CHAPTER VI

The Resumption of Negotiations

As the final arrangements for the reconvening
of the truce negotiations were made in October 1951, developments on the
international scene gave no indication that a quick settlement of the Korean
War might be in the offing. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
were engaged in strengthening their military capabilities and those of
their allies.

In the United States President Truman signed the
National Security Act on 10 October and Congress voted over seven billion
dollars for foreign economic, technical, and military aid ten days later.
The new National Security Agency established under the act would co-ordinate
all of the foreign aid programs. The bulk of the military aid would go
to the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to help bolster
their ability to defend themselves against aggression. On 22 October the
members of NATO agreed to permit Greece and Turkey to join the organization,
thus broadening the NATO area of responsibility considerably. Of the fourteen
nations now included in NATO, eleven were contributing units to the United
Nations Command.1

The Soviet Union in the meantime had exploded
its second and third atomic bombs in October, serving notice that it had
embarked upon an ambitious nuclear program. Stalin publicly pledged friendship
to Communist China and received a message of thanks from Kim Il Sung of
North Korea for Russian assistance to the N.K. forces. In Moscow Foreign
Minister Andrei Vishinsky informed the U.S. Ambassador that the Soviet
Union would not bring pressure upon the Communist negotiators in Korea
to modify their truce demands. Thus, the prospects for swift action on
the conclusion of an armistice dwindled even before the meetings resumed.

The Line of Demarcation

On 24 October a fleet of nine 2 1/2 ton trucks
moved out of Munsan-ni and crossed the Imjin River. Loaded with tents and
equipment the convoy rolled into the tiny village of Panmunjom and its
cluster of mud huts. Swiftly the tent city to house the conferees rose
and a crew of forty men worked intently to install the flooring, lighting,
and heating that the approach of cold weather now made necessary. By the
following day the new site was ready.

The main conference area had several large tents
set aside for joint use and three that were to be at the disposal of the
UNC delegates and the press. Half a mile south the service echelons set
up

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the mess, communications, security, and engineer
facilities that would support the negotiations and aid in neutralizing
the truce conference area. Overnight, Panmunjom became famous.

When the delegates convened on 25 October in the
big conference tent, it almost seemed as though there had been no hiatus.
The Communists were formally correct and meticulous as always, and only
the presence of two new faces on their side of the table gave evidence
of change. Nam Il introduced General Pien Changwu and Maj. Gen. Chung Tu
Hwan who had replaced Teng Hua and Chang Pyong San respectively as Chinese
and North Korean delegates. Admiral Joy in turn presented the credentials
of Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, head of the ROK Field Training Command, and
now the ROK representative in lieu of General Paik Sun Yup.

Since both sides had accepted the security arrangements
worked out by the liaison officers during the long recess, the Communists
proposed that a joint office of the liaison officers be established to
supervise the details of the agreement. The UNC delegates agreed that the
liaison officers should handle the investigation of incidents and carry
out inspections at the truce site. This minor matter settled, Nam suggested
that the meetings of the subdelegates on the line of demarcation be resumed.
The same four delegates, General Hodes and Admiral Burke for the U.N. Command
and Generals Lee and Hsieh for the Communists, were named to meet on Item
2 that afternoon.2

During the August sessions on the line of demarcation,
it will be remembered, the UNC negotiators had given up their initial stand
that air and naval effectiveness be reflected in the battle line and the
Communists had indicated that they might be ready to discuss a line other
than the 38th Parallel3. Ridgway had won approval to settle
on a demilitarized zone not less than four miles wide with the line of
contact as the median just before the Communists called off the meetings.

In the interim the UNC delegation had not been
idle. Joy informed Ridgway in mid-October that he and his staff had worked
up a short paper and had mapped out a specific demilitarized zone based
on the line of contact. He did not intend to make the map the sole basis
of discussion, but he would not permit any major alterations to be made
in the UNC line.4

Thus, the UNC subdelegation was ready to present
the new proposal at the first meeting, but the initial exchanges between
General Hodes and General Lee developed into a sparring match:

Gen. Lee: Do you have any idea about the military
demarcation line?

Gen. Hodes: We ended the last conference before
the suspension by asking for your proposal. Do you have one?

Gen. Lee: We would like your opinion first.

Gen. Hodes: We gave our opinion many times, and
asked for your proposal based on our proposal. As it was your proposal
to have the subdelegation meeting, we expected you to have a proposal.
Let's have it.

Gen. Lee: You said you had made a new

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proposal, but we have heard nothing new which
will break the deadlock.

Gen. Hodes: That's right, you haven't.

Gen. Lee: We have established a subcommittee to
break the deadlock. The deadlock can be broken only if we have a mutually
satisfactory proposal.

Gen. Hodes: Right. What is your proposal to break
the deadlock?

After the better part of an hour was spent continuing
this stimulating conversation, the UNC delegates decided that the Communists
had no proposal to offer. Following a short recess, they made the opening
gambit- a concrete demilitarized zone traced on the map. In general, Hodes
explained, the zone was based upon the line of contact, but in order to
make each side's defenses more secure the UNC forces would withdraw along
the east coast and in the Kumsong area and the Communists would be expected
to do the same in the Kaesong area. Not unexpectedly, the Communists rejected
this proposal the following day and countered with a map of their own that
was much more favorable to them. Their adjustments gave the U.N. Command
some indefensible territory on the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas in return
for the J-Ridge, Bloody, and Heartbreak Ridges, the Punchbowl, Kumhwa,
and Ch'orwon. Hodes, in turn,

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found the Communist suggestion unacceptable, but
at least a start had been made and the enemy had not mentioned the 38th
Parallel.5

Although General Lee stoutly asserted that the
Communists were not "merchants," but rather "military men of revolutionary
spirit," when Hodes inquired whether the enemy position was for bargaining
purposes, the horse trading began. The crux of the matter was the Kaesong
area which the UNC delegates claimed was necessary to protect the approach
to Seoul. If the site for the negotiations had not been placed at Kaesong,
the UNC forces would probably have taken the city, Hodes declared. And
besides, since the U.N. Command would have to give up the offshore islands
that it controlled adjoining enemy-held territory, Kaesong would be fair
compensation. Hodes pointed out that the Communists would also benefit
from the UNC withdrawals from the areas around Kaesong and Kumsong, but

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the enemy wanted no part of a trade that would
involve the loss of Kaesong.6 Possession of Kaesong was important
politically and psychologically as well as militarily since it lay south
of the 38th Parallel and the ROK Government had been insisting upon its
return. As a symbol it was worth far more than a greater amount of territory
in central or east Korea.7

At first the Communists were willing to barter.
They were agreeable to an exchange on the central and eastern fronts to
straighten out the line of defense. But, as the UNC delegates persisted
in their demand for Kaesong, the enemy lost interest. After several fruitless
days of discussion, the Communists proposed a 4-kilometer demilitarized
zone based solely on the line of contact. This, they asserted, was their
best and last proposal.8

General Ridgway had thought that the UNC map which
had been presented would be the final offer with only minor changes permitted.
But his superiors reminded him that the U.S. minimum position was the maintenance
of the security of Line KANSAS. If KANSAS had an adequate outpost line
of resistance, certain adjustments in the proposed line of demarcation
on the map would appear to be practicable, they informed the Far East commander
on 30 October.9

The instructions from Washington and the determined
Communist stand on Kaesong led Ridgway to issue new orders on 2 November.
He told the UNC delegates to retreat to the second-line position which
placed the city in the demilitarized zone. The last concession, Ridgway
went on, would be to concede the Kaesong area, provided that the Communists
agreed to the adjustments on the eastern and central fronts and permitted
the UNC forces to locate its outpost line of resistance on the west bank
of the Imjin River.10

For the next two days Hodes and Burke conducted
a dogged campaign to budge the Communists, but to no avail. The enemy was
firmly resolved not to give up Kaesong. By 4 November Ridgway and Joy had
decided that a settlement based on the battle line with appropriate minor
adjustments would be the best they could hope for.11

When the subdelegations met on the following day,
General Hodes presented the UNC compromise offer. This accepted a 4-kilometer
demarcation zone based on the actual line of contact at the time of the
signing of the armistice with "appropriate adjustments." Three officers
from each side would work out the battle line and would be prepared to
give it to the delegation prior to the completion of the truce. In the
meantime, the UNC proposal recommended that the conferees proceed to other
items. on the agenda.12

The Communists showered a barrage of questions
on Hodes and Burke, but their interest swiftly waned when they

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discovered that the UNC delegation would not rule
Kaesong out of any future adjustments that might be made. Then General
Lee launched his assault. Item 2 must be settled now, he declared, and
a military demarcation zone fixed before discussion of other agenda items
could begin. Postponement of the matter until the armistice was signed
was out of the question, Lee and his colleague, Hsieh, maintained, since
agreement in principle was not enough. The Communists insisted that the
current line be determined and that it should serve as the line of demarcation,
despite Hodes's assertion that the present line would have no validity
unless the truce was completed quickly. Otherwise, a new line and demilitarized
zone reflecting changes on the battlefield would have to be agreed upon.13

To Admiral Joy the enemy's stand indicated that
the Communists intended to make the line of demarcation worked out at this
time a permanent rather than a temporary settlement and he thought that
this effort should be resisted.14 In Washington, U.S. political
and military leaders agreed, but with definite reservations. If the UNC
delegation maintained a hard-and-fast stand on Kaesong and the line of
demarcation too long, they told Ridgway, it would appear to be a major
concession when the UNC finally accepted the Communist position. Public
opinion at home, Ridgway was told, would not understand a breakdown of
negotiations over Kaesong, in the face of recent Communist concessions.
Therefore, if the Communists flatly rejected the UNC proposal to postpone
agreement on the line of demarcation, the enemy's line of contact in the
Kaesong area should be accepted quickly. To prevent the Communists from
making the line of demarcation permanent, they suggested to Ridgway that
a time limit be set for the completion of the other agenda items. If no
agreement was reached at the expiration of the limiting period, the demilitarized
zone would be subject to revision.15

General Ridgway did not object to the JCS counsel
on Kaesong, but he felt strongly that agreement to the present line of
contact as a permanent line, subject only to minor adjustments, would be
a mistake. In the 8 November subdelegate meeting, Ridgway pointed out,
the Communists had indicated that they did not think that any major change
in the battle lines had taken place since July. If the summer and fall
campaigns of the Eighth Army were thus ignored, then the enemy obviously
intended to cling closely to whatever line was now determined upon. This
would in itself amount to a de facto cease-fire during the time
period set and time extensions would doubtlessly be sought by the Communists
and granted by the U.N. Command for the settlement of other agenda items.
A cease-fire while the negotiations were still going on would be to the
great disadvantage of the U.N. Command, in Ridgway's opinion, and if he
had to give up Kaesong, he wanted to stand inflexibly upon the principle
that the line of contact on the effective

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date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.16

The JCS were not willing to go quite so far. They
agreed that the UNC delegation should press for acceptance of a postponed
line of demarcation, but not that this would be the final position. Since
the Communists had made substantial concessions on the location of the
line, the JCS thought that an early agreement satisfying the UNC major
requirements should be sought. Otherwise the enemy might even revert to
its former stand on the 38th Parallel.17

In the meantime the subdelegation meetings had
reached an impasse. The Communists grew more adamant in their stand for
a 4-kilometer zone based on the line of contact with no adjustments either
at the present or in the final settlement. They paid little attention to
Hodes's charge that they wanted the demarcation line settled so that they
could
take their time on the other agenda items.18

The session on 14 November was particularly spirited.
After General Lee admitted that agreement to a demarcation line now would
amount to a de facto cease-fire, Hodes attacked the concept. General
Hsieh became annoyed and then abusive. He called Hodes "Turtle egg" -an
especially insulting term in Chinese.19 "Only the Devil," he
charged later, could believe that the U.N. had good faith and loved peace.
Hsieh also slurringly referred to Admiral Joy as "the senior delegate of
your delegation, whose name I forget."20

Although the UNC delegates ignored the insults,
Hodes evened the score the following day in a reference to Nam Il as "your
senior delegate whose name I trust you are able to recall." But progress
in the negotiations outside the jibe level was slow.21

Military and political leaders in Washington were
becoming impatient and on 14 November they instructed Ridgway to accept
the Communist line of demarcation in the interest of reaching an early
agreement. Since the Communist proposal not only met the U.S. basic position
on the maintenance of the security of Line KANSAS, but also provided protection
for Line WYOMING, they did not consider that agreement amounted to concession.
By placing a time limit of one month for the completion of the rest of
the agenda, they evidently hoped to forestall a slowdown of operations
for an extended period of time and to spur the enemy to greater speed in
the negotiations. They told Ridgway that the military pressure upon the
enemy should not be lessened, but at the same time admitted that no major
change in the line of contact favorable to the United States was likely
during the next month. Air and naval action, on the other hand, would not
be affected by the agreement.22

The UNC delegation earnestly sought to eke some
advantage from the enemy as they readied their next offer, but with little
success. Each day they would relax

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over a few games of solitaire or bridge to ease
the strain of dealing with their stubborn opponents before they took up
the cudgels again. Finally on 17 November, they reluctantly presented the
new proposal which met the Communist position on the line of demarcation,
but tacked on the thirty-day time limit.23

After several days of questions and careful study
of the UNC proposal, the Communists were almost satisfied. Still they held
out for UNC agreement that the line of demarcation would not be revised
until after the other agenda items were settled. Although the expiration
of the thirty-day limit without the conclusion of a truce would witness
the termination of the line of demarcation's validity, the psychological
effect of placing it along the existing line of contact might carry over
into the post-thirty-day period. The U.N. Command balked briefly, then
accepted the enemy's proposal. By 23 November the staff officers were hard
at work tracing out the battle line.24

Disputes over the real location of the line of
contact that the staff officers could not agree upon were referred back
to the subdelegation and in the course of one such discussion an unusual
incident took place. As both sides claimed possession of a particular hill
in the central sector, General Hodes arranged for a telephone connection
between the conferees and the officer in charge on the hill in question.
In Hsieh's presence he called the unit commander and confirmed that the
U.N. Command still controlled the hill. This annoyed Hsieh and he whispered
in Chinese to his staff officer, "never mind. It will be ours tonight."
Lieutenant Wu, the UNC interpreter overheard this remark and when he repeated
it to Hodes later on, the UNC force on the disputed hill was alerted for
an attack.25 However, despite the warning, superior Chinese
forces drove the UNC forces off the hill and Hodes had to admit the next
day that the enemy now had possession and had to adjust the line of contact.

By 27 November the last details were ironed out
and the demarcation line agreed upon. (Map III) With its task completed,
the subdelegation on Item 2 adjourned at the end of its thirty-seventh
session.

It had been a tortuous road that the subdelegates
had followed since 17 August when they had held their first meeting. Initially
the UNC representatives had labored to move the enemy from its stand on
the 38th Parallel and toward a settlement along the actual line of contact.
This had been successful. During the long suspension of the talks the Eighth
Army had carried out its offensives and won improved positions along most
of the front. When the conference resumed in late October, the UNC delegation
had an additional objective- to secure, or at least demilitarize

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Kaesong. But this meant a departure from the concept
of the line of contact, since the Communists still held Kaesong. Despite
all the arguments and inducements that the U.N. Command had unveiled, the
enemy remained unimpressed and became more firmly resolved to keep Kaesong.

While the United Nations Command delegates still
felt that they might get Kaesong, they had been willing to sit down and
draw a line of demarcation right away. But as chances for Kaesong became
slimmer, they changed their attitude and attempted to defer mapping out
the line until the armistice was ready to be signed, in the hope that the
situation would be altered and the Communists might be more amenable to
giving up Kaesong at that time.

The Communists, on the other hand, had been more
consistent. Once they had discarded the 18th Parallel, they had shifted
to the line of contact. After a brief flirtation with the idea of adjustments,
they had been quickly disenchanted by the UNC insistence upon adjusting
the Kaesong area out of Com-

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munist hands. From this point onward the enemy
delegates clung steadfastly to an immediate settlement on the line of contact
with no adjustments other than those involving minor terrain features.

