A New York statute provides that, with certain exceptions, the presence
of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession
by all persons then occupying the vehicle. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that respondents may challenge the
constitutionality of this statute in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
and that the statute is "unconstitutional on its face.'' 568 F.2d 998,
1009. We granted certiorari to review these holdings and also to consider
whether the statute is constitutional in its application to respondents.
439 U.S. 815.

Four persons, three adult males (respondents) and a 16-year-old girl
(Jane Doe, who is not a respondent here), were jointly tried on charges
that they possessed two loaded handguns, a loaded machinegun, and over
a pound of heroin found in a Chevrolet in which they were riding when
it was stopped for speeding on the New York Thruway shortly after noon
on March 28, 1973. The two large-caliber handguns, which together with
their ammunition weighed approximately six pounds, were seen through the
window of the car by the investigating police officer. They were positioned
crosswise in an open handbag on either the front floor or the front seat
of the car on the passenger side where Jane Doe was sitting. Jane Doe
admitted that the handbag was hers. The machinegun and the heroin were
discovered in the trunk after the police pried it open. The car had been
borrowed from the driver's brother earlier that day; the key to the trunk
could not be found in the car or on the person of any of its occupants,
although there was testimony that two of the occupants had placed something
in the trunk before embarking in the borrowed car. The jury convicted
all four of possession of the handguns and acquitted them of possession
of the contents of the trunk.

Counsel for all four defendants objected to the introduction into evidence
of the two handguns, the machinegun, and the drugs, arguing that the State
had not adequately demonstrated a connection between their clients and
the contraband. The trial court overruled the objection, relying on the
presumption of possession created by the New York statute. Tr. 474-483.
Because that presumption does not apply if a weapon is found "upon the
person'' of one of the occupants of the car, ... the three male defendants
also moved to dismiss the charges relating to the handguns on the ground
that the guns were found on the person of Jane Doe. Respondents made this
motion both at the close of the prosecution's case and at the close of
all evidence. The trial judge twice denied it, concluding that the applicability
of the "upon the person'' exception was a question of fact for the jury....

At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that they
were entitled to infer possession from the defendants' presence in the
car. He did not make any reference to the "upon the person'' exception
in his explanation of the statutory presumption, nor did any of the defendants
object to this omission or request alternative or additional instructions
on the subject....

In this case, the Court of Appeals undertook the task of deciding the
constitutionality of the New York statute "on its face.'' Its conclusion
that the statutory presumption was arbitrary rested entirely on its view
of the fairness of applying the presumption in hypothetical situations--situations,
indeed, in which it is improbable that a jury would return a conviction,
or that a prosecution would ever be instituted. We must accordingly inquire
whether these respondents had standing to advance the arguments that the
Court of Appeals considered decisive. An analysis of our prior cases indicates
that the answer to this inquiry depends on the type of presumption that
is involved in the case.

Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of
factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine
the existence of an element of the crime--that is, an "ultimate'' or "elemental''
fact--from the existence of one or more "evidentiary'' or "basic'' facts.
E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843-844; Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467; Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S.
35, 42. The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under
the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, however, depending on
the strength of the connection between the particular basic and elemental
facts involved and on the degree to which the device curtails the factfinder's
freedom to assess the evidence independently. Nonetheless, in criminal
cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a
given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's
responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find
the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S., at 702-703, n.31.

The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference
or presumption, which allows--but does not require--the trier of fact
to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic
one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. United States, supra, at 840 n.3. In that situation the basic
fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. See, e.g.,
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 402 n.2. When reviewing this type
of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate
its invalidity as applied to him. Because this permissive presumption
leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does
not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond
a reasonable doubt'' standard only if, under the facts of the case, there
is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the
inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation
of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused
the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.

A mandatory presumption is a far more troublesome evidentiary device.
For it may affect not only the strength of the "no reasonable doubt''
burden but also the placement of that burden; it tells the trier that
he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic
fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence
to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. In this situation,
the Court has generally examined the presumption on its face to determine
the extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide. To the extent
that the trier of fact is forced to abide by the presumption, and may
not reject it based on an independent evaluation of the particular facts
presented by the State, the analysis of the presumption's constitutional
validity is logically divorced from those facts and based on the presumption's
accuracy in the run of cases. It is for this reason that the Court had
held it irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory presumption, but not in analyzing
a purely permissive one, that there is ample evidence in the record other
than the presumption to support a conviction.

