Solomon Island Campaign

First Island taken was Tulagi, where 1st Lt Myles Crosby
Fox was was one of the 38 Marines from the 1st Marine Raider Battallion that
were Killed in Action. The following day, the Japanese Navy caught the
Allied Navies by surprise and sank several ships, sending over 1,200 sailors to
their watery graves.

Official
Account of the Battle of Tulagi:

(a long read, but
interesting; highlighted area is enemy action that caused his death.)

Chapter 3: Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo Tulagi: The First
Day After Task Group Yoke separated from the larger body of ships at 0240 on
D-Day, its approach to Tulagi was accomplished without incident. All elements of
the group arrived in position at about 0630[1] and made ready for the landing.
As the ships approached the transport area, 15 fighters and 15 dive bombers from
Wasp strafed and bombed the target area,[2] setting fire to seaplanes that were
caught in the harbor.[3] Five-inch naval gunfire from the destroyer Monssen,
opened up at a promontory of Florida Island, west of Tulagi, and 60 rounds were
expended on the target between 0727 and 0732.

In the meantime, both the Buchanan
and San Juan (an antiaircraft cruiser) pumped 100 rounds each into nearby
targets. Buchanan concentrated on a point of land east of Haleta, on Florida,
while the San Juan blasted a small island south of the same point of land.[4] At
0740, 20 minutes before H-hour, Company B (reinforced) of the 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines, under command of Captain Edward J. Crane, landed on Florida near Haleta
to protect the left flank of the Tulagi Force. The landing was unopposed,
although enemy troops had been reported in position there on 25 July.[5] Crane,
his company reinforced by the 4th platoon of Company D and 21 men from
Headquarters Company, reached his objective within 40 minutes.

The 252 officers
and men went ashore in eight landing boats and were guided to their objective by
one of the several Australians on duty with the division.[6] While this covering
force deployed inland from its Florida beach, the remainder of the 1st
Battalion, 2d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Hill) made a similar
security landing at Florida's Halavo Peninsula near Gavutu and Tanambogo. The
craft drew some fire from Gavutu but there were no casualties, and no enemy
forces were encountered on the peninsula. These Marines later returned to their
ships. At Tulagi not a single landing craft of the first wave was able to set
its passengers directly ashore. All of them hung up on coral formations at
distances varying from 30 to well over 100 yards from the beach line, and the
assault personnel of raider Companies, B and D waded ashore against no
opposition, through water initially from waist to armpit deep.[7] Map 15:
Landings in Tulagi Area, 7 August 1942 Meanwhile the enemy defense forces,
concentrated in the southeastern third of the island, realized that an all-out
assault was underway.

Between 0725 and 0749, the Tulagi Communication Base
notified the Commanding Officer of the Twenty-Fifth Air Flotilla at Rabaul that
Tulagi was under bombardment, that the landings had begun, and that the senders
were destroying all equipment immediately. At 0800 the Japanese messages said
shells were falling near the radio installation. Ten minutes later, the final
message went out: "Enemy troop strength is overwhelming. We will defend to
the last man."[8] Companies B and D had reached the beach, and the landing
craft carrying raider Companies A and C now began to hang upon the coral.

The
Weapons Company (Captain George W. Herring) of the raider battalion, whose 60mm
mortars had been attached to the assault companies,[9] headed ashore to assume
responsibility for beachhead security. Assaulting Marines crossed the beach and
moved up the face of a steep, heavily wooded coral slope, the southwestern
portion of the 350-foot ridge that forms an almost unbroken wall along the
island's entire length.

Major Lloyd Nickerson's Company B pushed on to the far
coast of the island where it captured, without opposition, the native village of
Assapi. This company then swung to the right and, trying in with Major Justice
Chambers' Company D which had gained the high ground, began moving southeast.
The advance of these two companies was steady and without opposition until
Company B reached Carpenter's Wharf, halfway down the east shore of the island,
where it encountered a series of enemy outposts.

Meanwhile additional raiders
had landed. Captain Lewis W. Walt's Company A, landing to follow the leading
companies, swung right atop the ridge spine, and tied in on the left with
Company D. Major Kenneth Bailey's Company C also swung right, tied its left
flank to Company A, and echeloned itself to the right rear to the beach.

