Several developed and emerging stock markets are already in bear-market territory

US/China trade tensions have eased, a ‘No’ deal Brexit is priced in

An opportunity to re-balance global portfolios is nigh

The recent shakeout in US stocks has acted as a wake-up call for investors. However, a look beyond the US finds equity markets that are far less buoyant despite no significant tightening of monetary conditions. In fact a number of emerging markets, especially some which loosely peg themselves to the US$, have reacted more violently to Federal Reserve tightening than companies in the US. I discussed this previously in Macro Letter – No 96 – 04-05-2018 – Is the US exporting a recession?

In the wake of the financial crisis, European lacklustre growth saw interest rates lowered to a much greater degree than in the US. Shorter maturity German Bund yields have remained negative for a protracted period (7yr currently -0.05%) and Swiss Confederation bonds have plumbed negative yields never seen before (10yr currently -0.17%, but off their July 2016 lows of -0.65%). Japan, whose stock market peaked in 1989, remains in an interest rate wilderness (although a possible end to yield curve control may have injected some life into the market recently) . The BoJ balance-sheet is bloated, yet officials are still gorging on a diet of QQE policy. China, the second great engine of world GDP growth, continues to moderate its rate of expansion as it transitions away from primary industry and towards a more balanced, consumer-centric economic trajectory. From a peak of 14% in 2007 the rate has slowed to 6.5% and is forecast to decline further:-

Source: Trading Economics, China, National Bureau of Statistics

2019 has not been kind to emerging market stocks either. The MSCI Emerging Markets (MSCIEF) is down 27% from its January peak of 1279, but it has been in a technical bear market since 2008. The all-time high was recorded in November 2007 at 1345.

Source: MSCI, Investing.com

A star in this murky firmament is the Brazilian Bovespa Index made new all-time high of 89,820 this week.

Source: Trading Economics

The German DAX Index, which made an all-time high of 13,597 in January, lurched through the 10,880 level yesterday. It is now officially in a bear-market making a low of 10,782. 10yr German Bund yields have also reacted to the threat to growth, falling from 58bp in early October to test 22bp yesterday; they are down from 81bp in February. The recent weakness in stocks and flight to quality in Bunds may have been reinforced by excessively expansionary Italian budget proposals and the continuing sorry saga of Brexit negotiations. A ‘No’ deal on Brexit will hit German exporters hard. Here is the DAX Index over the last year: –

Source: Trading Economics

I believe the recent decoupling in the correlation between the US and other stock markets is likely to reverse if the US stock market breaks lower. Ironically, China, President Trump’s nemesis, may manage to avoid the contagion. They have a command economy model and control the levers of state by government fiat and through currency reserve management. The RMB is still subject to stringent currency controls. The recent G20 meeting heralded a détente in the US/China trade war; ‘A deal to discuss a deal,’ as one of my fellow commentators put it on Monday.

If China manages to avoid the worst ravages of a developed market downturn, it will support its near neighbours. Vietnam should certainly benefit, especially since Chinese policy continues to favour re-balancing towards domestic consumption. Other countries such as Malaysia, should also weather the coming downturn. Twin-deficit countries such as India, which has high levels of exports to the EU, and Indonesia, which has higher levels of foreign currency debt, may fare less well.

Evidence of China’s capacity to consume is revealed in recent internet sales data (remember China has more than 748mln internet users versus the US with 245mln). The chart below shows the growth of web-sales on Singles Day (11th November) which is China’s equivalent of Cyber Monday in the US: –

Source: Digital Commerce, Alibaba Group

China has some way to go before it can challenge the US for the title of ‘consumer of last resort’ but the official policy of re-balancing the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption appears to be working.

Emerging market equities are traditionally more volatile than those of developed markets, hence the, arguably fallacious, argument for having a reduced weighting, however, those emerging market countries which are blessed with good demographics and higher structural rates of economic growth should perform more strongly in the long run.

A global slowdown may not be entirely priced into equity markets yet, but fear of US protectionist trade policies and a disappointing or protracted resolution to the Brexit question probably are. In financial markets the expression ‘buy the rumour sell that fact’ is often quoted. From a technical perspective, I remain patient, awaiting confirmation, but a re-balancing of stock exposure, from the US to a carefully selected group of emerging markets, is beginning to look increasingly attractive from a value perspective.

The first self-righting vessel was a life-boat, designed in 1789. It needed to be able to weather the most extreme conditions and its eventual introduction (in the 1840’s) transformed the business of recuse at sea forever. The current level of debt, especially in the developed economies, seems to be acting rather like the self-righting ship. As economic growth accelerates and labour markets tighten, central banks gradually tighten monetary conditions in expectation of inflation. As short-term rates increase, bond yields follow, but, unlike the pattern seen in the higher interest rate era of the 1970’s and 1980’s, the effect of higher bond yields quickly leads to a tempering of credit demand.

Some commentators will rightly observe that this phenomenon has always existed, but, at the risk of saying this time it’s different, the level at which higher bond yields act as a break on credit expansion are much lower today in most developed markets.

When in doubt, look to Japan

For central bankers, Japan is the petri dish in which all unconventional monetary policies are tested. Even today, QQE – Quantitative and Qualitative Easing – is only seriously being undertaken in Japan. The Qualitative element, involving the provision of permanent capital by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) through their purchases of common stocks (at present, still, indirectly via ETFs), remains avant garde even by the unorthodox standards of our times.

Recently the BoJ has hinted that it may abandon another of its unconventional monetary policies – yield curve control. This is the operation whereby the bank maintains rates for 10yr maturity JGBs in a range of between zero and 10 basis point – the range is implied rather than disclosed – by the purchase of a large percentage of all new Japanese Treasury issuance, they also intervene in the secondary market. During the past two decades, any attempt, on the part of the BoJ, to reverse monetary easing has prompted a rise in the value of the Yen and a downturn in economic growth, this time, however, might be different – did I use that most dangerous of terms again? It is a long time since Japanese banks were able to function in a normal manner, by which I mean borrowing short and lending long. The yield curve is almost flat and any JGBs with maturities shorter than 10 years tend to trade with negative yields in the secondary market.

Japanese banks were not heavily involved in the boom of the mid-2000’s and therefore weathered the 2008 crisis relatively well. Investing abroad has been challenging due to the continuous rise in the value of the Yen, but during the last few years the Japanese currency has begun to trade in a broad range rather than appreciating inexorably.

In the non-financial sector a number of heavily indebted companies continue to limp on, living beyond their useful life on a debt-fuelled last hurrah. Elsewhere, however, Japan has a number of world class companies trading at reasonable multiples to earnings. If the BoJ allows rates to rise the zombie corporations will finally exit the gene pool and new entrepreneurs will be able to fill the gap created in the marketplace more cheaply and to the benefit of the beleaguered Japanese consumer. My optimism about a sea-change at the BoJ may well prove misplaced. Forsaking an inflation target and offering Japanese savers positive real-interest rates is an heretically old-fashioned idea.

Whilst for Japan, total debt consists mainly of government obligations, for the rest of the developed world, the distribution is broader. Corporate and consumer borrowing forms a much larger share of the total sum. Giving the historically low level of interest rates in most developed economies today, even a moderate rise in interest rates has an immediate impact. Whereas, in the 1990’s, an increase from 5% to 10% mortgage rates represented a doubling payments by the mortgagee, today a move from 2% to 4% has the same impact.

The US stock market as bellwether for global growth

Last month US stocks suffered a sharp correction. The rise had been driven by technology and it was fears of a slowdown in the technology sector that precipitated the rout. Part of the concern also related to US T-Bonds as they breached 3% yields – a level German Bund investors can only dream of. Elsewhere stock markets have been in corrective (0 – 20%) or bear-market (20% or more) territory for some time. I wrote about this decoupling in Macro Letter – No 101 – 31-08-2018 – Divergent – the breakdown of stock market correlations, temp or perm? Now the divergence might be about to reverse. US stocks have yet to correct, whilst China and its vassals have already reacted to the change in global growth expectations. Globally, stocks have performed well for almost a decade: –

Source: MSCI and Yardeni

The next decade may see a prolonged period of range trading. After 10 years, during which momentum investing has paid handsomely, value investing may be the way to navigate the next.

Along with stocks, oil prices have fallen, despite geopolitical tensions. The Baker Hughes rig count reached 888 this week, the highest since early 2015. With WTI still above $60/bbl, the number of active rigs is likely to continue growing.

US 10yr bond yields have already moderated (down to 3.06% versus their high of 3.26%) and stocks have regained some composure after the sudden repricing of last month. The ship has self-righted for the present but the forecast remains turbulent.

How are Chinese stocks responding to tariffs with the US and a slowdown in Asian growth?

Despite US tariffs, China’s September trade balance with the US reached a record high

A number of China’s Asian neighbours have seen a deceleration in growth

The Shanghai Composite has fallen more than 50% since 2015, the PE ratio is 7.2

Government bond yields have eased and the currency is lower against a rising US$

During 2018 Chinese financial markets have been on the move. 10yr bond yields rose from all-time lows throughout 2017 but have since declined: –

Source: Trading Economics, PRC Ministry of Finance

Despite this easing of monetary conditions the negative impact US tariffs, continues to weigh on the Chinese stock market: –

Source: Trading Economics, OTC, CFD

Despite being a leader in frontier technologies such as e-commerce (China has 733mln internet users compared with 391mln in India, 413mln in the EU and a mere 246mln in the US) the recent decline in tech giants Alibaba (BABA) and Tencent (TCEHY) have added to financial market woes. However, as the chart above shows, Chinese stocks have been in a bear-market since 2015. Some of its Asian neighbours have followed a similar trajectory as their economies have slowed in response to a US$ strength and US trade policy.

The notionally pegged Chinese currency has also weakened against the US$, testing it lowest levels in almost a decade: –

Source: Trading Economics

Meanwhile, President Xi has now announced plans to rebalance China’s economy towards consumption, turning it into an importing superpower. Surely something has to give.

The IMF expects Chinese GDP to grow at 6.6% in 2018. They continue to point to signs of economic progress: –

The country now accounts for one-third of global growth. Over 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty and the country has achieved upper middle-income status. China’s per capita GDP continues to converge to that of the United States, albeit at a more moderate pace in the last few years.

The authors go on to predict that the country may become the world’s largest economy by 2030. However, there are headwinds: –

Despite the sharp rebound in nominal GDP and industrial profits, total nonfinancial sector debt still rose significantly faster than nominal GDP growth in 2017. While the corporate debt to GDP ratio has stabilized, government and especially household debt is rising, driven by continued strong off-budget investment spending and a rapid increase in mortgage and consumer loans.

Raise investment. Beijing can engineer an increase in public-sector investment. In theory, private-sector investment can also be expanded, but in practice Chinese private-sector actors have been reluctant to increase investment, and it is hard to imagine that they would do so now in response to a forced contraction in China’s current account surplus.

Reduce savings by letting unemployment rise. Given that the contraction in China’s current account surplus is likely to be driven by a drop in exports, Beijing can allow unemployment to rise, which would automatically reduce the country’s savings rate.

Reduce savings by allowing debt to rise. Beijing can increase consumption by engineering a surge in consumer debt. A rising consumption share, of course, would mean a declining savings share.

Reduce savings by boosting Chinese household consumption. Beijing can boost the consumption share by increasing the share of GDP retained by ordinary Chinese households, those most likely to consume a large share of their increased income. Obviously, this would mean reducing the share of some low-consuming group—the rich, private businesses, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or central or local governments.

Although fiscal stimulus appears to be rebounding it is a short-term solution. There have been many example of non-productive public investment: as a longer-term policy, this route is untenable: –

If Beijing does not rein in credit growth in time, it will be forced to do so once debt levels reach the point at which debt can no longer rise fast enough to maintain the country’s targeted economic growth rate. This adjustment can happen quickly, in the form of a debt crisis. Or (what I think is far more likely, at least for now) it can happen slowly, in the form of what is subsequently called a lost decade (or decades) of slow growth, similar to what Japan experienced after 1990.

Increased unemployment is a dangerous route to take, debt levels are already stretched, which leaves wealth transfers to the private sector.

A forced contraction in China’s current account surplus must be counteracted by either an increase in unemployment, an increase in the debt, or wealth transfers to Chines consumers (rather than savers).

Available data suggests that economic growth decelerated in the third quarter, mainly due to lackluster infrastructure investment and negative spillovers from financial deleveraging. Surprisingly, export growth remained robust in Q3 despite the ongoing trade war between China and the United States. The September PMI survey, however, revealed that external demand is softening, which suggests export figures are likely to worsen in the next few months. In response, the government has reverted to old tactics, boosting lending and increasing fiscal stimulus. Although these initiatives are effective in supporting the economy in the short-term, they threaten the effort made in previous years to reshape the country’s economic model and allow the country to avoid the “middle income trap”.

China Economic Growth

Looking ahead, economic growth is expected to decelerate. This reflects China’s more mature economic cycle and the impact of previous economic reforms, as well as the tit-for-tat trade war with the United States and the cooling housing market. However, a looser fiscal stance and a more accommodative monetary policy should cushion the slowdown. FocusEconomics panelists see the economy growing 6.3% in 2019, which is unchanged from last month’s forecast. In 2020 the economy is seen expanding 6.1%.

A widespread consensus has developed around the view that China’s economic growth is slowing and that the leadership in Beijing will have no choice but to capitulate in the tariff war with President Donald Trump to avoid a further slowdown. Leading US news organizations (here and here) have sounded this theme as a kind of late summer siren song to lull people into thinking that Trump’s confrontational approach is bound to succeed at some point. The reality is that, as has been the case for the last few years, the case for China’s imminent economic difficulties is overblown.

The most widely cited piece of evidence for the new conventional wisdom, for example, is that fixed asset investment is slowing dramatically. Unfortunately, this assessment is based on a monthly data series released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which is currently revising the method used to calculate fixed asset investment. The method that was used so far involved considerable double counting, which the authorities are paring back. The slowing growth of this metric, thus, tells us nothing, and assessments based on existing data are no longer meaningful.

There are three sources of growth in any economy: consumption, investment, and net exports. The problem is that data on China’s fixed asset investment, which include the value of sales of land and other assets, have increasingly overstated the expansion of the economy’s productive capacity. Nonetheless, financial analysts and others have relied on this series because it is the only high-frequency data available on investment. China’s data on gross domestic capital formation, which accurately measures the expansion of productive capacity, are available only on an annual basis and with a lag of five months.

According to NBS data, fixed asset investment grew by only 5.5 percent in the first seven months of 2018, the lowest in decades. In the first half of the year (January to June), fixed asset investment grew by 6 percent. But the price index for fixed asset investment rose by 5.7 percent, implying that real investment barely grew. This, however, is inconsistent with the more reliable NBS data, which show the expansion of capital formation, properly measured, accounted for about one-third of the 6.8 percent of China’s GDP growth.

When the NBS releases final data for 2018 (probably in about nine months), we are likely to learn that the growth of capital formation, properly measured, exceeded the growth of fixed asset investment, just as it did in 2017.

The full article is in three parts – part 2 – taking a closer look at domestic consumption – is here and part 3 – charting the steady rise in imports – is here.

Conclusions and Investment Opportunities

According to analysis from Star Capital (28-9-2018) the PE ratio for Chinese Stocks was just 7.2 times – the second cheapest of the 40 stock markets they monitor – although its CAPE ratio was a more exalted 15.7. Since June 2015 the Shanghai Composite Index have fallen by 53%, peak to trough, whilst since January it has retraced 32% to its low last month. The downtrend has yet to reverse, but, as the second chart above shows, we are testing a support line taken from the lows of 2005 and 2014.

The Q2 2018 Monetary Policy Report the PBoC revealed a moderation in the rate of growth of loans to households to 18.8%, other areas of lending continue to expand rapidly. M2 growth has been steady at around 8%. I believe they will allow interest rates to remain unchanged at 4.35%, or reduce them should the need arise. Last month PBoC foreign exchange reserves fell slightly (-$34bln) but they remain above $3trln: enough to moderate the RMBs decline. China’s real broad effective exchange rate (trade-weighted) is still in a broad, multi-year uptrend due to its soft peg to the US$. Here is the chart since 2006: –

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis

I expect China to reach a trade deal with the US within the next year. The recent slowdown in growth rate of debt formation by households will reverse: and the Shanghai Composite Index will form a base. The RMB may weaken further as the US continues to raise interest rates. Provided the US stock market maintains its nerve, an opportunity to buy Chinese stocks may emerge in the next few months. It may not yet be time to buy but there is little benefit in remaining short.

The IMF revised Chinese growth forecasts higher in July – were they premature?

Retail sales, industrial output and fixed investment have slowed

The Real Estate sector is still buoyant but home price increases are moderating

Narrow money supply growth has slowed, other parts of the economy will follow

China has long been the marginal driver of demand for a wide array of commodities. In an attempt to understand the recent rise in the price of industrial metals, the strength of Chinese demand is a key factor. The picture is mixed.

As the deceleration has progressed, the PMI has shown its expected downward response. In due course, company revenues – and ultimately profits – will follow if this is long maintained.

Greater recourse to receivables financing (funded partly by recourse to shadow finance) can delay full recognition of this awhile, but it cannot fail to impair either the magnitude or the quality of earnings as it works through the economy.

At the heart of the credit equation lies the Real Estate market:-

Source: Cantillon Consulting

During 2016 property prices in China increased by 19%, new homes by 12.4%, the fastest since 2011, but the market has cooled of late due to government intervention to subdue its speculative excess. New-home prices, excluding government-subsidized housing, gained from the previous month in 56 of 70 cities in July, compared with 60 in June. New Home Sales for August were the weakest in three years at +3.8%, however, investment in Real Estate development increased 7.8% last month – this is hardly a collapse. House prices are still forecast to rise by 6.8% in 2017 with growth driven by continued increases in second and third tier cities:-

Source: Bloomberg

There are concerns that the property market may crash later this year but Chinese authorities seem to be cogniscent of this risk. They lifted restrictions on international bond sales in June, allowing cash strapped property developers to tap international markets. Bloomberg – Indebted China Developers Get Funding Relief as Bond Sales Soar – covers this story in greater detail.

With Real Estate contributing around 15% to GDP this more moderate pace of expansion is expected to temper the pace of growth for the second half of 2017. In Q2 GDP was estimated at 6.9%, the same level as Q1 – this puts nominal growth near to a five year high.

The tide appears to have turned; Industrial output, fixed investment and retail sales all slowed during the summer. Industrial output rose 6% in August, the weakest this year. Retail sales rose 10.1% down from 10.4% and 11% in July and June. Fixed-asset investment in urban areas was up 7.8% in the year to August, the slowest since 1999:-

The Chinese economy is undergoing a transition in which economic growth is rising in some sectors of the economy but declining in others. At the same time, China’s official quarterly GDP figures have been criticized for being overly smooth and less informative. Moreover, Chinese government policies have stimulated or cooled the economy at different times, further muddling the signal from economic data.

The authors construct a factor model but find that:-

…no single common factor explains the majority of the variation in Chinese activity. This is consistent with the view that the Chinese economy is in a transition, so different sectors are less synchronized. Indeed, our analysis shows that the five most important factors together account for about 75 percent of the total variation in the selected Chinese data.

Here are the weightings which the authors assigned to each factor and the cumulative total:-

Source: Kansas City Federal Reserve

In conclusion the authors look in detail at the evolution of the drivers behind their principal factor – Factor 1:-

Source: Kansas City Federal Reserve

As China is transitioning from an investment- and export-driven economy to a more consumption-driven economy, the recent improvement in the manufacturing, investment, and trade group is likely to be temporary. Indeed, this improvement may reflect the rebound in global commodity prices that led to higher industrial profits and production; an increase in fiscal spending, which supported investment; and improvement in global growth coupled with the depreciation in the Chinese currency at the end of last year, which boosted Chinese exports. These driving forces may prove to be temporary, casting doubts on the sustainability of recent strength in the manufacturing, investment, and trade group.

This suggests that the increase in commodity demand outside China has led to increases in prices and that this has helped boost Chinese GDP growth.

Indian, an economy with a large enough GDP to tip the scales, has been slowing since Q1 2016 so the KCFR conclusion seems like the cart leading the horse, it’s little wonder they express it tentatively.

Which brings me to a recent article from Mauldin Economics – or, more accurately China Beige Book – China: Q2 Early Look Brief in which Leland Miller takes issue with the idea that Chinese growth has peaked, corporate deleveraging is the cause, and that the commodity sector is in slowdown mode.

Here’s an extract which gives a flavour of Miller’s contrarian perspective:-

Why Rebalance When You Can Have Both?

The second quarter saw minimal progress in moving away from manufacturing toward services leadership in the economy. This was an excellent failure, however, since services performed well and manufacturing almost as well. Manufacturing tapered but extended its powerful rally since the first half of 2016. Revenue, hiring, and new orders were all higher on-quarter and sharply higher on-year. Still, services outperformed manufacturing in revenue and profits. Hiring in services has been uneven, but Q2 was solid.

Commodities Surprises to the Upside.

Defying early signs of a slowdown, our biggest Q2 surprise was another robust performance in commodities. Make no mistake, the warning signs look like Times Square: the second quarter saw huge across-the-board jumps in inventory, sliding sales price growth in three of four sub-sectors, and rising input costs. Yet, more firms again saw rising sales prices than input cost hikes, sales volumes accelerated, and cash flow moved from red to black, bolstering balance sheets.

Away from Markets’ Gaze, Aluminum Shines.

Commodities’ unsung hero: aluminum. CBB data show aluminum firms wildly outperforming the current market narrative, seeing broad Q2 gains in revenues, profits, volumes, output, and new orders, as well as cash flow, which jumped into the black for the first time in our survey’s history. The why is less clear than the what, but one obvious possibility is aluminum is the latest recipient of some of China’s excess liquidity. The #moneyball may have struck again.

Miller goes on to admit that Real Estate has slowed, credit conditions have deteriorated (outside the property space) and inventories in manufacturing, retail, and commodities hit all-time highs. By one estimate China’s unused steel capacity equals the output of Japan, India, America and Russia combined. Personally I only take issue with Miller’s spelling of aluminium!

China Beige Book remain more optimistic than the majority of commentators but they end their review on a note of caution:-

China’s attempt at deleveraging has been discussed to no end, but its implications are not well understood. In Q1, corporate reporting to CBB showed credit tightening was limited to interbank markets. In Q2, it hit firms: bond yields and rates at shadow banks touched the highest levels in the history of our survey, and bank rates their highest since 2014. So why did borrowing not collapse, denting the broader economy? One reason is what we call the “Party Congress Put.” While borrowing did see a mild drop for the third straight quarter, companies’ six-month revenue expectations remain robust in every sector save property. Companies assume deleveraging is transient, likely because they are skeptical the Party will allow economic pain in 2017. It will not be until 2018 when we find out whether deleveraging is genuine – because it won’t be until 2018 that it will actually hurt.

This brings me back to the question, what caused the initial increase in commodity prices? Part of the impetus behind the rise has been a deliberate curtailing of supply by the Chinese authorities, however, investors should be wary of equating a rise in prices with a sustainable recovery in demand. The Economist – Making sense of capacity cuts in China described it thus:-

Stockmarkets have been on a tear over the past 18 months. Shares are, on average, up by a third globally. Commodities have rallied. And the optimism has infected corporate treasurers, who, for the first time in five years, are spending more on new buildings and equipment. Plenty of factors have fed into the upturn, from Europe’s recovery to early hopes for the Trump presidency. But its origins date back to a commitment by China to demolish steel mills and shut coal mines.

On the face of it, that is an unlikely spark for a change in sentiment. Normally, growth comes from the investment in new facilities, not the closure of those in use. In fact, China’s case is a rare one. By taking on extreme overcapacity, its cutbacks have provided a boost, for itself and for the global economy. The risk, however, is that the way the country is going about the cuts both disguises old flaws and creates new ones.

In early 2016 China announced plans to reduce steel and coal capacity by at least 10% over five years – equivalent to around 5% of global supply. By 2020 they aim to reduce coal output by 800m tonnes – 25% of Chinese production. Steel capacity is set to be slashed by 100m-150m tonnes – 20% of total output – and aluminium, by 30%.

This is not the first time China has attempted to manipulate global commodity markets, yet previous forays disappointed. This time it’s different – a dangerous phrase indeed! Higher prices for steel are likely to encourage domestic investment in new supply. Iron Ore stocks at Chinese ports have reached record levels. Meanwhile the underlying problem – oversupply – has not been addressed. Signs of a roll-back in policy are already evident in the coal industry, where mines which had their production capped at 276 days in 2016, have been permitted to revert to 330 days production this year.

… I would argue that “the end of China’s stellar growth story” has already occurred, and occurred quite a long time ago. Growth in the Chinese economy has collapsed, but growth in economic activity has not collapsed (let us assume, with Grenville, that somehow the reduction in GDP growth from over 10 percent to 6.5 percent does not represent a slowdown in economic activity). The growth in economic activity has instead been propped up by the acceleration in credit growth and by the failure to write down investments that have created economic activity without having created economic value. In that case, high GDP growth levels simply disguise the seeming collapse of underlying economic growth in a way that has happened many times before—always in the late stages of similar apparent investment-driven growth miracles.

The question which springs from Pettis’s article is, when will the non-performing investments be written off? Given the relatively modest government debt to GDP ratio in China (69%) there is still scope to postpone the day of reckoning, but in the shorter-term, trade tensions with the US and a certain reticence on the part of major Central Banks to embrace infinite QE, risks interrupting the current rebound in global growth over the next two years.

The IMF WEO – July 2017 update left global forecasts for global GDP growth unchanged at 3.5% for 2017 and 3.6% for 2018, but their forecasts for China were revised higher by 0.1% and 0.2% respectively. The increasing levels of debt, inventory build and buoyancy of the Real Estate sector may be sufficient for China to avoid a slow-down in GDP growth, but this will be the result of a further inflating of their debt bubble.

Chinese stocks, which continue to trade on single digit P/E ratios, look inexpensive, but this is how they almost always look. Chinese government 10yr bond yields have risen by more than 1% since October 2016 to 3.67% (14-9-2017). Despite the rhetoric emanating from Washington DC, the RMB has retraced much of the ground it lost during 2016 – since January the RMB has strengthened by 4.7% against the greenback.

An economic slowdown in China will prompt the authorities to provide liquidity, this in turn should feed through to lower interest rates, which in turn will help to support domestic stocks. US pressure, such as economic sanctions or the imposition of regulatory constraints, is likely to lead to a renewed weakening of the Chinese currency. A process lower domestic bond yields will help to accelerate. Chinese equities remain in a technical up-trend, as does the currency, while the direction of bond yields is upward as well. This favours remaining; long stocks, short bonds and long the RMB.

When might things change? It is difficult to forecast – I am a trend follower by inclination. The, possibly apocryphal phrase, attributed to Keynes, that ‘The markets can remain irrational longer than I can remain solvent,’ is etched firmly on my heart. The Chinese edict limiting coal production was, perhaps, the catalyst for present rally. I prefer to trade leaders rather than laggards and will therefore be watching the price of Chinese coal closely. Below is the five year chart:-

Source: Barchart.com

There is room for a downward correction – to fill a technical gap – but I see no reason to sell industrial commodities on the basis of this price pattern. Notwithstanding Pettis’s more nuanced view, I believe growth, as we understand it on a month to month basis, may slow. If it occurs the slowdown will be gradual, moderate and, if the government intervenes, might be deferred: though, in the long run, not indefinitely.

Household debt levels relative to GDP have risen rapidly in many countries over the past decade. We investigate the macroeconomic impact of such increases by employing a novel estimation technique proposed by Chudik et al (2016), which tackles the problem of endogeneity present in traditional regressions. Using data on 54 economies over 1990‒2015, we show that household debt boosts consumption and GDP growth in the short run, mostly within one year. By contrast, a 1 percentage point increase in the household debt-to-GDP ratio tends to lower growth in the long run by 0.1 percentage point. Our results suggest that the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify as the household debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60%. For GDP growth, that intensification seems to occur when the ratio exceeds 80%. Finally, we find that the degree of legal protection of creditors is able to account for the cross-country variation in the long-run impact.

The chart below shows the growing divergence between the household debt of developed and emerging market economies:-

Source: BIS

Of the emerging markets, South Korea has the highest household debt ratio, followed by Thailand, Malaysia and Hong Kong: all have ratios above 60%. Singapore is on the cusp of this watershed, whilst all the remaining emerging economies boast lower ratios.

Part of the reason for lower household debt in emerging economies is the collective market memory of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Another factor is the higher savings rate among many emerging economies. The table below is incomplete, the data has been gathered from multiple sources and over differing time periods, but it is still quite instructive. It is ranked by highest household savings rate as a percentage of GDP. On this basis, I remain bullish on the prospects for growth in the Philippines and Indonesia, but also in India and Vietnam, notwithstanding the Indian Government debt to GDP ratio of 69% and Vietnam’s budget deficit of -5.4% of GDP:-

There are other countries who household sector also looks robust: China and Russia, are of note.

Last month I wrote about The Risks and Rewards of Asian Real Estate. This BIS report offers an additional guide to valuation. It helps in the assessment of which emerging markets are more likely to weather the impact of de-globalising headwinds. Policy reversals, such as the scrapping of the TPP trade deal, and other developments connected to Trump’s “America First” initiative, spring to mind.

Savings and Investment

When attempting to forecast economic growth, household debt is one factor, but, according to the economics textbooks, household savings are another. Intuitively savings should support investment, however, in a recent article for Evonomics – Does Saving Cause Lending Cause Investment? (No.) – Steve Roth shows clear empirical evidence that a higher savings rate does not lead to a higher rate of investment. Here is a chart from the St Louis Federal Reserve which supports Roth’s assertions:-

Source: St Louis Federal Reserve Bank

Personal savings represents a small fraction of GDP especially when compared to lending and investment. Roth goes on to analyse the correlations:-

His assessment is as follows:-

Of course, correlation doesn’t demonstrate causation. But lack of correlation, and especially negative correlation, does much to disprove causation. What kind of disproofs do we see here?

Personal saving and commercial lending seem to be lightly correlated. The correlation declines over the course of a year, but then increases two or three years out. It’s an odd pattern, with a lot of possible causal stories that might explain it.

Personal saving and private investment (including both residential and business investment) are very weakly correlated, and what correlation there is is mostly negative. More saving correlates with less investment.

Commercial lending has medium-strong correlation with private investment in the short term, declining rapidly over time. This is not terribly surprising. But it has nothing to do with private saving.

