08TBILISI970, GEORGIA PREPARES TO OFFICIALLY CALL FOR

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TBILISI 000970
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: PRELPGOVGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA PREPARES TO OFFICIALLY CALL FOR
REPLACEMENT OF CIS PKF IN ABKHAZIA
REF: TBILISI 964
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Georgian Foreign Minister Tkeshalashvili
provided the Ambassador on June 9 with a non-paper outlining
the steps the Georgian government plans to take to replace
the (all-Russian) CIS peacekeepers currently stationed in
Abkhazia with an international police force. The paper
states that Georgia will agree to a non-use of force pledge
in parallel with the withdrawal of all Russian military
forces (including the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of
the additional paratroopers and railroad troops) and Russia's
agreement to a new peace negotiation format. The paper also
calls for an increased UN role in the new peacekeeping format
and reiterates Georgia's commitment to a peaceful resolution
of the conflicts. Tkeshalashvili told the Ambassador that
the Georgians have not yet decided when to start the formal
process calling for the withdrawal of the peacekeepers,
noting that Georgia first wanted to work with the U.S. and
Europe to find an acceptable way to substitute Russian
peacekeepers with European police. She said Georgia was
working closely with German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and
EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy
Javier Solana, and will provide them with copies of the
non-paper. Georgian Ambassadors will also begin briefing
European capitals on the paper's substance beginning on June
¶10. End summary.
¶2. (C) Comment: Coming on the heels of a cordial but
unproductive Saakashvili-Medvedev meeting on June 6 (reftel),
the Georgian non-paper represents the culmination of
frustrations over recent Russian actions of the last three
months while trying to maintain the diplomatic high ground by
calling on Russia to be a constructive facilitator in an
expanded negotiating format on Abkhazia. The Georgian
leadership is concerned that further delays on replacing the
peacekeeping forces with international police and
internationalizing the negotiating format will result in
Russia further tightening its grip on Abkhazia. A hasty
Georgian call for the removal of the Russian peacekeepers
would be counterproductive and it is clear that the Georgians
are trying to frame this action in a way that prompts Russia
to reverse some of its recent steps. Ultimately, Georgia is
trying to replace the peacekeeping structure while preserving
the UN presence as well as the Russian role, should Russia
choose to maintain it.
¶3. (U) Begin text:
Non-paper
Georgia Calls for International Arrangement to Replace
Russian Troops in Abkhazia
Executive Summary
¶1. The recent actions of the Russian Federation in Georgia's
province of Abkhazia have serially violated Georgian
sovereignty and conclusively discredited its claim to be a
neutral peacekeeper. This has created an urgent need to
revise the failed conflict-resolution process. (See section
I of the "Supporting Materials")
¶2. Georgia has responded with restraint to these provocations
and consistently sought to act in concert with the
international community. It will continue to do so while
pursuing a conclusive and peaceful end to the conflict.
¶3. In accordance with its unambiguous legal right and in
close cooperation with the international community, the
Government of Georgia will now seek the replacement of
Russian troops (deployed under a CIS mandate) with a truly
neutral civil force overseen by the international community.
¶4. Georgia will reaffirm its pledge on the non-use of force
in parallel with Russia's withdrawal of its military forces,
including peacekeepers, and its agreement to a changed peace
process negotiation format.
¶5. Georgia will seek to retain and reinforce the role of the
UN in the new format.
¶6. The provision of security on the ground and mediation at
the negotiation table by the international community is now
the sine qua non to achieve meaningful, concrete progress in
ending the conflict in Abkhazia. The Government of Georgia
believes strongly that Russia should be an active and
constructive part of this process, if it so chooses.
¶7. The Government of Georgia reaffirms its repeatedly stated
TBILISI 00000970 002 OF 007
commitment to a comprehensive, peaceful, and negotiated
solution to the separatist conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia.
The Government of Georgia will continue to vigorously pursue
a direct dialogue with the Abkhaz, aiming to develop and
mutually agree a consensus on the final settlement of the
conflict within the internationally recognized borders of
Georgia, by offering internationally guaranteed measures,
including the widest possible autonomy for Abkhazia (See
section II of the "Supporting Materials.")
