Chapter XXI
The Nut CrackerSaipan--Tinian--Guam

As was stated earlier, Rear Admiral Turner remained at Kwajalein Atoll
until the capture of Eniwetok Atoll had been completed and the garrison
forces were readying to take over. He departed in his flagship, Rocky Mount,
for Pearl Harbor on 25 February 1944, entering that port on 3 March 1944.
During the long, long month commencing on 5 February, he had been sitting
on the anxious seat waiting for his promotion to Vice Admiral to be approved
by the United States Senate, and more than a bit disturbed by the backstairs
gossip surrounding the delay. The hard-fought assaults on Kwajalein and
Roi-Namur, and then on Engebi, Eniwetok and Parry, combined with this backlash
had worn him down to a nubbin.

In an off-hand remark to me he said:

When I came back from the Marshalls, I was dead tired. I stayed dead
tired for the rest of the war.1

When this remark was mentioned to Fleet Admiral Nimitz, he leaned back
in his chair, his weathered face wreathed in a soft smile, and he spoke softly:

Kelly was operating under a forced draft. There were times during this
period when I wanted to reach out and shake Kelly. But Spruance always
said: 'Let me handle him' and handle him he did.

I always attended rehearsals that were held in the Hawaiian Islands.
Kelly had a firm hold on rehearsals and did a magnificent job. His insistence
on rehearsals was a major factor in his success.

And then after a pause, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, the Grand Old Man of the
Pacific War, added:

It must be added in all honesty that from this period in the war on, an

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ever increasing number of old shipmates were aware that Kelly Turner
was partaking more freely of the liquid that cheers, but all reports indicated
that he was handling it extremely well.

The Overall Problem of Defeating Japan

As Admiral Turner said in 1949 in a speech before the General Line School:

To defeat the Japanese, we had long recognized that we must plan ultimately
either to invade the home islands or else destroy their armies in Manchuria
and North China, and then isolate the home islands by blockade. We also
needed to weaken their industry by strategic air bombing in order to reduce
their logistics potential at home. Thus it was necessary for us to concentrate
large military forces, land, sea, and air, plus heavy stocks of material
in bases reasonably close to Japan. In turn, that meant that we required
large land deployment areas and large harbors in the Western Pacific Ocean. . . .

The only possible suitably adequate areas were the Philippines, Formosa
and China, and of these the Philippines was much the
best. . . .3

Planning for the Pacific War

Out of the SEXTANT American-British Conference ending at Cairo, Egypt,
on 6 December 1943, came the necessary approved plan to conduct the war
against Japan throughout 1944.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff and our own Chiefs of Staff never lacked
for suggestions or recommendations from the Pacific or the Southwest Pacific
commands as to how the war against Japan might be won. And frequently they
received contrary recommendations from Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur.

In December 1943, the scales were tipped very lightly in favor of doing
what Admiral Nimitz recommended.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting in accordance with the recommendations
of our Joint Chiefs, did not decide against General MacArthur's plan of
advance along the New Guinea-Netherland Indies- Philippine axis. In fact,
they decided that one advance would be made along this north-south line
toward Japan and another advance would be made along an east-west

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ever increasing number of old shipmates were aware that Kelly Turner
was partaking more freely of the liquid that cheers, but all reports indicated
that he was handling it extremely well.
line passing through the Marianas. The two lines of advance they hoped would
be mutually supporting during the early phases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided that when conflicts over resources occurred, the Central Pacific
Campaign would have priority over the Southwest Pacific Campaign, primarily
because it held greater promise of a more rapid advance toward Japan and
her essential lines of communication with the south to bring natural resources
into the homeland.4

Based on these high level decisions, Admiral Nimitz promulgated his
GRANITE Plan. This covered the prospective operations against the Japanese
in the Central Pacific Ocean Area during 1944.

As desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Marshall Islands would
be assaulted early in 1944, with Eniwetok being taken about 1 May 1944.
About 15 August, the Mortlock Islands (160 miles southeast of Truk) and
Truk Atoll in the Carolines would be taken. Then, about 15 November 1944,
Saipan, Tinian, and Guam would be assaulted simultaneously,
if possible.5

All during this period, Admiral King held to the firm opinion that the
Marianas were the key to the Western Pacific since, from the Marianas,
we could quite easily cut the Japanese line of communications to the Netherland
East Indies and Malaysia and from there could bomb Japan.6

Admiral King also believed that reaching the mainland of China was a
major objective of the drive through the center of the Pacific Ocean. This
was in order to take advantage strategically, not only of China's geographical
position but of her huge manpower.

Two things happened in the first seven weeks of 1944 to change the strategic
picture further in our favor.

The Japanese Combined Fleet retreated from Truk Atoll to the Palau
Islands in the Western Carolines.

Eniwetok was taken in late February, rather than in early May.

Admiral Nimitz, soon after Eniwetok was firmly in hand, wrote to the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet:

The capture and consolidation of Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok, together
with the successful Fleet operations against Truk and the Marianas, have

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created changes in the strategic situation which permits advancing the
timing of operations contemplated by the GRANITE
Plan.7

In a long reasoned discussion, Admiral Nimitz then developed two proposed
schedules of future operations, one in which Truk would be assaulted 15
June 1944, with the Southern Marianas assault to follow on 1 September
1944. The other schedule called for Truk to be neutralized and bypassed,
and the Southern Marianas to be assaulted on 15 June 1944. Subsequently,
Woleai, Yap and the Palaus (about 1060 miles southeast of Manila) were
to be captured by 1 November 1944 (later changed to 1 October).8

Admiral Nimitz believed that following the latter schedule, which advanced
the assault date on the Marianas by two and a half months, would permit
readiness of his forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas to launch a major assault
in the Formosa-Luzon-China area in the spring of 1945.

While awaiting the decision by Admiral King and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Nimitz's Staff would not be idle. The Admiral wrote Admiral
King that: "Plans are being drawn up and forces prepared for either objective
[Truk or the Southern Marianas]."

It should be recorded here that there was some naval opposition and
considerable lack of enthusiasm for the operation to take the Southern
Marianas. This arose because of the complete inadequacy of the harbors
in Saipan and Tinian and the limited capacity of Apra Harbor, Guam. For
a satisfactory mobile logistic support base in this general area it would
be necessary for the Pacific Fleet to go 400 miles southwest of Guam to
Ulithi Atoll in the Western Caroline Islands. Eniwetok had a fine anchorage,
but the rim islands were all too small for the development of shore-based
storage and work shop activities. Moreover, it was located a thousand miles
back towards Pearl Harbor from the Marianas.

Admiral Nimitz's letters to COMINCH and later visits to Washington were
occurring against a background of strong urging by General MacArthur during
January and February 1944, to do something quite different with the naval
forces of the Central Pacific.

In early February 1944, General MacArthur was pressing for the commitment
of large combatant Pacific Fleet forces on a long continuing basis to support
his advance toward the Philippines. In a despatch he said:

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I propose that with the completion of the operations in the Marshalls,
the maximum force from all sources in the Pacific be concentrated in my
drive up the New Guinea coast to Mindanao, to be coordinated with a Central
Pacific Operation against the Palaus and the support by combatant elements
of the Pacific Fleet with orders to contain or destroy the Japanese
Fleet.9

Despite the firm decision of the Combined Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs
of December 1943, that the Central Pacific campaign would have priority,
General MacArthur sought to advance his own proposals by sending his Chief
of Staff and supporting officers to Pearl Harbor, and then on to Washington.

Admiral King thought that the proposal to divert major naval resources
from the Central Pacific to the Southwest Pacific on a long time basis
was "absurd" and so said to anyone within hearing and in a letter to Admiral
Nimitz.10

On 2 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs avoided meeting the issue head on,
but did go so far as to state:

Our first major objective in the war against Japan will be the vital
Luzon-Formosa-China coast area.11

This tied in with the Central Pacific Campaign far more realistically
than the south-north drive up through New Guinea, particularly when coupled
with a Joint Chiefs' cancellation of General MacArthur's proposed assault
on Kavieng in New Ireland, and advice to him that the Central Pacific Campaign
had priority in military resources over the Southwest Pacific Campaign.

It was another ten days before the seal of approval to the Central Pacific
Campaign and the GRANITE Plan was
reaffirmed.12

The final Joint Chiefs' decision was to confirm Admiral Nimitz's proposal
to assault the Marianas on 15 June 1944. Success in the Marianas, of itself,
would largely neutralize Truk and isolate the Central Carolines because
it would throttle the main Japanese aircraft pipeline down from the Empire
to the Carolines. The Palaus in the far western Carolines would be assaulted
on 15 September 1944, with the object of establishing a fleet base there,
as well as a forward staging area for later operations against Mindanao,
Formosa, and the China coast. If all went well, Mindanao would be assaulted

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Pacific and Lower Marianas distance charts.

--858--

on 15 November by General MacArthur, supported by the Pacific Fleet, and
Luzon or Formosa would be assaulted on 15 February 1945. The object of
taking Mindanao was to further the advance to Formosa either directly or
via Luzon.

The JCS directed that long-range planning be undertaken for assaults
on all three objectives--Luzon, Formosa, and the China coast area--with
General MacArthur's Staff undertaking the first, and Admiral Nimitz's staff
the latter two.

The Purposes of the Exercise

The code name of FORAGER was assigned to the capture, occupation, and
defense of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific had four principal purposes in mind
in launching FORAGER. The obtaining of an island base from which the Japanese
homeland could be bombed was the one appealing to all Services, although
more strongly to the Army Air Force, since it would permit them to really
pull an oar in the Pacific War. A second principal purpose was to obtain
a base which would permit the isolation and neutralization of the Central
and Western Carolines. This one appealed particularly to the Army as it
was anxious to facilitate General MacArthur's movement to the Philippines,
and this would be made more practical if, as he advanced, Japanese island
positions on his right flank were isolated or neutralized. The other two
principal purposes were primarily naval. The Navy thought it was highly
desirable to have effective command of the sea in the general Marianas
area, and thus a forward position on the flank of the Japanese communication
lines to the Philippines and Southeast Asia. This was in order to harass
or break these Japanese lines of communication. There also was a strong
naval desire to secure a large base from which a direct amphibious assault
could be launched against the Ryukyus, the Bonins, or the Japanese Homeland.

The Nut Cracker

A glance at the detailed chart and maps of Saipan, Tinian and Guam immediately
indicates that the Marianas were quite a different cup of tea from Makin
or Tarawa or Kwajalein or the other atolls which had been

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captured in 1943
and early 1944. Rather than small flat rims of coral, they were good sized
islands with all the defensive possibilities which real fortification,
rough terrain and tropical growth over large land masses can provide.

And it is worth stating a second time that with the Marianas located
over 3,000 miles from Pearl and something less than half that far from
Tokyo, it would be far more difficult to establish there the prerequisites
for a successful amphibious operation. These are:

Secure lines of communication to the zone of conflict.

Command of the seas around the objective.

Command of the air around the objective.

It has to be kept in mind that an invader is most vulnerable as he hits
the beaches. This is the transition period of an amphibious assault.

Resources

Three divisions, which had been earmarked for the sequential assaults
on the Mortlock Islands and on Truk, were designated for the invasion of
Saipan and the subsequent capture of Tinian. These were the Second and
Fourth Marine Divisions, with the 27th Infantry, a National Guard unit
from the State of New York, in reserve. They were to be mounted in the
Hawaiian Islands, 3,000 miles away.

