Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733

Full metadata record

DC Field

Value

Language

dc.contributor.author

Simonovits, András

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2009-01-28T15:52:30Z

-

dc.date.available

2009-01-28T15:52:30Z

-

dc.date.issued

2004

en_US

dc.identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733

-

dc.description.abstract

The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetricinformation on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond,2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-bestbenefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paperdetermines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is,however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.

en_US

dc.language.iso

eng

en_US

dc.publisher

|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich

en_US

dc.relation.ispartofseries

|aCESifo Working Paper |x1370

en_US

dc.subject.jel

D82

en_US

dc.subject.jel

H55

en_US

dc.subject.jel

D91

en_US

dc.subject.ddc

330

en_US

dc.subject.keyword

flexible retirement

en_US

dc.subject.keyword

asymmetric information

en_US

dc.subject.keyword

actuarial fairness (neutrality)

en_US

dc.subject.keyword

mechanism design

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Flexible Altersgrenze

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Versicherungstechnik

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Asymmetrische Information

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Second Best

en_US

dc.subject.stw

Theorie

en_US

dc.title

Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution