Plaintiffs
Abdul Mohamed Waked Fares, Mohamed Abdo Waked Darwich, Lucia
Touzard Romo, and Groupo Wisa, S.A., have been designated as
Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers by Defendants
pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
(“Kingpin Act”), 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq. In this action, they bring claims pursuant to the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“A P A ”) for
Defendants' alleged failure to provide them with
sufficient post-designation notice regarding the bases for
their designations. Presently before the Court are
Plaintiffs' [3] Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants' [14] Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.
Upon consideration of the pleadings, [1] the relevant legal
authorities, and the record for purposes of the pending
motions, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' [3] Motion for
Summary Judgment, DENIES Defendants' [14] Motion to
Dismiss, and GRANTS Defendants' [14] Motion for Summary
Judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes
that Defendants have provided Plaintiffs with sufficient
post-designation notice under both the Due Process Clause and
the APA.

I.
BACKGROUND

A.
Statutory Background

The
Kingpin Act authorizes the President to designate
“foreign person[s] that play a significant role in
international narcotics trafficking” as significant
foreign narcotics traffickers (“S F N Ts ”). 21
U.S.C. §§ 1903(b), 1907(7). The Act also authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with other
federal government agencies, to designate foreign persons
“as materially assisting in, or providing financial or
technological support for or to, or providing goods or
services in support of, the international narcotics
trafficking activities of a[n] [SFNT], ” id.
§ 1904(b)(2), “as owned, controlled, or directed
by, or acting for or on behalf of, a[n] [SFNT], ”
id. § 1904(b)(3), or “as playing a
significant role in international narcotics trafficking,
” id. § 1904(b)(4). The Secretary of the
Treasury has delegated this authority to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), an agency within
the Department of the Treasury. Persons designated pursuant
to such authority are referred to as “specially
designated narcotics traffickers”
(“SDNTs”). 31 C.F.R. §§ 598.803,
598.314. The consequences of an SDNT designation are dire, as
the designation acts to block “all such property and
interests in property within the United States, or within the
possession or control of any United States person, which are
owned or controlled by” the designated person. 21
U.S.C. § 1904(b).

Following
designation, an SDNT may “seek administrative
reconsideration of his, her or its designation . . ., or
assert that the circumstances resulting in the designation no
longer apply, and thus seek to have the designation rescinded
. . . .” 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. Administrative
reconsideration is handled by OFAC. Id. The SDNT
may, in addition, seek a meeting with OFAC, although
“such meetings are not required, and the office may, at
its discretion, decline to conduct such meetings prior to
completing a review pursuant to this section.”
Id. After OFAC “has conducted a review of the
request for reconsideration, it [must] provide a written
decision to the blocked person . . . .” Id.

B.
Factual Background

OFAC
designated Plaintiffs as SDNTs on May 5, 2016, along with
non-parties Waked Money Laundering Organization (“Waked
MLO”) and Nidal Ahmed Waked Hatum. These designations
were based on the government's determination that
Plaintiffs play a significant role in international narcotics
trafficking by facilitating money laundering on behalf of
“multiple international drug traffickers and their
organizations.” AR 107. Following their designations,
Plaintiffs filed a request for reconsideration with OFAC on
May 24, 2016. In that request, Plaintiffs asked for access to
the administrative record, expedited review of their request
for reconsideration, and a meeting with OFAC. AR 3 Plaintiffs
promised that the grounds for their request “w[ould] be
provided in response to any OFAC questionnaires directed to
the Petitioners, and w[ould] be supported by briefing and
evidence volunteered by the Petitioners.” Id.

OFAC
denied Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration on June 8,
2016, noting that reconsideration was inappropriate because
only 19 days had passed since the initial designation of
Plaintiffs as SDNTs, and Plaintiffs had not provided any
supporting evidence in conjunction with their request. AR
16-17. Nonetheless, OFAC indicated that, should
Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration “be further
developed or clarified, ” they could submit another
request for reconsideration at a later date. Id.
OFAC also informed Plaintiffs that their request for the
administrative record was being processed, but noted
“that the review process can be lengthy and requires
extensive interagency consultation in order to comply with
U.S. government regulations regarding the protection of
classified, privileged, and otherwise protected
information.” AR 18.