Without determining whether the presumption in this case was mandatory,
the Court of Appeals analyzed it on its face as if it were. In fact, it
was not, as the New York Court of Appeals had earlier pointed out. 40
N.Y.2d, at 510-511, 354 N.E.2d, at 840.

The trial judge's instructions make it clear that the presumption was
merely a part of the prosecution's case, that it gave rise to a permissive
inference available only in certain circumstances, rather than a mandatory
conclusion of possession, and that it could be ignored by the jury even
if there was no affirmative proof offered by defendants in rebuttal. The
judge explained that possession could be actual or constructive, but that
constructive possession could not exist without the intent and ability
to exercise control or dominion over the weapons. He also carefully instructed
the jury that there is a mandatory presumption of innocence in favor of
the defendants that controls unless it, as the exclusive trier of fact,
is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the
handguns in the manner described by the judge. In short, the instructions
plainly directed the jury to consider all the circumstances tending to
support or contradict the inference that all four occupants of the car
had possession of the two loaded handguns and to decide the matter for
itself without regard to how much evidence the defendants introduced.

Our cases considering the validity of permissive statutory presumption
such as the one involved here have rested on an evaluation of the presumption
as applied to the record before the Court. None suggests that a court
should pass on the constitutionality of this kind of statute "on its face.''
It was error for the Court of Appeals to make such a determination in
this case.

III

As applied to the facts of this case, the presumption of possession
is entirely rational. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' analysis,
respondents were not "hitchhikers or other casual passengers,'' and the
guns were neither "a few inches in length'' nor "out of [respondents']
sight.''... The argument against possession by any of the respondents
was predicated solely on the fact that the guns were in Jane Doe's pocketbook.
But several circumstances--which, not surprisingly, her counsel repeatedly
emphasized in his questions and his argument--made it highly improbable
that she was the sole custodian of those weapons.

Even if it was reasonable to conclude that she had placed the guns in
her purse before the car was stopped by police, the facts strongly suggest
that Jane Doe was not the only person able to exercise dominion over them.
The two guns were too large to be concealed in her handbag. The bag was
consequently open, and part of one of the guns was in plain view, within
easy access of the driver of the car and even, perhaps, of the other two
respondents who were riding in the rear seat.

Moreover, it is highly improbable that the loaded guns belonged to Jane
Doe or that she was solely responsible for their being in her purse. As
a 16-year-old girl in the company of three adult men she was the least
likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy handguns.
It is far more probable that she relied on the pocketknife found in her
brassiere for any necessary self-protection. Under these circumstances,
it was not unreasonable for her counsel to argue and for the jury to infer
that when the car was halted for speeding, the other passengers in the
car anticipated the risk of a search and attempted to conceal their weapons
in a pocketbook in the front seat. The inference is surely more likely
than the notion that these weapons were the sole property of the 16-year-old
girl.

Under these circumstances, the jury would have been entirely reasonable
in rejecting the suggestion--which, incidentally, defense counsel did
not even advance in their closing arguments to the jury--that the handguns
were in the sole possession of Jane Doe. Assuming that the jury did reject
it, the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the
floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants
of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that
each of the respondents was fully aware of the presence of the guns and
had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over
the weapons. The application of the statutory presumption in this case
therefore comports with the standard laid down in Tot v. United States,
319 U.S., at 467, and restated in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S., at
36. For there is a "rational connection'' between the basic facts that
the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter
is "more likely than not to flow from'' the former.

Respondents argue, however, that the validity of the New York presumption
must be judged by a "reasonable doubt'' test rather than the "more likely
than not'' standard employed in Leary. Under the more stringent
test, it is argued that a statutory presumption must be rejected unless
the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational
jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S., at 842-843. Respondents' argument again overlooks
the distinction between a permissive presumption on which the prosecution
is entitled to rely as one not necessarily sufficient part of its proof
and a mandatory presumption which the jury must accept even if it is the
sole evidence of an element of the offense.

In the latter situation, since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing
guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the fact
proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. But in the former situation, the prosecution may rely on all of
the evidence in the record to meet the reasonable-doubt standard. There
is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet
a reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part
in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for
other relevant evidence before it may be admitted. As long as it is clear
that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding
of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described in Leary.

The permissive presumption, as used in this case, satisfied the Leary
test. And, as already noted, the New York Court of Appeals has concluded
that the record as a whole was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

I agree with the Court that there is no procedural bar to our considering
the underlying constitutional question presented by this case. I am not
in agreement, however, with the Court's conclusion that the presumption
as charged to the jury in this case meets the constitutional requirements
of due process as set forth in our prior decisions. On the contrary, an
individual's mere presence in an automobile where there is a handgun does
not even make it "more likely than not'' that the individual possesses
the weapon.

I

In the criminal law, presumptions are used to encourage the jury to
find certain facts, with respect to which no direct evidence is presented,
solely because other facts have been proved. (16)1
See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 840 n.3; United States
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138 (1965). The purpose of such presumptions
is plain: Like certain other jury instructions, they provide guidance
for jurors' thinking in considering the evidence laid before them. Once
in the juryroom, jurors necessarily draw inferences from the evidence--both
direct and circumstantial. Through the use of presumptions, certain inferences
are commended to the attention of jurors by legislatures or courts.

Legitimate guidance of a jury's deliberations is an indispensable part
of our criminal justice system. Nonetheless, the use of presumptions in
criminal cases poses at least two distinct perils for defendants' constitutional
rights. The Court accurately identifies the first of these as being the
danger of interference with "the factfinder's responsibility at trial,
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond
a reasonable doubt.'' If the jury is instructed that it must infer some
ultimate fact (that is, some element of the offense) from proof of other
facts unless the defendant disproves the ultimate fact by a preponderance
of the evidence, then the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant concerning the element thus inferred. (17)2

But I do not agree with the Court's conclusion that the only constitutional
difficulty with presumptions lies in the danger of lessening the burden
of proof the prosecution must bear. As the Court notes, the presumptions
thus far reviewed by the Court have not shifted the burden of persuasion;
instead they either have required only that the defendant produce some
evidence to rebut the inference suggested by the prosecution's evidence,
see Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), or merely have been suggestions
to the jury that it would be sensible to draw certain conclusions on the
basis of the evidence presented. See Barnes v. United States, supra, 412
U.S. at 840 n.3. Evolving from our decisions, therefore, is a second standard
for judging the constitutionality of criminal presumptions which is based--not
on the constitutional requirement that the State be put to its proof--but
rather on the due process rule that when the jury is encouraged to make
factual inferences, those inferences must reflect some valid general observation
about the natural connection between events as they occur in our society.

This due process rule was first articulated by the Court in Tot v. United
States, supra, in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of §2(f)
of the Federal Firearms Act. That statute provided in part that "possession
of a firearm or ammunition by any ... person [who has been convicted of
a crime of violence] shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or
ammunition was shipped or transported [in interstate or foreign commerce].''
As the Court interpreted the presumption, it placed upon a defendant only
the obligation of presenting some exculpatory evidence concerning the
origins of a firearm or ammunition, once the Government proved that the
defendant had possessed the weapon and had been convicted of a crime of
violence. Noting that juries must be permitted to infer from one fact
the existence of another essential to guilt, "if reason and experience
support the inference,'' id., at 467, the Court concluded that under some
circumstances juries may be guided in making these inferences by legislative
or common-law presumptions, even though they may be based "upon a view
of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case,''
319 U.S., at 468. To provide due process, however, there must be at least
"a rational connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed''--a
connection grounded in "common experience.'' Id., at 467. In Tot,
the Court found that connection to be lacking.

Subsequently, in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court
reaffirmed and refined the due process requirement of Tot that
inferences specifically commended to the attention of jurors must reflect
generally accepted connections between related events. At issue in Leary
was the constitutionality of a federal statute making it a crime to receive,
conceal, buy, or sell marihuana illegally brought into the United States,
knowing it to have been illegally imported. The statute provided that
mere possession of marihuana "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction unless the defendant explains his possession to the satisfaction
of the jury.'' After reviewing the Court's decisions in Tot v. United
States, supra, and other criminal presumption cases, Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, concluded "that a criminal statutory presumption
must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional,
unless it can be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made
to depend.'' 395 U.S., at 36 (footnote omitted). The Court invalidated
the statute, finding there to be insufficient basis in fact for the conclusion
that those who possess marihuana are more likely than not to know that
it was imported illegally. (18)5

Most recently, in Barnes v. United States, supra, we considered the
constitutionality of a quite different sort of presumption--one that suggested
to the jury that "[p]ossession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily
explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably
draw the inference ... that the person in possession knew the property
had been stolen.'' Id., 412 U.S. at 840 n.3. After reviewing the various
formulations used by the Court to articulate the constitutionally required
basis for a criminal presumption, we once again found it unnecessary to
choose among them. As for the presumption suggested to the jury in Barnes,
we found that it was well founded in history, common sense, and experience,
and therefore upheld it as being "clearly sufficient to enable the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt'' that those in the unexplained possession
of recently stolen property know it to have been stolen. Id., at 845.

In sum, our decisions uniformly have recognized that due process requires
more than merely that the prosecution be put to its proof.
(19)6 In addition, the Constitution restricts the court in its charge
to the jury by requiring that, when particular factual inferences are
recommended to the jury, those factual inferences be accurate reflections
of what history, common sense, and experience tell us about the relations
between events in our society. Generally this due process rule has been
articulated as requiring that the truth of the inferred fact be more likely
than not whenever the premise for the inference is true. Thus, to be constitutional
a presumption must be at least more likely than not true.

II

In the present case, the jury was told that,

Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any
machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive
evidence of their unlawful possession. In other words, [under] these presumptions
or this latter presumption upon proof of the presence of the machine gun
and the hand weapons, you may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited
weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile
at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions
is effective only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting
the conclusion flowing from the presumption, and the presumption is said
to disappear when such contradictory evidence is adduced.

Undeniably, the presumption charged in this case encouraged the jury
to draw a particular factual inference regardless of any other evidence
presented: to infer that respondents possessed the weapons found in the
automobile "upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand
weapon'' and proof that respondents "occupied the automobile at the time
such instruments were found.'' I believe that the presumption thus charged
was unconstitutional because it did not fairly reflect what common sense
and experience tell us about passengers in automobiles and the possession
of handguns. People present in automobiles where there are weapons simply
are not "more likely than not'' the possessors of those weapons.

Under New York law, "to possess'' is "to have physical possession or
otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.'' N.Y.
Penal Law §10.00(8). Plainly the mere presence of an individual in an
automobile--without more--does not indicate that he exercises "dominion
or control over'' everything within it. As the Court of Appeals noted,
there are countless situations in which individuals are invited as guests
into vehicles the contents of which they know nothing about, much less
have control over. Similarly, those who invite others into their automobile
do not generally search them to determine what they may have on their
person; nor do they insist that any handguns be identified and placed
within reach of the occupants of the automobile. Indeed, handguns are
particularly susceptible to concealment and therefore are less likely
than are other objects to be observed by those in an automobile.

In another context, this Court has been particularly hesitant to infer
possession from mere presence in a location, noting that "[p]resence is
relevant and admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but
absent some showing of the defendant's function at [the illegal] still,
its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference
of guilt--'the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary....'
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467.'' United States v. Romano, 382
U.S. 136, 141 (1965). We should be even more hesitant to uphold the inference
of possession of a handgun from mere presence in an automobile, in light
of common experience concerning automobiles and handguns. Because the
specific factual inference recommended to the jury in this case is not
one that is supported by the general experience of our society, I cannot
say that the presumption charged is "more likely than not'' to be true.
Accordingly, respondents' due process rights were violated by the presumption's
use.

As I understand it, the Court today does not contend that in general
those who are present in automobiles are more likely than not to possess
any gun contained within their vehicles. It argues, however, that the
nature of the presumption here involved requires that we look, not only
to the immediate facts upon which the jury was encouraged to base its
inference, but to the other facts "proved'' by the prosecution as well.
The Court suggests that this is the proper approach when reviewing what
it calls "permissive'' presumptions because the jury was urged "to consider
all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference.''

It seems to me that the Court mischaracterizes the function of the presumption
charged in this case. As it acknowledges was the case in Romano,
supra, the "instruction authorized conviction even if the jury disbelieved
all of the testimony except the proof of presence'' in the automobile.
(20)7 The Court nevertheless relies on all of the evidence introduced
by the prosecution and argues that the "permissive'' presumption could
not have prejudiced defendants. The possibility that the jury disbelieved
all of this evidence, and relied on the presumption, is simply ignored.

I agree that the circumstances relied upon by the Court in determining
the plausibility of the presumption charged in this case would have made
it reasonable for the jury to "infer that each of the respondents was
fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons.'' But the jury
was told that it could conclude that respondents possessed the weapons
found therein from proof of the mere fact of respondents' presence in
the automobile. For all we know, the jury rejected all of the prosecution's
evidence concerning the location and origin of the guns, and based its
conclusion that respondents possessed the weapons solely upon its belief
that respondents had been present in the automobile.
(21)8 For purposes of reviewing the constitutionality of the presumption
at issue here, we must assume that this was the case.

The Court's novel approach in this case appears to contradict prior
decisions of this Court reviewing such presumptions. Under the Court's
analysis, whenever it is determined that an inference is "permissive,''
the only question is whether, in light of all of the evidence adduced
at trial, the inference recommended to the jury is a reasonable one. The
Court has never suggested that the inquiry into the rational basis of
a permissible inference may be circumvented in this manner. Quite the
contrary, the Court has required that the "evidence necessary to invoke
the inference [be] sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred
fact....'' Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 843 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 407 (1970). Under the presumption
charged in this case, the only evidence necessary to invoke the inference
was the presence of the weapons in the automobile with respondents--an
inference that is plainly irrational.

In sum, it seems to me that the Court today ignores the teaching of
our prior decisions. By speculating about what the jury may have done
with the factual inference thrust upon it, the Court in effect assumes
away the inference altogether, constructing a rule that permits the use
of any inference--no matter how irrational in itself--provided that otherwise
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of guilt.
Applying this novel analysis to the present case, the Court upholds the
use of a presumption that it makes no effort to defend in isolation. In
substance, the Court--applying an unarticulated harmless error standard--simply
finds that the respondents were guilty as charged. They may well have
been but rather than acknowledging this rationale, the Court seems to
have made new law with respect to presumptions that could seriously jeopardize
a defendant's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, I dissent.

Do you agree with the majority's characterization of the device involved
in Ulster City as a "permissive inference''? If the factfinder's
responsibility is to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt
based on evidence presented by the prosecution, how can the court apply
any standard other than the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-rational-connection
test'' to this device, regardless of how it is characterized? Has the
majority applied a standard even lower than the preponderance standard,
i.e., "not-irrational''? Is the majority correct in considering all the
evidence in the case in deciding whether the presumption passes constitutional
muster? Is the dissent correct in insisting that the presumption be judged
solely on the basis of the relationship between the basic fact and the
presumed fact? Did the device in this case operate to shift the burden
of production to the defendant? Is this constitutional? Is the decision
in this case consistent with proposed Rule 303?

17. 2.
The Court suggests that presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion
to the defendant in this way can be upheld provided that "the fact proved
is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.''
As the present case involves no shifting of the burden of persuasion,
the constitutional restrictions on such presumptions are not before us,
and I express no views on them.

It may well be that even those presumptions
that do not shift the burden of persuasion cannot be used to prove an
element of the offense, if the facts proved would not permit a reasonable
mind to find the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. My conclusion
in Part II, infra, makes it unnecessary for me to address this concern
here.

18. 5.
Because the statute in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), was
found to be unconstitutional under the "more likely than not'' standard,
the Court explicitly declined to consider whether criminal presumptions
also must follow "beyond a reasonable doubt'' from their premises, if
an essential element of the crime depends upon the presumption's use.
Id., at 36 n.64. See supra n.2. The Court similarly avoided this question
in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).

19. 6.
The Court apparently disagrees, contending that "the factfinder's responsibility
... to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt'' is the only
constitutional restraint upon the use of criminal presumptions at trial.

20. 7.
In commending the presumption to the jury, the court gave no instruction
that would have required a finding of possession to be based on anything
more than mere presence in the automobile. Thus, the jury was not instructed
that it should infer that respondents possessed the handguns only if it
found that the guns were too large to be concealed in Jane Doe's handbag;
that the guns accordingly were in the plain view of respondents; that
the weapons were within "easy access of the driver of the car and even,
perhaps, of the other two respondents who were riding in the rear seat'';
that it was unlikely that Jane Doe was solely responsible for the placement
of the weapons in her purse; or that the case was "tantamount to one in
which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain
view of the three other occupants of the automobile.''