This post is the first of two looking at Barcelona’s methods and tactics from the Champions League Final versus Juventus. This week we look at Barcelona’s defending process.

Set Pieces; Pique the spare man in mixed marking system

Barcelona have only conceded one goal from set pieces all season while Juventus are a dangerous team from them, so this may have been a game where Barcelona may have been legitimately worried about conceding from a set play. With Barcelona’s lack of height in comparison to Juventus, Gerard Pique’s role in defending set pieces would be key – the only player other than Sergio Busquets and GK Marc-Andre Ter Stegen above 6ft2 and capable of competing in the air.

As the ball is delivered, we see Pique is the spare man with nobody close to him and makes an easy header away to launch a counter attack from a defensive set play.

When Barcelona set up at corners, they defended the front zone with Luis Suarez, Pique spare on the edge of the 6yard box and the rest of the team man-man, making their best efforts to disrupt the movement of the Juventus players and protecting Pique to allow him access to the ball to win the header as the spare man, front zone, centre or back – Pique was to judge the flight and win it.

Juventus won a couple of headers at the back post in the 2nd half, Pogba in particular had a good chance but overall, Barcelona defended set pieces relatively well, Suarez launching a counter from one corner at the front post resulting in a shot from 15m from Suarez in the opposition box.

Defensive positional rotation; Rakitic covers Alves

Often, Alves would push forward into right wing or into central midfield as he and Rakitic often rotate positions in attack, but as a result, Rakitic will often have to cover for Alves in defence if he is too far away to cover. Sometimes, Alves would follow his direct opponent; Pogba – into the centre when he drifted inside, and Rakitic would rotate outside to right back and cover Alves.

Alves has drifted into centre midfield then moves to help in possession, and is drawn over to the left side, here, Rakitic is the right back position as Suarez reacts late to cover the right hand side in almost a 4-2-3-1 defensive shape, Suarez is too high as he is not natural player in this position.

As Alves drifts inside with Pogba, Rakitic drops back into the right back position to cover Evra. If Alves lets Pogba cut inside, he can be free to shoot, or find an attacking pass. Rakitic dropping into right back while Alves man-marks works well as Alves becomes a defensive midfielder and both positions are covered, albeit by rotating positions defensively.

Iniesta, Busquets and Rakitic move out of line to close down the space of the central midfielders

With 4 v 3 in central midfield; often 2 of Messi, Suarez or Neymar would drop onto the lateral central midfielders, as Rakitic, Busquets or Iniesta would press high to close off the space and passing angles available to each player. This forced play back and allowed Barcelona to organise.

Rakitic pushes forward v Pogba as Suarez drops onto Pirlo from the kick off, Messi blocks the passing lane to Evra as Neymar pushes forward to close down the far side space.

This time, Busquets presses onto Pogba as Alves is in central midfield (covered by Rakitic) with a clear 4-4-1-1 shape being formed with Busquets pressing out of zone.

As the game wore on, the pressure Barcelona put onto the midfield of Juventus in deep positions forced mistakes and turnovers inside the Juventus half, the pressure giving less time on the ball and as a result, misplaced passes into players who were ready to press quickly onto any possible receiver based on the body shape of the player with the ball, being able to read the next pass before it was played.

This pressure from Iniesta was constant throughout the game and eventually led to a goal from Neymar, which was given as a handball (correctly) in the 71st minute. Jordi Alba intercepted the wide pass then drove quickly towards goal on the attacking transition, before crossing into Neymar.

Juventus sometimes could by-pass the pressure when the body shape was open and the midfield were connected, but after Barcelona went 2-1 up, the midfield started to get closer to the forwards for more direct passes and this made it more difficult for the deep midfielders to find team mates in safe positions away from pressure, resulting in interceptions such as this one.

When Barcelona couldn’t exert quick pressure from someone in midfield pushing high, often we would see the wide forwards drop onto the lateral central midfielders of Juventus. This was to create a 5v4 advantage in central midfield with rough man-marking duties to discourage passes to the midfield 4 of Juventus and marking by Busquets v Vidal, Messi v Pogba, Neymar v Marchisio and Suarez v Pirlo. This left Iniesta and Rakitic free to cover spaces, press higher and shift to the man left by a ‘marker’ to press the wide pass.

