Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia

MAX G. MANWARING

From Parameters, Winter 1998, pp. 28-38.

The United States' civil-military involvement in
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, with NATO and other elements of
the international community, has been a major topic in the national and
international security dialogue since the 1995 signing of the Dayton Peace
Accords for Bosnia. Many have concluded, in light of that experience and
subsequent developments, that conflict of the sort encountered in the Balkans
may well be a harbinger of future US military operations. The dialogue
suggests that the complex challenges of multinational peace and stability
operations encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflect the disorder of the
post-Cold War era and could characterize other intranational conflicts.

The US Army deployed a significant number of personnel to Bosnia early
in 1996 to collect, consolidate, and report on hundreds of incidents and
activities that were related to the deployment and subsequent operations
of US forces in the region. The raw material collected by the teams under
the rubric of "lessons learned" was reviewed and analyzed within
the Army, emerging as lessons to be examined by all of its elements to
support training, review doctrine, and develop and acquire materiel appropriate
to peace support operations. One of the organizations involved in the process
of learning from the experiences of the deployed force, the US Army Peacekeeping
Institute, subsequently sponsored two meetings of senior US and other officers
and civilians, during which the lessons were examined and validated.

At the invitation of the Army Chief of Staff, more than 100 individuals
from over 50 different national and international organizations attended
the two meetings, eventually sending him more than 75 recommendations derived
from the lessons that had been collected and analyzed. The topics reported
out dealt with strategic and operational issues, and addressed lessons
learned that affected the Chief of Staff's responsibilities under Title
10, USC, his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his advisory
responsibilities.

This article examines some of the recurring themes from those meetings,
which took place in May 1996 and April 1997. The intent then and now was
not to relive history as we would have liked it to have been, but to focus
on the broad themes and issues that invoke the invaluable power of leader
judgment and unity of effort in peace operations. The consistency of the
lessons learned from these and other US and United Nations reports is impressive,
and inspires confidence that the lessons are valid.

The US Civil-Military Experience in Bosnia

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the international security
system and the verities that shaped US and Western national purposes, policies,
strategies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. In place
of the predictable Cold War international structure we now have a world
of dangerous uncertainty and political ambiguity in which time-honored
concepts of security and the classical military means to attain it, while
necessary, are no longer sufficient.[1] As a consequence, it is important
to revisit some of the imperatives of contemporary multinational peace
and stability operations.

Five salient topics derived from the US experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina
through early 1997 have been collected here. While many other sets of issues
emerged from the two meetings, space precludes addressing more than a representative
number of the most important ones. To ensure open and forthright discussion
during the meetings, a strict agreement of nonattribution was adopted by
the participants.[2] Consequently, while documentation of the proceedings
is sketchy in the following discussions, every effort has been made to
describe the proceedings accurately.[3]

The five categories of issues are:

Understand and deal with the political complexity of contemporary peace
and stability operations.

Address and resolve the problem of ad hoc arrangements in strategic
planning and coordination.

Develop more mature peace and stability operations doctrine.

Revisit the total army issue.

Rethink the force protection issue.

Political Complexity

The political complexity of contemporary peace operations stems from
the fact that intrastate conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia
are the result of careful political consideration and strong political
motivation. Additionally, a large number of national and international
civilian and military organizations and nongovernmental organizations are
engaged in a broad political, economic, informational, and military effort
to bring peace and stability to specified peoples. Thus, contemporary conflict
is not only political but also multinational, multiorganizational, multidimensional,
and multicultural. Understanding and working effectively in that complex
environment depends on "mind-set adjustments that will allow leaders
to be comfortable with political ambiguity and at ease as part of a synergistic
process."[4]

The political complexity issue dominates contemporary peace and stability
operations at two levels--the type of conflict and the cooperation politically
necessary to deal with it.

First, in intrastate conflict, confrontation is transformed from
the level of military violence to the level of a political-psychological
struggle for the proverbial "hearts and minds" of a people. Within
the context of a people being the ultimate center of gravity, antagonists
can strive to achieve the Clausewitzian admonition to "dare to win
all"--the complete political overthrow of a government--instead of
simply attempting to obtain leverage for limited territorial, political,
economic, and social concessions in the more traditional sense.[5] Thus,
turning Clausewitz upside down, contemporary conflict is not an extension
of politics, politics is an extension of conflict.

In this environment, responses to direct and indirect threats must be
primarily political and psychological. The blunt force of military formations
supported by tanks and aircraft could be irrelevant or even counterproductive.
The more subtle use of "soft" political, economic, psychological,
and moral power--supported by information operations, careful intelligence
work, and surgical precision at the more direct military or police level--would
be imperative.

