Round Table on Sustainable Development

Transcription

1 Unclassified SG/SD/RT(2008)1 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 24-Apr-2008 English - Or. English GENERAL SECRETARIAT SG/SD/RT(2008)1 Unclassified Round Table on Sustainable Development Mobilising Investments in Low-Emission Energy Technologies on the Scale Needed to Reduce the Risks of Climate Change Richard Doornbosch, Dolf Gielen and Paul Koutstaal This paper was prepared under the authority of the Chair of the Round Table on Sustainable Development at the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy analysis, IEA, OECD or of the governments of their Member countries. Dolf Gielen is senior Energy Analyst at the IEA and coordinator of the Energy Technologies Perspectives project. Paul Koutstaal is a program leader at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analyses. English - Or. English For further information, please contact Richard Doornbosch, Principal Advisor Round Table on Sustainable Development, OECD Tel: +33 (0) JT Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This paper was written under the supervision of Simon Upton and benefited greatly from his many comments and suggestions. The first part draws heavily on the IEA s forthcoming Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 and we very much appreciate the IEA allowing us to use results of its two-year project. We would like to thank Jan Corfee-Morlot (OECD), Romain Duval (OECD), Jane Ellis (OECD), Erik Knight (Oxford University), Michael Molitor (Carbon Shift), Benito Müller (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies) and Seb Walhain (Fortis) for their input and comments. In particular, we are grateful to Paul Veenendaal (CPB) for providing data on the investment flows in the policy scenarios in Section 5. Finally, we would like to thank Amelia Smith for proofreading and formatting of the paper. The Round Table on Sustainable Development gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by The McCall MacBain Foundation and Shell. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS THE ARGUMENT SUMMARISED Introduction What are the most promising energy technologies to support the transition to a low carbon economy? Decarbonising electricity generation Technological change crucial for massive deployment of low carbon power generation Large potential for energy efficiency Forecasting technology change in transport very difficult What are the additional costs of low emission energy technologies? Energy investments in Incremental investments in Abatement costs How much capital is being mobilised for clean energy investments at present? Research and development in low emission energy technologies Carbon markets The enabling environment Carbon markets and low emission energy investments How could sufficient investments be mobilised to fill the financing gap? Policy scenarios Foreign investment gap Options for international coordination Accelerating the innovation of low carbon emission technologies Harnessing carbon markets ENDNOTES REFERENCES

4 THE ARGUMENT SUMMARISED Without changes in policies the world is on a path towards global average temperature increases of 6 degrees Celsius and perhaps more. Between now and 2050 we must halve global energy sector emissions while doubling the supply of energy and sustaining economic growth. The scale of that challenge is daunting. There are no precedents on which we can rely. But experience with the Montreal Protocol the agreement to phase out ozone-depleting CFC s shows on a much smaller and less complex scale that national governments will sign up to strong measures if they know technologies are available and affordable and if there is a genuinely equitable basis on which countries with very different resources can engage. A key message of the OECD s Environmental Outlook 2030 is that effective global action on climate change is not only possible but affordable and that equitable ways of engaging all countries are available. The IEA s Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 adds detail and context to these conclusions by providing a detailed bottom-up study of those technologies which can be developed to meet the required emissions reductions in the energy sector. It confirms that although the costs are high (between $1 800 and $5 600 billion per annum in 2050), they could be manageable when the right policies are put in place and when set against the economic growth projected over that period. Large gaps between what is needed and the world s current trajectory The composite picture shows, however, a large difference between the sort of best-case outcomes that modelling exercises can produce and the trajectory the real world is on. This can be characterised as a series of gaps that need to be bridged if the least-cost outcomes of the OECD and IEA model simulations are to be achieved. The gap between profitable opportunities to improve energy efficiency and the market s ability to capture them A large number of immediately available opportunities to reduce energy consumption have been identified. The so-called low hanging fruit of moving to a low carbon economy involve investments that can in principle deliver lower emissions at a profit over their lifetime. Improvements in end-use efficiency could provide around half the 48 Gt CO 2 per annum reductions that will be needed by 2050 if emissions are to be consistent with a temperature increase of around degrees Celsius (see Figure 4 on page 17). Nevertheless, businesses and consumers seem remarkably indifferent to the possibilities. The barriers to their uptake are not always well understood but include a wide range of phenomena. Sometimes it is because the gains do not seem large enough to justify the time and effort needed to extract them. In other cases, capital markets do not recognise the returns that would justify higher up-front capital costs. There is also the widely remarked-upon phenomenon whereby landlords ignore low-emission building solutions on the basis that energy costs will be met by tenants. These and other barriers at the micro level stand in the way of some very large potential emission reductions and are unlikely to be overcome simply by pricing carbon. Standards and codes can be an effective way of dealing with those non-market barriers, but because they rely on administrative actions they can be costly to impose and out of touch with dynamic 4

