We had an extensive interview late last week in New York, responding to President Trump’s extraordinary public assault on the nuclear deal the United States and other world powers concluded with Iran during Barack Obama’s presidency. It was a rare opportunity to talk at length with someone in the middle of a major international controversy, and not surprisingly Minister Zarif had a lot to say about this, a deal he told me might now have only a 50 percent chance of surviving. In fact, there’s a key deadline coming up in a few days, when President Trump may choose not to certify Iran’s compliance with the deal — even though inspectors say that it is.

"The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don't think you've heard the last of it. Believe me.”

That was President Trump. I told Minister Zarif I thought it was the toughest language used by an American president toward Iran since at least George W. Bush's presidency.

Glasser: Well, thank you. I’m Susan Glasser and, of course, welcome back to The Global POLITICO. We are extremely honored this week to have as our guest the honorable foreign minister of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who’s been here in New York for the last couple of weeks, a time of great conversation around all things Iran. Obviously, we had President Trump’s speech last week at the U.N. General Assembly that castigated his country in dramatic terms that we haven’t heard from an American president in a long time, arguably, since George W. Bush, that kind of rhetoric.

Zarif: No, arguably since the revolution.

Glasser: Yes, arguably since the revolution. Well, that’s interesting. So, I want to get to the speech, and you’re about to leave New York and head back to Tehran. What is your takeaway about the status right now of the Iran deal? What is the percentage chance, in your view, that the agreement that you reached with six major countries will stand up against President Trump’s vow to blow it up?

Zarif: First of all, it’s very good to be with you. I believe the international community has underscored the value of this deal. I was with the president of the General Assembly yesterday, and he told me that there are six items that almost everybody spoke about during the General Assembly, and one of those six items was the Iran nuclear deal, and almost everybody, with obvious two exceptions, supported the deal and underlined the need for everybody to respect that deal.

It’s not because it’s a perfect deal. And actually I believe we do not have a perfect deal in the real world because a deal has two sides; it requires give and take for the two sides, for each of the two sides to take some part home. Now, this deal had seven or eight sides: the P5+1, Iran, and the European Union.
So, the deal needed to address the concerns, anxieties, interests of at least seven different players, so it cannot be perfect for any of them. It has to have elements that would satisfy the concerns of one side and elements that would satisfy the concerns of the other sides. But what was important when we started negotiating this deal was that we agreed to a common objective, and that common objective that Iran should have a nuclear program that would remain exclusively peaceful.
The significance of that common objective was that we abandon the posturing of the previous 10 years. In the previous 10 years there were two seemingly diametrically opposed objectives.

Glasser: But now you’re back to posturing?

Zarif: Yes, we’re back to posturing. That’s the problem. But the posturing didn’t help us get anywhere. You see, the United States has imposed all the sanctions that are available to it. I don’t think there is anything left in the books that the U.S. could impose on Iran, but it didn’t produce the intended consequences. Let me be frank with you.

Glasser: The deal didn’t, or the sanctions—

Zarif: No, the sanctions didn’t; the sanctions didn’t. When the United States started imposing the sanctions, Iran had less than 200 centrifuges. When the United States came to the negotiating table in 2013, Iran had 20,000 centrifuges. And it imposed sanctions without limitation. Didn’t get anywhere.

Of course, Iran did not benefit from that either because when this process started we had a plus-6 or -7 percent growth. When we went to the negotiating table, we had a minus-7 percent growth, or decline. So, everybody lost. That is why we have to redefine the objectives, stop posturing and start negotiating.
Now, after two years of negotiations and two years of rather successful implementation, at least on the Iranian side, but the implementation by the United States has been lackluster, to say the best. At least we all know that the deal is working, and that is what every member of P5+1 with one exception, said in the ministerial meeting that we had in the Security Council.

Glasser: So, tell me a little bit about that. Here’s this dramatic moment. President Trump has just given his speech to the United Nations; then you meet for the first time with the group of countries that negotiated this deal. It’s the very first time you’re in the room with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson; you’ve had no conversations with him that I’m aware of; you’ve not met face-to-face. Tell me a little bit about how that played out.

Zarif: But the statement was so negative, as you pointed out, and as I stressed. This was the most insulting statement that had ever been made by any U.S. president against Iran since the revolution, certainly one of the worst and most negative statements ever made against Iran in the General Assembly by anybody.
And that would set the bar for a civilized meeting between myself and Secretary Tillerson at a very low level, and that is why Secretary Tillerson was happy that we didn’t throw shoes at each other.

Glasser: Right, that was his comment publicly. But my understanding was it was a tense meeting in the sense that you had the United States really taking a different position than even its European allies, never mind you. How did that play out?

Zarif: Well, it was disappointing. It was disappointing because of how the United States characterized the deal, how the United States characterized the implications of the deal regionally and globally. I don’t think people in the room agreed with that, but that was a closed meeting and I cannot go into the details of what happened in the closed meeting in the interests of respecting the participants and the privacy of the participants in the meeting.

Glasser: But it’s fair to say, and they’ve certainly said this publicly, that Secretary Tillerson took the point of view that the United States did not, Congress did not ratify this, that this was not an agreement that President Trump—obviously he publicly disagrees with it, and that they were pressing you to negotiate further.

Zarif: Well, this deal has been the subject of thorough negotiations for two years; you cannot renegotiate just one aspect of the deal that one party doesn’t like because there are aspects of the deal that other parties don’t like. And probably if you look at the deal in every paragraph there is something that one of the seven or eight parties has difficulty with or has a preference for another wording or another even approach. So it is just meaningless. And it proves that the U.S. is not a reliable negotiating partner for it to negotiate at length a set of gives and takes. It wasn’t one concession, but there were sets of concessions by each side.
And now, for it to come and say, “Okay, I’ll take the concessions that you made, I’ll take the concessions that some other parties to this deal made, and I’ll pocket them, and now I want to renegotiate the parts that I had to come down from my original position.”

So, that’s one problem. The other problem is, and what was very disappointing for everybody, was how he characterized the validity of the deal. Not only he neglected the fact that this deal was not a bilateral treaty that would require congressional ratification; it wasn’t a multilateral treaty that would require congressional ratification. It was instead a Security Council resolution, and it would be rather ridiculous for the United States, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, to question the validity of a resolution that it itself produced, itself presented as a cosponsor, to the Security Council, and voted upon, and it was approved unanimously.

Iran was not a party, Iran was not a cosponsor, Iran was not a member of the Security Council, and Iran has observed the terms of that agreement, the terms of the nuclear deal. The United States is a member of the Security Council, has [inaudible] to do that, and is now threatening to withdraw and to walk away from it because it was negotiated by the previous administration. Now, look at the message that you are sending to the world: that tomorrow if you ask another country not to even negotiate with the United States, but to accept a Security Council resolution, they should be worried that the United States might walk away from them.

Glasser: Well, that’s right. The credibility issue, obviously, is one that a lot of people have talked about in the context of especially this unfolding situation with North Korea and a similarly heated exchange of words, perhaps even a more alarming exchange of words between President Trump and North Korea’s leader.
I want to ask you about that. Do you think this situation with the Iran deal makes it tougher for the United States to negotiate with other countries such as North Korea?

Zarif: I think it would make it tougher for anybody to believe and rely upon the United States—anybody, not just North Korea. You’ve seen U.S. allies saying that the United States is not a reliable partner.

Glasser: Do you feel that Europe will stand with Iran and stand by the Iran agreement if President Trump withdraws?

Zarif: That’s a public statement that they have made, and that will have extremely important ramifications for the future of the deal, so we will have to wait and see whether Europe will implement what it has said it would do.

Glasser: So, I’ve just come from Washington, where, of course, the view, having listened to President Trump’s words, is that he sort of backed himself into a corner in a way, that he’s almost made it that he has to at least decertify or not give the certification on October 15, given the very strong nature of his rhetoric. Is that also your assessment at this point, that you would be surprised if he did certify it?

Zarif: Well, I would imagine that if the president wanted to find reasons after having made that statement to reach the conclusion that it is in the national security interests of the United States to remain with the deal, that he could cite the fact that he made a very strong case and the international community did not accept that case, and the United States, as a player in the global community, does not want to be isolated by the international community. And therefore, if he doesn’t see it in the national interests of the United States, will walk away from the deal.

Glasser: Now, you are a very astute observer of American politics. Do you know of previous instances where President Trump has been known to back down in such a public way from his position? What is your read of this new president of ours?

Zarif: Well, I believe all politicians will need to check their previous statements with the emerging realities. Realities in international relations do change and, as realities change, positions need to be modified. This would not be the first time that President Trump or other presidents have walked back from positions that they have taken during the campaign. And I believe sometimes it’s much more prudent, even much more mandated, to stand where the national security interests of your country does.

And I believe the restraint that we exercised when President Rouhani spoke before the General Assembly indicates that you don’t need to be tough; you don’t need to respond to every word in order to show the international community your resolve, your determination, your sense of nationalism, and the fact that you are a servant of your people.

Glasser: Well, you have been quite restrained. This has been very bombastic, even florid, rhetoric on the part of the president when it comes to Iran, both criticizing your abuses in the region, as they see it broadly, as well as this particular deal. You have not responded in kind. You had one tweet—I can read it now, but it was pretty restrained, and President Rouhani said—I believe he didn’t even mention President Trump by name. He did criticize the actions of a “rogue newcomer,” which we’re taking to be a pretty clear reference, but you said, “Trump’s ignorant hate speech belongs in medieval times, not the 21st century U.N. Unworthy of a reply.” But basically, you’re not getting into a Kim Jong Un-like war of words with President Trump. Why not?

Zarif: We take pride in the fact that we are prudent and moderate. We believe that we live in a world where everybody needs to take into account that our world is interdependent; our security is indivisible; we cannot have security at the expense of insecurity of others. So, we do not believe in heated rhetoric; we do not believe in such heated exchanges because we do not believe that it serves anybody’s interests. And we do not believe that engaging in such exchanges advances our national security interests. Nor do we believe they advance U.S. national security interests.

Glasser: You know, a lot of people are writing, as I know you know well Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan wrote the other day, that some of this rhetoric is “turning Washington and not Tehran into the diplomatic outlier.” It does seem to be a change of positions on the global stage. Do you think that President Trump made it easier for you to make the case for Iran?

Zarif: I guess so.

Glasser: You guess so because people—

Zarif: But I don’t take any comfort in that.

Glasser: Sure.

Zarif: I want the United States to exercise reasonable, prudent, forward-looking policies.

Glasser: But let me ask you this. If you put aside the rhetoric, doesn’t he have something of a point, when it comes to the fact of why not negotiate? There are clearly other issues that the U.S. and European allies would like to talk to Iran about—your activities in the region, which they perceive to be destabilizing, and things of that nature. Why not talk to the Trump administration and find out what their conditions really are?

Zarif: Well, first of all, we need to differentiate between two issues. One is, we have a nuclear deal. We thoroughly negotiated it after we had exhausted the posturing towards it. So, I think we need to put that behind us. When we reached the conclusion of that deal, I tweeted that this is the foundation and not the ceiling, and we expected everybody to create confidence, or at least to remove some of the mistrust that existed, that had been built up in the course of the previous three, three and half decades, through faithful, good-faith implementation.

Glasser: Right. You saw this as step one?

Zarif: As step one. Unfortunately, we haven’t seen much confidence-building on the U.S. side. So that’s No. 1.

We’ve got to put aside the nuclear deal. This is an achievement. The global community believes it’s an achievement. It’s not broken, so let’s not fix it, because when you try to fix something that’s not broken, then that would be the beginning of the problem.

Other issues? Iran has always been ready to engage with the international community, provided that the international community is worthy of trust; that parties to this negotiation are not coming back in two years and saying, “Okay, I negotiated something. I don’t like it now. I want a change.” And this is the message that the United States is sending. So if the United States is prepared to rectify this message, if the United States is prepared to send a correct message, that once you reach a deal with the United States then that deal is there to stay, then it will be a different story.

