184. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge
and Richard T. Kennedy of
the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

Field Marshal Thanom, Chairman of the Thai National Executive Council, has
sent a message to the President dealing with the situation in Indochina and
U.S.-Thai relations (Tab A).2

The letter congratulates the President on his re-election and for the leading
role which he and his staff have played in bringing the Vietnam conflict to
the brink of a settlement3 in keeping
with “peace with honor.” Thanom then goes on to point out, though, that the
continued presence of large North Vietnamese combat forces in Laos and
Cambodia does not augur well for the prospect of immediate peace in
Southeast Asia, notes the damage which the externally-supported Thai
insurgency has caused to his country’s national development, and speaks of
Thailand’s consequent “continual need of effective weapons and budgetary
resources.”

Thanom goes on to say that “with
regard to the question of a general peaceful settlement of all conflicts in
Southeast Asia, it is our opinion that if such a settlement were to be
contingent upon the terms dictated by the aggressive forces then it is
neither satisfactory nor in consonance with your noble goal of ‘peace with
honour’.” He adds that a durable peace in Vietnam also requires that the
questions of indirect aggression and externally supported insurgency in the
immediate neighboring states must be properly dealt with and included in the
terms of the eventual settlement.

Turning to the Thai role in support of U.S. actions in the Vietnam war,
Thanom calls attention to Thai
base facilities which have been made available “gratuitously” to the U.S.
armed forces stationed on Thai soil— with consequent great savings to the
United States—this despite grave risks and heavy criticism, including
criticism from U.S. quarters.

In conclusion, Thanom expresses the
belief that the U.S. continues to bear a great responsibility for the
preservation of the power equilibrium in the Asian-Pacific region and for
helping to bring prosperity to the nations of the region. Citing the “vital
concern” to Thailand of the questions he has raised, Thanom declares that for some, preventive
measures should be taken immediately; for others, exchanges of views are
necessary. He therefore suggests that “confidential discussions at a high
level between our two countries would be mutually beneficial,” and asks that
this suggestion receive the President’s urgent attention.

—The nature of the settlement which will be worked out for the war
in Indochina;

—Whether or not this settlement will safeguard Thai
interests;

—The dimensions of the quid pro quo which the Thai should receive
from the U.S. in return for the large contributions which they have
made to the U.S. war effort.

These matters are indeed ones which we would expect the Thai to be concerned
about, and to want to receive the President’s urgent attention. Accordingly,
Thanom will probably be
considerably put out if the visit to Saigon by the Vice President and
General Haig is not extended to
include Bangkok. We believe that it in fact would be highly desirable for
them to touch base with Thanom, even
though additional consultations with Prime Minister Souvanna and President Lon Nol might then also be necessary.

Attached at Tab A
but not printed was telegram 17465 from Bangkok, December 12, which
transmitted Thanom’s December 12
letter.↩

The United States and
North Vietnam reached an agreement on a cease-fire in late October, but
ratification was put on hold due to South Vietnamese objections to the
North Vietnamese being allowed to remain in place within South Vietnam.
The agreement was not ratified until January 1973.↩