Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Recent indicators suggest that Russia intends to upgrade its naval facility in the Port of Tartus along the Syrian Coast in tandem with its ongoing air operations based out of Bassel al-Assad International Airport in neighboring Latakia Province. On September 28, Russian media sources reported the deployment of at least two repair and supply vessels to Tartus with an onboard escort of “anti-terror group” Naval Infantry personnel. The deployment of these vessels comes in ostensible support of recently-announced naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea involving several warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet, including the guided missile cruiser Moskva, the destroyer Smetlivy, and the tank landing ship Saratov. Nonetheless, the two repair vessels are designed to equip military ports by installing mooring buoys, breakwaters, and floating landing stages or docks – making them valuable assets in efforts to modernize the base at Tartus.

The timing of this mobilization coincides with a report in the leading Russian business newspaper Kommersant on September 21 reporting that the naval installation at Tartus currently hosts 1700 Russian military “specialists” and security personnel working to “equip and secure” the base and “rebuild the dock.” If confirmed, these numbers would reflect a major increase in activity at the facility after it had reportedly been largely abandoned by Russian forces in 2013. A source from the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing work to modernize the Russian facility in order to hold destroyers and large landing ships but claimed that this effort had no connection to a “prepared military intervention” in Syria. However, the start of Russian air operations in northwestern Syria on September 30 belies this statement as likely disinformation. The naval facility at Tartus has served as a historic logistical hub for Russian military equipment and personnel entering Syria, and received several tank landing ships and cargo vessels over the past month transporting vehicles and supplies destined for the Bassel al-Assad International Airport.

The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus bears several implications for future Russian military activity in Syria. The base constitutes the only Russian naval base outside of the former Soviet Union and provides Russia with strategic access to the Mediterranean, although its capacity to host large, modern vessels remains limited. Russian officials have discussed potential upgrades to the base for several years without significant action, although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated in March 2015 that Syria would welcome “any widening of the Russian presence” in Tartus. The decision to undertake this modernization program at this time suggests a decision by Russian leadership to prepare for further support over the long-term to the Syrian regime by allowing the provision of further military equipment or the deployment of a full contingent of troops by sea. The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus also reflects Russian intent to secure permanent strategic basing in Syria in line with its establishment of an airbase at Bassel al-Assad International Airport. At minimum, recent Russian activity in Tartus indicates that Russia views its military intervention in Syria as a long-term commitment rather than a short-term limited operation.

Additional background on the Russian naval facility in Tartus from ISW senior naval analyst Christopher Harmer can be found here.

Sources consulted include: Western news outlets including AP and Reuters as well as Russian news agencies such as TASS, Interfax, Lenta, and Kommersant.

These charts contrast international leaders’ positions on Assad before and after mainstream media coverage of Russia’s deployment of aircraft to Syria, marked here as September 4, 2015. Several leaders softened their stance on the Syrian leader following Russian intervention, undermining the United States’ stated goal of achieving a negotiated political solution in which Assad is not in power. One example is below.

First Russian strikes in Syria: Russian warplanes conducted 20 airstrikes on the rebel-held towns of Rastan and Talbisah north of Homs City, as well as on the towns of Al Latamneh and Kafr Zeita in Hama Province. In addition, Russia “aided” regime airstrikes in the northwestern countryside of Latakia Province, according to an anonymous regime security source. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the airstrikes targeted eight Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) positions in total. The Syrian regime also released statements confirming Russian airstrikes in Homs and Hama, claiming that the airstrikes targeted both ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliated militants, likely referring to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. However, local Syrian sources claim the airstrikes exclusively targeted rebel positions, including the headquarters of Free Syrian Army-affiliated, Western-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient al-Izza Gathering in the town of Al Latamneh, rather than ISIS-held positions. Syrian Civil Defense Forces, a volunteer emergency responder organization, reported 36 civilian casualties from the Russian airstrike in Talbisah in northern Homs, in addition to several civilian casualties in Hama. Although there are small ISIS “sympathetic” cells in the rebel-held pockets of northern Homs, the Russian decision to target terrain that is held by the Syrian opposition and not ISIS signals Russia’s intent to assist the Assad regime’s war effort at large, beyond anti-ISIS operations.

Official Syrian regime request: Damascus confirmed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad requested military assistance from Russia in a letter to President Vladimir Putin prior to the launch of Russian airstrikes in Syria. The Kremlin’s chief of staff Serge Ivanov confirmed Assad “appealed to the leadership of [Russia] with a request for military aid.”

Russian effort to edge out U.S.-led coalition: U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby stated that a Russian official informed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad about the airstrikes and requested that American military aircraft avoid Syrian airspace during Russian operations. An anonymous U.S. official reported that the U.S.-led coalition warplanes continued to conduct airstrikes against ISIS militants in Syria. Senior Israeli officials also announced that Russia informed Israel about an hour before it conducted airstrikes in Syria. Russian government officials made contact with Israeli National Security Adviser, Yossi Cohen, as well as other senior officials in the Israeli defense establishment. The notice was designed to avoid any confrontation between Israeli and Russian planes.

