This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-113
entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's
Oversight of Power Source Investments' which was released on December
30, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
December 2010:
Defense Acquisitions:
Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's Oversight of Power Source
Investments:
GAO-11-113:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-113, a report to Congressional Committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and equipment
rely on power sources, such as batteries. In response to a mandate in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, GAO
determined (1) DOD’s approximate investment in power sources, (2) the
extent to which DOD coordinates its power source investments, and (3)
the extent to which DOD’s policies facilitate the use of standard
power sources. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed
DOD investment data, met with DOD officials and industry
representatives, and attended DOD conferences aimed at facilitating
power source coordination.
What GAO Found:
GAO determined that DOD has invested at least $2.1 billion in power
sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. However, DOD
lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in
the power sources area. Availability of complete data varies across
the three investment categories: science and technology (S&T),
logistics support, and acquisition programs. While DOD appears to have
adequate departmentwide data on S&T efforts, it does not have
departmentwide data for all logistics support investments. DOD lacks
sufficient data on its investments in power sources when they are
developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1 billion
amount includes investments in S&T and logistics support that GAO was
able to identify, but not power source investments as part of
acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment
data in that area. This lack of complete, departmentwide investment
data hinders DOD’s oversight and future planning in the power sources
area, adversely affecting its ability to ensure basic accountability,
anticipate future funding, and measure performance.
DOD’s mechanisms for coordinating power source S&T-—including
interagency working groups, conferences, informal networks, and
information technology resources—-are generally effective. However, in
some of these activities participation by pertinent member agencies is
voluntary and could be more complete. Agencies may be missing
opportunities to coordinate activities—-such as avoiding initiation of
similar research projects-—and leverage resources because agency
participation is voluntary and the level of participation by pertinent
agencies varies. In addition, DOD’s strategic planning process to
facilitate the allocation of S&T funds for power source technologies
could be improved. The S&T planning efforts can also be complicated by
external factors, such as the additions Congress makes to DOD’s budget.
Although DOD power source experts GAO staff spoke with agree that the
department needs to increase its emphasis on power source
standardization, DOD lacks departmentwide policies to help emphasize
power source standardization. Existing policies have demonstrated
limited effectiveness because of compliance problems and because they
may only apply to specific power source applications. Although it is
generally more economical to address standardization early in the
acquisition process, according to DOD officials, power sources are
generally not considered early in the process, potentially hindering
standardization efforts. DOD has also not evaluated departmentwide
opportunities for retrofitting deployed weapon systems and equipment
with standard or other preferred power sources when cost effective.
What GAO Recommends:
To increase oversight of power source investments, GAO recommends that
DOD consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data. To
improve interagency coordination of S&T projects, DOD should determine
ways to strengthen agency participation in coordination mechanisms. To
increase emphasis on standardization, DOD should develop a standardization
plan and enforceable departmentwide policies and identify opportunities to
retrofit existing systems with standard power sources when cost effective.
DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with
the other four. It was unclear from DOD’s response what actions it plans
to take in response to GAO’s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-113] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Lacks Comprehensive, Departmentwide Data on Some Power Source
Investments:
S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective, Though
Opportunities Exist to Improve Strategic Planning:
DOD’s Power Source Standardization Efforts Are Not Departmentwide and
Lack Robust Enforcement:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Budget Activities:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Principal DOD Coordination Mechanisms for Investments in
Power Source S&T Projects:
Figures:
Figure 1: Sample of the DOD Power Source Inventory:
Figure 2: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by DOD Component
from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 3: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by Type from
Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 4: Minimum DOD Investments through DLA in Power Sources for
Logistics Support:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 30, 2010:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and equipment
rely on power sources such as batteries. We estimate that DOD invested
at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through
fiscal year 2010 in three investment areas: science and technology
(S&T) activities such as research, logistics support such as providing
the warfighter with supplies, and acquisition programs such as those for
weapon systems or equipment. This amount will likely rise because of
growing warfighter energy and power demands as well as interest in
smaller, lighter, and more capable power sources. Power sources are a
mission-critical technology and may ultimately affect the warfighter
if DOD is unable to meet demand. For example, severe shortages of some
types of batteries during initial combat operations in Iraq threatened
to significantly degrade the operational capabilities of the United
States military.[Footnote 1] During the shortages, caused in part by
industrial base limitations and initial reliance on one supplier, the
Marines reported having less than a 2-day supply of certain mission-
critical batteries rather than the required 30-day supply.[Footnote 2]
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated
that GAO determine DOD's power source investments and coordination
efforts.[Footnote 3] In this report, our specific objectives were to
(1) determine, as completely as possible, DOD's total investment in
power sources; (2) assess the extent to which DOD coordinates power
source S&T investments departmentwide as well as with the Department
of Energy (DOE); and (3) assess the extent to which DOD has policies
that facilitate power source standardization. In consultation with
congressional staff, we limited the scope of the term power sources to
include tactical power sources used for soldier-carried equipment and
vehicle applications as well as power sources for munitions (e.g.,
missiles) and satellites. Our scope excludes power sources used to
support installations such as temporary or permanent military
facilities. In terms of specific technologies, we focused on
batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors. This was based on the
predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power sources, the
level of investment in fuel cells, and congressional interest in
capacitors.
To determine DOD's total investment in power sources for S&T,
logistics support, and acquisition programs, we interviewed officials
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across DOD
component organizations to determine an appropriate methodology for
collecting the most complete set of investment data possible. We
analyzed DOD investment data extracted from DOD research and logistics
support databases and also other data that we gathered from pertinent
DOD components. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of providing approximate or minimum investment
amounts in S&T and logistics support in this report. To assess the
extent to which DOD coordinates power source S&T investments, we
interviewed officials across the military services, other pertinent
DOD components, DOE, and the power source industry. In addition, we
attended private sector and federal government conferences related to
power sources, took part in training sessions related to DOD-wide
information-sharing resources, and collected information from the
membership of a power sources industry association. We also drew
extensively on other GAO work related to interagency coordination.
[Footnote 4] In order to assess the extent to which DOD's policies
facilitate power source standardization, we interviewed officials
across the military services and other pertinent DOD components and
reviewed existing policies and standardization efforts. A more
detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in
appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD invests in power sources such as batteries, fuel cells, and
capacitors to support the warfighting effort by powering weapon
systems and equipment.[Footnote 5] DOD's power source investment is
expected to rise because of an increased reliance on advanced weapon
systems and equipment and ongoing efforts to develop new technologies
that are smaller, lighter, and more power dense.[Footnote 6] Batteries
are devices that convert chemical energy into electrical energy. The
two main types of batteries are primary (non-rechargeable) and
secondary (rechargeable). Primary batteries, which are discarded after
their charge has been depleted, are the most common battery type for
soldier-carried applications. A subclass of primary batteries called
thermal batteries is used for short-term, high-power applications
(e.g., missiles). While primary batteries typically self-discharge
available energy when not in use, thermal batteries have a longer
shelf life because they remain inert until activated. Secondary
batteries, which can be reenergized after their charge has been
depleted, are less commonly used by deployed units than primary
batteries. However, the Army has undertaken educational campaigns to
increase their use in light of some cost efficiencies and operational
advantages--including overall weight reduction of soldiers' equipment.
[Footnote 7] Further, the military services are interested in
transitioning from non-rechargeable batteries to secondary batteries
because their use by deployed units may decrease the number of vehicle
convoys needed to supply batteries in war zones. DOD is also
interested in limiting the proliferation of battery types to reduce
the number of different battery types the soldiers have to carry and
limit soldier confusion over which battery is required to operate a
device--thus simplifying operations and resupply. See figure 1 for a
sample of DOD's power source inventory.
