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GenapSys, a California-based startup, was soon to release a new DNA sequencer that the company's founder, Hesaam Esfandyarpour, believed was truly revolutionary. The sequencer would be substantially less expensive—potentially costing just a few thousand dollars—and smaller than other sequencers, many of which were large devices costing tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars. GenapSys' device, named GENIUS, could also quickly generate large amounts of data, as it was capable of sequencing an entire human genome in less than eight hours. At this price, GenapSys' device would be attractive to customers that had been unable to afford sequencers, such as smaller laboratories or hospitals, and even expand the market to include industries such as agriculture and biofuels.

As GenapSys came closer to releasing its product, Esfandyarpour and his Senior Director of Operations and Strategy, Leila Rastegar (HBS '11), sat down to decide which of three business models they would choose to bring this device to market. In the first model, the company would sell sequencers at a higher price to those entities which already purchased sequencers, primarily major research labs and pharmaceutical firms, but position its machine as a faster alternative to existing technologies. In the second model, GenapSys would sell its sequencer at a lower price but charge more for the cartridges necessary to run a sample, and earn its primary revenue from these cartridges. The third model would see GenapSys sell its device at or around cost, but use the data customers generated to create a proprietary database of genetic information. Customers could pay to access the database for research, to create genetic tests, or for many other purposes. GenapSys would also build an online store with the genetic tests customers created.

Esfandyarpour's and Rastegar's decision would determine GenapSys' customer base and financial position for the coming years, and also impact development and capital needs of the firm. Which was the right model to bring the device to market and have a meaningful impact?

The National Football League (NFL) was both the most popular spectator sport in the U.S. and a major economic entity, taking in roughly $10 billion a year in revenue. However through the early twenty-first century, an increased understanding of the long-term effects of head injuries on NFL players indicated a serious threat to the long-term viability of the game. Particularly concerning was the indication that some deceased professional football players had developed chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE)—a neurodegenerative disease which had a strong influence on a person's mental and physical health—most likely as a result of repetitive hits sustained during their football careers and which may have contributed to their deaths.
Over 4,000 retired players had jointly sued the NFL over the head injuries they had sustained during their time in the NFL and the resulting health problems they attributed to these injuries. In part, the lawsuit alleged that the NFL had not been forthcoming with players about the health risks of head injuries. The two sides had reached a tentative $765 million settlement in 2013, the bulk of which would go to compensating retired players suffering from such diseases as Alzheimer's or dementia.
While this settlement compensated retired players, it was not applicable to current or future players. Could the NFL preserve the sport by making it safer through new rules or equipment changes, or was football an inherently physical game that no amount of new rules or equipment could make completely safe? Were current and future players, now knowing full well the potential long-term health implications of football, tacitly accepting the risks involved? As a team owner, is now the time to sell while franchise value and fan support are at their peaks, or will the business of the NFL be viable for years to come?