IN JULY Page received a cablegram summoning him to Washington.
This message did not explain why his presence was desired, nor
on this point was Page ever definitely enlightened, though there
were more or less vague statements that a "change of atmosphere"
might better enable the Ambassador to understand the problems
which were then engrossing the State Department.

The President had now only a single aim in view. From the date
of the so-called Sussex "pledge," May 4, 1916,
until the resumption of submarine warfare on February 1, 1917,
Mr. Wilson devoted all his energies to bringing the warring powers
together and establishing peace. More than one motive was inspiring
the President in this determination. That this policy accorded
with his own idealistic tendencies is true, and that he aspired
to a position in history as the great "peace maker "
is probably the fact, but he had also more immediate and practical
purposes in mind. Above all, Mr. Wilson was bent on keeping the
United States out of the war; he knew that there was only one
certain way of preserving peace in this country, and that was
by bringing the war itself to an end. "An early peace is
all that can prevent the Germans from driving us at last into
the war," Page wrote at about this time; and this single
sentence gives the key to the President's activities for the succeeding
nine months. The negotiations over the Sussex had taught
Mr. Wilson this truth. He understood that the pledge which the
German Government had made was only a conditional one; that the
submarine campaign had been suspended only for the purpose of
giving the United States a breathing spell during which it could
persuade Great Britain and France to make peace.

"I repeat my proposal," Bernstorff cabled his government
on April 26,(<A NAME="n151"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#151">151</A>)
"to suspend the submarine war at least for the period of
negotiations. This would remove all danger of a breach [with the
United States] and also enable Wilson to continue his labours
in his great plan of bringing about a peace based upon the freedom
of the seas---i. e., that for the future trade shall be free from
all interference in time of war. According to the assurances which
Wilson, through House, has given me, he would in that case take
in hand measures directly against England. He is, however, of
the opinion that it would be easier to bring about peace than
to cause England to abandon the blockade. This last could only
be brought about by war and it is well known that the means of
war are lacking here. A prohibition of exports as a weapon against
the blockade is not possible as the prevailing prosperity would
suffer by it.

"The inquiries made by House have led Wilson to believe
that our enemies would not be unwilling to consider peace. In
view of the present condition of affairs, I repeat that there
is only one possible course, namely, that Your Excellency [Von
Jagow] empower me to declare that we will enter into negotiations
with the United States touching the conduct of the submarine war
while the negotiations are proceeding. This would give us the
advantage that the submarine war, being over Mr. Wilson's head,
like the sword of Damocles, would compel him at once to take in
hand the task of mediation."

This dispatch seems sufficiently to explain all the happenings
of the summer and winter of 1916-1917. It was sent to Berlin on
April 26th; the German Government gave the Sussex "pledge"
on May 4th, eight days afterward. In this reply Germany declared
that she would now expect Mr. Wilson to bring pressure upon Great
Britain to secure a mitigation or suspension of the British blockade,
and to this Mr. Wilson promptly and energetically replied that
he regarded the German promise as an unconditional one and that
the Government of the United States "cannot for a moment
entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German
naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States
upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree
be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting
the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such
matters is single not joint; absolute not relative."

This reply gave satisfaction to both the United States and
the countries of the Allies, and Page himself regarded it as a
master stroke. "The more I think of it," he wrote on
May 17th, "the better the strategy of the President appears,
in his latest (and last) note to Germany. They laid a trap for
him and he caught them in their own trap. The Germans had tried
to 'put it up' to the President to commit the first unfriendly
act. He now 'puts it up' to them. And this is at last bound to
end the controversy if they sink another ship unlawfully. The
French see this clearly and so do the best English, and it has
produced a most favourable impression. The future? The German
angling for peace will prove futile. They'll have another fit
of fury. Whether they will again become reckless or commit 'mistakes'
with their submarines will depend partly on their fury, partly
on their fear to make a breach with the United States, but mainly
on the state of their submarine fleet. How many have the English
caught and destroyed? That's the main question, after all. The
English view may not be fair to them. But nobody here believes
that they will long abstain from the luxury of crime."

It is thus apparent that when the Germans practically demanded,
as a price of their abstention from indiscriminate submarine warfare,
that Mr. Wilson should move against Great Britain in the matter
of the blockade, they realized the futility of any such step,
and that what they really expected to obtain was the presidential
mediation for peace. President Wilson at once began to move in
this direction. On May 27th, three weeks after the Sussex "pledge,"
he made an address in Washington before the League to Enforce
Peace, which was intended to lay the basis for his approaching
negotiations. It was in this speech that he made the statement
that the United States was "not concerned with the causes
and the objects" of the war. "The obscure fountains
from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested
to search for or to explain." This was another of those unfortunate
sentences which made the President such an unsympathetic figure
in the estimation of the Allies and seemed to indicate to them
that he had no appreciation of the nature of the struggle. Though
this attitude of non-partisanship, of equal balance between the
accusations of the Allies and Germany, was intended to make the
President acceptable as a mediator, the practical result was exactly
the reverse, for Allied statesmen turned from Wilson as soon as
those sentences appeared in print. The fact that this same oration
specified the "freedom of the seas" as one of the foundation
rocks of the proposed new settlement only accentuated this unfavourable
attitude.

This then was clearly the "atmosphere" which prevailed
in Washington at the time that Page was summoned home. But Page's
letters of this period indicate how little sympathy he entertained
for such negotiations. "It is quite apparent," he had
recently written to Colonel House, "that nobody in Washington
understands the war. Come over and find out." Extracts from
a letter which he wrote to his brother, Mr. Henry A. Page, of
Aberdeen, North Carolina, are especially interesting when placed
side by side with the President's statements of this particular
time. These passages show that a two years' close observation
of the Prussians in action had not changed Page's opinion of their
motives or of their methods; in 1916, as in 1914, Page could see
in this struggle nothing but a colossal buccaneering expedition
on the part of Germany. "As I look at it," he wrote,
"our dilly-dallying is likely to get us into war. The Germans
want somebody to rob---to pay their great military bills. They've
robbed Belgium and are still robbing it of every penny they can
lay their hands on. They robbed Poland and Serbia---two very poor
countries which didn't have much. They set out to rob France and
have so far been stopped from getting to Paris. If they got to
Paris there wouldn't be thirty cents' worth of movable property
there in a week, and they'd levy fines of millions of francs a
day. Their military scheme and teaching and open purpose is to
make somebody pay for their vast military outlay of the last forty
years. They must do that or go bankrupt. Now it looks as if they
would go bankrupt. But in a little while they may be able to bombard
New York and demand billions of dollars to refrain from destroying
the city. That's the richest place left to spoil.

"Now they say that---quite openly and quite frankly. Now
if we keep 'neutral' to a highwayman---what do we get for our
pains? That's the mistake we are making. If we had sent Bernstorff
home the day after the Lusitania was sunk and recalled
Gerard and begun to train an army we'd have had no more trouble
with them. But since they have found out that they can keep us
discussing things forever and a day, they will keep us discussing
things till they are ready. We are very simple; and we'll get
shot for it yet. . . .

