Vital reports on Iraq totalled only 5½ pages

Page Tools

The two main reports on Iraq from the nation's intelligence agencies before the invasion "regrettably" extended to 5½ pages in total and were not the subject of rigorous assessment, the Flood report found.

But while there was a "failure of intelligence", contestable findings were presented as fact, and "systemic" deficiencies, Philip Flood's inquiry found the intelligence services "reflected reasonably" the available information.

The intelligence was "thin, ambiguous and incomplete" but "the obverse conclusion - that Iraq didn't have WMD aspirations and capability - would have been a much more difficult conclusion to substantiate," Mr Flood said.

His findings on the performance of the agencies before the invasion reflected the overall tenor of his report - reams of criticism leavened with positive observations.

The main subject of his criticisms were the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the two agencies responsible for analysing raw intelligence collected in the field and presenting findings to the Government.

AdvertisementAdvertisement

Both organisations were also the target of many of the 23 recommendations Mr Flood made.

On Iraq, ONA was less cautious than DIO but the two agencies produced two joint reports before the conflict.

At two pages and 3 pages, respectively, they "did not take a holistic approach to Iraq, its strategic environment and imperatives ... and the likely capacity of its WMD".

Moreover, no formal "national assessment" was undertaken into Iraq before the war. These are the detailed reports that were once the forte of ONA but have since fallen out of favour as its political masters press for readable and concise reports.

"I think the [short reports] were a reflection of the fact that ONA and DIO knew what the Government's policy was on Iraq already, so there was no need for something that highlighted differences and problems in the intelligence," said Carl Ungerer, a former ONA analyst and Labor staffer.

Mr Flood thought differently. He found no pressure from the politicians on the intelligence.

However, he was sharply critical of the trend to do away with more lengthy assessments and the fact that dissenting opinion is not given to ministers.

ONA, for example, has put dissenting views to the Government only twice in more than 25 years.

This, he concluded, largely reflected a lack of resources at ONA - the ranking intelligence service which Mr Flood used to head - and underpins the recommendation for a doubling of staff numbers to 145 and funding to $25 million a year.

"In most case, ONA is literally 'one deep' in expertise," Mr Flood said - meaning if someone was away for any reason, the expertise vanished. This, he said, was "unacceptable".

ONA has also neglected its role as a co-ordinating body for the five other intelligence agencies due to lack of resources and should bolster this capacity to set intelligence priorities and identify targets.

Under reforms recommended by Mr Flood, ONA will cement its role as the leading intelligence agency.

DIO was also urged to spend more time on longer reports and concentrate on military matters because there was too much duplication with ONA.

DIO got it badly wrong on the JI threat and suffers from a lack of uniformed military officers in its ranks - now numbering only about 20 per cent of total staff.

Mr Flood found no evidence, as alleged by whistleblower Lieutenant-Colonel Lance Collins, of a "pro-Jakarta lobby" within DIO, and he defended DIO boss Frank Lewincamp, saying he welcomed different views.

And while there was a need for a big improvement in language skills across the board, only 4 per cent of DIO's analysts had a foreign language, a crucial requirement to the independent verification of overseas intelligence.