Mr. GERRY. The Constitution of the United States was proposed by a
Convention met at Philadelphia; but with all its importance, it did not possess
as high authority as the President, Senate, and House of Representatives of the
Union; for that Convention was not convened in consequence of any express will
of the people, but an implied one, through their members in the state
legislatures. The Constitution derived no authority from the first Convention;
it was concurred in by conventions of the people, and that concurrence armed it
with power, and invested it with dignity. Now, the Congress of the United
States are expressly authorized, by the sovereign and uncontrollable voice of
the people, to propose amendments whenever two thirds of both houses shall
think fit. Now, if this is the fact, the propositions of amendment will be
found to originate with a higher authority than the original system. The
conventions of the states respectively have agreed, for the people, that the
state legislatures shall be authorized to decide upon these amendments in the
manner of a convention. If these acts of the state legislatures are not good,
because they are not specifically instructed by their constituents, neither
were the acts calling the first and subsequent conventions.

Mr. AMES. It is not necessary to increase the representation, in order {405}
to guard against corruption; because no one will presume to think that a body
composed like this, and increased in a ratio of 4 to 3, will be much less
exposed to sale than we are. Nor is a greater number necessary to secure the
rights and liberties of the people, for the representative of a great body of
people is likely to be more watchful of its interests than the representative
of a lesser body.

Mr. MADISON. Suppose they, the people, instruct a representative by his vote
to violate the Constitution; is he at liberty to obey such instructions?
Suppose he is instructed to patronize certain measures, and from circumstances
known to him, but not to his constituents, he is convinced that they will
endanger the public good; is he obliged to sacrifice his own judgment to them?
Is he absolutely bound to perform what he is instructed to do? Suppose he
refuses; will his vote be the less valid, or the community be disengaged from
that obedience which is due, from the laws of the Union? If his vote must
inevitably have the same effect, what sort of a right is this, in the
Constitution, to instruct a representative who has a right to disregard the
order, if he pleases? In this sense, the right does not exist; in the other
sense, it does exist, and is provided largely for.