"The prestige and fear of the United States has gone down,
down, down---disappeared; and we are regarded as 'discussors,'
incapable of action, scared to death of war. That's all the invitation
that robbers, whose chief business is war, want---all the invitation
they need. These devils are out for robbery---and you don't seem
to believe it in the United States: that's the queer thing. This
neutrality business makes us an easy mark. As soon as they took
a town in Belgium, they asked for all the money in the town, all
the food, all the movable property; and they've levied a tax every
month since on every town and made the town government borrow
the money to pay it. If a child in a town makes a disrespectful
remark, they fine the town an extra $1,000. They haven't got enough
so far to keep them going flush; and they won't unless they get
Paris---which they can't do now. If they got London, they'd be
rich; they wouldn't leave a shilling and they'd make all the rich
English get all the money they own abroad. This is the reason
that Frenchmen and Englishmen prefer to be killed by the 100,000.
In the country over which their army has passed a crow would die
of starvation and no human being has ten cents of real money.
The Belgian Commission is spending more than 100 million dollars
a year to keep the Belgians alive---only because they are robbed
every day. They have a rich country and could support themselves
but for these robbers. That's the meaning of the whole thing.
And yet we treat them as if they were honourable people. It's
only a question of time and of power when they will attack us,
or the Canal, or South America. Everybody on this side the world
knows that. And they are 'yielding' to keep us out of this war
so that England will not help us when they (the Germans) get ready
to attack America.

"There is the strangest infatuation in the United States
with Peace---the strangest illusion about our safety without preparation."

Several letters to Colonel House show the state of the British
mind on the subject of the President's peace proposals:

.

To Edward M. Mouse

Royal Bath and East Cliff Hotel, Bournemouth,

23 May, 1916.

DEAR HOUSE:

The motor trip that the Houses, the Wallaces, and the Pages
took about a year ago was the last trip (three days) that I had
had out of London; and I'd got pretty tired. The China(<A
NAME="n152"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#152">152</A>)case
having been settled (and settled as we wanted it), I thought
it a good time to try to get away for a week. So here Mrs. Page
and I are---very much to my benefit. I've spent a beautiful week
out of doors, on this seashore; and I have only about ten per
cent. of the fatal diseases that I had a week ago. That is to
say, I'm as sound as a dollar and feel like a fighting cock.

Sir Edward was fine about the China case. He never
disputed the principle of the inviolability of American ships
on the high seas; but the Admiralty maintained that some of these
men are officers in the German Army and are now receiving officers'
pay. I think that that is probably true. Nevertheless, the Admiralty
had bungled the case badly and Sir Edward simply rode over them.
They have a fine quarrel among themselves and we got all we wanted
and asked for.

Of course, I can't make out the Germans but I am afraid some
huge deviltry is yet coming. When the English say that the Germans
must give up their militarism, I doubt if the Germans yet know
what they mean. They talk about conquered territory---Belgium,
Poland, and the rest. It hasn't entered their heads that they've
got to give up their armies and their military system.. When
this does get into their heads, if it ever do, I think they may
so swell with rage at this "insult" that they may break
loose in one last desperate effort, ignoring the United States,
defying the universe, running amuck. Of course it would be foolhardy
to predict this, but the fear of it keeps coming into my mind.
The fear is the more persistent because, if the worst comes to
them, the military caste and perhaps the dynasty itself will
prefer to die in one last terrific onslaught rather than to make
a peace on terms which, will require the practical extinction
of their supreme power. This, I conceive, is the really great
danger that yet awaits the world---if the Allies hold together
till defeat and famine drive the Germans to the utmost desperation.

In the meantime, the Allies still holding together as they
are, there's no peace yet in the British and French minds. They're
after the militarism of Prussia---not territory or other gains;
and they seem likely to get it, as much by the blockade as by
victories on land. Do you remember how in the Franco-Prussian
War, Bismarck refused to deal with the French Emperor? He demanded
that representatives of the French people should deal with him.
He got what he asked for and that was the last of the French
Emperor. Neither the French nor the English have forgotten that.
You will recall that the Germans starved Paris into submission.
Neither the French. nor the English have forgotten that. These
two leaves out of the Germans' own book of forty-five years ago---these
two and no more---may be forced on the Germans themselves.
They are both quite legitimate, too. You can read a recollection
of both these events between the lines of the interviews that
Sir Edward and Mr. Balfour recently gave to American newspapers.

There is nothing but admiration here for the strategy of the
President's last note to Germany. That was the cleverest play
made by anybody since the war began--- clever beyond praise.
Now he's "got 'em." But nobody here doubts that they
will say, sooner or later, that the United States, not having
forced the breaking of the British blockade, has not kept its
bargain---that's what they'll say---and it is in order again
to run amuck. This is what the English think---provided the Germans
have enough submarines left to keep up real damage. By that time,
too, it will be clear to the Germans that the President can't
bring peace so long as only one side wishes peace. The Germans
seem to have counted much on the Irish uprising, which came to
pass at all only because of the customary English stupid bungling;
and the net result has been only to put the mass of the Irish
on their mettle to show that they are not Sinn Feiners. The final
upshot will be to strengthen the British Army. God surely is
good to this bungling British Government. Wind and wave and the
will of High Heaven seem to work for them. I begin to understand
their stupidity and their arrogance. If your enemies are such
fools in psychological tactics and Heaven is with you, why take
the trouble to be alert? And why be modest? Whatever the reason,
these English are now more cocky and confident than they've been
before since the war began. They are beginning to see results.
The only question seems to be to hold the Allies together, and
they seem to be doing that. In fact, the battle of Verdun has
cemented them. They now have visible proof that the German Army
is on the wane. And they have trustworthy evidence that the blockade
is telling severely on the Germans. Nobody, I think, expects
to thrash 'em to a frazzle; but the almost universal opinion
here is that the hold of militarism will be shaken loose. And
the German High Canal Navy---what's to become of that? Von Tirpitz
is down and out, but there are thousands of Germans, I hear,
who complain of their naval inactivity. But God only knows the
future---I don't. I think that I do well if I keep track of the
present. . . .

My kindest regards to Mrs. House,

Yours very heartily,

W. H. P.

.

To Edward M. House

London, 25 May, 1916.

DEAR HOUSE:

No utterance by anybody has so stirred the people of this
kingdom for many months. as Sir Edward Grey's impromptu speech
last night in the House of Commons about Peace, when he called
the German Chancellor a first-class liar. I sent you to-day a
clipping from one of the morning papers. Every paper I pick up
compliments Sir Edward. Everyone says, "We must fight to
a finish." The more sensational press intimates that any
Englishman who uses the word "peace" ought to be shot.
You have never seen such a rally as that which has taken place
in response to Sir Edward's cry. In the first place, as you know,
he is the most gentle of all the Cabinet, the last man to get
on a "war-rampage," the least belligerent and rambunctious
of the whole lot. When he felt moved to say that there can be
no peace till the German military despotism is broken, everybody
from one end of the Kingdom to the other seems to have thrown
up his hat and applauded. Except the half-dozen peace cranks
in the House (Bryan sort of men) you can't find a man, woman,
child, or dog that isn't fired with the determination to see
the war through. The continued talk about peace which is reported
directly and indirectly from Germany---coming from Switzerland,
from Rome, from Washington---has made the English and the French
very angry: no, "angry" isn't quite the right word.
It has made them very determined. They feel insulted by the impudence
of the Germans, who, since they know they are bound to lose,
seem to be turning heaven and earth to induce neutrals to take
their view of peace. People are asking here, "If they are
victorious, why doesn't their fleet come out of the canal and
take the seas, and again open their commerce? Why do they whimper
about the blockade when they will not even risk a warship to
break it?" You'll recall how the talk here used to be that
the English wouldn't wake up. You wouldn't know 'em now. Your
bulldog has got his grip and even thunder doesn't disturb him.

Incidentally, all the old criticism of Sir Edward Grey seems
to have been forgotten. You hear nothing but praise of him now.
I am told that he spoke his impromptu speech last night with
great fire and at once left the House.--- His speech has caused
a greater stir than the Irish rebellion, showing that every Englishman
feels that Sir Edward said precisely what every man feels.

The Germans have apparently overdone and overworked their
premature peace efforts and have made things worse for them.
They've overplayed their hand.

In fact, I see no end of the war. The Allies are not going
to quit prematurely. They won't even discuss the subject yet
with one another, and the Germans, by their peace-talk of the
sort that they inspire, simply postpone the day when the Allies
will take the subject up.

All the while, too, the Allies work closer and closer together.
They'll soon be doing even their diplomatic work with neutrals,
as a unit---England and France as one nation, and (on great subjects)
Russia and Italy also with them.

I've talked lately not only with Sir Edward but with nearly
half the other members of the Cabinet, and they. are all keyed
up to the same tune. The press of both parties, too, are (for
once) wholly agreed: Liberal and Conservative papers alike hold

the same war-creed.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.

Before leaving for Washington Page discussed the situation
personally with Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce. He has left memoranda
of both interviews.

.

Notes of a Private and Informal Conversation
with Sir Edward Grey, at his residence, on July 27, 1916, when
I called to say good-bye before sailing on leave to the United
States

. . . Sir Edward Grey went on to say quite frankly that two
thoughts expressed in a speech by the President some months ago
had had a very serious influence on British opinion. One thought
was that the causes or objects of the war were of no concern
to him, and the other was his (at least implied) endorsement
of "the freedom of the seas," which the President did
not define.

Concerning the first thought, he understood of course that
a neutral President could not say that he favoured one side or
the other: everybody understood that and nobody expected him
to take sides. But when the President said that the objects of
the war did not concern him, that was taken by British public
opinion as meaning a condemnation. of the British cause, and
it produced deep feeling.

Concerning the "freedom of the seas," he believed
that the first use of the phrase was made by Colonel House (on
his return from one of his visits to Berlin),(<A NAME="n153"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#153">153</A>) but the public now regarded
it as a German invention and it meant to the British mind a policy
which would render British supremacy at sea of little value in
time of war; and public opinion resented this. He knew perfectly
well that at a convenient time new rules must be made governing
the conduct of war at sea and on the land, too. But the German
idea of "the freedom of the seas" ("freedom"
was needed on land also) is repulsive to the British mind.

He mentioned these things because they had produced in many
minds an unwillingness, he feared, to use the good offices of
the President whenever any mediatorial service might be done
by a neutral. The tendency of these remarks was certainly in
that direction. Yet Sir Edward carefully abstained from expressing
such an unwillingness on his own part, and the inference from
his tone and manner, as well as from his habitual attitude, is
that he feels no unwillingness to use the President's good office,
if occasion should arise.

I asked what he meant by "mediatorial"---the President's
offering his services or good offices on his own initiative?
He said---No, not that. But the Germans might express to the
President their willingness or even their definite wish to have
an armistice, on certain terms, to discuss conditions of peace
coupled with an intimation that he might sound the Allies. He
did not expect the President to act on his own initiative, but
at the request or at least at the suggestion of the German Government,
he might conceivably sound the Allies---especially, he added,
"since I am informed that the notion is wide-spread in America
that the war will end inconclusively---as a draw." He smiled
and remarked, as an aside, that he didn't think that this notion
was held by any considerable group of people in any other country,
certainly not in Great Britain.

In further talk on this subject he said that none of the Allies
could mention peace or discuss peace till France should express
such a wish; for it is the very vitals of France that have received
and are receiving the shock of such an assault as was never before
launched against any nation. Unless France was ready to quit,
none of France's Allies could mention peace, and France showed
no mood to quit. Least of all could the English make or receive
any such suggestion at least till her new great army had done
its best; for until lately the severest fighting had not been
done by the British, whose army had practically been held in
reserve. There had for a long time been a perfect understanding
between Joffre and Haig---that the English would wait to begin
their offensive till the moment arrived when it best suited the
French.

The impression that I got from this part of the conversation
was that Sir Edward hoped that I might convey to the President
(as, of course, he could not) Sir Edward's idea of the effect
of these parts of the President's speech on feeling in England
toward him. Nowhere in the conversation did he make any request
of me. Any one, overhearing it, might have supposed it to be
a conversation between two men, with no object beyond expressing
their views. But, of course, he hoped and meant that I should,
in my own way, make known to the President what he said. He did
not say that the President's good offices, when the time should
come, would be unwelcome to him or to his government; and he
meant, I am sure, to convey only the fear that by these assertions
the President had planted an objection to his good offices in
a large section of British opinion.

Among the conditions of peace that Sir Edward himself personally
would like to see imposed (he had not yet discussed the subject
with any of his colleagues in the Government) was this: that
the German Government should agree to submit to an impartial
(neutral) commission or court the question, Who began the war
and who is responsible for it? The German Chancellor and other
high German officials have put it about and continue to put it
about that England is responsible, and doubtless the German people
at least believe it. All the governments concerned must (this
is his idea) submit to the tribunal all its documents and other
evidence bearing on the subject; and of course the finding of
the tribunal must be published.

Then he talked a good deal about the idea that lies behind
the League for Enforcing Peace---in a sympathetic mood. He went
on to point out how such a league---with force behind it---would
at any one of three stages have prevented this war---(1) When
England proposed a conference to France, Germany, Italy, and
Russia, all agreed to it but Germany. Germany alone prevented
a discussion. If the League to Enforce Peace had ineluded England,
France, Italy, and Russia---there would have been no war; for
Germany would have seen at once that they would all be against
her. (2) Later, when the Czar sent the Kaiser a personal telegram
proposing to submit their differences to some tribunal, a League
to Enforce Peace would have prevented war. And (3) when the question
of the invasion of Belgium came up, every signatory to the treaty
guaranteeing Belgium's integrity gave assurance of keeping the
treaty---but Germany, and Germany gave an evasive answer. A league
would again have prevented a war---or put all the military force
of all its members against Germany.

