On April 23, 2012, the plaintiff in State of Ohio ex rel. David P. Joyce, Prosecuting Attorney of Geauga County Ohio v. MERSCORP, Inc., et al., N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:11-cv-02474, filed its motion seeking an order certifying the action as a class action, appointing Geauga County as class representative, and appointing plaintiff’s counsel, the New York law firm of Bernstein Liebhard LLP, as class counsel. The plaintiff argues that the case, which the plaintiff is attempting to bring on behalf of all 88 Ohio counties for relief relating to the allegedly unlawful failure of MERS and its member institutions to record millions of mortgages and mortgage assignments throughout Ohio, meets all requirements of Rule 23(a) and that certification is proper under any one of the 3 subsections of Rule 23(b). The plaintiff hopes to persuade the court that the MERS/member institution policy concerning recordation of mortgages and assignments is a “common scheme or course of conduct” that has given rise to claims “ideally suited for class certification.”

Mortgage-backed securities litigation has been very good for some of the most obscure laws on the books. I’ve already mentioned the starring role the unheralded statute of repose has taken in bank motions to dismiss securities claims by MBS investors, and we all know about Bank of America’s ingenious (or nefarious, depending on your perspective) use of New York’s Article 77 — a proceeding so rarely invoked that the judge assigned the case had to look it up — to seek approval of its proposed $8.5 billion settlement with investors in Countrywide mortgage-backed notes. Today I bring you the Edge Act, a hundred-year-old law that grants federal-court jurisdiction to civil suits against any U.S corporation in which claims arise from international banking or banking transactions in a U.S. territory.

You’re probably wondering what the Edge Act has to do with U.S. MBS trusts in which securities are backed by U.S.-issued mortgages on properties in the United States. Well, it turns out that a handful of the mortgages backing BofA securities actually originated in the Virgin Islands and Guam. We are talking about a very small handful. According to a brief AIG submitted to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, of the 1.7 million mortgages underlying the 349 MBS trusts at issue in AIG’s $10 billion case against Bank of America, exactly 8 mortgages in 3 trusts originated in U.S. territories.

U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer of federal court in Los Angeles is poised to deliver a ruling in AIG’s mortgage-backed securities case against Countrywide that could have an impact on just about every company headquartered in New York. The issue: How long do N.Y. businesses have to bring fraud claims? Are they entitled to the benefit of the state’s generous six-year statute of limitations? Or, as Countrywide argues in a supplemental motion to dismiss filed on March 23, are companies headquartered in New York instead restricted to the generally stingier time limits in their states of incorporation?

To understand how this question arose in AIG’s MBS case, we have to back up a few steps. It’s no secret that in MBS litigation, there’s no more potent defense than arguments that investors waited too long to file suit. It’s a quick, clean way to excise big chunks of a plaintiff’s case, particularly because federal securities claims, with exceptions for American Pipe tolling (if you don’t know, don’t ask), are generally time-barred after three years under the statute of limitations or the more-obscure-until-MBS-litigation statute of repose. That’s why we’ve seen so many MBS plaintiffs — including AIG and the satellite insurance companies that are also plaintiffs in its Countrywide suit — assert state-law fraud claims in addition to federal securities claims.

Wanna know why? Because it was AIG United Guarantee that was contracted to perform the loan reviews for FNMA to support put-back demands last year and the year before. Wanna know how I know? Because I requested, had lots of one-to-one conversation with the AIG staff and received a fraud investigation from FNMA of my loan origination. And my suspicions were confirmed, thanks to AIG UG investigators, although in FNMA’s view, the ‘mistakes’ discovered were not ‘material’ (to FNMA).

Here’s my point – AIG UG has seen every nook and crannie of the FNMA 2005-2008 cesspool. They don’t want to have anything more to do with it. Ha!

HW-

United Guaranty, the mortgage insurance subsidiary of AIG (AIG: 23.12 -1.78%), said Monday it refuses to accept all of the new HARP refinancing terms based on fears it will end up on the hook for fraudulently written or bad loans.

United Guaranty responded to HousingWire after Bloomberg News said the mortgage insurer refuses to provide blanket waivers on reps and warranties for mortgage lenders trying to get loans through the HARP process. Reps and warrants force originators to buy-back loans that were either poorly or fraudulently underwritten.

Washington, DC—Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings issued the following statement on a new GAO report issued regarding AIG. The report found inconsistent accounts of attempts by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to negotiate with AIG’s counterparties to lower U.S. taxpayer exposure.

“GAO’s report cries out for the full and immediate implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. As distasteful as the AIG bailout was, the systemic risk posed by AIG to the domestic and international economies was real, and cannot be overstated. This report reinforces the need to implement provisions in Dodd-Frank that will prohibit the use of tax-payer dollars to artificially prop up or benefit one firm, and ensure that massive, nonbank companies cannot engage in financial transactions that put our nation’s economy at risk again.”

Cummings was one of the Members of Congress who asked GAO to examine the decision to provide AIG with taxpayer funds. The report echoes the findings of investigations conducted, at Cummings’s request, by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program (SIGTARP) which found clear shortfalls in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s negotiations with AIG counterparties regarding the payments they would receive for credit default swap contracts they held.

Summary

In September 2008, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) approved emergency lending to American International Group, Inc. (AIG)–the first in a series of actions that, together with the Department of the Treasury, authorized $182.3 billion in federal aid to assist the company. Federal Reserve System officials said that their goal was to avert a disorderly failure of AIG, which they believed would have posed systemic risk to the financial system. But these actions were controversial, raising questions about government intervention in the private marketplace. This report discusses (1) key decisions to provide aid to AIG; (2) decisions involving the Maiden Lane III (ML III) special purpose vehicle (SPV), which was a central part of providing assistance to the company; (3) the extent to which actions were consistent with relevant law or policy; and (4) lessons learned from the AIG assistance. To address these issues, GAO focused on the initial assistance to AIG and subsequent creation of ML III. GAO examined a large volume of AIG-related documents, primarily from the Federal Reserve System–the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)–and conducted a wide range of interviews, including with Federal Reserve System staff, FRBNY advisors, former and current AIG executives, AIG business counterparties, credit rating agencies, potential private financiers, academics, finance experts, state insurance officials, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) officials. Although GAO makes no new recommendations in this report, it reiterates previous recommendations aimed at improving the Federal Reserve System’s documentation standards and conflict-of-interest policies.

While warning signs of the company’s difficulties had begun to appear a year before the Federal Reserve System provided assistance, Federal Reserve System officials said they became acutely aware of AIG’s deteriorating condition in September 2008. The Federal Reserve System received information through its financial markets monitoring and ultimately intervened as the possibility of bankruptcy became imminent. Efforts by AIG and the Federal Reserve System to secure private financing failed after the extent of AIG’s liquidity needs became clearer. Both the Federal Reserve System and AIG considered bankruptcy issues, although no bankruptcy filing was made. Due to AIG’s deteriorating condition in September 2008, the Federal Reserve System said it had little opportunity to consider alternatives before its initial assistance. As AIG’s troubles persisted, the company and the Federal Reserve System considered a range of options, including guarantees, accelerated asset sales, and nationalization. According to Federal Reserve System officials, AIG’s credit ratings were a critical consideration in the assistance, as downgrades would have further strained AIG’s liquidity position. After the initial federal assistance, ML III became a key part of the Federal Reserve System’s continuing efforts to stabilize AIG. With ML III, FRBNY loaned funds to an SPV established to buy collateralized debt obligations (CDO) from AIG counterparties that had purchased credit default swaps from AIG to protect the value of those assets. In exchange, the counterparties agreed to terminate the credit default swaps, which were a significant source of AIG’s liquidity problems. As the value of the CDO assets, or the condition of AIG itself, declined, AIG was required to provide additional collateral to its counterparties. In designing ML III, FRBNY said that it chose the only option available given constraints at the time, deciding against plans that could have reduced the size of its lending or increased the loan’s security. Although the Federal Reserve Board approved ML III with an expectation that concessions would be negotiated with AIG’s counterparties, FRBNY made varying attempts to obtain these discounts. FRBNY officials said that they had little bargaining power in seeking concessions and would have faced difficulty in getting all counterparties to agree to a discount. While FRBNY took actions to treat the counterparties alike, the perceived value of ML III participation likely varied by the size of a counterparty’s exposure to AIG or its method of managing risk. While the Federal Reserve Board exercised broad emergency lending authority to assist AIG, it was not required to, nor did it, fully document its interpretation of its authority or the basis of its decisions. For federal securities filings AIG was required to make, FRBNY influenced the company’s filings about federal aid but did not direct AIG on what information to disclose. In providing aid to AIG, FRBNY implemented conflict-of-interest procedures, and granted a number of waivers, many of which were conditioned on the separation of employees and information. A series of complex relationships grew out of the government’s intervention, involving FRBNY advisors, AIG counterparties, and others, which could expose FRBNY to greater risk that it would not fully identify and appropriately manage conflict issues and relationships.

When New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman sued Bank of New York Mellon in August, the AG asserted that the Countrywide mortgage-backed securitization trustee had breached its duty to MBS investors. “As trustee, BNYM owed and owes a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty,” said the AG’s suit, which was filed as a counterclaim in BNY Mellon’s case seeking approval of the proposed $8.5 billion Bank of America settlement with MBS investors. “[BNYM] breached that duty to [investors’] detriment and disadvantage, by failing to notify them of issues regarding the quality of loans underlying their securities.”

But according to BNY Mellon, it had no such duty.

The bank’s lawyers at Mayer Brown and Dechert filed a 14-page brief this week outlining its interpretation of the responsibilities of an MBS securitization trustee. The filing came at the direction of Manhattan federal Judge William Pauley, who’s deciding whether the BofA MBS settlement should be heard in state court, where BNY Mellon filed it, or in federal court, where key objectors to the proposed settlement want it to proceed. Pauley was concerned with the “securities exception” to the Class Action Fairness Act, which could end up guiding his decision on the forum question. For BNY Mellon, however, any discussion of its trustee responsibilities is fraught with danger. It’s already facing the New York AG’s claims, and several other state attorneys general have threatened similar actions. MBS investors, meanwhile, are pushing BNY Mellon (and other securitization trustees) to bring put-back claims, with the implied threat that investors will take action against trustees unless they do.

On September 23, 2011, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP filed a complaint alleging violations of the federal securities laws by Bank of America Corporation and certain of its officers and/or directors. The class action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of BofA securities between February 25, 2011 and August 5, 2011 (the “Class Period”).

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from today. If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff’s counsel, Samuel H. Rudman or David A. Rosenfeld of Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. If you are a member of this class, you can view a copy of the complaint as filed or join this class action online at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/bofaaig/ . Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

The complaint charges BofA and certain of its officers and directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. BofA is one of the largest financial institutions in the world.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants misled investors by failing to disclose that BofA potentially owes American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) over $10 billion. Specifically, defendants’ statements during the Class Period were materially false and misleading for failing to disclose that between 2005 and 2007, BofA and two companies that BofA acquired — Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) and Countrywide Financial Corporation (“Countrywide”) — and their subsidiaries sold AIG over $28 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”), and that as a result of these sales, AIG suffered losses in excess of $10 billion and BofA was potentially subject to suit for those losses. Throughout the Class Period, defendants repeatedly informed investors about the claims of other entities for their RMBS losses but not about the massive losses suffered by AIG.

The $8.5 billion settlement that Bank of New York and Bank of America hope will resolve all (or almost all) mortgage backed securities claims between them has faced a lot of opposition. The attorneys general of New York and Delaware oppose the deal, as do various investors not involved in the deal negotiations. Now a new, completely different type of opposition has surfaced: homeowners whose loans are funding the securities involved in the BNY-BofA settlement.

On Tuesday, four homeowners whose loans were securitized into trusts in the settlement both sued to block the settlement in federal court and asked the New York State Court judge weighing the settlement for permission to intervene on behalf of all the borrowers whose loans are in the trusts and give the court their perspective on the BNY-BofA settlement.

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP today announced that it is investigating concerns by hedge funds and institutional investors who believe Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC) may have failed to disclose to investors the risk associated with a $10 billion lawsuit threat from American International Group (“AIG”) (NYSE: AIG).

According to reports, AIG invested in billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities sold by Bank of America prior to the housing collapse. In January 2011, after analyzing data from hundreds of thousands of loans, AIG reportedly informed the bank that it felt the risk of the securities had been misrepresented and was prepared to sue the banking giant for more than $10 billion.

Hagens Berman is investigating whether Bank of America failed to disclose fully the risks of its dispute with AIG. According to media reports, the bank did not mention the threat of the lawsuit in its quarterly regulatory filing, which was issued four days before AIG’s lawsuit was filed.

“We believe that Bank of America knew, or should have known, that its dispute with AIG represented a significant risk for investors,” said Partner Reed R. Kathrein, who is leading the firm’s investigation from its San Francisco office. “If the company did indeed fail to disclose such a risk, it could represent a major breach of the securities laws.”

On August 8, 2011, after several months of negotiations, AIG filed its lawsuit. Bank of America shares fell sharply, losing 20 percent of their value.

Institutional investors and others who purchased Bank of America common stock between May 5, 2011 and August 8, 2011, and who have losses exceeding $1,000,000 as a result of BAC’s stock drop on August 8, 2011, are encouraged to contact the firm. Reed R. Kathrein can be reached at (206) 623-7292 or via email at CCME@hbsslaw.com. Investors can also learn more about this investigation at www.hbsslaw.com/BACsecurities.

Top Bank of America Corp lawyers knew as early as January that American International Group Inc was prepared to sue the bank for more than $10 billion, seven months before the lawsuit was filed, according to sources familiar with the matter.

Bank of America shares fell more than 20 percent on August 8, the day the lawsuit was filed, adding to worries about the stability of the largest U.S. bank. It wasn’t until Warren Buffett stepped up with a $5 billion investment that those fears were eased, though hardly eliminated.

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP,
INC., AIG SECURITIES LENDING
CORPORATION, AMERICAN
GENERAL ASSURANCE COMPANY,
AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN
GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF DELAWARE,
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
COMPANY, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP
RETIREMENT PLAN, CHARTIS
PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY,
CHARTIS SELECT INSURANCE
COMPANY, CHARTIS SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRY INSURANCE
COMPANY, FIRST SUNAMERICA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, LEXINGTON
INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF PITTSBURGH, PA, NEW
HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
SUNAMERICA ANNUITY AND LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY,
SUNAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, THE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, THE UNITED STATES
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, THE VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, and WESTERN NATIONAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

One of the most frustrating facts of the recently abated financial crisis is that those who might have been partly responsible for it have got off scot-free. The only two people prosecuted criminally — the Bear Stearns hedge fund managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin — were found not guilty by a jury in Brooklyn. Other potential culprits — Angelo Mozilo, chief executive of Countrywide Financial, Joseph Cassano, chief executive of AIG Financial Products, and Dick Fuld, the chief executive of Lehman Brothers — were either slapped with a small civil penalty, in the case of Mozilo, or the Justice Department made the decision not to prosecute after months of investigation.

The New York Fed will instead sell the assets individually and in blocks, the regulator said yesterday in astatementposted on its website.BlackRock Inc. (BLK), the New York Fed’s investment manager, will issue the first bid list next week, according to the statement.

“We had anticipated we would have the opportunity to buy these assets at a fair price by January 2011 and earn a return on them for the benefit of the U.S. taxpayer,” Mark Herr, a spokesman for New York-based AIG, said in an e-mailed statement. “Now, we must make up for lost time and lost earnings.”

Barclays Plc (BARC) is among investors considering making a counter offer, the Financial Times reported, citing unidentified people familiar with the matter. Seth Martin, a Barclays spokesman in New York, declined to comment.

Pursuant to that certain Asset Purchase Agreement, dated as of December 12, 2008 (as amended to date, the “Asset Purchase Agreement”), by and among the sellers party thereto (such entities, the “Original Sellers”), Maiden Lane II LLC (“ML II”), as buyer, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “FRBNY”), as controlling party, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG Inc.”) and AIG Securities Lending Corp., as AIG agent, ML II purchased from the Original Sellers tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities. Pursuant to that certain Credit Agreement, dated as of December 12, 2008 (as amended to date, the “Credit Agreement”) among ML II, as Borrower, the FRBNY, as Controlling Party and as Senior Lender, and The Bank of New York Mellon, as Collateral Agent, the FRBNY made a loan to ML II to finance the purchase of the assets (the “Senior Loan”). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein, shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Credit Agreement and if not defined therein, the meaning ascribed thereto in the Asset Purchase Agreement.

Set forth below is a summary of proposed terms under which AIG Inc. would propose to enter into a Purchase Agreement (the “AIG Inc. PA”) with ML II and FRBNY, as Senior Lender and Controlling Party, pursuant to which one or more Buyers (as defined below) would purchase from ML II all of the assets (other than cash) owned by ML II as of the Cut-Off Date set forth below (each such asset, individually, an “Asset”, and collectively, the “Assets”).

NEW YORK (Reuters) – U.S. officials believe China’s insurance regulator passed on proprietary information about AIG to its Chinese rivals during the American firm’s collapse in 2008, according to unpublished diplomatic cables.

The U.S. government bailout of American International Group Inc in 2008 sent shock waves around the world, and China seemed especially rattled.

The Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) forced AIG’s local operations to open their books on a daily basis after the company’s September 2008 rescue, according to a series of U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and provided to Reuters by a third party. The regulator then shared the confidential information with local competitors, in part to convince at least one of them to buy the troubled assets.

And so it begins. We’re about to witness the main event in financial institution internecine warefare: investment funds (MBS buyers) vs. banks (MBS sellers).

There have already been some opening skirmishes. The monoline bond insurers (MBIA, Syncora, FGIC, Ambac (and here), CIFG (and here), and–I haven’t found any litigation with them on this, but there’s gotta be some–ACA) have been litigating against some of the banks whose securitizations they insured for various fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranty claims. Many of the Federal Home Loan Banks (Chicago, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, maybe others that I don’t recall of the top of my head), which slurped up RMBS during the bubble, only to find them toxic, have brought (separate) suits mainly on securities fraud charges, but also on common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. (See here for a totally dated, August 2010 estimation of the liabilities in these suits.)

Then last fall the financial world was shaken by the New York Fed, BlackRock, and PIMCO’s demand letter to Bank of New York Mellon and Countrywide. That showed that A-list financial institutions were taking the range of problems with RMBS, from representation and warranty breaches to servicer malfeasance, seriously. (You can see the NY Fed, acting for the Maiden Lane LLCs, as really another representing AIG, essentially the mother of all monolines for these purposes.) But that wasn’t litigation proper, just an angry growl, with a threat of litigation if things weren’t resolved. (When you see the letterhead for the response, you’ll see that BoA/CW is taking this mighty seriously. Despite the typo in that snippy letter, it didn’t come cheap. These guys are lawyering up.)

