Interview of the National Security Advisor by a Roundtable of Wire and Print Journalists
Dr. Rice's Office

5:26 P.M. EST

MR. McCORMACK: Okay, guys, I just want to let you know you're on
the record here.

Q Oh, we're on the record.

Q Thank you very much for going on the record.

MR. McCORMACK: Oh, suddenly you're interested? (Laughter.)

Q So have you changed your mind about testifying?

DR. RICE: No, it's not my mind. It's -- (Laughter.) I would like
to be very clear that this is not a matter of preference. I would like
nothing better in a sense than to be able to go up and do this. But I
have a responsibility to maintain what is a longstanding separation --
constitutional separation between the executive and the legislative
branch. This body is -- the commission is a body under Article II of
the legislature, and so I have to maintain that separation.

I also have a responsibility to make sure that the commission knows
everything that I know, and that's why I spent four hours with them,
and I'm prepared to spend longer with them anywhere they want, any time
they want, answer as many questions as they have. And I hope we'll
have an opportunity to do that. But I just have to maintain the
separation.

Q Have they indicated they'd like to have you back?

DR. RICE: We've not talked about it, but I hope they will.

Q One thing that Clarke is saying today is that you
considered terrorism an important issue, but not an urgent issue. Is
that true?

DR. RICE: I don't know what it means. I thought we weren't
interested in it at all. According to the "60 Minutes" interview, I
thought we ignored it. So now it was important, but not urgent. I
really don't know what to make of this, what is a kind of shifting
story.

I will say that what we did suggests that we thought it both
important and urgent. We kept in place an experienced team of
counterterrorism experts from the Clinton administration, whose
responsibility it was to keep the Clinton administration strategy
going. We did everything during that period of time that we could.
The intelligence agencies had the authorities that had been there in
the Clinton administration. Nothing unraveled those authorities so
they were still acting on those authorities.

George was still out disrupting and trying to break up cells in
various parts of the world. The President wrote to Musharraf on
February 16th. Colin and I had met with the Pakistanis. We'd met with
the Uzbeks to -- we had approved additional counterterrorism support
for the Uzbeks. We were doing everything that we could.

Now, was it the only priority? Of course not. There were other
things that had to be done, as well, including the crisis with China
around the EP-3 shoot-down; trying to build a relationship with Russia,
China.

Good thing we built the relationship, by the way with Russia,
because when the war comes, we are able to get into Central Asia
without friction with the Russians. So that turned out to be an
important thing.

But at the same time that we were pursuing what the Clinton
administration had been doing, we were developing a more robust
strategy to try and eliminate al Qaeda. And by Dick's calculation, as
well as that of George Tenet, this was still going to be multi-year.
You couldn't do it overnight. I was impressed with some of the
testimony by several people who said, it would have been difficult to
just invade Afghanistan. I happen to agree with that view.

But we were developing a more robust strategy. That was a strategy
that drew on some of the ideas that Dick Clarke had given us in that
January 25th memo. He said in the August 2002 interview that they
were, in fact, ideas that had been around since 1998. That was my
understanding, as well.

And we pursued those ideas toward a more robust strategy. So I
don't know what else you do to demonstrate that you think it's urgent
and important. The President was being briefed by George Tenet at
least 40 some -- 40 plus of his briefings dealt, in one way or another
al Qaeda, or the al Qaeda threat.

During the threat period it got really urgent. That's when I was
on the phone with Colin and Don, and Don was moving the Fifth Fleet out
of port, and when Colin was buttoning down embassies abroad. And when
we actually did have Dick Clarke come in and -- Andy Card and I did --
and on July 5th convene the domestic agencies to say, even though all
the threat reporting is about some threat abroad -- because it was the
Persian Gulf, the G8, possibly something in Israel -- bring the
domestic agencies together, let's make sure that they're buttoning
down. The FAA issues alerts. The FBI issues warnings. So it's pretty
urgent and important.

Q Do you think the fact that the staff of the commission was
equally critical of both the Clinton administration and the Bush
administration for not being more active militarily, and the fact that
Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright pretty much agreed with your
people that it would have been hard to invade Afghanistan, do you think
that makes your case a little bit easier to make?

DR. RICE: Well, I think it just says that September 11th was a
life-changing event for the United States. It was life-changing for
Americans. It was life-changing for the country, for the strategic
direction of the country. We did think that there were other ways to
deal with the threat than just using cruise missile strikes against --
against al Qaeda.

