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Iraq is an American problem. Afghanistan is a NATO problem. The President needs to use his considerable powers of persuasion with our NATO allies to provide more resources and troops for Afghanistan. He needs to use his considerable powers of persuasion--especially now that he's at a peak of popularity and support--to get our allies to lift their restrictions about the use of the military, especially the caveat that a particular country's troops will not be placed in harms way. What a stupid way to run a war.

President Obama already has asked the right question, which is, "Shouldn't we think of this as a war in Afghanistan AND Pakistan?" The problem is, I don't really see good answers for Pakistan. What the public should be asking is, "What are the possible consequences of Pakistan falling apart and of Islamic extremists taking power?" The answers are pretty scary.

The most important question is whether the Obama administration is willing to see this through and take the necessary steps to achieve success in Afghanistan, with success defined as a stable, capable, representative government in Kabul, the prevention of a Taliban resurgence, and the denial of a base in Afghanistan for terrorists. Such a stance will not only be correct in terms of policy and US interests but will also reap political rewards, since it will enjoy will enjoy substantial though not universal support in the Republican party. The only worrying aspect of administration actions so far has been the (largely self-serving) tendency on the part of some key officials to declare the situation hopeless, which raises doubts about the administration's staying power. The worst thing the administration can do, both strategically and politically, is to give the impression that it doesn't have the stomach for this fight. Then support, both in the US and, even more, such support as still exists among NATO allies, will begin to evaporate.

I support the strategy of Gen. McKiernan, focused as it is on protecting the Afghan population and building Afghan institutions so that security (and other things) can be provided by Afghans themselves as soon as possible. However, as with any operation of this type, even adopting a sound strategy may not work, since so much depends on what our allies (and enemies, and fence sitters) choose to do. In that light, I'd be curious to know how the Obama administration is doing its force sizing for Afghanistan--why 17,000 more troops, and why not 30,000 (or 100,000 for that matter, bringing resources up to Iraq-like levels)? Also, how long is it likely to take for the new strategy and new buildup to yield results? (I'd guess at least mid-2010 but it would be interesting to know how the administration views the likely time frame for turning momentum in our direction.)

The most important question for President Obama to be asking about Afghanistan is twofold: (1) What does "victory" look like in the landlocked, tribally-organized (using "organized" very loosely) state, and (2) How can we accomplish that goal in such a way as to allow us to focus our efforts, energy, and resources on Pakistan, which has long since surpassed Afghanistan as the key Central Asian front in the War on Terror?

Blindly sending more troops into Afghanistan, unless it is accompanied by a very real shift in strategy (and is directed toward the accomplishment of a clear set of objectives), would demonstrate that the Obama administration learned precisely the wrong lessons from George W. Bush's experiences and policies in the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of the GWOT. If there is no clear purpose in pursuit of a clear goal for those additional troops to fulfill, then President Obama is doing little more than continuing a policy of treading water in the region, losing American lives here and there and making no real progress.

Unfortunately, the constant reference to the total overhaul of U.S. strategy in Iraq as simply 'the surge' has contributed to the establishment of the entirely inaccurate conventional wisdom that all that changed in Iraq to take it from the brink of failure to near-total success was the number of U.S. troops on the ground there. The fact is, 100,000 more troops could have been sent to the region, but if they had continued to follow the same ineffective strategy of sitting on large bases, being bound to vehicles when exiting the wire, and simply allowing village and town after village and town to be backfilled with, and threatened by, sectarian fighters and terrorists, nothing really would have changed. Whether President Obama sends 17,000 more troops or 100,000 more troops to Afghanistan, the situation there will remain largely the same unless the objective there is defined and an appropriate strategy is implemented. In determining how to proceed, Mr. Obama should lean heavily on the recommendations of General David Petraeus, the Commanding General of U.S. Central Command and the man who deserves as much credit as any for turning around a bad situation in Iraq.

Unfortunately, I fear that President Obama's waffling on the number of troops to send to Afghanistan (first 30,000, not 17,000) is further evidence of his distaste for actually making decisions -- one of the worst possible qualities in an executive and commander. Rather than truly overhaul Afghan strategy, or decide to allow Gen. Petraeus to do so, I suspect Mr. Obama will attempt to proceed in half-measures like this 'surge,' boosting troops slightly, making speeches and small changes here and there, and looking for a way to get out of Afghanistan and central Asia as a whole altogether, all the while -- like with the "stimulus" bill -- attempting to impart the narrative that he "inherited" the current situation, and therefore that no decision, result, or fallout from that situation an his handling of it should be construed as being his fault in any way.

The most important question President Obama and the American public must ask about the strategy review of Afghanistan should actually focus on Afghanistan's next door neighbor, Pakistan.

The Obama administration cannot sufficiently address the security challenges IN Afghanistan without figuring out what to do about Pakistan, in large part because of the porous and virtually non-existent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The stakes and the national security threats are extremely high in Pakistan. Pakistan, with five times as many people as Afghanistan, has a larger population than Russia. It has nuclear weapons, and Pakistani involvement in the transfers of nuclear know-how and technology has endangered global security. The Pakistani security establishment's decades-long involvement with the Taliban and ties to Islamist militant groups and terrorist organizations has caused headaches for at least the last five U.S. presidents. And U.S. intelligence agencies have been warning for the past several years about the safe havens for terrorist groups inside of Pakistan.

Sending more troops to Afghanistan without answering broader strategic questions such as what to do about Pakistan is like putting a band aid on a gunshot wound. It might stem some of the bleeding and result in reductions in violence, but it won't solve the central security challenges in South Asia.

In a country that has always been only loosely ruled, does it make sense to devote American strength to building a strong central state? Or might we be able to extricate ourselves sooner if we accept a decentralized Afghanistan with some regions ruled by groups that are currently fighting against our troops?

Special bonus question: Is our determination to eradicate the Afghan drug trade – in a world where prohibition makes the drug trade extraordinarily profitable – alienating Afghans and driving them into the arms of our enemies?

On Afghanistan:
Americans need a Presidential fireside and wireside chat to lay out the mission, the benchmarks and the shared sacrifice from troops, military families and civilians needed in Afghanistan.

On Bipartisanship Redux:
Watching another round of the "vote no and take the dough" practice that ranges from pay raises to tax credits on individual lawmakers'returns to attendance at gas tax-funded ribbon-cuttings and stimulus-sponsored ground-breakings, I would predict that despite any votes for "no" all 50 states will ultimately take the dough.

Foreign interventions in Afghanistan have sucked the life out of many countries. And the challenges associated with Afghanistan are not limited to Afghanistan, as the collateral issues bleed into neighbors such as Iran and Pakistan. Neither nation building nor occupation will further U.S. foreign policy objectives, as neither approach has proved to be successful. There is no easy recipe or standard play from the playbook that can facilitate Afghanistan’s illusive quest for stability. What we know is that stability will require a mix of troops, development support, and long term commitment from the U.S. AND other countries, as well as the recognition that failures will be at least as common as successes.

The key question is: "How do we get beyond a military solution and figure out a workable economic development plan that will dilute the influence of extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan?"
I have worked extensively in both countries since 1992--before the rise of the Taliban. Afghans have not turned to the Taliban because they believe in the Taliban ideology. They have been forced to accept the Taliban because of economic desperation. The infrastructure of the country needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. A few months ago, I sat with the governor of Uruzgan Province in southern Afghanistan, in his unheated office, as he explained his province did not have a single bank. His payroll for his police force and other employees arrived as bags of cash from Kabul. When weather kept planes grounded for weeks at a time, his employes did not get paid. A cop sent out to a remote outpost in the dead of winter with little food and no prospects for regular pay to support his family is going to have little incentive to face down anything the Taliban has to offer.

No matter the questions and no matter the potential answers, one thing is clear now from this announced escalation: The war in Afghanistan is now Barack Obama's War. The questions that must be asked on the back of a 17,000 troop escalation in Afghanistan are extraordinarily difficult to answer, but we should expect the Obama administration to address them:

1) How will the escalation help to normalize the political environment in nuclear Pakistan?

2) Will the escalation increase our preparedness for containing a possible--some might argue imminent--collapse in leadership in both Pakistan and Afghanistan?

3) Will a stable Afghanistan calm the political tinderbox in Pakistan or destabilize it?

4) Will the escalation improve the environment for the West's investment in an economically viable Afghanistan, including training farmers to diversify from poppy crops and also developing urban sector commerce and manufacturing?

5) Will the escalation improve our ability to coordinate into mainstream political action the maze of tribal affiliations in Afghanistan in a way that defuses the power of the Taliban's militant wing?

6) How do we evaluate, measure, and define the success of the escalation that includes a strategy to exit and end the war there

7) Conversely, how do we evaluate, measure, and define a cause for further escalation in the future?

8) How does the escalation mesh with a more comprehensive diplomatic and economic escalation in the region?

