Wishes Horses Causes

Over the last five (5) years, the NTSB has concluded that the lack of a functioning positive train control system has been a "contributing cause" in ten (10) of the railroad accidents it has investigated.

If I were in the business of assigning contributing causes, I know that in the last 5 years I could find at least six (6) more accidents where lack of a PTC system might be classified by NTSB as a "contributing cause."

I'm not, I'm happy to say. It's not that I don't acknowledge such a thing as a "contributing cause." Anybody who has ever investigated a low-speed wheel climb derailment knows that sometimes there are only contributing causes. But...

But I do have difficulty figuring out exactly how the lack of a specific variant of a train control system can be "elevated" to the cause, contributing or otherwise. Either the train control system that existed at the time of the accident was/is safe. Or it was/is not safe.

What about "safe enough"? Doesn't that apply? Well, actually not. The "enough" introduces a conditionality that explictly, intrinsically locates the cause elsewhere; in the actions of those operating outside, in violation, of the requirements of the existing train control system.

Full disclosure: This is not an academic discussion, or a semantic debate. There's a lawsuit out there, brought by the locomotive engineer on December 1, 2013 of Metro-North train 8808 . That locomotive engineer argues that Metro-North is liable to him, as an employee, for his failure to control the speed of the train, in its failure to adapt its automatic speed control system to enforce the 30 mph max when operating through the curve at Spuyten Duyvil.

He's suing-- for what, 10 million smackers?-- and I've been subpoenaed by the locomotive engineer's attorney because in 2005, I had discussions with JD Riley, then General Road Foreman of Engines on MNR about installing a "medium" code, enforcing 30 mph, through the curve. I agreed with JD Riley then that installing the code was the prudent, wise, thing to do. I still hold to that. And I'm only too happy to provide that information in a deposition.

However, the decision by MNR to not install that code did not cause the derailment of 8808.

The lack of any particular enforcement application of to a train control system cannot cause an accident if the train control system itself is safe.

Safety of a train control system on the railroad means quite simply that the train control system embodies and demonstrates the process vital to safe railroading: no authority for movement over the railroad by a train, equipment, or personnel is generated that will conflict with any other authority of any train, equipment, or personnel to move over the same section of the railroad. The train control system has to be configured such that a)compliance is mandatory b)compliance with the directives of the system does not violate that vitality. Short version? No overlaps.

Did Metro-North's train control system satisfy both (a) and (b) before, during, and after December 1, 2013. Clearly the answer is "yes." The rules and procedures of the railroad preclude the overlapping of authorities. The rules and procedures of the railroad demand compliance.

For a condition to qualify as a cause, rather than a speculation or a wish, then we need to be able demonstrate a unique, determining, precipitating relationship between action, or system, and event. That demonstration requires repeatability.

So we ask, how many trains will inevitably derail﻿when there is no "medium" code through the curve at Spuyten Duyvil? The answer is......none. zero. zilch. No train will derail because of the lack of the medium code.

After the incident in 2005, and prior to the derailment in 2013, Metro-North operated approximately 30,000 passenger trains through the curve at Spuyten Duyvil. None derailed. Zero. Zilch.

Then we ask how many trains will inevitably derail at Spuyten Duyvil when operated through the curve at 82 mph? Our answer will be "all of them." Or..."almost all of them."

We have our cause for derailment: operating in excess of the maximum authorized speed for the track segment. Speed is the factor common to all the derailments. Speed is the cause.

Now did Metro-North recognize that failure to operate a train at the proper speed presented a risk of derailment? Clearly, yes. The 30 mph maximum was not some number pulled out of the air, made up to placate a worry wart Superintendent like myself; or a brilliant, General Road Foreman, like JD Riley.

Did Metro-North take action consistent with that recognition to ensure locomotive engineers understood the importance of complying with maximum speed authorizations?

To answer that, we look at the selection, training, certification, supervision of locomotive engineers by the railroad. Does Metro-North select, train, certify and supervise locomotive engineers in order to ensure their compliance with rules and operating procedures of the railroad? Of course. The railroad does not just let anyone operate the controls of a train.

Back in the day when I wondered about these things, I did some simple math pencil and paper calculations and I figured that the time and effort Metro-North spent to train and qualify a locomotive engineer came pretty close to $250,000 per individual. Now that's back in 2007 day. The railroad spent a quarter of a mill training someone to safely operate trains so the railroad could then pay that same someone another $100 + grand a year to safely operate those trains. How's that song go? Nice work if you can get it. And you can get it if you try.

Now the railroad only pays that money because the job is that important. And what is the job? Locomotive engineer? No, that's the job title..

The job is to control the speed of the train, no matter what; to operate the train at the speed that conforms to, under "normal" conditions, the maximum authorized by the railroad but as, and as always, mitigated by the actual operating conditons. That's it. That's the job we call locomotive engineer. That's the only reason railroads even have locomotive engineers-- to control the speed of the train.

I've been asked: had Metro-North acted on JD Riley's suggestion, would the overspeed derailment of train 8808 on December 1, 2013 been prevented? And my answer is a clear, resounding, unequivocal maybe.

Maybe? Yes, maybe. We install enforcement systems to impose the requirements of the train control system despite, and in opposition to, human error. We install these systems because in the long run the likelihood of accidents, the frequency of accidents, the ratio of accidents will be reduced. But, these enforcement systems are subject to......failure.

At any given moment, for any given movement, automatic speed control systems,and positive train control systems, can fail to enforce the operating requirements on a train, or trains. What then? We have our super-duper hi-tech super-certified 6,7, 8, or 9 Sigma PTC system and... it goes dark. Now what? Do we just stop the train as it approaches Spuyten Duyvil curve and wait for the system to be repaired, if it even can be repaired.

We do not. We move the train. We move it safely under the rules. Our operating rules include procedures for safe train movements under those precise circumstances. The safety of those train movements depends entirely upon knowledge of, expertise with, and adherence to the operating requirements of the railroad on the part of the train crews.

Metro-North is responsible for, and answerable to its passengers for their safety under any and all conditions. Those are the terms, and conditions, of running railroad.

The employees of the railroad are responsible for their adherence to the operating rules and procedures under any and all conditions. Those are the terms and conditions of their employment.

And I'm only too happy to provide that information in a deposition, too. ﻿