Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings

Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme

INVO's extensive inspection activities in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 resulted in a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The programme was very well funded and was aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material and production and manufacturing of nuclear weapons.
IAEA report S/1997/779 to the UN Security Council provides a detailed
overview of Agency activities in Iraq and its assessment of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme.
An update and summary of this report can be found in S/1998/927 and
S/1999/393. The reports cover all Agency activities in Iraq between 1991 and 1998.

This fact sheet is based upon these reports and highlights the components of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme, IAEA assessment of the past nuclear programme, and IAEA achivements.

Using open-source literature and theoretical studies, ran various computer codes through Iraq’s mainframe computer to adapt the codes and develop the physical constants for a nuclear weapon development programme

Was aware of more advanced weapon design concepts

Invested significant efforts to understand the various options for neutron initiators

Tested high explosivelenses

Made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of uranium metal

Casted a uranium sphere of about five centimeter diameter, several hemispheres of similar size and a small number of rods weighing 1.2 kg per piece, from which to machine “sub-calibre munitions”

Nuclear Delivery System

Considered two options:

Production of a derivative of the Al Hussein/Al Abbas missile, designed to deliver a one-tonne warhead to a maximum range of 650 km

Using an unmodified Al Hussein missile with a range of 300 km

II - Assessment of Iraq's past nuclear programme

As of 16 December 1998, the following assessment could be made of Iraq's clandestine programme:

There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons was considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation.

Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon

There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapons-grade nuclear material through its indigenous processes.

There were no indications that Iraq otherwise clandestinely acquired weapons-usable material

All the safeguarded research reactor fuel was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.

There were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

III - IAEA Achievements in Iraq

IRAQ

IAEA

Procurement
and production of uranium compounds

Removed all known weapon usable materials

All
known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium
compounds useful to a nuclear programme were destroyed
during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected and completed the
destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored the sites
as part of their OMV activities.

Took
custody of all known imported compounds and indigenously
produced uranium compounds

Industrial-scale
facilities for the production of uranium compounds suitable
for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment

All
known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium
compounds useful for fuel fabrication and for isotopic
enrichment were destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected
and completed the destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored
the sites as part of their OMV activities.

R&D
of indigenous uranium enrichment technologies

Destroyed,
removed, or rendered harmless all known single-use equipment
used in enrichment R&D

Destroyed all known facilities and equipment for the enrichment
of uranium
Subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification all facilities
and known dual-use equipment capable of being used in
enrichment R&D

Design
and feasibility studies for an indigenous plutonium production
reactor