It is a question that has animated discussions in maritime circles recently. A recent report in the Indian media suggests New Delhi is planning to undertake joint projects with Japan and the United States for the defense of its littoral spaces, including one for the installation of a sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) chain in India’s near seas. In an article for a Indian defense magazine in April this year, Prasun Sengupta, a well-known analyst and commentator, surmises that New Delhi is considering Japanese assistance in the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point in the Bay of Bengal to prevent Chinese submarines from approaching Indian exclusive economic zone.
According to Sengupta, besides providing funds for the upgrading of naval air bases and construction of new electronic/signals intelligence stations along the Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands, Tokyo plans to finance an undersea optical fiber cable from Chennai to Port Blair. Once completed, this network is likely to be integrated with the existing U.S.-Japan “Fish Hook” SOSUS network meant specifically to monitor People’s Liberation Army-Navy(PLAN) submarine activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Rim.
The starting point for this collaboration is supposed to have been Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington last year, when India and the United States agreed to intensify cooperation in maritime security. New Delhi is said to have decided to move forward with its plans to strengthen its near-seas defenses after ASEAN defense ministers at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus gathering in Lankawi, Malaysia, in March collectively stated their desire for India to play a security role beyond the Indian Ocean.
There is no official confirmation of these developments. However, it is entirely possible China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) plans in Southeast Asia may have served as a trigger for an Indian response in the Bay of Bengal. In an article last month, Lyle Goldstein, a well known China specialist, claimed Beijing was in the process of creating an undersea “Great Wall” in the South China Sea by establishing an array of ocean-floor acoustic sensors to detect U.S. submarines. China’s hydrophone system is reportedly modeled on the U.S. Navy’s SOSUS, meant originally to track Soviet submarines in the mid-1950s. Reports that the PLAN is on the verge of operationalizing its sensor chain may have prompted New Delhi to pursue an undersea sensor project in the South Asian littoral.

The more interesting venture, from an Indian perspective, is between Japan and the United States in the wider Pacific. Since the early 2000s, when PLAN submarine patrols are supposed to have turned aggressive, the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) began setting up a chain of fixed arrays to monitor the movement of Chinese submarines in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This resulted in the establishment of the “Fish Hook Undersea Defense Line” in early 2005, stretching from Japan to Southeast Asia with key nodes at Okinawa, Guam, and Taiwan. The system reportedly consists of two separate networks of hydrophones, one stretching from Okinawa to southern Kyushu, and the other from Okinawa to Taiwan.

In July 2013, Beijing claimed that the United States and Japan had established “very large underwater monitoring systems” at the northern and southern ends of Taiwan. One supposedly stretched from Yonaguni to the Senkaku Islands, while the other covered the Bashi Channel down to the Philippines. In addition, Chinese analysts contended, large numbers of hydrophones had been installed “in Chinese waters” close to China’s submarine bases in Qingdao, Xiaopingdao, and Yulin on Hainan Island, even though it wasn’t fully clear if these sensors were all operational.

Fewer doubts remain about the efficacy of an older version of the SOSUS in the northeastern Pacific (off the Tsugaru Strait) and the southwestern Pacific (the Tsushima Strait) that Japan and the United States have jointly managed since the days of the Cold War. Analysts aver that Japan’s experience with working the system for over six decades has provided Japanese engineers and technicians with the proficiency and professionalism to install sea-based sensors in distant littoral spaces, including in the Indian Ocean.
New Delhi, however, would need to consider the implications of operating sensitive equipment with a foreign partner– especially the sharing of critical sensor data. In the case of the joint Japan-U.S.SOSUS, for instance, while the JMSDF and U.S. Navy personnel jointly manage the JMSDF Oceanographic Observation Centre in Okinawa, all the information is available to the U.S. Pacific Command,as the facility is under the operational control of the U.S. Navy. Needless to say, there are concerns that India may be required to provide its foreign collaborators with a level of informational access with which the Indian navy may not be too comfortable.

Some observers worry that placing undersea sensors around the Andaman and Nicobar islands may ultimately result in deployment of other A2/AD tools that China might find provocative. Japan’s activation of a coastal surveillance unit on Yonaguni Island, only 67 miles from the east coast of Taiwan, has been widely perceived to be an A2/AD measure. Reports suggest that Japan’s far-flung islands may soon see the placement of mobile anti-ship missile batteries and air-defense systems to bolster A2/AD capabilities.
Against the backdrop of a recent logistical agreement with the United States, and with other foundational pacts like the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation in the pipeline, there are concerns that the establishment of an undersea sensor chain around the Andaman and Nicobar islands might be a precursor to the placement of area-denial weapons – a move that Beijing would deem “escalatory.”
Inadequate return on investment constitutes another source of worry. The setting up of a listening array, experts aver, goes well beyond the placement of hydrophones on the seabed. A sound surveillance system requires steady economic and human investment, with the careful cultivation of an entire cadre of specialists able to interpret the array’s data output. The United States and Japan invested in their system for years before it began producing results. India could seek Japanese assistance in installing a SOSUS but could take years on training specialists and refining the related technologies.

Moreover, undersea sensors produce enormous quantities of raw data that require a dedicated system to sift and sort through. Over the years, the task of organizing the data collected has become increasingly unviable. The lack of resources to manage data-collection facilities has led navies to consider a proposal to treat the data as a marketable commodity, by sharing it with environmental scientists and civilian agencies for a price. In order to allow the access of data in real-time,however, the hydrophones have had to be connected online, there byraising concerns about the possible misuse of data.

Despite such worries, an Indian sound sensor array in the Indian Ocean could prove invaluable. For a country that has a major anti-submarine warfare handicap and a lack of operational submarines, an undersea sensor would be a godsend. India has so far not made any major investments in improving its sub-hunting capabilities. If it can install a deterrence system and operate it with a degree of competence, it could retain its strategic primacy in the Indian Ocean.This piece was first posted on the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative website here.@HariPrasad-1@Kshatriya87@LETHALFORCE@sayareakd@MKM

We definitely need it to discourage china's growing ambition in indian ocean. Modi too a large extent has curtail china by his very high profile diplomacy. CHina for the first time looks on backfoot and rattled. We need to maintain the pressure. The oil route through Gwadar is totally economically non viable. CHina will continue to supply its oil through Indian ocean. We neet to maintain our assets there in Indian ocean and increase our presence and vigilance. So any of such kind of move is well comed.

submarines are important key player in check -mate battle scenarios during war. the edge of submarines are their invisibility to ground /surface based detectors , once its location can be traced then it becomes useless.. i remember when Putin went to AUS G-20 he went with a warship and a nuclear submarine.. that was enough for his entire security in the enemy/NAto land..
we just have 1 nuclear submarine and rest are diesel based that keep hopping up the surface for fuel,air etc.. and building/inducting a nuclear sub army is costly and time taking process.. so better we should start with the wall of detectors , having intelligence on enemy's sub is biggest advantage..

That article by Prasun K. Sengupta was sure a hit. It has been discussed in almost all defence forums I know and also garnered the attention of international observers, like Peter Coates, who authors Gentleseas.

On topic, yes, the undersea defence line will be indispensable in the near future. With PLAN submarine patrols in IOR on a steady increase (as mentioned in the original TRISHUL piece), the operations (and in war time, the very survival) of Indian nuclear submarines will become extremely difficult in IOR unless such defences and grids are not set up - in which case PLAN SSNs can routinely pester Indian SSBNs, putting our second-strike capability on edge every now & then.

We should definitely look to take advantage of the expertise of US/Japan in this field in order to create joint solutions.

India does not need this. Chinese subs will never make it out of south China seas with the naval Alliance. US satellites track everything in south China seas and Ohio subs do around the clock patrols and not to mention the dozen or more us naval bases and guam and Japanese and Australian
Navies

Yes,SOSUS chain is a very effective and cheap way to monitor submarines.But still we are progressing well with P8i/P-3 with INS Kamorta and siblings making regular rounds in the seas as for anti submarine warfare strategy.

India does not need this. Chinese subs will never make it out of south China seas with the naval Alliance. US satellites track everything in south China seas and Ohio subs do around the clock patrols and not to mention the dozen or more us naval bases and guam and Japanese and Australian
Navies

We definitely need it to discourage china's growing ambition in indian ocean. Modi too a large extent has curtail china by his very high profile diplomacy. CHina for the first time looks on backfoot and rattled. We need to maintain the pressure. The oil route through Gwadar is totally economically non viable. CHina will continue to supply its oil through Indian ocean. We neet to maintain our assets there in Indian ocean and increase our presence and vigilance. So any of such kind of move is well comed.

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Who are you? What happened to @HariPrasad-1 ? Why did you hacked his account?

India does not need this. Chinese subs will never make it out of south China seas with the naval Alliance. US satellites track everything in south China seas and Ohio subs do around the clock patrols and not to mention the dozen or more us naval bases and guam and Japanese and Australian
Navies

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

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In other words, we are drawing own advantage for security in IOR from US and Japan on the name of alignment because India needs this for security in future from China or others threat.
We need this but US and Japan don't.: P

PLAN has already carried out 3 reported submarine patrols within IOR, two SSNs and one SSK, since 2013. Each patrol lasting several months at a time. Coming up all the way to Karachi and Colombo.

As originally reported in TRISHUL, the overall PLAN submarine sorties of this type have been a steady rise. From none in 2005, 2 in 2006, 6 in 2007 and an average of 12 patrols an year between 2008 and 2015. As the number of boats keeps growing, these patrols will increase in frequency.....to the point where at any given time, there could be atleast 1 or 2 PLAN SSNs lurking in the IOR.

