Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness?

The pros and cons of stricter disclosure rules for parliamentarians
are hotly debated. Some argue that disclosure rules for
parliamentarians increase transparency of the legislative branch,
leading to lower levels of rent-seeking and corruption, increased
citizen trust in parliament, and better quality of law-making.
Others argue that disclosure rules endanger the privacy of
parliamentarians, that their introduction would stop businesspeople
and lawyers from running for seats, which would decrease the quality
of law-making. This is the first attempt to empirically test these
conjectures on the composition of parliament empirically. We find
that the introduction of disclosure rules is usually not accompanied
by a significant shift in the proportion of lawyers and
businesspeople in parliament.

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