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entitled 'Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future
Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs' which was released on
September 6, 2006.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Hurricane Katrina:
Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future Enhancements Beyond Interim
Levee Repairs:
GAO-06-934:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-934, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge and floodwaters breached levees and
floodwalls causing billions of dollars of property damage, and more
than 1,300 deaths. Under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct
reviews on his own initiative, GAO reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) (1) progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection
projects by June 1, 2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other
repairs and complete five existing hurricane protection projects; and
(3) plans and estimated costs to add enhancements and strengthen
hurricane protection for the region. GAO reviewed related laws and
regulations, Corps planning documents and repair tracking reports,
observed ongoing repair work, and met with key agency officials and
other stakeholders.
What GAO Found:
Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps worked quickly to repair and
restore almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood
control structures to prehurricane levels of protection. Although the
Corps stated that it had restored prehurricane levels of protection to
the area by June 1, 2006, it used temporary solutions and developed
emergency procedures to protect against flooding, in the event of a
hurricane, for sections where permanent repairs could not be completed
in time. For example, the Corps constructed interim gates on three
canals to prevent storm surges from flooding New Orleans. When
construction of one canal gate fell behind schedule and could not be
completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised an emergency plan to drive
sheet piling into the canal and close it off if a hurricane threatened
before the gate was completed. More importantly, because these initial
repairs were performed only on levees and floodwalls with obvious
visual damage, the reliability of those adjacent to them is still
unknown. The Corps originally allocated $801 million for initial
repairs, but the current allocation has increased to over $1 billion.
After completing the initial repairs, the Corps plans to conduct
additional repairs and construction on the existing hurricane
protection system. These plans include (1) repairing all damaged pumps,
motors, and pumping stations by about March 2007; (2) restoring
sections of existing hurricane protection projects that have settled
over time to their original design elevations; and (3) completing
construction of incomplete portions of five previously authorized
hurricane and flood control projects by September 2007. An additional
$941 million had been allocated for this additional work, but the Corps
expects actual costs will be greater because of subsequent decisions to
change the design of these projects, cover the local sponsor’s share,
and because of rapidly escalating construction costs.
In addition, the Corps plans to undertake further work to enhance and
strengthen the hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. These
projects are estimated to take years and require billions of dollars to
complete. Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than
$7 billion for some aspects of this work and additional appropriations
are expected. According to an external review organization established
by the Corps, hurricane protection systems should be deliberately
designed and built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and
provide consistent levels of protection. However, the Corps does not
have a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to integrate the
repairs already authorized and planned and that would ensure the
efficient use of federal funds. Instead, the Corps appears to be
following a piecemeal approach, similar to its past practice of
building projects without giving sufficient attention to the
interrelationships between various elements of those projects or fully
considering whether the projects will provide an integrated level of
hurricane protection for the area.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Corps develop a comprehensive strategy and
implementation plan that incorporates all elements for rebuilding and
strengthening the system to ensure that specified levels of protection
are constructed in a cost-effective manner, within reasonable time
frames. GAO also recommends that the Corps establish an independent
task force to help support and guide its ongoing and future repair
efforts.
In its response for the Corps, the Department of Defense generally
concurred with GAO’s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-934].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Anu Mittal, (202) 512-
3841, mittala@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane Protection
Had Been Restored to Southeastern Louisiana:
Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing
Construction of Incomplete Portions Continue to Rise:
The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Managing the
Multiple Restoration, Construction, and Future Enhancements Proposed
for Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps' Plans
and Projects:
Figures:
Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall:
Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee:
Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair
Project Sites:
Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana and
Repair Project Sites:
Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites:
Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites:
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites:
Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps:
Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Project:
Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project:
Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project:
Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project:
Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project:
Abbreviations:
Corps: Army Corps of Engineers:
DOD: Department of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 6, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore near Buras,
Louisiana, about 60 miles southeast of New Orleans, with wind speeds of
up to 127 miles per hour and a storm driven wave surge of up to 30
feet. The size and strength of the storm and subsequent flooding
resulted in one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history, as
storm waters flowed over floodwalls and breached levees in Louisiana's
Orleans and neighboring parishes, causing widespread flooding, billions
of dollars of property damage, and more than 1,300 deaths.
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) began constructing hurricane
protection projects in southeastern Louisiana almost 60 years ago, in
the 1940s. Over the years, the Corps constructed five major hurricane
and flood damage reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana,
comprising about 350 miles of earthen levees and concrete floodwalls
across six parishes. These projects were designed to provide various
levels of hurricane protection, and generally could withstand storms
with maximum wind speeds between 87 and 115 miles per hour. The
hurricane protection projects in Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard
parishes suffered the greatest damage from Hurricane Katrina. The Corps
estimates that more than one-half of the 269 miles of federally
constructed levees and floodwalls in these three parishes were damaged
by the storm's winds and flood waters.
The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1941, as amended,
authorizes the Corps to respond in cases where flooding occurs due to a
storm and repair or restore flood control and hurricane protection
projects including levees, floodwalls, and other flood control
structures damaged or destroyed by flood waters.[Footnote 1] Generally,
it is Corps policy to pay for the full costs of repairs to federally
constructed levees and to fund 80 percent of the cost to repair certain
nonfederally constructed levees, and the local sponsor or government
funds the remaining 20 percent. However, because of the unprecedented
damage and loss caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Corps deviated from
its usual policy and has funded 100 percent of the repair, restoration,
and construction costs for both federal and nonfederal levees and flood
control structures.
The official Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30,
when 97 percent of all tropical storms and hurricanes normally occur.
After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps stated that it would repair the 169
miles of levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures
damaged by Katrina to prestorm conditions by June 1, 2006--the
beginning of the 2006 Atlantic hurricane season. After June 2006, the
Corps had planned to repair damaged pumps, pump motors and pump
stations, restore all hurricane protection structures that had subsided
over time to their authorized design heights (the elevation specified
in their design), and complete construction of incomplete portions of
previously authorized hurricane protection projects. In April 2006, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency released advisory flood elevations
for New Orleans and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual
chance of flooding, also called a 100-year flood. In response, the
Corps is revising its plans and cost estimates to raise the height of
levees and floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year level of
protection. In addition, the Congress required the Corps to conduct an
analysis and design for comprehensive improvements in the coastal area
of Mississippi in the interest of hurricane and storm damage reduction
and for several other purposes,[Footnote 2] and to provide an interim
report of its findings on June 30, 2006, and issue a final report by
December 30, 2007.[Footnote 3]
We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, as part of our continued
effort to assist the Congress by (1) monitoring the extensive damage to
southeastern Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and (2) evaluating
ongoing efforts to repair and strengthen the region's hurricane
protection projects. Specifically, for this report we reviewed the
Corps' (1) progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection
projects by June 1, 2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other
repairs, restore levees and flood control structures to design
elevations, and complete construction of previously authorized but
incomplete portions of five existing hurricane protection projects; and
(3) plans and estimated costs to add enhancements and strengthen
hurricane protection projects for the region.
To determine the status of work to repair damage to hurricane
protection projects, we tracked the progress of repairs and funds spent
by reviewing weekly repair reports and daily funds status reports
obtained from the Corps' New Orleans district. We interviewed officials
at Corps headquarters, the New Orleans district office, as well as
officials assigned to the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task
Force. We also observed repairs at selected sites in Orleans and St.
Bernard parishes. To determine the Corps' plans and estimated costs to
repair pumps and pump stations, restore projects to design grade, and
complete construction of incomplete portions of previously authorized
hurricane protection projects, we reviewed documentation of the Corps'
plans, estimated costs, and results of surveys and reports of damage
assessments. We also interviewed New Orleans District officials about
their plans and estimated costs for this work. To determine the Corps'
plans, timelines and estimated costs to add hurricane project
enhancements and strengthen the level of hurricane protection, we
reviewed documentation of plans, estimated timelines and costs, and
laws authorizing funding and authority to the Corps to make repairs and
rebuild. We also interviewed New Orleans District officials on their
plans, timelines and estimated costs for this work. We conducted our
work between January and July 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Through a combination of permanent and temporary measures, the Corps
restored the level of hurricane protection that existed prior to
Hurricane Katrina to Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes by
June 1, 2006. To restore pre-Katrina levels of protection in a period
of about 9 months, the Corps worked quickly and in some instances,
engineered temporary solutions because not all repairs could be
completed in time. For example, the Corps has plans to build permanent
gates and pumps at the points where three drainage canals in New
Orleans meet Lake Pontchartrain. These structures will help stop water
from the lake surging into the canals during a hurricane. However,
these permanent structures could not be completed by June 1, 2006, so
the Corps is installing three interim gated structures and temporary
pumps that will continue to provide protection to the area for 3 to 5
years until permanent structures can be constructed. While most repairs
that were needed to restore protection were completed by June 1, 2006,
some work was behind schedule. Until this work can be completed, the
Corps has developed emergency procedures to protect against flooding in
the event of a hurricane while repair work is ongoing. For example,
because the construction of one of the interim gates along the 17th
Street canal in the Orleans East Bank is behind schedule, the Corps
will drive sheet pile barriers into the canal to block storm surges
from Lake Pontchartrain in the event of a hurricane. Additionally, all
repair work completed by June 1, 2006, was performed only on levees and
floodwalls with obvious damage noted during visual inspections
conducted after the hurricane. Consequently, the reliability of levees
and floodwalls adjacent to those that were repaired is still unknown.
In December 2005, the Corps had estimated that it would cost $841
million to repair the existing system to pre-Katrina levels. By March
2006, the Corps had awarded 59 contracts to complete the associated
repairs for about $801 million. In June 2006, however, the Corps
revised its cost estimates for this work and expects that when all
contracted work is completed for these repairs, total costs will exceed
$1 billion.
After repairing damaged sections of hurricane protection projects to
pre-Katrina levels, the Corps plans additional work to repair all
damaged pump stations; restore to their original authorized design
heights, those sections of the hurricane protection projects that have
settled over time; and construct previously authorized but incomplete
portions of the five hurricane protection projects in the area.
Specifically, the Corps plans to (1) repair pumps, pump motors, and
pump stations damaged by the hurricane and subsequent flooding by about
March 2007; (2) raise all hurricane protection structures to design
elevation by September 1, 2007; and (3) complete construction of
incomplete portions of previously authorized projects by September 30,
2007. The Corps originally estimated that it would cost $59 million to
repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations. However, to date,
the Corps has allocated $70 million for the pump repairs. Estimated
total costs for the other repairs and construction planned by the Corps
are unknown at this time because the Corps is revising these estimates.
The Corps had originally allocated $1.1 billion from the December 2005
emergency supplemental appropriation to cover the cost of additional
work needed to restore elevation to sections of the hurricane
protection projects that had settled over time and to complete
construction of the previously authorized but incomplete segments of
all five hurricane protection projects in this area. In June 2006, the
Corps shifted $224 million of these funds to cover the increasing cost
of repairs, leaving a balance of about $871 million allocated for this
work. The Corps is also revising the cost estimates for this work to
reflect design changes, escalating construction costs, and costs to
fund the portion of the work normally paid by local sponsors. According
to the Corps, all of these costs may not have been adequately accounted
for in the original funding allocation.
In response to new and emerging requirements from a broad range of
stakeholders, the Corps continues to propose enhancements to existing
hurricane protection projects as well as new projects to improve and
strengthen hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana.
Implementing these enhancements and strengthening the hurricane
protection system for southeastern Louisiana is in itself an immense
challenge. For example, the Corps is concurrently developing options to
address the Federal Emergency Management Agency's new flood control
standards; devising solutions to address some of the findings of the
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force; and trying to evaluate
approaches that will meet the long term needs of local interests as
well as respond to congressional requirements, as outlined in three
emergency supplemental appropriations. However, we are concerned that
the Corps is proceeding with over $7 billion of interim repairs and
construction without a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan
to ensure that these various efforts are appropriately coordinated and
integrated with each other as well as with any future plans for a
stronger hurricane protection system. Following Hurricane Katrina, the
Corps established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and
Corps officials said they used its findings and lessons learned to
improve engineering practices. However, the Corps has not indicated
that it plans to establish a similar organization to help guide its
interim repair and restoration efforts. While the Corps' preliminary
technical report issued in July 2006 provides a conceptual framework to
help stakeholders make decisions about long-term strategies for
building a stronger and better hurricane protection system for coastal
Louisiana, it neither provided any details on what needs to be done to
achieve higher levels of protection nor how current efforts will be
integrated with future efforts, if authorized. One of the criticisms
that has arisen from investigations of the existing hurricane
protection system was that it was a system in name only and was, in
fact, a series of disjointed projects that did not function together to
adequately protect the area. To avoid the potential for repeating the
mistakes of the past and risk creating a set of disjointed projects
that may not work together, may become redundant or obsolete, and may
result in an inefficient use of federal funds, we believe that it would
be imprudent for the Corps to proceed with such a large scale
multibillion dollar construction project without developing a
comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to guide its efforts,
measure progress, and ensure accountability.
In light of the billions of dollars that Congress has already
appropriated to rebuild and strengthen existing southeastern Louisiana
hurricane protection projects, and to ensure the most efficient use of
these federal resources, we are recommending that the Corps develop a
comprehensive strategy that incorporates all projects and plans for
rebuilding and strengthening the system and an implementation plan that
will achieve that level of protection in a cost-effective manner,
within a reasonable time frame. We are also recommending that the Corps
establish an evaluative organization like the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force, to help the Corps develop a strategic plan,
monitor progress, and provide expert advice on the construction of a
stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
(DOD) generally concurred with both of our recommendations but
contended that a body like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task
Force was not the proper organization to help the Corps develop a
strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide expert advice on the
construction of a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection
system. The Corps plans to rely on three teams of experts to provide
independent technical reviews, develop a strategic plan to construct a
hurricane protection system, and monitor implementation. We believe
that the Corps' proposal to use three external groups of experts
satisfies the spirit of our recommendation.
Background:
There are five major federally authorized projects comprised of more
than 350 miles of levees, floodwalls, and other flood control
structures across six parishes that provide hurricane protection in
southeastern Louisiana. While construction of hurricane protection
projects in southeastern Louisiana began almost 60 years ago,
construction of three major projects began about 40 years ago in the
1960s. Segments of those were still incomplete when Hurricane Katrina
struck the area in late August 2005. The projects were designed to
provide protection from hurricanes with maximum wind speeds of 87 to
115 miles per hour (115 miles per hour being roughly equivalent to a
Category 3 hurricane). Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds
equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane, or winds up to 127 miles per
hour, and record high storm surge. To determine the extent of the
damage to levees and floodwalls caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Corps
contracted for an initial assessment in September 2005 and a second
assessment in April 2006. Both assessments were based on visual
inspections of the levees and floodwalls. For the first assessment,
engineers walked the levees and floodwalls in Orleans, Plaquemines and
St. Bernard parishes and looked for damage. The second assessment
reexamined only those sections that were initially reported to be
undamaged. The first assessment found 169 miles of damaged levees and
floodwalls of which 128 miles were moderately damaged and 41 were
severely damaged or destroyed. Most of the damage was found in
Plaquemines Parish where 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were
damaged. The second assessment of those sections initially found to be
undamaged found additional cracks in the levees, soil erosion near
floodwalls, and levee heights that had settled below their design
elevation. Subsequently, the Corps and the contractors conducted
sampling and other tests to determine the extent of the damage, but
this was only done where exterior damage--such as cracks, depressions,
or seepage--was observed. Both assessments documented obvious external
damage but did not indicate whether other structures without visible
damage--but similar in design and composition to damaged levees and
floodwalls--were, in fact, damaged or weakened.
In its May 2006 draft final report, an independent team sponsored by
the National Science Foundation reviewed the failures of the hurricane
protection projects and concluded that the pervasiveness of problems
and failures calls into question the integrity and reliability of other
sections of flood protection projects that did not fail during
Hurricane Katrina. In its June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force--a team of 150 experts from the Corps
and about 50 federal, state, international, academic, and industrial
organizations--found that repaired sections of levees and floodwalls
were likely the strongest parts of the system until remaining sections
could be similarly upgraded and completed. The task force report
concluded that since there are many areas where protection levels are
only the same as before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans metropolitan
area remained vulnerable to storm surge and wave conditions equivalent
to or greater than Hurricane Katrina.
The most severely damaged portions of the hurricane protection projects
in the area were found in the three parishes of Orleans, Plaquemines,
and St. Bernard. Within these three parishes, there are approximately
243 miles of earthen levees and 26 miles of floodwalls. The 26 miles of
floodwalls comprised 19 miles of I-walls and 7 miles of T-walls. I-
walls are vertical concrete barriers anchored to levees by steel sheet
pile driven vertically into the levees. T-walls are vertical concrete
barriers with a horizontal concrete base anchored by multiple steel
beams driven diagonally into the levees and are stronger than I-walls
(see fig. 1).
Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
[End of figure]
Corps officials told us that T-or L-walls[Footnote 4] will be
constructed to replace floodwalls that were destroyed and need to be
replaced.
Corps of Engineers Has the Authority and Responsibility to Rebuild and
Restore Damage to Hurricane Protection Projects:
Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941, as amended, commonly
referred to as Public Law 84-99,[Footnote 5] authorizes the Corps to
conduct emergency operations and rehabilitation activities when levees
fail or are damaged during storms. Under the implementing regulations
for Public Law 84-99, after a storm, the Corps may repair and restore
federally authorized flood control projects and hurricane protection
structures, or nonfederal flood control projects that were inspected
and found to have met federal standards for construction and
maintenance prior to the flood event.[Footnote 6] Assistance for the
rehabilitation of hurricane protection structures is limited to repair
or restoration to the prestorm condition and level of protection (e.g.,
the prestorm elevation/height of levees, allowing for normal
settlement).[Footnote 7]
Under Corps policy, damage to federally constructed levees that have
been completed and officially turned over to a nonfederal sponsor are
to be repaired with 100 percent of the cost borne by the federal
government and damage to nonfederally constructed levees are to be
repaired with 80 percent of the cost borne by the federal government
and 20 percent by the local sponsor or government. However, in
September 2005, the Corps noted that Hurricane Katrina had caused
unprecedented damage and loss of infrastructure in the Gulf Coast
region. According to the Corps, damage to the region eroded the tax
base to such an extent that local sponsors would have great difficulty
funding their share of rebuilding expenses. In response, the Corps
requested a one-time waiver from the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works from the policy requiring local sponsors to fund 20
percent of the cost of rehabilitating nonfederal flood and hurricane
protection projects. For federally authorized projects that were under
construction when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Corps also
requested a waiver from the policy requirement that local sponsors fund
a share of the repair cost. In October 2005, the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works approved both requests. In the December 2005
emergency supplemental, Congress appropriated funding to the Corps to
repair levees and flood control structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina
to the level of protection for which they were designed, at full
federal expense.
Construction of Earthen Levees Depends on Local Building Materials and
Soil Foundations:
Most earthen levees are constructed with a mixture of clay and sand.
The most commonly used method is to build an earthen embankment sloped
on both sides and rising to a flat crown (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); St. Louis Post-Dispatch
(graphic).
[End of figure]
Depending on local conditions and the availability of suitable
materials, levees can be built in one or more stages. The number of
stages is generally dependent on the ability of the local soil to
provide an adequate base, and not sink under the weight of levees, and
to compact and provide suitable strength. When appropriate conditions
exist, levees can be built in a single stage. In other cases, levees
may need to be built in stages (also called lifts) that allow for
subsidence of the foundation soil or settlement of the fill material.
Between stages the levees are allowed to settle for up to 5 years.
Because the soil in southeastern Louisiana has a tendency of settling,
historically most levees built in the New Orleans area were required to
be built in three to four stages, and construction took 15 to 20 years.
Because of the urgency of the repairs that the Corps made after
Hurricane Katrina, earthen levees in the New Orleans area had to be
rebuilt in only several months. To do this, the Corps relied on
mechanical compaction by heavy construction equipment to compensate for
the normal settlement that would occur over time.
Building levees quickly can pose risks, however, as was witnessed on
May 30, 2006, when a 400-foot section of a reconstructed levee in
Plaquemines Parish slipped 3 to 4 feet under its own weight. Corps
officials said the underlying soil was weaker than previous tests had
indicated and was unable to support the weight of the newly constructed
levee. To provide interim protection, the Corps constructed a small
earthen berm on top of the levee to return it to approved design height
by June 7, 2006.
Current Repairs to the Hurricane Protection Projects Are Limited to
Prestorm or Previously Authorized Levels of Protection:
By June 1, 2006, the Corps planned to complete repairs to 169 miles of
southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects to prestorm
conditions--that is, to repair most levees and floodwalls to the
condition they were in before Hurricane Katrina. For 128 miles of
levees with minor or moderate damage, the Corps planned to repair or
fill scour (erosion) and holes. For 41 miles of levees and floodwalls
with major damage, or that were completely destroyed, the Corps planned
to rebuild these damaged sections entirely, including rebuilding to the
original design grade, plus an allowance for settlement. The Corps only
planned to repair hurricane-damaged levees and structures and did not
plan to repair or replace any existing levees or floodwalls unless
exterior damage was observed.
The Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair damage in three sections of
the city of New Orleans (Orleans East Bank, New Orleans East and the
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, commonly called the Industrial Canal)
and the parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The following sections
briefly describe the location and damage caused by Hurricane Katrina
for these five areas and the number of contracts the Corps awarded for
completing the repairs.
Orleans East Bank:
Orleans East Bank is located south of Lake Pontchartrain, from the 17th
Street Canal to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, and along the
western bank of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal to the Mississippi
River. About 19 miles of levees and floodwalls are along the Orleans
Lakefront, the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and three drainage canals-
-17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue--which drain rainwater
from New Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair
Project Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.
[End of figure]
A total of about one mile of levees and floodwalls were damaged along
the 17th Street Canal and two sides of the London Avenue Canal. There
was also intermittent minor erosion, and all 13 of the area's pump
stations were damaged. The Corps constructed interim sheet pile walls
at the breach sites along the drainage canals and contracted for the
construction of permanent T-walls at each of the breach sites. However,
the Corps was concerned about the integrity of the canal walls that
were not breached during Hurricane Katrina. The Corps chose to
construct interim closure structures (gates) where the canals empty
into Lake Pontchartrain to reduce storm surge from entering the canals
during hurricanes and storms. According to Corps officials, the Corps
did not have the authority to construct permanent gates; so, in late
January and early February 2006, the Corps awarded contracts for the
construction of three interim gates and 34 pumps along the three
drainage canals. A total of 12 contracts were awarded for the Orleans
East Bank area.
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal:
The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal is a 5.5 mile long waterway that
connects the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain. The east and west
sides of the Industrial Canal are lined by a total of 12.3 miles of
levees and floodwalls (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana and
Repair Project Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.
[End of figure]
A total of 5 miles of levees and floodwalls were damaged by Hurricane
Katrina along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Two breaches occurred
on the western side of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, near the
intersection of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal, and two separate large breaches occurred on the lower
eastern side, resulting in major flooding to New Orleans' Lower Ninth
Ward. The Corps awarded eight contracts to repair and completely
rebuild damaged and destroyed levees and floodwalls along the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal.
New Orleans East:
New Orleans East is bounded by the east bank of the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal on the west, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, Bayou
Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge to the east, and the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway to the south. The area has 39 miles of exterior levees and
floodwalls and eight pump stations (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project
Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.
[End of figure]
The hurricane damaged 4.6 miles of levees and floodwalls and all eight
pump stations. Ten contracts were awarded to repair this damage.
Plaquemines Parish:
Plaquemines Parish includes long, narrow strips of land on both sides
of the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico.
The Mississippi River levees protect the parish from floods coming down
the river, and the New Orleans to Venice hurricane protection project
(portions of which are not yet completed) protects against hurricane-
induced tidal surges. The distance between these Gulf-side levees,
called back levees, and the Mississippi River levees is less than 1
mile, in most places. Plaquemines Parish has a total of 169 miles of
levees and floodwalls and 18 pump stations (see fig. 6).
Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.
[End of figure]
In Plaquemines Parish, a total of 150 miles of levees and floodwalls
were damaged along with 18 pump stations. The Corps awarded 20
contracts to repair and rebuild levees and floodwalls damaged by
Hurricane Katrina in Plaquemines Parish. According to the Corps, there
was considerable erosion scour along the total length of the levees.
The Mississippi River levees were also damaged by numerous ships and
barges that crashed into them. Five of the 6 miles of floodwalls along
the Mississippi River were also destroyed but will be replaced with
earthen levees because the Corps determined that the underlying
foundation could not support the weight of a concrete floodwall.
St. Bernard Parish:
In St. Bernard Parish, levees and floodwalls extend along the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway to the north, along the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet to the east and south, and then turn west toward the Mississippi
River, continuing along the river to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
along the western side. St. Bernard Parish has 30 miles of exterior
levees and floodwalls, 22 miles of nonfederal interior levees, and
eight pump stations (see fig. 7).
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.
[End of figure]
In St. Bernard Parish, 8 miles of exterior levees and floodwalls were
damaged, 14 miles of nonfederal interior levees (back levees) were
damaged and all eight pump stations and two control structures were
damaged. The Corps awarded nine contracts to repair and rebuild the
levees, floodwalls, and flood control structures in St. Bernard Parish.
Independent Research Teams Have Studied the Cause of Hurricane
Protection Failure:
Following Hurricane Katrina, several independent review teams began
studies to determine the cause of hurricane protection failures in
southeastern Louisiana. These teams included the Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force, Independent Levee Investigation Team
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, and the American Society
of Civil Engineers External Review Panel. The Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force and Independent Levee Investigation Team have
issued preliminary reports of their findings and conclusions. The
American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel was assembled
to review the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force work and
conclusions. On June 1, 2006, the Interagency Performance Evaluation
Task Force issued a draft final report that concluded that the levees
and floodwalls in New Orleans and southeastern Louisiana did not
perform as a system and that it was a system in name only. According to
the report, the hurricane system's performance was compromised by the
incompleteness of the system, the inconsistency in the levels of
protection, and the lack of redundancy. Inconsistent levels of
protection were caused by differences in the quality of materials used
in the levees and variations in elevations due to subsidence and
construction below design specifications. Corps officials said they
considered the findings and recommendations of the Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force when making decisions about how to
repair levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
Billions of Dollars Have Been Appropriated for Post-Katrina Hurricane
Protection Repairs and Construction:
The Corps has received over $7 billion dollars to restore hurricane
protection and complete construction on existing hurricane protection
projects in southeastern Louisiana through three emergency supplemental
appropriations.[Footnote 8] In September and December 2005, the Corps
received a total of $3.299 billion in the second and third emergency
supplemental appropriations. In September 2005, the second emergency
supplemental appropriation provided the Corps with $400 million for
repair of flood control and hurricane protection projects.[Footnote 9]
In December 2005, the third supplemental appropriation provided the
Corps with $2.899 billion, of which $2.3 billion was provided for
emergency response to and recovery from coastal storm damages and
flooding from hurricanes Katrina and Rita.[Footnote 10] The Corps has
allocated nearly $2.1 billion to the New Orleans District to repair
damage to existing hurricane protection, rebuild existing projects to
original authorized height, and complete unconstructed portions of
previously authorized hurricane protection projects. In turn, the New
Orleans District has allocated nearly $1.9 billion for this work.
In June 2006, through the fourth emergency supplemental appropriation,
the Congress provided almost $4 billion to the Corps to strengthen the
region's hurricane defenses and restore areas of coastal wetlands. The
legislation included specific provisions for southeastern Louisiana
hurricane protection and flood reduction project enhancements (canal
closures, selective levee armoring, and storm proofing pump stations),
and incorporating nonfederal levees in Plaquemines Parish into the
federal levee system.[Footnote 11] The June 2006 emergency supplemental
also provided general construction funding that the Corps plans to use
to, among other things, raise levee heights for certain hurricane
protection projects in order to certify them in the National Flood
Insurance Program (also called a 100-year flood level of protection).
Table 1 summarizes the estimated costs and funds allocated for the
Corps' planned work to date.
Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps' Plans
and Projects:
Corps plans and projects: Repair damage to existing hurricane
protection;
Initial estimated cost: $841 million;
Funds allocated: $1,018 million[A].
Corps plans and projects: Rebuild existing projects to original
authorized height;
Initial estimated cost: Not estimated;
Funds allocated: $342 million[A].
Corps plans and projects: Complete unconstructed portions of previously
authorized hurricane protection projects;
Initial estimated cost: $529 million;
Funds allocated: $529 million.
Corps plans and projects: Repair pumps, pump motors, and pump stations;
Initial estimated cost: $59 million;
Funds allocated: $70 million.
Corps plans and projects: Enhance hurricane protection to provide
protection from a 100-year flood;
Initial estimated cost: Not estimated;
Funds allocated: $495.3 million.
Corps plans and projects: Enhance hurricane protection to provide
protection from a Category 5 hurricane;
Initial estimated cost: Not estimated;
Funds allocated: Funds have not been allocated.
Source: GAO analysis of Army Corps of Engineers' budgetary and other
documents.
[A] The Corps allocated $801 million to repair damage to existing
hurricane protection and $566 million to rebuild existing projects to
original authorized height. In June 2006, the Corps shifted $224
million from funds allocated to rebuild existing projects to fund
repair cost increases; that is, the Corps reallocated $217 million to
fund repairs to the existing hurricane protection and $7 million to
fund repairs to other hurricane and coastal protection projects.
[End of table]
At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane Protection
Had Been Restored to Southeastern Louisiana:
On June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 100 percent of prehurricane
protection levels had been restored to southeastern Louisiana. However,
work continued on almost half of the contracts because some were behind
schedule while other contracts were not scheduled to be completed until
as late as March 2007. In instances where the Corps determined it could
not complete permanent repairs by June 1, 2006, the Corps installed
temporary structures or levee supports and developed emergency
procedures to protect against flooding in the event of a hurricane. The
Corps originally allocated $801 million for this phase of the repairs;
however, the current allocation for total costs for this phase is just
over $1 billion.
To restore 100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection in
southeastern Louisiana by the start of the 2006 hurricane season, the
Corps worked quickly to award contracts for a variety of work to be
performed in a relatively short period of time. Between October 2005
and March 2006, the Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair and rebuild
earthen levees, concrete floodwalls, and other hurricane protection
structures, and to construct interim repairs in areas where final
repairs could not be completed by June 1. To complete repairs quickly,
some contractors worked 24 hours a day, and Corps project managers
monitored the progress of the work. As of June 1, 2006, the Corps
reported that 22.7 miles of new levees and 195 miles of scour repairs
were completed. Although the Corps reported that 100 percent of
prehurricane levels of protection had been restored by June 1, 2006, as
of July 18, 2006, 27 of the 59 contracts were not completed. Of those
27 contracts, the Corps projected that 20 would be completed by
September 30, 2006, and the remaining 7 contracts would be completed by
March 2007. The remaining work includes grading, compacting, and
shaping the levees, as well as grass seeding and fertilizing.
In some instances, to restore prehurricane levels of protection, the
Corps decided to change the design of the existing hurricane structure.
For example, in the Orleans East Bank, the Corps determined that it did
not have the time to assess the stability of existing canal walls nor
could it complete repairs to all of the breaches along the drainage
canals before June 1, 2006. As a result, at a cost of $111 million, the
Corps decided to install interim gated closure structures (gates) on
all three canals--17th Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue--where
they intersect Lake Pontchartrain to prevent storm surge from entering
the canals and to install 34 temporary pumps to drain floodwaters from
the Orleans East Bank portion of the city (see fig. 8). According to
Corps officials, the agency planned to install interim gates and
temporary pumps because it did not have the authority to install
permanent gates and pumps under its emergency flood control authority.
The Corps expects the interim gates and temporary pumps to remain in
place for 3 to 5 years, after which the Corps will construct permanent
gates and pumps. The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provides
$530 million for permanent gates and pumps at the three drainage
canals.[Footnote 12]
Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
[End of figure]
According to the Corps, the interim gates will be operated manually,
and the temporary pumps will not be enclosed. If a major storm or
hurricane should occur, the Corps plans to close the gates when water
levels in the 17th Street and London Avenue canals reach 5 feet and the
water level in the Orleans Avenue canal reaches 9 feet. The Corps is
reviewing the results of recent soil samples collected in the area and
may change its plans, depending on these results, a Corps official
said. The temporary pumps being installed by the Corps can only pump
out a portion of the drainage water that would normally be pumped into
the canals during a storm event. As a result of the restriction being
placed on the water levels pumped into the canals and the limited pump
capacity of the temporary pumps, the Corps has acknowledged that some
flooding could occur from the heavy rainfall that normally occurs
during a hurricane.
In instances where the Corps did not expect permanent repairs to be
completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised some interim and temporary
solutions to provide the same level of protection that existed before
Hurricane Katrina. For example, as of June 1, 2006, construction of one
of the three interim gates--the 17th Street canal gate--was behind
schedule. The Corps estimated it would be completed by September 15,
2006. If a hurricane threatens before the interim gate is in place, the
Corps plans to drive sheet piling in front of the Hammond Highway
Bridge that crosses the 17th Street canal to close off the canal from
Lake Pontchartrain. On June 12, 2006, the Corps announced that the
temporary pumps built for the drainage canals could not provide the
required pumping capacity. The Corps plans to procure replacement pumps
with different specifications for the 17th Street canal and repair new
pumps already installed at the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals.
Under normal conditions, the Corps said it would have conducted
hydraulic modeling and testing to determine the correct pump
configuration. The Corps did not perform modeling and testing,
officials said, because the process can take months, and there was
insufficient time to do so before the start of the hurricane season. If
the canals must be closed due to a hurricane, before pumping capacity
is restored at the drainage canals, the Corps plans to use a
combination of temporary and portable pumps.
Similarly, in Plaquemines Parish, the Corps made temporary repairs to 5
miles of levees along the Mississippi River after the Corps concluded
that a floodwall located on top of a section of levee was not reliable.
The Corps decided to add a temporary reinforcement because there was
not enough time to replace 5 miles of floodwalls before the start of
the 2006 hurricane season. To provide this interim protection, the
Corps added compacted clay along the backside of the damaged levee. The
Corps subsequently determined that the foundation soil in this area
would be unable to support the weight of floodwalls, so the Corps has
decided to construct a full earthen levee embankment instead. However,
this permanent structure is not scheduled to be completed until March
2007.
The Corps allocated about $801 million to repair levees and floodwalls
to pre-Katrina conditions. An additional $217 million was needed to
fund the $125 million costs to increase the pumping capacity of the new
temporary pumps for the drainage canals and $92 million to fund such
things as (1) additional work that has been required on existing repair
contracts, relating to weakened levees in Plaquemines parish, the three
drainage canal gates, and two hurricane protection and flood reduction
projects; (2) contingency measures that had to be implemented until the
temporary gates on the drainage canals are completed; and (3) costs to
acquire nearby real estate for construction of the gates and associated
levees. The Corps allocated these additional funds from the $566
million that was allocated by the Corps for raising all hurricane
protection structures to their authorized design elevations, which is
discussed in greater detail in the next section of this report.
Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing
Construction of Incomplete Portions Continue to Rise:
Beyond the repairs that were to be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps
has additional plans to continue repairs, restoration, and construction
activities on other portions of the existing five southeastern
Louisiana hurricane protection and flood control projects. The Corps
plans to (1) repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations by
about March 2007; (2) restore sections of the five hurricane protection
and flood control projects that have settled over time to their
original design elevation; as well as (3) complete construction of
previously authorized but incomplete portions of these hurricane
protection and flood control projects by September 2007. Although
$1.165 billion was originally allocated for this work, the Corps
expects actual costs will be greater because the original allocation
did not reflect design changes, additional costs to fund the local
sponsor's share, and rapidly escalating construction costs. Further, in
June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million from this allocation to pay
for the additional costs to repair damaged levees and floodwalls,
leaving only $941 million for this work.
The Corps Plans to Repair Damaged Pumps, Motors, and Pump Stations by
March 2007:
The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors at 66 of 75 pump
stations damaged by flood waters that were caused by Hurricane
Katrina.[Footnote 13] The pump stations are located in Orleans, St.
Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes as well as in neighboring Jefferson
Parish. Pumps remove storm runoff from city streets. The Corps plans to
make electrical and mechanical repairs to pumps and motors--such as
rewiring motors and replacing pump bearings--and structural repairs to
pump stations, such as repairing roof tops. As of June 2006, the Corps
had planned to complete repairs to all of these pumps, pump motors, and
pump stations by March 2007, for an estimated cost of $59 million.
However, to date, the Corps has allocated $70 million for the pump
repairs. A Corps project manager said that five contracts have been
awarded for $7.7 million, as of June 2006, and that he expects to award
a total of 25 contracts for this work.
In April 2006, three pump motors that were flooded during Hurricane
Katrina caught fire during a rainstorm and shut down, raising questions
about the reliability of other pumps that had also been flooded. The
possible failure of pumps due to fires combined with (1) the
restrictions placed on the level of water that can be pumped into the
canals because of uncertainty about the integrity of the canal
floodwalls and (2) the reduced capacity of the temporary pumps to
remove water from the canals has led to widely reported concerns about
flooding from rainwater during a hurricane. In response to these
concerns, the Corps accelerated plans to repair all damaged pumps,
motors, and pump stations. A Corps official estimated it would take
several weeks to repair each of the larger and older pump motors. The
Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors by taking some of them
offline one at a time, thereby maintaining as much of the available
pumping capacity at each pumping station as possible.
Restoration of Hurricane Protection to Authorized Design Elevations Is
Expected by September 2007:
The Corps plans to raise the height of all federal and some nonfederal
levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures within
the southeastern Louisiana area, which have settled over the years, to
their original design elevation by September 1, 2007. In December 2005,
the Corps surveyed levees not damaged by Hurricane Katrina and
estimated that about 48 miles of levees were 1 to 2˝ feet below design
elevation in St. Bernard, Orleans, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes.
The Corps estimated that restoring these levees to their designed
height would cost $50.8 million. However, the Corps allocated $566
million from funds provided in the December 2005 emergency supplemental
appropriation to raise not only the heights of these levees but also
the heights of floodwalls and other structures in southeastern
Louisiana, which may have settled over time, to their original design
height. The primary difference between the Corps' initial cost estimate
and the funds allocated in the emergency supplemental is the higher
cost of raising floodwalls and other structures, compared with the cost
of raising only about 48 miles of levees. In July 2006, the Corps
estimated that 94 miles of levees, about 16 miles of floodwalls, 89
gates, and 2 control structures were below design elevation in Orleans,
Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes. According to a Corps official,
the agency is revising the plans and estimated costs for this work to
include the costs of raising all settled floodwalls and the cost of
replacing all I-walls with T-walls or L-walls.
As of July 2006, the Corps had not announced the results of its second
damage assessment. Currently, this work is still scheduled to be
completed by September 1, 2007. As of June 2006, funds allocated for
this work were reduced to $342 million because, as previously
mentioned, $224 million was shifted to help fund the escalating costs
to repair damaged levees and floodwalls to pre-Katrina levels by June
1, 2006, and to fund repairs to hurricane damage at other hurricane
protection and coastal protection projects. According to a Corps
official, cost estimates for this work were to be available by July 15,
2006, after which the Corps plans to determine if it needs to request
more funds.
Completion of Previously Authorized but Unconstructed Portions of Five
Hurricane and Flood Reduction Projects Expected by September 2007:
By September 30, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the construction of
all previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five hurricane
protection and flood reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana. In
December 2005, the Corps estimated the cost of completing these five
projects to be $529 million. However, the Corps is revising its cost
estimates due to escalating construction costs and design changes that
have occurred since Hurricane Katrina. The Corps' costs will also
increase because local sponsors are no longer required to share any of
the costs incurred to complete these projects. Details of the five
projects are described below.
