Named after the three cities I live in, this blog will focus on Israeli, Palestinian, and Turkish politics and social issues. In addition, I will periodically cover other topics related to the Middle East.

Thursday, December 26, 2013

…on the
twenty-fifth of December. While perhaps it is still early to make such a
bombastic statement, however there is no doubt that what we saw on this day is an
historic turning point. For the first time, Turkish citizens and analysts alike
are starting to imagine a Turkey without the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan.

Just hours after
the resignations came the second political earthquake: news came in that a “Second
Wave” arrests was about to take place. However, no time at all passed before
rumors spread throughout the media and twitter waves that the police were
refusing to carry out the prosecutor’s orders, which included the detainment
of Erdogan’s son, Bilal, along with a whole list of key business figures.

The next day,
late in the afternoon, news broke that the prosecutor of the “Second Wave,” had
been removed from the case. According to the prosecutor, M.
Akkas, “I learned that I was removed from my duty without any
justification, while the search warrants, seizure [of materials] and arrest
orders [were also taken from me]. The responsibility from now on falls with the
Istanbul public prosecutor and his deputy. All of the public and my colleagues
should know that my task as a prosecutor has been obstructed…”

In the meantime, Erdogan, who just appointed a new cabinet in a "reshuffle" (a move planned ahead of
probe in preparation of the March local elections and post-budget approval) has
opted to stand strong against all accusations of corruption, blaming it on international
conspiracy. Further, he even went so far to praise the main suspect of the “First
Wave” of the corruption probe, Reza Zarrab,
and is standing by the CEO of Halkank, who was allegedly found with shoe
boxes of dollars stashed away in his home. In Erdogan’s words,“Zarrab exports
gold and I know that he is involved in charity activities as well.” In others,
if some thought he would throw Zarrab and his accused accomplices “under the
bus,” at least for now that is far from the case.

In my last blog,
I asked how long will AKP MPs be willing to put up with this circus; one major
MP already resigned on December 25 (following the resignation of the ministers),
Idris Naim Sahin; another MP, hinted to widespread corruption while handing
over his post to the newly appointed minister after Erdogan relieved him from
his position as minister in the “reshuffle.” Lastly, one AKP MP criticized the
PM for appointing an Interior Minister who is not a MP. However, the fact that there is a stirring within the party, does not mean that we are anywhere near a group
of AKP MPs abandoning Erdogan, in order to set up a new party within the
parliament.

Nevertheless, if
the state of affairs continue to deteriorate at the speed it has been during
the last few days, it seems hard to imagine that his party members will remain
silent. In the event they do not take matters into their hands, then Erdogan
will need to face a growing chorus of opposition calling for his resignation,
or at least, early elections, among the Turkish population at large. For now, however, the ball is still in Erdogan's court, and he very well could come out on top if he plays his cards right.

Monday, December 23, 2013

A Turkish telenovela could not
have had a better script: last Tuesday morning, police forces completed an
early morning raid detaining some of the country’s top political, social, and
business elite: An Iranian-Azeri businessmen, married to a famous pop-star;
three government ministers’ sons; the CEO of a government bank; a
multi-millionaire construction tycoon; and a local mayor of Istanbul’s
Fatih district, a member of the ruling government. Within hours of the arrest,
it was clear that this would be one of the greatest scandals in Turkish
history, a graft probe that connected the lives of the rich and famous with the
country’s top politicians.

Reza Zarrab (left) with Turkish Minister Suat Kılıç (right)

Since news broke almost a week ago, we
have learned that the raid was related to three different probes, and two of
the big names, each belonging to a different probe, have been released awaiting
trial: the construction mogul, Ali Agaoglu, and the mayor of Fatih
municipality, Mustafa Demir. While these two probes are quite telling on their
own accord, the graft probe that has shaken the Turkish political world to the core is related
to the arrest of Reza Zarrab, the Iranian-Azeri businessman (married to the famous singer Ebru Gündes), who is accused of paying off millions of
dollars to high-ranking personalities, such as, two government ministers’ sons,
and the CEO of the state ran bank, Halkbank. Further, it is alleged that Egemen
Bağış, the Turkish Minister of EU Affairs, was central in acquiring Turkish
citizenship for Zarrab, and rumored that the Economic Minister,
Zafer Cağlayan, whose son was arrested, received a $350,000 watch as a present from Zarrab.

