What is intentionality? Intentionality is a distinguishing characteristic of states of mind such as beliefs, thoughts, wishes, dreams, and desires, which are about things outside themselves. This ...
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What is intentionality? Intentionality is a distinguishing characteristic of states of mind such as beliefs, thoughts, wishes, dreams, and desires, which are about things outside themselves. This book explores various ways in which philosophers have tried to explain intentionality, and then suggests a new way. Part I of the book gives a critical account of the five most comprehensive and prominent current approaches to intentionality. These approaches can be summarized as the instrumentalist approach, derived from Carnap and Quine, and culminating in the work of Daniel Dennett; the linguistic approach, derived from the work of Chomsky and exhibited most fully in the work of Jerry Fodor; the biological approach, developed by Ruth Garrett Millikan, Colin McGinn, and others; the information-processing approach, which has been given a definitive form in the work of Fred Dretske; and the functional role approach of Brian Loar. Part II sets out a multi-level, developmental approach to intentionality. Drawing upon work in neurophysiology and psychology, the book argues that intentionality is to be found, in different forms, at the levels of brain functioning, prelinguistic consciousness, language, and at the holistic level of ‘whole person performance’ which is demarcated by our ordinary everyday talk about beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions, and the other ‘propositional attitudes’.Less

Approaches to Intentionality

William Lyons

Published in print: 1997-12-04

What is intentionality? Intentionality is a distinguishing characteristic of states of mind such as beliefs, thoughts, wishes, dreams, and desires, which are about things outside themselves. This book explores various ways in which philosophers have tried to explain intentionality, and then suggests a new way. Part I of the book gives a critical account of the five most comprehensive and prominent current approaches to intentionality. These approaches can be summarized as the instrumentalist approach, derived from Carnap and Quine, and culminating in the work of Daniel Dennett; the linguistic approach, derived from the work of Chomsky and exhibited most fully in the work of Jerry Fodor; the biological approach, developed by Ruth Garrett Millikan, Colin McGinn, and others; the information-processing approach, which has been given a definitive form in the work of Fred Dretske; and the functional role approach of Brian Loar. Part II sets out a multi-level, developmental approach to intentionality. Drawing upon work in neurophysiology and psychology, the book argues that intentionality is to be found, in different forms, at the levels of brain functioning, prelinguistic consciousness, language, and at the holistic level of ‘whole person performance’ which is demarcated by our ordinary everyday talk about beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions, and the other ‘propositional attitudes’.

This book is about how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative, and how we might use this idea to give satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted ...
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This book is about how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative, and how we might use this idea to give satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis. Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on relativism about truth, it has tended to focus on refutations of the doctrine, or refutations of these refutations, at the expense of saying clearly what the doctrine is. The aim here is to start by giving a clear account of what it is to be a relativist about truth, and then to use the view to give satisfying accounts of what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do. The book seeks to provide a richer framework for the description of linguistic practices than standard truth-conditional semantics affords: one that allows not just standard contextual sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context in which an expression is used), but assessment sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context from which a use of an expression is assessed).Less

Assessment Sensitivity : Relative Truth and its Applications

John MacFarlane

Published in print: 2014-04-17

This book is about how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative, and how we might use this idea to give satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis. Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on relativism about truth, it has tended to focus on refutations of the doctrine, or refutations of these refutations, at the expense of saying clearly what the doctrine is. The aim here is to start by giving a clear account of what it is to be a relativist about truth, and then to use the view to give satisfying accounts of what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do. The book seeks to provide a richer framework for the description of linguistic practices than standard truth-conditional semantics affords: one that allows not just standard contextual sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context in which an expression is used), but assessment sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context from which a use of an expression is assessed).

