1. The petitioner, which is a public sector undertaking has laid a challenge
to a common order dated 3.3.2010 passed by the Central Information
Commission (in short CIC) to the extent it directs provision of minutes of the
Departmental Promotion Committee (in short DPC), pertaining to promotions
made from grade E-6 to E-7 with respect to the year 2006, and grade E-7 to
E-7A, for the years 2007 and 2009.

1.1 The CIC by virtue of the impugned order disposed of two appeals of the
respondent vis-à-vis her grievance of denial of information; the details with
respect to which are set out hereinafter.

2. The respondent in the first instance, filed an application dated
14.7.2009, with the petitioner, seeking information with regard to two
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 1 of 18
aspects: First part pertained to her Annual Confidential Report (in short
ACR) for the period spanning from 2004 to 2008. In particular, the periods
towards which the query of the respondent was directed, was as follows:-

2.1 The second part of the respondent's application was related to her
seeking information with regard to 'rating and remarks' of the Reporting and
Reviewing Officers alongwith their names. In addition, the rating and
remarks made by the Accepting Authority were also sought. Furthermore,
information was sought with regard to moderation, if any, being made by the
Moderation Committee to the respondent's ACRs in respect of the
aforementioned periods prior to the deliberations by the DPC. As would be
obvious, this application (hereinafter referred to as the 1st application) was
filed under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (in short the
RTI Act).

2.2 The Chief Public Information Officer (in short CPIO) of the petitioner,
vide his response dated 19.8.2009, provided the respondent with the
following information:

(i) copy of her ACR for the year 2008-09;

(ii) ACR ratings (and not the ACRs) for the period in issue; and

(iii) lastly, conveyed to her that there was no moderation of ACRs in her
case, as she was in grade E-7. She was also informed that the process of
moderation of ACRs, by Moderation Committee, commenced in 2007, and
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 2 of 18
that, the process of moderation of ACRs is applicable only to executives upto
grade E-6.

2.3 The respondent being aggrieved with the decision of the CPIO, to the
extent that, her request for being supplied with ACRs for the remaining
period i.e. 2004 to 2007, having not been granted, preferred an appeal with
First Appellate Authority, under Section 19 of the RTI Act. The said appeal,
was filed on 20.8.2009 (in short hereinafter referred to as the August Appeal).

2.4 The First Appellate Authority, after referring to the Office
Memorandum dated 14.5.2009, (reference to which was also made by the
respondent) came to the conclusion that the system of communicating entries
made in the ACR, which was thereafter referred to as Annual Performance
Appraisal Report (in short APAR), was applicable prospectively i.e. with
effect from the reporting period 2008-09. Consequently, the First Appellate
Authority dismissed the appeal and sustained the decision of the CPIO.

2.5 The respondent, being aggrieved by the decision of the First Appellate
Authority, preferred an appeal under Section 19(3) of the RTI Act with the
CIC. The said appeal was filed on 14.10.2009.

2.5.1. It appears on this appeal, notice was issued by the CIC on 18.1.2010.
There is some contest between the parties as to whether the notice was issued
by the CIC only to the respondent or also to the petitioner. I will be dealing
with this issue in the course of my judgment.

2.6 It appears that, while the aforementioned appeal was pending
adjudication, the respondent filed yet another application dated 14.08.2009
under the RTI Act with the CPIO of the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as
the 2nd application). By this application, eight (8) queries were raised by the
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 3 of 18
respondent. For the sake of convenience the same are extracted herein
below:

b) Attested Copy of Marks allotted by DPC Members in DPC 2007
for the post of AGMs.

c) Attested Copy of Marks allotted by DPC Members in DPC 2009
for the post of AGMs.

d) What are the criteria followed for promotions from DGM to
AGM.

e) Attested Copy of DPC 2006 proceedings for the post of DGM.

f) Name of all eligible Senior Managers who appeared for DPC
2006 interview for the post of DGMs.

g) How many were promoted as DGM w.e.f. 01.04.2006 and their
names.

h) What are the criteria followed for promotion from Sr. manager
to DGM in 2006."

