Misovec Criticism of Card Key System Is Flawed

While I am not a proponent of the card key system, I feel that guest
columnist Kathleen Misovec's analysis of the system ["MIT Card Puts Student
Safety at Risk," Nov. 18] is flawed in many respects.

If anyone is to fight against the card key system, they should do so
with carefully reasoned arguments. Misovec enumerates the flaws of the card
system, but never compares it to the current system of keys. The relevant
issue is not whether the card system has flaws but whether its flaws make
it less secure than keys. Students' privacy is an equally important issue,
but not my concern here.

One of Misovec's concerns is that the card key takes longer to use than
a normal key. While this may be true, it should not constitute any
additional risk. Though the Campus Police can offer us little protection
off-campus, the safety of our front doors is probably a very high priority.
If you feel that it is reasonable to walk to your dorm, the thought of
standing for a few seconds in front of your dorm should not petrify
you.

And, yes, it is a flaw of the card key system that the same card which
provides access to a dorm identifies its owner explicitly. Remember,
though, that the current system relies on keys labeled for each dorm. The
labeling is certainly more cryptic than a name, but any intent criminal
could find the dorm which corresponds to a given key. And if a criminal
does acquire a key and determine where it goes, what can the Institute do?
Replace the lock and the keys for everyone in that dorm? You must admit
that the ability to invalidate any single key is a great benefit.

Another of Misovec's concerns is that card keys may be duplicated. This
is simply wrong. The current system relies on keys which can be and often
are duplicated at any hardware store. There is currently no widely
available method for duplicating card keys. In this sense, card keys are
much more secure than typical keys.

Misovec goes further, implying that putting card readers on Institute
buildings would somehow reduce security over the current system of leaving
exterior doors unlocked all the time. I think professors will welcome the
placement of card readers between the outside world and their lab
equipment.

Misovec goes on to explain that unauthorized use of one's meal card
causes financial loss. This is the case with any debit card, whether it is
also a card key or not. The only new concern is that consolidating the meal
card and card key means that losing one card inconveniences you in many
more ways.

Finally, Misovec is concerned that students will have to carry both a
card for exterior doors and keys for interior doors. Again, this is not a
change. Before the card key system, we had to carry our IDs and two keys.
Now we only need to carry our IDs and one key.

A card key system is as secure or more secure than metal keys. It is not
at all surprising that MIT's administrators would like to adopt card keys.
It is only disturbing how little they have considered the students' privacy
and how little they have sought our input. If we are to influence the
administration, we must approach them with rational arguments.