Research Project Title

Presenter Information

Faculty Sponsor

Nathan King, Whitworth University

Research Project Abstract

Traditional efforts to describe mental phenomena have operated based on definitions of minds as singular, gestalt objects rather than collections of fundamental objects. By an argument against vague cases in categorizing objects, it will be shown that it is necessary to construct a novel metaphysical theory of objects, and particularly minds, which acknowledges gestalt objects to be arbitrarily defined.

Session Number

RS12

Location

Robinson 210

Abstract Number

RS12-b

This document is currently not available here.

DOWNLOADS

Since April 01, 2016

COinS

Apr 23rd, 3:15 PMApr 23rd, 4:45 PM

A Non-gestalt Theory of Objects

Robinson 210

Traditional efforts to describe mental phenomena have operated based on definitions of minds as singular, gestalt objects rather than collections of fundamental objects. By an argument against vague cases in categorizing objects, it will be shown that it is necessary to construct a novel metaphysical theory of objects, and particularly minds, which acknowledges gestalt objects to be arbitrarily defined.