The unworkabwe command and controw structure of separate U.S. miwitary speciaw operations forces (SOF), which wed to de faiwure of Operation Eagwe Cwaw in 1980, highwighted de need widin de Department of Defense for reform and reorganization, uh-hah-hah-hah. Since de incident, de Army Chief of Staff, Generaw Edward C. "Shy" Meyer, cawwed for a furder restructuring of speciaw operations capabiwities, eventuawwy hewping to create de U.S. Dewta Force.[8] Awdough unsuccessfuw at de joint wevew, Meyer neverdewess went on to consowidate Army SOF units under de new 1st Speciaw Operations Command in 1982, a significant step to improve de U.S. Army's SOF.

By 1983, dere was a smaww but growing sense in de Congress for de need for miwitary reforms. In June, de Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began a two-year-wong study of de Defense Department, which incwuded an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator Barry Gowdwater (R-AZ). Wif concern mounting on Capitow Hiww, de Department of Defense created de Joint Speciaw Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; dis agency, however, had neider operationaw nor command audority over any SOF.[9][10] The Joint Speciaw Operations Agency dus did wittwe to improve SOF readiness, capabiwities, or powicies, and derefore was insufficient. Widin de Defense Department, dere were a few staunch SOF supporters. Noew Koch, Principaw Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internationaw Security Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rywander, bof advocated SOF reforms.[11]

At de same time, a few on Capitow Hiww were determined to overhauw United States Speciaw Operations Forces. They incwuded Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Wiwwiam Cohen (R-ME), bof members of de Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniew (D-VA), de chairman of de United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Congressman Daniew had become convinced dat de U.S. miwitary estabwishment was not interested in speciaw operations, dat de country's capabiwity in dis area was second rate, and dat SOF operationaw command and controw was an endemic probwem.[11] Senators Nunn and Cohen awso fewt strongwy dat de Department of Defense was not preparing adeqwatewy for future dreats. Senator Cohen agreed dat de U.S. needed a cwearer organizationaw focus and chain of command for speciaw operations to deaw wif wow-intensity confwicts.[9]

In October 1985, de Senate Armed Services Committee pubwished de resuwts of its two-year review of de U.S. miwitary structure, entitwed "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."[12] Mr. James R. Locher III, de principaw audor of dis study, awso examined past speciaw operations and specuwated on de most wikewy future dreats. This infwuentiaw document wed to de Gowdwater-Nichows Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.[13][14] By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform biwws in bof houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced de Senate biww, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and oders, which cawwed for a joint miwitary organization for SOF and de estabwishment of an office in de Defense Department to ensure adeqwate funding and powicy emphasis for wow-intensity confwict and speciaw operations.[15] Representative Daniew's proposaw went even furder—he wanted a nationaw speciaw operations agency headed by a civiwian who wouwd bypass de Joint Chiefs and report directwy to de Secretary of Defense; dis wouwd keep Joint Chiefs and de Services out of de SOF budget process.[10]

Congress hewd hearings on de two biwws in de summer of 1986. Admiraw Wiwwiam J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of de Joint Chiefs of Staff, wed de Pentagon's opposition to de biwws. He proposed, as an awternative, a new Speciaw Operations Forces command wed by a dree-star generaw. This proposaw was not weww received on Capitow Hiww—Congress wanted a four-star generaw in charge to give SOF more cwout. A number of retired miwitary officers and oders testified in favor of de need for reform.[11] By most accounts, retired Army Major Generaw Richard Schowtes gave de most compewwing reasons for change. Schowtes, who commanded de joint speciaw operations task force in Grenada, expwained how conventionaw force weaders misused SOF during de operation, not awwowing dem to use deir uniqwe capabiwities, which resuwted in high SOF casuawties. After his formaw testimony, Schowtes met privatewy wif a smaww number of Senators to ewaborate on de probwems dat he had encountered in Grenada.[16]

Bof de House and Senate passed SOF reform biwws, and dese went to a conference committee for reconciwiation, uh-hah-hah-hah. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The biww cawwed for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star generaw for aww SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Speciaw Operations and Low-Intensity Confwict, a coordinating board for wow-intensity confwict widin de Nationaw Security Counciw, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (de so-cawwed "SOF checkbook").[17][18] The finaw biww, attached as a rider to de 1987 Defense Audorization Act, amended de Gowdwater-Nichows Act and was signed into waw in October 1986. Congress cwearwy intended to force DOD and de Administration to face up to de reawities of past faiwures and emerging dreats. DOD and de Administration were responsibwe for impwementing de waw, and Congress subseqwentwy had to pass two additionaw biwws to ensure proper impwementation, uh-hah-hah-hah.[11] The wegiswation promised to improve SOF in severaw respects. Once impwemented, MFP-11 provided SOF wif controw over its own resources, better enabwing it to modernize de force. Additionawwy, de waw fostered interservice cooperation: a singwe commander for aww SOF promoted interoperabiwity among de forces assigned to de same command. The estabwishment of a four-star Commander in Chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Speciaw Operations and Low Intensity Confwict eventuawwy gave SOF a voice in de highest counciws of de Defense Department.[17]

Impwementing de provisions and mandates of de Nunn-Cohen Amendment to de Nationaw Defense Audorization Act for Fiscaw Year 1987, however, was neider rapid nor smoof. One of de first issues to surface was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC), whose principaw duties incwuded monitorship of speciaw operations activities and wow-intensity confwict activities of de Department of Defense. The Congress even increased de number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but de Department of Defense stiww did not fiww dis new biwwet. In December 1987, de Congress directed Secretary of de ArmyJohn O. Marsh to carry out de ASD (SO/LIC) duties untiw a suitabwe repwacement was approved by de Senate. Not untiw 18 monds after de wegiswation passed did Ambassador Charwes Whitehouse assume de duties of ASD (SO/LIC).[19]

Meanwhiwe, de estabwishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A qwick sowution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abowish an existing command. United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), wif an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viabwe mission in de post Gowdwater-Nichows era, and its Commander in Chief, Generaw James Lindsay, had had some speciaw operations experience. On 23 January 1987, de Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to de Secretary of Defense dat USREDCOM be disestabwished to provide biwwets and faciwities for USSOCOM. President Ronawd Reagan approved de estabwishment of de new command on 13 Apriw 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 Apriw 1987 and nominated Generaw Lindsay to be de first Commander in Chief Speciaw Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him widout debate.[11]

USSOCOM's first tacticaw operation invowved 160f Speciaw Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) ("Night Stawkers") aviators, SEALs, and Speciaw Boat Teams (SBT) working togeder during Operation Earnest Wiww in September 1987. During Operation Earnest Wiww, de United States ensured dat neutraw oiw tankers and oder merchant ships couwd safewy transit de Persian Guwf during de Iran–Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to ask de United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so dat dey couwd be escorted by de U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to de Kuwaiti reqwest on 10 March 1987, hoping it wouwd deter Iranian attacks.[11] The protection offered by U.S. navaw vessews, however, did not stop Iran, which used mines and smaww boats to harass de convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In wate Juwy 1987, Rear Admiraw Harowd J. Bernsen, commander of de Middwe East Force, reqwested NSW assets. Speciaw Boat Teams depwoyed wif six Mark III Patrow Boats and two SEAL pwatoons in August.[11] The Middwe East Force decided to convert two oiw servicing barges, Hercuwes and Wimbrown VII, into mobiwe sea bases. The mobiwe sea bases awwowed SOF in de nordern Persian Guwf to dwart cwandestine Iranian mining and smaww boat attacks.

On 21 September, Nightstawkers fwying MH-60 and Littwe Birds took off from de frigate USS Jarrett to track an Iranian ship, Iran Ajr. The Nightstawkers observed Iran Ajr turn off her wights and begin waying mines. After receiving permission to attack, de hewicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping de ship. As Iran Ajr's crew began to push mines over de side, de hewicopters resumed firing untiw de crew abandoned ship. Speciaw Boat Teams provided security whiwe a SEAL team boarded de vessew at first wight and discovered nine mines on de vessew's deck, as weww as a wogbook reveawing areas where previous mines had been waid. The wogbook impwicated Iran in mining internationaw waters.[11]

Widin a few days, de Speciaw Operations forces had determined de Iranian pattern of activity; de Iranians hid during de day near oiw and gas pwatforms in Iranian waters and at night dey headed toward de Middwe Shoaws Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. Wif dis knowwedge, SOF waunched dree Littwe Bird hewicopters and two patrow craft to de buoy. The Littwe Bird hewicopters arrived first and were fired upon by dree Iranian boats anchored near de buoy. After a short but intense firefight, de hewicopters sank aww dree boats. Three days water, in mid-October, an Iranian Siwkworm missiwe hit de tanker Sea Iswe City near de oiw terminaw outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and de American captain were injured in de missiwe attack.[11][20] During Operation Nimbwe Archer, four destroyers shewwed two oiw pwatforms in de Rostam oiw fiewd. After de shewwing, a SEAL pwatoon and a demowition unit pwanted expwosives on one of de pwatforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a dird pwatform 2 miwes (3 km) away. Documents and radios were taken for intewwigence purposes.

On 14 Apriw 1988, 65 miwes (100 km) east of Bahrain, de frigate USS Samuew B. Roberts hit a mine, bwowing an immense howe in its huww.[21] Ten saiwors were injured. During Operation Praying Mantis de U.S. retawiated fiercewy, attacking de Iranian frigate Sahand and oiw pwatforms in de Sirri and Sassan oiw fiewds.[20] After U.S. warships bombarded de Sirri pwatform and set it abwaze, a UH-60 wif a SEAL pwatoon fwew toward de pwatform but was unabwe to get cwose enough because of de roaring fire. Secondary expwosions soon wrecked de pwatform.[11] Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutraw ships dropped drasticawwy. On 18 Juwy, Iran accepted de United Nations cease fire; on 20 August 1988, de Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrow boats, and hewicopters den returned to de United States.[11] Speciaw operations forces provided criticaw skiwws necessary to hewp CENTCOM gain controw of de nordern Persian Guwf and bawk Iran's smaww boats and minewayers. The abiwity to work at night proved vitaw, because Iranian units used darkness to conceaw deir actions. Additionawwy, because of Earnest Wiww operationaw reqwirements, USSOCOM wouwd acqwire new weapons systems—de patrow coastaw ships and de Mark V Speciaw Operations Craft.[11]

Speciaw Operations Command first became invowved in Somawia in 1992 as part of Operation Provide Rewief. C-130s circwed over Somawi airstrips during dewivery of rewief suppwies. Speciaw Forces medics accompanied many rewief fwights into de airstrips droughout soudern Somawia to assess de area. They were de first U.S. sowdiers in Somawia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported de expanded rewief operations of Restore Hope.[11][22][23] The first teams into Somawia were CIA Speciaw Activities Division paramiwitary officers wif ewements of JSOC. They conducted very high risk advanced force operations prior to de entry of de fowwow on forces. The first casuawty of de confwict came from dis team and was a Paramiwitary officer and former Dewta Force operator name Larry Freedman. Freedman was awarded de Intewwigence Star for "extraordinary heroism" for his actions.[24]

The earwiest missions during Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed severaw hydro-graphic reconnaissance missions to find suitabwe wanding sites for Marines. On 7 December, de SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where dey found suitabwe wanding sites, assessed de area for dreats, and concwuded dat de port couwd support offwoading ships. This was a tough mission because de SEALs swam against a strong current which weft many of dem overheated and exhausted. Furdermore, dey swam drough raw sewage in de harbor, which made dem sick.[11] When de first SEALs hit de shore de fowwowing night, dey were surprised to meet members of de news media. The first Marines came ashore soon dereafter, and de press redirected deir attention to dem. Later, de SEALs provided personaw security for President George Bush during a visit to Somawia.[11][23] In December 1992, Speciaw Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somawia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Speciaw Forces command ewement depwoyed to Mogadishu as de Joint Speciaw Operations Forces-Somawia (JSOFOR) dat wouwd command and controw aww speciaw operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initiaw contact wif indigenous factions and weaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on de area for future rewief and security operations. Before redepwoying in Apriw, JSOFOR ewements drove over 26,000 miwes (42,000 km), captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds (20,560 kg) of expwosives.[11]

In August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed de depwoyment of a Joint Speciaw Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somawia in response to attacks made by Generaw Mohamed Farrah Aidid's supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger, was charged wif a mission named Operation Godic Serpent to capture Aidid. This was an especiawwy arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after severaw Lockheed AC-130 air raids and UN assauwts on his stronghowds.[11][25][26]

Whiwe Marines from de 24f MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and hewicopters from HMM-263), de task force arrived in de country, and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on de Aidid snatch mission, but having de advantage of being in de area for more dan two monds, decided after mission anawysis dat de mission was a "no-go" due to severaw factors, centered around de inabiwity to rescue de crew of a downed hewicopter (re: de indigenous forces techniqwe of using RPGs against hewicopters and bwocking de narrow streets in order to restrict de movement of a ground rescue force). This knowwedge was not passed on to de Rangers, due to de Marines operating from de USS Wasp and de Rangers remaining on wand. TF Ranger was made up of operators from Dewta Force, 75f Ranger Regiment, 160f SOAR, SEALs from de Navaw Speciaw Warfare Devewopment Group, and Air Force speciaw tactics units.[11][25] During August and September 1993, de task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, aww of which were successes. Awdough Aidid remained free, de effect of dese missions seriouswy wimited his movements.[26]

On 3 October, TF Ranger waunched its sevenf mission, dis time into Aidid's stronghowd de Bakara Market to capture two of his key wieutenants. The mission was expected to take onwy one or two hours.[25] Hewicopters carried an assauwt and a ground convoy of security teams waunched in de wate afternoon from de TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingwy heavy fire, more intense dan during previous missions. The assauwt team captured 24 Somawis incwuding Aidid's wieutenants and were woading dem onto de convoy trucks when a MH-60 Bwackhawk was hit by a rocket-propewwed grenade (RPG).[11][26] A smaww ewement from de security force, as weww as an MH-6 assauwt hewicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to de crash site.[11][25][26] The battwe became increasingwy worse. An RPG struck anoder MH-60, crashing wess dan 1 miwe (1.6 km) to de souf of de first downed hewicopter. The task force faced overwhewming Somawi mobs dat overran de crash sites, causing a dire situation, uh-hah-hah-hah.[25] A Somawi mob overran de second site and, despite a heroic defense, kiwwed everyone except de piwot, whom dey took prisoner. Two defenders of dis crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Cwass Randaww Shughart, were posdumouswy awarded de Medaw of Honor.[11][25][26] About dis time, de mission's qwick reaction force (QRF) awso tried to reach de second crash site. This force too was pinned by Somawi fire and reqwired de fire support of two AH-6 hewicopters before it couwd break contact and make its way back to de base.[11]

The assauwt and security ewements moved on foot towards de first crash area, passing drough heavy fire, and occupied buiwdings souf and soudwest of de downed hewicopter. They fought to estabwish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by very heavy enemy fire, whiwe treating deir wounded, and worked to free de piwot's body from de downed hewicopter. Wif de detainees woaded on trucks, de ground convoy force attempted to reach de first crash site. Unabwe to find it amongst de narrow, winding awweyways, de convoy came under devastating smaww arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casuawties, and sustaining substantiaw damage to deir vehicwes.

Reinforcements, consisting of ewements from de QRF, 10f Mountain Division sowdiers, Rangers, SEALs, Pakistan Army tanks and Mawaysianarmored personnew carriers, finawwy arrived at 1:55 am on 4 October. The combined force worked untiw dawn to free de piwot's body, receiving RPG and smaww arms fire droughout de night.[11] Aww de casuawties were woaded onto de armored personnew carriers, and de remainder of de force was weft behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.[25] AH-6 gunships raked de streets wif fire to support de movement. The main force of de convoy arrived at de Pakistani Stadium-compound for de QRF-at 6:30 am,[25] dus concwuding one of de bwoodiest and fiercest urban firefights since de Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a totaw of 17 kiwwed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates pwaced Somawi casuawties above 1,000.[25] Awdough Task Force Ranger's few missions were successes, de overaww outcome of Operation Godic Serpent was deemed a faiwure because of de Task Force's faiwure to compwete deir stated mission, capturing Mohamed Farrah Aidid.[25] Most U.S. forces puwwed out of Somawia by March 1994. The widdrawaw from Somawia, was compweted on March 1995.[11] Even dough Operation Godic Serpent faiwed, USSOCOM stiww made significant contributions to operations in Somawia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveiwwance missions, assisted wif humanitarian rewief, protected American forces and conducted riverine patrows. Additionawwy, dey ensured de safe wanding of de Marines and safeguarded de arrivaw of merchant ships carrying food.[11][20]

USSOCOM's 10f Speciaw Forces Group, ewements of JSOC and CIA/SAD Paramiwitary Officers winked up again and were de first to enter Iraq prior to de invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah. Their efforts organized de Kurdish Peshmerga to defeat Ansar Aw Iswam in Nordern Iraq before de invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah. This battwe was for controw of a territory in Nordeastern Iraq dat was compwetewy occupied by Ansar Aw Iswam, an awwy of Aw Qaeda. This was a very significant battwe and wed to de termination of a substantiaw number of terrorists and de uncovering of a chemicaw weapons faciwity at Sargat. These terrorists wouwd have been in de subseqwent insurgency had dey not been ewiminated during dis battwe. Sargat was de onwy faciwity of its type discovered in de Iraq war. This battwe may have been de Tora Bora of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Aw Qaeda and deir awwy Ansar Aw Iswam.[citation needed] This combined team den wed de Peshmerga against Saddam's nordern Army. This effort kept Saddam's forces in de norf and denied de abiwity to redepwoy to contest de invasion force coming from de souf. This effort may have saved de wives of hundreds if not dousands of coawition service men and women, uh-hah-hah-hah.[27]

At de waunch of de Iraq War dozens of 12-member Speciaw Forces teams infiwtrated soudern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiwes and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of Navy SEALs seized oiw terminaws and pumping stations on de soudern coast.[28]Air Force combat controwwers fwew combat missions in MC-130H Combat Tawon IIs and estabwished austere desert airstrips to begin de fwow of sowdiers and suppwies deep into Iraq. It was a far cry from de Persian Guwf war of 1991, where Speciaw Operations forces were kept wargewy on de sidewines. But it wouwd not be a repway of Afghanistan, where Army Speciaw Forces and Navy SEALs wed de fighting. After deir star turn in Afghanistan, many speciaw operators were disappointed to pway a supporting rowe in Iraq. Many speciaw operators fewt restricted by cautious commanders.[29] From dat point, USSOCOM has since kiwwed or captured hundreds of insurgents and Aw-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted severaw foreign internaw defense missions successfuwwy training de Iraqi security forces.[30][31]

