No sooner had Nawaz
Sharief won the elections in Pakistan, politicians in Kashmir rushed to put up
billboards screaming ‘we seek resolution of Kashmir.’ But behind these
declarations of ‘we hope the peace processes is restarted’ lies a contrary
will. While these politicians, for the sake of convenience are apt in shifting
the responsibility of the ‘peace process’ beyond the borders of Kashmir, in
reality the achievement of such noble goals may not be in their professional
interests.

The disenchantment
(and the conflict) in Kashmir began decades ago, not only against Indian
machinations here, forced by a military arm, but also against a political
system which aided these machinations, by providing them a cover of legitimacy.
By forcing a political paralysis and institutional decay in Kashmir, it was New
Delhi only, in league with its well-groomed local political elites, which
turned political discontent into a popular separatist uprising. And such a
political system exclusively survived on being subservient to political
manipulations executed in New Delhi, which not only fueled this
conflict but also reinforced the disenfranchisement of the common people. In
such a scenario, would a political resolution or any ‘peace processes’ in
Kashmir, be in favour of those politicians who survive on the continuity of the
conflict here?

Balraj Puri claims
that in 1953 he advised Jawaharlal Nehru to extend political freedoms in
Kashmir. Nehru apparently replied “we have gambled at the international stage
on Kashmir, we cannot afford to lose it. At the moment, we are there at the
point of the bayonet. Till things improve, democracy and morality can wait.”
(Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 46)

The same political
tools in Kashmir controlled by New Delhi have been used to stealthily force
economic subjugation, political deniability and social engineering here.
Political parties, which include both pro Delhi units and the ‘political
convenience conflict shops’ that were setup during the conflict in Kashmir, would
be decimated in any free and fair democratic exercise and will surely want no
political settlement that ensures such fair processes or resolution.

Since the conflict
in Kashmir is not only about political demands, but also about (and against)
the colossal war crimes committed here against civilians, a resolution has to
be addressed not only at the political level but also in the context of local
governance. While a political settlement should include tripartite
participation (India, Pakistan & Kashmir) the local political setup that
has always claimed to be in power for ‘governance issues only’ (yet
conveniently harps on the ‘peace process’ rhetoric), fails to address the
problem where it can. Not only has this political power failed to deliver justice
to common citizens for crimes committed against them by organs of the state,
this denial of justice is often seen as deliberate. And more often than not,
the same state political apparatus has been seen to promote suppression on the
ground, and involved in the trampling of human rights.

What talk of ‘peace
process’ and ‘conflict resolution’ by politicians whose oppressive tools for
extending this conflict (like AFSPA & PSA) remain intact and in practice?
Does conflict resolution not also mean restoration of civil liberties and
respect of human rights? Is it possible to have ‘conflict resolution’ when
political classes extend this ‘conflict’ by sustaining the reasons that fueled the
conflict in the first place? And how meaningful is a trumpeted ‘democratic’
process that claims to have people ‘elect’ the same set of political powers
that are responsible for their present plight? It has been often observed that
in conflict areas, the occupying power, in order to strengthen its grip and
oppress any dissent, often creates a political oligarchy presented as
‘democratic change’. And since these oligarchies thrive on political
arrangements with the dominant power, would not the resolution of conflict be
against their interests? What solution to the conflict can such political
forces offer, except for maintaining and enforcing a status quo? But if the
status quo was any solution, why clamor about any ‘peace process’ and
‘resolution’ rhetoric?

The same
politicians who can’t stop talking about ‘justice and reconciliation’ in
Kashmir are the ones who have failed to provide any justice in a single case
related to the thousands ofmissing
or disappeared young men or the numerous extrajudicial killings. Ironically not
only have such ‘managed’ political arrangements weakened India’s case in
Kashmir, they have also utterly failed to justify its claims of identifying
with the common people on ground. And in spite of the overwhelming military
presence of India in Kashmir and an identified political class, nothing has
been able to change the disputed nature of Kashmir nor has it been able to
improve (or rescue) India’s relationship here.

Even while India
may present ‘democratic’ changes in Kashmir over electoral periods, in ‘embedded and controlled’ democracy there can be a
constant change of political elites but this ‘change’ will not cascade into any
real change on ground, where the clamor for ‘political resolution’ and
‘conflict justice’ shall continue.

The first step to
any peace process does not lie in Islamabad or New Delhi; it lies in the
corridors of power in Srinagar (which is paradoxically controlled by New
Delhi). It lies in allowing political dissidence, not in muting them behind
armed barricades, nor in denying them their civil, political and religious
rights. Anysuppression of people’s political, social, cultural or
economic interests by a political power can only delay a revolutionary change,
not deny it.

The observation of
Sir Francis Younghusband in 1909 about Kashmiris“The name of the “owner” was
entered, but “owner” is really an incorrect term, for all land in the Kashmir
valley is “owned” by the State'. The actual holders have a right of occupancy
as against the State as long as they pay its dues, and are practically
sub-proprietors; but they have no right of alienation or mortgage”stands true even today, albeit for
political and economic ownership's here. Now the ‘political
ownership’ is manipulated and controlled by the New Delhi (who replaced the
Maharaja earlier) and the economic ‘ownership’ of Kashmir has been sublet to
arms of New Delhi (like the NHPC) and by the tactic approval of the same
political arrangements that India has been enforcing in Kashmir.

New Delhi and
Islamabad can deliberate and agree upon a resolution mechanism only if Kashmris
are onboard. But such efforts cannot override the need for justice for the
victims of this conflict and the responsibility of local ‘political powers’ in
dispensing this justice. Having consciously denied justice to all victims of
the conflict in Kashmir and having led an apparatus that only extended such
crimes, what logic does it serve to look up to Islamabad for peace?

Justice Rajindar
Sachar after one of his visits to Kashmir (1993) is reported to have remarked
publicly“ I do not know how
and in what manner the Kashmir question will be solved with its nuances of
Azadi (freedom), plebiscite and greater autonomy. But one thing is certain and
that is India will remain the loser unless the face that it presents to the
people of Kashmir valley is humane, compassionate and understanding. At present
the face is ugly and insensitive”

Not only has this
face become uglier since then, but those hands hidden in gloves have had more
innocent blood on them. And it is this face that India needs to look in the
mirror before looking up to Islamabad.

Srinagar

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