Generally speaking, there are no grounds in Russian-U.S. relations for reviving the Cold War and going to the brink of mutual assured destruction. In the presence of common threats, geopolitical interests can adversely impact bilateral relations only to a certain extent. But the current tendencies do not give hope for their speedy improvement.

Assessing the possible foreign policy consequences of America’s turn toward the right requires a multi-layered approach built around key questions: What happened in the November 2014 mid-term elections — and why? How will America’s political system and government institutions adjust to reflect the election outcome and shifting opinion?

If America, with its power, influence, capabilities and share in the world economy proclaims itself "First", it thereby sets the tone. So everyone will have to follow it and also to become "first of all." It's hardly worth to be glad about it. But we must be ready.

A few weeks ago, as we planned our coverage of Russia’s election, my colleagues and I at Kommersant, a Moscow-based daily newspaper, discussed whether we should prepare an overview of the foreign policy proposals of all eight candidates running for president. I argued it wasn’t worth it. What’s the point in analyzing seven programs that have no chance of being carried out?

In early 2018, a remarkable milestone was reached in post-Cold War history: as of February 5, the Berlin Wall had officially been down for as long as it was up. But in contrast to the jubilance and optimism that surrounded the fall of communism, today is characterized by growing mistrust and even open hostility between Moscow and Western capitals as we appear to be further away from the promise made in 1989 by President George H. W. Bush of a “Europe whole and free.”

In 100 years since the Revolution of 1917, it continues to have impact on the Russian society. Divergent assessments of the Revolution and different approaches to its commemoration have been sparking off heated debates on Russia’s past and future that emphasize the need to reconcile different narratives.

Against a background of shifting geoeconomic power from the West to the East, economic nationalism has become the development strategy that allows rising powers to reverse negative asymmetry in interdependent economic relationships.

Before 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a “national idea.” Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU.

In the eyes of many, the possession of the nuclear bomb is a symbol of special military-political might and of belonging to a select group. The experience of the difficult negotiations with Ukraine, in the course of which Kiev was persuaded—in the long last—to give up the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the U.S.S.R., can be of use to those who now have to address similar problems with other countries.