Spread
out across the island, the raiders swept southeast against little opposition
until Phase Line A, from the high ground northwest of Hill 281 to Carpenter's
Wharf, was reached at 1120. Here Major Chambers was wounded by mortar fire, and
Captain William E. Sperling assumed command of Company D. By this time Colonel
Edson, commanding the 1st Raider Battalion, was ashore and ready to begin a
coordinated attack to the southeast. Confronting him was the more thickly
settled portion of the island where the British governmental activities had
centered. This area is a saddle between the ridge first swept by the raiders and
a smaller hill mass at the island's southeastern end.[10] After directing a
preparatory fire of infantry weapons into the area to their front, the raiders
moved out toward the high ground beyond the saddle.

Company C, on the right
flank of the attack, drew fire almost immediately from Hill 208, a knob forward
of the ridge that had just been cleared. The bulk of the Japanese resistance
concentrated in the seaward face of the high ground, and Company C was caught by
fire from enemy infantry weapons as it tried to pass between the hill and the
beach. The raider company then turned its attack toward the hill and fought for
nearly an hour before the Japanese positions were silenced.

Radio communications
between Edson and General Rupertus deteriorated rapidly after this attack was
launched, but the raider commander remained in contact with his fire support
ships. Operation orders called for the various fire support sections to provide
the landing force with naval gunfire liaison parties, and two of these were in
Edson's CP with their radios.[11] When the other raider companies came under
fire from Hill 281 while Company C fought against Hill 208, Edson put these
naval gunfire teams to work.

The San Juan fired a seven-minute, 280-round
concentration of 6-inch shells onto Hill 281. When it lifted the raiders
advanced with a steady pressure against the enemy. Four hours later, at 1625,
Edson notified Rupertus that 500 enemy had broken contact with his force and had
withdrawn into the southeastern ridge. The advance continued slowly until dusk.
At that time Company E (raiders), relieved of the beach defense mission by 2/5
which had landed at 0916, reported to its parent organization. Company D, now on
the extreme left flank, had met little opposition since midmorning, when the
first enemy encountered were flushed near Carpenter's Wharf by Company B. After
this contact Company D pushed south along the eastern beach and at dusk reached
the crest of Hill 281. Meanwhile Company B moved up again, now on the right of
Company D, and gained high ground overlooking the cut of a cross-island roadway
through the saddle between Hills 281 and 230. Company D, on the far side of the
road and to the left of B, took up night defensive positions with its right
flank resting on the southern brink of the cut. Company B, augmented by elements
of Headquarters Company, rested it left flank on the cut and extended its lines
generally westward along the brink.[12] Both companies put listening posts
forward of the lines.

Companies A and C (less one platoon) meanwhile encountered
the terrain feature which harbored the island's most serious resistance. In the
forward slope of Hill 281, a deep ravine lay almost parallel to the raider
advance and debouched several hundred yards southeast of Hill 208. Its sides
were precipitous, and within it the enemy held strong positions which made
assault hazardous. Maps which had been captured and translated during the day
confirmed that this ravine would contain the core of enemy resistance. With
further action against the pocket impossible at the time, all battalion elements
went into position for the night.

Company E was placed on Company B's right,
while Companies A and C (less one platoon) respectively tied in from the right
of Company E. The positions extended along high ground facing the ravine's long
axis, and listening posts were established.[13] During Edson's sweep down the
island, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rosecrans), had landed 1,085 officers and
men and committed its units to various tasks. Company F scouted the northwest
section of the island but met no opposition. At 1000 Company E was ordered to
operate generally in support of Company B (Raiders), and one hour later the 3d
Platoon of Company H (weapons) went forward to assist Company C (raiders) in the
latter's attack against Hill 208. By 1300, when the raider battalion began its
attack from Phase Line A, Company G moved down the trail along the ridge line
and supported the raider battalion. Rosecrans' command post later displaced
southeast from near Beach Blue toward the scene of this action.

Tulagi--The
First Night and Succeeding Day The first night on Tulagi set the pattern for
many future nights in the Pacific war. During
darkness, four separate attacks struck the raider lines, and, although minor
penetrations occurred, the enemy made no attempt to consolidate or exploit his
gains. The first attack, which met with some initial success, hit between
Companies C and A. Outposts fell back to the main line of resistance (MLR), and
the two companies were forced apart. The attack isolated Company C from the rest
of the battalion, but the company was not molested again. Company A refused its
right flank and awaited developments. They were not long in coming. Shifting the
direction of his attack toward his right front, the enemy attempted to roll back
Walt's men from the refused flank. But the flank held, killing 26 Japanese
within 20 yards of the MLR. That ended the concerted attacks of the night.
Thereafter, enemy efforts consisted entirely of attempts at quiet infiltration
of the Marine positions. Individuals and small groups worked from the ravine
through the raider lines and launched five separate small-scale attacks against
the command post between 0030 and 0530. These were repulsed, and efforts of the
part of two other enemy groups to skirt the beach flanks of Companies D and C
likewise were turned back.

