UNRWA’s
existence is the problem; stopgap reforms are not possible and
would not be
helpful even if they were.

Following
the recent military operation in Gaza, the United Nations Relief
and Works
Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) has become a center
of attention.
For over six decades UNRWA has controlled and perpetuated the
Palestine refugee
narrative of “right of return.” In order to ensure its continued
control over
its Arab Palestinian clients and perpetuate the refugee
narrative, UNRWA issues
Palestinian Refugee ID cards. However, the agency does not have
the authority
to issue such ID cards. Awarding refugee status is the
prerogative of sovereign
states, which vet applicants and decide whether to award refugee
status. Today,
over five million Palestinians are holders of these unofficial
cards.

Neither
UNRWA nor the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has the
authority to award refugee status.

While the
UNHCR does not issue such documents, UNRWA continues to print
and distribute
refugee ID cards to Arab children with the full knowledge that
these children
have never been refugees as defined by the 1951 Refugee
Convention.

A very
dangerous interdependence has developed between the agency and
its clients:
UNRWA is dependent on its clients for its continued existence
and the clients
are dependent on UNRWA for their “the right of return.” The
symbiotic
relationships between the agency and its clients have resulted
in the extreme
anti-Israeli policies and operations.

No one
should have been surprised that UNRWA allowed Hamas to use its
facilities,
provides employment to Hamas members, or that UNRWA’s textbooks
follow the
Hamas agenda. UNRWA is a Palestinian organization, employing
30,000 Palestinian
and an international skeleton of about a 100 advisers, who are
dedicated to the
Palestinian cause.

UNRWA has
been operating as a “non-territorial government” which
undermines the ability
of those it serves to become independent productive citizens.
The fact that the
Israeli government chooses to ignore this threat and views
UNRWA’s operations
as helpful is a miserable, failed, short-sighted political
strategy.

UNRWA’s
existence is the problem. Stopgap reforms are not possible and
would not be
helpful even if they were. Transferring UNRWA’s operations to
the UNHCR will
only make things worse. Such an act will affirm that five
million Arab
“refugees” living in the region will not be satisfied until they
are allowed to
move into Israel.

Second, if
the UNHCR takes over UNRWA’s responsibilities, the issues of
anti-Israeli
propaganda, the use of UNRWA’s facilities as safe havens for
terrorists, and
the employment of tens of thousands Palestinians , many of whom
are members of
terrorist organizations, will remain unresolved. The only change
will be the
title of the agency, and the name on the agency’s stationary.

Changing
the situation requires that UNRWA’s operations be phased out and
that the
Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan adopt UNRWA’s
facilities,
schools and health clinics.

The Israeli
government should immediately stop using the term “refugee
camps” in its formal
announcements; it is a false statement.

Refugee
camps do not exist; these are urban neighborhoods governed by
UNRWA.

The US, as
UNRWA’s largest donor, can and should also demand an immediate
halt to the
dissemination of Palestinian refugee ID cards. All cards should
be declared
invalid.

Finally, on
a personal note, in 1995, after the signing of the Declaration
of Principles
and the handshake between Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and
Shimon Peres, UNRWA
was asked by the UN General Assembly to begin to plan phasing
out. A five-year
period was assumed to be enough time to phase out UNRWA’s
operations and
transfer its operations and facilities to the new Palestinian
Authority. The
document was entitled “Fiveyear Horizon Plan.” I obtained a
copy, but then lost
it.

UNRWA
archived the document, hid it, and now claims that it cannot be
found. The
phase-out plan did not materialize because the second intifada
of 2000 broke
out and UNRWA’s emergency services suddenly became necessary.

Indeed, the
intifada was a life-saver for UNRWA. The recent military
operation in Gaza
should not lead to a second resurrection of UNRWA.