Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

ljadw wrote:Frieser said : The allies were stronger, but we had Manstein who made the plan , Guderian who executed the plan and Hitler who spoiled the plan .

No, sorry, he does not indulge it such a childish oversimplification. That is your invention. He does make some errors in various strength assessments, such as the strength and capabilities of the French Armée de l'Air and French tanks, but that is fairly commonplace.

MarkN said : only 3 fully equipped British divisions faced 100 fully equipped German divisions, implying : we won, because a British Fighter pilot was worth 10 such Germans, parotting Winston : never was so much owed by so many to so few . The usual Victorian hyperbole .

No, he did not and you sound increasingly childish by insisting that he did. You even quoted what he actually said earlier today and yet are now saying he said something different. " I cannot be bothered to look up the correct number, but let's just say it was 100 for the sake of argument." Are you that ignorant of English that you cannot understand the distinction?

Truth is that if FC lost the Battle of Britain, the Navy would have prevented a landing and that if the Navy was eliminated, the Army would have defeated the landing .

Not in June 1940 they would not. As of 16 June 1940, RAF FC had an establishment of 1,456 aircraft, actual strength of 1,094, and an operational strength of 549, and average operational strength for the month was under 600. As of 17 August the establishment was 1,558, actual strength was 1,379 and operational strength was 631. However, average operational strength in August was 702. In September, after heavy attrition, it was 687. The RAF grew significantly in strength from June to August...as did the Army. The Royal Navy was somewhat more static, but increased the number of small craft for coastal defense considerably. Meanwhile, aside from the major naval bases, there was essentially zero coastal defenses in June 1940, while by mid summer 40 emergency batteries were in place and 143 were in operation by the end of the year. As of 1 June 1940, the 19 divisions in England had 110 obsolescent 18-pdr, 193 equally obsolescent 4.5" howitzers, and 295 modern 25-pdr. Altogether 598 pieces instead of the 1,152 required. That is "second rang" in both numbers and quality. The 19 also shared 122 2-pdr AT guns and should have had 912. They should have had 11.210 Bren guns and had 7,500. And so on.

There could be NO Sealion in June 1940,as Fall Rot ended only June 25, thus the June comparison is meaningless ,besides without a comparison with the June strength of the LW,Heer and KM,the figures for RAF, Navy and Army are irrelevant .

ljadw wrote:There could be NO Sealion in June 1940,as Fall Rot ended only June 25, thus the June comparison is meaningless ,besides without a comparison with the June strength of the LW,Heer and KM,the figures for RAF, Navy and Army are irrelevant .

Thank you for stating the utter bleeding obvious. Did you really have to repost an entire block of text to do so?

Before we "compare" would you mind agreeing with yourself as to the existence or non-existence of "first rate" units and what defines them?

"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

There is no good definition for first rate,as every unit can be first rate or third rate .

It is an illusion (well spread in the Anglo-Saxon world which is obsessed by the word "quality " ) that one can classify military units as first , second, third etc rate .

Not only is it impossible, but it is also irrelevant : first rate means :"better than second rate" ,which is irrelevant : an allied unit had not to be better than an other allied unit, but to be better than a German unit . That's why Hitler's claim about 186 first rate divisions is meaningless .

Classify the two following units as first /second rate :

A : manpower : 600 ;tanks : 30; artillery : 10;trucks : 100

B : manpower : 800;tanks : 20 ; artillery : 20; trucks : 80 .

It is impossible to classify them .

It is the same for weapons : a rifle from 1918 was,compared to a rifle of 1940, not second rate . It is the same for tanks, aircraft,..

ljadw wrote: There is no such thing as first rate : a unit can be today first rate and tomorrow second rate .

1) No such thing
2) There is such a thing
3) It can change from day to day

All in the same sentence.....

ljadw wrote: There are no such things as first rang units:

ljadw wrote:There is no good definition for first rate,as every unit can be first rate or third rate .
It is an illusion (well spread in the Anglo-Saxon world which is obsessed by the word "quality " ) that one can classify military units as first , second, third etc rate .
Not only is it impossible, but it is also irrelevant : first rate means :"better than second rate" ,which is irrelevant : an allied unit had not to be better than an other allied unit, but to be better than a German unit . That's why Hitler's claim about 186 first rate divisions is meaningless .

No. 29 of the divisions were classed as bodenständigen. The remainder were classed as either bewegung (16), FJ (4), or schnelltruppen (12), which by definition were .

Mobile division does not mean first rate :
116 Pz and Das Reich were not first rate on 6 june; the LSS was not operational : the remainings of Das Reich and the LSS were transferred to the west for refitting,which means that they were not first rate . 116 Pz was not operational on 6 june, thus not first rate . https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 4#p2115324

You are the one which started using this terminology - not some random Anglo-Saxon.

It is nonsense. But nonsense obviously means something to you. Is that because you are a clown or a troll?

I was using your terminology :I said that mobile division does not mean first rate , as some people are claiming, and I gave examples of this . I did not say that PzD can be considered as first-rate .On 4 january, you said that Germany had in 1940100 divisions that were first-rate and I denied this . I still deny that the German divisions after Fall Rose were better than the British Homa Forces divisions . I said that after a failed Overlord most German divisions could not be transferred to the East because they had not the qualities required for the east.

Your definition of first-rate is flawed : more tanks, equipment, training does not mean first-rate .

Richard Anderson then made a connection between your first two points: second rang & not transferrable. And thus place mobile units as "first rate" according to whay he thought was YOUR definition.

Then YOU explained that mobility does not mean first rate. See here...

ljadw wrote: Mobile division does not mean first rate :

So Richard Anderson then asked...

Richard Anderson wrote: Really? What then means "first rate"? What is your criteria?

You still haven't given an answer.

YOU started with the terminology and YOU still haven't explained what you mean by it.

ljadw wrote:On 4 january, you said that Germany had in 1940100 divisions that were first-rate

Stop lying...

ljadw wrote: I still deny that the German divisions after Fall Rose were better than the British Homa Forces divisions .

But you have failed to produce any evidence to support that.

ljadw wrote: I said that after a failed Overlord most German divisions could not be transferred to the East because they had not the qualities required for the east.

What qualities????? What changes YOUR "second rang" division into one that can be transferred to the east?

You have also stated...

ljadw wrote: The stronger the forces in the West, the more divisions the Allies would need for a landing,and the less likely such a landing would be . At the end,the Germans lost the race and the Allied forces were strong enough for a landing . https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 2#p2116682

But how do forces become stronger?

You have claimed that 1PzDiv with 300 panters is the same strength as 11PzDiv with 150.
You said that to dismiss the idea that a British Army Tank Brigade with 3 pantsers was the mucj weaker than a British Army Tank Brigade with 150 pantsers.

So how does a force become stronger if (YOUR words)...

ljadw wrote:All British divisions were at full strength,as far as manpower is concerned (State of British Ground Forces, september 1940 Sealion P4 post by Knouterer).
: the counterattacking divisions were mobile .
: army manpower strength in Britain : 1,740,000 + 63000 from Canada, Australia and NZL .
That there were shortages of equipment is irrelevant as there were also shortages of equipment for the Germans . Britain did not need to have the equipment the Germans had . https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 7#p2117637

In 1944 the British had approximately the same number of divisions in the UK as they did in 1943, and 1942 and in 1941 and the latter half of 1940. The same number of divisions with the same number of manpower. The difference between each date was the equipment. In 1940, the units had very little, in 1944 they had everything they needed. So how do they become stonger if (YOUR words) "shortages of equipment is irrelevant".

Richard Anderson then made a connection between your first two points: second rang & not transferrable. And thus place mobile units as "first rate" according to whay he thought was YOUR definition.

Then YOU explained that mobility does not mean first rate. See here...

ljadw wrote: Mobile division does not mean first rate :

So Richard Anderson then asked...

Richard Anderson wrote: Really? What then means "first rate"? What is your criteria?

You still haven't given an answer.

What qualities????? What changes YOUR "second rang" division into one that can be transferred to the east?

You have also stated...

ljadw wrote: The stronger the forces in the West, the more divisions the Allies would need for a landing,and the less likely such a landing would be . At the end,the Germans lost the race and the Allied forces were strong enough for a landing . https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 2#p2116682

But how do forces become stronger?

You have claimed that 1PzDiv with 300 panters is the same strength as 11PzDiv with 150.
You said that to dismiss the idea that a British Army Tank Brigade with 3 pantsers was the mucj weaker than a British Army Tank Brigade with 150 pantsers.

So how does a force become stronger if (YOUR words)...

In 1944 the British had approximately the same number of divisions in the UK as they did in 1943, and 1942 and in 1941 and the latter half of 1940. The same number of divisions with the same number of manpower. The difference between each date was the equipment. In 1940, the units had very little, in 1944 they had everything they needed. So how do they become stonger if (YOUR words) "shortages of equipment is irrelevant".

How do you come to this conclusion? On what basis do you know that a landing would be successful? Did you throw a dice aqnd get a 6?

[/quote]
1) He thought wrong :most divisions could not be transferred to the East , NOT only because they were second rang , 2 Pz also could not go to the east, because it was needed in the West .

2) Forces became stronger because they did increase numerically

3 ) 1 Pz was not stronger than 11 Pz because it had more tanks , its strength would depend on the opponent . The results of both divisions were on the same level, although the number of tanks was going down : this proves that one can not use the number of tanks as argument .

The average tank strength of the Barbarossa PzD was lower than that of the Fall Weiss PzD, but there is no proof that the latter were stronger than the former . In september 1939 3 Pz had 394 tanks, 10 Pz 150 . Was 3 Pz much stronger than 10 Pz ? A tank unit is a combined arms force,of which the tanks are only a not decisive element .

4) About the equipment shortages ; The shortages of 1940 can not be compared with the 1944 equipment, because the mission was different ; in 1940 the Home Forces had a defensive mission, in 1944 the BEF had an offensive mission .The difference between each date was NOT only the equipment, it was also the opponent .

5)The Allied forces of 1943 were stronger than the German forces of 1942, thus a landing in 1942 by these forces would be successful,the same for 1943 .But a landing in 1944 by the 1942 Allied forces would fail . Between 1940 and 1944 there was an armament race between Allies and Germans, and the Germans lost . Something everyone could predict .

Conclusion : the 1940 Home Forces (some 30 divisions ) would easily defeat in 1940 a German landing , on which only a few divisions would participate : 100 divisions does not mean an invasion by 100 divisions . The Home Forces would be numerically and qualitatively stronger than the invading Germans . Qualitatively meaning : weapons .

The meaning of second rang is that obvious that I suspect a hidden intention in the repeated demand for clarification :

one should look to the context where I used this term= the post from Kelvin where he said that the 60 divisions in the West could be used to strengthen the Ostfront.I answered that a big part,or even the majority of these divisions were second rang = useless in the East, too weak for the East .This does not mean that they were useless , too weak for the West .They were strong enough to man the fortifications at the Pas de Calais, but too weak to stop the Allied advance in Normandy .

709, 711, 716 IDs were static divisions, "good " for a static mission, but not "good " to man a front that was attacked by an enemy who was superior in mobility, firepower and manpower and with air superiority , an enemy as the Wallies in Normandy and the Soviets in the East .

These divisions were first rate and second rang at the same time, depending on their mission .

The 30 British divisions in 1940 would not be attacked by an enemy superior in manpower, firepower, mobility and air superiority, thus their equipment shortages were irrelevant .Even if one could compare them with the German static divisions from 1944 and it would appear that they were weaker, this still would be irrelevant, as the Home Forces would be stronger than the German forces that could land .

So you are blaming your repeated word salad replies on poor Kelvin now?

A translation : Germany had 60 strong divisions in the West and after a failed Overlord,they would go to the East and stop the Soviets .

His simple declarative sentence required no "translation".

I objected to this ,because

1) they could not go to the East and stop the Soviets because even after a failed Overlord they were needed in the West

Except divisions did go East, repeatedly, from 1941 to 1944, despite successful "Overlord's" in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. 19. Panzer Division arrived during NEPTUNE, was rebuilt, and went East, after NEPTUNE was successful. Four of the ten Panther battalions training under 10. Panzer Brigade went East during NEPTUNE. The same occurred in Italy after successful landings.