Russia's Recent Escalation
The peacekeeping and negotiating fo
rmats for the Georgian
province of Abkhazia have failed to yield any progress on
their principal goals over the fifteen years of their
existence. These are to allow the return of several hundred
thousand refugees and IDPs to their homes, and to peacefully
restore Georgia's territorial integrity, while respecting the
legitimate concerns of the ethnically Abkhaz population of
Abkhazia.
Even in the best of circumstances, the prevailing formats
were ineffective. Now that they have essentially fallen
apart due to Russia's actions, the international community
faces a dangerous destabilization in the South Caucasus.
Russia, rather than providing security on the ground, has
become a party to the conflict.
This conclusion must be drawn in the light of the following
events:
-- In March, the Russian Federation unilaterally - and
illegally - withdrew from a long-standing CIS economic and
arms embargo on the secessionist leadership of Abkhazia.
-- In April, Moscow sharply escalated tensions by decreeing
the establishment of legal links between Russia and the
Georgians regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This de
facto recognition in effect integrates the two regions into
Russia's legal space and is in direct violation of both
international law and Georgian sovereignty.
-- On April 20, a Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed
Georgian aircraft over Georgian airspace, an act of
aggression confirmed by UNOMIG.
-- In the weeks since, Russia has continued to unilaterally
increase its troop strength in Abkhazia, without fulfilling
its legal obligation of consulting with Georgia.
-- In direct contravention of all peacekeeping norms and
agreements, Russia introduced offensive military troops and
heavy weaponry to Abkhazia; actions that have been verified
by UNOMIG.
-- Russian peacekeepers have frequently acted provocatively
in the conflict zone, endangering the life and physical
integrity of ethnic Georgian residents in the Gali region of
Abkhazia.
The Tipping Point: Russia's Introduction of "Railroad Forces"
Russia's latest troop increase in late May, involving 400
Ministry of Defense "railroad forces," offered stark evidence
of Russia's true intentions.
There is no longer any doubt that Russia is following through
a well-planned scheme leading to the full annexation of the
Georgian province of Abkhazia. Russia is pursuing this plan
in clear disregard of Georgia's sovereign rights,
international law, and in flagrant disregard of the will of
the international community, including the EU and the US.
With respect to the so-called "railway forces," three issues
are particularly important:
-- Their introduction into Abkhazia marks the first time that
Russia has overtly overstepped its CIS mandate.
-- The April 16 decree is now being implemented militarily.
Russia's attempt to justify its move on legal and
humanitarian grounds was rejected by the international
community. This "railroad" operation is managed by the
Russian Ministry of Defense, consists of armed troops, and
aims to develop Abkhazia's infrastructure to enable
large-scale military movements (among other projects, the
"railroad troops" are building a special rail route to the
military base in Ochimchire, and are paying close attention
to the roads and bridges near Kodori, a Georgian-controlled
territory in upper Abkhazia).
TBILISI 00000970 003 OF 007
-- The timing and context of the "railroad" operation is
crucial. It was implemented against the backdrop of the
nearly universal condemnation of Russia's previous
provocations by the international community; a broad
international endorsement of the comprehensive peace plan
developed by Georgia; and the developing prospect of a
constructive dialogue leading to positive changes in the
peace process.
It also took place one week prior to the visit of EU High
Representative Javier Solana to Georgia, and in advance of a
meeting in St. Petersburg between Presidents Saakashvili and
Medvedev.
Finally, it was implemented after the assumption of the
Russian Presidency by Dmitry Medvedev, implying that the new
President intends to pursue the destabilizing policies of his
predecessor.
Georgia's Response: Diplomacy & Clear Demands to Safeguard
its Sovereignty
Immediately after the "railway" forces illegally entered its
territory, Georgia engaged in close consultations with its
partners.
The Government sought to generate a clear understanding both
of the gravity of the situation and of the urgent need for
action. Such action must include the direct involvement of
the international community in revising, overseeing and
guaranteeing the outcome of the conflict-resolution process.
Georgia has made it very clear that a full reversal of recent
Russian actions is an essential prerequisite to make
substantive progress on resolving the conflict. President
Saakashvili conveyed this message to his Russian counterpart
in a telephone conversation on June 3, leaving ample time for
deliberations in advance of their June 6 meeting in St.
Petersburg.
