Quadrilateral Bloc: Threatening China’s Regional Dominance

Undoubtedly, ‘Co. Gang States’ Australia, India, Japan and the United States of America are trying to buffer the rising power of China. This could be a good scheme for those who engaged in this struggle but their circumstances seem to be more in danger than in favor for each of them.

Debate should be initiated witha briefpreface about the group of four harmonious democracies who met in Manila on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and East Asia Summits on 12th November to discuss regional and global cooperation.

The meeting was the first since the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” was first mooted by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007.Wary of their relations with China, India and Australia hesitated to take part initially.

Recently the Quad meeting again made China circumspect with regards to its strategic security. Chinese foreign ministry warned against countries politicizing cooperation in the region. So that, on 13th November in response of recent meeting of four countries’ officials, US, Australia, Japan and India, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said that ‘The regional cooperation should neither be politicized nor exclusionary’.

Actually thismeet-up highlighted the deep suspicion and turbulence among China’s neighbors over Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitions for regional dominance. It also clearly underscored growing regional competition between Beijing and Washington.

The meeting comes with the United States’emphasisto shift the strategic focus,while Donald Trump using the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in order to categorize the region during his first trip to Asia. It could be assertively said that this term indicates United States’ diplomatic approach towards security commitment of Asia’s border region.

In their meeting, on the eve of the leaders’ summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the four countries agreed to extend the cooperation towards a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region”. The meeting, known as the “Quad”, did not release a joint statement and the US officials have denied the move as if it were not aimed at containing China. However, Beijing warned last week that any maneuvers towards a security grouping should not target or damage a “third party’s interest”.

In Donald Trump’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister NarendraModi on the sidelines of ASEAN, he not only discussed regional security but also pledged to boost bilateral trade and security ties.

According to the newspaper ‘The Hindu’, Modi told Trump that the Indo-US ties were becoming broader and deeper. “You too can feel that India-US ties can work together beyond the interest of India, for the future of Asia and for the welfare of the humanity in the world,” the Indian Prime Minister was quoted as making this statement. In a separate meeting with ASEAN leaders, Trump called for closer ties with Southeast Asia and urged ASEANleaders not to become “satellites” to anyone,referringto a veiled caution against China’s growing clout in the region.

“We want our partners in the region to be strong, independent, and prosperous, in control of their own destinies, and satellites to no one,” Trump said.

Bydrawing the logical implications, the Quad meeting was not a coincidence or serendipity. Trump appeared keen to promote his Indo-Pacific concept as the keystone of his Asian strategy and worked hard to strengthen ties with its allies and partners, including India and Vietnam to counter-balance China.Jinan University’s Southeast Asian affairs specialist Zhang Mingliang also claimed that“The Quad was largely an expected response from the four countries to Beijing’s growing military and economic influence”.

Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS (School of Oriental & African Studies) China Institute in London, also said: “India, Australia and Japan each had their reasons for wanting the Quad to mean something, especially considering the declining power of the US under Trump.” Moreover,“For all the silliness of Trump, China’s neighbors remain wary of China’s increasing might and intentions,especially as Xi Jinpingtried to restate China’s “historical” place or dominance in the region”, he claimed.

Anyhow, by calculating the aftermath of ‘Quad-Nexus’, it can be postulated that the Quad will drive Russia and China closer together. While Russian President Vladimir Putin will see the Quad as another example of the US attempting to maintain its unipolar world dominance and will feel for China, Moscow is wary of the growing power of China and the Central Asian tentacles of its “Belt and Road Initiative”, Beijing’s plan to grow global trade.

For the United States of America, there are two aims to be fulfilled in this way. One, other states in Quad bloc will be seen as welcome supporters to maintain its constant dominance over the seas. Two, satisfy its own point to provoke an eventual conflict to satisfy its own sense of importance.

What are the fruits for Australia? Not much. About 30 percent of Australian exports go to China, with Japan and South Korea accounting for only 20 percent. China wants to dominate the South China Sea so that it can keep importing from resource-rich countries such as Australia. One other factor is also there, Canberra’s participation in the Quad would encourage India to take part.

