"An important book .... Richelson's insights and access to sources are extraordinary."– American Historical Review

"An especially important and welcome addition to the literature of the military space program."– Journal of Military History

"Richelson puts these satellite operations in the context of world events – from Russian missile programs to the Gulf War – and explains how DPS's infrared sensors are used to detect meteorites, monitor forest fires, and even gather industrial intelligence."– Journal of American History

"An excellent book that absolutely merits and needs this kind of significant updating."– Roger Launius, Senior Curator, Division of Space History, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian

Washington
D.C., January 8,
2013 -
As the United States prepares to transition this month from Cold War-era missile detection programs to a more sophisticated infrared platform, recently
declassified documents published by the National Security Archive take a fresh look at the history of the U.S. space-based early warning program. The new
materials flesh out critical details about the progress and problems associated with the new "SBIRS" program, which is about to become operational. Among
the records posted for the first time today are internal memos discussing such sensitive topics as the utility of using "white" defense warning programs as
cover for classified signals intelligence satellite launches.

This posting updates a November 9, 2007, electronic briefing book published in anticipation of the final Defense Support Program (DSP) spacecraft launch.

Today's update includes the documents from the original posting plus an additional 17 documents. Largely obtained through the Freedom of Information Act
and archival research, they cover the theoretical work behind the concept of space-based missile detection, early doubts about the feasibility of such
detection, and 1960s research and development work on the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS). They also include documents on the evolution of the Defense
Support Program (DSP) with regard both to its capabilities and its use for a variety of additional missions, including problems with some of the program's
early satellites.

Compiled by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the documents in this briefing book originated with the Defense Department,
Air Force, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Aerospace Corporation, General Accounting Office, and
other organizations.

As early as 1948, U.S. government scientists were investigating the possibility of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles by the heat generated when
they were launched, including the heat or infrared signals from their missile plumes. In 1955, the work of two members of the RAND Corporation staff,
William Kellogg and Sidney Passman, on infrared detection of missiles "captured the attention of various science advisory committees" and created support
for development of an infrared warning satellite. (Document 1, Document 2)

The next year, the Air Force selected the Lockheed Corporation to build a photographic reconnaissance satellite. Lockheed proposed a number of additional
systems, including a satellite equipped with an infrared radiometer and telescope to detect both the hot exhaust gases emitted by long-range jet bombers
and large rockets as they climbed through the atmosphere. As a result, before the end of 1957, Lockheed's proposal became Subsystem G of Weapons System 117
(WS-117L), the overall Defense Department space-based reconnaissance and surveillance program.[1]

By early November 1958, Subsystem G had become MIDAS - the Missile Defense Alarm System. Throughout 1959 and for a number of years afterwards plans
for a future MIDAS constellation were drawn up and revised – with the number of satellites and their orbital characteristics changing from plan to plan.
Thus, a January 1959 plan recommended an operational constellation of twenty spacecraft operating at 1,000 miles while a revised plan, produced later that
year, envisioned a constellation of twelve spacecraft at 2,000-mile altitudes.[2]

Between 1959 and the end of 1963 there were three salient features to the MIDAS program – revised plans, internal and external reviews of the feasibility of
MIDAS (and indeed of the whole concept of infrared detection from space), and the launch of test satellites. While some were afraid that background
radiance and cloud clutter, among other potential problems, would prevent an effective system from being developed, others in the Air Force and contractor
organizations were more optimistic. (Document 3 and Document 4)

The attempt to determine the feasibility of MIDAS began on February 26, 1960, when MIDAS 1 was launched from the Atlantic Missile Range. Unfortunately, the
satellite and booster never separated and landed in the Atlantic Ocean. MIDAS 2 was successfully orbited on May 24, 1960, but the transmission of infrared
data to a ground readout station lasted only for a brief time before the satellite's communication link failed. It would not be until the launch of MIDAS
7, on May 9, 1963, that a MIDAS satellite would clearly demonstrate the ability to detect missile launches – detecting the launch of both Minuteman and
Polaris missiles, whose launch had been scheduled to provide a test for MIDAS. While a booster malfunction prevented MIDAS 8 from reaching orbit, MIDAS 9
was also successful in detecting missile launches.[3] (Document 8)

