The amendment defines “virtual currencies” as “a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.” A “custodian wallet provider” is defined as “an entity that provides services to safeguard private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers, to hold, store and transfer virtual currencies.” (5th AMLD art. 1, para. 2(d).) As previously mentioned, the new rules extend the customer due diligence requirements to custodian wallet providers and virtual-currency exchange platforms.

Central Beneficial Ownership Registers

Another change to improve transparency concerns the national central beneficial ownership registers in the EU Member States. Beneficial owners are defined as “any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer, and/or natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is conducted.” (4th AMLD art. 3, para. 6.) The amendment requires that the central beneficial ownership registers for corporate or other legal entities are available to any member of the general public. (5th AMLD art. 1, para. 15(c).) The previous version of the AMLD made access for members of the general public dependent on demonstrating a legitimate interest. (4th AMLD art. 30, para. 5.) Information on beneficial owners of trusts will for the first time be available to the general public, but only to those who show a legitimate interest. (5th AMLD art. 1, para.16(d).) Previously, only competent authorities, Financial Intelligence Units, and entities subject to the customer due diligence rules were granted access to beneficial ownership information on trusts. (4th AMLD art. 31, para. 4.) When a trust is the beneficial owner of an entity, information will be accessible to persons that file a written request. (5th AMLD art. 1, para.16(d).)

Furthermore, in order to facilitate cooperation and information exchange between the Member States, the amendment requires Member States to connect their central registers via the “European Central Platform.” (5th AMLD art. 1, para.15 (g).) The interconnection of the central registers via the European Central Platform must be completed by March 10, 2021. (Id. art. 1, para. 42.) Beneficial ownership information must be available through the national registers and the interconnected European Central Platform for at least five years and no more than ten years after the entity has been removed from the register. (Id. art. 1, para.15 (g).)

Use of Anonymous Prepaid Cards

Furthermore, the amendment of the AMLD lowers the monetary thresholds for identifying the holders of prepaid cards to address risks linked to their use in financing terrorist activities. Payments carried out with anonymous prepaid cards online will be allowed only when the transaction amount does not exceed €50 (about US$59). (5th AMLD recital 14; art. 1, para. 17(b).) In-store use of an anonymous prepaid card must not exceed an amount of €150 (about US$176). (Id. art. 1, para. 7(a).)

Centralized Automated Mechanisms for Payment and Bank Accounts

The amendment obligates EU Member States to establish centralized registries or electronic data retrieval systems to identify natural or legal persons holding or controlling payment accounts, bank accounts, and safe-deposit boxes. (Id. art. 1, para. 19.) The national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) must be allowed direct, immediate, and unfiltered access to that information. Technical aspects of the interconnection of the centralized registries is to be worked out by the European Commission by June 26, 2020. (Id.)

High-Risk Third Countries

Finally, the amendment sets stricter standards for financial transactions with high-risk third countries, meaning non-EU countries that have been identified by the European Commission as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering or counterterrorism regimes. If a country is on that list, enhanced due diligence requirements must be performed by the companies conducting business with such a country. The AMLD harmonizes the enhanced due diligence obligations across the EU, but Member States may require companies to perform one or more additional mitigating measures. (Id. recital 12; art. 1, para. 11.)

Currently, a person entering or leaving the EU carrying cash equal to or exceeding €10,000 (about US$11,679) must declare the cash and make it available for control. However, this control mechanism has been frequently circumvented by criminals by shipping cash via mail or freight or by carrying highly liquid commodities that can be easily converted into cash. (COM (2016) 825 final, supra, at 2 & 4.) The revision of the CRC therefore extends the disclosure obligation to unaccompanied cash sent in postal parcels or freight consignments and amends the definition of “cash.” (Id. art. 2, para. 1(a), art. 4.) Cash is now defined as comprising currency, bearer-negotiable instruments, commodities used as highly liquid stores of value, and certain types of prepaid cards. The new categories are further described in Annex I to the amended CRC. The Commission is authorized to adopt delegated acts to amend the annex and add additional components to the definition of cash. (Id. art. 14.)

