Quilliam is the world's first
counter-extremism think tank. Located in London,
our founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist
organizations. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, human rights, democracy
and developing a Muslim identity at home in, and with the West.

Quilliam welcomes the 'Prevent' programme
as one strand of several in the government's counter-extremism policy but
believes changes are necessary, including to certain of its underpinning
assumptions.

· Taking preventative measures against violent extremism is vital but
the Prevent programme needs a sharper focus on preventing violent extremism as
a debate about ideas. In other words, the government should recognise that
violent extremism is always preceded by political and religious extremism. Prevent's
work should serve to bolster liberal democratic values against such extremism rather
than being distracted by youth sporting activities.

· When looking at radicalisation, Prevent should address the complex
identity issues stemming from a failure to access a shared British identity, a
failure which leaves some people vulnerable to radicalisation.

· Prevent should move away from talking about separate faith
"communities" and "community cohesion" and instead focus on creating national
cohesion whereby every British citizen is considered primarily as a British
citizen, not only as a member of an artificially constructed "faith community",
which homogenises identity and denies individuality.

· Many civil servants working both in national and local government
lack the necessary advice and expertise to properly understand the complex
ideological and theological issues surrounding extremism and therefore to
properly support the Prevent programme. Assessing whether a group or speaker
propagates dangerous ideas should be carried out centrally by people with
experience, expertise and the executive power to transparently and accountably
disrupt extremist groups' gatherings.

· Whilst cases like that of Andrew Ibrahim demonstrate that there has
been some success in involving mosques in aiding the Prevent programme, many of
the people most important to Prevent are yet to be impacted by it.

· The government must communicate better the goals of the Prevent
programme. This is a process which has been undermined by some government
partners who have misrepresented Prevent and its objectives to the public.

· Prevent must foster a sense of belonging amongst all British
citizens by developing an understanding of shared values. The struggle to
prevent all kinds of extremism must be understood as the struggle to create
national cohesion through developing an accessible British identity based on
shared universal values, principally freedom of speech, equal rights for all, accepting
that no one religion has a monopoly on influencing law in our secular public
space and that sovereignty is for the people. Fostering such an identity and
defeating extremist ideologies of all types is the best preventative measure
against violent extremism.

1. Is the Prevent programme the right way of
addressing the problem of violent extremism, or are there better ways of doing
it?

a. Prevent is a vital
strand of Britain's
strategy to prevent violent extremism but this role is being undermined by its
unfocused implementation. The only way in which violent extremism can be
eradicated is if the ideas and ideologies which justify it are defeated. This
will only occur through debate and so the Prevent strategy must support that
side of the debate which stands for shared universal values antithetical to
violent extremism.

b. The fact that this
is a debate about ideas means that Prevent must have a sharper focus on
supporting those individuals and groups who promote shared universal values.
Kickboxing classes and football leagues, however well intentioned, do not help
to propagate the crucial ideas which can undermine and defeat violent
extremism. Prevent should take as partners organisations committed to
furthering this debate about ideas and, in particular, encouraging belief in
those ideas which tie people together in modern Britain.

c. Choosing partners
on the basis of their claim to represent all members of one group tends to
empower only politically active, male, middle-aged members of a diverse
population. It also undermines parliament as a body which represents us all as
equal citizens. This is of particular importance at present as the new
secretary of state for Communities and Local Government, the Rt Hon John Denham
MP appears to have shown some sympathy for the politics of 'community
representation' in the past.

2. How robust is the Government's analysis
of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism? Is
the 'Prevent' programme appropriately targeted to address the most important of
those factors?

a. Whilst it is to be
welcomed that Prevent acknowledges that there is no single cause of
radicalisation[1], its emphasis on real and perceived grievances[2] heavily outweighs the more fundamental question of identity[3]. In the video he recorded before carrying out the 7/7 suicide bomb
attacks, Leeds-born Mohammad Sidique Khan addressed the British public saying:
"Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this
fight."[4] The fact that Sidique Khan felt no loyalty or connection to other
British citizens, identifying only with Muslims, was crucial in allowing him to
murder innocents.

b. The argument that
radicalisation is driven by grievances, in particular about foreign policy and
the idea that of a "War on Islam", is a
popular one but one that is undermined by a comparison between Britain and
America. If British foreign policy feeds into a narrative of a "War on Islam"
then America's
foreign policy must also equally or more so. Yet, despite American Muslims
sharing British Muslims' concerns about a "War on Islam"[5], America
has seen nothing like the home-grown 7/7 attacks. This can be explained by the
greater accessibility immigrants to America
have to a shared identity built on universal values than is granted to
immigrants to Britain.

c. Furthermore, the
idea that violent extremism is driven by concerns about foreign policy is
belied by how such violent extremism occurs. Targets in Britain chosen
by Islamist terrorists have included nightclubs, airports, underground trains
and buses - none of which have any connection to foreign policy. Thus, whilst
radicalisers exploit such grievances to manipulate vulnerable members of
society and to justify violent extremism to those who do not share their
ideology, the radicalised were vulnerable to manipulation because of their
failure to access a British identity based on shared universal values. Changes
to British foreign policy would not eradicate the existence of extremist
ideologies which legitimise and encourage violence.