5 change. More work is needed to find ways to keep standards and codes up to date and to reveal the price of carbon that they imply. If emission reduction is to be compatible with sustainable growth, the costs imposed by regulatory solutions need to be as transparent as carbon prices. The gap between the state of technologies on the drawing board and their commercial viability By 2050 the electricity sector must be virtually decarbonised. In the period between 2030 and 2050 about 30% of new capacity in the IEA scenario is projected to use fossil fuel with carbon capture and storage, 30% wind and 30% other renewables. There is a huge gap between the current state of those technologies and what they are expected to deliver. Large investments must be made in researching, developing and deploying new technologies prior to 2030 if they are to be commercialised on a large scale thereafter. The IEA estimates that sufficient deployment requires R&D investments of between $20 and $100 billion per annum and learning or early deployment investments in new technologies of $100 to $200 billion per annum on average over this period. The investments required will be much higher in the period prior to 2030 because this is the phase during which initially high deployment costs will need to be brought down. If deployment policies work well, costs should fall sufficiently for carbon markets to pay for any additional costs on a fully commercial basis after Currently these investments run at a fraction of this level ($45 billion). Without carbon markets the investments in technology required will be far higher and the overall policy mix less effective. Figure A. Annual physical investments in low carbon power generation in BLUE (average ) Source: IEA,

6 A large financing gap for low carbon energy technologies Under current settings, the extent to which carbon markets will mobilise the capital needed to finance the incremental costs of low carbon technologies is projected to be around $20 billion in Whereas the incremental cost of the technologies required to make deep emission cuts will be at least on the order of $100 to $300 billion per annum by 2020, growing to as much as $1 800 to $5 600 billion per annum by The carbon market would have to grow considerably in coming years to bridge this gap (see Figure 10 on page 28). Announced trading schemes and other policies are insufficient. The gap between the present segmented market and the possibility of a global coalition of countries exploring all least-cost opportunities to reduce emissions in an integrated market More than 75% of the global growth in CO 2 emissions will be in developing countries, with more than 50% in China and India alone. Halving emissions in OECD countries alone will yield only around 10 Gt CO 2 emission reductions of the 48 Gt CO 2 needed. Halving emissions everywhere is probably not feasible, as developing countries are in a different more energy intensive development phase and will enjoy much higher economic and population growth leading emissions to rise quickly. However, even if it were assumed that emissions in OECD countries could be reduced to zero this would still only deliver up to 38% of the 48 Gt CO 2 emissions reductions needed against the business-as-usual trajectory. Without prejudging what would constitute an equitable outcome, it is clear that the current architecture cannot deliver either a fair sharing of the burden or exploit the least-cost opportunities to reduce emissions at the global level within a timeframe that will head off huge sunk investments in emission-intensive technologies. Given the high costs of adjustment, it seems that only some sort of integrated trading system can provide a reasonable means of securing a fair sharing of the burden by guiding private investments towards developing countries. The current segmentation of markets will lead to much higher CO 2 prices and mitigation costs. It could be argued that, as inefficient as they are, these higher prices might induce additional investments in the deployment of new technologies. On the other hand, resulting uncertainty around the development of CO 2 price levels is likely to delay these investments. Time is of the essence Delay could prove very costly. The period between now and 2020 will be crucial for closing these gaps. Without early action, billions of dollars of conventional technology will be installed in buildings, infrastructure and power generation, thereby casting a long emissions shadow over the future. This is best illustrated by the rapid increase in the market share of coal fired power plants in recent years. Despite climate change concerns, emissions from coal use accelerated from a growth rate of 1% per year between 1990 and 2000 to 4.4% per year between 2000 and The IEA estimates that in the period through to 2030, $600 billion will be invested in replacing and expanding the capacity of coal fired power plants around the world. To virtually decarbonise electricity supply this capacity must be retired early or large scale retrofitting with CCS will be needed. Options for international collaboration to close the gaps The question of technology development and commercial scale deployment cannot be separated from the international architecture of an agreement on climate change. Both domestic capital formation and international capital flows will be influenced by such architecture. A sense of this can be derived from policy scenarios that provide alternative future policy settings characterised both by the level of urgency given to mitigating climate change and the level of international cooperation. Both will influence international capital flows in low carbon energy investments. 6

7 Three scenarios are elaborated in the paper to highlight the way in which these two dimensions might influence investment flows: A Grand Coalition scenario, in which there is a broad recognition of the climate change problem and countries are willing to cooperate by setting a target for emissions and providing for international trade in emission allowances. A Fragmented scenario, in which countries do acknowledge that climate change poses a problem but cannot agree on an all-encompassing international approach. Instead, there is a range of different national or regional policies with only limited collaboration. A Lowest Common Denominator, scenario in which countries align their ambitions to those with the lowest ambitions because no country wants to be found ahead of other countries for competitiveness reasons. Figure B. Carbon investment flows between regions (in $ billions), 2020 USA 5 EU 18 FSU India China Rest of non-annex I Rest of Annex I Grand Coaltion Fragmented Lowest Common Denominator Figure B shows what happens under these policy scenarios to international investment flows made available through carbon markets. In the Grand Coalition scenario, the fast-developing countries benefit optimally from the large availability of relatively inexpensive mitigation options in their countries as they participate fully in emission trading. By contrast, Annex 1 countries (except the countries of the former Soviet Union) are the major importers of emission allowances as emission reduction targets are based on emissions per capita. The total value in 2020 of the allowances bought by these Annex 1 countries is about $75 80 billion for an importation of 3.6 Gt of CO 2 allowances. In the Fragmented and Lowest Common Denominator scenarios these investment flows are likely to be lower, because demand for emission reductions will be subsequently lower and because international financing of emission reductions rely almost complete on CDM. 7

8 Collective action allows for emission reductions in developing countries without harming economic growth A striking point is that countries such as China and India could benefit from taking part in an international agreement by limiting their rates of emission growth in a way that would generate saleable carbon credits. In developing countries, private investment is unlikely to extend to low carbon emission technologies unless there is an incentive to do so. But if emission reductions in developed countries are sufficiently stringent (and the demand for carbon credits high enough) the demand for low-emission investment opportunities could be significant. What would be needed to channel that demand in the direction of developing countries would be some sort of (voluntary) limitation in the rate of emission growth to generate a supply of carbon credits. If this were to happen, private investment would become the principle vehicle for financing low emission technologies in developing countries. The analyses suggest that emission limitations in developing countries could actually have a positive effect on their GDP given the scale of likely capital flows. Designing mechanisms that could generate such an outcome would go a long way towards satisfying the need for a burden sharing consistent with the universally agreed formula of common but differentiated responsibilities. Without such a mechanism, compensation and support for mitigation will rely on government transfers which have no hope of bridging the gap. CDM: More than expected, less than needed The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has provided valuable experience in mobilising capital for investments in low emission technologies in developing countries. However, the CDM is unlikely to be a complete answer. There are both fundamental and practical problems limiting the medium and long term potential of CDM to deliver carbon finance for sustainable development and emission reductions. The CDM will lead to more carbon leakage at the individual firm level, where it has a subsidy effect by reducing production costs. The result is that with CDM the price of carbon is not internalised in consumer prices (see paragraph 112 for further explanation). A more practical reason limiting the longterm potential of CDM is the transaction costs associated with establishing and verifying additionality. One way of coping with this is by bundling projects or bringing projects under an umbrella CDM programme of activities. The possibilities of scaling up CDM in this way might be larger than has been imagined but risk being limited through methodologies becoming too complex to manage. Sectoral approaches might be a feasible way to ramp up investments in low emission technologies in developing countries To achieve mitigation efforts in developing countries on the required scale and the financial flows needed to support them, it will probably be necessary to move in the short to medium term to a financial mechanism closer to emission trading schemes. One mechanism that has been suggested is a sectoral CDM. Under this approach, carbon credits would be granted to those companies that exceeded a baseline performance or intensity target. The perceived political advantage over an allowance system is that there is no downside. If emission reductions are not achieved, there is no compliance regime forcing participants to buy allowances in the market. To work, a sector-wide baseline would need to be negotiated internationally to secure the environmental integrity of the scheme and a commitment from buying countries that credits will be eligible and demand sustained for a long period of time. However, the fundamental shortcomings of an offsetting scheme implicitly subsidising energy use will remain. Whether this is a price worth paying in the medium term to ensure a broader international coalition would depend on the final design and detail of the system. 8

9 A further step would be to establish cap-and-trade systems for distinct economic sectors in return for making the allowances tradable in other emission trading schemes. The additionality problem is again tackled at the outset when establishing the relative or absolute cap for the installations under the trading scheme. Burden sharing would be confronted by determining the cap in relation to the caps in linked trading systems (permit allocation). While developed countries would necessarily be pursuing absolute cuts in emissions, developing countries might pursue measurably lower rates of emission growth in the sectors in question. Since many of the cheaper abatement options are likely to be in fast-developing economies, the benefit to developing countries would be likely to come in the form of a strongly increased inflow of carbon finance through the sale of allowances at a higher price to developed countries trading schemes. Another advantage could be that the discount at which emission reduction under the CDM is currently sold would be avoided, increasing the profitability of cutting emissions for developing countries. Carbon markets will not be enough While only private capital is likely to provide the huge investment that will ultimately be needed, carbon markets are not a panacea, particularly in the early stages. While technologies are still being developed and the learning process of early deployment is under way, governments have an important role to play. Cost effective policies that encourage innovation and deployment in all countries are currently insufficient. 9

10 1. Introduction 1. The global economy is set to grow fourfold between now and 2050 and developing countries such as China and India could grow nearly tenfold. This growth rate will have huge benefits for the well being and living standards of billions of people. The implied pressure on natural resources and the environment poses an enormous challenge for the energy sector. The IEA s upcoming Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 estimates that, without changes in policy, oil demand will increase by 70% by 2050, and CO 2 emissions by 130%. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) this could put the world on a path towards global average temperatures rising by 6 degrees Celsius and perhaps more. 2. If, instead, the world aims to stabilise GHG concentrations at ppm CO 2 -eq. with a view to limiting the increase in global mean temperature to degrees Celsius, GHG emissions would need to be reduced to a level between 30 and 60 percent below 2000 levels by The IPCC states that for low to medium stabilisation levels ( ppm CO 2 -eq.) developed countries as a group would need to reduce their emissions by 10 40% below 1990 levels by Stabilising GHG emissions at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system will necessitate a comprehensive change in the way energy is supplied and used. If no action is taken, the current emissions track would see energy-related emission increase to around 62 Gt CO 2 in Reducing those emissions to half the current level by 2050, for example, implies cutting energy-related emissions to just 14 Gt CO 2 per year. Halving today s level of emissions while doubling the supply of energy is a daunting challenge. Although this paper focuses on the energy sector, emissions from non-energy sectors and non CO 2 GHG need to be reduced in a similar vein. Energy-related CO 2 emissions comprise only around 55% of total GHG (IPCC, 2007). But this percentage is likely to rise substantially in the future. 4. An energy technology revolution is needed if deep emission reductions are to be secured in the energy sector. Higher levels of energy efficiency, deployment of renewables, nuclear power, carbon capture and storage and decarbonisation of the transport sector are all needed on a massive scale. This will depend critically on the way governments incentivise technological change and influence market conditions both in developed and developing countries. A step change is needed in government policies to remove barriers to investment and create a high level of certainty around the future demand for low carbon technologies on which industry can rely. More than 75% of the global growth in CO 2 emissions will be in developing countries and more than 55% in China and India alone. Effective climate action therefore also means an unprecedented level of cooperation amongst all major economies. 5. Deep emission cuts imply ambitious policy targets in OECD and non-oecd countries. However even halving of emissions in OECD countries will yield only 6.5 Gt CO 2 emission reduction. Halving emissions everywhere is politically difficult, as developing countries will enjoy much higher economic and population growth and under business as usual emissions are bound to rise quickly. It will also raise equity questions as historic emissions and per capita emissions are much lower in developing countries. Looked at on the basis of per capita emissions, for example, the average American currently emits 20 tonnes per year, while the average European or Japanese emits between 11 and 13 tonnes, the average Chinese emits just 5 tonnes and the average Indian 2 tonnes. This means policies are set to fail if non-oecd countries do not participate in a meaningful way. The question is therefore how to ensure as efficient and equitable an adjustment path as is possible. Least cost opportunities in all energy sectors and in all regions should be exploited to avoid compromising economic growth. Directing financial flows from North to South will be crucial to achieve an efficient and equitable outcome. 6. This paper explores strategies for mobilising the investments needed to develop and commercialise low emission energy technologies. Section 2 will present the result of the IEA s Energy 10

11 Technology Perspectives 2008 which outlines the least-cost options for reducing emissions in both developed and developing countries. Section 3 will show the difference in investments and cost of holding global energy emissions in 2050 to 2005 levels and reducing them by a further 50%. Section 4 will describe the current state of the carbon market and the carbon finance available to pay for the incremental costs of using low emission technologies. The available carbon finance will be compared with the cost estimates in Section 3 to show the financing gap for low emission technologies. Section 5 describes options for a post-2012 architecture and their implications for mobilising investments in clean energy investments. 2. What are the most promising energy technologies to support the transition to a low carbon economy? 7. The transition to a low emission energy system requires an investment regime that directs capital to the most promising opportunities to reduce emissions. A global and uniform carbon price has long been acknowledged to be an important tool to achieve this. But even if the barriers to generating such a global price were to be surmounted there would still be a role for governments in helping to research and develop the portfolio of technologies needed to deliver low emission energy services at acceptable costs. Therefore governments should execute an innovation strategy aimed at pushing a broad portfolio of technologies closer to commercialisation. Though picking winners in a fine-grained sense should be avoided, governments must make choices when setting global research and development priorities and formulating deployment policies. These choices encompass the scale of government research budgets, the distribution of these budgets and the geographic spread of demonstration projects. Their critical mass also needs to bear some relationship to the likelihood of technologies to deliver emission reductions on the scale required and within timeframes that can make a difference. 8. This section highlights the most promising energy technologies that would support the transition to a low carbon economy and their regional distribution by combining and comparing the technical and economic potentials of the different options known today. The analysis in the IEA s Energy Technologies Perspective 2008 does just that by comparing two climate change mitigation scenarios (and several subscenarios) with a business-as-usual scenario. 9. The first mitigation scenario is called the Accelerated Technologies scenario (ACT) in which energy-related emissions return to about today s level by Emissions are reduced by 35 Gt compared with the Baseline scenario and this scenario is consistent with an increase in temperature of about degrees Celsius (eventual stabilisation level) The second scenario is called BLUE and reduces global energy related emissions to half their current level in 2050, which would be consistent with an expected increase in temperature of degrees Celsius and require a reduction of 48 Gt in 2050 compared to the baseline. In the ACT scenario these deep emission cuts require that all technologies with a cost of up to $50 per tonne of CO 2 saved are to be deployed, whereas in BLUE all technologies with a cost of up to $200/t CO 2 would be needed. 11. Figure 1 gives an overview of the global energy-related CO 2 emissions in the baseline and the two ambitious climate change mitigation scenarios. As can be seen, the ACT scenario implies deep emission cuts in power generation and energy efficiency, whereas achieving the 50% reduction of emissions in BLUE requires deep emission cuts across all sectors. Action in both power generation and energy efficiency is urgent and necessary, whichever final target is being pursued. 11

12 Figure 1. Global energy-related CO 2 emissions in Baseline, ACT and BLUE scenarios Source: IEA, Decarbonising electricity generation 12. Electricity production is today responsible for 32% of total global fossil fuel use and 41% of energy-related CO 2 emissions (Figure 1). Without new policies, emissions from power generation are expected to continue to grow rapidly and account for 44% of total CO 2 emissions in the Baseline scenario. This high share is the net result of a significant growth in production and a massive switch to coal, driven by its lower relative price in many regions. Coal accounts for 52% of power generation in the Baseline scenario. This is to a large extent caused by the rapid increase in power generation in China and India and the relative abundance of coal reserves. Coal is expected to regain its dominant position. 13. The Baseline outlook has deteriorated in recent years despite climate policy efforts. From 1990 to 2000, the average annual increase in emissions was 1.1% per year. Between 2000 and 2005, however, growth accelerated to 2.9% per year despite the increased focus on climate change. High economic growth, notably in coal-based economies, and higher oil and gas prices (which have lead to an increase in coal-fired power generation) are the main reasons for the increase. Emissions from coal use increased by 1% per year between 1990 and 2000, but they rose by 4.4% per year between 2000 and Decarbonising the electricity sector is at the same time the single biggest contributor to deep emission cuts. A combination of electricity end-use efficiency and supply side measures will be needed. Emissions on the supply side are reduced by Gt CO 2 in the ACT and BLUE scenarios respectively. Introducing economic CO 2 incentives as assumed in these scenarios will immediately improve the relative attractiveness of gas over coal and increase efforts to improve generation efficiency. Across all fossil fuels the technical fuel savings potential is between 1.75 to 2.50 Gt CO 2 per year. The largest savings are from improving the efficiency of coal-fired plants, which alone provide savings of 1.40 to 1.98 Gt CO The total share of renewables in power generation is set to more than double: from 18% to 35% in ACT, and up to 48% in the BLUE scenario. Most of the growth is for the emerging renewable technologies wind, solar, biomass, and, to a lesser extent, geothermal. However, the use of mature hydropower technology also doubles from today s level, bringing it very close to what is seen to be its ultimate technical potential. 12

13 16. Variable renewables play an important role in these scenarios. In terms of power production, hydro, wind and solar reach equal importance in the BLUE scenario in Until 2020 biomass and wind constitute the bulk of new renewables capacity, with solar beginning to make significant contributions after Hydro shows continuous growth over the whole period, but the rate of growth levels off after 2030 as the availability of suitable sites becomes constrained. 17. Most electricity generated by coal fired power plants in ACT and BLUE and half of the gas fired power generation in BLUE comes from plants equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Retrofitting of coal plants with CCS plays a significant role in ACT, but new purpose-built plants with CCS dominate in the BLUE scenario. The strong growth of CCS in BLUE compared to ACT can be attributed to gas and biomass with CCS. 18. Nuclear power generation already plays an important role in the Baseline. Nuclear capacity in the Baseline scenario increases from 368 GW to 570 GW in 2050, and output increases by 61%. As most of the existing capacity will need to be replaced in the next 45 years, the Baseline implies an average of more than ten new reactors per year. Without this capacity replacement, more CO 2 -emitting coal-fired capacity would be built and reference emissions would be even higher. The nuclear share rises further in ACT and BLUE. However, the use of nuclear is constrained at 1250 GW, based on past experience of limits to the number of reactors that can actually be built in one year (about 25 GW). A sub-scenario (not shown here) where the share of nuclear can increase to 2000 GW shows that its further expansion would be costeffective, largely at the expense of fossil-fueled plants with CCS. This would raise the contribution of nuclear to global emission reduction considerably, but the acceptance and feasibility of such expansion remains to be seen. Moreover, the 2000 GW case does not yield substantial further emission reductions. 2.2 Technological change crucial for massive deployment of low carbon power generation 19. The physical investments in technologies that are still under development or even in the demonstration phase and that are needed to reach the deep emission cuts in the BLUE scenario are enormous. Figure 2 details the challenge for low carbon power generation over the period in BLUE. A few examples can illustrate the scale of the challenge. The 32 nuclear power plants that should be opened on average every year through 2050 could be compared with the 2 nuclear power plants opened and 8 plants retired in The historical height is much higher though, with 25 nuclear power plants that opened in a single year. An average 58 power plants would need to start operating every year with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) of CO 2 emissions while at present there is no commercial scale CCS plant operating at all. The deployment of CCS is crucial as coal will remain the most accessible fuel for some of the largest emerging and OECD countries saw 20 GW of new wind generation commissioned a level of growth that is regarded as booming. But to reach its goal, the BLUE scenario need to assume the addition of 70 GW per year for 46 years. 20. To achieve these kinds of growth rates it is crucial that further technological progress is achieved through further research and in particular through the learning process that can be expected with increased deployment. Investments in low carbon generation are increasing over time and in the period about 30% of the new capacity is fossil fuel with CCS, 30% wind and 30% other renewables. Once capitalintensive power plants are built they will be used. To prevent locking in old technology, the timing of investment in new technologies is critical. This can be illustrated by considering China, which alone added around 70 GW, or one hundred and forty 500 MW coal-fired power plants, to its generating capacity in The present high growth rate in developing countries and the high replacement rate of existing capacity in OECD countries over the next 15 years underlines the urgency of speeding up the technological development of low carbon emissions as assumed in the IEA s scenarios. Every year that low carbon alternatives can be brought earlier to the market will avoid costly write-offs of expensive capital stock. 13

14 Figure 2. Annual physical investments in low carbon power generation in BLUE (average ) Source: IEA, Large potential for energy efficiency 21. Lower energy demand from improved demand side energy efficiency is the second largest contributor to emission savings in the IEA s scenarios. When supply side efficiency improvements from power generation are added, it becomes even the largest and certainly the least expensive. In ACT, power demand is reduced by 21% because of end-use efficiency measures in the building and industry sectors and measures that reduce transmission and distribution losses. This results in 6 Gt CO 2 emission reduction. In BLUE, electricity demand is reduced less because of increased electricity use for heatpumps and plug-in vehicles, but is still 15% below baseline electricity demand. 22. In Figure 3 the CO 2 reductions from electricity savings have been allocated to the end-use sectors for the BLUE scenario. It shows the importance of action in the end-use sectors. 14

15 Figure 3. Reduction of energy-related CO 2 emissions from the Baseline scenario in the BLUE scenario by sector, Source: IEA, In the Baseline scenario, direct and indirect CO 2 emissions from the building sector increase by 129% between 2005 and This high growth rate is reduced strongly in ACT and BLUE to 35% (7.0 Gt) and 43% (8.6 Gt) respectively below the Baseline level 5. The single most important reason for the lower emissions is energy savings with demand being around one-third lower in ACT and 40% in BLUE compared to the Baseline. Significant reductions in fossil fuel and electricity use occur in both scenarios as a result of increased energy efficiency. Electricity savings dominate total savings in the buildings sector (lighting, appliances, stand-by losses). Energy efficiency improvements in space and water heating are responsible for much of the remainder. 24. In industry, efficiency gains account for 64% of the total 5.9 Gt CO 2 reduction in ACT. However, emissions are still 66% higher than in In BLUE emissions are reduced by roughly 12 Gt CO 2, 22% below the 2005 level. 25. In addition to incorporating energy efficiency gains from existing technologies, a large number of novel technology options for mitigating CO 2 emissions from industry have been considered in the ACT and BLUE scenarios. Approximately 37% of the emission savings, or 4.4 Gt CO 2, in the industry sector can be attributed to carbon capture and storage. Industrial cogeneration of heat and power doubles in Baseline and quadruples in ACT and BLUE Forecasting technology change in transport very difficult 26. Deep emission reductions in the transportation sector appear to be the most challenging. Transport suffers from a much more acute case of technological lock-in than electricity generation. While there are many power generation alternatives already in the field, the internal combustion engine remains overwhelmingly dominant for transportation. In ACT and BLUE, a 15% reduction in car, truck, and air travel is projected in 2050 through switching to public transportation and other low carbon modes compared with a tripling in the reference case. Far deeper reductions are needed, however, and strong 15

16 policies to moderate travel growth may be required if new propulsion systems and fuel switching in transport are not forthcoming. The necessary technology breakthroughs to enable electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles cannot be reliably forecast at this stage. Plug-in electric hybrid vehicles are a likely interim option. 27. In the Baseline Scenario CO 2 emissions from transportation (well-to-wheels) grow by 149% to 18.4 Gt in Well-to-wheels emissions increase faster than tailpipe emissions due to the significant introduction of coal-based synfuels in the Baseline Scenario. These fuels are already economic at current oil prices. Their production would triple well-to-wheels emissions. Tailpipe emissions alone are about 14 Gt by 2050 in the Baseline Scenario. 28. Growth in CO 2 emissions, like growth in energy demand, varies by region. Developing countries show much steeper increases than do developed countries. In the Baseline Scenario, CO 2 emissions from transport in non-oecd countries increase by more than 300%, while OECD countries see an increase of about 50%. This is mainly due to differing rates of growth in transport activity, but also to the faster deployment of clean and efficient transport technologies in OECD countries. 29. In the ACT scenario, well-to-wheels CO 2 emissions are 44% (8.1 Gt CO 2 ) lower than the Baseline level. Slightly more than two-thirds of this reduction is due to improved fuel efficiency, while the rest is the result of the increased use of biofuels. The improved fuel economy of Light Duty Vehicles (LDVs) provides most of the CO 2 emission reductions. The average fuel intensity of the LDV stock in 2050 is more than 50% lower than in This reflects a combination of better efficiency from the remaining conventional vehicles, a very large share of hybrid vehicles and some reduction in the average size of vehicles on the market, particularly in those regions where vehicles are now very large. 30. In BLUE a combination of maximum efficiency and a much stronger penetration of biofuels, hydrogen and electricity is assumed leading to an additional 4.4 Gt CO 2 reduction against the ACT case. The fuel savings in BLUE account for 52% of the CO 2 reductions in The most significant improvements beyond those included in the ACT scenario come from the introduction of plug-in hybrids and pure electric vehicles, and/or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. Electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles each reach a 30%-plus market share. 31. In both the ACT and BLUE scenarios the use of synfuels from coal and gas is reduced significantly, which has important CO 2 benefits. Biofuels increase to 17% of total transportation fuel demand in ACT, with equal shares of ethanol and biodiesel. Second generation biofuels dominate, with sugar cane as the principal first generation biofuel feedstock. Use of biofuels is 700 Mtoe, or 26% of total transportation fuel demand in BLUE Figure 4 summarises the analysis by presenting the reduction in CO 2 emissions by technology area in the BLUE scenario in