We really thought that using again, for instance, in response to
the Cole, using cruise missile strikes again against training camps
that probably would have already been abandoned would have sent exactly
the wrong message. And so one of the things that the new strategy
looked at was actually to have the Defense Department do contingency
plans that would allow us to go after the Taliban, not just after al
Qaeda training camps. And that was written into the new strategy
because we were worried that you didn't want to be in the position of
just all-out invasion of Afghanistan, or cruise missile strikes, there
had to be something in between. And what was in between was to, first,
put more pressure on the Taliban, for a short time diplomatically; then
put pressure on them by arming not just the Northern Alliance, but
southern tribes, as well, so that you put real pressure on them. If
you couldn't them that way, think about using military force against
their targets. But I found consistency in the views of the two that an
all-out invasion of Afghanistan would probably have been --

Q Dr. Rice, I want to ask about the August 4th -- that a lot
of the questioners --

DR. RICE: August 6th.

Q August 6th -- I apologize. What can you tell us about what
was in it? Many of the commission members seem to think that it was
critical -- a pretty critical document, although obviously, the
contents are classified -- whatever light you can shed on this.

DR. RICE: This document was a kind of analytic step-back piece
that says we know that al Qaeda has been interested in striking the
American homeland, and then it's historical. Most of it is about, he
admired the 1993 events at the World Trade Center -- the bombing in
'93. Some things about '97 and '98. There's mention of hijacking for
the purpose of getting the release of prisoners. So it's not in the
context of flying airplanes into buildings. It mentions that al Qaeda
has tried to infiltrate people into the United States. But it's all
kind of things that you've heard before, and it's a compilation of
statements about al Qaeda. There's no threat warning information.
There's nothing that says, here, here, or here, in this period of time
-- not even of the kind that we were getting in the June-July time
period, where it would say, there's a lot of chatter about the Persian
Gulf; or there's a lot of chatter about the G8 Summit -- nothing like
that appears in this memo.

There's one statement about a phone call to a particular embassy
that talks about using explosives inside the United States, which
turned out to be a call that nobody thought had any credibility. We
went back -- we actually checked. So this is a look-back piece. The
agency did from time to time these analytic pieces, and that's what
this is.

Q Okay, and then the September 4th memo that Mr. Clarke sent
to you. The commissioners seemed to suggest that it was full of
warnings, that you're going to have explain --

DR. RICE: It wasn't warning -- it said, you're about to have a
meeting on the new NSPD -- I'm paraphrasing now -- you're about to have
a meeting. It was a road map, as we call it, a guide for me to direct
the meeting, to conduct the meeting.

It says, you're about to have this meeting on this NSPD. It's a
good NSPD. It's got a lot of good stuff in it. But let me give you a
history of how bureaucracies have defeated these things before. And
one day, we're going to be really sorry because there's going to be an
attack on the United States -- I'm sorry, an attack with thousands of
Americans dead, or something like that, and then how will we feel that
the Agency couldn't do this, or that -- that's not a warning.

Q So you understood it as a theoretical warning, as opposed
to a specific warning?

DR. RICE: Absolutely. One day we're going to be sorry? No. This
was -- the notion that he would -- anyone would say that this was a
warning. Of course, we all knew that one day a catastrophic attack was
possible. But this was about, you really need not to let the
bureaucracies defeat this new NSPD. That's what this was about.

Q Dr. Rice, I think -- I think there's only one passage where
Mr. Clarke talked about you specifically.

DR. RICE: I think so. Ask those guys. We're trying to get
something, to make sure it's not classified.

MR. McCORMACK: Yes, this is all unclassified.

DR. RICE: It's all unclassified, okay, fine.

Q Just so you don't have to listen to me, would you mind just
looking at that paragraph? Could you just give us your version of that
call? I think it's the only time that he said that you specifically
did something. I sense you don't have the same recollection about it,
which is why I'm asking.

DR. RICE: I have no idea what he's talking about. He says, when
Condi Rice came back from that meeting, called me and related what the
President requested, and I said, well, you know we've had this strategy
ready since before you were inaugurated.

I just want to, again, refer you to the August 2002 interview in
which he says, no, we didn't give them a plan. Either he gave us a
plan, or he didn't give us a plan. But he doesn't have it both ways.
In the August 2002 interview, he didn't give us a plan. In the book,
apparently, he did give us a plan.

