Subtitle: President Bush has pushed stopping the spread of nuclear weapons
to the top of the international agenda. Ironic, then, that the US' nuclear development
program may promote the very proliferation it seeks to prevent

By Senator Dianne Feinstein

Friday, Jan 09, 2004, Page 9

With the world's focus on the debate over Iraq, the war on terror and the Bush
administration's doctrine of unilateral preemption, the American government's
new emphasis on the utility of nuclear weapons has not received the attention
it deserves.

This is unfortunate, as this exploration of new uses for nuclear weapons represents
a revolutionary shift in US national security policy.

Today, the world faces unprecedented challenges at the nexus of terror and
weapons of mass destruction. With both North Korea and Iran openly pursuing
nuclear ambitions and a potential nuclear arms race in South Asia, it is critical
that America provide leadership, in both word and in deed, to reduce the risks
and the role of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

Instead, the Bush administration seems intent on doing just the opposite. Many
of the actions of the American administration, and much of the US government's
rhetoric, may actually be increasing the threat from nuclear weapons rather
than making the world safer.

The Bush administration's January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review signaled a major
change in US nuclear policy by advancing a new triad that integrates nuclear
weapons with conventional strike options and blurring the line between the use
of conventional and nuclear weapons. It also specified scenarios in which the
US might use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear states, and called
for a new generation of US nuclear warheads, including low yield or so-called
"mini-nukes."

The US has never had a no-first-strike policy, but it has likewise never had
a policy such as that embodied in the Nuclear Policy Review. Today, under the
terms of the ideas set out in that review, the US contemplates the first use
of nuclear weapons, and seeks to integrate tactical battlefield nuclear weapons
alongside conventional munitions.

Despite efforts to downplay the significance of the Nuclear Posture Review
since its publication, it remains, in my view, extremely provocative and dangerous.
Earlier this year, at a hearing of the US Senate's Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, I asked Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, whose Department oversees
America's research and development of nuclear weapons, whether the Bush administration
wanted to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons. Secretary Abraham said it did
not; that his department was only studying adaptations of existing weapons.

Yet, there should be no doubt that the Bush administration is beginning the
research and development of new nuclear weapons. Just this year, a 10-year-old
ban on the research and development of nuclear weapons below five kilotons --
the bomb at Hiroshima was 15 kilotons -- was eliminated.

Pushed by the Bush administration, Congress authorized US$21 million for the
study and development of new nuclear weapons, including a 100-kiloton bunker
buster, as well as tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. Moreover, the time
to test readiness of the Nevada test site has been moved up from three years
to two years, and funding has been provided to produce additional fissile material
for new nuclear weapons.

I argued and voted against these new nuclear initiatives in the US Senate earlier
this year. Clearly, the nuclear door is being reopened. For, by taking the steps
called for in the Nuclear Posture Review -- specifically, developing "new
capabilities ... to defeat emerging threats," including "extensive
research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges"
-- the Bush administration is lowering the threshold for the possible use of
nuclear weapons by the US or other countries.

This approach is not in America's national interest, nor is it consistent with
American traditions and values. A first-use of nuclear weapons by the US should
be unthinkable, and responding to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons
violates a central tenet of just war and US military tradition. Indeed, nuclear
options should not be considered as an extension of conventional options. Why?
Because this inevitably lowers the threshold for use.

So, if the US develops nuclear weapons that blur the distinction between conventional
and nuclear forces, the message this sends to the rest of the world must be
considered. I believe it is critical that the US set a very high international
standard for nuclear restraint. If America does not, it may very likely encourage
others to develop their own standards and their own nuclear arsenals. That seems
to be happening.

Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, and the history of bloody warfare
between them presents a major and ongoing security threat to South Asia. If
either country adhered to the thinking embodied in the Bush administration's
new nuclear policy, there would be little reason for each not to seek to integrate
nuclear weapons even more deeply into their own contingency plans -- and possibly
use them.

At a time when the US brands as "evil" certain countries based, in
part, on their pursuit of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, it must
be especially careful in how it considers its own options and contingencies
regarding nuclear weapons.

If the US is not careful, our own new nuclear posture could provoke the very
nuclear-proliferation activities we are seeking to prevent.

Dianne Feinstein is the senior US senator from the state of California. Copyright:
Project Syndicate