3. How appropriate, and how effective, is
the Government's strategy for engaging with communities? Has the Government
been speaking to the right people? Has its programme reached those at whom it is-or
should be-aimed?

a. The question of
"engaging with communities" is the wrong premise for countering violent
extremism. We need to look at a wider "national cohesion" rather than more
limited "community cohesion"; the British society which we would hope to build
and which would be truly resilient to violent extremism is not a Balkanised one
of separate communities existing apart within the same country like the Ottoman
millet system. Rather, we must build a society where all citizens are equally
integrated and involved through the democratic structures of the state.

b. The idea of engaging
with any single Muslim "community" or even separate Muslim "communities" within
Britain
is part of a narrative which suggests that there can be "community leaders" and
"community representatives". Giving them a voice occurs at the expense of
integrating individual Muslims fully into British society through the
democratic structures of the state. This is not to say that Prevent should not
operate with partner organisations; groups like Radical Middle Way, the Mosques and Imams
National Advisory Board and the British Muslim Forum facilitate access to and
communication with large numbers of mosques and Muslims around the country
without claiming to speak for them. However, these bodies tend to lack the
organisational infrastructure of a group like the Muslim Council of Britain
whose leadership, in claiming to speak for all Muslims in their dealings with
the government, actually co-opt and deny individual Muslims' voices.

c. In terms of gaining
access to and influencing those people who are most at risk of radicalisation,
Prevent has seen little success. For example, three groups which are
particularly vulnerable to radicalisation (students, prisoners and Somali
youths) have seen little benefit from Prevent spending, partly as a result of
unfocused approaches to identifying priority areas for activity. For example,
when deciding which universities should be prioritised for attention as part of
the Prevent strategy, the decision is made purely according to the size of the
establishment's local Muslim community.[6] Thus prioritisation for Prevent attention is decided not on the
basis of evidence of radicalisation occurring nor even on the basis of the
number of Muslims studying at the establishment but on a much more arbitrary
basis. Durham
is an example of a university with few Muslim students and few local Muslims
yet Hizb ut-Tahrir is very active on campus there. Prevent is a very important
and delicate programme which necessitates a focus on the most vulnerable people
in society and on establishments where radicalisation is occurring, not aimed
carelessly at areas which simply have many Muslims resident in them. This
strategy risks alienating British Muslims by playing into the hands of groups
which claim that Prevent is aimed against all Muslims, not just extremists.

4. Is the necessary advice and expertise
available to local authorities on how to implement and evaluate the programme?

a. The Prevent strategy
is concerned with addressing complex ideological and theological issues which
local authorities are ill-placed to understand. The recent case where
Kensington and Chelsea Council did not prevent the broadcast of a video message
by Anwar al-Awlaki, an English-speaking jihadist preacher who advocates an
al-Qaeda worldview, at Kensington Town Hall until his appearance was
highlighted by politicians and campaigners shows that local authorities lack
the advice and expertise to implement the government's commitment to disrupting
radicalisers and making it harder for them to operate in the places they use[7].

b. It is therefore
vital that central government provide clear guidance and advice to prevent such
a situation arising in the future and to help with identifying suitable
partners for 'Prevent' who are committed to shared British values. Furthermore,
decisions about whether a certain speaker should be allowed a platform in
council premises should be taken centrally where experience and expertise in
counter extremism exists whilst clear advice and guidance must be given to
local authorities and police about how to choose partners who promulgate shared
universal values. At present, the
Department for Communities and Local Government is funding local authorities'
Prevent work with £45 million over three years but how this money is spent
remains in the hands of local authorities which lack the expertise to choose
partners effectively. This leads to the situation where money is handed out by
the local authorities with no means to assess whether it is furthering the
Prevent agenda or not.

c. Of the £12 million
already distributed by local authorities to fund community group run Prevent
projects, around £850,000 has been given to affiliates of the Muslim Council of
Britain, whose deputy director-general signed a declaration supporting Hamas
and understood by some to advocate attacks on the Royal Navy.[8] £38,000 was also allocated to the Cordoba Foundation, only £4,000
of which was withdrawn[9] despite the Cordoba Foundation sponsoring the recent event at KensingtonTown Hall
which was supposed to feature a video message from Anwar al-Awlaki, and the
fact that it has also hosted Dr Abdul Wahid, UK chairman of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Bristol council gave £3,180 to the 1st Bristol
Muslim Scout Troop for "camping equipment"[10] and large sums of money have been distributed by Enfield[11]and other councils to fund purely sporting groups. How such projects
contribute to combating the ideologies which justify and promote violent
extremism remains unclear. Systematic measures must be taken to ensure that
such lapses do not occur and that all money spent on Prevent contributes to
preventing extremism.