For the assault on Guam, the Third Marine Division and the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, made up of the 4th Marine Regiment, the 22nd Marine Regiment,
and, after 10 July 1944, the 305th Infantry Regiment, were assigned. The
units initially assigned were designated the 3rd Amphibious Corps on 15
April 1944, Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commander. They were to
be mounted in Guadalcanal and the New Hebrides, 1,650 to 2, 200 miles southeast
of Guam. The 77th Infantry Division, training in the United States during
the early planning period, was to be brought to the Hawaiian Islands by
March, and alerted for a move on to the Marianas twenty days after Dog
Day at Saipan. It could not be mounted for a Dog Day assault or as the
Guam Reserve because of lack of transports and cargo ships.13
From this listing
of participating troops, it is apparent that the Marianas was to be the
biggest amphibious assault to date in the Central Pacific Campaign with
three and two-thirds divisions designated for assault and two divisions
designated for the Reserve.

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FORAGER, the Marianas campaign, was complicated. As Admiral Turner said:

The Marianas Campaign, from an amphibious view point had nearly everything;
great strategic importance, major tactical moves including successive troops
landings on three enemy islands; tough enemy resistance of all kinds, including
major Fleet battle; coordination of every known type of combat technique
of the land, sea, and air; difficult logistic problems; and the build up
of a great military base area concurrently with the
fighting.14

Before the operational phases of the Marianas campaign are related,
a few of the major changes in the administrative and organizational aspects
of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific will be set down.

Ships and Landing Craft and More Ships and More Landing Craft

COMINCH, on 1 February 1944, assigned all attack transports, attack
cargo ships, and landing ships and craft, in or destined to report to the
Pacific Ocean Areas, to Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific (Rear Admiral
R.K. Turner). This broadened his command from the Fifth Amphibious Force
in the Central Pacific to all the amphibious forces in the Pacific Ocean
Area.15
On 8 March 1944, Vice Admiral Turner reported to CINCPAC for this
additional duty which included command of all amphibious craft assigned
to the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Fleets; the Amphibious Training Command;
and the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units currently assigned to those
Amphibious Forces for training or combat operations. He was also responsible
for the preparation and periodic correction of two Pacific Fleet publications
entitled Tactical Orders, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet and Current Doctrine
for Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

As the Amphibious Forces moved through the Gilberts and the Marshalls,
some of the landing ships (LSTs) and many of the landing craft (LCTs)
were left behind to provide the necessary unloading lighterage at the island
bases. There was a real need to reorganize the landing ships and craft
which returned to Pearl with sizeable gaps in their organizations and provide

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appropriate division commanders, group commanders and flotilla commanders.
The need was brought to the attention of CINCPAC and COMINCH, and the latter,
on 30 March 1944, authorized remedial action. Thereafter, COMPHIBSPAC,
acting under delegated authority, reorganized the LSTs, the LCIs and
the LCT' s, generally on the basis of geographical location. This, as many
skippers were quick to report, broke up many fine chains of command which
had existed since the landing ships and craft were on the building ways
back in the States. Soon afterwards, a more favorably-received step was
taken. This was to provide adequate repair facilities for these craft even
in the forward areas.

In early April 1944, the first edition of
Transport Doctrine, Amphibious
Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet was issued. This healthy sized document provided
general transport doctrine as well as specific transport doctrine for all
types of landing ships and landing craft. It was amended a dozen times
before World War II was over, but it served to indoctrinate the tens of
thousands of young Americans who were becoming amphibians.16

The Fifth Amphibious Force Staff Grows and Grows

By the time the Fifth Amphibious Force was deep in its training to take
the Marianas Islands, Vice Admiral Turner's Staff had grown to thirty officers.
The number of officers attached to the staff for communications, intelligence
and other specialty duties had increased to 56. The Chief of Staff had
been advanced in rank to Commodore early in April 1944.

The officers on the staff on 1 May 1944, were as follows:

Paul S. Theiss

Commodore

1912

Chief of Staff

Don Z. Zimmerman

Colonel (Air Corps)

AUS

Assistant Plans Officer

John P. Vetter

Captain

1920

Plans Officer

Stanley Leith

Captain

1923

Operations Officer

Benjamin O. Wells

Captain (Retired)

1917

Intelligence Officer

George A. Harvey

Lieutenant-Colonel

AUS(1923)

Assistant Military Officer

Robert E. Hogaboom

Lieutenant-Colonel

USMC(1925)

Military Operations

Beverly M. Coleman

Commander

USNR(1922)

Beachmaster Officer

John McN. Taylor

Commander

1926

Gunnery Officer

--862--

Vice Admiral Turner at porthole, 6 June 1944. (80-G-238010)

Charles F. Horne, Jr.

Commander

1926

Communications Officer

Clayton O. Totman

Lieutenant-Colonel

USMC(1935)

Assistant Plans Officer

John S. Lewis

Commander

1932

Assistant Naval Operations

W.A. Neal

Major

USMCR

Transport Quartermaster

W.F. Lalyer

Major

USMCR

Assistant Plans Officer

Frederick L. Ashworth

Lieutenant Commander

1933

Aviation Officer

Francis C. Bowen

Major

AUS(1931)

Assistant Communications Officer

--863--

Cecil W. Shuler

Major

USMC (1939)

Assistant Intelligence Officer

William J. Francis

Lieutenant Commander

1935

Aerological Officer

Charles W. Weaver

Lieutenant Commander

USNR(1931)

Assistant Operations Officer

Harry B. Stark

Lieutenant Commander

1936

Flag Secretary and Aide

John J. Kircher

Lieutenant Commander

1936

Flag Lieutenant and Aide

Charles W. Coker

Lieutenant Commander

1937

Assistant Plans Officer

Howard D. Lane

Lieutenant Commander

USNR(1925)

Assistant Communications Officer

Richard H. Amberg

Lieutenant

USNR(1938)

Assistant Plans Officer

Walter L. Luke

Lieutenant (junior grade)

USNR(1940)

Prospective Flag Lieutenant and Aide

Charles W. Postelwaite

Radio-Electrician

USNR(1943)

Radar Officer

Jacob M. Bregar

Captain (SC)

USNR(1917)

Force Supply Officer

Robert M. Gillett

Captain (MC)

1923

Force Medical Officer

Kenneth G. Lovell

Lieutenant Commander (CEC)

1939

Force Civil Engineer

Ralph E. Bishop

Chief Pay Clerk

1943

Assistant Force Supply Officer

Year dates are those of first commission or first warrant in the Navy,
Marine Corps or Army, or in the case of Naval Reserve officers, their pay
entry date.17

An officer who worked with this staff during this period and on through
the end of the Pacific War labeled it: "Outstanding--incredibly hard
working."18

Kneeding FLINTLOCK into FORAGER

Although FLINTLOCK was termed a grand success, COMFIFTHPHIBFOR issued
a 37-page letter, with comments on the operation and many suggestions for
further improvements in the naval phases and naval techniques of the amphibious
operations.19

--864--

On the other hand, the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, was reasonably
satisfied, as this extract from his report indicates:

Recommendations made and acted upon--as a result of the Gilberts offensive
proved sound. In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can
be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and
utilized in the Marshalls.20

From the time of the conquest of the Marshalls, the DUKW was the major
small logistical workhorse of the Central Pacific Campaign, and as Admiral
Turner commented:

The Army's most important contribution to the technique of amphibious
warfare.21

The Marianas

The Marianas are a 450-mile long string of fifteen volcanic islands
lying north and south between Latitudes 13° and 21° north, and generally
along the 145th parallel of east longitude.

Guam is the southernmost of the island string. It lies a bit less than
1,400 sea miles south-southeast of Tokyo and 1,500 sea miles east of Manila.
101 miles separate Saipan, the second largest of the Marianas, from Guam.
Tinian nestles up to Saipan and Rota is 37 miles northeast of Guam. Eleven
smaller islands stretch 350 miles north of Saipan.

Guam also is the largest of the Marianas, with a land area of 206 square
miles. Saipan covers 70 square miles and Tinian only 38 square miles. Each
of these three islands has both rock-ribbed hills and swampy valleys. Guam
has half a dozen rugged peaks over a thousand feet high with the highest
being Mount Lamlam of 1,334 feet. Saipan tops out in its center at Mount
Tapotchau at 1,554 feet, while smaller Tinian, in general, is flatter with
Lasso Hill of 564 feet its highest point. Tropical vegetation, in 1944,
covered much of the islands, and there were marshes and rice paddies in
the lowlands. The only useful harbors in the group are Apra Harbor in Guam
and at Tanapag in Saipan. The latter is very small. The tide in the Marianas
is negligible since it is less than 1.5 feet.

Raising sugar cane, copra, bananas, and papayas were the principal activities
of the natives in 1944. Seventy percent of Saipan was under sugar cultivation.

The population of Saipan and Tinian was principally Japanese with a modest
proportion of Chammorro's, while that of Guam was entirely
Chammorro.22

Natural Defenses

Saipan

Looking at the three principal southern islands in 1944 from the amphibious
assault viewpoint, it was seen that a barrier reef one to two miles off
shore protected the west side of Saipan. The land sloped gently away from
the beaches which were extensive but only 10 to 15 yards wide. On the east
side, the beaches were narrow and the shores steep with many wave- cut
cliffs. The north end and east side of Saipan, except for Magicienne Bay,
were free of reefs. This bay provided no shelter from the prevailing

--866--

Northeast coast of Saipan. (80-G-238000)

trade winds and the Japanese, reputedly, had not used the bay because of this
and the inshore reefs.

Tinian

Tinian had the same natural defenses as Saipan's east coast--healthy
sized cliffs and very narrow shallow beaches. This would make the logistic
support problem very difficult in the early hours of any assault landing.

Guam

The detailed information available during the 1944 planning period in
regard to the beaches of Guam was good, because the Marines had studied
the island from a defensive point of view during the pre-1941 period. The
northern half of the island was easily defendable because of the high cliffs
overlooking the beaches and the strong surf and rugged offshore reefs. The

--867--

whole east coast of Guam was marked by a 400-foot plateau and a narrow
coastal flat. However, in the vicinity of Agana Bay near the capital Agana,
there were some breaks in the long reefs on the western side of the island,
and another break south of Orote Peninsula. This peninsula jutted out three
miles into the western ocean and provided a lee for the beaches south of it.

The Weather Prospects

In a few words, the weather was warm, showery and generally overcast.
The summer months are the rainy season, August being the wettest month
with numerous thunderstorms and squalls.

Typhoons are scarce around the Marianas but do occur. The monsoon winds
blow in from the southwest in August and September; the trade winds blow
from the northeast the rest of the year.

So, from a weather point of view, the landings and early logistic support
follow up had to be completed before the end of July, if the landings were
to be made on the west coast of Saipan where the preferred beaches were
located. The "generally overcast" type of weather meant that air reconnaissance
would have photographic and observation problems.23

Japanese Reaction to Loss of Marshalls

Admiral Koga, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, made
a visit to Japan from Truk soon after our seizure of Kwajalein and Eniwetok
in the Marshalls, to Participate in military conferences. The Japanese
High Command on 1 March 1944 took the decision to build up overseas personnel
and material strength, construct fortifications with special emphasis on
the Marianas and Western Carolines, and firmly defend their new "Secondary
Defense Line." These important defensive steps were planned to be completed
by April 1944, and except for planned aircraft and air bases they were
largely in hand by the end of May 1944.24

A Japanese Central Pacific Area Force secret order captured during the
FORAGER Operation indicated that, in the Marianas, Japanese plans contemplated
a total of fourteen airfields and two seaplane bases adequate to

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handle 600 aircraft.25
In the Southern Marianas, by early June 1944, there were
two Japanese airfields operational on both Saipan and on Guam, three operational
airfields on Tinian and a surfaced runway on Rota. Additional airfields
were in various stages of completion. There was a major Japanese seaplane
base at Tanapag Harbor on Saipan.

The Japanese Defenses

Soon after arriving back in Pearl, and still not sure whether the next
amphibious objective would be Truk or the Marianas, COMFIFTHPHIBFOR requested
CINCPAC to provide air and submarine reconnaissance of the Carolines and
Marianas to supplement that obtained on 22-23 February 1944, during the
first air strikes against the Marianas.26

This was done by Navy PBYs, flying out of Eniwetok on 18 April and 25
April 1944, and again on 7 May and 29 May 1944. The submarines of the Pacific
Fleet during April 1944 gave their particular attention to prospective
landing beaches with rewarding results.

The Japanese on Saipan

The natural defenses of Saipan, the first island in the Marianas to
be assaulted, were considerable. The east coast was largely free of fringing
reefs except around the largest bay--Magicienne Bay--but the beaches
were narrow--and more importantly from the Marines' point of view--the
shores back of the beaches were steep, rugged and easily defended.

The west coast of Saipan was lower and the land back of the beaches
sloped gently upward, which was fine from the Marine point of view. But,
with the exception of a gap off Charan Koa and the entrance to Tanapag
Harbor, a barrier reef protected the whole west coast of Saipan.

On Saipan the Japanese had an island 123/4
miles long and 53/4 miles
wide to defend. In comparison, the later objectives, Tinian was 10.5 miles
long and markedly narrower than Saipan, while Guam was 32 miles long and
4 to 8 miles wide.

Beginning in March 1944, the Japanese not only rapidly built up their

--869--

defenses and their defensive forces in the Marianas, but, additionally,
reorganized the command structure which controlled the area.

The Fourth Fleet which had held the bag during the loss of the Gilbert
Islands and the Marshall Islands was downgraded to controlling only the
naval garrisons in the Eastern Carolines (including Truk) and the bypassed
garrisons in the Marshalls, all of which were dying on the vine. A new
command directly under the Combined Fleet, called the Central Pacific Area
Fleet, was established under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo,
IJN, who had been commander of the Japanese naval force making the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor. Vice Admiral Nagumo maintained his Headquarters
on Saipan and was present and accounted for when the assault commenced.
He controlled the naval garrisons in the Western Carolines where the important
Palau Islands were located, as well as the Marianas and the Bonins where
Iwo Jima was located. The responsibility for the defense of individual
islands rested upon the senior Army or Naval officer assigned to that island.
By and large, the Japanese Army was able to place the senior officer on
each island.

Saipan also housed the Japanese Army command for all Japanese Army forces
in the Mandates. This was the 31st Army. Its Commanding General was Lieutenant
General Hideyoshi Obata. He lived a few days longer than others because
he was absent from his command and in the Palau Islands for a conference
when we landed 01115 June 1944. His senior subordinate, Lieutenant General
Yoshitsugu Saito, IJA, Commanding the 43rd Division, took over Obata's
duties and fought the good fight.

All during the months of March, April, May, and early June, the Japanese
poured troops into the Marianas. They had their troubles doing this as
the following extract from an interrogation of Commander Tadao Kuwahara,
IJN (Retired), Convoy Commander for part of the movement of the 43rd Division,
will show:

I left Tateyama for Saipan on 30 May 1944 with a convoy of seven vessels
and four escorts. Three of the ships were transporting 10,000 troops to
Saipan. This was the last convoy to go to Saipan. . . . The convoy was
attacked by submarines on the 1st through the 6th of June, all attacks
occurring at about 1500-1600. The submarines had been following another
convoy bound for Japan. When the two convoys crossed, the submarines turned
around and followed my convoy. . . . On 4 June, the convoy was attacked
simultaneously from the two front quarters and the port after quarter.
Katsuya Maru was sunk. On 5 June, we were attacked again from two sides
and Takaoka Maru and Tamahime Maru were sunk. On 6 June we were

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Saipan.

--871--

attacked once more on two sides, simultaneously. Kashimaran Maru, carrying aviation
gasoline was hit during this attack and exploded. About an hour later,
another attack sank Haore Maru. Of the troops of the three troop
transports. . . 80% were
saved. . . .27

Eighty percent of the Japanese troops of this particular movement were
saved but their heavy equipment including guns and ammunition were all lost.

As was reported by despatches from Saipan to Japanese Headquarters in Tokyo:

The shipwrecked units are 3rd and 4th Independent Tank Companies,14th
and 17th Independent Mortar Battalions, 3 aviation units, etc., and have
no use as fighting units; the infantry are without hats and shoes and are
in confusion.28

And, while the Japanese rapidly built up the defenses of Saipan, there
was much they didn't do. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas in
his Operational Report on the defenses of Saipan, based on data determined
after the occupation, wrote:

Subsequent to the capture of Saipan, an inspection of its defenses was
made by the Engineering Section of the Expeditionary Troops. Information
was obtained from an important prisoner of war who had been the former
Intelligence Officer of the Japanese 43rd Division
and from captured documents. . . .

It can be seen that only slightly more than one-third of the heavy coast
defense and dual purpose guns that were available on the island had been
completely mounted and made ready for firing.29

--872--

Japanese Defense Doctrine

The Japanese documents captured in previous amphibious operations had
always stressed the Japanese island defense doctrine of "destroying the
enemy at the beaches," or in other words during the most difficult period
of the amphibious operations--the transition period from naval war to
land war. It was widely anticipated that since the Marianas were quite
different islands than those in the coral atolls, that the Japanese defensive
pattern would change. But it didn't. A captured document on Saipan read:

It is expected that the enemy will be destroyed on the beaches through
a policy of tactical command based on aggressiveness, determination and
initiative.30

The Japanese Fleet Again Retires Westward

When Task Force 58 raided the Palau Islands at the end of March 1944,
the Japanese Combined Fleet once again retreated westward, this time to
Tawi Tawi Harbor in the Sulu Archipelago in the Southwest Philippines.
It was operating in this area, 1,600 miles away from the Marianas, when
the Joint Expeditionary Force moved in to assault the Marianas.

Worried about the defense of western New Guinea, a good sized detachment
of the Combined Fleet was under orders early in June 1944 to support a
Japanese amphibious assault to recapture Biak Island off northwestern New
Guinea. Japanese land-based planes from the Marianas were ordered down
south to Halmahera to support the operation. The Japanese task force for
this assault, Operation KON, was actually well assembled at Batjan in the
Moluccas (southwest of Halmahera, four hundred miles south of Mindanao)
by 11 June.

Reports of the TF 58 raids on the Marianas late on that day raised doubts
in the minds of the Japanese as to whether the Marianas were being raided
or whether they were a United States amphibious assault objective. Upon
receipt of news on 13 June that battleships were bombarding Saipan, the
Japanese assault on Biak was cancelled by Admiral Toyoda, Commander in
Chief Combined Fleet. He had succeeded to command the Combined Fleet upon
the death in a plane accident of Admiral Koga.31
The cancellation was the first of many pleasant dividends from FORAGER.

--873--

Organizing for FORAGER

The tremendous size of the FORAGER Operation began to become a reality
when the Commander Pacific Ocean Areas in his basic order directed:

All major Commanders in the Pacific Ocean Areas will support this
operation.32

To give further orientation on the titular nomenclature used in the
Central Pacific it should be recorded that when Admiral Spruance was directed
to conduct the wide-ranging FORAGER Operation it was as Commander Fifth
Fleet rather than as Commander, Central Pacific Task Forces.

The Expeditionary Troops included the two Landing Forces, each approximately
the equivalent of a corps command, as well as the Expeditionary Troop Reserve
and the Garrison Troops. Lieutenant General Smith retained command of the
Northern Landing Force, but in this task used a staff separate from the
one which functioned with him in the whole Expeditionary Troop command.
Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, commanded the Southern Landing Force
at Guam.

The two assault Landing Forces initially totaled 127,500 men, with 71,000
for Saipan and 56,500 for Guam.

Commander of the Saipan troops in the Expeditionary Reserve (CTG 56.3),
the 27th Infantry Division, was Major General Ralph Smith, AUS. Major General
Andrew D. Bruce, AUS (CTG 56.4), commanded the 77th

--874--

Infantry Division,
initially designated "In general area reserve" but planned to be used for
the Guam landings.

As it turned out, the "general reserve" was embarked from Pearl Harbor
in two echelons based on the availability of transports. Captain J. B.
Heffernan (1917) embarked the first echelon, the 305 Regimental Combat
Team from the 77th Division, in a division of transports on 2 July, and
Captain H. B. Knowles (1917) embarked the second echelon, which was the
remainder of the 77th Division in two divisions of transports on 9 July.

In the original plan it was estimated that the Joint Expeditionary Force

--875--

would complete its missions for FORAGER about Dog Day plus 40 (July 25th)
and that the entire movement of garrison forces and equipment would be
completed about Dog Day plus 80 (September 3rd).33
The first estimate turned out to have been optimistic.

Command Decentralization

In the Saipan landings, Vice Admiral Turner took one more step away
from the immediate control of all the details of the assault landing operations.
At Kwajalein the actual landing of the Landing Force with its ten times
a thousand details had been turned over to the Commander Transports. At
Saipan there was an even greater divesture of detailed duty, with Rear
Admiral Hill, the Second-in-Command, taking over a very large share of
the duties of the Attack Force Commander.

Admiral Turner described the arrangement as follows:

Although I had command of the entire Joint Expeditionary Force, I also
exercised command of the Northern Attack Force, for the capture of Saipan.
But I divided these duties, assigning to Admiral Hill all naval duties
concerned with the landing of troops, and retaining in my own hands the
gunfire and air control, all protective measures at the objective, and
SOPA duties at Saipan. But for the Tinian attack, we formed a new Attack
Force under Admiral Hill, and he exercised all naval duties for Tinian.
However, I retained the SOPA and protective duties at
Saipan.34

That this arrangement worked out to Vice Admiral Turner's satisfaction
is indicated in the following extract from a personal letter written to
an old subordinate and friend (Rear Admiral T.S. Wilkinson) two days before
all organized resistance ceased on Tinian:

I found here that I had my hands full running the SOPA job and the gunfire
and aircraft, while Hill was fully engaged in landing and supplying the
troops.35

Rear Admiral Hill stated in his FORAGER Report:

This command relationship functioned satisfactorily. . . . However,
gunfire and close air support are so intimately related to the operations
of the ground troops that it is considered advisable in future operations
to vest in

--876--

the naval commander responsible for the landing, the complete
control of naval gunfire and close air support.36

No sale of this suggestion was made.

Vice Admiral Turner issued his Attack Order A11-44 for the Northern
Attack Force on 21 May 1944. Its size and complexity tended to dwarf previous
assault orders. It ran to 341 pages, which added to the 41 pages of CINCPAC's
order, the 163 pages of Commander Fifth Fleet's order, and the 254 pages
of Commander Joint Expeditionary Force's order, provided 800 pages of reading
matter plus dozens of chart diagrams for the amphibians to peruse.

In organizing the Northern Attack Force, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill
was designated in the orders as Second-in-Command and assigned to command
the Western Landing Group. Commodore Theiss, the Chief of Staff and the
most amphibiously seasoned senior officer in the command, other than Vice
Admiral Turner, was designated Commander Control Group, in

--877--

an effort to
avoid a recurrence of the boat control problems which had plagued the Northern
Attack Force at Roi-Namur.

A Demonstration Group of nine transports and four cargo ships was organized
from ships carrying the Division Reserves.

A good many of the amphibians who had carried through in the Marshalls
were available, and a few amphibians, such as Captain Herbert B. Knowles,
Captain Donald W. Loomis and Captain Henry C. Flanagan, dated back to the
Gilberts, or New Georgia and even to Guadalcanal. However, the Bureau of
Naval Personnel was sweeping most of the veterans ashore, and one had to
fight the Bureau real long and hard to stay at sea and fight the war.

The Northern Attack Force was organized in Attack Order A11-44 of
21 May 1944 as shown on page 877.

The Northern Attack Force

The ships, landing craft and troop assignments to the Northern Attack
Force (TF 52) were as follows:

Note (1) * LST destroyed by fire and explosions in fire at Pearl on 21 May 1944.
** Replacement LST.
*** Did not actually participate in amphibious assault.

Note (2) Commanding Officers as of 1 July 1944, except for LSTs destroyed which are
as of 21 May 1944. There were changes in command during the campaign.

Note (3) Names of Officers in Charge of LCTs have not been located.

--888--

Scheme of Maneuver

The Scheme of Maneuver for FORAGER called for landing first on Saipan
on 15 June 1944 with two divisions of troops, the Second and Fourth Marines.
They were to land abreast over the western reef on beaches adjacent to
the sugar refinery village of Charan Kanoa and on both sides of Afetna
Point. They were to strike across the island, expanding the attack to the
south, and overrun Aslito airfield in the southern part of the island.

A major innovation was that early on 15 June the transports carrying
the Division Reserve were to make a feint of landing troops at beaches
north of Tanapag Harbor, and about four miles to the north of the actual
landing beaches at Charan Kanoa, in the hope of deceiving the Japanese
regarding the primary point of attack and thus to immobilize temporarily
their reserves believed to be in the area around Tanapag Harbor. The transports
of the Demonstration Group were ordered to lower their landing craft from
the davit heads, to simulate debarkation of troops and to make smoke and
maneuver as necessary. The transports were to remain outside of the effective
range of enemy shore batteries but the largely empty landing craft were
to make a run into within 6,000 yards of the beach.

After the capture of Saipan had been completed, the troops who had accomplished
this task were to be reorganized and then capture Tinian. The landing places
on Tinian and the exact units to conduct the assault were to be determined
later, but it was hoped to land about 5 July 1944.

The landing on Guam tentatively, and hopefully, set for 18 June, was
to be accomplished by two simultaneous assault landings. The Third Marine
Division was to land over the reef at Asan Village west of Agana. The 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade was to land over the reef in Agat Bay south
of Orote Peninsula.

The Marines were to hold on the left and expand to the front and right.
The 1st Provisional Marines were to hold on the right and expand to the
left, capture Orote Peninsula and then join up with the Third Marines.

After the Third Marines and the 1st Provisional Brigade had joined forces,
the Scheme of Maneuver called for holding on the south and moving east
across Guam to cut the Japanese defense forces in two.

Due to the long, long delay before the assault on Guam could be launched;
there was time to bring the 77th Infantry Division from General Reserve
in Hawaii to the combat zone. The modified Scheme of Maneuver for Guam,
developed after it was known that the 77th would be immediately available

--889--

Fortifications, radar, and air facilities on Saipan.

--890--

for the assault landing, called for one regiment of the 77th Infantry to
be the Brigade Reserve, and the other two regiments to be the Corps Reserve,
and for both to prepare for landings at Agat.

Commodore L.F. Reifsnider, who had fought through the Guadalcanal and
New Georgia campaigns, was designated the Second-in-Command to Rear Admiral
Conolly (CTF-53), who had the assault chore at Guam. Well before the landing
operation was underway, the Commodore received his promotion to Rear Admiral.

Alternate plans were drawn up by the Northern Attack Force for landing
at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, in case surf or other conditions were not suitable
for landing at Charan-Kanoa.

Arrangements were also made to transfer the troops making up the early
assault waves at Saipan to LSTs at Eniwetok, so that these troops would
not have to undergo a time consuming transfer period off the landing beaches,
and they would not have to exist in vastly overcrowded LSTs for more than
four or five days. Similar arrangements using further away Kwajalein as
a staging point were made for assault forces against Guam.

The gunfire support ships and the jeep support carriers were divided
about equally between the two attack forces, with the Guam contingent directed
to assist in the Saipan attack with limited ammunition and bomb expenditures.
The Saipan gun and air support contingents were due to repay the favor
later, having been resupplied by mobile logistic support forces in the
meantime.

The Southern Attack Force was to arrive about 80 miles east of Guam
at 1700 June 16th, so as to be able to initiate minesweeping, underwater
demolition, and last minute photo reconnaissance should it be practicable
to carry out the June 18th assault.

FORAGER Versus FLINTLOCK

A comparison is given below of the ships and landing craft assigned by
Commander Central Pacific Task Forces to the Joint Expeditionary Force for
FLINTLOCK and for FORAGER.
Numerous changes of individual ships
took place during the period between the assignment and the sailing date, but
only very minor changes in the type total.37

--891--

FLINTLOCK (278)*January 1944

FORAGER (535)**June 1944

Command Ships (AGC)

2

2

Battleships (OBB)

7

7

Cruisers, Heavy (CA)

6

6

Cruisers, Light (CL)

3

5

Carriers (CVE)

8

11

Destroyers (DD)

51

86

Destroyer Escorts (DE)

10

16

Minesweepers, Fast (DMS)

8

10

Minesweepers (AM)

8

10

Minesweepers, Motor (YMS)

8

24

Attack Transports (APA)

28

43

Attack Cargo Ships

7

13

Transports, Fast (APD)

4

13

Transports (AP)

7

17

Cargo Ships (AK)

4

10

Merchant Transports (XAP)

4

9

Merchant Cargo Ships (XAK)

9

12

Landing Ships, Dock (LSD)

5

8

Landing Ships, Tank (LST)

47

91

Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI)

24

50

Landing Craft, Tank (LCT)

12

36

Auxiliary, Transport, Hospital (APH)

0

1

Auxiliary, Coastal Transport (APc)

0

1

Auxiliary, Repair Ship, Large (ARL)

0

2

Auxiliary, Repair Ship, Small (ARS)

0

2

Auxiliary, Repair Ship, Battle Damage (ARB)

0

1

Auxiliary, Net Cargo Ship (AKN)

0

1

Auxiliary, Net Layer (AN)

0

4

Auxiliary, Seaplane Tender, Destroyer-Type (AVD)

0

2

Patrol Craft (PC)

0

10

Submarine Chasers (SC)

10

16

Tugs

6

6

Rehearsals

Rehearsal of the Northern Attack Force was held 15-19 May 1944 at Maalaea
Bay, Maui and at Kahoolawe Island in Hawaiian Waters. This rehearsal

--892--

was the biggest and longest held to date in the Pacific campaigns. Several
mishaps during the rehearsal and post-rehearsal period left their mark
on the amphibious forces.

On the suggestion of Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, each of three LCTs
was equipped as a gunboat with six 4.2-inch Coast Guard mortars and 2,
500 rounds of projectiles. These were desired primarily to protect the
left flank of our Landing Force against Japanese reserves moving down the
coastal road from Garapan. By having the LCTs steam parallel to the beaches,
they would also be able to cover the landing beaches with a blanket of
heavy mortar fire while the assault waves were being formed.

During heavy weather enroute to the rehearsal area the night of 14-15
May, two of the three specially equipped LCTs carried away their securing
gear from the LSTs on which they were mounted and riding and slid into
Davy Jones Locker with considerable loss of life.38

The first day rehearsal was further marred by the non-arrival of one
LST Group due to the very rough weather. The Colorado grounded on an uncharted
pinnacle. All days of the rehearsal were marred by relatively rough water.
All of these and more led Admiral Hill to call the rehearsals "as a whole
very ragged and poorly conducted." However, a more junior participant thought that

the rehearsal period in the Hawaiian area proved to be immensely beneficial
in providing much needed supervised drill for Commanding Officers of LSTs
in the expeditious launch of tractors at the right time and right
place.39

In other words, the rehearsal served its essential purpose.

Before Sailing, A Logistic Disaster

For the FORAGER Operation, 47 LSTs were assigned to the Northern Attack
Force by Commander Joint Expeditionary Force. After they had participated
in the big rehearsal held between 14 and 20 May, they returned to the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base and were nested in West Loch near the Naval Ammunition
Depot for final preparations before sailing on the campaign.

At this time there were only six ammunition ships available to the whole

--893--

Pacific Ocean Area. Because of this lack, 16 LSTs had been designated
to each carry 750 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber anti-aircraft shells and
the powder for them. Ten more LSTs were designated each to carry 270 4.5-inch
rockets, 6,000 rounds of 40-millimeter and 15,000 rounds of 20-millimeter
machine gun ammunition.

So the nested LSTs were tinder box inflammable, since gasoline in drums
covered much of their topsides, not already occupied by vehicles, and they
had much ammunition stowed outside of their magazines.

Because of the loss of the two of the "LCT gunboats," Vice Admiral Turner
made the decision to abandon this project. A natural corollary of that
decision was to unload the 4.2 mortar ammunition out of the remaining "LCT
gunboat." The unloading detail was disaster-bound.

One or more 4.2-inch high explosive mortar shells being off-loaded by
Army personnel into an Army truck on the elevator on the forecastle of
the LST-353 exploded about 1508 on 21 May 1944. Those who saw the explosion
from close aboard died. The immediate follow-up explosion was severe enough
to cause a rain of fragments on all eight LSTs in the LST nest, and to
start serious gasoline fires on three of these LSTs. A second large explosion
at 1511 in the forward part of one of these three LSTs rained burning
fragments on nearly all LSTs berthed not only in the nest but in the West
Loch area. This led to a further large explosion at 1522 and the rapid
burning, wrecking and loss of six LSTs and the three LCTs carried aboard
three of the LSTs.

General Hogaboom, during his interview with this scribe, remembered that:

Admiral Turner boarded a tug and personally led the fight to save what
could be saved. At great personal danger, he personally supervised the
operation until the fires were suppressed. His drive and energy permitted
us to sail but one day late and we still landed at Saipan on D-Day at
H-Hour.40

In a general article about Admiral Turner, his participation in fighting
the inferno of burning and exploding LSTs is described in a bit more detail
by Robert Johnson in the Honolulu Sunday Advertiser for 13 September 1959.

He was rough and tough in West Loch the afternoon and evening of May
21, 1944, in the glare of explosions that might have caused a serious delay
in his plans for the capture of Saipan in June.

--894--

At the height of the fire and explosions in West Loch that day, a Navy
boatswain mate, first class, commanding a yard tug encountered the admiral
and included the encounter in his written report later:

I received an order from an Admiral to proceed to T9 (an ammunition
depot dock) and put out the fire there. Due to the fact that ammunition
was exploding, I backed away.

The Admiral came to me and said: 'Go back in there and stay or I will
shoot you.' Four or five LSTs were at T9, all of which were burning and
terrible explosions were occurring but I carried out my last order, as
I had been told.

Even worse than the loss of the ships and craft was the loss of 163
men and the injury of 396 others.

Since the LSTs were scheduled to sail on 24 May, it took a bit of doing
to put the various LST task units and troops back together with all the
necessary amtracs and DUKWs and replacement personnel. Departure of the
LSTs took place on 25 May, and the sturdy craft made up the lost day while
enroute to the assault area.

In reviewing the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which investigated
the disaster, Admiral King gave the back of his hand to both the Army and
the amphibians by stating:

The organization, training and discipline in the LSTs involved in this
disaster leave much to be desired. The lack of proper understanding and
compliance with safety precautions when handling ammunition and gasoline,
particularly in LST 353 where the first explosion occurred, is also noted.
It is perfectly apparent that this disaster was not an
'Act of God.'41

It might be observed that adequate ammunition ships might have saved
the day. Two naval historians put this problem in perspective in the following way:

The need for fleet ammunition in large quantities during the early stages
of the war did not develop and never became a matter of large scale expenditure,
with a corresponding quick replenishment on a gigantic scale, until after
we started the Central Pacific drive.

When the Japanese surrendered, there were 50 ammunition ships under
Service Squadron Ten control.42

--895--

Further Reorganization Pacific Amphibious Forces

Late in April, 1944, Vice Admiral Turner recommended that the Amphibious
Force, Third Fleet, be brought to the Central Pacific from the South Pacific,
and that additional Amphibious Groups be established, so that the various
landings being contemplated could be adequately prepared for.

Enroute to the Marianas, word was received from COMINCH that a reorganization
along these lines was ordered. Six Amphibious Groups were established in
Amphibious Force, Pacific.

Group One

Rear Admiral W.H.P. Blandy (1913)

Group Two

Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill (1911)

Group Three

Rear Admiral R.L. Conolly (1914)

Group Four

Rear Admiral L.F. Reifsnider (1910)

Group Five

Rear Admiral G.H. Fort (1912)

Group Six

Rear Admiral F.B. Royal (1915)

The Third and the Fifth Amphibious Force, Pacific, were continued under
Rear Admiral T.S. Wilkinson (1909) and Vice Admiral Turner respectively.
Rear Admiral Wilkinson was promoted on 12 August 1944 to Vice Admiral.
The Administrative Command, Amphibious Force, Commodore W. B. Phillips
(1911), was continued and the Training Command, Amphibious Force, Rear
Admiral R.O. Davis (1914), was assigned as part of the Amphibious Force,
Pacific Fleet.43

This major increase in the number of amphibious groups showed an acceptance
at the highest naval level of the ever increasing number of troops which
would be involved in conquering the stepping stones to Japan.

Loading and Overseas Movement

Since the Fourth Marine Division was on the island of Maui, the Second
Marine Division on the island of Hawaii, and the 27th Infantry Division
on Oahu, and the ports of Kahului on the north coast of Maui and Hilo on
the east coast of Hawaii were small, the loading of the Northern Attack
Force took inordinately long.

The Southern Attack Force troops were loaded at the small man-made
ports in Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands in the Southern Solomons.

--896--

Altogether there were 21 separate movement groups in the Joint Expeditionary
Force for the initial phases of the FORAGER Operation, and 33 altogether
by 15 June 1944. All were operating on a rigidly controlled schedule. Some
groups replenished at Kwajalein, some at Roi-Namur and others at Eniwetok.

The Main Body of the Northern Attack Force took to sea on Decoration
Day, 1944, but the lesser amphibians from the Hawaiian area eased out to
sea almost daily during the long period from 25 May until 2 June. The Southern
Attack Force from almost Down Under sailed between 3 and 6 June 1944.

At Eniwetok, all the assault troops, elements of the beach parties,
wave guides and other control officers of the Northern Attack Force were
shifted into 32 LSTs. This eliminated any long-winded delays on the day
of the assault landing. But:

The trip from Pearl to Saipan was marred by more than 70 breakdowns
in the Tractor Groups.44

Frequent tactical drills were held including a full rehearsal of the
approach to Saipan. This exercise proved invaluable.45

Except for a collision subsequent to an emergency turn at night between
the destroyer transport Talbot and the Pennsylvania on 10 June, the bucking
of an adverse current and the usual ration of possible sound contacts of
submarines, passage of both Attack Forces to the objective area was uneventful.

And as one Flotilla Commander of LSTs bragged:

Both Tractor Groups arrived in their assigned areas in a precise formation,
well closed up, and within one minute of the time they were scheduled to
arrive after the voyage of 3500 miles.46

Estimates of Japanese Troop Strength in the Marianas

In single words, Japanese troop strength in the Marianas was "underestimated"
by our Forces before the campaign, and has been " growing" since the campaign.

Some six weeks before the landings, when the basic amphibious plan for

It is estimated that by the FORAGER target date, the garrisons will
consist of a total of about 30,000 men, including 7,000 construction
personnel.47

On 31 August 1944, with the three island battles over and won, and the
report stage reached, Commander Expeditionary Troops (Lieutenant General
Smith) estimated that there had been 54,000 Japanese military personnel
on the three islands when CTF 51 commenced the assault. This figure was
sizably larger than the approximately 2,400 prisoners of war who had been
taken and the 43,000 Japanese who had been reported buried. By and large
those buried were Japanese military personnel, although not all were combat
troops by any means.

The Marines in their historical studies of FORAGER (1950-1954) estimated
Japanese military personnel in the Marianas on 15 June 1944 to have been
9,200 on Tinian, 18,500 on Guam, and 29,700 on Saipan for a total of 57,
400. The Army historians some years later (1959) estimated that 58,168
Japanese military personnel were on the three islands with 31,629 on Saipan,
8,039 on Tinian and 18,500 on Guam.48

If, since World War II the Japanese have recorded their troop strength
in the Marianas about 15 June 1944, I have missed it. During the Saipan
battle, two Japanese prisoners of war, one a naval commander and executive
officer of the naval station there, each estimated the combined strength
of Japanese Army and Navy troops" on Saipan as about 20,000.49
This could be correct since there were considerable numbers of air base personnel
and construction and maintenance personnel, including Koreans who might
not, in the minds of the POWs, have been considered "troops."

Saipan Japanese Garrison

In accordance with the requirements of Admiral Spruance's Operation
Plans, JICPOA provided a weekly estimate of enemy military strength on

--898--

Saipan. When TF 51 sailed from Eniwetok, this estimate was
17,600.50
Starting with this figure, the first step along the line in the process of escalating
estimates located in strictly naval records, is a note in Admiral Nimitz's
Command Summary for 17 June (Saipan date) which states that:

20,000 troops were estimated to be on Saipan.

And again from the same source on 24 June (Saipan date):

Among captured documents are those indicating strength of enemy to be
about 23,000.

Surprisingly enough, as of 1800 on 10 July 1944, the day after Saipan
was "secured," Vice Admiral Turner logged:

Enemy dead buried by our Troops number 11,948. There are 9006 civilians
interned and 736 prisoners of war.51

However, after Saipan had been declared "secured," it soon became apparent
that there were a large number of "unsecured" Japanese military personnel
on the island. CTF 51 logged in his War Diary on 2 August 1944:

As a result of intensified "clean up" drive, 147 Japanese soldiers were
killed on Saipan during the past 24 hours. An average of 50 per day have
been killed on Saipan since that island was secured.

A few days later, Vice Admiral Turner logged:

Since July 15, 1944, 1748 Japanese soldiers have been killed on Saipan,
158 captured and over 850 civilians interned.52

When the FORAGER campaign was over and won and the victors were enroute
back to Pearl Harbor, busily writing their reports, both CTF 51 (Vice Admiral
Turner) and CTF 56 (Lieutenant General Smith) showed marked agreement in
their estimates of Japanese military strength on Saipan.

CTF 56 included a reconstituted "Enemy Order of Battle" in his FORAGER
Report, indicating there were 26,500 Japanese military personnel on Saipan.
CTF 51 wrote:

From the day of the assault to 15 August approximately 25,144 enemy
dead had been buried and 1,810 prisoners captured.

On 7 November 1944, with all the reports of subordinate commanders available
to him, with many of the captured Japanese documents translated,

--899--

and with the interrogation of all the Japanese prisoners completed, CINCPOA gave
a more modest total in his official report to COMINCH on the Saipan operation.
He stated that:

Actually encountered on Saipan were about 4,000 naval troops and 20,000
army troops.53

The unknown number of Japanese civilians who were killed while performing
logistical tasks in Japanese troop rear areas as the Japanese Army retreated
northward, and the considerable number of Japanese civilians who committed
suicide in the final days of the battle, both markedly increased the figure
of "enemy dead buried" over the actual number of Japanese "troops,"

The point of all this is that since the number of assaulting troops
should be three to four times the number of defending troops, the failure
of our intelligence to determine reasonably closely the very healthy number
of Japanese defenders in the Marianas made the task of the Landing Force
long, difficult and costly.

Including the Floating Reserve, 71,000 troops were in our original assault
force against Saipan. This was quite an adequate number to overrun quickly
an island defended by only 17,600 then the estimated Japanese troop strength
when TF 51 sailed from Hawaii. With 24,000 Japanese troops on Saipan, our
assault forces, using the same ratio, should have numbered in the neighborhood
of 100,000.

As one commentator wrote on 23 June 1944, in a "Daily Running Estimate"
prepared for COMINCH by his staff.

Captured documents indicate that there were about 23,000 enemy troops
assigned to the defense of Saipan, but it is not known whether this number
includes about 7,000 [without equipment] which were recently landed from
ships that had been sunk. . . . If there were 30,000 enemy combatant troops
available on Saipan, our overall superiority would have been about 2 to
1 which is very small for this type of operation.54

The delay in conquering Saipan, basically caused by an inadequate number
of assault troops and faulty intelligence upset a lot of people, including
Vice Admiral Turner.

--900--

The Gambit

During the last part of the period when Vice Admiral Turner and his
Expeditionary Force were wending their way from Guadalcanal and from Pearl
towards the Marianas, Task Force 58 was reducing the Japanese aircraft
in the Marianas to gadfly impotence. The first TF 58 strike on the afternoon
of 11 June was particularly effective since it gained control of the air
in the Marianas, the first basic requisite for a successful amphibious
operation.

Japanese sources, after the war ended, reported there were over 500
aircraft based on Guam, Tinian, and Saipan about 1 June 1944. But by the
time the TF 58 raids had started on 11 June, half of these planes had been
ordered to island-hop to Halmahera off the west end of New Guinea to support
the Japanese counter-offensive to recapture Biak Island 450 miles to the
eastward. As many of the Japanese pilots were recent graduates of the flying
schools, operational losses during this long inter-island hop were high.
Japanese plane losses during the TF 58 sweeps ran past the
200 mark.55
When the TF 58 raids were over, there were comparatively few Japanese aircraft
around to bother Task Force 51 on 15 June 1944, or on the days to follow.

On 13 June, the fast and big-gunned battleships from Task Force 58 undertook
the bombardment of selected targets on Saipan and Tinian. The minesweepers
swept the offshore areas to the west of Saipan with the following results:

Reports from minesweepers which had arrived in Saipan Area on June 13th
revealed that surf conditions were favorable. No mines or underwater obstructions
have been encountered.56

On 14 June, the old battleships of the Expeditionary Force took up the
task of pinpoint bombardment of gun positions, and the Japanese batteries
retaliated in kind, hitting the battleship California and the Braine (DD-630).

The same day some 300 UDT personnel swam over the beach approach area
and gladly reported that the barrier reef off Charan Kanoa was flat on
top and generally only two to four feet under the surface. This would permit
DUKWs to cross at many places. No inshore mines were discovered at this

--901--

time and no underwater obstacles were located off the chosen landing beaches.
For quite obvious reasons, the Japanese chose the beaches between Agingan
Point and Cape Obiam, providing the closest access (from good beaches)
to Aslito Airfield, to be heavily mined with anti-boat and beach mines.

Saipan marked the first assignment of high speed transports to each
individual Underwater Demolition Team. Although the practice had been initiated
at Kwajalein, Saipan marked the first foot-by-foot daylight reconnaissance
by frogmen under cover of blanketing fire by fire support ships against
offensive weapons in the beach areas.57

The Approach

As the amphibians approached Saipan-Tinian from the east and then worked
their way around to Saipan's west coast, one LST recorded the scene:

At 2010 sighted glow on horizon (port bow) and this developed to be
battle action on Saipan. Star shells and other evidence of battle were
seen all night.58

The Weather--Dog Day

The Demonstration Landing

The Japanese propaganda English language broadcast gave its reaction
to the efforts of Transport Division Ten and Transport Division Thirty
off the beaches north of Tanapag Harbor:

With full knowledge of the enemy's attempt, our garrison forces allowed
the invaders to approach as near as possible to the coast and then opened
up a fierce concentrated fire on the enemy and foiled the attempt. Thrown
into wild confusion by the accurate Japanese fire, the enemy barges, or
what was left of them, swiftly returned to their mother vessels at about
8:20 a.m.60

--902--

Since the transports and their landing craft observed no gunfire from
the beach, the only truth in this description is the hour of 0820 when
the rear elements of the landing craft returned to their transports and
were hoisted aboard.

The Landings on Saipan

The Saipan assault required a simultaneous landing across a reef 250
to 700 yards wide of two divisions of Marines, landing eight Battalion
Landing Teams abreast on eight landing beaches covering a front of 6,000
yards. 8,000 troops were due to go ashore in amtracs in the first hour.

This was the largest landing of the Pacific campaign to date and necessitated
the adequate coordination of the Landing Plans of the two Marine divisions,
and an organization which would keep the very large number of assault craft,
and the early logistic support craft, in reasonable step and balance.

It was the first Central Pacific landing against a large heavily defended
island and in marked contrast to the assaults against heavily defended
coral strips.

After the battle was well over, the Commander of the assault troops wrote:

For the defense of Saipan, the enemy contemplated a series of strong
beach defenses and a system of mobile defenses in depth behind the beach
areas. . . .

The landing beaches in the Charan Kanoa Area used by Blue assault forces
consisted of approximately 6000 yards of sandy beach backed by an alluvial
plain varying from 400 yards to nearly 1 mile in width. The beaches in
this vicinity were lined almost continuously by fire trenches, some sections
of anti-tank trench, numerous machine gun emplacements and some dual purpose
weapons. . . . It appears from the almost complete absence of enemy dead
found in the area, that the defenses lining the beach were abandoned by
the enemy on D-Day (or earlier).61

How Hour was initially set for 0830 but was retarded to 0840, due to
delays in transfer of control personnel.62

Transport Group Able landed the Second Marine Division on Red and Green
beaches while Transport Group Baker did the same chore for the Fourth Marine
Division on Blue and Yellow beaches. The Transport Area

--903--

Landing Plan, Saipan, 15 June 1944.

--904--

for the large transports
was eight to nine miles from the assigned beaches, and about three miles
for the LSTs. The Line of Departure was 4,250 yards from the beach. Assault
waves were landed in amtracs largely from LSTs which carried the first
waves of Marines right on board.

Transport Group Able had priority for the first two hours subsequent
to How Hour on the use of the channel through the reef opposite Beach Blue
One. UDT Seven blasted the outer reef for 200 yards opposite the Yellow
beaches to open up another highly useful channel and on Dog Day plus two
a channel to Red Beach Three was blasted out of the reef by UDT Five.

The Landing Plans were complicated, as can be judged from the fact that
the Transport Group Able Plan included four pages of diagrams just for
forming up the early waves.

The barrier reef was so shallow that the guide boats could not cross
it. Accordingly, Commander Landing Force had agreed that the Boat Control
Officer could be instructed:

The reef marks the limit of Navy responsibility for leading in the assault
and succeeding waves; from there on in, the troops are on their own. Your
job is to get them to the correct part of the reef.63

Since "the correct part of the reef" was unmarked by buoys, this was
a difficult chore and not perfectly performed.

All the lead waves left the Line of Departure at 0813 for their 4,250
yard run to the beach. Actual landings on all beaches were minutes late,
ranging from 0843 on Red and Green to 0854 on Blue
and Yellow.64

A combination of more active enemy mortar and machine gun fire from
the area of Afetna Point and a current inside the reef lagoon, not detected
by the UDTs, pushed the landing waves directed to land just north of Afetna
Point, where Beach Green Two was located, further northward to Green One.
The boat control officers had turned back at the reef and the Marine drivers
of the amtracs were on their own while crossing the 600-yard-wide lagoon.
The drivers on Red, Blue and Yellow beaches made their designated beaches.
The drivers for Red and Green beaches to the north of Afetna Point all
eased to the north, but only the ones for Beach Green Two failed to land
on the correct beaches.

One of the problems immediately following the assault landings was that
subsequent boat traffic for five of the eight beaches (Red Two, Red Three,

--905--

Green One, Green Two, Blue One) had to be squeezed through one channel
in the outer reef. A Traffic Control Officer with a bull horn undertook
this difficult task.

As Commander Transport Division Twenty described the situation in his
Saipan Report:

Unloading across the reef, several hundred yards wide, presented difficulties.
The only channel through the reef led to a fair sized pier which was damaged
by shell fire and could be used only by a few boats at all stages of the
tide. Landing craft could successfully enter through the channel and unload
on the beaches only at high tide. Consequently, the majority of the unloading
the first day was done by LVTs and DUKWs. Only high priority supplies
were unloaded. The limitations imposed by the reef and low tide made it
impossible to unload boats rapidly.65

And as the Commander 23rd Regimental Combat Team said in his FORAGER
Report:

The time element in landing tanks through the channel was much too long,
since only one LCM could negotiate the pass at a time.

The Assault

Not all the observers or participants saw the initial assault landings
in the same way. In the eyes of the big boss, Vice Admiral Turner, everything
was pretty much "on the button":

Initial landings were made successfully on schedule in the face of severe
machine gun and mortar fire. This type of opposition proved to be a most
critical feature of the day's operation as a deterrent element. Dive bombing
by planes and close interdictive fire by supporting ships proved to be
effective counter measures. . . .

By 1800, Line 01 [first day's objective] reached. 20,000 troops had
been landed.66

Rear Admiral Hill, the boss at the next echelon down, detailed the assault
landings in these words:

The landing was made with precision and with only a slight difference
in time of landing of first waves on all beaches. Casualties in troops
and vehicles en route to the beach were extremely light, but shortly after
landing the beach area was brought under fire by mortars and light artillery
defiladed on the high ground in rear of the beaches. These guns were well camouflaged

--906--

and difficult to locate and during the first three days continued
to inflict serious casualties upon our troops and beach parties.

By evening a narrow beachhead had been won, with a gap between Second
and Fourth MARDIVs in Charan Kanoa Town. Heavy swells had built up on the
reef. Two [actually eight] loaded LVTs were overturned and several men
drowned. It was necessary to suspend unloading by LVT across the reef
DOG night.67

Way, way down the command chain, some of the operational problems loomed
larger in the Dog Day reports.

The Commander of the LCI gunboats logged the reasons for not providing
all the planned close gunfire support of the initial assault waves as follows:

The LCI(G)s were stationed at the line of departure by 0750 and. . . .
preceded the first assault waves into the beaches by 200 yards.

. . . Due to the protruding reef, the LCI(G)'s did not open fire with
their 20mm guns or fire their rockets [on Red and Green beaches] as the
range was too great for effective fire. . . . LCI(G)'s firing on Blue
and Yellow beaches were able to get close enough to the beaches to effectively
fire their 20mm guns and rockets.

While leading the first waves into the beach numerous mortar bursts
landed in the water very close to the line of advancing LCI(G)'s. LCI(G)
726 suffered a direct mortar hit, killing 2 enlisted men and wounding the
Commanding Officer, one other officer and two (2) enlisted men. . . .
Other LCI(G)'s had a great many pieces of shrapnel from mortar shells. . . .
LCI(G)-451, firing on Red Beach suffered one direct hit from a salvo
of enemy shells of 3" to 5" diameter. The shell hit the starboard life
raft, took off part of the ladder from the main deck aft to the top of the
deck house, went thru the main deck and out the side of the ship in number
4 troop compartment, just forward of the magazines. It severed the entire
main electric trunk line. . . .68

* * * * *

About 2500 yards from the beach we started to fire. We continued to
fire until the boats reached the reefs. It seemed that our shots were falling
short of the beach.69

* * * * *

Fired ranging shots of rockets, but they did not reach the beach. Fired,
in all, four rounds of ranging shots but as they did not reach the beach,
did not fire any more rockets.70

2140, severely damaged our ramp while recovering disabled LVTs. The
hinge which controls the ramp parted, with the exception of one small piece. . . .
Due to this ramp condition it was impossible to launch the three
LVTs on board after completion of repairs.72

Vessels this Task Unit arrived at line of departure and began launching
LVTs and DUKWs in accordance with schedule. Surf conditions unfavorable,
making launching difficult. Several vehicles suffered damage and the ramps
and ramp hoisting gear of several LSTs were damaged. Launching was accomplished,
however, without delay.75

The Japanese coast defense guns and artillery worried the landing craft
late on Dog Day and the conscience of at least one of the skippers who
retreated from them. Representative LST reports follow.

D-Day night about 1915 LST-224 was fired upon from Saipan. Four shells
hit ahead of the starboard bow approximately 100 yards. The enemy apparently
sought and obtained our range with what appeared to be 5" shells. Their
deflection was off about 100 yards which provided time to get underway
and back down away from the shelling. . . . Having orders not to fire
on the Island, and our heaviest gun being 3" 50 cal., the only alternative
was to withdraw out of range to protect the ship's personnel and cargo,
as did other landing craft in the area.76

* * * * *

Constant reports from the beach described very rough fighting, particularly
during the night, which kept our forces from maintaining orderly dumps.77

--909--

* * * * *

All seriously wounded men were sent to other ships which had doctors,
this being sometimes hard to do because hospital ships were not always
in sight and it was like sending the coxswains on a wild goose chase. However,
it would have been folly to try to care for apparently dying men on a ship
without skilled doctors.78

The Weather Deteriorates

Rear Admiral Hill had this to say about the weather:

A heavy swell, which existed from the night of Dog Day until Dog plus
One morning, prevented delivery of supplies across the barrier reef facing
RED, GREEN, and YELLOW beaches and forced all supplies for both divisions
to be handled across BLUE Beaches.
79

While this was a temporary problem, the longer range problem was:

Unloading of boats on the Red beaches was possible only from two hours
before until two hours after high tide.80

As Commander Transport Division Twenty reported in regard to Dog Day
plus one:

The congestion of boats at the reef continued because of the limited
beach usable at high tide and the fact that boats could not reach the beach
at low tide.

