Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich (1907–1966)

Ukrainian-born rocket designer and engineer who masterminded the Soviet
Union's early success in space. As a youngster he was inspired by aviation
and trained in aeronautical engineering at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute.
Upon moving to Moscow, he came under the influence and guidance of aircraft
designer Andrei Tupolev and co-founded the Moscow rocketry organization
GIRD. Like the Verein
für Raumschiffahrt in Germany, and Robert Goddard
in the United States, GIRD was by the early 1930s testing liquid-fueled
rockets of increasing size. Seeing the potential of these devices, the Russian
military seized control of GIRD and replaced it with RNII (Reaction Propulsion
Scientific Research Institute). RNII developed a series of rocket-propelled
missiles and gliders during the 1930s, culminating in Korolev's RP-318,
Russia's first rocket-propelled aircraft. But before the aircraft could
make a powered flight, Korolev was denounced by colleagues to the NKVD (forerunner
to the KGB), arrested, beaten, and, along with other aerospace engineers,
thrown into the Soviet prison system during the peak of Stalin's purges
in 1937-38. Korolev spent months in transit on the Trans-Siberian railway
and on a prison vessel at Magadan, followed by a year in the Kolyma gold
mines, the most dreaded part of the Gulag. However, Stalin soon recognized
the importance of aeronautical engineers in preparing for the impending
war with Hitler, and set up a system of sharashkas (prison-factories) to
exploit the incarcerated talent. Loyalty to the Soviet Union was a hallmark
of these gifted innovators: Korolev never believed that Stalin was behind
his arrests, even though he wrote numerous letters to the Soviet leader
protesting his innocence, without reply.

In the end, Korolev was saved by the intervention of Tupolev,
himself a prisoner, who requested his services in the TsKB-39 sharashka.
Later, Korolev was moved to another sharashka in Kazan where he led design
projects to build jet engines and rocket thrusters. His rehabilitation was
complete when he was released and sent to Germany to gather information
on the V-2, collecting hardware and German expertise
to reestablish Soviet rocket and missile technology. After the War and throughout
the 1950s, Korolev concentrated on devising Russian alternatives to the
V-2 and establishing a powerful Soviet rocket-production industry (see "R"
series of Russian missiles). Trials produced the multistage R-7 with
a range of 6,400 km, providing the Soviet Union with an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States. To speed
development of the R-7, Korolev's other projects were spun off to a new
design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk headed by his one-time assistant, Mikhail
Yangel. This was the first of several design
bureaus, some later competing with Korolev's, that would spring up once
Korolev had perfected a new technology. Such immense strategic importance
had Korolev's rocket and missile program acquired that it was controlled
at a high level in the Soviet government by the secret Committee Number
2. In September 1953, Korolev proposed the development of an artificial
satellite to this committee arguing that the R-7-launched flight of Sputnik
1 would serve as a powerful public demonstration of the Soviet Union's ICBM
capability. A year later, he put forward even more ambitious plans, for
a "two-to-three-ton scientific satellite", a "recoverable satellite," a
"satellite with a long orbital stay for one to two people," and an "orbital
station with regular Earth ferry communication." All of these were subsequently
realized: Sputnik 3 flew in 1958 followed by the first spy satellite Zenit
in 1962, the cosmonauts in Vostok in 1963
and Voskhod in 1964 broke long-endurance
records, and the first space station Salyut
was flown in 1971.

The Soviet lunar program depended heavily on the high technical performance
of Korolev's rocket systems and the industrial infrastructure that he built
up, as well as his political influence, drive, and determination. At first,
all went well. Plans to explore the Moon, eventually using astronauts, were
presented in 1957. Successful flyby, landing, and lunar orbital flights
were accomplished in quick succession during 1959. But it was clear that
these missions were achieved at the limits of the technology available with
the R-7 launcher. Sending people to the Moon demanded a much bigger launch
vehicle and advances in electronics and guidance systems, and when the Moon
race became official policy after President Kennedy's declaration in 1961,
the Soviet military-industrial complex failed to keep up. Korolev concentrated
his resources on the N-1 rocket, using a cluster
of 30 R-7-type engines. An alternative from the military sector called UR-500K
which used storable propellants emerged as a competitor. Bureaucratic intervention
and personality clashes led to indecision and both projects were supported,
but at inadequate levels. The Soviet heavy-lift launchers could not compete
with NASA's Saturn and Apollo
programs and when Korolev died suddenly following surgery in 1966, the Soviet
Moon program faltered. The N-1 failed its test firings and was canceled
in 1976 (though the UR-500K survived to become the Proton).

Korolev's legacy is the town named for him and Energia
Rocket & Space Corporation (RCS Energia) – the modern Russian
business organization that evolved from Korolėv's design bureau - which
built Mir and is now a partner with NASA in
the production of the International Space Station.
Korolev himself was classified as top secret throughout his career, and
his name became publicly known only after his death.