Two months after officers observed respondent using his car to deliver
cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges.
At that time, the arresting officers seized his car without securing a
warrant because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (Act). During a subsequent
inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car.
Respondent was then charged with a state drug violation. At his
trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered
during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the
court denied the motion, and the Florida First District Court of Appeal
affirmed. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure
of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The
latter court answered the question in the affirmative, quashed the
lower court opinion, and remanded.

Held: the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain
a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they
have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband.
In deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the
Amendment, this Court inquires whether the action was regarded as an
unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was framed. See,
e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149. This Court has
held that, when federal officers have probable cause to believe that an
automobile contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment does not require
them to obtain a warrant prior to searching the car for and seizing the
contraband. Id. at 150-151. Although the police here lacked
probable cause to believe that respondent's car contained contraband,
they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was
contraband under Florida law. A recognition of the need to seize
readily movable contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly
underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. This
need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its
contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure. In
addition, this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently
accorded officers greater latitude in exercising their duties in public
places. Here, because the police seized respondent's [526 U.S.
560] vehicle from a public area, the warrantless seizure is virtually
indistinguishable from the seizure upheld in G. M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351. Pp. 563-566.

The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act provides that certain forms of
contraband, including motor vehicles used in violation of the Act's
provisions, may be seized and potentially forfeited. In this
case, we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police
to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place
when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable
contraband. We hold that it does not.

I

On three occasions in July and August, 1993, police officers observed
respondent Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, and
thereby developed probable cause to believe that his car was subject to
forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (Act), Fla.Stat.
§ 932.701 et seq. (1997).{1} Several months later, they
arrested respondent at his place of employment on charges unrelated to
the drug transactions observed in July and August, 1993. At the
same time, the arresting officers, without securing a warrant, seized
respondent's automobile in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. See § 932.703(2)(a). {2} They seized the [526 U.S. 562]
vehicle solely because they believed that it was forfeitable under the
Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police found two
pieces of crack cocaine in the ashtray. Based on the discovery of
the cocaine, respondent was charged with possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Florida law.

At his trial on the possession charge, respondent filed a motion to
suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory search. He
argued that the warrantless seizure of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." The trial court initially reserved ruling on respondent's
motion, but later denied it after the jury returned a guilty
verdict. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal
affirmed. 680 So.2d 550 (1996). Adopting the position of a
majority of state and federal courts to have considered the question,
the court rejected respondent's argument that the Fourth Amendment
required the police to secure a warrant prior to seizing his
vehicle. Id. at 554. Because the Florida Supreme Court and
this Court had not directly addressed the issue, the court certified to
the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent
circumstances, the warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 555.

In a divided opinion, the Florida Supreme Court answered the certified
question in the affirmative, quashed the First District Court of
Appeal's opinion, and remanded. 710 So.2d 949, 955 (1998).
The majority of the court concluded that, absent exigent circumstances,
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to
seizing property [526 U.S. 563] that has been used in violation of the
Act. Ibid. According to the court, the fact that the police
develop probable cause to believe that such a violation occurred does
not, standing alone, justify a warrantless seizure. The court
expressly rejected the holding of the Eleventh Circuit, see United
States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554 (1989), and the majority of other
Federal Circuits to have addressed the same issue in the context of the
federal civil forfeiture law, 21 U.S.C. § 881, which is similar to
Florida's. See United States v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287 (CA6 1994)
(per curiam); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241 (CA7 1990);
United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1983);
United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (CA4 1982); United States v. Bush,
647 F.2d 357 (CA3 1981). But see United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d
1080 (CA10 1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (CA2 1992);
United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209 (CA9 1989). We granted certiorari,
525 U.S. 1000 (1998), and now reverse.

II

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures," and further provides that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const., Amdt. 4. In
deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the
Amendment, we have taken care to inquire whether the action was
regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was
framed. See Wyoming v. Houghton, supra, at 299; Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens").

In Carroll, we held that when federal officers have probable cause to
believe that an automobile contains contraband, [526 U.S. 564] the
Fourth Amendment does not require them to obtain a warrant prior to
searching the car for and seizing the contraband. Our holding was
rooted in federal law enforcement practice at the time of the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we looked to laws of the
First, Second, and Fourth Congresses that authorized federal officers
to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods
subject to duties. Id. at 150-151 (citing Act of July 31, 1789,
§ § 24, 29, 1 Stat. 43; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 50, 1
Stat. 170; Act of Feb. 18, 1793, § 27, 1 Stat. 315; Act of Mar. 2,
1799, § § 68-70, 1 Stat. 677, 678). These enactments
led us to conclude that "contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment," Congress distinguished

the necessity for a search warrant between goods
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar
place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant.

