Plaintiff Marion Lee Lawrence, appearing pro se, brings this
employment discrimination action apparently under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. Defendants move for an order pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

It is implicit that if the complaint fails to meet the
requirements of Rule 8, it could not have properly "commenced"
a civil action within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 3.*fn2
Defendants allege that, even under the liberal standards
applied to pro se pleadings, "a factual basis for a cognizable
claim cannot be discerned from" the materials submitted as
plaintiff's complaint.

The filing of a formal complaint is not necessary to commence
an action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact,
the submission of materials much like those filed by plaintiff
in the instant action has been deemed sufficient to commence an
employment discrimination action, so long as the papers set
forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." See Antoine v. United
States, 781 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1986). As noted by the Supreme
Court in Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984), "the Federal Rules . . .
do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed
description of the asserted basis for relief" in order to
satisfy the general pleading standard for civil actions brought
in federal court. Id., 104 S.Ct. at 1724-25. However, it is
well established in the Second Circuit, as elsewhere, that a
plaintiff seeking to bring an employment discrimination or
other civil rights action "cannot rest on naked assertions or
conclusory allegations of discrimination, but must plead some
concrete, supporting facts in order to state a claim. . . ."
Nielsen v. Flower Hospital, 639 F. Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N Y
1986); see also Martin v. New York State Dep't of Mental
Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1978).

The courts which have considered whether papers other than a
formal complaint suffice for purposes of commencing an
employment discrimination claim have only done so when a
right-to-sue letter was filed as part of the complaint. See
Flower Hospital, 639 F. Supp. at 740; Antoine, 781 F.2d 433;
Firle v. Mississippi State Dep't of Educ., 762 F.2d 487 (5th
Cir. 1985); Mahroom v. Defense Language Institute,
732 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); compare Baldwin County, 104 S.Ct. 1723
(in which Supreme Court held that right-to-sue letter on its
own not sufficient when not accompanied by other papers which
provide "short and plain" statement of claim). Plaintiff
received notice of her right to file a civil action in the
EEOC's decision on defendant Department's request to reopen.
This notice was included in her pleadings. However, the
complaint does not provide a "short and plain statement of the
claim" showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief, as
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and the complaint must accordingly
be dismissed.

The sum of plaintiff's claim is contained in her application
to proceed in forma pauperis, in which she is required to
describe the nature of the employment discrimination she
alleges. In this section of the application form, plaintiff
states:

The only charge which I am complaining about is
racially motivated conspiracy against me by the
Department of Treasury employees, namely, Steven
Kesselman, Agatha Vorsanger, Eileen Collins, et
al.; and about denial of due process of my appeal
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission/ORA
officials, namely, Richard Reda and Ronald
Copeland.

The legislative history of Title VII does not indicate that
Congress intended the EEOC to be subject to suit by a plaintiff
dissatisfied with EEOC procedures or administrative
determinations, and the courts have rejected efforts by
dissatisfied plaintiffs to sue the EEOC over the handling or
disposition of complaints. See, e.g., McCottrell v. EEOC,
726 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1984).

Accordingly, neither the EEOC nor its chairman are proper
parties to the action brought by plaintiff in the instant case.
The complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to the EEOC and
its chairman, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Department of the
Treasury is likewise an improper party defendant, and the
complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to the Department. As
stated above, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice to
file and serve another complaint pleading the factual basis of
plaintiff's claims as to the secretary of the Department of the
Treasury.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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