The current study examines the specific experiences of individuals
who have reported haunt phenomena in the context of common paranormal
belief measures. One hundred and sixty nine community college students
completed online surveys assessing personality waits, cognitive
functioning, Tobacyk's (2004) measure of paranormal belief,
Gallagher, Kumar, and Pekala's (1994) Anomalous Experiences
Inventory, and a measure designed for the current study to assess
haunting experiences. Results using Spearman correlations show
occasional and small relationships between paranormal belief measures
and haunting experiences. Contrary to existing literature, t test
findings show analytical and personality measures do not significantly
differ between those who have experienced haunting phenomena and those
who have not. We conclude that previous research in paranormal belief
may not apply to individuals who have experienced haunting phenomena due
to paranormal belief measures' lack of content regarding haunting
experiences.

It is not unusual for people to interpret personal experiences as a
ghostly encounter. Rice (2003) reported that 42.1% of the population
believes in ghosts, and Gallup and Newport (1991) have reported that 9%
of the general population has seen a ghost. McClenon (1994) reported
that 30% of his accounts of supernatural events refer specifically to
apparition experiences. More research in paranormal beliefs shows that
38% of people believe in ghosts, and in other studies 41% of
participants report a belief in ghosts (Irwin, 2009). These findings
show that many people believe in ghosts and that researchers credit this
type of belief as paranormal belief. Yet, what are the common
experiences associated with haunting, and how do these experiences
relate to paranormal belief?.

A body of research addresses paranormal belief and experience
through two common measures, the Paranormal Belief Scale (PB; Tobacyk,
2004) and the Anomalous Experiences Inventory (AEI; Gallagher, Kumar,
& Pekala, 1994). Both of these measures address a wide variety of
beliefs and experiences about extraordinary and paranormal experiences.
However, the current study suggests that research involving paranormal
beliefs has rarely examined haunt experiences. For the sake of clarity,
we define haunt experiences or haunting as internally perceived (e.g.,
sensations of a presence, or visions of entities) or externally
witnessed phenomena (e.g., objects moving) that are interpreted as
spirit activity. Paranormal belief measures such as Tobacyk's
(2004) PB measures and Gallagher e t al.'s (1994) AEI measures
assess individuals' belief in psychic abilities or witchcraft. Yet
little research examines visual, auditory, and physical experiences that
are interpreted as haunting experiences. As such, it is unclear to what
extent previous relationships with PB or AEI apply to individuals who
report and experience haunting phenomena.

The lack of examination of haunting experiences is unfortunate, as
haunting encounters are commonly reported in the literature as part of
paranormal belief, and haunting experiences are constantly reported to
the thousands of paranormal investigation groups that exist in the
United States alone. For instance, Hufford (1982) has reported a
haunting case involving his principal interest of "old hag"
attacks, but witnesses also described noises and movement around the
house during regular waking hours. McClenon (1994) has reported many
witness accounts of apparition appearances with moving objects,
pyrokinesis, backwards writing, and other phenomena. Even in direct
poltergeist cases (e.g., Roll, 1972) or haunting in Eastern cultures
(Emmons, 1982), many and varied phenomena occur with what individuals
describe as haunting experiences.

We approach the current study from a standpoint similar to Hufford
(1982) and McClenon (1994, 2002) in the context of the experiential
source hypothesis. Rather than assuming cultural cues, tradition, or
social influence as explanations for haunting phenomena, we focus on the
experiences that people interpret as haunting. As such, Hufford (1982)
and McClenon (1994, 2002) have explained that experiences represent the
heart of any belief and have proposed that interpretation of these
experiences creates belief about paranormal events. However, problems
may arise with the accurate use of paranormal belief measures in this
population due to a lack of assessment of individuals who have had haunt
experiences.

Our introduction starts with previous findings on paranormal
belief. We propose two important points about previous research that
suggest haunt experiences are not appropriately represented. First,
little research has been conducted that assesses the types of
experiences (e.g., Hufford, 1982; McClenon 1994, 2002) representing
haunt phenomena. Specifically, most research has not assessed or
operationally defined individuals who have experienced haunt phenomena
in their samples. Second, items on both the PB and AEI scales, in their
overall measures and subscales, do not directly address common haunt
experiences in their content.

Traits and Paranormal Belief

The relationship between PB and other traits and attitudes has not
been flattering to people who believe in the paranormal. The body of
research conducted has been summarized by Irwin (2009) and diverges into
two paradigms of interest to the current study. First, Irwin addresses
the psychodynamic functions hypothesis of paranormal belief. This theory
presumes that paranormal belief fulfills a psychological need of the
individual; as such, research based in this paradigm assumes that
deviancy, mental weakness, or psychopathology is an explanation for
paranormal belief. The second paradigm provided by Irwin represents the
cognitive deficits hypothesis. Under this paradigm, researchers assume
that paranormal belief is a function of irrational thinking and poor
critical thought and analysis. We address some of the core findings of
each of these paradigms below.

Related to the above, a growing body of research links paranormal
belief to a composite measure of mental functioning that researchers
classify as transliminality (Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm,
2000; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; Thalbourne & Houran, 2000).
Although not a direct measure of mental illness, transliminality
contains multiple components of psychopathological criteria. Thalbourne
and Delin (1994) identify both manic and depressive experience as part
of the tranliminality measure, as well as schizotypy (Irwin, 2009;
Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm, 2000). Recent work by Kelley
(2010a, 2010b, 2011) makes an evolutionary argument that paranormal
belief is adaptive because of its association with hypnotizability and
transliminality. Shamanistic healing as a hypnosis process should be
more effective on those who are susceptible to the influence of shamans
as healers. Although Kelley (2010a, 2010b, 2011) stresses the adaptive
value of both hypnotizability and transliminality in an evolutionary
context, these states still represent pejorative traits that could be
considered signs of weakness in the human character.

Other researchers following Irwin's (2009) cognitive deficits
hypothesis have shown a relation between paranormal belief and
deficiencies in cognitive and analytical thinking. For instance, Rogers,
Davis, and Fisk (2009) demonstrated significant differences in the
number of conjunction fallacies that paranormal believers made compared
to nonparanormal believers. Smith, Foster, and Stovin (1998) showed a
negative relationship between Tobacyk's PB measure and Raven's
matrices tests (r = -.53 for full measure, r = -.07 to -.61 for
subscales). Watt and Wiseman (2002) later replicated these findings
while testing for experimenter effects. Also, Lindeman and Aarino (2006)
showed a small but significant negative relationship between PB and
analytical thinking (r = -.19). Other cognitive functioning and
paranormal belief researchers report negative relationships typical to
the findings above. When examining analytical tendencies, early work by
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) found small relationships between paranormal
belief, irrational belief (r = .09, trend), and critical
inference-making with its spiritualism and traditional religious belief
subscales (r = -.23-.34). More recent work using the REI
(Rational-Experiential Inventory; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, &
Heier, 1996) found no relation between need for cognition and belief in
the unusual, esoteric thinking, and superstition, while showing a
positive relationship between intuitive thinking styles and these
variables (r = -.27-.31). Thus, Epstein et al. (1996) suggest that
paranormal belief is unassociated with an analytical nature, but instead
associated with intuitive reactions to events. Related research
demonstrates relationships between paranormal belief and such cognitive
fallacies as contingency and probability estimation (e.g., Blackmore
& Troscianko, 1985; Brugger & Graves, 1997; Rogers, Davis, &
Fisk, 2009; Tobacyk, Milford, Springer, & Tohacyk, 1988). The
general conclusion reached by Lindeman and Aarino (2006) in their review
of PB and its predictors is that poorer rational and cognitive
functioning is associated with greater degrees of paranormal belief.

However, negative mental and cognitive associations with paranormal
belief have not been consistent and are occasionally reversed. Shumaker
(2001), for instance, found a positive relationship between PB and
mental health. Similarly, Gow, Lang, and Chant (2004) found no
relationship between neuroticism and PB. As mentioned previously, Auton,
Pope, & Seeger (2003) found a relationship between neuroticism and
PB but did not find a relationship between PB and psychopathy. Parra
(2006) found what he defined as healthy schizotypy with individuals who
had seen ghosts. With regard to cognitive deficiencies, Blackmore (1997)
found no differences between high and low paranormal believers and
contingency estimation. Likewise, Epstein et al. (1996) demonstrated no
relationship between superstitious belief and need for cognition.

Haunt Experiences, Sampling, and Measurement

Despite the negative relationships between PB, personality
variables, and cognitive functioning, examining haunt experiences and
their relationship to these findings suggests there is reason to wonder
if these relationships apply to individuals whose belief in the
paranormal comes from haunting experiences. We suggest that some of
these findings, and related inconsistencies, may be due to the nature of
haunting phenomena and its relation to scales that measure paranormal
belief.

As a simple point, studies in paranormal belief have generally
neglected either sampling haunt experiences or addressing them in detail
beyond subjective physical and emotional states. Wiseman, Watt, Stevens,
Greening, and O'Keeffe (2003) demonstrated significant differences
between believers and nonbelievers when exposing them to a haunted
location. But these researchers cataloged mostly subjective somatic
effects (e.g., shortness of breath, dizziness, and headaches). Lange and
Houran (1997) performed experiments in which they examined paranormal
experiences with demand characteristics (i.e., telling participants that
an area was haunted or not haunted), but their results focused on
internal perception and sensations gained from the experience. What is
notable is that both Wiseman et al. (2003) and Lange and Houran's
(1997) samples represented tourists of a known haunted house, and not
experiences of individuals who witnessed phenomena in their homes. In
other instances, findings involving haunting and paranormal belief were
applied to adolescent samples (e.g., Francis & Williams, 2009),
which used belief in ghosts or a belief in the ability to talk with the
dead as proxy measures of paranormal belief. Research by Parra (2006)
examined crisis apparition experiences and their relation to several
mental health variables but did not address any other types of phenomena
beyond the apparition experience itself and the sensing of a presence.
Research by Houran, Kumar, Thalbourne, and Lavertue (2002) examined
haunting and its relationship to transliminality using a measure of
ghostly experience consisting of eight items taken from the AEI (1994).
Previous research from Houran and Lange (2001) showed that these items
matched predicted patterns of phenomena in poltergeist experience, but
they state that the measure is not comprehensive. Indeed, previous work
by Lange, Houran, Harte, and Havens (1996) suggests haunting experiences
consist of seven subsets: visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, sensed
presences, object movement, and the erratic functioning of
electrical/mechanical equipment. Beyond the research mentioned here,
researchers have not conducted studies that address a fuller body of
subjective and objective experiences that would comprise the common
haunt experience in personal residences and public locations.

Per Lange et al. (1996), Hufford (1982), and McClenon (1994, 2002),
the current study proposes that haunting experiences represent phenomena
that include emotional and somatic states but also involve more complex
events. Some of these experiences are subjective and easily explained by
psychological means (e.g., tactile experiences, perception of a sensed
presence). Yet other events are more difficult to explain because they
represent external phenomena (e.g., RSPK: the movement of objects, and
recorded apparitions). Given the many reports provided to paranormal
groups and the previous work of researchers in cataloging haunting
experiences (e.g., Emmons, 1982; Hufford, 1982; McClennon, 1994; Roll,
1972), it makes sense to examine haunting experiences from lesser
somatic states or perceptions to greater events that are more difficult
to explain. By cataloging experiences described by participants as
haunting, we can examine if the experiences associated with haunting
relate to paranormal beliefs, at least as measured by PB and AEI.

However, when we consider haunt experiences and paranormal belief
as measured by PB and AEI, several methodological problems manifest.
These problems do not represent poor psychometric properties, although
the PB measure has been criticized for such (e.g., see Irwin, 2009;
Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b; Lawrence, Roe, & Williams, 1997). Rather,
our concerns lie with scale content and operational definition issues.
Namely, both scales neglect describing events that can be defined as
belonging to haunt experiences.