Furthermore, if the custom authorities have reason to suspect that an amount of cash that is below the threshold of €10,000 is related to a criminal activity such as money laundering, terrorism financing, or fiscal crimes, they are allowed to take appropriate actions, in particular detain the cash temporarily. (Id. arts. 6, 7.) Any temporary detention of cash must be justified by special circumstances and be subject to an effective remedy in law. (Id. art. 7, para. 2.) Details, in particular the maximum detention period, must be laid down by the Member States in national legislation. (Id. art. 7, para. 3.)

Finally, the amended CRC Regulation aims to improve the information exchange between the competent authorities of the Member States and with the Commission. (Id. art. 9.)

According to the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, which published the news on May 17, 2018, the indictment says that the Brazilians tried to recruit jihadists to fight in Syria and discussed attacks in Brazil. (Id.) The indictment was based on the findings of a confidential Federal Police investigation that included the interception of conversations and messages in applications and social networks. (Id.) The investigations began in November 2016 when Spanish authorities notified the Brazilian authorities that cell phone numbers from Brazil appeared in WhatsApp groups suspected of “promoting, organizing or integrating” the Islamic State. (Id.)

The Amendment Law restricts the right to be elected to the Knesset for an otherwise qualified candidate (an Israeli citizen over 21 years of age) who has been convicted of a serious terrorism or security offense and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of over seven years. Accordingly, the name of such a candidate may be included in a candidates’ list proposed by a political party in the Knesset national election only after the passage of 14 years from the date the candidate has finished serving his or her imprisonment sentence. (Amendment Law § 1 (amending § 6(a) of the Law).)

A candidate who has been convicted of the offenses subject to the restriction and completed his or her prison sentence at least seven years prior to the entry into force of the Amendment Law is not subject to the candidacy restriction. (Amendment Law § 2. The Amendment Law came into effect on the date of its publication in the official gazette, May 2, 2018.)

The restriction provided under the Amendment Law adds to the existing restriction imposed by the Law on the right of a candidate to be elected. Accordingly, a candidate becomes ineligible to be elected when he or she has been deprived of the right to be elected in accordance with a court decision by virtue of any law, or when he or she

has been sentenced, in a final verdict, to actual imprisonment for a period of over three months, and on the day of the submission of the list of candidates seven years have not yet passed since he finished serving his term of imprisonment, unless the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee has determined that the crime for which he was convicted, under the circumstances of the case, does not carry moral turpitude. (Basic Law: the Knesset (5718-1958, § 6(a), unofficial translation, Knesset website.)

Explanatory notes of the Amendment Law’s Draft Bill recognize the basic right of any person to be elected to the Knesset. The notes justify imposing stricter restrictions on the eligibility of an offender to be elected to the state’s legislative branch on the grounds that the commission of serious offenses of terrorism or security constitutes a rebellion against the state itself. (Basic Law: the Knesset (Amendment No. 48) (Limiting the Right to Be Elected Due to Conviction for a Terrorism Offense or a Serious Security Offense), Draft Bill submitted by Knesset Member Anat Berko, KNESSET BILLS 5778 No. 739 (Nov. 6, 2017), p. 24.)

Article 4 of the bill obliges the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to reach bilateral agreements covering Internet Technology (IT) and cybercrime with as many foreign governments as possible to block some websites in foreign countries. (Essam El-Din, supra.)

Article 8 gives customers and ISPs the right to appeal censorship decisions before the criminal court within seven days of censorship of the website. (Essam El-Din, supra.)

Article 11 provides for imprisonment of no less than three years and a fine of no less than 100,000 Egyptian pounds (LE) (about US$5,565) for those who establish a website with the aim of promoting the commission of crimes cited in the Penal Code or any other laws. (Marina Gamil, Cabinet Refers Draft Cybercrime Law to Parliament, EGYPT TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018).)

Article 14 states that anyone found guilty of illegally using the internet or other IT tools to access copyrighted content of audio-visual channels is to be punished with three months of imprisonment and a fine ranging from LE10,000 to 50,000 (about US$565 to 2,830). (Essam El-Din, supra.)

The penalties stipulated in article 21 include a term of imprisonment and a fine of LE 1 million–5 million (about US$56,630–283,160) upon conviction of logging into government sites and destroying, changing, copying, recording, or leaking any data, information, or accounts, regardless of the method used. (Mamdouh & Al-Abd, supra.)

Under article 25, anyone found guilty of breaching privacy by hacking e-mails or social accounts or creating false e-mails, websites, and accounts could face three months in jail and a fine of up to LE30,000 (about US$1,700). (Essam El-Din, supra.)

Article 26 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for a period of no less than six months and a fine of LE50,000–100,000 (about US$2,830–5,565) on anyone who violates any of the so-called “family principles or values of Egyptian society,” which the law did not define or explain. (Hassan, supra.)

Article 30 of the draft law imposes the penalty of imprisonment for at least one year and/or a fine of LE20,000–200,000 (about US$1,130–11,325) on any individuals found to administer websites, e-mails, accounts, or information systems that commit any of the crimes stipulated in the law. Parliament’s Communications Committee Approves Cybercrimes Bill, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Apr. 17, 2018).)

Under article 31, ISPs are subject to stricter punishments, which may include imprisonment of the owners of those providers in a maximum-security prison. The ISP is also punishable by a fine of LE3 million (about $US169,895) in the event that they refuse to comply with the decision of the competent authority to censor a website that is considered damaging to national security or has caused the death of one or more persons. (Mamdouh & Al-Abd, supra.)

Support for the Bill

Members of Parliament have defended the necessity of the draft law in fighting internet piracy, protecting information, and preventing abuses of technology. (Amira Al-Fekki, Internet Usage in Egypt Under State Regulation, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Apr. 22, 2018).)

According to Kamal Amer, the head of the Parliament’s Defense and National Security Committee, the new bill would help combat the growing danger of extremist and militant Islamist movements that use the internet and modern technology to carry out terrorist attacks. The new law would also supplement the army’s comprehensive campaign against militant and terrorist groups in North Sinai. (Essam El-Din, supra.)

Criticism of the New Bill

Some writers voiced concerns that the draft law would impose limitations on liberties. They argue that the draft law aims to enhance state control over websites and establish a legal framework for blocking them while intimidating social media users. (Hassan, supra.) Fuad Abdelnaby, professor of constitutional law at Menoufia University, criticizes the draft law by stating that it contains loosely defined terms and vague content that make it easy to convict any person of “threatening national security,” “damaging family values,” or “affecting public morals” without giving a clear definition of these offenses. (Id.) Furthermore, Khaled al-Balshi, the former chief of the Freedoms Committee at the Press Syndicate said that the current regime believes social media poses a threat to its survival due to the absolute freedom social media provides. (Id.)

]]>Israel: Restrictions on Release of Terrorists’ Bodies and Funeralshttp://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-restrictions-on-release-of-terrorists-bodies-and-funerals/
Thu, 03 May 2018 16:30:15 +0000http://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/?post_type=glm_article&p=13876(May 3, 2018) On March 7, 2018, the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) passed an amendment to the Combatting Terrorism Law 5776-2016. The Amendment authorizes the District Commander of the Israel Police (DCIP) to issue restrictions on the release of bodies of terrorists who died in the course of perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate terrorist acts. It further provides the commander with the authority to impose restrictions on the processing of terrorists’ funerals. (Combatting Terrorism (Amendment No. 3) Law, 5778-2018 (Amendment Law), Knesset website (in Hebrew); Combatting Terrorism Law, 5776-2016, Knesset website (in Hebrew); legislative history, Knesset website (in Hebrew); up-to-date Hebrew text available in the Nevo legal database (by subscription). For an English summary of the original legislation, see Ruth Levush, Israel: New Comprehensive Counterterrorism Legislation Adopted, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (July 15, 2016).)

Restrictions Order Regarding Funeral Processions for Terrorists

Under the Amendment Law the DCIP is authorized to issue an order imposing conditions for the funeral of a terrorist “in order to protect public safety and security, including in order to prevent disturbances, incitement to terror or identification with a terrorist organization or an act of terror.” (Amendment Law adding § 70A(b) to the Law (all translations by author).)

The order may include conditions regarding the number of persons that may participate in the funeral and their identity, the funeral route and date, and objects that are forbidden to be used during the funeral. In special cases the order may also include instructions as to the burial place in consideration of the family wishes. (Id. adding § 70A(c).) The order may also require a deposit of a bond to guarantee the fulfillment of its conditions if in the opinion of the DCIP the funeral procession may harm public security or result in disturbances to public order, incitement to terrorism, identification with a terrorist organization, or an act of terrorism. (Id. adding § 70A(d).) The Amendment Law regulates procedures for materializing the bond, including the right of the funeral procession organizer to be heard in situations where the order’s conditions have been violated. (Id. adding § 70A(e)–(f).)

Order to Delay Release of Terrorist Body for Burial

The DCIP may order that the delivery of a terrorist’s body for a funeral be delayed if the DCIP has a reasonable suspicion that the funeral will result in a terrorist attack or harm human lives, or that it will facilitate “concealment of terrorism or identification with a terrorist organization or an act of terrorism,” and no other alternatives for addressing these dangers have been found. The funeral can be delayed until the conditions set in the order are met or until 10 days have elapsed from the date on which the order issued under this subsection is carried out, whichever is earlier. The General Commissioner may order the extension of the delay period until the conditions set in the order regarding the funeral procession are met. (Id. adding § 70B(a).)

Orders regarding conditions or the delay of terrorists’ funerals may be reviewed by the administrative court. (Id. adding § 71.) Violation of an order preventing particular activities or the use of a place for burial is punishable by two years of imprisonment. (Id. adding § 72.)

Iran’s anti-money laundering (AML) law (2008) and bylaw (2010) criminalized money laundering, established a ministerial coordination council and Financial Intelligence Unit, and instituted preventive measures for financial institutions and certain nonfinancial businesses and professions. Iran also adopted a law on combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) in 2016.

Since June 2016, Iran has established a cash declaration regime at its border and introduced draft amendments to its AML and CFT laws in Parliament to make those laws conform to international standards. (IMF Highlights Iran’s AML/CFT Progress, supra.) Other efforts by Iran to strengthen its AML/CFT framework include its ratification on January 24, 2018, of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), and the Central Bank of Iran’s (CBI’s) recent approval of several preventive measures to be implemented by financial institutions, including customer due diligence and collecting beneficial ownership information. (Iran Takes Initial Step to Join UNTOC, TEHRAN TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018); IMF Highlights Iran’s AML/CFT Progress, supra.) The government had pushed all these reform measures in an effort to have Iran removed from the FATF list of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories by the FATF’s deadline of January 31, 2018. (Affianian, supra.)

However, several items contained in the FATF Action Plan, including amendments to the current AML/CFT laws and a bill regarding Iran’s accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (currently being debated at the powerful Majlis (Parliament) National Security and Foreign Policy Commission), remained incomplete as of the deadline. (Maziar Motamedi, Iran Traces Political Motives in FATF Decision, FINANCIAL TRIBUNE (Feb. 24, 2018).)

Amendment of the Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism

Two Iranian parliamentary commissions are currently debating bills on reforming the country’s policies on money laundering and the financing of terrorism. (Affianian, supra.) The Parliament passed the Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism on March 17, 2016 (Islamic Parliament Research Center website (in Persian)), and the Cabinet approved some amendments to this Law for debate in Parliament on October 29, 2017. (Executive Bylaw of the Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Oct. 29, 2017, Laws and Regulations Portal of Iran (in Persian).)

The amended version of the Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism includes a provision requiring “all natural and legal entities, including non-governmental and charity organizations,” to register identifying information on their clients in their systems and refrain from providing services to those on sanction lists. (Iran Gov’t Notifies CFT Law, FINANCIAL TRIBUNE (Nov. 7, 2017).) In addition, these entities must assess the risk status of their clientele on the basis of “their background, occupation, income and asset sources, original birthplace and current place of residence, [and] services they wish to use,” among other criteria, and refuse to offer services to clients who cannot be screened through “reliable independent data sources.” (Id.) Furthermore, they are required to make increased efforts to identify risky clients on the basis of guidelines provided by the High Council of Anti-Money Laundering and fully identify account beneficiaries. (Id.)

The amended version of the Law also places restrictions on financial institutions, prohibiting them from “establishing correspondent ties with shell banks” and maintaining correspondent ties with banks that work with shell banks. (Id.) Lastly, the amendment directs the High Council of Anti-Money Laundering to institute measures to prevent nongovernmental and charity organizations from engaging in terrorist financing. (Id.)

IMF Recommendations

In its assessment, the IMF made recommendations to Iran aimed at further restoring confidence in the its financial system, improving Iran’s status with the FATF, and accelerating Iran’s reintegration into international financial and trade systems. The most critical recommendation is that Iran adopt and publish before the FATF’s June 2018 plenary meeting the comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework based on the FATF Action Plan agreed to by Iranian authorities. (IMF Highlights Iran’s AML/CFT Progress, supra.)

Other recommendations by the IMF include

conducting a National Risk Assessment on money laundering and terrorism financing to enhance authorities’ understanding of risks and development of appropriate policies;

the issuing by the CBI of guidance to financial institutions to improve compliance in identifying beneficial owners and domestic politically exposed persons (PEPs) and applying effective preventive measures;

developing mechanisms (such as a public registry for beneficial ownership) to ensure the transparency of and timely access to accurate and current information of all types of entities established in Iran;

improving the system of declaration of assets of senior public officials in line with international best practices;

establishing an autonomous anti-corruption agency with law enforcement powers to prioritize the pursuit, prosecution, and adjudication of corruption cases without outside interference; and

improved domestic coordination between between AML and anti-corruption frameworks. (Id.)

]]>Philippines/Indonesia: Agreement on Border Issueshttp://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/philippines-indonesia-agreement-on-border-issues/
Wed, 28 Feb 2018 20:30:07 +0000http://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/?post_type=glm_article&p=13542(Feb. 28, 2018) Following a meeting of high-ranking officials of the Philippines and Indonesia, it was announced on January 10, 2018, that the two countries had agreed to a number of measures aimed at increasing trade and curbing terrorism. (Lilian Mellejor,PH, Indonesia to Intensify Cross-Border Cooperation, PHILIPPINES NEWS AGENCY (PNA) (Jan. 10, 2018).)

At the January meeting, the Philippines and Indonesia reaffirmed their existing mutual understanding on border relations. They agreed to increase border-crossing stations, adopt measures aimed at improving safe passage of Indonesians and Filipinos between both countries, and develop recommendations to enhance cross-border cooperation and maritime defense. (Id.)

]]>France: Government Announces National Plan to Prevent Radicalizationhttp://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-government-announces-national-plan-to-prevent-radicalization/
Mon, 26 Feb 2018 14:30:33 +0000http://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/?post_type=glm_article&p=13519(Feb. 26, 2018) In a speech given on February 23, 2018, the French Prime Minister, Edouard Philippe, announced a national plan against Islamic radicalization. (Edouard Philippe, Prime Minister of France, Address before the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (CIPDR): Présentation du Plan national de prévention de la radicalisation [Presentation of the National Plan to Prevent Radicalization] (Feb. 23, 2018) (video and transcript), Gouvernement.fr website.) The plan consists of sixty measures to better identify potential Islamic radicals and intervene before they turn against French republican principles. (Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, Le gouvernement lance un plan tous azimuts de prévention de la radicalisation [The Government Launches an Across-the-Board Plan to Prevent Radicalization], LE MONDE (Feb. 23, 2018).) The main proposed measures include

improving the detection and segregation of radicalized inmates in French prisons,

providing improved psychological counseling for and monitoring of young French minors returning from Syria and Iraq,

removing government agents (especially members of law enforcement and the military) who have been radicalized,

improving the monitoring of religiously affiliated schools,

working with mental health professionals to find better ways to detect and deal with radicalized individuals,

working with social network providers to ensure the removal of illicit content within an hour of posting,

developing educational tools to fight against conspiracy theories on the internet, and

creating a scientific committee to better understand the phenomenon of radicalization and find ways to more efficiently counter it.

This plan fulfills a promise that was made in September 2017 by President Emmanuel Macron. (Jacquin, supra.) It is also part of an ongoing effort by the French government since at least 2014 to fight terrorism and radicalization. (Chichizola, supra.) Countering radicalization is viewed as a priority in France, which has seen several high-profile terrorist attacks over the last few years, and where close to 20,000 individuals have been flagged by the authorities as potentially radicalized. (Jacquin, supra.)

]]>Saudi Arabia: Twin Brothers Charged with Islamic Crime of Hirabahttp://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/saudi-arabia-twin-brothers-charged-with-islamic-crime-of-hiraba/
Fri, 09 Feb 2018 20:30:32 +0000http://loc.gov/law/foreign-news/?post_type=glm_article&p=13492(Feb. 9, 2018) On January 16, 2018, the Criminal Court of Riyadh began the trial of twin brothers accused of killing their 67-year old mother; attempting to kill their 73-year-old father and twenty-two year old brother; and accusing the rulers, police, and Muslim scholars of apostasy. (Saudi Arabia: Twins on Trial in Al-Hamra District Case in Riyadh, ASSAKINA (Jan. 16, 2018) (in Arabic); Sami Aboudi, Killing of Mother in Saudi Arabic Sparks Debate About Islamic Scholar, REUTERS (July 5, 2016).) The brothers, who were twenty years old when they committed their crimes, were arrested on June 24, 2016, by Saudi security forces while they were trying to flee across the border to Yemen. (Saudi Arabia: Twins on Trial in Al-Hamra District Case in Riyadh, supra; Killing of Mother in Saudi Arabic Sparks Debate About Islamic Scholar, supra.) The prosecution has called for the brothers to be sentenced to death. (Saudi Prosecution Tries Twin Brothers Who Beheaded Their Mother, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Jan. 17, 2018) (in English).)

The public prosecutor is seeking to convict both defendants of the crime of hiraba, as described in verse 33 of Surat al-Maida of the Holy Koran. (Saudi Arabia: Twins on Trial in Al-Hamra District Case in Riyadh, supra.) Verse 33 of Surat al-Maida reads as follows:

It is but a just recompense for those who make war on God and His apostle, and endeavour to spread corruption on earth, that they are being slain in great numbers, or crucified in great numbers, or have, in result of their perverseness, their hands and feet cut off in great numbers, or are being [entirely] banished from [the face of] the earth: such is their ignominy in this world. But in the life to come [yet more] awesome suffering awaits them. (The Message of the Quran, translated and explained by Muhammad Asad, Arthur’s Classic Novels website (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).)

The crime of hiraba or qat‘ al-sabil (brigandage, highway robbery) is one of a handful of crimes known in Islamic law as hudud—that is, crimes whose punishment is prescribed by God. (Mohammad H. Fadel, Hiraba, or Brigandage, WORLD HISTORY (June 13, 2015).) Saudi Arabia is probably the only country that enforces the classical uncodified Islamic law of crimes. (Caryle Murphy, Saudi to Codify Sharia “for Clarity,” NATIONAL (July 21, 2010).)

Some media reports have stated that the twin brothers committed their crimes on the basis of instructions they received from the terrorist organization known as Daesh (ISIS) and that the mother had objected to her sons joining Islamic State jihadists in Syria. (“Specialized Criminal Court” Begins Trial of Twin Brothers Who Killed Their Mother, OKAZ (Dec. 31, 2017) (in Arabic); Killing of Mother in Saudi Arabic Sparks Debate About Islamic Scholar, supra.)

Despite the fact that in court “the first defendant commented that he and his twin brother had not intended to commit the crime” and “denied having any association with terrorist organizations,” the General Secretariat of the Council of Senior Scholars, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious body, attributes the brothers’ crimes to the takfiri (extremist) ideology spreading in society and blames ISIS for relentlessly working “to hold the nation’s youth as hostage to its extremist thought.” (Saudi Prosecution Tries Twin Brothers Who Beheaded Their Mother, supra.) Saudi clerics have warned that the goal of ISIS is to put youth on “a path paved with violence, death, murder and terrorism and away from the teachings of Prophet Mohammed.” (Id.)