United States Speciaw Operations Command pwayed a pivotaw rowe in fighting de former Tawiban government in Afghanistan in 2001[32] and toppwing it dereafter, as weww as combating de insurgency and capturing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. USSOCOM in 2004 was devewoping pwans to have an expanded and more compwex rowe in de gwobaw campaign against terrorism,[33] and dat rowe continued to emerge before and after de kiwwing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.[34][35] In 2010, "of about 13,000 Speciaw Operations forces depwoyed overseas, about 9,000 [were] evenwy divided between Iraq and Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah."[34]

In de initiaw stages of de War in Afghanistan, USSOCOM forces winked up wif CIA Paramiwitary Officers from Speciaw Activities Division to defeat de Tawiban widout de need for warge-scawe conventionaw forces.[36] This was one of de biggest successes of de gwobaw War on Terrorism.[37] These units winked up severaw times during dis war and engaged in severaw furious battwes wif de enemy. One such battwe happened during Operation Anaconda, de mission to sqweeze wife out of a Tawiban and Aw-Qaeda stronghowd dug deep into de Shah-i-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah. The operation was seen as one of de heaviest and bwoodiest fights in de War in Afghanistan, uh-hah-hah-hah.[38] The battwe on an Afghan mountaintop cawwed Takur Ghar featured speciaw operations forces from aww 4 services and de CIA. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controwwers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Aw-Qaeda fighters atop a 10,000-foot (3,000 m) mountain, uh-hah-hah-hah. Subseqwentwy, de entrenched Tawiban became targets of every asset in de sky. According to an executive summary, de battwe of Takur Ghar was de most intense firefight American speciaw operators have been invowved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were kiwwed in Mogadishu, Somawia, in 1993.[39][40][41] During Operation Red Wings on 28 June 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for hewp. A Chinook hewicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down, uh-hah-hah-hah. Aww members of de rescue team and dree of four SEALs on de ground died. It was de worst woss of wife in Afghanistan since de invasion in 2001. The Navy SEAL Marcus Luttreww awone survived.[42][43] Team weader Michaew P. Murphy was awarded de Medaw of Honor for his actions in de battwe.

SOC chief Owson said in 2011 dat SOCOM "is a microcosm of de Department of Defense, wif ground, air, and maritime components, a gwobaw presence, and audorities and responsibiwities dat mirror de Miwitary Departments, Miwitary Services, and Defense Agencies."[35] In 2010, speciaw operations forces were depwoyed in 75 countries, compared wif about 60 at de beginning of 2009.[34] In 2011, SOC spokesman Cowonew Tim Nye (Army[44]) was reported to have said dat de number of countries wif SOC presence wiww wikewy reach 120 and dat joint training exercises wiww have been carried out in most or aww of dose countries during de year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Bewize, Braziw, Buwgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mawi, Norway, Panama, and Powand in 2010 and awso, drough mid-year 2011, in de Dominican Repubwic, Jordan, Romania, Senegaw, Souf Korea, and Thaiwand, among oder nations. In addition, SOC forces executed de high-profiwe kiwwing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.[35]

In November 2009 The Nation reported on a covert JSOC/Bwackwater anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan, uh-hah-hah-hah.[45]

In 2010, White Housecounterterrorism director John O. Brennan said dat de United States "wiww not merewy respond after de fact" of a terrorist attack but wiww "take de fight to aw-Qaeda and its extremist affiwiates wheder dey pwot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somawia and beyond." Owson said, "In some pwaces, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are wower in profiwe. In every pwace, Speciaw Operations forces activities are coordinated wif de U.S. ambassador and are under de operationaw controw of de four-star regionaw commander."[34]

The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been de subject of internaw U.S. debate, incwuding between representatives of de Bush administration such as John B. Bewwinger III, on one hand, and de Obama administration on anoder. The United Nations in 2010 awso "qwestioned de administration's audority under internationaw waw to conduct such raids, particuwarwy when dey kiww innocent civiwians. One possibwe wegaw justification – de permission of de country in qwestion – is compwicated in pwaces such as Pakistan and Yemen, where de governments privatewy agree but do not pubwicwy acknowwedge approving de attacks," as one report put it.[34]

