[11] MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the
opinion of the court.

[12] The law of Louisiana, under which the Board of Health exerted the authority
which is complained of, is found in section 8 of Act No. 192, enacted in 1898.
The portion of the section which is essential is as follows, the provision which
is more directly pertinent to the case in hand being italicized:

[13] "In case that any parish, town or city, or any portion thereof, shall
become infected with any contagious or infectious disease, to such an extent
as to threaten the spread of such disease to the other portions of the State,
the state Board of Health shall issue its proclamation declaring the facts and
ordering it in quarantine, and shall order the local boards of health of other
parishes, towns and cities to quarantine against said locality, and shall establish
and promulgate the rules and regulations, terms and conditions on which intercourse
with said infected locality shall be permitted, and shall issue to the other
local sanitary authorities instructions as to the measures adopted in quarantining
against persons, goods or other property coming from said infected localities,
and these rules and regulations, terms and conditions shall be observed and
obeyed by all other health authorities, provided that should any other of the
noninfected portion of the State desire to add to the regulations and rules,
terms and conditions already imposed by the state board, they do so on the approval
of the state Board of Health. The state Board of Health may, in its discretion,
prohibit the introduction into any infected portion of the State, persons acclimated,
unacclimated or said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of
such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the disease. The state
Board of Health shall render the local boards of health all the assistance in
their power and which the condition of their finances will permit."

[14] The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, interpreting this statute,
held that it empowered the board to exclude healthy persons from a locality
infested with a contagious or infectious disease, and that this power was intended
to apply as well to persons seeking to enter the infected place, whether they
came from without or from within the State. The court said:

[15] "The law does not limit the board to prohibiting the introduction
of persons from one portion of the State to another and an infected portion
of the State, but evidently looked as well to the prohibition of the introduction
of persons from points outside of the State into any infected portion of the
State. As the object in view would be 'to accomplish the subsidence and suppression
of the infectious and contagious diseases and to prevent the spread of the same,'
it would be difficult to see why parties from outside of the State should be
permitted to enter into infected places, while those from the different parishes
should be prevented from holding intercourse with each other.

[16] "The object in view was to keep down, as far as possible, the number
of persons to be brought within danger of contagion or infection, and by means
of this reduction to accomplish the subsidence and suppression of the disease
and the spread of the same.

[17] "The particular places from which the parties, who were to be prohibited
from entering the infected district or districts, came could have no possible
influence upon the attainment of the result sought to be attained. "It
would make no possible difference whether this 'added fuel' sought to be excluded
should come from Louisiana, New York or Europe."

[18] Referring to past conditions and the public dangers which had arisen from
them, the evil which the statute of 1898 was intended to remedy was pointed
out as follows:

[19] "During the fall of 1897, and during the existence of an epidemic,
a vessel arrived in the Mississippi River with emigrants aboard under conditions
similar to those under which the Britannia reached the same stream in 1898.

[20] "The excited public discussions at the time as to the right of the
state board, under the then existing law, to prevent the landing of the emigrants
and as to its duty in the premises, were so extended as to authorize us to take
judicial notice of the fact, and in our opinion the clause in the present act
which covers that precise matter was inserted therein for the express purpose
of placing the particular question outside of the range of controversy.

[21] "For a number of years past emigrants have been coming into New Orleans
in the autumn from Italy.

[22] "There was a probability when the general assembly met in 1898 that
the epidemic of 1897 might be repeated, and a great probability that emigrants
would seek to enter, as they had done the year before, to the great danger,
not only of the people of Louisiana, but of the emigrants themselves.

[23] "Independently of this, there was great danger to be apprehended from
the increasing intercourse between New Orleans and the West India Islands in
consequence of a war with Spain.

[24] "It was to ward off these dangers that this particular provision was
inserted in the act of 1898."

