COMMENTARY No. 65

a CANADIAN
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication

INSURGENCY, LEGITIMACY & INTERVENTION IN ALGERIA

January 1996

Unclassified

Editors Note:

Of the many places where Islamic fundamentalism is colliding with its "enemies"
-- the Middle East and certain Gulf states, Afghanistan and even to an extent,
Bosnia -- one of the most volatile is Algeria.

Here the situation takes on more than a religious dimension, given the
December 1991 electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (subsequently
annulled by the ruling military), the number of Algerians who currently reside
in France (800,000), and conversely, the large French community in Algeria
(750,000).

Professor Peter St. John, from the University of Manitoba,
approaches the topic from two directions: first, by providing a brief overview
of the previous, and current, phases of civil unrest; and then by a closer
examination of the efforts to "internationalize" the struggle (and
thereby to invite the international community to participate in its resolution).

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY
series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS
endorsement of the author's views.

Religious fundamentalists are at war with secularists in a struggle which is
decimating Algerian society. Both sides have their supporters outside Algeria,
long-standing economic relationships with Algeria are at stake and already the
conflict's baneful influence has spread to nearby Western Europe. In the years
of fratricidal civil war since 1993, nearly 50,000 Algerians have died, more
than 50 journalists have been murdered, and almost 100 foreigners have been
mutilated and killed.

The prospect of global intervention now looms as France, the United States,
Western Europe and the Arab-Muslim world are being lured like moths by the
progressive internationalization of the conflict.

The first Algerian War (1954-1962) took place in the midst of the Cold War,
triggered at least in part by two significant international influences:
international communism, which carried with it the potential for Soviet, Chinese
and Yugoslav intervention; and a vast movement of decolonization, favouring
indigenous insurgents, which was rapidly liberating the former colonial holdings
of the Western European powers.

By contrast, the present insurgency in Algeria has until now been a civil
war between military, secularist "governing" forces on one hand, and
Islamic fundamentalist insurgents on the other. Although the current insurgency
has threatened to become internationalized (as did its predecessor) since
Islamic militants hijacked Air France Flight 8969 in Algiers in December 1994,
this current conflict is radically different from the first one internally and
internationally. International communism has given way to Islamic
fundamentalism, and the former colonial struggle has been replaced by
ethno-political contention for power throughout the Second and Third Worlds.

The internationalization of the present Algerian insurgency could easily
become the harbinger of future Islamic insurgencies in Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia,
Morocco, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia or even Iraq. Certainly the radical "Governments
of God" in Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan are actively encouraging religious
and political "revolution" in Algeria, knowing full well that a
victory there might bring fundamental change to the rest of the Arab Islamic
world. One can well imagine that a billion Muslims, from Mauritania to the
Philippines, are watching the outcome of this contest with considerable
interest. But the Western nations are also watching Algeria; their interests lie
in stifling the fundamentalist upsurge and protecting important commercial and
trade interests in the region. Should the pressures for intervention prove
overwhelming, Algeria might well become the lightning rod between the Islamic
and Western worlds.

Legitimacy and identity

Over the years Algeria had developed a political culture unused to
accommodating opposing points of view. With no mechanisms for peaceful
evolution, Algeria developed a long tradition of the use of violence to effect
change.

It is quite striking that most Algerians seem opposed to both the military
dictatorship of the government and its replacement with an Islamic dictatorship.
The failure to develop a middle road between these two extremes is, as Claire
Spencer points out, due to "the lack of an inclusive, yet politically
tolerant definition of what it means to be Algerian". The very question of
identity has now been politicized in Algerian society, and the formulation of
future societal goals will have to be based on a recognition of cultural, ethnic
and regional differences requiring a whole new balance of political forces.

The crisis in Algerian identity can be traced to the politicization of the
issue of language. Under French rule, Arabic was suppressed, and by 1962 all the
Algerian élites were French-speaking. Between 1965 and 1978, President
Boumedienne attempted to Arabize education, and partially succeeded. In 1979
there were demonstrations over the lack of jobs for Arab speakers, and French
speakers were characterized as Hizbal Franca (the Party of France). The
Berber population, comprising 15%-20% of Algerians, clung to the French language
as a means to resist Arabization.

Since 1988, the language dispute has become enmeshed in the controversy
between secularists and Islamists, and the Islamist linkage of Arabic with the
values of Islam has denied the Berbers a role in Algeria's future. The Front of
Socialist Forces (FFS) has also been daubed with the brush of Hizbal Franca
and, like the Berbers, is threatened with marginalization in an Islamic state.
An Islamic Arabic Algerian nation appeals to large numbers of Algerians in much
the same way that the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), with
its secular nationalism, appealed to a significant proportion of the populace at
an earlier stage. The obvious problem is that both exclude large and important
sectors of society.

Unfortunately, successive governments in Algeria have consistently failed to
address these fundamental social and cultural issues. The resulting irony is
that a move toward liberalization has had the tragic effect of dividing
Algerians down the middle between secularists and Islamists. The result has been
civil war, a domestic insurgency which has witnessed the death of nearly 50,000
Algerians since 1992, and a rapidly internationalizing conflict which has
prompted the flight of nearly 40,000 productive, middle-class Algerians to
France.

The October riots and their aftermath

The second Algerian insurrection began in Algiers with the October 1988
riots. This spontaneous violence was savagely repressed by the government,
resulting in the death of 500 people at the hands of the security forces. The
riots were a reaction to three factors: hesitant economic reforms initiated by
President Chadli Benjedid (hereafter Chadli), rising youth unemployment and
shattered social and political expectations. At least 75% of the Algerian
population is under 25 years old, many of whom are unemployed. The heavy
dependence on a petrochemical-based economy led to serious national revenue
declines in the 1980s in Algeria, as the world price of oil plummetted. Chadli,
who assumed the presidency in 1979, attempted to work on the economy's
structural problems between 1980 and 1987, and in July of that year launched a
second series of reforms which included the creation of a human rights league.
In December 1988 (just after the October riots), Chadli was elected to a third
term and in early 1989, he initiated a third wave of reform in which he
announced his government's intention to make Algeria "a nation of laws".

These constitutional reforms included separating the FLN from the state,
moving the military out of interference in politics and heading toward
democratization. On 23 February 1989, a new Algerian constitution was passed
with a 92% majority and included the right to form political parties. Soon,
dozens emerged.

Islamic Salvation Front

Meanwhile, in February 1989 an Islamist movement which came to be known as
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had been created. Anticipating, or perhaps
reacting to the deteriorating economic and social conditions, the FIS created a
network of small, informal groups (endemic mosques, in fact) which grew rapidly,
somehow escaping government control from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In
September 1989, the FIS filed for legal recognition and was certified as a
political party. Such status had been previously denied confessional political
parties in both Morocco and Tunisia.

The attempt at democratic elections

Early in 1990, the army announced it would formally withdraw from politics,
and Algeria under President Chadli seemed poised to be the first Arab country to
achieve a formal multi-party democratic system. In the spring, there were
marches and political rallies everywhere, and even former president Ben Bella
returned from exile in France to campaign on behalf of democracy. Municipal
elections took place in June 1990, resulting in a massive victory for the FIS,
which won control of 850 of 1,500 municipalities in the country, with 54% of the
popular vote to 28% for the incumbent FLN. Although 35% of the electorate
boycotted the elections, this completely unexpected showing by the FIS indicated
that people were tired of the old order, desperately sought change and were
therefore partial to the Islamist message. (There had been small indicators of
this popular inclination toward the FIS. Following an earthquake in November
1989, the FIS had supplied food and help to the victims long before the
government did.)

President Chadli gave no indication of dismay at these results, though he
and the government were undoubtedly taken by surprise. In July 1990, he duly
authorized major elections for the national parliament, to be held in the first
three months of 1991. In March 1991, through a major exercise in gerrymandering,
the government expanded Algeria's parliament from 295 seats to 542, potentially
favouring the FLN. Outraged by this blatant manipulation of the electoral
process, the FIS called for a general strike. As violence escalated, Chadli
called in the army and imposed martial law for the second time in three years,
and postponed the elections.

In response, the leader of the FIS threatened jihad against the
army, a response which could be seen as a declaration of war against the state.
On 30 June the army arrested Abassi al Madani and his second-in-command, Ahmed
Belhadj, on charges of conspiracy against the state. Almost 700 Islamists were
taken into custody, raising the number of FIS members imprisoned to 3,000 by 1
July.

