The coming of the industrial society, based on a new division
of labour and on the systematic application of new technologies,
was accompanied by the advent of a new image of man and society.
This new image was expressed in such important documents as the
Constitution of Virginia, Article I (1776), the Bill of Rights as
part of the Constitution of the United States of America (1788)
and the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789).
Those documents brought to the fore the pivotal idea of human
rights as universal rights, grounded on the recognition of the
inherent dignity of all members of the human family.1

During the Second World War mankind experienced extreme
cruelties on a large scale, both from policies based on
ideologies which emphasized the supposed inequality of
"races," and from the uses of new military
technologies. After the turmoil of this war the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1'.,48) stressed that "All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood" (Article 1). The
universality of human rights is, again, emphasized in Article 2:
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status."2 Human beings, endowed with reason and
conscience, are to be treated as ends in themselves, and not as
passive victims of conditions and contingencies they cannot
control.

Looking back on the advent of industrial society, it may come
as a surprise when we see how little attention was paid, until
recently, to a systematic analysis of the relationships between
technological changes, on the one hand, and the development and
actual implementation of human rights, on the other. We will
return to this observation in the ensuing sections. In the
meantime it is important to note that the question of the impact
of new scientific and technological developments on human rights
was brought before the United Nations in 1968 as a result of an
initiative taken by the International Conference on Human Rights
held in Tehran, Iran, in that year as part of the programme for
the International Year for Human Rights.3 Following
the recommendations of this conference the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting the
Secretary-General to undertake "continuous and
interdisciplinary studies, both national and international, which
might serve as a basis for drawing up appropriate standards to
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms." Specific
attention was to be paid to developments in science and
technology in relation to:

(1) respect for the privacy of individuals and the
integrity and sovereignty of nations in the light of advances
in recording and other techniques;

(2) protection of the human personality and its physical
and intellectual integrity in the light of advances in
biology, medicine, and biochemistry;

(3) uses of electronics that may affect the rights of the
person and the limits that should be placed on such uses in a
democratic society; and, more generally,

(4) the balance which should be established between
scientific and technological progress and the intellectual,
spiritual, cultural, and moral advancement of humanity.4

This resolution accentuates the dangers that technological
developments harbour with respect to human rights and fundamental
freedoms. It should be clear, however, that in many cases
technological developments offer opportunities for individual and
collective choices and for the enhancement of human rights.5

Nevertheless, it is quite evident that present-day innovations
in the domains of energy sciences, information technology, and
biotechnology occur so rapidly and offer so many new choices for
society that, as Weeramantry says in his seminal contribution to
this subject: "Science and technology have burgeoned in the
post-war years into instruments of power, control and
manipulation. But the legal means of controlling them have not
kept pace. Outmoded and out-manoeuvred by the headlong progress
of technology, the legal principles that should control it are
unresponsive and irrelevant." 6

Most contributions dealing with the relationship between
technological developments and social and cultural life analyse
chiefly the negative and positive effects of technological
change on society, either directly or indirectly. The only course
left to society seems to be to adjust to the exigencies of
science and technology, for better or for worse. In these
analyses, science and technology are considered as autonomous
forces over which society has no control. In consequence of the
preoccupation with their impact on society, analysis of the ways
in which society shapes technological developments has been
neglected.

In the next sections we shall discuss the genesis of the model
of development that can be considered responsible for this
one-sided approach of Western technology. It is important to
understand this model of development, in which deterministic
ideas regarding technology play a paramount role, if we are to
reconsider Western technology's role in the context of
opportunities for choice regarding our social and cultural life.
After presenting this "technological imperialistic" or
"technological functionalist" model of development and
discussing its main shortcomings, we shall present some other
models of development which have been formulated - partly at
least- as a reaction to the claims of technological imperialism.
The results of this analysis will be used to elucidate and
elaborate the relationship between technological changes and
human rights: How can choices be made in a world of technological
and social constraints? In what ways can human rights play a
pivotal role in the processes of decision-making?

In this contribution much attention is given to the origin,
development, and socio-cultural impacts of the Enlightenment
model of development. This emphasis on this Western model of
development is a deliberate choice based on the following
reasons: (a) the model elucidates the specific characteristics
of Western technology and the impact of its diffusion throughout
the world within a historical perspective; (b) the model is still
a powerful instrument in the minds and hands of innovating elites
in and outside the Western world, notwithstanding its theoretical
and intellectual shortcomings; (c) the presentation of this model
reveals, we hope, its strong ideological bias and the concomitant
need to deconstruct it in order to find new courses of action;
(d) it is hoped that this presentation emphasizes a contrast
between the "Western view" of technological development
and the models implied by the case-studies in this volume.

However, before describing models of development and their
relevance to the relationship between technological change and
human rights, we shall turn briefly to the question: "What
do we understand by technology?"

When we speak about the relationships between technology and
human rights, it is evident that we have to deal with the
interrelations between some very complex phenomena: technology,
science, society or systems of societies, and systems of rights
of a universal nature.

To begin with the concept of technology, nearly all human
societies have, or have had, technologies which are often very
elaborate. As we know, archaeologists have used the occurrence of
characteristic technologies as the basis for the classification
of prehistorical societies. These classifications are largely
based on artefacts left behind by the peoples who once used them.
In view of the task in hand, however, we have no use for a
general definition of technology which includes only artefacts or
the material products of inventions. Our definition of technology
must enable us to distinguish between the use of technology in
pre-industrial and industrial societies and between industrial
societies and post-industrial ones in terms of such factors as
flexibility, rigidity, or its pervasiveness in social life.

In a very broad sense the concept of technology may refer to
those aspects of culture which relate to the manipulation of the
natural environment by man or "that whole collection of ways
in which the members of a society provide themselves with the
material tools and goods of their society - the collection of
artefacts and concepts used to create an advanced
socio-politico-economic structure." 7 As we shall
explain, such a definition is not adapted to our purposes, as it
is too wide.

In order to clarify the questions relating to the interactions
between technology and society, we distinguish between:

1. Technology as sets of physical objects, designed and
constructed by man. In an industrial society this term refers
especially to "artificial things, and more particularly
to modern machines: artificial things tha

(a) require engineering knowledge for their design and
production; and
(b) perform large amounts of operations themselves."
8

In this context the term may also be used to refer to
inventions and processes with extensive potentialities for
application, such as laser technology, chip technology, and DNA
recombinant technology, and the applications of such technologies
within existing or new machines and production processes.

2. Technology as a term which refers to human activities
in connection with the utilization of artefacts. Moreover,
technology implies the knowledge requisite to use these
technical things. "Technological 'things' are
meaningless without the 'know-how' to use them, repair them,
design them and make them. As such this know-how can, partly
at least, ... be systematized and taught, as in the various
disciplines of engineering." 9

3. Finally, "technology" may refer to a body of
knowledge that is necessary to generate new rules for the
design, construction, and application of technical
possibilities to different types of problems (such as, for
example, the control of environmental pollution). Here the
term technology refers to the theory of the
application (logia), not just to "artificial
things," the ways in which they are used in practice and
the transmission of this practical knowledge
("technics": German, die Technik; French, la
technique) as is emphasized in the first and second
meaning of the concept "technology."

It could be observed that in the third meaning the development
of "software" is stressed, in contradistinction to the
"hardware" side of technology that predominates in the
first two meanings of technology. Moreover, it is evident that
when the third meaning of technology predominates, the
distinction between "science" and
"technology" tends to fade away. This is shown in
Bell's analysis of post-industrial society when he says that
"What has become decisive for the organization of decisions
and the direction of change is the centrality of theoretical knowledge
- the primacy of theory over empiricism and the codification of
knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that, as in any
axiomatic system, can be used to illuminate many different and
varied areas of experience."10

Bell points to the importance of the rise of new intellectual
technologies, enabling the management of organized complexity -
the complexity of large organizations and systems, the complexity
of theory with a large number of variables - and the
identification and implementation of strategies for rational
choice in games against nature and games between persons. Bell
argues that "by the end of the century [a new intellectual
technology] may be as salient in human affairs as machine
technology has been for the past century and a half." 11

It follows from what has been said thus far that in the third
meaning of technology not only does the distinction between
"science" and "technology" become blurred,
but also that this meaning is strongly associated with a new,
emerging mode of production in which these intellectual
technologies play a pivotal role. As such, the third meaning of
technology goes together with specific types of artefacts
(hardware) and a specific way in which the hardware of production
has been laid out in a factory or other place of work. This
implies, as Hill observes, "the division of labour and work
organization which is built into, or required for efficient
operation by the productive technique." 12
Habermas, approaching Bell's encompassing delineation of
technology, states that technology means "scientifically
rationalised control of objectified processes. It refers to the
system in which research and technology are coupled with feedback
from the economy and the administration." 13 In
this context it should be remembered that the division of labour
and work organization is not to be regarded as the inescapable
result of the "logic" of "technology" - as is
often argued - but as the result of engineering and management
decisions.