By Genevieve Casagrande and Christopher Kozak

Sources consulted include: Social media accounts of local Syrian activists, local Syrian news affiliates, international news agencies, and Russian news agencies.Updated 9/30/2015 1:25pm (EDT): Syrian Civil Defense Forces reported 33 civilian casualties
from the Russian airstrike in Talbisah in northern Homs. According to local
sources, these Russian airstrikes have expanded into the provinces of Hama and
Latakia, as well as other rebel-held areas in the northern countryside of Homs.
These airstrikes continue to target areas held by Syrian rebels, including
Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham, Western-backed
TOW anti-tank missile recipients, and a number of other local rebel groups.
Notably, the nearest positions held by ISIS are over 55 km from the areas
targeted by the Russian airstrikes. No Russian airstrikes have yet been
reported against ISIS’s positions in Syria.Russia’s foreign ministry accused international media of
conducting information warfare by reporting civilian casualties from Russian
airstrikes in Syria. As Russian involvement in Syria continues to expand,
Russian disinformation will come in direct conflict with the situation reported
by ground forces inside Syria. In this instance, despite claims by Syrian
sources that Russian airstrikes are exclusively targeting Jabhat al-Nusra and
rebel locations, Russian officials claim that the airstrikes are only targeting
ISIS in Syria.

After a vote in Russia’s upper house of parliament
unanimously authorized President Vladimir Putin to conduct military operations
in Syria, the head of President Putin’s administration stated that the military
objective of the operation was “exclusively” to provide air support to the
Syrian government forces in combatting ISIS. Shortly after the vote, Russia’s
Ministry of Defense also acknowledged the start the Russian air campaign, which it
claimed involved “precision airstrikes on Islamic State land-based targets in
Syria.” Russia’s defense minister Sergey Shoygu also told members of the
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) alliance that the
air campaign would consist of Russian air strikes against ISIS’s military
equipment, lines of communication, vehicles, weapons caches, and oil
infrastructure in Syria. Genevieve Casagrande and Hugo SpauldingSources consulted include: social media accounts of local Syrian activists and Russian news agencies such as TASS, Sputnik, Interfax, and RIA Novosti.

Updated 9/30/2015 12:30pm (EDT): Russian Airstrikes in Syria Map

Posted 9/30/2015 8:52am (EDT): An alleged Russian airstrike hit the rebel-held town of Talbisah north of Homs City. Talbisah is home to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham, and a number of other local rebel groups, all of which are active in local governance efforts in the area. Both Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have claimed a number of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) in Homs City, located only 12 kilometers south of Talbisah. Following reports of U.S. and Turkish efforts to establish an ISIS "free zone" in the northern Aleppo countryside, JN withdrew from the border and reportedly reinforced positions in this rebel-held pocket north of Homs city. Notably, the airstrike did not hit ISIS militants and rather resulted in 33 civilian casualties. If confirmed, the airstrike would signal Russian intent to assist in the Syrian regime's war effort at large, rather than securing the regime's coastal heartland of Latakia and Tartous. Genevieve Casagrande

Sunday, September 27, 2015

The following three viewsheds provide unique perspectives into how the Syrian regime, the U.S. and Turkey, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) perceive the battlefield. The regime viewpoint, shown from Damascus looking northward toward Turkey, shows the recent Russian military buildup in Syria. As the Syrian opposition encroaches further on the coastal heartland of Latakia and Tartous, this Russian buildup bolsters the regime’s remaining defensive line. In sharp contrast, Russian positions in northern Latakia are a cause for concern for Turkey, whose border is a mere 45 kilometers away from the Bassel al-Assad Airport. Russia’s increased involvement in Syria presents a new threat to Turkey’s southern border, which is currently adjacent to both ISIS and Kurdish-controlled areas. The U.S. largely shares Turkey’s viewpoint, as it uses Turkish bases and stages out of Gazientep, the perspective that is shown. Finally, ISIS’s main effort in the past has been in Iraq, and the viewshed illustrating the ISIS perspective looks east towards Iraq from its headquarters in Raqqa, Syria. ISW has forecasted that ISIS will most likely turn its offensive efforts toward Syria’s central corridor around Homs, Hama, and Idlib in the next quarter, while nevertheless maintaining pressure on cities in Iraq. However, the confirmation of a “coordination cell” between Russia, Syria, Iran and Iraq in Baghdad highlights the potential for future Russian military expansion into Iraq. ISW assesses that ISIS is most vulnerable if it is pressured at both Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour, and ISIS reinforced this latter location during the third week of September. The final graphic shows Russian military positions across Syria, juxtaposed with the terrain controlled by actors in the Syrian Civil War.

Friday, September 18, 2015

ISIS is executing a global strategy to defend and expand its territory within Iraq and Syria; to foster affiliates and exacerbate disorder in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia; and to inspire and resource polarizing terror attacks in the wider world. The map depicts the geographic areas of those parallel campaigns, labeled the Interior, Near Abroad, and Far Abroad rings, respectively. The map also marks the areas where ISIS has declared one or more “wilayats,” or governorates in the Near Abroad. ISIS maintains active affiliates in each of its governorates, which provide the organization with strategic resiliency outside of Iraq and Syria.

