Opinions and analyses on US and global security presented by H. Ross Kawamura: a foreign policy commentator; an advocate for liberal interventionism and robust defense policy; a watchful guardian of a world order led by the USA, Europe, and Japan.

Monday, February 23, 2015

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s trip to the Middle East spurred criticism from the opposition and some opinion leaders, as ISIS broadcasted videos of killing two Japanese hostages worldwide on the Internet (“ISIS Says It Has Killed 2nd Japanese Hostage”; New York Times; January 31, 2015), when Abe declared to donate a $200 million humanitarian aid to the Middle East, and stand against prevailing terrorism in this region ("The Best Way Is to Go in the Middle"; Speech by Prime Minister Abe; January 18, 2015). According to the poll by the Japan News Network, 55% of the Japanese public see the timing of Abe’s visit to the Middle East was inappropriate (“55% Say Abe’s Middle East Visit Inappropriate”; TBS News; February 9, 2015).
However, it is too superficial to relate the hostage killing and Abe’s $200 million aid speech in Egypt and his subsequent visit to Israel. The real objective of terrorists is to agitate fears among the public, and demonstrate their presence, according to a New York based writer Sawako Yasuda. I agree with her, because I believe that it was media criticism to George W Bush that drew anti-American terrorists to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Criticism to Abe blamers also comes from the Arab side. Palestinian Ambassador to Japan Waleed Siam, who is the Dean of the Council of Arab Ambassadors in Tokyo, condemned ISIS and defended Abe (“Rising Voices against Blaming Abe”; J-CAST News; February 2, 2015).
Though the murder of two hostages imperiled Japanese people, Japan needs to secure its own national interest by departing from postwar omnidirectional diplomacy. Japan is losing confidence in Obama’s America, as Obama himself remarked that the United States was no longer the world policeman. If that is the case, Japan has to do something more involved to stabilize the Middle East as a core member of democratic nations. Otherwise, Japan cannot sustain its economy, because it is so dependent on Middle East oil (“A tipping point for Japan’s foreign policy”; Financial Times; January 28, 2015 or here). The problem is beyond Japan’s self-restricted narrow national interest. The Japan Forum on International Relations, a leading think tank advocating proactive pacifism of the Abe administration, issues the 37th policy recommendation to endorse Japan’s departure from postwar “One Country Pacifism”, in order to get actively involved in buttressing the liberal world order.
The focal point of this recommendation is neither re-militalization nor the quest for great power status of Japan, but founding a real “global no-war regime” by suppressing threats to world peace (“Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action”; Japan Forum on International Relations; August 2014). Abe’s initiative of civilian aid to displaced people around Iraq and Syria is an action to put the concept of positive or proactive pacifism into practice. The advent of ISIS is a grave challenge that could dissolve current Westphalian system as it strives for establishing a global caliphate of fanaticism and terrorism. That will endanger the vital foundation of Japan’s peace, prosperity, and national welfare. Regardless of the partisanship of Nagatacho politics, it is Japan’s interest to suppress threats in the Middle East.
Despite that, some Japanese blame the timing of Abe’s Middle East tour, as they firmly believe that his diplomatic schedule was so reckless as to provoke ISIS to kill Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa. It is extremely tragic that our fellow citizens were so brutally murdered. However, I would argue that Abe seized the opportunity to visit the Middle East and address Japan’s global engagement. That serves the public interest of the world, but those who denounce him give hardly any consideration to this. I am not hailing Shinzo Abe. I am critically concerned with Barack Obama’s horrible mismanagement in the Middle East, as I frequently and repeatedly argue on this blog. American allies, including Japan must take any action to make up for his blunder.
The foremost reason that allowed ISIS to vandalize and imperil the Middle East is the failure of Obama’s Iraq policy. This is typically indicated in frequent change of the Secretary of Defense in his administration. From Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, to Chuck Hagel, criticized Obama’s disengagement with Iraq. Even former Under Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy, who joined Obama’s team so early during the transition period, left the administration along with Panetta, and refused to accept the job offer after Hagel. The power vacuum by Obama’s premature pullout from Iraq has made the problem extremely complex. While most of the experts and opinion leaders focus on the axis of Sunni extremists and ex-Baathists in Syria and western Iraq, Shiite jihadists in southern Iraq and Levant are no less formidable as Iran sponsors them. Too many opinion leaders assume as if it were an equation of only one unknown x. They dismiss another unknown y in this equation, which is Iran’s influence.
How should we solve such a complicated equation? It is very risky to deploy Kurdish and Shiite militias in the same place, just to fight against ISIS, because sectarian killings by those militias are reported (“U.S.-backed Iraqi forces face risky urban warfare in battle against Islamic State”; Washington Post; February 8, 2015). In addition to local Shiites in southern Iraq, Iran sponsors Shiite proxies in Syria to defend the Assad administration. According to Phillip Smyth, Researcher of the University of Maryland, their influx into Syria is nothing to imply spontaneous Shiite unity, but to indicate highly organized geostrategic and ideological plots by Iran. There is already Hezbollah in Lebanon that Iran has been supporting since overthrowing the shah. In addition, Iraqi Shiite group Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas joins the civil war in Syria. Like ISIS, Iran recruits volunteers by Facebook. That is particularly targeted for Afghan Shiites living in Iran. The Revolutionary Guard of Iran makes such an extensive network to look for insurgents. The negative influence that Iran can exert is bigger than commonly thought (“The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects”; Washington Institute for Near East Policy – Policy Focus 138; February 2015). Despite those so many concerns, Obama is extremely naïve as to believe that Iran would play a constructive role in Iraq and Syria, if the West admitted nuclear infrastructure and rightful position in the Middle East for them. Even Democrat Senator Bob Menendez and Obama’s long term ally Senator Tom Kaine oppose such a daydream about Iran (“Obama’s fight with his own party over foreign policy”; Washington Post; February 1, 2015). Smyth suggests that the West interdict online propagandas and recruitments of both ISIS and Shite jihadists in the Policy Focus, but that is just the beginning.
In order to explore how America should manage these dual enemies, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy held a panel discussion on February 11. Michael Knights, Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute, and Phillip Smyth, the University of Maryland, presented strategic overviews and suggested policy directions. Their debates were concluded by P. J. Dermer, retired Army Colonel. To begin with, Knights told that the war against ISIS is winnable in a few years, but the clash by Shiite proxies with the Kurds and the Iraqi central government can disunify Iraq. Also, Baghdad worries that Shiites would take over their country, if the coalition is too dependent on Iran. Therefore, he insisted that the United States and coalition members must outperform Iran in this war. Otherwise, Iraq will fall into Iran’s satellite state, and the United States will lose a vital regional partner. Iranian influence in the Levant region is another problem. As Shiite militias secure Assad’s rule in Syria, their presence will pose threats to Israel over Golan Heights, and to Iraq over the north western borders. Therefore, Smyth warns that Iran would expand its sphere of influence from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. In view of complexity to deal with ISIS and Iran at the same time, Dermmer concluded that the biggest challenge for the United States will be making Iraq as a stable and lasting partner after defeating ISIS. See the video below.

