Recently in Nevada Supreme Court Category

Lopez (Eduardo) v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections,Docket No. 54174Carson City - 10:00 a.m. - Justices Cherry, Saitta, and GibbonsThis
is an appeal from a Carson City district court order granting a motion
to dismiss an inmate's lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Eduardo Lopez, an inmate at the Ely State Prison, brought a
tort action alleging that the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC)
was negligent in failing to follow its policies and procedures by
housing Lopez with a known enemy, Jeffery Troxel. Lopez allegedly
sustained injuries caused by Troxel during an altercation in their
shared cell on June 29, 2006. According to NDOC's inmate grievance
procedure, an inmate must initiate an informal grievance involving
personal injury within six months of when the claim arises. Lopez filed
an informal inmate grievance on March 10, 2007, more than six months
after the alleged claim arose. The NDOC rejected the grievance as being
untimely. Lopez filed a first-level grievance on April 2, 2007, and it
also was rejected as being untimely. Lopez never filed a second-level
grievance. Lopez filed a civil complaint against the NDOC in the
district court on June 24, 2008. The district court dismissed Lopez's
lawsuit on the basis that Lopez failed to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to initiating a state tort action. Lopez appeals. ISSUES:
Did the district court err in granting the NDOC's motion to dismiss due
to Lopez's failure to exhaust administrative remedies? Does NRS
209.243(1) violate equal protection by restricting a prisoner's right to
file a personal injury administrative claim within six months of the
date of the injury, while non-prisoners may file such an action within
two years of the injury? Is the precedent set forth in Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), still controlling law in Nevada?

Goodlow (Deljuan) v. State of Nevada,Docket No. 54198Carson City - 10:30 a.m. - Justices Cherry, Saitta, and GibbonsThis
is Deljuan Goodlow's appeal of his judgment of conviction, entered
after a Washoe County jury found him guilty, for first-degree murder
with the use of a deadly weapon, home invasion, and burglary. The
underlying incident began when Carolyn Van Loock and Royce Riley were
staying at the Lido Inn in Reno during a trip from California and
witnessed two men arguing. After seeing a gun, they went inside their
motel room. Frank Smith and Deljuan Goodlow broke the couple's motel
room window, attempted to kick down the door, and shot Riley, while Van
Loock hid in the bathroom. Riley died from a gunshot wound to the
chest. Security cameras from a neighboring property recorded some of
the incident. Smith and Goodlow fled from the Lido Inn in a black car.
Police searched for the black car and eventually found it, although no
one was inside. Officers saw blood both inside and outside the car and
then found Goodlow nearby, with cuts on his arm and the keys to the car
in his possession. The police arrested Goodlow and showed him the
surveillance video that recorded the incident. Goodlow admitted that he
was in the recording. Over Goodlow's objection, the district court
ruled that his case and Smith's should be tried together. During jury
selection, the district court judge commented on the "horrible" crimes
and referred to notorious historical figures. When Goodlow moved for a
mistrial due to the statements, the district court denied the motion.
The defendants also objected, under Batson v. Kentucky,
to the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential
minority jurors, but the district court denied the defendants'
objection. After a seven-day trial, the jury convicted Goodlow, and the
district court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life in prison
without the possibility of parole. ISSUES: Did the
district court abuse its discretion in joining Goodlow's and Smith's
cases? Do the district court judge's comments during jury selection
require this court to reverse Goodlow's conviction? Did the State's use
of peremptory challenges to exclude potential minority jurors during
jury selection violate Batson v. Kentucky? Was there sufficient evidence to support Goodlow's convictions for burglary and first-degree murder?

Kamalaudeen (Mohamed) v. State of Nevada,Docket No. 53067Carson City - 11:30 p.m. - Justices Cherry, Saitta, and GibbonsThis
is Mohamed Kamalaudeen's appeal of his judgment of conviction, entered
after a Washoe County jury found him guilty, for murder and solicitation
to commit murder for the killing of University of Nevada, Reno,
professor Judy Calder. Kamalaudeen was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for murder, a consecutive term of 5 to
20 years for a deadly weapon enhancement, and 4 to 15 years in prison
for solicitation to commit murder. ISSUES: Should the
public defender's office have been disqualified from representing
Kamalaudeen because it represented one of the State's witnesses in an
unrelated case? Did the district court err by admitting gruesome
autopsy photographs? Was Kamalaudeen's sentence for the deadly weapon
enhancement correct? (Disclaimer: This synopsis is
intended to provide only general information about this case before the
Nevada Supreme Court. It is not intended to be all inclusive or reflect
all positions of the parties.)

Smith (Frank) v. State of Nevada,Docket No. 54234Carson City - 2:00 p.m. - Justices Cherry, Saitta, and GibbonsIn
this case, Frank Smith is appealing his judgment of conviction, entered
after a Washoe County jury found him guilty, for first-degree murder
with the use of a deadly weapon, home invasion, and burglary. The
underlying incident began when Carolyn Van Loock and Royce Riley were
staying at the Lido Inn in Reno during a trip from California and
witnessed two men arguing. After seeing a gun, they went inside their
motel room. Frank Smith and Deljuan Goodlow broke the couple's motel
room window, attempted to kick down the door, and shot Riley, while Van
Loock hid in the bathroom. Riley died from a gunshot wound to the
chest. Security cameras from a neighboring property recorded some of
the incident. Smith and Goodlow fled from the Lido Inn in a black car.
Police searched for the black car and eventually found it, although no
one was inside. Officers saw blood both inside and outside the car and
located Goodlow nearby, with cuts on his arm and the keys to the car in
his possession. After the police arrested him, Goodlow identified Smith
as being involved. Smith was eventually extradited from California.
During the seven-day joint trial, Goodlow testified on his own behalf,
while Smith chose to remain silent. A jury convicted both men of
first-degree murder, home invasion, and burglary. The district court
sentenced Smith to life in prison without the possibility of parole,
plus an equal consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon. Smith
now appeals. ISSUES: Did the district court err by
failing to sever Smith's trial? Does Smith's conviction rest on
insufficient evidence? Should this court overrule its prior opinion in State v. District Court (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 188 P.3d 1079 (2008)?

In Schuck v. Signature Flight Support, a 3-judge panel (Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering), issues a decision, authored by Justice Pickering, which affirms the grant of summary judgment in a case involving damage to an airplane. The Court also finds that the district court erred in awarding the plaintiff's original lawyers, who withdrew, judgment for unpaid fees and costs.

This is an appeal from a district court order denying the State's
motion to correct what it argues is an illegal sentence that reduced a
drug trafficker's prison term from 10 years to life, to 2 to 15 years.
Arthur Lucero pleaded guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance
and was sentenced to a term of 120 months to life in prison, pursuant to
NRS 453.3385(3). The district court subsequently suspended Lucero's
sentence and placed him on probation pursuant to NRS 453.3405, which
allows a district court to reduce or suspend the sentence of a person
found guilty of trafficking if it finds that the person has provided
substantial assistant in the investigation or prosecution of any
offense. Subsequently, the district court revoked Lucero's probation
and modified his sentence to a term of 24 to 180 months in prison. The
State filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the
modification resulted in a sentence that was less than the range
provided by NRS 453.3385(3). The district court denied the motion and
the State has appealed that decision. ISSUE: Did the district court err by denying the State's motion to correct an illegal sentence?

This is an appeal from a Washoe County district court order granting
Charles Huebler's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Huebler was convicted in the district court, pursuant to a guilty plea,
of one count of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. He was
sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after 10 years.
While Huebler did not file a direct appeal of his conviction, he did
file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his
petition, Huebler argued that his right to due process was violated
because the State failed to disclose evidence favorable to his defense,
which the prosecution has a duty to do under the United States Supreme
Court case Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court granted Huebler's petition, and the State is now appealing that decision. ISSUES: Did the district court err in determining that Huebler had established a claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland?

This appeal and cross-appeal in a products liability case arose from a
motocross motorcycle accident that caused severe burns to over 90
percent of Joseph Provenza's body. The appeals are from a multimillion
dollar judgment and a post-judgment order denying a new trial. LeMans
Corporation manufactured the clothing Joseph was wearing at the time of
the crash. Joseph and his parents, Michael and Kim Provenza, sued
several related Yamaha companies, which manufactured and distributed the
motocross motorcycle Joseph was riding. The Provenzas also sued LeMans
because, the Provenzas contended, the LeMans clothing exacerbated
Joseph's injuries. In the early months of litigation, Michael Provenza
and agents of the Provenzas' trial counsel deliberately altered and
destroyed portions of the motocross motorcycle. When Yamaha's experts
attempted to inspect the motorcycle, they discovered the alterations.
As a sanction, the district court dismissed claims against Yamaha.
However, the district court denied a similar motion to dismiss filed by
LeMans, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury returned a verdict
against LeMans for approximately $41 million in damages, plus
approximately $10 million in prejudgment interest. The district court
modified the judgment to exclude prejudgment interest for the reasonable
value of medical services that the Provenzas had obtained for free from
Shriners Hospital. LeMans now appeals the judgment against it, and the
Provenzas have filed a cross-appeal challenging the modification of the
judgment. ISSUES: Did the district court err in
failing to dismiss the action against LeMans? Did the district court
abuse its discretion in denying a new trial? Did the district court err
in amending the judgment to delete prejudgment interest on one element
of the Provenzas' damages?

