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Reproduced below is the
text of Sir Douglas
Haig's fifth despatch as British Army Commander-in-Chief, dated
20 February 1918. It summarises details of operations at Cambrai
during November and December 1917.
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General Headquarters,
British Armies in the Field,
20th February, 1918

My Lord;

I have the honour to submit
the following Report on the operations on the Cambrai front during November
and December, 1917.

General Plan

1. As pointed out in my
last Despatch, the object of these operations was to gain a local success by
a sudden attack at a point where the enemy did not expect it.

Our repeated attacks in
Flanders and those of our Allies elsewhere had brought about large
concentrations of the enemy's forces on the threatened fronts, with a
consequent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of his line.

Of these weakened sectors
the Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise
operation in contemplation. The ground there was, on the whole,
favourable for the employment of tanks which were to play an important part
in the enterprise, and facilities existed for the concealment of the
necessary preparations for the attack.

If, after breaking through
the German defence systems on this front, we could secure Bourlon to the
north and establish a good flank position to the east, in the direction of
Cambrai, we should be well placed to exploit the situation locally between
Bourlon and the Sensee River and to the north-west.

The capture of Cambrai
itself was subsidiary to this operation, the object of our advance towards
that town being primarily to cover our flank and puzzle the enemy regarding
our intentions.

The enemy was laying out
fresh lines of defence behind those which he had already completed on the
Cambrai front; and it was to be expected that his troops would be
redistributed as soon as our pressure in Flanders was relaxed.

He had already brought
large forces from Russia in exchange for divisions exhausted in the struggle
in the Western theatre, and it was practically certain that heavy
reinforcements would be brought from East to West during the winter.
Moreover his tired divisions, after a winter's rest, would recover their
efficiency.

For all these reasons, if
the existing opportunity for a surprise attack were allowed to lapse, it
would probably be many months before an equally favourable one would again
offer itself. Furthermore, having regard to the future, it was
desirable to show the enemy that he could not with impunity reduce his
garrisons beyond a certain point without incurring grave risks.

Against these arguments in
favour of immediate action I had to weigh the fact that my own troops had
been engaged for many months in heavy fighting, and that, though their
efforts had been uniformly successful, the conditions of the struggle had
greatly taxed their strength.

Only part of the losses in
my divisions had been replaced, and many recently arrived drafts, still far
from being fully trained, were included in the ranks of the Armies.
Under these conditions it was a serious matter to make a further heavy call
on my troops at the end of such a strenuous year.

On the other hand, from the
nature of the operation, the size of the force which could be employed was
bound, in any case, to be comparatively small, since success depended so
much on secrecy, and it is impossible to keep secret the concentration of
very large forces. The demand made upon my resources, therefore,
should not be a great one.

While considering these
different factors, preparations were
quietly carried on, so that all might be ready for the attack if I found it
possible to carry it out. The success of the enemy's offensive in
Italy subsequently added great force to the arguments in favour of
undertaking the operation, although the means at my disposal for the purpose
were further reduced as a consequence of the Italian situation.

Eventually I decided that,
despite the various limiting factors, I could muster enough force to make a
first success sufficiently sure to justify undertaking the attack, but that
the degree to which this success could be followed up must depend on
circumstances.

It was calculated that,
provided secrecy could be maintained to the last moment, no large hostile
reinforcements were likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight
hours after the commencement of the attack. I informed General Sir
Julian Byng, to whom the execution of the plans in connection with the
Cambrai operations was entrusted, that the advance would be stopped by me
after that time, or sooner if necessary, unless the results then gained and
the general situation justified its continuance.

The general plan of attack
was to dispense with previous artillery preparation, and to depend instead
on tanks to smash through the enemy's wire, of which there was a great
quantity protecting his trenches.

As soon as the advance of
the tanks and infantry, working in close co-operation, began, the artillery
was to assist with counter-battery and barrage work; but no previous
registration of guns for this purpose could be permitted, as it would rouse
the enemy's suspicions. The artillery of our new Armies was therefore
necessarily subjected to a severe test in this operation, and proved itself
entirely worthy of the confidence placed in it.

The infantry, tanks and
artillery thus working in combination
were to endeavour to break through all the enemy's lines of defence on the
first day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation
developed favourably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the
enemy's communications, disorganise his system of command, damage his
railways and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of his
reinforcements.

It was explained to all
Commanders that everything depended on secrecy up to the moment of starting,
and after that on bold, determined and rapid action. Unless opposition
could be beaten down quickly, no great results could be looked for.

The Commander-in-Chief of
the French Armies, to whom I secretly communicated my plans, most readily
agreed to afford me every assistance. In addition to the steps taken
by him to engage the enemy's attention elsewhere, he arranged for a strong
force of French infantry and cavalry to be in a position whence they could
be moved forward rapidly to take part in the exploitation of our success, if
the
situation should render it possible to bring them into action.

On the 20th November
certain of these French units were actually put in motion. The course
of events, however, did not open out the required opportunity for their
employment, but the French forces were held in readiness and within easy
reach so long as there appeared to be any hope of it.

Had the situation on the
20th November developed somewhat more favourably in certain directions, the
nature of which will become apparent in the course of this report, the
presence and co-operation of these French troops would have been of the
greatest value.

The Enemy's Defences

2. The German defences on
this front had been greatly improved and extended since the opening of our
offensive in April, and comprised three main systems of resistance.

The first of these three
trench systems, constituting part of the Hindenburg Line proper, ran in a
general north-westerly direction for a distance of six miles from the Canal
de l'Escaut at Banteux to Havrincourt. There it turned abruptly north
along the line of the Canal du Nord for a distance of four miles to
Moeuvres, thus forming a pronounced salient in the German front.

