The sometimes delicate relationship between scientific research and
national security was the subject of a hearing yesterday before the
House Science Committee.

"The war on terrorism will be won in the laboratory just as much as on
the battlefield," according to Committee chairman Sherwood L.
Boehlert. But "if the laboratory is a theater of war, then what are
its rules of engagement? War demands secrecy; science thrives on
openness. How can a free society balance those competing demands?"

The hearing focused in particular on the proposed new category of
"sensitive but unclassified" information, and on the treatment of
foreign students and faculty.

"Sensitive but unclassified" information -- also recently designated
"sensitive homeland security information" -- has been controversial
because it has no clear definition, and therefore seems to invite the
arbitrary withholding of information.

Most of the witnesses at the hearing objected to the indeterminate
character of the new category, which is neither fish nor fowl (nor
meat nor dairy). The prevailing sentiment was that classified
information should be classified, and unclassified information should
simply be unclassified.

But White House science advisor John H. Marburger testified that the
"sensitive" category is not new and does not signify any shift in
government information policy.

"The designation Sensitive Homeland Security Information (SHSI) does
not refer to some new category of information; rather it is the type
of information that the government holds today which is not routinely
released to the general public, such as law enforcement data and
critical computer security threats or vulnerabilities. The vast
majority of government information is and will remain publicly
accessible," Dr. Marburger said.

In a significant public commitment, he added that "The [SHSI]
designation would be implemented under existing law and policy, and
complements and does not supercede existing mechanisms for
classification and declassification of government information."

The prepared testimony from the October 10 hearing on "Conducting
Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and
Security" is posted here:

Scholars, government officials, and citizen activists gathered at an
international workshop in Geneva, Switzerland last week to consider
the theory and practice of intelligence oversight in democratic
societies, including the obstacles to effective oversight in both new
and mature democracies.

The workshop yielded an interesting assortment of published papers,
which notably provide new information about intelligence agencies in
several Eastern European countries.

The papers and other information about the conference, which was
sponsored by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces, may be found here:

The first time that the U.S. government ever imposed prior restraint on
a U.S. publication was in 1979 when it sought to block publication of
Howard Morland's 1979 Progressive Magazine article on "The H-Bomb
Secret."

The Morland article became the subject of a landmark lawsuit (United
States of America v. The Progressive) that raised challenging
questions about the role of nuclear secrecy, the limits of government
accountability, and the requirements of the First Amendment. The case
also divided the scientific community. (The Federation of American
Scientists opposed publication of the article, which eventually
appeared in the November 1979 issue of The Progressive.)

Now, over two decades later, some of the central points of contention
have been declassified and disclosed in the form of a 1979 exchange of
correspondence between the eminent Hans Bethe, who opposed publication
of the Morland article, and Livermore physicist Ray E. Kidder, who
favored it.

The 1979 Bethe-Kidder correspondence, with an introduction by Howard
Morland, is posted here: