Court of Appeal Says Deference Must Be Accorded Determination of
Arizona Court That Distribution Be Held Up Pending Outcome of Conservatorship
Proceeding

By a MetNews
Staff Writer

Bradford D.
Lund, a grandson of Walt Disney, on Friday failed in his bid in the Fourth
District Court of Appeal to gain a reversal of a judgment denying a petition
for an order to Wells Fargo, trustee of the family trust, to distribute to him
his share of the res.

Div.
Three, in an opinion by Justice Raymond Ikola, said that even though the trust
is administered in California, deference must be given the decision of an
Arizona court that distribution to Lund be deferred until after resolution of a
conservatorship proceeding. Lund is said to be mentally impaired.

He
is the son of the Disney’s adopted daughter, Sharon Disney, who died in 1993,
and developer William Lund.

Sharon
Disney was one of two daughters of Walt and Lillian Disney. Under the terms of
the trust, the res is to be distributed in equal shares to the grandchildren
upon the death of whichever daughter survived the other.

That
event occurred in 2013 when Diane Disney Miller, a biological daughter, died at
the age of 79.

Any
grandchild over the age of 30—which included Brad Lund—was to take his or her
share outright. The trust was estimated in 2014 at $400 million.

“The
superior court having jurisdiction over the trust pursuant to this part has
exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings concerning the internal affairs of
trusts.”

He
also cited the a provision of the Arizona constitution that: Brad then cites
article 6, section 14, of the Arizona Constitution which states, “The superior
court shall have original jurisdiction of: 1. Cases and proceedings in which
exclusive jurisdiction is not vested by law in another court.”

—AP

Walt Disney, who died in 1966, is seen in a
photo with daughters Sharon and Diane.

Exclusive
jurisdiction, he argued, is in Orange County, California, where the trust is
administered.

Ikola
responded:

“While
Brad’s argument has facial appeal, it relies on a misinterpretation of the term
‘jurisdiction’ as used in section 17000.”

What
it means, he said, is that probate departments have exclusive jurisdiction
within a superior court over probate matters.

“Accordingly,
section 17000 was not intended to confer exclusive fundamental jurisdiction to
any particular court, but, rather, was simply intended to streamline the
process of adjudicating trusts by ensuring parties would not bounce back and
forth between different courts depending on the type of relief sought,” Ikola
wrote, adding:

“Since
section 17000 does not deprive Arizona of jurisdiction, principles of comity
counsel in favor of avoiding an order contradicting the Arizona court’s order.
Moreover, the Arizona court’s order was merely a temporary order. If Brad is
found to be competent, the Arizona court may well dissolve the temporary order
without making any further orders concerning the trust. In that respect, it
would be premature for us to address the broader question of where any
remaining issues concerning trust distributions ought to be decided.”