Despite the success of MIDAS 7 and 9, there was no immediate move to deploy an operational system, as there were still issues concerning costs and the
exact capabilities a warning satellite might also have, such as the ability to detect the signatures of a nuclear detonation. In 1966, a new series of
test launches began with the objective of demonstrating that the satellites could operate for as many as six months and detect submarine-launched and
medium-range missiles as well as ICBMs. The tests were also intended to demonstrate the ability to detect launch points to within eight to ten miles. (Document 9)

Three tests were conducted in 1966 – in June, August, and October. While the first mission failed due to booster problems, the next two were successful. One
or both of the two successful missions detected the infrared signature of SS-N-6 missiles, which was extraordinarily dim – thus demonstrating the sensor's
ability to detect a wide range of missiles, both liquid and solid-fueled. As a result, the decision was made to go ahead with construction and deployment
of an operational constellation of early warning satellites.[4]

The satellites launched in 1966 were part of Program 461, as MIDAS had become known before the end of 1963. The program to produce an operational
constellation was first known as Program 949, then Program 647, and then finally designated the Defense Support Program (DSP). In contrast to the
satellites associated with the MIDAS and 461 programs, which orbited about 2,000 miles above the earth, the DSP satellites were supposed to be launched
into a geostationary orbit – 22,300 miles above a point on the equator, allowing them to maintain a constant view of the third of the earth that their sensor
could monitor (and also made the DSP program, even before its first launch, an inadvertent cover for NRO geosynchronous signals intelligence satellite
launches).[5]
(Document 12a, Document 12b) While the first of those satellites, launched on November 5, 1970, would fail to attain the proper orbit, the second did, placing it in a position over the
equator that allowed it to monitor Soviet and Chinese missile launches.[6]

Excerpt from an angry note (Document 37) by Charles Horner, commander-in-chief of U.S. Space Command, to the head of the Aerospace Corporation, after the latter company produced a study (Document 36) recommending exploring alternatives to the FEWS early warning system.

After two more successful launches, the U.S. established a three-satellite DSP constellation – with satellite stations over the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Eurasia. Eventually, in addition to three operational satellites, two retired satellites would be maintained in reserve. Then, subsequent to the launch of
DSP-14 in June 1989, a four-satellite operational constellation was established, with the creation of a European station. That constellation has been
maintained since that time. Throughout the DSP program the data from the constellation has been augmented by data from infrared sensors carried by the two
or three National Reconnaissance Office signals intelligence satellites operating in highly-elliptical orbit at any given time. Over the life of the
program, the satellites have detected thousands of strategic and tactical missile launches, as well as French and Chinese atmospheric nuclear
detonations – the latter via its infrared sensor and the nuclear detonation detection sensors also carried on the spacecraft.[7]

Since the first launch, the capabilities of DSP satellites have been enhanced. The first model of the satellite, which encompassed Flights 1-4, had an
expected lifetime of 1.25 years (commonly exceeded) and 2000 detectors. The most recent model DSP-1, first orbited in 1989, had an expected lifetime of 5
years (also exceeded) and 6000 detectors – which provided far more accurate estimates of the coordinates associated with missile launches, an improvement
intended to allow DSP to provide more precise information in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. The newer model also could detect
infrared radiation from two different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (making it harder to jam) as well as having both a below-the-horizon and
above-the-horizon capability. (Document 34, Document 43)

In addition to the evolution in DSP capabilities, there has also been an evolution of missions and customers. As previously noted, DSP was originally
established to detect strategic missiles launched against the United States, whether by the Soviet Union or China, and to detect nuclear detonations. The
ability of DSP sensors to detect shorter-range offensive and surface-to-air missiles allowed it to detect and provide intelligence on missiles fired during
regional conflicts – such as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) as well as the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[8] (Document 30, Document 33)

Further, the discovery that DSP's infrared sensor was detecting the flight of Soviet Backfire bombers, one version of which would be used to attack U.S.
naval vessels in the event of war, led to the SLOW WALKER program. Its ability to detect the infrared signals reflecting off of spacecraft resulted in the
FAST WALKER program. The ability to detect infrared events of sufficient intensity has also allowed DSP to provide data on aircraft crashes, ammunition
dump explosions, and industrial processes.[9] (Document 19a, Document 19b, Document 44, Document 51)

A key element of the DSP system has been the ground network used to control the satellites and receive the data they collect. Control over and processing
of data from the first satellite stationed over Eurasia and its successors was the responsibility of the Overseas Ground Station (OGS) at Nurrungar, in the
Australian Outback – the source of much political controversy. A second ground station at Buckley AFB in Colorado, the CONUS Ground Station (CGS), would
control the Atlantic and Pacific satellites. Later on, to control the European satellites, the European Ground Station (EGS) was established at Kapaun,
Germany. In addition to the large processing stations, a number of mobile ground terminals were built to allow DSP data to be received in the event of the
destruction of any of the fixed stations. In addition, Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTaGS) were deployed to Europe and Asia as part of the SLOW WALKER
program. Between 1999 and 2001, the OGS and EGS were closed down, while relay stations were established at Pine Gap, Australia and Menwith Hill, United
Kingdom to send the data back to CGS for processing.[10] (Document 24, Document 25, Document 43)

While generations of DSP satellites demonstrated expanding capabilities, consideration of a follow-on system began as early as 1979. An initial concern, as
noted above, was to improve DSP's ability to contribute data in the midst of a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union – by making the satellites and ground
stations more survivable and able to provide more detailed information, such as the precise coordinates of Soviet missile launches. In addition, since the
creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983, plans for future launch detection satellites needed to be integrated
into plans for national missile defense.

Debates and disagreements over issues such as costs and technical requirements, within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress,
resulted in a host of DSP follow-on programs having been proposed and then cancelled for over fifteen years. Thus, the Advanced Warning System (AWS), Boost
Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS), the Follow-On Early Warning System (FEWS), and Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles (ALARM) program, along with
their acronyms, all came and went between 1979 and 1995.[11] (Document 29, Document 32)

In 1995, the Air Force announced a new follow-on program – the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The program was to consist of four operational satellites
in geostationary orbit, two infrared sensors on highly-elliptical orbiting National Reconnaissance Office satellites, and a SBIRS-Low segment that would be
a crucial element of national missile defense. The low-earth orbiting portion of SBIRS was renamed the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). Two
STSS spacecraft were orbited in September 2009. However, ultimately, the Missile Defense Agency (responsible for the STSS program) decided not to pursue
the STSS program and opted for an alternative system, the Precision Tracking Space System.[12] (Document 59)

Problems with the infrared sensors for the high-altitude satellites, schedule delays, and large increases in project costs repeatedly delayed the expected
launch of the first SBIRS geosynchronous satellite. They also resulted in consideration of either alternative or stop-gap programs – such as the
Alternative Infrared Satellite System and Infrared Augmentation Satellite – to guarantee the continuity of a space-based launch detection program.[13] (Document 44, Document 50, Document 52, Document 56)

While the SBIRS sensors orbited on NRO signals intelligence satellites in 2006 and 2008 were successful in returning infrared launch and other data, a
problem with the safe-hold function on an NRO geosynchronous satellite in 2007 caused further problems for the SBIRS geosynchronous launch schedule (Document 55). Finally, in May 2011, the first SBIRS geosynchronous spacecraft (GEO-1) was successfully launched (Document 57). The current
status of that spacecraft as well as status of both payloads for future highly-elliptical orbit and geosynchronous launches was examined in a later
December 2011 Department of Defense acquisition report (Document 58) – which found that GEO-1 was "on track to complete its trial period and enter
into operations in January 2013 and that there were no significant software-related issues."

Read
the DocumentsNote:
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This paper examines the radiation emitted by the flames of
rocket motors burning nitric acid and aniline as well as alcohol
and oxygen. The objective of the reported research was to gather
data that could be employed for a number of purposes – including
optical detection tracking and homing on those targets.

Document
2: William W. Kellogg and Sidney Passman, Rand Corporation,
RM-1572, Infrared Techniques Applied to the Detection and
Interception of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, October
21, 1955. For Official Use Only

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This study was written by an expert on infrared technology
(Passman) and an expert on high-altitude earth observation (Kellogg).
They noted that a basic characteristic of an ICBM is the heat
that it generates during takeoff and re-entry into the atmosphere
and that hot metal is a good emitter of infrared radiation.
They go on to examine alternative means for detecting missile
launches from emitted radiation, observing the limitations of
airborne detection and suggesting that satellite-based detection
might be feasible.

By March 1959, when the PSAC Early Warning Panel met, the Missile
Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) program – for the space-base
detection of missile launches--had been established and was in
the research and development phase. The report examines a number
of alternative approaches to missile launch detection – the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) ground-based radars, a
fleet of U-2 aircraft equipped with infrared detection, as well
as MIDAS. With respect to MIDAS, the panel concluded that construction
of such a system was not yet justified.

The DDR&E Ad Hoc Group, consisting of governmental and
outside representatives, and chaired by Jack Ruina, head of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency, was appointed by Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara to study the MIDAS program. The draft
version of the report – that would be finalized by the end of
the month – asserted that it was impossible to predict whether
an operationally significant version of MIDAS could be developed
within the following decade and examined the problems facing
any attempt to produce an effective, operational system.

This memo was written at a time when there was still significant
doubt within the Defense Department as to whether the MIDAS
program could produce an operational system but strong belief
in the program within the Air Force and its contractors. Director
of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown warns the Air
Force not to try to deploy an operational constellation under
the cover of launching a series of research and development
satellites.

In this letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, General Bernard
Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, conveyed
his concern over Secretary of Defense McNamara's order to the
Air Force, issued a week earlier, to drop all deployment plans
for MIDAS and reorganize the program. He questioned the Defense
Secretary's view on the declining future importance of early
warning, emphasized the need to make a commitment to deploy
a system, and disputed whether some of the alleged impediments
to development of a system were truly problems.

Document 7: Roswell L. Gilpatric,
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subject:
MIDAS, December 28, 1962. Secret

Source: Freedom of Information Act

On December 17, 1962, launch of the sixth MIDAS test satellite
failed after the booster broke up and exploded shortly after
launch. Eleven days later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric
informed the Air Force Secretary Eugene Zucker that the Defense
Department still considered it unwise to proceed with MIDAS
as an operational system and that a number of alternatives might,
collectively, provide the capability promised by the higher-risk
MIDAS.

Document
8: Adam Yarmolinsky, Memorandum for Mr. Timothy J. Rearden,
Special Assistant to the President, May 31, 1963 w/att: "A
MIDAS Satellite Was Successfully Launched by Air Force on 9
May 1963 from Vandenberg AFB." Secret

Source: Freedom of Information Act

The launch of MIDAS 7 represented a turning point in the battle
over whether space-based warning of missile launches was feasible.
The satellite's infrared sensor was to be tested against the
launch of Air Force and Navy missiles. Yarmolinsky's memo reports
on the results from the first half of the satellite's forty-seven
days in operation – and notes its sensor's successful detection
of each launch.

Document 9: Robert
E. McClellan, Space and Missile Systems Office, History of the
Space Systems Division, July - December 1965, October 1968 (excerpt).
Secret

Source: Freedom of Information Act

Despite the successful detections in 1963, MIDAS did not evolve
into an operational program. By 1965, it had been designated
Program 461 – in keeping with security procedures that intended
to obscure the mission of each program. One component of the
program, involving the detection of submarine-launched missiles,
was designated Program 266 in October 1965. This portion of
the SAMSO history explains plans for the Research Test Series
intended to help produce an operational space-based early warning
system.

Source: Record Group 340, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

This memo from Alexander Flax, who served as both the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development and Director of the National Reconnaissance, discusses the possibility of a geosynchronous satellite equipped with an infrared sensor that would detect and provide intelligence on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) launches. The memo makes it clear that the potential program would be a supplement to the ongoing Program 949 effort to develop an infrared early-warning satellite.

Developmental work on a space-based launch detection capability
continued into1966 and 1967 under Program 461. Meanwhile, on
November 1, 1966 the Air Force designated Program 949 as a follow-on
to 461. This portion of a SAMSO history discusses the objectives
of the new program, plans for further launches of developmental
satellites, the sensors the satellites were to carry, and plans
for an overseas ground station.

These two documents address the way in which the Air Force's officially classified, but well-known, early warning satellite program was serving as a cover for the NRO's high-altitude signals intelligence satellite programs.

While the DSP satellites were developed for the purpose of
detecting Soviet strategic missile launches, government personnel
and contractors involved in the program would soon discover
that the infrared sensor could also detect a number of other
events of interest – including the launch of shorter-range missiles
such as the Scud – a capability that would be of great value
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. This synthesis describes the effort
made, at the Australian ground station, during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War to monitor Egyptian Scud launches employing the DSP
satellite located over the Horn of Africa.

On five occasions in October and November 1975, a DSP satellite
(DSP-E) picked up intense infrared returns. In one instance
the illumination lasted for more than four hours. One fear was
that the satellite had been the target of Soviet lasers in an
attempt to test the Soviet ability to "blind" the
U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance satellites. This memo to
an aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger provides background
on the events and possible explanations. Ultimately, it was
concluded that the most likely source of the signals was pipeline
fires.

Written by an individual who was involved in the DSP program
for several decades, and published in a classified journal,
this article provides technical details on the operation of
the infrared sensor, the data reduction process, the types of
data that can be produced by the satellite's infrared and nuclear
detonation detection sensors, the accomplishments of the program
since the first DSP launch in November 1970 – which included the
detection of gas fires, midair collisions, large fires, and
surface-to-air missile activity.

Document
16: General Daniel James Jr., CINC, Aerospace Defense Command, Letter to General William V. McBride, September 17, 1976. Secret.

Source: Record Group 340, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

This letter addresses problems with several early Defense Support Program satellites, including the ability of the 3rd and 4th DSP satellites to detect Soviet submarine-launched SS-N-6 Mod II missiles – the missile with the dimmest signature of any Soviet missile of the time.

The issue of how well the Soviet Union understood the capabilities
of U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance satellites was one that
continually concerned the operators of those systems. This message
is an attempt to provide some answers with regard to DSP.

The ninth DSP satellite was placed into orbit on March 16,
1981 and stationed over the Atlantic. Two weeks later President
Ronald Reagan was wounded during an assassination attempt. This
memo, from the Aerospace Defense Command, noted problems with
the satellite and that it had generated false missile launch
warnings on two occasions – on April 5 and 13. The later false
reports "could have resulted in unacceptable posturing
of SAC [Strategic Air Command] forces," according to the
memo.

The discovery of DSP's detection of the infrared emissions
of Backfire aircraft assigned to Naval Aviation units flying
on afterburner led the Navy to establish a program to access
and exploit that data. The first document includes a rarely-seen
reference to the SLOW WALKER program. The second provides information
on the aircraft that was the main target of the program.

This portion of the 1984 Air Force Space Command history describes
the events related to the DSP constellation that year. It discusses
movements of the satellites, problems with satellites, efforts
made to fix the problems, and future initiatives to provide
more capable sensors.

Even before DSP had completed its first decade of operations,
thought was being given to a follow-on system – particularly
one that would be more survivable in the event of an actual
war with the Soviet Union. This document provides a history
of one of the early proposed follow-ons – the Advanced Warning
System.

Document
22:
Air Force Space Command, History of Air Force Space Command,
January - December 1987, n.d. (excerpt). Classification
Unknown

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This portion of the 1987 Air Force Space Command history essentially
covers two topics – developments with the satellite constellation
that year as well as the controversy in Australia over the presence
of the Overseas Ground Station at Nurrungar. The debate over
the ground station's presence was heightened in 1987 due to
the publication of Desmond Ball's A Base for Debate, which examined
the ground station issue, which is discussed in detail in the
history.

