Numerous analyses are being published in an attempt to explain Serbian-Albanian
relations. One of them is the book by Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer
entitled Albania – from Anarchy To a Balkan Identity (1), published
by Nea in Belgrade. As the authors are known experts on Albania and Albanians,
the message of the book is very important for policy makers, primarily
American and British Governments as leading political actors in international
politics regarding Albania and Yugoslavia.

Albanian
flag on a mosque in Kosovo, 2006

However,
in spite of the profusion of information significant for political sciences
as well as politics, the book contains numerous fundamental errors which
lead the readers to conclude erroneously that in the Serbo-Albanian conflict
Albanians are in the right, while the Serbs are aggressors and imperialists.
For this reason, the focus of this analysis is, primarily on the errors
contained in the book, without in any way denying the value of what can
be useful and important for readers in Serbia and in foreign countries.
It cannot be denied that the authors made a valiant effort to get to know
Albania and Albanians from on-the-spot firsthand experience, to get acquainted
personally with many actors of the Albanian political scene and to understand
their attitudes. They strived also to analyze in detail the political and
social scene in today’s Albania and to present it truthfully to the readers,
all of which makes their book very well documented. It may even be considered
indispensable for the understanding of the contemporary political reality
of Albanian ethos (2). However, this book contains also a number of errors,
which are easily seen as such in the light of well-documented and academically
sound writings of Albanian authors themselves. The authors of the book
state: “Dukadjin was responsible for codification of unwritten laws embodied
in a canon, a form of primitive constitution inherited from the Illyrians”
. This clearly shows that they have wholly accepted the thesis of the Albanians’
direct descent from the Illyrians (3). However, there is absolutely no
proof of this. The Albanians appear in history very late, only in the11th
century , while the Illyrians disappeared from the historical scene in
the first half of the 3rd century . This means that between the disappearance
of the Illyrians and the appearance of the Albanians there is a hietus
of about eight centuries (5). It may be that the Albanians are, indeed,
the descendants of the Illyrians, but it is a claim that no one can make
with any certainty.

On page 15 we find this statement: “There was also an opening up towards
secular Islamic countries like Egypt and Libya” (6). A secular country
is a country in which religion is separate from the state. Therefore, the
terms Islamic and secular are linguistically and logically incompatible,
for either a country is Islamic or it is secular. Both countries mentioned
are in their constitutional enactments defined as Islamic, i.e. they have
a state religion, which limits the rights of other religions (7). This
claim is reiterated on page 220, where the authors mention “secular and
leftist Islamic countries (8),” showing that they paid no attention to
the theocratic nature of Islam. Thus it was difficult for them, in spite
of their long stay in Albania and among Albanians, to understand correctly
the true nature of Albanian society, which is over 80 percent Muslim, counting
those Albanians who live in Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania. If to this
we add the number of Albanians in Turkey this percentage would be even
larger. On page 96 the authors state: “During their history Albanians moved
with relative ease from one religion to another—they were Catholic, Orthodox
or Muslim, according to their interest at the time (9).”

Kosovo
mosque formerly known as Bin Laden Mosque, whose name was later changed
because the name gave bad publicity to the independence seeking Muslim
Albanians

If this statement is correct in the case of individual conversions
from Roman Catholicism to Orthodoxy and vice versa, it certainly is not
correct as regards conversion to Islam. When the Osmanlis conquered, or
rather annexed, Southern Albania after 1417, as stated by reputed Albanian
historians Puto and Pollo, “the Turkish rule in Southern Albania was a
great misfortune. The Turks destroyed everything without exception… Their
chroniclers proudly pointed out what great loot was won in Albania, what
wholesale burning of towns and villages was perpetrated, with what indescribable
savagery the local inhabitants were treated, and how children were taken
away from their homes to be made Janissaries or sold on slave markets (10).”
But, as all this was executed in the name of Islam, as one of the most
famous historians of the Osmanli Empire, and a Turk himself, Halil Inalgic
(11) claims, saying that the Albanian people did not accept Islam. An Albanian
historian Atanas Gegaj in his study says: “It could be said that the Christian
element was predominant in Albania until the 18th century and continued
to fight for its religion and nationality (12).” The most famous example
is George Kastrioti, the renowned Scandarbeg, who was of Serbian descent,
(13). He was, according to Albanian sources, leading a bloody civil war
against those Albanians who accepted Islam and joined the Osmanli army.
His main opponents were an Albanian Muslim, Balaban-pasha born in Mata,
and George’s nephew Hamza who fought against his uncle. As another Albanian
historian Rexhep Krasniqi claims, Balaban-pasha captured seven generals
of George Kastrioti and had them flayed alive because they refused to renounce
Christianity (14).

