In January 2006, L.K. Advani, then Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, walked out from the house. The reason? Muslim headcount in the Army as proposed by Sachar Committee. But, why this much hue and cry over a simple matter and walkout? Was there anything to hide? Why Mr. Advani & Company was so afraid by Muslim headcount in Indian Army? The book under review can give you an idea, why it could have been?

This book covers a wider theme of the religious composition of the armed forces, the paramilitary and the police and documents data on marginal representation of Muslims in the Army and other Security & Intelligence Services especially on decisive positions till 2008. In fact, it answers some of the crucial questions like – Who runs IndiaÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s security sector consisting of ministries of home, intelligence and defence affairs? The book is written by Dr. Omar Khalidi, an independent scholar and a staff member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), United States of America.

Colonial Hangover

Tracing the changes and continuity in recruitment and other policies in the Army both in colonial period and since the Independence, the author concludes, Ã¢â‚¬Å“As noted before, just before independence the colonial administration agreed to throw open the army to Indians of all the caste and communitiesÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ (H)owever, in practice, the matter remained where it was.Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 37). And this claim is fully backed by data. He further points, Ã¢â‚¬Å“It is interesting to note that during the colonial era, the army used Urdu written in Roman letters to Ã¢â‚¬Å“solveÃ¢â‚¬Â the language issues by using neither Devnagari nor Urdu script for written communication. In post-independence era, Sanskritized Hindi replaced Urdu, exemplified by the title change of military news magazine Fauji Akhbar to Sainik Samachar !Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 44)

Saffronisation of Army?

The author poses questions like: What is the influence of the ideology of Hindutva in the armed forces?, Do the majority of the rank and file share the Hindutva vision of India? And will the military remain the last reliable line of defence in worsening communal relations, since the police uniforms are tainted with partnership. To answer, the author quotes J. S Nadkarani, Ã¢â‚¬Å“Sympathy for Hindutava is far more wide spread amongst senior officers than was suspected. One has reason to believe that under their immaculate uniforms, a large number of senior officers wear saffron vest. It is quite easy to spot them. They invariably start their conversation by stating that they are really secular at heart. They have never believed in caste or creed. But one must be fair. DonÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t you think we are pampering the Minorities? Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 79). The authorÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s suspicion grows as he sees some 50 top retired officers of the army, navy and air force joining BJP between May 1991 and March 1998 stating the typical Ã¢â‚¬ËœnationalisticÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ reasons: BJPÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s tough stand against minorities and Pakistan. He also cites the incident of 31 May 1999, when the Defence Minister (in BJP led government) took the unprecedented step of taking senior officers to brief the BJP National Executive (p. 80).

Khaki and Communal Violence

One of the most important aspects that the author in this book examines is the impacts of under-representation of ethnic and religious groups especially Muslims in this sectorÃ¢â‚¬â€low percentage in Police and Biased/Partisan/Active Hostility. The author argues, Ã¢â‚¬Å“Even though the police conduct in the riots during the Babri mosque or other similar riots may be dismissed as merely partisanship, dereliction of duty, negligence and so forth, there are a number of instances in which the police was the perpetrators of unprovoked violence against innocent and unarmed Muslims. The two notorious cases are from Moradabad in 1980 and Meerut in 1987. Similarly the police was an active participant in the 1992-93 Bombay killings of Muslims as documented by more than one organization. Later in March 1993 and during Gujarat pogrom, February-March 2002, when police took active part in killing or leading the mobs attacking MuslimsÃ¢â‚¬Â (p. 140-41). The author has dealt this issue at length.

Muslim hence Ã¢â‚¬ËœUnreliableÃ¢â‚¬â„¢

The last but most important chapter of the book documents the structure of communal biasness in intelligence agencies. In 1970, M K Dhar, a former joint director of IB confessed that his anti-Muslim perceptions were further strengthened by what I was thought at the Anand Parvat training facility of the Intelligence BureauÃ¢â‚¬Â¦I was told in no uncertain terms the Muslims were not to be trusted.Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 157).The book also details about the un-written policy of non-recruitment of Muslims in Intelligence Services. And former CBI Director, Vijay Karan confirms it Ã¢â‚¬Å“It is a sort of an unwritten code. Everybody knows about it and it is accepted as a fact.Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 157) According to senior journalist Saikat Datta, Ã¢â‚¬Å“from 1969 till today the 1,000-strong RAW has avoided recruiting any Muslim officers.Ã¢â‚¬Â (p. 157) This chapter also deals with the ethnic composition of the Paramilitary Forces, Central Reserve Police and Rapid Action Forces.

Though written in an academic fashion — of course it was needed while writing a book on sensitive issue like this — the language of the book is lucid and easy to read for even a normal reader. The book is an eye opening work in many ways and unravels many popular beliefs like the army and intelligence agencies are secular. The work is must for libraries and research institutions. Civil and human rights activists can hardly afford to miss it.

Minority Rights theorists have drawn our attention towards essentially cultural rights of ethnically differentiated minority groups living within the precincts of the Ã¢â‚¬Ëœnation-stateÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. Perforce, culture remains the site of contestation with groups vying for recognition, essentially, concession from the Ã¢â‚¬Ëœnational cultureÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. In India, far from ensuring equity and equal citizenship to its vulnerable minorities, such a conceptualisation centred on the discourse of cultural rights and autonomy has only allowed successive regimes to dodge the agenda of empowerment.

To all intents and purposes, such state practices border on what can be termed, Ã¢â‚¬ËœminorityismÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. Different from the right wing invocation of minorityism as essentially Ã¢â‚¬ËœappeasementÃ¢â‚¬â„¢, the term is used here to refer to the secular stateÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s refrain from making any committed advance towards minority empowerment, its flirtations with culturalisms of various kinds while in effect, shying away from issues of material progress, of distributive justice, of participation and share in national wealth. State policies are thus oriented more towards disregarding the instrumentality of minority identities. However, intrinsic to Ã¢â‚¬ËœminorityismÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ is also the occasional showers of sops that make no remarkable impact on the living conditions of the beneficiaries.

In this perspective Ã¢â‚¬ËœminorityismÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ of the state implies, privileging questions of culture and identity over and above everyday issues of survival. It thus seeks succour in the reification of communities and groups considered outside the national mainstream. Minorityism is inherent when the democratic state, instead of deepening citizenship and aiding the emergence of sovereign and self-legislating individuals from among minority groups, negotiates and speaks through deliberately created and pampered Ã¢â‚¬Ëœcultural spokesmenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ who thrive on perpetuating cultural boundaries and claiming to be the sole and authentic interlocutors of community consciousness

.The statecraft informed by minorityism consciously ignores internal differentiation and persisting hierarchies within minority cultures. In the Indian case, for example, caste, class or gender issues are often obfuscated while engaging with the community as a monolith. Consequently, the democratic state betrays its moral obligation of unleashing the process of democratization and addressing the concerns of Ã¢â‚¬Ëœminorities within minorityÃ¢â‚¬â„¢.

The Sachar Committee, with its emphasis on issues of equity, marked a clear departure from such minortyism. Three years on, after the Report was submitted, the state seems to have reverted to Ã¢â‚¬ËœminorityismÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ of the past in its implementation of the ReportÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s recommendations.

The constitution of the Sachar Committee to study specifically the Muslims of the country itself was a welcome rupture from past practices most of which (such as PMÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s 15-Point Programme) had remained half-hearted attempts that only served to conceal the social reality behind the mask of a generic term, Ã¢â‚¬ËœminorityÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. This euphemism has often led to a mismatch between scheme outlays, target groups and actual beneficiaries. This is notwithstanding the fact that the specificity of the Muslim case, as demonstrated by the Report, necessitates added attention. In 2001, Muslims constituted 13.4% of the countryÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s population and more than 70% of its minority population, but in terms of human development indicators they lagged behind all other religious communities of the country; their literacy rate being the lowest at 59.1 when compared to Christians (80.3), Sikhs (69.4), Buddhists (72.7) and Jains (94.1). This seems to have affected their work participation rate too which at 47.4 was the poorest when contrasted with the national average or the figures returned by other communities.