Today, in the testimony, I'm told he says, well, the plan was from
1998 -- the Dilenda (ph) Plan, which was there, but that was from
1998. I thought this plan was supposedly developed in 2000. This
story has so many twists and turns now that I think he needs to get
this story straight.

Okay, thanks.

Q And may I ask you something more general, the Vice
President said he was out of the loop. You said he wasn't in most of
the meetings. But he hadn't been replaced. He still was the
counterterrorism official. And I wonder if the counterterrorism
official is out of the loop on terrorism issues, if that's not a
problem.

DR. RICE: I would not use the word out of the loop. He was in
every meeting about terrorism. He was not in the President's daily
briefing with George Tenet. What the President did was to reestablish
his principal conduit for intelligence information on everything,
including terrorism, to be his DCI. But he was not -- he was in every
meeting that was held on terrorism, all the deputies' meetings, the
principals' meeting that was held, and so forth -- the early meetings
after September 11th. When the President went to Camp David, he went
with his closest advisors on September 15th. It was a time when he
wanted people in the room with whom he had a particular relationship --

Q Dr. Rice -- and that speaks to my last question. It was
clear that he'd been demoted. And so can you see why people outside
the process would look like -- that might look like terrorism was less
of a priority since you demoted the terrorism guy.

DR. RICE: He wasn't demoted. We had a different organizational
structure. Dick was still the national coordinator. He was still
doing all of the things he had been doing. He had the CSG. He had --
by the way, he had daily access to me through a staff meeting that I
hold every day, that is -- by the way -- quite operational. It's not
to sit down and debate the fine points of American security policy.
It's for the person to say -- who does Africa to say, the President
really needs to call the President of Sudan today because the peace
treaty is going off track. Or Condi you need to call Secretary Powell,
there's a mix-up here. We're not sure what's going on. Or can you get
the -- the President needs to have a meeting on this. It's very
operational.

That's how I do business. I don't use e-mail for business. I
think it's intemperate, and I don't communicate by e-mail. So the
staff meeting was, to me, the central thing. I did have to send Dick
two e-mails telling him, come to my staff meetings, because he kept
being too busy. I finally told him that it was important that he not
be too busy. So he was not demoted. When people met, he was there.
But, yes, we had a somewhat different structure. We were a new team.
It is usually the case that when you transition into a new team, you
sort of adjust to that structure.

Q Can I just interject on the same point -- just a second,
Alex. Others have used the word, if not the concept and the word of
demotion, including the Vice President in his talk with Rush Limbaugh
--

DR. RICE: Well, I never thought -- I didn't think of it as
demotion. I thought of it as reorganization. Perhaps Dick felt that
he had less -- he didn't sit with Powell and Rumsfeld and so forth.
It's just not the way we operated. I did sit with Powell and Rumsfeld
and Tenet, and those people. He had access to me.

I'll give you an example. When we have our morning phone call,
which is every day -- Colin, Don and I do -- the senior directors will
say, will you raise with Powell this or that, will you raise with
Rumsfeld this or that. The Vice President, Powell, Rumsfeld and I have
a luncheon every week. I get a long list of things I'm supposed to
raise with them. So it's just -- it was just a different structure.
We used a lot more informal daily kinds of ad hoc meetings between
principals and used principals meetings for more policy development.
We did not have a single principals meeting during the China aircraft
crisis.

Q And finishing up on motive, though, do you think he thought
he was demoted?

DR. RICE: Maybe.

Q Do you think -- do you or anybody else here think -- have
reason to not trust him or not -- question his judgment or competence?

DR. RICE: No, I wouldn't have kept him on if I hadn't both trusted
and thought he was competent. But the restructuring was because the
organization had to work with this President, and for this National
Security Advisor, not for the last one.

Q Dr. Rice, can I ask on another specific thing came up in
the testimony today, the time line of which is a little uncertain, Mr.
Clarke said that he had at some point after the Olympics suggested that
some kind of air defense system might be necessary, including possibly
in Washington. Was that during the previous administration, or during
your administration? Do you have any recollection of it --

MR. McCORMACK: He referred to the Atlanta Olympics -- I think he
was talking about.

DR. RICE: Atlanta Olympics, that would have been a previous
administration.

Q Right, but there was this period -- it was possible that it
was early on in your administration. Was there any discussion at all?

DR. RICE: No, no, not that I recall anything.

Q Do you recall him mentioning an air defense system at all?

