DIVINING Grant's
next move, Lee occupied the morning of the 7th in cutting a direct military road
southward, through the forest, from the plank road toward Shady Grove church, south of the
Ny, to the highway leading eastward to Spottsylvania Court House, so he could have a
continuous march of his entire army, by its right flank, when the time came for again
placing that army across some other road, leading toward Richmond, that Grant might desire
to follow. Grant's inaction led Lee to suspect the movement that he had ordered, and when
Stuart, later on, sent him word that Grant's trains were moving in the rear of his army,
and word came from Ewell that the Germanna road had been abandoned, Sedgwick leaving his
dead unburied and many of his wounded uncared for, Lee issued orders for Longstreet's
corps to take up the line of march, at dark, along the new military road toward
Spottsylvania Court House, be followed by Ewell withdrawing by Hill's rear, while the
latter remained guarding the rear of the army.
Anderson with the First corps, which, in
Longstreet's absence, he now commanded, marched at 11 p.m., and, before daylight of the
8th, rested in a grove near Spottsylvania Court House, forming a strong support to the
cavalry that was keeping back Grant's new advance. Ewell was held at the plank road, near
Parker's store, until the early morning of the 8th, when the Second corps, with the
exception of Early's division, which was left near Todd's tavern in support of Hill,
marched to a junction with the First corps near Spottsylvania Court House. Grant, in
person, tarried with Hancock until noon, after sending minute instructions to his advance
for marching beyond Spottsylvania Court House toward Richmond and Butler; but learning,
soon after, that Warren had met with a severe check on the highway to Spottsylvania Court
House, and that Lee, although having the longer march to compass, had won the race for
position, and a second time blocked his "on to Richmond." During the night of
the 7th, Fitz Lee, dismounting his cavalry division and using his men as infantry, had
succeeded in throwing rude defenses of trees and rails across the Brock road, and had
successfully driven back repeated attacks of the Federal advance, keeping Warren miles
from the position which Grant had ordered him to occupy that night.
Early on the morning of the 8th, Anderson moved
the First corps about a mile to the northern front of Spottsylvania Court House, to
support Fitz Lee's hard pressed cavalry, where his men, in an incredibly short time, threw
up hasty breastworks and were ready for Warren's corps, as it advanced in assault, and to
drive it back in a disastrous repulse. Stuart was on the field in person, for the last
time, as it soon proved, to cheer the army of Northern Virginia on to victory,
contributing, by his great tactical skill and ready but always practical advice, to
Warren's defeat, and joining enthusiastically in the cheers of victory that followed the
repulse of the Federal advance, making certain the holding of the position which Lee's
superior energy had secured.
At 1 p.m. of the 9th, Grant's dispatch, from
"near" Spottsylvania Court House, to Halleck read: "If matters are still
favorable with Butler, send all reinforcements you can. The enemy are now moving from our
immediate front either to interpose between us and Fredericksburg or to get the inside
road to Richmond." It is incredible that at that hour of the day the Federal general
commanding did not know that, instead of moving from his immediate front, Lee was, at that
very time, in line of battle across his front; since at 5 in the afternoon of the
preceding day, he had arrived with Ewell, and, with his First and Second corps in
position, had met a second Federal attack, which he had driven back, and Ewell, in a
countercharge, had gained an advance of a half mile, on the right of the Catharpin road
leading to Todd's tavern, while the First corps held his right, across the Brock road,
leading to the same point along the divide between the Ny and the Po rivers, the two most
northerly of the four, that, not far to the southeast, unite and make the Mattapony.
During the night of the 8th, the Confederates
threw up rude and irregular defenses along the emergency line which they had taken, a part
of it after dark. On the morning of the 9th, Lee rode along the line that had been
occupied, but was not favorably impressed with it. At Ewell's suggestion, a somewhat
elevated point, projecting between some of the southward branches of the Ny, near the
right center, was taken into the lines and occupied by artillery; orders were also given
for providing a second line of defenses, beyond the incurred line, as taken, on the right.
Lee's position, as now occupied, extended from the Po river on the southwest, where the
Louisa road to Spottsylvania Court House and Fredericksburg crosses the big bend of that
river, in the arc of a circle, eastward, across the Brock road and the Po-Ny watershed. to
a branch of the Ny river; while from its right center sprang a horseshoe salient,
northward, eastward 'and southward, around the crest of the spur between two small
branches of the Ny and overlooking that river to the northeastward. Ewell's men were
disposed within this salient, which conformed, in a general way, to a broad bend of the
Ny. Hill's men were to extend the line to the left, to the Po, and Longstreet's were to
extend it to the right, from the Bald hill southward and then southeastward, covering the
front of Spottsylvania Court House and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, thus leaving
open no way to the southward on which Grant could move toward Richmond, as he had planned
on the 7th. Held back by Hampton and Early, the most of Hancock's corps had been detained
on the Brock road, near and behind Todd's tavern, during the 8th, while Anderson with the
First and Ewell with the Second corps were engaged with Grant's advance near Spottsylvania
Court House.
On the 9th, Grant sent Sheridan, with his
cavalry, on a raid, moving from Alsop's at 4 in the morning, to first destroy Lee's
ammunition train, then strike the James and open communication with Butler. Stuart safely
guarded the ammunition train, but was not strong enough to prevent Sheridan passing his
right and gaining the highway to Richmond. Early on the morning of the 9th, Burnside
advanced across the Ny, on the road leading from Spottsylvania Court House to
Fredericksburg, which he had reached by a circuitous march to the eastward, and was moving
to strike Lee's right and rear. Early, temporarily in command of the Third corps, arrived
in time to meet this attack, which had to advance across open fields, with infantry and
artillery, and give it a handsome repulse. Thus brought into position, the Third corps
held Lee's right, from the horseshoe salient around the front of Spottsylvania Court
House; it also occupied a portion of the eastern front of the salient, while Ewell held
the remainder of that front, its north projecting apex and its western face. Favorable
positions for artillery were found throughout the line, which was made stronger with each
passing hour while awaiting Grant's attack from the north and west, after .the repulse of
that of Burnside from the east.
Advancing on the 9th, Hancock took position on
Grant's right and sent three divisions across the Po to menace Lee's left and rear from
the west. These movements revealed to Lee that Grant intended to attack his entire front,
and, with his superior numbers, which were double those of Lee, attempt to turn both his
flanks. During the night of the 9th, in anticipation of Grant's attack, Lee sent Heth's
division, of Hill's corps, across the Po, by a circuit to the southward, under the command
of Early, who, moved into line across the Louisa road, fell upon Hancock's flank and rear,
at dawn of the 10th, just as he was obeying Grant's recall to join in his proposed front
attack. Heth severely punished Barlow's division, of Hancock's corps, on which his attack
fell, and captured one of his guns, in this engagement, which became known as the
"battle of Waite's Shop."
About the time of the failure of Hancock's
flanking movement to Lee's left, at 9:30 of the 10th of May, Grant dispatched to
Washington, still from "near" Spottsylvania Court House:
The enemy hold our front in very strong force
and evince a strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last I shall
take no backward steps but may be compelled to send back to Belle Plain [below Aquia creek
on the Potomac] for further supplies. Please have supplies of forage and provisions sent
there at once and 50 rounds of ammunition (infantry) for 100,000 men. Send General Benham
with the necessary bridge train for the Rappahannock river. We can maintain ourselves at
least, and, in the end, beat Lee's army, I believe. Send to Belle Plain all the infantry
you can rake and scrape. With present position of the armies, 10,000 men can be spared
from the defenses of Washington, besides all the troops that have reached there since
Burnside's departure. Some may also be brought from Wallace's department. We want no more
wagons nor artillery.
This dispatch tells the condition of things
within Grant's lines and his view of the situation, on the morning of the 10th, in a way
that needs no comment.
At noon of the day before, May 9th, C. A. Dana,
assistant secretary of war, who had joined Grant to watch events, reported to Secretary
Stanton various matters that he had heard about, among others: General Wilson, with his
division of cavalry, occupied Spottsylvania Court House yesterday morning for an hour; but
as Warren's corps had not yet made its appearance, and as columns of rebel infantry were
gaining position on both his right and left, he fell back to Alsop's. Prisoners were taken
by Wilson, who reported that two divisions of Longstreet's corps had just come, they
having marched all night. General Grant at once gave orders for attacking these troops
with the whole of Warren's corps, to whose support Sedgwick was hurrying up, in order to
destroy them before the rest of the rebel army could arrive. Warren, however, proceeded
with exceeding caution, and when he finally did attack, sent a single division at a time
and was constantly repulsed. The general attack, which Generals Grant and Meade directed,
was never made, for reasons I have not yet been able to learn; but successive assaults
were made upon this and that point in the rebel positions with no decisive results. The
last assaults were made just before dark, when the fighting was very sharp General Grant's
orders, last night, were not to renew the fighting to-day; but if, as now appears to be
the case, Lee has left anything open in front of our right, by massing on our left, he may
attack at this weakened point of their lines with a view of passing toward Richmond on
that side.
Hancock found Early, at the "open
place" Grant was seeking, the next morning. At 11 of the morning of the 10th, Grant
began his massed attack on Lee's left, which was met by Field's division and driven back
by a withering fire of musketry and artillery. At 3 in the afternoon, a second massed
attack was made on the First corps, near Lee's center, on the line of the Brock road,
through the piney woods of the Po-Ny watershed. This also met a bloody repulse, after
which the Confederates sprang over their breastworks and collected the guns and ammunition
the enemy had left behind, and distributed these so that each Confederate was doubly
armed. For a third time, near the close of the day, Grant made assault, with Hancock and
Warren, against Lee's weak left. This front line, under Hancock, was driven back by
Field's division, but his second line rushed bravely forward and leaped over the
breastworks of Gregg's Texans, who, refusing to yield, obtained aid from an adjacent
brigade, which turned on the flank of the bravely-fighting Federals and forced them to
retreat from the stubborn fight they had made.
At about the same hour of the closing day,
Grant made assault on Ewell, along the western face of the great salient, a brigade of
Sedgwick's corps attacking Dole's, in Ewell's center, and driving him from his works. The
brigades of Daniel and Steuart then fell upon the flanks of Upton's Federal brigade, while
those of Battle and Johnson met it in front. Upton tenaciously held against these what he
had won; but when Gordon and Walker reinforced the attack on his flanks, he was compelled
to retire with heavy loss. Ewell's guns, raking the front with furious fire, had prevented
all attempts to reinforce the gallant Upton.
The Confederate right, under Early, was also
attacked, several times, during the 10th, by Burnside's corps, on the Fredericksburg road.
There the Confederate artillery had full play on the Federal lines, as they essayed to
cross the broad fields in front, and Pegram and Cutts, with their big guns, easily
repulsed all of Burnside's attacks. Gen. F. A. Walker, commenting on Grant's tactics,
writes: "To assault 'all along the line,' as was often done in the summer of 1864, is
the very abdication of leadership."
At 8:30 of the 11th, Grant dispatched to
Halleck: We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting, the result to this time
in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. We have lost
to this time eleven general officers, killed, wounded and missing, and probably 20,000 men
... I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions
and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The
arrival of reinforce ments here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will
be sent as fast as possible and in as great numbers ... I am satisfied the enemy are very
shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their
officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time
there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of
Richmond.
It was the condition of his own army and of his
own method of campaigning and not Lee's, that Grant thus described. He little knew,
although what he had so recently encountered should have taught him, the spirit of the men
that, under Lee, confronted him.
The shifting about of troops in the Federal
lines, on the 11th, led Lee to the conclusion that Grant was about to draw back from the
Spottsylvania Court House field of combat; so he made preparations to meet any new
movement he might attempt by ordering all the artillery, placed in difficult positions, to
be withdrawn to where it could be quickly assembled for marching. Obeying this order,
General Long withdrew the guns from the northern portion of the great salient, so that
Edward Johnson's division, at its apex, was left on guard with only muskets and two pieces
of artillery. Near midnight, of the 11th-12th of May, Johnson discovered, through the
dense foggy mist then prevailing, that the Federal troops were massing in his front, and
asked General Ewell to have the supporting artillery returned. Not fully realizing the
importance of time under the existing conditions, Ewell gave orders, not for the immediate
return of the guns, but that they should be returned at daybreak of the 12th. Before that
time arrived, Hancock's superb corps, in solid mass, rushed upon the apex of the salient,
expecting to carry it by assault. Johnson's command, a mere remnant of the division that
had stormed Culp's hill, at Gettysburg, was on the alert and met this attack bravely; but
musketry alone was not sufficient to drive back Hancock's many, massed battalions, which
swarmed over the log breastworks and captured Johnson and 2,800 of his men. Just then, the
batteries that had been ordered back came forward at a gallop, but only in time to fall
into Hancock's hands and add their twenty cannon to his captures.
