CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1953.
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India
from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th December, 1951,
of the High Court of Judicature, Madras, in Civil
Miscellaneous Petition No. 2591 of 1951.

1007

V.K.T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (B. Ganapathy
Iyer, with him) for the appellant.

B. Somayya and C.R. Pattabhi Raman (T. Krishna Rao
and M.S..K. Sastri, with them) for the respondent.
T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-
Cochin (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur with him)
for the Intervener (State of Travancor,Cochin).
1954. March 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MUKHERJIA J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment
of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, dated the 13th
of December, 1951, by which the learned Judges allowed &
petition, presented by the respondent under article 226 of
the Constitution, and directed a writ of prohibition to
issue in his favour prohibiting the appellant from
proceeding with the settlement of a scheme in connection
with a Math, known as the Shirur Math, of which the
petitioner happens to be the head or superior. It may be
stated at the outset that the petition was filed at a time
when the Madras Hindu Religion Endowments Act (Act II of
1927), was in force and the writ was prayed for against the
Hindu Religious Endowments Board constituted under that Act,
which -was the predecessor in authority of the present
appellant and had initiated proceedings for settlement of a
scheme against the petitioner under section 61 of the said
Act.

The petition was directed to be heard along with two
other petitions of a similar nature relating to the temple
at Chidambaram in the district of South Arcot and questions
were raised in all of them regarding the validity of Madras
Act 11 of 1927, hereinafter referred to as the Earlier Act.
While the petitions were still pending, the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,, 1951 (hereinafter
called the New Act), was passed by the Madras Legislature
and came into force on the 27th of August, 1951. In view of
the Earlier Act being replaced by the new one,, leave was
given to all the petitioners to amend their petitions and
challenge the validity of the. New Act as well.

1008

Under section 103 of the New Act, notifications, orders and
acts under the Earlier Act are to be treated as
notifications, orders and acts issued, made or done by the
appropriate, authority under the corresponding provisions of
the New Act, and in accordance with this -provision, the
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, who takes
the place of the President, "Hindu Religious Endowments
Board under the Earlier Act, was added as a party to the
proceedings.

So far as the present appeal is concerned, the material
facts may be shortly narrated as follows: The Math, known as
Shirur Math, of which the petitioner is the superior or
Mathadhipati, is one of the eight Maths situated at Udipi in
the district of South Kanara and they are reputed to have
been founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent
of dualistic theism in the Hindu Religion. Besides these
eight Maths, each one of which is presided over by a Sanvasi
or Swami, there exists another ancient religious institution
at Udipi, known as Shri Krishna Devara Math, also
established by Madhwacharya which is supposed to contain an
image of God Krishna originally made by Arjun and
miraculously obtained from a vessel wrecked at the coast of
Tulava. There is no Mathadhipati in the Shri Krishna Math
and its. affairs are managed by the superiors of the other
eight Maths by turns and the custom is that the Swami of
each of these eight Maths presides over the Shri Krishna
Math in turn for a period of two years in every sixteen
years. The appointed time of change in the headship of the
Shri Krishna Math is the occasion of a great festival, known
as Pariyayam, when a vast concourse of devotees gather at
Udipi from all parts of Southern India, and an ancient usage
imposes a duty upon the Mathadhipati to feed every Brahmin
that comes to the place at that time.

The petitioner was installed as Mathadhipati in the
year 1919, when he was still a minor, and he assumed
management after coming of age some time in 1926. At that
time the Math was heavily in debt. Between 1926 and 1930
the Swami succeeded in clearing off a large portion of the
debt. In 1931, however, came the
1009
turn of his taking over management of the Shri Krishna Math
and he had had to incur debts to meet the heavy expenditure
attendant on the Pariyayam ceremonies, The financial
position improved to some extent during the years that
followed, but troubles again arose in 1946, which was the
year of the second Pariyayam of the Swami. Owing to
scarcity and the high prices of commodities at that time,
the Swami had to borrow money to meet the expenditure and
the debts mounted up to nearly a lakh of rupees. The Hindu
Religious Endowments Board, functioning under the Earlier
Act of 1927, intervened at this stage and in exercise of its
powers under section 61 -A of the Act called upon the Swami
to appoint a competent manager to manage the affairs of the
institution. The petitioners case is that the action of the
Board was in stigated by one Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer
of Udipi, who wanted to have control over the affairs of the
Math. It appears that in pursuance of the direction of the
Board, one Sripath Achar was appointed an agent and a Power
of Attorney was executed in his favour on the 24th of
December, 1948. The agent, it is alleged by the petitioner,
wanted to have his own way in all the affairs of the Math
and paid no regard whatsoever to the wishes of the Mahant.
He did not even submit accounts to the Mahant and
deliberately flouted his authority. In this state of
affairs the Swami,, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a
notice upon the agent terminating his agency and calling
upon him to hand over to the Mathadhipati all account papers
and vouchers relating to the institution together with the
cash in hand. Far from complying with this demand, the
agent, who was supported by the aforesaid Lakshminarayans
Rao, questioned the authority of the Swami to cancel his
agency and threatened that he would refer the matter for
action to the Board. On the 4th of October, 1950, the
petitioner filed a suit against the agent in the Sub,Court
of South Kanara for recovery of the account books and other
articles belonging to the Math, for rendering an account of
the management and also for an injunction restraining the
said agent from interfering with the affairs of the Math
under colour of the
1010
authority conferred by the Power of Attorney which the
plaintiff had cancelled. The said Sripath Achar
anticipating this suit filed an application to the Board on
the 3rd of October, 1950, complaining against the
cancellation of the Power of Attorney and his management of
the Math. The Board on the 4th October, 1950, issued a
notice to the Swami proposing to inquire into the matter on
the 24th of October following at 2 p.m. at Madras and
requesting the Swami either to apppear in person or by a
pleader. To this the Swami sent a reply on 21st October,
1950, stating that the subject-matter of the very enquiry
was before the court in the original suit filed by him and
as the matter was sub judice the enquiry should be put off.
A copy of the plaint filed in that suit was also sent along
with the reply. The Board, it appears, dropped that
enquiry, but without waiting for the result of the suit,
initiated proceedings suo moto under section 62 of the
Earlier Act and issued a notice upon the Swami on the 6th of
November, 1950, stating that it had reason to believe that
the endowments of the said Math were being mismanaged and
that a scheme should be framed for the administration of its
affairs. . The notice was served by affixture on the Swami
and the 8th of December, 1950, was fixed as the date of
enquiry. On that date at the request of the counsel for the
Swami, it was adjourned to the 21st of December, following.
On the 8th of December, 1950, an application was filed on
behalf of the Swami praying to the Board to issue a
direction to the agent to hand over the account papers and
other documents, without which it was not possible for him
to file his objections As the lawyer appearing for the Swami
was unwell, the matter was again adjourned till the 10th of
January, 1951. The Swami was not ready with his objections
even on that date as his lawyer had no t recovered from his
illness and a telegram was sent to the Board on the previous
day requesting the latter to grant a further adjournment.
The Board did not accede to this request and as no
explanation was filed by the Swami, the enquiry was closed
and orders reserved upon it. On the 13th of January, 1951,
the Swami, it appears sent a written
1011
explanation to the Board, which the latter admittedly
received on the 15th On the 24th of January, 1951, the Swami
received a notice from the Board stating inter alia that the
Board was satisfied that in the,, interests of proper
administration of the Math and its endowments, the
settlement of a scheme was necessary. A draft scheme was
sent along with the notice and if the petitioner had any
objections to the same, he was required to send in his
objections on or before the 11th of February, 1951, as the.
final order regarding the scheme would be made on the 15th
of February, 1951. On the 12th of February, 1951, the peti-
tioner filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises,
in the High Court of Madras, praying for a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the Board from taking further steps
in the matter of settling a scheme for the administration of
the Math. It was alleged inter alia that the Board was
actuated by bias against the petitioner and the action taken
by it with regard to the settling of a scheme was not a bona
fide act at all. The main contention, however, was that
having regard to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution in matters of religion and religious
institutions belonging to particular religious
denominations, the law regulating the framing of a scheme
interfering with the management of the Math and its affairs
by the Mathadhipati conflicted with the provisions of art-
icles 19(1) (f) and 26 of the Constitution and was hence
void under article 13. It was alleged further that the
provisions of the Act were discriminatory in their character
and offended against article 15 of the Constitution. As has
been stated already, after the New Act came into force, the
petitioner was allowed to end his petition and the attack
was now directed against the constitutional validity of the
New Act which replaced the earlier legislation.
The learned Judges, who heard the petition, went into the
matter with elaborate fullness, both on the constitutional
questions involved in it as well as on its merits. On the
merits, it was held that in the circumstances of the case
the action of the Board was a perverse exercise of its
jurisdiction and that it should
1012
not be allowed to proceed in regard to the settlement of the
scheme. On the constitutional issues raised in the case, the
learned Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the
New Act to be ultra vires the Constitution by reason of
their being in conflict with the fundamental rights of the
petitioner guaranteed under articles 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 27
of the Constitution. In the result, the rule nisi issued on
the petition was made absolute and the Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras, was prohibited from proceeding
further with the framing of a scheme inregard to the
petitioner's Math. The Commisioner has now come up on
appeal before us on the strength of a certificate granted by
the High Court under article 132(1) of the Constitution.