2.7 The CPIO vide his response dated 14.9.2009, in sum and substance,
declined to give information with regard to DPC minutes and the interview
marks obtained by candidates, whose cases had been deliberated upon by the
DPC. Other information like, list of all eligible Senior Managers who, had
appeared before the DPC of 2006 for interview to the post of DGM, and
those, who had been promoted from the post of Senior Managers to DGM for
the very same year i.e. 2006, were supplied. In addition to this, information
with regard to criteria followed for promotion from Senior Manager to DGM
for the year 2006 was also supplied to the respondent. Pertinently, the
information which was not supplied; was denied, on the ground that the
petitioner held that information in its fiduciary capacity.

WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 4 of 18

2.8 The respondent claims that, since she was aggrieved, she had preferred
an appeal to the First Appellate Authority against its decision dated
14.9.2009, by filing an appeal dated 9.10.2009. According to the respondent,
the appeal was dispatched by registered cover with record delivery. It is
important to note at this stage that the petitioner denies having any record of
the institution of the said appeal.

2.9 It is the respondent's case that, since she did not receive a response from
the First Appellate Authority in respect of the decision of the CPIO on her 2nd
application, she preferred an appeal with the CIC, as the prescribed period
provided under Section 7 of the RTI Act, had lapsed. According to the
respondent, the period between filing of her appeal with the First Appellate
Authority and her moving the CIC, was forty seven (47) days.

2.10 The CIC, apparently, did not issue notice in the second appeal which
emanated out of the 2nd application filed by the respondent on 14.8.2009.
The CIC, however, by the impugned order which, as indicated above, is a
common order, disposed of both appeals.

3. Being aggrieved, the captioned writ petition was filed by the petitioner,
when on the very first date of hearing i.e. on 16.4.2010, the impugned order
was stayed. The said order was made absolute on 06.7.2011.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSELS

4. In this background, submissions on behalf of the petitioner have been
made by Mr. Neeraj Malhotra, while the respondent has been represented by
Ms. Girija Krishan Varma.

5. Mr. Malhotra submitted that, the impugned decision of the CIC deserved
to be set aside on the following grounds:

WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 5 of 18

(i) The impugned order had been passed in breach of principles of natural
justice in as much as no notice was issued in the second appeal dealt with by
the CIC qua the 2nd application of the respondent filed on 14.8.2009. Insofar
as the first appeal was concerned which arose out of the respondent's
application dated 14.7.2009, notice with regard to the said appeal was
received by the petitioner's office in Tehri, in the State of Uttrakhand in the
afternoon, on 26.2.2010, which was the day when, the appeal was fixed for
hearing. This notice was also received under the cover of the letter of the
respondent dated 22/23.02.2010. The petitioner, thus, did not have an
effective opportunity of representing its case.

(ii) The CIC by the impugned order had sustained the CPIO's stand to the
extent that only ACR ratings/grades need be supplied to the respondent
without the remarks of the Reporting and Reviewing Officer. The respondent
not having challenged that part of the order in the petitioner's writ petition, no
relief can be granted to her with respect to the same.

(iii) As regards the direction issued by CIC to disclose DPC minutes relating
to promotion from grades E-6 to E-7 for the year 2006 and grade E-7 to E-7A
for the years 2008-09; the same was erroneous in law as, it ignored the right
of the petitioner to deny the information in that behalf, since it fell within the
provisions of Sections 8(1) (d), (e) and (j) of the RTI Act. It was submitted
that, disclosure of DPC minutes (which included the ACR ratings and the
marks awarded at interview) would effect the competitive position of other
employees, and thus, stood excluded under the provisions of Section 8(1)(d)
of the RTI Act. That apart, it was submitted, that the petitioner held
information with regard to the grade and the marks obtained at the interview
in a fiduciary capacity and there being no demonstrable overweening public
interest, the said information also stood excluded under Section 8(1)(e) of the
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 6 of 18
RTI Act. Recourse was also taken to the provisions of Section 8(1)(j) of the
RTI Act, to contend that the information with regard to the ratings/grades
given by the DPC and/or the marks obtained in the interview by other
employees of the petitioner, was personal information, the disclosure of
which did not have any relationship to any public activity or interest and
furthermore, disclosure could lead to invasion of privacy of such third parties
i.e. the employees.

(iv) It was also contended that, the CIC could not have directed disclosure of
the impugned information without following the procedure prescribed under
Section 11 of the RTI Act.

(v) In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the
judgment of the Single Judge of this Court in RK Jain v. UOI & Anr., 2012
(279) ELT 16 (Del.) as also the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in the very same case titled as RK Jain v. UOI & Anr., 2012 VAD (Del) 443.
This apart, reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Girish Ramachandra Despandey v. CIC and Anr. 2012 (9) Scale

700.

6. On the other hand, Ms. Girija Krishan Varma made the following
submissions:

(i) Respondent has been waiting far too long for receipt of information
sought under the two applications filed by her. The petitioners on one pretext
or the other had been declining disclosure of information. It was submitted
that the information sought by the respondent was relevant in order to
demonstrate the discrimination which had been meted out to her post 2004
when, she had made a complaint of sexual harassment against the Senior
Manager (Personnel) working with the petitioner. It was contended that the
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 7 of 18
respondent was down-graded, in 2006 and 2007, precisely for this reason.
Therefore, the request made by the respondent, for being furnished her own
ACRs for the period 2004 to 2007.

(ii) The petitioner had notice of the appeals pending before the CIC. For
this purpose, reliance was placed on communication dated 18.1.2010 issued
to the respondent. It was sought to be contended that, since notice had been
issued to the respondent by the CIC, a similar notice would have been issued
to the petitioner as well. In any event, since the CIC by the said
communication dated 18.1.2010 had required the respondent to submit a
copy of the notice along with a copy of the second appeal to the petitioner,
the needful was done by dispatching the notice alongwith the appeal to the
petitioner, on 22.2.2010. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that, it had no
notice, and thus, the principles of natural justice were breached, is not made
out.

(iii) The submission on merits made by the petitioner was untenable for the
reason that there was overarching the public interest in the disclosure of the
information. The information was being sought to prove victimization and
harassment of the respondent by the officers of the petitioner; which is a
public authority. The minutes of the DPC are being sought to demonstrate
the iniquitous manner in which performance of the respondent has been
adjudged as against those who were promoted. The disclosure of
gradings/ratings of other employees would enable the respondent to compare
her position qua the others and thus establish the discrimination meted out to
her.

(iv) The information sought could not be excluded under Section 8(1)(d) as
the information was not of the nature which involved commercial confidence,
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 8 of 18
trade secret or intellectual property. Similarly, the information could not be
declined under Section 8(1)(e) as the relationship between the employer and
the employee was not a fiduciary relationship, as say, between a lawyer and
his client or between a doctor and his patient. The attempt to invoke the
provisions of Section 8(1)(j) should also fail as the CPIO was required to
determine as to whether the information sought was firstly personal in nature;
secondly, could cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual; and
thirdly, and more importantly, weigh whether disclosure of the information
was in public interest. The public interest element was sought to be stressed
based on her charge of sexual harassment by a Senior Manager (Personnel)
employed with the petitioner, who since then, according to the learned
counsel, had been promoted to the post of DGM.

(v) It was submitted that Section 11 would not have any application in the
present case as the said section applies, where information relates to or is
supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by such third
party. In other words, that unless information is titled as "confidential" when,
it is handed over to the recipient, the provisions of Section 11 do not get
triggered. It is contended that, on receipt of a query pertaining to a third
party, the CPIO has to give notice within five (5) days of a request being
received and it is only then that Section 11 comes into play. Both the CPIO
and the First Appellate Authority having failed to invoke provisions of
Section 11, the petitioner is estopped from taking recourse to the same.

(vi) Since the petitioner had delayed in supplying the information, it should
be visited with penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act.

(vii) Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions of
the CIC in the case of PK Saha v. Coal India Ltd. dated 23.10.2008, whereby
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 9 of 18
the CIC has taken a similar position vis-a-vis the DPC proceedings. Reliance
was also placed by the learned counsel on the following judgments:

7. After hearing counsels for parties and perusal of the record, what
emerges is as follows:

7.1. The respondent preferred two applications with the CPIO, the first one is
dated 14.7.2009, while the second application is dated 14.8.2009.

