Hodge had believed
that the high ground east of Shuri would have to be taken before Conical Hill,
which is farther to the south, somewhat lower, and one of the strongest natural
positions on Okinawa, could be successfully assaulted. For his part, General
Bradley, commanding the 96th Division, was convinced after his reconnaissance
of the terrain that Conical Hill would have to be approached from the northwest,
by advances down the ridge line of the chain of hills. As events turned out,
Conical Hill was reduced before Oboe Hill and the high ground at Shuri, and
by attack from another direction. Furious fighting was still in progress in
the inner areas for many days after capture of Conical's eastern face had
opened the way for American troops to pass down the coast to Yonabaru and
spill out into southern Okinawa.27

Conical--the Million Dollar Hill

The Navy, pouring expensive shells
into Conical Hill from Buckner Bay, marked it with a "Million Dollar"
price tag. The peak rose 476 feet high above the Yonabaru coastal plain, less
than two miles south of Hill 178. From it radiated six long, sharp ridges.
A long eastern spur ran down toward Buckner Bay; a second jutted northeast
to Gaja Ridge, and another due north. Others ran northwest to King Hill, due
west to Love, and due south for 800 yards along the coast to end in a rounded
knob called Sugar Hill, just northwest of Yonabaru. The flat plain between
Conical Hill and Buckner Bay was about 400 yards wide, and Route 13, the important
east coast thoroughfare, passed through it.
(See Map No. 47.)

--35--

A mile northeast of Conical Peak on
the coastal flat was the enemy's projected Yonabaru airstrip, grass-covered
and barely distinguishable. Unaha lay west of the airstrip, and behind that
village the ground rose steeply to Hill 178. This high ground formed the northern
edge of a U-shaped bowl the open end of which faced the bay. A chain of hills
known from north to south as Tare, William, Easy, Charlie, and King shaped
the base of the U, while Conical itself was the southern arm. The enclosed
area was flat and sometimes swampy, except for Gaja Ridge, which rose by the
village of Yonagusuku (or Gala) near the middle of the southern arm.

A valley running behind Fox, Charlie,
King, and Conical Hills, the entire way down to the Naha-Yonabaru road, separated
the Conical Hill sector from the inner ring of Shuri defenses. The Oboe Hill
mass, guarding Shuri's eastern flank, lay a mile northwest of the peak of
Conical, across the valley.28

About 1,000 Japanese, heavily armed
with mortars and organic 75-mm artillery, occupied positions on Conical Hill
itself. Defense of the sector was entrusted to Col. Hotishi Kanayama's
89th Regiment of the 24th Division, reinforced by the 27th
Independent Battalion, one of a number of harbor construction battalions
which had changed their designation to "Sea Raiding Battalions."
Also attached were one company of the 3d Independent Machine Gun Battalion
and the 23d Antitank Company. A captured Japanese map dated 8 May placed
two battalions of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade as guarding the
ground between the peak of Conical and Yonabaru, but it appears that these
units were moved to the Dakeshi sector soon afterward. Their place was taken
by the converted airdrome-maintenance squadron from the Naha airfield and
also by the 29th Independent Battalion.29

The Attack That Failed

The task given the 383d Infantry,
96th Division, when on 10 May it relieved the 184th Infantry, 7th Division,
was the capture of Conical Hill. The 1st Battalion, which was to make the
main effort, effected the relief on William Hill and the eastern slopes of
Easy Hill. Easy was a symmetrical, oblong hill on a north-south axis, with
steep sides. A deep, narrow cut separated Easy from Charlie Hill on the south.
Charlie Hill on its eastern side was also steep. It was roughly circular and
had three prominent noses: one to the northeast offering an approach, one
on the southwest pointing to Love Hill, and a third

--352--

running almost due south to a cut
separating it from a U-shaped hill called King. Fox Hill lay to the west of
Easy, its southern tip ending in a steep little rise west of Charlie known
as Fox Pinnacle.