Figure 1: Sample of the DOD Power Source Inventory:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane (NSWC Crane):
[End of figure]
In general, fuel cells and capacitors are less mature technologies
than batteries with respect to defense applications. Fuel cells are
electrochemical devices that convert the chemical energy in a fuel,
such as hydrogen, into electrical energy. Fuel cells look and function
very similar to batteries. However, the available energy of a battery
is stored within the battery--and its performance will decline as that
energy is depleted--while a fuel cell continues to convert chemical
energy to electricity as long as it has a supply of fuel. Capacitors
are passive electrical components that store energy and may be used
for a wide range of commercial and defense applications. Although most
capacitors are used for small, primarily consumer-oriented electronic
devices, they are increasingly being developed for high-power
weaponry. DOD research organizations have ongoing S&T efforts focused
on maturing fuel cell and capacitor technologies so they can be
deployed. Given the developmental nature of these technologies--as
well as the predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power
sources--this report principally discusses batteries.
DOD invests in power sources in three broad, interrelated investment
categories: (1) S&T efforts related to developing and improving power
source technologies, (2) purchasing power sources for logistics
support as part of routine warfighter resupply, and (3) developing or
purchasing power sources for integration into a weapon system or
equipment as part of an acquisition program. Ideally, technologies
developed as part of S&T efforts will ultimately be incorporated into
new or existing weapon systems or equipment. These three investment
categories are described below.
1. S&T: DOD research, development, test and evaluation investment is
separated into seven discrete investment categories known as budget
activities. The first three categories represent basic and applied
research and technology development activities and are collectively
known as S&T activities.[Footnote 8] These can include activities such
as developing or improving upon different chemical combinations that
enhance energy storage or power output capabilities, developing
lighter components, and identifying and incorporating novel material
components. This research may be conducted by many different entities,
including DOD research centers and other government laboratories,
power sources manufacturers, and academic institutions. According to
DOD officials, these projects may be funded through a variety of
mechanisms, including a DOD component's base budget, small business
programs, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program; and additions Congress makes to DOD's budget (i.e.,
congressional add-ons).[Footnote 9]
2. Logistics support: This category includes the provision of
logistical services, materiel, and transportation required to support
the military in the continental United States and worldwide. Power
sources are like any other materiel requirements of military units,
such as food and clothing, in that they are a consumable commodity
that must be reordered and resupplied according to military service
needs. Power sources for logistics support are typically purchased
through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is the primary
supplying agent for DOD.
3. Acquisition programs: This category includes the selection of a
military standard power source, the selection of a commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) power source, or the design, development, and production
of a program-unique power source as part of a DOD acquisition program.
This process may be managed by the program office responsible for the
weapon system or equipment acquisition, the contractor developing the
system, or both. Since virtually all weapon systems and equipment
include a power source, most acquisition programs have to undergo this
process.
For the purpose of this report, we define coordination as any joint
activity by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more
public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone.
As we have previously reported,[Footnote 10] interagency coordination
is important to avoid carrying out programs in a fragmented,
uncoordinated way in areas where multiple agencies address a similar
mission. Standardization, which is a form of coordination, includes
efforts to expand the use of common or interchangeable parts by
developing and agreeing on compatible standards. With respect to power
sources, this may include developing standard shapes to facilitate the
use of common, nonproprietary power sources in a range of weapon
systems and equipment.
DOD Lacks Comprehensive, Departmentwide Data on Some Power Source
Investments:
DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment
in the power sources area and no single DOD office aggregates these
data across all investment categories. Further, availability of
complete data varies across the three investment categories: S&T,
logistics support, and acquisition programs. We determined that
DOD invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2010. While DOD appears to have adequate
departmentwide data on S&T efforts, it does not have departmentwide
data for all logistics support investments. DOD has limited data on
its investments in power sources when they are developed or purchased
for acquisition programs. The $2.1 billion amount includes the
investments in S&T and logistics support that we were able to identify
but not power source investments as part of acquisition programs
because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data in that area.
In general, a lack of investment information can adversely affect
DOD's ability to avoid unnecessary duplication; control costs;
ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the
budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and
detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management
issues. [Footnote 11]
DOD Has a High Level of Data on Power Source S&T Investments:
We determined that from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 DOD
invested approximately $868 million in the development of power source
technologies through many individual power source S&T projects.
However, this amount is approximate as it may not include all power
source S&T project funding.[Footnote 12] Figure 2 depicts DOD's
approximate investment in power sources S&T by DOD component. In the
period from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010, the Army was
the largest investor with a total investment of about $361 million and
the Navy was the second largest investor with a total investment of
about $342 million. During that same time period, the Air Force
invested about $90 million, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) invested about $51 million, and the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) invested about $26 million.
Figure 2: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by DOD Component
from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Army: $62.5 million;
Navy: $45.9 million;
Air Force: $12.2 million;
DARPA: $4.1 million;
MDA: $2.5 million;
Total: $127.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Army: $54.2 million;
Navy: $50.2 million;
Air Force: $18 million;
DARPA: $19.1 million;
MDA: $2.5 million;
Total: $144 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Army: $76.7 million;
Navy: $83.7 million;
Air Force: $24.5 million;
DARPA: $13.4 million;
MDA: $3.4 million;
Total: $201.7 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Army: $92.8 million;
Navy: $86.9 million;
Air Force: $26.8 million;
DARPA: $5.5 million;
MDA: $8.1 million;
Total: $220.1 million.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Army: $74.9 million;
Navy: $74.8 million;
Air Force: $7.1 million;
DARPA: $8.6 million;
MDA: $9.5 million;
Total: $174.9 million.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA,
and MDA.
[End of figure]
DOD's investment is largely concentrated within two power source
technology areas: batteries and fuel cells. There is also significant
investment in projects that involve more than one type of technology,
which we refer to in figure 3 as multiple types. We found that the
total investment for capacitor-related research was small relative to
the other areas. This may be because capacitors for high-power defense
applications are an emerging and still immature technology.[Footnote
13] Officials informed us that DOD-wide interest in capacitors has
increased along with an interest in high-power weaponry. As shown in
figure 3, the largest investment--about 36 percent of the total for
fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010--was in fuel cells.
Figure 3: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by Type from
Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Multiple types: $24.7 million;
Capacitors: $1.5 million;
Fuel cells: $64.4 million;
Secondary batteries: $11.3 million;
Primary batteries: $25.3 million;
Total: $127.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Multiple types: $28.2 million;
Capacitors: $8.4 million;
Fuel cells: $64.3 million;
Secondary batteries: $16.8 million;
Primary batteries: $26.4 million;
Total: $144.1 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Multiple types: $64.9 million;
Capacitors: $1.2 million;
Fuel cells: $78.6 million;
Secondary batteries: $25.9 million;
Primary batteries: $31.1 million;
Total: $201.7 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Multiple types: $84.5 million;
Capacitors: $1.9 million;
Fuel cells: $61.6 million;
Secondary batteries: $43.9 million;
Primary batteries: $28.3 million;
Total: $220.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Multiple types: $76.7 million;
Capacitors: $3.4 million;
Fuel cells: $43.6 million;
Secondary batteries: $23.8 million;
Primary batteries: $27.3 million;
Total: $174.8 million.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA,
and MDA.
[End of figure]
We identified a suite of DOD-wide information technology resources
that includes a database used for tracking DOD-wide S&T activities.
[Footnote 14] This database does not categorize projects in such a way
that one could readily and reliably extract all activities for a
certain research area (such as batteries). Despite these limitations,
we were able to obtain suitable data from each research organization,
which enabled us to present an approximate investment figure.
DOD Has Data on Some Logistics Support Investments, but Not All
Investments Are Tracked:
We found that DOD invested at least $1.2 billion in power sources for
logistics support from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010.
