Event Information

Pillars of the Obama administration’s science policy, such as advanced manufacturing and robotics, promise significant rewards for the federal government. For the Department of Defense, 3-D printing, lasers, and other innovative technologies are set to disrupt budgets and transform battlefield operations. The U.S. military is already on target to become one of the largest adopters of cutting-edge additive manufacturing, improving acquisition processes and lowering costs. It is also essential that DoD find ways to innovate adaptively and in an ongoing manner in reaction to the changing threat environment, which requires flexible hardware and software as much as possible. But how far can this would-be revolution really go?

On July 31, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on the next defense technology revolution and how it will shape the future of the force, with particular focus on 3-D printing. Panelists included Brennan Hogan of LMI, Jim Joyce from Deloitte Consulting LLP, James Kenyon of Pratt & Whitney, and Dave Logan of BAE Systems Inc. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, moderated.

Event Information

Pillars of the Obama administration’s science policy, such as advanced manufacturing and robotics, promise significant rewards for the federal government. For the Department of Defense, 3-D printing, lasers, and other innovative technologies are set to disrupt budgets and transform battlefield operations. The U.S. military is already on target to become one of the largest adopters of cutting-edge additive manufacturing, improving acquisition processes and lowering costs. It is also essential that DoD find ways to innovate adaptively and in an ongoing manner in reaction to the changing threat environment, which requires flexible hardware and software as much as possible. But how far can this would-be revolution really go?

On July 31, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on the next defense technology revolution and how it will shape the future of the force, with particular focus on 3-D printing. Panelists included Brennan Hogan of LMI, Jim Joyce from Deloitte Consulting LLP, James Kenyon of Pratt & Whitney, and Dave Logan of BAE Systems Inc. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, moderated.

As more Americans pursue college degrees, it has become less of an obstacle to becoming a leader in the military, hurting their relative quality.

The law of unintended consequences is alive and well in a strange place: more Americans are going to college, which is a good thing, but it has reduced the quality of officers joining the military.

I saw the importance of having a high-quality officer corps firsthand when I was deployed with an infantry company to Sangin, Afghanistan in 2011. For seven frustrating months, our battalion was stuck in a Groundhog’s Day of either finding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or having the IEDs find us. The only variation was imposed on us by the actions of the other side.

Waiting for the plane home, I joked to another officer, “That was nothing like what the counterinsurgency manual described.”

“I wouldn’t know – I haven’t read it,” he replied. “I don’t need a book to tell me what to do.”

This anecdote of one lieutenant’s antipathy to “book learning” reflects a deeper problem: the decline in the intelligence of military officers, which our recent study found has become significant. This is not just a result of continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has been a trend for at least 35 years.

Using data from a Freedom of Information Act request, we found that the average intelligence of Marine Corps officers has dropped since 1980. For example, 41% of new Marine officers in 2014 would not have met the intelligence standards demanded of officers in World War II. This decline is especially surprising because, as others have documented, 2011 saw the most intelligent group of enlistees in the history of the volunteer military. Thus, even as the intelligence of our enlisted troops have been rising, that of our commissioned officers has been declining.

Why the decrease in officer quality?

We didn’t find it was due to more minorities or women in the ranks, as many have assumed. The basic answer is that more people are going to college. Officers in the volunteer military have always been required to have a four-year college degree. The pool of college students has increased by over 50% since 1980, so these days a lot more Americans meet the key qualification to become an officer than was the case three decades ago. That has been very positive for society by increasing social mobility. But perhaps it hasn’t been all good news. The expansion of the pool of college students means a larger, but lower quality, pool of potential officers. While our data were about Marine officers, the results likely apply to the whole military.

Another example drawn from my experience shows the problems created by a lack of intellectual curiosity. The Afghan Army had several large pictures in their bases and on their trucks of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the famous Tajik warlord who fought against the Soviets. Few of the Marine officers knew his history, but more importantly many others didn’t care to learn. They then couldn’t understand why the local Pashtuns were upset with the presence of “foreign” Tajik troops in their village. Wrongly, we measured success as merely counting the number of Afghan Army patrols, which we took as an indicator of closer relations with the local Pashtuns, without recognizing how the locals truly felt.

Our military is being given increasingly complex and diverse missions across the globe; it doesn’t make sense to train a young officer how to fight against the Soviets in World War III and then ask him or her to be a sociologist and diplomat. But as long as the United States relies on the military to conduct foreign affairs, the military needs to be staffed with knowledgeable, intellectually capable officers.

This decline has not been helped by the anti-military culture that has prevailed at elite universities since the Vietnam War. While Harvard University restored its ROTC program following the repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in 2011, the continued paucity of cadets there belies their claim that it was always about homosexuals in the military. This year, only *one* cadet was commissioned from Harvard into the Navy — hardly the contribution we would need to create a more intelligent officer corps.

This need for critical thinkers was recognized well before the current wars. In the 1990s, Marine General Charles Krulak wrote of the “Three Block War.” In a single city, the military is conducting humanitarian relief on one block; peacekeeping operations are conducted on the next; and in the third, the troops are engaged in a full-out fight for their lives. Krulak’s prediction was eerily prescient; in Iraq and Afghanistan, we would hand out candy to children on one block, on the next we were trying to solve problems of local governance, and on the third we were walking through a minefield of IEDs.

The military needs intelligent, flexible leaders. We are lacking enough of them right now. As a first step, administer the existing enlisted intelligence test (ASVAB) to all potential officers’ intelligence. After a year of results, establish a minimum score as a short-term solution. In the long-term, we will need to critically evaluate what qualifications produce a successful officer and how we measure those qualifications. The long-term solution will be complicated, but it is vital. Not just for national security, but for the sake of the enlistees who entrust their lives to officers.

Authors

As more Americans pursue college degrees, it has become less of an obstacle to becoming a leader in the military, hurting their relative quality.

The law of unintended consequences is alive and well in a strange place: more Americans are going to college, which is a good thing, but it has reduced the quality of officers joining the military.

I saw the importance of having a high-quality officer corps firsthand when I was deployed with an infantry company to Sangin, Afghanistan in 2011. For seven frustrating months, our battalion was stuck in a Groundhog’s Day of either finding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or having the IEDs find us. The only variation was imposed on us by the actions of the other side.

Waiting for the plane home, I joked to another officer, “That was nothing like what the counterinsurgency manual described.”

“I wouldn’t know – I haven’t read it,” he replied. “I don’t need a book to tell me what to do.”

This anecdote of one lieutenant’s antipathy to “book learning” reflects a deeper problem: the decline in the intelligence of military officers, which our recent study found has become significant. This is not just a result of continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has been a trend for at least 35 years.

Using data from a Freedom of Information Act request, we found that the average intelligence of Marine Corps officers has dropped since 1980. For example, 41% of new Marine officers in 2014 would not have met the intelligence standards demanded of officers in World War II. This decline is especially surprising because, as others have documented, 2011 saw the most intelligent group of enlistees in the history of the volunteer military. Thus, even as the intelligence of our enlisted troops have been rising, that of our commissioned officers has been declining.

Why the decrease in officer quality?

We didn’t find it was due to more minorities or women in the ranks, as many have assumed. The basic answer is that more people are going to college. Officers in the volunteer military have always been required to have a four-year college degree. The pool of college students has increased by over 50% since 1980, so these days a lot more Americans meet the key qualification to become an officer than was the case three decades ago. That has been very positive for society by increasing social mobility. But perhaps it hasn’t been all good news. The expansion of the pool of college students means a larger, but lower quality, pool of potential officers. While our data were about Marine officers, the results likely apply to the whole military.

Another example drawn from my experience shows the problems created by a lack of intellectual curiosity. The Afghan Army had several large pictures in their bases and on their trucks of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the famous Tajik warlord who fought against the Soviets. Few of the Marine officers knew his history, but more importantly many others didn’t care to learn. They then couldn’t understand why the local Pashtuns were upset with the presence of “foreign” Tajik troops in their village. Wrongly, we measured success as merely counting the number of Afghan Army patrols, which we took as an indicator of closer relations with the local Pashtuns, without recognizing how the locals truly felt.

Our military is being given increasingly complex and diverse missions across the globe; it doesn’t make sense to train a young officer how to fight against the Soviets in World War III and then ask him or her to be a sociologist and diplomat. But as long as the United States relies on the military to conduct foreign affairs, the military needs to be staffed with knowledgeable, intellectually capable officers.

This decline has not been helped by the anti-military culture that has prevailed at elite universities since the Vietnam War. While Harvard University restored its ROTC program following the repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in 2011, the continued paucity of cadets there belies their claim that it was always about homosexuals in the military. This year, only *one* cadet was commissioned from Harvard into the Navy — hardly the contribution we would need to create a more intelligent officer corps.

This need for critical thinkers was recognized well before the current wars. In the 1990s, Marine General Charles Krulak wrote of the “Three Block War.” In a single city, the military is conducting humanitarian relief on one block; peacekeeping operations are conducted on the next; and in the third, the troops are engaged in a full-out fight for their lives. Krulak’s prediction was eerily prescient; in Iraq and Afghanistan, we would hand out candy to children on one block, on the next we were trying to solve problems of local governance, and on the third we were walking through a minefield of IEDs.

The military needs intelligent, flexible leaders. We are lacking enough of them right now. As a first step, administer the existing enlisted intelligence test (ASVAB) to all potential officers’ intelligence. After a year of results, establish a minimum score as a short-term solution. In the long-term, we will need to critically evaluate what qualifications produce a successful officer and how we measure those qualifications. The long-term solution will be complicated, but it is vital. Not just for national security, but for the sake of the enlistees who entrust their lives to officers.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/07/decline-in-average-intelligence-marine-corps-officers?rssid=defense{79C9C3D2-CF53-4E2A-AE24-71C23318040D}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/103173990/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Understanding-the-steady-and-troubling-decline-in-the-average-intelligence-of-Marine-Corps-officersUnderstanding the steady and troubling decline in the average intelligence of Marine Corps officers

When the United States ended the draft and transitioned to an all-volunteer military in 1973, there was concern about who would join and whether the transition would negatively impact the quality of the force, which many suspected it would.

As it turns out, the quality of the force as a whole actually increased over time. In 1977, 27.1 percent of new enlisted recruits met the military’s standard for being “high quality,” meaning that they possessed a high school diploma and above-average intelligence relative to the U.S. population as a whole. Decades later, at the height of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 60 percent of new enlisted recruits met the high quality standard.

But what about military officers? Though commissioned officers comprise only about 16 percent of the force, they clearly have a major impact on the success of the military as a whole given their leadership role for their troops and responsibility for strategy and tactics.