The big attack on 11 May started auspiciously.
After a thorough mortar preparation Company B took Easy Hill without too much
difficulty and then moved through the cut between Easy and Charlie to flank
Fox from the southeast and gain positions on its crest. Company C, after jockeying
for favorable jumping-off positions, managed to establish itself on top of
Charlie Hill, though not at its summit. The Americans then began the first
of a long series of grenade duels with Japanese dug into the reverse slope
twenty or thirty yards away. Two days later Company B attacked the summit
of Charlie from Fox, but it was stopped by withering fire from King Hill and
from enemy positions close to those of Company C on Charlie. Machine-gun fire
from Conical Hill and mortar fire from the reverse slopes of Love were added
as four Americans moved over the skyline and attacked Charlie's reverse slope.
Company B was forced to withdraw.

Some progress was made on 14 May.
Company B attacked Charlie Hill again, securing a foothold on its northern
end, and Company C extended its positions down Charlie's southern nose. Every
man, however, in the platoon of Company A which attacked down the west side
of Charlie was killed or injured. Another platoon from the same company tried
unsuccessfully to take Fox Pinnacle. On the same day Company L, 3d Battalion,
which on 13 May had taken up positions to seal the draw between Charlie and
King Hills and thus close a gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions, attacked
King and gained the entire crest.

Although the reverse slopes of Charlie
and King had not been reduced, an attack on Love Hill, a low, bare ridge running
generally east and west, was launched on 16 May as part of a plan which was
intended to clean out Charlie and put Company L on the western end of King
to supply a base of fire. From Love Hill, fire could reach the reverse slope
positions on the southwest side of Conical Hill and support the 382d Infantry's
attack on Oboe. Because of the inherent strength of Love's defenses the attack
did not succeed; nor was progress made on Charlie's southern slopes against
the large number of caves, swarming with Japanese. Tanks helped a platoon
of Company C to reach Love Hill but ran out of ammunition and withdrew. A
murderous barrage, from an estimated fifty machine guns firing from Love itself
and from Conical and Oboe Hills and the reverse slopes of King and Charlie,
then hit the platoon. Six men, all of them

--353--

CONICAL HILL and the adjoining enemy positions to the north and west

EAST COAST FLATLANDS, over which the 184th Infantry, 7th Division,
advanced to Yonabaru after of the east slope of Conical Hill.

--354--

wounded, made their way back to the American lines that night; twenty were left on the objective.

Before dawn on 20 May five more survivors,
who had spent the intervening four days behind enemy lines, returned. One
of them, Sgt. Donald B. Williams, had hidden in a cave to tend a wounded comrade.
Enemy soldiers had fired a bazooka into the cave, and Williams had killed
a Japanese who had tried to enter. Williams returned only after his comrade's
condition was hopeless and he himself was growing weak for want of food and
water. The other four men, Sgt. R. D. Turner, Pvt. William Schweneger, Pvt.
Keith Cochran, and Pvt. Kenneth Boynton, the first two of whom were wounded,
had stayed in a tomb near the foot of Love Hill. Their attempts to escape
at night were thwarted by machine-gun and mortar fire trained on the tomb's
entrance. On the second night four Okinawans--an old man, two old women, and
a 10-year-old girl-had moved into the tomb with them, and one of the women
went out and filled two of their canteens with water. On the fourth day a
heavy American air strike hit the hill, and an American machine gun poured
lead at a 3-inch opening in the tomb from a distance of 100 yards. The four
members of Company C made their escape that night when loud singing and women's
voices indicated that the Japanese near by were having a party.

