Presswatch: The Uses of Symmetry

by Adam Jones (1988)

[Originally published in Latin America Connexions. An analysis of "objectivity" in
North American media coverage of Central America's crisis in the eighties.
The same theme was explored at greater length, and in a similar context,
in Mark Pedelty, War Stories.]

There could hardly be a more poignant
illustration of this month's Presswatch theme than the destruction of Iran
Air Flight 655 by a U.S. warship stationed in the Persian Gulf. My topic
this month is media symmetry: how it's created, or discounted, or distorted.

The similarities between the destruction
of Flight 655 and the Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner over the Kamchatka
peninsula in 1983 are striking. For that reason they are generally avoided.
The downing of KAL 007 gave Ronald Reagan another chance to assail the
Soviets as evil hypocrites, talking peace out of one side of their mouth
and ruthless annihilation out of the other. While some hard questions remain
about the KAL incident (see R.W. Johnson's book, Shootdown),
the innocuous nature of the Iran Air flight is generally conceded. At press
time, the U.S. had backed down from its original contention that the jet
was flying outside its appropriate corridor. There are even indications
(thanks to some frank coverage in the Toronto Globe and Mail) that the
radar system on board the U.S.S. Vincennes has been known to mistake an
approaching cloud for an attacking fighter.

Can we therefore assume, as the laws
of symmetry would dictate, that the U.S. regime, like its Soviet counterpart,
is riddled with evil and hypocrisy? Far from it. The Reagan Administration
recognizes only a public-relations dilemma. "Let's put it this way: we're
not oblivious to the realities of the media and public perceptions," says
an Administration official (New York Times, July 4). "We're dealing
with it as a reality. We've got a problem here." That is, a problem of
sincere-but-misguided public perceptions, not of U.S. policy or Navy skeet-shooters
in the Persian Gulf. Above all, symmetry must be avoided, since real-world
comparisons might force modifications in U.S. global posturing.

Consider a more subtle example of
the same phenomenon. In 1986, after the assassination of Olof Palme, the
Globe and Mail carried an obituary for the Swedish Prime Minister.
It included the following sentence: "He (Palme) condemned the U.S. war
effort in Vietnam, although he also opposed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968." Glance again at the quote. Palme opposed the invasion of Vietnam,
and he opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia. A perfectly clear, ordinary
case of real-world symmetry leading to ethical consistency. The kind of
thing the human brain was made for, you might think. So why the word, "although"?
The Globe, attempting to juggle these elements is knocked off balance
by a prevailing mainstream dogma: that there is some qualitative difference
between an invasion when carried out by a country with which one happens
to be allied, and one carried out by an enemy. This isn't to accuse the
Globe of deliberate distortion (in this case, at least). It's merely
to note that the faint whiff of contradiction, or anomaly, that the paper
detects in Palme's political position is the product of ideological biases
that are deeply ingrained in our media and political culture.

Sometimes the vagaries of symmetry
are that subtle. Sometimes they're pretty obvious. Symmetry - the attempt
to find it, or to create it out of whole cloth whether the exercise is
justified or not - takes many forms. It is one of the most interesting
and revealing elements of modern mainstream journalism, and worth looking
at more closely for that reason.

For purposes of illustration, we
can divide the broad concept into a few sub-categories. And there's no
need to look further than a few months' worth of North American (mainly
U.S.) print media for suitable examples of each genre.

Redbait Symmetry

Also knows as "The Ghost of Tail-Gunner
Joe." Ever since the ascent of the House Un-American Activities Commission
after World War Two, and the corresponding penetration of anti-communist
paranoia into the very marrow of liberal-democratic society, anything that
reflects favourably on a communist, socialist, or left-leaning government
or movement has been taboo. (To a surprising extent, this holds true in
media discussion of Scandinavia, though that variant of socialism carries
enough nice liberal-western credentials to get through on occasion. Besides,
there's not many Scandinavians, and they live way away at the top of the
world, so a few political eccentricities are forgivable.) Similarly, anything
that tarnishes the image of a government or movement opposing the leftist
rabble-rousers must be placed in the appropriate context. That is, symmetry
must be provided - or it must be created.

