Neoplatonism is traditionally considered a mystical philosophy; on the contrary the aim of this book is to show the importance of a logical and epistemological approach for the understanding of ...
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Neoplatonism is traditionally considered a mystical philosophy; on the contrary the aim of this book is to show the importance of a logical and epistemological approach for the understanding of Neoplatonic basic ontological problems. In doing that, Lloyd considers a very wide range of philosophers from Plotinus up to Byzantine Neoplatonists. After a preliminary discussion of how the Neoplatonic semantics and logical concepts are a result of their understanding of previous philosophers (in particular Aristotle), Lloyd introduces the key point of the book, i.e. his theory of the P‐series. A P‐series is a group of terms ordered according to priority a posteriority in which the first term is universal and common to all the others. This logical theory is applied to explain how the reality is structured (procession and emanation from the One) and how knowledge is constituted. The book ends with an analysis of how mystical apprehension differs from the union with the One.Less

The Anatomy of Neoplatonism

A. C. Lloyd

Published in print: 1998-06-25

Neoplatonism is traditionally considered a mystical philosophy; on the contrary the aim of this book is to show the importance of a logical and epistemological approach for the understanding of Neoplatonic basic ontological problems. In doing that, Lloyd considers a very wide range of philosophers from Plotinus up to Byzantine Neoplatonists. After a preliminary discussion of how the Neoplatonic semantics and logical concepts are a result of their understanding of previous philosophers (in particular Aristotle), Lloyd introduces the key point of the book, i.e. his theory of the P‐series. A P‐series is a group of terms ordered according to priority a posteriority in which the first term is universal and common to all the others. This logical theory is applied to explain how the reality is structured (procession and emanation from the One) and how knowledge is constituted. The book ends with an analysis of how mystical apprehension differs from the union with the One.

Engages in a wide-ranging exploration of what we can learn from the study of ancient civilizations, which is relevant to fundamental problems, both intellectual and moral, that we continue to face ...
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Engages in a wide-ranging exploration of what we can learn from the study of ancient civilizations, which is relevant to fundamental problems, both intellectual and moral, that we continue to face today. How far is it possible to arrive at an understanding of alien systems of belief? Is it possible to talk meaningfully of 'science' and of its various constituent disciplines, 'astronomy', 'geography', 'anatomy', and so on, in the ancient world? Are logic and its laws universal? Is there one ontology—a single world—to which all attempts at understanding must be considered to be directed? When we encounter apparently very different views of reality, how far can that be put down to a difference in conceptions of what needs explaining, or of what counts as an explanation, or to different preferred modes of reasoning or styles of enquiry? Do the notions of truth and belief represent reliable cross-cultural universals? Are the discourses of human nature and of human rights universally applicable? What political institutions do we need to help secure equity and justice within nation states and between them? Lloyd provides compelling evidence that the science and culture of ancient Greece and China have much to offer contemporary debates in many fields of study.Less

Geoffrey Lloyd

Published in print: 2004-02-05

Engages in a wide-ranging exploration of what we can learn from the study of ancient civilizations, which is relevant to fundamental problems, both intellectual and moral, that we continue to face today.

How far is it possible to arrive at an understanding of alien systems of belief? Is it possible to talk meaningfully of 'science' and of its various constituent disciplines, 'astronomy', 'geography', 'anatomy', and so on, in the ancient world? Are logic and its laws universal? Is there one ontology—a single world—to which all attempts at understanding must be considered to be directed? When we encounter apparently very different views of reality, how far can that be put down to a difference in conceptions of what needs explaining, or of what counts as an explanation, or to different preferred modes of reasoning or styles of enquiry? Do the notions of truth and belief represent reliable cross-cultural universals? Are the discourses of human nature and of human rights universally applicable? What political institutions do we need to help secure equity and justice within nation states and between them?

Lloyd provides compelling evidence that the science and culture of ancient Greece and China have much to offer contemporary debates in many fields of study.

This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book ...
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This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.Less

Aquinas on Friendship

Daniel Schwartz

Published in print: 2007-03-01

This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.

This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a ...
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This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a detailed study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The book provides a synthesis of three disciplines: philosophy, classical studies, and statistics.Less

The Aristotelian Ethics : A study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

Anthony Kenny

Published in print: 1978-09-28

This book is an attempt to solve a long-standing problem of Aristotelian scholarship on the basis of historical and philosophical arguments and a statistical study of features of style. It presents a detailed study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The book provides a synthesis of three disciplines: philosophy, classical studies, and statistics.

Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot. Yet Aristotle’s accounts of the individual virtues remain opaque, for most contemporary commentators of Aristotle’s Nicomachean ...
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Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot. Yet Aristotle’s accounts of the individual virtues remain opaque, for most contemporary commentators of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have focused upon other matters. By contrast, this book takes Aristotle’s detailed description of the individual virtues to be central to his ethical theory. Working through the Nicomachean Ethics virtue by virtue, explaining and generally defending Aristotle’s claims, the book brings each of Aristotle’s virtues alive. A new Aristotle emerges, an Aristotle fascinated by the details of the individual virtues. Justice and friendship hold special places in Aristotle’s virtue theory. Many contemporary discussions place justice and friendship at opposite, perhaps even conflicting poles of a spectrum. Justice seems to be very much a public, impartial, and dispassionate thing, while friendship is paradigmatically private, partial, and passionate. Yet in Aristotle’s view they are actually symbiotic. Justice is defined in terms of friendship, and good friendship is defined in terms of justice. Virtue ethics is not only about being good; it is also about becoming good. The book reconstructs Aristotle’s account of moral development. Certain character types serve as stages of moral development. Certain catalysts and mechanisms lead from one stage to the next. Explaining why some people cannot make moral progress specifies the preconditions of moral development. Finally, the book describes Aristotle’s quest to determine the ultimate goal of moral development: happiness.Less

Aristotle and the Virtues

Howard J. Curzer

Published in print: 2012-03-01

Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot. Yet Aristotle’s accounts of the individual virtues remain opaque, for most contemporary commentators of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have focused upon other matters. By contrast, this book takes Aristotle’s detailed description of the individual virtues to be central to his ethical theory. Working through the Nicomachean Ethics virtue by virtue, explaining and generally defending Aristotle’s claims, the book brings each of Aristotle’s virtues alive. A new Aristotle emerges, an Aristotle fascinated by the details of the individual virtues. Justice and friendship hold special places in Aristotle’s virtue theory. Many contemporary discussions place justice and friendship at opposite, perhaps even conflicting poles of a spectrum. Justice seems to be very much a public, impartial, and dispassionate thing, while friendship is paradigmatically private, partial, and passionate. Yet in Aristotle’s view they are actually symbiotic. Justice is defined in terms of friendship, and good friendship is defined in terms of justice. Virtue ethics is not only about being good; it is also about becoming good. The book reconstructs Aristotle’s account of moral development. Certain character types serve as stages of moral development. Certain catalysts and mechanisms lead from one stage to the next. Explaining why some people cannot make moral progress specifies the preconditions of moral development. Finally, the book describes Aristotle’s quest to determine the ultimate goal of moral development: happiness.

Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy. This book sheds new light on this challenging text by arguing that it is ...
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Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy. This book sheds new light on this challenging text by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. The Posterior Analytics, this book argues, is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge: what it is and how it is acquired. Aristotle first discusses two principal forms of scientific knowledge (epistēmē and nous). He then provides a compelling account, in reverse order, of the types of learning one needs to undertake in order to acquire them. The Posterior Analytics thus emerges as an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind’s ascent from perception of sensible particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. This book also highlights Plato’s influence on Aristotle’s text. For each type of learning Aristotle discusses, this book uncovers an instance of Meno’s Paradox (a puzzle from Plato’s Meno according to which inquiry and learning are impossible) and a solution to it. In addition, this book argues, against current orthodoxy, that Aristotle is committed to the Socratic Picture of inquiry, according to which one should seek what a thing’s essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes.Less

Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning : The Posterior Analytics

David Bronstein

Published in print: 2016-03-01

Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy. This book sheds new light on this challenging text by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. The Posterior Analytics, this book argues, is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge: what it is and how it is acquired. Aristotle first discusses two principal forms of scientific knowledge (epistēmē and nous). He then provides a compelling account, in reverse order, of the types of learning one needs to undertake in order to acquire them. The Posterior Analytics thus emerges as an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind’s ascent from perception of sensible particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. This book also highlights Plato’s influence on Aristotle’s text. For each type of learning Aristotle discusses, this book uncovers an instance of Meno’s Paradox (a puzzle from Plato’s Meno according to which inquiry and learning are impossible) and a solution to it. In addition, this book argues, against current orthodoxy, that Aristotle is committed to the Socratic Picture of inquiry, according to which one should seek what a thing’s essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes.

Focuses on two themes in Aristotle's philosophy and their interconnection. The first is his account of the meaning (or signification) of terms such as ‘man’, ‘fish’, and ‘eclipse’, which refer to ...
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Focuses on two themes in Aristotle's philosophy and their interconnection. The first is his account of the meaning (or signification) of terms such as ‘man’, ‘fish’, and ‘eclipse’, which refer to kinds of objects or processes. The second is his theory of the essences of these kinds, what we refer to in defining them, and what makes them what they are. For Aristotle, the meaning of such terms is determined by a distinctive type of efficient causal connection between the kind and thoughts with which the terms are associated. However, although these terms signify existing kinds with essences, one who has the relevant thoughts need not know either that the kind exists or that, if it exists, it has an essence of a given type. In consequence, Aristotle's account of the essence of kinds has to be grounded in his metaphysics and not in his theory of the mastery of natural kind terms. Aristotle's essences are specified in our definitions of kinds because they determine the kind's distinctive nature and necessary properties. They simultaneously ground the identity of the kind and explain its necessary, but non‐essential, features. In these respects, Aristotelian essentialism, which plays a central role in his scientific and metaphysical writings, is distinct both from twentieth‐century attempts to revive essentialism (such as are to be found in the writings of Kripke and Putnam) and from the views criticized by anti‐essentialists (such as Locke and Quine). This book aims to set out and critically evaluate Aristotle's distinctive form of essentialism.Less