17 Figure 4. Reduction in CO 2 emissions by technology area in BLUE, 2050 Source: IEA, What are the additional costs of low emission energy technologies? 33. In the previous section the contribution to emission reductions that might be expected from new technologies was outlined against two target outcomes: emissions at 2005 levels in 2050 and 50% lower still. The investment levels needed to realise the enormous scaling up of energy supply to a more than doubling of demand will by itself pose considerable difficulties, especially in developing countries. To move towards a low carbon energy supply at the same time will be even more challenging, as low emission technologies often come at a premium. This section will review the investment and cost consequences of the two scenarios. 3.1 Energy investments in The cost of the ACT and BLUE scenarios can be divided into a number of categories 8 : the cost of Research, Development and Demonstration (short and medium term); the cost of deployment and learning investments (short and medium term); the increased cost of investments in low- CO 2 technologies in their commercial stage (medium and long term). 35. All three terms have been quantified in the ETP The study concludes that additional RD&D investments are very important but also very difficult to assess. They should be increased with $ billion a year. The learning investments through deploying new technologies that are not yet commercial amount to roughly $ billion a year. The remainder and by far the largest part is the investment in fully-commercialised technologies. These last are the subject of the analysis that follows. 17

18 3.2 Incremental investments in Investments in the baseline are dominated by the demand side, totaling $4 500 billion a year or 90% of total investments. More than 90% of these relate to the transport sector. Supply-side investments of $500 billion per year are dominated by the electricity sector, with half of this being allocated to power plants. 37. According to the IEA, placing the energy sector on a lower emission path means that the increased or incremental investments in commercial technologies for the period 2010 to 2050 amount to an annual average of $400 billion for ACT and $1 000 billion for BLUE 9. Large as these numbers are, they amount to % of total GDP for the period. 38. In both scenarios, consumers invest heavily in more energy efficient devices especially cars (light duty vehicles) with the latter making up more than half of incremental investments. Investments in energy efficiency are quite distinct from those on the supply side. They are often economic in their own right, based on total life cycle cost due to the resulting fuel savings, but must be made by millions or even billions of companies and consumers, increasing transaction costs and making replication more complicated. Whereas the additional investments on the supply side in low carbon power generation often come at a premium and are executed by large (state owned) companies and utilities that are very price sensitive. 39. Policies to mobilise investments and encourage innovation on the demand side therefore also require a very different approach. More emphasis should be placed on addressing non-market barriers by optimising codes and regulations (e.g. building codes), providing information (e.g. certificates) and capacity building support for innovative energy efficiency projects (e.g. by international development banks). End-use efficiency measures deserve special attention because a significant potential exist on the short and medium term. 40. For electricity generation the incremental investments can be divided into higher investments needed for fossil fuel-fired power plants with CCS, wind, solar and other renewable power generation and reduced investments flowing from lower electricity consumption as a result of improved energy efficiency. In terms of transmission investment, lower demand is offset by the need to connect and strengthen the grid to account for the intermittent nature of most renewables. 41. Almost half of additional investments in the ACT and Blue scenarios are in OECD countries and the remainder in developing countries, although a substantial share of the investment would accrue in developing countries in later decades. 3.3 Abatement costs 42. The incremental investments as calculated above are both commercial investments that are profitable in their own right and non-commercial investment costs that must be overcome in the absence of a price on carbon. The aggregate investment numbers hide large differences in the financial viability of the underlying project investments. To see which investments would be profitable in the absence of a price on carbon and which would not it is necessary to look at the marginal cost curve for emission reductions. 43. Figure 5 shows this curve which is used to compare costs between different technological options in The x-axis shows the emission reduction compared to the Baseline scenario. The y-axis shows the costs of the most expensive option that is applied to meet a certain emission reduction target. The marginal cost rises as deeper emission reductions are aimed for and more expensive solutions required. As can be seen in Figure 5, the deep emission cuts of 35 Gt in ACT requires a global carbon price of $50 per tonne CO 2,while the 48 Gt reductions in BLUE requires a price of $200 per tonne CO 2. The approximate position 18

19 along the curve of categories of options is indicated. While ACT can be achieved with end-use efficiency and changes in power generation, BLUE will also require more costly measures in other end-use sectors, in particular the transport sector. 44. A cost band (vertical arrows) is indicated to reflect the difference between technology optimism and pessimism. It does not reflect the uncertainty that if certain key technologies such as CCS and nuclear fail to be deployed on a massive scale, behavioural change and reduced economic activity would be the only way to meet the target. It should be kept in mind that this figure is a schematic, greatly simplified, representation. The curve consists of hundreds of options. While energy efficiency is generally cheap, expensive efficiency options also exist. Figure 5. Marginal emission reduction cost for the global energy system in 2050 Note: Marginal abatement cost curves are not suited for planning of deep emission cuts, but they can provide a useful snapshot of the changes in a certain year. For example, many options are not additive. Technology learning also changes the shape of the curve. Source: IEA, This schematic representation conveys some important messages. First, costs are relatively flat up to the stabilisation target of ACT but rise quickly as the additional emission reductions technologies in BLUE are added. Second, while cost uncertainty is important in the early stages of emission reduction, it narrows around the ACT target but then increases again significantly for BLUE. While $200 per tonne is the lower end estimate for the cost in BLUE, if technological progress is slower than expected, costs might rise as high as $500 per tonne of CO 2. Therefore, at the margin the BLUE scenario requires technologies at least four times as costly as the most expensive technology needed for ACT. It also should be stressed that this curve assumes global action in which all least-cost opportunities to reduce are utilised. If developing countries do not implement all options up to a cost level of $200 per tonne, both the optimistic and the pessimistic end of the range would move upwards sharply. 19

20 46. The total cost of reducing emissions is substantial in both cases. The cost per tonne of CO 2 may even be higher than the marginal cost for a specific period in the deployment phase of new technologies. The total area under the curve in Figure 5 is a measure of the total annual incremental cost in These costs range from $1 800 to $5 600 billion in The average incremental costs of reducing CO 2 emissions by 50% against current levels are in the range of $38 to $117 per tonne of CO 2 saved in Although the IEA analysis does not specify the total incremental cost in 2020, it does estimate that research, development and early deployment expenditure will need to be between $120 and $300 billion per year on average over the period. These costs are higher in the period prior to 2030 because this is the phase during which initially high technology costs will need to be brought down. If deployment policies work well, costs should fall sufficiently for carbon markets to pay for any additional costs on a fully commercial basis after To remain on a trajectory limiting temperature increases to under 3 degrees Celsius at the end of the century, by 2020 global energy emissions should be reduced by roughly 7 Gt lower than they would be on a business-as-usual path. The incremental cost would be $140 to $280 billion in 2020 if this 7 Gt were to be reduced at an average cost of $20 to $40 per tonne of CO 2 saved Another way to estimate the additional cost is by using a general equilibrium model, as in the recently published OECD Environmental Outlook. In a scenario that reduces global emissions in 2050 by 45% over 2005 levels, world GDP would be reduced by about 2.5% over the total period relative to the baseline. This would be equivalent to slowing annual world GDP growth rates by about one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) over the 2005 to 2050 timeframe, leading the OECD to conclude that climate change mitigation is affordable 11. In the OECD study it is assumed that all countries implement a $25 tax on CO 2 and other GHG emissions from 2008 onwards, making it possible to exploit least cost options to reduce emissions across all gasses and sectors and in all countries. 49. IPCC estimates suggest that mitigation of climate change would be less than 1% of GDP if GHG concentrations were to be stabilised around 550 ppm CO 2 -eq. For stabilisation between 445 and 535 ppm CO 2 -eq, costs are less than 3% of GDP 12. However, these costs are calculated in the absence of any burden sharing agreements. As a result, the costs would be distributed unequally. The OECD concludes that costs to OECD countries would be lowest (about 1% in GDP loss in 2050), while the GDP losses in Brazil, Russia, India and China would be roughly five times this level, and those in the rest of the world about four times as high as in the OECD. The oil and gas exporting Middle East region and Russia would suffer a 10.5% reduction in GDP over the period to It is likely that the negotiation of a more equitable burden-sharing arrangement would reduce particular inequities, but although efficient and equitable solutions are possible it will in practice probably be at a greater cost to overall GDP than the minimal losses calculated above. This trade-off will be at the heart of any future negotiation. 4. How much capital is being mobilised for clean energy investments at present? 50. The investment in low emission energy technologies depends on a multitude of factors: a country s general business climate, its legal and regulatory regime in the energy sector, financial and technology specific rules and regulations. As commercial investments are driven by risk and return, the level and direction of investments is determined by both long-term financial viability and the degree of regulatory certainty. Therefore, in addition to an enabling environment for investments a clear and predictable long-term price on CO 2 emissions would be an important driver guiding investments into low emission technologies and overcoming their premium cost. 51. Technological development, however, begins by researching and developing new technologies that could provide energy services with lower emissions. These investments are only indirectly guided by a price on carbon. The prospect of a large, stable future market for low emission technologies will help guide 20

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