Wednesday, December 31, 2014

Window on Eurasia: The Longer Putin is in Office, the Worse for Russia, Butakov Says

Paul
Goble

Staunton, December 31 – Tomorrow is
the 15th anniversary of Boris Yeltsin’s New Year’s gift to the
Russian people – Vladimir Putin as their ruler – a man who was not the servant
of the oligarchs as some had expected but rather a willful leader who has made
the last decade a half into his own “era.”

But it is now clear that whatever
Russians believe he has done for their country now, the longer Putin remains in
office, Yaroslav Butakov argues in a commentary on Rufabula.com today, the more
disastrous things will become the consequences for Russia and the Russian
people (rufabula.com/articles/2014/12/31/putin-retrospective).

The reasons for that conclusion, the
historian says, are to be found in the personality of the man who has become
the ruler of Russia.Putin has shown
himself to be increasingly inadequate in providing answers to the questions
that his own actions are causing to be raised, and he is sacrificing the interests
of the country in the name of maintaining his own power.

It is quite possible, Butakov says,
that Putin is suffering from an emotional problem which means that “the chief
goal of his political acts is personal self-assertion.” Such an individual
needs “extraordinary circumstances where he can display his qualities as ‘a
savior’” and win plaudits for doing so regardless of the consequences.

“An authoritarian ruler is always
put forward by a ruling class,” the historian points out, “but having become
such, the ruler begins to ‘build’ a ruling class” that will support him and his
projects. Consensus on this point, of course, can ultimately be “destroyed by
the actions” of the ruler himself.

“Disagreement at the top is a
necessary factor of any revolution, for a consolidated ruling class always is
capable of putting down any dissatisfaction coming only from below,” Butakov
says. “Only groups in the elite itself who are dissatisfied [will be] capable
of pulling down the regime,” he says.

“However paradoxical” it may seem,
the analyst continues, “the very sharpest intra-elite conflict in Russia after
1993 preceded the ascent of Putin to the Olympus of power.”That was the fight between Putin and Luzhkov
in 1999. It was “a real ‘crisis of the people at the top.’” And it arose over
what to do about Chechnya.

That struggle featured themes that
are once again surfacing. Indeed, Butakov argues, “there is nothing new in
principle in this connection” in 2014, although there are some minor variations
because of the experience of 15 years ago and the inertia of some of the
participants who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing from that time.

Compared with 1999, the situation
Putin finds himself in today appears “particularly firm,” but “is that so in
reality?” Butakov asks. In fact, “the lack of a definite intra-elite opposition
is the result, above all, of the negative selection of cadres” by Putin, of his
driving out of all “independently thinking personalities” be they Kasyanov or
Illarionov.

“The elite as a whole needs an
executor, but the leader for his part needs around him only executors” of his
will,” he says. “No one must interfere with his plans to pay the single ‘savior’”
of the situation.” Over time, Butakov argues, “this dilemma can become
irresolvable.” The real question is: “has that time come?”

It is still not clear how groups
within the elite are reacting to what has changed in their worlds thanks to
Putin’s policies. But to the extent that they do become convinced that he
threatens their interests, their opposition will first occur behind the scenes
and then “provoke a domino effect for the entire political system of ‘enlightened
authoritarianism.’”

How much longer the Putin era will
last remains unclear, Butakov says. But “the Russian Federation as ‘the legal
successor of the USSR’ or some kind of ‘USSR 2.0’ has turned out to be a failed
and lifeless project.” And Putin’s efforts to play a role “exceeding the
capacity of the country” are only leading Russia to collapse much faster than
would otherwise be the case.

Consequently, on this New Year’s
Eve, Russian must recognize that the longer Putin remains in office and
conducts the policies he is promoting now, “the more catastrophic the
consequences” will be for everyone concerned.

One can only hope, Butakov
concludes, “that a year from now, our New Year’s television picture will look
different than it does today.”