This essay provides answers to common objections to Christianity
which I've encountered in my discussions with atheists.
Eventually, I may find time to expand
on some of these, but for now these brief answers will have to suffice.
Note that all of these objections are philosophical rather than
evidential. If you have questions about
the evidence for the Resurrection or
the historical reliability of the
New Testament, I have hopefully addressed some of these issues
elsewhere.

Theism and atheism are actually best understood as categories rather
than particular creeds. For instance, there is no single "atheistic"
system of ethics just as there is no single "theistic" system of ethics.
Atheists differ radically and substantially from other atheists in many
areas such as ethics, politics, ontology, and epistemology. What divides atheists
from theists is the belief in the existence of a personal, supernatural
God or gods. The nature, character, and identity of this God is what
then further differentiates theists into Christians, Muslims, Jews,
Mormons, Hindus, and Zoroastrians. Consequently, it would be incorrect
to say that a Christian is an "atheist" with regard to Zeus. Rather,
Christians, pagans, and theists of all types believe in the existence of
a personal, supernatural God (or gods) while atheists of all types do
not.

We might amend our objection to state that Christians "disbelieve in the
existence of every God but the Christian God". But based on the general
English usage of the word "existence", I think that this second
statement is also false. For instance, because my friend Rob has a
degree in engineering, I would disbelieve the claim that Rob actually
has a degree in English. However, it would be extremely misleading to
claim that I consequently "disbelieve in the existence of Rob." I
disbelieve in a claim about one of Rob's attributes, but not in Rob's
existence. In the same way, Christians do not necessarily believe that
God has the character or attributes ascribed to Him by other religions.
But they, like all theists, still believe in His existence.

Short answer: claiming that Christians are "atheists" when it comes to
other gods mistakes a particular belief ("God is not like Baal") for a category ("atheism").

First, this objection is necessarily personal. It is possible to claim
that our personal, subjective threshold for evidence has not
been met,
but this fact would only disproves God's existence if we were certain that our
personal standard of proof is correct. How do we know it is correct? And what do we
even mean when we talk about the "correct" standard of proof?

A second question deals with the burden of proof. The skeptic
often presumes
that the burden of proof lies with the theist to prove that God exists
(the evidence must "convince me" to move from atheism to theism). But
why should the burden of proof not lie with the skeptic to convince the
theist that God does not exist? We might answer that "extraordinary
claims require extraordinary evidence." But then we are left asking who
determines the definition of "extraordinary." People with different
worldviews may share many presuppositions about the intrinsic likelihood
of certain events, but in other areas there will be a genuine lack of
agreement about what is intrinsically likely or unlikely. For instance,
an atheist might consider a miracle wildly implausible. On the other
hand, a theist would consider the creation of the universe ex nihilo by
anything other than God wildly implausible. We need to recognize that
our presuppositions are intrinsic to our worldview and are truly
presuppositions. They determine what we consider plausible and
implausible, prior to our examination of the evidence. Although this truth
may seem unremarkable when we share basic assumptions about reality, it
makes an enormous difference when we come to issues that touch on these
presuppositions directly (see Resurrection and
Worldview for one such example).

Finally, this objection actually addresses the theist's warrant to
believe that God exists rather than the question of whether He exists.
In other words, it says that the evidence is not sufficient to compel
me to believe in God. But our warrant to believe in a fact does not
affect the truth or falsehood of this fact. For instance, physicists in
the 1910s had little warrant to believe that quantum mechanics was true.
But it was true! So even if we grant that theists are not warranted in
the belief in God's existence, He could exist nonetheless.

Short answer: first, this statement is personal and subjective. Second,
this statement assumes that the burden of proof ought to fall on the
theist; how do we know this? Third, there is a difference between
claiming that belief in God is unwarranted (i.e. is not reasonable based
on the evidence at hand) and that He does not exist.
See also The
Necessity of Faith and Resurrection and
Worldview.

