This paper analyzes how key features of international institutions that reflect the depth of
cooperation affect participation. We derive a set of arguments from the enforcement,
managerial and rational design literatures and test these arguments on a new dataset that
covers more than 200 global environmental treaties since 1950. We find very little
support for the enforcement school’s claim of a depth versus participation dilemma: the
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specificity of obligations has only a minor and statistically insignificant negative effect
on participation rates (measured by treaty ratifications). The existence of monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms has no significant effect either, and results for variables
capturing other forms of delegating authority (e.g. treaty-specific secretariat, decisionmaking
rules) are mixed. In contrast, we find more support for the managerial and
rational design schools’ arguments: assistance provisions in treaties have a significant
and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, most dispute settlement
mechanisms promote treaty participation. While countries do not appear to stay away
from treaties that mandate deeper cooperation, the inclusion of positive incentives and
dispute resolution mechanisms promotes the formation of international institutions.