Aristotle on Meaning and Essence

David Charles

Published in print: 2002-10-10

Focuses on two themes in Aristotle's philosophy and their interconnection. The first is his account of the meaning (or signification) of terms such as ‘man’, ‘fish’, and ‘eclipse’, which refer to kinds of objects or processes. The second is his theory of the essences of these kinds, what we refer to in defining them, and what makes them what they are. For Aristotle, the meaning of such terms is determined by a distinctive type of efficient causal connection between the kind and thoughts with which the terms are associated. However, although these terms signify existing kinds with essences, one who has the relevant thoughts need not know either that the kind exists or that, if it exists, it has an essence of a given type. In consequence, Aristotle's account of the essence of kinds has to be grounded in his metaphysics and not in his theory of the mastery of natural kind terms. Aristotle's essences are specified in our definitions of kinds because they determine the kind's distinctive nature and necessary properties. They simultaneously ground the identity of the kind and explain its necessary, but non‐essential, features. In these respects, Aristotelian essentialism, which plays a central role in his scientific and metaphysical writings, is distinct both from twentieth‐century attempts to revive essentialism (such as are to be found in the writings of Kripke and Putnam) and from the views criticized by anti‐essentialists (such as Locke and Quine). This book aims to set out and critically evaluate Aristotle's distinctive form of essentialism.

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit ...
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This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.Less

Aristotle on Moral Responsibility : Character and Cause

Susan Sauvé Meyer

Published in print: 2011-11-24

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we ...
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How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are the five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle was the first to investigate these questions to a depth that makes his account fruitful even for contemporary philosophy, but also challenging. He addressed them by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of perceptual content. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models offered by Aristotle to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception is fundamentally different from his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book is groundbreaking in charting this new territory: it offers an understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty, and aims at bringing out the breakthroughs Aristotle achieved.Less

Aristotle on Perceiving Objects

Anna Marmodoro

Published in print: 2014-08-04

How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are the five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle was the first to investigate these questions to a depth that makes his account fruitful even for contemporary philosophy, but also challenging. He addressed them by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of perceptual content. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models offered by Aristotle to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception is fundamentally different from his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book is groundbreaking in charting this new territory: it offers an understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty, and aims at bringing out the breakthroughs Aristotle achieved.

In this book, Stephen Everson offers a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle's account of perception. Everson explains how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive such things as colours and ...
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In this book, Stephen Everson offers a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle's account of perception. Everson explains how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive such things as colours and sounds, as well as material objects. Everson has two main aims: the first is to place Aristotle's theory of mind within the context of his natural science, in particular, to show that Aristotle's account of perception is an application of the explanatory method of the Physics. To this end, Everson is keen to emphasize, against recent interpretations, that Aristotle explains perception in terms of material changes in the organs that possess perceptual capacities. The second aim is to argue that Aristotle's resulting method of explaining mental activity has substantive advantages over contemporary accounts in the philosophy of mind, such as functionalism and supervenience. Much of Everson's argument is directed against Myles Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotle’ philosophy of mind. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle argues that the sense organs undergo alteration without undergoing any material change: Everson calls this reading, the ‘spiritualist’ reading. Everson opposes this with the ‘literalist’ reading, according to which a sense organ is physically altered whenever it perceives something; it therefore takes on a property of the sensible object that affects it. In order to defend this reading, Everson presents a detailed account of the role of matter and material change in the perceptual activities of the each of the individual senses, and also of the perceptual system as a unified whole, including the activities of phantasia or imagination.Less

Aristotle on Perception

Stephen Everson

Published in print: 1999-02-11

In this book, Stephen Everson offers a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle's account of perception. Everson explains how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive such things as colours and sounds, as well as material objects. Everson has two main aims: the first is to place Aristotle's theory of mind within the context of his natural science, in particular, to show that Aristotle's account of perception is an application of the explanatory method of the Physics. To this end, Everson is keen to emphasize, against recent interpretations, that Aristotle explains perception in terms of material changes in the organs that possess perceptual capacities. The second aim is to argue that Aristotle's resulting method of explaining mental activity has substantive advantages over contemporary accounts in the philosophy of mind, such as functionalism and supervenience. Much of Everson's argument is directed against Myles Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotle’ philosophy of mind. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle argues that the sense organs undergo alteration without undergoing any material change: Everson calls this reading, the ‘spiritualist’ reading. Everson opposes this with the ‘literalist’ reading, according to which a sense organ is physically altered whenever it perceives something; it therefore takes on a property of the sensible object that affects it. In order to defend this reading, Everson presents a detailed account of the role of matter and material change in the perceptual activities of the each of the individual senses, and also of the perceptual system as a unified whole, including the activities of phantasia or imagination.

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