Ukrainian Elections-2004 as mirrored in the World Press
Compiled by Professor Dominique Arel for The Ukraine List
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

This section was prepared for posting on the Archive's portal
by Olena Lisniak (State Committee on Archives of Ukraine)

The Ukraine List (UKL) #302
compiled by Dominique Arel
6 December 2004
1-AFP: European Mediators Huddle With Ukraine Rivals Amid Signs of Deal
2-UPI: Q & A: Daniel Bilak on Kuchma's Calculus
3-The Guardian (UK): Gwendolyn Sasse, An End Is In Sight
4-Ira Straus: re: Wynnyckyj, "What Happened in Parliament Saturday" (UKL301)
5-Times (UK): Kuchma Seeking Immunity
6-Der Tagesspiele (Berlin): The Chancellor and Ukraine [UKL translation]
7-Critical Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine (Saturday, December 4, 2004)
[Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL]
8-CEPS Policy Brief: Ukraine and the EU after The Orange Revolution
9-Maclean's (Canada): Interview with Jim Jacuta (CIUS Ukraine Transparency and Election Monitoring Project)
**Thanks to Daniel Bilak, Lisa Koriouchkina, Peter Lavelle, Julia Luetsch, Ira Straus, Gwendolyn Sasse, Marko
Suprun, Frank Sysyn, Kataryna Wolczuk, Yulia Yarotska, Roman Zurba**
**The Canadian government and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress are announcing major initiatives to bring
hundreds of international observers from Canada to the third round (or "repeat second round") of elections in
Ukraine. All details in the next UKL, probably tonight. We will also include information about American and
European initiatives in that regard --DA**
#1
European mediators huddle with Ukraine rivals amid signs of deal
by Gali Tibbon
Agence France-Presse, 6 December 2004
#2
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 18:34:33 +0300
From: Peter Lavelle
#3
There are hurdles aplenty in Ukraine's presidential marathon but an end is in sight
by Gwendolyn Sasse
The Guardian (UK), 6 December 2004
#4
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 12:40:19 EST
(The time of testing and temptation: will Yushchenko keep his promises?)
Ira Straus
(U.S. coordinator, Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, an independent international non-
governmental organization)
Dear Dominique and UKL list,
It seems to me there is an easy enough way to resolve the concerns of Mychailo Wynnyckyj ("What Happened in
Parliament Saturday, and Implications", ULK 301). Wynnyckyj fears that Kuchma might sign one part of a
package deal (the political reform part) and veto the other parts. This fear provides the argument for
Yushchenko to renege on his commitments on political reform. The reneging has already divided the pro-
Yushchenko majority coalition.
The simplest solution is to write into the political reform bill a clause stating that this bill cannot to be
regarded as enacted into law unless and until there is full timely (date specified) enactment and signature
of the other portions of the package. Thus, if Kuchma were to fail to sign the other parts, the political
reform part would also fail to become law.
It is extremely important for Yushchenko to keep his promises to moderates in Ukraine, such as his agreement
with the socialists on political reform. It is a disturbing sign that he has thus far started letting his
radical faction of supporters peel him away from his promises.
As soon as the Supreme Court handed him the victory on the third round of the election, some people imagined
that they could dispense with their previous agreements. They cannot -- not if they want a solid, united,
governable Ukraine.
Yushchenko and his camp are now being tested by temptation. Moderate Ukrainians will be watching whether they
give in to the voice of temptaton at this early stage. After all, they will have plenty of greater
temptations after coming to power. And there will always be the argument for further consolidating power.
Yushchenko, unlike Saakashvili, does not represent anything close to national consensus. He needs to keep
building consensus as far as feasible, not revert to his radicals who would destroy it.
The radicals want a strong presidency as a means (1) for radical economic reform, (2) for linguistic
ukrainization.
The second purpose is extremely divisive. Yushchenko needs to stick to his campaign promises to make Russian-
speakers feel at home. He should be thinking about measures to give Russian a status as a state language, not
further ukrainization. Linguistic ukrainization will probably gradually proceed over time, as an organic
development, but as a government-enforced project it is an offense against a large part of the citizenry. It
is a good example of how exaggerated nationalist ideas and demands for unity serve in practice to undermine
the unity of a country. It is the kind of mistake that's encouraged by those latter-day Schmitteans in the
West who are trying to rehabilitate ethnic nationalism vis-a-vis the milder civic variant.
