{Counterinsurgency} is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.

As noted, Kilcullen, and I, are not drawing distinctions between guerrilla warfare, to which this statement applies, and insurgency. With that in mind, we can then ask whether it is possible for us “to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population”?

The answer is “no,” and the rationale is critical to appreciating why Kilcullen’s lessons learned for tactical commanders may mislead politicians who try to generalize it to a war-winning strategy (just implement his tactics and we win) or even worse, to grand strategy. For the explanation, we must look at the different types of 4GW.

The Two Forms of 4GW

As a simple dichotomy for analytical purposes, we can say that 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside interests (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW).

1. Violence between two or more local groups, who can form from any combination of clans, governments, ethnicities, religions, gangs, and tribes.

2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners – both comprising, as above, any imaginable combination of factions.

4GW victories by governments are usually of the first kind, local governments fighting insurgencies. Often foreign assistance is important or even decisive, but the local government leads in such areas as political reform and tactics. Western governments have “won” a few type two insurgencies, but only by assisting the locals – with the locals carrying the primary burden. That is, the foreign interest may lead, but the local government must implement."

Fabius' crtique should be read in full. I have selected this part to highlight because I believe that attempting to disaggregate the overarching concept of 4GW into a dichotomy ( and perhaps, eventually, a typology) is a necessary step in finding the recurring, related, yet distinct, patterns of state vs. non-state conflict. In that respect, Fabius made a valuable contribution to moving the 4GW discussion forward.

"..."Fabius", I'd be very happy to engage with you in a more detailed discussion of my ideas, of which "28 articles" is actually not a particularly representative sample: I wrote it in response to specific requests from several deployed company commanders when I was in Iraq in January-March 2006, and as I write at the start of it (bottom of page 1 on the internet version) "there are no universal answers...what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically."

In other words, in 28 articles I'm not expressing my latest "experimental" or strategic thinking, but rather trying to provide a quick compilation of ready-reference tactical ideas based on extant "classical" COIN thinking, and where possible drawn from proven experience from the field. I'm fundamentally a practitioner rather than a theorist, and my aim was mainly to meet an immediate need from colleagues in the field.

... have to say, however, that as a practitioner I don't believe any of these discussions are ready for prime time. What the guys need in the field are workable frameworks and basic assumptions that help them in their day-to-day. So (especially in "28 articles") I have tried to help where I can without claiming COIN as the silver bullet solution to problems that are actually far more complex. I try to keep the speculative stuff for forums where it won't confuse guys whose average day is way more complicated and dangerous than mine.

Do I believe that the admonitions I make in the paper can be carried out by the average company commander? Actually I have huge confidence in the adaptability and agility of the guys in the field and have been impressed, again and again, as I have served with them in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But even if the advice is not strictly achievable, I still think it's worth giving since it helps turn the "ship of state" in the right direction."

Again, as with the article by Fabius, Colonel Kilcullen's reply is something far better read in full than in a short snippet offered here. Kilcullen's expertise, a rare combination of academic preparation ( he has a PhD. in Anthropology), field experience in waging unconventional warfare and in high level policy making, provides a level of insight into problems we face in Iraq and Afghanistan rarely seen in online discussions of this type.

Thanks again to Fabius Maximus and to Colonel Kilcullen for their contributions and to Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle for their tireless efforts at SWJ/SWC in bringing important matters of defense policy to greater public attention.

4GW victories by governments are usually of the first kind, local governments fighting insurgencies. Often foreign assistance is important or even decisive, but the local government leads in such areas as political reform and tactics. Western governments have “won” a few type two insurgencies, but only by assisting the locals – with the locals carrying the primary burden. That is, the foreign interest may lead, but the local government must implement."

A very important point, and one mysteriously unlearned by the Bush Administration. Afghanistan is an example of enabling local enemies of your enemy to win, Iraq is an example of disabling local enemies of your enemy by trying to win on your own.

"Afghanistan is an example of enabling local enemies of your enemy to win, Iraq is an example of disabling local enemies of your enemy by trying to win on your own."

The latter scenario you describe, which the Bush administration is clinging to, is driven by Saudi and Israeli pressure. Each view Iran as a much greater threat than a permanent failed state in Iraq.Or even an Al Qaida Iraq.

Hence the paralysis. We should tell the al Saud that unless they start footing more of the bill ( perhaps in depressing oil prices if this remains within the capacity of their reserve "flex") then we will cut our costs by tilting to the Shiite-Kurdish majority in a decisive manner.

As for this statement: Afghanistan is an example of enabling local enemies of your enemy to win, Iraq is an example of disabling local enemies of your enemy by trying to win on your own.

The problem is the two countries are not the same thing. In a queer way it highlights the very lack of understanding of in region / in country drivers, frameworks and terms of reference - for American driven abstractions of no real meaning.

For Afghanistan, there was a ready made alignment of interest with the Northern factions against the Pashtun dominated Talebans. Not merely enemy of my enemy, but subsequent alignment of interest that allowed (allows?) a degree of operational cooperation.

In the case of Iraq, contra the ill-informed fantasies in the US of A, such does not and did not exist with the Shia.

The colonial hangover structurally makes the US of A look like an imperialist (more so than in the case of the light touch in Afghanistan) grabbing assets, and the interests of the Shia (in the majority, a la as-Sadr, al-Malaki, etc) aligns with Iran, and not operationlly with the US.

There is not a basis for real cooperation, and so, bingo, you get the Hobbesian terror that is now Iraq, with the US having only un-enemies, and no real friends with truly aligned interests (except to an extent the Kurds, themselves marginal).

Saudi pressure has fuck all to do with this, it's comical to even suggest.

Mark's suggestion on a 'threat' to the Ibn Saud is ridiculous. Tilting to the Shia is not a real option for the US, nor are the Kurds and the Shia a stable coalition. Or even a reasonable gamble.

I'd note that the Saudis no longer have enough reserve flex to manage petrol pricing in the way imagined, and regardless it's immaterial to US interests re Iraq (whose marginal revenues are actually better w higher pricing).

Well, regardless, the US should say "Welcome the Soviet scenario" - essentially there is no way out of ending up just like the Soviets in Afghanistan. Only question is how long you want to piss away billions before admitting it.

My comment was based on the recent Saudi public diplomacy remarks of not wanting the U.S. to leave Iraq unilaterally and the reports (which were very mixed) of the Cheney-Abdullah meeting. I'll take your word on the Saudi oil flex.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban had also alienated significant segments of its Pushtun base with the killing of the elder Karzai, a respected elder of the "royal" clan, such as it is (Hamid Karzai and his father were early Taliban supporters which made the killing also something of a betrayal. Not sure how that conflict was viewed through the eyes of Pushtunwali customs but I doubt if it played well) and some conflict with the warlord of Khost (whose name escapes me at present).