Your letter is an unusual mixture of your personal beliefs,
specific comments about the UCORP report, quasilegal opinions, and a
few negative comments that hardly raise the level of discourse, (e.g.
"that's ridiculous"-p.4; "schizophrenic"-p.4; "Absurd"-p.5). You
seem to have great difficulty in focusing on the report, and you
misinterpret or misunderstand some fundamental specifics (e.g., the
comparison of the ORNL "Distinguished Scientist" program with the
numbers of collaborations of UC faculty with LLNL and LANL is
meaningless.) The ORNL "Distinguished Scientist" program
is more like the UC "University Professor" program. As suggested by
the earlier critique that you co-signed with other Senate leaders,
your current letter suggests that you have not read the UCORP report
carefully.

UCORP did respond to your charge to evaluate the role of the
University under the current contract, contrary to your complaint
(p.1). Surely you cannot object to UCORP providing an historical
context in its analysis, since this context permits the reader to
compare the problems observed by earlier committees (e.g., Jendresen
Committee) with those found by UCORP under the current contract. You
may disagree with the style of the UCORP report, but its content
reflects the rational views of a diverse faculty, even if the views
differ from yours. In fact, David Krogh's analysis of the UCORP
report suggests that UCORP answered most of the questions posed by
you and other Council leaders.

One of your more curious statements is found in paragraph 2, p.1
("The Committee's analysis...does not address (or even mention) the
arguments presented by me and others...") The Committee considered
the arguments presented by you and all the other consultants very
carefully. The transcripts of all comments, including yours, were
made available in the supporting documents. The reader can judge the
value of each statement by examining these transcripts. The problem
seems to be that UCORP came to a conclusion that differs from your
own.

Please examine your paragraph in the middle of p.3 ("I think that
the Committee's view of public service..."). We understand you to
mean that you are prepared to damage UC if you perceive that
something is a "public service". One could create a very long list
of "public services" that might benefit various segments of society
(road work, bridge repair, welfare, etc.) Would you wish UC to
undertake the management of all these services without regard to
possible damage to the University? In fact, the Committee fully
understands that public service, whether to the nation, the state, or
some segment of the population, entails some costs. But the Committee
also firmly believes that the University is not obligated to accept
every call to public service. The public service role, regardless of
the origin of the request, should not damage the University. The
Committee was unanimous in its conclusion that the management of LANL
and LLNL is not an appropriate public service for UC.

UCORP's analysis of the contract in terms of public service
specifically did examine the issue from both sides. Clearly, the DOE
believes that management of the weapons labs is an important public
service. But it must be a public service that is also in the best
interest of the University, and UCORP concluded that it does not meet
this standard. We also concluded that the management role as defined
by the DOE does not require the special capabilities of the
University.

As a Professor of Law with a specialty in taxes you offer an
interpretation of IRS code in the footnote on p.4. I think we all
agree that it is unlikely
that UC would lose its non-profit status. Why then does the
management contract carefully and repeatedly stipulate "no loss or
gain"? Does UC gain financially if it is given some money by the DOE
that it then uses to fund research, or some other normal University
activity? Can such a transaction ever violate the "no loss or gain"
clause?

We are pleased that you find important recommendations in the
UCORP report. The fact that repeated faculty criticisms (every five
years) of the UC management role have led to some improvements
demonstrates the value of objective critical "outsider" review. It
also points out the limited role of the faculty. If "UC management"
were true management, and if the capabilities of the University in
philosophy, social sciences, international relations, foreign policy,
history, and all its other relevant strengths--in addition to those
in science--were actually utilized in the management role, there
might be a real benefit from having UC manage the Labs. Under the
mechanisms used for the last fifty years, including the period of the
current contract, the benefit to the nation from "UC management"
seems negligible.

If funding at LBNL is the price or prize to the faculty for "UC
management", then the faculty should be asked if it wishes to pay the
price. If the contracts with LANL and LLNL were phased out, perhaps
the DOE would not wish to support LBNL. However, it must be
recognized that UC owns the land at LBNL, and given the many
interconnections between UCB faculty and LBNL staff, who would want
to replace UC as manager? Since LBNL is a National Lab, it must be
assumed that the interconnections represent the best use of DOE
funding for that site, and these relationships would in principle not
be jeopardized by a change in the
management contract. The claim that a change in managers would
jeopardize LBNL funding is not supported by any concrete
evidence.

