THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A PACKAGE CONTAINING Cs-137 WHICH EXCEEDED EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS

BWXT received two type A packages packed inside a larger package from Baker Hughes in Houston, TX on 1/27/04. When they opened the larger package, they discovered that one of the type A packages containing a single 2.5 curie Cs-137 source exceeded the limits (200 mr/hr) for external radiation. The package was measuring 375 mr/hr, however the surface smears were within limits and the package was intact. The seal numbers on the package and manifest matched. The licensee notified both Baker Hughes and the transport company, Emery Worldwide, of the problem.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"An Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) review being performed for a system modification identified a previously unidentified failure mode for a piece of Safety Related Equipment (SRE). The SRE item (conductivity probe) is in place to detect and prevent the transfer of moderating materials to a fissile material storage column. The conductivity probe was subsequently tested and found to not meet the currently required performance criteria (i.e. the conductivity probe was not capable of detecting certain moderating materials that could be present in the fissile material). The operation was already in a shutdown state and all fissile material had been removed from the system when the test was performed on the probe.

"Safety significance of the event: The safety significance is very low since the system was currently shutdown and the identified failure mode has not occurred since startup of the operation in 1999.

"Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur: Failure of the piece of SRE could only result in a criticality if a subsequent unlikely event were to also occur resulting in a large spill of fissile material.

"Controlled parameters: Moderation and Geometry

"Estimated amount, enrichment, form of licensed material (include process limit and % worst case critical mass): Uranium compounds in the column would be 43 times minimum critical mass if spill of materials in full column occurred. Process limit is limited by geometry of equipment

"Control(s) or control system(s) and the failure(s) or deficiencies: A fissile material transfer line is monitored (for moderation) such that the transfer of moderating materials into a column is prevented. The monitoring equipment was found to not be compatible for all moderating materials in the system preventing it from halting the transfer of moderating materials into the equipment under certain postulated upset conditions.

"Corrective actions taken and when was each was implemented: The conductivity probe was tested in the newly identified failure mode and was found to not respond adequately. The system was already in a shutdown state and all fissile material had been removed from the system when the test was performed on the probe. Compensatory measures (both administrative and engineered) were drafted and reviewed by the plant safety review committee. The system remains shutdown until all compensatory measures are approved and in place."

Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"At approximately 19:00 P.M. on May 27th, one of two criticality detectors for [DELETED] failed a routine source check. The failure resulted in the detector not being able to give a High alarm, which resulted in a loss of criticality detector coverage for [DELETED] at the [DELETED] at BWX Technologies. This situation presents no risk to the public or workers, since the [DELETED] have not had any fuel since February 20, 2001. The last time the [DELETED] criticality detectors were source checked (successfully) was on April 11, 2004. However, [DELETED] was authorized for fuel operations, therefore, criticality detectors were required to be functional. This loss of criticality detector coverage is required to be reported to the NRC within 24 hours per 10CFR70.24 and 10CFR70.50(b)(2)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) received a shipment of natural uranium [DELETED] from CAMECO [DELETED]. When the receipt survey was begun, one of the 55-gallon drums was found to be contaminated on the bottom. The survey result was 455 disintegrations per minute (DPM)/100 square centimeters. [The limit is 220 DPM/100 sq cm.] Access to the drum was restricted by placing it into a roped off area.

The remaining drums are being surveyed. [DELETED] drums were received and four have been surveyed. Access to all of the drums has been restricted until they are surveyed.

Since the contamination was found after the delivery truck had been released, the consignor has been notified of the event and has been requested to check the truck for contamination.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Tennessee.

"Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) wishes to withdraw the Notification of an Event which was made on June 24, 2004 at 1852 hours. The event number was #40840.

"The immediate event notification was made because NFS' procedure required an immediate notification in the event a package was received and was found to be contaminated in excess of 220 DPM/100 square centimeters of alpha activity. This procedure was intended to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).

"The material involved in this event was natural uranium, which is a low toxicity alpha emitter as defined by 49 CFR 173.403. 49 CFR 173.443, which is referenced by 10 CFR 71.87(i) which in turn is referenced by 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), gives the non-fixed radioactive wipe limit for this material as 22 DPM/square centimeter. This limit converts to 2,200 DPM/100 square centimeters of alpha activity, which is considerably more than the 455 DPM/100 square centimeters of alpha activity which precipitated this incident. A repeat survey confirmed this contamination level and found no other elevated shipping packages.

"To prevent a recurrence of this notification, NFS is revising procedure NFS-HS-A-50, rev. 12 to provide a differentiation between alpha emitters and low-toxicity alpha emitters.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector (via email and voice mail) and the State of Tennessee.

Notified R2DO (Carolyn Evans) and NMSS EO (Scott Moore).

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL* * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

Ignition of off-gas process line during disassembly of processing equipment. A small flame occurred for a period of several minutes inside ventilated containment. The fire was extinguished by Operations personnel. Slight damage occurred to plexiglass surface and prefilter element. Filtration in ventilation system is intact and operational. Radiological hazard involved a quantity of highly enriched Uranium > 0.2 microCuries. There was no loss of containment and no injury to personnel. Health Physics, Fire Safety, and Nuclear Criticality safety personnel responded and performed evaluation to ensure safe shutdown of operation. Repairs are being made to the off-gas [DELETED] involved and recovery is underway. All surveys showed no evidence of occupational exposure, contamination, or environmental release. Investigation is being conducted to determine the cause of the fire and the [DELETED] other off-gas process [DELETED] will be inspected for similar problems.

Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee does not intend to make any State, local or other Federal notifications or issue any press release at this time.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J. KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

POTENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:
"Potential vulnerability to workers and public of a high consequence event involving failure of safety controls that were designed to prevent a hydrogen explosion in the BLEU Preparation Facility U-Aluminum Dissolution gloveboxes/dissolvers.

SEQUENCE LEADING TO EVENT:
"Rotometers FIC-1F14A, 1C01, and 1D01 needle valves were closed on the U-Aluminum dissolver system. FIC-1C01 and FIC-1D01 or FIC-1F14A needed to be open to allow a nitrogen purge in the dissolver to protect against a Hydrogen explosion in the enclosure or at the dissolver/enclosure interface.

PREVENTION OR MITIGATION:
"Other controls were in place to partially mitigate a potential hydrogen explosion that was analyzed in support of the Integrated Safety Analysis for the operations at Bldg. [DELETED]. A nitrogen trickle system provides sufficient flow of nitrogen to the dissolvers during dissolution to provide 5 volumetric changeouts in 30 minutes. The trickle nitrogen flow was available for the operator to access the dissolvers one hour after dissolution. Enclosures 1C01/1C11 and 1D01/1D11 did have an air sweep to the enclosure ventilation system. Should hydrogen have leaked or migrated to the enclosure upon opening of the dissolver lid, the purge would have maintained the hydrogen concentration below the lower explosive limit.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

The licensee reported a transfer of low concentration HEU solution from favorable to unfavorable geometry was initiated upon sampling data that was not representative of the solution. The solution has been determined to be above the transfer concentration limit. Verification of HEU concentration is an administrative "item relied on for safety" (IROFS) for the accident sequence. The remaining IROFS for the accident sequence is an inline radiation detector that automatically closes redundant block valves. This system performed as designed. The system was placed in a safe shutdown condition and the solution remains in a favorable geometry.

Mass is controlled in the unfavorable geometry tank by limiting the volume and concentration of transfers into it. The failed control is administrative sampling and verifying the concentration is below the limit. The licensee states the solution will be reprocessed to lower concentration prior to discharge.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"Raffinate column WOG Vent [DELETED] is not sized appropriately to handle flow in the event of overflowing of [DELETED] combined with a loss of DI water pressure and a failure of DI water valve when transferring SNM material from sump columns ([DELETED] or [DELETED] using [DELETED]). This would prevent transferring SNM material into an unfavorable geometry tank. The WOG line is specified as IROFS [DELETED] and is listed as [DELETED] in the Recovery Deionized Water Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation Risk Indexing Supplement. Setpoint analysis was believed to be completed on all Recovery WOG lines. It was determined that this WOG line calculation was not performed at November 15, 2004. As such, IROFS [DELETED] was not reliable and available on [DELETED] and [DELETED] transfers to [DELETED] which occurred on October 28, November 2 and November 11, 2004. [DELETED] has been taken out of service. A follow-up memo to Operations will be provided to prevent the use of the pump and [DELETED]."

Defense in-depth measures that were available are as follows:

1. Pumping operations did not overflow [DELETED].

2. Deionized water line to [DELETED] was pressurized [DELETED].

3. Administrative Control listed in the NCSE specified that the operator shut valve [DELETED] upon a loss of DI water pressure. This control is flowed down into the operating procedure.

4. Valve [DELETED] listed as a configuration controlled item was available to be closed upon a loss of pressure in the DI water line.

5. The WOG line was positioned lower than the DI water input line and listed as a configuration controlled item as such.

There are no actual potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment due to defense in depth and configuration control items in place. In additional, overflow [DELETED] did not occur [DELETED].

What is the safety significance of the event?

Not in compliance with 10CFR70.61. However criticality was not a concern due to defense-in-depth controls and configuration control equipment installed at the time.

Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur:

Transfer of SNM during a backflow scenario into DI water line and subsequent unfavorable geometry tankxx-001.

What is the control(s) or control system(s) and the failure(s) or deficiencies?

IROFS[DELETED] WOG line on [DELETED].

What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?