This is an important observation because it means that in the
debate on the relationships between technological changes and
human rights we need not restrict ourselves to questions of
whether the "inevitable march of technology" makes it
urgent to develop measures to protect people in those cases where
their fundamental rights and liberties are at stake. We can also
concentrate on the values upon which decisions concerning
technological developments and applications are based and on the
desirability of enhancing the quality of such decisions in line
with human rights. Such thinking is extremely important for many
- if not all - developing countries because it highlights the
role of choice and of cultural diversity in the process of
economic development.

In this section we have briefly discussed some definitions of
the concept of "technology." We have shown that the
term is used in different ways, varying from the references to
material things or artefacts to systems of control embracing
complex societal processes. Moreover, the definition of the
concept of "technology" is also dependent on the type
of society that is being considered (e.g. pre-industrial,
industrial, post-industrial). We conclude from this overview that
it is necessary, when we are analysing the different ideas and
models concerning societal development and technological change,
to be alert to indications of altering relationships between
technological change and societal change (or even societal
transformation).

Discussing the impact of technology on human rights is
primarily a debate about the impact of Western science and
technology on such rights. Before introducing the dominant model
of Western development, in which science and technology have
played such a pivotal and unique role since the eighteenth
century, it is useful to reflect on the reason why this specific
type of development took place in the West. Of course, this
question cannot be answered in a systematic way, but we shall try
to formulate some arguments which may contribute to a better
understanding of the social and cultural circumstances which
contributed to the genesis of Western technology.

An important element in the explanation of the rise of Western
technology relates to the subordination of nature in the Jewish
and Christian religions. This point was formulated in an original
way by Archbishop Temple when he said: "Christianity is the
most materialistic of all higher religions, for while they attain
to spirituality by turning away from matter, it expresses its
spirituality by dominating matter.'' 14 The thesis
concerning the subordination of nature as a necessary
precondition to the modern dynamic pursuit of technical progress
seems to be generally accepted by theology, according to van der
Pot.15 It relates to the view that in the
Judeao-Christian religions God is conceived as being on the side
of humans in the struggle between human beings and nature. This
view is, in its turn, tied to the idea that God created the world
- so the world itself is not God and is not to be considered to
be sacred. It is tied also to the idea that God created man in
his own image and elevated him above all other creatures on
earth, giving him the right, so to speak, to intervene in the
course of events on earth. In contradistinction to most other
religious systems, the Judeao-Christian beliefs do not contain
inhibitions on the control of nature by man. According to Max
Weber, Christianity inherited its hostility against magical
thinking from Judaism. This opened the road to important economic
achievements, for magical ideas place a heavy constraint on the
rationalization of economic life.16 With the coming of
ascetic Protestantism this demystification of the world attained
its completion.

This lack of deference towards the limits of the
"natural" order was accompanied by an absence of
disdain for activities directed at practical utility, as was, for
example, certainly the case in ancient Greek culture.

Van der Pot concludes, after a systematic analysis of many
theological, historical, and sociological sources, that
Christianity contributed significantly to the origin of the
modern dynamic push towards technological change, by the
subordination of nature, by contributing to a hopeful attitude
towards the future, and by reacting with approval to work that is
directed at practical utility.17 All this had already
exerted important influences on technological development in the
West long before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth
century.

There were major applications of technological innovations
during a long period preceding this revolution. In the thirteenth
century a first "industrial revolution" took place.
Many of the innovations then made, such as the watermill, came
from outside Western Europe but the Western Europeans showed keen
judgement in assessing the opportunities for their application.
Necessity was not the major drive behind this technological
trend, but, according to van der Pot, the idea that human beings
are creatures of God and must not be humiliated by continuing
monotonous labour.18 Here we witness an important
contribution of technology as provider of opportunities for the
liberation of human beings from labour and for the reduction of
their dependence on natural conditions.

