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Tue, 19 May 2015 15:33:16 +0200Tue, 19 May 2015 15:33:16 +0200Taking the lead: when non-banks arrange syndicated loanshttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/37445
In the mid-1990s, institutional investors entered the syndicated loan market and started to serve borrowers as lead arrangers. Why are non-banks able to compete for this role against banks? How do the composition of syndicates and loan pricing differ among lead arrangers? By using a dataset of 12,847 leveraged loans between 1997 and 2012, I aim to answer these questions. Non-banks benefit from looser regulatory requirements, have industry expertise which helps them in the screening and monitoring of borrowers and focus on firms that ask for loans only instead of additional cross-selling of other services. I can show that non-banks specialize on more opaque and less experienced borrowers, are more likely than banks to choose participants that help to reduce potentially higher information asymmetries and earn 105 basis points more than banks.Marcel Gruppworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/37445Tue, 19 May 2015 15:33:16 +0200The Effects of Contingent Convertible (CoCo) Bonds on Insurers' Capital Requirements Under Solvency IIhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/37443
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as a potential mechanism to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. We develop a stylized model with a direct financial connection between banking and insurance and study the effects of various types of bonds such as non-convertible bonds, write-down bonds and CoCos on banks' and insurers' risk situations. In addition, we compare insurers' capital requirements under the proposed Solvency II standard model as well as under an internal model that ex-ante anticipates additional risks due to possible conversion of the CoCo bond into bank shares. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we consider different CoCo designs (write-down factor, trigger value, holding time of bank shares) and compare the resulting capital requirements with those for holding non-convertible bonds. We identify situations in which insurers benefit from buying CoCo bonds due to lower capital requirements and higher coupon rates. Furthermore, our results highlight how the Solvency II standard model can mislead insurers in their CoCo investment decision due to economically irrational incentives.Tobias Niedrig; Helmut Gründlworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/37443Tue, 19 May 2015 15:16:55 +0200Are IPOs of different VCs different?http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/36071
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.Tereza Tykvová; Uwe Walzworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/36071Mon, 15 Dec 2014 09:57:33 +0100Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [This version February 2005]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35722
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.Julia Hirschreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35722Mon, 01 Dec 2014 10:13:33 +0100Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [Version May 2005]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35721
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.Julia Hirschworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35721Mon, 01 Dec 2014 10:04:52 +0100Over-allotment options in IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt - an empirical investigation : [First Version: December 2, 2002]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35708
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.Stefanie A. Franzke; Christian Schlagreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35708Mon, 01 Dec 2014 08:47:47 +0100Financing asset growthhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34773
We document the existence of a debt anomaly that is in addition to the asset growth anomaly: for a given asset growth rate, firms that issue more debt, as well as firms that retire more debt, have lower stock returns in the 12 months starting 6 months after the calendar year of asset growth. Exploring the reasons for debt issuance, we find that managers of firms for which analyst expectations are more over-optimistic, which suffer from declining investment profitability, and whose earnings-price ratios are relatively high are inclined to rely more heavily on debt financing. On the other hand, firms that retire more debt for a given asset growth rate tend to have improving profitability but to be over-priced. We also find that the financing decision is influenced by the prior debt ratio, the asset growth rate, profitability, and CEO pay sensitivity. We interpret our results in terms of managerial incentives, signaling, and market timing.Michael J. Brennan; Holger Kraftreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34773Tue, 25 Nov 2014 15:46:07 +0100Systemic risk spillovers in the European banking and sovereign network : [Version September 10, 2014]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35086
We propose a framework for estimating network-driven time-varying systemic risk contributions that is applicable to a high-dimensional financial system. Tail risk dependencies and contributions are estimated based on a penalized two-stage fixed-effects quantile approach, which explicitly links bank interconnectedness to systemic risk contributions. The framework is applied to a system of 51 large European banks and 17 sovereigns through the period 2006 to 2013, utilizing both equity and CDS prices. We provide new evidence on how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank linkages evolved over the European sovereign debt crisis and how it is reflected in network statistics and systemic risk measures. Illustrating the usefulness of the framework as a monitoring tool, we provide indication for the fragmentation of the European financial system having peaked and that recovery has started.Frank Betz; Nikolaus Hautsch; Tuomas A. Peltonen; Melanie Schienleworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35086Mon, 20 Oct 2014 13:02:32 +0200Systemic risk in the financial sector: what can we learn from option markets? : [version 10 february 2014]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35010
We propose a novel approach on how to estimate systemic risk and identify its key determinants. For US financial companies with publicly traded equity options, we extract option-implied value-at-risks and measure the spillover effects between individual company value-at-risks and the option-implied value-at-risk of a financial index. First, we study the spillover effect of increasing company risks on the financial sector. Second, we analyze which companies are mostly affected if the tail risk of the financial sector increases. Key metrics such as size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and earnings have a significant influence on the systemic risk profiles of financial institutions.Holger Kraft; Alexander Schmidtreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35010Mon, 08 Sep 2014 13:19:44 +0200Insight private equity : [Version 26 September 2012]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34784
We build on previous work on operational performance evaluation of private equity portfolio companies as we are able to at least partially decrypt the black box consisting of restructuring tools these investors use and the corresponding impact on their portfolio companies. Beyond answering whether private equity improves operating efficiency we figure out which of the typical restructuring tools drive operating efficiency. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions in the last thirty years we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors experience has a positive and financial leverage a negative influence on operational performance.Andrej Gill; Nikolai Visnjicreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34784Thu, 14 Aug 2014 14:01:35 +0200Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: a new regulatory attempt after the crisis : [March 27, 2012]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34369
The paper analyzes the mutual influence of the capital structure and the investment decision of a bank, as well as the incentive effects of the bank executives compensation schemes on these decisions. In case the government implicitly or explicitly insures deposits and/or the banks debt, banks are incentivized to invest in risky assets and to have a high leverage. Capital regulation could potentially solve this excessive risk taking problem. However, this is only possible if the regulator can observe and properly measure the investment risks of the bank, which was called into question during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Hence, we propose a regulatory approach that is also able to implement the first best risk taking levels by the bank, but does not require the regulator to know the investment risk of the bank. The regulatory approach involves the implementation of capital requirements, which are made contingent on the management compensation.Christian Eufinger; Andrej Gillreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34369Tue, 12 Aug 2014 12:07:03 +0200Granularity of corporate debt : [Version 10 März 2014]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34385
We study the dispersion of debt maturities across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt,'' using a model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2012 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that we observe both very concentrated and highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, observed variation in granularity supports the model's predictions, i.e. maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment oppoJaewon Choi; Dirk Hackbarth; Josef Zechnerreporthttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34385Mon, 11 Aug 2014 13:31:45 +0200Executive compensation structure and credit spreads : [Version 9 Juli 2014]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34453
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.Stefano Colonnello; Giuliano Curatola; Ngoc Giang Hoangworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34453Mon, 14 Jul 2014 15:59:32 +0200The role of bank lending tightening on corporate bond issuance in the eurozonehttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/33833
This paper empirically tests the role of bank lending tightening on non-financial corporate (NFC) bond issuance in the eurozone. By utilizing a unique data set provided by the ECB Bank Lending Survey, we capture the "pure" credit supply effect on corporate external financing. We find that tightened credit standards positively affect the NFC bond issuance: A 1pp increase in banks reporting considerable tightening on loans leads to around a 7% increase in firms' bond issuance in the eurozone. Focusing on a spectrum of aspects contributing to bank credit tightening, we document that banks' balance sheet constraints, as well as the perception of risk lead to significantly higher NFC bond issuance. In addition, we show that stricter lending conditions, such as wider margins, higher collateral requirements and covenants significantly increase NFC bond issuance volumes too. Furthermore, the impact of bank credit tightening on firms' bond issuance is particularly observable in core eurozone countries and not in peripheral countries. This is partially due to the underdeveloped of debt capital markets in the peripheral countries.Orcun Kaya; Lulu Wangworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/33833Wed, 28 May 2014 17:24:31 +0200Market implied costs of bankruptcyhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32504
This paper takes a novel approach to estimating bankruptcy costs by inference from market prices of equity and put options using a dynamic structural model of capital structure. This approach avoids the selection bias of looking at firms in or near default and therefore permits theories of ex ante capital structure determination to be tested. We identify significant cross sectional variation in bankruptcy costs across industries and relate these to specific firm characteristics. We find that asset volatility and growth options have significant positive impacts, while tangibility and size have negative impacts. Our bankruptcy cost variable estimate significantly negatively impacts leverage ratios. This negative impact is in addition to that of other firm characteristics such as asset intangibility and asset volatility. The results provide strong support for the tradeoff theory of capital structure.Johann Reindl; Neal Stoughton; Josef Zechnerworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32504Tue, 17 Dec 2013 08:26:40 +0100Granularity of corporate debt : [Version 9 Mai 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32503
We study to what extent firms spread out their debt maturity dates across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt." We consider the role of debt granularity using a simple model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms may diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2011 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that many firms have either very concentrated or highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, our model's predictions are consistent with observed variation in granularity. Corporate debt maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment opportunities, with higher leverage ratios, and with lower levels of current cash flows. We also show that during the recent financial crisis especially firms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed maturity structures. Finally, granularity plays an important role for bond issuances, because we document that newly issued corporate bond maturities complement pre-existing bond maturity profiles.Jaewon Choi; Dirk Hackbarth; Josef Zechnerworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32503Tue, 17 Dec 2013 08:23:01 +0100Financial network systemic risk contributionshttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32497
We propose the realized systemic risk beta as a measure for financial companies’ contribution to systemic risk given network interdependence between firms’ tail risk exposures. Conditional on statistically pre-identified network spillover effects and market as well as balance sheet information, we define the realized systemic risk beta as the total time-varying marginal effect of a firm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the system’s VaR. Statistical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk spillover channels and determines companies’ systemic importance in the U.S. financial system. Our approach can be used to monitor companies’ systemic importance allowing for a transparent macroprudential supervision.Nikolaus Hautsch; Julia Schaumburg; Melanie Schienleworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32497Mon, 16 Dec 2013 09:12:18 +0100The cost of firms' debt financinghttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32480
We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk remia paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5,500 issues over the period 2005-2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005-07 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010-12 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms got a discount of 40 basis points.Daniele Pianeselli; Andrea Zaghiniworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/32480Tue, 10 Dec 2013 09:34:51 +0100Financing asset growth : [version 11 august 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/31412
In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with managerial incentives to report high equity earnings. Managers rely most heavily on debt to finance their asset growth when their future earnings prospects are poor, when they are under pressure due to past declines in earnings, negative past stock returns, and excessively optimistic analyst earnings forecasts, and when the earnings yield is high relative to bond yields so that from an accounting perspective equity is ‘expensive’. Managers of high debt issuing firms are more likely to be newly appointed and also more likely to be replaced in subsequent years. Abnormal returns on portfolios formed on the basis of asset growth and debt issuance are strongly positively associated with the contemporaneous changes in returns on assets and on equity as well as with earnings surprises. This may account for the finding that debt issuance forecasts negative abnormal returns, since debt issuance also forecasts negative changes in returns on assets and on equity and negative earnings surprises. Different mechanisms appear to be at work for firms that retire debt.Michael J. Brennan; Holger Kraftworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/31412Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:47:49 +0200Systemic risk in the financial sector: what can we learn from option markets? : [version 12 july 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/31409
In this paper, we propose a novel approach on how to estimate systemic risk and identify its key determinants. For all US financial companies with publicly traded equity options, we extract their option-implied value-at-risks (VaRs) and measure the spillover effects between individual company VaRs and the option-implied VaR of an US financial index. First, we study the spillover effect of increasing company risks on the financial sector. Second, we analyze which companies are most affected if the tail risk of the financial sector increases. We find that key accounting and market valuation metrics such as size, leverage, balance sheet composition, market-to-book ratio and earnings have a significant influence on the systemic risk profile of a financial institution. In contrast to earlier studies, the employed panel vector autoregression (PVAR) estimator allows for a causal interpretation of the results.Holger Kraft; Alexander Schmidtworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/31409Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:39:49 +0200Hidden gems and borrowers with dirty little secrets: investment in soft information, borrower self-selection and competitionhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30572
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.Reint Gropp; Christian Gründl; André Güttlerworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30572Fri, 28 Jun 2013 14:56:45 +0200Performance benefits of tight control : [Version 18 Juni 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30577
This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate governance changes on operational performance. Our analysis shows significant positive abnormal growth in several performance ratios for the private period of our sample companies relative to comparable public companies. These performance differences come from the increase in ownership concentration after the leveraged buyout transaction.Andrej Gill; Nikolai Visnjicworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30577Fri, 28 Jun 2013 08:31:07 +0200Insight private equity : [Version 18 June 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30576
We are able to shed light on the black box of restructuring tools private equity investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies. By building on previous work considering performance evaluation of PE backed companies, we analyze whether private equity improves operating efficiency and which of the typical restructuring tools are the main performance drivers. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions of the last thirty years, we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency, these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors’ experience has a positive influence while financial leverage has no influence on operational performance.Andrej Gill; Nikolai Visnjicworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/30576Fri, 28 Jun 2013 08:17:01 +0200Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: pay structures as a regulatory signal : [March 6, 2013]http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29379
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Christian Eufinger; Andrej Gillworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29379Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:49:05 +0200Non-voting shares in France : an empirical analysis of the voting premiumhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/22870
It is the objective of this paper to determine the voting premium for French shares by comparing the values of voting and non-voting shares, and to analyze the value of the voting rights. The study uses data for 25 French companies which had both types of shares outstanding and traded on the stock exchange during the entire period from 1986 to 1996, or for some time during this interval. The average value of the voting premium is 51,35%.
The paper analyzes the reasons for this surprisingly high value by testing different hypotheses based on dividend differences, the revival) of the voting right, capitalization, shareholder structure, and the share of non-voting capital in total equity capital. The regressions show that the shareholder structure strongly influences the value of the voting premium.
A case study of the attempted takeover of Casino by Promodes shows that investors attach a much higher value to the voting right during relevant situations than at other tomes. Both companies involved had, at the time, two types of shares outstanding and listed. Furthermore the paper shows that non-voting shares have never played an important role in equity finance in France since the companies have different alternatives.
In an international cumparison, France is found to have the second highest voting premium, exceeded only by that of Italy. A probable reason is the low quality of the national accounting standards and the low level of minority shareholder protection.Christian K. Muusworkingpaperhttp://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/22870Thu, 06 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0200