The trial in the above-entitled
matter was held on Wednesday, February 16, 1994, in Helena, Montana. The
Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge of the Workers' Compensation Court, presided.
Petitioner, Crystal Tempel (claimant) was present and represented by her
attorney, Mr. Thomas A. Budewitz. Respondent, National Union Fire Insurance
of Pittsburgh, was represented by Mr. Oliver H. Goe.

A Pretrial Order was agreed
to between the parties and adopted by this Court. As reflected herein,
there were no uncontested facts. The parties proposed and this Court adopted
the following issues for determination:

1. Whether Petitioner suffered
a compensable industrial injury arising out of and in the course of
her employment on January 28, 1993, while working for R.G.I.S. Inventory
Specialists.

2. If Petitioner suffered
an accident on January 28, 1993, arising out of and in the course of
her employment with R.G.I.S. Inventory Specialists, were her subsequent
medical expenses related to such accident.

3. Whether Petitioner is
entitled to costs.

At the commencement of trial
and consistent with the rules of the Court, the parties agreed and stipulated
that the depositions of Crystal Tempel, Tom Tempel, Barb Tewmey, Patricia
Hanon, and Dr. Finney were to be admitted into evidence and considered
part of the record. Exhibit Nos. 1 through 5 consisting of the medical
reports and records of Dr. Wienert and Dr. Finney, St. Peter's Hospital
and Dr. Gorsuch, as well as a summary of medical expenses were admitted
into evidence without objection. Exhibit Nos. 6 through 10, including
the diary of Crystal Tempel, the daily log of Patricia Hanon, the Employer's
First Report, Report to Walt Kelly from Patricia Hanon, and an April 16,
1993 letter from ALEXSIS to Crystal Tempel were objected to by the claimant
on the grounds of hearsay and relevance. Such objections were overruled
and the exhibits were admitted into evidence. Crystal Tempel, Tom Tempel,
Lorie Wallace and Patricia Hanon were all sworn and testified.

At the close of trial, and
having had the opportunity to personally hear from all the witnesses and
to review all relevant evidence including depositions, this Court entered
a bench ruling for respondent finding that it did not believe Tempel's
claim of a work-related accident occurring on January 28, 1993. The Court
requested respondent to prepare proposed findings of fact consistent with
the bench ruling. Having received and considered the proposed findings,
this Court now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Claimant began working for
R.G.I.S. Inventory Specialists, in October, 1992. R.G.I.S. is also known
as "Marketing Force," and will be called by that name in the findings
that follow.

2. Through its employees, Marketing
Force sets up and stocks manufacturers' displays in retail stores throughout
Montana and other states. Claimant's job was to set up and stock manufacturers'
displays at various retailers in the Helena area.

3. At the time of claimant's
initial employment by Marketing Force, she had a history of back problems.
She had undergone a laminectomy in June of 1992.

4. Claimant alleges that on
January 28, 1993, she suffered a further back injury while stocking a
Muppet Babies display at the Helena K-Mart store. She testified that while
working at K-Mart she reached overhead for a box and fell backwards; she
immediately felt pain in her back and down into her leg. There were no
witnesses.

5. On January 28, 1993, Marketing
Force was insured by National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh, which
has responded to and defended against claimant's petition.

6. Resolution of this case
requires the Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who testified
at trial. Having observed the witnesses and their demeanor, and considered
the depositions submitted by the parties, I find that claimant and her
witnesses were not credible.

7. At the time of her alleged
injury, claimant's supervisor was Patricia Hanon (Hanon), who maintained
regular telephone contact with her. Hanon testified at trial and I found
her to be credible.

8. Claimant did not report
any injury to K-Mart personnel or Hanon on January 28, 1993. She went
to work the next day setting up a display at the Helena Wal-Mart store.

9. On February 4 or 5, 1993,
claimant left a message on Hanon's answering machine stating that she
was quitting as of that day.

10. On February 8, 1993, claimant
and Hanon talked by telephone. They disagree as to what claimant said.
According to claimant, she told Hanon that she hurt herself at work while
lifting boxes. Hanon testified that claimant told her that she'd reinjured
her back while on a family outing and said nothing about a work-related
injury. I find Hanon more believable and adopt her version of the conversation.

11. Claimant did not notify
Hanon of any work-related accident until February 20, 1993, when she left
a message on Hanon's answering machine stating that she needed a workers'
compensation claim form because she hurt her back on the job.

12. I find that no work-related
accident occurred on January 28, 1993. In reaching this conclusion, I
have considered not only the demeanor of the witnesses but also their
stories. Claimant's story was particularly troublesome. She quit work
before she saw a doctor. She testified that following the injury she was
in a state of denial, didn't think the injury was serious, and didn't
consider a workers' compensation claim. She didn't talk about going to
a doctor until mid-February. However, according to Lorie Wallace, a friend
who testified on claimant's behalf, on the evening of January 28, 1993,
claimant said she had hurt her back at work and was thinking about quitting
work. Meanwhile, on February 1, 1993, claimant was able to attend a three
hour concert in Great Falls. Claimant also says she started a diary on
February 4, 1993, to record matters connected to the injury, while at
the same time claiming that she didn't believe she had a serious injury
or that it was job related. Then, there are inconsistencies in her diary
and not all entries were made contemporaneously; it was clear to the Court
that the diary was prepared with this litigation in mind. After considering
all things, the Court reached a firm conclusion that claimant was not
telling the truth and that both the diary and the alleged conversation
with Lorie Wallace were manufactured with this litigation in mind.

13. The further rationale stated
by the Court at the end of trial is adopted by reference.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to section 39-71-2905, MCA.

2. Claimant must prove by a
preponderance of credible evidence that she suffered an injury in the
course and scope of her employment. Eastman v. Transport Ins.
Co.255 Mont. 262, 266, 843 P.2d 300 (1992). She
has not sustained her burden.

3. Claimant is not entitled
to either attorney fees or costs.

JUDGMENT

1. The Court has jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to section 39-71-2905, MCA.

2. Claimant did not suffer
an injury in the course and scope of her employment. Therefore, her petition
is dismissed with prejudice.

3. Claimant is not entitled
to an award of attorney fees or costs.

4. This JUDGMENT is certified
as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to ARM 24.5.348.

5. Pursuant to ARM 24.5.344,
any request for rehearing or for amendment of the Court's decision shall
be filed within 20 days.