1.On the 7th
of May 1942, the LEXINGTON was operating in the Coral Sea as part of Task Force
SEVENTEEN, with Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch on board as Commander Air.The Air Task Group consisted of the
LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN and accompanying destroyers.Various actions took place during that day and the next, May 8th.The following report is submitted:

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, MAY 7th.

2.At early dawn May 7th the YORKTOWN launched 10
scout bombers to search a hundred and twenty degree arc to a distance of 250
miles, median 025 degrees true, for enemy forces.At 0835 contact report was received from YORKTOWN of two enemy
carriers, two cruisers and two destroyers in a position in the vicinity of
Misima Island, the distance being about 170 miles from the ship.So far as reported, the rest of the search
was negative.The scout in the eastern
arc reported low visibility in that area and turned back at 150 miles, the rest
of his arc not being searched.

3.The LEXINGTON attack group was launched for attack about
0925.It consisted of 10 VF, 28 VSB,
and 12 VTB.Eight SBD’s were retained
at the ship for anti-torpedo plane patrol.After the group was well on its way, YORKTOWN reported

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action- The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942

the scout making the
contact had corrected his report when he returned to the ship to 2 CA and 2
CL.This implied to me that there was
no carrier present.However, the group
was allowed to continue.

4.About 11:30 the group made contact with a carrier of the
RYUKAKU type and started their attack.VS-2 consisting of 10 SBDs loaded with 1-500 and 2-100 lb bombs,
attacked first and obtained 2 500lb bomb hits as follows:

1 on stern about 50 feet from
ramp.

1 about 2/3 aft on flight deck,
center.

These later were confirmed by
independent observers, including Commander of Fighting Squadron Two.

5.VB-2 attacked at 1145 and obtained 5-1000 lb bomb hits as
follows:

1 about 2/3 aft on sbtd side
flight deck.

1 aft on flight deck amidships.

1 aft on port side flight deck.

1 amidships about ½ way aft.

1 near stbd side aft.

Sixteen pilots participated in
that attack and it is not practicable to determine which ones definitely made
direct hits.However, the number of
hits was confirmed not only by the participating pilots and the Squadron
Commander, but also by the Commander of Fighting Two and others who were in
excellent position to observe.The ship
was a mass of flames from bomb hits and covered by splashes from the later
torpedo hits.

6.VT-2 attacked at 1145 and obtained 9 torpedo hits by planes as
follows:

2-T-1, pilot, Lieut. Comdr. J.H.
Brett, Jr., USN.

2-T-2, pilot, Lt. (jg) L.F.
Steffenhagen, USNR.

2-T-4, pilot, Lieut. R.F.
Farrington, USN.

2-T-7, pilot, Lieut. E.W. Hurst,
USN.

2-T-8, pilot, Ensign C. Hamilton,
USN.

2-T-9, pilot, Gunner H.E.
Tulkington, USN.

2-T-10, pilot, Lt. (jg) L.W.
Thornhill, USN.

2-T-11, pilot, Rad. Elect. J.E.
Thornhill, USN.

2-T-12, pilot, C.A.P. M.H.
Georgious, USN.

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action -The Battle of the Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942

7.Photographs were obtained during the latter phases of the
attack, showing only the bow of the carrier with the rest of it completely
enveloped in smoke, splashes, and flames.It is difficult to conceive any other result than complete destruction
of this carrier and the personnel loss must have been close to 100%.From the bow silhouette in the photographs
plus the cut away flight deck, the pilots descriptions, and radio intelligence
it is believed that this carrier was the RYUKAKU.These photographs were saved when the LEXINGTON was abandoned.

8.One of our planes was lost in this attack.Lieutenant ALLEN, executive officer of VS-2,
was definitely seen to go into the water as the result of enemy fighter
action.Another SBD, Lieut. (jg) QUIGLEY,
of VS-2, was damaged by AA fire, reporting his control wires shot away and his
plane became unmanageable.He was
directed by his Squadron Commander to bail out or land on Rossel Island in the
Louisiades Archipelago.This was
friendly territory and it is hoped he made a safe landing.Air Headquarters at Townsville was notified
with the idea of his rescue, results so far unknown.

9.The rest of the group returned and landed about 1345.A second attack on enemy ships in the De
Boyne Island area was ready at 1450 but was not ordered by the Task Force
Commander due to the possibility of other enemy carriers being in our vicinity
and not yet located.Evidence existed
that we were being shadowed by enemy planes and enemy radio was intercepted
giving our approximate position and exact course and speed.The weather in our area was squally, with
about 90% overcast, frequent rain squalls, in which ceiling and visibility were
zero.Wind varied from 15 to 22 knots
from southeast.

10.About 1745, very close to sunset, radar contacts gave a group
of enemy planes to the westward.Fighter Control directed fighters in the air to intercept and additional
fighters were launched.These planes
intercepted a formation of nine enemy zero fighters and engated them in
combat.Results were as follows:Four zero Jap fighters shot down, two other
zero fighters damaged as evidenced by smoke and gasoline leakage.Yorktown fighters claimed three which would
account for the entire formation of nine, if there was no over-lapping.

Our losses:One VF, Lieut. (jg) P.G. Baker, pilot,
failed to return.It is believed that
he collided with a zero fighter, included in the above enemy losses.

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

11.While landing the combat patrol, well after sunset and almost
completely dark, strange planes appeared flying around our formation.They were challenged and I received one
report that they answered correctly and it was presumed at first they were
YORKTOWN planes approaching to land.One observer reported they were two-engine torpedo planes.YORKTOWN reported they were enemy
planes.Some ships opened fire on
them.YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON planes
were still circling to land.However,
these strange planes made no hostile move, were turning running lights and
eventually moved off thirty miles to the eastward, where radar showed them
circling and apparently landing on an enemy carrier.They were definitely enemy planes and apparently mistook us for
their own force.The indicated presence
of enemy carriers only thirty miles east was reported to the Task Force
Commander.It was estimated that these
carriers were the SHOKAKU and the ZUIKAKU of Cardiv FIVE, which until that time
had been unaccounted for.

12.It is believed that this day’s action resulted in the complete
destruction of the enemy carrier RYUKAKU with practically all personnel and
ultimate loss of all her planes.In
addition, during the day, the following enemy plane losses were inflicted:

6 zero type VF at 1745.

4 “97” type VF at scene of enemy
carrier.

1 VT near scene of enemy carrier.

Total 11 planes.This does not include planes shot down by
YORKTOWN group.

Our losses during the day
were:2 SBD, 1 VF.The pilot and radioman of 1 SBD may be safe
on Rossel Island.

SECOND
DAY’s NARRATIVE

13.The Task Force Commander’s decision was to proceed during the
night to southwestward and search for and attack the enemy carriers at
dawn.The LEXINGTON was directed to
search 360 degrees, 200 miles in the northern semicircle and 150 miles in the
southern semicircle.

14.Contact was made by LEXINGTON scout 2-S-2, Lieut. (jg) Joseph
Smith, about 0820, with a formation of two CV, 4 CA, and 3 DD 170 miles to the
northeastward.Attack group consisting
of 24 SBDs, 10 VF, and 12 VTB was launched

U.S.S LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

between 0900 and 0920, and
proceeded immediately.At 0832 radio
intercepted enemy transmission giving our position, course, and speed and we
knew definitely we had been located.I
predicted enemy attack would come in about 1100.All preparations to receive it were made.Ship was at General Quarters; condition Zed
was set; returning scouts were launched as anti-torpedo plane patrol;
additional fighters not already in the air were launched at 1030 and 1100; and
all stations were warned to be ready.

15.The weather in our vicinity was clear, unlimited visibility
and ceiling, few clouds, no rain squalls, wind about 15 knots, from
southeast.Radar reported at 1100 many
enemy aircraft approaching from northward, distance about 75 miles.First enemy planes were sighted from the
ship at 1113.They were torpedo
planes.They were at about 6-700 feet
altitude and split and came in from both bows.Ship’s speed had been built up to 25 kts. at 1100 when the attack was
expected and was immediately increased to 30 kts. when the hostile aircraft
were sighted.

16.Our combat patrol, under the Fighter Director, was patrolling
at 10,000 feet.Exact altitude of the
approaching enemy was not determined, but was known to be over 10,000
feet.The fighters made contact 20-30 miles
out but the enemy bombers were at 17,000 feet and the performance of our fighters
was not sufficient to gain enough altitude to attack them before they reached
the “push-over” point.The bombers
intercepted were accompanied by 18 protective fighters, which our fighters
subsequently engaged in combat and show down or damaged six.They were Me-109, 00, 96, and 0 types.

17.The Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol was on station at 2000 feet, but
about 6000 yards out.This patrol
always has a tendency to get too far out, probably due to both concern over AA
fire from surface ships and an eagerness to intercept torpedo planes well
out.From this position the enemy
torpedo planes at high speed came in over them.Even so, the SBD’s on the port side intercepted; shot down 4 VT
with torpedoes, 4 without torpedoes, 1 VB and 2 accompanying VF.One SBD was shot down by enemy VF.

18.Anti-aircraft fire from this force was opened generally about
1113.Torpedo planes made the first
attack, the first approaching from port and others circling to come in from
starboard bow.Most of these planes
came in at about a 40 or 45 degree dive from 6-7000 feet, making high speed and
dropping

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942

their torpedoes in the dive
attitude from altitude of 300-500 feet, although some were seen to level off
just above the water and make a normal drop.The range at the dropping point varied from 500 to 1200 yards.I turned to port with full rudder to bring
the first torpedoes ahead.From then on
torpedoes were coming from both starboard and port and I maneuvered with full
rudder both ways as I considered best to avoid torpedoes.Some from starboard crossed ahead; two
others ran parallel to the ship, one on each side; some from port ran ahead;
two ran under without hitting.At 1120,
first torpedo hit ship and exploded just forward of port forward gun gallery;
at 1121, one hit a little further aft about opposite the bridge.In the meantime, dive bombers were making
their attack from about a 70 degree dive angle.They were pushing over from high altitude, 17,000 feet, and were
not visible until they were in the final stages of their dive.One bomb estimated at 1000 lbs hit the after
end of the port forward gun gallery in the ready ammunition locker just outside
the Admiral’s cabin.Two other near
misses hit close aboard aft on the port side and at first were mistaken for
torpedo hits.Another bomb estimated
500 lbs hit the gig boat pocket on the port side, and one 100 lb hit the stacks
and exploded inside.There were one or
more near misses aft on the starboard side, fragments killing and injuring a
number of men in the stack machine guys, sky aft, and the after signal station.I personally saw a flaming bomb, approaching
the ship from port, and burning with a reddish colored flame.I am unable to say whether or not it hit.

19.Apparently there were seven explosions against the LEXINGTON,
two of which are thought to have been torpedoes, 1 1000-lb bomb hit, 2 1000-lb
bomb very near misses on the port side, and 2 smaller bombs.Fires were started in the main deck near the
Admiral’s country, beneath the incinerator, near the gig boat pocket, and one
in the forward starboard marine compartment near the forward elevator.The ship was listing about 6 degrees to
port.Damage control reported they were
shifting oil to correct the list and fire parties reported they were fighting
the fires.Main Control reported all
units in commission.Number 2, 4, and 6
fire rooms were partially flooded, but water was being controlled by the
pumps.Steering gear was intact and the
ship was making 25 kts under good control.Both elevators at this time were reported out of commission, jammed in
the up position, due to machinery casualties in the wells, probably from shock.

20.At about 1300, Damage Control reported the ship on an even
keel, that three fires

were out and the other one in the
Admiral’s country under control.The
ship was periodically

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

turned into the wind to land and
reservice aircraft.The attack group
returned and was landed, the torpedo planes about 1400.

21.The attack group reported two 1000-lb bomb hits on enemy
carrier of the SHOKAKU class made by Commander J.B. Ault, U.S.N., Group
Commander, and three other SBD’s operating with him.5 torpedo hits were made by VT-2 as follows:

2-T-3, pilot, Ensign N.A. Sterrie,
USNR.

2-T-5, pilot, Ensign T.B. Bash,
USNR.

2-T-6, pilot, Ensign H.R. Mazza,
USNR.

2-T-7, pilot, Lieut. E.W. Hurst,
USN.

2-T-12, pilot, C.A.P. B.C.
Shearon, USN.

They further reported when last
seen she was on fire, settling and turning in a circle.It is believed that this ship was sunk.Radio intercepts later tended to confirm
this belief.She was rapidly loosing
headway.

22.In the meantime, Damage Control was gradually getting all
damage checked and cleared up.At 1247
a heavy explosion shook the ship.It
appeared to come from amidships well down in the bowels of the ship.Communication with Central Station was
immediately lost, all telephones except the JV line went out including the
ship’s service phones, and a bad fire broke out from the main deck down to the
vicinity of Central Station just forward of the main elevator.All pressure was lost in the fire main
forward.Rudder indicators on the
bridge went out, although steering control was working.By using the JV line to trick wheel to
receive reports of the position of the rudder, steering was retained on the
bridge.The forward gyro compass system
was out, but after gyro compass and repeaters were satisfactory.

