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A Handbook of Contemporary Research

Research Handbooks in Intellectual Property series

Edited by Toshiko Takenka

This major Handbook provides a comprehensive research source for patent protection in three major jurisdictions: the United States, Europe and Japan.
Leading patent scholars and practitioners join together to give an innovative comparative analysis both of fundamental issues such as patentability, examination procedure and the scope of patent protection, and current issues such as patent protection for industry standards, computer software and business methods. Keeping in mind the important goal of world harmonization, the contributing authors challenge current systems and propose necessary changes for promoting innovation.

Chapter 14: Back to the Graham Factors: Nonobviousness after KSR v. Teleflex

Handbook Chapter

Extract

14 Back to the Graham factors: nonobviousness after KSR v. Teleflex Elizabeth A. Richardson* Introduction To be patentable, an invention must have utility, it must be new, and it must be different enough from what has come before such that it is not merely an obvious advance. Nonobviousness is thus a central part of the bargain between the inventor and society; an invention that is simply obvious over the prior art is not worthy of the limited monopoly a patent provides, because such an invention contributes less to society than an invention that represents a greater (nonobvious) advance. Akin to the ‘inventive step’ in many other jurisdictions, nonobviousness is in some respects the heart and soul of patentability, separating the truly innovative wheat from the chaff of unpatentable minor improvements. In the United States, nonobviousness as a requirement for patentability is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), which provides in relevant part: A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [novelty], if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.1 This fairly straightforward statutory language belies a far more complex tapestry of case law, from both the United States Supreme Court and the...

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