India aims to be a main player in Central Asian affairs and seems to counter the belt and road strategy. This Central Asian ambition is largely impractical and unnecessary as any Central Asian resource can be accessed elsewhere. Importantly, the only way for India to gain such access is via Iran, particularly through the Chabahar port. Participation in the Quad would mean that India is spreading itself too thin, and needlessly provoking China by influencing its vital maritime security interests in a similar way as it is attempting to do in Central Asia. It would be deliberately damaging for both India and Australia. To sum-up, it can be argued that the outcome of like-minded ‘Quad-Union’ may reshape the regional geopolitical landscape in the long run. However if this nexus seeks to stop China from gaining power, then it will be just their futile attempt.

South Korea should go with the United States

Now,
previous success won’t guarantee same success in future in the age of the
Fourth Industrial Revolution, We are expecting generation that ability to
create new and missing things is more important than keeping existing assets.

The
economic survival strategy also changes.

There is no
longer continuous growth in this new era, even for a major growing corporation.
For example, an automobile can be a mobile computer with value added on
software and electronics. Every industry becomes IT related company, not only
food and pharmaceuticals industry, but also construction and banking business
as well. Now, a company own by person who counts the money in front of the
vault and calculates the stock number can’t be survived. Although the South
Korean economy has global competitiveness in mobile phone semiconductors and
some industries, South Korea is facing huge challenges.

South
Korean companies must challenge upcoming new business in order to servive.
South Korea has strong engineering system. But even Germany which has world’s
most powerful engineering system is having difficulties in developing new
business areas. South Korea has no resources and can’t be self-sufficient. It
is the fate of South Korea to look out for the world.

The US and
China trade wars of two axis of the global economy are becoming reality.

As the
United States imposed a $ 60 billion tariff in retaliation for China`s breach
of intellectual property rights, the Chinese Department of Commerce immediately
launched a counterattack by imposing a $3 billion tariff on 128 U.S. products.

Global
stock markets plummeted dramatically and The WSJ reported that world was
horrified by the terrible of uncontrolled commerce war. This trade war is a
step in keeping the United States ” Economic security “on the rapid
growth of China’s high-tech sector.

China, once
called the “World Factory” by cheap labour put their hand to
rebellion. To take an instance from smartphone, Huawei, Oppo, Vivo’s
superiority in Apple designed by California and produced by China is striking.
Oppo and Vivo are focused on advanced technologies, not only low-price.

China is
moving from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Created in China’ through the ‘China
Manufacturing 2025’ plan for the manufacturing powerhouse. By the manufacturing
2025 project has an ambition to boost China’s competitiveness to surpass the
US, Germany, and Japan levels and to become the world’s No.1 in 2049.

According
to Financial Times that the Trump government emphasized “economic security
is the security of the country,” that is meaning the United States to take
aim at the Chinese manufacturing 2025.

It is not
so simple in terms of South Korea reality.

In South
Korea, China and USA are first and second market highly dependent on exports of
Korea that counts 25 percent of China and 12 percent of US market.

If the
market shrinks due to the friction between the U.S. and China, South Korea
could be caught in the middle of the market and not be able to choose either

But The
true global leader in today is the United States and Unites States is really
strong.

Related

Power Projection of China

A coin has always two faces, an analyst is ought to analyze the both sides.

China is considered as flag holder of soft
power with a global agenda of peaceful rise. At moment, the world is facing a
new emerging global order by the rise of multiple actors in the international
arena. Now there are two school of thoughts who are proposing contradictory
views like one wing regarded it as optimistic Sino rise who believes that
China’s rise is peaceful. Its foreign policy is viewed as one of the most
harmonious policy ever structured. They believe in the mutual cooperation and
peaceful coexistence. Rise of China is an optimistic opportunity which is
justified by different aspects. As African states were facing a massive number
of problems at all levels, many super powers came and ruled the world but they
didn’t bothered the prosperity of third world countries.

China started invested in African region
and assured the chances of prosperity over there. Due to this economic
integration of China in Africa, a demise of Indian influence in that has been
observed as well. Their economic cooperation is based on model of helping
underdeveloped countries by initiating the projects like Belt and Road
Initiative. They are extending the helping hand to developing countries by
selling products at cheaper rates. They respect the ideologies of other countries,
for example, China didn’t celebrated Pig year in Muslim countries. Regarding
Pakistan, here the optimistic view is prevailed at higher context. Pakistan’s
policy makers favor Chinese investment in Pakistan, as it will help Pakistan in
economic prosperity. China helps Pakistan at almost all of the international
forum. Friendship of china and Pakistan is the strongest one to be observed.
Pakistan can learn a lot from them. The proper use of diplomacy, image
building, projection of soft power and individualism in ideologies and beliefs.
Long term planning strategies can be learned from them. China is all weather
friend of Pakistan but self-skills are significant, as there is a famous
Chinese saying, “to serve a guest by fish is a good way but to teach them how
to catch fish is the best way to serve them.”

On the other hand, there are supporters of
pessimistic Sino rise who believe that China’s rise is threat for globe. This
pessimism is oftenly prevailed by western analysts. They think that rise of
China can disturb the existing world order. For example, China is competing
with American economy in the international market. Balance of power is coin of
international politics, so other actors are emerging now. But the rise and
demise of powers after a certain time period is one of the laws of nature.
Specially America is feeling threatened by this emergence of China as a super
power which can be seen through events like Huawei issue over 5G technology,
its sensitization, trade war between china and America, claim of copyrights by
America etc. increasing influence of China in majority of states is posing the
seriousness of issue. Chinese model of Confucianism is spreading as it has
started practices in South Korea as well which is predicted through their cultural
stimulus. Pessimistic school of thought
deny the authenticity of foreign policy of China, they consider that it is a
mere framework which has nothing to do with reality.In reality China’s behavior
is like relations having towards Taiwan, South China Sea etc. Interest of
states are very important which may differ from each other. Lensing through
these views, this unpredictable situation leaves a humans mind into a chaos,
whether the rise of China is peaceful or just a myth?

Related

The origin of the Four Modernizations and President Xi Jinping’s current choices

On
September 13, 1971 Lin Biao tried to flee to the USSR with all his family,
aboard a Trident plane of civil aviation, which had left with little fuel and
no active radio contact.

The crash
of the aircraft in Mongolia, where both Lin and his whole family died, was
caused by the order given directly by Mao to shoot down the plane.

What had happened, obviously in political and
not in personal terms?

The answer is simple: Lin Biao was very
strongly opposed to the new agreement between China and the United States and
hence had organized a military coup. For Lin Biao all the room for US
geopolitics was to be found in what the Third International’s forces
traditionally defined as “imperialism”.

For Mao Zedong, imperialism was vital for both
the USSR and the USA- and considering that he was far from the continent that
was the prize for which of the two won the Cold War, namely Europe-he refused
to make too many differences between the two.

As a man of Tao and Zen, Mao treated an evil
with another evil.

Mao Zedong, however, also knew that a new
economic relationship with the United States was needed, after the long
economic crisis and the factional instability within the Chinese regime. The
Soviet Union could certainly not give it economic stability and hence the
“Great Helmsman” turned to the distant enemy rather than to the near
quasi-friend.

Nothing can be understood about China,
including current China, if geopolitical choices are separated from economic,
financial and industrial ones which, however, are subjected to the strategic
“policy line” defined by the Party – a policy line that is cultural and always based on a
very long term.

On September 29, 1972 the diplomatic
relationship with Japan were resumed, along with those with the United States.
An evident overlapping of different geopolitical lines which, however – in the
minds of the Chinese decision-makers -were similar also from the symbolic
viewpoint.

In 1973 Deng Xiaoping reappeared in public,
upon direct order by Mao Zedong.

Those were also the years of the late
definitive success of the “policy line” of Zhou Enlai, who had
successfully gone through the Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution, which
had partly overwhelmed him, and led the 10thCPC Congress.

That was the compromise which held the Party
together, after Lin Biao’s elimination. An unstable agreement between the
reformist “Right” (Zhou had spoken of “four modernizations”
many years before, exactly in 1965) and the Left, silenced by Mao, that had
crossed the red line of the Cultural Revolution and the failed communization of
rural areas.

In those years, also the Party’s Left lacked
mass management of the people and the Party and had to agree with the other
factions, while Mao mediated and also created “third wheels”.

