I called on Zorin at his Embassy this morning for about an hour's
talk, accompanied by Embassy officer Perry. Young Bogomolov
interpreted.2

2.

In reply to my question, Zorin admitted he had instructions to keep in
contact with me in accordance with my suggestion to Dobrynin. I said I felt sure Soviet
Government wished to see fighting stopped, and therefore I would
tell him frankly of our impressions of our conversations to date. I
described the futility of across-the-room highly publicized
speeches, and Hanoi representative's refusal of my suggestion to
undertake unpublicized discussions. I suggested that he might wish
to encourage the NVN delegation to
have informal contacts with us through a member of the delegation or
staff. He said this was impossible until we stopped bombing.

3.

After some discussion, he asked whether I suggested contacts
between one member each of the delegations, or more than one. I
replied either, and urged him to think over my suggestion.

4.

He gave me the usual line, handed Stewart by Gromyko.3 I explained
in detail that we considered the President's March 31 speech the
basis for our meeting, and rejected the idea that the only reason
for meeting was to learn the hour and date of bombing cessation. I
said that if this was all, no meeting would have been necessary. I
explained our interpretation of the language of Hanoi's April 3
statement, which proposed “contacts with the view of determining
with the American side” etc. I told him we had constantly been ready
to talk about the cessation of bombing, but would insist upon
discussing at the same time relevant matters on the basis of the
President's speech.

5.

One point of a little less rigidity on his part came when I said
we would not insist on an agreement for restraint, that we would
accept signs of restraint instead of words. He seemed interested in
this and asked whether we had made this clear to the other side. I
said yes, but if he thought there was any doubt I would make it
clear again on Monday,4
but suggested he might wish to bring this to their attention as
well. I explained that unfortunately Hanoi
had thus far increased the movement South and the action around the
DMZ, rather than shown any signs
of restraint. When he refused to pass any messages to NVN representatives as intermediary, I
said that I wasn't asking him to tell me what he was going to do,
but that I would assume that in accordance with his instructions he
would bring this to the attention of the other side.5

6.

Several times, when he stated Hanoi's rigid position, I said that
if the North Vietnamese maintained that attitude I thought the
situation would become dangerous. I made no threats, but emphasized
the kind of pressure the President would be under from public
opinion, which would complain that Hanoi, while enjoying a
limitation of bombing, was not talking seriously or showing
restraint.

7.

The best I can say is that Zorin was somewhat less argumentative and at least
listened courteously. He will certainly report our talks to
Moscow.

A memorandum of this
conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Harriman Papers,
Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Paris Peace
Talks, Subject File, HARVAN
and HARVAN/PLUS, Meetings
with the Soviets: Zorin-Oberemko.↩

In 171322 to Paris, May 26, the Department
expressed “serious concern” at Harriman's intention to raise this idea again
directly and suggested that instead he focus on the restoration
of the DMZ. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG
59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968–1969, Todel Chron.)↩