JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Presiding Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment
and opinion.

OPINION

GORDON
JUSTICE.

¶
1 Defendant Jacob Miles was convicted after a jury trial of
armed robbery and sentenced as a habitual criminal to natural
life with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). This
court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
People v. Miles, No. 1-02-2880 (2003) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶
2 Defendant now appeals from the trial court's dismissal
of his pro se petition filed pursuant to section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401
(West 2012)). Defendant claims that his armed robbery
conviction is void because he was charged with armed robbery
with a firearm but convicted of armed robbery with a
dangerous weapon. Defendant argues that he was not charged
with armed robbery with a dangerous weapon and that these two
types of armed robbery are mutually exclusive. For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court's dismissal
of his section 2-1401 petition.

¶
3 BACKGROUND

¶
4 Since defendant raises a purely legal question on this
appeal, we do not repeat here the underlying facts of his
conviction and instead incorporate by reference our prior
order where we already described the facts and the evidence
at trial. See People v. Miles, No. 1-02-2880 (2003)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (finding
unpersuasive defendant's claim that the State failed to
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). We describe
below the procedural history and the facts needed to decide
the issues presented on this appeal.

¶
5 Defendant was indicted for armed robbery. The charges
stemmed from the armed robbery of a pizza delivery man on the
night of August 16, 2000. Specifically, the indictment
charged defendant with "knowingly [taking] United States
currency from the person or presence of James Gilbert by the
use of force *** [while] he carried on or about his person or
was otherwise armed with a firearm, in violation of Chapter
720, Act 5, Section 18-2 of the Illinois Complied Statutes
1992, as amended."

¶
6 Effective January 1, 2000, which was before both the
offense and indictment at issue, the armed robbery statute
was amended (1) to create separate subsections for armed
robbery "with a dangerous weapon other than a
firearm" and armed robbery "with a firearm"
and (2) to add a 15-year sentencing enhancement for being
"armed with a firearm." Pub. Act 91-404 (eff. Jan.
1, 2000) (amending 720 ILCS 5/18-2); People v.
Walden,199 Ill.2d 392, 396 n.1 (2002) (noting the
effective date of the amendment). The amended statute
provided, in relevant part, that:

"(a) A person commits armed robbery when he or she
[commits robbery]; and

(1) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is
otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm;
or

(2) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is
otherwise armed with a firearm[.]" 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)
(West 2002).

The
amended statute also provided for the following sentencing
enhancement:

"Armed robbery in violation of subsection (a)(1) is a
Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(2) is a Class X
felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b)
(West 2002).

¶
7 Before trial, defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the
indictment pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court case of
People v. Walden,199 Ill.2d 392 (2002),
[1]
which was decided after defendant was indicted. In
Walden, the supreme court held: "The 15-year
enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a
firearm *** violates the proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution and is unenforceable."
Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 397.

¶
8 Defense counsel argued that the indictment charged
defendant under the armed robbery statute "as
amended" and therefore defendant had been charged under
an unconstitutional subsection. While the indictment did not
cite a specific subsection, it did charge defendant with
committing the offense while "armed with a
firearm." Defense counsel argued that Walden
rendered the armed-robbery-while-armed-with-a-firearm
provision unenforceable.

¶
9 The trial court held that, since the Walden court
had declared the amendment unconstitutional, the preexisting
statute now applied and the earlier statute did not
differentiate between dangerous weapons and firearms. The
earlier statute provided in full:

"(a) A person commits armed robbery when he or she
[commits robbery] while he or she carries on or about his or
her person, or is otherwise ...

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