Eliminating ongoing grievances, expanding space for Malay cultural identity, improving quality of education and increasing employment, increasing local ownership and engaging community-based and civil society organisations as well as increasing diplomatic support, are key elements to end the violence and bring about the much needed national reconciliation in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.

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Given that much of the violence is attributed to insurgent groups that are politically motivated to see the former region of Patani rise up and acquire independence, it is odd that there is no mention in this article of any kind of political solution to “end the violence.”

Expanding the quality of education and improving job opportunities may reduce the tendency for under-educated and out-of-work young men to be prone to insurgents’ recruitment efforts. But keep in mind that even many university-educated people who are not involved with insurgent groups still support independence.

To be sure, some of these folks that I know realize that independence is nothing but a pipedream. As a result, some of these people support some form of autonomy.

Still, the point is that though these educated folks have good jobs and are not involved with violence, it doesn’t mean that they don’t have strong Patani Malay Muslim nationalist sentiment. In other words, improving the quality of education will not get rid of this sentiment.

In fact, the expansion of the private Islamic school system may have effectively accentuated Malay Muslim cultural identity. Older Thai Buddhists talk about this all the time, claiming that a few decades ago Thais and ethnic Malays studied together at state schools. Now, they say, there is more social distance between the two ethno-religious groups as a result of the option for Muslims to study secular education at private Islamic schools. Let’s also keep in mind that at these private Islamic schools (or many of these schools, or with some teachers at these schools) children are taught the Patani Malay Muslim nationalist narrative.

Of course, the option for the government back in the 1960s — which was when it began to transform traditional Islamic pondok schools into private Islamic schools that used Thai as a medium of instruction — would have been to try and eliminate Islamic education all together. That of course would have had disastrous consequences, resulting in widespread violence. Still, the compromise between Malay Islamic education and Thai state-led secular education was instrumental in the formation of PULO, and even more so in the case of BRN.

Improving education is important, but what also is absolutely necessary is some kind of “accurate” teachings of history. Thais are taught that this region had always been a part of “Siam.” On the other hand, ethnic Malays are taught that this region was independent and a part of Malaysia. Neither group is taught that the Kingdom of Patani long had not only tributary status with Ayuthaya and Bangkok but also with stronger Malay states to the south. Both are taught exaggerations of the “truth.” It thus may be important for young intellectuals (both Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim) to try and learn more about history from less-biased sources. Hopefully someday both Thais and ethnic Malays are taught versions of history that are not so biased and not meant to produce Patani Malay Muslim nationalism or Thai nationalism.

Moreover, all this talk of giving respect to cultural identity may amount to nothing more than what Pierre Bourdieu referred to as a “politics of condescension.” For instance, a Thai official may make some effort to speak a bit of the local Malay (and this does happen), but at the end of the day the official, legitimate language is Thai. Unless the region is separated and forms an independent country, the local Malay will forever be marginal in relation to Thai. Yes, an effort by Thai Buddhists to speak some Malay will be appreciated by many Malay Muslims, but deep in the hearts of many people there still may be strong resentment that their language is not official.

Speaking of the issue of language, when Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya was down in the south in August 2009 with representatives from the OIC, he said “If it were up to me, I would make Yawi an official language.”

Kasit may have had good intentions, but his absolute cluelessness about the meaning of “Yawi” is deeply disturbing. Calling the local language “Yawi” is in itself not only inaccurate, but it is also offensive to some Malay Muslims. “Jawi” is standard Malay with the Arabic script. Yawi is just the word Thai Buddhists have long used to refer to the local Malay language. Thai officials need to start calling the language Malayu, Malayu tin, or Malayu Patani. Otherwise they will continue to show disrespect towards the identity of ethnic Malays.

Moreover, Kasit clearly had no idea that there is no written form of the local Malay. I mean, how can a language be “official” if it has no written form?

One thing I’ve found very interesting is that over the past 6 years that I have spent time in the far south, more and more Buddhists – as well as Malay Muslims — seem to call the local Malay “pasa Malayu.” When I was first here I only heard folks call it “pasa Yawi” or “pasa Islam.” Occasionally I would even hear people refer to it as the much more offensive “pasa Khaek.” Recently I have even heard Buddhists in Bangkok refer to the people in the far south as “Malayu.” This is progress.

(One quick point: I have been to hospitals and can confirm that Malay is sometimes used with patients.)

But will more culturally sensitive policies end the violence? Three insurgents who had confessed to their involvement with BRN-C told me that the group’s goal is to acquire independence. When I asked them if autonomy, decentralization, or Chavilit’s proposal would appease insurgent leaders, 2 of the 3 said no.

Thai governments have over the years made limited concessions to the Patani Malay Muslim nationalist movements, but there will be no political concessions under this current government. Maybe once the storm clears in Bangkok a new government may consider some kind of political reforms. That may reduce the violence and co-opt some “separatists.” But keep in mind that previous governments co-opted a previous generation of separatists and implemented more culturally sensitive policies. I recall reading comparative work on separatist movements in southern Thailand and in the southern Philippines before this current wave of violence. The literature asserted that Thai government efforts to address long-standing grievances effectively marginalized support for separatist groups. A couple years after reading these articles, violence reached unprecedented levels.

Unless the government grants full-fledged independence, violence will likely someday resurface no matter what kinds of policies it enacts. But independence of course won’t happen.

And much to the frustration of many Malay Muslims, many other Malay Muslims do not want independence or even some form of autonomy. That said, based on my observations and experiences, they definitely would appreciate more culturally sensitive policies, a better educational system, and the creation of more job opportunities.