The Trinity of orthodox Christianity is harmonious. The Trinity for Blake is, conspicuously, not a happy family: the Father and the Son do not get on. It might be thought that so cumbersome a notion ...
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The Trinity of orthodox Christianity is harmonious. The Trinity for Blake is, conspicuously, not a happy family: the Father and the Son do not get on. It might be thought that so cumbersome a notion is inconceivable before the rise of Romanticism but the Ophite Gnostics of the 2nd century AD appear to have thought that God the Father was a jealous tyrant because he forbade Adam and Eve to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and that the serpent, who led the way to the Tree of Knowledge, was really Christ. This book explores the possibility of an underground ‘perennial heresy’, linking the Ophites to Blake. The ‘alternative Trinity’ is intermittently visible in Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and even in Milton's Paradise Lost. Blake's notorious detection of a pro-Satan anti-poem, latent in this ‘theologically patriarchal’ epic is less capricious, better grounded historically and philosophically, than is commonly realised.Less

The late A. D. Nuttall

Published in print: 1998-07-30

The Trinity of orthodox Christianity is harmonious. The Trinity for Blake is, conspicuously, not a happy family: the Father and the Son do not get on. It might be thought that so cumbersome a notion is inconceivable before the rise of Romanticism but the Ophite Gnostics of the 2nd century AD appear to have thought that God the Father was a jealous tyrant because he forbade Adam and Eve to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and that the serpent, who led the way to the Tree of Knowledge, was really Christ. This book explores the possibility of an underground ‘perennial heresy’, linking the Ophites to Blake. The ‘alternative Trinity’ is intermittently visible in Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and even in Milton's Paradise Lost. Blake's notorious detection of a pro-Satan anti-poem, latent in this ‘theologically patriarchal’ epic is less capricious, better grounded historically and philosophically, than is commonly realised.

This chapter provides the first critical survey of those societies that worked under the rubric of the Church of England over the course of its ‘long eighteenth century’. Transcending a scholarly ...
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This chapter provides the first critical survey of those societies that worked under the rubric of the Church of England over the course of its ‘long eighteenth century’. Transcending a scholarly focus on the voluntary quality of such groups and challenging more general assumptions about the supposedly areligious nature of ‘enlightened’ sociability and learning, it shows how the Church of England revitalized its authority by utilizing extra-parochial societies to reconstitute its relationship with its national and international communion. As a reference work, the chapter seeks to inform the general reader whilst guiding specialists towards new lines of enquiry. But its insights into societies such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge underscore the extent to which ‘Anglican religious societies’ actively shaped the wider history of the English-speaking world.Less

Anglican Religious Societies, Organizations, and Missions

David Manning

Published in print: 2017-10-05

This chapter provides the first critical survey of those societies that worked under the rubric of the Church of England over the course of its ‘long eighteenth century’. Transcending a scholarly focus on the voluntary quality of such groups and challenging more general assumptions about the supposedly areligious nature of ‘enlightened’ sociability and learning, it shows how the Church of England revitalized its authority by utilizing extra-parochial societies to reconstitute its relationship with its national and international communion. As a reference work, the chapter seeks to inform the general reader whilst guiding specialists towards new lines of enquiry. But its insights into societies such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge underscore the extent to which ‘Anglican religious societies’ actively shaped the wider history of the English-speaking world.

Certain epistemologies, politics, and metaphysics are built into mass produced technological offerings. Apparently neutral seeming tools carry normative principles, and are built on unexamined ...
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Certain epistemologies, politics, and metaphysics are built into mass produced technological offerings. Apparently neutral seeming tools carry normative principles, and are built on unexamined assumptions about social relations. This chapter argues for comprehending the situated-ness of design by attending to how these assumptions and interests are exposed by the use, and the repurposing, of technologies in differing social and historical situations. As many of the examples detailed in the volume refer to cross-cultural appropriations, subversions, or unexpected (re)-uses of technologies, we discuss the specific treatment of knowledge in different social and cultural contexts, and the effects of particular Euro-American assumptions about knowledge and communication on the design of ICTs. The chapter discusses the potential of anthropology and ethnography as modes of approaching and understanding the design and use of technologies, and makes a strong argument, through examples from Papua New Guinea and the US, for the specificity of technology and design as emergent in particular social relations and forms.Less

Anthropology, Cross-Cultural Encounter, and the Politics of Design

James LeachLee Wilson

Published in print: 2014-05-30

Certain epistemologies, politics, and metaphysics are built into mass produced technological offerings. Apparently neutral seeming tools carry normative principles, and are built on unexamined assumptions about social relations. This chapter argues for comprehending the situated-ness of design by attending to how these assumptions and interests are exposed by the use, and the repurposing, of technologies in differing social and historical situations. As many of the examples detailed in the volume refer to cross-cultural appropriations, subversions, or unexpected (re)-uses of technologies, we discuss the specific treatment of knowledge in different social and cultural contexts, and the effects of particular Euro-American assumptions about knowledge and communication on the design of ICTs. The chapter discusses the potential of anthropology and ethnography as modes of approaching and understanding the design and use of technologies, and makes a strong argument, through examples from Papua New Guinea and the US, for the specificity of technology and design as emergent in particular social relations and forms.