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project:
The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is
located in St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles parishes in
southeastern Louisiana, in the vicinity of the city of New Orleans and
between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The project
includes a series of control structures, concrete flood walls, and
about 125 miles of earthen levees designed to protect residents living
between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River levees from storm
surges in the lake (see fig. 9).
Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Project:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).
[End of figure]
This project was designed to provide protection from a standard project
hurricane (equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane). The Flood
Control Act of 1965[Footnote 14] authorized the project that, at the
time of Hurricane Katrina, was 90 percent complete in St. Bernard and
Orleans parishes, 70 percent complete in Jefferson Parish, and 60
percent complete in St. Charles Parish. The pre-Katrina scheduled
completion date for this project was 2015, at an estimated cost of $738
million, where the estimated federal share was $528 million and the
estimated local sponsor share was $210 million. At the time of the
storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project were
$121 million. This estimate is expected to increase due to higher
construction costs following Hurricane Katrina.
West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project:
The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is located on
the west bank of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the city of
New Orleans and in Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. The
project is designed to provide hurricane protection to residents from
storm surges from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador, and waterways leading
to the Gulf of Mexico. The project encompasses 66 miles of earthen
levees and floodwalls (see fig. 10).
Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).
[End of figure]
This project was designed to provide Category 3 level of hurricane
protection. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized this
project.[Footnote 15] At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was
38 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this project
was 2016, at an estimated cost of $331 million, where the federal
estimated share was $215 million and the estimated local sponsor share
was $116 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete
the remainder of the project were $148 million; however, the Corps
expects the final cost to be much higher. The design for this project
includes 4 miles of T-walls, and since the cost of T-walls has
escalated, officials said they expect the cost to complete the project
will increase as well.
Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project:
The Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project is
located in southeastern Louisiana, about 30 miles southwest of New
Orleans, along Bayou Lafourche and between the communities of Larose
and Golden Meadow in Lafourche Parish. The project is a ring-shaped
levee about 40 miles in length (see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).
[End of figure]
According to Corps officials, this project was designed to provide a
100-year level of hurricane protection to about 2,300 acres of
residential and commercial land and 9,400 acres of agricultural land.
The Flood Control Act of 1965[Footnote 16] authorized this project
that, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, was about 96 percent complete.
The pre-Katrina completion date of this project was 2007, at an
estimated cost of $116 million, where the federal estimated share was
$81 million and the estimated local sponsor was $35 million. At the
time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the
project were $4 million. However, according to the project manager,
significant settlement has occurred throughout the project and levees
are between 1 to 1 ˝ feet below design elevation. Further, when this
project was designed in the early 1970s, a nearby marsh was expected to
help slow storm surge. Since that time, the local environment has
changed causing the marsh to disappear and, according to the project
manager, the Corps is reconsidering the project design and may have to
recommend raising the height of the levees in order to provide
authorized levels of protection, which could significantly increase the
costs of the project.
Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project:
The Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project is located on the
east bank of the Mississippi River, in Orleans Parish, and on the east
and west banks of the Mississippi River, in Jefferson Parish and St.
Tammany Parish. The project was designed to provide drainage and flood
protection from a 10-year rainfall event[Footnote 17] and encompasses
major drainage lines and canals, additional pumping capacity, and new
pump stations (see fig. 12).
Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).
Note: Shading indicates areas where drainage and flood protection work
is planned or in progress.
[End of figure]
The project was originally authorized by the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act, 1996[Footnote 18] and the Water
Resources Development Act of 1996.[Footnote 19] At the time of
Hurricane Katrina, the project was about 60 percent complete. The pre-
Katrina completion date for this project was 2009, at an estimated cost
of $908 million, of which the federal estimated share was $678 million
and the estimated local sponsor share was $230 million. At the time of
the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project
were $225 million (this estimate has been revised to $339 million).
According to a Corps official, this estimate will increase further
because costs for engineering and construction have escalated in the
months following Hurricane Katrina.
New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project:
The New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project is located along
the east bank of the Mississippi River from Phoenix, Louisiana--about
28 miles southeast of New Orleans--down to Bohemia, Louisiana, and
along the west bank of the river from St. Jude, Louisiana--about 39
miles southeast of New Orleans--down to the vicinity of Venice,
Louisiana. The project was designed to provide protection from
hurricane tidal overflow from a 100-year storm and consists of 87 miles
of enlarged levees built on the back side of the ring of levees (see
fig. 13).
Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection
Project:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); Stanley Consultants
(graphic).
Note: Reaches shown above are back levees.
[End of figure]
This project was authorized under the River and Harbor Act of
1962.[Footnote 20] At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was
about 84 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this
project was 2018, at an estimated cost of $253 million, where the
federal share was $177 million and the estimated local sponsor share
was $76 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete
the remainder of the project were $32 million. According to a Corps
official, estimated costs to complete this project are expected to
increase due, in part, to design changes.
The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Managing the
Multiple Restoration, Construction, and Future Enhancements Proposed
for Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection:
In response to various requirements and directives from stakeholders,
the Corps has already developed or is in the process of developing a
number of plans and projects that will further restore, construct, and/
or enhance hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana, to make it
stronger and better. Constructing these projects may take years and
require billions of dollars in federal funds. However, the Corps does
not have a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that all of these
efforts are effectively integrated and an implementation plan to ensure
funding allocations are made in the most efficient manner possible,
avoiding redundancies and misuse of resources.
In addition to the repairs and construction activities already
described in prior sections of this report, a number of requirements
and directives placed on the Corps over the last several months have
required it to modify existing plans or develop new plans for hurricane
protection in southeastern Louisiana:
* The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided nearly $4
billion to the Corps to enhance hurricane protection in southeastern
Louisiana.[Footnote 21] Specific provisions provided $530 million for
permanent pumps and closures for New Orleans' three drainage canals;
$350 million for two navigable closures to prevent hurricane surge from
entering the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway; $250 million to storm-proof existing interior drainage pump
stations in Jefferson and Orleans parishes; $170 million to armor
critical sections of New Orleans levees; and $215 million to include
nonfederal levees in Plaquemines Parish into the federal system, which
means the levees will be repaired and built to Corps standards and
eligible for future rehabilitation. These projects are in addition to
the other work described in prior sections of this report.
* The 2006 emergency supplemental also appropriated nearly $1.6 billion
to the Corps to reinforce or replace floodwalls in the New Orleans
metropolitan area and provided that at least $495 million of the
amounts appropriated for construction be used to raise levees for the
Lake Pontchartrain and West Bank levee projects to provide a level of
protection necessary to satisfy the certification requirements of the
National Flood Insurance Program (often referred to as the 100-year
flood standard.) In April 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
announced the release of new advisory flood elevations for New Orleans
and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of
flooding, or a 100-year flood. The Corps' restoration plans for
hurricane protection did not meet these new elevation requirements. In
response, the Corps revised its plans and estimated costs to raise the
height of levees and floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year
level of protection. The Corps estimated it would need an additional
$4.1 billion to upgrade all of the floodwalls and raise levees to meet
the new standard by 2010. The Corps' estimate included $2.5 billion to
raise the height of levees in all of the New Orleans area, except for
lower Plaquemines Parish, in some cases by as much as 7 feet, which
included $900 million to complete other levee work in the area and
upgrade or replace existing I-walls with T-walls. In lower Plaquemines
Parish, the estimated cost to replace all I-walls with T-walls is $1.6
billion.