We can see the front 3 of Messi, Neymar and Suarez all dropped to mark the midfielders as Rakitic and Iniesta are free in the centre to block direct passes through the middle, and to shift from zonal to man-marking when the marker ie Messi presses Evra on the touchline, Rakitic marks Pogba.

We can see here that When Pirlo is safe in possession, that Iniesta have covered the pass to Marchisio while Messi blocks the pass to Evra as Pogba drifts high into the Alves zone (out of image), we have the 2 spare central midfielders covering the centre spare and able to change role with each pass and change of marking responsibility between zonal or man-man depending on the ball position, team mate position, opponent position and where the space is.

This post continues our look at the Champions League Final between Juventus and FC Barcelona. This week we look at Juventus’ attacking process.

Isolate the centre backs 1v1 in wide areas

When playing with 2 centre forwards in a defensive based system, the natural idea is to isolate the centre backs 1v1 in transition, and to try and take them on and go direct to goal. For Juventus, both strikers are quick and good in 1v1 play, so isolating the centre backs in wide areas would be a natural way to play with 2v2 at the back.

Mascherano is dragged wide by Morata who takes 1 touch and knocks it past Mascherano and enters the final 3rd with Tevez and Vidal in support, which results in Vidal blazing a cutback over.

Morata this time in a wide area against Pique on the left, with Tevez and Vidal again the 2 supporting players, this time a cutback is made towards Tevez but Mascherano blocks it.

This time, Barcelona block forward passes but Pogba is capable of running with the ball past players. As this happens in the centre, Vidal and Tevez break wide with Morata deeper with again, 3 players in the attacking phase.

Attacking from the left side

When Juventus won possession, they tried to attack quickly and direct to the goal, looking to isolate the centre backs 1v1 but if not, attacking behind Alves down the left side, often with the dribbling ability of Tevez and Pogba, but more often in the 2nd half through Patrice Evra on the overlap.

Tevez dribbles at Dani Alves then enters the box from the left side, drawing over Pique from the front zone and looking to cross to Morata v Mascherano with Marchisio arriving late on the edge.

Evra could occasionally get forward once Pogba drifted inside with the ball and Rakitic (who would often rotate positions with Alves) and find himself in a crossing position with Morata and Tevez 1v1.

Again, Evra is the player attacking on the left with Vidal and Pogba towards the back post, Tevez and Marchisio towards the front zone.

In the 2nd half, we saw more of Evra attacking from deeper positions in possession as Juventus opened up to attack Barcelona while 1-0 down. This was to help force back Alba and Alves who has been the spare players in Barcelona’s attack in the 1st half, so spending more time attacking the Barcelona half could potentially limit the influence the full backs could have in attack.

Note Liechtsteiner in the centre next to Iniesta, both full backs in the midfield line but Liechtsteiner staying close to Iniesta to cover him in transition.

Overcompactness Vulnerable to the switch of play especially Messi-Neymar or Alba on the left

Barcelona exploit this via switching play to Neymar / Jordi Alba The biggest problem with Juventus playing closer to the left side (Messi’s side) and compacting the space is that the defensive and midfield chains get dragged across to cover for each player moving across, resulting in a lack of protection on the far side. Often Neymar would drag Liechtsteiner inside, while Jordi Alba made late runs from deep and exploit the space 2v1. The 1st goal comes from this, resulting in Bonucci being drawn across to deal with Neymar while Vidal failed to track Iniesta who passes to Rakitic for the opening goal.

Here, we can see the ‘front 3 (Rakitic in place of Messi) with Suarez and Neymar inside. Jordi Alba arrives late and causes Liechsteiner a problem as he goes to deal with Alba, drawing Bonucci over to track Neymar.

We can see this time that the space around Messi is closed for any diagonal 1-2 passes but the switch of play is open – he can look for the pass behind the defence into the run of Neymar (which has been seen and resulted in goals all season) while Alba stretches the play from a deeper position on the left side.

As Neymar stays wide, Liechsteiner is now no longer making chain movements with Bonucci as the overcompactness has been exploited too many times, so his position is adapted to close down the switch of play 1v1 much earlier. Here, Messi can use Iniesta then Alba can run late (out of image) to play 2v1 with Neymar as Marchisio will be dealing with Iniesta in a central position.

