Code Ann. § 35-42-5-1 (West 1998); and carrying a handgun without
a license, a class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-1 (West
1998). Jones pled guilty to murder and the handgun violation. The
trial court sentenced him to the presumptive term of fifty-five
years for murder, with a concurrent one-year sentence for the
handgun conviction.

Appellant raises two issues in this direct appeal:
(1) Whether the trial court was required to create a
detailed sentencing statement articulating its reasons
for imposing the presumptive sentence for murder, and

On the evening of September 12, 1996, Jones, Dennis Johnson,
and Raymond Johnson formulated a plan to rob Norval Peters. They
then secured firearms from Johnson's home to help them carry out
their scheme.

Early the next day, the men regrouped at the home of Carlos
Arevado, a neighbor of Peters. They waited for Peters' fiancée to
leave before forcing their way into the house.

According to Jones, the other two men made their way into the
home before him. Raymond Johnson attempted to subdue Peters by
striking him in the head with his gun. Peters, however, shot the
three intruders with his own weapon. The trespassers then shot and
killed Peters.

I. A Presumptive Sentence Does Not Require a
Detailed Sentencing Statement

Appellant argues that the trial court's sentencing order did
not adequately identify the aggravating and mitigating factors the
court considered in imposing sentence.

Sentencing is conducted within the "discretion of the trial
court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that
discretion." Sims v. State, 585 N.E.2d 271, 272 (Ind. 1992). The
trial court also has discretion to determine "whether a presumptive
sentence will be increased or decreased because of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances." Id. When a standard sentence has been
imposed, we presume that the trial court considered "the risk that
the person will commit another crime, the nature and circumstances
of the crime committed, and the prior criminal record, character,
and condition of the person." Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250,
1254 (Ind. 1986) (citing Keys v. State, 390 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ind.
1979)). Finally, and most importantly as it relates to Jones'
issue, a sentencing judge must articulate her reasoning only when

The trial judge here imposed the presumptive term for the
murder conviction and thus was not required to state a basis for
imposing that sentence.

II. The Trial Court Properly Rejected the
Mitigating Factors

Jones argues in the alternative that the trial court's
sentence should be remanded because it failed to consider all
significant mitigating circumstances after both parties had
acknowledged that some mitigators were present.

Jones concedes the proposition articulated in Tunstill v.
State that a trial court is not "obliged to accord the same weight
to a factor which the defendant considers mitigating or to find
mitigators simply because it is urged by the defendant." 568 N.E.2d
539, 546 (Ind. 1991). However, appellant urges that this grant of
discretion to a trial judge is appropriate only where opposing
parties cannot agree about the existence of mitigating factors.
Appellant further suggests that there was no dispute as to the
mitigating evidence presented, and, as a result, the trial judge

was required to accord as much weight to the mitigating
circumstances as did the respective parties.

Sentencing decisions are within the discretion of the trial
court and we will reverse only upon a showing of abuse of that
discretion. Sims, 585 N.E.2d at 272. When a trial court imposes
the presumptive sentence, we have long held that it will be
presumed on appeal that the trial court considered the proper
factors in making its sentencing determination. Hammons, 493
N.E.2d at 1254; see also Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1 (West 1998)
(listing aggravating and mitigating factors).

When a court engages in a balancing process between
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is obligated to
include a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence
imposed. Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1254; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-3
(Ind. 1998). The trial court is not required to find mitigating
circumstances which are offered by a defendant or to explain why he
has chosen not to make such a finding, Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1254-
55, though the failure of a trial court to find mitigating
circumstances which are clearly supported by the record may
reasonably give rise to a belief that they were overlooked and
hence not properly considered, id. at 1255.

It appears clear from the statement the trial judge made at
the close of the sentencing hearing that the court indeed engaged

in a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.See footnote
1 In
mitigation, he recognized that Jones' lacked a male role model
during his formative years and that he was only eighteen when he
committed the crime. The judge also indicated several aggravating
factors, including Jones' criminal history at an early age, his
intoxicated state when he committed the crime, and his disregard
for the hardship that his potential incarceration would cause his
young child and girlfriend.

A judge's use of aggravating factors to offset a mitigating
factor in order to arrive at a presumptive sentence is well within
his discretion--indeed it exhibits the type of reasoning required
by our law.

At the heart of Jones' argument, however, is his contention
that the trial court failed to consider additional mitigating
circumstances strongly supported by the record.See footnote
2 Our review of the
record causes us to believe Jones' claim is without merit. What
constitutes a "significant" mitigating factor is generally within
the discretion of the trial court. See Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d
339, 347 (Ind. 1997) (stating, "the 'proper' weight to be afforded

by the trial court to the mitigating factors may be to give them no
weight at all.").

We have on occasion found an abuse of discretion on the
grounds that a trial court failed to consider significant
mitigating factors, see, e.g., Tunstill, 568 N.E.2d at 545 (holding
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider as
mitigating the undisputed fact that the victim induced the
defendant by delivering unprovoked blows to the defendant). The
mitigating factors argued by Jones are not of the Tunstill caliber,
and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give
them such weight as would lead to a reduced sentence.

Conclusion

We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Dickson, Sullivan, Selby, and Boehm, JJ., concur.

Footnote: 1
At the beginning of his sentencing statement the judge noted; "this
case has compelling facts on . . . both sides." (R. at 98.)
Footnote: 2
Appellant lists a number of mitigating factors which he feels the trial
court failed to take into consideration, including: (1) Jones' age and
troubled childhood, (2) Jones' voluntary intoxication, (3) Jones' voluntary
guilty plea, (4) Jones' expression of remorse (5) Jones' loss of two siblings
to violent acts, (6) testimony speaking to Jones' good character, and (7) the
potential hardship that would be imposed on Jones' family as a result of his
incarceration.