Excerpt:tenancy - jurisdiction - sections 36 (1) and 100 (18) of bombay tenancy and agricultural lands (vidarbha region) act, 1958 - respondent dispossessed from land which he owned on lease - claimed repossession - tribunal directed applicant to deliver possession to respondent - petition challenging jurisdiction of tribunal - proceedings were under section 36 and partook in nature of restitution process initiated by tenant - if process can answer the exercise of power by 'tehsildar' under section 100 (18) then not only an appeal but even a revision would be competent - petition dismissed on lack of merit.
- - the process was merely that of restitution and doing away with the wrong caused by an order which was the wrong caused by an order which was not more good......that when under an order made by tahsildar, a party who was not entitled had entered upon the land, the tahsildar is endowed with express and eminent obligation to restore back the possession to the party from whom such possession was taken under whom such possession was taken under his order. thus viewed, the proceedings were very much under section 36 of the act itself and merely partook in the nature of restitution process initiated by the tenant. 8. no exception can be taken, therefore, to the order made by7 the tribunal and there was no need to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the tribunal itslef. it the process can answer the exercise of the power by the tahsildar under section 100 (18) of the act, then not only an appeal but even a revision would be competent. in that view.....

Judgment:ORDER

1. A short question is raised by the petitioner in this case upon admitted facts that the respondent is the landholder of survey No. 3/3, area 7 acres and 13 gunthas, of village Dombala, tahsil Daryapur, district Amravati.

2. It was the allegation of the petitioner that he was in possession as lessee of this filed for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 and that he was dispossessed on June 30, 1955.

3. Therefore, he filed an application under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, under Section 19 (2) read with Section 9 (6) for repossession the land claiming a status that he was a protected lessee as contemplated by the Act. Those proceedings were terminated by the Writ petition in this High Court being Special Civil Application No. 173 of 1966 and the claim of the petitioner Bajirao was negatived and he was found not to be a protected lessee and as such not entitled to repossess the land.

4. During the pendency of those proceedings, the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, became applicable and those proceedings wer tried as is admitted by the parties under Section 36 (1) of the Act. It is further not in depute that the petitioner entered upon the land under an order made by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Daryapur, under Section 19 (2) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act and those orders were later on set aside and ultimately, the petitioner was found not to be entitled to repossess the land.

5. After that litigation ended, it appears that the respondent moved an application before the authority purporting to be one under Section 36 of the present Act. The Tahsildar granted that application restoring possession to the respondent. In an appeal, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Daryapur reversed that order on the ground that the orders made in the earkuer proceedings did not direct handing over the possession to the respondent. When the matter went before the Tribunal the Tribunal treated that as if this was a revision arising out of the proceedings taken under Section 106 and following that line of reasoning came to the conclusion that no revision would be tenable but there was inherent power in the Tribunal to make justice and that is how the possession was directed to be delivered to the respondent.

6. In this Court, therefore, the complaint is that this order is all without jurisdiction because this has been ordered as if in execution proceedings by the Tribunal and there is ample authority for the proposition that no revision lies in view of the decision of this Court reported in Sitya Dewaji v. M.R.T. (1970 Maha LJ 13 = Special Civil Application No. 488 of 1969 decided on 16-1-1970).

7. This controversy can be settled by only observing that this need not have been treated as proceedings initiated by the respondent in execution proceedings by the respondent in execution under Section 106 of the Act. As the facts indicate what had happened was that under an order of the authority which is referable now to provisions of Section 36 (1), the petitioner entered upon the land and when the order was revoked or set aside it was the primary jurisdiction of that authority to recall the possession delivered and put the other party in possession who was entitled to it but was ousted because of an order of the Court which was not set aside in the same said proceedings. The process was merely that of restitution and doing away with the wrong caused by an order which was the wrong caused by an order which was not more good. Amongst other things, the duties of Tahsildar are enumerated in Section 100 of the Act and by Clause 18 thereof, it is one of his duties to take measures for putting the tenant or the landholder into possession of the land and it can be assumed that when under an order made by Tahsildar, a party who was not entitled had entered upon the land, the Tahsildar is endowed with express and eminent obligation to restore back the possession to the party from whom such possession was taken under whom such possession was taken under his order. Thus viewed, the proceedings were very much under Section 36 of the Act itself and merely partook in the nature of restitution process initiated by the tenant.

8. No exception can be taken, therefore, to the order made by7 the Tribunal and there was no need to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal itslef. It the process can answer the exercise of the power by the Tahsildar under Section 100 (18) of the Act, then not only an appeal but even a revision would be competent. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed with costs.