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Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Key restrictions will start to ease years
before the 15-year accord expires, advancing Tehran's ability to build a
bomb even before the end of the pact • Confidential document is only
text linked to last year's nuclear deal that hasn't been made public.

A Shahab 2
surface-to-surface missile on diplay during a military parade in Iran
[Archive]

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Photo credit: Reuters

Key restrictions on Iran's nuclear program
imposed under an internationally negotiated deal will start to ease
years before the 15-year accord expires, advancing Tehran's ability to
build a bomb even before the end of the pact, according to a document
obtained Monday by The Associated Press.

The confidential document is the only text
linked to last year's deal between Iran and six foreign powers that
hasn't been made public, although U.S. officials say members of Congress
who expressed interest were briefed on its substance. It was given to
the AP by a diplomat whose work has focused on Iran's nuclear program
for more than a decade, and its authenticity was confirmed by another
diplomat who possesses the same document.

Both demanded anonymity because they were not authorized to share or discuss the document.

The diplomat who shared the text with the AP
described it as an add-on agreement to the nuclear deal in the form of a
document submitted by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency
outlining its plans to expand its uranium enrichment program after the
first 10 years of the nuclear deal.

But while formally separate from the bigger
nuclear accord, he said that it was in effect an integral part of that
pact and had been approved by the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France
and Germany, the six powers that negotiated the deal with Tehran.

Marking the agreement's anniversary last
Thursday, U.S. President Barack Obama said it has succeeded in rolling
back Iran's nuclear program, "avoiding further conflict and making us
safer." But opposition from U.S. Republicans and even some Democrats
could increase with the revelation that Iran's potential breakout time
would be more than halved over the last few years of the pact.

Also opposed to the deal are Sunni Arab states
in the region, along with Israel, which in the past has threatened to
strike Iran if it deems that Tehran is close to making a nuclear weapon.
Alluding to that possibility, David Albright, whose Washington-based
Institute for Science and International Security is a U.S. government
go-to resource on Iran's nuclear program, said the plan outlined in the
document "will create a great deal of instability and possibly even lead
to war, if regional tensions have not subsided."

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman told the
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Monday that "Iran is
still the greatest threat to Israel. It continues to forge ahead with
its ballistic missile program and we don't need to guess what the
targets are. During the parades in Tehran, we see what is written on the
missiles -- 'Wipe Israel from the face of the earth.' The fact that
countries of the world are ignoring Iran's violations of U.N. Security
Council resolutions and the nuclear deal it has itself signed, requires
further consideration."

Details published earlier outline most
restraints on Iran's nuclear program meant to reduce the threat that
Tehran will turn nuclear activities it says are peaceful to making
weapons.

But although some of the constraints extend
for 15 years, documents in the public domain are short on details of
what happens with Iran's most proliferation-prone nuclear activity --
its uranium enrichment -- beyond the first 10 years of the agreement.

The document obtained by the AP fills in the
gap. It says that as of January 2027 -- 11 years after the deal will
have been implemented -- Iran will start replacing its mainstay
centrifuges with thousands of advanced machines.

Centrifuges churn out uranium to levels that
can range from use as reactor fuel and for medical and research purposes
to much higher levels for the core of a nuclear warhead. From year 11
to 13, says the document, Iran will install centrifuges up to five times
as efficient as the 5,060 machines it is now restricted to using.

Those new models will number less than those
being used now, ranging between 2,500 and 3,500, depending on their
efficiency, according to the document. But because they are more
effective, they will allow Iran to enrich at more than twice the rate it
is doing now.

Components other than centrifuge numbers and
efficiency also go into the mix of how quickly a nation can make a
nuclear weapon. They include how much enriched uranium it has to work
with, and restrictions on Iran's stockpile extend until the end of the
deal, crimping its full enrichment program.

But a comparison of outputs between the old
and newer machines shows the newer ones work at double the enrichment
rate. That means they would reduce the time Iran could make enough
weapons grade uranium to six months or less from present estimates of
one year.

And that time frame could shrink even more.
While the document doesn't say what happens with centrifuge numbers and
types past year 13, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told The AP that
Iran will be free to install any number of advanced centrifuges beyond
that point, even though the nuclear deal extends two additional years.

That will give Iran a huge potential boost in
enrichment capacity, including bomb making should it choose to do so.
But it can be put to use only after the deal expires.

Moniz noted that the limit on the amount of
low-enriched enriched uranium Iran will be allowed to store will remain
at 300 kilograms (660 pounds) for the full 15 years, significantly below
the amount needed for further enrichment into a bomb. As well, the
stockpile will remain restricted to a level used for reactor fuel that
is well below weapons grade.

These restrictions translate into "serious constraints on ... [Iran's] nuclear program for 15 years," Moniz said.

In selling the deal to skeptics, the U.S.
administration said it is tailored to ensure that Iran would need at
least 12 months to "break out" and make enough weapons grade uranium for
at least one weapon. Moniz said the document obtained by the AP posed
no contradiction to that claim because "we made it very clear that we
were focused on 10 years on the minimum one-year breakout time."

The document also notes that Iran will greatly
expand its work with centrifuges that are even more advanced, including
large-scale testing in preparation for the deal's expiry 15 years after
its implementation on Jan. 18.

But State Department spokesman Mark Toner said
that "the prohibition on Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon -- and our
ability to monitor the peaceful nature of its nuclear program -- remains
in effect indefinitely.

"The breakout time does not go off a cliff nor do we believe that it would be cut in half, to six months, by year 11," he said.

Iran insists it is not interested in nuclear
weapons, and the pact is being closely monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA says Tehran has essentially kept to its
commitments since the agreement was implemented, a little more than six
months after Iran and the six powers finalized it on July 14, 2015.

The bigger nuclear deal provides Iran with
sanctions relief in exchange for its nuclear constraints. But before
going into recess, the U.S. Congress last week approved a bill to impose
new sanctions for Tehran's continuing development and testing of
ballistic missiles, a program the White House says is meant to carry
atomic warheads even if it is not part of the nuclear agreement.

It also approved a measure that calls for
prohibiting the Obama administration from buying more of Iran's heavy
water, a key component in certain nuclear reactors.

The White House has said removing the country's surplus
heavy water denies Tehran access to a material that may be stored for
potential nuclear weapons production. But critics note that the purchase
was made only after Iran exceeded heavy water limits proscribed by the
nuclear deal and assert it rewarded Tehran for violating the agreement.

AP and Israel Hayom StaffSource: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=35053 Follow Middle East and Terrorism on TwitterCopyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.