Stephen Kinzer, the New York Times'
Nicaragua correspondent, is the undisputed modern master of Redbait Symmetry.
Nicaragua's "civil war" began with terrorist raids by U.S.-backed contra
forces based in Honduras, and that's remained the trend ever since. The
result has been thousands of Nicaraguan civilians murdered, ambushed, maimed,
raped, kidnapped, tortured, or "disappeared." Kinzer isn't blind to the
damage that the contras have caused. It's just that, from his reporting,
you'd rarely get the notion that the contras were responsible. Consider
his account of U.S. aid mandated by Congress for child victims of the U.S.
war effort in Nicaragua (April 8, 1988):

The fighting here has taken
a heavy toll on young Nicaraguans. In health centers and hospitals, it
is common to find children maimed by land mines, shot in crossfire or otherwise
wounded by weapons of war.

Now, who planted the land mines? What's
all this about "shot in crossfire"? Who happened to be in charge of the
"weapons of war"? From these padded phrases, it might seem the kids in
question simply failed to exercise due caution when crossing the road.
In almost all cases, of course, the culprits are the contras. But acknowledging
this would reveal the U.S. proposal for "humanitarian" aid to the rebels
as a grotesque travesty (or a "ridiculous paradox," in Daniel Ortega's
words). It would also cast aspersion on the contras, whose essential illegitimacy
is another almost universally-respected taboo subject in the U.S. media.
Therefore, a kind of hazy symmetry is cobbled together. Children die at
the hands of "weapons of war," not the U.S. surrogates holding them. Kinzer
again (January 28, 1988):

The land mine that the Orozco
brothers found (and which blinded one of them Author's note) had apparently
been placed by retreating contras hoping to prevent Sandinista soldiers
from pursuing them. But the random terror of civil conflict, by its nature,
envelops all armed groups in guilt.

The chutzpah here is breathtaking.
Ask yourself how "random" the terror would be - and how shared the guilt
- if the culprits were Soviet soldiers and the victims Afghan villagers.
Or if it were the Sandinistas planting mines that maim small children using
public trails.

Sometimes these apologetics are too
extreme even for the Times (or for a sufficiently vocal group of
Times readers). On March 9, in a classically half-assed attempt at Redbait
Symmetry, Kinzer wrote that "The Sandinista Government today cancelled
a negotiating session with contra representatives that was planned for
Wednesday. The contras had earlier announced they would not attend." Two
days later, a redfaced Times printed a partial retraction of this howler,
though with ol' Redbait still alive and kicking: "In fairness, (the article)
should have reported the collapse of the negotiation plan without attributing
it to either side." Translation: Our mask slipped a little. We'll be more
careful next time.

A recent editorial in the Christian
Science Monitor (World Edition, May 23-29) takes a more subtle tack.
U.S. backed efforts at "land reform" in Latin American countries have manifestly
failed. U.S. policy cannot contemplate the removal of the main impediments
to meaningful reform: the local oligarchs whose interests the U.S. trumpets.
Therefore, land reform is no longer a vital issue:

(It) is still an important
symbol of progress to many Latins. But it is no longer seen as the single
most important ticket to economic justice. For many people, more urban
jobs, higher wages, and better working conditions are now equally or more
important.

The Monitor thus establishes that land
has lost its primary importance in the social sweepstakes; there is symmetry
between agrarian reform and a host of other concerns. The proof for this
interesting appraisal is that "many" people (mostly city-dwellers, logically
enough) focus their attention elsewhere. No majority viewpoint - and it
would presumably have to be quite a large majority to be visible and worth
commenting on - is suggested. But, very gently, what Tom Barry calls the
"root of rebellion" in Latin America - elite control over land - is relegated
to the sidelines. Where does Redbait sneak into the equation? Quite simply,
the relevance of the leftist critique (which generally and sensibly puts
land reform at the top of the agenda) is seen to be in decline. The obstinate
refusal of U.S. policymakers and their Latin proxies to address the issue
is downplayed. Their reformist zeal isn't necessarily absent - maybe it's
just directed elsewhere, in response to the masses' pleas to de-emphasize
the land question ...