A cursory examination of Tobacyk's (2004) Revised Paranormal
Belief Scale or Gallagher et al.'s AEI scale (1994) shows that few
items address any aspect of paranormal belief that directly relates to
haunting. The current research, similar to complaints of the PB measure
made by Lawrence (1995a), notes that the actual construction of items in
PB fails to address any aspect of paranormal belief that directly
relates to haunting. Out of the seven subsets of the PB scale (e.g.,
Traditional Religious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition,
Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition), there is not
a single item that asks a question about a belief in haunting and
ghosts. This is not to say, however, that some items do not indirectly
relate to a belief in ghosts or haunting. For example, Item 25 ("It
is possible to communicate with the dead") and Item 1 ("The
soul continues to exist though the body will die") could indirectly
relate to a person who has had haunting encounters. But these questions
might also relate to individuals who are devout with particular
religious beliefs. We would not make the claim that haunting experiences
do not influence the scores of some of the PB scale subsets. Rather, it
appears that scores on the PB measure are not likely to directly vary
because of haunting experiences. Simply put, the scale does not address
them.

Although Gallagher et al.'s (1994) anomalous experience
inventory contains more items than Tobacyk (2004), similar issues arise
when examining the full scale as well as the haunting and poltergeist
subscale created from it (Lange & Houran, 2001). This measure's
five subscales (Anomalous Experience, Anomalous Belief, Anomalous
Ability, Fear of Anomalous Events, and Drug Use) contain only a few
items that directly assess haunt experience. These items are emphasized
in the poltergeist subscale created from the measure. They are:

(49) "I have seen a ghost or apparition"

(51) "At times I have felt possessed by an outside force"

(48) "I have communicated with the dead"

(66) "I have had a psychical mystical experience which scared
me to death"

(38) "I have experienced objects appearing or disappearing
around me"

(29) "I have experienced my physical body or objects floating
in the air"

(55) "I am able to communicate with the dead"

(67) "I have seen elves or fairies or other types of little
people"

The questions mentioned above might relate to experiences that
would be the result of witnessed haunting phenomena, but could also
represent a person who believed he or she was an occultist with
psychokinetic abilities. In either case, the exact reasons individuals
would select these items are unclear. Thus, these items could increase
because of haunting experience, but the measure provides no way to
indicate that these beliefs result directly from haunting.

Because of the above, it is not unreasonable to question if
findings about PB and mental and cognitive deficiencies would apply to
individuals who do believe in and report haunting experiences. The lack
of representation in the AEI and PB measures, and the lack of studies
addressing people that have experienced haunting, suggests the degree to
which haunting phenomena contribute to PB and AEI is undetermined.
Similar to any research where variables that are not measured in a
particular study could affect findings, it is possible that people
experiencing haunting may be suppressing or exaggerating relationships
between PB and related variables. An equally viable conclusion is that
haunteds do not relate at all to current findings on PB, AEI, and their
predictors.

Summation

We make the case that neglect of individuals who have experienced
haunting phenomena, either by sample or measurement, leaves a gap in
paranormal belief research that needs to be addressed. As an initial
examination of this possibility, we used an experiential interview
measure that addresses common haunt phenomena about personal sensation,
visual experiences, auditory experiences, physical sensations, and seen
movement. Our first goal was to discover how an experience-oriented
measure of haunting experiences relates to subscales in both PB and AEI.
Using Spearman Rho correlations, the current study predicts that these
measures will relate to each other, yet poorly relate to a measure of
haunt experiences. Next, we used haunt experience as a nominal variable
to compare measures of neuroticism, personality, analytical tendency,
and paranormal belief between people who report haunting experiences
with those who do not. Given the lack of relevant items in either
measure to address haunt experiences, we expect that paranormal belief
scores will not significantly differ between those who have experienced
haunt phenomena (e.g., haunteds) and those who have not (e.g.,
nonhaunteds).

Method

Sample

One hundred and sixty-nine students from a Midwest community
college participated in an online survey in return for credit in their
current courses. Participants were informed that these were studies
involving their experiences and attitudes in order to minimize biased
response. Students were also instructed to complete surveys at the
beginning (i.e., first 2 weeks) of the semester, to limit the influence
of either sociology or psychology classes on student response. Although
data were collected online, participation was exclusively within the
college population. Participation in the study was voluntary, and
alternate experiences in the form of research reports were provided for
student participants. Mean age was 26.73 years (SD = 8.53), representing
a diverse age range. Gender composition was 55 males and 107 females (7
did not respond). Ethnicity for the current study was mainly Caucasian
(84.24%) and the working poor were the majority (62% reported <
$24,000 annual income).

Measures

The following measures were completed by participants in an online
survey format. Participants were required to complete the entire body of
measures described below within one sitting.

Rational-Experiential Inventory. The 40-item REI is a measure
designed to independently assess rational-analytical and intuitive
thinking styles (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Participants completed
this measure on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = "definitely not
true of myself" and 5 = "definitely true of myself." The
REI contains four subscales: Rational Ability ([alpha] = .85), Rational
Engagement ([alpha] = .83), Experiential Ability ([alpha] = .85), and
Experiential Engagement ([alpha] = .86). The ability subscales were
designed to assess ability in both analytical and experiential thought.
The engagement subscales were designed to assess enjoyment and use of
both rational and experiential thought styles.

International Personality Inventory Pool: Mini IPIP. This 20-item
measure represents a shortened measure of the Big-5 personality scales
of Extraversion, Neuroticism, Contentiousness, Openness to Experience,
and Agreeableness (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006).
Participants answered questions in a 5-point Likert format where 1 =
"not at all like me" and 5 = "very much like me."
Internal consistency for these 4-item personality measures ranged from
.63 to .78.

