Auscape International v. National Geographic Society

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lewis A. Kaplan, District Judge

OPINION

Freelance photographers and writers who created images or wrote text that appeared in the National Geographic Magazine (the " Magazine ") bring this action against the National Geographic Society ("NGS") and a number of its licensees, including ProQuest Information and Learning Company and ProQuest Company (collectively, the "ProQuest Defendants"). Plaintiffs claim that reproduction of their works as parts of CD-ROM collections of images of past issues of the Magazine violates their rights under the Copyright Act of 1976,*fn1 the Lanham Act,*fn2 and state statutory and common law.

In Auscape International v. National Geographic Society (" Auscape I ")*fn3 this Court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' copyright infringement claims, to the extent they were based upon the electronic and microform reproductions of plaintiffs' works,*fn4 and their Lanham Act claims. The Court denied dispositive motions by both sides with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice to renewal following appellate review of the copyright issue in a parallel case, Faulkner v. National Geographic Society (" Faulkner II ").*fn5 The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed Faulkner II 's holding that defendants' CD-ROM archives of digital images of the Magazine, known as The Complete National Geographic (the "CNG"), were "revisions" of the print publications within the meaning of Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976*fn6 and therefore did not infringe any copyrights held by freelance photographers and writers whose works first were published, with their consent, in the Magazine*fn7.

The parties now renew their motions for summary judgment as to the state law claims.*fn8 Plaintiffs assert three state law claims against NGS alone: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) conversion. They assert six state law claims against all defendants: (1) unfair competition, (2) unfair trade practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) involuntary trust pursuant to California Civil Code §2224, (5) commercial misappropriation in violation of the common law right of privacy, and (6) violation of the right of publicity under California Civil Code §§ 3344 and 3344.1.

Facts

Much of the background is set forth in Auscape I and Faulkner II, familiarity with which is assumed. A few words are necessary, however, about the agreements NGS signed with plaintiffs.

Twenty plaintiffs remain in this case,*fn9 some of whom licensed numerous works to NGS and signed numerous agreements. As a result, a plethora of contracts, not all of which contain the same relevant provisions, is at issue. Almost all the agreements, however, fall into two groups: stock photography and assignment agreements.

A. Stock Photography Agreements

The form of contract that governs a particular work depends on how the work was submitted to NGS. In many instances, photographers submitted pre-existing photographs to NGS, which either returned the images or, if it chose to publish them, sent payment. To memorialize such a transaction, NGS wrote a letter acknowledging its purchase of "one-time reproduction rights"*fn10 to the purchased photographs. These letters are referred to as "stock photography agreements."

B. Assignment Agreements

In other instances, NGS commissioned works for the Magazine . In such cases it signed contracts under which freelancers took photographs of (or wrote articles about) specified subject matter.*fn11 The agreements stated that the works produced would be considered "as specially commissioned for use by NGS" and that all the rights, including copyright, were to be "deemed transferred exclusively and indefinitely to NGS."*fn12 These contracts are referred to as "assignment agreements."

Under most of the assignment agreements, NGS collected all the photographs taken on a particular assignment and selected some for publication. Photographs not selected for publication were returned to the photographer and, with the rights in them, became his or her property.*fn13 Under others, NGS agreed to reconvey copyright in assignment photographs to the photographer, but retained the right to "reproduce any photographs from the assignments whether published or unpublished for NGS use or for NGS products."*fn14 Most of the assignment agreements reserved to NGS the right to use the licensed work for "further use," such as "promotional, advertising, or another editorial use," for which the photographer or writer would be paid additional compensation.*fn15

C. The Schofield Agreement

A few Agreements are not Easily Categorized

One is that between NGS and plaintiff Phil Schofield, dated October 20, 1999 (the "October 1999 Agreement"), pertaining to photographs by Schofield that appeared in the May 2000 Magazine (the "May 2000 Works").*fn16 That contract contains a clause permitting NGS to use Schofield's "name and likeness" in connection with the publication of the commissioned works.*fn17

