India probably has undertaken research directly related to the
development of nuclear weapons, and may well have fabricated one or more
nuclear devices. In this connection, the following points are
particularly significant in the short term (i.e., the next several
years):

1.

The fissionable material employed would almost certainly be
plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor at Trombay: India
probably has 50-60 kilograms available at present.

2.

The Indian government would probably identify the devices, if
tested, as peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs).

3.

Agreements with both the US and
Canada limit the use of the CIRUS reactor to peaceful purposes,
but:

a.

neither agreement provides for inspection or
verification procedures to determine the uses to which
CIRUS-produced plutonium is put;

b.

the language of the agreements does not specifically
preclude "peaceful" nuclear explosions; and

c.

India has not accepted US and Canadian interpretations of these
agreements as precluding all nuclear explosions on the
grounds that any such explosion is tantamount to a
nuclear weapons test.

Regarding the prospects of an Indian decision to proceed with a nuclear
test, it is our judgment that such a decision-is unlikely during the
next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The
political and economic restraints would appear — in the near term — to
outweigh the international political or military benefits which could
flow from becoming the world’s sixth "nuclear power.” Indian leaders and
their country’s potential adversaries realize that a nuclear test
conducted several years before a viable delivery system can be acquired
is of very limited military value. It is true that India might
anticipate achieving [Page 3]new
status as the result of a nuclear test, and the immediate reaction of
the Indian populace could be quite favorable. On the other hand, the
long-term costs — in terms of both the diversion of resources from
critical domestic programs and the prospective loss of foreign technical
assistance — could be very high.

Fissionable Materials

General. Of the three fissionable materials — plutonium-239, uranium-235,
and uranium-233 — which can be used in making nuclear weapons, India
almost certainly would base a nuclear weapons program on plutonium, at
least for the next several years. Facilities for producing uranium-235
probably will not be available during the 1970s. Uranium-233 could be
produced in significant quantities in Indian power reactors now in
operation and those under construction, but it could be produced much
more efficiently in a future generation of reactors — the so-called
"fast breeder" reactors — planned for the 1980s. Plutonium, on the other
hand, will be readily available dung the 1970s and would be the natural
choice for weapons use.

Plutonium. India has in operation or under construction seven nuclear
reactors capable of producing kilogram quantities of plutonium: the
CIRUS research reactor at Trombay; two US-type power reactors at Tarapur; two Canadian-type power
reactors at Rana Pratap Sagar, Rajasthan; and two other Canadian-type
power reactors at Kalpakkam, near Madras. Significant factors relating
to each of these power stations are outlined below:

1.

CIRUS. This is a 40-megawatt research reactor at the Ehabha
Atomic Research Center, Trombay. Fueled with natural uranium
and moderated with heavy water, this reactor can produce
plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons. In operation
since 1963, the CIRUS reactor may have produced as much as
70 kilograms of plutonium, and 50-60 kilograms of this could
already have been extracted at the nearby chemical
separation plant and available for use in nuclear
devices.

Agreements with Canada, in connection with supply of the
reactor components, and with the US, in connection with supply of the heavy
water, preclude use of the reactor for other than peaceful
purposes: "The heavy water sold hereunder shall be for use
only … in connection with [Page 4]research into and the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes…” However, lacking provisions
for inspection, these agreements cannot prevent the Indians
from using CIRUS-produced plutonium for experiments related
to nuclear explosives, provided secrecy is maintained.

2.

Tarapur. At Tarapur the Indians have a nuclear power station
with two boiling-water type reactors, each generating 190
electrical megawatts (MWe). In operation since 1969, these
reactors are fueled with enriched uranium supplied by the
US. They cannot be
refueled while in operation and are not suitable for
producing plutonium for use in Indian nuclear weapons.

In connection with USAID in building the Tarapur
reactors, India entered into safeguards arrangements with
the US: "The Parties to this
agreement emphasize their common interest in assuring that
any material, equipment or device made available … for use
in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station … shall be used solely
for peaceful purposes…” (Article VI) "No material, equipment
or device … will be use for atomic weapons or for any other
military purpose …” (Article VII)

While the Tarapur safeguards — unlike the CIRUS agreements —
do provide for inspection rights, they still do not
explicitly preclude nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes. The US position on
PNEs (that any nuclear
explosion constitutes a nuclear weapon test) was presented
to India at a later date.

3.

Rajasthan. In this area the Indians have a nuclear power
station with two Canadian (CANDU) type power reactors, one
scheduled to begin operation a few weeks from now and the
other expected to be completed in 1976. Designated RAPP-1
and RAPP-2, each of these reactors will generate 200 MWe.
They will use some Canadian uranium initially, but over the
long term these reactors presumably will be fueled with
indigenously-produced natural uranium from India’s
substantial deposits of this nuclear raw material. RAPP-1
will use heavy water supplied by the US.

Capable of being refueled while in operation, these reactors
would be excellent producers of "clean" plutonium for
weapons use. Each reactor could produce some 160 kilograms
of plutonium annually.

However, both RAFF reactors are under a Canada-India-IAFA
Trilateral Safeguards Agreement which provides for control
and inspection rights: "The Government of India agrees that
the nuclear material used or produced in the Rajasthan
Atomic Power Station will be used only for peaceful
purposes.” (Article 2)

It should be noted that the Indians probably would have no
pressing need in any case to use plutonium from the RAPP
reactors in nuclear explosives. Plutonium from the CIRUS
reactor could support a modest test program until such time
as unsafeguarded plutonium became available from the
Kalpakkam reactors (see below). It appears unlikely,
therefore, that India would see a need to confront the issue
of safeguards on the RAPP reactors by involving material
from those reactors in a nuclear explosives program,
"peaceful" or otherwise.

