Well,well,well, P2, from Ms Hinder's letter it would seem the more things change the more they stay the same.
Same, in that CAsA will take no responsibility for anything except their inflated salaries and bonuses.
Change in that they and they alone produce nefarious, convoluted, unworkable regulations that nobody understands, including themselves, based on Ms. Hinders letter, in the guise of "Reform" of course. But woe betide you if you place your own interpretation on the law.
CAsA won't give you one, because they don't have a clue what they mean either, but subsequently when the doo doo hits the fan, to quote an infamous FOI, tasked with shutting down an operator, for no particular reason, other than his director thought it was a good idea, "A whole lot of shit is coming your way".
God almighty, It becomes more and more unbelievable.

Just a few words about the image below; there in lies some porky pies.

3.6.1 Building height - In accordance with aviation safety requirements of America and New Zealand..... This aint from the MOS 139; try CFR77.19 if you want a 1 in 7 transitional surface.

From CFR77.19:

Transitional surface. These surfaces extend outward and upward at right angles to the runway centerline and the runway centerline extended at a slope of 7 to 1 from the sides of the primary surface and from the sides of the approach surfaces. Transitional surfaces for those portions of the precision approach surface which project through and beyond the limits of the conical surface, extend a distance of 5,000 feet measured horizontally from the edge of the approach surface and at right angles to the runway centerline.

The width of the primary surface (if Essendon airport was actually in the USA) would be 1,000 ft (304.8m). So it would fail there as well.

From the MOS:

The transitional surface comprises inclined planes that originate at the lower edge from the side of the runway strip (the overall strip), and the side of the approach surface that is below the inner horizontal surface, and finishes where the upper edge is located in the plane of the inner horizontal surface.

Runway 26 strip width from runway centre is shown as 90m; should be 150m. Runway 35 is shown as 75m; should be 150m also. EAPL have used the runway gable markers as the edge of the strip; it should be the overall strip.

Again from the MOS:

The transitional surface slopes upwards and outward at a specified rate and is to be measured in a vertical plane at right angles to the centreline of the runway.

This a line projecting from the runway centreline at 14.3 degrees until it intercepts the inner horizontal surface at 45m. If you work it out it's around 197m from runway centre. Then draw a line down to the edge of the overall strip. That's what the transitional surface should look like. Look at the drawing below; nothing like it!

3.6.2 Navigational aids - This runway comprises an Instrument Landing System (ILS) which requires clearance distance in accordance with CASA's Manual of Standards Part 139. The requirements of this manual have been totally ignored and would severely impact on our development.

Still trying to piece together the bureaucratic trail of obfuscation and dodgy deals related to the Ministerial approval of the DFO development.

The FOI - PDF: 15569 KB - is a fascinating document and would appear to be cleverly constructed as to paint CASA in a bad light of zero care, zero responsibility. This is highlighted by the fact that word weasel confection from CASA (Acting Executive Manager of Corporate Affairs Ms Nicola Hinder) features, without any apparent connection, on the last page of the FOI released document...

Besides the letter from Ms Hinder, the following is the sum total excerpts that highlight CASA's input as the premier government regulatory body responsible for aviation safety in this country.

From the Department & Ministerial sign off page (pg 2 of the FOI PDF):

Quote:

Page 5 of the FOI:

Quote:

PB: "..Runway 26 strip width from runway centre is shown as 90m; should be 150m. Runway 35 is shown as 75m; should be 150m also. EAPL have used the runway gable markers as the edge of the strip; it should be the overall strip...

..This a line projecting from the runway centreline at 14.3 degrees until it intercepts the inner horizontal surface at 45m. If you work it out it's around 197m from runway centre. Then draw a line down to the edge of the overall strip. That's what the transitional surface should look like. Look at the drawing below; nothing like it.."P2 Q/ What about Runway 17/35, how come CASA didn't survey/check the transitional surfaces of that runway?

Attachment G (page 234 FOI PDF):

Quote:

The last two extracts is as close as you are going to get to a signed confession that CASA signed off on the building of the DFO...

Still digging but in the meantime here is bit of historical scuttlebutt from the dodgy history of the government airport lease agreements - note who was the DOTARS Ag Deputy secretary at the time...

Hate playing ‘catch-up’ but (still drug fuzzy) managed to get up to speed on the Essendon DFO imbroglio from the P2 #286 offering. Strangely enough, coming from behind, for once has been of some benefit. It makes you realise just how bloody serious this whole ‘airports’ thing is.

It also makes you realise just how incredibly difficult, if not impossible, it is going to be to ‘get a rope’ on the situation and return to some semblance of control. The cost of regaining that control if (and it’s a big IF) the government ever decided to act is massive. Yet, when you think it through its not just the cost; take the CASA input as a test case. There is a vast gulf between what the public may expect of the pinnacle ‘Aviation Safety’ body and what is actually delivered. The ‘law’ fully supports the CASA ‘hands off’ approach, can you imagine trying to mount a case against CASA which sought to prove that they do indeed have a responsibility to the travelling public using our airports.

I reckon if you asked a punter stood waiting in the long line to gain access to the departure gate if they reckoned the airport was ‘safe’ - “what do you reckon the chances are of an aircraft hitting this terminal?” - they’d give you strange look; then ask “who’s responsible for preventing that?” they’d all say one of two things “CASA or the government”.

Yet here we sit, surrounded by stark evidence to the contrary. The ‘Hinder’ letter but a small indicator of how perverted the spirit and intent of legislation designed to protect Joe Public and his kids, shopping at a DFO built within the confines of an operational runway has become; to point where clearly they are not only unprotected, but callously placed in harms way by the machinations of government agencies which seek only to avoid the responsibility placed on them.

I could, at a pinch, live with that legally authorised dereliction if there was the moral fibre or conscience to provoke some sort of responsibility; if somewhere in the paper work mountain there was a voice to say ‘No, this can’t be allowed’. But there ain’t, is there. The more the attitude become entrenched, the more used to the normalised deviance one becomes, the sop to conscience becomes the drug of choice allowing any and all aberrations’ to pass the good sense test. The Essendon accident is disgusting and demands a full investigation, not likely to happen, those that could bring such a thing into reality are those who would be investigated.

Watch closely as the tried and true allies of time, deflection, dissemble, deniability and deception slowly grind away any and all objections, the cost of any result far outweighing the benefits as new ways of doing the same old thing are developed. It is disgusting, but it remains, repeated history.

A strange situation, where the well being of the Australian public using our airports will, ultimately, depend on the fighting spirit shown by the relatives of a few American citizens, needlessly killed by an irresponsible system of safety management. Shame on Australia: shame.

Some images to clarify this transitional surface business courtesy of the NZCAA. Keep in mind the transitional surface arrangement over the dutch is 1:7 or 8.13 degrees. This 1:7 slope is NOT a CASA requirement as suggested in the EAPL document.

Now this image is how it's worked out in Australia per the CASA MOS.

The NZCAA and FAA have adopted a more stringent definition of the transitional surface than CASA has; the reason being to protect airstrip space from possible encroaching development.......sound familiar.

I thought I had gotcha moment when I read the NZCAA requirements but that was just my lack of understanding of kiwi englush. In their requirements the strip width can be a minimum 150m wide; conveniently the same as runway 35 at Essendon. Then I worked out they are referring to 150m wide each side of the strup; why they couldn't have just written 300m is anyone's guess.

It makes me wonder though if someone tried to pass off the NZ requirement as a CASA requirement and conveniently misinterpreted the 150m. If it had been prepared in accordance with the NZ requirements correctly; there would not be any buildings at the DFO sight.

But but Mr. Peabody Australia is the safest country in the world to fly in!! Our stringent world leading industry crippling over regulation is designed to ensure as little aviation as possible occurs.
This is a disaster!! All those Ministers Statements, all those CAsA press releases!! Do you mean to tell us it's all a myth??

Some images to clarify this transitional surface business courtesy of the NZCAA. Keep in mind the transitional surface arrangement over the dutch is 1:7 or 8.13 degrees. This 1:7 slope is NOT a CASA requirement as suggested in the EAPL document.

Now this image is how it's worked out in Australia per the CASA MOS.

The NZCAA and FAA have adopted a more stringent definition of the transitional surface than CASA has; the reason being to protect airstrip space from possible encroaching development.......sound familiar.

I thought I had gotcha moment when I read the NZCAA requirements but that was just my lack of understanding of kiwi englush. In their requirements the strip width can be a minimum 150m wide; conveniently the same as runway 35 at Essendon. Then I worked out they are referring to 150m wide each side of the strup; why they couldn't have just written 300m is anyone's guess.

It makes me wonder though if someone tried to pass off the NZ requirement as a CASA requirement and conveniently misinterpreted the 150m. If it had been prepared in accordance with the NZ requirements correctly; there would not be any buildings at the DFO sight.

PB

Yet again Mr PB an excellent, concise and dare I say fully transparent post, that highlights clearly the bizarre disconnections between the Australian rule set and oversight of airports versus (apparently) the rest of the world... Please Mr PB keep your informative posts coming and the key for the Tim Tam cupboard is in the mail...

Briefly going back in time to this commitment by Carmody to Senator Fawcett (02:30 minutes)..

Now on a passing strange coincidence and very much aligned to the disturbing revelations contained in the 'Oversight or Lack There of' post series so far; I note that on the same day that CASA was appearing before the Senators in the Drone Wars inquiry - see HERE - that they have released a NPRM on Part 139...

Part 139 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR) and the subsidiary Part 139 Manual of Standards (MOS) were implemented in 2003. These rules regulate:

the operation of certified, registered and ‘certain other’ aerodromes

obstacles and hazards

aerodrome radio communication services.

[size=undefined]By 2014, CASA and industry both recognised that a comprehensive review of the Part 139 legislative framework was necessary. While a review of the rules for fire fighting (Subpart 139.H of CASR) and heliports will be subject to separate consultation, the proposed amendments to Part 139 of CASR and the Part 139 MOS aim to:
[/size]

more closely reflect the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) for Annex 14, Aerodromes to the International Convention on Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention)

simplify the categorisation of aerodromes by moving to two categories: certified aerodromes (regulated) and uncertified aerodromes (unregulated)

introduce a graduated structure for aerodrome certification requirements to ensure that regulatory requirements are commensurate with the operation(s) being conducted at the aerodrome

re-write existing regulations in an outcome-based format, where appropriate

reduce existing regulatory costs

provide a more streamlined and clearer regulatory framework for Part 139.

Why We Are Consulting

CASA recognises the valuable contribution that community and industry consultation makes to the regulatory development process. This notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) sets out the rationale for updating the rules related to aerodromes, describes previous consultation we have conducted and asks you to consider a range of proposals for rule changes.

And some examples from the NPRM under paragraphs...

1) 3.2.2 Harmonisation with ICAO

Quote:- Some standards are not consistent with Volume I of Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention and its associated documents...

..As Australia is a signatory to the Chicago Convention, CASA seeks to include certain aspects of PANS-Aerodromes in the Part 139 rules and supporting guidance materials.

- The ICAO Air Navigation Commission has initiated a review of the relationships between obstacle limitation surfaces and PANS-OPS surfaces, which relates to instrument approach procedures, and a complete review of Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention.

& from 2) 3.3 Key considerations

Quote:These obligations and principles underpinned CASA’s approach to reviewing the Part 139 regulations and standards. The review has also considered the following:

- The protection of the travelling public requires the maintenance of minimum physical standards, infrastructure condition and the protection of terminal instrument flight procedures including obstacle free areas...

...- Regulations will only be written to address identified risk or to harmonise with the Annex 14 SARP and PANS-Aerodromes.

Ps Also refer para 3.5.1

Finally in reference to the proposed amendment to Part 139 (Annex A - Draft Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment (Part 139) Regulation 2017) I note the CASA word weasel confection of the day is the word 'HAZARD' - see HERE...

From Subpart 139.001 'Simplified outlined of this Part':

Quote:Some objects or structures can create a hazard to aircraft operations at an aerodrome and more generally. CASA must be notified of proposals to build such objects or structures and can make determinations about whether they are hazards.

& from 139.150 'Hazards to aircraft operations':

Quote:Prescribing objects or structures that may be hazards

(5) The Part 139 Manual of Standards may prescribe kinds of objects or structures that may constitute a hazard to aircraft operations.
(6) Paragraphs (1)(a) and (3)(a) do not limit the kinds of objects or structures that may be prescribed by the Part 139 Manual of Standards under subregulation (5).

The factories at Moorabbin Airport (MB) illustrated above, lower right hand corner, were built on airport land, following "privatisation".

Runway 22/04 was shortened considerably, obviously a disadvantage to operations, especially flying training. In addition, that inappropriate development totally precludes take-off or landing on the former grass landing strip 27/09 which had been located next to the airport northern boundary (right hand side of photo). Prior to the land grab and buildings, I flew to MB with one main gear leg hung up electing for a wheels up landing on strip 27 into a moderate westerly wind. A short landing with minimal aircraft damage resulted.

Due to irresponsible government policies allowing encroachments (and similar or worse eg Bankstown), that option is not available today.

It would be just as logical for governments to long lease freeway sections for new factories and shopping centres, reduce the lanes, introduce ASICs for at least all commercial vehicle drivers, biennial licence renewals, and a swag of new strict liability criminal road rules. These should include severe fines for incorrectly adjusted rear vision mirrors, lack of vehicle maintenance and driver logs, unauthorised mapping equipment and incorrectly fitted or unauthorised parts or modifications and so on and on....huge safety benefits along with massive reductions in traffic congestion. A win win for governments and a mighty boost for employment via more independent government rules rewrite and enforcement corporations.

Addition to my post re freeway development.
We should also insist on a regime of stringent car driver medicals as a public safety measure, the model being AVMED or AVMAD if you will. By huge licence cancellations the number of road accidents would fall dramatically, though not as much in proportion to the reduction in road use owing to the debilitating effect of loss of recency (skills loss). However safety comes first and consequent reduction in hospital admissions (fewer road accident victims) would allow thousands of doctors to migrate to ROADMED or what will become known as ROADMAD.

One of the biggest unseen impediments to the continued growth and operational efficiency of airports across the country is actually an issue that is largely beyond the control of the airport. This issue revolves around land use planning.

To those outside the aviation industry, it may seem curious as to what interest airports would have with planning decisions for developments beyond the airport precinct.

However, the reality is, sometimes development proposals, whether they be just outside the boundary of the airport or 20km away in the CBD, can have significant impacts on the airport and its operations.

The reason for this is that poor land use planning decisions around airports can lead to a range of issues and problems including aircraft safety hazards, operational restrictions, protracted litigation, amenity impacts for nearby residents and airport closures in the extreme case. A concept known as airport safeguarding aims to prevent or mitigate these issues for the benefit of the whole community.

This was recognised by the commonwealth and all state and territory governments back in 2012 when the then Standing Council of Transport and Infrastructure agreed to the implementation of a new initiative, the National Airport Safeguarding Framework. The agreement represented a collective commitment from governments to ensure an appropriate balance is maintained between the social, economic and environmental needs of the community and the effective use of airport sites.

NASF raised the airport safeguarding bar in Australia but unfortunately in a number of cases state, territory and local government planning systems have been lagging behind the guidelines. Reforming these jurisdictional planning schemes to align as closely as possible with NASF is a key focus area for the airport industry.

The NASF also remains a focus area for the federal Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development in its recently released Corporate Plan 2017-18, which has identified key activities in relation to airspace protection and building-generated windshear and turbulence — both of which can result in significant safety and operational issues for aircraft.

The airport industry is pleased the department has recognised these issues as priority focus areas, both of which have been particularly problematic for airports in recent times. However, it is essential that the states follow the lead of the federal department and make genuine efforts to reform their respective planning schemes to ensure development proposals don’t detrimentally impact aviation.

While most people can appreciate why proposals for residential developments in the close vicinity of airports can be problematic when you consider aircraft noise issues, what is less commonly understood is why developments 20km or 30km away from the airport can be an issue. This comes down to the importance of airspace protection. Airspace can be most easily thought of as invisible three-dimensional planes or surfaces above the ground around an airport, sometimes quite complex in geometry.

These airspace surfaces can be influenced by geographical features such as mountains and high terrain, buildings, towers and construction cranes, which constitute obstacles for pilots to avoid. The airspace above these invisible surfaces forms an airport’s protected airspace, which extends dozens of kilometres beyond the airport site.

