should
be abandoned, in order not to prejudice the
surprise of the attack. On the 12th and 13th of
August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference
with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.

It
was a conference to which the Tribunal will have
to have regard from several points of view. I
summarize now only one aspect of the matter: At
the beginning of the conversation Hitler
emphasized the strength of the German position,
of Germany's Western and Eastern Fortifications,
and of the strategic and other advantages they
held in comparison with those of England,
France, and Poland. Now I quote from the
captured document itself. Hitler said this:

"Since
the Poles through their whole attitude
had made it clear that, in any case, in
the event of a conflict, they would
stand on the side of the enemies of
Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation
at the present moment could only be of
advantage for the unavoidable conflict
with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany's
eastern frontier, not only would the 11
East Prussian divisions be tied down,
but also further contingents would be
kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a
previous liquidation."

Then this:

"Generally
speaking, the best thing to happen would
be to liquidate the false neutrals one
after the other. This process could be
carried out more easily if on every
occasion one partner of the Axis covered
the other while it was dealing with an
uncertain neutral. Italy might well
regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of that
kind." Ciano was for postponing the
operation. Italy was not ready. She
believed that a conflict with Poland
would develop into a general European
war. Mussolini was convinced that
conflict with the Western Democracies
was inevitable, but he was making plans
for a period 2 or 3 years ahead. But the
Führer said that the Danzig
question must be disposed of, one way or
the other, by the end of August. I
quote: "He had, therefore, decided
to use the occasion of the next
political provocation which has the form
of an ultimatum. . . ."

On
the 22d of August Hitler called his Supreme
Commanders together and gave the order for the
attack. In the course of what he said he made it
clear that the decision to attack had, in fact,
been made not later than the previous spring. He
would give a spurious cause for starting the
war. And at that time the attack was timed to
take place in the early hours of the 26th of
August. On the day before, on the 25th of
August, the British Government, in the hope that
Hitler might still be reluctant to plunge the
world into war,