Cummings, Katherine
2014-01-09T17:20:11Z
2014-01-09T17:20:11Z
2013-05-05
27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 539 (2013)
1049-0280
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/13583
32 pages
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Water Laws
Colorado
New Mexico
Utah
Arizona
Adapting to Water Scarcity: A Comparative Analysis of Water Harvesting Regulation in the Four Corner States
Article

Macfarlane, Katherine A.
2012-12-01T23:02:24Z
2012-12-01T23:02:24Z
2012
91 Or. L. Rev. 177 (2012)
0196-2043
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12494
30 pages
In every federal civil case, a defendant must raise its affirmative
defenses in the pleading that responds to a plaintiff’s complaint.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), failure to properly
plead, for example, a statute of limitations defense, waives the
defense for good. Rule 8(c) does not exempt any category of
affirmative defense, nor does it forgive unintentional omissions of
certain defenses. It also does not prefer governmental defendants to
others. Yet in habeas corpus cases, the most significant affirmative
defenses to habeas petitions need not comply with Rule 8(c). Instead,
federal courts may raise the affirmative defenses of statute of
limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default and
nonretroactivity sua sponte even if the defense would otherwise be
waived pursuant to Rule 8(c).
This Article contends that habeas litigation is the worst place to
grant State respondents any sort of procedural favor. Habeas cases
implicate criminal convictions that are fundamentally unfair. And
habeas petitioners need all the help they can get—since the passage of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
the odds of winning habeas relief are akin to the odds of winning the
lottery.
After examining the history of affirmative defenses, the Article
next describes the purpose behind Rule 8(c) and argues that the rule
was meant to be strictly applied. It next explains how federal courts’
willingness to take sua sponte action on behalf of habeas respondents
violates both the spirit and the letter of Rule 8(c). It further argues that
the Supreme Court’s reliance on comity and other policy-based
justifications do not suffice to overcome the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which apply without regard to what sort of case is being
heard. In light of the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief, it
also contends that habeas cases are the worst candidates for
aggressive sua sponte advocacy that revives affirmative defenses at
the expense of those imprisoned unfairly.
With respect to Rule 8(c), habeas respondents should be treated
similarly to, not differently from, every other civil defendant. The
Article concludes that assisting respondents with sua sponte action in
habeas cases conflicts with the purpose of an adversarial system by
giving an unfair advantage to defendants who need it the least.
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
rights_reserved
habeas corpus
Sua Sponte
Adversarial No More: How Sua Sponte Assertion of Affirmative Defenses to Habeas Wreaks Havoc on the Rules of Civil Procedure
Article

Hall, W. Tyler
2016-01-27T19:54:48Z
2016-01-27T19:54:48Z
2016-01-27
94 OR. L. REV. 179
0196-2043
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19578
44 pages
In September 2014, the Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA)—the worldwide governing body of soccer—declared its intent to ban the contentious practice of third-party ownership (TPO). A TPO agreement is between a soccer club and a third party—an investment fund, corporation, sports agent, or private investor—by which the third party purchases an economic stake in future profits from the sale of one or more players at the club. The third party believes the player has the potential to improve and be sold to another club for a high enough fee to make a profit on the initial investment. The profits made selling economic stakes in future transfers are a crucial resource for cash-strapped soccer clubs around the world.
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Sports law
FIFA
After the Ban: The Financial Landscape of International Soccer After Third-Party Ownership
Article

Bard, Jennifer S.
2016-05-10T22:05:27Z
2016-05-10T22:05:27Z
2016-05-09
94 OR. L. REV. 295
0196-2043
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19865
64 pages
This Article demonstrates why efforts to develop brain imaging
technology that will enhance the human ability to detect deliberate
deception are doomed to failure because they are based on false
assumptions about how our brains perceive and store information.
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Memory
“Ah Yes, I Remember It Well”: Why the Inherent Unreliability of Human Memory Makes Brain Imaging Technology a Poor Measure of Truth-Telling in the Courtroom
Article

Wong, Ashley Sachiko
2016-05-10T22:11:51Z
2016-05-10T22:11:51Z
2016-05-09
94 OR. L. REV. 425
0196-2043
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19867
30 pages
This Note outlines the legal, moral, and social implications of the Hall decision. Additionally, it provides possible responses to the questions left unanswered by Hall regarding the need to remedy the relationship between the intellectually disabled community and the criminal justice system.
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Intellectual disability
Aligning the Criminal Justice System with the Mental Health Profession in Response to Hall v. Florida
Article

Tatoian, Erica R.
2016-05-10T21:54:37Z
2016-05-10T21:54:37Z
2016-05-09
31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147
1049-0280
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19863
20 pages
The law treats our companion animals, for most purposes, the same as other forms of chattel: a pair of shoes, a chair, a cell phone. But how can this be so? How can the law not discern between sentient beings and inanimate objects?
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Pets
Animal rights
Animals in the Law: Occupying a Space Between Legal Personhood and Personal Property
Article

Akerson, David(University of Oregon School of Law, September 10, 2015)

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Akerson, David
2015-09-11T21:41:25Z
2015-09-11T21:41:25Z
2015-09-10
16 Or. Rev. Int'l. L. 173 (2014)
1543-9860
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19401
52 pages
This Article applies the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of proportionality to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, by the United States military forces (U.S. Military) and the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the “war on terror” in places such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Mali.
en_US
University of Oregon School of Law
All Rights Reserved.
Military
Humanitarian law
Applying Jus In Bello Proportionality to Drone Warfare
Article