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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003601
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D, AND EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2027
TAGS: PRELAFPRELPGOVASCHTWKSKNRSPGJA
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER YACHI
Classified By: Deputy Secretary John Negroponte, for reason 1.4(B)/(D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Abe Cabinet is committed to moving
forward on extending the Anti-Terror Special Measures law
despite the LDP's defeat in the Upper House election, Vice
Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi told Deputy Secretary
Negroponte on August 3. The two agreed that the U.S.-Japan
alliance was indispensable to the maintenance of peace and
stability in the region. Ambassador Schieffer observed that
the U.S. and Japan were making substantial progress in a
bilateral, multi-agency effort to strengthen information
security, which the Deputy Secretary noted will lead to
greater sharing of sensitive information. VFM Yachi detailed
a number of Japan's foreign policy priorities, including the
concept of an arc of freedom and prosperity running from the
Nordics to Mongolia. Yachi noted that PM Abe's visit to
China as well as PM Wen's visit to Japan had provided "good
direction" and that Japan-China relations were in "good
shape," even though some problems continued to exist. End
Summary.
LDP Defeat Unrelated to Foreign, Security Policies
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi welcomed the
Deputy Secretary, noting his visit was timely, coming
immediately after the Upper House elections. Yachi noted he
had spoken with Prime Minster Abe on August 1. Based on that
conversation, Yachi characterized the Upper House elections
as a big defeat for PM Abe, the LDP and the coalition
government, but emphasized that foreign policy and security
policy were not issues in the campaign, nor did the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) raise any objections to these
policies during the campaign. Instead, the dominant issue in
the campaign was the pension issue, involving 50 million
missing pension records. The second issue was economic and
social disparities, including gaps rich and poor, between big
cities and rural areas, and the working poor. The third
issue was the politics and money problem; despite the small
amount of money involved, the electorate demanded very strict
political ethics.
¶3. (C) Yachi emphasized that despite the severe judgment on
the Abe Administration evident in the elections, PM Abe would
maintain his foreign policy strategy. He added that the
majority of Japanese supported Abe's security and foreign
policies, including some within the DPJ such as
Representatives Maehara and Nagashima. Regarding extension
of the Anti-Terror Special Measures law authorizing the
Indian Ocean refueling mission, some in the DPJ support it,
but the DPJ as a whole is against its extension. Yachi said
that extending the law, which expires November 1, will be
"politically very difficult." Yachi explained that with the
ruling coalition's two-thirds majority in the Diet's Lower
House, extension of the law would take place after sixty days
even if the Upper House fails to act. (Note: The Japanese
Constitution allows the Lower House to consider a bill as
rejected by the Upper House if the Upper House fails to act
within 60 days. The legislation then returns to the Lower
House, where the law can be passed with a two-thirds
majority, thereby overruling the Upper House's assumed
rejection.) The DPJ was not of one mind in opposing the
extension, Yachi said, but timing could be difficult. Even
though PM Abe intends to begin the Diet session as soon as
possible, the Special Measure extension cannot be dealt with
immediately, since other Diet business, such as
interpellation of the Prime Minister takes precedence.
Extension may come after November 1, Yachi stated, and could
create a "gap of ten to twenty days" in Japan's logistic
support in the Indian Ocean.
Foreign Policy Priorities
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Yachi noted that PM Abe's foreign policy priorities
included having five countries -- the U.S., Japan, China,
Russia, and India -- take more responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. He cited three
major areas of importance: 1) maintaining and strengthening
the U.S.-Japan alliance; 2) strengthening Japan's ties with
India and Russia; and 3) strengthening Japan's ties with its
neighbors, especially China and the ROK. A second priority
was to strengthen partnerships with countries on the margins
of the Eurasian continent, the "arc of freedom and
prosperity" running from the Nordic countries through the
Baltic, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, South
Asia, and to Mongolia. Japan did not see itself as leading
this partnership but, as Yachi described, a "co-runner in a
marathon." He emphasized Japan's contribution would provide
economic assistance, not military power. The Deputy Secretary
observed that the U.S. concept of strengthening relations
with the countries of central Asia might be complimentary to
what Yachi described. He noted that Secretary Rice had
talked of having those countries turn more towards a
North-South axis, instead of relying primarily on their
traditional ties with Russia. The Deputy Secretary noted the
possibility of projects linking central Asian countries to
India and Pakistan, e.g., linking electrical grids and
creating markets for central Asian gas, alternative to
Russia.
