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SCAP-13-0000765
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
THE SIERRA CLUB and SENATOR CLAYTON HEE,
Petitioners/Appellants-Appellants,
vs.
CASTLE & COOKE HOMES HAWAII INC.; THE LAND USE COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF HAWAII; OFFICE OF PLANNING, STATE OF HAWAII;
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND PERMITTING,
Respondents/Appellees-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-13-0000765; CIV. NO. 12-1-1999)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, and McKenna, JJ., and Circuit
Judge Browning, in place of Acoba, J., recused;
and Pollack, J., dissenting)
I.

Introduction
In this appeal, Appellants Sierra Club and Senator Clayton

Hee oppose the Land Use Commission’s (“LUC”) reclassification of
approximately 767.649 acres of Appellee Castle & Cooke Homes
Hawaii, Inc.’s (“Castle & Cooke”) land from the state
agricultural land use district to the state urban land use
district.

The land is slated for development of Castle &
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Cooke’s Koa Ridge Makai and Waiawa projects.

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Appellants sought

review of the LUC’s decision by the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit (“circuit court”),1 which dismissed their appeal.
Appellants raise the following points of error:
1. The trial court erred by refusing to uphold the
requirements of Article XI, Section 3, of the Hawaii State
Constitution.
2. The decision of the State Court to uphold the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order
of the Land Use Commission is in violation of Act 183, HRS
§[§] 205[-]41-52.
3. The decision of the State Court to uphold the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order
of the Land Use [C]omission is in violation of HAR § 15-1577.

Although there are three points of error, Appellants essentially
make two points.

First, they argue that the LUC should be

required to “stay” the reclassification of the potentially
important agricultural land at issue pending formal designation
of Important Agricultural Lands (“IALs”) in each county,2
pursuant to the intent behind Article XI, Section 3 of the
Hawaii Constitution, as implemented by Act 183 (points of error
one and two).

Second, they argue that the circuit court should

have ruled that the LUC improperly weighed the evidence
supporting its findings that the reclassification (1) would not
substantially impair agricultural production, and (2) was
1

The Honorable Rhonda A. Nishimura presided.
Act 183 directed the counties to formally identify IALs, then submit
IAL land maps to the county councils for decision-making. The county
councils then transmit the maps to the LUC, which then finally designates
IALs. See Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §§ 205-47(a), (e), -48, and 49(a)(Supp. 2005). To date, formal IAL designation has not been completed.
See Sierra Club v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, 2015 WL 9306955, *14 (2015);
see also http://mapoahuagland.com/about/faq (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
2

LUC to “specifically consider” the following when reclassifying
agricultural land:
Lands in intensive agricultural use for two years prior to
date of filing of a petition or lands with a high capacity
for intensive agricultural use shall not be taken out of
the agricultural district unless the commissions finds
either that the action:
(A) Will not substantially impair actual or potential
agricultural production in the vicinity of the subject
property or in the county or State; or
(B) Is reasonably necessary for urban growth.

We affirm the circuit court’s decision and order, which
affirmed the LUC’s decision and order, and which dismissed
Appellants’ appeal.

This court has already recently held that,

pursuant to Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City & County of
Honolulu, 102 Hawaii 465, 476, 78 P.3d 1, 12 (2003), Article XI,
Section 3, standing alone, is not self-executing, and its
constitutional history as well as the legislative history of Act
183 do not reveal an intent to require the LUC to delay
reclassifying agricultural land pending formal designation of
IALs.

See Sierra Club, 2015 WL 9306955, *1.

Therefore, this

opinion does not further address Appellants’ first and second
points of error; rather, this opinion focuses on Appellants’
third point of error, whether the reclassification violated HAR
§ 15-15-77(b)(6).

As to that point of error, we conclude that

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substantial evidence supported the LUC’s findings that the
reclassification of the land at issue in this case satisfied HAR
§ 15-15-77(b)(6).

The evidence in support of these findings was

adduced through Castle & Cooke’s witnesses, whose expertise and
credibility the Appellants did not challenge.
II.

Background
A.

Land Use Commission Proceedings
1.

Castle & Cooke’s Petition

On October 3, 2011, Castle & Cooke filed a Petition for
Land Use District Boundary Amendment (“Petition”) before the
LUC.

Castle & Cooke sought to reclassify approximately 767.649

acres of land at Waipio and Waiawa, on the island of Oahu, from
the agricultural district to urban district to develop the Koa
Ridge Makai and Waiawa Project (the “Project”).
Castle & Cooke described the Koa Ridge Makai portion of the
Project as follows:
Koa Ridge Makai is planned to consist of approximately
3,500 residential dwelling units comprised of a mix of
single-family and multi-family residential units, light
industrial, commercial and community uses. A mixed-use
“Village Center” is planned to include a health care
component, residential, commercial, and community center.
Parks and open space are also planned throughout Koa Ridge
Makai, together with churches, recreational centers, and
schools.

Castle & Cooke described the Waiawa portion of the project as
consisting of “approximately 1,500 residential units comprised
of a mix of single-family and multi-family residential units, a
community center with neighborhood retail, a neighborhood park,
4

to provide long-range protection from urbanization for 10,500
acres of prime and unique agricultural lands and for
preservation of open space, while providing adequate land for
residential, commercial and industrial uses needed in Central
Oahu for the foreseeable future.”
2.

