Both counts two and four of the complaint allege violations
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Title VII), for which
subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred by
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). However, before subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred, an administrative determination must be made by the
EEOC. More particularly, an action may be initiated in the
district court within 90 days after plaintiff's receipt of
notice, ("a right to sue letter"), from the EEOC. That right to
sue letter is generally available "[i]f a charge filed with the
Commission pursuant to subsection (b) . . . is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the
filing of such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a
civil action . . . or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

It is to be noted that count one of the complaint, alleging
discriminatory discharge and denial of severance pay benefits,
was properly filed with the EEOC. After the 180 day period,
plaintiff requested and received a right to sue letter, thus
properly conferring subject matter jurisdiction with respect to
that count. Counts two and four, however, were never alleged in
the original EEOC complaint. In order to amend the EEOC
complaint, the law provides that all charges "shall be filed
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred . . . except that in a case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or
local agency . . . such charge shall be filed by or on behalf
of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
Because almost two years had elapsed since the
occurence of the conduct alleged in counts two and four,
subsequent amendment of the EEOC complaint to include those
allegations, in compliance with the time frame of the statute,
was impossible. Thus, defendants argue that those claims must
be dismissed.

However, in recognition of the fact that in many instances
the original EEOC complaint may be incomplete, the Second
Circuit has refused to limit judicial inquiry to those original
charges. Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health,
743 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1970). The
underlying rationale for these rulings is that many
complainants file without legal representation, and are thus
unaware of the legal requirements and ramifications. Sanchez,
431 F.2d at 463. Accordingly, the statute has been liberally
construed in keeping with its remedial purpose, i.e., the
protection of employees from unlawful discrimination. Smith v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.
1978); see also Love v. Pullman,
404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). In deciding what
additional claims may properly be considered, the Second
Circuit has held that "district courts may assume jurisdiction
over a claim 'reasonably related' to a charge filed with the
EEOC, including incidents occurring after the filing of the
EEOC claim." Stewart v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

With respect to the case at bar, the charges contained within
the fourth cause of action, alleging retaliation, clearly fall
within the parameters of the "reasonably related" rule.
Id. Retaliatory conduct stems directly from the filing of the
complaint, and therefore shares a close relationship with the
original charges. By its nature, retaliatory conduct occurs
subsequent to the complaint and cannot be included in the
original complaint. National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand,
457 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.Conn. 1978); see also Malave v. Bolger,
599 F. Supp. 221, 222 (D.Conn. 1984). Furthermore, it has been
noted that routine EEOC procedure calls for the investigation
of retaliatory conduct. Leisner v. New York Tel. Co.,
358 F. Supp. 359, 362 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

As to the harassment charges contained in the second cause of
action, in the Court's view they cannot be deemed reasonably
related to the charges of sexual discrimination contained in
the first count. Plaintiff's harassment count essentially
comprises three allegations: (1) derogatory remarks allegedly
based on plaintiff's pregnant condition; (2) crude and
obnoxious remarks designed to embarrass plaintiff; and (3)
physical harassment accomplished by throwing paper objects at
plaintiff. With respect to the first allegation, it has been
held that harassment which sheds light on the motive for
termination is reasonably related to the termination charges
contained in an EEOC complaint. Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
554 F. Supp. 285, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). However, at least one
district court has defined harassment as a form of conduct
separate and unrelated to an employment practice such as the
decision to terminate. Eastwood v. Victor Temporaries,
441 F. Supp. 51, 53 (N.D.Ga. 1977). In the case at bar, the
harassment alleged by plaintiff is not of the nature which
would shed light on plaintiff's termination. Although perhaps
incidental to her pregnancy, the remarks appear to have been
separate and discrete, rather than continuing and inextricably
linked to her termination.*fn1 With respect to the second and
third allegations of harrassment, the remarks and conduct
represent broad and general forms of taunting which appear
totally unrelated to Ms. Clay's termination. Therefore those
incidents are unlikely to be investigated by the agency
concerned with discriminatory termination resulting from
pregnancy. Kawatra v. Medgar Evers College of the City of New
York, 700 F. Supp. 648, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Torriero v. Olin
Corp., 684 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

Additionally, plaintiff is not necessarily precluded from
ERISA coverage merely because no written agreement meeting
taxation and other requirements existed. As stated by the Ninth
Circuit, "ERISA operates to protect an employee's interest in
the welfare benefit program regardless of whether the employer
complies with the administrative and reporting requirements
detailed under ERISA." Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348,
1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 183, 88
L.Ed.2d 152 (1985). In Blau, the court held that an unpublished
severance benefits package was cognizable under ERISA. Id.

Alternatively, defendant contends that suit is improper
because plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies by failing to appeal ILC's decision to deny severance
benefits. However, nowhere in defendant's pleadings is it
alleged that any appeals process existed, or that plaintiff was
required to take any additional steps for appeal. Furthermore,
plaintiff's affidavit alleges that she was never informed of an
appeals process. Therefore, based upon the pleadings before
this Court, defendant's contention must be rejected. See
Dahlberg, 748 F.2d at 88 (emphasizing that a complaint may not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears,
beyond a doubt, that plaintiff can prove "no set of facts" in
support of his claim). Accordingly, applying the standard for a
motion to dismiss, see id., defendants' motion is denied as to
plaintiff's third cause of action.

Lastly, the Court considers plaintiff's request for a jury
trial. Although this issue was not expressly raised by
defendants' motion, it was argued in both plaintiff's and
defendants' papers on the motion. It must first be noted that
no right to a jury trial has been recognized with regard to
Title VII actions within this circuit. Snell v. Suffolk County,
611 F. Supp. 521, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d
Cir. 1986). Inasmuch as the state-law claim alleged in count
five must be dismissed, plaintiff's right to a jury trial, if
any, will be predicated on the ERISA claim alleged in the third
cause of action.

ERISA itself contains no express provision for a jury trial.
In the Second Circuit, courts have relied on Katsaros v. Cody,
744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105
S.Ct. 565, 83 L.Ed.2d 506 (1984), for the proposition that no
right to a jury trial exists when an ERISA claim is equitable
in nature. In addition, in Nobile v. Pension Comm. of Pension
Plan, 611 F. Supp. 725, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the plaintiff
sought restitution of pension benefits based on a breach of the
fiduciary duty to provide information about the pension plan.
Since the ERISA claim at issue stemmed from the law of trusts,
the court held that the claim was equitable in nature and
denied plaintiff's request for a jury trial. Id.

Turning to the case at bar, plaintiff seeks recovery of a
specific sum of money calculated according to her prior service
with ILC. Hence the action is to compel restitution of these
benefits from the plan administrator. Since this remedy is
equitable in nature, no right to a jury trial exists. Although
plaintiff cites Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig and Fils, Inc.,
739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), in support of the right to a jury
trial, as to the case at bar it must be emphasized that
"[m]erely because plaintiff seeks a monetary remedy does not
require that the action be viewed as legal rather than
equitable in nature. . . ." Gardella v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York, 707 F. Supp. 627, 629 (D.Conn. 1988). Although
Vicinanzo exhaustively documented the right to a jury trial
under ERISA, see 739 F. Supp. at 884-91, persuasive precedent
suggests that the right is limited. See Brock v. Group Legal
Adm'r, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In Re
Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 320-22 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v.
Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
627 F.2d 820, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101
S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981). The Court is particularly
reluctant to grant a jury request in the instance where
plaintiff's strongest support for a jury trial, the state tort
claim, is no longer a part of the case. Accordingly,
plaintiff's request for a jury trial is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
is granted as to plaintiff's second and fifth causes of action.
The motion to dismiss is denied as to the third and fourth
causes of action in the complaint. In addition, plaintiff's
application for a jury trial is denied for the reasons stated
above.

SO ORDERED.

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