Thursday, September 17, 2015

Grand Strategic Objectives:• Rule all Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate• Provoke and win an apocalyptic war with the WestStrategic Objectives in Syria:• Preserve and expand territorial control in Syria• Implement governance guided by Shari’a law and subjugate minorities within the caliphate• Seize a historic caliphate capital and eliminate the Alawite regime• Neutralize or absorb the Syrian armed opposition• Neutralize or absorb Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN or JAN)• Stoke regional disorder through sectarian or religious conflict in Syria

Establish an Islamic Emirate in Syria that is a future component of the envisioned al-Qaeda Caliphate

Unify the global jihadist movement

Strategic objectives:• Destroy the Assad regime• Transform Syrian society from secular nationalism to an Islamic theocracy• Establish locally-accepted governance as a precursor to an eventual Islamic Emirate• Build an army to protect the Islamic Emirate by partnering with Syrian rebel groups• Resolve the fitna, or schism, with ISIS• Counter U.S. influence in Syria

Grand Strategic Objectives: • [Syrian Regime] Preserve the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a post-war Syria encompassing the entire pre-war Syrian state• [Iran] Preserve a viable Syrian regime led by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a key member of the ‘Axis of Resistance’; achieve strategic positioning against Israel• [Russia] Preserve the Syrian state – not necessarily Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – as a key foothold in the Middle East and an ally against terrorism• [Hezbollah] Prevent the spread of the Syrian Civil War into Lebanese core terrainStrategic Objectives:• [Syrian Regime] Maintain Syrian territorial integrity through an ‘army in all corners’; consolidate Syrian civilian population in regime-held areas; bolster international and domestic legitimacy as ruler of Syria.• [Iran] Position against Israel in southern Syria along the Golan Heights; preserve access to supply lines from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon; develop network of Syrian proxies to maintain Iranian influence if regime falls• [Iran/Russia] Enable Syrian regime to defend core terrain along Syrian central corridor• [Hezbollah] Secure Lebanese border region against incursion by militant groups

The trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may fundamentally shift within the 90 day timeframe. Russia escalated its military assistance on behalf of the Syrian regime in early September 2015, deploying armored vehicles and hundreds of personnel to the Syrian Coast in preparation for the establishment of at least one forward air operations base. Rebel factions led by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat alNusra (JN) continue to pressure the regime’s stronghold along the Alawite Coast following a several-month campaign to expel regime forces from Idlib Province. Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition intend to establish an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border with the assistance of moderate rebel forces. There a number of ways that the actors driving conditions on the ground could respond to these events or generate new conditions. The interplay between these developments and their courses of action could create numerous different outcomes in Syria over the next 12 weeks. A number of these divergent pathways could generate negative effects that intensify the conflict, spread regional disorder, and threaten U.S. interests in Syria.

It is possible to forecast these trajectories to provide policy-makers and analysts with a key tool to anticipate the actions of adversaries such as ISIS and avert the potential pathways that could be most damaging to the U.S. or its allies. The following forecast applies the traditional techniques of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to actors and conditions in Syria. IPB is a process of analyzing enemy forces, terrain, weather, and civilian considerations in order to anticipate their effects upon friendly forces and their planned or ongoing operations. IPB involves analysis of the possible courses of action of the primary actors on the ground, given existing knowledge about their capabilities, tactics, and intent. Courses of action are ranked from most to least likely and evaluated for the dangers that they potentially pose to friendly force operations. The purpose of this course of action projection is to inform decision-makers with accurate forecasts that adequately account for a range of possibilities as well as the outside risk of most dangerous courses of action. Most dangerous courses of action are designated as such because they are not most likely, but they are nevertheless plausible. Illuminating them allows commanders to mitigate risk while planning in the context of most likely courses of action.

The forecasts presented in this paper are undergirded by several fundamental assumptions. First, the recent deployment of Russian military forces to Syria will maintain a defensive posture to prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime rather than a direct offensive posture to seize territory from anti-regime actors. Second, the Iranian nuclear accord and its corresponding sanctions relief for the Iranian government will be implemented in full. Third, the U.S. and Turkey will succeed in organizing and launching some form of offensive by rebel forces on the ground in an attempt to implement an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria. Fourth, Turkey will not take hostile action against the Syrian Kurdish YPG due to pressure on both parties by the U.S. Fifth, neighboring states – particularly Lebanon – will remain relatively stable. Sixth, the Iraqi Security Forces will continue their current pace and scale of anti-ISIS operations in Iraq with a prioritization of Anbar Province. If one or more of these assumptions prove false over the 90 day timeframe, this forecast will need to be adjusted to account for a significant inflection in the Syrian Civil War.

Based upon the assessed courses of action available to actors on the ground in Syria, ISW anticipates a spectrum of possible developments in the Syrian Civil War over the 90 day timeframe.

These outcomes have been characterized through analysis of the most likely courses of action (MLCOAs) and most dangerous courses of action (MDCOAs) for three primary actors: ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian regime with its allies.

The trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may fundamentally shift within the 90 day timeframe. Russia escalated its military assistance on behalf of the Syrian regime in early September 2015, deploying armored vehicles and hundreds of personnel to the Syrian Coast in preparation for the establishment of at least one forward air operations base. Rebel factions led by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al- Nusra (JN) continue to pressure the regime’s stronghold along the Alawite Coast following a several-month campaign to expel regime forces from Idlib Province. Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition intend to establish an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border with the assistance of moderate rebel forces. There a number of ways that the actors driving conditions on the ground could respond to these events or generate new conditions. The interplay between these developments and their courses of action could create numerous different outcomes in Syria over the next 12 weeks. A number of these divergent pathways could generate negative effects that intensify the conflict, spread regional disorder, and threaten U.S. interests in Syria.

It is possible to forecast these trajectories to provide policy-makers and analysts with a key tool to anticipate the actions of adversaries such as ISIS and avert the potential pathways that could be most damaging to the U.S. or its allies. The following forecast applies the traditional techniques of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to actors and conditions in Syria. IPB is a process of analyzing enemy forces, terrain, weather, and civilian considerations in order to anticipate their effects upon friendly forces and their planned or ongoing operations. IPB involves analysis of the possible courses of action of the primary actors on the ground, given existing knowledge about their capabilities, tactics, and intent. Courses of action are ranked from most to least likely and evaluated for the dangers that they potentially pose to friendly force operations. The purpose of this course of action projection is to inform decision-makers with accurate forecasts that adequately account for a range of possibilities as well as the outside risk of most dangerous courses of action. Most dangerous courses of action are designated as such because they are not most likely, but they are nevertheless plausible. Illuminating them allows commanders to mitigate risk while planning in the context of most likely courses of action.

The forecasts presented in this paper are undergirded by several fundamental assumptions. First, the recent deployment of Russian military forces to Syria will maintain a defensive posture to prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime rather than a direct offensive posture to seize territory from anti-regime actors. Second, the Iranian nuclear accord and its corresponding sanctions relief for the Iranian government will be implemented in full. Third, the U.S. and Turkey will succeed in organizing and launching some form of offensive by rebel forces on the ground in an attempt to implement an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria. Fourth, Turkey will not take hostile action against the Syrian Kurdish YPG due to pressure on both parties by the U.S. Fifth, neighboring states – particularly Lebanon – will remain relatively stable. Sixth, the Iraqi Security Forces will continue their current pace and scale of anti-ISIS operations in Iraq with a prioritization of Anbar Province. If one or more of these assumptions prove false over the 90 day timeframe, this forecast will need to be adjusted to account for a significant inflection in the Syrian Civil War.

Based upon the assessed courses of action available to actors on the ground in Syria, ISW anticipates a spectrum of possible developments in the Syrian Civil War over the 90 day timeframe.
These outcomes have been characterized through analysis of the most likely courses of action (MLCOAs) and most dangerous courses of action (MDCOAs) for three primary actors: ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian regime with its allies.

The United States faces
national security challenges in 2015 of a scope and scale that we have not
encountered since the end of the Cold War. The Islamic State in Iraq and
al-Sham (ISIS) has seized control of terrain in Iraq and Syria, declared itself
a caliphate, and aims not only to reify that claim but also to provoke an
apocalyptic war with the West. ISIS is challenging al-Qaeda, the terrorist
organization from which it sprung, as the leader of the global jihadist
movement. Russia, a nuclear power, is waging a crypto-war in Ukraine and is
using its military capabilities to intimidate NATO. The United States and Iran
have signed a nuclear deal that will relieve sanctions in ways that will likely
increase Iran's malign behavior in the Middle East, which already includes the
use of proxy military forces to undermine U.S. allies. China is laying claim to
areas in the South China Sea and is using its increasing military might to
enforce those claims.

The threat to the United
States in 2015 includes not only states and transnational organizations that
have the intent and capability to harm America. The U.S. also faces a threat
from the growing global disorder that its enemies and adversaries are
exploiting. The Islamic State, for example, is pursuing a strategy that both
breaks strong states and preys upon power vacuums in failed states. It has
worked to provoke and expand a Sunni-Shia sectarian war since its origins as
al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004. That sectarian war is now engulfing the region and
spreading around the world.

Iran is helping to
accelerate and expand sectarian war. The Iranians are supporting the Assad
regime through a comprehensive strategy, including military resources such as
trainers, advisors, and funding. That Alawite regime is deliberately starving
its own people, dropping heinous barrel bombs on civilian targets, torturing
family members of its opponents, and gassing its own people. These are war
crimes committed primarily against Sunni. The perpetuation of the Assad regime
is one of the major accelerants of the radicalization of Sunni as well as Shi'a
populations, and without the Iranians, the regime would not have survived this
long. Tehran has gone so far as to recruit its own people as “volunteers” to
fight in Syria, and has mobilized Shi'a from as far away as Afghanistan to
enter this sectarian battle.

All of these
developments have led to the growth of dangerous power vacuums. The world has
witnessed the collapse of governments and states. Governments changed in
Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring. Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, all
challenged by the Arab Spring, are failed or failing states. The Islamic State,
therefore, has room to grow in the voids where government once was and Iran's
counter-strategy is making the problem much worse.

The Islamic State
announced its intent to "remain and expand" in November 2014. The
slogan, which appeared on the cover of its English language magazine, conveyed
its strategic objectives: to remain in Iraq and Syria and to expand beyond
their borders. My analysts at the Institute for the Study of War assess that
ISIS is operating in three rings: an Interior ring, consisting of Iraq and Syria; a Near Abroad ring in lands that were parts of
historical Caliphates; and a Far Abroad ring in Europe, the United States,
Australia, and Asia. In the Near Abroad, ISIS has active governorates, or
wilayats, in Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, the Caucasus,
Algeria, and Nigeria.

The analysts at the
Institute for the Study of War have observed that ISIS has brought signature
capabilities and campaigns from Iraq to Egypt, where it is now pursuing a
campaign against Egyptian Security Forces in the Sinai modeled on the “Soldiers
Harvest” campaign that eroded the Iraqi Security Forces’ capabilities and
control in Mosul, Iraq in late 2013. That historical campaign’s signature
weapon, the House-Borne IED (HBIED), destroyed the houses of Egyptian security
forces in Sinai repeatedly this summer. The United States has seen the impact
of the fall of Mosul, and it should be extremely concerned about a capable
terrorist organization that is trying to thin security forces in
internationally significant terrain, such as the Egypt-Israel border.

The United States must
therefore evaluate its efforts against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in this wider
global context. President Obama, in September 2014, declared his intent to
“degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL,” the
government’s acronym for the Islamic State. The international coalition against
ISIS speaks of its mission slightly more modestly, using the military doctrinal
term defeat (meaning to break the enemy’s will or capability to fight) in lieu
of destroy (meaning physically to render an enemy's combat capability
ineffective until it is reconstituted).