Despite the CommitteeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s insistence, the follow up action that the UPA claims to have undertaken suffers from anomalies of the past. The specificity of the Muslim case continues to be obfuscated with the usage, minority. A case in point is UPAÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s flagship scheme, Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MSDP) for 90 minority concentrated districts in the country through which the government promises to address much of the infrastructural deficits faced by Muslims. One, the definitional ambiguity has only led to its dilution. Backward districts with minority share between 20 to 50% have been identified; as a result, the scheme would reach out to only 30% of the Muslim population of the country, the bulk of the Muslim population remaining outside its purview. Further, the acceptance of a district-wise approach rather than minority-concentrated cluster approach negates the possibility of the scheme actually meeting the needs of the target group. The disempowered Muslim community within such identified districts would scarcely muster enough influence to ensure resource allocation in localities and villages of their residence. Till date only 47 districts have been declared to be covered by the scheme.

Critical to the CommitteeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s portrayal of reality has been the comprehension of religious communities as cognitive categories across which statistical models or demographic comparisons could be made. In this view, religious communities are not merely bearers of distinct cultural identity but also constitute significant variables for development studies, thus the term Ã¢â‚¬Ëœsocio-religious categories (SRCs). Till 2004, one of the reasons why the Census of India desisted from reporting socio-economic data disaggregated along religious groups was on grounds that religion did not comprise a constitutional category, particularly for affirmative action. So while population data could be gathered or mysteriously religion specific fertility data could be published, the same about work participation, economic activity, employment, literacy etc were denied. In fact, one of the major roadblocks that the Committee had faced during the process of assessing Muslim share in public employment or their participation in beneficiary oriented schemes was the conspiratorial refrain from government offices and establishments of the unavailability of data disaggregated along religious communities. The reasons cited being far and wide. The army, suspected to be a major defaulter in accommodating Muslims, refused to provide such data citing national interest and security concerns. Muslim representation in the higher rungs of the judiciary was also kept a secret as its revelation, it was argued, would sully its image. Many state governments, including those run by Ã¢â‚¬Ëœsecular partiesÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ declined to provide information regarding percentage of Muslim prisoners taking refuge in the pretext of Ã¢â‚¬ËœsensitivityÃ¢â‚¬â„¢.

The Committee, therefore, strongly recommended the creation and maintenance of a National Data Bank (NDB) that, it was hoped, would serve both as a data source, and more importantly, as a ledger to ensure adequate share to various socio-religious categories. The NDB, in its view, was to be an autonomous body with considerable authority that would make it obligatory on the part of ministries and departments of both central and state governments to provide relevant information on employment, participation in schemes, credit flows and other indicators of human development. Far from it, the governmentÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s response is to kill the spirit behind the idea and reduce it to a mere statistical exercise that would base itself mainly on the sample surveys of NSSO. Muslim representation in various government departments, ministries, public and private sectors, host of beneficiary oriented schemes, bank credit that the Committee expected to be maintained in the NDB continue to remain outside its scope.

The Committee displayed extreme caution by accepting the complex nature of Ã¢â‚¬ËœIndian socio-economic fabricÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ that is constituted apart from religion, by caste, economic, regional, linguistic, gender and other differentials. The SRCs, therefore are not assumed to be homogenous collectivities but driven by caste, class or regional variations. At the outset, the Report had cautioned against the tendency to stereotype Muslims as a monolith and acknowledged the presence of entrenched social and economic cleavages within the community. It thus argued for a multi-pronged strategy and careful selection of the target groups even among Muslims. For example, the presence of status differentiation along caste linesÃ¢â‚¬â€high caste ashrafs, the clean occupational castes belonging to the ajlaf category and also the arzals, the Ã¢â‚¬ËœuncleanÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ onesÃ¢â‚¬â€find mentioned. The recognition of Arzals, hitherto denied, strengthens the case of Dalit Muslims for their inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes. In this light, the Committee desisted from recommending blanket reservation for all Muslims; while making a strong case for the creation of a separate provision for the Arzals, the lowest of the lot. By making no commitment towards amending the discriminatory provisions of Article 341, the UPA seems to have succumbed to the interests of Muslim Ã¢â‚¬Ëœcultural spokesmenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ on the one hand and the Hindu right wing on the other, both of whom are one in denying the dalit Muslims their due.

