In the Matter of
Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act

CC Docket No. 97-213

The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is a non-partisan
organization of more than 250,000 members dedicated to preserving the
freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights. The Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC") is a non-profit public interest research
center that examines the civil liberties and privacy implications of
new technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") is also
a public interest organization devoted to protecting civil liberties
in digital media.

The ACLU, EPIC and EFF respectfully submit comments in this Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") on implementation of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA")1 to urge the Commission to exercise its
conferred authority by extending the deadline for compliance with the
Act to no earlier than October 24, 2000.2

Law enforcement has derailed the implementation process from the
statuteís inception, and neither the public, nor the
telecommunications industry are in a position to comprehend the scope
of the capacity and surveillance requirements sought by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). We believe that the impasse in the
enactment process alone makes the implementation of CALEA impossible
under the current statutory deadline of October, 1998.

Moreover, we believe that because the most pertinent issues, the
actual technical standards that may be adopted by industry, are not
addressed in this NPRM, the Commission must extend the deadline for
compliance to allow for the public scrutiny contemplated by
CALEA.3

In short, we base our conclusions on the foregoing:

I. To date, the FBI has not met its public capacity notice
requirements under the Act which require law enforcement to quantify
the actual and maximum capacity technical needs, including
projections with the number of anticipated interceptions. Industry,
the public and the Congress need an accurate assessment of the
capacity requirements to provide meaningful oversight and to ensure
that they do not exceed the statutory scope. No implementation of
CALEA should proceed without compliance with this statutory
requirement.

II. Law enforcement was not permitted to dictate system design
under CALEA, but has placed a choke hold on the process by repeatedly
preventing the adoption of industry standards and creating a "wish
list" of technically infeasible and costly requirements. In addition,
it has become abundantly clear that the FBI is seeking unprecedented
surveillance capabilities never envisioned by the Congress. Simply
put they have consistently requested that industry provide numerous
capabilities for surveillance that go far beyond the current
court-authorized electronic surveillance under the provisions of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and CALEA. Thus,
the Commission must engage in detailed review of this process by
extending the compliance date.

III. Congressional limitations on information subject to
interception have been disregarded. CALEA required the strengthening
of privacy protections so that carriers do not intercept or disclose
any information they are not authorized to. The additional
surveillance features sought by the FBI contravene the
Congressí intention to maintain current levels of surveillance
and not expand them. We also address some incorrect assumptions in
the NPRM that would expand CALEAís application. We conclude
that these issues preclude "reasonably achievable" implementation of
the Act.

Background on Surveillance and CALEA

Today, the revolutionary development of electronic
infrastructures, that make it possible to easily communicate in a
variety of ways, also make possible new forms of government intrusion
and surveillance. Additionally, the actual use of government
surveillance has grown faster in recent years than ever before and in
past 10 years, the number of interceptions per year has more than
doubled.4

According to statistics released by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts and the Department of Justice:5

the use of electronic surveillance for criminal and national
security investigations increased substantially in 1996;

court orders for electronic surveillance by state and federal
agencies for criminal purposes also increased, from 1058 in 1995
to 1150 in 1996 (a nine percent increase);

for the first time in eight years, a court denied a
surveillance application;

extensions of surveillance orders increased from 834 to 887.
In all, interceptions were in effect for a total of 43,635 days in
1996.

The report also shows that the vast majority of interceptions
continued to occur in drug-related cases: 71.4 percent (821 total)
for drug investigations; 9.9 percent (114) for gambling; 9.1 percent
(105) for racketeering; 3.5 percent (41) for homicide and assault and
a few each for bribery, kidnapping, larceny and theft, and loan
sharking. No orders were issued for "arson, explosives, and weapons"
investigations.

Moreover, the according to the report, electronic surveillance
continued to be relatively inefficient. Overall, 2.2 million
conversations were captured in 1996. A total of 1.7 million
intercepted conversations were deemed not "incriminating" by
prosecutors. Each interception resulted in the capture of an average
of 1,969 conversations. Prosecutors reported that on average, 422
(21.4 percent) of the conversations were "incriminating." Federal
intercepts were particularly efficient, with only 15.6 percent of the
intercepted conversations reported as "incriminating."

Notwithstanding the increase in government surveillance, in 1994,
responding to FBI pressure and allegations that new technology
hampers the ability to conduct electronic interceptions, the Congress
enacted CALEA. The law was enacted during the final days of the 103d
Congress amidst fervent opposition from the ACLU, EPIC, EFF and other
concerned organizations that believed that the FBI had not
substantiated the need for extraordinary government surveillance
capabilities. We adhere to those views even today. Furthermore, the
dramatic rise in the number of interceptions conducted rebuts the
government claim that new technologies frustrate wiretapping
abilities.

CALEA requires telephone carriers to ensure continued government
interception capabilities despite changes in technologies by October,
1998. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the Act was
intended "to balance three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly
focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly
authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of
increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3)
to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and
technologies."6 To maintain that balance, Congress
established detailed guidelines on how industry standard setting
organizations would accomplish the costly mandate of CALEA and
imposed several obligations on law enforcement to facilitate the
process as well.

Section 107 of CALEA, in pertinent part, provides that an industry
association or a standards-setting organization will set the
technical standards; the Attorney General must consult with the
standards-setting organizations, with representatives of users of
telecommunications equipment, facilities, and services, and with
State utility commissions, "to ensure the efficient and industry-wide
implementation of the assistance capability
requirements."7

Section 107 further provides that if technical requirements are
not issued by industry standards-setting organization or if any
person believes any standards issued are deficient, the Federal
Communications Commission may establish such requirements or
standards.8 The Commission has promulgated the current
NPRM in response to an impasse in the implementation process and the
failure of law enforcement to effectively cooperate and fulfill its
statutory obligation in providing detailed notice of its technical
capacity requirements so that industry can promulgate technical
standards.

Section 50 of the NPRM states that this proceeding is being
undertaken irrespective of the actual industry standard requirements
to determine whether it is "reasonably achievable" to enact CALEA
within its compliance period. The NPRM section 50 specifically
states:

Because it is not clear whether requests for extension
of time of the Section 103 compliance date will be forthcoming, we do
not propose to promulgate specific rules regarding requests at this
time. We propose to permit carriers to petition the Commission for an
extension of time under Section 107, on the basis of the criteria
specified in Section 109 to determine whether it is reasonably
achievable for the petitioning carrier "with respect to any
equipment, facility, or service installed or deployed after January
1, 1995" to comply with the assistance capability requirements of
Section 103 within the compliance time period. We seek comment on
that proposal. We also seek comment on what factors, other than those
specified in Section 109 of CALEA, the Commission should consider in
determining whether CALEA's assistance capability requirements are
reasonably achievable within the compliance period.

The NPRM, section 45, sets out several statutory factors that the
Commission may consider in determining whether CALEAís
capability requirements are reasonably achievable within the
compliance period. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that
the factors provided by Congress were "designed to give the
Commission direction so that the following goals are realized: (1)
Costs to consumers are kept low, so that ëgold-platingí
by the industry is kept in check; (2) the legitimate needs of law
enforcement are met, but that law enforcement does not engage in
gold-plating of its demands; (3) privacy interests of all Americans
are protected; (4) the goal of encouraged competition in all forms of
telecommunications is not undermined, and the fact of wiretap
compliance is not used as either a sword or a shield in realization
of that goal."9

Our comments address these and other factors in concluding that
the FCC should extend the compliance deadlines as permitted by
Congress.

I. CALEAís Capacity Notice Requirements:

Section 104 of CALEA directed the Attorney General to issue a
notice of capacity requirement to industry not later than one year
after the lawís enactment.10 Hence the deadline for
the notice was October 25, 1995. Carriers were provided with a
deadline of three years after notification by the Attorney General to
install capacity that meets the notification requirements. Under the
timetable that Congress proposed, industryís deadline would
have been October 1998.

