On September 7, 2000, in the middle of one of claimant's shifts, she
returned to the station house to charge the battery on her radio. After charging the
battery, she began driving back to her house where she would remain on call. While
driving home, claimant came upon an overturned tanker truck. No emergency personnel
had arrived at the accident. Claimant parked her car about 80 to 100 feet away from the
overturned truck and approached a bystander. The bystander told claimant that the truck
was leaking hazardous material. Claimant told the bystander that the area had to be
evacuated. She got on her radio and tried, unsuccessfully, to radio the station to report
the accident. Shortly afterwards, claimant heard a dispatch call sending emergency
personnel to the accident and summoning her back to the station. Claimant left the
accident and returned to the station. After returning to the station, claimant noticed a
heavy feeling in her chest and a chemical taste in her mouth. She received oxygen and
was transported to the hospital, where she was treated for chemical inhalation.

On an earlier occasion, claimant came upon a car accident on the way to the
station house. She stopped, gathered information, and reported that information to the
communications center. Later, claimant asked her supervisor what her responsibilities
were in such a situation, a question to which her supervisor responded only that he
"would have done the same thing."

Claimant filed a workers' compensation claim for the injury that she
sustained when she inhaled toxic chemicals on September 7. Employer denied her claim
on the ground that claimant was not acting within the course of her employment when the
injury occurred. Claimant asked for a hearing, and an administrative law judge (ALJ)
upheld the denial. He reasoned that "when on call the claimant's employment duties
consist only of being constantly available to report in the event the primary EMT unit is
dispatched." It followed, he reasoned, that "[a]nything she did beyond that was personal"
and outside the "course and scope of her employment duties as an on call EMT when she
was injured[.]"

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a), only injuries that "aris[e] out of and in the
course of employment" are compensable. The question whether an injury arises "in the
course of" employment focuses on whether "the time, place, and circumstances of the
injury justify connecting the injury to the employment." Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331
Or 178, 186, 11 P3d 1286 (2000). The question whether an injury arises out of
employment "tests the causal connection between [a] claimant's injury and a risk
connected with [his or] her employment." Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes, 325 Or 592, 601,
943 P2d 197 (1997).

Although separately stated, both questions are part of a unitary "work-connection" test that asks whether the relationship between the injury and the employment
is sufficiently close for the injury to be compensable. Fred Meyer, Inc., 325 Or at 596.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the unitary work-connection test does not "supply a
mechanical formula for determining whether an injury is compensable." Robinson, 331
Or at 185. Rather, each case must be evaluated on its facts to determine if the
circumstances of the injury are sufficiently connected to the employment to render the
injury compensable. Id. Although a claimant must satisfy both parts of the test to some
degree, the injury will be connected to the work, and thus compensable, if the facts
supporting one part of the test are strong even though the facts supporting the other are
weak. Id. at 186. The question whether an injury is sufficiently connected to work to be
compensable presents an issue of law for the court. See id. at 187-90 (independently
reviewing and reversing the board's determination that an employee's injury had not arisen
out of and in the course of employment); Halsey Shedd RFPD v. Leopard, 180 Or App
332, 334, 44 P3d 610 (2002) (employing the same standard of review).

We begin with the question whether claimant's injury arose "in the course of
employment." An injury arises in the course of employment when it

"takes place within the period of employment, at a place where a worker
reasonably may be expected to be, and while the worker reasonably is
fulfilling the duties of the employment or is doing something reasonably
incidental to it."

Having found that claimant's injury occurred in the course of her
employment, we also conclude that her injury "ar[ose] out of" that employment. As
noted, the question whether an injury arises out of employment tests the causal connection
between a claimant's injury and a risk connected with employment. Here, the causal
connection is strong. Stopping at an accident scene may, as it did in this case, involve
exposure to a variety of toxic substances. We note that this is not a case in which the
personal nature of the on-call employee's activities defeats the requisite causal connection
between the employee's injury and the risks associated with his or her work. See Halsey
Shedd RFPD, 180 Or App at 339 (reasoning that the "risk that claimant's foot would slip
on the dirt and gravel in his own driveway was not a risk 'distinctly associated' with being
a firefighter"); Allen, 29 Or App at 635 (reasoning that "there is not sufficient connection
of [the] decedent's personal errand with the employment to justify a holding that it arose
out of the employment"). Rather, the risk of being exposed to toxic substances at an
accident scene is precisely the sort of risk that is inherent in the nature of claimant's work.
Having examined both parts of the statutory test, we agree with the board that there is a
sufficient connection to claimant's work to hold her injury compensable.

Affirmed.

1. Other subsections within the section entitled Patient Care set out rules for
EMTs to follow when they are providing aid to a patient. They apply to active duty
EMTs who have been dispatched to a particular location.

"Although claimant, as an 'on call' EMT, may not have been required
to stop at an accident scene to gather reporting information, the employer
did not expressly limit the reporting requirements in its policy manual to
'active duty' EMTs. Moreover, when claimant had previously questioned
her supervisor regarding her work responsibilities in such circumstances,
she was led to believe that stopping at the scene of a witnessed accident was
consistent with the duties of an 'on call' EMT."

Employer contends that the board's interpretation of the policy manual is inconsistent with
its express adoption of "the ALJ's Findings of Fact." The ALJ, however, did not discuss
employer's policy manual in the section of his opinion and order entitled Findings of Fact,
although he did do so elsewhere. We do not perceive an inconsistency in the board's
adoption of the ALJ's Findings of Fact and its construction of the policy manual.

3. In Allen, we explained that, even though the injury may have occurred in
the course of employment, "there is not sufficient connection of [the] decedent's personal
errand with the employment to justify a holding that it arose out of the employment." 29
Or App at 635. Accordingly, we held that injury was not compensable. We reached a
similar conclusion in Halsey Shedd. 180 Or App at 338-39.

4. The mere fact that an activity occurs while an employee is on call does not
necessarily mean that it occurs in the course of employment. See Halsey Shedd RFPD,
180 Or App at 337; Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation
Law §14.05[6], 14-16 (2003). In concluding that claimant was in the course of her
employment, we rely on the fact that she was performing an errand--charging the radio
battery--that was required for her to serve as an on-call EMT.

5. Claimant argues that employer's policy and procedure manual required her
to report accidents that she witnessed. Employer counters that the manual applies only to
active duty EMTs who are assigned to drive ambulances. The text of the manual supports
claimant's view, and the context cuts in both directions. Although the text, read in
context, is ambiguous, the board did not resolve the ambiguity. Rather, it concluded only
that claimant's reading of the manual was reasonable. Similarly, it found that her
conversation with her supervisor about an earlier incident "led [her] to believe that
stopping at the scene of a witnessed accident was consistent with the duties of an 'on-call'
EMT."