Plaintiff
Thomas Jewell Carr, a pretrial detainee, filed a pro
se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This
matter is before the Court for initial review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will
allow the failure to train claim against Defendant Louisville
Metro Government[1] and the three federal constitutional
claims against Defendant Buckley in his individual capacity
to proceed. The remaining claims and Defendants will be
dismissed from this action. Further, as to the proceeding
claims, the Court will stay this action pending final
disposition of the state criminal case against Plaintiff.

I.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff
names the following six Defendants in this action: (1)
Officer Buckley, a metro police officer at “(LMD)
Jefferson County”; (2) Thomas B. Wine, the Commonwealth
Attorney for Jefferson County; (3) Courtney Straw, an
Assistant Commonwealth Attorney for Jefferson County; (4)
Judge Haynes, a district court judge for Jefferson County,
Kentucky; (5) Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender
Corp; and (6) “City of Louisville/State of
Kentucky.” Plaintiff sues the four individuals in both
their individual and official capacities. The remaining two
Defendants he sues in their official capacity. As relief,
Plaintiff seeks “200-million dollar's” and
“Lawyer recommandation's/ Depending on settlement
offer if any.”

According
to Plaintiff, Defendant Buckley and some other officers
responded to a 911 caller reporting that
“(4-subject's with gun's entered their home) as
well as stated ‘3-black-female's' are
‘Assaulting her, ' then stated
‘2-Black-male's, ' followed by saying ‘We
watching out the window now & there is at least 16-people
outside and they all jumping on her.'” Plaintiff
states that the victim and other witnesses at the scene made
statements that “‘Caller's' had a
‘Gun.'” Plaintiff states that Defendant
Buckley and the other officers ignored statements given to
them and “‘refused' to locate (9-1-1
caller's) question them for statements & check weapon
for ‘DNA' from ‘Victim' because
‘Victim' had a bloody nose & mouth as well a
‘HUGE-knot' on her ‘forehead' as if she
had been ‘Pistol-whipped.'” According to
Plaintiff, Defendant Buckley talked to the first witness, who
was a black female

who pointed out the ‘Victim/White-Female, ' which
came to his ‘conclusion' the
‘victim-White-Female' was ‘DATING' the
‘1st contact-witness/Black-female's' (uncle)
which would be a ‘Black-male' as his (subject),
therefore; (Assuming-& Racial-Profiling) the situation,
‘mis-leading' himself as well other officer's
to ‘ignore' (any-statement's) outside of (her
boyfriend-A BLACK MALE) which is ‘why'
officer's (never) got statement's from ‘9-1-1-
caller's' & ‘Immediately' began
searching the area for myself ‘before' i (returned)
to the scene ‘self-Willingly' because I did
‘Nothing-Wrong.' Plaintiff states that the victim
voiced that she did not want to press charges and did not
want to be bothered. Plaintiff states that this made the
officers upset and mad.

Plaintiff
states that Defendant Buckley took statements from other
witnesses. According to Plaintiff, at the end of the
investigation during a phone conversation, Defendant Buckley
“admitted (No-Witnesses, witnessed ‘Accussed'
Assault-Victim) and (Assumed) once ‘again' that
‘victim' was being ‘Relucktant' and
trying to keep the ‘Accussed' out of trouble
because ‘victim' wanted to ‘NOT' press
charges & would ‘NOT' say . . . that
‘Accussed' Assaulted-her.” Plaintiff states
that Defendant Buckley changed “the statement in
‘Citation' as well ‘Testified-under
oath'” to lock Plaintiff up and have him indicted.
Plaintiff contends that he was falsely arrested and charged.

Plaintiff
states that Defendants Wine and Straw
“continuously” call and write letters to
Plaintiff's “fiancée/victim” trying to
get her to change her statement and say that Plaintiff
assaulted her. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants have
threatened his “fiancée/victim” with
prosecution if she continues to write to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
states that she writes him letters about how she is being
“Harrassed & threaned” and how it has caused
her to be “hurt/confused and feeling
‘insulted.'” Plaintiff states that Defendants
Wine and Straw flash false evidence, “photo's of
victim/my fiancée” to mislead the judge to
believe that Plaintiff caused her injuries. Plaintiff
contends that he is being judged by his past, and that his
past does not make him guilty of today's allegations.
Plaintiff asserts that he is innocent of the charges.

Plaintiff
complains that his “fiancée/victim” was
forced to stay outside the courtroom while Defendant Buckley
testified falsely against him. Plaintiff also complains that
Defendant Haynes would not allow his
“fiancée/victim” to testify at the
probable cause hearing. Plaintiff contends that if she had
been allowed to testify, she would have shown that Defendant
Buckley's statements were false. Further, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant Haynes found probable cause based on
false testimony. Plaintiff states that Defendant Haynes
revoked his probation and denied him shock probation after
serving six months. Plaintiff states that Defendant Haynes
also let Plaintiff's probation officer testify against
him.

As to
Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defendant Corp.,
Plaintiff states that he has had five different attorneys and
has filed complaints with the Kentucky Bar Association about
his attorneys, but “still receive[s]
‘Negative-outcomes' or ‘None at
All.'” Plaintiff asserts that he has been lied to
by a secretary in this Defendant's office, neglected by
counselors, insulted by counselors, lied to by counselors at
this office, “‘Denied' motion's to be
filed by ‘Attorney's, '” had his messages
ignored, and had conflicts with attorneys in this
Defendant's office.

Plaintiff
states that his first attorney left the office and moved to
New York. Thereafter, Plaintiff was represented by a second
attorney who only talked briefly to Plaintiff once right
before his court hearing. This attorney, according to
Plaintiff, told Plaintiff that he was making a deal with the
prosecutor on another charge. Plaintiff represents that he
informed this attorney that he wanted a fast and speedy trial
“so everything can be taken care of all at once.”
Plaintiff states that the attorney represented he would file
such a motion. According to Plaintiff, after that, this
second attorney never contacted Plaintiff to discuss his
case, never returned Plaintiff's calls, and never filed a
motion for a speedy trial. Plaintiff states that when he
called to speak with this attorney, he was informed by
Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defendant Corp.
that this attorney was out sick. Plaintiff asserts that this
was a lie because Plaintiff later found out that this
attorney had been suspended.

Plaintiff
states that a “step-in' Attorney” represented
him in court in July. This third attorney, according to
Plaintiff, informed Plaintiff that she had spoken with
Plaintiff's fiancé and his fiancé denied
all of the allegations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff states
that he had a fourth attorney at his next court date who also
told him that he had spoken with Plaintiff's
fiancé, and his fiancé had denied the
allegations against Plaintiff. This fourth attorney,
according to Plaintiff, stated that he was going to file a
motion to dismiss Plaintiff's case and that everything
would be “wrapped up & over” by September
2016.

On
August 31, 2016, according to Plaintiff, he called the public
defender's office and was informed that he was now being
represented by a fifth attorney. Plaintiff states that he
spoke with this attorney, and she informed him that no
dismissal motion had been filed. According to Plaintiff, she
further stated that she did not believe that Plaintiff had
been told a motion to dismiss his case would be filed, and
she believed that Plaintiff was lying about the motion.
Plaintiff states that she refused to file only certain
motions for Plaintiff.

As to
the “City of Louisville/State of Kentucky, ”
Plaintiff contends that it is responsible for the poor
training of the other Defendants. Further, Plaintiff asserts
that this Defendant is responsible for the actions of the
other Defendants.[2]

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.

A claim
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Official-capacity
suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Because
Defendants Haynes, Wine, and Straw are employees or officers
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the claims brought against
them in their official capacities are deemed claims against
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Id. at 166. State
officials sued in their official capacities for money damages
are not “persons” subject to suit under §
1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money
damages from state officers or employees in their official
capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims under §
1983. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment[3] acts as a bar to
claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at
169; Boone v. Kentucky, 72 F. App'x 306, 307
(6th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff's] request for
monetary relief against the prosecutors in their official
capacities is deemed to be a suit against the state and also
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Bennett v.
Thorburn, No. 86-1307, 1988 WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that an official capacity suit
against a judge who presided over state court litigation was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

Accordingly,
Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants
Haynes, Wine, and Straw for damages will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
for seeking monetary relief from Defendants who are immune
from such relief.

2.
Individual-Capacity Claims

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;With
regard to Plaintiff&#39;s claims against Defendant Haynes,
judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions arising
out of all acts performed in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520
(1985). Judicial immunity is embedded in the long-established
principle that &ldquo;a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself.&rdquo; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355
(1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347
(1871)). The law is clear that a judge acting within the
scope of his official duties and within his jurisdictional
authority is absolutely immune from damages liability.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991);
Ireland v. ...

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