For analysis purposes, several points need to be addressed. Because
of the nature of this inventory, KR-20 values were expected to be low or
negative. Many items in the checklist are discriminative events and not
necessarily additive. For instance, a person who indicates he or she
felt a positive presence is not likely to also select that he or she
experienced a negative presence within the same report. As such, item
clusters in the inventory should be considered conceptual factors
because of their dichotomous nature.

Phenomena items selected across as many as four reports were summed
to produce an overall score representing the summed number of phenomena
experienced both within and between reports. As such, both single
experiences and multiple experiences were represented to produce a score
containing the number of phenomena experienced across reports. These
items were then grouped by two methods. First, items were summed
according to the categories described above (i.e., feeling presences,
hearing voices, visual experiences, physical experiences, and movement).
Second, with respect to Houran and Lange (2001) and Houran et al.
(2002), we divided experiences across categories into lesser or easily
explained phenomena: Lesser Haunt Experience (L), 14 items, min = 0, max
= 13, M = 3.22, KR-20 = .03, and experiences that are less easily
explained and more dramatic: Greater Haunt Experience (G), 13 items, min
= 0, max = 15, M = 2.29, KR-20 = .21. We tentatively called these
categories lesser and greater haunting experiences. Finally, an overall
sum score of all experiences was created: Sum (S), 25 items, min = 0,
max = 12, M = 2.31, KR-20 = .01. These summed factors were not normally
distributed, and interitem correlations were low by design. Yet,
Spearman Rho rank-order correlations show a moderate relationship
between these conceptual factors (r = .37-.49, p < .05), except for
Feeling Presences, which was unrelated to the other categories. A full
list of haunt inventory items are displayed in the Appendix, and Table 1
provides a full Spearman Rho correlation matrix for haunting experience
factors, which we discuss more fully in the Results section.

It is important to note that this measure was designed to represent
the degree of haunt experiences that a person has had with respect to
both frequency and variety. Whether a person had one experience with a
large variety of phenomena that occurred or several experiences in which
a few repeated phenomena occurred, the outcome is the same: a greater
number of experiences that can be classified as haunting phenomena.
Thus, low or high scores on any subscales should be interpreted as a
greater number of haunt phenomena experienced, without respect to
time-frame of occurrence.

Finally, to gather some perspective on which individuals reported
events, several context questions were included in each report.
Participants indicated whether they thought their experience was
rational or supernatural in origin on a 5-point polar scale where 1 =
"rational" and 5 = "supernatural"; how frightened
they were from the experience on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 =
"not at all frightened" and 5 = "very frightened";
and how much they tried to investigate the event after it was over on a
5-point Likert scale where 1 = "I didn't investigate at
all" and 5 = "I tried very hard to investigate events."

Results

Descriptive Statistics of Haunting Experiences

In order to provide a sample background for the following analysis,
several descriptive analyses were performed to provide a contextual
picture of haunt phenomena experienced by participants. Although Rice
(2003) as well as Gallup and Newport (1991) report belief in ghosts at
much smaller percentages, out of 169 participants, 101 reported some
type of haunting experience. Out of these 101 participants, 60% reported
some type of feeling of a presence, 45% reported some type of auditory
phenomena, 43% reported some type of visual phenomena, 44% reported some
type of personal physical sensation, and 36% reported some type of
object moving. Looking at phenomena as either lesser or greater, 15
participants reported lesser phenomena only, and 6 reported greater
types of phenomena only, while 79 participants reported both types.
Thus, feeling presences was the most frequently experienced phenomena,
while auditory, physical, and visual experiences were experienced by a
little less than half of the haunting sample. Overall ratings of
individual haunting experiences were viewed as somewhat paranormal in
origin (M = 2.82, SD = 1.52), were reported as somewhat frightening
experiences (M = 2.23, SD = 1.32), but on average were not investigated
thoroughly (M = 1.63, SD = 1.12).

We recognize that the number of participants within the current
sample who experienced haunting phenomena is much greater than reported
by previous researchers. For the sake of clarification, we wish to point
out possible explanations for this difference. From a cultural
perspective, we conducted the current study in a rural, mainly poor area
within the Bible Belt of America. Thus, one possible explanation is what
Irwin (2009) terms the social marginality hypothesis (i.e., socially
disadvantaged groups' use of paranormal belief to gain control over
life). However, other explanations seem more likely. First, this region
(by personal experience and reputation) is known for a frequent and
persistent number of haunting stories, known haunted houses, and
residential haunting. Second, the more likely culprit for our increased
number of haunting reports is that we asked a wide body of questions
about haunting phenomena, as opposed to a one- or two-item general
response. Thus, the large number of items in the Appendix is partially
because we were more inclusive in our approach. Similar to
Hufford's (1982) and McClenon's (1994, 2002) approaches to
examining paranormal events, the current study would respectfully
suggest that for haunting experiences, the devil is in the details.

Correlations Between Paranormal Belief and Experience, Haunt
Experiences, and Cognitive and Personality Variables

In order to examine the predictive relationships between haunting
experiences, paranormal belief, personality, and cognitive variables, a
series of Spearman rank order correlations was conducted. These analyses
were conducted in three steps to show a comprehensive picture of how PB,
AEI, and haunt experience measures are related among themselves and to
each other and cognitive and personality variables. First, Spearman Rho
correlations were obtained for each haunting category (i.e., presences,
auditory phenomena, visual phenomena, physical phenomena, and movement)
as well as lesser, greater, and summed experience ratings. The goal of
this analysis was to confirm the interrelation of our haunting
experience factors, and the results are displayed in Table 1. Second,
Spearman Rho correlations were obtained for AEI and PB scales and scale
subsets, and their relation to personality and cognitive variables.
These results can be seen in Table 2. The goal of this analysis was to
demonstrate the predictive relationships of PB and AEI scales to
participants' scores on personality and cognitive variables. Third,
we conducted Spearman Rho correlations for PB, AEI, personality
measures, and cognitive functioning for each individual factor of
haunting experiences. These results can be seen in Table 3. The goal of
these analyses was to examine how paranormal belief measures relate to
haunting experience measures, and to compare what PB and AEI predict in
terms of the cognitive and personality measures in contrast to what the
current study's haunt experience measures predict. Please note that
correlations for haunting experience categories were individually
obtained based on the number of participants who reported that
particular type of experience. We excluded those who did not report
experiences in order to avoid confounds with the sample of individuals
who did not report a particular type of experience. All tests were
conducted as two-tailed tests.

