This thesis explains, analyses and examines the classical and modern positions on the nature and causes of the weakness of will. Since Plato and Aristotle’s identification of the problem, many principles and propositions on the subject of practical rationality in general and motivation in particular have been examined in details. These principles and propositions are being discussed on the basis that they are still somewhat relevant to modern theories. An emphasis is made on what is now known as the standard conception of strict akrasia and its supposedly paradoxical nature.
We argue that a skeptical position toward strict akrasia cannot be based on one version or another of the preference-revealed theory and we demonstrate that a description of the decision process is necessary to assign an overall preference or a better judgment. We discuss the philosophical debate on internalist and externalist conceptions of the connection between better judgment and decision. We then argue that, based on experimental results in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, the externalist conception, although imperfect, is stronger. But these experimental results are not incompatible with the hypothesis that agents are maximizers when it comes to the satisfaction of their preference. This hypothesis continues to justify a form of skepticism toward strict akrasia. However, we strongly argue against this hypothesis and we demonstrate why maximization is not absolutely necessary to rational choice; therefore, we have to revise the standard conception of strict akrasia.
We then discuss Richard Holton’s influential theory on non-strictly akratic weakness of will. Although compatible with a non-maximizing conception, Holton’s theory tends to reduce episodes of weakness of will to irresolution cases.
Lastly, we introduce the theory of intertemporal choice, a more potent theory that describes and explains, with the same conceptual schema, both strict and non-strict akrasia. This schema concerns the properties of temporal distribution of akratic decision’s consequences and the prospective attitudes that motivate agents to make those decisions. Also, the structure of these distributions, along with the devaluation of the future, allows us to explain, clearly and simply, why weakness of will is irrational. We discuss the hypothesis that this devaluation of the future is due to a pure temporal preference and we mention a number of critical elements and rival hypothesis more in keeping with a cognitive approach to the problem.