* As required by the 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act[Footnote 22] and Department of Defense Appropriations Act,[Footnote
23] the Corps is conducting a study of flood control, coastal
restoration, and hurricane protection measures for the southeastern
Louisiana coastal region. The Corps must propose design and technical
requirements to protect the region from a Category 5
hurricane.[Footnote 24] The two laws appropriated a total of $20
million to the Corps for this study. The Corps was required to provide
a preliminary technical report to Congress by June 30, 2006 (which was
issued on July 10, 2006) and a final technical report by December 30,
2007. The final study must consider alternative designs to protect
against a storm surge produced by a Category 5 hurricane originating
from the Gulf of Mexico. According to the Corps, alternatives being
considered include a structural design consisting of a contiguous line
of earthen or concrete walls along southern coastal Louisiana, a
nonstructural alternative involving only environmental or coastal
restoration measures, or a combination of those alternatives. The
Corps' July 2006 preliminary technical report did not specifically
identify which alternatives the Corps would recommend but instead
provided a conceptual framework for both structural and nonstructural
components that should be considered in developing long-term solutions
for the region. Although the cost to provide a Category 5 level of
protection for the southeastern Louisiana coastal region has not yet
been determined, it would be in addition to the over $7 billion already
provided to the Corps in the three emergency supplemental
appropriations discussed in previous sections of this report.
* Finally, the Corps is responding to the findings and recommendations
from the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and its review
of the existing hurricane protection and why it failed. For example,
the task force reported that overtopping and erosion caused most
breaches to levees and floodwalls and recommended armoring to prevent
scour from overtopping, thereby reducing the chance of breaching. As
discussed above, the 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided
$170 million to armor critical areas on levees.
Although the long-term solutions for southeastern Louisiana have not
yet been determined and may not be decided for some time, the Corps is
proceeding with over $7 billion of already authorized repair and
restoration work without a comprehensive strategy to guide its efforts.
Without such a strategy, we believe that the Corps may end up
replicating past missteps, which occurred because it was required to
follow a piecemeal approach to developing the existing hurricane
protection that, according to experts, is not well integrated. For
example, the draft final report issued May 2006 by the investigation
team sponsored by the National Science Foundation stated (1) that there
was a failure to integrate the individual parts of a complex hurricane
system, (2) that insufficient attention was given to creating an
integrated series of components to create a reliable overall system,
and (3) that projects were engineered and constructed in piecemeal
fashion to conform to incremental appropriations. In its June 2006
draft final report, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force
also concluded that hurricane protection systems should be deliberately
designed and built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and
provide consistent levels of protection.
According to the Corps, the technical report due to the Congress in
December 2007 will include the long-range strategy that will provide an
integrated and comprehensive review of flood control, coastal
restoration, and hurricane and storm damage reduction measures for the
southeastern Louisiana region, and the preliminary framework for this
strategy is included in the report provided to the Congress on July 10,
2006. However, according to a senior Corps official, there is currently
no other strategic plan in place to guide its efforts. We are concerned
that the Corps has embarked on a multibillion dollar repair and
construction effort in response to the appropriations it has already
received, without a guiding strategic plan, and appears to be simply
doing whatever it takes to comply with the requirements placed on it by
the Congress and other stakeholders. Consequently, we are concerned
that the Corps is once again, during this interim period, taking an
incremental approach that is based on funding and direction provided
through specific appropriations and is at risk of constructing
redundant or obsolete structures that may be superseded by future
decisions, thereby increasing the overall costs to the federal
government for this project.
During the past 4 years, we reported that the Corps' planning for civil
works projects were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations
and used invalid assumptions and outdated data.[Footnote 25] We
recommended, and the Corps agreed, that an external peer review of its
plans and decisions was needed, especially for high risk and costly
proposed projects. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Corps
established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and used
the task force's findings and lessons learned to improve its
engineering practices and policies to provide hurricane protection.
However, the task force is set to dissolve once its final report is
released in September 2006, and the Corps has not indicated that it
plans to establish another similar body to help guide its interim
repair and restoration efforts, monitor progress, or provide expert
advice.
Conclusions:
Following Hurricane Katrina--one of the largest natural disasters in
U.S. history--the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly repaired and restored
almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control
structures to prehurricane levels of protection in time for the start
of the 2006 hurricane season. Now that these urgent repairs have been
completed, the Corps is beginning to implement a variety of other plans
to make many additional repairs and enhancements to existing
southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects that may cost
billions of dollars and take years to complete. Further, additional
enhancements are being considered to increase the overall level of
protection for the area to protect against even larger hurricanes that
may add many billions of dollars and many years to the scope of the
Corps efforts.
Currently, the Corps does not know what ultimate level of protection
will be authorized for southeastern Louisiana and therefore cannot make
strategic decisions about which components of a hurricane protection
system will most effectively provide the required level of protection.
Nonetheless, the Corps has been appropriated over $7 billion to
continue repairs and construction on five existing hurricane protection
projects in the area. However, it does not have a comprehensive
strategy to guide these efforts and appears to be simply doing whatever
it takes to comply with the requirements placed on it by the Congress
and other stakeholders. We believe that taking such an incremental and
piecemeal approach for such a complex and expensive repair and
restoration project is imprudent and that, even for these interim
repairs and enhancements, the Corps should be fully considering project
interrelationships to avoid unnecessary duplication and redundancy, and
to reduce federal costs. We also believe that relying on an independent
body like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force to help
guide and oversee this process will help ensure that the Corps obtains
objective and reliable support as it implements these authorized
enhancements to the existing hurricane protection projects.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to construct a hurricane protection system that provides the
appropriate level of protection to southeastern Louisiana and ensures
the most efficient use of federal resources, we are making the
following two recommendations:
The Army Corps of Engineers should develop (1) a comprehensive strategy
that includes an integrated approach for all projects and plans for
rebuilding and strengthening the system and (2) an implementation plan
that will achieve the specific level of protection in a cost-effective
manner, within a reasonable time frame.
The Army Corps of Engineers should establish an evaluative organization
like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, to assist in
its efforts in developing a strategic plan, monitoring progress, and
providing expert advice for constructing a stronger and well-integrated
hurricane protection system.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD)
for its review and comment. In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD
concurred with our first recommendation that the Army Corps of
Engineers develop (1) a comprehensive strategy to integrate projects
and plans for rebuilding and strengthening hurricane protection and (2)
an implementation plan that will provide a specific level of protection
in a cost-effective manner within a reasonable time frame. DOD
partially concurred with our second recommendation that the Army Corps
of Engineers establish an evaluative organization to assist in its
efforts to develop a strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide
expert advice for constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane
protection system, because it believes that a body like the Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force is not the proper mechanism for this
work. According to DOD, the Corps will rely on three teams of experts
to plan and monitor the construction of a hurricane protection system.
First, an independent technical review person or team will identify,
explain, and comment on the assumptions underlying the Corps' economic,
engineering, and environmental analyses for each project, and evaluate
the soundness of Corps' models and planning methods. Second, the team
currently reviewing flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane
and storm damage reduction measures for the southeastern Louisiana
region will assist the Corps in developing a strategic plan for
constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection
system. Lastly, the Corps has assembled a Federal Principals Group
consisting of senior leaders from federal agencies to guide the
development of a comprehensive plan and monitor implementation of the
plan. We believe that the Corps' proposal to use three external groups
of experts satisfies the spirit of our recommendation. DOD's comments
are included in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available, at no charge, on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Anu Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable James M. Inhofe:
Chairman:
The Honorable James M. Jeffords:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Environment and Public Works:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable David L. Hobson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department Of The Army:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Civil Works:
108 Army Pentagon:
Washington DC 20310-0108:
Aug 21 2006:
Ms. Anu K. Mittal:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
"Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future
Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs," dated July 28, 2006 (GAO
CODE 360655/GAO 06-934). Comments on the draft report are enclosed.
Without endorsing the findings of your draft report, I generally agree
with the recommendations that are included. However, I am concerned
that the findings and conclusions do not adequately represent how the
emergency need, strategic planning, and technical challenges go hand in
hand in determining the best path forward. It is still an emergency
situation along the Gulf Coast and the Corps of Engineers is moving
forthright to re-establish lines of defense.' I am extremely confident
that the repair, restoration, and strengthening of the risk reduction
measures for the greater New Orleans area are incorporating findings of
independent review groups and assessing modifications that may be
needed for the projects to function as an integrated, holistic system.
