Wednesday, November 30, 2016

Russian President
Vladimir Putin has kept international attention riveted on Russian operations
in Syria while escalating military deployments and political operations
across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Putin’s global strategy relies on creating the impression
that a U.S. challenge to Russian expansion would be met with a conventional military
or even nuclear Russian response. Putin aims to present the incoming administration with the false
dichotomy of partnering with Russia and allowing Putin to operate with impunity
or going to war.

Putin has not changed his approach following the U.S.
election despite the conciliatory tone struck by President-elect Donald Trump.
He has instead continued to make forward military deployments and used
increasingly aggressive rhetoric. Russia announced a massive new deployment of
some of their most advanced anti-aircraft systems to Syria the day after the
president-elect expressed his hope for a "strong and enduring relationship
with Russia" during a phone call with the Russian president.[1]Putin has continued to act to ensure that the incoming administration must
negotiate any U.S.-Russia reset on Russian terms. The Russian president intends
to cement Russian military presence in strategically significant areas and compel
the incoming administration to accept Russian faits accomplis at the expense of
U.S. interests.Putin will be able
to diminish U.S. influence globally even before Trump takes office if the
outgoing and incoming administrations do not resist him.

Putin has used
Russian military operations in Syria as cover to deploy highly capable air
force, anti-aircraft and naval units into the Middle East. He is already using
these capabilities to limit U.S. freedom of operations in the eastern
Mediterranean. Russia has continued to build its network of anti-air missile
systems, and deployed an additional seven advanced S-300 units along the Syrian
coast on November 15, 2016. Putin has also deployed advanced naval capabilities.
Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, deployed to Syria
with much fanfare. The ship itself brings
no meaningful additions to Russia’s military capabilities in the theater and
primarily functions as a propaganda tool.
Highly-capable vessels that do enhance Russia’s ability to challenge
U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean accompany it, however. The Pyotr
Velikiy and Admiral Grigorovich, as well as three submarines,
provide Russian forces off the Syrian coast with advanced offensive cruise missile
capabilities, naval air defense systems and anti-ship missiles.[2] All of
these systems in combination allow Russia to establish an anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) zone over much of the eastern Mediterranean and Syria. These
systems constrain the operations of US forces.
American aircraft can either operate according to Putin’s desires or risk
a military confrontation with Russia.

Constraining
American activities is the primary purpose for most of these deployments. ISIS, al Qaeda, and affiliated opposition
groups have no air or sea forces and extremely limited anti-aircraft
capabilities. Putin is fighting on
behalf of the Assad regime and with the Iranians, so their aircraft are allies
rather than threats to Russian troops. These
advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems can only be directed against
American forces or those of America’s NATO allies or Israel. The Kremlin itself stated that these systems are
meant to play a “deterrent role”.[3]

Putin has
also increased the intensity and tempo of military deployments in the Baltic
region, heightening Russia’s military posture and signaling his intention to
continue challenging the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe. Moscow announced
on November 21, 2016 that it would permanently deploy Iskander-M tactical
ballistic missiles to the European enclave of Kaliningrad along with additional
S-400 anti-air missile systems.[4] Russian
forces in Kaliningrad will also receive the Bastion-P anti-ship missile system,
which was recently shown to have land attack capabilities.[5]These
deployments follow the June 2016 overhaul of the Baltic Sea Fleet leadership,
as well as efforts to provide the fleet with advanced surface vessels.[6]

Putin is
using the symbolic value of these deployments to achieve much larger strategic
gains than the marginal increases in tactical capability most of them
constitute. The permanent deployment of the Iskander system, which can launch
missiles carrying either a conventional or nuclear payload, demonstrates
Russia’s ability to conduct a tactical or operational nuclear strike in Europe
without using its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and without requiring manned
bombers to penetrate NATO air defenses. The renewed armament of the Baltic Sea
Fleet similarly signal Russia’s intention to intimidate the Baltic States and
Poland even as NATO reinforces them with multinational battalions. Putin hopes to
intimidate or coerce the U.S. into ceding influence in Eastern Europe, allowing
him to expand Russian military and political influence.

Putin is watching
how the U.S. and its allies react to deployments in the Middle East and Europe
in order to gauge his ability to increase the Russian military presence in
Asia. Russia has been engaged in a high-profile buildup on the Kuril Islands, the
subject of a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia.[7] The
Russian Ministry of Defense announced in May that it will build new military infrastructure
there, including a new Pacific naval base, and recently deployed Bal and Bastion-P
anti-ship systems.[8]The
buildup of Russia’s Far East is likely to follow familiar playbook. Russia already
operates S-400s on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Tor-M2U short-range air defense
systems on the Kuril Islands.[9] Russian
forces were in the coastal province of Primorsky Krai were equipped with
Iskander-M tactical missile systems in July 2016 and undertook drills on November
19, 2016.[10]
Anti-air systems may be used to secure the airspace in Russia’s Far East, while
the Iskander systems signal the threat of nuclear escalation. The Russian
Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a new ground forces division in
the Far East, including additional deployments to the Kuril islands, as well as
heavy bomber patrols in the Pacific.[11] Putin
will become more aggressive in his militarization of the Pacific if his approach
in other theaters goes unchallenged.

Putin has
coupled these deployments with nuclear rhetoric and signaling in order to coerce
the West to acquiesce to or even partner with Russia. Russian officials and media cast the current
situation as a re-emergence of the Cold War, highlighting Russia’s capabilities
and of its willingness to use nuclear weapons. Russia recently codified its
withdrawal from the Plutonium
Accords, a
bilateral agreement with the U.S. to destroy weapons-grade plutonium used to build
nuclear weapons.[12] Russian media has
launched a propaganda campaign to further the narrative of escalating nuclear
tensions, including claims of nation-wide drills in case of a nuclear
attack.[13] It
has also highly publicized recent Russia’s new ICBM, the Sarmat (NATO
designation: Satan 2), and tests of the error-prone Bulava, a sub-launch
ballistic missile (SLBM).[14] Putin
aims to propagate the narrative of Russian capability and readiness to engage
in nuclear war to artificially raise the stakes of U.S. resistance to Russian
military expansion.

In addition to exerting military pressure,Putin has worked to undermine U.S. influence
and support by forming partnerships with foreign governments and political
parties. Putin aims to split the solidarity of U.S. allies while empowering countries
that oppose U.S. interests in an effort to reduce support for U.S. operations
globally.

Putin seeks
to constrain U.S. operations in the Middle East further by courting Egypt as a
military partner and providing advanced weapons to Iran. Russia undertook its
first military exercises with Egypt, involving elite Russia airborne units
along with Egyptian paratroopers, in mid-October. Putin likely seeks to
establish a base on Egyptian territory to further strengthen Russia’s military
presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.[15] Cairo
may well refuse to allow Russia to base on its territory, as this would risk it
losing significant military aid from the U.S., but Putin has already convinced
President Abdel Fattah el Sisi to support Russian initiatives in the UN
Security Council.[16]

Putin has
also continued to provide arms and advanced capabilities to Iran, including
S-300 air defense systems, with the intention of strengthening a regional power
that opposes U.S. interests in the Middle East. These systems have serious
implications for Iran’s missile development program and may hamper future nuclear
deterrence measures.[17] Russia
and Iran recently announced a $10 billion arms deal, which would supply Iran
with Russian tanks, planes and helicopters while increasing military ties
between the two countries.[18] Russia’s
ongoing intervention and empowerment of Iran strengthens the Moscow-Tehran axis
and could significantly constrain America’s ability to fight against al Qaeda
and the Islamic State throughout the Middle East.

Putin aims to
reduce U.S. and NATO influence in Europe by continuing to support anti-European
Union and pro-Russian political parties in European governments.[19] Three
key elections have positioned pro-Russian parties to disrupt the stability of
NATO member and partner states. Estonia’s Prime Minister lost a no-confidence
vote on November 9, 2016.[20] The
pro-Russian party in Estonia is a consolidated minority but is unlikely to gain
a controlling majority in the upcoming elections. The Prime Minister’s fall,
however, weakens the pro-Western majority and creates significant instability
in a country that will soon host one of NATO’s new multinational battalions.
The pro-European Prime Minister of Bulgaria stepped down after a pro-Russian
candidate won the office of the president on November 13, 2016.[21]
Bulgaria is a NATO member state that has generally attempted to avoid ‘provoking’
Russia by limiting its NATO activity.[22] A
pro-Russian party would cause Bulgaria to further reduce its participation as a
NATO member and weaken the alliance. Moldova elected a pro-Russian president
whose party aims to prevent Moldova from further integrating with the EU and
NATO, also on November 13, 2016.[23] Russia
is supporting these parties and others in Europe in order to reduce these
countries’ cooperation with the U.S. and potentially create resistance to
future NATO activity.

Putin has expanded Russia’s military capabilities and
political power globally by pairing the deployment of Russian military forces
with aggressive rhetoric to preclude a U.S. response. If Putin continues to
bolster Russian forces, equipment and influence in strategic theaters, he will be
able to face the new U.S. administration from a defensive position rather than
having to undertake actions that President Trump could portray as aggressive. Putin
aims to leverage these positions to force the U.S. and its partners to form a
pragmatic partnership with Russia at the expense of key U.S. national interests
rather than risk a military confrontation.

