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Saturday, September 17, 2016

sales made during the pendency of the proceedings are wholly illegal and void ab initio in law= the sale in favour of the appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (c) Nos. 18090-18118 of 2004 is concerned during the pendency of the writ petitions, the same is also void ab initio in law as the same happened during the pendency of the Writ Petition before the learned single Judge of the High Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh & Ors.[12] held that the sale transactions of a similar nature is void ab initio in law. Thus, the transactions of the alleged sales made during the pendency of the proceedings are wholly illegal and void ab initio in law and therefore the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law. The said sale transactions are also contrary to law which is in operation in respect of agricultural lands. - The Impleadment Application - neither the agreements of sale nor the power of attorney(s) confer any right upon him at this time, as the same is barred by the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, 1952, provisions of the Specific Relief Act as well as the Limitation Act, the applicant has no legal right to come on record to challenge the impugned judgment and therefore the Impleadment Applications are rejected, as the same are wholly unsustainable in law.- We also hold that the transfer of the acquired lands by way of the alleged sale deeds executed by Mr. S. Rangarajan in favour of the appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004, as well as the transfer of lands by way of alleged sale deeds in favour of some of the appellant-purchasers in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18090-18118 of 2004 are illegal and void ab initio in law.

R. RAJASHEKAR AND ORS. …APPELLANTS
Vs.
TRINITY HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETY AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9120-9148 OF 2016
(Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.18090-18118 of 2004)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9149-9152 OF 2016
(Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.23336-23339 of 2004)

J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.

The present appeals arise out of the common impugned judgment and order
dated 06.05.2004 in Writ Appeal Nos. 7543-7557 of 1996 and connected
matters passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka,
wherein the judgment and order dated 12.07.1996, passed by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 8188-8201 of 1989 and
other connected petitions quashing the acquisition notifications issued
under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as the “L.A. Act”) was set aside.

The relevant facts which are required for us to appreciate the rival legal
contentions advanced on behalf of the parties are stated in brief
hereunder:

The lands involved in all these acquisition proceedings are
agricultural lands belonging to poor agriculturalists. On 09.01.1984,
Trinity House Building Co-Operative Society (hereinafter referred to as the
“respondent-Society”) was registered with the object of providing sites for
building residential houses for its members. On 12.03.1985, the said
society, represented by its President and Vice President entered into an
agreement with M/S Srinivasa Enterprises, represented by its proprietor,
Mr. S. Rangarajan. The said agreement was entered into between the parties
essentially for getting the lands acquired in favour of the respondent-
Society. The relevant clauses of the agreement will be extracted in the
reasoning portion of the judgment. As per the agreement, a contract of
agency was created in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan to act as a middleman
between the respondent-Society and the State Government to get the lands
mentioned therein acquired in favour of the respondent-Society.

It is also an undisputed fact that between 06.05.1987 and 12.06.1989, the
land owners of the lands mentioned in the agreement dated 12.03.1985 have
also executed power of attorney(s) in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan. The
state government of Karnataka by its order dated 23.06.1986, fixed the last
date as 30.06.1984 for the registration of the societies. The respondent-
Society finds a place at Serial No. 43 in the annexure attached to the
above government order.

By way of order dated 30.04.1987, the state government of Karnataka
constituted a ‘Three Men Committee’ to verify the claims of land for
acquisition being made by the various societies, and a State level Co-
ordination Committee also was constituted by the Government to inquire into
the affairs of the society before recommending their claim for acquisition.

The case of the respondent-Society came up for consideration before the
State Level Coordination Committee on 25.09.1987. The State Level
Coordination Committee, without application of mind to the facts of the
case, cleared the case of the respondent-Society for acquisition of lands
in its favour. The relevant portion pertaining to the Society reads thus:

On 10.03.1988, the Additional Registrar of Co-Operative Societies,
Bangalore passed an order under Section 64 of the Karnataka Co-operative
Societies Act, 1959, to inquire into certain allegations made against 98
House Building Co-Operative Societies of Bangalore City, including the
respondent-Society, and appointed Sri G.V.K. Rao, the then Controller of
Weights and Measures to investigate into the allegations of irregularities
and malpractices against the concerned societies.

In the meanwhile, on 15.04.1988, an agreement was entered into between the
state government of Karnataka and the respondent-Society as required under
Section 39 read with Section 41 of Part VII of the L.A. Act. The relevant
portions of the Agreement are extracted hereunder:
“AND WHEREAS THE SOCIETY has applied to the Government of Karnataka
(hereinafter referred to as “THE GOVERNMENT” that certain land more
particularly described in the schedule hereto annexed and hereinafter
referred to as “THE SAID LAND” should be acquired under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) hereinafter referred to as “the
said Act” for the following purpose namely:
Formation of sites and construction of houses to the members of the trinity
House Building Co-Operative Society Ltd. at Avalahalli and Herohalli,
Yelahanka hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore District.
AND WHEREAS the Government having caused an inquiry to be made in
conformity with the provisions of the said Act and being satisfied as a
result of such inquiry that the acquisition of the said land is needed for
the purpose.”

Subsequently, on 09.05.1988, the report of the G.V.K. Rao Committee was
submitted to the Government for its action. The Report found irregularities
in the manner in which the respondent-Society has granted membership to its
members. It was stated in the report that the Vice President of the
respondent-Society accepted these lapses and even attempted to justify the
same.

Even after the G.V.K. Rao Committee submitted its report, the state
government of Karnataka proceeded to issue the preliminary notification
under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act, which was published in the official
gazette dated 09.06.1988, proposing to acquire the lands in question to the
extent of 92 acres 38 guntas in Avalahalli and Herohalli villages of
Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore District in favour of the
respondent-Society.

Subsequently, around 33 Objection Petitions were filed before the Land
Acquisition Officer by the landowners, which were all rejected under the
inquiry conducted by him under Section 5-A(2) of the L.A. Act. The
objections filed by some of the landowners were rejected by land
acquisition officer primarily on the ground that the objections are not
valid, and that the concerned lands come in the middle of the layout and
that the lands are being acquired for the formation of house sites by the
respondent society, which is a public purpose as per the definition of
Section 3 (f) (vi) of the L.A. Act. On 18.03.1999, the state government
issued the final notification under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act declaring
that the lands were required for public purpose without proper application
of mind to the report received from the Land Acquisition Officer. The
relevant portion of the notification is extracted hereunder:

“And whereas the Government of Karnataka is satisfied after considering the
report of the special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore
under sub-section (2) of Section 5A and section 6(1) of special Land
Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894) as amended by Karnataka Act No. 17
of 1961 and Land Acquisition (Amendment Act 1984) that the said lands are
needed to be acquired for the purpose specified above.”

Aggrieved of the impugned acquisition notifications, the landowners
challenged the validity of the same by way of filing Writ Petitions before
the High Court of Karnataka urging various legal grounds and prayed for
quashing the same. The learned single Judge of the High Court, after
hearing the parties arrived at the conclusion that the facts of the case
were similar to those in the decision of this Court in the case of H.M.T.
House Building Co-Operative Society v. Syed Khader[1]. On the facts of the
case, the learned single Judge, by way of common judgment and order dated
12.07.1996 held as under:
“In the instant case, the 4th respondent along with the statement of
objections has produced Audit Report as Annexure-I. In the said report
there is reference that the landowners have been paid the consideration for
their lands through M/S Sree Srinivasa Enterprises. There is also a
reference that the society entered into an agreement dated 13.03.1985 with
that of M/S Sree Srinivasa Enterprises and as per the said agreement the
society has to pay Rs. 160/- per sq. yard to M/S Sree Srinivasa
Enterprises......
In the statement of objections it is stated that the society through the
agency of M/S Srinivasa Enterprises, represented by its proprietor has made
payments to the landowners. This fact shows that the facts involved in
these petitions are identical with that of the case involved in the
decision of HMT House Building Co-Operative Society (supra). The Supreme
Court in the said decision has held that the power u/s 4(1) and 6(1) of the
Act has been exercised for extraneous consideration at the instance of the
persons who have no role in the decision making process. In the said view
of the matter, I hold that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court is
applicable in all fours and therefore the impugned notifications are liable
to be quashed. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to
above, I hold that the petitioners are entitled to challenge the impugned
acquisition since the land acquisition proceedings is the product of
colourable exercise of power at the instance of the third parties.”

The learned single Judge has further held that the lands could not
have been acquired by the state government in favour of a society for the
purpose of providing residential sites to its members without following the
procedure provided under Part VII of the L.A. Act. The learned single Judge
accordingly, quashed the impugned notifications and also the acquisition
proceedings in exercise of the extraordinary and discretionary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Aggrieved of the common judgment and order passed by the learned Single
Judge, the respondent-Society filed Writ Appeals before the Division Bench
of the High Court challenging the correctness of the same urging certain
legal grounds. The Division Bench of the High Court held that there was no
evidence on record to suggest that the “outside agency” (M/s Srinivasa
Enterprises) had influenced the acquisition proceedings. On the other hand,
it is clear from the material placed on record that the case of the
respondent-Society was considered by the State Level Co-ordination
Committee on 25.09.1987, and on the basis of the clearance granted by the
Committee the state government granted approval to acquire the lands in
question. Accordingly, the Division Bench, by way of common final impugned
judgment and order dated 06.05.2004 allowed the appeals and set aside the
judgment and order passed by the learned single judge and restored the
acquisition proceedings. Hence, the present appeals.

We have heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, Mr. V. Giri and Mr. Basava Prabhu S.
Patil, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and
Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Society and Mr. H.N. Nagamohan Das, the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent-original landowners in the first two
appeals filed by the so-called purchasers.

The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants vehemently
question the correctness of the findings and reasons recorded by the
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and order. It is
contended that the findings and reasons recorded on the contentious points
are not only erroneous in law but also suffer from error in law. They place
strong reliance on the three judge bench decision of this Court in the case
of HMT House Building Cooperative Society (supra), which has been followed
in the subsequent decisions of this Court in the cases of H.M.T. House
Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa[2], Bangalore City
Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka[3], B. Anjanappa and
Ors. v. Vyalikaval House Building Cooperative Society Limited and Ors.[4].
The learned senior counsel further sought to distinguish the decision of
this Court in the case of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v.
Narayanamma[5], upon which strong reliance has been placed by the Division
Bench of the High Court, which has been followed by this Court in the cases
of Sumitramma v. State of Karnataka[6] and Muniyappa v. State of
Karnataka[7]. It is submitted that the reliance placed upon the said
judgments by the Division Bench of the High Court, in the absence of a
scheme framed and approved by the government as required under Section 3
(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act in favour of the respondent-Society, is held to be
violative of not only the statutory provisions of law, but also the
decisions of this Court referred to supra.

It is further contended by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants that the framing of a scheme and its prior approval by
the state government is sine qua non for initiating acquisition proceedings
for the purpose of Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act. It is submitted that
in the instant case, neither any such scheme has been framed by the
respondent-Society nor has there been any approval accorded by the state
government before initiating land acquisition proceedings in its favour and
therefore, they submit that the entire proceedings are vitiated in law.

It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that this Court in
the case of HMT House Building Co-Operative Society (supra) elaborated upon
the scope of the term housing for the purpose of Section 3(f)(vi) of the
L.A. Act. It was held therein as under:
“19. According to us, in Section 3(f)(vi) the expression "housing" has been
used along with educational and health schemes. As such the housing scheme
contemplated by Section 3(f)(vi) shall be such housing scheme which shall
serve the maximum number of members of the society. Such housing scheme
should prove to be useful to the public. That is why the Parliament while
introducing a new definition of "public purpose", said that any scheme
submitted by any co-operative society relating to housing, must receive
prior approval of the appropriate Government and then only the acquisition
of the land for such scheme can be held to be for public purpose. If
requirement of Section 3(f)(vi) is not strictly enforced, every housing co-
operative society shall approach the appropriate Government for acquisition
by applying Section 3(f)(vi) instead of pursuing the acquisition under Part
VII of the Act which has become more rigorous and restrictive. In this
background, it has to be held that the prior approval, required by Section
3(f)(vi), of the appropriate Government is not just a formality; it is a
condition precedent to the exercise of the power of acquisition by the
appropriate Government for a housing scheme of a co-operative society.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

It is further submitted that a perusal of the above extracted portion of
the judgment would show that prior approval of the government to the
Housing Scheme, as contemplated under Section 3(f) (vi) of the L.A. Act is
a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent domain power by the state
government for acquisition of lands for the purpose of the housing scheme
of a Co-operative society. Consequently, the existence of Housing Scheme
framed by the respondent-Society is a pre-condition for grant of approval
of the same by the State Government.

Further reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of B.
Anjanappa (supra), wherein it was held as under:
“20. We then enquired from Shri Bhat whether his client had submitted
housing scheme for the approval of the State Government. Shri Bhat
responded to the Court's query by relying upon the recommendations made by
the State Leval Coordination Committee for the acquisition of 179 acres,
one and half guntas land. We have carefully gone through the
recommendations of the State Level Coordination Committee but do not find
any trace of housing scheme which was under the consideration of the
Committee.

21. Shri Bhat then relied upon the approval accorded by the State
Government for the acquisition of land and the directions issued to Deputy
Commissioner, Bangalore to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the
1894 Act. He also relied upon the judgment in Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara
Sangha v. Narayanamma.

22. In Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of
Karnataka and Ors. decided on 2.2.2012, this Court considered the question
whether the approval granted by the State Government for the acquisition of
land can be considered as an approval of the housing scheme within the
meaning of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act and answered the same in negative.

23. The judgment in Kanak Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma
(supra), if read in the light of the 1st and 2nd HMT judgments and the
finding recorded by us that Respondent No. 1 had not framed any housing
scheme and secured its approval from the State Government, the direction
given to the Deputy Commissioner to issue notification under Section 4(1)
cannot be treated as the State Government's approval of the housing scheme
framed by Respondent No. 1. It is also apposite to note that in Kanak
Gruha's case, this Court was not called upon to consider a case in which
the State Government had come out with a specific stand that the housing
society had not framed any scheme.”

In the instant case there was no scheme framed by the respondent-Society
for the purpose of providing housing sites to its members and therefore, no
prior approval could have been accorded to it by the State Government. It
is submitted that the cut-off date for registration of societies and
enrolment of members being 30.06.1984, and the respondent-Society having
been registered just before the said cut-off date, i.e. on 01.02.1984, and
there being no Board of Directors constituted prior to December 1984, and
therefore, it could not have enrolled any members before the cut off date.
As such, there was no scheme framed before the cut off date. In the absence
of the same, there could not have been any government approval of the
scheme for initiating acquisition proceedings, so as to justify the
acquisition of lands under Section 3(f) (vi) of the L.A. Act. It is further
submitted by the learned senior counsel that the letter dated 26.11.1987;
on which reliance has been placed by the division bench of the High Court
in the impugned judgment also does not amount to an “approval” of a scheme
in law. The letter reads as under:
“Government of Karnataka
Karnataka Government Secretariat,
Vidhana Soudha,
Bangalore, dated 26.11.1987

No.RD 77 AQB 86

From :

The Revenue Commissioner and
Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department,
Bangalore.

To
The Special Deputy Commissioner,
Bangalore.

Sir,

Sub : Acquisition of land in favour of Trinity House Building Co-op.
Society
****
I am directed to convey the approval of Government for initiating the
acquisition proceedings for an extent of 94-18 acres of land in Avalahalli
and Harohalli village in favour of Trinity House Building Co-Op. Society as
recommended by the 3 men Committee and the State Level Co-Ordination
Committee.
The extent of land to be notified under Section 4(1) may be selected out of
the list of Sy. No. Furnished by the 3 men committee.....”

It is submitted that the above communication does not reflect the existence
of any Housing Scheme and the application of mind by the state Government
for according approval thereto. It mechanically directs for publication of
the notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act.

The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contend
that the lands in the instant case could not have been acquired in favour
of the respondent-Society in the absence of there being an housing scheme
framed by it and approval of the same. It is thus, contended that
acquisition of lands in the instant case is violative of both the statutory
provisions of law as well as the law laid down by this Court.

On the other hand, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent-Society vehemently opposes the legal
contentions advanced on behalf of the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants and sought to justify the impugned judgment and
order by placing strong reliance on the decision of this Court in the case
of Kanaka Gruha (supra). The learned senior counsel further submits that
the state government after accepting the report of Three Men Committee and
State High Level Co-ordination Committee, by way of its letter dated
26.11.1987, granted approval for acquisition of lands in question in
favour of the respondent-Society, the relevant portion of which has been
extracted supra.

The learned senior counsel further questions the locus standi of the
appellants in filing the first batch and second batch of appeals. It is
submitted that the agreement dated 12.05.1985 entered into between the
respondent-Society and M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises stipulates the respondent-
Society to pay consideration to Mr. S. Rangarajan for getting the layout
plan approved, costs of the entire lands purchased, execution of layout
work etc. It is submitted that the original landowners in the instant case
executed the general power of attorney in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan to
get the lands in question acquired. It is further submitted that the
preliminary notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act
dated 09.06.1988, and the final notification issued under Section 6(1) of
the L.A. Act dated 18.03.1989 were challenged by the respondent-original
landowners by way of Writ Petitions before the High Court of Karnataka,
wherein the learned single judge, by way of common judgment and order dated
12.07.1996 quashed the land acquisition proceedings. It is submitted that
within a few days, Mr. S. Rangarajan sold the lands in question in favour
of his daughter, son and son in law, who are the appellants in first batch
of appeals. It is contended that the purported sale transactions in respect
of lands covered in the acquisition notifications is illegal as the same is
nothing but fraud played by the said middleman on the original land owners
and the society with a mala fide intention to deprive the landowners of
their constitutional rights, thereby deceiving not only the original
landowners, but also the respondent-Society. It is thus, contended that
since the alleged sale of lands in favour of some of the appellants by Mr.
Rangarajan on the basis of the power of attorney executed by the landowners
is void ab initio in law, they have no locus standi to challenge the
legality of the impugned judgment and acquisition proceedings in respect of
the lands involved in these proceedings before this Court.

Mr. H.N. Nagamohan Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent original landowners-farmers sought to justify the impugned
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. It is
further submitted by the learned senior counsel that during the pendency of
the Writ Appeals before the High Court, there came to be a compromise
between the farmers and the society. The compromise is immensely beneficial
to farmers as for the acquisition of every acre, each one of them are
entitled for allotment of one site and the society has agreed to deposit
the award amount as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned
senior counsel submits that if the acquisition proceedings are not upheld,
the farmers will be deprived of both the award amount as well as a site for
every acre of land. In such a scenario, the only party which stands to gain
is the fraudulent purchasers of the lands. Alternatively, he submits that
even if the acquisition proceedings are quashed on the basis of the non
compliance with Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act and decisions of this
Court referred to supra and the sale transactions between Mr. S. Rangarajan
and some of the appellants are held void, then also the landowners will get
justice for depriving them and their family members of livelihood for more
than 28 years by preventing them from cultivating the said lands and
earning their livelihood.

We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties. Before we turn our attention to the essential questions of law
that arise for our consideration in the present case, it is important to
advert to a submission made on behalf of the appellants. The learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants have also sought to contend
that the respondent-Society had no locus standi to file the Writ Appeal as
it did not have any right over the said lands in the instant case. It is
submitted that a right would vest in the society only once possession of
the land was taken by the state government and award passed in favour of
the landowners, and thus, it did not have the locus standi to challenge the
quashing of the acquisition proceedings. The said submission has been
sought to be rebutted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent-Society, by placing reliance on a
constitution bench decision of this Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam
Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (D) by LRS. & Ors.[8].

We are unable to agree with the contention advanced on behalf of the
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Once the land
is sought to be acquired in favour of the respondent-society and
notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A. Act regarding
the same, the respondent-Society acquires the right to challenge the
quashing of the acquisition proceedings by a court of law. The contention
advanced by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent-Society that the appellant-purchasers have no
locus standi to file these special leave petitions cannot be accepted by us
for the reason that they had been impleaded as respondents in the Writ
Appeals before the High Court.

The essential questions of law that would arise for our consideration in
the instant case are:
Whether the acquisition of lands in favour of the respondent-society in the
impugned acquisition proceedings is covered under the definition of the
term public purpose, as defined under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act?
Whether the sale transactions in favour of the appellants in the first and
second batch of appeals during the pendency of the proceedings by the Power
of Attorney(s) holder Mr. S. Rangarajan, on behalf of some of the land
owners and sale of lands by some of the other landowners during the
pendency of the Writ Petitions in favour of the appellant-purchasers in
connected second appeals is legal and valid?
Whether the appellant-purchasers are entitled for the reliefs as prayed by
them?
What order?

Answer to Point Nos. 1 and 2:

Point nos. 1 and 2 are interrelated and are answered together as under:

Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act reads as under:

“(f) the expression “public purpose” includes-
.....
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing,
health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority
established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or with the
prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a
society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860),
or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a state, or a
co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative
societies for the time being in force in any State......”

The respondent-Society and M/s Srinivasa Enterprises by its proprietor Mr.
S. Rangarajan, entered into an agreement dated 13.03.1985. The relevant
clauses from the said agreement are extracted hereunder:
“2. WHEREAS the second party is the contractors, Representatives, Estate
agents and Builders, acting as agents for providing lands to Co-operative
societies, has entered into sale agreements with owners of the lands in Sy.
Nos. 64, 66/5, 66/7, 66/11, 66/13 and Sy. Nos. 50,53, 57/3, 57/4B, 57, 57/7
57/6, 90/1, 60/2, 60/5, 61/2, 61/3, 62, 63/2, 63/3, 64, 64/2, 65/1, 67,
67/4, 67/2, 3, 64/1, 67/3A, 68/I, 68/3 of Herohalli and Avalahally
villages of Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk respectively and WHEREAS
the second party has offered the first party its services in the matter of
securing sale of the above said lands in the First Party from the owners
thereof, free from encumbrances....”

5. The Second Party shall secure in the name of the First Party by way of
acquisition to the First Party lands in Sy. Nos. 64, 66/5, 66/7, 66/11,
66/13 and Sy. Nos. 50, 53, 57/3, 57/4B, 57, 57/7 57/6, 60/1, 60/3, 60/2,
60/5, 61/2, 61/3, 62, 63/2, 63/3, 64, 64/2, 65/1, 67, 67/4, 67/2, 3, 64/1,
67/3A, 68/I, 68/3 measuring about 180 acres at Harohally and Avalahally
villages of Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk respectively in one
continguous plot from the respective owners thereof…”

6.The Second Party shall arrange to initiate land Acquisition Proceedings
as per the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act under Clause 4(1), 6(1)
Notifications issued in the name of the First Party.”

7. All Acts, Deeds and things connected with the Acquisition of lands as
aforesaid shall be got completed by the Second Party with a view to
facilitate Acquisition of lands within a period of 18 months or any period
to be extended in writing by the First Party.

8. The Second Party shall take necessary steps to get the said lands
Acquired in the name of the First Party through the Government for the
formation of residential sites and handover the possession of said lands in
favour of the First Party within a period of 18 months from the date of
this Agreement.”

It becomes clear from a perusal of the aforesaid conditions incorporated
in the agreement that M/S Srinivasa Enterprises, represented by its
proprietor Mr. S. Rangarajan, had agreed to undertake the responsibility to
get the lands mentioned therein acquired in favour of the respondent-
Society from the state government and prepare a Layout Plan as per the
regulations of the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to
as “BDA”) and Town Planning Authority, and to get the plan sanctioned by
BDA in favour of the respondent-Society. In addition to the aforesaid
responsibility, he had also undertaken to execute the layout work in
accordance with the sanctioned layout plan under the supervision of the BDA
and get the sites released from the said authority in favour of the
respondent-Society. In terms of the agreement, Mr. S. Rangarajan was to be
paid Rs. 160/- per square yard by the respondent-Society, the calculation
of which was to be done at Rs. 100 per sq. yard and calculation of cost of
land at Rs. 60 per sq. yard for the layout charges. The details of the
payment plan are outlined as under:
“
|Initial advance at the time of signing this agreement |Rs. 50,000/- |
|On production of document of Title relating to the lands |25% |
|forming Subject matter of this agreement And after | |
|verification by the lawyers Of the society and at the time of | |
|Submission of Application for Acquisition. | |
|Upon section 4(1) notification is published in the official |30% |
|gazette | |
|Upon section 6 (1) notification is published in official |30% |
|gazette | |
|Upon approval of the plan of the Bangalore Development |15% |
|Authority | |

”

The aforementioned amount was enhanced to Rs. 170 per acre by way of
supplementary agreement dated 05.03.1992.

Thus, Mr. Rangarajan was essentially required to act as a middleman between
the respondent-Society and the state government to ensure that lands are
acquired in favour of the respondent-Society for the purpose of its housing
project. Further, between the years 1985 and 1987, the respondent
landowners had executed power of attorney(s) of the lands in favour of Mr.
Rangarajan. A sample clause from these Power of Attorney(s) reads as under:

“WHEREAS the schedule property has been sold by us under agreement to sell:
AND we have also agreed and declared to relinquish our rights for acquiring
the schedule property in favour of the Trinity House Building Co-Operative
Society Ltd., Bangalore AND WHEREAS we have received the full consideration
for the said schedule property as per Agreement under separate document and
receipt.

AND WHEREAS the registration formalities or the acquisition proceedings is
yet to be completed AND WHEREAS the entire consideration/ compensation/
award has been received by us under separate documents as said above we
hereby give this Power of Attorney in favour of SRI S. RANGARAJAN, S/o Late
K.S.S. Naidu, as desired by the Trinity House Building Co-Operative Society
Ltd., Bangalore.”

A perusal of the agreement executed between the respondent-Society
and Mr. Rangarajan, as well as the power of attorney(s) executed by the
landowners in favour of Mr. Rangarajan would clearly show that the ultimate
intent of the parties was to get the lands of the landowners acquired in
favour of the respondent-Society.

It was also brought to our attention by the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the fact that co-operative
societies were indulging in malpractices had also come to the notice of the
state government. Accordingly, the state government of Karnataka, on
23.06.1986 issued an order stating:
“A large number of House Building Co-operative Societies in Bangalore were
purchasing lands directly from the landlords or under Land Acquisition Act
for formation of layout. This has resulted in uncontrolled, un-planed and
haphazard growth of city of Bangalore. It also created acute problem of
order to regulate the orderly development of the city, it was felt hat the
activities of such societies should be restricted.....However it was
proposed to continue acquisition of lands for 70 House Building Co-
Operative Society subject to the clearance from the Three Men Committee
appointed for scrutiny of such proposal. Additional 49 societies listed in
the schedule to this order could not come within the purview of the said
Government Order....The cut-off date was fixed as 30-6-1984 for the purpose
of Registration of societies and enrolment of members for the said
purpose.....
It has been considered necessary to reconstitute the THREE MEN COMMITTEE
for Verification and for reporting to the revenue Department regarding the
extent of lands to be acquired for each society and for relaxation of cut-
off date for registration of certain societies and for enrolment of members
even beyond 30.06.1984.”

The G.V.K. Rao Committee report also mentions the irregularities in the
functioning of the respondent-Society. The relevant portions of the report
are extracted as under:

“…it appears that the society had entered into an agreement with Estate
Agents for acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act and in the
process, the amount being paid to the Estate Agents towards his service
charges itself is more than the costs of the land under land acquisition.
This is a clear case of the Society frittering away the advances collected
from the members and the site deposit collected from the members are not
employed in a prudent manner.
........
The society had admitted 18 members without applications for membership, 3
members with incomplete applications, at least 21 members from out-side the
jurisdiction of the society (all are from outside Bangalore) and 8 members
without resolution of the committee.....At one stage he has also stated
that many of their members are Senior Government Officers and this
demolishes the contention of the Vice-president that because of their
inexperience and ignorance, they have committed the mistakes. The way
society is admitting members from Bombay, Mangalore, Kolar, Andaman,
Secunderabad etc, makes it clear that they have absolutely no intention of
following their byelaws.
...........

When these lapses were brought to the notice of the Vice-President of the
society he has explained that, in the initial stages, since they did not
get the prescribed application forms printed, they had admitted a few
members without applications and thereafter when they had asked the members
to fill in the prescribed applications they have not filled in....Further
he has stated that since there is a lot of pressure from the members of
their community, they have admitted members from outside the jurisdiction
(mostly outside the state) and subsequently, they made efforts to amend the
Byelaws, the same has not been approved by the Department, and he has
pleaded that because of the inexperience of the committee, some mistakes
have been committed by the society while admitting the members and they
will take steps to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated.”

The G.V.K. Committee Report was considered by a Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in the case of Narayana Reddy v. State of
Karnataka[9], wherein it was held as under:
“39. As regards the Agreements entered into between the six respondent-
Societies and their agents, inter alia, for the purpose of influencing the
Government and to procure the preliminary and the final notifications under
Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which they did procure and
which are subject matter of challenge in these Petitions, the questions
which arises for consideration is, if the agreements are hit by Section 23
of the Contract Act on the ground that they were opposed to public policy
whether the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed on the grounds
that they were the result of exercise of influence by the agents on the
Government which submission of the petitioners stand substantiated by the
approval given for acquisition is all such cases which has made the
Government itself to realise that it has totally bungled in the matter as
is evident from the G.V.K. Rao Committee.....As far as the question that
the agreements in question are opposed to public policy is concerned, it is
seen that the real purpose of the Agreement entered into between the
respondent-Societies and their agents was that the agent should get the
preliminary and the final notifications from the Government and for that
purpose huge amounts were paid or agreed to be paid. Any power conferred on
the Government under a statute like the power conferred under Section 4 and
6 of the Act has to be exercised bona fide and for the purpose for which it
is conferred, therefore an agreement under which a party to the agreement
is required to influence the statutory authority and to procure a decision
favourable to the other party, is certainly opposed to public policy.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

The principle of law that an agreement under which a party to an agreement
is required to influence a statutory authority and to procure a decision
favourable to the other party, is certainly opposed to public policy, has
been elaborated by this Court in the case of Rattan Chand Hira Chand v.
Askar Nawaz Jung[10], wherein it was held as under:
“The contract such as the present one which is found by the City Civil
Court as well as the High Court to have been entered into with the obvious
purpose of influencing the authorities to procure a verdict in favour of
the late Nawab was obviously a "carrier" contract. To enforce such a
contract although its tendencies to injure public wealth is manifest is not
only to abdicate one's public duty but to assist in the promotion of a
pernicious practice of procuring decisions by influencing authorities when
they should abide by the law. To strike down such contracts is not to
invent a new head of public policy but to give effect to its true
implications. A democratic society is founded on the rule of law and any
practice which seeks to subvert or circumvent the law strikes at its very
root. When the Court discountenances such practice, it only safeguards the
foundation of the society. Even assuming, therefore, that the Court finds a
new head of public policy to strike down such practice, its activism is not
only warranted but desired.”

Further, in the first HMT case (supra), this Court has held as under:

“We are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statutory
notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been
issued due to the role played by M/s S.R. Constructions, respondent No. 11.
On the materials on record, High Court was justified in coming to the
conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been
initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of
the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than
a crore of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.”

In the instant case, the learned single Judge of the High Court rightly
placed strong reliance upon the judgment in the first H.M.T. House Building
Co-operative Society case (supra) and held that the said decision is
applicable on all fours to the facts of the case on hand, holding that
neither was a scheme framed by the respondent-Society nor prior approval
granted by the state government. The said finding was erroneously reversed
by the Division Bench of the High Court, which placed reliance upon the
letter dated 26.11.1987 of the State Government addressed to the Special
Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District and held that facts of the instant
case were similar to those of the decision of this Court in the case of
Kanaka Gruha (supra), wherein it was held as under:
“For emphasizing that prior approval of the appropriate Government in the
present case was not just an empty formality, we would refer to Annexure R-
1, which is as under: "Dated: 14.11.85 The Revenue Commissioner and
Secretary to Government, Bangalore.

