Abstract

Existing apology research has conceptualized apologies as a device to rebuild relationships following a transgression. As a result, apology research has failed to investigate the use of apologies for outcomes for which individuals are obviously not culpable (e.g., apologies for heavy traffic or bad weather). In this paper, we define superfluous apologies as expressions of regret for an undesirable circumstance for which the apologizer is clearly not responsible. Across four studies, we find that issuing a superfluous apology demonstrates empathic concern, which motivates an increase in trust and liking.

People often feel malicious envy, a destructive interpersonal emotion, when they compare themselves to successful peers. Across three online experiments and a field experiment of entrepreneurs, we identify an interpersonal strategy that can mitigate feelings of malicious envy in observers: revealing one’s failures. Despite a general reluctance to reveal one’s failures—as they are happening and after they have occurred—across four experiments, we find that revealing both successes and failures encountered on the path to success (compared to revealing only successes) decreases observers’ malicious envy. This effect holds regardless of the discloser’s status and cannot be explained by a decrease in perceived status of the individual. Then, in a field experiment at an entrepreneurial pitch competition, where pride displays are common and stakes are high, we find suggestive evidence that learning about the failures of a successful entrepreneur decreases observers’ malicious envy while increasing their benign envy in addition to decreasing their perceptions of the entrepreneur’s hubristic pride (i.e., arrogance) while increasing their perceptions of the entrepreneur’s authentic pride (i.e., confidence). These findings align with previous work on the social-functional relation of envy and pride. Taken together, our results highlight how revealing failures encountered on the way to success can be a counterintuitive yet effective interpersonal emotion regulation strategy.

Prior advice research has focused on why people rely on (or ignore) advice and its impact on judgment accuracy. We expand the consideration of advice-seeking outcomes by investigating the interpersonal consequences of advice seekers’ decisions. Across nine studies, we show that advisors interpersonally penalize seekers who disregard their advice, and that these reactions are especially strong among expert advisors. This penalty also drives advisor reactions to a widely-recommended advice-seeking strategy: soliciting multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds. Advisors denigrate and distance themselves from seekers who they learn consulted others, an effect mediated by perceptions that their own advice will be disregarded. Underlying these effects is an asymmetry between advisors’ and seekers’ beliefs about the purpose of the advice exchange: whereas advisors believe giving advice is more about narrowing the option set by providing direction, seekers believe soliciting advice is more about widening the option set by gathering information.

Most people belong to many different groups. While some people experience consistently high or low status across all of their groups, others experience wildly different levels of status in each group. In this research, we examine how status inconsistency – the degree to which one’s status varies across groups – impacts well-being and perspective-taking. Across five studies, we find robust evidence that status inconsistency (controlling for average status) has negative intrapersonal, but positive interpersonal, consequences. Study 1A shows that higher status inconsistency across many groups is related to lower levels of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and subjective social status. Study 1B tests the causal relationship between status inconsistency and well-being, demonstrating that even thinking about one’s status inconsistency can lead to lower feelings of happiness. Study 2 focuses on attitudes towards the most status-inconsistent groups and shows that individuals are most likely to leave the groups in which their status is furthest away from their mean personal status across groups, irrespective of whether the deviance is positive (much higher status than average) or negative (much lower status than average). Studies 3A and 3B shift to investigate the interpersonal effects of status inconsistency on perspective-taking. Study 3A shows that status inconsistency is related to higher levels of trait perspective-taking and empathetic concern, and Study 3A that thinking about one’s status inconsistency increases perspective-taking on a task. Taken together, the results indicate that those whose status is inconsistent across groups experience lower levels of well-being, but are better at understanding others’ points of view.