How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

@article{6280c03d-64c4-4ddd-a6cc-2118f20d8bcc,
abstract = {<p>This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.</p>},
author = {Ellingsen, Tore and Östling, Robert and Wengström, Erik},
issn = {0899-8256},
keyword = {Cheap talk,Noncooperative game theory,Pre-play communication},
language = {eng},
month = {01},
pages = {153--181},
publisher = {0899-8256},
series = {Games and Economic Behavior},
title = {How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004},
volume = {107},
year = {2018},
}