The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore.

Sir,
Sub: Acquisition of Land in Sy. Nos.19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenahalli village
and Sy. No.29/3 of Konanakunt village Bangalore South Taluk in favour of
Kanaka Gruhaniramana Sahakara Sangha, Bangalore.

I am directed to convey the approval of Government to initiate acquisition
proceedings by issuing 4(1) notification in respect of lands measuring 8
acres 03 guntas as recommended by the Official Committee in Sy. Nos.19/2,
26, 29 of Kadirenehalli village and Sy. No.29/3 of Kenanakunte village,
Bangalore South Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha
Bangalore.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
(Mandi Hussain)
Under Secretary to Government Revenue Department.
Copy to the President, Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara No.435 Middle School
Road, V.V. Puram, Bangalore-4."

Considering the fact that State Government directed the Assistant Registrar
of Co-operative Societies of Bangalore to verify the requirement of the
members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed before
the Committee of three Members for scrutiny and thereafter the State
Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for
acquisition of the land in question by letter dated 14.11.1985, it cannot
be said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescribed under
Section 3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and
scrutiny.”

The Division Bench of the High Court in the instant case, accordingly, held
that the approval granted in the case on hand sufficiently satisfied the
requirements of Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act. The Division Bench of the
High Court, however, crucially fails to appreciate the fact that the said
letter issued by the state Government to the Deputy Commissioner does not
speak of either framing of a Housing Scheme as contemplated under Section
3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act or approval of the same as has been interpreted by
the three judge bench decision of this Court in the case of H.M.T. House
Building Co-operative Society (supra), which has been reiterated by this
Court in subsequent judgments on the similar set of facts including that of
Bangalore City Coop. Housing Society Ltd.(supra), the relevant paragraphs
of which are extracted hereunder:

20. Now the question which is to be answered is as to whether in view of
the definition of "public purpose" introduced by the aforesaid amending Act
68 of 1984 in Section 3(f)(vi), is it open to the appropriate Government to
acquire land for cooperative society for housing scheme without making
proper enquiry about the members of the Society and without putting such
housing co-operative society to term in respect of nature of construction,
the area to be alloted to the members and restrictions on transfer thereof?

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

22. In the present case, a hybrid procedure appears to have been followed.
Initially, the appellant society through M/s. S.R. Constructions purported
to acquire the lands by negotiation and sale by the land holders. Then from
terms of the agreement dated 17.3.1988, it appears that the procedure
prescribed in Part - VII was to be followed and the lands were to be
acquired at the cost of the appellant society treating it to be a
"company". The allegation made on behalf of the appellant society that the
housing scheme had been approved by the appropriate Government on 7.11.1984
shall not be deemed to be a prior approval within the meaning of Section
3(f)(vi) but an order giving previous consent as required by Section 39 of
Part VII of the Act. In the agreement dated 17.3.1988 it has been
specifically stated "And whereas the Government having caused inquiry to be
made in conformity .with the provisions of the said Act and being satisfied
as a result of such inquiry that the acquisition of the said land is needed
for the purpose referred to above has consented to the provisions of the
said Act being in force in order to acquire the said land for the benefit
of the society members to enter in the agreement hereinafter contained with
the Government". [emphasis supplied] But, ultimately, the lands have been
acquired on behalf of the appropriate Government treating the requirement
of the appellant society as for a public purpose within the meaning
of Section 3(f)(vi), It is surprising as to how respondent M/s S.R.
Constructions entered into agreement with the appellant society assuring it
that the lands, details of which were given in the agreement itself, shall
be acquired by the State Government by following the procedure of Sections
4(1) and 6(1) and for this, more than one crore of rupees was paid to M/s.
S.R. Constructions (respondent No. 11)”

Further, in the case of Vyalikaval House Building Coop. Society v. V.
Chandrappa[11], this Court held as under:

“109. The Court in Kanaka Gruha case noted that the Assistant Registrar of
Cooperative Societies, Three-Man Committee and the State Level Committee
had recommended the acquisition of land on behalf of the appellant and the
Government had directed the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore to
initiate acquisition proceedings by issuing Section 4(1) notification and
proceeded to observe:

‘17. Considering the fact that the State Government directed the Assistant
Registrar of Cooperative Societies of Bangalore to verify the requirement
of the members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed
before the Committee of three members for scrutiny and thereafter the State
Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for
acquisition of the land in question by Letter dated 14-11-1985, it cannot
be said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescribed under
Section 3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and
scrutiny.’

110. In our view, none of the orders and judgments referred to hereinabove
can be relied upon for holding that even though the appellant had not
framed any housing scheme, the acquisition in question should be deemed to
have been made for a public purpose as defined in Section 3(f)(vi) simply
because in the representation made by him to the Revenue Minister of the
State, the Executive Director of the appellant had indicated that the land
will be used for providing sites to poor and people belonging to Backward
Class and on receipt of the recommendations of SLCC the State Government
had directed the Special Deputy Commissioner to issue notification under
Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and that too by ignoring the ratio of the
judgments of the three-Judge Benches in 1st H.M.T. and 2nd H.M.T. cases and
the judgment of the two-Judge Bench in Vyalikaval House Building Coop.
Society case.

111. In majority of the cases decided by the High Court to which reference
has been made hereinabove, the petitioners were non-suited on the ground of
delay and laches or participation in the award proceedings. In Muniyappa
case, the judgment in 1st H.M.T. case was distinguished on the premise that
a scheme had been framed and the same had been approved by the State
Government and further that the petitioner had failed to show that the
approval was vitiated due to intervention of the extraneous consideration.
In Sumitramma case this Court noted that in 1st H.M.T. case, no separate
order was made by the Government for grant of approval whereas in
Sumitramma case an order has been passed on 14-10-1985 conveying the
Government’s approval for the issuance of Notification dated 21-1-1986
under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. In Kanaka Gruha case also, this Court
treated the direction contained in letter dated 14-11-1985 of the Revenue
Commissioner and Secretary to the Government to the Special Deputy
Commissioner, Bangalore to initiate the acquisition proceedings by issuing
notification under Section 4(1) as an approval within the meaning of
Section 3(f)(vi).

112. In none of the three cases, this Court was called upon to consider
whether the decision taken by the Government to sanction the acquisition of
land in the backdrop of an agreement executed by the society with a third
party, as had happened in 1st H.M.T. and 2nd H.M.T. cases and the present
case whereby the Estate Agent agreed to ensure the acquisition of land
within a specified time-frame subject to payment of huge amount of money
and the fact that the agreement entered into between the society and the
Government was in the nature of an agreement contemplated by Part VII of
the Act.”

113. While in 1st H.M.T. case the amount paid to M/s S.R. Constructions was
rupees one crore, in the present case, the appellant had agreed to pay more
than rupees five crores for facilitating issue of notifications under
Sections 4(1) and 6(1) and sanction of the layouts and plans by BDA within
a period of less than one year. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold
that the appellant’s case is squarely covered by the ratio of 1st H.M.T.
and 2nd H.M.T. cases and the High Court did not commit any error by relying
upon the judgment in 1st H.M.T. case for declaring that the acquisition was
not for a public purpose.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)

The stand of the respondent-Society is that the acquisition of lands by the
State Government is under Section 3 (f) (vi) of the L.A. Act and that a
scheme has been submitted and the same has been approved. But from a
perusal of the original acquisition file of the state government, it is
clear that there is no such scheme and no prior approval of the same by the
State Government as required under Section 3 (f)(vi) of the L.A. Act.

Thus, in the light of the judgments of this Court referred to supra, and in
the absence of framing of scheme by the respondent-Society and approval of
the same by the State Government as required under Section 3 (f)(vi) of the
L.A. Act, the Division Bench, holding that the letter dated 26.11.1987
referred to supra amounts to approval of the scheme, is wholly erroneous in
law for the reason that neither the Three Men Committee, nor the State
Level Co-ordination Committee even adverted to the said letter in their
proceedings. Further, no details are forthcoming from the original file
regarding the details of the scheme, and the application of mind by the
state government to approve the same. In the light of the decisions of this
Court, as well as the wording of Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act, we are
constrained to hold that the acquisition proceedings in the instant case
cannot be said to be one for ‘public purpose’ as defined under Section 3
(f) (vi) of the L.A. Act, especially in the light of the fact that not only
was there no scheme formulated by the respondent-Society and approved by
the State Government for the said purpose before initiating the acquisition
proceedings, but that the evidence on record clearly indicates that the
respondent-Society paid consideration to Mr. S. Rangarajan to act as the
agent between it and the state government, to ensure that the lands of the
original land owners are acquired in its favour. Upholding such an
acquisition would be akin to approving to such type of agreements which are
opposed to public policy and the same cannot be allowed by this Court under
any circumstances, as the concept of hiring middlemen to get lands of the
poor agricultural workers acquired by the state government in favour of a
Cooperative Society is abhorrent and cannot be granted the sanction of law.

Even as far as the terms of the so-called agreement are concerned, the
parties failed to meet those as well. The relevant clause of the agreement
is extracted as under:
“7. All Acts, Deeds and things connected with the Acquisition of lands as
aforesaid shall be got completed by the Second Party with a view to
facilitate Acquisition of lands within a period of 18 months or any period
to be extended in writing by the First Party.
8. The Second Party shall take necessary steps to get the said lands
Acquired in the name of the First Party through the Government for the
formation of residential sites and handover the possession of said lands in
favour of the First Party within a period of 18 months from the date of
this Agreement.”

It is clear that the parties to the said agreement were not even able to
honour the terms of the same. Thus, the acquisition of the lands cannot be
allowed to sustain for that reason as well.

Further, the state government did not even take into consideration the
finding of the G.V.K. Rao Committee report, which found that the respondent-
Society was issuing membership to persons fraudulently, including to those
persons who were not even residing within the area of operation of the
jurisdiction of the society. Further, the acquisition of lands of two
different villages by issuing the impugned notifications by the State
Government in exercise of its eminent domain power at the instance of a
middleman amounts to a mala fide exercise of power by the state government.
This is further made clear from the stand of the state government reflected
throughout the proceedings, not just before this Court, but also before the
High Court, where it remained a silent spectator to the proceedings, and
neither actively defended the acquisition of lands nor opposed it. Even in
the affidavit dated 03.08.2016 submitted before this Court in these
proceedings, the stand of the state government is merely that it will
proceed to make an award under Section 24(1)(a) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “New L.A. Act,
2013”), if the validity of the acquisition of the lands in question is
upheld. This stand of the state government clearly goes to show the
seriousness in which it has exercised its eminent domain power in such
important case of acquisition of lands of poor agricultural workers in
blatant violation of the provisions of the L.A. Act and law laid down by
this Court.

Thus, the impugned notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and Section
6(1) of the L.A. Act are bad in law as the same suffer from not only legal
mala fides but also legal malice, which amounts to colourable exercise of
power by the state government and therefore, the same are liable to be
quashed and accordingly quashed.

At this stage, it is also important to reflect on another argument advanced
by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that
since till date no award has been passed in favour of the landowners by the
Land Acquisition Officer and therefore, the land acquisition proceedings
are lapsed on that count also by virtue of Section 11A of the L.A. Act.

The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submit
that since no award has been passed within two years from the date of the
acquisition of the lands, which got over in April 1991, thus, by virtue of
Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the acquisition proceedings are lapsed. A
question which was sought to be examined was whether Section 24(1)(a) of
the New L.A. Act, 2013, which came into force from 01.01.2014 would save
the proceedings in the instant case, even if the award has not been passed
within two years from the date of the acquisition of the lands. Before we
deal with the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, it would be useful to advert to the relevant
statutory provisions.

Section 11A of the L.A. Act reads as under:
“11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall
make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date
of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that
period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall
lapse....”

The relevant provisions of the New L.A. Act, 2013 read as under:
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to
have lapsed in certain cases.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—
where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been
made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of
compensation shall apply; or
............ ”

“114. Repeal and saving.–(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is
hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1)
shall not be held to
prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.
......... ”

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as under:

“6. Effect of repeal- Where this Act, or any or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter
to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall
not-—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything
duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued
or incurred under any enactment so repealed;
.....”

It was contended that when the New L.A. Act, 2013 came into force,
the acquisition proceedings had already lapsed by virtue of Section 11A of
the L.A. Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act clearly lays down that
the repeal of the L.A. Act does not revive anything not in force or
existing at the time the repeal takes effect. It is submitted that the
repeal took effect on 01.01.2014 and as on that date, the acquisition
proceedings were no longer alive. Thus, Section 24(1)(a) of the New L.A.
Act,2013 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not revive the
acquisition proceedings which were dead long before coming into force of
the New L.A. Act, 2013.

On the other hand, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent-Society very strongly opposed the said
contention placing reliance upon Section 24(1)(a) of the New L.A. Act, 2013
and Section 11A of the L.A. Act that an Award could not be passed because
of the status quo order passed by way of an interim order that had been
passed during the pendency of the writ petitions, writ appeals and as well
as the proceedings before this Court. Therefore, the acquisition
proceedings cannot be said to have lapsed on that ground alone.

In view of the fact that for the reasons stated supra, we have already come
to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the
acquired lands are liable to be quashed and there is no need for us to
render an opinion on this question of law in these cases, as interesting as
it is.

Answer to Point nos. 3 and 4:

Having arrived at the conclusion on the points framed in these appeals for
the reasons stated supra, the acquisition proceedings in the instant case
are liable to be quashed, we now turn our attention to answer the question
of the relief required to be granted by this Court in favour of the
appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004
and the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18090-18118 of 2004. The
appellants in the connected third appeals arising out of SLP (C) No. 23336-
23339 of 2004 are the original owners of lands who had approached the High
Court after a long lapse of time. Therefore, Mr. Shanti Bhushan learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Society submits the
appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 23336-23339 of 2004 are liable to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches as they have approached the High
Court after long lapse of time without proper and sufficient explanation in
approaching belatedly to the High Court by filing writ petitions. Mr.
Shekhar Naphade, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the said
appellants-landowners has seriously opposed the above contention by
contending that the said question has already been answered by this Court
in H.M.T. House Building Coop. Society (supra) wherein it was held that
once the proceedings are void ab initio in law for non-compliance with
mandatory statutory requirement of prior approval of the Scheme, the
original owners cannot be shut out from the Court in challenging the
acquisition proceedings and therefore, they are entitled to challenge the
same at any point of time even in the collateral proceedings. We have
accepted the above contention as the same is well founded and tenable in
law.

On the issue of whether the so called purchasers of the lands during the
pendency of Writ petitions were entitled to relief as prayed for by them in
the instant cases, our answer must be in the negative for the following
reasons:

The respondent-original landowners in the first appeal had executed power
of attorney(s) in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan to facilitate him to get the
lands acquired in favour of the respondent-Society, the relevant terms of
which have been extracted supra to show that they have not executed the
power of attorney in his favour to sell their lands other than the
respondent-Society. On the basis of the same the acquisition proceedings
were initiated and the notifications under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the
L.A. Act were issued. Some of the respondent-original landowners objected
to the same by submitting their objections to the proposed acquisition of
their lands before the Land Acquisition Officer after Section 4(1)
notification was published. No doubt their objections have been
mechanically overruled by the Land Acquisition Officer and the State
Government without application of mind to the facts of the case and the
provisions of the L.A. Act. The fact that the report submitted by the
Special Deputy Commissioner under Section 5A(2) of the L.A. Act has not
been even considered by the State Government properly and objectively is
evident from the original file produced in these cases. After the Writ
Petitions were allowed by the learned single Judge of the High Court, the
middleman, Mr. S. Rangarajan played fraud on the land owners and the
society by making use of said Power of Attorney(s) and executed the sale
deeds in favour of his son, daughter and son-in-law who are the appellants
in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004, within a
span of a few days from the date of passing the judgment by the learned
Single Judge in the writ petitions. The said action of Mr. S. Rangarajan
tantamounts to fraud played by him upon the respondent-original landowners
and therefore, the said transaction of executing the sale deeds in favour
of his son, daughter and son in law is void ab initio in law.

As far as the sale in favour of the appellants in the appeals arising outof SLP (c) Nos. 18090-18118 of 2004 is concerned during the pendency of thewrit petitions, the same is also void ab initio in law as the same happenedduring the pendency of the Writ Petition before the learned single Judge ofthe High Court.A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Uddar GaganProperties Ltd. v. Sant Singh & Ors.[12] held that the sale transactions ofa similar nature is void ab initio in law. Thus, the transactions of thealleged sales made during the pendency of the proceedings are whollyillegal and void ab initio in law and therefore the same cannot be allowedto sustain in law. The said sale transactions are also contrary to lawwhich is in operation in respect of agricultural lands.

The Impleadment Application Nos. 74-102 of 2010 filed in the appeals
arising out of the SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004 are also liable to be
rejected, as the applicant therein claims to be the Power of Attorney(s)
holder of some of the lands in question and agreements of sale. Since he
neither approached the High Court, nor this Court by way of filing SLPs andneither the agreements of sale nor the power of attorney(s) confer anyright upon him at this time, as the same is barred by the provisions of theLand Reforms Act, 1952, provisions of the Specific Relief Act as well asthe Limitation Act, the applicant has no legal right to come on record tochallenge the impugned judgment and therefore the Impleadment Applicationsare rejected, as the same are wholly unsustainable in law.

For the reasons stated supra, we pass the following orders:

The appeals filed by the so-called purchasers and some of the landowners
seeking to set aside the common impugned judgment and order dated
06.05.2004 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in
Writ Appeal Nos. 7543-7557 of 1996 and other connected appeals are allowed
to the extent as indicated below and the impugned judgment and order is
hereby set aside. The common judgment and order dated 12.07.1996 passed by
the learned single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 8188-8201
of 1989 and other connected writ petitions in quashing the acquisition
notifications and proceedings are restored.

We also hold that the transfer of the acquired lands by way of the allegedsale deeds executed by Mr. S. Rangarajan in favour of the appellants in theappeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004, as well as thetransfer of lands by way of alleged sale deeds in favour of some of theappellant-purchasers in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18090-18118of 2004 are illegal and void ab initio in law.

Since the learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the acquisition
notifications and proceedings at the instance of the original landowners,
which common judgment and order has been restored by this Court by setting
aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court in the Writ Appeals filed by the respondent-Society, we grant
the relief as has been granted by the learned single Judge in favour of the
said original landowners, who are the respondents in the first two appeals
before us and also allow the appeals filed by some of the landowners in the
civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) No. 23336-23339 of 2004.

Since we have set aside the common impugned judgment and order of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, we consequently restore the
common judgment and order of the learned single Judge passed in the Writ
Petitions, wherein the acquisition notifications and proceedings in respect
of the lands of some of original landowners have been quashed at their
instance. The same shall now be enjoyed by them. So also the appellants in
the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 23336-23339 of 2004 are entitled
for the same relief as we quashed the acquisition notifications and
proceedings. For this purpose, we direct the Deputy Commissioner of
Bangalore, Urban District and also the Commissioner of Police/DGP to extend
all such protection and assistance to the landowners to ensure that this
judgment and order is implemented properly.