This
matter is before the Court on a Motion to Quash or Vacate,
Issue a Protective Order, and/or Sever and Dismiss, and
Incorporated Memorandum of Law [DE 12], filed by pro
se Defendant John Doe 1 on November 1, 2017.

This
copyright infringement case involves a Defendant originally
known to Plaintiff only by an IP address of
73.74.68.193:6881. On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion
to Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference in which
Plaintiff requested leave to issue subpoenas in order to
request from Defendant's Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”) the identity of the subscriber assigned
that IP address, as well as the identities of several other
subscribers, at the time of the alleged downloads. On July
27, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion.

In the
instant Motion, Doe 1 requests that the Court (1) quash a
third party subpoena served by Plaintiff on Doe 1's ISP
in order to determine Doe 1's identity so Plaintiff can
pursue claims for copyright infringement; and (2) issue a
Protective Order prohibiting any party from publicly
disclosing any information that Plaintiff obtains in response
to the subpoena. In the alternative, Doe 1 asks the Court to
sever and dismiss him from the suit. On November 15, 2017,
Plaintiff Venice PI, LLC, filed a response.

As a
preliminary matter, Plaintiff's response contains no
certificate indicating that Doe 1 was ever properly served
with a copy of the response. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
5(d) requires that a certificate of service must be filed
along with all papers filed with the court after the
complaint, with the exception of certain discovery-related
documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). The certificate
of service attached to Plaintiff's response only
indicates that Plaintiff served the document electronically
to those parties who have appeared in this case. Doe 1 has
not appeared, and the Court does not have any indication that
he was served with the response. Normally, the Court would
strike such a filing. However, given the unusual
circumstances inherent in Doe 1's efforts to keep his
identity from the Court, Plaintiff's response will be
considered on the merits. Plaintiff is advised to properly
serve any future filings in this case to any defendant whose
identity it has discerned.

A.
Request to Quash

On
timely motion, a court must quash or modify any subpoena that
“requires disclosure of privileged or other protected
matter [or] subjects a person to undue burden.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3)(A). A party has standing to move to
quash a subpoena issued to a third party when “the
subpoena infringes on the movant's legitimate
interests.” United States v. Raineri, 67- F.2d
702, 712 (7th Cir. 1982). Courts have found even the
“minimal privacy interest” inherent in linking a
movant's personally identifying information to his online
activity sufficient to confer standing to file a motion to
quash on the basis of protected privacy interests. See,
e.g., Sunlust Pictures v. Does 1-75, No. 12 C 1524, 2012
WL 3717768 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012).

The
party seeking to quash a third-party subpoena under Rule
45(d) bears the burden of demonstrating that the information
sought is privileged. Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does
1-2010, 4:11-MC-2, 2011 WL 4759283 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 6,
2011). However, “there is no expectation of privacy in
Internet subscriber information because it has already been
exposed to a third party, the Internet Service
Provider.” Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does
1-14, 287 F.R.D. 513, 516-19 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (citations
omitted). In support of his motion, Doe 1 explains that he
was not aware people were accessing the internet through his
unsecured wireless internet signal, and that the wifi account
has since been protected by a password. Doe 1 makes no
argument that the information sought by the subpoena is
privileged or protected. Plaintiff in response asserts that
Doe 1's argument constitutes a denial of liability,
consideration of which is premature at this stage of the
litigation. Because the subpoena here does not require
disclosure of protected matter, there is no basis for
quashing it.

B.
Protective Order

Doe 1
also asks that the Court issue a protective order preventing
or limiting the disclosure of his personally identifying
information by his ISP. A Court may enter a protective order
to “protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
Fed. R. Civ. P 26(c). Doe 1 does not provide any reasoning to
supports his request for a protective order, and does not
allege that disclosing his identity for the purposes of this
litigation will subject him to annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense. Though Courts have in
some cases allowed defendants in copyright infringement cases
to proceed anonymously, those cases tend to involve the
downloading of pornographic content which might tend to
embarrass the defendant. In this case, the downloaded content
is a film described in the Complaint as “a major motion
picture . . . about a private investigator who must follow a
bizarre and comic path to recover his stolen dog.” In
contrast to the Sunlust Pictures and Malibu
Media cases, this case does not appear to involve any
content that is particularly salacious or potentially
embarrassing. Therefore, a protective order is neither
necessary nor appropriate.

C.
Request to Sever

Doe 1
also asks the Court to sever Plaintiff's claim against
him from the claims of the other 17 putative defendants in
this case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 provides that
multiple defendants may be joined in one action if “any
right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 20 “is to
promote trial convenience and expedite the final
determination of disputes, thereby preventing unnecessary
multiple lawsuits.” Bailey v. N. Trust Co.,
196 F.R.D. 513, 515 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (quoting Gorence v.
Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 93 C 4862, 1996 WL 734955, at
*3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 19, 1996)). “Under the Rules, the
impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of
claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
724 (1966).

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that, “[o]n motion
or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add
or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. The court has “broad
discretion whether to sever a claim under Rule 21.”
Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016
(7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has held that “a
district court may sever claims under Rule 21, creating []
separate proceedings, so long as the [severed] claims are
‘discrete and separate.'” Gaffney v.
Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 442 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Rice, 209 F.3d at 1016).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Courts
throughout the country are split on whether allowing joinder
of many anonymous defendants alleged to have participated in
a single BitTorrent &ldquo;swarm&rdquo; in a single suit, as
here, is appropriate. reFX Audio Software Inc. v. Does
1-141, 2013 WL 5835704 (Oct. 28, 2013) (noting the
split, then holding that Plaintiff&#39;s allegation
&ldquo;that all 141 Defendants committed the same type of
violation using BitTorrent&rdquo; was &ldquo;insufficient to
link them together for the purpose of joinder&rdquo;);
see also Sunlust Pictures, LLC, v. Does 1-75, No.
12-C-1546, 2012 WL 3717768, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012)
(listing cases); compare, e.g., In re BitTorrent Adult
Film Copyright Infringement Cases, Nos.
11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 12-1147(JS)(GRB), 12-1150(LDW)(GRB),
12-1154(ADS)(GRB), 2012 WL 1570765, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2012) (severing defendants because, among other reasons,
allegations were insufficient to show that defendants
actually shared file bits with one another), SBO
Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-57, No. RWT 12cv22, 2012 WL
1415523, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 20, 2012) (severing defendants
and noting that &ldquo;the better-reasoned decisions have
held that where a plaintiff has not plead that any defendant
shared file pieces directly with one another, the first prong
of the permissive joinder is not satisfied&rdquo;), and
Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d
1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding permissive joinder
likely to cause prejudice to defendants, particularly where
&ldquo;Plaintiff&#39;s allegation that all Doe Defendants
meet the Rule 20(a) joinder requirements is speculative and
conclusory&rdquo;), with Pac. Century Int&#39;l v. Does
1-31, No. 11 C 9064, 2012 WL 2129003, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 12, 2012) (allowing joinder during early stages of the
case in which the anonymous defendants allegedly participated
in the same swarm), Digital Sin, ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.