The Trump administration has disrupted a longstanding bipartisan consensus on U.S. policy toward China, which it viewed as overly timid and insufficiently robust in responding to China’s excesses. Although past policy shifted based on events, it largely was grounded in a judgment that U.S. interests would be served by a constructive relationship with China that mitigated risk of conflict and maximized opportunities for cooperation in areas of converging interests, such as North Korea and climate change.

U.S. policy toward China now appears animated by a judgment that the past trajectory of the bilateral relationship favored China and disadvantaged the United States in a long-run competition for global leadership. To try to break that trajectory, the Trump administration over the past two years has adopted an increasingly zero-sum, unilateralist, protectionist, and nativist “America first” approach to the relationship. But if the aim is to influence Chinese behavior, the administration will need to demonstrate considerably more focus in strategic thinking, time, resources, and coordination with partners.

An attitude without a strategy

This approach was clearest in Vice President Pence’s October 4, 2018, speech on China. The speech, and subsequent comments by the vice president during his November 2018 trip to Asia, made clear that the United States intends to confront China until Beijing changes its behavior on a wide range of well-known and longstanding concerns. These include discriminatory trade barriers, forced technology transfer, militarization of outposts in the South China Sea, pressure on Taiwan, human rights and religious freedom, government-sponsored cyber-enabled economic espionage, and Chinese interference in other countries’ political systems.

What is less clear, however, is whether the Trump administration’s objectives are to compel China to alter its behavior in specific issue areas of concern, to “decouple” the American economy from China’s through supply chain diversification, or to obstruct China’s rise. It is possible to find public statements from the president and his senior advisors that could be interpreted as advocating for all three of these potential objectives, sometimes on the same day.

There also is little clarity on the Trump administration’s strategy for achieving its objectives. Trump administration officials often talk publicly and privately of their greater tolerance for friction with China and their willingness to push back on problematic Chinese behavior. Such comments reflect an attitude, but not a strategy.

There similarly is no discernible pattern of American behavior in pursuit of discrete objectives. Whereas conventional administrations devote considerable bandwidth to establishing priorities in the U.S.-China relationship, assessing opportunity costs and tradeoffs, and deciding on timing and sequencing of actions to advance those priorities, this administration appears far less encumbered by such questions.

Instead, the vice president’s public statement on China appears to have established a permissive environment for departments and agencies to pursue actions relating to China as they see fit. The net result has been a jumble of seemingly uncoordinated actions, the most notable of which was Canada’s arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer at the request of U.S. authorities on the same day that President Trump was hailing major breakthroughs in his meeting with President Xi Jinping at the G-20 meeting in Argentina.

The Trump administration also has reimagined the role of diplomacy in the bilateral relationship. Gone are the days of regularly-scheduled dialogues, which the Trump administration views as laborious, unproductive, and doing more to legitimize the Communist Party leadership than to deliver benefits to the American people. Instead of cultivating bilateral connections in order to manage tensions, address differences, and identify opportunities, the Trump administration considers senior-level bilateral meetings below the presidential level as venues to accept Chinese concessions. Diplomacy has largely given way to unilateral, unidirectional American demands, often done publicly.

Diplomacy has largely given way to unilateral, unidirectional American demands, often done publicly.

While this new and different approach has succeeded in setting a new tone for the relationship, it has not yet secured many tangible results. The brightest area of cooperation for a period was North Korea, but the shared spirit behind such efforts dissipated along with North Korea’s cessation of nuclear and missile tests, Trump’s invocation of unilateral tariffs against China, and Xi’s efforts to fortify relations with Kim Jong-un following Trump’s embrace of the North Korean leader. Secretary Pompeo’s October 8, 2018, visit to Beijing for the express purpose of advancing cooperation on North Korea was a lead balloon; no visible progress has been made to deepen U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea since.

China has been undaunted in its efforts to militarize outposts in the South China Sea. The cross-Strait situation is growing tenser. China is becoming more brazen in its disregard of American concerns on human rights and religious freedom. China appears to have resumed cyber-enabled economic espionage for commercial gain against the United States, after a cessation of such activities at the end of the Obama administration. The flow of fentanyl from China into the United States has persisted at high levels, but hopefully the situation will improve following a verbal agreement by President Trump and Xi in their meeting in Argentina to stem the problem. The bilateral trade deficit has ballooned, and Chinese investment flows into the United States have plummeted. And bilateral cooperation on common challenges such as climate change, nonproliferation, and pandemic disease prevention has virtually ceased.

Economic diplomacy with China

The United States has legitimate trade and investment complaints with China. The most important of these is market access. China’s average tariff rate of 7.5 percent is similar to that of other major trading nations, but the average disguises some high barriers in key sectors—for example, 25-percent tariff on autos for many years, recently reduced to a still-high 15 percent. China has been slow to further open this system over the past decade. China is also more restrictive towards direct investment than other large emerging markets, requiring foreign firms to operate through joint ventures in sectors such as autos, financial services, and telecom. These joint venture requirements force foreign investors to transfer their technology to Chinese firms, often state enterprises, on unfavorable terms. American firms generally understand the risk in complying with demands to transfer technology, but often fear they have few alternatives, given that refusing to do so could result in their being locked out of the China market.

There are other industrial policies that impinge on trade and investment. One-quarter to one-third of China’s economy consists of state enterprises that receive favorable treatment from banks (also state owned) and the government. These enterprises are not particularly involved in China’s export success, but the largest ones are going global and their investment around the world is more strategic than commercial. Chinese policies to protect these firms in the domestic market create tension with the U.S. and other market economies.

Finally, the United States has made an issue of its trade deficit with China. China has a large bilateral surplus with the United States because it imports petroleum and raw materials from the developing world and exports manufactured goods to the United States. It is not clear that there is much China could do to significantly reduce the U.S. deficit, especially given the fiscal stimulus in the United States that is leading to rising deficits with all partners. Through October, the U.S. global trade deficit overall was up 11 percent from the year before; with Canada and Mexico, up 15 percent; with the European Union, up 15 percent; with China, up 11 percent. China’s overall trade balance with the rest of the world is close to zero, so China is no longer the counterpart to the large U.S. deficit; that role is played by Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others—the world’s leading trade surplus nations.

In response to these economic issues, the Trump’s administration’s approach to bilateral diplomacy has been scatter-shot and inconsistent. The United States has imposed tariffs on imports from China, then suspended the increase in the tariffs scheduled for January 1, then announced the increase would go into effect March 2. The United States imposed what is essentially the death penalty (a large fine from the Commerce Department) on the Chinese firm ZTE for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, before President Trump intervened to save ZTE. The chief financial officer of Huawei was arrested in Canada at U.S. request. Then President Trump indicated that he might intervene in the case if there is a good trade deal. Financial markets have been whip-sawed as the administration blows hot and cold on trade and investment issues. A contrasting area of consistency has been the tightening of U.S. investment and export restrictions in high-tech sectors through new legislation. But overall, bilateral policy has been inconsistent and ineffective.

Financial markets have been whip-sawed as the administration blows hot and cold on trade and investment issues.

Multilateral approaches to deal with China have been non-existent. The United States pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (TPP), which was designed to address many of the issues raised by state capitalist systems—state enterprises, intellectual property right protection, investment openness, to name a few. The United States has been undermining the World Trade Organization (WTO) by refusing to appoint new appellate judges. While the WTO’s record has been disappointing in holding China to the letter and spirit of its commitments, partners such as Japan and the EU would like to strengthen its capacities, while the United States is rendering it increasingly irrelevant.