On the left, Neymar’s willingness to run into tight spaces draws the attention of several players which overcompacts the side of the ball and leaves Busquets free to find Messi in his most dangerous zone which Juventus did well to block for the 1st half. Struggle to deal with Alba deep runs With the ability of Messi to find passes through the midfield line or behind the defence or to switch play to the left side to Neymar, means that the far side full back and wide midfielder are tucked in to stop the short passes, which means that when Neymar drifts inside, Jordi Alba can run free, A natural consequence of playing a narrow 4-4-2 diamond is that the full backs have nobody directly against them. In Barcelona’s attacking system of 2-5-3 or 2-4-1-3, the full backs were key to numerical superiority and accessing the wide areas to stretch the Juventus defence.

Here we can see Neymar inside looking for the diagonal pass from Messi with Jordi Alba running late onto the outside as Iniesta receives to stretch the play wide while Neymar can offer a pass through the channel for the combination into the front.

As Neymar drifts inside and receives in the channel, Alba is wide and unable to be engaged in a 1v1 if Neymar passes wide. As Juventus have no set ‘midfielder’ there is a common 2v1 on the left side.

This time, Barcelona are on the counter-counter attack and Jordi Alba is the player attacking the space left by Liechtsteiner as the Juventus Full Backs adapted to attack more in the 2nd half.

Changes to the defensive process in the 2nd half; Neymar tracked deeper and pressed higher

In the 2nd half, as Juventus were more adventurous in their attacking play, Leichtsteiner often came out of the defensive line to close down Neymar as he dropped deeper to take the ball and run inside with it (as he did against Bayern Munich away for the 1st and 2nd goals). Liechtsteiner tracked him deep and played 2v1 against him with Marchisio who would adapt his position to play higher and close off the space of Jordi Alba in the channel in a pre-transition space. A part of the Juventus attacking process was to press high then force Barcelona into taking throw ins, which would be switch across the field, providing Juve a chance to press high up on the far side and win the 50-50 ball. On 3 occasions, Dani Alves switched play from right to left from a throw in return pass, the 3r resulting in a turnover form an aggressive press and a direct attack at goal.

2nd half; Attacking Full Backs

A part of the Juventus attacking process was to press high then force Barcelona into taking throw ins, which would be switch across the field, providing Juve a chance to press high up on the far side and win the 50-50 ball. On 3 occasions, Dani Alves switched play from right to left from a throw in return pass, the 3r resulting in a turnover form an aggressive press and a direct attack at goal.

Dani Alves takes a return pass but is forced to clear the ball – instead clearing it towards Neymar in a switch of play which is pressed by Liechsteiner in a deeper position then he reached in the 1st half, leading to a turnover then a goal from a cutback by Liechtsteiner in his first venture into the box.

Jordi Alba rushes out to press and the backheel beats him, allowing Liechsteiner some space to attack the box.

Tevez drops short as the ball is cutback, spins and has a shot saved, which is turned home by Morata at the back post (Alves leaves him to press Tevez with his back to goal).

Evra pressing out of the defensive line to close down Messi, Rakitic or Alves at RW

As Messi plays the deepest of the Barcelona front 3, Patrice Evra was tasked to push out of the defensive line and play close to Messi, usually with Paul Pogba but often with Vidal close to Messi (Pogba moved to RM on 30 minutes for 6 minutes then back to LM).

When Evra pressed ahead of the defensive line, it often would leave a large space for Suarez, Alves or Rakitic to move into, which would draw the Juve defensive line over and leave them ‘over compact’ and vulnerable to a switch of play, particularly from Messi to Neymar or Jordi Alba.

Messi has been closed down but not enough to impact where he will dribble into and release the ball as the exit diagonally hasn’t been sufficiently closed enough as the compactness of the block is not tight enough. We can see clearly Barcelona’s 2-4-1-3 (Pique and Mascherano on half way line) and are able to retain possession with stability deep in midfield from here.

Here, Dani Alves and Rakitic are wide with Messi inside, in a 4v3 situation, Messi tracked by Pirlo who moves forward but the gap between Evra and Barzaghli is still open for Suarez or Rakitic to move into. Alves is forced into turning towards the touchline and Juventus can recover the ball with the throw in.

This time we can see Juventus almost in a situational 3-4-3 situation with Evra on the same line as Marchisio, Pirlo and Pogba, with Vidal moving closer to Busquets as Tevez plays close to Messi.

Rakitic has drifted into the channel that Evra has left to move forward onto the midfield line, which has drawn Barzaghli over and away from Bonucci, meaning Neymar can drag Liechtsteiner inside and open up the far side space for Jordi Alba who can play 2v1 with Neymar if the switch of play is made.

Closing the space around Messi to prevent penetrating dribbles from right-centre

When Messi was in possession, normally Paul Pogba was tasked with using his power and athletic ability to try and help Evra stop Messi, with Pirlo inside all in close proximity to Messi, often leaving a gap behind Evra which usually Rakitic or Suarez would drift into, pulling over Barzaghli, Bonucci and Liechtsteiner as the defensive chain across the line. Occasionally, we would see Vidal drop into the low 4-4-2 block and play left centre midfield and be close to Messi in place of Pogba.

Often, this would result in ‘over compactness’ on the ball side, leaving Barcelona able to attack the far side via a right-centre to left side switch to Neymar or Jordi Alba who would start from deep in a shape almost resembling a 3-4-1-2 if Alves stayed deep.

Here we can see both Vidal and Evra close to Messi, with Morata and Pirlo helping block Messi’s space to move inside. Juventus here are weak against a switch of play as the far side full back, Liechtsteiner has had to tuck into the centre back position as the defensive chain is dragged over by the movement of Suarez behind Evra who presses out of his defensive line to play closer to Messi.

This time we see Evra in a very wide position with Pogba in line with Messi as Juventus block all diagonal entries into the final 3rd from the right side channel with Alves in Rakitic’s RCM position and Rakitic close to Suarez to play in the space between Marchisio and Pirlo to help open up the space on the right side and offer a straight pass through the midfield to attack the penalty box.

Tevez and/or Morata dropping into left midfield to form a 4-1-4-1

When Alves and Rakitic were able to gain some momentum down the right hand side, Carlos Tevez or Alvaro Morata would occasionally drop deep to form a block of 4 across the field and as a result, force Barcelona into periods of passive circulation to try and draw Juventus forward to create space.

Here we can see a clear 4-1-4-1 from Juventus, blocking the middle and forcing play backwards with Tevez v Alves, protecting Pogba who is dealing with Messi and can’t be caught out 2v1 by Alves.

To help the full backs against the inside and outside runs of Messi/Neymar & Rakitic/Alves & Alba with Marchisio/Pogba & Liechtsteiner/Evra able to defend with equality on the sides.

Normally Juventus have 3 ‘pressing’ systems designed to close down the space of the deepest midfielder who can play direct forward passes, while the midfield diamond can change to a flat 3 with the narrow positioning of Marchisio and Pogba around Pirlo, allowing Vidal to move forward and press high.

Here, the Juventus defensive block retreat to inside their own half into an organised 4-4-2, with Pogba on the same zone as Messi as he drops deep; this is part of Pogba’s individual responsibility to stop Messi dribbling past him and attacking the defence from right – centre.

Vidal pressing out of line to close down space of Busquets to form a situational front 3

Here, Vidal can stay deep bit this would give Busquets enough space to choose a pass through the Juventus press and force them deeper, so Vidal is tasked with playing high and close to Busquets to disrupt his impact in the game from his deep midfield zone.

Again, Vidal is high and close to Busquets moving ahead of his position, leaving 3 of the Barcelona back 4 on their own with no pressing against them, leaving 10 v 7 in the Juventus half.

Tevez and Morata are to cover the channel and block any forward passes through the midfield line and prevent Barcelona from gaining control of the most strategically important area of the field and instead force the play wide into areas where Juventus can control.

In the 2nd half, Barcelona started to play in more transitional phases as Juventus opened up and started attacking, but often we would see Juventus withdraw into a diamond midfield to block central access and force Barcelona wider where Marchisio and Pogba could drift over to protect the full back, delaying the speed and organisation of the Barcelona attack and allowing Juventus time to form a defensive shape.

High press when Ter Stegen in possession

When Barcelona are allowed to pass the ball from GK an open defensive shape, they can quickly start to dominate possession from the back and move the attacking block closer to the opponent goal and pin them in, making counter attacks difficult to come by and often into areas which Barcelona press them into.