After analyzing test scores of 46,000 officers who took the Marine Corps’ required General Classification Test (GCT), Klein and Cancian find that the quality of officers in the Marines, as measured by those test scores, has steadily and significantly declined over the last 34 years.

The General Classification Test (GCT) from World War II to present day

So what exactly is the GCT, and how are the scores used by the U.S. military? The GCT dates back to World War II, when it was developed to help classify incoming servicemen. Designed to have a mean score of 100, with a standard deviation of 20, 120 was used as the bar for entry into Marine Officer Candidate School (OCS).

After World War II, the military replaced the GCT with the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The Marine Corps, however, still administers the GCT to officers at The Basic School (TBS) because it strongly predicts their success there.

TBS is a six-month course that all Marine officers attend after completing two prior requirements: Obtaining a four-year college degree and attending Officer Candidate School.

GCT scores over time

Through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Marine Corps, Klein and Cancian received data on the GCT scores of all officers—46,000 altogether—from Fiscal Year 1980 to Fiscal Year 2014.

After analyzing the data, the authors uncovered a startling trend: A statistically significant decline in scores over the past 34 years, the magnitude of which, the authors say, “is relevant given the distribution of the scores.”

Other key findings include:

Eighty-five percent of those taking the test in 1980 exceeded a score of 120, which was the cut-off score for officers in World War II. In 2014, only 59 percent exceeded that score.

At the upper end of the distribution, 4.9 percent of those taking the test scored above 150 in 1980 compared to 0.7 percent in 2014.

Over 34 years, the average score decreased by 6.6 percent, from 130.9 to 122.1.

Taken together, the 8.2-point drop in average score represents 80 percent of an entire standard deviation’s decline (from 10.5 in 1980 to 9.6 in 2014). In other words, today’s Marine officers scored nearly an entire standard deviation worse, on average, than their predecessors 34 years ago.

Why more Americans going to college might be having unexpected effects on officer quality

So what’s causing this steady decline in GCT scores? According to Klein and Cancian, the decline in officer quality might actually have to do with the fact that more people are receiving college degrees than ever before: The authors note that the decrease of GCT scores over time correlates to an increase in the college participation rate during that same period.

A four-year degree is required to become an officer. Therefore, the authors posit, as more people who may not have obtained four-year degrees in the past receive them, more people who would otherwise not be eligible for commissions become viable applicants. Because the decline concerns all college graduates, it has likely also impacted the other military services.

Klein and Cancian also address claims that changing demographics in the military may be driving the decline in scores. In particular, the authors look at the effects of a higher proportion of women and Hispanics in the force, as well as the military’s efforts to actively recruit more African-American officers.

What they find very much disputes claims that affirmative action or changing demographics have played any role in declining officer quality: “We find, in fact, a positive association between African-American officers and mean GCT score, perhaps because recruitment efforts by the Marine Corps have attracted minority officers who are more qualified than the typical college graduate,” say Klein and Cancian. The authors also note that the proportion of Hispanic officers has no statistically significant impact on the decline in score.

Today’s less qualified officer candidates will be tomorrow’s senior military leaders

Klein and Cancian stress the importance of acknowledging and reversing the decline in officer quality as measured by the GCT score not just for the short-term impacts it has. The junior officers of today will become the generals of tomorrow; if the military does not receive the intelligent young leaders today that it used to receive in the past, it will not have high quality generals in the future.

“What has been the impact of this drop in quality on the effectiveness of the military? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the myriad studies associating performance with intellect, however, it is hard to imagine anything other than a seriously deleterious impact on the quality of officers and, by extension, on the quality and efficacy of the military,” say the authors.

Authors

When the United States ended the draft and transitioned to an all-volunteer military in 1973, there was concern about who would join and whether the transition would negatively impact the quality of the force, which many suspected it would.

As it turns out, the quality of the force as a whole actually increased over time. In 1977, 27.1 percent of new enlisted recruits met the military’s standard for being “high quality,” meaning that they possessed a high school diploma and above-average intelligence relative to the U.S. population as a whole. Decades later, at the height of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 60 percent of new enlisted recruits met the high quality standard.

But what about military officers? Though commissioned officers comprise only about 16 percent of the force, they clearly have a major impact on the success of the military as a whole given their leadership role for their troops and responsibility for strategy and tactics.

After analyzing test scores of 46,000 officers who took the Marine Corps’ required General Classification Test (GCT), Klein and Cancian find that the quality of officers in the Marines, as measured by those test scores, has steadily and significantly declined over the last 34 years.

The General Classification Test (GCT) from World War II to present day

So what exactly is the GCT, and how are the scores used by the U.S. military? The GCT dates back to World War II, when it was developed to help classify incoming servicemen. Designed to have a mean score of 100, with a standard deviation of 20, 120 was used as the bar for entry into Marine Officer Candidate School (OCS).

After World War II, the military replaced the GCT with the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The Marine Corps, however, still administers the GCT to officers at The Basic School (TBS) because it strongly predicts their success there.

TBS is a six-month course that all Marine officers attend after completing two prior requirements: Obtaining a four-year college degree and attending Officer Candidate School.

GCT scores over time

Through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Marine Corps, Klein and Cancian received data on the GCT scores of all officers—46,000 altogether—from Fiscal Year 1980 to Fiscal Year 2014.

After analyzing the data, the authors uncovered a startling trend: A statistically significant decline in scores over the past 34 years, the magnitude of which, the authors say, “is relevant given the distribution of the scores.”

Other key findings include:

Eighty-five percent of those taking the test in 1980 exceeded a score of 120, which was the cut-off score for officers in World War II. In 2014, only 59 percent exceeded that score.

At the upper end of the distribution, 4.9 percent of those taking the test scored above 150 in 1980 compared to 0.7 percent in 2014.

Over 34 years, the average score decreased by 6.6 percent, from 130.9 to 122.1.

Taken together, the 8.2-point drop in average score represents 80 percent of an entire standard deviation’s decline (from 10.5 in 1980 to 9.6 in 2014). In other words, today’s Marine officers scored nearly an entire standard deviation worse, on average, than their predecessors 34 years ago.

Why more Americans going to college might be having unexpected effects on officer quality

So what’s causing this steady decline in GCT scores? According to Klein and Cancian, the decline in officer quality might actually have to do with the fact that more people are receiving college degrees than ever before: The authors note that the decrease of GCT scores over time correlates to an increase in the college participation rate during that same period.

A four-year degree is required to become an officer. Therefore, the authors posit, as more people who may not have obtained four-year degrees in the past receive them, more people who would otherwise not be eligible for commissions become viable applicants. Because the decline concerns all college graduates, it has likely also impacted the other military services.

Klein and Cancian also address claims that changing demographics in the military may be driving the decline in scores. In particular, the authors look at the effects of a higher proportion of women and Hispanics in the force, as well as the military’s efforts to actively recruit more African-American officers.

What they find very much disputes claims that affirmative action or changing demographics have played any role in declining officer quality: “We find, in fact, a positive association between African-American officers and mean GCT score, perhaps because recruitment efforts by the Marine Corps have attracted minority officers who are more qualified than the typical college graduate,” say Klein and Cancian. The authors also note that the proportion of Hispanic officers has no statistically significant impact on the decline in score.

Today’s less qualified officer candidates will be tomorrow’s senior military leaders

Klein and Cancian stress the importance of acknowledging and reversing the decline in officer quality as measured by the GCT score not just for the short-term impacts it has. The junior officers of today will become the generals of tomorrow; if the military does not receive the intelligent young leaders today that it used to receive in the past, it will not have high quality generals in the future.

“What has been the impact of this drop in quality on the effectiveness of the military? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the myriad studies associating performance with intellect, however, it is hard to imagine anything other than a seriously deleterious impact on the quality of officers and, by extension, on the quality and efficacy of the military,” say the authors.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/06/29-iraq-afghanistan-us-military-morale-crisis?rssid=defense{98BE6EBC-A7C6-4E52-8A7C-BB1EB9E6B28D}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/98403762/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Iraq-Afghanistan-and-the-US-military%e2%80%99s-morale-%e2%80%9ccrisis%e2%80%9dIraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. military’s morale “crisis”

In April 2015, USA Todayreported a disconcerting, if somewhat incongruous, finding about the Army’s morale. Despite a six-year, $287 million effort to make troops more optimistic and resilient, an Army survey found that 52 percent of soldiers scored badly on questions that measured optimism, while 48 percent reported having little satisfaction or commitment to their job.

This study is only the latest of several such studies. A 2011 Center for Army Leadership study found that only 26 percent of active soldiers thought that the Army was headed in the right direction, while the Military Times in 2014 published a study ominously titled “America’s Military: A Force Adrift.” The results are as troubling as they are surprising. After all, not only has the Pentagon invested heavily in resiliency programs, but for much of the force, combat deployments are more infrequent as the wars wind down.

What then is driving this morale crisis?

To begin with, the morale “crisis” must be placed in context. First, concerns over low morale are not new and not unique to the Army. Indeed, observers regularly fretted over low morale during the defense drawdown of the 1990s, during the start of the Iraq War, during the Iraq Surge, during the Afghanistan Surge and at practically all the points in between—each time with renewed concerns over “breaking the force.” And yet the military has not broken. To the contrary: After each report of troop morale hitting “rock bottom,” troop morale seems to slip lower yet and, still, the military soldiers on. In fact, some previous indicators of low morale—like achieving accession and retention goals—have rebounded as of late. This is not to diminish the military’s present troubles, but it is also important to avoid the “Chicken Little” trap: Despite the dismal poll numbers, the sky is not falling.

Observers regularly fretted over low morale during the defense drawdown of the 1990s, during the start of the Iraq War, during the Iraq Surge, during the Afghanistan Surge; and at practically all the points in between—each time with renewed concerns over “breaking the force.” And yet the military has not broken.

Although the morale crisis might not be an actual crisis, it may still be hard to overcome. Indeed, many of the easy explanations for declining morale seem to come up short. It is easy to point to combat stress as the root cause of low morale, but the evidence is less clear. Interestingly, a study by the Center For Army Leadership found that the number of Active Component leaders who believed the Army was headed in the “right direction” hit an all-time low of 26 percent in 2011, down from 38 percent in 2006, even though by 2011 active combat in Iraq was over and casualties had been halved.[1] Moreover, recent studies in the Journal of the American Medical Association and by the Army with the National Institutes of Health question the connection between combat experience and suicide, which some might assume is tied to morale (but no evidence of this has yet arisen in the research).

The dissatisfaction also cannot be simply attributed to the recent cultural changes to the military. Another Military Times survey found that while a mere 15 percent of those surveyed approved of President Barack Obama’s performance as commander-in-chief, they increasingly approve of some of the more controversial military social policy reforms instituted under his administration. Sixty percent now support allowing homosexuals to serve openly in uniform, up from 35 percent in 2009. A Washington Post – Kaiser Family Foundationpoll found that 58 percent of veterans and active duty soldiers believed in opening up “ground units that engage in close combat” increasingly to women, as well.[2]

Still others point to cuts to military benefits. A Military Timesstudy, for example, found that the troops “feel underpaid, under-equipped and under-appreciated.” It noted that only 44 percent of troops rated their pay and allowances as “good” or “excellent” in 2014, down from 87 percent in 2009. Ratings of military healthcare similarly declined from 78 percent in 2009 to 49 percent in 2014. In fact, the study continued, Congress reduced the annual military pay raise to 1 percent (the lowest pay raise in 40 years), limited bonuses, and debated charging troops for some of their housing costs, while post-military healthcare issues took center stage with the scandal at the Phoenix Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital.

On closer examination, however, benefit cuts offer at best a partial explanation. Even with the reversals in military benefits, overall they still remain quite generous and somestudies demonstrate that service members are better compensated than their civilian equivalents. Indeed, soldiers were spared the salary freezes that were imposed on the civilian federal work force during the “Great Recession.” They still enjoy defined benefit pensions after 20 years of active federal service, and receive health insurance—which, according to a 2014 Congressional Budget Office study, requires users to pay smaller shares of their health care costs than do most civilian consumers.[3]

Moreover, military dissatisfaction extends well beyond compensation. As the Military Times’ polling data also notes, only 49 percent of troops rated their officers as “good or excellent” in 2014 (down from 78 percent in 2009) and only 27 percent said their senior leadership have their “best interests at heart” in 2014 (down from 53 percent in 2009).

Ultimately, the military’s discontent may stem from dissonance between the commitment to, and pride in, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan and the knowledge that these sacrifices have not yielded the desired results. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably have prompted a crisis of confidence within the military itself. On the one hand, many troops still believe in the mission. A December 2013 Washington Post – Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that 44 percent of veterans and active duty troops thought that the Iraq War was worth fighting (with 50 percent opposed), compared with 38 percent in the general American adult population (with 58 percent opposed). The contrast was even starker for Afghanistan, where 53 percent of veterans remained committed to the war (41 percent opposed) but only 30 percent of Americans did (66 percent opposed).[4] Similarly, 80 percent of veterans feel “often” or “sometimes” proud of what they personally did in Iraq, whereas only 28 percent said they did things that “often” or “sometimes” made them question the mission.[5] At the same time, service members and veterans increasingly believe that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have not been successful. A 2014 Military Timespoll found that a mere 30 percent of active duty troops thought Iraq was successful in 2014, down from almost 64 percent in 2011. And while military-specific views of Afghanistan are hard to come by, a January 2014 Pew – USA Today poll found that 52 percent of Americans believed the United States failed to achieve its objective in Afghanistan (the same number as with Iraq).

Ultimately, the military’s discontent may stem from dissonance between the commitment to, and pride in, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan and the knowledge that these sacrifices have not yielded the desired results. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably have prompted a crisis of confidence within the military itself. On the one hand, many troops still believe in the mission.

Arguably, if anything, the mismatch between commitment and results likely has only grown more vivid as of late, especially in Iraq. The sites of many of hard-fought battles of the Iraq War—Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul—now are in the hands of the Islamic State, and the Iraqi Security Forces, once so painstakingly trained by American forces, have failed to perform. Today, despite service members’ pride in the mission, few can call it a success.

If this is indeed the case then the cause of the military’s malaise may run even deeper. It also may explain why so many soldiers question the Army’s direction and so many troops doubt their senior leadership. Troops need to believe that the hardships they endure will lead to success in the end, something that cannot be guaranteed today. And unfortunately, this morale problem cannot be solved merely by motivational speeches or added benefits. It instead requires hard critical thinking about what went wrong with wars over the past decade. And if the military’s morale problem becomes impetus for future change—so that the next military campaign produces better results than past ones—it may even prove beneficial in the end.

[1] See p. 37 of the study. Reserve Component Soldiers were slightly more optimistic with 35% answering in the affirmative, although this too was down by 8% from 2010.[2]Question 36[3]p. 2[4]Question 41[5]Question 57

Authors

In April 2015, USA Todayreported a disconcerting, if somewhat incongruous, finding about the Army’s morale. Despite a six-year, $287 million effort to make troops more optimistic and resilient, an Army survey found that 52 percent of soldiers scored badly on questions that measured optimism, while 48 percent reported having little satisfaction or commitment to their job.

This study is only the latest of several such studies. A 2011 Center for Army Leadership study found that only 26 percent of active soldiers thought that the Army was headed in the right direction, while the Military Times in 2014 published a study ominously titled “America’s Military: A Force Adrift.” The results are as troubling as they are surprising. After all, not only has the Pentagon invested heavily in resiliency programs, but for much of the force, combat deployments are more infrequent as the wars wind down.

What then is driving this morale crisis?

To begin with, the morale “crisis” must be placed in context. First, concerns over low morale are not new and not unique to the Army. Indeed, observers regularly fretted over low morale during the defense drawdown of the 1990s, during the start of the Iraq War, during the Iraq Surge, during the Afghanistan Surge and at practically all the points in between—each time with renewed concerns over “breaking the force.” And yet the military has not broken. To the contrary: After each report of troop morale hitting “rock bottom,” troop morale seems to slip lower yet and, still, the military soldiers on. In fact, some previous indicators of low morale—like achieving accession and retention goals—have rebounded as of late. This is not to diminish the military’s present troubles, but it is also important to avoid the “Chicken Little” trap: Despite the dismal poll numbers, the sky is not falling.

Observers regularly fretted over low morale during the defense drawdown of the 1990s, during the start of the Iraq War, during the Iraq Surge, during the Afghanistan Surge; and at practically all the points in between—each time with renewed concerns over “breaking the force.” And yet the military has not broken.

Although the morale crisis might not be an actual crisis, it may still be hard to overcome. Indeed, many of the easy explanations for declining morale seem to come up short. It is easy to point to combat stress as the root cause of low morale, but the evidence is less clear. Interestingly, a study by the Center For Army Leadership found that the number of Active Component leaders who believed the Army was headed in the “right direction” hit an all-time low of 26 percent in 2011, down from 38 percent in 2006, even though by 2011 active combat in Iraq was over and casualties had been halved.[1] Moreover, recent studies in the Journal of the American Medical Association and by the Army with the National Institutes of Health question the connection between combat experience and suicide, which some might assume is tied to morale (but no evidence of this has yet arisen in the research).

The dissatisfaction also cannot be simply attributed to the recent cultural changes to the military. Another Military Times survey found that while a mere 15 percent of those surveyed approved of President Barack Obama’s performance as commander-in-chief, they increasingly approve of some of the more controversial military social policy reforms instituted under his administration. Sixty percent now support allowing homosexuals to serve openly in uniform, up from 35 percent in 2009. A Washington Post – Kaiser Family Foundationpoll found that 58 percent of veterans and active duty soldiers believed in opening up “ground units that engage in close combat” increasingly to women, as well.[2]

Still others point to cuts to military benefits. A Military Timesstudy, for example, found that the troops “feel underpaid, under-equipped and under-appreciated.” It noted that only 44 percent of troops rated their pay and allowances as “good” or “excellent” in 2014, down from 87 percent in 2009. Ratings of military healthcare similarly declined from 78 percent in 2009 to 49 percent in 2014. In fact, the study continued, Congress reduced the annual military pay raise to 1 percent (the lowest pay raise in 40 years), limited bonuses, and debated charging troops for some of their housing costs, while post-military healthcare issues took center stage with the scandal at the Phoenix Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital.

On closer examination, however, benefit cuts offer at best a partial explanation. Even with the reversals in military benefits, overall they still remain quite generous and somestudies demonstrate that service members are better compensated than their civilian equivalents. Indeed, soldiers were spared the salary freezes that were imposed on the civilian federal work force during the “Great Recession.” They still enjoy defined benefit pensions after 20 years of active federal service, and receive health insurance—which, according to a 2014 Congressional Budget Office study, requires users to pay smaller shares of their health care costs than do most civilian consumers.[3]

Moreover, military dissatisfaction extends well beyond compensation. As the Military Times’ polling data also notes, only 49 percent of troops rated their officers as “good or excellent” in 2014 (down from 78 percent in 2009) and only 27 percent said their senior leadership have their “best interests at heart” in 2014 (down from 53 percent in 2009).

Ultimately, the military’s discontent may stem from dissonance between the commitment to, and pride in, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan and the knowledge that these sacrifices have not yielded the desired results. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably have prompted a crisis of confidence within the military itself. On the one hand, many troops still believe in the mission. A December 2013 Washington Post – Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that 44 percent of veterans and active duty troops thought that the Iraq War was worth fighting (with 50 percent opposed), compared with 38 percent in the general American adult population (with 58 percent opposed). The contrast was even starker for Afghanistan, where 53 percent of veterans remained committed to the war (41 percent opposed) but only 30 percent of Americans did (66 percent opposed).[4] Similarly, 80 percent of veterans feel “often” or “sometimes” proud of what they personally did in Iraq, whereas only 28 percent said they did things that “often” or “sometimes” made them question the mission.[5] At the same time, service members and veterans increasingly believe that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have not been successful. A 2014 Military Timespoll found that a mere 30 percent of active duty troops thought Iraq was successful in 2014, down from almost 64 percent in 2011. And while military-specific views of Afghanistan are hard to come by, a January 2014 Pew – USA Today poll found that 52 percent of Americans believed the United States failed to achieve its objective in Afghanistan (the same number as with Iraq).

Ultimately, the military’s discontent may stem from dissonance between the commitment to, and pride in, the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan and the knowledge that these sacrifices have not yielded the desired results. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably have prompted a crisis of confidence within the military itself. On the one hand, many troops still believe in the mission.

Arguably, if anything, the mismatch between commitment and results likely has only grown more vivid as of late, especially in Iraq. The sites of many of hard-fought battles of the Iraq War—Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul—now are in the hands of the Islamic State, and the Iraqi Security Forces, once so painstakingly trained by American forces, have failed to perform. Today, despite service members’ pride in the mission, few can call it a success.

If this is indeed the case then the cause of the military’s malaise may run even deeper. It also may explain why so many soldiers question the Army’s direction and so many troops doubt their senior leadership. Troops need to believe that the hardships they endure will lead to success in the end, something that cannot be guaranteed today. And unfortunately, this morale problem cannot be solved merely by motivational speeches or added benefits. It instead requires hard critical thinking about what went wrong with wars over the past decade. And if the military’s morale problem becomes impetus for future change—so that the next military campaign produces better results than past ones—it may even prove beneficial in the end.

[1] See p. 37 of the study. Reserve Component Soldiers were slightly more optimistic with 35% answering in the affirmative, although this too was down by 8% from 2010.
[2]Question 36
[3]p. 2
[4]Question 41
[5]Question 57

Authors

Raphael S. Cohen

Publication: Lawfare

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/23-syria-strategy-ohanlon?rssid=defense{F31A7B2F-9FD9-4E67-B0B5-E9CBA32E95F3}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/97456790/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Deconstructing-Syria-Towards-a-regionalized-strategy-for-a-confederal-countryDeconstructing Syria: Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederal country

U.S. policy towards Syria since the Arab spring uprisings of 2011 has been a litany of miscalculation, frustration, and tragedy for the people of that ill-fated land. The ascendance of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as the major element of the opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime may not amount to an imminent threat to American security; indeed, very few Americans have died to date at the hands of ISIL or affiliates. But ISIL’s rise does place at much greater risk the security of Iraq, the future of Syria itself, and the stability of Lebanon and Jordan. It could jeopardize the safety of American citizens as well, given the possibility of attacks by “lone wolves” inspired in their western home by ISIL propaganda, or by westerners returning from the Syrian jihad to carry out attacks at home. Massacres on a par with the Charlie Hebdo tragedy, or worse, could easily occur in the United States. The potency of the al-Nusra organization, al Qaeda’s loyal affiliate, within the Syrian opposition is also of considerable concern.

This paper makes a case for a new approach to Syria that attempts to bring ends and means more realistically into balance. It also seeks to end the Hobson’s choice currently confronting American policymakers, whereby they can neither attempt to unseat President Assad in any concerted way (because doing so would clear the path for ISIL), nor tolerate him as a future leader of the country (because of the abominations he has committed, and because any such policy would bring the United States into direct disagreement with almost all of its regional allies). The new approach would seek to break the problem down in a number of localized components of the country, pursuing regional stopgap solutions while envisioning ultimately a more confederal Syria made up of autonomous zones rather than being ruled by a strong central government. It also proposes a path to an intensified train and equip program. Once that program had generated a critical mass of fighters in training locations abroad, it would move to a next stage. Coupled with a U.S. willingness, in collaboration with regional partners, to help defend local safe areas using American airpower as well as special forces support once circumstances are conducive, the Syrian opposition fighters would then establish safe zones in Syria that they would seek to expand and solidify. The safe zones would also be used to accelerate recruiting and training of additional opposition fighters who could live in, and help protect, their communities while going through basic training. They would, in addition, be locations where humanitarian relief could be provided to needy populations, and local governance structures developed.

The strategy would begin by establishing one or two zones in relatively promising locations, such as the Kurdish northeast and perhaps in the country’s south near Jordan, to see how well the concept could work and how fast momentum could be built up. Over time, more might be created, if possible. Ultimately, and ideally, some of the safe zones might merge together as key elements in a future confederal arrangement for the Syrian state. Assad, ISIL, and al-Nusra could have no role in such a future state, but for now, American policymakers could otherwise remain agnostic about the future character and governing structures of such an entity.

Authors

U.S. policy towards Syria since the Arab spring uprisings of 2011 has been a litany of miscalculation, frustration, and tragedy for the people of that ill-fated land. The ascendance of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as the major element of the opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime may not amount to an imminent threat to American security; indeed, very few Americans have died to date at the hands of ISIL or affiliates. But ISIL’s rise does place at much greater risk the security of Iraq, the future of Syria itself, and the stability of Lebanon and Jordan. It could jeopardize the safety of American citizens as well, given the possibility of attacks by “lone wolves” inspired in their western home by ISIL propaganda, or by westerners returning from the Syrian jihad to carry out attacks at home. Massacres on a par with the Charlie Hebdo tragedy, or worse, could easily occur in the United States. The potency of the al-Nusra organization, al Qaeda’s loyal affiliate, within the Syrian opposition is also of considerable concern.

This paper makes a case for a new approach to Syria that attempts to bring ends and means more realistically into balance. It also seeks to end the Hobson’s choice currently confronting American policymakers, whereby they can neither attempt to unseat President Assad in any concerted way (because doing so would clear the path for ISIL), nor tolerate him as a future leader of the country (because of the abominations he has committed, and because any such policy would bring the United States into direct disagreement with almost all of its regional allies). The new approach would seek to break the problem down in a number of localized components of the country, pursuing regional stopgap solutions while envisioning ultimately a more confederal Syria made up of autonomous zones rather than being ruled by a strong central government. It also proposes a path to an intensified train and equip program. Once that program had generated a critical mass of fighters in training locations abroad, it would move to a next stage. Coupled with a U.S. willingness, in collaboration with regional partners, to help defend local safe areas using American airpower as well as special forces support once circumstances are conducive, the Syrian opposition fighters would then establish safe zones in Syria that they would seek to expand and solidify. The safe zones would also be used to accelerate recruiting and training of additional opposition fighters who could live in, and help protect, their communities while going through basic training. They would, in addition, be locations where humanitarian relief could be provided to needy populations, and local governance structures developed.

The strategy would begin by establishing one or two zones in relatively promising locations, such as the Kurdish northeast and perhaps in the country’s south near Jordan, to see how well the concept could work and how fast momentum could be built up. Over time, more might be created, if possible. Ultimately, and ideally, some of the safe zones might merge together as key elements in a future confederal arrangement for the Syrian state. Assad, ISIL, and al-Nusra could have no role in such a future state, but for now, American policymakers could otherwise remain agnostic about the future character and governing structures of such an entity.

Michael O'Hanlon joined a Russia Today panel to discuss the ongoing crisis between Russia and NATO. While O'Hanlon notes that bringing Ukraine into NATO would be counterproductive, a new security architecture for the region -- one that includes Moscow and NATO -- is a good idea.

Authors

Michael O'Hanlon joined a Russia Today panel to discuss the ongoing crisis between Russia and NATO. While O'Hanlon notes that bringing Ukraine into NATO would be counterproductive, a new security architecture for the region -- one that includes Moscow and NATO -- is a good idea.

These days, at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, reform in the way the Pentagon buys weaponry remains a hot topic. Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall released his “Better Buying Power 3.0” vision for improvements in how the Department of Defense acquires weaponry, Chairmen Thornberry and McCain of the House and Senate Armed Services committees are leading the way on respective bills to change legal code for such acquisitions, and industry as well as many other actors and voices are pushing their ideas.

On June 10, Brookings convened a group of some 20 specialists from the think tank world, industry, and government circles to discuss various ideas for moving forward. Some of the ideas expressed in the discussion are summarized here, according to Chatham House rules, by which the comments of specific individuals are not revealed but the general substance of the conversation is conveyed. Jeff Jeffress of Censeo Consulting Group helped me kick off the discussion; a wide range of other viewpoints were added to the mix as well.

Use Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Title 12 more often, to allow purchases of commercial or commercial-like goods by the Pentagon, with far fewer regulations and requirements than for traditional “Title 15” goods,

Streamline oversight by Pentagon officials for certain types of contracts (for example, when there is competition, or a close commercial equivalent, to provide some market-based discipline on pricing, making detailed documentation of costs by a unit like the Defense Contracts Management Agency less important),

Follow the “JIEDDO model” for more technologies—accelerating purchases of key technologies in the way that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization developed and bought mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) and other technologies with fewer requirements for documenting attainment of various milestones, in order to protect troopers in Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly as possible,

Break down information technology purchases into smaller batches, using open-source and modularity concepts to make sure that various “batches” can subsequently talk to each other, and

Protect the intellectual property rights of firms selling technologies to the government, especially when most of the investment was conducted by those firms themselves, perhaps for commercial technologies that are close analogues to the systems built for the Department of Defense.

Some of these ideas beg other questions, such as which specific Pentagon contracts can in fact be transformed from their current character into something like a Title 12 or JIEDDO arrangement? There are other big issues I did not address in my paper, such as what changes to the DoD acquisition workforce would be most sensible at this stage?

Thus, the group at Brookings was asked to help generate a number of ideas and observations—and to help Brookings do its part to keep the current national conversation about DoD acquisition reform moving forward. I would group the ideas into two categories—concerning people and DoD organizational/bureaucratic issues on the one hand, and concerning types of contracts and contractors on the other. Specifically, these were some of the key points:

People and organization

The multiple lines of communication within the DoD acquisition world are excessive, involving program managers, deputy executive officers, executive officers, and then the higher ranks of the DoD acquisition, technology, and logistics office. Perhaps one of these layers could be eliminated.

Certainly, the amount of paperwork required of these acquisition executives should be scaled back. Undoubtedly, a culture of excess caution and fear of approving projects prematurely should be modified to expedite efficiency and timeliness as well. Often, processes and procedures put in place to prevent abuse are based on just one or two past problems, or mistakes that are not likely to recur. Creating special procedures to be sure they don’t recur may not be worth the time and trouble.

Within the acquisition workforce, younger professionals should probably have the opportunity to do rotations to learn from best practices in other parts of the broader defense community. But once good program managers are found, they should often be kept on the same job for longer than the 18 to 24 months that is now the norm, to enhance continuity and expertise.

The total size of the DoD acquisition workforce may not be excessive given the amount of work, and paperwork, demanded of it today.

However, if one could streamline oversight on most projects and programs, and dramatically reduce it on others, perhaps the workforce could be scaled back at least modestly.

The acquisition workforce is often seemingly biased against seeing industry make much of a profit. It also tends to feel discouraged from open communications with industry. Both of these realities can be counterproductive.

In terms of Congressional action, the Senate has often tended to want to prevent abuses and mistakes—adding procedures to reduce the likelihood of such problems, even at the cost of more regulation. The House has wanted, especially this year, to accelerate the pace at which weapons are developed and procured. In some ways, these instincts run at cross-purposes with each other.

Moreover, one key idea in circulation on the Hill now—moving more responsibility for overseeing programs from the Pentagon’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) office to the military services—has engendered significant resistance from the Pentagon. It is not clear that the services have the capacity to carry out such new responsibilities; if assigned them, they might need in effect to recreate (or borrow) much of the existing AT&L workforce to handle the job. But perhaps they would also be somewhat less stringent in the application of various oversight mechanisms, thereby simplifying and speeding the acquisition process. So there could be pros and cons to such a change.

