The polls

Based on polling data, Sachs outlined the three most likely scenarios for Israel’s next government, including a Netanyahu-led, right-wing coalition and a Herzog-led coalition. Much would depend on what Moshe Kahlon, the chairman of the Kulanu party who is expected to be the kingmaker in these elections, decides to recommend to the president as his party’s choice for prime minister.

According to Sachs, a third possible outcome of the vote is a national unity government, if the results resemble the polls and Kahlon declines to recommend a candidate for prime minister to the president.

Wittes noted that the data indicate that the next parliament will be deeply fragmented, making governing difficult regardless of who forms the next coalition.

Whither the Palestinian issue?

Indyk remarked that the candidates seemed determined to avoid discussing Israel’s most pressing issues during the campaign—in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rabinovich explained that the Israeli electorate has shifted to the right in recent years. Rabinovich stated that the electorate’s rightward trend renders this a no-win issue for Labor chairman and Zionist Union co-leader Isaac Herzog and especially for Tzipi Livni—Herzog’s partner in the Zionist Union who is closely associated with the peace negotiations. According to Rabinovich, despite its nonappearance in the campaign, the Palestinian issue remains an underlying factor determining many voters’ attitudes.

Wittes noted that the relative silence on the Palestinian issue does not imply that the Israeli public is satisfied with the status quo. While they may not feel the day-to-day costs of the ongoing conflict, she said, the tensions in and around Jerusalem and the prospect of another war in Gaza do weigh heavily on voters. Wittes said that Israelis do not believe that a solution exists that their leadership is bold enough to grasp. For Israelis, she explained, the problem does not lie only with their own leadership; it lies with the other side—with rising instability on Israel’s borders and Israelis’ lack of faith in Mahmoud Abbas as a negotiating partner.

Moreover, Rabinovich noted that the center-left of the Israeli political spectrum has failed to produce a compelling alternative that can lead Israel towards peace and security. On the contrary, the Likud and the Jewish Home Party’s campaigns have used the issue of regional chaos to sow fear amongst the electorate.

Sachs said the 2015 campaign has really been a battle of agendas. Netanyahu prefers to focus on security issues—for instance, by arguing that a Herzog-Livni government would endanger Israel by making territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Yet, a recent poll found that 64 percent of Israelis felt that the peace process would not advance after the elections regardless of who forms the next government. In light of this sentiment, Sachs noted, many Israelis focus on socio-economic issues, allowing the opposition to capitalize on public anger against Netanyahu for Israel’s housing crisis and the cost of living.

The U.S.-Israel relationship

Indyk recalled that in previous elections, the reelection bids of incumbent candidates who mishandled Israel’s relationship with the United States suffered as a result. Yet, he noted, Netanyahu appears to have calculated that he stands to benefit from a confrontation with the Obama administration. Sachs said that although President Obama is not popular in Israel, Israelis appreciate the importance of the U.S. relationship, and do not look kindly on a prime minister who quarrels with Washington. He added that Netanyahu was criticized in Israel for his approach to the United States and, in particular, for the fallout of his recent trip to address Congress on the Iranian threat, which angered the administration.

Israel’s next government: what to expect

Indyk said that, because of the volatility among the Palestinians and the importance of the peace process to Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration remains committed to advancing peace talks, and would be willing to work with an Israeli government committed to a two-state solution. Should Israel’s next government oppose a two-state solution, Indyk predicted that the Obama administration may seek to press for a United Nations Security Council resolution outlining the basic principles of a two-state solution, in order to preserve future options while containing the potential for short-term violence.

Rabinovich stated that the European Union has found that soft power works with regard to Israel and argued that if the United States does indeed choose to internationalize the effort to resolve the conflict, some European countries may ratchet up pressure on Israel.

Wittes argued that a new Israeli initiative to revive negotiations with the Palestinians is unlikely to emerge from the election. Rather, she said, depending on who forms the next government, there may be new proposals for unilateral actions. However, given the brewing crisis in the West Bank, the dire humanitarian circumstances in Gaza, and the formalization of the Palestinians’ accession to the International Criminal Court on April 1, the new Israeli prime minister will likely face a crisis with the Palestinians early in his or her tenure.

The polls

Based on polling data, Sachs outlined the three most likely scenarios for Israel’s next government, including a Netanyahu-led, right-wing coalition and a Herzog-led coalition. Much would depend on what Moshe Kahlon, the chairman of the Kulanu party who is expected to be the kingmaker in these elections, decides to recommend to the president as his party’s choice for prime minister.

According to Sachs, a third possible outcome of the vote is a national unity government, if the results resemble the polls and Kahlon declines to recommend a candidate for prime minister to the president.

Wittes noted that the data indicate that the next parliament will be deeply fragmented, making governing difficult regardless of who forms the next coalition.

Whither the Palestinian issue?

Indyk remarked that the candidates seemed determined to avoid discussing Israel’s most pressing issues during the campaign—in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rabinovich explained that the Israeli electorate has shifted to the right in recent years. Rabinovich stated that the electorate’s rightward trend renders this a no-win issue for Labor chairman and Zionist Union co-leader Isaac Herzog and especially for Tzipi Livni—Herzog’s partner in the Zionist Union who is closely associated with the peace negotiations. According to Rabinovich, despite its nonappearance in the campaign, the Palestinian issue remains an underlying factor determining many voters’ attitudes.

Wittes noted that the relative silence on the Palestinian issue does not imply that the Israeli public is satisfied with the status quo. While they may not feel the day-to-day costs of the ongoing conflict, she said, the tensions in and around Jerusalem and the prospect of another war in Gaza do weigh heavily on voters. Wittes said that Israelis do not believe that a solution exists that their leadership is bold enough to grasp. For Israelis, she explained, the problem does not lie only with their own leadership; it lies with the other side—with rising instability on Israel’s borders and Israelis’ lack of faith in Mahmoud Abbas as a negotiating partner.

Moreover, Rabinovich noted that the center-left of the Israeli political spectrum has failed to produce a compelling alternative that can lead Israel towards peace and security. On the contrary, the Likud and the Jewish Home Party’s campaigns have used the issue of regional chaos to sow fear amongst the electorate.

Sachs said the 2015 campaign has really been a battle of agendas. Netanyahu prefers to focus on security issues—for instance, by arguing that a Herzog-Livni government would endanger Israel by making territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Yet, a recent poll found that 64 percent of Israelis felt that the peace process would not advance after the elections regardless of who forms the next government. In light of this sentiment, Sachs noted, many Israelis focus on socio-economic issues, allowing the opposition to capitalize on public anger against Netanyahu for Israel’s housing crisis and the cost of living.

The U.S.-Israel relationship

Indyk recalled that in previous elections, the reelection bids of incumbent candidates who mishandled Israel’s relationship with the United States suffered as a result. Yet, he noted, Netanyahu appears to have calculated that he stands to benefit from a confrontation with the Obama administration. Sachs said that although President Obama is not popular in Israel, Israelis appreciate the importance of the U.S. relationship, and do not look kindly on a prime minister who quarrels with Washington. He added that Netanyahu was criticized in Israel for his approach to the United States and, in particular, for the fallout of his recent trip to address Congress on the Iranian threat, which angered the administration.

Israel’s next government: what to expect

Indyk said that, because of the volatility among the Palestinians and the importance of the peace process to Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration remains committed to advancing peace talks, and would be willing to work with an Israeli government committed to a two-state solution. Should Israel’s next government oppose a two-state solution, Indyk predicted that the Obama administration may seek to press for a United Nations Security Council resolution outlining the basic principles of a two-state solution, in order to preserve future options while containing the potential for short-term violence.

Rabinovich stated that the European Union has found that soft power works with regard to Israel and argued that if the United States does indeed choose to internationalize the effort to resolve the conflict, some European countries may ratchet up pressure on Israel.

Wittes argued that a new Israeli initiative to revive negotiations with the Palestinians is unlikely to emerge from the election. Rather, she said, depending on who forms the next government, there may be new proposals for unilateral actions. However, given the brewing crisis in the West Bank, the dire humanitarian circumstances in Gaza, and the formalization of the Palestinians’ accession to the International Criminal Court on April 1, the new Israeli prime minister will likely face a crisis with the Palestinians early in his or her tenure.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/03/11-upcoming-israel-elections?rssid=rabinovichi{DF6C2390-CE55-4C7A-83DB-35185A2E1870}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86789894/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~Israel%e2%80%99s-upcoming-elections-What-to-watch-what-to-expectIsrael’s upcoming elections: What to watch, what to expect

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

It is time for Israel to reconsider, in coordination with the United States, its policy toward the Syrian civil war.

For nearly four years, since March 2011, Israel has been sitting on the fence. Israeli policymakers and analysts are divided into two schools with regard to Syria’s future. The first, known as “the devil we know” school, argues that with all his faults Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime are preferable to an Islamist or jihadist alternative, and to the anarchy that is likely to ensue should the regime collapse. The other school argues that as the 2006 war in Lebanon amply demonstrated, the axis of Iran, Assad’s Syria, and Hezbollah presents a far more serious threat to Israel.

Israel’s passive stance on Syria

This debate has not been decided and the absence of a clear cut choice has contributed to the largely passive stance taken by Israel. This trend has been reinforced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s caution and preference for the status quo, as well as by the conviction that Israel’s ability to help shape the future of Syrian politics is hampered by the opposition’s reluctance to be seen as Israel’s allies or proxies. The regime’s narrative has been from the outset that this is not an authentic civil war, but rather a conspiracy hatched from the outside, by Syria’s enemies.

In fact, Israel has not been entirely passive. It acted several times to interdict arms transfers to Hezbollah, has responded to minor provocations along the ceasefire line in the Golan, and has tacitly offered humanitarian aid. But of Syria’s five neighbors, Israel, Syria’s enemy and intermittent negotiating partner, has been the least involved in and least affected by the devastating civil war.

This may be changing now as the result of three major developments:

The regime’s success, with massive help from Iran and its Lebanese’s proxy, with Hezbollah, to consolidate its hold on the 40 percent or so of Syria’s territory that it controls.

The weakening of the moderate, secular, or mildly Islamist opposition as both a military and a political actor.

The apparent decision by Iran and the Hezbollah to intensify its presence and activity in the Syrian Golan and to extend Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the Golan Heights.

This last development represents a curious reversal of roles. In the 1990s, Syria negotiated peace with Israel and operated against it in South Lebanon and through Lebanon, thus preserving a quiet front in the Golan. Hezbollah is now trying to keep its own border with Israel relatively quiet while preparing and testing the ground for opening a new front with Israel in the Golan.

Recent tensions between Israel and Hezbollah

This development came to a head last month. On January 18, Israel (without taking responsibility) destroyed two vehicles in the Golan killing an Iranian general and the son of Imad Moughniya, Hezbollah’s chief of operations, who was killed in Damascus in a car bomb in 2008. Hezbollah retaliated by attacking an Israeli convoy at the foothills of Mount Hermon with rockets, killing two Israeli soldiers and wounding several others. In the aftermath of these events, both sides signaled to one another that they were not interested in an escalation and quiet was restored. On January 28, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered one of his fiery speeches. While saying that he was not interested in a war with Israel, he asserted that he was not afraid of one, that he did not recognize Israel’s “rules of engagement,” and that

The martyrs who fell in Qunaitra reflected a fusion of Lebanese-Iranian blood on Syrian territory, and also reflected the unity of the cause and the unity of the fate and the battle of these countries [against Israel]. When blood unites Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, then we will enter an era of victory.
-Daily Star, January 31, 2015

When Nasrallah repudiates “the rules of engagement,” he is in fact saying that the deterrence achieved by Israel after the 2006 war in Lebanon no longer exists. Indeed, the Israeli defense establishment has sensed for some time now that Hezbollah conducts itself more aggressively and is preparing an infrastructure in the Syrian Golan for attacks against Israel. The Israeli operation was intended to signal to Hezbollah that this new line of conduct is not acceptable to Israel. But the clashes of late January ended in a draw. The draw is illustrative of the fact that Israel cannot achieve easy victories in a new war of attrition with Hezbollah. The danger of deterioration to war is another problem, and while such a war would probably end in an Israeli victory, its cost might very well be prohibitive.

In these circumstances, Israel’s best option is to signal to Hezbollah and to its Iranian patrons that its response to escalation along the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Golan will not be local, and that it may well target major units and installations of Assad’s regime, thus affecting the course of the Syrian civil war. This would not be a simple or easy decision. In the current conditions in Syria, it may play to the hands of the Islamic State and run against the grain of the Western offensive against it. It could also trigger a significant Syrian response. This is a call the Israeli leadership will have to make if the trends observed last January continue, and that call would have to be made in close coordination with Washington in order to dovetail it with U.S. policy in Syria and Iraq. Caution and restraint may well prevail, but the foundation for the first major change in Israel’s policy towards the Syrian civil war has been laid.

Authors

It is time for Israel to reconsider, in coordination with the United States, its policy toward the Syrian civil war.

For nearly four years, since March 2011, Israel has been sitting on the fence. Israeli policymakers and analysts are divided into two schools with regard to Syria’s future. The first, known as “the devil we know” school, argues that with all his faults Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime are preferable to an Islamist or jihadist alternative, and to the anarchy that is likely to ensue should the regime collapse. The other school argues that as the 2006 war in Lebanon amply demonstrated, the axis of Iran, Assad’s Syria, and Hezbollah presents a far more serious threat to Israel.

Israel’s passive stance on Syria

This debate has not been decided and the absence of a clear cut choice has contributed to the largely passive stance taken by Israel. This trend has been reinforced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s caution and preference for the status quo, as well as by the conviction that Israel’s ability to help shape the future of Syrian politics is hampered by the opposition’s reluctance to be seen as Israel’s allies or proxies. The regime’s narrative has been from the outset that this is not an authentic civil war, but rather a conspiracy hatched from the outside, by Syria’s enemies.

In fact, Israel has not been entirely passive. It acted several times to interdict arms transfers to Hezbollah, has responded to minor provocations along the ceasefire line in the Golan, and has tacitly offered humanitarian aid. But of Syria’s five neighbors, Israel, Syria’s enemy and intermittent negotiating partner, has been the least involved in and least affected by the devastating civil war.

This may be changing now as the result of three major developments:

The regime’s success, with massive help from Iran and its Lebanese’s proxy, with Hezbollah, to consolidate its hold on the 40 percent or so of Syria’s territory that it controls.

The weakening of the moderate, secular, or mildly Islamist opposition as both a military and a political actor.

The apparent decision by Iran and the Hezbollah to intensify its presence and activity in the Syrian Golan and to extend Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the Golan Heights.

This last development represents a curious reversal of roles. In the 1990s, Syria negotiated peace with Israel and operated against it in South Lebanon and through Lebanon, thus preserving a quiet front in the Golan. Hezbollah is now trying to keep its own border with Israel relatively quiet while preparing and testing the ground for opening a new front with Israel in the Golan.

Recent tensions between Israel and Hezbollah

This development came to a head last month. On January 18, Israel (without taking responsibility) destroyed two vehicles in the Golan killing an Iranian general and the son of Imad Moughniya, Hezbollah’s chief of operations, who was killed in Damascus in a car bomb in 2008. Hezbollah retaliated by attacking an Israeli convoy at the foothills of Mount Hermon with rockets, killing two Israeli soldiers and wounding several others. In the aftermath of these events, both sides signaled to one another that they were not interested in an escalation and quiet was restored. On January 28, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered one of his fiery speeches. While saying that he was not interested in a war with Israel, he asserted that he was not afraid of one, that he did not recognize Israel’s “rules of engagement,” and that

The martyrs who fell in Qunaitra reflected a fusion of Lebanese-Iranian blood on Syrian territory, and also reflected the unity of the cause and the unity of the fate and the battle of these countries [against Israel]. When blood unites Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, then we will enter an era of victory.
-Daily Star, January 31, 2015

When Nasrallah repudiates “the rules of engagement,” he is in fact saying that the deterrence achieved by Israel after the 2006 war in Lebanon no longer exists. Indeed, the Israeli defense establishment has sensed for some time now that Hezbollah conducts itself more aggressively and is preparing an infrastructure in the Syrian Golan for attacks against Israel. The Israeli operation was intended to signal to Hezbollah that this new line of conduct is not acceptable to Israel. But the clashes of late January ended in a draw. The draw is illustrative of the fact that Israel cannot achieve easy victories in a new war of attrition with Hezbollah. The danger of deterioration to war is another problem, and while such a war would probably end in an Israeli victory, its cost might very well be prohibitive.

In these circumstances, Israel’s best option is to signal to Hezbollah and to its Iranian patrons that its response to escalation along the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Golan will not be local, and that it may well target major units and installations of Assad’s regime, thus affecting the course of the Syrian civil war. This would not be a simple or easy decision. In the current conditions in Syria, it may play to the hands of the Islamic State and run against the grain of the Western offensive against it. It could also trigger a significant Syrian response. This is a call the Israeli leadership will have to make if the trends observed last January continue, and that call would have to be made in close coordination with Washington in order to dovetail it with U.S. policy in Syria and Iraq. Caution and restraint may well prevail, but the foundation for the first major change in Israel’s policy towards the Syrian civil war has been laid.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/06-israel-changing-middle-east?rssid=rabinovichi{67310940-6562-4801-8BFD-064D4853B387}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/84829564/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~Israel-and-the-Changing-Middle-EastIsrael and the Changing Middle EastHow does Israel respond to the tumult affecting many of its neighbors and much of the Middle East? How should observers think about the new challenges posed by a rapidly shifting strategic environment?

In a new paper, I argue that supra- and sub-conventional military threats are Israel’s primary security concerns. At the supra-conventional level, worries about Iran’s nuclear program and skepticism regarding the wisdom of ongoing negotiations with Tehran keep the prospect of Israeli military action alive. Hamas and Hizballah’s acquisition and use of longer-range high-trajectory fire missiles and rockets are an additional supra-conventional pressure.

These organizations’ persistent sub-conventional danger is intimately connected to the deterrence posed by their arsenals. Though any military engagement with Hamas or Hizballah is in many respects asymmetric, the numerous and highly advanced missiles that they possess constrain Israel’s ability to respond to them and / or act against Iran. They represent difficult hybrids of supra- and sub-conventional threats. And Israel may yet have to contend with the potential for renewed armed conflict in the West Bank.

I also note that Israel’s sole and feasible diplomatic option is further development of its relationships with the moderately conservative Arab states – the Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. These actors share considerable security and economic interests with Israel: opposition to Iran’s rise, possible collaboration on natural resources issues, and perhaps even security cooperation in the Levant.

Israel has acted tentatively in the face of the Middle East’s “Great Unraveling,” which I describe as the period marked by Syrian civil war, anarchy in Libya and Yemen, state weakness in Iraq and Lebanon, and the rise of the Islamic State. Jerusalem had limited ability to support the regimes in Egypt and Jordan and has intervened only sporadically in Syria’s civil war – with humanitarian aid and limited retaliation to provocations in the Golan Heights and arms transfers to Hizballah. Israeli policymakers are split on the question of whether Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is preferable to the chaos that could emerge on their northern border following his exit. And Israel has displayed similar caution in Lebanon, while its actions on Iraq have been limited to rhetorical support for Kurdish independence.

Although Israel faces Salafi-jihadist threats in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, it views the implicit cooperation between Iran and the United States on the Islamic State with concern. For Jerusalem, any rapprochement between Tehran and Washington would go against Israel’s unequivocal position on the issue of a nuclear agreement.