As to the first purpose, no miracles should be expected economically. Ukraine is a mess, yet it is growing
impressively. Practically all the post-Soviet space is a mess. Visions of miracles, if the "right" people
come to power, have always proved mirages, except perhaps in the Baltics where the national socio-political
culture was cohesive and western enough to support rapid transformation.
Anyway, it is my understanding that the political reform would actually come into effect only after a year's
delay. This would give Yushchenko time to break up enough of the power concentrations that Kuchma built, so
as to ensure a solid future for Ukrainian democracy. The path to that future thereafter lies through consensus,
not any kind of Jacobinism.
One should not forget how much Gorbachev accomplished in six short years through the method of consensus,
bequeathing a post-Soviet space with broad freedoms and almost unanimously oriented toward becoming market
democracies. Or how little Yeltsin accomplished in his eight years, after the initial burst of changes which
however destroyed consensus. Putin reverted to consensus methods and accomplished a lot more, even if the
accomplishments have become mixed as to which way they are taking the country. Jacobinism has failed, and the
objective conditions in Ukraine can be expected to make it a disaster there, too, if attempted.
Such a disaster would forfeit the fruits of the orange revolution and leave Ukraine back in the same mess of
constipating divisions that it has suffered ever since independence. It is through methods of maximum
feasible consensus that Yushchenko can move the country forward sustainably, even if not with breakneck speed.
Yushchenko won the election by appealing to the center, saying that he would be good to Russian-speakers, and
good to Russia as well as the EU and NATO. By these means he won the votes of Kiev and the core of Ukraine
that holds the country together.
The role of the West in this may not be insignificant. Its influence, intentional or not, is considerable. It
should encourage Yushchenko to do the following:
1. keep his promises.
2. proceed with political reform, within a carefully arranged package to be sure so it does not undo the
revolution.
3. be good to Russian-speakers, e.g. consider state status for Russian.
4. be good also to Russia, e.g. develop further economic integration with it alongside the slower process of
integration with the EU.
5. keep his radicals under control and subordinate to the broader national interest.
If Yushchenko does all this, the "revolution" will succeed. No matter who wins subsequent elections, there
will be no counter-revolution.
In order to play this role, the West will have to make an effort, not just act mechanically. The EU could try
to make the three "common space" plans (EU-Russia, EU-Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine) compatible, but as far as I
can tell, it hasn't tried; instead it has proceeded with its usual blindness to export the complications, with
the result of acting divisively toward Ukraine. If the EU were to try and Russia were to refuse to arrange a
compatibility of spaces, that would be different, and the political consequences in Ukraine would also be
very different. NATO's behavior has been better, but it may face plenty of temptation in the near future. If
Ukraine comes into NATO, then Ukraine and NATO will be tempted to kick the Russian fleet out of Sevastopol,
although it is hard to see what need there would be for doing so. The base might better become a joint NATO-
Russia one under the auspices of the NRC.
The West will also have to ignore the advice and pressure of its own Polish and Ukrainian nationalists. They
have thus far predominated in what the West hears about Ukraine and have encouraged a highly divisive,
crudely two-camp approach to it. It will help if more moderate voices with more comprehensive and balanced
conceptions start making themselves heard.
Despite the prevalence of extremists in the media-think tank discourse on Ukraine, it seems eminently
feasible, given past experience, that the West could play a constructive moderating role. Several times
already, the US has acted as a brake on Ukrainian nationalism. It insisted that Ukraine return its nuclear
weapons to Russia. To be sure, Russia was singularly ungrateful for the help, announcing virtually the day
after that it didn't need and didn't want the West as a mediator in its relations with Ukraine. Those
relations remained rocky, and further Western mediation did indeed help in the eventual resolution of the most
contentious points. The West joined Russia in welcoming the election of Kuchma over Kravchuk, who was seen as
increasingly just a Ukrainian nationalist doing nothing good for his country's reform. Russia again was less
than grateful, harping on its phobias instead about Western interference, and competition for influence on
Ukraine actually picked up during Kuchma's reign even as Russian-Ukrainian relations calmed down. Of course,
Ukraine is a sensitive area for Russians. The Russian reaction would have been far worse if the Western role
had been more negative.
I am sure Russia will not be sufficiently grateful if the West now helps Ukraine maintain its balance in
policy toward Russia and toward Russian-speakers. Nevertheless the West ought to do it, for two good reasons:
First of all, it is the right way to help Ukraine. The West is winning; there is no need to act out of fear
and make Russia a bigger loser in the process. Doing so would only hurt Ukraine, exacerbating its East-West
division and sacrificing the victory to the demons of revenge. A case for revenge is, to be sure, being made
at this time, in defensive language as is the usual mode, based on two-camp reasoning: Russia is defined as
the enemy, defeat of its interests is defined as the essence of Western and democratic victory, and
compromise with any of those interests is viewed as compromising or betraying the revolution. Among those who
write this way, Russia is pretty openly perceived as the devil, triumphing everywhere with infinite power and
guile. Accordingly, any acceptance of its interests means an intrusion of the devil who will inevitably take
over everything. Meanwhile, back in the real world, Russia is not triumphing everywhere, it is losing just
about everywhere, and it has legitimate interests whose acceptance would not mean betrayal of anyone to the
devil. It is losing precisely because its own "analysts" adopt the same two-camp devil-theory approach in
reverse, saying that the US is triumphing everywhere that it has a foot in the door. They have led their
government down the suicidal path of forcing the issue on either-or terms, as if to hope for exclusion of the
inevitable Western influence. The result is that Russia lost out, faced with a moderate candidate who had the
wisdom to appeal to the political center. Now the West may find itself tempted to follow Russia in such a
self-defeating attitude; if it were to do so, it would quickly drive the Ukrainian revolution into the ground.
The main substance of the emerging democratic victory in Ukraine exists in itself, independent of anything
anti-Russian. By conciliating Russia and Russian-speakers, the West would consolidate the victory, not betray
it. Russian influence in Ukraine is inevitable, as is Western influence. In the long run, the health of
Ukrainian democracy depends on finding ways for Russia to represent its interests and exercise its influence
legitimately within the democratic system, as the West also will presumably do.
Second, because the West has important, legitimate interests in relations with Russia. If the West were to
encourage a punitive extremist policy on the part of Yushchenko, the Russian paranoid reaction would rise to
much greater heights than it has already reached. Russian paranoia would in fact get empirical verification,
making it hard ever to dislodge the impression and heal the damage to relations. That "verification" might not
seem persuasive to some Westerners who would argue that Russia was at fault for doing wrong first and was
only repeaing the consequences, but most moderate people everywhere wisely reject this "he hit me first" way of
reasoning. "He hit me first" is relevant when it comes to resolving the immediate fight, and any concomitant
power struggle over the terms for avoiding future hitting, but not the public policies that flow thereafter.
It is always the responsibility of the victor to keep his mental balance and avoid getting dizzy with success.
Yushchenko is going through his time of testing and temptation. He has stumbled. It is important for him to
pick himself up and make it through.
#5
Kiev's Strongman Seeks Immunity
Mark Franchetti and Askold Krushelnycky, Kiev
The Times (UK), 5 December 2004
#6
The Chancellor and Ukraine
Putin's Waiter
by Christoph Marschall
Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), 1 December 2004
[translated by Julia Luetsch for UKL]
#7
Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine (Friday, December 3, 2004)
Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL
The response to the Supreme Court decision about the third round of elections in Ukraine was striking. On the
one hand, newspapers in Russia offered the Russian interpretation of the events in Ukraine. On the other hand,
political forecasts became extremely popular. "What would happen ifS" scenarios inspired quite a few
predictions.