267 U.S. at 151.

The Florida Supreme Court recognized that, under Carroll, the police
could search respondent's car without obtaining a warrant if they had
probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. The
court, however, rejected the argument that the warrantless seizure of
respondent's vehicle itself also was appropriate under Carroll and its
progeny. It reasoned that

[t]here is a vast difference between permitting the
immediate search of a movable automobile based on actual knowledge that
it then contains contraband [and] the discretionary seizure of a
citizen's automobile based upon a belief that it may have been used at
some time in the past to assist in illegal activity.

710 So.2d at 953. We disagree.

The principles underlying the rule in Carroll and the founding-era
statutes upon which they are based fully support the conclusion that
the warrantless seizure of respondent's car did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Although, as the Florida Supreme Court observed, the
police lacked [526 U.S. 565] probable cause to believe that
respondent's car contained contraband, see 710 So.2d at 953, they
certainly had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was
contraband under Florida law.{3} Recognition of the need to seize
readily movable contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly
underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. See 267
U.S. at 150-152; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390
(1985); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). This
need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its
contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure.{4}
Furthermore, the early federal statutes that we looked to in Carroll,
like the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, authorized the warrantless
seizure of both goods subject to duties and the ships upon which those
goods were concealed. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 43, 46; 1 Stat. 170,
174; 1 Stat. 677, 678, 692.

In addition to the special considerations recognized in the context of
movable items, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently
accorded law enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising their
duties in public places. For example, although a warrant
presumptively is required for a felony arrest in a suspect's home, the
Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests in public places where an
officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has occurred.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-424 (1976). In
explaining this rule, we have drawn upon the established [526 U.S. 566]
"distinction between a warrantless seizure in an open area and such a
seizure on private premises." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
587 (1980); see also id. at 586-587 ("It is also well settled that
objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be
seized by the police without a warrant"). The principle that
underlies Watson extends to the seizure at issue in this case.
Indeed, the facts of this case are nearly indistinguishable from those
in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
There, we considered whether federal agents violated the Fourth
Amendment by failing to secure a warrant prior to seizing automobiles
in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments. Id. at 351. We
concluded that they did not, reasoning that

[t]he seizures of the automobiles in this case took
place on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, and did
not involve any invasion of privacy.

Ibid. Here, because the police seized respondent's vehicle from a
public area -- respondent's employer's parking lot -- the warrantless
seizure also did not involve any invasion of respondent's
privacy. Based on the relevant history and our prior precedent,
we therefore conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not require a
warrant to seize respondent's automobile in these circumstances.

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SOUTER, J., concurring

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion subject to a qualification against reading
our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of
anything a State chooses to call "contraband," whether or not the
property happens to be in public when seized. The Fourth
Amendment does not concede any talismanic [526 U.S. 567] significance
to use of the term "contraband" whenever a legislature may resort to a
novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as
legislatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing, cf., e.g.,
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443-446 (1996); id. at 458 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510
U.S. 43, 81-82, and n. 1 (1993) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (expressing concern about the breadth of new
forfeiture statutes). Moreover, G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), (upon which we rely today) endorsed the
public character of a warrantless seizure scheme by reference to
traditional enforcement of government revenue laws, id. at 351-352, and
n. 18 (citing, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272 (1856)), and the legality of seizing abandoned
contraband in public view, 429 U.S. at 352 (citing Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).

STEVENS, J., dissenting

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting.

During the summer of 1993, Florida police obtained evidence that
Tyvessel White was engaged in the sale and delivery of narcotics, and
that he was using his car to facilitate the enterprise. For
reasons unexplained, the police neither arrested White at that point
nor seized his automobile as an instrumentality of his alleged
narcotics offenses. Most important to the resolution of this
case, the police did not seek to obtain a warrant before seizing
White's car that fall -- over two months after the last event that
justified the seizure. Instead, after arresting White at work on
an unrelated matter and obtaining his car keys, the officers seized
White's automobile without a warrant from his employer's parking lot
and performed an inventory search. The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that the seizure, which took place absent exigent
circumstances or probable cause to believe [526 U.S. 568] that
narcotics were present, was invalid. 710 So.2d 949 (1998).{1}

In 1971, after advising us that "we must not lose sight of the Fourth
Amendment's fundamental guarantee," Justice Stewart made this comment
on what was then settled law:

[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions." The exceptions are "jealously and
carefully drawn," and there must be "a showing by those who seek
exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative. . . . [T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption
to show the need for it."

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-455 (footnotes
omitted). Because the Fourth Amendment plainly "protects property
as well as privacy" and seizures as well as searches, Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56, 62-64 (1992), I would apply to the present case
our longstanding warrant presumption.{2} [526 U.S. 569] In the
context of property seizures by law enforcement authorities, the
presumption might be overcome more easily in the absence of an
accompanying privacy or liberty interest. Nevertheless, I would
look to the warrant clause as a measure of reasonableness in such
cases, United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of
Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972), and the circumstances of this case do
not convince me that the role of a neutral magistrate was dispensable.