The U.S. does
not have to choose between cooperating with Russia at the expense of U.S.
interests and full-scale war, however, nor do Russian military capabilities
outmatch America’s. Putin’s success depends on overselling Russian capabilities
and will to engage militarily with the U.S. even though Russia is neither able
to win nor interested in fighting a full-scale war.

Recent
Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria have revealed significant
capability gaps and overreliance on elite units. Russia’s ongoing economic
crisis will further exacerbate these problems while offering the U.S. and its
allies key leverage points for engagement.
The U.S. maintains significant military and diplomatic signaling
capabilities, as well as conventional military superiority, with which to
confront Russian actions.

Putin has
been most successful in his campaigns when fighting inferior military forces
and when he has been able to use elite units in combination with the element of
surprise. The successful annexation of Crimea was not an example of
overwhelming force, but rather of Russia’s Special Operations Forces securing
decisive positions before Ukrainian or international forces could respond
militarily or politically.[24] Russian
elite units, including Spetsnaz and Airborne Troops (VDV), are effective, but they
are limited in quantity and cannot be counted on to deliver military victory in
all situations.

The ongoing
stalemate between Russian proxy forces and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas
region provides an example of Putin’s more likely modus operandi. Russia’s military escalation against Ukraine
in August 2016 demonstrated that Putin would rather use the threat of force to strengthen
Russia’s position at the negotiating table rather than escalate to a
large-scale war of attrition when swift military victory is unattainable.[25] Forward-deployed
“tripwire” U.S. and allied forces capable of preventing Russian elite units
from attaining rapid decisive victories would remove a critical method from
Putin’s playbook.[26]

The most
recent example of a prolonged campaign, the Russian intervention in Syria, has
demonstrated both the improvements and the limitations of new Russian military
technology, command-and-control, and coordination of airpower operations. Putin
has used the intervention to display enhanced Russian capabilities, such as long
range Kalibr land attack cruise missiles and improved coordination of air and
ground force operations with the Syrian regime.[27] Russian
military forces have primarily relied on old hardware and tactics with limited
success, however, outside of select demonstrations of advanced capabilities.
Russian airstrikes in northern Syria still mainly employ unguided gravity
bombs, rather than precision munitions.[28] The
deployment of the Admiral Kuznetsov
showcased the aircraft carrier’s ongoing technological problems and the
limitations of ongoing efforts to modernize the vessel.[29]The
crash of one of the new carrier-based MiG-29K fighters demonstrated the Russian
Navy’s outstanding issues with sustaining air operations.[30] The
majority of Russia’s conventional forces have not been as thoroughly equipped
or modernized as its forces in Syria. Reductions to planned budget outlays have
already disrupted procurement plans and could further delay the
already-protracted efforts to modernize the Russian military.[31]

Putin’s
establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S.
engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from
impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been
deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense
network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to
cover close engagements.[32]U.S.
forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these
systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first
jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike
from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged.[33]The
deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and
time-consuming. It would require
extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on
operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to
accomplish these tasks, however. Putin
is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to
preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his
policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes.

Russia’s
failing economy will further aggravate ongoing problems with Russia’s military
at large and impair Putin’s ability to present Russian conventional forces as a
credible military threat. Putin began large-scale military reforms after the
2008 Russo-Georgia War. These reforms
have proceeded haltingly, however, for both institutional and financial
reasons.[34] The
Russian Armed Forces continue to face serious personnel deficits and
organizational problems. They are unlikely to complete the long-promised
transition to an all-volunteer professional military any time soon, especially
as reductions to the defense budget continue to hamper their ability to provide
contract soldiers with adequate monetary incentives.[35]

Budget
restrictions also mean that Putin will have to prioritize what portions of the
military are expanded and modernized, if any. Russia has already postponed or
altered plans for new hardware outlined in the 2011-2020 State Armament Program.
Defense spending has been made a priority in the 2017 federal budget, but it is
a larger share of a smaller pie, as spending has been reduced across all
sectors.[36] Putin’s
increased pressure on EU countries and the U.S. to lift sanctions reflects the
effect that sustained economic pressure can have on preventing Russian military
expansion.

Putin’s
reliance on inflammatory nuclear rhetoric in light of these conventional
shortcomings is not surprising, nor is it a new strategy. Modernizing and
displaying its nuclear arsenal provides Russia with a relatively cheap method
by which to heighten its military posture against the U.S. and its allies.
Russian officials have kept statements on potential changes to Russian nuclear
doctrine purposefully vague while conducting high-profile tests of strategic
nuclear forces and deployments of nuclear-capable tactical systems in order to
deter conventional action that would overcome Russia’s inferior forces.[37]The
U.S. maintains its own nuclear capability and has decades of nuclear doctrine
specifically created to deter Russian (Soviet) nuclear attacks. Russia’s
nuclear posturing is undesirable and disappointing, especially in the wake of
START II and other post-Cold War nuclear arms reduction efforts. It is neither novel
nor beyond U.S. capability to address through its own deterrence efforts,
however.