In advance of the
Hindenburg Line the enemy had constructed a series of strong forward
positions, including La Vacquerie and the north-eastern corner of
Havrincourt Wood. Behind it, and at distances respectively varying
from a little less to rather more than a mile, and from three-and-a-half to
four-and-a-half miles, lay the second and third main German systems, known
as the Hindenburg Reserve Line, and the Beaurevoir, Masnieres, Marquion
Lines.

The Attack

3. All necessary
preparations were completed in time, and with a secrecy reflecting the
greatest credit on all concerned. At 6.20 a.m. on the 20th November,
without any previous artillery bombardment, tanks and infantry attacked on a
front of about six miles from east of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord
opposite Hermies.

At the same hour,
demonstrations with gas, smoke and artillery took place on practically the
whole of the British front south of the Scarpe, and subsidiary attacks were
launched east of Epehy and between Bullecourt and Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.

On the principal front of
attack, the tanks moved forward in
advance of the infantry, crushing down the enemy's wire and forming great
lanes through which our infantry could pass. Protected by smoke
barrages from the view of the enemy's artillery, they rolled on across the
German trenches, smashing up the enemy's machine guns and driving his
infantry to ground.

Close behind our tanks our
own infantry followed and, while the tanks patrolled the line of hostile
trenches, cleared the German infantry from their dug-outs and shelters.

In this way, both the main
system of the Hindenburg Line and its outer defences were rapidly over-run,
and tanks and infantry proceeded in accordance with programme to the attack
upon the Hindenburg Reserve Line.

In this advance, the 12th
(Eastern) Divisions (Major-General A. B. Scott), moving along the Bonavis
Ridge on the right of our attack, encountered obstinate resistance at Lateau
Wood, which sheltered a number of German batteries. Fierce fighting,
in which infantry and tank crews displayed the greatest gallantry, continued
throughout the morning at this point, and ended in the capture of the
position, together with the enemy's guns.

Meanwhile, the 20th (Light)
Division (Major-General W. D. Smith), which had captured La Vacquerie at the
opening of its attack, stormed the powerful defences of Welsh Ridge.
The 6th Division (Major-General T. O. Marden) carried the village of
Ribetourt, after sharp fighting among the streets and houses, while the 62nd
(West Riding) Division (T.) (Major-General W. P. Braithwaite) stormed
Havrincourt, where also parties of the enemy held out for a time.

The capture of these two
villages secured the flanks of the 51st (Highland) Division (T.)
(Major-General G. M. Harper), advancing on the left centre of our attack up
the slopes of Flesquieres Hill against the German trench lines on the
southern side of Flesquieres Village. Here very heavy fighting took
place. The stout brick wall skirting the Chateau grounds opposed a
formidable obstacle to our advance, while German machine guns swept the
approaches.

A number of tanks were
knocked out by direct hits from German field batteries in position beyond
the crest of the hill. None the less, with the exception of the
village itself, our second objectives in this area were gained before
midday.

Many of the hits upon our
tanks at Flesquieres were obtained by a German artillery officer who,
remaining alone at his battery, served a field gun single-handed until
killed at his gun. The great bravery of this officer aroused the
admiration of all ranks!

On the left of our attack
west of the Canal du Nord, the 36th (Ulster) Division (Major-General 0. S.
W. Nugent), captured a German strong point on the spoil bank of the canal
and pushed northwards in touch with the West Riding troops, who, as the
first stage in a most gallant and remarkably successful advance, had taken
Havrincourt.

By 10.30 a.m. the general
advance beyond the Hindenburg Reserve Line to our final objectives had
begun, and cavalry were moving up behind our infantry.

In this period of the
attack tanks and British infantry battalions of the 29th Division
(Major-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle) entered Masnieres and captured
Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the passages of the Canal de l'Escaut at
both villages.

At Marcoing the tanks
arrived at the moment when a party of the enemy were in the act of running
out an electrical connection to blow up one of the bridges. This party
was fired on by a tank and the bridges secured intact. At Masnieres,
however, the retreating enemy succeeded in destroying partially the bridge
carrying the main road. In consequence the first tank which
endeavoured to cross at this point fell through the bridge, completing its
destruction.

The advance of a number of
our guns had been unavoidably delayed in the sunken roads which served this
part of the battle-field, and though our infantry continued their progress
beyond Masnieres, without the assistance of tanks and artillery they were
not able at first to clear the enemy entirely from the northern portion of
the village.

Here parties of Germans
held out during the afternoon, and gave the enemy time to occupy Rumilly and
the section of the Beaure-voir-Masnieres line south of it; while the
destruction of the bridge also prevented the cavalry from crossing the canal
in sufficient strength to overcome his resistance.

In spite of this
difficulty, a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, Canadian Cavalry Brigade
(5th Cavalry Division, Major-General H. I. M. Macandrew), succeeded during
the afternoon in crossing the canal by a temporary bridge constructed during
the day. This squadron passed through the Beaurevoir-Masnieres line
and charged and captured a German battery in position to the east of it.

Continuing its advance, it
dispersed a body of about 300 German infantry, and did not cease its
progress until the greater part of its horses had been killed or wounded.
The squadron thereupon took up a position in a sunken road, where it
maintained itself until night fell. It then withdrew to our lines,
bringing with it several prisoners taken in the course of a most gallant
exploit.

Meanwhile, west of the
Canal de l'Escaut patrols of the 6th Division during the afternoon entered
Noyelles-sur-l'Escaut, where they were reinforced by cavalry, and other
cavalry units pushed out towards Cantaing. West of Flesquieres, the
62nd Division, operating northwards from Havrincourt, made important
progress.

Having carried the
Hindenburg Reserve Line north of that village, it rapidly continued its
attack and captured Graincourt, where two anti-tank guns were destroyed by
the tanks accompanying our infantry. Before nightfall infantry and
cavalry had entered Anneux, though the enemy's resistance in this village
does not appear to have been entirely overcome until the following morning.

This attack of the 62nd
(West Riding) Division constitutes a
brilliant achievement, in which the troops concerned completed an advance of
four and a half miles from their original front, overrunning two German
systems of defence and gaining possession of three villages.

On the left flank of our
attack Ulster battalions pushed northwards along the Hindenburg Line and its
forward defences, maintaining touch with the West Riding troops, and carried
the whole of the German trench systems west of the Canal du Nord as far
north as the Bapaume-Cambrai Road.

At the end of the first day
of the attack, therefore, three German systems of defence had been broken
through to a depth of some four and a half miles on a wide front, and over
5,000 prisoners had already been brought in. But for the wrecking of
the bridge at Masnieres and the check at Flesquieres, still greater results
might have been attained.

Throughout these operations
the value of the services rendered by the tanks was very great, and the
utmost gallantry, enterprise and resolution were displayed by both officers
and crews. In combination with the other arms they helped to make
possible a remarkable success.

Without their aid in
opening a way through the German wire, success could only have been attained
by methods which would have given the enemy ample warning of our attack, and
have allowed him time to mass troops to oppose it. As has been pointed
out above, to enable me to undertake such an operation with the troops at my
disposal, secrecy to the last moment was essential.

The tanks alone made fit
possible to dispense with artillery preparation, and so to conceal our
intentions from the enemy up to the actual moment of attack.

Great credit is due also to
the Royal Flying Corps for very gallant and most valuable work carried out
under conditions of the greatest difficulty from low clouds and driving
mist.

In the subsidiary attack at
Bullecourt battalions of the 3rd Division (Major-General C. J. Deverell) and
the 16th (Irish) Division (Major-General W. B. Hickie) successfully
completed the work begun by our operations in this area in May and June,
1917, capturing the remainder of the Hindenburg support trench on their
front, with some 700 prisoners.

A number of counter-attacks
against our new positions at Bullecourt on this and the following day were
repulsed, with great loss to the enemy.

The Advance Continued

4. On the morning of the
21st November the attack on Flesquieres was resumed, and by 8.0 a.m. the
village had been turned from the north-west and captured. The obstacle
which more than anything else had limited the results of the 20th November
was thereby removed, and later in the morning the advance once more became
general.

Masnieres had been cleared
of the enemy during the previous evening, and at 11.0 a.m. our troops
attacked the Beaurevoir-Masnieres line and established themselves in the
portion to the east and north of Masnieres. Heavy fighting took place,
and a counter-attack from the direction of Rumilly was beaten off.

At the same hour we
attacked and captured Les Rues des Vignes, but later in the morning the
enemy counter-attacked and compelled our troops to fall back from this
position. Progress was also made towards Creve-Coeur; but though the
canal was crossed during the afternoon, it was found impossible to force the
passage of the river in face of the enemy's machine gun fire.

That evening orders were
issued by the Third Army to secure the ground already gained in this area of
the battle, and to capture Rumilly on the morrow; but in consequence of the
exhaustion of the troops engaged it was found necessary later in the night
to cancel the orders for this attack.

West of the Canal de
l'Escaut infantry of the 29th Division and dismounted regiments of the Ist
and 5th Cavalry Divisions; including the Ambala Brigade, were heavily
engaged throughout the day in Noyelles, and beat off all attacks in
continuous fighting.

Following upon the capture
of Flesquieres, the 51st and 62nd Divisions, in co-operation with a number
of tanks and squadrons of the 1st Cavalry Division, attacked at 10.30 a.m.
in the direction of Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon.

In this attack the capture
of Anneux was completed, and early in the afternoon Cantaing was seized,
with some hundreds of prisoners. Progress was made on the outskirts of
Bourlon Wood, and late in the afternoon Fontaine-notre-Dame was taken by
troops of the 51st Division and tanks. The attack on Bourlon Wood
itself was checked by machine gun fire, though tanks advanced some distance
into the wood.

Farther west, the 36th
Division advanced north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, and reached the
southern outskirts of Moeuvres, where strong opposition was encountered.

The Position on the 21st
November

5. On the evening of the
second day of the attack, therefore, our troops held a line which ran
approximately as follows:-

From our old front line
east of Gonnelieu the right flank of our new positions lay along the eastern
slopes of the Bonavis Ridge, passing east of Lateau Wood and striking the
Masnieres-Beaurevoir line north of the Canal de l'Escaut at a point about
half way between Crevecoeur and Masnieres. From this point our line ran
roughly north-west, past and including Masnieres, Noyelles and Cantaing, to
Fontaine, also inclusive.

Thence it bent back to the
south for a short distance, making a sharp salient round the latter village,
and ran in a general westerly direction along the southern edge of Bourlon
Wood and across the southern face of the spur to the west of the wood, to
the Canal du Nord, south-east of the village of Moeuvres. From
Moeuvres the line linked up once more with our old front at a point about
midway between Boursies and Pronville.

The forty-eight hours after
which it had been calculated that the enemy's reserves would begin to arrive
had in effect expired, and the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as
well as certain important tactical features to the east and west of the
wood, still remained in the enemy's possession.

It now became necessary to
decide whether to continue the operation offensively or to take up a
defensive attitude and rest content with what had been attained.

The Decision to Go On

6. It was not possible,
however, to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by
us north of Flesquieres were completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and
unless this ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at
excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the
Flesquieres Ridge would be necessary and would have to be carried out at
once.

On the other hand, the
enemy showed certain signs of an intention to withdraw. Craters had
been formed at road junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east.
The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain
observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the
Sensee River.

The enemy's defensive lines
south of the Scarpe and Sensee Rivers would thereby be turned, his
communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his
positions in this sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the
importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause the
abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a
considerable distance to the north of it.

The successive days of
constant marching and fighting had placed a very severe strain upon the
endurance of the troops, and, before a further advance could be undertaken,
some time would have to be spent in resting and relieving them. This
need for delay was regrettable, as the enemy's forces were increasing, and
fresh German divisions were known to be arriving, but, with the limited
number of troops at my command, it was unavoidable.

It was to be remembered,
however, that the hostile reinforcements coming up at this stage could at
first be no more than enough to replace the enemy's losses; and although the
right of our advance had definitely been stayed, the enemy had not yet
developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by
the numbers at my disposal.

As has already been pointed
out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a
defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards and
north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a large extent
achieved.

An additional and very
important argument in favour of proceeding with my attack was supplied by
the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai
front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no
matter what measure of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two
divisions previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at
my disposal, and with this accession of strength the prospect of securing
Bourlon seemed good.

After weighing these
various considerations, therefore, I decided to continue the operations to
gain the Bourlon position. The 22nd November was spent in organising
the captured ground, in carrying out certain reliefs, and in giving other
troops the rest they already needed.

Soon after midday the enemy
regained Fontaine-notre-Dame; but, with our troops already on the outskirts
of Bourlon Wood and Cantaing held by us, it was thought that
the recapture of Fontaine should not prove very difficult. The
necessary arrangements for renewing the attack were therefore pushed on and
our plans were extended to include the recapture of Fontaine-notre-Dame.

Meanwhile, early in the
night of the 22nd November, a battalion of the Queen's Westminsters (56th
Division, Major-General F. A. Dudgeon) stormed a commanding tactical point
in the Hindenburg Line west of Moeuvres known as Tadpole Copse, the
possession of which would be of value in connection with the left flank of
the Bourlon position when the latter had been secured.

The Struggle for Bourlon
Wood

7. On the morning of the
23rd November the 51st Division, supported by tanks, attacked
Fontaine-notre-Dame, but was unable to force an entrance. Early in the
afternoon this division repeated its attack from the west, and a number of
tanks entered Fontaine, where they remained till dusk, inflicting
considerable loss on the enemy.

We did not succeed,
however, in clearing the village, and at the end of the day no progress had
been made on this part of our front.

At 10.30 a.m. the 40th
Division (Major-General I. Ponsonby) attacked Bourlon Wood, and after four
and a half hours of hard fighting, in which tanks again rendered valuable
assistance to our infantry, captured the whole of the wood and entered
Bourlon Village. Here hostile counter-attacks prevented our further
progress, and though the village was at one time reported to have been taken
by us, this proved later to be erroneous.

A heavy hostile attack upon
our positions in the wood, in which all three battalions of the 9th
Grenadier Regiment appear to have been employed, was completely repulsed.

Throughout this day, also,
the 36th Division and troops of the 56th (London) Division (T.) were engaged
in stubborn fighting in the neighbourhood of Moeuvres and Tadpole Copse, and
made some progress.

This struggle for Bourlon
resulted in several days of fiercely contested fighting, in which English,
Scottish, Welsh and Irish battalions, together with dismounted cavalry,
performed most gallant service and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.

During the morning of the
24th November the enemy twice attacked, and at his second attempt pressed
back our troops in the north-eastern corner of the wood. An immediate
counter-attack delivered by the I4th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, the 15th Hussars, dismounted, and the remnants of the 119th
Infantry Brigade (4oth Division and Ist Cavalry Division), drove back the
enemy in turn, and by noon our line had been re-established.

Meanwhile, dismounted
cavalry had repulsed an attack on the high ground west of Bourlon Wood, and
in the afternoon a third hostile attack upon the wood was stopped by our
artillery and rifle fire.

On this afternoon our
infantry again attacked Bourlon Village, and captured the whole of it.
Later in the evening a fourth attack upon our positions in the wood was
beaten off after fierce fighting. Further progress was made on this
day in the Hindenburg Line west of Moeuvres, but the enemy's resistance in
the whole of this area was very strong.

On the evening of the 25th
November a fresh attack by the enemy regained Bourlon Village, though our
troops offered vigorous resistance, and parties of the 13th Battalion, East
Surrey Regiment (40th Division), held out in the south-east corner of the
village until touch was re-established with them two days later.

The continual fighting and
the strength of the enemy's attacks, however, had told heavily on the 40th
Division, which had borne the brunt of the struggle. This division was
accordingly withdrawn, and on the following day our troops were again
pressed back slightly in the northern outskirts of Bourlon Wood.

With the enemy in
possession of the shoulder of the ridge above Fontaine-notre-Dame, as well
as of part of the high ground west of Bourlon Wood, our position in the wood
itself was a difficult one, and much of the ground to the south of it was
still exposed to the enemy's observation. It was decided, therefore,
to make another effort on the 27th November to capture Fontaine-notre-Dame
and Bourlon Village, and to gain possession of the whole of the Bourlon
Ridge.

In this attack, in which
tanks co-operated, British Guards (Major- General G. P. T. Feilding)
temporarily regained possession of Fontaine-notre-Dame, taking some hundreds
of prisoners, and troops of the 62nd Division once more entered Bourlon
Village.

Later in the morning,
however, heavy counter-attacks developed in both localities, and our troops
were unable to maintain the ground they had gained. During the
afternoon the enemy also attacked our positions at Tadpole Copse, but was
repulsed.

As the result of five days
of constant fighting, therefore, we held a strong position on the Bourlon
Hill and in the wood, but had not yet succeeded in gaining all the ground
required for the security of this important feature. The two following
days passed comparatively quietly, while the troops engaged were relieved
and steps were undertaken to prepare for a deliberate attack which might
give us the tactical points we sought.

Meanwhile, on other parts
of the front the organisation of our new positions was proceeding as rapidly
as conditions would allow. In particular, troops of the 12th Division
had effected some improvement on the right flank of our advance opposite
Banteux, and the 16th Division had made further progress in the Hindenburg
Line north-west of Bullecourt.

At the end of November the
number of prisoners taken in our operations south-west of Cambrai exceeded
10,500. We had also captured 142 guns, some 350 machine guns, and 70
trench mortars, with great quantities of ammunition, material and stores of
all kinds.

The German Attack
Early Warnings

8. During the last days of
November increased registration of hostile artillery, the movements of
troops and transport observed behind the German lines, together with other
indications of alike nature, pointed to further efforts by the enemy to
regain the positions we had wrested from him.

The front affected by this
increased activity included that of our advance, as well as the ground to
Vendhuille and beyond. The massing of the enemy's infantry, however, his
obvious anxiety concerning the security of his defences south of the Sensee
River, the tactical importance of the high ground about Bourlon, and the
fact that we were still only in partial possession of it, all pointed to the
principal attack being delivered in the Bourlon sector.

Our Dispositions for
Defence

9. Measures were
accordingly taken, both by the Third Army and by the lower formations
concerned, to prepare for eventualities.

Arrangements had been made
after our last attack to relieve the troops holding the Bourlon positions by
such fresh divisions as were available, and when these reliefs had been
satisfactorily completed, I felt confident that the defence of this sector
could be considered secure.

Covering our right flank
from Cantaing to the Banteux Ravine, a distance of about 16,000 yards, five
British divisions were disposed, and, though these had been fighting for
several days and were consequently tired, I felt confident that they would
prove equal to stopping any attack the enemy could make on them.

From the Banteux Ravine
southwards the divisions in line were weak and held very extended fronts.
On the other hand, the line held by us in this southern sector had been in
our possession for some months. Its defences were for this reason more
complete and better organised than those of the ground gained by us in our
attack. Moreover, the capture of the Bonavis Ridge had added to the
security of our position farther south.

The reserve divisions
immediately available in the area consisted of the Guards and 2nd Cavalry
Divisions (Major-General W. H. Greenly commanding 2nd Cavalry Division),
both of which had been engaged in the recent fighting at Fontaine and
Bourlon Wood.

These were located behind
the La Vacquerie-Villers Guislain front, while another division, the 62nd,
which had also been recently engaged, was placed farther to the north-west
in the direction of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. A fresh South Midland
division (61st Division, Major-General C. I. Mackenzie) was assembling
farther back, two other cavalry divisions were within two or three hours
march of the battle area, and another cavalry division but a little farther
distant.

In view of the symptoms of
activity observed on the enemy's front, special precautions were taken by
local commanders, especially from Villers Guislain to the south. Troops were
warned to expect attack, additional machine guns were placed to secure
supporting points, and divisional reserves were closed up. Special
patrols were also sent out to watch for signs of any hostile advance.

The Battle Reopened

10. Between the hours of
7.0 and 8.0 a.m. on the last days of November the enemy attacked, after a
short but intense artillery preparation, on the greater part of a front of
some ten miles from Vendhuille to Masnieres inclusive. From Masnieres
to Banteux, both inclusive, four German divisions would seem to have been
employed against the three British divisions holding this area (29th, 20th
and 12th Divisions).

Between Banteux exclusive
and Vendhuille one German division and portions of two others were employed
against the northern half of the British division holding that front (the
55th Division, Major-General H. S. Jeudwine).

On the Masnieres front the
29th Division, composed of English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Guernsey and
Newfoundland battalions, although seriously threatened as the day wore on by
the progress made by the enemy farther south, where their battery positions
had been taken in reverse, most gallantly beat off a succession of powerful
assaults and maintained their line intact.

At the northern end of the
Bonavis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which the
advance of the enemy's infantry followed the opening of his bombardment
appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both in line and in immediate
support, almost before they had realised that the attack had begun.

The nature of the
bombardment, which seems to have been
heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously alarming
them, contributed to the success of the enemy's plans. No steadily
advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault
columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the many deep folds and
hollows typical of a chalk formation, and shielded from observation from the
air by an early morning mist.

Only when the attack was
upon them great numbers of low-flying German aeroplanes rained machine gun
fire upon our infantry, while an extensive use of smoke shell and bombs made
it extremely difficult for our troops to see what was happening on other
parts of the battlefield, or to follow the movements of the enemy.

In short, there is little
doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in these areas of
the battle at the moment of delivery the assault effected a local surprise.

None the less, stubborn
resistance was offered during the morning by isolated parties of our troops
and by machine gun detachments in the neighbourhood of Lateau Wood and
south-east of La Vacquerie, as well as at other points. In more than
one instance heavy losses are known to have been inflicted on the enemy by
machine gun fire at short range.

North-east of La Vacquerie
the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade (20th Division) repulsed four attacks, in
some of which the enemy's infantry approached to within 200 yards of our
guns, before the surviving gunners were finally compelled to withdraw, after
removing the breech-blocks from their pieces.

East of Villers Guislain
the troops holding our forward positions on the high ground were still
offering a strenuous resistance to the enemy's attack on their front, at a
time when large forces of German infantry had already advanced up the valley
between them and Villers Guislain.

South of this village a
single strong point known as Limerick Post, garrisoned by troops of the
1/5th Battalion (King's Own), Royal Lancaster Regiment, and the 1/10th
Battalion, Liverpool Regiment (both of the 55th Division), held out with
great gallantry throughout the day, though heavily attacked.

The progress made by the
enemy, however, across the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and up the deep
gully between Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu, known as 22 Ravine, turned our
positions on the ridge as well as in both villages. Taken in flank and
rear, the defences of Villers Guislain, Gonnelieu and Bonavis were rapidly
over-run.

Gouzeaucourt was captured
about 9.0 a.m., the outer defences of La Vacquerie were reached, and a
number of guns which had been brought up close to the line, in order to
enable them to cover the battle-front about Masnieres and Marcoing, fell
into the hands of the enemy.

At this point the enemy's
advance was checked by the action of our local reserves, and meanwhile
measures had been taken with all possible speed to bring up additional
troops. About midday the Guards came into action west of Gouzeaucourt,
while cavalry (4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, Major-General A. A. Kennedy
commanding 4th Cavalry Division) moved up to close the gap on their right
and made progress towards Villers Guislain from the south and south-west.

The attack of the Guards,
which was delivered with the greatest gallantry and resolution, drove the
enemy out of Gouzeaucourt and made progress on the high ground known as the
St. Quentin Ridge, east of the village. In this operation the Guards
were materially assisted by the gallant action of a party of the 29th
Division, who, with a company of North Midland Royal Engineers, held on
throughout the day to a position in an old trench near Gouzeaucourt.

Valuable work was also done
by a brigade of field artillery of the 47th Division, which moved direct
into action from the line of march.

During the afternoon three
battalions of tanks, which when they received news of the attack were
preparing to move away from the battlefield to refit, arrived at
Gouzeaucourt and aided the infantry to hold the recaptured ground.
Great credit is due to the officers and men of the Tank Brigade concerned
for the speed with which they brought their tanks into action.

Meanwhile, the defence of
La Vacquerie had been successfully maintained, and our line had been
established to the north of that village, in touch with our troops in
Masnieres.

The Northern Attack

11. In the northern area,
from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Tadpole Copse, the German attack was not
launched until some two hours later. This was the enemy's main attack,
and was carried out with large forces and great resolution.

After a heavy preliminary
bombardment, and covered by an artillery barrage, the enemy's infantry
advanced shortly after 9.0 a.m. in dense waves, in the manner of his attacks
in the first battle of Ypres.

In the course of the
morning and afternoon no less than five principal attacks were made in this
area, and on one portion of the attack as many as' eleven waves of German
infantry advanced successively to the assault. On the whole of this
front a resolute endeavour was made to break down by sheer weight of numbers
the defence of the London Territorials and other English battalions holding
the sector.

In this fighting the 47th
(London) Division (T.) (Major-General Sir G. F. Gorringe), the 2nd Division
(Major-General C. E. Pereira) and the 56th (London) Division (T.) greatly
distinguished themselves, and there were accomplished many deeds of great
heroism.

Under the fury of the
enemy's bombardment a company of the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, were
in the course of being withdrawn from an exposed position in a sap-head in
advance of our line between Bourlon Wood and Moeuvres when the German attack
burst upon them.

The officer in command sent
three of his platoons back, and with a rearguard composed of the remainder
of his company held off the enemy's infantry until the main position had
been organised. Having faithfully accomplished their task, this
rearguard died fighting to the end with their faces to the enemy.

Somewhat later in the
morning an attack in force between the Canal du Nord and Moeuvres broke into
our foremost positions and isolated a company of the 13th Battalion, Essex
Regiment, in a trench just west of the canal. After maintaining a
splendid and successful resistance throughout the day, whereby the pressure
upon our main line was greatly relieved, at 4.0 p.m. this company held a
council of war, at which the two remaining company officers, the company
sergeant-major, and the platoon sergeants were present, and unanimously
determined to fight to the last and have "no surrender".

Two runners who were sent
to notify this decision to Battalion Headquarters succeeded in getting
through to our lines and delivered their message. During the remainder
of the afternoon and far into the following night this gallant company were
heard fighting, and there is little room for doubt that they carried out to
a man their heroic resolution.

Early in the afternoon
large masses of the enemy again attacked west of Bourlon Wood, and, though
beaten off with great loss at most points, succeeded in overwhelming three
out of a line of posts held by a company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berks
Regiment, on the right of the 2nd Division.

Though repeatedly attacked
by vastly superior numbers the remainder of these posts stood firm, and
when, two days later, the three posts which had been overpowered were
regained, such a heap of German dead lay in and around them that the bodies
of our own men were hidden.

All accounts go to show
that the enemy's losses in the whole of his constantly repeated attacks on
this sector of the battle front were enormous. One battery of eight
machine guns fired 70,000 rounds of ammunition into ten successive waves of
Germans.

Long lines of attacking
infantry were caught by our machine gun fire in enfilade, and were shot down
in line as they advanced. Great execution also was done by our field
artillery, and in the course of the battle guns were brought up to the crest
line and fired direct upon the enemy at short range.