The learned Advocate-General for Madras, who appeared
in support of the appeal, confined his arguments exclusively
to the constitutional points involved in this case.
Although he had put in an application to. urge grounds other
than the constitutional grounds, that application was not
pressed and he did not challen the findings of fact upon
which the High Court based its decision on the merits of the
petition. The position, therefore, is that the order of the
High Court issuing the writ of prohibition against the
appellant must stand irrespective of the decision which we
light arrive at on the constitutional points raised before
us.

It is not disputed that a State Legislature is competent
to enact laws on the subject of religious and charitable
endowments, which is covered by entry 28 of List III in
Schedule VII of the Constitution. No question of
legislative incompetency on the part of the Madras
Legislature to enact the legislation in question has been
raised before us with the exception of the provision,
relating to payment of annual contribution contained in
section 76 of the impugned Act. The argument that has been
advanced is, that the contribution is in reality a tax and
not a fee and consequently the State Legislature had no
authority to enact a provision of this character. We will
deal with this point separately later on. All the other
points canvassed
1013
before us relate to the constitutional validity or otherwise
of the several provisions of the Act which have been held to
be invalid by the High Court of Madras on grounds of their
being in conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed
under articles 19(1) (f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution.
In order to appreciate the contentions that have been
advanced on these heads by the learned counsel on both
sides, it may be convenient to refer briefly to the scheme
and the salient provisions of the Act.

The object of the legislation, as indicated in the
preamble, is to amend and consolidate the law relating to
the administration and governance of Hindu religious and
charitable institutions and endowments in the State of
Madras. As compared with the Earlier Act, its scope is
wider and it can be made applicable to purely charitable
endowments by proper notification under section 3 of the
Act. The Earlier Act provided for supervision of Hindu
religious endowments through a statutory body known as the
Madras Hindu religious Endowments Board. The New Act has
abolished this Board and the administration of religious and
charitable institutions has been vested practically in a
department of the Government, at the head of which is the
Commissioner. The powers of the Commissioner and of the
other authorities under him have been enumerated in Chapter
II of the Act. Under the Commissioner are the Deputy
Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners and Area Committees.
The Commissioner, with the approval of the Government, has
to divide the State into certain areas and each area is
placed in charge of a Deputy Commissioner, to whom the
powers of the Commissioner can be delegated. The State has
also to be divided into a number of divisions and an
Assistant Commissioner is to be placed in charge of each
division. Below the Assistant Commissioner, there will be
an Area Committee in charge of all the temples situated
within a division or part of a division. Under section 18,
the Commissioner is empowered to examine the records of any
Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, or Area
Committee, or of any trustee not being the trustee
1311014
of a, Math, in respect of any proceeding under the Act, to
satisfy himself as to the regularity, correctness, or
propriety of any decision or order. Chapter III contains
the general provisions relating to all religious
institutions. Under section 20, the administration of
religious endowments is placed under the general
superintendence and control of the Commissioner and he is
empowered to pass any orders which may be deemed necessary
to ensure that such endowments are properly administered and
their income is -duly appropriated for the purposes for
which they were founded or exist. Section 21 gives the
Commissioner, the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and
such other officers asmay be authorised in th is behalf, the
power to enter the premises of any religious institution or
any place of worship for the purpose of exercising any power
conferred, or discharging any duty imposed, by or under the
Act. The only restriction is that the officer exercising
the power must be a Hindu. Section 23 makes it obligatory
on the trustee of a religious institution to obey all lawful
orders issued under the provisions of this Act by the
Government, the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the
Area Committee or the Assistant Commissioner. Section 24
lays down that in the administration of the affairs of the
institution, a trustee should use as much care as a man of
ordinary prudence would use in the management of his own
affairs. - Section 25 deals with the preparation of
registers of all religious institutions and section 26
provides for the annual verification of such registers.
Section 27 imposes a duty on the trustee to furnish to the
Commissioner such accounts, returns, reports and other
information as the Commissioner may require. Under section
28, power is given to the Commissioner or any other officer
authorised by him to inspect all movable and immovable
properties appertaining to a religious institution. Section
29 forbids alienation of all immovable properties belonging
to the trust, except leases for a term not exceeding five

-,,ears, without the Sanction of the Commissioner. Section
30 lays down that although a trustee may incur expenditure
for making arrangements for securing the health and
1015
comfort of pilgrims, worshippers and other people, when
there is a surplus left after making adequate provision for
purposes specified in section 79(2), he shall be guided in
such matters by all genera or special instructions which he
may receive from the Commissioner or the Area Committee.
Section 31 deals with surplus funds which the trustee may
apply wholly or in part with the permission in writing, of
the Deputy Commissioner for any of the purposes specified in
section 59(1). Chapter IV deals specifically with Maths.
Seetion 52 enumerates the grounds on which a suit would lie
to remove a trustee. Section 54 relates to what is called "
dittam " or scale of expenditure. The trustee has got to
submit to the Commissioner proposals for fixing the "dittam"
and the amounts to be allotted to the various objects
connected with the institution. The proposals are to be
published and after receiving suggestions, if any, from
persons interested in the instution, they would be
scrutinised by the Commissioner. If the Commissioner thinks
that a modification is necessary, he shall submit the case
to the Government and the orders of the Government would be
final. Section 55 empowers the trustee to spend at his
discretion and for purposes connected with the Math the
"Pathakanikas " or gifts made to him personally, but he is
required to keep regular accounts of the receipts and
expenditure of such personal gifts. Under section 56, the
Commissioner is empowered to call upon the trustee to
appoint a manager for the administration of the secular
affairs of the institution and in default of such
appointment, the Commissioner may make the appointment
himself. Under section 58, a Deputy Commissioner is
competent to frame a scheme for any religious institutions
if he has reason to believe that in the interests of the
proper administration of the trust any such scheme is
necessary. Sub-section (3) of this section provides that a
scheme settled for a Math may contain inter alia a provision
for appointment of a paid executive officer professing the
Hindu religion, whose salary shall be paid out of the funds-
of the institution. Section 59 makes provision for
application of the "cy pres" doctrine when the specific
1016
objects of the trust fail. Chapter VI of the Act, which
comprises sections 63 to 69, deals with the notification of
religious institutions. A religious institution may be
notified in accordance with the provisions laid down in this
chapter. Such notification remains in force for five years
and the effect of it is to take over the administration and
vest it in an executive officer appointed by the
Commissioner. Chapter VII deals with budgets, accounts and
audit and Chapter VIII relates to finance. Section 76 of
Chapter VIII makes it compulsory for all religious
institutions to pay annually to the Government a
contribution not exceeding 5 per cent. of their income on
account of the services rendered to them by the Government
and their officers functioning under this Act. Chapter IX
is not material for our purpose, and Chapter X deals with
provisions of a miscellaneous nature. Section 89 in Chapter
X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply
with the provisions of the Act. Section 92 lays down that
nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to confer any
power or. impose any duty in contravention of the rights
conferred on any religious denomination under clauses (a),

(b) and (c) of article 26 of the Constitution. Section 99
vests a revisional jurisdiction in the Government to call
for and examine the records of the Commissioner and other
subordinate authorities to satisfy themselves as to the
regularity and propriety of any proceeding taken or any
order or decision made by them These, in brief, are the
provisions of the Act material for our present purpose.
The learned Judges of the High Court have taken the view
that the respondent as Mathadhipati has certain well defined
rights in the institution and its endowments which could be
regarded as rights to property within the meaning of article
19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The provisions of the Act to
the extent that they take away or unduly restrict the power
to exercise these rights are not reasonable restrictions
within the meaning of article 19(5) and must consequently be
held invalid. The High Court has held in the second place
that the respondent, as the head and
1917
representative of a religious institution, has a right
guaranteed to him under article 25 of the Constitution to
practise and propagate freely the religion of which he and
his followers profess to be adherents. This right, in the
opinion of the High Court, has been affected by some of the
provisions of the Act. The High Court has held further that
the Math in question is really an institution belonging to
Sivalli Brahmins, who are a section of the followers of
Madhwacharya and hence constitutes a religious denomination
within the meaning of article 26 of the Constitution. This
religious denomination has a fundamental right under article
26 to manage its own affairs in matters of religion through
the Mathadhipati who is their spiritual head and superior,
and those provisions of the Act, which substantially take
away the rights of the Mathadhipati in this respect, amount
to violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 26. Lastly, the High Court has. held that the
provision for compulsory contribution made in section 76 of
the Act comes within the mischief of article 27 of the
Constitution. This last point raises a wide issue and We
propose to discuss it separately later on. So far as the
other three points are concerned, we will have to examine
first of all the general contentions that have been raised
by the learned Attorney-General, who appeared for the Union
of India as an intervener in this and other connected cases,
and the questions raised are, whether these articles of the
Constitution are at all available to the respondent in the
present case and whether they give him any protection
regarding the rights and privileges, of the infraction of
which he complains.

As regards article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, the
question that requires consideration is, whether the
respondent as Mathadhipati has a right to property in the
legal sense,, in the religious institution and its
endowments which would enable him to claim the -protection
of this article ? A question is also formulated as to
whether this article deals with concrete rights of property
at all ? So far as article 25 of the Constitution is
concerned, the point raised is, whether this
1018
article which, it is said, is intended to protect religious
freedom only so far as individuals are concerned, can be
invoked in favour of an institution or Organisation ? With
regard to article 26, the contention is that a Math does not
come within the description of a religious denomination as
provided for in the article and even if it does, what cannot
be interfered with is its right to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion only and nothing else. It is said, that
the word it religion ", as used in this article, should be
taken in its strict etymological sense as distinguished from
any kind of secular activity which may be connected in some
way with religion on but does not form an essential part of
it. Reference is made in this connection to clause (2)(a)
of article 25 and clause (d) of article 26. We will take up
these points for consideration one after another.
As regards the -property rights of a Mathadhipati, it may
not be possible to say in view of the pronouncements of the
Judicial Committee, which have been accepted as good law in
this country ever since 1921, that a Mathadhipati holds the
Math property as a lifetenant or that his position is
similar to that of a Hindu widow in respect to her husband's
estate or of an English BishoP holding a benefice. He is
certainly not a trustee in the strict sense. He may be, as
the Privy Council(1), says, a manager or custodian, of the
institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and
is answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it
would not be right to describe Mahantship as a mere office."
A superior of a Math has not only duties to discharge in
connection with the endowment but he has a personal interest
of a beneficial character which is sanctioned by custom and
is much larger than that of a Shebait in the debutter
property. It was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High
Court(2), that Shebaitship. itself is property, and this
decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh
v Lal Behary(3), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata(4).
(1) Vide Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I. A. 302
(2) Vide Monahai v. Bhupendra, 60 Cal. 452.

(3) 63 I.A. 448.

(4) 70 I.A. 57.

1019

The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council
pointed out in the last case, was to emphasise the propriet
ary element in the Shebaiti right and to show that though in
some respects an anomaly, it was an anomaly to be accepted
as having been admitted into Hindu ,law from an early date.
This view was adopted in its entirety by this court in
Angurbala v. Debabrata (1), and what was said in that case
in respect to Shebaiti right could, with equal propriety, be
applied to the office of a Mahant. Thus in the conception
of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of
office and property, of duties and personal interest are
blended together and neither can be detached from the other.
The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the
endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his
large powers of disposal and administration and his right to
create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties;
and these and other rights of a similar character invest the
office of the Mahant with .the character of proprietary
right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a
genuine legal right. It is true that the Mahantship is not
heritable like ordinary property, but that is because of its
peculiar nature and the fact that the office is generally
held by an ascetic, whose connection with his natural family
being completely cut of, the ordinary rules of succession do
not apply.

There is no reason why the word "property", as used in
article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, should not be given a
liberal and wide connotation and should not be extended to
those well recognised types of interest which have the
insignia or characteristics of proprietary right. As said
above, the ingredients of both office and property, of
duties and personal interest are blended together in the
rights of a Mahant and the Mahant has the right to enjoy
this property or beneficial interest so long as he is
entitled to hold his office. To take away this beneficial
interest and leave him merely to the discharge of his duties
would be to destroy his character as a Mahant altogether.
It is true that the beneficial interest which he enjoys is
appurtenant to his duties
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 1125.

1020

and as he is in charge of a public institution, reasonable
restrictions can always be placed upon his rights in the
interest of the public. But the restrictions would cease to
be reasonable if they are calculated to make him unfit to
discharge the duties which he is called upon to discharge.
A Mahant's duty is not simply to manage the temporalities of
a Math. He is the head and superior of spiritual fraternity
and the purpose of Math is to encourage and foster spiritual
training by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who
could impart religious instructions to the disciples and
followers of the Math and try to strengthen the doctrines of
the particular school or order, of which they profess to be
adherents. This purpose cannot be served if the
restrictions are such as would bring the Mathadhipati down
to the level of a servant under a State department. It is
from this standpoint that the reasonableness of the
restrictions should be judged.

A point was suggested by the learned AttorneyGeneral
that as article 19(1) (f) deals only with the natural rights
inherent in a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of
property in the abstract without reference to rights to any
particular property, it can be of no real assistance to the
respondent in the present case and article 3l of the
Constitution, which deals with deprivation of property, has
no application here. In the case of The State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(II) (Civil Appeal No. 107 of
1952, decided by this court on the 17th December, 1953), an
opinion was expressed by Patanjali Sastri C. J. that article
19(1) (f) of the Constitution is concerned only with the
abstract right and capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of
property and that it has no relation to concrete property
rights. This, it may be noted, was an expression of opinion
by the learned Chief Justice alone and it was not the
decision of the court ; for out of the other four learned
Judges who together with the Chief Justice constituted the
Bench, two did not definitely agree with this view, while
the remaining two did not express any opinion one way or the
other. This point was not raised before us by the Advocate-
General for Madras, who appeared in support of the appeal,
nor by any of the other
(1) (1954] S.C.R. 587
1021
counsel appearing in this case. The learned Attorney.
General himself stated candidly that he was not prepared to
support the view taken by the late Chief Justice as
mentioned above, and he only raised the. point to get an
authoritative pronouncement upon it by the court. In our
opinion, it would not be proper to express any final opinion
upon the point in the present case when we had not the
advantage of any arguments addressed to us upon it. We
would prefer to proceed, as this court has proceeded all
along, in dealing with similar cases in the past, on the
footing that article 19(1) (f) applies equally to concrete
as well as abstract rights of property.