In the event of growing tensions, these SSNs can be shadowing our SSBNs without fail, and there would be no way for us to know for sure - unless we have such an undersea trip-wire in place which would alert us to the presence/arrival of hostile submarines and their locations - so that aircraft & ships know where to look. Only then can MPAs like P-8I be dispatched.

The effect of MPAs is localized - a fleet of 12 aircraft cannot give you 24x7 early-warning against hostile submarines; only when you know beforehand where to look can a plane proceed to that sector - and remember that if a proper SSN does not want to be seen, if will not be seen. At operating depths (300 meters or more), it is practically invisible.

To cover the whole IOR, you need a fleet of 1,000 MPAs on station at any given time.

The undersea defence line is indispensable. At the present time it's importance might be lost on some but within the next 10 years it will become an obvious reality - but by then it would be too late to get a strategic one-up on China's plans for the IOR. Unless we start the developments now.

one has to look at things in a broader perspective regarding this underwater monitoring systems.

paki navy main weapon is its submarine arm.
it will soon have 8 Chinese subs in its inventory and claims are being made of nuclear as well as conventional armed SLCM capability.
the Chinese in due course will supply this capability to tie down Indian navy to the Arabian sea , it is a very logical assumption.

now if India gets access to such underwater monitoring systems then what harm is there to install them in the arabian sea to monitor both paki and chinese naval movements.

these sensors can be installed out side our sea ports and in a race track pattern parallel to the paki coastline to serve as a 1st line underwater surveillance system.
because during war and peace time porki subs are and will be the only major threat to our ports and coastal areas.

In other words, we are drawing own advantage for security in IOR from US and Japan on the name of alignment because India needs this for security in future from China or others threat.
We need this but US and Japan don't.: P

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US and Japan planned decades ago for this. And yes India would not need to be allied if China threat did not exist. India definitely benefits greatly in being allied against Chinese. Can you convince me how India alone can handle China?

With a large coastline of approximately 7600 km surrounded by two major ocean basins on both sides of peninsular India as Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, drained by major river basins from Himalayas, there are multidimensional requirement of underwater technologies to cater the country's demand. With increased thrust on underwater technology in India during the past 15 years, it is imperative to put forth India's development in the frontier area of underwater technologies. Under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT) is leading the frontier areas of underwater technologies. The Institutes like Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute and Indian Institute of Technologies are also contributing in a minor way. Under International Seabed Authority (ISA) regulations, Government of India registered as a contractor on 17th August 1987. India was allocated 150,000 sq. km area in Central Indian Ocean Basin for exploration of manganese nodules. After detailed exploration, 50% of this area has been relinquished to the ISA. While other Institutes in India are responsible for metal extraction, NIOT is responsible for developing technology for mining of manganese nodules from the deep seabed. To harness the non-renewable resources ranging from placer deposits at water depth of 100 m, gas hydrates at 1000 m, hydrothermal sulphides at 3000 m to polymetallic nodules at 5400 m water depth, various technologies were developed and proven in the field. To cater to the disaster management, range of observation systems, drifters and seafloor based observations are being developed and data collection and dissemination is in place. This paper deals with the achievements in the development of underwater vehicles and systems during the past 15 years in India in the civilian front. The major technologies developed, like the Deep sea crawler (512 m) for mining of manganese nodules, In-situ soil tester (5462 m) for measuremen- of in-situ soil property on the sea bed, Work Class Remotely Operated Vehicle (5289 m) for general purpose, including assistance in nodule mining, Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (200 m) for shallow water and operation in polar regions, being developed, and drifter buoys for collection of ocean data are explained in detail. The challenges involved in design, development, testing and issues faced during the sea trials of the various systems and lessons learnt are explained in this paper.

India will sign a contract with the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a United Nations organisation, later this year that will give the country exclusive rights to mine for precious metals trapped in magma on the seabed of the Indian Ocean.

Officials say that while the long-term mining projects will fructify only over decades, they will be of immense strategic and commercial value.

The Union Cabinet on Wednesday approved a proposal by the Earth Sciences Ministry to sign the agreement to mine for so-called polymetallic sulphides over 10,000 sq km around parts of central and southwest Indian ridges in the ocean.

Permission

In 2002, the government was granted permission only to explore ocean regions and prospect for precious metals.

These compounds in the ocean ridges have attracted worldwide attention for their long-term commercial and strategic values, said a Ministry statement.

Initial estimated resource of polymetallic nodules on the site retained by India on the central Indian Ocean basin is 380 million tonnes with 0.55 tonnes of cobalt, 4.7 tonnes of nickel, 4.29 tonnes of copper and 92.59 tonnes of manganese.

Survey on

However, the actual estimates will vary depending on the results of a detailed survey and exploration, coupled with results of test mining of nodules upon developing the mining technology.

A slew of Indian organisations such as the National Institute of Ocean Technology and the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research are involved with these surveys and developing specialised shipping vehicles.

Challenge

A key technical challenge is being able to develop the specialised drills and extraction-technology required to fish out the metals.

The ISA, under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), governs non-living resources of the seabed of international waters.