To prevent the organised possession phase from the GK, Juventus played very aggressively when the ball was in transit back to Marc-Andre Ter Stegen or at goal kicks, often playing 1v1 across the line with the midfield pushed up against Busquets, Rakitic and Iniesta.

Here, we can see that Busquets has passed back to Ter Stegen but Juve are already pressed against every short outball which Barcelona prefer. Despite the accuracy and range of passing Ter Stegen has, Juventus have very aggressive players when attacking high balls or loose passes, so even a diagonal pass from Ter Stegen was at the risk of a turnover in a position where Juventus could flood the box from a wide attack.

In this clip, both Morata and Tevez press Ter Stegen with Pogba and Vidal able to cover the passing lanes of Mascherano, Alves and Busquets and then press Pique which forces a Barcelona throw in which leads to the equalizing goal.

The Blacks play 4-2-3-1 v the Yellow 4-2-3 formation. The Yellows play 9 v 10 and when they win possession, look to counter attack quickly over the line with passes and dribbles. Players must not go chasing the ball and remember the distances between players are important, and moving forward to close down passing angles while closing off passing lanes into midfield are a crucial element of the defensive strategy. Above, the right back is in possession. The full back plays close to the winger, leaving a back 3 as the far side full back tucks in. The 2 holding players cover the spaces making an ‘M’ formation, playing close to the attacking midfielder and stopping passes into him. The 3 attacking midfielders press the ball and closest passing options, with the far side player playing almost in line with his full back, wide enough to shut down a long switch to the far side.

Coaching Points:

Press, cover, balance and communicate at all times

As the ball moves, so does the defence

Be aware of movement behind as well as infront

Force play back – Disallow passes into midfield and the striker as quickly as possible

Be decisive when pressing the ball, where will play be forced?

Speed in transition to cross the end line

Progressions/Variations:

Add in a striker and a goalkeeper and play a short field match – 70 yards

Play games of 15 minutes then swap roles – what are the scores?

Play against different formations, what is different playing against 4-2-3-1 than 4-3-3?

Since January, the return to form of Lionel Messi has seen him reach new heights in performance, unseen ever when he was World Player of The Year for 4 seasons running (2009 2010 2011 2012) and now he has changed his role in the team to play as a deep inverted winger, who has almost a free role as Dani Alves and Ivan Rakitic adapt the RB and RCM positioning to change and cover for Messi as he goes looking for solutions from deep.

We often see Messi in a position where he can play a now trademark diagonal through ball from the inside right channel to the inside left channel, where Thierry Henry, David Villa, Pedro, and now Neymar are the main beneficiaries of his fantastic through balls and lofted passes from this deep position.

In the game v Bilbao, they tried to overload Messi 2v1 and 3v1 on the touchline and block his access to the dribble diagonally towards the centre backs with the ball protected on his left side, but often left his supporting team mates unmarked or left the space inside open to be attacked by the supporting team mates. Often, this would mean that Messi would simply make a pass and allow his team mates to attack the defence with players on the far side with freedom of movement.

Leaving Alves free in Rakitic’s RCM position

Here, Messi is blocked from dribbling inside as he would normally like to, but instead of completely blocking his central access, Alves is left free in the RCM position as Rakitic covers the Alves position.

As Messi has the intelligence to know that Alves is in a good attacking position, he finds his team mate then drags away his marker with a run down the line with Suarez and Neymar in good areas.

Again, Messi has a 3v1 but with support inside from Alves and Rakitic, but with a difficult passing angle. Instead, he continues his run down the line, dribbles past all 3 players then beats another 2 inside the box before scoring one of the best goals in recent history.

Messi is able to face up the defender and get into a position where he can access the centre. This time, Bilbao have only 2v1 against him, with the 3rd player v Alves inside. Barcelona plays lots of passes with a back to goal for 1-2 play, and as a result in this position Alves knows that is what Messi will look for to get out of trouble.

As Messi turns outside, Messi is still tracked 2v1 but again, the supporting team mates are left free; here, the left back is too deep and needs to engage Alves to make it harder to receive cleanly.

Again, in a 1-2 scenario, Messi is pressed by 2 players – Alves in the last clip by nobody – while Suarez drifts behind the defence unmarked where he can receive and pass across goal to Neymar who is untracker by the right back who is unaware of the movement of Neymar to the back post.

Bilbao came into the game with a clear game plan to stop Messi and attack Barcelona with direct passes to Aritz Aduriz in transition and with an aerial based game from restarts, but neglecting to play close enough to the other 10 dangerous Barcelona attackers resulted in Barcelona being able to exploit the extra free players with the overload placed on Messi.

Europa League holders and this seasons finalists, Sevilla, are a team with a strong defensive unit and a strong attacking process, particularly on the counter attack.

Against a possession orientated team like Fiorentina, they allowed the Italians to have the ball and then defend from areas where they felt comfortable to make Fiorentina predictable; on the sides where Fiorentia played with ‘inverted wingers’ in a 4-3-3.

From the wide zone, they looked to block the cut inside with close positioning to play 2v1 or if the play was with a midfielder or full back in a wide zone, they would ensure they had solid defensive triangles to cover the pass through the movement to engage 1v1 on the side which would often be in 2v2,3v3 or 4v4 scenarios. To do this, the central midfielder on the far side would look to cover any angle between the 2 closest pressing players to the ball and block anything diagonally between the lines or into the feet of Gomez., the CF of Fiorentina.

Covering diagonal passes when opponent is trapped into the side zone

Here, Pasqual finds himself in possession in the wide area and with minimal pressure, but he cannot find an easy pass through the press because the position that M’bia has taken between the players and behind the press, forcing the play to go in a different direction as the 3 players closest to the ball offer an angle to force play back and not across the field, stopping penetration and quick circulation across the field.

This time, the same 3 players press on the side and try to direct play backwards while the 2 CMs cover the angles behind the area of engagement, blocking the pass to Salah between the lines. The key to this is the far side CM moves forward around 4m and covers the angle better, while able to press Valero if needed, while Bacca can drop into the midfield line if the CM moves onto the top line to press and re-create the 4-4-2 block.

Covering the angles when 3v3 on the side

As Sevilla get drawn over to play 3v3 on he side, the far side CM covers the space behind M’Bia who goes to play v Valero. As Fiorentina have now 2 players between the lines, it is very important the that far side CM can block the angle out of the wide zone and into the centre, as the CB would have to press out of line if the ball was to reach this space. The left winger is now tucking in to help pick up Salah who has drifted inside (too far) but still causes a problem if he has the ball.

Covering passes when the pressure is not close enough to engage 1 v 1

When the Sevilla press can’t get across and shut down the space of the ball carrier, they still look to block anything diagonal, making sure that even if a player is “out of position” that he is covering the space that Fiorentina wish to attack through. This delays the attack, forces it away from its intended direction and allows Sevilla time to regroup and get closer to the ball in a compact shape.

Again, the RB has advanced with the ball and with little pressure, the Winger shifts over to press the ball, while the CM shift over quickly to secure the central space – the RM has tucked so far over that he is on the middle line of the field with the far side CF able to drift over and play RM for a few seconds to make a low block 4-5-1 situationally until the ball is moved backwards.

This is part of many reasons why teams like Sevilla are competitive on a consistent basis in European competition and still compete in the top levels of La Liga.

In the Champions League Semi Final between Barcelona and Bayern Munich, the score was decided by one player’s ability to find space when there is little available, despite Bayern Munich’s best attempts to control the space around Lionel Messi, particularly in the 1st half.

For the 1st half, Bayern played wide and looked to enter the attacking phases from the CF drifting wide then playing 1v1 on the side and attacking from there, while Barcelona played more direct from central zones in transition, looking to use Suarez’ tenacity behind the Bayern defence, or with lots of circulation which kept the ball and looked for a breakthrough from quick combinations around the goal or in 1v1 play.

The 2nd half changed for Barcelona when Iniesta, Neymar, Messi and Rakitic all played directly through the channels, looking to cut inside and combine with centrally based players; Suarez or Neymar on the last line of the defence, with Alba and Alves staying deeper and making late runs outside the play.

The main danger was always through an ‘inverted’ player, cutting inside, particularly Messi from the right channel, where all 3 goals came from, and several chances created from here.