Overall, while Israel’s options in the region remain limited, the elections will have a significant impact on its relationships with the Arab states. With the Arab Peace Initiative still awaiting Israeli response, these states could provide the impetus for a fresh look at the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

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Fri, 06 Feb 2015 07:30:00 -0500Itamar RabinovichHow does Israel respond to the tumult affecting many of its neighbors and much of the Middle East? How should observers think about the new challenges posed by a rapidly shifting strategic environment?

In a new paper, I argue that supra- and sub-conventional military threats are Israel’s primary security concerns. At the supra-conventional level, worries about Iran’s nuclear program and skepticism regarding the wisdom of ongoing negotiations with Tehran keep the prospect of Israeli military action alive. Hamas and Hizballah’s acquisition and use of longer-range high-trajectory fire missiles and rockets are an additional supra-conventional pressure.

These organizations’ persistent sub-conventional danger is intimately connected to the deterrence posed by their arsenals. Though any military engagement with Hamas or Hizballah is in many respects asymmetric, the numerous and highly advanced missiles that they possess constrain Israel’s ability to respond to them and / or act against Iran. They represent difficult hybrids of supra- and sub-conventional threats. And Israel may yet have to contend with the potential for renewed armed conflict in the West Bank.

I also note that Israel’s sole and feasible diplomatic option is further development of its relationships with the moderately conservative Arab states – the Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. These actors share considerable security and economic interests with Israel: opposition to Iran’s rise, possible collaboration on natural resources issues, and perhaps even security cooperation in the Levant.

Israel has acted tentatively in the face of the Middle East’s “Great Unraveling,” which I describe as the period marked by Syrian civil war, anarchy in Libya and Yemen, state weakness in Iraq and Lebanon, and the rise of the Islamic State. Jerusalem had limited ability to support the regimes in Egypt and Jordan and has intervened only sporadically in Syria’s civil war – with humanitarian aid and limited retaliation to provocations in the Golan Heights and arms transfers to Hizballah. Israeli policymakers are split on the question of whether Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is preferable to the chaos that could emerge on their northern border following his exit. And Israel has displayed similar caution in Lebanon, while its actions on Iraq have been limited to rhetorical support for Kurdish independence.

Although Israel faces Salafi-jihadist threats in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, it views the implicit cooperation between Iran and the United States on the Islamic State with concern. For Jerusalem, any rapprochement between Tehran and Washington would go against Israel’s unequivocal position on the issue of a nuclear agreement.

Overall, while Israel’s options in the region remain limited, the elections will have a significant impact on its relationships with the Arab states. With the Arab Peace Initiative still awaiting Israeli response, these states could provide the impetus for a fresh look at the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

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Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/01/29-israel-changing-middle-east-rabinovich?rssid=rabinovichi{37D855E6-9181-4FD6-9481-C5B7F11E5A70}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/84396952/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~Israel-and-the-Changing-Middle-EastIsrael and the Changing Middle East

Complexity and ambivalence are inherent in Israel’s relationship with its Middle Eastern environment. Israel’s national security agenda is shaped by the hostility of a large part of the Arab and Muslim worlds. During the past 66 years, Israel has been able to crack the wall of Arab hostility, to make peace with two Arab neighbors, and to establish semi-normal relations with several Arab states. But the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its Palestinian core in particular, rages on, and Iran has joined the fray as a powerful and determined adversary.

In Israel, debates over the state’s identity, its place and role in the region, and the more specific issues of the future of the West Bank and Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians, govern the country’s politics and national discourse. The March 2015 Israeli elections are being conducted over a wide range of issues, but they are seen first and foremost as a referendum on these key questions. Politics and policy can hardly be separated. Appearances can be misleading. Currently, the focus of the election campaign seems to be on socio-economic issues. The main challenger of Netanyahu’s current government and potential right-wing coalition is “The Zionist Camp” led by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni. They are strong advocates of reviving a peace process with the Palestinians, but they realize that the Israeli public has drifted to the right. Furthermore, the primaries in the Labor Party produced a left-leaning list of candidates. But whatever the current drift of the campaign, in the elections’ immediate aftermath, whoever forms the next government will have to deal primarily with the Palestinian issue and the national security challenges facing the country.

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Authors

Complexity and ambivalence are inherent in Israel’s relationship with its Middle Eastern environment. Israel’s national security agenda is shaped by the hostility of a large part of the Arab and Muslim worlds. During the past 66 years, Israel has been able to crack the wall of Arab hostility, to make peace with two Arab neighbors, and to establish semi-normal relations with several Arab states. But the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its Palestinian core in particular, rages on, and Iran has joined the fray as a powerful and determined adversary.

In Israel, debates over the state’s identity, its place and role in the region, and the more specific issues of the future of the West Bank and Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians, govern the country’s politics and national discourse. The March 2015 Israeli elections are being conducted over a wide range of issues, but they are seen first and foremost as a referendum on these key questions. Politics and policy can hardly be separated. Appearances can be misleading. Currently, the focus of the election campaign seems to be on socio-economic issues. The main challenger of Netanyahu’s current government and potential right-wing coalition is “The Zionist Camp” led by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni. They are strong advocates of reviving a peace process with the Palestinians, but they realize that the Israeli public has drifted to the right. Furthermore, the primaries in the Labor Party produced a left-leaning list of candidates. But whatever the current drift of the campaign, in the elections’ immediate aftermath, whoever forms the next government will have to deal primarily with the Palestinian issue and the national security challenges facing the country.

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Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/02/sykes-picot-rabinovich?rssid=rabinovichi{DC3D38A4-ED3A-40E1-B93A-D522A0B3F33A}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65480847/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~The-End-of-SykesPicot-Reflections-on-the-Prospects-of-the-Arab-State-SystemThe End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System

During much of the past three years, the Syrian civil war has been the most prominent item on the Middle Eastern political agenda and has dominated the political-diplomatic discourse in the region and among policy makers, analysts and pundits interested in its affairs.

Preoccupation with the Syrian crisis has derived from the sense, apparent since its early phases, that it was much more than a domestic issue. It has, indeed, become a conflict by-proxy between Iran and its regional rivals and the arena of American-Russian competition. It has also had a spillover effect on several neighboring countries and has been a bellwether for the state of the Arab Spring.

As the conflict festered it also prompted a broader discussion and debate over the future of the Arab State system. The collapse of Syria, the ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the general instability in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Robin Wright, a journalist and scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, argues that “the map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters.” Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: “A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too.” Similarly, Parag Khanna, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, argues, “Nowhere is a rethinking of “the state” more necessary than in the Middle East.” He contends that “The Arab world will not be resurrected to its old glory until its map is redrawn to resemble a collection of autonomous national oases linked by Silk Roads of commerce.” Lt. Colonel Joel Rayburn, writing from the Hoover Institution, points out that the alternative may not be new states but rather simply collapse. “If watching the fall or near-fall of half a dozen regimes in the Arab Spring has taught us anything, it should be that the Arab states that appeared serenely stable to outsiders for the past half century were more brittle than we have understood,” warning darkly, “This conflict could very well touch us all, perhaps becoming an engine of jihad that spews forth attackers bent on bombing western embassies and cities or disrupting Persian Gulf oil markets long before the fire burns out.”

This discussion touches on a key question: Will the collapse of one or several other Arab states produce a new order in the region?

The regional order has been threatened before, but today’s challenge is unique. Syria is what has prompted the latest reevaluation of the Skyes-Picot borders, but many of the problems predated the Syrian civil war. Ambitious monarchs in the 1930s and 1940s challenged the order after the colonial period. The doctrine of Pan-Arab Nationalism and Gamal Abd al-Nasir’s messianic leadership in the 1950s and by Saddam Hussein in 1990 again posed a threat. Now it is now challenged not by a powerful state or a sweeping ideology but by the weakness of several Arab states that seem to be on the verge of implosion or disintegration.

This paper assesses the situation in Syria, with an emphasis on what might lead to its de facto partition or lasting collapse. It then examines Syria’s neighbors and their prospects for stability. The paper concludes by exploring how the United States, Israel and Iran might affect this tenuous balance.

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During much of the past three years, the Syrian civil war has been the most prominent item on the Middle Eastern political agenda and has dominated the political-diplomatic discourse in the region and among policy makers, analysts and pundits interested in its affairs.

Preoccupation with the Syrian crisis has derived from the sense, apparent since its early phases, that it was much more than a domestic issue. It has, indeed, become a conflict by-proxy between Iran and its regional rivals and the arena of American-Russian competition. It has also had a spillover effect on several neighboring countries and has been a bellwether for the state of the Arab Spring.

As the conflict festered it also prompted a broader discussion and debate over the future of the Arab State system. The collapse of Syria, the ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the general instability in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Robin Wright, a journalist and scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, argues that “the map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters.” Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: “A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too.” Similarly, Parag Khanna, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, argues, “Nowhere is a rethinking of “the state” more necessary than in the Middle East.” He contends that “The Arab world will not be resurrected to its old glory until its map is redrawn to resemble a collection of autonomous national oases linked by Silk Roads of commerce.” Lt. Colonel Joel Rayburn, writing from the Hoover Institution, points out that the alternative may not be new states but rather simply collapse. “If watching the fall or near-fall of half a dozen regimes in the Arab Spring has taught us anything, it should be that the Arab states that appeared serenely stable to outsiders for the past half century were more brittle than we have understood,” warning darkly, “This conflict could very well touch us all, perhaps becoming an engine of jihad that spews forth attackers bent on bombing western embassies and cities or disrupting Persian Gulf oil markets long before the fire burns out.”

This discussion touches on a key question: Will the collapse of one or several other Arab states produce a new order in the region?

The regional order has been threatened before, but today’s challenge is unique. Syria is what has prompted the latest reevaluation of the Skyes-Picot borders, but many of the problems predated the Syrian civil war. Ambitious monarchs in the 1930s and 1940s challenged the order after the colonial period. The doctrine of Pan-Arab Nationalism and Gamal Abd al-Nasir’s messianic leadership in the 1950s and by Saddam Hussein in 1990 again posed a threat. Now it is now challenged not by a powerful state or a sweeping ideology but by the weakness of several Arab states that seem to be on the verge of implosion or disintegration.

This paper assesses the situation in Syria, with an emphasis on what might lead to its de facto partition or lasting collapse. It then examines Syria’s neighbors and their prospects for stability. The paper concludes by exploring how the United States, Israel and Iran might affect this tenuous balance.

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/02/13-china-israel-us?rssid=rabinovichi{93A9820F-5D6A-484F-863F-10C72D6348C4}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65480848/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~China-Israel-and-the-United-States-Challenges-and-Opportunities-in-the-Middle-EastChina, Israel and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities in the Middle East

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Due to the inclement weather, this conversation was pre-recorded without a live audience.

The rise of China’s diplomacy in the Middle East raises new policy questions and opportunities for the United States and Israel. While some have suggested that the United States rebalance from its Middle East focus towards Asia, China’s interests in the Middle East have grown considerably. Israel, as a key U.S. ally and with its vibrant economy, may be able to play a role in facilitating long-term Sino-American cooperation in the Middle East. As the region remains mired in a dramatic political transition and escalating tension, promoting regional stability and coexistence are in the interests of Israel, China, the United States and the international community.

In lieu of a February 13 event by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, in partnership with the Israel Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv—which was cancelled due to inclement weather—panelists held a pre-taped discussion examining a broad range of issues related to opportunities and challenges for trilateral strategic cooperation in the Middle East. These panelists included Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to the United States, president of the Israel Institute and Distinguished Fellow in Foreign Policy and the Saban Center at Brookings; Yang Guang, director-general, Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Pan Guang, vice president of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies and professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; and Yoram Evron, director of the China Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Event Information

Due to the inclement weather, this conversation was pre-recorded without a live audience.

The rise of China’s diplomacy in the Middle East raises new policy questions and opportunities for the United States and Israel. While some have suggested that the United States rebalance from its Middle East focus towards Asia, China’s interests in the Middle East have grown considerably. Israel, as a key U.S. ally and with its vibrant economy, may be able to play a role in facilitating long-term Sino-American cooperation in the Middle East. As the region remains mired in a dramatic political transition and escalating tension, promoting regional stability and coexistence are in the interests of Israel, China, the United States and the international community.

In lieu of a February 13 event by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, in partnership with the Israel Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv—which was cancelled due to inclement weather—panelists held a pre-taped discussion examining a broad range of issues related to opportunities and challenges for trilateral strategic cooperation in the Middle East. These panelists included Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to the United States, president of the Israel Institute and Distinguished Fellow in Foreign Policy and the Saban Center at Brookings; Yang Guang, director-general, Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Pan Guang, vice president of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies and professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; and Yoram Evron, director of the China Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

Authors

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

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Despite the notable diplomatic victory of helping normalize relations between Israel and Turkey, hopes for reviving the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians remain low following President Obama’s first trip to Israel. Billed as a trip where the President would ”listen” to the newly formed Israeli government and Palestinian leaders as opposed to actively seeking to renew talks between the two sides, it remains unclear whether any progress can be made on this perpetually vexing issue. Is there any hope for a renewed peace process? What role can the Obama administration play in restarting talks between Israelis and Palestinians? What will the new coalition in Israel mean for the country’s foreign policy?

On March 28, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine the future of the stalled peace process. Panelists included former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich, Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Natan Sachs. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Event Information

Despite the notable diplomatic victory of helping normalize relations between Israel and Turkey, hopes for reviving the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians remain low following President Obama’s first trip to Israel. Billed as a trip where the President would ”listen” to the newly formed Israeli government and Palestinian leaders as opposed to actively seeking to renew talks between the two sides, it remains unclear whether any progress can be made on this perpetually vexing issue. Is there any hope for a renewed peace process? What role can the Obama administration play in restarting talks between Israelis and Palestinians? What will the new coalition in Israel mean for the country’s foreign policy?

On March 28, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine the future of the stalled peace process. Panelists included former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich, Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Natan Sachs. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Editor's note: In an interview with Charlie Rose, Martin Indyk and Itamar Rabinovich discuss President Obama's recent speech in Jerusalem and prospects for the Middle East peace process. Read an excerpt below.

Charlie Rose: Characterize this speech by the President [Martin Indyk].

Martin Indyk: This speech was typical Obama at his best working his oratorical magic on a crowd that lapped it up. He spoke very convincingly about his commitment to Israel’s security and his understand of their security dilemmas, and particularly underlined he was going to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But then he went into a riff about peace, and the necessity of peace, and the possibility of peace, and why peace has to be just, even saying; “Put yourself,” you Israelis, “in the shoes of the Palestinians,” and he talked over the heads of the leadership of Israel to say to them “you need to push your leaders, to take risks for peace”

Rose: Basically [Obama] saying; “you [Israel] have to make sacrifices on settlements and other issues in order to get some kind of agreement for Palestinians because that is in fact in the long term interest of your national security.”

Indyk: Exactly. “I care about your security but here is the best way to secure your future…”

Rose: An agreement with the Palestinians…

Indyk: An agreement with the Palestinians.

Rose: that gives them some sense…

Indyk: Two states for two people, he talked specifically about a Jewish state.

Rose: What did you think [Itamar Rabinovich]?

Itamar Rabinovich: I agree. It was a very well crafted, very convincing speech. It was in the heart of the mission to speak to the Israeli public. In a way, President Obama has been doing what President Sadat had done in the late 70’s. He came to Jerusalem before the actual negotiations with Mr.Begin in order to build support for the peace with Egypt at the time, and to enable Mr.Begin to make concessions and win public support. So he was investing public diplomacy in the same way trying to build support in the, or among, the Israeli public for the painful concessions that will have to be made.

Rose: And so how do you think the Prime Minister and his party will take this?

Rabinovich: They would have done, they could have done, without this part of the visit but they had their part of the visit in the first day.

Rose: Which was Iran?

Rabinovich: Well we don’t know what went on behind closed doors. But publically, you know Netanyahu came out weakened, hurt, from the elections and one of the criticisms leveled at him was that he mismanaged the relationship with the United States and here was the President all smiles and friendship and patting each other on the back. That was very good for Mr. Netanyahu, he relished it and he took advantage of it, but this was the first course. The second course is somewhat less tasty for the Prime minister.

Authors

Editor's note: In an interview with Charlie Rose, Martin Indyk and Itamar Rabinovich discuss President Obama's recent speech in Jerusalem and prospects for the Middle East peace process. Read an excerpt below.

Charlie Rose: Characterize this speech by the President [Martin Indyk].

Martin Indyk: This speech was typical Obama at his best working his oratorical magic on a crowd that lapped it up. He spoke very convincingly about his commitment to Israel’s security and his understand of their security dilemmas, and particularly underlined he was going to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But then he went into a riff about peace, and the necessity of peace, and the possibility of peace, and why peace has to be just, even saying; “Put yourself,” you Israelis, “in the shoes of the Palestinians,” and he talked over the heads of the leadership of Israel to say to them “you need to push your leaders, to take risks for peace”

Rose: Basically [Obama] saying; “you [Israel] have to make sacrifices on settlements and other issues in order to get some kind of agreement for Palestinians because that is in fact in the long term interest of your national security.”

Indyk: Exactly. “I care about your security but here is the best way to secure your future…”

Rose: An agreement with the Palestinians…

Indyk: An agreement with the Palestinians.

Rose: that gives them some sense…

Indyk: Two states for two people, he talked specifically about a Jewish state.

Rose: What did you think [Itamar Rabinovich]?

Itamar Rabinovich: I agree. It was a very well crafted, very convincing speech. It was in the heart of the mission to speak to the Israeli public. In a way, President Obama has been doing what President Sadat had done in the late 70’s. He came to Jerusalem before the actual negotiations with Mr.Begin in order to build support for the peace with Egypt at the time, and to enable Mr.Begin to make concessions and win public support. So he was investing public diplomacy in the same way trying to build support in the, or among, the Israeli public for the painful concessions that will have to be made.

Rose: And so how do you think the Prime Minister and his party will take this?

Rabinovich: They would have done, they could have done, without this part of the visit but they had their part of the visit in the first day.

Rose: Which was Iran?

Rabinovich: Well we don’t know what went on behind closed doors. But publically, you know Netanyahu came out weakened, hurt, from the elections and one of the criticisms leveled at him was that he mismanaged the relationship with the United States and here was the President all smiles and friendship and patting each other on the back. That was very good for Mr. Netanyahu, he relished it and he took advantage of it, but this was the first course. The second course is somewhat less tasty for the Prime minister.

Few foresaw the surprising setback suffered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his Likud Party, and the right in general in Israel’s recent general election. It is an outcome that will have important ramifications for Israel’s domestic politics and foreign policy alike, particularly its Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Although the final vote tally awaits (soldiers’ votes have not yet been fully counted), the basic result is known.

Given the current stalemate between the right and left, a shift of one or two seats (out of 120) in the Knesset could make a difference in the composition of the next government, which in Israel is always a coalition of some type.

Netanyahu was the sole contender for the position of prime minister, and his reelection, together with the right-wing parties’ overall victory, seemed a foregone conclusion.

He and his allies were challenged by four parties or electoral lists — Labour, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah and Meretz — though their leaders (three of them women) were not perceived to be running for prime minister.

Three of these groups — Labour, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah — were viewed as potential coalition partners in a Netanyahu government; the small, left-wing Meretz was expected to remain in opposition.

