A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Author Bio

Osborne, Martin J. : University of Toronto

Rubinstein, Ariel : Tel Aviv University.

Preface

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Game Theory 1.2 Games and Solutions 1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 1.4 Rational Behavior 1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 1.6 Bounded Rationality 1.7 Terminology and Notation

5.1 A Model of Knowledge 5.2 Common Knowledge 5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? 5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 5.5 The Electronic Mail Game

Notes

PART II. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION

Chapter 6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information

6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game 6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games 6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies

Notes

Chapter 7. Bargaining Games

7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.4 Variations and Extensions

11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 11.5 Nash Equilibrium

14.1 Two Approaches 14.2 The Stable Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern 14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus 14.4 The Shapley Value

Notes

Chapter 15. The Nash Solution

15.1 Bargaining Problems 15.2 The Nash Solution : Definition and Characterization 15.3 An Axiomatic Definition 15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Author Bio

Osborne, Martin J. : University of Toronto

Rubinstein, Ariel : Tel Aviv University.

Table of Contents

Preface

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Game Theory 1.2 Games and Solutions 1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 1.4 Rational Behavior 1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 1.6 Bounded Rationality 1.7 Terminology and Notation

5.1 A Model of Knowledge 5.2 Common Knowledge 5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? 5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 5.5 The Electronic Mail Game

Notes

PART II. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION

Chapter 6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information

6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game 6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games 6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies

Notes

Chapter 7. Bargaining Games

7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.4 Variations and Extensions

11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 11.5 Nash Equilibrium

14.1 Two Approaches 14.2 The Stable Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern 14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus 14.4 The Shapley Value

Notes

Chapter 15. The Nash Solution

15.1 Bargaining Problems 15.2 The Nash Solution : Definition and Characterization 15.3 An Axiomatic Definition 15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution