HUFF, J.: Leatrice Williams Collins appeals from the trial court's grant of a directed verdict in
favor of unknown motorist John Doe. The trial court held Collins failed to meet the requirement of
the uninsured motorist statute, South Carolina Code Annotated Section 38-77-170 (Supp. 1999).
We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Collins was injured in an automobile accident on March 11, 1994. According to Collins, she was
traveling north on Highway 301 when a car traveling on Highway 521 failed to yield the right of
way where Highway 521 intersects with Highway 301. Collins swerved into the lane of oncoming
traffic to avoid the car. Because a truck was heading towards her, she swerved back into her
original lane, sideswiping a car driven by Joanne Calvin. The car that failed to yield the right of
way did not stop.

Collins filed this action against John Doe, the unknown driver of the unidentified vehicle pursuant
to Section 38-77-170. She alleged Doe's failure to yield the right of way and other acts of
negligence, carelessness, and recklessness caused her collision with Calvin.

At trial, Collins called Roberta Briggs, Calvin's sister, as a witness. Briggs testified that while she
was walking she saw Calvin and waved at her so that she could catch a ride. Calvin stopped to
make a left turn to pick her up. Briggs stated she saw a light-colored car fail to stop at the yield
sign and keep going. The light-colored car passed Calvin on the right, hitting the sidewalk.
Briggs
saw Collins swerve out of her lane and try to pass Calvin's car on the driver's side. Briggs testified
that when Collins was not able to get around because of oncoming traffic, she pulled back and hit
Calvin's car. On cross-examination, she testified Collins was traveling fast.

Collins also called Calvin as a witness. Calvin testified she was coming off of Highway 521 at the
Highway 301 intersection when she stopped for her sister. She stated the car traveling behind her
on Highway 521 ran Collins's car into the other lane. Calvin stated Collins had to hit her to avoid
a head-on collision with a truck. On cross-examination, she testified she did not see Collins's car
until it hit her.

After Collins rested her case, Doe moved for a directed verdict arguing that Collins's failure to
produce an affidavit of a witness to the accident as required by Section 38-77-170 rendered her
unable to recover under the statute. The trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Collins argues the trial court erred in granting Doe's motion for directed verdict. She asserts that
although she did not present the affidavit of a witness to the accident, the witnesses' trial
testimony satisfied the statutory requirements. We agree.

Section 38-77-170 provides:

If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the
insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision,
unless:

(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police
authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;

(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident
must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle;
provided however, the witness must sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the
accident contained in the affidavit;

(3) the insured was not negligent in failing to determine the identity of the other vehicle and the
driver of the other vehicle at the time of the accident.

The following statement must be prominently displayed on the face of the affidavit provided in
subitem (2) above: A FALSE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THIS
AFFIDAVIT MAY SUBJECT THE PERSON MAKING THE FALSE STATEMENT TO CRIMINAL
PENALTIES AS PROVIDED BY LAW.

The primary concern in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislature if it
reasonably can be discovered in the language when construed in the light of its intended purpose.
Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1996);
Singletary v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ.,
316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994). "However plain the ordinary meaning of the words
used in a statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead to a
result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or would
defeat the plain legislative intention." Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C.
271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994). The uninsured motorist statutes are remedial in nature and
enacted for the benefit of the injured persons. They are to be liberally construed so that the
purpose may be accomplished. Gunnels v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 242, 161 S.E.2d 822
(1968); Franklin v. Devore, 327 S.C. 418, 489 S.E.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1997).

In a case such as this where there was no contact with the unknown vehicle, the plain language of
Section 38-77-170 requires the filing of an affidavit by a corroborating witness. An affidavit is a
"voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths." Black's Law Dictionary 58 (7th ed. 1999). In requiring the witness
to sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident, the legislature intended to
preclude false statements by making such a false statement subject to criminal laws. Testimony at
trial is obviously taken under oath. Giving false testimony at trial constitutes the felony of perjury
and subjects the perjurer to a fine and/or up to five years imprisonment. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-10
(Supp. 1999). Although Section 38-77-170 does not specifically provide for sworn testimony as a
substitute for an affidavit, we find such testimony fulfills the legislature's intent. To hold
otherwise would elevate form over substance. SeeSouth Carolina Second Injury Fund v. American
Yard Products, 330 S.C. 20, 496 S.E.2d 862 (1998), citingLiberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. South Carolina
Second Injury Fund, 318 S.C. 516, 518, 458 S.E.2d 550, 551 (1995) ("[t]he real purpose of the
legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words.").

Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in holding Collins' claim must fail as a matter of law
because she failed to provide affidavits by her corroborating witnesses.

John Doe asserts that even if this court holds Collins satisfied Section 38-77-170, he is still entitled
to a directed verdict because Collins did not produce witnesses to establish John Doe caused the
accident. We disagree. (1)

When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this court, like the trial court, must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brady Dev. Co. v. Town
of Hilton Head Island, 312 S.C. 73, 439 S.E.2d 266 (1993). A directed verdict should not be granted
unless only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence. Horry County v. Laychur,
315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993). When considering the motion, neither this court nor the trial
court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony and evidence.
Garrett v. Locke, 309 S.C. 94, 419 S.E.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1992).

Briggs testified that she saw a light colored car fail to yield to Collins and she saw Collins swerve
out of her lane and then sideswipe Calvin's car. On cross-examination, she stated Collins was
traveling too fast to stop. Calvin also testified an unknown car failed to yield and ran Collins out of
her lane. On cross-examination, however, Calvin admitted she did not see Collins until the impact.
The testimony by these witnesses verifies the existence of an unknown vehicle driven by an
unknown driver that failed to yield the right-of-way. It is a question for the jury as to the weight to
assign the testimony and whether John Doe's negligence or Collins's own negligence caused the
accident.

The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and the case
REMANDED.

ANDERSON, J., concurs.

GOOLSBY, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

GOOLSBY, Judge (dissenting): I respectfully dissent. I would affirm, believing as did the trial
judge, that the absence of the affidavit mandated by the South Carolina General Assembly in
South Carolina Code section 38-77-170 required him to direct a verdict against the appellant
Leatrice Williams Collins. (2)

Section 38-77-170 provides in pertinent part:

If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the
insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision,
unless:

(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police
authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;

(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident
must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle;
provided however, the witness must sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the
accident contained in the affidavit;

. . .

The following statement must be prominently displayed on the face of the affidavit provided in
subitem (2) above: A FALSE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THIS
AFFIDAVIT MAY SUBJECT THE PERSON MAKING THE FALSE STATEMENT TO CRIMINAL
PENALTIES AS PROVIDED BY LAW. (3)

Here, there is no sworn statement in writing, which is what an "affidavit" is. (4) Absent also is the
mandated signature of a witness on an affidavit "attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident."
Moreover, the mandated warning concerning false statements appears nowhere "on the face of [an]
affidavit." Collins in no way complied with any of the express commands of the statute in question,
as easy as they are to be understood and observed.

In interpreting a statute, we, as appellate judges, are to give effect to the language used by the
legislature, (5) especially if, as here, the statute's language is plain and unambiguous. (6) To do that
means we can only hold that the requirement of a certain affidavit, with prescribed language
printed in a particular way and appearing prominently on the face of the affidavit, does not include
a witness' mere testimony given in court under oath. (7)

As to any suggestion that to disallow in-court testimony under oath is to elevate form over
substance, I can only say that the technical requirement of a signed affidavit containing on its face
certain prescribed language is not a mere matter of form; rather, it is one of substance. (8) Indeed, it
is an express element of the right of action itself. (9) The legislature has said there
must be a signed
affidavit with certain language that must appear prominently on its face and, if one is not
provided, "there is no right of action or recovery." (10) If the legislature had deemed the in-court
testimony of a witness under oath a proper substitute for the particular type of affidavit required
by section 38-77-170, then the legislature would have said so in plain and unambiguous language.

I would affirm.

1. SeeI'on, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000) (holding appellate court may
address issue the lower court did not rule on where the issue is raised as an additional sustaining ground).

2. When granting respondent John Doe's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge stated:

I feel I am compelled to apply the plain language of the statute. While in my mind the sworn testimony of
a witness in court is the equivalent of an affidavit from the standpoint of reliability, that is not what the
statute clearly requires[.] I feel that I must give effect to the plain language of the legislature. This court
cannot legislate. [I]f that is not what the legislature had intended and if they had intended that sworn
testimony in court would be sufficient, [it] very clearly could have put that in the statute or the statute
could be amended to that effect.

I feel like that while that testimony is just as reliable as an affidavit might be, there may be other reasons
that the legislature chose not to include that in the statute. . . . I think it's clearly a matter for the
legislature which I cannot do.

6. SeeJones v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 247 S.C. 132, 136, 146 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1966) ("The
first rule of construction in the interpretation of statutes is that of intention on the part of the legislature
and where the terms of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, there is no room for construction, and courts
must apply them according to their literal meaning. . . . There is no safer nor better rule of interpretation
than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly says.");
see
alsoMcKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 473 (In holding that oral sworn testimony failed to satisfy
the requirements of a statute that required an affidavit, the supreme court stated: "The mandate of the
statute is clear. The Court cannot, under the guise of statutory interpretation, overlook [the] plain
meaning of the statute to imply instead a wholly different meaning than was intended by the
legislature."); Martin v. Ellisor, 266 S.C. 377, 223 S.E.2d 415 (1976)
("When . . . [a] statute is plain and
unambiguous, it becomes the duty of the court to apply it literally because the legislative design is unmistakable. . . .
This rule of literal application may be forced to yield, but only when its application would produce an absurd
result.").

7. Cf.McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 472-73 (holding that oral sworn statements were not
sufficient where search warrant statute required affidavit); United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding sworn information presented to a commissioner other than that contained in
affidavits could not be considered where rule of criminal procedure provided that a warrant shall issue
only on affidavit sworn to before a judge or commissioner as the word affidavit referred to a sworn
statement in writing made especially under oath); Powelson v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970) (holding oral sworn statements not an affidavit within a statute requiring sworn statements
to be contained in an affidavit before a search warrant could be issued).

8. SeeSoil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc.,
323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996) (wherein the
supreme court noted the conclusion of the court of appeals that "form should not be elevated over
substance" applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction to hold that the unambiguous wording
of the arbitration statute required notice that a contract is subject to arbitration be typed in underlined
capital letters or rubber-stamped on the contract's first page, and found that the technical requirements of
the statute were not met where the arbitration notice on the contract was not underlined);
Criterion Ins.
Co. v. Hoffmann, 258 S.C. 282, 292, 188 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1972) (wherein the supreme court stated,
construing a prior version of the uninsured motorist law, "the procedural obligations that the insured must
discharge in order to recover, since they are prescribed by statute, are viewed by the courts as mandatory,
and strict compliance with them is a prerequisite to recover").

10. SeeCriterion, 258 S.C. at 290, 188 S.E.2d at 462 ("Except for the statute, and endorsements required,
no right exists to recover from one's own insurance carrier. One must look to the terms of the uninsured
motorist statute and policy endorsements and comply therewith to get the benefit of the law. . . . It is the
province of the lawmakers to create a right of action, to provide for process and to declare the procedure for
collecting from one's own insurance carrier. They did just that.").