The Rashid Ali revolt was, by no means, a spontaneous act committed by a
group of power-hungry politicians. Rather, it was initiated by a cell of men
whose intentions were both deep-seated and profound. Basically, the coup served
as a sort of boiling point where the age-old frustrations of a great number of
individuals converged. The primary component of the conspirators’ actions was
the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. In order to truly understand the Arab
nationalist movement, especially its relation to the Rashid Ali Putsch, it is
necessary to recount and analyze its history. Furthermore, in order to
correctly view Arab nationalism and its role in the coup properly, it is crucial
to consider the parallel development of German and British policy agendas in the
Arab East from the First World War onward.

Like other nationalisms, Arab nationalism aimed at independence from
foreign control.4 It also possessed a pan-Arab dimension which called for the
ultimate union of all Arab peoples into a single, independent state comprised of
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Arabia.5 A ready and most relevant parallel to the
pan-Arab cause was Hitler’s attempt to bring all ethnic Germans or Volksdeutsche
under the umbrella of one greater German state. In theory, as the Hungarian
German stood on par with the Bavarian, so too did the Yemeni stand in union with
the Syrian. As will be seen, this very commonality would prove itself a major
factor in the development of relations between the leadership corps of the Arab
world and its Teutonic associates in the latter 1930’s.

The origins of modern Arab nationalism can be traced back to the dawn of
the twentieth century. Most of the movement’s ire, at this time, was directed
against the Ottoman Empire, the overlord of the Arab world. With the advent of
the First World War, Turkey cast its lot with Germany and the Central Powers.
As a result, Great Britain and its Entente allies sought to foment Arab revolt
against the Ottomans.6 In return for Arab assistance, the British government
promised to realize the dearest of all pan-Arab aspirations--the creation of an
independent, unified Arab state. However, as the policy aims of their Turkish
all the pan-Arabs were incongruent, any German hope of attaining collaboration
with the Arabs was hindered by its alliance with the Ottoman Empire.

The extent of Britain’s assurances, prior to the initiation of the Arab
revolt in June 1916, were found in an extremely vague series of letters to an
Arab leader, Sharif Husayn, from the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir
Henry McMahon.7 Although the gist of the missives reflected London’s
willingness to meet Arab demands for independence, McMahon was careful to
include a number of conditions. The most significant of which related to the
French government’s desire to hold a certain degree of influence in the Levant.
In consideration of their ally, the British deliberately excluded the coastal
strip of Syria from their promises to Husayn.8 As the Arab leader found the
French demand repugnant, the issue was postponed until after the war.9
Therefore, as things stood in the summer of 1916, Arab rebels found themselves
wary of two things as they prepared to act: first, how reliable were McMahon’s
assurances for independence, and second, how likely was the possibility of a
renewed foreign presence in the Middle East.

In the spring of 1916, and unknown to Arab nationalists, Great Britain,
France, and Russia concluded the notorious Sykes-Picot Treaty. The agreement
called for the partitioning of the Asian sections of the old Ottoman Empire into
zones of influence. Generally speaking, the treaty assigned to France, Britain,
and Russia, respectively, the areas of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Turkish
Armenia.10 Palestine was to fall under international control.11 The division
of zones, excluding that of the newly created Soviet Union, was given finality
with the April 1920 San Remo Conference.12 This meeting established that under
sanction of the League of Nations, France should be granted mandatory control
over Syria while Great Britain would hold the like over Iraq and Palestine.13

France and Great Britain’s policy concerns were more than adequately
accommodated by San Remo. Gaining Palestine enabled Great Britain to extend its
influence onto both banks of the Suez Canal, while Iraq guaranteed oil
concessions and an overland bridge for transit between the Mediterranean and
the Persian Gulf. France, for her part, gained undivided control over the whole
of Syria. Its occupation of the Levant signaled the abolishment, in July 1920,
of the Arab government at Damascus. The Damascus government (October 1918-July
1920), set-up under the leadership of Husayn’s son, Faysal, was what very little
London and Paris could offer the Arabs in the form of a post-war concession.
Needless to say, the conclusion of the Entente agreements proved a stinging
disappointment for the Arabs.

As far as Germany was concerned, the Versailles Treaty of 1919 quickly put
an end to its activities in the Middle East. The Treaty compelled the German
government to cede “overseas possessions and special rights in dependent
countries such as Egypt.”14 Berlin also lost properties in the Ottoman
Empire.15 Furthermore, the domestic problems which besieged Germany after the
war, forced the new Weimar government to look almost exclusively inward. Not
for another fifteen years would Germany reappear in the Arab East.