Rexhep Krasniqi, also states that George and his father John accepted
Islam under duress in order to save their lives, and that George was then
given the name Scandar. After the battle at Nish in 1433 Scandar forced
the Sultan’s scribe to confirm that he was again the governor of the town
of Kruja in Albania. “When he returned there he again took his father’s
religion which he had renounced only out of necessity.” He massacred mercilessly
all Albanians who refused to return to Christianity. This was how began
the holy war of Albanian Christians against the Muslims, says Rexhep Krasniqi,
an Albanian with a Muslim name (15). This is confirmed by another Albanian
Atanas Gegaj, who states that the first man to be killed in Kruja was a
Muslim, commander of the town, Hasan-beg. Gegaj adds that Albanians reacted
to this news with great joy and that they all hastened to demolish all
signs of Islam and return to the country its Christian character. Gegaj
says: “The die is cast. Scandarbeg will from now on fight not only for
the independence of the fatherland but for the salvation of Christian civilization
from the danger of Islam as well (16).” He also confirms that George and
his brother converted to Islam by force in order to save their lives.

Egyptian
mission in Kosovo, 2006

In spite of such harsh treatment Albanians resisted Islamization for
three centuries. At the beginning of the 17th century, jizyah, a tax in
Islamic fiscal system imposed on non-Muslims, amounted to 305 aspras. By
the middle of the century it was increased to 780 aspras (17). Those who
had no money lost their lives. This, together with many such constant abuses,
was the reason for Islamization.

Vickers and Petiffer on page 97 state: “In spite of the widely accepted
view that the Osmanli rule mainly aspired to the expansion of Islam, there
was little official encouragement to convert Empire’s Christian subjects
[to Islam] (18).” However, the facts tell a different story. The essence
of Islam is to proselytize, and Islam, as the Koran says, is the basis
of the state. Therefore, to deny the need to convert the people to Islam
would mean to deny Koran, to deny Muhammad. The Koran says: “And who seeks
a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted from
him, and in the life to come he shall be among the losers.” (Sura
3:86) (19). Had it not been thus, Turkey would not exist today. Almost
the entire territory of today’s Turkey was Byzantine until 1071; and the
population of this territory was predominantly Greek and Armenian. There
were inhabitants of other ethnic groups, but there were no Turks (20).
Only after a violent conquest did Turkey start to establish the foundations
of its state on the territory it occupies today. It was the country of
the Greeks and the Armenians. Nearly three hundred years later, in 1340,
in this state ruled by Muslim Turks, lived eight million inhabitants, of
which six million were Christians, i.e. Greeks and Armenians, and only
two Muslim Turks (21). Where did all the Christians go? Some managed to
leave the country and some were massacred. But the overwhelming majority
was first Islamized and then Turkicized. They are inhabitants of today’s
Turkey. They are Turks, who thanks to Islamization have changed their genotype
and phenotype and, having once belonged to a Mongoloid yellow race, now
became predominantly Caucasian, as is claimed by probably the greatest
modern historian of the Arab world Philip Hitti (22).