[DELETED] has been taken out of service on 11/15/04.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

Sequence of occurrences:
On December 17, 2004, materials were transferred to a storage area without being transferred thru a particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from being transferred. Prior to the addition of materials to the system, operations personnel verify that the correct materials are added to the system. The device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from entering the storage area.

Remaining activities relied on:
The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. Operations personnel verified that the correct material type was added to the system. Also, the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.

Actions taken in response to the event:
A root cause investigation was initiated as a result of the event. Transfers were suspended until compensatory measures can be put in place.

Safety significance of event:
The safety significance was low for the event given the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.

Brief scenario of how a criticality could occur:
In order for a criticality to occur, multiple occurrences of an excessive amount of a more reactive/incorrect material type would have to be added to the system; and, the material would have to be transferred without use of the particular device.

What are the controls or control systems and the failures or deficiencies?
The controls were limitations on material types input into the system and the use of a particular device when transferring materials to a storage area. Materials were transferred to the storage area without being transferred thru the particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) for the area credited the device as a passive control device. The act of transferring the materials thru the device should have been credited as an administrative control since operations personnel have the ability to bypass the device if the procedure is not followed correctly.

What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?
A root cause investigation was initiated on December 21, 2004 after discovery of the event. Material transfers were suspended on December 21, 2004 until compensatory measures can be implemented.

Actual or potential health and safety consequences:
There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were low given the actual materials involved and the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

The Nuclear Fuel Services, License # [DELETED], reported that a faulty PLC evoked an event that degraded the safety conditions of the plant. Their comments are described below in a statement/answer format. The statement is cited first and the answer follows.

"Actual or potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public, and the environment, including relevant chemical and radiation data for actual personnel exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials (e.g., level of radiation exposure, and duration of exposure):

"There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were low given the very low likelihood of adding a sufficient mass of a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system.

"The sequence of occurrences leading to the event, including degradation or failure of structures, systems, equipment, components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences:

"On January 7, 2005, it was determined that the Programmable Logic controller (PLC) for the oxide dissolution operation had a negative holdup value. Upon investigation, a negative holdup value in the PLC results in the PLC using an artificially high mass limit. This could allow the system mass limit to be exceeded. The PLC is an item relied upon for safety and is credited as one of the mass controls in the safety basis.

"Discuss whether remaining structures, systems, equipment components, and activities relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences are available and reliable to perform their function:

"The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. Operations personnel verified that the correct material type and quantity was added to the system.

"Actions taken in response to the event:

"The operation was shutdown until compensatory measures can be put in place.

"Safety Significance of Event:

"The safety significance was low for the event given the very low likelihood of adding a sufficient quantity of a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system. It should also be noted that this other/incorrect material type is not present in the facility.

"Brief scenario of how a criticality could occur:

"In order for a criticality to occur, multiple occurrences of an excessive amount of a more reactive/incorrect material type would have to be added to the system.

"What are the controls or control systems and the failures or deficiencies?

"The controls were limitations on the mass and material types input into the system. The PLC is used to control the mass input into the system. The PLC for the oxide dissolution operation had a negative holdup value. Upon investigation, a negative holdup value in the PLC results in the PLC using an artificially high mass limit. This could allow the system mass limit to be exceeded. The PLC is an item relied upon for safety and is credited as one of the mass controls in the safety basis

"What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?

"On January 7, 2004, the operation was shut down. Compensatory measures are in the process of being developed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"On Monday, January 17, 2005, at approximately 0545, Security personnel manning the Central Alarm Station notified the Emergency Team captain [Redacted] that they were unable to detect any information from the facility fire protection system and the system operability was in question. Compensatory measures were put in place: the e-team patrolled the facility with a special emphasis placed on radiologically controlled areas. The system was restored at 0956."

II. Evaluation of the Event

"10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) states that the NRC must be notified of an event within 24 hours followed by a 30-day written report if the following condition is met:

"An event in which equipment that meets all of the following three conditions is disabled or fails to function as designed: [10CFR70.50(b)(2)]

"(1) The equipment is required by regulation or license condition to prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive material exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident; and

"(2) The equipment is required to be available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function; and

"(3) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"License SNM-42, Chapter 1, Section 1.9.2 requires that: "Fire detectors be installed and maintained in controlled areas. These detectors will alarm in the continuously manned NPD security alarm station." The system malfunction in the Central Alarm Station prevented them from being continuously monitored.

"Evaluations have been performed to determine that the system is not an IROFS and that regulatory limits will not be exceeded by [DELETED]. While SARs 15.9, 15.10, and 15.11 currently list the smoke detectors as IROFS, an evaluation was performed in December, 2004 which determined that these systems were not required to be IROFS and they are in the process of being removed from the ISA Summary.

"The equipment was required to be available and operable when it failed to function. Also, redundant equipment was not available; however, compensatory measures were utilized. The emergency team was dispatched to patrol the facility and monitor for local alarms and system activations. Special emphasis was placed on controlled areas. Compensatory measures were in place within 15 minutes of notification of the system loss.

III. Notification Requirements

"The event is reportable due to:

"Although the fire system monitoring is not an IROFS, it is required by the license to mitigate the consequences of an event in a controlled area. Also, it was required to be functional when the communications loss occurred and a redundant system was not available to perform the required safety function. Based on this, notification is required to the NRC within 24 hours followed by a 30-day written report.

IV. Status of Corrective Actions:

"The equipment has been returned to service and is functioning. An investigation of the event is underway."

On 2/16/05 a radioactive Yellow - III shipment containing eight well logging sources was shipped from Baker Hughes Inteq in Houston, TX. The shipment of sources, Am-241/Be (1480 GBq), arrived at BWXT in Lynchburg, VA. On 02/21/05. Emery Worldwide indicated the shipment mode had a Transportation Index (TI) reading of 9, however, BWXT's reading was 12.6. BWXT placed the package in a restricted area to minimize exposure to personnel, which has a surface contact reading of 83.3 millirem/hr, and at one meter away it read 12.6 millirem/hr.

Since this shipment had a TI >10 it was reportable under 10CFR 20.1906. (Note: Transportation Index is the radiation reading in millirem/hr at a distance of one meter.)

"ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSEQUENCES TO THE WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING RELEVANT CHEMICAL AND RADIATION DATA FOR ACTUAL PERSONNEL EXPOSURES TO RADIATION OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS OR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS REPRODUCED FROM LICENSED MATERIALS

"There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were very low given the actual material storage conditions. No additional containers of SNM above the approved limit were stored in the storage racks and additional containers were specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.

"THE SEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCES LEADING TO THE EVENT, INCLUDING DEGRADATION OR FAILURE OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS, AND ACTIVITIES OF PERSONNEL RELIED ON TO PREVENT POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR MITIGATE THEIR CONSEQUENCES:
"On March 24, 2005, a Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer (NCSE) inspected a storage rack and observed that a piece of Configuration Controlled Equipment (CCE) was not in place. The piece of equipment is credited for preventing containers of SNM from being stored between approved storage positions. A posted Station Limit Card (SLC) instructs the operations personnel on the number and location where containers of SNM may be stored in the racks.

"DISCUSS WHETHER REMAINING STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS, AND ACTIVITIES RELIED ON TO PREVENT POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR MITIGATE THEIR CONSEQUENCES ARE AVAILABLE AND RELIABLE TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION:
"The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. The storage requirements are posted via a Station Limit Card on the storage rack and no containers were observed to be stored in unapproved locations.

"ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT:
"The bottom two storage positions that could be involved were covered by signs instructing the operations personnel to not use them. The process engineer for the area was instructed to install the needed equipment to bring the storage rack into compliance. The event was entered into the PIRCS system (PIRCS ID 4704).

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT:
"The safety significance was very low for the event given that no violation of container storage was found. Containers of SNM were not stored in unapproved locations in the storage rack. More than one failure would have been necessary to be outside of the normal case configuration modeled in the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. The risk index could very easily have been written to credit additional limits and requirements that would have made this report unnecessary.

"BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW A CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"For a criticality to occur, multiple containers (more than two) would have had to have been stored incorrectly.

"WHAT ARE THE CONTROLS OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES?
"The controls were equipment design to prevent containers of SNM from being stored between approved storage locations in a storage rack. The bottom of the storage rack had not been modified to prevent a container from being stored between approved storage locations.

"WHAT ARE THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN AN WHEN WAS EACH IMPLEMENTED?
"The storage positions involved at the bottom of the storage rack were taken out of service immediately on 3/24/2005. The process engineer for the area was immediately notified of the necessary modification to the equipment. The event was entered into the PII2CS system."

There was no exposure to personnel with this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No other notifications were issued.

"On 3/24/2005, NFS made a 24-hour report to the operations center based on l OCFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2). L OCFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2) requires a 24hour report for loss or degradation of items relied on for safety (IROFS) that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of Sec. 70.61. The report was made because it was observed that a piece of configuration controlled equipment for a storage rack was not in place that would prevent containers from being stored between approved storage positions.

"The storage of containers between approved storage positions was bounded by the normal case Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) model; and, it was later determined that other IROFS listed in the ISA Summary were in place such that the performance requirements were met. This information was discussed and reviewed with an NRC Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Inspector during the week of March 28, 2005. Based on this information and discussion with the NRC Inspector, it is requested that this event report be retracted."

Notified R2DO (Rodgers) and NMSS (Burgess).

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a media inquiry that was made to BWX Technologies as a result of Event #41594, that was originally reported to the NRC by Ledoux & Company on April 13, 2005. The attached BWX Technologies Press Release was provided to Alex Nussbaum of the Bergen Record, Hackensack, NJ at approximately 4:45 pm on April 18, 2005."

This event occurred at Building [DELETED] in the Uranium-Aluminum Hydrogen dilution system area. The licensee observed a solution accumulated in a HEPA filter housing on the Building [DELETED] roof. Analysis of the solution determined the liquid to be a caustic byproduct of the process. Further analysis indicated that approximately 3 grams of U-235 were in the HEPA housing and filter. Further reviews of the system design identified potential pathways from the Uranium-Aluminum dissolution system that did not appear to be adequately controlled or analyzed.

The nuclear criticality safety of the system relied on the physical design to prevent uranium [DELETED] materials from entering the hydrogen dilution system and the filter housing. The system also relied on a drain in the dilution system ductwork to prevent material from entering the filter housing.

The licensee considers the Nuclear Criticality Safety significance low given the very low likelihood of accumulating a sufficient mass or concentration of uranium [DELETED] material into the HEPA filter housing

The process was not in operation when the solution in the filter housing was found. The operation will remain shut down until additional reviews and/or design modifications are completed.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"On Tuesday, May 10, 2005, at approximately 1352, BWXT -- NPD received a Radioactive, Type A Package from:

"Baker Hughes, 1999 Ranking Road, Houston, TX 77073

"BWXT performed radiological surveys of the package which indicated that the outer package exceeded the 200 mRem/hr limit for contact reading found in 10 CFR 71.47(a). The external surface reading was 263 mRem/hr. 10 CFR 71.47(b) does not apply since this was not an 'exclusive use shipment.' This event is reportable under 10 CFR 20.1906."

The bill of lading shows seven pieces in three crates. Only one container was above the limit. The licensee verified that the shipment vehicle was properly placarded.

"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of [the below stated] press release that was made by BWX Technologies. Inc in response to recent information that has been published and broadcast by local media. This [local media] information has the potential to mislead the public into thinking that BWXT manufactures nuclear weapons at its owned and operated facilities in Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana.

"The [below stated] press release was provided to the Lynchburg News & Advance which is a local newspaper, and the following central Virginia television stations: WSET (Lynchburg), WSLS (Roanoke), and WDBJ (Roanoke). The press release was provided to these agencies at approximately 1500 on May 20, 2005.

PRESS RELEASE:

"Recent information that has been published and broadcasted by local media regarding BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT) has the misfortunate potential to mislead the public in thinking that BWXT manufactures nuclear weapons at its owned and operated facilities in Virginia, Ohio, and. Indiana. At these facilities, BWXT does not manufacture nuclear weapons nor will the nuclear materials processed at these facilities be utilized in nuclear weapons. BWXT does not have any plans, and is not in any discussions with the Government, to conduct nuclear weapons manufacturing at these facilities, nor does BWXT plan to pursue this business area for these sites.

"For more than 50 years, facilities at these locations have supported other national defense programs for the Department of Energy. In addition, the Virginia facility produces research and test reactor components for laboratories, colleges and universities nationwide. [It] converts enriched uranium for commercial use in support of the fissile material disposition program, and supplies uranium targets for use in the production of medical isotopes."

"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a Letter to the Editor that was submitted by BWX Technologies, Inc. This letter was submitted in response to recent information that was published on May 26, 2005, in the Lynchburg News & Advance. The May 26, 2005, article specifically asked the question 'Is BWXT highly secure?' The attached letter is related to the adequacy of BWXT's security program and was submitted to the News & Advance at approximately 1400 on May 27, 2005. Although BWXT does not feel that the reporting criteria listed under Part 70, Appendix A is applicable, this article is related to licensed activity. Therefore, a concurrent NRC notification is being made." Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for the text of the attachment.

"On Tuesday, July 5, 2005, at approximately 8:30 pm, Radiation Protection personnel discovered that the [DELETED] Alarm System was unable to detect information from the [DELETED] Honeywell alarm panel, which includes alarms for criticality monitoring and fire protection. This failure was identified when Radiation Protection personnel were performing a check of the criticality alarm system as part of a post storm watch evaluation of the alarm system. As a compensatory measure, Radiation Protection personnel were immediately dispatched to the local alarm panel at the [DELETED] to monitor the alarms. Phone and radio communications are available to alert security if any alarms or other abnormal conditions occur.

"The cause of the failure is currently being evaluated. The system is currently being repaired and compensatory measures will remain in place until system is determined to be functioning."

The [DELETED] calciner was loaded with low-level contaminated scrap materials. The door gasket had a small leak and the operator attempted to stop the leak. This inadvertently caused an increase in the leakage. Air contacted the hot gases leaking from the calciner and the gases were ignited. No IROFS were degraded or failed. There was a brief flame in enclosure [DELETED] from the calciner door. A prefilter in the vent duct caught fire, the HEPA filter was damaged and part of the vent duct melted. Immediately following the event, the calciner was shutdown.

There were very small potential consequences due to the fact that containment was not lost. No elevated airborne, surface contamination, or effluent radioactivity levels were detected. There were no actual health and safety consequences. The equipment is still shut down pending completion of the investigation.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

At 2230 EDT the facility received multiple Criticality Alarms believed to be due to lightning strikes on site. The Emergency Operations Center has been activated and is in the process of staffing. Most alarms have been reset to normal. The licensee has sent teams to take local radiation readings. Local state and local agencies have been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is onsite.

* * * UPDATE FROM POWELL TO ROTTON AT 2330 ON 07/13/05 * * *

BWXT secured Alert based on surveys of affected areas being normal.

* * * UPDATE FROM POWELL TO GOTT AT 0010 ON 07/14/05 * * *

"Emergency has been terminated. EOC will maintain a minimal staffing for follow-up. A Post Incident Review Team has been appointed to assess the incident."

"On Wednesday, July 13, 2005, at 10:45 p.m. BWX Technologies, Inc. declared an Alert per the BWXT Emergency Plan and internal emergency procedures. BWXT contacted the NRC Operations Center to report that an Alert had been declared due to a criticality alarm that resulted from a lightning strike. The decision to declare an Alert was based on the fact that radiation indicator alarms on the criticality panel went into a high alarm and it was not immediately determined that high radiation levels did not exist. EOC personnel conservatively determined that an Alert should be declared and implemented the notification process while an evaluation into the exact cause of the alarm was implemented. Further evaluation of the situation confirmed that the activation of the alarms was not caused by high levels of radiation but by the lightning strike, which caused damage to electronic components within the alarm system. Therefore, the Alert criteria were actually not met. BWXT is requesting that the Alert declaration that was made on July 13, 2005, be withdrawn."

"On Wednesday, July 13, 2005, at approximately 9:40 pm, NPD established a storm watch for the facility criticality alarm system during a violent thunderstorm. At approximately 9:50 pm, a lightning strike at the Mt. Athos facility activated the criticality monitoring system and damaged the fire alarm system.

"Storm watch procedures were in place and personnel were evacuated to a safe location. After repairs were complete, at approximately 1:00 am, during functional testing of the [DELETED] criticality alarm system, a power surge occurred. Tests indicated that while the [DELETED] facility safety alarms were functional, communications from the alarm panel, which includes the fire alarms to the NPD [DELETED] Alarm Station [DELETED], were lost. It is uncertain whether the lightening strike or the power surge damaged the communications capability.

"By 9:00 am on July 14, 2005 the system was repaired and fire detection was functional."

"Evaluation of the Event:

"10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) states that the NRC must be notified of an event within 24 hours followed by a 30-day written report if the following condition is met. An event in which equipment that meets all of the following three conditions is disabled or fails to function as designed: [10CFR70.50(b)(2)]

"(1) The equipment is required by regulation or license condition to prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive material exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident and

"(2) The equipment is required to be available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function; and

"(3) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"Evaluations have been performed to determine that the fire detection system in this area is not an IROFS and that regulatory limits will not be exceeded by a fire.

"The equipment was required to be available and operable when it failed to function. Also, redundant equipment was not available; however, compensatory measures were utilized. Radiation Protection personnel were dispatched to monitor the local alarms and system activations. Compensatory measures [personnel at the local alarm panel] were in place by approximately 1:00 am.

"Notification Requirements

"The event is reportable due to:

"Although the fire system monitoring is not an IROFS, it is required by the license to mitigate the consequences of an event in a controlled area. Also, it was required to be functional when the communications loss occurred and a redundant system was not available to perform the required safety function. Based on this, notification is required to the NRC within 24 hours followed by a 30-day written report.

"Status of Corrective Actions:

"The system has been repaired, tested, and is functioning properly. A new surge protector will be installed on the Honeywell System when it is received."

CRITICALITY ALARM SYSTEM INOPERABLE IN THE NDA/LOADING DOCK AREA DUE TO DETECTOR FAILURE

"The NDA RMS-3 detector pair had stopped communicating with the RadNet computer in early September. The RadNet program is not required to actuate the criticality alarm, but is used for detector monitoring and diagnostics. This pair of readouts is in a remote location and are not monitored frequently. On 10/8/05 while performing monthly meter checks and semi-annual calibration the following was noted:

1) NDA East background 10-20 µR/hr, NDA West 0.2 - 0.4 Mr/hr; both had green normal lights.
2) Conducted internal source check, NDA West - normal.
3) Conducted internal source check NDA East- only read 1.1 Mr/hr when >10 Mr/hr is expected, source check took much longer than is normal.
4) Attempted to calibrate East detector, when exposed to 20 Mr/hr indicated 200-300 µR/hr, when exposed to 100 Mr/hr indicated 4 Mr/hr. Normal alarm setpoint is 20 Mr/hr.
5) Attempted to communicate with NDA East RMS-3 with a local computer, but it would not communicate.
6) Replaced detector, no change noted.
7) Replaced RMS-3 internals with a spare RMS-3. This RMS-3 started communicating with the RadNet program normally and was calibrated normally. When the NDA East RMS-3 was turned off for replacement, the NDA West also started communicating with the RadNet program.

"NDA East detector was last calibrated on 8/18/05 due to the replacement of NDA West detector. Locally source checked when communications initially failed on 9/9/05."

A valid signal from both detectors is required in order to initiate a criticality alarm. The source check performed on 9/9/05 may not have confirmed detector operability since it utilized a RadNet generated input signal. The licensee noted that no known condition requiring operation of the criticality alarm system had occurred in this portion of the facility, i.e., the [DELETED] corridor of the Bldg. [DELETED] complex, during the interval when the criticality alarm system was inoperable.

At 1800 hours following replacement of the NDA East RMS-3 internals, all recalibrations and tests confirming operability of the entire criticality alarm system had been completed satisfactorily.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 0938 EST ON 11/4/05 FROM RIK DROKE TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On October 8, 2005, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made a 24-hour telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center based on Title 10 CFR Part 70.50 (b) (2). This section requires a 24-hour report for an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: (1) the equipment is required by regulation or license condition to prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposure to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident; (2) the equipment is required to be available and operable to perform the required safety function; and (3) no redundant equipment is available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function. The report was made on a Saturday by a maintenance team engaged in repair and calibration of the NFS Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS), when it was observed that a single detector in the network did not respond to a calibration check as expected. The detector and read-out meter were immediately removed from service, replaced with a properly calibrated unit, and system operability restored.

"On Monday, October 10, 2005, when the NFS Nuclear Measurements Department staff returned to work, and were able to evaluate the CAAS technical basis documentation, it was determined the SNM process and storage area monitored by the out-of-calibration CAAS detector was monitored as well by several other detectors in adjacent areas. Upon further testing of the subject detector in the laboratory, it was demonstrated a redundant electrical circuit in the unit especially designed for nuclear criticality monitoring purposes (which is independent of detector calibration) would have enabled the unit to initiate an alarm in the event of a criticality event. Therefore, for two entirely separate reasons, redundant equipment was available and operable to perform the required safety function during the period of time the subject detector was out of calibration. This information was discussed and reviewed with the NFS Resident NRC Inspector during the week of October 10, 2005. Based on this information and discussion with the NRC Inspector, it is requested that this event report be retracted."

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions

A low level caustic discard solution was transferred to caustic waste tanks without sample and analysis. An in-line uranium concentration monitor was also present which would have stopped the transfer of high concentration solution. The solution in the tank was sampled. The solution concentration was very low and would have met analysis requirements.

There was no actual or potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment. The safety significance was very low due to the very low mass (8.91 grams U-235 at 65 weight %) and concentration (0.033 grams U-235/liter) [solution volume discarded without sampling was 270 liters].

This event was entered into the Problem Identification , Resolution and Correction System (PIRCS). An investigation is underway.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

Licensee reported an administrative IROF [Item Relied On For Safety] failure for the Environmental Safety Program. During the transfer of NaOH based uranium solution from Tank # XX-0023 to Tank # XX-0011 the licensee failed to identify a mass limit more restrictive for Tank # XX-0011 prior to transfer. The licensee exceeded the mass limit requirements due to the two tanks not being identical. Tank #XX-0011 was quarantined and the accident sequence for the tank transfer re-evaluated. This event did not involve or violate any criticality controls, and no release occurred.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

The NRC Resident Inspector questioned the impact of glovebox enclosure vacuum on the design and function of the glovebox overflow drains. Enclosure vacuum was not considered in the set-point analysis for these drains such that, under certain circumstances, the drains may not function as intended. The degraded safety scenario would involve high uranium concentration solution entering the glovebox (which is considered unlikely as the solution is typically low level caustic solution). The vacuum on the glovebox enclosure would have to exceed that which could result in the overflow drains being incapable of performing their functions. (The licensee notes that vacuums on enclosures have not been observed which would cause the drains to not be capable of performing their function). The solution in the enclosure would have to exceed the height necessary for criticality.

The licensee suspended operations in the affected enclosures on 10/21/05. A review was performed for all glovebox enclosures (during the week of 10/24/05). Modifications were made to all Building [DELETED] enclosure overflow drains to account for the absolute worst case enclosure vacuum for the facility (week of 10/24/05).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

"A drum of thorium shavings appears to have been lost during shipment. On 11/11/2005 Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) shipped a 55 gallon drum of thorium shavings to LR International Inc. The drum was then to be shipped to Highways International of Holland.

"On or about 11/22/05 [a contact point] at Highways International informed [NFS] that the shipment had not arrived. [NFS] checked the [shipping company] tracking number and it showed that the shipment had been delivered on 11/21/05.

"[NFS] contacted LR International who said that they did not accept large shipments at their Wood Dale Road location and that they had directed the driver to [a trucking company] in Bensenville, IL. [NFS] contacted [the trucking company] who said that they had not received a shipment, but would check again."

After contacting the shipping company and other contact points more in the ensuing time period on 12/7/05 NFS determined that the shipment was lost. The shipment consisted of 10 kilograms of natural thorium with a calculated activity of 2200 microCurie.

The licensee informed the agreement state of Tennessee. The state of Tennessee representative told the licensee that they would contact the agreement state of Illinois.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore it is being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

* * * UPDATE FROM DROKE TO KNOKE AT 17:40 EST ON 12/13/05 * * *

The licensee provided the following RETRACTION via facsimile:

"On December 8, 2005, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), made a telephone notification to the State of Tennessee and the NRC Operations Center based on SRPAR 1200-2-5-.140 and 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii), respectively. At that time, an NFS shipping package containing 10 kgs of Thorium was suspected to be lost, stolen, or missing; in that, the carrier stated the package had been delivered to a forwarding agent in Illinois on November 21, 2005, and the forwarding agent stated that they could not locate the package. Although the referenced regulations allow NFS up to 30 days to make the notification after learning of the potentially missing material, and the material has to still be missing at that time, NFS chose to inform the regulatory agencies soon after management became aware of the matter.

"NFS has now been informed by the forwarding agent that the package of Thorium has been located at their facility, and arrangements are being made to return the package to NFS. The FBI has also confirmed that the package has been located. Because it has been less than 30 days since NFS first learned that the package of Thorium may be missing, and because the package has now been located, NFS believes that the earlier telephone notification was not required and is therefore requesting that it be retracted."

Notified R2DO (Decker), R3DO ( Burgess) and NMSS (Essig).

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"During a revision to a related Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE), it was determined that the setpoint for the Building [DELETED] Condensate Tank in-line uranium concentration monitor was set at a non-conservative value.

"Along with other controls, the in-line uranium concentration monitor for the Building [DELETED] Condensate Tank is relied on in two Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations which are associated with two different facility areas/operations: 1)The monitor is relied on to maintain mass control for the condensate tank in Building [DELETED]; and 2) the monitor is relied on to maintain concentration control for tanks in the Waste Water Treatment Facility (WWTF).

"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment.

"Upon discovery of the situation, transfer operations to the condensate tank were suspended. WWTF overcheck sample results were reviewed (for condensate solutions) which confirmed extremely low uranium concentrations. The condensate tank in-line monitor was re-set to the most conservative concentration value and the monitor was recalibrated and re-tested. A review was performed for all other in-line monitor set-points to verify that the set-points were appropriate; no problems were noted with the set-points for other in-line monitoring systems."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On February 6, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on February 6, 2006 at approximately 7:30 a.m. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 4:00 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The re-analysis that was done cleared the alarm at approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. The final difference after re-analysis was below the Alarm Threshold Limit.

"Per E41-116 and the FNMCP, an Alarm Investigation team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit. NRC Ops was contacted at 1502 on February 6, 2006. The NPD MC&A contact at NRC (Tom Pham) was contacted at 1500 on February 6, 2006. Our resident inspector was notified via voice mail at approximately 1530 on February 6, 2006."

"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On February 20, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on February 20, 2006 at approximately 08:00 a.m. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 07:00 on February 20, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. An internal investigation is underway.

"Per E41-116 and the FNMCP, an Alarm Investigation Team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit. NRC Ops was contacted at about 15:45 on February 20, 2006. The NPD MC&A contact at NRC (Tom Pham) was contacted via voice mail at about 15:40 on February 20, 2006. Our resident inspector was notified via voice mail at approximately 15:55 on February 20, 2006."

"At approximately 10:50 on February 20, 2006, a large [DELETED] component was being removed from a vertical cold water rinse tank using a crane. While suspended directly over the tank, the fixture failed and the component was dropped into the tank. There was no significant damage to the tank or the component. Approximately 20 gallons of water was expelled from the tank and the crane was damaged from the 'recoil' of the crane hook.

"There were no injuries resulting from this event. The final configuration of the component in the tank is an analyzed situation that is currently authorized by the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). Under the guidance of Industrial Health and Safety and Criticality Safety, the component was removed from the water tank using a different type of fixture and a different crane. The cranes were then locked out to prevent use. BWXT has suspended all use of this type of fixture for component handling until the cause of the failure is understood.

"In reviewing the ISA, BWXT concluded this event (dropping a large component due to a fixture failure) was not specifically analyzed in the ISA. However, protective clothing evaluations had been performed and documented under OSHA regulations, to ensure that the worker is protected against chemical consequences. It is clearly bounded by the criticality safety and radiological safety analysis and did not result in failure to meet the criticality or radiological performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The potential chemical consequences are not as clear and BWXT is continuing to evaluate whether this type event could have resulted in failure to meet the performance requirements. Further, BWXT does not believe the potential chemical consequences of this event would fall under the definition of Hazardous Chemicals produced from licensed materials in 10 CFR 70.4, however, further discussions with NRC are required to reach consensus on this. Therefore, BWXT is reporting this event under 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(b)(1).

"If it is concluded the potential chemical consequences do not fall under the 10 CFR 70.4 definition, this notification will be withdrawn."

"Approximately 37 liters of High Enriched Uranyl Nitrate (HEUN) solution was inadvertently transferred to a filter enclosure not currently approved for operation. The filter enclosure was equipped with two independent safety-related drains that diverted the solution to the building floor and maintained a safe slab configuration within the enclosure and on the building floor. Upon discovery of this condition, operations in the affected area were terminated and corrective actions were initiated. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure.

"The equipment, which was not approved for use, was connected to a solution transfer line in service. This allowed unattended transfer of solution to a process enclosure. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure. The safety-related enclosure drains have been inspected by safety personnel and verified to remain free of obstructions to ensure functionality.

"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended. The unapproved enclosure is being physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment due to the incomplete control flow down of the safety analysis.

"The safety significance of the event is very low, because the system worked as required and maintained a safe slab configuration.

"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended on March 6, 2006. Starting on March 7, 2006, reviews are being conducted on other out of service equipment to ensure similar conditions don't exist. The unapproved enclosure will be physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"During inspections of the facility, NFS personnel identified an out-of-service equipment elevator and questioned if it contained any potential unsafe accumulation points. The elevator door was later opened and it revealed a pit area that was approximately 8-10 inches below the building floor level. This is considered a 1-hour reportable event because there is no [item relied on for safety or formal controls] in place to prevent a solution leak from entering this location. A solution leak to this area is considered a credible abnormal condition."

No actual material accumulation occurred. The licensee currently has compensatory measures in-place to prevent material accumulation in the area.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

The following was discovered In Building [DELETED] "Accumulation of product in a process vessel was discovered whose mass was different than analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis for a health physics related consequence."

The licensee is continuing to evaluate the cause. The system involved is shut down and no other similar systems are operating. The licensee will continue to evaluate and determine the cause prior to restarting the process. This is not a criticality safety issue.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM J. WHEELER TO M. RIPLEY 1034 EDT 04/13/06 * * *

"On March 22, 2006, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made a 24-hour report to the operations center based on 10CFR70, Appendix A, (b)(1). 10CFR70, Appendix A, (b)(1) requires a 24-hour report for a condition that resulted in the facility being in a state that was different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and that resulted in failure to meet the performance requirements of Section 70.61. The report was made because it was discovered that product had accumulated in a process vessel whose mass was greater than that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis for a health physics related consequence.

"The health physics consequence evaluation assumed that the entire mass of product was respirable. Between March 24, 2006, and April 6, 2006, measurements of the actual product mass were taken, and it was determined that less than 1 percent of the mass was respirable. The actual respirable product mass was 3 percent of the amount that would result in a high health physics consequence assuming a release of material. Substitution of the actual respirable product mass into the health physics consequence evaluation resulted in a low consequence and thus performance requirements were met. Based on this information, it is requested that this event report be retracted.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

The licensee reports that a facility supervisor has been found to be in violation of the fitness for duty program procedure (NFS-HR-08-001A) due to failure to adhere to a 5 hour alcohol abstinence requirement before reporting to the site The individual's site access has been denied.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the HOO for additional details.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

On Wednesday, May 31, 2006, at 1130 hours, it was determined that the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) was not capable of providing a [DELETED] Complex site-wide evacuation alarm in the event of a criticality. There were no indications on the system control panel indicating a problem with the system. Specifically, the power light was on and there were no trouble alarms at the panel. Preliminary troubleshooting indicates a short in one of the cards in the central panel. The local control panels in each of the buildings appear to be operating normally. However, an alarm at the local control panel will not initiate the [DELETED] Complex site-wide evacuation alarm. This condition may have existed since May 1, 2006.

No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event; however, there was a risk of potential health and safety consequences to the occupational workforce, involving significant radiation exposure from an accidental criticality event with no warning alarm to initiate prompt [DELETED] Complex site-wide evacuation. The potential risk was significantly lessened after May 15 when all licensed activities at the [DELETED] Complex stopped except for the operation of the Effluent Processing Building, which contains negligible amounts of uranium.

On May 20, 2006, a severe thunderstorm passed over the [DELETED] Complex, and a lightning strike caused some electronic components throughout the plant to stop working or function erratically.

On May 24, 2006, an indication of a communication system failure in the CAAS was identified. There are two circuits in the system, one is for communications between the individual detectors in each of the buildings and the other circuit is for the alarms. There was no indication of the general system failure that was later observed on May 31. The communication system was repaired and tested successfully.

Between May 24 and May 31, instrument technicians were performing regular calibrations of instruments throughout the plant and identified a few instruments that appeared to be affected by the lightning strike. Based on this evidence, and knowledge of the design of the CAAS, the [DELETED] Complex Maintenance Manager recommended to the Plant Manager that the criticality system be tested to ensure it was not affected prior to performing any licensed activities, although there was no direct evidence at that time that the system was affected. It was decided that this testing should take place on May 31.

[DELETED] Complex operations are in safe standby condition and will not be resumed until the CAAS is fully functional.

"On June 8, 2006 at approximately 11:00 am, during a daily waste line inspection, dampness was observed in a pipe chase near the [DELETED] building. A test indicated that the liquid was acidic. Investigation into the incident revealed that a portion of the concrete chase underneath an onsite railroad spur/roadway had apparently fallen onto a copper nitrate and a pickle acid line. A small pool of blue liquid was seen under the pipes, indicating that the Copper Nitrate Line was damaged.

"Area operations were informed, the copper nitrate production was shut down, and preparations have begun to excavate and repair the line. Approximately one gallon of waste solution was released. [The release was terminated by licensee.]

"This concurrent report is being made because the event was reported to the following government agencies: EPA Region III - 215/814-3435, and Virginia DEQ - 434/582-5120"

"On June 20, 2006 at approximately 3:00 p.m. it was reported to Environmental Protection Department that a sanitary sewer manhole was observed to be overflowing. It was also reported that the flow was moving over the adjacent pavement to a nearby catch basin. A subsequent inspection by Environmental Engineering confirmed that the sanitary sewer waste was overflowing the manhole and discharging to a nearby catch basin. This catch basin discharges to the storm water system via the once through cooling drain lines. It is estimated that approximately 1-2 gallons entered the catch basin.

"Following the above confirmation both Environmental Engineering management and Radiation Protection personnel were notified. In addition, Industrial Engineering was called to effect repairs and/or unclog the sanitary sewer line.

"Because the sanitary sewage flow was being directed around the sanitary sewer treatment plant as a result of the overflow, it was concluded that this event represented a 'bypass' as described by the BWXT NPD VPDES Water Discharge Permit (VA0003697).

"Section H 'Reports of Unusual or Extraordinary Discharges' of 'Conditions Applicable to all VPDES Permits' requires that this type of event be reported to VADEQ (Virginia Department of Environmental Quality) promptly, but in no case later than 24 hours with a written report to follow in 5 days.

"On June 20, 2006 at about 4:00 p.m. a phone call was made to VADEQ South Central Regional Office notifying them of the event."

"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a media inquiry from [a reporter] at the Richmond Times Dispatch. The inquiry was specific to a tritium leak from a spent storage fuel pool and underground piping in 2000. [The reporter] indicated that NRC had provided specific information concerning sites in Virginia that had been reported by the Society of Concerned Scientists. The BWXT Manager of Communications confirmed that BWXT had a leak of material from the pool and that the leak was repaired."

This report is being made to the NRC as a result of a media inquiry from the Lynchburg News and Advance. [The reporter] was asking about the Society of Concerned Scientists report on a leak that occurred at the BWXT site in 2000. She asked what BWXT does to prevent such things from occurring. The Manager of Communications indicated that BWXT follows regulatory guidelines given to us so that our systems function safely and in compliance.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On August 9, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on August 10, 2006 at approximately 07:30. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 22:30 on August 9, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. No new feed material is being added to the process until the alarm is resolved. An internal investigation is underway.

Per E41-116 and the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP), an Alarm Investigation Team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit."

Licensee notified Resident Inspector and HQ NRC.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"In a letter dated August 14, 2006, BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT) made a notification to the NRC Region Il, as required by license SNM-42, Section 9.4.2, that low levels of Tc-99 contamination had been discovered in two shallow groundwater-monitoring wells (FEP-1 and FEP-2) adjacent to the Final Effluent Ponds. The levels detected exceeded the license action level for beta activity."

The Tc-99 levels identified were 1,408 and 6,206 picocuries/liter for the wells FEP-1 and FEP-2 respectively. These exceeded the NRC licensed action level for beta activity. Additionally, the gross beta levels are above the gross beta screening level for groundwater and surface water. BWXT indicated that as a result of their initial investigation the contamination is contained on the BWXT site and there is no potential for contamination to migrate to offsite groundwater or to affect drinking water at the site.

"This concurrent report is being made as the result of an August 25, 2006 notification letter that is being submitted to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.

"BWXT has initiated an investigation and will provide the results to the Senior NRC Resident Inspector when complete. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed of the event and the current status of the investigation."

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"A routine-6-month calibration was performed on the [DELETED] condensate discharge inline monitor system. The calibration identified that the gamma spectrometer. Monitoring system was not functional. The system failed all calibration efforts including a self-check. This piece of equipment is an active engineered IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] for discharge of low-level condensate waste. The failure of this IROFS leaves only one other IROFS in place but fails to meet the minimum performance criteria. This equipment may have been in a failed state for more than eight hours. The remaining IROFS that remains intact is sampling the waste prior to discharge.

"There were no actual safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment due to the low level of waste discharged through this system.

"All waste discharges have been suspended until equipment functionality can be demonstrated. A complete review of recent discharges through this system is underway to ensure that all discharges have been according to approved discard limits. The receiving tanks are also being sampled to confirm that the uranium concentration is within approved limits.

"All waste discharges from other plant facilities having similar monitoring equipment have been suspended until equipment functionality can be demonstrated."

"During the investigation of a suspected operational upset an accumulation of fissile material exceeding the controlled limit was found in an enclosure. The material was placed in a safe geometry container after inspection of the system. Samples were obtained expeditiously to determine the actual mass of the material. This particular operation has been suspended until corrective actions are in place. This is a failure of an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) if the mass is determined to be in excess of the limit.

"[The event is of] very minimal safety significance. No actual safety consequences [occurred] due to the always safe mass of fissile material for the as-found conditions. Two additional IROFS were available and reliable to perform their safety function.

"There were no actual safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment. The quantity of fissile material was below the always safe mass for the conditions. Also, the fissile material was contained in an enclosure used for normal operations."

"On 3/1/2007, NFS made a 24-hour report to the operations center based on 10CFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2). 10CFR70, Appendix A, Paragraph (a)(2) requires a 24-hour report for loss or degradation of items relied on for safety (IROFS) that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of Sec. 70.61. The report was made because an accumulation of fissile material potentially exceeding the allowed mass was discovered in an enclosure.

"Samples of the material were obtained and analyzed. The results demonstrated that the mass limit was not exceeded; therefore, the documented safety basis including the Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) in question remained intact. Based on this information it is requested that this event report be retracted."

"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On March 16, 2007 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was officially reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on March 16, 2007 at approximately 21:00. The time in which the potential alarm situation was initially reported to Measurement Control personnel was approximately 12:00 on March 16, 2007. A re-analysis of the process material cleared the alarm at approximately 13:00 on March 17, 2007. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. The final difference after re-analysis was below the Alarm Threshold Limit.

"Per E41-116 and the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP), an Alarm Investigation Team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its Alarm Threshold Limit."

The licensee secured the process while investigating the alarm condition but subsequently restarted once the alarm was verified cleared.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Project Manager.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"At approximately 8:30 am on March 22, 2007, NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] was questioned by an NRC inspector regarding control methods for the RTRT [Research Test Reactor & Targets], HEU [High Enriched Uranium] and LEU [Low Enriched Uranium] compact press glovebox lines regarding hydraulic fluid entry into the glovebox. The glove box is a mass-moderator controlled box. Mass and moderator upset conditions were considered during the ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] and are documented in the SAR. However, no moderator upset condition (reflecting hydraulic leak into the press box) is documented in the SAR. Moderator upset (reflecting hydraulic leak into the box) is considered in the NCS analysis supporting the SAR analysis and operation. Moderator upset was specifically evaluated, and results documented in the NCS analysis. The evaluation demonstrated the glovebox remained subcritical and below license limits even if fully flooded with hydraulic fluid.

"At the time of discovery, the glovebox line was not in operation and there was no evidence of a hydraulic leak. Soon after notification, RTRT Operations removed the glove boxes from service and the press glovebox operations were subsequently locked out from use.

"At this time BWXT believes this may be an unanalyzed condition in the ISA and is therefore reporting this event under 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b)(1). BWXT continues to research the ISA documentation to determine the extent of the evaluation during the ISA. If more information is found BWXT may withdraw this notification.

"BWXT has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"On Wednesday April 18, 2007, at approximately 1330, Uranium Processing and Research Reactors (UPRR) personnel notified Nuclear Criticality Safety that a procedural deviation had occurred during the transfer of solution from favorable geometry columns to an unfavorable waste container. The event occurred in the General Purpose Area of the Uranium Recovery Facility where used organic solution from the solvent extraction system is purified for re-use or disposal. The General Purpose Area is physically segregated from the Dissolution and Solvent Extraction Processing Areas of Uranium Recovery, is not part of the Container Controlled Area, and consequently carefully controlled use of unfavorable geometry containers is part of the approved process.

"Dual, independent sampling of the organic solution's uranium concentration is performed according to procedure to verify Nuclear Criticality Safety limits are met prior to bringing the solution into the General Purpose Area. The solution is then processed in favorable geometry columns to remove uranium in accordance with procedural requirements. After processing, the solution can be returned to the extraction process by performing dual sampling and subsequent transfer to a borosilicate glass Raschig ring filled (critically safe, neutron poisoned) container. If however, the material is to be disposed of, then an additional dual sampling by Nuclear Materials Control personnel is required prior to transfer to an unpoisoned, unfavorable geometry waste container through an inline monitor.

"In this event, approximately 60 liters of solution required processing. The operator performed the initial dual, independent sampling of the solution for entry to the process. The results of sampling [DELETED], well below the operating limit of [DELETED]. The operator then processed the solution according to procedure to remove the majority of the uranium. He then obtained two samples of the remaining low concentration solution and verified acceptability of the solution for transfer. These results were [DELETED], respectively. At this point the operator transferred the solution to an unfavorable geometry waste container without the required NMC samples or inline monitor.

"II. Evaluation of the Event

"10 CFR 70 Appendix A states that the NRC must be notified of an event within 24 hours followed by a 30-day written report if the following condition is met:

"(b) Twenty-four hour reports. Events to be reported to the NRC Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery, supplemented with the information in 10 CFR 70.50(c)(1) as it becomes available, followed by a written report within 30 days;

"(2) Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of §70.61.

"An evaluation has determined that this event resulted in loss or degradation of items relied on for safety (IROFS's) resulting in failure to meet the performance requirement of §70.61 in that the risk of a credible high-consequence event (i.e., a criticality accident) was no longer limited such that its likelihood was highly unlikely. However, multiple other IROFS's as noted above (dual input sampling, uranium removal processing, and dual sampling prior to transfer) were in place and functioning to prevent a criticality accident.

"The documented ISA scenarios were reviewed. The evaluated scenario for this operation identified multiple IROFS to prevent transfer of an unsafe mass of uranium to an unfavorable geometry waste drum.

"1. First and foremost, the concentration limit of [DELETED] grams [DELETED]/liter verified by two independent samples ensures the mass of material in the process is limited.

"2. Second, dual independent sampling is performed by two different organizational groups to ensure an acceptable mass prior to transfer from the column system to unfavorable geometry.

"3. Third, the solution is transferred through an active in-line monitoring system that terminates the transfer (i.e., shuts off the flow) if an unacceptable concentration is detected.

"Of these controls, the first was executed properly in this event. Part, but not all, of the second control set was also executed. The third control was not used.

"Criticality safety calculations supporting the ISA demonstrate that even if the solution was at the upper limit for entry to the area, no Uranium was removed during processing, and the material was transferred to unfavorable geometry without verification, that a criticality could still not occur.

"III. Notification Requirements

"The event is reportable under 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b) (2) Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of §70.61.

"IV. Status of Corrective Actions:

"The solution has been returned to the favorable geometry columns using the approved procedures, and the concentration was confirmed by sampling to be less than [DELETED] grams [DELETED]/liter. Operations in the Uranium Recovery Facility General Purpose Area, where this process is performed, have been suspended. An investigation of the event is underway."

A facility representative notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1107 ON 4/20/07 FROM L. MORELL TO P. SNYDER * * *

"BWXTs investigation of this issue is ongoing. Based on our investigation and associated time lines, BWXT believes that notification may also have been required under 10CFR70, Appendix A:(a)(5). This determination was made at approximately 10:30 am on April 20, 2007.

"This reporting criteria states:
"Loss of controls such that only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the ISA Summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than 8 hours.

"Therefore, BWXT is providing this update to the notification report and a corrected page 1 of the original Event Notification that includes identification of 10CFR70, Appendix A: (a)(5). The facts of the issue as described in the initial report remain as stated."

The coversheet of the original event notification has been revised to include the additional notification requirement as a result of this report.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"BWXT operates a component acid cleaning operation for [DELETED] components. One of the potential accident scenarios specifically evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is allowing the component to remain in the acid for sufficient time to dissolve the component and SNM into an unfavorable geometry acid solution. Dissolving through the [DELETED] and dissolving sufficient quantities of SNM to result in a potential safety issue would take hours."

"To protect against this accident scenario, there are strict procedural controls (Items Relied On For Safety - IROFS) on the duration of time the component is in the acid. In addition, there is an engineered feature consisting of a timer and automatic acid tank dump valve (IROFS). This system will dump the entire acid bath from the tank well before the [DELETED] material is breached in the event the operator does not remove the component."

"On April 30, 2007, at approximately 7:00 a.m., during a weekly functional test of the acid tank dump valve, the valve failed to open. This weekly test is listed in the ISA as a management measure to assure the continued availability and reliability of the dump valve system (IROFS). The last successful scheduled test of the valve was on April 24, 2007. The last successful use of the valve to dump the tank occurred on April 27, 2007. Therefore, the ability of the dump valve system (IROFS) to perform its intended safety function is questionable from April 27, 2007 to April 30, 2007. [DELETED] components were processed during the period when the functionality of the dump valve is in question. However, all [DELETED] operations were performed in accordance with operating procedures and there was no over [DELETED].

"BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, (b)(2).

"There is currently no [DELETED] components being processed in the acid tanks."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

ALERT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE SUPER COMPACTOR FACILITY WITH A POSSIBLE RADIOACTIVE RELEASE

BWXT declared an alert condition onsite at 0959 EDT due to a fire at their super compactor facility where dry active waste is compacted with a possible uncontrolled release. The fire was extinguished in about 20 minutes. BWXT initially requested offsite fire assistance but called it off after extinguishing the fire.

The licensee notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 11:30 ON 5/8/07 TO SNYDER * * *

BWXT terminated the alert condition at 1130 EDT.

The licensee notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

"On Tuesday, May 8, 2007 at 0957, BWX Technologies, Inc. declared an Alert per the BWXT Emergency Plan and internal emergency procedures. BWXT contacted the NRC Operations Center to report that an Alert had been declared due to a radioactive waste drum fire that occurred in the supercompactor building and the fact that there was a possibility that 'restricted area airborne concentrations may have been in excess of 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table 1' as defined in the BWXT Emergency Plan and internal emergency procedures. Analysis of samples taken during the emergency indicated no detectable activity. Surveys of the potentially impacted areas and personnel responding to the event found no unusual elevations. Also, data for the routine fixed air sampling and stack programs did not show any elevated samples indicative of an increase in contamination in the area or a release of materials during the event. Therefore, the Alert criteria of airborne concentrations in excess of 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table 1 were not met. BWXT is requesting that the Alert declaration that was made on May 8, 2007 be retracted. The BWXT NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified of the retraction.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

"BWXT operates a multiple-component acid cleaning operation for SNM [DELETED] components. One of the potential accident scenarios specifically evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is for the multiple components to be dislodged from the fixture and fall into the acid solution. If the components were to remain in the acid for a sufficient time, the acid could dissolve the [DELETED] releasing the SNM into unfavorable geometry acid tank. Dissolving through the [DELETED] and dissolving sufficient quantities of SNM to result in a potential safety issue would take about an hour.

"To protect against this accident scenario, the fixture is designed to handle the components while maintaining the required spacing (IROFS). In addition, there is an engineered feature consisting of a timer and automatic acid dump valve (IROFS). This system will dump the entire acid bath from the tank well before the [DELETED] material is breached.

"On May 24 2007, at approximately 4:30 p.m., an operator was placing a fixture holding 9 components on a 10 position fixture into the acid solution tank. The fixture hung up on the tank. The resulting impact caused 7 of the components dislodge from the fixture and fall into the tank. The fixture maintaining the spacing between components is an IROFS. The operator immediately initiated a manual dump of the acid solution and opened the water valve to rinse any residual acid off the components in the tank. The second IROFS, automated timer that activates the dump valve, was not challenged since the operator manually dumped the tank.

"BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10CFR70.61, Appendix A, (b)(2).

"The component acid bath operation has been suspended and the failed fixture was tagged and taken out of service. The components which fell into the tank were inspected and found to have no loss of [DELETED] integrity.

"The operator involved in the incident was FFD tested.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and an investigation team has been established to perform a thorough review of the incident."

"On July 13, 2007 at approximately 8:00 a.m., in the Recovery Area Specialty Fuels Facility (SFF), a concern regarding an unattended Raschig ring vacuum cleaner with no top and hose attached was brought to the attention of the SFF foreman. The vacuum cleaner was in the Conversion Area which is part of the Container Control Area (CCA). The vacuum cleaner is used to collect spills and for general cleaning purposes. The vacuum cleaner was filled with Raschig rings to the level of the side mounted hose connection in accordance with procedure. Removal of the top created a free space of approximately [DELETED] in diameter by [DELETED] deep above the hose connection that contained no Raschig rings. With the hose connected and in an upright position, a volume of approximately [DELETED] was created, in violation of the NCS Posting. Solution could have collected in the vacuum cleaner, filling the Raschig ring portion of the vacuum cleaner and the free space above the rings before spilling onto the floor. The foreman immediately removed the hose from the vacuum cleaner and subsequently notified Safety Management. The top was placed back on the vacuum cleaner.

"Evaluation of the Event

"Although the configuration of the unattended vacuum cleaner (no top with hose attached) created a potential unfavorable geometry in the CCA, there was no immediate safety concern. Uranium [DELETED] materials were not being processed in the area at the time and have not been processed in the area for approximately 2 years. Although there is a sprinkler system overhead, there are no other lines containing uranium [DELETED] solutions in the immediate area. The vacuum cleaner drum was sampled and found to contain [DELETED] of liquid with a concentration of less than [DELETED] grams 235U per liter. Considering that the vacuum cleaner was partially full, an additional [DELETED] liters of solution would have been necessary to fill the vacuum cleaner above the Raschig rings, which is a significant accumulation that would likely have been identified by area personnel. The liquid in the drum would also have served to dilute any solution added to the vacuum cleaner. The combined effect of these as found conditions was such that a criticality was highly unlikely.

"This event is bounded by existing scenarios in our ISA. The scenario deals with an [DELETED] Recovery Container Entry Requirements. Specifically, the scenario addresses [DELETED liters that is filled with uranium [DELETED] solution. The scenario credits the following controls as IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety].

"1. [DELETED].
"2. [DELETED].

"The first IROFS was degraded for this event to occur. The second IROFS was not compromised. As a result double contingency was lost."

"On 7/26/07 at approximately 10:30 AM, an unusual condition occurred in the outside alley west of [DELETED]. During movement of a portable Raschig ring vessel from the Recovery [DELETED] to the Central Storage [DELETED], the vessel tipped over, spilling its contents. The vessel contained uranium-[DELETED] waste solution at less than [DELETED] gram U-235 per liter.

"In order to transfer the portable Raschig ring vessel outside of a radiologically controlled area, the vessel was covered by two 55-gallon plastic bags in order to contain contamination within the vessel as it was being transferred outside the radiologically controlled area. The vessel overturned creating an unfavorable geometry container via the outer 55 gallon plastic bag that collected solution from the spill separately from the Raschig rings.

"The solution from the portable Raschig ring vessel was sampled and found to have a concentration of [DELETED] grams U235 per liter. The solution that collected in the outer bag was held at a [DELETED] height approximately [DELETED]. The inner bag also contained some solution, but it also contained Raschig rings, and therefore was not of immediate concern. Although the configuration of the tipped over vessel created an unfavorable geometry, due to the low concentration of the solution and the [DELETED] height, there was little risk of a criticality accident. The vessel was outside the process area when it tipped over, so there was no opportunity that additional uranium-[DELETED] solution could have been collected in the bags or the vessel.

"Previous safety analyses considered the issue of whether a spilled vessel could preferentially separate high concentration solution from the Raschig rings in a Raschig Ring vessel, leaving solution in the vessel without the poisoning effect of the rings and concluded that event was not credible. In this event, however, the spilled solution was preferentially separated from the Raschig rings though the concentration remained low. Based on these facts, this condition that was not fully analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA).

"The immediate corrective action was to suspend operations associated with the vessel, isolate the spilled material, and clean up the spill. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence are being developed. Since this event was not fully analyzed in the ISA, transfer of bagged Raschig ring vessels containing uranium-[DELETED] solutions shall not occur until appropriate evaluations are performed.

"The operators involved in the event were Fitness For Duty tested. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(1).

"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION
On August 22, 2007, in accordance with operational procedures, a pre-filter was removed from the saw enclosure ventilation in the [DELETED]. The filter was constructed with a paper core and metal housing, approximately [DELETED] high with a [DELETED] diameter. The calculated volume approached 23 liters. The weight gain measured on the filter at the time of removal was about [DELETED] grams.

"Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) was notified because the weight gain was more than expected. Net weight difference is often used as a conservative U-235 mass until acceptable accountability measurements are completed. Preliminary ESP-2 counting showed the filter was less than the standard for containers of this size. An RWP was approved to transport the filter to drum count in order to perform NDA counting. NMC [Nuclear Materials Control] subsequently provided a U-235 value of approximately [DELETED] grams based on the greater of two counts.

"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT
It was determined that the existing NCS analysis for fuel accumulation in glove box pre-filters defined a limit of [DELETED] in a glove box pre-filter with the requirement that filters be changed out at a documented frequency determined by specific operations performed in the glove box. There was an operational requirement to check the enclosure manometer to determine if the exhaust filters need to be changed, no minimum change frequency had been specified. It is unlikely that a large fuel quantity could collect on this filter - the saw cuts only a few grams from each element, most of the cut material is zirconium, and much of the fines are collected in the coolant which is changed whenever throughput approaches [DELETED]. It is probable that the filter would clog, as indicated by the manometer check, before accumulation approached the limit.

"On September 5, 2007, it was determined the requirement of the NCS analysis to implement a minimum change frequency for the saw enclosure filter had not been completed nor the ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] been updated. Although there was no immediate safety concern and controls were in place, IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] had not been fully implemented. The operation of the saw was suspended on 9/5/07 at 11:15 am until the procedures and ISA are revised to include the IROFS.

"III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(2) - Loss or degradation of IROFS that results in the failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.

"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The operation has been suspended pending further investigation."

"At or around 6:30 am on Sunday, September 23 the main ventilator fan on the [DELETED] exhaust system in the [DELETED] Area ceased operation and the back-up ventilator was activated. It was determined that a breaker tripped on the main ventilator and power was lost. The breaker was reset and the main fan reactivated. At this time, it is not known how long the main fan was inactive.

"At approximately 9:30 am the breaker on the main fan tripped again and the back-up fan was activated. The main fan was inactive for approximately 30 minutes before the breaker was reset.

"The BWXT Title V Air Permit requires that if air pollution control equipment fails or malfunctions such that excess emissions occur for more than one hour, the DEQ must be notified as soon as practicable, but in no case later than four daytime business hours after the malfunction is discovered. Once Environmental Engineering was notified on Monday morning, September 24, it could not be ascertained with 100% certainty that excess emissions had occurred for more than one hour. To ensure compliance with the permit, BWXT notified DEQ within the four business hour permit limitation that an event had occurred. Should it be determined during our evaluation that an exceedance did not occur, BWXT will withdraw both the DEQ and NRC notifications.

"BWXT is making this concurrent notification in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (c)."

"Per area operating procedures the components being [DELETED] were removed from the acid baths, and heat/agitation to the spacer component [DELETED] baths was turned-off. Following the 6:30 am fan failure it was determined that no [DELETED] activities were occurring and hence there were no excess emissions. Following the 9:30 am fan failure, the breaker was reset and the main ventilator was re-activated in approximately 30 minutes. Since the main ventilator was restarted within approximately 30 minutes, it was concluded that no excess emissions were possible for more than one hour and hence no notification was required. BWXT, therefore, has withdrawn the Title V Air Permit notification and is also withdrawing the concurrent 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (c) notification."

"A second-shift Waste Treatment operator discovered acidic wastewater (a mixture of nitric acid, hydrofluoric acid and water) discharging from a sump on the Bay 5A Pickle Acid Scrubber pad at approximately 10:30 PM on 10/16/2007. The acidic wastewater ran downhill onto the roadway to the north and eventually onto a concrete pad near the bottom of the hill. By the time of the discovery, or very shortly thereafter, the overflow stopped. The operator notified area supervision and verified that all valves and pumps at the Waste Treatment facility were functioning normally and wastewater was being received in the equalization tanks.

"Estimates on 10/17/2007 by Environmental Engineering of the amount of flow discharged to the line versus the amount received at Waste Treatment, combined with visual observation of the spill area, suggest that approximately 275 gallons of acidic wastewater were released from the trench, of this amount, approximately 25 gallons potentially reached uncovered surfaces adjacent to the road (gravel/grass). This was deemed to be a Reportable Quantity of a hazardous substance and appropriate notifications were made to the National Response Center (Notification #851841), the EPA Region 11 Consent Order Coordinator and the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.

"The spill area was neutralized with soda ash and thoroughly rinsed. The small gravel/grass areas that may have been impacted are being assessed for additional remediation as necessary."

"An overexposure was discovered during a routine compliance inspection of Accurate NDE & Inspection on March 25, 2008. This overexposure was not reported to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. An industrial radiographer received a dose of 7819 mrem for the calendar year 2007. The licensee has been cited for the overexposure and for not reporting the overexposure. This overexposure is being investigated by the LA Department of Environmental Quality."

"A manual trip of Salem Unit 2 was initiated due to a high water level in 23 Steam Generator. The high water level in 23 Steam Generator occurred while reducing power in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for loss of circulating water. The operators had entered the abnormal operating procedure for circulating water due to loss of the electrical bus supplying power to the screens. The main supply breaker had tripped open due to the panel being wet from heavy rain. With the screens out of service, TWS [traveling water screen] DP's rose to a value where the circulators were removed from service per procedure. The restoration of the supply breaker is currently in progress. The cause of the high level in 23 Steam Generator during the power reduction is currently under investigation. Following the trip, 2N43, power range nuclear instrumentation channel 3, was declared inoperable due to inaccurate indication and is currently under investigation.

"The crew entered EOP-TRIP-1, appropriately transitioned to EOP-TRIP-2 and stabilized the plant at no load conditions. All rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as designed with decay heat being removed via the 21 -24MS10's, the atmosphere relief valves.

"The AFW Pumps were manually started as required to maintain steam generator levels.

"Salem Unit-2 is currently in mode 3. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547°F with pressure at 2235 psig. All ECCS and ESF Systems are available.

"No personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the Trip. No radiological release due to this event."

No Primary relief valves or PORVs lifted during the trip. There are no known fuel or steam generator tube leaks. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Township.

The licensee called to correct the original report that stated the AFW pumps were started manually to maintain SG level. The AFW pumps started automatically due to manually tripping the 21 and 22 SGFPs. The licensee also added notification of the 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)-Specified System Actuation due to the automatic start of the motor driven AFW pumps.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST C-14 SOURCES

While conducting the annual physical inventory of radioactive materials on 04/11/08, 2 samples containing a total of 10.1 milliCuries of C-14 were not able to be located. The samples were: (1) RMR 631- Methylene Bisphenyl Isocyanate (MDI) 1.1 mCi of C-14, and (2) RMR 652 - Dipropylene glycol dimethyl ether, 9.0 mCi of C-14. The samples had been present in their approved storage location during the 2007 physical inventory.

All authorized users were interviewed to identify location or usage within the last year. A detailed search of all storage areas and radioisotope-approved labs was performed. Conducted a review of facility waste disposal records, and no information related to the sources location was found.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

LOSS OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY DETECTION SYSTEM FOR TWO AREAS CAUSED DURING MAINTENANCE

"On 05/09/2008 at 0525 PDT during a maintenance activity, a fuse in a Nuclear Criticality Detection System cabinet failed open which caused two of the nine Nuclear Criticality Accident Alarm system coverage areas to go offline. About 5 minutes later, Security personnel made a plant wide PA announcement to suspend all movement of fissile material. The alarm horns were placed in manual mode and manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panel was established at this time and continued until the system was restored to full operation.

"The safety significance is very low. Accidental nuclear criticality is highly unlikely. The system was only degraded for about 5 minutes before Security personnel made a plant wide announcement to suspend all fissile material movement. NCD coverage for the entire plant was reestablished within about 35 minutes.

"Corrective Actions to Restore the Safety System and when each was implemented:
- Manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panels was established at 0530
- The NCD panel fuse was replaced by 0605 restoring NCD coverage to all areas of the plant.
- The alarm horns were placed back in automatic mode at 0720 and the system continued to be monitored by maintenance personnel.
- Complete system operability was declared at 0730.
- A plant wide PA announcement that the suspension of fissile material movement had been lifted was made at 0745."

The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2 and the State of Washington Department of Health.

"On 05/09/2008, at 14:20 CDT, Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A, was entered when the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train was declared inoperable due to a gap in one of the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer modules greater than 1/8 inch. At the time this condition was discovered, the 'B' RHR train was already inoperable for maintenance.

"The Unit is in the process of being returned to service following completion of a Refueling Outage. The unit remained stable, in Mode 4, with the 'A' RHR Train inservice providing cooling for decay heat removal. Efforts to correct the gap in the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer were commenced shortly after identification of this condition, and the condition was corrected and 'A' Train RHR returned to Operable status at 17:45 CDT. 'B' Train RHR is currently being restored following completion of maintenance. The Unit will remain in Mode 4 until the 'B' RHR train is restored to Operable status.

"Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train to be operable while in Mode 4. An operable ECCS train includes both an RHR Subsystem, and a Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) subsystem. The 'A' Train CCP Subsystem remained operable."

"On March 9, 2008, Watts Bars Security staff was notified by the Rhea County Sheriff's Department that a single emergency preparedness siren had spuriously activated due to inclement weather and possible lightning strike. The county subsequently notified the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) who, in turn, contacted the Tennessee Valley Authority Operations Duty Specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The siren has been deactivated and repairs will be initiated. Due to the interaction with the county and TEMA (State and local government agencies), this report is being made as a four hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION DUE TO BOTH RHR TRAINS BEING INOPERABLE DURING MODE 3

"On 05/11/2008, at 0300 CDT, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered when excessive leakage was identified on EJ8842 RHR to hot leg injection relief valve. Due to the location in the system this leak adversely affected the operability of both RHR trains. EJHV8716A and EJHV8716B RHR Hot Leg Injection cross tie valves were closed to isolate the leak path. Technical Specification 3.5.2 does not have a CONDITION statement that addresses both RHR trains being out of service in Mode 3.

"At the time of discovery the RCS was being heated towards NOP/NOT. RCS pressure was 1340 psig and temperature 504F.

"The Unit is being cooled down to reenter Mode 4 at this time. When the Unit enters Mode 4 Technical Specification 3.5.3 will be in effect. Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train to be operable while in Mode 4. An operable ECCS train includes both an RHR Subsystem, and a Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) subsystem. The requirement to have EJHV8716A and EJHV8716B open is not applicable to Technical Specification 3.5.3.

"The Unit will remain in Mode 4 until EJ8842 is restored to Operable status.