Tuesday, March 12, 2013

This article was originally published on Verdad
Abierta on Monday, March 11, 2013 as “Y el
narco ahí detrás,” by the Ideas for Peace Foundation.

Illegal armed groups have always been involved in drug trafficking, according to areport from the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP). The zones where paramilitaries originally sewed their presence ofblood and fire and where now they make up criminal bands, coincidewith territories most infested with the drug trade. And it’s nothaphazard.

Camilo Echandía, a professor at Universidad Externado of Colombia,explains in his report “Geographic Dimensions of the Gangs Associatedwith Drug trafficking: Ruptures and Continuities 1981-2012” that “thecharacter of these actions, the strategies, and the extreme cruelty ofthe methods used against the civil population” are evidence that the paramilitaries’ primary interest went beyond counterinsurgency,which is how they have historically justified their criminal actions.

According to the study, this is an excuse that covers up their truemotivations. “They [paramilitaries] instead concentrated on the protection of their crops and territories, as well as the control of routes and ports, for the export of drugs, all of which today constitute criminal bands’ reason for being,” explained Echandia. FIP’s research analyzes the territorial presenceof these groups in the past 30 years (1981-2012), as well as thelocation of coca crops, murders and massacres.

By bringing together this information, it is possible to conclude thatthere “exists a line of historical continuity expressed in thegeographic pattern of convergence between the armedorganizations and drug trafficking.” In addition, this signifies thatthe counterinsurgency fight was not the main objective of theparamilitary groups— later demobilized—and therefore, “thepresent gangs have continuity with the organizations that arose over the last 30 years in close relation with drug trafficking,” says the report, which divides the history of illegal armed groups associated with drug trafficking into three periods for study.

During the first period, from 1981 to 1993, MAS—a sector of the drug trade most affected by guerrilla kidnappings—played a leadingrole. In this decade, the intensification of violence was directlyrelated to the breakdown of the accords which for a long time limitedguerrilla activity and drug trafficking to the coca-producing zones,mostly in the southeast part of the country. “The use of violencebrought with it a process of agrarian counter-reform whichforced campesinos to sell or abandon their lands. By the late 1980s,self-defense groups which had grown alongside drug trafficking, wieldedenormous offense power,” explained the report.

Between 1990 and 1991 were the first demobilizations of the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia);however, instead of diminishing their control over land, their controlgrew. Echandía found that between 1987 and 1992 there was a correlation between areas where the AUC was present with the areaswhere massacres and murders occurred. With the death of Pablo Escobar,the armed organizations that had grown up with drug trafficking inthe previous decade experienced a new boost from the resources providedby other drug traffickers, which in turn led to great territorial expansion andhighly elevated levels of violence,” says the report.

The second period, from 1994 to 2002, is when the Mexican cartelsentered to compete in the market. “Unlike the previous period, in whichthe business of drug trafficking submitted to self-defensegroups—during this new period in which the defining characteristic wasthe disappearance of the Colombian cartels only to be graduallyreplaced with so-called Mexican cartels—is that now the self-defensegroups were submitting to the business of drug trafficking.”

The statistics show that in 1997 self-defense groups were active in 279 municipalities and grew to 455 by 2002. Membership also grew: from 3,800 to 12,175; these same years of growth represent the zenith of drug trafficking in Colombia. This is explained by the guerillas’ territorial losses, but also by “the continuity of the close relationship with drug trafficking established in the 1980’s.”

In this period it becomes evident that the self-defense groups’ interests lay far beyond counterinsurgency. Of the 531 municipalities with self-defense presence (between 1997 and 2002), in only 100 (18%) did guerilla activity pose a real threat. What’s more, in 279 municipalities (52%) guerilla activity was low, and in the 152 that represent the remaining 30%, there was no active guerilla presence, concludes Echandia’s study for FIP.

In the maps of territorial expansion of the auto-defense forces from this period, it is clear that their offer of protection does not correspond to security demands, from which it can be deduced that their presence in particular zones was motivated principally by drug trafficking. “This fact is corroborated by the discovery that in 52% of scenarios in which the guerrillas pose an elevated threat and the self-defense groups exert influence, coca cultivation is present,” concludes Echandia. This does not mean that these groups do not confront guerrillas, but that such combat occurs precisely in areas most strategic for drug trafficking.

The report also signals that between 2000 and 2003 self-defense groups’ territorial control grew as drug traffickers purchased land to “strengthen control over regions where the business was concentrated and also to guarantee a seat at the table in the negotiation process initiated at the end of 2002.”

The third period studied by FIP runs from 2003-2012. Evidence from this period shows that after the demobilization of the self-defense groups, criminal bands emerged exactly in strategic drug trafficking zones. “The heads of self-defense groups sold or ceded their participation in the drug trafficking business to factions, but a lack of regulation, a function that AUC had carried out in the past, doomed them to confrontation,” explains the report.

Echandia’s analysis demonstrates that the groups that demobilized did not exercise control in the major coca-producing regions, and for this reason, concludes that demobilizations “had a tactical purpose to not fundamentally alter the structure of armed groups.” This is shown, since 2005, by the presence of armed groups in the same zones in which self-defense groups were active, and which were under the control of drug traffickers that were related to or second-in-commands of demobilized heads of drug trafficking groups.

In 2007 the reduction of coca cultivation and drugs for export explains the growth of disputes between criminal bands for control of the drug trade. At the same time some of the bands sealed alliances with the guerrillas.

According to the report, at least six fronts of the FARC agreed to collaborate on the cultivation of coca, the protection of laboratories and use of different trafficking routes. Still, massacres prove the intensity of the disputes over strategic zones. The authorities have dealt additional blows. According to the police, criminal bands dropped from 33 in 2006, to 21 in 2007, back up to23 in 2008, to 16 in 2009 and down to six in 2011. Today active organizations hover between four and five, with 4,170 members in 231 municipalities.

Los Urabeños are the most powerful band. They have grown and strengthened their presence on the ground in over 100 cities. There power is such that, at the beginning of 2012, they instigated an armed strike that collapsed trade and transport in different zones in Magdalena, Antioquia, Chocó, Córdoba, Sucre and Bolívar.

For their part, Los Paises were absorbed by Los Urabeños, who also cemented an alliance with La Machos. Los Rastrojos, who had managed to consolidate as an organization with access to the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts and the borders with Ecuador and Venenezuela, lost their two highest leaders, which Los Urabeños took advantage of in order to gain access to Pacific shipping routes. The demobilization of 272 members of ERPAC also brought disputes over control of routes, but today everything indicates—according to the report—that it will be Los Urabeños who seek total control.

Even though criminal band membership dropped by 37% in 2012, Los Urabeños and Renacer have been the groups least affected. The former grew by 1.994 members and the latter, which depends on Los Rastrojos, acquired autonomy and acts in the south of Chocó. Los Rastrojos, who lost more than 400 members, have 1,656 members today. Since the official dissolution of ERPAC 335 members remain active and Los Machos membership dropped to 45. All groups remain in the drug trafficking scene, according to the FIP report.

According to Echandia, what happened in the past with self-defense groups and what is happening currently with criminal bands, demonstrates a special interest in the commercialization of illegal drugs: these groups are most interested in controlling trafficking and shipping routes. The FARC, in contrast, are most interested in the cultivation and processing of coca. The current alliances are therefore unsurprising.

It is also necessary to add the illegal mining boom to criminal band’s drug trafficking activities. According to the results of the FIP report, 54% of gold mining occurs in territories controlled by criminal bands or that are under fiery dispute.

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