What Can We Learn from the Pollard Case?

Daniel J. Elazar

In the years since Israel's Peace for Galilee operation in
Lebanon in 1982, there has been a growing rift between the
American Jewish leadership and Israel regarding appropriate
political tactics to insure Israel's security and survival. In
1987 the American Jewish Congress and Rabbi Alexander Schindler
of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations actually adopted a
policy of openly criticizing policies and actions of Israel in
the American media and other public forums. In many respects the
last straw for these American Jewish leader that brought them to
break their silence was the Pollard case.

Jonathan Pollard, a young American Jew with romantic Zionist
ideas, with his wife Ann as an accomplice, used his position in
U.S Naval intelligence to supply classified information on the
Arab states to the Israeli government through the Israeli
spymaster in Washington, Rafi Eitan, and the then - military
attache, Aviam Sela. While Eitan insisted on paying Pollard, the
young couple apparently did what they did for love of Israel.
Moreover they were hardly discreet about it, although their work
went unnoticed for some time. To make matters worse, Pollard was
picked up by the FBI as he sought refuge in the Israeli Embassy
which, as always must be in such cases, turned him away. Hence
the Pollard case hit the headlines in the United States in a most
dramatic way.

Now that the dust has settled in the case and the controversy
surrounding it has faded from the front pages, it is appropriate
to step back and try to assess what the Jewish people can learn
from one of the most upsetting, painful and divisive experiences
to affect Israel-American Jewish relations, as well as
Israel-United States relations, in recent memory.

A Foolish and Reckless Act and an Excessive Punishment

First of all, let us establish that the vast majority of
Israelis who expressed an opinion on the subject, agreed with
their American Jewish brethren that the employment of an American
Jew as a spy within the government of the United States was
foolish and reckless and needlessly jeopardized the good
relationship developed between Israel and the United States which
had reached a high point under the Reagan administration.
Catching Pollard, everyone agrees, opened the door to anti-Israel
forces within the administration, which had been forced to keep
quiet for the past several years, to launch a counter-attack, the
degree of whose success is not yet known.

If there is any sympathy in Israel it is for Pollard, the man
and for his wife, who have impressed most Israelis with their
sincerity in doing what they did out of love for Israel. That
sympathy was increased by his life sentence, far harsher than
that meted out to those Americans who spied for the Soviet Union,
and transfered American secrets to its major enemy, as distinct
from someone who passed on American intelligence of a peripheral
nature regarding third parties. In this they are joined by many
American Jews and perhaps other Americans as well who, as the
first wave of passion subsided, took a second look at Pollard's
life term to ask why he was so severely punished relative to
others. No less a person than Harvard law professor Alan
Dershowitz, one of the leading defenders of civil rights in the
United States, raised this question openly in the columns of the
New York Times and drew a favorable response from other
columnists around the country.

What Separates American and Israeli Jews?

The real differences between Israeli and American Jews appear
on other levels. On one hand, the situation reminds the
sympathetic observer of Churchill's description of the Americans
and English as "kindred peoples separated by a common language."
In this case we are speaking of two segments of the Jewish people
separated by their common love of Israel.

American Jews love Israel as the embodiment of their ideals;
in other words, as a fulfillment of their particular synthesis of
American and Jewish idealism which has become the American Jewish
creed, highly moralistic in its expectations and messianic in its
anticipations. That kind of Israel offers nourishment and
sustenance to American Jewry. When it falls short, as it does in
many little ways, and more blatantly in situations like the
Lebanon War or the Pollard case, many American Jews are truly
hurt, seeing their ideal as violated and reacting with
bitterness.

Israeli Jews, on the other hand, whatever their aspirations
for Israel in the future, are presently wrapped up in their
concern for Israel's survival in the face of so many enemies.
Hence their love for Israel leads them to accept what at least
some American Jews see as moral breaches. To most Israelis those
actions often are seen in light of a higher morality of survival,
in this case survival by enhancing Israel's ability to prevent
war, in itself a moral good. Both communities are partially
right in the focus of their love and in their moral assessment.
Each sees itself as entirely correct, at least until there is
time for second thoughts.

