POLITICO 44

“I believe that we underestimate the impact of sanction. We have largely failed to recalibrate our judgment about the utility of sanctions in light of the Iraq experience and in light of the changes in Libyan policy. Recall, please, that in the case of Iraq, we had a very problematic sanctions regime. It was leaky at times, because of smuggling through Syria and Jordan. It was corrupt at times, such as in the case of the ‘oil for food’ program. It was unverified after 1998 when the U.N. inspectors were kicked out. But the key lesson of the Iraq case is that sanctions worked. They worked unambiguously.

“George W. Bush didn’t disarm Iraq. Bill Clinton did. Now, yes, Desert Fox played a role as well, so military force was a part of the package, though it came late and probably just finished off a program that was teetering anyway. And the inspections from 1991 to 1998 were more intrusive than anything the Iranians will accept. And there are myriad other differences, several of which — including dynamics of democratization in Iran — work in our favor. But the starting point in our discussions about Iran ought not be the shallow ‘war or nukes’ dichotomy that many propose. The starting point ought to be how to emulate — if possible — the successful sanctions regime that ended Iraqi nuclear weapon aspirations in the 1990s and that encouraged Libya to seek to normalize its international standing.

“The fact is, we have two recent ... examples of extremely successful sanctions regimes working largely as advertised. Let’s try to learn from our successes and not just our failures.”

Pejman Yousefzadeh, attorney

“I have long been in favor of talks with Iran that cover not only the issue of nuclear weapons but a variety of other subjects, as well — including Iran’s human rights record. At first blush, this would not seem to be a very ‘realpolitik’ approach, but in fact, it is. Showing how Iran has failed to meet its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 — and repeatedly emphasizing Iran’s human rights failures in public and during negotiations — would help demonstrate and highlight the fundamental illegitimacy of the Islamic regime, much as emphasizing the failures of the Soviet Union in the realm of human rights helped demonstrate the illegitimacy of the Soviet regime for the world to see. Illegitimate regimes that have been called out as such in public lose massive amounts of bargaining power in negotiations concerning a variety of topics, including human rights. Pressuring Iran on the issue of human rights will help undermine the Iranian negotiating strategy on the issue of nuclear weapons, support for t

errorism worldwide, interference in Iraq and other issues, as well.”

Dana Perino, former White House press secretary

“Sanctions had better work, and that means they have to be serious enough — even Draconian — to force a decision by the Iranian regime where it decides that it is more secure if it is not pursuing a nuclear weapon. We need to build external and internal pressure for that decision to be made, or else the president will be left with two terrible choices: accepting an Iran with a clear path to a nuclear weapon or having to contemplate military action.”