This history, written by an Air Force and NRO historian, focuses on the 1955-1967 period, which
covers the initiation of the Air Force effort to develop spacecraft that could detect missile launches using space-based infrared sensors through the conclusion of Program 461 – which included the launch of nine Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) spacecraft (six of which reached orbit) and three Program 461 spacecraft.

In the 1980s, the DSP constellation was expanded from three
operational satellites to four. In addition to adding a satellite
to the space segment, a ground station was also added. In addition
to the stations at Buckley AFB, Colorado and Nurrungar, Australia
a station was added Kapaun, Germany (the European Ground Station).
With the collapse of the East German government in 1989, the
U.S. began to consider the possibility that a unified German
government might wish that foreign military forces vacate German
territory. This memo is one example of the contingency planning
that was initiated.

Controversy over the Australian ground station was not restricted
to the debate over whether Australia should continue to provide
a home for the station. There was also a disagreement between
the United States and Australia over the powers of the Overseas
Ground Station Deputy Commander – a post held by an Australian – when
the American commander was not present. This memo is one of
several that addressed the issue.

Document
26:
Air Force Space Command, History of Air Force Space Command,
January - December 1990, n.d. Classification Not Available

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This extract from the 1990 history provides information on
DSP operations as well as the issues involving the ground stations
in Europe and Australia. With regard to the latter it fills in
much of what is redacted from the Doss memo (Document 25)

From the very beginning of the DSP program it was clear that
the satellite's sensors could detect tactical as well as strategic
ballistic missiles – creating the possibility that DSP could be
used to provide warning and other information to commanders
in the field. With the end of the Cold War it was easier for
theater commanders to request DSP support. This memo responds
to a request from the U.S. Central Command for such support.
It provides information on U.S. Space Command's creation of
a system for the transmission of DSP data concerning tactical
missile launches, as well as on the data that DSP is capable
of providing.

This memorandum recounts a meeting at U.S. Space Command headquarters
to resolve issues concerning access to DSP and other technical data, mutual support of tactical warning efforts,
warning of strategic attack versus warning of theater missile
attack, and the use of DSP to support specific service programs.

Document 29:
Assistant Secretary of Defense C3I, Report to the Congress
on the Follow-On Early Warning System, April 15, 1991.
Secret

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This report provided Congress with information, redacted
from the declassified version, on DoD's view on the need for
an improved system, DSP performance in Desert Storm, and the
objectives on the Follow-On Early Warning System (FEWS) – as the
planned successor to the DSP system was known at the time. The
remaining portion of the memo provides background, an explanation
of why the AWS was cancelled, the impact of the new system
on DSP ground stations, and acquisition plans.

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, DSP played a key role in providing
warning of Iraqi Scud missile launches (of which there 88) – whose
targets were in Bahrain, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. This heavily
redacted briefing provides some details of DSP capabilities
and performance during the war – including why DSP failed to
provide warning of the Scud that fragmented above Dhahran and
whose warhead fell onto a warehouse that was housing American
soldiers, killing 28 and wounding about 100.

Document
31: General Accounting Office, Early Warning Satellites:
Funding for Follow-On System is Premature, November 1991. Unclassified

Source: General Accounting Office

Despite DoD's support for FEWS, the General Accounting Office
was skeptical, as they explained in this report, that funding
of satellite development was currently justified. It examines
some of the history of the consideration of DSP follow-on programs,
and some possible alternatives to FEWS.

The full assessment covers the contribution of a variety of
space systems to the operations that first halted Iraq's advance
and then forced the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The
extract reprinted here concerns the contribution of the DSP
satellites.

This briefing, given by the DSP program director, provides
a history of the DSP program – including such subjects as the
collection and processing of data by the satellite, improvements
in DSP capabilities, DSP ground stations, and the evolving missile
threat.

The cancellation of AWS and then criticism of FEWS was part
of what would be a prolonged search for a follow-on system.
A major study in the search process was conducted by the Air
Force Program Executive Officer for Space. The study examined
the capabilities and costs of a number of alternative systems – both in geosynchronous as well as low-altitude orbit – that
might be used for the missile launch detection mission.

Document 36: Guido W. Aru
and Carl T. Lunde, Aerospace Corporation, DSP-II: "Preserving
the Air Force's Options," Executive Overview, April
23, 1993. For Official Use Only

Source: Freedom of Information Act

The Schnelzer study recommended continuation of the FEWS program – a
recommendation that was popular in the Air Force and with the
U.S. Space Command. There were dissenters – both in the Aerospace
Corporation (which provided technical support to the Air Force
and National Reconnaissance Office) and the Space Systems Division
of the Air Force Systems Command.

This executive overview summarizes the results of a 500-page
study, which questioned some of the requirements established
for a follow-on to DSP (largely on the grounds that they were
relics of the Cold War) and proposed an alternative that the
authors believed would satisfy reasonable launch detection requirements
at far less cost.

Upon learning of the contents of the Aru and Lunde study (Document
36), U.S. Space Command commander-in-chief Charles Horner sent
this hand-written note to the Aerospace Corporation's president
expressing his anger at the report's contents.

Document
38: Col. Joe Bailey, System Program Director, Space-Based
Early Warning Systems, "Point Paper on DSP-II TOR,"
May 24, 1993. For Official Use Only

Source:
Freedom of Information Act

This point paper provides a concise background, overview, and
critique of the Aru and Lunde DSP-II report (Document 36), released
under the name of the head of the director of Space-Based Early
Warning Systems (responsible for both the DSP and successor program)
of the Air Force Space and Missile System Center. The critique
focuses in part on the requirements not met by the proposed
alternative to FEWS. Other criticisms involved the projected cost
of the alternative as well as the tone of the report.

These two letters are responses by Aerospace Corporation president
Aldridge to General Horner concerning the DSP-II study (Document
36) – the first only a few days after Horner's handwritten complaint
of May 24 (Document 37). In his May 27 letter Aldridge states
Aerospace "clearly understands ... that the FEWS capability
is the only concept that satisfies the needs of the operational
commander."

Document
40: Report of the Space-Based IR Sensors/Technical Support
Group, October 1993. For Official Use Only

Source: Freedom of Information Act

While Aerospace Corporation analysts might not have been authorized
to produce a report questioning the need for FEWS, a review
group appointed by Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch was.
The group was headed by Robert Everett of the MITRE Corporation.
While the group did not support the DSP-II proposal, it also
suggested an alternative to FEWS. The group's report examined
the requirements associated with FEWS as well as capabilities
that a follow-on system needed to have and what type of system
would satisfy those requirements.

Document
41:
Guido William Aru, Statement before the House of Representatives
Committee on Government Operations, Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee, February 2, 1994. Unclassified

Source: House Committee on Government Operations

The controversy over the follow-on to DSP, which included charges
that FEWS opponents were being intimidated, was one topic of
early 1994 Congressional hearings on strategic satellite systems.
In his testimony Guido Aru provided his view of the issues involved,
the results of his research, as well as actions directed against
him and his co-author.

Document
42: Harry N. Waldron, History of the Space and Missile
Systems Center, October 1994 - September 1997, Volume I.
March 2002. (excerpt). For Official Use Only

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This extract from the SMSC history covers both past and current
DSP operations and capabilities as well as plans for the follow-on
system – the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Specific topics
discussed include satellite capabilities, ground stations, use
of DSP for tactical warning, and envisioned SBIRS capabilities.

Document
43: Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) System Program
Office, Defense Support Program (DSP): A Pictorial Chronology
1970-1998, n.d. Unclassified

Source: Air Force Public Affairs

This booklet was prepared for a celebration of the Defense
Support Program. It provides a breakdown of different DSP "models"
and their capabilities, DSP program directors in the government
and industry, a launch history, the phases of the program, DSP
use in Operation Desert Storm, and information on DSP ground
stations.

In 1995, the long process to find a successor to DSP appeared
to have concluded with the approval of the Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) program. Among the topics covered by this briefing
are SBIRS mission areas, the SBIRS constellation, the allocation
of tasks to specific parts of the constellation, SBIRS connection
to national missile defense, and DSP detections of aircraft
explosions.