This is an appeal from a Washoe County district court judgment in a
medical malpractice action, which alleged that doctors diagnosed and
treated a woman for metastatic bone cancer that she did not have. In
May 2000, Shirley Marrs was informed by respondents Steven Schiff, M.D.,
and John Shields, M.D., that she had terminal metastatic bone cancer.
Marrs received continuous treatment until January 2003, which she
alleges caused her significant emotional and physical distress. Marrs
resumed treatment with another medical provider who informed her in
September 2004 that she, in fact, did not have metastatic bone cancer.
In September 2005, Marrs filed a complaint against respondents alleging
that they misdiagnosed her and then followed up with unnecessary
treatment. Marrs further alleged that respondents concealed their
misdiagnosis during the course of treatment. At trial, the district
court granted respondents' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
grounds that Marrs's complaint was filed too late under NRS 41A.097(1),
which provides that an action for injury against a health care provider
may not be commenced more than four years after the date of injury.
Subsequently, Marrs moved to have the district court judge who presided
over the trial disqualified for bias. Another district court judge
denied the motion to disqualify. ISSUES: Did the
district court err in concluding that Marrs's complaint was
time-barred? Should the time for filing a complaint have been extended
due to respondents' alleged concealment of their negligence? Did the
second judge err by failing to disqualify the trial judge?

Southern California Edison v. Dist. Ct. (Dept. of Taxation),

Docket No. 55228

Carson City - 11:30 a.m. - Full Court

In this original petition for a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court
is being asked to determine the standard of review a district court
should apply in reviewing refund decisions of the Nevada Tax
Commission. Southern California Edison filed several claims with the
Nevada Department of Taxation for refunds of use taxes Edison paid
between 1998 and 2000. The Department denied Edison's claims and Edison
appealed to the Nevada Tax Commission. Ultimately, the Commission
denied Edison's claims. Edison then filed a complaint in district court
pursuant to NRS 372.680, which allows for an independent action to be
brought in district court against the Department after a final decision
is rendered by the Commission. Such an action would be reviewed by the
district court de novo, that is, without deference to the Commission's
decision. The Department filed a motion to dismiss Edison's complaint,
arguing that recent amendments to the pertinent statutes have altered
the refund procedure and that the proper vehicle for challenging the
Commission's decision is a petition for judicial review pursuant to NRS
233B.130. Such a petition would be reviewed by the district court under
a substantial evidence standard, which would require the district court
to give more deference to the Commission's decision. The district
court ordered that the matter should proceed as a petition for judicial
review. The district court proceeding has been postponed until the
Supreme Court decides the petition for writ of mandamus. ISSUE: Did legislation alter the practice for use tax refund claims to allow only petitions for judicial review?

This is Curtis Guy's appeal from a district court order denying his
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty
case. Guy was convicted by a Clark County jury of first-degree murder
in the death of Ceasor Evans stemming from a dispute over cocaine. Guy
previously appealed his conviction and death sentence, which were
affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Guy then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that his conviction
was invalid for numerous reasons. The district court denied the habeas
corpus petition and Guy has appealed that decision. ISSUES: Was
Guy's trial counsel ineffective, warranting a new trial? Did the
district court err in finding that the jury's consideration of two
invalid aggravators was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Did the
district court properly deny Guy's claim of cumulative error?

In a 24-page unpublished Order of Affirmance, the Nevada Supreme Court affirms the judgment of conviction against O.J. Simpson. The Court rejects Simpson's claims of a Batson violation, judicial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, limitation on the right of confrontation, hearsay violation, and redundancy of the deadly weapons enhancements. The Court also finds that the district court properly instructed the jury on robbery and conspiracy and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

In a separate Order of Reversal and Remand, the Court grants a new trial to Simpson's co-defendant Clarence Stewart.The Court found that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sever Stewart's trial from Simpson's trial.