[25] And by implication from the reasoning just referred to the existence of
the conditions rendering it necessary to call the power into play in the case
before it was recognized. Thus construing the statute, the state court held
that it was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and was not
in conflict with any law or treaty of the United States. These latter considerations
present the questions which arise for our decision. All the assignments of error
relied upon to show the invalidity of the statute of the State of Louisiana,
and hence the illegality of the action of the Board of Health from the point
of view of Federal considerations, are, in the argument at bar, summarized in
four propositions. We shall consider them separately and thus dispose of the
case. In doing so, however, as the first and second contentions both rest upon
the assertion that the statute violates the Constitution of the United States,
we shall treat them together.

[26] "First. The statute drawn in question, on its face and as construed
and applied, is void for the reason that it is in violation of article I, section
3, paragraph 8, of the Constitution of the United States, inasmuch as it vests
authority in the state Board of Health, in its discretion, to interfere with
or prohibit interstate and foreign commerce.

[27] "Second. The statute is void for inasmuch as it is in conflict with
section 1 of the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, in this it deprives the plaintiff of its liberty and property
without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the law."

[28] That from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce quarantine
laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has
been recognized by Congress, is beyond question. That until Congress has exercised
its power on the subject, such state quarantine laws and state laws for the
purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or
infectious diseases, are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,
although their operation affects interstate or foreign commerce, is not an open
question. The doctrine was elaborately examined and stated in Morgan Steamship
Company v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455. That case involved determining
whether a quarantine law enacted by the State of Louisiana was repugnant to
the commerce clause of the Constitution because of its necessary effect upon
interstate and foreign commerce. The court said:

[29] "Is the law under consideration void as a regulation of commerce?
Undoubtedly it is in some sense a regulation of commerce. It arrests a vessel
on a voyage which may have been a long one. It may affect commerce among the
States when the vessel is coming from some other State of the Union than Louisiana,
and it may affect commerce with foreign nations when the vessel arrested comes
from a foreign port. This interruption of the voyage may be for days or for
weeks. It extends to the vessel, the cargo, the officers and seamen, and the
passengers. In so far as it provides a rule by which this power is exercised,
it cannot be denied that it regulates commerce. We do not think it necessary
to enter into the inquiry whether, notwithstanding this, it is to be classed
among those police powers which were retained by the States as exclusively their
own, and, therefore, not ceded to Congress. For, while it may be a police power
in the sense that all provisions for the health, comfort and security of the
citizens, are police regulations, and an exercise of the police power, it has
been said more than once in this court that, even where such powers are so exercised
as to come within the domain of Federal authority as defined by the Constitution,
the latter must prevail. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210; Henderson v. The
Mayor, 92 U.S. 259, 272; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S.
650, 661.

[30] "But it may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to
provide for the commercial cities of the United States a general system of quarantine,
or shall confide the execution of the details of such a system to a National
Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all state laws
on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.
But, until this is done, the laws of the State on the subject are valid. This
follows from two reasons:

[31] "1. The act of 1799, the main features of which are embodied in Title
LVIII of the Revised Statutes, clearly recognizes the quarantine laws of the
States, and required of the officers of the Treasury a conformity to their provisions
in dealing with vessels affected by the quarantine system. And this very clearly
has relation to laws created after the passage of that statute, as well as to
those then in existence; and when, by the act of April 29, 1878, 20 Stat. 37,
certain powers in this direction were conferred on the Surgeon General of the
Marine Hospital Service, and consuls and revenue officers were required to contribute
services in preventing the importation of disease, it was provided that 'there
shall be no interference in any manner with any quarantine laws or regulations
as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under state laws,' showing very
clearly the intention of Congress to adopt these laws or to recognize the power
of the State to pass them.

[32] "2. But, aside from this, quarantine laws belong to that class of
state legislation which, whether passed with intent to regulate commerce or
not, must be admitted to have that effect, and which are valid until displaced
or contravened by some legislation of Congress." Again, in Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 21, the court was called upon to consider a quarantine law
of the State of Texas which by its terms was applicable to and was enforced
as to both interstate and foreign commerce. After referring approvingly to the
case which we have above cited, the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, said:

[33] "It is not charged that this statute is invalid nor could it be if
tested by its terms. While it is true that the power vested in Congress to regulate
commerce among the States is a power complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations
other than those prescribed in the Constitution, and that where the action of
the States in the exercise of their reserve powers comes into collision with
it, the latter must give way, yet it is also true that quarantine laws belong
to that class of state legislation which is valid until displaced by Congress,
and that such legislation has been expressly recognized by the laws of the United
States almost from the beginning of the government."

