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Sunday, February 28, 2016

Will Modi realise his superpower aspirations?

Shahab Enam Khan,
Parvez Karim
Abbasi

The Trimurti of his foreign policy could be his
greatest strength. This is the first part of a two-part long form.

The Latin term “Imago Dei” relates to a long held Judeo-Christian
theological belief that God created man in his own image. Descending from the
lofty realms of theological speculation to the worldlier arena of Indian
foreign policy, pundits and analysts have entered into a frenzy of speculation
trying to gauge the possible policy changes and course corrections emanating
from South Block during Narendra Modi’s prime ministerial tenure.

It can be safely said that the effects of the economic and foreign policy
changes of an emerging superpower will reverberate throughout the South Asian
landscape. Any misplaced doubt regarding India’s preeminence in South Asia can
be safely dispelled by the spectacle of Modi’s prime ministerial swearing-in
ceremony at Rashtrapati Bhavan in Delhi.

The sight of all the heads of state from the Saarc region attending the
inauguration could be likened to a Rajya Abishek of a Chakravertin Samrat or
the Delhi Durbar during the times of the British Raj.

Economic diplomacy lies at the heart of Modi’s foreign policy. Foreign
investment and trade opportunities are being assiduously sought, not only from
traditional and familiar sources such as the Americans and the Japanese, but
also from India’s perceived strategic competitor, China.

A case in point was Modi winning a $20bn pledge from Chinese President Xi
Jinping even amidst the border flare-up that coincided uncomfortably during the
Chinese president’s visit to India last September. The shrewd Gujarati business
acumen has triumphed over saber-rattling and jingoistic nationalism that
normally constitutes BJP rhetoric regarding China.

The success of Mr Modi’s “Make in India” campaign relies heavily on
large-scale investments from China to revive the job-creating manufacturing
sector. This is in line with his previous chief ministerial regime in Gujarat,
where he welcomed Chinese investment with open arms.

It remains to be seen if Modi manages to inject sustained double-digit
growth in the Indian economy that forms a crucial component in realising its
superpower aspirations. The fate of the long-delayed modernisation of Indian
defense force and attempts to match Chinese military might is inextricably tied
with the health of the economy.

Furthermore, Indian offers of duty reduction, trade facilitation, tied loans
to improve transit and connectivity issues, and free trade agreements to its
neighbouring South Asian countries are yet to materialise or deliver concrete
results in many instances.

The long arm of Chinese trade and investment has made considerable inroads
in the region at India’s expense. The Chinese recently proposed the
establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Maritime Silk
Road – all of which is calculated to increase Chinese influence in smaller
South Asian economies.

These economies, that had formerly courted Indian trade and investment have
now more than one option to choose from. The largesse India will be able to
offer pales in significance to the Chinese one. Thus, Modinomics, in one sense,
is dedicated to retaining Indian economic hegemony in South Asia that the
Indian analysts and policy planners had taken for granted.

Many analysts have dubbed the foreign policy regime under Manmohan Singh as
the “lost decade” of diplomacy. The deft and subtle diplomacy that had been the
hallmark of the land of Chanakya was replaced by a series of erratic,
confrontational, and ham-fisted knee jerk reactions. From picking fights with
the sole superpower (the unseemly row regarding the visa fraud allegations
surrounding Devyani Khobragade) to the trial of the Italian marines related to
the Enrica Lexie incident, India had been punching above its weight and souring
relations with its Western allies.

The periodic, calibrated border incursions by the Chinese have literally
kept the Indian policy-makers and defense establishment on their toes. It has
not only served to rein in Indian pretensions to parity with the Chinese, but
have effectively prevented India from using the significant Tibetan exile
population to fan anti-China unrest in Tibet.

The “Look East” policy of the UPA government, geared towards increased
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, had been largely overshadowed by
increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. “The String of Pearls”
offensive by the Chinese is increasingly curbing Indian presence in its own
backyard. It remains to be seen if Narendra Modi’s proposed transnational
“Mausam” initiative can take the edge of the Chinese thrust in the Indian
Ocean.

Nearer at home, the Congress-led UPA government was found woefully lacking
in combating high profile terrorist attacks such as the 26/11 attack on Mumbai
by Pakistani members of LeT (despite having prior intelligence regarding an
impending attack).

Lack of effective coordination amongst the various Indian intelligence
agencies paved the way for yet another large scale LeT attack on Indian soil
following the attack on parliament in New Delhi in 2001.

Despite international condemnation and incontrovertible proof of tacit ISI
support for LeT operatives, the Pakistani diplomats managed to pull off a near
miraculous escape – a show trial for the ringleaders of LeT was all that the
Indian diplomats managed to wriggle out from the Pakistanis. It speaks volumes
about South Block’s ineptitude that it could not make use of the proverbial
“smoking gun.”

The UPA government can be partially exonerated from failing to solve a
six-decade, complex, multifaceted, problem with its archrival Pakistan.
However, the sheer negligence it had shown to maintaining and fostering
traditionally friendly relationships with neighbouring countries is well-nigh
inexcusable.

It is mind-boggling to think that Manmohan Singh had never paid a visit to
Bhutan, Nepal, or Sri Lanka during his prime ministerial tenure.

First on the list is Maldives, whose geostrategic importance far dwarfs its
territorial size. Of late, the country has been warmly responding to increased
Chinese trade and investment. This, in itself, should not be alarming in a
globalised milieu.

However, the public dressing-down of the Indian ambassador of Maldives by
the Maldivian political leadership and the termination of the $511m contract with
a consortium headed by the Indian GMR group for maintenance of the
international airport at Male, should not be brushed off lightly.

Mishandling by the South Block during the UPA period is partially to blame
for the straining of relations. The Indian support vacillated like a pendulum
back and forth from Mohamed Nasheed to Mohammed Waheed Hassan, which further
exacerbated ongoing political instability in the archipelago.

This inevitably led to a considerable erosion of Indian credibility in the
country. The recent humanitarian relief effort by the Modi government in
alleviating the drinking water crisis in Male, is a step in the right direction
and will partially reduce anti-Indian resentment.

Sri Lanka provides the classic example of foreign policy bungling by the UPA
government under the influence of coalition politics and personal prejudice.
The Indian government had previously refused to sell weapons to Sri Lanka in
their campaign against LTTE.

This was done to appease the sentiments of the Tamil coalition partner of
UPA, DMK. The Sri Lankans then turned to China, Russia, and Pakistan to procure
the necessary hardware. This paved the way for increased presence of Chinese
and Pakistani military personnel and advisors in Sri Lanka. Ironically, the UPA
government then provided tacit consent to the combative President Rajapaksa’s
final military campaign to decisively defeat the LTTE.

The LTTE’s role in carrying out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi may have
influenced South Block’s limited involvement in this matter. The Chinese reaped
rich rewards for their timely assistance. They have invested in key strategic
sectors, ie infrastructure and services in Sri Lanka.

The docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo port is a portent of the
increased strategic and commercial ties between Colombo and Beijing. Of late,
the defeat of Rajapaksa by his onetime ally, Maithripala Sirisena in the
presidential elections could well play in to the hands of the Modi government.

Sirisena, in his presidential campaign, had criticised the exponential
increase in Chinese influence on the island nation. Rajapaksa had hinted at RAW
involvement in fermenting revolt within his party ranks and orchestrating his
electoral defeat.

The new government has stated that it would work to redress the lopsided
tilt towards China. The ground reality, though, remains that substantial
Chinese investment and trade links would provide it with considerable influence
on Sri Lankan policy-makers in the foreseeable future.

Nepal illustrates yet another lost opportunity for a more pragmatic foreign
policy involvement from the previous UPA government.

During its first stint in power, the UPA-1 government provided a certain
amount of support to the Maoist insurgents or the Communist Party of Nepal.

Thus, South Block was hedging its bet between the traditionally
India-friendly Nepali Congress and the Marxists. It was also done to prevent
Marxist insurgency from spilling over into restive areas of India such as West
Bengal and Bihar and to contain growing Chinese involvement in the mountainous
kingdom. It also helped foster agreement amongst the various Nepali political
parties, who in turn then launched a concerted movement to bring an end to end
to King Gyanendra’s unpopular direct rule.

However, it led things to slide from there. The ordinary Nepalese blamed
Indian involvement behind the gridlock in the constituent assembly, delay in
writing the constitution, tussle for control between the army and the Maoists,
and agitation in the southern plains of Terai for autonomy.

Modi’s arrival on the scene may signal a more evenhanded and subtler
approach in line with the Chinese. Modi and Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Nepal (the
first by an Indian foreign minister in 23 years) did not show favouritism to
any particular party – a gesture contributed in reducing palpable anti Indian
resentment.

Bhutan, Nepal’s Himalayan neighbour would prove to be the least daunting of
the checklists of Modi’s “neighbourhood first” policy. In fact, Narendra Modi
made his first prime ministerial visit to Bhutan, where he again focused on
strengthening and reemphasising business, trade (the hydro-electric deal) and
strategic ties. Bhutan also will continue to prove a valuable ally to India in
combating anti-Indian insurgents from Northeast India.

Probably, the country that the UPA government let down most was Bangladesh
during its 10-year-long tenure. The ruling Awami League government under Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina was perceived to be friendly towards India and the
Gandhi-Sheikh families also shared close ties.

India has provided strong support to the AL government of Sheikh Hasina
since 2008. It had openly expressed its desire to see secular forces in power
in Bangladesh as evidenced by former Indian foreign secretary Sujatha Singh’s
visit to Dhaka in November 2013.