Perhaps the most telling result here: Personal saving has a significant and quite consistent negative correlation with business investment. Again: more saving, less investment. This directly contradicts what you learned in Econ 101.

The last line — commercial lending versus business investment — is most interesting compared to line 3 (CommLending vs PrivInv). Changes in commercial lending seem to have their strongest short-term effects on residential investment, not business investment. But its effect on business investment seems more consistent and longer-term.

This is a fascinating insight, however, there are international factors at work here. This data looks at the US, but the US is a far from closed economy; the current account deficit tells you that. Setting aside cross border capital flows there are even larger forces to consider.

Firstly, in general, when an economy slows, its government increases fiscal spending and its central bank reduces interest rates. Secondly, when short term interest rates fall, banks are incentivised to borrow short and lend long. They achieve this using a fraction of their own capital, lending depositors’ money at longer maturity and profiting from the interest rate differential.

Once fiscal stimulus has run its course and banks have leveraged their reserves to the maximum, the importance of household savings should, in theory, become more pronounced, but if interest rates are low investors are likely to defer investment. If government fiscal pump-priming has failed to deliver an economic recovery, investors are likely to be dissuaded from investing. Despite Roth’s empirical evidence to the contrary, I do not believe that the household savings rate is an unimportant measure to consider when forecasting economic growth, merely that it is overshadowed by other factors.

Conclusion

Household savings may have little impact on GDP growth but Household debt does. In the UK the savings Ratio was 6.6%, whilst the Household debt to income ratio was 152% at the end of 2015. By comparison, at the end of 2014 the US the savings ratio was 5% and household debt to income a more modest 113%. The ratio of the ratios is broadly similar at around 23 times.

With interest rates still close to the lowest levels in centuries and real interest rates, even lower, debt, rather than savings, is likely to be the principal driver of investment. That investment is likely to be channelled towards assets which can be collateralised, real estate being an obvious candidate.

I began this letter with a quote from Hamlet. I wonder what advice Polonius would give his son today? The incentive to borrow has seldom been more pronounced.

The impact of the oil price collapse is still feeding through the US economy but, since the most vulnerable states have learnt the lessons of the 1980’s and diversified away from an excessive reliance of on the energy sector, the short-run downturn will be muted whilst the long-run benefits of new technology will be transformative. US oil production at $10/barrel would have sounded ludicrous less than five years ago: today it seems almost plausible.

The plunge in oil prices since the middle of 2014 has not translated into a dramatic boost for consumer spending, which has continued to grow moderately. This has been particularly surprising since the sharp drop should free up income for households to use toward other purchases. Lessons from an empirical model of learning suggest that the weak response may reflect that consumers initially viewed cheaper oil as a temporary condition. If oil prices remain low, consumer perceptions could change, which would boost spending.

Given the perceived wisdom of the majority of central banks – that deflation is evil and must be punished – the lack of consumer spending is a perfect example of the validity of the Fed’s inflation targeting policy; except that, as this article suggests, deflations effect on spending is transitory. I could go on to discuss the danger of inflation targeting, arguing that the policy is at odds with millennia of data showing that technology is deflationary, enabling the consumer to pay less and get more. But I’ll save this for another day.

The FRBSF paper looks at the WTI spot and futures price. They suggest that market participants gradually revise their price assumptions in response to new information, concluding:-

The steep decline in oil prices since June 2014 did not translate into a strong boost to consumer spending. While other factors like weak foreign growth and strong dollar appreciation have contributed to this weaker-than-expected response, part of the muted boost from cheaper oil appears to stem from the fact that consumers expected this decline to be temporary. Because of this, households saved rather than spent the gains from lower prices at the pump. However, continued low oil prices could change consumer perceptions, leading them to increase spending as they learn about this greater degree of persistence.

…even if the industry mix stabilizes, the relative rise in services and relative declines in manufacturing and mining are likely to have a persistent negative effect on productivity growth going forward.

The service and finance sector of the economy has a lower economic multiplier than the manufacturing sector, a trend which has been accelerating since 1980. A by-product of the growth in the financial sector has been a massive increase in debt relative to GDP. By some estimates it now requires $3.30 of debt to create $1 of GDP growth. A reduction of $35trln would be needed to get debt to GDP back to 150% – a level considered to be structurally sustainable.

Meanwhile, US corporate profits remain a concern as this chart from PFS group indicates:-

With energy input costs falling, the beneficiaries should be non-energy corporates or consumers. Yet wholesale inventories are rising, total business sales seem to have lost momentum and, whilst TMS-2 Money Supply growth remains solid at 8%, it is principally due to commercial and industrial lending.

US oil production has fallen below 9mln bpd versus a peak of 9.6mln. Rig count last week was 351 down three from the previous week but down 383 from the same time last year. Meanwhile the failure of Saudi Arabia to curtail production, limits the potential for the oil market to rally.

From a global perspective, cheap fuel appears to be cushioning the US from economic headwinds in other parts of the world. Employment outside mining and manufacturing is steady, and wages are finally starting to rise. However, the overhang of debt and muted level of house price appreciation has dampened the animal spirits of the US consumer:-

A combination of much less household debt, revived access to consumer credit and recovering asset prices have bolstered U.S. consumer spending. This trend will likely continue despite an estimated 50 percent reduction since the mid-2000s of the housing wealth effect— an important amplifier during the boom years.

…Since the Great Recession, the ratio of household debt-to-income has fallen back to about 107 percent, a more sustainable—albeit relatively high—level.

…The wealth-to-income ratio rose from about 530 percent in fourth quarter 2003 to 650 percent in mid-2007 as equity and house prices surged. Not surprisingly, consumer spending also jumped.

The conventional estimate of the wealth effect—the impact of higher household wealth on aggregate consumption—is 3 percent, or $3 in additional spending every year for each $100 increase in wealth.

…Recent research suggests that the spendability, or wealth effect, of liquid financial assets—almost $9 for every $100—is far greater than the effect for illiquid financial assets, which explains why falling equity prices do not generate larger cutbacks in aggregate consumer spending. Other things equal, higher mortgage and consumer debt significantly depress consumer spending.

…The estimated housing wealth effect varies over time and captures the ability of consumers to tap into their housing wealth. It rose steadily from about 1.3 percent in the early 1990s to a peak of about 3.5 percent in the mid- 2000s. It has since halved, to about the same level as that of the mid-1990s. During the subprime and housing booms, rising house prices and housing wealth effects propagated and amplified expansion of consumption and GDP.

During the bust, this mechanism went into reverse. High levels of mortgage debt, falling house prices and a reduced ability to tap housing equity generated greater savings and reduced consumer spending. Fortunately, house prices have recovered, deleveraging has slowed or stopped, and consumer spending is strong, even though the housing wealth effect is only half as large as it was in the mid-2000s.

In 2015, we accumulated almost $71 billion in new credit card debt. And for the first time since the Great Recession, we broke the $900 billion level in total credit card debt so we are back on track in getting to $1 trillion.

After a long stretch of declines, the labor force participation rate has risen in recent months, driven in part by an increase in the share of prime-age people flowing into employment from outside the labor force. So far, this flow has remained largely confined to those with higher educational attainment, suggesting further increases in labor force participation rate could be relatively limited.

…Overall, the scenarios show that while more prime-age people could enter the labor force in the coming years, the cyclical improvement in the overall participation rate may be limited to the extent only those with higher educational attainment flow into employment. In addition, the potential increase in the participation rate could be constrained by other factors such as an increase in the share of prime-age population that reports they are either retired or disabled and a limited pool of people saying they want a job, even if they have not looked recently. Thus, while higher NE flow indicates the prime-age participation rate could increase further, it will likely remain lower than its pre-recession rate.

Conclusion

At the 2015 EIA conference Adrian Cooper of Oxford Economics gave a presentation – The Macroeconomic Impact of Lower Oil Prices – in which he estimated that a $30pb decline in the oil price would add 0.9% to US GDP between 2015 and 2017. If this estimate is correct, lower oil is responsible for more than a quarter of the current US GDP growth. It has softened the decline from 2.9% to 2% seen over the last year.