At one point west of
Bourlon the momentum of his first advance i carried the enemy through our
front line and a short way down the southern slopes of the ridge.
There, however, the German masses came under direct fire from our field
artillery at short range and were broken up.

Our local reserves at once
counter-attacked, and succeeded in closing the gap that had been made in our
line. Early in the afternoon the enemy again forced his way into our
foremost positions in this locality, opening a gap between the 1/6th
Battalion and the 1/15th Battalion, London Regiments. Counter-attacks,
led by the two battalion commanders, with all available men, including the
personnel of their headquarters, once more restored the situation. All
other attacks were beaten off with the heaviest losses to the enemy.

The greatest credit is due
to the troops at Masnieres, Bourlon and Moeuvres for the very gallant
service performed by them on this day. But for their steady courage
and staunchness in defence, the success gained by the enemy on the right of
our battle front might have had serious consequences.

I cannot close the account
of this day's fighting without recording my obligation to the Commander-in-Cheef
of the French Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops
within reach for employment in case of need at the unfettered discretion of
the Third Army Commander.

Part of the artillery of
this force actually came into action, rendering valuable service, and though
the remainder of the troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they
were available should occasion arise was a great assistance.

The Fighting at Gonnelieu
and Masnieres

12. On the 1st December
fighting continued fiercely on the whole front.

The Guards completed the
capture of the St. Quentin Ridge and entered Gonnelieu, where they captured
over 350 prisoners and a large number of machine guns. Tanks took an
effective part in the fighting for the ridge. At one point, where our
infantry were held up by fire from a hostile trench, a single tank attacked
and operated up and down the trench, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's
garrison.

Our infantry were then able
to advance and secure the trench, which was found full of dead Germans.
In it were also found fifteen machine guns that had been silenced by the
tank. In the whole of this fighting splendid targets were obtained by
all tank crews, and the German casualties were seen to be very great.

Farther south, a number of
tanks co-operated with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division
and with the Guards in the attacks upon Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood,
and were in great measure responsible for the capture of the wood.

Heavy fighting took place
for this position, which it is clear the enemy had decided to hold at all
costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the
wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine guns were found.
In one spot four German machine guns, with dead crews lying round, were
discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three German field guns,
complete with teams, were also captured in this wood.

Other tanks proceeded to
Villers Guislain, and, in spite of heavy direct artillery fire, three
reached the outskirts of the village, but the fire of the enemy's machine
guns prevented our troops advancing from the south from supporting them, and
the tanks ultimately withdrew.

Severe fighting took place,
also, at Masnieres. During the afternoon and evening at least nine separate
attacks were beaten off by the 29th Division on this front, and other
hostile attacks were repulsed in the neighbourhood of Marcoing,
Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon. With the Bonavis Ridge in the enemy's
hands, however, Masnieres was exposed to attack on three sides, and on the
night of the 1st/2nd December our troops were withdrawn under orders to a
line west of the village.

On the afternoon of the 2nd
December a series of heavy attacks developed against Welsh Ridge in the
neighbourhood of La Vacquerie, and further assaults were made on our
positions in the neighbourhood of Masnieres and Bourlon.

These attacks were broken
in succession by our machine gun fire, but the enemy persisted in his
attempts against Welsh Ridge and gradually gained ground. By nightfall
our line had been pushed back to a position west and north of Gonnelieu.

Next day the enemy renewed
his attacks in great force on the whole front from Gonnelieu to Marcoing,
and ultimately gained possession of La Vacquerie. North of La
Vacquerie repeated attacks made about Masnieres and Marcoing were repulsed
in severe fighting, but the positions still retained by us beyond the Canal
de l'Escaut were extremely exposed, and during the night our troops were
withdrawn under orders to the west bank of the canal.

The Withdrawal from
Bourlon

13. By this time the enemy
had evidently become exhausted by the efforts he had made and the severity
of his losses, and the 4th December passed comparatively quietly.

For some days, however,
local fighting continued in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie, and his
attitude remained aggressive. Local attacks in this sector were
repulsed on the 5th December, and on this and the following two days further
fierce fighting took place, in which the enemy again endeavoured without
success to drive us from our positions on Welsh Ridge.

The strength which the
enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks made it evident that
only by prolonged and severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right
flank on the Bonavis Ridge. Unless this was done, the situation of my
troops in the salient north of Flesquieres would be difficult and dangerous,
even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended.

I had therefore to decide
either to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale, or to
withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquieres Ridge.

Although this decision
involved giving up important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as
to the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, on the night
of the 4th/5th December the evacuation of the positions held by us north of
the Flesquieres Ridge was commenced. On the morning of the 7th
December this withdrawal was completed successfully without interference
from the enemy.

Before withdrawing, the
more important of the enemy's field
defences were destroyed, and those of his guns which we had been unable to
remove were rendered useless. The enemy did not discover our
withdrawal for some time, and when, on the afternoon of the 5th December, he
began to feel his way forward, he did so with great caution. In spite
of his care, on more than one occasion bodies of his infantry were caught in
the open by our artillery.

Much skill and courage were
shown by our covering troops in this withdrawal, and an incident which
occurred on the afternoon of the 6th December in the neighbourhood of
Graincourt deserves special notice.

A covering party,
consisting of two companies of the 1/15th Battalion, London Regiment, 47th
Division, much reduced in strength by the fighting at Bourlon Wood, found
their flank exposed by a hostile attack farther east, and were enveloped and
practically cut off. These companies successfully cut their way
through to our advanced line of resistance, where they arrived in good
order, after having inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.

The new line taken up by us
corresponded roughly to the old Hindenburg Reserve Line, and ran from a
point about one and a half miles north by east of La Vacquerie, north of
Ribecourt and Flesquieres to the Canal du Nord, about one and a half miles
north of Havrincourt - i.e., between two and two and a half miles in front
of the line held by us prior to the attack of the 20th November.

We therefore retained in
our possession an important section of the Hindenburg trench system, with
its excellent dug-outs and other advantages.

The Results of the Battle

14. The material results of
the three weeks' fighting described above can be stated in general terms
very shortly.

We had captured and
retained in our possession over 12,000 yards of the former German front tine
from La Vacquerie to a point opposite Boursies, together with between 10,000
and 11,000 yards of the Hindenburg Line and Hindenburg Reserve Line and the
villages of Ribecourt, Flesquieres and Havrincourt. A total of 145
German guns were taken or destroyed by us in the course of the operations,
and 11,100 German prisoners were captured.

On the other hand, the
enemy had occupied an unimportant section of our front line between
Vendhuille and Gonnetieu. There is little doubt that our operations
were of considerable indirect assistance to the Allied forces in Italy.
Large demands were made upon the available German reserves at a time when a
great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in
Flanders.

There is evidence that
German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the
Cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of German
forces against Italy was suspended for at least two week's at a most
critical period, when our Allies were making their first stand on the Piave
Line.

General Review

15. I have already
summarised in the opening paragraphs of this Despatch both the reasons which
decided me to undertake the Cambrai operations and the limitations to which
those operations were subject.

In view of the strength of
the German forces on the front of my attack, and the success with which
secrecy was maintained during our preparations, I had calculated that the
enemy's prepared defences would be captured in the first rush.

I had good hope that his
resisting power behind those defences would then be so enfeebled for a
period that we should be able on the same day to establish ourselves quickly
and completely on the dominating Bourlon Ridge from Fontaine-notre-Dame to
Moeuvres, and to secure our right flank along a line including the Bonavis
Ridge, Crevecoeur and Rumilly to Fontaine-notre-Dame.

Even if this did not prove
possible within the first twenty-four hours, a second day would be at our
disposal before the enemy's reserves could begin to arrive in any formidable
numbers.

Meanwhile, with no wire and
no prepared defences to hamper them, it was reasonable to hope that masses
of cavalry would find it possible to pass through, whose task would be
thoroughly to disorganise the enemy's systems of command and
inter-communication in the whole area between the Canal de l'Escaut, the
River Sensee and the Canal du Nord, as well as to the east and north-east of
Cambrai.

My intentions as regards
subsequent exploitation were to push westward and north-westward, taking the
Hindenburg Line in reverse from Moeuvres to the River Scarpe, and capturing
all the enemy's defences and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a
line from Cambrai northwards to the Sensee, and south of that river and the
Scarpe.

Time would have been
required to enable us to develop and complete the operation; but the
prospects of gaining the necessary time, by the use of cavalry in the manner
outlined above, were in my opinion good enough to justify the attempt to
execute the plan.

I am of opinion that on the
20th and 21st November we went very near to a success sufficiently complete
to bring the realisation of our full programme within our power.

The reasons for my decision
to continue the fight after the 21st November have already been explained.
Though in the event no advantage was gained thereby, I still consider that,
as the problem presented itself at the time, the more cautious course would
have been difficult to justify.

It must be remembered that
it was not a question of remaining where we stood, but of abandoning
tactical positions of value, gained with great gallantry, the retention of
which seemed not only to be within our power, but likely even yet to lead to
further success.

Whatever may be the final
decision on this point, as well as on the original decision to undertake the
enterprise at all with the forces available, the continuation of our efforts
against Fontaine-notre-Dame gave rise to severe fighting, in which our
troops more than held their own.

On the 30th November risks
were accepted by us at some points in order to increase our strength at
others. Our fresh reserves had been thrown in on the Bourlon front,
where the enemy brought against us a total force of seven divisions to three
and failed. I do not consider that it would have been justifiable on
the indications to have allotted a smaller garrison to this front.

Between Masnieres and
Vendhuille the enemy's superiority in infantry over our divisions in line
was in the proportion of about four to three; and we were sufficiently
provided with artillery. That his attack was partially successful may
tend to show that the garrison allotted to this front was insufficient,
either owing to want of numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion from
previous fighting.

Captured maps and orders
have made it clear that the enemy aimed at far more considerable results
than were actually achieved by him. Three convergent attacks were to
be made on the salient formed by our advance; two of them delivered
approximately simultaneously about Gonnelieu and Masnieres, followed later
by a still more powerful attack on the Bourlon front.

The objectives of these
attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault, and the
enemy's hope was to capture and destroy the whole of the British forces in
the Cambrai salient.

This bold and ambitious
plan was foiled on the greater part of our front by the splendid defence of
the British divisions engaged; and, though the defence broke down for a time
in one area, the recovery made by the weak forces still left and those
within immediate reach is worthy of the highest praise. Numberless
instances of great gallantry, promptitude and skill were shown, some few of
which have been recounted.

I desire to acknowledge the
skill and resource displayed by General Byng throughout the Cambrai
operations, and to express my appreciation of the manner in which they were
conducted by him, as well as by his Staff and the subordinate commanders.

In conclusion, I would
point out that the sudden breaking through by our troops of an immense
system of defence has had a most inspiring moral effect on the Armies I
command, and must have a correspondingly depressing influence upon the
enemy.

The great value of the
tanks in the offensive has been conclusively proved. In view of this
experience, the enemy may well hesitate to deplete any portion of his front,
as he did last summer, in order to set free troops to concentrate for
decisive action at some other point.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your obedient Servant,
D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France