First, with regard to the relationships between haunting experience
factors, relationships between factors, except Feeling Presences, were
moderately interrelated (r = .37-.49; see Table 1). Lesser, Greater, and
Sum categories were all interrelated with all other factors except
Feeling Presences (r = .37-.78). Thus, whereas feeling presences seems
unrelated to other haunt experiences, the other factors appear
"experientially connected," suggesting a link between these
individual experiences and our conceptual factors of haunt phenomena.

With regard to the correlations of PB, AEI, and cognitive and
personality variables, the findings can be seen in Table 2. An
examination of the relationships between these measures shows that
individual factors of PB modestly to moderately interrelate (r =
-.25-.57), with a few exceptions (see Table 2). Overall relationships of
the subset scales to the overall PB measure are stronger (r = .29-.81).
Interestingly, the Religious Belief subscale of paranormal belief
relates poorly to the other subsets (r =-.25-.25), and does not
significantly relate to three of the seven PB factors. For AEI,
relationships between the five factors are modest to strong (r =
.20-.87), and AEI Paranormal Fear only modestly relates to the other
factors (r = .20-.25). AEI and PB are moderately interrelated (r
=-.18-.60), with a few exceptions (see Table 2). However, the subscale
of AEI Fear is completely unrelated to the PB scales (r =-.01-.14).
Thus, the AEI and PB subscales are moderately intercorrelated (with
noted exceptions), and the full scales are moderately related to each
other.

When the relationships of the PB and AEI subscales with the
personality

and cognitive function measures are examined, most are found to be
nonsignificant, with exceptions noted below. With regard to cognitive
function, AEI Fear and PB Superstition, which are unrelated to each
other, r(157) = .14, n.s., are both negatively and significantly related
to Rational Engagement (r =-.23 to -.37) and Rational Ability (r =-.20
to -.27). For AEI and PB predicting our personality variables,
Neuroticism was predicted by PB Superstition and AEI Fear (rs =.
17-.21). Conscientiousness was predicted by all of the AEI subsets
(except AEI Fear), PB Religious Belief, PB Superstition, PB
Spiritualism, and PB Precognition (r = -.25-.29). Agreeableness was
predicted by AEI Paranormal Experience, AEI Paranormal Belief, PB
Religion, and PB ELF (r =-.22-.29). Thus, two specific subscales of PB
and AEI were negatively related to a tendency toward analytical thinking
and reasoning, and about half of the subscales of both the PB and AEI
were related to three of the Big 5 personality variables.

In context of our previous analysis, results from Spearman Rho
haunting factor correlations can be seen in Table 3. In support of our
hypothesis, the majority of measures, including subscales of the AEI and
PB, failed to predict the current study's haunting experience
factors, with exceptions noted below. Feeling Presences was
significantly related (p < .05) to Rational Engagement, r(56) = .28,
p < .05, and yet unrelated to any of the PB or AEI subsets. Hearing
Voices was significantly related to Openness to Experience, r(76) = .26,
p< .05, whereas in Table 2 it can be seen that neither AEI nor PB
relates to this personality factor. Hearing Voices was also related to
the Paranormal Ability subscale of the AEI, r(76) = .24, p < .05.
Visual Experiences was associated with the Paranormal Ability subscale
of the AEI, r(68) = .25, p < .05, the PB subscales of Superstition,
r(68) = .26, p < .05, and Neuroticism, r(68) = .21, p < .05, as
well as the AEI Poltergeist subscale, r(68) = .24, p < .05. Physical
Events was significantly associated with Extraversion, r(71) = .24, p
< .05, which again was not related to either PB or AEI, and Physical
Events was also related to the AEI: Paranormal Ability, r(71) = .31, p
< .05; Movement (of objects) was significantly associated only with
Rational Engagement, r(57) = .35, p < .05, whereas AEI and PB
inversely predicted Rational Engagement (see above, or Table 2) ; both
the AEI and PB subscales were unrelated to our movement of objects
experience category.

These correlations taken in conjunction with Table 2 demonstrate
that the haunt experience subscales only modestly relate to a few
specific subscales of both PB and AEI. Rational Engagement is the only
variable all three measures predict (although in opposite predictive
directions). There is only one instance where PB, AEI, and haunt
experiences interrelate with one another and predict a personality or
cognitive variable: Visual Experiences is related to PB Superstition,
r(68) = .26, p < .05, and both variables predict Neuroticism--PB:
r(156) =. 17, p < .05; VE: r(68) = .21, p < .05. Thus, the haunt
experience subscales independently predict factors of the personality
and cognitive variables that the AEI and PB do not.

Our dichotomy of lesser and greater haunt experiences was overall
not significantly predicted by any of the measures, with two exceptions.
Lesser Haunt Experiences was significantly associated with the
Precognition subscale of paranormal belief, r(99) = .28, p < .05, and
the AEI Poltergeist subscale, r(99) = .24, p < .05. Greater Haunt
Experiences was associated with Extraversion, r(99) = .22, p < .05.
Extraversion was not predicted by either the AEI or PB subscales (per
Table 2).

In overall summary, the correlative relationships between the
paranormal belief measures, haunt experiences, and personality and
cognitive variables show that all three of these measures (i.e., PB,
AEI, and haunt experiences) are only modestly related with a few
specific factors. More importantly, with two exceptions, these measures
independently predict different cognitive and personality variables.

Differences in Measures for Individuals Who Have and Have Not
Experienced Haunting Phenomena

To examine if people who experience haunt phenomena rate
differently than those who have not experienced haunt phenomena,
independent t tests were conducted across paranormal belief,
personality, and cognitive ability measures. Results are presented in
Table 4.

With regard to personality and cognitive variables, haunteds and
nonhaunteds did not significantly differ on mean scores of Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, or Openness to
Experience.

Likewise, haunteds did not differ on mean scores of Rational
Engagement, Rational Ability, or Experiential Ability. However, a
significant difference was shown for Experiential Engagement (30.98 vs.
33.85), t(156) = 2.39, p = .01, wherein those who experienced haunting
phenomena scored higher than those who did not.

Discussion

The goal of the current study was to provide an initial analysis of
how haunting experiences predict paranormal belief and experience as
defined by Tobacyk's (2004) Paranormal Belief Scale, and Gallagher
et al.'s (1994) Anomalous Experiences Inventory. We expressed
concerns that paranormal belief and experience as measured by these
constructs raise questions about whether people who have experienced
haunt phenomena are accurately represented in these measures. More
importantly, we wished to test if associations between PB and AEI with
other personality measures would apply to individuals who have
experienced haunting phenomena.

Generally speaking, the current article provides initial evidence
that validates our concerns. Individuals who reported haunting
experiences did rate significantly higher on several subscales of both
the PB and AEI. Yet, relationships between these measures and haunt
experiences, on the whole, are nonexistent, and where relationships do
exist, they are inconsistent across haunting categories and weak in
variance explained.

Paranormal Belief and Haunt Experience

In the current study, both PB and AEI did not predict haunting
experiences as a whole, including the subscale specifically associated
with poltergeist and haunt experience. The exception to this statement
was AEI Paranormal Ability, which significantly, albeit weakly, related
to hearing voices, visual experiences, and physical experiences. The
paranormal ability section of the AEI contained some of the specific
items mentioned in the AEI Poltergeist subscale, namely the ability to
communicate with the dead or supernatural forces. In this sense at
least, the current study provides some evidence that these types of
supernatural communication items indirectly relate to someone having
seen or experienced voices or apparitions. Yet two out of several items
within a specific subscale do not explain why this factor, which is
operationally defined as a person's belief in extraordinary
abilities, would relate to haunting experiences. The general
interpretation of haunting experiences is that they are conceived as the
result of external and invisible entities, and not a person's
special powers. Even if items do significantly relate to haunt
experience, the nature of the items themselves still does not address
haunting, and increases in these scores could be due to other beliefs,
including ESP, mediumship, or new age occult practices.

Paranormal belief, as measured by Tobacyk (2004), was poorly
predictive of haunting experiences. Only the Superstition subscale
predicted any type of haunt phenomena, and only for the Visual
Experiences category. Although poltergeist subscale items may account
for why AEI subscales relate to haunting experience, none of the
superstition items on PB remotely relates to haunt experiences.
Therefore, we have no clear explanation for why visual haunting
experiences would promote a belief in superstitions such as unlucky
numbers or curses from breaking a mirror.

In a similar vein, even when haunting phenomena are reconfigured
into lesser or greater haunting events, or as an overall score, these
measures did not fare much better. Out of 12 PB and AEI subscales, only
4 significantly predicted across the three experience summations of
lesser, greater, and overall haunt experiences. Specifically, PB
Precognition, and AEI Poltergeist predicted lesser haunt experiences,
while neither AEI nor PB predicted greater haunt experiences. However,
the sum measure was predicted by AEI Paranormal Experience, AEI
Poltergeist, PB Superstition, and PB Precognition.

As the AEI Paranormal Experience measure has much overlap with the
AEI Poltergeist items (6 of the 8 items in the poltergeist scale come
from AEI Paranormal Experience), it is not surprising to see that both
correlated with the same measure, at least in the overall sum category.
However, both the Paranormal Experience and the Poltergeist measures of
the AEI did not reliably predict either of the categories of haunt
experience (most relationships were not significant). When they did
significantly predict haunting experience, the relationships explained
little variance.

As there seems to be no consistent pattern across these
configurations, and items in these subscales have limited representation
with haunting phenomena, we interpret this evidence in two ways. First,
although our haunting experience measure is conceptual, the subscales do
moderately and significantly relate to each other and the sum measures
of haunt experience. Significant relationships between paranormal belief
and haunting experience measures are likely the result of inclusion of
haunting subscale categories in the sum measure that already relate to a
particular PB or AEI subset. As such, it seems likely that the lesser
and greater dichotomies and overall sum scores of haunting experience
may not contain much unique covariation with AEI and PB subscales.

Second, the lack of consistent prediction suggests that whatever
variables facilitate these relationships between haunt experience and
AEI and PB scales are artifacts not measured by the current study.
Indeed, the general lack of direct relationships between the 12 possible
PB and AEI subscales and our five haunting experience measures supports
our hypothesis that haunt experiences may not directly relate to
existing paranormal belief and experience measures.

However, people who experienced haunt phenomena did present
significantly greater mean scores on several of these subscales compared
with individuals who did not experience haunting, which was contrary to
our expectations. We interpret these findings to mean that the
experience of haunt phenomena will lead to an overall increase in
paranormal belief and experience as assessed by these measures. Assuming
generalization of the current sample, we could expect individuals who
report haunting experiences to have more belief in psi, witchcraft,
spiritualism, and precognition, as well as higher scores on paranormal
experience, ability, and beliefs.

What is troubling is that the current study cannot explain why
these scores are higher, as there is no direct relationship between the
majority of AEI and PB subscales and the number of haunt phenomena
experienced. If taken from the perspective that correlations between
variables indicate what factors might lead to a higher score, and
therefore a greater average, then significantly higher means in the PB
and AEI subsets cannot be accounted for by haunting experience alone.
Thus, an important finding of the current research is that other
unmeasured variables likely mediate the relationships between PB, AEI,
and haunt phenomena, in turn producing greater mean overall scores on PB
and AEI subsets.