I would argue that the windfall of lower oil prices has already arrived, it has shown up in the deterioration of the trade balance, the increase in wages versus consumer prices and the nascent rebound in the participation rate. That the impact has not been more dramatic is due to the headwinds on excessive debt and the strength of the US$ TWI – it rose from 103 in September 2014 to a high of 125 in January 2016. After the G20 meeting Shanghai it has retreated to 120.

According to the March 2015 BIS – Oil and debt report, total debt in the Oil and Gas sector increased from $1trln in 2006 to $2.5trln by 2015. The chart below looks at the sectoral breakdown of US Capex up to the end of 2013:-

Source: Business Insider, Compustat, Goldman Sachs

With 37% allocated to Energy and Materials by 2013 it is likely that the fall in oil prices will act as a drag on a large part of the stock market. Energy and Materials may represent less than 10% of the total but they impact substantially in the financial sector (15.75%).

Notwithstanding the fact that corporate defaults are at the highest level for seven years, financial institutions and their central bank masters will prefer to reschedule. This will act as a drag on new lending and on the profitability of the banking sector.

The table below from McGraw Hill shows the year to date performance of the S&P Spider and the sectoral ETFs. This year Financials are taking the strain whilst Energy has been the top performer – over one year, however, Energy is still the nemesis of the index.

The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China have been unable to gain traction with their monetary policies…. Excluding off balance sheet liabilities, at year-end the ratio of total public and private debt relative to GDP stood at 350%, 370%, 457% and 615%, for China, the United States, the Eurocurrency zone, and Japan, respectively…

The windfall of cheap oil has arrived, but cheap oil has been eclipsed by the beguiling spectre of cheap debt.

US Growth and employment – can the boon of cheap energy eclipse the collapse of energy investment?

Last year’s oil price falls are still feeding through to the wider economy

Oil producing states have remained resilient despite the continued lower price of WTI

The wider economy has rebounded after the slowdown in Q1

Stock earnings growth is regaining upward momentum

At the end of last year I became cautious about the prospects for the US stock market. The principal concern was the effect a sustained decline in the price of oil was likely to have on the prospects for employment and economic growth.

The Texan Experience

Oil rich Texas represents a microcosm of the effect lower energy prices may be having on employment and growth. This article from December 2014 by Mauldin Economics – Oil, Employment, and Growth – neatly sums up my concerns at the end of last year:-

…we need to research in depth as we try to peer into the future and think about how 2015 will unfold. In forecasting US growth, I wrote that we really need to understand the relationships between the boom in energy production on the one hand and employment and overall growth in the US on the other. The old saw that falling oil prices are like a tax cut and are thus a net benefit to the US economy and consumers is not altogether clear to me. I certainly hope the net effect will be positive, but hope is not a realistic basis for a forecast. Let’s go back to two paragraphs I wrote last week:

Texas has been home to 40% of all new jobs created since June 2009. In 2013, the city of Houston had more housing starts than all of California. Much, though not all, of that growth is due directly to oil. Estimates are that 35–40% of total capital expenditure growth is related to energy. But it’s no secret that not only will energy-related capital expenditures not grow next year, they are likely to drop significantly. The news is full of stories about companies slashing their production budgets. This means lower employment, with all of the knock-on effects.

…As we will see, energy production has been the main driver of growth in the US economy for the last five years. But changing demographics suggest that we might not need the job-creation machine of energy production as much in the future to ensure overall employment growth.

…The oil-rig count is already dropping, and it will continue to drop as long as oil stays below $60. That said, however, there is the real possibility that oil production in the United States will actually rise in 2015 because of projects already in the works. If you have already spent (or committed to spend) 30 or 40% of the cost of a well, you’re probably going to go ahead and finish that well. There’s enough work in the pipeline (pardon the pun) that drilling and production are not going to fall off a cliff next quarter. But by the close of 2015 we will see a significant reduction in drilling.

Given present supply and demand characteristics, oil in the $40 range is entirely plausible. It may not stay down there for all that long (in the grand scheme of things), but it will reduce the likelihood that loans of the nature and size that were extended the last few years will be made in the future. Which is entirely the purpose of the Saudis’ refusing to reduce their own production. A side benefit to them (and the rest of the world) is that they also hurt Russia and Iran.

Employment associated with energy production is going to fall over the course of next year. It’s not all bad news, though. Employment that benefits from lower energy prices is likely to remain stable or even rise. Think chemical companies that use natural gas as an input as an example.

I am, however, at a loss to think of what could replace the jobs and GDP growth that the energy complex has recently created. Certainly, reduced production is going to impact capital expenditures. This all leads one to begin thinking about a much softer economy in the US in 2015.

Last month’s employment report suggests we may have avoided the downturn from cheaper oil, but uncertainty remains. Earlier this month the Dallas Fed – Robust Regional Banking Sector Faces New Economic Hurdles whilst focusing on the health of the banking sector, worried that the effect of lower oil prices, combined with higher interest rates, may yet wreak havoc in the Eleventh District. Here are some of the highlights:-

Not only have district banks achieved greater profitability than their counterparts nationwide, but their loan portfolios also have grown twice as fast. District banks returned to lending sooner than banks in the rest of the country and experienced more rapid loan growth due to the region’s economic strength.

…Possibly reflecting banks’ quest for yield in a low-interest-rate environment, the so-called three-year asset/ liability gap has been growing, particularly for district banks. This measure subtracts liabilities with maturities greater than three years (certificates of deposit, for example) from loans and securities with maturities greater than three years and divides the difference by total assets. A bigger gap means that banks would be hurt by rising interest rates because their assets are tied up for a longer time relative to their liabilities. Consequently, when interest rates rise, banks’ funding costs could rise while interest income remains stagnant, squeezing profitability.

…The other big concern is potential fallout from recent dramatic oil and gas price declines, which affects Texas banks in particular. In July 2014, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot price exceeded $105 a barrel; by March, it had tumbled to below $50 before bouncing back to near $60 at the start of May. The size and rapidity of the decline raised concerns about the impact on the Texas economy and Texas banks, especially given the experiences of the energy and financial collapses of the 1980s. While the state’s economy has become more diverse and thus less reliant on the oil and gas industry, the price drop has still negatively affected the Texas economy and labor market. Some pockets of the state remain heavily dependent on the energy sector, making local industries vulnerable to spillover effects. And because of community banks’ close ties to the areas they serve, they are more exposed than large banks.

…One measure of potential distress is the so-called Texas ratio, the book value of an institution’s nonperforming assets as a percent of its tangible equity capital and its loan-loss reserves. Essentially, the Texas ratio compares an institution’s bad assets to its available capital. A Texas ratio above 1 (expressed as 100 percent) indicates that probable and potential losses exceed an institution’s immediate loss-absorbing cushion, putting it at greater risk of bankruptcy. There have been two instances of dramatic oil price declines since 1980; one gives rise to concern and the other to hope.

Between June 1980 and September 1986, the WTI price declined 74 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Roughly 20 percent of all Texas institutions had a Texas ratio greater than 100 percent by year-end 1988. A staggering 706 Texas banks and thrifts failed—including nine of the 10 largest banking institutions—between September 1986 and year-end 1990.9

A more recent oil price decline, in the second half of 2008 and early 2009, was also dramatic, but in a different way. Over a nine-month period beginning in June 2008, the price fell more than 71 percent. Yet less than 1 percent of Texas banks had a Texas ratio exceeding 100 percent and only seven failed in 2008–09. The slight pickup in bank troubles in 2010 is likely attributable to generally difficult financial and economic conditions that year.

