Unsettled questions of gender and the law present a broad range of challenges in courtrooms, legislatures, and everyday lives. Laws meant to protect or promote gender equality may have unintended consequences, and laws that seem irrelevant to gender may nonetheless significantly impact gender issues. This conference will convene judges; legal practitioners; and scholars of law, the humanities, and the social sciences from around the world to explore the ways in which legal regulations and gender influence each other. From varying historical and cultural perspectives, participants will address legal encounters with gender in the essential spaces of daily life: the body, the home, school, work, the nation, and the world.

Panelists: Katharine T. Bartlett, A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of LawLenora Lapidus, Director, Women’s Rights Project, American Civil Liberties UnionSandra L. Lynch, Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the First CircuitKimberly Jenkins Robinson, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law

5 p.m.

Reception

Friday, March 13, 2009

9 a.m.

Session III: The Market, the Family, and Economic Power

Convener: Janet Halley, Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Panelists: Beshara Doumani RI ’08, Associate Professor of Middle East History, University of California at BerkeleyGillian Lester, Sidley Austin Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of LawVicki Schultz RI ’01, Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences, Yale Law SchoolChantal Thomas, Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School

10:15 a.m.

Break

10:30 a.m.

Roundtable Discussion: The Market, the Family, and Economic Power (Session III continued)

Panelists: Lisa Duggan, Professor of American Studies and Gender and Sexuality Studies, New York UniversityAlice Kessler-Harris RI ’02, R. Gordon Hoxie Professor of American History and Professor in the Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Columbia UniversitySharon Rabin-Margalioth,Professor of Law, Radzyner School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (Israel), and Global Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of LawYing Sun,Senior Consultant, Trainer, and Program Manager, TAOS Network (China)Philomila Tsoukala, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law CenterMona Zulficar, Senior Partner, Shalakany Law Office (Egypt)

Panelists: Lauren Berlant, George M. Pullman Professor of English, University of ChicagoBrenda Marjorie Hale, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, House of Lords (United Kingdom)Linda K. Kerber RI ’03,May Brodbeck Professor in the Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of IowaAyelet Shachar,Professor of Law and Political Science and Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Multiculturalism, University of Toronto Faculty of LawReva Siegel, Deputy Dean and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Sometimes, sexist language is blatant and universally shunned. Other times, it is more subtle and even socially acceptable. For instance, as summarized in this article, substantial social science research has considered the use of male-gendered generics (the use of such words as he, man, chairman, or mankind to represent both women and men) rather than gender-neutral alternatives (such as she or he, human, chairperson, or humankind). This research concludes that male-gendered generics are exclusionary of women and tend to reinforce gender stereotypes. Yet, these words may not be recognized as discriminatory because their use is perceived as normative and therefore not unusual. In addition, those who use these words may not be intentionally harmful. Complaining about their use may even be criticized as a trivial activity or an overly sensitive reaction.

Given this social science research, there is a surprising absence of awareness on the use and effect of these words among lawyers, law faculty, law student, and judges. Based on our original empirical analysis of hundreds of legal documents (judicial opinions, legal briefs, and law review articles), we find that the legal community continues to use male-gendered words even though gender-neutral alternatives exist. Thus, while some judges, lawyers, and legal scholars may not intend to be sexist, they are being subtly sexist. The research reveals a strong general pattern of the dominant use of the male-gendered option in a number of word pairs (four out of the nine word pairs) and substantial use in three other word pairs. In contrast, there is the dominant use of the gender-neutral word option in two word pairs.

Finally, the article offers some proactive suggestions. While the legal community is reluctant to change, it did shift from using the male-gendered option of reasonable man to the gender-neutral reasonable person. We suggest that this change occurred because of the legal community’s heightened awareness of the sexist nature of the use of reasonable man, and that a heightened awareness of the subtle sexism of all male-gendered generics could prompt further changes. The article ends with a useful guide on gender neutral language that can be duplicated for distribution in the legal community and elsewhere.