A famous proposed solution to the one over many problem is found in Plato. For example, it appears in The Parmenedies and is introduce by Zeno arguing that . . . if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like-is that your position? and Socrates responds: do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate-things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation? Where is the wonder? and the discussion moves on to the interesting question that..