The inconsistency and failure of U.S. economic diplomacy towards China flow in part from a lack of consensus on objectives. One can detect in the administration elements of three distinct approaches towards economic issues with China:

Seek massive restructuring of the Chinese economy. The United States has provided a long and detailed list of demands for opening and policy reform and some of the rhetoric from the administration suggests that China needs to capitulate completely in order to reach a deal. This is unrealistic, as China is not going to completely change its system within a short time.

Promote de-coupling of the U.S. economy from China. Some advisors recognize that China is not going to change and advocate treating the relationship as if it were part of a new cold war, in which Washington aims to isolate and contain China. In this view, the United States should impose high trade and investment barriers and keep them in place to encourage U.S. firms and consumers to wean themselves off China. The problem with this approach is that our allies and partners are not going to follow us down this road. For almost all of them, China is a bigger trading partner than the United States is, and a faster growing one. There would be huge economic costs to decoupling, and it would lead to an unstable world of competing economic institutions and blocs.

Practical compromise based on continued gradual opening. Markets are nervous at the moment because there is no obvious off-ramp to the trade war. Even if there is some kind of short-run deal, it is not likely to last because many of the underlying issues will continue to fester.

There would be huge economic costs to decoupling.

Although the approach is inconsistent, the combination of Trump’s tolerance for trade friction and possible softening in China’s economic outlook could yet still present opportunities to press China through time-bound negotiations to gain market access and some restructuring. If achieved, such progress would be noteworthy and commendable. But to get there, the United States will need a clear strategy, coordinated with allies, as to what is acceptable opening and reform to maintain the economic relationship. Washington also will need to convince Beijing that addressing irritants on the trade front would lead to improvements in the overall relationship.

Loss of leverage

The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum. America’s ability to influence how Chinese leaders identify and pursue their interests is strengthened when allies and partners amplify American efforts, and diminished when the United States acts alone. President Trump and his senior advisors, notably National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have shown disdain for multilateralism. Favorable views of the United States are at historic lows in most countries where the Pew Research Center does polling. And despite shared concerns among many of America’s closest allies about China’s behavior, there has been little coordinated action to address such concerns. When there has been joint pressure, such as in a joint letter of concern about human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the United States has been notably absent. One key exception, however, was the December 20 U.S. censure of Chinese officials for engaging in cyber-espionage, which attracted public support from America’s “Five Eyes” intelligence partners (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

There also has not been a clear articulation of American strategy in Asia that could attract allies and partners to pull closer to the United States in contesting Chinese behaviors of concern. Washington’s signature initiative in the region, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, remains primarily a set of slogans lacking both in substance and visible support from President Trump. Washington has driven up negative perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but has yet to articulate an alternative for countries that are in need of infrastructure. America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership blew a hole in U.S. economic and commercial influence in East Asia that has not yet been filled with any bilateral or multilateral trade initiatives. America’s traditional partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and Germany, are reluctant to partner visibly with the United States, in part due to concern that Trump could change his mind on China, cut a trade deal with Xi, and leave them holding the bag.

Indeed, our partners in a number of cases have been hedging, improving relations with China and pulling their punches. To secure the type of international support that will be necessary to influence Chinese behavior, the administration will need to demonstrate a level of focus in strategic thinking, time, resources, and coordination with partners that has not been visible in the first two years.

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By David Dollar, Ryan Hass, Jeffrey A. Bader
The Trump administration has disrupted a longstanding bipartisan consensus on U.S. policy toward China, which it viewed as overly timid and insufficiently robust in responding to China’s excesses. Although past policy shifted based on events, it largely was grounded in a judgment that U.S. interests would be served by a constructive relationship with China that mitigated risk of conflict and maximized opportunities for cooperation in areas of converging interests, such as North Korea and climate change.
U.S. policy toward China now appears animated by a judgment that the past trajectory of the bilateral relationship favored China and disadvantaged the United States in a long-run competition for global leadership. To try to break that trajectory, the Trump administration over the past two years has adopted an increasingly zero-sum, unilateralist, protectionist, and nativist “America first” approach to the relationship. But if the aim is to influence Chinese behavior, the administration will need to demonstrate considerably more focus in strategic thinking, time, resources, and coordination with partners.
An attitude without a strategy
This approach was clearest in Vice President Pence’s October 4, 2018, speech on China. The speech, and subsequent comments by the vice president during his November 2018 trip to Asia, made clear that the United States intends to confront China until Beijing changes its behavior on a wide range of well-known and longstanding concerns. These include discriminatory trade barriers, forced technology transfer, militarization of outposts in the South China Sea, pressure on Taiwan, human rights and religious freedom, government-sponsored cyber-enabled economic espionage, and Chinese interference in other countries’ political systems.
What is less clear, however, is whether the Trump administration’s objectives are to compel China to alter its behavior in specific issue areas of concern, to “decouple” the American economy from China’s through supply chain diversification, or to obstruct China’s rise. It is possible to find public statements from the president and his senior advisors that could be interpreted as advocating for all three of these potential objectives, sometimes on the same day.
There also is little clarity on the Trump administration’s strategy for achieving its objectives. Trump administration officials often talk publicly and privately of their greater tolerance for friction with China and their willingness to push back on problematic Chinese behavior. Such comments reflect an attitude, but not a strategy.
There similarly is no discernible pattern of American behavior in pursuit of discrete objectives. Whereas conventional administrations devote considerable bandwidth to establishing priorities in the U.S.-China relationship, assessing opportunity costs and tradeoffs, and deciding on timing and sequencing of actions to advance those priorities, this administration appears far less encumbered by such questions.
Instead, the vice president’s public statement on China appears to have established a permissive environment for departments and agencies to pursue actions relating to China as they see fit. The net result has been a jumble of seemingly uncoordinated actions, the most notable of which was Canada’s arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer at the request of U.S. authorities on the same day that President Trump was hailing major breakthroughs in his meeting with President Xi Jinping at the G-20 meeting in Argentina.
The Trump administration also has reimagined the role of diplomacy in the bilateral relationship. Gone are the days of regularly-scheduled dialogues, which the Trump administration views as laborious, unproductive, and doing more to legitimize the Communist Party leadership than to deliver benefits to the ... By David Dollar, Ryan Hass, Jeffrey A. Bader
The Trump administration has disrupted a longstanding bipartisan consensus on U.S. policy toward China, which it viewed as overly timid and insufficiently robust in responding to China’https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20190114-financial-times-ryan-hass/20190114 Financial Times Ryan Hasshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/592241198/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Financial-Times-Ryan-Hass/
Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:55:27 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=557910

Kim Jong-un is in China this week to kick off the new year. The visit is his fourth in the past 10 months, and reinforces the message he delivered in his annual New Year’s speech just a week ago. Amid the ongoing stalemate in U.S.-North Korea talks on denuclearization, uncertainties about the how much further inter-Korean ties can progress without the lifting of sanctions, and planning for a potential second summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, analysts hoped that Kim’s personal commentary could provide clues on the trajectory of diplomacy in 2019.

Kim’s trip to Beijing and his performance on January 1 showcased a confident North Korean leader prepared to continue engaging in diplomacy, but on his own terms and in ways that will shake the alliance between Washington and Seoul and further weaken Beijing’s resolve on sanctions implementation.

Anatomy of the speech

Parsing Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s Day speech to detect any shifts in tone and policy is an annual ritual for North Korea watchers. The speech reviews the regime’s successes of the past year and uses boilerplate language about the need to strengthen ideological training and improving the economy. It also typically mentions inter-Korean relations and the United States, and exalts the country’s national defense, including its nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong-un has taken to delivering the annual address himself, reviving his grandfather Kim Il-sung’s practice, rather than using the written joint editorial format like his father Kim Jong-il, who avoided public speaking. Kim’s public appearance means that in international scrutiny also focuses on his appearance: his clothing, mannerisms, and how much weight he has gained or lost given the family’s history of diabetes and stroke.

Kim’s annual speech is an evaluation of the regime’s performance, with a list of accomplishments (mostly his), challenges (mostly blamed on the United States), goals, and developmentals (mostly for his officials). It often comes across like a set of New Year’s resolutions, setting out unreasonable expectations that are broken quickly, even within days. For outsiders analyzing the North Korean leadership’s intentions for the coming year, it is a Rorschach test; one’s conclusions about the speech is shaped by the watcher’s assumptions, the current political environment, and his or her own ideological inclinations.

The New Year address can be useful for predicting the coming months, but not always. In 2017, Kim announced that North Korea had “entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles.” This was true, and he tested ICBMs later that year. In 2018, he said the U.S. “mainland is within range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time,” amping up the harsh rhetoric and escalating the confrontation with President Donald Trump amid fears about a potential military conflict. But this proved to be more rhetoric that a real threat. Around the same time, he also began to engage in a flurry of summits, improving relations with South Korea, reviving ties with China (which he had held at arm’s length since he came to power in December 2011), and holding an amicable meeting with Donald Trump.

Much of the credit for Kim adjusting his approach is owed to President Moon of South Korea, who seized on the conciliatory parts of Kim’s speech and downplayed Kim’s promise to “mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles.” Moon eagerly sought to build personal, political, and economic ties with the Kim regime, in large part to quiet the drumbeat of war. Moon’s initiative and Kim’s willingness to go along turned down the temperature, with Moon acting as midwife to the unprecedented U.S.-North Korea summit in June 2018.

Kim’s theme for 2019: Shedding isolation for diplomacy

For 2019, Kim indicated that he was still interested in engagement, which is good news. He ticked off the list of high-level meetings in 2018 and celebrated the unity of socialist countries, citing his meetings with the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. He boasted about various cultural and athletic exchanges with a number of countries, almost as if to thumb his nose at the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign that sought to economically and politically isolate the regime. His recent trip to Beijing suggests that he plans to have multiple high-level exchanges with Chinese leaders this year.

Kim also said he was willing to meet again with Trump, but warned that “if the United States does not keep its promise in our international community and misinterprets our patience and intention and continues with the sanctions, then we have no choice for the sake of our national interest and the peace of the Korean Peninsula but to come up with new initiatives and new measures.” The South Korean Blue House and Donald Trump decided to focus on the positive in Kim’s message, the former touting Kim’s speech as having a “positive effect on resolving the Korean Peninsula issue smoothly in the new year.” Trump tweeted, “I also look forward to meeting with Chairman Kim who realizes so well that North Korea possesses great economic potential!”

South Korea’s sanguine response was not surprising. Moon has been busy trying to maintain the momentum of last year’s diplomatic engagement. Trump’s tweet reflects his desire to convey progress on North Korea and to show that his personal relationship with Kim is strong, despite the fact that the United States and North Korea have not been able to reconcile their definitions of denuclearization or the sequence in which the two sides would take additional steps. For example, while Washington has called for Pyongyang to completely abandon its nuclear weapons program and allow intrusive inspections, the Kim regime has insisted on “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a reference to U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia.

The speech had some other tantalizing bits about North Korea’s nuclear program that appears to have been enough to keep Washington and Seoul invested in the engagement process. Kim said that he and his regime “declared at home and abroad that we would neither make nor test nuclear weapons any longer nor use them and proliferate them and we have taken various practical measures,” reiterating his declaration at the April 2018 party central committee meeting. This is a positive statement, but falls far short of a complete abandonment of nuclear weapons and contradicts previous comments and apparent actions. In last year’s speech, Kim said he would mass produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and recent reports indicate that North Korea continues to operate and upgrade nuclear weapons-related facilities. Seoul and Washington’s receptiveness to Kim’s speech this year may have been influenced by two personal and warmly received letters Kim sent to Moon and Trump. On January 2, Trump announced at a cabinet meeting that he had “just got a great letter from Kim Jong-un,” adding they had “really established a very good relationship.”

Diplomacy on Kim’s terms

Despite the clear effort to present Kim as a statesman, his remarks contained some worrisome elements. His speech and its orchestration hinted at Kim’s tactics for the coming year and the challenges the United States will face ensuring national and regional security.

The speech seemed designed to present Kim as a reasonable, responsible head of state.

First, the production of the speech seemed designed to present Kim as a reasonable, responsible head of state. He addressed the country via television wearing a gray suit and tie, comfortably seated in an overstuffed leather chair. His dark-paneled, book-lined office could have been mistaken for that of a top executive at a South Korean conglomerate. Kim’s appearance reinforced the speech’s softer tone and message: Kim is a modern statesman, relatable, powerful, and a responsible steward of a state that has nuclear weapons. He was probably seeking to strengthen the regime’s oft-repeated pledge that North Korea would be a trustworthy nuclear power. Even in its production aesthetics, Kim’s speech framed him as the reasonable party who, he suggests, has fulfilled his part of agreements made during the spring and summer of summits; in doing so, he has thrown the ball in the U.S. court, in typical regime fashion, to set up Washington to take the blame if negotiations go badly.

Second, Kim appeared confident as he listed off his accomplishments with South Korea. He said that he is “very satisfied” with developments in inter-Korean ties, and that the north and south had “committed themselves to terminating fratricidal war based on force of arms.” In fact, the new format and venue for the speech was probably aimed, in part, at the South Korean public, to revive the dream of reunification by appealing to ethno-nationalism and obliquely blaming outsiders—the United States—for hampering this treasured goal. Kim’s charm offensive—evident in his appearance and the content of his lofty language about brotherhood and the Korean nation—was squarely directed at Seoul and the South Korean people.

Finally, Kim was generous with complimenting himself and the Moon government for progress on inter-Korean ties, but he was not shy about clarifying his expectations. He once again reiterated many of the regime’s long-standing demands: an end to U.S.-South Korea military exercises, a peace mechanism to replace the 1953 armistice that ended the military conflict of the Korean War without formally ending the war, and the removal of sanctions. Kim stressed Korean unity in an us-versus-them framework. “We will never tolerate the interference and intervention of outside forces who stand in the way of national reconciliation,” Kim said, and stressed that Koreans from the north and south are “the master of peace on the peninsula.” Moreover, Kim’s vague threat to “find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country” was probably aimed at trying to pressure the Moon administration to choose between peninsular unity or the alliance with the United States by reminding Seoul of the tense atmosphere of 2017.

As the Trump administration considers the next steps on talks with North Korea and the potential second Trump-Kim summit early this year, it should be mindful about Kim’s perception of his own strength as he enters his eighth year as North Korea’s leader. He clearly remains determined to erode the U.S.-South Korea alliance and exploit potential fissures in U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korea nuclear issue. Washington must avoid normalizing Kim’s claimed status as a responsible nuclear power, enforce sanctions to disabuse Kim of the notion that he can drive events on the Korean Peninsula, and reduce the threat that North Korea poses to regional and global security—all while being sensitive to Seoul’s priorities, reinforcing Beijing’s support for North Korean denuclearization, and advancing diplomacy. That’s a New Year’s resolution that will require discipline, focus, and support from allies.