Protection of airspace surrounding an airport is as critical to the maintenance, safety and efficiency of an airport as the safe design and operation of on-ground infrastructure such as runways, taxiways, terminals and navigational aids. However, while ground infrastructure deficiencies can be subsequently modified, once airspace surrounding an airport is lost it is gone forever and limits future airport growth.

This is why land use planning decisions, particularly those that may have airspace protection implications, are of such critical importance to airports. If airspace is lost due to the development of a structure this can result in critical obstructions in the design of instrument flight procedures and may impose limits on the range of weather conditions in which aircraft operations can take place. This could be because of the height of the structure, but also may relate to its lighting configuration.

The impacts of any one obstacle may be relatively minor, but together a number of obstacles may seriously limit runway utilisation, increase environmental impacts, cause airspace congestion and reduce the effective handling capacity of the airport. From an airline perspective, the proliferation of obstacles surrounding airports can ultimately impact on the viability of routes and threaten the commercial viability of some operations.

Such impacts can have significant economic consequences to the local or regional economies that an airport supports.

The impacts of planning decisions that allow for residential developments in the close vicinity of airports can have equally detrimental impacts. Without appropriate mitigation measures the impacts of aircraft noise on communities can ultimately result in the imposition of curfews on airports which significantly limit the number and type of operations.

Airport safeguarding and the jurisdictional implementation of the NASF principles and guidelines should not just be an aspirational objective, it is essential to the ongoing viability of the aviation industry. State governments and planning authorities must recognise the importance of this issue and support the work of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development to ensure we do not unwittingly jeopardise the future of Australian aviation with poor land use planning decision.

Caroline Wilkie is the chief executive of the Australian Airports Association.

Corporate jet operators at Essendon Airport may no longer need to divert to Melbourne Airport during curfew hours under proposed changes the airport’s boss hopes will cut red tape.

Essendon Airport boss Chris Cowan has swung in behind plans to update the curfew, which applies between 11pm and 6am. But the airport says it is also open to supporting further changes pushed by community representatives.

An overhaul of the curfew at Essendon, the nation’s biggest corporate jet base, could also reignite debate about the way curfews work at Sydney, Adelaide and Coolangatta airports.

Under proposals the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development is consulting on, jet aircraft that meet “strict” noise criteria will be able to land during the curfew.

As well, under the proposals, non-emergency helicopters and propeller-driven aircraft would no longer be able to operate at ­Essendon during the curfew and the weight restriction for jets operating outside the curfew hours would be lifted from 45,000kg to 55,000kg.

Bill Shorten and the federal member for Wills, Labor MP Peter Khalil, have written to residents about the proposal, saying there will be a community forum next week “to discuss any concerns local residents may have with the proposed amendments and to hear the views of the community on this issue”.

Mr Cowan said the airport was committed to working with the community aviation consultation group and future meetings were planned.

“We think it’s a very balanced, very good proposal which is good for the operators, which is very important, but we think it’s also a better outcome for the community. But we as an airport rely very heavily on our community group for feedback ... we will support reasonable amendments to that if that’s what the community sees as relevant,” Mr Cowan said.

He said was happy to discuss measures such as a yearly cap on the numbers of jet movements during the curfew.

According to the department’s consultation paper, under the existing curfew aviation operators find it hard to connect to eastern seaboard cities for a full day of meetings and return to ­Essendon on the same day.

Mr Cowan said operators sometimes needed to divert to Melbourne Airport during the curfew and bring the plane back to Essendon the next day.

“In many instances, they are flying from remote airports (and) they don’t have the flexibility to arrive here ... corporate jets are all about flying anywhere, any time.

“This is one of those levers that they’re not going to use all the time.

“But having the flexibility to use it is very important to them.”

Essendon says modern jets can be quieter than many propeller aircraft and that the curfew didn’t cap movements or impose noise limits on smaller propeller planes, so says it believes changes could result in less noise.

Under the proposal, there would be a noise limit of 90 decibels on landing, a tougher standard than for Sydney, Adelaide and Coolangatta.

At the moment there is no cap on the propeller aircraft during curfew hours.

Mr Cowan said that as not all jets would be able to meet the proposed noise standards, “we therefore would like to see that over time that anyone who aspires to get some flexibility would move to have quieter jets”.

"U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Elaine L. Chao today announced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will award $277.5 million in airport infrastructure grants to 67 airports in 22 states across the United States as part of the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program (AIP)."

The state government and Richmond Valley Council have been accused of putting the interests of developers over public safety by approving residential and commercial buildings near airport runways

The criticism followed the recent approval of a manufactured homes development near runways at the Evans Head Memorial Aerodrome.

Evans Head Memorial Aerodrome Committee president Dr Richard Gates said the failure of the NSW government to mandate Public Safety Zones around airfields and airports was nothing short of criminal negligence.

Dr Gates said information received from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) in relation to a fatal plane crash at Essendon Airport showed that houses and a primary school were in the public safety zone.

‘For years the NSW State government has used an outdated ‘noise nuisance measure’, the Australian Noise Exposure Forecast or ‘ANEF’, to determine how close residential and commercial buildings can be built near runways,’ Dr Gates said.

‘However there is substantial international research which shows that aircraft noise is not an appropriate safety measure to determine how close construction should be to an active runway to be safe.

‘Local, state and federal governments have known that the ANEF is the wrong measure and have failed to act. The exception is Queensland which has Public Safety Areas around its airfields to shield the public from the risk of aircraft accident and to give aviators room to move should there be a problem.

‘While the federal government has provided a National Airports Safeguarding Framework based on the advice of the National Airports Safeguarding Advisory Group (NASAG), the framework does not include public safety zones, which begs the question ‘why have they been left out’ particularly when these are standard practice in most first world countries and the Queensland government has adopted them for their airfields?’

‘It is very clear the big developer lobby has captured the safety agenda and land use planning policy and is influencing policy and standards and planning decisions in ways which are not in the public interest. They are gobbling up our aviation infrastructure through inappropriate encroachment aided and abetted by the State.’

‘We have been making formal and informal representations about these matters for years to all levels of government, their bureaucracies and Senate Estimates. With one of our submissions to the federal government we were the subject of an FOI request. It would seem that what we had to say touched a raw nerve with the big developers and their powerful lobby groups. ”

“What brought the matter of Public Safety Zones to a head for us was the fatal Essendon aircraft crash earlier this year and discussion about it at Senate Estimates. CASA indicated that even if there had been a legislated Public Safety Areas, the accident would have occurred outside that ‘hypothetical safety zone’.

‘When we requested information supporting the CASA claim, they repeatedly fobbed us off until just recently. While the information they provided did not show the full extent of the hypothetical Public Safety Zone at Essendon, completed drawings showed many houses and part of a Primary School within the zone. Little wonder they weren’t keen to share the information! It confirmed our long held concern that residential and other buildings were far too close to the runway and flight paths of aircraft, a concern expressed by residents around Essendon.’

The public safety zone at Casino airport. (supplied)

In light of this information and armed with the model used by CASA based on the Queensland standard, we plotted out the Public Safety Zones for both airfields controlled by Richmond Valley Council at Casino (Figure 1) and Evans Head (Figure 2).

For both airfields Council has approved extensive residential development well within Public Safety Zones where aircraft mishaps are most likely to occur. Council used the inappropriate ANEF or noise nuisance measure to make their determinations and no consideration was given to Public Safety Zones whatsoever . You have to wonder if they are even aware of them which begs questions of local government having the necessary expertise to make planning decisions involving the specialist area of aviation safety.”

The Joint Regional Planning Panel, which recently determined that a Manufactured Homes Estate could be built immediately adjacent to the airfield at Evans Head, also failed to take account of public safety areas in its deliberations and relied on council advice.

With regard to Casino Airport substantial residential development has occurred within the hypothetical Public Safety Zone. There has been at least one aircraft accident near a house in that zone.

‘In our view Richmond Valley Council and the State government must urgently put airfield public safety issues first, and implement appropriate legislation to make sure both the public and aviation interests are protected”.

‘Further, there needs to be a careful reconsideration of the “Affordable Risk Model” used by governments in risk assessment in aviation so that the public interest and human life and not moneyed interests come first.

‘When governments put money ahead of human safety, particularly when a problem can easily be fixed, there is not only a moral problem but a legal liability issue.

What say you Mr PeaBody? It's not like you haven't been telling them...