Kathryn D. Myers, assistant county counselor, of Olathe, for the appellee.

Before PIERRON, P.J., GREEN and BEIER, JJ.

Per Curiam: The Johnson County Housing Coalition (JCHC) appeals from
the Board
of Tax Appeal's (BOTA) denial of its application requesting an exemption from ad valorem
taxes. We affirm.

JCHC was organized as a nonprofit, § 501(c)(3) corporation in the State of Kansas.
It
is a State-recognized nonprofit community housing development organization whose stated
purpose is to provide low income persons, handicapped persons, elderly persons, and persons
with special needs with housing facilities and services.

JCHC filed an application for exemption from ad valorem taxation for a residential
apartment complex consisting of 5 structures totalling 40 living units. The property was
acquired by JCHC on January 31, 2000, and JCHC applied for the exemption under K.S.A.
2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. The apartment complex is
used predominately as
low income housing, housing for the disabled, and housing for handicapped persons. The
Johnson County appraiser (County) recommended the exemption be granted.

BOTA determined the applicable statutes were K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b
Fourth and
K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth. In the order, BOTA found that as of June 2000,
23 of the 40
units appeared not to be rented by low income, elderly, or handicapped persons. It also
found JCHC did not use the subject property exclusively for housing the elderly,
handicapped persons, or persons with limited or lower income pursuant to K.S.A. 2000 Supp.
79-201b Fourth and the property was not used predominately for humanitarian
purposes
pursuant to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth. In addition, BOTA noted that K.S.A.
2000
Supp. 79-201b Fourth was a more specific statute addressing property operated
under United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development guidelines and, as such, should be the
statute applied to the subject property. BOTA denied the exemption.

In its petition for reconsideration, JCHC clarified that 35 of the 37 habitable units
were rented to low income households. The other two units included one unit where the
tenant was simply delinquent in reporting income and one unit in which an eviction was
pending. The three remaining units were being renovated, used for storage, or for the
management office.

In its order denying JCHC's petition for reconsideration, BOTA reiterated K.S.A.
2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth still controlled as it was the most specific statute
addressing real
property. BOTA then found JCHC had not demonstrated it had satisfied the requirements
of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth. There was no evidence JCHC used the
property
exclusively for cooperative housing for persons having limited or low income and operated
the property pursuant to Sections 236 or 221(d)(3) of the national housing act. BOTA also
stated the evidence did not show the property was used exclusively for elderly and
handicapped persons having a limited or low income.

On appeal, JCHC argues BOTA erred in its determination that K.S.A. 2000 Supp.
79-201b Fourth applied and asserts that K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth
is the applicable statute
and that the exemption should be granted accordingly. This issue involves the interpretation
of statutes. The County contends BOTA was correct in finding K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b
Fourth applied but asserts BOTA erred in denying the exemption pursuant to that
statute.
The County, however, did not cross-appeal.

"The interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
responsibility of
enforcing a statute is entitled to judicial deference and is called the doctrine of operative
construction.
Deference to an agency's interpretation is particularly appropriate when the agency is one of
special
competence and experience. Although an appellate court gives deference to the agency's
interpretation
of a statute, the final construction of a statute lies with the appellate court, and the agency's
interpretation, while persuasive, is not binding on the court. Interpretation of a statute is a
question of
law over which an appellate court's review is unlimited. [Citation omitted.]" In re Appeal
of United
Teleservices, Inc., 267 Kan. 570, 572, 983 P.2d 250 (1999).

JCHC candidly concedes the subject property does not fall within the exemption
created by K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth. The statute reads:

"The following described property, to the extent herein specified, shall be and is
hereby exempt
from all property or ad valorem taxes levied under the laws of the state of Kansas:

"Fourth. All real property and tangible personal property, actually and
regularly used exclusively
for housing for elderly and handicapped persons having a limited or lower income, or used
exclusively
for cooperative housing for persons having a limited or low income, assistance for the financing of
which was received under 12 U.S.C.A. 1701 et seq., or under 42 U.S.C.A. 1437
et seq., which is operated
by a corporation organized not for profit under the laws of the state of Kansas or by a corporation
organized not for profit under the laws of another state and duly admitted to engage in business in
this
state as a foreign, not-for-profit corporation; and all intangible property including moneys, notes
and
other evidences of debt, and the income therefrom, belonging exclusively to such a corporation
and
used exclusively for the purposes of such housing. For the purposes of this subsection,
cooperative
housing shall mean those not-for-profit cooperative housing projects operating pursuant to
sections 236
or 221(d)(3), or both, of the national housing act and which have been approved as a cooperative
housing project pursuant to applicable federal housing administration and U.S. Department of
Housing
and Urban Development statutes, and rules and regulations, during such time as the use of such
properties are restricted pursuant to such act, statutes or rules and regulations."

Clearly, the subject property is not used exclusively as housing for elderly and
handicapped persons having a limited or lower income. There is also no evidence the
property is used exclusively for cooperative housing as defined in the aforementioned statute.
This much is admitted by JCHC. However, JCHC contends the subject property falls
within the exemption created by K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth. It reads:

"The following described property, to the extent herein specified, shall be and is
hereby exempt
from all property or ad valorem taxes levied under the laws of the state of Kansas:

"Ninth. All real property and tangible personal property actually and
regularly used by a
community service organization for the predominant purpose of providing humanitarian services,
which is owned and operated by a corporation organized not for profit under the laws of the state
of
Kansas or by a corporation organized not for profit under the laws of another state and duly
admitted
to engage in business in this state as a foreign not-for-profit corporation if: (a) The directors of
such
corporation serve without pay for such services; (b) the corporation is operated in a manner which
does
not result in the accrual of distributable profits, realization of private gain resulting from the
payment
of compensation in excess of a reasonable allowance for salary or other compensation for services
rendered or the realization of any other form of private gain; (c) no officer, director or member of
such
corporation has any pecuniary interest in the property for which exemption is claimed; (d) the
corporation is organized for the purpose of providing humanitarian services; (e) the actual use of
property for which an exemption is claimed must be substantially and predominantly related to the
purpose of providing humanitarian services, except that, the use of such property for a nonexempt
purpose which is minimal in scope and insubstantial in nature shall not result in the loss of
exemption
if such use is incidental to the purpose of providing humanitarian services by the corporation; (f)
the
corporation is exempt from federal income taxation pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the internal
revenue code of 1986 and; (g) contributions to the corporation are deductible under the Kansas
income
tax act. As used in this clause, 'humanitarian services' means the conduct of activities which
substantially and predominantly meet a demonstrated community need and which improve the
physical, mental, social, cultural or spiritual welfare of others or the relief, comfort or assistance
of
persons in distress or any combination thereof including but not limited to health and recreation
services, child care, individual and family counseling, employment and training programs for
handicapped persons and meals or feeding programs. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
clause, motor vehicles shall not be exempt hereunder unless such vehicles are exclusively used for
the
purposes described therein."

When reviewing decisions made by BOTA, certain guidelines and legal
principles have
been developed by the courts. Taxation is the rule; exemption is the exception. Any doubts
are to be resolved against the exemption and in favor of taxation. The burden of establishing
exemption from taxation is on the one claiming it. In re Tax Exemption Application of Via
Christi Regional Med. Ctr., 27 Kan. App. 2d 446, 447, 6 P.3d 896 (2000). Tax exemption
statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of imposing the tax and against allowing the
exemption for one who does not clearly qualify. Presbyterian Manors, Inc. v. Douglas
County,
268 Kan. 488, 492, 998 P.2d 88 (2000).

BOTA ruled K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth controlled over K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 79-201 Ninth because it is the most specific statute addressing residential
property. K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 79-201b Fourth specifically deals with exemptions of low income housing
whileK.S.A.
2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth is a more general statute that deals with property used for
the
predominant purpose of providing humanitarian services. General and specific statutes
should be read together and harmonized whenever possible. "[T]he rule is that to the extent
they conflict, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended the
general statute to be controlling." Wilkerson v. Brown, 26 Kan. App. 2d 831,
834-35, 995 P.2d
393, rev. denied 269 Kan. 941 (2000).

If K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth controlled, there would be virtually no
purpose for
any section of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b. All exemptions listed in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b
can necessarily be classified as humanitarian activities. When a conflict exists between a
statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain
phase of it, the specific statute controls unless the legislature intended to make the general act
controlling. In re L.D.B., 22 Kan. App. 2d 821, 824-25, 924 P.2d 642 (1996).
K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 79-201 Ninth deals generally with providing humanitarian services while
K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 79-201b Fourth refers specifically to low income residential housing.

Legislative history makes it clear the legislature did not intend K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201
Ninth to control over K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201b Fourth in cases such
as this. K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 79-201 Ninth was adopted largely in response to a BOTA decision which
required the
subject property be used "exclusively" for charitable, educational, scientific, or religious
purposes. House Bill 2651 expansively defined the term "humanitarian services" in response
and in contrast to the narrow interpretation of the term "charitable and benevolent purposes"
as used in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Second adopted by the Supreme Court in
Lutheran Home,
Inc., v. Board of County Commissioners, 211 Kan. 270, ¶¶ 6-7, 505 P.2d
1118 (1973). K.S.A.
2000 Supp. 79-201 Ninth also eliminated the language about "investment income"
that had
been included in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 79-201 Second and abandoned the "exclusive
use"
requirement of earlier exemptions in favor of the provision the property be used for the
"predominant purpose" of providing humanitarian services. In re Tax Appeal of Univ. of
Kan.
School of Medicine, 266 Kan. 737, 756-57, 973 P.2d 176 (1999).