26 files

Files in which applications for grant of Arms Licenses were processed would certainly contain personal information of the applicants since no Arms License can be granted without obtaining personal information of the applicant. The disclosure of personal information which has no relationship to any public activity of the person to whom the information pertains. Hence, such information is exempt from disclosure under Section 8 (1) (j) of the Act of the RTI Act, particularly when no element of public interest is involved in disclosure of such information. Therefore, the direction of the Commission for inspection of the files relating to applications for Arms License cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

The writ petition challenging the order of the CIC is to be heard by a Single Judge of this Court but the same is listed before us because the petitioner has also sought a declaration of “Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 as ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India”.
It is contended, that the ‘proviso’ virtually takes away the exemption provided for in Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) and is too widely worded leaving unguided discretion in the Competent Authority to override the exemption by citing public interest, without defining “larger public interest” and is thus arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is alternatively contended that the said ‘proviso’ may be required to be “read down”.
We are unable to find any merit in the challenge to the vires of the ‘proviso’ aforesaid to Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e).

High Court of HImachal Pradesh
We find no provision in the Act which empowers the Commission to either reduce or enhance this penalty. If the Commission comes to the conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for delay or that the Public Information Officer (P.I.O) concerned has satisfactorily explained the delay then no penalty can be imposed. However, once the Commission comes to the conclusion that the penalty has to be imposed then the same must be @ Rs.250/- per day and not at any other rate at the whims and fancy of the Commission. To this extent the petitioner is absolutely right. The penalty either has to be imposed at the rate fixed or no penalty has to be imposed.

The petitioner sought for the information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter called as 'Act'). Subsequently, the State Information Commission by an order dated 23.07.2009 directed the Public Information Officer of the Virudachalam Municipality to furnish the information as directed by the Commission on or before 10.08.2009 and get the acknowledgement of the petitioner and send the follow up information.
2. The petitioner, who claims to be a District Secretary of V-Pillar India filed the present writ petition seeking for the direction to implement the order passed by the first respondent and to furnish the information as sought for vide his petition dated 14.06.2007.
3. It must be stated that the Act itself is a self-contained Code and it is not as if the commissioner did not order for the production of the information. On the contrary, under Section 25 of the Act, the Commissioner has got the power to monitor and report on the information. Under Section 18 of the Act, the commissioner also has got the power of the Civil Court including summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person, requisitioning any public record or issuing summons for examination of the witnesses or documents. Any disobedience of the Act also visit with a penalty under Section 20 of the Act.
4. Therefore, the attempt made by the petitioner to make this Court as executing court for the Commission cannot be countenanced by this Court. It is for the petitioner to take appropriate action in terms of the Act. It is only in case where such informations are denied or the Commission's order is not supportable by the provisions of the Act, the question of an intervention by this Court will arise.

The strident approach of the Commission had the most undesirable effect of terrorizing the appellant into subservience, and the materials on records suggest that the Civil Surgeon constituted a medical board to examine the extent of visual impairment of the concerned candidate(s). It will bear repetition to state that the authorities under the Act are vested with the power to ensure supply of information sought for as obtaining on the records, rather than the ideal or the legal state of affairs. We are mindful of the position that the selection process to the extent relevant in the present context concerns visually impaired persons.
But the Commission illegally took upon itself the task of injecting validity to the selection process. Instead of ensuring supply of factual position, he has gone to the length of directing the Director, Primary Education, to ensure action against the erring official. Such an approach is wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, being an authority of limited jurisdiction.- पटना हाई कोर्ट।

second appeal within 45 days from the date of filing
The provisions of the Act and Rules do not prescribe any period within which a second appeal under s.19(3) is to be disposed of. Section 19(6), however, prescribes the period within which appeals under sub-ss.(1) and (2) of s.19 are to be disposed of. Such appeals are to be disposed of within 30 days from the date of receipt thereof or within such extended period not exceeding a total of forty five days from the date of filing thereof, as the case may be, for reasons to be recorded in writing.
It appears that the second appellate authority has not yet decided the petitioner’s appeal mainly for the reason that the statute has not prescribed any period within which a second appeal is to be disposed of. As rightly submitted by counsel for the petitioner in the absence of any period prescribed for disposing of 2 a second appeal under s.19(3), the second appellate authority was under an obligation to dispose of the petitioner’s second appeal within a reasonable time.
A second appeal arises from a decision in the first appeal under s.19(1), and a first appeal arises from a decision or a failure to give a decision under s.7. The sparkle of a strong strand of speed woven through the sections of the Act is abruptly lost in the second appeal that has been allowed to run wild. This open-ended second appeal scheme is bound to make the s.6 request go totally adrift generating a multi-tier avoidable and unwanted offshoot Court proceedings such as this case.
In my opinion, keeping in mind the respective maximum periods fixed for deciding the first appeal under s.19(1) and disposal of a request for obtaining information under s.7, the second appellate authority should have decided the second appeal within 45 days from the date of filing thereof. In view of the scheme of the statute, I think this period should be considered the reasonable period for deciding the second appeal.
I am of the view that this petition should be disposed of directing the authority to decide the appeal. For these reasons, I dispose of the petition ordering that the second appellate authority shall decide the petitioner’s second appeal within 45 days from the date of communication of this order.

The writ petitioner claiming to be an activist in the field of right to information, has approached us by filing the present writ petition with the prayer, the authority should not insist upon the detailed address of the applicant as and when any application is made under the Right to Information Act. He apprehends, the interested parties would cause a threat to the activist and in fact there had been past incidents of unnatural deaths of activist in the field, presumably by the interested persons having vested interest to conceal the information that is asked for by the activist.
The petitioner submits, the authority may not insist upon the detailed address particularly when the applicant would provide a particular post box number that would automatically conceal their identity to the public at large. We have considered the relevant provisions of the statute.
Section 6(2) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 would clearly provide, an applicant making a request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him. Looking to the said provision, we find logic in the submission of the petitioner.
When the legislature thought it fit, the applicant need not disclose any personal detail, the authority should not insist upon his 2 detailed whereabouts particularly when post box number is provided for that would establish contact with him and the authority. In case, the authority would find any difficulty with the post box number, they may insist upon personal details.
However, in such case, it would be the solemn duty of the authority to hide such information and particularly from their website so that people at large would not know of the details. We thus dispose of this writ petition by making the observations as above.
The Secretary, Ministry of Personnel should circulate the copy of this order to all concerned so that the authority can take appropriate measure to hide information with regard to personal details of the activist to avoid any harassment by the persons having vested interest. Read what is post box.

India being a socialist, democratic and secular democratic republic, the quest to obtain the information about the religion professed or not professed by a citizen cannot be in any event, be considered to be in public interest, which information is strictly confidential as per Section 15 of the Census Act, 1948. Mere terming of the members of the 'family' in respect of which the information is sought as public figures and the leaders of nation, cannot change the statutory impact of the above provisions.
It is thus evident that the petitioner is making efforts to make unjustified inroads into the privacy of said individuals even if they are public figures. Consequently, the information supplied to the Census Officer cannot be made public in view of the statutory bar imposed by Section 15 of the Census Act which is not inconsistent with Section 22 read with section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal which stands dismissed.- Punjab & Haryana High Court

On a perusal of the information sought and the time consumed, we find that reasonable period has been spent and hence, that would tantamount to an explanation for delay caused by the officer concerned.
In view of the aforesaid, the reduction of the penalty by the learned single Judge is justified. Before parting with the case, we may hasten to add that the issue that was raised on the initial occasion with regard to locus standi of the CIC to prefer an appeal is kept open. The appeal is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.

The petitioner is the Secretary of Vettikkattiri Service Co- operative Bank which is registered under the provisions of the Kerala Co- operative Societies Act. This writ petition has been filed mainly with the prayer to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the second respondent to consider Ext.P6 and pass orders thereon without compelling the personal attendance of the Secretary of the petitioner society. Ext.P6 is a statement filed along with an affidavit and balance sheet of the society in response to Ext.P5 notice requiring the petitioner to appear before the second respondent.
In fact, the said notice has been issued to the petitioner for the purpose of deciding whether the society would fall under the definition of `public authority' as defined under section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act. As per Ext.P5 the petitioner was also required to produce all the relevant records. The contention of the petitioner is that since all the required details including the balance sheet and statement have been furnished along with Ext.P6, personal attendance of the petitioner is not required for the purpose of deciding the issue.
I am afraid such a contention cannot be countenanced. In case the second respondent requires a clarification on any matter or any statement or any particulars in the balance sheet, the presence of the petitioner is essential and it is essential for the purpose of taking an effective and proper decision on the aforesaid issue. As per Ext.P5, the petitioner was required to appear before the second respondent on 16.11.2010. When this matter is taken up today, the learned standing counsel for the second respondent submitted that the petitioner has not turned up on 16.11.2010 before the Commissioner and therefore the matter was adjourned.
It is further submitted that notice regarding the next posting of hearing will be intimated to the petitioner. In view of the discussion above I am of the view that the Secretary of the petitioner society has to appear before the second respondent upon such intimation. The petitioner society is bound to co-operate with the second respondent. S

The Commission is hereby directed to give appropriate show cause notices to the petitioners. After hearing them on the question of penalty as well as on its recommendation to take disciplinary action against them, can pass an appropriate order.

While entertaining an application for information made under the Act, the locus standi or the intention of the applicant cannot be questioned and is required to furnish all the information sought by him except what has been exempted under Section 8 therein.

A perusal of Section 20 of the Act shows that it makes a provision to impose penalty either on Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer. However, there is no provision to initiate a departmental inquiry against the First Appellate Authority as per the Section 20 of the Act.

Taking into consideration larger perspective, respondent No.4 is permitted to inspect the records and thereafter can make a request for providing the specific number of pages required by paying the requisite fee. In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh.

Exemption of Information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations for Intelligence organization cannot be notified by State Government
In terms of Section 24(4), the State Government is empowered to notify in the Official Gazette that nothing contained in the Right to Information Act shall apply to such intelligence and security organization being organizations established by the State Government. Nevertheless, in the light of the first proviso, such power being conferred on the State Government to notify exempting such intelligence and security organizations, it cannot notify in respect of the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations. As a necessary corollary, the power to exempt from the provisions of the Act is not available to the State Government even in case of intelligence and security organizations in respect of the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human rights violations. The application of the notification depends upon the nature of information required.

The portal can be accessed by general public on the Home Page of the Commission’s website `eci.nic.in’ by clicking on `Online RTI’.
There is also online payment gateway for making payment of requisite fees under the RTI Act.
The portal also facilitates online reply to applications and also for making first appeal and reply thereto.
There will be timely notification alerts to RTI applicant via SMS and E-Mail.

Filing of an application under section 18(1) of the Act complaining the alleged inaction of the Public Information Officer is clearly not permissible in law.
If one is aggrieved by the orders passed by the Public Information Officer under Section 7 of the Act, he has to file an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act before the appellate authority and in case he is aggrieved by the action or inaction of the appellate authority, he has to file a second appeal under Section 19(3). -Karnataka High Court

Education Officer that he should use his powers under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as “1977 Act”)
This judgment also considers situation of private institutes in the light of section 11 of the RTI Act. Its bearing in the matter, if any; can be pointed out by the parties to respondent No.1.

Section 23 is a provision relating to exclusion of jurisdiction of the courts. In terms of this section, no court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceedings in respect of any order made under this Act and no such order shall be called in question otherwise than by way of an appeal provided for under this Act. In other words, the jurisdiction of the court has been ousted by express language. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle of law that despite such excluding provision, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court, in terms of Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution respectively, cannot be divested.
It is a jurisdiction incapable of being eroded or taken away by the exercise of legislative power, being an important facet of the basic structure of the Constitution. In L.Chandra Kumar, the Court observed that the constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary not being available for the members of the Tribunal, such tribunals cannot be considered full and effective substitute to the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. They can, however, perform a supplemental role. Thus, all decisions of the tribunals were held to be subject to scrutiny before the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the orders passed by the authority, i.e., the Central or the State Information Commissions under the Act of 2005 would undoubtedly be subject to judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
In view of the above finding, henceforth, no information seeker can be allowed to insinuate or defame the Commissioners in the guise of prosecuting their cases.
Under such circumstances, when specific power is vested on the Commissioner and the Commission had proceeded against the information seeker, who had abused the Chief Information Commissioner in the course of his proceedings, it will be open to the said authority to disqualify a particular information seeker by passing a speaking order

The explanation offered by the CVC is not sufficient to excuse the delay in furnishing the information. The CVC has not been able to show that it acted ‘reasonably or diligently’ in the circumstances outlined hereinbefore. However, this Court would lay the responsibility for this delay in providing information collectively on the CVC and not on its CPIO alone. The exercise that the Court is now undertaking should in the usual course have been performed by the CIC in the appeal filed before it by the Petitioner.
But for some reason, the CIC did not take up the appeal for a long time and this compelled the Petitioner to approach this Court. The Petitioner is right in contending that if the matter again goes back to the CIC only for the purpose of determining what should be the penalty and the compensation payable by the CVC, it would needlessly delay the matter further.
High Court Delhi

The Information Commission receives innumerable requests from various aggrieved parties. The Commission is a multi-member body and has to arrange its own business dealing with those appeals. Even if there has been any unreasonable delay, if a party approaches this Court, then the Commission must be put on notice before fixing a time limit for the Information Commission to hear those appeals either expeditiously or out of turn by jumping the queue. In such cases, the petitioner must make out a case for a deliberate delay dealing with those appeals and that the particular appeal of the aggrieved petitioner must be so important that in public interest such direction can be given.
A writ of mandamus is issued to a public authority including a quasi-judicial authority to do a statutory obligation or to refrain from performing an act contrary to the Statute. Unless it is proved that the Commission did not discharge its obligation, no direction can be issued to the Commission by this Court and even if any such direction is to be issued, the same cannot be done without notice to the Commission.
When the Government Advocate has no right to represent the Commission and only represent the Government Department and Information Offices appointed by such Department, no direction should have been issued to the Commission.
Keeping this request and anguish of the Commission in mind, this Court declared that when an order of the Tamil Nadu Information Commission is under challenge, Information Commission need not be made as a party to those proceedings and even if counsels make them as a party, in the array of parties, they should be struck of from the writ petition. It is also indicated that all that this Court can do is to make a copy to the Information Commission either interim or final order, so that the Commission follow the same as a legal precedent.

Chief Information Officer is not a Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act
4. First and foremost, I am of the opinion that the Chief Information Officer is not a Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act. Section 18 of the Right to Information Act cloths the said authorities with certain powers of a Court. In Sub-Section (3) of Section 18, it is provided as under:- "18(3) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be shall, while inquiring into any matter under this section, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit;
(d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any Court or office;" Section 20 of the Right to Information Act pertains to penalties, which can be imposed when it is found that the Public Information Officer or the Public Information Officer has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 or malafide denied request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information, which was the subject matter of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing information.
It can thus be seen that all acts or omissions connected with information which is mala fide withheld or information supplied is incorrect or incomplete or misleading, are dealt with under Section 20 by making such action penal. In this context, if one peruses Section 18, it clearly emerges that Information Commission is entrusted with the powers of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for specified purposes such as summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and to compel them to give evidence, requiring the discovery and inspection of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning any public record or copies for issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents. Such powers cannot be construed as converting the said authority into a Court for all purposes much less for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act.