Preparing the Attack

The Planning Begins

The attack upon the Gilbert Islands was an early experience in
amphibious
operations and the first atoll operation in the Central Pacific Area.
Men,
materiel, and methods were chosen in a series of crucial
decisions
by a planning staff which had to anticipate every aspect of the
operation.
Once the landing forces arrived at their objectives, 2,000 miles from
base,
they had to win with what they brought.

Planning was undertaken by several staff groups. The general staff
of
the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, that of the
Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA), and that of the 27th Infantry Division
were
all implicated. The staff of the 27th Division were acquainted with
their
mission in a joint conference with the staff of CinCPOA, early in
August
1943, and set about studying a reorganization to fit its requirements.
The whole operation was given the code name GALVANIC,
and the Army
portion was designated as KOURBASH. Tarawa,
Nauru, and Apamama were
first selected as the objectives. The Army's mission was to be Nauru.
For
the next two months, 27th Division planning centered upon Nauru.

Analysis of the naval problems eventually caused the original
mission
to be shifted from Nauru to Makin. Nauru lay so far to the west that a
supporting naval force there would be dangerously separated from
another
committed at Tarawa and Apamama. A great tactical advantage would thus
be offered to any strong, intercepting Japanese force. Nauru was also
so
large and well defended that a larger body of troops than could be
transported
would be needed to gain possession of it. The decision to confine the
operation
to the central Gilberts was made known to 27th Division Headquarters

--7--

on 28 September. Abruptly its planning was transferred to
capturing
Makin. Only six weeks remained in which to get ready.

The new mission required redefinition of the force necessary. On
29
August a first draft of a reorganized 27th Division Landing Force bad
been
submitted to the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, calling for
attachment to the division of several units to assist in landing
operations
and to support the ensuing action. This draft had to be amended.
Previous
planning was not entirely wasted but its revision had to be complete.
The
submarine Nautilus, with the 27th Division's assistant G-2,
Capt.
Donald M. Neuman, aboard, cruised in the vicinity of Makin, taking
through
the periscope rolls of pictures which included the entire west shore of
Makin. Mosaics from the Seventh Air Force photographic reconnaissance
flights
of 23 July 1942, 20 February 1943, and 11 July 1943, and pictures taken
during a raid by carrier-based planes on 18-19 September 1943, were
used
to establish the strength and position of enemy defenses. The report of
the Marines (Carlson's Raiders) on their night invasion

Map No.3: Makin Atoll

--8--

of 16/17 August 1942 added more useful data. To Oahu came
two former
residents at Makin, Lt. Comdr. Heyen of the Royal Australian Navy and
Pvt.
Fred C. Narruhn of the 1st Fiji Infantry. The latter bad been born on
Makin;
both were to accompany the expedition. With these new sources of
information,
new plans were devised which fitted the conditions at Makin.

Makin Atoll

Makin atoll is an irregular formation of reefs and islands around a
large lagoon, approximately triangular in shape
(Map No. 3).
The northern side is a reef 17 miles long, running
east and west between islands, The western side, about 14 miles from
tip
to tip, consists of small islands, a reef broken by several channels
into
the lagoon, and the western end of Butaritari Island. The remainder of
Butaritari, and the island of Kuma northeast of it, stretch for some 13
miles to the eastern corner of the atoll.

The main passage into the lagoon runs through the reef at its
southwest
corner, passing just north of the northwestern tip of Butaritari.
Another
near the northern corner is sufficiently deep but is almost blocked by
islets in the lagoon. Other channels are suitable only for small boats.
Numerous islets are scattered about the inland water, so that
navigational
difficulties and beach conditions alike favor the use of the
southwestern
portion for anchorage.

None of the other islands is as large or important as Butaritari,
on
which the Japanese had developed a seaplane base. Butaritari is shaped
like a long, bending ribbon; its western end resembles a fishtail, or
the
armrest of a crutch, with two main points projecting westward from the
central shore, forming there a shallow curve, As one goes eastward from
this shore, the main body of the island narrows abruptly. It averages
500
yards from ocean to lagoon, and at some points is much less. Butaritari
and Kuma are connected by a reef, one side of which is high enough to
permit
crossing on foot at low tide.