Conceptually, it seems that haunt experiences by common definition
should represent activity that individuals would perceive as paranormal.
Although the current measure for assessing haunting experiences is not
statistically perfect, it is conceptually correct in the sense that the
categories roughly correspond to Lange et al.'s (1996) dichotomies
of haunt experience. They also conform to Hufford's (1982) emphasis
on experiences of participants. Thus, although our findings show little
relationship to PB and AEI, it seems conceptually correct that they
should be related.

However, potential mediating variables that might account for the
predictive relationships between haunting and paranormal belief measures
in the current study should be considered within the context of Hufford
(1982) and McClennon (1994, 2002) and the experiential source
hypothesis. The items from our haunting experience measure represent
basic experiences that people have reported and interpreted as haunting
events. Based on McClennon (1994), these would be considered primary and
secondary experiences: the raw material in which meaning is derived for
a person or group of people. However, both Hufford (1982) and McClennon
(1994) have suggested that two additional processes are likely to occur
in a haunting scenario before belief is determined. Before belief, a
testing or evaluation period of experiences occurs, and similar to
conformity effects found in social psychology (e.g., Asch, 1965; Sharif,
1937), a consensus of the meaning of the events also occurs before
belief is generated.

In the context of this process, one could view the measures of the
current study as existing on different levels of the meaning creation
process. Whereas our measure contains simple experiences or events, most
items in both the PB and AEI scales represent interpreted beliefs. An
example from the AEI Poltergeist scale demonstrates this tendency:
"I have seen elves or fairies or other types of little
people." This item does not specify if a person witnessed small
apparitions, blobs, mists, or small people. It clearly infers that
whatever the individual witnessed was interpreted as a visit from
fairies. Thus, our measure would most likely sit at the first stage of
the meaning process, whereas PB and AEI represent the end process, the
outcome of belief.

The problem with the experiential source hypothesis for our
findings is that there are two stages of belief-processing between our
measures and the PB and AEI. As such, the lack of relationship between
these measures may imply mediating variables (which we discuss below),
but may also represent differences in how haunting events are processed
in comparison to the other types of paranormal belief that are
represented in PB and AEI. Therefore, trait and personality influences
may play different roles within either of these intermediate
"meaning-making" stages between raw experience and the beliefs
that result.

Personality Measures, Cognitive Measures, and Haunt Experiences

Our case for haunteds not being represented by either PB or AEI
scales is further supported when we examine personality and cognitive
variables. Contrary to previous research with PB, cognitive functioning,
personality measures, and psychopathology, haunting experiences as a
whole were not predicted by either experiential tendency or ability
(a.k.a. intuitive tendency; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein,
1999). In fact, the opposite seems evident. Feeling presences and
movement of objects were associated with enjoying and engaging in
analysis. This is in contrast to the finding that negatively relates PB
and AEI to Rational Engagement in the current study. To our knowledge,
this is a unique finding and contrary to the expectations of previous
research (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996). It is interesting to note that
rational engagement is significantly associated with the experience of
witnessing the movement of objects. One interpretation of this finding
is that haunteds who experience the extraordinary event of objects
moving on their own begin to engage in cognitive analysis of how such an
event could happen. Again, this interpretation follows the lines of
Hufford (1982) and McClenon (1994, 2002), as participants attempt to
find meaning and explanation for these difficult-to-explain events in
the context of their cultural beliefs. As such, this finding suggests
that individuals in our study who had haunting experiences are somehow
different from those described by Irwin (2009) in his paranormal belief
research supporting the cognitive deficiencies hypothesis.

However, the current study did not directly assess probability
estimation or intelligence. Therefore, the current findings, while
contrary to previous literature, do leave open the possibility that
haunteds may still suffer from probability contingency effects (e.g.,
Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger & Graves, 1997; Rogers,
Davis, & Fisk, 2009) or lower IQscores (e.g., Smith, Foster, &
Stovin, 1998; Watt & Wiseman, 2002). We can state that haunteds are
different with regard to general cognitive analysis and intuitive
thinking tendencies compared to other paranormal belief samples. We are
unable to draw conclusions about IQ and probability estimation, and we
present these variables as areas for future research in haunt
experiences and paranormal belief.

Examinations of mean score differences between those who
experienced haunting phenomena versus those who did not are also
contrary to the cognitive deficiencies hypothesis (Irwin, 2009).
Haunteds do not significantly differ on rational ability, rational
engagement, or experiential ability compared with nonhaunteds. Yet, in
support of general findings in previous research (Epstein et al., 1996),
mean scores for experiential engagement (a desire and enjoyment of using
intuitive cognitive styles) were significantly greater with the sample
of individuals who did experience haunt phenomena. Since PB and AEI
scores do not correlate as a whole with haunt experience, and haunteds
do not appear to suffer from significantly lower scores in analytical
tendency and ability compared to nonhaunt samples, we tentatively
conclude that previous findings concerning PB, AEI, analytical tendency,
and intuitive tendency (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996) do not generally
apply to individuals whose paranormal belief is rooted in haunting
experiences.

Personality measures in the current study tell a mixed story about
previous findings. Extraversion predicted experiencing physical
phenomena, greater paranormal experiences, and overall sum scores of
haunting experience. The small significant relationships between
extraversion and paranormal experiences may lend indirect support for
haunteds having some sensation-seeking tendency. While not measured in
the current study, extraversion does significantly relate to sensation
seeking (e.g., Zuckerman, Bone, Neary, Manglesdorff, & Brustman,
1972). Thus, it seems possible that future research may find a
relationship between sensation seeking and paranormal belief (e.g.,
Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Kennedy, 2005; Smith, Johnson, &
Hathaway, 2009) within a haunting experience sample.

Openness to experience predicted hearing voices and approaches
significance for physical experiences. No other relationships were
significant, and mean differences between those who have experienced
haunting phenomena and those who have not were not significantly
different. Thus, whereas previous research would suggest that openness
to experience (e.g., Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Kennedy, 2005;
Smith et al., 2009) and neuroticism (e.g., Francis & Williams, 2009)
would predict paranormal experience, it does not reliably do so for
participants who have experienced haunting phenomena. However, the
sparse relationships with openness to experience and reports of hearing
voices in the current study do indirectly support the hypothesis that
people who have experienced haunting phenomena may share tendencies
toward openness to experience. We would tentatively conclude that any
relationship between openness to experience and haunting experience is
small and not very predictive.

