The Ralph McInerny Center for Thomistic Studies will offer a three-year program in philosophical studies that will provide a wide-ranging introduction to classical philosophy. This program will consist of six courses over three years (during the fall and spring semesters), each course consisting of 6 or 7 two-hour sessions, including lectures and time for discussion.

This program is intended for generally educated citizens who wish to develop a deeper grounding in philosophy. No previous formal study in philosophy is required. Our goal is to provide people with sound philosophical “tools” that will help them to evaluate and form judgments about problems and issues facing them and their fellow citizens, drawing especially on the ethics and metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.

OUR FIRST COURSE will be an introduction to ancient Greek philosophy. We will begin September 27, 2006 (Wednesday) from 7 to 9 p.m., at the McInerny Center office at 616 E Street, NW, Suite 1214. Short recommended readings will be provided online, along with suggestions for further reading. OUR SECOND COURSE will briefly survey the main periods in the history of philosophy, from Medieval to Early Modern until contemporary philosophy. And it will focus particularly on two absolutely uniquely great figures like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. OUR THIRD COURSE will deal with the basic principles in natural philosophy and logic as the needed background for the study more advanced areas, like metaphysics, in the FOURTH COURSE, and ethics and political theory in the FIFTH COURSE. Finally, in the SIXTH COURSE, we will end the program by addressing the public square and the current issue.

Cost of enrolling: $ 100.00 per course ($ 50.00 for students). Some tuition grants are available. To register, contact rmcindc@gmail.com.

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

V. BASIC PRINCIPLES IN ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY - Second Class

Prof. M. Pakaluk, RMC @ FRC, 24 September 2008

Moral Philosophy: Conscience, freedom, virtues, habits, pleasure

Points on conscience:

1. What we loosely refer to as ‘conscience’ was classically divided into two things, synderesis (a natural ‘habit’ of the mind) and conscientia (an ‘act’ of the mind, a kind of judgment)2. Conscience is not classically regarded as a source of obligation (an inner voice) but rather as the application of reason to particular cases. Just like any reasoning, it is measured by the truth (reality) and is capable of “getting it wrong”.3. Because conscience is the arriving at a judgment of what should be done, all things considered, anything that I (merely) have strong feelings about, or very much want, cannot be counted as a dictate of conscience.4. There must be starting points of practical reasoning (because there must be starting points for any reasoning), which are in some sense provided by ‘nature’; these are naturally good but can be corrupted.5. Because the will should follow what reason proposes, an erring conscience binds; but6. Because we can be responsible for not knowing what we should know, in those cases an erring conscience does not excuse

St. Thomas Aquinas, S.T. I, 79, 12 c

"Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, 73] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (Article 8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "synderesis". Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit.

St. Thomas Aquinas, S.T. 79, 12 c

Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" (Ecclesiastes 7:23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit--namely, "synderesis": thus Jerome calls "synderesis" conscience (Gloss. Ezekiel 1:6); Basil [Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [De Fide Orth. iv. 22 says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.

Freedom

Often there are distinguished different types of freedom:-- Freedom of indifference: the mere power of choosing among indifferents-- Negative freedom: absence of external constraint or limitation, whether legal, economic, or social (peer pressure, stigma, public opinion)-- Positive freedom: expressive or creative realization of one’s nature to achieve some valuable good

Each earlier sort of freedom is (typically) a condition for the later sort.Libertarians differ from other conservatives in taking government’s role to be the restricted to preserving negative freedom.

But:(i) it is doubtful that there is any coherent notion of negative freedom which stands on its own, which isn’t regarded as in service to a positive notion (for the libertarian this is typically an ideal of self-reliance);(ii) freedom is not possible without truth, and yet once truth is introduced, one is led to a positive conception of freedom.

Freedom depends upon truth:

For you to act freely, is for (i) you to act (ii) of your own accord to attain (iii) what you want.Coercion and compulsion can diminish all of these: psychological diminishes (i); external diminishes (ii); both can diminish (iii).

But so can ignorance:

-- If you act in ignorance of a first principle of practical reason, then, to that extent, it is not you who are acting (not, at least, the sort of being that you are).-- If you act at the suggestion of another, or on a principle supplied by another, which cannot stand up to ‘right reason’, then you do not act of your own accord.-- If you act for an end (purpose, goal) that cannot reasonably be endorsed, then in getting that you do not actually get what you want (see Plato’s Gorgias).

Because freedom depends upon truth, and truth involves correspondence to something over and above us, then freedom depends upon some act of acquiescence in, obedience to, or reverence for the truth.

False contrasts between: freedom and law (either human or divine); freedom and nature.

Habits

A habit is necessary whenever something of a certain nature has a goal which its nature itself is not sufficient for it to achieve. The habit, then, a ‘second nature’, is acquired (either by a natural or conventional process) so that such a thing may reliably achieve its goal. Habits suit nature as exercised over time. E.g. God and the angels have no habits.

A habit is a certain ‘category’ of existence, a stable disposition, quality-like (it makes a thing of a certain sort). Habits are good if they conduce to a thing’s achieving its goal, otherwise bad.

Habits of a human being may belong either to the body (strictly, the body-soul unity insofar as this involves vegetative or animal functions not directly responsive to reason) or to the ‘soul’ (strictly, the mind, and the body-soul unity insofar as this involves animal functions responsive to reason). Good habits of the body are healthy and healthy conditions; bad habits are bad health and unhealthy conditions. Good habits of the ‘soul’ are ‘virtues’, and bad habits are ‘vices’.

1. We acquire them by doing other sorts of actions better or worse.2. We acquire them by doing like acts (we become courageous by acting courageously). (A circle?)3. The correct action is so because, in various dimensions, it falls within a mean between extremes.4. Similarly, bad habits which we can acquire may be assigned to either of two extremes.

Pleasure

There are two sorts of pleasure, bodily and ‘psychical’.Bodily pleasures are restorative and always imply either pain or a deficiency.Psychical pleasures are inherent in the activity, yet still ‘side effects’.The paradox of hedonism, and instrumentalism.

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About our Program in Philosophical Studies

A Basic Program in Philosophical Studies must have several virtues. It should give a good and reasonable idea of why and how philosophy is different from science and from every other human intellectual activity, including the arts. It should deal with at least some of the major philosophical issues debated in the history of philosophy. It should take into account at least some of the most important philosophers in history, showing the basic differences in their approaches, methodologies, and conclusions about reality. It should take into account ancient Greek philosophy because the best introduction to philosophy is the history of its birth. As Jacques Maritain wrote, “an account of the historical origins of philosophic thought is the best method of acquainting beginners with the problems of philosophy, introducing them into the world, entirely new to them, of rational speculation, and furnishing them, incidentally, with much extremely useful knowledge.” At the same time, a good program in philosophical studies can never be just historical. Rather, it should always show how every issue and historical debate is related to, or can help the understanding of, the problems of our contemporary world.

A program in philosophical studies should focus on the differences between philosophy, on the one hand, and physics, mathematics, history, poetry, the arts, and other techniques, on the other. It should touch upon several branches of philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of nature, ethics, and logic. It should address the birth of moral philosophy with Socrates, Plato’s philosophy of ideas, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ philosophical realism, St Augustine’s view on creation, the birth of modern philosophy with Descartes, Kant’s transcendental philosophy, etc.… These are all key authors and ideas in the history of philosophy, and their (sometimes very different and even conflicting) achievements can help us better understand both ourselves and the world around us. A program in philosophical studies should start with the birth of philosophy in Ancient Greece; but, even while studying historical issues and authors of the past, it should always focus on the most important questions of our contemporary culture and lives: the existence of God and of the human soul, the concepts of person and freedom, the concept of truth, the space and time issue, the point of our duties and of our happiness.

Philosophy should not be approached as if it were just a technique to master. On the contrary, learning philosophy is a matter of achieving, from time to time, genuine insights into reality – insights that will eventually (sometimes after many years and in unexpected ways) reveal themselves to be very useful in our lives and studies. This is what we should expect from this program: to achieve some insight into the reality of our own being and of the things around us.

-- Jan. 28: Law and Morality: What is the Legitimate Scope of Political Power Regarding Issues of “Personal Morality”? (Christopher Wolfe)-- Feb. 11: The Moral and Political Status of Human Life in its Earliest (Embryonic and Pre-Embryonic) Stages (Joshua Hochschild)-- Feb. 25: Environmental Stewardship and Agriculture: Ethical Principles for Relating to Non-Human Life (Joshua Hochschild)-- Mar 11: The Death Penalty: Human Dignity and Capital Punishment (Michael Pakaluk)-- Mar 25: The Family in Public Policy: Families Ideal and Actual, and What Should Government Do? (Pat Fagan)-- Apr 15: Immigratration (Christopher Wolfe)-- Apr 29: Homosexuality and Public Policy (Christopher Wolfe)