Iran has problems with the way the United States has behaved in our region. You see, we have problems with the fact that the U.S. and its allies have been ambivalent about terrorism, have not been on the right side in standing against these various terrorist organizations; being Daesh, Taliban, Al Qaeda, others. We have a clear record.

From Day One, we opposed Al Qaeda. From Day One, we opposed the Taliban. From Day One, we opposed ISIS. From Day One, we opposed Nusrat. From Day One, we came to the assistance of everybody who opposed them. And all this nonsense about Iran playing a sectarian policy cannot stand the test of history. Why did we go to the aid of Barzani in Erbil when ISIS was about to take over? Why did we go to the aid of the Afghans when Taliban came to take over? Were they Shias? Why did we do it?

We have a consistent policy of opposing extremism. We have a consistent policy of opposing takeover by military force. That is why we objected to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; that is why we objected to the U.S. invasion of Iraq; that is why we objected to the Turkish coup; that is why we objected to pressure against Qatar. We have a consistent policy.

Unfortunately, the United States and its allies cannot claim that they had the consistent policy, and if they did it would be a consistent policy supporting the wrong side.

Glasser: So, there’s an awful lot to unpack in there. We could get to the whole problems in the broader Middle East, which I want to because I do think, clearly there’s a view, especially among Republicans who are critical of the Iran nuclear deal right now, that they want to sit down and they want to argue face-to-face with you about issues like what they perceive to be Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region, about your support for Shiite militias, about the consequences of the unraveling of Syria and Iraq and the role that Iran’s played.

But, just quickly, let’s finish up on the Iran deal, if I could. I understand your position about the credibility of the United States; but, obviously, the world we’re living in is the one in which President Trump in two weeks may well come out and decide and say, “I’m not going to certify that Iran is in compliance with this, even though technically it has, because I believe it to be violating the spirit of the deal,” or whatever, “and I’m going to send this to Congress to decide.”

If that happens, No. 1, what do you do? No. 2, what is your message to Congress, which is controlled by Republicans? Many of them have been very critical from the start of this agreement that was made by the Obama administration. What do you say to them?

Zarif: Well, first of all, if President Trump made that determination, he would not have any international consequence because that’s a domestic U.S. procedure. What I also have to certify every three months to our parliament is that the United States and other members of participants in the JCPOA are observing the deal. And my reports have been less than flattering for the United States. I didn’t decertify, but I have mentioned the problems with the implementation by the United States—banking, delays in granting licenses for airplanes, other stuff that are not in conformity with the deal.

But that is a domestic issue. To the extent that President Trump’s decision would exacerbate the atmosphere of uncertainty, it would be a violation of not only the spirit of the deal, but even the letter of paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the deal, as was his statement. I mean, his statement was not impromptu or a campaign rally; he made that statement in front of the U.N. General Assembly, and that statement in and of itself was a violation of the letter of paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the deal.

Glasser: So, do you pull out if the U.S. does?

Zarif: No, no, no, we won’t pull out. We will wait for Congress to make its decision. We would consider that a violation of the provisions of the deal that would call on the United States to ensure that the national environment or economic activities of Iran would not be negatively affected by U.S. behavior. These are in the deal, I mean, I’m not creating them and I’m not creating new conditions, unlike the United States, which it seems to be establishing new criteria.

My criteria are the criteria that have been spelled out in rather great detail in the deal. But then, it’s up to Congress to adopt any decision, or not to adopt any decision, and I believe in the past a Republican Congress had this idea to let the nuclear agreement stay, as did our parliament. Neither one approved the deal; neither our parliament, nor the U.S. Congress. They didn’t approve of the deal, but they allowed it to stay. Ours pursued its own procedure by requiring me to report to parliament every three months and by requiring the government to take certain actions if the appropriate domestic authority found the United States not to be in compliance. So did the U.S. Congress.

