(In
part one, we ended with the question regarding the nature of a blind person's
exemption from mitzvot,
whether it is based on a leniency or on a deficiency in da'at.)

Now, if indeed a blind person is disqualified from serving as a witness
because of a weakness in his da'at
 and
this is certainly a reasonable assumption  we can answer the question raised by
the Tosafot
in
Ha-Chovel,
why don't we exclude robbers and slaves from liability for shame according to
Rabbi Yehuda, just as a blind person is excluded. We may simply say that a blind
person is exempted from liability based on the analogy to testimony, because his
disqualification from serving as a witness is rooted in a deficiency in
da'at,
and this factor can exempt him from liability for shame as well. But as for
robbers and slaves, who are disqualified from giving testimony irrespective of
the level of their da'at,
there is no reason to exempt them from liability for shame. The fact that the
Tosafot
did
not offer this answer implies that they understood a blind person's exemption
from liability for shame, or his disqualification from serving as a witness, or
perhaps both of them, as being unconnected to a deficiency in da'at.

See,
however, Shitah
Mekubetzet,
ad loc., who brings the Tosafot
Shantz,
who raise the same question as our Tosafot.
After raising the possibility that perhaps, in fact, a slave is exempt from
liability for shame, they conclude: "Even if you say that he is liable for
shame, there is no logical reason to be lenient regarding a slave or others who
are disqualified from giving testimony more than regarding a Jew who is
qualified to testify, even though we are lenient regarding a blind person."
While our Tosafot
discuss
the scope of the scriptural decree based on the wording "your eyes," the
Tosafot
Shantz focus
on the possibility of excluding certain people based on logical reasoning. Their
initial position  that even a slave is exempt from liability for shame 
certainly does not posit that the exemption regarding shame is based on a
deficiency of da'at.
It
would seem, however, that their conclusion may be understood as we explained
above, that the exemption is limited to a blind person because it is based on a
deficiency of da'at
with
respect to shame and with respect to testimony.

This is stated explicitly by the Ra'avadin
his chiddushim
(ad
loc.): "Just as there, a blind person is exempt because he lacks da'at,
so too here a blind person is exempt, and excluded altogether from the law of
shame, not to pay and not to receive." At the end of his comment, the Ra'avad
explicitly states that, according to R. Yehuda, a blind person is excluded from
the law of shame, both when is the shaming party and when he is the shamed
party. This, indeed, is implied by the plain sense of the Gemara, for the Mishna
merely establishes that one who shames a blind person is liable, without making
any mention whatsoever of the law regarding a blind person who shames another
person. And on this the Gemara comments: "Our Mishna is not in accordance with
R. Yehuda," who speaks of a blind person who is the shaming
party.

The
Ra'avad's assertion is in accordance with his own position, for it is clear that
if the exclusion from the law of shame is merely a leniency for the blind person
that is unconnected to his level of da'at,
then there is no room to apply the exclusion in the reverse case where the blind
person is the shamed party. If, however, it is connected to a deficiency in
da'at,
there is room to suggest that a blind person is excluded even when he is the
shamed party. This assertion, however, is not simple, in light of the fact that
we maintain (Bava
Kama 86b)
that one who shames an idiot is exempt from liability, but one who shames a deaf
person is liable.

The
Tosafot
(ad
loc., s.v. suma),
however, write with respect to R. Yehuda: "A blind person who shames another
person is exempt, but one who shames a blind person is liable, for 'your eyes'
does not imply that he is exempt." They too are in accordance with their own
position that the exemption is based on a scriptural decree that is unconnected
to da'at,
and so there is certainly no reason to exempt one who shames a blind person. It
is, of course, possible that even if the Tosafot
would
see the exemption granted to a blind person who shamed another person as based
on a deficiency in da'at,
they could still impose liability upon one who shames a blind person, he not
being inferior to a deaf person. But in light of their position regarding the
nature of the exemption, it clearly would have been inconceivable that a blind
person should be excluded from the law of shame, "not to pay, and not to
receive."

The Ra'avad's understanding is, however, reflected in another novel
position. For the second Baraita in the continuation of the passage in Ha-Chovel
reads: "R. Yehuda says: A
blind person is not liable for shame. Similarly, R. Yehuda exempted him from all
judgments in the Torah." The Baraita seems to be saying that no type of monetary
claim can be brought against a blind person  parallel to the blind person's
exclusion from exile, lashes, and judicial execution mentioned in the Baraita in
the first part of the passage. Thus the Gemara connects the various exemptions:
"What is the reason of R. Yehuda? The verse states: 'Then the congregation shall
judge between the slayer and the revenger of blood according to these judgments'
(Bamidbar 35:24)  whoever is included in slaying and blood revenge is
included in judgments; whoever is not included in slaying and blood revenge is
not included in judgments." The Ra'avad, however, explains: "And similarly, [R.
Yehuda] exempted him from all judgments in the Torah, so that he does not judge,
nor is he judged, and the court is not obligated to hear his claims." The
implication is that just as a claim cannot be brought against the blind person,
so that he should become liable, so too he cannot bring claims against others,
according to R. Yehuda. This also follows from the words of the author of the
Sefer ha-Terumot  who often relies on the Ra'avad  for after
establishing that a blind person can present a claim, take an oath, and require
an oath, he adds: "If so [If you should say?] that an oath is not taken for his
claim, nor does he take an oath for the claim of others, if so, we should not
testify against him or judge him, for it is like out of his presence, and he is
regarded like an idiot. Yet we maintain that a blind person is liable for shame,
and the law is not in accordance with R. Yehuda who exempts him from all
judgments in the Torah." We see then that, according to R. Yehuda, a blind
person is in fact excluded from all civil suits, and the reason is, as is more
or less stated explicitly, that according to R. Yehuda, a blind person "is
regarded like an idiot." This follows the position of the Ra'avad
above.

The Rashba, on the other hand, clearly understood that a blind person's
exemption is not based on a deficiency in his da'at, at least with
respect to rabbinic mitzvot. For we have already noted his position above
that "according to R. Yehuda, [a blind person] is entirely exempt from all the
mitzvot, even by rabbinic decree, and it is only on the level of pious
conduct that he is obligated. And the matter of Rav Yosef and perisat
Shema,since it is only by rabbinic decree, even a blind person who
once saw the luminaries, and he became blind - so that if he came to say the
'yotzer or' blessing, he is permitted and pious since he had already
derived benefit - he can even discharge the obligation of others." This
position, that even one who is only obligated on the level of pious conduct can
discharge the obligation of others, is certainly novel. And it too applies only
to rabbinic mitzvot. This is not the place to discuss the position
further, but however we understand it, we must assume that the Rashba understood
that while a blind person is exempt from mitzvot, his fulfillment of them
 again, at least with respect to rabbinic mitzvot  is not inferior to
that of a seeing person. Clearly, were there a qualitative difference between
them even with respect to the fulfillment, the blind person could not possibly
discharge the obligation of others. This assumption, however, is only
understandable if the blind person's exemption is anchored in some side reason.
If it derives from a deficiency in da'at, it is reasonable to say that
this affects not only his obligation, but also his fulfillment, and he would
then be unable to discharge the obligation of others.

EXEMPTION
FROM NEGATIVE MITZVOT

The question regarding the nature of a blind person's exemption from
mitzvot, whether it is based on a leniency or on a deficiency in
da'at, may possibly depend on another controversy. A Baraita, both in the
passage in Bava Kama (87a) and in the Yerushalmi (Sota
2:5), states that R. Yehuda "exempts him from all the mitzvot stated in
the Torah." It is not clear, however, whether we are dealing here only with
positive precepts or also negative precepts, namely, prohibitions. We find a
similar formulation (Sukka 26a) regarding "all those who occupy
themselves in the work of heaven" who "are exempt from the reading of
Shema, from prayer, from tefilin, and from all the mitzvot
stated in the Torah, to fulfill the words of R. Yose ha-Gelili. For R.
Yose ha-Gelili would say: Whoever is occupied in a mitzva is exempt from
a mitzva." Here it is absolutely clear that one who is occupied in a
mitzva is exempt from positive commandments, but nevertheless forbidden
to transgress prohibitions. And similarly it is stated regarding an onen
(Berakhot 18a): "He is exempt from the reading of Shema, from
prayer, from tefilin, and from all the mitzvot stated in the
Torah." Nevertheless, the Chakham Tzevi rules (no. 1) "that regarding
punishments and prohibitions there is certainly no difference between an onen
and others."[12] This being the case, it may be suggested that the same
applies to a blind person, that R. Yehuda only exempted him from positive
precepts, but not from prohibitions. So in fact have ruled R. Eliyahu Mizrachi,
the Peri Megaddim, and several other
Acharonim.[13]