From June 2014 through March 2015, the price of WTI fell 58 percent. Nevertheless, not one Texas bank had a Texas ratio greater than 100 percent as of the first quarter and only one bank had failed as of March.

The bottom line: The persistence of low oil prices seems to matter more for banks than the magnitude of falling prices. A precipitous, but short-lived, decline is likely to have only a minor impact on the banking industry. Even a longer-term decline similar to that seen in the 1980s is unlikely to provoke the same scope of disruption now as it did then.

…Mitigating factors also make Texas banks better able to weather falling oil prices. Memories of the 1980s crisis linger, and the 2008–09 financial crisis is also fresh in the minds of bankers and regulators. Apart from regulatory changes, Texas bankers manage their risks more prudently, using better risk diversification. The Shared National Credit (SNC) program is one example. Generally, large loans are held by multiple institutions through the SNC program, allowing individual institutions to spread the risk of large credit exposures. While the SNC program has been around since 1977, it has grown in importance and coverage. SNC industry trends by sector show that commodities credits, including those tied to the oil and gas industry, increased from $395 billion in 2002 to $798 billion in 2014. Regulatory filings and investor conference calls suggest that energy exposure at the larger banks in Texas is now predominantly through these shared credits.

…The low-interest-rate environment and a flat yield curve with relatively little difference in interest rates across various maturities have pressured bank earnings over the past five years. Banks have responded by extending their maturity profile in an attempt to generate more robust returns. As interest rates normalize, regulators will need to monitor banks’ ability to restructure their maturity profiles and adapt to the new environment.

The impact of recent oil price declines on banks also bears watching, particularly in Texas. While banks appear to be managing their energy exposure well—and a relatively short spell of low energy prices is not expected to have a severe, adverse effect on local banks—the importance of energy in certain regions points to the possibility of relatively large localized disruptions. The banking system has navigated a post crisis path to recovery. Conditions have improved markedly, but the industry must remain vigilant to potential risks to its financial health and stability.

For the state as a whole, April employment was 1% higher versus the US +1.9%. The largest fall was seen in Oil and Gas Extraction (-14.4%) followed by Manufacturing (-4%) and Construction (-2.6%). Leisure and Hospitality led employment increases (5.3%) Information (4.6%) Education and Health (2.6%) and Trade, Transportation and Utilities (2.3%).

The importance of Oil and Gas to Texas, from an employment perspective, is small– only 2.5% of the workforce – but the sector’s impact on the rest of the region’s economy is much greater. Many ancillary sectors, including manufacturing, banking and finance rely on energy. The most encouraging aspect of the data above is the 2.3% increase in Trades, Transportation and Utilities. As an employer this sector amounts to 20.2% of the total. For this sector, lower energy prices are like the tax cut John Mauldin alluded back in December.

The Energy Complex and US growth

The recent energy technology boom has increased the oil and gas sector’s importance – please revisit Manhattan Institute – New Technology for Old Fuels – my personal favourite essay on this subject. The share of oil and gas in total employment peaked in the early 1980s at 0.8% it’s now back to 0.5%. Its share of GDP followed a similar path, falling from 4% in the 1980’s to less than 1% at the start of the millennium; it’s now back around 2%. Energy self-sufficiency remains elusive – the US is still a net oil importer and therefore benefits from lower oil prices. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates a $700 per household saving from the decline in gasoline prices in 2015. This should also spur an increase in capital investment. The traditional estimate of a halving of output has increased dramatically; meanwhile energy efficiency has significantly improved. The fall from $105 to $60 – assuming the market remains around the current level – will probably add 0.4% to GDP.

As one might expect, the direct impact of cheaper oil on the energy sector has been negative. The US rig count fell by 850 between December 2014 and March 2015. Many energy exploration firms have reduced headcount and cut capital expenditure. I don’t believe the benefits of technology have been exhausted by the energy exploration firms, especially the shale-industry. The Manhattan Institute – Shale 2.0– takes up the story and go on to make some policy recommendations:-

John Shaw, chair of Harvard’s Earth and Planetary Sciences Department, recently observed: “It’s fair to say we’re not at the end of this [shale] era, we’re at the very beginning.” He is precisely correct. In recent years, the technology deployed in America’s shale fields has advanced more rapidly than in any other segment of the energy industry. Shale 2.0 promises to ultimately yield break-even costs of $5–$20 per barrel—in the same range as Saudi Arabia’s vaunted low-cost fields.

The shale industry is unlike any other conventional hydrocarbon or alternative energy sector, in that it shares a growth trajectory far more similar to that of Silicon Valley’s tech firms. In less than a decade, U.S. shale oil revenues have soared, from nearly zero to more than $70 billion annually (even after accounting for the recent price plunge). Such growth is 600 percent greater than that experienced by America’s heavily subsidized solar industry over the same period.

Shale’s spectacular rise is also generating massive quantities of data: the $600 billion in U.S. shale infrastructure investments and the nearly 2,000 million well-feet drilled have produced hundreds of petabytes of relevant data. This vast, diverse shale data domain—comparable in scale with the global digital health care data domain—remains largely untapped and is ripe to be mined by emerging big-data analytics.

Shale 2.0 will thus be data-driven. It will be centered in the United States. And it will be one in which entrepreneurs, especially those skilled in analytics, will create vast wealth and further disrupt oil geopolitics. The transition to Shale 2.0 will take the following steps: 1.Oil from Shale 1.0 will be sold from the oversupply currently filling up storage tanks. 2. More oil will be unleashed from the surplus of shale wells already drilled but not in production. 3. Companies will “high-grade” shale assets, replacing older techniques with the newest, most productive technologies in the richest parts of the fields. 4. And as the shale industry begins to embrace big-data analytics, Shale 2.0 begins.

Further, if the U.S. is to fully reap the economic and geopolitical benefits of Shale 2.0, Congress and the administration should: 1. Remove the old, no longer relevant, rules prohibiting American companies from selling crude oil overseas. 2. Remove constraints, established by the 1920 Merchant Marine Act, on transporting domestic hydrocarbons by ship. 3. Avoid inflicting further regulatory hurdles on an already heavily regulated industry. 4. Open up and accelerate access to exploration and production on federally controlled lands.

Nonetheless, in the near-term, states which benefitted from $100+ crude oil and the energy related innovations it spawned, are now feeling the effects of what appears to be a sustained period of lower energy prices. The EIA predicts WTI crude will average $60 over the course of 2015.

So far, if Texas is any guide, the negative effects of the oil price decline have failed to materialise.

The effect of a 25% rise in crude oil prices is also worth considering:-

State

Employment Change

State

Employment Change

Wisconsin

-0.74

Ohio

-0.61

Minnesota

-0.73

Missouri

-0.6

Tennessee

-0.72

Illinois

-0.59

Rhode Island

-0.71

Massachusetts

-0.59

Florida

-0.71

Delaware

-0.58

New Hampshire

-0.7

South Dakota

-0.57

Idaho

-0.69

New York

-0.57

Nevada

-0.69

California

-0.56

Arizona

-0.68

Alabama

-0.56

Indiana

-0.68

DC

-0.5

Nebraska

-0.67

Kentucky

-0.48

Vermont

-0.66

Pennsylvania

-0.47

Iowa

-0.66

Utah

-0.38

New Jersey

-0.65

Kansas

-0.35

Washington

-0.64

Mississippi

-0.35

Maryland

-0.64

Arkansas

-0.34

Georgia

-0.64

Montana

-0.31

Michigan

-0.64

Colorado

-0.15

Virginia

-0.64

New Mexico

0.36

South Carolina

-0.64

West Virginia

0.36

Oregon

-0.64

Texas

0.6

Connecticut

-0.63

Louisiana

0.78

Maine

-0.62

Alaska

0.87

North Carolina

-0.62

North Dakota

1.01

Hawaii

-0.61

Oklahoma

1.16

Wyoming

2.14

Sources: CFR, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Wall Street Journal

The effect on the US as a whole is estimated at -0.43%. In other words, a fall in crude oil is good for employment and should also act as a cathartic stimulus to GDP growth.

A final measure of the vulnerability of the US economy to the recent oil price decline is shown by the next table. This shows the substantial diversification away from the energy sector seen in every one of the major oil producing states since the 1980’s:-

Share of Oil and Gas Extraction as a % of GDP

1981

2000

2010

Alaska

49.5

15.1

19.1

Louisiana

35.5

11.1

9.7

New Mexico

26.1

5.2

5.1

North Dakota

20.3

0.9

4.3

Oklahoma

21.6

4.8

9.1

Texas

19.1

5.8

7.8

West Virginia

2.4

1

1.5

Wyoming

37.1

9.8

18.5

Source:CFR, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Looking at how unemployment has changed across the 51 states over the last 12 months:-

State

April

April

12-month net change

2014

2015

Alabama

7.1

5.8

-1.3

Alaska

6.9

6.7

-0.2

Arizona

6.9

6

-0.9

Arkansas

6.3

5.7

-0.6

California

7.8

6.3

-1.5

Colorado

5.4

4.2

-1.2

Connecticut

6.8

6.3

-0.5

Delaware

5.9

4.5

-1.4

DC

7.8

7.5

-0.3

Florida

6.4

5.6

-0.8

Georgia

7.3

6.3

-1

Hawaii

4.5

4.1

-0.4

Idaho

4.9

3.8

-1.1

Illinois

7.4

6

-1.4

Indiana

6

5.4

-0.6

Iowa

4.4

3.8

-0.6

Kansas

4.5

4.3

-0.2

Kentucky

7

5

-2

Louisiana

5.7

6.6

0.9

Maine

5.8

4.7

-1.1

Maryland

5.9

5.3

-0.6

Massachusetts

5.8

4.7

-1.1

Michigan

7.5

5.4

-2.1

Minnesota

4.2

3.7

-0.5

Mississippi

7.8

6.6

-1.2

Missouri

6.3

5.7

-0.6

Montana

4.7

4

-0.7

Nebraska

3.4

2.5

-0.9

Nevada

8.1

7.1

-1

New Hampshire

4.5

3.8

-0.7

New Jersey

6.7

6.5

-0.2

New Mexico

6.7

6.2

-0.5

New York

6.5

5.7

-0.8

North Carolina

6.4

5.5

-0.9

North Dakota

2.7

3.1

0.4

Ohio

5.9

5.2

-0.7

Oklahoma

4.7

4.1

-0.6

Oregon

7

5.2

-1.8

Pennsylvania

6

5.3

-0.7

Rhode Island

8.1

6.1

-2

South Carolina

6.1

6.7

0.6

South Dakota

3.4

3.6

0.2

Tennessee

6.5

6

-0.5

Texas

5.2

4.2

-1

Utah

3.8

3.4

-0.4

Vermont

4

3.6

-0.4

Virginia

5.3

4.8

-0.5

Washington

6.2

5.5

-0.7

West Virginia

6.8

7

0.2

Wisconsin

5.5

4.4

-1.1

Wyoming

4.3

4.1

-0.2

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Only Louisiana (+0.9%) North Dakota (+0.4%) and West Virginia (+0.2%) of the top oil producing states, have witnessed increased levels of unemployment. South Dakota (+0.2%) and South Carolina (+0.6%) were the only other states in the union to see unemployment rise. This is not the picture of a faltering economy.

The Federal Reserve Leading Index, whilst it hit a low point of +0.9% in January – down from +2% in July 2014 – has rebounded – April +1.12% – and has remained in positive territory since August 2009. The Conference Board Leading Economic Index increased 0.7% in April to 122.3, following a +0.4% in March, and a -0.2% February. The Conference Board commented:-

April’s sharp increase in the LEI seems to have helped stabilize its slowing trend, suggesting the paltry economic growth in the first quarter may be temporary. However, the growth of the LEI does not support a significant strengthening in the economic outlook at this time. The improvement in building permits helped to drive the index up this month, but gains in other components, in particular the financial indicators, have been somewhat more muted.

The outlook appears steady rather than robust but this has been the pattern of the economic recovery ever since the first round of quantitative easing (QE) in November 2008.

Conclusion and Equity Investment Opportunities

The US economic recovery remains intact. The long run economic benefits of structurally lower energy prices and energy security are slowly feeding through to the wider economy. This is good for the US and, as long as the US continues to run a trade deficit with the rest of the world, it’s good for the US main trading partners too.

After a sharp correction in October 2014 the S&P500 recovered. Since its January lows the market has ground slowly higher:-

Source: Barchart.com

The table below shows a series of additional valuation measures:-

Indicator

Ratio

Date

Start of Data

Trailing 12 month P/E

20.53

Mean

15.54

Min

5.31

Dec 1917

Max

123.73

May 2009

1875

Shiller Case P/E

27.1

Mean

16.61

Min

4.78

Dec 1920

Max

44.19

Dec 1999

1885

Price to Sales

1.81

Mean

1.4

Min

0.8

Mar 2009

Max

1.81

Jun 2015

2001

Price to Book

2.89

Mean

2.75

Min

1.78

Mar 2009

Max

5.06

Mar 2000

2000

Source: multpl.com

On most of these metrics the market looks relatively expensive but the current level of interest rates is unprecedented. JP Morgan Asset Management predict average corporate earnings to grow by 4% in 2015 – stripping out energy stocks this rises to 11%. They also remind investors that the S&P has seen 10 bear markets since 1926. Eight occurred as a result of economic recessions or commodity price shocks (price increases not decreases) and extreme valuations were a contributing factor only on four occasions. They go on to refute the idea that interest rate increases by the Federal Reserve will derail the bull market, pointing to the positive correlation between rising interest rates and rising equity prices when interest rates start from a low point. They make the caveat that the initial reaction to interest rate increases is negative but in the longer term stocks tend to rise.

At the risk of uttering that most dangerous of phrases – “this time it’s different” – I believe the majority of the rise in equity prices was a function of the reduction in the level of interest rates since 2008. This had two effects; investors switched from interest bearing securities to equities, hoping that capital appreciation would offset the declining income from bonds: and corporations, faced with negative real interest rates, decided to raise dividends and buy back stock, rather than make capital investments when interest rates were artificially low. The chart below shows US 10yr Government Bond yields since 1790:-

Source: Global Financial Data

The chart ends in 2013, since when yields have plumbed new depths. Ignoring the inflation shock of the 1970’s and 1980’s it would be reasonable to expect US Treasuries to yield around 3% but that was before the Federal Reserve moved from a stable price target – i.e. around zero – to a 2% inflation target. I think it is reasonable for corporates to assume a long-term cost of finance based on a 3% real yield for US Treasuries plus an appropriate credit spread. Is it any wonder that corporates continue to buy back stock?

The impact of the oil price collapse is still feeding through the US economy but, since the most vulnerable states have learnt the lessons of the 1980’s and diversified away from an excessive reliance of on the energy sector, the short-run downturn will be muted whilst the long-run benefits of new technology will be transformative. US oil production at $10/barrel would have sounded ludicrous less than five years ago: today it seems almost plausible.

US stocks are not cheap, but Q1 earnings declines have been reversed and, whilst growth is muted, the longer term benefits of lower energy prices are just beginning to feed through. At the beginning of the year I was cautious and considering reducing exposure to the US market. Now, I am still cautious, but, if earnings start to improve, today’s valuations will prove justified and further upside may be well ensue. The US bond market is doing the Fed’s work for it – 10yr yields have risen from a low of 1.64% in January to 2.30% today. Whilst the first rise in official rates is likely to act as a negative for stocks, the market will recover as long as the momentum of earnings growth remains positive and energy prices remain subdued.