Early construction of a causeway pier at Beach Blue One facilitated
logistic support, and LSTs were beached successfully on the reef opposite
Yellow One on 17 June. The 27th Division troops were put ashore on the
16th, 17th, and 19th, the last Regimental Combat Team wading ashore from
LSTs beached on the reef opposite Yellow Three.

By Dog plus Three there were nearly 50,000 troops ashore and a large
amount of artillery.81

There were problems other than the heavy surf which held up logistic
support from time to time during the first few days. These were the Japanese
aircraft flown down from Iwo Jima and the Empire.

--910--

The Japanese Gadflies

The amphibians had gotten through the Kwajalein and Eniwetok assaults
without a single Japanese airplane to worry them. This was not the case
in the Marianas.

Task Force 51 was sighted by a Japanese plane the morning of 13 June
and was under minor air attack three times on 15 June by one to five Japanese
planes. No air attacks on Task Force 51 occurred on 16 June. There were
five attacks by formations of three to forty Japanese planes commencing
late in the day of 17 June 1944. From that date until 7 July the amphibians
ate smoke a fair share of each night. There were 70 designated Japanese
air raids noted during these twenty days, but the largest number of planes
in a single attack was 12, and a good share of the Japanese planes were
shot down by the combat air patrol before getting in close to the amphibians.
By and large, the Japanese planes came down the Marianas Chain to the battle
area and were reserviced at Guam and Rota. During the days of the Battle
of the Philippine Sea a number of planes were flown into Guam from the
Japanese carriers and enroute they harassed the amphibians.82

All the amphibious craft contributed their might to the defense of the
Transport Area, as the following LST reports will indicate:

At 1915 a single engine Jap bomber dove at us from starboard to port
at a distance of about 50 yards off the water, dropping a small bomb which
missed. All the ships in the area opened fire but none seen to hit the
plane which was very fast and visible at most for only a second or two,
as the time of night and overcast sky made visibility very poor.83

Another witness pictured this incident as follows:

On the evening of 17 June, the retiring LSTs were attacked by one VAL.
Fire was not opened until the plane was in the dive. It was ineffective.
For the majority of the LSTs, this was the first Jap plane they had ever
seen. It is certain that buck fever had many of the gunners. The one bomb
released was a near miss off the bow of LST-42. Strafing, or gunfire from
other LSTs started a fire forward on LST-84. . . . LST-23 and LST-128
also had casualties resulting from shrapnel. . . .84

And the final report of this brief incident:

The Japanese bomber was about as accurate as our gunfire. With upward
of 30 ships to hit, he scored a good clean miss.85

--911--

Rear Admiral Conolly had talked to everyone who would listen about the
great value of smoke during air attacks and while a "Smoke Plan" had existed
throughout the Central Pacific campaign, Saipan marked its first extensive
use. By the time Saipan had been secured, the amphibians had absorbed many
Japanese air raids and only the jeep carrier Fanshaw Bay and the battleship
Maryland absorbed hits from them. The plane that torpedoed the Maryland
while she was anchored sneaked in without being detected by radar. Rear
Admiral Hill noted:

Despite this large number of air attacks, only minor damage was suffered.
This fact is attributed in part to the excellence of land based anti-aircraft
batteries and night fighters, but at least equal credit should be given
to the protection provided the ships by heavy smoke cover.86

The cargo ship Mercury (AK-42) was the first amphibious ship to gain
a sure kill of a Japanese plane since the George F. Elliott absorbed one
at Guadalcanal nearly two years before. Vice Admiral Turner's War Diary stated:

The Mercury was credited with a kill when a Jap plane was destroyed
by crashing into one of her booms. The pilot was killed.87

* * * * *

Enemy tactics in the air have persistently been to fly low to avoid
radar detection. Steps have been taken to rearrange our radar pickets so
as to improve our technique in picking up these planes.88

The Japanese First Mobile Fleet Moves Up

Long before the battle on Saipan had been won, the Japanese First Mobile
Fleet, under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, took a fling at our amphibious
forces, but found that Admiral Spruance and a reenforced Task Force 58
stood in the way.

Separately, the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 comprised seven carriers
and eight cruiser-hulled carriers, guarded by seven fast battleships, three
heavy cruisers, ten light cruisers and 52 destroyers.89
Ships pulled out
from the Joint Expeditionary Force and added to TF 58 included four heavy
cruisers, three light anti-aircraft cruisers and 18 destroyers. Additionally,
the Fleet Flagship Indianapolis with its two protecting destroyers moved
from TF 51 to TF 58.

--912--

Also, the eight older battleships, the three remaining cruisers and
a good share of the remaining destroyers of the Joint Expeditionary Force
were told off to cover the Transport Area during darkness from a position
about 25 miles to its westward, especially to guard against the possibility
that a fast detachment of the Japanese First Mobile Fleet might do an end
run around TF 58 and seek to attack the cargo ships and disrupt the logistic
support of the troops on Saipan.

Days of Change

The 16th and 17th of June 1944, were days when the plans of the Joint
Expeditionary Force were subject to many changes, as the Japanese First
Mobile Fleet charged into the Philippine Sea from Tawi Tawi.

Kelly Turner's War Diary had these entries:

TG 52.10, Bombardment Group Two and the Hopkins,Perry,Long and Hamilton
had been directed to proceed to Guam to initiate scheduled attack [on June
18th]. However, due to imminence of a major engagement west of Saipan,
Com 5th Fleet cancelled the tentative date of attack on Guam and directed
CTF 51 to make preparations to reinforce carrier forces of TF 58.90

The Battle of the Philippine Sea has been well and brilliantly told
by a number of authors. There has been strong support from the Marines,
from those who were in the amphibious forces, and from Fleet Admiral King
in regard to the manner in which the battle was fought by Admiral Spruance.

Admiral Turner wrote in his speech "Major Aspects of the Marianas Campaign":

Before leaving Pearl Harbor, lengthy discussions were held concerning
the prospect of Fleet action. Tentative decisions were made as to what
action we should take if Fleet action should eventuate. The ideas of major
commands were in complete accord that whatever happened, Task Force 58
would adequately cover the Expeditionary Force during its landing of troops.

On June 16th, it became certain that the Japanese Fleet would attack.
We believed then, and know now, that Admiral Toyoda's objective was air
attack on the transports, using the airfields on Guam and Tinian for refueling
and rearming.

So on June 16th, after further conferences, Admiral Spruance made these
decisions:

a. Reenforce TF 58 with 7 cruisers and 18 destroyers from the Expeditionary
Force, and concentrated at noon June 18th, 350 miles to west to (1) cover
the Saipan landings and (2) attack the Japanese Fleet.

--913--

b. Continue transport unloading until dark June 17th, [then] leave behind
the transports and LSTs needed immediately, plus screen and small craft,
and secretly move the bulk of transports and LSTs out of sight to the
eastward of Saipan. From there, transports and LSTs would be returned
for unloading as called for.

c. Continue full gunfire support of troops, but during darkness form
up remaining battleships, cruisers and DDs 25 miles to the west in covering
position.

d. With three CVE divisions, provide [combat air patrol] CAP for ships
near Saipan, and provide air for troops support as available.

What happened?

By dark June 18th, the enemy Fleet was thought to be still well to the
westward. Admiral Spruance was strongly urged by some officers to make
a fast run west and surprise the enemy at dawn. Instead he retired, as
previously planned, toward Guam.

In fact, the end run had already been made [by the Japanese]. At 0720
next morning CAP planes of the nearby Task Force 58 caught Japanese planes
taking off from the Guam airfield after re-fueling. Then the Turkey Shoot
began. By nightfall, Admiral Toyoda had had enough and started home. For
a few days, our forces at Saipan had some minor air attacks by planes from
Guam that had remained hidden, but damage was slight and there was not
much interference with our landing operations.

The point is mentioned to emphasize the importance of sticking to the
objective. The Fifth Fleet objective then was the capture of Saipan, and
only secondarily the defeat of the Japanese Fleet. To capture Saipan, we
needed the transports afloat and not sunk. Suppose at 0800 on June 19th,
Admiral Mitscher had been 600 miles away with all his planes in the air!

Admiral Spruance's decision to adhere strictly to a course of action
that would ensure the accomplishment of the major objective of that great
military adventure was sound and wise.91

Long before World War II ended, Fleet Admiral King had expressed his
strong approval of the manner in which the Battle of the Philippine Sea
was fought. In his Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy, issued 27
March 1945, and covering combat operations from 1 March 1944 to 1 March
1945, Fleet Admiral King wrote:

As the primary mission of the American Forces in the area was to capture
the Marianas, the Saipan amphibious operations had to be protected from
enemy interference at all costs. In his plans for what developed into the
Battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance was rightly guided by this
basic mission. He therefore operated aggressively to the westward of the Marianas,

--914--

but did not draw his carriers and battleships so far away that
they could not protect the amphibious units.

While Admiral Spruance was beating off the onrush of the Japanese Fleet,
the situation ashore had continued to improve, and on 20 June, Lieutenant
General H. M. Smith, Commander Northern Troops And Landing Force (CTG 56.1),
assumed command ashore at about 1000.

After the threat of the Japanese Fleet had been met and successfully
dissipated by the Fifth Fleet under Admiral Spruance, the Commander Joint
Expeditionary Force turned his thoughts again to the necessity of conserving
the troops previously allotted for the Guam assault for that purpose. The
Commander Joint Expeditionary Troops, being faced with a rugged and skillful
defense by larger than anticipated Japanese forces on Saipan, and an extinction
chore that was going slowly, cast envious eyes on the troops allocated
for the Guam assault.

In a despatch designed to restate the necessity of retaining the troops
still afloat and regaining control of those (the 106th Regimental Combat
Team) already ashore on Saipan, Vice Admiral Turner informed CTF 56 that:

While recognizing the decisive character of the operations for the capture
of Saipan, the great importance of the early capture of Guam in this campaign
is also realized. Unless further shore operations become unfavorable, CTF
51 is not willing to accept the decision to postpone the Guam attack until
the Army's 77th Division arrives.93

Despite this unwillingness of CTF 51, the Guam attack was postponed
until after the 77th Division arrived there. In fact, the date for launching
the Guam assault was set exactly by the "when" the 77th would be available
at Guam.

The Delayed Time Table

The Japanese defense at Saipan was stronger and more successful than
had been anticipated. By 21 June, the whole of the Expeditionary Force
Reserve had been landed, bringing to three full divisions plus Fifth Corps
troops fighting on Saipan. The very bitter defense encountered thereafter
eventually led to the unwelcome but quite sound decision not to go ahead
with a landing on Guam until Saipan was in hand. That is, it was better to

--915--

ensure the complete control of Saipan rather than to have a foothold
on both Saipan and Guam without complete control of either one. The troops
of the Southern Attack Force were looked upon as a possible further reserve
to bolster the hard fighting troops on Saipan. So the Southern Attack Force
cruised around and around to the eastward of Saipan, waiting for favorable
developments, before undertaking its assault on Guam.

On 17 June it was decided by CINCPOA to prepare one Regimental Combat
Team in Hawaii for possible early employment in the Marianas by immediate
movement to Saipan.

On the 21st, the decision was taken to bring all the 77th Infantry Division
forward from the Hawaiian Islands as soon as practicable. By dark 22 June,
the last of enough transports to lift two Regimental Combat Teams of the
77th Infantry Division were unloaded at Saipan and hurried back to Pearl.
Lift for the initial RCT of the 77th was already gathering at Pearl Harbor.