Plaintiffs
received the redacted administrative record underlying their
SDNT designations in two deliveries on July 5, 2016 and July
18, 2016. AR 22, 112. OFAC's letter accompanying the July
18, 2016 disclosure indicated that “should additional
unclassified, non-privileged, or otherwise releasable
information become available, ” it would be provided to
Plaintiffs. AR 112. OFAC subsequently furnished additional
information by means of two unredacted summaries of
“otherwise privileged information, ” which were
provided to Plaintiffs on August 26, 2016 (“August
Summary”) and October 28, 2016 (“October
Summary”). AR 289, 292.

II.
LEGAL STANDARD

A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants
move to dismiss this action as moot pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). To survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over their claims. Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483
F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ctr. for Arms Control
& Non-Proliferation v. Redd, No. CIV.A. 05-682
(RMC), 2005 WL 3447891, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2005). The
jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of
the Constitution to the adjudication of actual, ongoing cases
or controversies; a limitation that “gives rise to the
doctrines of standing and mootness.” Foretich v.
United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 852 (D.C. Cir.
2011). Pursuant to the mootness doctrine, it “is not
enough that the initial requirements of standing and ripeness
have been satisfied; the suit must remain alive throughout
the course of litigation, to the moment of final appellate
disposition. If events outrun the controversy such that the
court can grant no meaningful relief; the case must be
dismissed as moot.” People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 59 F.Supp.3d 91, 95 (D.D.C. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A
case is moot when the challenged conduct ceases such that
there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated in circumstances where it becomes impossible for the
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the
prevailing party.” United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

The
Complaint seeks two forms of relief under the Due Process
Clause and the APA stemming from Defendants' alleged
failure to supply Plaintiffs with sufficient notice regarding
the bases for their designations as SDNTs: (i) a declaration
that “the administrative record provided by Defendants
violates Plaintiffs' due process and statutory rights to
adequate post-designation notice and a meaningful opportunity
to administratively challenge their designations;” and
(ii) an order requiring “Defendants to provide an
unredacted copy of their administrative record, or any other
solution chosen by the Court or agreed to by the parties
which provides Plaintiffs with adequate post-designation
notice.” Compl. at 11. Although Defendants have
provided additional disclosures to Plaintiffs following the
initiation of this lawsuit, there is no question that
Defendants have yet to provide all of the relief sought in
this action (e.g., the complete unredacted
administrative record upon which the SDNT designations were
based). In other words, although the government contends that
Plaintiffs have received all the disclosure that they are
entitled to, Plaintiffs have not received all the relief that
they have sought in their Complaint. Accordingly, this case
is not moot.

That is
not to say that Plaintiffs are entitled to such additional
relief, but rather that this is a merits question that is not
properly resolved on the basis of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
resolves this matter on the basis of Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment. Nonetheless, the Court observes that
its resolution of whether Defendants have provided sufficient
notice under the Due Process Clause and the APA would be
identical were it instead to proceed on the basis of
Defendant's motion to dismiss, as the record for purposes
of that motion would be identical to the one considered for
purposes of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
See Lenox Hill Hosp. v. Shalala, 131 F.Supp.2d 136,
140 n.4 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that a district court can
consider the administrative record for purpose of a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)).

B.
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs
have moved for summary judgment on their claims pursuant to
the Due Process Clause and the APA, and Defendants have
cross-moved for summary judgment in their favor. Summary
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter o f l a w. ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual
dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment;
the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact.
Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If material facts are genuinely in
dispute, or undisputed facts are susceptible to divergent yet
justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Under the particular circumstances of this case, there is no
factual dispute for the Court to resolve. Rather, the parties
disagree only over the legal question of whether the
disclosures by OFAC regarding Plaintiffs' SDNT
designations satisfy due process and the APA. There is no
dispute, for example, over the timing or content of
OFAC's disclosures.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Furthermore,
&ldquo;when a party seeks review of agency action under the
APA [before a district court], the district judge sits as an
appellate tribunal. The &lsquo;entire case&#39; on review is
a question of law.&rdquo; Am. Bioscience, Inc. v.
Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, &ldquo;the standard set forth in Rule 56[] does
not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing
the administrative record . . . . Summary judgment is [] the
mechanism for deciding whether as a matter of law the agency
action is supported by the administrative record and is
otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.&rdquo;
Southeast Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F.Supp.2d 135,
142 (D.D.C. 2010). T h e A P A &ldquo;sets forth the full
extent of judicial authority to review executive agency
action for procedural correctness.&rdquo; FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). It
requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions” that are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §
...

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