Contracts and contractors

It is desirable to foster competition and more actors/players in the DoD acquisition world.

That said, DoD must be careful not to spin its wheels soliciting additional bids for contracts where the additional bids tend just to add time to the process; similarly, the protest process after a competitive bid is awarded adds time as well, even if it is necessary at some level.

Since the majority of costs for most systems are in the operating/maintenance domains, it is important for DoD not to overlook ways in which the procurement process can lower subsequent operation and maintenance costs, if a system is built in a way that makes it more durable and serviceable. Creating the possibility for greater use of performance-based logistics contracts for maintenance should be a major consideration in acquisition policy.

DoD needs to be careful not to allow relatively minor modifications of a system originally built according to commercial code (Title 12) to disqualify it, subsequently, for continued Title 12 status. This happens too often, even for systems that are clearly still commercial in their main character.

It is essential to use Title 12 and related mechanisms for computer contracts if new players are to be induced to compete for DoD contracts. But even that may not be enough to persuade many firms in Silicon Valley and elsewhere to compete for Pentagon contracts. Specifically, even if legislation and regulation allow greater use of commercial computer hardware and software, many firms will doubt that DoD is committed to employing these options, so it will also be important that the Pentagon create successful precedents that DoD takes special care to encourage and shepherd.

As a rule, having two firms make a given system, in order to encourage efficiency and lower costs through a dual-buy approach to competition, is smarter when DoD need not spend huge sums on duplicative research and development efforts. It is less likely to be desirable when research and development costs are high.

Lots is happening in Pentagon acquisition policy, and Brookings, along with its dedicated colleagues making up the national security industrial base working group, intends to continue to follow and contribute to the debate.

Authors

These days, at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, reform in the way the Pentagon buys weaponry remains a hot topic. Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall released his “Better Buying Power 3.0” vision for improvements in how the Department of Defense acquires weaponry, Chairmen Thornberry and McCain of the House and Senate Armed Services committees are leading the way on respective bills to change legal code for such acquisitions, and industry as well as many other actors and voices are pushing their ideas.

On June 10, Brookings convened a group of some 20 specialists from the think tank world, industry, and government circles to discuss various ideas for moving forward. Some of the ideas expressed in the discussion are summarized here, according to Chatham House rules, by which the comments of specific individuals are not revealed but the general substance of the conversation is conveyed. Jeff Jeffress of Censeo Consulting Group helped me kick off the discussion; a wide range of other viewpoints were added to the mix as well.

Use Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Title 12 more often, to allow purchases of commercial or commercial-like goods by the Pentagon, with far fewer regulations and requirements than for traditional “Title 15” goods,

Streamline oversight by Pentagon officials for certain types of contracts (for example, when there is competition, or a close commercial equivalent, to provide some market-based discipline on pricing, making detailed documentation of costs by a unit like the Defense Contracts Management Agency less important),

Follow the “JIEDDO model” for more technologies—accelerating purchases of key technologies in the way that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization developed and bought mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) and other technologies with fewer requirements for documenting attainment of various milestones, in order to protect troopers in Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly as possible,

Break down information technology purchases into smaller batches, using open-source and modularity concepts to make sure that various “batches” can subsequently talk to each other, and

Protect the intellectual property rights of firms selling technologies to the government, especially when most of the investment was conducted by those firms themselves, perhaps for commercial technologies that are close analogues to the systems built for the Department of Defense.

Some of these ideas beg other questions, such as which specific Pentagon contracts can in fact be transformed from their current character into something like a Title 12 or JIEDDO arrangement? There are other big issues I did not address in my paper, such as what changes to the DoD acquisition workforce would be most sensible at this stage?

Thus, the group at Brookings was asked to help generate a number of ideas and observations—and to help Brookings do its part to keep the current national conversation about DoD acquisition reform moving forward. I would group the ideas into two categories—concerning people and DoD organizational/bureaucratic issues on the one hand, and concerning types of contracts and contractors on the other. Specifically, these were some of the key points:

People and organization

The multiple lines of communication within the DoD acquisition world are excessive, involving program managers, deputy executive officers, executive officers, and then the higher ranks of the DoD acquisition, technology, and logistics office. Perhaps one of these layers could be eliminated.

Certainly, the amount of paperwork required of these acquisition executives should be scaled back. Undoubtedly, a culture of excess caution and fear of approving projects prematurely should be modified to expedite efficiency and timeliness as well. Often, processes and procedures put in place to prevent abuse are based on just one or two past problems, or mistakes that are not likely to recur. Creating special procedures to be sure they don’t recur may not be worth the time and trouble.

Within the acquisition workforce, younger professionals should probably have the opportunity to do rotations to learn from best practices in other parts of the broader defense community. But once good program managers are found, they should often be kept on the same job for longer than the 18 to 24 months that is now the norm, to enhance continuity and expertise.

The total size of the DoD acquisition workforce may not be excessive given the amount of work, and paperwork, demanded of it today.

However, if one could streamline oversight on most projects and programs, and dramatically reduce it on others, perhaps the workforce could be scaled back at least modestly.

The acquisition workforce is often seemingly biased against seeing industry make much of a profit. It also tends to feel discouraged from open communications with industry. Both of these realities can be counterproductive.

In terms of Congressional action, the Senate has often tended to want to prevent abuses and mistakes—adding procedures to reduce the likelihood of such problems, even at the cost of more regulation. The House has wanted, especially this year, to accelerate the pace at which weapons are developed and procured. In some ways, these instincts run at cross-purposes with each other.

Moreover, one key idea in circulation on the Hill now—moving more responsibility for overseeing programs from the Pentagon’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) office to the military services—has engendered significant resistance from the Pentagon. It is not clear that the services have the capacity to carry out such new responsibilities; if assigned them, they might need in effect to recreate (or borrow) much of the existing AT&L workforce to handle the job. But perhaps they would also be somewhat less stringent in the application of various oversight mechanisms, thereby simplifying and speeding the acquisition process. So there could be pros and cons to such a change.

Contracts and contractors

It is desirable to foster competition and more actors/players in the DoD acquisition world.

That said, DoD must be careful not to spin its wheels soliciting additional bids for contracts where the additional bids tend just to add time to the process; similarly, the protest process after a competitive bid is awarded adds time as well, even if it is necessary at some level.

Since the majority of costs for most systems are in the operating/maintenance domains, it is important for DoD not to overlook ways in which the procurement process can lower subsequent operation and maintenance costs, if a system is built in a way that makes it more durable and serviceable. Creating the possibility for greater use of performance-based logistics contracts for maintenance should be a major consideration in acquisition policy.

DoD needs to be careful not to allow relatively minor modifications of a system originally built according to commercial code (Title 12) to disqualify it, subsequently, for continued Title 12 status. This happens too often, even for systems that are clearly still commercial in their main character.

It is essential to use Title 12 and related mechanisms for computer contracts if new players are to be induced to compete for DoD contracts. But even that may not be enough to persuade many firms in Silicon Valley and elsewhere to compete for Pentagon contracts. Specifically, even if legislation and regulation allow greater use of commercial computer hardware and software, many firms will doubt that DoD is committed to employing these options, so it will also be important that the Pentagon create successful precedents that DoD takes special care to encourage and shepherd.

As a rule, having two firms make a given system, in order to encourage efficiency and lower costs through a dual-buy approach to competition, is smarter when DoD need not spend huge sums on duplicative research and development efforts. It is less likely to be desirable when research and development costs are high.

Lots is happening in Pentagon acquisition policy, and Brookings, along with its dedicated colleagues making up the national security industrial base working group, intends to continue to follow and contribute to the debate.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/01-getting-active-army-end-strength-right-evans?rssid=defense{357AE9A0-D5E5-462F-B219-E85233BF21E0}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/93843620/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Getting-it-right-Optimal-active-Army-end-strengthGetting it right: Optimal active Army end strength

Thirteen years of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has wearied our citizens and civilian leaders and placed significant strain on our national budget. Sequestration triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011 has created an environment where substantial reductions must be made across all services. As a “people-centric” force, the United States Army’s principle currency for reducing the operating budget is force structure, i.e. people. While other services look to meaningful reductions of high cost weapons systems, the Army must reduce the number of soldiers in its active and reserve components to achieve a fiscally sustainable end strength. Accepting that the Army force structure construct (operating and generating force components) is the best construct to train and ready the force for the future, how large does the U.S. Army active component need to be in order to meet the demands of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous security environment of the 21st century?

The active Army requires manning at the 480,000 to 490,000 soldier level to meet all of its operational and force generation requirements. An expectation that trained, ready, and well-equipped forces can be created after an emergency occurs is misguided. Arresting the reduction of active Army end strength at the end of FY 2015 is the best strategy to ensure that our nation maintains its competitive advantage, can prevent conflict before it arises, shape the security environment for successful employment of our elements of national power, and win decisively in a complex world.

Authors

Thirteen years of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has wearied our citizens and civilian leaders and placed significant strain on our national budget. Sequestration triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011 has created an environment where substantial reductions must be made across all services. As a “people-centric” force, the United States Army’s principle currency for reducing the operating budget is force structure, i.e. people. While other services look to meaningful reductions of high cost weapons systems, the Army must reduce the number of soldiers in its active and reserve components to achieve a fiscally sustainable end strength. Accepting that the Army force structure construct (operating and generating force components) is the best construct to train and ready the force for the future, how large does the U.S. Army active component need to be in order to meet the demands of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous security environment of the 21st century?

The active Army requires manning at the 480,000 to 490,000 soldier level to meet all of its operational and force generation requirements. An expectation that trained, ready, and well-equipped forces can be created after an emergency occurs is misguided. Arresting the reduction of active Army end strength at the end of FY 2015 is the best strategy to ensure that our nation maintains its competitive advantage, can prevent conflict before it arises, shape the security environment for successful employment of our elements of national power, and win decisively in a complex world.

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Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/05/29-military-sector-sector-solutions-displacement-ferris?rssid=defense{53E048C4-1586-43BF-92DE-F0585ADBCBFB}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/93567582/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~The-role-of-civilmilitarypolice-coordination-in-supporting-durable-solutions-to-displacementThe role of civil-military-police coordination in supporting durable solutions to displacement

The relationship between displacement and security would appear to be obvious: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often displaced because of a lack of security, and cannot find solutions to displacement until security is reestablished, either at their place of origin or new location. In a similar vein, the fact that large numbers of people are displaced can have serious security implications—potentially impeding stability and peacebuilding efforts. Overcoming conflict requires finding durable solutions to those that have been displaced.