In this report GAO specifies a number of reasons why it
believes that the SBIRS-Low system might miss its initial deployment
date – including the gap between the beginning of production and
the availability of test results and the immaturity of key satellite
technologies.

This memo expresses the author's dissatisfaction with a General Accounting Office report on the effort to develop the Spaced-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace DSP spacecraft. Before providing a detailed response, the author states that the report "is not completely accurate, and its conclusions, recommendations, and basic premises have been overcome by events."

Document 47: Space and Missile Systems Center History Office, History of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1 October 1998 – 30 September 2001, Volume I (Extract). Secret.

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This extract from the 1999-2000 fiscal years' history of the organization responsible for management of the SBIRS program covers the activities of the operational Defense Support Program (spacecraft, launches, and ground sites) as well as developmental work on the space and ground segments of the SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low programs.

This management plan discusses the SBIRS mission and requirements and provides a program summary, as well as discussing program management and business strategy, risk management, cost and performance management, support concept, and the approach to testing.

Despite the optimism generated by the selection of SBIRS as
the DSP follow-on, problems emerged with the new sensors, which
were intended to be more capable than those carried on DSP spacecraft.
As a result, projected costs increased substantially while the
date when the first SBIRS would be launched kept receding. This
General Accounting Office study provides a detailed examination
of the problems experienced by the SBIRS program as well as
an evaluation of remaining risks with regard to cost and schedule
delays.

This directive, issued by the unified command which operates the DSP and SBIRS systems (through the Air Force Space Command), focuses on the system through which theater missile warning is provided to theater users (including allies), which can be used for various defensive purposes. The directive also states that the information provided through the system from DSP sensors includes that related to aircraft flying on afterburner and special events (including explosions).

Document 52: Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Report to the Defense and Intelligence
Committees of the Congress of the United States on the Status
of the Space Based Infrared System Program, March 2005. Unclassified

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This unclassified document, over fifty pages in length, provides
a description of the SBIRS mission, technical difficulties,
management adjustments, remaining areas of risk (with regard
to the ground and space segments), and assessments of the confidence
in cost and schedule projections.

This letter is one of several to relevant Congressmen concerning changes in the troubled SBIRS program – including a plan to purchase only two geosynchronous satellites initially and then, possibly, a third – rather than the original plan to purchase five.

This briefing, by the head of the unit responsible for SBIRS development, describes the architecture of the SBIRS system, its mission, its capabilities, and how those capabilities were to be an improvement on those of DSP satellites.

This memo from the Secretary of the Air Force to the undersecretary of defense responsible for acquisition reports a potential problem with the geosynchronous SBIRS spacecraft. The problem was the failure of an NRO satellite's 'safe-hold' system (which engages when an on-orbit satellite experiences anomalies) to work properly, which caused termination of the mission. The NRO satellite's safe-hold system was similar in design to the one on the SBIRS geosynchronous spacecraft.

This memo from the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology directs the Air Force to begin planning to acquire Infrared Augmentation Satellites (IRAS) as a hedge against delays in the SBIRS geosynchronous spacecraft reaching operational status. The IRAS program was cancelled in 2009.

Document 57: U.S. Air Force, "SBIRS GEO-1 Successfully Launched, Ushering the Dawn of a New Era in Overhead Surveillance," May 7, 2011. Unclassified.

This article announces the successful launch of the first SBIRS geosynchronous satellite, following the launch of two SBIRS payloads aboard highly-elliptically orbiting NRO signals intelligence satellites in 2007 and 2008.

Document 58: Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), SBIRS High As of December 31, 2011, December 31, 2011. Unclassified.

This report discusses the status of the SBIRS geosynchronous payloads (including the spacecraft in orbit and the five planned for launch),the two highly elliptical orbit payloads yet to be launched (HEO-3 and HEO-4), and the revised ground architecture strategy.

This fact sheet provides basic information on the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), which replaced the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (STSS) – formerly SBIRS-Low – as a potential low-earth orbit complement to SBIRS-High.