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By Jung H. Pak
Kim Jong-un is in China this week to kick off the new year. The visit is his fourth in the past 10 months, and reinforces the message he delivered in his annual New Year’s speech just a week ago. Amid the ongoing stalemate in U.S.-North Korea talks on denuclearization, uncertainties about the how much further inter-Korean ties can progress without the lifting of sanctions, and planning for a potential second summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, analysts hoped that Kim’s personal commentary could provide clues on the trajectory of diplomacy in 2019.
Kim’s trip to Beijing and his performance on January 1 showcased a confident North Korean leader prepared to continue engaging in diplomacy, but on his own terms and in ways that will shake the alliance between Washington and Seoul and further weaken Beijing’s resolve on sanctions implementation.
Anatomy of the speech
Parsing Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s Day speech to detect any shifts in tone and policy is an annual ritual for North Korea watchers. The speech reviews the regime’s successes of the past year and uses boilerplate language about the need to strengthen ideological training and improving the economy. It also typically mentions inter-Korean relations and the United States, and exalts the country’s national defense, including its nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong-un has taken to delivering the annual address himself, reviving his grandfather Kim Il-sung’s practice, rather than using the written joint editorial format like his father Kim Jong-il, who avoided public speaking. Kim’s public appearance means that in international scrutiny also focuses on his appearance: his clothing, mannerisms, and how much weight he has gained or lost given the family’s history of diabetes and stroke.
Kim’s annual speech is an evaluation of the regime’s performance, with a list of accomplishments (mostly his), challenges (mostly blamed on the United States), goals, and developmentals (mostly for his officials). It often comes across like a set of New Year’s resolutions, setting out unreasonable expectations that are broken quickly, even within days. For outsiders analyzing the North Korean leadership’s intentions for the coming year, it is a Rorschach test; one’s conclusions about the speech is shaped by the watcher’s assumptions, the current political environment, and his or her own ideological inclinations.
The New Year address can be useful for predicting the coming months, but not always. In 2017, Kim announced that North Korea had “entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles.” This was true, and he tested ICBMs later that year. In 2018, he said the U.S. “mainland is within range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time,” amping up the harsh rhetoric and escalating the confrontation with President Donald Trump amid fears about a potential military conflict. But this proved to be more rhetoric that a real threat. Around the same time, he also began to engage in a flurry of summits, improving relations with South Korea, reviving ties with China (which he had held at arm’s length since he came to power in December 2011), and holding an amicable meeting with Donald Trump.
Much of the credit for Kim adjusting his approach is owed to President Moon of South Korea, who seized on the conciliatory parts of Kim’s speech and downplayed Kim’s promise to “mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles.” Moon eagerly sought to build personal, political, and economic ties with the Kim regime, in large part to quiet the drumbeat of war. Moon’s initiative and Kim’s willingness to go along turned down the temperature, with Moon acting as midwife to the ... By Jung H. Pak
Kim Jong-un is in China this week to kick off the new year. The visit is his fourth in the past 10 months, and reinforces the message he delivered in his annual New Year’s speech just a week ago.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/8-key-things-to-notice-from-xi-jinpings-new-year-speech-on-taiwan/8 key things to notice from Xi Jinping’s New Year speech on Taiwanhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/590952560/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~key-things-to-notice-from-Xi-Jinping%e2%80%99s-New-Year-speech-on-Taiwan/
Mon, 07 Jan 2019 16:30:04 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=556130

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By Richard C. Bush

On January 2, China’s President Xi Jinping gave a long speech on Beijing’s policy of unification with Taiwan, restating the rationale for that policy for the benefit of domestic and Taiwan audiences. The purpose was to mark the 40th anniversary of a statement China made to Taiwan on New Year’s Day 1979, the same day that China and the United States established diplomatic relations. That Xi made the speech was not a surprise: Reaffirming policy is what leaders do on anniversaries.

The 3,500-word address reiterated most of the accumulated tenets and tropes of China’s goal of unification of Taiwan over the last 40 years. But there was not a significant shift in Chinese policy and no sign it will make a dent in opposition to unification in Taiwan.

The 1979 statement: A refresher

The key innovation in 1979 statement was to shift Beijing’s basic approach regarding Taiwan from “liberation,” which includes the possibility of violence, to “peaceful unification.” Xi re-emphasized that peaceful unification was still the best way to end the division that had existed between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan ever since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China government and its ruling Nationalist/Kuomintang (KMT) party, defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists, retreated to Taiwan. For Xi to reemphasize peaceful unification is not a small matter because recently some in China who are frustrated that the goal remains unfulfilled have advocated the use of force.

The 1979 statement did not say much about the terms and conditions for resolving its dispute with Taiwan and achieving unification. Those were developed in the early 1980s and summarized by the slogan “one country, two systems” (1C2S). This is the approach that China first implemented in Hong Kong, and the formula that was applied there gives the best sense of how it might be used in Taiwan, although that is not for certain. Under 1C2S, in summary:

Taiwan would become a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and, by implication, the Republic of China (ROC) government would cease to exist. The Chinese flag would fly over Taiwan.

Taiwan’s economic and social life would continue more or less as before.

Politically, Taiwan’s institutions would be transformed into sub-national bodies, and, based on Hong Kong’s experience, these would be structured to prevent political forces and political leaders that China didn’t like from coming to power.

What Xi did and didn’t say

The first noteworthy item in Xi’s January 2 address—and in his entire approach to Taiwan—is how he embeds the specific issue of unification into the signature theme for his now open-ended tenure as China’s leader: the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” In fact, the same theme—a divided China is a weak China—appears in the 1979 statement whose anniversary he was celebrating.

Second, Xi stated what may seem to be a new version of the 1992 Consensus: “the two sides of the Strait belong to one China and will work together to seek national unification.” Actually, that was Beijing’s formulation at the time. Taipei had a less definitive formulation then, but Xi did not rewrite history.

Third, Xi backtracked from past policy on what aspects of Taiwan’s current system would be preserved after unification under 1C2S. He said, “Under the premise of ensuring national sovereignty, security, and development interests, the social system and life styles of Taiwan compatriots will be fully respected…and the private property, religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots will be fully guaranteed.” This is less than previous formulations, which included the Taiwan army and the island’s political institutions. Moreover, Beijing would likely reserve for itself how to define “legitimate rights and interests.”

Fourth, Xi Jinping did not set an explicit deadline for unification. Yet he did warn, as he did in 2013, that the Taiwan issue “should not be passed down generation after generation.”

Fifth, Xi did propose the creation of a body to conduct “extensive and in-depth democratic consultations on cross-Strait relations and the future of the nation and make institutional arrangements for promoting peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.” It would be composed of individuals representing political parties and various social circles on Taiwan and the Mainland. The catch with this vague proposal was the precondition for participation: “on the common political basis of adhering to the ‘1992 Consensus’ and opposing ‘Taiwan independence.’” Under current circumstances, that would guarantee the exclusion of representatives of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which Beijing believes is separatist in character, and any social groups with similar political outlooks. That would render the idea a non-starter.

Sixth, Xi reiterated a principle that he had left out of the Taiwan section of his report to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2017: “placing hopes on the Taiwan people.” The implication I see here is that Beijing has more confidence now than it did two years ago that the KMT will come back to power in 2020 and so displace the current DPP administration.

Seventh, he reiterated a line from former President Jiang Zemin’s speech on Taiwan from January 1995: “Chinese will not fight Chinese.” On the other hand, Xi would not commit Beijing to abandoning the use of force and said it would “reserve the option to take any necessary measure.” This threat was directed, he said, “at the interference of external forces [code for the United States] and at an extremely small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and their separatist activities.” Chinese leaders would themselves interpret this vague formulation.

Eighth, Xi revived the goal of “the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic cooperation [and build a cross-Strait common market.” The two sides had been moving in this direction during the Ma Ying-jeou administration but the process stalled in 2014 because of concern in Taiwan about opening the market to the Mainland too widely. Even today, not all on Taiwan would welcome a return to Ma’s policies.

Within the fairly tight parameters of past policy, therefore, Xi made as good a case for unification as any Chinese leader could make. He stressed how ending the state of division fit within the broader revival of China as a great power. However, he gave no hint that China was prepared to creatively adjust the substance of 1C2S to accommodate Taiwan concerns and even retreated from previous promises. As much as he promised that Beijing would take Taiwan viewpoints into account, he ignored Taiwan’s democratic system and the obstacle it has created to China’s achievement of its goals.

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By Richard C. Bush
On January 2, China’s President Xi Jinping gave a long speech on Beijing’s policy of unification with Taiwan, restating the rationale for that policy for the benefit of domestic and Taiwan audiences. The purpose was to mark the 40th anniversary of a statement China made to Taiwan on New Year’s Day 1979, the same day that China and the United States established diplomatic relations. That Xi made the speech was not a surprise: Reaffirming policy is what leaders do on anniversaries.
The 3,500-word address reiterated most of the accumulated tenets and tropes of China’s goal of unification of Taiwan over the last 40 years. But there was not a significant shift in Chinese policy and no sign it will make a dent in opposition to unification in Taiwan.
The 1979 statement: A refresher
The key innovation in 1979 statement was to shift Beijing’s basic approach regarding Taiwan from “liberation,” which includes the possibility of violence, to “peaceful unification.” Xi re-emphasized that peaceful unification was still the best way to end the division that had existed between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan ever since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China government and its ruling Nationalist/Kuomintang (KMT) party, defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists, retreated to Taiwan. For Xi to reemphasize peaceful unification is not a small matter because recently some in China who are frustrated that the goal remains unfulfilled have advocated the use of force.
The 1979 statement did not say much about the terms and conditions for resolving its dispute with Taiwan and achieving unification. Those were developed in the early 1980s and summarized by the slogan “one country, two systems” (1C2S). This is the approach that China first implemented in Hong Kong, and the formula that was applied there gives the best sense of how it might be used in Taiwan, although that is not for certain. Under 1C2S, in summary:
- Taiwan would become a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and, by implication, the Republic of China (ROC) government would cease to exist. The Chinese flag would fly over Taiwan. - Taiwan’s economic and social life would continue more or less as before. - Politically, Taiwan’s institutions would be transformed into sub-national bodies, and, based on Hong Kong’s experience, these would be structured to prevent political forces and political leaders that China didn’t like from coming to power.
What Xi did and didn’t say
The first noteworthy item in Xi’s January 2 address—and in his entire approach to Taiwan—is how he embeds the specific issue of unification into the signature theme for his now open-ended tenure as China’s leader: the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” In fact, the same theme—a divided China is a weak China—appears in the 1979 statement whose anniversary he was celebrating.
Second, Xi stated what may seem to be a new version of the 1992 Consensus: “the two sides of the Strait belong to one China and will work together to seek national unification.” Actually, that was Beijing’s formulation at the time. Taipei had a less definitive formulation then, but Xi did not rewrite history.
Third, Xi backtracked from past policy on what aspects of Taiwan’s current system would be preserved after unification under 1C2S. He said, “Under the premise of ensuring national sovereignty, security, and development interests, the social system and life styles of Taiwan compatriots will be fully respected…and the private property, religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots will be fully guaranteed.” This is less than previous formulations, which included the Taiwan army and the island’s political ... By Richard C. Bush
On January 2, China’s President Xi Jinping gave a long speech on Beijing’s policy of unification with Taiwan, restating the rationale for that policy for the benefit of domestic and Taiwan audiences.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/beijings-goal-is-re-unification-with-taiwan-why-cant-it-get-there/Beijing’s goal is re-unification with Taiwan—Why can’t it get there?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/590952562/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Beijing%e2%80%99s-goal-is-reunification-with-Taiwan%e2%80%94Why-can%e2%80%99t-it-get-there/
Mon, 07 Jan 2019 16:30:03 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=556133

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By Richard C. Bush

When Beijing crafted its “one country, two systems” formula (1C2S) for Taiwan unification in the early 1980s, it thought the moment was ideal to secure the capitulation of Taiwan’s leaders. Taipei had suffered a serious psychological blow after the United States had switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing on New Year’s Day 1979. China’s leaders knew that their Taiwan counterparts, leaders of the Nationalist/Kuomintang party (KMT) were Chinese nationalists who had moved to the island in 1949 and that they favored ultimate unification (but on their own terms). Maybe, Beijing hoped, Taiwan’s leaders would see 1C2S as a face-saving way out of a dire situation.

There was another reason Beijing might have believed that KMT leaders would find 1C2S attractive. That was, the formula would allow them to maintain the authoritarian rule they had imposed in the late 1940s. The KMT would have to give up its belief in the Republic of China, which it had controlled since 1928, and become a part of the People’s Republic of China, its enemy since 1949. But at least they could stay in power. The losers in this arrangement would be the 80 percent of the island’s population whose families had been in Taiwan for generations who had little or no control over Taiwan’s future. But giving the people a say in either China or Taiwan was not at all a priority for Chinese leaders.

KMT leaders rejected Beijing’s offer and soon changed the game. They started a transition to democracy that was completed in the mid-1990s. This fostered a very public discussion of what Taiwan was, where it had been, and how it fit with its Chinese neighbor. Democratization essentially gave the Taiwan public a seat at the table any time Beijing and Taipei governments tried to resolve their differences through negotiations. Among other things,

Taiwan’s democratization created a strong popular identification with Taiwan itself. Some people see themselves as Taiwanese only. Others regard themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, without defining what they mean. Consistently, these two groups constitute 90 percent of Taiwan opinion. Less than 10 percent regard themselves as Chinese only.

The share of Taiwan people who want unification with China right away or sometime in the future has been stuck between 10 and 15 percent for some time. Most Taiwan people want a continuation of the status quo.

The KMT’s three decades of harsh authoritarian rule conditioned many Taiwan people to be wary of any new group of authoritarian leaders from China.

Most Taiwan people understand that Taiwan’s economy is tied to China’s (40 percent of Taiwan exports go there). They don’t like instability, whatever the cause. They don’t want a military conflict. They do want a genuine say over their destiny, and for now 1C2S has no market on Taiwan as a basis for resolving differences with China.

What has happened in Hong Kong over the last five years only reinforces Taiwan skepticism. Originally, 1C2S in Hong Kong provided for the rule of law and protection of civil and political rights, but the electoral system was geared so that any political force or political leader that Beijing feared could never gain legislative or executive power. There was hope beginning in 2013 for a reform of the electoral system that ultimately would result in popular elections for all senior leaders, but through a tragic train of events that did not happen. Now political freedoms are being abridged as well.

Xi Jinping’s January speech ignores the impact on the quest for unification of popular feelings in democratic Taiwan. His statement that “there is national identification between the people on the two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait” ignores what polls show about the weakness of Chinese identity on the island. Those same polls belie his apparent confidence that unification on Beijing’s terms is inevitable. He does not seem aware that Taiwan citizens don’t want to risk their democratic system, which they value despite its flaws, for a 1C2S structure that is partially democratic at best.

What’s the obstacle?

Xi does intimate reasons why China has not made more progress towards its unification goal.

