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Error: 1 , Vol.15 NoI (2013) BritishJournal Publishing, Inc Impact of Fraud and Fraudulent Practices on the Performance of Banks in Nigeria Uchenna Chiezey Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Tel: , Agbo J. C. Onu PhD Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Tel: , Abstract Banking business has become more complex with the development in the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) which has changed the nature of bank fraud and fraudulent practices. Fraud and fraudulent activities pose a significant problem to the banking industry in Nigeria. The paper, therefore, evaluated the impact of fraud and fraudulent practices on the performance of banks in Nigeria within the period The main argument is that fraud and fraudulent activities have no effect on bank performance in Nigeria. The paper focused on the twenty-four (24) deposit money banks in Nigeria within the period. The paper employed evaluative research design to determine the nature, magnitude and economic consequences of fraud on banks in Nigeria. Secondary sources of data were utilized for the study. The relationships between fraud cases and other variables were estimated using Pearson Product Moment correlation. Multiple regression ysis was used to ascertain the impact of fraud and fraudulent practices on bank performance in Nigeria within the study period. The paper found that the percentage of mobilized funds lost to fraud was highest between 2001 and However, due to the stringent measures adopted by the regulatory bodies to tackle the menace of fraud and fraudulent activities, there was a significant decrease between 2006 and The paper concluded that fraud and fraudulent activities inflict severe financial difficulties on banks and their customers. They reduce the amount of money available for the development of the economy. The paper recommended that banks in Nigeria need to strengthen their internal control systems and the regulatory bodies should improve their supervisory role in order to check and curtail the incidence of fraud and fraudulent activities in the banking industry in Nigeria. Keywords: Fraud, Fraudulent Practices, Performance, Banks, Impact 122 1. Introduction Fraud and fraudulent activities affect every business. Fraud losses continue to pose a significant problem to many industries despite significant advances in fraud detection technologies. Wilhem (2004) estimated annual losses due to fraud for various industries in the US to include $67b (Insurance), $150b (Telecommunication), $1.2b (Bank), $40b (money laundering), $5.7b (Internet) and $1b (Credit card). These losses pose a significant threat to banks considering their role in the economy. Owolabi (2010) noted that the problem of fraud in the banking industry is not limited to any economy, nation, continent or environment. Fraud and fraudulent activities can ultimately result to bank failure. Bank failure in Nigeria can be traced to the 1930 s bank failure and crisis. According to Nwankwo (1994) the crisis of confidence in the Nigerian banking industry occurred in the1930s when all indigenous banks, except the National Bank, collapsed. It occurred again during the banking boom and crash of the late 1940s when all, but four indigenous banks, experienced the liquidators hammer. Also between 1952 and 1954, 16 out of 21 indigenous banks failed. In the late 1990s, 26 failed banks were liquidated while others went through various surgical operations ranging from restructuring, renaming, acquiring and outright sales to new investors. A prominent feature of bank failure which led to the reforms in the banking sector in Nigeria was fraud. This indicates a fundamental problem with fraud investigation and management in Nigerian banks. There is, therefore, need for a comprehensive fraud management scheme to have a holistic view of all the factors involved in fraud occurrence. The holistic scheme, as Wilhelm (2004) opines, includes fraud deterrence, fraud prevention, fraud detection, fraud mitigation, fraud ysis, fraud policy, fraud investigation and fraud prosecution. These stages must be successfully integrated and balanced to reap the benefits of advancements in fraud detection technologies and to save the economy from continuous lose of money to fraud and fraudulent activities in the banking sector in Nigeria. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of fraud and fraudulent practices on the performance of banks in Nigeria within the period The main argument is that fraud and fraudulent activities have no effect on bank performance. The focus of the study is on the twenty-four (24) deposit money banks in Nigeria within the period. 2. Statement of the Problem The banking business has become more complex with the development in the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) which has changed the nature of bank fraud and fraudulent practices. Berney (2008) observes that customers rely heavily on the web for their banking business which leads to an increase in the number of online transactions. Gates and Jacob (2009) and Malphrus (2009) assert that the internet provides fraudsters with more opportunities to attack customers who are not physically present on the web to authenticate transactions. Within a 6 year period, the FBI received 207,051 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) for criminal activities related to cheque fraud, cheque kiting, counterfeit cheques, and counterfeit negotiable instruments. These fraudulent activities accounted for 47 percent of the 436,655 SARs filed by U.S. financial institutions and equaled approximately $7 billion in expected losses (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], 2002). According to Greene (2009), the true economic costs are about 150 percent of the actual fraud loss. In Nigeria, in spite of the banking regulation and bank examination by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the supervisory role of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), and The Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN), there is still a growing concern about fraud and other unethical practices in the banking industry. Evidence from the NDIC Report (2008) reveals that the report of the examinations and special investigations 133 showed that some banks were still bedevilled with problems of fraud, weak board and management oversight; inaccurate financial reporting; poor book-keeping practices; nonperforming insider-related credits; declining asset quality and attendant large provisioning requirements; inadequate debt recovery; non-compliance with banking laws, rules and regulations; and significant exposure to the capital market through share and margin loans. Okpara (2009) found that one of the factors that impacted the most on the performance of the banking system in Nigeria was fraudulent practices. This study, thus, examines the extent to which fraud and other unethical practices have impacted on the banking industry in particular and the national economy generally. 