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Monday, July 31, 2017

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our
Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for
the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian
Civil War from June 7 to June 29, 2017. The control of terrain represented on
the graphics is accurate as of June 15 or June 22, 2017.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the
Institute for the Study of War for their contributions to the text and graphics
of this series of Syria SITREP Maps.

Thursday, July 20, 2017

The Russian military is reshaping
its air campaign in Syria in order to compel the U.S. into partnering with
Russia, which cannot destroy jihadists, roll back Iran, or set conditions for a
desirable settlement to the war. Russia prioritized airstrikes against ISIS in
Homs, eastern Hama, and Deir ez Zour Provinces in support of the Bashar al
Assad regime from June 8 – July 16. Russia also conducteda series ofhigh-profile strikes, including long-range
strategic bombing runs from Russia and cruise missiles launched from the Eastern
Mediterranean against ISIS between May and July 2017. Russia de-prioritized
its air campaign against the Syrian opposition in June and early July as part
of an effort to encourage the U.S. to accept Russia’s proposal for a
“de-escalation zone” in Southwest Syria. The U.S. later agreed to the de-escalation
zone agreement on July 7 following a meeting between U.S. President Donald
Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia is disguising its strategic
intent by masquerading as a reliable counterterrorism partner for the U.S. in
Syria. President Trump’s reported decision
to end support for some anti-Assad opposition fighters will likely only
encourage Putin to seize greater control over the conflict and continue rolling
back U.S. influence in the country.

The
‘de-escalation zone’ deal has further secured Russia’s freedom of action to
support Iran and Bashar al Assad’s campaign. Russia has consistently
usedceasefires
in Syriato
temporarily shiftand
reorient resources elsewhere in the theater. The U.S.-Russia-Jordan
ceasefire is no exception. The deal has freed up Russian resources to surge
airstrikes in support of pro-regime operations to disrupt the U.S. and its
partner forces in Eastern Syria under the guise of fighting ISIS. Pro-regime
forces with support from Russian airstrikes launchedoperations
against U.S.-backed
groups in Northern Suwayda and Eastern Rif Dimashq Provinces from July 8 –
10 amidst the start of the ceasefire, reportedly seizing over a
“dozen” small villages and positions from rebels in the area. Russia has
likewise surged strikes in
support of pro-regime forces near Palmyra and Deir ez Zour. This shift
seeks to constrain U.S. operations and provide leverage for Russia in future
negotiations over a potential second ceasefire in Eastern Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting.ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Tuesday, July 18, 2017

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) achieved small but significant gains against
ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City between June 20 and July 17. The SDF completed
its full encirclement of Ar-Raqqa City on June 29 after seizing a number of
villages on the southern bank of the Euphrates River. Operation Inherent
Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend stressed that the maneuver emplaced
a “physical
band” that would “prevent escape or reinforcement” by ISIS in Ar-Raqqa
City. The SDF later breached
the heavily-fortified Old City of Ar-Raqqa on July 3 after coalition airstrikes
destroyed two twenty-five meter sections of the historic Rafiqah (Old City)
Walls. These breaches enabled partner forces on the ground to avoid pre-positioned
ISIS defenses at existing channels through the wall, including prepared
direct and indirect fire zones, land mines, IEDs, and SVBIEDs. The SDF simultaneously
continued to secure incremental gains along both the eastern and western axes
of Ar-Raqqa City.

The battle for Ar-Raqqa City
nonetheless stands to protract over the next several months. The SDF has
reportedly encountered
intensified resistance and “better-emplaced defenses” over the past four weeks
following initial rapid gains in districts on the outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City.
ISIS has extensively leveraged innovative
tools to slow coalition advances, including drone-borne munitions and a new
type of motion-activated IED. The SDF has struggled for over a month to
penetrate one “significant
defensive IED belt” on the northern outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City. The SDF
must also contend with continued pressure to protect and evacuate the estimated
30,000
to 50,000 civilians that remain trapped in Ar-Raqqa City. These challenges have
been exacerbated by the poor
combat performance of elements of the Syrian Arab Coalition of the SDF.
Most clearing operations are reportedly led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG while
allied Sunni Arabs – often suffering from lower standards of training,
equipment, and motivation – serve as the rear holding force. ISIS has exploited
these seams to mount successful local counteroffensives against several
districts originally cleared by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These failures highlight
future problems likely to be faced by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in the
establishment of a reliable local holding force such as the Raqqa
Internal Security Forces.

Thursday, July 13, 2017

Key Takeaway:Russian President Vladimir Putin is
establishing a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean Sea in part to contest
the United States’ ability to operate freely and hold
NATO’s southern flank at risk.[1] Russia’s
military has deployed approximately 15 naval vessels as part of a permanent Mediterranean
Task Force (MTF) as of July 5, 2017.[2] Russia
secured long-term naval basing for the MTF in Tartous, Syria in January 2017
after signing a bilateral agreement with the Bashar al Assad regime that extends
the previous lease on the Russian Naval Facility for the next 49 years.[3]

Russian
warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s MTF launched two series of Kalibr
cruise missile strikes against ISIS positions in Syria on May 31
and June 23.[4]
The MTF’s June 23 strikes included coordinated fixed wing airstrikes.[5]
This strike highlighted Russia’s ability to execute a combined arms assault
utilizing forward observation positions on land, strategic assets from the sea,
and follow-on strikes from the air within an active combat zone. The increasing
complexity of Russia’s coordinated strikes is indicative of Moscow’s dedication
to the development and modernization of its military and to showcasing its
arsenal for multiple audiences. Putin is exploiting the Syrian war to
test Russia’s newest naval assets and weaponry in combat, including the P-800
Onyx supersonic anti-ship missiles.[6]
The MTF will continue to receive the Russian Navy’s most advanced warships
outfitted with Russia’s intermediate- and long-range land and ship attack
cruise missiles. Russian officials have claimed that the MTF has also conducted
a variety of operational and logistical naval exercises near the Libya and
Egyptian coasts.[7]
Russia, which is in a strategic coalition with Iran, will continue to utilize the MTF to expand
Russian military influence along the Mediterranean basin, while simultaneously increasing
the risk to U.S. freedom of maneuver in the Middle East and North Africa.[8]
Russia’s growing naval capabilities, partnerships, and future basing expansion could
threaten major global maritime trade chokepoints, including the Suez Canal, the
Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab al Mandab Strait, in the long term.[9]

[1]
John W. Miller and Fredrick W. Kagan, “The New Cold War in the Mediterranean,”
Fox News, February 17, 2016,
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/02/17/new-cold-war-in-mediterranean.html

[5]
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Facebook Page, June 23, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/1492252324350852/videos/vb.1492252324350852/1944936562415757/?type=3&theater
; Ellen Stockert and the ISW Syria Team, “Russia’s Maneuvers in Syria: May 1 –
June 7, 2017,” Institute for the Study of War, June 2017. Publication
available upon request.

[6]
Genevieve Casagrande and Kathleen Weinberger, “Putin’s Real Syria Agenda,”
Institute for the Study of War, March 2017. Publication available upon
request.

[9] Jennifer
Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, and Frederick W. Kagan, “U.S. Grand Strategy:
Destroying ISIS and al Qaeda, Report Four – America’s Way Ahead in Syria,”
Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, March 2017 ;
Genevieve Casagrande, “Russia Moves to Supplant U.S. Role,” Institute for the
Study of War and Critical Threats Project, March 2017. Publications
available upon request.

Monday, July 10, 2017

ISW is issuing a correction to the map published on July 10,
2017. The three corrections are circled as changes on this version. ISW removed
ISIS’s control zone in eastern Qalamoun, northeast of Damascus. ISIS retreated
from this zone on 25 MAY 2017. ISW expanded ISIS’s control zone east of Tel
Afar, west of Mosul. ISIS held this terrain from 2014 onward, which ISW had
under-represented historically. ISW refined an estimate for ISIS’s support
zones in Idlib province. ISIS re-infiltrated Idlib province in 2015, in
conjunction with its loss of critical border crossings in Aleppo and Raqqa
provinces. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other al-Qaeda linked groups are presently
attempting to disrupt ISIS’s operations in Idlib.