We now come to article 25 which, as its language
indicates, secures to every person, subject to public order,
health and morality, a freedom not only to entertain such
religious belief, as may be approved of by his judgment and
conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outward
acts as he thinks proper and to propagate or disseminate his
ideas for the edification of others. A question is raised
as to whether the word "persons" here means individuals only
or includes corporate bodies as well. The question, in our
opinion, is not at all relevant for our present purpose. A
Mathadhipati is certainly not a corporate body; he is the
head of a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his office
has to perform the duties of a religious teacher. it is his
duty to practise and propagate the religious tenets, of
which he is an adherent and if any provision of law prevents
him from propagating his doctrines, that would certainly
affect the religious freedom which is guaranteed to every
person under article 25. Institutions as such cannot
practise or propagate religion; it can be done only by
individual persons and whether these person propagate their
personal views or the tenets for which the institution
stands is really immaterial for purposes. of article 25. It
is the propagation of belief that is protected, no matter
whether the propagation takes place in a church or
monastery, or in a temple or parlour meeting.
As regards article 26, the first question is, what is the
precise meaning or connotation of the expression
1321022
"religious denomination" and whether a Math could come
within this expression. The word "denomination" has been
defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'Ca collection of
individuals classed together under the same name: a
religious sect or body having a common faith and
Organisation and designated by a distinctive name. It is
well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres
of the logical teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya
and was followed by various teachers since then. After
Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and
philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects
of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present
day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be
balled a religious denomination, as it is designated by a
distinctive name,-in many cases it is the name of the
founder,-and has a common faith and common spiritual
organization. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by
the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a
religious denomination; and so do the followers of
Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is a fact
well established by tradition that the eight Udipi Maths
were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and
the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of
that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in
question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute
a section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As article 26
contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a
section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity
represented by it can legitimately come within the purview
of this article.

The other thing that remains to be considered in regard
to article 26 is, what is the scope of clause (b) of the
article which speaks of management " of its own affairs in
matters of religion ?" The language undoubtedly suggests
that there could be other affairs of a religious
denomination or a section thereof which are not matters of
religion and to which the guarantee given by this clause
would not apply. The question is, whereas the line to be
drawn between what are matters of religion and what are not
1023
It will be seen that besides the right to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion, which is given by clause

(b), the next two clauses of article 26 guarantee to a
religious denomination the right to acquire and own property
and to administer such property in accordance with law. The
administration of its property by a religious denomination
has thus been placed on a different footing from the right
to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The
latter is a fundamental right which no legislature can take
away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the
legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore,
that questions merely relating to administration of
properties belonging to a religious group or institution are
not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the article
applies. What then are matters of religion ? The word
"religion " has not been defined in the Constitution and it
is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid
definition. In an American case(1), it has been said " that
the term religion has reference to one's views of his
relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to
His will. It is often confounded with cultus of form or
worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from
the latter." We do not think that the above definition can
be regarded as either precise or adequate. Articles 25 and
26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon
article 44(2) of the Constitution of Eire and we have great
doubt whether a definition of "religion" as given above
could have been in the minds of our Constitution-makers when
they framed the Constitution. Religion is certainly a
matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is
not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in
India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God
or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly
has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are
regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to
their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to
say that religion is nothing else, but a
(1) Vide Davie v. Benson 133 U.S 333 at 342.

1024

doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code
of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might
prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of
worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion,
and these forms and observances might extend even to matters
of food and dress.

The guarantee under our Constitution not only protects
the freedom of religious opinion but it protects also acts
done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by
the use of the expression " practice of religion " in
article 25. Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia
while dealing with the provision of section 116 of the
Australian Constitution which inter alia forbids the
Commonwealth to prohibit the "free exercise of any religion"
made the following weighty observations(1) :
" It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject
of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government
should not interfere with religious opinion&, it
nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are
done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the
principle of freedom of religion. It appears to me to be
difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the
interpretation of section 116. The section refers in
express terms to the exercise of religion, and therefore it
is intended to protect from the operation of any
Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of
religion. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting
liberty of opinion. It protects also acts. done in
pursuance of religious belief as part of religion."
These observations apply fully to the protection of
religion as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
Restrictions by the State upon free exercise of religion are
permitted both under articles 25 and 26 on grounds of public
order,. morality and health. Clause (2)(a) of article 25
reserves the right of the State to regulate or restrict any
economic, financial, political and other secular activities
which may be associated with religious practice and there is
a further right given to the State by sub-clause (b) under
which the State can
(1) Vide Adelaide Company V. The Commonwealth 67 C.L.R.
116, 127
1025
legislate for social welfare and reform even though by so
doing it might interfere with religious practices. The
learned Attorney-General lays stress upon clause (2)(a) of
the article and his contention is that all secular
activities, which may be associated with religion but do not
really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to
State regulation.

The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot,
we think, be supported. In the first place, what
constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to
be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that
religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to
the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical
ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain
periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of
sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all these
would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact
that they involve expenditure of money or employment of
priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities
would not make them secular activities partaking of a
commercial or economic character; all of them are religious.
practices and should be regarded as matters of religion
within the meaning of article 26(b). What article 25(2)(a)
contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious
practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the
Constitution except when they run counter to public order,
health and morality, but regulation of activities which are
economic, commercial or political in their character though
they are associated with religious practices. We may refer
in this connection to a few American and Australian cases,
all of which arose out of the activities of persons
connected with the religious association known as "Jehova's
Witnesses." This association of persons loosely organised
throughout Australia, U.S.A. and other countries regard the
literal interpretation of the Bible as fundamental to proper
religious beliefs. This belief in the supreme Authority of
the Bible colours many of their political ideas. They
refuse to take oath of allegiance to the king or other
Constituted
1026
human authority and even to show respect to the national
flag, and they decry all wars between nations and all kinds
of war activities. In 1941 a company of " Jehova's
Witnesses " incorporated in Australia commenced proclaiming
and teaching matters which were prejudicial to war
activities and the defence of the Commonwealth and steps
were taken against them under the National Security
Regulations of the State. The legality of the action of the
Government was questioned by means of a writ petition before
the High Court and the High Court held that the action of
the Government was justified and that section 116, which
guaranteed freedom of religion under the Australian
Constitution, was not in any way infringed by the National
Security Regulations(1). These were undoubtedly political
activities though arising out of religious belief
entertained by a particular community. In such cases, as
Chief Justice Latham pointed out, the provision for
protection of religion was not an absolute protection to be
interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of
the Constitution. These privileges must be reconciled with
the right of the State to employ the sovereign power to
ensure peace, security and orderly living without which
constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a
mockery.

The courts of America were at one time greatly agitated
over the question of legality of a State regulation which
required the pupils in public schools on pain of compulsion
to participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the national
flag, while reciting in unison, a pledge of allegiance to it
in a certain set formula. The question arose in Minersville
School District, Board of Education, etc. v. Gobitis(2). In
that case two small children, Lillian and William Gobitis,
were expelled from the public school of Minersville,
Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as
part of the daily exercise. The Gobitis family were
affiliated with "Jehova's Witnesses" and had been
(1) Vide Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth, 67 C.L.R.,
116, 127.