[46]Joint Speciaw Operations Command (JSOC) is a component command of de USSOCOM and is charged to study speciaw operations reqwirements and techniqwes to ensure interoperabiwity and eqwipment standardization, pwan and conduct speciaw operations exercises and training, and devewop Joint Speciaw Operations Tactics.[1] It was estabwished in 1980 on recommendation of Cow. Charwie Beckwif, in de aftermaf of de faiwure of Operation Eagwe Cwaw.[47]

Units

The U.S. Army's 1st Speciaw Forces Operationaw Detachment-Dewta, popuwarwy known as Dewta Force, is de first of de two counter-terrorism, speciaw mission units dat faww under de Joint Speciaw Operations Command.[48] Modewed after de British Speciaw Air Service, Dewta Force is regarded as one of de premier speciaw operations forces in de worwd.[49] Dewta awso incwudes a stringent training and sewection process. Dewta recruits primariwy from de most proficient and highwy skiwwed sowdiers of de U.S. Army Speciaw Operations Command, awdough it encompasses de capabiwity of recruiting droughout de U.S. Armed Forces.[25][49] Recruits must pass a rigid sewection course before beginning training, known as de Operators' Training Course (OTC). Dewta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and oder tier one SOF and has created a curricuwum based on dis training and techniqwes dat it has devewoped.[49] Dewta conducts cwandestine and covert speciaw operations aww over de worwd.[49] It has de capabiwity to conduct myriad speciaw operations missions but speciawizes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.[25][48][50]

The Intewwigence Support Activity (ISA, The Activity) is de support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to provide Human Intewwigence (HUMINT) and Signaw Intewwigence (SIGINT) mainwy for Dewta and DEVGRU's operations.[48][51] Before de estabwishing of de Strategic Support Branch in 2001, de ISA reqwired de permission of de CIA to conduct covert operations, which considerabwy wessened its effectiveness in its support of JSOC operations as a whowe.[48][52][53]

The U.S. Army's 75f Ranger Regiment: Regimentaw Reconnaissance Company (formerwy known as Regimentaw Reconnaissance Detachment/RRD) is a unit dat has rumored to be de newest operationaw member of de Joint Speciaw Operations Command. The unit is bewieved to have been formawwy invited to join JSOC in 2007 due to its extensive training and uniqwe capabiwities to conduct speciaw reconnaissance and cwose target reconnaissance (CTR) operations.

The U.S. Navy's Navaw Speciaw Warfare Devewopment Group (DEVGRU, SEAL Team Six) is de second of de two counter-terrorism, speciaw mission units dat faww under de Joint Speciaw Operations Command.[48] DEVGRU is de U.S. Navy's counterpart to Dewta, speciawizing in maritime counter-terrorism. DEVGRU recruits de most proficient operators from Navaw Speciaw Warfare, specificawwy de U.S. Navy SEALs. Like Dewta, DEVGRU can conduct a variety of speciaw operations missions, but trains primariwy for maritime counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. DEVGRU has gained prowific notoriety in recent years, due to high-profiwe hostage rescue operations and deir rowe in de kiwwing of Osama Bin Laden. [25][48]

The Air Force 24f Speciaw Tactics Sqwadron (24f STS) is de AFSOC component of JSOC. The 24f STS consists of speciawwy sewected AFSOC personnew, incwuding Pararescuemen, Combat Controwwers, and TACPs. These speciaw operators usuawwy serve wif Dewta Force and DEVGRU, because of de convenience of de 24f STS's abiwity to synchronize and controw de different ewements of air power and enhance air operations deep in enemy territory; As weww as providing needed medicaw assistance in de case of Pararescuemen, uh-hah-hah-hah. [25]

The Joint Communications Unit (JCU) is a technicaw unit of de United States Speciaw Operations Command charged to standardize and ensure interoperabiwity of communication procedures and eqwipment of de Joint Speciaw Operations Command and its subordinate units. The JCU was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC in 1980, after de faiwure of Operation Eagwe Cwaw. The JCU has earned de reputation of "DoD's Finest Communicators". [1]

Portions of JSOC units have made up de constantwy changing speciaw operations task force, operating in de U.S. Centraw Command area of operations. The Task Force 11, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26 and Task Force 145 are creations of de Pentagon's post-11 September campaign against terrorism, and it qwickwy became de modew for how de miwitary wouwd gain intewwigence and battwe insurgents in de future. Originawwy known as Task Force 121, it was formed in de summer of 2003, when de miwitary merged two existing Speciaw Operations units, one hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan, and de oder tracking Sadaam Hussein in Iraq.[54][55]

Speciaw Operations Command – Joint Capabiwities (SOC-JC) was transferred to USSOCOM from de soon to be disestabwished United States Joint Forces Command in 2011. [56] Its primary mission was to train conventionaw and SOF commanders and deir staffs, supports USSOCOM internationaw engagement training reqwirements, and supports impwementation of capabiwity sowutions in order to improve strategic and operationaw Warfighting readiness and joint interoperabiwity. SOC-JC must awso be prepared to support depwoyed Speciaw Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Headqwarters (HQ).

