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December 29, 2016

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

A ceasefire in Syria, brokered by the Russians and the Turks, is scheduled to take effect at midnight on Thursday. Notably absent from any of the negotiations was the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement outlining the agreement, and in effect, marginalized any American role in resolving the six-year conflict in the country.

The Russian-Turkish brokered ceasefire follows a December 20 meeting in Moscow between the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to discuss the future of Syria, both short and long term. A ceasefire was one of the topics, as was the potential for a political solution to the civil war. The ceasefire agreement announced by Mr. Putin seems to have addressed both.

It appears that once again, President Putin and his foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, have outplayed American President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry. As I have said in the past, the new power brokers in the region - especially when it comes to Syria - are Russia, Turkey and Iran.

While all of us are pleased that there is a chance for a cessation of the bloodshed in war-torn Syria, it remains to be seen if this ceasefire will have any greater chance of success than the preceding attempts. Mr. Putin called the ceasefire "fragile."

As with previous ceasefire agreements, the parties to this agreement are the Syrian government and its allies on one side, and the armed opposition on the other.

Syria's regime is backed militarily by a tightly-managed coalition of Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Iraqi and Afghan Shi'a militias. About half of the ground forces fighting for the al-Asad regime are provided by these alliance groups. However, it was the introduction of Russian airpower in September 2015 that guaranteed the survival of the Bashar al-Asad government, allowed the regime to regain momentum in its military operations, and to retake the city of Aleppo.

It is also important to note that, as in previous ceasefires, the agreement does not include groups labeled as terrorists. Those groups specifically include the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the former al-Qaidah affiliate in Syria, now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS, Levant Conquest Front). However, some groups that have been labeled as terrorists in the past, such as Ahrar al-Sham, are now included in the scope of this agreement.

If past precedent holds, agreement on what constitutes a terrorist group will still be an issue. The exact wording in the agreement defines groups that can be attacked as "those associated with" designated terrorist groups. The Syrian regime regards virtually any group that has taken up arms against it as a terrorist group. In the Arabic-language Syrian government-controlled press, the words rebel and opposition are not used - all opposition is labeled terrorism.

There is no doubt that the opposition has suffered recent setbacks - the loss of its stronghold in east Aleppo was a strategic, tactical and symbolic defeat. The Syrian coalition now has the momentum. I expect that after totally securing the city of Aleppo, they will turn their attention to neighboring Idlib governorate and use their successful seizure of Aleppo as the template to expel the rebels from that area. Unless the situation changes, I do not think the opposition will be able to prevent this regime coalition operation from succeeding.

The opposition knows it is now in a much weakened position and that they have lost much of their leverage in negotiations with the regime. If the opposition can get something that guarantees that they will have a voice in a future political settlement, they will likely adhere to the agreement. That is a tall order, however - the two sides are still far apart. The Russians believe that any future political solution must include the continuance of the Bashar al-Asad government, while Turkey and the opposition want the future of the present government to be on the table as well.

There is one group that is not included in the agreement which the United States considers to be part of the fight against ISIS. This is the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF, or in Arabic QSD), composed of Sunni Arabs and Kurdish fighters who are members of the Syrian Kurdish group known as the YPG. The U.S.-led coalition supports the SDF with airstrikes, weapons and on-the-ground advisers. They have proven themselves to be effective against ISIS, and are now only about 15 miles from the ISIS capital of al-Raqqah.

The Turks consider the YPG to be nothing more than an extension of the PKK, a Kurdish separatist organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States, NATO and the European Union. The situation is more than mere rhetoric - Turkish aircraft have bombed SDF units, despite the fact that these units are engaged in direct combat with ISIS.

It is not clear if the Turks are going to continue their attacks in the SDF/YPG. Given President Erdoğan's recent activities and statements, I fear the US is headed for a showdown with the Turks over this issue. (See my earlier article, More U.S. troops to Syria - a showdown with the Turks?)

Part of the agreement calls for talks on a future political settlement in Syria after the ceasefire holds for 30 days. Those talks will be held in Astana, Kazakhstan - again with no American participation. The Russians did note that after January 20, the Trump Administration may be asked to play a role.

I suspect that President-elect Trump's statements have partially shaped this ceasefire and political settlement talks framework. Mr. Trump has hinted that he is not in favor of continuing American policy demanding the removal of the current Syrian government, and thus ending what covert support to the opposition that exists. The opposition may believe that they may be losing American sponsorship and should take this opportunity to at least have some say in Syria's future.

I further suspect that the Russians are hoping that a Trump Administration might be amenable to coordinated or joint operations against ISIS. While many senior U.S. military officers are wary of closer ties with the Russians, the Russian and Turks are now in the drivers' seats.

December 25, 2016

Early on Christmas day, a Russian Air Force passenger jet crashed into the Black Sea while on its way to an air base in Syria. The aircraft, Russian Air Force Tu-154B (NATO: Careless) RA-85572 was flying from Moscow to Humaymim Air Base just south of Latakia on Syria's Mediterranean coast.

Humaymim Air Base base has been the headquarters of Russian expeditionary forces deployed to Syria since September 2015. The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from a refueling stop in Sochi on the Black Sea.

The aircraft was carrying 84 passengers and eight crew. The majority of the passengers were members of the Russian Army choir, heading to Syria to provide holiday concerts for Russian troops in Syria, as well as a few reporters and at least one charity fund director.

At this point, there is no suspicion of terrorism - Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered a thorough investigation into the incident. I believe the investigation will show some technical issue or pilot error - this was a Russian military aircraft and access to the aircraft would normally be restricted to authorized military personnel. However, while the aircraft was being serviced in Sochi, others may have have had access to the plane.

Two questions come to mind:

- Why was the aircraft on this flight route?
- Why did the flight stop in Sochi?

The aircraft was headed from Moscow to Syria. That's not unusual - the Russian Air Force flies at least one resupply and troop rotation flight to Humaymim Air Base every day. In addition to Tu-154 jets, the Russians also use AN-124 (NATO: Condor) heavy transports and Il-62 (NATO: Classic) passenger aircraft.

The normal flight route from Moscow takes the aircraft over Russian airspace to the Caspian Sea, then the airspace of Iran and Iraq before entering Syrian airspace.

This circuitous route is used because Russian Air Force aircraft are not normally granted permission to overfly Turkey. This restriction is in response to an American request that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refuse overflight clearance for Russian military aircraft heading to or from Syria.

This particular flight appears to have been on a different flight route - from Moscow to the international airspace of the Black Sea, then via Turkish airspace to Syria. Why would the Turks grant overflight clearance to this Russian military flight? Was the fact that the aircraft was carrying the Russian Army choir deemed to not fall into the category of a military flight? Would the Turks have known the exact manifest?

Call me a cynic, but I wonder if the recent meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Moscow to discuss the future of Syria, resulted in an agreement between the Russians and Turks to allow overflight of Turkish airspace for the airbridge between Moscow and Humaymim Air Base.

That would represent a significant change in Turkish-Russian relations, and a blow to NATO solidarity. I note that the United States was not invited to the Moscow meeting.

In any case, the aircraft was flying directly from Moscow to Humaymim, a distance of about 1400 miles. This is easily within the flight range of the Tu-154B - a refueling stop in Sochi was not required. Why did the aircraft make a stop? Were there mechanical problems with the aircraft the caused the pilot to land at Sochi?