[34] Further, in calling attention to the fact, as remarked by the court in
Morgan Steamship company v. Louisiana Board of Health, supra, that in the nature
of things quarantine laws and laws relating to public health must necessarily
vary with the different localities of the country, it was said:

[35] "Hence even if Congress had remained silent on the subject it would
not have followed that the exercise of the police power of the State in this
regard, although necessarily operating on interstate commerce, would be therefore
invalid. Although from the nature and subjects of the power of regulating commerce
it must be ordinarily exercised by the national government exclusively, this
has not been held to be so where in relation to the particular subject-matter
different rules might be suitable in different localities. At the same time,
Congress could by affirmative action displace the local laws, substitute laws
of its own, and thus correct any unjustifiable and oppressive exercise of power
by state legislation."

[36] Despite these conclusive adjudications, it is earnestly insisted in the
argument at bar that by a correct appreciation of all the decisions of this
court on the subject, the rule will be discovered to be that the States may
enact quarantine or other health laws for the protection of their inhabitants,
but that such laws, if they operate upon or directly affect interstate or foreign
commerce, are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States independently
of whether Congress has legislated on such subjects. To sustain this contention
a most copious reference is made to many cases decided by this court, where
the nature and extent of the power of Congress to regulate commerce was considered
and the validity of state legislation asserted to be repugnant to such power
was passed upon. To analyze and review the numerous cases referred to in order
to point out their want of relation to the question in hand, would involve in
effect a review of the whole subject of the power of Congress to regulate commerce
in every possible aspect, and an analysis of practically the greater body of
cases which have in this court involved that serious and difficult subject from
the beginning. We shall not undertake to do so, but content ourselves with saying,
after duly considering the cases relied upon, that we find them inapposite to
the doctrine they are cited to sustain, and hence, when they are correctly appreciated,
none of them conflict with the settled rule announced by this court in the cases
to which we have referred.

[37] The confusion of thought which has given rise to the misconception of the
authorities relied upon in the argument, and which has caused it to be supposed
that they are apposite to the case in hand, is well illustrated by the premise
upon which the proposition that the cited authorities are applicable rests.
That proposition is thus stated in the printed argument (italics in the original):
"Turning now to the decisions of this court, it will be found that the
basis upon which it has upheld the exclusion, inspection and quarantine laws
of various States, is that criminals, diseased persons and things, and paupers,
are not legitimate subjects of commerce. They may be attendant evils, but they
are not legitimate subjects of traffic and transportation, and therefore, in
their exclusion or detention, the State is not interfering with legitimate commerce,
which is the only kind entitled to the protection of the Constitution."

[38] But it must be at once observed that this erroneously states the doctrine
as concluded by the decisions of this court previously referred to, since the
proposition ignores the fact that those cases expressly and unequivocally hold
that the health and quarantine laws of the several States are not repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, although they affect foreign and domestic
commerce, as in many cases they necessarily must do in order to be efficacious,
because until Congress has acted under the authority conferred upon it by the
Constitution, such state health and quarantine laws producing such effect on
legitimate interstate commerce are not in conflict with the Constitution. True
is it that, is some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that
a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances,
of objects actually affected with disease, was valid because such objects were
not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate
by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. In other words, the power
exists until Congress has acted, to incidentally regulate by health and quarantine
laws, even although interstate and foreign commerce is affected, and the power
to absolutely prohibit additionally obtains where the thing prohibited is not
commerce, and hence not embraced in either interstate or foreign commerce. True,
also, it was held in some of the cases referred to by counsel, that where the
introduction of a given article was absolutely prohibited by a state law upon
the asserted theory that the health of the inhabitants would be aided by the
enforcement of the prohibition, it was decided that, as the article which it
was thus sought to prohibit, was a well-known article of commerce, and therefore
the legitimate subject of interstate commerce, it could not be removed from
that category by the prohibitive effect of state legislation. But this case
does not involve that question, since it does not present the attempted exercise
by the State of the power to absolutely prohibit the introduction of an article
of commerce, but merely requires us to decide whether a state law, which regulates
the introduction of persons and property into a district infested with contagious
or infectious diseases, is void, because to enforce such regulation will burden
interstate and foreign commerce, and therefore violate the Constitution of the
United States. It is earnestly insisted that the statute, whose constitutionality
is assailed, is, on its face, not a regulation, but an absolute prohibition
against interstate commerce, and it is sought to sustain this contention by
various suggestions as to the wrong which may possibly arise from a perversion
and an abuse by the state authorities of the power which the statute confers.
Thus it is said, what is an infectious and contagious disease is uncertain,
and involves a large number of maladies. How many cases of such malady are essential
to cause a place to be considered as infected with them is left to the determination
of the Board of Health. That board, it is argued, may then arbitrarily, upon
the existence of one or more cases of any malady which it may deem to be infectious
or contagious, declare any given place in the State, or even the whole State
of Louisiana, infected, and proceed to absolutely debar all interstate or foreign
commerce with the State of Louisiana. True it is, as said in Morgan v. Louisiana,
ubi sup. :

[39] "In all cases of this kind it has been repeatedly held that, when
the question is raised whether the state statute is a just exercise of state
power or is intended by roundabout means to invade the domain of Federal authority,
this court will look into the operation and effect of the statute to discern
its purpose. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. 275; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 587."

[40] But this implies that we are to consider the statute as enacted and the
natural results flowing from it. It does not import that we are to hold a state
statute unconstitutional by indulging in conjecture as to every conceivable
harm which may arise or wrong which may be occasioned by the abuse of the lawful
powers which a statute confers. It will be time enough to consider a case of
such supposed abuse when it is presented for consideration. And it is also to
be borne in mine, as said by this court in Louisiana v. Texas, supra, 22, if
any such wrong should be perpetrated "Congress could by affirmative action
displace the local laws, substitute laws of its own, and thus correct any unjustifiable
and oppressive exercise of power by state legislation." And the views which
we have previously expressed suffice to dispose of the contention that the subjecting
of the vessel of the plaintiff in error to the restriction imposed by the quarantine
and health law of the State operated to deprive the defendant in error of its
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It having been ascertained that the regulation was lawfully adopted and enforced
the contention demonstrates its own unsoundness, since in the last analysis
it reduces itself to the proposition that the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to strip the government, whether state or national, of all power to enact
regulations protecting the health and safety of the people, or, what is equivalent
thereto, necessarily amounts to saying that such laws when lawfully enacted
cannot be enforced against person or property without violating the Constitution.
In other words, that the lawful powers of government which the Constitution
has conferred may not be exerted without bringing about a violation of the Constitution.

[41] "Third. The statute as applied and construed is void, for the reason
that it is in conflict with treaties between the United States on the one part
and the Republic of France and the Kingdom of Italy on the other part, guaranteeing
certain rights, privileges and immunities to the citizens and subjects of said
countries."

[42] Reliance is placed to sustain this proposition, on the provisions of a
treaty concluded with the Kingdom of Italy on February 26, 1871; on the terms
of a treaty with Great Britain of July 3, 1815, as also a treaty between the
United States and the Kingdom of Greece, concluded December 22, 1837, and one
concluded with the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway on July 24, 1827. The treaties
of other countries than Italy are referred to upon the theory that as by the
treaty concluded with France on April 3, 1803, by which Louisiana was acquired,
it was provided that France should be treated upon the footing of the most favored
nation in the ports of the ceded territory, therefore the treaties in question
made with other countries than France were applicable to the plaintiff in error,
a French subject.