This chapter offers a critique of Jürgen Habermas’s contemporary philosophy, with particular emphasis on its “antispeculative” habitus. This “antispeculative” habitus is entirely structured around a ...
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This chapter offers a critique of Jürgen Habermas’s contemporary philosophy, with particular emphasis on its “antispeculative” habitus. This “antispeculative” habitus is entirely structured around a critique of classical metaphysics, generally characterized as a symbol of the hubris of a human thought that desires to subjugate the entirety of what there is under its almighty power. Habermas has illustrated this vast genre, the veritable backbone of contemporary philosophy in three periods (or movements), each in turn embraced and then abandoned: a therapeutic approach, a critical approach (that is, the idea of philosophy as bringing out a phenomenon’s conditions of possibility), and finally, his most recent approach, which adopts a certain form of naturalism. This chapter examines three periods of Habermas’s evolution that embody the movement of contemporary philosophy to show how the symptoms of the current crisis of the death of philosophy persist. The first period of Habermas’s philosophy is marked by Knowledge and Human Interests, the second by “universal pragmatics”, and the third by fallibilist pragmatism. The chapter concludes by analyzing the theory of argumentation.Less

The Antispeculative View : Habermas as an Example

Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel

Published in print: 2011-05-24

This chapter offers a critique of Jürgen Habermas’s contemporary philosophy, with particular emphasis on its “antispeculative” habitus. This “antispeculative” habitus is entirely structured around a critique of classical metaphysics, generally characterized as a symbol of the hubris of a human thought that desires to subjugate the entirety of what there is under its almighty power. Habermas has illustrated this vast genre, the veritable backbone of contemporary philosophy in three periods (or movements), each in turn embraced and then abandoned: a therapeutic approach, a critical approach (that is, the idea of philosophy as bringing out a phenomenon’s conditions of possibility), and finally, his most recent approach, which adopts a certain form of naturalism. This chapter examines three periods of Habermas’s evolution that embody the movement of contemporary philosophy to show how the symptoms of the current crisis of the death of philosophy persist. The first period of Habermas’s philosophy is marked by Knowledge and Human Interests, the second by “universal pragmatics”, and the third by fallibilist pragmatism. The chapter concludes by analyzing the theory of argumentation.

Chapter 5 highlights the differences between early New Sanctuary activists and the activists they increasingly needed to recruit for their specialized knowledge of either immigration politics or ...
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Chapter 5 highlights the differences between early New Sanctuary activists and the activists they increasingly needed to recruit for their specialized knowledge of either immigration politics or religious institutions. Activists’ discourses on religion and politics revealed that early New Sanctuary activists, mostly clergy and experienced religious activists, tended to speak of religion and politics as integrated phenomena, suggesting that any changes in either of them must be sought in conjunction with each other. Newer recruits were more likely to talk of religion and politics as distinct, primarily interested in and knowledgeable about either religious or political change. To maintain commitment to multiple targets as they grow, multi-target social movements need to recruit a delicate balance of actors with direct experience with and investment in each of its targeted institutions. In New Sanctuary, this translated into the need for a diverse group of immigrants and religious people.Less

The Art of Balance

Grace Yukich

Published in print: 2013-07-30

Chapter 5 highlights the differences between early New Sanctuary activists and the activists they increasingly needed to recruit for their specialized knowledge of either immigration politics or religious institutions. Activists’ discourses on religion and politics revealed that early New Sanctuary activists, mostly clergy and experienced religious activists, tended to speak of religion and politics as integrated phenomena, suggesting that any changes in either of them must be sought in conjunction with each other. Newer recruits were more likely to talk of religion and politics as distinct, primarily interested in and knowledgeable about either religious or political change. To maintain commitment to multiple targets as they grow, multi-target social movements need to recruit a delicate balance of actors with direct experience with and investment in each of its targeted institutions. In New Sanctuary, this translated into the need for a diverse group of immigrants and religious people.

