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Friday, May 12, 2017

The U.S.-Turkey Divide Beyond Raqqa

By
Elizabeth Teoman and Ethan Beaudoin

Key
Takeaway:The U.S. should start
to reorient its long-term relationship with Turkey during the upcoming meeting
between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May
16. The U.S. and Turkey suffer from a deep strategic divergence that goes far
beyond operational disagreements over the offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa
City. The U.S. must instead prioritize its remaining leverage on efforts to halt
and reverse this mounting divide and reenlist Turkey as a legitimate NATO ally
against the threats posed by Salafi-Jihadist Groups and the Russo-Iranian
Coalition.

The
current friction between the U.S. and Turkey extends beyond operational
disagreements over the anti-ISIS operation in Ar-Raqqa City. Turkey’s strategic
objectives diverge from those of the U.S. in key ways. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan ultimately seeks to reassert Turkey’s status as a
regional power throughout the sphere of influence of the former Ottoman Empire.
Erdogan promotes the spread of Islamism across the Middle East and North Africa
as a means to create governments responsive to him and his Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP). His aspirations drive an independent regional policy
that eschews traditional partnerships with the U.S. and Europe. He also
leverages tools of the state to consolidate his increasingly authoritarian rule
at home. These objectives - and the manner in which he pursues them – undermine
the strategic goals of the U.S. in the Middle East and Europe. Erdogan’s
distinct brand of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ leads him to support Salafi-Jihadist Groups
such as Ahrar al-Sham that serve as a vector for al Qaeda. His embrace of
populist nationalism fuels an active conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), which is waging an insurgency in Turkey. The PKK’s Syrian branch – the Syrian
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) – is the primary anti-ISIS ground force
partner for the United States. Erdogan’s attempts to forge an independent
foreign policy prompt him to pursue superficial yet deepening ties with Russia
and Iran.

The U.S.’s myopic focus on the campaign against ISIS in
Ar-Raqqa City has ignored – and often exacerbated - the growing strategic divergence
with Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump has
doubled-down on his predecessor’s preference for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa
City led by the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The president
authorized the U.S. Department of Defense on May 8 to provide direct material
support, including weapons and ammunition, to the YPG despite the long-standing
objections of Turkey. This decision subordinates long-term regional stability
to short-term military expediency. It increases the risk that the U.S. will
fail to secure its objectives because any near-term gains against ISIS in
Ar-Raqqa City will likely prove ephemeral. The YPG-led SDF will ultimately
struggle to provide a political alternative acceptable to a Sunni Arab majority
population that will not submit to the YPG’s vision even when it is implemented
by other Sunni Arabs. This outcome will create an environment permissive for Salafi-Jihadist
groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda. The decision also increases the risk that
Turkey will launch cross-border operations targeting the YPG in Northern Syria,
particularly against the town of Tel
Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province. The U.S. may attempt to prevent
this move - including with new military deployments along the border as well as
expanded intelligence sharing against the PKK – but such responses will fail to
address Turkey’s fundamental concerns. These efforts also risk expending
sources of available leverage that the U.S. could instead use to drive a
strategic realignment with Turkey on key issues such as the threats of al
Qaeda, the
Russo-Iranian coalition, and the wider Turkish-Kurdish War.

The U.S. should act to prevent Turkey from being drawn
further into the Russo-Iranian orbit in Syria. Turkey’s
cooperation with Russia and Iran is transactional and contingent upon Erdogan’s
perceived foreign policy gains. Turkey circumvents the European Union-regulated
Southern Gas Corridor through Russian-backed TurkStream in order to transport gas supplies
to southern Europe. Turkey also signaled its intent to purchase the S-400 air
defense system from Russia as an allegedly more affordable option to NATO
member states’ defense systems. Turkey participates in the Russian-led Astana
talks as a guarantor in order to legitimize itself as a key actor in the Syrian
theater. The December 2016 “cessation of hostilities” deal and the recent
announcement of “de-escalation zones” support this effort by reinforcing Turkey’s
de facto zones of control in Idlib Province and territorial control seized in Turkey’s
Operation Euphrates Shield.

The U.S. needs to sever the link between Turkey and
Salafi-Jihadist groups. Turkey channels its support for anti-regime operations
through al Qaeda-aligned opposition groups. Turkey notably supported the “Jaysh
al Fatah Operations Room” led by al Qaeda in Syria to seizethe city of Idlib in 2015. Turkey
included Ahrar al Sham – a Salafi-Jihadist group allied with al Qaeda – in its Operation
Euphrates Shield. Turkey also tolerated ISIS’s territorial control along its
southern border as an acceptable YPG deterrent. This outreach empowered
irreconcilable actors on the ground at the expensive of acceptable opposition
groups, blocking any prospect of a legitimate negotiated settlement to the
Syrian Civil War. This empowerment also ensures continued safe haven for ISIS,
al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups that threaten the U.S. and Europe.
The U.S. thus cannot allow Turkey to unilaterally shape governance in Ar-Raqqa
City or Northern Syria. The U.S. must over time persuade Turkish leaders that
backing al Qaeda linked groups actually threatens Turkey’s interest. Turkey’s backing
of al Qaeda-aligned groups exacerbates the risk of domestic terrorism in
Turkey, elevates the terror threat to NATO member countries, and even competes
with Erdogan’s own quasi-imperial vision of the Middle East.

The U.S. should seek to capitalize
on points of short-term cooperation and set conditions to shape a long-term
strategic convergence with Turkey against Russia, Iran, and Salafi-Jihadist
groups. The U.S. and Turkey still share fundamental strategic
objectives and short-term interests. The announced de-escalation zones in Syria
benefit the Bashar al-Assad regime and the Russo-Iranian coalition more than advance
Turkey’s interests. Both the U.S. and Turkey need to block the expansion of
Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria. This deal will enable pro-Assad
regime forces to regroup and reset for offensive operations in central and
southern Syria, far from Turkey’s area of interest. Turkey is not likely to
cede areas of opposition control to fully implement the agreement. The U.S. and
Turkey can also cooperate on counter-terrorism operations inside Turkey.

The U.S. still retains multiple sources of leverage over
Turkey outside of Syria. The coordinated use of these levers can support a
strategy to bring Turkeyback
into alignment with the United States. The U.S. can
begin to roll back Turkey’s support for Salafi-Jihadist groups by addressing
Turkey’s concerns over the YPG’s growing influence in northern Syria and taking
tangible steps to pressure the Assad regime. The
U.S. can assuage Turkish fears of PKK expansion by supporting operations to
remove the PKK from Sinjar, Iraq.
Expanding economic aid could supplement Turkey's capacity to rebuild
northern Syria. Enhanced U.S. military
and intelligence cooperation through NATO can bolster the weakened, post-restructuring
Turkish Armed Forces that face a growing Russian-Iranian military
footprint, provided that Erdogan curbs his
post-coup authoritarian crackdown. The U.S. also has a range of
counter-terrorism sanctions measures it can use to address the threat posed by
al Qaeda-linked networks in Turkey. The U.S. can also pressure Turkey over
human rights violations during Erdogan’s
crackdown on domestic dissent.

The U.S. needs a broader strategic
outlook on cooperation with Turkey. Turkey is an ally rapidly drifting away
from the U.S. and Europe. Focusing exclusively or primarily on near-term
anti-ISIS gains in Syria will put long-term U.S. strategic interests at grave
risk. The Trump Administration must reframe the terms of engagement with
Erdogan or risk losing an important NATO partner in Turkey. A Turkey that acts
like a NATO ally can be an effective part of a U.S. strategy to destroy
Salafi-Jihadist groups and roll back the influence of the Russo-Iranian
coalition.