During the last week, Turkey's once believed-invincible Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been working hard to close the pandora’s box that has been opened: following
the arrests, he sacked tens of high-ranking police officers involved in the
trial, and is placing great pressures on the judicial system. Similar to his
reaction during the Gezi Park protests, the Prime Minister, is trying to
convince all that this is the work of secret forces; some pro-government
newspaper outlets have placed blame on the US, while others on the likely candidate, Israel (surely it must be the Jews behind this). However, the
gravity of this embarrassment is not the fact that his government is condoning
rampant corruption, rather, more and more, it seems like it is an integral part
of it.

Just days ago, numerous photos have hit
the press showing Reza Zarrab at official state events and ceremonies, leading
some to cynically suggest that Zarrab should be declared as an honorary member
of the government. While there is no photo of him with the Prime Minister, he
appears twice with the PM’s wife, Emine Erdoğan, together with Suat Kılıç, the up-and-coming favorite Minister of Erdoğan, in a photo with the previously mentioned Minister, Egemen Bagis, and with the
wife of the Interior Minister, Muammer Güler, whose son was
one of the ones arrested. In other words, from the photos it is apparent that Reza Zarrab had very
close relations with many in the high-echelons of the governing AK party; further, his presence at
official openings begs the question whether or not he or his wife, Gündeş, contributed illegal monies to public
institutions.

Zarrab’s close relations is damning to
the AK Party’s image that was elected as an anti-corruption party. During their
eleven years in power, rumors of corruption have come-and-gone, and with over
four-hundred billion dollars of foreign investment energizing Turkey’s economy,
and the subsequent over-the-top construction boom, corruption seems almost unavoidable
(something that is central to the two previous probes that were mentioned at
the beginning of the article). However, most damaging to the party, is the fact
that Erdoğan has decided to challenge the allegations head-on, risking a head-on collision with the Turkish electorate, which despite all his
rallying, must simply be tired of the endless controversy; yes, some Turkish citizens
might have not been the most sympathetic to the Gezi Park protests, but this
too took a toll on them. Now, if Erdogan does not quickly take control (with no
signs of this in the future), he is at risk of being left alone, with a much
less (even if consolidated) numbered of die-hard supporters.

If this was not enough, with the Gülen Movement accused as being the perpetrators, uncovering
of this scandal, it is hard to imagine that the party will be able to make up
the votes lost due to the parting of this once staunch ally. Furthermore, even if it is too early
to predict how this scandal will play out, it perhaps is time to ask how much
longer members of Erdoğan’s party will put up with this circus;
at what point will respectable members of his cabinet jump ship. Such as, Foreign
Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who, despite criticism of his
foreign policy, remains a serious politician that could lead a conservative
agenda in Turkey. Lastly, it seems more likely than ever that Turkey’s
president, Abdullah Gül, also will
remain unscathed from these scandals, and this could be an opportunity to strengthen his hold over Turkish politics.

In the first article of my series on the upcoming Turkish local elections, I ended by saying that this season will be
interesting to say the least, no one could have predicted such a major fallout.
What is clear is that if there was any chance for opposition parties to make
gains against the AK Party, the time is now. Also, if Erdoğan weathers this storm, he certainly he will hold up his reputation as being the political genius, as we all know him as; but the question remains, at what price.

Whatever comes out of this political scandal, it is clear that the biggest loser from this graft probe will not be one politician or another, truly, it is the Turkish state's standing among its citizens, and in the world. They say in Turkish, yazık (it's a pity); simply put, this probe cannot be described in any other way.

