In the past three weeks, Netflix has cancelled two of its original series (“Sense8” and “The Get Down”) after canceling only five series from 2013-2017. These cancellations come on the heels of executives’ comments about needing a better return on investment.

When taken together, it’s clear Netflix NFLX, +0.41% is beginning to acknowledge the challenging economics of producing original content, just as we warned in April 2016. Creating successful original content is very costly and very hit-or-miss. The surfacing of this ugly truth could be a catalyst for more investors to question the viability of Netflix’s business model and to send its shares to a more rational level, which is close to $50 according to our reverse discounted cash flow modeling scenarios and about one-third the level of where they trade today.

Content costs continue to outpace revenue growth

Apart from the two cancellations, Netflix’s streaming content obligations continue to grow faster than revenue. We first warned about Netflix’s alarming streaming-content obligation growth in 2014. Since then, the issue has only worsened as free cash flow has fallen further.

Since 2010, content obligations have grown 42% compounded annually while revenue has grown 24% compounded annually, per Figure 1. At the end of the first quarter of 2017, content obligations totaled $15.3 billion and have grown faster than revenue year over year in six of the past seven years. Netflix Chief Content Officer Ted Sarandos recognized this issue when he stated “a big expensive show for a tiny audience is hard, even in our model, to make that work very long.”

Cash burn compounds obligation growth issues

As Netflix’s content obligations increase, its free cash flow (FCF) only grows more negative. Since 2010, the last year Netflix generated positive FCF (and first year it began increasing its content library), Netflix has burned through a cumulative $6.4 billion in cash, per Figure 2.

Membership growth can’t offset costly content

Netflix could certainly justify the massive content costs were it rapidly expanding its membership base. One could argue that membership growth (and subsequent revenue) more than offsets the costs of creating original content. However, Netflix’s membership growth rates, both domestically and abroad, have been slowing for quite some time.

Per Figure 3, international members grew 39% year over year in the first quarter of 2017, down from 65% in the first quarter of 2016 and 78% in the first quarter of 2014. Similarly, domestic members grew 8% year over year in the first quarter of 2017, down from 13% in the first quarter of 2016 and 22% in the first quarter of 2014.

Competition is breaking Netflix’s business model

When we first placed Netflix in the Danger Zone in November 2013, we focused on two competitors in the streaming video segment: Amazon Prime and Hulu. Since then, the streaming video market has grown dramatically, and Netflix has lost much of its early-mover advantage, as we detailed in July 2016. Today, the market is highly fragmented with competitors offering live TV bundles, original content, and exclusive access to content from certain movie studios to attract customers. A non-exhaustive list of competitors can be seen below:

Verizon Go90

CBS All Access

Hulu

Amazon Prime Video

Starz

Showtime

HBO Now

Sling TV

DIRECTV NOW

PlayStation Vue

The increase in competition leaves limited pricing power, a linchpin for the viability of Netflix. Without pricing power, Netflix can’t afford to continue to do all the things that have helped management hype the stock, such as invest in growing original content, attracting new members and maintaining its large content library.

As we have written for some time, investors won’t tolerate huge cash flow losses forever. The recent revelations about not being able to afford to continue to invest in original content indicate that key investors are, in fact, losing patience and aren’t as willing to continue to fund the company’s large cash losses. Accordingly, all investors, not just the bankers and insiders, should beware, especially since the valuation of the stock has yet to recognize the cracks in the Netflix bull thesis.

Netflix valuation remains unrealistically optimistic

Now that investors are beginning to acknowledge the true economics of Netflix’s business, the time to value Netflix based on fundamentals has arrived. Netflix investors should be afraid, very afraid.

The future cash flow expectations embedded in the stock price make Netflix one of the most overvalued stocks in the market. Here’s why:

To further illustrate just how overvalued Netflix remains, we quantify three scenarios for the improvement in margins, subscribers, and/or revenue that is required to justify the current stock price of $152. For reference, Netflix currently has just under 99 million paying subscribers, and there are 248 million potential subscribers (people 18 and above) in the United States.

Scenario 2: If we assume that Netflix adopts a strategy that improves margins by doubling prices at the expense of revenue growth, the current expectations are still overly optimistic. If Netflix can increase pretax margins to 13.2% (which was the highest in company history, reached in 2010), and grow revenue by 12% (half the five-year average), the company must grow NOPAT by 16% compounded annually for 28 years to justify its current price. In this scenario, Netflix would be generating over $186 billion in revenue 28 years from now, which at double current subscription prices implies the company would have 776 million subscribers.

Scenario 3: Even if we assume Netflix is able to drastically improve margins through price increases without any impact on revenue growth, shares are still overvalued. If Netflix can achieve 13.2% pretax margins and grow revenue by consensus estimates for 2017 and 2018 and by 23% thereafter, the company must grow NOPAT by 37% compounded annually for the next decade to justify the current price. In this scenario, Netflix would generate over $70 billion in revenue 10 years from now, which at double current subscription prices implies the company would have 239 million subscribers, nearly triple its current user base.

Each of these scenarios also assumes Netflix is able to grow revenue and NOPAT without spending on working capital or fixed assets, an assumption that is unlikely, but allows us to create unquestionably optimistic scenarios. For reference, the company’s invested capital has grown on average $1.4 billion (15% of 2016 revenue) a year over the last five years.

Clearly, the current valuation of Netflix implies a future cash flow stream that even the strongest of business models would be challenged to achieve. Given the flaws in Netflix’s business and the market’s increasing awareness of them, investors are taking imprudent risk with the stock at anywhere close to its current valuation.

David Trainer is the CEO of New Constructs, an equity research firm that uses machine learning and natural language processing to parse corporate filings and model economic earnings. Kyle Guske II is an investment analyst at New Constructs.