Munawar Ahmad Anees examines the impact of the fall of the Ottoman
Khalifa on the Indian Muslims and argues that we should use this
experience to rethink the political basis of the Khilafat

While Kemal Ataturk and his associates were busy abolishing the
Ottoman Khilafah, another drama intrinsically linked with their
actions, was being played in India which during the late Ottoman
period, like the Ottoman Empire itself, was going through a traumatic
period. India had, for almost 800 years, been a Muslim country,
but it was never part of the Ottoman Empire. However, it then became
a colony of an alien empire -a status which the vast majority of
Muslims were fighting to change. The institution of the Khilafah
played a special inspirational, emotional and practical role for
the Indian muslims. How the Indian Muslims reacted to the demise
of the Khilafah gives us a special insight into the theory and practice
of the institution itself and how it could be perceived in the future.

Perhaps the most dominant theme of this period in Indian Muslim
history was treachery. Nawab Salar Jung, the late Prime Minister
of Hyderabad Daccan, personified this theme when, in December 1887,
he stated:

'England has in India some fifty millions of moslem subjects,
including in their mass the most war-like of the native races...
and England is not likely to forget that it was these very races
who, in 1857, at the bidding of their caliph, the Sultan Abdul Medjid,
gave their united support to the British connection at that supreme
moment when their defection might have cost the life of every white
man and woman in India. My late father frequently assured me that
the whole influence of the caliphate was used most unremittingly
from Constantinople to check the spread of mutiny, to rally round
the English standards the Mussulman races of India - and that in
this way the debt that Turkey owed to Great Britain for British
support in the Crimea was paid in full. And the time may come again
when the devotion of the mussulmans to their caliph and the shrine
of St. Sophie may be not less necessary to great Britain than in
1857.' (quoted from Rafiuddin Ahmad, A Muslim view of Abdul Hamid
and the Powers, nineteenth century, volume 38, P. 162, July 1895).

Nearly thirty six years after Salar Jung's statement on the loyalty
of Muslims of the British crown, Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad,
the second `Khilafah' of the heretical Ahmadiyya Jama'at of Qadian,
declared this Muslim loyalty to be due to their religious obligation.
In a paper written for the All-India Muslim Conference held at Lucknow
on September 21, 1919 to consider the question of the future of
Turkey (a condensed version of the first part of which appeared
under the title The Future of Turkey in Muslim World (Hartford,
Connecticut volume 10, issue 3, PP. 274-281, 1920), he expressed
the view that:

`So long as Turkey was at war with Great Britain, a considerable
number of Indian mussulmans were fighting against her, and it is
likely that thousands of Turks have lost their lives at the hands
of these mussulmans. But such action on the part of the mussulmans
was no proof of the fact that they felt no sympathy for the Turks.
It was merely an illustration of the law that a lower principle
has always to be subordinated to a higher one. Loyalty to the British
government was to the mussulmans a religions duty, since they had
received many favours from the said Government.' It is obvious that
Nawwab Salar Jung and Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad were not alone
in their adamant support for the British rule over Muslim India,
as the Nawwab noted, the Ottoman Khilafah in Istanbul did not view
the 1857 freedom struggle as a Muslim cause and exploited his Titular
officer for his own political ends by issuing a Fatwa (religious
declaration) that called upon Indian Muslims not to rise against
the British. This being true, one may aptly ask on what grounds,
during their declaration of war against Britain and France on November
11, 1914, the Ottoman rulers issued a proclamation of Jihad on November
25, 1914 and called upon Muslims under Ottoman dominion in particular,
and the rest of the Muslims in general, to join the Ottoman war?
The proclamation read: `The Muslims in general who are under the
oppressive grasp of the aforesaid tyrannical governments in such
places as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, and India,
and those dwelling in China, Afghanistan, Africa and other regions
of the earth, are hastening to join in this Great Jihad to the best
of their abili ty, with life and property, alongside the Ottomans,
in conformity with the relevant holy Fatwas.' (signed by Shaykh
Al-Islam Khayri Effendi. Translation of a text discovered by professor
Abul Latif Tibawi in the London public record office - see Islamic
Quarter ly, Volume 19, Issue 3-4 pp. 157-163, 1975).

