About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Friday, March 15, 2013

Experimental philosophy is not an elephant

by Massimo Pigliucci

There has been quite a stir in philosophical circles over the last several years caused by the emergence of a new sub-field referred to as experimental philosophy (colloquially, “XPhi”). I was actually at one of the first symposia that a young crowd of energetic philosophers had organized to get things started back in the early aughts. More recently, I had a nice chat on my podcast with one of the movers of experimental philosophy, Joshua Knobe. Despite my initial sympathies, however, I’ve developed a bit of weariness for the whole approach, and I recently had to confront my reservations head on.

The occasion for the confrontation has been the fact that I am writing a book for Chicago Press on whether and how philosophy makes progress, and the last chapter (yet to be written) features a discussion of philosophical methods, including XPhi. The fodder for the considerations that follow was conveniently provided by a recent popular defense of XPhi by Mark Phelan, which appeared in the magazine Philosophy Now, entitled “Experimental philosophy as an elephant.”

The thrust of Phelan’s article is that XPhi is a growing elephant whose observers can’t seem to grasp more than a part at a time, while they are stumbling in the dark trying to figure it all out. It’s a bit of an uncharitable characterization of critics of the approach, which together with its description as a “movement” (why not just a field of inquiry?) by its supporters contributes to irritating rather than welcoming people from the outside. Be that as it may, let’s get to the meat of Phelan’s defense of XPhi.

Phelan takes on four common criticisms — or misconceptions, depending on how you see them — of XPhi in turn: the charge that it is really a bunch of social science surveys attempting to settle philosophical issues by majority vote; the idea that it really consists of a type of meta-philosophy; the perception that it deals only with the role of intuitions in philosophy; and the conclusion that whatever XPhi is, it just isn’t philosophy.

Is it just philosophy by survey? That perception, as Phelan acknowledges, comes from papers that explore how people (often lay people, not professional philosophers) assess the concept of knowledge. This, as is well known, has classically been defined by Plato as “justified true belief.” As philosophers also know very well, Edmund Gettier published a paper back in 1963 in which he provided (very, very convoluted) examples of situations that seem to satisfy Plato’s definition, and yet that do not really seem like they should count as actual knowledge. (No need to get into the specifics here, but you can learn more about it, as usual, over at the SEP.)

Phelan summarizes the results of one of the relevant XPhi papers, using a thought experiment featuring the hypothetical characters of Bob and Jill: “[the authors] found that around 60% of people from East Asia and the Indian Subcontinent think – unlike most professional philosophers in the West – that Bob does not merely believe but really knows that Jill drives an American car in the above case. On the other hand, three-quarters of Westerners share with the (Western) philosophers the intuition that Bob does not know but only believes that Jill drives an American car.”

Phelan correctly interprets this to mean that we now have (interesting) empirical evidence [1] that (lay) people in Asia have a different concept of knowledge from professional philosophers in the West. But notice that this isn’t a particularly illuminating comparison at all: what we want to know — philosophically speaking — is whether Asian philosophers have a different conception of knowledge than Western ones, and if so why (i.e., how they justify it by argument).

Moreover, while Phelan’s point was that XPhi studies of this sort do not pretend to settle philosophical issues by survey, he then turns around and suggests precisely that: “[the results] challeng[e] the purported universality of analytic philosophy’s methodology and findings ... [the authors] argue from their results to a challenge for analytic epistemology.” If that’s not doing philosophy by survey I don’t know what is!

My take on this first part is that lay people’s opinions about technical philosophical issues are entirely irrelevant to the practice of philosophy, just like the opinions of lay people on Fermat’s last theorem, or on the structure of Hamlet are entirely irrelevant to the practice of professional mathematics or literary criticism. It is interesting to know how (lay) people think of philosophical, mathematical, or literary questions, in terms of the social science of common knowledge, but social science of common knowledge is not philosophy (or math, or literary criticism).

Is it “just” meta-philosophy? Apparently, one of the things XPhi is “accused” of is being a type of meta-philosophy, rather than philosophy per se. That sounds strange to me, however, because meta-philosophy — i.e., reflecting on the practices, methods and goals of philosophy — is a type of philosophy anyway. Here Phelan’s “defense” is that some XPhi is meta-philosophical, but not all of it. Fair enough. The problem is with the examples he picks to illustrate the non-meta-philosophical aspects of XPhi. For instance, he refers to research by Eddy Nahmias and collaborators on “the phenomenology of free will.” The authors interpreted the results of their survey of (lay) people’s conceptions about free will as providing some support for a compatibilist notion of free will. But, just as above, why on earth would lay opinion about a technical philosophical issue provide “evidence,” slight or not, for that position? The survey is interesting because it tells us about the variety of people’s intuitive positions about something like free will, of course. But that seems to me to qualify as philosophically-inspired social science, not as philosophy.

Is it all about intuitions? The problem with the use of intuitions in philosophical discourse is a vexing one, although I think there is a bit of confusion even among philosophers about what we mean by philosophical intuitions and what role do they actually play in philosophical arguments. Phelan admits that quite a bit of the XPhi literature is, in fact, about intuitions, and has the goal of “broadening the sample class of those whose intuitions matter” (although, one more time, why exactly is it that the intuitions of non-philosophers should matter at all when it comes to technical discussions within philosophy?). But his strategy is, again, to argue that that’s not all that XPhi practitioners do. Here he cites the work of Eric Schwitzgebel, who published a number of papers on whether moral philosophers are more ethical than other people. The answer, disturbingly, seems to be no (though see footnote 1 for the possibility of quibbling about the proper contrast groups, the way the research is conducted, etc.). For instance “Schwitzgebel and colleagues found that professional ethicists are no more likely to vote, or respond to student emails, than are non-ethicist philosophers and professors. Audiences in ethics sessions at philosophical conferences are generally just as likely to behave discourteously as audiences in non-ethics sessions. And ethics books (even obscure ones) are more likely to be missing from library collections than are books from other philosophical sub-disciplines.” It isn’t entirely clear to me that not responding to students’ emails is unethical (it depends on the specifics of the context), and there are rational arguments against voting. It’s also debatable that other professors are the best contrast group here, since the range of behavior is likely to be much smaller than in the population at large, which means that one would need very large sample sizes to pick up a statistically significant difference. And perhaps it is students of ethics who steal books about ethics, because they haven’t learned their stuff yet!

