¶2The State charged Van Camp with: possession with intent to deliver more than
forty grams of cocaine, as party to a crime, second or subsequent offense;
possession of cocaine, second or subsequent offense; possession of an electric
weapon; and possession of drug paraphernalia.[2]At trial, Juan Salinas testified that, in
July 2008, he was a confidential informant working with officer Michael Wanta
of the Brown County Drug Task Force.According to Salinas, he had a conversation with Van Camp about purchasing
a quarter kilogram of cocaine from Salinas.Salinas told Wanta about the conversation, and, at Wanta’s instruction,
Salinas agreed to meet Van Camp at a Walgreens parking lot in Green Bay
on July 11 to complete the transaction.

¶3On July 11, Wanta searched Salinas, provided Salinas with a
bag containing approximately 252 grams of cocaine, and outfitted Salinas with
an audio recording device.Salinas then
drove alone in his car to the Walgreens and waited about ten minutes for Van Camp
to arrive.When Van Camp arrived in
a red Durango, Salinas exited his car and got into the Durango’s passenger
seat.Salinas testified he gave Van Camp
the cocaine in exchange for $5,500 in cash.After Salinas exited the Durango, police immediately arrested Van Camp
and recovered the bag containing the cocaine.Police also found an additional five bags of cocaine on Van Camp’s
person and an electronic stun gun and digital scale in Van Camp’s
vehicle.

¶4Van Camp testified in his defense.He admitted knowing Salinas and knowing that
Salinas might be a source for cocaine.Van Camp
testified Salinas called him repeatedly and offered to sell him cocaine, but he
said he was not interested.Van Camp
also admitted meeting Salinas on July 11, but stated he did not know exactly
why they were meeting.During the
meeting, Salinas handed him a bag, which Van Camp opened and saw what he
believed was cocaine.Van Camp
weighed the cocaine on a scale he had in the vehicle. He believed it was “short,” so he only gave
Salinas $5,500 instead of $6,500.However, Van Camp testified the cocaine admitted into evidence was
not the same cocaine he purchased from Salinas.He explained the cocaine he purchased from Salinas was a solid brick
with “no shake.”

¶5Van Camp’s theories of defense focused mainly on the
cocaine charges.In regard to the
charge of possession with intent to deliver more than forty grams of cocaine, Van Camp
asserted the affirmative defense of entrapment.During closing argument, Van Camp argued the State induced him to
purchase the cocaine through Salinas’ repeated phone calls.[3]Van Camp’s attorney also emphasized the
State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance Van Camp
purchased and possessed was cocaine.Counsel
argued the State had not met its burden because it had not offered a believable
explanation for the discrepancies in the weights of the different packages of
cocaine.[4]Counsel argued the weight discrepancies could
not be explained by evaporation, by residue left inside previous containers, or
by typographical error.The jury,
however, found Van Camp guilty of all counts.

¶6On direct appeal, Van Camp’s appellate counsel argued
the circuit court erred by denying Van Camp’s request for a jury
instruction on chain of custody.See State
v. Van Camp, No. 2011AP388-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App
Dec. 28, 2011).Counsel asserted a
chain of custody instruction was necessary because police provided Salinas with
252 grams of cocaine, but the cocaine seized from Van Camp weighed only
249.09 grams, and because the weights of the five smaller bags of cocaine found
on Van Camp’s person following his arrest differed from the weights of the
five bags of cocaine introduced into evidence at trial.Id., ¶1.We concluded the circuit court properly
exercised its discretion by denying the request for the chain of custody
instruction because the other instructions fully and fairly informed the jury
of the applicable law.Id.,
¶12.Moreover, we observed that, despite
refusing to give the chain of custody instruction to the jury, the circuit
court allowed Van Camp to argue the chain of custody issue to the jury,
which counsel did. Id., ¶14.

¶7Van Camp subsequently filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motion arguing his postconviction/appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims in regard to his
entrapment defense and for failing to address the admissibility of the cocaine.The circuit court denied Van Camp’s
motion without a hearing.

¶8Van Camp renews his argument that he is entitled to
relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06
because his postconviction/appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.[6]See State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶¶18,
36-37, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 (defendant moving for relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 must show
“sufficient reason” why claims were not made on direct appeal); see also State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 682,
556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (Ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel may constitute “sufficient reason as to why an issue which could have
been raised on direct appeal was not.”).

¶9To prove postconviction/appellate counsel was ineffective, Van Camp
must prove counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense.See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Balliette, 336
Wis. 2d 358, ¶28 (A Wis. Stat. §
974.06 motion for relief “based on ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel must lay out the traditional elements of deficient performance and
prejudice to the defense.”).To
demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant must show specific acts or
omissions of the lawyer that are “outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.”Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690.A lawyer is not
ineffective for failing to make claims that would have been denied. See State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82,
¶21, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 228, 769 N.W.2d 110.Further, “‘[p]ostconviction counsel is entitled to exercise reasonable
professional judgment in winnowing out even arguable issues in favor of others
perceived to be stronger.’”State
ex rel. Ford v. Holm, 2004 WI App 22, ¶4, 269 Wis. 2d 810, 676 N.W.2d
500 (citation omitted).

¶10To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.If a defendant fails to satisfy one prong of
the analysis, we need not address the other. Id. at 697.

I. Entrapment

¶11Van Camp first argues his postconviction/appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims in regard to his entrapment
defense. Entrapment is an affirmative defense available to a defendant when law
enforcement induces the defendant to commit an offense the defendant was not
otherwise disposed to commit.State
v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 954, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991).Stated another way, a defendant is entrapped
when the criminal design originated with the government agent, and the
defendant would not have committed the crime except for the urging of
authorities.State v. Schuman, 226
Wis. 2d 398, 403, 595 N.W.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1999).

¶12Establishing the defense is a two-step process.Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d at 954.First, the defendant must show by the great
weight of credible evidence that he or she was induced to commit the crime.State v. Saternus, 127 Wis. 2d 460, 472,
381 N.W.2d 290 (1986).If the defendant
meets that burden of persuasion, the burden falls on the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.Id. at 474.The State meets this burden by proving
either: the inducement was not excessive or the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime before being induced.State v. Hilleshiem, 172 Wis. 2d 1,
9, 492 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶13Van Camp argues his postconviction/appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue he was entrapped as a matter of law.Van Camp asserts that, because the State
engaged in its own crime by selling him cocaine, the officers’ conduct shows he
was entrapped as a matter of law.We
understand Van Camp’s argument to be that he wishes us to apply the
“objective” test of entrapment.The
objective entrapment test focuses only on the conduct police used to induce the
crime and does not consider whether the defendant was predisposed.See Saternus, 127 Wis. 2d at 470-71.However, our supreme court has rejected the
“objective” test and “chose[n] to follow the subjective approach,” which
focuses instead on “whether the police conduct affected or changed the
particular defendant’s state of mind.”Id.
at 470. Because Wisconsin law does not
use the objective test for entrapment, postconviction/appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise that claim.See State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶14 n.4, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729
N.W.2d 182; see also Hilleshiem, 172 Wis. 2d at 9(“In the context of narcotics transactions, merely seeking or offering to
buy drugs is not the kind of inducement which establishes entrapment.”).

¶14Van Camp also faults postconviction/appellate counsel for
failing to raise claims with respect to certain telephone logs and medical
records that he asserts prove he was entrapped.Van Camp contends the telephone logs prove he was induced to
purchase cocaine and not predisposed.However, Van Camp’s telephone logs were admitted into evidence and
a summary of those logs that showed the calls between Van Camp and Salinas
was published to the jury.It is unclear
what claim Van Camp’s postconviction/appellate counsel allegedly failed to
raise in regard to the telephone logs.

¶15In any event, we observe Van Camp testified that each time
he called Salinas it was to discuss something related to Van Camp’s repair
business and that it was Salinas who repeatedly called him to pressure him to
buy cocaine.However, Salinas testified
he never discussed Van Camp’s work with him, Van Camp wanted to
purchase cocaine from him, Van Camp had purchased cocaine from Salinas on
three prior occasions, and, after Van Camp stated he wanted to buy the
cocaine at issue in this case, Salinas only called Van Camp several times
to arrange the delivery.The jury, by
virtue of its guilty verdict, did not find the phone calls between Salinas and Van Camp
constituted entrapment.See State
v. Sharp, 180 Wis. 2d 640, 659, 511 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1993) (Weighing testimony and evaluating credibility of witnesses are matters for the jury.).Postconviction/appellate
counsel was not deficient for failing to ask us to disregard the jury’s
determination.

¶16As for the medical records, Van Camp moved to admit
medical records showing he shot himself in the head almost ten years earlier
and had difficulty hearing.The circuit
court disallowed the medical records, reasoning the records were irrelevant.However, the circuit court did allow Van Camp
to testify the injury impacted his hearing and, on the day of the reverse
sting, he had received treatment at the hospital and came from the hospital to
meet Salinas.Van Camp argues his
postconviction/appellate counsel was ineffective in regard to his entrapment
defense because the medical records “would show there was no predisposition for
intent to deliver.Rather they would
show the drugs were for personal use.”

¶17However, what Van Camp planned on doing with the cocaine
after he purchased it has no bearing on whether the State entrapped him into
purchasing the cocaine. In any event,
the State charged Van Camp with possession of more than forty grams of
cocaine with intent to deliver.In
support of the “intent to deliver” portion of the charge, officer Mark Hackett
testified that, based on his training and experience, a purchase of 250 grams
of cocaine would be consistent with distribution as opposed to personal use.Further, sergeant Poteat testified that,
based on his narcotics training, 250 grams of cocaine equaled approximately
2,500 uses.Van Camp offers no
explanation in support for his assertion that these medical records would show
the 250 grams of cocaine was only for his personal use.Accordingly, we conclude
postconviction/appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an
argument regarding Van Camp’s “intent to deliver.”

¶18Van Camp next argues postconviction/appellate counsel was
ineffective because the circuit court gave erroneous jury instructions.Specifically, Van Camp asserts the court
gave the entrapment jury instruction that had been withdrawn by the Wisconsin Criminal
Jury Instructions Committee in 2001 and the jury was erroneously instructed
that it should automatically conclude he had an intent to deliver cocaine.These contentions are unsupported by the
record.The record reflects the circuit
court used Wis JI—Criminal 780 (2002)
when instructing the jury, which is the current entrapment instruction, and the
court never instructed the jury it must automatically conclude Van Camp
had an intent to deliver the cocaine.

II. Admissibility of Cocaine Evidence

¶19Van Camp argues his postconviction/appellate counsel was
ineffective for “not challenging the admissibility and chain of custody of the
drugs properly.”Before the cocaine in
this case could be admitted into evidence, the State needed to authenticate and
identify the cocaine with “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”See Wis. Stat. § 909.01.The law with respect to chain of custody
requires proof sufficient “to render it improbable that the original item has
been exchanged, contaminated or tampered with.” B.A.C. v. T.L.G., 135 Wis. 2d 280,
290, 400 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1986).“A
perfect chain of custody is not required.”State v. McCoy, 2007 WI App 15, ¶9, 298 Wis. 2d 523, 728 N.W.2d
54.“Alleged gaps in a chain of custody
“‘go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)).

¶20Van Camp argues the cocaine should not have been admitted
into evidence because the cocaine tested by the crime laboratory before the
reverse sting weighed a little less than 252 grams while the cocaine seized
from him weighed a little more than 249 grams.He contends this weight discrepancy means the evidence should not have
been admitted.

¶21We disagree.First, sergeant
Poteat and officers Wanta and Hackett all testified the cocaine admitted into
evidence at trial was the same cocaine used in the reverse sting operation.Second, the State established a sufficient
chain of custody to allow the evidence to be admitted.See McCoy, 298 Wis. 2d 523, ¶9.State
crime analyst Nied testified that, after determining the 252 grams of substance
from a 2004 case was cocaine, he returned the cocaine to the Brown County Drug
Task Force.Evidence sergeant Poteat testified
that, upon its return from the State Crime Laboratory, the cocaine from the
2004 case remained in the locked evidence room until Poteat gave the cocaine to
Wanta to use in this case.Wanta, in
turn, testified he gave the cocaine to Salinas after searching Salinas for
contraband.Salinas testified he sold
the cocaine to Van Camp and was searched by Wanta after the sale. Hackett testified he found the cocaine in Van Camp’s
vehicle and then returned it to the evidence locker.

¶22Given this testimony, the less than three-gram weight
discrepancy is de minimis and not enough to have rendered the cocaine
inadmissible as a matter of law.See B.A.C.,
135 Wis. 2d at 290.Further, Nied
explained the weight of material may change over time as moisture evaporates or
if some adheres to the inside containers when the material is transferred.Postconviction/appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of the cocaine based on
the weight discrepancy.

¶23Van Camp further asserts the cocaine should not have been
admitted into evidence because the cocaine he purchased was a solid brick of
cocaine, yet the officers testified they put six pieces of cocaine together
when making the package for him to purchase.He contends six pieces of cocaine cannot create a solid brick of
cocaine.This argument, however, goes to
the weight the jury accords the evidence as opposed to the evidence’s
admissibility.See McCoy, 298 Wis. 2d
523, ¶9.Again, Poteat, Wanta, and
Hackett testified the cocaine admitted into evidence was the same cocaine used
in the reverse sting operation.Moreover,
we observe that, of the six pieces of cocaine, one piece was substantially
larger than the others, weighing 224 grams, while the others had a combined
weight of twenty-five grams.

¶24Finally, Van Camp argues that, with respect to the
additional bags of powder cocaine found on his person when he was arrested, the
cocaine should not have been admitted into evidence because there was a
discrepancy between what the officers said that cocaine weighed and what the
crime laboratory said it weighed.However,
similar to the weight discrepancy in the cocaine used in the reverse sting
operation, the weight discrepancies in the cocaine found on Van Camp’s
person goes to persuasiveness rather than admissibility.See id.The State established a sufficient chain of
custody in regard to the cocaine found on Van Camp’s person and the
cocaine was identified at trial as being the cocaine found on Van Camp’s
person.Further, the weight
discrepancies were brought out at trial.The jury heard four of the five bags of cocaine each had less than a one-gram
weight discrepancy, and, although the crime laboratory stated the remaining bag
weighed approximately 2.3 grams less than what the police initially reported, Poteat
testified the amount of cocaine in that bag looked the same and he believed a
mistake had been made when that bag was weighed. Postconviction/appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of the cocaine found on Van Camp’s
person.

¶25In sum, postconviction/appellate counsel did not render
deficient performance by failing to raise Van Camp’s aforementioned claims
on direct appeal.Accordingly, Van Camp
has not established counsel rendered ineffective assistance.In any event, we also conclude Van Camp
has not shown that his defense was prejudiced by any of counsel’s alleged
deficiencies.Because Van Camp’s
counsel did not render ineffective assistance, we conclude the circuit court
did not err by denying Van Camp’s Wis.
Stat. § 947.06 motion.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be
published.See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.

[1] All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless
otherwise noted.

[2] The
State also charged Van Camp with possession of THC as a second or
subsequent offense.However, the State
moved to dismiss that charge during trial, and the court granted the State’s
request.

[3] Salinas
testified he called Van Camp several times to arrange delivery of the
cocaine Van Camp wished to purchase.

[4] Specifically,
the cocaine sold to Van Camp had been weighed by the State Crime
Laboratory in 2004 and, at that time, the laboratory recorded the cocaine’s
weight at a little less than 252 grams.However, after the reverse sting, police recorded the weight of the
cocaine seized from Van Camp’s vehicle at 249.09 grams.Forensic scientist John Nied explained the
weight of the material could change over time as moisture evaporated and stated
that some amount of the material would have adhered to the inside of the
original containers whenever the material was transferred into new
containers.

Further, police weighed the contents of each small bag
found on Van Camp’s person and recorded the weights as 1.8 grams, 3.38
grams, 1.07 grams, 1.29 grams, and 1.19 grams.However, the crime laboratory reported that the contents of each bag weighed
.94 grams, 1.04 grams, 1.02 grams, 1.06 grams, and 1.18 grams, respectively.Evidence sergeant David Poteat admitted there
was a two-gram discrepancy in the weight of one of these baggies.He believed the discrepancy was the result of
a mistake or error.

[5]
Van Camp’s arguments in support of why his postconviction/appellate
counsel was ineffective are generally difficult to decipher and misstate many
facts.Any arguments we do not
explicitly address is denied for being inadequately developed.See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627,
646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (appellate court need not address
inadequately developed arguments).

[6] In
his brief-in-chief Van Camp argued both his trial and
postconviction/appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.However, in his reply brief, Van Camp
stated, “To clarify for the record, all claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, both trial and appellate, are ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims ….”Accordingly, we will
not consider any claims with respect to trial counsel.