While the various Indian Muslim groups were denying allegiance
to the Ottoman Khilafah, what was happening elsewhere in the Muslim
world? The Ottoman Empire itself was falling apart rapidly. While
there were numerous outside forces -one must not overlook the fact
that the Ottomans provided the only real challenge and threat to
Christendom for over 600 years - it was rotten from inside too.
Administrative corruption, intrigues, conspiracies, and anachronism
of the ruling elites were but some of the more significant factors.
Of course, the rise of Arab nationalism and the ritual scapegoat
of seeing an invisible foreign hand in all ills at home could be
easily taken as the causative agents. However, there are other sides
to this most complex period of recent Muslim history. Muslim intellectual
impotence as reflected by the pre-eminence of Western science and
technology, conflict ing ideals of pan-Islamism and Muslim or Arab
nationalism, the unique mobilization of Muslim masses in India under
the banner of the Khilafat Movement, their migration (hijra) to
Afghanistan, the Muslim failures at international diplomacy, and
the role of non-Muslim minorities (millets) under Ottoman rule are
some of the other factors that promoted the downfall of the Ottoman
Khilafah.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the prolonged threat
posed to the Western countries by Ottoman rule has invariably created
a very strong bias against things Turkish. Historiography of the
Ottoman period as recorded in Western annals, therefore, has not
remained immune from these prejudices. In this context, the observation
of Andre Raymond is quite suggestive for Western and Arab historians
alike"` .. Arab historians feel reluctant to study a phase of their
past which they tend, by analogy with a more recent period of their
history, to consider as colonial. The general obscurity which still
shadows the Ottoman era must ac count for the rest of its discredit
in the eyes of modern historians. It is, however, a somewhat incomprehensible
obscurity, as sources exist for that period, more numerous, more
abundant, and more varied than for any other period of Muslim history,
especially in the field of archival documentation. This biased view
of the Ottoman era has facilitated the falsifying of modern history
of the Arab countries for the purpose of justifying European colonization.'
(International Journal of Turkish stud ies, P. 84, 1981).

It is plausible to assume that the ideological fervor that accompanied
the expression of Arab nationalism during the Ottoman period was,
in part, inspired by the vocal and agitated non- Muslim minorities
living under Turkish rule. These minority groups, known as millets
(from Arabic millah - a rite, nation or community), were quite numerous
and spread far and wide through out the empire. Nasim Sousa records
that by 1914, there were at least thirteen millet groups each with
a distinct social, ethnic, and religious background: Armenian Catholics,
Armenian Georgians, Bulgarian Catholics, Catholics, Chaldean Catholics,
Greeks, Jews (of the two rites), Maronites, Melkits, Nestorians,
Protestants, Syrian Catholics and Syrian Jacobites. (see: The Capitulatory
Regime of Turkey - its history, origin and nature, Baltimore, P.
89, 1933).

For the express benefit of millet groups, Ottoman rulers are known
to have introduced a number of reforms going back to the first quarter
of the nineteenth century. These and subsequent reforms were, by
and large, unsuccessful. Ottoman rulers, follow ing the dictates
of their religion, did not dare to mutilate the ethnic and religious
configurations of millet groups and extended unilateral concessions
to these minorities but these non-Muslim groups were not forthcoming
in accepting these reforms. The ecclesiastical leadership, especially,
opposed these measures for they perceived them as an attempt towards
assimilation and subsequent loss of their independence. On the other
hand, the Ottoman xenophobic propaganda does find its legitimacy
in the fact that foreign powers manipulated these millets for their
own ends. In fact, some of the reforms may be partially traced back
to the period of foreign political pressures to which the Ottomans
were subjected. While foreign pressure prompted the Ottomans to
intro duce reforms, the same `visible' hand directed the millets
to reject those reforms.