Specifically, section 104(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to
identify capacity required at specific locations, and to base the
notice on the type of equipment or service involved, or by the type
of carrier. In addition, it requires the Attorney General to provide
a numerical estimate of law enforcement's anticipated use of
electronic surveillance for 1998. The statute also defines the
maximum capacity as the largest number of intercepts that a
particular switch or system must be capable of implementing
simultaneously. The initial capacity relates to the number of
intercepts the government will need to make on the date that is four
years after enactment.

By mandating the publication of numerical estimates of law
enforcement surveillance activity, Congress intended CALEA's notice
requirements to serve as "mechanisms that will allow for
Congressional and public oversight. The bill requires the government
to estimate its capacity needs and publish them in the Federal
Register." Congress made it clear that "[t]he purpose behind the
provision is... to ensure that carriers receive adequate and specific
notice from the Attorney General about the needs of law
enforcement...".11

a. The First FBI Notice

In October, 1995, the FBI, operating under delegated authority by
the Attorney General, issued a first proposed capacity notice. The
Notice was criticized for; (1) failing to comply with the
notification and public accountability provisions mandated in CALEA;
and (2) failing to substantiate the proposed capacity requirements
with adequate documentation.12 Ultimately, it was
withdrawn by the Bureau for these reasons.

The FBI's Federal Register notice failed to identify the "actual
number of communications interceptions" that the Bureau estimates
will be needed by the end of 1998. Instead, the capacity requirements
were "presented as a percentage of the engineered capacity of the
equipment, facilities, and services that provide a customer or
subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
communications." 60 Fed. Reg. 53643.13

Furthermore, in EPICís comments on the initial FBI notice,
they stated: "[t]he Bureau's "percentage" approach to capacity
requirements allows neither telecommunications carriers nor the
public to ëknow the required level of capacity.í" The
percentages contained in the Federal Register notice (e.g., maximum
capacity of one percent of "engineered capacity" for geographic areas
falling within Category I) also engendered a great deal of public
confusion concerning the Bureau's proposed requirements and their
impact on the privacy of personal communications.

The confusion became readily apparent after an article appearing
on the front page of November 2, 1995, New York Times interpreted the
Bureau's notice as requiring "the capacity to monitor simultaneously
as many as one out of every 100 phone lines." Asked about the issue
at a press briefing later that day, Deputy Attorney General Jamie S.
Gorelick said "there appears to be some misunderstanding or
miscommunication as to the implications of what is contained in [the
Federal Register] notice." In a letter to House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Henry Hyde, Director Freeh asserted that, "We have not and
are not asking for the ability to monitor one out of every 100
telephone lines or any other ridiculous number like that. ...
Information supplied by the FBI was simply applied in a manner not
intended to reach erroneous conclusions."

b. The Second FBI Notice

The FBI offered a revised NPRM in January, 1997, but has yet to
publish rules as a result of the proceeding. 14 The second
NPRM was also rejected by industry and privacy groups alike for
requiring greater capacity for interceptions by carriers than
actually required today.

The second FBI notice called for substantial increases in
surveillance of both landline and wireless communications over the
next ten years, with a total maximum capacity of 57,749 simultaneous
intercepts to be conducted in the United States. Calculating out the
percentages provided by the FBI, by 1998 the FBI anticipates an
increase of 33 percent of landline interceptions and 70 percent of
wireless phones. By 2004, the Bureau estimates a total increase of 74
percent in interceptions of landline phones and 277 percent in
wireless phones.

The second notice also implied that every carrier serving a
particular region would have to install capacity sufficient to meet
the total surveillance needs for that area, even if the carrier only
served a portion of the customers in the area. Such a plan would not
only be cost prohibitive, but would provide for unauthorized and
unnecessary capabilities.

Moreover, the second notice failed to make any distinction between
the interception of call content and call-identifying information,
even though this too was expressly required by Congress. From both
constitutional law and privacy perspectives, this distinction is
critical since the interception of call content is inherently more
intrusive than the interception of call-identifying information. Any
number of innocent individuals, conveying private information could
be subject to unwarranted invasions by allowing call content
information without court authorization. It is for this reason that
CALEA limits the type of information that may be intercepted under
pen register and trap and trace authority.

It is now three years since the CALEAís enactment and to
date the government has not promulgated final rules. The
Bureauís refusal to provide the actual capacity requirements
in its Federal Register notice denies any possibility of meaningful
public oversight. Recently, the FBI has stated that it intends to
promulgate a final notice January, 1998. Even if final regulations
are promulgated at this late date, it will be impossible for industry
to adopt technical standards accordingly under the current deadline
of October 25, 1998. If the Congressional mandate for "public
oversight" of the FBI's implementation of CALEA is to be realized, it
is incumbent upon the Bureau to make available additional information
concerning its proposed capacity requirements and then for the
Commission to require sufficient time for public review.

Underscoring this point, on October 23, 1997, several
representatives from the telecommunications industry testified before
the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives on the implementation of CALEA. The
consensus of each of the industry speakers was that the
Bureauís failure to provide rules in a timely fashion has
prevented CALEAís implementation.

Roy Neel, President and CEO of the United States Telephone
Association stated, "[t]he FBIís delay in announcing its final
capacity notice has been a significant obstacle for industry standard
setting organizations. Throughout 1995 and early 1996, industry
participants often postponed resolving certain issues pending the
release of the capacity regulations and the equally anticipated
Electronic Surveillance Interface."

Furthermore, it has become clear that the actual requirements that
the FBI seeks go well beyond that authorized under CALEA. As we
discuss below, we believe that the standards and the petitions
submitted by industry and CDT/EFF make clear that the FBI has asked
for capabilities not provided for by CALEA.

The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their
non-compliance with CALEAís capacity notice requirements
warrant a Commission order delaying implementation. Additionally,
since this NPRM does not address the actual technical standards being
considered for industry adoption, the Commission must extend the
deadline for compliance pending public review.

It is entirely possible that industry and the FBI may achieve a
compromise on the standards, but even if industry is strong-armed by
the FBI into complying with their requests, we intend to petition the
FCC to engage in through review of the issues not included in this
proceeding.

II. Law Enforcement Has Prevented Industry Adoption of Authorized
Standards By "Gold Plating" its Stated Needs

Congress expressly denied law enforcement agencies the authority
to dictate the design of telecommunications networks under CALEA by
conferring this authority to industry associations. 15
Industry has proposed several standards proposals which may be
adopted in the near future. However, industry organizations have
publicly acknowledged that law enforcement agencies have played an
extensive role in the process and have thwarted the opportunity to
adopt reasonable standards.

Realizing that industry could not promulgate standards in light of
the FBI resistance, on July 16, Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association petitioned the FCC to assume the authority over standards
adoption. The petition indicates, the organizations were compelled to
adopt FBI requests. More recently, in hearings on the implementation
of CALEA before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, October
23, industry groups explained how the FBI has prevented adoption of
reasonable standards. Many members of the Committee were critical of
both the Act and the FBI. Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA), who chaired part of
the hearing, bluntly stated that the legislation would not have
passed in the Republican 104th or 105th Congresses.

A major area of contention was the FBI's demand for added features
not required by the 1994 law. These include an enhanced ability to
track geographical locations of cell phones, the ability to monitor
conference calls when the targeted party has left, and the ability to
separate out content from signaling data of packet-based
communications.

The FBI's efforts to lobby against the industry designed standards
during a vote on the specifications also came under fire. The Bureau
organized a campaign to vote down the industry-developed standards,
which was described in the hearing as "ballot stuffing." Twenty-eight
police agencies filed the same 74-page ballot comments, including a
sheriff in Florida who included the FBI's letter requesting that he
file the comments. CTIA's Wheeler described the FBI's actions as
"rolling a hand grenade under the table."

Another controversial issue was the FBI's effort, during its
negotiations with the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)
over the wiretap standard, to petition the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) to revoke the standards-settings authority
of TIA after 50 years. The FBI apparently withdrew the request after
several months.

Jay Kitchen, President of the Personal Communications Industry
Association explained that the impasse in the CALEA process was due
in large part to FBI interference. He stated:

"Unfortunately, a breakdown of monumental proportions
has occurred. As of today, final standards have not been set, in
large measure due to the actions of law enforcement officials.
Initially, the FBI waited almost one and one-half years after the
enactment of CALEA to submit its recommendations to standards setting
bodies. After the submission of this list, industry representatives
and the FBI were able to reach consensus on standards that provided,
by PCIA's estimates, 90 percent of the capabilities that the FBI had
requested. Since then, however, the FBI has held up the entire
standards setting process in order to ensure that every capability on
its "wish list" is made part of the standards."

Similarly, Matthew J. Flanagan, President of the
Telecommunications Industry Association, stated that industry
concessions to FBI demands have been rejected by law enforcement and
they have been pressured to concede even more:

"During these meetings, industry made several
concessions to law enforcement, agreeing to include features in the
standard that many in industry were convinced were not required under
CALEA. For example, law enforcement requested that it be provided
with continuous information about the location of an intercept
subject's cellular phone, irrespective of whether the phone was being
used or not. Industry refused to provide this feature, finding that
it greatly exceeded what CALEA permitted. In a compromise, however,
industry agreed to provide law enforcement with the location of a
cell phone at the beginning and end of each call -- even though many
industry participants felt that even this compromise exceeded the
scope of CALEA."

As a result of all of the concessions, the proposed industry
standard goes well beyond a fair reading of CALEA and incorporates
several of the additional features and capabilities requested by law
enforcement prior to CALEAís passage but which were rejected
by the Congress.

III. Congressional Limitations on Information Subject to
Interception Have Been Disregarded

Congress stated that CALEA was meant to preserve and not expand
government surveillance capabilities. To guarantee that surveillance
is not expanded, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to
protect user privacy and security of information they are not
authorized to intercept.

Section 103 of CALEA, Assistance Capability Requirements,
specifically imposes four industry requirements to protect privacy
while assisting with law enforcement interceptions. Carriers are
required to ensure that their systems are capable of: 16

expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant
to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to
the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic
communications carried by the carrier within a service area...;

expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant
to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access
call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the
carrier--

before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a
wire or electronic communication...; and

in a manner that allows it to be associated with the
communication to which it pertains, except that, with regard to
information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen
registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section
3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying
information shall not include any information that may disclose
the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent
that the location may be determined from the telephone number);

delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying
information to the government, pursuant to a court order or other
lawful authorization, in a format such that they may be
transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services
procured by the government to a location other than the premises
of the carrier; and

facilitating authorized communications interceptions and
access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a
minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications
service and in a manner that protects--

the privacy and security of communications and
call-identifying information not authorized to be intercepted;
and

This section makes clear that Congress specifically limited the
type of information that could be permissibly provided by industry to
the FBI under CALEA by distinguishing between call content and call
identifying information. Thus, we disagree with assumptions made in
the NPRM that broaden the scope of communications information that
may be intercepted. Section 20 states:

"We tentatively conclude that providers of exclusively
information services, such as electronic mail providers and on-line
services providers, are excluded from CALEAís requirements and
are therefore not required to modify or design their systems to
comply with CALEA....[W]e seek comment on the applicability of
CALEAís requirements to information services provided by
common carriers. We also note, however, that Congress anticipated
that calling features such as call forwarding, call waiting,
three-way calling, speed dialing, and the "call redirection portion
of voice mail" would be subject to CALEAís requirements. We
tentatively conclude that calling features associated with telephone
service are classified as telecommunications services for the
purposes of CALEA, and carriers offering these services are therefore
required to make all necessary network modifications to comply with
CALEA." (emphasis added)

Congress explicitly rejected any application of CALEA to
information services including electronic mail and on-line services
recognizing that interception of those communications is the
equivalent of "call content" and is therefore, subject to a much
higher degree of protection under the Constitution. The NPRM,
however, incorrectly assumes there is a distinction between carriers
that exclusively provide information services and common carriers
that provide information services. There is absolutely no basis for
such a distinction under CALEA. Congress did not exclude such
services based on the carrier offering the services, but on the
nature of the services and a recognition that content of
communications has always been accorded greater protections.

Furthermore, the tentative conclusion that calling features
associated with telephone services are subject to CALEA as "call
identifying" information is incorrect. CALEA restricts recording or
decoding of electronic impulses to dialing and signaling information
that relates to call processing only. Congress explicitly rejected
the inclusion of "other dialing tones that may be generated by the
sender that are used to signal customer premises equipment of the
recipient are not to be treated as call-identifying
information."18 Thus, the addition of these features is an
expansion of current surveillance abilities and not permitted.

Not addressed in the NPRM are nearly a half-dozen other features
that Bureau contends are "call identifying" features and thus subject
to CALEA. As the Response Comments on the Petition for Rulemaking of
the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, August 11, 1997, correctly point out, the FBI has sought
the addition of the following features not considered by Congress:

packet switching information

wireless telephone call location information

packet data content delivery information

multi-party monitoring information

an expanded definition of call identifying information

pen register information

feature status messages19

Instead of addressing these threats to privacy, Section B of the
NPRM frames the discussion of privacy protection in solely in terms
of the type of record keeping procedures to be used by
telecommunications carriers that conduct interceptions on behalf of
law enforcement. However, Congress made clear that protecting the
privacy of innocent individuals from surreptitious surveillance was
of paramount importance and charged the Commission with the task of
seeing to the necessary safeguards. The additional surveillance
features sought by the FBI contravene Congressí intention that
the law would maintain current levels of surveillance and not expand
them. These issues must be addressed by the Commission before the
implementation of CALEA can be accomplished and before record keeping
and industry security procedures are determined.

Conclusion

Before rushing to embrace any proposals to enlarge the capability
of government surveillance of its citizens, the ACLU and EPIC urge
the Commission to take note of words written nearly 70 years ago --
that remain true even today. As Justice Louis Brandeis so aptly
stated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):

The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the
telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the
mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the
persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations
between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and
privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of manís
telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call, or who may call him. As a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping.

The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their
non-compliance with CALEAís capacity notice requirements
warrant serious Commission response. Congress envisioned the
implementation process as an open process to ensure that law
enforcement did not surreptitiously gain unprecedented surveillance
capabilities. Thus, before the adoption of industry standards, there
must be careful scrutinization of law enforcementís capability
requirements. We believe the only way to accomplish this task is for
the Commission to extend the compliance deadline to October 24, 2000
under the authority provided by the Congress.

247 U.S.C. Section 1008(c)(2) and (c)(3). Under Section
107(c), the Commission is permitted to grant an extension for a
period of time that it deems necessary for the carrier to comply with
the assistance capability requirements. Id. at 1008(c)(3)(A).

3 Paragraph 44, of the NPRM states in pertinent part:

Based on the ongoing nature of the standard-setting
process, we conclude that it would be inappropriate at this time for
us to address technical capability standards issues. Nothing in this
Notice should be construed as evidence of any predisposition on the
part of the Commission regarding capability standards, and we
encourage the industry and law enforcement community to continue
their efforts to develop the necessary requirements, protocols and
standards.

4Administrative office of the US Courts, 1996 Wiretap
Report for the Period January 1 through December 31, 1996, April
1997.

5Id.

6H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
13 (1994).

747 U.S.C. Section 1006 (a)(2).

8Id.

9140 Cong. Rec. H. 107-83 (October 4, 1994).

1047 U.S.C. 1003

11H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 13 (1994).

12Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Re: Initial FBI Notification of Law Enforcement Capacity
Requirements as Mandated in the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (November 1995).