Comments for Bulletin for the Study of Religionhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog Thu, 19 Feb 2015 15:46:03 +0000hourly1Comment on Not All Atheists by Carlhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-713085 Thu, 19 Feb 2015 15:46:03 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-713085Thanks for the response, Matt. Let the “mulling over” commence! ]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Matt Sheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-712663 Thu, 19 Feb 2015 05:16:50 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-712663Thanks for your thoughts Carl.

On your first point, I am in full agreement, and I think that some scholars would parse this as merging the description of first order claims (i.e., those of adherents) with theoretical analysis. The point for me is to not let first-order claims stand as an explanation for behaviour/action in the world but as an important piece of data to be analyzed. For me, they are a conceptual filter through which things are interpreted. That filter, whether minimally or maximally “religious,” will necessarily be informed by the social context that produces those theologies–for groups as well as for individuals.

Regarding the second point, I’m not entirely sure if I follow. My point, quite simply, is that the ideas of actors are produced through social relations and not causal mechanisms in and of themselves. They are, rather, linguistic justifications for things going on in the world. If I understand you correctly, the perception of an “encounter with the divine” is a particular way that some may interpret their worlds, though this, I would claim, is nonetheless mediated within the social world and thus cannot be separated from it in our analysis.

And yes, the double-standard may very well be accidental as this is speculative on my part. That said, her aim is clearly one of moral critique rather than analytic per se.

While I agree that the facts of Hicks’ motivation remains fuzzy and that Stoker Breunig is overdetermining his character, there certainly is some evidence to suggest such a motivation. In another sense, Hicks’ precise motivations don’t matter, since this has become a flash point event that has stirred already existing tensions between atheists (along with Christians, secularist, and those who identify strongly with the West) and Muslims. It’s touched a nerve that was already pulsing.

And yes, I take categories such as race, gender, class, and nationalism, etc., as inescapable conceptual grids through which identities and ideologies are produced and mediated. Following this logic, conceptions of religion are caught up in such grids, more and less, which suggests that they must also be interrogated. All of these categories are not always evident in individual cases, I submit, as may be the case with Hicks, but they do become part of the analysis when a larger narrative emerges (as in this case) as others weigh in and re-ignite old battles that implicate these various grids.

]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Carlhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-707598 Sun, 15 Feb 2015 19:13:41 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-707598Matt, my response to your response. I’ll leave you the last word. I’ve enjoyed the exchange, as usual.

“One of our tasks as scholars, I would claim, is to place the first order claims of social actors within theoretical frameworks in order to problematize and grapple with their production, logic, effects, etc.” Certainly. That said, there seems to me a tendency within Religious Studies to too-quickly frame the first-order claim as something other. If the Muslim actor says “I did this because it is Allah’s will,” is a theological position taken by those who respond, in effect, “What is *really* at work here?” We could perhaps flesh this out more, but insofar as religion scholars are (presumably) keen to avoid theological claims—to “taint” the data, if you will—the first-order claims must necessarily be part of the equation.

“I view religious ideology as an interpretive framework that functions to mediate relations in the social world. Examining how the latter shapes the former is, in my opinion, a more fruitful line of analysis since the former is a product of social life and human imagination.” Following my previous comment, is this effectively a theological position? That is to say, might the former actually be a product of an encounter with the divine? (Not saying it is, mind you, but it’s a question we don’t tend to ask much. Not asking that question may well blind us to a set of theological presuppositions that undergird our work.)

“…I suspect that it is also intended to point out a double-standard when it comes to what is expected of Muslims and thus serves (at least partly) as a polemic attempting to destabilize conventional narratives in the public sphere (i.e., it likely has a practical aim rather than a strictly analytic one).” I think the illustration of the double-standard is accidental, though I imagine we’ll have to just disagree on this point.

“To me the deeper theoretical problem is one of showing how purported religious identities are filtered or mediated within popular discourse–variously overdetermined by common assumptions about belief and often radicalized, (in the case of Islam) while, it would seem, underdetermined in the case of Hick’s, who is not, despite Stoker Breunig’s polemic, being subject to a widespread condemnation on the basis of his alleged atheism.” Hicks is definitely being subject to widespread condemnation by the Left. Accusations of “Islamophobia” are as common as, um … things that are common. Where Brunei (and others) miss the boat and, by extension undermine their own arguments concerning Muslims and terrorism, is in how quick they have been to attribute Hicks’s actions to a fear of Islam, despite evidence to the contrary (he defended the “Ground Zero” Mosque on the grounds of religious freedom). Hicks is currently undetermined because there is little evidence to make a determination. That has not, however, stopped Brunei, et al from “overdetermin[ing] by common assumptions about belief” and “radicalizing” Hicks.

“In cases where he is accused based on his atheism, one task for scholars, I submit, is to dig deeper and analyze how and why such positions are produced in the first place rather than assume some one-to-one causal link between alleged or professed intentions and subsequent actions.” Agreed.

]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Matt Sheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-707523 Sun, 15 Feb 2015 18:03:54 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-707523Thanks for your thoughts on this Danie. I would, however, like to challenge you on the following point:

“… the difference between the acts of Hicks, and that of any other believer lies in the fact that we Atheists take responsibility for our own action and do not claim it was mandated by a god or his rules/wants.”

For me, this statement seems to imply that there is some normative centre or core to atheism or atheist identity, rather than viewing it as a highly contested and always shifting ground of values, ideals, and so forth. I don’t mean to suggest that there are no stable values or ideals that are common with many types of atheism, but rather that there is no consensus or widespread agreement as to what they are. To claim that there is strikes me as a normative assertion of authority, rather than a descriptive one of actually existing realities on the ground.

Moreover, I would argue that “rules” still exist for those who identify as atheists. The centre of authority may be more diffuse and harder to trace than it is with, say, those who adopt a strict Christian identity, but “atheism” is no less conditioned by the logic of various dominant ideologies (e.g., secularism, liberalism, capitalism, etc.) that structure its “rules” in equally complex ways. One need only look at the differences between, say, 18th century British atheists, vs. atheism in China or Iran today to see these processes at work.

]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Matt Sheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-707510 Sun, 15 Feb 2015 17:54:20 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-707510Carl: Thanks for your thoughts on this. If I may pick up on one of your points:

“So far as I can tell, the media has gotten quite good at refraining from painting this or that terrorist attack as “Muslim violence” … Bruenig seems to be under no such restrictions.”

For me, part of the problem as someone who is interested in tracing the discursive logic of these debates, is how the first-order claims of certain individuals, such as those who profess a particular religious motivation, come to over-determine our analysis of causation and, in turn, perpetuate narratives that are (often) radicalized and, moreover, tend to essentialize “religion.” One of our tasks as scholars, I would claim, is to place the first order claims of social actors within theoretical frameworks in order to problematize and grapple with their production, logic, effects, etc.

Personally, I view religious ideology as an interpretive framework that functions to mediate relations in the social world. Examining how the latter shapes the former is, in my opinion, a more fruitful line of analysis since the former is a product of social life and human imagination.

And I would agree that Stoker Breunig’s argument is hypocritical, though I suspect that it is also intended to point out a double-standard when it comes to what is expected of Muslims and thus serves (at least partly) as a polemic attempting to destabilize conventional narratives in the public sphere (i.e., it likely has a practical aim rather than a strictly analytic one). To me the deeper theoretical problem is one of showing how purported religious identities are filtered or mediated within popular discourse–variously overdetermined by common assumptions about belief and often radicalized, (in the case of Islam) while, it would seem, underdetermined in the case of Hick’s, who is not, despite Stoker Breunig’s polemic, being subject to a widespread condemnation on the basis of his alleged atheism.

In cases where he is accused based on his atheism, one task for scholars, I submit, is to dig deeper and analyze how and why such positions are produced in the first place rather than assume some one-to-one causal link between alleged or professed intentions and subsequent actions. Here questions of “religion” are always caught up in matter so race, gender, class, nationalism, etc.

]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Danie de Waalhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-703086 Fri, 13 Feb 2015 18:25:41 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-703086Well said.

As a non- academic, the difference between the acts of Hicks, and that of any other believer lies in the fact that we Atheists take responsibility for our own action and do not claim it was mandated by a god or his rules/wants. Whatever I do is also not an Act of a representative of any Atheist but myself.

]]>Comment on Not All Atheists by Carlhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/02/not-all-atheists/#comment-702820 Fri, 13 Feb 2015 16:09:50 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9907#comment-702820Excellent write-up. Allow me to go in a direction completely other than what you’ve written.

Something else that struck me about Breunig’s article was how quickly she assumed this was, shall we say, ‘religiously-motivated violence’ when, so far as I know, Hicks has not assented to this. If so, it seems Bruenig has fallen into the very trap she would denounce were it applied to Muslims: being too quick to assume a particular motivation. So far as I can tell, the media has gotten quite good at refraining from painting this or that terrorist attack as “Muslim violence” until the perpetrators themselves make such claims. It may be an “Allah Akbar” while engaged in the act or a clearer statement of intent when under questioning, but in the absence of such pointers, the media (well, maybe not FOX) tend to be good about basing their descriptions on what is known rather than what is assumed. Bruenig seems to be under no such restrictions.

Secondly, I assume Brunei would not write an article entitled “The Charlie Hebdot Murders Should Be a Wake-Up Call for Muslims” (interesting aside: “CH” for both!). That is to say, she would (perhaps rightly) push back against narratives that look for this or that percentage of Muslims to speak out before accepting that there are Muslims who deplore such violence.

If I’m right about both of these, and not just engaging in sweeping assumption for which there is no support, the implication is clear: Bruenig’s larger position is hypocritical.* If it is not incumbent upon all Muslims to denounce terrorism, as is so often suggested, it is not incumbent upon all atheists to denounce Hicks’s actions. If it is malpractice to assume religiosly-motivated violence simply because the perpetrator was Muslim, it is malpractice to assume religiosly-motivated violence simply because the perpetrator was atheist.

I know this isn’t what your article was about, and my conclusion may be overly reductive, but it seemed worth mentioning.

*Or, if she is not being hypocritical, we may need to revisit whether we should write articles to the effect that “The Charlie Hebdot Murders Should Be a Wake-Up Call for Muslims.”

]]>Comment on Reza Aslan’s Theory of Religion and Politics by Abuisahttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/01/reza-aslans-theory-of-religion-and-politics/#comment-628575 Wed, 14 Jan 2015 15:22:31 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9800#comment-628575Yes reza has a narrative, a very plausabile narrative, thats emphasis spcial context in understanding religion. His books are on the money in explaing complex religious history. I accept that there are other thesis/ narrative. But by calling him a charlatan, it is you who has lost the plot; and has prompted me to write this. To make matters worse, you mention people such as maajid- who is the definition of a charlatonism. If I was guessing you are drawn to people who share your narritive- guessing i would say you have an islamphobic stance- but I could be wrong. ]]>Comment on Charlie Hebdo, “Free Speech,” and Critique by Karen Zoppahttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-free-speech-and-critique/#comment-614288 Fri, 09 Jan 2015 16:23:08 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9776#comment-614288What irks me in all the “coverage” is the insistence on using the newsspeak of “terrorism,” “Islamicist,” and “democracy.” How would we all react if we reported this as murder rather than “terrorism”? How would the claim that individuals intolerant of free expression – in this case satire – eliminated their discomfort with mass execution? Or hoped to increase the membership in a group dedicated to violence with such an action? What if we read that capitalist governments who manipulate information all the time for their own purposes are exploiting this event to make hypocritcal statements about “democracy,” “freedom,” and “our values”? I am trying to make the point, as Huxley did, that newsspeak muddies our thinking and obscures those things we might need to attend to. Nevertheless, i still agree with Voltaire. ]]>Comment on Theory & Religion Series: Talal Asad’s Formations of the Secular by Eoinhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/12/theory-religion-series-talal-asads-formations-of-the-secular/#comment-614275 Fri, 09 Jan 2015 16:15:55 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9667#comment-614275This blogpost is not scholarship, it is a blogpost. My ideological musings are my own and are not meant to represent any particular ‘neo-Marxist teleological historical force’. I was asked to write about a book that has been influential in my thought.

As for shoehorning something called Irish Catholicism, that was assessed in November as being appropriately scholarly by a panel of peers. In geography.

]]>Comment on Theory & Religion Series: Talal Asad’s Formations of the Secular by etseqhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/12/theory-religion-series-talal-asads-formations-of-the-secular/#comment-598707 Sun, 04 Jan 2015 10:05:54 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9667#comment-598707Good grief – is this what passes as scholarship these days? Redefine, I mean, “deconstruct” the concepts of secular and religion so that they become meaningless and then lapse into ideological musings about the evils of colonialism, capitalism, and western religions but valorize Islam as some sort of neo-marxist teleological historical force to replace the old proletariat. Since you probably eschew quantitative work anyway, I’m sure you’ll have no problem shoehorning Irish Catholicism into Asad’s post-colonial gibberish but don’t expect anyone outside of Religious Studies to take you seriously. Who would have thought that ostensible secular leftists would abandon the Enlightenment critique of religion for some addled brained, new age mysticism in the guise of “critical theory” ]]>Comment on Theory & Religion Series: Ann Taves’ Religious Experience Reconsidered in the study of atheism by Tommyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/01/theory-religion-series-ann-taves-religious-experience-reconsidered-in-the-study-of-atheism/#comment-594995 Sat, 03 Jan 2015 03:09:49 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9741#comment-594995Dear Karen,

Thank you for taking the time to comment, and your comment is well thought and direct. Indeed a point that has been similarly drawn before (McCutcheon, 2007; [on the codependency of the sacred and the secular]), and rightly so as you imply. In a manner of speaking, I see Taves’ framework as a position that embraces the fallibilism of the humanities and sciences. A turtles all the way down kind of view, we could always be wrong and often are, there is no guarantee. Our best science and scholarship might be flawed. However, I would agree that Taves does not get out of the binary, but I do not think that is her ultimate purpose, or at least should not be. In my view, she is more or less providing a pragmatic option to maneuver within that, and other binaries, by acknowledging the contested ground on which they stand and studying the processes by which importance is ascribed to a phenomena, whether it be the decision to ascribe importance made by the researcher, or the data being researched, or both as co-constructive processes. The framework provides a starting place for the study of cognitive and societal processes (tracking the discursive sacred-secular binary) on which the phenomena, however specified, exists.

]]>Comment on Theory & Religion Series: Ann Taves’ Religious Experience Reconsidered in the study of atheism by Karen Zoppahttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2015/01/theory-religion-series-ann-taves-religious-experience-reconsidered-in-the-study-of-atheism/#comment-594755 Sat, 03 Jan 2015 01:20:47 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9741#comment-594755I have a very different take on Taves’ Religious Experience Reconsidered. My persistent question is how, if at all, “things deemed religious” are fundamentally different from things named/assumed/designated religious as a sui generis category? I think Taves has tried very hard to find a way around this binary, but I was not convinced she succeeded. We are still faced with the same methodological and taxonomical aporia in approaching “things deemed religious” as we are in either endorsing religion as sui generis or in rejecting it as such. Taves taxonomical grids are organizationally useful but not theoretically decisive. ]]>Comment on Imagining the Past as Present: The Islamic State and the Rhetoric of Authenticity by Carl J. Stonehamhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/11/imagining-the-past-as-present-the-islamic-state-and-the-rhetoric-of-authenticity/#comment-406123 Wed, 05 Nov 2014 15:00:32 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9494#comment-406123Very well said! ]]>Comment on Imagining the Past as Present: The Islamic State and the Rhetoric of Authenticity by Richard Amesburyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/11/imagining-the-past-as-present-the-islamic-state-and-the-rhetoric-of-authenticity/#comment-405209 Wed, 05 Nov 2014 11:13:33 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9494#comment-405209Warnings against first-order claims about what constitutes true Islam and the like are sounded so regularly on this blog that, notwithstanding a certain sympathy, I feel provoked to question this orthodoxy. It is of course the case that such claims, when presented as neutral descriptions, can encode a “crypto-theology” or otherwise mask (and so leave undefended) a normative agenda. But denunciations of crypto-theology, however salutary, simply beg the question against *explicit* theology (or whatever one prefers to call it), and the letter referred to in the penultimate paragraph appears to fall more or less squarely within the latter category. One can, of course, stipulatively define “scholarship” so as to demote all theological claims to the level of “data,” but why assume that these signatories, who appear to be acting rather explicitly in the capacity of self-identified Muslim theologians, are engaged in a deficient version of what Bruce Lincoln does? ]]>Comment on Dead Religions by Bhairavhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/10/dead-religions/#comment-385165 Sat, 01 Nov 2014 07:24:16 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=8501#comment-385165I agree that theoretic contemplations about a religion might be significantly different from the empirical or theoretic understanding of it by a practitioner.

It would be wrong to generalise that all religion is about past. Perhaps it is true for “book” based religions like judaism, christianity or Islam where the prophetic sayings are given prime importance. For oriental religious movements under Hindu or Budhist umbrella, one’s personal truth has deeper significance than someone else’s personal truth in past. However, it cannot be denied that some schools in oriental religions creates a mental fantasy land where the stories, realisation of personalities in past (through books, discourses) are given prime importance. I would refrain from making blanket statements generalising about religions here.

]]>Comment on Dead Religions by Bhairavhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/10/dead-religions/#comment-383174 Fri, 31 Oct 2014 22:17:46 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=8501#comment-383174I agree that theoretic contemplations about a religion might be significantly different from the empirical or theoretic understanding of it by a practitioner.