As Vice Admiral Turner wrote to his old subordinate, Wilkinson:

It was evident that we needed that division for Guam and, in fact, used
it beginning the second day of the Guam landing.94

On 24 June, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade was designated the Floating
Reserve for the Saipan operation and the rest of the Southern Landing Force
was ordered to return to Eniwetok to await the decision as to when it would
assault Guam.

On 5 July 1944, Vice Admiral Turner wrote a letter to Admiral Nimitz
which among other things said:

Of course, we all feel disappointed over the fact that the Marianas
Campaign is not going as rapidly as had been hoped for, particularly because
of the ill effect on STALEMATE [Palau Island-Assault].

* * * * *

There will be a let-down at the end of the Saipan capture, as the troops
are only human, and it would be desirable to have some fresh troops for
Tinian, though that is now impossible. We will get ready for that operation
as soon as possible, but can't predict the date. It would be better, for
some reasons, to hold off until the attack on Guam is well started, but
we will not do so if we can get the troops rehabilitated
in time.95

And when it got down to hard actualities, Vice Admiral Turner did hold

--916--

off on Tinian until the attack on Guam was well started. The latter started
on 21 July and the Tinian assault three days later.

In the letter of 30 July 1944, to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, in discussing
the delay in capturing Saipan, Vice Admiral Turner wrote:

We simply didn't have enough troops here, and the reason we didn't have
enough troops was that we didn't have enough ships to bring them
in.96

The number of ships available in the Pacific for FORAGER was strongly
influenced by the fact that the gargantuan amphibious landing in Normandy,
France, occurred earlier in the same month as Saipan and had an overriding
call on worldwide transport and cargo ship resources.

At Long Last

Slow, but steady progress was made in capturing Saipan.

The Fourth of July was celebrated by taking the towns of Garapan and
Tanapag. Five days later:

Convoy moving into forward beach during Saipan attack as seen from the Rocky Mount. (80-G-231985)

--917--

The Marines raised the American Flag over the airstrip at the northern
part of Saipan. By 1625, the entire island was secured and organized resistance ceased.

Vice Admiral Turner sent the following despatch:

To our brave troops who have captured Saipan, the naval forces who have
striven to assist them, I make a bow of respect.98

The Cost

On 10 July, the day after Saipan was declared "secure," Vice Admiral
Turner logged:

The following is the estimate of casualties to our forces as of 1800
today. Total casualties 15,053. Of this number 2,359 were killed, 11,481
wounded and 1,213 are missing. Enemy dead buried by our troops number 11,948.
There are 9,006 civilians interned and 736 prisoners of
war.99

Many of our missing turned out to be dead. The total of Japanese buried
went up rapidly in the days ahead until it reached 25,144 on 15
August 1944.100

Naval Gunfire Support

The Naval Gunfire Support prior to the assault landings an Saipan was
divided into three phases:

Phase One--Dog Day Minus Two (13 June 1944)

This phase was conducted from 1040 to 1725 by seven new fast battleships
temporarily detached from Task Force 58, and their anti-submarine screen
of eleven destroyers. The bombardment was fired using plane spot and from
ranges in excess of 10,000 yards. This latter precaution was necessary
to keep the ships outside of mineable waters until these waters were swept.

Since the Japanese on Saipan had British Whitworth Armstrong 6-inch
coast defense guns, as well as their own 140-millimeter coast defense guns,

--918--

the statement that the big battleships at 10,000 to 16,000 yards remained
out of range of the enemy shore batteries, is incorrect.

The results of the gun bombardment by the fast battleships during Phase
were incommensurate with the weight of metal dropped on Saipan during this
bombardment. This was due primarily to inexperience of both the aircraft
observers in locating Japanese camouflaged guns and of the gunnery personnel
in conducting slow deliberate shore bombardment.

But as the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops reported:

Heavy gun installations, power plans, barracks, the buildings of the
town and installations at or near the airfield received a particularly
heavy shelling.101

Phase Two--Dog Day Minus One (14 June 1944)

A succinct summary by the Marines of this phase indicated:

This bombardment was executed by ships of Task Group 52.17, nearly all
of which had had considerable [gunfire support] experience. . . . Their
fire delivered with both air and ship spot, was very effective, including
direct hits on many important installations.102

Phase Three--Dog Day (15 June 1944)

As for the last phase:

This firing was executed by ships of Task Group 52.17. It destroyed
or neutralized a great many important targets and neutralized the beaches
sufficiently that the assault troops were able to effect a landing.

* * * * *

As a result of Naval gunfire and air bombardment, many coast defense
guns were destroyed and the enemy was, according to Prisoner of War statements,
forced to evacuate his prepared beach defenses except for a small delaying
forces. Forward slopes facing seaward were rendered only temporarily tenable
to the enemy, and his supply, transport, and communication facilities and
organizations were reduced to a state of chaos.103

Due to the excellence of the Japanese camouflage, the very large number
of targets, and the fact that neither photography nor visual observation
had located many targets on the reverse slopes of the hills eastward of
the landing

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beaches, numerous Japanese mortars and artillery guns were
not fired upon prior to the actual Saipan landing.

As late as three months after Saipan had been captured, Lieutenant General
Smith, it seems, thought the naval gunfire support in the Marianas was
reasonably satisfactory for he wrote in his final report on FORAGER:

Naval gunfire support was a decisive factor in the conduct of operations,
and it is recommended:

1. That whenever possible, similar extended, deliberate, observed fires
be delivered against landing beaches and enemy positions prior to
the landing.104

Some five years later, however, the worm had turned and the bombardment
of Saipan was labeled by General Smith, "The partially ineffective Saipan
bombardment." He also stated:

Three and a half days of surface and air bombardment were not enough
to neutralize an enemy of the strength we found on Saipan.105

Skill and Hazard

The pinpointed naval gunfire bombardment essential to accomplish the
results desired by the assault troops is a difficult chore, and involves
manifold hazards and calls for first-rate skills. These aspects were touched
upon several times in the reports on the Saipan operation.

The fire control ships were directed to lie to in order to ensure that
they would not interfere with the movement of the assault waves to the
beach. Throughout the critical assault landing phase, while in this minimum
defensive position, they unhappily were in triple jeopardy from coast defense
guns, submarines, and air attack. As Rear Admiral Hill noted:

Close fire support ships were required to remain dead in the water in
accurate positions prescribed, from HOW minus THIRTY until the passage
of the last assault boat wave. The final support positions were established
to place heavy ships at the stipulated minimum distance of 2000 yards from
the nearest shoal or reef, and destroyers 1500 yards.

Ammunition replacement was another constant worry. At the end of Dog
plus two:

With no immediate replacement of ammunition available, it became necessary
to restrict the rate of starshell expenditure to 6 per hour per ship except

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for emergencies, and to limit the amount of AA common available for support
of troops to all in excess of 60 rounds per gun, per ship, which was to
be held in reserve for surface and air action.106

Rear Admiral Hill, a long time naval gunnery expert, finished up the
Saipan operation with a very warm feeling for the naval gunfire support
provided. He wrote:

There can remain little doubt that naval gunfire is the most feared
and most effective of all weapons which the Japanese are confronted in
resisting a landing and assault. Without exception, prisoners of war have
stated that naval gunfire prevented their movement by day or night and
was the most deciding factor in accomplishing their
defeat.107

This opinion was supported by the Chief of Staff of the Japanese high
command on Saipan who in reporting to Army Headquarters in Tokyo, radioed:

The call fire on land is extremely quick and exact and until night attack
units are some tens of meters from the enemy, they continue to receive
naval gunfire.

* * * * *

If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that
we could fight it out with the enemy in decisive battle.108

The most vocal supporters of naval gunfire effectiveness were the Japanese
prisoners and diarists. Among their many plugs for the Navy gun, the following
are selected:

[POW] The greatest single factor in the American success [was] naval
gunfire--

[Diarist] Practically all our anti-aircraft guns and machine gun positions
were destroyed by bombing and shelling on the 13th, 14th and 15th. . . .

* * * * *

[Diarist] I have at last come to the place where I will die. I am pleased
to think that I will die calmly in true samurai style. Naval gun fire supported
this attack which was too terrible for words. [Diary 13 June, Day of Bombardment
by fast battleships].109

--921--

As previously noted, there were some balancing U.S. opinions to come
to light a bit later.

Since the length of the shore gun bombardment is always brought into
question in connection with an assault landing, it is worth stating that
long continued shore gun bombardment by heavy ships always draws enemy
submarines to the area like bees to a honey comb. It was true at Guadalcanal,
in the Gilberts, and in the Marshalls. So there was and is a naval reluctance
to stay still in one spot in an area or even to stay around in an area
too long and invite submarine attack. This is despite the real advantages
to the assaulting troops of a long continued gun bombardment.

A study of Japanese naval records by the Far East Command in the early
1950's indicated that the Japanese lost fourteen submarines in the Marianas
area during June and July 1944. These were RO-36, 42, 44, 48, 111, 114,
117, the I-5, 10, 26, 54, 55, 184,
185.110
It was a minor miracle, despite
our very excellent anti-submarine defense, that the ships of Task Force
51 and of Task Force 58 remained for long weeks in the vicinity of the
Marianas without sustaining losses from these Japanese submarines.

The Hard Won Victory

While the skill of our commanders was great and the valor of our troops
unending, the battle was made longer by the low ratio of assaulting troops
to enemy defenders. It would be unperceptive not to say also that a basic
ingredient in the long and bloody struggle for Saipan was the confidence
of the Japanese Commander and his troops in their ability to defeat an
amphibious assault.

And a quixotic ingredient in the cause of the Japanese eventual defeat
is drawn from the following record:

A POW taken late in the preceding period near Matansa, states that he
is a chief Petty Officer. Was Chief Yeoman to Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander
Central Pacific Area, with Headquarters at Garapan, Saipan. POW states
that Vice Admiral Nagumo and Rear Admiral Yano committed suicide 1030 7
July at the temporary headquarters located inland from Matansa. POW witnessed
the suicides. . . . POW, acting in his capacity of Chief Yeoman wrote
the order issued by Vice Admiral Nagumo for the counter attack against
our forces on the morning of 7 July. The same order commanded

--922--

all civilian
and military personnel remaining on the north end of Saipan to commit suicide
on 7 July. . . .111

Saipan Land Marks

As one of the most experienced amphibians, Commodore H.B. Knowles,
wrote at the end of the war in regard to amphibious techniques:

The Saipan Landing Plan is a landmark in Pacific amphibious history,
for it incorporates what became the technique for all later amphibious
landings in the Central Pacific and the major assaults in the Philippines.
Described in this plan for the first time are the duties and organization
of a control and beachmaster set up to handle a landing of multiple troop
divisions; an expanded communication net work to cover this more complex
structure; a system for the transfer of assault troops to LSTs in the
final staging area and the despatch of LVTs at the Line of Departure with
troops already embarked; the use of rocket and mortar ships in direct support
of the assault waves; and the addition of hospital LSTs close in shore
to speed casualty handling.112

41.
Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry to inquire into all the circumstances connected
with the explosion in the LST-353 and the subsequent explosion in other ships in West
Loch on May 21, 1944, Ser 001466 of 22 May 1944. Rear Admiral John P. Shafroth, Jr., USN,
President of the Court.