Defeating ISIS is a
correct mission statement for the activities of the United States. It does not
mean U.S. troops must be everywhere that ISIS is, or that military force is the
only instrument that should be used. Rather, defeating ISIS requires using
military force, diplomacy, and all the instruments of U.S. national power to
break the organization’s capability to fight, since the will of an apocalyptic
enemy is not likely to break. Some in policy circles might hope that ISIS could
be contained in Iraq and Syria. But unfortunately, ISIS has already spread
beyond those areas, as I have noted. The opportunity for containing ISIS in
Iraq and Syria has passed. The opportunity to defeat it in Iraq and Syria in
ways that collapse its global reputation and capabilities is fleeting.

The United States is not
succeeding at defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Make no mistake, the United
States and the international coalition have been essential to limiting ISIS’s
expansion and reversing some of its gains. Airstrikes in Iraq have been vital
to helping ground forces retake terrain and degrade ISIS. The U.S. has helped
the Iraqi Security Forces recover some territory that ISIS had seized, such as
the very important gain in Tikrit. ISIS has gained new terrain in Ramadi,
however, and still retains its safehaven in Mosul. This is not surprising. The
U.S. has not provided support to the Iraqi Security Forces in ways sufficient
to render them sufficiently effective against this enemy, such as close air
support.

The problems of the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at this time stem from the government’s lack of a
monopoly on the use of force, an unsurprising consequence of the long delay in
providing any U.S. military support to Iraq and then constraining that support
to levels inadequate to meet the crisis Iraq faced. Iranian-backed proxy forces
thus took the field shortly after the fall of Mosul and have gained influence
from the reliance the Iraqi government must place on them. The

Iranian proxies are
different from the popular mobilization of Shi’a volunteers that have also
taken the field. The popular mobilization has largely remained under the
control of Iraq’s clergy and political parties. But the Iranian-backed groups
have asserted their own command and control. They include Katai’b Hezbollah,
which the United States designated as a terrorist organization, and Asai’b Ahl
al-Haq, the Lebanese Hezbollah-trained militia responsible for kidnapping and
killing five U.S. soldiers in Iraq in 2007, among many other American and Iraqi
deaths it has caused.

Since the fall of
Ramadi, the Iranian-backed militias have deliberately chosen campaign
objectives different from those designated by Iraq’s Prime Minister, Haider
al-Abadi, in order to throw Abadi’s strategy off track and take control of the
military situation. They are motivated by the determination they share with
their Iranian masters to drive the U.S. out of Iraq once more and install
pliable Iranian clients—a role in which these groups’ leaders fancy
themselves—permanently in Baghdad. In recent weeks, they have threatened Iraqi
officials in order to ensure that they do not advance the Prime Minister’s
vital and popularly supported reforms. They or another Iranian-backed element
have kidnapped Turkish workers in order to compel Turkey to change its policies
in Syria. And they are increasing violence among Shi'a in vital cities such as
Baghdad and Basra. The Iranian-backed militias are in a showdown with the Prime
Minister, and the future of the government of Iraq and the unity of the country
rely on the Prime Minister winning this very real contest for power.

The U.S. is trying to
counter ISIS as though it is the only enemy on the battlefield, when in fact it
is but one of the terrible actors driving the global sectarian war. A strategy
that tries to empower Iran and help Tehran expand its influence throughout the
region will inevitably fail. It is actually making things worse. Exclusive
focus on the Islamic State has also led the U.S. to ignore the growing threat
of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Jabhat al-Nusra poses a
threat to the United States for several reasons. It is strong, growing, and
effective, and it creates momentum for global al-Qaeda, which is still a real
threat to the United States. It hosts the Khorosan Group, elements of al-Qaeda
core that are plotting to attack the West. It recruits foreign fighters from a
global network who will eventually bring the fight to their home countries. It
also precludes many of the political and military solutions that the United
States seeks. It violently eliminates moderate opposition from the battlefield;
it was the organization that killed, kidnapped, and dispersed the group of
roughly fifty U.S. vetted and trained rebels introduced this summer. It opposes
political transition or working with the West. It is intertwined into courts,
administration, and command structures in rebel-held Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra
embeds itself in existing opposition civilian and military structures and
gradually remakes them in al-Qaeda’s image. It is therefore stealthier, more
intertwined with social and military groups, and harder to defeat than ISIS.
Jabhat al-Nusra uses more patient means than ISIS to achieve its objectives,
but those objectives are no less dangerous: namely an emirate for al-Qaeda in
Syria that is a part of al-Qaeda’s global caliphate.

The United States needs
to recalibrate its policy to the security realities that we face. A strategy
that tries to compartmentalize the ISIS threat from other drivers of regional
and global instability will fail.

