THE TRUTH ABOUT U.S. "MEDIATION"AND THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL WAR
IN CHINA

Talk with the American Correspondent A. T. Steele

September 29, 1946

Steele: Sir, do you consider that the U.S. effort to mediate in
the Chinese civil war has failed? If the policy of the United States continues
as at present, what will it lead to?

Mao: I doubt very much that the policy of the U.S. government is
one of "mediation".[1]Judging by the large amount
of aid the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to wage
a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the U.S. government
is to use the so-called mediation as a smoke-screen for strengthening Chiang
Kai-shek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China through
Chiang Kai-shek's policy of slaughter so as to reduce China virtually to
a U.S. colony. The continuation of this policy will certainly arouse the
firm resistance of all patriotic people throughout China.

Steele: How long will the Chinese civil war go on? What will be
its outcome?

Mao: If the U.S. government abandons its present policy of aiding
Chiang Kai-shek, withdraws its forces now stationed in China and carries
out the agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers
of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain,
[2] the Chinese civil war is sure to end at an early
date. Otherwise it may turn into a long war. This would of course bring suffering
to the Chinese people, but on the other hand, the Chinese people would certainly
unite, fight for survival and decide their own fate. Whatever the difficulties
and hardships, the Chinese people will certainly fulfil their task of achieving
independence, peace and democracy. No forces of suppression, domestic or
foreign, can prevent the fulfilment of this task.

Steele: Sir, do you consider Chiang Kai-shek the "natural leader"
of the Chinese people? Is the Communist Party of China going to reject Chiang
Kai-shek's five demands [3] in all circumstances?
If the Kuomintang tries to convene a National Assembly without the participation
of the Communist Party, [4] what action will the
Communist Party take?

Mao: There is no such thing in the world as a "natural leader".
If Chiang deals with the political, military, economic and other problems
of China in accordance with the truce agreement [5]
signed last January and the joint resolutions then adopted by the Political
Consultative Conference, [6] and not in accordance
with the so-called "five demands" or ten demands, which are one-sided and
run counter to the agreement and joint resolutions, we will still be willing
to work with him. The National Assembly must be convened jointly by various
political parties, in line with the resolutions adopted by the Political
Consultative Conference; otherwise we will firmly oppose it.

NOTES

1. In December 1945 the U.S. government sent George C.
Marshall to China as the president's special representative and used "mediation
in the hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China"
as a cover for strengthening the U.S. forces of aggression and the reactionary
Kuomintang rule in various ways. To gain time to prepare for his civil war,
Chiang Kai-shek, prompted by U.S. imperialism, pretended to accept the demand
of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people to stop the civil war.
In January 1946 representatives of the Kuomintang government and the Chinese
Communist Party signed a truce agreement, issued a cease-fire order and formed
the "Committee of Three" and the "Peiping Executive Headquarters" with the
participation of U.S. representatives. During the "mediation", Marshall resorted
to all kinds of ruses to help the Kuomintang forces attack the Liberated
Areas, first in northeastern China and later in northern, eastern and central
China; he actively trained and equipped the Kuomintang troops and supplied
Chiang Kai-shek with a vast amount of arms and other war matériel.
By June 1946 Chiang Kai-shek had massed 80 per cent of his regular forces
(which were about two million men) at the front for attacks on the Liberated
Areas; more than 540,000 of these troops were transported directly by the
warships and planes of the U.S. armed forces. In July, when the disposition
of his troops had been completed, Chiang Kai-shek launched a country-wide
counter-revolutionary war. Subsequently, on August 10, Marshall and Leighton
Stuart, U.S. ambassador to China, issued a joint statement declaring that
"mediation" had failed in order to give Chiang Kai-shek a free hand to wage
civil war.

2. This refers to the agreement on China reached at the
Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United
States and Britain in December 1945. In the conference communiqué
the three foreign ministers "reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of China". The foreign ministers
of the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that Soviet and U.S. forces
should be withdrawn from China at the earliest possible time. The Soviet
Union faithfully carried out the terms of this agreement. It was only because
of repeated requests from the Kuomintang government that the Soviet forces
postponed the date of withdrawal. On May 3, 1946, the armed forces of the
Soviet Union completed their withdrawal from northeastern China. But the
U.S. government broke its promise completely, refused to withdraw its troops
and stepped up its interference in China's internal affairs.

3. On two occasions, in June and August 1946, Chiang Kai-shek
put forward his "five demands" to the Chinese Communist Party, declaring
that only if the Communist Party accepted them would the Kuomintang consider
stopping the civil war. The five demands stipulated that the Chinese People's
Liberation Army withdraw from the following places: (1) all areas
south of the Lunghai Railway; (2) the entire length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan
Railway; (3) Chengteh and the area south of it; (4) most of northeastern
China, and (5) all areas liberated since June 7, 1946, from the puppet troops
in Shantung and Shansi Provinces by the people's armed forces of the Liberated
Areas. The Chinese Communist Party categorically rejected all these
counter-revolutionary demands.

4. According to the resolution of the Political Consultative
Conference held in January 1946, the National Assembly was to be an assembly
of democracy and unity, in which various political parties would take part,
and was to be convened under the auspices of a reorganized government after
the terms of the agreements reached at the Political Consultative Conference
had been carried out. On October 11, 1946, the Kuomintang troops occupied
Changchiakou, and this "victory" turned the heads of the Chiang Kai-shek
clique. On that very afternoon it openly violated the terms of the PCC resolution
and ordered the convening of a divisive and dictatorial "National Assembly"
controlled exclusively by the Kuomintang. Officially opened in Nanking on
November 15, 1946, this "National Assembly" was firmly opposed and boycotted
by the Chinese Communist Party, the democratic parties and the entire people.

5. See "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of
Self-Defence", Note 1, p. 92 of this volume.