Throughout the conversation, which lasted about an hour, Sir
Edward said more than once, as he has often said to me, that
he hoped we should be able to keep the friction between our governments
at the minimum. He would regard it as the greatest calamity if
the ill-feeling that various events have stirred up in sections
of public opinion on each side should increase or should become
permanent. His constant wish and effort were to lessen and if

possible to remove all misunderstandings.

.

Lord Bryce was one of the Englishmen with whom Page was especially
inclined to discuss pending problems.

.

Notes on a conversation with
Lord Bryce, July 31, 1916

Lord Bryce spoke of the President's declaration that we were
not concerned with the causes or objects of the war and he said
that that remark had caused much talk---all, as he thought, on
a misunderstanding of Mr. Wilson's meaning. ---He meant, I take
it, only that he did not propose at that time to discuss the
causes or the objects of the war; and it is a pity that his sentence
was capable of being interpreted to mean something else; and
the sentence was published and discussed here apart from its
context---a most unfair proceeding. I can imagine that the President
and his friends may be much annoyed by this improper interpretation."

I remarked that the body of the speech in which this remark
occurred might have been written in Downing Street, so friendly
was it to the Allies.

"Quite, quite," said he.

This was at dinner, Lady Bryce and Mrs. Page and he and I
only being present.

When he and I went into the library he talked more than an
hour.

"And what about this blacklist?" he asked. I told
him. He had been in France for a week and did not know just what
had been done. He said that that seemed to him a mistake. "The
Government doesn't know America---neither does the British public.
Neither does the American Government (no American government)
know the British. Hence your government writes too many notes---all
governments are likely to write too many notes. Everybody gets
tired of seeing them and they lose their effect."

He mentioned the blockade and said that it had become quite
effective---wonderfully effective, in fact; and he implied that
he did not see why we now failed to recognize it. Our refusal
to recognize it had caused and doubtless is now causing such
ill-feeling as exists in England.

Then he talked long about peace and how it would probably
be arranged. He judged, from letters that he receives from the
United States as well as from Americans who come over here, that
there was an expectation in America that the President would
be called in at the peace settlement and that some persons even
expected him to offer mediation. He did not see how that could
be. He knew no precedent for such a proceeding. The President
might, of course, on the definite request of either side, make
a definite inquiry of the other side; but such a course would
be, in effect, merely the transmission of an inquiry.

But after peace was made and the time came to set up a League
for Enforcing Peace, or some such machinery, of course the United
States would be and would have to be a party to that if it were
to succeed. He reminded me that a little group of men here, of
whom he was one, early in the war sketched substantially the
same plan that the American League to Enforce Peace has worked
out. It had not seemed advisable to have any general public discussion
of it in England till the war should end: nobody had time now
to give to it.

As he knew no precedent for belligerents to call in a third
party when they met to end a war, so he knew no precedent for
any outside government to protest against the invasion of a country
by a Power that had signed a treaty to guarantee the integrity
of the invaded country---no precedent, that is to say, for the
United States to protest against the invasion of Belgium. "That
precedent," I said, "was found in Hysteria."

Lord Bryce, who had just returned from a visit to the British
headquarters in France, hardly dared hope for the end of the
war till next year; and the intervening time between now and
the end would be a time, he feared, of renewed atrocities and
increasing hatred. He cited the killing of Captain Fryatt of
the Brussels and the forcible deportation of young women
from Lille and other towns in the provinces of France occupied
by the Germans.

The most definite idea that he had touching American-British
relations was the fear that the anti-British feeling in the United
States would become stronger and would outlast the war. "It
is organized," he said. "The disaffected Germans and
the disaffected Irish are interested in keeping it up."
He asked what effect I thought the Presidential campaign would
have on this feeling. He seemed to have a fear that somehow the
campaign would give an occasion for stirring it up even more.

"Good-bye. Give my regards to all my American friends;

and I'm proud to say there are a good many of them."

.

One episode that was greatly stirring both Great Britain and
the United States at this time was the trial of Sir Roger Casement,
the Irish leader who had left Wilhelmshaven for Ireland in a German
submarine and who had been captured at Tralee in the act of landing
arms and munitions for an Irish insurrection. Casement's subsequent
trial and conviction on a charge of high treason had inspired
a movement in his favour from Irish-Americans, the final outcome
of which was that the Senate, in early August, passed a resolution
asking the British Government for clemency and stipulating that
this resolution should be presented to the Foreign Office. Page
was then on the ocean bound for the United States and the delicate
task of presenting this document to Sir Edward Grey fell upon
Mr. Laughlin, who was now Chargé d'affaires. Mr. Laughlin
is a diplomat of great experience, but this responsibility at
first seemed to be something of a poser even for him. He had received
explicit instructions from Washington to present this resolution,
and the one thing above all which a diplomatic officer must do
is to carry out the orders of his government, but Mr. Laughlin
well knew that, should he present this paper in the usual manner,
the Foreign Secretary might decline to receive it; he might regard
it as an interference with matters that exclusively concerned
the sovereign state. Mr. Laughlin, however, has a technique all
his own, and, in accordance with this, he asked for an interview
with Sir Edward Grey to discuss a matter of routine business.
However, the Chargé d'affaires carried the Casement resolution
tucked away in an inside pocket when he made his call.

Like Mr. Page, Mr. Laughlin was on the friendliest terms with
Sir Edward Grey, and, after the particular piece of business had
been transacted, the two men, as usual, fell into casual conversation.
Casement then loomed large in the daily press, and the activities
of the American Senate had likewise caused some commotion in London.
In round-about fashion Mr. Laughlin was able to lead Sir Edward
to make some reference to the Casement case.

"I see the Senate has passed a resolution asking clemency,"
said the Foreign Secretary-exactly the remark which the American
wished to elicit.

"Yes," was the reply. "By the way, I happen
to have a copy of the resolution with me. May I give it to you?"

"Yes, I should like to have it."

The Foreign Secretary read it over with deliberation.

"This is a very interesting document," he said, when
he had finished. " Would you have any objection if I showed
it to the Prime Minister?"

Of course that was precisely what Mr. Laughlin did wish, and
he replied that this was the desire of his government. The purpose
of his visit had been accomplished, and he was able to cable Washington
that its instructions had been carried out and that the Casement
resolution had been presented to the British Government. Simultaneously
with his communication, however, he reported also that the execution
of Roger Casement had taken place. In fact, it was being carried
out at the time of the interview. This incident lends point to
Page's memorandum of the last interview which he had before leaving
England.

.

August 1st. I lunched with Mr. Asquith. One does not usually
bring away much from his conversations, and he did not say much
to-day worth recording. But he showed a very eager interest in
the Presidential campaign, and he confessed that he felt some
anxiety about the anti-British feeling in the United States.
This led him to tell me that he could not in good conscience
interfere with Casement's execution, in spite of the shoals of
telegrams that he was receiving from the United States. This
man, said he, visited Irish prisoners in German camps and tried
to seduce them to take up arms against Great Britain---their
own country. When they refused, the Germans removed them to the
worst places in their Empire and, as a result, some of them died.
Then Casement came to Ireland in a German man-of-war (a submarine)
accompanied by a ship loaded with guns. "In all good conscience
to my country and to my responsibilities I cannot interfere."
He hoped that thoughtful opinion in the United States would see
this whole matter in a fair and just way.

I asked him about anti-American feeling in Great Britain.
He said: "Do not let that unduly disturb you. At bottom
we understand you. At bottom the two people surely understand
one another and have unbreakable bonds of sympathy. No serious
breach is conceivable." He went on quite earnestly: "Mr.
Page, after any policy or plan is thought out on its merits my
next thought always is how it may affect our relations with the
United States. That is always a fundamental consideration."

I ventured to say that if he would keep our relations smooth
on the surface, I'd guarantee their stability at the bottom.
It's the surface that rolls high at times, and the danger is
there. Keep the surface smooth and the bottom will take care
of itself.

Then he asked about Mexico, as he usually has when I have
talked with him. I gave him as good a report as I could, reminding
him of the great change in the attitude of all Latin-America
caused by the President's patient policy with Mexico. When he
said, "Mexico is a bad problem," I couldn't resist
the impulse to reply: "When Mexico troubles you, think of---Ireland.
As there are persons in England who concern themselves with Mexico,
so there are persons in the United States who concern themselves
about Ireland. Ireland and Mexico have each given trouble for
two centuries. Yet these people talk about them as if they could
remove all trouble in a month."

"Quite true," he said, and smiled himself into silence.
Then he talked about more or less frivolous subjects; and, as
always, he asked about Mr. Bryan and Mr. Roosevelt, "alike
now, I suppose, in their present obscure plight." I told
him I was going from his house to the House of Lords to see Sir
Edward Grey metamorphosed into Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

"The very stupidest of the many stupid ceremonies that
we have," said he---very truly.

He spoke of my "onerous duties" and so on and so
on---tut, tut! talk that gets nowhere. But he did say, quite
sincerely, I think, that my frankness called forth frankness
and avoided misunderstanding; for he has said that to other people
about me.

Such is the Prime Minister of Great Britain in this supreme
crisis in English history, a remarkable man, of an abnormally
quick mind, pretty nearly a great man, but now a spent force,
at once nimble and weary. History may call him Great. If it do,
he will owe this judgment to the war, with the conduct of which

his name will be forever associated.

.

II

Mr. and Mrs. Page's homecoming was a tragedy. They sailed from
Liverpool on August 3rd, and reached New York on the evening of
August 11th. But sad news awaited them upon the dock. About two
months previously their youngest son, Frank, had been married
to Miss Katherine Sefton, of Auburn, N. Y., and the young couple
had settled down in Garden City, Long Island. That was the summer
when the epidemic of infantile paralysis swept over the larger
part of the United States. The young bride was stricken; the case
was unusually rapid and unusually severe; at the moment of the
Pages' arrival, they were informed that there was practically
no hope; and Mrs. Frank Page died at two o'clock on the afternoon
of the following day. The Pages had always been a particularly
united and happy family; this was the first time that they had
suffered from any domestic sorrow of this kind, and the Ambassador
was so affected that it was with difficulty that he could summon
himself for the task that lay ahead.

In a few days, however, he left for Washington. He has himself
described his experience at the Capital in words that must inevitably
take their place in history. To appreciate properly the picture
which Page gives, it must be remembered that the city and the
officialdom which he portrays are the same city and the same men
who six months afterward declared war on Germany. When Page reached
Washington, the Presidential campaign was in full swing, with
Mr. Wilson as the Democratic candidate and Mr. Charles E. Hughes
as the Republican. But another crisis was absorbing the nation's
attention: the railway unions, comprising practically all the
2,000,000 railway employees in the United States, were threatening
to strike-ostensibly for an eight-hour day, in reality for higher
wages.

.

Mr. Page's memorandum of his
visit to Washington in August, 1916

The President was very courteous to me, in his way. He invited
me to luncheon the day after I arrived. Present: the President,
Mrs. Wilson, Miss Bones, Tom Bolling, his brother-in-law, and
I. The conversation was general and in the main jocular. Not
a word about England, not a word about a foreign policy or foreign
relations.

He explained that the threatened railway strike engaged his
whole mind. I asked to have a talk with him when his mind should
be free. Would I not go off and rest and come back?---I preferred
to do my minor errands with the Department, but I should hold
myself at his convenience and at his command.

Two weeks passed. Another invitation to lunch. Sharp, the
Ambassador to France, had arrived. He, too, was invited. Present:
the President, Mrs. Wilson, Mrs. Wallace, the Misses Smith of
New Orleans, Miss Bones, Sharp, and I. Not one word about foreign
affairs.

After luncheon, the whole party drove to the Capitol, where
the President addressed Congress on the strike, proposing legislation
to prevent it and to forestall similar strikes. It is a simple
ceremony and somewhat impressive. The Senators occupy the front
seats in the House, the Speaker presides and the President of
the Senate sits on his right. An escorting committee is sent
out to bring the President in. He walks to the clerk's or reader's
desk below the presiding officer's, turns and shakes hands with
them both and then proceeds to read his speech, very clearly
and audibly. Some passages were applauded. When he had done,
he again shook hands with the presiding officers and went out,
preceded and followed by the White House escort. I sat in the
Presidential (or diplomatic?) gallery with the White House party,
higgledy-piggledy.

The speech ended, the President drove to the White House with
his escort in his car. The crowds in the corridors and about
the doors waited and crowded to see Mrs. Wilson, quite respectful
but without order or discipline. We had to push our way through
them. Now and then a policeman at a distance would yell loudly,
"Make way there! "

When we reached the White House, I asked the doorman if the
President had arrived.

"Yes."

"Does he expect me to go in and say good-bye?"

"No."

Thus he had no idea of talking with me now, if ever. Not at
lunch nor after did he suggest a conversation about American-British
affairs or say anything about my seeing him again.

This threatened strike does hold his whole mind---bothers
him greatly. It seems doubtful if he can avert a general strike.
The Republicans are trying "to put him in a political hole,"
and they say he, too, is playing politics. Whoever be to blame
for it, it is true that politics is in the game. Nobody seems
to foresee who will make capital out of it. Surely I can't.

There's no social sense at the White House. The President
has at his table family connections only---and they say few or
no distinguished men and women are invited, except the regular
notables at the set dinners---the diplomatic, the judiciary,
and the like. His table is his private family affair---nothing
more. It is very hard to understand why so intellectual a man
doesn't have notable men about him. It's the college professor's
village habit, I dare say. But it's a great misfortune. This
is one way in which Mr. Wilson shuts out the world and lives
too much alone, feeding only on knowledge and subjects that he
has already acquired and not getting new views or fresh suggestions
from men and women.

He sees almost nobody except members of Congress for whom
he sends for special conferences, and he usually sees these in
his office. The railroad presidents and men he met in formal
conference---no social touch.

A member of his Cabinet told me that Mr. Wilson had shown
confidence in him, given him a wide range of action in his own
Department and that he relies on his judgment. This Cabinet member
of course attends the routine state dinners and receptions, as
a matter of required duty. But as for any social recognition
of his existence---he had never received a hint or nod. Nor does
any member of the Cabinet (except, no doubt, Mr. McAdoo, his
son-in-law). There is no social sense nor reason in this. In
fact, it works to a very decided disadvantage to the President
and to the Nation.

By the way, that a notable man in our educational life could
form such a habit does not speak well for our educational life.

What an unspeakably lamentable loss of opportunity! This is
the more remarkable and lamentable because the President is a
charming personality, an uncommonly good talker, a man who could
easily make personal friends of all the world. He does his own
thinking, untouched by other men's ideas. He receives nothing
from the outside. His domestic life is spent with his own, nobody
else, except House occasionally. His contact with his own Cabinet
is a business man's contact with his business associates and
kind---at his office.

He declined to see Cameron Forbes(<A NAME="n154"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#154">154</A>)
on his return from the Philippines.

The sadness of this mistake!

Another result is---the President doesn't hear the frank truth
about the men about him. He gives nobody a chance to tell him.
Hence he has several heavy encumbrances in his official family.

The influence of this lone-hand way of playing the game extends
very far. The members of the Cabinet do not seem to have the
habit of frankness with one another. Each lives and works in
a water-tight compartment. I sat at luncheon (at a hotel) with
Lansing, Secretary of State; Lane, Secretary of the Interior;
Gregory, Attorney-General; Baker, Secretary of War; Daniels,
Secretary of the Navy; and Sharp, Ambassador to France; and all
the talk was jocular or semi-jocular, and personal---mere cheap
chaff. Not a question was asked either of the Ambassador to France
or of the Ambassador to Great Britain about the war or about
our foreign relations. The war wasn't mentioned. Sharp and I
might have come from Bungtown and Jonesville and not from France
and England. We were not encouraged to talk---the local personal
joke held the time and conversation. This astounding fact must
be the result of this lone-hand, watertight compartment method
and---of the neutrality suppression of men. The Vice-President
confessed to his neighbour at a Gridiron dinner that he had read
none of the White Papers, or Orange Papers, etc., of the belligerent
governments---confessed this with pride---lest he should form
an opinion and cease to be neutral! Miss X, a member of the President's
household, said to Mrs. Y, the day we lunched there, that she
had made a remark privately to Sharp showing her admiration of
the French.

"Was that a violation of neutrality?" she asked
in all seriousness.

I can see it in no other way but this: the President suppressed
free thought and free speech when he insisted upon personal neutrality.
He held back the deliberate and spontaneous thought and speech
of the people except the pro-Germans, who saw their chance and
improved it! The mass of the American people found themselves
forbidden to think or talk, and this forbidding had a sufficient
effect to make them take refuge in indifference. It's the President's
job. He's our leader. He'll attend to, this matter. We must not
embarrass him. On this easy cushion of non-responsibility the
great masses fell back at their intellectual and moral ease---softened,
isolated, lulled.

That wasn't leadership in a democracy. Right here is the President's
vast failure. From it there is now no escape unless the Germans
commit more submarine crimes. They have kept the United States
for their own exploiting after the war. They have thus had a
real triumph of us.

I have talked in Washington with few men who showed any clear
conception of the difference between the Germans and the British.
To the minds of these people and high Government officials, German
and English are alike foreign nations who are now foolishly engaged
in war. Two of the men who look upon the thing differently are
Houston,(<A NAME="n155"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#155">155</A>)
and Logan Waller Page.(<A NAME="n156"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#156">156</A>)
In fact, there is no realization of the war in Washington. Secretary
Houston has a proper perspective of the situation. He would have
done precisely what I recommended---paved the way for claims
and let the English take their course. "International law"
is no strict code and it's all shot to pieces anyhow.

The Secretary [of State] betrayed not the slightest curiosity
about our relations with Great Britain. I saw him several times---(1)
in his office; (2) at his house; (3) at the French Ambassador's;
(4) at Wallace's; (5) at his office; (6) at Crozier's(<A NAME="n157"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#157">157</A>)---this during my first stay
in Washington. The only remark he made was that I'd find a different
atmosphere in Washington from the atmosphere in London. Truly.
All the rest of his talk was about "cases." Would I
see Senator Owen? Would I see Congressman Sherley? Would I take
up this "case" and that? His mind ran on "cases."

Well, at Y's, when I was almost in despair, I rammed down
him a sort of general statement of the situation as I saw it;
at least, I made a start. But soon he stopped me and ran off
at a tangent on some historical statement I had made, showing
that his mind was not at all on the real subject, the large subject.
When I returned to Washington, and he had read my interviews
with Grey, Asquith, and Bryce,(<A NAME="n158"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#158">158</A>)
and my own statement, he still said nothing, but he ceased to
talk of "cases." At my final interview he said that
he had had difficulty in preventing Congress from making the
retaliatory resolution mandatory. He had tried to keep it back
till the very end of the session, etc.

This does not quite correspond with what the President told
me---that the State Department asked for this retaliatory resolution.

I made specific suggestions in my statement to the President
and to Lansing. They have (yet) said nothing about them. I fancy
they will not I have found nowhere any policy---only "cases."

I proposed to Baker and Daniels that they send a General and
an Admiral as attachés to London. They both agreed. Daniels
later told me that Baker mentioned it to the President and he
"stepped on the suggestion with both feet." I did not
bring it up. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, both General
McClellan (or Sheridan?[<A NAME="n159"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#159">159</A>])
and General Forsythe were sent to the German Army. Our military
ideas have shrunk since then!

I find at this date (a month before the Presidential election),
the greatest tangle and uncertainty of political opinion that
I have ever observed in our country. The President, in spite
of his unparalleled leadership and authority in domestic policy,
is by no means certain of election. He has the open hostility
of the Germans---all very well, if he had got the fruits of a
real hostility to them; but they have, in many ways, directed
his foreign policy. He has lost the silent confidence of many
men upon whose conscience this great question weighs heavily.
If he be defeated he will owe his defeat to the loss of confidence
in his leadership on this great subject. His opponent has put
forth no clear-cut opinion. He plays a silent game on the German
"issue." Yet he will command the support of many patriotic
men merely as a lack of confidence in the President.

Nor do I see any end of the results of this fundamental error.
In the economic and political readjustment of the world we shall
be "out of the game," in any event---unless we are
yet forced into the war by Hughes's election or by the renewal
of the indiscriminate use of submarines by the Germans.

There is a great lesson in this lamentable failure of the
President really to lead the Nation. The United States stands
for democracy and free opinion as it stands for nothing else
and as no other nation stands for it. Now when democracy and
free opinion are at stake as they have not before been, we take
a "neutral" stand-we throw away our very birthright.
We may talk of "humanity" all we like: we have missed
the largest chance that ever came to help the large cause that
brought us into being as a Nation. . . .

And the people, sitting on the comfortable seats of neutrality
upon which the President has pushed them back, are grateful for
Peace, not having taken the trouble to think out what Peace has
cost us and cost the world ---except so many as have felt the
uncomfortable stirrings of the national conscience.

There is not a man in our State Department or in our Government
who has ever met any prominent statesmen in any European Government---except
the third Assistant Secretary of State, who has no authority
in forming policies; there is not a man who knows the atmosphere
of Europe. Yet when I proposed that one of the under Secretaries
should go to England on a visit of a few weeks for observation,

the objection arose that such a visit would not be " neutral."

.

III

The extraordinary feature of this experience was that Page
had been officially summoned home, presumably to discuss the European
situation, and that neither the President nor the State Department
apparently had the slightest interest in his visit.

"The President," Page wrote to Mr. Laughlin, "dominates
the whole show in a most extraordinary way. The men about him
(and he sees them only on 'business') are very nearly all very,
very small fry, or worse---the narrowest two-penny lot I've ever
come across. He has no real companions. Nobody talks to him freely
and frankly. I've never known quite such a condition in American
life." Perhaps the President had no desire to discuss inconvenient
matters with his Ambassador to Great Britain, but Page was certainly
determined to have an interview with the President. "I'm
not going back to London," he wrote Mr. Laughlin, "till
the President has said something to me or at least till I have
said something to him. I am now going down to Garden City and
New York till the President send for me; or, if he do not send
for me, I'm going to his house and sit on his front steps till
he come out!" Page had brought from England one of the medals
which the Germans had struck in honour of the Lusitania sinking,
and one reason why he particularly wished to see the President
alone was to show him this memento.

Another reason was that in early September Page had received
important news from London concerning the move which Germany was
making for peace and the attitude of Great Britain in this matter.
The several plans which Germany had had under consideration had
now taken the form of a definite determination to ask for an armistice
before winter set in. A letter from Mr. Laughlin, Chargé
d'affaires in Page's absence, tells the story.

.

From Irwin Laughlin

Embassy of the United States of America.

London, August 30, 1916.

DEAR MR. PAGE:

For some little time past I have heard persistent rumours,
which indeed are more than rumours, since they have come from
important sources, of an approaching movement by Germany toward
an early armistice. They have been so circumstantial and so closely
connected---in prospect---with the President, that I have examined
them with particular attention and I shall try to give you the
results, and my conclusions, with the recommendation that you
take the matter up directly with the President and the Secretary
of State. I have been a little at a loss to decide how to communicate
what I have learned to the Government in Washington, for the
present conditions make it impossible to set down what I want
to say in an official despatch, but the fortunate accident of
your being in the United States gives me the safe opportunity
I want, and so I send my information to you, and by the pouch,
as time is of less importance than secrecy.

There seems to be no doubt that Germany is casting about for
an opportunity to effect an armistice, if possible before the
winter closes in. She hopes it may result in peace---a peace
more or less favourable to her, of course but even if such a
result should fail of accomplishment she would have gained a
breathing space; have secured an opportunity to improve her strategic
position in a military sense, perhaps by shortening her line
in Flanders; have stiffened the resistance of her people; and
probably have influenced a certain body of neutral opinion not
only in her favour but against her antagonists.

I shall not try to mention the various sources from which
the threads that compose this fabric have been drawn, but I finally
fastened on X of the Admiralty as a man with whom I could talk
profitably and confidentially, and he told me positively that
his information showed that Germany was looking in the direction
I have indicated, and that she would soon approach the President
on the subject---even if she had not already taken the first
steps toward preparing her advance to him.

I asked X if he thought it well for me to broach the subject
to Lord Grey and he suggested that I first consult Y, which I
did. The latter seemed very wary at the outset, but he warmed
up at last and in the course of the conversation told me he had
reliable information that when Bethmann-Hollweg went to Munich
just before the beginning of the. allied offensive in the west
in June he told the King of Bavaria that he was confident the
Allies would be obliged to begin overtures for peace next October;
adding that if they didn't Germany would have to do so. The King,
it appears, asked him how Germany could approach the Allies if
it proved to be advisable and he replied: "Through our good
friend Wilson."

I asked Y if the King of Spain's good offices would not he
enlisted jointly with those of the President in attempting to
arrange an armistice, but he thought not, and said that the King
of Spain was very well aware that the Allies would not consider
anything short of definite peace proposals from Germany and that
His Majesty knew the moment for them had not arrived. I then
finally asked him point blank if he thought the Germans would
approach the President for an armistice, and, if so, when.

He said he was inclined to think they might do so perhaps
about October. On my asking him if he was disposed to let me
communicate his opinion privately to the Government in Washington
he replied after some hesitation that he had no objection, but
he quickly added that I must make it clear at the same time that
the British Government would not listen to any such proposals.

These conversations took place during the course of last week,
and on Sunday---the 27th---I invited the Spanish Ambassador to
luncheon at Tangley when I was able to get him to confirm what
Y had said of his Sovereign's attitude and opinions.

I may mention for what it is worth that on Hoover's last trip
to Germany he was told by Bullock, of the Philadelphia Ledger,
that Zimmermann of the Berlin Foreign Office had told him
that the Germans had intended in June to take steps for an armistice
which were prevented by the preparations for the allied offensive
in the west.

Y was very emphatic in what he said of the attitude of his
government and the British people toward continuing the war to
an absolutely conclusive end, and I was much impressed. He said
among other things that the execution of Captain Fryatt had had
a markedly perceptible effect in hardening British public opinion
against Germany and fixing the determination to fight to a relentless
finish. This corresponds exactly with my own observations.

I leave this letter entirely in your hands. You will know
what use to make of it. It is meant as an official communication
in everything but the usual form from which I have departed for
reasons I need not explain further.

I look forward eagerly to your return,

Very sincerely yours,

IRWIN LAUGHLIN.

.

Page waited five weeks before he succeeded in obtaining his
interview with Mr. Wilson.

.

To the President

The New Willard, Washington, D. C.

Thursday, September 21, 1916.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

While I am waiting for a convenient time to come when you
will see me for a conference and report, I send you notes on
conversations with Lord Grey and Lord Bryce.(<A NAME="n160"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#160">160</A>) They are, in effect, though
of course not in form, messages to you.

The situation between our government and Great Britain seems
to me most alarming; and (let me add) easily removable, if I
can get the ear of anybody in authority. But I find here only
an atmosphere of suspicion---unwarranted by facts and easily
dissipated by straight and simple friendly methods. I am sure
of this.

I have, besides, a most important and confidential message
for you from the British Government which they prefer should
be orally delivered.

And I have written out a statement of my own study of the
situation and of certain proposals which, I think, if they commend
themselves to you, will go far to remove this dangerous tension.

I hope to go over them with you at your convenience.

Yours faithfully,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.