It would be wrong to generalise that all religion is about past. Perhaps it is true for “book” based religions like judaism, christianity or Islam where the prophetic sayings are given prime importance. For oriental religious movements under Hindu or Buddhist umbrella, one’s personal truth has deeper significance than someone else’s personal truth in past. However, it cannot be denied that some schools in oriental religions creates a mental fantasy land where the stories, realisation of personalities in past (through books, discourses) are given prime importance. I would refrain from making blanket statements generalising about religions here.

]]>Comment on The Meaning of Islam and the Politics of Multicultural Identity, Part 1 by mattsheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/10/the-meaning-of-islam-and-the-politics-of-multicultural-identity-part-1/#comment-337253 Wed, 22 Oct 2014 23:52:33 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9381#comment-337253See my comments to Oliver and Carl. ]]>Comment on The Meaning of Islam and the Politics of Multicultural Identity, Part 1 by mattsheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/10/the-meaning-of-islam-and-the-politics-of-multicultural-identity-part-1/#comment-337251 Wed, 22 Oct 2014 23:52:08 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9381#comment-337251Thanks for your thoughts Oliver.

I would take issue here with your analogy with fascism. Fascism, however we may define it in its central components, is a particular political ideology that, among other things, relies on forms of nationalism that tend to be hyper-ethnocentric. It therefore has racism built into its very fabric by privileging groups based on their particular ethic and/or religious identity.

And I am not arguing that we can’t criticize “Islam.” I am arguing, first and foremost, that we should pay closer attention to what it is we are referring to when we talk about Islam. To summarize: my claim is a) that it not a very productive term *by itself* since it reflects certain generalized and symbolic idea rather than substantive ones, and b) that if we are going to criticize things related to “Islam” we need to pay attention to context, history, and the many variations/iterations of this term (e.g., who is using it, how, and why?)

It is true that groups who base their identity on Islam draw upon all sorts of ideas within the tradition (e.g., the Qur’an, different schools of thought and theological traditions, etc.) that are compatible with radical political acts being carried out today, but to reduce their motivations to “Islam” is not only to grossly generalize the identities of approx. 1.5 billion people, but attribute causation that is a-historical and deprived of any socio-political context. Even if it’s true that “78% of British Muslims think that the Danish cartoonists should have been prosecuted,” which is one statistic and not exactly definitive evidence, Harris and Maher are using selective stats to generalize and condemn all Muslims. Their interests in undermining “religion” writ large (and I imagine you know how hostile they are to “religion”) makes their marshalling of these “facts” problematic to say the least and tells us very little as to what causes radicalization and the spread of said expressions in the first place. These are the sort of things that I am suggesting need closer attention.

]]>Comment on The Meaning of Islam and the Politics of Multicultural Identity, Part 1 by Matt Sheedyhttp://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/2014/10/the-meaning-of-islam-and-the-politics-of-multicultural-identity-part-1/#comment-337186 Wed, 22 Oct 2014 23:34:03 +0000http://www.equinoxpub.com/blog/?p=9381#comment-337186Some very good points Carl. I am certainly willing to amend my reflections along the lines of what you suggest at the start–that beliefs are not “sufficiently stable” to support their usage of the term “Islam.” More to the point, however, I am calling attention to the symbolic effects of this term, which, as you suggest, are generally devoid of any substance and reflect a very limited range of common ideas, esp. in the West. In this sense, “Islam” overdetermines what is at stake and often creates the impression that social acts that rely on “Islam” as an alibi are they product of “religious belief” rather than said beliefs re-produced in particular contexts.

I do think that their position (Harris, Maher, etc.) is implicitly Islamophobic and thus racist, though I don’t think that the reasons for this are adequately spelled out. If we consider the ways in which the symbolic production of “Islam” is tied to all sorts of stereotypes about Arabs and foreign others (Iranians, Afghanis, etc.) and often conflated in highly reductive ways, any attempt to generalize “Islam” as the root of the problem must account for the fact that it is caught up within such fields of cultural representation.

I would prefer to think of “Islam” as analogous to any ideology–sometimes minimalist, sometimes maximalist, and with many different effects in terms of how it is taken up in contexts of interaction. In this sense, I think it needs to be a central variable in our conversation, but one that always needs to account for how it has been produced within cultures and contexts that are shaped by socio-political factors. Otherwise, we get this regressive loop that attributes actions to “Islam” instead, e.g., particular “Islamic” ideologies that are the products of material conditions. This is the kind of move I would like to see rather than the banal and useless tennis match a la Islam is violence/Islam is peace.