I look forward to the answers. It is important to know if this was mechanical or human failure, or worse, terrorism.

December 13, 2016

The graphic above is a Reuters photograph with a caption from the Arab-language al-Jazeera network. The caption reads:

Truce agreement and the evacuation of civilians and fighters from Aleppo. Syrian opposition sources confirmed that they had reached an agreement with the regime for a cease fire and the evacuation of civilians and fighters from the besieged neighborhoods of Aleppo. It will take effect beginning Tuesday evening.

So this is how the battle of Aleppo ends. The struggle for control of what was Syria's largest city began in earnest in the summer of 2012. My assessment at that time (See Syria--the battle for Aleppo - July 30, 2012):

The battle of Aleppo will be a harbinger of things to come. If the opposition is defeated by overwhelming military force, which it might be since the Bashar al-Asad regime seems to have no reticence about turning its military - the armed forces built to fight the superior Israel Defense Forces - on its civilian population, it may well portend the end of the uprising. The opposition cannot afford to lose in Aleppo - for them it is do or die.

The opposition - a term that includes not only the Free Syrian Army, but a variety of Islamic militias as well as the al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria, formerly the jabhat al-nusrah (Victory Front), now calling itself the jabhat al-fatah al-sham (Levant Conquest Front) - fought the battle for over four years.

Several times in the years of fighting, the opposition held the upper hand, even to the point of advancing south while pushing back the Syrian Army almost completely out of Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Despite the coordinated - and significant - intervention of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hizballah fighters, the opposition was still able to continue to put pressure on the Syrian regime.

In 2015, when it appeared that the regime was again faltering, especially in Aleppo and Idlib, the Russians intervened with massive amounts of airpower, the likes of which the opposition had never experienced at the hands of the Syrian Arab Air Force.

The introduction of effective airpower into the fighting was able to not only stop the Syrian withdrawal and rebel advance, it precipitated a major reversal of fortune that has led us to the fall of Aleppo today.

I was not alone in my predictions - virtually every military analyst warned that the city would be retaken by the regime and its backers. There was too much firepower arrayed against the rebels - with Russian airpower and advice, the forces encircled the city and slowly but deliberately began to crush the resistance.

Repeated American attempts at ceasefires failed. The regime appeared to have the upper hand - I am sure Russian military analysts had come to the same conclusions that I had - it was only a matter of time, so why agree to any ceasefire except on the most favorable terms? American diplomacy had failed - I summed up my thoughts in October with an article, Aleppo--the impotence of American diplomacy.

That impotence characterized by chronically ineffective Secretary of State John Kerry continues. A ceasefire agreement that will go into effect on December 14 allowing civilians as well as rebel fighters to leave the city was reached - the agreement was hammered out between the Turkish national intelligence organization and the Russian military. Kerry has been trying for weeks to reach some agreement with his counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with no results.

The recriminations will consume the news for the next week. As government forces and their allies begin their bloody retribution in the former rebel stronghold, the question is - what happens now? This is the fall of Aleppo, not the end of the war.

I believe the Syrian alliance will now focus its military efforts to the south and southwest of Aleppo. The alliance now consists of what remains of the Syrian Army - now less than half its pre-war strength due to losses and defections - IRGC forces, Iranian Army troops, Hizballah fighters, Iraqi Shi'a militias, Afghan Shi'a volunteers, as well as Russian special forces and advisers. The Syrian Army contribution to effort comprises only half of the total ground forces.

The ground components are supported by Russian Navy missiles, Russian Army field and rocket artillery, and a large contingent of Russian Air Force fighters, fighter-bombers and attack aircraft, including helicopter gunships. These aircraft are based near Latakia at Humaymim air base, normally used by the Syrian Navy antisubmarine warfare helicopter squadron.

The Russian expeditionary presence in Syria, protected by state-of-the-art air defenses and electronic warfare systems, is a potent military force. Without the presence of the Russians and other foreign forces, the Syrian armed forces would be hard-pressed to conduct successful offensive operations.

I should also mention the Syria deployment of the Russian Navy aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and its complement of fighters and fighter-bombers, but the carrier has had numerous maintenance issues - its catapults are now inoperative, forcing the Russians to relocate the aircraft to Humaymim.

The first military objective after the Syrian alliance has fully secured Aleppo will be the re-opening of the main north-south highway - officially called the M5 or International Highway, but more commonly known as the Aleppo Highway. The highway is a good four-lane road that runs from the border with Jordan in the south, north through Damascus, Homs and Hamah, then ending in Aleppo. It is the main line of communication for the western part of Syria, home to the country's major population centers.

Referring to the map, the area in the red oval - coincidentally the primary target area for the Russian Air Force - is currently under opposition control and includes that main highway. The regime has been forced to rely on a two-lane desert road out to the east to maintain its line of communication between its strongholds in Hamah and Homs with its forces in the Aleppo area.

That desert road has at times been cut by rebel attacks - the regime needs to secure the main highway before they will be able to mount a major offensive to defeat the opposition in Idlib Governorate. That attack will be south on that highway from Aleppo and north on the highway from Hamah - obviously supported heavily by Russian airpower.

There is still fight left in the rebels, but they have just been handed a serious military defeat and major symbolic setback. As with the Syrian regime and its allies' assault on Aleppo, the massive amount of firepower and complete domination of the airspace over the battlefield will almost certainly overwhelm the fractured opposition. Unless there is a change of the situation on the ground - which I do not foresee - the revolution and the civil war may well be lost.

It gets worse for the opposition. On January 20, Donald Trump becomes the new American president. Given his pronouncements that the United States is not going to support the overthrow of dictators around the world or engage in nation building, we may see the development of an actual coherent policy on Syria.

Current American policy appears to be bifurcated between the removal of Bashar al-Asad and the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS. The two are almost impossible to achieve together - I believe the new president may opt to drop the former and keep the latter.

The situation for the various components of the Syrian opposition worsened with the loss of Aleppo - I fear they will get no help from a Trump Administration.

December 10, 2016

On December 10, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced the deployment of an additional 200 American troops to support the impending attack on the self-proclaimed Islamic State capital city of al-Raqqah. The additional troops will bring the declared American troop level in Syria to 500. Their mission will remain the same, per Secretary Carter, to "recruit, organize, train and advise local Syrian Arab and Kurdish forces to fight" the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The "local Syrian Arab and Kurdish forces" Carter references are the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF). This group presents itself as Arab-Kurdish cooperation, and is an attempt to put to present a less-threatening image of Kurdish participation in the fight against ISIS.

Why is that necessary? The Turks are alarmed of even the merest hint of Kurdish nationalism or autonomy in either Syria or Iraq, believing any such movement will spill over into southern Turkey. That said, the Kurds comprise the bulk of the SDF and constitute the most effective force facing ISIS.

This announcement will not please the Turks, and not only for the reasons above. The Turks are supporting a Free Syrian Army (FSA) assault in northern Syrian called Operation Euphrates Shield (dara' al-furat) with air, armor, artillery and special operations forces. The operation - in conjunction with Kurdish-controlled areas on the border - has been successful in almost totally closing the Turkish frontier to ISIS, hurting the group's ability to bring in new recruits and supplies from Turkey.

