Dealing with the China-Taiwan puzzle

As the guarantor of regional security in Asia, the United States
should be paying closer attention to the military buildup and
strident anti-Taiwan rhetoric of the People's Republic of China
(PRC).

Other nations may be able to dismiss these threats as just
another round of saber rattling, but if the troubled situation in
the Taiwan Strait worsens, it will likely require a U.S. military
response.

The rising tensions stand in direct contrast to the positive
domestic changes occurring both in Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.
Taiwan will hold its second presidential election in March - one of
a number of democratic changes that have occurred during the past
few years. Politically free and increasingly affluent, the island
republic not only survived the Asian financial crisis but, unlike
some of its neighbors, is thriving. Its investments in China total
$40 billion, and cross-Strait trade between the two is $24 billion
per year - perhaps $40 billion when goods passing through Hong Kong
destined for the United States are included. Meanwhile, economic
reforms in China are producing a nascent middle class. Millions of
mainlanders are forming private businesses and fueling a
competitive job market. People are able to chose where they wish to
live, whether to buy homes, and even which mortgage lenders to use.
Chinese department stores carry competitively priced goods in
abundance, and state-owned stores must compete in the
marketplace.

True, freedom of the press is absent, and people are not yet
free to worship, but a robust publishing industry - much of it
supported by Western-style advertising - is flourishing.
Ever-growing numbers of Chinese are making more and more personal
choices. Eventually, they will insist that if they are allowed to
make informed choices in the marketplace, they should be permitted
to make similar choices in the political arena.

All this demonstrates there is ample reason for the United
States to promote trade and commerce with China. Unfortunately,
these positive trends must be balanced against the PRC's
well-documented military buildup along the Taiwan Strait.
Especially troubling is Beijing's repeated refusal to reject the
use of force in any future attempts to resolve the longstanding
reunification issue.

How can the United States help defuse this potential crisis?
Primarily by voicing its traditional strong support of Taiwan and
by resisting calls that it pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the
PRC. In addition, the United States must avoid mediating between
the governments of democratic Taiwan and authoritarian China. The
only precondition Washington should set for any such talks is that
the use of force be repudiated by both sides. Policy-makers here
should remind the PRC that the Taiwan Relations Act -
overwhelmingly passed by Congress in 1979 - served all sides well
until President Clinton imprudently departed from it in June 1998.
That's when the president publicly stated his opposition to
Taiwan's participation in international organizations where formal
nationhood is a requirement. He also opposed independence for
Taiwan and renounced a "two-China" policy, implying the only
legitimate Chinese government resided in Beijing. As far as many
Asian observers were concerned, Washington had suddenly abandoned
its long-held position of official neutrality in regard to China's
claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. America was perceived as siding
with China in the often-tense dispute.

One result of this apparent shift has been the introduction in
Congress of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. This legislation
would take democracy in Taiwan and the changing security situation
in Asia into account and enable America to provide enhanced defense
equipment (including access to theater missile defense) to the
island republic.

In view of President Clinton's departure from established - and
legal - precedent in Asia, Chinese leaders may be confused about
how the United States would respond to overt military action aimed
at Taiwan. The administration should make clear to the PRC that
intimidating acts such as missile firings, embargoes or blockades
will not be tolerated by the United States.

The degree of the U.S. response to any such force need not be
specified. In military planning, it is foolhardy to announce one's
intentions in advance. But the PRC should recall the U.S. response
to its belligerence during Taiwan's March 1996 presidential
election, when China test-fired missiles a mere 20 miles off the
island republic's coast and issued warlike threats. America
promptly dispatched two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the
Strait.

Some U.S. commentators argue for "strategic clarity" toward
China, while others press for "strategic ambiguity." Still others,
infatuated by the ever-present mirage of billions of dollars in
sales to China, would accommodate Beijing by abandoning Taiwan.

To remain true to our history and our ideals, however, Americans
cannot abandon a democratic nation to military coercion or
aggression. American presidents, Republican or Democrat, must
maintain the TRA's pledge: "We will regard any attempt to determine
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including
boycott or embargo, as a threat to the peace . . . and a matter of
grave concern to the United States."

America's response should be twofold. On trade, the United
States should work to include the PRC and Taiwan as members in the
World Trade Organization. This will accelerate tangible reforms on
the mainland and promote further democratization. At the same time,
America should stress its commitment to the principle that force
cannot be tolerated to resolve differences between Taiwan and the
China. "Strategic ambiguity" - indeed, any ambiguity - in U.S.
foreign policy toward Asia can only make a bad situation worse.