On the morning of 8 August, two companies of
the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved up to assist in the sweep of the
southeastern part of the island. Companies E and F, 5th Marines, passed through
Company D raiders, attacked down the forward slope of Hill 281, and swung right
toward the enemy pocket in the ravine. Now flanking this troublesome terrain
feature on three sides, Marines laid down a heavy mortar concentration from the
60mm weapons of the raiders and 2/5's 81s.

By midafternoon the preparation was
complete, and at 1500 the raiders and Company G, 5th marines, pushed through the
ravine to wipe out remaining resistance. This ended organized opposition on the
island, and by nightfall of 8 August Tulagi was labeled secure. For several
days, however, individual Japanese and small groups continued to be flushed from
hiding places and hunted down by patrolling Marines.

The Landings on
Gavutu-Tanambogo: These islets, each dominated by a low, precipitous central hill
of coral, are joined by a 500-yard causeway. Gavutu's hill, 148 feet in height,
stands some 25 to 30 feet higher than Tanambogo's highest point, and Gavutu thus
became the main objective of the landing which aimed at the higher ground. The
plans[14] called for the landing to strike the northeast coast after an approach
from the east, and since Tanambogo lies approximately northwest of Gavutu the
assault force faced the possibility of flanking fire from that island as well as
frontal resistance from the main objective.

Opposition from both islands was
expected from the terrain dominating the flat beach. Naval gunfire and close air
support by SBDs from the Wasp were expected to neutralize most enemy
emplacements on these hills, but the fire plan did not reckon with the coral
cave. Caves of this type began to appear as serious obstacles for the parachute
battalion of Gavutu at about the same time the raiders began to encounter them
on Tulagi.

Surprise was impossible. There were not sufficient craft for
simultaneous landings, and the hour of assault was established in General
Vandegrift's Operation Order Number 7-42 as H-plus four hours. So four hours
after the raider landing on Tulagi, the parachute battalion made its frontal
assault in the face of fire from an alerted garrison which was supported by
fires from a flanking position. The battalion went ashore in three waves, one
company per wave.

The thoroughness with which the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan
had carried out her fire support mission--280 rounds of 6-inch fire against
Gavutu in four minutes[15]--and the intensity of the Wasp's dive-bombers'
preparation caused heavy damage to the enemy installations, but this destruction
actually worked to the disadvantage of the parachute battalion in one instance.
The unit intended to land on a seaplane ramp from which the beach could be
easily reached, but the ramp had been reduced to an unusable mass of rubble.

Observing this, the landing wave commanders altered course slightly to the north
where craft became even more vulnerable to flanking fire. Part of the troops,
scrambling over a concrete pier that jutted four feet out of the water, were
exposed to fire from both islands. General Vandegrift estimated that troops
landing in this area suffered ten per cent casualties. Company A, the first
wave, got ashore without casualties to work inland against no serious
opposition.

The four boats carrying Company B and the final wave, with Company C
and miscellaneous attachments, came under fire as they neared the island. The
landing succeeded, however, and Company B, moving left and working toward
Gavutu's southern end, gained some protection from enemy fire and continued to
attack. Pinned down on the beach under heavy fire, the other companies made no
advances until Company B gained high ground from which its fire assisted in
getting the attack off the beach. Hill 148, Gavutu's high ground, was plastered
by naval guns and assaulted on the east and southeast.

By 1430, Major Charles A.
Miller, who had succeeded the wounded Major Robert H. Williams in command,
controlled most of the island. Partially defiladed positions on Hill 148's
west-southwestern slopes, however, still were active, and enemy emplacements
there and on Tanambogo threatened further advance. Miller requested
reinforcements to complete the capture of both islands. In anticipation of their
arrival, Miller also requested an air strike and naval gunfire on Tanambogo, and
Wasp planes furnished a 10-minute strike while Buchanan and Monssen, in position
south of Gavutu, fired over that island and subjected the exposed faces of the
hill on Tanambogo to an intense concentration of 5-inch shells.

