Monday, December 2, 2013

The conflict in neighboring Syria has provided both
opportunities and problems for Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and to a lesser extent the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) have attempted to forge ties with Syrian Kurds and shape events
there to their benefit. These have only met with limited success as the Syrians
have their own agendas. To help explain this policy is Wladimir van Wilgenburg
who until recently was based in Irbil, and is an analyst for the Jamestown
Foundation out of Washington DC, and writes for Al Monitor.

Pres. Barzani saw the war in Syria as an opportunity to expand his influence into that country (Xinhua)

1. When the Syrian
war started it seemed like the KRG saw this as an opportunity to expand its
influence into that country. In general terms what was the KRG’s policy towards
the conflict when it began?

Both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
saw it as an opportunity to expand their influence after the Syrian government
left large parts of northern Syria and focused on combating the insurgency in
the major cities. The policy of Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), and the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) was limited to a Kurdish agenda in Syria, and not on toppling Assad or
supporting Assad.

On 26 October 2011, he tried to unite the Kurdish political parties by forming
the Kurdish National Council (KNC). This was also supported by Jalal Talabani,
the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since the PKK-affiliated
Democratic Union Party (PYD) increasingly became the strongest actor on the
ground, he was forced to recognize their role.

In 2012, he supported a deal between the PYD and the KNC to form the Supreme
Kurdish Council, a political body, to administer the Kurdish areas. Turkey was
not happy with this and also the Western countries wanted the KNC joining the
Syrian opposition. But Masoud Barzani didn’t want the Syrian Kurdish parties to
join the opposition without the recognition of Kurdish rights. KDP officials
such as Falah Mustafa Bakir, the KRG’s head of foreign relations, and Fuad
Hussein, chief of staff for president Barzani criticized the Syrian opposition
for not giving Kurds more rights,

Moreover, Barzani tried to empower the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria
(KDP-S) within the KNC in order to increase the influence of the KDP-S inside
Syria. Although the KNC was backed by Barzani, there are many different Kurdish
parties inside the KNC, and only the KDP-S is affiliated with Barzani’s KDP.

However, since the PYD is the strongest actor on the ground as a result of it’s
military control over the Kurdish areas in Syria through the People’s Defense
Units (YPG) backed up by the PKK, Barzani’s influence is limited inside Syria.

Salih Muslim and his PYD have become the dominant Kurdish group in Syria (Tracking Terrorism)

2. What are the
differences between Barzani and the PYD?

They have differences in ideology and strategy. The PKK follows Abdullah
Öcalan’s ideology of democratic confederalism. This strategy focuses on
creating semi-autonomous
Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Iran without threatening the countries’
respective borders. Therefore, when the PYD announced it plans last summer 2013
to form a transitional government or democratic self-rule, they always
emphasise it doesn’t threaten the unity or territorial integrity of Syria. For
instance, an official of PKK’s Iranian affiliate, PJAK, Ferhad Abdullazadegan, said, that “Before the fallout of Syria’s crises
in 2011, the Kurdish struggle continued to establish a democratic structure
that does not jeopardize the unity and integration of Syria as well.” In its
ideology the PKK is also different from the KDP. While the KDP is much more
conservative, a Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Council Co-President
Bese Hozat says the PKK is a “democratic socialist
movement against nationalism, religionism and sexism which all are ideologies
that lead up to fascism, nationalism and militarism.” Russia, Iran, and
allegedly the Syrian government have been supporting the PYD since it opposes
Turkish support for the toppling of the Assad government, although the PYD and
the PKK say they follow a ‘third line’.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani is closely allied to
Turkey and aims to build a more autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq and even
possibly an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, through economic ties and oil deals
with Turkey. Nechirvan Barzani, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region, said that “We have a door of hope, which
is Turkey. And if that door, that hope is closed, it will be impossible for us
to surrender to Baghdad. We will do something that will put in danger the
interests of all those concerned.” But at the same time he also said that
Turkey is opposed to Kurdish independence. Nevertheless, the KDP has tried to
attract Western and other international oil companies in order to become less
dependent on Baghdad, while the United States has opposed independent oil deals
of the KRG and supported Baghdad against the Iraqi Kurds. While the PKK is very
Marxist, against ‘imperialism’ and ‘capitalism’, the KDP is much more
conservative and works with tribes in Iraqi Kurdistan, while the PKK in its
ideology is against Kurdish tribes.

3. The KRG has tried to provide some
training for Syrian Kurds to counter the influence of the PDY. Has that been
successful?

By October 2012, the KDP had trained around one thousand and two hundred
Syrian Kurdish fighters suggested a Kurdwatch report.
However, the KDP didn’t want to risk a civil war with the PKK in Syria.
Although some KDP-trained Kurdish fighters returned to Syria, the PYD didn’t
allow them to create rival militias to the YPG. In May 2013, 74 members of the
KDP-S were arrested
at the border by the PYD security. Attempts by other Kurdish parties to create
rival militias were also stopped by the YPG and Asayesh. For instance, the Kurdish
Unity party in Syria tried to create militias in the province of Hasakah, but
the PYD didn’t allow them. They hoped their militias would be part of an united
Kurdish army under the control of the Supreme Kurdish Council, but the YPG says
it cannot allow any other Kurdish armed militias since it would lead to a civil
war and it sees itself as a legitimate Kurdish army.

The PYD's YPG militia has attempted to stop other Kurdish parties from forming their own armed groups (Al Jazeera)

4. What is the relationship between the
various Syrian Kurdish parties?

The Kurds in Syria are divided between various power blocs: Damascus (Assad),
Erbil (Barzani), Sulaymaniya (Talabani), Qandil (PKK) and Istanbul (Turkey –
Erdogan). The Sulaymaniya, Qandil, and Damascus axis had similar policies,
while the Erbil, Istanbul and the Western countries also had similar policies.

The Kurdish National Council recently joined the Syrian opposition. The
Barzani-backed parties are the strongest Kurdish parties within the KNC, but
some smaller Kurdish parties in the KNC worked with the PYD and joined their
security forces.

For instance, the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party of Syria, led by
Abdulhamid Darwish, is affiliated with Talabani’s PUK. Nevertheless, while the
PUK still supports the PYD, the party of Darwish left the militias of the PYD
after Kurdish protestors were shot
in the city of Amuda in June 2013, and its party supported the KNC move to join
the Syrian National Coalition. Nevertheless, still some smaller Kurdish parties
inside the KNC still back the PYD plan of creating an interim administration,
this while the majority of the KNC is supporting it. Initially the KNC backed
the plan, but it seems the negotiations failed.

The PYD on the other hand is still part of so-called ‘Internal Syrian
Opposition Group’, the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB)
that is against foreign intervention and wants a dialogue between the
opposition and the Syrian regime. Both the PYD and the NCB support a dialogue
in Geneva between the different competing political powers. As mentioned, the
PYD has relations with some smaller Kurdish parties inside the KNC, but also
has relations with the Iraqi Kurdish opposition party Gorran (Change) and the
PUK. Off course, it also has good relations with PKK-affiliates in Iran, Iraq,
and Turkey.

5. The KRG has shut
down some of its border crossings with Syria for short periods of time. How
were those closings connected to events in Syria?

The KRG has no official border with Syria. There is only a border crossing
controlled by the KDP, the Peshkhabour border point in Dohuk, 260 miles
northwest of Baghdad, which is also known as the Saemalka border crossing by
Kurds. The border crossing was closed several times as a result of the disputes
between the KDP and PKK, and as a result the PYD accused Turkey and the KDP of
imposing an embargo on them.

The KDP closed down the border crossing after the PYD arrested KDP-militia
members trying to cross the border in May, and the border crossing was closed
by both sides after 23 October, Salih Muslim, the PYD-leader, was refused entry
by the KDP and he crossed the Iraqi border through a smuggling route. The PYD
says the border crossing is still open to foreign journalists, but the KDP
doesn’t allow foreign journalists to cross at this point. The border crossing
was not always completely closed. On 15 July 2013, 700 Syrian refugees were allowed to cross for medical
aid. And in August 2013, around 30,000 crossed the border to the
KRG. And before the closure in October, Syrian Kurds were going back to Syria
to visit their relatives for the holiday.

Currently, the PYD hopes
it can use the recently captured Iraqi border crossing in Yaroubiya as an
alternative to the Turkish and Barzani-controlled border crossings and build
relations with the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki.