The Court does not expressly disavow the warrant presumption urged by
White and followed by the Florida Supreme Court, but its decision
suggests that the exceptions have all but swallowed the general
rule. To defend the officers' warrantless seizure, the State
points to cases establishing an "automobile exception" to our ordinary
demand for a warrant before a lawful search may be conducted.
Each of those cases, however, involved searches of automobiles for
contraband or temporary seizures of automobiles to effect such
searches.{3} Such intrusions comport with the practice [526 U.S.
570] of federal customs officers during the Nation's early history on
which the majority relies, as well as the practicalities of modern
life. But those traditions and realities are weak support for a
warrantless seizure of the vehicle itself, months after the property
was proverbially tainted by its physical proximity to the drug trade,
and while the owner is safely in police custody.

The stated purposes for allowing warrantless vehicle searches are
likewise insufficient to validate the seizure at issue, whether one
emphasizes the ready mobility of automobiles or the pervasive
regulation that diminishes the owner's privacy interests in such
property. No one seriously suggests that the State's regulatory
regime for road safety makes acceptable such unchecked and potentially
permanent seizures of automobiles under the State's criminal
laws. And, as the Florida Supreme Court cogently explained, an
exigent circumstance rationale is not available when the seizure is
based upon a belief that the automobile may have been used at some time
in the past to assist in illegal activity and the owner is already in
custody.{4} Moreover, the state court's conclusion that the
warrant process is a sensible protection from abuse of government power
is bolstered by the inherent risks of hindsight at post-seizure
hearings and law enforcement agencies' pecuniary interest in the
seizure of such property. See Fla.Stat. § 932.704(1) (1997);
cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,
55-56 (1993). [526 U.S. 571]

Were we confronted with property that Florida deemed unlawful for
private citizens to possess regardless of purpose, and, had the State
relied on the plain view doctrine, perhaps a warrantless seizure would
have been defensible. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
(1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (citing Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). But "`[t]here is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing an automobile,'" Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)); no serious fear for officer
safety or loss of evidence can be asserted in this case considering the
delay and circumstances of the seizure; and only the automobile
exception is at issue, 710 So.2d at 952; Brief for Petitioner 6, 28.{5}

In any event, it seems to me that the State's treatment of certain
vehicles as "contraband" based on past use provides an added reason for
insisting on an appraisal of the evidence by a neutral magistrate,
rather than a justification for expanding the discretionary authority
of the police. Unlike a search that is contemporaneous with an
officer's probable cause determination, Horton, 496 U.S. at 130-131, a
belated seizure may involve a serious intrusion on the rights of
innocent persons with no connection to the earlier offense. Cf.
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). And a seizure supported
only by the officer's conclusion that at some time in the past there
was probable cause to believe that the car was then being used
illegally is especially intrusive when followed by a routine and
predictable inventory search -- [526 U.S. 572] even though there may be
no basis for believing the car then contains any contraband or other
evidence of wrongdoing.{6}

Of course, requiring police officers to obtain warrants in cases such
as the one before us will not allay every concern private property
owners might have regarding government discretion and potentially
permanent seizures of private property under the authority of a State's
criminal laws. Had the officers in this case obtained a warrant
in July or August, perhaps they nevertheless could or would have
executed that warrant months later; and, as the Court suggests, ante at
565, n. 4, delay between the basis for a seizure and its effectuation
might support a Fourth Amendment objection whether or not a warrant was
obtained. That said, a warrant application interjects the
judgment of a neutral decisionmaker, one with no pecuniary interest in
the matter, see Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-251 (1977) (per
curiam), before the burden of obtaining possession of the property
shifts to the individual. Knowing that a neutral party [526 U.S.
573] will be involved before private property is seized can only help
ensure that law enforcement officers will initiate forfeiture
proceedings only when they are truly justified. A warrant
requirement might not prevent delay and the attendant opportunity for
official mischief through discretionary timing, but it surely makes
delay more tolerable.

Without a legitimate exception, the presumption should prevail.
Indeed, the particularly troubling aspect of this case is not that the
State provides a weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant either
before or after White's arrest, but that it offers us no reason at
all. The justification cannot be that the authorities feared
their narcotics investigation would be exposed and hindered if a
warrant had been obtained. Ex parte warrant applications provide
neutral review of police determinations of probable cause, but such
procedures are by no means public. And the officers had months to
take advantage of them. On this record, one must assume that the
officers who seized White's car simply preferred to avoid the hassle of
seeking approval from a judicial officer. I would not permit bare
convenience to overcome our established preference for the warrant
process as a check against arbitrary intrusions by law enforcement
agencies "engaged in the often competitive" -- and, here, potentially
lucrative -- "enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).