The point is: what are we supposed to make of such findings? The idea, I take it, is to challenge statements by some moral philosophers that studying ethics makes someone a better person (Socrates comes to mind). But how often is such statement made anyway? And shouldn’t we be testing it in the population at large, rather than just among academics? And which understanding of ethics would that be? Does it make no difference whether the ethicist in question is a utilitarian or a deontologist? At any rate, this kind of research can certainly function as a corrective against facile broad statements by philosophers about the utility of what they teach (but then why pick on philosophers and not educators in general?). But is it philosophy? No, it’s social science of philosophical statements.

Is it not philosophy? And we finally get to the crux of the matter, the criticism that whatever XPhi is, and however valuable some of this research may be, it simply isn’t philosophy. Phelan’s strategy here is twofold. On the one hand, he says that XPhi practitioners do deploy the standard tools of philosophical reasoning, they simply wish to augment the tool kit. On the other hand, he questions the idea that philosophy is “essentially normative” and that XPhi violates principles such as the famous is/ought distinction made by Hume.

Unlike some critics of XPhi, I do not think that its practitioners are poor philosophers or are otherwise deficient technically or intellectually. But none of the examples discussed above — or the additional ones brought forth by Phelan in his article — seem to me to augment standard philosophical practice. The results of XPhi inquiries are often interesting, and sometimes even surprising, but they all fall much more naturally under the rubric of social science research (carried out on philosophically inspired topics).

As for the second point, XPhi here hasn’t really invented anything new. W.V.O. Quine, one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, already put forth a model of philosophy as a kind of science, going as far as (mistakenly, I think) suggesting that epistemology, for instance, is but a branch of psychology.

It isn’t - and that’s not so much because philosophy is prescriptive (though it certainly is, in many cases — epistemology and ethics being two obvious ones), but because philosophical analysis is a matter of critical reflection on empirically underdetermined issues. If an issue can be univocally resolved empirically, it’s science.

For instance, the question of, say, how many planets are present in the solar system is an exquisitely empirical one, and the answer is found in astronomy, not in any branch of philosophy. The only philosophical aspect of said question, as far as I can see, is a discussion of why astronomers count certain celestial bodies as planets and others as “planetoids” (give me back Pluto, damn it!), which is informed by (philosophical) considerations about the definition of concepts characterized by fuzzy boundaries.

Take, in contrast, the question of how to think about ethical problems. While empirical input from science is certainly pertinent (e.g., in discussions about abortion, when, exactly, does the fetus begin to feel pain?), the bulk of the activity is one of critical reflection based on logically constructed arguments — i.e., it’s philosophy.

The model that I have been proposing for a while, then, is one of weak continuity between philosophy and science, where the practice of each does inform the other, without either being encompassed by the other. Science is (no longer) a branch of philosophy, and philosophy isn’t a branch of science, pace Quine and the XPhi practitioners.

The positive lesson to be taken from XPhi is that philosophers need to be careful when they make what are essentially empirical statements, things like “it is common intuition that...” Well, is it common? How do you know? Ask XPhi! But this doesn’t license the leap to the idea that lay people’s intuitions are pertinent to anything other than social science and that they somehow augment or provide additional tools for the understanding of technical philosophical matters. At least, no more than the opinions of lay people in cosmology, mathematics, or literary criticism do in those respective fields.

————

[1] Throughout this post I will take XPhi’s empirical results at face value, because I am concerned with what the role of the field is with respect to philosophy in general, not with its specific findings. But of course, as in the case of any empirical finding — especially if it pertains to social science — there can be quite a bit to quibble about in terms of representativeness and size of samples, the way questions are posed, the statistical analyses of the data, etc.

44 comments:

Interesting post, but a minor complaint. The question how many planets are in our solar system is essentially a philosophical one, not a astronomical one, since it depends entirely on the definition. There is simply no empirical or theoretical consequence, if we call Pluto a planet or a planetesimal. However there is a good reason for introducing the category of 'planets,' namely they were the first 'wandering stars' observed. But this is a property of the human eye and the luminosity of the sun, not an intrinsic property of celestial object.

And following this line of thought a bit further, I think that the relationship of philosophy and ' XPhi' is actually quite similar to the relationship of theoretical physics and experimental physics. In the sense that experimental physics usually conducts theoretically inspired experiments to settle theoretical questions. And physics as clearly defining both the theoretical and experimental branch of the trade, is then an accident of the development of physics as an empirical science. In contrast the question, if 'XPhi' is a part of philosophy is an accident of the development of modern philosophy as purely theoretical endeavor.

Once you have your definitions sorted, the question of how many bodies meet the definition is entirely (exquisitely!) empirical. A charitable reading of Massimo's post would suggest that this is what he was talking about.

I'm not sure it's fair to say that lay people's opinions are not pertinent. They may just be pertinent differently. I think it is pertinent to remember why we are having a discussion. When specialists spend all of their time talking to other specialists, it is easy to focus on the trees rather than the forest. Getting the opinions of lay people can help correct that and refocus the discussion back to the forest.

An interesting and thought-provoking post as always. Again, I agree with much of it but there is one point where I would suggest a counter-argument.

> why on earth would lay opinion about a technical philosophical issue provide “evidence,” slight or not, for that position?<

Wittgenstein said that that philosophy mostly consisted of linguistic puzzles. I agree, to a point. Specifically, I think that a great deal of the disagreements between philosophers boil down to semantic misunderstandings.

So to echo and expand on glotzberg's comment above, I think that XPhi may be useful in refocusing our discussions so that we use terms in the light of how they are commonly understood.

Many of the words crucial to philosophical argument were not invented as technical jargon with specific meanings but arose naturally in common usage. Words such as "knowledge", "existence", "belief", "morality", etc are therefore properly defined by examining their usage.

If Bob disagrees with Mary on whether mathematical concepts exist, I think that's just because they have two different interpretations of the word "exist". If Bob holds that only physical objects exist, then he is perfectly consistent in maintaining that mathematical objects do not. If Mary thinks they do exist because statements about them are true whether or not they have been discovered, then she simply has a different idea of what existence entails.

So, to me, the question of whether mathematical objects exist is entirely a question of semantics. It might therefore be helpful to the field of philosophy if we had some way to get our terms straight. For non-jargon terms, our best guide is usage.

Rather than conducting surveys asking people for their own vague and unhelpful definitions of these concepts, how much more useful it might be to ask them questions which reveal how they actually understand them in practice.