With respect to the above, there is another possibility regarding
the findings of extraversion and openness to experience found in the
current study. Previous research has examined paranormal belief in the
general population but did not isolate those who have experienced
haunting phenomena. It is possible that previous samples contained large
numbers of individuals who actively believe in, are curious about, and
seek various forms of paranormal encounters. However, in our experience
with cases and reports of haunting, people are surprised and not
necessarily seeking any relationship with a ghost or spirit. More often
than not, people have experienced these events without their consent or
a wish for such activity to occur. Therefore, one possible explanation
of our findings with openness to experience and possibly sensation
seeking is that the samples fundamentally differ in the current research
and previous studies. Our sample may have more people who have
experienced involuntary haunting, whereas other samples may be more
confounded by sensation seekers. Simply put, it is hard to seek a
stimulus, or desire to experience a new stimulus, when the person cannot
reliably plan for it and is not aware that it is going to happen. Repeat
experiences of haunting might be tempting to extraverts, sensation
seekers, and open experiences, but if haunting events are independent of
people's control, it is unlikely that clusters of sensation seekers
would be present in an involuntary haunting experience population.

Conclusion

The current study's results strongly suggest that haunteds,
when assessed by a dichotomy of experiences, do not seem to be directly
associated to either PB or AEI, do not appear cognitively deficient, and
do not conform to previous research regarding either openness to
experience or neuroticism. They do, however, score significantly higher
on several PB and AEI subscales compared to people who have not reported
haunting experiences. We suggest the current evidence supports our
earlier hypothesis that haunteds are either not being represented in
paranormal research or are not being assessed, but they in some way
indirectly drive or confound current research in paranormal belief.

If the current sample is representative, two-thirds reported some
type of haunt experience, which suggests that these experiences are
relatively common for college students, at least in rural communities
with poor income levels. Even though these experiences are not directly
assessed in other studies, the current research suggests that portions
of other researchers' samples contain individuals who do experience
haunting, and through some unknown set of variables have greater degrees
of paranormal belief. It may be the case that researchers are currently
assessing more extreme haunting experiences, such as apparitions, but
neglecting to examine previous and less fearful events and encounters
that also contribute to paranormal belief. The current study cannot
identify these sets of variables, but we believe it is important to
further research haunt experiences. Because the current findings are so
contrary to previous research, replication is a priority, as well as an
examination of other variables such as transliminality (Lange et al.,
2000). These additional variables in the context of research that
further explores the experiences and interpretation of haunting, similar
to Hufford (1982) or McClennon (1994, 2002), would provide a much better
map for exploring how these haunting events relate to paranormal belief
as a whole.

We do not consider this research conclusive, but suggestive, as
some weaknesses exist. First, whereas the haunting experience measure
appears to be accurate in terms of describing haunting experiences and
has moderate relationships between its subscales, its internal
reliability is low because of "either-or" item content. As
such, results may differ if haunting experiences are approached from a
more traditional intercorrelated direction, although this transition may
come at the cost of measures that are less related to direct reports of
haunting experience.

Second, Lange et al.'s (2000) transliminality measures were
not included in the current study. The AEI has been used with
transliminality measures in previous research (e.g., Lange et al.,
2006), and it has been shown to strongly relate to items on the AEI
(Thalbourne & Houran, 2000). A strong possibility exists that one of
the variables that can tie haunting experience and paranormal belief is
"a hypothesized tendency for psychological material to cross
thresholds into or out of consciousness" (Lange et al., 2000, p.
591). As several psychopathological aspects have been melded into the
measure of transliminality, it seems that future research should include
it in order to fully assess individuals who have experienced haunt
phenomena and have potential for mental illness.

Whereas neuroticism and openness to experience were examined in the
current study, we used very short measures that lack the details of
their larger predecessors. We would interpret the lack of relationships
between openness to experience and neuroticism only as initial evidence,
particularly with the significantly greater experiential engagement
scores for haunteds that other research has shown to be related with
openness to experience (i.e., Pacini & Epstein, 1999). We are
currently replicating the current study with more detailed measures and
narrative accounts of these haunting experiences to assess the
relationships between haunteds and mental health in more detail. Thus,
whereas the current study does show that haunteds are no more neurotic
than nonhaunteds, it is by no means a complete refutation of mental
instability.

In conclusion, we submit these findings with the hope that they
serve as a spur for other researchers to further examine haunt
experiences. It seems that these individuals represent a neglected
subset of paranormal participants that does not fit with current
findings and, as such, they offer opportunities for further
understanding paranormal belief and how it relates to personal
experiences.

Haunting Experience
Feeling Presence (2 items)
I felt a positive presence (L)
I felt a negative presence (L)
Auditory Experience (6 items)
I heard a bump or knock (L)
I heard several bumps or knocks (L)
I heard moaning/laughter/voices (G)
I heard a voice say something to me (G)
I heard a voice say my name (G)
Visual Experiences (7 items)
I saw a floating light or darkness (L)
I saw some form of mist or smoke (L)
I saw a streak of light or darkness (L)
I saw the outline of a human shape (G)
I saw a detailed human shape (G)
I saw the outline of a non-human shape (G)
I saw a detailed non-human shape (G)
Physical Experiences (7 items)
My hair was tugged or pulled (L)
I was touched or poked (L)
I was scratched (G)
I was pushed or hit (G)
I felt a weight on my chest (L)
I had trouble breathing (L)
Other physical phenomena (L)
Movement (6 items)
An object(s) disappeared and reappeared later (G)
I saw movement of an object (G)
I saw a small object(s) float (G)
I saw a small object(s) fly across the room (G)
I saw furniture move (G)
I saw some other heavy object move (G)
Note: L = Lesser Haunt Experience, G = Greater Haunt Experience