The situation was alarming for more reasons than the determination
of Germany to force the peace issue. The State Department was
especially irritated at this time over the blockade. Among the
"trade advisers" there was a conviction, which all Page's
explanations had not destroyed, that Great Britain was using the
blockade as a means of destroying American commerce and securing
America's customers for herself. Great Britain's regulations on
the blacklist and "bunker coal" had intensified this
feeling. In both these latter questions Page regarded the British
actions as tactless and unjust; he had had many sharp discussions
at the Foreign Office concerning them, but had not made much headway
in his efforts to obtain their abandonment. The purpose of the
"blacklist" was to strike at neutral firms with German
affiliations which were trading with Germany. The Trading with
the Enemy Act provided that such firms could not trade with Great
Britain; that British vessels must refuse to accept their cargoes,
and that any neutral ship which accepted such cargoes would be
denied bunker coal at British ports. Under this law the Ministry
of Blockade issued a "blacklist " of more than 1,000
proscribed exporting houses in the United States. So great was
the indignation against this boycott in the United States that
Congress, in early September, had passed a retaliatory act; this
gave the President the authority at any time to place an embargo
upon the exports to the United States of countries which discriminated
against American firms and also to deny clearance to ships which
refused to accept American cargoes. The two countries indeed seemed
to be hastening toward a crisis.

Page's urgent letter to Mr. Wilson brought a telegram from
Mr. Tumulty inviting the Ambassador to spend the next evening
and night with the President at Shadow Lawn, the seaside house
on the New Jersey coast in which Mr. Wilson was spending the summer.
Mr. Wilson received his old friend with great courtesy and listened
quietly and with apparent interest to all that he had to say.
The written statement to which Page refers in his letter told
the story of Anglo-American relations from the time of the Panama
tolls repeal up to the time of Page's visit to Shadow Lawn. Quotations
have already been made from it in preceding chapters, and the
ideas which it contains have abundantly appeared in letters already
printed. The document was an eloquent plea for American cooperation
with the Allies---for the dismissal of Bernstorff, for the adoption
of a manly attitude toward Germany, and for the vindication of
a high type of Americanism.

Page showed the President the Lusitania medal, but that
did not especially impress him. "The President said to me,"
wrote Page in reference to this visit, "that when the war
began he and all the men he met were in hearty sympathy with the
Allies; but that, now the sentiment toward England had greatly
changed. He saw no one who was not vexed and irritated by the
arbitrary English course. That is, I fear, true---that he sees
no one but has a complaint. So does the Secretary of State, and
the Trade Bureau and all the rest in Washington. But in Boston,
in New York, and in the South and in Auburn, N.Y., I saw no one
whose sympathy with the Allies had undergone any fundamental change.
I saw men who felt vexed at such an act as the blacklist, but
that was merely vexation, not a fundamental change of feeling.
Of course, there came to see me men who had 'cases.' Now these
are the only kind of men, I fear, whom the Government at Washington
sees---these and the members of Congress whom the Germans have
scared or have 'put up' to scare the Government---who are 'twisting
the lion's tail,' in a word."

"The President said," wrote Page immediately after
coming from Shadow Lawn, "'Tell those gentlemen for me'---and
then followed a homily to the effect that a damage done to any
American citizen is a damage to him, etc. He described the war
as a result of many causes, some of long origin. He spoke of England's
having the earth and of Germany wanting it. Of course, he said,
the German system is directly opposed to everything American.
But I do not gather that he thought that this carried any very
great moral reprehensibility.

"He said that he wouldn't do anything with the retaliatory
act till after election lest it might seem that he was playing
politics. But he hinted that if there were continued provocation
afterward (in case he were elected) he would. He added that one
of the worst provocations was the long English delay in answering
our Notes. Was this delay due to fear or shame? He evidently felt
that such a delay showed contempt. He spoke of the Bryan treaty.(<A
NAME="n161"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#161">161</A>) But on no
question had the British 'locked horns' with us---on no question
had they come to a clear issue so that the matter might be referred
to the Commission."

Page delivered his oral message about the German determination
to obtain an armistice. This was to the effect that Great Britain
would not grant it. Page intimated that Britain would be offended
if the President proposed it.

"If an armistice, no," answered Mr. Wilson. "That's
a military matter and is none of my business. But if they propose
an armistice looking toward peace-yes, I shall be glad."

The experience was an exceedingly trying one for both men.
The discussion showed how far apart were the President and his
Ambassador on practically every issue connected with the crisis.
Naturally the President's reference to the causes of the war---that
there were many causes, some of them of long persistence, and
that Great Britain's domination of the "earth" was one
of them--conflicted with the judgment of a main who attributed
the origin of the struggle to German aggression. The President's
statement that American sympathy for the Allies had now changed
to irritation, and the tolerant attitude toward Germany which
Mr. Wilson displayed, affected Page with the profoundest discouragement.
The President's intimation that he would advance Germany's request
for an armistice, if it looked toward peace---this in reply to
Page's message that Great Britain would not receive such a proposal
in a kindly spirit---seemed to lay the basis of further misunderstandings.
The interview was a disheartening one for Page. Many people whom
the Ambassador met in the course of this visit still retain memories
of his fervour in what had now become with him a sacred cause.
With many friends and officials he discussed the European situation
almost like a man inspired. The present writer recalls two long
conversations with Page at this time: the recollection of his
brilliant verbal portraiture, his description of the determination
of Englishmen, his admiration for the heroic sacrifice of Englishwomen,
remain as about the most vivid memories of a life-time. And now
the Ambassador had brought this same eloquence to the President's
ear at Shadow Lawn. It was in this interview that Page had hoped
to show Mr. Wilson the real merits of the situation, and persuade
him to adopt the course to which the national honour and safety
pointed; he talked long and eloquently, painting the whole European
tragedy with that intensity and readiness of utterance and that
moral conviction which had so moved all others with whom he had
come into contact during this memorable visit to the United States;
but Mr. Wilson was utterly cold, utterly unresponsive, interested
only in ending the war. The talk lasted for a whole morning; its
nature may be assumed from the many letters already printed; but
Page's voice, when it attempted to fire the conscience of the
President, proved as ineffective as his pen. However, there was
nothing rasping or contentious about the interview. The two men
discussed everything with the utmost calmness and without the
slightest indications of ill-nature. Both men had in mind their
long association, both inevitably recalled the hopes with which
they had begun their official relationship three years before,
at that time neither having the faintest intimation of the tremendous
problems that were to draw them asunder. Mr. Wilson at this meeting
did not impress his Ambassador as a perverse character, but as
an extremely pathetic one. Page came away with no vexation or
anger, but with a real feeling for a much suffering and a much
perplexed statesman. The fact that the President's life was so
solitary, and that he seemed to be so completely out of touch
with men and with the living thoughts of the world, appealed strongly
to Page's sympathies. "I think he is the loneliest man I
have ever known," Page remarked to his son Frank after coming
away from this visit.

Page felt this at the time, for, as he rose to say good-bye
to the President, he put his hand upon his shoulder. At this Mr.
Wilson's eyes filled with tears and he gave Page an affectionate
good-bye. The two men never met again.