THIS
CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 41; Report), entered by the Honorable Monte C.
Richardson, United States Magistrate Judge, on January 31,
2017. In the Report, Magistrate Judge Richardson recommends
that Defendants, Stazac Management, Inc., Lauren E. Carr, and
Ronald L. Carr's Motion to Dismiss and in the
Alternative, Motion to Stay Pending Disposition of State
Court Actions and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 25;
Motion) be granted, in part, and denied, in part.
See Report at 22. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Court grant the Motion to the extent
Defendants seek a stay as to Counts II and III of the
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 1; Complaint)
pending resolution of underlying actions. See Report
at 22. The Magistrate Judge recommends denying the Motion in
all other respects. Id. On February 14, 2017,
Defendants Stazac Management, Inc., Lauren E. Carr, and
Ronald L. Carr (the Stazac Defendants) filed objections to
the Report. See Defendants, Stazac Management, Inc.,
Lauren E. Carr, and Ronald L. Carr's Objection to Report
and Recommendation and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc.
42; Objections). Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance
Company (PIIC) responded in opposition to the Objections on
February 22, 2017. See Plaintiff's Response in
Opposition to the Objection to the Magistrate's Report
and Recommendation of Defendants' Stazac Management,
Inc., Lauren E. Carr and Ronald L. Carr and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law (Doc. 44; Response). Thus, this matter is
ripe for review.

The
Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). If no specific
objections to findings of fact are filed, the district court
is not required to conduct a de novo review of those
findings. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779
n.9 (11th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). However, the district court must review the legal
conclusions in the report de novo. See
Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Rice, No.
2:07-mc-8-FtM-29SPC, 2007 WL 1428615, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May
14, 2007).

This
case arises out of a coverage dispute concerning a
professional liability insurance policy, see
Complaint, Ex. A (the Policy), issued by PIIC to Stazac
Management, Inc. See generally Complaint. In Count I
of the Complaint, PIIC seeks a declaratory judgment that it
has no duty to defend the Stazac Defendants on the claims
made against the Stazac Defendants by Stonehurst Plantation
Master Association, Inc., Greenland Chase Homeowner's
Association, Inc., and Amelia View Homeowners Association,
Inc. (the HOA Claims).[1]See Complaint at 11-12. In Counts
II and III of the Complaint, PIIC seeks a declaratory
judgment that it has no duty to indemnify the Stazac
Defendants as to the HOA Claims as well. Id. at
12-15. Because the Magistrate Judge summarizes the
allegations of the Complaint in his Report, including the
Policy provisions at issue and the nature of the HOA Claims,
the Court will not repeat the factual background of this case
here. See Report at 2-10. Indeed, the Stazac
Defendants do not appear to dispute the Magistrate
Judge's factual findings. Rather, in their Objections,
the Stazac Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that the Court deny the Stazac Defendants'
request for dismissal of Count I. See Objections at
2. Specifically, the Stazac Defendants contend that
Magistrate Judge Richardson erred in that “Count I of
the Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to allege
an actual controversy.” Id. The Stazac
Defendants argue that there is no actual controversy because
the language of the Policy requires PIIC to defend Stazac
against the HOA Claims. PIIC responds that the Stazac
Defendants' arguments in support of dismissal do not show
the absence of an actual controversy, but rather go to the
merits of the parties' dispute. See Response at
5. As such, PIIC maintains that these arguments are
procedurally improper at this stage of the proceedings, and
were correctly rejected by the Magistrate Judge for that
reason. See id. at 4-8. Notably, PIIC does not
object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the
Court stay consideration of Counts II and III until the
underlying actions are resolved, and asserts that the Court
should adopt the Report in its entirety. See
Response at 2-3, 8.

Upon
independent review of the file and for the reasons stated in
Judge Richardson's Report, the Court will overrule the
Objections, and accept and adopt the legal and factual
conclusions recommended by the Magistrate Judge.
Specifically, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that the Court should exercise its discretion
to allow this declaratory judgment action to proceed,
id. at 12-15, but defer consideration of PIIC's
duty to indemnify until the underlying actions are resolved.
Id. at 22. In addition, the Court will adopt Judge
Richardson's finding that the Stazac Defendants'
arguments as to the duty to defend are premature and improper
at this stage of the proceedings. See Report at
15-19.[2] Rather than demonstrate the lack of an
actual controversy between the parties, the Stazac
Defendants' arguments highlight that there is a bona fide
dispute at issue here, namely, the interpretation of the
Policy and its application to the HOA Claims. Essentially,
the Stazac Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed
because their interpretation of the Policy is the correct
one. See Objections at 3. While the Court expresses
no opinion on whether the Stazac Defendants may ultimately
prevail on this issue, because they are seeking a ruling on
the merits of the dispute, their arguments are premature at
the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. See Wells
Pharmacy Network, LLC v. Regulatory Compliance Assocs.
Inc., Case No. 5:16-cv-319-Oc-37PRL, 2016 WL 6106746, at
*6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2016) (citing Nielson Golden Crab
Fishery v. Butterworth, No. 10-61091-CIV, 2011 WL
3293357, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2011)); see also
Feldkamp v. Long Bay Partners, LLC, No.
2:09-cv-253-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 3610452, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 14, 2010) (“As in state court, ‘[a] motion
to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment is not a
motion on the merits. Rather, it is a motion only to
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration
of its rights, not to whether it is entitled to a declaration
in its favor.'” (quoting Royal Selections, Inc.
v. Fla. Dep't ofRevenue, 687 So.2d 893,
894 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997))); cf. Am. Fid. &
Cas. Co. v. Pa. Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 280 F.2d 453, 457-60 (5th Cir. 1960) (finding
dismissal for failure to state a claim warranted on
insurer's declaratory judgment action regarding duty to
defend where insurer did not dispute that claims were covered
under the policy).[3]

The
Magistrate Judge carefully considered the foregoing
arguments, among others, reviewed the applicable law, and
determined that the Stazac Defendants' contentions were
unavailing. The Court concludes that Judge Richardson's
recommended resolution of the Motion results from a correct
application of the appropriate legal framework and an
accurate assessment of the relevant record. While the Stazac
Defendants disagree with Judge Richardson's conclusions,
they have failed to show them to be legally or factually
incorrect. In addition, as PIIC does not object to the
recommendation that the Court stay Counts II and III of the
Complaint, see Response at 2-3, the Court will adopt
the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in that regard as
well. As such, the Court concludes that the Motion to Dismiss
is due to be denied, in part, and granted, in part. In light
of the foregoing, it is

2. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc.
41) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court to the extent set
forth above.[4]

3. Defendants, Stazac Management, Inc., Lauren E. Carr, and
Ronald L. Carr's Motion to Dismiss and in the
Alternative, Motion to Stay Pending Disposition of State
Court Actions and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 25) is
GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

A. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent that Counts II and III
of the Complaint are STAYED pending resolution of the
underlying actions.

B. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.

4. Defendants Stazac Management, Inc., Lauren E. Carr, and
Ronald L. Carr shall respond to Count I of the Complaint
within the time permitted by Rule 12(a)(4)(A), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

5. In light of the Court's resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss, the parties shall confer and file an amended case
management ...

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