Actors focusing on durable solutions to displacement and those focusing on security tend to work in isolation from one another.

It is surprising, then, that despite these linkages, actors focusing on durable solutions to displacement and those focusing on security tend to work in isolation from one another. Displacement-focused actors like UNHCR and its partner NGOs certainly recognize the importance of security in finding durable solutions to displacement—indeed, security is the foundation of any durable solution, be it return to the place of origin, local integration into the place of refuge, or settlement elsewhere. And yet they are often unable to bring the displaced into either peacemaking or longer-term peacebuilding processes with security actors.

Likewise security actors, including military, peacekeepers and police forces, do not always recognize the broader peace implications involved with finding durable solutions to displacement. Unresolved displacement issues can lead to any number of security problems. In some cases, refugees or IDPs can be “spoilers” to peace processes, and camps or settlements can harbor rebels or militias that oppose peace. In other cases the mere presence of large numbers of displaced people—often impoverished and living in slums or remote camps without adequate livelihoods, and in some cases lacking freedom of movement—can cause instability. Compounded with other socioeconomic and political pressures, and often living in areas that are already poor and potentially unstable, the presence of the displaced needs to be considered in efforts to secure peace and stability. Sustainable peace can hinge on finding durable solutions to displacement.

The fact that these displacement-focused development/humanitarian actors and security-focused actors have not been able to coordinate more closely is thus a serious issue that relates to some of today’s most challenging conflicts around the world. To that end, there seems to be growing interest in the relationship between ending displacement and peacebuilding, as underscored in several recent initiatives by the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, there is some literature that speaks to this seemingly obvious and yet complex relationship between security actors and durable solutions to displacement. Perhaps the most encouraging has been the recent momentum of global initiatives: the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit; the UN Secretary General’s establishment of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to review UN Peacekeeping; the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2185, which makes policing an essential part of peacekeeping; and the Sustainable Development Goals that emerged from the Rio+20 Conference. These are just a few of the initiatives in the coming year that present new energy and possible opportunities to draw closer linkages between actors working on these complex issues.

The continually unfolding emergency in South Sudan is also raising new issues about the involvement of peacekeepers with IDPs.

Peacekeepers are already mandated to do what they can to create “conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, and to do as much as possible to ensure security in and around refugee and IDP settlements or camps.” And yet the continually unfolding emergency in South Sudan is also raising new issues about the involvement of peacekeepers with IDPs. Since fighting broke out in December 2013, more than 120,000 IDPs have taken refuge at United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping bases in South Sudan. These bases are not equipped to meet the basic needs of the IDPs who are sheltering there, nor can they offer sufficient protection. IDPs are wary of the peacekeepers and do not see them as neutral. The security and humanitarian situation remains tenuous, and there is concern that if the bases were to be overrun by militias, they might not be able to protect the civilians who have sought protection there or even their own staff and assets. With a mandate to protect civilians, UNMISS forces cannot force the IDPs to leave the bases for areas that are not safe. And yet peacekeeping forces are poorly equipped to manage humanitarian operations.

The case of South Sudan raises fundamental issues of mandates and operations of peacekeeping missions, of training of peacekeeping forces, and questions of equity between those living on UNMISS bases and the 90 percent of IDPs who live elsewhere, in less secure sites. As one participant in the expert workshop said, “Finding solutions for IDPs is UNMISS’ only exit strategy.” Although the particular IDP protection challenges facing UNMISS may turn out to be unique, they do raise broader questions about the relationship between peacekeeping and solutions for displacement.

This report affirms that finding durable solutions for those displaced by the conflict is critical to building sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. It also asserts that closer collaboration and coordination between security and displacement-focused actors is a complex process that requires working across institutional boundaries and sometimes addressing broader political issues. As William O’Neill writes, “…people do not leave their homes, livelihoods, and familiar surroundings for trivial reasons. Ensuring that the state institutions charged with providing security and order to groups forcibly displaced inevitably requires changes in political systems and the distribution of power so that displacement does not recur.

Authors

The relationship between displacement and security would appear to be obvious: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often displaced because of a lack of security, and cannot find solutions to displacement until security is reestablished, either at their place of origin or new location. In a similar vein, the fact that large numbers of people are displaced can have serious security implications—potentially impeding stability and peacebuilding efforts. Overcoming conflict requires finding durable solutions to those that have been displaced.

Actors focusing on durable solutions to displacement and those focusing on security tend to work in isolation from one another.

It is surprising, then, that despite these linkages, actors focusing on durable solutions to displacement and those focusing on security tend to work in isolation from one another. Displacement-focused actors like UNHCR and its partner NGOs certainly recognize the importance of security in finding durable solutions to displacement—indeed, security is the foundation of any durable solution, be it return to the place of origin, local integration into the place of refuge, or settlement elsewhere. And yet they are often unable to bring the displaced into either peacemaking or longer-term peacebuilding processes with security actors.

Likewise security actors, including military, peacekeepers and police forces, do not always recognize the broader peace implications involved with finding durable solutions to displacement. Unresolved displacement issues can lead to any number of security problems. In some cases, refugees or IDPs can be “spoilers” to peace processes, and camps or settlements can harbor rebels or militias that oppose peace. In other cases the mere presence of large numbers of displaced people—often impoverished and living in slums or remote camps without adequate livelihoods, and in some cases lacking freedom of movement—can cause instability. Compounded with other socioeconomic and political pressures, and often living in areas that are already poor and potentially unstable, the presence of the displaced needs to be considered in efforts to secure peace and stability. Sustainable peace can hinge on finding durable solutions to displacement.

The fact that these displacement-focused development/humanitarian actors and security-focused actors have not been able to coordinate more closely is thus a serious issue that relates to some of today’s most challenging conflicts around the world. To that end, there seems to be growing interest in the relationship between ending displacement and peacebuilding, as underscored in several recent initiatives by the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, there is some literature that speaks to this seemingly obvious and yet complex relationship between security actors and durable solutions to displacement. Perhaps the most encouraging has been the recent momentum of global initiatives: the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit; the UN Secretary General’s establishment of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to review UN Peacekeeping; the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2185, which makes policing an essential part of peacekeeping; and the Sustainable Development Goals that emerged from the Rio+20 Conference. These are just a few of the initiatives in the coming year that present new energy and possible opportunities to draw closer linkages between actors working on these complex issues.

The continually unfolding emergency in South Sudan is also raising new issues about the involvement of peacekeepers with IDPs.

Peacekeepers are already mandated to do what they can to create “conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, and to do as much as possible to ensure security in and around refugee and IDP settlements or camps.” And yet the continually unfolding emergency in South Sudan is also raising new issues about the involvement of peacekeepers with IDPs. Since fighting broke out in December 2013, more than 120,000 IDPs have taken refuge at United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping bases in South Sudan. These bases are not equipped to meet the basic needs of the IDPs who are sheltering there, nor can they offer sufficient protection. IDPs are wary of the peacekeepers and do not see them as neutral. The security and humanitarian situation remains tenuous, and there is concern that if the bases were to be overrun by militias, they might not be able to protect the civilians who have sought protection there or even their own staff and assets. With a mandate to protect civilians, UNMISS forces cannot force the IDPs to leave the bases for areas that are not safe. And yet peacekeeping forces are poorly equipped to manage humanitarian operations.

The case of South Sudan raises fundamental issues of mandates and operations of peacekeeping missions, of training of peacekeeping forces, and questions of equity between those living on UNMISS bases and the 90 percent of IDPs who live elsewhere, in less secure sites. As one participant in the expert workshop said, “Finding solutions for IDPs is UNMISS’ only exit strategy.” Although the particular IDP protection challenges facing UNMISS may turn out to be unique, they do raise broader questions about the relationship between peacekeeping and solutions for displacement.

This report affirms that finding durable solutions for those displaced by the conflict is critical to building sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. It also asserts that closer collaboration and coordination between security and displacement-focused actors is a complex process that requires working across institutional boundaries and sometimes addressing broader political issues. As William O’Neill writes, “…people do not leave their homes, livelihoods, and familiar surroundings for trivial reasons. Ensuring that the state institutions charged with providing security and order to groups forcibly displaced inevitably requires changes in political systems and the distribution of power so that displacement does not recur.

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok?rssid=defense{A66FA373-F137-4EDE-9E6A-F4A62D9644CD}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/91296591/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Tides-of-change-Taiwans-evolving-position-in-the-South-China-SeaTides of change: Taiwan's evolving position in the South China Sea

Taiwan, along with China and four Southeast Asian countries, is a claimant in the South China Sea, though this fact is sometimes overlooked. On paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims. The dashed or U-shaped line encapsulating much of the South China Sea appears on both Taiwanese and Chinese maps.

Neither China nor Taiwan has officially clarified the meaning of the dashed line which could be seen as making a claim to the wide expanse of water enclosed within the dashed line or (merely) to the land features contained therein and to maritime zones made from them in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law.

In the past year, Taiwan has taken small but significant steps toward clarifying that its claims are from land and in accord with UNCLOS and international law. It has also adopted a more conciliatory position by advocating that its East China Sea Peace Initiative, which calls on parties to shelve disputes and promote joint exploration and development in the East China Sea (where China, Taiwan and Japan have competing claims), be applied in the South China Sea as well.

These movements are significant in that they could have a stabilizing effect in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited its claims from the Republic of China (ROC) after the Chinese civil war. Thus, the ROC’s interpretation of its claims is relevant to the PRC’s claims. Notably, a more limited reading of the claims would not be inconsistent with China’s official position as set out in its 2009 and 2011 statements to the United Nations.

Taiwan’s overtures have largely, however, been ignored. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” principle, which has cast a long shadow over Taiwan. This paper argues that in order to carve out a modest political space for itself in the South China Sea, Taiwan should:

Clarify that its claims accord with UNCLOS and international law without expressly eschewing the dashed line.

Tread carefully on any public education on Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea to avoid unleashing nationalist sentiment, which would limit policy options.

Continue promoting President Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for the East China Sea in the South China Sea.

Push behind the scenes for participation in code of conduct negotiations and in cooperative activities involving all claimants.

Provide evidence that Taiping Island is an “island” capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life under UNCLOS Article 121.

The paper also argues that all parties who have an interest in better management of the dispute and a more peaceful region—including China—have an interest in supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in negotiations and activities relating to the South China Sea. This can be done in ways consistent with China’s one-China principle. Proper management of the dispute necessarily involves Taiwan: Taiwan controls the largest land feature in the South China Sea, its vessels regularly patrol the area, and it has one of the biggest fishing industries in the Pacific.

For China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in cooperative activities would support both Beijing’s desire for better cross-strait relations, and its dual-track approach to the South China Sea dispute, which seeks one-on-one negotiations on sovereignty issues and multilateral arrangements within the region to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The paper lays the foundation for these arguments by taking a closer look at calls within the United States for Taipei to “clarify” or “abandon” its dashed line; examining Taiwan’s claims in and evolving position on the South China Sea; and highlighting salient Chinese responses and the broader context within which Taiwan operates as a means by which to gauge the viability of various courses of action.

Authors

Taiwan, along with China and four Southeast Asian countries, is a claimant in the South China Sea, though this fact is sometimes overlooked. On paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims. The dashed or U-shaped line encapsulating much of the South China Sea appears on both Taiwanese and Chinese maps.

Neither China nor Taiwan has officially clarified the meaning of the dashed line which could be seen as making a claim to the wide expanse of water enclosed within the dashed line or (merely) to the land features contained therein and to maritime zones made from them in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law.

In the past year, Taiwan has taken small but significant steps toward clarifying that its claims are from land and in accord with UNCLOS and international law. It has also adopted a more conciliatory position by advocating that its East China Sea Peace Initiative, which calls on parties to shelve disputes and promote joint exploration and development in the East China Sea (where China, Taiwan and Japan have competing claims), be applied in the South China Sea as well.

These movements are significant in that they could have a stabilizing effect in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited its claims from the Republic of China (ROC) after the Chinese civil war. Thus, the ROC’s interpretation of its claims is relevant to the PRC’s claims. Notably, a more limited reading of the claims would not be inconsistent with China’s official position as set out in its 2009 and 2011 statements to the United Nations.

Taiwan’s overtures have largely, however, been ignored. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” principle, which has cast a long shadow over Taiwan. This paper argues that in order to carve out a modest political space for itself in the South China Sea, Taiwan should:

Clarify that its claims accord with UNCLOS and international law without expressly eschewing the dashed line.

Tread carefully on any public education on Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea to avoid unleashing nationalist sentiment, which would limit policy options.

Continue promoting President Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for the East China Sea in the South China Sea.

Push behind the scenes for participation in code of conduct negotiations and in cooperative activities involving all claimants.

Provide evidence that Taiping Island is an “island” capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life under UNCLOS Article 121.

The paper also argues that all parties who have an interest in better management of the dispute and a more peaceful region—including China—have an interest in supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in negotiations and activities relating to the South China Sea. This can be done in ways consistent with China’s one-China principle. Proper management of the dispute necessarily involves Taiwan: Taiwan controls the largest land feature in the South China Sea, its vessels regularly patrol the area, and it has one of the biggest fishing industries in the Pacific.

For China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in cooperative activities would support both Beijing’s desire for better cross-strait relations, and its dual-track approach to the South China Sea dispute, which seeks one-on-one negotiations on sovereignty issues and multilateral arrangements within the region to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The paper lays the foundation for these arguments by taking a closer look at calls within the United States for Taipei to “clarify” or “abandon” its dashed line; examining Taiwan’s claims in and evolving position on the South China Sea; and highlighting salient Chinese responses and the broader context within which Taiwan operates as a means by which to gauge the viability of various courses of action.

Downloads

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/05/07-next-eastern-ukraine-pifer?rssid=defense{F631822A-CF78-4554-A1B0-A2E0A9FAA535}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/91297707/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Whats-next-in-eastern-Ukraine-More-of-the-sameWhat's next in eastern Ukraine? More of the same.

Concern is rising over the situation in eastern Ukraine, with reports of increased shelling across the line of contact and rising casualties, as well as of Russia arming and organizing separatist forces while assembling regular army units along the Ukraine-Russia border. Tension is up, but the most likely prospect is continuation of a no war/no peace situation … a frozen conflict.

The Minsk II ceasefire—brokered between Ukraine and Russia by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on February 12—remains fragile at best. Shelling between Ukrainian and separatist/Russian forces never ceased entirely. Periodically, including now, it spikes up. All heavy weapons have not been withdrawn, something that should have taken place by the end of February.

Undoubtedly, both sides commit ceasefire violations. But reports by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission more often attribute shelling to the separatist/Russian side. They also indicate problems gaining access to areas of separatist-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk, suggesting there may be things the separatists do not wish OSCE observers to see.

If the Minsk II ceasefire is tottering, what comes next? One can see three broad scenarios.

First, Minsk II succeeds, and peace takes hold, followed by implementation of the political and economic elements of the agreement. Ukraine restores sovereignty over the east, albeit with some devolution of authority to regional officials.

Second, Minsk II breaks down completely, and large-scale hostilities resume. The Russian military has maintained a presence in eastern Ukraine, training up separatist fighters and providing overall command-and-control—to the point where the State Department now refers to “combined Russian-separatist forces.” Those forces give the Kremlin options. And Russian President Vladimir Putin likes to have options.

But does Moscow want to launch a new offensive? That would mean more costs, including dead soldiers, for the Russian army. If the Russian-separatist forces occupy new territory, they could well find a hostile populace and need to deal with a partisan campaign.

Beyond that, a new offensive would trigger further Western sanctions. The Kremlin clearly does not want that and appears to hope that the European Union (EU) will not renew sanctions in July. Merkel has done her best to preconfigure a decision to extend EU sanctions, but the possibility, however thin, of ending them this summer gives Moscow an incentive not to rock the boat.

A collapse of the ceasefire cannot be ruled out. Putin could make a different choice; he has surprised everyone before. And even if neither side wishes a resumption of large-scale fighting, the continued shelling creates the potential for escalation due to miscalculation. A breakdown of Minsk II thus has to be ranked as more probable than the agreement’s success.

The third and most likely scenario is a continuation of the current situation of no war/no peace … a frozen conflict. The ceasefire holds in some places, but not all. Shelling and fighting continue in certain locales, but no major offensive. Discussions in the Contact Group between representatives of Kyiv, the separatists, Russia and the OSCE take place every so often, but no breakthroughs to stabilize a settlement.

In contrast to Crimea, which Moscow quickly annexed, the Kremlin appears to regard eastern Ukraine and the conflict there as a means to destabilize the Ukrainian government and make it harder for Kyiv to address a difficult reform agenda or draw closer to the European Union. Kyiv finds itself in difficult straits right now. Moscow may see no need to sow further havoc. Should the Ukrainian government make progress, the Russians can ratchet up military pressure.

For its part, a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine may not be unwelcome in Kyiv. It would allow the government time to get its financial house in order and tackle a long list of reforms. And the Ukrainian government may not want to take on economic responsibility for the separatist-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk—which Minsk II mandates it do before regaining sovereignty. Kyiv may instead prefer to push that costly economic burden on Moscow.

So, for the foreseeable future, don’t bet on peace (unfortunately). Don’t be totally surprised if large-scale hostilities break out. But expect more of what we have seen the past two months.

Authors

Concern is rising over the situation in eastern Ukraine, with reports of increased shelling across the line of contact and rising casualties, as well as of Russia arming and organizing separatist forces while assembling regular army units along the Ukraine-Russia border. Tension is up, but the most likely prospect is continuation of a no war/no peace situation … a frozen conflict.

The Minsk II ceasefire—brokered between Ukraine and Russia by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on February 12—remains fragile at best. Shelling between Ukrainian and separatist/Russian forces never ceased entirely. Periodically, including now, it spikes up. All heavy weapons have not been withdrawn, something that should have taken place by the end of February.

Undoubtedly, both sides commit ceasefire violations. But reports by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission more often attribute shelling to the separatist/Russian side. They also indicate problems gaining access to areas of separatist-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk, suggesting there may be things the separatists do not wish OSCE observers to see.

If the Minsk II ceasefire is tottering, what comes next? One can see three broad scenarios.

First, Minsk II succeeds, and peace takes hold, followed by implementation of the political and economic elements of the agreement. Ukraine restores sovereignty over the east, albeit with some devolution of authority to regional officials.

Second, Minsk II breaks down completely, and large-scale hostilities resume. The Russian military has maintained a presence in eastern Ukraine, training up separatist fighters and providing overall command-and-control—to the point where the State Department now refers to “combined Russian-separatist forces.” Those forces give the Kremlin options. And Russian President Vladimir Putin likes to have options.

But does Moscow want to launch a new offensive? That would mean more costs, including dead soldiers, for the Russian army. If the Russian-separatist forces occupy new territory, they could well find a hostile populace and need to deal with a partisan campaign.

Beyond that, a new offensive would trigger further Western sanctions. The Kremlin clearly does not want that and appears to hope that the European Union (EU) will not renew sanctions in July. Merkel has done her best to preconfigure a decision to extend EU sanctions, but the possibility, however thin, of ending them this summer gives Moscow an incentive not to rock the boat.

A collapse of the ceasefire cannot be ruled out. Putin could make a different choice; he has surprised everyone before. And even if neither side wishes a resumption of large-scale fighting, the continued shelling creates the potential for escalation due to miscalculation. A breakdown of Minsk II thus has to be ranked as more probable than the agreement’s success.

The third and most likely scenario is a continuation of the current situation of no war/no peace … a frozen conflict. The ceasefire holds in some places, but not all. Shelling and fighting continue in certain locales, but no major offensive. Discussions in the Contact Group between representatives of Kyiv, the separatists, Russia and the OSCE take place every so often, but no breakthroughs to stabilize a settlement.

In contrast to Crimea, which Moscow quickly annexed, the Kremlin appears to regard eastern Ukraine and the conflict there as a means to destabilize the Ukrainian government and make it harder for Kyiv to address a difficult reform agenda or draw closer to the European Union. Kyiv finds itself in difficult straits right now. Moscow may see no need to sow further havoc. Should the Ukrainian government make progress, the Russians can ratchet up military pressure.

For its part, a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine may not be unwelcome in Kyiv. It would allow the government time to get its financial house in order and tackle a long list of reforms. And the Ukrainian government may not want to take on economic responsibility for the separatist-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk—which Minsk II mandates it do before regaining sovereignty. Kyiv may instead prefer to push that costly economic burden on Moscow.