'Centrist' Symmetry, or The Liberal's
Lament

When the United States decides to replace
a cosmetically unappealing surrogate (usually a military dictator or junta)
with a slightly more palatable regime (usually concealed by an electoral
façade and a round of "brave but doomed" attempts at systemic reform),
the media must work to map out the centre ground. No matter how abject
the willingness of the new man to kowtow to entrenched elite elements -
by giving the army free rein, pulling back on land reform, turning a blind
eye to death squads - he must be painted as the voice of moderation, a
veritable oasis in a desert of extremes. This allows all commentators back
home, short of the really far-out fringe, to "get on board" and throw their
weight behind this paragon of sober pragmatism. The mechanism is simple:
a symmetry is established whereby the violence of the extreme right mirrors
the depredations of the extreme left, with the selected hero desperately
navigating a course between the two.

In El Salvador, José Napoleon
Duarte fits the 'centrist' bill. Co-opted into a reformist military junta
that was soon toppled by another military coup, Duarte eventually accepted
the U.S. version of his country's destiny and agreed to run in the farcical
1984 elections. Today he is ill, stricken with terminal liver cancer. The
eulogies are already being trundled out. And the similarity of the theme
- helpless Duarte, trapped between the extremes - gives a powerful insight
into the willingness with which the dogma of centrist symmetry is swallowed
south of the border:

(Duarte) embodied the U.S.
policy to forge a strong democratic center in El Salvador .. his stature
still bolstered U.S. efforts to contain leftist guerrillas and right-wing
groups. Without his presence, both extremes might make rapid gains. (Newsweek,
June 13 1988.)

He has been that most valuable
and admirable of politicians, a serious and decent person who chose to
devote himself over the decades to the seemingly impossible mission of
moving from his religious faith to the building of democracy in just about
the most inhospitable circumstances imaginable. For his efforts he has
suffered grievous personal and family injury at the hands of right and
left alike. ... Against immense odds he has struggled to create a center
and make it hold. (Washington Post, in the Manchester Guardian
Weekly, June 12 1988.)

(The reference there to "grievous personal
and family injury at the hands of right and left alike is an interesting
example of spurious symmetry all by itself. The reference to "personal
injury" apparently recalls Duarte's incarceration and torture by the right-wing
military in the early 1970s; the "family injury" apparently refers to the
recent kidnapping of his daughter by FMLN guerrillas, though the daughter
was unharmed and, embarrassingly for Duarte, seems to have had a pretty
enjoyable and enlightening time with the rebels.)

The New York Times
(Editorial, June 8) notes that Duarte's "frustrations are a reminder that
of all the burdens a decent democrat carries in a poor, third world country,
excessive expectations can be the heaviest":

Returning in 1980 to head
a provisional junta, (Duarte) found himself beset on the left by dogmatic
Marxist insurgents and on the right by death squads. ... At the same time,
the Duarte years have been learning years. ... The left is less cockily
sure of its dogmas and timetables. The right knows that death squads will
kill U.S. aid as well as Salvadorans. By stubbornly holding the center
ground, Mr. Duarte has bought time and space for this moderating trend.

Where, in these solemnities, would one
find any indication that Duarte has personally overseen the expansion of
the military's campaign to the Salvadoran countryside, where bombing with
napalm and white phosphorus continues to take a withering toll? How does
Duarte's blanket refusal to open meaningful talks with those "dogmatic
Marxist insurgents" - as he committed himself to doing at the 1987 meeting
of the Central American presidents in Guatemala - figure in the equation?
And what measures has Duarte taken to counter the shocking rise of death-squad
activity in El Salvador since the signing of the Guatemala accord? (As
for death squads "kill(ing) U.S. aid as well as Salvadorans," this can
only be meant as humour.)

It is instructive to compare the
tack of the U.S. media, indicated above, with some of the more thoughtful
coverage in this country. In an excellent column in the Globe and Mail
(June 14, 1988), Paul Knox notes that with the rise of the FMLN/FDR
guerrillas in the early 1980s, "Alarmed U.S. strategists, fearing the loss
of a second ally in the region (after the revolution in Nicaragua), sought
to construct a 'centrist' political facade that would make it politically
acceptable to give the Salvadoran army the support it needed to defeat
the insurgency." Knox adds that Duarte

promised land reform, respect
for human rights and an end to the war but one by one these dreams were
abandoned ... Mr. Duarte gambled on an alliance with the United States
against his more radical countrymen. Less charitably, you could say he
made a Faustian deal with a power whose influence tainted his every move.

Given that the U.S. was inextricably
allied with the "more radical" Salvadoran military and oligarchy, this
doesn't seem to have been much of a "gamble." But at least Knox pinpoints
the basic shabbiness of this political whore - and the quotation marks
he places around 'centrist' in the above quote are worth their weight in
gold.

