Congress` Message To The Saudis

May 18, 1986|By Stephen Chapman.

When it proposed to sell $354 million worth of missiles to Saudi Arabia, the Reagan administration hoped to provide a sign of its support for an ally. But the House and Senate have voted to forbid the sale, by margins so lopsided that they may be able to override the threatened presidential veto. This provides a different message: that Congress has trouble distinguishing between friends and enemies.

Saudi Arabia is a nation of considerable size, few people and immense oil deposits--roughly a quarter of the world`s known reserves. In addition to the persistent internal threat presented by the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism, it is plagued by powerful and covetous neighbors.

One is the Soviet Union. Another is Iran, whose success in its war with Iraq creates the danger of a direct challenge to moderate states in the Persian Gulf--and which lately has punished Riyadh`s increased oil output with attacks on Saudi tankers.

The perils of the house of Saud are not irrelevant to the rest of the world. Whoever controls Arabia`s oil commands considerable leverage over the industrialized democracies. That`s why the United States, under presidents both Democratic and Republican, has consistently made a priority of keeping those fields out of the hands of its enemies.

The question of whether American interests would warrant direct military intervention to preserve access to Saudi oil makes for an interesting debate. Fortunately, the existence of a pro-American government in Riyadh makes it academic. The Saudis are happy to take considerable responsibility for defending themselves, asking only that the U.S. sell them the weapons needed to do so.

That alone ought to be enough to justify this sale, which is merely a resupply of weapons the Saudis already have. (It is insignificant enough that neither Israel nor pro-Israel lobbies in the U.S. have actively opposed the deal.) So should the fact that the Saudis, if necessary, can buy equivalent anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles elsewhere, to the benefit of some economy besides our own. But bolstering the Riyadh regime serves another strategic interest: the security of Israel. The Saudis are no friend of the Jewish state, but neither do they pose any real threat to it.

The opponents of the sale insist otherwise, noting Saudi Arabia`s aid to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization. But this is more in the nature of protection money than enthusiastic support. The Saudis have also provided ample financial aid to Jordan`s King Hussein, besides supporting his effort to open peace negotiations with Jerusalem.

But no one should expect daring initiatives of Saudi Arabia, whose combination of wealth and vulnerability is hazardous enough. As Henry Kissinger has written, it ``aims above all to avoid open confrontation or unambiguous pronouncements, striving to advance its security without exposing itself to direct challenge. . . . (The Saudis) can acquiesce in what they are reluctant to advocate; they can be privately relieved at the thwarting of radical designs to which they have to pay lip service publicly.`` Thus their criticism of our attack on Col. Moammar Khadafy, whom they detest but fear.

Congress thinks that a nation buying American arms ought to endorse American policies. But if we can`t get the French to cooperate in fighting Khadafy, or prevent the Israelis from invading Lebanon, we shouldn`t demand perfect loyalty from the Saudis.

If we were willing to use all our means to enforce obedience, we might indeed alter their foreign policy, at small gain to us and great risk to them. Becoming an American puppet would isolate the kingdom from most of the Arab world and invigorate its domestic opponents, heightening the chance of a more militant regime imposed from without or within.

Ritual humiliations like the one just carried out by Congress are no help, either. They only advise Arab states that moderation will gain them nothing from the U.S., which is a good way to stimulate radicalism. In insisting that King Fahd emulate Anwar Sadat, Congress is more likely to produce more Khomeinis.