This article identifies a foundation for Confucian democratic political thought in Confucian thought. Each of the three aspects emphasized is controversial, but supported by views held within the historical debates and development of Confucian political thought and practice. This democratic interpretation of Confucian political thought leads to (1) an expectation that all people are capable of ren and therefore potentially virtuous contributors to political life; (2) an expectation that the institutions of political, social, and economic life function so as to (...) develop the virtue of being a perfected human being; and (3) an expectation that there be public spacefor political criticism and for ongoing contestation over the duties and behaviors of individual leaders and citizens and over the functioning of the institutions that am to cultivate their behavior. (shrink)

Dasan J eong Yagyong (1762–1836) is regarded in South Korea today as one of pre-modern Korea’s best philosophers. This article examines one of the reasons he is so respected. He modified traditional Korean Confucian moral philosophy to include notions of human nature as desires rather than innate virtue, the importance of free will rather than mere determination, and the existence of a Lord Above as a necessary incentive to proper behavior. Though he supported these changes to traditional Korean Confucian philosophy (...) with references to the Classics and his own personal moral experience, observers have noticed the possibility of Western influence on his thinking. He is thus hailed by Koreans as a cross-cultural philosopher, an example of how Koreans can borrow from the West while nonetheless remaining authentically Korean. (shrink)

While self-interest is depreciated in Confucian ethics the processes of family relations in traditional China are animated by the self-interested actions of family members. The paper outlines the Confucian ideology of filial piety which is commensurate with the governance of family life organized hierarchically and through the senior male's management of the joint-family's collective property. The structure, operations and principles of membership in traditional Chinese families are indicated, highlighting the tensions within them between consanguinity and conjugality and their material bases. (...) The differential operation of self-interested actions by husbands and wives is also presented. A non-Confucian model of the relational-self is outlined in which both the collective context of Chinese families and the self-interested actions of individual family members within them is explicated. (shrink)

The biblical text Leviticus and the Confucian Analects might appear as neither an obvious nor a very promising choice for a comparative philosophical exercise. To be sure, both texts now and then do share some similarity in matter. But such similarity in matter upon closer examination and contextualisation frequently turns out to be undermined by overt differences which call into question the comparative effort. Our comparison therefore proceeds from a different angle and is motivated by an asserted similarity in rhetoric, (...) by which we mean to claim no more than that both texts record situations in which someone speaks to someone else. Moreover, there is a dominant speaker in each text, the Lord and the Master respectively, whose words seem to carry authority. What kind of authority is concerned in each case it is the aim of this paper to investigate. We do so by first giving an account of what philological and historical research tells us about these texts in order to better understand the task and complexities with which translators were and still are grappling when bringing these texts into the English language. Our main concern then is with a philosophical investigation into the rhetorics of authority as it presents itself to us in standard and influential English translations of Leviticus and the Analects. In the end, we offer some salient comparisons of the two texts as they appear to each author of this article. This will allow the comparison to arise in the eyes of our readers, whose sight quite naturally will be different from ours. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that the concept of individualism was absent in early China. In this uncommon study of the self and human agency in ancient China, Erica Fox Brindley provides an important corrective to this view and persuasively argues that an idea of individualism can be applied to the study of early Chinese thought and politics with intriguing results. She introduces the development of ideological and religious beliefs that link universal, cosmic authority to the individual in ways that may (...) be referred to as individualistic and illustrates how these evolved alongside and potentially helped contribute to larger sociopolitical changes of the time, such as the centralization of political authority and the growth in the social mobility of the educated elite class. Starting with the writings of the early Mohists (fourth century BCE), Brindley analyzes many of the major works through the early second century BCE by Laozi, Mencius, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi, as well as anonymous authors of both received and excavated texts. Changing notions of human agency affected prevailing attitudes toward the self as individual—in particular, the onset of ideals that stressed the power and authority of the individual, either as a conformist agent in relation to a larger whole or as an individualistic agent endowed with inalienable cosmic powers and authorities. She goes on to show how distinctly internal (individualistic), external (institutionalized), or mixed (syncretic) approaches to self-cultivation and state control emerged in response to such ideals. In her exploration of the nature of early Chinese individualism and the various theories for and against it, she reveals the ways in which authors innovatively adapted new theories on individual power to the needs of the burgeoning imperial state. -/- With clarity and force, Individualism in Early China illuminates the importance of the individual in Chinese culture. By focusing on what is unique about early Chinese thinking on this topic, it gives readers a means of understanding particular "Chinese" discussions of and respect for the self. (shrink)

The concept of rectifying names [cheng-ming] is a familiar one in the Confucian Analects. It occupies an important, if not central, position in the political philosophy of Confucius. Since, according to Confucius, the rectification of names is the basis of the establishment of social harmony and political order, one might suspect that later political theories of Confucian-ists should be traced back to the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names. It need not be added that the theory of rectifying names, as developed (...) by Hsün Tzu in the third century B. C., served the double purpose of strengthening his political doctrine of government on the one hand and repudiating doctrines of names on the other. (shrink)

Reconstructing the content of Xunzi’s (荀子) moral knowledge is the main goal of this thesis. A first main task of this reconstruction is to provide a clarification of the content and functions of li. A second primary goal of the reconstruction is to discuss the roles and functions of the moral sage or morally superior person, junzi (君子), in Xunzi’s account of moral practice. The figure of the sage is important in explaining the rationale of li and exemplifying how to (...) behave in accordance with the rules of proper conduct in different situations. As truth is essential to knowledge, it is crucial to understand how moral belief can be truth-apt within Xunzian theory. To that end, the thesis reinterprets the doctrine in terms of Railton’s subjective naturalism. In the literature on Xunzi’s moral thought, the problem of the cognitive status of moral judgment has been neglected, and this thesis attempts to remedy this oversight. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one mainly elucidates the content of Xunzi’s moral knowledge. It includes an exposition of the origin and several functions of li and the significance of the sage and his or her close relation with li. In part two, the argument focuses on whether Xunzi’s moral knowledge is truth-apt and reconstructs his position into terms of subjective naturalism. (shrink)

The absence in the Analects of explicit statements on and detailed discussions of the nature of things including human nature is obvious enough that readers would need no prompting by Zigong, one of Confucius' disciples, to be made aware of it, given that the word appears in the text only twice, one of these being Zigong's reminder that the Master's view on xing cannot be heard.1 On the other hand, the notion of xing attracted considerable attention in the Warring States (...) period, as seen in the extant works of Mencius and Xunzi, as well as in newly discovered texts. This apparent gap in intellectual deliberations on xing could have been a gradual evolution; its ideological trajectory could be traced to nascent concepts in the Analects. Starting with the analogy in the Analects of unpolished jade, this paper shows that xing contains both morally desirable and undesirable elements that need to undergo the process of grinding and polishing in order to bring out their inherent beauty. Drawing on the Confucian discourse, particularly in the contexts of self-cultivation, I will retrace impressions of it in the Analects and unveil the sub-texts of Confucius' conception of xing, arguing that native quality and cultural refinement are complementary and that together they complete the moral transformation of human development. (shrink)

In personal relationships, we conceive of the related person as an individual who is more than a combination of qualities, a bearer of claims or a role-occupant. She is envisaged as a distinct and irreplaceable particular. We have immediate concerns for her that are not mediated by consideration of principles such as the promotion of welfare or the fulfillment of duty. The aim of my dissertation is to analyze and defend this particularistic concern and show how it is anchored in (...) what I call an engaged perspective. Recent critics of Kantianism and utilitarianism claim that these theories endorse only an objective or impersonal perspective, which ignores the particularity of individuals. I contrast this with an engaged perspective which I explicate by building on insights embodied in the Confucian account of role-ethics in the period 550 B.C.-290 B.C. I argue that although Confucian ethics has been rightly interpreted to stress the way in which social role mediates between relationships, nonetheless its ideal concerns socially-mediated relations of love between individuals. ;I first examine the cardinal Confucian virtue of jen, or loving, and other role virtues such as filial piety, and show how they help create connectedness and mutuality. People are connected when they share their emotional world and care for each other. And they share an exclusive mutuality when they generate a unique history of reciprocation and participate in the common good of their relationship. In addition, particularity functions as a structural factor to govern the caring, reciprocity, and emotions of love. Consequently, an engaged agent considers her beloved and the relationship she is engaged in as irreplaceable particulars. The engaged perspective is a distinctive "we" perspective arising from the awareness of such connectedness and mutuality. I also contrast the engaged perspective with the personal perspective. ;Finally, I analyze the motivational structure of a Confucian agent by examining the influence of propriety, emotions, thinking and will on Confucian agency. This confirms my analysis of the engaged perspective and further informs us about the type of agency required in engagement. (shrink)