At this point, it seems certain that Netanyahu will form a new government, but he will be a much weaker prime minister than he was during the past four years.

The main winner was Yair Lapid, whose Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) emerged suddenly to pick up 19 seats and become the second largest party in the Knesset. Moreover, like the opposition, the right-wing bloc that comprised Netanyahu’s last government has undergone some important shifts.

Several developments converged to produce this unexpected outcome. For starters, the Israeli middle class and younger voters took the social protests of the summer of 2011 into the ballot box.

If Netanyahu thought that he had managed to take the steam out of the protests over high housing prices and falling living standards, he was proved wrong.

Authors

Few foresaw the surprising setback suffered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his Likud Party, and the right in general in Israel’s recent general election. It is an outcome that will have important ramifications for Israel’s domestic politics and foreign policy alike, particularly its Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Although the final vote tally awaits (soldiers’ votes have not yet been fully counted), the basic result is known.

Given the current stalemate between the right and left, a shift of one or two seats (out of 120) in the Knesset could make a difference in the composition of the next government, which in Israel is always a coalition of some type.

Netanyahu was the sole contender for the position of prime minister, and his reelection, together with the right-wing parties’ overall victory, seemed a foregone conclusion.

He and his allies were challenged by four parties or electoral lists — Labour, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah and Meretz — though their leaders (three of them women) were not perceived to be running for prime minister.

Three of these groups — Labour, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah — were viewed as potential coalition partners in a Netanyahu government; the small, left-wing Meretz was expected to remain in opposition.

At this point, it seems certain that Netanyahu will form a new government, but he will be a much weaker prime minister than he was during the past four years.

The main winner was Yair Lapid, whose Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) emerged suddenly to pick up 19 seats and become the second largest party in the Knesset. Moreover, like the opposition, the right-wing bloc that comprised Netanyahu’s last government has undergone some important shifts.

Several developments converged to produce this unexpected outcome. For starters, the Israeli middle class and younger voters took the social protests of the summer of 2011 into the ballot box.

If Netanyahu thought that he had managed to take the steam out of the protests over high housing prices and falling living standards, he was proved wrong.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/expert-qa/2012/11/30-rabinovich-qa?rssid=rabinovichi{A447821C-7A13-45A3-8E1B-4F972C571C06}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65480855/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~Syrian-Crisis-a-Cause-for-Concern-in-IsraelSyrian Crisis a Cause for Concern in Israel

Fighting between rebels and forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al Assad continues to escalate. With reported atrocities, deaths and casualties mounting, this raging civil war deeply concerns the region and the global community, but few countries are more vested in the outcome than Israel. In, his paper “Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis,” Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich analyzes the impact of the war, its possible outcomes, and the long history between the two nations.

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Fighting between rebels and forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al Assad continues to escalate. With reported atrocities, deaths and casualties mounting, this raging civil war deeply concerns the region and the global community, but few countries are more vested in the outcome than Israel. In, his paper “Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis,” Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich analyzes the impact of the war, its possible outcomes, and the long history between the two nations.

In The Lingering Conflict Itamar Rabinovich, a former chief negotiator for Israel, provides unique and authoritative insight into the prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East. His presentation includes a detailed insider account of the peace processes of 1992–96 and a frank dissection of the more dispiriting record since then.

Rabinovich’s firsthand experiences as a negotiator and as Israel’s ambassador to the United States provide a valuable perspective from which to view the major players involved. Fresh analysis of ongoing situations in the region and the author’s authoritative take on key figures such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu shed new light on the long and tumultuous history of Arab-Israeli relations. His book is a shrewd assessment of the past and current state of affairs in the Middle East, as well as a sober look at the prospects for a peaceful future.

While Rabinovich explains the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—a classic dispute between two national movements claiming the same land—The Lingering Conflict also considers the broader political, cultural, and increasingly religious conflict between the Jewish state and Arab nationalism. He approaches the troubled region in an international context, offering provocative analysis of America’s evolving role and evaluation of its diplomatic performance.

This book builds on the author’s previous seminal work on geopolitics in the Middle East. As Rabinovich brings the Arab-Israeli conflict up to date, he widens the scope of his earlier insights into efforts to achieve normal, peaceful relations. And, of course, he takes full account of recent social and political tumult in the Middle East, discussing the Arab Spring uprisings—and the subsequent retaliation by dictators such as Syria’s al-Asad and Libya’s Qaddafi—in the context of Arab-Israeli relations.

Praise for the book:

"There is no better guide than Itamar Rabinovich to the story of Israel and the Arabs over the past half-century. His careful chronicle of peacemaking efforts makes depressing reading, as a story of courageous efforts that failed and opportunities that were missed."—David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post and author of Blood Money

"The Lingering Conflict reflects the author gained as an important participant in key Arab-Israeli negotiations. With its informed analysis of the consequences of the Arab Spring, this book makes a major contribution toward understanding the tangled issues that stand in the way of Middle East peace."—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state

"[The Lingering Conflict] . . . adopts the style of sweeping overview, stitching together the disparate strands of the domestic politics and diplomacy in each of the three key countries from which Rabinovich was able to observe these developments, this book is a tour d'horizon of the peace process that should appeal to a broad public audience."—Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University

Related content from the book's author, Itamar Rabinovich:

Itamar Rabinovich and Martin Indyk went on Charlie Rose to discuss Obama's speech in Jerusalem during the president's visit to Israel in the spring of 2013. Read the interview here or watch the video at CharlieRose.com.

In The Lingering Conflict Itamar Rabinovich, a former chief negotiator for Israel, provides unique and authoritative insight into the prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East. His presentation includes a detailed insider account of the peace processes of 1992–96 and a frank dissection of the more dispiriting record since then.

Rabinovich’s firsthand experiences as a negotiator and as Israel’s ambassador to the United States provide a valuable perspective from which to view the major players involved. Fresh analysis of ongoing situations in the region and the author’s authoritative take on key figures such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu shed new light on the long and tumultuous history of Arab-Israeli relations. His book is a shrewd assessment of the past and current state of affairs in the Middle East, as well as a sober look at the prospects for a peaceful future.

While Rabinovich explains the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—a classic dispute between two national movements claiming the same land—The Lingering Conflict also considers the broader political, cultural, and increasingly religious conflict between the Jewish state and Arab nationalism. He approaches the troubled region in an international context, offering provocative analysis of America’s evolving role and evaluation of its diplomatic performance.

This book builds on the author’s previous seminal work on geopolitics in the Middle East. As Rabinovich brings the Arab-Israeli conflict up to date, he widens the scope of his earlier insights into efforts to achieve normal, peaceful relations. And, of course, he takes full account of recent social and political tumult in the Middle East, discussing the Arab Spring uprisings—and the subsequent retaliation by dictators such as Syria’s al-Asad and Libya’s Qaddafi—in the context of Arab-Israeli relations.

Praise for the book:

"There is no better guide than Itamar Rabinovich to the story of Israel and the Arabs over the past half-century. His careful chronicle of peacemaking efforts makes depressing reading, as a story of courageous efforts that failed and opportunities that were missed."—David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post and author of Blood Money

"The Lingering Conflict reflects the author gained as an important participant in key Arab-Israeli negotiations. With its informed analysis of the consequences of the Arab Spring, this book makes a major contribution toward understanding the tangled issues that stand in the way of Middle East peace."—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state

"[The Lingering Conflict] . . . adopts the style of sweeping overview, stitching together the disparate strands of the domestic politics and diplomacy in each of the three key countries from which Rabinovich was able to observe these developments, this book is a tour d'horizon of the peace process that should appeal to a broad public audience."—Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University

Related content from the book's author, Itamar Rabinovich:

Itamar Rabinovich and Martin Indyk went on Charlie Rose to discuss Obama's speech in Jerusalem during the president's visit to Israel in the spring of 2013. Read the interview here or watch the video at CharlieRose.com.

For decades, Israel viewed Syria as its most bitter Arab enemy. Syria’s Arab nationalist ideology was fiercely anti-Israel, and border disputes left the two nations perpetually on the brink of conflict. After the June 1967 war, Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights became the most important issue separating the two countries, and when Syria joined the peace process launched in Madrid in October 1991, the future of the Golan Heights became the main bone of contention between the adversaries. The Israeli-Syrian negotiations came close to fruition but ultimately failed. During the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, relations with the United States became tense and Israeli-Syrian contacts were severed. The Ehud Olmert years in Israel saw renewed peace talks with Syria via the Turkish channel, again raising hopes of an end to hostilities but again ending in failure.

In early 2011, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis that has since descended into civil war sparked a rethink of Israel’s policy toward its neighbor. While Israel may have once preferred the Assad regime to remain in power rather than take its chances with an unknown successor, this “the devil we know” approach is no longer valid. After Israel had found itself frustrated by developments beneficial to Iran and its “Resistance Axis” throughout the Arab Spring—most notably the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak—the increasing pressure on the Syrian regime has represented a blow to Iran and its allies. Thus, while recognizing that Israel has little to no influence on the course of events in Syria, Israel’s leaders have largely reached a consensus that Assad’s departure from power is preferable.

As it rages on, Syria’s civil war complicates a variety of Israel’s foreign policy priorities. Clearly, the uncertainty in Syria has put the question of the Golan Heights on hold indefinitely. It may be a long time until Israel can readdress the prospect of giving the Golan back to Damascus, as many hawkish (and in fact some dovish) Israelis have seen Bashar al-Assad’s actions in his domestic crisis as proof that past efforts at a Golan-for-peace deal were misguided. Israel’s efforts to challenge Iran over its nuclear program are also affected by the instability facing Tehran’s ally in Damascus. If Israel or the U.S. were to launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, a desperate and beleaguered Assad could conceivably seek to transform his domestic war into another Arab-Israeli war by taking the opportunity to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. However, the Syrian conflict has the potential to bring the damaged Israeli- Turkish relationship closer to normalcy; if the two nations can resolve their dispute over the Mavi Marmara incident, they can find common ground in seeking to foster a stable post-Assad government in Syria.