It makes no mention of "further use" but distinguishes between "primary use," for which Schofield would not be compensated further, and "secondary use," for which he would. Primary use under the agreement is limited mainly to original publication in the Magazine and other uses made within ninety days thereof. Secondary use is defined to include use in "anthologies or other collections and compilations of NGM [the Magazine ] or any form in which NGM . . . may be recast, transformed or adapted, in any medium known or hereinafter developed, discovered or created, including but not limited to any form of electronic media."*fn18 Despite the distinctions between primary and secondary use, however, the contract includes the following clause:

"Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit or impair NGS' copyright in any issue of NGM . . . as a collected work in which the Photographs produced under this Agreement appear, and NGS shall have the right to reprint and republish such issue of NGM . . . without further compensation, in any medium now known or hereinafter developed, discovered or created, either singly or in an indexed anthology or in any other type of compilation of issue(s) of NGM."*fn19

The contract provides also that NGS shall not, without Schofield's consent, license the rights in the May 2000 Works to third parties for use in a product that is not made by "NGS, a corporate subsidiary, or licensee of NGS . . . which carries an NGS trademark and over which NGS has final . . . right to review, formulate standards for, or to exercise a veto over the appearance, text, Use or promotion."*fn20 Finally, the contract states that "[t]he original transparencies of all published Photographs will remain at NGS, and NGS will return to you the original transparencies of unpublished photographs."*fn21

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.*fn22 Where the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the non-movant's claim.*fn23 In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence*fn24 sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.*fn25

A court faced with cross-motions for summary judgment need not "grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other," but "must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration."*fn26

A. Preemption

Count III of the complaint is a claim for unfair competition. It alleges that defendants are liable for false designation of origin in that defendants' placement of copyright notice on the CNG was an effort to "palm off" plaintiffs' works as their own.*fn27 Count VII alleges unjust enrichment on the theory that defendants were enriched solely by their infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights.*fn28 These claims are identical to claims made in the Faulkner case. This Court there held that such claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act because they ultimately reduce to claims of copyright infringement.*fn29 Plaintiffs' claims, therefore, are preempted as well.

B. Statutes of Limitations

Defendants argue that statutes of limitations have run as to all claims save those pertaining to the May 2000 Works.*fn30 The first question is which statutes of limitations apply.

1. Choice of Law

A federal court adjudicating state law claims ordinarily applies the substantive law of the forum state.*fn31 If a case is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),*fn32 however, the law of the transferor court applies.*fn33 This action was filed in the Central District of California*fn34 before being transferred to this Court pursuant to Section 1404(a). Accordingly, this Court applies California law.

California applies the governmental interest approach to conflict of law issues.*fn35 Choice of law depends on "an analysis of the respective interests of the states involved."*fn36 Where the conflict concerns a statute of limitations, the governmental interest approach generally leads California courts to apply California law.*fn37 "An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum"*fn38 because a "state has a substantial interest in preventing the prosecution in its courts of claims which it deems to be 'stale.'"*fn39 This led the Ninth Circuit to conclude, subject to rare exceptions not relevant here, that California courts will dismiss a claim that is barred by California's statute of limitations.*fn40 In consequence, if any of plaintiffs' claims would be untimely in California, they must be dismissed as untimely.

2. California Statutes of Limitations

a. Contract Claims

Under California law, the limitations period begins to run at the moment the cause of action accrues.*fn41 A cause of action accrues "when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements."*fn42 In an action for breach of contract, this ordinarily occurs at the time of breach, and the statute begins to run at that time regardless of whether any damage is apparent or whether the injured party is aware of his right to sue.*fn43

The contract claims, which are asserted only against the NGS defendants, are governed by a four-year statute of limitations.*fn44 As plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 31, 2002, the claims are untimely unless the agreements were breached after January 31, 1998.

The contract claims appear to rest on two different theories. First, plaintiffs allege that the publication of the CNG exceeded the scope of the licensing agreements. In particular, they contend that such publication constituted "further use" of their works warranting additional compensation under the assignment agreements, and that it exceeded the scope of the "one-time reproduction rights" granted under the stock photography agreements.*fn45 Second, plaintiffs allege that the licensing agreements prohibited NGS from transferring the rights in their works to third parties, and so were breached when NGS authorized the other defendants to create the CNG.

(1) Electronic Use

NGS first published the CNG in 1997. Under plaintiffs' first theory, this is when NGS breached the agreements and so when the contract claims accrued.

Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that their claims are timely. First, they claim that the statute of limitations was tolled until they discovered the existence of the CNG, which was shortly before filing the complaint. Second, they argue that each annual publication of the CNG amounted to a new breach of contract and that a new limitations period started with the release of each edition.

The discovery argument is unavailing. Under California law, "[i]n ordinary tort and contract actions . . . [t]he plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action, or of the identity of the wrongdoer, does not toll the statute."*fn46 The discovery rule only applies in cases where (a) the cause of action is governed by a statute expressly providing for the rule, (b) the relationship between the parties is one of special trust, such as when the defendant is a fiduciary, or (c) the plaintiff "is unable to see or appreciate a breach has occurred," such as in cases "involving underground trespass, negligently manufactured drugs, products liability, violations of the right of privacy, latent defects in real property, or breaches of contract committed in secret."*fn47

This is an ordinary contract action in every sense. No California statute provides for the discovery rule in actions by authors against publishers. Nor are publishers fiduciaries or in any special relationship of trust with authors.*fn48 Finally, this is not a case where injury was hidden. To the contrary, the CNG was marketed vigorously and the fact that the Magazine was available in electronic format was widely announced. The discovery rule plainly does not apply.

The claim that each annual edition of the CNG constituted a new breach also is unavailing. The works published in an earlier CD-ROM appear in exactly the same way in exactly the same context in later CD-ROMs. That is, the use of a works in CD-ROM 109 is not a "further use" beyond that made in CD-ROM 108. Nor is it a new electronic use or an additional "reproduction" of the work. To the extent it breached the agreements in releasing CD-ROM 108, and it is not clear that it did,*fn49 NGS committed no new breach in releasing CD-ROM 109, and so the limitations period did not begin anew.

(2) Unauthorized Transfer

The claims based on the unauthorized transfer are untimely as well. These claims accrued when NGS authorized, without plaintiffs' consent, the creation and marketing of the CNG products by the other defendants. As the Court found in Auscape I , NGS's contracts with the ProQuest Defendants ended in 1993.*fn50 Further, NGS licensed its rights to the other defendants in 1996.*fn51 Any claims based on the unauthorized transfer of rights thus accrued, at the latest, in 1996, six years before the complaint was filed.

b. Tort Claims

The relevant California statutes of limitations for the tort claims are as follows. The claims sounding in unfair trade practices and breach of fiduciary duty are governed by four-year statutes of limitations.*fn52 The conversion claims (asserted against the NGS defendants only) are governed by a three-year statute.*fn53 The claims of involuntary trust, to the extent they seek remedies for fraud, also are governed by a three-year statute.*fn54 And the claims based on the rights to privacy and publicity are governed by a one-year statute and a two-year statute, respectively.*fn55 In sum, the longest statutory period applicable to any of plaintiffs' tort claims is four years. Any claims that accrued before January 31, 1998, are therefore untimely.

The claims against the ProQuest Defendants arise from the inclusion of plaintiffs' works in the GPO databases. As the Court found in Auscape I , such actions ended as early as 1996.*fn56 Hence, plaintiffs' claims against the ProQuest Defendants are untimely.

The timeliness issue for plaintiffs' tort claims against the NGS defendants is less straightforward. These claims are based on the publication of the CNG, which would suggest that they accrued in 1997 when the CNG first was published. Plaintiffs argue, however, that their claims are timely because each annual publication of the CNG started a new limitations periods.

Defendants argue that such reliance on the continuing wrong doctrine is erroneous in this context because California has enacted the Uniform Single Publication Act ("USPA"), which provides that

"No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions."*fn57

All of plaintiffs non-contract claims fall within the statute, which speaks specifically to right of privacy claims and broadly to causes of action for any other tort . The relevant question, then, is whether the claims are "founded upon a[] single publication" within the meaning of the USPA or whether they are founded upon numerous publications, that is, each annual publication of the CNG.

The California courts have given some guidance on this question. In Kanarek v. Bugliosi ,*fn58 a California appellate court held that the paperback republication of a book updating a hardcover publication was a "new" publication and therefore gave rise to a new libel claim. It held that since the paperback edition of a book "was undoubtedly intended to and did reach a new group of readers . . . [t]he filing of a new action for damages based on libel is not barred by the Uniform Single Publication Act."*fn59

Kanarek was premised on the assumption that paperback versions of books are published to reach audiences that are unwilling to pay the higher prices of hardcover editions. The case thus stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may avoid the USPA if the defendant's second publication was designed to be different enough from the first in either form or price to reach a new sector of the market.

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence suggesting that later editions of the CNG are less expensive or in a different format than earlier versions, or evidence of an intent to reach a new sector of the market. Instead, the evidence shows that the contents of CD-ROM 108 (the earliest publication of the CNG) are wholly included in the contents of CD-ROM 109 (the first publication of the CNG that would be actionable under the applicable statutes of limitations*fn60 ). The works published in an earlier CD-ROM appear in exactly the same way in exactly the same context as they do in later ones. The only difference between versions of the CNG is that each successive annual version includes more content, namely, another year's worth of issues of the Magazine . Thus, instead of being aimed at a new audience, the later CNG editions are aimed at the same audience- those who seek the most up-to-date archive of the Magazine . A later edition is not new publication. It is the same publication with an addendum.

More on point is Belli v. Roberts Bros. Furs,*fn61 in which a California appellate court held that different editions of the same issue of a newspaper must be considered a single publication under the USPA. The court noted that the legislative history of California Civil Code § 3425.3, which incorporates the USPA, demonstrated that the statute was originally drafted with reference to a single "edition" of a newspaper or magazine, but was changed to apply to a single "issue" of a newspaper or magazine.*fn62 This change of language was crucial, the court held, because "issue" is a broader term than "edition," as multiple editions of a newspaper may comprise a single issue.*fn63 In other words, when a publication is modified to include more up-to-date information, rather than marketed with a substantially different form or price so as to reach a new sector of the market, the modification is not a new publication. No new limitations period is triggered.

Belli suggests that if a freelancer's photograph appeared in CD-ROM 108, its reappearance in CD-ROM 109 or any subsequent version of the CNG was not a new publication of the work. The later CD-ROMs simply included additional material, much like later editions of a newspaper contain the same information as earlier editions in the same issue.*fn64 The CNG is an "issue" of a larger digital archive, and each year's update a new "edition" within that issue.

Defendants' successive publications of the CNG are thus a "single publication" under the USPA. The statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' tort claims began to run in 1997. They did not restart with each subsequent edition of the CNG, and so plaintiffs' claims sounding in tort are time barred.*fn65

C. The May 2000 Works

1. Contract Claims

Schofield alleges that NGS breached the October 1999 Agreement by making electronic use of those photographs in excess of the scope of the agreement and by authorizing its subsidiaries to reproduce the Magazine in electronic media.

a. Electronic Reproduction

Schofield's contract provides for additional payment for "secondary use" of the May 2000 Works, which includes electronic use in "NGS products" and derivatives thereof. An NGS product is "a product of NGS [or a] corporate subsidiary . . . which carries an NGS trademark and over which NGS has final . . . right to review, formulate standards for, or to exercise veto power over the appearance, text, Use or promotion of the product."*fn66 The CNG is clearly an NGS product: it bears the NGS logo, and no party other than NGS and its subsidiaries is alleged to have editorial control over it. In all respects it is a product that NGS planned, designed, controlled, and marketed.

