I
believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will
fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave
the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1.
As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in
the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or
northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to
achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to
prepare for actual warfare.

2.
In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to
prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring
most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this
fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they
would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know,
to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years
ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of
German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility
of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more
in evidence.

3.
The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar
as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the
United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the
China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the
Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever
making up might vanish.

Army 24877Trans. 11/17/41 (2)

[a] For Part 2, see S.I.S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1090 (Part 2 of 3) [a] (Departmental Secret)

(To be handled in Government Code)

4.
There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government
are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a
very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United
States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show
how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5.
If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our
lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United
States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate.
Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already
the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether
they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the
United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6.
It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that
little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to
much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be
the victor.

7.
It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in
the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now
stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

Army 24857

JD 6553Trans. 11/17/41 (7)

[a] Part 1 & 3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple

#1090 (Part 3 of 3) [c] (Secret outside the Department)

Great
Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian
navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the
Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start
warlike activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a
compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an
inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany
as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to
war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will
be carried out through the Pacific area.

8.
Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan,
having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical.
In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials,
too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even
though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the
situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two
months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe
would be the best plan.

Furthermore,
I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894 [a] and 901 [b]
sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.

Army 25139Trans. 11/22/41 (NR)

[a] S.I.S. #23166 in which NOMURA gives his views of the present world

situation.

[b] S.I.S. #23114 in which Ambassador NOMURA apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.

[c] For Parts 1 and 2, see S.I.S. Nos. 24877 and 24857.

(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)