5. Are the objectives of the 'Prevent'
agenda being communicated effectively to those at whom it is aimed?

a. Prevent has
certainly seen some successes; the case of Andrew Ibrahim, whose plans to
launch a suicide bomb attack with a homemade device were discovered after his
local mosque reported that he had burn marks on his hands and arms,[12] demonstrates this to be the case. However, other opportunities were
missed to identify Ibrahim as a threat including his college failing to take
further the concerns of a visiting lecturer after Ibrahim asked questions about
"the best" biological agents for killing people. This shows that the objectives
of the Prevent agenda are still not being effectively communicated to all
necessary people.

b. This situation has
been exacerbated by misinformation about Prevent, in particular Contest 2,
which has been spread by some individuals and organisations, some of whom are
government partners. Figures associated with prominent organisations like the
Muslim Council of Britain have misrepresented Contest 2 to the public by
continuing to organise public meetings about an imaginary version of Contest 2,
published in the Guardian and alleged to be a draft but which did not become
part of the Prevent agenda.[13] To avoid the alienation of those whom Prevent aims to support,
measures must be taken to ensure that Prevent partners are giving Muslim and
non-Muslim members of the public accurate information about it.

6. Is the Government seeking, and obtaining,
appropriate advice on how to achieve the goals of the 'Prevent' programme?

It is impossible to say whether or not "the
Government" as a whole is receiving appropriate advice on achieving the goals
of Prevent as different departments appear to be applying different standards
to their choosing of partners in the Prevent programme. Whilst the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and Home Office both appear to have implemented measures to
ensure that it is seeking advice on Prevent from partners who promote shared
British values, Communities and Local Government continues to cooperate with
Saudi-funded and Islamic Forum Europe and Jamaat-e-Islami dominated East London
Mosque. Furthermore, leading politicians
from both the Labour and Conservative parties have paid uncritical visits to
East London Mosque, with then Communities Minister Sadiq Khan visiting the
mosque in February of this year[14] followed by Conservative mayor of London Boris Johnson in
September.[15]

7. How effectively has the Government
evaluated the effectiveness of the programme and the value for money which is
being obtained from it? Have reactions to the programme been adequately gauged?

At present
it is difficult to see what measures have been taken by government departments
to evaluate the effectiveness of their programmes. Certainly, without rigid
systems for careful monitoring of how money is distributed to Prevent partners
and how those partners contribute to countering extremist ideologies, some
would argue that the government is failing in its duty to British tax-payers to
check that results are being achieved from spending public funds.[16]

8. Is there adequate differentiation between
what should be achieved through the Prevent programme and the priorities that
concern related, but distinct, policy frameworks such as cohesion and
integration?

When
looking at the Prevent programme it is vital to remember that violent extremism
cannot be defeated except by defeating the underlying issues which encourage it
to develop and the ideologies which feed on those issues. This entails
fostering a sense of belonging based on shared values, principally to freedom
of speech, equal rights for all, accepting that no one religion has a monopoly
on influencing law in our secular public space and that sovereignty is for the
people. "Cohesion" and "integration" should be understood in reference to these
values rather than more superficial matters such as clothing, work or speaking
English. Thus groups and individuals who are committed to these values should
be understood to be "integrated" whilst those who reject these values should
not, even if they show superficial signs of integration. People who reject these values, although they
are not being criminalised, must be recognised as undermining national cohesion
and thereby the objectives of the Prevent programme.

9. Conclusion

The
government's strategy for defeating terrorism is made up of four strands,
Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. There is no debate about the necessity of
continuing Pursue, Protect and Prepare yet the most important of these strands,
Prevent, is in disarray. Nearly five years after the suicide bombings of London
Underground and buses the government is yet to set in place effective
preventative measures against the radicalisation of British citizens. Indeed,
some money allocated for Prevent has actually undermined national cohesion
through promoting separatism and thereby preventing the creation of a British
identity based on shared universal values. There is also little evidence that
the government has acted on its commitment to "challenge those who want to work
against our shared values."[17] It is vital that Prevent money be used only to support shared
values

[13] Daud Abdullah, deputy director general of the Muslim Council of
Britain spoke at an event called "Putting Contest 2 in Context" in Hounslow on
11th July 2009. Flyers for the event made reference to "leaked
drafts" of Contest 2 rather than to Contest 2 in its published form.