While the CNG is an NGS product, it is not one for which Schofield was entitled to additional compensation. The agreement clearly states that NGS retains full copyright ownership of the Magazine as a collective work and full rights to reprint the May 2000 Magazine in any format, including digital media, without further compensation. NGS's reproduction of the May 2000 Works therefore was completely within its contractual rights.

b. Unauthorized Transfer

The parties do not dispute that NGS authorized its subsidiaries to reproduce the Magazine in electronic media.*fn67 Schofield claims, however, that the October 1999 Agreement did not permit NGS to do so.

As the Court noted in Faulkner II , copyright in a collective work is distinct from copyright in each contribution.*fn68 Moreover, Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act provides that "[t]he ownership of copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance."*fn69

Thus, one who owns copyright in a compilation may grant to others the right to reproduce and distribute that compilation.

As NGS owns the copyright to the Magazine as a collective work, by the plain terms of Section 201(d)(1), it is presumed to be permitted to assign its rights to third parties. The burden is on Schofield to show that this right was curtailed.

This is a burden that Schofield does not meet. No clause of the October 1999 Agreement limits NGS's ability to transfer its rights in the Magazine . The Agreement prohibits unauthorized transfer of rights for use in non-NGS products.*fn70 As noted, however, the CNG is an NGS product. Moreover, the contract states that NGS will retain full rights in the Magazine , and that "[ n ] othing herein shall be deemed to limit or impair NGS' copyright in any issue of NGM . . . as a collected work."*fn71

2. Tort Claims

a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Schofield argues that NGS, as the publisher of a collective work, owed a fiduciary duty to the contributors to ensure that proper credit was given for each contribution, and to prevent the unauthorized copying of the contributions.*fn72 Count XII alleges that NGS breached this duty when it distributed the CNG, which allows users to make unauthorized copies of individual images outside of the context of the Magazine.

The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim in California are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) damage proximately caused by that breach.*fn73 While California courts have been reluctant to give a precise definition of a fiduciary relationship, one principle is clear: parties to arm's length transactions do not, without more, owe each other fiduciary obligations; they are obliged to perform under the contract, but failure to discharge such an obligation gives rise to contractual liability, not liability for breach of fiduciary duty.*fn74 It therefore is generally held that the relationship between author and publisher is not a fiduciary relationship, but rather a commercial relationship between contracting parties. Publishers are not duty bound to act always in the interest of their author clients. They are bound only by the terms of the contracts they sign.*fn75

In this case, there is no evidence indicating that NGS assumed a fiduciary role. Schofield sold his services in the marketplace and NGS bought them. Schofield and NGS were parties to an arm's length transaction and were bound only by the terms of the October 1999 Agreement. To the extent Schofield may have wanted a publisher to prevent the copying of the May 2000 Works, he could have bargained for such protection with NGS or chosen to sell his services to another publisher.

b. Conversion

Count XIV of the complaint alleges that NGS has converted plaintiffs' photographic transparencies and negatives by failing to return them after initially using them for purposes of publishing the Magazine.

Under California law, the elements of conversion are (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.*fn76 Generally, a plaintiff must demand the return of the converted property, and defendant must refuse to comply, before a conversion claim can be stated. The only exceptions are when the property was acquired wrongfully in the first place, or when demand would be futile because, for example, it has already been sold or destroyed.*fn77

Under the terms of the October 1999 Agreement, NGS was permitted to make use of all transparencies for the May 2000 Works, and was entitled to keep the transparencies of the published photographs. NGS therefore is the rightful owner of the published transparencies and so cannot be liable for converting them.*fn78

Nor is NGS liable for converting the transparencies of any unpublished photographs. While NGS was required to return the transparencies for all unpublished works, there is no evidence that NGS still remains in possession of them. Moreover, Schofield's claim would fail even if there were. Since NGS was entitled to possess the transparencies for the purpose of selecting which of them to publish, and since there is no evidence that the transparencies have been lost, sold, or destroyed (or that demand would otherwise be futile), Schofield was required to produce evidence showing that he demanded the return of the transparencies and that NGS refused to comply. This he has not done.*fn79

c. Unfair Trade Practices

Count II of the complaint alleges unfair trade practices in violation of California's Business and Professions Code Section 17200. That statute, in relevant part, prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."

