167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Taylor) and the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
to the President1

Washington, October 2,
1963.

SUBJECT

Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam

Your memorandum of 21 September 19632 directed that General
Taylor and Secretary
McNamara proceed to South
Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to defeat the
Viet Cong and to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related political and social
questions. You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment
was not hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be
taken by the South Vietnam Government and what steps our Government
should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action.

Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA, and your Staff, we have conducted an
intensive program of visits to key operational areas, supplemented by
discussions with U.S. officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as
officials of the GVN and third
countries.

We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt.

The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of the mission
as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted.

I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions.

1.

The military campaign has made great progress and continues to
progress.

2.

There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and perhaps
elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu
government is becoming increasingly unpopular.

3.

There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful
coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu
is always a possibility.

4.

Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN military officers are becoming
hostile to the government, they are more hostile to the Viet Cong
than to the government and at least for the near future they will
continue to perform their military duties.

5.

Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu
could change the present favorable military trends. On the other
hand, a return to more moderate methods of control and
administration, unlikely though it may be, would substantially
mitigate the political crisis.

6.

It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will move
Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed,
pressures may increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are
exerted, they are almost certain to continue past patterns of
behavior.

B. Recommendations.

We recommend that:

1.

General Harkins review
with Diem the military
changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the
Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of
1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This
review would consider the need for such changes as:

a.

A further shift of military emphasis and strength to
the Delta (IV Corps).

b.

An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas,
so that all combat troops are in the field an average of
20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.

c.

Emphasis on “clear and hold operations” instead of
terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.

d.

The expansion of personnel in combat units to full
authorized strength.

e.

The training and arming of hamlet militia to an
accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f.

A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program,
especially in the Delta, and action to insure that
future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be
protected, and until civic action programs can be
introduced.

2.

A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential
functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be
carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be
possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that
time.

3.

In accordance with the program to train progressively
Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense
Department should announce in the very near future presently
prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the
end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an
initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel
with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war
effort.

4.

The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our disapproval of
his political program.

a.

Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the
commodity import program, but avoid a formal
announcement. The potential significance of the
withholding of commitments for the 1964 military
budget should be brought home to the top military
officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the Joint
General Staff; up to now we have stated $95 million
may be used by the Vietnamese as a planning level
for the commodity import program for 1964.
Henceforth we could make clear that this is
uncertain both because of lack of final
appropriation action by the Congress and because of
executive policy.

b.

Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the
Saigon-Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power
Project. We should state clearly that we are doing
so as a matter of policy.

c.

Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units, now
under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near
the Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut
off unless these units are promptly assigned to the
full authority of the Joint General Staff and
transferred to the field.

d.

Maintain the present purely “correct” relations
with the top GVN,
and specifically between the Ambassador and
Diem.
Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense
Secretary Thuan on military matters should not,
however, be suspended, as this remains an important
channel of advice. USOM and USIA should also seek to maintain
contacts where these are needed to push forward
programs in support of the effort in the field,
while taking care not to cut across [Page 339]the basic picture of
U.S. disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid
intentions. We should work with the Diem government but
not support it.3

As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be
closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce
repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the
military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but
recognize that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether
to move to more drastic action or try to carry on with
Diem even if he
had not taken significant steps.

5.

At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage
actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek
urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative
leadership if and when it appears.

6.

The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy
toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the
government position to be presented both in Congressional
testimony and in public statements.

a.

The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United
States security. For this reason, we adhere to the
overriding objective of denying this country to
Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as
promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we
mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the
national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S.
military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task
can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date
which we are taking as the time objective of our
counterinsurgency programs.

b.

The military program in Vietnam has made progress and
is sound in principle.

c.

The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply
serious. It has not yet significantly affected the
military effort, but could do so at some time in the
future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war,
the U.S. will review its attitude toward support for the
government. Although we are deeply concerned by
repressive practices, effective performance in the
conduct of the war should be the determining factor in
our relations with the GVN.

d.

The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain
actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if
required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the
abandonment of repression because of its effect on the
popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions
of disapproval and the withholding of support from
GVN activities that
are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will
use these means as required to assure an effective
military program.

From the above analysis it is clear that the situation requires a
constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of political tensions
and improved performance by the Vietnamese Government. We cannot say
with assurance whether the effort against the Viet Cong will ultimately
fail in the absence of major political improvements. However, it does
seem clear that after another period of repressive action progress may
be reduced and indeed reversed. Although the present momentum might
conceivably continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power and political
tensions continue, any significant slowing in the rate of progress would
surely have a serious effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S.
effort.

VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE
Diem REGIME

A. Conduct of U.S.
Representatives.

U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness toward their
Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those contacts and
communications which are necessary for the actual conduct of operations
in the field. To some extent this is the attitude already adopted by the
Ambassador himself, but it could be extended to the civilian and
military agencies located in Saigon. The effect of such action would be
largely psychological.