We have got to begin exploring alternatives to Hamid Karzai. In too many instances in the past, we've placed all of our chips on one person- especially authoritarian leaders-and had few lines to opponents
or alternatives. Karzai has tolerated unusually high levels of corruption which make it impossible to win over the civilian population. The lessons of our reliance on the Shah in Iran, Diem in Vietnam, and
Mubarak in Egypt should prompt us to diversify.

Barack Obama picked his poison too early. He will find Afghanistan to be an even more difficult war to end than Iraq was for George Bush. Deep tribalism and decades of conflict make it a quagmire of nation building that the Taliban merely exacerbates. Even more worrying, the critical nature of Pakistan makes it a two-nation pacification project that could cost more money and take twice as long as Iraq. For the rest of his presidency it will be a slow burn in the background as the economy and the fiscal frustration of his social agenda take a huge personal toll.

Afghanistan seems to be falling once again to the Taliban. This group is frightening, because they threaten to destroy the gains for women, for democracy, for freedom, and for any hope for improvement of life in Afghanistan. They also threaten to destabilize Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal.

This is not a job for the United States alone, and we have been fortunate to be part of a NATO coalition in Afghanistan. President Obama should employ his powers of persuasion to get our allies to increase their forces in that nation as we increase ours, with the goal of defeating the Taliban and assuring a stable government for the people of Afghanistan.

If the President backs away and allows Afghanistan to be taken over again by the Taliban, it will be terrible for them and for the rest of the region and the world.

I think the critical battle to winning in Afghanistan and to defeating Osama Bin Laden is winning over the hearts, minds, and friendship of the people of neighboring Pakistan. Pakistan has an enormous Islamic population, parts of which have been radicalized; it has nuclear weapons; its territory and peoples have been harboring extremists; and it could easily stumble into war with India which is one of our best allies anywhere in the world. We have to win over the people of Pakistan and not just the government. A surge in troops in Afghanistan cannot succeed if Pakistan continues as it is going today. I think we should seriously consider admitting Pakistan to NAFTA, or sign some similar free trade treaty with Pakistan, because a prosperous Pakistan that has lots of trade ties to us will be more likely to become our friend. We cannot afford to have Pakistan be a poor, failing state with a figure head government that is not in control of its own military or intelligence services. Lets do a free trade “Marshall Plan” for Pakistan.

Kristin LordVice President, Dir. of Studies, Center for a New American Security :

The most important question the President and his advisors should be asking is how to win the support of the Afghan and Pakistani people, not just in the cities but in the countryside. Without that support, military victories are likely to be tactical and short-lived.

There are several questions that President Obama must answer if he wants to build political support for an Afghanistan initiative: what is the rationale, what is the mission, and what is the exit strategy? President Bush left too many of these questions unanswered with his war in Iraq and the Republicans, as well as public support for the war, suffered as a result.

The Public should ask the following of the President: 1.What are the goals? 2. What is the general time frame? 3. What are the projected costs, in lives and treasure? 4. How will we pay for it? 5. What is the support of our Allies in troops and finances? 6. What is the Afghan position in what we seek to accomplish? If the President believes that Afghanistan is worth the sacrifice, then he must take on the responsibility and listen to our battlefield commanders and let them get the job done as swiftly and effectively as possible with minimal loss of life and cost to our Treasury.

First question: Is the American mission in Afghanistan to root out al Qaeda pockets that threaten the United States (a job for elite special forces), or is our mission to establish an effective central government with the characteristics of a functioning democracy (a task for an army of occupation)? These goals are not the same.

Second question: Do we want to pursue a scorched earth policy that drives poppy cultivation out of southern Afghanistan and pushes millions of Afghan farmers into the Taliban? Or can we finally acknowledge that "supply side" drug wars in foreign lands will never solve the "demand side" drug problem in America?

Our most important question for Afghanistan policy is what constitutes success. Two years from now, what progress would make us think our presence had been beneficial to Afghanistan and the United States? A reduction in violence? A functioning political system? No terrorist attacks in the U.S.? Water and electricity for the Afghan people? Until we produce a stronger consensus on our goals, it is going to be challenging to convince the American public that Afghanistan is a worthwhile investment of troops and financial support.

The most important question to ask is the one the Bush Administration never asked or perhaps never cared to answer; What is our exit strategy? . There is a reason why Afghanistan, not Iraq, is known as the “graveyard of empires.”

I think the public is far more accepting of this expedition than Iraq, despite the economic problems at home, because it is smaller in scale (so far) and is identified more closely with the fight against Al-Qaeda. Given the security concerns in the region, particularly in Pakistan which is more volatile today than ever before, the campaign in Afghanistan and the border region is very important. We cannot make the mistake of not knowing how to get out or getting stuck there alone. We need committed allies for the long haul and that’s tough to find. We also need to realize that Afghanistan’s terrain, unlike Iraq’s, is the primary reason why no foreign power, or even domestic government, has been able to maintain centralized control of the country’s security over significant periods of time.

Karl Knapstein (guest)
Service Tech , CO:

Ambassador Holbrook buried the "Can we win?" question and announced, on The News Hour last night, the meeting next week in Washington that includes the Foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan. A wonderful first paragraph of this chapter in the "Book of Obama". We need to buy all the opium production at above fair market from the growers and burn it on sight. Thus building good will with the people and cutting the cash flow that arms the insurgents. Schools,water,roads and a profitable,self sustaining agricultural program can brought to fruition through an International effort (we simply can't afford it). More of the same for Pakistan through a proper jobs program. Sealing off the mountainous Tribal areas with prosperity and some hope for a "normal" future would syphon off their young soldiers as most are there for the Money. Maybe the International Community should get together and Buy Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons before it's too late.

Lawrence McDonald (guest)
writer , OH:

Obama should answer one simple question about Afghanistan, and he should answer it clearly and, above all, briefly:
Why are we in Afghanistan?
He has never done this.

Edward Stroligo (guest)
Writer , NY:

What do we want to do? How likely is it we'll be able to do whatever with whatever we're willing to spend to do it with? Seems like the main occupations of the place are fighting and growing opium. If you stop the fighting, they really start growing opium, and if you stop the opium-growing, they really start fighting. Seems like the only realistic approach is to kill off the fighters we really don't like, then let them fight over the opium.

Carl Owen (guest)
Mailman , OK:

How much, how long. What will this cost us in men and material and money. How long will it take us to complete the mission and how long will the results stand? Stabilizing Afghanistan is the crucial first step to fighting the al Qaeda/Taliban resurgency in Pakistan. That fight is going to be the hardest one we've ever fought.

Lee Olyer (guest)
Engineer , CO:

We need to stop this nonsense about Obama "using his powers of persuasion" to bring in NATO for two reasons. 1) Ineffectiveness. The combined forces of the EU couldn't defeat the Wyoming National Guard, much less be of any help to US forces. The EU forces operate under a ridiculous maze of rules of engagement that make them a liability rather than an asset. 2) Stomach. NATO just isn't interested in doing any fighting. The decay of Europe and Western Civilization has left the "chocolate makers" with a will bent more towards fornicating rather than fighting - even to defend themselves. The US is on our own here and looking for any worthy assistance from Europe is a waste of time.

Anthony Noel (guest)
business columnist , NC:

The question is "What?" What do we hope to accomplish? Until we have a very clear, JOINT statement of that from the Afghan government and we, the country's chief occupying force, everything else -- legislative battles over funding, punditry over the extent of our involvement, and most certainly, how to proceed -- is meaningless. I would like to see President Obama propose a meeting of all interested parties in the region, including Afghanistan's neighbors; Russia; Israel; and the Taliban. It is time to get everyone in one room and get them all on the record. Even if we do, it is likely Afghanistan will remain the strategic objective it has been for so many for so long. But if we don't, the odds against coming to any workable resolution are far greater.

Elizabeth Gibson Guss (guest)
Clinnical Social Worker, retired , VA:

I am influenced by the insider’s report from Sarah Chayes (NPR Fresh Air, Feb. 2, 2009 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100189461) where she answers this very question. Sarah Chayes states that having this new administration means that there will be a review of policy; there is about a 6 month window of opportunity. She states the focus needs to be “a shift [by military and by policy] from seeing our job as to hunt down and kill the bad guys to protecting the population.” She rails at the description of the Afghan people as just ‘tribal’; she states that the Afghan people have been ‘driven into the arms’ of the Taliban by the severity of corruption by government officials that were placed in positions of power by our actions. She also describes the damaging presence of the Pakistani Military Intelligence Agency whom she describes as having reconstituted the Taliban and is acting as proxies for the Pakistani Military and thus has defacto control over the Afghan people. Please give a listen - there's more!

Stefan Saal (guest)
sculptor , NH:

To paraphrase an ancient Chinese poem: "In early spring, the life forces stir, and when the seeds fall to earth, all things are made ready." Afghanistan is in need of nourishment. Do we have the wisdom and influence to provide this nourishment? To whom exactly should we provide this nourishment? And who exactly will be attending to our own nourishment in the meantime? Like early spring, nourishment is provided through movement and tranquility. We need helpers and we need to be on the lookout for the right people. To be the sole source of nourishment is a heavy responsibility.

William McEnery (guest)
IT Analyst , RI:

Mr. Blakeman said--The Public should ask the following of the President: 1.What are the goals? 2. What is the general time frame? 3. What are the projected costs, in lives and treasure? 4. How will we pay for it? 5. What is the support of our Allies in troops and finances? 6. What is the Afghan position in what we seek to accomplish? If the President believes that Afghanistan is worth the sacrifice, then he must take on the responsibility and listen to our battlefield commanders and let them get the job done as swiftly and effectively as possible with minimal loss of life and cost to our Treasury. Did anyone ask you this regarding Iraq? Did your administration ask yourselves this? Were you listening to commanders? Were you concerned about our Treasury. Your hypocrisy is amazing.

Response from Bradley Blakeman:

With regard to the Bush Administrations actions in Iraq: The questions I suggest be asked of this President with regard to Afghanistan was asked to President Bush with regard to Iraq. You might not have agreed with his answers. One thing is for sure, if President Obama were President in 2007/08 there would not have been the surge, there would have been a surrender and Iraq would have been lost. Iraq today is on their way to a more stable, secure government. A safe and free and reliable Iraq will be worth it weight in gold for the United States. We have had a remarkable success in reducing the loss of American and Iraqi lives. The cost economically is high, but, amortized over time, will be found to be a reasonable investment. Were mistakes made, of course. The bottom-line is that 50 Million are free and we and are allies are safer as a result.

William McEnery (guest)
IT Analyst , RI:

In response to Mr Blakeman's response to my post....a better question to you might be why do we even have to ask the question regarding Afganistan? Why aren't the Afgani people having the same "fortunes" of the people of Iraq. Trust me I'm not some liberal who doesn't understand that mistakes are made and plans have to be altered. I understand nation building is not easy, but teh rhetoric from teh past administration did not make it to be the problem it would have and has become. If you cannot understand why people are angry and don't like the answers we were given then I guess we'll keep disagreeing. Despite our obvious differences I respect and thank you for the response to my post. USA.USA

Stephen Mormino (guest)
Union Roofer , IL:

A never ending merry-go-round, now do we want to stay on the ride are get off. For my self since all the information that I do get comes from the media I really feel that I am not qualified to ask an intelligent question.

Patrick Northway (guest)
Acct/Finance , IN:

Some questions never do and never will get asked. Do extremists question the existence of God? Do fools question their own foolishness? Do the arrogant ask if they will ever fail? Hey! There's a theme here. Every single major conflict the US has lost (Hello! LOST) since World War 2 has been of dubious benefit and started under dubious circumstances. What do we get for expending billions of dollars and thousands of lives? Zip. We failed to contain communism after two wars; we are failing even more miserably to contain terrorism. HMMMMM!!!! PERHAPS there is a better way! The really, really funny part is that two administrations are probably going to spend another ten to fifteen years trying to "figure out an exit strategy!!!"
Guys, here's your exit strategy: leave, stupid.

Margaret McCann (guest)
painter, etc. , NJ:

If Mr. Emanuel writes-"Whether President Obama sends 17,000 more troops or 100,000 more troops to Afghanistan, the situation there will remain largely the same unless the objective there is defined..."--so how can he make this criticism?-- "...President Obama's waffling on the number of troops to send to Afghanistan (first 30,000, not 17,000) is further evidence of his distaste for actually making decisions". More like: if only Pres. Bush had put more troops into Iraq at the beginning--or not at all!

Phil Gonzalez (guest)
retired , TX:

President Obama in 2006 the Afghan mission was turned over to NATO and their primary purpose was one of nation building and peacekeeping, not counterinsurgency. Will this change. Will NATO play a bigger part in counterinsurgency? The supreme headquarters in Afghanistan (ISAF) commanded by Gen. David McKiernam wasn't built to plan and conduct theaterwide counterinsurgency operations like those in Iraq. Will Gen. McKiernam get the headquarters he needs to fight a war in Afghanistan. How will just bombing the border effect the network instead of just killing the terrorist sent to fight in Afghanistan. Are you going to heed the warnings of Karzai about the borders bombings. Is Karzai becoming more anti American because of the bombings. President Obama do you think Karzai will seek more aid from Iran and Russia.

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