(2) 310 U.S. 586.

1027

brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture of
respect for the flag was forbidden by the scripture. The
point for decision by the Supreme Court was whether the
requirement of participation in such a ceremony exacted from
a child, who refused upon sincere religious ground,
infringed the liberty of religion guaranteed by the First
and the Fourteenth Amendments ? The court held by a majority
that it did not and that it was within the province of the
legislature and the school authorities to adopt appropriate
means to evoke and foster a sentiment of. national unity
amongst the children in public schools. The Supreme Court,
however, changed their views on this identical point in the
later case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette(1). There it was held overruling the earlier
decision referred to above that the action of a State in
making it compulsory for children in public schools to
salute the flag and pledge allegiance constituted a
violation of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. This
difference in judicial opinion brings out forcibly the
difficult task which a court has to perform in cases of this
type where the freedom or religious convictions genuinely
entertained by men come into conflict with the proper
political attitude which is expected from citizens in
matters of unity and solidarity of the State organization.
As regards commercial activities, which are prompted by
religious beliefs, we can cite the case of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania(2). Here also the petitioners were "Jehova's
Witnesses" and they went about from door to door in the city
of Jeannette distributing literature and soliciting people
to purchase certain religious books and pamphlets, all
published by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. A
municipal ordinance required religious colporteurs to pay a
licence tax as a condition to the pursuit of their
activities. The petitioners were convicted and fined for
violation of the ordinance. It was held that the ordinance
in question was invalid under the Federal Constitution as
constituting a denial of freedom of speech, press and
religion;

(1) 319 U.S. 624.

(2) 319 U.S. 105.

1028

and it was held further that upon the facts of the case it
could not be said that "Jehova's Witnesses" were engaged in
a commercial rather than in a religious venture. Here
again, it may be pointed out that a contrary view was taken
only a few years before in the case of Jones v. Opelika(1),
and it was held that a city ordinance, which required that
licence be procured and taxes paid for the business of
selling books and pamphlets on the streets from house to
house, was applicable to a member of a religious
Organisation who was engaged in selling the printed
propaganda, pamphlets without having complied with the
provisions of the ordinance.

It is to be noted that both in the American as well as
in the Australian Constitutions the. right to freedom of
religion has been declared in unrestricted terms with. out
any limitation whatsoever. Limitations, therefore, have
been introduced by courts of law in these countries on
grounds of morality, order and social protection. An
adjustment of the competing demands of the interests of
Government and constitutional liberties is always a delicate
and a difficult task and that is why we find difference of
judicial opinion to such an extent in cases decided by the
American courts where questions of religious freedom were
involved. Our Constitution-makers, however, have embodied
the limitations which have been evolved by judicial
pronouncements in America or Australia in the Constitution
itself and the language of articles 25 and 26 is
sufficiently clear to enable us to determine without the aid
of foreign authorities as to what matters come within the
purview of religion and what do not. As we have already
indicated, freedom of religion in our Constitution is not
confined to religious beliefs only; it extends to religious
practices as well subject to the restrictions which the
Constitution itself has laid down. Under article 26(b),
therefore, a religious denomination .or organization enjoys
complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites
and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the
religion they hold and no outside authority has any
jurisdiction to
(1) 316 U.S. 584.

1029

interfere with their decision in such matters. Of course,
the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with
these religious observances would be a matter of
administration of property belonging to the religious
denomination and can be controlled by secular authorities in
accordance with any law laid down by a competent
legislature; for it could not be the injunction, of any
religion to destroy the institution and its endowments by
incurring wasteful expenditure on rites and ceremonies. It
should be noticed, however, that under article 26(d), it is
the fundamental right of a religious denomination or its
representative to administer its properties in accordance
with law; and the law, therefore, must leave the right of
administration to the religious denomination itself subject
to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to
impose. A law which takes away the right of administration
from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and
vests it in any other authority would amount to a violation
of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of article 26.
Having thus disposed of the general contentions that were
raised in this appeal, we will proceed now to examine the
specific grounds that have been urged by the parties before
us in regard to the decision of the High Court so far as it
declared several sections of the new Act to be ultra vires
the Constitution by reason of their conflicting with the
fundamental rights of the respondent. The concluding
portion of the judgment of the High Court where the learned
Judges summed up their decision on this point stands as
follows:

" To sum up, we hold that the following sections are
ultra vires the State Legislature in so far as they relate
to this Math: and what we say will also equally apply to
other Maths of a similar nature. The sections of the new
Act are: sections 18, 209 21, 25(4), section 26 (to the
extent section 25(4) is made applicable), section 28 (though
it sounds innocuous, it is liable to abuse as we have
already pointed out earlier in the judgment), section 29,
clause- (2) of section 30, section 31, section 39(2),
section 42, section 53 (because courts have ample powers to
meet these contingencies), ,section 54, clause (2) of
section 55, section 56, clause (3)
1331030
of section 58, sections to 69 in Chapter VI, clauses (2),
(3) and (4) of section 70, section 76, section 89 and
section 99 (to the extent it gives the Government virtually
complete control over the Matadhipati and Maths).
It may be pointed out at the outset that the learned
Judges were not, right in including sections 18, 39(2) and
42 in this list, as these sections are not applicable to
Maths under the Act itself This position has not been
disputed by Mr. Somayya, who appears for the respondent.

Section 20 of the Act describes the powers of the
Commissioner in respect to religious endowments and they
include power to pass any orders that may be deemed
necessary to ensure that such endowments are properly
administered and that their income is duly appropriated for
the purposes for which they were founded. Having regard to
the fact that the Mathadhipati occupies the position of a
trustee with regard to the Math, which is a public
institution, some amount of control or supervision over the
due administration of the endowments and due appropriation
of their funds is certainly necessary in the interest of the
public and we do not think that the provision of this
section by itself offends any fundamental right of the
Mahant. We do not agree with the High Court that the result
of this provision would be to reduce the Mahant to the
position of a servant. No doubt the Commissioner is
invested, with powers to pass orders, but orders can be
passed only for the purposes specified in the section and
not for interference with the rights of the Mahant as are
sanctioned by usage or for lowering his position as the
spiritual head of the institution. The saving provision
contained in section 91 of the Act makes the position quite
clear. An apprehension that the powers conferred by this
section may be abused in individual cases does not make the
provision itself bad or invalid in law.

We agree, however, with the High Court in the view
taken by it about section 21. This section empowers the
Commissioner and his subordinate officers and also persons
authorised by them to enter the premises of
1031
any religious institution or place of worship for the
purpose of exercising any power conferred, or any duty
imposed by or under the Act. It is well known that there
could be no such thing as an unregulated and unrestricted
right of entry in a public temple or other religious
institution, for persons who are not connected with the
spiritual functions thereof. It is a traditional custom
universally observed not to allow access to any outsider to
the particularly sacred parts of a temple as for example,
the place where the deity is located. There are also fixed
hours of worship and rest for the idol when no disturbance
by any member of the public is allowed. Section 21, it is
to be noted, does not confine the right of entry to the
outer portion of the premises; it does not even exclude the
inner sanctuary the Holy of Holies" as it is said, the
sanctity of which is zealously preserved. It does not say
that the entry may be made after due notice to the head. of.
the institution and at such hours which would not interfere
with the due observance of the rites and ceremonies in the
institution. We think that as the section stands, it
interferes with the fundamental rights of the Mathadhipati
and the denomination of which he is head guaranteed under
articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Our attention has
been drawn in. this connection to section 91. of the Act
which, it is said, provides a sufficient -safeguard against
any abuse of power under section 2 1. We cannot agree with
this contention. Clause (a ) of section 91 excepts from the
saving clause all express provisions of the Act within which
the provision of section 21 would have to be included.
Clause (b) again does not say anything about custom or usage
obtaining in an institution and it does not indicate by whom
and in what manner the question of interference with the,
religious and spiritual functions of the Math would be
decided in case of any dispute arising regarding it. In our
opinion, section 21 has been rightly held to be invalid.
Section 23 imposes a duty upon the trustees to obey all
lawful orders issued be the Commissioner or any subordinate
authority under the, provisions of the Act. No exception
can be taken to the section if those
1032
provisions of the Act, which offend against the fund&mental
rights of the respondent, are left out of account as being
invalid. No body can make a grievance if he .is directed
to obey orders issued in pursuance of valid legal authority.
The same reason would, in our opinion, apply to section 24.
It may be mentioned here that sections 23 and 24 have not
been specifically mentioned in the concluding portion of the
judgment of the High Court set out above, though they have
been attacked by the learned Judges in course of their
discussion.

As regards section 25, the High Court has taken
exception only to clause (4) of the section. If the
preparation of registers for religious institutions is not
wrong and does not affect the fundamental rights of the
Mahant,one fails to see how the direction for addition to or
alteration of entries in such registers, which clause (4)
contemplates and which will be necessary as a result of
enquiries made under clause (3), can, in any sense, be held
to be invalid as infringing the fundamental rights of the
Mahant. The enquiry that is contemplated by clauses (3) and
(4) is an enquiry into the actual state of affairs, and the
whole object of the section is to keep an accurate record of
the particulars specified in it. We are unable, therefore,
to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges. For
the same reasons, section 26, which provides for annual
verification of the registers, cannot be held to be bad.
According to the High Court section 28 is itself innocuous.
The mere possibility of its being abused is no ground for
holding it to be invalid. As all endowed properties are.
ordinarily inalienable, we fail to see why the restrictions
placed by Section 29 upon alienation of endowed properties
should be considered bad. In our opinion, the provision of
clause (2) of section 29, which enables the Commissioner to
impose conditions when he grants sanction to alienation of
endowed property, is perfectly reasonable and to that no
exception can be taken.

The provision of section 30(2) appears to us to be
somewhat obscure. Clause (1) of the section enables
1033
a trustee to incur expenditure out of the funds in his
charge after making adequate provision . for the purposes
referred to in section 70(2), for making arrangements for
the health, safety and convenience of disciples, pilgrims,
etc. Clause (2), however, says that in incurring
expenditure under clause (1), the trustee shall be guided by
such general or special instruction as the Commissioner or
the Area Committee might give in that connection. If the
trustee is to be guided but not fettered by such directions,
possibly no objection can be taken to this clause; but if he
is bound to carry out such instructions, we do think that it
constitutes an encroachment on his right. Under the law, as
it stands, the Mahant has large powers of disposal over the
surplus income and the only restriction is that he cannot
spend anything out of it for his personal use unconnected
with the dignity of his ,office. But as the purposes
specified in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of section 30(1) are
beneficial to the institution there seems to be no reason
why the authority vested in the Mahant to spend the surplus
income for such purposes should be taken away from-him and
he should be compelled to act in such matters under the
instructions of the Government officers. We think that this
is an unreasonable restriction on the Mahant's right of
property which is blended with his office.

The same reason applies in our opnion to section 31 of
the Act, the meaning of -which also is far from clear. If
after making adequate provision for the purposes referred,
to in section 70(2) and for, the arrangements mentioned in
section 30(2) there is still a surplus left with the
trustee, section 31 enables him to spend it for the purposes
specified in section 59(1) with the previous sanction of the
Deputy Commissioner. One of the purposes mentioned in
section 59(1) is the propagation of the religious tenents of
the institution, and it, is not understood why sanction of
the Deputy Commissioner should be necessary for spending the
surplus, income for the propagation of the religious tenets
of the order which is one of the primary duties of a Mahant
to discharge. The next thing that strikes one is, whether
sanction is necessary if the trustee
1034
wants to spend the money for purposes other than those
specified in section 59(1) ? If the answer is in the nega-
tive, the whole object of the section becomes meaningless.
If, on the other hand, the implication of the section is
that the surplus can be spent only for the purposes
specified in section 59(1) and that too with the permission
of the Deputy Commissioner, it undoubtedly places a
burdensome restriction upon the property rights of the
Mahant which are sanctioned by usage and which would have
the effect of impairing his dignity and efficiency as the
head of the institution. We think that sections 30(2) and
31 have been rightly held to be invalid by the High Court.
Sections 39 and 42, as said already, are not applicable
to Maths and hence can be left out of consideration,.,
Section 53 has . been condemned by the - High Court merely
on the ground that the court has ample jurisdiction to
provide for the contingencies that this section is intended
to meet. But that surely cannot prevent a competent
legislature from legislating on the topic, provided it can
do so without violating" any of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. We are unable to agree with
the High Court on this point. There seems to be nothing
wrong or unreasonable in section 54 of the Act which
provides for fixing the standard, scale of expenditure. The
proposals for this purpose would have to be submitted by the
trustee ; they are then to be published and suggestions
invited from persons having interest in the amendment. The
Commissioner is to scrutinise the original proposals and
the . suggestions received and if in his opinion a
modification of the scale is necessary, he has to submit a
report to the Government, whose decision will be final.
This we consider to be -quite a reasonable and salutary
provision.

Section 55 deals with a Mahant's power over Pathakanikas
or personal gifts. Ordinarily a Mahant has absolute power
of disposal over such gifts, though if he dies without
making any disposition, it is reckoned as the property of
the Math and goes to the succeeding Mahant. The first
clause of section 55 lays down that such Pathakanikas shall
be spent only for the
1035
purposes of the Math. This is an unwarranted restriction on
the property right of the Mahant. It may be that according
to customs prevailing in a particular institution, such
personal gifts are regarded as gifts to the institution
itself and the Mahant receives them only as the
representative of the institution; but the general rule is
otherwise. As section 55(1) does not say that this rule
will apply only when there is a custom of that nature in a
particular institution, we must say that the provision in
this unrestricted form is an unreasonable encroachment upon
the, fundamental right of the Mahant. The same objection
can be raised against clause (2) of the section; for if the
Pathakanikas constitute the property of a Mahant, there is
no justification for compelling him to keep accounts of the
receipts and expenditure of such personal gifts. As said
already, if the Mahant dies without disposing of these
personal gifts, they may form part of the assets of the
Math, but that is no reason for -restricting the powers of
the Mahant over these gifts so long as he is alive.
Section 56 has been rightly invalidated by the High
Court., It makes provision of an extremely drastic
,character. Power has been given to the Commissioner to
require the trustee to appoint a manager for administration
of the secular affairs of the institution and in case of
default, the Commissioner can make the appointment. himself.
The manager thus appointed -though nominally a servant of
the trustee, has practically to do everything according to
the directions of .the Commissioner and his subordinates.
It is to be noted that this power can be exercised at the
mere option of the Commissioner without, any justifying
necessity whatsoever and no pre-requisites like mis-
management of property or maladministration of trust funds
are necessary to enable the trustee to exercise such drastic
power. It is true that the section contemplates the
appointment of a manager for administration of the secular
affairs of this institution. But no rigid demarcation could
be made as we have already said between the spiritual duties
of the Mahant
1036
and his personal interest in the trust property. The effect
of the section really is that the Commissioner is at liberty
at any moment he chooses to deprive the Mahant of his right
to administer the trust property even if there is no
negligence or maladministration on his part. Such
restriction would be opposed to the provision of article
26(d) of the Constitution. It would cripple his authority
as Mahant altogether and reduce his position to that of an
ordinary priest or paid servant.

We find nothing wrong in section 58 of the Act which
relates to the framing of the scheme by the Deputy
Commissioner. It is true that it is a Government officer
and not the court who is given the power to settle the
scheme, but we think that sample safeguards have been
provided in the Act to rectify any error or unjust decision
made by the Deputy Commissioner. Section 61 provides for an
appeal to the Commissioner, against the order of the Deputy
Commissioner and -there is a right of suit given to a party
who is aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner ,with a
further right of appeal to the High Court.

The objection urged against the provision of clause
(3)(b) of section 58 does not appear to us to be of The
executive officer mentioned in much substance that clause
could be nothing else but a manager of the properties of the
Math, ad the cannot possibly be empowered to exercise the
functions of the Mathadhipati himself. In any event, the
trustee would have his remedy against such order of the
Deputy Commissioner by way of appeal to the Commissioner and
also by way of suit as laid down in sections 61 and 62.
Section 59 simply provides a scheme for the application of
the cy pres doctrine in case the object of the trust fails
either from the inception or by reason of subsequent eve*.
Here again the only complaint that is raised is, that such
order could be made by the Deputy Commissioner. -We think
that this objection has not much substance. In the first
place, the various objects on, which the trust funds could
be spent are laid down in the section itself and the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner is only to make a
choice out of the several heads-.

1037

Further an appeal has been provided from an order of the
Deputy Commissioner under this section to the Commissioner.
We, therefore, cannot agree with the High Court that
sections 58 and 59 of the Act are invalid.

Chapter VI of the Act, which contains sections 63 to 69,
relates to notification of religious institutions The
provisions are extremely drastic in, their character and the
worst feature of it is that no access is allowed to the
court to set aside an order of notification. The Advocate-
General for Madras frankly stated that he could not support
the legality of these provisions. We hold therefore, in
agreement with High Court that these sections should. be
hold to be void.

Section 70 relates to the, budget of religious institu-
tions. Objection has been taken- only to clause (3.) which
empowers the Commissioner and the Area Committee to make any
additions to or alterations in the budget as they deem fit.
A budget is indispensable in all public institutions and we
do not think that it is per be unreasonable to provide for
the budget of a religious institution being prepared under
the supervision of the Commissioner or the Area Committee.
It is to be noted that if the order is made by an Area
Committee under clause (3), clause (4) provides an appeal
against it to the Deputy Commissioner.

Section 89 provides for penalties for refusal by the
trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act. If the
objectionable portions of the Act are eliminated, the
portion that remains will be perfectly valid and for
violation of these valid provisions, penalties can legiti-
mately be -provided. Section 99 vests an overall revisional
power in the Government. This, in our opinion, is
beneficial to the trustee, for he will have an opportunity
to approach, the Government in case of an irregularity,
error or omission made by the Commissioner or any other
subordinate officer.

The only other point that requires consideration is the
constitutional validity of section 76 of the Act which runs
as follows:

"76. (1) In respect of the services rendered by the
Government and their officers, every religious institution
shall, from the income derived by it, pay to the
1341038
Government annually such contribution not exceeding five per
centum of its income as may be prescribed.

(2)Every religious institution, the annual income of
which for the fasli year immediately preceding as calculated
for the purposes of the levy of contribution under sub-
section (1), is hot less than one thousand rupees, shall pay
to the Government annually, for meeting the cost of auditing
its accounts, such further sum not exceeding one and a half
per centum of its income as the Commissioner may determine.
(3)The annual payments referred to in sub-sections (1)
and (2) shall be made, notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any scheme settled or deemed to be
settled under this Act for the religious institution
concerned.

(4)The Government shall pay the salaries, allowances,
pensions and other beneficial remuneration of the
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners
and other officers and servants (other than executive
officers of religious institutions) employed for the
purposes of this Act and the other expenses incurred for
such purposes, including the expenses of Area Committees and
the cost of auditing the accounts of religious
institutions."

Thus the section authorises the levy of an annual
contribution on all religious institutions, the maximum of
which is fixed at 5 per cent. of the income derived by them.
The -Government is to frame rules for the purposes of fixing
rates within the permissible maximums and the section
expressly states that the levy is in respect of the I
services rendered by the Government and its officers. The
validity of the provision has been attacked on a two-fold
ground: the first is, that the contribution is really a tax
and as such it was beyond the legislative competence of the
State Legislature to enact such provision. The other is,
that the contribution being a tax or imposition, the
proceeds of which are specifically appropriated for the
maintenance of a particular religion or religious
denomination, it comes within the mischief of article 27 of
the Constitution and is hence void.

1039

So far as the first ground is concerned, it is not
disputed that the legislation in the present case is covered
by -entries 10 and 28 of List III in Schedule VII of the
Constitution. If the contribution payable under section 76
of the Act is a "fee", it may come under entry 47 of the
Concurrent List which deals with " fees" in respect of any
of the matters included in that list. On the other hand, if
it is a tax, as this particular tax has not been provided
for in any specific entry in any of the three lists, it
could come only under entry 97 of List I or article 248(1)
of the Constitution and in either view the Union Legislature
alone would be competent to legislate upon it. On behalf of
the appellant, the contention raised is that the
contribution levied is a fee and not a tax and the learned
Attorney General, who appeared for the Union of India as
intervener in this as well as in the other connected appeals
made a strenuous attempt to support this, position. The
point is certainly not free from doubt and requires careful
consideration.

The learned Attorney-General has argued in the first
place that our Constitution makes a clear distinction
,between taxes and fees. It is true, as be t has pointed
out, that there are a number of entries in List I of the
Seventh Schedule which relate to taxes and duties of various
sorts; whereas the last entry, namely entry 96, speaks of
"fees" in respect of any of the matters dealt with in the
list. Extractly the same is with regard to entries 46 to 62
in List II all of which relate to taxes and here again the
last entry deals only with "fees" leviable in respect of the
different matters specified in the list. It appears that:
articles II 0 and 1 19 of the Constitution which deal with
"Money Bills" lay down expressly that a bill will not be
deemed to be a "Money Bill" by reason only that it provides
for the imposition of fines......... or for the demand or
payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered,
whereas a bill dealing with imposition or regulation. of a
tax will always be a Money Bill. Article 277 also mentions
taxes, cesses and fees separately. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the word "tax" as used in article 265 has not
been used in the wider sense as including all other
1040
impositions like ceases and fees; and that at least seems to
be the implication of clause (28) of article 366 which
defines taxation as including the imposition of any tax or
impost, whether general, local or special. It seems to us
that though levying of fees is only a particular form of the
exercise of the taxing power of the State, our Constitution
has placed fees uder a separate category for purposes of
legislation and at the end of each one of the three
legislative lists, it has given a power to the particular
legislature to legislate on the imposition of fees in
respect to every one of the items dealt with in the list
itself. Some idea as to what fees are may be gathered from
clause (2) of articles 110 and 119 referred to above which
speak of fees for licences and for services rendered. The
question for our consideration really is, what are the
indicia or special characteristics that distinguish a fee
from a tax proper ? On this point we have been referred to
several authorities by the learned counsel appearing for the
different parties including opinions expressed by writers of
recognised treatises on public finance.

A neat definition of what "tax" means has been given by
Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia,in Matthews v.
Chicory Marketing Board(1). A tax", according to the
learned Chief Justice, "is a compulsory exaction of money by
public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and
is not payment for services rendered". This definition
brings out, in our opinion, the esential characteristics of
a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which,
in a general sense, are included within it. It is said that
the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is
imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer's consent
and the payment is enforced by law(2). The second
characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for
public purpose without reference to any special benefit to
be conferred on the payer of the tax.This is expressed by
saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general
revenue, which when collected revenues of the State. As the
(1) 60 C.L.R. 263, 276.

(2) Vide Lower Mainland Dairy v. Crystal Dairy Ltd. [1933]
A.C. 168.

1041

object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon
any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no
element of quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the public
authority(1). Another feature of taxation it; that as it is
a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon
the taxpayer depends generally upon his capacity to pay.
Coming now to fees, a 'fee' is generally defined to be a
charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some
governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed
to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in
rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are
arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and
no account is taken of the vary abilities of different
recipients to pay(2). These are undoubtedly some of the
general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds
of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that
would be applicable to all cases.

As regards the distinction between a tax and a fee, it,
is argued in the first place on behalf of the respondent
that a fee is something voluntary which a person has got to
pay if he -wants certain' services from the Government; but
there is no obligation on his part to seek such services and
if he does not want the services, I he can avoid the
obligation. The example given is of a licence fee. If a
man wants a licence that is entirely his own choice and then
only he has to pay the fees, but not otherwise. We think
that a careful examination will reveal that the element of
compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of
imposition. though in different degrees and that it is not
totally absent in fees. This, therefore, cannot be made the
sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing a tax
from fees. It is difficult, we think, to conceive of a tax
except it be something like a poll tax, the incidence of
which falls on all persons within a State. The house tax
has to be paid only by those who own houses, the land tax by
those who possess lands, municipal taxes or rates will fall
on those who have properties within a
(1) see Findlay Shirras on "Science of Public Finance",
Vol. 1, P. 203.

(2) Vide Lutz on "Public Finance" p. 215.

1042

municipality. Persons who do not have houses,land or
Properties within municipalities, would not have to pay
these taxes, but nevertheless these impositions come within
the category of taxes and nobody can say that it is a choice
of these people to own lands or houses or specified kinds of
properties so that there is no compulsion on them to pay
taxes at all. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is
enforceable by law against a man in spite of his
unwillingness or want of consent ; and this element is
present in taxes as well as in fees. Of course, in some
cases whether a man would come. within the category Of a
service receiver may- be a matter of his choice, but that by
itself would not constitute a major test which can be taken
as the criterion of this species of imposition. The
distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the
fact that a tax is levied he a part of a common burden,
while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege.
Fees confer a special capacity, although the special advan-
tage, as for example in the case of registration fees for
documents or marriage licences, is secondary to the primary
motive of regulation in the public interest(1). Public
interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions but in
a fee it is some special benefit which the individual
receives. As seligman says it is the, special benefit
accruing to the indivitual which is the reason for payment
in the case of fees; in the case of a tax, the particular
advantage if it; exists at all is an incidental result of
State action(2).

If, as we hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of return
or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely
necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the
legislative provision, be co-related to the expenses
incurred by Government in rendering the services. As
indicated in article 1 10 of the Constitution ordinarily
there are two classes of cases where Government imposes fees
upon persons. In the first class of cases, Government
simply grants a permission or privilege to a person to do
something, which otherwise that person would not be
competent to do and extracts fees either
(1) Vide Findlay Shirras on "Science of Public Finance"
Vol. 1, P. 202
(2) Vide Seligman's Essays on Taxation, P. 408.

1043

heavy or moderate from that person in return for the
privilege that is conferred.; A most common illustration of
this type of cases is furnished. by the licence fees for
motor vehicles. Here the costs incurred by the Government
in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting of
licences may be very small and the amount of imposition that
is levied is based really not upon the costs incur. red by
the Government but upon the benefit that the individual
receives. In such cases, according to all the writers on
public finance, the tax element is predominant(1), and if
the money paid by licence holders goes for the upkeep of
roads and other matters of general public utility, the
licence fee cannot but be regarded as a tax.

In the other class of cases,- the Government does some
positive work for the benefit of persons and the money is
taken as the return for the work done or services rendered.
If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated
specifically for the performance of such work and is not
merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general
public,, it could be counted as fees and not a tax. There
is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and
as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may
manifest itself in three different forms known respectively
as special assessments,fees and taxes(2). .
Our Constitution has, for legislative purposes, made a
distinction between a tax and a fee and while there are
various entries in the legislative lists with regard to
various forms of taxes there is an entry at the end of each
one of the three lists as regards fees which could be levied
in respect of any of the matters that is included in it.
The implication seems to be that fees have special reference
to governmental action undertaken in respect to any of these
matters.

Section 76 of the Madras Act speaks definitely of the
contribution being levied in respect rendered by the
Government; so far it has the appearance of fees. It is
true that religious institutions do not want these services
to be rendered to them and it
(1) Vide Spligman's Essays on Taxation, p. 409
(2) lbid, P. 406,
1044
may be that they do not consider the State interference to
be a benefit at all. We agree, however, with the learned
Attorney-General that, in the present day concept of a
State, it cannot be said that services could be rendered by
the State only at the request of those who require these

-services. lf in the larger,interest of the public, a State
considers it desirable that some special service should be
done for certain people, the people must accept these
services, whether willing or not(1) It may be noticed,
however, that the contribution that has been levied under
section 76 of the Act has been made to depend upon the
capacity of the payer and not upon the quantum of benefit
that is supposed to be conferred on any particular religious
institution. Further the institutions,, which come under
the lower income group and have income less than Rs. 1,000
annually, are excluded from the liability to pay the
additional charges under clause (2) of the section. These
are undoubtedly some of the characteristics of a 'tax' and
the imposition bears a close analogy to income-tax. But the
material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the
present case is that the money raised by levy of the
contribution is not ear-marked or specified for defraying
the expenses that the Government has to incur in performing
the services. -All the collections go to the consolidated
fund of the State and all the expenses have to be met not
out of these collections but out of the general revenues by
a proper method of appropriation as is done in case of other
Government expenses. That in itself might not be
conclusive, but in this case there is total absences of any
co-relation between the expenses incurred by the Government
and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of
section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return
or counter-payment or quid pro quo cannot have any possible
application to this case. In our opinion, therefore, the
High Court was right in holding that the contribution levied
under section 76 is a tax and not a fee and consequently it
was beyond the power of the State Legislature to enact this
provision.

In view of our decision on this point, the other ground
hardly requires consideration. We will indicate, however,
very briefly our opinion on the second point raised. The
first contention, which has been raised by Mr. Nambiar in
reference to article 27 of the Constitution is that the word
"taxes", as used therein, is not confined to taxes proper
but is inclusive of all other impositions like cesses, fees,
etc. We do not think it necessary to decide this point in
the present case, for in our opinion on the facts of the
present case, the imposition, although it is a tax, does not
come within the purview of the latter part of the article at
all. What is forbidden by the article is the specific
appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of
expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular
religion or religious denomination. The reason underlying
this provision is obvious. Ours being a secular State and
there being freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution, both to individuals and to groups, it is
against the policy of the ,Constitution to pay out of public
funds any money for the promotion or maintenance of any
particular religion or religious denomination. But the
object of the contribution under section 76 of the Madras
Act is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu
religion or any denomination within it. The purpose is to
see that religious trusts and institutions,, wherever they
exist, are properly administered. It is a secular
administration of the religious legislature seeks to control
and the in the Act, is to ensure that the institutions that
the object, as enunciated endowments attached to the
religious institutions are properly administered and their
income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which they
were founded or exist. There is no qustion of favouring any
particular religion or religious denomination in such
cases . In our opinion, article 27 of the Constitution is
not attracted to the facts of the present case.The result,
therefore, is that in our opinion sections 21, 30(2),
31,55,56 and 63 to 69 are the only sections which should be
declared invalid as conflicting with the fundamental
rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in
question and
1351046
section 76(1) is void as beyond the legislative competence
of the Madras State Legislature. The rest of the Act is to
be regarded as valid. The decision of the High Court will
be modified to this extent, but as the judgment of the High
Court is affirmed on its merits, the appeal will stand
dismissed with costs to the respondent.