But, it would be important what Congress decides. It had decided in the past not to take action; it can decide again. And then a lot would depend on how Europe responds to this, whether the European Union wants to follow the United States, or whether the European Union, as has been stated by various European representatives, wants to resist the pressure by the United States, and how, whether it simply resisted by making political statements; whether it takes appropriate legal measure—a whole range of options that are open—and based on the realities on the ground, Iran will exercise its option.

Our options range from walking away from the deal to somehow accommodating Europe. We would need to then decide—

Glasser: So, you haven’t decided yet? You’re going to wait to see?

Zarif: No, we have decided what we will do in each eventuality, but because there are several possible scenarios that we could be facing, we will not announce any specific decision before we see what are the facts on the ground.

Glasser: What have you heard from your European counterparts over this week and last week as far as what you think their response will be?

Zarif: The Europeans have made it very clear to us and to the United States that they intend to do their utmost to ensure survival of the deal. We will wait.

Glasser: Do you believe that a rift between the United States and Europe is possible in this situation?

Zarif: Well, I wouldn’t call it a rift, but it is possible for Europe to consider what is in the best interest of Europe, and in my view, in the best interests of the international community, including the United States, and may not decide to take at face value what the U.S. will say.

Glasser: What about, we haven’t talked as much about Russia and China. I know you met with Russian President Vladimir Putin recently. Iran has worked closely with Russia in the past. What is your view of their position on this, and what role they’ll play? They were key in helping to make the deal.

Zarif: They have been very supportive of both the deal and the Iranian position within the deal. They have supported our position on U.S. lack of full compliance with the deal in the meetings of the Joint Commission. And they have insisted on the need for full implementation. So, we are confident that they will continue to take every necessary action to ensure that’s needed fully implemented and fully complied with.

Glasser: More broadly, tell me a little bit about your relationship with Russia today. What was that meeting with President Putin like? Do you see Iran and Russia as strategic allies and partners?

Zarif: Russia is a neighbor. We have similarities of position on important regional issues, such as the need to stand against extremism, terrorism, violence, and stand for national unity and territorial integrity of states in the region. So, there are commonalities of position.

Of course, like any two countries, we may have differences of position, but I believe we are bound by important ties of neighborliness, as well as important national security issues.

Glasser: You raised the broader Middle East. A lot of Republicans in Washington would say these days that a consequence of President Obama’s Middle East policy was essentially to give a stronger hand, both to Iran and to Russia, in the region. Do you agree with that?

Zarif: No, I don’t. You see, let’s not go back to the 1980s, when people supported Saddam Hussein, when people supported the Taliban, when people supported all the wrong people. Let’s just go back to the last three or four weeks. Saudi Arabia and some of its allies imposed pressure on Qatar. Now, Iran had the choice and we decided to reject pressure and imposition, and open our space, airspace, airports, to Qatar, which is a neighbor with whom we have differences. We’ve had differences with Qatar over Syria; we’ve had differences with Qatar on other issues.

But we decided to adopt a position of principle. Now, everybody is saying that Iran is benefiting from the situation, that Iran’s relations with Qatar are improving. We don’t benefit from it; but if our relations are improving, if Qatar is moving away from some of its old patterns, are we to blame? Or is somebody else to blame? Saudi Arabia decided not to support the new government in Iraq in 2003. We were opposed to the U.S. invasion of it, but we were the first country to recognize the governing council.

We helped consecutive governments in Iraq since 2003. We immediately established our embassy, sent our ambassador to Iraq after 2003. Saudi Arabia refused to send their ambassador until two years ago. Now, they adopted the wrong approach. Are we to blame for having adopted the right approach?

And see, in Syria we were not the ones who financed Al-Nusra, [inaudible], [inaudible] and even Daesh. We stood against it. Now you see that some of our neighbors are accusing each other. Who supported them more, and for longer? Now, they made the wrong choice. We made the right choice. Why should we be blamed for the mistakes they made? They made the mistakes.