The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LaCPR) effort is also
identifying risk reduction measures that can form a system that will
provide enhanced protection of coastal communities and infrastructure
and restore coastal ecosystems. The existing measures of repair and
strengthening are essential to the ultimate survival of one of the
Nation's great cities and will be integrated components of the holistic
system.
Very truly yours,
Signed by:
John Paul Woodley, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works):
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report Dated July 28, 2006 GAO-06-934 (GAO Codes 360655):
"Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed To Guide Future
Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Army Corps of Engineers
develop (a) a comprehensive strategy that includes an integrated
approach for all projects and plans for rebuilding and strengthening
the system; and (b) an implementation plan that will achieve the
specific level of protection in a cost-effective manner, within a
reasonable timeframe. (p. 41/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. The Corps is actively developing a comprehensive
watershed strategy for hurricane and storm risk reduction for coastal
Louisiana and Mississippi. We will ensure the measures for rebuilding
and strengthening the hurricane projects funded with recent
appropriations are integrated into the comprehensive system. This work
is part of an existing project management plan that identifies the
tasks, schedule, and resources required to implement the system repair
and strengthening in the most timely and cost-effective manner.
The Corps has also developed a corporate framework that not only
incorporates lessons learned in restoring hurricane and storm damage
reduction in New Orleans, but for application in its nationwide program
as well. The Corps is committed to comprehensively design, construct,
maintain, and update its systems with full participation of all
stakeholders. The Corps will develop a more comprehensive,
probabilistic method for planning and design of systems that considers
a broader variety of storm characteristics and storm generated
conditions. As part of this comprehensive framework, the Corps will
provide optimized engineered systems with integrated structural and non-
structural risk reduction solutions, across the range of probabilistic
levels of protection. The Corps is committed to continually reassess
design standards, rigorously apply internal quality assurance and
quality control reviews and implement an independent peer review
process of appropriate planning and design documents, and make
organizational changes throughout its programs to better plan,
engineer, construct, operate, maintain, and manage its systems. The
Corps is further committed to inform and facilitate a national dialog
with stakeholders and public professionals on establishing public
protection guidelines, or risk and reliability tolerances, for
engineered systems. In the research arena, the Corps will focus its
efforts to improve the resilience of structures, to seek new knowledge
and capabilities for updating design criteria, and to discover new
approaches for creating adaptive planning and design capabilities and
products.
Further, the Corps has developed a long range strategy that integrates
and capitalizes on the latest results of the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force (IPET), the American Society of Civil Engineers'
(ASCE) External Review Panel (ERP), and National Academies review. This
is being incorporated with the Louisiana Coastal Protection and
Restoration (LACPR) effort currently underway. This effort will be a
comprehensive review of flood control, coastal restoration, and
hurricane and storm damage reduction measures for the Louisiana coastal
region, resulting in a technical report to Congress due in December
2007. A preliminary report was furnished to Congress in July 2006.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Army Corps of Engineers
establish an evaluative organization like the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force, to assist in its efforts in developing a
strategic plan, monitoring progress, and providing expert advice for
constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection
system. (p. 41/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Corps of Engineers is currently
assembling an external peer review group to assist in the evaluation of
the recently funded repairs and modifications to the hurricane
protection system and to assist in guiding the development of the
comprehensive system plan. The expertise to advise the strategic
planning can be brought to bear without establishing another
organization.
The Corps of Engineers values the analyses and assistance being
provided by the IPET as well as that of other external and independent
evaluation groups. While the IPET is providing scientific and
engineering answers to questions about the performance of the New
Orleans hurricane and flood protection system during Hurricane Katrina
it is also advising other ongoing efforts including the repair and
strengthening of the system and the investigation of measures that
could potentially improve the level of risk reduction. While the IPET
is a successful example of the independent technical review (ITR)
process that the Corps of Engineers currently employs for its projects,
we do not believe it is the proper mechanism for this project.
ITR is an ongoing part of the Corps' project development process
intended to confirm that technical work is done in accordance with
clearly established professional principles, practices, codes and
criteria. This typically includes but is not limited to: economic and
environmental assumptions and projections, evaluation data, economic
analyses, environmental analyses, engineering analyses (including
hydrology and hydraulics, geotechnical, and structural analyses),
methods for integrating risk and uncertainty and for conducting trade-
offs, and the use of models in the evaluation of engineering, economic
and environmental effects. A qualified person or team not involved in
the day-to-day technical work supporting the development of the project
performs ITR, including experts from other agencies, universities and
consultants. Due to the potential risk and the magnitude of the
hurricane protection system, an external peer review by a qualified
team outside of the Corps will be conducted to identify, explain and
comment upon assumptions that underlie economic, engineering, and
environmental analyses, as well as to evaluate the soundness of models
and planning methods.
The Corps of Engineers is also employing a wide array of experts in the
strategic planning as part of the LACPR effort. The Corps and the State
of Louisiana have assembled a team of expert scientists and engineers
from more than 30 organizations including universities, private firms,
environmental organizations, State and Federal governmental agencies,
and international groups.
We have also assembled a Federal Principals Group consisting of senior
leaders of the applicable Federal agencies to both guide the
development of our comprehensive watershed plan and monitor
implementation of the plan. The purpose of the project is to identify
risk reduction measures that can be integrated to form a system that
will provide enhanced protection of coastal communities and
infrastructure, as well as for restoration of coastal ecosystems. The
scope of the project is to address the full range of flood control,
coastal restoration, and hurricane protection measures available,
including those needed to provide comprehensive "Category 5"
protection. In addition to the experts on the team, a separate team of
experts from the Corps' Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction Center of
Expertise as well as an external group of experts are providing
support.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Anu Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Edward Zadjura, Assistant
Director; John Delicath, James Dishmon, Doreen Feldman, Christine Frye,
John Kalmar, Carol Kolarik and Omari Norman made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] 33 U.S.C. § 701n(a)(1).
[2] Developed in 1969, the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1 to 5
rating based on a hurricane's maximum sustained winds. For example, a
Category 5 hurricane has wind speeds greater than 155 miles per hour.
Prior to this scale, the Corps built systems designed to withstand a
"standard project hurricane." For some of the projects in southeastern
Louisiana this was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 storm
with winds from 111 to 130 miles per hour. A standard project hurricane
was assumed to strike the Louisiana coast once every 200 to 300 years.
[3] Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761 (Dec. 30, 2005).
[4] An L-wall is similar to a T-wall except that the horizontal
concrete base and diagonal steel beams are only on the landward side of
the wall.
[5] 33 U.S.C. § 701n.
[6] 33 C.F.R. §§ 203.44-203.45.
[7] 33 C.F.R. § 203.49(b)(1).
[8] There have been four emergency supplemental appropriations in
response to Hurricane Katrina. The first emergency supplemental
appropriation, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988 (Sept. 2, 2005), was
used to fund, among other things, other Corps emergency missions, such
as unwatering. The Corps did not use the appropriation to repair levees
destroyed or damaged by the storm. The second, third and fourth
emergency supplementals appropriated funds to the Corps to repair and
rebuild damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.
[9] Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate
Needs from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
62, 119 Stat. 1990, 1991 (Sept. 8, 2005).
[10] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs
Arising from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-61, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761-2763 (Dec. 30, 2005).
[11] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234; 120
Stat. 418, 453-455 (June 15, 2006).
[12] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120
Stat. 418, 454 (June 15, 2006).
[13] Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency dried and cleaned some flooded pumps and motors in an
effort to quickly restore prehurricane pumping capacity to the region.
[14] Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077.
[15] Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 401, 100 Stat. 4082, 4128.
[16] Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077.
[17] A 10-year flood means there is a 10 percent annual chance of
flood.
[18] Pub. L. No. 104-46, § 108, 109 Stat. 402, 408.
[19] Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 533, 110 Stat. 3658, 3775.
[20] Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1184.
[21] Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418, 453-55 (June 15, 2006).
[22] Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2247 (Nov. 19, 2005).
[23] Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761 (Dec. 30, 2005).
[24] Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 5009, 119 Stat. 2680, 2814 (amending Pub.
L. No. 109-103).
[25] GAO, Corps of Engineers: Observations on Planning and Project
Management Processes for the Civil Works Program, GAO-06-529T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
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