RUSSIAN RESPONSE
Gudok interviewed the head of the regional elections commission Sergei Yusov who personally visited over a
hundred different voting stations in Donets'k and Luhans'k regions (Tikhov Cherkasova, "Devilish Dances on
Kreshchatik", Gudok, 12/4/2004). Yusov argues that violations during the elections were minor. He points out
that even today Kyiv cannot dispute neither the fact that 85% of southeastern Ukraine supported Yanukovich,
nor that the turnout rate was 100% in some regions. He quotes the results of voting in the Southern Russia.
Almost 90% of Ukrainian citizens who came to the voting station at the regional consulate of Ukraine voted for
Yanukovych. Yusov argues that political crisis in Ukraine would have negative repercussions for Russia as a
whole and for border territories of Russia in particular. The general consul of Ukraine in the Southern
Regional constituency of Russia, Pyotr Andrienko also supported Yanukovich. Andrienko protests against
violations of the Constitution taking place in Ukraine right now. He is also concerned that Donets'k,
Luhans'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv regions and a part of Zaporizhzhia are encouraged towards autonomy. He
argues that these regions are "milking cows" of Ukraine and as such are fairly self-sufficient. The majority
of the population of these regions is working while people in Kyiv are out protesting.
ON RE-VOTE
Izvestia quotes Putin as saying: "Running the runoff elections once again would not achieve anything. One
could organize elections for the third, fourth, twenty fifth time until one of the parties involved does not
receive the results it needs". Izvestia states that the Russian government does not consider this a political
loss; only one battle but not the whole war is lost (Yusin, "Ukrainians are up for a third round", Izvestia
No. 227-M (26784)).
FORECASTS
Izvestia foresees two possible scenarios of the situation in Ukraine. First of all, Moscow could honorably
surrender and accept Yushchenko's victory (Yusin, "Ukrainians are up for a third round", Izvestia No. 227-M
(26784)). It could try to establish a dialogue with him. The second option is to accept a challenge and to
move on to the third round with the intention of winning it. After all, only half of Ukraine is ready to
support Yushchenko. Izvestia concludes that the Kuchma-Yanukovych team has too much to lose to give up their
hopes right now. A "witch hunt" would ensue should Yushchenko win (it might happen despite his will as his
collaborators might encourage political prosecution). To avoid losing this round, Yanukovych needs just one
thing - to win. While it is difficult, it is not impossible, Izvestia cheerfully speculates. There are three
conditions that might allow Yanukovych to win. First of all, he needs to bring back his potential electorate -
all gasterbeiters from Russia, - in time for elections. Secondly, he should demand international observers'
presence during the elections in the Western regions of Ukraine. And finally, he needs to persuade his
"Russian colleagues" not to interfere in the internal affairs of a brotherly but nevertheless sovereign state.
Komsomolskaya Pravda also outlines 3 possible scenarios (Anisimiov, "What Should Russia Expect of Ukraine?",
Komsomol'skaya Pravda, No. 203). The first one is re-vote. Yushchenko's victory is highly probable in this
case. The miners of Donbass have always been apprehensive of Yushchenko who closed coalmines earlier on the
premise that it was cheaper to purchase coal in Poland. In this case, issues of Russian language and double
citizenship might become problematic. Also, it is obvious that Ukraine would become more Europe-oriented in
this case. Then, it would affect Russia in regard to geopolitics. However, it might prove economically
profitable for Russia. KP hypothesizes that then Ukraine would become more transparent for foreign investors.
The presence of European companies in Ukraine is negligible while Russian companies have always had a strong
presence there. Thus, Russian financial-industrial groups would have an advantage.
[The other two scenarios have been superseded by the Court decision -DA]
WHITHDRAWAL OF UKRAINIAN FORCE FROM IRAQ
Izvestia reports that on Friday, with 257 votes "for", Rada passed a resolution about withdrawal of Ukrainian
soldiers out of Iraq (Stepanov, "Rada voted to withdraw soldiers from Iraq", Izvestia, #227-M (26784)). The
right-wing opposition, the left wing and the centrists supported this resolution. Pyotr Symonenko reminded that
both Yushchenko and Yanukovich insisted on this withdrawal in their elections campaign. However, Yushchenko
supporters objected to this decision. Yuriy Kostenko, the leader of the Ukrainskoy Narodnoy Party, said,
"This is an effort to influence the West so that it would decrease its support of our democratic opposition".
A member of Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc, Andriy Shtil' remarked that this resolution does not have any power
until it is approved by president. Currently, there are 1,589 Ukrainians serving in Iraq. Since August 2003, 9
soldiers died and over 200 were wounded. Maintenance of the military regimen in Iraq costs about $20mln a
year.
In its analysis of this resolution, Kommersant argues that it is important to pay attention to the political
intentions of the parties involved (Kolesnkov, "Repeat, Please", Kommersant #228). Thus, while originally,
Yushchenko was one of the strongest proponents of withdrawal, the Rada's decision might take this trump card
out of his hands. If Kuchma signs the resolution, it would mean that the authorities aim to disarm the
opposition leader and are preparing for the third round of elections. According to Aleksei Yedin, a member of
"Trudovaya Ukraina", the motivation for this resolution is unclear. Offended by Tyhypko's decision to resign,
the deputies might have decided to introduce a contentious issue in the relations between Yushchenko and the
West, Yedin argues.
FOREIGN PRESS
Izvestia reprinted an article from the Guardian about a new movement emerging in Ukraine (No Comment, Izvestia,
#227-M (26784)). Thus, the students in Kharkiv oppose both Yanukovich and Yushchenko. The young residents of
Kharkiv united under a green flag and a slogan "We are for Peace". They built a tent camp in the center of the
city and inundated the city with thousands of green ribbons. To facilitate peaceful negotiations, they
organized a soccer game. Both teams participating in the game consisted of supporters of Yushchenko and
Yanukovych. Also, the students erected a Christmas tree that they encouraged people to decorate with orange
and blue ribbons. "We would like to prevent conflicts between the "orange" and the "white-blue"," - a
graduate student of Kharkiv State University Dmitriy Tkachev said. - "Even 12-year old school kids are
fighting among themselves defending Yushchenko or Yanukovich. We would like to persuade the Ukrainians that
politicians are simply using them to further their personal goals".
UKRAINIAN IMPACT ON RUSSIA
Meanwhile, events in Ukraine continue to stir political responses in Russia. Thus, the Prefektura of the
Central Administrative Constituency of Moscow announced that theatrical forms of protests that became popular
lately should be considered public entertainment and as such fall under the jurisdiction of Luzhkov's
resolution about entertainment events. Thus, it becomes significantly more difficult to organize events of
this kind. Now, a petition for a permission of these events would need to be submitted one month prior to the
actual event, Kommersant reports (Kashin, "Prefektura responds to "goat" offense", Kommersant, #228).
Theatrical actions of protest became extremely fashionable in Moscow. Earlier this year, Communist party
activists organized a performance entitled "Vova, Go Home!" A girl representing president's mother came out on
a street and yelled "Vova, Go Home!". Several dozen young men wearing masks with Putin's face came out to her
call. This performance had a tremendous resonance in the city. A party "Rodina" organized a similar show
during the meeting of "Yedinaya Rossiya". Members of the party brought a live goat covered in bearskin to the
hotel Cosmos where an assembly meeting of "Yedinaya Rossiya" took place. Participants of the show shouted:
"You are not bears, you are goats". However, after the recent resolution, such actions are far less likely to
happen. One of the young activists expressed his indignation by pointing out, that mandarins at Yushchenko's
rally or white-blue posters and scarves in Yanukovych's support are akin to a theatrical show as well.
#8
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 13:04:20 -0000
From: "Kataryna Wolczuk"
Ukraine and the EU after The Orange Revolution
Grzegorz Gromadzki, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl,
Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk
CEPS Policy Brief No. 60/December 2004
This article is also available on the website of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw (www.batory.org.pl)
and as Policy Brief No. 17/2004 of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine in Kyiv
(www.foreignpolicy.org.ua).
#9
A "Grotesquely Corrupted Result"
by Danylo Hawaleshka
Maclean's (Canada), 6 December 2004
********************************************************************** **
UKL 302, 6 December 2004
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Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa
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