It is
clear, however, from the words of Rabbenu Yeshaya that a blind person is exempt
even from negative precepts. For in his Sefer ha-Makhri'a (no. 78), after
accepting the position of Rashi (Rosh ha-Shana 33a) that a woman is
forbidden to fulfill time-bound positive commandments, because that would
involve a violation of the prohibition of bal tosif,adding to the
mitzvot, he writes: "And proof cannot be brought [against Rashi] from
blind people, that while R. Yehuda exempted a blind person from all the
mitzvot stated in the Torah, by rabbinic law he is obligated. For he does
not violate the prohibition of bal tosif, for he is not bound by the
prohibition of bal tosif." This is also implied by Rabbenu Peretz in his
Tosafot (Bava Kama 87a, s.v. ve-chen), who explains that a
woman is exempt from time-bound positive commandments even by rabbinic law, but
a blind person, according to R. Yehuda, is obligated in mitzvot by
rabbinic law, "because the Rabbis wished to distinguish him from a non-Jew, for
were he exempt even by rabbinic law, then there would be nothing to distinguish
him from a non-Jew. But a woman, even if she is exempt from positive
commandments even by rabbinic law, nevertheless, there are many differences
between her and a non-Jewess, such as menstrual blood and many other
mitzvot." He seems to be implying that a blind person is not bound by the
prohibition of nidda, for were he bound, surely there would be a
distinction, as in the case of a woman. And the same may be said about all the
other prohibitions.[14]

As for explaining this controversy, it may be dependent upon the nature
of a blind person's exemption from mitzvot. If he was only granted a
leniency on account of the great efforts that obligation would demand, it is
reasonable to say that he was released from the positive fulfillment of
mitzvot, but prohibitions were not permitted to him. If, however, his
exemption stems from a deficiency in da'at, it stands to reason that it
applies to all commandments. This, of course, is not necessary, for it is
possible that the level of da'at required for the fulfillment of
mitzvot is greater than that which is necessary in order to take
precautions not to violate prohibitions.

Returning to the issue itself, it seems that a distinction may be made
between different types of blind people. For it follows from the words of
Tosafot that R. Yehuda exempts not only one who is blind from birth, but
even a seeing person who became blind.[15] For they raise the objection
(Megila 24a, s.v. mi): How could R. Yehuda say that "anyone who
has never in his life seen the [heavenly] luminaries may not read the parts of
the prayer preceding Shema [pores al Shema]," implying that
someone who had once seen the luminaries may in fact read those sections? Surely
he exempts a blind person from all the mitzvot in the Torah!
Nevertheless, it seems that the exemption of the two types of blind people is
not the same. For someone who was blind from birth may indeed be defined as one
with a deficiency in da'at, for it may be presumed that his handicap
effected his development and horizons. But someone who was born with sight and
afterwards became blind  at least in the case where he became blind after his
capabilities and personality had already been fashioned and established  may be
seen as having da'at for all matters. His exemption, then, stems from the
efforts that he would have to invest in order to fulfill mitzvot, these
efforts relating, of course, to the present and not to the
past.[16]

RETURN
TO CHANUKA LIGHTING

Let us now return to our original issue. In light of our uncertainty
regarding a blind person's exemption from mitzvot, we can discuss the
possibility of obligating a blind person in the mitzva of lighting
Chanuka candles according to R. Yehuda, based on the argument that he too was in
the miracle. For the Gemara states (Shabbat 23a) that a woman lights
Chanuka candles for this reason, but "if a deaf person, an idiot, or a minor
lit, he has not accomplished anything." According to Rashi, the difference is
clear, for he understands that "they too were in the miracle" relates to women's
participation in and bringing about of the miracle. And the miracle was
performed through women, but not through deaf people, idiots or minors.
According to the Tosafot and most Rishonim, however, "they too
were in the miracle" relates to women's exposure to the danger, and this should
apply to deaf people, idiots and minors, as well.Thus, we are forced to
the conclusion that the reason that the latter are not obligated in Chanuka
candles and parallel mitzvot is that the argument "they too were in the
miracle" suffices only to remove an exemption based on a leniency. For regarding
a mitzva that involves the publicizing of a miracle, which stems from the
obligation to offer praise and thanksgiving in the wake of rescue and salvation,
we do not take into account the efforts that will be required for its
fulfillment. But an exemption connected to a deficiency in da'at  which
may exclude a person not only from obligation but even from the possibility of
fulfilling the mitzva[17]  should be valid even with respect to a
mitzva of praise and thanksgiving. Thus, according to the Tosafot,
the question of a blind person's obligation in Chanuka candles according to R.
Yehuda must depend upon the nature of his exemption, as was explained above. If
we assume that there is a difference between the various types of blind people,
then a person who was blind from birth should be exempt from Chanuka candles,
but a person who once saw but was later blinded should be
obligated.[18]

However, even though the aforementioned argument stands to reason, it is
not irrefutable. For regarding megila reading, the Riva in fact raises a
question from the law applying to women to the law applying to minors, according
to the Tosafot, and offers a different answer: "You might say that even
minors should be obligated in megila reading for surely the verse states
'children and women'! It may be suggested that women, since they are bound by
the negative precepts and by the positive precepts that are not time-bound, the
Rabbis imposed upon them the mitzva of megila reading, even though
it is a time-bound positive precept, since they too were in the miracle. But
minors who are not bound by mitzvot whatsoever they did not obligate,
even though they too were in the miracle." We see that the Riva does not make a
distinction based on the factor of da'at, but between overall exemption
and exemption from a particular mitzva. Accordingly, however we
understand a blind person's exemption according to R. Yehuda, he may possibly be
exempt from lighting Chanuka candles, because he does not have a framework of
obligation into which this mitzva can be
integrated.

In the
other direction, even if a blind person'sexemption from mitzvot
is based on a deficiency in da'at, it may be possible to obligate him
in Chanuka candles, based on the argument that he too was in the miracle. For
without a doubt, even if his exemption is similar to that of a deaf person, they
are not necessarily to be equated. Surely, a deaf person, an idiot and a minor
are mentioned in many places as a threesome sharing the same standing and laws.
Nevertheless, the Ramban writes that even Torah law may distinguish between
them. See his Chiddushim to Yevamot 104b mentioned earlier, where
he proposes a certain explanation  different than the one discussed above 
that the Gemara is referring to a deaf person who neither hears nor speaks. He
explains: "It may be suggested that even though a deaf person is treated like an
idiot, that is with respect to mitzvot. Nevertheless, he has a little
intention when others stand over him And a deaf person can indicate this
intention through hinting, for he has weak da'at, and therefore the only
hindrance is the reading. But an idiot has no intention whatsoever." And on the
rabbinic level, surely there are striking differences, for regarding a deaf
person the Sages instituted betrothal and marriage, whereas an idiot who
betrothed a woman has accomplished nothing. While the Gemara (Yevamot
112b) explains the distinction in another manner  "regarding a deaf man or
woman who can fulfill the rabbinic enactment, the Rabbis instituted marriage;
regarding an idiotic man or woman who cannot fulfill the rabbinic enactment,
because a person cannot be expected to live in a cage with a serpent, the Rabbis
did not institute marriage"  it may be suggested that the two explanations are
the same, and the difference regarding the possibility of married life stems
also from the difference in level of da'at. Similarly, regarding
acquisition, we learned (Gittin 59a): "A deaf person may transact
business by gesticulating and by being spoken to by gestures. Ben Betera says:
By motions with closed lips and by being spoken to in the same way." But
regarding an idiot, the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Mekhira 29:4): "An idiot 
his purchase is not a purchase and his sale is not a sale and his gifts are
invalid."[19] And furthermore, the Rambam's formulation (Hilkhot Gerushin
13:8) suggests that we may rely on a deaf person for testimony regarding a
woman. For regarding second-hand testimony (ed mi-pi ed), he writes: "But
if he heard from an idiot or from a minor, he may not testify, and we don't rely
on their words," omitting mention of a deaf person, even though practically
speaking it is possible to hear from him in writing.[20] One should not wonder
then if we distinguish between a blind person and a deaf person, and say that
even if both are exempt from mitzvot by Torah law because of a deficiency
in da'at, there is, nevertheless, a significant difference between their
respective levels of da'at, even if they are both defined as having "weak
da'at." Thus, it is possible to argue that regarding obligation based on
the argument that "they too were in the miracle," a blind person may be
obligated, even though a deaf person is exempt.

FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SAGES

Thus
far we have dealt with the position of R. Yehuda, and we have examined the
possibility of obligating him in Chanuka candles, even if he is exempt from
other mitzvot. According to the Sages, we must examine the reverse
possibility. From the perspective of the obligation in mitzvot falling
upon his person, a blind person should be obligated in Chanuka candles as well.
It is, however, possible that it is precisely with respect to Chanuka candles
that a blind person is exempt, for the reason mentioned in the question posed in
the Maharshal's responsum: "Since he is not included in the publicizing of the
miracle, for he does not see, he is also not obligated to publicize it for
others." There is room to consider this possibility on two levels: First, is a
blind person in and of himself obligated and fit to fulfill the mitzva;
second, can he discharge the obligation of others living with him in the same
house.

As for
the first question  whether or not a blind person is obligated in and of
himself  it is possible to exempt him for two reasons. It may be suggested that
from the outset, when Chazal instituted the mitzva of lighting
Chanuka candles, they related explicitly and directly to a blind person and
exempted him. Alternatively, it may be proposed that in fact he was never
explicitly exempted, but nevertheless he is not included in the mitzva,
since he is unable to fulfill it, inasmuch as the mitzva involves both
lighting and seeing. A similar question arises regarding a sick person with
respect to the four minor public fasts: Was he included in the enactment, but he
is exempt because of his sickness, or  as has been reported in the name of R.
Chayyim of Brisk, ztz"l  perhaps he was never included in the enactment, so
that even if he fasts, he does not fulfill the mitzva of a public fast,
he being excluded from the parameters of the enactment.

The
first reason is fundamentally a question of fact  was such an exemption ever
established. Surely, this would require a source, and since we find no support
in Chazal or the Rishonim for such a theory, it is reasonable to
assume that such a step was never taken and such a limitation was never
formulated. The second reason depends upon the nature and essence of the
mitzva, and thus it requires us to define the mitzva with all its
components. Primarily, we must establish the relationship between seeing and
lighting; and we must get down to the root of the matter.

THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEEING AND LIGHTING

The
source of the law regarding one who sees Chanuka candles is a passage in
Bameh Madlikin (Shabbat 23a): "R. Chiyya bar Ashi said in the name
of Rav: One who lights a Chanuka candle must recite a blessing. And R. Yirmiya
said: One who sees a Chanuka candle must recite a blessing. Rav Yehuda said: On
the first day, one who sees recites two blessings, and one who lights, recites
three blessings. Afterwards, one who lights recites two blessings and one who
sees recites one blessing." The Rishonim disagree about the meaning of
this passage. Rashi (ad loc.) comments: "I found in the name of R. Yitzchak ben
Yehuda who said in the name of Rabbenu Ya'akov that this blessing is only
necessary for one who has not yet lit in his house or for one who is sitting in
a boat." Rashi implies that if a person has not yet lit Chanuka candles, he
recites a blessing when he sees such candles, even if he intends to light his
own candles afterwards. This also follows from what the Rambam writes regarding
the first night (Hilkhot Chanukah 3:4): "Whoever sees it [= a Chanuka
candle] and has not yet recited a blessing, recites two blessings, 'She'asa
nissim' ('Who performed miracles for our forefathers') and
'Shehecheyanu' ('Who has granted us life')." Other Rishonim  the
Ra'avya (no. 843), the Mordekhai(no. 267),[21] the Rashba(Shabbat 23a) and others  write, however, that if a person intends
to light Chanuka candles, even if he has not yet done so, he does not recite a
blessing over seeing them.

We
find two explanations of the second opinion in the Rishonim. The author
of the Manhig (no. 149) writes: "And where he did not yet light in his
house. And if he wishes to arrange them over his own lighting, and not recite a
blessing until he lights in his own house, he is permitted to do so, in order to
endear it to him, as it is stated: I saw Rav Kahana arrange over his cup of
kiddush the blessing of Shehecheyanu relating to the sukka
and the blessing 'to sit in a sukka.'"[22] According to him, we are
dealing here with endearment of the blessing  or perhaps endearment of the
mitzva  and the relationship between the two. It would seem that, in his
opinion, there is no essential connection between seeing and lighting; either
there are two separate fulfillments, each one with its own blessing, or else
there is only one fulfillment of lighting, and the She'asa nissim
blessing is over the phenomenon of the miracle and not over the mitzva
of publicizing it. Thus, if a person wishes to recite a blessing over the
seeing prior to his own lighting, he is permitted to do so, but if he wishes to
push off the blessing over seeing until he lights, he may do that as
well.

The
Ritva, however, explains (Shabbat 23a, ed. R. Reichman): "And some say
that since he intends to light in his own house, he is not required now to
recite a blessing over his seeing. This does not involve 'passing over
mitzvot,' because it is preferable [to recite the blessing] through
lighting." The Ritva implies that by combining seeing and lighting, a
qualitative dimension is added to the one or the other, or perhaps to both, and
therefore it is "preferable" to join them. And while he too is apparently of the
opinion that it is possible to recite the blessing over seeing prior to
lighting, though he is not required to do so, nevertheless it seems that we are
dealing with a different level of fulfillment and not merely with
endearment.

The
Orchot Chayyim (Hilkhot Chanuka, no. 9) writes: "But one who has
lit in his own house or intends to light [there] or has [already] heard the
blessings does not recite any blessings when he sees others who have lit," i.e.,
one is obligated to delay the blessing of seeing until the time of lighting.
According to this, it is certainly reasonable to assume that the mitzva
has two components and that a dimension is added when the two are
combined.

Now,
according to the Rambam, it is not clear how a person should act when he lights
Chanuka candles after having already recited a blessing over seeing them: should
he recite the She'asa nissim blessing a second time, or should he only
recite the Le-hadlik ner shel Chanuka blessing. The fact that the Rambam
makes no distinctions between different lighters suggests that even in such a
case both blessings are recited. Thus, we are forced to assume one of two
things: We must either define the She'asa nissim blessing as both a
blessing over seeing and a blessing over a mitzva, and so both blessings
relate to the lighting itself; or we must say that there are two levels of
seeing, one as a separate phenomenon and one as a component in the framework of
publicizing the miracle through the lighting, and it is over this component that
the blessing is recited the second time. If we adopt the second understanding,
then the relationship between the seeing and the lighting is even deeper than
what we had seen in the other Rishonim.

Thus,
we have seen that there are two views among the Rishonim regarding seeing
the Chanuka candles and the blessing recited thereon. Some have defined it as a
separate phenomenon and some have seen it as integrated in the framework of the
lighting. There is yet a third position. For the Mordekhai writes (no. 267) that
the blessing recited by one who sees Chanuka candles was instituted, among other
things, for the sake of a lodger for whom Chanuka candles are being lit at home,
but he does not see them: "Nevertheless, he must see [the candles], as it is
stated below: 'On the first day, one who sees recites two blessings, and
afterwards he recited one blessing.' Similarly, Ri said that people who are
visiting at a fair, and there is no Jew in that city, are accustomed to light in
the house of a non-Jew."[23] We see then that seeing involves a fulfillment of a
mitzva and it is not merely a phenomenon that obligates a blessing like
the ocean or thunder. It is a fulfillment that obligates a blessing over its
unique publicizing of the miracle even for one who has already fulfilled his
obligation of publicizing the miracle through lighting. A person who lights
Chanuka candles does not recite a blessing over seeing candles after he already
lit because he already achieved both fulfillments when he saw the candles while
he was lighting them. See however the Rashba (Shabbat 23a) who writes:
"Some of the Rabbis of blessed memory explain that even when others are lighting
for a person in his home, he must recite a blessing over seeing, but they have
nothing to rely upon." It is clear from what he says that there is no blessing
over the fulfillment of seeing  and it seems that there is no fulfillment of
seeing  over and beyond the lighting. The blessing for one who sees was
instituted for those who do not fulfill the obligation of publicizing the
miracle through lighting, and as a substitute for it. Whenever a fulfillment of
lighting can be related to a person, there is no need for seeing and no
recitation of a blessing over it, for the seeing is included in the lighting. We
cannot say that the Rashba fundamentally agrees that there is a fulfillment in
the seeing, but he disagrees with the Mordekhai because he thinks that there is
no reason to obligate a lodger to light candles in order to see them, because
what he sees are not Chanuka candles since he doesn't fulfill his obligation of
lighting through them. For the Rashba exempts a person from reciting a blessing
over seeing, even when he sees the candles that were lit on his behalf so that
he may fulfill his obligation of lighting. We are forced then to say that
according to the Rashba, there is no obligation to recite a blessing over a
separate fulfillment of seeing, and thus it stands to reason that there is no
such obligation or fulfillment for one who has lit Chanuka
candles.

To be
continued.

FOOTNOTES:

[12]
According to Rashi (Berakhot
17b,
s.v. mi),
who understands that an onen
is
exempt from mitzvot
because
he is occupied in the mitzva
of
burial, there is nothing new in the words of the Chakham
Tzevi. But
the Chakham
Tzevi is
talking even according to the position of Tosafot
(ibid.,
s.v. patur)
that an onen's
exemption
has a different basis.

[13]
See the summary found in Sedei
Chemed
(ma'arekhet
samekh,
no. 66). The Sedei
Chemed
writes there that it is stated explicitly in the Yerushalmi
(Sota
2:5) that there is no difference between positive and negative precepts. He is
referring to what is stated there that not only when the husband is blind do we
not give his suspected wife to drink from the bitter waters  for he is excluded
by the verse, "And it be hid from the eyes of her husband," to the exclusion of
a blind person who has no eyes  but even when the wife is blind, we do not give
her to drink, based on R. Yehuda. The Korban
ha-Edah explains:
"It goes like R. Yehuda who exempts a blind person from all the mitzvot
stated
in the Torah, even negative precepts, and so she does not drink." According to
him, it would appear that she does not drink because she is not bound by the
prohibition against adultery. This, however, is not necessary  and according to
those who maintain that in any event a blind person is bound by the seven
Noachide laws (see Sedei
Chemed,
ibid.) it is groundless. It is more reasonable to explain that she is in fact
bound by the prohibition against adultery, but exempt from participating in the
sota
process.
This,
however, is only possible if we assume that the suspected wife drinks the bitter
waters as a mitzva,
and not as a requirement set down by the court. The matter requires further
study.

[14]
See Arukh
ha-Shulchan
53, no. 5, who rejects both proofs, though his arguments are highly
unpersuasive.

[15]
It seems obvious that the Sages who disagree with R. Yehuda obligate both types
of blind people, and by Torah law. R. Ya'akov Emden (Resp.
She'eilat Ya'avetz,
no. 75), however, is in doubt about the matter: "Perhaps [the Sages] only
disagree about a seeing person who became blind; since he had been obligated, he
remains so. But a person who is blind from birth, even the Sages may agree that
he is exempt from all the mitzvot."
His explanation, "since he had been obligated, he remains so," seems to be
difficult on the level of Torah law. If we wish to make such a distinction, it
seems more reasonable to base it on different levels of da'at.
R. Emden's proofs can be refuted.

[16]
See Tosafot,
Megila
19b,
s.v. ve-Rabbi
(end), who apparently also distinguish between a person who was born blind and a
seeing person who became blind, but for a different reason altogether. The
Tosafot
ask why can't a minor discharge the obligations of others even in a rabbinic
mitzvah,
based on the argument of two rabbinic factors, if a blind person can. They
answer: "It may be suggested that a blind person is better than a minor, for he
was already obligated by Torah law, which is not the case with a minor." The
distinction does not relate to da'at,
but to the nature of the rabbinic obligation. According to this answer, it is
not the number of rabbinic factors alone that determines the quality of the
obligation. Therefore, they argue that regarding a blind person who had already
been obligated by Torah law, the Rabbis extended his obligation, and disregarded
his exemption; whereas regarding a minor, they had to create a new obligation.
Thus, the quality of a blind person's obligation is like one who is obligated by
Torah law, whereas the minor's obligation is inferior, and so the former can
discharge the obligation of others, whereas the latter cannot.

[17]
On this point, there is, of course, room to discuss each of the three separately
and to distinguish between them, but this is not the place to enter into such a
discussion

[18]
A parallel question arises regarding a blind person's obligation in prayer
according to R. Yehuda, if we understand, following the plain sense of the
Gemara before us (Berakhot
20b) and the Yerushalmi
(Berakhot
2:3) that a woman is obligated in rachami,
"beseeching for mercy," even though it is a time-bound positive commandment, and
not like the Rambam (Hilkhot
Tefila,
1:2) that a woman is obligated in rachami,
because it is not
a
time-bound positive commandment. For if a blind person is exempt from mitzvot
because
he was granted a leniency, it stands to reason that it is not valid regarding
rachami.
But if his exemption stems from a deficiency in da'at,
it is possible that a blind person is exempt, even if a woman is obligated. See
Tosefta,
Berakhot
(3:16),
which brings the law of a blind person regarding prayer in an anonymous Baraita.
R. Yehuda may disagree, and in any event the Baraita is not dealing with the
obligation to pray, but rather with the fulfillment of prayer if he comes to
pray.

[19]
See, however, Shita
Mekubetzet on
Ketubot
20a, which brings the position of the Ri Migash and Talmidei Rabbenu Yona that
even an idiot buys and sells by rabbinic law.

[20]
See Arukh
ha-Shulchan,
Even
ha-Ezer
17, no. 74, who suggests that a deaf person may be qualified to give testimony
regarding a married woman through an examination, just like a mute, though he
hesitates to issue a lenient ruling on the matter.

[21]
Some have understood that this is the Mordekhai's understanding of Rashi
himself, and that he had a different reading of Rashi. However, in Siddur
Rashi,
no. 317, and its parallels, the reading is like Rashi before us. See also Rashi,
Sukka
46a,
s.v. ha-ro'e,
and see also the note of R. Meir Yona to Sefer
ha-Ittur,
Hilkhot
Chanuka,
117b, note 41.

[22]
In Hagahot
Maimuniyot,
Hilkhot
Chanuka,
chap. 3, letter 1, this position is attributed also to the Ra'avya. But the
Ra'avya writes (no. 843): "But if he will eventually recite the blessing, he is
not required to recite the Shehecheyanu blessing when he sees
Chanuka candles, as is the case with a sukka, where all the blessings are
arranged over the cup." The fact that he refers specifically to the
Shehecheyanu blessing implies that it is only that blessing that can be
pushed off, but the She'asa nissim blessing must be recited by the seer
immediately, in accordance with the view of Rashi and the Rambam, and against
the Manhig. Aptowitzer in his notes (ad loc.) understood
differently.

[23]
See Piskei
Ri'az,
Shabbat,
chap. 2, no. 17, who also obligates one who lodges among non-Jews to light
candles, but it is not clear whether the lodger must light with a blessing, as
is implied by the Mordekhai. For the practical halakha, see Shulchan
Arukh,
Orach
Chayyim
676:3 and 677:3.