Though DLA supplies the nation's military services with critical
resources needed to accomplish their worldwide missions, there are
additional methods outside of DLA's procurement processes by which the
military services may purchase power sources.[Footnote 15] For
example, a service might purchase a power source outside of DLA's
procurement processes if that service is the only consumer of the
power source item. However, we found no DOD effort to aggregate and
analyze these investments, even though DLA and military service
logistics databases track investments using a standard governmentwide
federal supply coding system that could be used for this purpose.
We collected data from DLA and military service databases for
investments in power sources for logistics support from fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2010. We determined that military service
purchases through DLA likely account for the majority of logistics
supports investments captured by DOD databases.[Footnote 16] However,
while the $1.2 billion investment amount we compiled includes data
from these databases, DOD officials informed us that not all of these
databases track power source purchases made as part of contractor-
performed maintenance for weapon systems and equipment--known as
contract logistic support. As we have previously reported, DOD has
extensively relied on contractors for activities such as logistics
support.[Footnote 17] Thus, the minimum investment amount we generated
does not include what is likely a substantial amount of power source
investments for logistics support. Figure 4 depicts DOD's minimum
investment in power sources for logistics support.
Figure 4: Minimum DOD Investments through DLA in Power Sources for
Logistics Support:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Minimum DOD Investments through DLA: $215.4 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Minimum DOD Investments through DLA: $210.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Minimum DOD Investments through DLA: $261.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Minimum DOD Investments through DLA: $296.8 million.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Minimum DOD Investments through DLA: $233.6 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DLA data.
[End of figure]
DOD Lacks Sufficient Data on Its Total Investment in Power Sources for
Acquisition Programs:
Though virtually all DOD weapon systems and equipment rely on a power
source, DOD has little data on its total investment in power sources
for acquisition programs. DOD officials told us that neither the
department nor individual DOD components have information showing the
total amount invested in power sources for acquisition programs,
although this information may be retained by individual program
offices. We asked some program offices if they could provide basic
cost information on the principal power sources used by their
programs. Some program offices provided this information, but others
did not. Some offices that could not provide this information provided
an explanation; for example, one program office told us that the cost
for the power source was built into the overall cost for the system
and thus was not broken out as a specific expense. Other program
offices simply provided no cost data and no explanation.
We also asked a number of senior DOD officials--including officials
from OSD and from the services at the assistant or deputy assistant
secretary level[Footnote 18]--whether they could provide data on total
investment in power sources for acquisition programs at the
departmentwide or service levels, but none were able to do so.
Officials from the Office of the Director of Operational Energy Plans
and Programs, an office within OSD that serves as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and others regarding operational
energy, concurred.[Footnote 19] They stated that since these costs are
not aggregated, DOD would have to require each acquisition program
office to identify power source investments and then consolidate them.
They stated that this would be a labor-intensive data collection
effort given the large number of DOD acquisition programs.[Footnote 20]
In order to gain an understanding of how some acquisition programs
determined which power sources would be used by their programs, we
asked several Army, Navy, and Air Force acquisition program offices to
provide us with information on this process.[Footnote 21] Although
these offices provided responses with varying levels of detail, we
determined that there are several methods by which a program office
may acquire power sources. For example:
* Selection of existing military standard power sources: The program
office for the V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotor aircraft developed by the
Navy in the 1980s, followed a mandatory Navy specification for rotary
aircraft that required the use of government-furnished batteries made
to DOD military standards. According to the program office, the V-22
program tested two military standard batteries already used in two
other aircraft and determined that they met the power source
requirements of the V-22. As such, the program selected these two
batteries for use by the V-22. Because the V-22 selected preexisting
batteries, the program incurred no development costs; the combined
unit costs provided were $3,688.
* Selection of COTS power sources: Officials from the Navy's P-8A
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft told us the program uses a COTS
battery as the principal power source for its electronics systems.
[Footnote 22] The P-8A is derived from a Boeing 737 commercial
aircraft and has roles in antisubmarine and antisurface warfare as
well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The program
office assessed the suitability of the power source used by the Boeing
737 and found that this COTS solution met their requirements and
selected it for use by the program. Because the P-8A selected a
preexisting COTS battery, the program incurred no development costs
associated with program-unique power sources. The unit cost provided
was $11,500.
* Development of program-unique power sources: Officials in the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program office told us that they
determined that the program required the design, development, and
production of a program-unique thermal battery because of the
missile's strict design parameters in terms of internal space
available for the power source. The program developed a new battery,
but the program office was only able to provide limited cost
information because the costs involved were included in the overall
cost of the missile. The unit cost provided was $3,775.
S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective, Though
Opportunities Exist to Improve Strategic Planning:
DOD coordination mechanisms for power source S&T activities are
generally effective in facilitating coordination across pertinent DOD
components and with DOE, but opportunities exist for improvement. We
also found that DOD's strategic planning process for appropriately
directing S&T investment for power source technologies could be
improved. DOD also generally has deficiencies in strategic planning
for critical technologies, processes for technology transition, and
tools that support transition. Further, S&T planning efforts can be
complicated by external factors. For example, congressional additions
to DOD's budget account for just over half of the total S&T funding we
identified for power sources. Since this process can be informal and
lack transparency, outcomes in this area may be unpredictable and
difficult to incorporate into strategic plans.
S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective:
DOD uses various mechanisms to facilitate the coordination of power
source S&T activities across pertinent DOD components, DOE, and in
some cases industry. According to DOD power source researchers, the
principal means for coordinating is the Chemical Working Group of the
Interagency Advanced Power Group (IAPG). The Chemical Working Group is
part of the long-standing IAPG interagency working group and brings
together researchers from relevant DOD components, DOE, and other
federal stakeholders to exchange information about power source
projects and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. In addition, the
Defense Technical Information Center--an organization responsible for
providing information services to DOD--has a number of information
technology resources related to S&T that were developed to facilitate
information sharing between stakeholders across the DOD research and
engineering community. Table 1 lists the principal ways DOD
coordinates S&T projects.
Table 1: Principal DOD Coordination Mechanisms for Investments in
Power Source S&T Projects:
Select coordination mechanisms: Interagency groups;
Description: Interagency groups provide a forum in which researchers,
acquisition personnel, and other pertinent stakeholders can share
information and leverage resources. Key groups related to power
sources include the Chemical Working Group of the IAPG and the Power
Sources Technology Working Group of the Joint Defense Manufacturing
Technology Panel.
Select coordination mechanisms: Conferences;
Description: There are several major conferences in the power sources
area that provide a forum for information sharing and professional
development in the power sources community, which includes DOD, DOE,
and other agencies. One such conference is the Power Sources
Conference, which has been held 44 times and brings together
government, academic, and commercial researchers to discuss research
projects.
Select coordination mechanisms: Information technology resources;
Description: The Defense Technical Information Center provides a suite
of databases and Web 2.0 services to facilitate information sharing
and professional development. One example is the Research and
Engineering Database that compiles ongoing research and development
projects throughout DOD.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
As an example of the efficacy of these mechanisms, no power source
projects presented at the 2010 annual Chemical Working Group meeting
were identified as involving duplicative research within DOD or
between DOD and DOE, though the meetings have been effective in
identifying instances of project duplication in the past.
Additionally, both DOD and DOE participate in several other
coordinating groups together to leverage common efforts, and in July
2010 DOD and DOE signed a memorandum of understanding developing a
framework for cooperation and partnership on energy issues. Both
organizations agreed to collaborate on S&T projects at research
institutions sponsored by either agency, to synchronize S&T to expand
complementary efforts, and to develop joint initiatives for major
energy S&T programs of mutual interest.
Though we found these mechanisms to be generally effective, agencies
may miss opportunities to fully coordinate because attendance at these
interagency groups and conferences is voluntary and the level of
agency participation varies. Further, conversations with officials
from DOD component organizations suggest that there may be limited
awareness within the DOD power sources community of the coordination
services available through the Defense Technical Information Center.
In areas where multiple agencies address a similar mission,
interagency coordination is important to collectively meet common
goals and avoid carrying out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated
way. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 23] this lack of
coordination can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program
customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.
Agency officials informed us that the community of power source
experts from the federal government, industry, and academia is small
and well-connected by interpersonal relationships. Although it is not
possible to accurately estimate the impact of these often informal
relationships, officials believed that such relationships facilitate
information sharing, which is beneficial to DOD-wide power source S&T.
S&T Strategic Planning Could Be Improved:
We found that though DOD has generally effective S&T coordination
mechanisms, its strategic planning process to facilitate the
allocation of S&T funds for power source technologies could be
improved. Most DOD components generate strategic plans to guide S&T
investments, though we found no current Air Force plan. We found that
existing military service-level S&T strategic plans are not specific
and typically do not discuss investments in power sources in depth, if
at all. There have also been several technology roadmaps developed or
initiated specifically for the power sources area.[Footnote 24]
However, we have been told by DOD researchers that these roadmaps may
quickly become irrelevant without frequent updating because necessary
investment levels and the maturity of the pertinent technologies may
evolve over time. Further, unless roadmapping efforts are coordinated,
DOD cannot be assured that they will be complementary and fully assist
agencies in addressing shared technological challenges. Additionally,
though DOD has established the Energy and Power Community of Interest
to focus on power source issues as part of its broader Reliance 21
program,[Footnote 25] representatives of this group told us that it is
a relatively new organization and is still finalizing organizational
planning. They said that the community of interest will develop
strategic planning documents specific to power sources that will
enable DOD to better plan in this area.
We have previously reported that DOD lacked a single executive-level
OSD official who is accountable for operational energy matters and
recommended that one be designated.[Footnote 26] We also noted that
DOD lacked a comprehensive strategic plan for operational energy. As a
result, in October 2009 DOD established the Director of Operational
Energy Plans and Programs. According to officials from this office,
they will, among other things, coordinate departmentwide policy,
planning, and program activities related to operational energy demand
and relevant technologies. Further, officials told us that this office
will also include power source technologies in its purview. The
Director was recently confirmed, and the office is currently working
to gather the personnel required to support its efforts. The Duncan
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
requires the office to submit an annual strategic plan on
departmentwide operational energy.[Footnote 27]
We have previously reported that DOD generally faces problems with
deficiencies in strategic planning for critical technologies,
processes for technology development and transition, and tools that
support transition.[Footnote 28] Similarly, some DOD officials told us
about challenges in transitioning a new power source technology from
the laboratory to an acquisition program. We identified some efforts
that support power source technology transition within the services.
However, DOD researchers said that the overall problem still occurs in
this area and that promising technologies may be forgotten or
overlooked if they are not transitioned into an acquisition program.
In addition, DOD's lack of oversight and comprehensive data on power
source investments for acquisition programs may further complicate
technology transition efforts.
External Factors Can Pose Planning Challenges:
S&T planning efforts can be complicated by external factors. We found
that DOD investments in power source S&T come from several sources,
including base budget funds, small business programs (such as the SBIR
program), and congressional add-ons--that is, additions Congress makes
to DOD's budget. From the data we collected, we determined that
congressional add-ons account for approximately 55 percent of the DOD
total investment we identified in power source S&T from fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2010. While these add-ons provide funding for
S&T, officials at DOD research organizations told us that these add-
ons may pose a challenge to strategic planning for two reasons. First,
research organizations may lack complete discretion over how to apply
the funds--while they may be able to accept or decline an add-on,
these add-ons do not give them full control over the project. Second,
since this process can be informal and lack transparency, outcomes in
this area may be unpredictable and difficult to incorporate into
strategic plans.
DOD's Power Source Standardization Efforts Are Not Departmentwide and
Lack Robust Enforcement:
Though DOD officials agree that the department needs to increase its
emphasis on power source standardization, it lacks a departmentwide
policy to emphasize or compel early consideration of standard power
sources. Absent emphasis on early standardization, profit incentives
can often lead companies to develop unique, proprietary power sources.
The Army has a policy to encourage standardization, but the other
services lack comparable policies. Although it is generally more
economical to address standardization early in the acquisition process
and prior to the deployment of weapon systems or equipment to the
field, opportunities may exist to increase standardization by
retrofitting weapon systems or equipment for which a proprietary power
source has already been developed. This was recently done successfully
with the TALON bomb disposal robot. DOD's lack of emphasis on power
source standardization limits opportunities to obtain potential
benefits, including reduced item unit costs and a smaller logistical
footprint.
Efforts to Standardize Lack Sufficient Emphasis and Oversight:
It is important to emphasize standardization early in a program before
certain system decisions are made. Without early consideration of the
available standard power source, the design parameters of a system may
become more constrained as other parts are developed and integrated.
As a result, remaining space may not be sufficient to fit the shape of
appropriate standard power sources. Although in some cases developing
a program-unique power source is necessary because of legitimate
constraints, such as necessary limitations on the space available for
a power source, officials told us that companies may develop program-
unique power sources unnecessarily. Not requiring power source
standardization can result in unnecessary proliferation that may
ultimately have downstream implications in terms of resupplying the
warfighter. DOD officials we spoke with agree that the department
needs to increase its emphasis on power source standardization.
However, DOD lacks a departmentwide policy to help emphasize power
source standardization and compel early consideration of standard
power sources. We found that without policies requiring
standardization, programs may choose to develop or select nonstandard
power sources when an existing military standard or other preferred
item could have been used, potentially hindering standardization
efforts.
DOD and industry officials told us that power sources are often not
considered by program offices, or are thought of by acquisition
officials as a peripheral concern because of the low costs relative to
overall program costs. Additionally, according to the Defense
Standardization Program, DOD's performance-based acquisition policies
give contractors primary responsibility for recommending the use of
standard components to meet performance requirements. DOD officials
and power source company representatives have told us that program
managers may choose not to exercise oversight of these contractor
decisions. Further, during these discussions, we were told that
companies have a profit motive to develop proprietary power sources as
part of the acquisition of a weapon system or equipment because they
would prefer to be sole-source suppliers. Thus, they may not consider
standard options that would provide more optimal solutions for DOD
customers.
According to DOD officials, an instance of a contractor choosing a
proprietary power source over an existing battery occurred with the
batteries for two radio systems used by the Army and the Marine Corps--
the AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio and the AN/PRC-152
Falcon radio. Though the radios are functionally similar, they each
use a program-unique proprietary battery instead of an existing
battery or a battery common to both radios. Further, although the
batteries are very similar in design and each will fit in the other
device, a superficial design characteristic on one battery prohibits
the battery from powering the other manufacturer's radio. In addition,
the charger interfaces are not compatible, so the batteries cannot be
charged using a single charger without modification, such as through
an adapter. As a result, the service users of the two radios must
manage inventories for two types of batteries and chargers, and the
soldiers in the field have to ensure that they take the correct
battery for their radio since the other battery will not be
compatible. Also, the military services are unable to competitively
procure the batteries because each is a proprietary device and the
services must rely on the sole-source supplier of each battery--
potentially increasing the risk of item shortages or delays.
Though DOD officials we spoke with in the power sources area agree
that the department needs to increase emphasis on power source
standardization early in programs, existing organizational efforts
lack authority and resources to implement any policies. For example,
DOD's Defense Standardization Program established the Joint
Standardization Board for Power Source Systems to focus specifically
on power source standardization.[Footnote 29] According to the board's
charter, it serves as a standing technical group for power source
standardization efforts.[Footnote 30] Its specific role is to
participate in the development of an overarching DOD standardization
strategy for power sources and to promote commonality of component
parts or interfaces by facilitating a coordinated approach with joint
programs. However, the Chairman of the Joint Standardization Board for
Power Source Systems told us that though the board is part of the
Defense Standardization Program, it does not have the funding it needs
to function and thus has had little impact. He added that other joint
standardization boards have significant user funding because
particular acquisition program managers, or sponsors, have a vested
interest in the results of their work.
Officials from this board also noted that while emphasizing
standardization early in acquisition programs will undoubtedly yield
future benefits, DOD lacks a comprehensive plan for creating an
appropriate level of emphasis on power source standardization and that
DOD also lacks a policy for ensuring the achievement of
standardization goals. Accordingly, these officials recommended in a
Defense Standardization Program publication that DOD establish a plan
(in conjunction with power source experts from throughout the federal
government, industry, and academia) to create an appropriate level of
DOD-wide emphasis on standardization. Further, they recommended that
DOD create a policy that addresses the use of nonstandard power
sources and that might articulate a process of senior-level review to
determine if requests to use nonstandard power sources are justified.
Army Policy Encourages Standardization, but Other Services Lack
Comparable Policies:
The most significant DOD power source standardization policy we found
related to acquisition programs is section 8.8 of Army Regulation (AR)
70-1.[Footnote 31] Two main objectives of this policy are to decrease
the number and types of batteries the Army uses and limit the
development of unique batteries except where necessary. The regulation
prioritizes use of military or commercial standard rechargeable
batteries in acquisition programs, with a particular emphasis on using
rechargeable batteries. Program managers are supposed to coordinate
system battery requirements with Army power source subject matter
experts, who we were told are currently in the Army Power Division.
[Footnote 32] For programs where military or commercial standard
rechargeable battery types are not practical, program offices can
choose from a list of military-preferred batteries. The regulation
requires that program managers obtain an Army acquisition executive
approval--which we were told is the responsibility of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology--if a
program manager intends to use batteries other than those articulated
in the regulation. This approval is based on a favorable technical
evaluation by Army Power Division officials.
Army Power Division officials stated that there are several
difficulties associated with ensuring that acquisition programs
consistently follow the regulation. They said that section 8.8 of AR
70-1 can only succeed if there is an effective mechanism for ensuring
that acquisition programs comply with it, and they identified
challenges that may compromise effective implementation of the
regulation. First, Army Power Division officials told us that program
managers might not be aware of the requirements. They said that they
do not know how many Army acquisition programs comply with section 8.8
of AR 70-1 since they are only aware of the programs to which they
provide consulting services as part of the regulation. They could not
tell us if any programs did not comply with the regulation and
therefore did not request a technical evaluation before developing a
program-unique battery.
Second, they said that program managers may not comply with AR 70-1
because they do not understand the potential downstream logistical
issues that can occur when battery decisions are not made early in the
acquisition process. Army Power Division officials said they prefer to
get involved with an acquisition program early in the process so they
can help identify the best battery solution before system decisions
restrict potential choices. They said that to do so they have to earn
the respect and trust of program managers so that these programs will
seek technical consultation early in the process. They added that the
Army Power Division proactively tries to establish and maintain good
relationships with the different Army program offices that might have
battery needs.
Third, the Army Power Division receives approximately half of its
funding via customer reimbursement, meaning that it receives funding
from program offices when it provides consultative services. These
variables put the Army Power Division in a difficult position when
current and potential acquisition program customers of their technical
services request a favorable technical evaluation to support use of a
program-unique battery. Army Power Division officials told us that
their evaluation may be influenced by their desire to avoid
compromising existing relationships with program offices. They added
that an unfavorable evaluation may lead the program manager to forgo
consultation with the Army Power Division in the future, meaning the
Army Power Division would lose a customer and associated funding.
Further, these officials told us that if a program were to request an
evaluation of a nonstandard battery late in the weapon system or
equipment development process (such as right before the start of
production), the Army Power Division might suggest approval of the
battery to the Army acquisition executive to avoid delaying production.
While Army officials acknowledge compliance issues, the Program
Manager-Mobile Electric Power has recently established the position
Product Director for Batteries to help facilitate central coordination
to reduce battery proliferation in the Army based on a perceived lack
of central coordination in the Army on battery issues.[Footnote 33]
This position has just been established and thus has not yet had much
impact, but the Product Director for Batteries told us that pending
approval he intends to eventually take over and update section 8.8 of
AR 70-1--including enforcement and approving or denying of waiver
applications--as well as any other Army battery standardization
efforts. He told us that because he is a program manager he will have
more authority than the Army Power Division to promulgate and enforce
policies applicable to increasing the emphasis on standardization.
[Footnote 34]
Aside from the Army efforts, we found limited power source
standardization efforts in the other military services. In general,
they are limited to specific applications, such as aircraft, and are
not applicable to the whole service or are not departmentwide. The
Navy has several platform-specific efforts within the Naval Air
Systems Command to develop military performance specifications for
multiple battery types to limit proliferation of aircraft battery
types. The Marine Corps Systems Command has developed an interactive
computer-adaptive tool to help acquisition personnel in selecting
appropriate, existing batteries for their programs. Also, the Marine
Corps Systems Command has a topic paper on electrical connectors--
including connectors for batteries--that is intended to reduce
proliferation of the connectors that connect the battery to weapon
systems or equipment. However, use of these tools is voluntary. We did
not find any Air Force-wide processes for encouraging the use of
existing standard or other preferred power sources.
DOD Has Not Evaluated Departmentwide Opportunities to Standardize
Power Sources in Deployed Weapon Systems and Equipment:
Although it is generally more economical to address standardization
early in the acquisition process and prior to the deployment of weapon
systems or equipment to the field, opportunities may exist to increase
standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or equipment for which
a proprietary power source has already been developed. However, DOD
has not undertaken a departmentwide assessment to identify other
weapon systems or equipment that use a nonstandard power source but
that could be retrofitted with a more efficient and lower-cost
standard power source with a relatively small investment. Such efforts
may provide significant cost savings and operational benefits.
[Footnote 35] For example, Army and Navy research organizations
replaced the expensive proprietary batteries used by TALON bomb
disposal robots with military standard batteries that are already in
the DLA inventory. Army officials noted that their standardization
effort for the TALON robot generated a cost savings of about $7,000
per unit of the system. A Navy effort to retrofit TALON robots with
military standard batteries extended the robot's battery life by 23
percent. Because of the success of the standardization effort in terms
of cost and operational advantages, the Marine Corps and the Army
replaced proprietary battery packs with the retrofitted military
standard batteries for deployed units of the system.
Standardization May Provide Benefits to Both DOD and the Industrial
Base:
DOD's lack of emphasis on power source standardization limits
opportunities to obtain potential benefits, including reduced item
unit costs and a smaller logistical footprint. According to a Defense
Standardization Program case study of an effort by the Army to
standardize batteries, standardization may enable DOD components to
offer manufacturers greater production volumes and avoid reliance on
sole-source suppliers for mission-critical items, which may result in
a healthier industrial base and improved operational readiness.
[Footnote 36] In general, the military battery industrial base in the
United States is characterized by small and midsized companies that
operate in an environment with lower sales volume compared to the
commercial battery industry. One study of the industry characterized
the United States military battery industry as struggling for survival
with some companies relying solely on government sales for income.