Other Parties and Intervenors to the Petition
Proceedings

As the district boundary petition involved land areas
greater than 15 acres, pursuant to HRS § 205-4(e)(1) (Supp.
2005), “the office of planning[] and the county planning
department” were mandated to appear as parties to “make
recommendations relative to the proposed boundary change.”

The

Office of Planning (“OP”) and the City and County of Honolulu
3

Under HAR § 15-15-78 (effective 2000-2013), the LUC can reclassify
lands incrementally if “full development of the subject property cannot
substantially be completed within ten years after the date of” the LUC’s
approval.

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Department of Planning and Permitting (“DPP”) generally
supported the Petition.

The LUC granted the Sierra Club’s and

Senator Clayton Hee’s petitions to intervene.

They opposed the

Petition and sought to protect the Project lands from
urbanization.
3.

Evidence Presented at the LUC Hearings on the
Petition

The LUC held three evidentiary hearings on the Petition in
early 2012.

Relevant to the issues on appeal, the several

individuals testified, and their testimony is summarized below.
a.

Testimony of Ann Bouslog

Castle & Cooke called Ann Bouslog, an expert in the fields
of real estate, market assessment and economic impacts.

She

testified that the Project was necessary for urban growth in the
region as follows:

“Oahu has an acute shortage of housing

suitable for primary residents. . . . And this shortfall is
expected to increase in the coming decades.

Even with complete

buildout of all identified planned and entitled units as of late
last year, Oahu could be short some 30,000 units of primary
housing by the year 2030.”

Bouslog projected that there would

be a shortage of “at least 6500” homes “in Central Oahu based on
DPP’s own 2009 projections. . . .”

She testified that Central

Oahu is a popular residential location and projected that all
5000 of the Project’s homes would be bought between 2023 and
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2026.

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When offered the chance to cross-examine Bouslog, the

Appellants’ attorney stated, “No questions for this witness.”
b.

Testimony of Bruce Plasch

Castle & Cooke also called Bruce Plasch, an expert in
agriculture and economic assessment.

He testified that the

contraction of plantation agriculture released 177,000 acres for
diversified agriculture by January 2010, with about 15,000 acres
still available on Oahu.

2,500 acres were in upper Kunia, 8,500

acres were on the North Shore, over 2,700 acres were near
Kahuku, and about 1,700 acres were scattered throughout Oahu.
According to Plasch, “most of these lands have soil ratings,
solar radiation, and access to irrigation water similar to Koa
Ridge Makai and Castle & Cooke Waiawa.”

Plasch testified that

42,600 acres of land on Oahu is of high-quality outside the
City’s urban growth boundaries.

Of that land, only 12,000 acres

was being farmed in 2010, leaving nearly 30,000 acres available
for diversified agriculture.

To farm these lands, which were

once irrigated, Plasch testified, water infrastructure would
need to be improved.

Aloun Farms’ Principals, Alec and Mike Sou, submitted a
letter in support of the Petition; it stated that their 335-acre
replacement lands4 have “productive soils, a reliable source of
water and existing irrigation systems which will support the
cultivation of [Aloun Farms’] variety of crops.”
d.

Testimony of Hector Valenzuela

The Appellants submitted into evidence the written
testimony of Hector Valenzuela, a University of Hawaii professor
and vegetable crop extension specialist.

He did not support the

Petition because it “would represent a permanent loss to Oahu
and to the state of a substantial portion of the previous
remaining prime agricultural land available for diversified
agricultural production.”
4.

The LUC’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Decision and Order

On June 21, 2012, the LUC approved the Petition by a vote
of 7-0.

The LUC issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Decision and Order.

With regard to whether the

reclassification would impair agricultural production and was
reasonably necessary for urban growth, the LUC made the
following findings:
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NEED FOR THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT.
68. Oahu has an acute shortage of housing suitable for
primary residents, and this shortfall is projected to
continue to increase by 2030 based on growth projections.
Even with complete buildout of all identified planned and
entitled units as of July 2008, the shortfall will be
approximately 30,000 units by 2030. This is based on DPP’s
2009 population projections (which assume the State
Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism’s
2035 Series, published in 2008) and an updated inventory of
Commission-entitled and planned potential future
developments islandwide.
69. There is a need to entitle at least 6,500 more units
in Central Oahu.
70. Central Oahu has proven to be a popular residential
location due to its cool, upland climate, relative
proximity to the island’s main employment centers, high
quality master-planned communities, and affordability.
71. The Project is estimated to close an average of 200 to
425 residential units per year, and complete absorption of
the Projects 5,000 residential units is projected to occur
between 2023 and 2026.
. . . .
IMPACTS UPON RESOURCES OF THE AREA
Agricultural Resources
. . . .
87. In anticipation of the Project and to mitigate the
impacts of development on agricultural operations,
Petitioner arranged with Dole Foods to issue a lease to
Aloun Farms for approximately 335 acres of former pineapple
land located north of the Dole Plantation. The lease term
is for ten years, with a five-year renewal option. In
addition, approximately 332 acres of abutting lands have
been offered to Aloun Farms. The approximately 667 acres
of land being offered as replacement land is twice as much
land as Aloun Farms is farming currently at Koa Ridge. The
335 acres currently leased by Aloun Farms has sufficient
access to water from the Tanada Reservoir, which provides
fresh clean water to the replacement lands and is
distributed through an existing irrigation delivery system
throughout the site. Coordinated efforts to improve the
delivery of year round supply of water are being worked out
with Dole Foods, and a plan acceptable to Aloun Farms has
been clearly laid out in Aloun Farms’ water contract.
Aloun Farms has begun site [sic] and the soil amendment
process of the 335-acre replacement site and anticipates
its first crops in the summer of 2012. The replacement
lands will allow Aloun Farms to grow a variety of crops and
maintain similar production, revenues, operating costs,

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delivery costs, employment, and payroll as would occur at
Koa Ridge Makai.
88. Because of the replacement lands with a source of
water and existing irrigation that have been made available
and because Petitioner stopped charging Aloun Farms rent at
Koa Ridge which saves Aloun Farms $129,000 annually, the
Project is not anticipated to have a significant impact on
the operation of Aloun Farms. However, some adjustments in
varieties and cultivation practices might be required due
to different agronomic conditions (e.g., soils,
temperature, solar radiation, elevation and rainfall).
Also, Aloun Farms will incur the cost of preparing the
former pineapple field for farming vegetable crops.
. . . .
94. The contraction and closure of sugarcane and pineapple
plantations have released farmland that can now be used for
other crops. As of January 2010, over 177,000 acres
remained available statewide for farming.
95. On Oahu, over 15,000 acres of former plantation land
remain available including approximately 2,500 acres in
upper Kunia, approximately 8,500 acres on the North Shore,
over 2,700 acres near Kahuku, and approximately 1,700 acres
scattered throughout other parts of the island. The word
“available” refers to land not being farmed.
96. The Island of Oahu has approximately 42,600 acres of
high quality farmland outside of the City’s Urban Growth
Boundaries, excluding lands under military control and
lands in Kahuku that are scheduled to become a wildlife
refuge. In 2010, an estimated 12,000 acres were farmed on
Oahu, some of which was land within the Urban Growth
Boundaries. Assuming that the farms in the Urban Growth
Boundaries eventually relocate to land outside of the Urban
Growth Boundaries, over 30,000 acres of good farmland on
Oahu will remain available for growing additional crops
(42,000 acres - 12,000 acres).
. . . .
113. Reclassification and development of the Petition Area
will not have an adverse impact on agricultural resources
nor on actual or potential agricultural production in the
vicinity of the Petition Area or in the City or State.
There is sufficient land available on Oahu and in the State
to accommodate the loss of land for the Project and to
accommodate diversified agriculture.

The LUC made the following Conclusions of Law relevant to
this appeal:

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1. Pursuant to HRS chapter 205 and the Commission rules
under HAR chapter 15-15, and upon consideration of the
Commission decision-making criteria under HRS section 20517, the Commission finds upon the clear preponderance of
the evidence that the reclassification of Koa Ridge Makai,
Increment 1, consisting of approximately 576.435 acres of
land, situated at Waipio, Island of Oahu, State of Hawaii,
TMKs: 9-4-06: portion of 1, portion of 2, portion of 3,
portion of 5, 38, and portion of 39 and 9-5-03: portion of
1 and portion of 4, shown approximately on Exhibit “A”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein, from
the State Land Use Agricultural District to the State Land
Use Urban District, and subject to the conditions stated in
the Order below, conforms to the standards for establishing
the boundaries of the State Land Use Urban District, is
reasonable, not violative of HRS section 205-2 and is
consistent with the policies and criteria established
pursuant to HRS sections 205-16, 205-17, and 205A-2.
2. The Commission also finds upon the clear preponderance
of the evidence that the reclassification of Castle & Cooke
Waiawa, Increment 2, pursuant to the incremental
districting under section HAR 15-15-78, consisting of
approximately 191.214 acres of land, situated at Waiawa,
Island of Oahu, State of Hawaii, TMKs: 9-4-06: portion of
29 and portion of 31 and 9-6-04: 21, shown approximately on
Exhibit “A” attached hereto and incorporated by reference
herein, from the State Land Use Agricultural District to
the State Land Use Urban District, and subject to the
conditions stated in the Order below, conforms to the
standards for establishing the boundaries of the State Land
Use Urban District, is reasonable, is not violative of HRS
section 205-2, and is consistent with the policies and
criteria established pursuant to HRS sections 205-16, 20517, and 205A-2.
. . . .
6. Article XI, Section 3, of the Hawaii State Constitution
states the following in full: “The State shall conserve
and protect agricultural lands, promote diversified
agriculture, increase agricultural self-sufficiency and
assure the availability of agriculturally suitable lands.
The legislature shall provide standards and criteria to
accomplish the foregoing. Lands identified by the State as
important agricultural lands needed to fulfill the purposes
above shall not be reclassified by the State or rezoned by
its political subdivisions without meeting the standards
and criteria established by the legislature and approved by
a two-thirds vote of the body responsible for the
reclassification or rezoning action.”
7. HRS section 205-41 declares that there is a compelling
State interest in conserving the State’s agricultural land
resource base and assuring the long-term availability of
agricultural lands for agricultural use to achieve the

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purposes of Article XI, Section 3, of the Hawaii State
Constitution.