Unlike the previous objection, this objection stresses that the
standards used in our assessment of God's existence are objective
standards, rather than subjective, personal standards. However, it is
unclear how anyone can claim their beliefs can be totally objective
given that all chains of reason or logic start with certain
presuppositions or axioms. These presuppositions or axioms, by
definition, cannot be based on reason or logic alone. Furthermore, not
all human beings share a common set of presuppositions. Thus, the set
of axioms that we hold must include some element of personal, subjective
preference or choice that cannot be defended by an appeal to reason or
logic.

For instance, if I were to claim that the physical world were a
remarkably persistent and self-consistent illusion (as do many Eastern
religions), could you disprove this conjecture with an appeal to reason
and logic alone? If not, then there must be a personal, subjective
component to our belief in the real existence of the physical world that
is independent of reason and logic. Perhaps even more compelling is the
question of why we believe in the trustworthiness of reason and logic in
general (or our own reason in particular) as valid means to truth. This
belief certainly cannot be based on reason and logic, since their
validity is precisely what we are trying to substantiate!

Short answer: all chains of reason and logic must begin with
presuppositions or axioms which are not based solely only on reason or
logic. Therefore, no one can claim that their beliefs are based solely
on reason or logic. See also The
Necessity of Faith and Resurrection and
Worldview.

There are two major problems with this objection. First, if we consider
the claims of Christianity, it is hard to see how almost anyone could be
truly objective about its claims. For instance, Jesus taught that God
is good and holy, that man is sinful and faces either eternal joy in
God's presence through repentance and faith in Him or eternal punishment
in Hell. Only a sociopath could regard these kind of options with
anything like objectivity. This is true not just of Christianity but of
any religion that addresses eternal questions. In fact, personally
speaking, the only reason that I can regard the claims of Islam or
Zoroastrianism or Greek paganism without terror is that I have concluded
(as a Christian) that the claims of these religions must be false if the
claims of Jesus are true. Similarly, I question whether anyone could
really regard the claims of Jesus with equanimity unless they have
already concluded that they are almost certainly false.

Second, we can perform a thought experiment to test our objectivity with
regards to Christianity. Imagine that Jesus suddenly appeared to us in
an undeniable way and told us that the Bible was absolutely true in
everything it said: about heaven and hell and sin and God's wrath
against evil and our need for salvation. Would we immediately begin to
love and revere God? Would we join a local church, turn our whole lives
over to the Lordship of Christ and proclaim his forgiveness to our
friends and family? If not, then we have a clear motivation to find the
evidence for Christianity insufficient. There is clearly something
besides the truth or falsehood of Jesus' claims that will obscure our
efforts at objectivity. Obviously, the fact that we dislike the claims
of Christianity does not make it true. But it does move us outside the
realm of "objective, disinterested observers." Certainly, the same
logic applies to Christians, who have a personal desire to find the
evidence for Christianity sufficient. I am merely trying to point out
that no one ought to claim pure, disinterested objectivity with regard
to the claims of Christianity or any other religion.

Short answer: Christianity and many other religions address questions
that have immediate implications for our daily lives, our personal
happiness, our moral obligations and our eternal welfare. No human
being can possibly be a completely objective, disinterested observer
when it comes to such questions. See also Why I am a Christian.

First, this statement cannot be used to support the claim that
Christianity is objectively false unless we also assume that personal,
subjective experience is not a valid means to objective truth. On what
basis do we do so? If a friend tells me that they spent the previous
night reading alone in their room, I tend to accept their testimony about their
personal, subjective experience
without independent verification because their claim is relatively
mundane. So clearly, I accept personal, unsubstantiated experience as a valid means
to truth in at least some cases. The main reason that we
discount personal experience as a valid means to truth in general has to do with
extraordinary claims. If my friend told me that they spent the previous
night floating in midair, I would demand additional evidence given how
extraordinary this claim is. However, our definition of "extraordinary"
is intimately related to our worldview presuppositions as discussed in
Question 3, and is therefore ultimately dependent on our presuppositions
about the nature of reality.