There is yet another level, however, one which reflects how
much the two communities still do not really know each other
despite so many decades of interaction and presumed intimacy.
Isralis simply do not understand how American Jews feel. No
matter how much some (not many) may have come to understand the
matter intellectually, they cannot conceive of the American
reality existentially. For them the Jewish people remains first
and foremost their primordial group which commands or should
command the fundamental allegiance of all Jews wherever they may
be. In that sense they do not understand how American Jews have
become Americans while remaining committed Jews.

American Jews, on the other hand, cannot understand how much
Israelis are a Middle Eastern people, faithful to the notion that
peoples, primordial ethno-religious communities, are the building
blocks of the human order, that with few exceptions one is born
into peoplehood and can never really leave one's original people
except with a great wrenching effort. As long as no such effort
is made, loyalty to one's people remains first and foremost for
Israelis. Perhaps the two communities will never learn to
understand each other existenstially in this matter. If so, Jews
will simply have to learn to live with that misunderstanding, but
both communities must keep trying.

Raising the "Dual Loyalty" Issue and Jewish Insecurity

This brings us to the proximate issue of "dual loyalty" and
American Jewish security. In some respects, American Jews look
upon Israel as their creation and their pet, so that when Israel
seems to jeopardize their status as Americans, it is as if a
faithful dog whom they have fed and cared for (and they have an
exaggerated view of how much they have helped Israel, which is to
be expected), has just turned around and bitten the hand that
feeds it. Israelis can argue, properly, that this is a selfish
attitude. That does not make it any less real, but here Israelis
have a right to ask American Jews, "if you feel so
American, how is it that you are so insecure?

Shlomo Avineri, who posed that question, may not know the
half of it. I was in Washington, D.C. the day Pollard was
arrested and in the United States in 1987 at times that happened
to coincide with his sentencing and the reaction to it. What was
striking on all three occasions was the degree to which the issue
of dual loyalty was raised almost exclusively by Jews. In some
cases, the American Jewish establishment did so itself,
apparently in the hope of preventing the issue from surfacing by
raising the charge in order to deny it. Even more frequently, it
was raised by Jews in the media, most of whom are highly
assimilated but still apparently need to demostrate their "bona
fides" as Americans by constantly raising the issue. Thus Ted
Koppel, who has become well-known as a good friend of Israel but
who, himself, is married to a non-Jew, repeatedly devoted his
Nightline program to the Pollard case, repeatedly raising the
dual loyalty issue, to my mind gratuitously.

My business in the States is primarily with non-Jews and it
leads me to have close contact with government and public affairs
circles and to regularly monitor the media other than the major
newspapers and television networks where the Jewish presence is
so strong. Maybe they were just being polite, but I did not find
any signs of non-Jews raising the dual loyalty issue
independently.

The level of American Jewish insecurity is astounding. As
one who was born and raised in a religiously observant, Zionist,
Hebrew-oriented home in the midwestern and western United States,
it was not until I became an adult that it even occured to me
that this could be a real issue. Perhaps this was my naivete or
perhaps it reflected a high degree of integration in American
life. Nevertheless, since 1973 I have watched with ever-growing
amazement how American Jews keep looking for anti-semitsm to fall
upon them as a result of some Israel-related crisis. So far it
has not, but they keep escalating the stakes. As Avineri
suggests, American Jewry would do well to examine its deeper self
in this respect.

On the other hand, even Jacob Neusner has a point in his
excessive, unnecessary, and tasteless Washington Post article, of
March 11, 1987. In an immediate sense, the United States may
indeed be more physically secure for Jews than embattled Israel
and, although he is dead wrong in seeing Israeli culture as
limited and parochial, in certain ways there may be a greater
flowering of a wider range of Jewish ideas in free, pluralistic
and affluent America than in an Israel under siege. But why make
the comparison? What is it that drives some people to suggest
that the other group is not what it hopes to be in order to
justify who they are? America can be praised for what it is
without denigrating Israel and it is unseemly for an American
Jew, no matter how committed to the United States, to do so.
Denigration is different from criticism. It is certainly
legitimate to criticize Israeli actions and one can do so without
in the least bit denigrating the Jewish state, but that is not
what Neusner does. Neusner's brilliance enables him to go
immediately for the jugular, but even where he may have a point,
it is not to his credit to make it.

Israeli Authorities Misunderstand American
Courtesy and Political
Morality

The Israeli authorities also have a lot to learn. As many
analysts assumed, the decision to employ Pollard was not traced
back to senior ministers. If experience is any guide, in no
government do ministers themselves actually deploy field agents.
The usual rule is that those on the political level give their
spymasters tasks and then say to them "do what you have to and
don't let us know about it." Were that not the case, there would
never be a moment when any political figure was safe. Spying is
by definition a dirty business, a little more, a little less, and
the political leadership have to insulate themselves from it.

The foolishness of the Israeli leadership is in misassessing
the American response. Israelis still do not understand American
political culture and political morality, even after observing
Watergate and more recently, Irangate. This is not the place to
go into an explanation of why Americans are like they are, but
Americans apply strict moral standards in the political realm of
a kind probably never applied in any other country (Canada may
come close, influenced as it is by the United States). Moreover
the structure of the American political system with its
separation of powers makes it well nigh impossible to quash
issues such as the Pollard case. Congress would invariably get
into the act. Even within the executive branch, presidents do
not rule the roost in these matters. If nothing else, Justice
Department investigators take a professional pride in being
fearless in their work and showing no favor. In this case they
were probable egged on by anti-Israel elements, but even without
that, in all likelihood they would have acted as they did.

The "normal" processes in international relations would lead
the Israelis to expect that Pollard uncovered was an
embarrassment, but since two friendly states were involved, the
issue would be resolved at the political level. That is to say,
there would be whatever appropriate apoligies and reparations
made and then the political leadership of the offended country
would quiet the matter for the sake of continued good relations.
Apparently they did not understand that things cannot be handled
like that in the United States. Certainly not in our time. The
media would go about their business of "exposing" without
restraint. Every aspect of America's moralistic political streak
would come to the fore and, since this moralistic streak
coincides with American Jewish political moralism it would be
reinforced by the most articulate elements in American society --
the Jews.

Israelis in authority apparently continued to misjudge
American courtesy as well. One can have little doubt that Prime
Minister Shamir came back from his February 1987 visit to the
United States encouraged that the matter was ended. Prior to his
trip the American Jewish leadership had brought heavy pressure to
bear on him not to go on the grounds that the timing was very
bad. Pollard was due to be sentenced during the time Shamir was
to be in the country and in general the climate was not good.
Shamir persisted for his own reasons and the American government
obliged by postponing the sentencing and by not raising the issue
with him. Since this would not have been the Israli way -
Israelis everything on their sleeves - Shamir and his colleagues
were lulled into thinking that they could go back to business as
usual. Hence the unfortunate timing of Rafi Eitan's appointment
and Aviam Sela's promotion. . The Israeli leadership must learn
to better understand the United States if it is to properly
assess American reactions on other issues that may even be more
vital to Israel's future.

The Unstatesmanlike Response of American Jewish Leaders

On the other hand, American Jews have to climb down from
their moralistic hobby horse, which was reflected in their
expectation that Eitan and Sela should be cast out of the temple
forever. They have to understand that Israelis, however wrong
and foolish they believe employing Pollard was, will inevitably
take into consideration the long and excellent service records of
both men. They will never be brought to believe that one
mistake, which after all caused no fatalities or wars, demands
such an overrighteous reaction. This, indeed was one of the
greatest sticking points in communication between the two
communities. Neither can understand the other's view on the
subject of punishment of the Israeli principals.

Finally - and this is probably too much to expect - American
Jewry should take this opportunity to reexamine the way it
responds to such issues as an organizaed community. In a private
conversation, one of the leading elder statesmen of American
Jewry reflected on how unseemly it was for the American Jewish
leadership to fall over their feet to run to Israel to publicly
lecture the Israeli leadership on how to behave in the aftermath
of the case. Dignity has its place in international relations
and it is a very important one. Those American Jewish
organizations engaged in external relations (what American Jews
call "community relations") will in almost every case sacrifice
dignity for publicity since they live off of the latter; hence
the unseemly scramble for column inches in the New York Times.
But this, too, is registered by friends and foes alike, who
undoubtedly have come to certain conclusions about how the Jewish
people does its business and, in turn, how to do business with
the Jewish people.

All told, the Pollard case was far from being our finest
hour. Let us at least try to learn from our mistakes.