Create something from nothing – one of the
Thirty-Six Stratagems of the Chinese Art of War.

In 1973, just before the equilibrium between
Zhou and the old CPC apparata broke again, Deng Xiaoping was fully
rehabilitated and also became member of the Chinese regime’s deep axis, namely
the Central Military Commission.

In 1975 Deng was elected vice-President of the
Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

The connection between the reformists – if we
can call them so – siding with Zhou Enlai, and the “centre” of the
Party’s apparatus – that regained its roles and posts by ousting the Armed
Forces -prevailed once again.

Again in 1975, the National People’s Congress
praised the “Four Modernizations” already proposed by Zhou and, in
its final statement, hoped “that China would be turned into a modern and
powerful Socialist country in the approximately twenty years before the end of
the century”.

Political transformation through the new
economy, as well as preservation of the regime through political transformation
itself.

We could call it “the Tao of
geoeconomics”. Acceleration of industrialization and modernization, but
without creating the disaster of rural masses, who were objectively unable of
providing the start-up capital for implementing any of the Four Modernizations.
This was the real difference with the USSR of the 1930s.

That capital had to be produced in innovative
companies and be attracted from outside.

At the time, however, the CPC was not yet
firmly in the hands of any factions. In September 1975, the national
Agriculture Conference saw the harsh clash between Deng Xiaoping and the old
“Shanghai group” of the Cultural and Proletarian Revolution that,
however, no longer controlled most of the Party.

Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and shortly
afterwards, in Tiananmen Square, there were severe incidents, albeit with the
constant presence of many wreaths reminding of Zhou.

Later there were also strikes and unrest,
until the capture and trial of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai. It had
inspired the “Cultural Revolution” and was then directly accused by
Hua Guofen – the man appointed by Mao to lead the transition- of having
prepared a coup.

China’s transformation, however, began again
from rural areas: at the second Agriculture Conference in Dazhai, in December
1976 – where various cases of corruption and “social polarization” were
described and stigmatized- the discussion focused on the First Modernization,
namely that of rural areas.

When you regulate too much, a parallel and
illegal market is created. This always happens.

Obviously this also happens when total
communization is applied to the economic cycle of rural areas.

Certainly those were residues of Sovietism in
the CPC’s doctrine, but also of the
a-dialectical implementation of Marxism-Leninism in historical and social
contexts in which the analysis of the founder of “scientific
Communism” had never focused.

In fact, when you read the works and
correspondence that Marx dedicated to the Russian agricultural issue, you note
that the author of “Capital” foresaw a direct Socialist social
transformation stemming from the maintenance of the social and community
networks in traditional villages. It may seem strange, but it is so.

This system operates only with a
non-industrialized State that is scarcely widespread in the territory.
Otherwise, the problem is that of capitalism in rural areas to generate the
surplus of urban and industrial investments.

Even in the Second Volume of
“Capital”, Marx’s model is essentially this one.

It is precisely on the agricultural issue that
the stability and success of many Communist regimes isdefined and, not
surprisingly, the first of Zhou’s and later Deng’s Four Modernizations was
precisely that of agriculture.

The topic characterized all Party’s
organizations, but it was in late December 1978 that the Third Plenary Session
of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to decentralize the economy – another
factor strongly different from the Leninist tradition – and even to liberalize
it, in addition to a process of ideological revision, namely Gaige Kaifang that
roughly means “reform and opening”.

That was also related to the request for opening
international trade based on the criterion of “mutual benefit” and
equality between the various countries.

Hence, also from the ideological viewpoint,
Deng became the Supreme Leader of the Party – as well as of the State apparatus
– and announced the Open Door policy.

An extremely important fact was also the
separation of the Bank of China from the People’s Bank of China, so as to serve
as single State body for foreign exchanges.

That was the start of the “Long
March” towards the Four Modernizations, with an unusually united Party,
and currently towards “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” , as
well as – at geopolitical level -President Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road.

In January 1980, the “four freedoms”
– of work, people, goods and capital – were abolished.

The new planning needed to manage all aspects
of productive forces.

