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December 9, 2016

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Substantial Truth

"Truth" is an absolute defense against defamation. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 411 (1967). Consequently, a plaintiff has to provide convincing
evidence of a defamatory statement's falsity in order to prove
defamation.

The law does not require that a statement must be perfectly
accurate in every conceivable way to be considered "true." Courts have
said that some false statements must be protected for the wider purpose
of allowing the dissemination of truthful speech. The resulting
doctrine is known as "substantial truth." Under the substantial truth
doctrine, minor factual inaccuracies will be ignored so long as the
inaccuracies do not materially alter the substance or impact of what is
being communicated. In other words, only the "gist" or "sting" of a
statement must be correct.

The substantial truth defense is particularly powerful because
a judge will often grant summary judgment in favor of a defendant (thus
disposing of the case before it goes to trial) if the defendant can
show that the statement the plaintiff is complaining about is
substantially true, making the defense a quick and relatively easy way
to get out of a long (and potentially expensive) defamation case.

Substantial truth can also be a flashpoint for libel cases involving public figures and officials who must show actual malice by the defendant in order to recover. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
501 U.S. 496 (1991), the plaintiff tried to argue that inaccurate
quotations were evidence of actual malice. The Supreme Court refused to
adopt such a stringent rule, noting the difficulty of taking notes and
translating from recordings and the need to edit a speaker's comments
into a coherent statement. The Court stated:

We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered
by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. (citations omitted)

The Court went on to note the use of quotation marks to directly
attribute inaccurate statements to the speaker "bears in a most
important way on [this] inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every
case." Generally speaking, a publisher is given more leeway for
inaccuracies when he is interpreting his sources than when he is
purporting to be providing a "direct account of events that speak for
themselves." Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).

Some examples of statements that courts have found to be "substantially true":

A statement that a boxer tested positive for cocaine, when
actually he had tested positive for marijuana. See Cobb v. Time Inc. 24
Media L. Rep. 585 (M.D. Tenn 1995).

A statement that an animal trainer beat his animals with
steel rods, when actually he had beaten them with wooden rods. See
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269
(Nev. 1995).

A statement that a father sexually assaulted his
stepdaughter 30-50 times, when the stepdaughter testified he had done
so only 8 times. See Koniak v. Heritage Newspapers, Inc., 198 Mich.
App. 577 (1993).

A statement that a man was sentenced to death for six
murders, when in fact he was only sentenced to death for one. See
Stevens v. Independent Newspapers, Inc., 15 Media L. Rep. 1097 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1998).

A statement that Terry Nichols was arrested after the
Oklahoma City Bombing, when actually he had only been held as a
material witness. See Nichols v. Moore, 396 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

A statement that a man was charged with sexual assault, when
actually he had only been arrested but not arraigned. See Rouch v.
Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 440 Mich. 238 (1992).

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Disclaimer

Information in this guide is based on general principles of law and is intended for information purposes only; we make no claim as to the comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. It is not offered for the purpose of providing individualized legal advice. Use of this guide does not create an attorney-client or any other relationship between the user and the Digital Media Law Project or the Berkman Center for Internet & Society.

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