This book aims to reconcile pragmatism (in both its classical American and its Wittgensteinian forms) with analytic philosophy. It investigates relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions ...
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This book aims to reconcile pragmatism (in both its classical American and its Wittgensteinian forms) with analytic philosophy. It investigates relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions and their use. Giving due weight both to what one has to do in order to count as saying various things and to what one needs to say in order to specify those doings makes it possible to shed new light on the relations between semantics (the theory of the meanings of utterances and the contents of thoughts) and pragmatics (the theory of the functional relations among meaningful or contentful items). Among the vocabularies whose interrelated use and meaning are considered are: logical, indexical, modal, normative, and intentional vocabulary. As the argument proceeds, new ways of thinking about the classical analytic core programs of empiricism, naturalism, and functionalism are offered, as well as novel insights about the ideas of artificial intelligence, the nature of logic, and intentional relations between subjects and objects.Less

Between Saying and Doing : Towards an Analytic Pragmatism

Robert B. Brandom

Published in print: 2008-04-24

This book aims to reconcile pragmatism (in both its classical American and its Wittgensteinian forms) with analytic philosophy. It investigates relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions and their use. Giving due weight both to what one has to do in order to count as saying various things and to what one needs to say in order to specify those doings makes it possible to shed new light on the relations between semantics (the theory of the meanings of utterances and the contents of thoughts) and pragmatics (the theory of the functional relations among meaningful or contentful items). Among the vocabularies whose interrelated use and meaning are considered are: logical, indexical, modal, normative, and intentional vocabulary. As the argument proceeds, new ways of thinking about the classical analytic core programs of empiricism, naturalism, and functionalism are offered, as well as novel insights about the ideas of artificial intelligence, the nature of logic, and intentional relations between subjects and objects.

Humans naturally acquire languages that connect meanings with pronunciations. These distinctive languages are described here as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. Children ...
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Humans naturally acquire languages that connect meanings with pronunciations. These distinctive languages are described here as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. Children acquire meaningful lexical items that can be combined, in certain ways, to form meaningful complex expressions. This raises questions about what meanings are, how they can be combined, and what kinds of meanings lexical items can have. This book argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions. Rather, meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. More specifically, phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build monadic concepts (a.k.a. mental predicates) that are massively conjunctive, while lexical meanings are instructions for how to fetch concepts that are monadic or dyadic. This allows for polysemy, since a lexical item can be linked to an address that is shared by a family of fetchable concepts. But the posited combinatorial operations are limited and limiting. They impose severe restrictions on which concepts can be fetched for purposes of semantic composition. Correspondingly, the argument here is that in lexicalization, available representations are often used to introduce concepts that can be combined via the relevant operations.Less

Conjoining Meanings : Semantics Without Truth Values

Paul M. Pietroski

Published in print: 2018-04-12

Humans naturally acquire languages that connect meanings with pronunciations. These distinctive languages are described here as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. Children acquire meaningful lexical items that can be combined, in certain ways, to form meaningful complex expressions. This raises questions about what meanings are, how they can be combined, and what kinds of meanings lexical items can have. This book argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions. Rather, meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. More specifically, phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build monadic concepts (a.k.a. mental predicates) that are massively conjunctive, while lexical meanings are instructions for how to fetch concepts that are monadic or dyadic. This allows for polysemy, since a lexical item can be linked to an address that is shared by a family of fetchable concepts. But the posited combinatorial operations are limited and limiting. They impose severe restrictions on which concepts can be fetched for purposes of semantic composition. Correspondingly, the argument here is that in lexicalization, available representations are often used to introduce concepts that can be combined via the relevant operations.

The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, ...
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The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.Less

Garry Hagberg

Published in print: 2008-05-22

The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.

In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory ...
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In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory of thought, meaning, action, and evaluation. This volume features specially written essays from the most important philosophers working on the subject, and the collection reappraises Davidson’s philosophy with an engaging and illuminating discussion of various problems in the philosophy of truth, meaning, and the mental. In particular, Lepore and Ludwig’s interpretation of Davidson’s philosophy presents a new look and systematization of his philosophy of language, meaning, and thought. Davidson has been a considerable presence in the philosophical landscape since the 1970s, but from the contemporary point of view we have yet to come to a decision about his final place in the annals of philosophy.Less

Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental

Gerhard Preyer

Published in print: 2012-09-06

In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory of thought, meaning, action, and evaluation. This volume features specially written essays from the most important philosophers working on the subject, and the collection reappraises Davidson’s philosophy with an engaging and illuminating discussion of various problems in the philosophy of truth, meaning, and the mental. In particular, Lepore and Ludwig’s interpretation of Davidson’s philosophy presents a new look and systematization of his philosophy of language, meaning, and thought. Davidson has been a considerable presence in the philosophical landscape since the 1970s, but from the contemporary point of view we have yet to come to a decision about his final place in the annals of philosophy.