Flushed with victory, the Federal columns
prepared to continue their assault, by dashing forward, through the salient, to the
southward; but Lane's brigade, on Ewell's right, which had not been involved in the
capture, as had Steuart's on its left, faced about, and, pouring a rapid and well-directed
fire upon Hancock's advancing left flank, forced it to recoil. Promptly forming his men
across the base of the salient, and taking direction from the noise of the advancing fire
of the Federals, Gordon made ready to go forward and meet and drive back the Federal
onset. At this juncture, Lee, roused from his quarters in the rear of the salient, by the
mighty roar of the conflict in progress, came riding rapidly to Gordon's line and quietly
took position to lead it forward. Gordon, in a tone clear, but not loud, spoke out:
"This is no place for General Lee." His men caught the words and instantly
shouted, "General Lee to the rear," while Gordon, his mobile face showing the
incarnation of heroic daring, fairly shouted to General Lee: "These men are Georgians
and Virginians. They have never failed you; they will not fail you now." Just then a
veteran stepped from the ranks, and seizing his bridle turned "Traveler"
backward, and again the imperative order came from his soldiers: "Lee to the
rear," and as he obeyed, Gordon's men rushed forward to death and to victory.
The steady roar of the battle, which had been
continuous since half past 4 of the morning, from the dawning of the day, now swelled in
volume as Gordon met Hancock in the pine thickets embraced within the salient. The Federal
left was soon thrust back and Gordon held the works on the east. Ewell hurried forward
Ramseur's brigade, which had occupied the extreme left of the salient, in attack upon
Hancock's right; while from Early's command, the Third corps, came the brigades of McGowan
and Harris, following up the advance of Gordon and Ramseur. Lee, remaining where Gordon
had left him, again rode forward to lead Harris' Mississippians, who, seeing this, in turn
shouted: "Lee to the rear," as they followed up Ramseur's attack on Hancock's
right.
These rapid combinations and charges of Lee's
men soon drove Hancock outside the salient, and only left him in possession of the outer
trenches at its apex and along its northern front. Two divisions, from the Sixth corps,
were hurried forward to support Grant's line along the northern and northwestern side of
the salient. These engaged in combat with the brigades of Harris' Mississippians,
McGowan's South Carolinians and Ramseur's North Carolinians, and from opposite sides of
these log breastworks, a bloody struggle continued from early morning until late
afternoon, with unflinching desperation on either side, fairly filling the trenches and
piling their borders, on each side, with the slain and the wounded, and giving to this
portion of the famous salient the name of "the Bloody Angle."
Grant continued to hurl division after division
and corps after corps ;in fierce and continuing attack, upon every portion of Lee's line.
The Fifth and part of the Sixth corps were charging his left, while Burnside, with another
corps, was charging his right. A division of the Fifth corps was added to Hancock's attack
in the center. Lee had not another man to spare, but the few hardy veterans that sustained
the keystone of this arch of defense, held it with a desperate and unyielding courage
unsurpassed in the annals of human conflicts.
The Federal engineers had, by careful
triangulations, mapped the great salient and, guided by this information, batteries were
so placed, in all available positions, as to bring cross-fires to bear upon its defenders.
Big mortars were placed in position that dropped their heavy shells into the Confederate
lines. Cannon were dragged to the front, and their muzzles thrust through or across the
Confederate log intrenchments, and fired upon Lee's three brigades of heroes, who,
unhesitatingly, stood to their assigned duty. Infantrymen, from opposite sides of the
works, climbed up and fired into the faces of their opponents; they grappled one another
and attempted to drag each other across the breastworks; bayonet thrusts were made through
crevices; the continuous musketry fire cut off large trees standing in the line of the
works; the dead and the dying had to be flung to the rear to give room for the living,
fighting ones, in the trenches; and, to add to the horrors of the combat, a cold, heavy
rain set in and partly filled the trenches, where the combatants stood, until they seemed
to fairly run with blood.
