199. Telegram From the Embassy in the
Philippines to the Department of State1

Manila, November 15, 1969,
0418Z.

11818. 1. I had opportunity yesterday with Marcos alone
to discuss in general terms our approaches to forthcoming negotiations. My
remarks followed very closely the previous discussion with Romulo reported
in detail Manila 111492 and in interest of brevity I will not repeat herein my
opening remarks. They were perhaps more sharply focused this time on the
dangers involved in negotiating through the press with large and
high-ranking negotiating panels.

2. Marcos in general, like Romulo, said most of the
things that I wanted him to say but seemed to have more apparent conviction
than had Romulo. He said he had already taken some steps in this direction
by telling the main members of the panel that he personally was going to
make the decisions and that he did not want each of them playing the press
in his own behalf. He went so far at one point as to speculate that perhaps
we should not start out negotiations with publicly known meetings at all,
but have the members of the technical panels meet quietly to see how far
they could get before higher levels become involved.

3. I found general approach of Marcos quite encouraging.
He said they were not really prepared as yet to handle matters of such
importance and he wanted to put a damper on any idea of “immediate” talks.
He said he felt that February was really too soon and at one time mentioned
mid-summer. He also said that he thought we should allow time for passions
to cool down and hoped for a better atmosphere under which to conduct the
talks. He said he had told the policy council that he wanted no more
statements about Americans being evicted either from the bases or from their
economic interests in the Philippines. He also said he did not want to push
us on matters on which we on our side might not be ready. He made reference
in this regard to trade policy and evidenced some concern over President’s
recent speech re Latin America.

4. Marcos said he was making Defense Secretary Mata head
of the technical panel on military matters, assisted by Alex Melchor. It was
interesting that he remarked that if Mata did not remain in the cabinet he
[Page 426]would be replaced on the panel
by General Yan. I told him I thought this was very good, as, while we might
not necessarily agree, it would be very easy for us to quickly understand
each other with such personalities.

5. Marcos at one point mentioned Washington in
connection with Laurel–Langley discussions. He also at one time referred to
the desirability to wait a while before getting into such touchy subjects as
“vested rights” on the part of American business here. His remarks on this
subject could have implied that he preferred a negotiated settlement on this
issue as he once referred to what proportion of present American holdings
(presumably land) would be a fair and equitable settlement. I am not sure
just what he meant on this and there was not time to explore further.

6. I mentioned the problem of negotiating on some of these matters with the
prospects of constitutional changes hanging over our heads due to the coming
convention in 1971. Marcos said this was indeed a
matter that concerned him. He said he sometimes thought it might be better
to delay completion of some of our negotiations until we could see what the
composition of the convention delegates would be. He said that once he could
look at the slate of delegates he felt he could almost know in advance what
they would come up with. I jokingly remarked that he would have me at a
disadvantage there as he could make such a judgment while I could not.

7. While all of Marcos’ remarks indicated that he wanted
delayed, quiet, and sober approaches to be made on all items of negotiation
between us for the sake of eventually arriving at a sound and durable basis
for our future relationships, I have a feeling that something unsaid was
also on his mind. The Philippines are in a desperate financial situation and
he, of course, is fully aware and conscious of their predicament. I think,
repeat think, he will hope that we can go into a quiet period without new
issues between us for a while in the hopes of our financial assistance. On
my part I hope he may try to tamper down reaction here to the forthcoming
release of the Symington testimony
with this in mind.

8. It probably will appear that his super-active moves of this week (PHILCAG, today’s coming statement on
Symington, etc.) give a contrary
impression to my above analysis. Please bear in mind, however, that
Marcos’ motives as of today is to do almost
anything he can think of in order to dominate press coverage and get Osmena
and LP charges and accusations re the
elections off page one of the press. Please bear this in mind over the next
few days as you judge his moves and statements.