The LUC’s Decision and Order reclassified the Petition
lands from the state agricultural land use district to the state
urban land use district, subject to preconditions that are not
relevant on appeal.
B.

Circuit Court Appeal

Appellants filed an agency appeal with the circuit court.
Relevant to this appeal, the Appellants argued that the LUC’s
decision and order violated HAR § 15-15-77(b)(6),5 which requires
the LUC to “specifically consider” the following when
reclassifying agricultural land:
Lands in intensive agricultural use for two years prior to
date of filing of a petition or lands with a high capacity
for intensive agricultural use shall not be taken out of
the agricultural district unless the commission finds
either that the action:
(A) Will not substantially impair actual or potential
agricultural production in the vicinity of the subject
property or in the county or State; or
(B) Is reasonably necessary for urban growth.

The Appellants focused on subsection (A), arguing, “Despite
overwhelming and dispositive evidence to the contrary, the
Findings conclude that there are sufficient alternative
agricultural lands and that agriculture on Oahu will not be
5

The Appellants also argued that the LUC’s decision and order violated
HAR § 15-15-77(a), which requires district boundary amendments to conform to
the Hawaii State Plan. The Appellants abandoned this issue upon transfer to
this court, as this issue was not raised as a point of error in their Opening
Brief, and was referenced for the first time in their Reply Brief. This
argument has therefore been waived. See Matter of Hawaiian Flour Mills,
Inc., 76 Hawaii 1,14 n.5, 868 P.2d 419, 432 n.5 (1994) (citing Hawaii Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4)).

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harmed by the reclassification.”

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They argued that the LUC’s

decision was “based on the unsubstantiated assertion that there
is a large amount of available farm land on Oahu and thus taking
this proven and productive land out of production will not be
harmful to agriculture on Oahu or in Hawaii in general.”
Specifically, the Appellants contended that the replacement
lands lack State funding for water infrastructure, and lack a
track record of producing crops like those grown on the Petition
lands.

As to subsection (B), whether the reclassification was

necessary for urban growth, the Appellants claimed in a footnote
that “there was very unconvincing testimony of the need for an
additional 5000 housing units in this location. . . .”
In its Answering Brief, Castle & Cooke counter-argued that
the reclassification complied with HAR § 15-15-77(b)(6).

Castle

& Cooke argued that the LUC was provided with substantial
evidence that the reclassification “will not substantially
impair actual or potential agricultural production” and “is
reasonably necessary for urban growth.”

As to the “agricultural

production” prong, Castle & Cooke pointed to Plasch’s testimony
about the thousands of acres that had become available for
diversified agriculture upon the contraction of plantation
agriculture.

Castle & Cooke also noted it had designated 679

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acres as IAL in other parts of Oahu6 and provided its current
tenant, Aloun Farms, with replacement land for its farming
operations.

To refute the Appellants’ suggestion that the

replacement land lacks necessary water infrastructure, Castle &
Cooke cited to Aloun Farms’ letter of support, that noted their
replacement land “has productive soils, a reliable source of
water and existing irrigation systems which will support the
cultivation of [their] variety of crops. . . .”

Thus, Castle &

Cooke maintained, reclassification of the petition lands “would
not substantially impair actual or potential agricultural
production.”
As to the “urban growth” prong, Castle & Cooke argued that
the LUC was provided with substantial evidence that the
reclassification was necessary for urban growth from, inter
alia, Bouslog, who testified about Central Oahu’s acute housing
shortage for primary residents.

Castle & Cooke pointed out that

the Appellants did not dispute Bouslog’s testimony or crossexamine her during the LUC hearings.

They also failed to

“provide any witness or documents to the LUC that would
contradict the evidence presented during the hearings that the

6

During the pendency of the Petition proceedings, Castle & Cooke
successfully obtained LUC designation of this land as IAL through the farmer/
landowner-initiated IAL designation procedure set forth in HRS § 205-44
(Supp. 2005). This procedure is separate from the formal county-initiated
IAL designation procedure set forth in HRS § 205-47.

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reclassification of the Petition lands is reasonably necessary
for urban growth.”
The LUC argued in its Answering Brief that the
reclassification did not violate HRS § 15-15-77(b)(6), because
(1) the Project area is designated for urban development in the
CO SCP; (2) there is an acute shortage of housing for primary
residents on Oahu; (3) and adequate replacement lands exist for
agricultural tenants displaced by the project.

The LUC asserted

that it did not “simply ignore” testimony that the lands had
been in active cultivation, but “considered the specific
replacement lands . . . as well as other evidence concerning
agriculture in Hawaii in general. . . .”
The circuit court held oral argument.

The circuit court

asked the Appellants which particular findings of fact and
conclusions of law they believed were in error, as their Opening
Brief did not include that information; the Appellants viewed
“the entire thing” as in error.

Further into the oral argument,

the Appellants’ attorney conceded, “We’re not challenging the
expertise [of individuals who testified before the LUC] because
[the LUC is] entitled to make credibility determinations.”
After hearing argument from all of the parties, the circuit
court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the LUC’s decision.
The circuit court issued its Decision and Order Denying and
Dismissing Appellants the Sierra Club and Senator Clayton Hee’s
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Appeal Filed on July 20, 2012, on April 11, 2013.

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The circuit

court made the following findings relevant to this appeal:
7. The Court, in its review of all the Findings of
Fact, finds that there is evidence as to the unmet housing
needs and the availability of other suitable agricultural
land and the criteria required under HRS § 205-17 and HAR §
15-15-77. The Court finds that the LUC D&O was not
arbitrary and/or an abuse of discretion in that there was
substantial, reliable, probative evidence to support its
Findings of Fact.
8. The Court finds that there was no challenge by
Appellants as to the credibility or the expertise of the
various witnesses that testified before the LUC.
9. The Court therefore finds that the LUC did not
violate HAR § 15-15-77.

The circuit court therefore affirmed the LUC’s Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order and dismissed the
appeal.

The Appellants timely appealed, ultimately obtaining a

transfer of the appeal from the ICA to this court.
III.

Standard of Review
Review of a decision made by the circuit court upon its
review of an agency’s decision is a secondary appeal. The
standard of review is one in which this court must
determine whether the circuit court was right or wrong in
its decision, applying the standards set forth in HRS § 9114(g) . . . to the agency’s decision.

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

Camara v.

Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984).
In order to preserve the function of administrative
agencies in discharging their delegated duties and the
function of this court in reviewing agency determinations,
a presumption of validity is accorded to decisions of
administrative bodies acting within their sphere of
expertise and one seeking to upset the order bears “the
heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is

responsibility to search the record in this case for evidence
supporting the LUC’s factual findings.

See Campbell v. DePonte,

57 Haw. 510, 513, 559 P.2d 739, 741 (1977) (“An appellant’s mere
challenge of a finding does not cas[t] the onus of justifying it
on this court.

The party seeking to overthrow findings has the
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burden of pointing out specifically wherein the findings are
clearly erroneous.”) (citation omitted).
It was clear in this case that the entire decision and
order was not at issue in this appeal.

The Appellants focused

on the agriculture and urban growth findings, not the
introductory findings describing procedural matters, the
petition area, the proposal for reclassification, Castle &
Cooke’s financial capability to undertake the project, or State
and City plans; or the hundreds of other findings regarding
impacts upon the economy, society, flora, fauna, archaeological,
historical, cultural, groundwater and surface water, parks and
recreation, and scenic resources; or noise, air quality, highway
and roadway facilities, water service, wastewater disposal,
drainage, solid waste disposal, schools, police and fire
protection, emergency/medical services, civil defense,
electricity and telephone service, energy conservation,
commitment of state funds and resources, and conformance with
State and City land use management plans.
We remind counsel that Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure
(“HRAP”) Rule 28(b)(4)(C) (2010) requires that an appellant’s
opening brief concisely state points of error, and, “when the
point involves a finding or conclusion of the . . . agency,
either a quotation of the finding or conclusion urged as error
or reference to appended findings and conclusions. . . .”
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court has looked past violations of HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) to reach
the merits of a case where issues of great importance are at
stake.

See, e.g., Morgan v. Planning Dep’t, 104 Hawaii 173,

181, 86 P.3d 982, 990 (2004) (“[B]ecause the issues raised in
the instant case are of great importance [i.e., the Hawaii
constitution’s recognition of the significance of conserving and
protecting Hawaii’s natural beauty and natural resources], we
address the merits of the issues raised . . . notwithstanding
the [Appellants’] technical violation of HRAP Rule 28(b)(4).”)
In this case, due to the public interest in the proposed Koa
Ridge development, we choose to construe Appellants’ appeal as
challenging the findings of fact reproduced in Section II.A.4 of
this opinion.

Even given this latitude, however, the Appellants

fail to carry their burden of showing why the LUC’s decision and
order should not be affirmed.
The Appellants allege that the LUC improperly weighed the
evidence before it in determining that the reclassification of
the Petition lands would not substantially impair agricultural
production and was reasonably necessary for urban growth.

A

court reviewing an agency’s findings of fact, however must
“decline to consider the weight of the evidence to ascertain
whether it weighs in favor of the administrative findings, or
. . . review the agency’s findings of fact by passing upon the
credibility of witnesses or conflicts in testimony, especially
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the findings of an expert agency dealing with a specialized
field.”

Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawaii 459, 465,

918 P.2d 561, 567 (1996).

Appellants’ attorney acknowledged as

much before the circuit court, when he admitted, “We’re not
challenging the expertise [of individuals who testified before
the LUC] because [the LUC is] entitled to make credibility
determinations.”
As such, the resolution of this issue on appeal depends on
whether the witnesses the LUC credited provided substantial
evidence to support the LUC’s findings of fact.

Substantial

evidence is “credible evidence which is of sufficient quality
and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to
support a conclusion.”

In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 94

Hawaii 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000).

In this case, the

witness testimony the LUC credited (summarized in Sections
II.A.3.a, b, and c of this opinion) provided substantial
evidence to support its findings.

The LUC’s Decision and Order Omits a Conclusion that the
Preponderance of the Evidence Shows that the
Reclassification Does Not Violate Part III of Chapter 205,
but the Omission is Harmless.
HRS § 205-4(h) (Supp. 2005) requires the LUC to approve a

proposed boundary amendment only after concluding, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that it is “reasonable, not
violative of section 205-2 [governing districting and
classification of lands] and part III of this chapter [governing
Important Agricultural Lands], and consistent with the policies
and criteria established pursuant to sections 205-16 [compliance
with the Hawaii State Plan] and 205-17 [listing other LUC
decision-making criteria].”

concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
reclassification of the Koa Ridge and Waiawa lands were
“reasonable, not violative of HRS section 205-2 and . . .
consistent with the policies and criteria established pursuant
to HRS sections 205-16, 205-17, and 205A-2.”

Conclusions of Law

1 and 2 are erroneous because they omit any conclusion regarding
part III of HRS Chapter 205.

Although the Appellants did not

challenge these conclusions of law, this court may freely review
them.

Ka Paakai O KaAina v. Land Use Comm’n, 94 Hawaii 31, 41,

7 P.3d 1068, 1078 (2000).
Under the circumstances of this case, however, this error
is harmless because the LUC made separate conclusions to show
that it recognized the significance of important agricultural

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lands under the Hawaii State Constitution and Part III of
Chapter 205:
6. Article XI, Section 3, of the Hawaii State Constitution
states the following in full: “The State shall conserve
and protect agricultural lands, promote diversified
agriculture, increase agricultural self-sufficiency and
assure the availability of agriculturally suitable lands.
The legislature shall provide standards and criteria to
accomplish the foregoing. Lands identified by the State as
important agricultural lands needed to fulfill the purposes
above shall not be reclassified by the State or rezoned by
its political subdivisions without meeting the standards
and criteria established by the legislature and approved by
a two-thirds vote of the body responsible for the
reclassification or rezoning action.”
7. HRS section 205-41 [located in Part III of Chapter 205]
declares that there is a compelling State interest in
conserving the State’s agricultural land resource base and
assuring the long-term availability of agricultural lands
for agricultural use to achieve the purposes of Article XI,
Section 3, of the Hawaii State Constitution.

Again, we note that the formal county-initiated IAL designation
process has not concluded.

See

http://mapoahuagland.com/about/faq/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
Further, the City & County of Honolulu has no intention of
identifying the Project lands as IAL because they are included
in county plans calling for urban development.

See id.

Under

HRS § 205-47(a), “lands that have been designated, through the
state land use, zoning, or county planning process, for urban
use by the State or county” are not subject to county
identification as IALs.

Thus, under the facts of this case,

reclassification would not be “violative of part III” because
this particular parcel was not, and would not be, identified as
IAL.

We believe these conclusions of law show that the LUC
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complied with Part III of Chapter 205 to the extent that it
could, given the unfinished state of the formal county IAL
designation process.
VI.

THE SIERRA CLUB and SENATOR CLAYTON HEE,
Petitioners/Appellants-Appellants,
vs.
CASTLE & COOKE HOMES HAWAIʻI INC.; THE LAND USE COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF HAWAIʻI; OFFICE OF PLANNING, STATE OF HAWAIʻI;
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND PERMITTING,
Respondents/Appellees-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-13-0000765; CIV. NO. 12-1-1999)
DISSENT
(By: Pollack, J.)
I agree with the majority that the Land Use Commission
erred in failing to find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the reclassification of 768 acres of land from the
agricultural land use district to the urban land use district
was not violative of part III of Chapter 205 of the Hawaiʻi
Revised States (HRS) as required by HRS § 205-4(h).

As a result

of this violation of HRS § 205-4(h), I would vacate the approval

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of the petition and remand the case to the Land Use Commission
so that it may discharge its duty to find, by a clear
preponderance of the evidence, whether or not the proposed
reclassification is violative of Part III of Chapter 205.

I

would also provide further guidance to the Land Use Commission
with regard to its review of the petition on remand.
HRS § 205–4(h) requires the Land Use Commission (also
“Commission”) “to approve a proposed boundary amendment only
after concluding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is
‘reasonable, not violative of section 205–2 and part III of this
chapter, and consistent with the policies and criteria
established pursuant to sections 205–16 and 205–17.’”

other words, the plain language of HRS § 205-4(h) requires the
Land Use Commission to find upon the clear preponderance of the
evidence “that a proposed reclassification is not violative of,
inter alia, Part III of Chapter 205.”
232 (Pollack, J., dissenting).

Id. at 524, 364 P.3d at

The Commission is directed to

make such findings when it reviews “petitions for changes in
district boundaries of lands within conservation districts,
lands designated or sought to be designated as important
agricultural lands, and lands greater than fifteen acres in the
agricultural, rural, and urban districts, except as provided in

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section 201H–38.”

HRS § 205–4(a); cf. Ka Paʻakai O KaʻAina v.

Land Use Commʻn, 94 Hawaiʻi 31, 44, 7 P.3d 1068, 1081 (2000) (“In
order to comply with HRS § 205–4(h)’s mandate, the LUC is
required to enter specific findings that, inter alia, the
proposed reclassification is consistent with the policies and
criteria of HRS § 205–17(3)(B).”).
This court has interpreted policies set forth in
statutes to “provide guidance to the reader as to how the act
should be enforced.”

Chapter 205 declares “that the people of Hawaii have a
substantial interest in the health and sustainability of
agriculture as an industry in the State” and that
[t]here is a compelling state interest in conserving the
State’s agricultural land resource base and assuring the
long-term availability of agricultural lands for
agricultural use to achieve the purposes of:
(1) Conserving and protecting agricultural lands;
(2) Promoting diversified agriculture;
(3) Increasing agricultural self-sufficiency; and
(4) Assuring the availability of agriculturally suitable
lands,
pursuant to article XI, section 3, of the Hawaii State
Constitution.

HRS § 205–41 (Supp. 2005).

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As stated, “[t]he plain language of HRS § 205–4(h)
necessitates a finding by the Land Use Commission that a
proposed reclassification is not violative of, inter alia, Part
III of Chapter 205.”

requires that the Commission’s analysis take into account Part
III’s declaration of policy in HRS § 205-41, which provides
guidance to the Commission in determining whether to approve a
petition for reclassification:
HRS § 205–41, as a section within Part III of Chapter 205,
is expressly cross-referenced by HRS § 205–4(h) as a
relevant consideration that the Commission should account
for in evaluating petitions for changes in district
boundaries listed in HRS § 205–4(a). Hence, the State
policies established in HRS § 205–41, although not creating
substantive rights for a party, “provide guidance” to the
Commission in the course of deciding, pursuant to HRS §
205–4(h), whether to approve amendment petitions enumerated
in HRS § 205–4(a), such as the petition involved in this
case.

Id. at 525, 364 P.3d at 233 (Pollack, J., dissenting) (citing
Poe, 97 Hawaiʻi at 540, 40 P.3d at 942).
HRS § 205-4(h) expressly requires consideration of
Part III--including the general guidance set forth in HRS § 20541--for all proposed reclassifications for lands greater than
fifteen acres in agricultural, rural, and urban districts.
There is no exception for lands that are anticipated to be
reclassified.

As such, consideration of Part III “is not

contingent on whether the petition lands were already slated for

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urban development under county plans or on whether the county
does not intend to designate them as important agricultural
lands.”

Id. at 525, 364 P.3d at 233.

Instead, the Land Use

Commission’s obligation to render findings with regard to Part
III is triggered when a petition is governed by HRS § 205-4(a).
The Commission’s statutory requirements pursuant to HRS § 2054(a) will not be excused based on the perceived intentions of
the counties with regard to the designation process regarding
important agricultural lands outlined in Part III.

Indeed, the

very existence of the Land Use Commission, its authority to
grant and deny such applications, and its statutory obligations
to conserve and protect agricultural lands demonstrates that the
Commission’s role is not merely to defer to the counties’
decision with regard to how lands are to be used.
525, 364 P.3d at 233.

See id. at

Thus, in accordance with the “policies

underlying Part III, state and county government should consider
the ‘compelling state interest in conserving the State’s
agricultural land resource base assuring the long term
availability of agricultural lands for agricultural use.’”

Id.

at 507, 364 P.3d at 215 (majority opinion).
However, as it did in D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, the
Land Use Commission failed to make any findings with regard to
Part III of Chapter 205, and “by neglecting to consider Part
III, as required by HRS § 205-4(h), the Commission failed to

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incorporate the guidance that HRS § 205-41 provides in its
analysis and in its final approval of the proposed
reclassification.”
dissenting).
erred.

Id. at 525, 364 P.3d at 234 (Pollack, J.,

In failing to consider Part III, the Commission

“Whether this error is harmless cannot be determined

with reasonable certainty because this court is not in a
position to conclude that the Commission would have acted in the
same or similar manner had it fully applied Part III of section
205--specifically the policies embodied by HRS § 205-41--in its
decision-making calculus.”

Id. (collecting cases and concluding

that the complexity and scope of a proposed residential and
commercial development involving 1,500 acres of prime
agricultural land renders inappropriate a harmless error
evaluation).
In this case, the Land Use Commission considered
whether 768 acres of prime agricultural land should be
reclassified from the state agricultural land use district to
the state urban land use district.

The proposed development

would reclassify this prime agricultural land to make way for
the building of 5,000 residential units, a medical center
complex, a “mixed-use village center,” hotel, “commercial
development,”

“light industrial,” schools, churches, recreation

centers, and roadways.

The written testimony of University of

Hawaiʻi professor and vegetable crop extension specialist, Hector

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Valenzuela, stated that the reclassification of the land “would
represent a permanent loss to Oahu and to the state of a
substantial portion of the precious remaining prime agricultural
land available for diversified agricultural production.”

And,

indeed, the requested reclassification pertains in part to lands
that Professor Valenzuala identifies as being of “unique and
extraordinary value” because of the availability of near ideal
soil quality, ideal geographical isolation and microclimatic
conditions for the production of high value specialty
horticultural crops, current availability and infrastructure for
irrigation water, and proximity to local markets.
“The complexity and scope of the project involved in
this case complicate, and render not feasible, a harmless error
analysis.”

Horton-Schuler, 136 Hawaiʻi at 526, 364 P.3d at 235

(Pollack, J., dissenting).

The Land Use Commission has broad

discretion in reviewing a petition for reclassification, such as
the one in this case, and it may have reached a number of
different conclusions if it applied the proper analysis:
Had the Land Use Commission adhered to its duty to consider
Part III in its decision-making process, a number of
possible results could have been reached. The Commission
could have decided in the same manner as it did in this
case. Another possibility is that the Commission could have
imposed any number of different or additional conditions as
part of its approval of the reclassification petition.
Alternatively, the Commission could have opted to limit the
area of land to preserve the agricultural viability of some
of the State’s most fertile lands. The Commission could
even have denied the proposed reclassification.

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Id. at 526, 364 P.3d at 234.

In view of the fact, as Professor

Valenzuela explained, that the reclassification “represent[s] a
permanent loss to Oahu and to the state of a substantial portion
of the precious remaining prime agricultural land available for
diversified agricultural production,” this court cannot conclude
with reasonable certainty that the Commission would have reached
the same decision upon the petition “given the myriad
alternatives to that decision.”

See id.

Additionally, the fact that the Commission included
conclusions of law quoting Article XI, section 3 of the Hawaiʻi
State Constitution and mentioned the State’s compelling state
interest to conserve agricultural lands under Part III of
Chapter 205 does not cure the Commission’s failure to make
findings that the proposed reclassification is not violative of
Part III of Chapter 205 as required by HRS § 205-4(h).

Indeed,

correctly stating the law and actually applying the law to the
facts of the case are separate tasks.

And, while a correct

understanding of the law is important, it is not sufficient to
satisfy the Commission’s obligation to apply the law to the
facts of this case.
Thus, I would find that the Land Use Commission
violated HRS § 205-4(h) in this case and that its approval of
the petition for land use boundary reclassification should be
vacated and the petition remanded in order for the Commission to

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discharge its duty to find, by a clear preponderance of the
evidence, whether or not the proposed reclassification is
violative of Part III within a decision making framework guided
by the State policies declared in HRS § 205-41 and as described
by my dissent in Horton Schuler.

See id. at 524-26, 364 P.3d at

233-35.
I would also direct the Commission on remand to
consider, in its review of the petition, Article XI, Section 3,
which conserves and protects agricultural lands.

See id. at

526-40, 364 P.3d at 235-40 (discussing the significant
constitutional duties of the Land Use Commission with respect to
preserving agricultural lands).

As discussed in my dissenting

opinion in Horton-Schuler, Article XI, Section 3 of the Hawaiʻi
Constitution is a self-executing provision that charges the
State with a significant responsibility regarding the protection
and conservation of agricultural lands.
at 235-40.1

Id. at 526-32, 364 P.3d

“Agencies are often asked to decide issues that are

of profound importance to the general public and that implicate
constitutional rights and duties.”

Id. at 532, 364 P.3d at 240.

Both the Horton-Schuler case and this one demonstrate “the

1

Even assuming that Article XI, Section 3 requires implementing
legislation to be enforceable, the legislature has provided the necessary
legislation in Part III of Chapter 205. Horton-Schuler, 136 Hawaiʻi at 531,
364 P.3d at 239 (Pollack, J., dissenting).

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Commission’s role in deciding questions of immense importance to
the public that implicate the protections secured by our
Constitution.”

Id.

“[T]o the extent possible, an agency must

execute its statutory duties in a manner that fulfills the
State’s affirmative obligations under the Hawaiʻi Constitution.”
Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Hawaiʻi 376,
413, 363 P.3d 224, 261 (2015) (Pollack, J., concurring).
Accordingly, agency decisions involving constitutional rights
and duties must be made in accordance with the State’s
constitutional obligations:
The Land Use Commission, as an agency of the State, is
obligated in its decision making to (1) “conserve and
protect agricultural lands,” (2) “promote diversified
agriculture,” (3) “increase agricultural self-sufficiency,”
and (4) “assure the availability of agriculturally suitable
lands.” The Commission may not act without independently
considering the effect of its actions on the protections
afforded agricultural farmlands under Article XI, Section
III. “Hence, an agency may not fulfill its statutory
duties without reference to and application of the rights
and values embodied in the constitution.”

Horton-Schuler, 136 Hawaiʻi at 532, 364 P.3d at 240 (Pollack, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, 136
Hawaiʻi at 413, 363 P.3d at 261).
In summary, because the Land Use Commission failed to
make findings and conclusions as to whether the
reclassification, by clear preponderance of the evidence, is not
violative of Part III of Chapter 205 as required by HRS § 205–
4(h), I would vacate and remand the petition for further
proceedings consistent with HRS § 205–4(h), Part III of Chapter
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205.

And, I would also direct the Commission to fulfill its

duties in a manner consistent with its responsibilities under
Article XI, Section 3 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.
DATED: