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In this chapter, which responds to chapter 2, we suggest that a shift of focus from short-term episodes to the more general manifestations of one's sense of shame promotes a completely different picture of the action tendencies and emotional conditions associated with this emotion than the one offered by advocates of the claim that shame is morally ugly. We scrutinize the methodology and presuppositions of central empirical studies offered in favor of this conclusion and explain how a series of distinctions should make us revise this conclusion. As we explain, not only are there no good...

In this chapter, which responds to chapter 2, we suggest that a shift of focus from short-term episodes to the more general manifestations of one's sense of shame promotes a completely different picture of the action tendencies and emotional conditions associated with this emotion than the one offered by advocates of the claim that shame is morally ugly. We scrutinize the methodology and presuppositions of central empirical studies offered in favor of this conclusion and explain how a series of distinctions should make us revise this conclusion. As we explain, not only are there no good empirical reasons to claim that shame is morally ugly, but the long-term action tendencies associated with shame can be of moral value and our sense of shame can also manifest itself by preventing altogether the occurrence of what we deem shameful.