Is Trump reinstating a values-centric US foreign policy towards China?

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President Donald J. Trump and First Lady Melania Trump, joined by President Xi Jinping and First Lady Peng Liyuan, applaud and thank the performers at a cultural performance at the Great Hall of the People, Thursday, November 9, 2017, following a State Dinner in their honor, in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. (Official White House Photo by Andrea Hanks)

Trump decries linkage of values & policy but his China policy may be an exception

This iteration of American policy towards China came as a welcomed contrast to Trump administration’s disdain for a linkage of values and policy. In characterising Trump’s ‘America First’ policy in early 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson spoke of decoupling US foreign policy and values. On U.S.’ commitment to human rights and socio-political freedoms around the world, he notably deemed them as American “values” and “not our policies.” The Trump administration’s maiden National Security Strategy also noted an interests-heavy approach and emphasised a disdain for a values-policy linkage with the disclaimer: “We are not going to impose our values on others.”

One may argue that with respect to China, however, the pertinence of a values-centric U.S. foreign policy has been a standard fixture. The same can be traced back to the 1959 speech by then-Senator John F. Kennedy, in which he deemed “Red China” to have sought a “route of regimented controls and ruthless denial of human rights.”

Further, the values-centric approach towards China continued well into the post-Cold War U.S. worldview –– from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice deeming China’s sentencing of human rights activists as “deeply disturbing” to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating that China “should face consequences and international condemnation” for its internet freedom restrictions.

However, the centrality of the values-centric approach in U.S. policy fizzled overtime. First, in view of China’s large market potentialities, the U.S. adopted a pragmatic, economic-centric approach. Encapsulated in its attempt to induct China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led world order, the Permanent Normal Trade Relations was passed to end the “annual ritual of reviewing China’s trade status”, and eventually pave way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation.

Second, the three Ts –– Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen –– that dominated the values-centric approach, stood dampened, as China’s relative military advantage vis-à-vis Taiwan grew, the state-sponsored Sinicisation of Tibet marginalised the natives, and the Tiananmen incident faded in Chinese collective memory due to stringent internet censorship.

Under its declared return of an era of “great power competition”, the Trump administration has adopted a confrontational approach towards China with the increased adoption of trade tariffs and a steady frequency of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. Additionally, there also seems to be an attempt to reinstate the U.S. values-laden approach.

On China’s restrictive visa policy, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 by a unanimous voice vote. The bill aims to impose consequences for China’s restrictive access to Tibet which prevents “journalists from observing human rights abuses in Tibet and preventing Tibetan Americans from visiting their home country.” Under the bill’s provisions, Chinese authorities who are involved in the implementation of such restrictive visa polices will become ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted into the U.S.. Given the strong bipartisan nature of the bill –– backed by Congressional heavyweights like Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), President Trump is expected to sign the bill into law once it also passes the U.S. Senate with similar bipartisan vigour.

On Beijing’s attempts to censor the internet, the Trump administration laudably finds itself in agreement with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Back in August, these organisations and a dozen other international groups had penned a joint-letter urging Google CEO Sundar Pichai to cancel the development of the “Dragonfly” –– a censored search engine app for China. Reportedly, the Trump administration is also now coaxing Google to end its development of the app which it believes will “strengthen (Chinese) Communist Party censorship and compromise the privacy of Chinese customers”.

Finally, the Trump administration is also reportedly mulling over the idea of imposing sanctions against Chinese senior officials and companies in view of Beijing’s detention of minority Muslims in Xinjiang.

Thus, in now pursuing its “great power competition” policy vis-à-vis China, the Trump administration seems poised to reinstate China’s record on socio-poltical freedoms –– in addition to U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and military assertiveness, as a major bone of contention.

About the Author

Kashish Parpiani is a Research Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in Mumbai, India. His research interests include U.S. Grand Strategy, U.S. Civil-Military Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific.
Parpiani holds post-graduate degrees (MSc.) in International Relations and (MA.) in the United States’ Foreign Policy from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (NTU, Singapore) and the University of Warwick (U.K.) respectively. In the past, he has served in brief research capacities at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore and the Institute for National Security Studies, Israel.
For more, visit https://www.orfonline.org/people-expert/kashish-parpiani/