Taking advantage of Section 17200's broad "any unlawful act" language, the complaint alleges numerous predicate acts in support of this claim.*fn80 It alleges (1) contract breach and failure to compensate plaintiffs for the use of their works, (2) misleading use of plaintiffs' names, (3) false designation of origin, (4) false claim of copyright ownership, (5) false advertising, (6) copyright infringement, and (7) violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970 ("RICO").*fn81

None of these allegations can support an unfair trade practices claim. First, Schofield's claims of contract breach fail for the reasons stated above.*fn82 Second, the claims based on false use of names, false designation of origin, false claims of copyright ownership, and false advertising are simply restatements of the Lanham Act claims that were dismissed in Auscape I .*fn83

Third, an unfair trade practices claim predicated on "wanton and repeated acts of copyright infringement" is preempted by Section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.*fn84 And finally, plaintiffs have dropped their RICO claim.*fn85

d. Involuntary Trust

Count VIII of the complaint, which seeks to impose an involuntary trust NGS's profits from the CNG, fails for the same reason.

The imposition of an involuntary trust under California law requires (1) the existence of property or some interest in property, (2) the right of the complaining party to that property, and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of that property by another party who is not entitled to it.*fn86

Plaintiffs assert that the "wrongful acquisition" in this case was defendants' false advertising, misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, misappropriation of plaintiffs' good will, names or likenesses, contract breaches, and copyright infringement.*fn87 The claim for involuntary trust therefore is predicated on claims that already have been dismissed or are preempted. Accordingly, it is dismissed as well.

e. Rights of Privacy and Publicity

Finally, Counts IV and V of the complaint allege violations of the common law right of privacy and the right of publicity under California Civil Code Section 3344. These claims are the same for present purposes.*fn88 Each requires (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity, (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise, (3) lack of consent, and (4) resulting injury.*fn89

Schofield claims that defendants "used" his name, without his consent, "for the purposes of advertising or selling" the CNG.*fn90 That is, because his name already was attached to the May 2000 Works in the original Magazine in order to give him credit for his contributions, his name necessarily was copied when the Magazine was copied and then "used" in the marketing of the CNG.

The October 1999 Agreement clearly provides that Schofield "grant[ed] to NGS without additional charge the right to use [his] name, likeness and biographical material in connection with the publication of any Photographs produced under this Agreement."*fn91

He nonetheless argues that this consent was limited to use of his name in connection with the print version of the Magazine . In other words, Schofield interprets the term "the publication" to refer to a specific publication as opposed to the general act of publishing. This reading, however, does not comport with the plain meaning of the contract's terms.

Under California law, when interpreting a contract, "[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.*fn92 When the "name and likeness" clause is read in conjunction with the other parts of the agreement, it is clear Schofield's interpretation cannot stand.

First, the agreement contemplates many possible publications, specifically apportioning rights for print and electronic publications and publications outside the context of the Magazine . In this context, the "name and likeness" clause must be read to refer to all uses specifically enumerated in the agreement. It cannot be read arbitrarily to apply to one kind of publication and not another.

Moreover, the Agreement provides that " nothing herein" shall limit NGS's rights to reproduce the Magazine , "and NGS shall have the right to reprint and republish" the Magazine in electronic form.*fn93 Schofield's reading of the "name and likeness" clause would contravene this language and render it essentially inoperative. To adopt it would prevent NGS from reproducing the May 2000 Magazine, which bears Schofield's name.

The October 1999 Agreement, therefore, expressly permitted NGS to use Schofield's name in connection with the CNG.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the state law claims are granted. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

SO ORDERED.

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