"On April 11, 2012, a technician performing compaction tests using a CPN MC portable moisture density gauge (10 millicuries cesium-137; 50 millicuries americium-241), left the gauge during a test to prepare the next test location 20 to 30 feet away. A compaction roller ran over the gauge and shattered the gauge housing. The technician cordoned off the area and contacted the Radiation Safety Officer. The RSO contacted the Virginia Emergency Operations Center and returned the gauge to its storage area after ensuring the sources were inside their shields. Based on an onsite investigation by members of the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program, it was determined that no individual was likely to have received a radiation dose and that the gauge sources were secured in their shields. The licensee has contacted the gauge distributor to return the gauge."

The following information was received from the State of California by email:

"The hospital had sent a depleted Tc-99m generator to an incorrect recipient, a non-licensee. They had intended to return it to Mallinckrodt in St. Louis, [Missouri]. He [RSO] thought the generator still contained about 100 mCi. The package was shipped on 4/4/12, and was retrieved on 4/6/12 after the mistake was discovered."

The package was returned to Saint Joseph Hospital and the following week the hospital resent the package to the correct recipient, Mallinckrodt.

The following information was provided by the State of Nevada via email:

On 4/11/12 a report was received [by Nevada State Health Division] that a truckload of radioactive scrap metal belonging to Top Dollar Recycling was refused in Southern California. This scrap steel originally came from a mine in Utah. On 4/12/12, the 40 foot semi-truck of scrap metal returned to Top Dollar Recycling and a site visit by the State Radiation Control Program (RCP) was conducted.

RCP staff took measurements of the semi-truck's scrap metal. Background reading was <10uR/hr, and the highest readings of 50uR/hr on contact were near the back of the truck on the driver's side. The truck was unloaded using a small bobcat loader, spread out and surveyed. One piece of scaffolding, about 4 foot long and bent roughly in half, had elevated readings of 180 uR/hr on contact and identified as Ra-226. The scaffold, which was tubular steel and hard packed with soil type debris, was the source of radiation.

The remainder of the semi-truck was unloaded, and all scaffolding metal was segregated and surveyed individually. No additional sources of radiation were identified. The other metal on the truck was also surveyed with no elevated readings. The outside of a very large pile (12' x 20') of metal from the same mine was scanned and no elevated reading were found.

Top Dollar Recycling took possession of the item, wrapped it in a plastic garbage bag before moving it to a sturdy container in the storage/control location.

"Swagelok received a return from Duke Energy (Oconee) for two 8U series bellows valves for investigation of stem tips that had loosened during performance testing of equipment.

"Our evaluation confirmed loosening of the stem tips and determined the root cause to be higher than normal torque being applied to the valve handle during closure. (Please note that we did not specify a minimum or maximum torque for our operating instructions). This caused the stem and the stem insert interface to loosen, but not fully disengage. Our tests show that closure to catalog specification of 4.0 x 10-9 atm. cc/sec of helium can still be achieved with this condition.

"Therefore, it is the opinion of Swagelok that there is no inherent safety risk associated due to this condition, however lower than expected flow through the valve, or erratic flow, can occur if the stem tip loosens. If utilities consider full flow as a safety function, they should evaluate the valves currently in service for this condition.

"Applicability - There have been no other field returns for this condition. The possible condition extends to the Swagelok 4U, 6U and 8U series bellows valves. Only hand operated valves are susceptible; air operated valves are excluded, as are the 12U series valves supplied by Swagelok."

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HAD ONLY ONE POWER SOURCE DURING PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On April 16, 2012, at 0738 hours, the Harris Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center (i.e., Event Number 47838) of preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power supply.

"Following completion of the power transfer, it was discovered that in the current alignment, the TSC is only powered from one power source, which is the backup power supply.

"A backup diesel generator is stationed near the TSC which can be connected if necessary during an emergency.

"Activities are in progress to modify the existing procedure to allow the TSC to be connected to the offsite power source which will restore two sources of power to the TSC. This normal power arrangement is expected to remain in place while maintenance is performed on the TSC normal power supply for approximately two months.

"At 1540 (EDT) on 4/17/12, with Unit 1 in mode 5 and Unit 2 in mode 1, the Work Control Center was notified that the U1 #2 Main Stop Valve (MSV) was disassembled. The U1 #2 MSV was required to be intact to maintain Unit 1 Secondary Containment. Ongoing work on the D Main Steam Line Outboard Valve created a pathway that violated Unit 1 secondary containment integrity. Unit 1 Secondary Containment is required to be operable for Unit 2 while Unit 1 Zone 1 is aligned to the Recirculation Plenum. Unit 1 Zone 1 was isolated from the recirculation plenum and Unit 2 Secondary Containment was restored at 1643 (EDT) on 4/17/12. Unit 2 Secondary Containment differential pressures were maintained throughout the event.

"This is considered a loss of an entire safety function and requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."

The licensee is still investigating the cause but it appears to be associated with recent administrative changes to the Reactor Vessel draining definition and work process procedures.

"At 2130 (CDT) on April 17, 2012, the Unit 1 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 1 Refueling Outage. The Unit 1 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 1 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available in the MCR but not through ERDS for either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 2 Plant Process computer will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 1 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact to the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.

"The new Unit 1 PPC is scheduled to be functional on April 21, 2012. However, based on the mode Unit 1 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 1 PPC will be tested as mode changes occur. The Unit 1 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 1 PPC is declared functional.

"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."