Despite the apparent chaos within the country, Algerians went to the polls
on 26 December 1991 to vote in their first multi-party democratic election. The
results were a considerable shock to the ruling élites, who were
expecting a divided vote in favour of the FLN. Instead, in the first run-off,
the FIS won 231 of 430 seats; the FLN won a mere 15 seats and the FFS (Socialist
Front), came second with 25 seats. The second round of the elections was to be
held on 16 January 1992, when the remaining seats would be filled.

The FIS was ecstatic at what seemed to be a clear-cut victory, and Chadli,
it seems in retrospect, assumed he could preside over an Islamist government.
The military, thoroughly alarmed, thought differently, and on 9 January 1992,
the army resumed its historic role as the main determinant of Algerian politics.
The generals forced Chadli to resign and replaced the presidency with a
five-member High Council of State. Acting illegally in this way, the army was as
culpable as the FIS was with its provocations of violence. The generals also
cancelled the remaining elections due in a few days time and imposed a
nation-wide state of emergency.

Throughout this period of extraordinary conflict, the FIS and its radical
affiliates worked steadily to internationalize Algeria's domestic situation.
Their plan was to provoke intervention in Algeria against what they considered
to be an illegitimate government. They were counting on the intervention of
established Islamist governments in Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.
But intervention was also sought from France, the European Community, the United
States and anyone else ready to aid the Government of God in its legitimate
electoral victory.

As both sides in the civil war soon discovered, the use of naked force by
one sector of society against another was not going to win the war. As a result,
the government and the Islamists both began to orchestrate whatever
international support they could muster. Little did they suspect that this
strategy, previously successfully used by the FLN, might this time boomerang.

Five strategies for internationalization

The Islamists used five strategies to internationalize the war. The
first occurred in August 1992, when a bomb exploded in Algiers international
airport, causing immense damage and killing nine people. The message was that
international travellers were not welcome in Algeria. The FIS was immediately
blamed, and Algerians began seriously to examine its proposed political program.
That program included introduction of the sharia, or religious law -- cutting
off the right hand for stealing, stoning for adultery, a complete ban on alcohol
and the enforced wearing of the hijab or veil -- as the law of the land. The FIS
also made its theology perfectly clear: God cannot be subordinated to democracy,
nor can His laws be nullified through parliamentary debate and legislation. For
the worldly inhabitants of Algiers, this was akin to stepping back into the Dark
Ages, and resistance to the Islamist message began to emerge.

The second strategy used to internationalize the war began in May
1993 when the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began targeting journalists, both
foreign and local, for execution. The GIA spokesperson announced that "those
who fight by the pen shall die by the sword". By the end of 1995, almost 50
journalists had been brutally slain, proving this was no idle threat, and
shutting down all national and international discussion of the Algerian
situation.

The third strategy emerged in August 1993 with the kidnapping of
three French consular officials. The last of these, released after a week,
brought with him a scrawled message which stated, "Foreigners, leave the
country. We give you one month." By mid-December, 23 foreigners were dead.
Clearly this new tactic was both a provocation and a warning to Algeria's aid
and trade partners, and a reaction from France was not long in coming. Charles
Pasqua, French Minister of the Interior, cracked down hard in France in late
November, arresting 88 people with known connections to the FIS. With four
million Muslims in France, 800,000 of them Algerians, and a French community of
75,000 in Algeria, both countries could bring considerable pressure to bear on
each other. By December 1995, 100 foreigners had died in Algeria, many of them
French; none American.

The fourth tactic was the GIA hijack on 26 December 1994, the second
anniversary of the invalidated national election. As the incident progressed, 3
passengers were murdered, 63 were freed, and finally in Marseilles the French
Special Forces ended the incident by killing all 4 Algerian hijackers. Although
170 passengers were rescued, the hijacking greatly internationalized the war.
There was also international revulsion at the strong evidence that the hijackers
had intended to explode the plane over Paris, and at clear indications of Iran's
involvement.

The fifth strategy, aimed at bringing home the reality of the
Algerian war to ordinary French citizens, began in the Paris Metro on 25 July
1995. A bomb exploded killing 7 and wounding 17, the first of a series of
disruptive bombings which by October had wounded 150 people. Ultimately, the
bombings appeared to be aimed at separating the French government from its
support for its Algerian counterpart.

Writing for Time magazine, Lara Marlowe interviewed a young Islamist
in Algeria, who stated that if Western governments ended their support for the
Algerian régime, it would collapse in two weeks. Perhaps this comment
struck at the heart of the matter, since French pilots, advisers and money were
pouring steadily into Algeria.

Internationalization had also divided the French Cabinet, since Interior
Minister Pasqua was hardline but Foreign Minister Alain Juppe was conciliatory.
Finally, as a result of these developments, there was also growing concern in
Europe that the Islamists might radicalize the other states of the Maghreb,
Morocco and Tunisia.

Intervention and negotiation

The purpose of internationalization is to force international intervention
in a civil war. However, internationalization may not necessarily favour the
initiating party -- the insurgents; it can also favour the incumbents. The
important point is that intervention almost inevitably leads to negotiation,
because the international community demands it. This is the position in which
the Algerian imbroglio now finds itself.

When Prime Minister Zeroual became president in early 1994, he announced he
was prepared for political dialogue with all factions, including Islamists, if
they would renounce the use of violence. He had in fact already held secret
talks with the imprisoned leaders Belhadj and al Madani. Now, in the late
summer, he placed them under house arrest, enabling contact with political
associates and creating a moment of hope for political compromise.
Unfortunately, the extremists on both sides closed down this first attempt at
negotiation, as the eradicators faced off against the GIA in a flurry of
destructive violence.

In the following months, the régime launched a harsh offensive
against the Islamists, who in turn retaliated with car bombs and more
assassinations of intellectuals, women and policemen. Neither side seemed
capable of winning the bloody stalemate.

The National Contract

Therefore, in mid-January a second step was taken in the direction of
negotiation and compromise. Responding to a call by Algerian politicians for an
end to the killing, a Roman Catholic group in Rome, called Sant 'Egidio,
convened a meeting of Algerian opposition leaders. For the first time, the GIA
expressed an interest in negotiating, and the FIS sent two leaders in exile to
Rome to join members of the FLN and the FFS. After a week of talks, an agreement
emerged in a remarkably far-sighted document called the National Contract. The
agreement set seven conditions for the opening of talks, including the release
of jailed Islamic leaders, the creation of a transitional administration and the
lifting of a three-year state of emergency. It condemned violence, called for
respect for the 1989 constitution and supported the idea of multi-party
democracy. It also appealed for respect for legality, human rights and minority
rights. The alternation of political power would hold out the vision of a
pluralistic civil society to secularists and Islamists, Arabs and Berbers, and
those on the left and the right.

Unfortunately, the Algerian government quickly denounced the Sant 'Egidio
agreement as interference in its internal affairs, and to counter its appeal,
announced a presidential election for November 1995.

Intense violence resumed in Algeria, initiated in late January by the
explosion of a huge car bomb near the police headquarters, which killed 38 and
wounded 256. It was apparent that the threshold of a "hurting stalemate"
had not yet been reached.

With four million of Europe's ten million Muslims, and a 165-year
relationship with Algeria, France was the nation most directly engaged in the
Algerian insurgency. Yet even after three generations of Algerians had lived in
France, Islam was not well understood. In addition, the daily flood of refugees
from Algeria was heightening fears of terrorism in France. Throughout 1994,
there was a profound lack of sympathy for the Islamic fundamentalists, but by
the fall of 1995, the French body politic had grown increasingly uncomfortable
with the idea of supporting a corrupt, repressive military junta in Algiers, out
of touch with people and interested only in hanging on to power. Also by the
fall, France's conservative government had shifted from strong support for the
generals to a more even-handed approach, with emphasis on the need for
negotiation. This strategy is frequently the precursor of a mediatory role, and
France was positioning itself for a negotiated settlement.

In the United States, President Clinton announced in May 1994, "Islam
is not the issue; our foe is oppression and extremism". In other words, the
USA was contemplating reaching out to Muslim régimes which emerged
through peaceful means. By 1995, both Washington and Paris had arrived at fairly
similar assessments of the situation in Algeria. Both supported the Sant 'Egidio
process, as did Germany, but this promising avenue was closed when the
presidential elections were announced for November.

It was therefore not surprising that the third, fourth and fifth attempts at
initiating negotiations were regional and European in origin. The Sant 'Egidio
declaration appealed to the international community as a whole, and a summer of
bombings in France accelerated that country's acceptance of allied involvement.
In June 1994, with the situation in Algeria much in mind, the European Council
agreed to augment its efforts toward peace, stability and the socio-economic
development of the 12 nations of the Mediterranean region. This led, in December
1994, to the European Union increasing its economic assistance to the region to
5.5 billion (ECU) over five years, which compared favourably with 7.5 billion
for Eastern Europe.

Later, at the Naples meeting of the G7 countries, a communiqué
affirmed the Mediterranean region as an area of common concern. This
announcement clearly also had Algeria in mind. Finally, in October 1995 in
Barcelona, NATO began a Mediterranean initiative designed to promote dialogue
between nations to the north and south of the sea. Algeria's small nuclear
program, developed with Chinese assistance, was within easy missile range of
Western Europe, thus making it a NATO security concern.

Conclusions

Democratization as a solution

Of all the countries of Arab Islam, Algeria seemed to have the most assets
for a successful transition into the modern, politically pluralistic world. But
the polyglot, tolerant, cosmopolitan Algeria loved by the poets and
intellectuals simply did not take root at independence. The vision of the
leaders of modern Algeria was not the creation of a national identity, which
would integrate the interests of Arabs, Berbers, French, Jews, Spaniards, Turks
and Italians. Rather it was a continuum of confrontation among clans and
factions, a dreary brew of ideologists, socialists, Third Worldists and pan-Arab
nationalists. The bankruptcy of this formula became apparent after the October
riots in 1988.

It is ironic and really quite surprising that a severe economic downturn in
an authoritarian régime of dubious legitimacy should result in a
leadership response of liberalization, pointing in the direction of
democratization. Yet this is exactly what happened after the October riots. The
door to democratization swung open. That the country was not equal to the
challenge may say more about Algeria's past than its future.

So what is democratization and does it stand a chance in Algeria? Professor
J.P. Entelis of Fordham University believes that Algeria, alone among the Arab
states, has made a serious commitment to political pluralism. It consisted of
the lessening of authoritarian control and the enlarging of political space by
making room for social movements and civic groups to organize and advance their
interests. But if democratization is to work, the political culture of democracy
must be present. According to Entelis, this culture entails a belief in the
legitimacy of democracy; tolerance for opposing beliefs and preferences; a
willingness to compromise with political opponents; some minimum level of trust
among political competitors; civility of political discourse and a willingness
to participate in politics.

It is apparent that under the present conditions of civil war, any
possibility of democratization is in complete abeyance. But that does not mean
that the elements of a democratic political culture are absent from Algeria
either. The long-term effect of French politics has had a deep impact on the
Algerian psyche, and the democratic experiment very nearly succeeded in 1991-92.
Chadli was arguably correct in moving toward democratization, but the panicky
reaction of the army and its brutal intervention led to the present violence.

Democratization is not the same as democracy, but it does establish the
precedents for a self-administering, self-perpetuating and orderly government.
With international support and encouragement, Algeria could still develop a
credible democratic system.

SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

There are four possible scenarios for Algeria: Islamic government; a
return to authoritarianism; democratization; or protracted civil war. During
the last three years, the Islamists have become so vicious, destructive,
splintered and out of control that it is unlikely Algerians or the international
community would allow them to govern. It is one thing to be unfairly robbed of
an electoral victory; it is quite another to participate eagerly in the death of
50,000 countrymen for the sake of religious principle. Islamic fundamentalism
has been badly, perhaps irretrievably, discredited in Algeria.

But by the same token, government authoritarianism has run its course and is
no longer a viable option for a majority of Algerians. The régime is
tolerated only because the Islamists are perceived as an even worse alternative.
A 60% vote in favour of President Zeroual in the election on 16 November 1995
was a vote not to continue army rule, but to support a move toward democracy.
Since 75% of the electorate voted in the face of Islamic fundamentalist threats
that the ballot boxes would become their coffins, it appears a democratic
culture may well be alive and thriving. More than 90 observers from the Arab
League, the Organization of African Unity and the UN were satisfied with the
voting process, in Algiers at least.

So if a Lebanon-style disintegration is to be avoided, Algerians must be
prepared to swallow their legendary pride and accept long-term international,
reconstructive intervention, which may come from one or more institutions of
Europe, NATO and the United Nations. Compromise will come in Algeria when both
sides believe they have more to lose than to gain from fighting. It is at this
moment that intervention must make the peace, rather than just preside over it.
As Richard K. Betts has pointed out: "To make peace is to decide who rules.
Making peace means determining how the war ends."

The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by
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