Borders and infrastructure enable or disable the
movement of humans and goods, data and money. Therefore, both sites catalyse
the future of human togetherness – either fostering equality or aggravating
inequality. Can the decisions about the control of movement, and thus about the
future of society – that are often made behind closed doors – become a
democratic project? Berliner Gazette
and Volksbühne at Rosa Luxemburg Platz have invited activists, researchers,
coders and journalists to search for answers at the BG Annual Conference,
entitled TACIT FUTURES.
It takes place in Berlin from 27 to 29 October, initiating discussions and
collaborative processes tackling the democratic control of movement. Warming up
for this event, Berliner Gazette’s
Krystian Woznicki sat down with researcher Catarina Frois to talk
hyper-security, video-surveillance and borders.

Krystian Woznicki: In your work you have been
researching video surveillance, which nowadays has become omnipresent in
private space and public space alike. A strong focus of most technologies in
this sector lies on predicting futures moves: the analysis of (people's) movements
(in particular) within a framework of patterns and a cybernetic approach that
could be called 'killing the enemy in its future'. Allow us to pose some questions
against this background: by which types of video surveillance do you see
yourself and us as society most affected? Which types of video surveillance do
you see being debated today, and which are largely neglected?

While it’s undeniable that CCTV can be instrumental in aiding security forces... it is useless in predicting intentions or even detecting people's planning to harm others.

Catarina Frois: I think the problem of video
surveillance, in terms of its preventive purpose, remains today the same as
ever (and this applies equally to several other surveillance technologies): you
can monitor movements and actions, but so far, you cannot control minds, i.e.,
while it’s undeniable that CCTV can be instrumental in aiding security forces
to investigate and counteract more effectively after the fact, it is useless in
predicting intentions or even detecting people´s planning to harm others. Video
surveillance in closed environments, virtually omnipresent in today’s
semi-public and private spaces – city streets, shops, banks, shopping centres,
supermarkets, pharmacies, etc. – as well as video surveillance for traffic
control or open areas (streets) are widespread in several major cities.
Considering the unstable equilibrium upon which freedom and security are
balanced, the current events recently witnessed, with terrorist attacks in
various European cities, will only accentuate this enhancement and expansion of
surveillance technologies in the name of the former, and consequently a
constraint of the latter and a further strangling of the private sphere.

KW: How does video surveillance contribute to social
sorting as well as discrimination and how does it infringe upon the mobility of
people who are concerned by those forms of segregation?

It is easy to see how video surveillance can be used wrongly in the absence of proper regulation and legal restrictions.

CF: The major problem with video surveillance and the
way it tends to be used, has to do with its targeting of specific
groups/individuals: young men, ethnic population, people who, somehow, seem to
be ‘suspicious’. The thing is that with the current state of affairs,
discrimination will undoubtedly be focused on the alien – most notoriously Arab
or Muslim types – coinciding with a period in which Europe is facing a severe
refugee crisis. This raises serious concerns, because the focus on stereotype,
discrimination, prejudice and xenophobia do and will certainly affect a wider
population. It is clear that one of the risks involved in the use of any
technology lies in its potential for misuse, and it is easy to see how video
surveillance can be used wrongly in the absence of proper regulation and legal
restrictions. Just think about the state of exception decreed in France after
the terrorist attacks last November. Citizens should be aware that we have
already virtually accepted the state of emergency as the norm instead of the
exception.

KW: Does video surveillance exert a control of
movement? And if so, in which way?

CF: One of the major strengths of video surveillance
is precisely this: to control the movement of a person or a group and to visualise
specific features that may arise: clothing, age, height, etc. When linked
through a web connection, several CCTV circuits may follow a specific
individual in places and spaces he/she moves on throughout the day, since leaving home in the morning until the end of day when returning. If you are
somehow marked as a suspect – the criteria for which must be loosened and
expedited in situations of emergency, then you may be controlled.

One of the major strengths of video surveillance is precisely this: to control the movement of a person or a group and to visualise specific features that may arise: clothing, age, height, etc.

