Nicaragua - History

THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, Nicaragua has suffered from political
instability, civil war, poverty, foreign intervention, and natural
disasters. Governments since colonial times have been unable to bring
stability and sustainable economic growth. Personal and foreign special
interests have generally prevailed over the national interests, and
foreign intervention in Nicaraguan political and economic affairs,
especially by the United States, has resulted in various forms of
populist and nationalist reactions. The legacy of the past can be seen
today in the attitudes toward foreign influence. Although the upper and
middle classes tend to emulate North American life-styles and be
supportive of United States policies, the Nicaraguan poor are highly
suspicious of the culture and political intentions of the United States.

Since precolonial times, Nicaragua's fertile Pacific coast has
attracted settlers, thus concentrating most of the population in the
western part of the country. The Caribbean coast, because of its
proximity to the West Indies, historically has been the site of foreign
intervention and non-Hispanic immigration from black and indigenous
groups from the Caribbean and from British settlers and pirates. The
resulting diverse ethnic groups that today inhabit the Caribbean coast
have for centuries resisted Hispanic Nicaraguan governments and demanded
political autonomy.

During most of the twentieth century, Nicaragua has suffered under
dictatorial regimes. From the mid-1930s until 1979, the Somoza family
controlled the government, the military, and an ever expanding sector of
the Nicaraguan economy. On July 19, 1979, Somoza rule came to an end
after the triumph of an insurrection movement led by the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación
Nacional--FSLN). However, the predominance of the FSLN led to the
development of a different kind of authoritarian regime that lasted for
more than a decade.

During the 1980s, Nicaragua was the center of Cold War confrontation
in the Western Hemisphere, with the former Soviet Union and Cuba
providing assistance to the Sandinista government, and the United States
supporting anti-government forces. A regional peace initiative brought
an end to civil war in the late 1980s. The Sandinistas lost in the 1990
elections, and a new government headed by President Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro was installed in April 1990.

Nicaragua - History - PRECOLONIAL PERIOD

Present-day Nicaragua is located south of the pre-Columbian culture
areas of the Maya and the Aztec in Mexico and northern Central America.
Although conventional wisdom states that the culture of lower Central
America did not reach the levels of political or cultural development
achieved in Mexico and northern Central America, recent excavations in
Cuscutlatán, El Salvador may prove that assumption erroneous.

Two basic culture groups existed in precolonial Nicaragua. In the
central highlands and Pacific coast regions, the native peoples were
linguistically and culturally similar to the Aztec and the Maya. The
oral history of the people of western Nicaragua indicates that they had
migrated south from Mexico several centuries before the arrival of the
Spanish, a theory supported by linguistic research. Most people of
central and western Nicaragua spoke dialects of Pipil, a language
closely related to Nahuatl, the language of the Aztec. The culture and
food of the peoples of western Nicaragua also confirmed a link with the
early inhabitants of Mexico; the staple foods of both populations were
corn, beans, chili peppers, and avocados, still the most common foods in
Nicaragua today. Chocolate was drunk at ceremonial occasions, and
turkeys and dogs were raised for their meat.

Most of Nicaragua's Caribbean lowlands area was inhabited by tribes
that migrated north from what is now Colombia. The various dialects and
languages in this area are related to Chibcha, spoken by groups in
northern Colombia. Eastern Nicaragua's population consisted of extended
families or tribes. Food was obtained by hunting, fishing, and
slash-and-burn agriculture. Root crops (especially cassava), plantains,
and pineapples were the staple foods. The people of eastern Nicaragua
appear to have traded with and been influenced by the native peoples of
the Caribbean, as round thatched huts and canoes, both typical of the
Caribbean, were common in eastern Nicaragua.

When the Spanish arrived in western Nicaragua in the early 1500s,
they found three principal tribes, each with a different culture and
language: the Niquirano, the Chorotegano, and the Chontal. Each one of
these diverse groups occupied much of Nicaragua's territory, with
independent chieftains (cacicazgos) who ruled according to each
group's laws and customs. Their weapons consisted of swords, lances, and
arrows made out of wood. Monarchy was the form of government of most
tribes; the supreme ruler was the chief, or cacique, who,
surrounded by his princes, formed the nobility. Laws and regulations
were disseminated by royal messengers who visited each township and
assembled the inhabitants to give their chief's orders.

The Chontal were culturally less advanced than the Niquirano and
Chorotegano, who lived in well-established nation-states. The
differences in the origin and level of civilization of these groups led
to frequent violent encounters, in which one group would displace whole
tribes from their territory, contributing to multiple divisions within
each tribe. Occupying the territory between Lago de Nicaragua and the
Pacific Coast, the Niquirano were governed by chief Nicarao, or
Nicaragua, a rich ruler who lived in Nicaraocali, now the city of Rivas.
The Chorotegano lived in the central region of Nicaragua. These two
groups had intimate contact with the Spanish conquerors, paving the way
for the racial mix of native and European stock now known as mestizos.
The Chontal (the term means foreigner) occupied the central mountain
region. This group was smaller than the other two, and it is not known
when they first settled in Nicaragua.

In the west and highland areas where the Spanish settled, the
indigenous population was almost completely wiped out by the rapid
spread of new diseases, for which the native population had no immunity,
and the virtual enslavement of the remainder of the indigenous people.
In the east, where the Europeans did not settle, most indigenous groups
survived. The English, however, did introduce guns and ammunition to one
of the local peoples, the Bawihka, who lived in northeast Nicaragua. The
Bawihka later intermarried with runaway slaves from Britain's Caribbean
possessions, and the resulting population, with its access to superior
weapons, began to expand its territory and push other indigenous groups
into the interior. This Afro-indigenous group became known to the
Europeans as Miskito, and the displaced survivors of their expansionist
activities were called the Sumu.

Nicaragua - COLONIAL PERIOD, 1522-1820

The Spanish Conquest

Nicaragua's Caribbean coast was first seen by Spanish explorers in
1508. It was not until 1522, however, that a formal military expedition,
under Gil González Dávila, led to the Spanish conquest of Nicaraguan
territory. González launched an expedition from Panama, arriving in
Nicaragua through Costa Rica. After suffering both illness and
torrential rains, he reached the land governed by the powerful chief
Nicoya, who gave González and his men a warm welcome. Soon thereafter,
Nicoya and 6,000 of his people embraced the Roman Catholic faith. González
continued his exploration and arrived in the next settlement, which was
governed by a chief named Nicaragua, or Nicarao, after whom the country
was named. Chief Nicaragua received González as a friend and gave him
large quantities of gold. Perhaps to placate the Spanish, Nicaragua also
converted to Roman Catholicism, as did more than 9,000 members of his
tribe. All were baptized within eight days. Confident of further
success, González moved on to the interior, where he encountered
resistance from an army of 3,000 Niquiranos, led by their chief, Diriagén.
González retreated and traveled south to the coast, returning to Panama
with large quantities of gold and pearls.

In 1523 the governor of Panama, Pedro Arias Dávila (Pedrarias),
appointed Francisco Hernández de Córdoba to lead the Nicaraguan
conquest effort. Hernández de Córdoba led an expedition in 1524 that
succeeded in establishing the first permanent Spanish settlement in
Nicaragua. He quickly overcame the resistance of the native peoples and
named the land Nicaragua. To deny González's claims of settlement
rights and prevent his eventual control of the region, Hernández de Córdoba
founded the cities of León and Granada, which later became the centers
of colonial Nicaragua. From León, he launched expeditions to explore
other parts of the territory. While the rivalry between Hernández de Córdoba
and González raged, Pedrarias charged Hernández de Córdoba with
mismanagement and sentenced him to death. González died soon
thereafter, and the Spanish crown awarded Pedrarias the governorship of
Nicaragua in 1528. Pedrarias stayed in Nicaragua until his death in July
1531.

Spain showed little interest in Nicaragua throughout this period,
mostly because it was more interested in exploiting the vast riches
found in Mexico and Peru. By 1531 many Spanish settlers in Nicaragua had
left for South America to join Francisco Pizarro's efforts to conquer
the wealthy regions of the Inca Empire. Native Nicaraguans settlements
also decreased in size because the indigenous inhabitants were exported
to work in Peruvian mines; an estimated 200,000 native Nicaraguans were
exported as slaves to South America from 1528 to 1540. Many Spanish
towns founded in Nicaragua during the first years of the conquest
disappeared. By the end of the 1500s, Nicaragua was reduced to the
cities of León, located west of Lago de León (today Lago de Managua),
and Granada, located on Lago de Nicaragua.

Nicaragua - Colonial Rule

Although Nicaragua had been part of the audiencia (audience
or court) of Panama, established in 1538, it was transferred to the
Viceroyalty of New Spain when Spain divided its empire into two
viceroyalties in 1543. The following year, the new audiencia of
Guatemala, a subdivision of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, was created.
This audiencia extended from southern Mexico through Panama and
had its capital first at Gracias, Honduras, and then at Antigua,
Guatemala after 1549. In 1570 the audiencia was reorganized and
reduced in size, losing the territory of present-day Panama, the Yucatán,
and the Mexican state of Tabasco.

The five-man audiencia, or court, was the highest
governmental authority in the territory. During most of the colonial
period, the president of the audiencia held the additional
titles of governor and captain general (hence, the alternative name of
Captaincy General of Guatemala) and was charged with administrative,
judicial, and military authority. The governor, or captain general, was
appointed by the Spanish king and was responsible to him; in fact, the
colony was sometimes referred to as the Kingdom of Guatemala.

The audiencia was divided into provinces for administrative
purposes, and the leading official in each province was generally called
an alcalde mayor, or governor. León was the capital of the
Province of Nicaragua, housing the local governor, the Roman Catholic
bishop, and other important appointees. An elite of creole (individuals
of Spanish descent born in the New World) merchants controlled the
economic and political life of each province. Because of the great
distance between the centers of Spanish rule, political power was
centered with the local government, the town council or ayuntamiento,
which ignored most official orders from the Spanish crown.

Throughout the seventeenth century, trade restrictions imposed by
Spain, natural disasters, and foreign attacks devastated the economy of
the Captaincy General of Guatemala. The local government neglected
agricultural production, powerful earthquakes in 1648, 1651, and 1663,
caused massive destruction in the Province of Nicaragua, and from 1651
to 1689, Nicaragua was subjected to bloody incursions from English,
French, and Dutch pirates. In 1668 and 1670, these buccaneers captured
and destroyed the city of Granada, center of the province's agricultural
wealth. The Captaincy General of Guatemala was generally neglected by
Spain. Within the captaincy general, the Province of Nicaragua remained
weak and unstable, ruled by persons with little interest in the welfare
of its people.