Retrospectively, the CommitteeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s approach seems to have been aimed towards demystifying the Ã¢â‚¬ËœMuslim questionÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ so far confounded by misplaced notions of a Ã¢â‚¬Ëœpampered minorityÃ¢â‚¬â„¢Ã¢â‚¬â€recipient of disproportionate allocation of resources and political sops on the basis of its sheer electoral strength. The right wing discourse of Muslim appeasement that for a period tended to capture the national commonsense was put to rest forever by quantifying Muslim marginality that impacts almost all aspects of their lifeÃ¢â‚¬â€education, employment, health, access to bank credit or infrastructureÃ¢â‚¬â€almost parallel to the dalit situation in the country. Acknowledging the widespread perception of discrimination that existed among minorities, and in this case, among Muslims of India, the Committee felt the need for an adequate mechanism that would Ã¢â‚¬Ëœgive full satisfaction to the minorities that any denial of equal opportunities or bias or discrimination in dealing with them,Ã¢â‚¬Â¦will immediately be attended to and redress givenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. It recommended the institution of an Equal Opportunity Commission to Ã¢â‚¬Ëœlook into the grievances of the deprived groupsÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. Citing the example of UKÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Race Relation Act, 1976, the Committee expressed the hope that such a tool would serve to reassure the minorities that any unfair act against them would invite the Ã¢â‚¬Ëœvigilance of the lawÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. Three years down the line, while the said Commission is still to see the light of the day, in the deliberations that have followed, its scope already seems to have been substantially watered down. The Expert Group constituted to examine its viability, in a recently submitted report, emphasised that the Commission should Ã¢â‚¬Ëœfocus on advisory, advocacy and auditing functions rather than grievance redressalÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ with no penal powers that could be exercised against the offenders. In this light, the Commission, in all probability, would be another ineffectual body on the familiar lines of National Human Rights Commission or National Minorities Commission.

The Sachar report demolished the right wing discourse that had thrived on perpetuating stereotypes regarding high Muslim fertility, reluctance towards contraceptive usage, propensity towards Madarsas etc. Analysis of population figures revealed a constant decline in Muslim fertility and growing tendency among Muslims to adopt contraceptive usage. Findings revealed that Madarsas cater to only 3-4% of the Muslim children in the school going age. That this too was an imposed choice as it corresponded largely to the absence of institutions of formal and modern education in their area. That economic disparity and lack of infrastructure were the main causes for educational backwardness could be established by the fact that there was very high enrolment rate among Muslim children but a significantly low level of retention.

However, culturological minorityism continues to inform the stateÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s approach towards attending to the educational needs of the community. Intervention in and through the Madarsas remains its key educational strategy for the community. In the process it allows for the perpetuation of myths regarding Muslim preference for religious instruction; yet the allocation betrays sincerity of purpose. The ill-conceived and meagrely funded Madarsa Modernisation Scheme (106 crores between 2002-2006 to cover nearly 5000 Madarsas) is to be rechristened as Ã¢â‚¬ËœQuality Improvement in Madarsa EducationÃ¢â‚¬â„¢. In the absence of any pledge for enhanced funding or programmatic change, the scheme remains literally Ã¢â‚¬Ëœold wine in new bottleÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ and therefore condemned to failure. In the year 2008-09, as per the report of Ministry of Minority Affairs, a paltry sum of Rs. 49.50 crore was allocated under the scheme to cover 14539 Madarsa teachers across 14 states. Even if we ignore the overhead costs involved, this comes to an average of barely Rs. 2800 per teacher that could have gone as monthly salary. So much for the Prime Minister and his governmentÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s concern for the minorities of the country.

Apart from the Madarsas, the government is still to come up with any programme that could respond to the CommitteeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s singular stress on formal and modern education to Muslim children except for an advisory to state governments to open upper primary schools in minority concentrated villages under the existing Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. This again is not backed by any additional budgetary provision, thus suggesting the casualness of the government on the issue. Besides, apart from the upper primary, there is absolutely no follow up on the recommendation to open government high schools, centres of higher learning in Muslim populated areas or initiating diversity-incentive in existing institutions of advance education. Scholarships have been announced with much fanfare by the Ministry of Minority Affairs however, they can only be dubbed as a cruel joke–Rupees 400 per month to a day scholar and 800 for a hosteller pursuing degree/post-graduation in a technical or professional course.

In its approach towards comprehending the reality, the report is largely an exposition of the living conditions of a Muslim citizen. As observed earlier, the report addresses the citizenship concerns of a community, its performance judged in the light of its ability to have attained substantial citizenship, political power and agency. If we take T.H MarshallÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s take on citizenship as embodying civil, social and political rights, the Sachar Committee Report stands out as a text that exclusively confines itself to the given spheres of a MuslimÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s life. Quite consciously so, the realm of culture remains, for all practical purposes, outside the CommitteeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s lens. The Committee partially attended to the deep-seated powerlessness among Muslim communities of the country. In his Political Representation of Muslims in India, Iqbal Ansari, brought to the fore Muslim under-representation in politics. The Sachar Committee noted that even in positions where methods of selection is nomination, rather than elections, Muslims have been denied their true representation. In the course of its investigation the Committee made the startling discovery that areas of high Muslim concentration and of average to low SC/ST population were declared reserved for SCs and STs. It had expressed the hope that the Ã¢â‚¬ËœDelimitation CommissionÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ would look into the issue and take remedial measures. Instead, the delimitation exercise has redrawn the boundaries in a manner that has further fragmented the Muslim electorate, plausibly a factor in the erosion of Muslim representationÃ¢â‚¬â€the number of Muslim MPs falling from an already low 37 in 2004 to a pitiful 29 in 2009.

This underscores the fact that despite the current philosophical engagement with culturally marked, differentiated or multi-cultural citizenships that focus specifically on protection of minority cultures, in the Indian situation, citizenship claims of minority groups extends beyond claiming cultural rights. The discourse on minority rights therefore needs to unshackle itself from enclosures of culture and identity and persevere issues of material deprivation, resource allocation and equity in the distribution of power; between cultural collectivities and also within them. In this light, the orientation of the state requires thorough interrogation.

(Excerpts from the paper presented at the National Conference on Ã¢â‚¬ËœMuslim Alienation: Manifestation and ChallengesÃ¢â‚¬â„¢, November 17th-18th, 2009, Jamia Millia Islamia. The writer teaches at Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi)

A Singapore journalist says both major parties in India must abandon increasing communalism

“Some countries are united by a common language; India has around fifteen major languages and numberless minor ones. Nor are its people united by race, religion or cultureÃ¢â‚¬Â¦Does India exist? If it doesn’t, the explanation is to be found in a single word: communalism. The politics of religious hatred.”

In reading Dr Khalidi’s article, “Why is India not a Secular State“, I find that he has presented irrefutable points to back his basic premise. My difficulty is largely with the wording of the title and the conclusive paragraph of his meaningful essay.

Yes, in many ways the Muslim and Christian minorities have suffered unequal treatment at the hands of the state in India. Sikhs suffered only in one phase for a few years mostly in reaction to their own militancy. After that the state moved to ensure that Sikhs do not get away from the Hindu fold. Continue reading Is India Really A Secular State?

There is always a big gap between theory and practice, theology and history. Indian constitution, no doubt, is one of the best in the world. It is truly secular in spirit so much so it was secular even when word secular was not added to it until 1975 i.e. during emergency. If it were truly implemented India would be an ideal country to live in especially for minorities, both religious as well as linguistic. Continue reading How Secular Is India Today?

The cancer of communalism and bigotry in South Asia continues to haunt us. These days, the Muslims are once again a subject of intense, though not always fair, scrutiny in India: their loyalties are being questioned and many are potential terrorists if not already abettors of violence. The post 9/11 world has contributed to the demonising of the Muslim identity and history to surreal heights. Continue reading Ghalib: Ode to Benaras

Sixty-one years ago as the independent sovereign nation of India dawned on the global horizon, its leaders led by a visionary Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru boldly declared that the new nation will be a secular democracy. In these sixtyone years, despite frequent travails and tribulations in an ethnically and religiously diverse nation, where at least six major religions and thirteen major languages flourish, as IndiaÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s neighours have faltered, India has continued to thrive as a modern, secular democracy. Continue reading India: A Secular Democracy Strains For Balance

Kishore Budha

News narratives are complex, especially during times of crises. Journalism professional values often call for striking a balance between the various demands of the sociology of journalism with a focus on balance and fairness. This is not a simple case of reporting or copy editing, but works at various filtering mechanisms such as newsroom culture, biases and ideology, shared values, competition etc.Continue reading Delhi Shootout: Hindustan Times’s Complex Narrative

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