With an Eye on Eternity - Chapter 10

With an Eye on Eternity

Chapter 10

[The following section is somewhat technical, for it deals with
the mechanics and technicalities of the Written Torah and the
Oral Law. Therefore, it is not for casual or quick reading. If
you are a Yeshiva student or "Ben-Torah" it will bepart of your daily fare. For the layman, it is something to work
on when you feel like biting into a challenge. If you need help,
don't hesitate to ask someone to help you with it. At most, all
it requires is some help accompanied by a desire to understand.

Although a mastery of this particular chapter should not be considered
a prerequisite for studying Torah, still a general idea of the
first part of this chapter, which illustrates the basic link between
the written Torah and its Oral Law explanation, is most
important.]

The Master of the Universe did not wish to write the Torah in
such a simplified form that no explanation would be required.
Quite to the contrary, He wrote in it many concealed things (devarim
stumim). The true meaning of the concealed material is impossible
to fathom by any man in the world without access to the explanations
which were handed down through a chain of tradition (kabbalah),
one which begins with G-d, the Author of the Torah, Himself. Examples
of this concealment involve such mitzvohs as the mitzvoh
of tefillin and the mitzvoh of mezuzoh, in
regard to which we find commandments in the Torah. Those passages
which deal with these commandments offer no explanation whatsoever
as to what they actually are. [So how then could one know how
to observe the commandments of the Torah?]

However, the truth is that the Master intentionally concealed
the true meaning of His words for reasons known only to Him. However,
all which He concealed in the written Torah (The Bible) He taught
to Moshe Rabeinu orally, and from him the tradition - masorah
(literally meaning "handing over") - was transmitted
to the Sages generation after generation. Through this Oral Law
tradition, the meaning of all passages are fully explained and
make it possible for us to understand how to fulfill every aspect
of the mitzvohs in just the way the Master wishes them
to be done.

The harmonious interweaving of the contents of the Written Torah
and their explanation, by way of the Kabbalah, is divided
into three categories:

[Masorah and kabbalah constitute interchangeable
terms. Both refer to the body of Oral Law explanations which was
passed on from generation to generation. Masorah, which
means handing over, focuses on the one handing over the
knowledge, that is, the giver. In contrast, kabbalah means
receiving; it spotlights the receiver. Each is part of the chain
of tradition which comprises all of the knowledge embodied in
the Oral Law. Therefore, they are one and the same. Because the
secret wisdom of Torah (sodos haTorah) can only be acquired
by receiving it orally from another, we also refer to it by the
term kabbalah. However, as you see here, the term kabbalah
is also used as a general term to describe the total body of Oral
Law knowledge.]

The first): Torah passages with subject matter which is stated
only in general rules of ambiguous terms. These do not specify
details, but the details are filled in and fully explained by
the masorah (or kabbalah). [Example: the aforementioned
passages dealing with tefillin and mezuzah.]

The second): Torah passages, the textual meaning of which
is uncertain because they can be interpreted in many ways [which
conflict with one another], and for which the Oral Law masorah
established the definitive explanation.

The third): Still more complicated Torah passages, in which, if
we were to adhere faithfully to the text, then the implied intent
emerges in one form; but the masorah states that the desired
intent [of G-d] is radically different from the obvious interpretation.
Regarding this category, our Sages z"l said, "The halacha
[the authority of the Oral Law] supersedes the text." "halacha
okeres es hamikra"(Sota 17b). Only a few passages
fall into this third category. Most importantly, even here, if
one takes the pains to probe the depths of the obvious interpretation,
he will find that the literal meaning of the text neither contradicts
the halachah entirely nor opposes it fully. Instead, upon
close analysis, it is found that the text in its literal posture
is being extrapolated in a certain vein and within certain delimitations.

Also, among those concepts which we have received from the masorah
of the Oral Law is this one: The Author of the Torah, G-d wrote
it in a specific format and utilized a unique set of rules. If
we want to understand the intention of the Author, we must analyze
and interpret the Torah according to those rules and the specific
format which He employed. It follows that it may be possible to
explain a passage in a manner which fits the text well, or to
explain the text in what appears to be a still more fitting way,
[than the Oral Law explanation]. Nevertheless, such an explanation
will not be a true one for the particular passage because the
intent of the Author Himself was a different one. These rules
and their format make up the "13 Rules Through Which the
Torah is Interpreted" "yud gimmel middos shehatorah
nidreshet bahen," along with their full compliment of
details.

One must also know that the core of all of the laws contained
in the positive commandments (mitzvohs aseh) and in the
negative prohibitions (mitzvohs lo sa'aseh) were all handed
down from Moshe Rabeinu. Also, the Sages received the tradition
that the teachings of the masorah are alluded to in the
Written Torah (remazim heim b'Torah shebichtov) through
various hints, and these hints themselves follow specific formulas
known to the Sages. It was common knowledge and acknowledged by
them that it was G-d's desire that we exert ourselves in this
area in order to pinpoint those places in the text where the written
Torah hints at the Oral Law rulings.

Not surprisingly, we find in the Talmud that each of the Sages
went to great lengths to identify and define the hints in the
text which, in his opinion, produced the most faithful match to
the masorah's ruling. This is why you will often find in
the Talmud discussions involving a search for proofs [from the
Biblical text] for a specific law [known to us through the masorah]
and disputes in some cases between the Sages about the validity
of certain proofs. In some instances, you will find that, in the
light of a simple logical explanation of the passages in question,
the proofs will not fit adequately. However, the reason is as
we have stated before: the law itself was known to the Sages by
way of the masorah. What the Sages were attempting to do
was to pinpoint the particular passage which hints at this
law in the written Torah, all the time following through in the
aforementioned procedures.

The Sages did not claim that the interpretation they gave to the
text [serving as the source of a particular law] was the textual
intent of that passage. What they meant to state was that this
was what G-d, the author of the Torah, had inserted in that passage
to serve as a desirable hint about the particular law and
that the hint was discovered by the method used for the discernment
of such allusion. The hint was only meant to provide an additional
facet to what He wanted to express through the literal meaning
of the text [the peshat]. Our sages sometimes term this
allusion as asmachtah ("a support").

All of the material which we have been discussing relates to the
various types of mitzvohs and laws of the Torah. However,
when we deal with the category we call aggadohs (the sections
of the Talmud and midrashim which deal in ethics and other
non-halachic matters), other principles are involved. These
I have explained in a separate essay ["Essay on the Aggodahs"].

Besides [the laws handed down through the masorah] there
are other laws which comprise the "Rabbinic laws" (takanos
chazal). [These were added in the generations after the receiving
of the Torah and are invoked to fortify Torah observance.] Even
in these cases, very delicate hints can be found in the passages
of the Torah; this, too, is called asmachta. However, this
variety of"asmachta"is much more
superficial than is the first type which we have mentioned. The
basic intent of this secondary type of hint is to serve as a focal
point [or peg] for remembering a particular law. Nonetheless,
our Sages did not refrain from viewing these Rabbinic laws as
ones which have also been incorporated into the Torah's texts
as hints - although in some cases the allusions may be very remote
ones. Such hints as incorporated into a passage rest upon prescience,
seeing into the future (tzipiyah b'asidos), for all is
foreseen by G-d and He hinted [in His Torah] about everything
[which will ever occur]. However, this particular area [the Rabbinic
Laws] is not at all part of the explanation of the commandments.
Therefore He alluded to them in a very abstract manner.

There are also other details of law which were not handed down,
and the Sages derived them through logical reasoning processes
or through the "13 Rules of Interpretation" [as mentioned
previously]. Disputes can arise in regard to these laws. The decisionrendered, based also on a set of rules for deciding such disputes,
is binding upon us. We must follow and fully abide by them. We
cannot allow the fact that there is a dispute in the matter to
weaken to any degree the validity of the final decision. This
is exactly what G-d commanded us: if there be a dispute regarding
the laws of the Torah, it must be decided by the bais din
[when the Temple existed it was the "Sanhedrin," the
Highest Court which decided], and the decision which emerges must
be obeyed in an absolute fashion.

It has also been passed down to us by way of the commandment,
"You shall not turn aside from that which they tell you,
either to the right or to the left" (Deuteronomy 17:11).
"Lo sasur min hadavar asher yegidu l'cha yamin u'smol,"
the Master intended that (a) the Jewish Courts and their Sages
be empowered to issue decrees and to legislate laws, and (b) that
we all are obliged to follow them, and (c) that no one may violate
their directives in any manner or form. We must realize that all
of these laws were legislated by the Sages to ensure the observance
of the mitzvos of Torah itself and to do what is desirable
in the eyes of G-d. These laws, then, are to be observed just
as meticulously as all of the mitzvohs of Torah must be
observed. Moreover, it has been passed down to us by the masorah
that the intention of this commandment [of following the instructions
of our Sages] is that we make "fences around the Torah."

It would have actually been appropriate that G-d Himself command
us in the Torah about these very same laws. However, it was His
desire that the laws originate through our own efforts and that
we ourselves be the ones to initiate certain mitzvohs [the
Rabbinic laws] according to the format of His Torah. He also desired
that we do this by following the specific regulations and limitations
which He provided for this purpose.

Therefore, there is no difference between our obligation to follow
the commandments which have been explicitly expressed in the Torah
and our duty to follow the enactments and decrees of our Sages
(takanos chazal u'gezerosaihem). For, it was G-d's desire
that we observe these [laws legislated by the Sages] along with
those expressly-stated in the Torah. Likewise, just as the violation
of expressly stated Torah laws is considered a rebellion against
G-d's word, so too is the violation of any laws promulgated by
the Sages. No distinction is made between the two types other
than that which the Sages themselves have made. That is, where
a bona fide doubt exists in cases of Torah law in regard
to whether something is forbidden or permissible, doubt is resolved
on the side of the stricter opinion; and, in cases of Rabbinical
laws, the doubts are resolved in favor of the more lenient option.

Another example of such divine differentiation can be found among
those laws belonging to the category of the negative commandments:
adulterous relations by Torah ruling are punishable by koress
(to be "cut off" spiritually) or by death sentences
which are decreed by bais din. [The implementation depends
on the particular adulterous relationship - for there are various
Torah punishments for the respective kinds of forbidden sexual
relationships.] In contrast, the wearing of shatnes [wearing
a garment containing wool and linen is only forbidden by a negative
commandment with no capital punishment involved.] Or, to cite
another example: it is forbidden to derive any benefit from meat
and milk [cooked together] yet cheilev (forbidden fat),
although forbidden to be eaten, one may derive benefit when used
for non-food purposes. These distinctions are there solely because
they represent the boundaries established by G-d's will. However,
our obligations are to observe the commandments within the specific,
designated limits. In regard to the applicable limits, there is
no difference whatsoever between one variety and another.

It follows then that for this specific reason the Sages saw fit
to discuss so extensively [in the Talmud] many of the laws and
decrees they promulgated. They discussed them in great detail
and clarified their nature in complicated disputes, though they
be only Rabbinic Legislation. In terms of binding obligation upon
us to carry out these regulations, it was considered by them of
equal importance that we obey the Rabbinic Laws and decrees and
follow them as faithfully as the commandments of Torah itself.
The only difference is that is was G-d's desire that the Rabbinic
Laws come about in a special fashion, through our own efforts.
Therefore, it is the very same, whether He commands us to put
in tefillin between our eyes - or He commands us that we
legislate decrees upon ourselves for the safeguarding of Torah.
All it means is that the form of discharging one particular mitzvoh
is in such and such a manner, and the form of executing another
is in a different manner. The common denominator in both is that
they represent the fulfillment of G-d's will and comprise acts
of obedience to His Decree.

Included among the explanations which define this particular commandment
our Sages have received [of following the words of the Sages]
is this: power lies in the hands of the bais din to set
aside a Torah regulation (yesh koach b'yad bais din l'vatel
davar min haTorah) when it is done for the purpose of safeguarding
the Torah itself.

This power is limited to a law which is set aside in a passive
way (b'shev v'al ta'aseh) but not in an active way (b'kum
aseh). It was upon this principle which the Sages made their
decrees regarding the use of the shofar and lulav on Shabbos,
as explained in the Mishna and Talmud. The Rabbis legislated that
we refrain from fulfilling these mitzvohs because of the
chance of inadvertently violating Shabbos. This was done
by employing the authority of the masorah handed down to
them (Rosh Hashanah 29b, Sukkah 42).