Afghanistan: Should We Stay or Should We Go?

Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things). So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, into Africa — into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world? On whose budget?

Curiously missing from this line of reasoning, and other similarly well-thought out arguments, is the regional dimension. Violent extremism emanating from conflict-torn Afghanistan is destabilising a nuclear-armed state and threatening to spark a wider confrontation. There are few places on Earth where transnational Islamic terrorism, regional rivalries, ethnic strife and weapons of mass destruction form such a toxic potpourri. Somalia isn’t one of them, nor is Yemen, and devastating though it has been, the war in Congo has never threatened to engulf a whole continent in radioactive dust.

I was an early skeptic of the war in Afghanistan and have been a vocal critic of how successive Finnish governments have allowed us to drift into it without explaining to the electorate why we should invest so much into stabilising this godforsaken country.

Yet, as the war effort has faltered and the Taleban have staged their spectacular comeback, I have become convinced that it is in our best interest not to let Kabul fall, because the consequences would be devastating for the whole of South Asia. In short, it’s not about 9/11; it’s about world peace.

The reason is simple: While I don’t subscribe to the view that Pakistan is about to collapse, I find it all too conceivable that its nuclear weapons may fall into the wrong hands. And by this I don’t mean some brilliant night time heist, or sale to the highest bidder. All you need is an Islamist-backed military coup, and the stage is set for war with India. Indeed, one well-executed terror operation might be enough to spark a nuclear exchange, as the attack on Indian Parliament almost did in 2001. As Judah Grunstein eloquently put it after Mumbai:

Through a convergence of terrorists’ savvy with the structural changes in the mediasphere, an enormously disproportionate impact can be brought to bear by applying what really amounts to minute pressure to geopolitical faultlines. To give an idea, based on these World Bank automobile statistics, more people died of car accidents in India on the day of the attacks than in the attacks themselves. But we are now seriously and soberly considering the possibility of a worst-case scenario that involves nuclear war.

Do we need 101,000 foreign soldiers in Afghanistan to stop someone from applying that “minute pressure”? No, if we could do it with less, but I’m pretty sure we need more. I simply think the minimalist alternative is no longer on the table. That time passed 4-5 years ago, when we allowed the Taleban to regroup and paid no attention to the Islamist-pampering general on the other side of Durand Line. Our cock-ups in Afghanistan have probably exacerbated the problems in Pakistan; but our withdrawal would not correct the situation. And if the terrorists just set up shop somewhere else? So much the better — they may still attack the U.S. and Europe, but they will cease to be a factor in South Asian geopolitics.

In the Lowy Interpreter, Sam Roggeveen wonders how convincing arguments like these would be if we weren’t in Afghanistan already:

Would we now advocate an invasion and long-term occupation of Afghanistan to stabilise the Indian Ocean region, reduce the chances of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, disrupt drug supplies, protect energy sources, substitute for the lack of a regional security framework and discourage Pakistani cooperation with the Taliban? More to the point, have any of these problems been reduced or made more manageable by the Western presence in Afghanistan? How?

No, they wouldn’t be convincing at all. But here’s the thing: We realised AIDS was a problem only after someone died; there still isn’t a cure, yet no one is saying all that research has been in vain. In other words, without 9/11 we wouldn’t be in Afghanistan, but I seriously doubt things would be better in South Asia. In fact, I would argue that the Western presence in Afghanistan and the simultaneous diplomatic efforts have indeed reduced the chances of an atomic war between India and Pakistan. They certainly haven’t made it more likely.

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5 Responses

I have become convinced that it is in our best interest not to let “Kabul fall, because the consequences would be devastating for the whole of South Asia. In short, it’s not about 9/11; it’s about world peace.”

What exactly would these consequences be? The Taliban was in power from 1996-2001, were they so devastating then? It’s not like they haven’t been in power, so I don’t see what would be so “devastating for the whole of South Asia” if they came back.

I have to wonder what the honest chances of an Islamist backed coup actually SUCCEEDING in Pakistan is. Do the militants have enough legitimacy and enough forces to actually overthrow the Government in Islamabad AND manage to get the military to play along? If they don’t know, when is this situation more likely to come to fruition and how? And, for the purposes of furthering the debate a little, let us say an Islamist group does manage to overthrow the Government in Pakistan, does this automatically increase the chances of a nuclear holocaust with India? Or would jihadists simply continue using the same low resource, high impact strategies they have been using for decades now?

One also has to wonder what Pakistan believes is its best interest…. I don’t believe, based on everything I’ve read, that wiping out terrorist threats is a top priority of Pakistan for several reasons (One stated by Coll in the article you linked and the other having to do with maintaining a foothold for influence in Afghanistan via support for militants in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan). So what should coalition forces do? If it’s not in Pakistans best interest we certainly shouldn’t be so naive to believe they’ll actually follow through, and coalition forces certainly can’t hope to succeed in Pakistan without the help of Islamabad. So do we stay in Afghanistan indefinitely in hopes that we can curb potential threats to Pakistan’s stability before they spiral out of control? Or do we stay there in hopes no other variant of the Taliban ever comes to power again (which is highly unlikely)?

Fighting an open-ended mission against a Taliban threat with less fighters than there are gang-members in LA, doesn’t sound like very sound strategic logic. Especially, when you consider this threat is 7,000 miles away and we can squelch it by less intensive means, i.e. drone strikes, support for Pakistan’s COIN mission, securing the homeland (@home), etc.

1) Just as the Alarmist/Escalationist argument tends to forget that the Pakistani state is actually quite robust, the Minimalist/Withdrawalist argument forgets that the world, including South Asia, was much different on September 10, 2001. The Minimalists posit that, should the Taleban recapture Kabul and set up their administration in Afghanistan, the results would be much the same as in 1996-2001. This argument not only overlooks the fact that it was a pretty dismal regime but also ignores the changed realities in Pakistan. A Taleban victory in Afghanistan would give an enormous boost to their Pakistani brethrens’ campaign to topple the government and seriously undermine efforts to bolster civilian rule in Islamabad.

2) One can always argue that a weak civilian government in Pakistan is more likely to adopt an aggressive posture towards India just to shore up its patriotic credentials. Indeed, Pakistan *has already had* quite a few Islamist-backed autocrat generals, and none of them started a war. I would argue, though, that the current brand of Islamic militancy in Pakistan is more uncompromising and violent than anything the country has experienced before. Should these Islamists gain power, even if by proxy, it’s quite conceivable they would not act rationally and with Pakistan’s best interest in mind when tensions flared up with India.

I guess that’s the bottom line: A nuclear-armed state cannot be allowed to be run by guys with no sense of national self-preservation. (See also: Jong-Il, Kim.)

Point 1) The Taliban in Pakistan are a problem, but are becoming less of a threat to the central government in Islamabad as the days go by. Furthermore, it is very likely that our presence in Afghanistan continues to destabilize the Northwest border region. While partially withdrawing from Afghanistan may give the Taliban more places to call sanctuary, it still won’t change the fact that many Afghans and Pakistanis resent their governing style, but still prefer it over one that is completely foreign. Also, I wouldn’t call it a “minimalist” approach if we still retain the means to destroy insurgent/terrorist cells when we see fit and have the capability.

Something like a Phoenix program is better to occupying the country and expecting everyone’s complacency and allegiance.

Point 2) To me that’s an analytical stretch to say that a weak Pakistan will become more hostile to India.

Once again, I also find it a stretch to say that our being in Afghanistan makes Pakistan safer, and thus less likely to be controlled by the Taliban. While I believe this scenario isn’t likely in either case, I think Pakistan becomes safer when we don’t have a 100,000 troops in Afghanistan pushing the Taliban into Pakistan.