At that meeting, President Saakashvili clearly outlined three
measures Russia needed to take to defuse the escalating
crisis in Georgia's territories. These were:
¶1. The withdrawal of illegally deployed Russian troops;
¶2. an immediate stop to the ongoing construction of military
infrastructure; and
¶3. the reversal of the April 16 decree that established
official ties between Russia and the separatist republics of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Unfortunately, at the June 6th meeting with his Georgian
counterpart, President Medvedev did not indicate any
willingness to reverse these acts or to forego further
provocations.
Russia is also against international mediation in the
conflict. President Medvedev asserted during the June 6th
meeting that Russia and Georgia could resolve the separatist
conflicts bilaterally. This is not Georgia's position.
With its ongoing illegal, unilateral and often hostile acts
that subvert peace in the region, Russia is clearly no longer
a neutral party.
Sadly, the CIS also has proved ineffective as an actor. In a
note sent in early May to the CIS Executive Committee,
Georgia demanded to begin consultations on changing the
mandate and composition of peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia.
Georgia has yet to receive a reply to this request.
Despite these provocative moves, Georgia remains convinced
that Russia's constructive participation in an
internationally run process would be welcome.
First Moves: Withdrawing Russian Troops & Establishing New
Security Arrangements
Urgent action is now needed to design and implement a new
mechanism that can finally establish genuine, internationally
guaranteed security in the region.
A negotiating format that fosters direct talks with
the
Abkhaz people and can lead to agreement on the implementation
of a peace plan is equally essential.
With respect to security on the ground, the Government of
Georgia has proposed that the Russian forces in Abkhazia be
replaced by a joint Georgian-Abkhaz local police force
TBILISI 00000970 004 OF 007
trained and supervised by the European Union.
The UN's role can and should be retained; depending on the
final outline of the new security arrangements, its role
might even be reinforced. We believe that non-military
police operations will serve as the best confidence building
measure and should be part of the first steps to be
undertaken for the implementation of the peace plan.
Common policing would mean that we and Abkhaz undertake
common responsibility for security while being assisted in
this endeavor by the international community. However
Georgia remains open to alternative international
arrangements if agreed upon during consultations. If Russia
confirms that it wishes to act as an unbiased and
constructive actor, it would be welcome to participate in
this effort.
The first step in this process must be for Georgia to
formally request the termination of the peacekeeping
operation under the CIS mandate and the consequent withdrawal
of Russian troops from Abkhazia.
In making this demand for the withdrawal of Russian forces
from Georgian territory, the goal of the Government of
Georgia is to help lead a joint international effort to
finally establish viable peacekeeping and negotiating
formats, and to resolve the conflicts on its territories
within a reasonable timeframe.
This will allow for long-term stability in the region, the
return of refugees and IDPs, and the internationally
guaranteed protection of the rights of the Abkhaz minority
within a unified Georgia.
The existing legal framework of the peacekeeping operation
and international law give Georgia the unambiguous legal
right to make this request.
Georgia's request for the withdrawal of Russian forces will
differentiate between the additional troops that were brought
into the territory of Georgia in clear violation of its
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and those troops
connected with the peacekeeping mission.
-- The additional troops (paratroopers and railroad troops)
will have to leave Georgian territory immediately, without
any reservations.
-- Those troops operating within the peacekeeping framework
agreed in the joint declaration made by CIS heads of state in
2003 will have to be withdrawn under Article 1 of that same
declaration: "In the case one of the sides of the conflict
requests to stop the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia,
Georgia, the operation is considered to be ceased, and the
Collective Peacekeeping Forces Command guarantees withdrawal
of the contingent and armament of the peacekeeping forces
during 1 month, under the timetable plan agreed with the
Georgian side."
The Government of Georgia believes that the specified
timeframe allows for constructive dialogue on the
technicalities of withdrawal and provides the time needed to
conclude negotiations on new peacekeeping formats that will
provide genuine security guarantees. Finally, the timeframe
allows the first practical steps of Georgia's proposed peace
plan for Abkhazia to be implemented.
Meanwhile, Georgia will reaffirm its pledge on the non-use of
force in parallel with Russia's withdrawal of its military
forces, including peacekeepers, and its agreement to a
changed peace process negotiation format.
Summary of Next Steps:
In summary, the Government of Georgia sees the following
steps being taken:
-- Formal withdrawal of consent for the existing peacekeeping
mandate.
-- Intense consultations with the international community to
design new, internationally guaranteed policing arrangement
for Abkhazia, Georgia.
-- The withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia, Georgia
and their replacement by a civil force under international
supervision led by the EU.
-- The establishment of a new negotiating format that allows
TBILISI 00000970 005 OF 007
direct dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, with
the participation of the UN, EU and OSCE. Russia's
constructive role in this process will be welcomed.
-- The intense further development of the implementation
details that will ensure broadest autonomy for Abkhazia and
the reintegration of the Abkhazians into Georgia.
Finally, priority must be given to the difficult question of
how to allow for the return of refugees and IDPs to Georgia's
territory of Abkhazia, as well as for their compensation.
These rightful residents of Abkhazia were driven away by a
campaign of terror labeled ethnic cleansing by the United
Nations, the OSCE, and even Russia itself. Today, the
population of Abkhazia is roughly one-quarter of what it was
before the separatist conflict.
Over 400,000 Georgians and other non-Abkhaz were forced to
flee under direct threat to their safety and lives; the vast
majority remains either refugees or IDPs.
The consequent depopulation of Abkhazia distorts its politics
today. Georgia recognizes that the rights and interests of
the remaining inhabitants of the region (the number of which
is estimated to be from 100,000 to 150,000) must be
respected, but strongly disagrees that the entire fate of the
region can be decided without taking into account the will of
nearly three-fourth of the regions pre-conflict population.
Supporting Materials:
Section I below outlines Russia's most recent actions with
respect to the Abkhazia region, many of which came in
flagrant violation of international law and Georgia's
sovereignty.
Section II provides an overview of Georgia's proposed peace
plan for Abkhazia, while
Section III includes links to additional resources and
information.
¶I. Russia's Destabilizing Actions
Russia's claim to be a neutral guarantor of peace in the
Abkhazia region has been seriously undermined by its
intentional attempts at destabilization.
-- NATO has said that Russia's behavior "does not contribute
to stability, but undermines it."
-- The European Union, likewise, "is concerned that recent
Russian moves in Georgia...might undermine stability on
Russia's southern border."
-- In a June 5 resolution, the European Parliament expressed
its "deep disapproval at Russia's announcement that it would
establish official ties with institutions within the
separatist authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia," adding
that it "deplores, in this regard, the decision taken by the
Russian Ministry of Defense on 31 May 2008 to send its forces
to Abkhazia to restore the rail and road infrastructure in
the breakaway region in accordance with the presidential
decree."
The timeline below provides an overview of the Kremlin's most &#x0
00A;recent steps regarding the Abkhazia region.
¶1. March 6: Russia withdrew from the 1996 CIS sanctions
agreement prohibiting military support to the separatist
rebels, as well as limiting economic and trade relations.
¶2. March 21: The Russian Duma (lower house of Parliament)
adopted a resolution urging the Russian government to
consider "the expediency of recognizing the independence" of
Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. The resolution
also called on the Kremlin to intensify efforts aimed at
protecting its newly-minted citizens in the territories.
(Russia has been distributing passports to residents in the
separatist regions since approximately 2002.)
MORE INFORMATION:
http://www.president.gov.ge/PDF/GEORGIA UPDATE 2008-05-31.pdf
¶3. April 3: In a letter to the separatist leaders in the
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, Russia's then-President
Vladimir Putin vowed to continue his country's de-facto
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through means that
are "not declarative, but practical" - such as by lifting
sanctions and establishing legal links.
TBILISI 00000970 006 OF 007
¶4. April 16: Russia's then-President Vladimir Putin ordered
his government establish official relations with the
separatist rebels in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These ties
were to cover economic, social, scientific, informational,
cultural, educational, and other fields.
¶5. April 20: A Russian Air Force fighter jet shot down an
unmanned Georgian drone in Georgian airspace over the
Abkhazia region. Later, a United Nations investigation
confirmed that it was indeed a Russian aircraft that had
downed the drone, rather than "Abkhaz air-defense forces" as
Russian officials had claimed.
¶6. April 25: The Russian Foreign Ministry's special envoy for
relations with CIS countries, Valery Kenyakin, declared that
"Russia will have to react through military means" in case
Georgia uses force to establish control over its separatist
territories.