On 19 May Company E established itself
on the western end of King Hill but was driven off by fire from Charlie and
Love Hills and the reverse slope of King. Since the 96th Division had taken
over this sector, more than 300 had been killed or wounded in trying to move
down this series of hills. Constant attack and the use of tanks and demolitions
had been unavailing, and the strain was beginning to tell on the troops. On
20 May an air strike was run against the reverse slopes of Charlie, toward
the American lines, but, although the planes dropped their 500-pound bombs
accurately from an altitude of only a few yards, the Charlie pocket continued
to withstand assault. It was still alive with Japanese, and supporting fire
from Love Hill was deadly. Charlie pocket was not to be finally eliminated
or Love Hill taken until 30 May, after nineteen days of bitter struggle.

The Hole in the Dike

The 13th of May, hot and clear, was
a turning point in the battle for Okinawa. On the two preceding days the 2d
Battalion, 383d Infantry, had cleaned out Gaja Ridge and, by working south
from Yonagusuku (Gaja) and the twin villages of Tobaru and Amaru, had opened
the possibility of reaching Conical's peak from the north and northeast. On
the 12th a toe hold had been gained on

--355--

Conical's northern spur, which ran
down to Tobaru and Amaru, and Company G had made an extensive reconnaissance
and destroyed many enemy positions up the draw on the west side of this spur.
When General Hodge read the 96th Division's report that evening, he immediately
telephoned its commander, General Bradley, and directed that the frontal assault
on Conical Hill from the north be pushed. "We'll have the key to the
Shuri line if he can make it," General Hodge told his
associates.30

At 1100 on the 13th General Buckner
arrived at the observation post of Colonel May, who had decided that the time
was ripe for the assault on Conical Hill. Company F had spent the morning
clearing Yonagusuku (Gaja) of Japanese who had infiltrated during the night;
two platoons of tanks from Company B, 763d Tank Battalion, working with Company
E, had pounded enemy positions in Conical's northern slopes all morning; but
Company G, attacking strong points west of Conical's northern spur, was prevented
from climbing to the crest by fire from Charlie Hill in its rear and from
Conical itself. Colonel May ordered Lt. Col. Lee Morris, 2d Battalion commander,
to attack Conical frontally with Companies E and F and to have tanks move
with the infantry up the hill.

Two platoons of Company F on the left
drove toward Conical's northeast spur and reached a series of boulders halfway
up with surprising ease. The two platoon sergeants, T/Sgt. Guy J. Dale and
T/Sgt. Dennis O. Duniphan, held a hasty consultation and decided to move up
to the crest without waiting for orders from the company commander, 1st Lt.
Owen R. O'Neill. By 1300 the men had reached the northeast crest of the ridge.

Japanese reaction was intense. Knee-mortar
fire fell on the two platoons as they dug in, and at 1525 a counterattack
of at least company strength struck frontally and on Company F's exposed left
flank. Sergeant Duniphan stood up and emptied a BAR into enemy soldiers ten
feet away, then grabbed a rifle and continued to fire at the attackers. Lieutenant
O'Neill sent a runner down the hill to order 1st Lt. Richard W. Frothinger,
leader of the 2d Platoon, to come up immediately. Lieutenant Frothinger led
his platoon up the hill in a headlong dash through hostile machine-gun fire.
An American artillery spotting plane flying over Conical watched the fight
and called for fire. Suddenly an overwhelming concentration of artillery air
bursts and 4.2-inch mortar fire splattered the area just beyond the crest.
The fire was perfectly timed, and the Japanese were repulsed.

--356--

Map No. 48: Conical Hill

Meanwhile Company E had climbed the
eastern slopes of Conical's northern spur and the steep sides of the peak
itself, taking positions on Company F's right, fifty yards east of Conical's
peak. At dusk Company G dug in facing west along the northern spur; thus the
lines extended continuously in a generally east-west direction high up on
Conical's northern slopes. The eastern anchor of the Shuri line was weakening.
The Japanese, having surmised correctly that the main effort against Conical
Hill would be down the Charlie-King ridge line, had disposed their forces
to meet the threat from that quarter. But the 383d Infantry had discovered
and used a naturally stronger but less heavily defended avenue of approach;
two American platoon leaders had taken the initiative and led their men up
the hill at a moment of precious opportunity.