¶5. (C) PM Abe's third foreign policy emphasis involved
several diplomatic items: North Korean missiles, the
abduction issue (Japan's number one priority, Yachi noted),
the Northern Territories problem, where discussions with
Russia were already underway, and UNSC reform. On the latter
issue, Yachi noted the GOJ appreciated the U.S. consistent
support for Japanese membership on the council, but suggested
that "we made need some more flexibility" on reform, i.e.,
something other than the G-4 proposal. Turning to climate
change, Yachi noted PM Abe's proposal made in Germany and
said Abe looked forward to promoting this idea at the G-8
meeting in Hokkaido next year.
¶6. (C) Yachi also emphasized the need for a stable
diplomatic balance among countries in the region, noting that
Japan supported ASEAN 3 the EAS, APEC, and stronger bilateral
ties with Australia. The planned September bilateral meeting
and trilateral breakfast during APEC would provide good
opportunities for Prime Minister Abe to discuss regional
cooperation with President Bush, Yachi noted.
¶7. (C) Turning to security issues, Yachi said the GOJ
wished to "accelerate" realignment of U.S. bases in Japan.
On the subject of collective self-defense, he noted creation
of an experts group that would issue a report in September or
October. In response to the Ambassador's question about
whether the Upper House elections would affect that process,
VFM Yachi replied that it would and that the issue would
become more contentious. The Ambassador also asked if the
collective security issue might put at risk the LDP's
coalition with Komeito. Yachi replied it was difficult to
say; if Abe were able to consolidate his political base he
could obtain Komeito acquiescence, but if Abe's position
continued to weaken it would be difficult to get Komeito
support.
¶8. (C) Yachi mentioned Japan's plan to establish a national
security council, noting a bill was already in the Diet and
the government would seek enactment in the fall. Yachi said
the proposed NSC would have 5 members -- the Prime Minister,
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Defense Minister, Foreign
Minister, "maybe" a National Security Advisor, and a small
secretariat lead by a secretary-general. VFM Yachi also said
SIPDIS
that Japan needed a law covering peace-keeping operations
(PKO). So far the government had enacted special measures
for participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Japan needed a
general law, he pointed out, authorizing the government to
decide at any time when Japan should participate in PKOs,
noting such a law would be sought next year.
U.S.-Japan Alliance
-------------------
¶9. (C) The Deputy Secretary emphasized that our alliance
with Japan remained the cornerstone of our posture in Asia.
He said it was reassuring to hear Yachi's comments that
despite the election, Japan shared that view and was
committed to strengthening the alliance. VFM Yachi said the
U.S.-Japan alliance was indispensable, particularly given the
security environment with North Korea and a Chinese military
buildup without sufficient transparency. He noted the GOJ
would continue to support realignment of U.S. forces in Japan
and missile defense cooperation. Yachi noted the good
channel of communication provided by Ambassador Schieffer,
adding that he hoped the Deputy Secretary would also take a
leadership role in "paying more attention to Japan." Yachi
noted PM Abe's upcoming visit to India, Indonesia, and
Malaysia from August 19-26 and his September 8-9 attendance
at APEC, noting that planned official visits to Australia and
New Zealand had had to be canceled this time in order for PM
Abe to return quickly to the Diet session. Yachi said the
GOJ wished to have a Japan-U.S. summit of 30-40 minutes at
APEC and a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral breakfast meeting
also at the leaders' level. He noted President Bush's
invitation to PM Abe and his wife to visit Crawford next year
and said they were both very interested in doing so.
Information Security
---------------------
¶10. (C) Yachi turned to the issue of strengthening
information security, an issue of great importance. He noted
we had agreed on the substance of a General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and that the GOJ
hoped to sign the agreement next week. The Ambassador
confirmed he would be available and be pleased to sign the
agreement. DG Nishimiya said that the initial Bilateral
Information Security Task Force (BISTF) meeting had not been
conclusive, but the GOJ had now done its "homework" and was
making progress. He was very hopeful final agreement could
be reached in the afternoon. The Ambassador observed that we
were making substantial progress in this bilateral,
multi-agency effort, which was moving in the right direction.
The Deputy Secretary said improved protection of classified
information will lead to better use of sensitive information
and increase the amount of information shared.
Japan's Ties with China
-----------------------
¶11. (C) Stepping up cooperation and increasing mutually
beneficial ties with China would continue to be a cornerstone
of Japan's foreign policy, Yachi noted. Yachi noted that PM
Abe's visit to China as well as PM Wen's visit to Japan had
provided "good direction" and that Japan-China relations were
in "good shape," even though some problems continued to
exist. Prime Minister Abe was seeking to boost environmental
cooperation with China in bid to reduce pollution, mitigate
the water supply shortage, and increase energy efficiency,
noting Japanese energy efficiency is ten times higher than
China's. Nuclear energy is another area for future
cooperation, Yachi said. PM Abe's efforts to improve
relations were an important step forward, but stumbling
blocks such as the dispute over joint energy development in
the East China Sea continued to impede relations.
¶12. (C) Japanese political leaders were facing strong
domestic political pressure to begin drilling for gas in
disputed waters in the East China Sea but remain reluctant
due to fears of Chinese military intervention, Yachi stated.
China was only willing to agree to small-scale development
because it is aiming to develop a larger area for its
exclusive use, Yachi explained. China used a similar
strategy when negotiating a joint development agreement with
other countries, such as in the Spratly Islands, Deputy
Secretary Negroponte noted. Japan was willing to resolve the
SIPDIS
dispute via international arbitration but China opposed that
option.
Taiwan
------
¶13. (C) Turning to Taiwan, China remains suspicious of Chen
Shui-bian and is increasingly concerned over his aims for
Taiwanese independence, Deputy Secretary Negroponte noted.
Yachi agreed it was important to discourage Taiwan from
taking unilateral action in a bid to achieve independence.
Beijing was not just simply posturing, Yachi emphasized, but
seriously worried about cross-strait relations. Chinese
Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi mentions Taiwan every time he
calls on the phone, Yachi said. Yachi remarked that Beijing
had excellent intelligence operatives in Taiwan and was aware
of every move Japanese politicians make concerning
cross-strait relations.
¶14. (C) Japan stands by its 1972 Joint Declaration with
China, respects and understands that Taiwan is an integral
part of China, and will not change that stance, Yachi stated.
Japan has told Taiwan that Tokyo opposes its UN bid. Japan
supports a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and is
against unilateral action by any party to change the status
quo. The Deputy Secretary agreed that the cross-straits
dispute needed to be settled by peaceful means and stated the
U.S. does not support Taiwan's independence referendum.
¶15. (U) August 3, 2007; 10:30; Tokyo, Japan.
¶16. (U) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
Deputy Secretary Negroponte
Ambassador Schieffer
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Sedney, Dept of Defense
James Zumwalt, Director of Japan Affairs, Dept of State
Kaye Lee, Special Assistant
Ted Wittenstein, Special Assistant
James Pierce, A/POL, US Embassy (Notetaker)
Mary Wilson, Second Secretary, US Embassy (Notetaker)
Japan
Shotaro Yachi, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Shinichi Nishimiya, Director-General, North American Affairs
Bureau
Junichi Ihara, Councilor, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau
Nobukatsu Kanehara, Director, Policy Coordination Division
Takeo Mori, Director, First North America Division
Masahiro Mikami, Assistant to Vice-Minister for Foreign
Affairs
Mr. Miyamoto, Principal Deputy Director, National Security
Policy Division
Mr. Yoshitake, Deputy Director First North America Division
Mr. Fukushima, Official, First North America Division
SCHIEFFER