7.2. By virtue of the 1st application, information was broadly sought by the
respondent with regard to her ACRs spanning the period 2004 to 2009. In
response to this application, the petitioner supplied information with regard to
: the gradings/ratings which, the respondent received between the period
2004 to 2007. In addition, the ACR for the year 2008- 2009 was also
supplied, which obviously contained the rating for the said year as well. The
ACR for 2008-2009 was supplied on account of the directive contained in the
DOPT OM of 14.5.2009, which apparently the petitioner applied to itself.

7.3 The denial of ACRs for the period 2004 to 2007, was challenged by the
respondent with the First Appellate Authority. Since, the challenge was
repelled by the First Appellate Authority, an appeal was preferred with the
CIC. By the impugned order, insofar as this decision of the CPIO was
concerned, the CIC found no fault with it, and thus, sustained the decision
taken to deny the ACRs to the respondent for the period 2004 to 2007.

WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 10 of 18

7.4 As regards the 2nd application of the respondent dated 14.8.2009, which
concerned disclosure of information broadly qua minutes of the DPC
proceedings, the CIC by the very same impugned order directed the petitioner
to provide to the respondent, DPC minutes for the year 2006 with regard to
promotions made by the petitioner from grade E-6 to E-7, and those made, in
grade E-7 to E-7A, albeit for the years 2007 and 2009,
7.5 The petitioner claims that, it received no notice of the appeals from the
CIC. The petitioner in its rejoinder, however, has conceded that it did receive
intimation of the appeals having been fixed for hearing before the CIC in the
afternoon of 26.2.2010, albeit via a communication dated 22/23.02.2010, sent
by the respondent. According to the petitioner, the intimation was received at
its office located in Tehri, in the State of Uttrakhand and, therefore, sufficient
time was not available to make arrangements for its representation before the
CIC.

7.6 In addition, it is argued that the respondent, insofar as a 2nd application
dated 14.8.2009 was concerned, had bypassed the First Appellate Authority
and hence, the appeal qua the second application, filed before the CIC, was
not maintainable.

7.7 In regard to the above, the respondent, on the other hand, has filed a
copy of her appeal dated 9.10.2009, preferred with the First Appellate
Authority along with the registered AD card. It is the respondent's contention
that since there was no response of the First Appellate Authority, an appeal
was preferred with the CIC even vis-à-vis the 2nd application.

7.8 Therefore, the question, with regard to the alleged breach of the
principles of natural justice would boil down to whether the petitioner had
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 11 of 18
notice of the appeal and if it had notice of the appeals preferred by the
respondent, could it then have brought these facts to the notice of the CIC.

7.9 A perusal of the communication dated 8.1.2010, which is filed both by
the petitioner as well as respondent, would show that it was addressed by the
CIC to the respondent. The said communication was a notice of hearing,
which referred to the respondent's appeal dated 14.10.2009. Admittedly, this
was the appeal preferred by the respondent qua the decision rendered on the
1st application, by the CPIO. However, in the body of this communication
the office of the CIC advised the respondent to serve a copy of the said notice
along with a copy of her second appeal which, obviously pertained to the
decision of the CPIO in the 2nd application. It is not denied by the petitioner,
as noticed above, that it did receive a communication in that behalf from the
respondent, though on the date of hearing i.e. 26.2.2010 and, that too, at its
office at Tehri in the State of Uttrakhand.

7.10 Therefore, while the petitioner obtained knowledge of the fact that there
were two appeals which the respondent had filed, the knowledge was
received rather late. The petitioner, however, on its part, it appears took no
steps to approach the CIC between the afternoon of 26.2.2010 and 3.3.2010
when, the impugned order was passed. The petitioner being a public sector
undertaking had the necessary wherewithal to take steps to apprise the CIC
that it had received a notice with respect to the appeals, though rather late in
the day.

8. This, of course, is based on assumption that the petitioner received no
notice from the CIC; since the CIC is not before the Court, there is no way by
which this fact can be ascertained. What, however, does come through is
that, the petitioner took no steps after receipt of notice as it ought to have, to
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 12 of 18
defend its position before the CIC. Therefore, in a sense the petitioner is to
blame itself. There is no way of knowing whether, the CIC examined its
record with regard to service being effected on the petitioner as, the only
person who was heard on 26.2.2012 was, evidently the respondent.