BTW, OVERLORD was NOT successful until 8 May 1945. You keep confusing OVERLORD for NEPTUNE.

2) even if they could go to the East, they would not because the majority of these divisions were useless in the East .

I already established that the bewegung infanterie and Panzer divisions were those considered "useful" in the East and were the majority of divisions. It would be nice if you would stop attempting to falsify things.

Following this some people claimed that a big part (20) of these 60 divisions could go to the East because they were first-rate .

And afterward the discussion evolved in a discussion about the definition of first-rate units ,and some people used failed definitions to define "first-rate" ,as the number of tanks for a tank unit .

Nonsense. You claimed they were "second rang", that the "majority of these divisions were useless in the East", and other such. The existence of a "second rang" implies a "first rang". I simply asked you to clarify your definition of what was first rate and second rang. You have repeatedly refused to do so and instead substituted a word salad of contradictions - first rate exists, then it does not, all in your same sentence. I'm tired of it and so will simply assume you have no idea what you are talking about, which means we're back to square one - you are yammering on in the hopes no one will notice you have no clue what you're talking about.

"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw wrote:The meaning of second rang is that obvious that I suspect a hidden intention in the repeated demand for clarification :

The "hidden meaning" is that your repeated word salads make no sense. They are self-contradictory.

one should look to the context where I used this term= the post from Kelvin where he said that the 60 divisions in the West could be used to strengthen the Ostfront.

Except, of course, HE SAID NO SUCH THING. He simply stated in the event of a failed NEPTUNE, those 60 divisions constituted a large reserve.

Please. Stop. Lying. Or at least do us all the favor of realizing that ANYONE CAN CHECK WHAT WAS ACTUALLY POSTED. And NOBODY needs your TRANSLATION to understand it.

I answered that a big part,or even the majority of these divisions were second rang = useless in the East, too weak for the East .This does not mean that they were useless , too weak for the West .They were strong enough to man the fortifications at the Pas de Calais, but too weak to stop the Allied advance in Normandy .

And I answered that you were full of shit, because you are. 31 of those divisions were useful in the East - bewegung or schnelltruppen - many of them were rebuilding and were understrength...but a FAILED NEPTUNE allows the Germans to complete their rebuilding. Most of the bewegung divisionen were near full strength...and it was the personnel of the Reserve-Divisionen, which were bodenstandiges, which would be used to fill them up. That was the process followed by the Germans REPEATEDY during 1941-1944. The schnelltruppne were SPECIFICALLY there to fulfill Guderian's mad scheme, after what he EXPECTED would be a failed invasion.

709, 711, 716 IDs were static divisions, "good " for a static mission, but not "good " to man a front that was attacked by an enemy who was superior in mobility, firepower and manpower and with air superiority , an enemy as the Wallies in Normandy and the Soviets in the East .

Great, since no one says the divisions would go East, but they would be combed out for replacements.

These divisions were first rate and second rang at the same time, depending on their mission .

No they weren't. They were first-rate static divisions, fully manned and equipped as they were designed to be for their mission.

"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Kelvin said that the 60 divisions formed a reserve for the east : if they remained in the west, they would be useless .

There were NO 31 divisions that could be used in the east, if they were transferred to the east , they would not last a week .

A failed Neptune would not allow the Germans to complete their rebuilding, and if/ when they would be rebuilt, the Soviets would be at the gates of Berlin .

Even if Neptune failed, the Germans would still need 60 divisions in France . 60 divisions that can not be moved elsewhere do not constitute a strong reserve, they do not even constitute a reserve at all .

Only 4 PzD would be useful in the East : 12 SS, PzL, 2 Pz, 21 Pz and they would remain in France, because they were the last rescue for the Germans : without them ,nothing would stop the Allies, they would be east of the Rhine before September . If in June 1944 these divisions were not in France, it was over for Germany :your Schnelle Truppen could not contain the Allies .