I am somewhat bewildered to hear their discussion, because it sounds as if they admitted Obama’s approach to ask Iran for help to defeat ISIS, while America faces tough negotiations on nuclear disarmament with Tehran. I am critically afraid that Obama’s appeasement will make Iran overconfident as America appears weak for them. Remember that Retired Army General Jack Keane told that Iran was not interested in stability in Iraq as long as their influence was solidified by Shiite militias at the conversation with Senator John McCain at the American Enterprise Institute on June 18 last year.
Considering the points raised thus far, I believe that Abe’s $200 million aid plan was addressed exactly at the right time to dwarf the shadow of Iran, while the coalition fights against ISIS. Japanese media failed to mention this. Abe himself or Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida should have told this boldly in public, to promote awareness and understanding of the threat of Islamic extremism among the Japanese public and intellectuals. Japan took absolutely necessary action to relieve both Israel and Arab nations from the threat of Iran and make up for Obama’s fatal error to allow their involvement in this war. This is exactly a response to put proactive pacifism into practice. Why so many quibbles in Nagatacho and among the media?
In view of such security threats, Abe seized the best opportunity to visit the Middle East. The beheadings of Goto and Yukawa were horrible, and I would like to give my heartfelt condolences to them. But in my impression, those who blame Abe for their death are excessively emotional, and simply make use of this occasion to attack him. The problem is not whether to like Abe or not. We need an overview to think of Japan’s contribution to Middle East stability. America and Europe have been engaged to sweep out terrorists in the region for a long time, and Japan is the last major democracy to have additional leverage to suppress socioeconomic instability that nurtures ISIS and Shiite jihadists. Abe visited Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, and all the four arrange tight diplomatic schedules to meet the Japanese Prime Minister, regardless of the regime, state recognition, ethnicity, religion, and so forth. Even the god cannot stop anyone from disliking Abe, and do as they like. But to my regret, most of those who blame Abe’s visit spoke from old passive pacifism that Japan be detached from US-led coalition without showing the vision of the Middle East, which is so isolationist and outmoded in this century.
In addition, I would like to express my anger to widespread anti-Semitism among Japanese opinion leaders. They argued that Abe was too reckless to trigger Arab anger to visit Israel when Japanese hostages were killed. That is utterly wrong. The Palestinian Authority welcomed Abe’s visit to Israel, along with themselves. More importantly, Israel is a de facto ally to Gulf Arabs against Iran’s threat of nuclear weapons and Shiite proxies. From these perspectives, I wonder why so many intellectuals and citizens in Japan lapse so easily into anti-Israeli views, although both countries share common values and interests in global security. The joint press conference by Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Shinzo Abe on January 21 was nothing anti-Arab nor anti-Islam. Netanyahu stressed the global peril of nuclear proliferation to Iran and North Korea, and subsequent leak to terrorists. Meanwhile, Abe talked about terrorism and bilateral relations, and also stressed that Japan would endorse the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a friend to both actors. See the video below.

