Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

Note that there are no charts for MIA/POW. The millions of Germans in Allied POW camps simply don't exist in this fantasy world. However in his alternate fantasy world he uses the POW figures to promote another fiction that the reason Germany lost WW2 was because they simply decided to give up and ran into Allied POW camps to avoid the Soviets.

Michael Kenny wrote:Note that there are no charts for MIA/POW. The millions of Germans in Allied POW camps simply don't exist in this fantasy world. However in his alternate fantasy world he uses the POW figures to promote another fiction that the reason Germany lost WW2 was because they simply decided to give up and ran into Allied POW camps to avoid the Soviets.

ljadw wrote:1) Torch happened before Uranus,thus there was no reason to not send forces to NA

2 ) On 1 april 1943 the strength of the German forces in NA (army only ) including the PAA AND the 5th Panzer Armee was 130000,of which 25000 returned ,thus Hitler did not send 150000 + men to Tunesia

3 Only half of 6 th Army was encircled at Stalingrad (figures from the now defunct WW2 stats com site)

4 ) At second Alamein,Rommel had 103000 men (half of which were Italians) of which 70 % were saved .

Hi, Ljadw, only the half of Sixth Army was encircled ? but many books mention it lost all twenty divisions.

I think US landing was more threatening than Stalingrad as the former is closer to Hitler's European empire while Stalingrad was far away from the Volga. And actually German only sent one armoured unit : 10. Panzer division and HG unit and some Tiger units to North Africa, others were infantry units, like 164. 334 and 999.Infantry divisions. Hitler still have a number of Panzer reserves in the rear for reinforcemen, as 6.Panzer division already sent to save the Sixth Army, and he still had fresh 7.Panzer division, GD division, three Waffen SS Panzer divisons not yet used.

And given Soviet heavy casualties in 1941 and 1942, Hitler did not expect Soviet still had three Fronts with 1.1 million men for counteroffensive.

Kelvin wrote:
Hi, Ljadw, only the half of Sixth Army was encircled ? but many books mention it lost all twenty divisions.

It is about this page:https://web.archive.org/web/20160411190 ... _abwa.html
I would take it rather skeptically, for example the number of personnel evacuated from the pocket from alternative sources was almost twice as high (about 30 000). According to our former member Qvist in December 1942 the actual strength of 6 Army's elements outside the pocket was 55 000 men, out of original 300 000. This info also fits the known data about the ration strength of the encircled force.

Kelvin wrote:
Hi, Ljadw, only the half of Sixth Army was encircled ? but many books mention it lost all twenty divisions.

It is about this page:https://web.archive.org/web/20160411190 ... _abwa.html
I would take it rather skeptically, for example the number of personnel evacuated from the pocket from alternative sources was almost twice as high (about 30 000). According to our former member Qvist in December 1942 the actual strength of 6 Army's elements outside the pocket was 55 000 men, out of original 300 000. This info also fits the known data about the ration strength of the encircled force.

Hi, Art, in accordance with Beever book Stalingard, Sixth Army had 290,000 men, 236,000 of which were German soldiers, another 55,000 were Hiwi and about 10000 Romanian or some Croats in 100. Jager division. About 25,000 were evacuated by air. Given Soviet numercial superiority, I do believe German LOC were perfectly sealed except by air.
Stalingrad Front from South and Don Front from North linked their forces at Kalach and I see the map in which all Sixth army German soldiers were located east of Kalach and Strong Soviet manpower and use of Don River natural barrier help encirlce German force.

Kelvin wrote:
Hi, Art, in accordance with Beever book Stalingard, Sixth Army had 290,000 men, 236,000 of which were German soldiers, another 55,000 were Hiwi

It's a known misinterpretation of original documents:/viewtopic.php?p=1455889#p1455889
A more or less established wisdom is that 6 and 4 Pz Armies had >300 000 men around Stalingrad, of which most got encircled. As far as I understand Abwicklungsstab counted personnel that were in the unit rosters formally but were on leave or in hospitals, so were not physically present.

Verpflegungsstärke of AGB /6 Army in the pocket (both were overlapping each other ) was on 22 november 270000 men of whom 240000 Germans
On 18 december it was 230000 (of which 13000 Romanians ) . There were also some 20000 Hiwis and POW of whom it is not clear if they were included in the numbers of 270000 / 230000
Of these 213000 men ,42000 were evacuated and 108000 became POW at the capitulation .That means that

a) some 63000 Germans died during the encirclment period (10 weeks ) mostly from diseases,hunger,cold

b ) that contrary to what a lot of people still think today ,the Germans at Stalingrad preferred to be Soviet POW than to die for the Führer .

About the 300000 men (also Verplflegungsstärke = all men and women ,German, Axis, Soviet, military,civilians,who received supplies from AGB /6Army):some 70000 of them were Heerestruppen, who were mostly not in Stalingrad and thus not encircled.

A good guess (more you will not have) would be :
outside the pocket :90000 (50000 Heerestruppen and support units
inside the pocket : 230000 (20000 Heerestruppen and support units )

There 90000 outside the pocket could be higher,as the front and the fighting of 6Army was not limited to Stalingrad .

nickdfresh wrote - If you disagree with Tooze's main thesis, then why do you cite him? Is it because you're a disingenuous liar seeking to validate his own beliefs rather than actually present or inform himself about historical truths?

If you're going to cite speeches, cite the date and the source text, stop acting like a pedantic middle school child and this

usually name calling reflects badly on a person .... Your Historical truths are what you should lead with not trite small minded insults

doogal wrote:usually name calling reflects badly on a person .... Your Historical truths are what you should lead with not trite small minded insults

I think that small minded people feel insulted when one questions their beliefs about any subject.

Anyway, wanna compare the relative proportion of resources allocated to the airforces?

US in 1943 allocated 12.5 billion dollars to purchasing aircraft and 12.5 billion dollars on ships, out of total war expenditures of 86.2 billion dollars in 1943 (including subsidies for munition industries). Hence, aircraft and ships represented 34.8% of all US war expenditures in 1943. Source: War Production Board.

While in Germany in 1943 3rd quarter, the aircraft industry was selling 507 million RM of aircraft per month to the Wehrmacht while the shipbuilding industry was selling 82 million RM per month of ships. While German war related outlays in 1943 were 112 billion RM or about 9.7 billion RM per month, so ships and aircraft represented 6.3% of all German war expenditures if 3rd quarter sales were representative for the rest of the year. Source for sales: Adam Tooze, No Room for Miracles (2005) for sales data and Harrison, The Economics of WW2 (1998) for war related outlays.

Overall, the US focused much more on munitions than Germany: in the US sales of armaments in 1943 were 42.1 billion dollars out of 86.2 billion dollars. That's 48.9% of all war related expenditures. While in Germany's case total armament sales of metal working sector were 21.9 billion RM in 1943 or 19.6% of war related expenditures. Although it doesn't include armament purchased from occupied countries, but we know the occupied territories output of tanks, trucks and aircraft was less than 10% of German output.

So overall, the US and the WAllies in general had a much more materialistic "war of production" mentality than the Germans, who viewed war as a war of, well, combat done by people. Their focus was on the troops, training and providing the troops with adequate leadership, organization and psychological support. Armaments were only a small part of the whole German war effort while the US regarded armament production as "the war effort".

"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz