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The winds of change are without doubt
blowing through Scotland.

There is the decline of traditional power
and institutions, the hollowing out and, in places, implosion of some of the
key anchor points of public life and a fundamental shift in authority in many
areas.

This is Scotland’s ‘long revolution’ –
which the indyref was a product of and which then was a catalyst of further
change. It is partly understandable that in the immediate aftermath of the
referendum, expectations have risen, people have thought fundamental change
could happen in the period immediately following the vote, and timescales once
thought long have been dramatically shortened by some on the independence side.

Popular expectations, pressure and demand
for change are a positive, not a negative. Yet, there is the potential pitfall
of playing into a left-nat instant gratification culture which poses that all
that is needed for change is wish fulfillment, collective will and correct
leadership, and hey presto Scotland will be free! This is a dangerous cocktail because when
change doesn’t happen quickly, many of Scotland’s newly politicised
activists may turn away in disappointment.

The times they are a-changing, but they are
still messy, complicated and full of contradictions. For a start, the power of
establishment Scotland
is still, for all its uncomfortableness and nervous disposition in the indyref,
well-entrenched and deeply dug in across society. If brought under scrutiny and
challenge, from land reform to a genuine politics of redistribution, they will
fight bitterly and with powerful resources for their narrow vested interests.

Here then are a dozen observations about
contemporary Scotland
to consider after Yes and No.

1. Scotland
is different and not that different from the rest of the UK. It is pointless to argue that Scotland
is completely different from the rest of the UK
and England.
Our nation has been in a political union with England for 307 years and an
integrated economy. Equally it is totally counter-productive to argue, as some
such as John Curtice of Strathclyde
University come close to
doing, of reducing everything to number crunching and saying there is no
substantive difference.

Take one basic measurement of difference:
the gap between Labour and Conservative leads in Scotland. At the 2010 UK election Labour had a 25.3% lead over the
Tories in Scotland, while
the Tories had a 11.5% lead over Labour in England: giving a combined gap
between the two nations of 36.8%. This is the largest difference between the
two nations ever recorded. On the other hand, the Scottish Social Attitudes
Surveys illustrate that on a range of values the two nations share a lot more
than divides them. Therefore, Scotland
is both different and not that different from the rest of the UK and England.

2. Scotland has never had a socialist
majority. The argument that Scotland has
had, has or could have a socialist majority seems to be based on a very strange
interpretation of Scottish Labour. It argues that the Labour vote is an
expression of socialism. Clearly this does not come with any real historical
understanding of Labour’s record and culture of conservatism.

3. The idea that ‘the British state is
fucked’ is simplistic. These were the opening words
of an article in the ‘New Statesman’ following the Emily Thornberry-Ed Miliband
debacle on the English flag and ‘white van man’. These five words are telling
not just on the subject they are directly about, but also about the confusions
and chaos of the English left's imagination and how far removed it is from
understanding the popular mood.

And of course, it illustrates how the English left perceives the condition of
the state and political change, which is filled with pessimism falling into
caricature. But this perception south of the border is shared by many north of
the border.

4. The pro-indy argument that Britain is ‘a
failed state’ is wrong. This was the received
wisdom of Sir Tom Devine, Scotland’s
most prominent historian in the aftermath of the indyref. The notion that Britain is ‘a
failed state’ is a shocking over the top statement. First, it is insulting to
the grim realities of people who live in real failed states such as Somalia, Eritrea
and Iraq
– which are a million miles away from the mostly sedate decline of UK plc.

Second, there is what this says about how
public figures, such as Devine, think of Britain - and what motivates
liberal establishment voices to talk in such a way. This framing of the British
state passes for conventional wisdom on large sections of Scottish left-nat
opinion. It presupposes that the British state is beyond reform, hollowed out
and completely run in the interests of the super-rich, when while it is true it
is failing, it has never been and is not today just a brutal exercise in class
and economic power. This view also misses the degree of adaptability and
statecraft which still exist in parts of the British state, admittedly in
decline. Two pieces of evidence for this are: Scotland
got a Parliament when we decisively voted for one, and obtained an independence
referendum when the issue emerged (unlike Catalonia).

To repeat the point: this is not an
argument for or defence of the British state, it is a call to avoid writing it
off by caricature: such discourse is everywhere in indy opinion, former
broadcaster Derek Bateman in the last week titling a piece, ‘UK: Living
Hell’.

5. The notion that the British state is
‘a Serco state’ unlike Scotland
has to be challenged. In a ‘Prospect’ magazine
essay pre-indyref Neal Ascherson made this point. The UK was, he wrote, on ‘the transition to a ‘Serco
state’ – which would soon cripple public services in Scotland’.

This counterposes the corporatisation of
public services under the auspices of the British state with that of Scotland’s.
This is a popularly articulated view in pro-independence opinion, and was given
added mileage in the late stages of the indyref with the claim that NHS English
reforms handing over huge swathes of public services and monies to the private
sector would lead to privatisation in Scotland. This poses the threat to
Scotland’s public services as external, and our practices as mostly virtuous,
with all that is required being to defend them from these threats across the
border.

What Ascherson and others miss in all of
this is the corporatisation of public services is alive and well in Scotland.
Consider the recent ScotRail franchise awarded by the Scottish Government, or
Serco gaining the Northern Isles ferry services. Then there is the
uncomfortable truth of England
debating re-regulating buses which could leave Scotland
as the only part of the UK
committed to bus de-regulation. Sadly the Serco state is well and truly
entrenched in Scotland,
as is denial of it.

6. Scottish Labour is not in a good
place. Nor is British Labour. But neither is dead.
The analysis of much of this is superficial in the extreme. Thus the latter is
posed by much of the British media as being rooted in the failings of Ed
Miliband’s leadership, rather than about more fundamental and long-term causes.

North of the border there is a tendency to
write off Scottish Labour and see it as a declining conservative force, either
dying or already dead, and beyond resuscitation. All of this is filled with an
air of anger, condescension and dismissal – which seems a strange mixture and
misplaced given the pitiful state of Scottish Labour.

The Scottish Labour Party is not in a good
way, its problems beyond the election of a new leader (given it will be their
seventh attempt in fifteen years), but it is not completely dead. The party has
a bedrock support of about one-third of Scots, a constituency aging and in
decline, but which it can hold onto for the immediate future. This combined
with the weakness of the other opposition parties to the SNP, means the party
should not be completely written off. Neither does this underplay the scale of
change the party faces: tone, lack of strategy, failure to come to terms with
the SNP, devolution, and perhaps most damningly, modern Scotland.

7. The notion that ‘this was as bad as
it could get’ which politicians of all sides reinforced in the indyref has to
be ditched. Post-Autumn Statement this sentiment is
weakening with the growing realisation that 60% of public spending cuts worth
at least £48 billion are coming the way of the UK
and Scotland’s
share of them.

Pre-September 18th a widespread
Yes view was that the current state of Scotland was that ‘things couldn’t
get any worse’ from where they were now. From this misjudgement of the state of
the present and the union, people felt they could project out under future
self-government all kinds of positives: greater social justice, being more
Nordic and social democratic, and that a transformed more equal society was
easily within reach.

8. It is a myth that Scotland is
defined by egalitarianism when post-devolution politics haven’t undertaken any
real redistribution to those in most need. The well
kent mantra goes along the lines, ‘no tuition fees, free care for the elderly,
council tax freeze, no proscription charges, free bus passes and so on’. The
list is used to emphasise the big picture of a secure social democratic Scotland
prioritising equality, fairness and universalism, unlike the punitive,
right-wing British state.

Underneath this rhetoric is the very
different situation that all of the above have distributed resources to above
average income and more affluent groups. Instead, fifteen years of a Scottish
Parliament have witnessed under both Labour and the Lib Dems, then SNP, no
serious redistribution to those who are poor and most disadvantaged. In fact,
our political classes have consciously designed their language to expressly
camouflage and disguise this situation. This has produced a widening divergence
between official words and deeds, which throws up a disconnect between the mantra
presented and realities, with all the potential problems that entails.

9. Salmondnomics is dead and discredited
along with the Laffer lefties insisting an independent Scotland has to
cut corporation tax. The Scottish Government’s
first Oil and Gas Analytical Bulletin in March 2013 predicted a ‘renewed oil
boom’ based on a ‘cautious’ oil price of $113 a barrel for North Sea Brent crude. As of December 9th 2014 the price
stood at $66.85 a barrel, a fall of over 40%, with every sign that it will fall
lower. This blows a significant hole in the Salmondnomic vision of
independence.