At the second leadership and cooperation level of political dominance,
a mandate likely to be promulgated for intervention in another intrastate
conflict situation such as that in the Balkans might read something like
this: "In cooperation with international organizations, national civilian
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition partners, initiate
a combined peace operation to aggressively take control of a contested
area, stop any escalation of violence, and impose an internationally acceptable
level of law and order. In addition, be prepared to support relevant agencies
in dealing with the political, economic, and social aftermath of the intrastate
violence." This kind of situation requires the greatest civil-military
and military-military diplomacy, cooperation, and coordination.

In such situations, responses must also be well organized, highly cooperative,
carefully coordinated, and conducted with considerable political skill.
Otherwise, "strategic ambiguity" is introduced; opponents are
given the opportunity to "play at the seams" of the operation
and frustrate objectives; allies are allowed to pursue their own agendas;
political, personnel, and monetary costs rise; and the probability of mission
failure increases.

Until appropriate political-psychological responses to perceived direct
and indirect threats in intranational conflict become reality and until
realistic political-psychological responses to multilateral coordination
and cooperation problems in that security environment become habitual,
the United States and the rest of the international community face unattractive
alternatives in such situations. They can either leave forces in place
to maintain a de facto military occupation, or they can depart the scene
with the sure knowledge that the conflict will erupt again. In the latter
case, the time, treasure, and blood expended will have been for nothing.

At a minimum, there are five educational and cultural imperatives to
modify Cold War mind-sets and to develop the leader judgment needed to
deal effectively with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional,
multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural peace and stability
operations.

First, the study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been
the philosophical cornerstone for understanding conventional war. It is
no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. Thus, concepts such as "enemy,"
"war," and "victory" should be reconsidered and redefined
for intrastate conflict. Moreover, nontraditional interests centering on
national and international stability need to be reexamined and defined.
Finally, the application of all the instruments of national and international
power--including the full integration of legitimate civil and military
coalition partners--to achieve political ends has to be rethought and refined.

Second, leaders at all levels must understand the strategic and political
implications of tactical actions. They must also understand the ways that
force can be employed to achieve political ends, and the ways that political
considerations affect the use of force. In addition, leaders at all levels
need to understand "ambiguity" and be fully prepared to deal
with it.

Third, US military personnel are expected to be able to operate effectively
in coalitions or multinational military formations. They must, however,
acquire the ability to interact collegially and effectively in peace support
operations with representatives of US civilian agencies, non-US civilian
governmental agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
civilian populations, and local and global media. As a consequence, efforts
that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness, such
as civilian and military exchange programs, language training programs,
and combined (multinational) exercises should be revitalized and expanded.

Fourth, in that connection, planners and negotiators who will operate
at the strategic and high operational levels should be nurtured to function
in coalition decisionmaking and planning situations that can blend US deliberate
planning processes with concurrent multinational and multiorganizational
practices.

Finally, education and training for contemporary peace and stability
operations must prepare military peacekeeping personnel to be effective
warfighters. Peace missions have and will continue to put military forces
into harm's way. Political actors in an intrastate conflict are likely
to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional
weaponry. For many societies, violence is a normal and accepted way of
causing change or keeping things "the way they always have been."
In either case, peacekeepers must--first and foremost--be good soldiers.
Because of the environment in which they must work, peacekeeping soldiers
must also display political sensitivity, considerable restraint, and iron
discipline.

Ad Hoc Solutions and the Need for Strategic Planning and Coordination

Ad hoc problem solving and the convoluted strategic planning and coordination
situation that developed in the Bosnian experience is a consequence of
a systemic disconnect between NATO operational and US planning and implementing
processes. It is also a consequence of the fact that, as one participant
remarked, "The US created a lot of these problems. They didn't want
to work within NATO . . . . The US was a lone wolf out there in this operation
and did not coordinate . . . with NATO at all."[6] Like it or not,
and prepared for it or not, contemporary conflict requires strategic planning
and cooperation between and among coalition partners, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and the US civil-military representation.
This, in turn, depends on leader judgment that will ensure not just unity
of command, but unity of effort.

The harsh reality of the Bosnia-Herzegovina experience demonstrated
three major strategic planning and coordination problems. First, US and
NATO planning and implementing procedures broke down in the face of competing
national and institutional interests, and the associated segregated planning
and implementing processes. Second, early US military coordination during
the assessment and planning phases of the Bosnia intervention did not include
key US civilian organizations, international organizations, NATO coalition
partners, or nongovernmental organizations. Third, ad hoc reaction to changing
conditions and the resultant "mission creep" became the norm
in the absence of a single overarching political-military campaign plan.
As a result, there was no strategic clarity, no unity of effort, and very
limited effectiveness in some aspects of NATO operations in 1996.

At the same time independent uncoordinated planning, called "stovepipe"
activities, produced operational and tactical confusion and required more
improvisation to fix command and control arrangements, mission limits,
supported and supporting logistical and personnel procedures, rules of
engagement, and status of forces agreements. As an example, on 1 December
1995, the Commander in Chief of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)
was assigned by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to command the NATO
Implementation Force. However, the AFSOUTH commander did not have proper
authority to command US forces or to resolve US logistical, command and
control, communications, and intelligence relationships. The resultant
confusion led to more quick fixes and contributed to the duplication of
effort required to conduct operations. It also added significantly to the
political, financial, and manpower costs of the unintegrated peace and
stability mission in Bosnia.

Given such a convoluted organizational and procedural situation, it
is extremely difficult to make any kind of operation credible or effective.
For operations such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina to achieve any measure
of effectiveness beyond keeping a lid on the situation, logic and good
management call for a mechanism to achieve a unity of effort. Creating
that unity of effort requires contributions at different levels.

First, at the highest level, the primary peacekeeping parties must be
in general agreement with regard to the objectives of a political vision
and the associated set of operations. And although such an agreement regarding
a strategic or operational end-state is a necessary condition for unity
of effort, it is not sufficient. Sufficiency and clarity are achieved by
adding appropriate policy implementation and military management structures--and
"mind-set adjustments"--at the following three additional levels.

The second level of effort requires an executive-level management structure
that can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution
of policy among and between the relevant US civilian agencies and armed
forces. That structure must also ensure that all political-military action
at the operational and tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement
of the mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This requirement
reflects a need for improved coordination within the operational theater
and between the theater commander and Washington.

Third, steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and effectiveness
by integrating coalition military, international organization, and nongovernmental
organization processes with US political-military planning and implementing
processes. It has become quite clear that the political end-state is elusive
and operations suffer when there is no strategic planning structure empowered
to integrate the key multinational and multiorganizational civil-military
elements of a peace or stability operation. It is also clear that duplication
of effort, an immediate consequence of the absence of such a strategic
planning body, is costly in political, personnel, and financial terms.[7]

At a base level, however, unity of effort requires education as well
as organizational solutions. Even with an adequate planning and organizational
structure, ambiguity, confusion, and tensions are likely to emerge. Only
when and if the various civilian and military leaders involved in an operation
can develop the judgment and empathy necessary to work cooperatively and
collegially will they be able to plan and conduct operations that meet
the needs and use the capabilities of the US interagency community, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition military forces.
Unity of effort ultimately entails the type of professional military education
and leader development that leads to effective diplomacy, as well as to
military competence.

The Need for More Mature Doctrine

The need for more mature peace and stability operations doctrine is
made clear when every civil and military organization involved in missions
such as those in the former Yugoslavia operates under its own procedures
or doctrine. To compound this problem, extant doctrine is generally designed
to provide conventional military solutions to traditional military problems.
There is no standardized doctrine for all levels in such operations, even
within NATO. Moreover, there is little or no doctrinal recognition of the
fact that peace and stability operations are primarily multinational, political,
and psychological in nature. In that context, we are reminded, "We
are operating with very old doctrine and legalities. These need to be changed
and bought up to speed as soon as possible. . . . Joint doctrine is good,
interagency not so, and multinational doctrine is virtually nonexistent."[8]

At present, peace and stability operations appear to be viewed as relatively
traditional military actions organized to take control of a specified area,
stop any violence, and impose peace. The conflict statistics of the past
50 years, however, show convincingly that the trend continues to be away
from traditional international operations and toward nontraditional intranational
missions. Decisionmakers, policymakers, and planners assume they are dealing
with a system of sovereign states involved in conventional territorial
aggression. Instead, more often than not, contemporary conflict involves
the security and survival of a community or people within a fragmented
state. In that situation, peace enforcers will probably find no definable
military force to face, no specific territory to control, no single part
of society on which to concentrate, and no wholly legitimate government
with which to work. Instead, peace enforcers will likely find contending
sources of authority involved in the long-term causes and effects of myriad
instabilities and destabilizing forces within the affected state or region.

