Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
Commentary by Jon Roland
It is a fundamental principle of law that an agent cannot acquire additional
powers from his principal by entering into an agreement with the agent of
another principal. He may make agreements, if he has the authority to make
any agreements at all, only to exercise powers already delegated to him.
Officials of the U.S. government are agents of the people under the terms of
the Constitution, which defines and limits the powers that they may
exercise, and those limits apply not only within the territorial boundaries
of the United States, but everywhere and over all persons, regardless of
whether they are citizens or not.
The correct opinion in this case is that of Black. The concurring opinions
of Frankfurter and Harlan are erroneous in that they base their position on
the offense being capital. Clark, in dissent, is correct in saying the
capital nature of the charge is irrelevant, but incorrect in saying that
treaties may extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction in the way he suggests, to
other than U.S. military personnel, on territory that is not embassy
territory but merely foreign territory under temporary U.S. control under
the terms of a status of forces agreement. He would, however, have been
correct if the territory had been that of a U.S. embassy or equivalent
diplomatic facility, and the offense had been prosecuted under civilian
criminal statutes authorized by the "laws of nations" clause.
For more on this see also
Conflict of Criminal Laws, Edward S. Stimson (1936) — Jurisdiction for a
criminal offense is limited to the territory where the offender is when the
offense is committed, not where the effects occur.
Rights of foreigners in the "war on terrorism" — Article: November 26, 2001
The meaning of "offenses against the laws of nations"