[43] Conceding, arguendo, this latter proposition, and therefore assuming that
all the treaties relied on are applicable, we think it clearly results from
their context that they were not intended to and did not deprive the government
of the United States of those powers necessarily inhering in it and essential
to the health and safety of its people. We say the United States, because if
the treaties relied on have the effect claimed for them that effect would be
equally as operative and conclusive against a quarantine established by the
government of the United States as it would be against a state quarantine operating
upon and affecting foreign commerce by virtue of the inaction of Congress. Without
reviewing the text of all the treaties, we advert to the provisions of the one
made with Greece, which is principally relied upon. The text of article XV of
this treaty is the provision to which our attention is directed, and it is reproduced
in the margin.*fn1 It is apparent that it provides only the particular form
of document which shall be taken by a ship of the Kingdom of Greece and reciprocally
by those of the United States for the purpose of establishing that infectious
or contagious diseases did not exist at the point of departure. But it is plain
from the face of the treaty that the provision as to the certificate was not
intended to abrogate the quarantine power, since the concluding section of the
article in question expressly subjects the vessel holding the certificate to
quarantine detention if, on its arrival, a general quarantine had been established
against all ships coming from the port whence the vessel holding the certificate
had sailed. It other words, the treaty having provided the certificate and given
it effect under ordinary conditions, proceeds to subject the vessel holding
the certificate to quarantine, if, on its arrival, such restriction had been
established in consequence of infection deemed to exist at the port of departure.
Nothing in the text of the treaty, we think, gives even color to the suggestion
that it was intended to deal with the exercise by the government of the United
States of its power to legislate for the safety and health of its people or
to render the exertion of such power nugatory by exempting the vessels of the
Kingdom of Greece, when coming to the United States, from the operation of such
laws. In other words, the treaty was made subject to the enactment of such health
laws as the local conditions might evoke not paramount to them. especially where
the restriction imposed upon the vessel is based, not upon the conditions existing
at the port of departure, but upon the presence of an infectious or contagious
malady at the port of arrival within the United States, which, in the nature
of things, could not be covered by the certificate relating to the state of
the public health at the port whence the ship had sailed.

[44] "Fourth. The statute as applied is void for the reason that it is
in conflict with the laws of the United States relating to foreign immigration
into the United States."

[45] In the argument at bar this proposition embraces also the claim that the
statute is void because in conflict with the act of Congress of 1893 entitled
"An act granting additional quarantine powers and imposing additional duties
upon the Marine Hospital Service." 27 Stat. 449. And that it also is in
conflict with the rules and regulations adopted for the enforcement of both
the immigration laws and the quarantine law referred to.

[46] The immigration acts to which the proposition relates are those of March
3, 1875, of August 3, 1882, of June 26, 1884, of February 26, 1885, of March
23, 1887, and March 3, 1891, and the regulations to enforce the same. Without
undertaking to analyze the provisions of these acts, it suffices to say that,
after scrutinizing them, we think they do not purport to abrogate the quarantine
laws of the several States, and that the safeguards which they create and the
regulations which they impose on the introduction of immigrants are ancillary,
and subject to such quarantine laws. So far as the act of 1893 is concerned,
it is manifest that it did not contemplate the overthrow of the existing state
quarantine systems and the abrogation of the powers on the subject of health
and quarantine exercised by the States from the beginning, because the enactment
of state laws on these subjects would, in particular instances, affect interstate
and foreign commerce. An extract from section 3 of the act, which we think makes
these conclusions obvious, is reproduced in the margin.*fn1a Nor do we find
anything in the rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury
in execution of the power conferred upon him by the act in question giving support
to the contention based upon them. It follows from what has been said that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana did not err in deciding that the act in question
was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and was not in conflict
with the acts of Congress on the treaties made by the United States which were
relied upon to show to the contrary and its judgment is, therefore,

[47] Affirmed.

[48] MR. JUSTICE BROWN, with whom was MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

[49] The power of the several States, in the absence of legislation by Congress
on the subject, to establish quarantine regulations, to prohibit the introduction
into the State of persons infected with disease, or recently exposed to contagion,
and to impose a reasonable charge upon vessels subjected to examination at quarantine
stations, is so well settled by repeated decisions of this court as to be no
longer open to doubt. This case, however, does not involve that question, but
the broader one, whether, in the assumed exercise of this power, the legislature
may declare certain portions of the State to be in quarantine, and prohibit
the entry therein of all persons whatsoever, whether coming from the United
States or foreign countries, from infected or uninfected ports, whether the
persons included are diseased or have recently been exposed to contagion, or
are perfectly sound and healthy, and coming from ports in which there is no
suspicion of contagious diseases.

[50] I have no doubt of the power to quarantine all vessels arriving in the
Mississippi from foreign ports for a sufficient length of time to enable the
health officers to determine whether there are among her passengers any persons
afflicted with a contagious disease. But the State of Louisiana undertakes to
do far more than this. It authorizes the state Board of Health at its discretion
to "prohibit the introduction into any infected portion of the State of
persons acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune, when in its judgment
the introduction of said persons would add to or increase the prevalence of
the disease;" and at its meeting on September 29, 1898, the Board of Health
adopted the following resolution:

[51] "That hereafter, in the case of any town, city or parish of Louisiana
being declared in quarantine, no body or bodies of people, immigrants, soldiers
or others shall be allowed to enter said town, city or parish so long as said
quarantine shall exist, and that the president of the board shall enforce this
resolution."

[52] In other words, the Board of Health is authorized and assumes to prohibit
in all portions of the State which it chooses to declare in quarantine, the
introduction or immigration of all persons from outside the quarantine district,
whether infected or uninfected, sick or well, sound or unsound, feeble or healthy;
and that, too, not for the few days necessary to establish the sanitary status
of such persons, but for an indefinite and possibly permanent period. I think
this is not a necessary or proper exercise of the police power, and falls within
that numerous class of cases which hold that States may not, in the assumed
exercise of police power, interfere with foreign or interstate commerce.

[53] The only excuse offered for such a wholesale exclusion of immigrants is,
as stated by the Supreme Court, "to keep down, as far as possible, the
number of persons to be brought within danger of contagion or infection, and
by means of this reduction to accomplish the subsidence and suppression of the
disease, and the spread of the same." In other words, the excuse amounts
to this: that the admission, even of healthy persons, adds to the possibility
of the contagion being communicated upon the principle of adding fuel to the
flame. It does not increase the danger of contagion by adding infected persons
to the population, since the bill avers that all the immigrants were healthy
and sound. All it could possibly do is to increase the number of persons who
might become ill if permitted to be added to the population. This is a danger
not to the population, but to the immigrants. It seems to me that this is a
possibility too remote to justify the drastic measure of a total exclusion of
all classes of immigrants, and that the opinion of the court is directly in
the teeth of Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, wherein a state statute,
which prohibited the driving or conveying of any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle
into the State, between March 1 and November 1 in each year, was held to be
in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution. Such statute was declared
to be more than a quarantine regulation, and not a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the State. Said Mr. Justice Strong, page 472: "While we
unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection
of life, liberty, health or property within its borders; while it may prevent
persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts,
etc., from entering the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may
establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with
the transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary
for its self-protection. It may not under the cover of exerting its police powers
substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce."
The statute was held to be a plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of Congress;
that it was not a quarantine law; not an inspection law, and was objectionable
because it prohibited the introduction of cattle, no matter whether they may
do an injury to the inhabitants of a State or not; "and if you do bring
them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the State without unloading
them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities." Cases covering
the same principle are those of State v. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578,
and City of Bangor v. Smith, 83 Maine, 422.

