Modern SAMs like this Chinese HQ-9 system have none of
the vulnerabilities of the SAMs defeated in the Middle East, and employ
highly automated digital fire control systems and radars. (image
Chinese
internet).

Background

There are major
disparities in the
recorded combat effectiveness of Soviet supplied Surface to Air
Missile (SAM) systems, used in past decades, across theatres of
operation. Most interesting is how poorly these SAM systems performed
in the Middle East, compared to their combat effect in South East
Asia.

The relevance of this arguably
obscure
historical detail, is that contemporary perceptions of the
effectiveness of the latest generation of Russian and Chinese built
SAM systems are more than often, in Western defence bureaucracies,
determined on the basis of views such as “We trashed Russian SAMs
completely in 1991, so why should we care about the effectiveness of
current SAM systems?”.

The latter argument has been put to
this author more than once in recent times, by parties in Australia
and overseas, so the perception that the effectiveness of state of
the art new technology SAMs is no different to that of 1960s and
1970s technology SAMs operated in Middle East nearly two decades ago
is widely held, and often fervently believed.

The material reality is that newer
generation SAM systems such as the S-300PMU1, S-300PMU2 Favorit
(SA-20),
HQ-9/FD-2000/FT-2000 and S-400 Triumf (SA-21) are in terms of
basic technology and
performance very close to, if not better than the US MIM-104
Patriot series, and importantly, have never been challenged in combat
by Western air forces, these including the formidable Israeli Air
Force.

The volume of detailed technical
material now available from open sources on Soviet era SAM systems,
specifically the SA-2 Guideline (S/SA-75 Volkhov/Dvina), SA-3 Goa
(S-125 Neva/Pechora), SA-5 Gammon (S-200 Vega) and SA-6 Gainful (2K12
Kub/Kvadrat) is staggering, by Cold War era standards, and permits a
much more focused and deeper analysis of the operational issues than
was even possible using then limited classified source materials,
during the Cold War period.

Soviet
SAM
Operations
-
SEA
Versus MidEast Theatres

In South East Asia, the Soviet S-75/SA-2
Guideline was used exclusively, with batteries deployed widely across
North Vietnam from the mid 1960s. Sources vary widely on numbers, but
a common figure is 50 batteries rotating between 150 fixed SAM sites.
Figures on the number of SAMs fired per kill also vary, with
declassified data suggesting dozens of rounds per kill, increasing
over time as the US improved its defence suppression technique and
technology.

The Soviet S-75/SA-2
Guideline was designed primarily as a “strategic
SAM”,
intended
to
provide
area
defence
of fixed target areas against
attacking aircraft at medium to high altitudes. The command link guided
weapon had a variable thrust liquid propellant rocket sustainer motor,
and was supported typically by an X-band RSNA-75 Fan Song engagement
radar, and a P-12 Spoon Rest 2D VHF-Band acquisition radar. Nominal
redeployment time for a battery was several hours, dependent in part on
battery crew proficiency, and in part on terrain, as a large convoy of
vehicles was required for movements.

Perhaps most contentious matter in
this
discussion is what constitutes the best “measure of effectiveness”
for assessing the PAVN SAM force. Over North Vietnam (NVN), most
losses were statistically produced by PAVN Anti-Aircraft Artillery
(AAA) batteries, in fact total US Air Force losses of 740 F/RF-4,
F-105 and F-100 tactical fighters between 1964 and 1973 can mostly be
credited to AAA in NVN and Laos. Declassified US statistics show a
good fraction of the these losses resulted from low altitude attacks
on SAM sites, and most others from low altitude attacks on other
targets in an attempt to stay below the medium to high altitude
engagement envelope of the
SA-2. While direct losses to SAM firings appear modest, the
percentage of kills to SAMs was as high as 31.5% for F-4 in 1971-73,
and 17 B-52s were lost, mostly to SAMs.

Usually supported by experienced
Soviet or Warsaw Pact instructors, the PAVN operated the SA-2 to best
effect, exploited its limited mobility fully, and used the SA-2 to
bait “flak traps”, as well as to drive US aircraft into the envelope
of dense AAA fire. In addition, the large and ongoing effort to
suppress or destroy SAM
systems absorbed a large proportion of sorties flown into NVN.