This is what XPhi does. As such, it may be that it has much to offer the field of philosophy (if taken seriously by philosophers).

If a lay person tells a philosopher that another philosopher has convincingly shown that the philosopher in question is likely to be wrong, should the latter pay no attention to this layman's rendition of the argument? Or when a philosopher discusses a particular science, should we assume he knows more about its accuracy than a scientifically educated non-philosopher? Should we in other words assume the philosopher is ipso facto smarter?

Massimo, I agree with your reservations about XPhi. I cannot recall the sources now, but I have heard some XPhi practitioners make some claims now and again that seem to question philosophical positions merely on the basis of popular opinion. The obvious example would be free will, where a lot of the public seems to think that the *definition* of free will includes indeterminism. But really, so much the worse for public opinion!

I do want to ask you something, though. As you know, there are lots of 'borderline' disciplines out there, perched precariously between two (or more) major disciplines. Neurolinguistics, forensic anthropology, engineering physics, behavioural economics... and XPhi.

Given that you seem to think (and I agree) that much XPhi research is interesting and worth doing, I'm having trouble seeing what's at stake in the debate about whether XPhi is or is not philosophy.

(Goodness knows it's pretty much impossible to define what 'philosophy' is anyway, without just listing the topics it discusses.)

Is it just a question of whether they get their funding from the philosophy department or the psychology department? Why does it matter?

> The question how many planets are in our solar system is essentially a philosophical one, not a astronomical one, since it depends entirely on the definition. <

As Disagreeable pointed out, I did address this very issue in the main post. Yes, to some extent, everything depends on definitions (and other starting assumptions), which is why science has to be based on a certain philosophical understanding. But once astronomers articulate what they mean by “planet” and how they distinguish instances of it from other celestial objects, the question is entirely empirical, and hence wholly scientific.

> I think that the relationship of philosophy and ' XPhi' is actually quite similar to the relationship of theoretical physics and experimental physics. <

That I reject completely, since the point of philosophy is not to make empirically verifiable predictions about what lay people think of topic X or Y.

glotzerg,

> I'm not sure it's fair to say that lay people's opinions are not pertinent. <

This has nothing to do with fairness. If a particular lay person has actually done the enormous amount of work needed to catch up with the technical philosophical literature, and if that same person does at that point have something novel to add to technical philosophy, by all means. But that is simply not the case for most lay people, so surveys of their philosophical opinions tell you nothing more valuable than surveys of popular opinions about mathematics or literary criticism. That is, nothing at all (of technical relevance).

Disagreeable,

> Wittgenstein said that that philosophy mostly consisted of linguistic puzzles. I agree, to a point. Specifically, I think that a great deal of the disagreements between philosophers boil down to semantic misunderstandings. <

Well, I don’t. And even if I bought Wittgenstein’s exceedingly narrow conceptualization of philosophy, the interesting semantic issues would still be technical, not arising from everyday language.

> so that we use terms in the light of how they are commonly understood. <

Why? Would you ask that of a physicist, a mathematician, or a literary critic?

> Many of the words crucial to philosophical argument were not invented as technical jargon with specific meanings but arose naturally in common usage. <

So did many of the words used in science or other technical fields. But then professionals appropriate certain words and defined them in a technical context. The term “natural selection” for instance, does not imply at all a conscious agent of selection, which the common English word does. As long as biologists are clear on this, there is no problem.

> the question of whether mathematical objects exist is entirely a question of semantics. <

No, it’s a question of ontology which requires semantic clarification. But no philosopher would make the confusion that you attribute, in your example, to hypothetical Bob and Mary.

I have no problems with philosophers using precisely defined terms. I just think that a lot of the time they do not or else take their own assumptions for granted and then talk past each other.

In particular, when philosophers define terms such as knowledge, they are often seeking precise definitions for concepts we already intuitively understand and have words for. Whether the definitions philosophers come up with are any good can only be determined by matching them up against the intuitions the labels were originally coined to name and the definitions are intended to capture.

If we want to make new, precise definitions for terms and not require them to match the intuitive concepts, it would be more helpful if new terms were used, which is why I referred to jargon.

I'm far from convinced that no philosopher would make Bob or Mary's mistake. I rather suspect this is what's going on in such disputes. I don't think this is a crazy or uninformed view as there are philosophers such as Wittgenstein who appear to agree with it. Not that this makes it correct (it's an argument from authority), but you seem to be alleging that I am merely confused due to my relative ignorance which is why I bring it up.

This is a classic example of a disagreement rooted in different semantic assumptions.

Ontology is the philosophy of existence. In my view this is equivalent to saying that it is the study of what it means to exist, i.e. the meaning of existence, i.e. the meaning of "existence", i.e. the semantics of "existence". In other words, the whole field of ontology has arisen because existence is such a hard thing to pin down precisely.

Whether mathematical objects exist or not is then absolutely a question of semantics - the semantics of "existence".

I am aware that this comes across as my playing word games in bad faith to win a point, but I think it comes pretty close to expressing what I actually believe.

You see, as I see it there is no non-circular precise definition of the concept of existence. In my view, existence is just an intuitive concept we all share which has evolved over time. Whether mathematical objects exist or not can only be answered given a precise definition of existence, and there is no consensus on this (nor will there ever be, in my view).

I would be delighted to consider any definition of existence you might care to propose, however (especially with regard to how it might apply to mathematical Platonism).

>That I reject completely, since the point of philosophy is not to make empirically verifiable predictions about what lay people think of topic X or Y. <

I agree with the second part. But I think of this the other way around. There are philosophical questions which need input from surveys. For example the question of a fair tax system depends certainly to some part on the people's definition of fair. So there can be cases where a specific input is needed, that can be gained by a dedicated survey. And if philosophers need specific empiric observations, then they should try to get it instead of theorizing about possible values of this input.

> Should we in other words assume the philosopher is ipso facto smarter? <

Who said anything about being smart? I simply said that in philosophy — like in *any* other technical field — the opinions of large samples of lay people are irrelevant because typically those people do not have the necessary training to enter into those discussion. It’s not a reflection on my intelligence that I cannot debate deep issues of cosmology with a professional cosmologist. It’s just that I don’t have the necessary technical background.

