Section 30

30. But what of the memory of mental acts: do these also fall
under the imaging faculty?

If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may
well believe
that this image, fixed and like a picture of the thought, would
explain how we remember the object of knowledge once entertained.
But if there is no such necessary image, another solution must be
sought. Perhaps memory would be the reception, into the image-taking
faculty, of the Reason-Principle which accompanies the mental
conception: this mental conception- an indivisible thing,
and one that
never rises to the exterior of the consciousness- lies unknown
below; the Reason-Principle the revealer, the bridge between the
concept and the image-taking faculty exhibits the concept as in a
mirror; the apprehension by the image-taking faculty would thus
constitute the enduring presence of the concept, would be our memory
of it.

This explains, also, another fact: the soul is unfailingly
intent upon intellection; only when it acts upon this image-taking
faculty does its intellection become a human perception:
intellection is one thing, the perception of an intellection is
another: we are continuously intuitive but we are not unbrokenly
aware: the reason is that the recipient in us receives from both
sides, absorbing not merely intellections but also sense-perceptions.