South to Sugar Hill

In what Colonel May called "the
greatest display of courage of any group of men I have ever seen," two
platoons of Company G, 383d Infantry, on 15 May moved up the northwest spur
of Conical Hill from King Hill through extremely thick mortar fire. They dug
in not far below Conical Peak. An earlier attempt by the company's reserve
platoon to establish physical contact with the rest of the company from Conical's
north spur around the base of the peak itself had been stymied when the six
men engaged in the maneuver were all hit and tumbled seventy-five feet to
the bottom of the peak.

Tanks worked over Japanese positions
on Conical's eastern slopes and advanced as far south as the outskirts of
Yonabaru on 16 May, and Company F secured slightly better positions, preparatory
to a main attack down the east side of Conical Hill. On the following day
the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, relieved Companies E and F of the 383d,
placing all three regiments of the 96th Division in the line. If the fresh
battalion succeeded in clearing the eastern slopes of Conical Hill, the 7th
Division could be called from reserve to sweep down the coast and flank the
Shuri line.
(See Map No. 48.)

Sugar Hill, at the southern end of
the 800-yard hogback that extended south from Conical's peak, was the objective
of the 38rst Infantry. On the eastern face of the hogback a number of finger
ridges ran down into the Yonabaru coastal flats. Reducing the Japanese emplacements
which covered the finger ridges from the west would be difficult, for the
crest of the hogback would continue to be untenable because of fire from Love,
Mike, and other hills to the west. It would be necessary to deny the crest
to the enemy and to guard every inch of the military crest as soon as it was
captured, to ward off Japanese attempts to establish positions on the skyline.

--357--

Second Lieutenant Leonard K. Warner,
a Hawaiian, on 18 May led a platoon of Company K, 381st Infantry, down to
the third finger ridge. On the way Lieutenant Warner had dashed up the second
finger with two satchel charges and crossed the crest of the hogback to throw
them into a heavy machine gun emplacement. On the third finger the platoon
was receiving heavy fire from its rear, chiefly from emplacements between
the first and second fingers, when Lieutenant Warner's company commander called
him and asked whether he could move on to Sugar Hill.

"Hell yes," said Warner.
"The way the Japs are shooting me in the back they'll chase me all the
way down there."31

Fire from Cutaway Hill, a peak shaped
like an eyetooth and located on the hogback two-thirds of the way between
Sugar Hill and Conical's peak, added to the platoon's troubles, and it had
to withdraw under smoke. An outpost line on the first finger was held during
the night. During the day, tanks working from the flats had had a difficult
time and in the end had been forced to withdraw by heavy fire from Chinen
Peninsula.

Lt. Col. Daniel A. Nolan, commander
of the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, on 19 May sent fifteen men with demolitions
to attack the enemy emplacements between the first and second fingers. After
they failed in an attempt to climb the precipitous slope during the day, 2d
Lt. Donald Walsh led the men after dark to the northernmost of the machine-gun
positions. They killed its occupants and discovered that it commanded the
Japanese defensive system on the reverse slopes of the Conical hogback. The
enemy counterattacked persistently but unsuccessfully all night. On the next
day the battalion engaged in fierce fighting southward to within 200 yards
of Cutaway Hill, and Company L consolidated for the night between the second
and third fingers. That night Company K secured the area between the peak
of Conical Hill and the second finger, and fought bitter grenade battles with
Japanese twenty yards away on the other side of the ridge line. On the 21st
the company used 1,100 grenades in hanging on to its position.

On 21 May, while Company L was heavily
engaging the enemy on Cutaway Hill and on the hogback to the north of it,
Companies I and F attacked across the heavily serrated ground on the east
side of the hogback toward Sugar Hill. The men paused at each ridge to set
up a base of fire and pound the reverse slopes of the next fold with hundreds
of mortar shells, then moved on with tanks to

--358--

flush the Japanese from their caves
and pillboxes. The company's 60-mm. mortars and heavy machine guns, giving
heavy and effective support, were advanced from ridge to ridge just behind
the troops. Artillery fire pounded the reverse slopes of Sugar Hill and broke
up a strong attempt to reinforce this position by small groups of enemy advancing
from the southwest across open ground. Company F, on the right, had to send
its men by individual rushes across the open fields below Cutaway Hill to
the north slopes of Sugar. This company consolidated its lines on Sugar Hill,
but plunging fire from Cutaway was to plague the men for a week. Company I
captured the eastern part of Sugar without much difficulty, and Company G
came up to strengthen the line against the anticipated counterattack. Company
F took the brunt of the attack that night and killed fifty Japanese. The day's
gain had cost the 381st Infantry 56 casualties, but the regiment had disposed
of 403 Japanese.32

All of Conical Hill's eastern slopes
were now in American hands, and the 7th Division could proceed down the corridor
by Buckner Bay without molestation from its right flank. The western side
of Conical and the reverse slope of Cutaway remained firmly in the hands of
the Japanese.

The month of May saw major changes
in the chain of command, involving a transfer of additional responsibility
to Tenth Army. On 17 May Admiral Turner was replaced as Commander Task Force
51 by Admiral Harry W. Hill, who was to control the air defenses of Okinawa
and the naval forces in the area. The Commanding General of Tenth Army now
reported directly to Admiral Spruance. General Buckner was given command of
all forces ashore, direct responsibility for the defense and development of
captured positions in the Ryukyus area, and, to assist in this mission, operational
command of Task Force 51. On 27 May Admiral Spruance was relieved as Commander
Fifth Fleet by Admiral William F. Halsey, who commanded the Ryukyus operation
until 27 June, when, with the formation of the Ryukyus Force, Tenth Army came
directly under CINCPOA.33

3.
Tenth Army Opns Ord 8-45, 7 May 45;
interv 1st I & H Off with Brig Gen Walter A. Dumas, ACofS, G-3, Tenth Army, 9 Jul 45.
There is still some question as to the precise scheme of maneuver.
The Tenth Army operation plan overlay, which according to the text of the plan
was to show the scheme of maneuver more precisely than the order itself,
indicated a very close envelopment of Shuri by the two divisions immediately
north of the Japanese headquarters city.
The XXIV Corps field order indicated pressure across the line by both its
divisions rather than major effort near the center of the Army line.
Despite the scheme of maneuver outlined on the Tenth Army overlay,
it seems that the actual plan was for uniform pressure across the line
which would crack the Japanese defenses at some point and be
immediately exploited wherever the particular break might come.

7.
The account of operations of the 6th Marine Division is taken from Carleton,
6th Mar Div History, Ch. II, supplemented and corrected by III Amph Corps G-3
Periodic Rpts for the period and 6th Mar Div Actn Rpt, a detailed and well-balanced narrative.

13.
The account of operations of the 1st Marine Division is based on Stockman,
1st Mar. Div History, and III Amph Corps G-3 Periodic Rpts for the period.

14.
Some confusion had arisen as to the location of the town of Wana because the
standard target map showed it on the southwest slopes of Warta Ridge.
Study of the ground by historians indicated that the town actually may have been
located southeast of Dakeshi and northeast of Wana Ridge.

17.
The account of the night attack of Company E, 307th Infantry, is based entirely on
the signed statement of 2d Lt Robert F. Meiser, commanding 2d Platoon, Company E.
This statement is recorded in Leach, 77th Div History Okinawa, Vol. II, Ch. III, pp. 67-81.

19.
Personal Obsn of 1st I & H Off.
The precise location of Chocolate Drop Hill is not clear.
While XXIV Corps and 77th Division records place it in Target Area 8073P of
the 1:25,000 map of Okinawa, observation of the ground and study of photographs
indicate that the hill is located from 200 to 300 yards northeast of that point.