These instabilities and destabilizing forces include starvation, environmental
devastation, lack of socioeconomic and political justice, criminal anarchy,
large-scale refugee flows, militant religious fundamentalism, greedy civil
and military bureaucrats, warlords, and ethnic cleansers. Sooner or later,
the spillover effects of intranational violence caused by these and other
instabilities place demands on the international community--if not to resolve
the problems they represent or create, then at least to harbor the victims.
These kinds of substate instability problems require a holistic approach
that relies on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working
in an integrated manner to achieve the common goals of peace and stability.
Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that "only
sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural,
and humanitarian problems can place an enforced peace on durable foundations."[9]

Difficult as all this may be from an ethnocentric perspective, the doctrinal
problem of bringing likely participants together on a level playing field
must be dealt with quickly and completely. The urgency of developing mature
multilateral civil-military doctrine for contemporary peace and security
requirements is clear: "If [the US Army] is going to truly be an army
capable of fighting two major regional contingencies, or whatever the policy
is, and still be able to meet national diplomacy requirements, you are
going to have to deal with these [doctrinal] issues. Now; not tomorrow,
not the next day, now. Now is the time for a change of mind-set."[10]

Relevant doctrine at the conceptual level for multilateral peace and
stability operations must, first, focus on the need to recognize the real
locus of power (e.g., the civil population) in a given operational area,
and, second, the civilian and military resources and time stages needed
to plan for and implement a truly successful conclusion to a given peace
process. Then, in an operation involving national and international civilian
organizations and coalition partners, early coordination during the assessment
and plan-development phases is essential for establishing mission responsibilities
and supported and supporting relationships and limits, and for avoiding
ad hoc reactions to contingencies.

At an organizational level, the countries and international organizations
most likely to be coalition partners need to share the understanding that
cooperation and coordination are key to success. That understanding then
should lead to the development of processes that can and will define and
implement shared partnership goals (end-states), options (ways), and realistic
capability requirements (means). In that connection, these same processes
need to develop standardized doctrine at all levels that ensures the rapid
and coordinated response of combat, combat support, and combat service
support forces--both to enable and to sustain a holistic strategic civil-military
effort.

Thus, at the operational level, a comprehensive doctrine for peace and
stability operations would have to include as equal partners:

Doctrine so structured would allow the various political actors to plan,
coordinate, and integrate their activities at specified stages of the implementing
process. These unifying efforts, in turn, could ensure that conditions
are established to allow a host nation to develop or renew its political
solvency and legitimacy--and that a given mandate for peace may in fact
be fulfilled.

The Total Army Issue

There remains the old Cold War problem of the tooth to tail ratio. In
accordance with the Total Army concept, the active Army continues to rely
on the reserve components to provide vital elements of support. Because
of the dependence on the reserve components to provide an appropriate balance
of skills in a given military situation, one conference participant said
that lack of timely access to reserve component forces can be "a war
stopper. That is perhaps too bold a statement, but it would [make the problem]
extraordinarily difficult."[11] In the most stark terms, continued
and timely reserve component support for a unified operation in the former
Yugoslavia, and possible subsequent peace and stability operations elsewhere,
is essential to mission planning, execution, and completion.[12]

In the initial stages of Operation Joint Endeavor in 1995, the late
arrival of reserve component units into Bosnia-Herzegovina to provide an
appropriate mix of reserve and active force structure and skill densities
"really slowed things down and made everything `touch and go' up to
the last minute."[13] The availability of these reserve forces is
dependent on the identification of appropriate units and individuals, and
a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). In the early stages of
the Bosnian intervention, the call-up authorization was not used in a timely
manner. Moreover, as the operation in the former Yugoslavia continues,
the extensive use of a relatively small number of specialized reserve component
units and individuals has created a shrinking pool of available personnel.
Qualified civil affairs and psychological operations personnel are especially
scarce. Alternative solutions, such as contracting selected functions or
relying on an allied nation for appropriate capabilities, do not exist.
Thus, the Total Army issue is becoming more and more critical as the United
States continues to support the operation in the Balkans, and to maintain
other commitments around the world. This problem will likely reach crisis
status in the not-too-distant future unless enlightened leaders take measures
to create a more responsive and balanced total force. The following five
recommendations, if adopted and carried out, would help resolve the issue.

Reevaluate and expand the force structure of selected active and reserve
units and individuals to meet current planning requirements for major regional
contingencies, logistics readiness centers, and operational tempo standards.

Determine the "right mix, the right number, or a combination of
the two" of active and reserve component units and individuals with
high deployment tempos, and make the appropriate adjustments.

Redefine and reduce the time required to mobilize and demobilize reserve
component soldiers to allow maximum time on mission support.

Pursue initiatives such as the "Prime the Pump" and the "Voluntary
Early Access to Ready Reserve" programs to make available up to 30,000
reserve component volunteers prior to a planned PSRC authorization.