The Shariat law is the most functional expression of Islam. It guided
the ideology of the Osmanli Empire and it was implemented through fatwas
(religious/legal opinions prescribing appropriate behavior in given situations).
Collections of these fatwas, which are numerous, show, that contrary to
what Pettifer and Vickers claim conversion to Islam was forced and ordered
by the highest Osmanli religious authority, the Sheik ul Islam. Fatwas
are given in the form of questions, which a Muslim puts to the Sheik ul
Islam and to which the Sheik gives the answer. For instance: the fatwa
may run like this: “If a representative of authorities ties the unbeliever
Zaid by the neck and starts to strangle him, and Zaid, to save himself,
says let me go, I am Muslim, is the status obtained in this fashion considered
legal ? The answer is yas" (23) The result is that the Turks themselves
today deny that their community exists as an ethnic entity. Answering a
journalist’s question, a former Turkish chargé d’affaires in Belgrade,
Egin Oba said: “ Turkey created a national state in which being a Turk
does not mean being a member of any ethnic group, but being a citizen of
Turkey. Twenty-four different ethnic groups live in Turkey today (24).

Saudi
Mosque in Kosovo, 2006

It is interesting that Pettifer and Vickers did not see that the Albanian
historians themselves contradicte their claim that the Oslmanlis did not
spread Islam by force. Thus Albanian authorities Puto and Pollo say: “The
Sultan acceded to religious pressures on the Albanian population. At the
end of the 16th century began the first campaign for Islamization of Albanians
the goal of which was to make of them Muslim subjects connected with the
destiny of Osmanli Empire (25).” On page 97 Pettifer and Vickers further
say that the Russo-Osmanli wars of the 18th century considerably accelerated
the decline of the Osmanli Empire which brought no noticeable change in
previous Osmanli politics of religious tolerance.” This must be understood
to mean that since their conquest of Albania until the 18th century the
Osmanli authorities treated Albanians with religious tolerance. But, as
we can see, the Albanian sources deny that. Besides, can it be logical
to claim that the state which is based on Islam can be considered religiously
tolerant?

Islam prohibits religious tolerance, and according to the Shariat law,
a Muslim who abandons Islam must be condemned to death (26). On page 97
the authors say: “As Muslims they were allies of the Osmanlis who protected
them from Slavonic and Greek pressures (27). Above all, there is the well-known
fact that Islam neither knows nor acknowledges the notion of nation (28).
Therefore, Albanians as a nation did not exist for the Osmanli administration,
and as Enver Hoxha says: “Fraternity in Islam was a principle and a legal
question. As a principle, spiritual and material unity had to exist among
members of a community and between the rulers and those who are being ruled.(29)”
Therefore, there could be no alliance between the Osmanli and the Albanians,
for both of them were Osmanlis in the sense that they lived in a state
ruled by the Osmanli dynasty. It was as much their state as it was the
sate of the Turks in as much as the latter were Muslims in contrast to
other Turkish nationals who were not.

When writing about the system of millet, Pettifer and Vickers show that
they are familiar with it, but their story about the alliance between the
Osmanlis and the Albanians shows their lack of clear understanding of the
socio-political dimensions of the millet system. Furthermore, their mention
of the Osmanlis having to protect the Albanians from Greek and Slavonic
pressures contains yet another inaccuracy. How could the Greeks and the
Slavs pressure Albanian Muslims in the country which is ruled by the Albanians?
Stavro Skendi, an Albanian, speaks to this point when he says that in the
course of the history of the Osdmanli Empire at least 30 Albanians held
the office of Grand Vizier, which would correspond to today’s office of
prime minister (30). Then, on page 98 the authors say: “the relations between
religious groups were relatively friendly and, like in the past, they acted
freely” (31). They obviously have in mind inter-religious relations between
two World Wars. In view of the fact that George Kastrioti was fighting
especially against Albanian Muslims, how can it be claimed that the relations
between various religions were friendly?

Destroyed
Church in Kosovo, 2006

A veritable multitude of data tells us that Albanian Muslims killed
their Christian fellow-Albanians. It was precisely the threat of death
and torture by Muslim Albanians, which forced Christian Albanians to embrace
Islam. Ethnic Turks cannot primarily be blamed for this because the majority
of Muslims in Albania was made up of indigenous but Islamized population.
Trough the entire history the Christians and the Muslims were on the opposing
sides. The Roman Catholics sided with the Italians and the Austrians; the
Orthodox sided with the Russians and the Greeks; and the Muslims served
the Sultan and the Caliph, the head of Islamic world in Istanbul. The Orthodox
town of Voskopoja, a center of enormous economic and cultural importance,
whose highly developed school system was on the par with other European
educational systems, was demolished by Albanian Muslims, who treated their
Orthodox fellow-countrymen with the ferocity of wild beasts. This episode
is very well described by Albanian historians, such as Arben Puto, Stefanaq
Pollo, Kristo Frasheri, Stavro Skendi and others. Frasheri writes:
“The tragic end of Voskopoja, a town with about 20,000 inhabitants, is
an example of the situation in Albania. Having refused to become the prey
of feudalists in Southern Albania, the Voskopeans were attacked three times
in 1769, in 1772 and 1789 and their town looted. After ten years of destruction,
robbery and wars, Voskopolis disappeared from the face of Albania (32).”

Describing the relations among the members of three religions between
two World Wars, Viron Koka, contemporary Albanian historian, contradicts
the claims Pettifer and Vickers. He says: “Priests continued like before
to put the interest of religion above the interest of the nation and to
fight severely against all progressive manifestations even against the
independence of Albanian people (33).” Koka adds: “Catholics considered
Muslims a horde of primitive Asians deprived of national feelings and unworthy
of being comprised within the term of Albanian nation (34).” The extent
of the hostility among the members of three religions is best illustrated
by the fact that in the eighties of the last century, during Hoja’s greatest
reign of terror, after decades of religious persecution in Shkoder(Scutari),
where the concentration of Roman Catholics is greatest, and in spite of
official Albanian propaganda, Roman Catholics and Muslims chose for their
spouses members of their own religion. The number of mixed marriages between
these two religions did not surpass five percent (35).

Saudi
Mosque in Kosovo, 2006

The lack of attention Pettifer and Vickers pay to the Albanian Islam
and the forms of its phenomenon is particularly evident in the following
statement: “The Bektesis who performed very perfunctorily traditional Muslim
rites, called for the cleansing of, and retaliation against (Sunni) Osmanli
authorities and preached tolerance towards all non-Muslim beliefs (36).”
There are only two accurate pieces of information in this statement. First,
the Bektesis performed only perfunctorily all Sunni Muslim rites. However,
they did this because they had their own rites. Second, by the end of the19th
and the beginning of the 20th centuries the Bektesis had more awareness
of the Albanian ethnic character which distanced them from the Turks than
did others, i.e. Albanian Sunni Muslims who felt more closely connected
with the Turks. However, it is more than clear that the Bektesis did not
express collectively this awareness of their ethnicity in relation to the
ethnic Turks. If expression was given at all to this ethnic awareness,
it was done by individuals or very small groups which were more numerous
among the Bektesis than among the Sunnis. However, a large majority of
both the Bektesi and the Sunnis remained as connected with Turks, in the
ethnic sense, as with the Sultan to whom they were collectively loyal and
were, therefore, against the independence of Albanian lands from the Osmanli
Empire. For this reason they proudly called themselves the Sultan’s sons.
Writing about one of the most famous Bektesi, Sami Frasheri, who was renowned
as a champion of the Albanian national awakening, Frasheri Kristo, a famous
Albanian historian, says that he spent his entire life in Instanbul and
that he felt an extraordinary connection with the Turkish people (37).”
Turkish historians consider Frasheri one of the founders of Turcism and
Pan-Turcism because he contributed to the awakening of modern the Turkish
nation through his writings in Turkish newspapers (38).