Thus there was a gradual unfolding of drama behind the scenes
of the rise of Arab nationalism, which was an ominous sign for the
Ottoman rulers. Even fully discounting the aftermath of Western
warfare with Turkey, the role of the so-called millet groups as
disruptive forces in the empire cannot be neglected. For example,
Abdul Latif Tibawi has brought to light some of the underground
literature produced under Christian influence during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century. Reference is made here to the three widely
circulated Arabic handbills of 1880 which stress Arab ethnic origin
and a demand for autonomy (Tibawi: A Modern History of Syria, London.
Macmillan pp. 165-166, 1969). recently, Jacob M. Landau has provided
evidence for the existence of `an Arab anti-Turk handbill' 1881,
(see: Turcica - Revue D'E tudes Turques, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp.
215-227, 1977) It would be naive to argue that a handful of handbills
could topple the most expansive and powerful Muslim empire in history.
But these do seem to indicate that Ottoman history (at least in
English works) is too inconclusive, most of it is not easily accessible,
and suffers from both Western and Arab historic bias. Therefore,
the ephemeral, like these handbills, have a significance of their
own in terms of providing certain important clues for further historical
research.

It would be a fallacy to assume that Arab nationalism was a monolithic
monster running after Arab ethnic supremacy over the Turks and other
Muslims. Even during those turbulent times when the forces of nationalism
and the evil of colonialism had gripped the entire Muslim and Arab
world, sanity prevailed in certain quarters. For example, the Amir
of Makkah, Husayn Ibn Ali, up until 1916, was not an advocate of
Arab nationalism, (see: C.W. Duron, Ideological Influences in the
Arab Revolt, in The World of Islam - studies in honour of Philip
K. Hitti, edited by James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder, London,
Macmillan, pp. 233-248, 1959). Of Husayn and his son Abdullah's
attitude toward the Ottoman Khilafah, C.F. Dawn observes that: `The
Ottoman government applied the title caliphate to itself and sought
popular support among the Muslims of the world. Under the modern
theory of the caliphate, the Ottoman government had a perfectly
valid claim to the title as long as it enforced the Shari'ah. Abdullah
and Husayn obviously regarded the Ottoman government's claim to
the title as genuine, and just as obviously believed that most Muslims
shared their opinion' (Dawn, Op. Cit., p. 246). It was only after
Husayn failed in his efforts to extract some concessions for his
political interests within the framework of the Ottoman empire that
he joined the Arab nationalistic ex tremes. Abdullah Ibn Husayn,
on the other hand, began to toute to the theory of Arab pre-eminence.

This brings us to an important juncture in the history of the
spread of pan-Islamism during the late phases of the Ottoman era.
Diametrically opposed to Arab nationalism, as espoused on the basis
of purely territorial or ethnic origin, was the dialectic of pan-Islamism
that found varied expressions with its adherents across the Muslim
world. Aziz Ahmad perhaps provides us with the best historical account
of that period (see: Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964,
London, Oxford University Press, Chapter vi pp. 123-140, 1967).
He argues that it was only after the enforced separation of the
Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and the signing of the treaty of
Kuchuk Kaynarja in 1774, that the universal claim to Khilafah was
advocated by Turks and was ac cepted by the Russians. It was by
virtue of the universality of their claim, that the British extracted
a Fatwa from the Ottoman against the 1857 freedom struggle of Indian
Muslims. On the other hand, prior to this Ottoman proclamation,
one of the prominent Indian Muslims, Shah Muhammad Ishaq, grandson
of Shah Wali Allah migrated to the Hijaz in 1841 and offered his
support for Ottoman policies. Later, Indian groups such as Nadwat
Al' Ulama and Deoband schools joined in this pro-Ottoman policy
by giving credence to the universality of the Turkish Khilafah.

