In the last chapter of Buying Aircraft, I. B. Holley, jr., concludes
that the process of procuring aircraft for the U.S. Army Air Forces during
World War II was as much a weapon of war as the fighters, bombers, and
guns procured. The author's specialized study of aircraft procurement bridges
the gap between the larger volumes on industrial mobilization and wartime
production, such as TheArmy and Economic Mobilization and The
Army and Industrial Manpower, and the various volumes in The Technical
Services subseries that focus on the detailed research, development, and
procurement of military materiel for the specific combat and service components
of the War Department.

The long years of modest aircraft procurements for the Army Air Service
and Air Corps between the wars adversely affected the growth of the American
airframe, engine, and components manufacturing industry and discouraged
the development of assembly line production methods. The Air Corps Act
of 1926 further exaggerated problems by mandating a set of restrictive
procedures that governed military aircraft procurement in the following
years. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the first of his large
aircraft production targets in November 1938 in response to the deteriorating
situation in Europe, existing AirCorps studies of industrial mobilization
were inadequate to handle such a large program. Nevertheless, the aircraft
production orders that were now expected to flow encouraged aircraft manufacturers
to begin much-needed plant expansions, and the outbreak of war in Europe
in September 1939 accelerated that trend as foreign orders and Roosevelt's
emerging foreign and national security policies stressed American preparedness.
The quick defeat of Poland, the sudden collapse of France, and the ensuing
isolation of Great Britain created a sense of national emergency and spurred
congressional action that finally removed the procurement restrictions
in 1940-41.

The leaders of the Air Corps struggled from 1939 until Pearl Harbor
to resolve its key aircraft procurement problems, among them how to define
actual requirements for air weapons and spares without an accepted air
doctrine and reliable attrition figures for air combat. Moreover, the evolving
U.S. economic mobilization and war production structure provided other
variables that complicated Air Corps procurement planning and procedures.
The final form of aircraft production planning emerged only in late 1942
under the War Production Board (WPB) and its various aircraft production
sections and the Joint Aircraft Committee and its subordinate Air Service
Unit at Wright Field, Ohio.

Central to the success of wartime aircraft production was the development
of new plant capacity through expansion of existing facilities and the
building of entirely new aircraft plants. After much discussion between
the government and aircraft industry, most new capacity was completed during
1941-43 under the auspices of the Defense Plant Corporation which built
government-owned production and assembly facilities for operation by the
aircraft and also automobile manufacturers. The large automobile companies,
which specialized in assembly line mass production, approached produc-

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tion problems much differently than the aircraft manufacturers who were
accustomed to job shop production relying on highly skilled workers. Production
of B-24s at Ford's newly built Willow Run, Michigan, facility tested the
automobile industry's approach to aircraft production using special tooling,
subassemblies, and semiskilled labor. Modification centers were established
to make changes and improvements in production line aircraft so that serial
production would not be disrupted.

Successful aircraft procurement depended heavily upon the contracting
process and the subsequent administration of the contracts. During the
war the Army Air Forces constantly revised its air materiel procurement
organization and procedures. Procedures for negotiating and administering
various types of contracts changed as experience was gained in thousands
of large and small procurements. The author rightly devotes significant
coverage to the mundane but critically important aspects of contract negotiation
and administration and the hard lessons learned in aircraft procurement
and production during the war.

Key topics:
1 . The effect of congressionally mandated prewar procurement limitations
on the development of an efficient aircraft industry that could provide
a ready wartime productive capacity (Chs. II-VII).
2. The importance of prewar mobilization planning for effective industrial
mobilization (Chs. II, V-XIII).
3. The problems faced in developing realistic prewar requirements for military
aircraft procurement and production (Chs. VII, X, XI).
4. The evolution of Army Air Corps and Air Forces organization for aircraft
procurement (Chs. IV-VII, XII, XIX).
5. The role of the government in developing the aircraft plant capacity
required to sustain the Allied war effort, such as the role of the Defense
Plant Corporation, tax- amortization policies, and private capital expansion
(Chs. VI-VII, XI-XIV).
6. The role of the automobile industry in manufacturing aircraft during
World War II (Chs. VII, XIV, XX).
7. Development of procedures for contract negotiations, administration,
and termination in aircraft procurements (Chs. XV-XVIII).
8. Use of cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF), fixed-price, and price adjustment
contracts for aircraft procurement (Chs. XV-XVII).
9. Problems of allocation of limited aircraft, airframe, engine, and component
production capacity between the Army Air Forces and U. S. Navy and within
the War Department (Chs. XIX, XX).
10. The roles of the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), Office
of Production Management (OPM), and War Production Board (WPB) in developing
the policies and procedures for organizing, developing, and administering
the nation's productive capacities in general and the aircraft industry
in particular (Chs. IX-XIV, XIX, XX).
11. The importance of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in establishing the
national aircraft production goals and programs during the prewar years
(Chs. VII-XI).
12. Statistics for wartime aircraft and engine production (Ch. XX).