Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy: Testing
Theories of International Relations

Jennifer Lind
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, MIT; and Visiting Fellow,
Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College

November 12, 2003

Traditionally, debate over Japanese security has assumed that Japan is militarily
weak, and in turn asks the questions, "Why, and when might it rearm?"
My project shows that Japan in fact has a strong military but shows restraint,
in other words, that it has already rearmed. The question I seek to answer is
then, "What explains both Japan's power and its restraint?"

Security specialists care about Japanese security for theoretical as well as
pragmatic reasons. On the theoretical side, this project weighs in on the realist
versus constructivist argument. Japan has been a poster child for constructivist
theorists who argue that one must look at domestic issues to understand a state's
behavior in the international arena. On the pragmatic side, the understanding
of Japanese security affects judgments that go into defining future US policy,
including perceptions of Japan in East Asia. To summarize this project, I have
found that Japan is one of the world's top 3 or 4 military powers. Constructivist
theories are inconsistent with the high level of military power Japan developed,
as well as with the increase in Japanese military roles. Last, the project concludes
that since World War II Japan has pursued a strategy of "buck-passing,"
consistent with offensive and defensive realism.

Realism and constructivism are paradigms, not individual theories, so neither
can be falsified outright. I am testing two theories within these paradigms.
The antimilitarism explanation (attributed to Thomas Berger and others) says
domestic political culture and norms inhibit major changes in security policy.
The case scholars make regarding Japan is that antimilitarism norms have been
robust since WWII, and so they predict Japan should have a low level of military
power and low level of military activity.

Realism by contrast says that the international system is the key determinant
in security policy. States select a security strategy from a menu of options,
where one such option is buck-passing. Under a buck-passing strategy, a state
allows an ally to do the work for them. Its benefits include transferring costs
of balancing efforts on to another state, and it might result in favorable conditions
after a war in which two other countries wear each other out. Realism offers
no clear prediction regarding Japan, but realist scholars would argue that Japan
was a good candidate for buck-passing after World War II. Reasons include the
existence of a powerful and credible U.S. ally, and Japan's insulation from
the Soviet threat caused by geography.

Buck passers seek to maintain a balance of power. According to a buck-passing
strategy, if the balance of power shifts adversely, a buck-passer will first
relies on allies to restore it, though if allies fail to do this, the country
would eventually increase its military capabilities and roles. Thus in order
to make specific predictions for Japan, one first needs to code the balance
of power in East Asia.

In coding the balance of power for the US/Japan alliance versus the USSR, I
identify three periods. From 1950 to 1975, the balance of power was favorable
to the US/Japan alliance. Soviet forces were concentrated in Europe. From 1975
through the 1980s, the balance of power began to favor the USSR, as the USSR
built up its naval and air power. It built a large fleet and also militarized
the Kurile Islands, increasing its amphibious capability against Japan. At the
same time, US began to focus on the Persian Gulf, diverting naval forces from
East Asia. In the post cold war period, a favorable balance of power has reemerged.
Based upon this coding, a buck-passing strategy would predict Japan should develop
low military power in the first period. In the middle period it predicts a need
for increased military capability (in particular maritime power) as well as
a call for greater military roles. These increases should taper off following
the end of the cold war.

In measuring capabilities, I have chosen to look at aggregate defense spending,
not defense as a percentage of GDP as many scholars do when studying Japan.
I do this because the percentage indicates a level of effort - the burden of
military spending assumed by society - rather than direct output, which is what
really matters when analyzing a balance of power. Looking at aggregate defense
spending, we see Japan overtaking other US allies in the 1980s. In the post
cold war period, we see Japan as the #2 defense spender after the US as measured
in market exchange rates. Adjusting to purchasing power parity, Japan falls
only one slot down to #3, behind the US and Russia.

This military spending has purchased strong capabilities. In the '50s and '60s
Japan's capabilities were poor, its equipment largely being left-over US equipment.
Starting in the late '80s, Japan began purchasing state-of-the-art F- 15s, AWACS,
Aegis cruisers, and other modern defense platforms. Its naval tonnage doubled,
while the overall age of the fleet dropped significantly. It also acquired a
significant fleet air defense capability with the SM-2 MR. An organic air defense
capability is necessary for blue water operations, and allows the Japanese navy
to sail at a distance from friendly shores, outside the range of coastal air
cover. Other great powers have inferior air defense capabilities, and are accordingly
limited to operations in their littoral waters. I put the Japanese navy as the
world's 3rd or 4th most powerful today. In the same time period the percentage
of current generation fighter aircraft in Japan's inventory rose significantly,
complemented by a high number of early-warning aircraft, which are critical
in utilizing fighters to control airspace. Most importantly, Japan's pilots
receive a very high number of flying hours for training. I rank the Japanese
air force as perhaps the 4th most powerful in the world.

Looking now at Japan's military roles, in the early period Japan refused to
deploy forces beyond its shores, citing constitutional constraints. Starting
in the mid-1970s, Japan took on the role of patrolling its sea lanes out to
1000 miles, and it began participating in multilateral and joint US-Japan military
exercises (RIMPAC, Fleet-ex, etc.) Into the '90s, Japan can be characterized
as participating in multilateral endeavors at a low but broadened level, with
small military commitments to various UN and coalition operations.

In applying this data back to the two competing theories, we see that the antimilitarism
theory works for the first period but cannot explain the major changes in the
'80s. By contrast buck-passing also predicts low military power and involvement
in 1950-75 period but also offers an explanation as to why Japan rearmed in
the '80s. However a question remains as to why Japan chose a buck-passing strategy
in particular from its menu of options rather than other realist strategies.
Here I see a possible role for antimilitarism theory --domestic opposition to
military may very well have guided policymakers in selecting a buck-passing
strategy rather than a more aggressive strategy. However this project concludes
that Japan's military power and participation has not been significantly constrained
by domestic norms.

Jennifer Lind is a Research Fellow and Visiting Professor in the Department
of Government, Dartmouth College. She is currently working on a book manuscript
entitled "Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics." Ms.
Lind's research interests include historical memory, East Asian security, and
U.S. foreign and military policy in East Asia. She has worked as a consultant
for RAND and for the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense. Ms.
Lind holds a Master's degree from the School of International Relations &
Pacific Studies at the University of California San Diego, and a B.A. from UC
Berkeley. She is receiving her Ph.D. from MIT's Department of Political Science
this year.