4.

Kalpakkam. The two CANDU-type reactors being built at this
site differ from those at the Rajasthan plant in only one
major respect: they are being built without foreign
assistance and without safeguards. Like the Rajasthan
reactors, they are fueled with natural uranium and can be
refueled while in operation; as a result, they would be
virtually ideal producers of weapons-grade plutonium.

Expected to be operational by 1977-78, each reactor will have
a plutonium production capacity of about 160 kilograms
annually, or 320 kilograms for both reactors. It should be
noted, however, that production of "clean" plutonium at this
rate would require substantial supplies of uranium, since
each reactor would have to be refueled completely about
every 60 days. As a result, we would not expect the Indians
to utilize the full capability of these reactors for the
production of weapons-grade plutonium unless there is a
definite requirement for it in the late 1970s. (Note: These
CANDU reactors should noc be mistaken for the experimental
"fast breeder" reactor project, also at Kalpakkam, which
India is undertaking with French assistance.)

Uranium-235. India has no capability at present to produce enriched
uranium, either to fuel the Tarapur power reactors or for weapons use.
The decision may be made to acquire uranium enrichment facilities to
produce fuel for the Tarapur reactors, probably by importing the
technology. [Page 6]It is too early
to predict whether or when India might have a production-scale uranium
enrichment capability, particularly in view of the uncertainties
associated with the future spread of gas centrifuge technology, but it
is unlikely that India would be in a position to produce kilogram
quantities of highly enriched uranium for weapons use before about
1980.

Uranium-233. India has enormous reserves of thorium in its monazite
sands, and has shown interest for years in utilizing the thorium in
"fast breeder" reactors (FBRs) planned for the 1980s, fueled with
plutonium and producing U-233. The U-233 would then be used to fuel the
next generation of FBRs.

Less than 1 kilogram of U-233 is presently being produced in Indian
research reactors each year, and 4 or 5 kilograms of this material may
now exist in India. It should be noted also the U-233 presently on hand
was produced principally in the CIRUS reactor, and any larger amounts
available during the next few years would be produced in nuclear power
reactors now in operation or under construction. In all cases, whatever
safeguards apply to plutonium produced in those reactors would apply
equally to the U-233.

As a result, while India probably will begin during the-1980s to produce
large quantities of U-233 to fuel future power reactors, this would not
be a significant factor in relation to a nuclear weapons program during
the 1970s. Ample quantities of plutonium will become available at an
earlier date.

Delivery Systems. India presently prossesses aircraft which could be
adapted to deliver nuclear weapons — Canberra light jet bombers, and
Mystere IV, Hunter, SU-7 FITTER, and MIG-21 FISHBED fighters. In the
early stage of a nuclear program, the Indians would have some difficulty
developing a nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by the fighter
aircraft. While the Canberra, with a 4,000 pound payload, could carry a
nuclear bomb, neither it nor any other aircraft currently available to
India possesses sufficient range capabilities to constitute a strategic
threat to China. A longer range bomber would appear to be the minimum
requirement. Indigenous production of such an aircraft is beyond India’s
capabilities in the next few years, and it is doubtful whether a
suitable bomber could be imported.

It appears more likely, therefore, that the Indian objective would be to
acquire a strategic missile system — an IRBM with a range of some 2,000 miles. India’s space effort
could provide the technological and industrial base for supporting a
ballistic missile R&D effort, but in
view of the relatively early stage of development of the space program,
it is highly unlikely that India could deploy effective IRBMs before 1980.

The Political Decision

For several years it has been apparent that — in the absence of a major
breakthrough in nuclear disarmament — India would sooner or later elect
to develop nuclear weapons. We believe that activities specifically
related to nuclear weapons development probably have been undertaken.
Indeed, if the Indian government has even considered the possibility of.
embarking on a nuclear weapons program — and we know that it has — it
would be surprising if research basic to weapons development had not
been authorized. The real uncertainty arises in estimating how far these
efforts may have proceeded.

While we have no direct evidence to support a judgment on this point, we
consider it entirely possible that one or more nuclear devices have
actually been fabricated and assembled. If this is the case, a test
could be conducted on short notice. We believe that India would abide by
the terms of the limited Test Ban Treaty, which requires that any
nuclear tests be underground. Several months would be required to
prepare a suitable test site, but we cannot exclude the possibility that
such a site is being or has already been prepared without our
knowledge.

It is our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the
next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The
principal arguments against such a decision are: the high cost of a
nuclear weapons program, which would be competing with critical domestic
programs, and India’s full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including
the USSR) would be jeopardized. It is
recognized that there are continuing pro-nuclear pressures, and in the
near term the strongest incentive may well be the desire for the
increased status of a nuclear power. A decision to proceed with a
nuclear weapons program might be viewed as offering short-term domestic
political benefits. On balance, however, the factors against testing

would seem to outweigh the increased status and the possible
inter-national political and military gains which India might hope to
achieve by demonstrating a nuclear weapons capability with no delivery
system in sight.

The restraints outlined above could be over-ridden, of course, by other
developments (e.g., a resumption of Sino-Indian tensions coupled with a
thaw in Sino-Soviet relations). Barring such developments, we feel that
Mrs. Gandhi will resist the
pro-nuclear pressures and will not authorize nuclear testing. She will
make national decisions according to her own priorities and her own
sense of national requirements, and is unlikely to see her own or her
country’s interests as being served by a nuclear test. On balance,
therefore, we believe an Indian nuclear test during the next few months
is unlikely, and the decision to test may be deferred for several
years.

Nonetheless, in view of reports about the possibility of a test and of
Indian nuclear capabilities, we cannot completely rule out such a
nuclear test. It would thus be prudent to develop contingency plans in
the event of such a possibility.