The Turkish-supported FSA forces are making good progress, pushing southeast towards al-Raqqah. In the last few days, they have reached the ISIS-held city of al-Bab. But al-Bab is almost 100 miles from al-Raqqah - it will take weeks, possibly months for the FSA to reach and mount an attack on al-Raqqah. In contrast, the U.S.-backed SDF forces are within 25 miles of the ISIS capital.

It is Turkey's stated policy that al-Raqqah should be liberated by the FSA (with their support). They claim that to the residents of al-Raqqah, the SDF will be regarded as a Kurdish force despite the "SDF" designation and minor Arab participation. In essence, according to the FSA and Turks, the people will be trading one oppressor for another.

Although I have no direct evidence to refute this, my reading of what little uncensored information leaking out of al-Raqqah seems to indicate that the people of al-Raqqah are totally terrified by ISIS and would welcome any relief, hoping that even a Kurdish liberating force would be better than ISIS and at some point life would return to normal under a Syrian (read: Arab) government.

It appears from Secretary Carter's announcement that the United States will increase its support to the SDF, that we won't wait for the Turkish-supported FSA to reach al-Raqqah and possibly urge the SDF to move on the city in the near future.

In October, the commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve said there are threats to the United States in planning in al-Raqqah and that time is of the essence.

I wrote at the time, "The timing, according to U.S. Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, is being driven by planning and potential execution of terror attacks against Western targets emanating from the ISIS "capital" and main operations center. The general did not name a specific threat or target." (For the complete article, see The coming assault on al-Raqqah - a political minefield.)

If General Townsend is correct and the timeline to mount an assault on al-Raqqah is short, these additional American forces will be welcome. Although 200 troops - even the final number of 500 troops in Syria - does not sound like a lot, they bring special capabilities to the effort. Rather than being direct action forces, although they have conducted such missions, they are true "force multipliers," leveraging American air power, intelligence and logistics in support of the very effective Kurdish-dominant SDF.

The problem with a decision to move ahead of the arrival of the Turkish-backed FSA Euphrates Shield force is that it will alienate Turkey, a NATO ally. However, if there is a major threat to Western targets, waiting for the FSA to reach al-Raqqah is not an option.

The Turks will have to understand that this is not about them, or the Kurds - it is about our own security.

December 2, 2016

During the night of 29-30 November. Israeli Air Force aircraft conducted strikes against targets near Damascus, Syria. The target locations were identified in various media as a weapons storage area of the elite 4th Armor Division (a regime protection unit) and a convoy on the Beirut-Damascus highway. The specific targets in both cases were reported to be weapons destined for Hizballah in Lebanon.

The Israelis have for years conducted these types of operations when what they call "advanced weapons" are about to be transported from Syria to Lebanon's Biqa' Valley, where they become part of Hizballah's arsenal.

"Advanced weapons" to the Israelis include, but are not limited to, air defense weapons and surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). Although it is impossible to prevent the transfer of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to terrorist groups, the movement of larger, radar-guided air defense missile systems is easier to detect. The same applies to SSM launchers.

Some of these weapons come from Syrian stocks, but most were en route Lebanon from none other than the Islamic Republic of Iran - yes, Iran, the world's primary state sponsor of terrorism. After the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria's weapons were used against its own people. Since then, most of Hizballah's weapons have originated in Iran.

The Iranians make no secret of the fact that they support Hizballah with money, weapons and training. They routinely fly Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Boeing 747 cargo aircraft or charter aircraft of IRGC-affiliated airlines laden with arms from Iran to the Damascus International Airport.

I know this from personal experience as the Air Attaché at the American embassy in Damascus - anyone could watch weapons crates from IRIAF aircraft being loaded onto trucks bearing the Hizballah emblem at the civilian cargo terminal at the airport.

One such flight took place on December 1 - here is an air traffic control plot of the IRIAF 747 freighter on its way to Syria.

Once the weapons, supplies and Hizballah fighters returning from training in Iran were loaded onto the Hizballah vehicles, the convoy would make the 35 mile trip to the Lebanese border (see map).

This Israeli strike was based on intelligence information that Hizballah was being provided the "Buk" air defense missile system. The Buk missile system is a family of self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile systems designed to shoot down cruise missiles, aircraft and drones.

There are variants known in the West as the SA-11 and SA-17* - the exact variant believed to be in this shipment is unknown, but either version would represent a significant upgrade in Hizballah's ability to counter Israeli air operations. This crossed an Israeli "red line" and triggered the attack.

I suspect that if the Iranians, Syrians and Hizballah attempt this again, the Israelis will react the same way.

_________
* A Russian SA-17 was used to down Malaysian Flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014.

November 22, 2016

President-elect Trump and General James Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)

President-elect Trump may soon nominate James "Mad Dog" Mattis to be the next Secretary of Defense. Mattis is a 66-year old retired U.S. Marine Corps general who has served multiple combat tours - including the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq - in a variety of command positions, including the 7th Marine Regiment, the 1st Marine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command and finally the United States Central Command.

General Mattis retired in May 2013. Current law requires that there be a seven-year window between military service and assuming duties as the Secretary of Defense. It is possible for Congress to waive that requirement - it was last done in 1950 for General of the Army George Marshall.

General Mattis has a stellar reputation in the U.S. defense community, often being cited as one of the premier military leaders and thinkers of his generation. As evidenced by his plain and often colorful remarks about the nature of warfare and the role of the armed forces in national policy, he may be a controversial selection to some of those on the Democratic side of the aisle.

If nominated by Mr. Trump and confirmed by the Senate - as I expect to happen - he will be a stark contrast to current Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. Secretary Carter has gotten high marks for his management of the Department of Defense and the armed forces, but he has been unable to convince President Obama to make needed policy changes in the conduct of the wars in Afghanistan and against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In that piece, I said, "What we need, to paraphrase Michael Corleone in the movie The Godfather, is a wartime consigliere. The Secretary of Defense is not merely an administrator, but an active participant in the command and control of military operations. Since the passage of the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the military chain of command goes directly from the President/Commander in Chief to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander."

I still think that we need a wartime consigliere. We need a wartime leader to guide the President in the redirection of the war in Afghanistan, the defeat of ISIS, and to direct and oversee the rebuilding of the American military after eight years of atrophy.

Secretary Carter, from all accounts, has been a successful bureaucrat and manager. He has served with distinction in a variety of positions in the Department of Defense, as well as experienced in academia and consulting.

However, Mr. Carter is not a wartime consigliere. If nominated and confirmed, General Mattis will be.

November 19, 2016

President-elect Donald Trump has nominated Kansas Congressman Mike Pompeo (right) to become the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Is he the best choice for this key position?

The CIA is more than an intelligence collection, analysis and production agency, although that is its primary role. In addition to managing the National Clandestine Service's intelligence operations, it is the lead organization of the United States government authorized to conduct covert operations.

Covert operations are among the most sensitive operations of the country. According to Executive Order 12333 issued by President Ronald Reagan, covert action is defined as special activities, both political and military, that the US Government could legally deny. These include assistance to groups attempting regime change in countries hostile to the United States - Syria comes to mind. The agency also conducts lethal operations ("targeted killing") against designated terrorist leaders - Anwar al-Awlaki is an example.

Directing and leading the CIA is a demanding job requiring experience and expertise in foreign policy, military operations and intelligence collection. Has the Agency always been led by directors with such credentials? Obviously not - usually the directors have had one, maybe two of these skill sets, but it is difficult to find someone with all three.

Unfortunately, at times, the director's sole "qualification" was being a political favorite of the president.

First, let me say that Congressman Pompeo has an outstanding record. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), served as an armored cavalry officer in the U.S. Army, earned a law degree from Harvard University, practiced law for a short period of time, and started or managed several successful businesses in the energy and aviation industries.

As a member of the House of Representatives since being elected in 2010, he has served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (including the subcommittee on the CIA), and the Committee on Energy and Commerce. He also was a member of the House Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.

Based on public records, I don't see any intelligence or foreign policy experience during his time in the military, as a lawyer or private industry. Although he has served on the House committee that oversees the intelligence community, that in and of itself does not translate to intelligence experience.

The Congressman's military experience as a armored cavalry officer will serve him well, but his experience with military intelligence was probably limited to receiving tactical or operational level intelligence reports from the military intelligence company assigned to his armored cavalry regiment. As a captain, his exposure was at a fairly low level and likely at the Secret level - in other words, no access to highly classified material or special access programs.

President-elect Trump, as with previous presidents, should have the Cabinet members, advisers and agency chiefs that he believes will provide him the best advice and leadership. He obviously has faith and trust in Congressman Pompeo to serve as his CIA director.

That said, I cannot help thinking that there are more qualified individuals from the armed forces and Defense Department, the intelligence community or the foreign policy ranks that have more applicable experience to lead this vital organization.

I do, however, wish Congressman Pompeo the best in his new position.

___________________
Disclosure: During my career as a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, I had several assignments to the CIA.

November 14, 2016

On November 14, 2001, the Afghan capital city of Kabul fell to the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance after a short but intense battle. The Northern Alliance was supported primarily by U.S. airpower controlled by American special operations troops and paramilitary officers of the CIA.

Fifteen years later, what have we accomplished?

Let's remember why the United States invaded Afghanistan. Following the al-Qa'idah attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Taliban government of Afghanistan was given the opportunity to respond to a request (actually, it was a demand) to turn over al-Qa'idah leader Usamah bin Ladin to American authorities for trial.

The Taliban, citing the tribal code known as pashtunwali, refused, claiming that bin Ladin had been granted sanctuary in Afghanistan and turning him over to a foreign power would be a violation of their honor.

In response, President George Bush authorized the invasion of Afghanistan, pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) passed by the Congress on September 14, 2001 - the President signed it into law four days later. The law authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States against those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as any entity who harbored said persons or groups.

By refusing to turn over Usamah bin Ladin to the United States, the Taliban met the criteria of the authorization. On October 7, 2001, American forces began the campaign known as Operation Enduring Freedom by dropping bombs and firing cruise missiles against Taliban military and communications facilities, as well as al-Qa'idah training camps in the areas of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

It was the beginning of the longest war in American history.

On November 14, the capital fell. The Taliban was forced from power, and al-Qa'idah fell back towards the Pakistan border.

In the battle of Tora Bora - December 6 to December 17 - the United States relied on local Afghan allies, including the Northern Alliance, to arrange the "modalities" of bin Ladin's capture or surrender. I remember wondering who made that fateful, ill-advised decision - you cannot outsource your fighting. There were additional American troops available, but the U.S. military commander did not commit them to the fight. Big mistake.

The result was predictable. Whether tribal loyalties came into play, or money changed hands, or some other deal was struck, Usamah bin Ladin escaped across the border into the Pashtun-controlled tribal area of Pakistan. This event should have been a warning about any long term commitment to the Afghans.

At this point, the American military mission in Afghanistan was essentially complete, only partially accomplished, but complete. Al-Qa'idah no longer had a base of training and operations in Afghanistan, but they merely changed venues. They initially moved to Pakistan - who has been virtually no help - then to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, North Africa, and even to Syria where they were the predecessor of the so-called and self-proclaimed Islamic State.

It was not until 2011 that justice was finally delivered to Usamah bin Ladin, then living in relative safety in Pakistan. Yet, for ten years preceding that raid, American forces were involved in a civil war in Afghanistan. Even after the killing of bin Ladin, American forces remain in Afghanistan. After 15 years, we have lost almost 2400 troops killed and over 20,000 wounded. Although the cost is pegged at over $700 billion, the actual costs when long-term medical and disability bills are included is much higher.

What have we accomplished in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora that justifies the blood and treasure? It depends on who you ask, but since this is my article, I'll answer.

What was the mission? Get al-Qa'idah and bin Ladin - once that was accomplished, the effort should have focused on the remnants of al-Qa'idah, not propping up the Karzai government, what most of us knew was going to a futile effort at creating a representative form of government. We are not very good at this.

So now we have been there for 15 years, and have accomplished what? The Afghan military is incapable of quelling the violence, the Taliban is on the ascent, and we insist that our "advise and assist" mission is still viable.

Solution? I guess we first need to define the goals. If it is to defeat the Taliban, say so and deploy enough troops to get it done (I am not advocating that). If it is an inclusive political settlement, get that process moving.

What we are doing now is not working.

Not much. Why not? Because have never really defined a mission beyond 2001. Why are we there? To defeat and expel al-Qa'idah from the country? That was accomplished years ago. To defeat the Taliban? The Taliban does not pose a threat to the United States.

Naysayers will counter that the Taliban will allow al-Qa'idah to return and re-establish training bases, and later mount operations against the United States and/or its allies. I think we have demonstrated that we are capable of devastating the country - again - if the Taliban is stupid enough to allow that to happen.

In simple terms, tell the Taliban - or whichever corrupt warlord eventually seizes power in arguably the most corrupt country on the planet - that if al-Qa'idah comes back to Afghanistan, so does American military power.

October 30, 2016

According to the senior U.S. commander leading the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an attack on the group's main stronghold in the Syrian city of al-Raqqah may start soon.

The timing, according to U.S. Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, is being driven by planning and potential execution of terror attacks against Western targets emanating from the ISIS "capital" and main operations center. The general did not name a specific threat or target.

The announcement comes just weeks after the kickoff of the Iraqi offensive to recapture the city of al-Mawsil (Mosul) from ISIS, who seized the city from Iraqi forces in June 2014. That offensive will possibly take months - the lead Iraqi forces have just reached the city limits.

The original U.S.-led coalition plan - developed jointly with the Iraqi military - was to have Iraqi forces first surround Mosul, then press the attack and eradicate ISIS in Iraq. In my opinion, the Iraqis launched the attack prematurely, since there are still pockets of ISIS control outside of Mosul. For my analysis on the Iraqi plan, see my earlier article, The Iraqi operation to retake Mosul - are they ready?

The current operation against Mosul in Iraq has been expected for some time - Iraqi officials have claimed that the city will be back under Iraqi government control by the end of this year. I hope they are right, but I think they may be overly optimistic.

Likewise, it is no secret that at some point, ISIS must also be removed from its main operations center in al-Raqqah, Syria. One only need look at a situation map of the fighting in Syria to see that ISIS is being pushed back toward al-Raqqah.

The group is under pressure from U.S.-led air operations, the very effective Syrian Kurdish forces (the YPG), the U.S.-supported and advised Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, a joint Syrian Arab and Syrian Kurd armed group), and recently the Turkish supported (air, armor and artillery) Free Syrian Army (FSA) operating northeast of Aleppo. To be fair, there is the infrequent Russian air operation against ISIS, but only in support of Syrian Army operations.

The Turkish-supported FSA operation in northern Syria, called Operation Euphrates Shield, has sealed off the remaining section of the Syrian-Turkish border from ISIS access. The rest of the Syrian-Turkish border is controlled by the YPG, much to Ankara's displeasure. The Euphrates Shield forces have been effective in pushing ISIS south and east, but the FSA fighters are still almost 100 miles from al-Raqqah.

That distance becomes important as the U.S.-led coalition begins planning on just how the fight against ISIS in Syria will be executed. This is a political minefield, not just for the coalition, but for all of the different interested parties in Syria. I find it interesting that the senior American commander is talking about the attack on al-Raqqah, yet represents a country who refuses to commit its ground troops to the fight. That, however, is a topic for another day.

As in Iraq, all parties are committed to the destruction and/or eradication of ISIS. However, in Iraq, all of the parties are more or less allied in that fight. There are differences between the United States and the Iranian-backed Shi'a militias to be sure, but they are nonetheless of common purpose.

In Syria, there are at least five anti-ISIS factions, some of which are engaged in combat operations against each other. Let's take a look at the sides in this multifaceted conflict.

* First, there is the Syrian government and its allies. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is supported politically by Russia, Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. Military support is provided by the Russian armed forces, primarily through airpower, as well as ground forces from the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Shi'a militias, and a group of Afghan Shi'a fighters.

These allies effectively double the size of what remains of the Syrian Army. The Syrian military has been severely crippled by losses and defections to the point that without this external assistance, it would cease to be a viable force.

* Second, we have the FSA, now supported by the Turkish military. One might question Turkey's motives in its participation in Operation Euphrates Shield. Although the stated reason is to fight ISIS - and they are doing that - many believe it is to ensure that the Syrian Kurds do not create some form of autonomous region in northern Syria as they have in Iraq, or worst case, attempt to merge the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish areas into one political entity.

Turkey's prime minister has made the claim that the Turkish Army will mount the attack on al-Raqqah, rather than allow the Syrian Kurds to do it. The problem with that: the Turks and FSA are 100 miles from al-Raqqah, while the Kurds are only 35 miles from the city.

* The third faction is the Kurdish militia called the YPG - arguably the most effective fighters arrayed against ISIS. As noted, Turkey is upset over American support for the YPG. The Turks regard the Kurdish militia as an extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (more commonly known by its Kurdish initials, PKK), which has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and NATO.

Given the proximity of YPG forces to al-Raqqah, LTG Townsend has stated that they will be involved in the military operation, with the added caveat that he wants only Arab forces to enter and retake the city itself. This is similar to the effort in Mosul, where Iraqi Arabs are supposed to be the only units to actually enter the city, with the Kurds outside to provide support. I don't think it will work in either Mosul or al-Raqqah - the Kurds represent a much-needed military capability.

* Fourth, there is the U.S.-supported SDF. These forces are a combination of Syrian Kurds and Syrian Arabs who are committed to fighting ISIS. They are funded and equipped by the United States, and have American special operations forces embedded to "advise and assist." These units have been effective in conducting operations against ISIS in eastern and northeastern Syria, with dedicated U.S.-led coalition air support. They will likely be a key part of any assault on al-Raqqah.

* Fifth, there are anti-regime Islamist groups not affiliated with the FSA or SDF. These include, among others, the former al-Qa'idah affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusrah (the Victory Front) now calling itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS, the Levant Conquest Front).

The relationships of these factions vary between temporary tactical alliances to outright hostilities. While they are all anti-ISIS, they are not united in their efforts. As I said, Syria is a political minefield with no one entity in charge or coordinating the overall situation in the country.

The situation in Syria is confusing and chaotic - it will decrease the effectiveness of any military operation against ISIS in al-Raqqah. Although ISIS will be defeated, the political minefield that is Syria will remain.

October 26, 2016

During an address explaining why Turkey must be involved in the Iraqi military operation to retake the city of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan set off alarm bells by displaying a 1920 map of Turkey based on what was then called the misak-i milli ("national oath").

On the "National oath" map, the borders of Turkey include portions of what is now Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Syria, Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of this territory was part of the Ottoman Empire prior to its defeat in World War I. The map designates what the Turks believed should be the new borders of their new country.

President Erdoğan has argued for several months that Turkish troops must participate in the Iraqi military operation against ISIS in Mosul, based on Turkey's historic ties to that city, as well as the city of Kirkuk, also included in the "national oath" area. Both Mosul and Kirkuk have large Turkmen populations.

Although the Turks claim that the two cities are majority "Turkmen," thus validating their claims to the cities or at least to have a say in their future status. However, over the years, Iraq has successfully "Arabized" the cities over the years to alter the demographics -- they are now Arab cities.

To further complicate matters, the Kurds have also laid claim to Kirkuk and have tried to "Kurdize" the city by expelling Arab citizens. During the rapid ISIS advance into northern Iraq in 2014, Kurdish peshmerga took control of Kirkuk to prevent it from falling to the group. I suspect they will be extremely reluctant to relinquish their claim to the city, claiming it now as a part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

The term "Turkmen" itself is illustrative of the issue. After the war, most of the non-Turkish area of Ottoman Empire was divided up into the modern nations of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine (Israel), and the borders with Greece and Bulgaria were adjusted. The British - victors in the war against the Ottomans - coined the term to differentiate the ethnic Turks in what was to become northern Iraq from the population of what was to become modern Turkey. The Turks still bristle at the imposed terminology.

Erdoğan is not only concerned with the Iraqi military campaign in Mosul - I am sure his military advisers and intelligence service have briefed him on the reality that the Iraqi forces, with U.S.-led coalition support, will eventually retake Mosul. Although the final cost in resources and human life is not yet known, the outcome is not in doubt - the Iraqis will prevail.

What Erdoğan wants is a say in what happens in northern Iraq after ISIS is expelled. In other words, the Turkish president wants to ensure that the Kurds are kept in check. He is concerned about increased Kurdish influence in Iraq based on their contributions to the Iraqi military effort against ISIS - the Kurds are undoubtedly the most effective arrow in the Iraqi quiver.

Further, Erdoğan wants to head off any thoughts of a unified Kurdish entity in what is now northern Iraq and northern Syria, called Rojava by the Syria-based Kurds. After ISIS is expelled from Iraq and Syria, as they will be, the Kurds are going to want a reassessment of their status in both Iraq and Syria. Turkey wants to make sure that status is agreeable to Ankara, agreeable to Erdoğan.

That said, I believe it Erdoğan wants more than just having a say in the future of northern Iraq and northern Syria. The use of the 1920 "national oath" map at his presentation was not accidental - it was there for a reason.

Turkish demands for a role in northern Iraq, and its military actions in northern Syria are complemented by a series of Turkish air provocations against fellow NATO ally Greece. On at least two occasions, Turkish Air Force F-16's have penetrated Greek airspace, drawing reactions from the Hellenic Air Force. One incursion is possibly a navigational error in an area of meandering borders, but two distinct incursions in the same area raises the "deliberate" flag.

At the same time, Erdoğan does not assuage the apprehensions of his neighbors when he openly encourages his young population to question the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which effectively defined Turkey's borders with its neighbors. These are the borders that define the Middle East as we know it today. As part of that treaty, Turkey relinquished claims to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, effectively ending the border conflicts that continued for several years after World War I.

There was a subsequent agreement to the Treaty of Lausanne that dealt specifically with the city of Mosul. The Ankara Pact (1926), based on a commission report of the League of Nations, stated that Mosul should remain part of Iraq. The pact was ratified by Iraq, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

One cannot help but think of the actions of a recalcitrant Germany in the 1930's, bristling at the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty imposed what the Germans considered to be egregious conditions and sought to to subvert them clandestinely, eventually leading to the birth of a movement that led to the creation of the National Socialist (Nazi) party.

A segment of the Turkish population, encouraged by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), are echoing a similar refrain, bristling at the terms - imposed or agreed to, depending on where you stand - of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Ankara Pact.

We should not dismiss Erdoğan's words as mere rhetoric. He has shown himself to be a capable - if distasteful - political force with a vision for Turkey's future. His attempts to convince Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi to include Turkish troops in the operation to recapture Mosul is a tactical maneuver to stem Kurdish nationalism. Erdoğan considers increased Kurdish influence in Iraq or greater autonomy to be a threat to Turkish national interests.

What we should be concerned about is Erdoğan's long-term, strategic vision of Turkey. Are his display of the "national oath" map, decision to provide military support to the Free Syrian Army in northern Syria, Turkish air attacks on Kurdish forces in Syria, Turkish Air Force seemingly deliberate incursions into Greek airspace, and not-so-subtle encouragement of Turkish nationalists to challenge the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Ankara Pact a harbinger of things to come?

Are the Turks intent on at some point reclaiming what they consider to be Turkish territory "stolen" from them almost a century ago? I hope not, but I would not put it past Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

___________

Personal anecdote: When I was the Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, I had virtually no contact with the Syrian military. One exception was the monthly attaché dinner at the Syrian Officers Club to welcome new attachés and bid farewell to those about to depart. Departing attachés were presented a small inlaid wooden box, a Syrian specialty. On the top of the box was a medallion with a map of Syria.

The map included a part of Turkey known as the sanjak of Alexandretta, an area ceded to Turkey by the French mandatory authorities in 1936. The Syrians have never recognized that agreement and believe the territory to be still part of Syria.

At every presentation, the two Turkish military attachés (one seen with me in the photo) would stand at attention and march from the room in protest of the inclusion of what they considered to be Turkish territory on a map of Syria.

October 19, 2016

In a surprise visit, the director of Syria's National Security Bureau, 'Ali Mamluk, traveled to Cairo to meet with his Egyptian counterpart, Director of General Intelligence Khalid Fawzi. The two met in the Egyptian capital on October 16 during a visit which lasted only a few hours.

Mamluk is a key member of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's inner circle, and is under European Union sanctions for his alleged actions against Syrian citizens during the protests that led to the civil war.

Of note, the visit also coincided with a joint Russian-Egyptian military exercise involving paratroopers from both countries.

The author and General al-Sisi (2013)

The Russians have been seeking increased influence in Egypt since the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated government of Muhammad al-Mursi in 2013 by the current president of Egypt, former chief of the Egyptian armed forces General 'Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi.

Both Syria and Egypt are involved in military operations against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula, and Syria in the north and eastern part of that country. The common enemy was the ostensible, and plausible, reason for the two senior officials to meet.

Egypt is nominally involved in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, although it has limited its military actions to its own territory and a small operation in Libya. After ISIS killed 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in February 2015, the Egyptian Air Force conducted airstrikes on ISIS targets in Darnah, killing 64 members of the group.

Syrian official media reported that the two intelligence officers "agreed on coordinating stances politically between Syria and Egypt, and boosting coordination for combating terrorism hitting both countries." That is diplo-speak for Syria's claim that Cairo supports the government of Bashar al-Asad.

Mamluk and Fawzi were probably the two best interlocutors for this meeting. Both have enough stature to represent their respective countries/regimes, with an understanding of realpolitik to be able to discuss issues with candor despite awkward situations.

The Syrians chose to publicize the meeting of the two officers in a bid to portray Egyptian President al-Sisi as a supporter of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The topic was raised at the meeting - the Syrians want all the support they can muster for the continuation of the al-Asad regime in any future Russian-backed political settlement of the civil war in Syria.

The Egyptian media opted to not report the meeting. I suspect that originally the meeting was supposed to be kept in confidence. Mamluk traveled to and from the meeting in a Syrian Air Force TU-134 jet painted in SyrianAir (the flag carrier airline of Syria) colors*.

Egypt is in a tough position, and is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian president has received a lot of backing and support from Saudi Arabia, but earlier this month, Egypt was one of only four countries who voted for a Russian-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria.** This vote came after Russia had vetoed a Saudi-supported French resolution aimed at halting the Russian and Syrian bombing of Aleppo. Saudi Arabia retaliated by halting the shipment of subsidized oil products to Egypt.

Egypt has recently strengthened its relationship with the Russian Federation. Much of that was due to the Obama Administration's decision to halt planned deliveries of additional AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships and spare parts following the removal of Mursi.

Vladimir Putin, sensing an opening, dispatched his Minister of Defense to Cairo and offered the Egyptians a lucrative arms package. The Egyptians, in need of weapons to continue fighting Islamists on the Libyan border and in the Sinai Peninsula, accepted. For the first time in decades, thanks to the American short-sighted knee-jerk reaction, Russia has regained a foothold in its former client state.

'Ali Mamluk's visit to Cairo undoubtedly was approved - and possibly instigated - by the Russians. Putin's main objective in Syria is the survival of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, preferably through a diplomatic/political solution, but by force of (Russian) arms if required. Egypt is a key player in the region - its public support for the al-Asad government plays right into Putin's plans.

Well played, Mr. Putin, well played.

_______________

* I have flown on this same aircraft (YK-AYB) in 1994 as the guest of then Minister of Foreign Affairs Faruq Shara' and Ambassador to the U.S. Walid Mu'alim (now the foreign minister).

** Arabic linguist humor: After the Security Council voted down the Russian draft, the United Kingdom ambassador scolded his Russian counterpart, "This text...it's a sham, just as Russia’s hollow commitment to a political process in Syria is a sham." Al-Sham (pronounced A-SHAM) is the Arabic word for Damascus, Syria or the Levant, depending on context. See also, What's in a name? - the Syrian-Iranian car company.

October 16, 2016

The "liberation" (as the Iraqis are calling it) of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been anticipated for some time. Iraqi politicians, including Prime Minister Haydar al-'Abadi, have promised to return the city to Baghdad's control by the end of the year. I have said in the past that although they may be able to start the operation before the end of the year, I am not sure they will be able to complete the operation by then.

This could be a long, difficult, and bloody battle. ISIS has controlled Mosul since they overran the city in June 2014. They have had well over two years to prepare for what they know is their last major stand in Iraq.

Based on what we have seen in other cities held by ISIS and retaken by Iraqi forces, ISIS has developed a series of tunnels to allow the group to move men and weapons to where they are needed, as well as placed minefields, improvised explosive devices (IED) and other obstacles, mapped out ambush sites, and prepare scores of vehicle-borne IED's with suicide drivers willing to confront attacking Iraqi forces. They will likely force civilians to be human shields as they have in other battles. ISIS has claimed that its fighters will fight to the death to defend the city. I believe them - ISIS fighters rarely surrender.

If and when ISIS is defeated in Mosul, it will only be a matter of time before it is completely eradicated or ejected from Iraq. I believe that given the forces arrayed against ISIS, and the resources dedicated to this operation, the Iraqis will ultimately be successful in retaking Mosul. The question is how much will it cost, in terms of time, resources, city infrastructure, and most importantly, human life.

Map by Thomas van Linge (@arabthomness)

I hope they are not starting this operation on a political timetable - this is a major operation for the Iraqis. There is still a large pocket of ISIS fighters in Hawija (southwest of Kirkuk). This presence poses a threat to Iraqi supply lines as well as creating the potential for ISIS guerrilla attacks against Kurdish and Sunni areas at a time when the Iraqis need to be focused squarely on the Mosul operation. If it was me "advising and assisting" the Iraqis, I would tell them to eliminate that pocket before launching the operation into Mosul.

I would also advise that they more completely isolate Mosul, specifically interrupting the ISIS main line of communication (LOC) from the city to the west towards the ISIS controlled area of Syria and to the ISIS capital of al-Raqqah. According to several Iraqi commanders who have spoken on this, cutting that supply line will fall to the Shi'a and Yazidi militias, probably centered on Tal 'Afar.​ This is even more important than eliminating the Hawija pocket.

One senior Iraqi Army officer indicated that they may leave an escape route for the ISIS fighter to flee to Syria, referring to the western LOC. Allowing ISIS any route out is a bad idea - in all of the recent fights between Iraqi forces and ISIS, ISIS has effectively exploited weaknesses in Iraqi attempts to cordon the group. Now is not the time to give ISIS any opportunity to regroup after the fall of Mosul.

According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Marine Corps General Joe Dunford, the Iraqi forces are ready for the operation in Mosul. All that is necessary is a political decision on the part of Prime Minister al-'Abadi, which could come at any moment. I hope the general is right, but why did President Obama order another 1,100 U.S. troops to Iraq, remarking yet again that the Americans are not "ground forces," but there to provide only "training and assistance, logistical support."

Here is an example of the United States not providing ground forces. This is Comanche Battery, 1-320 Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, currently deployed to a fire base south of Mosul.

Iraqi forces will include the Army, Air Force, Special Police and Counter-terrorism units, along with the Kurdish peshmerga and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The PMU include Shi'a militias, as well as some Sunni, Christian, and Yazidi militias. Although Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Army Aviation aircraft will participate, the bulk of air support will be provided by the US-led coalition (mostly U.S. Air Force).

The Iraqis must put an "Iraqi face" on this effort, that it is all Iraqis working together to liberate Mosul regardless of ethnicity or religious group. This will be critical after the city is cleared of ISIS.

As the Iraqis continue to push ISIS back into Syria (as well as out of the remaining areas under its control in the western Euphrates Valley), the real challenge will be reconstituting Iraq as a coherent nation. That means working with the Sunnis and Kurds to determine the future of the north - what areas now controlled by the Kurds might be included in the Kurdish autonomous region. For example, Kirkuk was taken from ISIS by the Kurds - I see no indication they are willing to give it up. It has always been the Kurds' contention that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city - Baghdad does not agree.

The Iraqis must remove ISIS from Iraq - retaking Mosul is the key. Can the army that lost Mosul to ISIS in 2014 take it back from ISIS in 2016? They have to.

October 12, 2016

Two days ago (October 10), I wrote an article on a missile attack by the Yemeni Houthis on the USS Mason operating in the Red Sea in international waters. I have included that article in its entirety below.

Today, that same destroyer was targeted again from Houthi territory in Yemen. The warship fired defensive missiles in response. The ship was not hit or damaged.

This is what happens when the United States does not respond immediately and decisively to attacks on American ships in international waters. If we fail to respond again to this provocation, we can expect them to continue, not only here but in other places as well.

If it appears obvious that this Administration will not act to defend its own ships and sailors, other groups - for example, the Iranian IRGC, primary sponsors and supporters of the Houthis - will feel emboldened to also challenge American ships.

Let me try this with smaller words:

Memo for the President - At least four lethal missiles have been fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer operating in the Red Sea on your orders. This is a challenge not only to the United States, but to the right of any vessel to operate in international waters.

If you do not take immediate and decisive action, this will continue and escalate. If that happens, one of these missiles may hit an American ship, causing casualties and possibly the loss of ship itself.

The headline from the Red Sea is pretty straight forward - two missiles were fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer while the warship was sailing in international waters off the coast off Yemen. The missiles were fired from a coastal area of the country under the control of the Houthis, a Shi'a rebel group sponsored by Iran.

Fortunately, the missiles did not hit their intended target. According to the Navy, the ship did not sustain any damage nor were any of the crew injured, although the missile impacted close enough to the vessel to trigger on board countermeasures.

The vessel targeted in the attack was the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG-87), traveling in company with another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Nitze (DDG-94), and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15).

The three ships were ordered to the Red Sea near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait in the wake of a Houthi missile attack on the United Arab Emirates logistic vessel HSV Swift on October 1 in this same area.

The Swift was not so lucky - it was struck by a missile and caught fire. The vessel was formerly under charter to the U.S. Navy, but was sold to the UAE National Marine Dredging Company and was operating under charter to transport humanitarian aid to Yemen and evacuate wounded civilians from the country.

The missiles used in both attacks are believed to be either a Chinese-built C-802 anti-ship missiles (NATO: CSS-N-8 Saccade) or an Iranian reverse-engineered copy called the Noor. While not technologically advanced, the missiles' simple design is easy to maintain, easy to operate, and can be very effective.

As I said, what happened is fairly straight forward, but why would the Houthis open fire on a U.S. Navy warship?

This is an obvious challenge to any member of the Saudi-led coalition currently conducting airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Houthis have warned these nations to avoid Yemeni waters. The United States is a member of the coalition, providing intelligence, logistics and aerial refueling.

The Houthis may not have been aware of the nationality of the warship, although it would be patently irresponsible to launch a missile at a ship ostensibly in international waters without positive identification.

It may go further - this may be an indirect challenge to the U.S. Navy by the Iranians, the primary supporters of the Houthis. The Iranian advisers working with the Houthis are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which views the American Fifth Fleet as its primary adversary in the region.

Over the past few months, there have been numerous provocations in the Persian Gulf by IRGC crews in armed fast boats harassing U.S. Navy warships. Coincidentally, at least one of these incidents involved the USS Nitze and the USS Mason.

The attack also occurred the day after Saudi aircraft bombed a funeral in Sana, killing more than 100. The Houthis may have been seeking retaliation for what they believe was a deliberate attack. The IRGC issued a statement that the rebel group would avenge the bombing, calling it "a U.S., Saudi, Israeli joint conspiracy."

The question now - how does the United States react to what many believe constitutes an act of war?

The Administration must react decisively. Not doing so will only embolden the Houthis to continue to fire on American warships in the Red Sea, and embolden the Iranians to continue their escalating provocations in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians have already assessed this Administration as unwilling to challenge Tehran. Failing to act will only validate that assessment.

The reaction needs to be stronger than a diplomatic protest from Secretary of State John Kerry - he is already regarded as weak by the Iranians.

October 10, 2016

The headline from the Red Sea is pretty straight forward - two missiles were fired at a U.S. Navy destroyer while the warship was sailing in international waters off the coast off Yemen. The missiles were fired from a coastal area of the country under the control of the Houthis, a Shi'a rebel group sponsored by Iran.

Fortunately, the missiles did not hit their intended target. According to the Navy, the ship did not sustain any damage nor were any of the crew injured, although the missile impacted close enough to the vessel to trigger on board countermeasures.

The vessel targeted in the attack was the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG-87), traveling in company with another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Nitze (DDG-94), and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15).

The three ships were ordered to the Red Sea near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait in the wake of a Houthi missile attack on the United Arab Emirates logistic vessel HSV Swift on October 1 in this same area.

The Swift was not so lucky - it was struck by a missile and caught fire. The vessel was formerly under charter to the U.S. Navy, but was sold to the UAE National Marine Dredging Company and was operating under charter to transport humanitarian aid to Yemen and evacuate wounded civilians from the country.

The missiles used in both attacks are believed to be either a Chinese-built C-802 anti-ship missiles (NATO: CSS-N-8 Saccade) or an Iranian reverse-engineered copy called the Noor. While not technologically advanced, the missiles' simple design is easy to maintain, easy to operate, and can be very effective.

As I said, what happened is fairly straight forward, but why would the Houthis open fire on a U.S. Navy warship?

This is an obvious challenge to any member of the Saudi-led coalition currently conducting airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Houthis have warned these nations to avoid Yemeni waters. The United States is a member of the coalition, providing intelligence, logistics and aerial refueling.

The Houthis may not have been aware of the nationality of the warship, although it would be patently irresponsible to launch a missile at a ship ostensibly in international waters without positive identification.

It may go further - this may be an indirect challenge to the U.S. Navy by the Iranians, the primary supporters of the Houthis. The Iranian advisers working with the Houthis are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which views the American Fifth Fleet as its primary adversary in the region.

Over the past few months, there have been numerous provocations in the Persian Gulf by IRGC crews in armed fast boats harassing U.S. Navy warships. Coincidentally, at least one of these incidents involved the USS Nitze and the USS Mason.

The attack also occurred the day after Saudi aircraft bombed a funeral in Sana, killing more than 100. The Houthis may have been seeking retaliation for what they believe was a deliberate attack. The IRGC issued a statement that the rebel group would avenge the bombing, calling it "a U.S., Saudi, Israeli joint conspiracy."

The question now - how does the United States react to what many believe constitutes an act of war?

The Administration must react decisively. Not doing so will only embolden the Houthis to continue to fire on American warships in the Red Sea, and embolden the Iranians to continue their escalating provocations in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians have already assessed this Administration as unwilling to challenge Tehran. Failing to act will only validate that assessment.

The reaction needs to be stronger than a diplomatic protest from Secretary of State John Kerry - he is already regarded as weak by the Iranians.

October 1, 2016

The images of the ferocious Russian and Syrian air and missile attacks on Aleppo are heart-breaking - media reports show horrific results. Since the complete collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry's latest attempt to engineer another "cessation of hostilities" between the Syrian coalition and the anti-regime rebels, the fighting has intensified to unprecedented levels.

Little, if any, humanitarian aid - the heart-string issue that originally drove the recent ceasefire attempt - has arrived for people in besieged Syrian cities, including hundreds of thousands in Aleppo. The United Nations will not deliver aid without security assurances from the Bashar al-Asad government, and that is not forthcoming.

Russian and Syrian warplanes have launched an astounding number of airstrikes on anti-regime opposition groups, and almost none against positions of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Moscow's stated reason for deploying force to Syria. No surprise there.

What is a surprise is the ferocity of the Russian air and missile campaign against the hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in the opposition-controlled areas of Aleppo, as well as opposition controlled cities all over the country. The Russians have also introduced new weapons to complement the terror-inducing barrel bombs dropped by Syrian Air Force helicopters.

The Russians had previously used conventional high-explosive bombs, thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) bombs, and some cluster munitions. However, in the last few weeks, they have added phosphorous incendiary bombs, napalm, and huge "bunker buster" bombs called "shaking" bombs by the residents of Aleppo in reference to the earthquake sensations the bombs produce when they penetrate deeply into buildings before they detonate. They have also deployed rocket launchers firing thermobaric and incendiary weapons into Aleppo. It is reminiscent of Russian attacks on Grozny, Chechnya in 1999-2000.

The Russians and Syrians have gone after the anti-regime rebels with a vengeance, almost as if it is in retaliation for the failure of the ceasefire. The choice of targets in Aleppo is also disturbing - hospitals, blood banks, other medical facilities, civil defense centers, and virtually any infrastructure that might support the rebels in any way. Medical supplies are dwindling fast as doctors attempt to treat the large and increasing number of civilian casualties inflicted by the more lethal ordnance being used.

Why the savage attacks on Aleppo?

The Russian goal in Syria is not the defeat of ISIS, although that would be an additional benefit. Their primary interest in Syria is the survival of the Syrian government and its president, Bashar al-Asad. To guarantee that outcome, the Russians need to destroy or defeat the anti-regime rebels, some supported by the United States, others supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Taking Aleppo is a key part of that effort.

The Syrian Army and their supporters are massing for an eventual ground assault to do just that - the ferocious air and missile campaign is the first phase of that operation. Forces from the Syrian Army, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force, Iranian Army, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq's Badr Corps Shi'a militia, and Afghan Shi'a militiamen, all backed by Russian artillery and air support, will prove to be too much for the opposition forces in and around the city.

Aleppo will fall - it is only a matter of time. The city will come back under regime control - it will be used as a base to launch more attacks on other remaining opposition cities, probably starting with Idlib province, the province that sits between regime-controlled territory in Hamah and the newly-captured city of Aleppo.

If the Russians continue the current pace of air and missile operations and the Shi'a coalition supporting Bashar al-Asad is willing to continue to press the attack on the ground, it is likely that the opposition will be defeated in western Syria. The only viable opposition enclave will be the Kurdish-controlled area in the northwest and northeast areas of the country, and a small Turkish-backed FSA presence between the Kurdish enclaves.

At that point, the Russians will have been successful in achieving their primary goal - the survival of the Ba'ath regime of Bashar al-Asad. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will have outplayed President Barack Obama and Secretary John Kerry again.

The United States will have to reassess its goals in Syria, which since 2011 have included the removal of Bashar al-Asad. The United States may have to settle for solely focusing on its primary objective - the eradication of ISIS and the former al-Qa'idah affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

As for the removal of Bashar al-Asad, I think it safe to say that window of opportunity is rapidly closing if it has not closed already. Even John Kerry, in leaked conversations reported in the New York Times, has said as much. A reading of Kerry's comments indicates he would accept a referendum on the continued governance of the al-Asad regime, in stark contrast to the hard-line American foreign policy of five years ago when President Obama said unequivocally that Bashar al-Asad had to go.

Virtually nothing Secretary Kerry has proposed in Syria has worked - the Russians are now firmly in the driver's seat. The world, especially our allies in the region who feel this Administration has cozied up to the Iranians at their expense, is witnessing the abject failure American foreign policy in Syria. They worry that, when needed, the United States will not be there for them.