This oil-fuelled prosperity—a mix of
aspiration to Norwegian long term sensibilities with Chavez-style populist
politics—was forged to the belief that cutting corporation tax was needed to
give Scotland
a crucial future commercial advantage, focusing on the Irish ‘Celtic Tiger’
pre-crash. Sometimes the most fervent believers on this, emphasising the need
to cut taxes to maximise income were the most left-wing voices desperate to
square the economic-social circle of their own contradictions; in honour of
Arthur Laffer the economist who invented a ‘curve’ on the revenue benefits of
cutting taxes they could be seen as Laffer lefties.

Related to this has been the economic
determinist trope that Scotland
is the 14th richest country in the world per head. This is a direct attempt to
counter the ‘poor Scotland’
of yore, but it is posed in a meaningless way to most people. Hardly any voters
go around thinking of their lives, families and future, in relation to
international league tables and where they place Scotland.

10. A second independence referendum and
independence are more likely than they have ever been but they are not
inevitable. Politics never works in tidy linear
patterns. In the 1960s and early 1970s political scientists talked of the
homogenisation of British politics; they no longer do. In Quebec, after the two
referendums of 1980s and 1995, the second won by a whisker for the union, both
pro and anti-independence opinion thought that independence was inevitable;
nearly twenty years later, Canada is still together and the consensus is the
opposite to what it once was.

It is a truism often ignored that politics
never reaches a final destination. There remains in the No victory a small
window for British political elites. It would have to entail constitutionally
reforming the UK, tackling
the English question by democratic reforms beyond English votes for English
laws, and rebalancing economic, social and political power away from London and the South
East.

It is more than likely that the above tall
order is not going to happen, but it is possible the UK political centre could shift the
terms of debate. The UK
government could determine some of the context of the discussion by, for
example, passing a law stipulating the need for a super-majority in
constitutional referendums. This would be seen as a new 40% rule by
independence supporters, but it could change the dynamics and politics of the
situation. And whether it does or not, there is the possibility of the hurdle
of winning a defining majority for independence: a sort of informal
super-majority if you like.

11. The mantra that ‘political change is
easy’ has to be challenged. The exact opposite of
this is true. The above quote went on to cite the examples of 1945 and 1979 as
proof that political systems can be easily transformed, when they show the
opposite.

One defence of such outlandish comments is
that they were part of a campaigning logic of talking up the potential and
belief of change in the indyref. However, similar exhortations and statements
have come forth post-indyref. At SNP conference, speaking to the BBC, one
prominent independence supporter declared with the utmost confidence, ‘we know
what social justice is and achieving it is easy’.

There is no valid rationale for such
unsubstantiated hyperbole. It insults the intelligence of people, and is
grounded in either an unconscious or deliberate attempt to deceive them. There
has long been a left tradition of getting carried away with your own rhetoric,
starting out for the best intentions, deceiving others, and ending up deceiving
yourself. It never ends well whatever the excuse. Political change and social
justice aren’t easy; look around the world. We don’t need such language and
claims in Scotland
today.

12. Never underestimate the forces of
conservatism and the entrenched nature of the many faces of establishment Scotland. Power and authority have shifted in society. But formable forces of
traditional and conventional sources – economic, social, cultural and political
– remain in place entrenched across Scotland. In business, the public
sector and bodies, media, and political parties including large parts of the
SNP, the forces of conservatism and minimising change are still very strong.

There are many facets of establishment Scotland and
their entrenched interests. Scotland has historically had a very weak democracy
disguised by romantic hopes and overblown left rhetoric which pre-devolution
was never fully put to the test by virtue of political power sitting in
Westminster. When some of the emergent radical voices now cite and invoke the
notion of radical Scotland
they have to understand this context, historically and contemporaneously, if
there is to be any realistic chance of fundamental change. It will require, in
short, a second Scottish ‘long revolution’ building on the first.

Taking all this into account what should
the future politics of Scotland’s
radicals address? To begin there has to be serious work on ideas, policy and
values including the following:

- Develop a serious programme of political economy – a concept Scotland
gave the modern world and then stopped exploring. Political economy is much
wider than economics, and includes moral purpose and the importance of social
factors: a terrain relevant for 21st century reinvention.

- Address the limits of economic growth,
finite resources and break with the economic determinism of the Westminster consensus and
Salmondnomics.

- Put social justice at the heart of everything Scotland,
government, public bodies and business do. This
should go beyond its current articulation of welfarism, the poor and low pay,
and include structural issues and power, from land to corporate capture and the
super-rich.

- Tackle our weak democracy. Scotland has
historically had an elite run society and politics. The indyref ignited the
democratic impulse of public life and has to be nurtured to bust upon the
closed, managed order which has been unchallenged too long. A programme of
political, economic, social and local democracy is needed which identifies what
forces and vessels people can use and own to have collective voice.

- Develop a vision of independence and self-government which isn’t
about the SNP meme of defining it as ‘the full powers of the Parliament’. This is a limiting, debilitating, top down use of politics and
society, one where political change and power comes through politicians.
Instead, a self-governing Scotland
is about more than independence and the powers of the Parliament – but
interindependence, dispersing political power, and redistributing and fairly
sharing income, wealth and opportunity.

In the above, a spirit and mindset of
independence is needed – one which isn’t made up of cheerleaders, herd
instincts or blind party loyalties. It should embody in Gandhi’s words the call
to ‘be the change you wish to see in the world’, while not buying into the
miserablism and pessimism of those in senior places in public life who say you
cannot change anything fundamental.

This requires developing a practice of
social and political change, nurturing catalysts and agencies which make real a
culture of self-government, and is, critically, not owned by any one party or
perspective. This would nurture a culture which explores new forms of
collective expression and the political – liberating these terms from the dead
hand of labourism, old new left assumptions and neo-liberal passivity – a
conversation going on all over the West from Spain and Greece to many of the
Nordics – and from which Scotland can draw inspiration.

Sixty-one years ago the writer Naomi
Mitchison wrote:

It seems to me that you are bound to
assume that a self-governing Scotland
is going to be immediately morally better, and I don’t see it unless there has
also been a revolution. I can’t see how the people who are likely to govern Scotland under
any democratic system are going to be any different from the undoubted Scots
who are in positions of local power.

This is one of the major fissures in
Scottish politics: between those who believe an independent Scotland will
automatically be better, fairer and more democratic, and those who see
independence as a means to an end. One is a final destination and ending; the
other is an opening and challenge.

All across the Western world politics is
trying to come to terms with the huge pressures of globalisation, corporate
power and concentrations of income, wealth and status. Established centre-left
parties are in retreat and decline, characterised by what Neal Lawson has
called an ‘existential crisis of social democracy’ reinforced by the multiple
crises of capitalism which have weakened, not strengthened the forces of the
centre-left.

This is both an opportunity and challenge
to today’s Scottish radicals. Only this week it was reported that 913,138
people in the UK
have in the last year had to rely on food banks, while over the same period
900,000 people have had their benefits sanctioned and withdrawn. This is what
happens in the sixth richest country in the world.

Scottish pro-independence opinion has to
build the widest coalition to resist this and the free market vandals running
amok whose ambition along with Tory Chancellor George Osborne is to reduce the
size of UK
public spending to that of 1938 levels. This is a political struggle of epic
ideological proportions, but it isn’t won by completely caricaturing the
British state or ‘othering’ England.

Nor is it won by the practices of the old
defensive left or the Scottish patronage state. The former tradition can be
seen in the Labour Party, STUC and ‘civic Scotland’; the latter has a rich
lineage through Labour’s most successful Secretaries of State Tom Johnston and
Willie Ross, up to the present day and the Scottish Government’s White Paper on
independence. Instead, there is a terrain to set out for a different kind of
state, public realm, deeper, more diffuse democracy and creative commons –
which is within our reach.

We cannot go ‘back to the future’ of the Britain or Scotland of 1945-75: to some
mythical golden age of stability and security. Instead, we have to embrace
uncertainty, fluidity and contingency, and use this age of epic transformative
change as the ally of progressive politics.

Icelandic politician Birgitta Jónsdóttir said
recently that, ‘A revolution is not worth anything if there is no evolutionary
process as part of it.’ The last thirty years have seen retreat and defeat for
progressives all over the West as a reactionary revolution has presented itself
as the future. Scotland’s
radicals need to take a long view in these heady times, and chart a different
path and culture of political change, which contributes to making Scotland’s
second ‘long revolution’. To begin with this will be a ‘revolution of the
normal’ – reclaiming the notion of the public and social from neo-liberalism,
but while that is exciting and bracing, it has to be only the beginning.