Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Window on Eurasia: For Ordinary Russians, Moscow’s Use of Regular Army in Ukraine Crosses a Rubicon, Mitrokhin Says

Paul
Goble

Staunton, August 27 – While Russia’s
involvement in the fighting in southeastern Ukraine has been obvious for a long
time, Moscow’s decision to send regular military units and even more the loss
of life of soldiers who were only following orders is transforming the conflict
there for ordinary Russians, according to Nikolay Mitrokhin.

Moscow took this step, the Russian
commentator says, because the pro-Russian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk were in
danger of losing and because Vladimir Putin needed to save face and improve his
chances in negotiations by keeping his “Novorossiya” project going at least
while talks are going on (grani.ru/opinion/mitrokhin/m.232396.html).

But in many ways, this step
represents a crossing of the Rubicon for Russians because it means that those
going to fight and die in Ukraine are not doing so for ideological or financial
reasons as has been the case up to now but rather because they have been
ordered to do so by Russian officers.

However the situation develops in
that regard, Mitrokhin’s article provides a remarkable survey of changes in the
composition of the pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine, a survey that shows why
Russians could be enthusiastic about what was going on because for most of them
there was until now no risk that they or their family members would have to
participate.

In his Grani.ru essay today,
Mitrokhin says that the dispatch of regular Russian troops to Ukraine
highlights something many Russians have been reluctant to acknowledge: “the
project of forming separatist ‘republics’ in the Donbass will fail without the constant
introduction of new forces and fresh blood from Russia.”

The commentator points out that the
armed conflict in the Donbas has already “passed through several stages” as far as the composition of the forces fighting on the
pro-Russian side is concerned.

In the first, which
lasted from April 12 to April 20, there were several groups: “petty criminal
groups” which hoped to avoid punishment by the Ukrainian authorities, Russian
spetsnaz, GRU and FSB officers, ideologically committed Russian nationalists
who had earlier served in various wars and in the occupation of Crimea, and “the
group least significant militarily but most significant politically” a small
number of local people.

In the second
when began from the middle of May and lasted into the summer, Mitrokhin says, the
military needs of the pro-Russian forces changed because the Ukrainian army
recovered its military capacity and was overwhelming the ability of the Donetsk
and Luhansk “republics” to oppose its advance.

To help these
entities survive, Moscow organized “channels for the identification,
recruitment and transfer of potential fighters for ‘the Russian world,’”
primarily by means of attracting to the colors Russian veterans of the Chechen,
Georgian and Afghan wars “who were in financially or morally difficult straits.”

Joining them
were “politicized ‘volunteers,’” and together these two groups, who came
primarily between May and July, were able to slow the advance of the Ukrainian
army.But as this flow dried up – summer
vacations and the failure of the “republic” leaders to pay them on time had an
impact -- and as the Ukrainian army gained the initiative, the situation became
dire.

By early
August, both Donetsk and Luhansk were at risk of falling, and that forced
Moscow to act. On August 7, “the situation changed in essential ways,”
Mitrokhin says. The Muscovites who had headed the two “republics” were
dismissed and replaced by locals, even as the Russian military expanded its
actions in the region.

Indeed, only “the
participation of Russian military personnel” is the only way for “continuing
the war and preserving any territory” under the control of the so-called “republics.”
Russia could of course “at the cost of thousands of lives of its own citizens”
even with the war but that level of involvement would spark more serious
sanctions from the West.

Moreover, Mitrokhin says, Western reaction could put the
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad “under threat of transportation isolation,”
something which could have a major impact given that in that region “there
exist separatist attitudes” which might be the basis for a new challenge to
Moscow’s control.

“It is not excluded,” he continues, “that Russian forces
are now fulfilling a different task,” that of an ambulance brigade sent to
prevent the Donetsk and Luhansk regimes from failing any time soon, to “preserve
Putin’s face,” and “to prolong the existence of these ‘republics’ at a minimum
until the end of talks” and thus allow Moscow to pull out men and materiel from
the region.

But
whatever happens next, one thing is clear, Mitrokhin says. “The Donbas has
finally been transformed into the latest field of responsibility of the [Russian]
ministry of defense” – or at least that is what “military bureaucrats” are
calling it when they explain to soldiers’ mothers why their sons are “disappearing.”