KW: What types of control of movement do you see being
exerted with the help of video surveillance?

CF: The majority of video surveillance systems used in
Europe today (except the UK) are not cross-referenced or centrally managed, and
can only control movement in real time, for example through traffic cameras or
in tourist sites in major capital cities. Therefore, video surveillance
existing in closed environments, since they are not centralised and, most of
the times, are not being viewed in real time, are not really ‘controlling’.

KW: Do you see video surveillance having an
influence on the future?

CF: Unfortunately yes, I believe that CCTV is here to
stay, its uses are ever broader and more diversified. The tendency – if I have
to guess – would be to record in real time not only image but also sound, as
well as its increasing cross-reference with other surveillance
technologies.

The state has the right and obligation to protect its territory and population... but that isn’t necessarily achieved more effectively through the increase of surveillance technologies.

KW: What types of democratic control of movement
should we be fighting for in this context and with which imperatives? What is
the state meant to do in this context? What do we need from the state and what
are we entitled to? How and in which respects/areas can we gain partial
autonomies from the state? Could you describe concrete examples?

CF: Citizens can and should always claim their right
to privacy, to autonomy, fighting not only prejudice and discrimination against
one’s self but also against others. The major enemy in this endeavour is fear
and ignorance. The state has the right and obligation to protect its territory
and population (remember Michel Foucault’s title Security, Territory, Population), but that isn’t necessarily achieved
more effectively through the increase of video surveillance or other
surveillance technologies which also entail potential for negative uses. In
other words, there is always space for debate on the best means to achieve a
desired end, and perhaps we tend to rely too readily on ‘high’ technology, neglecting
other more simple and ‘softer’ tools at our disposal.

Citizens need to be aware of the dangers they face and
to protect themselves, and sometimes that should be done by paying attention to
what happens next door. It is common for people to neglect situations of
poverty, violence, mistreatment, to consider that it ‘is not their business’. Communities
and neighbourhoods have a major task to perform in this respect. That is not
the same as saying that we have to ‘control each other’, but instead to call
for the attention of city councils, for example, when streets are not properly
illuminated or appear to be degraded; to educate our children in respect for
difference and to incorporate these same values in our community. On the other
hand, I always stress that I do not see in video surveillance an ingenuous state
or police plan to exert control.

Sometimes (video) surveillance is used for what it was
intended originally, but other times the information collected is not even
properly used, as I have repeatedly witnessed in my investigations, namely when
considering the lack of exchange between security forces within one or more
than one country. On the other hand, it is also easy to fall into the other
extreme, and to turn the debate on security into a pretext for political
rhetoric, where the most important issue – the protection and freedom of people
– is somehow forgotten. This is to say that even though we should be aware of
our rights and the rights of the others, we must neither see surveillance as
the solution for all our problems, as the only solution for a given problem,
nor as the root of all our concerns. Just as security and freedom need a fine
balance, so too must our debate on surveillance strike an even balance.

Join the TACIT FUTURES Public Talks on 27 – 29 October in
Berlin. Speakers include net activism pioneer Konrad Becker, internationally
celebrated process philosopher Brian Massumi, leading refugee activists from
the International Women Space, and the key thinker of the post-colonial
movement Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. More information here.

About the authors

Krystian Woznicki is a critic and photographer. Fugitive Belonging, his most recent book published by Diamondpaper 2018, blends criticism and photography. He is also the author of 'A Field Guide to th...

This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence.
If you have any queries about republishing please contact us.
Please check individual images for licensing details.

Do you care about online rights? digitaLiberties needs your support to keep publishing alternative perspectives on surveillance, net neutrality and privacy. Please help by donating whatever you can.

Recent comments

openDemocracy is an independent, non-profit global media outlet, covering world affairs, ideas and culture, which seeks to challenge power and encourage democratic debate across the world. We publish high-quality investigative reporting and analysis; we train and mentor journalists and wider civil society; we publish in Russian, Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese and English.