In heavy rain and glutinous mud predominantly British troops eventually succeeded in capturing the small
village of Passchendaele in the autumn of 1917, often regarded as a minor
gain albeit achieved at heavy cost in casualties.

It is interesting to note that this view of the battle was widely expressed by Haig's contemporaries
and is not in fact a modern perspective. Reproduced below is a defence
of Haig's tactics during Third Ypres by a British general, Sir John
Davidson, published in Source Records of the Great War (Volume V), ed. Charles F. Horne,
1923.

Note that Davidson could by no means claim a disinterested viewpoint; during the battle he served as
Haig's head of operations staff at GHQ.

The word "Passchendaele" was and has been used as a reproach to British generalship, and as a symbol of waste and useless suffering.

To the men who actually fought, such an attitude might be intelligible, for their horizon was
limited by the expanse of mud and waste on every hand, by the incessant fire
to which they were subjected, by the comparatively insignificant gains of
ground at great sacrifice, and by the abnormal fatigue and hardship.

Similarly to the wounded
and to those who had lost their husbands, sons and brothers it appeared that
heavy suffering had been inflicted and limbs and lives lost with little or
no result so far as winning the war was concerned.

To the gunner during the
latter period of the offensive, day in and day out handling his
mud-spattered ammunition with unspeakable fatigue, constantly endeavouring
to save his guns from disappearing into the morass, serving his pieces
clustered round the only solid means of approach, the duckboard pathway,
under a concentrated and almost continuous hail of enemy projectiles; to the
infantryman heavily equipped staggering through an interminable sea of mud
towards what appeared to him as certain death, the physical and mental
strain was well-nigh unbearable. A blank wall on every side and no
apparent end to the misery.

Ludendorff states in
reference to the last phase of the operations, "What the German soldier
experienced, achieved and suffered in the Flanders battle will be his
everlasting monument of bronze erected by himself in the enemy's land."

What the British soldier
achieved was something far greater. This was the bitterest campaign of
the whole war, the one in which the British single-handed shouldered the
whole burden, and of which the British nation may most justly feel proud;
the one in which the British held the German Army in its grip, closed with
it, and fixed it to its ground, thus preventing the enemy from taking the
initiative in such a manner as to gain the decision elsewhere.

Let us examine the facts.

The objects before the
British in delivering the offensive in Flanders were briefly, from a
strategical point of view, to pin the German Army to the British front in
the North and draw in their Reserves; and from a tactical point of view:

(a) To free Ypres by
gaining the Passchendaele ridge which lies in a semi-circle round the
eastern side and dominates the town and surrounding country.

(b) To gain the
Passchendaele ridge, thereby commanding with long-range gunfire the enemy's
communications through Roulers and his submarine bases at Ostend and
Zeebrugge.

(c) To exploit to the full
any tactical success gained (for this special preparations were made).

In order to gain strength
for offensive purposes and to increase the number of our available reserves
we had entered into negotiations with the French to take over part of our
defensive front. This, however, they were unwilling to do, but
requested to be allowed to take a small part in the Flanders offensive.

It was considered advisable
to acquiesce in their demands, but this was done with great reluctance and
disappointment, for the mixture of French, Belgian and British troops in a
confined area was not conducive to success, and their infantry, guns and
ammunition arrived late, thereby delaying the commencement of operations
until the 31st of July and involving the loss of many days of valuable
summer weather which would have been of incalculable advantage in view of
the exceptionally bad weather experienced in August.

It is difficult to see how
in the circumstances described any other course could justifiably be
advocated, though the air was full of the cries of "No more Somme battles,"
"We must wait for the Americans," and so on.

Had the British Commander
accepted this advice, presented from influential quarters, and had he not
forced on a British battle on the British front, it is more than likely we
should have been involved before many weeks had elapsed in a defensive
battle of German making, at a point chosen by the enemy, where it would be
most difficult for the British forces to operate in parrying the blow.

It will be convenient to
divide the operations into five periods as has been done roughly in the
official despatch and by Ludendorff in his War Memories:

First period: July 31st to
August 16th. Second period: August 17th to September 19th. Third
period: September 20th to October 4th. Fourth period: October 5 to
October 24th. Fifth period: October 25th to November 10th.

As ill-luck would have it,
after we had waited patiently for many days to open the attack for reasons
given above, the weather broke on the afternoon of the 31st of July and rain
continued incessantly for four days. However, very considerable
results were achieved on the opening day and the enemy continued to
counter-attack violently for some days with great loss.

The British delivered their
second attack, also successfully, on the 16th of August, but thereafter the
abnormally wet weather necessitated a cessation of the operations for a
whole month; this constitutes the first two periods. Fortunately the
weather improved in September and the 10th ushered in the third period with
a British attack on a wide front.

The culmination of our efforts came in the fourth period, between the 22nd and 25th of October.
Then the capture of Passchendaele was the final stroke.

In reference to these periods some extracts from Ludendorff's Memories are instructive.
Ludendorff and his subordinate commanders were greatly puzzled at our
tactics, and the deliberate manner in which the German counterattacks were
repeatedly smashed with heavy loss, and were constantly discussing and
altering the tactics of the defence so as to minimize the loss.

Not only does he admit this in his memoirs, but documents captured at the time showed that the German
High Command recognized the failure of their methods.