Weak management was "as much a cause" of the disaster as the craft's technical failings, said the official report into its destruction.

The devastating report lambasted the agency's shortcomings, criticised the White House and Congress and warned "the scene is set for another accident" unless real changes were made to the space programme.

The immediate cause of the disaster, in which Columbia's seven-man crew died, was identified as damage inflicted on the left wing by insulating foam dislodged during lift-off.

The hole allowed super-hot gases to spread through the wing as the craft returned to the Earth's atmosphere, causing it to disintegrate on its landing approach. Requests from some Nasa engineers for pictures of the damage to be taken by a spy satellite while the Columbia was still in orbit were ignored, the report said.

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Another shuttle, Atlantis, could have been deployed on a rescue mission to save the Columbia's crew had the full extent of the problem been realised early enough.

However, shuttle managers were apparently convinced that the damage posed no threat to safety and members of the debris-assessment team feared being "singled out for possible ridicule" if they voiced more concerns.

Nasa was still suffering many of the problems that dogged the organisation in the run-up to the loss of the Challenger in 1986, the Columbia accident investigation board concluded.

But in its search for causes of the latest disaster the board went back to race to the moon, a triumph, it said, which encouraged Nasa's self-image as "a perfect place".

The resulting complacency left a legacy of "flawed decision making, self-deception, introversion and a diminished curiosity about the outside world" which further undermined Nasa culture.

Short-term tinkering would not be enough to ensure the shuttle's future, the report said. Something far more radical was in order.

"Based on Nasa's history of ignoring external recommendations, the board has no confidence that the shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed post-accident vigilance."

Blame for the tragedy was also extended to Nasa's political masters, determined to achieve more at less expense.

Jon Clark, a Nasa employee whose wife, Dr Laurel Clark, died on Columbia, said last night: "It was an inadvertent, systematic failure across the organisation. Every single one of us from the top down wants to change and make Nasa a better organisation."