The views expressed in
this testimony are those of the author alone and do not necessarily

Satellite imagery provided by All Source Analysis confirms the recent arrival of Russian main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and other military equipment at an airbase in Syria's coastal Latakia province, indicating that Russia has deployed troops inside Syria. Concurrent military exercises inside Russia with the stated mission of training for long-range deployments of airborne troops suggest that Russia may intend to deploy additional forces, possibly further inside Syria. AllSourceAnalysis imagery of Taganrog Central airbase just east of the Ukrainian border from September 12 shows airborne troops rolling parachutes along a runway along with vehicles and tents more likely configured for sustained operations than for exercises or snap inspections. Russian President Vladimir Putin is seeking ways to support the Assad regime, to thwart a possible buffer zone established by the United States and Turkey, and to embarrass the United States by positioning Russia as the leader of a new international anti-ISIS coalition. Russian mobilization may protect the Assad regime from rapid collapse, but it may also cause greater radicalization among the Syrian opposition. The Russian deployment to Syria is game-changing. It will alter the nature of international negotiations, compromise and weaken the cohesion and efforts of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, strengthen the Assad regime, and initiate direct Russo-Iranian military operations (suggesting the creation of a de facto Russo-Iranian military coalition, at least in Syria) for the first time. The U.S. and its partners must fundamentally reassess their approach to the Syrian conflict in light of this critical inflection.

Tuesday, September 15, 2015

Key Takeaway: ISW’s updated ISIS sanctuary map includes a new attack zone in Deraa, southwestern Syria and an expanded sanctuary zone in Idlib, northwestern Syria. ISIS claimed an attack against the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Deraa on August 18, and also may be responsible for an ongoing assassination campaign against JN in Idlib. ISIS likely intends to target JN and Syrian opposition’s governance structures in preparation for future offensives in western Syria. ISIS’s increased attacks against JN also reflect an expansion of the rivalry between ISIS and JN for leadership of the global jihadist movement.

Since ISW last published a Control of Terrain in Syria map in June, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) seized the town of Qaryatayn in the Eastern Qalamoun region on August 5 following a brief offensive. The key crossroads town provides ISIS with opportunities to conduct further advances in the direction of Damascus, Homs City, or the strategic T4 (Tiyas) Airbase. ISIS fighters also conducted several attacks against Hezbollah positions along the Lebanese border southwest of Qusayr in Homs Province, highlighting the presence of active ISIS forces in the region. Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions participating in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room advanced into the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province, directly threatening the coastal regime heartland in Latakia Province. JN and other rebel forces also seized the besieged Abu Dhuhur Military Airbase in eastern Idlib Province, leaving the two pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya northeast of Idlib City as the only remaining regime presence in the province.

ISW has modified its Control of Terrain in Syria map to order to highlight the terrain which is assessed to be under the predominant control of Lebanese Hezbollah rather than the Syrian regime. Hezbollah seized the town of Qusayr southwest of Homs City in an offensive over April to June 2013 which marked its first overt intervention into the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah later played a key role in a major operation which cleared rebel forces from Yabroud and other towns along the M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs. Hezbollah launched a new offensive in May 2015 to eliminate the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the border with Lebanon, including the besieged rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus. The addition of a new zone of control to the map thus reflects the dominance of Hezbollah along the Syrian-Lebanese border.

This map represents the military situation at the Syrian-Turkish border as of Sept. 11, 2015. Particular attention is paid to border crossings, many of which are now closed or highly restricted and under the control of a variety of groups including the Syrian regime, ISIS, Kurds, the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, and Syrian rebels.

Is Bashar al-Assad losing the Syrian Civil War? Given recent reports of direct Russian military support for the Syrian regime as well as continued increases in the assistance provided by Iran and its proxies, this map details the known or assessed locations where Russia, Iran, and Iranian proxies have established headquarters or staging areas in support of the Syrian regime. The map also highlights the locations of the remaining besieged or otherwise vulnerable positions occupied by the Syrian, whose vulnerability was highlighted on September 9 when rebel forces seized the isolated Abu Dhuhur Military Airbase in eastern Idlib Province. These positions are superimposed over an updated map depicting the areas controlled by the major factions in Syria as of September 14, 2015. -

Saturday, September 12, 2015

Key Take-away: An
Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia kidnapped 18 Turkish workers in Baghdad and
subsequently demanded concessions from Turkey related to its policies in Syria
and Lebanon. Turkey has recently concluded an agreement with the United States
to support the anti-ISIS coalition particularly in Syria, where Turkey has also
increased its support to opposition groups fighting the Iranian-backed Assad
regime. This kidnapping by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq is a new escalation
in the regional sectarian and geopolitical war between Iran and the Sunni states
in the Middle East. Iraqi Shi’a militias likely will increase regionally
focused action to support Iranian foreign policy, particularly as the Iraqi
government deals with significant political and military challenges that limit
its ability to respond.

Unidentified gunmen kidnapped 18 Turkish
workers from a construction site near Sadr City in eastern Baghdad on September
2. No group immediately claimed responsibility, but the demographics and
history of the area implicated Iraqi Shi’a militias. The event’s occurrence in
Iraq’s capital prompted the Iraqi government and security forces to act. A
force from the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) attempted
to rescue the hostages on
September 3 from a location on Palestine Street near the kidnapping site. The BOC
subsequently clashed with gunmen
from the prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, Kata’ib
Hezbollah, (KH) an Iranian-backed group designated as a terrorist group by
the U.S. Treasury Department that enjoys significant freedom of movement in Baghdad.
One ISF member died in the clashes, and three others were injured. Yet the
Iraqi government ceased public discussion of the incident, suggesting that it
wanted to avoid conflict with Iranian proxy groups, despite the blows such a
move would deal to the government’s authority. The Iraqi government currently
is facing challenges related to ISIS, internal power struggles, a major budget
deficit, and an emerging security vacuum in the vital southern province of Basra.
Government actions against proxy groups
could generate uncontrolled violence in Baghdad under these conditions.
Therefore, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi chose to refrain from action
against KH, despite his likely desire to target the groups.

The kidnapping was clearly the work of an Iranian-backed Shi’a
militia. An unidentified group released a 3-minute video on YouTube on
September 11, showing five masked gunmen signs reading “Death
Squads” and “Labayk Ya Hussein.” The latter slogan is used by Shi’a Muslims and
likely meant to show a Shi’a identity for the group. The kidnapping also took
place in an area of Baghdad where it is unlikely that independent smaller
groups would have freedom of movement to conduct such an attack without the
involvement of Iranian proxy groups. Moreover, the gunmen in the video displays
18 Turkish-speaking individuals confirmed to be the Turkish
hostages
kidnapped on September 2, recorded with Arabic subtitles that depict the
motives of the kidnappers. The Arabic translations of their remarks call for
the Turkish government to abide by the “demands” of their kidnappers. The
translation also criticizes Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s “aggressive
behavior in the region.” The slogans of “Death squads” and “Labayk Ya Hussein”
along with the messages regarding Turkey’s regional behavior indicate that the
kidnappers are members of Iranian-backed Shi’a militias in Iraq.

Above: Screenshot
of the video showing gunmen, the Turkish hostages, and the list of the demands.

The hostages read the kidnappers’ demands, which were also
displayed at the end of the video. The kidnappers demanded that Turkish President
Erdogan:

- Lift Jaysh al-Fatah’s siege of specific majority Shi’a regime-held
enclaves in Syria, namely al-Fuaa, Kafariya,
Nubul, and al-Zahra, that are defended in part by Lebanese Hezbollah in
northern Syria. The demand follows two failedceasefire agreements between
pro-Syrian regime fighters and opposition fighters, mediated by Iran and
Turkey. Jaysh al-Fatah laid siege to
these areas in order to demand that Lebanese Hezbollah, which is besieging the
Sunni town of Zabadani, release civilian and opposition fighters there.

The kidnapping represented more than a backlash by Shia militias
against PM Abadi for his reforms curbing the
militias’ power. The Iranian proxies were motivated by a desire to further
Iran’s regional agenda in response to Turkey’s increased commitment in Syria.
The overt and violent support for Iran’s regional agenda by Iraq’s Shi’a
militias is a step-change. These cross-theater demands demonstrate that Iranian-backed
militias in Iraq will act on Iran’s behalf in the regional sectarian and
geopolitical war between Iran and the Sunni states of the Middle East. This
escalation will likely contribute to more destabilization and violence in Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Locally in Iraq, this incident shows how Iran gains
from nurturing and maintaining proxy groups to execute its regional agenda.
Iran will therefore continue to act against measures by PM Abadi to execute a reform agenda that weakens
the proxies by dislodging their ally, former PM Nouri al-Maliki, from his post
as a VP and bringing militias under state control. Iranian proxies in Iraq
recently obstructed the passing of
the National Guard Law at the Council of Representatives, (CoR) a draft law
that has the potential to bring these groups under state control. Iran and its
proxies remain capable of creating conditions that can undermine the very partners
that the U.S. supports to combat ISIS, particularly the Iraqi government and
the ISF.

The office of Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shi’a cleric, demanded the release of the Turkish
hostages on September 12 and criticized the kidnapping for the damage it has on
the authority of the state and the Iraqi government. The Iranian-backed Iraqi
Shi’a militias, unlike most Shi’a in Iraq, do not follow Sistani, but rather,
Iran’s Supreme Leader. Accordingly, this incident is likely to generate more
intra-Shi’a friction and polarization within Iraq. The leader of the Sadrist
Trend, Moqtada al-Sadr, also criticized the kidnappers on September 12 and their representation of Shi’a Islam.
Sadr called for the government to take action to release the hostages and expressed
“our” readiness to support, referring to the Sadrist Trend. Sadr alluded to the involvement of the proxies by reiterating
his warning about the "brazen militias," a term he uses to describe
these groups. In addition, Sadr called for "boycotting them" and
distancing them from the Popular Mobilization. The Peace
Brigades, the armed wing of the Sadrist Trend previously known as Jaysh
al-Mahdi, also operates in areas near the kidnapping site and other Shi’a
neighborhoods in Baghdad. His group is currently competing with the proxies and
previously clashed with AAH in Baghdad, although previous clashes had been
contained by the leaders of the groups. It is therefore important to watch if
increased tension between the proxies and Sadr generates Shi’a group infighting
in the capital.

The threat to U.S. interests emanating from the Middle East is not
constrained to ISIS. Conflict among regional powers such as Iran and Turkey can
undermine U.S. efforts and interests in the region. It is critical to watch for
the response of the Iraqi government as internal and external pressure mounts,
particularly if the government decides to take decisive military actions against
the militias in Baghdad to preserve its image and state authority. The U.S.
must also watch for additional coercive behavior by Iranian-backed groups as
they act aggressively to preserve the Assad regime under pressure.

Tuesday, September 8, 2015

Key Take-away: Iranian proxy groups in Iraq have begun to challenge PM
Abadi and ISF control in Baghdad through more aggressive means. Kata’ib
Hezbollah among other proxy groups recently denounced new initiative to pass
the National Guard law, which resulted in the law’s obstruction. Kata’ib
Hezbollah also likely kidnapped 18 Turkish workers in Baghdad on September 2 and
clashed with the ISF in Baghdad on September 3. The proxy groups are likely to
increase kinetic activities in Baghdad to pressure or coerce PM Abadi to limit
further reforms. This push is eroding state authority at a time when the state
is preoccupied with ISIS threat and is unlikely to be able to confront threats
from the proxies.