So, for the foreseeable future, don’t bet on peace (unfortunately). Don’t be totally surprised if large-scale hostilities break out. But expect more of what we have seen the past two months.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/05/05-british-election-matters-us-shapiro?rssid=defense{303584FC-B8CD-4800-BF68-67A4DC4AD56F}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/91095596/0/brookingsrss/topics/defense~Little-England-Why-the-British-election-matters-to-the-United-StatesLittle England: Why the British election matters to the United States

Foreign elections don’t get a lot of attention in the United States. These days, particularly, we are a bit caught up in our own imminent presidential election—it is a mere 18 months away. And, honestly, from an American perspective, such elections tend to feature poor production values, mind-numbingly substantive debates, and endless banging on about pensions, health care, and other extremely parochial issues. But on May 7, there is an election in the United Kingdom that might just merit putting aside that latest exposé on Hillary Clinton’s hairstyle.

Why is the British election worth diverting ourselves from such weighty issues? Well, first, it’s in English (more or less) which makes it at least plausibly comprehensible for interested Americans. But perhaps more importantly, the British election will have important implications for the United States and may well be a harbinger of things to come.

The United Kingdom (U.K.) has long been the United States’ most stalwart and visible ally. Indeed, more than an ally, the United Kingdom became, in foreign policy terms, a sanity check. In the halcyon days of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, the U.K. was the first place American policymakers went to understand how U.S. foreign policy would be received beyond their shores.

The U.K. was never an American poodle, but it was fair to say that if you couldn’t sell a policy in Britain, it was unlikely to do well in France, India, or China. The U.K. was America’s most sympathetic critic, its most willing collaborator, and its most able partner. Indeed, it was the only large country in the European Union that maintained its defense spending at 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as all NATO members are supposed to do.

The Little England strategy

Like so much of the post-Cold War world, all of that has been changing of late and particularly since David Cameron became prime minister five years ago. At that time, in the very depths of the financial crisis, Cameron adopted what is uncharitably called a “Little England” strategy. As part of an overall program of dramatic spending cuts, Cameron slashed military spending, cut the British diplomatic corps, and broadly began to pull back from all manner of overseas commitments (with the exception of development aid). He also allowed a referendum on Scottish independence that nearly broke apart the three hundred year-old United Kingdom and promised another referendum for his second term on whether the U.K. should remain in the European Union.

In September 2013, Cameron couldn’t sell participation in U.S. air strikes in Syria to enough members of his own coalition to get approval from parliament. In retrospect, this embarrassing defeat represented his last gasp effort to demonstrate that the U.K.’s relationship with the United States remains special. When the U.S. intervention in Syria (and Iraq) did begin in August 2014, the U.K. was essentially absent. At this point, the U.K.’s best hope for maintaining its 2 percent of GDP defense spending commitment is that the government’s economic policies reduce its GDP.

This direction in British policy isn’t completely new or unexpected. Indeed, the novelist Julian Barnes predicted this slow stroll toward decline in his 2000 comedic novel "England, England." “Britain,” Barnes noted, “had once held domination over great tracts of the world’s surface, painted it pink from pole to pole. As time went by, these imperial possessions had spun off and set themselves up as sovereign nations. ... So where did that leave us now? With something called the United Kingdom which to be honest and facing facts, didn’t live up to its adjective. Its members were united in the way that tenants paying rent to the same landlord were united.” Barnes envisioned England separating itself from the rest of the United Kingdom, from Europe, and ultimately from the world. The result, in Barnes’ reading of the future, was that “England had cut its own throat and was lying in the gutter beneath a spectral gas-light, its only function as a dissuasive example to others.”

Of course, Barnes’ novel seemed meant more as a warning than a prediction. But to judge by the current government efforts, the prime minister seems to have adopted it as an instruction manual.

It is not clear that a government led by Cameron’s principal opponent, Ed Miliband of the Labour Party would reverse this retreat. Devolution of course began under Labour, which may end up depending on the independence-minded Scottish National Party to govern. But Labour is at least solidly committed to maintaining the U.K. within the European Union and not ideologically opposed to any and all spending increases. The United Kingdom’s retreat from the world is largely voluntary—it has the resources to continue to punch above its weight for some time to come. Little England is the U.K.’s direction, but it is not its destiny.

But back to United States

It would be a mistake for Americans to assume that they have nothing at stake in the Little England strategy. Sure, the U.S.-U.K. relationship has been becoming less special for some time. And, yes, Germany carries more financial weight; France is increasingly interested in joining the United States in military adventures abroad, and the Australians seem willing to send Special Forces just about anywhere. But a Little England nevertheless does not augur well for a U.S. foreign policy which aims specifically to empower like-minded states to share the burdens of leadership. Ultimately, the United States will struggle to lead a more empowered group of regional powers if even the U.K. will not follow.

Authors

Foreign elections don’t get a lot of attention in the United States. These days, particularly, we are a bit caught up in our own imminent presidential election—it is a mere 18 months away. And, honestly, from an American perspective, such elections tend to feature poor production values, mind-numbingly substantive debates, and endless banging on about pensions, health care, and other extremely parochial issues. But on May 7, there is an election in the United Kingdom that might just merit putting aside that latest exposé on Hillary Clinton’s hairstyle.

Why is the British election worth diverting ourselves from such weighty issues? Well, first, it’s in English (more or less) which makes it at least plausibly comprehensible for interested Americans. But perhaps more importantly, the British election will have important implications for the United States and may well be a harbinger of things to come.

The United Kingdom (U.K.) has long been the United States’ most stalwart and visible ally. Indeed, more than an ally, the United Kingdom became, in foreign policy terms, a sanity check. In the halcyon days of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, the U.K. was the first place American policymakers went to understand how U.S. foreign policy would be received beyond their shores.

The U.K. was never an American poodle, but it was fair to say that if you couldn’t sell a policy in Britain, it was unlikely to do well in France, India, or China. The U.K. was America’s most sympathetic critic, its most willing collaborator, and its most able partner. Indeed, it was the only large country in the European Union that maintained its defense spending at 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as all NATO members are supposed to do.

The Little England strategy

Like so much of the post-Cold War world, all of that has been changing of late and particularly since David Cameron became prime minister five years ago. At that time, in the very depths of the financial crisis, Cameron adopted what is uncharitably called a “Little England” strategy. As part of an overall program of dramatic spending cuts, Cameron slashed military spending, cut the British diplomatic corps, and broadly began to pull back from all manner of overseas commitments (with the exception of development aid). He also allowed a referendum on Scottish independence that nearly broke apart the three hundred year-old United Kingdom and promised another referendum for his second term on whether the U.K. should remain in the European Union.

In September 2013, Cameron couldn’t sell participation in U.S. air strikes in Syria to enough members of his own coalition to get approval from parliament. In retrospect, this embarrassing defeat represented his last gasp effort to demonstrate that the U.K.’s relationship with the United States remains special. When the U.S. intervention in Syria (and Iraq) did begin in August 2014, the U.K. was essentially absent. At this point, the U.K.’s best hope for maintaining its 2 percent of GDP defense spending commitment is that the government’s economic policies reduce its GDP.

This direction in British policy isn’t completely new or unexpected. Indeed, the novelist Julian Barnes predicted this slow stroll toward decline in his 2000 comedic novel "England, England." “Britain,” Barnes noted, “had once held domination over great tracts of the world’s surface, painted it pink from pole to pole. As time went by, these imperial possessions had spun off and set themselves up as sovereign nations. ... So where did that leave us now? With something called the United Kingdom which to be honest and facing facts, didn’t live up to its adjective. Its members were united in the way that tenants paying rent to the same landlord were united.” Barnes envisioned England separating itself from the rest of the United Kingdom, from Europe, and ultimately from the world. The result, in Barnes’ reading of the future, was that “England had cut its own throat and was lying in the gutter beneath a spectral gas-light, its only function as a dissuasive example to others.”

Of course, Barnes’ novel seemed meant more as a warning than a prediction. But to judge by the current government efforts, the prime minister seems to have adopted it as an instruction manual.

It is not clear that a government led by Cameron’s principal opponent, Ed Miliband of the Labour Party would reverse this retreat. Devolution of course began under Labour, which may end up depending on the independence-minded Scottish National Party to govern. But Labour is at least solidly committed to maintaining the U.K. within the European Union and not ideologically opposed to any and all spending increases. The United Kingdom’s retreat from the world is largely voluntary—it has the resources to continue to punch above its weight for some time to come. Little England is the U.K.’s direction, but it is not its destiny.

But back to United States

It would be a mistake for Americans to assume that they have nothing at stake in the Little England strategy. Sure, the U.S.-U.K. relationship has been becoming less special for some time. And, yes, Germany carries more financial weight; France is increasingly interested in joining the United States in military adventures abroad, and the Australians seem willing to send Special Forces just about anywhere. But a Little England nevertheless does not augur well for a U.S. foreign policy which aims specifically to empower like-minded states to share the burdens of leadership. Ultimately, the United States will struggle to lead a more empowered group of regional powers if even the U.K. will not follow.

Event Information

The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions process has been called outdated, under-resourced, and unnecessarily confusing–among other things. Given Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s recent service as DoD's chief operations officer, the prospects for reform may be promising. Removing barriers to entry in order to foster innovation, as well as specialized approaches like expediting procedures related to information technology are seen as key issues in the time ahead. Early plans for new reforms were recently unveiled by the House Armed Services Committee.

On April 13, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on the acquisitions procedures at the Department of Defense and the need for reforms. The event opened with a keynote address by Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics at DoD. Secretary Kendall has been a leader in strengthening best practices while at DoD, managing Better Buying Power–aimed at bettering productivity, eliminating bureaucracy, and promoting competition–among other initiatives. Following Kendall’s remarks, and a short discussion with the audience, a panel will further discuss the ideas for reform. Participants included William Lynn of Finmeccanica, and Brookings Federal Executive Fellow Jason Tama. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, moderated the panel.

Event Information

The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions process has been called outdated, under-resourced, and unnecessarily confusing–among other things. Given Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s recent service as DoD's chief operations officer, the prospects for reform may be promising. Removing barriers to entry in order to foster innovation, as well as specialized approaches like expediting procedures related to information technology are seen as key issues in the time ahead. Early plans for new reforms were recently unveiled by the House Armed Services Committee.

On April 13, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on the acquisitions procedures at the Department of Defense and the need for reforms. The event opened with a keynote address by Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics at DoD. Secretary Kendall has been a leader in strengthening best practices while at DoD, managing Better Buying Power–aimed at bettering productivity, eliminating bureaucracy, and promoting competition–among other initiatives. Following Kendall’s remarks, and a short discussion with the audience, a panel will further discuss the ideas for reform. Participants included William Lynn of Finmeccanica, and Brookings Federal Executive Fellow Jason Tama. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, moderated the panel.