In the late 1600s, the Miskito, who lived in Nicaragua's Caribbean
lowlands, began to be exploited by English "filibusters"
(irregular military adventurers) intent on encroaching on Spanish
landowners. In 1687 the English governor of Jamaica named a Miskito who
was one of his prisoners, "King of the Mosquitia Nation," and
declared the region to be under the protection of the English crown.
This event marked the beginning of a long rivalry between Spanish (and
later Nicaraguan) and British authorities over the sovereignty of the
Caribbean coast, which effectively remained under British control until
the end of the nineteenth century.

After more than a century of exploiting the mineral wealth of the New
World, the Spanish realized that activities other than mining could be
profitable. The Province of Nicaragua then began to experience economic
growth based on export agriculture. By the early 1700s, a powerful elite
was well established in the cities of León, Granada, and, to a lesser
extent, Rivas.

Events in Spain in the early 1700s were to have long-lasting
repercussions in Nicaragua. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14)
resulted in the Bourbons replacing the Hapsburgs on the Spanish throne.
The Hapsburgs had supported strict trade monopolies, especially in the
Spanish colonies. The Bourbons were proponents of more liberal
free-trade policies. Throughout the captaincy general, groups were hurt
or helped by these changes; the factions supporting changes in trading
policy came to be known as liberals while those who had profited under
the old rules were known as conservatives. Liberals generally consisted
of growers with new crops to sell, merchants, or export interests.
Conservatives were generally composed of landowners who had profited
under the old protectionism and who resisted new competition. In time,
conservatism also became associated with support for the Roman Catholic
Church; the liberals took a more anticlerical stand.

Throughout the captaincy general, cities came to be associated with
one or the other of these political factions, depending on the basis of
the economy of each. Typically, each of the five provinces of the
captaincy general had one city that championed the liberal cause and
another that spoke for the conservatives. In Nicaragua, León was
primarily involved in exporting animal products such as leather and
tallow and soon became the center for free-trading liberalism. The
conservative elite in Granada, however, had made their fortunes under
the old protectionist system and resisted change. Competition between
the two cities over influence on colonial policy became violent at
times, and each city supported armed groups to defend itself and its
ideas. In time, the hatred and violence between the two cities and the
two factions became institutionalized, and often the original
ideological difference was forgotten. Independence in the next century
only exacerbated the struggle as it eliminated Spain as a referee. The
violent rivalry between liberals and conservatives was one of the most
important and destructive aspects of Nicaraguan history, a
characteristic that would last until well into the twentieth century.
Politicians frequently chose party loyalty over national interest, and,
particularly in the 1800s, the nation was often the loser in interparty
strife.

Liberal-conservative rivalry was not only a domestic issue but also
an international one. The other provinces in the captaincy general, and
later the successor nations, had similar liberal and conservative
factions. Each faction did not hesitate to support its compatriots,
often with armed force, in another province. After independence, the
intercountry interference continued unabated; conservatives or liberals
in each of the five successor states frequently sent troops to support
like factions in its neighboring countries. This constant intervention
and involvement in its neighbors' affairs was a second and equally
pernicious characteristic of Nicaraguan politics throughout its
independent existence.

Nicaragua - National Independence, 1821-57

Spain's control over its colonies in the New World was threatened in
the early 1800s by the struggle for national independence throughout the
entire region. Weakened by the French invasion in 1794 and internal
upheaval, Spain tried to hold onto its richest colonies, which led to
even further neglect of its poorer Central American territories.
Resentment toward the Spanish-born elite (peninsulares--those
born in Spain and the only persons allowed to administer Spanish
colonies) grew among Nicaraguan creoles. The first local movements
against Spanish rule in Central America occurred in 1811, when the
Province of El Salvador staged a revolt. Peninsular authorities
were deposed and replaced by creoles, who demanded less repressive laws.
Although the Province of Nicaragua officially refused to join the
rebellion, a popular uprising soon broke out. Violence and political
rivalry prevailed in all of the Central American colonies during the
ensuing decade.

Establishment of an independent Nicaragua came in stages. The first
stage occurred in 1821 when the Captaincy General of Guatemala formally
declared its independence from Spain on September 15, which is still
celebrated as independence day. At first the captaincy general was part
of the Mexican Empire under General Agustín de Iturbide, but efforts by
Mexico to control the region were resisted all over Central America.
Separatist feelings throughout the isthmus grew, however, and five of
the United Provinces of Central America--Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, andd Nicaragua--declared their independence from
Mexico in July 1823. The sixth province, Chiapas, opted to remain with
Mexico. Under a weak federal government, each province created its own
independent internal administration. Inadequate communication and
internal conflicts, however, overshadowed efforts to institutionalize
the federation for the next decade and a half. Efforts to centralize
power led to civil war between 1826 and 1829. The federation finally
dissolved in 1837, and a Constituent Assembly formally declared
Nicaragua's independence from the United Provinces of Central America on
April 30, 1838.

Nicaragua - Foreign Intervention, 1850-68

British and United States interests in Nicaragua grew during the
mid-1800s because of the country's strategic importance as a transit
route across the isthmus. British settlers seized the port of San Juan
del Norte--at the mouth of the Río San Juan on the southern Caribbean
coast--and expelled all Nicaraguan officials on January 1, 1848. The
following year, Britain forced Nicaragua to sign a treaty recognizing
British rights over the Miskito on the Caribbean coast. Britain's
control over much of the Caribbean lowlands, which the British called
the Mosquito Coast (present-day Costa de Mosquitos), from 1678 until
1894 was a constant irritant to Nicaraguan nationalists. The start of
the gold rush in California in 1849 increased United States interests in
Central America as a transoceanic route, and Nicaragua at first
encouraged a United States presence to counterbalance the British.

The possibility of economic riches in Nicaragua attracted
international business development. Afraid of Britain's colonial
intentions, Nicaragua held discussions with the United States in 1849,
leading to a treaty that gave the United States exclusive rights to a
transit route across Nicaragua. In return, the United States promised
protection of Nicaragua from other foreign intervention. On June 22,
1849, the first official United States representative, Ephraim George
Squier, arrived in Nicaragua. Both liberals and conservatives welcomed
the United States diplomat. A contract between Commodore Cornelius
Vanderbilt, a United States businessman, and the Nicaraguan government
was signed on August 26, 1849, granting Vanderbilt's company--the
Accessory Transit Company--exclusive rights to build a transisthmian
canal within twelve years. The contract also gave Vanderbilt exclusive
rights, while the canal was being completed, to use a land-and-water
transit route across Nicaragua, part of a larger scheme to move
passengers from the eastern United States to California. The westbound
journey across Nicaragua began by small boat from San Juan del Norte on
the Caribbean coast, traveled up the Río San Juan to San Carlos on Lago
de Nicaragua, crossed Lago de Nicaragua to La Virgen on the west shore,
and then continued by railroad or stagecoach to San Juan del Sur on the
Pacific coast. In September 1849, the United States-Nicaragua treaty,
along with Vanderbilt's contract, was approved by the Nicaraguan
Congress.

British economic interests were threatened by the United States
enterprise led by Vanderbilt, and violence erupted in 1850 when the
British tried to block the operations of the Accessory Transit Company.
As a result, United States and British government officials held
diplomatic talks and on April 19, 1850, without consulting the
Nicaraguan government, signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in which both
countries agreed that neither would claim exclusive power over a future
canal in Central America nor gain exclusive control over any part of the
region. Although the Nicaraguan government originally accepted the idea
of a transit route because of the economic benefit it would bring
Nicaragua, the operation remained under United States and British
control. Britain retained control of the Caribbean port of San Juan del
Norte, and the United States owned the vessels, hotels, restaurants, and
land transportation along the entire transit route.

Continued unrest in the 1850s set the stage for two additional
elements in Nicaragua history: frequent United States military
interventions in Nicaragua and a propensity for Nicaragua politicians to
call on the United States to settle domestic disputes. In 1855 a group
of armed United States filibusters headed by William Walker, a soldier
of fortune from Tennessee who had previously invaded Mexico, sailed to
Nicaragua intent on taking over. Internal conflict facilitated Walker's
entry into Nicaragua. In 1853 conservative General Fruto Chamorro had
taken over the government and exiled his leading liberal opponents.
Aided by the liberal government in neighboring Honduras, an exile army
entered Nicaragua on May 5, 1854. The subsequent conflict proved
prolonged and bloody; Chamorro declared that his forces would execute
all armed rebels who fell into their hands, and the liberal leader,
General Máximo Jérez, proclaimed that all government supporters were
traitors to the nation.

The liberals enjoyed initial success in the fighting, but the tide
turned in 1854 when Guatemala's conservative government invaded
Honduras, forcing that nation to end its support of the liberals in
Nicaragua. Chamorro's death from natural causes in March 1855 brought
little respite to the beleaguered liberals, who began to look abroad for
support. Through an agent, they offered Walker funds and generous land
grants if he would bring a force of United States adventurers to their
aid. Walker leaped at the chance--he quickly recruited a force of
fifty-six followers and landed with them in Nicaragua on May 4, 1855.

Walker's initial band was soon reinforced by other recruits from the
United States. Strengthened by this augmented force, Walker seized
Granada, center of conservative power. The stunned conservative
government surrendered, and the United States quickly recognized a new
puppet liberal government with Patricio Rivas as president. Real power,
however, remained with Walker, who had assumed command of the Nicaraguan
army.

As Walker's power and the size of his army grew, conservative
politicians throughout Central America became increasingly anxious.
Encouraged by Britain, the conservative governments of the other four
Central America governments agreed to send troops to Nicaragua. In March
1856, Costa Rica declared war on the adventurer, but an epidemic of
cholera decimated the Costa Rican forces and forced their withdrawal.
Encouraged by this victory, Walker began plans to have himself elected
president and to encourage colonization of Nicaragua by North Americans.
This scheme was too much even for his puppet president Rivas, who broke
with Walker and his followers and sent messages to Guatemala and El
Salvador requesting their help in expelling the filibusters.

Undeterred, Walker proceeded to hold a farcical election and install
himself as president. Making English the country's official language and
legalizing slavery, Walker also allied himself with Vanderbilt's rivals
in the contest for control of the transit route, hoping that this
alliance would provide both funds and transportation for future
recruits. His call for Nicaragua's annexation by the United States as a
slave state garnered some support from United States proslavery forces.

In the meantime, forces opposing Walker were rapidly gaining the
upper hand, leading him to attack his liberal allies, accusing them of
half-hearted support. Most Nicaraguans were offended by Walker's
proslavery, pro-United States stance; Vanderbilt was determined to
destroy him, and the rest of Central America actively sought his demise.
The British also encouraged opposition to Walker as a means of curbing
United States influence in the region. Even the United States
government, fearful that plans to annex Nicaragua as a new slave state
would fan the fires of sectional conflict growing within the United
States, became opposed to his ambitions.

The struggle to expel Walker and his army from Nicaragua proved to be
long and costly. In the process, the colonial city of Granada was
burned, and thousands of Central Americans lost their lives. The
combined opposition of Vanderbilt, the British Navy, and the forces of
all of Central America, however, eventually defeated the filibusters. A
key factor in Walker's defeat was the Costa Rican seizure of the transit
route; the seizure permitted Walker's opponents to take control of the
steamers on Lago de Nicaragua and thereby cut off much of Walker's
access to additional recruits and finances. Vanderbilt played a major
role in this effort and also supplied funds that enabled the Costa
Ricans to offer free return passage to the United States to any of the
filibusters who would abandon the cause. Many took advantage of this
opportunity, and Walker's forces began to dwindle.

The final battle of what Nicaraguans called the "National
War" (1856-57) took place in the spring of 1857 in the town of
Rivas, near the Costa Rican border. Walker beat off the attacks of the
Central Americans, but the strength and morale of his forces were
declining, and it would be only a matter of time until he would be
overwhelmed. At this point, Commander Charles H. Davis of the United
States Navy, whose ship had been sent to Nicaragua's Pacific coast to
protect United States economic interests, arranged a truce. On May 1,
1857, Walker and his remaining followers, escorted by a force of United
States marines, evacuated Rivas, marched down to the coast, and took the
ships back to the United States.

Walker's forced exile was short-lived, however; he made four more
attempts to return to Central America (in 1857, 1858, 1859, and 1860).
In 1860 Walker was captured by a British warship as he tried to enter
Honduras. The British Navy turned him over to local authorities, and he
was executed by a Honduran firing squad. Walker's activities provided
Nicaraguans with a long- lasting suspicion of United States activities
and designs upon their nation.

Originally a product of interparty strife, the National War
ironically served as a catalyst for cooperation between the liberal and
conservative parties. The capital was moved to Managua in an effort to
dampen interparty strife, and on September 12, 1856, both parties had
signed an agreement to join efforts against Walker. This pact marked the
beginning of an era of peaceful coexistence between Nicaragua's
political parties, although the onus of the liberals' initial support of
Walker allowed the conservatives to rule Nicaragua for the next three
decades. After Walker's departure, Patricio Rivas served as president
for the third time. He remained in office until June 1857, when liberal
General Máximo Jérez and conservative General Tomás Martínez assumed
a bipartisan presidency. A Constituent Assembly convened in November of
that year and named General Martínez as president (r. 1858-67).

The devastation and instability caused by the war in Nicaragua, as
well as the opening of a railroad across Panama, adversely affected the
country's transit route. After only a few years of operation in the
early 1850s, the transit route was closed for five years from 1857 to
1862, and the entire effort was subsequently abandoned in April 1868.
Despite the failure of the transit plan, United States interest in
building a canal across Nicaragua persisted throughout most of the
nineteenth century. By 1902, however, there was increasing support from
the administration of United States president Theodore Roosevelt to
build a transisthmian canal in Panama. The opening of the Panama Canal
in 1914 effectively ended serious discussion of a canal across
Nicaragua.

Nicaragua - Conservative and Liberal Regimes, 1858-1909

The Conservative Party (Partido Conservador) ruled in Nicaragua from
1857 to 1893, a period of relative economic progress and prosperity
sometimes referred to as the "Thirty Years." A railroad system
connecting the western part of Nicaragua with the port of Corinto on the
Pacific coast was built, and roads and telegraph lines were extended.
Exports of agricultural products also increased during this period.
Coffee as an export commodity grew between the 1850s and the 1870s, and
by 1890 coffee had become the nation's principal export. Toward the end
of the 1800s, Nicaragua experienced dramatic economic growth because of
the growing demand for coffee and bananas in the international market.
The local economic elites were divided between the established cattle
raisers and small growers and the new coffee-producers sector. Disputes
about national economic policy arose between these powerful elites.
Revealing their sympathies, the ruling conservatives passed laws
favoring cheap labor that benefited mostly coffee planters.

The period of relative peace came to an end in 1891 when Roberto
Sacasa, who had succeeded to the presidency in 1889 after the death of
the elected incumbent, was elected to a term of his own. Although a
conservative, Sacasa was from León, not Granada, and his election
produced a split within the ruling Conservative Party. When Sacasa
attempted to retain power after the March 1893 end of his term, the
liberals, led by General José Santos Zelaya, quickly took advantage of
the division within conservative ranks.

A revolt began in April 1893 when a coalition of liberals and
dissident conservatives ousted Sacasa and installed another conservative
in office. An effort was made to share power with the liberals, but this
coalition soon proved unworkable. In July, Zelaya's liberal supporters
resigned from the government and launched another revolt, which soon
proved successful. A constitutional convention was hurriedly called, and
a new constitution incorporating anticlerical provisions, limitations on
foreigners' rights to claim diplomatic protection, and abolition of the
death penalty was adopted. Zelaya was confirmed as president, a post he
would retain until 1909.

Zelaya's rule proved to be to be one of the most controversial
periods in Nicaraguan history. Zelaya was a ruthless dictator who
managed to stay in power for sixteen years despite foreign and domestic
opposition. Nevertheless, he was responsible for the creation of a
professional army and the growth of strong nationalist feelings.

Zelaya opened the country to foreign investment, expanded coffee
production, and boosted banana exports. His government promoted internal
development and modernized Nicaragua's infrastructure. During his
tenure, new roads and seaport facilities were constructed, railroad
lines were extended, and many government buildings and schools were
built. The proliferation of United States companies in Nicaragua grew to
the point that, by the early 1900s, United States firms controlled most
of the production of coffee, bananas, gold, and lumber.

Zelaya's administration was also responsible for an agreement ending
the Nicaraguan dispute with Britain over sovereignty of the Caribbean
coast. Aided by the mediation of the United States and strong support
from the other Central American republics, control over the Caribbean
coast region was finally awarded to Nicaragua in 1894. Sovereignty did
not bring the government in Managua control over this region however;
the Caribbean coast remained culturally separate and inaccessible to the
western part of the country. Although his reputation was boosted by
resolution of the centuries-old dispute with Britain, Zelaya was
regarded with suspicion abroad. His imperialistic ambitions in Central
America, as well as his vocal rebukes of United States intervention and
influence in Central America, won him little support. Zelaya's
nationalist anti-United States stance drove him to call upon the Germans
and Japanese to compete with the United States for rights to a canal
route. Opposition to these schemes from the conservative faction, mostly
landowners, led Zelaya to increase repression. In 1903 a major
conservative rebellion, led by Emiliano Chamorro Vargas, broke out.
Another uprising in 1909, this time aided by British money and the
United States marines, was successful in driving Zelaya from power.

Nicaragua - United States Intervention, 1909-33

United States interest in Nicaragua, which had waned during the last
half of the 1800s because of isolationist sentiment following the United
States Civil War (1861-65), grew again during the final years of the
Zelaya administration. Angered by the United States choice of Panama for
the site of a transisthmian canal, President Zelaya made concessions to
Germany and Japan for a competing canal across Nicaragua. Relations with
the United States deteriorated, and civil war erupted in October 1909,
when anti-Zelaya liberals joined with a group of conservatives under
Juan Estrada to overthrow the government. The United States broke
diplomatic relations with the Zelaya administration after two United
States mercenaries serving with the rebels were captured and executed by
government forces. Soon thereafter, 400 United States marines landed on
the Caribbean coast. Weakened and pressured by both domestic and
external forces, Zelaya resigned on December 17, 1909. His minister of
foreign affairs, José Madriz, was appointed president by the Nicaraguan
Congress. A liberal from León, Madriz was unable to restore order under
continuing pressure from conservatives and the United States forces, and
he resigned on August 20, 1910.

Conservative Estrada, governor of Nicaragua's easternmost department,
assumed power after Madriz's resignation. The United States agreed to
support Estrada, provided that a Constituent Assembly was elected to
write a constitution. After agreeing with this stipulation, a coalition
conservative-liberal regime, headed by Estrada, was recognized by the
United States on January 1, 1911. Political differences between the two
parties soon surfaced, however, and minister of war General Luis Mena
forced Estrada to resign. Estrada's vice president, the conservative
Adolfo Díaz, then became president. In mid-1912 Mena persuaded a
Constituent Assembly to name him successor to Díaz when Díaz's term
expired in 1913. When the United States refused to recognize the
Constituent Assembly's decision, Mena rebelled against the Díaz
government. A force led by liberal Benjamín Zelaydón quickly came to
the aid of Mena. Díaz, relying on what was becoming a time-honored
tradition, requested assistance from the United States. In August 1912,
a force of 2,700 United States marines once landed again at the ports of
Corinto and Bluefields. Mena fled the country, and Zelaydón was killed.

The United States kept a contingent force in Nicaragua almost
continually from 1912 until 1933. Although reduced to 100 in 1913, the
contingent served as a reminder of the willingness of the United States
to use force and its desire to keep conservative governments in power.
Under United States supervision, national elections were held in 1913,
but the liberals refused to participate in the electoral process, and
Adolfo Díaz was reelected to a full term. Foreign investment decreased
during this period because of the high levels of violence and political
instability. Nicaragua and the United States signed but never ratified
the Castill-Knox Treaty in 1914, giving the United States the right to
intervene in Nicaragua to protect United States interest. A modified
version, the Chamorro- Bryan Treaty omitting the intervention clause,
was finally ratified by the United States Senate in 1916. This treaty
gave the United States exclusive rights to build an interoceanic canal
across Nicaragua. Because the United States had already built the Panama
Canal, however, the terms of the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty served the
primary purpose of securing United States interests against potential
foreign countries--mainly Germany or Japan--building another canal in
Central America. The treaty also transformed Nicaragua into a near
United States protectorate.

Collaboration with the United States allowed the conservatives to
remain in power until 1925. The liberals boycotted the 1916 election,
and conservative Emiliano Chamorro was elected with no opposition. The
liberals did participate in the 1920 elections, but the backing of the
United States and a fraudulent election assured the election of Emiliano
Chamorro's uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro.

A moderate conservative, Carlos Solórzano, was elected president in
open elections in 1924, with liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa as his vice
president. After taking office on January 1, 1925, Solórzano requested
that the United States delay the withdrawal of its troops from
Nicaragua. Nicaragua and the United States agreed that United States
troops would remain while United States military instructors helped
build a national military force. In June, Solórzano's government
contracted with retired United States Army Major Calvin B. Carter to
establish and train the National Guard. The United States marines left
Nicaragua in August 1925. However, President Solórzano, who had already
purged the liberals from his coalition government, was subsequently
forced out of power in November 1925 by a conservative group who
proclaimed General Emiliano Chamorro (who had also served as president
from 1917 to 1921), as president in January 1926.

Fearing a new round of conservative-liberal violence and worried that
a revolution in Nicaragua might result in a leftist victory as happened
a few years earlier in Mexico, the United States sent marines, who
landed on the Caribbean coast in May 1926, ostensibly to protect United
States citizens and property. United States authorities in Nicaragua
mediated a peace agreement between the liberals and the conservatives in
October 1926. Chamorro resigned, and the Nicaraguan Congress elected
Adolfo Díaz as president (Díaz had previously served as president,
1911- 16). Violence resumed, however, when former vice president Sacasa
returned from exile to claim his rights to the presidency. In April
1927, the United States sent Henry L. Stimson to mediate the civil war.
Once in Nicaragua, Stimson began conversations with President Díaz as
well as with leaders from both political parties. Stimson's meetings
with General José María Moncada, the leader of the liberal rebels, led
to a peaceful solution of the crisis. On May 20, 1927, Moncada agreed to
a plan in which both sides--the government and Moncada's liberal
forces--would disarm. In addition, a nonpartisan military force would be
established under United States supervision. This accord was known as
the Pact of Espino Negro.

As part of the agreement, President Díaz would finish his term and
United States forces would remain in Nicaragua to maintain order and
supervise the 1928 elections. A truce between the government and the
rebels remained in effect and included the disarmament of both liberal
rebels and government troops. Sacasa, who refused to sign the agreement,
left the country. United States forces took over the country's military
functions, and strengthened the Nicaraguan National Guard.

A rebel liberal group under the leadership of Augusto César Sandino
also refused to sign the Pact of Espino Negro. An illegitimate son of a
wealthy landowner and a mestizo servant, Sandino had left his father's
home early in his youth and traveled to Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.
During his three-year stay in Tampico, Mexico, Sandino had acquired a
strong sense of Nicaraguan nationalism and pride in his mestizo
heritage. At the urging of his father, Sandino had returned to Nicaragua
in 1926 and settled in the department of Nueva Segovia, where he worked
at a gold mine owned by a United States company. Sandino, who lectured
the mine workers about social inequalities and the need to change the
political system, soon organized his own army, consisting mostly of
peasants and workers, and joined the liberals fighting against the
conservative regime of Chamorro. Highly distrusted by Moncada, Sandino
set up hit-and-run operations against conservative forces independently
of Moncada's liberal army. After the United States mediated the
agreement between liberal forces and the conservative regime, Sandino,
calling Moncada a traitor and denouncing United States intervention,
reorganized his forces as the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan
Sovereignty (Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua-EDSN).
Sandino then staged an independent guerrilla campaign against the
government and United States forces. Although Sandino's original
intentions were to restore constitutional government under Sacasa, after
the Pact of Espino Negro agreement his objective became the defense of
Nicaraguan sovereignty against the United States. Receiving his main
support from the rural population, Sandino resumed his battle against
United States troops. At the height of his guerrilla campaign, Sandino
claimed to have some 3,000 soldiers in his army, although official
figures estimated the number at only 300. Sandino's guerrilla war caused
significant damage in the Caribbean coast and mining regions. After
debating whether to continue direct fighting against Sandino's forces,
the United States opted to develop the nonpartisan Nicaraguan National
Guard to contain internal violence. The National Guard would soon become
the most important power in Nicaraguan politics.

The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the growing power of Anastasio
"Tacho" Somoza García, a leader who would create a dynasty
that ruled Nicaragua for four and a half decades. Moncada won the 1928
presidential elections in one of the most honest elections ever held in
Nicaragua. For the 1932 elections, the liberals nominated Juan Bautista
Sacasa and the conservatives, Adolfo Díaz. Sacasa won the elections and
was installed as president on January 2, 1933. In the United States,
popular opposition to the Nicaraguan intervention rose as United States
casualty lists grew. Anxious to withdraw from Nicaraguan politics, the
United States turned over command of the National Guard to the
Nicaraguan government, and United States marines left the country soon
thereafter. President Sacasa, under pressure from General Moncada,
appointed Somoza García as chief director of the National Guard. Somoza
García, a close friend of Moncada and nephew of President Sacasa, had
supported the liberal revolt in 1926. Somoza García also enjoyed
support from the United States government because of his participation
at the 1927 peace conference as one of Stimson's interpreters. Having
attended school in Philadelphia and been trained by United States
marines, Somoza García, who was fluent in English, had developed
friends with military, economic, and political influence in the United
States.

After United States troops left Nicaragua in January 1933, the Sacasa
government and the National Guard still were threatened by Sandino's
EDSN. True to his promise to stop fighting after United States marines
had left the country, Sandino agreed to discussions with Sacasa. In
February 1934, these negotiations began. During their meetings, Sacasa
offered Sandino a general amnesty as well as land and safeguards for him
and his guerrilla forces. However, Sandino, who regarded the National
Guard as unconstitutional because of its ties to the United States
military, insisted on the guard's dissolution. His attitude made him
very unpopular with Somoza Garcia and his guards. Without consulting the
president, Somoza Garcia gave orders for Sandino's assassination, hoping
that this action would help him win the loyalty of senior guard
officers. On February 21, 1934, while leaving the presidential palace
after a dinner with President Sacasa, Sandino and two of his generals
were arrested by National Guard officers acting under Somoza García's
instructions. They were then taken to the airfield, executed, and buried
in unmarked graves. Despite Sacasa's strong disapproval of Somoza García's
action, the Nicaraguan president was too weak to contain the National
Guard director. After Sandino's execution, the National Guard launched a
ruthless campaign against Sandino's supporters. In less than a month,
Sandino's army was totally destroyed.

President Sacasa's popularity decreased as a result of his poor
leadership and accusations of fraud in the 1934 congressional elections.
Somoza García benefited from Sacasa's diminishing power, while at the
same time he brought together the National Guard and the Liberal Party
(Partido Liberal-PL) in order to win the presidential elections in 1936.
Somoza García also cultivated support from former presidents Moncada
and Chamorro while consolidating control within the Liberal Party.

Early in 1936, Somoza García openly confronted President Sacasa by
using military force to displace local government officials loyal to the
president and replacing them with close associates. Somoza García's
increasing military confrontation led to Sacasa's resignation on June 6,
1936. The Congress appointed Carlos Brenes Jarquín, a Somoza García
associate, as interim president and postponed presidential elections
until December. In November, Somoza García officially resigned as chief
director of the National Guard, thus complying with constitutional
requirements for eligibility to run for the presidency. The Liberal
Nationalist Party (Partido Liberal Nacionalista--PLN) was established
with support from a faction of the Conservative Party to support Somoza
García's candidacy. Somoza García was elected president in the
December election by the remarkable margin of 107,201 votes to 108. On
January 1, 1937, Somoza García resumed control of the National Guard,
combining the roles of president and chief director of the military.
Thus, Somoza García established a military dictatorship, in the shadows
of democratic laws, that would last more than four decades.

Nicaragua - The Somoza Era, 1936-74

Somoza García controlled political power, directly as president or
indirectly through carefully chosen puppet presidents, from 1936 until
his assassination in 1956. A cynical and opportunistic individual,
Somoza García ruled Nicaragua with a strong arm, deriving his power
from three main sources: the ownership or control of large portions of
the Nicaraguan economy, the military support of the National Guard, and
his acceptance and support from the United States. His excellent command
of the English language and understanding of United States culture,
combined with a charming personality and considerable political talent
and resourcefulness, helped Somoza García win many powerful allies in
the United States. Through large investments in land, manufacturing,
transport, and real estate, he enriched himself and his close friends.

After Somoza García won in the December 1936 presidential elections,
he diligently proceeded to consolidate his power within the National
Guard, while at the same time dividing his political opponents. Family
members and close associates were given key positions within the
government and the military. The Somoza family also controlled the PLN,
which in turn controlled the legislature and judicial system, thus
giving Somoza García absolute power over every sphere of Nicaraguan
politics. Nominal political opposition was allowed as long as it did not
threaten the ruling elite. Somoza García's National Guard repressed
serious political opposition and antigovernment demonstrations. The
institutional power of the National Guard grew in most government-owned
enterprises, until eventually it controlled the national radio and
telegraph networks, the postal and immigration services, health
services, the internal revenue service, and the national railroads. In
less than two years after his election, Somoza García, defying the
Conservative Party, declared his intention to stay in power beyond his
presidential term. Thus, in 1938 Somoza García named a Constituent
Assembly that gave the president extensive power and elected him for
another eight-year term.

Somoza García's opportunistic support of the Allies during World War
II benefited Nicaragua by injecting desperately needed United States
funds into the economy and increasing military capabilities. Nicaragua
received relatively large amounts of military aid and enthusiastically
integrated its economy into the wartime hemispheric economic plan,
providing raw materials in support of the Allied war effort. Exports of
timber, gold, and cotton soared. However, because more than 90 percent
of all exports went to the United States, the growth in trade also
increased the country's economic and political dependence.

Somoza García built an immense fortune for himself and his family
during the 1940s through substantial investments in agricultural
exports, especially in coffee and cattle. The government confiscated
German properties and then sold them to Somoza García and his family at
ridiculously low prices. Among his many industrial enterprises, Somoza
García owned textile companies, sugar mills, rum distilleries, the
merchant marine lines, the national Nicaraguan Airlines (Líneas Aéreas
de Nicaragua--Lanica), and La Salud dairy--the country's only
pasteurized milk facility. Somoza García also gained large profits from
economic concessions to national and foreign companies, bribes, and
illegal exports. By the end of World War II, Somoza García had amassed
one of the largest fortunes in the region--an estimated US$60 million.

After World War II, however, widespread domestic and international
opposition to the Somoza García dictatorship grew among political
parties, labor, business groups, and the United States government.
Somoza García's decision to run for reelection in 1944 was opposed by
some liberals, who established the Independent Liberal Party (Partido
Liberal Independiente--PLI). Somoza García's reelection was also
opposed by the United States government. The dictator reacted to growing
criticism by creating a puppet government to save his rule. He decided
not to run for reelection and had the PLN nominate the elderly Leonardo
Argüello, believing he could control Argüello from behind the scenes.
Argüello ran against Enoc Aguado, a candidate supported by a coalition
of political parties that included the conservatives and the PLI.
Despite the large support for the Aguado candidacy, Somoza García
subverted the electoral process by using government resources and the
National Guard to ensure the electoral victory of his candidate. Argüello
was sworn in on May 1, 1947, and Somoza García remained as chief
director of the National Guard.

Argüello had no intention of being a puppet, however, and in less
than a month, when Argüello's measures began to challenge Somoza García's
power, the National Guard chief staged a coup and placed a family
associate, Benjamín Lacayo Sacasa, in the presidency. The
administration of United States president Harry S. Truman responded by
withholding diplomatic recognitions from the new Nicaraguan government.
In an effort to legitimize the new regime and win United States support,
Somoza García named a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution.
The assembly then appointed Somoza García's uncle, Víctor Román
Reyes, as president. The constitution of 1947 was carefully crafted with
strong anticommunist rhetoric to win United States support. Despite
efforts by Somoza García's to placate the United States, the United
States continued its opposition and refused to recognize the new regime.
Under diplomatic pressure from the rest of Latin America, formal
diplomatic relations between Managua and Washington were restored in
mid-1948.

Despite its anticommunist rhetoric, the government promoted liberal
labor policies to gain support from the communist party of Nicaragua,
known as the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaragüese--PSN)
and thwarted the establishment of any independent labor movement. The
government approved several progressive laws in 1945 to win government
support from labor unions. Concessions and bribes were granted to labor
leaders, and antigovernment union leaders were displaced in favor of
Somoza García loyalists. However, after placement of pro-Somoza García
leaders in labor unions, most labor legislation was ignored. In 1950
Somoza García signed an agreement with conservative general Emiliano
Chamorro Vargas that assured the Conservative Party of one-third of the
congressional delegates as well as limited representation in the cabinet
and in the courts. Somoza García also promised clauses in the new 1950
constitution guaranteeing "commercial liberty." This measure
brought back limited support from the traditional elite to the Somoza
García regime. The elite benefited from the economic growth of the
1950s and 1960s, especially in the cotton and cattle export sectors.
Somoza García again was elected president in general elections held in
1950. In 1955 Congress amended the constitution to allow his reelection
for yet another presidential term.

Somoza García had many political enemies, and coups against him were
attempted periodically, even within the National Guard. For protection,
he constructed a secure compound within his residence and kept personal
bodyguards, independent of the National Guard, with him wherever he
went. Nevertheless, on September 21, 1956, while attending a PLN party
in León to celebrate his nomination for the presidency, Somoza García
was fatally wounded, by Rigoberto López Pérez, a twenty-seven-year-
old Nicaraguan poet, who had managed to pass through Somoza García's
security. The dictator was flown to the Panama Canal Zone, where he died
eight days later.

Somoza García was succeeded as president by his eldest son Luis
Somoza Debayle. A United States-trained engineer, Luis Somoza Debayle
was first elected as a PLN delegate in 1950 and by 1956 presided over
the Nicaraguan Congress. After his father's death, he assumed the
position of interim president, as prescribed in the constitution. His
brother Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, a West Point
graduate, took over leadership of the National Guard. A major political
repression campaign followed Somoza García's assassination: many
political opponents were tortured and imprisoned by guards under orders
from Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the government imposed press
censorship and suspended many civil liberties. When the Conservative
Party refused to participate in the 1957 elections--in protest of the
lack of freedom imposed by the regime--the Somoza brothers created a
puppet opposition party, the National Conservative Party (Partido
Conservador Nacional-- PCN), to give a democratic facade to the
political campaign. Luis Somoza Debayle won the presidency in 1957 with
little opposition. During his six-year term, from 1957 to 1963, his
government provided citizens with some freedoms and raised hopes for
political liberalization. In an effort to open up the government, Luis
Somoza Debayle restored the constitutional ban on reelection.

In 1960 Nicaragua joined El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Costa
Rica joined later) in the establishment of the Central American Common
Market (CACM--see Appendix B). The main objective of the regional
economic group was to promote trade among member countries. Under this
partnership, trade and manufacturing increased, greatly stimulating
economic growth. Furthermore, in the international political sphere,
Luis Somoza Debayle's anticommunist stance won government favor and
support from the United States. In 1959 Nicaragua was among the first
nations to condemn the Cuban Revolution and to accuse Fidel Castro Ruz
of attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The Luis Somoza
Debayle government played a leading role in the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba in 1961, allowing the Cuban exile brigade to use military bases on
the Caribbean coast to launch the failed maneuver.

Trusted friends of the Somoza family held the presidency from 1963
until 1967. In 1963 René Schick Gutiérrez won the presidential
election; Somoza García's younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle,
continued as chief director of the National Guard. Shick gave the
appearance of following the less repressive programs of Luis Somoza
Debayle. President Schick died in 1966 and was succeeded by Lorenzo
Guerrero Gutiérrez.

When poor health prevented Luis Somoza Debayle from being a
candidate, his brother Anastasio ran in the 1967 presidential election.
To challenge the candidacy of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the
conservatives, the PLI, and the Christian Social Party (Partido Social
Cristiano-PSC) created the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional
Opositora-UNO). The UNO nominated Fernando Agüero as their candidate.
In February 1967, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was elected president amidst
a repressive campaign against opposition supporters of Agüero. Two
months later, Anastasio's brother Luis died of a heart attack. With his
election, Anastasio Somoza Debayle became president as well as the
director of the National Guard, giving him absolute political and
military control over Nicaragua. Corruption and the use of force
intensified, accelerating opposition from populist and business groups.

Although his four-year term was to end in 1971, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle amended the constitution to stay in power until 1972. Increasing
pressures from the opposition and his own party, however, led the
dictator to negotiate a political agreement, known as the Kupia-Kumi
Pact, which installed a three-member junta that would rule from 1972
until 1974. The junta was established in May 1972 amidst opposition led
by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal and his newspaper La Prensa.
Popular discontent also grew in response to deteriorating social
conditions. Illiteracy, malnourishment, inadequate health services, and
lack of proper housing also ignited criticism from the Roman Catholic
Church, led by Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. The archbishop began to
publish a series of pastoral letters critical of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle's government.

On December 23, 1972, a powerful earthquake shook Nicaragua,
destroying most of the capital city. The earthquake left approximately
10,000 dead and some 50,000 families homeless, and destroyed 80 percent
of Managua's commercial buildings. Immediately after the earthquake, the
National Guard joined the widespread looting of most of the remaining
business establishments in Managua. When reconstruction began, the
government's illegal appropriation and mismanagement of international
relief aid, directed by the Somoza family and members of the National
Guard, shocked the international community and produced further unrest
in Nicaragua. The president's ability to take advantage of the people's
suffering proved enormous. By some estimates, his personal wealth soared
to US$400 million in 1974. As a result of his greed, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle's support base within the business sector began to crumble. A
revived labor movement increased opposition to the regime and to the
deteriorating economic conditions.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle's intentions to run for another presidential
term in 1974 were resisted even within his own PLN. The political
opposition, led by Chamorro and former Minister of Education Ramiro
Sacasa, established the Democratic Liberation Union (Unión Democrática
de Liberación--Udel), an opposition group that included most
anti-Somoza elements. The Udel was a broad coalition of business groups
whose representation included members from both the traditional elite
and labor unions. The party promoted a dialogue with the government to
foster political pluralism. The president responded with increasing
political repression and further censorship of the media and the press.
In September 1974, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was reelected president.

Nicaragua - The Rise of the FSLN

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberación Nacional--FSLN) was formally organized in Nicaragua in 1961.
Founded by José Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge
Martínez, the FSLN began in the late 1950s as a group of student
activists at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
(Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua--UNAN) in Managua. Many of
the early members were imprisoned. Borge spent several years in jail,
and Fonseca spent several years in exile in Mexico, Cuba, and Costa
Rica. Beginning with approximately twenty members in the early 1960s,
the FSLN continued to struggle and grow in numbers. By the early 1970s,
the group had gained enough support from peasants and students groups to
launch limited military initiatives.

On December 27, 1974, a group of FSLN guerrillas seized the home of a
former government official and took as hostages a handful of leading
Nicaraguan officials, many of whom were Somoza relatives. With the
mediation of Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the government and the
guerrillas reached an agreement on December 30 that humiliated and
further debilitated the Somoza regime. The guerrillas received US$1
million ransom, had a government declaration read over the radio and
printed in La Prensa, and succeeded in getting fourteen
Sandinista prisoners released from jail and flown to Cuba along with the
kidnappers. The guerrilla movement's prestige soared because of this
successful operation. The act also established the FSLN strategy of
revolution as an effective alternative to Udel's policy of promoting
change peacefully. The Somoza government responded to the increased
opposition with further censorship, intimidation, torture, and murder.

In 1975 Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the National Guard launched
another violent and repressive campaign against the FSLN. The government
imposed a state of siege, censoring the press, and threatening all
opponents with detention and torture. The National Guard increased its
violence against individuals and communities suspected of collaborating
with the Sandinistas. In less than a year, it killed many of the FSLN
guerrillas, including one of its founders, José Carlos Fonseca Amador.
The rampant violation of human rights brought national and international
condemnation of the Somoza regime and added supporters to the Sandinista
cause.

In late 1975, the repressive campaign of the National Guard and the
growth of the group caused the FSLN to split into three factions. These
three factions--Proletarians (Proletarios), Prolonged Popular War, and
the Insurrectional Faction, more popularly known as the Third
Way--insisted on different paths to carry out the revolution. The
Proletarian faction, headed by Jaime Wheelock Román, followed
traditional Marxist thought and sought to organize factory workers and
people in poor neighborhoods. The Prolonged War faction, led by Tomás
Borge and Henry Ruiz after the death of Fonseca, was influenced by the
philosophy of Mao Zedong and believed that a revolution would require a
long insurrection that included peasants and labor movements. The Third
Way faction was more pragmatic and called for ideological pluralism. Its
members argued that social conditions in Nicaragua were ripe for an
immediate insurrection. Led by Daniel José Ortega Saavedra and his
brother Humberto Ortega Saavedra, the Third Way faction supported joint
efforts with non-Marxist groups to strengthen and accelerate the
insurrection movement against Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The FSLN's
overall growing success led the factions to gradually coalesce, with the
Third Way's political philosophy of pluralism eventually prevailing.

Nicaragua - End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era

United States support for President Somoza waned after 1977, when the
administration of United States President Jimmy Carter made United
States military assistance conditional on improvements in human rights.
International pressure, especially from the Carter administration,
forced President Somoza to lift the state of siege in September 1977.
Protests and antigovernment demonstrations resumed although the National
Guard continued to keep an upper hand on the FSLN guerrillas.

During October 1977, a group of prominent Nicaraguan businesspeople
and academics, among then Sergio Ramírez Mercado--known as Los Doce
(the Group of Twelve)--met in Costa Rica and formed an anti-Somoza
alliance. Los Doce strengthened the FSLN by insisting on Sandinista
representation in any post-Somoza government. Nevertheless, opposition
to the dictatorship remained divided. Capital flight increased, forcing
President Somoza to depend on foreign loans, mostly from United States
banks, to finance the government's deficit.

The dictatorship's repression of civil liberties and the lack of
representative institutions slowly led to the consolidation of the
opposition and armed resistance. The Somoza regime continually
threatened the press, mostly the newspaper La Prensa and the
critical editorials of its publisher and Udel leader, Pedro Joaquín
Chamorro Cardenal. The final act in the downfall of the Somoza era began
on January 10, 1978, when Chamorro was assassinated. Although his
assassins were not identified at the time, evidence implicated President
Somoza's son and other members of the National Guard. The opposition
held the president and his guards responsible for Chamorro's murder,
thus provoking mass demonstrations against the regime. The Episcopate of
the Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter highly
critical of the government, and opposition parties called for Anastasio
Somoza Debayle's resignation. On January 23, a nationwide strike began,
including the public and private sectors; supporters of the stride
demanded an end to the dictatorship. The National Guard responded by
further increasing repression and using force to contain and intimidate
all government opposition. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, meanwhile, asserted
his intention to stay in power until the end of his presidential term in
1981. The general strike paralyzed both private industry and government
services for ten days. The political impasse and the costs to the
private sector weakened the strike, and in less than two weeks most
private enterprises decided to suspend their participation. The FSLN
guerrillas launched a series of attacks throughout the country, but the
better-equipped National Guard was able to maintain military
superiority.

Indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population and abuses of human
rights by National Guard members further tarnished the international
image of the Somoza government and damaged the economy. In February
1978, the United States government suspended all military assistance
forcing Somoza to buy weapons and equipment on the international market.
The Nicaraguan economy continued its decline; the country suffered from
increased capital flight, lack of investment, inflation, and
unemployment.

Although still fragmented, opposition to the Somoza regime continued
to grow during 1978. In March, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, an anti-Somoza
businessman, established the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento
Democrático Nicaragüense--MDN). In May 1978, the traditional
Conservative Party joined Udel, Los Doce, and the MDN in creating the
Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposición--FAO) to try to
pressure President Somoza for a negotiated solution to the crisis.
Although the FSLN was not represented in the FAO, the participation of
Los Doce in the FAO assured a connection between the FSLN and other
opposition groups. The FSLN responded to the FAO in July by establishing
a political arm, the United People's Movement (Movimiento del Pueblo
Unido--MPU). The MPU included leftist labor groups, student
organizations, and communist and socialist parties. The MPU also
promoted armed struggle and a nationwide insurrection as the only means
of overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship.

The FSLN strengthened its position on August 22, 1978, when a group
of the Third Way faction, led by Edén Pastora Gómez (also known as
Commander Zero--Comandante Cero), took over the National Palace and held
almost 2,000 government officials and members of Congress hostage for
two days. With mediation from Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, as well
as from the Costa Rican and Panamanian ambassadors, the crisis was
solved in two days. The results of the negotiations favored the
insurrection and further tarnished the government's image. President
Somoza had no alternative but to meet most of the rebels' demands,
including the release of sixty FSLN guerrillas from prison, media
dissemination of an FSLN declaration, a US$500,000 ransom, and safe
passage for the hostage takers to Panama and Venezuela. The attack
electrified the opposition. The humiliation of the dictatorship also
affected morale within the National Guard, forcing Anastasio Somoza
Debayle to replace many of its officers to forestall a coup and to
launch a recruitment campaign to strengthen its rank and file. Fighting
broke out throughout the country, but the National Guard, despite
internal divisions, kept recapturing most of the guerrilla-occupied
territories.

By the end of 1978, the failure of the FAO to obtain a negotiated
solution increased the stature of the insurrection movement. In October,
Los Doce withdrew from the negotiation process when the FAO persisted in
seeking a negotiated settlement with the dictator, and many of FAO's
members resigned in protest over the negotiations with Somoza. The
insurrection movement, meanwhile, gathered strength and increased the
fighting. The Somoza regime was further isolated and discredited when in
November the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights published a report charging the National
Guard with numerous violations of human rights. The report was followed
by a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the Nicaraguan
government. In December 1978, the FSLN was further strengthened when
Cuban mediation led to an agreement among the three FSLN factions for a
united Sandinista front. Formal unification of the FSLN occurred in
March 1979.

Nicaragua - The Sandinista Revolution

A mediation process led by the OAS collapsed during January 1979,
when President Somoza refused to hold a national plebiscite and insisted
on staying in power until 1981. As fighting increased, the Nicaraguan
economy faced a severe economic crisis, with a sharp decline in
agricultural and industrial production, as well as high levels of
unemployment, inflation, defense spending, and capital flight. The
government debt also increased mostly as a result of defense
expenditures and the gradual suspension of economic support from all
international financial institutions.

On February 1, 1979, the Sandinistas established the National
Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótico Nacional--FPN), which included Los
Doce, the PLI, and the Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular
Social Cristiano--PPSC). The FPN had a broad appeal, including political
support from elements of the FAO and the private sector. After the
formal unification of the Sandinista guerrillas in March, heavy fighting
broke out all over the country. By then the FSLN was better equipped,
with weapons flowing from Venezuela, Panama, and Cuba, mostly through
Costa Rica. The FSLN launched its final offensive during May, just as
the National Guard began to lose control of many areas of the country.
In a year's time, bold military and political moves had changed the FSLN
from one of many opposition groups to a leadership role in the
anti-Somoza revolt.

On June 18, a provisional Nicaraguan government in exile, consisting
of a five-member junta, was organized in Costa Rica. Known as the
Puntarenas Pact, an agreement reached by the new government in exile
called for the establishment of a mixed economy, political pluralism,
and a nonaligned foreign policy. Free elections were to be held at a
later date, and the National Guard was to be replaced by a nonpartisan
army. The members of the new junta were Daniel José Ortega Saavedra of
the FSLN, Moisés Hassan Morales of the FPN, Sergio Ramírez Mercado of
Los Doce, Alfonso Robelo Callejas of the MDN, and Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro, the widow of La Prensa's editor. Panama was the first
country to recognize the junta. By the end of June, most of Nicaragua
was under FSLN control, with the exception of the capital. President
Somoza's political and military isolation finally forced him to consider
resignation. The provisional government in exile released a government
program on July 9 in which it pledged to organize an effective
democratic regime, promote political pluralism and universal suffrage,
and ban ideological discrimination--except for those promoting the
"return of Somoza's rule." By the second week of July,
President Somoza had agreed to resign and hand over power to Francisco
Maliano Urcuyo, who would in turn transfer the government to the
Revolutionary Junta. According to the agreement, a cease-fire would
follow, and defense responsibilities would be shared by elements of the
National Guard and the FSLN.

On July 17, 1979, Anastasio Somoza Debayle resigned, handed over
power to Urcuyo, and fled to Miami. The former Nicaraguan dictator then
established residence in Paraguay, where he lived until September 1980,
when he was murdered, reportedly by leftist Argentine guerrillas. After
President Somoza left Nicaragua in 1979, many members of the National
Guard also fled the country, seeking asylum in neighboring countries,
particularly in Honduras and Guatemala. Others turned themselves in to
the new authorities after the FSLN took power, on promises of amnesty.
They were subsequently tried and many served jail terms. The five-member
junta arrived in the city of León a day after Somoza's departure, on
July 18. Urcuyo tried to ignore the agreement transferring power, but in
less than two days, domestic and international pressure drove him to
exile in Guatemala. On July 19, the FSLN army entered Managua,
culminating the Nicaraguan revolution. The insurrection left
approximately 50,000 dead and 150,000 Nicaraguans in exile. The
five-member junta entered the Nicaraguan capital the next day and
assumed power, reiterating its pledge to work for political pluralism, a
mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy.

Nicaragua - THE SANDINISTA YEARS, 1979-90

Consolidation of the Revolution, 1979-80

The new government inherited a country in ruins, with a stagnant
economy and a debt of about US$1.6 billion. An estimated 50,000
Nicaraguans were dead, 120,000 were exiles in neighboring countries, and
600,000 were homeless. Food and fuel supplies were exhausted, and
international relief organizations were trying to deal with disease
caused by lack of health supplies. Yet the attitude of the vast majority
of Nicaraguans toward the revolution was decidedly hopeful. Most
Nicaraguans saw the Sandinista victory as an opportunity to create a
system free of the political, social, and economic inequalities of the
almost universally hated Somoza regime.

One of the immediate goals of the new government was reconstruction
of the national economy.

The junta appointed individuals from the private sector to head the
government's economic team. They were responsible for renegotiating the
foreign debt and channeling foreign economic aid through the state-owned
International Reconstruction Fund (Fondo Internacional de Reconstrucción--FIR).
The new government received bilateral and multinational financial
assistance and also rescheduled the national foreign debt on
advantageous terms. Pledging food for the poor, the junta made
restructuring the economy its highest priority.

At first the economy experienced positive growth, largely because of
renewed inflow of foreign aid and reconstruction after the war. The new government enacted the Agrarian
Reform Law, beginning with the nationalization of all rural properties
owned by the Somoza family or people associated with the Somozas, a
total of 2,000 farms representing more than 20 percent of Nicaragua's
cultivable land. These farms became state property under the new
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Large agroexport farms not owned by the
Somozas generally were not affected by the agrarian reform. Financial
institutions, all in bankruptcy from the massive capital flight during
the war, were also nationalized.

The second goal of the Sandinistas was a change in the old
government's pattern of repression and brutality toward the general
populace. Many of the Sandinista leaders were victims of torture
themselves, and the new minister of interior, Tomás Borge Martínez,
tried to keep human rights violations low. Most prisoners accused of
injustices under the Somoza regime were given a trial, and the Ministry
of Interior forbade cruelty to prisoners. In their first two years in
power, Amnesty International and other human rights groups found the
human rights situation in Nicaragua greatly improved.

The third major goal of the country's new leaders was the
establishment of new political institutions to consolidate the
revolution. On August 22, 1979, the junta proclaimed the Fundamental
Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua. This statute abolished the
constitution, presidency, Congress, and all courts. The junta ruled by
unappealable degree under emergency powers. National government policy,
however, was generally made by the nine-member Joint National
Directorate (Dirección Nacional Conjunto--DNC), the ruling body of the
FSLN, and then transmitted to the junta by Daniel Ortega for the junta's
discussion and approval.

The new government established a consultive corporatist
representative assembly, the Council of State, on May 4, 1980. The
council could approve laws submitted to it by the junta or initiate its
own legislation. The junta, however, had the right of veto over
council-initiated legislation, and the junta retained control over much
of the budget. Although its powers were limited, the council was not a
rubber stamp and often amended legislation given it by the junta. The
establishment of the Council of State and the political makeup of its
thirty-three members had been decided in negotiations among the
revolutionary groups in 1979. The members were not elected but appointed
by various political groups. In the discussions establishing the
council, it was agreed that the FSLN could name twelve of the
thirty-three members. Soon after its formation, however, the junta added
fourteen new members to the Council of State, with twelve of those going
to the FSLN. This new configuration gave the FSLN twenty-four of the
forty-seven seats. Opponents of the FSLN viewed the addition of the new
members as a power grab, but the FSLN responded that new groups had been
formed since the revolution and that they needed to be represented.

The membership of the junta changed during its early years. Chamorro
resigned in early 1980, ostensibly for health reasons, but later
asserted that she had become dissatisfied with increased FSLN dominance
in the government. Robelo resigned in mid-1980 to protest the expansion
of the Council of State. Chamorro and Robelo were replaced by a rancher
who belonged to the PDC and a banker, one of the members of Los Doce. In
1983 the junta was reduced to three members, with Daniel Ortega clearly
playing the lead role among the remaining three.

Immediately after the revolution, the Sandinistas had the best
organized and most experienced military force in the country. To replace
the National Guard, the Sandinistas established a new national army, the
Sandinista People's Army (Ejército Popular Sandinista--EPS), and a
police force, the Sandinista Police (Policía Sandinista). These two groups, contrary to the
original Puntarenas Pact were controlled by the Sandinistas and trained
by personnel from Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Opposition
to the overwhelming FSLN influence in the security forces did not
surface until 1980. Meanwhile, the EPS developed, with support from Cuba
and the Soviet Union, into the largest and bestequipped military force
in Central America. Compulsory military service, introduced during 1983,
brought the EPS forces to about 80,000 by the mid-1980s.

Immediately after the revolution, the FSLN also developed mass
organizations representing most popular interest groups in Nicaragua.
The most significant of these included the Sandinista Workers'
Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores--CST) representing labor
unions, the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association
(Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza--AMNLAE),
and in 1982 the National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (Unión Nacional
de Agricultores y Ganaderos--UNAG) composed of small farmers and
peasants. The FSLN also created neighborhood groups, similar to the
Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, called Sandinista
Defense Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista--CDSs). One of the
CDSs primary purposes was the gathering and dissemination of information
to all Nicaraguans. The CDSs did a block-by-block census of all numbered
houses in cities and therefore knew everyone's whereabouts. The CDSs
were also responsible for distributing rationed goods and community
improvement projects. The opponents of the Sandinistas made little
attempt to develop effective mass organizations that could challenge the
well organized and well disciplined Sandinista groups. Thus, the FSLN
mass organizations were instrumental in consolidating Sandinista power
over political and military institutions. By 1980 Sandinista
organizations embraced some 250,000 Nicaraguans. Less than a year after
their victory, the Sandinistas controlled the government.

Nicaragua - Growth of Opposition, 1981-83

Domestic support for the new Sandinista government was not universal,
however. The ethnic minorities from the Caribbean coast, neglected by
national governments since colonial times, rejected Sandinista efforts
to incorporate them into the national mainstream and demanded autonomy.
Government forces responded by forcibly relocating many of these ethnic
groups, leading many indigenous groups during the early 1980s to join
groups opposing the government.

From late 1979 through 1980, the Carter administration made efforts
to work with FSLN policies. However, when President Ronald Reagan took
office in January 1981, the United States government launched a campaign
to isolate the Sandinista government. Claiming that Nicaragua, with
assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union, was supplying arms to the
guerrillas in El Salvador, the Reagan administration suspended all
United States aid to Nicaragua on January 23, 1981. The Nicaraguan
government denied all United States allegations and charged the United
States with leading an international campaign against it. Later that
year, the Reagan administration authorized support for groups trying to
overthrow the Sandinistas.

Using an initial budget of US$19 million and camps in southern
Honduras as a staging area, the United States supported groups of
disgruntled former members of the National Guards. These groups became
known as the Contras (short for contrarevolucionarios). The Contras initially consisted of former members of the
National Guards who had fled to Honduras after the fall of President
Somoza. By the end of 1981, however, the group's membership had
multiplied because peasants from the north and ethnic groups from the
Caribbean coast had joined in the counterrevolutionary war.
Nevertheless, early Contra leadership was represented mostly by former
members of the National Guard; this fact made the movement highly
unpopular among most Nicaraguans.

The Contras established operational bases in Honduras from which they
launched hit-and-run raids throughout northern Nicaragua. The
charismatic Edén Pastora abandoned the Sandinista revolution in July
1981 and formed his own guerrilla group, which operated in the southern
part of Nicaragua from bases in Costa Rica. The United Nicaraguan Opposition operated in the northwest, the
Opposition Block of the South operated in the southeast, and the
Nicaraguan Coast Indian Unity operated in the northwest. Although the
Sandinista army was larger and better equipped than the Contras, the
antigovernment campaign became a serious threat to the FSLN government,
largely through damage to the economy.

As the Contra war intensified, the Sandinistas' tolerance of
political pluralism waned. The Sandinistas imposed emergency laws to ban
criticism and organization of political opposition. Most social programs
suffered as a result of the war because the Sandinista regime was forced
to increase military spending until half of its budget went for defense. Agricultural production also declined sharply
as refugees fled areas of conflict.

The bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, although supportive of the
anti-Somoza movement during the late 1970s, later opposed the Sandinista
regime in the 1980s. The church's hierarchy was hurt during the first
years of the revolution by the active role of its radical branch, known
as the Popular Church of Liberation Theology, whose philosophy became
heavily influence by Liberation
Theology, as well as by radical priests in the
Sandinista government. Ernesto Cardenal Martínez, a Jesuit priest who
had joined the Sandinista Revolution, became the minister of culture for
the FSLN government. Father Miguel D'Escoto Brockman (also known as Jerónimo)
was appointed minister of foreign relations, and Father Edgardo Parrales
Castillo was named minister of social welfare. However, Cardinal Miguel
Obando y Bravo (the former archbishop of Managua) soon became as
critical of the FSLN as he had been of the Somoza dictatorship. The
cardinal's opposition brought internal divisions within the Roman
Catholic Church, with one side, the hierarchy, rejecting the Marxist
philosophy of the Sandinista leadership, and the other, the Popular
Church, participating in the civic struggle of the people. The bishops
distrusted the Sandinista revolutionary ideology and its base of
support. The Popular Church, however, wanted to play a part in the
revolutionary changes affecting the masses.

Conflict within the Roman Catholic Church broke into the open when
Pope John Paul II visited Nicaragua in March 1983. Discussions over
details of the pontiff's visit had been tense. The government provided
free transportation for an estimated half million Nicaraguans to witness
the highlight of the visit, an outdoor mass in Managua. At the mass, the
Pope refused to offer a prayer for the souls of deceased soldiers.
Antigovernment demonstrators began chanting, "We love the
Pope." Their calls were soon drowned out by progovernment members
of the crowd chanting, "We want peace." The entire mass was
disrupted, and the pope angrily asked the crowd for silence several
times. The entire spectacle was broadcast to the world and was portrayed
as a deliberate attempt by the Sandinistas to disrupt the mass. The
event proved to be a tremendous public relations debacle for the
Sandinistas and a coup for the Nicaraguan church hierarchy.

By 1981 the country's most influential papers, La Prensa,
joined the growing chorus of dissent against the Sandinista government.
Under the state of emergency declared in 1982, the paper was subject to
prior censorship. Despite several instances of suspended publication,
some mandated by the Ministry of Interior, and some in protest by the
paper's editor over cut copy, the paper continued to operate. In
anticipation of upcoming elections, the government eased censorship.
Increased latitude in what it could publish only increased La
Prensa's bitter criticism of the government.

Nicaragua - Institutionalization of the Revolution, 1984

Discussion over the date and procedures for the first national
postrevolutionary election began almost immediately after the
revolution. The Fundamental Statue of the Republic of Nicaragua gave the
junta the authority to call for elections "whenever the conditions
of national reconstruction might permit." In 1983 the Council of
State passed an amended Political Parties Law that, among other things,
defined a political party as a group "vying for power" (the
original version proposed by the FSLN defined a political party as a
group already "participating in public administration").
Amendments to the law also promised all parties full access to the
media.

In mid-1984, the Electoral Law was passed setting the date and
conditions for the election. As was the case with the Political Parties
Law, much debate went into the law's drafting. The opposition parties
favored the election of a two-year interim president and a six-year
legislature that would draft a new constitution. The junta, citing
foreign pressure to hold elections early and the added cost of two
elections in two years, prevailed with its proposal to simultaneously
elect the president and members of the new legislature for six-year
terms. The opposition preferred a 1985 date for elections to give it
time to prepare its campaign, but the FSLN set the election for November
4, 1984 and the inauguration for January 10, 1985. The law set the
voting age at sixteen, which the opposition complained was an attempt to
capitalize on the FSLN's popularity with the young. The number of
National Assembly seats would vary with each election--ninety seats to
be apportioned among each party according to their share of the vote and
an additional seat for each losing presidential candidate. The entire
electoral process would be the responsibility of a new fourth branch of
government, the Supreme Electoral Council. Parties that failed to
participate in the election would lose their legal status.

By July 1984, eight parties or coalitions had announced their
intention to field candidates: the FSLN with Daniel Ortega as
presidential candidate; the Democratic Coordinator (Coordinadora Democrática--CD),
a broad coalition of labor unions, business groups, and four centrist
parties; and six other parties--the PLI, the PPSC, the Democratic
Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Demócratica--PCD), the
communists, the socialists, and the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action
Movement. Claiming that the Sandinistas were manipulating the electoral
process, the CD refused to formally file its candidates and urged
Nicaraguans to boycott the election. In October, Virgilio Godoy Reyes of
the PLI also withdrew his candidacy, although most of the other
candidates for the National Assembly and the PLI's vice presidential
candidate remained on the ballot. Other parties reportedly were
pressured to withdraw from the election also.

On November 4 1984, about 75 percent of the registered voters went to
the polls. The FSLN won 67 percent of the votes, the presidency, and
sixty-one of the ninety-six seats in the new National Assembly. The
three conservative parties that remained in the election garnered
twenty-nine seats in the National Assembly; the three parties on the
left won a total of six seats. Foreign observers generally reported that
the election was fair. Opposition groups, however, said that the FSLN
domination of government organs, mass organizations groups, and much of
the media created a climate of intimidation that precluded a truly open
election. Inauguration came on January 10, 1985; the date was selected
because it was the seventh anniversary of the assassination of newspaper
editor Chamorro. Attending Ortega's swearing in as president were the
presidents of Yugoslavia and Cuba, the vice presidents of Argentina and
the Soviet Union, and four foreign ministers from Latin America.

Nicaragua - The Regional Peace Effort

Daniel Ortega began his six-year presidential term on January 10,
1985. After the United States Congress turned down continued funding of
the Contras in April 1985, the Reagan administration ordered a total
embargo on United States trade with Nicaragua the following month,
accusing the Sandinista regime of threatening United States security in
the region. The FSLN government responded by suspending civil liberties.
Both the media and the Roman Catholic bishops were accused of
destabilizing the political system. The church's press, as well as the
conservative newspaper La Prensa, were censored or closed at
various periods because of their critical views on the military draft
and the government's handling of the civil war. In June 1986, the United
States Congress voted to resume aid to the Contras by appropriating
US$100 million in military and nonmilitary assistance. The Sandinista
government was forced to divert more and more of its economic resources
from economic development to defense against the Contras.

Debate in the United States over military aid for the Contras
continued until November 1986, when the policy of the Reagan
administration toward Nicaragua was shaken by the discovery of an
illegal operation in which funds from weapons sold to Iran during 1985
were diverted to the Contras. The Iran-Contra scandal resulted from
covert efforts within the Reagan staff to support the Contras in spite
of a United States Congressional ban on military aid in 1985. In the
aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, the United States Congress again
stopped all military support to the Contras in 1987 except for what was
called "non-lethal" aid. The result of the cutoff was a
military stalemate; the Contras were unable or unwilling to keep on
fighting without full United States support, and the Sandinista
government could not afford to continue waging an unpopular war that had
already devastated the economy. The conditions for a negotiated solution
to the conflict were better than ever, leaving both parties, the Contras
and the Sandinistas, with few options other than to negotiate.

After Oscar Arias Sánchez was elected to the presidency of Costa
Rica in 1986, he designed a regional plan to bring peace to Central
America, following earlier efforts by the Contadora Group (formed by Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia
in 1983). The Arias Plan, officially launched in February 1987, was
signed by the presidents of the five Central American republics
(Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) at a
presidential summit held in Esquipulas, Guatemala in August 1987. This
agreement, also known as Esquipulas II, called for amnesty for persons
charged with political crimes, a negotiated cease-fire, national
reconciliation for those countries with insurgencies (Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua), an end to all external aid to insurgencies
(United States support to the Contras and Soviet and Cuban support to
guerrillas in Guatemala and El Salvador), and democratic reforms leading
to free elections in Nicaragua. After the signing of Esquipulas II, the
government created a National Reconciliation Commission headed by
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. The United States government responded
by encouraging the Contras to negotiate. At the time, there were an
estimated 10,000 Contra rebels and as many as 40,000 of their dependents
living in Honduras.

An additional step toward the solution of the Nicaraguan conflict was
taken at a summit of Central American presidents held on January 15,
1988, when President Daniel Ortega agreed to hold direct talks with the
Contras, to lift the state of emergency, and to call for national
elections. In March the FSLN government met with representatives of the
Contras and signed a cease-fire agreement. The Sandinistas granted a
general amnesty to all Contra members and freed former members of the
National Guard who were still imprisoned.

By mid-1988, international institutions had demanded that the
Sandinistas launch a drastic economic adjustment program as a condition
for resumption of aid. This new economic program imposed further
hardship on the Nicaraguan people. Government agencies were reorganized,
leaving many Nicaraguans unemployed. The Sandinista army also went
through a reduction in force. To complicate matters, in October 1988 the
country was hit by Hurricane Joan, which left 432 people dead, 230,000
homeless, and damages estimated at US$1 billion. In addition, a severe
drought during 1989 ruined agricultural production for 1990.

With the country bankrupt and the loss of economic support from the
economically strapped Soviet Union, the Sandinistas decided to move up
the date for general elections in order to convince the United States
Congress to end all aid to the Contras and to attract potential economic
support from Europe and the United States. As a result of Esquipulas II,
the Sandinista regime and the Contras successfully concluded direct
negotiations on a cease-fire in meetings held at Sapoá, Nicaragua,
during June 1988. In February 1989, the five Central American presidents
met once again in Costa del Sol, El Salvador, and agreed on a plan to
support the disarming and dissolving of Contra forces in Honduras, as
well as their voluntary repatriation into Nicaragua. President Ortega
also agreed to move the next national elections, scheduled for the fall
of 1990, up to February 1990; to guarantee fair participation for
opposition parties; and to allow international observers to monitor the
entire electoral process.

Nicaragua - The UNO Electoral Victory

As a result of the Esquipulas II peace accords, the FSLN government
reinstated political freedoms. At first, the various anti-Sandinista
groups were weak and divided and did not have a cohesive government
program to challenge the FSLN. The Sandinistas, therefore, felt
confident of their success at the polls despite deteriorating
socioeconomic conditions in the country. On June 6, 1989, fourteen
parties, united only in their opposition to the Sandinistas, formed a
coalition called the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional
Opositora--UNO), whose support was drawn from a broad base, including
conservative and liberal parties as well as two of Nicaragua's
traditional communist factions. Despite its determination to vote the
Sandinistas out of power, however, the UNO coalition remained a weak
opposition lacking a cohesive program.

The UNO and the Sandinistas began their political campaigns in the
summer of 1989. Although sharp divisions within the UNO remained, all
fourteen parties finally compromised, and on September 2 the
anti-Sandinista coalition nominated Violeta Barrios de Chamorro,
publisher of La Prensa and former member of the junta, as their
candidate for president. Virgilio Godoy Reyes, head of the PLI and
former minister of labor under the Sandinistas, was chosen as her
running mate. The FSLN nominated Daniel Ortega for the presidency and
Sergio Ramírez Mercado as his running mate.

The political campaign was conducted under the close international
supervision of the OAS, the UN, and a delegation headed by former United
States President Jimmy Carter. The administration of United States
president George H.W. Bush provided economic assistance to the
Sandinista opposition. Most of this aid was channeled through the
National Endowment for Democracy, which contributed more than US$9
million. Despite some violent incidents, the electoral campaign was
carried out in relative peace. The FSLN was better organized than the
opposition and used government funds and resources--such as school buses
and military trucks--to bring Sandinista supporters from all over the
country to their rallies. In an effort to divert attention from the
critical economic situation, the Sandinista campaign appealed to
nationalism, depicting UNO followers as pro-Somoza, instruments of
United States foreign policy and enemies of the Nicaraguan revolution.
Despite limited resources and poor organization, the UNO coalition under
Violeta Chamorro directed a campaign centered around the failing economy
and promises of peace. Many Nicaraguans expected the country's economic
crisis to deepen and the Contra conflict to continue if the Sandinistas
remained in power. Chamorro promised to end the unpopular military
draft, bring about democratic reconciliation, and promote economic
growth. In the February 25, 1990, elections, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro
carried 55 percent of the popular vote against Daniel Ortega's 41
percent. Exhausted by war and poverty, the Nicaraguan people had opted
for change.

Although the election results surprised many observers, both sides
began conversations to bring a peaceful transfer of power. In March a
transition team headed by Chamorro's son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo
Oyanguren, representing the UNO, and General Humberto Ortega,
representing the FSLN, began discussions on the transfer of political
power. However, Sandinista bureaucrats systematically ransacked
government offices and gave government assets to loyal government
supporters, destroyed records; consolidated many of the government
agencies (in particular, the Ministry of Interior, whose security forces
were incorporated into the EPS), and passed legislation to protect their
interests once they were ousted from the government. On May 30, the
Sandinista government, along with the UNO transition team and the Contra
leadership, signed agreements for a formal cease-fire and the
demobilization of the Contras. Despite continued sporadic clashes, the
Contras completed their demobilization on June 26, 1990.

The FSLN accepted its new role of opposition and handed over
political power to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the UNO coalition on
April 25, 1990. President Chamorro pledged her determination to give
Nicaragua a democratic government, bring about national reconciliation,
and keep a small nonpartisan professional army. Nicaragua underwent yet
another sea change as the country stepped out of the Cold War spotlight.