This chapter presents the assurance theory of testimony developed by Richard Moran. It argues that this theory faces a dilemma: in order to receive a speaker’s assurance, an audience must trust, but ...
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This chapter presents the assurance theory of testimony developed by Richard Moran. It argues that this theory faces a dilemma: in order to receive a speaker’s assurance, an audience must trust, but our warrant for trust seems to come either from a non-reductive entitlement or be reductively grounded on the evidence. The solution this chapter proposes comes from an analysis of what it is to trust someone to do something. What is proposed is that trust is an attitude that makes trusting reasonable. The assurance theory thus supplemented with an account of trust provides a good epistemic theory of a certain domain of testimony. But it fails to give a complete theory of testimony.Less

The Assurance Theory

Paul Faulkner

Published in print: 2011-05-01

This chapter presents the assurance theory of testimony developed by Richard Moran. It argues that this theory faces a dilemma: in order to receive a speaker’s assurance, an audience must trust, but our warrant for trust seems to come either from a non-reductive entitlement or be reductively grounded on the evidence. The solution this chapter proposes comes from an analysis of what it is to trust someone to do something. What is proposed is that trust is an attitude that makes trusting reasonable. The assurance theory thus supplemented with an account of trust provides a good epistemic theory of a certain domain of testimony. But it fails to give a complete theory of testimony.

When are transnational networks likely to convince policymakers in developing countries to adopt potentially costly environmental regulations for the good of managing biodiversity? Since most of the ...
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When are transnational networks likely to convince policymakers in developing countries to adopt potentially costly environmental regulations for the good of managing biodiversity? Since most of the world’s remaining biodiversity is found in developing countries, identifying the pathways through which policymakers in these states are incentivized to engage in conservation is critical. This book argues that networks of nonstate experts are most likely to convince policymakers to address an emerging environmental problem if three conditions are met: First, network members must have a scientifically validated consensus about the cause-and-effect relationships and parameters of the problem, since a consensus about the science delegitimizes competing arguments and strengthens the authority of a network’s arguments. Second, networks must build mechanisms for socialization with policymakers in domestic regulatory agencies. Doing so promotes norms of shared ownership and responsibility for knowledge claims about conservation. Third, networks will have to make scientific arguments for conservation consonant with local environmental justice claims by communities residing in and around areas of globally important biodiversity. Networks can do so by arguing for policies that would protect biodiversity in a way that ensures continued, if environmentally sustainable, access for low-income populations that may otherwise be excluded from natural resources. If these three conditions are not met, conservation efforts are likely to face resistance from groups of local actors, policymakers, or both, who cannot reconcile global claims for biodiversity conservation with their immediate demands.Less

Between Preservation and Exploitation : Transnational Advocacy Networks and Conservation in Developing Countries

Kemi Fuentes-George

Published in print: 2016-04-29

When are transnational networks likely to convince policymakers in developing countries to adopt potentially costly environmental regulations for the good of managing biodiversity? Since most of the world’s remaining biodiversity is found in developing countries, identifying the pathways through which policymakers in these states are incentivized to engage in conservation is critical. This book argues that networks of nonstate experts are most likely to convince policymakers to address an emerging environmental problem if three conditions are met: First, network members must have a scientifically validated consensus about the cause-and-effect relationships and parameters of the problem, since a consensus about the science delegitimizes competing arguments and strengthens the authority of a network’s arguments. Second, networks must build mechanisms for socialization with policymakers in domestic regulatory agencies. Doing so promotes norms of shared ownership and responsibility for knowledge claims about conservation. Third, networks will have to make scientific arguments for conservation consonant with local environmental justice claims by communities residing in and around areas of globally important biodiversity. Networks can do so by arguing for policies that would protect biodiversity in a way that ensures continued, if environmentally sustainable, access for low-income populations that may otherwise be excluded from natural resources. If these three conditions are not met, conservation efforts are likely to face resistance from groups of local actors, policymakers, or both, who cannot reconcile global claims for biodiversity conservation with their immediate demands.

In this chapter, I explain and critically examine Laurence BonJour's version of coherentism, as presented in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Speaking roughly, BonJour holds that an ...
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In this chapter, I explain and critically examine Laurence BonJour's version of coherentism, as presented in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Speaking roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief has warrant only if it is an element in a system of beliefs that is coherent in the long run. Somewhat less roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief B has warrant for a person S if and only if S has a reason for thinking B to be true; and that reason, on BonJour's view, can only be the conjunction of (1) B being a member of S's system of beliefs, and that system is coherent (in the long run) and (2) if B is a member of S's system of beliefs and S's system of beliefs has been coherent for a sufficiently long run, then B is likely to be true. After explaining BonJour's coherentism, I comment on two interesting facets of BonJour's thought: (1) his relationship to classical foundationalism and his trust in reason, and (2) the success of his argument for a coherentist justification of empirical belief. Finally, and most importantly for the larger purpose of my book, I consider his conception of warrant, concluding that BonJourian coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.Less

BonJourian Coherentism

Alvin Plantinga

Published in print: 1993-07-22

In this chapter, I explain and critically examine Laurence BonJour's version of coherentism, as presented in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Speaking roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief has warrant only if it is an element in a system of beliefs that is coherent in the long run. Somewhat less roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief B has warrant for a person S if and only if S has a reason for thinking B to be true; and that reason, on BonJour's view, can only be the conjunction of (1) B being a member of S's system of beliefs, and that system is coherent (in the long run) and (2) if B is a member of S's system of beliefs and S's system of beliefs has been coherent for a sufficiently long run, then B is likely to be true. After explaining BonJour's coherentism, I comment on two interesting facets of BonJour's thought: (1) his relationship to classical foundationalism and his trust in reason, and (2) the success of his argument for a coherentist justification of empirical belief. Finally, and most importantly for the larger purpose of my book, I consider his conception of warrant, concluding that BonJourian coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.

This chapter explores the ways in which Google, Apple, and other corporations have turned the development of cultural algorithms into epistemological quests for both self-knowledge and universal ...
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This chapter explores the ways in which Google, Apple, and other corporations have turned the development of cultural algorithms into epistemological quests for both self-knowledge and universal knowledge. This effort to construct a new framework for reality has its roots in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, a keystone of the European Enlightenment. Apple’s intelligent assistant Siri, Spike Jonze’s film Her, and Google’s ambition to realize the Star Trek computer serve as exemplars for the algorithmic pursuit of knowledge. These quests are both romantic and rational, seeking a transcendent state of knowing, a state that can be reached only with mechanisms that ultimately eclipse the human. Through their ambitions to develop algorithms that can “answer, converse, and anticipate” with ever-greater intimacy, the technology titans shaping our algorithmic future are constructing a new epistemological framework of what is knowable and desirable: an intellectual hierarchy of needs that will ultimately map out not only the public sphere of information but the interior space of human identity.Less

Building the Star Trek Computer

Ed Finn

Published in print: 2017-03-31

This chapter explores the ways in which Google, Apple, and other corporations have turned the development of cultural algorithms into epistemological quests for both self-knowledge and universal knowledge. This effort to construct a new framework for reality has its roots in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, a keystone of the European Enlightenment. Apple’s intelligent assistant Siri, Spike Jonze’s film Her, and Google’s ambition to realize the Star Trek computer serve as exemplars for the algorithmic pursuit of knowledge. These quests are both romantic and rational, seeking a transcendent state of knowing, a state that can be reached only with mechanisms that ultimately eclipse the human. Through their ambitions to develop algorithms that can “answer, converse, and anticipate” with ever-greater intimacy, the technology titans shaping our algorithmic future are constructing a new epistemological framework of what is knowable and desirable: an intellectual hierarchy of needs that will ultimately map out not only the public sphere of information but the interior space of human identity.

In the final chapter the concept of care is revisited to reflect on what applying care ethics to different everyday contexts contributes to our understanding of care. The author suggests the ...
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In the final chapter the concept of care is revisited to reflect on what applying care ethics to different everyday contexts contributes to our understanding of care. The author suggests the principle of ‘responsiveness’ can be developed though a contextualised understanding of the significance of reciprocity, and also emphasises the epistemological dimension of care. She considers care as a focus and resource for different forms of struggle and highlights the importance of care thinking within different types of political space, including both user and carer movements. The chapter concludes by emphasising the necessity of care in diverse policy contexts and the danger of ‘abandoning’ care from policy and practice discourse.Less

Care: ethics, policy and politics

Marian Barnes

Published in print: 2012-06-27

In the final chapter the concept of care is revisited to reflect on what applying care ethics to different everyday contexts contributes to our understanding of care. The author suggests the principle of ‘responsiveness’ can be developed though a contextualised understanding of the significance of reciprocity, and also emphasises the epistemological dimension of care. She considers care as a focus and resource for different forms of struggle and highlights the importance of care thinking within different types of political space, including both user and carer movements. The chapter concludes by emphasising the necessity of care in diverse policy contexts and the danger of ‘abandoning’ care from policy and practice discourse.