Alison Piepmeier directs the Women's and Gender Studies Program at the College of Charleston, where she is full professor of English, and she is a member of the Governing Council of the National Women's Studies Association. Her most recent book is Girl Zines: Making Media, Doing Feminism. She has recently been featured on ABC news for writing a lovely goodbye after facing a brain tumor for the past seven years.

Why Peter Singer is a poor guide for embracing human diversity

I've had irritated things to say about Peter Singer for some time (for instance, I've compared him to the increasingly greedy and soulless George Lucas). One of my main critiques of him is that he seems not to be interested in evidence. He makes claims about disability, and these claims are contradicted by the lived experiences of people with disabilities. He continues to make the same claims, which are then contradicted by more people with disabilities. Critiques of Singer's work are particularly relevant now, since MaterniT21 was put on the market less than a month ago. This maternal blood test diagnoses Down syndrome very early in a pregnancy, making it easier for the pregnancy to be terminated.

Jennifer Baker notes one excellent example of Singer's lack of respect for evidence, the conversation between Singer and Michael Bérubé, where Singer's claims about the lived experiences of people with Down syndrome are directly refuted by Jamie Bérubé's life. Singer apparently took these refutations as an exception, not a challenge

to his premise that people with Down syndrome should be viewed with low expectations. This despite the fact that high expectations have resulted in significant changes in the last thirty years: people with Down syndrome are now attending college, writing books, participating in cultural change efforts. It's as if Singer is unwilling to see the extent to which his understanding-indeed, our cultural understanding-of intellectual disabilities was/is wrong.

Another example: after a lengthy correspondence, Singer invited disability rights activist Harriet McBryde Johnson to speak at Princeton. The two of them engaged in a series of conversations, essentially about whether Johnson should have been killed at birth. Johnson's argument is no. Singer's isn't quite so clear.

His evidence, once again, seems specious. As an example of why parents should be able to kill disabled infants, he offers her the sad vision of a disabled child on the beach, unable to play. Here, he's saying, is evidence of a life not worth living. Johnson responds, "I expected something more sophisticated from a professional thinker," and she shares memories of her own childhood, as a child with a disability, playing on the beach. As Baker points out, "Facts really matter."

Cultural construction of stigma

Beyond facts, our interpretations really matter. Johnson asks him about race. One of the reasons he sees it as appropriate to kill babies with disabilities is because their lives are difficult and they are not first in line to be adopted. So what does he think about race? Babies of color are as challenging to adopt as babies with disabilities.

"It would be horrible," he says, "to see mixed race babies being killed because they can't be adopted, whereas white ones could be." What's the difference? Preferences based on race are unreasonable. Preferences based on ability are not. Why? To Singer, it's pretty simple: disability makes a person "worse off."

What Johnson is asking Singer to consider is the extent to which stigma and quality of life are culturally constructed. Singer is able to recognize that the stigma surrounding blackness in the US is based on stereotypes emerging from and supporting a history of oppression. That stigma doesn't say anything about inherent qualities in blackness; it says something about our racist society. He gets that. Indeed, I suspect he gets that there are no "inherent qualities in blackness" (although 19th c. philosophers would have heartily disagreed).

What he doesn't get is that the same is true for the stigma surrounding disability. Disability is socially constructed. The notion that the lives of people with disabilities are "worse off" is an example of social construction. He's viewing the lives of people with physical and intellectual disabilities through the lens of stigma, which seems to make completely ambiguous, pliable, contextual concepts seem absolute and true.

We have a great deal of evidence that such lenses often obscure and shape the world. As Bérubé explains, thirty years ago, people with Down syndrome were widely understood to be people who could never learn to read, to dress themselves, to speak. Now they go to college (at my college, for instance, they are attending typical classes and participating in the full range of college activities). This is a huge shift, and it's not that Down syndrome as a genetic condition has changed in thirty years. It's that our cultural understanding of it has changed, and that change has made a paradigm shift happen.

Disability as an example of embraceable human diversity

Activists and scholars like Johnson and Bérubé (along with many, many others) argue that the world needs to recognize and value human diversity, and that disability is another form of diversity that should be appreciated, even celebrated. Even more pointedly, other disability studies scholars note that disability is the most pervasive form of human diversity. As feminist philosopher Susan Wendell explains, "Unless we die suddenly, we are all disabled eventually." So we'd better start taking it seriously as a form of human diversity.

Our culture doesn't always provide good narratives about cultural diversity; as Baker notes, the "easy truths we assume" are often poor guides. When my daughter was born and I learned that she had Down syndrome, a series of narratives immediately kicked into action in my mind: "I'm going to have to quit my job! Has my life been destroyed? Am I going to love her even though she's pitiful? This story has suddenly become a tragedy, hasn't it?"

Singer might have said yes. He might have said that as a family we should get to decide whether or not this person continues to live, that her human status is liminal enough that society doesn't owe her anything. Fortunately, shortly after my daughter's birth I connected not with Singer but with feminist disability studies scholars and activists, and I learned that virtually every narrative in my mind was wrong. Inaccurate. I have a PhD and am a person who's been doing feminist scholarship for decades, but my beliefs about disability were profoundly skewed by our culture's stigma.

I now have a three year old who lives a life defined by play, by education and exploration, by curiosity and community (not to mention by some fabulous rock and roll drumming). Those in her world have learned that we have to keep raising our expectations, because she continues to meet and exceed them.

There is no real challenge to Singer's general argument in the article above. Piepmeier continues to cite exceptions to the rule. The rule is those with Down Syndrome can't be expected to perform like children who do not have Down Syndrome. It is a called a syndrome for a reason. Deficits in IQ, hearing, vision, and etc are not adaptive strengths. They are limitations and no amount of social constructivist B.S. is going to change that.

Here is Singer:
"The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically-based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact."

Even for people with disabilities who don't go to college, Singer's argument is offensive. How can anyone objectively measure the worth of a life? My child is one who will probably not ever read, let alone attend college, but her life is meaningful and our life is meaningful with her in it.

Singer's argument taken to the absurd means we should limit the life of anyone made 'worse off' by their disability or making those around them 'worse off'. That includes people with all manner of impairments, intellectual, physical and social. That includes those who through their own psychopathology are unable to relate to others with understanding.

No one is arguing about whether Down syndrome entails limitation. The question is whether those limitations justify differential treatment by the parents--including, as Singer has advocated, killing the diagnosed child before 28 days of age. One practical problem with this approach, even if you accept the possibility of a moral infanticide, is that 27 days old is way too early to know how affected a child will be.

It would be easier if, as MrSkeptic asserts, the discussion were a simple matter of fact--if the impairment of those with Down syndrome were both dire and absolutely predictable, and the only logical conclusion were an allowable infanticide. But Down syndrome varies widely, and there are many conclusions that can be drawn. As Dr. Piepmeier points out, people with Down syndrome are accomplishing things never before thought possible. In my experience, the immediate reaction is to cast the accomplished people with Down syndrome as exceptions--and to emphasize everything allegedly tragic. Interestingly enough, this argument is always data-free.

It is hard to find a human group that has made progress to match that of people with Down syndrome in the United States. In the last thirty years, life expectancy has more than doubled; people have graduated high school, and, as Dr. Piepmeier points out, some are attending college; and social acceptance has moved light-years forward (though there's a long way to go). Remember, people with Down syndrome have only had the legal right to education since 1977. And since promising cognitive therapies are already in clinical trials, it seems reasonable to expect that more progress will come. We are at the beginning, the very beginning, of what people with Down syndrome can do.

So to say, as Peter Singer does, that "we cannot expect" a person with Down syndrome to play the guitar, or appreciate Woody Allen, or whatever--as if these were what mattered most about being human!--is, as Piepmeier points out, factually wrong. We do not know what to expect. But more to the point, an expectation is not a neutral and objective fact: it is a force in the lives of those described. If you don't expect someone to be able to read, you won't teach them to read. If you don't expect them to be a meaningful part of a family, you can warehouse them in institutions. For decades, this approach produced a self-fulfilling result--people with Down syndrome, left to languish, did not develop, which seemed to prove that they could not develop.

Ultimately, though, I think we have to question the link between value and ability. It's not a matter of asserting that people with Down syndrome have more potential, and have accomplished more, than we have previously believed. It's a matter of understanding that being smarter doesn't make you better--and that what "they" can accomplish has a great deal to do with the world "we" build.

Peter Singer says that he goes where the logic takes him, but I don't think that is always the case. If he really followed what he claims, not only could Down syndrome foetuses be terminated but healthy as well, not to mention babies and severe dementia suffers. Or even people recovering from a coma that have total amnesia; none of these entities are technically persons with the interests/desires of persons. Taken to an extreme as long as the members of a society had these preferences one could even humanely use the individuals for experimentation or body banks.I doubt though that Peter will go there probably saying something like the parents or family wouldn't have these preferences even though we all well know some individuals kill new borns or their elderly relatives.

No one is arguing about whether Down syndrome entails limitation. The question is whether those limitations justify differential treatment by the parents--including, as Singer has advocated, killing the diagnosed child before 28 days of age. One practical problem with this approach, even if you accept the possibility of a moral infanticide, is that 27 days old is way too early to know how affected a child will be.

No one has said that 27 days is enough time to know how affected the child will be. The point of the 27 days is to give the parents time to decide if they want to take care of a child who will experience SIGNIFICANT mental and physical limitations. The degree to which the child will be affected is not really a concern, since it cannot be fully known. However, when a infant is diagnosed with Down's Syndrome, there is a guarantee the child will not be normal and will require more effort to raise than normal children. At least, that is what experience tells us. Parents may not want to invest their time in a Down Syndrome child and, according to Singer, that's okay and they shouldn't be shamed or punished for it.

From what I gather, Singer's utilitarian argument values parental and societal well-being over that of infants, and especially infants with Down Syndrome. This is not uncommon from the utilitarian perspective. Utilitarianism is inherently hierarchical. Some people are just more valuable than others. This is exactly what the majority has said with respect to the abortion debate. Mother's are more valuable than fetuses. Why? The law doesn't recognize fetuses as "legal persons." Singer applies the same idea to infants with Down Syndrome. They simply are not persons as legally defined. To be human, a person must meet a specific criteria (e.g., self-consciousness, rationality, and etc.).

Now, the real question is would infanticide of Down Syndrome lead to greater well-being? What's the evidence look like?

OK, OK, why stop at prenatal testing. If you want to increase the "average productivity" and decrease the "poor quality of life", we need to have regular blood or DNA testing. We can test for all neurological "differences.. let's put in physical differences... Hmmm how about anything that is not "normal". We could really improve the productivity. Of course, that opens that old chestnut question, who decides...
Yea, creating a Super Race. You need to tell the people who spout that stuff, nice thought process Adolph.

OK, OK, why stop at prenatal testing. If you want to increase the "average productivity" and decrease the "poor quality of life", we need to have regular blood or DNA testing. We can test for all neurological "differences.. let's put in physical differences... Hmmm how about anything that is not "normal". We could really improve the productivity. Of course, that opens that old chestnut question, who decides...
Yea, creating a Super Race. You need to tell the people who spout that stuff, nice thought process Adolph.

To be sure, no parent should be shamed or punished if they feel they cannot deal with the demands of raising an infant--any infant. That's why some states permit mothers to drop off newborns at hospitals without being charged with a crime, and that's why we have adoption. But saying that parents should have the right to step away from raising a child they feel they can't deal with is very different from saying that the parents should be able to kill that child. As it happens, there are parents waiting to adopt children with Down syndrome, making infanticide unnecessary, even if one thinks it is morally justifiable.

The idea that "some people are just more valuable than others" is not self-evident. Nor is it self-evident that being smarter, or more capable, makes one person better than another. Nor is it clear that a child not being "normal," or having "SIGNIFICANT" disabilities, makes that person less valuable.

As others have pointed out, "normal" is a complicated word: sometimes it means "average," and sometimes it means "ideal." I would respectfully ask MrSkeptic to define the word "normal" in a way which would allow us to kill some infants and not others. What metric would one use to measure normality? IQ? Health problems? Height? My point, again, is that most of these cannot be measured before 28 days of age. Contrary to MrSkeptic's contention, the level of disability matters a great deal, because this is the basis for Singer's reasoning. He traces a bright line between a child with a Down syndrome and "a normal child," and makes this the justification for his policy. If MrSkeptic says that the level of disability doesn't matter, he's not defending Singer: he's departing from Singer's logic.

Which brings us to the question of personhood. MrSkeptic asserts--I think he's trying to paraphrase Singer-- that "[t]hey ["infants with Down syndrome"] simply are not persons as legally defined. To be human, a person must meet a specific criteria (e.g., self-consciousness, rationality, and etc.)." That "and etc." is interesting, and since we are talking about the difference between life and death, I wonder if MrSkeptic might elaborate on what concepts it disguises. In addition, I wonder if MrSkeptic might be able to find evidence of any infant, with forty-six chromosomes or forty-seven, that demonstrates "self-consciousness," "rationality," or whatever "and etc." refers to. Further, since these are apparently advocated by MrSkeptic as criteria for life, should not born infants with Down syndrome be allowed the chance to develop them--as they do?

As a practical point, it's not clear to me that allowing parents the option of infanticide solves any problems. It's not a policy consistent with a democratic ethic of equality, and it opens up questions that are bound to be both expensive and unsolvable. For instance: what do we do with people who have had "self-consciousness and rationality," but have lost them--as in Alzheimer's? Should we be allowed to kill them? What about children who develop typically, then develop features of autism? What about epileptic children, blind children, deaf children--all of whom are arguably "more work" than other children, and are not, by our narrow standards, "normal"? Should we be allowed to kill them before 28 days of birth?

If killing infants with Down syndrome is permitted, then all these questions have to be answered. To have Down syndrome is not a trivial thing; but the difficulty is not merely a matter of biology, but of our society's response to the fact.

mr. skeptic has made some valid observations on both piepmeier's and singer's stances, but methinks the utilitarian viewpoint can only go so far. Utilitarianism, while a valuable tool of logic, is not really capable of weighing the more slippery bits of humanity--like joy and love.

It's Mr. Skeptic's last question that's at stake here. He asks: "Now, the real question is would infanticide of Down Syndrome lead to greater well-being? What's the evidence look like?" (and I assume he means for everyone, i.e. both those with down syndrome and the people that know them.) I think that's exactly the point piepmeier's post is addressing. Singer has repeatedly been given evidence by innumerable scholars that theirs and others lives have been significantly changed for the better through interaction with people that meet the dubious standard of "compromised" abilities.

To be sure, no parent should be shamed or punished if they feel they cannot deal with the demands of raising an infant--any infant. That's why some states permit mothers to drop off newborns at hospitals without being charged with a crime, and that's why we have adoption. But saying that parents should have the right to step away from raising a child they feel they can't deal with is very different from saying that the parents should be able to kill that child. As it happens, there are parents waiting to adopt children with Down syndrome, making infanticide unnecessary, even if one thinks it is morally justifiable.

Do you also believe abortion is unnecessary? Would you be in favor of making abortion illegal if it were possible to find adoptive parents for every child? Ninety to ninety-five percent of women choose to kill a fetus when they know it has Down syndrome. Are they immoral for doing so? Most people believe it is morally acceptable. Singer simply argues for extending this right into early infancy because there are no real distinctions between a severely disabled fetus and infant.

The idea that some people are just more valuable than others is not self-evident.

I have not argued that it is self-evident. There is plenty of evidential support for the idea that some people are more valuable than others. For example, social psychologists tell us that we tend to value those who are more like ourselves. In moral dilemmas, social psychologists tell us people will easily sacrifice five people for a loved one. If you look within the realm of government, you will notice that we have asked secret service agents to protect the President of the United States. If need be, they have been asked to sacrifice their lives. Why? Because we believe the President is more valuable than secret service agents. Hierarchy is intrinsic to moral sentiment and reasoning, especially when there are competing interests. This is simply a fact you cannot dispute.

Nor is it self-evident that being smarter, or more capable, makes one person better than another. Nor is it clear that a child not being normal," or having SIGNIFICANT disabilities, makes that person less valuable.

Again, 90-95% of mothers abort severely disabled fetuses because they want a normal biological child. If they truly believed a disabled fetus was just as valuable as a normal biological fetus, they wouldn’t kill the disabled fetus. What about the 5-10% who believe otherwise? This is not a real challenge because saying some people are more valuable than others does not imply all people hold the same values. There will be variation in value much like all things.

As others have pointed out, "normal" is a complicated word: sometimes it means average, and sometimes it means ideal. I would respectfully ask MrSkeptic to define the word normal in a way which would allow us to kill some infants and not others.

No one has said a simple definition would justify killing severely disabled infants. Singer has proposed multiple lines of justification. He has used the values of total well-being, quality of life, replacability, and personhood to justify treating severely disabled infants as severely disabled fetuses. The only difference he sees is when killing takes place (before birth or after birth.

I understand Singer’s point of view. His argument is strong from a utilitarian perspective and I have not seen a serious challenge from you or Peipmeier from within the context of utilitarianism or any other ethical system for that matter. At most, I have simply seen both of you say that people with Down syndrome should be valued, that people with Down syndrome have surpassed our low expectations, and some of enjoy relationships with those with down syndrome. Okay…so how does challenge Singer’s argument about having the choice to end a severely disabled infants life? How does that bear on the question, "Should the choice be available?"

Personally, I am not sure where I stand. I am a consequentialist and I value well-being, but I, like you, have a strong moral aversion to killing infants, even if they are severely disabled. When I compare your moral strategy (i.e., finding adoptive parents for the severely disabled) to Singer’s moral strategy (i.e., give parents the right to kill their disabled infants), I find yours superior. However, the question is, “Do adoptive parents for severely disabled children exist and are there plenty of them?” Moreover, do they have plenty of resources to meet the challenge?” If they do, then I think we can maximize well-being for all. If not, then Singer’s view might be superior. (However, it should be noted the same argument could be applied to abortion in general. If we can find adoptive parents for all unwanted children, then abortion is inferior and women's right to choose should be taken away. Would you be okay with that?)

If MrSkeptic says that the level of disability doesn't matter, he's not defending Singer: he's departing from Singer's logic.

Can you please give me a reference? I have only read one of Singer’s essays on non-voluntary euthanasia. It was written in 1993. It could be possible I am reading an old argument.

Which brings us to the question of personhood. MrSkeptic asserts--I think he's trying to paraphrase Singer-- that "they "infants with Down syndrome" simply are not persons as legally defined. To be human, a person must meet a specific criteria (e.g., self-consciousness, rationality, and etc.)." That "and etc." is interesting, and since we are talking about the difference between life and death, I wonder if MrSkeptic might elaborate on what concepts it disguises.

I will elaborate. It was autonomy. In my last post, I just couldn’t think of it off the top of my head so I used etc. Sorry for the confusion.

In addition, I wonder if MrSkeptic might be able to find evidence of any infant, with forty-six chromosomes or forty-seven, that demonstrates "self-consciousness," "rationality," or whatever "and etc." refers to. Further, since these are apparently advocated by MrSkeptic as criteria for life, should not born infants with Down syndrome be allowed the chance to develop them--as they do?

I would like you to keep in mind, Singer values self-consciousness, rationality and autonomy and uses them in arguing for infanticide, not me. Singer acknowledges that normal infants do not have these qualities and because they do not have these qualities they are less valuable and are not entitled to the same rights as those who do. However, their lack of it is not sufficient justification for killing them. That's where Singer's other lines of reasoning come into play.

As a practical point, it's not clear to me that allowing parents the option of infanticide solves any problems. It's not a policy consistent with a democratic ethic of equality, and it opens up questions that are bound to be both expensive and unsolvable. For instance: what do we do with people who have had "self-consciousness and rationality," but have lost them--as in Alzheimer's? Should we be allowed to kill them? What about children who develop typically, then develop features of autism? What about epileptic children, blind children, deaf children--all of whom are arguably "more work" than other children, and are not, by our narrow standards, "normal"? Should we be allowed to kill them before 28 days of birth?

Good questions! How does Singer address them? I would like to know, since it is his argument we are discussing, not necessarily mine.

The phrase "severely disabled" is used 10 times in one of the above comments. We're talking about Down Syndrome here, not being born without a head. My 3 year old daughter has Down Syndrome but is anything but disabled. She runs, jumps, makes jokes, goes to a regular pre-school, reads 400-500 words, entertains herself reading books, sings songs and is almost instantly on friendly terms with anyone she meets.

She isn't an exception.

I think the term "severely disabled" either needs to be better defined here, or better yet, just not used at all in a discussion of Down Syndrome. The shoe just doesn't fit.

one more thing: 40 years ago it was common for an ob/gyn/pediatrician, when confronted with an infant with Down Syndrome, to inform the parent that their child would never learn to walk, talk, would never recognize them, never hold a job, and on and on. This, of course, has been proven to be entirely untrue. Problem is, 40 years have passed and the medical community quite often still quotes this same script and uses phrases like "severely disabled." No wonder 90-95% of women "diagnosed" as carrying a fetus with Trisomy 21 choose abortion!

As usual in criticisms of Peter Singer, this article just flat out fails to understand (or purposefully misrepresents) his views or speaks past them.

Singer is repeatedly and rather smarmily charged with "lack of respect for evidence." We are told that "Singer's claims about the lived experiences of people with Down syndrome are directly refuted by Jamie Bérubé's life." But, in fact, Singer asserts (quite correctly) that this case is exceptional and that citing a few other similar examples is merely "anecdotal." The facts are, that typically, adults with DS will have a mental age of 8 or 9 years old and live a shortened life span, but that there is significant variation in the severity of DS, so some will be less disabled, some more. Some may attend college, but most don't graduate from High School, so the former group are, unambiguously exceptional.

The author's response to this (quite correct) assertion from Singer, is to assert that "[there have been] significant changes in the last thirty years: [a small minority of] people with Down syndrome are now attending college, writing books, participating in cultural change efforts." But this is just to reassert the fact that there are some exceptional cases- the very thing that Singer accepted in the first place.

Clearly, it is the author of this article who displays a lack of respect for evidence, when Singer is criticised for not acknowledging precisely the point which he himself made.