B. Economic Leverage.

Together, USOM's Commodity Import
Program (CIP) and the PL 480 program account for between 60 and 70
percent of imports into Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the
CIP has already been suspended.
CIP deliveries result in the
generation of piastres, most of which go to the support of the defense
budget. It is estimated that CIP
pipelines will remain relatively large for some five or six months, and
within this time period there would not be a serious material effect.
Even within this period, however, the flow of piastres to support the
defense budget will gradually begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its foreign
exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures.

Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would mean that
there would be no material reason for inflation to begin in the short
term period. However, the psychological effect of growing realization
that the CIP program has been suspended
might be substantial [Page 341]in 2-4
months. Saigon has a large number of speculative traders, and although
there is considerable police effort to control prices, this might not be
able to contain a general trend of speculation and hoarding. Once
inflation did develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the conduct of the war.

Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final approval—the
Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon Electric Power
Project ($4 million). Suspension of these projects would be a possible
means of demonstrating to Congress and the world that we disapprove of
GVN policies and are not providing
additional aid not directly essential to the war effort.

C. Paramilitary and Other
Assistance.

(1)

USOM assistance to the Combat
Police and USOM and USIS assistance to the Director
General of Information and the ARVNPsyWar Program could be
suspended. These projects involve a relatively small amount of local
currency but their suspension, particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs
which the U.S. wishes to see progress.

(2)

However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at Colonel
Tung, the Special
Forces Commander, whose forces in or near Saigon played a
conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are a continuing
support for Diem.
Colonel Tung commands a
mixed complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others presently through
CIA. All of those now in or
near Saigon were trained either for combat missions or for
special operations into North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on
grounds of their not being used for their proper missions, the
U.S. could inform Diem
that we would cut off MAP and
CIA support unless they were
placed directly under Joint General Staff and were committed to
field operations.

The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small. The
equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and the
pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN budget. Psychologically,
however, the significance of the gesture might be greater. At
the least it would remove one target of press criticism of the
U.S., and would probably also be welcomed by the high military
officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the disaffected groups in
Saigon.

At the same time, support should continue, but through General
Harkins rather than
CIA, for border surveillance
and other similar field operations that are contributing to the
war effort.

We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk
that Colonel Tung would
refuse to carry out external operations against the Lao corridor
and North Vietnam. It might also limit CIA's access to the military. However, U.S. liaison
with high military officers could probably [Page 342]be fully maintained through the
U.S. military advisors. On balance, we conclude that these
possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in
this action.

(3)

Consideration has been given both by USOM and the military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility
of redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as
to bypass the central government in Saigon. Military studies have
shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and
cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of
communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that
the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the field under the rural strategic
hamlet program. However, there is a consensus among U.S. agencies in
Saigon that such an effort is not practical in the face of
determined opposition by the GVN
unless, of course, a situation had developed where the central
government was no longer in control of some areas of the country.
Nor is it at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up
the position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position.

D. Propaganda.

Although the capability of USIS to
support the United States campaign of pressure against the regime would
be small, the Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the
content and timing of the United States pronouncements outside the
country. He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in
stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of democratic
political philosophies. This medium could be used to exploit a wide
range of ascending political pressure. In addition, a phased program of
United States official pronouncements could be developed for use in
conjunction with the other leverages as they are applied. We must
recognize the possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong countermeasures.

E. The Leverage of Conditioning Our
Military Aid on Satisfactory Progress.

Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage embodied in our
constantly making it plain to Diem and others that the long term continuation of
military aid is conditioned upon the Vietnamese Government demonstrating
a satisfactory level of progress toward defeat of the insurgency.

F. Conclusions.

A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension, will not have large material effects on the
GVN or the war effort, at least for
2-4 months. The psychological effects could be greater, and there is
some evidence that the suspension is already causing concern to [Page 343]Diem. However, the effect of pressures that can be
carried out over an extended period without detriment to the war effort
is probably limited with respect to the possibility of Diem making necessary changes.

We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a far more
intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP deliveries or long continued suspension of the
commodity import program. If the Diem government should fail to make major improvements,
serious consideration would have to be given to this possible course of
action, but we believe its effect on the war effort would be so
serious—in psychological if not in immediate material terms—that it
should not be undertaken at the present time.

VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES

A. Prospects of a Spontaneous
Coup.

The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem Regime are not high. The two
principal sources of such an attempt, the senior military officers and
the students, have both been neutralized by a combination of their own
inability and the regime's effective countermeasures of control. The
student organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves
have displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently
being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an
explosion.

The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult job of
secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to upset the
Regime.

Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals
to take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested in
the military forces. They, therefore, concentrate their manipulative
talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by controls over key
units and their locations. They are aware that these actions may reduce
efficiency, but they tolerate it rather than risk the prospect that they
be overthrown and their social revolution frustrated. They have
established a praetorian guard to guarantee considerable bloodshed if
any attack is made. The generals have seen slim hope of surmounting
these difficulties without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of
the Army and the Establishment itself.

Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short term, new
factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem or an unpredictable and even
irrational attack launched by a junior officer group, which would call
urgently for U.S. support or counteraction. In such a case, the best
alternative would appear to be the support of constitutional continuity
in the person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be
developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional
period.

The prospects that a replacement regime would be an improvement appear to
be about 50-50.4 Initially, only a strongly authoritarian regime would
be able to pull the government together and maintain order. In view of
the pre-eminent role of the military in Vietnam today, it is probable
that this role would be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking
power after the selective process of a junta dispute. Such an
authoritarian military regime, perhaps after an initial period of
euphoria at the departure of Diem/Nhu, would
be apt to entail a resumption of the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese
Establishment before Diem, and
an emphasis on conventional military rather than social, economic and
political considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of
xenophobic nationalism.

These features must be weighed, however, against the possible results of
growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would continue and even magnify the present
dissension, unhappiness and unrest.

C. Possible U.S. Actions.

Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great difference
to the chances of a coup. However, at the present time we lack a clear
picture of what acceptable individuals might be brought to the point of
action, or what kind of government might emerge. We therefore need an
intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to
establish necessary contacts to allow the U.S. to continuously appraise
coup prospects.

If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still remain
difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a spontaneous
coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu
would trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show
with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative
government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a U.S.
“puppet” would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam and in
significant areas of the world, including other underdeveloped nations
where the U.S. has a major role.

In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at a
later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous coup,
and this too requires clandestine contacts on an intensive basis.

Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative policies the
U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and military objectives:

1.

Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to obtain the necessary
improvements through persuasion from a posture of
“reconciliation.” This would not mean any expression of approval
of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply that we
would go back in practice to business as usual.

2.

Follow a policy of selective pressures: “purely correct”
relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold
further actions in the commodity import program, and making
clear our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this
policy is letting the present impression stand that the U.S.
would not be averse to a change of Government—although we would
not take any immediate actions to initiate a coup.

3.

Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking military
officers. This policy might involve more extended suspensions of
aid and sharp denunciations of the regime's actions so timed as
to fit with coup prospects and planning.

Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows:

1.

Reconciliation.

We believe that this course of action would be ineffective
from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and
would also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying
the present U.S. support effort both to the Congress and
generally to significant third nations. We are most
unlikely, after recent events, to get Diem to make the necessary
changes; on the contrary, he would almost certainly regard
our reconciliation as an evidence that the U.S. would sit
still for just about anything he did. The result would
probably be not only a continuation of the destructive
elements in the Regime's policies but a return to larger
scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they were necessary. The result
would probably be sharp deterioration in the military
situation in a fairly short period.

2.

Selective Pressures.

We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures
to Diem in order to
incline him to the direction of our policies. The most
powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of
military and economic aid but any consideration of its use
reveals the double-edged nature of its effects. Any
long-term reduction of aid cannot but have an eventual
adverse effect on the military campaign since both the
military and the economic programs have been consciously
designed and justified in terms of their contribution to the
war effort. Hence, immediate reductions must be selected
carefully and be left in effect only for short periods.

We believe that the present level of pressures is causing,
and will cause, Diem
some concern, while at the same time not significantly
impairing the military effort. We are not hopeful that this
level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually induce
Diem to remove
Nhu from the
picture completely. However, there is a better chance that
Diem will at
least be deterred from resuming large scale oppressions.

At the same time, there are various factors that set a time
limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form.
Within 2-4 months we have to make critical decisions with
the GVN about its 1964
budget and our economic support level. In addition, there is
a significant and growing possibility that even the present
limited actions in the economic field-more for psychological
than for economic reasons would start a wave of speculation
and inflation that would be difficult to control or bring
back into proper shape. As to when we would reverse our
present course, the resumption of the full program of
economic and military aid should be tied to the actions of
the Diem
government.

As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic
and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to
develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an
agreed schedule. The extent to which such objectives are
met, in conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's
political performance, would determine the level of aid for
the following period.

3.

Organizing a Coup.

For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course of action should
not be undertaken at the present time.

On balance we consider that the most promising course of action to adopt
at this time is an application of selective short-term pressures,
principally economic, and the conditioning of long-term aid on the
satisfactory performance by the Diem government in meeting military and political
objectives which in the aggregate equate to the requirements of final
victory. The specific actions recommended in Section I of this report
are consistent with this policy.

Mr.
Colby
believes that the official “correct” relationship
should be supplemented by selected and restricted
unofficial and personal relationships with
individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador, where
persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of
the official U.S. posture. [Footnote in the source
text.]↩

Mr. Sullivan (State) believes that a
replacement regime which does not suffer from the overriding danger
of Nhu's ambition to
establish a totalitarian state (the control of which he might easily
lose to the Communists in the course of his flirtations) would be
inevitably better than the current regime even if the former did
have the deficiencies described. [Footnote in the source
text.]↩