Heavy surf beats on the southern shore of Butaritari, exposed as
it
is to the open sea.
(See illustration.)
From the northern shore, where the water is quieter, a wide reef
covered
with sticky mud extends into the lagoon from 500 to 1,500 feet. At the
western end of the island the smoother sections of the beach are very
widely

--9--

BUTARITARI from the southwest as seen from navy bombers opening the
action on D Day. At left are RED Beach 1 (A) and
RED Beach 2 (B). The West
Tank Barrier clearing (W) and YELLOW Beach (Y)
appear at right. Later site
of our artillery on Ukiangong Point (U).

separated from each other, and narrow, while jagged coral pinnacles
make an approach to them an occasion for dexterous navigation. They are
freer of heavy surf than the southern beaches and were believed during
the planning for the attack on Makin to offer suitable access,
regardless
of the coral obstacles, to the island itself. The Navy, whose task it
would
be to convey the assault troops to the

--10--

beaches, was satisfied that "landing boats could get ashore
there at
any time." The lagoon reef was also deemed to be no obstacle. "LST's
(Landing
ship, Tank) could stem the edge of the reef at low water springs, to
effect
the direct landing of vehicles. LCI's (Landing Craft, Infantry), DUKWs,
and Alligators could get ashore at all states of tides," according to
their estimate.

--11--

The islands are so flat that they afford no natural points
Of observation,
and so low that after rains, extensive areas, especially in the west,
are
covered by shallow ponds surrounded by marshland
(Map No. 4).
Butaritari and Kuma Islands were those on which
the natives lived the year around. Before the war copra had been the
principal
export; coconut palms are widely dispersed but at various points so
predominant
as to seem like cultivated groves. For food the natives raise bobai
plants, which they grow in pits.

Bobai pits were known to be more numerous near the
villages.
With soft banks and mucky bottoms from which the vegetation rose
several
feet to a level approximating that of the growth around them, these
pits
were recognized as substantial obstacles to foot soldiers and tanks.
Their
exact locations were unknown. Elsewhere, especially along the lagoon
shore
and at the edges of the ponds, mangroves and salt brush are found. The
terrain seemed likely to limit vehicles more than it would the foot
soldiers,
who could move forward under the ceiling of coconut palm branches or
through
the clearings and marshes, even if with difficulty. Inland from the
western
shore the firmest route for vehicles was the island highway and the
lagoon
beach. At low tide the reef itself is bared and could be used for the
passage
of wheeled vehicles.

The island's main highway is unpaved and narrow at most points.
Crossing
the marshes it resembles a causeway bordered by coconut palms. In the
villages
which it connects, it widens to two laces along the grass-roofed huts.
It is made of coral sand and is well-drained. From Ukiangong village on
the southwestern point, it runs northeastward to the lagoon shore and
along
that to the eastern end of the island; its route passes, therefore,
through
Butaritari village, near the island anchorage, across the bases of the
four wharves which jut into the lagoon near the anchorage, and through
the eastern village of Tanimaiaki. About 1,700 islanders, Melanesian
and
Polynesian, were known to live on Butaritari and Kuma, and with them,
before
the arrival of the Japanese, a score of Europeans and halfcastes.
Scattered
hamlets are connected with the main highway by secondary roads and
traits.
In the central portion of the island, such a narrow, unsurfaced road
runs
close along the ocean shore, and is connected with the main highway by
cross-island roads. Paths and trails branch out to points and coves,
but
except for a few, their location was not known to the invaders before
the
occupation.

--12--

Map No. 4: Butaritari Island (Western Half)

Air photographs of Butaritari Island revealed certain
features very
clearly. About 3,000 yards from the western end of the island lay a
clearing
from lagoon to ocean, a bare strip within which an antitank trap had
been
dug for most of its length. Its counterpart lay eastward approximately
two more miles, crossing the island somewhat west of its center.
Between
these two clearings the Japanese were known to have concentrated their
principal installations and to have built their main defenses. Between
them, also pushing out into the lagoon, the photographs showed three
wharves
of varying length, while a fourth, east of the easternmost clearing,
ran
from a point outside the fortified area.

The westernmost pier runs from a base about 300 yards east of the
West
Tank Barrier. Known as On Chong's Wharf, it was built like the others
by
the British as a high-water structure, for it extends only 400 feet and
is unusable at low tide. One thousand yards further east is King's
Wharf,
the main structure, projecting 1,000 feet into the lagoon and thus
clearing
the reef. At its tip it has several spurs, to one of which the Japanese
attached two seaplane ramps. Between its base and that of On Chong's
Wharf,
a wide sandspit protrudes sufficiently to create a small cove rimmed by
a smooth sandy beach adjacent to King's Wharf. Some 800 yards farther
east,
the third wharf springs from a wide base. Like On Chong's Wharf, this
structure,
which was known as Stone Pier, is dry at low tides, for it is only 500
feet long. At the base of each of the wharves and on the sandspit were
buildings, some of which had been erected in the days of British
occupation.
A concrete church which had protected Carlson's Raiders from Japanese
light
gunfire lies about 200 yards southwest of Stone Pier, and a long
concrete
native hospital is located along the beach northeast of Stone Pier.

A fourth pier, long, but of inferior construction and damaged by
storms,
was left outside the "citadel" area by the Japanese when they planned
the
fortifications. Although it stretched 1,750 feet into the lagoon from a
point 1,250 yards eastward from Stone Pier, it had not seemed worth
repairing
and using. The East Tank Barrier was therefore constructed just beyond
the base of Stone Pier, about 1,000 yards short of this Government
Wharf.

In the buildings around the base of Stone Pier, Carlson's Raiders
found
a center of Japanese activity on the night of their raid (16/17 August,
1942), In the period since that destructive visitation, the

--13--

Map No. 5: Attack from the West, 20 November 1943

Japanese had greatly increased their installations and defenses, but
the trees and other concealment left the exact character of these works
to be ascertained by the invaders in the course of the assault.

The aerial photographs also showed two sharp indentations of the
ocean
shore. On the eastern side of Ukiangong Point, the southwestern
projection
of Butaritari, a wide, deep bay has been worn. Again, at almost the
exact
midway point in the southern coast, the ocean has carved out a deep
Bight,
averaging over 100 yards in width and extending inward 600 yards. At
this
point, therefore, the width

--14--

of the island is reduced to 150 yards, despite the
projection of a knob
into the lagoon opposite one part of the Bight.

Although estimates of the number of Japanese forces on Makin
varied,
the 27th Division anticipated finding there 800 troops, operating 4
heavy
and 4 medium antiaircraft guns, from 20 to 40 machine guns, and the
rifles
of one company. The enemy's prepared positions were understood to be in
the area south of the wharves between the two tank barrier defense.
systems,
and in an outer perimeter paralleling the shore at the western end of
Butaritari.
The operations' overlay map for invasion from the RED
Beaches circled four
strongpoints at fairly regular intervals from the land separating the
two
RED Beaches to the southwestern point
(Map No. 5).
Ukiangong village was also reported to be the site of military
activity, probably defended by several machine guns.

The proximity of Makin to the airfields and seaplane bases at
Tarawa,
Mili, Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, Nauru, and Kwajalein made enemy air
strikes
from them a possibility. At Makin itself observers on the submarine Nautilus
had found considerable air activity in October. Invasion there would
thus
be carried to success only if enemy airpower had been neutralized by
blows
at his bases or by interception and antiaircraft during the operation.

Weather conditions suitable for air operations could be expected
for
at least part of November. Normally, weather changes in the equatorial
belt are slow and are predictable for several weeks in advance. When
the
equatorial front moves south it introduces a period of doldrum weather.
The limitless ceiling and excellent visibility which prevail before
this
change would not only aid bombing operations but would deny cover to
the
Japanese either for air raids or for an approach by units of their
fleet.
Naval operations would also derive benefit from the conditions which
could
be expected for much of November, since the steady easterly winds
furnished
an isothermal belt of surface water conducive to good sound-detection
of
enemy submarines. After the doldrum period the prevailing winds upon
Makin
would become strong westerlies, making landing on the western beaches
impossible.

Four miles east of Makin lay Little Makin, a satellite atoll of
small
proportions on which Japanese outpost installations might exist, but on
which no significant military activity had been noted in reconnaissance
by air and submarine
(Map No. 3).

--15--

To fulfill the mission of capturing Makin and eliminating
the Japanese
required: first, an attack upon the island which contained their
prepared
positions; secondly, control of Kuma and other smaller islands on which
outposts might be placed; and finally, pursuit of the enemy to all the
lesser points of refuge for enemy troops which might Le from
Butaritari.
As a precautionary measure, it also involved early air reconnaissance
over
Little Makin and the possible dispatch of a small force. Possession of
the captured atoll might then be transferred to a garrison force whose
mission it would be to convert Makin from a Japanese seaplane base to
an
American station for shore-based airplanes. The major field of
operations
for the invaders was necessarily the island of Butaritari.

The Tactical Plan

Landings at Makin and Tarawa, 105 miles away, were planned to begin
simultaneously by two separate landing forces from Task Force 54, Rear
Adm. Richmond K. Turner, commanding. Arrayed with them as elements of
the
Task Force were support and air support groups, a minesweeper group,
transport
and LST groups, and a garrison force. At 0830, 20 November 1943, the
first
landing craft were to touch the beach at each atoll. While the 27th
Division
Landing Team, with attached units, took Makin, the 2d Marine Division
was
to assault Tarawa, leaving one of its combat teams in reserve for the
support
of one or both operations. If this reserve remained uncommitted, it was
later to occupy Apamama.

The assaulting force at Makin was to consist of the 165th RCT,
less
the 2d BLT, which was designated as a reserve landing force during the
first stage. Once the beachheads were secure, command would pass from
Admiral
Turner to the senior troop commander and would apply to all shore-based
land, sea, and air forces. When capture was complete, command of the
island
was to be transmitted to the garrison force commander, and the landing
force was to be removed.

The plans adopted by the Northern Landing Force employed
overwhelming
strength in every arm against an enemy whose known positions were to be
bombarded and then enveloped. Instead of delivering an assault of
maximum
power at any one point, the schedule called for two separate landings,
one following the other after an

--16--

interval of about two hours. The western beaches were
designated as
RED Beach 1 and RED Beach
2, and on them, at 0830, he 1st and 3d BLT's
were to commence penetrating the island side by side, each being led by
a special landing group in 16 Alligators. If all went well according to
plan on the RED Beaches, at 1030 a second
landing was to be made on the
lagoon shore, among the piers, on what was known as YELLOW
Beach
(Map No. 4).

The second landing was to be made by the 2d BLT, following to the
beach
another special landing group, and was to be supported by the medium
tanks
of Company A, 193d Tank Battalion and their 75-mm guns, If the first
landing
met with unexpectedly successful opposition, the landing on YELLOW Beach
could be postponed and instead, the 2d BLT would be committed in
support
of the other two battalions on the RED Beaches.

Bombers of the Seventh Air Force, temporarily operating under Navy
control,
were to soften up the island during the week preceding the attack, to
provide
photographic reconnaissance on the last day before the attack, and to
strike
Nauru and air strips in the Marshalls from which the Japanese might
send
aid during the action to their force on Butaritari. Navy carrier-based
bombers would support the landing operations, dropping half-ton and
one-ton
demolition bombs and one-ton "daisy-cutters" for the first half-hour of
daylight upon coast artillery positions, heavy antiaircraft guns,
pillboxes,
housing installations, stores, and personnel. They were to strike first
the area from the West Tank Barrier eastward to the vicinity of
Government
Wharf. At 0615 this activity was to cease, but the carrier planes would
maintain daylight air patrols, submarine reconnaissance, morning and
afternoon
search flights, artillery spotting, observation liaison, and light
bombing
and strafing as needed throughout the operation.

At 0620, prearranged naval bombardment would begin according to a
firing
plan devised by collaboration of Army and Navy staffs. Striking first
with
the 14-inch guns of the four battleships and the 8-inch guns of three
cruisers,
this devastating attack was to rake the western shore from Kotabu
Island
to Ukiangong Point and to fall upon key points back from the beach. If
need be, the range might be narrowed to 2,000 yards. A second
bombardment
was to be directed from 0850 to 1025 upon the area between the tank
barriers
and from lagoon to ocean shore. During this preparation for a second
landing,
a zone of safety was established between beachhead line and

--17--

West Tank Barrier into which only patrols might advance
before the barrage
was lifted. The prearranged firing plan called for a total of 1,990
rounds
of 14-inch, 1,645 rounds of 8-inch, and 7,490 rounds of 5-inch shells
from
four battleships, four cruisers, and six destroyers: in all, 1,717 tons
of projectiles. Half the shells were fitted with delayed-action fuses
to
permit penetration among the thick coconuts before detonation.

When the first wave of boats was 800 yards from the RED Beaches (according
to schedule, at 0825), carrier-based fighters were to strafe the
beaches
and the area 100 yards inland and 500 yards north and south of the
beaches'
extremities. Then, as the boats reached a point 100 yards from the
shore,
the fighters were to withdraw while bombers returned to hit every
defense
installation within 500 yards to 1,000 yards inland from the beaches,
all
the way across the island from north to south. They were also to strike
every evident activity on Ukiangong Point, paying particular attention
to mortars, pillboxes, and installations which could register on the RED
Beaches, and using 100-lb. and 500-lb. demolition and fragmentation
bombs.