Overall, Israel would prefer regime change in Syria, but has concerns about what type of government would succeed Bashar al-Assad. It hopes for a secular regime to emerge, but due to limited influence —and the likelihood that support for any faction would backfire due to Israel’s toxic reputation in the Arab world—it is maintaining a passive stance. Without changing this greatly, however, Israel should build discreet channels to the emerging actors in Syria to prepare for future outcomes. And with several neighbors—such as Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf states—sharing some common goals for the outcome of the Syrian crisis, Israel must seek to cooperate with them to advance its interests, which requires building trust with those actors. Thus, to avoid being a bystander in the Syrian crisis, it would serve Israel well to re-engage with Turkey and earn good will in the Arab world by seriously restarting the Palestinian peace process.

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For decades, Israel viewed Syria as its most bitter Arab enemy. Syria’s Arab nationalist ideology was fiercely anti-Israel, and border disputes left the two nations perpetually on the brink of conflict. After the June 1967 war, Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights became the most important issue separating the two countries, and when Syria joined the peace process launched in Madrid in October 1991, the future of the Golan Heights became the main bone of contention between the adversaries. The Israeli-Syrian negotiations came close to fruition but ultimately failed. During the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, relations with the United States became tense and Israeli-Syrian contacts were severed. The Ehud Olmert years in Israel saw renewed peace talks with Syria via the Turkish channel, again raising hopes of an end to hostilities but again ending in failure.

In early 2011, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis that has since descended into civil war sparked a rethink of Israel’s policy toward its neighbor. While Israel may have once preferred the Assad regime to remain in power rather than take its chances with an unknown successor, this “the devil we know” approach is no longer valid. After Israel had found itself frustrated by developments beneficial to Iran and its “Resistance Axis” throughout the Arab Spring—most notably the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak—the increasing pressure on the Syrian regime has represented a blow to Iran and its allies. Thus, while recognizing that Israel has little to no influence on the course of events in Syria, Israel’s leaders have largely reached a consensus that Assad’s departure from power is preferable.

As it rages on, Syria’s civil war complicates a variety of Israel’s foreign policy priorities. Clearly, the uncertainty in Syria has put the question of the Golan Heights on hold indefinitely. It may be a long time until Israel can readdress the prospect of giving the Golan back to Damascus, as many hawkish (and in fact some dovish) Israelis have seen Bashar al-Assad’s actions in his domestic crisis as proof that past efforts at a Golan-for-peace deal were misguided. Israel’s efforts to challenge Iran over its nuclear program are also affected by the instability facing Tehran’s ally in Damascus. If Israel or the U.S. were to launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, a desperate and beleaguered Assad could conceivably seek to transform his domestic war into another Arab-Israeli war by taking the opportunity to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. However, the Syrian conflict has the potential to bring the damaged Israeli- Turkish relationship closer to normalcy; if the two nations can resolve their dispute over the Mavi Marmara incident, they can find common ground in seeking to foster a stable post-Assad government in Syria.

Overall, Israel would prefer regime change in Syria, but has concerns about what type of government would succeed Bashar al-Assad. It hopes for a secular regime to emerge, but due to limited influence —and the likelihood that support for any faction would backfire due to Israel’s toxic reputation in the Arab world—it is maintaining a passive stance. Without changing this greatly, however, Israel should build discreet channels to the emerging actors in Syria to prepare for future outcomes. And with several neighbors—such as Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf states—sharing some common goals for the outcome of the Syrian crisis, Israel must seek to cooperate with them to advance its interests, which requires building trust with those actors. Thus, to avoid being a bystander in the Syrian crisis, it would serve Israel well to re-engage with Turkey and earn good will in the Arab world by seriously restarting the Palestinian peace process.

Editor's note: In an interview with David Kenner of Foreign Policy magazine, Itamar Rabinovich discusses the Israeli outlook toward the Syrian uprising, and its calculation in responding to cross-border violence. Read an excerpt below and the full article at foreignpolicy.com.

Foreign Policy: How would a renewed confrontation along the Golan affect the Syrian uprising?

Itamar Rabinovich: I'd say Israel has very studiously refrained from intervening in this conflict, because it did not want to embarrass the opposition. Assad's line from Day One is that this is not a genuine domestic uprising, but a plot hatched by the U.S. and Israel -- and by doing anything that looks like helping the opposition, including humanitarian help, Israel would have embarrassed the opposition.

Clearly the Syrian army, in its present condition, is no match for the IDF. Israel could inflict significant punishment on them and in that way, let us say, help the rebels. But what [the rebels] would gain militarily, they would lose politically. Which may be the regime's game.

Foreign Policy: Do you think Israeli policymakers, in their heart of hearts, want the Syrian uprising to succeed? Or are they afraid of what comes after Assad?

Rabinovich: My argument is that there was ambivalence with regards to Bashar al-Assad -- we just found out recently that even Netanyahu indirectly negotiated with him in 2011, through the State Department. But after the 2006 war, following the damage that Israel sustained in Lebanon [at the hands of Assad's ally Hezbollah], and the discovery in 2007 of the North Korean nuclear reactor [in northeastern Syria], I think that changed Israeli attitudes.

Authors

Editor's note: In an interview with David Kenner of Foreign Policy magazine, Itamar Rabinovich discusses the Israeli outlook toward the Syrian uprising, and its calculation in responding to cross-border violence. Read an excerpt below and the full article at foreignpolicy.com.

Foreign Policy: How would a renewed confrontation along the Golan affect the Syrian uprising?

Itamar Rabinovich: I'd say Israel has very studiously refrained from intervening in this conflict, because it did not want to embarrass the opposition. Assad's line from Day One is that this is not a genuine domestic uprising, but a plot hatched by the U.S. and Israel -- and by doing anything that looks like helping the opposition, including humanitarian help, Israel would have embarrassed the opposition.

Clearly the Syrian army, in its present condition, is no match for the IDF. Israel could inflict significant punishment on them and in that way, let us say, help the rebels. But what [the rebels] would gain militarily, they would lose politically. Which may be the regime's game.

Foreign Policy: Do you think Israeli policymakers, in their heart of hearts, want the Syrian uprising to succeed? Or are they afraid of what comes after Assad?

Rabinovich: My argument is that there was ambivalence with regards to Bashar al-Assad -- we just found out recently that even Netanyahu indirectly negotiated with him in 2011, through the State Department. But after the 2006 war, following the damage that Israel sustained in Lebanon [at the hands of Assad's ally Hezbollah], and the discovery in 2007 of the North Korean nuclear reactor [in northeastern Syria], I think that changed Israeli attitudes.

The failure of the Obama administration, its Western allies and several Middle East regional powers to take bolder action to stop the carnage in Syria is often explained by their fear of anarchy. Given the Syrian opposition’s manifest ineffectiveness and disunity, so the argument goes, President Bashar Assad’s fall, when it finally comes, will incite civil war, massacres and chaos, which is likely to spill over Syria’s borders, further destabilizing weak neighbours like Iraq and Lebanon, and leading, perhaps, to a regional crisis.

What is actually happening in Syria refutes this argument. In fact, the lingering crisis is corroding the fabric of Syrian society and government. Anarchy is setting in now: it is preceding — and precipitating — the regime’s eventual fall.

The United States and others are substituting high rhetoric and symbolic punitive action for real action on Syria. Sanctions on those involved in electronic warfare against the opposition’s social media are not the answer to the shelling of civilian neighbourhoods in Homs and Deraa.

For several months, Russian and Chinese obstruction in the United Nations Security Council was both a real obstacle to more effective sanctions and a convenient veil for inaction. More recently, former UN secretary general Kofi Annan’s mission on behalf of the UN and the Arab League has come to play a similar role.

Annan prepared a six-point plan for ending the violence and launching political negotiations. He dispatched a group of monitors to Syria in order to supervise the plan’s implementation, and the UN is about to beef up that mission. But, predictably, the Annan plan is not working, as Annan himself, in a report to a closed-door session of the Security Council on April 25, came close to admitting.

Yet while the Annan mission has given the government some breathing room, that’s not enough to save it. On the surface, the regime appears almost intact, but in the country as a whole it is collapsing. Some areas are now beyond its control, public services are unavailable, and the economy is in free fall.

Assad’s fall does not yet seem imminent, but it has become inevitable. The regime has lost all legitimacy and its effectiveness is weakening. When it finally crumbles, the powerful state built by Bashar’s father, Hafez Assad, will hardly exist.

A cliché has been heard throughout the Syrian crisis: “Syria is not Libya.” But another analogy may be more suitable. Syria may well become a second Iraq, not by design but as an unintended consequence of current policy.

The American occupiers of Iraq, through their policy of “de-Baathification,” left Iraq without an army or a government, which proved to be fertile ground for Sunni insurgents, Al Qaeda and violent Shiite groups. In Syria, the ground is being prepared for a similar outcome, with a growing number of radical Islamists crossing into Syria and joining the opposition.

In this context, it is important to appreciate the difference between the “political” opposition and the local opposition groups waging the fight against the regime on the ground. Groups like the Syrian National Council are loose associations of individuals and groups, many of them outside Syria.

These are the groups criticized by the Obama administration and others for their failure to present a united front, formulate a credible agenda or be seen as a viable alternative to the current regime. But these groups have limited influence over the local opposition groups inside Syria, which are equally diverse and divided.

It is among these groups that radical Islamists have gained a foothold. Fear of another Islamist takeover is a second main argument against toppling Assad, but the longer he stays in power, the greater the gains made by Islamists on the ground.