Putin’s
current behavior is in part a litmus test to see how the incoming
administration uses, or does not use, these capabilities when faced with
challenges to America’s standing on the global stage.

Putin is
first and foremost testing U.S. resolve to maintain the NATO alliance. NATO has
stood for decades as a powerful reminder that the U.S. has the military
strength and political will to project power in the face of aggression. The
security guarantee provided by NATO has been instrumental in providing the
stability required to build a Europe that is whole, economically prosperous and
politically free. The U.S. has been able to count on multiple stable allies to
support overseas operations, economic development and international order as a
result. Putin aims to disrupt NATO not only to give himself greater freedom of
action in Europe, but also to disrupt it as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy.

If Putin
manages to destabilize Europe by undermining the credibility of NATO, it will
have serious symbolic and material consequences for the U.S. military. The U.S.
has been able to allocate military resources to other theaters due to the
deterrence value of NATO’s collective security guarantee under Article V. U.S.
forces would have to be deployed to Europe in large numbers to combat a Russian
attack on a NATO ally if the deterrent power of Article V were perceived to be
no longer credible. The U.S. would be confronted with abandoning its allies and
forfeiting its global leadership role, or else redirecting military resources from
addressing threats in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere.

Other world
powers will take note of how the new administration responds to Putin when considering
their own capacity for disrupting U.S. operations and influence. China has
built significant A2/AD zones through island building and the deployment of
anti-air and anti-ship capabilities.[38] Chinese
forces could use these systems to deter a U.S. response if China decided to
threaten U.S. allies in the Pacific. Iran is also investing in A2/AD
capabilities with Russia’s help. Iran is undoubtedly watching Russia’s example
of how these systems can be used to preclude U.S. action in Syria and the
Mediterranean. It is likely that China and Iran will be more aggressive in
challenging the U.S. if the new administration allows Putin to use similar
deployments to force policy concessions. Putin’s provocations must be addressed
in order to ensure that the U.S. maintains its influence and leadership role as
other countries consider challenging it.

Putin is
aware of Russia’s limitations and of U.S. capabilities to respond. He is also
aware that he is coming from a position of relative weakness and must
outmaneuver, rather than outmatch, U.S. forces. The new U.S. administration
must prevent Putin from capitalizing on his strategy and using it as a
blueprint by which Russia and other countries may further undermine U.S.
alliances and operations.If the U.S. utilizes its position of
strength, rather than shrinking from the threat of provocation, it will be able
to deter conflict without ceding further ground or compromising its interests.

Commitment to
the protection of U.S. allies in Europe is the lynchpin of deterring Russia’s
global expansion. Cooperation with NATO allies to preposition troops and train
local forces, among other forms of enhanced military assistance, is imperative
to signal that the U.S. maintains the will and capability to defend its allies
and interests. Taking early but sufficient measures now will reduce the need to
pay a much higher cost in political capital and military force later.

This effort
is not a unilateral American undertaking. The United Kingdom, Germany and
Canada will lead multinational battalions in the Baltic States.[39] Latvia
and Lithuania, two Baltic States that have been criticized for not spending the
requisite 2% of GDP on defense, are taking active measure to ensure that they
are doing their part to support these efforts. Both countries have pledged to
reach this spending threshold by 2018 and are bolstering independent
self-defense measures.[40]
Estonia, which already meets the 2% requirement, also maintains a 25,000-strong
Defense League.[41]
As NATO allies demonstrate their commitment to the alliance, Putin is gauging
his next moves based on how the U.S. reacts. The U.S. gains nothing by
retreating from this commitment, and would lose its credibility as a global
leader capable of defending its interests and allies.

The U.S. and
its allies have an opportunity to deter Putin from further expansion in the
Middle East and Asia through creative and unified signaling. There is a wide
range of tools in this box. NATO has recently shifted operations to focus on
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.[42]Turkey
has again called on the U.S. to impose a no-fly zone over Northern Syria.[43]U.S.
forces continue military exercises with Japan, a key ally.[44] Flexing
U.S. military strength reminds Putin of U.S. capabilities and will while
increasing readiness in the case of an outbreak of conflict.

The U.S. also
has non-military options at its disposal. Economic sanctions against Russia
provide a real incentive for Putin to restrain military action in order to
secure his position and help the Russian economy recover. The existing
sanctions and additional restrictions will help reinforce the U.S. commitment
to maintaining its global position rather than allowing Russia to act with impunity.
These sanctions can be paired with greater economic incentives to encourage
Russian compliance with American demands. Premature easing of sanctions without
a change in Russian behavior would signal lack of U.S. resolve and remove economic
pressure as a credible tool of foreign policy. Removing the sanctions without
gaining real concessions on important issues such as Ukraine and Syria would only
reinforce Putin’s propensity to take what he wants without regard for America’s
power or interests.