Because I agree with the Florida Supreme Court's judgment that this
seizure was not reasonable without a warrant, I respectfully dissent.

Footnotes

THOMAS, J., lead opinion (Footnotes)

1. That Act provides, in relevant part:

Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal
property, or real property used in violation of any provision of the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which
any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is
taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited.

Fla.Stat. § 932.703(1)(a) (1997).

2. Nothing in the Act requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to
seizing a vehicle. See State v. Pomerance, 434 So.2d 329, 330
(Fla.Ct.App. 1983). Rather, the Act simply provides that

[p]ersonal property may be seized at the time of the violation or
subsequent to the violation, if the person entitled to notice is
notified at the time of the seizure . . . that there is a right to an
adversarial preliminary hearing after the seizure to determine whether
probable cause exists to believe that such property has been or is
being used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.

§ 932.703(2)(a).

3. The Act defines "contraband" to include any "vehicle of any kind, .
. . which was used . . . as an instrumentality in the commission of, or
in aiding or abetting in the commission of, any felony."

§ 932.701(2)(a)(5).

4. At oral argument, respondent contended that the delay between the
time that the police developed probable cause to seize the vehicle and
when the seizure actually occurred undercuts the argument that the
warrantless seizure was necessary to prevent respondent from removing
the car out of the jurisdiction. We express no opinion about
whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could render probable cause
stale, and the seizure therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

STEVENS, J., dissenting (Footnotes)

1. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion could be read to suggest that
due process protections in the Florida Constitution might independently
require a warrant or other judicial process before seizure under the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. See 710 So.2d at 952
(discussing Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d
957 (1991)). However, the certified question put to that court
referred only to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 710 So.2d at 950. Thus, a viable federal
question was presented for us to decide on certiorari, but of course we
have no authority to determine the limits of state constitutional or
statutory safeguards.

2. E.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist.
of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 315-318 (1972) ("Though the Fourth Amendment
speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' the definition
of `reasonableness' turns at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the warrant clause"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 454-455 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W]ith
minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of the
Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a
magistrate's authority expressed through a validly issued warrant"),
overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see
also Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348 (1972) (noting "the now
accepted fact that someone independent of the police and prosecution
must determine probable cause"); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 481-482 (1963)

3. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)
(where the police have probable cause, "contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched
for without a warrant"); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820, n.
26, 825 (1982) ("During virtually the entire history of our country --
whether contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921
roadster, or a modern automobile -- it has been assumed that a lawful
search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that might
conceal the object of the search"); Wyoming v. Houghton, ante, at
300-301; Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)
("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search
the vehicle without more").

4. 710 So.2d 949, 953-954 (Fla. 1998) ("There simply was no concern
presented here that an opportunity to seize evidence would be missed
because of the mobility of the vehicle. Indeed, the entire focus
of the seizure here was to seize the vehicle itself as a prize because
of its alleged prior use in illegal activities, rather than to search
the vehicle for contraband known to be therein, and that might be lost
if not seized immediately"). The majority notes, ante at 555, n.
4, but does not confront, the argument that the mobility of White's
vehicle was not a substantial governmental concern in light of the
delay between establishing probable cause and seizure.

5. There is some force to the majority's reliance on United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), which held that no warrant is required for
felony arrests made in public. Ante at 565-566. With
respect to the seizures at issue in Watson, however, I consider the law
enforcement and public safety interests far more substantial, and the
historical and legal traditions more specific and engrained, than those
present on the facts of this case. See 423 U.S. at 415-424; id.
at 429 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[L]ogic sometimes must defer to
history and experience").

6. The Court's reliance on G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338 (1977), is misplaced. The seizure in that case was
supported by an earlier tax assessment that was "given the force of a
judgment." Id. at 352, n. 18 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We emphasized that the owner of the automobiles in
question lacked a privacy interest, but he had also lost any possessory
interest in the property by way of the prior judgment. In this
case, despite plenty of time to obtain a warrant that would provide
similar pre-seizure authority for the police, they acted entirely on
their own assessment of the probative force of evidence relating to
earlier events. In addition, White's property interests in his
car were apparently not extinguished until at the earliest, the seizure
took place. See Fla.Stat. §§ 932.703(1)(c)-(d) (1997)
(the State acquires rights, interest, and title in contraband articles
at the time of seizure, and the seizing agency may not use the seized
property until such rights, interest, and title are "perfected" in
accordance with the statute); § 932.704(8); Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1992). This statutory scheme and its aims,
see Fla.Stat. § 932.704(1) (1997), also distinguish more mundane
and temporary vehicle seizures performed for regulatory purposes and
immediate public needs, such as a tow from a no-parking zone. No
one contends that a warrant is necessary in that case.