[Footnote 37] Further, DOD demand is irregular because of fluctuations
based on periods of increased or decreased military activity. For
example, a surge in demand for some non-rechargeable batteries related
to the initiation of combat operations in Iraq exceeded the amount
that the industrial base could produce--which threatened to reduce
military capability.[Footnote 38] Though representatives from a major
DOD battery supplier told us that they would prefer to develop and be
the sole-source supplier of proprietary power sources, they noted that
absent this option they would prefer a scenario where companies could
compete to produce standard power sources in order to stabilize their
production volumes and revenue. Actions that could contribute to the
health of the industrial base--such as providing for greater
production volumes through increased standardization--could be
beneficial to DOD in ensuring the continued availability of military
battery producers and mitigating future potential production and
supply shortfalls.
Conclusions:
The goal of any acquisition program is to provide the warfighter with
the best possible weapon system or equipment. However, in light of
increasing dependence on power sources, supporting the warfighter's
power needs with more power, longer life, and less weight--as well as
ease and sufficiency of supply--is also crucial. The proliferation of
unique battery types could become more pronounced and ultimately
affect the warfighter as military power demands increase. The current
manner in which DOD manages its power source investments and
translates them into products that meet warfighter needs is less than
optimal. Specifically, DOD is not able to efficiently and effectively
plan future investments if it lacks of strategic investment knowledge
of its total power source investment in S&T, logistics support, and
acquisition programs. Further, while DOD mechanisms for coordinating
power source S&T projects appear effective, their success depends on
voluntary participation by all pertinent agencies. Incomplete
participation in coordination mechanisms limits opportunities to
leverage common efforts. Though DOD has some standardization efforts,
decisions on what power sources will be put into new equipment and
ultimately the hands of the warfighter and the supply system are often
not made by DOD program managers and hence these programs may
unnecessarily use proprietary power sources. Improving management and
coordination of the power sources area could help DOD achieve optimal
return on its investment. Without sufficient departmentwide
investment data; more effectively coordinated investments; and
increased power source standardization, optimal DOD outcomes in this
area cannot be expected.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To increase oversight of power source investments and to allow for
enhanced strategic planning, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data
(from S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power
sources area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source
investment data across these investment categories at a level
sufficient to guide decisions and policy.
To ensure a high level of interagency participation and coordination
in the power sources S&T area, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency
participation in interagency coordination mechanisms.
To increase DOD-wide emphasis on power source standardization both
during design of weapon systems and equipment as well as for deployed
systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify and
direct the appropriate office(s) to take the following actions:
* Develop a plan to optimize use of standard power sources for weapon
system or equipment types that are more amenable to such
standardization.
* Develop a DOD-wide policy--based on the above standardization plan--
similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior
acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to
use a power source that is not standard or preferred. As part of this
new policy, consider requiring an independent review of the
appropriateness of using the nonstandard or nonpreferred power source.
* Identify opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapon
systems and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an
existing military standard or other preferred power source.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one
of our five recommendations and partially concurred with four. The
department stated that it had already taken or plans to take specific
actions in response to our recommendations, but it is unclear from DOD’
s response what these actions entail.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from
S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources
area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data
across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide
decisions and policy. We believe that aggregating these data is
important to inform decision making and investment in the power sources
area.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency
participation in interagency coordination mechanisms. DOD commented
that existing coordination mechanisms are generally effective and have
been improving since the office of the Director, Operational Energy
Plans and Programs (DOEPP) was established. DOD added that the DOEPP
office will continue to seek ways to strengthen interagency coordination.
However, DOD did not provide specific information on how it believes
coordination mechanisms have improved or what additional methods might
be used to strengthen coordination. Our review identified voluntary
attendance and varying participation in interagency groups that if
enhanced could further improve coordination.
DOD also partially concurred with three recommendations related to
power source standardization, namely, that the Secretary of Defense: 1)
identify and direct appropriate office(s) to develop a plan to
optimize use of standard power sources for weapon systems or equipment
types more amenable to standardization; 2) develop a DOD-wide policy
similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior
acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to
use a power source that is not standard or preferred; and 3) identify
opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapons systems
and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an existing
military standard or other preferred power source. DOD indicated that
on-going activities led by the DOEPP office are adequately addressing
all these needs and no expansion of effort is necessary. However, DOD
did not provide any details related to specific, ongoing DOEPP activities
addressing these needs, and we found no evidence of any such DOD or
DOEPP actions while conducting our review. While DOD established the
DOEPP office in October 2009, it has only had a Director since June
2010. In late August 2010, DEOPP office officials informed us that they
were still writing position descriptions and working to gather the personnel
required to support their efforts, but gave no indication that any
substantive work had been undertaken. Our review revealed there is no
DOD-wide plan or policy to emphasize power source standardization,
even though DOD officials told us that DOD needs further emphasis in
this area. Without a departmentwide plan to emphasize or compel early
consideration of standard power sources, the use of unique,
proprietary power sources will likely continue and DOD will not be
able to obtain the full benefits of standardization, such as reduced
item unit costs and a smaller logistical footprint.
By not identifying specific actions the department has taken or plans
to take to implement our recommendations, we believe that DOD may not
have appropriately considered our recommendations, and as a result we
are concerned that in the coming months it will not seek ways to fully
implement these recommendations.
DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. The
report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
For the purposes of this report, we limited "power sources" to
tactical power sources used for soldier-portable and vehicle
applications (e.g., motorized land vehicles, aircraft, and ships) as
well as munitions and satellite power sources. We excluded power
sources for operational or strategic applications, including power
sources used to support installations such as temporary or permanent
military facilities, because of the size and complexity of the
tactical power sources portfolio and its significance to the efforts
of the warfighter. We focused on batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors
based on (1) language in the congressional mandate, (2) predominance
of batteries among tactically deployed power sources, and (3) the
recommendations of Department of Defense (DOD) experts.[Footnote 39]
To determine DOD's total investment in power sources, we met with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across
DOD component organizations to determine an appropriate methodology
for collecting as complete a set of investment data as possible. We
divided investment into three categories generally based on the three
main defense technology life cycle areas: (1) science and technology
(S&T); (2) logistics support, or the provision of logistics, materiel,
and transportation according to military needs; and (3) power sources
for DOD weapon systems or equipment acquisition programs. Based on a
review of the budget and on discussions with OSD officials, we found
that there was no central repository for DOD investments in power
source S&T. DOD officials told us that one would have to request the
data from each pertinent S&T organization. As a result, we developed a
data collection instrument asking each research organization to
provide data on all power source projects within our scope.
Specifically, we requested project-level information, including the
project name, purpose, budget activity, and funding history from
fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. We also requested data on
projected future funding, but not all organizations were able to
provide this information. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) compiled
the data for the Navy since ONR manages all Department of the Navy S&T
funds, including those for the Marine Corps. The Army Deputy Director
for Technology from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology's Research and Technology
Division compiled the data from the Army research organizations. The
Air Force Research Laboratory compiled data for Air Force power source
S&T projects. We assessed the reliability of these S&T data by (1)
performing electronic testing of required data elements and (2)
obtaining responses from agency officials knowledgeable about the
data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of presenting an approximate total of S&T investments in this
report. This investment amount is approximate because creating an
exhaustive list of all power source S&T projects was not possible
because of the lack of centralized DOD management of this area and the
fact that we had to rely on data gathered by each research
organization. Additionally, since some organizations involved in this
area are funded by other DOD customers, it is difficult to accurately
track the precise amounts of funding for specific projects.
We also interviewed officials from each service and its component
research organizations about S&T efforts in the power sources area.
For the Army, we met with the Army Deputy Director for Technology from
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology, Research and Technology Division; officials
from the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command; officials
from the Army Research Laboratory; officials from the Army Communications-
Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center's Army Power
Division; and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric Power Product
Director for Batteries. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations and Environment, and the Army Tank Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center both provided written responses to
our questions. For the Navy, we spoke with officials from ONR; Navy
Surface Warfare Center Crane Division; the Naval Undersea Warfare
Center Newport Division; the Naval Air Systems Command's Power and
Energy Division; and the Marine Corps Systems Command. The Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment
provided written responses to our questions. For the Air Force, we
spoke with officials from the Air Force Research Laboratory, and we
obtained written responses from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health and
the Air Force Materiel Command. We also obtained written responses
from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). We also
spoke with officials from U.S. Special Operations Command and obtained
data on their power sources S&T investments.
To assess the involvement of the defense power sources industry in DOD
investments in power source S&T, we met with representatives of Saft
America Inc. (Saft), Advanced Thermal Batteries, and EaglePicher
Technologies, LLC (EaglePicher). According to the companies, Saft and
EaglePicher are two large DOD battery suppliers. We also attended an
annual power sources technology conference as well as two meetings of
the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Military Power
Sources Committee and spoke with representatives from additional
companies, including Alion Science and Technology, Dow Kokam, and
Yardney Technical Products. We also gathered information through
interviews with and written responses from the membership of the NDIA
Military Power Sources Committee in order to gain additional
perspective from the industry. We also met with members of the South
Carolina Research Authority's Defense Advanced Battery Manufacturing
Coalition.
To determine DOD's investments in power sources as part of a DOD
weapon systems or equipment acquisition programs, we initially
searched DOD budget requests to locate power source investment data
related to acquisition programs. This method demonstrated that power
sources are typically not broken out as specific cost elements of
budget request line items related to acquisition programs. We were
told by cognizant DOD officials that this information was not
available in an aggregated format. Though we judged that the scope of
DOD's existing acquisition programs, which includes around 100 major
defense acquisition programs and smaller programs, was too large for
us to obtain information from every program, we decided to obtain
information from selected programs. We did not assess the reliability
of acquisition program data because we determined that it would not be
feasible for DOD to generate these data to enable us to determine the
investment in this area for this report. We selected weapon systems
and equipment from each of the military services to provide a cross
section of weapon system and equipment types (e.g., aircraft,
satellites, ships, vehicles, and portable electronics). As part of
this effort, we spoke with program office officials and obtained data
from the following programs:
* Army: Patriot/MEADS missile and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
* Navy: Joint Program Executive Office for the Joint Tactical Radio
System, DDG 1000 destroyer, AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided
Missile, P-8A Poseidon, Joint Multi-mission Submersible, Mine-Resistant
Ambush Protected vehicle, and the V-22 Osprey program offices.
* Air Force: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Navstar Global
Positioning System (GPS) GPS III, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellites program offices.
To determine DOD's investments in logistics support, we requested
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) data on sales of power sources to the
military from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Though these
data do not include power sources that DLA might have procured as part
of its inventory management processes, they do include all power
sources that the military services bought from DLA during this period.
To obtain data on military service power source procurements that
occur outside of DLA, we obtained data from the Air Force Materiel
Command, the Naval Supply Systems Command, and the Army Materiel Command.
We assessed the reliability of logistics support data by (1)
performing electronic testing of required data elements and (2)
obtaining responses from agency officials knowledgeable about the
data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of presenting a minimum investment in this area in this
report. Our investment total for logistics support represents a
minimum amount because, as DOD officials informed us, the data we
obtained from DLA and military service logistics databases do not
capture power source purchases made as part of contract logistics
support--a type of contracting activity on which DOD has relied
extensively.
To assess the degree to which DOD coordinates power source
investments, we spoke with cognizant officials from each of the
military services, research organizations across DOD, and DLA--
including DLA's Battery Network group. For information on coordination
of S&T investments, we spoke with the Army Deputy Director for
Technology from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Research and Technology Division;
officials from the Army Research, Development, and Engineering
Command; officials from the Army Research Laboratory; officials from
the Army Communications-Electronics Research, Development and
Engineering Center's Army Power Division; and the Program Manager-
Mobile Electric Power's Product Director for Batteries. The Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment and the Army
Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center both
provided written responses to our questions. For the Navy, we spoke
with officials from the ONR, the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane
Division, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport Division, the
Naval Air Systems Command's Power and Energy Division, and the Marine
Corps Systems Command. We also received written responses to our
questions from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment. For the Air Force, we spoke with
officials from the Air Force Research Laboratory, and we obtained
written responses from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health. In addition,
we obtained written responses from the DARPA. We also spoke to
officials from the DOD ManTech office and officials involved with the
DOD Reliance 21 program and the Energy and Power Community of
Interest. We also took part in a training session related to DOD-wide
information-sharing resources.
To assess the effectiveness of some of DOD's coordinating mechanisms,
we attended the 44TH Power Sources Conference where industry,
academic, and DOD power source researchers and other experts discussed
ongoing power source S&T efforts. We attended the annual meeting of
the Chemical Working Group of the Interagency Advanced Power Group as
well as a meeting of the Power Sources Technology Working Group. In
addition, we spoke with members of the Lithium Battery
Technical/Safety Group. To assess DOD coordination with the Department
of Energy (DOE), we spoke with representatives of the Joint DOD/DOE
Munitions Technology Development Program and the DOE Office of Vehicle
Technologies. We also drew extensively on other GAO work related to
interagency coordination.
To assess the extent to which DOD's policies facilitate the use of
standard power sources, we met with cognizant officials from each of
the military services, including officials from the Army
Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering
Center and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric Power's Product
Director for Batteries. We received written responses to questions
from an official from the Defense Standardization Program's Joint
Standardization Board for Power Source Systems. We also received
written responses from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment; the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Installations and Environment; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational
Health. We also reviewed applicable standardization policies and
regulations.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Budget Activities:
Budget activity: 1. Basic Research;
Description of activity: Systematic study directed toward greater
knowledge or understanding of fundamental aspects of phenomena without
specific applications toward processes or products in mind.
Budget activity: 2. Applied Research;
Description of activity: Systematic study to understand the means to
meet a recognized and specific need.
Budget activity: 3. Advanced Technology Development;
Description of activity: Development of subsystems and components and
efforts to integrate subsystems and components into system prototypes
for field experiments, tests in a simulated environment, or both.
Budget activity: 4. Advanced Component Development and Prototypes;
Description of activity: Efforts necessary to evaluate integrated
technologies, representative modes or prototype systems in a high-
fidelity and realistic operating environment.
Budget activity: 5. System Development and Demonstration;
Description of activity: Conducting engineering and manufacturing
development tasks aimed at meeting validated requirements prior to
full-rate production.
Budget activity: 6. RDT&E Management Support;
Description of activity: RDT&E efforts and funds to sustain, modernize,
or both, the installations or operations required for general RDT&E.
Budget activity: 7. Operational Systems Development;
Description of activity: Development efforts to upgrade systems that
have been fielded or have received approval for full-rate production
and anticipate production funding in the current or subsequent fiscal
year.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD Financial Management Regulation DOD
7000-14R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5, July 2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Director of Defense Research And Engineering:
3040 Defense Pentagon:
Washington DC 20301-3040:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street. N.W.
Washington. DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report. GAO-11-113. "Defense Acquisition: Opportunities Exist to
Improve DOD's Oversight of Power Source Investments." dated November
10. 2010 (GAO Code 120872). DoD's response to the report
recommendations is enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Zachary J. Lemnios:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
Draft Report Dated November 10, 2010:
GAO-11-113 (GAO CODE 120872):
"Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's Oversight of
Power Source Investments"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
consider how to best aggregate department wide investment data (from
S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources
area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data
across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide
decisions and policy. (See page 31/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. The Director of Operational Energy Plans and
Programs (DOEPP) has initiated efforts to aggregate power source
investment data more effectively.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency participation
in interagency coordination mechanisms. (See page 31/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. Existing coordination methods are
generally effective, and have been improving with the stand-up of the
DOEPP office. Under DOEPP leadership, the Department will continue to
seek ways of strengthening interagency coordination.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
identify and direct the appropriate office(s) to develop a plan to
optimize use of standard power sources for weapon system or equipment
types that are more amenable to such standardization. (See page 31/GAO
Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. On-going activities led by DOEPP are
adequately addressing this need, and no expansion of effort is
required.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop a DOD-wide policy-based on the above standardization plan-
similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior
acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to
use a power source that is not standard or preferred. As part of this
new policy, consider requiring an independent review of the
appropriateness of using the nonstandard or nonpreferred power source.
(See page 31 /GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. On-going activities led by DOEPP are
adequately addressing this need, and no expansion of effort is
required. Also, within the standardization efforts, there is a need to
preserve some flexibility for forward-deployed commanders to adjust as
conditions on the ground may require.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
identify opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapons
systems and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an
existing military standard or other preferred power source. (See page
32/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. On-going activities led by DOEPP are
adequately addressing this need, and no expansion of effort is
required.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Assistant
Director; John Oppenheim, Assistant Director; Frederick K. Childers;
John Dell’Osso; Rosa Johnson; John Krump; C. James Madar; Bill Solis;
Don Springman; Bob Swierczek; and Mark Viehman made key contributions
to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The batteries that were in short supply are used by United States
troops to communicate, acquire targets, and gain situational awareness
on the battlefield. Specifically, these non-rechargeable batteries
provide a portable power source for nearly 60 critical military
communication and electronic systems, including two radio systems, a
missile guidance system, and a transmission security device.
[2] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-275] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8,
2005). Batteries have also presented logistical challenges in previous
military conflicts. For example, the Army faced difficulties providing
sufficient quantities of batteries during the Vietnam War and the
Persian Gulf War.
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 243 (2009).
[4] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[5] The term power sources spans numerous technologies with a wide
range of functions, including energy storage and power generation.
Energy may be stored chemically, mechanically, or electrically within
a power source. In general, power sources generate power by
transforming energy stored within the power source device (in the case
of batteries) or energy that is stored external to the power source
(in the case of fuel cells). The power output may be pulsed, burst, or
continuous depending on the specific application.
[6] In light of DOD-wide power source needs, the Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 mandated that
DOD submit a roadmap on this topic. This document has not yet been
published. Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 218 (2008).
[7] DOD projects this total weight to increase as soldiers are
equipped with additional electronic equipment.
[8] The latter categories include product development and support
activities. The majority of the investment data we gathered from the
research organizations were in the S&T category. An explanation of
these activities can be found in appendix II.
[9] The SBIR program is a competitive program designed to increase the
participation of the nation's small, high-tech, innovative businesses
in the federal government's research and development efforts.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[11] GAO, DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Actions Needed to Reduce
Vulnerabilities and Improve Business Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-460T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12,
2009).
[12] Creating an exhaustive list of all power source S&T projects was
not possible because of the lack of centralized DOD management of data
on these projects. We had to rely on data gathered by each research
organization identified by DOD, and the potential exists that some
pertinent organizations were not identified. Additionally, since some
organizations involved in this area are funded by other DOD customers,
it is difficult to accurately track the precise amounts of funding for
specific projects.
[13] Capacitors have been used for consumer-oriented electronic
devices and other commercial applications for a long time, but the
types required for these DOD applications are still an immature
technology.
[14] The Defense Technical Information Center maintains a database
called the Research and Engineering Database. The purpose of the
database is to make information on S&T projects available to
researchers and engineers across DOD.
[15] The military services purchase power sources from the DLA
inventory according to their needs. The prices at which DLA sells
power sources to the military services are marked up from what DLA
originally paid to account for the cost of managing supply and
distribution of these items.
[16] We obtained logistics support investment data from the military
services. The data came from multiple databases and acquisition
program sources. We did not include the services’ data in the total
amount because we lacked sufficient information about the reliability
of these data. However, the amounts were very small compared to the
DLA total.
[17] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive
Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).
[18] Each service has an assistant or deputy assistant secretary who
has responsibility for energy and power issues.
[19] This position was established by the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, §
902 (2008). Operational energy is the energy required for moving and
sustaining DOD’s forces and weapons platforms for military operations.
[20] DOD is currently managing about 100 Acquisition Category (ACAT) I
programs, which are programs at or above a funding threshold of more
than $365 million in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars or, for
procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant
dollars. GAO, Defense Acquisition: Observations on Weapon Program
Performance and Acquisition Reforms, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-706T] (Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2010).
[21] We spoke to officials in 12 program offices for major acquisition
programs designated ACAT I. We also attempted to identify smaller
acquisition programs for the purpose of assessing how some programs
acquired power sources. However, we were unable to identify active
programs below the ACAT I level.
[22] Although some programs may select a COTS power source, they are
not suitable for all defense applications, especially those that are
highly specialized (e.g., missiles) or for programs that require
reliability and survivability in adverse environmental conditions.
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[24] One such example is the October 2009 Power Sources Technology
Roadmap sponsored by the Power Sources Technical Working Group of the
DOD Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel.
[25] The Reliance 21 program was established to perform integrated
strategic planning for DOD S&T and encourage transparency across
components.
[26] GAO, Defense Management: Overarching Organizational Framework
Needed to Guide and Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-426]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2008).
[27] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 331 (2008).
[28] GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD
Technology Transition Processes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14,
2006).
[29] The Defense Standardization Program is a program established by
DOD and is responsible for promoting standardization throughout DOD.
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, Defense Standardization
Program (DSP): Policies and Procedures, DOD 4120.24-M (March 2000).
[30] The Joint Standardization Board for Power Source Systems is one
of nine chartered joint standardization boards under the Defense
Standardization Program that are focused on different technology
areas. Each board is responsible for advancing interoperability,
logistical readiness, and cost efficiency within its technology focus
areas. These boards also provide standardization advocacy, guidance,
and executive-level support, ensuring high-level oversight and
advocacy of strategic standardization initiatives. OSD Memorandum for
Joint Battery Technical Working Group, Subject: Joint Standardization
Board for Power Source Systems (June 8, 2006).
[31] Army Regulation 70-1: Research, Development, Acquisition: Army
Acquisition Policy, para. 8-8, December 2003.
[32] These experts formerly made up the Power Sources Center of
Excellence, but now this responsibility has been transferred to the
Army Power Division of the Army Communication-Electronics Research,
Development, and Engineering Center.
[33] This position is in the office of the Program Manager-Mobile
Electric Power, which has traditionally dealt with attempting to create
DOD-wide standards for military generators.
[34] Before his position was established, the Product Director for
Batteries discussed the possibility of establishing such a position
with relevant organizations throughout the Army. Officials in these
organizations thought that the idea of a having battery director was
warranted to facilitate improving management in this area. Though a
charter is still forthcoming, the mission of his office will be to
facilitate central coordination in this area.
[35] In some cases, retrofitting may be achieved through the use of an
adapter cable that enables a system to use a standard battery.
[36] Defense Standardization Program, Army Battery Standardization:
Rechargeable Batteries Power the Future Force (2002).
[37] Department of Defense, Battery Manufacturing Gap Study (July 2004).
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-275].
[39] We conducted an analysis of the total weight of power sources
carried by soldiers during a typical mission based on initial
information that the combined weight of these power sources is overly
burdensome. We found that the total weight of power sources carried by
soldiers is not as significant as has been suggested by some sources.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: