I am happy, Mr. President, to find the argument placed
upon the proper ground, and that the honorable member
from the city has so fully spoken on the question, whether
this system proposes a consolidation or a confederation of
the states, as that is, in my humble opinion, the source of
the greatest objection, which can be made to its adoption.
I agree likewise with him, Sir, that it is, or ought to be, the
object of all governments, to fix upon the intermediate
point between tyranny and licentiousness; and therefore,
it will be one of the great objects of our enquiry, to ascertain
how far the proposed system deviates from that point
of political happiness. For my part, I will readily confess,
that it appears to be well guarded against licentiousness,
but I am apprehensive it has deviated a little on the left
hand, and rather invites than guards against the approaches
of tyranny. I think however, Mr. President, it has
been clearly argued, that the proposed system does not
directly abolish, the governments of the several States, because
its organization, and, for some time, perhaps, its operations,
naturally pre-suppose their existence. But, Sir, it
is not said, nor is thought, that the words of this instrument
expressly announce that the sovereignty of the several
States, their independency, jurisdiction, and power,
are at once absorbed and annihilated by the general government.
To this position and to this alone, the arguments
of the honorable gentlemen can effectually apply, and
there they must undoubtedly hold as long as the forms of
State Government remain, at least, till a change takes place
in the federal constitution. It is, however, upon other principles
that the final destruction of the individual governments
is asserted to be a necessary consequence of their
association under this general form,--for, Sir, it is the silent
but certain operation of the powers, and not the cautious,
but artful tenor of the expressions contained in this
system, that can excite terror, or generate oppression. The
flattery of language was indeed necessary to disguise the
baneful purpose, but it is like the dazzling polish bestowed
upon an instrument of death; and the visionary prospect
of a magnificent, yet popular government, was the most
specious mode of rendering the people accessory to the
ruin of those systems which they have so recently and so
ardently labored to establish. Hence, Sir, we may trace that
passage which has been pronounced by the honorable delegate
to the late convention with exultation and applause;
but when it is declared that "We the people of the United
States do ordain and establish this constitution," is not the
very foundation a proof of a consolidated government, by
the manifest subversion of the principle that constitutes a
union of States, which are sovereign and independent, except
in the specific objects of confederation? These words
have a plain and positive meaning, which could not be
misunderstood by those who employed them; and therefore,
Sir, it is fair and reasonable to infer, that it was in
contemplation of the framers of this system, to absorb and
abolish the efficient sovereignty and independent powers
of the several States, in order to invigorate and aggrandize
the general government. The plan before us, then, explicitly
proposes the formation of a new constitution upon the
original authority of the people, and not an association of
States upon the authority of their respective governments.
On that ground, we perceive that it contains all the necessary
parts of a complete system of government, the executive,
legislative and judicial establishments; and when two
separate governments are at the same time in operation,
over the same people, it will be difficult indeed to provide
for each the means of safety and defence against the
other; but if those means are not provided, it will be easily
foreseen, that the stronger must eventually subdue and
annihilate the weaker institution. Let us then examine the
force and influence of the new system, and enquire
whether the small remnant of power left to the States can
be adequate even to the trifling charge of its own preservation.
Here, Sir, we find the right of making laws for
every purpose is invested in the future governors of
America, and in this is included the uncontrolled jurisdiction
over the purses of the people. The power of raising
money is indeed the soul, the vital prop of legislation,
without which legislation itself cannot for a moment exist.
It will, however, be remarked that the power of taxation,
though extended to the general government, is not taken
from the States individually. Yes, Sir!--but it will be remembered
that the national government may take from
the people just what they please, and if anything should
afterwards remain, then indeed the exigencies of the State
governments may be supplied from the scanty gleanings
of the harvest. Permit me now, Sir, to call your attention
to the powers enumerated in the 8th section of the first
article, and particularly to that clause which authorizes the
proposed Congress, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United
States." With such powers, Mr. President, what cannot the
future governors accomplish? It will be said, perhaps, that
the treasure, thus accumulated, is raised and appropriated
for the general welfare and the common defence of the
States; but may not this pretext be easily perverted to
other purposes, since those very men who raise and appropriate
the taxes, are the only judges of what shall be
deemed the general welfare and common defence of the
national government? If then, Mr. President, they have
unlimited power to drain the wealth of the people in every
channel of taxation, whether by imposts on our commercial
intercourse with foreign nations, or by direct levies on
the people, I repeat it, that this system must be too formidable
for any single State, or even for a combination of
the States, should an attempt be made to break and destroy
the yoke of domination and tyranny which it will
hereafter set up. If, indeed, the spirit of men, once inflamed
with the knowledge of freedom, should occasionally
blaze out in remonstrance, opposition and force, these
symptoms would naturally excite the jealousy of their rulers,
and tempt them to proceed in the career of usurpation,
till the total destruction of every principle of liberty
should furnish a fit security for the exercise of arbitrary
power. The money which has been raised from the people,
may then be effectually employed to keep them in a state
of slavish subjection: the militia, regulated and commanded
by the officers of the general government, will be
warped from the patriotic nature of their institution, and
a standing army, that most prevailing instrument of despotism,
will be ever ready to enforce obedience to a government
by which it is raised, supported and enriched.
If, under such circumstances, the several States should
presume to assert their undelegated rights, I ask again
what balance remains with them to counteract the encroachments
of so potent a superior? To assemble a military
force would be impracticable; for the general government,
foreseeing the attempt would anticipate the means,
by the exercise of its indefinite control over the purses of
the people; and, in order to act upon the consciences as
well as the persons of men, we find it is expressly stipulated,
that every officer of the State government shall be
sworn to support the constitution of the United States.
Hence likewise, Sir, I conclude that in every point of rivalship,
in every contention for power on the one hand and
for freedom on the other, the event must be favorable to
the views and pretensions of a government gifted with so
decisive a pre-eminence. Let us, however, regard this subject
in another light. What, Mr. President, will be the feelings
and ideas of the people, when by the operation of the
proposed system, they are exposed to such accumulated
expense, for the maintenance of the general government?
Is it not easy to foresee, that however the States may be
disposed individually to preserve the parade of independence
and sovereignty, the people themselves will become
indifferent, and at last, averse to the continuance of an
expensive form, from which they derive no advantage?
For, Sir, the attachment of citizens to their government
and its laws is founded upon the benefits which they derive
from them, and it will last no longer than the duration
of the power to confer those benefits. When, therefore,
the people of the respective States shall find their governments
grown torpid, and divested of the means to promote
their welfare and interests, they will not, Sir, vainly
idolize a shadow, nor disburse their hard earned wealth
without the prospect of a compensation. The constitution
of the States having become weak and useless to every
beneficial purpose, will be suffered to dwindle and decay,
and thus if the governors of the Union are not too impatient
for the accomplishment of unrivalled and absolute
dominion, the destruction of State jurisdiction will be produced
by its own insignificance.