PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL WITH THE SOVIET BLOC-THE ARMS DE

Created: 10/12/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5

. L

KATIONAL IitJltXOEICB T-IMATE NUMBER

frobahleOF the KFrfTIAN abb deal vith the soviet bloc

(Advance Copy)

Subidttcd by the

DllEtTCttUmUX IrrTtaXIQbrXB

The follwlne lntelllynco orcnr.lintionsIn the pivimotloo of this tttlnctei Tl* Ccutrel Xntellljrnosy Btaa the inlelldrjetice orpwlicUNv* of the Dc>nrtxftts of State, the Amy, the Novy, tho Air Force, and The Joirt Staff.

To estimate. In the lljjht of the recent Egyptian orre deal with the Eovlct Bloc: (n) the likelihood of Israeli orhostilities ossuulnG no chnngo In present US policy;he effect of certain possible US courses of action on the situation; end (c) tbe outlook for Soviet exploitation of this and possible slnilor deals with other Arab states.

caicLusias

A. The Soviet -Egyptian ares deal hoa subetont lolly lncruoeed the risk tl>nt Iarael willpreventiveuch Israeli notion ie not lively within the next few weeks. The Israelis will probably

(

VSY SKKW

vith to ecterolL* core precisely the manltua> of the threat paced by Soviet Woe uilllDfpienea the Arabrt, to exploit the fovcmhle trend of VeeUtn puhllc opinion, and,portnntly, to dctcntlnc how for lamel cm roelistlc.-illy depend on Moslem and porticuJn.-ly US support in mintninlcg ita territorial Integrity. In tho eboenee of convincing evidence of western dcteniinntloo to preserve the territorinl ctatun quo, there is very roo)thot Israel viU ucderV-rie "preventiveooolbly In the next fevnd It vould alcost certainly be mre wlllin3 to tckc risks wbleh could touchew round of hostilities. An Israelivnr" noy itoxt infom of border mlds whore responsibilities end Intentions my initially bo obscure. a)

Al. If It becoue uisiistohobly cloarth sides thatS was prepared to uee ony doccs necessary. Including nlUtnry force, tocosica, itertain that no "second round" vculd devclcy. However, if the US declined to rpioxontee the territorialoev and noru directn that contained In the Tripartite Declaration, It would be extra jely difficult to cctor Israeli prewntlv* actlrn, sl.icc neither tho Irrnall* nor tho Arabs would be likely to believe thatUS would in fact intervene effectively nfrnlnot lamcl. (Porn. 9)

relatively narrcnr Hilts of its potential resources, to procure arra elsodtcro if they are not available free the US. Israel is aluost certainly c he possibilities ofolutions. Primo iiint&ter-deBlgnnto Den Gurion boa) previouslythat Isn-clorcible ncasureo If necessary to end thelockade of the oca route to "vleth on the Gulf of The Israeli General Staff, whichsoulelon of th* ^pyntinns "roo theeTa, is probably, pressing for ot lo.-at lied, tod territorial advances for tho jfurooaea of elirjnrtlnf. trouble apote and otherwise lnprovlng Tsrrol't position at tactically vulnerable plocca alone, tho border. 'loroover, eonsidiT-ation is prob>My beingo tho nerlts of *uar" while Israol stillecisive rdlit'-ry cfUe.

SrXd3

TO* SECrET

5- Tho Soviot-Kcyptioii nruo deal has substantially increased the risk tint Israel vlllpreventive war." It le unlikely, hvvcvrr, that Iaraol vinitiate such action in the next few weeks. i coirdttlnc the^flelvco to an outright var policy, the Isroolia vlll probably wleb to deUmlnc Don precisely tho mjiltudo of the thrcct posed by Soviet Bloc vilMnanese to orti to Arobe, to exploit the fDvorablo trend of Western public crlnlcc, end, nore Irn-ortontly, toJIW hcv fax Israel con rccllstlcolly dcpoM oo Western and particularly US support In ixvliitnlninc its territorial intofprlty.

6. Particularly if the prosjects of USWestern ccur.teroctloa In curbing Incidents ore uncertain, we believe that Israel, Ineseut ;ood, will olroet certainly be noro disposed tlnn before the oris deal to take chances In executluc of ito octivlot policies.ove ni^Jit touchew round of large-scale hostilities, whether by dcaljD ox otherwise. Israel's proponed ncvu to force the Gulf of Aanba cdfiht provetepping; stone to wor, aslee on Joracll novo to Intercept oms shlprxrnto tc Ecypt orioa of the work to dlvort the Jordco voters in the derjlli tar lied tone at Jlsr Banal Yocub on the Syrlcn border. ShcuM Icracl find Itself enoOGOCl in mjor clashed with one cf the Arab states it would probably be inerufuiincly disposed to teJbi ndvontay: of the situation to scire the troubled oxen or otherwise itiprove Its tactical position. Should

TOP SECFEf

(

TO? BZOMI

the iiitorveirtlou of other Arcu otateo apjeor to be In the atCtDQ It woulA probably otteiipt to aiito the initiative ourt Inoingonors1 conflict inevitable*

Co. Hcrcover, In the cl-iet.ro of ouvlnelnc eviderxc cf Western deterviintJor. to preecive the territorial status quo, there lo very real danger that Iareel will undertake preventive vaxf ocslbly within the lext few ler.tha. *te Egyptian orwi deal, jcrtlcul-nrly if followed uplrllnx deol with Syria, thrvatcuo Ifjoel with an cino race which it cannot afford to sustain with its own resources nrJ which ultitntolyo leave it Insapable of dcfci>:inn itcelf effectively. Ucleeo Israel obtnlrji ccur.ter-vailUvj irnsew ond nore direct OS pledge of proeut ind effective'nllltary intervention to preserve tho tcrritori.il atetua quo thom io new provided in the Tripartitet is likely to conclude that war offers the orly way cut. Under euch clrcuosrtnr.eereel it oloc likely to play flowu the poeol-billty of effectivel-rtorventiooreventive wrr by lejwhich the latter would portrayefensive reactto Arab ecerosoion ioaplredod by tie Soviet Unior. and which was accerinaiiied by offer* toiru jee.ee. >ui Israelimay start In tho form of border ralda Wiere reaponaibilitiOB aid Intentions Hay Initially be obscure.

Kegov cute Egypt off free land coo utlcottca with tho othor Arab states, it hue do territorial onbitlons of its own in Israel, will probablyealthy respect for Isroall ccnbnt cffcctlvvoer.', onddespite its otter-pts to free itself frai dependence on tho West will probably renaln fearful ofsanctions. ASGurrincyyt bel lores itself ip-catly strer^thencd by Soviet ana ond support, it .Tlcht be teppted to mke vor ou letteleano of soliiifinc Its lcodcrehlp in the Arab world. While* the deterrents ix-atloned ore likely to prevent such action, at least in the near future, Bcypt willertainly do Its boat to iryivss tltc Israelis with its will end ability to defend its interests and my therefore cod up with fully os eujQnMlVO and octolicy oo that new btlQQ lursucd by Israel.

CuTsegucnecstrer-2tbardnrj of US Policy Re*prdlnd IntcrverAlcc_

9. If It becone itsustokably clear to both sides that the US was prepared to use any neons necessary, including nilltary force, to halt OiKroeeion, it is olrnst certain that uo "secocd round* would develop. However if the U3 declinedyarantes the territorlol Ltntus quo Inev cod core diroet plcd^ than that contained la the Tripartite Declarationt would be extreocly difficult to deter Israeli preventive action since neither the ievoelic nor tbe Arabs would be likely to believe that the US wuld in fact intervene effectively nrjaliiet Israel.