Messi attacks the back 4 diagonally from the channel between the lines

Messi is in clear space and will use the run of Suarez to push back the defence to attack more space, eventually looking to complete the attack from a shot or a combination to shoot or switch play to Alba on the far side.

As Messi’s route is blocked, he reacts to play a (somewhat predictable) 1-2 with Neymar who will turn his back to goal to release the pass back to Messi.

With nobody able to track his run, Messi shoots 1st time from zone 14 from Neymar’s lay-off (and clever block) to allow Messi to shoot under no pressure on the run, which is saved.

Messi in a deep position; looking for penetration behind the high line

When Messi is in the final 3rd, and behind the opposition midfield, often he will look to complete an attack himself. If he is in a deeper role, if he can eliminate a midfielder and look for a pass behind the defence, he will often look to play diagonally into a run from the blindside attacker, Neymar.

As Messi cuts inside Lahm, he can scan and deliver a pass behind the defence into the run of the far side attacker, into plenty of space. Neuer reacts and recovers the pass before Neymar can score.

This time, Alonso has left Messi’s zone to press Alves 2v1, which leaves Messi open as the ball evades the pressure. This leaves Messi free to take 2 touches before shooting as Lahm is too far from the ball to close him down and stop the shot.

As Messi has enough space to shift the ball, Neuer must be expecting the ball to be curled into the far corner. Instead, Messi closes his hips and with minimal back lift, scores from 22m.

Messi playing on the last line of the defence

Messi drifts into the gap between Bernat and Boateng, with Rakitic able to find a straight pass through the channel into Messi’s feet to give him a 1v1 on the last line of the defence.

Messi is in his favourite zone, able to cut onto his left foot and open up the goal, with a 1v1. Here, he dribbles past Boateng and chips the ball over Neuer for a fantastic 2nd goal.

In the 1st half, Bayern ensured Barcelona could only attack with straight passes into Messi who would play in a wider area and very deep. The 2nd half change to have Neymar and Suarez higher and Neymar slightly narrower, with Iniesta and Rakitic closer to Messi with Alves higher, gave Messi more freedom to move closer to the middle and get between the lines more often.

These little changes impacted the defensive shape of Bayern and often allowed an easy pass across midfield into Iniesta to attack diagonally when Messi was blocked. Eventually, the spaces became bigger and Messi scored 2 from the right side channel, and assisted the 3rd.

]]>http://www.coachingadvancedplayers.com/attacking-diagonally/feed/0Change Formation in the Attacking Phasehttp://www.coachingadvancedplayers.com/change-formation-in-the-attacking-phase/
http://www.coachingadvancedplayers.com/change-formation-in-the-attacking-phase/#commentsMon, 11 May 2015 13:00:58 +0000http://www.coachingadvancedplayers.com/?p=4297Continue reading →]]>This is a short excerpt from Coaching the 4-2-3-1 Advanced Tactics by Stevie Grieve. The book takes a detailed look at how to get the best out of this very popular formation.

When changing formation, there are many variables that can come from this, mainly from and attacking and defensive positioning starting position basis.

Some players’ roles and responsibilities change, although not drastically. In a 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 some players responsibilities stay the same, mainly the back 4 and central striker. The back 4 as always must protect the goal and defend as a priority, then support the attacking phase secondary. Full backs in very attacking teams can allow wingers to play slightly more infield if they wish, or if the winger stays on the touchline, provide deep support or an under lapping run to offer an extra option if places under pressure. The runs from the full back can open up new solutions when the ball is with the winger.

Some wingers can commonly play 1v2, so the attacking full back can make it a 2v2 on the side, and this can also provide a 2nd outball to the sides from the centre. Full backs in more defensive teams may tend to stay behind the line of play to be closer to the defence and enable a swift transition and re-shape into defensive positions.

The striker, in both formations, plays alone against generally 2 central defenders, and so this player must look to offer an outball into feet to hold play up, or to draw a defender out of position, but also have the intelligence to know when to move into the channels to offer a pass behind the defence, or move to create space for other players.

Changing a 4-3-3 Into a 4-2-3-1

Moving from the 4-3-3 into a 4-2-3-1, the wingers drop deeper, around 8-12 yards and play between the midfield line and centre forward, while one of the 2 central midfielders moves forward around 8-12 yards to become the attacking midfielder, playing in a line with the wingers, and behind the striker.

The other central midfielder will drop 8 yards deeper to play in line with the defensive midfielder and these players will cover the space behind the 3 attacking midfielders and infront of the defence. These players look to provide the correct distances between the lines and control the space infront of the defence – too much space left and a clever attacking midfielder will exploit it, and too deep allows the opposition to gain control of the centre of the field.

In a 4-3-3, the advantages of moving from a 4-3-3 into a 4-2-3-1, is that when before there was 1 holding central midfielder, acting as a midfield ‘sweeper’ for any play breaking down or offering a pass back to retain possession, in a 4-2-3-1, there is now 2 players doing this role, which can be designated as a right side DM and a left side DM so for example, if the holding midfielder is a slow player, that player may need help covering the space between the width of the field between the midfield and defensive lines.

This may help if the 4-3-3 isn’t keeping possession close to the opposition goal, and when play breaks down, the 4-3-3 may be more open to counter attacks than a 4-2-3-1. Having 5 players attacking in the 4-3-3 (2 central midfielders and 3 attackers), means that there will be a back 4 and one player protecting the defence in a counter attacking scenario. In the 4-2-3-1, the central midfielders know that when one presses the ball, there will be cover inside protecting the defence.

Players’ new starting positions when moving into a 4-2-3-1 from 4-3-3

Now that the formation has become 4-2-3-1, the main change is that the triangle has rotated from a 1-2 triangle with lots of space between midfield and centre forward for players to move in and out of, to a 2-1 triangle with a space between defensive midfield; the base of the triangle, and attacking midfield; the top of the triangle.

A team playing in a deep 4-4-2 may struggle against this formation as it allows two players to play infront of the midfield and offer a pass between the 4-4 defensive shape into the attacking midfielder who will now play between the lines.

4-4-2 Defensive shape v 4-3-3 with the ball at the right full back of the 4-3-3

Above, the right back has the ball, he has 3 options to pass forward but all have the possibility to lose possession due to defensive overloading. The best solution may be to pass inside and change formation.

Option 1 – Pass into the right winger – The defending left midfielder will likely have closed off the passing lane to the winger. If the pass is successful, the winger is 1v1 against the left back. The far side winger and the striker will enter in the box early while the central midfielders should move forward to support from deep with late runs into the box.

Option 2 – Pass into the right central midfielder between the 2 opponents. The defensive left central midfielder can quickly put pressure from behind and force play back. If the RCM can turn side-on and protect the ball, he can penetrate the line with a pass forward, possibly looking for a 1-2 with the striker or a pass into the striker to switch play to the far side.

Option 3 – Pass into the centre forward. The central defender will play tight and place lots of pressure on the centre forward to hold play up well and protect the ball, to allow the 2 central midfielders to support from deep. The defence can intercept any misplaced passes into feet or a high pass could be played badly and force a turnover of possession easily.

4-3-3 changes to 4-2-3-1 as the pass is played inside to the bottom of the triangle

As the right full back passes to retain possession, there is a trigger to change formation between the right and left central midfielders – the left central midfielder drops deep and in-line with the defensive midfielder, while the right central midfielder makes a quick arced run into the space between the lines to receive between the 2 strikers pressing the ball, and if possible, infront of and between the central midfielders of the 4-4-2, preferably on the half turn, enabling a quick turn and penetration of the midfield line with a dribble or a pass into the striker.

Another option is to switch play to the far side. As this happens, the far side wingers will drop deep and wide in line with the RCM (now attacking midfield). If the ball can be switched from here to the left side, this can allow an overlapping run and possible 2v1 on the far side.

Attacking midfielder switches play to open up an attacking possibility on the far side

As the attacking midfielder (RCM in 4-3-3) has received side-on, and has blocked pressure from behind, he can see his team mates on the far side and the possibility of a 2v2 on the far side with a pass and overlap. From here, the striker, far side winger and attacking midfielder could all enter the box for a crossing possibility. The full back presses the winger and allows the full back space to receive the pass whilst overlapping, making the 2v1 on the side effective and allows a crossing scenario for the attack with numbers inside the box.

This is just a fraction of what Stevie has to offer in Coaching the 4-2-3-1 Advanced Tactics. Be sure to click the link if you’d like to learn more about the book and the 4-2-3-1 formation.