The Obama administration, focused on the November presidential election, is not interested in having to deal with a major crisis in Syria in the coming months, and is preoccupied with the risk of being drawn into another military entanglement. Other actors, too, seem to prefer the apparently limited current crisis to the unknown alternatives.

But the compelling moral case for a humanitarian intervention is increasingly being reinforced by sound raisons d’état. Furthermore, military or semi-military intervention is not the only option on the table. As the sanctions imposed on Iran outside the Security Council clearly show, effective action can be taken to tilt the balance and end the deadly stalemate in Syria. The current preference for inaction, while perhaps understandable, threatens to lead to precisely the outcomes that its advocates want to avoid.

Authors

The failure of the Obama administration, its Western allies and several Middle East regional powers to take bolder action to stop the carnage in Syria is often explained by their fear of anarchy. Given the Syrian opposition’s manifest ineffectiveness and disunity, so the argument goes, President Bashar Assad’s fall, when it finally comes, will incite civil war, massacres and chaos, which is likely to spill over Syria’s borders, further destabilizing weak neighbours like Iraq and Lebanon, and leading, perhaps, to a regional crisis.

What is actually happening in Syria refutes this argument. In fact, the lingering crisis is corroding the fabric of Syrian society and government. Anarchy is setting in now: it is preceding — and precipitating — the regime’s eventual fall.

The United States and others are substituting high rhetoric and symbolic punitive action for real action on Syria. Sanctions on those involved in electronic warfare against the opposition’s social media are not the answer to the shelling of civilian neighbourhoods in Homs and Deraa.

For several months, Russian and Chinese obstruction in the United Nations Security Council was both a real obstacle to more effective sanctions and a convenient veil for inaction. More recently, former UN secretary general Kofi Annan’s mission on behalf of the UN and the Arab League has come to play a similar role.

Annan prepared a six-point plan for ending the violence and launching political negotiations. He dispatched a group of monitors to Syria in order to supervise the plan’s implementation, and the UN is about to beef up that mission. But, predictably, the Annan plan is not working, as Annan himself, in a report to a closed-door session of the Security Council on April 25, came close to admitting.

Yet while the Annan mission has given the government some breathing room, that’s not enough to save it. On the surface, the regime appears almost intact, but in the country as a whole it is collapsing. Some areas are now beyond its control, public services are unavailable, and the economy is in free fall.

Assad’s fall does not yet seem imminent, but it has become inevitable. The regime has lost all legitimacy and its effectiveness is weakening. When it finally crumbles, the powerful state built by Bashar’s father, Hafez Assad, will hardly exist.

A cliché has been heard throughout the Syrian crisis: “Syria is not Libya.” But another analogy may be more suitable. Syria may well become a second Iraq, not by design but as an unintended consequence of current policy.

The American occupiers of Iraq, through their policy of “de-Baathification,” left Iraq without an army or a government, which proved to be fertile ground for Sunni insurgents, Al Qaeda and violent Shiite groups. In Syria, the ground is being prepared for a similar outcome, with a growing number of radical Islamists crossing into Syria and joining the opposition.

In this context, it is important to appreciate the difference between the “political” opposition and the local opposition groups waging the fight against the regime on the ground. Groups like the Syrian National Council are loose associations of individuals and groups, many of them outside Syria.

These are the groups criticized by the Obama administration and others for their failure to present a united front, formulate a credible agenda or be seen as a viable alternative to the current regime. But these groups have limited influence over the local opposition groups inside Syria, which are equally diverse and divided.

It is among these groups that radical Islamists have gained a foothold. Fear of another Islamist takeover is a second main argument against toppling Assad, but the longer he stays in power, the greater the gains made by Islamists on the ground.

The Obama administration, focused on the November presidential election, is not interested in having to deal with a major crisis in Syria in the coming months, and is preoccupied with the risk of being drawn into another military entanglement. Other actors, too, seem to prefer the apparently limited current crisis to the unknown alternatives.

But the compelling moral case for a humanitarian intervention is increasingly being reinforced by sound raisons d’état. Furthermore, military or semi-military intervention is not the only option on the table. As the sanctions imposed on Iran outside the Security Council clearly show, effective action can be taken to tilt the balance and end the deadly stalemate in Syria. The current preference for inaction, while perhaps understandable, threatens to lead to precisely the outcomes that its advocates want to avoid.

In The Lingering Conflict, Itamar Rabinovich, a former chief negotiator for Israel, provides unique and authoritative insight into the prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East. His presentation includes a detailed insider account of the peace processes of 1992–96 and a frank dissection of the more dispiriting record since then.

Rabinovich's firsthand experiences as a negotiator and as Israel's ambassador to the United States provide a valuable perspective from which to view the major players involved. Fresh analysis of ongoing situations in the region and the author's
authoritative take on key figures such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu shed
new light on the long and tumultuous history of Arab-Israeli relations. His book
is a shrewd assessment of the past and current state of affairs in the Middle East,
as well as a sober look at the prospects for a peaceful future.

While Rabinovich explains the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—a classic dispute between two national movements claiming the same land—The Lingering Conflict also considers the broader political, cultural, and increasingly religious conflict between the Jewish state and Arab nationalism. He approaches the troubled region in an international context, offering provocative analysis of America's evolving role and evaluation of its diplomatic performance.

This book builds on the author's previous seminal work on geopolitics in the Middle East, particularly Waging Peace. As Rabinovich brings the Arab-Israeli conflict up to date, he widens the scope of his earlier insights into efforts to achieve normal, peaceful relations. And, of course, he takes full account of recent social and political tumult in the Middle East, discussing the Arab Spring uprisings—and the subsequent retaliation by dictators such as Syria's al-Assad—in the context of Arab-Israeli relations.

Praise for the book:

"Itamar Rabinovich has written an excellent book on the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. His superb scholarship and penetrating analysis probe all the relevant domestic and international issues. He is particularly enlightening with his balanced account of the reasons for the failure of the 2000 Camp David meetings. Both orthodox and revisionist views are discussed in detail. This is a highly readable book accessible to both lay people and specialists. I recommend it very strongly and with enthusiasm."
—Farhad Kazemi, Professor Emeritus of Politics and Middle Eastern Studies, New York University

"There is no better guide than Itamar Rabinovich to the story of Israel and the Arabs over the past half-century. His careful chronicle of peacemaking efforts makes depressing reading, as a story of courageous efforts that failed and opportunities that were missed. Rabinovich brings alive the ideas and personalities that marked each of these crossroads. The Lingering Conflict belongs on the bookshelf of any thoughtful person who wants to understand the road the Arabs and Israelis have traveled since 1948."—David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post
and author of Bloodmoney

"Adding new material to and bringing up-to-date his 2003 history of Israel’s foreign policy relations, Rabinovich’s new book, The Lingering Conflict, reflects the author’s keen strategic insights and the perspective gained as an important participant in key Arab-Israeli negotiations. With its informed analysis of the consequences of the Arab Spring, this book makes a major contribution toward understanding the tangled issues that stand in the way of Middle East peace."
—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Itamar Rabinovich is a professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at Tel Aviv University, distinguished global professor at New York University, and is currently the Bronfman Distinguished Nonresident Fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria from 1992 to 1995 and served as Israeli ambassador to the United States 1993–1996. He also served an eight-year term as president of Tel Aviv University. Rabinovich is the author of several books, including The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (Oxford, 1991), The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton, 1999), and Waging Peace (Princeton, 2003).

In The Lingering Conflict, Itamar Rabinovich, a former chief negotiator for Israel, provides unique and authoritative insight into the prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East. His presentation includes a detailed insider account of the peace processes of 1992–96 and a frank dissection of the more dispiriting record since then.

Rabinovich's firsthand experiences as a negotiator and as Israel's ambassador to the United States provide a valuable perspective from which to view the major players involved. Fresh analysis of ongoing situations in the region and the author's
authoritative take on key figures such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu shed
new light on the long and tumultuous history of Arab-Israeli relations. His book
is a shrewd assessment of the past and current state of affairs in the Middle East,
as well as a sober look at the prospects for a peaceful future.

While Rabinovich explains the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—a classic dispute between two national movements claiming the same land—The Lingering Conflict also considers the broader political, cultural, and increasingly religious conflict between the Jewish state and Arab nationalism. He approaches the troubled region in an international context, offering provocative analysis of America's evolving role and evaluation of its diplomatic performance.

This book builds on the author's previous seminal work on geopolitics in the Middle East, particularly Waging Peace. As Rabinovich brings the Arab-Israeli conflict up to date, he widens the scope of his earlier insights into efforts to achieve normal, peaceful relations. And, of course, he takes full account of recent social and political tumult in the Middle East, discussing the Arab Spring uprisings—and the subsequent retaliation by dictators such as Syria's al-Assad—in the context of Arab-Israeli relations.

Praise for the book:

"Itamar Rabinovich has written an excellent book on the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. His superb scholarship and penetrating analysis probe all the relevant domestic and international issues. He is particularly enlightening with his balanced account of the reasons for the failure of the 2000 Camp David meetings. Both orthodox and revisionist views are discussed in detail. This is a highly readable book accessible to both lay people and specialists. I recommend it very strongly and with enthusiasm."
—Farhad Kazemi, Professor Emeritus of Politics and Middle Eastern Studies, New York University

"There is no better guide than Itamar Rabinovich to the story of Israel and the Arabs over the past half-century. His careful chronicle of peacemaking efforts makes depressing reading, as a story of courageous efforts that failed and opportunities that were missed. Rabinovich brings alive the ideas and personalities that marked each of these crossroads. The Lingering Conflict belongs on the bookshelf of any thoughtful person who wants to understand the road the Arabs and Israelis have traveled since 1948."—David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post
and author of Bloodmoney

"Adding new material to and bringing up-to-date his 2003 history of Israel’s foreign policy relations, Rabinovich’s new book, The Lingering Conflict, reflects the author’s keen strategic insights and the perspective gained as an important participant in key Arab-Israeli negotiations. With its informed analysis of the consequences of the Arab Spring, this book makes a major contribution toward understanding the tangled issues that stand in the way of Middle East peace."
—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Itamar Rabinovich is a professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at Tel Aviv University, distinguished global professor at New York University, and is currently the Bronfman Distinguished Nonresident Fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria from 1992 to 1995 and served as Israeli ambassador to the United States 1993–1996. He also served an eight-year term as president of Tel Aviv University. Rabinovich is the author of several books, including The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (Oxford, 1991), The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton, 1999), and Waging Peace (Princeton, 2003).

