Top Menu

Follow Us:

Centralized Decentralization: Subnational Governance in Jordan

Ms. Elliott holds an M.A. in Middle East Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and currently works on civil-society strengthening and political process monitoring projects in the MENA region. Mr. Ciesielski also holds an M.A. in Middle East Studies from the Elliott School, and previously worked with international NGOs in Jordan, Israel and Morocco. Ms. Birkholz is a Middle East Studies M.A. student at George Washington University and is currently a Program Associate for the Iraq programs at IREX.

Jordan is one of the last bastions of stability in an otherwise volatile region. However, its stability is threatened by a continuing economic crisis. In a survey conducted across all twelve governorates in 2017, only 22 percent of citizens view Jordan's overall economic condition as "good" or "very good" compared to 49 percent two years ago.1 Against this backdrop of economic frustration, Jordan is embarking on a decentralization process at the local level in an attempt to bring decision making closer to the citizen. In 2015, Jordan passed its first Decentralization Law, a continuation of calls from King Abdullah II dating back to 2005 to "enhance our democratic march and to continue the process of political, economic, social and administrative reform" by encouraging local participation in the provision of services and investment priorities.2 This is the latest in a series of small steps taken by the central government intended to improve governance at the local level and secure long-term stability in the kingdom.

Why is Jordan pursuing decentralization? What are its developmental and political implications? What are the vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with it? While exploring these questions, we observed a large amount of political rhetoric. In his earliest speeches on decentralization, King Abdullah II referred to political development as the "gateway to the full participation of all segments of society."3 An article from the Jordanian newspaper Al-Ghad called decentralization "a path to democracy."4 However, over the course of our in-person interviews with key stakeholders and knowledgeable individuals, not a single person referred to Jordanian decentralization as an initiative aimed at bolstering democracy in the kingdom. Our observations of the new local governance bodies as well as a more in-depth study of the rhetoric surrounding decentralization reinforced the notion that these reforms are not democratically motivated. Rather, they are an effort to administratively decentralize in order to improve economic development through more targeted service provision to the rural periphery.

Jordan's centralized makeup and its historical reliance on patronage networks to link rural tribal groups to the central government through service provision and handouts present complications for decentralization. Rural areas are historically underdeveloped, and many individuals and smaller tribes are left out of these patronage networks.5 If and how the Royal Court intends to incorporate these parties into decentralization initiatives was an integral part of our research. Unpacking the objectives of decentralization in Jordan and situating it within a larger framework of authoritarian political calculations will help to shed light on opportunities for success as well as the many obstacles in its way.

In addition, because decentralization efforts are so new, there is a lack of understanding both within the international community and among Jordanians concerning its aims and objectives. The Decentralization Law of 2015 created new popularly elected councils at the governorate level. In theory, these councils are meant to oversee budget allocation, advise on the needs of the governorate, and serve as a check on the executive councils whose members are appointed by the central government.6 However, a lack of adequate information campaigns and vagueness within the law itself have caused widespread confusion over the role of the governorate councils. The first elections for members under the new law took place in August 2017. The fact that less than a year has passed since these reforms took effect presented both opportunities and challenges for our work.

This essay is only available in the print edition of Middle East Policy.

Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal articles.

Also in this issue

About MEPC

The Middle East Policy Council is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to contribute to American understanding of the political, economic and cultural issues that affect U.S. interests in the Middle East.