Although the Communists had been forced to concede
on the 38th Parallel, they had won on establishing a line of demarcation
that lasted until the closing moments of the war.26 Admiral
Joy later wrote that he regarded this as a turning point in the negotiations,
for the United States lacked military pressure to lever the Communists
into more reasonable attitude after this agreement and Joy believed that
it cost the United States a full year of war in Korea.27 Whether
this was true or not, the President and his advisors had decided that the
U.N. Command should compromise in the interests of securing an earlier
armistice and in view of the fact that the enemy had already made considerable
concessions. With Item 2 finally out of the way, work could now begin on
Item 3, the setting up of the machinery to administer the truce.

Opening Skirmishes on Item 3

The early instructions to Ridgway had been quite
specific on the several points that were to be taken up under Item 3. They
stated that the Military Armistice Commission and its observer teams must
have free and unlimited access to all of Korea so that they could inspect
whenever necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the armistice.
They also informed Ridgway that there should be no reinforcing the number
of personnel or increasing the amount of war equipment during the armistice
period. This, of course, did not preclude the exchange of individuals or
units on a man-for-man basis or the replacement of wornout equipment.28
These two principles in modified form- the right to inspection and replacement
but no augmentation- formed the cornerstones of the UNC approach to Item
3.

The modifications stemmed from the field. On 1
August Admiral Joy suggested that along with no augmentation of troops
or equipment the U.N Command should insist that there be no construction
or rehabilitation of airfields.29 Two months later, Ridgway
attempted to clarify the UNC position on free and unlimited inspection.
Pointing out to the JCS that the enemy had indicated its willingness to
permit inspection in the demilitarized zone, but had consistently resisted
observation or inspection in territory under its exclusive control, Ridgway
questioned the need for unlimited inspection. Insistence upon this principle
might prolong or even cause the Communists to break off the negotiations.
In the opinion of the United Nations commander, inspection at selected
ground, sea, and air ports of entry would provide sufficient security for
his forces. Moreover, he believed that the Communists would exploit the
right to unlimited inspection in the intelligence field to an unacceptable
degree if it were granted them. Under the circumstance Ridgway felt that
the UNC initial position on inspection should insist upon: observation
by joint teams

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at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication
centers, with freedom of movement for those teams over principal transportation
lines; joint aerial observation and photoreconnaissance over all Korea;
and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone. As a final position,
the UNC delegation could concede aerial observation and photoreconnaissance.
His superiors approved the initial position several weeks later, but reserved
judgment on any modifications until the negotiations disclosed the Communist
position more thoroughly.30 As Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins,
the Army G-3, pointed out to General Collins, the Air Force was strongly
opposed to sacrificing aerial observation and it might turn out that the
Communists would prefer to dispense with the ground observer teams.31

As negotiations on Item 2 drew to a close in November,
General Collins and Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte experienced some doubts about
Communist acceptance of the inspection principle. The real deterrent to
a resumption of hostilities, they felt, lay in the maintenance of sufficient
power in the Korean area rather than in inspection. Since the Communists
might prefer to permit the negotiations to be broken off over this issue,
the Chief of Staff and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, General Bolte,
questioned whether inspection would actually provide security for the U.N.
Command and how it could best be carried out.32

Ridgway's answer on 23 November reinforced his
earlier stand. In his defense of the need for inspection he reminded the
JCS that enemy air power had been steadily increasing. In recent weeks
it had challenged the UNC air effort south of the Ch'ongch'on River. If
the enemy air bases were set up and maintained in North Korea, they could
eventually pose a serious threat to Japan in the event of a war with the
Soviet Union. For Ridgway the principle of inspection, which the United
States had been insisting upon since the initiation of negotiations with
the USSR in 1946 over the control of atomic energy, was a basic U.S. position
and could not be discarded in Korea without having an adverse reaction
upon future negotiations with the USSR. As for the mechanics of inspection,
he believed that forty joint teams, some located permanently at ports of
entry and others roving, could cover Korea adequately. If the enemy would
not accept inspection, Ridgway felt that the UNC delegation should be authorized
to break off negotiations.33

Several days later the U.S. leaders informed Ridgway
that lie should present his initial position requiring inspection on Item
3 and then modify it by conceding aerial observation and photoreconnaissance
if it proved necessary. However, they were still firmly opposed to having
the onus for cutting off the negotiations over this point fall on the U.N.
Command. Any decision to cease

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the discussions, they declared, must be made by
the Communists.34

When the plenary session at Pamnunjom resumed
on 27 November, there was one newcomer to the conference table. Maj. Gen.
Howard M. Turner, who had commanded a bombardment division of the Eighth
Air Force during World War II and more recently had been commanding general
of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, replaced General Craigie.

After Admiral Joy had presented Turner's credentials,
he immediately broached a new subject. To save time in the discussions
that would take place on Item 4, Joy proposed that prisoner of war data
covering the names and nationalities of all the prisoners and the location
of POW camps be exchanged so that each side could study the information
in advance of the formal meetings. Nam Il acknowledged the suggestion and
then proceeded to discuss Item 3.

In Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be settled quite
easily if the five principles he now advanced were accepted by the UNC
delegates. The first declared that all armed forces should cease hostilities
on the day the armistice was signed. Within three days all armed forces
should be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone and within five days should
be cleared from the rear areas, coastal islands, and waters of each side.
These were principles 2 and 3. Each side would agree that there would be
no armed forces or action in the demilitarized zone as the fourth principle,
and finally both sides would designate an equal number of members to form
an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements
and for the supervision of the implementation of the agreement.

Basically there was little in the Communist proposal
to quarrel with, as far as it went. But Admiral Joy was quick to point
out to Nam that it failed to cover important areas. The mechanics for beginning
a cease-fire and for clearing all the troops from the demilitarized zone
were fairly simple, Joy maintained, but it was essential that both sides
adopt measures to reduce the possibility of a resumption of hostilities.
There were several ways in which this could be done. Neither side should
build up its military supplies, equipment, or personnel in Korea during
the armistice and restrictions should be placed upon the construction and
rehabilitation of military facilities for offensive purposes. If both sides
accepted these conditions, Joy went on, neither would acquire a significant
advantage. To assure compliance with these limitations, Joy proposed that
a supervisory organization, with joint observer teams, be established and
given sufficient authority and freedom of movement to keep all Korea under
surveillance. The UNC 7-point formula for solving Item 3 in effect broadened
and clarified the Communist five principles.35

But the enemy soon indicated that it would not
accept the UNC extension of the Communist proposal in its initial form
and on the 28th the attack began. Nam centered his guns upon the UNC

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restrictions upon increases in forces, supplies,
equipment, and facilities and the granting of free access to all of Korea
for the joint observer teams. As far as the Communists were concerned,
Nam declared, they believed that the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Korea was a necessary condition for a final peaceful solution of the Korean
problem. However, the U.N. Command insisted that this be handled by the
political conference to follow the armistice and the matter of restrictions
and reduction of forces belonged, therefore, in the province of the political
conference. Insofar as the UNC proposal for the observer teams was concerned,
this was "entirely unnecessary" since there would be no restrictions applicable
under the military armistice and consequently no need for inspection. Thus,
by disposing of the restrictions, the Communists shrugged off the inspection
principle, too.

As the UNC delegation counterattacked, Admiral
Joy dismissed the Communist references to the withdrawal of foreign troops
as inappropriate. The enemy's 5-point plan, Joy went on, was too limited
in scope to provide the "bridge to peace" that the Communists spoke so
frequently about. He then proceeded to explain the UNC seven principles
in more detail and pointedly emphasized that restrictions on the build-up
of forces must be part of any armistice that the U.N. Command would accept.36

The main battle lines were now plainly discernible.
Since the U.N. Command enjoyed a military advantage in the air over the
Communists, it desired to maintain the status quo and preserve its superior
air capability during the armistice period. Hence the UNC insistence upon
no increase in military facilities, which, in essence, meant airfields.
To make sure that the enemy did not violate this principle required that
its companion, inspection, be also included. The Communists, on the other
hand, were just as determined to oppose any restrictions upon their opportunity
to strengthen their air capability during a truce. If they could avoid
agreement upon this principle, there would be no need for inspection.

The ensuing week witnessed a continuous maneuvering
for position on both sides. Defending its 7-point program, the U.N. Command
argued that either side could reduce its forces and capabilities during
the armistice if it so desired, but since the length of time that the armistice
would endure was unknown, it was vital for the security of the UNC forces
that there be no upsetting of the balance of military power.37
The enemy delegates in rebuttal charged that the U.N. Command was attempting
to prevent the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea, and to intervene
in the internal affairs of the People's Republic. This was quickly denied
by the U.N. Command, which asserted that only airfields would be affected
by the restrictions. Roads, railroads, and other facilities could be restored.38

On 3 December, the Communists made the first concession.
They offered to expand their original five points to seven. Principles
6 and 7 read as follows:

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6. In order to insure the stability of the military
armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political
conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce
into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition under any pretext.
7. In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of
paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral
in the Korean war to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting
necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry
in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the
joint armistice commission the results of inspection.39

The new Communist proposals threw the UNC delegation
on the defensive as they were unprepared for either the drastic restrictions
upon all military forces and equipment or for the introduction of neutral
nations to perform the task of inspection.40 After a brief recess
they submitted a list of questions to clarify the new points and then suggested
that Item 3 be given over to a subdelegation to work out a solution.41
While the UNC delegates explored the implications of the Communist move,
there would be time to get new instructions from Washington.

On 4 December the enemy accepted the UNC proposal
for establishing a subdelegation and appointed Generals Lee and Hsieh as
members. Admiral Joy named Generals Turner and Hodes.

When the subdelegation met that afternoon, Lee
soon made it clear that there would be no rotation of personnel or replenishment
of equipment under the Communist plan and that his side would brook no
interference with the reconstruction of facilities in North Korea. The
latter was a purely internal matter and inspection was out of the question.
In the course of the next session, Lee also revealed that the Communists
had not fully developed their concept of the organization and utilization
of the neutral nations group. Possibly three to five nations would be invited
by both sides, Lee stated, and the neutral organ would operate independently
out of agreedupon ports of entry. As for the Military Armistice Commission,
its duties and

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authority would be limited strictly to the demilitarized
zone.42

After studying the Communist's explanation of
the neutral nations' role, Joy and his staff were hopeful but cynical.
They felt that a deal might be worked out within a reasonable time. Since
they placed little faith in the enemy's promises and thought that the Communists
would eventually find some way to circumvent effective inspection behind
the lines anyway, the neutral nations' solution might answer the needs
of the U.N. Command as well as a military armistice commission.43
But until guidance arrived from Washington, Joy admitted that all the U.N.
Command could do was to delay and stall by asking questions and criticizing
the Communist proposal. He urged the submission of a UNC counterproposal
to regain the initiative: one that would insist upon rotation and replenishment
but would create a neutral nations organization in place of the Military
Armistice Commission, would drop the claims of the U.N. Command to retain
coastal islands north of the demarcation line after the armistice, and
also would cease to demand restrictions against rehabilitating airfields,
only against constructing new airfields. In his opinion, this would give
the U.N. Command all that it required and be very hard for the Communists
to refuse.44

General Ridgway agreed that the U.N. Command had
to take a stand soon or face the prospect of an unfavorable reaction throughout
the free world. On 7 December he pressed the JCS to at least announce the
points on which the U.N. Command would not concede. First and foremost
of these, he held, was the divorcement of the neutral nations' inspection
teams from the authority of the Military Armistice Commission. Differing
sharply with the UNC Panmunjom delegation, Ridgway wanted to reject categorically
this portion of the Communist proposal, since he felt its acceptance would
permit the injection of all sorts of political matters foreign to a military
armistice.45

As no immediate answer to Ridgway's message was
forthcoming, the subdelegation continued to mark time. Two new officers,
Admiral Libby and Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, sat in at the 6 December
meeting and thereafter to gain familiarity with the issues and Communist
techniques. But until a new policy was laid out, the discussion by the
UNC delegation had to be vague and could not get down to cases.

It should not be assumed, however, that the JCS
were inactive during the period. Policy had to be worked out with the State
Department and since the United States was engaged in political and military
conversations with the British in early December, the Joint Chiefs were
inclined to be cautious. Under the circumstances they preferred not to
take irrevocable positions at this stage of the negotiations.46

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By 7 December, after consultation with Secretaries
Marshall and Acheson, the JCS had hammered out a new position and requested
the President to approve it. Pointing out that there were four main issues
at stake on Item 3, they told the President that there could be no shift
in the UNC stand on rotation and replenishment, since these were essential.
Some concessions could be made in permitting the rehabilitation of facilities,
but any decision relating to airfields under this concession would have
to be referred to Washington if it became the last obstacle to an armistice.
As a final position, the JCS went on, the U.N. Command would agree to withdraw
from islands north of the demarcation line and to the use of neutral teams
of observers. However, the neutral nations selected to provide the observers
must be mutually agreed to by both sides and the teams must be responsible
to and subject to direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission.47

At first President Truman objected to a policy
allowing the enemy to rehabilitate its roads, railroads, and other facilities
which the United States and its allies had destroyed at great expense in
lives and materiel. But the JCS explained that there was a strong feeling,
particularly in the State Department, that the armistice might be the only
agreement reached on Korea for a long time and that it would be impossible
to prohibit rehabilitation over an extensive period. Furthermore, the United
States itself intended to carry out a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation
in South Korea. The President bowed to these arguments and approved the
new instructions which were forwarded to Ridgway on 11 December.48

On that same day there were indications that the
week's delay in the negotiations might have been beneficial. The U.N. Command
had been constantly urging the Communists to set up a subdelegation on
Item 4 in order to exchange prisoner of war data and the enemy finally
agreed to meet that afternoon. General Lee and Colonel Tsai would take
over the negotiations on Item 4 while General Hsieh and Colonel Chang would
carry on the discussions on Item 3.

Later during the debate, Hsieh made the first
break in the deadlock when he asked in a tentative fashion whether the
UNC would accept the idea of the neutral nations carrying out inspections
if the Communists gave in on the maintenance of forces and agreed that
there be a single directing head rather than two organs supervising the
armistice. Although Hsieh apparently was just probing the UNC position,
there was now a possibility of a compromise.49

Armed with the instructions from Washington and
the hint from Hsieh that the Communists might be receptive to a modification
of their stand, the UNC delegation presented a new package proposal on
12 December. It featured the concession by the U.N. Command of the islands
along the coast and in territorial waters north of the demarcation

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line and agreement to the concept that the neutral
nations acceptable to both sides furnish personnel for the observer teams.
On the other hand, the Communists must permit rotation and replenishment
and agree that the neutral nations be under the Military Armistice Commission.
There was no change in the UNC stand on airfields, and reconstruction and
rehabilitation were still forbidden. Since this was a package proposal,
Turner told Hsieh that it must be accepted in toto or not at all.50

Hsieh spent the next session attacking the UNC
plan, and Turner in turn counterattacked. When Hsieh assailed the rotation
and replenishment principle, Turner pointed out that acceptance of the
Communist view would in effect constitute the withdrawal of foreign forces
from Korea since attrition eventually would eliminate all but native troops.
The enemy had agreed to discuss this problem under Item 5 and not Item
3, Turner maintained, scoring a point.51

On 14 December Hsieh presented an alternate suggestion
which accepted the UNC concessions and in return offered to permit the
U.N. Command to rotate 5,000men a month. Turner ridiculed the low
figure. Upon further questioning, Hsieh admitted that even the 5,000rotatees
would have to be approved by the Military Armistice Commission each month
and that the Communists could conceivably veto any rotation if they so
desired since they would have equal membership in this group. This made
the enemy's proposal even more unacceptable and the negotiations began
to bog down again.52

Thus, by mid-December, the Communists had shown
a disposition to compromise on inspection- the issue which the JCS and
the UNC leaders had feared might be the greatest stumbling block to an
agreement on Item 3. True, there remained many details to be worked out
on the composition of the neutral nations organization and its duties and
relationship to the Military Armistice Commission, but the principle, at
least, had been accepted. The enemy was also willing to retreat from its
extreme stand against rotation provided a suitable quid pro quo was
offered. But the price for this concession- freedom to develop and rehabilitate
airfields during an armistice- was one that the U.N. Command was vehemently
opposed to.

General Ridgway flew to Korea on 17 December and
after canvassing the members of the UNC delegation forwarded an estimate
of the situation to the JCS. Concerned with the approach of the thirty-day
deadline on the line of demarcation, he told his superiors that an extension,
unless it was for a very short period of time and the conclusion of the
negotiations was in sight, would have a harmful effect upon his forces.
He admitted that neither he nor his staff were agreed upon what the Communists
intentions were, but argued that the best way to expose them lay in setting
out the UNC firm position in unequivocal language. Warning that the time
could come when the UNC might have to face a breaking off in the negotiations,
he felt that the decision to meet such a crisis

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should be readied in advance. Ridgway especially
deprecated the policy pursued in the past of abandoning positions since
this had only tended to make the enemy more obdurate and demanding.

Then, turning to the problems at hand, he strongly
urged that the U.N. Command stick to its stand on airfields and rotation.
In addition, the U.N. Command should insist upon neutral aerial inspection
and photoreconnaissance to watch the enemy's airfields and for free movement
of neutral observer teams throughout Korea over major lines of communication.
The tasks assigned to the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral
observer teams should be made mandatory so that the Communists could not
block action by these organs. In the opinion of himself and his staff,
the critical matter was airfields and the making of an armistice might
well hinge on the acceptance or nonacceptance of this principle.53

Domestic Problems and Foreign
Pressures

After meeting with the State Department and securing
Presidential approval, the JCS replied to Ridgway the following day. The
Washington leaders appreciated the fine effort that Ridgway and the UNC
delegation were making despite many difficulties. But the consensus of
official opinion held that a political conference after the armistice would
probably be unsuccessful and consequently the armistice might be the only
agreement for some time. In that event its character must provide for a
greater degree of permanency and the conditions imposed must be of a type
that could be enforced over a long period. The U.S. political and military
leaders felt that Communist violations of the armistice would probably
consist of demonstrations, threats, and equivocations rather than renewed
aggression. And in their view the major deterrent to another outbreak of
hostilities in Korea would be the Communist realization that further aggression
would bring full retribution. The United States was working on a declaration
to this effect which would be signed by as many of the United Nations participating
in the Korean War as could be persuaded; it would be issued after the conclusion
of the armistice. The United Kingdom had already indicated that it would
support such a statement.

In the light of these considerations. U.S. leaders
preferred not to take final positions on all the issues now under discussion,
as this would destroy the ability of the United States to maneuver or adjust
if new elements were introduced by the Communists. Neither did they care
to establish a given point at which the negotiations would be broken off.
Instead they listed the positions that Ridgway and his staff should now
support. Since it would be impracticable to enforce the rehabilitation
of airfields for any length of time, they were willing to permit some airfields,
excluding those suitable for jet operations, to be rebuilt and maintained.
As for aerial observation, this was desirable but not essential and should
not be a part of the UNC final position. Either adequate rotation of personnel
should be authorized or as long as there was no over-all increase in forces,
no limit at all should be fixed.

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In the matter of replenishment, the important
issue was that there be no augmentation of combat aircraft. On this Ridgway
should be adamant. The Washington leaders agreed that the neutral observer
teams should be stationed at the major ports of entry and have freedom
to move wherever their duties demanded. It would not be necessary to have
all the observer teams in place when the armistice went into effect, but
the Military Armistice Commission and some of the teams should be on hand.
If the deadline of 27 December approached and progress was still being
made in the negotiations, Ridgway was authorized to propose an extension
of up to fifteen days.54

The differences in approach to the intricate task
of negotiating with the Communists were sharply delineated in this exchange
between Ridgway and his superiors. The Far East commander and his staff
believed that continuing concessions could only indicate weakness to the
enemy and that the best course was one of strength and firmness. Only when
the Communists realized that the U.N. Command intended to cling steadfastly
to its principles and would yield no more, would they get down seriously
to the business of fashioning an armistice. The Washington leaders, on
the other hand, inclined toward a flexible approach based upon the practical
necessities for a long armistice period. This meant playing the Communist
game of shifting, adjusting, and maneuvering for advantages and avoiding
fixed positions that might precipitate a break in the negotiations. Inherent
in this approach were the hope that eventually a reasonable and workable
armistice agreement would be reached that would end the hostilities in
Korea, and the knowledge that as long as the U.N. Command continued to
be willing to negotiate, the Communists would be forced to bear the onus
for a breaking off of the conference. The influence of this latter consideration
upon the thinking of the government in Washington was constant and important.

For behind the American leaders the pressure for
an early solution to the Korean War through a cease-fire and armistice
was mounting. By mid-December the desire to halt the growing casualty lists
and to free U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea for redeployment elsewhere became
stronger. As the negotiations dragged on, the allies of the United States
became more reluctant to apply additional measures against Communist China
and disinclined to contribute more troops to Korea. It was also evident
that as long as the war continued and the United States poured resources
into a hot war, the flow of military assistance to areas engaged in the
cold war had to be restricted. Influences at home and abroad increasingly
favored a minimum settlement of the Korean War by means of an armistice
and the unification of Korea by political means.

Since the National Security Council recommended
in December that the United States adhere to the policy of avoiding a general
war with China and the USSR and of seeking an acceptable settlement in
Korea that would not jeopardize the U.S. positions regarding Taiwan, a
seat for Communist China in the United Nations, or vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, the chances that the war would be broadened in the near

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future appeared small. The council preferred to
continue the course now being pursued-limited war and economic pressure
upon Red China backed by the support of the majority of the United Nations-until
a satisfactory armistice was concluded. This would be followed by efforts
to reach a political settlement of the Korean problem, but in the meantime
the ROK Army would be strengthened and prepared to deter or repel a further
attempt by the Communists to take over South Korea. The council was now
convinced that with proper training and equipment the ROK Army could eventually
bear the brunt of the defense of South Korea. Only if the armistice negotiations
failed, would the council consider the additional measures of mobilization
and forms of military pressure to solve the situation.

The NSC decision deferred the imposition of a
naval blockade against

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China and the extension of the air war into Manchuria.55
And since the United States did not feel that the United Nations would
support a stricter economic embargo on China at this time, there seemed
to be little profit in pursuing that matter either.

Perhaps the case of the British may serve as a
graphic illustration of this point. The British had been undergoing a period
of economic crisis since World War II and were loathe to place additional
restrictions upon their trade with Communist China. It was natural that
they should also be concerned about the exposed position of Hong Kong if
more pressure were to be applied against the Chinese Communists and that
they should view the growing air strength of the enemy's air force in Korea
uneasily. Under the circumstances they were most anxious to limit the war
to the Korean Peninsula until a settlement could be worked out at the truce
table.56

British uncertainties over American policy led
to consultations in Washington during late December and January. While
British military leaders discussed the implications of broadening U.N.
action against Communist China with their American counterparts at the
military level, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden conferred with President Truman and his advisors.

Fundamentally, divergencies in policy stemmed
from the attitudes of the two countries toward Communist China and Nationalist
China. Since the British had recognized the former and established trade
relations, they were inclined to regard the new regime as a permanent one.
The United States, on the other hand, felt that as long as Communist China
remained aggressive and showed no signs of changing its attitude toward
the West, there was no point in according the Communists the advantages
that recognition would entail, such as a seat in the United Nations or
formal trade relations. Besides, the United States had certain obligations
toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Taiwan government, which it could not easily
avoid. Since the United States acknowledged the economic interests of the
British in the Far East, the U.S. policy planners felt that the British
must in turn realize that the United States must bear the major responsibility
for the area and supply the power to meet this responsibility.57

Although the conferences produced no changes in
either British or American policy, the two countries were able to reassure
each other. Neither desired an extension of the Korean War and so long
as there was no collapse of negotiations, their differences in regard to
Communist China could be adjusted. What might happen if the enemy did not
agree to an armistice or breached it was also discussed, but since the
United States had not reached a firm decision on an alternate course of
action, no positive information could be given to the British.58

Actually there seemed to be little choice for
the United States unless the situation altered. For those who still believed
that a military decision in Korea was either desirable or necessary to
settle

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the conflict, even if it meant taking on Communist
China, General Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, had some sobering
counsel at the end of December. He told Assistant Secretary of the Army
Karl R. Bendetsen that the United States had no certain current military
capability for reaching a favorable decision in the Far East and no knowledge
of how long it would take to acquire such a capability. Only by a drastic
change in the global strategy of the United States or through an all-out
mobilization of national resources could the military capability be immediately
increased. As Bolte pointed out, the first course might cause great danger
to the national security and the second would create grave economic problems.
Either might play directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.59

From General Ridgway came confirmation of Bolt's
position. In commenting upon the apparent willingness of the U.S. policy
makers to rely upon a postarmistice U.N. declaration threatening a spread
of the war if the Communists made a truce and then broke it, he stated
frankly that: ". . . conscience compels me to reiterate my conviction that
with presently available military forces this command would be incapable
of imposing a threat to Communist China sufficient in itself to deter it
from renewed aggression."60

But, as General Collins pointed out to the JCS
on 10 January, the very fact that the proposed U.N. declaration did not
necessarily restrict a future outbreak of hostilities to Korea posed a
new set of circumstances. Under the recent NSC decision the ROK forces
would be increased, trained, and equipped to assume the responsibility
for the defense of their own territory. Depending upon conditions at the
time, the United States might or might not intervene again in Korea if
the Communists violated an armistice agreement. In any event the JCS informed
Ridgway that he would prepare only contingency plans for U.S. intervention.61

As long as the negotiations continued, however,
the prospects for increasing the U.S. effort in Korea appeared forlorn.
The shift foreshadowed by the National Security Council action was toward
a gradual disengagement provided that a

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truce could be arranged. but meantime the Joint
Chiefs were faced with the problem of sustaining the present rate of military
build-up until the world situation improved. Whether the President or Congress
would be receptive to further augmentation of the armed forces while the
stalemate in Korea remained unbroken was still a moot question.

With the action on the battlefield still at a
low ebb and with little hope of accelerating the pace, the sharpest clashes
took place over the conference table. The airfield question limited agreement
on Item 3 and a new battle was about to break out over the disposition
of prisoners of war.

Notes

1 The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France,
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey were
represented in the UNC. In November Italy sent a medical unit to Korea,
leaving only Iceland, which had no armed forces, and Portugal unrepresented.

5 Summaries of Proceedings, Seventh and Eighth
Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 25 and 26 Oct 51, in FEC Subdelegates
Mtgs on item 2, Vol. I. All meetings through g November will be found in
this file.

23 Summary of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session,
Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17 Nov 51. According to Admiral Burke, both
he and Hodes felt that their usefulness to the delegation had ended at
this point. After they had taken such strong stands, Burke wrote, the order
to concede would mark them as "pushovers" in the eyes of the Communists.
See Ltr, Burke to Mrs. A. A. Burke, 16 Nov 51. In OCMH.

40 The term "neutral nations" was used very loosely
during the negotiations and usually meant those nations that did not have
military forces in Korea. The United States would not recognize the USSR
as a neutral and the Communists undoubtedly would not have allowed Nationalist
China to be placed in this category.