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/03/syria-israel-rabinovich?rssid=rabinovichi{7ABDC9B0-ED20-4585-AB11-114460F8B3B8}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65480864/0/brookingsrss/experts/rabinovichi~The-SyrianIsraeli-Relationship-as-a-US-Policy-IssueThe Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue

Executive Summary

The priority the United States placed on the Israeli- Syrian relationship declined dramatically under the administration of George W. Bush, compared to its cardinal position during the period of the Clinton Administration. In addition, during the Bush years, the relative importance of the Israeli component of Washington’s relationship with Damascus declined whereas other components, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, came to the fore. The Bush Administration’s overall policy toward Syria—neither to engage with Syria nor attack it, but to seek soft ways of penalizing it—failed to work.

On the Israel side, the Israeli government’s policy transformed from Ariel Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s initial rejection of “the Syrian option” to Olmert’s quest for a settlement with Syria. It will be up to the Obama Administration and Israel’s new government to decide whether to pick up where Olmert left off. Of critical importance is the fact that the emphasis of Syrian- Israeli negotiations has shifted from the relatively simple formula of “territories for peace” to a more comprehensive formula that includes Syria’s relationship with Iran, Hizballah, and the radical Palestinian organizations.

The Obama Administration and Israel’s new government will most certainly take a fresh look at Middle Eastern diplomacy. The Israeli government will have to decide whether it wants to proceed with the Syrian negotiations, in what fashion, and to what end. It will have to integrate such decisions into a larger strategy that will address the other core issues of Israel’s national security policies: its relationship with the new U.S. administration, how to address the Palestinian issue, and what to do about Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and a nuclear arsenal.

For the Obama Administration, Syria would be a small, yet a significant piece in a larger national security puzzle. Its policy towards Syria and the issue of an Israeli- Syrian peace process is likely to unfold along one of the following four scenarios:

A Derivative of a Potential American-Iranian Dialogue. One of the top priorities of the Obama Administration will be to develop an Iran strategy. It may continue (or push further) the Bush Administration’s policy of isolation or, more likely, it may explore whether a “grand bargain” with Iran is feasible. Such a choice would be natural for a president who had advocated an open dialogue approach with Iran during his election campaign.

If a dialogue materializes and unfolds successfully, a new context would be created for Washington’s relationship with Damascus. An American-Iranian understanding should cover Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. If such an understanding is indeed reached, Syria would no longer be seen as the junior partner of an evil state and therefore U.S.-Syrian accommodation and a new American stewardship of an Israeli-Syrian peace process would be facilitated.

A By-Product of Lingering Hostility with Iran. Should the previous option not be pursued or should it fail, the prospect of wooing Syria away from Iran would loom as a joint policy goal for both the United States and Israel. This idea is not new. In fact, the aim of breaking Syria away from Iran was used by the Olmert government in justifying its decision to enter into and publicize indirect negotiations with Syria. A similar rationale was articulated by France when Nicolas Sarkozy decided to engage with Asad. However, Syria has refused to discuss a change in its relationship with Iran as a precondition to progress in negotiations with Israel. Yet, in the past, various Syrian spokesmen have alluded to the position that Syria’s alliance with Iran is not fixed and that it is mostly a result of Washington’s rejection of Syria. Such claims can of course be tested, but testing them would not be an easy diplomatic exercise. The Ba’th regime has a long tradition of straddling the line and Syria’s leadership is likely, if a dialogue with the United States is renewed, to try to proceed in that dialogue without actually severing its intimate relationship with Tehran.

Henry Kissinger’s success in shifting Egypt in the early and mid-1970s from the Soviet orbit to a pro-American orientation has been cited as a model for pulling Syria away from Iran. It should be noted that a peace process and Egypt’s regaining of the Sinai were important dimensions of that successful strategic realignment. It should also be noted that while the Egypt case is an inspiring example, Anwar Sadat was a bold, visionary leader who was willing to jump from the Soviet orbit even before a safe position with the United States had been secured. Hafiz al-Asad showed no such inclination, and thus far, neither has Bashar.

A Policy of Using Force. As noted above, the Bush Administration decided to avoid both ends of the spectrum by refraining from either dialogue with or using force against Syria. If both varieties of dialogue mentioned above do not materialize, the Obama Administration could reconsider the option of using force against Syria. However, this is a highly unlikely prospect.

A Policy of Maintenance. Should the Obama Administration relegate the Syria issue to a relatively low place on its foreign policy agenda or should it decide to allocate priority to the Palestinian issue, it will have to find a way of keeping it and the question of the U.S. relationship with Syria on hold. If put on the back burner, the Syrian issue may deteriorate into direct or indirect conflict, similar to what occurred in earlier decades. Therefore, a strategy of conflict management will be necessary.

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Authors

The priority the United States placed on the Israeli- Syrian relationship declined dramatically under the administration of George W. Bush, compared to its cardinal position during the period of the Clinton Administration. In addition, during the Bush years, the relative importance of the Israeli component of Washington’s relationship with Damascus declined whereas other components, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, came to the fore. The Bush Administration’s overall policy toward Syria—neither to engage with Syria nor attack it, but to seek soft ways of penalizing it—failed to work.

On the Israel side, the Israeli government’s policy transformed from Ariel Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s initial rejection of “the Syrian option” to Olmert’s quest for a settlement with Syria. It will be up to the Obama Administration and Israel’s new government to decide whether to pick up where Olmert left off. Of critical importance is the fact that the emphasis of Syrian- Israeli negotiations has shifted from the relatively simple formula of “territories for peace” to a more comprehensive formula that includes Syria’s relationship with Iran, Hizballah, and the radical Palestinian organizations.

The Obama Administration and Israel’s new government will most certainly take a fresh look at Middle Eastern diplomacy. The Israeli government will have to decide whether it wants to proceed with the Syrian negotiations, in what fashion, and to what end. It will have to integrate such decisions into a larger strategy that will address the other core issues of Israel’s national security policies: its relationship with the new U.S. administration, how to address the Palestinian issue, and what to do about Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and a nuclear arsenal.

For the Obama Administration, Syria would be a small, yet a significant piece in a larger national security puzzle. Its policy towards Syria and the issue of an Israeli- Syrian peace process is likely to unfold along one of the following four scenarios:

A Derivative of a Potential American-Iranian Dialogue. One of the top priorities of the Obama Administration will be to develop an Iran strategy. It may continue (or push further) the Bush Administration’s policy of isolation or, more likely, it may explore whether a “grand bargain” with Iran is feasible. Such a choice would be natural for a president who had advocated an open dialogue approach with Iran during his election campaign.

If a dialogue materializes and unfolds successfully, a new context would be created for Washington’s relationship with Damascus. An American-Iranian understanding should cover Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. If such an understanding is indeed reached, Syria would no longer be seen as the junior partner of an evil state and therefore U.S.-Syrian accommodation and a new American stewardship of an Israeli-Syrian peace process would be facilitated.

A By-Product of Lingering Hostility with Iran. Should the previous option not be pursued or should it fail, the prospect of wooing Syria away from Iran would loom as a joint policy goal for both the United States and Israel. This idea is not new. In fact, the aim of breaking Syria away from Iran was used by the Olmert government in justifying its decision to enter into and publicize indirect negotiations with Syria. A similar rationale was articulated by France when Nicolas Sarkozy decided to engage with Asad. However, Syria has refused to discuss a change in its relationship with Iran as a precondition to progress in negotiations with Israel. Yet, in the past, various Syrian spokesmen have alluded to the position that Syria’s alliance with Iran is not fixed and that it is mostly a result of Washington’s rejection of Syria. Such claims can of course be tested, but testing them would not be an easy diplomatic exercise. The Ba’th regime has a long tradition of straddling the line and Syria’s leadership is likely, if a dialogue with the United States is renewed, to try to proceed in that dialogue without actually severing its intimate relationship with Tehran.

Henry Kissinger’s success in shifting Egypt in the early and mid-1970s from the Soviet orbit to a pro-American orientation has been cited as a model for pulling Syria away from Iran. It should be noted that a peace process and Egypt’s regaining of the Sinai were important dimensions of that successful strategic realignment. It should also be noted that while the Egypt case is an inspiring example, Anwar Sadat was a bold, visionary leader who was willing to jump from the Soviet orbit even before a safe position with the United States had been secured. Hafiz al-Asad showed no such inclination, and thus far, neither has Bashar.

A Policy of Using Force. As noted above, the Bush Administration decided to avoid both ends of the spectrum by refraining from either dialogue with or using force against Syria. If both varieties of dialogue mentioned above do not materialize, the Obama Administration could reconsider the option of using force against Syria. However, this is a highly unlikely prospect.

A Policy of Maintenance. Should the Obama Administration relegate the Syria issue to a relatively low place on its foreign policy agenda or should it decide to allocate priority to the Palestinian issue, it will have to find a way of keeping it and the question of the U.S. relationship with Syria on hold. If put on the back burner, the Syrian issue may deteriorate into direct or indirect conflict, similar to what occurred in earlier decades. Therefore, a strategy of conflict management will be necessary.