Take the necessary steps to promulgate any new legislation that might
be required to implement the above recommendations, and to make the Total
Army more efficient and effective.[14]

Force Protection

Force protection for US personnel involved in peace operations should
always be a guiding principle in the conduct of any mission--regardless
of the mission's level of intensity. Nevertheless, in Operation Joint Endeavor,
the US force protection effort has taken on a higher degree of importance
than the peace and stability mission in Bosnia itself. This has led to
the observation that "sometimes even a good thing carried to excess
can have negative effects. The force protection issue must be reconsidered."[15]
Again, this depends on sound judgment by good leaders who understand the
criticality of the issue and who are willing to initiate the relevant policy
changes.

Excessive emphasis on force protection at the strategic level calls
into question the willingness of the United States to use its formidable
military power. Force protection also has taken on a higher degree of importance
than the other battlefield dynamics of firepower, leadership, and maneuver,
and has often stifled the flexibility of the operational commander. Second-
and third-order effects send mixed signals to warring factions, reduce
US credibility with coalition partners as well as antagonists, and hamper
civil-military cooperation. Carried to its logical conclusion, excessive
emphasis on force protection can be politically and militarily dangerous.

There is only one tenable recommendation regarding the force protection
issue: "Make the necessary mind-set adjustments to return the responsibility
for force protection back to the operational commander."[16]

Conclusions

Even though every conflict situation differs in time and place, none
is ever truly unique. Throughout the universe of contemporary conflict
in general--and peace and stability operations in particular--there are
analytical commonalties. The final outcome of a conflict such as that in
the former Yugoslavia is not determined primarily by the skillful manipulation
of violence on the battlefield. Control of the situation and its resolution
are determined by the qualitative judgments and unity of effort established
before, during, and after a conflict is politically recognized to have
begun and ended.

Two common denominators underlie the discussion of the issues considered
in this article. The first is the need to understand and to behave as though
the Cold War is over and to learn how to optimize capabilities in an ambiguous,
nontraditional, international security environment. In colloquial terms,
this common denominator relates specifically to "mind-set." In
more formal terms, it refers to leader judgment. The second common denominator
involves the political partnership requirements that will permit doctrinal
and structural change related to coalitions and operations involving mixes
of military and civilian organizations. This requirement is fundamental
to maintaining unity of effort in complex humanitarian relief or peace
support operations. Together, these two common denominators are essential
for success in complex humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

The ultimate challenge now and for "2010 down the road" is
that national leadership needs to examine the grand picture and not just
Bosnia. The United States needs to reorient its thinking and actions to
deal with the issues of leader judgment and unity of effort, or "there
won't be any" solutions to the problems of peace and stability.[17]

NOTES

1. This and subsequent assertions are based on the consensus reached
in each of the conferences. Because of the nonattribution policy, however,
assertions are not cited. Direct quotes are cited as "Nonattribution."

2. The first Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference
was held at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., on 19-23 May 1996. The second conference
(BHAAR II) was held at Carlisle Barracks on 13-17 April 1997.

3. The Bosnia case is well documented by the periodic reports of The
United Nations Secretary General, and by a number of other lessons-learned
projects, including "Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from
Recent Experience" (UN Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping
Operations), December 1996. Additionally, the Joint Staff J-7 representative
on the BHAAR I Plenary Panel stated that "the BHAAR findings match
J-7's."

12. Few readers will be aware of the Army's responsibilities under Title
10, USC, for sustaining US forces deployed on such operations. See, for
example, David Fastabend, "An Appraisal of `The Brigade-Based New
Army,'" Parameters, 27 (Autumn 1997), p. 81, n. 1.

13. Nonattribution.

14. As one of the experienced individuals who reviewed a draft of this
article remarked, "The idea of a `Reserve Ready Reaction Force' has
been around for more than a decade. There are serious legal, financial,
and political problems involved with deploying selected reservists `prior
to a planned PSRC authorization.' Not the least of these problems is how
to hold civilian jobs for deployed reservists. Other problems involve child
care plans, drafting doctors, dentists, police, clergy, etc. who may be
doing essential community service, and getting reservists paid while Congress
debates funding for contingency operations." Overcoming such obstacles
will not be easy, but must be done.

Dr. Max G. Manwaring (Colonel, USA Ret.) is an adjunct professor of
political science at Dickinson College (Carlisle, Pa.) and a political-military
affairs consultant. He has a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
and he has served in various academic and military positions at, inter
alia, the US Army War College, the US Southern Command's Small Wars
Operations Research Directorate, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He
is the author of several articles and reports dealing with political-military
affairs and is editor or coeditor of El Salvador at War: An Oral History
(1989), Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict
(1991), Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder
(1993), Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success (1996),
and Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and
Lessons of Peace Operations (1998).