Russia and India in the Middle East: The need for joint effort

Apr 04 2013

Andréi Volodin

specially for RIR

Russia, India, and China should be able to defend not only their own interests, but those of other, less powerful nations. Source: AP

A mere attempt to intellectually grasp and then solve the problems in the Middle East, in conjunction with other members of the global community, is sure to become one of Russian-Indian diplomacy's greatest virtues.

Russia and India are pursuing a diverse
agenda of interaction in various areas and forums, and in different formats.
Such cooperation is needed now in the Middle East more than ever before. It is
a matter of resolving highly intensive conflicts in the most volatile region of
the world.

The increasing complexity of the
socio-political situation in the Middle East, manifested in the progressive
fragmentation of ties between ethnic groups, impacting the lives of all without
exception, is divided into a patchwork of hazardous "brain-teasers,"
each with its own specific slant: Syrian, Turkish, Israeli-Palestinian, Iraqi,
Iranian and Saudi Arabian.

The problems in the Middle East constitute
the biggest conundrum of our times. The mere attempt to intellectually grasp
and then solve these problems, in conjunction with other members of the
international community, is sure to become one of Russian-Indian diplomacy's
greatest virtues.

I shall confine myself to a consideration
of several circumstances each with a direct bearing on the potential diplomatic
cooperation between Russia and India, as well the fundamental problems of
foreign policy in the Middle East.

A few points need to be sketched out in
connection with the Syrian crisis. First, despite strong pressure both
externally and internally, the socio-political coalition of secular forces in
Syria has not collapsed. Moreover, by means of the "demonstration
effect," the creative paucity of the Arab world’s new Islamist leaders is
beginning to evince itself: the dead-end nature of this "development
model" is obvious to most Syrians. Second, a section of the U.S. foreign
policy establishment, including Secretary of State John Kerry, is aware of the
need to preserve the secular character of Syrian society, and it is in the best
interests of the U.S. (as well as Russia, India, and China) to create a
"corridor of opportunity" in settling the Syrian crisis. Third, the
"Islamic" solution to the Syrian crisis pushes the "envelope of
uncertainty" for America's strategic ally Israel — which is unlikely to be
welcomed by the movers and shakers in the U.S. Put briefly, the Syrian crisis
will have to be resolved through a complex compromise of an institutionalised
nature; that is fixed in a treaty. This is where Russia and India must play an
active role.

Related:

Meanwhile, the situation in Turkey has been
considerably complicated by the country's rulers. Turkey's long-term economic
growth has led the ruling establishment on a headlong charge to the markets of
the Middle East. This straightforward economic expansion is compounded by the
ideology of "neo-Ottomanism," which is unlikely to find much empathy
in the Arab world after the prolonged period of Turkish colonialism. Such an aggressive
foreign policy, which runs counter to the principles of the founder of the
modern Turkish state, Kemal Ataturk, is, in my opinion, one of the factors that
have shaken the leaders of post-Mubarak Egypt out of their lethargy and into
pursuing (by all available means) an active foreign policy of their own,
including the restoration of ties with Iran and the neutralisation of Turkey's
influence in the Middle East. Moreover, a consequence of supporting the
"rebel" forces in Syria is the overexertion of Turkey's internal
forces, since its Western allies fear that open support for Ankara could lead
to a "proper war" in the Middle East, with all the unforeseeable
repercussions for everyone, including the West itself. Lastly, experts are well
aware that there is little hope of a partial solution to the Kurdish problem,
i.e. cultural autonomy. What is more, over 85 percent of the Turkish population
opposes military conflict with Syria, added to which is the fact that given the
complex political situation, Ankara cannot possibly fight on several fronts.

Another derivative of the Middle Eastern
"brain-teaser" is what will become of the Persian Gulf's "oil
monarchies," led by Saudi Arabia.
It is known, for example, that growth in this sub-region is slowing and
that some sidelined members of the elite cherish the idea of ​​a
representative/constitutional monarchy more capable of adequately representing
the interests of the top circles of the Arabian Peninsula. Will tiny Bahrain be
the detonator of the oil monarchies' political system; that is fulfil the role
that Tunisia did two years ago? (Rumour has it that the Emir of Qatar recently
purchased a Greek island.) Saudi Arabia only stands to lose from prolonging the
conflict with Syria (read Iran). And this is happening at a time when the U.S.
seems to be considering a new, more realistic and balanced policy towards its
Iranian adversary. Finally, the adjustment to the "post-U.S." era in
Afghanistan poses a threat to the political systems of the "oil
monarchies" by weakening their eastern flank just when Iran is becoming
more geopolitically active.

The demographic potential of the Muslim
world is also burgeoning. Some of its leaders espouse the radical Islamization
of their societies as a kind of modern-day caliphate. Therefore, despite the
fiendish complexity, it is of paramount importance to maintain secularism as
the foundation of the political systems of the Middle East, and elsewhere too.
Syria has already been mentioned. Another objective force in opposition to
radical Islamism is Israel. The question is: can the U.S.-led West defend the
idea of ​​secularism in international relations, and this region in particular,
all by itself?

The collapse of the bi-polar world severely
weakened the capacity of international institutions to regulate global
conflict. And the departure of "Soviet neo-colonialism" from the
historical scene only underscored the inability of the U.S. to control the
world unilaterally. Libya and Syria have pressed home the urgent need for a
review of the "U.S.-centric world order." Clearly, the UN is no
longer fit for purpose in the area of conflict resolution and other immediate
and long-term problems facing mankind.

Therefore, the solution for me lies not in
a partial reform of the main international institution (which would likely
involve more talk than action), but in a substantive and far-reaching consensus
between countries active in world politics (including, of course, Russia, India,
and China) and able to defend not only their own interests, but those of other,
less powerful nations. Here, India and Russia can and must show initiative.