Abstract

This critique assesses Prof. Chang Ya-chung’s draft basic
agreement for cross-Strait relations by arguing that it overstates changes
in Beijing’s Taiwan policy, which is based on a strategy that has not seen
substantial change since it was devised in the early 1990s to prevent the
island’s democratization leading to the exercise of self-determination. By
over-estimating Taiwan’s political, diplomatic, military, and economic
vulnerability the proposal unnecessarily narrows down Taibei’s options
to the point where it has to accept Beijing’s one-China principle. This
merely closes off other options that Taiwan can just as readily pursue,
such as continuing to develop cross-Strait relations through ad hoc solutions
to practical problems or seeking more imaginative ways to create a
durable modus vivendi with international support. Even more problematic
is that a political framework for stability based on the principles of
Chinese nationalism is unlikely to be acceptable for Taiwan’s liberaldemocratic
politics and could thus amount to an unnecessary risk that
would lead to a less durable cross-Strait status quo than that which has
been maintained over the last two decades.