The simple metric of counting direct losses to enemy weapon types is
not a particularly good “measure of
effectiveness”
for assessing the effect and impact of air defence weapon types in a
mixed threat environment. With no SAMs deployed in a theatre, the
effectiveness of visually aimed and radar directed AAA is poor, as
aircraft can attack unhindered from medium and high altitudes, out of
the useful envelope of barrelled weapons. By the same token, in a SAM
rich environment where AAA would be absent, aircraft can attack unhindered from low altitudes, exploiting
terrain masking and performance limitations in SAMs and their
supporting radar systems.

In NVN operations, the PAVN followed period Soviet doctrine very
closely, and that doctrine dictated the use of mutually supporting and
overlapping air defence weapons through the whole altitude envelope.
The effect is synergistic, in the sense that no portion of the altitude
envelope then presents a low penetration risk for the attacker.

When assessing the combat effectiveness of SAMs, on a per system basis,
a much better measure is the number of kills produced per round fired,
per engagement. The difficulty in producing hard analysis is that
without hard data on rounds expended, this measure is difficult to
produce with any accuracy. While raw statistics on losses to AAA would
appear to favour AAA over SAMs in SEA operations, what proportion of
the aircraft sorties flown would have entered the AAA engagement
envelope had SAMs been absent, and what number of AAA systems was
deployed at what personnel and expended munitions cost, in comparison
with PAVN SAM battery numbers?

There are two illustrative examples from the NVN air campaigns, both
falling into the latter period of the conflict.

The first is the use of the F-111A during the 1972 Linebacker
I/II campaigns. Flying at very low altitudes using automatic terrain
following radar, the aircraft defeated both radar directed AAA and
SAMs, and incurred statistically per sortie the lowest loss rates in
these campaigns.

The highest per type loss rate during Linebacker II was incurred by the
B-52 fleet, exclusively to S-75/SA-2 SAM shots, despite the heavy use
of onboard EW, support jamming aircraft, defence suppression aircraft,
chaff bombers and fighter escorts. Had SAMs been absent from the
theatre, it is unlikely any B-52s would have been lost.

The statistical loss rate of 15 x B-52D/G across 729 flown sorties is
around 2 percent, the limit for sustainable losses in an attrition
strategy campaign, despite the concerted defence suppression effort
directed against the PAVN SAM force. Importantly, once the PAVN
expended most of its warstock of S-75/SA-2 SAM rounds, no further B-52s
were lost.

A factor frequently ignored in lay analyses of such campaigns is the
fraction of total effort expended in providing defence suppression
support for penetrating aircraft. A large proportion of tactical
aircraft sorties flown during Linebacker II, including much of the
F-111 effort, was directed against PAVN S-75/SA-2 SAM sites. Effort
expended and losses so incurred are directly correlated with SAM
deployment.

Any objective analysis of the combat effect of SAMs in SEA
operations must therefore consider not only losses directly
attributable to SAM hits or SAM combat damage, but also effort expended
and losses to all other causes arising from operational measures taken
to suppress or evade SAM batteries. From this perspective, Soviet SAMs
were the single most effective component of the PAVN IADS.

Above, proximity fused SA-2 round explodes
beneath a US Air Force RF-4C Phantom flown by Capts. Edwin Atterberry
and Thomas Parrott near Hanoi, 12th August, 1967. Below, the RF-4C
breaks up as a result of fatal structural damage. Both crew survived
the ejection, but Capt Atterberry was later killed in captivity by the
PAVN (US Air
Force images).

A damaged F-105D after a
near
miss by a proximity fused SA-2 round (US Air Force image).

US
Air Force F-105D Thunderchief evading
an SA-2 missile over North Vietnam (US Air Force image).

SA-2 missile
in flight over the NVAF airfield at Kep (US Air Force image).

An operational S-75 / SA-2 SAM site
photographed from low altitude by a US reconnaissance aircraft early
during the Vietnam conflict. Note the large number of radar and
generator vans, reduced in later variants of the system (US Air Force).

Data from
Middle Eastern conflicts,
other than Desert Storm, is far more fragmentary, and more than often
contaminated by a reluctance on the part of the Israelis, Egyptians
and Syrians to fully disclose combat losses. There have been ongoing
public arguments ever since over “who
killed what when” .

