Monument of the "Aaandenk" borehole, Allanridge. (close to Odendaalsrus) The Erleigh and Milne Saga THE ...

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Thursday, April 21, 2011

Coalbrook mine disaster, 1960

Coalbrook mine disaster, 1960

Mechanical Coal Cutter set on concrete block adjacent to the commemoration plate

EXCERPT FROM: MY FATHER WAS A GOLD MINER

In early 1960 my father was recruited by the owners of
Coalbrook coal mine, close to Vereeniging, to head up an emergency team of
shaft sinkers to sink a shaft to open the way to rescue 439 miners who had been
trapped some 300 meters underground. A borehole had already been sunk
immediately above where the miners were thought to be trapped, so the mine
engineers suggested that a 3 meter shaft be sunk closer to the Vaal River, to
deal with the water problem that was discovered by the borehole operation.

He had barely started on his last shaft sinking assignment
when the true ramifications of the catastrophe, the biggest in South African
mining history, became clear and a living nightmare that disturbed him for
years to come. This disaster played itself out over a number of days, with the
ensuing rescue effort running into weeks.

The catastrophe unfolded on the morning shift in late
December 1959, a number of black miners had bad omens from rumblings coming
from rock formations overhanging the underground working in a section of the
mine that was not being mined. When the underground rat population started
fleeing for any opening to fresh air to the surface the miners fled likewise,
all headed for shafts or shaft stations for hoisting to the surface. In fact a
portion of the mine's hanging wall did collapse, but no workers were injured by
that. Instead, the sheer force of wind caused by the collapse had many blown
over and injured. Normally men (white and black) went underground day by day
blissfully repressing any thought of accidents and not returning to see the
daylight again. But when seismic events took place all became aware of imminent
disaster facing them around the next corner. All too vividly men become aware that
they are living by grace of hundreds of meters of rock roofing above, in the
case of Coalbrook, or thousands of meters of rock hanging over them in the
deeper gold mines.

The immediate reaction of the "front line"
management, to the miners being spooked by the ominous rumblings of rock
formations hanging over them, was to block and stop them running away for exits.
White Shift Bosses instructed Boss Boys to stand in the way of the fleeing
miners and chase them back to the workings. Messages of a strike in progress
underground among the white and black workers were conveyed to the mine
managers sitting comfortably in their surface offices. They sent down teams of
white supervisors who threatened the workers with criminal charges for breaking
their contracts or instant dismissal. Alternatively, if they did not return to
their work places, the police would be called. And so the panic was halted and
all went back to work. A few days passed by without incident. Then the catastrophe
crept like a silent monster on the nearly 1,000 unsuspecting miners as entire
sections of the mine bore the brunt of collapsed overhang rock. This blocked any
hope of escape for 439 miners, the vast majority black but a good number of
white miners as well. Trapped in the belly of the earth, at coal faces and in
travelling ways, they remain buried to this very day. After more than a week of
anguished operations to sink makeshift shafts and boreholes to ascertain where
to focus rescue efforts and conditions in the collapsed underground workings,
all further rescue efforts were given up. The fatality was 439 black,
five white miners, and 40 mules. It appears all fled to the safety of an
insular-shaped redoubt in the south end of the mine’s section 10 underground
workings.

After this traumatic experience my father then returned to
the mature mines with a series of jobs all in the Klerksdorp area: Stilfontein,
Vaal Reefs, and lastly Hartebeesfontein, before final retirement in 1975. But
the experience at Coalbrook haunted him for time to come and was added to the
top of his list of narratives told ad infinitum to his sons, grandchildren and
whoever would listen.

How and why the Disaster enveloped

At about 19:00 on 28 December 1959, the Northern part of
section 10, including the area where the experiment had been done, collapsed.
The accompanying wind blast injured one person some distance away. There were
no other casualties, as the top coaling, which was still being done by Section
10, was done on day shift only. It covered an area of approximately 6 ha and
had been arrested towards the south by one of the 12.2 m wide barriers. Top
coaling was in progress approximately 300 m south of where the collapse
occurred. No roof noises, scaling or any other indication of instability was
observed during the day shift.

For the next three days, roof noises and pillar
scaling were observed around the perimeter of the fall, but then it died down.
Top coaling and other mining operations continued. Two weeks later an Inspector
of Mines made a routine visit to the mine and carried out an underground
inspection at sections in the vicinity. The collapse was not reported to the
inspector, and there is no record of anything abnormal being observed during
the inspection. On 21 January, 24 days after the first collapse, the major
event took place. At about 16:00, the miner in charge of a section, which was
then working just west of Section 10, was alarmed by loud shot-like noises
coming from the direction of Section 10 and pillar spalling. He withdrew his
gang to a safe place and on the way out they were overtaken by a wind blast. He
reported the incident to the shift boss, who proceeded in-bye to investigate.

At 16:20, the miner in charge of a gang working just south
of Section 10 also became aware of problems in Section 10 by a strong wind
blast from that direction and sounds like heavy thunder. He also withdrew his
gang. The mine overseer and acting manager (the mine manager was on annual
leave at the time) proceeded underground to investigate. They found that some
of the ventilation stoppings around No. 10 Section had been blown out and
methane was emanating. No carbon monoxide was detected, ruling out the possibility
of an explosion. Cracking noises were still coming from No. 10 Section, but
from nowhere else. Word was received from surface that a depression with wide
cracks had formed over Section 10. The mine overseer and acting manager
concluded that as surface had subsided, the ‘weight had come off’, and as the
problems were confined to Section 10, the remaining areas were safe. They
nonetheless withdrew the two sections in the immediate vicinity of Section 10
and made arrangements for the damaged ventilation stoppings to be replaced. The
sections to the east apparently continued working normally, as the haulages
continued to operate and no word of problems had been received from those
sections. Some time after 19:00, the men replacing the ventilation stoppings
south of Section 10 became aware of increasing thunder-like noises from Section
10 and increasing methane emissions. They withdrew but before they could reach
a safe place, were ‘overtaken by a hurricane of dust laden air accompanied by
crashing like thunder’. The gale swept through the mine for ten minutes with
great force and then at diminished force for a further 45 minutes. Men were
blown over, and a general exodus from the mine ensued. It was not realized
until much later that not a single one of the 438 persons from the four
sections working in the east had come out of the mine. The general manager and
mine overseer proceeded underground to investigate. All the entries to the east
had collapsed completely. They found one person from Section 4 who had been
working in the haulage and brought him to safety. He was the only survivor from
the east. The rescue operation was covered extensively in daily newspapers and
on the radio. Attempts were made to drill rescue holes from the surface, but
the strong dolerite sill hampered the operations. After some weeks, the rescue
attempts were abandoned. All the boreholes indicated a general scene of
collapse, several flooded with water and high concentrations of methane gas.
The bodies of the 437 men who died in the collapse were never recovered.
Seismic and surface observations The following seismic events were recorded
that can be connected to the collapses:

➤ December at 19:16,
Richter magnitude 0.5

➤ January at 16:45, Richter magnitude
0.3

➤
January at 19:26, Richter magnitude 1.0. Due to the very wide spacings of
seismographs it was not possible to locate these events accurately, but they
were roughly located in the general area of the mine.

The events on 28 December
and at 16:45 on 21 January exhibited single amplitude peaks while the one at
19:26 on 21 January lasted for 5 minutes, with three distinguishable amplitude
peaks during that period. Comparison of the times at which the seismic events
were recorded to the times at which wind blasts and other observations
indicating collapse underground were made, leads to the conclusion that the
seismic events were caused by the collapse and were not minor earthquakes
leading to the collapse. No surface cracks were observed on an inspection by
the general manager on 29 December, although a cattle herder did report cracks
to the local farmer on 9 January. On 21 January, the first surface cracks were
observed on the road traversing the mine at 16:20. By 18:30, the cracks had
progressed some 1200 m to the south-east. Above the area of the experiment, a
circular depression of about 1.8 to 2.1 m deep and diameter of 150 m had
formed, bounded by cracks approximately 0.5 m wide. The total area of collapse
as indicated by the extent of surface cracks, was approximately 324 ha. Over
most of the area, the amount of subsidence was approximately 0.6 m, but more in
areas where top coaling had been done. The general conclusion to be reached was
that the collapse on 28 December occurred above the experimental area and on 21
January it spread outwards from that area, only stopping where it reached solid
ground or pillars that were wider than 12.2 m. The notable exception was in the
north-west, where an area that was both mined on the 12.2 m wide pillars and
top coaled, bordering on the collapsed area, did not collapse—there the mined
span was restricted to approximately 275 to 300 m.

Looking at the concrete which seals the ill-fated Coalbrook North Shaft.

From left to right: Lenning Makiwane (Zamdela coordinator of Khulumani),

ommy McClean, and Gregotry MaClean.

Commemoration Plate (Date when erected not stated)

A 10x10 meter room for which provided 20 bunks. Most rooms have an eerie feel to them as articles belonging to the victims of the disaster 53 can still be found in the rooms.

Derelict houses located close to the ill-fated Coalbrook North Shaft.

The accommodation was for white miners.

What used to be the mine-owned trading store was turned into a bottle store some years after the catastrophe of 1960. However Zamdela residents complained that its situation being co close to the catastrophe and empty residences of the victims was a cultural abomination