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Jamal Ad-din Al-
Afghani (b. 1839) had emerged as the spearhead of the pan-Islamic
movement and he left his mark on Muslim lands such as India, Muslim
Russia, Egypt and the Ottoman empire. His collaboration with Shaykh
Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) resulted in the publication of the famous
anti-imperialist journal 'Urwat Al-Wuthqa. The ideas of Muhammad
Abduh were later disseminated by his pupil Muhammad Rashid Rida
(d. 1935). Abdallah Ibn Husayn is known to have maintained close
relations with Muhammad Rashid before 1914. C.E. Dawn maintains
that Abdallah borrowed his theory of Arabism from Muhammad Rashid.
Both Abduh and Rashid developed the theory of Arabism on the basis
of the pre-eminence of Arabs: the Qur'an was an Arabic book, the
blessed Prophet was an Arab, and, there fore, Arab Muslims are best
suited to lead a universal Islamic revival. For this to hapen, Arab
revival was seen by both of them as a pre-requisite. However, unlike
Abd Ar-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, neither Abduh nor Rashid made Islam subordinate
to Arabism. Al-Afghani, in the beginning, detested the so-called
machiavellian propaganda of Sultan Abd Al-Hamid II and continued
to argue for his strategy of Pan-Islamism: "Re-thinking the whole
system of Islam without breaking with the past" as Muhammad Iqbal
puts it. However, during the late years of his life, Al-Afghani
ac cepted an invitation from Sultan Abd Al-Hamid II to settle in
Istanbul and work for him. There he remained an influential figure
for a short time. Then, like so many other idealists, he fell into
disgrace through court intrigues, and died in 1897.

On the Indian Muslim intellectual scene, we have already mentioned
that people like Nawwab Salar Jung and Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud
Ahmad, under different pretexts, advocated a strong loyal ty to
the British crown. Apart from these the role of Seyyed Ahmad Khan
(d. 1898) and that of his associate Shibli Nu'mani, are also important.
From the period of the Crimean War to 1878, Britain encouraged a
pro-Turkish policy for Muslim India. Seyyed Ahmad Khan followed
the dictum as long as it was perpetuated by the British. In one
of his famous works, Tahzib Al-Akhlaq, he is on record as praising
the reforms in the Ottoman Dominions. However, with British policy
turning anti-Turkish, Seyyed Ahmad Khan went with the wind and quickly
announced his loyalty as a British subject. He rejected even the
spiritual jurisdiction of the Ottoman Khilafah. Mawlana Shibli Nu'mani
held the view that the real Khilafah had ended with the first four
Khulafa Ar- Rashidun and protested the ban imposed by Sultan Abd
Al-Hamid II against discussions on this vital subject.

It may be argued that Seyyed Ahmad Khan's policy of absolute loyalty
was a protectionist measure to ensure the survival of his educational
reforms, or else that he sought no further violent confrontation
with the West. On the other hand, Al-Afghani was diametrically opposed
to creating regional defences for Islam. In his universal outlook
for Muslim revival, he strongly criticised the ideas of Seyyed Ahmad
Khan. While Al-Afghani perceived the protection of the Muslim Ummah
on a Pan-Islamic scale and argued for taking up the challenge of
the Western onslaught, Seyyed Ahmad Khan's vision of Muslim revival
was territorically limited to India, suffered from the presence
of a docile polity that was utterly submissive to British imperialist
rule, and had no provision for a universal Khilafah whether as a
temporal or spiritual symbol. The legacy of Al-Afghani may be said
to have been continued in the ideas of Mawlana Abu Al-Kalam Azad
(1888-1958). Initially, he was influenced by the ideology propagated
by Aligarh Muslim University, founded by Seyyed Ahmad Khan. However,
Seyyed Ahmad Khan's teachings in Muslim political inactivity and
continued subservience to British rule was rejected by Mawlana Azad.
In order to awaken the Indian Muslims to their vital political obligations,
he started publishing a weekly, Al-Hilal (The Crescent), in 1912.
From that time on, Mawlana Azad professed a Pan-Islamic ideology
and following the First World War conflict between Turkey and Britain,
he supported the Ottoman Khilafah. During the period 1912-1920,
he had a firm belief in the universal concept of Khilafah, with
its attendant temporal and spiritual symbolism. He believed that
Sultan Selim, who was the conqueror of Egypt and Syria in 1517,
received an oath of allegiance from the last Abbasid Khilafah, Al-Mutawakkil.
(As a correction to this widely- held idea of the formal transfer
of the authority of Khilafah from Al-Mutawakkil to the Turkish Sultan
Selim, we may cite at this point the observations of Halil Inalcik,
`Islam in the Ottoman Empire', Cultura Turcica (Ankara), Volume
5-7, pp 19-29, 1968-1970. Inalcik notes that according to one tradition,
follow ing a ceremony at Aya Sofya Mosque in Istanbul, the formal
trans fer of authority between Sultan Selim and Khilafah Al-Mutawakkil
took place. However, he argues that there is no contemporary record
of such an event and believes that this tradition originated much
later in the 18th century in order to support certain political
objectives).

However, by the end of the year 1920, Pan-Islamism had lost much
of its appeal for Mawlana Azad. It should be recalled that March
19, 1920 was a national mourning day for Muslims in India because
the delegation of the Khilafat Committee was clearly notified by
the British authorities that Turkey would be allowed to retain only
those areas that were ethnically Turkish and she would lose all
other lands. For the members of the Khilafat Movement, this was
the end of the traditional Ottoman Khilafah.

It is plausible to argue that in the aftermath of the First World
War and the loss of the Ottoman Khilafah, with a concomitant rise
of Arab and Turkish nationalism, Mawlana Azad saw little chance
of success in clinging to the ideals of Pan-Islamism. Certain other
factors might have contributed towards this end. For instance, MK
Gandhi, one-time supporter of the Indian Khilafat movement, had
started objecting to the extra-territorial allegiance of Indian
Muslims. This prompted Mawlana Azad to go for greater Muslim-Hindu
cooperation in getting the Birtish out of India. His transition
from Pan-Islamism to Indian nationalism proved to be so strong that
in 1940 when the majority of Muslims gave their consent for an independent
Pakistan, he, in his presi dential address before the Ramgarh session
of the Indian National Congress, spoke of his Indian pride in these
words: I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality..
I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid
structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element which
has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim (see:
Khutbat-I Abu Al-Kalam Azad, Lahore, Al-Manara Academy, p 317, N.D.)
Thus ended the career of another Pan-Islamist, who became a victim
of parochial nationalism.

At the heel of Pan-Islamism - that had failed to achieve tangible
results - emerged the unique mobilization of Muslims known as "The
Khilafat Movement". While Arab nationalism was shaped under the
influence of foreign powers and non-Muslim minorities living in
the Ottoman Empire, and due to a lack of unanimity on the concept
of universal Khilafah, this movement by Indian Muslims owned its
Raison D'etre to complete rejection of nationalism, upholding the
cause of universal Khilafah and denunciation of foreign political
control. In many respects, it was identical to the ideals of Pan-Islamism
except that it vigorously supported the continuation of Turkish
Khilafah. Opinions differ on the motives underlying the inception
of the Khilafat movement. For instance, the movement has been seen
as a mere psychological comfort in the name of a bygone glory. It
has been dubbed even as a selfish move by Indian Muslims in the
sense that by retaining the Turkish Khilafah, they hoped to impress
upon Western powers that Muslim political strength has not faded.
This was supposedly their way out of the impending persecution by
Hindu majority in an independent India or continued repression by
the British imperialists. None of the above propositions seem to
be true in their entirety. First, the raw material for the Khilafat
movement may have been supplied by the early migration of the grandson
of Shah Wali Allah and the later institutional support of the Ottoman
Khilafah by Deoband and Nadwat Al-Ulama schools. The movement certainly
imbibed some of the ideals of Pan-Islamism, as well. Second, the
imminent emergence of an independent homeland for Muslims - Pakistan
- must have given a comfortable cushion to those who justifiably
feared persecution in a Hindu-dominated India. It, therefore, appears
that the real motives of the Khilafat movement must lie in the religious
piety of its members who had faith in universal Khilafah as symbolized
by the Turkish Sultan. Undoubtedly, the maintenance of the military
and political strength of the Ummah was an implied imperative of
the movement.

It is appropriate to recall at this point that the British were
successful in extracting yet another Fatwa, this time from the Ulama
of Hijaz by the courtesy of Husayn who was persuaded to launch an
anti-Turk revolt. In this new Fatwa, Turks were denied their right
to Khilafah, were accused of apostasy for their deposition of Sultan
Abd Al-Hamid II and thus the claim of an Arab, of the Quraysh tribe,
to universal Khilafah was legitimized. Mahmud Al-Hasan, one of the
early representatives of the Deoband School, had migrated to Hijaz
and established contacts with the Turkish representatives. When
asked to sign the Fatwa against the Turks, he refused and protested
that the charge of apostasy against the entire Turkish nation was
an un-Islamic act. He was apprehended by Husayn's agents and handed
over to the British, who imprisoned him in Malta during the period
1917-1920. It was the brothers, Muhammad and Shukat - who formally
the movement. Muhammad Ali was imprisoned by the British for nearly
five years (1914-1919) as a punishment for writing a pro- Turkish
article. When released from prison, he was given a hero's welcome
by Indian Muslims and thus started the most eventful phase of the
movement. For the next three years, Muslims and Hindus alike joined
the cause of Khilafat and the Indian National Congress became a
unified body for the people of India. However, this Muslim-Hindu
unity was short-lived, as we have already pointed out. Apart from
a divergent pursuit of political ends, Hindu leaders objected to
the so-called extra-territorial loyalty of Indian Muslims and brought
their cooperation with the movement to an end.

Mawlana Azad, in spite of his gradual replacement of Pan-Islamic
sentiments by Indian nationalist feelings, contributed towards the
emergence of the movement. He recognized the legality of Khilafah
and the need for its universal character. His Khalifat- based Pan-Islamic
vision included five essentials: allegiance of the Ummah to a single
authority, obedience, rallying under the banner of single authority,
Jihad, and emigration from a Dar Al- Harb (or land dominated by
non-Muslims). However, in view of the different Muslim states in
the world, he suggested that there be a regional leader or Imam
in each individual country who would owe his loyalty to the single
universal Khilafah. In the case of India, he had proposed that Mahmud
Al-Hasan of the Deoband School be the Imam. These five features
which shaped the universal Khilafah were indeed in full conformity
with the Pan-Islamic ideals, but Mawlana Azad could not continue
to subscribe to either of these two ideological currents.

The question of how far the Khilafat movement was able to win
adherents at home and abroad has been studied in depth by M Naeem
Qureshi of Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad (See: The Khilafat
Movement in India, 1919-1924, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University
of London, 1973). He has argued that the Ulama, who had failed in
1917 to enforce Shari'ah in the administrative policies of the Indian
government, realized that in order to salvage their own position,
they must partake in community politics. Thus, their political ambitions
gave religious coloring to a henceforth political issue and the
"resultant concord between the Ulama and the politicians was so
formidable that it turned the Khilafat into one of the most memorable
movements of modern India", (Qureshi, Journal of Asian History,
Volume 12, Issue 2, p 156, 1978). Inspite of this grand collaboration
between the Central Khilafat Committee and Jami'at Al-`Ulama, the
movement failed to give a definite sense of action to the Muslim
masses. The Khilafat movement received a mixed response from other
segments of the society. Because of concurrent political mass mobi
lization for the creation of Pakistan, the leaders of the Pakistan
Movement gave cautions support to the movement. Shi'a scholars questioned
the very claim of the Turkish Sultan to Khilafah and were not willing
to join the work of the Khilafat Committee on any consistent basis.
By 1920, internal strife had developed to such an extent that the
movement was almost suffocated. Yet another blow to the movement
came from the utter failure of mass migration in the year 1920.
The debate over whether India, after Muslims had lost political
control and were subjected by British imperialism, was Dar Al-Harb
or still retained its status as Dar Al-Islam (Hosue of Islam) may
have been initiated as early as the Fatwa of Shah Abd Al-Aziz (d.
1824) that declared India as Dar Al-Harb. The issue re-surfaced
with intensity during the Khilafat period and the Ali brothers and
Mawlana Azad, favoured migration. On the other hand, Amir Aman Allah
Khan of Afghanistan (d. 1960) provided a false hope to the intending
migrants (Muhajirun) that they would be welcomed in his country.
He even went to the extreme of promising his life in defence of
the common faith of Muslims.

Qureshi provides a chilling account of the emigration of Muslim
masses that, in the end, brought untold sufferings to those who
left their homes, and great disrepute for those who incited them
on false pretexts. A conservative estimate would put the total number
of affected people to be over 60,000 - of which nearly seventy per
cent returned to India, with the rest getting asylum or anonymity
in Turkey, Russia or Afghanistan (see: `The 'Ulama of British India
and the Hijarat of 1920', Modern Asian Studies, Volume 13, Issue
1, pp 41-59, 1979). If nothing else, Hijra was a definite manifestation
of the great frustration that Muslims were experiencing by continued
non-Muslim rule over their country. Qureshi believes that the Hijra,
"In the context of classical Islamic juristic interpretations and
Indian political develop ments, was neither illogical nor an isolated
event, but it was ill-conceived, miscalculated and ill-organized...
Thue advocates of the Hijarat were, in fact, tricked into involvement
by the machinations of the Afghan diplomacy".

To the complete dismay of the Khilafat movement, Kemalist forces
acted on March 3, 1924 to finally abolish the Khilafah. Abd Al-
Majid, who was elected as Khilafah on November 13, 1922 by the Turkish
Grand National Assembly was forced into exile and with that one
of the greatest eras of Khilafat, after the period of Al-Khulafa
Ar-Rashidun, came to an end. Aziz Ahmad (Op. Cit., p138) is of the
opinion that a letter from the Agha Khan and Amir Ali (who were
not known to be anti-Khilafat movement but were against any extremism)
sent to the Prime Minister of Turkey supporting the Muslim concern
over the Khilafah, was possibly a precipitating cause for the final
abolition. Toynbee believed that the Turkish government got suspicious
and thought that the letter was written at the (usual) instigation
of the British government.

Was the abolition of the Ottoman Khilafah the final culmination
for this historic Muslim Institution? Are there any lessons of significance
that may be learnt about Muslim political philosophy through these
episodes? Was failure upon failure - as evident through Pan-Islamism,
the Khilafat Movement and the final Turkish abolition - indicative
of our political nativity? Why is it the Muslim fate to ceaselessly
breed entities who are so much prone to foreign instigations whether
for monetary or other base political rewards? The concept of Khilafat
has in recent times become something of a romantic notion amongst
Muslims who regard the institution as preferable to those alternative
systems which political theorists have to offer. However, it has
to be pointed out that the very reason why the all-pervasive institution
of Khilafah petered out during the twentieth century was because
of the failure of the Ottoman Khilafah to overcome the political,
scientific and industrial might of the west. Thoughts and actions
today, which are based on emotions and romanticism are unlikely
to be the anchors on which to build the edifice of a functioning
Khilafat. Indeed, our study has shown that because of responses
based on emotionalism rather than real ism, movements to restore
or preserve the Khilafah came to nought. The Qur'an has made the
terrestrial station of humankind a Khilafah. The human being acts
as Allah's Khilafah on earth. How could a Kemalist abolish it? How
could a loyalist distort it? How dare a Millet disfigure it? The
only question that this brief study of the Ottoman Khilafah, pan-Islamism
and the Khilafat Movement has answered is that a collective failure
in the evolution of political philosophy that is in concert with
the contemporary and future needs of the ummah was the single most
common denominator in these ideological undercurrents.

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