Major clashes involving the use of
Soviet SAMs were the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt,
the
1973 Yom Kippur war, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

The first Soviet SAMs in the region
were 15 to 25 SA-2 batteries delivered during the late 1960s, but
were not particularly effective. They were crewed by Egyptians with
Soviet instructors, and some were captured in the Sinai advance of
1967. Syria during this period deployed the SA-2 and fielded 18
batteries, later supplemented by 16 SA-3 batteries.

In early 1970, the Soviets
initiated Operation Caucasus, and deployed an overstrength
division
of Soviet
PVO air defence troops, comprising 18 battalions in three brigades,
led by General Smirnov of the PVO, and drawn from PVO units in the
Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, Leningrad and Belarus districts. Each
battalion comprised four SA-3 batteries, a platoon of ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs
and supporting SA-7 MANPADS teams. While these units were ostensibly
“instructors”, they were dressed in Egyptian uniforms and
provided full crewing for the deployed SAM systems. Through early
1970 the PVO units were deployed along the Suez Canal. Operational
doctrine was similar to NVN, with batteries relocating frequently,
and setting up ambushes for Israeli aircraft, using multiple mutually
supporting batteries.

The Soviet
S-125/SA-3
Goa
was
designed
primarily to
provide point defence of fixed target areas against
attacking aircraft at low to medium altitudes. The command link guided
weapon had a fixed thrust solid propellant rocket sustainer motor,
and was supported typically by an X-band SNR-125 engagement
radar, and a P-15 Flat Face UHF-Band acquisition radar, with
respectable low altitude clutter rejection performance. Nominal
redeployment time for a battery was several hours, not unlike the
S-75/SA-2, dependent in part on
battery crew proficiency, and in part on terrain, as a large convoy of
vehicles was required for movements.
In subsequent engagements against the Israelis,
the Soviets are claimed to have shot down five Israeli aircraft using
the SA-3, making for a cumulative total of 22 lost to SA-2, SA-3 and
AAA during this period.The Egyptians sought to retake
their
1967 losses in 1973, and to support that campaign procured three
brigades of SA-6 Gainful, comprising 18 batteries. Unlike Soviet
batteries using the “shoot and scoot” 1S12 Long Track radar, Egyptian SA-6
batteries mostly used the semi-mobile P-15 Flat Face and P-15M Squat
Eye UHF radars. Syria is
claimed to have procured two brigades.

When the Egyptians crossed the Suez
Canal, and the Syrians stormed the Golan Heights, their ground forces
and strategic targets were protected by SAM and AAA units. It is
widely acknowledged that the Israelis suffered heavy losses of
aircraft during the fighting in 1973. Exactly how many were lost to
SAMs, and to which type of SAM, has been less well documented.
Israeli public claims are that 303 aircraft were lost in combat, and
other sources identify 40 of these as lost to SAMs, and between 4 and
12 to Arab fighters. This puts most Israeli losses as a result of low
altitude AAA fire, and emulates the pattern observed in SEA – SAMs
denying the use of high and medium altitude airspace, driving
aircraft down into the envelope of high density AAA.

The Soviets were cast out of Egypt
in
early 1976, followed by Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel and
Egypt’s realignment away from conflict with the West. Chinese and
Western contractors took over support of the Soviet SAM systems.

The next major conflict to see SAMs
used in anger was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, named “Operation
Peace for Galilee”, and intended to drive the
PLO out
of Lebanon. This well thought out and planned campaign was an
absolute rout of the Syrian SAM belt installed in the Bekaa Valley of
Lebanon. The first attack of the 9th
June, 1982, saw 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM batteries annihilated, the
Israelis using airborne standoff jammers extensively, and supported
by emitter locating systems, also fired large numbers of AGM-45
Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missiles, in addition to
domestically modified Shrikes with rocket boosters, launched from
trucks like Katyusha rockets. Crippled and defenceless SAM batteries
were then annihilated with free fall bombs.

The Soviet doctrine of ambush
attacks,
SAM system mobility, clever use of emission control and decoys,
camouflage of SAM sites, and the use of supporting electronic warfare
assets was abandoned by the Syrians completely. Hurley’s summary of
Syrian behaviour in the Winter 1989 issue of Air Power Journal
is
perhaps the best summary:

“Syrian SAM operators also invited
disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally
regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling.

As noted
by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence
Agency, “The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed
configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills
because they didn't want to dig latrines -- seriously.” The Syrian
practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several
months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location
of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical
advantage on the eve of battle. Even so, the Syrians might have been
able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they
effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to “hide”
them, which actually made them easier
to spot from
the air. It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for
their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable
doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage.
According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate
firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile
SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM
sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and
survivability of ground-based air defenses.”

The 1982 Bekaa Valley debacle was
repeated on a much larger scale in January, 1991, when US led
Coalition air forces annihilated Saddam’s SAM defences, the
decisive blows inflicted in the first few hours. While that campaign
is well documented in detail elsewhere, like the 1982 campaign, large
scale use was made of anti-radiation missiles, support jamming, and
precision weapons. The deployment pattern of Saddam’s forces also
differed little, with few batteries attempting to exploit any
inherent mobility in their systems, and often undisciplined emissions
permitting easy location, targeting and attack. The composition of
Saddam’s SAM force comprised much the same SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8
and SA-9 SAM systems, supplemented by some modern French supplied
Thales Roland SAMs and Tiger series radars.

The common
thread running through the
latter Middle Eastern SAM vs air power campaigns is very clear –
the use of ageing and often obsolescent SAM and radar technology and
the abandonment of the by then mature Soviet doctrine of SAM system
mobility, concealment, deception and mutual support. Most of the fire
control and search radars used were by then fully compromised to the
West, and highly effective electronic countermeasures were available.

There is another consideration,
which
is difficult to establish through published sources, which is that of
the education, training, proficiency and competencies of the SAM
battery crews operating Syrian and Iraqi systems during this period.

Study of the plethora of detailed
technical materials now available on Soviet SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6
and SA-8 SAM systems, and discussions with former Warsaw Pact
missileers, indicate that the full effectiveness and performance
potential of these first and second generation Soviet SAMs required
crews which were highly intelligent, with a good technical education,
and both very highly trained and proficient. Tight teamwork in the
missile control van was essential, as the crew had to integrate and
interpret outputs from multiple sensors, using often rudimentary
analogue displays. Critical tasks such as initial target acquisition,
and target tracking, were more than often performed manually, with
the operator having to concurrently interpret more than one display
output, in real time. Limited electronic counter-counter measures
were available, requiring a smart operator to interpret and
understand the type of hostile jamming, to manually select alternate
frequencies and modes.

This was paralleled by challenging
demands for technical personnel, especially in the setup and tear
down of SA-2 and SA-3 batteries, which a highly proficient crew could
relocate in about six hours. Launchers and vans had to be deployed,
everything connected by cable harnesses, antennas needed alignment,
and the whole system had to be tested before it could go online.
While the SA-6 and SA-8 were designed for shoot and scoot mobility,
maintenance of their complex systems was no less challenging,
requiring vanloads of test equipment. Training for all of these
systems required a van full of equipment to provide simulation inputs
for the SAM control system.

The failure of Syrian and Iraqi
missileers to follow Soviet operational doctrine, tactics and
deployment technique indicates that the root cause of poor
effectiveness in combat was deeply deficient training of missileers,
and prima facie, also support personnel. The effectiveness of the
very same SAM systems, operated by Soviet, Warsaw Pact and PAVN
personnel, was vastly better, whether in the Middle East or South
East Asia.

The 1999 bombing of Serbia is the
case
study, which closes this loop. While Serbian SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6
batteries were largely ineffective due to the use of standoff
jamming, anti-radiation missiles and stealth, they also proved vastly
more difficult to kill due to smart use of mobility, camouflage and
emission control. A single SA-3 battery, commanded by then LtCol
Zoltan Dani, downed an F-117A and an F-16C, and damaged another
F-117A. Prior to the conflict, Dani worked his crew for weeks in the
simulator, driving up proficiency and crew teamwork. During the
conflict, he relocated his battery as frequently as possible, and
exercised strict emission control. His battery survived and inflicted
the single most embarrassing combat loss the US has suffered for
decades. Serbian SA-6 crews, following the same hide, shoot and scoot
doctrine, mostly survived the war. The Serbian SAMs and radars were
largely of the same vintage and subtypes, as those used by the Iraqis
and Syrians. The fact that NATO forces were unable to quickly kill
off the Serbian SAM batteries forced continuing and ongoing sorties
by NATO support jamming and defence suppression aircraft, driving up
the cost to drop each bomb delivered several-fold. NATO forces
launched 743 AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile rounds for very
little damage effect – around one third of the number used to
cripple Iraq’s much larger air defence system in 1991.

If we compare Desert Storm to
Allied
Force, the SAM systems were largely the same, but NATO had better
electronic warfare systems, many more Emitter Locating Systems, and
an abundance of newer smart munitions, including newer and better
anti-radiation missiles. The fundamental difference was in the
personnel operating the SAM systems – better educated, better
trained, and highly motivated.

Fully
deployed
72V6
(SA-22)
SPAAGM
prototype
on
BAZ-6909
chassis.
This variant
incorporates a new VNIIRT designed 1RS2-1E agile
beam
phased array engagement radar. The primary design aim for
this system was the interception of PGMs, especially the AGM-88
HARM/AARGM
and GBUs (Sergei Kuznetsov
via Strizhi.ru).

Chinese LD-2000
demonstrator
during
trials, this 30 mm Gatling gun SPAAG was derived from a naval CIWS
point defence system developed to kill anti-ship cruise missiles. The
stated role of this
SPAAG now includes the defeat of munitions in flight.

Conclusions

The study
of SAM effectiveness in air campaigns between the 1960s and the last
decade may span a period of almost a half century, but in every one of
these campaigns the numerically dominant SAM systems were Soviet
designs which were developed during the 1950s and 1960s, specifically
the S-75 / SA-2 Guideline, the S-125 / SA-3 Goa and the 2K12 / SA-6
Gainful, with sporadic use of the S-200VE / SA-5 Gammon and 9K33 / SA-8
Gecko.
In comparison with SAM systems currently available on the global
market, offered by Russian and Chinese manufacturers, these legacy SAM
systems are inferior in many respects:

Modern SAM engagement and acquisition
radars are designed from the outset to be highly resistant to jamming,
and typically deliver higher peak power-aperture performance to engage
lower signature targets;

Some modern SAM engagement radars are claimed to provide a basic
LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) capability, making their detection
and tracking difficult;

Nearly all modern SAM systems and
supporting radars are highly mobile, engineered from the outset for
“hide, shoot and scoot” operations;

Modern SAMs are all kinematically
superior to their Cold War era predecessors, by virtue of better rocket
motor technology, and digital guidance, yielding greater engagement
ranges and terminal endgame manoeuvre performance.

Contemporary SAM systems in these categories
include the Russian SA-20 (S-300PMU1,
S-300PMU2), Chinese HQ-9/FD-2000 and Russian SA-21 (S-400). These are
modern systems with
highly jam resistant radars, and if the Chinese are correct, basic
low probability of intercept capability.

These systems will be
difficult to locate, jam and guide anti-radiation missiles against.
No less importantly they have modern highly automated digital fire
control systems, not unlike Western SAMs of this era. The demands for
proficiency and technical understanding of operation by crews seen in
early Cold War SAM systems no longer exist – operators have
sophisticated LCD panel displays with synthetic presentation. In
deployment, these systems are heavily automated, using mostly hydraulic
rams to elevate and unfold key system components, and thus little
operator
skill is needed to set up or relocate a battery – most can shoot
and scoot in five minutes.

The difficulties arising from technological evolution in long range or
area defence SAM systems have been exacerbated by the evolution of
associated operational doctrine, which now sees the deployment of
specialised equipment intended to defend SAM batteries from attack.
These include:

The development and deployment of
advanced point defence SAMs and SPAAGMs to engage and destroy guided
munitions launched against SAM sites;

The development
and
deployment
of
modern
emitting
decoys to defeat geolocation
receivers and guided munition seekers;

The development
and
deployment
of
active
and
passive electronic, optical and
infrared countermeasures to defeat
guided munition seekers;

The development and deployment of Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) sensor fusion systems to defeat electronic
countermeasures, and to an extent, low observables.

As a result,
a modern IADS equipped with current Russian and Chinese SAM systems
will be very difficult to defeat by non-lethal and lethal suppression
or kill techniques. A large fraction of
guided munitions launched will be shot down, or their guidance defeated.
In conclusion, the perception that contemporary
Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian
and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful
thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand
why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.