In Docket No. 249713, plaintiff Pioneer Mutual Insurance Company (?Pioneer?) appeals
the trial court?s order that granted summary disposition in favor of defendant Moran Oldsmobile-
Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. (?Moran?),1 pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). In Docket No. 251382,
Moran appeals the trial court?s order that denied its motion for sanctions against plaintiff for
allegedly filing and maintaining a frivolous lawsuit. We affirm both orders.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
These consolidated cases arise out of a subrogation action filed by Pioneer as subrogee
against Moran that alleges that Moran?s negligent repair of a car (?the car?) owned by Pioneer?s
insureds was the proximate cause of a fire that destroyed the car, another vehicle in the insureds?
garage, and the insureds? home and personal possessions.
Pioneer hired an investigator, Daniel Terski, to investigate the fire. Terski concluded that
the fire began in the car?s engine compartment, but could not say what caused the fire. Pioneer
then hired electrical engineer Michael McGuire to investigate the accident further. McGuire
reviewed Terski?s report and conducted his own examination of the car?s engine compartment,
and concluded that an electrical failure in the engine compartment was the cause of the fire.
Significantly, neither Terski nor McGuire concluded that the electrical failure was related to
repair work performed by Moran. A third investigator, Ray Davis, opined that the fire was
caused by a high-resistance short circuit in the battery cable because of what he characterizes as
?arcing marks? on the engine mount.2
Moran filed a motion for summary disposition on the basis that there was no genuine
issue of material fact because Pioneer could not show that Moran?s conduct caused the fire. The
trial court granted Moran?s motion on the basis that the opinions of Pioneer?s experts constituted
speculation and conjecture.
Moran then filed a postjudgment motion seeking sanctions for frivolous proceedings
against Pioneer, which the trial court denied.
II. DOCKET NO. 249713
Pioneer says that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of
Moran.3 Generally, to establish a theory of causation in a civil case, a plaintiff ?must present

1 Defendant General Motors Corporation is not a party to these appeals.
2 Moran alleges that these ?arcing marks? are actually standard manufacturing marks, and that
Davis?s conclusions were erroneous. Additionally, in their brief on appeal, Pioneer concedes
that Davis gave ?erroneous opinions.?
3 We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) de novo.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). In doing so, the facts are
considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there is a
(continued?)

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substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the
defendant?s conduct, the plaintiff?s injuries would not have occurred.? Skinner v Square D Co,
445 Mich 153, 164-165; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Accordingly, to establish a genuine issue of
factual causation, a plaintiff must ?set forth specific facts that would support a reasonable
inference of a logical sequence of cause and effect.? Id. at 174. ?[C]ausation theories that are
mere possibilities or, at most, equally as probable as other theories? are insufficient. Id. at 172-
173. Mere conjecture is insufficient to establish a factual issue regarding causation. Id. at 174.
Here, Pioneer?s experts, at best, could only testify that one possible cause of the fire is
alleged negligent conduct of Moran. McGuire testified that he had performed no objective
scientific or technical testing that would link any conduct of Moran to the fire. McGuire?s
conclusion is essentially a ?hunch,? made on the basis of the evidence he found of an electrical
failure, combined with the proximity in time of the fire to some significant repair work Moran
had completed on the car. The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by Pioneer was
simply too speculative, and that, as a result, summary disposition was appropriate.4 We agree
with the trial court, and hold that it properly granted summary disposition in favor of Moran.
III. DOCKET NO. 251382
Moran argues that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for sanctions against
Pioneer for a frivolous action.5 MCR 2.625(A)(2) provides that if a court finds that an action is
frivolous ?costs shall be awarded as provided by MCL 600.2591.? MCL 600.2591(3) provides
as follows regarding the meaning of ?frivolous? in this context:
(a) ?Frivolous? means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met:
(i) The party?s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the
defense was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party.

(?continued)
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.
4 In its written opinion on Moran?s motion, the trial court stated:
The opinion of plaintiff?s expert in this case fails to rise above mere speculation
and conjecture. Perhaps the technician might have been able to see a defect or
hazard when the connector was reconnected, or perhaps he might not have been.
Perhaps that was the cause of the fire, perhaps it was not. . . . Under these facts, it
would be inappropriate to submit this case to a jury. [Unpublished opinion of the
St. Clair Circuit Court (Daniel J. Kelly, J.), issued May 1, 2003 (Docket No. 01-
003434-NP), p. 3.]
5 We review a trial court?s decision whether to impose a sanction based on an action being
frivolous for clear error. Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 41; 570 NW2d 788 (1997); see
also Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). A decision is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. Id.
at 661-662.

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(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying
that party?s legal position were in fact true.
(iii) The party?s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.
As Moran acknowledges, Pioneer?s claims against it in Pioneer?s initial complaint were
based on the opinion of Davis regarding the cause of the fire. While his opinion was eventually
discredited, it does not follow that it was clearly unreasonable for Pioneer to rely on the accuracy
of that opinion in preparing the complaint that initiated suit against Moran, particularly where the
fire occurred within a short timeframe after Moran?s work on the car. Indeed, it seems clear that
parties and counsel generally need to rely on the views of experts regarding complex matters
such as ascertaining the cause of a possible mechanical or electrical malfunction. A plaintiff
should not have to second-guess its experts. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court6 did not
clearly err in refusing to categorize Pioneer?s suit against Moran as frivolous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski

6 During the motion hearing on Moran?s motion for sanctions, the trial court stated:
I suppose every time a lawsuit is dismissed on summary disposition there is a
thought that it was a frivolous action[,] otherwise[,] the Judge would have at least
allowed it to go to trial. . . . Obviously, I felt there wasn?t sufficient evidence to
proceed to trial. But for me to conclude that it was frivolous in its initiation goes
a step [further] and a step that I?m not prepared to take today.