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[1298b]
[1]
and these govern in accordance with law as in
the former case, this is oligarchical; and also when the deliberative officials
are elected by co-optation, and when the office is hereditary and has supreme
control over the laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But when certain persons control certain
matters, for instance when all the citizens control decisions as to war and
peace and the audit of officials while everything else is controlled by
magistrates and these are elected by vote, not by lot,1 the
constitution is an aristocracy; while if some matters are controlled by
magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates chosen by lot, and this
either directly or from a list previously selected by vote, or if magistrates
elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint body, some of these regulations are
features of an aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional government
itself.

We have then in this way distinguished
the different kinds of deliberative body in relation to the forms of
constitution, and each form of constitution carries on the administration in
accordance with the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the form that at the present day is
considered to be democracy in the fullest degree （and I mean one of the
sort in which the people is sovereign even over the laws） it is
advantageous for the improvement of its deliberative function for it to do the
same as is done in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts （for
they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries of those whom they want to
attend, whereas democratic states institute payment for attendance for the
benefit of the poor）, and also to do this in respect of the
assemblies
[20]
（for they will
deliberate better when all are deliberating jointly, the common people when with
the notables and these when with the masses）, and it is also
advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally
from the different sections, and, if the men of the people far exceed the
political class in number, it is advantageous either not to give pay to all but
only to as many as are commensurate with the number of the notables, or to
discard by lot those who exceed this number. In oligarchies on the other hand it is advantageous either
to co-opt some persons from the multitude, or to institute an office like the
one that exists in certain constitutional governments under the flame of
Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Law,2 and deal with
the matters about which these officials have held a preliminary deliberation
（for thus the common people will have a share in deliberation and will
not have the power to abolish any part of the constitution）, and then
for the people by their vote either to confirm or at all events not to pass
anything contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or to allow all to
take part in debate but only the magistrates to frame resolutions; and in fact it is proper to do just the
opposite of what takes place in constitutionally governed states; for the common
people ought to be given power to vote the rejection of a measure, but not to
vote its ratification, but it should be referred back to the magistrates. In
constitutional governments the procedure is the reverse; the few are competent
to vote the rejection of a resolution but are not competent to vote its
ratification, this being always referred back to the most numerous body.

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