3. Literature Review Fraud and fraudulent practices are in categories. Mitchell et al (1992) identified seventeen categories of unethical behavior in banking business which include defrauding government, bribery of public officials, insider trading, bribery of private citizens, discrimination, socially questionable activities, bad judgment in management decisions, corporate politics, unfair trade practices, industrial espionage, environmental harm, safety, conflict of interest and invasion of privacy. Most of these unethical behaviors were prevalent in banking business in Nigeria. Fraud is not peculiar either in magnitude or sophistication to Nigeria. The crash of multinational companies like ENRON, WorldCom Inc. and Global Crossing in the wake of fraud and accounting scandals, for instance, attests to this fact. Banks, nonetheless, played a dubious role in the collapse of these corporations (Microsoft Encarta, 2009). Various reasons have been given for increased occurrence of fraud in banks and other financial service industries. Ebong (2005) observes that people are driven to commit fraud as a means of easy acquisition of money and property which, in our today s world, translate into recognition and power. The pursuit of money and the constant quest for growth may not entirely explain all the financial scandals. Data on institutional causes of fraud in Nigerian banks were not readily available. Akindehinde (2011), in corroborating this fact, lamented the challenges often encountered while seeking data on fraud and forgeries from the banks. He noted that data could only be obtained from only eight banks between April and June, out of which only about five were received directly and the others stumbled upon. However, a survey carried out in India gave the institutional causes of bank fraud as lack of oversight by line or senior managers, deviation from existing process/controls, current business pressure to meet targets, difficult business scenario and collusion between the employees and external parties (Deloitte, 2012). The quest to outperform competitors by corporate leaders can lead a once moral and ethical person to become unethical in his actions. Barclays bank of England, for example, was accused of fixing its London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) submissions. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the bank admitted to manipulating the benchmark interest rate because other banks were doing it. Managers, therefore, tend to rationalize their unethical behaviors especially when surrounded by the kind of people who are engaged in the same deviant behavior. Thus, where there is excessive pressure for profit and dividends at the expense of decent business conduct and service, management invariably fails to provide ethical leadership and following. A worrisome development in fraud and fraudulent activities is increased rate of bank staff involvement especially in forgery cases. Forgery is the fraudulent copying and use of customer s signature to obtain money from the customer s account without his/her prior consent. Such forgery may be targeted at savings accounts, deposit accounts, current accounts or transfer instruments such as drafts. Okpara (2009) reported high involvement of bank staff 144 in these fraudulent practices. Nwaze (2009) affirms that most forgeries are perpetuated by internal staff or by outsiders who act in collusion with employees of the bank. Impersonation by third parties to fraudulently obtain new cheque books which are subsequently utilized to commit fraud is another peculiar dimension of bank fraud. Impersonation involves assuming the role of another with the intent of deceitfully committing fraud. Cases of impersonation have been known to be particularly successful when done with conniving bank employees who can readily make available the specimen signature and passport photograph of the unsuspecting customer. NDIC (2011) report reveals that per cent of fraud which was perpetuated with staff connivance amounted to N900 million losses to the affected banks. CBN (1995) special report on distressed banks showed that top management staff were involved in fraudulent activities. It showed that there was a lot of insider abuse in several banks. In some cases, the CEOs set up Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) to lend money to themselves for stock price manipulation or the purchase of estates. The report cited a case in which the CEO of a bank borrowed money and purchased private jets which were registered in the name of the son. In another bank, the management set up 100 fake companies for the purpose of perpetrating fraud. CBN also disclosed that 30% of the share capital of one bank was purchased with customers deposits, while another bank used depositors funds to purchase 80% of its Initial Primary Offer. It paid N25 per share while the shares were trading at N11 on the Nigerian Stock Exchange which later collapsed to less than N3 per share. In another instance, the CEO of a bank controlled over 35% of the bank through SPVs borrowing customers deposits. The collapse of the capital market wiped out these customers deposits amounting to hundreds of billions of naira. The implication is that a lot of the capital supposedly raised by these so called mega banks was fake capital financed from depositors funds. The extent of these unethical practices in the Nigerian banking system arguably reflects the general degree of corruption in the country. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2011) ranked Nigeria as 143 out of 180 countries based on the prevalence of corrupt practices. The increase in bank staff involvement may be connected with the reluctance to report and prosecute cases by the affected banks. Gold (2009) and Olasanmi (2010) opine that because many fraud cases escape detection, it encourages many others to join in perpetuating it. Fraud has been classified in various ways using different parameters. Owolabi (2010) classified perpetrators of fraud as management of the banks (otherwise referred to as management fraud), insiders (these perpetrators are purely the employees of the banks), outsiders (include customers and/or non-customers of the banks) and outsiders/insiders (this is a collaboration of the bank staff and outsiders). In almost the same manner, E-banking also attracts varieties of fraud such as skimming, (counter fact card fraud) stolen card, fraudulent applications, E-theft, never received issue, card data manipulation, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) video, spam mails or denial service, access swift fraud, inter-bank clearing frauds, money laundering frauds and identity theft/phishing (utilizing other people s identity such as credit card info and identity numbers to make unauthorized purchases). Table 1 below shows the types of fraud and forgeries perpetrated in banks in Nigeria. 155 Table 1: Types of Bank Fraud and Forgery S/No Types of Fraud/Forgery S/No Types of Fraud/Forgery 1. Presentation of forged cheques and Dividend 8. Outright theft of money/embezzlement warrants 2. Granting of unauthorized credits 9. Identity theft 3. Posting of fictitious credits 10. Granting of unauthorized Loans 4. Fraudulent transfers/withdrawals from customers accounts 5. Cheque suppression and cash defalcation 6. Excess charges 7. Non-refund of wrong debit Source: Field Survey 2013 Many factors account for the causes of fraud and fraudulent practices in Nigerian banks. Ojo (2008) classifies the causes of fraud and forgeries in banking transactions into two generic factors namely, the institutional or endogenous factors and the environmental or exogenous (social) factors. The institutional factors or causes are those that are traceable to the in-house environment of the banks. The notable institutional factors are weak accounting and internal control system, inadequate supervision of subordinates, disregard for know your customers (KYC) rule, poor information technology and data base management, hapless personnel policies, poor salaries and conditions of service, general frustrations occasioned by management unfulfilled promises, failure to engage in regular call-over, employees refusal to abide by laid-down procedures without any penalty or sanction, banks reluctance to report fraud due to the perceived negative publicity or image, banking experience of staff, inadequate infrastructure, inadequate training and re-training, poor book-keeping and genetic traits. The environmental or social factors, according to Idowu (2009), are those factors that can be traced to the immediate and remote environment of the bank. These factors or causes, according to Ogbunka (2002), are manifest in the penchant to get rich quick, slow and tortuous legal process, poverty and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, job insecurity, peer group pressure, societal expectations, increased financial burden on individuals and stiff competition in the banking industry which saw many banks engaging in fraud so as to meet up with liquidity and profitability objectives. Both factors affect the performance of banks in Nigeria. Fraud is perhaps the most fatal of all the risks confronting banks. The enormity of bank fraud in Nigeria can be inferred from its value, volume and actual loss. A good number of banks frauds are suppressed partly because of the personalities involved or because of concern over the negative effect such disclosure may have on the image of the bank. Customers may lose confidence in the bank and this could cause a setback in its growth. Fraud leads to loss of money belonging either to the bank or customers. Such losses may be absorbed by the profits for the affected trading period and this, consequently, reduces the amount of profit which would have been available for distribution to shareholders. Losses from fraud, which are absorbed by the equity capital of the bank, impair the bank s financial health and constrain its ability to extend loans and advances for profitable operations. In extreme cases, rampant and large incidences of fraud could lead to a bank s failure. Fraud can increase the operating cost of a bank because of the added cost of installing the necessary machinery for its detection, prevention and protection of assets. Moreover, devoting valuable time to safeguarding its asset from fraudulent men distracts management. This unproductive diversion of resources reduces outputs and low profits which in turn could retard the growth of the bank. It also leads to a diminishing effect on the asset quality of 166 banks. The problem is more dangerous when compounded by insider loan abuses. Indeed, the first generation of liquidated banks by NDIC was largely a consequence of frauds perpetrated through insider loan abuses. If this problem is not adequately handled, it could lead to distress and bank failure. This study is premised on The Fraud Triangle Theory. Cressey (1971) described the classical fraud theory and designated the propensities for fraud as a triangle of perceived opportunity, perceived pressure and perceived rationalization. The model is shown in Figure 1 thus: Fig.1: Classical Fraud Motivation Model Sources: Wells, Joseph T. (1997). Occupational Fraud Abuse. In Albrecht, W. Steve (Ed.). Fraud Examination. Thomson: South-Western Publishing, Every fraud executor is confronted with some kind of pressure or need. Pressures that motivate individuals to commit fraud are financial pressures (high medical bills or debts), vices (drugs, gambling, alcohol), work-related pressures (high pressure for good results at work or a need to cover up someone s poor performance, or to report results that are better than actual performance compared to those of competitors) and other pressures (frustration with the nature of work, or even a challenge to beat the system). This need or greed usually has a combination of other factors such as the opportunity and the attitude to commit the fraud. The executor of fraud must believe that he or she can commit the fraud without being caught (or if caught, nothing grave will happen). The opportunity to commit fraud is possible when employees have access to assets and information that allow them to both commit and conceal fraud. Opportunities are provided by a weak internal control environment, lack of internal control procedures, failure to enforce internal controls and various other factors such as apathy, ignorance, lack of punishment and inadequate infrastructure. Access must, therefore, be limited to only those systems, information, and assets that are truly necessary for an employee to complete his or her job. The third driver of fraud is ability of the perpetrators to find a way to rationalize their actions as acceptable. Rationalization/Absence of guardians refers to the manner in which people think about their work, performance and contribution within the workplace. They, therefore, attach a value that they should derive from the company for being productive or delivering something of value. Absence of guardians, on the other hand, refers to the situation 177 where there are limited or no processes in the organization to test the integrity of the financial information or processes. The absence of the integrity process includes an absence or ineffective role of internal auditors, external auditors, Board of Directors and reporting requirements banks, regulators and appropriate management review. The study adopted the Fraud Triangle Theory as its framework because it explains the factors that cause individuals to commit fraud and best describes fraud in the context of the banking industry. 4. Methodology The study employed evaluative research design to determine the nature, magnitude and economic consequences of fraud on banks in Nigeria within the study period. Secondary sources of data were utilized for the study. Data were obtained from the annual publications of the CBN and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). The relationships between fraud cases and other variables were estimated using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. Multiple regression ysis was used to determine the impact of fraud and fraudulent practices on bank performance in Nigeria within the study period. The model is specified as: Y = a 0 + a 1 TA1 + a 2 NOC + a 3 NS1 Where: Y = Actual Loss to banks a 1, a 2, a 3= Regression coefficients TAI = Total amount involved NOC = Number of fraud cases NS1 = Number of staff involved The model was tested using multiple regression ysis. The F-value was calculated to determine the extent of relationship between the variables under consideration at 5% level of significance. 5. Results and Discussion The effect of fraud and fraudulent practices on the performance of banks in Nigeria is not easily ascertainable. Whether fraud and fraudulent practices affect the performance of banks in Nigeria can be determined from the foregoing yses. Several types of fraudulent practices were reported in the Nigerian banking industry within the period of study. We rely on the available data obtained from NDIC within the period which are complete. The dominant types are presented in Table 2. 188 Table 2: Types of Major Fraud and Forgeries in Nigerian Banking Industry between 2003 and (N M) 2004 (N M) 2005 (N M) Type of Frequency Amount Actual % Frequency Amount Actual % Frequency Amount Actual loss % Fraud involved loss nvolved loss involved Granting , , Unauthorized 3 Loans/overdraft Presentation 249 2, , , of forged 2 cheques Posting fictitious credit Loss of money to armed robbers Fraudulent 283 4, , , transfer and 7 withdrawals Outright theft Suppression of , cash/cheques Attempted fraud Total 773 8, ,065 6, , ,229 10, , Year Source: NDIC Annual Reports for Fraudulent transfers and withdrawals dominated the reported fraudulent cases from 2003 to The total reported cases for the three years were 3,067 while fraudulent transfers were 957 representing 31.20% of the total cases reported. In 2003, the reported cases were 283, while in 2004; they rose to 309 which was an increment of 9.19%. In 2005, the cases recorded were 418 indicating an increment of 35.28%. This implies that fraud and fraudulent activities were prevalent in the banking sector in Nigeria during the period of study. Table 3: Fraud and Forgery cases and amount of money lost by Nigerian Banks ( ) No of Fraud and Forgery cases reported Amount involved (N billion) Loss to banks (N billion) Total 22, ,476 Source: CBN Annual Reports for No of fraud cases that led to losses 199 Table 3 shows the fraud and forgery cases and amount of money lost by banks during the study period. The actual losses to banks grew steadily from The amount lost decreased from 2.6 billion Naira in 2004 to 1.4 billion Naira in Thereafter, it grew steadily for the remaining years under review with 2010 recording the highest loss to Nigerian banks with a staggering amount of 11.4 billion naira. Though 2009 had the highest amount involved, it recorded a loss of 7.0 billion naira. A total of N41.15 billion was lost by banks to fraud. Table 4: Money mobilized by banks and amount lost to fraud ( ) Year Amount mobilised Amount lost to fraud % of mobilized funds lost (N billion) (N billion) Total Average: 46.13% Source: CBN AND NDIC Annual Reports for Deposit money banks in Nigeria lost more than they mobilized between the years In 2005, banks lost more than half of their mobilized funds to fraud. In subsequent years, banks lost less than one percent of deposits mobilized to fraud as deposits increased significantly and tighter measures put in place by regulatory bodies to combat fraud. Banks mobilized a total of N50, billion Naira, while the average percentage amount lost to fraud was 46.13%. Table 5 and Figure 2 agree with this finding. 2010 Fig. 2: Money lost by Banks to fraud as a Percentage of Mobilized funds within Source: CBN Annual Reports for Fig. 2 shows that the percentage of mobilized funds lost to fraud was highest between 2001 and But, between 2006 and 2011, there was a significant decrease. This was due to stringent measures adopted by the supervisory agencies to tackle the menace of fraud and fraudulent activities in the banking sector in Nigeria. The multiple regression ysis in Table 5 confirms the facts contained herein. Figure 3 indicates a progressive increase in the amount lost by banks to fraud from Fig. 3: Amount of money lost by banks due to fraud from Source: CBN Annual Reports for The CBN annual reports recorded a decrease in the amount lost to fraud in 2005 from 2.6 billion Naira to 1.4 billion Naira. From 2006 there was a continued increase in the amount lost with a record high of 11.4 billion naira recorded in This decreased in 2011 to 5.8 billion naira. The decrease is not unconnected to the measures adopted by the regulatory bodies to combat fraud and fraudulent activities in banks in Nigeria. 2111 Fig. 4: Relationship between Return on Assets, Return on Equity and amount of money lost to fraud by banks for the years Source: CBN Annual Reports for Fig. 4 shows the relationship between return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and the amount of money lost to fraud by banks. ROA and ROE were highly correlated (r =0.709). However, the amount lost to fraud was negatively correlated to ROE (r= ). Though the amount of money lost to fraud had a negative correlation with bank efficiency, it was very low (r=-0.050). This confirms the finding of multiple regression ysis in Table 6. Fig. 5: Ratios of Non-performing credit to total credit and Shareholders funds Source: CBN AND NDIC Annual Reports for The quality of these risk assets worsened progressively from 2001 to 2004 as shown in Fig. 5. The data revealed that the ratio of non-performing credit to total credit was greater than 100% in This meant that the shareholders funds had been completely wiped out industry-wide by the non-performing credit portfolio. The improvement in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans in subsequent years was linked to the purchase of toxic loans 2212 by Asset Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON). Data for the period were not available during the period of study. Fig. 6: Total number of Bank Staff involved in Fraud from Source: NDIC Annual Reports for A total of 3,532 bank staff was involved in fraud and forgery during the study period. The number involved in fraud and fraudulent activities was highest in the year Though the year 2010 recorded the highest amount lost to fraud, the number of bank staff involved dropped from that of the previous year. The number of bank staff involved in fraudulent practices was highly correlated with fraud cases reported (r= 0.936). This was also positively correlated with the total expected losses from fraud as well as with the actual amount of money lost to fraud (r= 0.797). This was significant 0.3%. Fig. 7: Cadre of Staff (%) involved in fraud and fraudulent practices from Source: NDIC Annual Reports for The manager cadre comprises managers and supervisors, while the accountant cadre is made up of accountants, officers and executive assistants. The clerk cadre comprises clerks and cashiers, while the typist cadre is made up of typists, technicians and stenographers. The 2313 messenger cadre is made up of messengers, drivers, cleaners, stewards and security guards, while the temporary staff comprises temporary staff who did not have tenure appointment. We employ multiple regression ysis to determine the relationship between the number of fraud cases and amount of funds mobilized by banks and its effect on the banks. Table 5: Loss to Banks Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Model β Std. Error β t Sig. (Constant) Amount involved (N billion) Number of Fraud and Forgery cases reported Source: Field Survey 2013 Table 5 shows that the amount involved in fraud and fraudulent activities during the study period was N.172 billion. The number of fraud and forgery is.000 which is less than the alpha ( ) value of This implies that there is a significant relationship between fraud and amount of funds mobilized by banks. This agrees with Table 4 and Fig. 2. Multiple regression ysis was also employed to ascertain the relationship between the occurrence of fraud and bank performance (non-performing loans, Returns on asset and equity). Table 6: Percentage of Mobilized funds Lost Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (Constant) % of mobilize funds lost Source: Field Survey 2013 Table 6 shows that the percentage mobilized funds lost is.061. This is greater than alpha value of 0.05 which implies that there is no significant relationship between occurrence of fraud and bank performance (non-performing loans, returns on asset and equity). This agrees with Fig. 4. We also employed multiple regression ysis to establish the relationship between the number and caliber of bank staff involved in fraud and the amount lost to fraud. 2414 Model Table 7: Bank Staff Involved in Fraud and Loss to Banks (N billion) Unstandardized Coefficients Β Std. Error β Standardized Coefficients (Constant) Acc cadre Clerk cadre Typist cadre Messenger cadre Temp staff Source: Field Survey 2013 Table 7 reveals that there was an inverse relationship between all cadres of staff except the clerk cadre which had a positive relationship. There was no significant relationship between the cadres of bank staff involved in fraud and fraudulent activities and the amount lost during the period of study. 6. Conclusion and Recommendations This paper has attempted to highlight the incidence and magnitude of fraud and some of its negative impact on the banking sector in Nigeria. Fraud inflicts severe financial difficulty on banks and their customers. It also leads to the depletion of shareholders funds and banks capital base as well as loss of customers money and confidence in banks. Such losses may be absorbed by the profits for the affected trading period and this consequently reduces the dividend available to shareholders. Losses from fraud which are absorbed by the equity capital of the bank impair the banks financial health and constrain its ability to extend loans and advances for profitable operations. In extreme cases, rampant and large incidents of fraud could lead to a bank s failure. The loss in funds affected the economy. It reduced the amount of money available to small or medium scale firms for developing the economy. The costs of fraud are always passed on to the society in the form of increased customer inconvenience, opportunity costs, unnecessary high prices of goods and services and lack of infrastructure. Fraud can increase the operating cost of a bank because of the added cost of installing the necessary machinery for its provision, detection and protection of assets. Moreover, devoting valuable time to safeguarding its assets from fraudulent men distracts management. This unproductive diversion of resources always reduces output and low profits which in turn could retard the growth of the bank. It also leads to a diminishing effect on the asset quality of banks. In view of the devastating effect of fraud and fraudulent practices on the performance of banks in Nigeria, the following recommendations are made: i. Banks need to strengthen their internal control systems to be able to detect and prevent fraud and fraudulent activities and to protect its assets. ii. The regulatory and supervisory bodies of banks in Nigeria need to improve their supervision using all tools at their disposal to appropriately check and curtain the incidence of fraud and fraudulent practices in the banking industry in Nigeria. iii. The Government, in every society, plays a key role in financial and other crime prevention. In this regard, the relevant institutions established to fight fraud including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria Deposit and Insurance 25 T Sig.15 Corporation (NDIC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), National Insurance Commission (NAICOM), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Police, Judiciary, National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and Standard Organization of Nigeria (SON), among others, should ensure the enforcement of various legal provisions in the fight against fraud in Nigeria. 2616 References [1] Akindehinde, O. (2011). Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NIDC) Annual Repot Meeting. [2] Berney, L. (2008). For online merchants, fraud prevention can be a balancing act. Cards & Payments, 21(2), [3] CBN (1995). Central bank of Nigeria Annual report and statement of accounts. [4] Cressey, D. R. (1971). 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Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Research. 2(1). [20] Olasanmi, O. O. (2010). Computer crime and Counter Measures in the Nigerian Banking Sector. Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 15 (1), 1-10 [21] Owolabi S. A. (2010). Fraud and Fraudulent Practices in Nigerian Banking Industry. African Research Review, 4 (3b), [22] Transparency International (2011). Corruption Perception Index. Retrieved November 17, 2012 from [23] Wilhelm, W. K. (2004). The Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory: A Holistic Approach to Fraud Management. Journal of Economic Crime Management Spring (2) 2. 28 Sir Patrick Gillam Lecture The Global Banking Crisis: an African banker's response Mallam Si Lamido Si Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria Professor Judith Rees Chair, LSE Suggested hashtag for Twitter Types of and Recent Cases Developing an Effective Anti-fraud Program from the Top Down 1 Types of and Recent Cases Chris Grippa (404-817-5945) FIDS Senior Manager with Ernst & Young LLP Works with clients Division of Gaming Customer Due Diligence Guidelines for Interactive Gaming & Interactive Wagering Companies November 2005 Customer Due Diligence for Interactive Gaming & Interactive Wagering Companies Public Advisory: Special Report on COUNTERFEIT CHECKS AND MONEY ORDERS Summary In recent years, law enforcement and regulatory authorities in Canada and the United States have seen a substantial increase INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON AUDITING (UK AND IRELAND) 240 Introduction THE AUDITOR S RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO FRAUD IN AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Effective for audits of financial statements for A Framework for Managing Crime and Fraud ASIS European Security Conference & Exhibition Gothenburg, April 15, 2013 Torsten Wolf Group Head of Crime and Fraud Prevention Agenda Introduction Economic Crime BANK Of ZAMBIA SURVEY ON HOW COMMERCIAL BANKS DETERMINE LENDING INTEREST RATES IN ZAMBIA September 10 1 1.0 Introduction 1.1 As Government has indicated its intention to shift monetary policy away from Eight common mortgage loan origination fraud schemes to watch for today Prepared by: Al Kohl, Manager, McGladrey LLP 816.751.4015, al.kohl@mcgladrey.com January 2013 Despite closer scrutiny by regulators U.S. DOC Inspector General Office of Investigations Department of Commerce OIG Investigations Welcome Greetings from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations. THE ROLE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN ENSURING FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY IN NIGERIA BY G. A. OGUNLEYE, OFR MANAGING/DIRECTOR/CEO NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 1 PAPER OUTLINE INTRODUCTION FUNCTIONS Chapter 6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF E-PAYMENT AND CHALLENGES IN NEPAL by Bam Bahadur Mishra 1 1. Development of E-payment in Nepal Nepal is a small economy of which the banking era has not yet completed a century. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON AUDITING (UK AND IRELAND) 240 THE AUDITOR S RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSIDER FRAUD IN AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTENTS Paragraphs Introduction... 1-3 Characteristics of Fraud... Chapter 7 Internal Control, Managing Cash, and Making Ethical Judgments 7 Questions 1. 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Introduction One of the core priorities of FLAC s current strategic plan is to strengthen consumer protection Asian Economic and Financial Review journal homepage:http://aessweb.com/journal-detail.php?id=5002 AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE PROFITABILITY OF THE NIGERIAN BEER BREWERY FIRMS Okwo A U D I T I N G A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO CONDUCTING A QUALITY AUDIT 9 th Edition Karla M. Johnstone Audrey A. Gramling Larry E. Rittenberg CHAPTER 10 AUDITING CASH AND MARKETABLE SECURITIES LEARNING OBJECTIVES Abstract DETECTION OF CREATIVE ACCOUNTING IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BY MODEL THE CASE STUDY OF COMPANIES LISTED ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF THAILAND Thanathon Chongsirithitisak Lecturer: Department of Accounting, HOW TO DETECT AND PREVENT FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD (SECOND EDITION) (NO. 99-5401) VI. INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES FOR FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL STATEMENT ALLEGATIONS Financial Statement ysis Financial statement Fighting Identity Fraud with Data Mining Groundbreaking means to prevent fraud in identity management solutions Contents Executive summary Executive summary 3 The impact of identity fraud? 4 The forgery Unit 1 Basic principles of Accounting Glossary COMPLEMENTARY each activity depends on the other INTEGRATED treated as a combined whole What is accounting? Accounting is concerned with two separate but CHAPTER ETHICS, FRAUD, AND INTERNAL CONTROL The three topics of this chapter are closely related. Ethics is a hallmark of the accounting profession. The principles which guide a manager s decision making CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT - EXAMPLE INTRODUCTION This Code of Business Conduct covers a wide range of business practices and procedures. It does not cover every issue that may arise, but it sets out basic 1 TIMOTHY LOH Financial Services & Law Review Setting Up In Hong Kong: A Guide for the Finance Industry Hong Kong is increasingly seen as a necessary operations center for the financial industry. It is The broad ytical framework used by CRISIL to rate finance companies is the same as that used for banks and financial institutions. In addition, CRISIL also addresses certain issues that are specific A U D I T I N G A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO CONDUCTING A QUALITY AUDIT 9 th Edition Karla M. Johnstone Audrey A. Gramling Larry E. Rittenberg CHAPTER 3 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING: MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON 240 THE AUDITOR S RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO (Effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after December 15, 2009) CONTENTS Paragraph Introduction INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE OF INTERNAL AUDITING (STANDARDS) Introduction to the International Standards Internal auditing is conducted in diverse legal and cultural environments; Fraud Prevention and Deterrence Fraud Risk Assessment 2016 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc. What Is Fraud Risk? The vulnerability that an organization faces from individuals capable of combining Solutions for End-of-Chapter Questions and Problems: Chapter Five 2. What are money market mutual funds? In what assets do these funds typically invest? What factors have caused the strong growth in this ELKHORN RURAL PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT 1230-1 I. POLICY SUMMARY POLICY #1230 Identity Theft Prevention Policy It shall be the policy of Elkhorn Rural Public Power District ( District ) to take all reasonable FLIP (Financial Literacy in Practice) February 2015 IDENTITY THEFT OVERVIEW This resource complements the material in Operation Financial Literacy. It has been written to address current issues which specifically A STUDY ON THE PERFORMANCE YSIS OF FACTORING SERVICES IN INDIA Dr. K. N. KALAIVANI Dr. S. Gopalraju Government First Grade College, Anekal, Bangalore 562 106 E-Mail: drkalaivanikn9570@gmail.com ABSTRACT ISA 240 February 2008 International Standard on Auditing The Auditor s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON AUDITING 240 The Auditor s Responsibilities Lawyers as Gatekeepers The SEC s New Focus on Inside and Outside Counsel Julie M. Allen Frank Zarb National Conference of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals June 28, 2014 R E D F L A G PROVISIONS 2 0 0 9 IDENTITY THEFT RED FLAG FAQS Provided to you by P r e p a r e d b y Eduard Goodman, J.D.,LL.M. Chief Privacy Officer I d e n t i t y T h e f t 9 11, L L C FREQUENTLY ASKED Sample Credit Union Report on Operations As of Audit Date GENERAL OVERVIEW Overall, the Credit Union appeared to be well managed and continuing to maintain its financial stability. 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The battle to contain fraud is as old as business FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CORRUPTION A Reference Guide and Information Note on the use of the FATF Recommendations to support the fight against Corruption The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the Substantive Requirements for a Registered Investment Adviser under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Alternative investment fund managers and other investment advisory firms that are registered Anti-Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financial Policy Version: March 2014 1. INTRODUCTION...3 2. DEFINITIONS...3 3. RISK-BASED APPROACH...3 4. AML COMPLIANCE OFFICER...4 5. SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION BILL C-27 [An Act to amend the Criminal Code (identity theft and related misconduct)] CBA Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights April 7, 2008 Introduction The The Impact of Fraud on the Real Estate Industry (insert name) PREP Chapter Presenter s name Location of meeting Date Program Goal: To explore the perception of real estate fraud at the local level and Global Review of Business and Economic Research GRBER Vol. 8 No. 2 Autumn 2012 : 237-245 Jian Zhang * Abstract: This study yzes the contribution of return on asset (ROA) and financial leverage gain Audit Committee Oversight of Foreign Operations November 2014 The Issue External auditor oversight can be a challenge for audit committees of reporting issuers with operations in foreign jurisdictions. Making Your Fraud Vision 20 / 20 Thomas R. Strause, CIA, CFE, CBA, CISA, CFSA, CICA Partner tstrause@fosaudit.com 610-603-5603 Topics to be Covered + Summary of Fraud Statistics ACFE 2014 Report + Current June 2006 Stored Value Facility Guidelines TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS...i 1.0 INTRODUCTION...1 1.1 Overview...1 1.2 Definitions and Generic Model of SVF...2 1.3 Applicability of the Guidelines...4 Mortgage Loan Fraud Connections with Other Financial Crime: An Evaluation of Suspicious Activity Reports Filed By Money Services Businesses, Securities and Futures Firms, Insurance Companies and Casinos Identity Theft The Identity Theft Conundrum Identity theft presents an inherent conundrum: The very attributes of modern commerce that consumers value and expect rapid, easy, 24-hour access to a wide variety Spotting ID Theft Red Flags A Guide for FACTA Compliance An IDology, Inc. Whitepaper With a November 1 st deadline looming for financial companies and creditors to comply with Sections 114 and 315 of the Fundamentals of Computer and Internet Fraud WORLD HEADQUARTERS THE GREGOR BUILDING 716 WEST AVE AUSTIN, TX 78701-2727 USA II. THE USE OF COMPUTERS IN OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD Occupational fraud refers to the Changes in the Auditor s Report A fundamental shift 16 March 2016 Arslan Khalid Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan Contents Background - Why change the auditor s report What is changing - New AD 19 Fraud Prevention Classification: Responsible Authority: Director, Finance and Administrative Services Executive Sponsor: Approval Authority: President s Council Date First Approved: NEW Date Last By Ronald A. Sarachan and Daniel J. T. McKenna Since 2007 the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Securities and Exchange Commission have opened more than 1,200 criminal investigations and three dozen MASTER OF JURISPRUDENCE AND GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS COURSE DESCRIPTIONS MJ 726: AGENCY REGULATIONS Elective (2 credit hours) This course studies the law governing administrative agencies in the task How to Detect and Prevent Financial Statement Fraud GLOBAL HEADQUARTERS the gregor building 716 West Ave Austin, TX 78701-2727 USA VI. GENERAL TECHNIQUES FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT YSIS Financial Statement Original Research Articles Researchers Dr. Akabom Ita Asuquo, Dr. Aniefiok Udoh Akpan Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Calabar Nigeria Email- drakabom3@gmail.com PAYROLL AGENTS Sector Specific AML/CFT Guidance Notes August 2015 Whilst this publication has been prepared by the Financial Supervision Commission, it is not a legal document and should not be relied Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. Code of Business Conduct and Ethics Introduction This Code of Business Conduct and Ethics ( Code ) covers a wide range of business practices and procedures. It does not Code of Busines ss Conduct and Ethics 1. Introduction a. This Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (the Code ) applies to all directors, officers, employees and third parties employed or directly engaged Internal Controls for Small Organizations Jen Parker, CPA Director of Accounting & Finance US Youth Soccer Fraud Statistics: The following statistics about fraud and white collar crime are from the Association Top Ten Fraud Risks That Impact Your Financial Institution Presented by Ann Davidson - VP Risk Consulting Allied Solutions LLC Agenda Education on understanding the fraud risk Take away.. Education to Good Corporate Governance: Essential to Prevent Conflicts of Interest and Fraud Pakistan s s Experience By: Asad Ali Shah Partner, Deloitte Pakistan Council Member, Institute of Chartered Accountants of GLOSSARY GLOSSARY Following are definitions for key words as they are used in the financial life skills resource. They may have different or additional meanings in other contexts. A account an arrangement Standard Chartered PLC Interim Management Statement 3 November 2015 Standard Chartered today releases its Interim Management Statement for the third quarter of 2015. Bill Winters, Group Chief Executive, Table of contents Strategic Planning and Organizational Structure Standard 1. General provisions Grounds for application of the Standard Provisions of the Standard 2. Contents of the Standard 3. Corporate IDENTITY THEFT PREVENTION PROGRAM Contents Welcome... 3 Overview... 4 Definitions... 5 Red Flags... 6 Red Flag 1 Alerts, Notifications or Warnings from a Consumer Reporting Agency... 7 Red Flag 2 Suspicious Compliance and Ethics at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Operational Risk and Internal Audit Course Marina Adams, Compliance Officer and AVP David K. Clune, Compliance and Ethics Officer Kevin White, Identification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions in Banks David Hsu Country Compliance Officer Citibank, N.A., Hong Kong AGENDA Identification of Suspicious Transactions Case Sharing Suspicious Market Intelligence Cell Fighting Financial Crime 1 Market Intelligence Cell Our objective To investigate and suppress illegal, dishonorable and improper practices, market abuse and any potential breach 3/27/2012 Proactive Fraud Detection with Data Mining Fear not the computer You play ball with it and it will play ball with you Executive Summary The time to test fraud controls is before you have a fraud The Effects of Vacant and Abandoned Property Part I, The History Vacant and Abandoned Properties THE HISTORY Print date: February 19, 2013 Target Audience This course is intended for Law Enforcement officers STATEMENT OF STUART F. DELERY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR Using Real Time Interactive Notifications to Effectively Fight Fraud, Accelerate Resolution and Increase Customer Loyalty Conducted by Javelin Strategy & Research June 2010 All Rights Reserved Rising Fraud Recognize the many faces of fraud Detect and prevent fraud by finding subtle patterns and associations in your data Contents: 1 Introduction 2 The many faces of fraud 3 Detect healthcare fraud easily and 2013 Financial Services Industry Compliance Benchmark Study Presented By: and Executive Summary Beginning in mid-december 2012, Compliance 360 conducted a survey among compliance professionals in the Financial