On 1 December 1989 de United States Army Speciaw Operations Command (USASOC) activated as de 16f major Army command. These speciaw operations forces have been America's spearhead for unconventionaw warfare for more dan 40 years. USASOC commands such units as de weww known Speciaw Forces (SF, or de "Green Berets") and de Rangers, and such rewativewy unknown units as de Psychowogicaw Operations Group (PSYOP) and Civiw Affairs Brigade (CA). These are one of de USSOCOM's main weapons for waging unconventionaw warfare and counter-insurgency. The significance of dese units is emphasized as conventionaw confwicts are becoming wess prevawent as insurgent and guerriwwa warfare increases.[58][59]

The 75f Ranger Regiment (U.S. Army Rangers) is de premier wight-infantry unit of de United States Army and is headqwartered at Fort Benning, Georgia. The 75f Ranger Regiment's mission is to pwan and conduct speciaw missions in support of U.S. powicy and objectives.[61] The Rangers are a fwexibwe and rapid-depwoyabwe force. Each battawion can depwoy anywhere in de worwd widin 18 hours notice. The Army pwaces much importance on de 75f Ranger Regiment and its training; it possesses de capabiwities to conduct conventionaw and most speciaw operations missions. Rangers are capabwe of infiwtrating by wand, sea, or air and direct action operations such as conducting raids or assauwting buiwdings or airfiewds.[62]

United States Army Speciaw Forces (SF) aka Green Berets perform severaw doctrinaw missions: unconventionaw warfare, foreign internaw defense, speciaw reconnaissance, direct action and counter-terrorism. These missions make Speciaw Forces uniqwe in de U.S. miwitary, because dey are empwoyed droughout de dree stages of de operationaw continuum: peacetime, confwict and war.[63] Foreign internaw defense operations, SF's main peacetime mission, are designed to hewp friendwy devewoping nations by working wif deir miwitary and powice forces to improve deir technicaw skiwws, understanding of human rights issues, and to hewp wif humanitarian and civic action projects. Speciaw Forces unconventionaw warfare capabiwities provide a viabwe miwitary option for a variety of operationaw taskings dat are inappropriate or infeasibwe for conventionaw forces. Speciaw Forces are de U.S. miwitary's premier unconventionaw warfare force.[64] Foreign internaw defense and unconventionaw warfare missions are de bread and butter of Speciaw Forces sowdiers. For dis reason SF candidates are trained extensivewy in weapons, engineering, communications and medicine. SF sowdiers are taught to be warriors first and teachers second because dey must be abwe to train deir team and be abwe to train deir awwies during a FID or UW mission, uh-hah-hah-hah.[63][65] Often SF units are reqwired to perform additionaw, or cowwateraw, activities outside deir primary missions. These cowwateraw activities are coawition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining and counter-drug operations.[66]

The 160f Speciaw Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stawkers) headqwartered at Fort Campbeww, Kentucky provides aviation support to units widin USSOCOM. The Regiment consists of MH-6 and AH-6 wight hewicopters, MH-60 hewicopters and MH-47 heavy assauwt hewicopters. The capabiwities of de 160f SOAR (A) have been evowving since de earwy 1980s. Its focus on night operations resuwted in de nickname, de "Night Stawkers."[67] The primary mission of de Night Stawkers is to conduct overt or covert infiwtration, exfiwtration, and resuppwy of speciaw operations forces across a wide range of environmentaw conditions.[68]

4f Miwitary Information Support Group (Airborne) and 8f Miwitary Information Support Group (Airborne) Sowdiers use persuasion to infwuence perceptions and encourage desired behavior.[69][70] PSYOP sowdiers supports nationaw objectives at de tacticaw, operationaw and strategic wevews of operations. Strategic psychowogicaw operations advance broad or wong-term objectives; gwobaw in nature, dey may be directed toward warge audiences or at key communicators. Operationaw psychowogicaw operations are conducted on a smawwer scawe. 4f PSYOP Gp is empwoyed by deater commanders to target groups widin de deater of operations. 4f PSYOP Gp purpose can range from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing de battwefiewd for combat. Tacticaw psychowogicaw operations are more wimited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goaws. In dis environment, dese force-enhancing activities serve as a means to wower de morawe and efficiency of enemy forces.[71]

In October 2005, de Secretary of Defense directed de formation of United States Marine Corps Forces Speciaw Operations Command, de Marine component of United States Speciaw Operations Command. It was determined dat de Marine Corps wouwd initiawwy form a unit of approximatewy 2500 to serve wif USSOCOM. On February 24, 2006 MARSOC activated at Camp Lejeune, Norf Carowina. MARSOC initiawwy consisted of a smaww staff and de Foreign Miwitary Training Unit (FMTU), which had been formed to conduct foreign internaw defense. FMTU is now designated as de Marine Speciaw Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG).[75]

As a service component of USSOCOM, MARSOC is tasked by de Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, eqwip, and depwoy responsive U.S. Marine Corps speciaw operations forces worwdwide, in support of combatant commanders and oder agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct foreign internaw defense, direct action and speciaw reconnaissance. MARSOC has awso been directed to devewop a capabiwity in unconventionaw warfare, counter-terrorism, and information operations. MARSOC depwoyed its first units in August 2006, six monds after de group's initiaw activation, uh-hah-hah-hah. MARSOC reached fuww operationaw capabiwity in October 2008.[76]

Units

Marine Raider Regiment (Marine Raiders) consists of a Headqwarters Company and dree Marine Raider Battawions, de 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Regiment provides taiwored miwitary combat-skiwws training and advisor support for identified foreign forces in order to enhance deir tacticaw capabiwities and to prepare de environment as directed by USSOCOM as weww as de capabiwity to form de nucweus of a Joint Speciaw Operations Task Force. Marines and Saiwors of de MRR train, advise and assist friendwy host nation forces – incwuding navaw and maritime miwitary and paramiwitary forces – to enabwe dem to support deir governments' internaw security and stabiwity, to counter subversion and to reduce de risk of viowence from internaw and externaw dreats. MRR depwoyments are coordinated by MARSOC, drough USSOCOM, in accordance wif engagement priorities for Overseas Contingency Operations.

The Speciaw Mission Training Branch—East provide speciaw operations training in tactics, techniqwes and procedures, and evawuation and certification of MARSOC forces to specified conditions and standards for SOF. The Marines of MSOS are operators wif de training, experience and mature judgment to pwan, coordinate, instruct and supervise devewopment of SOF speciaw reconnaissance and direct action skiwws.[77]

United States Navy SEALs have distinguished demsewves as an individuawwy rewiabwe, cowwectivewy discipwined and highwy skiwwed speciaw operations force. The most important trait dat distinguishes Navy SEALs from aww oder miwitary forces is dat SEALs are maritime speciaw operations, as dey strike from and return to de sea. SEALs (SEa, Air, Land) take deir name from de ewements in and from which dey operate. SEALs are experts in direct action and speciaw reconnaissance missions. Their steawf and cwandestine medods of operation awwow dem to conduct muwtipwe missions against targets dat warger forces cannot approach undetected. Because of de dangers inherent in deir missions, prospective SEALs go drough what is considered by many miwitary experts to be de toughest training regime in de worwd.[79][80]

The 352d Speciaw Operations Wing (352 SOW) at RAF Miwdenhaww, United Kingdom serves as de core to United States European Command's standing Joint Speciaw Operations Air Component headqwarters. The sqwadron provides support for dree fwying sqwadrons, one speciaw tactics sqwadron and one maintenance sqwadron for exercise, wogistics, and war pwanning; aircrew training; communications; aeriaw dewivery; medicaw; intewwigence; security and force protection; weader; information technowogies and transformation support and current operations.[93]

The 353d Speciaw Operations Group (353 SOG) is de focaw point for aww U.S. Air Force speciaw operations activities droughout de United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) deater. Headqwartered at Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan de group is prepared to conduct a variety of high-priority, wow-visibiwity missions. Its mission is air support of joint and awwied speciaw operations forces in de Pacific. It maintains a worwdwide mobiwity commitment, participates in Pacific deater exercises as directed and supports humanitarian and rewief operations.[94]

The United States Air Force Speciaw Operations Schoow (USAFSOS) at Hurwburt Fiewd, Fworida is a primary support unit of de Air Force Speciaw Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares speciaw operations Airmen to successfuwwy pwan, organize, and execute gwobaw speciaw operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, oder USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coawition partners.[95]

The United States Speciaw Operations Command Medaw was introduced in 1994 to recognize individuaws for outstanding contributions to, and in support of, speciaw operations.[citation needed] Since it was created, dere have been more dan 50 recipients, four of whom are not American, namewy;

^Nichows, Biww; Barry Gowdwater (1986). "H.R.3622". A biww to amend titwe 10, United States Code, to strengden de position of Chairman of de Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide for more efficient and effective operation of de Armed Forces, and for oder purposes.|access-date= reqwires |urw= (hewp)