By this time all
forces available to General Rupertus had been committed, but since Captain
Edward Crane's Company B (1/2) had met no opposition on Florida near Tulagi,
this unit was ordered to report to Miller. The message reached the company just
as landing craft arrived to withdraw the Marines from their Florida beach.[16]
Embarked in six landing craft, the company arrived at Gavutu at about 1800, and
Miller directed Crane to land on Tanambogo and seize that island.

Told that only
a few snipers held the island, Crane guided his overcrowded craft around the
east shore of Tanambogo according to directions provided by Flight Lieutenant
Spencer, RAAF, and under cover of darkness attempted a landing on a small pier
on the northeastern tip of the island. (One boat, containing the 2d Platoon,
hung up on a coral reef at Gavutu and took no part in the Tanambogo assault.)
The first boat landed without incident, and the men deployed along the beach;
but as the second boat discharged its men, a shell from one of the fire support
ships ignited a nearby fuel dump, and the resulting glare lighted the landing
area and exposed the Marines.

The enemy opened up immediately, taking all boats
under rifle and machine-gun fire. Casualties mounted among the Marines ashore
and still afloat, but the boat crews, being exposed, suffered most heavily. One
crew was completely wiped out and a Marine assumed control of the craft. The
reinforcing machine-gun platoon (4th Platoon, Company D) in the second boat
managed to set up two of its weapons on the pier, but intense enemy fire forced
a withdrawal. In the meantime, Crane and about 30 men had gone ashore. The
intensity of resistance, however, made withdrawal inevitable, and Crane
succeeded in re-embarking all wounded and all but 12 of the able survivors. The
boats withdrew, some to Gavutu where they reported the event, and others direct
to ships where the wounded were put aboard.

Two of the men left ashore managed
to return to Gavutu at about 2200 in a rowboat, while Crane and Lieutenant John
J. Smith, leader of the 2d Platoon, and the remainder of the dozen men made
their way around the beach and over the causeway to arrive at Miller's Gavutu
command post about midnight. At 2200, having been informed of the abortive
attack on Tanambogo, General Rupertus requested the release of an additional
combat team. This request reached Vandegrift during his conference with Admiral
Turner on board the USS McCawley, and Vandegrift, Turner concurring, released
the remaining two battalions of the Division Reserve.

At 0330, 8 August, the USS
President Hayes and President Adams, with the 1st and 3d Battalions, 2d Marines
(reinforced) embarked, were ordered to cross from the transport area off
Guadalcanal's Beach Red to the Tulagi transport area. Simultaneously battalion
commanders received orders to land their troops at Beach Blue on Tulagi and
report to General Rupertus.[17] Upon arrival at the transport area off Beach
Blue at 0730, the 3d Battalion was directed to pass to Gavutu, reinforce the
troops engaged there, and seize Tanambogo. Orders for the 1st Battalion were
canceled and this unit did not land.

The 3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel
Robert G. Hunt, landed on Gavutu in a succession of boat waves, with companies
in the following order: Company L, with 5th Platoon, Company M attached, at
1000; Company K, with 4th Platoon, Company M attached, at 1025; Company I, with
3d Platoon, Company M attached, at 1050; Company M, less 3d, 4th, and 5th
Platoons, with Headquarters Company, at 1120. Troops deployed initially to
eliminate Gavutu opposition and to take Tanambogo under fire. Company L, for
example, assumed positions generally around the base of Hill 148 facing
Tanambogo, while Company K moved up the hill to relieve parachute battalion
elements in positions there.

At 1330 Company K had just accomplished its mission
when as SBD pilot dropped a bomb within company positions on the northwest nose
of the hill. Three men were killed and nine wounded. Eight of the casualties
were men of the supporting platoon of Company M. At 1225, Captain W.B. Tinsley,
commanding Company I, was ordered to prepare for a landing on Tanambogo. He
would have the support of two tanks from Company C of the 2d Tank Battalion (one
of the reinforcing units of the 2d Marines), and his attack would be preceded by
a 10-minute naval gunfire preparation by the Buchanan. The company would not be
accompanied by its supporting machine-gun platoon, which was to stay in position
on Gavutu, and lay down supporting fires from there.

At 1315 the tanks landed on
Gavutu. Lieutenant E.J. Sweeney, commanding them, was ordered to land at 1615 on
Tanambogo, using one tank to cover the south side of the hill on that island and
the other to cover the eastern slope. The naval gunfire preparation began at
1600. Twenty minutes later the assault company, following the tanks, made its
landing. Lieutenant Sweeney was killed, but his tank rendered valuable support
to the riflemen.

The other tank, getting too far ahead of the assault troops, was
disabled by an iron bar and set afire by oil-soaked rags employed by Japanese
riflemen. The entire enemy group was wiped out; 42 bodies were piled up around
the disabled tank. At 1620 Company I landed and formed two attack groups. One
worked up the southern slope of the Tanambogo hill while the other, moving to
the right and then inland, attacked up the eastern slope. Japanese fought
fiercely from caves and dugouts, and the eastern group drew fire from a few
enemy riflemen and machine gunners on Gaomi, a tiny islet a few hundred yards
east of Tanambogo.

Naval gunfire from USS Gridley was directed upon Gaomi at
1700 and positions on the small island were silenced. At this time the 1st
platoon of Company K attacked across the causeway from Gavutu, secured the
Tanambogo end of the causeway, and took up positions for the night. By 2100, the
southeastern two-thirds of the island had been secured, and at 2300 a light
machine-gun platoon from Company M reported to Company I for support against
enemy counterattacks. Considerable close-ion fighting took place during the
night between the Marines and Japanese who sallied from foxholes and dugouts. No
change in position occurred, however, and by late the next day continued attacks
had secured the island. While Gavutu and Tanambogo were mopped up, the 1st and
2d Battalions, 2d Marines unloaded at Tulagi.

The 1st Battalion, unengaged since
its 7 August landing on Florida, went ashore at Beach Blue at 0900 on 9 August.
The 2d Battalion (Major Orin K. Pressley) followed an hour later. Here, as at
Guadalcanal, the amphibian tractor emerged as a versatile piece of equipment
whose importance and utility could hardly be overestimated. From noon of 8
August throughout the following night, five of these vehicles of the 3d Platoon,
Company A, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (one of the reinforcing elements of
the 2d Marines) operated between Gavutu and the President Adams. They carried
water, supplies, ammunition, and personnel to shore and evacuated wounded on the
return trips. On one occasion a tractor moved some distance inland to attack a
Japanese position that had pinned down and wounded a number of Marines. Using
their two machine guns, one .30 and one .50 caliber, the tractor's crew
neutralized the enemy fire and then evacuated the wounded Marines.[18] The five
tractors of the platoon were taken back on board the Adams before sundown on 9
August.

With the fall of Tanambogo, the last effective resistance in the Ngella
island group ceased. Subsequent operations consisted of mopping up,
consolidating defenses, and occupying several small peripheral islands including
Makambo, Mbangai, Kokomtambu, and Songonangona.[19] The mission of clearing out
these small islands fell to various units of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines.
Makambo was taken by Company E, Mbangai by Company F, and Kokomtambu and
Songonangona, by Company G. Occupation of all these smaller islands was
completed during the morning of 9 August. In all cases, opposition was slight.

Occupation of the entire island group and destruction of the Japanese garrison
had been accomplished in three days. The few prisoners taken were questioned and
sent to rear areas. Most of them finally were placed in a prisoner of war camp
near Featherstone, New Zealand. Comparatively, the American losses were not
excessive. An early report by Rupertus to the effect that the parachute
battalion had suffered 50-60 per cent casualties can only be explained in terms
of inadequate communications between him and his troops ashore.

The exact number
of Japanese casualties will never be known. An estimated 750-800 enemy were
present in the Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo area at the time of the landings.
Twenty-three prisoners were taken, and an intelligence summary gives 70 as the
approximate number of survivors who escaped to Florida. Immediately after
organized resistance ceased and the isolated defending groups were rounded up or
wiped out, Tulagi and its satellite islands were organized for defense against
counterattack.