8.1 As regards the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the
respondent had bypassed the First Appellate Authority qua the decision
reached by the CPIO on the 2nd application - the respondent, in my view, has
placed on record material which prima facie establishes that an appeal was
filed with the First Appellate Authority, on 9.10.2009, by means of recorded
delivery. The objection, if any, with regard to the same could have been taken
by the petitioner, if it was represented at the hearing held by the CIC on
26.2.2010.

9. While the learned counsel for the respondent has contended before me
that the respondent ought to have been supplied with the ACRs for the period
2004 to 2007, the respondent has not assailed that part of the order of the
CIC. In my view, while the contention of the respondent has merit, which is
that she cannot be denied information with regard to her own ACRs and that
information cannot fall in the realm of any of the exclusionary provisions
cited before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Section 8(1)(d),

(e) and (j), there is a procedural impediment, in as much as, there is no
petition filed to assail that part of the order passed by the CIC.

9.1. In my view, the right to obtain her own ACRs inheres in the respondent
which cannot be denied to the respondent under the provisions of Section
8(1)(d), (e) and (j) of the RTI Act. The ACRs are meant to inform an
employee as to the manner in which he has performed in the given period and
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 13 of 18
the areas which require his attention, so that he may improve his performance
qua his work.

9.2 That every entry in the ACR of an employee requires to be disclosed
whether or not an executive instruction is issued in that behalf - is based on
the premise that disclosure of the contents of ACR results in fairness in action
and transparency in public administration. See Dev Dutt vs Union of India
(2008) 8 SCC 725 at page 732, paragraph 13; page 733, paragraph 17; and at
page 737, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38.

9.3 Mr Malhotra sought to argue that, in Dev Dutt's case, the emphasis was
in providing information with regard to gradings and not the narrative. Thus
a submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason.

9.4 First, providing to an employee gradings without the narrative is like
giving a conclusion in judicial/quasi-judicial or even an administrative order
without providing the reasons which led to the conclusion. If the purpose of
providing ACRs is to enable the employee to assess his performance and to
judge for himself whether the person writing his ACR has made an objective
assessment of his work, the access to the narrative which led to the grading is
a must. [See State of U.P. Vs. Yamuna Shankar Misra and Anr., (1997) 4
SCC 7]. The narrative would fashion the decision of the employee as to
whether he ought to challenge the grading set out in the ACR.

9.5 Second, the fact that provision of ACRs is a necessary concomitant of a
transparent, fair and efficient administration is now recognized by the DOPT
in its OM dated 14.05.2009. The fact that the OM is prospective would not,
in my view, impinge upon the underlying principle the OM seeks to establish.
The only caveat one would have to enter, is that, while providing the contents
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 14 of 18
of the ACR the names of the Reviewing, Reporting and the Accepting Officer
will have to be redacted.

9.6 In the present case, as noticed above, while the respondent has been
furnished her ACRs for the year 2008-2009 she has been denied her ACRs
for 2004-2007. Both under service jurisprudence and having regard to the
provisions of the RTI Act, I am of the view that this information ought to
have been supplied to the respondent. The CIC has, in my view, wrongly
appreciated the law on the subject.

9.7 As a matter of fact, this aspect had been put to the learned counsel for
the petitioner, who in his usual fairness had agreed to consider the ACRs
being supplied for the remaining period to the respondent provided she did
not insist on information being supplied with regard to the DPC proceedings.

9.8 Since there was no consensus arrived at between the counsel for the
parties, I proceeded to hear the matter on both aspects. As indicated above,
while the CIC in my view has erred in law in denying ACRs for the period in
issue to the respondent in the petitioner's action, no relief in that behalf, can
be granted to the respondent, in the present writ petition. The respondent, in
my view, would be free to take recourse to a proper proceeding in that behalf,
in case the petitioner decides to adhere to its stand of not furnishing the ACRs
for the period 2004-2007.

9.9 On the other aspect with which the petitioner is aggrieved, I am not
persuaded by the argument of the petitioner that the information with regard
to the DPC proceedings would fall within the exception provided under
Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act. In my view, information with regard to DPC
proceedings cannot come within the ambit and scope of any of three
exclusions i.e. commercial confidence, trade secret and intellectual property
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 15 of 18
rights. Though, I am conscious of the fact that the information referred to in
Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act is not confined to the three types of
information referred to above - no amount of liberality adopted in that behalf
would bring ACRs within its ambit. Section 8(1)(d) would, in my view,
include such information which takes colour from the expression commercial
confidence, trade secrets and intellectual property.

9.10 The information regarding assessment of employees by a DPC is neither
commercial in nature nor is it a trade secret or intellectual property which
could harm the competitive position of another employee i.e. a third party.
The expression competitive position of a third party i.e. other employees of
the petitioner has to be read in consonance with the nature and the kind of
information to which the said expression applies. None of the expressions
used i.e. commercial secrets, trade secret and intellectual property would
envelop the assessment of a DPC carried out in a service environment.

10. As to whether DPC proceeding is an information which is made
available to the petitioner in its fiduciary relationship or is an information
which is personal to the employees is an aspect which is not dealt with, in the
CIC's order. As regards invocation of Section 8(1)(e) is concerned, which
deals with the aspect of fiduciary relationship, the petitioner had sown the
seed of objection as it was, the ground taken, by the CPIO in its order of
14.9.2009 and, therefore, perhaps ought to have been dealt with CIC.

10.1 The same, however, cannot be said with regard to the objection taken on
the ground that the information was "personal information" which, had no
relationship with any public activity or interest or that it would cause
unwanted invasion into the privacy of other employees as envisaged under
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. The order of the CIC is cryptic and sans
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 16 of 18
reasons. The impugned direction contained in the CIC's order in paragraph 6
only adverts to the fact that such a directive had been issued in other cases
and, therefore, the petitioner ought to be supplied information with regard to
DPC proceedings. Reasons are a link between the material placed before a
judicial/quasi-judicial authorities and the conclusions it arrives at. (See
Union of India vs Mohan lal Capoor, 1974 (1) SCR 797 at page 819(H) and
820 (B, C & D)]. The failure to supply reasons infuses illegality in the order,
and thus deprives it of legal efficacy. This is exactly what emerges on a bare
reading of the impugned order.

10.2 I must, however, note, at this stage, the contention of Mr. Malhotra that
the information contained in the DPC minutes would advert to the ACR
gradings of the other employees who may wish to object to the said
information being disclosed to the respondent, and if, the CIC was of the
view that such information ought to be disclosed in public interest,
notwithstanding the intrusion into the private domain of other employees, the
procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act ought to have been
followed. The argument being: notice ought to have been issued to the
employees who would then, have taken a call, as to whether or not they
would want to oppose the disclosure of information pertaining to them,
contained in the DPC proceedings.

11. Having regard to the contentions raised before me by learned counsel for
the parties, I am of the view that the interest of justice would be served if the
direction of the CIC contained in paragraph 6 of the impugned order is set
aside and the matter remanded for a denovo hearing by the CIC. It is ordered
accordingly. The CIC shall hear and dispose of the appeal of the respondent
which arises from her 2nd application dated 14.8.2009 after giving due notice
to the petitioner to file a reply and put forth its stand before it through its
WP(C) No.2506/2010 Page 17 of 18
representative or counsel. The petitioner would be free to raise objections,
amongst others, with regard to provisions of Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 of
the RTI Act as they are only an issue of law, which are based on the very
same set of facts, on the basis of which, objection under Section 8(1)(e) is
taken by the petitioner. The CIC would also have regard to the judgments
cited by the parties including the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Girish Ramchander Despandey Vs. CIC and Anr., (2012) 9 SCALE 700,
and the judgment of this Court in Arvind Kejriwal vs CPIO Officer & Anr.
183 (2011) DLT 662 and RK Jain vs UOI, 2012 V AD (DEL) 443 as
affirmed by the Division Bench Judgments of this Court.

12. For this purpose, parties will appear before the CIC on 15.03.2013. CIC
will expeditiously dispose of the matter, though not later than eight (8) weeks
from the first date of appearance.

13. The respondent shall also be free to take recourse to an appropriate
remedy as may be available to her, in accordance with law if, she wishes to
assail that part of the judgment of the CIC, whereby it sustained the decision
of the CPIO to decline her request for being supplied her own ACRs for the
period 2004 to 2007.