Iranian proxy militias recently took steps to obstruct the proposed
National Guard law, which was scheduled to appear before the Council of
Representatives (CoR) on September 8. The Nation Guard law was originally crafted
as an accommodation for Iraqi Sunnis to participate in PM Abadi’s government.
It was designed to give Iraqi Sunnis semi autonomy in managing security in
mostly Sunni provinces. However, discussion over the law expanded after the
fall of Mosul to include the Popular Mobilization and other militias fighting
with the Iraqi government against ISIS. The National Guard law thereby became a
vehicle for the Iraqi government to limit the ability of Iraqi Shi’a militias
to operate outside of the command and control of the Iraqi state, which raised
major concerns for militia leaders among Iran’s proxies in Iraq. These proxies
in particular include Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl-Haq (AAH), and the
Badr Organization. The National Guard law appeared on the national agenda again
on September 6, suggesting that PM Abadi’s reform agenda and the newfound
consensus within Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) generated new momentum
to pass this controversial legislation, which would serve PM Abadi’s cause in
limiting the power of political rivals, among them Iranian proxy militias.

On September 6, 2015, the speaker of the CoR, who is also a major
leader in the Iraqi Sunni bloc, Etihad, Salim al-Juburi stated the draft
National Guard Law was going to be passed in the CoR during the CoR session on September
8, indicating that major CoR blocs were reaching consensus on the law. However,
on September 7, discussion of the law was abruptlytakenoff CoR agenda.
According to member of the CoR Presidency Humam Hamudi, the decision was the
result of an agreement between the speaker of the CoR and presumably Hamudi in
order to ensure the law does not squander achievements of the Popular
Mobilization. This shift in the CoR’s plan for the National Guard law was
almost certainly the result of pressure exerted by Iranian proxy groups. Pressure
by the militias became overt on September 6 when KH, a powerful proxy group expressedits disapproval of CoR efforts to pass the law through a critical
statement on its website. KH’s statement portrayed the law as the making of a
conspiracy of the U.S, ISIS, the Baath Party, and Arab countries against the
“protectors of the people,” in reference to proxies.

KH was not the only proxy group to express such a stance. On September
8, other proxies such as AAH, the Badr Organization, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Jund
al-Imam, and others announcedtheir collective
disapproval of the National Guard law in a strongly worded statement read by a
KH leader in a press conference. The statement explained that the law would
have a negative impact on the future of the Popular Mobilization and the
Islamic Resistance, the latter a direct reference to the proxies and their
Iranian agenda. Proxies view the law as a threat for two reasons. The law would
give Iraqi Sunnis control over security assets in their areas, which would be problematic
for proxies operating in such majority Sunni locations as Samarra, Tikrit, and
Baiji. It would also place the proxies under the command and control of the
Iraqi Government, which runs entirely counter to the objectives of the Iranian
backed militias to exert influence over the Iraqi government through dominance within
the security sector. The proxies can leverage the general distrust of Iraqi
Sunnis by many Shi’a politicians of in order to obstruct the National Guard
law. Many Iraqi Shi’a politicians blame Iraqi Sunni communities for the rise of
ISIS, which has fed an inherent phobia that military empowerment of the Sunnis
would bring back the disbanded Baathist regime. The general bias against
empowering Iraqi Sunnis was likely a major factor in dropping the bill from the
CoR session; whereas the statements of the proxies were more focused on the
ramifications the law would have on their status as independent forces. Both reasons
nevertheless suit the agenda of the Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, upon which
they have begun to act more aggressively over the last week.

This rhetorical escalation by Iranian proxy groups over the
National Guard law is the latest manifestation of increasing tension between
the proxies and the Iraqi government as a result of PM Abadi’s numerous reforms.
On September 3, gunmen from KH clashed with a force from the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC) when the BOC element ventured into an area
of Palestine Street in eastern Baghdad where KH operates one of its
headquarters. The BOC force was pursuing the kidnappers of 18 Turkish workers who
were kidnappedon September 2
by unknown gunmen likely affiliated with one of the proxy groups in eastern
Baghdad. It is possible that KH kidnapped the Turks on Iran’s behalf, given
that Iran and Turkey are currently facing off in Syria as Turkey supports U.S.
efforts to fight ISIS, which can also impede Iranian interests in Syria. Iranian
proxy groups including KH were known to commit similar kidnappings in the
2006-2007 timeframe. The clash between the BOC and KH gunmen on September 3 killed
one BOC member and injured three others. However, aside from a formal statement
from the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which minimized the incident by
claiming it was the result of lack of coordination, public discussions of the
clash ceased shortly thereafter.

A threshold has nevertheless been crossed as KH used force in the
capital to pressure or coerce PM Abadi on behalf of Iran. Another manifestation
of this trend was the kidnapping on September 8
of the deputy minister of justice and director of investigations in Bunug of
Eastern Baghdad, an area where proxies enjoy much freedom of movement. Tensions
between PM Abadi’s government and the Iranian proxy militias is therefore
likely to escalate further in Baghdad and potentially result in more clashes
between proxy fighters and the ISF. Despite PM Abadi’s desire to contain the
proxies, the Iraqi government currently has limited means to escalate against
the militias in Baghdad while other security threats mount across northern and
southern Iraq. As a result, the Iraqi government will not likely take immediate
and forceful measures to confront the proxies in Baghdad. However, tension is
likely running high between proxies and the ISF in Baghdad. It is therefore
important to watch for more violence between the two sides as the proxies aim
to challenge the ISF’s control and shape political conditions to their benefit.