11, If oacaeseivo lorooll eetlon eh&uld lead ii; the near futuroaecoiiln vblcb the US otoed nolo oirt let oeveliiiier.ts take their ccurce, oil too Archtater, would olirjst certainlyinvolved, and on Isrcell victory would nlnceto Inly be the outcoiw. Ajiioet Arablone, we octlwto that Iereol could now seize oil of Arab-controlled Palestine, portiora of Eiryptldn, Cyrion, and 'irtinneso, territoryto Jcruel, and ooue Joruooiaa territory cost of the Jordan River. Israel would probably have to reckor with UN ictorvoution. Bowevwr, tho is'sot ijjpartont Ifxdtntioiin to IcraeU's ability to cccsoliocto these rplo* would be its cam lack of reserve

TOT SECliET

suppliestl* jsrobobillty that tl*euae of Its special treaty dbUfssUCMj would feel cm-pelled tc iLterveie, ot least vith olr ond rovol forces, if Jordanroded. yt'c capabilities would be -suhato-rt lolly lir,iroved If Jttuoll cnyloy Soviet Dloc nillt/iry persomeX In ueinj; its new wecp'.nfl efjalatt Israel. Dowevcr, it cpyxtra unlikely that the USSR, under pre oo it circu-wto nces, would be wllliryj to accept the rioks of hostilities with tbe West whichove would Involve. efeot of tlo Arabs would probably bo followederiod cf Clsunler in ore or :urc of the Arabondition which tho USSS would alnast certainly ctu-.pt to exploit.

A "Linda off" policy or. the part of the US would have ad extreroly ndverM effect OH Its position in the Arabut would retard US efforts to buildMiddle Knst dcfciae.

Theeal vith Ej-ypt rcpieeerrto the Dost drarntle uovooviet Minpeityj In tha Midola East which has beer,for lan tine. jor objective of this cat-roty. is ali.net certoicly to stiffen Arab resiuterce to Western pollclos In the

ha cVvpiitofic of bolnc tho only algniflcatit aourco of ot)'* for tho Arab atotea; ond (c) by invidious cccnxuriaouo in /xeb winds between tho ejectocuinrnd eoay torus of Soviet aid prcrlaedyyt, end the relative handful of inter lei which Iraq, hae been receivlnr;sSfJWr lastondlrvj of the "northaro tier" group trf lartl ..

Turkey, Iraq, the UK, ond roklaten ere now ranters of thla pact.

-TOP SR24KX

Ik. In addltloc to Ita ueefulnesa in underidrJog Ucatcrr. dafenoe off carta In tha area, tho USSR probably reouds the ciusfeutrollat tepdenclea, and other Arab atates, if only by veekenliis their dei*ndenco or. the Vest aid increeelnglrdna pever. deelelon to

CO. Apart frcn the ii proved proepeeto for locol Ccau-ioU ond the eitcouifiirrent to reutrolier; In the Kiddle East arising frou tho Soviet-ficyptlan ana deal, it Is roeolbla that tho USSR ron In vlev the develotuat of furtherd difficulties U 'he Kiddle East. avjcnicii.eeeftlet 11 '. ln Syria, for euqpeAj would probably brine heavy ^ressuroe on tho US ond UK fron Turkey cnl Irao, to poruit lr.terver.tloc In Syria before the situation be core -irretrievable. Thteonfront the Vcot with tltc choice tl* eithererious lucrraso larab taniOBO or in-neriallli^ tlio XVuibdad Fact otructure. Pur^ierocre, the ovatly lccivotod Oenjer of one xoceo aid anjed couflleteroa resultingthe deal lo likely both to set CM part ofob world OGPi'iot the other cud th* Arch worldrot Israel. The fact that these basic eleavnoe* la effectt crmo-purpooeo to each other lo likelyo odd to theo the prooi^etenl deterlcrotion that vMlA probablyer zuch3 run advor.ta^en to international Coriirtiau tMR would the pursuithe Arab etateo of reutrallot policies. It is poeelble that the USSR will atteurt both to exploitrit of Oenevo" and to disrupt tha Western pooltlon in the Kiddle Boot byfericj concellatton of tho Ecwtiao arus deal la return for US withdrawalhe Dhohran baee and the abaiirtoiiDcnt of British nlUtcry orroruyAfi-nte with Jordan cud Xraq. The USSR nlnht olnoto'iotioc of the Arab-Israeli situationuodrlpcr-