The 1st Parachute Battalion, depleted by its experience on Gavutu,
moved from that island at 1700 on 9 August to Tulagi where it went into position
in the Government building area. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines occupied the
southeastern sector of the island, while two battalions of the 2d Marines took
over the defensive mission in the northwest. The 1st Battalion occupied the
extreme end of the island while the 2d Battalion established positions at Sasapi.
Third Battalion, 2d Marines, took over the occupation and defense of Gavutu,
Tanambogo, and Makambo.[20]

The logistic problem on Tulagi was a miniature of
that encountered on Guadalcanal. Although certain details were peculiar to
Tulagi. The beachhead, for instance, was severely restricted by the abrupt
ridge, and there were no roads. Only after noon of the second day was it
possible to move supplies ashore at the piers on the eastern coast.

Both Gavutu
and Tanambogo were so small that only ammunition and water were landed until the
islands were secured. Naval gunfire on this side of the Solomon Islands
operation had more of a work-out than it had received across the channel at
Guadalcanal where opposition was at first light, but it was not an unqualified
success. As a matter of fact it was "very poor," according to naval
headquarters in Washington.[21] But this failing was caused mostly by lack of
intelligence and time for planning and coordinated training. Improper ordnance
made for another failing. Only armor-piercing shells could have blasted the
Japanese from their caves, but the ships repeatedly fired high-capacity
bombardment projectiles.

Although many naval officers were still of the opinion
that a ship was a "fool to fight a fort," some began to agree with the
Marine Corps that naval gunfire properly employed could be a big help in an
amphibious assault. It was a case of the gunfire ships needing to move in closer
for their fire missions. The commander of one ship reported: It was observed
that the enemy had not been driven from the beach at Gavutu by the shelling and
bombing preceding the landing. Furthermore Tanambogo withstood two days of
intermittent bombing and strafing and was not taken until a destroyer closed in
to point blank range and shelled it for several minutes. It was evident that
this fire was necessary to insure the capture of Tanambogo without further heavy
casualties.[22] Taking into account the indications that these shortcomings
would be corrected in TULAGI ISLAND, framed against the background of the larger
Florida Island, is fire-swept from the hits scored by American carrier
dive-bombers. (USN 11649) TANAMBOGO AND GAVUTU ISLANDS photographed immediately
after a pre-landing strike by USS Enterprise planes; Gavutu is at the left
across the causeway. (USN 11034) later operations, the Marine Corps was
generally satisfied with the ships' fire. "The operation did not involve a
real test ... [but] nothing developed during the operation to indicate the need
for any fundamental change in doctrine."[23]

After these three days of
fighting in the Tulagi area, this side of the operation remained quiet. Enemy
planes bypassed it to strike at the more tempting Guadalcanal airfield and
perimeter. Surface craft shelled Tulagi occasionally, but never was it subjected
to the kind of bombardment that struck Guadalcanal in October. There is no
record that enemy reinforcements landed either on Tulagi or on Florida Island.
With this sharp fighting out of the way, the division could give all its
attention to things on the larger island of Guadalcanal. There the picture was
not a bright one.

Footnotes
[1] At 0625, Tulagi sent its message to Japanese stations to the north that an
enemy surface force had entered the channel. Tulagi CommB msg of 7Aug42 in 25th
AirFlot War Diary, August-September 1942, hereinafter cited as 25th Air Flot
Diary. [2] ComWaspAirGru Rept to CO Wasp, 10Aug42. In general, during the first
day Wasp planes operated over the Tulagi area while Saratoga planes gave
comparable support to the main landing off Beach Red at Guadalcanal. Enterprise
planes gave protection to the carriers and flew patrol missions. [3]
"0630--All flying boats have been set afire by the bombardment." CTF
18 ActRept, 6-10Aug42, 1, hereinafter cited as CTF 18 AR. [4] Ibid., 2. [5]
ComSoPac War Diary, 25Jul42 (located at NHD). [6] LtCol H.R. Thorpe ltr to CMC,
19Jan49. [7] Maj J.C. Erskine interview in HistDiv, HQMC, 15Mar49. [8] 25th
AirFlot Diary. [9] Majs J.B. Sweeney, H. Stiff, W.E. Sperling interview in
HistDiv, HQMC, 4Feb49, hereinafter cited as Sweeney Interview. [10] The raiders
had been well briefed on the terrain of the island by Lt H.E. Josselyn, RANR, a
former resident of the area who had intimate knowledge of it. Ibid. [11] CTF 18
AR; 2; Lt A.L. Moon ltr to LtCol R.D. Heinl, Jr., 13Feb4 [12] Sweeney Interview.
[13] Ibid. [14] 1st Mar Div OpOrd No. 7-42, 20Jul42.