On the matter of comparisons of Lab-university interactions, you
should reread the text of the UCORP report with greater care. As
already noted, the ORNL Distinguished Scientist program is similar to
the UC University Professor program, and should not be compared with
total faculty interactions. UCORP confirmed, as had the earlier
Jendresen Committee, that UTenn-ORNL interrelationships, as reflected
in joint appointments and collaborations, is much more intensive than
UC-LANL or UC-LLNL interactions.

Contrary to your assertion, UCORP did not complain, but instead
made observations from the facts obtained in our review.
Specifically:

(a) non-UC faculty members do research and use the unique
equipment at LANL and LLNL, although their universities do not hold a
managment contract. It is clear that access to the Labs is not
dependent on a management agreement.

(b) from the experiences of UTenn-ORNL, it is clear that UC
faculty would still be able to interact with the Labs if they were
managed by a private corporation.

(c) UC cannot "gain" financially from the management contract, but
it appears that a small amount (trivial in the context of either UC
or Lab budgets) of funding for UC research support has been approved
by the Office of the President, and taken from the "management fee"
with the understanding of DOE. At what dollar level would such
action be regarded as improper favoritism to UC by a National Lab?
Even if not "profit" in a legal sense, the appearance of financial
gain or favoritism may be as troublesome as a clear violation of the
contract.

With regard to review of classified work at the Labs, the fact
that the "peer" reviewers must hold appropriate security clearances
weakens your argument that objective criticism is possible.
Furthermore, your concept of peer review differs from that of most
scientists, who recognize that such review includes the free exchange
of ideas, and review of every level of work from inception through
funding, analysis of work in progress, through to publication.

Academic freedom in the University is a fragile thing; consider
the UC experience with the loyalty oath. Look at the impact of
industry-sponsored research on free and open inquiry, as discussed in
an editorial in the Feb. 1996 New England Journal of Medicine.
Contrary to your statement, UCORP does not have a "rose-colored view
of university research." UCORP expressed its
concerns, and suggested that a review of UC policy in this area might
be needed.

What is "absurd" to a Professor of Law is not absurd to UCORP. It
appears
(p.5) that you think a state of national emergency exists now, and
apparently will always exist, by your definition. Can there ever be a
circumstance under which UC management of the Labs would be
inappropriate?

Nowhere did UCORP complain of "evil profits", as you state on
p.6.

I have spent my entire research career in an ORU that was
developed
specifically by Julius Comroe for the purpose of doing
multidisciplinary collaborative research. The issue that you fail to
recognize is whether program-driven work, e.g., to produce a better
TV set, is subject to the same rigors of peer review: to obtain
funds, to criticize the work, and to publish the results so that
others may confirm or reject the findings. Program-driven research at
the Labs and in some industrial settings clearly
is not subject to the same level of peer review. When the NIH
provides
funds for research in a specific disease like asthma, the situation
is very different than industrial funding of a specific project in
the hope of developing a profitable drug.

The UCORP concern about protection of whistle-blowers is based
upon study of cases occurring under the current contract. Historical
comparison was used
to indicate that the lack of UC oversight has been characteristic of
the
history of UC management of the Labs. There is little evidence of
improvement under the present contract, despite the Yucca Mountain
case you cite. Please read the text of the UCORP report, and the
supporting
materials. You, and apparently other members of the President's
Advisory Council, choose to ignore at least six different
whistle-blower cases at
LANL and LLNL under the current contract that have resulted in
settled or ongoing court cases. Your footnote (4) raises an
interesting legal point. Granted that the loss of law suits does not
mean that the personnel policies
are "unjust"; but it may mean that the policies were applied or
ignored in
an illegal manner. These cases emphasize the point that critics are
harassed and terminated at the Labs without evidence that UC has done
anything to help the individuals involved, contrary to explicit UC
policy.

UCORP is still concerned about the problems with personnel policy
at LANL,
and the apparent lack of appropriate oversight by the UC Lab.
Administration Office. We have additional data to reinforce these
concerns; the problems appear to involve UC management as much as
LANL management.

It appears that the only time the faculty voice has been heard in
the
53-year history of the management relationship is when the spotlight
of
public and media attention is focused on contract renewal. And
criticism of
the relationship is not welcomed, as one might hope in a university
devoted
to the free exchange and discussion of differing views. The
intensity and quality of the attacks addressed against UCORP, which
spent 18 months to
produce a consensus report, is proof of just how unwelcome faculty
input
truly is in this management relationship.

UCORP accepts your count of three Senate members (p.7) on the
President's Advisory Council. But you should desist from counting
high administrative officials as representative of the faculty or
Senate. Even though these individuals may hold formal faculty
appointments, they are surely first and foremost administrators and
part of the management team. We maintain, and
we believe most of our faculty colleagues would hold this view, that
our statement that there is little Senate input is correct.

The UCORP report did not state that UC would be held financially
liable for
a major environmental disaster. Again, you should read the text
carefully. UCORP observed, based on statements made by Carl Poppe and
others, that the
DOE has adopted a policy of holding contractors more and more
responsible
for such problems, even after the fact. You seem to believe that the
Regents' concern would prevent both the disaster and financial
responsibility. You are of course free to hold that opinion, but it
is only that, an opinion which may or may not prove to be correct.
UCORP also
raised the concern of public accountability, which goes far beyond
financial indemnification. Should a major hazardous event occur at
either
LANL or LLNL, what would be the cost to UC's relationship with the
citizens
of California? You appear to dismiss this concern out of hand.

You claim (p.7) to know the "true basis of the UCORP
recommendation". The members of UCORP are quite concerned about such
public assertions, dealing
with things that you cannot possibly know. The UCORP report
addresses
multiple concerns, and all of these were taken into account by the
individuals who worked on the document. For you to imply hidden
agendas is
to belittle the process, and the Senate is not well-served by such
statements.

Your statement about weapons design and testing is uninformed, and
your "outrage" is misplaced. The federal government (President) has
made it
clear that if he judges that design and testing are needed, these
activities will take place. The statement in the UCORP report on
this issue
is accurate and correct. We all hope, as you do, that these
activities will
not be needed, but that does not assure against changes in
policy.*

* See article by Peter Weiss, Valley Times and Oakland Tribune,
Nov. 17,
1994. The Lab retreated from an earlier statement that the
above-ground
testing facilities would not be used to develop new weapons.

I discussed this news story with Peter Weiss on April 23, 1996. In
reviewing his story, Weiss stated the following: According to DOE
Lab
sources on Nov. 16, 1995, the NIF and other installations important
for the
SBSS nuclear stockpile can be used, in theory, to design new weapons.
Most design experts agree, however, that a major new version of a
weapon would require actual testing. (Paraphrasing a Mike Campbell:
We could come up with
new prototypes if not too different from existing types. But if a
major
design change were required, we would have to conduct actual
tests.)

This position is similar to that taken recently by Sidney Drell,
at the
UCSC forum. Note that the Pentagon expects DOE to be able to develop
new warheads, if needed. Furthermore, President Clinton has gone on
record to
say that the US will withdraw from the CTBT, if necessary, on the
advice of
DOE and DOD. The statement made in the UCORP report on this topic is
correct as it stands.

We believe that professional historians will find little evidence
in the historical record of UC's management of the Labs to support
your apparent faith in UC management.

An underlying issue of debate involves philosophical questions:
what is the university? what does it do? what is the meaning of
research in the university? From its medieval foundation, the very
word universitas means a corporation, i.e., a fictive individual
whose identity exists in the law.
That corporation, based on the model of the University of Paris, was
a corporation of professors offering their knowledge and skills to
students.
The UC-Lab management contracts are instead built upon a definition
of the University as a corporation governed by the Regents, who
contract their management skills for a specific government project.
The knowledge and
skills of the University in teaching and research are in fact not
being
utilized in this process, except in a minor and relatively informal
way
through a few members of the President's Advisory Council. Instead,
managerial skills--not at all related to faculty academic expertise
(and arguably not a strong suit of University administration)--are
what the
Regents are expected to provide, perhaps without realizing that this
conveys
a smoke screen of legitimacy that has nothing to do with the
faculty.