Government

One of the major issues discussed in the wake of the National Security Agency leak involving Edward Snowden was how the government can prevent a similar leak from happening in the future. This article looks at several specific measures that can strengthen data security, making it more difficult for bad actors to break into the system, and tougher for them to make off with sensitive information onc...

If you have been following SCADA news in the last month, you might have noticed an avalanche of reports and blogs on new security vulnerabilities in power industry equipment. So far, vulnerability disclosures for 9 products using the DNP3 protocol have been released by the ICS-CERT, with another 21 SCADA product disclosures on their way.

I am not a SCADA Apologist. If anything, I consider people like myself and Joel Langill to be SCADA Realists. Clearly Joel and I believe security is important. If we didn’t, we wouldn’t be in this business. And our clients don’t pay us to hear: “Do nothing; it’s the other guy’s fault.”

Organizations, especially those involved in the electric industry, must view security investments as a viable risk-reduction tools that not only protect the nation’s way of life, but also investments they have made in their own businesses. To truly understand the risk that critical infrastructures face, and the level of security attention its different sectors require, you must first understand ...

Since somewhere as early as 2007 the various US intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies used the law to gain access to information harvested by tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Apple, Yahoo, Facebook, Skype and Youtube.

In reality, a well-prepared cyber attack does not need to last for 15 minutes to succeed. After preparations it takes only seconds to conduct the attack which may hit targets next door as well as those on the other side of the world.

Cyberweapons are now comparable to the ballistic nuclear missile arsenal of the US, which also resides under the jurisdiction of the President. Giving the President cyber-initiative responsibilities speaks volumes regarding the serious attitude to which they are treated.

Applying patches is a critical part of good security. According to US-CERT, about 95% of all network intrusions could have been avoided by keeping systems up to date with appropriate patches. What I am against is patching as a knee-jerk reaction to security vulnerabilities. You can’t expect your control system to operate reliably if you don’t have a controlled process for patching.

Industrial control systems (ICSs) were designed for reliability and safety and to enable system operability and functionality. Many ICSs were originally designed before networking was commonplace. Consequently, cyber security was not a design consideration.

In a brief filed on Friday, EFF continued its fight against secret surveillance law, asking the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to order the release of a secret opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).

After Stuxnet, security researchers and hackers on the prowl for new targets to exploit shifted their efforts to critical industrial infrastructure. Unfortunately, the SCADA and Industrial Control Systems applications they are now focusing on are sitting ducks.