before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts

"A Continuation of Oversight of the Wen Ho Lee Case"

October 3, 2000

My name is Notra Trulock, III, and I am the former Director of Intelligence
at the Department of Energy. I wish to thank the members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and Senator Arlen Specter, for providing this opportunity to
speak out on the facts of the Wen Ho Lee investigation. For months, I have
remained silent while my role in the investigation was discussed in the media, in
the course of Dr. Lee's bail hearings, and on Capitol Hill. I barely recognize the
individual portrayed in these very public proceedings. I wish to thank the
Committee for providing me this opportunity.

Much of what you have read or heard about DOE's conduct of the
Administrative Inquiry into Chinese nuclear espionage is just plain wrong. Much
of what you have heard or read about my role in that inquiry is worse than wrong,
it is defamatory. Indeed, I have been forced to file libel and slander lawsuits
against Mr. Charles Washington, Mr. Robert Vrooman, Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson, and Dr. Wen Ho Lee. I wish to address four separate allegations
today.

1. It is often alleged that I was inexperienced, overly ambitious, and that is what
led to the "later problems."

I became the Director of Intelligence in 1995. I had prior experience in
management and the direction of research programs. But I knew I needed
help and so sought out the most experienced managers from the CIA. My
first Deputy Director was an experienced CIA professional with nearly 30
years of experience in both analysis and operations. He had been a
successful manager and was highly recommended by the ClA's senior
management. I recruited another senior CIA manager with extensive
management experience in nonproliferation and foreign nuclear weapons
programs to run these activities for us; she later became my Deputy Director.
She received the Meritorious Achievement Medal from the Director of Central
Intelligence for her work at DOE. I recruited other experienced CIA experts
on intelligence production, operations and management and actively sought
their advice and guidance.

For technical advice and guidance, I relied heavily on the expertise and
experience of the scientists of our nuclear laboratories. We regularly
conducted peer reviews and competitive analyses on different topics; simply
put, we did not publish our conclusions or key judgments before their time.
It is now said that I was inexperienced in counterintelligence and that caused
all the later "problems." When the DOE Office of Counterintelligence came
under my management in 1995, I found the office to be riddled with personnel
problems and ineptitude. The senior managers of the office routinely
engaged in petty bickering; it was a bureaucratic nightmare. With a few
notable exceptions, the professional capabilities of the office were extremely
low. One example will suffice. One of the most highly touted CI analysts in
that shop was asked to produce an assessment of the CI threat in Georgia,
the former Soviet Republic. The analyst demurred, saying that Atlanta is a
safe city and why should we be worried about the CI threat there.

So, I relied on an experienced CIA counterintelligence expert already on site.
When he left for retirement, we found another expert fresh from an
assignment on the Aldrich Ames damage assessment team. He was
experienced, able, and held in high esteem within the counterintelligence
community and proved to be an excellent CI manager. This individual helped
shape our efforts to retool CI within DOE and, until encountering fierce
resistance from DOE management, had put our CI program on the right track.
For his efforts, the Director of Central Intelligence awarded him the highest
intelligence medal for his distinguished service.

As true bureaucrats, of course the DOE federal employees resisted these
changes bitterly. These employees and their allies in the Department's
Human Resources division sought to delay, obstruct, and block any and all
changes needed within the Office. The DOE federal employees and their
allies in DOE's senior management were content with a bumbling CI effort for
the Department.

2. It is now fashionable in the media to express doubts that Chinese espionage
even occurred. I would remind the Committee that the unclassified
Intelligence Community Damage Assessment, published in May 1999,
concluded that the Chinese had indeed obtained through espionage nuclear
weapons design information, including on the W88 Trident D5 warhead.
Further, that information probably accelerated China's efforts to develop
modern nuclear weapons. That conclusion mirrors very accurately the
conclusion arrived at by a prestigious group of laboratory nuclear weapons
scientists in 1995. The CIA reiterated their judgments about Chinese
espionage later in 1999 in an estimate on ballistic missile developments. I am
not aware that CIA or Intelligence Community representatives have refuted
these judgments or revised them.

It has also been erroneously reported that there were differences of opinion
among the scientists and that somehow I railroaded the group to the
"minority" opinion. Anyone with even the slightest experience with such an
august group as this will surely appreciate the silliness of that claim. In fact,
the study results were presented to then DOE Undersecretary Charles Curtis
and DOE senior managers by the scientists themselves both in the Fall 1995,
and again in the early Spring 1996. On both occasions, the scientists did the
talking; they were questioned closely by Curtis and had ample opportunity to
express their dissent or differing views. They didn't.

3. It is alleged that the Administrative Inquiry was flawed from the beginning in
that it focused on Los Alamos and Wen Ho Lee as early as October 1995.
We conferred with the FBI from June 1995 throughout the summer study
effort to its conclusion in September 1995. In the fall 1995, we sought to
refer this case to the FBI. But the FBI refused to accept it, claiming that it was
too old and that the trail was too cold. Instead, the FBI requested that we
initiate an "Administrative Inquiry". Much has been written about this inquiry,
most of it overblown and wrong.

The facts are these: the DOE Administrative Inquiry was nothing more than a
"records check", such as is done routinely in security reviews every day. By
law, only the FBI may conduct espionage investigations within the U.S.; DOE
counterintelligence officials are proscribed from conducting any such
investigations and conducting any interrogations, etc. We looked at records --
travel records, records of access to nuclear weapons design information,
records of interactions with visiting dignitaries, and security records for
indications of any "anomalies". In this review, the FBI was with us every step
of the way.

Early on, I concluded that DOE was understaffed and ill equipped to conduct
even an Administrative Inquiry. I went to the FBI and requested help in the
form of on-site assistance from experienced FBI agents. In fact, the FBI
provided one of their most experienced agents to assist us. This agent was
detailed to DOE for the duration of our inquiry. Moreover, we carefully
previewed our approach and methodology for the FBI; the FBI approved our
approach and monitored the progress of our inquiry. In this fashion, I
believed that such FBI involvement would protect both the integrity of the
inquiry and us from criticism later. I guess I was wrong.

Incredibly, when the FBI came under criticism for its handling of the
espionage investigation later on, FBI officials blamed the DOE inquiry for
"misleading" them. The FBI was there at the beginning, it was there during
the site visits, it reviewed and approved the final draft report of the inquiry in
1996, and it enthusiastically accepted the full report in June 1996. The FBI
was there every step of the way; its later criticism is disingenuous...at best.

What did we give to the FBI in June 1996? We turned over a long report that
detailed our approach and identified 12 "investigative leads" for follow up by
the FBI. We told the FBI on numerous occasions that the information in
question might also reside at the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE
contractors, but that our authority extended only to DOE facilities. "Don't
worry", the FBI said, "we'll take care of the DOD facilities." Of course, they
never followed up on the other potential sites of the information.

Obviously, the FBI also discarded the other 10 "investigative leads" on our list
and focused in on Wen Ho Lee and his wife. At the time, we assumed that
the FBI had some good reason to do so and was unwilling to share that
"reason" with us. Congressional reports over the past year have brought to
light some of those "reasons", but nothing has yet been revealed to indicate
why the FBI never followed up on the other 10 leads. In fact, nearly 3 years
later, DOE had to retransmit the list to FBI as the Bureau had "lost" the other
names. The report included an "investigatory note" written by the main DOE
investigator, which discussed Dr. Lee's opportunity, access, and motive.
Clearly Dr. Lee had opportunity and access; the investigator believed that Dr.
Lee also had "motive". The investigator's note was an adjunct to the main
body of the report; it was reviewed and approved by the FBI agent who had
participated in the inquiry and the investigator's supervisor Mr. Charles
Washington. I signed the report over to the FBI on Mr. Washington's
recommendation. It was clear that the report had the approval of the FBI and
Mr. Washington, the supervisor -- both clearly much more experienced than I
in these matters. The main content of the report was the 12 "investigative
leads" we transmitted to the FBI.

More puzzling to me: is it customary for the FBI to rely so heavily on such an
inquiry to guide its espionage investigations? It seems evident from FBI
testimony that its agents did little or nothing to follow up on the other leads.
Although the FBI told us in June 1996 that it would seek technical coverage of
Dr. Lee immediately, I was surprised to learn much later that it did nothing for
a year. It made one lame attempt to access his computer in November 1996,
after the election, but never went back when turned down by a lab official.
The lab official, supposedly trained by Robert Vrooman, didn't know his job
well enough to understand the FBI's request. Sadly, the FBI missed an
opportunity to uncover Lee's massive downloading of nuclear design secrets
early on in this scandal.

Why would the FBI rely so heavily on an inquiry that was so limited by statute
in its scope and breadth? Remember that the FBI so distrusted DOE at that
time that it had pulled back its FBI agents on loan to DOE, because the new
Hazel O'Leary regime with its emphasis on "openness" was so uncomfortable
for FBI operators. To jump from that distrust to complete and unwavering
faith in a DOE inquiry of limited scope in an espionage investigation is hard to
swallow. It is obvious in retrospect that the FBI either didn't take espionage
seriously or it just wasn't interested in pursuing the case.

We handed over the inquiry to the FBI in June 1996; at that point, we stepped
out and the FBI had complete control of the investigation. The FBI requested
that Dr. Lee not be alerted as to the FBI's investigation and we complied.
From 1996 on, this was the FBI's case; to imply that somehow I drove the FBI
on is wrong. Put simply, we had no idea what the FBI was doing on this case.
FBI officials provided little information on their progress, apparently because
there wasn't any. The FBI never told us until August 1997 that it had waited a
year to apply for a FISA warrant. Even then, as I later learned, the warrant
did not include coverage of Dr. Lee's computer. Finally, any testimony to the
Congress that concerned Dr. Lee, either during the Cox Committee hearings
or otherwise, came from the FBI not DOE intelligence.

Regarding Wen Ho Lee: of course, his name was on the DOE list. With all
the information now available about his travels, his unreported contacts with
senior Chinese nuclear weapons officials, his unreported contact with a
suspect in an espionage case, his later performance on polygraph exams,
and his computer downloading activities, how could we possibly have left him
off our list? We would have been grossly negligent not to include him, even
to highlight him and his activities. Ironically, Lee's late arriving white knight,
Robert Vrooman, was the first official to single out Lee for DOE-FBI's
attention in January 1996. In fact, he went out of his way to direct the DOE-FBI team's attention to Dr. Lee.

But Wen Ho Lee was not the only "lead" provided to the FBI; there were 10
others. Despite all the later claims, these all shared common elements: travel
to China or interactions with Chinese nuclear officials; access to nuclear
weapons design information; and anomalies or incidents reported in their
security files. Lab scientists later claimed "why not me, I traveled, I met with
Chinese, why not me on the list?" Most likely because they had followed the
appropriate security procedures and guidelines; they had reported their
contacts and travels and their security files were "clean." Given the
experiences of Los Alamos with the FBI in the recent investigation of the
missing computer hard drives, it's difficult to imagine any scientists now
clamoring to be on the "list."

By the way, there was no matrix that I was aware of; I didn't hear the word
"matrix" until a justice official revealed in 1999 that he had asked the FBI to
develop one in order to assist with the approval of the FISA.

It has been alleged that we focused on Dr. Lee as early as October 1995.
This is simply not true. The inquiry team did not travel to Los Alamos until
January 1996. Robert Vrooman brought Dr. Lee's name to the attention of
the team in 1996, that was the DOE investigator's first knowledge of Dr. Lee.
My first recollection of hearing Dr. Lee's name was in March or April 1996.
Subsequently, we traveled to Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia
National Lab in Albuquerque. While I have no access to the 1996 AI, it is my
recollection that the references on our list of "investigative leads" came from
both Los Alamos and Livermore.

One of the most absurd allegations thus far, which has been reported in the
Washington Post, LA Times and elsewhere, concerns the contents of a memo
sent to me in 1996. Charles Washington has repeatedly claimed that he
warned me in the memo that there was no evidence against Dr. Lee and that
the case should be closed. The Post even claimed to have a copy of the
memo. In fact, I have seen a copy of the memorandum, dated May 16, 1996.

Suffice to say the memo makes no mention of Dr. Lee, it makes
recommendations concerning the transmission of our Inquiry to the FBI, and it
notes that DOE is "close to becoming involved in an espionage investigation,
which we do not have the authority to do." In February 2000, I wrote to
Secretary Richardson requesting that he make this memo available to the
Justice Department to clear up these spurious allegations. My information is
that DOE has refused to provide that memo to Justice or to the appropriate
oversight committees on Capitol Hill. That the Washington Post would
publish Mr. Washington's version of the contents, rather than the actual
substance, is a comment on its own journalistic integrity.

Let me state this clearly: at no point in 1996, 1997, or 1998 did Robert
Vrooman or Charles Washington express any concern, disagreement,
dissent, or protest with the conduct of the Administrative Inquiry or the content
of the Inquiry's report. Mr. Washington was the Acting Director of DOE/CI
during the conduct of the Administrative Inquiry; he supervised the DOE
individuals conducting the inquiry, he reviewed and approved DOE's
proposed AI methodology, he reviewed and approved the inquiry team's
travel, he reviewed the inquiry team's report and approved its transmission to
the FBI.

Mr. Vrooman was present at our initial briefings for the FBI, he assisted our
team during their visit to Los Alamos in January 1996, he identified Dr. Lee to
our team for inclusion in the report, he was present at our briefing for the FBI
in late Spring 1996, and I saw Vrooman at least six times over the course of
the next three years. He was a key participant in a DOE-FBI-Los Alamos
meeting in April 1997 that focused upon the FBI's handling of the Lee
investigation to that point. At no time during that or any other meeting did
Vrooman protest or express any dissent or concern to the FBI or DOE
participants about the FBI's investigation of Lee. In each instance, as the
resident Los Alamos CI official, Vrooman willingly cooperated with the FBI in
its handling and approach to Dr. Lee.

4. The most contemptible allegations concern racism and ethnicity.

As Michael Kelly writing in the Washington Post noted, the President and his
supporters quickly played the race card when the issue of illegal campaign
contributions was first raised in late 1996. Yet I must say that it still came as
a surprise when it was alleged that I held "racist views toward minority
groups" and that this was the factor in targeting Lee. The facts of my
management experience at DOE put the lie to this allegation. I opened new
career opportunities for women and minorities during my tenure and was
awarded a Certificate of Achievement by the Department's chapter of Federal
Women's Group and Margaret Bachelor White, the head of DOE's Office of
Economic Impact and Diversity for my efforts in 1995. According to the
award: "Mr. Trulock personally assisted in the career development,
enrichment, and progression of numerous women and minorities in the Office
of Energy Intelligence and continues to seek now opportunities for
advancement or promotion." I also received an award from the DOE chapter
of Blacks in Government in 1996 for my efforts in support of Secretary
O'Leary's efforts to help South Africa.

Allegations made by disgruntled employees from the DOE Office of
Counterintelligence against me were repeatedly investigated by the
Department and repeatedly found to be baseless. Time after time, the
conclusion of independent outside investigators: "that Complainant was not
discriminated against with respect to the matters raised in his complaints."
Mr. Washington has claimed that he won his complaint, but the settlement,
arrived at after I had left the Department, states clearly that it "shall not
constitute an admission of liability" by DOE. Secretary Richardson's
willingness to settle this case has caused great discontent in the Department,
but the settlement served Richardson's larger purposes. The complainant is
rumored to have been awarded a staggering sum in the high six figures by
Richardson, although investigation after investigation found no basis for a
settlement.

Mr. Washington has even alleged that I assaulted him and that allegation has
been repeated in the national media. I have the Federal Protective Service's
1997 final report of the incident. The conclusion: "based on the facts of the
case no assault occurred." I repeatedly requested that the Department take
action on this false allegation, but the Department refused to do so.

Robert Vrooman has alleged that I stated that no ethnic Chinese should be
allowed to work on U.S. nuclear weapons programs. Again, categorically
false. In fact, I stopped efforts by senior DOE managers to compile a
database on the ethnicity of American citizens with access to classified
nuclear weapons information. I thought this an outrageous overreaction to a
serious problem.

We were concerned about the our ability to stay abreast of the explosion in
numbers of foreign national at the labs, particularly those from countries on
the sensitive list like Russia, India, and China. We were hardly alone in our
concerns; the Government Accounting Office repeatedly cited DOE for its lack
of safeguards in light of the ever-increasing numbers of foreign nationals at
our nuclear weapons labs. A 1997 FBI report on DOE CI made the same
observation and recommended a number of fixes; sadly, DOE management
resisted these recommendations. FBI Director Louis Freeh told DOE in 1997
that if DOE management failed to address its security vulnerabilities, the
Congress would do it for DOE. He was right; while many now decry the
heavy-handed security regime imposed by the Hill on the labs, they only have
DOE management, former Secretary Federico Pena and Deputy Secretary
Elizabeth Moler, to thank for the state of affairs in the labs today. These
officials resisted implementation of the mandates of the 1998 Presidential
Decision Directive and effectively delayed any meaningful reforms.