This book looks to David Hume for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. The book claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the ...
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This book looks to David Hume for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. The book claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study of the Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much 20th-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track. Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. This book examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his ‘theory of ideas’. It discusses such key topics as the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that ‘association’ and ‘imagination’ play in cognitive processes. It argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully.Less

Hume Variations

Jerry A. Fodor

Published in print: 2005-11-24

This book looks to David Hume for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. The book claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study of the Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much 20th-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track. Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. This book examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his ‘theory of ideas’. It discusses such key topics as the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that ‘association’ and ‘imagination’ play in cognitive processes. It argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully.

When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in ...
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When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in danger and not you; that the tree looks larger from my perspective than from yours. This book is an exploration and defence of the view that perspectivality is a philosophically shallow aspect of the world. This book opposes one of the most entrenched and dominant trends in contemporary philosophy: that perspective (and the perspective of the first person in particular) is philosophically deep and that a proper understanding of it is important not just in the philosophies of language and mind, but throughout philosophy. It argues that there are no such things as essential indexicality, irreducibly de se attitudes, or self-locating attitudes. The goal is not to show that we need to rethink these phenomena, to explain them in different ways. The goal is to show that the entire topic is an illusion — there’s nothing there.Less

The Inessential Indexical : On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Herman CappelenJosh Dever

Published in print: 2013-11-14

When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in danger and not you; that the tree looks larger from my perspective than from yours. This book is an exploration and defence of the view that perspectivality is a philosophically shallow aspect of the world. This book opposes one of the most entrenched and dominant trends in contemporary philosophy: that perspective (and the perspective of the first person in particular) is philosophically deep and that a proper understanding of it is important not just in the philosophies of language and mind, but throughout philosophy. It argues that there are no such things as essential indexicality, irreducibly de se attitudes, or self-locating attitudes. The goal is not to show that we need to rethink these phenomena, to explain them in different ways. The goal is to show that the entire topic is an illusion — there’s nothing there.

This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because ...
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This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error — if it requires certainty — then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error — as seems required if we know much of anything at all — this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know. This phenomenon has come to be known as ‘pragmatic encroachment’. All of the points above, it is argued, apply equally well to justification for believing. The results, then, have ramifications for and are borne on by debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief.Less

Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Jeremy FantlMatthew McGrath

Published in print: 2009-11-05

This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error — if it requires certainty — then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error — as seems required if we know much of anything at all — this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know. This phenomenon has come to be known as ‘pragmatic encroachment’. All of the points above, it is argued, apply equally well to justification for believing. The results, then, have ramifications for and are borne on by debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief.

This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends ...
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This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.Less

LOT 2 : The Language of Thought Revisited

Jerry A. Fodor

Published in print: 2008-08-28

This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.

In these chapters this book attempts to come to terms with the views that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language, that thought and language are ...
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In these chapters this book attempts to come to terms with the views that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language, that thought and language are best understood together via a theory of interpetation and that the mental is irreducible to the physical mental. In some cases these chapters elaborate and in some cases they criticize. But each is still on the cutting edge of work in philosophy of language and mind.Less

Meaning, Mind, and Matter : Philosophical Essays

Ernie LeporeBarry Loewer

Published in print: 2011-03-03

In these chapters this book attempts to come to terms with the views that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language, that thought and language are best understood together via a theory of interpetation and that the mental is irreducible to the physical mental. In some cases these chapters elaborate and in some cases they criticize. But each is still on the cutting edge of work in philosophy of language and mind.

This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to ...
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This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.Less

Mental Files

François Recanati

Published in print: 2012-12-06

This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.

This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on ...
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This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names.Less

Mental Files in Flux

François Recanati

Published in print: 2016-12-01

This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names.

This book provides a philosophical theory explicating the cognitive contribution of metaphor. Metaphor effects a transference of meaning, not between two terms, but between two structured domains of ...
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This book provides a philosophical theory explicating the cognitive contribution of metaphor. Metaphor effects a transference of meaning, not between two terms, but between two structured domains of content, or ‘semantic fields’. Semantic fields, construed as necessary to a theory of word-meaning, provide the contrastive and affinitive relations that govern a term’s literal use. In a metaphoric use, these relations are projected into a second domain which is thereby reordered with significant cognitive effects. The book provides a revision and refinement of ‘the semantic theory of metaphor’. Taking into account pragmatic considerations and recent linguistic and psychological studies, the book aims to forge a new understanding of the relation between metaphoric and literal meaning. It illustrates the thesis with sensitive and systematic analyses of metaphors found in literature, philosophy, science, and everyday language.Less

Metaphor : Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure

Eva Feder Kittay

Published in print: 1990-01-25

This book provides a philosophical theory explicating the cognitive contribution of metaphor. Metaphor effects a transference of meaning, not between two terms, but between two structured domains of content, or ‘semantic fields’. Semantic fields, construed as necessary to a theory of word-meaning, provide the contrastive and affinitive relations that govern a term’s literal use. In a metaphoric use, these relations are projected into a second domain which is thereby reordered with significant cognitive effects. The book provides a revision and refinement of ‘the semantic theory of metaphor’. Taking into account pragmatic considerations and recent linguistic and psychological studies, the book aims to forge a new understanding of the relation between metaphoric and literal meaning. It illustrates the thesis with sensitive and systematic analyses of metaphors found in literature, philosophy, science, and everyday language.

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s ...
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Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. It is widely conceded, thanks to famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, that there is a kind of mental content that is not narrow. But it is often maintained that there is also a kind of mental content that is narrow, and that such content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope. It carefully distinguishes a variety of conceptions of narrow content and a variety of explanatory roles that might be assigned to narrow content. It then argues that, once we pay sufficient attention to the details, there is no promising theory of narrow content in the offing.Less

Narrow Content

Juhani Yli-VakkuriJohn Hawthorne

Published in print: 2018-05-31

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. It is widely conceded, thanks to famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, that there is a kind of mental content that is not narrow. But it is often maintained that there is also a kind of mental content that is narrow, and that such content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope. It carefully distinguishes a variety of conceptions of narrow content and a variety of explanatory roles that might be assigned to narrow content. It then argues that, once we pay sufficient attention to the details, there is no promising theory of narrow content in the offing.

This book presents ten new essays about singular (de re) thought by a distinguished international group of philosophers of mind and language, as well as a comprehensive introduction by the editor. ...
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This book presents ten new essays about singular (de re) thought by a distinguished international group of philosophers of mind and language, as well as a comprehensive introduction by the editor. The contributors are: Kent Bach, John Campbell, Imogen Dickie, Manuel García‐Carpintero, Robin Jeshion, François Recanati, R.M. Sainsbury, Nathan Salmon, Arthur Sullivan, and Kenneth Taylor. The essays in this collection explore three main and overlapping sets of topics. One concerns the relationship between singular thought and perception. How does perception enable us to think non‐discursive thought about objects? Are there intermediaries, like sense data, that serve as the constituents of thought contents or is our thought on the basis of perceptual experience directly about the objects we perceive? The second concerns the relationship between singular thought and the semantics of demonstratives, indexicals, descriptions, proper names, and pronouns. What is the semantic content of these singular terms, and how do their semantic properties structure the nature of thoughts employing them? Topics addressed include puzzles about informative identities and the representation of them at the mentalistic level; belief attributions; the transfer of singular thought in communication; the semantics of empty referring expressions and fictional names. The third topic explores questions about the epistemic conditions for having singular thought. Is some variety of acquaintance necessary for singular thought, as Russell held? Can we convert descriptive, de dicto, thoughts into singular thoughts by manipulating the semantics, and what does this show about the mind's dependence upon language in structuring the nature of thought?Less

New Essays on Singular Thought

Published in print: 2010-06-03

This book presents ten new essays about singular (de re) thought by a distinguished international group of philosophers of mind and language, as well as a comprehensive introduction by the editor. The contributors are: Kent Bach, John Campbell, Imogen Dickie, Manuel García‐Carpintero, Robin Jeshion, François Recanati, R.M. Sainsbury, Nathan Salmon, Arthur Sullivan, and Kenneth Taylor. The essays in this collection explore three main and overlapping sets of topics. One concerns the relationship between singular thought and perception. How does perception enable us to think non‐discursive thought about objects? Are there intermediaries, like sense data, that serve as the constituents of thought contents or is our thought on the basis of perceptual experience directly about the objects we perceive? The second concerns the relationship between singular thought and the semantics of demonstratives, indexicals, descriptions, proper names, and pronouns. What is the semantic content of these singular terms, and how do their semantic properties structure the nature of thoughts employing them? Topics addressed include puzzles about informative identities and the representation of them at the mentalistic level; belief attributions; the transfer of singular thought in communication; the semantics of empty referring expressions and fictional names. The third topic explores questions about the epistemic conditions for having singular thought. Is some variety of acquaintance necessary for singular thought, as Russell held? Can we convert descriptive, de dicto, thoughts into singular thoughts by manipulating the semantics, and what does this show about the mind's dependence upon language in structuring the nature of thought?

This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and ...
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This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a precise statement of propositionalism has been left undeveloped; (ii) the motivations for propositionalism are rarely articulated; and (iii) apparent counterexamples and challenges to propositionalism, along with non-propositional theories of intentionality, are underexplored. The contributors to this volume explore and correct these impediments by discussing in detail what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; by shedding light on why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and by exploring the ways in which one might depart from propositionalism.Less

Non-Propositional Intentionality

Published in print: 2018-08-02

This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a precise statement of propositionalism has been left undeveloped; (ii) the motivations for propositionalism are rarely articulated; and (iii) apparent counterexamples and challenges to propositionalism, along with non-propositional theories of intentionality, are underexplored. The contributors to this volume explore and correct these impediments by discussing in detail what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; by shedding light on why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and by exploring the ways in which one might depart from propositionalism.

The work of Charles Travis belongs to the analytical tradition, yet is also radically at odds with many assumptions characteristic of the tradition. Such an approach, while being at odds with some ...
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The work of Charles Travis belongs to the analytical tradition, yet is also radically at odds with many assumptions characteristic of the tradition. Such an approach, while being at odds with some dominant strains of thought, does speak to a strand of the analytical tradition running from Frege, through Cook Wilson, Wittgenstein, and Austin, up to aspects of contemporary thinkers as diverse as Chomsky and McDowell. This volume is the first of its kind. It collects thirteen previously unpublished papers, including one of the last papers of the late Hilary Putnam, that tackle a range of issues arising in Travis’s work, offering both critical and positive responses. The volume also includes detailed replies by Travis to each of the papers and an introductory chapter by the editors that situates Travis’s ideas in the context of contemporary philosophy of language and mind. The volume divides into three sections, relating to language, thought, and perception. Topics covered in detail include: the character of linguistic and perceptual representation; the nature and evidential role of intuitions; Gottlob Frege; Ludwig Wittgenstein; the role of context in fixing speech content; and the structure of thought.Less

The Philosophy of Charles Travis : Language, Thought, and Perception

Published in print: 2018-07-12

The work of Charles Travis belongs to the analytical tradition, yet is also radically at odds with many assumptions characteristic of the tradition. Such an approach, while being at odds with some dominant strains of thought, does speak to a strand of the analytical tradition running from Frege, through Cook Wilson, Wittgenstein, and Austin, up to aspects of contemporary thinkers as diverse as Chomsky and McDowell. This volume is the first of its kind. It collects thirteen previously unpublished papers, including one of the last papers of the late Hilary Putnam, that tackle a range of issues arising in Travis’s work, offering both critical and positive responses. The volume also includes detailed replies by Travis to each of the papers and an introductory chapter by the editors that situates Travis’s ideas in the context of contemporary philosophy of language and mind. The volume divides into three sections, relating to language, thought, and perception. Topics covered in detail include: the character of linguistic and perceptual representation; the nature and evidential role of intuitions; Gottlob Frege; Ludwig Wittgenstein; the role of context in fixing speech content; and the structure of thought.

This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, ...
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This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.Less

Pursuing Meaning

Emma Borg

Published in print: 2012-05-31

This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.

This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special ...
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This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.Less

The Reference Book

John HawthorneDavid Manley

Published in print: 2012-03-29

This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.

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