While opponents regard Abe’s visit to Israel as further blind followership to the United States, he is more realist to pursue Japan’s independent interest and presence in the Middle East. By deepening relations with Israel while maintaining ties with Palestine, Abe seeks more Japanese influence there (“Shinzo Abe Raising Japan's Profile by Engaging the Middle East”; Economy Watch; 11 February, 2015). Many Japanese people were so shocked to hear the murder news that they reacted hastily to relate the tragedy to Israel, and some of them even talked as if this country was the root of all evils. But we are the nation of humanist Sempo Sugihara, not racist murder Adolph Hitler. Hopefully, the Special Government Assessment Committee headed by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazuhiro Sugita (“EDITORIAL: Review of Middle East policies best way to assess handling of hostage crisis”; Asahi Shimbun;February 12, 2015) wipe out such poorly grounded anti-Semitism instead of Israel, when they review the hostage crisis.
Also, we must understand the nature of Islamic extremism. Even if Japan had appeased, ISIS would have killed them. Extremists kill even their fellow Muslims. Why bother to kill kafirs? There is a widespread misunderstanding that Japan not be involved in the Islam-West clash of civilizations. That is utterly wrong. Christians and Jews are not the only people whom Islamic extremists antagonize throughout the history. They wiped out Buddhism in India, and destroyed Gautama Siddhartha’s sacred birth place. Remember, how Taliban treated the Japanese delegation scornfully when they made a plea to stop bombing the Buddhas of Bamyan. Nor is it right for Japan to stay away from the US-led coalition, because they even killed Russians (“ISIS video claims to show boy executing two men accused of being Russian spies”; CNN News; January 15, 2015). The foremost points we must bear in mind are their bigoted ideology and lunacy. As historical evidence indicates, Islamic extremists are intolerant of moderate Muslims and people of other religion. Today, they are more radicalized and violent due to their devotion to Salafism, the most doctrinaire sect of Sunni that legitimizes killing of innocent people.
We must understand complicated security interactions in the Middle East and the nature of Islamic extremism. Finally, I would suggest that the global community make an international protocol to defend the life of journalists and aid workers from terrorists in combat areas. They may not be willing to follow instructions by the government, because they value independence from the authority. However, terrorists use their courageous devotion to the job, by kidnapping and killing them to horrify the world. Therefore, the government of each sovereign state must show the guideline to journalists and aid workers how to avoid getting involved in dangers in the War on Terror area. It is more important to prevent the crisis, rather than saving hostages captured by terrorists. Once captured, there are virtually no ways to liberate hostages from terrorists.

Saturday, January 31, 2015

The Japanese language version of this blog,
which is provided by Nifty, is equipped with a detailed access counter system.
According to the counter, 95.4% of the visitors of this month are male, at
20:24, January 31. Other months are more or less the same.

It was 97.4% last November, 96.1% last
October, 98.0% last September, 93.6% last August, and 85.2% last July.
Statistics for last December is not available. It is difficult to identify the
gender of some visitors for the provider.

But why so male oriented? There are numerous
female bloggers keenly interested in political and social issues, but security
agendas may not draw their attention. I wish my Google blog were equipped with more
detailed access counter so that I could compare trends of Japan and the English
speaking world. Are Japanese women too “feminine”, or Anglophone women more “masculine”?
That would be an interesting question.

Friday, January 23, 2015

When President Barack Obama’s made a remark
that the United Staes was no longer the world policeman, hardly any people around
the world welcomed that. Even those who vehemently opposed the “arrogance” of
the Iraq War were puzzled to hear his so abrupt announcement. The vital problem
is, if the United States really were to step down from the world policeman, it
needs to nominate some partners to share some portions of responsibility. In
history, once America expressed withdrawal from global commitment after the
Vietnam War. Like today, Americans were annoyed with a long war. But the post
Vietnam America under Richard Nixon acted more responsibly than Barack Obama
does today.

To begin with, let me review the Nixon doctrine, which was announced in 1969 when President Nixon to Vietnamize the
war. In those days, opinion leaders around the world talked about American
decline, and even cast doubts whether the United States would continue to be
the anchor of global stability. As Obama does today, Nixon delivered a message
to placate anxiety of the post-American world among the allies that the United
States would keep treaty commitments and help allies when vital its security interests
were threatened. On the other hand, Nixon stressed that the United States
simply helps countries facing enemy threats from behind, and they assume the
primary responsibility of defense. These points are somewhat similar to Obama’s
foreign policy directions. However, when the superpower steps down or cedes
responsibility to others, it is necessary to help the partner grow capable of
sharing burdens. So far as this aspect is concerned, Obama is far poorer than
Nixon. Stark differences are shown in their Middle East policies.Shortly after Nixon announced his doctrine,
he assisted the Shah’s Iran to ascend to the Guard of the Gulf. This is
typically illustrated in his generous and prompt support to build up the
Imperial Iranian Air Force. In the early 1970s, Iran was plagued by the Soviet
invasion to its airspace. Particularly, MiG-25s flew so fast that even IIAF
F-4s were unable to intercept them, and Iran was at the mercy of Soviet air reconnaissance
those days. Iran was desperately in need of advanced fighters to shut out the Soviet
Air Force from its sovereign territory. Therefore Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
met President Nixon at Andrews Air Force base near Washington DC in July 1973.
Nixon invited the Shah to see the flight demonstration there to select either
F-14 or F-15 for Iranian air defense, whichever he preferred. The Shah chose
F-14 without hesitation, as soon as the show ended (“Thirty minutes to choose your fighter jet: how the Shah of Iranchose the F-14 Tomcat over the F-15 Eagle”; Aviationist; February 11, 2013).

After returning home, the Shah ordered 30
F-14s in January next year, and subsequent 50 of them in June, along with
AIM-54 Phoenix missiles. The Nixon administration acted so promptly that Iran received
the first F-14s in January 1976, while the United States provided intensive
trainings for Iranian pilots (“Grumman F-14 Tomcat#Iran”; Wikipedia). The
result of this was spectacular. IIAF F-14 shot down a drone in a test firing of
Phoenix missilein August 1977 to demonstrate Iran’s air defense capability
against Soviet intrusion. Since then, formidable MiG-25s stopped flying over
Iranian territory (“Aircraft/Jet fighters/F-14”; IIAF.net). Nixon kept his
words as he succeeded in helping the Shah build up military power, capable
enough to defend his own homeland, and even act on behalf of America as the Guard
of the Gulf. We must learn a critical lesson from this story that the United
States can cut back its military commitment only when there is a staunch and
reliable strategic partner in the region.

