Self-organized game dynamics in complex networks

Abstract

Complex networks are ubiquitous and known to profoundly
affect the processes that take place on them. From
a theoretical perspective, some of the most complex processes
studied to date, occurring on complex networks, are
related with behavioural dynamics and decision-making, often
described by means of social dilemmas of cooperation.
Among these, the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) provides the
most popular metaphor of such dilemmas, given that its only
Nash equilibrium is mutual defection, despite mutual cooperation
providing higher returns—thus the dilemma. We
may also assume a population dynamics (evolutionary) approach
to game theory where agents revise their behaviour
based on the perceived success of others, creating a gradient
of selection which dictates how cooperation self-organizes
through time. Evolutionary Games provide one of the most
sophisticated examples of complex dynamics in which the
role of the underlying network topology proves ubiquitous.
For instance, when cooperation is modeled as a prisoner's
dilemma game, cooperation may emerge (or not) depending
on how the population is networked (Santos et al., 2012a).