Excerpt: Since, at the time Wilmington moved for summary judgment on the complaint in the foreclosure action, the issues of forgery and fraud were also being litigated in the fraud action, the Supreme Court should have granted Wargo’s motion to stay all proceedings in the foreclosure action, pending resolution of the fraud action. If Wargo succeeds in proving that the documents transferring the property to Jean were fraudulent, or that the signatures thereon were forged, then Wilmington’s mortgage is not valid and Wilmington cannot succeed in the foreclosure action (see Johnson v. Melnikoff, 65 AD3d 519, 520; ?GMAC Mtge. Corp. v. Chan, 56 AD3d 521, 522). Moreover, since the Supreme Court did not determine in the foreclosure action that there was no forgery or fraud, but only that the issues of forgery and fraud were irrelevant to the disposition of that action, those issues have not been necessarily decided against Wargo. ? Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, and the Supreme Court should not have granted Wilmington’s motion to dismiss the complaint in the fraud action on that ground (see Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500).

Readers of my articles will recall that I have warned as far back as December 2006, that the global banks will collapse when the Financial Tsunami hits the global economy in 2007. And as they say, the rest is history.

Quantitative Easing (QE I) spearheaded by the Chairman of delayed the inevitable demise of the fiat shadow money banking system slightly over 18 months.

That is why in November of 2009, I was so confident to warn my readers that by the end of the first quarter of 2010 at the earliest or by the second quarter of 2010 at the latest, the global economy will go into a tailspin. The recent alarm that the US economy has slowed down and in the words of Bernanke “the recent pace of growth is less vigorous than we expected” has all but vindicated my analysis. He warned that the outlook is uncertain and the economy “remains vulnerable to unexpected developments”.

Obviously, Bernanke’s words do not reveal the full extent of the fear that has gripped central bankers and the financial elites that assembled at the annual gathering at Jackson Hole, Wyoming. But, you can take it from me that they are very afraid.

Why?

Let me be plain and blunt. The “unexpected developments” Bernanke referred to is the collapse of the global banks. This is FED speak and to those in the loop, this is the dire warning.

So many renowned economists have misdiagnosed the objective and consequences of quantitative easing. Central bankers’ scribes and the global mass media hoodwinked the people by saying that QE will enable the banks to lend monies to cash-starved companies and jump start the economy. The low interest rate regime would encourage all and sundry to borrow, consume and invest.

This was the fairy tale.

Then, there were some economists who were worried that as a result of the FED’s printing press (electronic or otherwise) working overtime, hyper-inflation would set in soon after.

But nothing happened. The multiplier effect of fractional reserve banking did not take off. Bank lending in fact stalled.

Why?

What happened?

Let me explain in simple terms step by step.

1) All the global banks were up to their eye-balls in toxic assets. All the AAA mortgage-backed securities etc. were in fact JUNK. But in the balance sheets of the banks and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs), they were stated to be worth US$ TRILLIONS.

2) The collapse of Lehman Bros and AIG exposed this ugly truth. All the global banks had liabilities in the US$ Trillions. They were all INSOLVENT. The central banks the world over conspired and agreed not to reveal the total liabilities of the global banks as that would cause a run on these banks, as happened in the case of Northern Rock in the U.K.

3) A devious scheme was devised by the FED, led by Bernanke to assist the global banks to unload systematically and in tranches the toxic assets so as to allow the banks to comply with RESERVE REQUIREMENTS under the fractional reserve banking system, and to continue their banking business. This is the essence of the bailout of the global banks by central bankers.

4) This devious scheme was effected by the FED’s quantitative easing (QE) – the purchase of toxic assets from the banks. The FED created “money out of thin air” and used that “money” to buy the toxic assets at face or book value from the banks, notwithstanding they were all junks and at the most, worth maybe ten cents to the dollar. Now, the FED is “loaded” with toxic assets once owned by the global banks. But these banks cannot declare and or admit to this state of affairs. Hence, this financial charade.

5) If we are to follow simple logic, the exercise would result in the global banks flushed with cash to enable them to lend to desperate consumers and cash-starved businesses. But the money did not go out as loans. Where did the money go?

6) It went back to the FED as reserves, and since the FED bought US$ trillions worth of toxic wastes, the “money” (it was merely book entries in the Fed’s books) that these global banks had were treated as “Excess Reserves”. This is a misnomer because it gave the ILLUSION that the banks are cash-rich and under the fractional reserve system would be able to lend out trillions worth of loans. But they did not. Why?

7) Because the global banks still have US$ trillions worth of toxic wastes in their balance sheets. They are still insolvent under the fractional reserve banking laws. The public must not be aware of this as otherwise, it would trigger a massive run on all the global banks!

8) Bernanke, the US Treasury and the global central bankers were all praying and hoping that given time (their estimation was 12 to 18 months) the housing market would recover and asset prices would resume to the levels before the crisis. .

Let me explain: A House was sold for say US$500,000. Borrower has a mortgage of US$450,000 or more. The house is now worth US$200,000 or less. Multiply this by the millions of houses sold between 2000 and 2008 and you will appreciate the extent of the financial black-hole. There is no way that any of the global banks can get out of this gigantic mess. And there is also no way that the FED and the global central bankers through QE can continue to buy such toxic wastes without showing their hands and exposing the lie that these banks are solvent.

It is my estimation that they have to QE up to US$20 trillion at the minimum. The FED and no central banker would dare “create such an amount of money out of thin air” without arousing the suspicions and or panic of sovereign creditors, investors and depositors. It is as good as declaring officially that all the banks are BANKRUPT.

9) But there is no other solution in the short and middle term except another bout of quantitative easing, QE II. Given the above caveat, QE II cannot exceed the amount of the previous QE without opening the proverbial Pandora Box.

10) But it is also a given that the FED will embark on QE II, as under the fractional reserve banking system, if the FED does not purchase additional toxic wastes, the global banks (faced with mounting foreclosures, etc.) will fall short of their reserve requirements.

11) You will also recall that the FED at the height of the crisis announced that interest will be paid on the so-called “excess reserves” of the global banks, thus enabling these banks to “earn” interest. So what we have is a merry-go-round of monies moving from the right pocket to the left pocket at the click of the computer mouse. The FED creates money, uses it to buy toxic assets, and the same money is then returned to the FED by the global banks to earn interest. By this fiction of QE, banks are flushed with cash which enable them to earn interest. Is it any wonder that these banks have declared record profits?

12) The global banks get rid of some of their toxic wastes at full value and at no costs, and get paid for unloading the toxic wastes via interest payments. Additionally, some of the “monies” are used by these banks to purchase US Treasuries (which also pay interests) which in turn allows the US Treasury to continue its deficit spending. THIS IS THE BAILOUT RIP OFF of the century.

Now that you fully understand this SCAM, it is left to be seen how the FED will get away with the next round of quantitative easing – QE II.

Obviously, the FED and the other central banks are hoping that in time, asset prices will recover and resume their previous values before the crisis. This is a fantasy. QE II will fail just as QE I failed to save the banks.

The patient is in intensive care and is for all intent and purposes brain dead, although the heart is still pumping albeit faintly. The Too Big To Fail Banks cannot be rescued and must be allowed to be liquidated. It will be painful, but it is necessary before there is recovery. This is a given.

Warning:

When the ball hits the ceiling fan, sometime early 2011 at the earliest, there will be massive bank runs.

I expect that the FED and other central banks will pre-empt such a run and will do the following:

1) Disallow cash withdrawals from banks beyond a certain amount, say US$1,000 per day; 2) Disallow cash transactions up to a certain amount, say US$10,000 for certain transactions; 3) Transactions (investments) for metals (gold and silver) will be restricted; 4) Worst-case scenario – the confiscation of gold AS HAPPENED IN WORLD WAR II. 5) Imposition of capital controls etc.; 6) Legislations that will compel most daily commercial transactions to be conducted through Debit and or Credit Cards; 7) Legislations to make it a criminal offence for any contraventions of the above.

Solution:

Maintain a bank balance sufficient to enable you to comply with the above potential impositions.

Start diversifying your assets away from dollar assets. Have foreign currencies in sufficient quantities in those jurisdictions where the above anticipated impositions are least likely to be implemented.

CONCLUSION

There will be a financial tsunami (round two) the likes of which the world has never seen.