Religious and political diversity also created conditions that
contributed to the emergence of modern science and technology
since the sixteenth century. The ongoing struggle between the
Roman Catholic Church and the secular powers within Europe, and
the fact that neither church nor state succeeded in definitely
imposing its will on the other, resulted in a demarcation between
the secular and the sacral powers as in the Concordat of Worms in
1122. This facilitated the development of a rational type
of control by the state. The emergence of modern bureaucracy, as
described by Weber, contributed in the course of Western history
to the secularization of the world. Moreover, the religious wars,
connected with the rise of Protestantism, broke the religious
monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church and gave a strong impetus
to modern science and technology, especially in Protestant
modernizing nations, such as England and the Netherlands in the
seventeenth century.

What has been said in the preceding pages concerning the
origin of Western science and technology is certainly not
sufficient to give an adequate account of these developments. The
analysis of Dijksterhuis shows us, in his The Mechanization of
the Image of the World (De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld),19
the long line of development of the natural sciences. This led to
the emergence of modern natural sciences in the period
between 1543, when Copernicus published his De revolutionibus
orbium coelestium, and 1687, when Newton's Philosophiae
naturalis principia mathematica was published. This period
represents an enormous advance of human knowledge and
opportunity, and changes deeply the dominant view of life. This
period determined the course of the natural sciences for
centuries to come, based on a mechanistic image of material
processes. This was not to be conceived of as a complex machine
designed by the Creator, but as processes which can be understood
by applying the concepts of mechanics: the physics and
mathematics of energy and forces. Only the West witnessed the
development of such a conception of science based both on
rationality (especially mathematics) and systematic observation
(especially controlled experiments).20

In this section we have described some elements of the origin
of Western science and technology. The development of a
mechanistic image of the (material) world, in connection with the
social and cultural processes we referred to earlier, led to the
advent of the technical culture we live in today, in the West and
many other parts of the world.

In the following section we describe the model of societal
development that arose in the eighteenth century, a model that is
fundamental to understanding the impact of science and technology
on social life and on human rights. When presenting this model we
will have opportunities to elaborate on the relationship between
science and technology and to discuss the link between
technological-economic development on the one hand and
individualism. secularization, and human rights on the other.

In the preceding section we have offered a brief description
of some developments in Western Europe that gave rise to the
Enlightenment, in which scientific positivism played such a
pivotal role. The Enlightenment made a profound impact on both
the industrial development of Western Europe - also causing the
sharp opposition between tradition and modernity - and on the
development of the idea of human rights. As Herrera put it
succinctly,

For Enlightenment, all things in nature are disposed in
harmonious order, regulated by a few simple laws, in such a way
that everything contributes to the equilibrium of the Universe.
The same rational order is the basis of the human world and
manifests itself through the instincts and tendencies of men. The
main obstacle to this linear unending human progress is, for the
Enlightenment, ignorance and the education of all strata of
society in the light of reason and science will finally lead to a
perfect and happy society.21

Indeed, the rational analysis of the physical and social world
will gradually show many ideas of the established traditional
order to be errors, which will be replaced by scientific truth.
Moreover, in connection with these ideas, a new type of society
evolved and conscious attempts were made to change political and
social orders in the direction of a "rational society."
It was, as Eisenstadt phrased it, the birth of "the
civilization of modernity," which is, among other things,
characterized by growing structural differentiation and
specialization, the establishment of universalistic
organizational frameworks, and the articulation of relatively
open, non-traditional systems of stratification and mobility in
which criteria of achievement are dominant.22

The rise of this industrial, open society, based on a specific
set of values of the Enlightenment, is closely connected to the
birth of human rights. Although the idea of human rights has deep
historical roots - and not exclusively in the Western world
-human rights, as formulated in documents such as the Bill of
Rights and the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du
citoyen, are very much the product of both the Enlightenment
and the rise of industrial society. As such the concept of human
rights is strongly associated with individualism, rationalism,
and universalism. Dumont states that the adoption of the Declaration
marks in a certain sense the triumph of the individual.23

Because of the great importance of the connection between the
rise of industrial society and the birth of human rights for our
understanding of the present-day debate concerning the impact of
technology on human rights, we will say a little more about this
link. Some observers assume a causal link between human rights
and the rise of an industrial, individualized society that is
based on contractual relationships. So Sorokin states that human
rights play a more prominent role in societies characterized by a
high frequency of individual social mobility than in stable,
closed societies. Mobility facilitates an increase of
individualism, because it destroys the seclusion of life in one
social niche, as is typical in a traditional society. In
Sorokin's words,

Mobility awakens his personality, transforms him from the
component of a group to an individual person. As he is shifting
from group to group, he must now receive rights and privileges
for himself, not for a specific group, because he himself does
not know in what group he will be tomorrow. Hence the
"Declaration of the Rights of Man," but not that of a
group, the demands for liberty of speech, religion,
self-realisation for a man, not for a group Hence the equality of
all individuals before the law, and individual responsibility
instead of that of a group, as in the case of an immobile
society. A mobile society inevitably must "invest" all
rights and responsibilities in an individual but not in a group.24

This seems to be a rather restricted view of the origin of
human rights. Are these rights - as liberties - primarily a
functional alternative in a modern world, for the security that
is provided in an organic way within traditional structures? In
European history we can observe several periods which bear
witness to the disintegration of established social structures
and the concomitant rise of individualism - for example, the
period after the downfall of the Greek city-states and the
Renaissance period in which the individual emerged from the
communal order of the Middle Ages - without the development of a
concept of human rights that is comparable to the concept as it
emerged in the eighteenth century.

In the historical documents to which we referred earlier, the
idea of human rights is associated with a very positive image of
individualism. In the period when these documents were being
produced, individualism was considered by many advocates of
social change to be a pivotal characteristic of the emerging
social order. It referred not only to respect for the intrinsic
value or dignity of the individual human being in relation to
privacy, but also to individual autonomy, the capacity of the
individual to think independently, to decide for himself or
herself, to control the conditions under which he - or she -
lived and worked. As such, autonomy was - and is - the reverse of
alienation and powerlessness. The coming social order was
contrasted with the traditional order of feudal society in which
an individual's opportunities in life were strongly determined by
his or her position in the social order, based on birth, and the
rights to which his or her estate entitled the individual.

The emerging social order was interpreted in terms of social
progress, development in the direction of a better society,
in which the position of every person is based, ideally, on
individual qualifications and achievements, and on his or her
position within a new division of labour. In this new ordering,
everybody contributes according to his or her talents or skills
and receives a remuneration according to the (market) value of
this contribution. The development in this direction was thought
to be contingent on the rise of industrial society, in which
economic growth is dependent on industrial production, propelled
by science and technology. It is dependent on the development of
open, worldwide markets and on the adequate use of individual
talents. This image of society implies increased individual
occupational and social mobility together with a growing equality
of educational opportunities, a fading away of traditional class
differences, a concomitant growth of the middle classes as a
consequence of the increasing demand for skilled and professional
workers, and, consequently, a decrease in collective types of
antagonism, especially class struggle. It is important to note
that in this perspective of societal development, the exigencies
of industrialization will generate everywhere - in the long run -
this same type of social order, which will finally merge into an
encompassing world system.

This connection between the birth of human rights and the rise
of a new liberal, democratic order produced consequences for the contents
of human rights as individual, universal rights. The origin
of human rights, and the subsequent development of socio-economic
rights, shed some light on the model of man that is traditionally
associated with those who favour civil rights. This model is, as
Campbell says, of a person somewhat beyond the "norm"
in the sense of the normal: an active, rational, and
entrepreneurial person for whom the life which is claimed is one
in which there is a degree of self-expression, self-help, and
self-defence. It is of a person who has the opportunity to have
and manage property, to communicate views and pursue happiness
along individually chosen lines, to share in government and
freely go about day-to-day activities without the interference of
officials and prohibitions of the state beyond those strictly
necessary for the defence of the rights of others.25

Human rights are, as we explained, tied to an individualistic
view of society and man. In this view individualism is combined
with rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism, and as such
they stand in opposition to particularism, collectivism, and
traditionalism. Human rights refer to the individual and are
beyond his or her particular social relationships or roots. This
primacy of reason, universalism, and the individual over the
group appears to be essential in solving problems related to
human rights as it develops in international law today.26

In order to pursue our analysis of the relationship of
technological development and human rights we have to elaborate
on the model of development that is connected with the
Enlightenment and the rise of industrial society. This is
particularly important because this model of development still
plays a dominant role in the thinking of many leaders in the
domain of (post) industrial development. Our description of the
Enlightenment model of industrial development will be, perforce,
of an ideal, typical or constructed in the Weberian sense. This
model was for the first time formulated in a coherent way by
Saint-Simon at the very beginning of the nineteenth century.

Saint-Simon was convinced that the progress of industrialism
would exert a far-reaching and overwhelmingly positive impact on
society. In the final analysis, he thought, it is in industry
that all the real forces of society can be found. A social order
adapted to the requirements of modern industry and its technical
development is the best ordering of society, and scientists will
have a decisive position of power within it. This model of
development has become known in modern economics and sociology as
the "industrial convergence thesis" (other appellations
being "technological functionalism" and
"technological imperialism") and is, as we have already
remarked, still a powerful model of development.27

In this model, two main forces determine the development of
society:

1. The march of rationality, resulting from the inquiring
human mind that follows the rules of positivist -
logico-empirical - science, while analysing the physical and
social world (see pp. 18-22 above) in the pursuit of truth.
Moreover, this leads to the development of new technologies,
which are partly at least - applications of the growth of
knowledge.

2. The open international large-scale markets which compel
industry to adopt quickly the best available technology in
production processes. Failure to do so by an enterprise or
branch of industry would result in quick deterioration of its
international competitive position. The general idea is that
of all the available technologies only one can be the most
efficient and effective. Relative benefits will flow to that
entity which succeeds in developing new technologies or in
acquiring the most efficient and effective technologies at an
early stage. This is, in fact, technological Darwinism: the
survival of the fittest technology.

It is, however, not only the adoption of the best technology
that counts, but also the successful combination of (new)
technologies with the best type of organization of both the
production process and the trading company or system of
companies. In connection with particular types of technology, the
argument runs, there is also only one type of organization which
is the most efficient and effective.

Furthermore, it follows from what we have said that a specific
combination of technology and organization determines the nature
of the division of labour. This, in turn, determines the job
requirements with which workers are confronted, requirements
relating to the content of available jobs, working relations,
working conditions, the organization's hierarchy, and
opportunities for advancement in the organization. This model
implies that the advancement of industrialism is, in modern
times, strongly dependent on the educational system that has to
provide individuals with the abilities and skills that meet the
require meets of the economic system. The educational system has
to educate and train persons both for the scientific and
technological high culture - the persons who will contribute to
the advancement of science and technology and fill management
positions - and for the many other jobs on which a modern
organization depends. Although part of the training and research
and development occur within modern enterprises, the economy of a
country is highly dependent on the rational organization of
higher education and research and on the effectiveness of this
system in fulfilling the needs of the economy. The role of the
state in the process of adapting the educational and research
system to these needs is an important one. The state is also very
important in relation to another task: the redistribution of part
of the national wealth by the agencies of the welfare state. This
function of the state tends to contribute to the reduction of
class conflict - a conflict which hampers the efficient and
effective production of goods and services. It also enhances the
capacity of citizens to play their role in the consumer market.

Industrialism has, in this way, a logic of its own,
"whether under capitalism or socialism or other auspices.
Much of what happens to management and to labour is the same
regardless of auspices."28 Indeed, the most
powerful engine of production is knowledge:
"Industrialization itself began with new knowledge about
steam and machinery. This is where the 'greet transformation'
began." 29

This logic of industrialism implies that social life can only adapt
to the deterministic line that has been described above. But
this is not considered to be a disadvantage. By the march of
rationality and the rationalization of economic and social life,
society is pushed towards a better future. It achieves a high
level of welfare and a lower degree of social inequality. Such
social inequality as remains is based on differences between
individual levels of achievement. There is also a strong
professionalization of the workforce as a consequence of the
great need for highly qualified staff in a science- and
"high-tech"-based organization for the production of
goods and services. Society has to adapt to this line of
development, but the pay-offs are considered to be very high.

It is evident that the universalism on which the model is
based contrasts with the cultural and social diversity of the
world in which the industrial - and post-industrial -development
take place. According to the logic of this model all of the
social institutions and cultural differences that hamper the
logic of industrial development are doomed. Social and cultural
differences between nations, regions, and peoples continue to
exist only as long as they do not stand in the way of progress or
when they contribute to a nation's specific advantage, for
example when traditional values help to discipline the workforce
and to comply with the exigencies of organizational change.

The relationship between technological development and human
rights is, within this model, not considered to be
problematic. On the contrary, the way of industrialism leads to
the liberation of man from traditional and limiting social and
cultural bonds and thus from bondage and ignorance. Industrial
development reduces class antagonism and depression by the state;
it enhances opportunities for individual choice; it provides the
opportunities for democratic participation and for the
development of socio-economic rights. The model is also
optimistic with respect to the possibilities for the solution of
problems in the future, including those problems that are caused
by industrial development itself. This optimism is, of course,
grounded on the confidence that logico-empirical science will
always find new opportunities and technologies to handle present
and future problems.