Fifteen minutes after the first wave had landed (if the schedule
were
strictly adhered to, at 0845), the bombers were to yield the field to
the
naval gunners. At 0850, the warships would resume scheduled fire upon
tank
barriers, gun positions, and the highway.

The same pattern of bombardment, strafing, and bombing was to
precede
the attack at YELLOW Beach, but there, extra
caution was needed to avoid
dropping bombs among friendly troops.

Both the BLT's landing on the western beaches at 0830 were to
advance
as rapidly as possible to a division beachhead line which crossed the
island
about 1,600 yards ahead in an area of swamps and pools. The
accompanying
light tanks were expected to devote particular attention to destroying
the enemy strongpoints believed to lie just inland from the beaches.
When
the two BLT's had reached the line, the unit on the left, it was
thought,
would have crossed easier terrain against less resistance. It was
therefore
quickly to reorganize,

--18--

extend across the island, and take over the whole line
white
the 3d BLT at the right would drop back and go into divisional reserve.
Patrols were to be sent forward after reaching the line but the second
phase of advance was to wait until 1030. Thus the advancing 1st BLT
would
keep clear of naval shells falling near the West Tank Barrier during
the
prearranged fire before the YELLOW Beach
landings.

Within the zone of each BLT invading from the west lay one of the
island's
projections, Flink Point at the left and Ukiangong Point at the right
(Map No. 4).
The special detachments from the 3d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, which were borne ashore in LVT's

ALLIGATORS AT MAKIN were used to carry the first
assault troops ashore, to convey wounded to the transports, serve as
ferries
from barges unable to clear the reefs, and take troops on special trips
to outlying islands. Here one drags a pallet to YELLOW
Beach at low tide.

--19--

(Landing Vehicle, Tracked), popularly called "Alligators,"
were to move
at once to the flanks and there establish positions defending the
beaches.
Only one platoon was to man the position on the left flank of RED Beach,
the remainder proceeding out the narrow Flink Point, over a shallow
water
passage which separated part of it from the remainder, and clearing all
hostile forces, At the southern end of the western beaches, on the
right
flank of RED Beach 2, the special detachment was
to leave one platoon in
charge of the position while the remainder joined Company L, 165th
Infantry,
and light tanks of the 193d Tank Battalion in clearing Ukiangong Point
to its tip.

Batteries of antiaircraft artillery (93d Coast Artillery (AA) less
automatic
weapons platoons) formed part of each of the BLT's, going in over the RED
Beaches. Additional antiaircraft protection was to arrive on D + 1 when
a provisional antiaircraft battalion of the 98th Coast Artillery (AA)
came
to serve as part of both the assault and garrison forces. It was to
remain
in floating reserve, prepared to land on divisional order.

The field artillery batteries which went ashore with the BLT's
were
to pass at once from battalion control and to take positions obtained
for
them on Ukiangong Point. From there they were to deliver supporting
call
fire upon any point under attack during the first day or two.

While the larger assault from the west was in its first stage, a
special
landing detachment in two landing craft was to take Kotabu Island, off
Flink Point (Map
No. 3).
A platoon of
marines with a reinforced infantry platoon from Company G, 165th
Infantry,
was to execute this mission after preparatory naval bombardment of the
little island. The detail was to destroy the enemy forces found there,
and on any of the other islets on the western side of the Makin
triangular
lagoon. Passage between the island and Flink Point would thus be
secured
from close-range enemy fire. If the landings at RED
Beach succeeded, that
scheduled for YELLOW Beach could then take
place.

At W Hour (fixed on D Day at 1030) the 2d BLT was to arrive at YELLOW
Beach, following a special landing group in Alligators. The landing
group
was to divide into two detachments each of which would go to one of the
flanks, clear the enemy from the base of the wharf there, and set up a
beach block and defensive position. The 2d BLT, once it was ashore, was
to reorganize and move southward,

--20--

cutting across the island from lagoon to ocean. While part
of the assault
would then become a holding action on the left, the main effort would
be
on the right toward the West Tank Barrier. Since the 1st BLT would be
advancing
eastward, the barrier would be enveloped from front and rear. When that
fortification had been taken the holding action on the left would be
superseded
by a strong drive eastward the length of the island, traversing the
narrow,
twisting ribbon of marsh and grove to its last sharp point. Special
landing
parties would be detached for the seizure of any outpost islands and
the
destruction of enemy units.

A feature of the plan was the availability, by afternoon, of
supporting
howitzer fire from the field artillery battalion on Ukiangong Point.
(See illustration.)
It was to cover any part of the main defensive
area on call and was expected to be of great value, especially if the
preparatory
bombardment had not fully neutralized Japanese defenses. Such was the
structure
of the tactical plan for the operation on Makin.

Training and Equipping the Attacking Force

The Northern Landing Force was comprised of 6,470 officers and enlisted
men. They were accompanied by 150 garrison force troops, 10
correspondents,
and 6 observers. The total sin was controlled by available transport
facilities
and the mission's nature. The latter was uppermost in determining the
composition
of the force. Since the initial tactical units were BLT's, the
battalion
headquarters elements were larger than normal. Other noteworthy
increases
were among engineer and signal personnel. Elsewhere, including division
headquarters, drastic reductions were the rule. Rifle companies were
cut,
although not uniformly, to about 150 men. Addition of a ship's party of
one company from the 105th Infantry to each battalion of the 165th
Infantry
made each BLT seem larger than normal in spite of the reduction of
rifle
company strength. The three BLT's were not uniform either, the range
extending
from 42 to 58 officers and from 917 to 1,161 men, Battalion medical
detachments
and the divisional collecting unit were cut down enough to permit the
sending
to Makin of a surgical team, 3 officers and 33 men, without enlarging
the
total medical personnel. This gave the landing force equipment

for an advanced hospital with full surgical service, an
innovation in
Pacific warfare at this stage. Of the 6,470 men in the force,
approximately
1,300 were in units which had been attached to the 27th Division for
this
operation.1

Although the 27th Division had anticipated taking part in some
aggressive
operation in the Central Pacific Area, and had trained for beach
landings
and jungle fighting since coming to the Hawaiian Islands, the imminent
arrival of actual combat encouraged intensive training for Makin.
jungle
woodcraft, jungle lore, and tropical hygiene were now studied. Weapons
training and practice with live hand grenades were emphasized for all
combat
troops. The field artillery, tank battalion, and infantry each
conducted
range firing of all their weapons, From small unit problems in jungle
fighting
to battalion and regimental combat team exercises, the troops reviewed
what was involved in daylight attack in close terrain, hasty and
prepared
defenses of a position, night operations, perimeter defense, day and
night
withdrawal, the attack of fortified positions in jungle terrain, and
the
elimination of snipers.

Amphibious training with floating equipment, practice in swimming
and
staying afloat fully clothed and wearing an infantry pack, unloading
and
loading supplies, and finally, ship-to-shore rehearsals under naval
gunfire
and air bombing, controlled by shore fire control parties, completed
the
realistic exercises.

--24--

General Ralph C. Smith and some of his staff were convinced
that the
initial forces to cross the beaches of Makin should be carried ashore
in
LVT's (Alligators) , amphibian tractors capable of self-propulsion on
water
and on land. Each of the 3 landing groups which first approached the 3
separate beaches on Butaritari was to ride in 16 Alligators. To operate
the vehicles, personnel was drawn from the Headquarters Company of a
tank
battalion.

Behind this first element in the invading forces they planned to
send
a platoon of tight tanks, and, on YELLOW Beach,
an additional force of
medium tanks. These heavy units would be brought to shallow water by
LCT's
(Landing Craft, Tanks), blunt-nosed lighters of relatively shallow
draft.

A detail of the 193d Tank Battalion began working with the landing
teams
on 15 October to develop the skill needed to operate and maintain
Alligators.
They had but one LVT on which to practice, and when those for the Makin
landings were delivered on 30 October, they were of a longer, later
type,
lacking not only armor but necessary armament. They had to be
conditioned
for use in great haste while machine-gun mounts were obtained for them
by stripping some of the armed vehicles on Oahu. Time for training with
the transports was very short indeed.

Time was also insufficient for infantry and tank crews to achieve
adequate
effectiveness in cooperation before the actual operation began.
Communication
between crews inside the tanks and infantrymen outside them was an
unsolved
problem; another was the method by which infantry officers could bring
tanks directly into support.

Materiel and supplies for the Northern Landing Force were, like
the
force itself, controlled by available transport and by the nature of
the
mission. The expedition was equipped with jeeps and trucks, but in
numbers
deeply cut from the Tables of Basic Allowances in order to save both
their
room and that of fuel to operate them.

The communications plans required, in addition to telephone and
telegraph
sets, switchboards, miles of wire on reels of various types, and a
considerable
quantity of radio equipment. Radio sets were to link the various levels
of command, afloat and ashore, the infantry, field artillery, naval
gunfire,
air, and tank support, the beach parties, and the air observers. They
ranged
in size from the 6-lb. portable SCR-536 to the 275-lb. SCR-608, and the
trailer-borne SCR-299. Two radar sets were brought to furnish air
warning.

--25--

Chart No. 2: Loading Plan

--26--

To clear beaches, haul supplies, and draw artillery pieces
into position,
38 tractor bulldozers were taken by the attacking force. Of these, two
D-7's and four R-4's were for use at each of the three beachheads, and
one R-4 was for the combat engineer platoon attached to each BLT. Ali
were
waterproofed under the guidance of the 13th Engineer Combat Battalion,
7th Division, which had landed at Attu. The engineers also brought one
10,000-gallon and five trailer-mounted 2,000-gallon units for
distilling
water, and three paving smashers for excavating in coral.

The divisional G-4 staff section had previously formulated, for
whatever
overseas mission might require, embarkation of the entire division, a
careful
table of supply requirements and their cubic content, and a loading
plan
with orders of priority. These data proved useful in the highly
complicated
task of loading and stowing cargo for the expedition. The Task Force
commander,
Admiral Turner, insisted that the cargo be stowed in such a fashion
that
the load be evenly balanced in each ship. The 27th Division staff was
primarily
interested in combat loading, an arrangement which would link materiel
with personnel, ship for ship, each vessel carrying what its occupants
would need in battle, and at the same time would load it in layers of
relative
urgency, so that the lowest would be the least necessary rather than
the
heaviest. The requirements of seaworthiness and navigability clashed in
some degree with those of maximum efficiency in supporting land combat.
Adjusting these conflicting requirements was difficult, but was
accomplished
by altering the plans to which Admiral Turner objected without
departing
from the combat-loading principle.

Another logistics problem was met by pallet loading, a practice
which
had been tried at Attu with inconclusive results. To make possible the
unloading and removal of supplies with a minimum of delay while under
enemy
fire, and to achieve some other lesser advantages, the 27th Division
adopted
the pallet system for the Makin operation.2
Pallet loading is prodigal of cargo space, and in the Gilberts
expedition, left unused
about 46 percent of the basic ship tonnage capacity. Naval officers at
Oahu were understandably opposed to a practice which seemed so
wasteful.

--27--

In favor of pallet loading, however, was not only the
reduced exposure
to enemy fire for those unloading at the beaches, but also the smaller
number of men needed to do the unloading. A larger proportion therefore
was free for combat. Although cargo space went unused, of the cargo
which
was brought ashore, much less was wasted because the sleds kept
perishables
above the mud and water and permitted the drawing of cargo units
swiftly
to the supply dumps.
(See illustration.)
Ammunition handling and rehandling could also be curtailed. In the end,
in consultation with a naval officer who had made a special
investigation,
1,850 41 x 61 pallets of two types were adopted.

Each BLT was to be loaded on its own transport with most of its
landing
craft, Headquarters and other units went on a fourth APA (Transport,
Attack).
The radar detachment, with its heavy trailers, and various service
detachments
were to ride on an AKA (Cargo Vessel, Attack). Medium tanks were to be
carried, with their lighters" on an LSD (Landing Ship, Dock), and 3
LST's
would take the 3 special landing groups, each with its 16 Alligators.
Thus
nine vessels were to carry the Makin force from Oahu to the target
area.

During the first week of November 1943, the final stages of
planning
and training reached their conclusion. The forces organized to capture
Makin and develop it as an American base were gathered for embarkation.
Hurried and incomplete as their preparations in some fields had
necessarily
been, the time had come for the expedition to move. The first
aggressive
drive toward Tokyo in the Central Pacific Area was about to begin.

2.
Pallets are large units of supplies or ammunition which can be hoisted
or lowered in slings, kept intact while on shipboard or in small craft,
and dragged ashore. The packages are fastened together and to a sled-
or
toboggan-like base by metal straps.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey,
HyperWar Foundation