Iraq strategy gets replay, but Afghanistan no repeat

Nation & World

Experts note major differences in terrain, enemy, national armies

WASHINGTON - In crafting his Afghanistan troop surge, President Barack Obama has borrowed liberally from an unlikely source: the playbook of his predecessor, George W. Bush.

Obama was an outspoken critic of the Iraq surge, attacking the plan when it was announced. But despite the president's long-held skepticism, his Afghanistan plan shares many similarities with the Iraq surge, including a similar number of troops, a fast push into the country, a limited duration, an emphasis on training local forces and a hope to flip the allegiance of insurgents.

Indeed, Obama administration officials are even calling their new strategy a surge. Testifying Wednesday before the Senate, Defense Secretary Robert Gates wryly drew some comparisons between the two deployments - including the need to explain the strategies in front of skeptical lawmakers.

"This is the second surge I've been up here defending," Gates said.

Scholars and defense officials have debated which elements were the most critical in the Iraq surge: the extra troops, the deals with former insurgents, improvement in the Iraqi security forces or something else.

What is not in doubt is that the surge quickly reduced violence levels in Iraq and positioned the U.S. to begin the withdrawal of its large military force.

One of the most important parts of the Iraq surge began largely independently of U.S. actions, when Sunni insurgents turned against al-Qaida militants.

Although Sunni tribal leaders made that decision on their own, they quickly sought out an alliance with U.S. forces to defeat al-Qaida militants. The Americans then helped organize them into local security forces and, in essence, paid them not to fight the U.S. or Iraqi militaries.

But Stephen Biddle, a military analyst and adviser to the U.S. military, cautioned that Taliban foot soldiers may not switch allegiance as easily as Sunni fighters in Iraq did.

Sunnis, Biddle said, had been defeated in a sectarian civil war in Baghdad and soured on their alliance with al-Qaida in western Iraq. The Taliban, in contrast, believe they are winning in Afghanistan.

Unlike Iraq, which has a developed infrastructure, Afghanistan is rural and rugged, with very few usable roads. That leaves coalition troops here far more dependent on air power, or traveling remote rural tracks that the insurgents seed with roadside bombs.

Mark Moyar, an expert on counterinsurgency and a professor at the Marine Corps University, said differences between the two countries mean it will be difficult for the Afghanistan buildup to show results as quickly as the Iraq surge.

"Afghanistan's population is highly dispersed, whereas Iraq's is concentrated in cities," Moyar said. "Thirty thousand troops can secure far more people when the population is concentrated than when it is spread out."

The enemy in Afghanistan is also different than in Iraq. While al- Qaida in Iraq was not considered an indigenous resistance movement, the Taliban movement has deep roots in Afghanistan, drawing heavily on conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.

The most important differences, officials said, are between the two countries' armies.

U.S. military officials say the Afghan army is far worse than Iraq's was before the surge. In Afghanistan, the U.S. has a hard time attracting and retaining qualified soldiers. Even Afghan officials acknowledge it will be a much more difficult undertaking to bring their army up to some reasonable standard of performance.