It is quite clear that Bektesis are not against Sunni Muslims. That,
of course, does not mean there was no hostility and persecutions, but the
basic Islamic connection between them was never broken as is wrongly concluded
by the same authors. The existence of this unbroken connection is confirmed
by the Bektesis themselves. This was done in independent Albania, at the
time when they could say what they wanted to say. Thus, for instance, Selman
Jemal baba, the head of the Bektesi monastery near Elbasan, said: Bektesism
is nothing other than the real Islam based on the Koran (39),” and baba
Rexhepi, the head of the Bektesi monastery in Detroit, USA points out:
“The Bektesis, especially those from our tekia, Asim baba near Girokostra,
did not want to be very distant from the Sunnis. But no one wants to believe
so. Generally speaking the Bektesi approve the verses of the Koran and
hadis. (40)” The “tolerance of the Bektesi,” which was undoubtedly greater
than that of the Sunnis can be seen in the following example. Idayet Beciri,
the head of the party of “National unity” about whom Vickers and Pettifer
say that he is for altering the borders in the Balkans (41) and whose party,
as is claimed by one English source, “is neo-fascist and calls for war
with Serbia.” At the same time the source states that this party is explicitly
hostile towards Albanian Greeks who are Orthodox (42). According to the
same source, “National Unity” is very tightly connected with the new-founded
Bektesi dervish community whose chief Rashat baba Bardhi 1991 met with
Beciri and blessed his party way back in 1991 (43). How Bektesis behaved
in the past is shown in the example of Ali-pasha Tepelini, himself a Bektesi
(44). Speaking of himself he said: “There is no minute in a day that someone
does not wish my death. And how can it be otherwise? It is already past
40 years that I have done evil to the entire world. I had more than 30,000
people killed or hanged. And it is known that if I live for a few years
more, I will kill many others (45).”

Pettifer and Vickers in several places in the book say: “large parts
of North and West Albania belonged to Serbia and Montenegro. (46)” This,
primarily, refers to Tetovo, Debar, Kosmet, etc. If the authors have in
mind that in these territories prior to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) the
Albanians were in a majority, they are right. But, is that criterion sufficient?
If we were to apply this criterion alone, the town of Rube in France would
belong to Algeria, because Algerians constitute a majority in it. But,
if considered how Albanians came to be in a majority in these areas the
conclusion would be different. René Pinon, a French historian, has
this to say about it: “In 1906, one quarter of the population of Tetovo’s
valley Polog was Albanian, and three quarters Bulgarian, Only four years
later proportions were inverted. Thanks to his rifle an Albanian managed
to get the land he liked” (47). If Tetovo now has an Albanian majority
the same is not true of the municipality of Plav in Montenegro which Pettifer
and Vickers say is Albanian (48). The majority of the autochthonous population
of the area is ethnically Serbian, but the majority of them is Muslim by
religion. The important fact is that they are not Albanian. The censuses
of 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 show 16.55, 19.11, 20.63 and 20.72 percent
respectively as Albanian (49).

Kosovo
Albanian woman, 2006

On page 178 the authors say that the situation with problems of the
Macedonian Albanians is completely different. Macedonian Albanians are
seen by Albania as very Islamized – which is only a part of the truth (50).
The first question we should ask is why Albanians from Albania would say
something of this sort about their fellow-Albanians in Macedonia, if they
wished them well? Do they really want to defame them in the world? However,
that fact is not only visible to the naked eye but is also confirmed by
most serious research work and by the statement of the head of the Albanian
Islamic religious community. Thus already in 1972, when communist anti-religious
propaganda was at its worst, research into the piety of the population
in Donji Polog near Tetovo, carried out using the most rigorously scientific
methodology, confirmed that more than 77 percent of Albanians are Muslims
who strictly respect all religious precepts, while 15.2 percent were vacillating
believers (51). That means that 92 percent of Albanian Muslims in this
region of Macedonia stated they were believers. When asked what kind of
believers Albanians in Macedonia were, the president of Meshihat, i.e.
chief religious authority for Macedonia Suleyman Rexhepi, said: “… and
as regards the path which IC (Islamic Community) will take, there is no
doubt that our path and the path of all Albanians is Allah’s path (52),
and added: “Albanians from Macedonia are very good Muslims and believers,
and I would not agree with you that a significant number among them deny
Islam. Allah’s religion cannot be denied (53).” Therefore, if the
highest cleric of the Albanian Islam, whose duty is always to ask his believers
to be even more devout than they are, says that he is not worried about
the state of their piety, we cannot see why anyone would question that
fact? It is particularly important that the question was raised in the
context of a political organization. The Democratic Party of Arben Jaferi,
which is mentioned by Pettifer and Vickers, was formed on July 6th 1997
and immediately adopted the slogan “with Islamic spirit and Albanian blood
(54).” This shows that the party has retreated from its formally secular
character, which is understandable to every expert on Islam. Islam does
not tolerate secularism, and every political party that has the support
of IC is anti secular, anti democratic and anti national for Islam prohibits
nationality, regardless of what its leadership says publicly. Besides,
the windows of kiosks in Pristina mosques prominently display the issues
of previously mentioned Naqavi translated into Albanian. The message it
brings is clear – today you may be Albanians, but if tomorrow you do not
subordinate the interests of the nation to the interests of Islam, if you
are not against Albanian atheists, Roman Catholics and Orthodox, you will
go to hell. For Allah wants it so!

The
office of Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo is located in the Kralja
Petra Street in Kosovo capital Pristina, inside a Serbian factory Novi
Dom. Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo includes the International
Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Saudi Red Crescent Society, the
Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation, Islamic Endowments and Makka Establishment, some of
which have already been designated as terrorist supports.

It has already been said that over 80 percent of Albanians are Muslim,
so without knowing Islam it is not possible to know Albanians. If former
Muslims and Albanian Christians who are now converted to atheism consciously
spread the incorrect story of a laicized and secular Albania, serious analysts
must not be duped by it, for if they are they will understand nothing of
the situation in Albania. It is curious that in several places Vickers
and Pettifer emphasize the revitalization of religion, particularly of
Islam, without ever questioning – where does it lead! More democracy means
more religious freedom, and more religious freedom for Islam means the
end of secular and national Albania! And there is not an iota of doubt
that this is so (55). The example of Turkey bears witness to this. Authors
claim that in the region of Istanbul alone live some half a million Albanians
(56). And it is the most discriminated against community of Albanians in
the world. They are forbidden to have schools in Albanian or declare themselves
as Albanians; they are forced to be Turks. In addition, no Albanian has
ever raised the question of the rights of their fellow-Albanians living
in Turkey. It means that Islam means more to these Albanians than their
national identity and, abandoning themselves to Turkey, they voluntarily
renounce their national identity and accept Turkish as their mother tongue.
During communism, Albanians in Albania even praised Turkey for these actions,
which only goes to show how close Islam is to albanian communism
(57). A lot of people in Albania still feel vaguely like this because of
the communist propaganda to which they were subjected for half a century.
But what does this mean viewed from the perspective of eternity Allah has
in mind for them? When Albania is Islamized, and it will happen, Albanian
nation will disappear; the Muslim nation will be the only one. So that
Albanian Jihad will be the only path to follow (58) and it will lead towards
Tetovo, Skoplje, Belgrade and the very heart of Europe. Besides, the map
of “Great Albania,” which until now did not comprise Nish within
its borders, now does (59). These facts, perhaps, seem pessimistic, but
as Winston Churchill once said: “An optimist is only a badly informed man.”

Footnotes

1. Miranda Vickers & James Pettifer, Albania – from Anarchy to a
Balkan Identity, C. Hurst & Company LTD 38 King Street, London. The
date of the edition is not stated, but judging by internal evidence and
the fact that Ivan Djordjevi?’s translation of the book appeared in Yugoslavia
in 1998 the date of publication is probably 1997. Miranda Vickers is a
historian specializing in the Balkans and a regular contributor to British
journals and newspapers on Albanian issues. James Pettifer is, also, a
regular contributor to English reviews, newspapers and wherever decisions
on the Balkans are discussed. In addition, he is a visiting professor at
the Insitute for Balkan studies at the University of Salonika. This book
presents an analysis of the Albanian situation between 1985 and 1996.

2.Working primarily with Albanian materials issued by the Albanian Academy
of Sciences, M. Jevtic, professor at the School of Political Sciences at
the University of Belgrade, specializing in political science of religion
, has published a great number of articles in domestic and foreign scientific
journals and compendia and more than a hundred articles in the domestic
press on Albanian issues.

7. One of the world’s most famous Islamologists Bernard Lewis in his
book Le retour de l’islam , Paris, 1985, pp.186-187 states that article
2 of the 1971 Constitution of Egypt reads “Islam is the state religion…
Islamic law is the main source of law”; then article 2 of Libya’s provisional
constitution of 1969 states “Islam is the state religion…”

26. According to The Koran with a translation into Serbian,
edition of Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia, Medina, Hijra 1412 year, p. XII,
note 33, item 1

27. Vickers and Pettifer, ibid., 97

28. Literature regarding this question is very voluminous. Suffice it
to mention the book of Ali Muhamed Naqavi, Islam and Nationalism, Teheran,
1984. Or perhaps cite the position of Feisal, King of Saudi Arabia, which
is evident in his address to the World Islamic league: “Dear brothers,
today we see the Muslim nation suffer from non-unity, quarrels and disagreements,”
quoted in The Muslim World League Journal, September-October 1987,
p.2

32. Puto and S. Pollo, ibid., p. 110; S. Skendi, ibid., p. 22; The treatment
of Christians at the hands of Muslim Albanians can be seen in the following
example. There is an area called Himara in southwestern Albania. Its inhabitants,
Albanians of Christian Orthodox religion, called Himariots were attacked
by Muslim Albanians led by Ali-pasha Tepelini. On Easter 1798 all the peasants
were in their churches expecting the priest to greet them after the service
with the words “Christ is risen”. At that very moment Ali-pasha’s soldiers
burst into churches and slew all the priests and took part of the believers
into slavery. This was the fate of villages Nivica-Bubari and Sv. Vasilije.
Subsequently, inhabitants of that region converted to Islam in huge numbers.
Ali-pasha then sent missionaries and built mosques and dervish monasteries
in every village.Quoted from Gabriel Remerand, Ali de Tebelen pacha de
Janina, 1774-1822, Paris, 1928, p.55

55. That is why the religion in Albania was abolished. “The history
of our people shows at what extent it suffered from religion… how it stirred
up dissension and provoked fratricidal wars. That is why… nothing
connects us with religion…not only as atheists but as well as Albanian
patriots.” Quoted from: Enver Hoxha, Le socialisme en Albanie, II,
Paris, 1994, p. 199. For this reason the head of the Albanian Orthodox
Church Noli, Albanian nationalist moreover , was against the catechism
in schools. Quoted from: Koqo Bihiku, Les Pamphlets Politiques de Noli
dans années 1925-1932, Studia Albanica, no..1/1987.

58 Preporod, Herald of Meshihat , i.e. had authority of Islamic community
in BIH(Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the issue from October first 1991, p.
22 says : “Jihad in Islam is the climax of its excellence…Jihad…is the
guide through all the past till doomsday” or, say in Takvim for 1992, annual
of presidency of Islamic priests of BIH p. 68: “ Islam aspires to
destroy all the states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth
that are opposed to the ideology and the programme of Islam… Islam seeks
the earth, not only a part of it but the entire planet” This text was published
first in English in: Al-Mawdudi, Jihad in islam , The holy Koran,
P.O. box 7492 Beirut, Lebanon, 1983

59 See, for instancee, site: www.frosina.org. Gazeta Sciptare, an Albanian
newspaper, also wrote on this topic. One of its articles was published
by Politika, Belgrade November 5, 1998, p.1.. Even Osama bin Laden himself
visited Albania in the mid 1990s of the last century. His visit was organised
by the then chief of the Albanian security agency SHIK, Bashkim Gazidede,
At that time bin Laden met with many highly placed Albanian leaders.

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