The United States is not eager to launch an air campaign against the Syrian regime that would be similar to the NATO campaign in Libya even though numerous U.S. lawmakers have called for such a campaign. Not only did Libya not have the formidable air defense systems that Russia has provided to Syria, but Syria's rebels have not been able to control large areas of territory. These factors would complicate any air campaign against the al Assad regime, but Washington's reluctance to get involved militarily is based on the fear that it could slip into a much messier conflict than it did in Libya.

Amid increasing calls from some U.S. lawmakers for an air campaign against the Syrian regime, the U.S. administration appears to be making a concerted effort to explain to the public why this is not a preferred course of action. Beyond the significant regional implications of such an action, Washington does not want to get involved in a conflict with Syria that likely would pose credible threats to U.S. air forces and risk involving ground forces as well.

The rationale in Washington

When U.S. Central Command chief Gen. James Mattis briefed the U.S. Senate ArmedServices Committee on Syria on March 6, his overarching message was that anymilitary action in the country would not be easy. Mattis noted that the lack of anysafe zones in Syria would mean deploying a significant number of ground troops tocreate such zones and warned that the United States believes the Syrian governmentpossesses chemical and biological weapons. When asked about the possibility ofimposing a no-fly zone in Syria, as NATO forces did in Libya, Mattis warned of thepotential dangers posed by the advanced air defense systems Syria has received fromRussia.

Mattis' remarks were a subtle rebuttal to calls made in recent days by Sen. JohnMcCain, one of the committee leaders, to launch airstrikes in Syria. On the same dayas Mattis' briefing, Foreign Policy published an article citing two anonymous Obamaadministration officials discussing what the White House is planning for the nextphase in the Syrian conflict. One official referred to the same danger posed byRussian-supplied air defense systems, adding that a recent Russian shipment to Syriacontained large amounts of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems, presumablyintended to defend Syria should the conflict become international.

Washington seeks to dampen the expectation that it intends to do in Syria what itdid in Libya. An air campaign is not on the horizon, and the United States is alsohesitant to publicize any of its attempts to arm the opposition, though remarks fromthe officials cited by Foreign Policy seem to indicate that Washington is givingother countries (likely Saudi Arabia and Qatar) approval to do so. Publicdiscussions of arming the opposition forces are, however, more for public relationsto show that something is being done to assist an opposition under siege. If theUnited States were actively engaged in such activities, it would manage theoperation covertly.

Syria's Defenses Compared To Libya's

The United States has a strategic interest in seeing the fall of the al Assad regimebecause of the effect it would have on Iran's influence in the Levant. Aside fromlevying sanctions and a public acquiescence to other countries sending in weapons,Washington does not appear to be publicly doing much to hasten al Assad's downfall.The United States is wary of entering the fray due to its fears that it would getdragged into a much messier conflict than those calling for an air campaign areanticipating. Pointing to the potential dangers posed by Syria's air defense networkis one way of discouraging calls for military intervention.

This is not to say that the Syrian Air Defense Command (ADC) is not formidable,especially in comparison to what NATO forces went up against in Libya. With anestimated 54,000 personnel, it is twice the size of former Libyan leader MoammarGadhafi's air force and air defense command combined at the start of the NATOcampaign. Syria's ADC consists of the 24th and 26th anti-aircraft divisionscomprising thousands of anti-aircraft guns and more than 130 surface-to-air missile(SAM) batteries. The bulk of Syria's ADC SAM weaponry is the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6,and SA-8 SAM systems that were also operated by Gadhafi's forces. However, theSyrians operate these systems in far greater numbers, have devoted significantresources to the maintenance and upgrade of these missile batteries and have alsosuccessfully deployed their SAM systems in a dense and overlapping layout that wouldcomplicate potential Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses operations.

Though also a Russian ally, Gadhafi did not have the more advanced Russian airdefense systems that the al Assad regime possesses. For instance, Iran reportedlyfinanced Syria's acquisition of 50 SA-22 systems first delivered in 2007 -- 10 ofwhich allegedly ended up in Iranian hands. The Syrians are also thought to operateseveral SA-11 systems, which the Libyans did not have. Furthermore, reports emergedin November 2011 that the Russians upgraded numerous Syrian radar sites andtransferred a number of advanced S-300 systems to Syria and that a Russian navalmission to Syria that month also served to transport several Russian missiletechnicians who were to assist the Syrians in operating the S-300s.

Syria's defenses against an air campaign are not restricted to the ground. Its airforce can contribute dozens of fighter aircraft and interceptors, the most advancedof which are the MiG-25 and MiG-29. But while the Syrian air force is bothquantitatively and qualitatively superior to Gadhafi's air force, which was juststarting to re-equip and modernize itself after years of sanctions, it has neitherplayed a meaningful role in managing the unrest in the country nor would it play ameaningful role in defending the country from an air campaign.

Perhaps the biggest difference between Libya and Syria is that the Syrian rebelshave not yet been able to hold significant territory. This matters not just fortheir ability to have safe areas from which to launch attacks, but also for the airdefense network's ability to function properly. Air defense systems typically aredesigned to provide cover through overlapping areas of coverage. When eastern Libyafell into rebel hands early on during the revolution, that overlap was severelydamaged, which in turn degraded the Gadhafi regime's overall air defense network.The Syrians are not facing this difficulty.

A Feb. 28 CNN report said that the Pentagon had drawn up detailed plans for militaryaction against the Syrian regime. The U.S. military indeed has updated its order ofbattle (orbat) for Syria in preparation for any contingency operations, and thiswork allegedly produced the best orbat the United States has had on Syria since2001. However, contingency plans exist for numerous countries with which war isunlikely. The situation in Syria -- whether through the loss of territory, massivedefections from the regime or the loss of Russian support -- will have to changebefore Washington implements any of the plans it has prepared.