That was explained by a covert war of the
Chinese economy against the penetration of foreign capital and joint ventures,
which in fact were immediately regulated by specific legislation enacted the
previous year.

The great British operation of economic
control over the South-Chinese coasts was resumed from Hong Kong, but the
Chinese government eliminated the possibility of such an action by Great
Britain (and by the USA, at least partly).

Hence the Party’s unity had to be reflected in
a new context and, to some extents, in the whole society, so as to prevent the
liberalized Chinese economy from taking the Party and Socialism away. A new
rationale for the CPC’s Leninist unity.

The new Act on contract law was enacted in
March 1981, and in 1982 also the new civil procedure law was enacted, which
became effective on October 1, 1982.

In September 1983, at the 12th CPC Congress,
there were three groups within the Party: the nostalgic Maoists, a small and
narrow majority for Deng Xiaoping; the Orthodox group that still wanted a
nationally planned economy, as in USSR -hence probably the heirs to Lin Biao;
finally the real reformists.

Deng won with a clear, but not overwhelming
majority.

Hence, everyone was waiting for the Four
Modernizations to fail, so as to go back to the old routine of the Plan.

As also happened in the USSR, it was often
fully imaginary compared to the actual reality of the things done and produced.

It was in 1983, however, that the Third Front
strategy was implemented, i.e. Mao’s directive – drawn up as early as 1962 –
according to which the national strategic industries had to be moved from the
coasts – militarily and politically difficult to defend – to the internal
areas. Without said Mao’s directive, the New Silk Road could not be understood
even currently.

Hence 14
open coastal cities that were declared so in 1984, but with a new law on
profits that served as mainstay of Modernizations: companies were asked to pay
a certain share of profits to the government, but they could withhold some
profits if they matched and exceeded the requirements of the contract with the
State.

In 1985 a new regulation also involved
government bonds. The seventh Five-Year Plan began, underlining a
“scale” approach, in which the coastal areas – gradually freed from
traditional strategic companies – were driving the economic development, which
later spread like wildfire even in the internal areas.

It was the Hong Kong model that Deng Xiaoping’s
executives copied and adapted.

For a short lapse of time, Chinese analysts
and Party planners also looked to the Singapore model, with the (single) Party
of Lee Kuan Yew.

It isby no mere coincidence that Shenzen was
close to the former British colony, and often the Chinese attracted and
favoured the companies of the British area towards the new Chinese coastal
areas also characterized by free-market economy.

Advanced and high-tech services in coastal
areas, and lower value-added, but still inevitable, productions in internal
regions.

A new dualism, where rural overpopulation had
to be gradually absorbed by inland strategic companies.

A double geopolitical status of inland areas
which, in many cases, is repeated also in the current Belt and Road Initiative.

In 1986, the “open-ended” contracts
for the manpower working in State-owned companies came to an end.

In October 1987,the 13th CPC Congress was
held, in which – for the first time – there was talk about the “commodity
economy”, i.e. a two-tier mechanism, in which the market is matched and
also “corrected” by the old national planning.

A sort of re-edition, for internal use, of the
formula “one country, two systems” implemented by China with the
agreements for Macao and Hong Kong.

The term “People’s ownership” was
also deleted, while individuals and groups, even non-Chinese ones, could buy
land with a system similar to that of the British real estate leasing.

Profits, wherever made, had to be reinvested
in the company that originated them, before requesting any financing from the
People’s Bank.

The Special Economic Zones, modelled again on
the Hong Kong system, became five.

Hence innovation on the coasts and strategic
companies in the central regions – mainly public ones, which still remained
almost completely public.

In April 1989, Jiang Zemin rose to power.

Student demonstrations also began in Tiananmen
Square, where, year after year, the various anti-regime organizations gathered:
Falun Gong, the networks of many illegal parties, unrecognized union
organizations and many “spontaneous” groups.

And some old “Red Guards”.

Zhao Ziyang, the Party leader already
defenestrated by Jiang Zemin, was in fact at the centre of
“spontaneous” organizations.

The various Autonomous Federations of Workers
-spread by location and not by industry – were legally created.

Gorbachev’s visit took place in May 1989.

That was the key moment of a long series of
doctrinal, practical, cultural and historical differences that – from the very
beginning – divided the two great Eastern heirs to the Marxist-Leninist Third
International.

What really mattered to the Chinese leadership
was that the Russian crisis did not overwhelm the Chinese Communists: that was
the meaning of the declaration signed by Gorbachev, which regarded the
“peaceful coexistence” of the two Communist regimes.

The leader of the Soviet Party was made fun of
– not even so elegantly – not because he had reformed the Soviet economic
system – in a way, however, that the Chinese deemed wrong – but for one reason
only: he had relinquished the Party’s role in the reformist process, which the
CPSU had to lead and guide for China, from the very beginning.

An
“economicist” mistake, as the CPC’s ideologues said – yet another proof of the
Marxist roughness of the “Northern enemy”, as Deng Xiaoping called
Russia.

Sarcastic sniggers on the lips of Chinese
leaders. Then Gorbachev explained again his perestrojka and glas’nost, but the
Chinese leaders, whose power was based on Party’s bayonets, kept on not taking
him seriously.

Days before the arrival of the Soviet leader,
at least one million people had gathered in Tiananmen Square.

The problems that the Chinese leadership had
to solve in a short lapse of time were radical: the “hard” wing that
was previously a minority prevailed and managed to convince Jiang Zemin.

The Party and its authority – the basis of any
transformation, even the most radical one – were re-established without much
talk. It was impossible to think about a heir to the “Long March”
that dissolved the Party within “society”.

On May 19, the CPC decided to follow the hard
line and the military forces reached the areas near the Square, from the
outskirts of Beijing.

Few hours later, the Square was completely
cleared, but that was done the hard way.

Shortly afterwards, at the 4th CPC Plenum,
Jiang Zemin – also following the
experience of Tiananmen Square – returned to one of his old theories and
developed the “Three Represents” model, i.e. the idea that the CPC’s
power was based on its “vast representation” of the Chinese
productive forces, of the cultural and technological avant-gardes and of the
wide strata of population.

In other words, the Chinese society – and its economy,
in particular – was reformed by bringing the elites together, part of whom were
in Tiananmen Square, but also the large crowds still organized by the Party.

A Confucian middle way that was particularly
successful.

Hence, Zhao Ziyang definitively lost the game
within the Party that, however, was also inside the Tiananmen Square
insurgency.

Once the crisis was over, Deng Xiaoping left
also the last very strong power in Jiang’s hands: the leadership of the Central
Military Commission.

Shortly afterwards – and there was nothing
more symbolic than that event – the Stock Exchange of Shanghai reopened. A
reopening that had been expected since the 1930s.

Later also the Shenzhen Securities Exchange
opened. In both of them, any securities – including those issued by the State –
were traded, but there was only one deep logic: to acquire productive capital
to generate strong and self-sustained development of the coasts and of the high
value-added industries that had to compete on the world free market, without
granting protection and aid that would go to the detriment of the deep
productive structures of the internal regions.

In 1992, Deng’s journey to Southern borders
had a clear route, although the CPC’s leadership had always had some doubts about
the “free economic zones”. The core of the issue was that the GDP had
to be increased in the lapse of time between the 1990s and the beginning of the
Third Millennium.

It had to be rapidly increased from 6% to
10%.

Without that “quantitative” assessment
– just to use the old Communist jargon – there could be no
“qualitative” transformation of Chinese society.

Everything had to be done soon – well, but
soon. That was the characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s years – extraordinary
years, in some respects.

In a short lapse of time, the Party developed
the concepts of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of
“market Socialism”, which are so important also in President Xi
Jinping’s current policy line.

There were also other changes that, in a few
years, led to the current Socialism with Chinese characteristics, as advocated
by President Xi Jinping. However, everything could be done from a legal view point
began in those years.

The transformation process of the Chinese
economy is long, powerful and complex, but – unlike what is often said in the
West – it is never a mere market mechanism or a naive adaptation of the Party
or the State to the absolute Western rules of globalization.

As early as the 1990s, China has decided to
govern market globalization and not just being a part of it. It wants to lead
the process so as to be – now that the end of the century about which Deng
thought has long been over – the axis of globalization and the centre of the
new global hegemonies.