¶7. April 28: Sergey Mironov, chairman of Russia's upper house
of Parliament, said that Russia would protect "its citizens"
in Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
¶8. April 29: The Russian Defense Ministry announced a
unilateral decision to increase the number of its
peacekeepers in the Abkhazia conflict zone. The one-sided
move breached the agreements that regulate deployment of
Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia.
¶9. May 8: The Russian Defense Ministry warned it might send
even more forces into the Abkhazia region, in addition to the
heavy artillery, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft systems, and
over 400 paratroopers with 30 BMD-2 airborne vehicles it had
recently deployed.
¶10. May 9: The Russian ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav
Kovalenko, claimed that withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping
forces from Abkhazia would result in war.
¶11. May 31: The Russian Defense Ministry announced it had
sent approximately 400 of its own forces into Abkhazia -
without consulting Georgia, and against Georgia's wishes - to
rehabilitate the separatist region's railway and road
infrastructure. World leaders condemned the move as "clearly
in violation of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity." Russia thinly veiled its actions by saying that
they were "in accordance with the Russian president's decree
on humanitarian aid to Abkhazia." Its defense ministry
labeled the new soldiers "railroad troops," claiming they
would rehabilitate strategic infrastructure in the
separatist-controlled territory. However, there is no means
of verifying such a claim, nor to assess how heavily armed
the new troops are. Furthermore, such engineering troops are
not recognized - even by Russia itself - as legitimate
peacekeeping forces. Traditionally, their role is to make
technical preparations in advance of military action.
II. The Government of Georgia's Peace Plan for Abkhazia
On March 28, President Mikheil Saakashvili proposed a
sweeping new peace plan for the separatist territory of
Abkhazia. With international support, the plan will
guarantee "unlimited autonomy, wide federalism, and very
serious representation in the central governmental bodies of
Georgia" for the Abkhaz. Russia will be invited, along with
other members of the international community, to act as a
guarantor of the process.
The new initiative builds on Georgia's 2006 peace proposal to
the separatist authorities in Sukhumi and includes the
following provisions:
¶1. Introduction of a new constitutional post of
Vice-President of Georgia, to be offered to Abkhazia.
¶2. Guaranteed representation for Abkhazia in all governmental
ministries and state agencies, and in Parliament.
¶3. Engagement of the international community to guarantee
wide federalism and broad autonomy for Abkhazia.
¶4. Veto rights for Abkhazia on all decisions related to the
region's constitutional status, as well as preservation and
further development of Abkhazian culture, language, and
ethnic identity.
¶5. Establishment of a joint free economic zone covering Gali
and Ochimchire districts in the Abkhazia region. The plan
includes joint management and control by Abkhazian and
Georgian authorities; rehabilitation and productive use of
currently depopulated territories; and redevelopment of the
Ochimchire seaport.
¶6. Provision of security guarantees.
TBILISI 00000970 007 OF 007
¶7. Gradual merger of law enforcement agencies and customs
services.
To elaborate the steps necessary to implement the proposals
outlined above, several thematic working groups have been
established within the relevant government ministries.
A legal group will prepare the required constitutional and
legislative amendments, including for the creation of a
Vice-Presidency and guaranteed representation in the
Government and Parliament. An economic group will design the
free economic zone in Gali and Ochamchire, and a political
group will conduct negotiations to secure international
guarantees of Abkhazia's autonomy.
In parallel, the Government of Georgia is seeking to
re-establish direct political dialogue and contacts with the
separatist authorities. A package of confidence-building
measures will be designed and implemented in concert with the
European Union; international involvement and assistance will
also be sought for the thematic working groups.
The Government believes that the measures above, if
implemented alongside a change in
the peacekeeping format,
can bring about a negotiated settlement for lasting peace in
the region.
III. Additional Information
¶1. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Deterioration
of the Situation in Georgia, June 5:
http://europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT TA P6-TA-2008
-0253 0 DOC XML V0//EN&language=EN
¶2. Statement by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
June 3: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-076e.htm l
¶3. Statement of the U.S. Department of State, May 31:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105 472.htm
¶4. Remarks by EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, June: http://www.unomig.org/media/headlines/
?id=10744&y=2008&m=6&d=5
¶5. Georgia Update: "Russia illegally deploys new troops in
Abkhazia," May 31: http://www.president.gov.ge/PDF/
GEORGIA UPDATE 2008-05-31.pdf
End Text.
TEFFT

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