Ian,

> Given that you seem to think (and I agree) that much XPhi research is interesting and worth doing, I'm having trouble seeing what's at stake in the debate about whether XPhi is or is not philosophy. <

Good question. There are several reasons, I think. One is purely intellectual. I am interested, for instance, in what demarcates science from pseudoscience. That demarcation is sometimes not sharp, but I find it intellectually interesting to think about it. Second, yes, there is an issue of practical things like who gets hired in a department, who gets funding for what, and who gets to take up precious journal space with publications. Third, there is the question of public perception of a given field, as in “oh, this is what philosophers do?” Well no, it isn’t. In the case of XPhi, I don’t even think of it as very close to mainstream philosophy, frankly. As I wrote in the post, it seems to me to be straight social science, only focused on what people think of philosophical issues. Similarly, one can do sociology of biology, with surveys showing that more than half of Americans reject the theory of evolution. These surveys have nothing to do with biology per se, though they have much to do with science education!

Well, my question was about when a philosopher versus a layman discusses a particular science, not about when he discusses the professional jargon of philosophy. Also, I suppose that when I point out a philosopher or two that discuss the purposes of biology, I should stick to discussing the scientists that don't.

you seem to have an inordinately (if common) negative impression of what philosophers do. I don’t know whether you have read technical philosophical papers, but I assure you that professionals are sophisticated enough not to need lay people’s input to parcel out and unpacked the concepts they use in their trade.

> when philosophers define terms such as knowledge, they are often seeking precise definitions for concepts we already intuitively understand and have words for. <

But the very point of philosophy is to make more precise, or even reject, commonsense intuitions about concepts like knowledge, truth, etc.

> Whether the definitions philosophers come up with are any good can only be determined by matching them up against the intuitions the labels were originally coined to name and the definitions are intended to capture. <

I completely disagree. That would be like, say, judging the quality of a painting by whether most people like it, or the sophistication of a critical analysis of Shakespeare by whether as a result more lay people will understand the Bard. The two have nothing to do with each other, since public understanding of X is an entirely different matter from technical advances concerning X.

> Whether mathematical objects exist or not is then absolutely a question of semantics - the semantics of "existence". <

In part, yes. Just like *any* discussion of anything is a matter of semantics, otherwise people would always talk past each other. My point is that it is not *just* a matter of semantics, as a cursory look at any book on the philosophy of mathematics should clearly demonstrate.

Yoshi,

> There are philosophical questions which need input from surveys. For example the question of a fair tax system depends certainly to some part on the people's definition of fair. <

Once again, no. It is easy to show that many, perhaps even most, people are simply *wrong* about their concept of fairness. That maybe because they haven’t thought about it, because they are uneducated about it, or because they are in the thralls of a particular political ideology. Of course, if a political philosopher — say John Rawls — wants to move from a technical discussion of justice and fairness to a program of implementation of specific policies, then that philosopher would have to engage in a public education campaign about those concepts.

>Once again, no. It is easy to show that many, perhaps even most, people are simply *wrong* about their concept of fairness.<

On other topics, such as if the majority of people were wrong about their concept of courage or wisdom, I could readily agree. But with fairness I hesitate. My moral intuition says there is something wrong with this statement. It seems to me that what is fair is determined by agreement; less like courage and more like the meaning of a word. For practicality purposes it seems to me fairness goes in the opposite direction: it would be ideal if we all agreed what was justified and fair. But as a society we assert one particular law/justice system for practicality's sake, instead of taking in the opinions and values of all parties involved to determine what is a fair resolution. Not that any of this reflects on the discussion on Xphi, just a tangential thought from a layman.

Not sure if that was addressed to me, Baron P, but I was not saying that people were wrong about their feelings. They might however have inconsistent intuitions or beliefs regarding concepts such as fairness.

@Disagreeable Me: Your question addresses fairness at an individual level. I'm not sure there is such a thing as individual fairness. If only one thinking, living person was walking around a lifeless world, what would exist to be called fair or unfair to that person? There would just be the physical world, and unless there was some kind of cosmic karma there would be nothing to be effected by an individual sense of justice.

So what does one person's opinion about fairness matter unless it is placed in context against the views of others? Yes, one person's ideas could be contradictory. But what does that matter if fairness or justice is only a state that arises between multiple people?

All true, but in the sense we agree, a single individual can be wrong about fairness. What's true of an individual is true of many individuals, so if a great number of people share the same contradictory beliefs, I think it's fair to say that most people or (even whole societies) could be wrong about fairness.

From Wikipedia: "Studies at UCLA in 2008 have indicated that reactions to fairness are "wired" into the brain and that, "Fairness is activating the same part of the brain that responds to food in rats... This is consistent with the notion that being treated fairly satisfies a basic need".[11] Research conducted in 2003 at Emory University, Georgia, USA, involving Capuchin Monkeys demonstrated that other cooperative animals also possess such a sense and that "inequity aversion may not be uniquely human"[12] indicating that ideas of fairness and justice may be instinctual in nature." But whole societies of humans may be wrong about that.

No need for all the studies. I have no doubt that ideas about fairness are instinctual.

As I said before, instincts are wrong all the time!

I really don't see why you think it is relevant that rats or monkeys have a sense of fairness. Infanticide is common in the natural kingdom too, but you don't see anyone concluding from this that it is right to murder babies.

Finally, I just want to emphasize that I am not making a positive claim that there is anything wrong with fairness as a concept.

I am claiming that there is nothing nonsensical about the hypothetical claim that philosophers might be able to demonstrate that some people, perhaps even most people, have inconsistent or otherwise faulty intuitions regarding fairness.

More of a practical question here. Even if we grant that XPhi is not philosophy as strictly defined, does it follow that it’s wrong for (some) philosophers to participate in such work? Why not consider XPhi as (ideally) a multidisciplinary field in which philosophers could help assure that the philosophical aspects of the subjects in question are accurately represented?

I’m intrigued by this study which suggests that even professional philosophers are influenced by the order in which scenarios are presented (a presumably irrelevant factor) when making moral judgments:

Regardless of whether these findings hold up, was it inappropriate for a philosopher to help conduct this study, and should such work be left entirely to non-philosophers who may have their own agendas? I recall that sociologists of science, for example, were (are) not necessarily friendly to science as a whole. Would we really want to see a new and separate discipline of sociology (or psychology) of philosophy develop, independent of input from philosophers?

Massimo:>you seem to have an inordinately (if common) negative impression of what philosophers do.<

That's not strictly true. Yes, I regard some philosophical work as meaningless semantic games (e.g. the ontological argument), but I regard other philosophical work as extremely valuable. I suspect this view is true even of many professional philosophers.