Lee's charges and lines of defense were greatly
strengthened by his grandly served artillery, which, when not assigned to fixed positions,
hastened to the battle, took every point of vantage it could find, and poured shot and
shell, with telling effect, into every portion of Grant's advancing lines, breaking their
ranks and often driving them to the rear. Wherever they found an open front, where they
would not fire on their comrades, the unaided artillery drove back Federal attacks. The
writer, who was on this field of awful combats, does not believe that human ear ever
listened to a more steady and continuous roar of musketry and artillery than that which
rose from that field of fierce contention, from the dawning of the day until late in the
afternoon. The slackening fight continued until night closed the scene, when Hancock
withdrew his surviving and nearly exhausted veterans from the ditch in which they had
fought so long, leaving but a regiment behind as a picket. Gordon's men worked throughout
the succeeding night, throwing breastworks across the base of the salient, and not until
near the dawn of the 13th were Lee's well-nigh exhausted men withdrawn from the long-held
and much-fought-for horseshoe salient, to find rest behind the new works their comrades
had constructed, thus straightening his front and giving him a shorter and more formidable
line than he had held before. Notwithstanding the capture of Johnson's division, at the
opening of the combat, Lee's losses, from his 50,000 present, were only some 8,000 men;
but these were 18 per cent of his army. Grant had thrown twenty-two brigades against Lee's
center, at the salient, but had failed to reach his rear, and had really gained nothing
but great losses for his strenuous efforts; from his 100,000 in hand, 16,000 were killed
or wounded.
At 6:30 of the afternoon of the 12th, after the
close of the famous battle of Spottsylvania Court House, Grant dispatched to Halleck:
"The eighth day of battle closes ... The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found
the last ditch. We have lost no organization," etc.
Dana, a half hour later, telegraphed to
Stanton:
The battle has raged without cessation
throughout the day. Wright and Hancock have borne the brunt of it Burnside's troops
generally have borne themselves like good soldiers. I should here mention that only his
white troops have been engaged, the colored division having been kept in the rear to guard
the trains. Warren has gained nothing. His attacks were made in the forenoon; with so much
delay, that Grant and Meade were greatly dissatisfied; but when they were made they were
unsuccessful, though attended with considerable loss. The rebel works in his front were
very strong, and finally, at about 1 o'clock, the chief portion of his troops were
withdrawn from his lines and brought to the support of Wright.
It was then intended to attempt a grand
assault, with a very powerful column under Wright, at about 5 o'clock; but when the men
were brought up, they were so tired from the long day's work, and the chances of success
were so much short of certainty, that General Wright advised General Meade to postpone the
attempt, and accordingly the obstinate battle was allowed to pause here. The results of
the day are, that we have crowded the enemy out of some of his most important positions
... Our troops rest to-night upon the ground they have so victoriously fought for. At 8
next morning, May 13th, Dana telegraphed again: Lee abandoned his position during the
night--whether to occupy a new one in the vicinity or to make a thorough retreat is not
determined ... Though our army is greatly fatigued, from the enormous efforts of
yesterday, the news of Lee's departure inspires the men with fresh energy. The whole force
will soon be in motion, but the heavy rain of the last thirty-six hours renders the roads
very difficult for wagons and artillery ... The proportion of severely wounded is greater
than either of the previous days' fighting. This was owing to the great use made of
artillery.
At 6 in the afternoon of the same day, he
dispatched:
The impression that Lee had started on his
retreat, which prevailed at the date of my dispatch this morning, is not confirmed. Our
skirmishers have found the rebels along the whole line, and the conclusion now is, that
the retrograde movement of last night was made to correct their position after the loss of
the key-points taken from them yesterday, and they are still before us in force. Of course
we cannot determine, without a battle, whether their whole army is still here, and nothing
has been done to-day to provoke one. lt has been necessary to rest the men, and
accordingly we have everywhere stood upon the defensive.
He then claimed that, in changing his lines,
Lee had uncovered the roads leading southward along his right, and that Grant had ordered
Meade to withdraw Warren from the right and Wright from the center, around to the left,
turn Lee's flank, and force him to move southward.
On the evening of the 12th, that
ever-to-be-remembered day of fearful carnage, the sad news came to Lee of the death of
Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart, the "Jeb" Stuart of the Confederacy and of
history, who had fallen, the day before, at the Yellow tavern, a few miles to the north of
Richmond, in repulsing an attempt of Sheridan to capture that city. Fully occupied with
the enemy in his front, Lee waited until the quiet of the 20th before officially
announcing to his army the great loss he had sustained, a loss only second, in its
far-reaching consequences, to that of "Stonewall" Jackson. In his tribute to
this grand leader of his cavalry corps, he said:
Among the gallant soldiers who have fallen in
this war, General Stuart was second to none in valor, in zeal, and in unflinching devotion
to his country. His achievements form a conspicuous part of the history of this army, with
which his name and services will forever be associated. To military capacity of a high
order and to the nobler virtues of the soldier, he added the brighter graces of a pure
life, guided and sustained by the Christian's faith and hope. The mysterious hand of an
all-wise God has removed him from the scene of his usefulness and fame. His grateful
countrymen will mourn his loss and cherish his memory. To his comrades in arms he has left
the proud recollection of his deeds and the inspiring influence of his example.
Notwithstanding Grant's recorded assertion,
"I never maneuver,'"he spent from the 13th to the I8th of May in front of Lee,
maneuvering and waiting for reinforcements, until he had rested his "tired" men,
and 25,000 fresh troops were added to his numbers. On the 14th, at 7:10 of the morning,
his dispatch read:
The very heavy rains of the last forty-eight
hours have made it impossible to move trains of artillery. Two corps were moved, last
night, from our right to the left, with orders to attack at 4 a.m., but owing to the
difficulties of the roads. have not fully got into position. This, with the continued bad
weather, may prevent offensive operations today.
The next morning he again telegraphed:
The very heavy rains of the last three days
have rendered the roads so impassable that little will be done until there is a change in
the weather, unless the enemy should attack, which they have exhibited but little
inclination to do for the last week. I believe it would be better to strengthen the corps
here, with all reinforcements coming, than to have them formed into separate commands.
The next morning he dispatched:
We have had five days of almost constant rain
without any prospect yet of its clearing up. All offensive operations necessarily cease
until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits and
feels the greatest confidence in ultimate success .... The promptness with which you have
forwarded reinforcements will contribute greatly to diminishing our mortality list and
insuring a complete victory. You can assure the President and secretary of war, that the
elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or
exhaustion on our part.
An attack was made by Grant on the morning of
May 18th, with his Second and Sixth corps, in another attempt to break Lee's center.
Advancing to Lee's new line, which had excluded the great salient, these 12,000 Federals
were broken, in retreat, by the heavy fire of twenty-nine of Lee's guns, before they came
within rifle range. In like manner Burnside's simultaneous attack on Lee's right was
similarly repulsed. Grant could find no weak point for breaking through, so he drew back,
farther to his left, and sought for a third road to Richmond. On the next day, the 19th,
Lee sent Ewell around Grant's right, to ascertain what he was doing. In this movement
Ewell was repulsed, with a loss of 900 men, but he had detained Grant another day in front
of Spottsylvania Court House and inflicted a severer loss than he himself suffered, as
Grant confessed.
On the afternoon of May 19th, Grant wrote:
"I shall make a flank movement early in the morning, and try to reach Bowling Green
and Milford station," and wished his base, in that event, changed to Port Royal. At
10 p.m., of the same day, he again wrote: "The enemy came out on our right, late this
afternoon, and attacked, but were driven back until some time since dark. Not knowing
their exact position, and the danger our trains at Fredericksburg will be in if we move, I
shall not make the move designated for to-night, until their designs are fully
developed." On the 20th he reported that his casualties of the previous day were 196
killed, 1,090 wounded, and 240 missing.
When Grant began his forward movement, on the
4th of May, he not only ordered Butler forward, but also directed Sigel, in the Shenandoah
valley, to make a simultaneous advance to capture Staunton and break Lee's communications
with the Shenandoah valley, with the 6,500 men and 28 guns in his command. Apprised of
this movement, Lee ordered Gen. John C. Breckinridge to collect at Staunton the infantry
and cavalry outposts that had wintered in the mountains west of the Great valley, and had
called upon the governor of Virginia to add to these the cadets from the Virginia military
institute, and with these march down the valley to meet this new irruption. Breckinridge
had some 4,500 men, including Gen. John Daniel Imboden's cavalry and McLaughlin's
artillery company with eight guns. These met Sigel at New Market, on the 15th of May, and
completely routed him, capturing six guns and nearly 900 prisoners. Breckinridge's
infantry made a front attack, aided by the artillery, while Imboden fell on Sigel's flank.
The mere boys from the institute fought like veterans in this, their first engagement.
Halleck telegraphed to Grant, on the 17th: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He
will do nothing but run. Never did anything else." The day before, Grant received the
unwelcome news that the "army of the James," under Gen. Ben Butler, from which
he expected so much assistance, and which he was longing to join, had been successfully
repulsed from a position it had gained on the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg,
and driven back into the angle between the James and the Appomattox, where, as Grant says
in his official report, "his army, therefore, though in a position of great security,
was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond, as if it had
been in a bottle strongly corked."
Source: Confederate
Military History, Vol. 3, Chapter
XXV.