One reason is ineffective persuasion. Beijing has just not found the right argument and mix of incentives and disincentives to stimulate a positive response from Taiwan. They were closest during the presidency of KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou, when cross-Strait relations became more stable and expanded economically. But Ma took economic integration further than the public wanted, and the Democratic Progressive Party and its leader Tsai Ing-wen, who are more cautious when it comes to China, took over. Xi’s linkage of Taiwan’s unification to “great rejuvenation” is the latest attempt to come up with a convincing argument, along with intensified assertions that China really is sincere when it says it will take Taiwan views into account. But based on President Tsai’s response to Xi’s speech, that argument won’t work.

The second reason to which Xi alludes is American interference. The Chinese logic here is that America is locked in a strategic rivalry with China. Given the geography of East Asia, the island of Taiwan is useful to the United States in blocking China’s outward advance. Thus, the logic goes, most U.S. moves that favor Taiwan are seen as evidence of this purported American plot to contain China. This reasoning is false. It has been long-standing U.S. policy to take no position on how substantively China and Taiwan resolve their difference; what matters is that any resolution occur peacefully and be acceptable to Taiwan’s people. It is not U.S. Taiwan policy that is blocking improvements in China-Taiwan relations, or even unification. It is that China hasn’t made an offer to Taiwan that its people find appealing.

The third reason that Xi cites for slow progress towards unification is “separatism,” the desire of some political forces on Taiwan to create an independent country with no political or legal ties to China. Now it is true that some Taiwanese politicians have long favored independence. They were the beneficiaries of democratization and had an impact within the DPP. Even though they were a minority island-wide, the option of independence roiled Taiwan politics during the 1990s and through 2007. But most Taiwan people long understood that creating a “Republic of Taiwan” would lead to a military attack by China, so independence was a really bad option. Despite China’s allegations that the Tsai administration is engaged in “separatist activities,” it has actually been quite cautious on the issue, if only because it wishes to preserve the support of the United States.

So why does the Chinese official media continue to charge that the Tsai administration is promoting independence? I suspect it is because officials and analysts believe that demagogic Taiwan politicians manipulate voters to get their support for causes that, at least in the Chinese view, are not in the public’s objective interests. Demagoguery is not absent in Taiwan, but the public’s opposition to unification is real and exists whether or not politicians engage in manipulation.

That opposition will continue to be decisive because of Taiwan’s constitutional order. Any fundamental change in the political system will require constitutional amendments. Constitutional amendments are really hard, requiring approval of three-quarters of the members of the Legislative Yuan and endorsement of over half of Taiwan’s eligible voters. As a practical matter, a proposed amendment that lacks the support of both the KMT and the DPP is doomed to failure.

Beijing’s choice

Under these circumstances, China has two options that do not involve the threat or use of military force. One is to fundamentally rework the substance of 1C2S to make it more appealing to Taiwan voters. The other is to use money, technology, and political leverage to manipulate Taiwan’s political system to advance its goals. It appears that in the recent local elections, Beijing has already begun to experiment with those tools. But China should rethink that approach. Governing a Taiwan that is incorporated through trickery and manipulation will be much more difficult than one that is persuaded that unification is in its interests.

But Xi’s recent speech suggests that neither Taiwan nor the United States should count on Beijing’s developing ideas that are sufficiently creative to elicit interest from Taiwan. China’s recent meddling in Taiwan’s political process should alert Taiwan leaders and the public of the need to better insulate their democracy from outside interference. The United States should develop ways to help them do that.

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By Richard C. Bush
When Beijing crafted its “one country, two systems” formula (1C2S) for Taiwan unification in the early 1980s, it thought the moment was ideal to secure the capitulation of Taiwan’s leaders. Taipei had suffered a serious psychological blow after the United States had switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing on New Year’s Day 1979. China’s leaders knew that their Taiwan counterparts, leaders of the Nationalist/Kuomintang party (KMT) were Chinese nationalists who had moved to the island in 1949 and that they favored ultimate unification (but on their own terms). Maybe, Beijing hoped, Taiwan’s leaders would see 1C2S as a face-saving way out of a dire situation.
There was another reason Beijing might have believed that KMT leaders would find 1C2S attractive. That was, the formula would allow them to maintain the authoritarian rule they had imposed in the late 1940s. The KMT would have to give up its belief in the Republic of China, which it had controlled since 1928, and become a part of the People’s Republic of China, its enemy since 1949. But at least they could stay in power. The losers in this arrangement would be the 80 percent of the island’s population whose families had been in Taiwan for generations who had little or no control over Taiwan’s future. But giving the people a say in either China or Taiwan was not at all a priority for Chinese leaders.
KMT leaders rejected Beijing’s offer and soon changed the game. They started a transition to democracy that was completed in the mid-1990s. This fostered a very public discussion of what Taiwan was, where it had been, and how it fit with its Chinese neighbor. Democratization essentially gave the Taiwan public a seat at the table any time Beijing and Taipei governments tried to resolve their differences through negotiations. Among other things,
- Taiwan’s democratization created a strong popular identification with Taiwan itself. Some people see themselves as Taiwanese only. Others regard themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, without defining what they mean. Consistently, these two groups constitute 90 percent of Taiwan opinion. Less than 10 percent regard themselves as Chinese only. - The share of Taiwan people who want unification with China right away or sometime in the future has been stuck between 10 and 15 percent for some time. Most Taiwan people want a continuation of the status quo. - The KMT’s three decades of harsh authoritarian rule conditioned many Taiwan people to be wary of any new group of authoritarian leaders from China.
Most Taiwan people understand that Taiwan’s economy is tied to China’s (40 percent of Taiwan exports go there). They don’t like instability, whatever the cause. They don’t want a military conflict. They do want a genuine say over their destiny, and for now 1C2S has no market on Taiwan as a basis for resolving differences with China.
What has happened in Hong Kong over the last five years only reinforces Taiwan skepticism. Originally, 1C2S in Hong Kong provided for the rule of law and protection of civil and political rights, but the electoral system was geared so that any political force or political leader that Beijing feared could never gain legislative or executive power. There was hope beginning in 2013 for a reform of the electoral system that ultimately would result in popular elections for all senior leaders, but through a tragic train of events that did not happen. Now political freedoms are being abridged as well.
Xi Jinping’s January speech ignores the impact on the quest for unification of popular feelings in democratic Taiwan. His statement that “there is national identification between the people on the two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait” ignores what polls show about the weakness of Chinese identity on the island. Those same polls belie his apparent ... By Richard C. Bush
When Beijing crafted its “one country, two systems” formula (1C2S) for Taiwan unification in the early 1980s, it thought the moment was ideal to secure the capitulation of Taiwan’s leaders.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/the-era-of-u-s-china-cooperation-is-drawing-to-a-close-what-comes-next/The era of U.S.-China cooperation is drawing to a close—What comes next?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/590940138/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~The-era-of-USChina-cooperation-is-drawing-to-a-close%e2%80%94What-comes-next/
Mon, 07 Jan 2019 15:00:11 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=556105

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By Bruce Jones

The year 2018 has proved to be a time of turbulence in U.S.-China relations, with the Korean Peninsula, trade and the South China Sea all making headlines.

But 2018 will prove to be more than just a year of turbulence: We will look back on it as a turning point in U.S.-China relations, the closing of an era of expanding cooperation. That era dates from China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and reached its most expansive phase in the wake of the global financial crisis, under U.S. President Barack Obama. There were even fears in the world of a “G-2,” of a U.S.-China condominium that would leave little room for anybody else. There is little risk of a G-2 now.

But if 2018 was an end of an era, what comes next and how rocky will the transition be?

Asian observers always keenly follow American politics, but never more so than now as they engage in a kind of American Kremlinology to discern how much of the turbulence and how much of the strategic shift in China is being driven by Trump, and how much is a function of wider dynamics. The short answer: The turbulence is Trump, especially on trade; but the deeper shift is structural.