In particular I wouldn't be commenting on this blog if I didn't value your philosophy. Having first come across you on your podcast, I found I liked the way you think and wanted to engage with you as a way of testing my own preconceptions.

>But the very point of philosophy is to make more precise, or even reject, commonsense intuitions about concepts like knowledge, truth, etc.>

And this is very valuable. However if we believe we have successfully captured a common sense intuition with a precise definition, then it seems reasonable to test that definition against the original intuition. If they don't match up, that doesn't mean that the work of philosophers is wasted, rather it tells us that the concept they were studying was not the common sense intuition but something else.

The concepts of knowledge and truth have existed before any sort of philosophical rigour. I don't think any philosopher is justified in telling the public at large that "truth" means something other than what they think it does, because the word is a label for that common-sense intuition.

What the philosopher can do instead is show that there is something inconsistent or otherwise faulty with the common sense intuition, and perhaps propose an alternative concept (ideally with a different name to avoid confusion, c.f. the philosopher Stephen Colbert's "truthiness").

Of course, within the domain of philosophical discourse it is reasonable and good practice to adopt precise definitions of words so that meaning is clear. However we should not delude ourselves that we have uncovered the truth about the original intuitive concepts unless we are willing to test our definitions against those intuitions. After all, what we conclude from one precise definition of an intuition may not match what we conclude from an alternative, equally legitimate definition.

>In part, yes. Just like *any* discussion of anything is a matter of semantics, otherwise people would always talk past each other. My point is that it is not *just* a matter of semantics, as a cursory look at any book on the philosophy of mathematics should clearly demonstrate.<

I would dearly love to get into this but it's probably beside the point of this topic. I could instead comment on your post on mathematical platonism if you like.

In any case, I'll allow that there are interesting questions beyond the semantic to be discussed with regard to mathematical platonism, however I still feel the Existence Premise of mathematical platonism simply boils down to how "existence" is defined.

I've read through the page on the SEP about it just to make sure I wasn't missing anything that would convince me otherwise, and I don't think I am. I would love to read anything you would recommend that you think might change my mind.

> does it follow that it’s wrong for (some) philosophers to participate in such work? <

Of course not. It does follow that it is wrong (intellectually, not morally) to call it philosophy, though.

> Would we really want to see a new and separate discipline of sociology (or psychology) of philosophy develop, independent of input from philosophers? <

Again, no, as long as we don’t pretend that the new interdisciplinary field is doing something that it is not: it’s not philosophy, but it is philosophically informed social science, or social science about philosophical topics. Not to make that distinction would be like calling sociology *of* science a science. It’s not, it sociology.

Disagreeable,

(thanks for the kind words about the podcast and the blog)

> However if we believe we have successfully captured a common sense intuition with a precise definition, then it seems reasonable to test that definition against the original intuition. <

You skipped on the “or reject” part of my comment...

> it tells us that the concept they were studying was not the common sense intuition but something else. <

Right, I still don’t see what a survey will do in terms of philosophical work, as interesting as it is sociologically.

> I don't think any philosopher is justified in telling the public at large that "truth" means something other than what they think it does, because the word is a label for that common-sense intuition. <

I think of this you are wrong. Once a term has been appropriated within a technical field how the public uses that term is simply irrelevant, no matter how close or far the public meaning is to the technical one. Philosophy here is no exception, this is true for any scholarly field.

> we should not delude ourselves that we have uncovered the truth about the original intuitive concepts unless we are willing to test our definitions against those intuitions. <

Again, this is off the mark. There is no “test” of logical work or rational argument. It is either logical and rational or it isn’t, regardless of what the majority of people think.

> I still feel the Existence Premise of mathematical platonism simply boils down to how "existence" is defined. <

Not sure about “boiling down,” but that definition is certainly a big part of it. And sure enough there are metaphysical discussions about the concept of existence. Once again, I don’t see what there is to learn about it by asking my mother...

> I would love to read anything you would recommend that you think might change my mind. <

You mean about mathematical Platonism? Don’t know, I was introduced to it by this book: http://goo.gl/4UgWk

I didn't mean to. I did after all say that philosophy could show that intuitive concepts are inconsistent. I just think that it's questionable whether philosophy can give precise definitions of intuitive concepts if those definitions don't match the concepts.

>Right, I still don’t see what a survey will do in terms of philosophical work, as interesting as it is sociologically.<

It tells us whether the arguments that philosophers make according to their precise definitions also apply to the intuitive common sense concepts.

>I think of this you are wrong. Once a term has been appropriated within a technical field how the public uses that term is simply irrelevant, no matter how close or far the public meaning is to the technical one. Philosophy here is no exception, this is true for any scholarly field.<

Point taken. What I was trying to say was that XPhi might help us to understand how the technical definition relates to the original intuitive concept, in case this isn't clear. Philosophers are otherwise in danger of taking for granted that their concept of knowledge is the same as a layperson's (though more precisely defined).

>There is no “test” of logical work or rational argument. It is either logical and rational or it isn’t, regardless of what the majority of people think.<

I said test a definition, not a syllogism or argument. Definitions of existing words can be tested by considering whether they match the usage of the words.

Furthermore, if definitions are not required to capture intuitive concepts exactly, then there may be more than one way philosophers might choose to define them precisely. The conclusions we draw from these differing definitions may contradict each other. If have any grounds to prefer one precise definition (and conclusion) over another, it should probably be in terms of how it matches usage.

>And sure enough there are metaphysical discussions about the concept of existence. Once again, I don’t see what there is to learn about it by asking my mother...<

If we accept that there are different ways of defining existence, some of which entail the existence of mathematical objects and some of which do not, then ideally we should simply choose different terms for the different concepts. Which one we choose to call "existence" could in principle be decided by looking at usage and examining common intuitions about what exists and what does not.

>You mean about mathematical Platonism? Don’t know, I was introduced to it by this book: http://goo.gl/4UgWk<

Well, I don't think I need my mind changed about Platonism. I am already a mathematical Platonist (well, a plenitudious Platonist to be precise). We seem to disagree on whether the question of the existence of mathematical objects depends only on the chosen definition of "existence". If there's anything you think might help here, that would be great. The book you linked to may be beyond my budget, unfortunately.

Perhaps Gödelian Platonism sidesteps the question of existence, although I haven’t come across an unambiguously clear exposition by the man of his meta-mathematics.

Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem shows that for a sufficiently strong logic, mathematicians cannot assert truth syntactically, i.e. exclusively by symbols and rules for their manipulation. This is a stronger version of what was known even before Gödel’s theorem, namely that lower order logics can be extended by new independent concepts and axioms. For example, geometry is equally consistent with parallel lines meeting or not. Even such an elementary concept as the infinity of natural numbers cannot be derived syntactically within a minimal “sufficiently strong logic”. It requires a new concept to be formed by a reasoning mind – the cardinality of the set of natural numbers – the validity of which depends only on its general acceptance by the mathematical community. Since first order logic is provably consistent and complete, no minds are needed to agree on the validity of its true propositions; given the propositional logic as input, a Turing machine will do. But any output the machine produces adds no new concept to what has been given; it remains within the tautology of the logic. If I’ve understood Gödel’s meta-mathematics correctly, his mathematical Platonism consists of the notion that for any mind capable of understanding a logic “sufficiently strong” to lead to the first incompleteness theorem, the logic, while not extendable syntactically, is in principle endlessly extendable synthetically by the mind, and furthermore, all reasonable minds will agree on the justification of the extensions. This is different from classical Platonism, which posits eternal truths. For Gödel, mind-independent mathematical truths do not exist. Only concepts synthetically formed by minds and universally agreed upon as valid are included in his Platonic mathematics.

My own position is that of plenitudious mathematical platonism. All possible formal axiomatic systems exist whether or not any mathematician has discovered them. When Gödel's mathematician extends an axiomatic system with her insight, she essentially discovers a new axiomatic system from the space of possible axiomatic systems.

For me, mathematical truths exist only in the context of a given formal system. There is no right or wrong way to formulate a formal system as long as it is consistent. Your example about parallel lines is a good one. The assumption that they do not meet gives us Euclidean geometry. Different assumptions give us different geometries, and all are just as valid to me.

And so while I am probably not a classical Platonist, I do think that mind-independent mathematical truths exist (within the context of a given system).

On X-Phi: I looked at the video from the Yale group [ http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/xphipage/Video_Release.html ]. (Apparently they had a show last Friday on "Experimental Philosophy in 3-D"). I don't know, X-Phi seems more social science than philosophy to me.

On the book "Philosophy of Mathematics" (referred to): I notice from the TOC and Index it doesn't apparently cover the anti-Platonist mathematics of Lavine/Mycielski (finite mathematics of indefinitely large size sets). [ http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2273942, etc. ]

On whether it is reasonable to characterise the debate on the existence of mathematical objects as mere semantic confusion:

>But no philosopher would make the confusion that you attribute, in your example, to hypothetical Bob and Mary.<

I think I have found one philosopher of mathematics who shares my views. This review [http://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/balaguer.pdf] explains the position of Mark Balaguer in his book "Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics".

I haven't read the book, but from the description it seems that it matches my own views perfectly. Balaguer defends both "full bodied platonism" (all possible mathematical objects exist) and anti-platonist fictionalism (mathematical objects do not exist and mathematical statements are true only in the context of a mathematical fiction).

Balaguer reconciles these two opposing view points by arguing that there is simply no fact of the matter. Both are true and both are false in their own way.

I believe this is equivalent to my own view that the question reduces only to the semantic issue of how we choose to define "existence".

I recommend that you read the review linked above as it gives a very good summary of the book and seems to articulate Balaguer's (and my) position quite well.

Much of philosophy concerns the clarification and justification or rejection of human intuitions. You might say that this is exactly what the field is about.

XPhi gives philosophers data about those intuitions, giving them more fodder to be justified or rejected. It is philosophy because it concerns human intuitions, but it is experimental in that it is gathering data.

So, in the example in the video linked to in Philip Thrift's comment, we find that people intuit that a corporation which knowingly harms the environment as a side effect of its policy does so intentionally, whereas a corporation that knowingly helps the environment does not do so intentionally.

Without this survey, philosophers might be tempted to define intentionality in one specific way such that a consistent judgement is applied in both scenarios. With this survey, we are prompted to consider whether there might be any way of reconciling the two judgements.

One such explanation might be that the intuitive concept of intentionality is bound to the concept of moral responsibility.

We don't feel like we need to reward the corporation that benefits the environment because they were motivated by profit and so would have performed the action even with no recognition. However, we do feel like we need to punish the corporation that punishes the environment because this behaviour needs to be deterred. We justify this feeling by saying that the corporation harmed the environment intentionally.

From this insight, we could derive a new definition for intentionality that captures the intuitive biases. "A side-effect of an action is deemed intentional if it occurs knowingly and is allowed to occur for morally relevant reasons".

This little sketch shows one way that XPhi is philosophically relevant. Of course other fields (quantum mechanics for example) also provide material for philosophers, so this alone does not justify calling XPhi philosophy. However, the subject matter of XPhi so closely matches that of philosophy proper that calling it philosophy is perhaps not too much of a stretch.

> I just think that it's questionable whether philosophy can give precise definitions of intuitive concepts if those definitions don't match the concepts. <

“Concepts” aren’t things out there that can be “matched.” They are human inventions.

> It tells us whether the arguments that philosophers make according to their precise definitions also apply to the intuitive common sense concepts. <

Yes, but whether that is or is not the case is simply not a philosophical issue, it’s a social science one.

> Philosophers are otherwise in danger of taking for granted that their concept of knowledge is the same as a layperson's <

As I wrote in the main post, one good thing that XPhi does is to provide a check for some philosophers’ casual talk along the lines of “it is intuitive that...” But even so, it is not at all clear that when philosophers talk that way the class of relevant intuitions is that of lay people. Intuition is very domain specific, so perhaps philosophers should refer to the common intuitions of philosophers, just like mathematicians or physicists (when they engage in thought experiments) do.

> Definitions of existing words can be tested by considering whether they match the usage of the words. <

If that’s what you care about. I don’t, and neither should philosophers. If you do care, you are doing more something like linguistics than philosophy.

> Much of philosophy concerns the clarification and justification or rejection of human intuitions. You might say that this is exactly what the field is about. ... XPhi gives philosophers data about those intuitions, giving them more fodder to be justified or rejected. <

That is a good argument, and I never said that philosophers should ignore empirical data, in this or any other case.

> Without this survey, philosophers might be tempted to define intentionality in one specific way such that a consistent judgement is applied in both scenarios. With this survey, we are prompted to consider whether there might be any way of reconciling the two judgements. <

Actually, I think what the example shows is that people are confused about concepts like persons and intentionality, which is to be expected, since these are not trained philosophers.

> I believe this is equivalent to my own view that the question reduces only to the semantic issue of how we choose to define "existence". <

I’ll take a look at the review, the ideas sound interesting, but I keep not buying that this is “just a semantic issue,” unless you define semantics so broadly that any issue becomes a semantic issue. Platonists and anti-Platonists do deploy arguments in defense of their theses, and they disagree even when they do agree on what it means for X to exist.

>“Concepts” aren’t things out there that can be “matched.” They are human inventions.<

Concepts can't be matched to definitions? So, if we share the concept of evil, and I attempt to define it as simply "evil is the absence of good", you don't think it's fair to say that this description matches or doesn't match the concept we share?

>Yes, but whether that is or is not the case is simply not a philosophical issue, it’s a social science one.<

>so perhaps philosophers should refer to the common intuitions of philosophers<

Point taken. However, it might nevertheless be useful for philosophers to have data about how common intuitions might differ from their own, since common intuitions are sometimes pertinent to matters being considered.

>> Definitions of existing words can be tested by considering whether they match the usage of the words. <

If that’s what you care about. I don’t, and neither should philosophers. If you do care, you are doing more something like linguistics than philosophy.<

I disagree. When Plato defined knowledge as "justified true belief", was he not doing philosophy? If he had instead defined knowledge as "beliefs we value" would we consider that to be a good definition? If not, why not? I would argue that we would not accept this second definition because it does not capture the intuitive concept of knowledge in common usage as well the first.

> I never said that philosophers should ignore empirical data, in this or any other case.<

Nor did I ever suggest that this was your position. I take it for granted that you value empirical data, and propose XPhi as a source of empirical data of particular relevance to philosophy.

>people are confused about concepts like persons and intentionality, which is to be expected, since these are not trained philosophers.<

It is my understanding that even trained philosophers have been shown to be susceptible to the effects shown by these experiments. I suggest that we should be open to the possibility that there is something more interesting going on than mere confusion, although I am not arguing that this is in fact the case. In any case, XPhi brings these results to light and it is up to philosophers to interpret them.

> and they disagree even when they do agree on what it means for X to exist.<

Until you back this up with a precise definition of existence which would be accepted by both camps, I remain respectfully skeptical. I suspect that when such philosophers assert this agreement, they are in fact subtly misunderstanding each other or otherwise interpreting the agreed definition differently.

My take is that 'science' is a process of removing known sources of errors, biases, and illogic from conclusions.

Any process that can follow this process IS 'doing science'. There are, of course, many domains of 'science' and different methodologies are going to apply to different domains (you don't apply the Historical Method to particle collision results, you don't need to because it doesn't have the same sources of errors as History does). Neither can we directly overlay Quantum Mechanics with History to get meaningful results (we can't even fully calculate a single atom over a few milliseconds yet).

But these methodologies evolved into usage because sources of errors, biases, and illogic were found in earlier methodologies, based on philosophical reflection, so the snake is also swallowing its own tail.

But, at the end of the day, our concepts either align with reality (to some useful/practical degree) or they do not. The only way to measure this is with empirical evidence. Sometimes that is REALLY hard to do, even sometimes impossible with our current level of technology and knowledge. But in every case, it is ultimately a matter of ignorance (lack of information) that causes the difficulty.

Assuming we all accept the logical absolutes (at least to a useful degree) we still have to acknowledge that they were acquired by a very long process of observation, thinking about problems, looking for commonality, and ultimately forming an induction based on these, very much empirical, observations. They didn't just pop in our heads magically (in fact, it usually takes years of drumming them into a students head before they can root and flower :)

So now consider an argument that some form of thought or experiment is consistently improved by leaving in errors, ensuring bias, and an application of illogic. It is a self-contradictory proposition.

Philosophy and Science are two-sides of a single coin, not a dichotomy that can be split.

I meant that there is no *factual* definition, no standard, to match. So it makes no sense to me that philosophers have to make sure that their concepts match lay concepts, as if the latter were some kind of arbiter of truth or accuracy.

> it might nevertheless be useful for philosophers to have data about how common intuitions might differ from their own, since common intuitions are sometimes pertinent to matters being considered. <

Yes, and I acknowledged that. If a philosopher says “it is intuitive that...” and they mean commonsense intuitions, then yes their statements are amenable to empirical investigation, and should be empirically investigated. I just don’t see this sort of exercise as playing any major role in actual philosophical practice. I mean ever since Socrates we’ve been in the business to show people that their conceptions about a number of issues are confused or misguided... ;-)

> When Plato defined knowledge as "justified true belief", was he not doing philosophy? <

Yes, a good example of something that most lay people wouldn’t think of or know how to articulate.

> It is my understanding that even trained philosophers have been shown to be susceptible to the effects shown by these experiments. <

Not really, most XPhi is about lay people’s understanding of terms, not practitioners. Even when we are talking of “philosophers,” by the way, we should distinguish between the intuitions of, say, philosophers of mind (pertinent to phil-mind issues) from those of ethicists (pertinent to ethics). Modern academic specialization means that just as there is no such thing as a “scientist” anymore (there are physicists, biologists, etc.; and indeed, quantum physicists, solid-state physicists, evolutionary biologists, molecular biologists, and so on), there is no such thing as a generic “philosopher.”

> Until you back this up with a precise definition of existence which would be accepted by both camps, I remain respectfully skeptical. <

That’s way outside of the scope of the post, and indeed likely of the blog! But the literature on metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics that I have read (not my specific field!) tells me otherwise.

Dark Star,

> My take is that 'science' is a process of removing known sources of errors, biases, and illogic from conclusions. <

Well, everyone is free to propose their own definitions, but that’s far too broad. Literary criticism would count as a science, according to that way of thinking.

> our concepts either align with reality (to some useful/practical degree) or they do not. The only way to measure this is with empirical evidence. <

To simple. What sort of empirical evidence is pertinent to the truth of Fermat’s Last Theorem, or of the principle of the excluded middle?

> Philosophy and Science are two-sides of a single coin, not a dichotomy that can be split. <

Neither, they are distinct fields of concern and inquiry, with many overlapping or mutually informing areas.

>I meant that there is no *factual* definition, no standard, to match.<

Agreed. However, if (and only if) Plato's definition of knowledge and other such definitions are intended to precisely capture shared intuitions, then the merit of those definitions can be judged by comparison to the facts about those same intuitions. That's all I was suggesting, and I don't think that should be controversial. However, perhaps this was not Plato's intention in which case my argument is misguided.

>Then what’s the point of XPhi?<

To answer XPhi questions! Is it not legitimate for a field of inquiry to pursue its own research goals? It seems to me that the point of XPhi is to examine the relationship between common intuitions people have and philosophical concepts, either to see how well they match, to characterise the differences, or to demonstrate the philosophical problems with human intuitions.

I don't think anyone is proposing that XPhi can shed light on difficult philosophical arguments by harnessing the wisdom of the crowd. It has its own interesting questions to answer and might also provide data (not insight) for philosophers.

Of course this doesn't mean it is actually philosophy. I suppose I am willing to concede this point, but then whether it is considered philosophy or not is just one of those semantic questions without a correct answer. If philosophy is necessarily a priori rather than empirical, then it isn't philosophy. If philosophy is the analysis of abstract concepts, then it arguably is (insofar as it analyses those abstract concepts intuited by human beings). We might as well have a debate about whether synchronised swimming is really swimming at all. :)

>I mean ever since Socrates we’ve been in the business to show people that their conceptions about a number of issues are confused or misguided... ;-)<

We're agreed on that. But isn't it easier to do this when equipped with data from experiments which expose the nature of those conceptions? In his practise of asking questions of ordinary citizens, Socrates was arguably not that far removed from an experimental philosopher himself.

>Yes, a good example of something that most lay people wouldn’t think of or know how to articulate.<

I think we should be clear on one point. XPhi does not ask lay people to articulate anything. Nobody is challenging the ability of philosophers to think and define terms clearly. Rather, XPhi asks people oblique questions that reveal their intuitions, and it is from these surveys that the intuitions are characterised by experts (philosophers).

>there is no such thing as a generic “philosopher.”<

Point taken.

>That’s way outside of the scope of the post,<

No problem, and I agree. However, as such I retain my skepticism regarding whether there is anything more than semantics at stake. Perhaps we can get into it if you ever post on something related to mathematical platonism again.

Anyway, I feel like I've probably said all that I have to say on the matter. I'd like to reiterate that I enjoyed the post and the ensuing discussion. You made a lot of good points, and despite appearances I'm not sure I disagree with you on much of it. In the end, you can probably count me an agnostic on the question.

> perhaps this was not Plato's intention in which case my argument is misguided. <

I think it’s safe to say it wasn’t, looking at the scholarship on Plato.

> Is it not legitimate for a field of inquiry to pursue its own research goals? <

None of the above discussion has to do with the legitimacy of XPhi qua novel field. The question concerns the legitimacy of calling such field “philosophy.”

> I don't think anyone is proposing that XPhi can shed light on difficult philosophical arguments by harnessing the wisdom of the crowd. <

Actually, that’s precisely what is frustrating about it. When called on that, XPhi practitioners deny it, but then they keep making statements in their papers that can only be interpreted that way...

> I suppose I am willing to concede this point, but then whether it is considered philosophy or not is just one of those semantic questions without a correct answer. <

No, not really. You (and others) seem to have a bad conception of “semantics.” If semantics is the study and clarification of meaning, then semantics is *crucial* to all our discussion, which means that nothing should be dismissed as “just” semantics. Also, I already outlined the practical reasons why this debate is relevant.

> isn't it easier to do this when equipped with data from experiments which expose the nature of those conceptions? <

Yes, if we were still in the time of Socrates. But professional academic philosophers (like all other academics) have now made a pretty sharp distinction between their practice as scholar and their practice as educators. At best, XPhi seems to be relevant to the latter.

>Well, then I failed to get my points across. Oh well. After all my explanations about what philosophy does and does not, and what XPhi does and does not, it is hard for me to imagine that you have come to the conclusion that we are talking about the same thing by different words. But I guess my imagination is limited... (Besides, let’s not continue this discussion here, it does belong to a separate thread.)<

This was in response to a comment on another thread. You seem to have deleted my original comment on semantics, and I presume this was an accident due to the mixup between the threads about cultural evolution and XPhi. I'll continue the discussion here and try to make my position on "just semantics" clear.

In the original post, I claimed that the question of whether XPhi counts as philosophy was one of those "just semantics" questions. I don't think this is because you "failed to get [your] points across" or because "we are talking about the same thing by different words". Rather, I have failed to communicate my point.

In saying that it is a semantic question, I am contrasting two different definitions for philosophy. Your definition includes the criterion that "philosophical analysis is a matter of critical reflection on empirically underdetermined issues." By this definition, XPhi is clearly not philosophy.

However, XPhi proponents are obviously using different criteria to determine what counts as philosophy. Perhaps for them philosophy is the study of concepts or beliefs, and XPhi would fall under this category.

Whatever definition an XPhi proponent might use, it does not seem unreasonable to me to disregard your criterion of "empirical undeterminability". Few of the standard dictionary definitions of philosophy mention anything about this.

For me, the debate between you and XPhi proponents is not that meaningful because there is no way to say who has the correct definition. It's a matter of preference. It's "just semantics".

>No, not really. You (and others) seem to have a bad conception of “semantics.” If semantics is the study and clarification of meaning, then semantics is *crucial* to all our discussion, which means that nothing should be dismissed as “just” semantics.<

Of course, semantics are crucial to all discussion, and agreeing on the semantics of terms is vital. However there is a difference between meaningful, substantive disagreements and those which arise *only* from differing interpretations of words. These are "just semantics" and often have no satisfactory resolution other than looking in a dictionary or at common usage.

However, I would not count as "just semantics" reasoned arguments for adopting certain definitions of terms. Even though semantics are the subject of such discussions, they are not the cause of whatever disagreements might arise. If you can provide reasons to prefer your definition of philosophy over that used by XPhi proponents, then that would be interesting.

Some examples of what I'm talking about:

Whether Pluto is a planet depends only on how one defines a planet - "just semantics".

The philosophical discussion about why we should or should not modify the definition of planet to include or exclude Pluto is not "just semantics" because there are presumably independent reasons backing up each side of the argument that do not arise from mere semantics.

Whether XPhi is philosophy depends only on how one defines philosophy - "just semantics".

However, whether the definition of philosophy *should* be such that empirical questions are outside of its purview is not "just semantics".

I do feel that "just semantics" questions are intrinsically less interesting, however I will freely admit that it is important to ensure we have clarified any semantic confusion before we attempt to resolve any more substantive disagreements.