[54] I am also unable to concur in the construction given in the opinion of
the court to the treaty stipulation with France and other foreign powers. The
treaty with France of 1803 provides that "the ships of France shall be
treated upon the footing of the most favored nation in the ports above mentioned"
of Louisiana. Article 14 of the treaty with Greece of December 22, 1837, set
forth in the opinion, provides that vessels arriving directly from the Kingdom
of Greece at any port of the United States of America, "and provided with
a bill of health granted by an officer having competent power to that effect,
at the port whence such vessel shall have sailed, setting forth that no malignant
or contagious diseases prevailed in that port, shall be subjected to no other
quarantine than such as may be necessary for the visit of the health officer
of the port where such vessel shall have arrived, after which said vessels shall
be allowed immediately to enter and unload their cargoes: Provided always, That
there shall be on board no person who, during the voyage, shall have been attacked
with any malignant or contagious disease; that such vessel shall not, during
the passage, have communicated with any vessel liable itself to undergo quarantine,
and that the country whence they came, shall not at that time be so far infected
or suspected that, before their arrival, an ordinance had been issued, in consequence
of which, all vessels coming from that country should be considered as suspected,
and consequently subject to quarantine." If the law in question in Louisiana,
excluding French ships from all access to the port of New Orleans, be not a
violation of the provision of the treaty that vessels "shall be subject
to no other quarantine than such as may be necessary for the visit of a health
officer of the port, after which such vessels shall be allowed immediately to
enter and unload their cargoes," I am unable to conceive a state of facts
which would constitute a violation of that provision. Necessary as efficient
quarantine laws are, I know of no authority in the States to enact such as are
in conflict with our treaties with foreign nations.

[55] *fn1 "Article XV. It is agreed that vessels arriving directly from
the United States of America at a port within the dominion of His Majesty the
King of Greece, or from the Kingdom of Greece, at a port of the United States
of America, and provided with a bill of health granted by an officer having
competent power to that effect at the port whence such vessel shall have sailed,
setting forth that no malignant or contagious diseases prevailed in that port,
shall be subjected to no other quarantine than such as may be necessary for
the visit of the health officer of the port where such vessel shall have arrived,
after which said vessels shall be allowed immediately to enter and unload their
cargoes; Provided always, that there shall be on board no person who, during
the voyage, shall have been attacked with any malignant or contagious disease;
that such vessel shall not, during the passage, have communicated with any vessel
liable itself to undergo quarantine; and that the country whence they came shall
not at that time be so far infected or suspected that, before their arrival,
an ordinance had been issued in consequence of which all vessels coming from
that country should be considered as suspected, and consequently subject to
quarantine."
1a "SEC. 3. That the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital
Service shall, immediately after this act takes effect, examine the quarantine
regulations of all state and municipal boards of health, and shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, cooperate with and aid state and
municipal board of health in the execution and enforcement of the rules and
regulations of such boards and in the execution and enforcement of the rules
and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, to prevent the introduction
of contagious or infectious diseases into the United States from foreign countries,
and into one State or Territory or the District of Columbia from another State
or Territory or the District of Columbia; and all rules and regulations made
by the Secretary of the Treasury shall operate uniformly and in no manner discriminate
against any port or place; and at such ports and places within the United States
as have no quarantine regulations under state or municipal authority, where
such regulations are, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, necessary
to prevent the introduction of contagious or infectious diseases into the United
States from foreign counties, or into one State or Territory or the District
of Columbia from another State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and
at such ports and places within the United States where quarantine regulations
exist under the authority of the state or municipality which, in the opinion
of the Secretary of the Treasury, are not sufficient to prevent the introduction
of such diseases into the United States, or into one State or Territory or the
District of Columbia from another State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
the Secretary of the Treasury shall, if in his judgment it is necessary and
proper, make such additional rules and regulations as are necessary to prevent
the introduction of such diseases into the United States from foreign countries,
or into one State or Territory or the District of Columbia from another State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, and when said rules and regulations
have been made they shall be promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury and
enforced by the sanitary authorities of the States and municipalities, where
the state or municipal health authorities will undertake to execute and enforce
them; but if the state or municipal authorities shall fail or refuse to enforce
said rules and regulations the President shall execute and enforce the same
and adopt such measures as in his judgment shall be necessary to prevent the
introduction or spread of such diseases, and may detail or appoint officers
for that purpose. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make such rules and regulations
as are necessary to be observed by vessels at the port of departure and on the
voyage, where such vessels sail from any foreign port or place to any port or
place in the United States, to secure the best sanitary condition of such vessel,
her cargo, passengers and crew, which shall be published and communicated to
and enforced by the consular officers of the United States."