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Table of contens 1 Introduction 2 The concept of sustainability 2.1 Ecological sustainability 2.2 Social sustainability 2.3 Economic sustainability 2.4 The sustainability strategy of the german government 3 Effects of energy use on the enviromment 4 Requirements of the SSGG for energy policy 4.1 Ecological implications of thr SSGG 4.2 Social and economic requirements of the SSGG 5 The German Renewable Energies Act 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Design and mechanisms 5.3 Fees-in tariffs 6 Does the EEG meet the sustainability requirements of the SSGG? 6.1 Management rules 6.2 Social sustainability 6.3 Economic sustainability 6.4 Development tendencis 7 Possible amendments for more sustainability 7.1 Changing the promotional system 7.2 A European regulation

Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation.

Usually, in monocentric city models the spatial patterns of segregated household groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, while early in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that wedge-shaped areas empirically predominate. This contribution presents a monocentric city model with different household groups generating positive externalities within the groups. At first, border length is founded as a criterion of optimality. Secondly, it is shown that mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas represent multiple equilibria if more than two groups of households are being considered. The welfare optimal segregated pattern depends on the relative purchasing power of different household groups.

Usually, in monocentric city models, the spatial patterns of segregated ethnic groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, whereas in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that empirically wedge-shaped areas predominate. In contrast to Rose-Ackerman.s discussion of the in.uence within a ring-shaped pattern which the aversion which different households in the context of racism have, Yinger showed that, depending on the population mix, a wedge-shaped pattern may arise if it is border length which causes the spatial pattern. In this contribution, a simulation based on a monocentric city model with two or more different household groups is used to derive spatial patterns. Wedge-shaped segregation is shown to be the result of positive externalities among similar households. Differences between households only lead to ring-shaped patterns if the e¤ect of a city center on spatial structure dominates neighborhood e¤ects. If more than two groups of households are being considered, mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas arise.

The aim of this study is to examine in which cases economic forces or historical singularities prevail in the determination of the long-run distribution of firms. We develop a relatively general model of heterogenous firms' location choice in discrete space. The main force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs for consumers if firms are located closely, whilst competition and transport costs work towards a more disperse structure. We then assess the importance of the initial conditions by simulating and comparing the resulting distribution of firms for identical economic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions of firms are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while differences in the resulting distributions indicate that 'history' is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions of firms is calculated by means of a measure, which exhibits a number of desirable features.

In the recent years there are many researchs discussing the effects of trade policy (tariffs, subsidies etc.) in international trade. The results are manifold. Some authors show that trade policy has negative effects on welfare, some spatial economists demonstrate that trade policy can have positive effects on welfare. This paper considers the effects of the trade policy made by both countries participating in international trade in a spatial economic model. It can be showed that trade policy of both trade partners (tariffs of one country and export subsidies of the other country) can improve the world welfare in comparison with free trade.