23.This heavy explosion at 1247 was what caused the loss of the
ship.Until that time everything was
well under control.Full propulsive
power was available, steering was O.K., the ship was on an even keel, and all
fires were either out or under control.The cause of this explosion was uncertain.At first it was thought to be a “sleeper” dud 1000-lb bomb which
went off in the bowels of the ship.However, further study indicates that small gasoline leaks from the
heavy pounding the ship had received had caused accumulation of gasoline vapors
in the lower regions and they were set off by a spark of unknown origin.In any event, from this time on the ship was
doomed.

24.Hoses from the after section of the fire main were led out and
every effort was made to combat this fire.The fire spread aft and additional communications were gradually being

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

lost.The fire main pressure dropped to 30-40 lbs.Minor explosions were recurring at frequent
intervals, increasing the fire.Whether
these were from 5-inch ammunition going off or from further gasoline vapors
could not be determined.All lights
forward were out and the main deck and below were full of smoke.It was a losing fight to control the
fire.The JV line to trick wheel went
dead and I steered for a while with the engines.Both gyros and repeaters were out and we used the magnetic
compass.

25.At about 1600, the one remaining phone working to Main Control
was getting very weak.Main Control had
reported the forward bulkhead of Afirm unit was so hot the paint was peeling
off in large blisters.I gave them
permission to shift to the after spaces.Finally, about 1630, fearing I would lose all communication with them I
ordered engineering personnel to secure the plant and get up on deck.The safeties were opened and the ship came
to a stop.I ordered life rafts made
ready and preparations made to abandon ship.Fire fighting efforts were still being made until the engineering plant
was abandoned, when all water pressure was gone.At this time I asked Admiral FITCH for destroyers to come
alongside and pass over fire hoses, thinking we might control the fire if we
got water.The Admiral directed DD’s to
come alongside and also directed me to disembark excess personnel to the
destroyers alongside.In response to
this the USS MORRIS came alongside and passed two hoses over, which were put to
work, and excess personnel went down lines to her deck.However, by this time the fire was beyond
control.Additional explosions were occurring;
it was reported the war heads on the hangar deck had been at a temperature of
140 degrees F; ready bombs storage was in the vicinity of the fire and I
considered there was danger of the ship blowing up at any minute.I had previously directed sick and wounded
to be disembarked in our whale boats and excess squadron personnel had gone on
lines to the destroyer alongside.

26.At 1707 Admiral FITCH directed me to abandon ship.I issued the orders and orderly
disembarkation began.Boats from
accompanying ships came alongside and assisted.Preference was given to lowering wounded and injured into the
boats.Most of the men went hand over
hand down lines over the side and into the water on life rafts.Most of the men were off by 1800.Admiral FITCH and myself were the last to
leave the bridge.He disembarked
forward where practically all had gone and I made a final inspection aft.I found a number of men aft on the starboard
side and in the port after gun gallery where there seemed to be some difficulty;
men in the water were having trouble getting away from the ship due to
drift.I

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

made a final inspection and went
aft where my executive officer, Commander SELIGMAN, reported to me all men were
off the ship.At this time a tremendous
explosion about the vicinity of the elevator shook the ship and we had to duck
to avoid falling debris.I directed
Commander SELIGMAN to disembark.I saw
him in the water swimming toward an approaching motor whale boat.Having assured myself there was no other
living person on the ship, I went down a line hand over hand and dropped off
into the water, to be picked up by a motor whale boat of the USS
MINNEAPOLIS.This boat took me to the
USS MINNEAPOLIS where I reported to Admiral FITCH.

27.The picture of the burning and doomed ship was a magnificent
but sad sight.The ship and crew had
performed gloriously and it seemed too bad that she had to perish in the hour
of her victory.But she went to a
glorious end, more fitting than the usual fate of the eventual scrap heap or
succumbing to the perils of the sea.She went down in battle, after a glorious victory for our forces in
which the LEXINGTON and her air group played so conspicious a part.

28.The PHELPS was directed by the Task Force Commander to sink
the LEXINGTON by torpedoes.Five
torpedoes were fired, at least three hit, and she finally went under on an even
keel.As she went under a tremendous
explosion occurred which rocked ships for miles around.It was the end of the LEXINGTON.These circumstances were reported to me
verbally by the Commanding Officer of the PHELPS.

29.The survivors were scattered among nearly all of the
accompanying ships.Check-ups by signal
disclosed a total of about 2735 survivors.There were no drownings in the water due to abandoning ship so far as
known.All losses of personnel were due
to air combat in the air group or to the bomb explosions and fire on the
ship.The preliminary total of
personnel losses subject to final check is 26 officers and 190 men out of a
total complement of 2951.This is
itself considered to be a remarkable achievement.

CONCLUSIONS

30-3.Anti-torpedo Plane Patrols must keep in close to the torpedo
release point, at about 3000 feet altitude, to insure interception of either
high or low approach torpedo planes.

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

Employment of SBD’s is a make-shift
at best; the best defense would be to have sufficient fighters for both a high
and low patrol.This condition will
seldom be realized.In this particular
attack, the Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol of SBD’s was partially effective.They shot down nine torpedo planes, four
with torpedoes aboard, four without, and one undetermined.They also shot down two fighters.One SBD was shot down by enemy fighters.The Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol on the port
side of the formation made all the intercepts.It was in position 3000 yds outside of screen at 2000 feet.If it had been at the designated altitude of
3000 feet, it’s position would have been more effective.It is considered that the Anti-torpedo Plane
Patrol of SBD’s is amply justified as better than nothing.

30-4.Our personnel are superior in quality and skill to the
Japanese.

30-5.The ship was completely ready for the attack in every
respect.A total of 11 fighters were in
the air for defense against bombers, and 14 SBD’s for defense against torpedo
planes, in addition to planes in the air for defense from the YORKTOWN.All guns were manned and ready.Material condition Zed to meet the attack
was completely set.Twenty-five to
thirty knots speed was being made.All
personnel were alert.

30-6.This battle definitely represented the simple problem of
carrier against carrier.Both air
groups were attacking the other’s carrier at about the same time.I predicted ahead of time that it was
possible for both attacks to be successful and for both opposing carriers to be
destroyed.That is what happened.But few of our attacking planes were
destroyed in the attack itself, whereas many of the Japanese planes were
destroyed by our fighters and AA fire in their attack on us.The LEXINGTON remained afloat for over seven
hours and rescued about 92% of her personnel, whereas the enemy carrier is
believed to have sunk within the hour and to have lost a heavy percentage of
its personnel.

30-7.In this battle, the enemy had the advantage of weather.The LEXINGTON was in a clear area, whereas
the Japanese were in a rain squall area.Nevertheless, the major part of the LEXINGTON air attack group was able
to find its objective.

30-8.Our own AA fire was, as usual, only partially

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

effective.The general tendency was still to use
insufficient lead and to fire under the target.

30-9.The loss of the ship was caused by an internal gasoline vapor
explosion near Central Station below the armored deck in the vicinity of the
forward torpedo hit.This explosion
resulted from minor gasoline leaks gradually accumulating highly explosive
vapor in the area.It was undetected,
due to the complete sealing of the ship in Condition Zed.The adjacent gasoline control room had been
flooded and sealed with CO2 as a preventive measure.For means of preventing see recommendation 31-2 below.

30-10.The material performance was in general excellent.No gun stoppages or material failures were
reported by the planes.The damage
control features of the design of the LEXINGTON speak for themselves; she
remained afloat for over seven hours after sustaining two torpedo hits, three
bomb hits, and two near misses and had to be finally sunk by additional torpedo
hits.

30-11.The performance of all personnel was magnificent.I cannot say too much in praise of the
conduct of the personnel, of the officers and men of the LEXINGTON and her
squadrons.The finest traditions of the
Naval service were upheld in every respect.Many cases of individual heroism occurred, and they are too numerous to
mention in this report.In accordance
with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Instructions, separate letter is being
submitted with recommendations for suitable awards in these cases.However, I wish to emphasize that every last
officer and man performed his duty with the greatest credit to himself, his
family, and his country.The country
can well be proud of their performance.

30-12.Our present methods of training and tactics are sound, as
proven by this engagement.Our attacks
were successful and except for the gasoline vapor explosion the ship would have
been saved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

31-1.That a new carrier, the first available, be re-named the
LEXINGTON to carry on the traditions of that great ship.

31-2.That the officers and men survivors of the LEXINGTON and her
air group be retained together as a unit, to man the new LEXINGTON.This will be of the utmost value for morale,
not only of these men but for the country as a whole, and will best utilize

U.S.S. LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

this group
of well-trained, seasoned, and tested officers and men.

31-3.That all carriers be immediately filled to their allowance of
27 fighters.

31-5.That Anti-torpedo Plane patrols be stationed at not more than
3000 yds from the carrier at 3000 feet altitude for protection against both
high and low level torpedo planes.Fighters should be used for this if available.

31-6.That fighters and torpedo planes of greater performance be
provided to carriers as soon as possible.

31-7.That every effort be made to strengthen the air defense of
carriers without sacrificing their offensive strength.

31-8.That damage control instructions to all ships contain the
following:

Whenever structural damage occurs
in the general vicinity of gasoline tanks, possibility of accumulation in
confined spaces of dangerous concentrations of gasoline vapors exists.The following immediate steps must be taken
to prevent destructive explosions:

1.Pump all gasoline tanks in the vicinity overboard or to tanks
in an undamaged area and keep them flushed with salt water.

2.Take all steps practicable to prevent sparks anywhere near the
damaged area.

3.Ventilate the damaged area thoroughly by all practicable
means, including bilge pumps, even though it involves partially breaking
condition Zed in that area.

31-9.That additional fire fighting apparatus be installed on
carriers, preferably separated units of diesel powered fire pumps and hoses, so
that entire reli-ance is not placed on the fire mains.

31-10.That more rescue breathing or oxygen smoke helmets be provided.Several hundred should be the minimum and
all men trained in their use.

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

SUMMARY
OF RESULTS

32.Enemy Damage May 7th:

1 carrier (RYUKAKU) sunk.In addition probably all her planes were
lost and practically all her personnel.

4 zero enemy
fighters (type zero) shot down at 1745.

2 probable enemy
zero destroyed at 1745.

1 type 97 VF at
scene of carrier attack (VB-2).

1 type 97 VF at
scene of carrier attack (VB-2).

1 3-place
seaplane probably, near scene of carrier attack (VF-2).

2 VF type 97 by
VF-2 at scene of attack on enemy carrier.

Total:

1 CV, (presumably 80 planes); 11
planes additional in combat (part of 80).These losses do not include planes shot down by YORKTOWN
planes.

Our Losses, May 7th:

1 SBD
shot down by enemy fighters at scene of attack.

1 SBD damaged at scene of attack, force-landed on Rossel
Island.Pilot and gunner may be safe.

1 VF shot down
by zero fighters at 1745.

Total:

3 planes, crew of
one which may be safe.

33.Enemy Losses, May 8th:

1 carrier (SHOKAKU) probably sunk
with all planes and heavy loss of personnel.

4 VT shot down
in vicinity of LEXINGTON (by AA).

1 VT shot down
in vicinity of LEXINGTON (VB-2).

By VF-2:Certain:

2 VS at enemy
carrier.

1 VF, type 00, at
enemy carrier.

1 VF, Me-109, over
LEXINGTON.

1 VF, 00, over
LEXINGTON.

1 VF, 0,over
LEXINGTON.

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:Report of Action – The Battle of the
Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.

34.It is believed the above figures speak for themselves and that
on the 7th and 8th of May, the LEXINGTON and her air
group achieved two great victories in our country’s cause and that her
performance will go down in the annals of the Navy as an outstanding example of
devotion to duty and successful accomplishment of a mission.

U.S.S.
LEXINGTON10-fd

May 15, 1942.

Subject:
Report of Action – The Battle
of the Coral Sea,7 and 8 May 1942.

35.This report of these actions is as accurate as I can determine
at this time.I have obtained written
statements from key personnel and can elaborate on any points if further
details are desired, especially on material matters.If my recommendation to keep the officers and crew together is
approved, it will facilitate supplemental reports.

36.The question of whether or not the SHOKAKU is sunk may be
controversial at this writing.No
report of any sighting of the SHOKAKU since the attack has been received.All information in my possession points to
the probability of the only carrier proceeding away from the area being the
damaged ZUIKAKU, which has been reported from radio intelligence.From the reports of the pilots at the scene,
stating she was settling, on fire, circling, but rapidly loosing all way,
unless positive information otherwise exists, I believe the SHOKAKU sank
shortly after the attack.