The Balfour Declaration widened the Anglo-Arab rift in November 1917. The
document essentially promised British aid in the establishment of a national
Jewish home in Palestine.16 The convenience for Great Britain in following
such a policy dwelled in the notion that not only was it able to secure moral
sanction for its occupation of the highly strategic Palestine, but it also won
substantial kudos in the eyes of world Jewry.17 Coming as no surprise, the Arab
majority in Palestine jibed at the idea of Jewish settlement. The resulting
tensions between Arab and Jew festered for the next two decades. And the
Palestinian situation would only find itself exacerbated by the exodus of Jews
from Germany after the ascension to power of the anti-Semitic Nazi regime in
1933 (between 1933 and 1936 the Jewish population in Palestine grew from 192,000
to 355,000).18 In reaction to the Jewish influx, Arab discontent quickly was
transformed itself into armed rebellion in 1936.19 Great Britain responded to
the region’s instability by forming a fact-finding commission concluded that
Palestine be partitioned into spheres of influence.20 However, fiery heads
prevailed, as neither Jewish nor Arab camps could find satisfaction in the
commission’s resolution, each side believing itself entitled to the whole of
Palestine. In an effort to allay Arab fears of continued Jewish immigration,
London, issued a White Paper, in 1939, which essentially placed a quota on the
number of Jews allowed into Palestine.21 As the Arabs still remained
dissatisfied with the British decision, it was perhaps becoming more evident
that London’s hold on the Middle East was loosening.

Surfacing as one of the most crucial figures in the Arab nationalist
movement in Palestine was Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.22
As the head of the Arab High Committee, an ultra-nationalist organization, the
Mufti was viewed by pan-Arabs as the tacit leader of their movement. Exiled
from Palestine for his hand in Arab dissent, the Mufti arrived in Baghdad on 16
October, 1939. The Mufti’s move to Baghdad opened a new chapter in the
development of pan-Arabsim in Iraq--it provided leadership and inspiration to an
ultra-nationalist mentality which had been in an incubation period in Iraq for
the last two decades.

From as early as its establishment in 1920, it became clear that Iraq would
be profoundly effected by the European agreements. As a country under mandatory
rule, Iraq found its leadership coming from two alien entities: the British
government, and the son of Sharif Husayn, Faysal of Hijaz. We can view the
British government as ‘alien’ for obvious reasons: to many Arabs, Great
Britain’s status as a foreign power asserting its mandate held little difference
from years of Ottoman rule. England’s first act of state was the imposition of
Faysal as the ruler of Iraq. Upon arriving in Iraq in 1921, “accompanied by
British officials, he was a stranger to the country and his social base of
support was narrow.”23 Entering a highly heterogeneous society, Faysal had to
pull his support from a patch-work of religious, tribal, ethnic, and, above all,
familial loyalties. With this in mind, Faysal had the unenviable task of
integrating this plurality of allegiances into the alien notion of national
territorial integrity.24 The anti-British, anti-Husayni attitude of the new
government’s many dissidents was made manifest in a revolt which spread
throughout the tribal areas of the Euphrates and the regions north and east of
Baghdad.25 As a result, great Britain lost the lives of four hundred of its
nationals, forty million pounds, and a great deal of confidence in its ability
to fulfill the Iraqi mandate.26

The rebellion prompted London to install a system of indirect rule. The
newer mode of governance, in Iraq, was established on the British model--it came
complete with parliament, political parties, and cabinet.27 Great Britain
maintained influence over Iraqi policy-making by making sure that its own
advisors sat in all ministries.28 Such would be the case for the next eleven
years, at which time, in 1932, Iraq became the first modern Arab state to obtain
independence.

It is important to mention, however, that after the termination of the
Iraqi mandate, Great Britain still retained a significant presence in the
state’s affairs. The extent of British influence in 1932 matched the provisions
of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The agreement provided for a close alliance
between the two states. A number of privileges given to Great Britain included
the following: air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba and the right to use the
ports, airfields, and railways of Iraq.29 With these advantages in hand, Great
Britain was able to exert sizable influence over the country’s economic and
political life.

After its release from mandatory rule, the Iraqi state had seemingly come
of age. Despite evident vestiges of British control, Iraq stood as a model for
the many states within the Arab world which aspired to one day gain independence
and serve as an active participant in the world community. However, in 1936,
Iraq became the first Arab state to experience a coup d’’etat. The 1936 Bakr
Sidqi coup appears to hold significance for two reasons. First, the event
introduced the highly nationalistic Iraqi military as a prime player in the
formulation of state policy-making, a position that lasted until 1941. And
second, along with the military’s ascension came the subsequent reappearance of
Germany as a primary figure in the development of Middle Eastern affairs. Much
of this German reemergence can be attributed to the great admiration which Iraqi
ultra-nationalists, primarily those in the army, had for the German nation and
its National Socialist ideals.30

One may look at the 1936 Putsch as a political christening of sorts for
the Iraqi military as the event made it, in the words of Majid Khadduri,
“virtually the sole deciding factor in the rise and fall of almost all Cabinets
from 1937 and 1941.”31 As the army rose, its political doctrine followed in
accordance. The military was extremely nationalistic and was comprised of
officers who believed that a strong army-led regime in Iraq was imperative if
the country was to exorcise foreign control, unite all Arabs, bring aid to
fellow Arab states in the fight against imperialism, and provide a strong sense
of law and order in the country.32 The military’s leading clique was known as
the “Golden Square,” and was comprised of Colonels Salah ad-Din as Sabbagh,
Kamil Shabib, Mahmud Salman, and Fahmi Sa’id. Under the “Golden Square’s”
leadership, the army was able to galvanize its strong influence on the Baghdad
government through its close relationship with various civilian officials, the
most significant being Rashid Ali al-Kilani.33 Al-Kilani was unmistakably
anti-British and a founding member of the Ikha al-Watani party which came to
prominence with its opposition to the previously mentioned 1930 Treaty of
Alliance. However, Iraq’s extremists did face opposition in a more moderate
group of nationalist politicians. Led by the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Sa’id,
this cell as Khadduri states, “was favorably disposed towards Great Britain and
foresaw grave danger to the Arab world from identification of Arab nationalism
with totalitarian ideologies.”34 Nuri essentially believed that the only
sensible way of gaining a pan-Arab union was through patience and compromise
with Great Britain and France. Furthermore, he saw any alliance with Germany as
a fast and sure way of alienating Great Britain and destroying the progress
already made. But, as things stood in 1937, the military had, quite evidently,
entrenched itself as the predominant force in Iraqi politics.

How can one explain the presence of a pro-British prime minister in a
government dominated by a pro-German military? Nuri’s rise to prime minister
had been sanctioned by the four colonels because of a mutual dislike both camps
had for the deposed Jamil Midfa’i regime (1937-1938).35 Furthermore, it may
also have been the case that when the military chose to champion Nuri’s rise in
December, 1938, it did not realize the true extent of the candidate’s
pro-British convictions. In the following pages, further light will be brought
to the estrangement of Nuri and the military.

The Iraqi military’s ascent followed in conjunction to events which were
taking place in Europe. One such occurrence was the appointment of Adolf Hitler
as Chancellor of Germany. Based on an amalgam of historical, cultural, and
racial awareness, the new government’s platform, sought to restore the greatness
which Germany had known prior to Versailles. It was stated earlier that the
Nazi regime endeavored to bring about the union of all ethnic Germans.
Accordingly, by 1939, Germany had made great strides in doing such--Austria and
the Sudetenland had both become part of Hitler’s greater German Reich.

Aptly enough, the Nazi state’s ability to effectively achieve its ethnic
union drew the admiration of many Arab nationalists, particularly those in
Iraq.36 Germany’s accomplishments excited the Iraqis who looked upon
themselves and the Germans as two peoples who shared similar historical
experiences. In order to better understand Iraq’s strong interest in the Nazi
German rise, one must analyze the relationship which existed between Germany and
the Ottoman Empire, prior to, and during the First World War.

At the turn of the century, Wilhelmine Germany looked upon the flaccid
Ottoman Empire as an entity prime for colonization as well as economic
exploitation.37 The Germans also viewed the Empire as a vehicle which might
enable them to compete with British and French interests in the region.38 In
order to achieve these policy goals, Germany sought to inculcate Turkish
political and military officials with the benefits of “cultural nationalism.”39
Surfacing with the rise of German Romanticism at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, this school of thought emphasized the glories, past and present, of a
people’s language and history. In essence, the Wilhelmine government sought to
utilize “cultural propaganda” as a means of assimilating Turkey’s educated
military and civilian elite to the ways of Imperial Germany, and, as a result,
galvanize Turko-German ties.

The Wilhelmine government’s policy had indeed affected a wide portion of
Turkish society. However, it is important to mention that just as ethnic Turks
were digesting the ideal of “cultural nationalism” so, too, were many ethnic
Arabs within the Ottoman military and government. Arabs were becoming
increasingly wary of the Ottoman government’s Turkification of the Empire. In
view of this growing Turkish cultural influence, Arabs looked to their owns
cultural past by reading books which spoke of heroes and the Arab conquest of
Spain.40 Furthermore, those Arabs who were most effected by German policy, the
military, surfaced as the movement’s vanguard and helped perpetuate various
secret societies which sought to spread Arab identity and culture.41 In
essence, a new form of nationalism was developing from the pattern which had
been handed to the Turks by the Germans.

Aptly enough, after the creation of the kingdom of Iraq, many of the Arabs
who had been educated by the Germans in the Ottoman Empire carried this sense of
“cultural nationalism” southward. Especially after receiving its independence
in 1932, Iraq was quick to develop as a hot-bed of Arab nationalism.42 With
Syria and Palestine still under foreign control, the instinct for Arab
nationalist leaders to turn to Iraq was natural. Truly, as it soon became
vaunted as the Prussia of the Arab East, many Arabs looked to Iraq as the most
promising country to achieve the pan-Arab union.43

Iraq’s fervent nationalist and pro-German sentiments did not elude the
watchful eye of Berlin as the new German regime began to realize the importance
in attaining an Arab-German rapprochement.44 In an effort to fan the Arab
fire, as early as 1937, the German government initiated propaganda activities in
the Arab East.45 And, in that same year, the head of the Hitler youth, Baldur
von Schirach, made a visit to Baghdad.46 Nazi propaganda found an echo in the
rise of paramilitary organizations such as Iraq’s Futuwwa, a group which was
designed with the specific intent of bringing the nationalist ideal to the
country’s youth.

Germany’s most effective agent in the Middle Eastern propaganda was Dr.
Fritz Grobba. Schooled in Arab culture and history, and fluent in Arabic and
Turkish, Grobba was no stranger to Middle Eastern affairs.47 He harbored much
faith in the great potential of the pan-Arab movement. In late 1937, he
believed that “the friendship of the Arabs for Germany [was] almost
instinctual.” Grobba also felt that “the friendship of the Arabs for Germany
[was] still active in the leading class in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine . . .”
Grobba expressed his own views on the future of German policy in the Arab East
by stating that “Even if Arab friendship towards Germany is determined above all
by the Arab’s own interest, it is an important factor for Germany, which we can
make both political and economic use of.”48 Quite clearly, it was not just
those within the pan-Arab camp who saw promise in German-Iraqi collaboration.

Clearly, during the inter-war period, pro-German, nationalistic sentiment
could be found both within the Iraqi military and government. And, as
addressed, this ideology was to become especially poignant after the army’s rise
to power in 1936. These attitudes coupled with the lingering sting of the
wartime and post-war European agreements made Iraq a country which would be
hostile to British interests while, at the same time, stand wide-open to those
of Germany. With the Mufti’s move to Iraq in April 1939, the pan-Arab movement
quickly surfaced as a significant threat to Great Britain’s Middle Eastern
status quo. General Sabbagh of the “Golden Square” expressed his pre-coup
Anglophobia by stating the following:

There is no murderous wolf for the Arabs and no deadlier foe of Islam than
Great Britain. As for the Arabs, they have been torn apart into small
coup-,
tries communities and tribes that fight each other. Three hundred and
fifty
million Muslims are still groaning under the yoke of British imperialism.
The
bloody ‘Lion Heart’ of the Crusaders’ wars was an Englishman an so was
Allenby, who conquered Jerusalem and said, ‘Now the Crusades are over.’
If you give some attention to the location of countries and continents,
and if
you understand the strategic significance of the British wars, you will
then
see that the Arabs have no future unless the British Empire comes to an
end.49

Quite clearly, the Iraqi situation, on the eve of the war, was prime for
revolt--Sabbagh’s words were truly representative of many within the Iraqi
government.50 However, despite such pervading sentiment, there were several
factors which the prospective conspirators faced. First, the steady Nuri Sa’id
was wise to the intent of many of the ultra-nationalists within the government
and endeavored to forestall any move to revolt by the extremists. Second, the
Iraqi government was still bound to the 1930 Treaty of Alliance with Great
Britain. Any breach of this treaty could signal a quick and resounding response
from the British who persisted, despite their tenuous stance in the Arab East,
to be the region’s most dominant military force. Thirdly, Germany was far away
from Iraq--in 1939, the Hitler’s mind was set on attaining European hegemony,
and fifteen hundred miles, in the meantime, kept German involvement in Iraq at a
minimum. By no means would a nationalist coup be a ‘sure thing.’

Against this backdrop the Rashid Ali al-Kilani revolt took place--the Arab
nationalist movement had found a home in Iraq, leadership in the Mufti, the
military and Rashid Ali, an enemy in Great Britain, and in its eyes, an ally in
Nazi Germany. Needless to say, by the fall of 1939, the smell of revolution
permeated the Baghdad air. In the next chapter the events which made up the
coup will be recounted in brief.