DR. RICE: No, I don't recall any such thing. And I'll tell you
something, it brings up an important point, which is that the January
25th memo is somewhat remarkable for what's not in it. There is a
mention of sleeper cells. There's one mention of sleeper cells -- at
10 pages, two words at the end of one line. There's no recommendation
about what to do about them. All of the recommendations relate to
Afghanistan. And there a recommendation on terrorist financing. But
all the recommendations relate to Afghanistan -- Predator, which was a
very good idea; the Northern Alliance, which was not a good idea, at
least in that context; the counterterrorism support for Uzbekistan --
it's all related to Afghanistan. I learned subsequently that
apparently there was an after-action report done on the Millennium
plot. As far as I can remember, and Steve Hadley can remember, it
wasn't briefed to us during the transition, it wasn't attached to the
January 25th memo. It does appear on September 17th, with a note to
Steve and Larry Thompson, who was managing the kind of domestic
preparedness issue at that point, saying, this might be helpful.

I know Dick has cited very positively their experience during the
Millennium period. When we got the threat spike, it might have been
useful to say, we had this Millennium experience, here's how we did
it. Never came up.

To be fair, it's a different circumstance because everybody knew --
those of us who were working with Y2K, the full Time Magazine issue on
the Millennium, that the Millennium was a high threat period. But it
might have been helpful to know that that paper existed.

Q Another thing that came up during the testimony, I'm not
sure whether you're going to be able to answer any of these questions,
but a recurring theme is the CIA was highly reluctant to do any covert
operations, and DOD was highly reluctant to use military options at
times. And one of the things they said was they couldn't figure out
the legality, relating to the assassination issue. Have these issues
been resolved? Because the American people would hear that testimony,
and they would say, why do we have these capabilities when we can't use
them?

DR. RICE: Well, first of all, George Tenet never came to me or to
the President -- and remember he saw the President every day -- never
came to either of us and said, I don't have enough authorities to do
what I need to do. And I think he said that in his testimony. We
weren't in a position yet to use military force for a variety of
reasons. We did. That's why we asked for contingency planning --
Defense Department -- to try to get some real military options.

And one little line that I did hear from Sandy Berger's testimony
today, he said, the military options were lousy. Yes, they were. And
so that's one reason we started looking for different military
options.

Now, the American people don't need to worry because after
September 11th, the President decided we were at war. He decided that
what happened to us on September 11th was an act of war, and that meant
all-out war on them. And therefore, we are using our military forces
in a full-scale way. And one of the debates that's really underlying a
lot this is, is this a narrow war on terrorism that just relates to bin
Laden and Afghanistan? Or is this a broad war on terrorism in which
you have to deal with bin Laden and Afghanistan, which we're doing.
We've got nearly 12,000 troops in Afghanistan, doing the work in
Afghanistan. We've got allies in the Afghan army. We've got allies
with Pakistan. So Afghanistan is being pursued aggressively. And
we're pursuing al Qaeda aggressively -- two-thirds of their known
leadership has gone down.

But the President believes that it's broader than that, that you
have to go after state sponsors; that you have to deal with weapons of
mass destruction states; that you can't let a source of instability
like Iraq remain in the Middle East as a kind of brewing threat; and
that ultimately, you need a forward strategy for freedom in the Middle
East itself, because until you change the politics of the Middle East,
people are going to keep flying airplanes into things. And so that's
really, in part, what this debate is about. Is it just law
enforcement, Afghanistan and bin Laden? Or is it broader than that?

And so in this President's mind, the kinds of questions that people
were talking about prior to 9/11 essentially no longer exist.

MR. McCORMACK: Okay, we have time for one more question.

Q Dr. Rice, just on Dick Clarke, you're his boss, you're
calling meetings that he's supposed to be at, I think if most of us
were called to a meeting that our boss wanted us to be and we didn't
show up, we'd be either disciplined, or fired. Was there any action
taken against Dick Clarke on that regard?

DR. RICE: I sent him one e-mail. He didn't come. I sent him
another e-mail, and I told him that I thought he really better start
coming, he came.

Q So there was no discussion of something that -- pardon me,
I'm sorry.

DR. RICE: That's all right.

Q That -- any disciplinary action against him, and there's no
conflict over that?

DR. RICE: No. Look, I know how to manage people, and I asked him
to come once. We continued to have a problem. I asked him to come
twice. We didn't have a problem after that.

Q Why wasn't he coming?

Q In his resignation letter --

DR. RICE: He said he was busy. And on a couple of occasions he
people had come and said he was busy doing --

Q Busy doing what?

DR. RICE: Giving speeches or doing other things. But it was not
acceptable.

Q In his resignation letter, he praised the President's
courage and determination, did he leave in a huff?

DR. RICE: No. What's really puzzling is that there are two very
different stories here. There's the book and the "60 Minutes"
interview. There is the August 2002 interview, where I assume he said
things that he believed to be truthful, that we didn't give him -- he
didn't give us a plan; that the strategy was to eliminate al Qaeda, not
to roll it back; that we had acted on the steps that he gave to us on
January 25th. I assume he was saying things that he believed to be
true.

There is also during the whole time that he's here -- relations are
very cordial. He comes to me and asks me to support him with Tom Ridge
to become deputy homeland secretary, said he was supportive of the
President. He'd like to continue to serve. He'd like to be deputy
homeland secretary. We had lunch. I invited him to lunch after he
left to kind of thank him for his long service. And he sat at the
table. We had an extensive discussion. It's three weeks before Iraq.
Not a word about concerns that Iraq was going to somehow take us off
the path of the war on terrorism. It would have been easy to do --
kick the others out, close the door, say, I just want you to know I
think you're making a mistake. Didn't do it.

So there are two very different pictures here. And the fact of the
matter is, these stories can't be reconciled. Either he gave us the
plan, as he says in his book; or he didn't, as he says in his
discussion -- his press interview in August. Either we were ignoring
the threat, or now it's changed to it was important but not urgent; or
we were actually responding to the things that he suggested, which is
what he said in the August 2002 interview. Either the President was
not interested in this problem, which is what he said in his "60
Minutes" interview; or it was the President who in March changed the
strategic direction of the NSPD, which is what he said in his August
2002 interview. So these are not reconcilable. And I assume he spoke
the truth on August 2002, so the question is, what happened here?

Q I have one question --

MR. McCORMACK: This is the last question --

Q I don't know what kind of an answer I'll get, but how
damaging is this to the Bush presidency?

DR. RICE: I think, Elisabeth, the American people do not believe
that the President of the United States is pursuing a folly in the war
on terrorism. He's pursuing a coherent, aggressive strategy that takes
the fight to the terrorists. It's the first such strategy in American
history against terrorism after a long period of time in which the
terrorists -- really going back to '80s -- thought they'd gained the
upper hand, in which they'd thought their victory was inevitable.
We've killed or captured two-thirds of the al Qaeda leadership. We've
got a worldwide coalition fighting this terrorism. We've liberated 50
million people. We have a good ally in Afghanistan. We're building a
good ally in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are fighting in the war
on terrorism like they never have before. I think that the American
people understand that.

And, frankly, when Dick Clarke is asked which of his stories is he
going to stand by, I think it will be very obvious to the American
people that there's a real problem in saying the things that he's said
about the President of the United States on "60 Minutes," when he's got
a record of having said something very different just a little while
ago.

Oh, yes, I just -- there's one other thing here, which is that,
after the attacks, this is on September 15th. As I mentioned to you,
Andy Card and I on July 5th during the high spike period asked Dick to
come in and asked him to convene the domestic agencies -- not because
there was any threat reporting about the United States -- there wasn't,
but just in case, just convene them. And here's the note that Dick
wrote to me on September 15th: "When the era of national unity begins
to crack in the near future, it is possible that some will start asking
questions like, did the White House do a good job of making sure that
intelligence about terrorist threats got to the FAA and other domestic
law enforcement authorities, as the attached paper, which was sent to
you in July, and the e-mail, also July, note, in late June the
Interagency Counterterrorism Security Group, which I chair, warned of
an upcoming, spectacular al Qaeda attack that would be qualitatively
different. We convened on 5 July a special meeting of domestic federal
law enforcement agencies because we could not rule out the possibility
that the attack would be in the U.S." In fact, that was the meeting
that we asked him to convene.

"At the special meeting on July 5 were the FBI, Secret Service,
FAA, Customs, Coast Guard, and Immigration. We told them that we
thought a spectacular al Qaeda terrorist attack was coming in the near
future." That had been had been George Tenet's language. "We asked
that they take special measures to increase security and surveillance.
Thus, the White House did ensure that domestic law enforcement
including the FAA knew that the CSG believed that a major al Qaeda
attack was coming, and it could be in the U.S., and did ask that
special measures be taken."

That was, of course, his job -- but that was his assessment on
September 15th.