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Thursday, 1 August 2013

July 2013 Notes: Could the RNR provide a solution to the Naval Services lack of force depth?

Reason for writing:the
Royal Navy is shrinking, it’s personnel numbers are being cut regularly and
unlike other services it’s reserves whilst loyal, well trained and very
committed are often seemingly an afternoon in defence considerations. These
notes consider the idea that perhaps the Royal Navy Reserve should be
re-established, re-energised and most importantly re-equipped so it’s once more
on a more equal footing with its other service counterparts and can play as
full a role as Britain in reality needs it to in the defence of the realm.

·VSTOL: Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing, the
cheapest system of carrier flight deck, but requires the most expensive
aircraft… the Royal Navy (RN) was the first navy to employ this to provide its
fixed wing airpower, but that was out of necessity when the first Queen Elizabeth class was cancelled
(CVA-01 was due to have been called after the Queen) and all it managed to get
built were the ‘Through-Deck Cruisers’ of the Invincible class.

·F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): produced in
multiple variants, B for VSTOL and C for CATOBAR, this is the new stealth jet
strike/fighter (what used to be called a Fighter Bomber…i.e. could fight its
way to the target, drop its bombs and fight its way back) coming into service
with the RN for the Fleet Air Arm to fly of the carriers.

·Eurofighter Typhoon: Principle aircraft belonging to
the Royal Air Force at the moment, a Cold War inspired Dog-Fighter that was
used in conjunction with Tornadoes over Libya to do some limited bombing…
although it was the much more venerable Tornadoes which had to aim the weapons.

In the 1800s the Royal Navy could
draw upon a massive merchant fleet to provide both manpower and ships in times
of war to make up for the peacetime procurement shortfall; in 1850s this was
formalised into the Royal Naval Reserves. In the 1900s a proper fleet was stood
up and until 1960 the Royal Naval reserve would retain their own vessels for
activation in times of war. It was done in part because it was presumed that
any future conflict would quickly go nuclear so a naval reserve would not be of
use. However, since 1960 through a combination of luck, diplomacy and strategic
deterrence there hasn’t been a nuclear war, there has been though been piracy,
drug trafficking, a huge naval task force was despatched to the Falklands,
constant patrols have been kept up worldwide at points of critical interest and
countless other mobilisations. For all these things a reserve force would have
been more than useful, they would have been lifesaving and more importantly far
more cost effective than having to implement commercial solutions within a
limited time frame.

For the modern Naval Service the
lack of a proper reserve[2] is
a problem which can only grow, fewer and fewer merchant ships are now British
flagged, and those that are growing bigger – now whilst this might seem a
benefit as fewer ships can carry more stuff, which in terms of commercial
carriage is great as it cuts costs, in terms of naval operations it’s a real
problem. The case study is the Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands war, the loss
of the helicopters and the supplies it was carrying really hampered the land
war effort and forced the amphibious task group to have to take far bigger
risks with its ships… now imagine if that ship had 50% bigger, even more loaded
with equipment, even more important therefore not to place all the eggs in
single basket.

Finally with a shrinking land
forces then it’s becoming more and more obvious that the Army will be relying
upon Territorial Units to provide whole formations in some war scenarios; it
seems strange that the RMs are not also similarly equipped with areserve formation to provide that extra
strength – more importantly extra amphibious strength when necessary. This
could be important because with the overall force size shrinking and the number
of/distance to possible flash points increasing there is more likelihood of
forces being overextended; and having amphibious thinking[3],
amphibious orientated[4],
amphibious trained[5],
but most importantly amphibious forces[6] available
to the missions that will be required of them is essential to the success of
those missions.

Missions though are not only about
what takes place on the front line, there are other posts of a more sedentary
nature which also would benefit from being able to draw reservists. For example
having reservists in the operational, logistics and planning staffs would mean
should a scenario arise where the regulars need go forward to help form a task
force staff or something similar, then the posts would not be left suddenly
empty or time taken whilst new officers come up to speed as the reservists
could just be activated and take post providing the extra person(s) who would
already be familiar not only with the role, but with personnel and their style
of work. Furthermore the reservists doing their weekends training would enable
more regular personnel to have weekends off therefore improving their family
lives immeasurably; something which would benefit retention of regular
personnel.

A specific area which could really
benefit from reservist personnel is naval intelligence[7],
which is a position which would not only benefit from having a large pool of
experience/knowledge to draw but more importantly is often under staffed;
especially when a crisis hits. Another area needing more personnel is Ships
Take up from Trade – STUFT; this has always traditionally been an RNR role, and
it still very much is, but the personnel for it need to be expanded both to
cope with an increased capability and with the real possibility that they might
have to man more ships or those ships might have to travel greater distances,
most importantly though they must be able to provide those ships that are
manned with better defences, such circumstance will again require more
personnel…the moral of the story with STUFT is that while the personnel are
great, to make proper used of it then the ships will need to be able to be
armed better than they have traditionally been.

Maritime Security will always be an
issue; the sea is not like land a wall cannot just be stuck up when you want to
keep people out – this means many more personnel that can be provided under
current circumstances with just the regular forces to rely upon; having
reserves that could be called up in emergencies would be a very effective
method of maximising security without having to pull regular forces or
interrupt maintenance of vessels in order to be able to respond to the
situation.

Key Points:

Formation

·Based on the ‘nucleus’ reserve structure used by the
RN traditionally, i.e. all ships would have small detachment of regulars to
oversee maintenance, the RM reserve commando(s) would have a core of regular
NCOs & Officers to build themselves round. Although, most importantly the
Unit commanders must be themselves reservists, this would be helped in the ship
circumstance by having more crews than ships, so the temptation could be easily
resisted… but it is important when especially consideringaircraft squadrons or commandos that the
reservist personnel feel their commander understands their situation(or at least has a similarity). This will be
important for retention which will be a key requirement to keep these forces
capable and relevant.

·Regular training – whilst retention will be a key
plank of effectiveness, it will be retention combined with training that will
provide the successes: 26 weekends a year plus two fortnight exercises will be
a good start, but online courses/simulations, seminars/lectures by veterans
& other knowledgeable people, a good technical & strategic service
magazine and finally the chance to sign up for a 6 month deployment on a
regular ship would all serve to create a far stronger, far more capable and
integrated reserve organisation.

·Career structure – the reservists can’t feel that
every time a regular retires they have first dibs on any post, it must be felt
that the reservists through commitment and hard work can conceivably become
unit commander… if it is felt that all that matters is rank in regulars then a
lot of great people will be put off, as there are many who would love to serve
in the navy but would not want to go regular and would grow frustrated if there
was any ‘glass’ ceiling. For example the army maintains a Major General
Reserves, who is a reservist officer; in comparison the RN hasn’t had a reserve
Rear Admiral since John Grant retired with the RNRs ships in 1960.

·Units must be collocated with regulars units so as to
enable them to train together, support each other; however reservists must have
their own properly supplied and organised units. Just putting them ad-hoc-ly
within units and having them fill in as and when required damages the regular
unit as it prevents it from making the case to needing to be properly supplied
with regular personnel, and also whilst building closer integration it can also
lead to a feeling of insecurities and also can make them feel that they have
limited chance of a long term career[8].

Roles proposed

·Crisis response/disaster relief – they would provide a
pool of manpower for when things happen, because naval service personnel all
have to be trained in fire fighting and damage control because of the nature of
ships…those same personnel are very useful when things go wrong ashore as they
have lots of good quality useful core skills.

·War fighting-
it’s obvious be must never be forgotten the primary role of these personnel is
to provide the naval service with the depth of personnel it needs to fight
modern wars whilst not pushing numbers of regulars above levels which the
government is unwilling to pay for.

·Manning STUFT – including having stand-alone self
defence systems they can install quickly. The last is important even if it’s
only chaff, flares and jamming gear it would still be useful and instil greater
confidence within the merchant crews whilst also serving to free up the escorts
to be a little looser as they would be less important to point protection.

·Providing support and fill – as they already do but on
a more well supplied basis, with more depth and more training then the RNRs
could not just provide personnel fill but also Unit Fill when that is required.

This is all about generating the
sort of force which will provide the naval service the reserves it needs for
future conflicts, being able to outfit merchant vessels so that they can fire
back if under attack will allow escorts to turn from guarding sheep dogs into
protective wolves – prowling for the enemy rather than having to hold a line at
all costs. Reserve ships will not only come with reserve crews, but provide
slack so that when regular vessels go into long term maintenance their duties
can be covered…a situation which would also benefit reserve personnel as it
would allow them to volunteer for an extended deployment to upgrade their
skills.

Points of Interest:

·RM’s could have a 4th (or even a 5th)
Commando so no matter what deployments were on it the world the Government
would always be able to deploy an amphibious brigade to trouble spots – that is
important because a brigade sized force is large enough to establish and defend
a bridgehead whilst further forces are off loader, or deal with many scenarios
without further support.

·RN would have a surge number of escorts – the force
level required for war fighting, and that required for global presence are
different, this is where the reserves come in

·Reserve equipment is a force multiplier as instead of
losing a ship or something when it has to go into long term refit, a ship can
be pulled out of the reserves and put into action – it could even be beneficial
with a special crew put together for its tour of volunteer reservists and
regulars so as to increase the proficiency of the reservists.

·Reconnecting with wider society; Sea Blindness is a
phrase which comes up all too often, and in many ways is a double edged blade
on its user, because it puts the failure to communicate the case not the people
who could make it, but those who would listen to it. The first lesson of
democracy has always been that whilst everyone may have a voice, everyone
doesn’t have to listen.A larger reserve
would combat this, would help the naval service to connect with the wider
nation in a more understanding and communicative way. This would be
accomplished simply by the mixing process, by the chucking together of regulars
who spend most of their careers away from home (some underwater with virtually
no communication to the outside world for months at a time) with people who
speak their language, share their values, but spend most of their lives at home
reading papers every day, watching the evening news – better preparing those
regulars for when they have to explain the case for the continued existence of
the navy.

·Benefits to personnel, if they become a single parent
or a parent get ill, then instead of losing them, their experience and the
investment made in their training they could transfer to reserve

Summary:

Short answer is yes, the long
answer is different. For Reserves to work they would have to be supported, not
just lip served, they would need their own ships; imagine for a moment if the 4
Type 22s instead being scrapped had been placed in reserve, or the 3 Type 23’s
sold Chile had been? The RN might have 7 frigates in reserve, not costing
anything apart from basic maintenance but available for if a conflict should
arise where escorts are needed quickly – then the RN would of at a stroke had
20 frigates in service rather than 13 (which in reality due to maintenance
requirements is more like 11, in training, returning from patrol, going on
patrol or on patrol). What would the navy have been able to do if the Upholder class had been put in reserve
rather than sold to Canada? Would it have ever had to go without the chance to
train it’s ASW ships against real submarines rather than just simulations? Would
not have been better for Largs Bay
the LSL(A), a vital component of UK amphibious forces which was sold to
Australia, to have been put in reserve for when it is needed? Or HMS Illustrious¸ the vital second ‘LPH’,
with no Ocean replacement yet being
mooted due to the focus on the Queen
Elizabeth’s and the Type 26s would it not be better for her to have gone
into reserve status? However, it’s not just ships – whilst cutting the harriers
as a ground attack aircraft instead of the Tornado is a decision to be debated
elsewhere, why could a reserve squadron have been raised; with far less flying
hours per year and reserve personnel it would have still save money and the
fleet would have still had some air defence aircraft until the F-35Bs entered
service? There also minesweepers, auxiliaries, all sorts of aircraft and
vessels which still had service left in them, and could have provided a more
than adequate reserve strength to support operations.

The problem with making cuts to
save money is too often the emphasis is on the cutting, because that is what is
at the front of the mind; and the need to save money in the recent financial
crisis is more than understandable. However, now the Army is being cut post
Afghanistan, and is promised an increased Territorial Army to support it – yet
successive governments have been cutting the Royal Navy and never have they
offered option,and therefore presumably
never even thought about ‘should we instead put that into reserve?’. This is
the question though which now should be asked, because coming up with whatever
escorts replace them in service the Type 23s will still be fairly good ships –
suitable for a reserve? More than likely… Alternatively, should the low cost,
adaptable and numbers orientated options of the Corvette or ACA be taken up
then they would make perfect systems for reservists, simple easy to master
systems that would allow the RN a solid base for future operations.

[11]
Probably requiring more than the 10 suggested here (http://amphibiousnecessity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/june-2013-notes-possibilities-of-royal.html)
to work properly, a force totalling 14 would probably be adequate to provide
for regulars, reserves and maintenance – representing an increase from
£3.5billion over 8 years to £4.9billion over 12 years – doable and very
attractive from the perspective of providing a secure SSK force to free up the
SSNs to do the jobs they are needed to do, rather than trying to be used for
everything.

[12]
The current reserve unit that supports the 29th Commando Regiment
Royal Artillery (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/3-Commando-Brigade/Attached-Army-Units/29-Commando-Regiment-Royal-Artillery),
is to be re-rolled by the Army under its Army 2020 program to mini-uavs and
subsumed into another unit that will no longer be a commando orientated force http://www.serfca.org/Portals/0/Images/f/SUMMARY%20OF%20A2020%20RESERVE%20STRUCTURE%20AND%20BASING%20CHANGES.pdf;
however, the RN has a number of gunnery personel, it would not seem strange
should some spare L118 guns be found for them to be used to form a reserve
battery – nor would be without president for naval personel to man land guns in
support of RM & British army units.

[13]
It could be adapted stuff, i.e. for example the Starstreek man portable triple
launcher could be adapted to ship use; alternatively a self-contained container
system could be used.