A fearless Presswatch prediction:
the ARENA party, closely allied with the Salvadoran death squads, will
win next year's presidential election. The media will discover that ARENA
is not so bad after all. Or at least that there are a few brave centrist
figures, struggling to hold the party's right wing in tow, who must be
supported. Maybe a force will emerge that is further right than ARENA (in
El Salvador, just about anything is possible), and the whole party can
sport the new centrist mantle. Sound ludicrous? A recent New York Times
story quotes a U.S. official to the effect that ARENA is a bunch of "nice
guys" who just happen to be "extremely conservative." And where officialdom
treads, 'Centrist' Symmetry is never far behind.(1)

Olympian Symmetry

This is particularly useful. The journalist
or editor sits above the fray like the Greek gods of old. From up there,
all the fuss and confusion below - the competing factions and fierce conflicts
- seem like so much muddle. Only a fool or an ideologue would dare think
that a meaningful perspective could be obtained in the midst of such chaos.
We must wait for time to tell, for a reasoned and judicious historical
perspective to emerge; say, two or three hundred years. Meanwhile, we might
as well just be honest about it. All our investigative skills and earnest
reportage can't provide the neat divisions and clear distinctions our readers
would probably admire. Thus - let's just lump everyone and everything together,
and let time (or more hotheaded types) sort it out.

The great thing about this brand
of symmetry is that it almost sounds humble. Things just aren't clear,
and all our skill can't make them much clearer. The notable thing about
Olympian symmetry is that it tends to be very selectively applied. No-one
has any difficulty providing events in Poland or Afghanistan, for example,
with a basic interpretive framework. But sit U.S.-backed proxies down to
negotiations with the Sandinistas; bring in some last-minute CIA instructions
that prompt the contras to sabotage the meeting; watch things break up
in acrimony - and voilà! The smokescreen descends.

It's discouraging but scarcely surprising that
peace talks between Sandinistas and contras collapsed amid mutual recriminations
last week ... It's not easy to determine which side killed this particular
dream. Both sides have by turn compromised and thrown up roadblocks in
their tortuous negotiations. (New York Times editorial, June 14,
1988).

The editorial compares the behaviour
of CIA surrogate Col. Enrique Bermúdez, who dropped the bombshell
of the "new negotiating position" two hours before the meeting ended, with
that of "Daniel Ortega ... (who may have) seized on these and other tough
new demands as an excuse to end the talks. For the Sandinistas, that would
eliminate an unwanted democratic opening, and leave them the option of
crushing the contras militarily." Meanwhile, Stephen Kinzer weighed in
again with his lofty musings, writing (June 11) that "rebel leaders hardened
their position in response to mixed political signals from the Sandinista
Government" - not in response to explicit CIA instructions to torpedo the
talks by making unacceptable demands at the last possible moment.

Strangely enough, the Times noted
later, without further comment (Editorial, June 27), that "instead of moving
to close the gap, contra negotiators came up with provocative new demands
for instant demobilization and the immediate release of all political prisoners."
Of course, the thrust of the editorial urged the beleaguered U.S. Secretary
of State, George Shultz, to take advantage of the new possibilities for
compromise, ignoring the fact that Shultz represents the most prominent
saboteur of compromise. Still, somehow it became possible, between June
14 and 27, to ascertain "which side killed this particular dream." Often,
symmetry takes a back seat - but it rarely gets out of the car. In most
cases, it's pretty clear that the contras could have walked into that Managua
conference room and sprayed the Sandinista delegation with machine-gun
fire, and Stephen Kinzer would still be writing: "Until the smoke clears,
it will be difficult to apportion blame for the most recent breakdown in
the peace talks, which is also the most serious so far ..."

Sometimes, even 40 years of perspective
doesn't destroy the effectiveness of Olympian Symmetry. Take, for example,
the systematic and deliberate recruitment of active Nazis by the U.S. government
after World War Two. (The Nazis had a lot of experience in combatting communism,
which made them prize intelligence catches.) Peter Grose, reviewing a new
book on this subject for the Washington Post, concludes as follows
(in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 15):

Any writing on this topic
- and the inquiry is only begun - has to find a subtle balance between
moral condemnation and pragmatic vindication. Both have their places; indeed,
both are necessary if the story is to be understood. (Christopher) Simpson
(author of Blowback) does not hide his outrage, but he fairly offers
the evidence to help a later generation comprehend well-intentioned actions
that suffer in the scrutiny of history.

So let's leave it for the scrutinizers
of history to sort out, and never mind that this kind of Olympian symmetry
- so useful when it comes to dismissing distasteful topics - is one of
the main reasons "the inquiry is only begun," four decades after the fact.
(One can only wonder how many former Nazis, troubled by pangs of conscience,
have sought solace in their "well-intentioned actions" that, owing to unforeseen
historical trends, happen to have rubbed public opinion the wrong way.
No matter. At least, if Grose's tacit advice to forgive and forget is followed,
the "later generation" won't be tempted to look for similarities in U.S.
foreign policy today. We can deal with the present-day horde of unsavoury
generals, drug-runners, and death-squad henchmen some years down the road,
once tempers have cooled.)

Historical Symmetry

This is probably the rarest of the breed,
in the print media at least; in some ways, it's also the most pernicious.
The essential argument of historical symmetry is that Things were bad,
but that's irrelevant, because they got better.

Like Olympian symmetry, this perspective
depends upon selective application. No-one (at least, no-one I would sit
at a dinner table with) pretends that increases in industrial production
justify the Stalinist reign of terror during the 1920s and 1930s. When
capitalist behaviour is at stake, however, it doesn't take a lot to mitigate
past mistakes. Yes, the U.S. deposed the democratically-elected government
of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Yes, the coup was followed by 32
years of basically uninterrupted military rule. Yes, at least 100,000 died
at the hands of army counterinsurgency forces and death squads, and hundreds
of thousands more fled their homes, all with the enthusiastic assent and
assistance of successive U.S. governments. But that was back then. The
U.S. helped arrange a quasi-democratic election in 1985, which brought
Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo to quasi-power. The killings go on, but
Vinicio, nice guy that he is, wants nothing to do with them personally.
Historical symmetry is established by the "return to democracy," and the
line is parroted almost without exception in the U.S. mainstream media,
for whom the "fragile flower of democracy" is an irresistible image and
theme.

To plumb the depths of this absurdity,
consider Stanley Karnow's long view of U.S. "influence" in the Philippines,
starting with the invasion and subjugation of the Filipino independence
movement after the U.S. seized the archipelago from Spain:

The conquest, which began
in 1898, was as ugly as any imperialist episode. But America soon started
to atone for its brutality. On a sultry August day in 1901, a converted
cattle ship, the Thomas, steamed into Manila Bay with 500 young schoolteachers
aboard. ... The early teachers remain legendary. Older Filipinos evoke
misty memories of 'Mr. Parker' or 'Miss Johnson', who introduced them to
reading or algebra. (New York Times, June 16, 1988.)

An estimated three hundred to five hundred
thousand Filipinos died in this "ugly" episode, many of them after horrific
tortures. Nonetheless, Mr. Parker and Miss Johnson stepped in to save the
day, and the rapid spread of reading (English) and algebra atoned for America's
earlier injudicious actions. Historical symmetry is established, and peace
(or at least intellectual stagnation) reigns supreme. Stanley Karnow, by
the way, is also author of the book that's now viewed as the standard mainstream
history of the Vietnam War. Is it any wonder?

Notes

1. 1991 note: This
prediction was amply borne out by the recruiting of Alfredo Cristiani as
the "moderate" ARENA head. In fact, even these heights of absurdity were
surpassed in a recent article by the Times' Shirley Christian about
the terminal cancer of Roberto d'Aubuisson, "the far-right (ARENA) leader
accused of death-squad involvement in the early 1980's." This is the man
who oversaw the campaign of death-squad slaughter in the early 1980s; the
man who Robert White, ex-U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, called a "pathological
killer." Christian, awed as usual by glamorous right-wing thugs, finds
him "a hard-smoking, hard-drinking man with a James Dean-like style and
image. ... In recent years Mr. d'Aubuisson has come to be viewed as an
astute politician in a country with few of those. He has developed a willingness
to compromise, say members of other parties." (New York Times, July
22, 1991.)

Created by Adam Jones, 1998. No copyright claimed for non-commercial use if source
is acknowledged.adamj_jones@hotmail.comLast updated: 17 October 2000.