Kurdish areas of Syria, which the PYD has now dubbed Rojava (Institute for the Study of War)

6. You mentioned that
in November 2013 the PYD declared its own region in northern Syria in what it
calls Rojava. What was the KRG’s response?

Initially, there were talks between the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and
PYD, and there was an agreement between the two over the interim administration.
This despite the fact the KNC made the decision to join the Turkey-supported
Syrian opposition. There were several talks between the KNC and the PYD over
power-sharing and the interim administration, but especially the KDP-affiliated
party was very suspicious about the plan, and in the end the agreement between
the KNC and the PYD broke down to a certain extent, and the PYD moved ahead
with the plan in November. There are around 35 organizations supporting
the PYD plan now, according to pro-PYD media. As a result, Barzani in a statement
said the PYD declaration in November was a unilateral decision and accused the
PYD of working with the Baath-regime and imposing its will on other Kurdish
parties. He indirectly suggested that since the PYD joined the war on the side
of the Syrian regime, tens of thousands of Kurds became refugees. Also as a result,
the opposition is opposed to the PYD.Barzani
thinks Syrian Kurds are losing their golden opportunity to achieve more rights.
After the tensions increased between the PYD and the KDP in October and
November, and the Kurdish National Congress scheduled for 25th of
November was delayed as a result, Barzani visited the Kurdish city of
Diyarbakir together with the Turkish Prime Minister, and there are claims
the KDP plans to create a party inside Turkey.

7. Pres. Barzani has
forged very close ties to Turkey over the last couple years. What influence has
Ankara had on the KRG’s Syrian policy?

I doubt the KRG’s policy is much related to Turkish influence since Barzani
supports cooperation between the KNC and the PYD in Syria and also supports
Kurdish autonomy, while Ankara only supports Kurdish autonomy if it follows the
fall of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and if the opposition agrees with it.
The Syrian opposition is very opposed to autonomy. Even the Islamist armed
groups are against any form of ethnic nationalism. Since Turkey realized the
PYD moved ahead with its plans for de-facto Kurdish autonomy, it seems that
Turkey has supported Jihadi groups and Free Syrian Army-groups against the PYD
in Afrin, Ras al-Ain, and Aleppo. Since cooperation between the KNC and PYD
failed, Barzani has supported the KNC decision to join the Syrian opposition
and has tried to empower the KDP-affiliated party inside the KNC. Nevertheless,
the PYD claims Turkey is working together with Barzani to impose an embargo on
the PYD.

8. This seems ironic
because Ankara is holding peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
Turkey, which is backed by the KRG, but they both oppose the PKK-affiliated PYD
in Syria. Can you explain this contradictory stance?

Both Ankara and Irbil (not Talabani-factions and Gorran)
prefer peace and stability in Turkey. Irbil wants a safe transport route to
Turkey for it’s oil, while Ankara prefers stability and peace in Turkey.
Nevertheless, both of them do not want a PYD or PKK-controlled Kurdish area in
Syria. Turkey fears it could have a spill-over effect through the PKK in the
future, while the PYD claims that Barzani is afraid of a ‘PYD-model’ that could
threaten his popularity. One shouldn’t forget that one of the reasons why
Turkey engaged in peace talks with the PKK, is their power inside Syria.

9. Have Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) or the Change List (Gorran) tried a different Syrian
strategy or criticized Barzani for his?

Yes, PUK and Gorran politicians are supporting the PYD and the PKK, and
politicians of Gorran and PUK also criticized
Barzani’s recent trip to Turkey. It seems they want to use the PKK to
counterbalance the KDP’s power inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Both of them seem to
think that the KDP is too strong and has too much power inside the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG).

10. Today does it look like the KRG is
going to get any more involved in Syria or is it just going to continue with
its current policy of aiding refugees and backing friendly parties?

I doubt that the KDP would get military involved in the chaos of the war in
Syria and will continue to support refugees inside the KRG and back Kurdish
parties in Syria. Most likely there will be more negotiations between the PYD
and the KDP in the future. And in some way Turkey and Barzani will have to deal
with a de-facto PYD-controlled area in the future (unless the Syrian government
changes it’s policies and decides to actively combat the PYD inside Syria). But
for the moment the tensions between the KDP and PKK are very high.
Nevertheless, it will not lead to a Kurdish civil war inside of Syria.

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Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com