On the American side, we see a course correction, and a “whole of society” revaluation of China. A loss of confidence in China on the part of American business, a backlash against China’s human rights record and overseas political behavior, and pushback in strategic affairs characterize the sentiment. Few in the United States would align with every element of Vice President Michael Pence’s flame-throwing speech on China, but the wider administration’s tougher line on China has widespread support. Only a few voices in the financial and technology industries still advocate deep cooperation.

What’s causing all of this? First, the answer lies in the evolution of strategy between Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao. It was likely inevitable as China’s economic growth gave it global interests, but the shift in tone under Xi has been marked. It reflects President Xi’s ambitions as well as the opportunity caused by the weakness of the West after the global financial crisis. Xi’s more assertive strategy includes consolidating control over the military and increasing defense spending; intensifying efforts to militarize the South China Sea; a crackdown internally on dissent; and, abroad, a major uptick in political interference—sometimes using lending through the Belt and Road Initiative for leverage, sometimes using more pernicious measures. Add to this China’s tactical coordination with the Russians when Moscow has engaged in what can only be understood as an act of war against the American political system. Trump has been turbulent; Xi has been aggressive, perhaps reckless.

Much of the foundation for this was laid under Hu, but Xi accelerated the timeline and sharpened the edges—and in so doing put paid to residual hopes of China’s “peaceful rise.” Whether this ends in a cold war, in outright conflict or in a form of managed competition, is the policy question of our time. Despite the growth of anti-China sentiment coming from the United States, outright bilateral conflict is not preordained. But relations are getting worse, and could rapidly deteriorate further.

The Trump administration’s China policy comes in two parts. From the strategic quarter, the effort is to push back on Chinese assertiveness through a framework of “peace through strength”—using American strength to resist Chinese adventurism, but with the medium term objective of returning U.S.-China relations to a stable state. The problem is that the strategy team don’t set the terms of engagement on second agenda, the trade and economic issues.

Some of the Trump administration’s economic actors are pursuing economic re-nationalization and decoupling from China. Much of their strategy is based on a misunderstanding of China’s role in global supply chains and an overestimation of American bargaining power. While others on the economic team and the political strategists have a more realistic world view, clashes within Trump’s team and President Donald Trump’s inherent volatility will inevitably produce more tension and unpredictability in U.S.-China relations.

Clashes within Trump’s team and President Donald Trump’s inherent volatility will inevitably produce more tension and unpredictability in U.S.-China relations.

The unpredictability has produced a welcome degree of discomfort in Xi’s inner circle and some debate about Beijing’s challenge to the United States. Still, it is unlikely to temper Xi’s ambition for long, or to limit the outward consequences of China’s miscalculations on political interference or of its increasingly pervasive crackdown on human rights.

The arrest of the CFO of Huawei means the year ended on a particularly troublesome note. It was a move within the limits of what is feasible under U.S. extradition and sanctions law, but it is an aggressive move, even if justified by Huawei’s alleged sanctions-busting with Iran, and espionage in the United States. China’s response was worse, detaining two innocent Canadians in retaliation, invoking state security. China’s intent may have been to punish Canada; it may have been to deter other countries from accepting U.S. extradition requests, but in so doing China has seriously underestimated the chilling effect across those remaining parts of American society still seeking cooperation with the Chinese.

It is possible that 2019 will see some respite in the tariff war as Trump calculates the economic and political cost of China’s retaliation. This is likely to be a cease fire, not a peace agreement. 2019 will also see the shift in the House of Representatives to the Democratic Party and the arrival in that House of a cohort of elected representatives with deep grounding in foreign policy and a strong concern for human rights. The brutality of China’s crackdown on Xinjiang, its export of authoritarian digital technologies, and use of the Belt and Road Initiative to preposition itself for bases in Africa and Latin America are likely to draw more focused ire.

The era of U.S.-China cooperation is drawing to a close. What follows is strategic competition—but not necessarily conflict. Economic cooperation can be maintained, and cooperation on some key global issues like pandemic disease control can be resumed. The year 2020 will arrive quickly with a potential change of U.S. president—and the Chinese leadership knows that President Donald Trump, and his preferred tools of tweets and tariffs, may prove an ephemeral phenomenon. But the strategic shift in U.S. thinking on China will endure. The new challenge for Washington and Beijing is to find the framework and the personalities to manage the competition and avoid a descent into conflict.

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By Bruce Jones
The year 2018 has proved to be a time of turbulence in U.S.-China relations, with the Korean Peninsula, trade and the South China Sea all making headlines.
But 2018 will prove to be more than just a year of turbulence: We will look back on it as a turning point in U.S.-China relations, the closing of an era of expanding cooperation. That era dates from China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and reached its most expansive phase in the wake of the global financial crisis, under U.S. President Barack Obama. There were even fears in the world of a “G-2,” of a U.S.-China condominium that would leave little room for anybody else. There is little risk of a G-2 now.
But if 2018 was an end of an era, what comes next and how rocky will the transition be?
Asian observers always keenly follow American politics, but never more so than now as they engage in a kind of American Kremlinology to discern how much of the turbulence and how much of the strategic shift in China is being driven by Trump, and how much is a function of wider dynamics. The short answer: The turbulence is Trump, especially on trade; but the deeper shift is structural.
On the American side, we see a course correction, and a “whole of society” revaluation of China. A loss of confidence in China on the part of American business, a backlash against China's human rights record and overseas political behavior, and pushback in strategic affairs characterize the sentiment. Few in the United States would align with every element of Vice President Michael Pence's flame-throwing speech on China, but the wider administration's tougher line on China has widespread support. Only a few voices in the financial and technology industries still advocate deep cooperation.
What's causing all of this? First, the answer lies in the evolution of strategy between Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao. It was likely inevitable as China's economic growth gave it global interests, but the shift in tone under Xi has been marked. It reflects President Xi's ambitions as well as the opportunity caused by the weakness of the West after the global financial crisis. Xi's more assertive strategy includes consolidating control over the military and increasing defense spending; intensifying efforts to militarize the South China Sea; a crackdown internally on dissent; and, abroad, a major uptick in political interference—sometimes using lending through the Belt and Road Initiative for leverage, sometimes using more pernicious measures. Add to this China's tactical coordination with the Russians when Moscow has engaged in what can only be understood as an act of war against the American political system. Trump has been turbulent; Xi has been aggressive, perhaps reckless.
Much of the foundation for this was laid under Hu, but Xi accelerated the timeline and sharpened the edges—and in so doing put paid to residual hopes of China's “peaceful rise.” Whether this ends in a cold war, in outright conflict or in a form of managed competition, is the policy question of our time. Despite the growth of anti-China sentiment coming from the United States, outright bilateral conflict is not preordained. But relations are getting worse, and could rapidly deteriorate further.
The Trump administration's China policy comes in two parts. From the strategic quarter, the effort is to push back on Chinese assertiveness through a framework of “peace through strength”—using American strength to resist Chinese adventurism, but with the medium term objective of returning U.S.-China relations to a stable state. The problem is that the strategy team don't set the terms of engagement on second agenda, the trade and economic issues.
Some of the Trump administration's economic actors are pursuing economic re-nationalization and decoupling from China. Much of their strategy is based on a misunderstanding of ... By Bruce Jones
The year 2018 has proved to be a time of turbulence in U.S.-China relations, with the Korean Peninsula, trade and the South China Sea all making headlines.
But 2018 will prove to be more than just a year of turbulence: We will look ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/north-korea-may-be-willing-to-begin-denuclearization-and-trump-should-make-a-deal/North Korea may be willing to begin denuclearization, and Trump should make a dealhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/590931666/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~North-Korea-may-be-willing-to-begin-denuclearization-and-Trump-should-make-a-deal/
Mon, 07 Jan 2019 14:00:56 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=555925

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By Michael E. O'Hanlon

In his traditional New Year’s Day speech earlier this week, North Korean strongman leader Kim Jong-un has just made an offer that, if serious, could present an opportunity for President Donald Trump to reach a historic breakthrough in the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula and record his greatest foreign-policy accomplishment as president.

Kim’s speech was not all sweetness and light. He warned that his patience is not infinite, and that in the absence of diplomatic progress, his country may resort to more confrontational tactics. Little has happened since the famous Singapore summit back in June between Kim and Trump; we seem no closer to a deal on North Korea’s threatening military capabilities now than we did six months ago. Meanwhile, Kim clearly resents and suffers from the tough international sanctions that the Trump administration has convinced the United Nations to impose these last two years, after North Korea’s big missile and nuclear tests of 2017. The latest statistics show that, despite sanctions evasion in multiple quarters, North Korean trade was down as much as half in 2018 compared to the year before.

But Kim held out an olive branch nonetheless. He seems to want a deal, and seems interested in another summit. He was much more specific than ever before about what he might offer in the course of such a tête-à-tête with Trump. So far, North Korea has only offered to place a moratorium on future nuclear and long-range missile tests, which has been a welcome development, but has only talked vaguely about “denuclearization” and has not stopped making more bombs. Now, apparently, Kim would put nuclear production capability on the table as a bargaining chip.

North Korea experts like Jonathan Pollack and Jung Pak have documented how unlikely Kim would be to give up all his nuclear bombs (U.S. intelligence estimates he has as many as 60 by now). They represent the collective accomplishments of a program that Kim’s grandfather and father prioritized when they led North Korea, so giving up all those bombs quickly would almost seem to dishonor the memory and legacy of his forefathers. And perhaps even more importantly, Kim as well as his generals remember the one cardinal mistake Saddam Hussein, Mohammar Quadhafi, and the Taliban all committed—leaving themselves vulnerable in war against the United States because of the lack of a nuclear deterrent. For Kim to give up the bomb, he would need a great deal of confidence that relations will remain peaceful.

There is an opportunity to compromise, relax

Yet there is still a big opportunity for compromise, if Kim is serious about ending production of more bombs. North Korea could stop expanding its nuclear arsenal, and we could relax, then lift some of the sanctions imposed on North Korea over the years, especially the U.N. sanctions that have really cut into North Korean trade with China and South Korea in the last couple years. The goal of complete denuclearization could await another day.

With this approach, the United States would keep enough sanctions in place to stay true to its principle that North Korea cannot be accepted as a nuclear-weapons state; before being fully welcomed into the community of nations, it will in fact have to honor its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up all its bombs. Yet as a practical matter, that second stage of nuclear talks can wait for a number of months or years. That is ok. The world will be much safer if North Korea stops enlarging and improving its nuclear and long-range missile arsenals that could threaten not only South Korea and Japan (and the almost 300,000 Americans living in those two countries combined), but also eventually North America.

Trump should take what he can get for now

The real challenge is likely to be verification. We know where some, but not all, of North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure is located. As such, international inspectors would have to be allowed to return not only to the Yongbyon location where they have been before, and where North Korea has operated a nuclear reactor to make plutonium as well as centrifuges to enrich uranium. They would also need some degree of free reign to explore other suspicious sites around the country. On the one hand, this would not be an arrangement unique to North Korea; similar provisions are part of the Iran nuclear deal, for example. On the other hand, North Korea has shown extreme nervousness about such inspections in the past.

Another possible problem: John Bolton, Trump’s national security advisor, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo may consider a deal that only freezes, rather than eliminates, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal inadequate for purposes of American and allied security. But they should reassess, or Trump should overrule them.

This compromise deal would go further than the Iran deal, in fact, if North Korea were willing to see its nuclear production facilities dismantled permanently. Yes, Kim would keep his nukes for a while. But he would have powerful economic and military reasons to behave himself. In this case, taking half a loaf is far more realistic than hoping for a complete denuclearization accord that just isn’t in the cards anytime soon. We should immediately engage in serious talks to see just how serious Kim really is about this intriguing and promising offer.

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By Michael E. O'Hanlon
In his traditional New Year’s Day speech earlier this week, North Korean strongman leader Kim Jong-un has just made an offer that, if serious, could present an opportunity for President Donald Trump to reach a historic breakthrough in the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula and record his greatest foreign-policy accomplishment as president.
Kim’s speech was not all sweetness and light. He warned that his patience is not infinite, and that in the absence of diplomatic progress, his country may resort to more confrontational tactics. Little has happened since the famous Singapore summit back in June between Kim and Trump; we seem no closer to a deal on North Korea’s threatening military capabilities now than we did six months ago. Meanwhile, Kim clearly resents and suffers from the tough international sanctions that the Trump administration has convinced the United Nations to impose these last two years, after North Korea’s big missile and nuclear tests of 2017. The latest statistics show that, despite sanctions evasion in multiple quarters, North Korean trade was down as much as half in 2018 compared to the year before.
But Kim held out an olive branch nonetheless. He seems to want a deal, and seems interested in another summit. He was much more specific than ever before about what he might offer in the course of such a tête-à-tête with Trump. So far, North Korea has only offered to place a moratorium on future nuclear and long-range missile tests, which has been a welcome development, but has only talked vaguely about “denuclearization” and has not stopped making more bombs. Now, apparently, Kim would put nuclear production capability on the table as a bargaining chip.
North Korea experts like Jonathan Pollack and Jung Pak have documented how unlikely Kim would be to give up all his nuclear bombs (U.S. intelligence estimates he has as many as 60 by now). They represent the collective accomplishments of a program that Kim’s grandfather and father prioritized when they led North Korea, so giving up all those bombs quickly would almost seem to dishonor the memory and legacy of his forefathers. And perhaps even more importantly, Kim as well as his generals remember the one cardinal mistake Saddam Hussein, Mohammar Quadhafi, and the Taliban all committed—leaving themselves vulnerable in war against the United States because of the lack of a nuclear deterrent. For Kim to give up the bomb, he would need a great deal of confidence that relations will remain peaceful.
There is an opportunity to compromise, relax
Yet there is still a big opportunity for compromise, if Kim is serious about ending production of more bombs. North Korea could stop expanding its nuclear arsenal, and we could relax, then lift some of the sanctions imposed on North Korea over the years, especially the U.N. sanctions that have really cut into North Korean trade with China and South Korea in the last couple years. The goal of complete denuclearization could await another day.
With this approach, the United States would keep enough sanctions in place to stay true to its principle that North Korea cannot be accepted as a nuclear-weapons state; before being fully welcomed into the community of nations, it will in fact have to honor its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up all its bombs. Yet as a practical matter, that second stage of nuclear talks can wait for a number of months or years. That is ok. The world will be much safer if North Korea stops enlarging and improving its nuclear and long-range missile arsenals that could threaten not only South Korea and Japan (and the almost 300,000 Americans living in those two countries ... By Michael E. O'Hanlon
In his traditional New Year’s Day speech earlier this week, North Korean strongman leader Kim Jong-un has just made an offer that, if serious, could present an opportunity for President Donald Trump to reach ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/to-denuclearize-north-korea-trump-should-think-small/To denuclearize North Korea, Trump should think smallhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/590978108/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~To-denuclearize-North-Korea-Trump-should-think-small/
Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:28:04 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=556237