In re Candelaria - In an en banc opinion authored by Chief Justice Parraguirre, with dissents by Justices Cherry and Saitta, the Court explains its rationale for its previously issued decision concerning the 5 year period applicable to those seek election as a justice of the peace: "In this appeal, we are asked to define the eligibility requirements set
forth in NRS 4.010(2)(a) for justice of the peace. Based on the
statute's plain and unambiguous language, we conclude that, before being
elected or appointed to a justice of the peace position, an attorney
must be licensed to practice law for a minimum of five calendar years,
which are typically 365-day years, from the date of his or her
admission. After expedited briefing and argument, we summarily affirmed
the district court's order granting the petition to remove the
candidate for justice of the peace from the ballot, as she did not meet
the minimum five-year requirement. This opinion sets forth the full
reasoning that underlies our disposition."

Orion Portfolio Servs. 2 v. Clark County - In an en banc opinion, authored by Justice Douglas, the Court addresses the following: "The United States
District Court for the District of Nevada has certified two questions to
this court, pursuant to NRAP 5. Although we accept the federal court's
certified questions, we reframe them to better reflect the factual
circumstances of the federal case and, accordingly, answer the following
questions. When a local government entity sells property using the
competitive bidding process, does NRS 332.185 require the government to
follow public bidding rules outlined in Chapter 332? And, under Nevada
law, is a contract obtained through competitive bidding void when it
materially differs from the contents of the invitation to bid?

We
conclude that the answer to both questions is yes. If a public entity
chooses to sell property by competitive bidding, it must follow the
rules set forth in NRS Chapter 332. And a contract obtained through
competitive bidding is void if it materially differs from the contents
of the invitation to bid."

This is an appeal from a Clark County district court order in a tort action. Appellant Robert Lord was severely injured while participating in a high-tech scavenger hunt in Las Vegas. Lord was rendered a blind quadriplegic when he fell approximately 30 feet head-first down an abandoned mine shaft. Lord and his wife, appellant Jacqueline Deerr-Lord, filed suit against settling defendants Joe Belfiore, Kristina Belfiore, Kevin Shields, Walter Smith, Scott Schell, and Argentena Consolidating Mining Co., and proceeded to trial against the only non-settling defendant, respondent Chee Chew. The Lords appeal the jury's defense verdict in favor of Chew. ISSUES:(1) Whether the district court erred in refusing various jury instructions related to vicarious liability; (2) Whether the district court erred in failing to hold the pre-injury release of liability unenforceable as a matter of law; (3) Whether the district court erred in awarding Chew attorney fees and costs; and (4) Whether judicial misconduct requires reversal.

Bell v. American Family Mutual Ins.,

Docket Nos. 50162 and 54090

Las Vegas-10:30 a.m. - Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering

Appellant Maulidi Bell was injured in an auto accident with Andre Bailey, whom respondent American Family insured. Bell obtained a $1,000,000 default judgment against Bailey in a Clark County District Court in excess of the $15,000 / $30,000 policy limits, the whole of which he seeks to collect from American Family.ISSUES:(1) Whether the third party appellant's counterclaims were barred by the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion based on a prior judge's ruling in a separate case, such that the district court properly reversed its earlier order allowing the third party to proceed in the insurer's action for declaratory relief (2) Whether a third-party claimant may bring a direct action for bad faith against an insurer, after obtaining a judgment against the insured, thus allowing the third-party to recover punitive damages in excess of the insurance policy limits, and (3) Whether Nevada allows an injured party, after securing a judgment against an insured tortfeasor, to execute on the judgment and acquire then assert the tortfeasor's first party cause of action for bad faith.

Fanders v. Riverside Resort and Casino,

Docket No. 51225

Las Vegas-11:30 a.m. - Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering

Appellant Juana Fanders was employed as a guest room attendant at the Riverside Resort & Casino in Laughlin, Nevada. On the day that she quit her job at Riverside, and before leaving the casino premises, Fanders was escorted to Riverside's security office where casino security guards allegedly assaulted and wrongfully imprisoned her. Fanders filed a civil action against the security guards and Riverside (collectively respondents) alleging assault and battery, wrongful imprisonment, and negligence. The Clark County district court granted summary judgment to respondents, ruling that Fanders' sole remedy was provided by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). ISSUES:(1) Whether Fanders was an employee at the time she was injured, (2) Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Fanders' injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment, and (3) Whether workers' compensation is Fanders' only recourse on her intentional tort claims against her former co-employees or against her former employer?

Stephans (Stuard) v. State of Nevada,

Docket No. 52254

Las Vegas-1:30 p.m. - Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering

Appellant Stuard Stephans and his codefendant were apprehended outside of a retail store after they were observed stealing three bottles of Ezra Fitch cologne each.Stephans now challenges a Clark County judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count each of burglary, grand larceny, and conspiracy to commit larceny.At trial the State attempted to prove the value of each cologne bottle through the testimony of the store security guard, who testified that he knew the price of the cologne based on the price tag on the bottle.ISSUES:(1) Whether sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support Stephans' conviction for grand larceny, (2) Whether the store security guard's testimony regarding the price of the bottle of cologne was inadmissible hearsay, (3) Whether the district court erred by rejecting Stephans' proposed jury instruction, which advised the jury that "[t]he mere fact that two people are committing the same type of crime at the same location is insufficient in and of itself to prove a conspiracy."(4) Whether the district court erred by failing to dismiss a juror for cause, and (5) Whether the district court erred by limiting Stephans' counsel's questioning of potential jurors.

Sparks v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,

Docket No. 50668

Las Vegas-2:00 p.m. - Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering

This appeal arises from an altercation that occurred during a tailgate at a football game between the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR) and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). Various persons from UNR and UNLV associated with Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity (ATO) attended a tailgate in an area reserved by the UNR Alumni Association and in which ATO served free alcohol. Several ATO members and non-ATO members, including Jeffrey Clack (non-ATO), left that area and wandered into another tailgate section where the car of appellants Roy and Andrea Sparks was located. The Sparks returned to their car to find Clack and a few other guys leaning on it. Andrea asked them to leave, and then Roy approached and also asked them to leave. Suddenly, an altercation broke out, during which Clack bit off the end of Roy's nose.The Sparks filed suit against Clack and various university, alumni, and ATO entities alleging negligence; assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; misrepresentation; and false imprisonment. The Sparks entered into a settlement agreement with the university defendants. The alumni defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The ATO defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court also granted. Appellants appeal both orders of the district court.ISSUES: (1) Whether the district court erred in granting the Alumni respondents' motion to dismiss on the ground that appellants did not exercise reasonable diligence in determining the identity of the true defendants; (2) Whether the district court's failure to comply with NRCP 56(c) in granting the ATO respondents' motion for summary judgment warrants reversal; (3) Whether the ATO respondents' motion for summary judgment wasprocedurally deficient; (4) Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the ATO respondents were negligent; (5) Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the ATO respondents are liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (6) Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the ATO respondents are liable for the intentional torts committed by Jeffrey Clack against Sparks.

This is an appeal from
a Clark County summary judgment in a declaratory relief action
regarding the proceeds of a trust, and from post-judgment orders denying
NRCP 60(b) relief and awarding attorney fees and costs. Respondent
Natalia Shvachko married Charles (Chic) Kotick in Las Vegas, Nevada.
During their marriage, Kotick executed a trust and designated Shvachko
as its primary beneficiary. The trust also stated that the
three children of appellant Deborah Gruber, who is Kotick's daughter
from a former marriage, would become the primary beneficiaries if
Shvachko was not married to and living with Kotick at the time of his
death. Kotick died approximately five years after marrying Shvachko;
Shvachko was married to and living with Kotick when he died. After Kotick died, Gruber filed a lawsuit requesting that the district court annul Shvachko's marriage to Kotick. Gruber
argued that the marriage was void because Shvachko was already married
to a man from Ukraine when she married Kotick, and that Shvachko induced
Kotick into marrying her with fraud. Shvachko answered Gruber's lawsuit
and moved for summary judgment.For the summary judgment motion, Shvachko produced a divorce certificate and an apostille from Ukraine.Gruber
responded by arguing that the summary judgment motion was premature
because she had not yet conducted discovery. Despite this argument, the
district court granted summary judgment and sanctioned Gruber by
awarding attorney fees and costs to Shvachko.Gruber then
requested a stay pending the appeal of the summary judgment and order
granting attorney fees and costs. Following a hearing, the district
court denied Gruber's motion and ordered Gruber to pay Shvachko's
attorney fees and costs.Gruber then filed a motion under NRCP 60(b) to set aside the summary judgment.After
conducting another hearing, the district court denied this motion and
ordered Gruber to pay Shvachko's attorney fees and costs. Gruber now
appeals from the summary judgment and post-judgment orders denying NRCP
60(b) relief and awarding attorney fees and costs. ISSUES:
(1) Did the district court err by granting Shvachko's motion for
summary judgment? (2) Did the district court abuse its discretion by
denying Gruber's request for a continuance to allow discovery? (3) Did
the district court abuse its discretion by denying Gruber's motion under
NRCP 60(b) to set aside the summary judgment?(4) Did the district court abuse its discretion on three occasions by awarding attorney fees and costs to Shvachko?

This is an appeal from
a Clark County judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of
conspiracy to commit murder and seven counts of attempted murder with
the use of a deadly weapon.Although he maintained that he
fired his weapon in self-defense, a jury convicted appellant Franklin
Jackson, along with his co-defendant Dresden Williams, for his
involvement in an afterschool shooting at a bus stop in Las Vegas.Jackson now appeals.ISSUES:(1) Did the State commit a violation of Brady v. Maryland
when it failed to disclose an anonymous informant's note concerning the
shooting? (2) Was Jackson denied a fair trial because multiple State
witnesses referred to gangs? (3) Should the district court have severed
the trial of Jackson from that of his co-defendant Dresden Williams
because the two had conflicting defense theories?

Hoagland v. State - In a panel decision (Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering), the Court finds that necessity may be asserted as a defense to a DUI charge, but the district court in this case did not erred in refusing to instruct the jury on necessity because the defendant's offer of proof was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy an element of the defense. The Court holds that a DUI violation is not a strict liability offense and recognizes that necessity is a common law defense. The Court also notes that due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense. The Court finds, however, that the defendant did not proffer evidence establishing that he did not substantially contribute to the emergency or create the situation, which is an element of the necessity defense. Here, the defendant's offer of proof showed that he parked his truck, in which he was living, in a prohibited parking stall at the Salvation Army. The Court finds that the defendant's action of parking in a prohibited stall created the situation requiring him to operate his truck while under the influence.

J.D. Construction v. IBEX Int'l Group - In a panel decision (Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering), the Court address the proper scope and nature of NRS 108.2275 proceedings where a property owner seeks to expunge a frivolous or excessive mechanic's lien. The Court finds that the trial court must determine the material facts in order to reach a conclusion as to whether a lien is frivolous or excessive, but the trial court is not required to hold a full evidentiary hearing.

San Juan v. PSC Industrial Outsourcing - In a panel decision (Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering), the Court holds as follows: " Our case law holds that a person who hires an independent contractor is
not, without more, vicariously liable to the independent contractor's
employees for their employer's torts, even though the job involves
inherent danger or "peculiar risk." The issue presented by this appeal
is whether this rule depends on the employer being solvent and
competent. We hold that it does not. The Nevada workers' compensation
system covers injured workers without regard to their employer's
solvency. And competence, judged after the fact and without regard to
the hirer's knowledge or fault, does not differ meaningfully from
negligence. Holding a person who hires an independent contractor
vicariously liable when the contractor turns out to be incompetent but
not if he proves negligent draws a distinction the law does not support."

Cramer v. State, DMV - In a panel decision (Justices Hardesty, Douglas and Pickering), the Court holds as follows: " In 1995, the
Legislature enacted NRS 50.320, which permits the use of an affidavit to
prove a person's blood-alcohol content in certain proceedings,
including driver's license revocation hearings, by a person who has been
previously qualified to testify as an expert witness by a district
court.

In Cramer v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles,
Docket No. 53248, we conclude that NRS 50.320 limits the use of an
expert witness affidavit to persons previously qualified by a district
court to testify as an expert witness. Therefore, an administrative
hearing officer lacks discretion to admit expert witness testimony by
affidavit when the affiant has not been qualified by a district court or
the affidavit fails to state the district court in which the affiant
was permitted to testify.

In State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Joseph,
Docket No. 53380, we reject the suggestion that the district court
qualification requirement in NRS 50.320 can be satisfied by way of a
stipulation entered into by parties in a separate, unrelated district
court case."

The Court has issued 38 opinions this year, four of which were in criminal cases.