CIA torture report: a timeline

1988: CIA deputy director of operations denounces torture, stating "[p]hysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective.

President George W. Bush signed the covert Memorandum of Notification after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Photo: Reuters

17 September 2001: President George W. Bush signs covert Memorandum of Notification to authorise the director of central intelligence to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities".

8 October 2001: Director of central intelligence George Tenet delegates the management and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the Memorandum of Notification to the CIA's deputy director for operations James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism Centre, Cofer Black. Tenet also directs that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be documented in writing.

Early November 2001: CIA Headquarters further determined that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet US prison standards and that CIA detention and interrogation operations should meet US custom and law.

The CIA first briefed then president Bush on enhanced interrogation techniques in April 2006, according to the torture report. Cheney, who served as his vice president, says Bush knew of and approved the torture. Photo: AFP

26 November 2001: Attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal memorandum stating that the "CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm".

17 December 2001: CIA's deputy director for operations James Pavitt rescinds 8 October order and issues via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in [redacted] to "determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities".

January 2002: A letter drafted for Tenet to Bush urges that the CIA be exempt from Geneva Conventions on torture, arguing that application would "significantly hamper the ability of CIA to obtain critical threat information necessary to save American lives".

7 February 2002: Mr Bush issues a memo stating Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, does not apply toa ban detainees.

March 2002: CIA Headquarters expands the authority beyond the language of the memorandum of notification and instructs CIA personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.

Late March 2002: Al-Qaeda facilitator Abu Zubaydah captured by CIA in Pakistan. Initially cooperative with the FBI, he is eventually tortured by the CIA, though it is determined he is not an al-Qaeda fighter or mastermind and little or no useful intelligence is gained from him during torture.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subject to EIT on four separate occasions. Photo: Reuters

July 2002: CIA agents discuss "novel interrogation techniques" with two "experts" who had never taken part in an actual interrogation. They suggest techniques such as face slapping, sleep deprivation, use of insects and diapers, waterboarding and mock burials.

13 July 2002: Deputy Assistant Attorney-General John Yoo tells CIA that enhanced interrogation is not illegal because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.

24-26 July 2002: US Attorney-General verbally agrees to the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" (EIT), including face slapping and waterboarding. The legal opinions were given on the basis that these techniques were required to force Abu Zubaydah to reveal further plots against the US. However, the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive interrogation techniques was to confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the US. The interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's EIT a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding information from the interrogators.

1 August 2002: White House Counsel memo includes justification of torture on grounds of "necessity defense", similar to CIA memo of 26 November 2001.

September 2002: Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, a Democrat, and Vice Chairman Richard Shelby, a Republican, are first briefed on the CIA interrogation program. Further requests for information by Graham to the CIA are ignored.

Mid-October 2002: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, described as an al-Qaeda terrorist operations planner "intimately involved" in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and the 1998 East Africa US embassy bombings, is captured and rendered to the CIA. He is subject to EIT on four separate occasions, with onsite interrogators saying he was cooperative. CIA headquarters disagreed, saying he could only be cooperative when he provided information to foil terror plots or help capture other terrorists. During one point in his years-long detention, Nashiri stages a hunger strike, resulting in the CIA force-feeding him rectally. While he provided information about al-Qaeda, Nashiri never demonstrated knowledge of actionable intelligence about terrorism.

November 2002: Suspected terrorist Gul Rahman dies in CIA custody in [REDACTED COUNTRY]. He had been forced to sit, shackled, on a cold concrete floor wearing only a nightshirt. Autopsy results revealed Rahman died of hypothermia as a result of sitting on the cold floor with no pants. .

December 2002: Videotaping of interrogations ends.

28 December 2002 to 1 January 2003: Al-Nashiri is threatened with a handgun and drill during a CIA interrogation.

Late January 2003: Tenet issues guidelines for detention and interrogation after the death of Rahman. These guidelines required that only basic health needs be met, in contrast to 2001 views that detention facilities would have to meet US. prison standards. The guidelines allow for enhanced interrogation techniques.

Early 2003: White House press secretary advised to avoid using the term "humane treatment" when discussing the detention of al Qaeda and Taliban personnel.

February 2003: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, believed by the CIA to be a facilitator of the 9/11 attacks, is rendered into CIA custody, where he endures 34 days of EIT. CIA eventually concluded that he was not a senior member of al-Qaeda and was not in a position to know details about al Qaeda's plans for future attack. Once again, CIA HQ insisted on use of EIT even after local interrogators determined the captive had no more useful intelligence. Ramzi bin al-Shibh was eventually transferred to Guantanamo Bay and put on anti-psychotic medication to control mental problems caused by his exposure to EIT.

February 2003: CIA informs the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of the existence of the interrogation videotapes. The Committees advise the CIA not to destroy them.

March 2003: Khalid Sheikh Mohmmad, the alleged 9/11 mastermind, is captured in Pakistan and interrogated by US and Pakistani officials. The CIA began using EIT on him within minutes of his transfer to their control. He was also forced to endure rectal rehydration without medical need. He was eventually waterboarded at least 183 times and is known to have fabricated a considerable amount of information during this time.

7 April 2003: A cable from [REDACTED] to CIA stations and bases instructs that it is not permissible to detain someone merely upon suspicion he or she has valuable information about terrorism and membership in a particular group or family does not constitute reason to detain.

May 2003: Senior CIA interrogator tells the CIA Inspector General that the model used for interrogation was based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions for propaganda purposes" from US airmen. He believes the CIA "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where confessions are not the ultimate goal".

Summer of 2003: CIA captures three south-east Asian operatives, Zubair, Lillie and Hambali. Although Hambali was co-operative with the CIA, he was subjected to EIT. He later recanted most of the information given during EIT, a recantation CIA agents regarded as genuine. A CIA cable read that Hambali had lied to relieve the pressure of the EIT and to tell his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear.

31 July 2003: Senior CIA personnel believed Mr Bush had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In August 2003, Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that he had never spoken to the president regarding the detention and interrogation program.

September 2003: Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld are briefed on the CIA detention and interrogation program for the first time.

October 2003: CIA interrogates Arsala Khan, an Afghan believed to have assisted al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in his escape through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001. He was subjected to many hours of standing and sleep deprivation, suffering multiple hallucinations as a result. Eventually, it was determined Khan had no relation to Bin Laden and had been falsely named by someone with a vendetta against him. It was recommended Khan be released to his village with a cash payment from the US government, but instead he was held an additional four years in US military custody.

December 2003: CIA Station overseeing detention in [REDACTED COUNTRY] informed HQ that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little".

[On at least 4 occasions, the CIA ordered persons detained in host country [REDACTED] who did not fit the memorandum of notification requirements. These persons were detained by host country at CIA behest to avoid violation of memorandum.]

January 2004: International Committee for the Red Cross writes a letter indicating it is aware the US is holding unacknowledged detainees in several facilities in [REDACTED COUNTRY]. The CIA quickly arranged to reduce the number of detainees, releasing five outright and transferring others to custody of the US military or foreign governments.

May 2004: CIA Inspector General challenges the legality of some interrogation methods and finds interrogators are exceeding rules imposed by the Justice Department. He also questions the effectiveness of the program.

August-September 2004: The Office of Legal Counsel issues letters to the CIA advising that the use of EIT against specific, named detainees does not violate federal anti-torture laws.

December 2004: Acting head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel Daniel Levin issues a memo denouncing torture. Soon after he is replaced.

May 2005: Steven Bradbury, new head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel issues a new classified memo endorsing the CIA's most severe EIT.

2 November 2005: The Washington Post publishes an article about the existence of a secret, global detention and interrogation program run by the CIA.

8,9 November 2005: Against the direction from the White House the director of the CIA's National Clandestine Service Jose Rodriguez, authorises the destruction of videotapes depicting the use of the CIA's EIT, including waterboarding, against Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri from 2002.

December 2005: Congress passes the Detainee Treatment Act, prohibiting the use of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" against any "individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government".

8 April 2006: CIA first briefs President Bush on enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA records state that when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself".

29 June 2006: In Hamdan v Rumsfeld the Supreme Court holds that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the US conflict with al-Qaeda and that detention at Guantanamo must comply with the Geneva Conventions.

September 2006: Mr Bush reveals the existence of the detention and interrogation program and claims it led to information leading to the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other terrorists. He also announces the transfer of detainees to the prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

October 2006: Mr Bush signs the Military Commissions Act, creating new rules for prosecuting and interrogating terror suspects. He says the new rules will allow the CIA to resume the formerly-secret program.

20 July 2007: Mr Bush signs Executive Order 13440 stating that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program "fully complies with the obligations of the United States under Common Article 3," and authorises the CIA's continued use of certain interrogation practices as determined by the CIA director.

8 November 2007: According to the Senate report, the CIA ceases EIT after this date.

2 January 2008: Attorney-General Michael Mukasey names Assistant US Attorney John Durham to lead a criminal investigation into the destruction of interrogation videotapes by the CIA.

8 March 2008: Mr Bush vetoes the Intelligence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which would have limited CIA interrogations to techniques authorised by the Army Field Manual.

April 2008: According to the Senate report, no detainee is held by the CIA after this month.

Late 2008: CIA review reveals CIA detained at least 119 persons, a number higher than what was told to Congress. Hayden told a CIA officer to keep the number to 98, the same number reported to Congress.

22 January 2009: President Barack Obama issues an executive order, rescinding Mr Bush's previous executive order, banning the CIA's detention authority, and restricting the CIA to interrogation techniques authorised by the Army Field Manual.