A more significant problem with trusting personal, subjective experience
arises when different people claim to have experienced objective
realities which are mutually exclusive. For instance, a Mormon might
claim to have had a near-death experience in which she encountered a
Mormon Jesus while a Muslim's near-death experience features a Jesus who
affirms the authority of the Qu'ran. Because the objective realities to
which these subjective experiences refer are mutually exclusive, one or
more of these experiences must be false. However, it simply does not
follow that all such experiences are false.

Imagine that I meet a man at a bus stop who claims to hold in his hand a
winning lottery ticket. Despite the improbability of his claim, I might
be inclined to believe him given his evident sincerity. Then imagine
that I meet another man who also claims to hold the winning ticket to
the same lottery. Because their two claims are mutually exclusive, it
follows that one of their subjective experiences must be false. But the
most that I can conclude is that subjective experience alone cannot be a
reliable guide to what is true. It simply does not follow that both of
their experiences are false. I happen to strongly agree that subjective
experience alone is an unreliable means to objective truth.
But dismissing it entirely from consideration involves strong
epistemological assumptions that seem to me to be unjustified.

Second, if this statement is taken to undermine the objective truth of
Christianity, then the same objection could be applied to almost any
worldview. Without a doubt, there have been numerous atheists who were
atheists not on the basis of objective evidence but because atheism was
the state-supported and state-endorsed view promulgated by the various
totalitarian regimes under which they lived. There are many more who
are atheists primarily because of terrible past experiences they had
with Christians. There are others atheists who know very little
about religion and whose arguments for atheism are simply not good
arguments. Do these facts prove that atheism is false? Of course not.
No doubt there are intellectuals and non-intellectuals who endorse
almost every worldview known to man. But the existence of such people
neither proves nor disproves the validity of these systems.

Short answer: Subjective experience is certainly not reliable as a sole
means to objective truth given the variety of subjective experiences. But
the subjective basis for many Christian's beliefs can only be an
objection to the truth of Christianity, if we are certain that
subjective experience is never a valid means to objective truth. How do
we know this? Second, the same argument can be applied to almost any
worldview including atheism. Many people hold true beliefs for bad
reasons, but this fact does not invalidate the beliefs themselves.

There are two huge problems with this argument. First, it is primarily
a theological argument. How do we know that God, if he exists, would
not allow error of any kind into the church? In fact, if the letters of
Paul and the other apostles are any indication, there were people in the
early Christian churches who held all kinds of wrong ideas and yet were
considered -by Paul and the other apostles- to be real Christians.

Second, although I would not minimize the theological differences
between major theologians of history, I think it a gross exaggeration to
claim that there is no core doctrinal agreement amongst them. In fact,
the situation seems to be quite the opposite. Every major Christian
theologian (especially those quoted most frequently by the Neoatheists)
would affirm the major historic creeds of the Christian church, the
deity of Christ, the doctrine of sin, the doctrine of atonement, the historicity of
the Resurrection, and the
authority of the Bible. In fact, if I look at my own personal spiritual
influences as a Christian, I find that they include men from all kinds of
denominations, including Charles Spurgeon (Baptist) Tim Keller
(Presbyterian), Martin Luther (Lutheran), John Calvin (Presbyterian),
C.S. Lewis (Anglican), and David Martin-Lloyd Jones (Methodist). Again,
I am not denying that there are areas in which these men disagree
seriously. However, it seems to me quite disingenuous for a skeptic to
throw up his hands and claim that there is such disagreement that the
Christian message is utterly obscure. If I could presume to speak for
these men, I think they would unanimously affirm (with the apostle Paul)
that the core of Christianity is and has always been "Jesus Christ and
him crucified". Matters of other doctrine are important but ultimately
secondary and should be faced only after we have answered the question:
who is Jesus?

Short answer: although Christians certainly disagree in many areas of
theology, the central message of Christianity ("Jesus died for our sins
and was raised to life for our justification") has been affirmed by
every Christian theologian throughout history, including those cited
repeatedly by the Neoatheists. See Who is
Jesus?

If anyone reading this essay has questions about it or about
Christianity in general, feel free to e-mail me at Neil -AT- Shenvi.org
I also highly recommend the book The
Reason for God by Tim Keller.
It is a phenomenal book. Free sermons treating many of the topics covered by this book can be found here.