Sunday, December 8, 2013

At the end of March 2014, Turkey will once again head to the polls to vote
in mayors for the country’s municipalities, marking five years since the
previous ones, and almost three years since the 2011 national elections. While
local elections do not always serve as an indicator for the general public’s
confidence in a ruling party, there is no doubt that the upcoming elections in
Turkey is quickly turning into a referendum for the ruling AK Party, which
received almost fifty percent of the vote in the last national elections.

Actually, it is not the opposition parties that are treating this as a
referendum, who obviously know the stakes are high; rather, it is Turkey’s
strong Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is pushing this stance. We
have to remember that Erdogan is at his best during elections, and during the
past few weeks he has been campaigning “full-steam ahead.”

Ever since the Gezi Park protests, in fact, Erdogan has been on a non-stop
campaign challenging his opponents, or anyone who has the potential to
challenge his hegemony, one-by-one. Most
recently, in an attempt to consolidate power within his own party, the Turkish
prime minister opened a front against the Gülen movement, or what is known in
Turkish as the Hizmet (Service) movement, or the Cemaat (the
Society). However, it is still premature to see how the unfolding row will play
out in the upcoming local elections. Clearly, the twitter wars between the two camps has showed us just how messy Turkish politics can become.

What is clear is that Erdogan’s constant divisive “powerhouse” politics
will most likely lead to a decline in his support, something I already claimed
just two weeks before the Gezi protests. However, let us not lose sight, local
elections can be misleading; it is important to remember that Erdoğan also
treated the 2009 elections as a referendum and despite the opposition parties
gaining some ground, just two years later, in the national elections, he swept
the ballots, getting almost 50% of the general vote (see my former blogs on 2009
local election, and 2011 national
elections).

The key to any true success on behalf of the main opposition party, the
Republican People’s Party (CHP), will depend greatly on how dynamic their
candidates are, and the party’s ability to open the door to communities they
have shunned in this past. In Istanbul, and the other major cities, utilizing
the space the Gezi Park protests created without exploiting it will be central;
in other words, the party will need to capture the overall population’s imagination,
heightening spirits that change is possible.

During the next 3.5 months, I will be covering different aspects of the
elections and focusing on how other parties, such as the newly formed Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) and how its candidate for Istanbul, the Gezi protester
and MP, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, will influence the race. On the same token, I will
be watching if CHP’s choice of Mustafa Sarıgul to run for mayor in Istanbul was
a good or bad one (he will officially open his campaign this Thursday).
Further, I will give a rundown of the other cities and regions, looking at
which parties are most likely to make gains, or hold ground, such as the Peace
and Democratic Party (BDP) in the southeastern Kurdish regions, and the
National Action Party (MHP), in the western regions and some cities in the
interior. Indeed, this election should
be an exciting one!

*The coverage will be indexed as seen above in title

FOLLOW ME on TWITTER @istanbultelaviv for more on whats happening in Turkey and Israel/Palestine, and the Middle East at large. Contact: louisfishman@gmail.com

Saturday, December 7, 2013

It has been a week since the
“Day of Rage,” when thousands of protesters took to the streets to protest
plans by the Israeli government to implement the Prawer-Begin plan, which aims
at transferring tens-of-thousands of Bedouin Arabs living in “unrecognized”
villages into established settlements, and making way for new Jewish towns in
their place. The protesters, who were mostly Palestinian-Israelis (or known by
the state as “Israeli-Arabs,”; those who live within the 1948 borders of the
Israeli state and hold Israeli citizenship), together with leftist Jewish
groups, sent a strong message to the Israeli government, and the Israeli
population at large, that they will not remain oblivious to the oppressive
plans of the Netanyahu government. During the day of rage, protest took place in Hura, Haifa and Jaffa in Israel, and also in Palestinian parts of Jerusalem, and in the Palestinian city of Ramallah, in addition to places throughout the world.

Despite the large protests, the
Israeli government remains adamant to move forward with plans to transfer the
population, and while it is still being discussed in the Knesset Internal
Affairs committee, it should go to the floor for parliamentary approval in the winter session. Therefore,
it is essential to spread the words in order to halt this racist plan and keep
it on the agenda. I for one, if in Israel, or abroad, will continue to protest
this plan.

As an
Israeli citizen, for me, this plan just reconfirms that Israel, in place of
reconciling with its history and recognizing the Nakba, and other injustices done to almost 20% of the population, it continues a policy of transferring Palestinians to make
way for Jewish settlements (in addition to expropriating lands).

Protesters being dispersed in Hura, see link to photos below

To read on about the Prawer
Plan, here are links to two organizations that are at the forefront of the
struggle for justice on behalf of the Bedouins in the Negev: First, there isAdalahand its page with links about the Prawer Plan,
and aposition
paperit sponsored; and then
there is the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality,with
plenty of information. Also, if tweeting, look for the #hashtags:#برافر_لن_يمر#פראוורלאיעבור and#StopPrawerPlan
(choose the language!)

Lastly,
the internet news site, 972Mag, has compileda nice collection of imagesof the protests and the clashes that
ensued, showing excessive police force, which used stun grenades, water-cannons,
and teargas to disperse crowds.

Friday, November 8, 2013

A protest poster by the newly formed HDP party
protesting attempts by government to interfere in
private lives

During the last few days, a new controversy has been brewing in
Turkey. Following a closed meeting of the government, reports were leaked to
the press that the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had ordered an
investigation into co-ed housing in the country’s university dormitories. This
was despite the fact that university dormitories as it is are not co-ed and
that such an incident had been reported at only one university, which was as
the result of a shortage in space. While the Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent
Arinc, denied that such a discussion had taken place, it took less than 24
hours for news to break that the story indeed was true (and exposing a divide
on how the incident should play out in the public).

Anyone that has a small sense of how Erdogan reacts to any
criticism could have forecasted how the controversy would play out. Rather than
trying to calm fears that the Turkish government was intervening in the private
lives of its citizens, and trying to impose its religious conservative values
on the overall population, Erdogan did the opposite. Fiercely defending his
crusade to save the young from such evils, the Prime Minister stated that: “Nobody knows what takesplaces in those houses [where male and
female students live together.All kinds of dubious things may happen [in those houses]. ...
Anything can happen. Then, parents cry out, saying, ‘Where is the state?' These
steps are being taken in order to show that the state is there. As a
conservative, democratic government, we need to intervene.”

If this was not enough, he further stated that he would make sure
legal measures would be implemented to enforce this not only in the public
dormitories but also in private residences, which is a blatant violation of
Turkish law and invasion of one’s private life. To make matters worse, he
called on private citizens to report the immoral behavior, which led to reports
of harassment of female students in private homes in Istanbul, and even one
police raid on a house. The tenant in this case, received support from the
owner of the apartment and her neighbors, despite their conservative lifestyle;
however, concerning other raids, the tenant stated: “another
student who saidhis house was
raided was toldby his neighbors
that associations in Tophane had made complaints about student houses to the
prime minister’s office. This is more worrying than the raids themselves…”

This sent the Turkish news media and social media into a frenzy,
and was upped a notch when the Interior Minister, Muammer Güler, issued a
chilling (ridiculous) statement referring specifically to mixed housing that “we are considering theissue from the viewpoint of a fight
against terrorism. Particularly apartments, student residences and
lodging houses where university students are living are places that terror
groups and other illegal groups are seeing as a resource for gaining support
and finding new members.” You heard right. Mixed housing leads to terrorism
(the same claims made against the Gezi protesters, earlier this year).

If the Prime Minister had expected party members and supporters to
fall one by one in line supporting his offensive statements concerning the
lifestyle of a certain sector he was wrong. Some of his previously greatest
supporters came out quickly to condemn his statement. Such criticism was voiced
by long time public intellectual and former politician, Nazlı Ilıcak, who
served as a MP in the Islamist Fazilet party (Erdogan’s former party).Ilıcak was shockedover the Prime Minister’s behavior and
stated on CNN Turk that she was ashamed of this act despite her being a staunch
supporter of the AK Party in the past. However, only today did we learn what a
rift it has caused, when Bulent Arinc, the above mentioned Deputy Prime
Minister, came out and stated his dismay over this week’s controversy.

In a press conference this morning, Arinc issued a statement,
hinting that he is close to resigning over the scandal. It is important
to point out the rift between Arinc and Erdogan was first made public on a wide
scale following the Gezi Park protesters when he took a much softer stand than
Erdogan. Frustrated at being undermined by Erdogan, Arinc stated, “I am not responsible for the
prime minister's remarks. I am not responsible for this situation. I
am not only a minister, I have my own weight...I never want to be turned into
the punching bag of some…” The highlight of his talk was that even if he
personally agreed with Erdogan over the issue of co-ed housing, he was critical
of Erdogan’s wishes to place this into law.

Unfortunately, this comes just after Erdogan was applauded by the
Turkish public at large for partially lifting the headscarf ban just a few
weeks back (see my former article,Whats
in a Headscarf), with four women parliamentarians entering the
parliament, crushing one of Turkey's taboo. Despite this major step forward,
Erdogan's wish to ban co-ed housing introduces just more trouble for women
who already face discrimination when trying to rent apartments, due to their
single status. In other words, it just another case of male hegemonic
discourse. Over the last decade, in Turkey's major cities and liberal
neighborhoods, women are increasingly living on their own. Together with this,
co-ed housing is becoming quite the norm among some sectors. Now with the Prime
Minister's taking a stand it will certainly cause some apartment owners to think
twice about renting to these communities.

This case is also just another
clear signal that secular lifestyle is under threat. While it differs with the
case of alcohol, where Erdogan can claim the government restrictions are in
sync with some European countries laws restricting sale of alcohol, banning
co-ed housing in private sphere is a blatant violation of even Turkish law.
Nevertheless, it is similar to the case surrounding alcohol as it shows the
Prime Minister's zero tolerance to other lifestyles; let us not forget that he
has stated in the past that anyone who drinks should be considered an
alcoholic. Also, while alcohol is legal, and no threat to it ever being banned,
he has done his utmost to minimize drinking by taxing it to such an extent that
it is cheaper to buy Turkish alcohol outside of Turkey; simply, for many
Turkish citizens, even drinking beer can be seen as a luxury.

Turkey is a dynamic country and any
interference by the government, whether secular or religiously conservative,
into one's lifestyle should be condemned. The current case once
again reiterates that Erdogan has lost touched with a large part of the
Turkish population, including his moderate base. While Turkey faces municipal
and presidential elections next year, and parliamentary ones in 2015, Erdogan's
constant polarizing actions can only be a sign that his party's support will
decline. However, whether the CHP and other parties will be able to benefit
from this stills seems far from reality. Only time will tell, but one thing is
for sure: even the Prime Minister's own party seem to becoming weary of his
escapades.

Monday, October 21, 2013

After over a
decade in power, Prime Minister Erdoğan finally announced that his government
has done away with the headscarf ban as part of his “Democratization Package,”
which is aimed at correcting an array of state-sanctioned injustices. As of
October 8, women in Turkey are now allowed to wear the Muslim headscarf in the
public sector, ending one of the Turkish Republic’s most stringent secular
codes. The next day, television crews were out there to get a glimpse of public
school teachers coming to school with their headscarves on. As someone
who has for years spoken against the ban, seeing these teachers was a joyous
moment; I still remember when it was also forbidden for university students
with the headscarf to enter the classroom. Good riddance to such times.

Even if there
are still some pockets of staunch secularists who vehemently oppose the right
of women to cover their heads, it seems most Turkish citizens see this as a
something of the past, and clearly unjust in its application. Simply, it was an
absurd law that was blatantly discriminatory. One voice of objection actually came
from an American emerita professor of anthropology at Stanford University,
Carol Delaney, in a letter to the editor in response to a previous article
entitled, Turkey Lifts
Longtime Ban on Head Scarves in State Offices(09 October 2013). She states:

“The
Turkish government’s lifting of the ban on head scarves in government
offices should not be taken as a sign of democracy, despite what Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claims. Instead, it is another insidious step
toward the Islamist state he desires and against the secular republic founded
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk”

What Professor
Delaney had in mind when writing this (or anyone else supporting the continued
ban) is hard to imagine since the debate over the headscarf for the most part
has been a point of contention among male politicians and not the Turkish
population at large. However, her point of view does represent one stream of
the former intolerant Turkish State’s political elite.

Erdoğan’s
revising of the dress code, however, also received a negative response among
some who have fought years for an end to the headscarf ban since the
Turkish government fell short of addressing the issue in its entirety, keeping
the headscarf ban in place in the military and police force. Further, while
woman lawyers are able to cover in court, they still cannot serve as judges or
public prosecutors. In other words, Erdoğan has legitimized the right to
restrict the headscarf in certain fields of work, something that should be seen
as a grave development in the path to freedom.

The fact that
the Prime Minister has chosen to keep the ban in these fields of work is
disappointing. While it can be argued perhaps that he chose to remain at a safe
distance from the former secularist bastion of the courts and army, we know
that over the last decade he has systematically strengthened civil institutions
in Turkey, securing a state system that is no longer threatened by military
coups; in other words, this does not hold up under scrutiny since he certainly
has the power to implement it also in these spheres. Such a decision can lead
to the conclusion that the Prime Minister might not find employment in security
forces as a proper place for religious women to serve. In other words, yes for
teachers, but not police officers.

Women are not
the only ones shortchanged in the revision of dress codes (by the way, women
public employees still need to make sure their skirt goes down to their knees
with no slit on the side). According to the current dress code, men employed in
the government sector need to be clean shaven; meaning, a man with a beard,
which also can be due to religious reasons, is still unable to work in the public
sector (while the beard is banned a modest mustache is permitted; closely
mirroring Erdoğan’s own facial features).

So what are we
to make of this? While the recent changing in the dress code should be
applauded, citizens in Turkey supporting a liberal democratic state can
actually interpret this move as a continuation of the “uniform” state, i.e.,
not a state that promotes diversity, but one that supports uniformity based
on the “State’s” will.

Further, the
move by Erdoğan to implement the changes in the dress code now, can actually be
interpreted as being motivated out ofrealpolitikand not out of a liberal understanding
of equal rights. With three elections just around the corner (municipality, presidential, parliamentary), Erdoğan needs to
address his own conservative base, and other political groups that have adopted
a more religious conservative agenda than his own; especially since some
liberal camps, who have supported his reforms during the last decade, are
reconsidering their support in light of the Gezi Park protests.

Perhaps it is
telling that the same day when the newspapers were congratulating the new
changes in the dress code, one of Erdoğan government ministers criticized a
woman television presenter’s dress, as it showed too much cleavage. The next
day she was fired by the television company. Truly this is a sign that in
Turkey (as many places) controversy related to a women’s dress or body, will
continue to be debated and monitored by male politicians.

While the partial-lifting of the headscarf ban is a great move towards allowing
more women into the workforce, it seems that this is not topping the Turkish
government’s agenda. With Erdoğan continuing to encourage families to have at
least three children, if not four, heavy social pressures are being placed on
Turkish women to remain in the home. Further, with Turkey’s booming economy,
one would think that in terms of gender equality, Turkey would have improved;
however, the opposite is true with Turkey dropping from 105 (out 135 countries)
in 2006, to 124 in 2012, on theGlobal gender
gap scale; despite this, one sign of hope is that women in the
workforce hasjumped from 23.3% in2008 to 29.3%in 2012 according to the Turkish
Statistic Foundation (TUIK).

With huge gaps in gender
equality, the major force of debate in Turkey now should move on from the issue
of headscarves onto working towards a more gender equitable society. Unfortunately, the government’s continued partial ban on the headscarf sends a tacit
message that women are not welcomed in all fields of government employment at a time when the opposite message is needed.

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

Last Sunday evening, news of an armed attack on a group of
protesters started to appear across my twitter feed. One of the protesters was
in intensive care due to multiple bullet wounds, his name was Hasan Ferit Gedik
(hereafter: Ferit). Reports were confusing, with some saying he was alive and others
he was dead; well, within hours it was clear that he would not make it. He was
only 21 years old. What a loss. As for his friend, Gökhan Aktaş, he was in critical condition, now stable, and even if his life is out of danger he will have a long
agonizing road to recovery.

Not like the six Gezi protesters who were killed facing police
violence, Ferit was murdered while protesting the presence of drug gangs, who have taken over Maltepe’s sub-neighborhood
of Gulsuyu, on the Asian side of Istanbul. Unknown assailants shot six bullets
in his head, back and neck, ending the People’s Front (Halk Cephesi) demonstration
in tragedy; however, despite the police knowing of the sensitivity of the
protest, they did not protect them. In the past, other protesters have been attacked
by members of the drug cartel in the very same neighborhood. The police force’s inability to clampdown on
the drug trafficking, prevent attacks-or indifference to such attacks-has
led to the serious accusation that the police are in cahoots with the
cartel.

If only those allegations had been leveled; following Ferit’s
death, there were reports of plain clothes policemen entering the hospital
room, and his shirt and undershirt being lifted. The next day, the public prosecutor
announced that he did not order any evidence to be confiscated and that it had
gone “missing”; of course, an essential piece of evidence. While at the same time, less than 72 hours
after his death, news broke that the weapons used in the attack-2 pistols and
an assault rifle- had been located off the coast not too far from the scene and were retrieved by police divers. Therefore, even if there have been arrests made, Ferit’s family and friends
have little reason to trust the authorities.

Throwing salt on the wounds, as of Wednesday night, Ferit’s funeral
procession has been blocked by the Turkish authorities who refuse to heed to the family’s
demand that his body before being buried be taken to the site of his killing as a memorial to his untimely death. For the
last 48 hours, his body has been resting in a coffin in his own neighborhood’s Cemevi
(jem-evi), the Alevi sect’s house of prayer. This neighborhood, Küçük Armutlu,
is no stranger to the Turkish police since it is a known leftist stronghold
with a tradition of challenging state authority. As of last night the neighborhood
is basically under siege with police and water cannons surrounding it.

If this was not enough, the fact that he was of the Alevi sect
comes at a time when the religious minority is locked in conflict with the
state-despite wide representation from all walks of life, all of the protesters
in Gezi who were killed were Alevi, and numerous clashes have recently taken
place against state projects to gentrify and transform their lower middle-class
neighborhoods. Most recently, an article in the online newspaper, Al-Monitor,
addressed the issues of the Alevis and the recent events. While some had
expected that PM Erdogan would address some of the Alevi demands in his
unveiling of the much-awaited “Democratic Packgage” on Monday-just hours after
Ferit’s passing away-this too proved to be a disappointment.

What is clear is that the Turkish government must open a transparent investigation into the murder of Hasan Ferit Gedik. While
police violence remains for the most part without any serious investigation as was demonstrated in the Gezi Park protests, this case brings the accusations up a notch, raising questions if there are connections between the
police and drug traffickers; if these accusations are not addressed at the
top-level, it will serve as just another example of the growing mistrust many Turkish people feel towards their government.UPDATE: Today, Thursday (03-10-2013) Ferit has been buried in the Gazi cemetery Before burying him the state authorities heeded the demands of the family that his body be taken to the site of his killing, where a memorial ceremony/protest was held.

*For articles in Turkish that helped me "fill in the blanks" concerning the case I used the following 3 articles from Radikal. This is an edited version of the original (slight changes for clarity).

Last week, following the death of Ahmet Atakan, a protester
in the Turkish southern province of Hatay, people took to the streets in
different cities in Turkey including Istanbul.
For the first time since the Gezi protests, the Turkish police crossed
the Bosphorus and decided to take on protesters in Kadikoy; a known secular neighborhood, with a history of leftists protests
taking place. While the government often tries to characterize the protesters
as provocateurs, it should be stated that the Turkish police’s violent
clampdown on this neighborhood was blatant provocation; until now, Kadikoy’s
protests had been left alone, and its residents often frequented the protests
in Taksim. Indeed, the intensity of the police actions on the new turf can only
be interpreted as a “payback” for their enduring support of the GeziPark
protests.

During last week, on any given afternoon, my computer was
receiving live feeds from Kadikoy, and I was tweeting the information to the best
of my knowledge. It sparked memories of the Gezi protests when my neighborhood
was one of the centers of clashes between protesters and the police; in fact,
the morning after the police finally took Gezi Park back from the protesters, I
returned home from a trip to a TOMA (water cannon) and teargas on my street; it
looked and felt like a warzone and I worried greatly for all the parents with
children stuck there, and the elderly who occupy a great part of the
neighborhood.

On the side streets of Kadikoy
(contact for accreditation)

Now that I am back in New
York, I was able to distance myself somewhat from the
events in Kadikoy. This was important
since it gave me the chance to ponder on the question why the Gezi Protests
occupied most of my summer; indeed, the protests were like a massive wave
crashing down on me. Day-in-and-day-out I was living Gezi.

The most obvious reason I was so fixated on Gezi is the fact
that Istanbul has been my home for over a decade; almost a quarter-of-my-life. Even if I have been commuting back and forth
from New York, and at times from Israel (making it a lot easier in terms of
distance), my four-walls in Istanbul are my home. They include memories of my
child’s first years (her first shoes), a collection of pointless memorabilia
(magnets from cities of the world), and artifacts from the past (the long
forgotten photo albums). Indeed, this is a personal side that few know about,
save for close friends, and of course my neighbors, who see me come and go
every few months, as I lug my suitcases up-and-down the 5-floor walk-up. They
have long become use to me, and me to them.

Not like past years however, Gezi happened just as I had
been over a year in Istanbul, making only two
brief trips to Israel.
For someone who has spent his life in a constant nomadic state this truly was
one of my most relaxed periods of my life; a year filled with plenty of love
and happiness; and, the Gezi protests broke this calm and serenity.

By chance just before all hell broke loose during the
evening of May 31, I found myself on Istiklal, Taksim’s main pedestrian avenue,
trying to find a route home and every side street I went down seemed to be
drenched with teargas. I know the streets of Istanbul even better than the ones
in Tel Aviv, a city I adore, and much better than the ones in New York, a place
where I randomly ended up due to employment; a love for the streets is not
bound by law and belonging is not based one’s passport or by a resident permit.
The same streets I saw under massive clouds of teargas are the very these same
streets where I pushed my daughter’s stroller, and where I taught her to ride a
bicycle. It is in also these streets I forged love and said farewell to other
loves. It is in these streets I regularly take a stroll on semi-serene Sunday
evenings. These streets are mine, and I share them with all who walk them.

A surprise to me was that where I encountered the violence
up close was actually at my favorite bar in Taksim; perhaps not a second-home
but a regular hangout for me. During the protests, it served at times as a
makeshift hospital; on weekends, as teargas poured in, so did the injured-a
woman injured by a plastic bullet on her back, an activist beaten
black-and-blue by police, and a leg injury due to a teargas canister. And, once
everyone was in safely the barman quickly brought the shutters down, turned out
lights fearing a police raid that could lead to arrests. Twice I met tourists who took cover there,
and once I led an Egyptian mother and her panicking daughter from the bar once
the gas settled and across police lines in the midst of battles taking place on
Istiklal. For me, this side showed me that when push came to shove the
protesters were left powerless, left with wounds, fear, and anger, but
nevertheless defiant.

For me, the politics of Turkey have very little to do with
my stance on Gezi; it is much more about a personal conviction that every
person has the right to express dissent unhindered; it is about freedom of
expression, it is about defending the innocent people who were injured, it is
about helping the elderly who fell down due to teargas, it is about standing up
against excessive force used by police, it is so that the death of the
protesters will not be in vain. Even if I am not a citizen of Turkey, Gezi
showed me that I have invested way too much in the country to remain indifferent.