But, you see, the biggest mistake that they have made, the biggest mistake since the revolution, is that this obsession with Iran. They have done everything. They supported Saddam Hussein. Just, just, please, just go over what they have done. They supported Saddam Hussein for eight years against Iran. What was the consequence? Immediately after Saddam Hussein found out that he could not get what he wanted from Iran, he turned the guns that they provided him against them. Are we to blame? Or are they to blame? We went to their help. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, we didn’t say, “You should have it. It’s fruit of your own labor.” We went to their help. So, I think if there are grievances in this region, we are the aggrieved party.

Glasser: You are always an advocate of diplomacy. Being such a skilled diplomat, looking forward, it looks like there’s a new prince in Saudi Arabia. He’s just made a grand gesture when it comes to allowing women to drive. Why not a grand gesture of talking to Iran? Would you meet with him?

Zarif: Of course we would. We have responded positively to every gesture by anybody.

Glasser: May I ask you just quickly, you referenced Syria. The war has been going on for six years; it’s been a horrible war. Don’t you have any regret at all for the terrible loss of life?

Zarif: Of course everybody has regrets for the terrible loss of life; but we put in place a political formula to end the war in Iraq four years ago. The day I took this office, almost four years and one month ago, I presented a four-point plan: ceasefire—that is, end the killing; an inclusive broad-based government of national unity; constitutional reform; and an election based on the reformed constitution.

We insisted on that. We acted on that. Unfortunately, certain players wanted a military solution, removing certain individuals from office. For us, the red line was not any individual; for us, the red line was fighting terrorism and allowing the Syrians to decide. Now, people confuse the situation in Syria. Had they accepted a political solution four years ago, there would have been much, much less loss of life, which we all mourn, not only regret, but mourn.

Glasser: Iran has always been very strong speaking out against the use of chemical weapons. You have a partner in Syria who has used chemical weapons on his own people. Does this not cause you to lose sleep at night?

Zarif: We have condemned the use of chemical weapons categorically, regardless of the culprit or the victim. We have called for an international investigation on the use of chemical weapons, on determining the culpability for the use of chemical weapons. That would require—it’s not that difficult—you see, Iran has been a victim of chemical weapons, and each time we accused the Iraqis of using chemical weapons, the secretary-general of the United Nations sent a delegation to the war fronts, to the war fronts. Took samples. Examined those samples.

Based on the samples that he had examined, based on the observations that they made on the ground, on the battlefields, they determined six times that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran. Not a single time Security Council condemned Iraq for it, but be it as it may, we asked this time for an international investigation of the responsibility for the use of these chemicals. Unfortunately, the United States and its allies prevented an international investigation. No international investigation has taken place. Nobody has—

Glasser: Yes, but you have influence over the government in Damascus—

Zarif: Of course we will do our best.

Glasser: And it’s not—you and I both know that the separate question of a long-term investigation is separate from the issue of what powers Iran might bring to bear in Damascus.

Zarif: That is why we insisted on an investigation, because we had insisted, used all our influence to ensure a chemical disarmament of the government of Syria. The Russia-U.S. plan to disarm Syria from its chemical weapons was actively supported by Iran, and we not only politically supported it, but provided support on the ground to Syria in order to disarm. That is why because we have invested so heavily in removing chemical weapons from Syria, we believe that there was a need for an international investigation. And, had there been an international investigation determining responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, Iran would have taken even a stronger measure.

Glasser: When I was preparing for this interview, I was at a security conference in Washington. I ran into General Petraeus, and I asked him what he would like to ask you in the interview, and he said he would be interested to know whether Iran is supporting something like the Lebanonization of Syria and Iraq after this next wave of conflicts?

Zarif: No, we’re not. We believe that we may need a constitutional reform in Syria that would disperse power, that would enable various communities to have a share of power, but that is for Syrians to decide. But we want sovereign, strong governments in both Iraq and Syria. I believe there are other parties who are pushing for division, for fragmentation, for breakup of these states. They think that that would resolve some of the problems, but I can assure you, that would be the beginning of great problems in our region, including this new referendum in Iraq.

Glasser: In Iraq—yes—we didn’t talk about that.

Zarif: Because we believe, although we are eternal friends of the Kurds, we went to their rescue when ISIS came close to Erbil, but we believe that this was an extremely imprudent step.

Glasser: Do you think there could be conflict again as a result of this Kurdish independence referendum?

Zarif: We are afraid that this could lead to a lot of tension inside Iraq, within various communities, and we hope before it’s too late, before it gets out of hand, that Kurds and Erbil and Baghdad would engage in negotiations not based on the referendum, but based on the constitution of Iraq, which is—

Glasser: Would you mediate that?

Zarif: Well, we are always ready to provide our good offices; we don’t impose our good offices. Our good offices are there if—

Glasser: But that’s not happening yet. There’s not negotiations that you’re aware of?

Zarif: Unfortunately, it’s not, but it is important for the Kurds to recognize that there is a constitution, to recognize article one of that constitution, which states very clearly, and that constitution was written with the participation of the Kurdish regional government. It states very clearly that national unity, territorial integrity of Iraq, is unnegotiable, and I think that is an important recognition that our Kurdish friends need to arrive at.

Glasser: Minister Zarif, I see that we are getting close to getting the hook, so I want to bring it quickly back to the main topic of your trip, and the future of the Iran deal. Just a couple quick finishing questions.

As you leave to get back on the plane to Tehran, what do you assess the likelihood that a year from now the Iran deal will still be in place? Is it 100 percent, 50 percent?

Zarif: Better than 50.

Glasser: Better than 50 percent. Well, I don’t know. Is that good odds or not, considering how much time you’ve poured into making this agreement stick?

Zarif: Good enough.

Glasser: If you had to do it all over again, would you have made the same deal with the United States?

Zarif: I would have made the same deal, but unfortunately the behavior of the current administration would make it very difficult to accept the United States as a reliable negotiating partner.

Glasser: If you could meet with President Trump right now, what would you tell him?

Zarif: I would tell him that alternative facts may be good publicity stunts, but they’re not good bases for policy.

Glasser: Finally, who is the better tweeter, your Supreme Leader or our President Trump?

Zarif: Well, President Trump does his own tweets, so I compare him to myself.

Glasser: Well, you’re a pretty good tweeter, but I looked. You don’t tweet very often.

Zarif: Because it takes time to tweet if you want to do it yourself. Every 140 characters, hopefully, if I get to 280 I’ll be happy.

Glasser: They didn’t offer you that?

Zarif: No, they haven’t, but if I get—it takes me more than an hour to prepare a 140-character tweet because I consult. I consult very widely. Before I tweet, I send emails to a number of serious individuals in Europe and the United States and I ask their views about the implications of the tweets I’m making, and I ask my own colleagues in Tehran. I think Twitter and other new media in the virtual world are important tools, but they give you a lot of power, and it’s a lot of responsibility that comes with that power.

Glasser: That’s a fascinating process. I think President Trump does not undertake such a deliberative process.

Zarif: Well, I’m in no position to advise the president of the United States.

Glasser: Minister Zarif, one last question. Are you worried about North Korea? Do you think the world is on the brink of a nuclear crisis?

Zarif: I’m worried. I don’t think the world is on the brink of a nuclear crisis, but the fact that you talk about this is dangerous. I mean, I don’t think anybody has talked about being on the brink of a nuclear crisis since the Cuban missile crisis, and it’s bad. It’s bad that, after almost half a century, we’re back to talking about the possibility. Even the possibility is frightening.

Glasser: Okay. Scary thought to end our conversation on, but I’m very grateful to you for your generosity with this time, and we wish you a safe journey back. And thanks again, Minister Javad Zarif from Iran, joining us here in the U.N. Mission of Iran here in New York. I’m Susan Glasser for The Global POLITICO. Thanks again, Minister Zarif.

Zarif: Thanks for having me.

Susan Glasser is POLITICO’s chief international affairs columnist and host of its new weekly podcast, The Global Politico.