Those failures have made Iraq vulnerable
not only against ISIS, but also against Iran. The Obama administration solicits
Iran to work together to fight against ISIS, while holding tough negotiations
on nuclear disarmament. Moreover, Iran has been a troublesome actor in Iraq as
its influence penetrates there through Shiites in the south. Now,
the Iraqi government is increasingly dependent on Shiite militia. Obama may think
anti-ISIS partnership with Iran temporary, but that poses long term negative effect
to Iraqi security. Iran still supports the Assad administration in Syria. Also,
Shiite militias want to displace Sunni people. The only way to overcome such
sectarian chasm is founding a solid security force of the central government
incorporating all ethnic and religious backgrounds (“The U.S. and Iran arealignedin Iraq against the Islamic State — for now”; Washington Post; December27, 2014).As a key ally to the United States in Iraq,
the Kurdish Regional Government sees ISIS threats were relatively contained as
a result of coalition air raid, but critically alarmed with Iranian penetration
through Shiite militias. Among those militias, Asaib Ahl Haq and the Badr militias are
vital threats to the Kurds as they are closely connected with the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard. Shias are most active in Diyala Governorate that borders
the Kurdish region and Iran, and they are moving further north to Kirkuk (“Forget ISIS: Shia Militias Are the RealThreat to Kurdistan”; National Interest; January 7, 2015). Despite such a
problem, the Obama administration is easing sanctions on Iran for nuclear talk.
That provoked anger on the Hill at his State of the Union Speech, and legislators cast
doubt whether Obama understands the threat of Iran (Unanimity at last: Obama isdelusional on foreign policy”; Washington Post; January 21, 2015). I agree to
their vehement criticism, and it seems as if Obama were consigning Middle East
security to Iran. I wonder if Obama really has long term visions to stabilize
Iraq and manage Iran.

Ever since America took over the hegemony
from Britain, its preeminence repeats upturns and downturns. Historical
backgrounds of Nixon and Obama are quite similar, but policy responses are so
starkly different. Obama is throwing away the responsibility of the world policeman
and pivoting to Asia without any preparation. So many commentators talk about a
superficial decline of the United States, but what really matters is the
quality of leadership. Unlike Nixon, Obama has no vision of foreign policy.
While the Shah had mutual trust with Nixon and Ford, neither Maliki nor Abadi
trusts Obama so much. Nixon had Henry Kissinger, but Obama has no reliable
foreign policy advisors. I believe that historical comparison between both
presidents will be of much implication to American foreign policy today.

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

The Obama administration is so reluctant to harness America’s hard power in foreign policy that even liberals and foreign leaders criticize his lack of leadership and superpower suicide. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama is not enthusiastic to use America’s soft power to advance its national interest and global public interest. We tend to focus on Obama’s inept handling of hard power diplomacy, as the world faces a resurgent of Cold War monsters like Russia and China, and also, the rise of religious fanaticism as typically seen in Islamic terrorists. But more balanced analysis is helpful to review Obama’s foreign policy critically, and explore better approaches for American and global security.
If Obama does not like hard power diplomacy so much, he must pursue more robust soft power diplomacy. However, in his 6 year presidency, he has achieved almost nothing. Normally, peace-oriented nations put heavy emphasis on soft power in their foreign policy. It is too well known that countries like Canada and Scandinavian nations give high priority to development aid and empowerment in their foreign policy, and that makes them vital civilian powers in the world. Such peace-oriented nations are military pigmy, compared with the United States, Britain, and France. Nor are they economic giants like Germany, which is an anchor to stabilize global and European monetary system. Soft power diplomacy is the only way for them to increase their presence in global politics.
Likewise, the Ohira administration of Japan launched a concept of comprehensive security in the late 1970s to fill the gap between increasing requirements for Japan’s contribution to global security and postwar pacifism. As Japan was unable to meet military requirements by the United States and its democratic allies, Prime Minister-then Masayoshi Ohira deepened development aid to ASEAN countries and policy dialogues with them. In a sense, it may be a precursor of current proactive pacifism of the Abe administration, as it was a turn over from unilateral pacifism. In those days, global security was in turmoil as it is today, since the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran and radical students occupied the US embassy, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
In view of the above examples, Obama’s awkward approaches in soft power diplomacy will erode American preeminence on the global stage furthermore. Here, I would like to call an attention to a column by Thomas Carothers, Vice President at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this article, Carothers points out that US aid to promote democracy has plunged 28% during the Obama era, and the US Agency for International Development spends 38% less expenditure today to foster democracy, human rights and accountable governance abroad than that of 2009. Particularly, such aid dropped sharply to the Middle East by 72% and Africa by 43%. It seems that the Obama administration prefers to live with stability under dictatorships however corrupt they may be, as they found it difficult to manage clashes between democracy activists and Islamists. Carothers comments that it is understandable, but he warns that autocracy foments corruption, and ultimately nurtures terrorism furthermore (“Why Is the United States Shortchanging Its Commitment to Democracy?”; Washington Post; December 22, 2014).
Criticism also comes from the Arab side. An Arab British journalist Sharif Nashashibi expresses his deep disappointment to American reconciliation with Arab autocrats at the expense of the quest for freedom among the grassroots (“A US resurgence in the Arab world?”; Middle East Eye; December 18, 2014). Obama has cut military presence in the Middle East which was initiated by Bush. Then, America must expand an alternative way of presence to suppress the spread of extremism there. Regretfully, Obama has cut both hard power presence and soft power presence! Is this a simple denial of Bush era foreign policy without showing the vision for the future?
One of the critical incidents to evaluate Obama’s soft power diplomacy is the response to Egypt’s refusal to the entry of Michele Dunne, Senior Associate in the Middle East program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dunne is a primary advocate for democracy promotion among American policymakers. She was going to Cairo to attend a conference by the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs under auspices of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Egyptian government denied her entry in a telephone interview when she arrived in Frankfurt for transit. The Egyptian side gave no reason for this (“Egypt Denies Entry to American Scholar Critical of Its Government”; New York Times; December 13, 2014). Eliot Abrahams, former Special Assistant to the President in the Bush administration, comments that this incident implies that the Sisi administration is in a spiral of autocratic corruption and jihadist uprising as it was with the Mubarak administration. Therefore, he argues that this country no longer deserves a strategic partner to the United States (“What’s General Sisi So Scared Of?”; Council on Foreign Relations---Pressure Points; December 13, 2014). Quite strangely, the Obama administration did not pose meaningful pressure to Egypt, regarding this case.
The point is no longer the matter of budget. It is quite doubtful whether Obama is seriously committed to advance American soft power. Obama’s pivot to soft power diplomacy from hard power one is empty. Accordingly, the Pivot to Asia has not strengthened American presence in Asia. Obama was not enthusiastic to support the democratic rally in Hong Kong. At the APEC summit in Beijing, Obama shook hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping so happily, although China flexed its military muscle to seize this opportunity to demonstrate J-31 stealth fighter to Asia-Pacific leaders. If neither the world policeman nor the champion of democracy, what sort of America does Obama envision?

Saturday, December 27, 2014

In face of rapid development of A2AD capabilities among America’s enemies, the US Navy needs countermeasures to secure freedom of international navigation and their maritime operations. Currently, the US Navy faces critical threats of advanced antiship missiles posed by challengers like China and Iran, but post Cold War defense spending cut has constrained America’s fleet defense capability. The United States must rebuild this capability so as not to allow any challengers to defy its maritime superiority.
The rise of enemy A2AD is nothing new. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Air Force challenged US naval supremacy with strategic bombers equipped with carrier killer missiles, notably Tu-22 Backfire and Tu-19 Badger. In order to defend carrier squadrons from Soviet saturation attack, the US Navy explored to make a fleet defense fighter for air superiority and interception. The Navy required a fighter equipped with powerful radar and long range missiles. That was F-14 Tomcat.
F-14 was not only capable of shooting down enemy attackers and missiles far away from the fleet. As a counter A2AD weaponry, its powerful radar enables the crews to find the enemy attackers before it was detected. Also, the fighter could hit multiple targets simultaneously with Phoenix long range air to air missiles to nullify saturation attacks of carrier killer missiles by the enemy. Tomcat was highly capable fleet defense fighter for “first look, first shot, first kill” missions. See the video below.
However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, air threats to American fleets were supposed to have expired for the time being. Therefore, the Congress demanded the Navy to replace F-14 fighter with F/A-18 which is less costly and more adaptable to multirole requirements. Americans were so unvigilant as to take Holidays from History, and China and Iran were preparing for their own Monroe Doctrine to claim dominance in their neighboring maritime sphere. In those days, Aegis combat system destroyers were supposed to assume fleet air defense, and F-14 squadrons were overcapable and too expensive to maintain. Even though, destroyers are vulnerable to enemy air attacks, however sophisticated, as seen in the HMS Shefield hit by an Argentine Exocet missile during the Falkland War.
F/A-18 Hornet and its advanced version Super Hornet are good fighters as they are multirole and cost effective. Some American allies like Canada, Australia, Spain, and so forth, deploy them instead of US Air Force F-15. However, they are not specialized for intercepting saturation attacks by the enemy. Also, F/A-18’s combat radius is shorter and flight speed is slower than F-14’s. During the Afghan War, F-14 flew farther beyond F/A 18’s flight range to attack Taliban and Al Qaeda. In view of rapid progress in enemy A2AD capability, the US Navy needs a reliable interceptor that can shoot down enemy missiles and attackers as far away as possible from the carrier squadron.
Currently, the Navy pushes for the Sixth Generation fighters such as F-X and F/A-XX projects, along with the Air Force. They are planned to be deployed by 2030 to replace Super Hornets. With more advanced engines, they will be able to fly farther, and boost performance. However, current budget constraints may force the Navy to give up new ideas presented by defense contractors. According to Dave Madjumdar, a freelance defense writer, the Navy may upgrade F-35C with new engine and missile system. However, Air Force pilots comment negatively to this idea. Even if advanced version, F-35 is no match for their F-22 in terms of air to air combat and SEAD/DEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses), says one pilot. Some even say a single engine fighter is underpowered, compared with a twin engine one, and thus, lower performance and less payload (“A New, "Super" F-35 to Rule the U.S. Military?”; National Interest; December 19, 2014). Remember F-14 had comparable capability and performance level to Air Force F-15.
The end of the Cold War has not resulted in the end of American enemy. They were honing their claws during a seemingly peaceful period. If the United States is too thrifty on defense, the price of it must be paid later. American enemies will be emboldened to see the US Navy balked by their A2AD capabilities. On the other hand, unnecessary rising costs and procurement delay must be curbed to proceed the project for fleet air defense smoothly. Senator John McCain is likely to chair the Armed services Committee next year, and he is a vocal critic to inefficient management of defense industries and bureaucracy at the Pentagon (“GOP Win Sets Stage for McCain to Put Pressure on Pentagon, Industry”; Military Times; November 5, 2014). In addition to technology, the US Navy must overcome so many challenges to defend the fleet from enemy A2AD.

Thursday, December 18, 2014

I attended the Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue, entitled “The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition: How Many Great Powers?”, which was hosted by Global Forum Japan and Meiji University on December 12. Panelists at the Dialogue, notably Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University, presented a lucid picture of Asia-Pacific power games based on realist perspectives.
Actually, I was rather astonished to hear Wall Street Journal’s editor Bret Stevens talk suspiciously at the Munk Debates on November 5 that Japan’s plutonium facilities could be used for nuclear weapons, if the threat of China grows more critical. Though I agree on his criticism to Obama’s superpower suicide, it was somewhat perplexing that an influential opinion leader like him spoke so alarmingly as if Japan were in the same league with North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. I am well aware that nuclear nonproliferation is a high priority issue in US foreign policy, and therefore, it sounded like he saw Japan a potential “enemy” to the United States. The problem is not just proliferation itself, but the rise of regional tensions beyond America’s control as we saw exchanges of nuclear tests between India and Pakistan in 1998.
However, Stevens’s comment may not be so “unfriendly” to America’s foremost ally in the Asia Pacific as I worried, according to Professor Mearsheimer’s realist perspectives. The state explores to maximize its national power and prestige, and tries to establish a solid sphere of influence in its neighborhood, for better chances of survival and more freedom in policy options. Therefore, realists see it natural that Japan acquire nuclear weapons, if the United States appeared too weak and unreliable to check growing threats of China. That is because it is the most cost effective deterrence against Beijing.
Granted such arguments, do Japanese leaders dare to get involved in power games with both America and China in their quest for nuclear weapons? Historically, the United States did not accept any dominant power in Asia, as shown in Secretary of State-then John Hay’s Open Door Policy in 1899. Even if seemingly appeasing to China, it is quite unlikely that the United States throws away its grip on Asia, nor does it want unmanageable Far East like the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry in 1998. Therefore, Japanese leaders should act and speak carefully on wartime history, as prominent opinion leaders like Mearsheimer and Stevens speak about the potential of a nuclearized Japan so openly.
The Dialogue was so impressive and insightful, and I would like to raise the following points to consider. The first one is the Pivot to Asia. Certainly, market opportunities in emerging economies in Asia are important. But does that mean that America should be less involved in Europe and the Middle East? Is the Ukrainian crisis simply a diversion from Asia? No, because Russia intrudes Japan’s northern airspace frequently. It is a threat to us both in Europe and Asia. In addition, China defies America globally. Remember China objected to the Iraq War along with Russia for fear of a unipolar world, though the PLA has no power projection capability in the Middle East. Also, China explores to expand influence in Africa through controversial aid. Therefore, I believe that the shift away from Europe and the Middle East is no guarantee of strengthening American presence in Asia. To my regret, this is the real consequence of Obama’s pivot to Asia as typically seen in the rise of ISIS, while China grows increasingly provocative in East Asia.
Regarding China’s global challenge to the United States, we should reconsider why this country frequently mentions itself “still a developing country”. This is not out of modesty, but megalomaniac ambition. I would rather interpret its implicit meaning, “Developing countries of the world, unite! Rise against Western (and also Japanese) imperialism!”. Remember China is a revolutionary state, and there is every reason for them to defy Pax Americana on a global scale. In order to check China’s expansionism, I would argue that the broken window theory be applied. That is, when American enemies find some weak spots, they will be emboldened like gangs who found broken windows on the street.
The second point is a presumed case of hegenomic transition. Should China take over the American world order, the gap with its precursor’s will be huge. Pax Americaca inherited liberal values, culture, and political systems from Pax Britannica. In face of rising rivals in early 20th century, Britain saw America preferable to Germany to share the burdens of a global superpower. This Greece and Rome relations shall never emerge, should China rise furthermore, because the hegemonic fault line between Pax Americana and Pax Sinica would be immense. If it were to happen, China would be Attla’s Hun that devastated Rome and left nothing for the following generations.
The third point is whether the nature of the regime does not matter in great power rivalries even from realist viewpoints. I would like to mention one example which is Iran, because this country has been in quest of the great power in the Gulf region, whether modernist or Islamic theocracy. During the Pahlavi era, Iran sought to rise as America’s guard of the Gulf. The shah was an enlightened despot, and pursued a nation building through Western styled modernization. The shah even appealed great history of the Persians and their superiority to Arabs by de-Islamification. That made Iran very pro-American and pro-Israeli both in terms of realpolitik and ideology. On the other hand, current theocracy wants to rise by defying American supremacy, and extremely anti-Israeli by nature. They advocate solidarity with Shiite mostazafins among their fellow Arabs. There is nothing strange that they sponsor terrorism, both in terms of realpolitik and ideology.
The dialogue was very helpful to understand an increasingly complicated picture of the Asia Pacific region, and sent a critical message to Japanese leaders to behave carefully regarding sensitive issues. Among three questions I mentioned, the most critical one is the real meaning of the Pivot to Asia. Is this just a rhetoric, or kow-tow to market opportunities in China, or real strategic commitment in this region? That is the problem.