The
U.S. must respond to Russia’s behavior globally. Putin views the areas along
Russia’s periphery as a single theaterof
operations.[45] These regions, in
addition to Russia’s domestic economic sphere, must be treated as a series of
interconnected points of leverage that affect Putin’s ability to undermine U.S.
national security interests. The U.S.
must maintain and enhance military and political support for its allies in
order to protect its interests in areas of strategic importance and preserve
its freedom to operate to ensure its national security. This task will be
critical for America’s global leadership role in the years to come.

[31] Analysts have noted that
the Russian government has so far shielded the defense sector from the most
austere cuts to the national budget. Reductions in defense spending have
primarily been limited to planned procurements. The Russian lower house of
parliament approved a budget for 2017-2019 on November 18th. The
Russian government has again made defense spending a priority while cutting
welfare spending. The approved budget will draw heavily on the National Wealth
Fund and deplete the Reserve Fund by the end of 2017, however. The available
resource pool will shrink as Russia’s economic situation continues to
deteriorate. Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, Lisa Sawyer Samp, Jeffrey
Rathke, Anthony Bell and John O’Grady, “Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force
Posture in Europe: Phase II Report,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, June 29, 2016. Available: https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-future-us-army-force-posture-europe-phase-ii-report;
“Russia approves 3-yr federal budget in first reading,” RT, November 18, 2016.
Available: https://www.rt.com/business/367394-russia-budget-state-duma/
; Thomas Nilsen, “Russia empties reserve fund, makes priority to defense
sector,” Barents Observer, November 21, 2106. Available: http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/11/russia-empties-reserve-fund-makes-priority-defense-sector

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a law on November 26 that solidifies the Popular Mobilization, the majority of which are Shi’a militias with a history of sectarian violence, as a permanent security institution in Iraq. The Popular Mobilization Act, passed primarily through the efforts of Shi’a and Kurdish parties, grants qualified Popular Mobilization Units the same rights and financial benefits as members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Sunni political leaders and parties, however, rejected the law as a serious blow against national reconciliation efforts and called for its reversal. The law’s current language does not address the structure of this new security institution or clarify which Popular Mobilization units, which includes several Sunni units, would be inducted into it. As it stands, the CoR will need to pass successive laws or amendments regarding the Popular Mobilization’s structure, raising a concern that the Shi’a parties’ dominance in the CoR will sway the structure to favor Shi’a militias. The law could benefit Sunnis if it legitimizes the use of local Sunni militias and tribal forces as security forces in majority Sunni provinces, thereby acting as an alternative to the National Guard Law, a key piece of legislation which Sunnis sought as reconciliation efforts but Shi’a parties blocked. National Alliance chairman Ammar al-Hakim and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr both called for the form of the Popular Mobilization to be non-partisan and inclusive, but sectarian Iranian proxy militias, who already dominate both the PMUs’ leadership and the CoR, are positioned to benefit from the law the most. A legitimized Popular Mobilization will result in a sectarian security force funded by the Iraqi government but responsive to Iranian advisers, which will further alienate Sunnis from the Iraqi Government.

Iraq could face another Sunni insurgency after ISIS
loses control of Mosul. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve has not
resolved the political conditions that originally caused Sunni Arabs to
mobilize in a non-violent protest movement in 2012-2013. Sunni
Arabs in Iraq who are liberated from ISIS’s control will not necessarily be
reconciled to the Iraqi Government. The success of anti-ISIS operations
in 2016 will open space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups
to resurge in ISIS’s absence. Sunni Arabs are displaced in large numbers, which
will grow as the Coalition seizes and secures Mosul. Iranian-backed Shi’a
militias will exacerbate grievances as they move to clear Sunni-majority
villages in northern Iraq and near Tel
Afar, a
historic stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq west of Mosul.
Shi’a militias have alienated local Sunni Arab populations in other cities
cleared of ISIS by conducting extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, and
other forms of violence against the local population. A permissive environment
is emerging for a Sunni insurgency in the vacuum of control left by ISIS, into
which other actors, including al Qaeda, could emerge in 2017.

Sunni Insurgent Groups and ISIS Before
Mosul Fell

Iraq stood on the brink of a Sunni
insurgency in late 2013 before ISIS began to seize terrain because former Iraqi
PM Nouri al-Maliki reversed the gains of the previous U.S.-led Coalition to reconcile and
reintegrate Sunni Arabs into Iraqi politics in 2008. Maliki launched a highly
sectarian policy to marginalize Sunni politicians and consolidate
control over the Iraqi military the day U.S. forces withdrew. His political
actions ignited a year-long Sunni anti-government protest movement that erupted in January 2013 after the near arrest of Rafi al-Issawi, the moderate Sunni Finance
Minister, in December 2012.

Sunni infighting crippled the Sunni political base in
2013, making it unable to channel or mitigate growing Sunni discontent away
from an insurgency. Maliki’s maneuverings compounded these internal fractures, leading to the erosion of
the Sunni political alliance, Iraqiyya, throughout 2012. Iraqiyya further split
over how to handle Maliki’s administration: Issawi led a boycott of Maliki’s cabinet
in January 2013 in solidarity with protests but several Sunni leaders broke rank and returned in March in
favor of negotiation. The Sunni political alliance was effectively dead before
the June 2013 provincial elections in Ninewa and Anbar Provinces, leaving the
protest without an effective channel to a political resolution.

Clashes between the government and
protesters kindled the growing insurgency and ultimately created the opening for
ISIS’s capture of Fallujah in January 2014. Violent government escalations
against the protest movement, such as the April 2013 massacre at the Hawija sit-in protest camp, galvanized the
movement. The mass arrest of Sunni males in Baghdad after ISIS attacked
the Abu Ghraib and Taji Base prisons in July 2013
heightened grievances.

Multiple anti-government
organizations competed to champion the Sunni cause, harness their discontent,
and facilitate a full insurgency. Chief among these competitors was ISIS,
rebranded from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni Arabs had rejected ISIS’s
predecessor, AQI, and joined the Iraqi Government to defeat it in the Sahwa, or
Awakening, movement from 2006 to 2008. ISIS resurged in parallel with the anti-government
protest movement and conducted a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) wave campaign in
2012-2013 targeting Shi’a civilians to spark a sectarian civil war that would
break the Iraqi state.

ISIS’s black flags were present within the protest
camps in Ramadi starting in October 2013. AQI’s resurgence and its presence in
previously off-limits camps demonstrates that Iraq’s Sunni Arab population
became willing to tolerate ISIS’s presence in their midst despite the earlier expulsion
of AQI, indicating the virulence of their anti-government sentiment. ISIS’s
presence in the camps suggests that ISIS cooperated on some level with other
anti-government insurgent organizations that had been present in the protest
camps.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia
(JRTN), a neo-Baathist insurgent group, harnessed the 2013 protest movement directly
in order to stoke its own insurgency. JRTN infused the anti-government protest movement
with revolutionary rhetoric and traditional Baathist branding. ISIS likely relied
on its support to infiltrate the protest camps. Other legacy revolutionary
groups, such as the 1920 Brigades, another neo-Ba’athist group, and Ansar
al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni insurgent group, re-emerged as well prior to December
2013. Saddam-era Iraqi Army officers made
up the core of JRTN and the 1920 Brigade’s manpower and lent military know-how and
leadership to the groups. This experience with military organization and
knowledge of the terrain made each neo-Baathist group a formidable rival to ISIS.

Maliki’s order for the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to clear the sit-in protest camp in December spurred the
development of an organized Sunni rebellion. The large scale clashes on December 30-31, 2013 between
protesters and the ISF in Ramadi signaled the start of an insurgency. The General Military Council of Iraqi
Revolutionaries (GMCIR) formed in January 2014 as an umbrella to
absorb recently-formed local military councils in majority Sunni areas
including Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Diyala.
The GMCIR formed as ISIS seized control of Fallujah on January 3, but it reflected the
degree of preparation by JRTN over the preceding year to cultivate a Sunni
insurgency. Another umbrella organization, the Council of Revolutionaries of
the Tribes of Anbar (CRTA), also formed in January 2014 in response to the clearing
of the Ramadi protest camp.

JRTN supported ISIS’s rise because
ISIS could further the anti-government cause. JRTN and GMCIR leader Izzat al-Douri,
a top Saddam-era deputy, acknowledged on July 17, 2014, following ISIS’s
first northern offensive, that ISIS “helped the revolutionaries achieve their
goals and were semi-[parallel] with them in facing the Iranian Safavid project
in Iraq.” These leaders, nonetheless, remained wary of ISIS’s adherence to
their brand of an anti-government but pan-Iraqi insurgency: CRTA leader, Sheikh
Ali Hatem, warned jihadists from taking advantage of the revolution in his formation statement on
January 3, 2014.

The cooperation between ISIS and JRTN
over the insurgency came to end likely by the fall of 2014 at which point ISIS
began to brutally marginalize and suppress JRTN. JRTN ceased to support ISIS’s means
of carrying out the insurgent: JRTN criticized ISIS openly in August 2014 after
ISIS targeted Yazidis in Sinjar while the GMCIR, in which JRTN played a dominant role, criticized ISIS for taking the
“revolution to a different path” and continuing north, rather than overthrowing the government in Baghdad. In turn, ISIS began to
consider JRTN a competitor, especially as JRTN frequently tried
to impose its own governance in overlapping territory. In response, ISIS began
to systematically assassinate retired Iraqi Army officers, JRTN’s
primarily recruitment pool, in Mosul in September 2014, a sign that it had
begun to eliminate organized military resistance as a solution to the dispute. ISIS's
military dominance forced JRTN to go to ground.

Increasing Sunni Unrest in Late
2016

Contemporary U.S.-led Coalition
operations to degrade and disrupt ISIS in 2016 may unlock the Sunni insurgency
that began as the GMCIR, CRTA, and other smaller groups. This outcome will
transpire if conditions are not set to help Sunni Arabs in Iraq to address
their original and mounting grievances. The Coalition has attempted to pursue Sunni
reconciliation politically in Baghdad, including through a National Guard Law aimed to provide Sunni communities with a local security
structure. These lines of effort largely failed because of efforts by Iranian
proxies and pro-Iranian political groups.

The U.S. and Iraqi Governments are
unlikely to be able to address the grievances in 2016, as the Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi government faces continued pressure from sectarian political and militia
leaders to maintain the Shi’a-dominated status quo. These leaders could further
Sunni distrust in the government. The Iraqi parliament passed the controversial
Popular Mobilization Act on November
26, which institutionalizes the Popular Mobilization Units, the bulk of which
are Shi’a militias, as part of the ISF. Sunni political leaders boycotted the
vote, warning that the law hurt
national reconciliation efforts. The law, the language of which remains
open-ended, could support local Sunni security forces by ensuring that they are
equally integrated into the new structure. However, Shi’a parties already
rebuffed conditions by Sunni parties to
increase the number of Sunni units, suggesting that Shi’a militias, including
those charged with sectarian violence, will dominate the future structure of
the Popular Mobilization. Meanwhile, former PM Maliki is carving a path to
return to the premiership, which would further alienate Sunni
Arabs in Iraq from the central government. His intermediate efforts have
already resulted in changes that are marginalizing Sunnis, including his facilitation of the dismissal of Sunni Defense
Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. This dismissal highlighted the division
among Sunni parties in the government, undermining potential Sunni political
unity.

Sunni political infighting has also emerged
on the provincial level ahead of provincial elections. These elections are
scheduled for April 2017, but the financial crisis could result in its merger with the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Anbar
Provincial Government has made repeated attempts to oust its governor over allegations of corruption and
mishandling the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Anbar
Provincial Court also issued on October 16 an arrest
warrant for
Ahmed Abu Risha, who in 2007 succeeded his brother, who was assassinated by
AQI, as the leader of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar that
helped the U.S. defeat AQI. The legacy Sahwa elements subsequently resisted
ISIS’s first attempt to retake Ramadi in January 2014. A similar dynamic is
re-emerging in Salah al-Din Province: the Sunni Jubur tribe dominates local
politics, but the tribe is divided on policy, including its relations with Shi’a militias, which constitute
a large portion of the security force in Salah al-Din, and the return of IDPs. The
divide has resulted in the governorship swapping between the rival branches of
the Jubur tribe. This continuous jostling over governance and security arrangements
can lend to instability in the province. This divide also appears in federal
politics; recently, one Jubur parliamentary member called for the dismissal of Salim al-Juburi, the
parliamentary speaker. In Ninewa Province, Sunni Arabs are displaced during anti-ISIS operations, then prevented
from returning to villages that Kurdish forces have secured. Sunni Arabs could
also be shut out of the post-ISIS administration of Ninewa Province if Shi’a
and Kurdish parties dominate security. The failure to create secure, stable and
effective local governance could drive Sunni populations to seek alternative ways
to protect themselves and redress their grievances, opening avenues for
insurgent groups to infiltrate.

Sunnis also remain at odds with each
other and these intra-Sunni confrontations are already creating opportunities
for Sunni insurgents. Unidentified tribal leaders in Ramadi have reportedly
allowed the return of known ISIS militants into
the city, only months after its recapture by the ISF in January 2016. Suicide
attacks in Fallujah in November 2016 suggest that ISIS has already reconsolidated its networks in the city, which was
cleared in June, or found residents that remain tolerant to its ideology.
Meanwhile, Sunni tribes have carried out violent reprisals on other Sunni civilians who
lived in recaptured ISIS-held towns, accusing those civilians off collaborating
with ISIS. These divides within Sunni communities will prevent local, national,
and political Sunni unity, and will require the same scale of neighborhood-by-neighborhood
Sunni reconciliation efforts that U.S.
forces carried out in 2007.

JRTN and AQI After ISIS in 2017

JRTN’s rhetorical resurgence has
already begun. JRTN is seeking to demonstrate that it is the best champion for
Sunnis in Iraq over the alternatives of ISIS and the Iraqi Government. JRTN is setting
conditions to take immediate advantage of ISIS’s loss in Mosul in order to
reclaim the city and its networks. The group issued a statement on October 17, the day
Coalition forces launched operations against ISIS in Mosul, claiming to have attacked ISIS in Mosul and calling
for additional resistance against ISIS. ISIS has been systematically imprisoning
or killing civilians and retired Iraqi Army officers who refuse to act as human
shields, an indication both that resistance
to ISIS is mounting and that ISIS is attempting to decapitate it. Meanwhile,
JRTN has continued to criticize ISIS’s methods, including issuing
a statement against an ISIS attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Saudi Arabia in
early July, in order to show itself as kinder, more reasonable champion for
Iraqi Sunnis.

JRTN and its allies are tapping into Sunni
disillusionment with the Shi’a-dominated government in order to demonstrate
that they are the best alternative for Sunnis. JRTN’s statements on October 15
and 17 rejected any Shi’a militia presence
in the city and criticized Iranian presence in Iraq, indicating that JRTN is
positioning itself to inherit ISIS’s mantle of Sunni resistance against the government.
The GMCIR, on behalf of all armed groups including JRTN, issued a similar
statement on October 16 criticizing the Iranian occupation
of Ninewa as a way to carry out a “demographic change in Iraq and the region.”
The 1920s Brigade warned on November 3 against the presence of Shi’a militias in Mosul
during anti-ISIS operations. These statements underscore that JRTN and other
insurgent groups are playing on concerns that the Iraqi Government will not be able to
protect Sunnis from the Shi’a militias or ISIS.

JRTN’s resurgence will have other
indicators. JRTN’s signature attack is a targeted assassination
from a moving vehicle. Recentreports of drive-by
shootings targeting ISIS militants in Mosul likely indicate that
JRTN is already on the rebound. Sunni insurgents, particularly JRTN, also have
run extensive IED campaigns in the past. Indicators of JRTN resurgence will therefore likely include
assassinations of Iraqi security officials, particularly Popular Mobilization
elements in charge of securing refugee camps and recaptured areas; IEDs along
major roads targeting ISF access to key terrain in northern and western Iraq;
and recruitment within the ISF. JRTN will likely recruit more successfully than
ISIS among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in 2016-2017 because ISIS re-invigorated the
blood feud and also lost its control over Sunni Arab populations. ISIS will
attempt to limit JRTN’s opportunities to resurge by eliminating current JRTN
members and possible recruitment pools from among civilians and former ISF
officials. ISIS has already executed hundreds of former police
and army officers before withdrawing from cities south of Mosul. These efforts
will likely lead to increased violence inside Sunni majority areas and places
where Sunni IDPs are aggregating, including Kirkuk and Tikrit.

Al Qaeda in Syria is also positioning
to unify disparate Sunni Arab factions in Iraq and gain popular support in the
wake of ISIS. AQ seeks to perform the role of the silent vanguard of Sunni
insurgencies, and it will enter Iraq with a low signature to evade the
Coalition. AQ may even partner with JRTN the way ISIS did before and just after
ISIS broke from al Qaeda to build a network of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq
to which AQ can preach. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Sunnis globally
to resist the “Safavid-Crusader” occupation of Iraq in a speech released on August 25, 2016,
in which he called for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” in the face
of territorial losses and urged AQ in Syria to support this rebuilding process
in Iraq, indicating al Qaeda’s intent to reinvigorate and reconstitute a Sunni
insurgency against Baghdad. Zawahiri’s call for cross-border relations also
suggests that AQ will renew efforts to maintain a unified, single organization
across Iraq and Syria, as it tried to do before it split from ISIS in 2014.

AQ will likely seek to build its networks on top of
pre-existing cells along the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar Province and in
Ninewa Province, including in Mosul. AQ will attempt to coopt remnant elements
of ISIS that escaped among the flows of IDPs. Attacks in IDP camps,
especially in the Euphrates River Valley and Diyala Province, could signal that
AQ or JRTN has infiltrated the camps and is seeking recruits. AQ will conduct outreach among ungoverned Sunni
Arab populations, by providing religious classes, infrastructure, and utilities
if possible. AQ will portray itself as a local Sunni resistance rather than use
the AQ brand, which is a liability that AQ leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has already
demonstrated he is willing to avoid. AQ’s resurgence in Iraq will therefore be
difficult to track and distinguish from active and vocal Sunni mobilization.
The establishment of new organized groups of Sunni resistance fighters is a
likely indicator that an AQ resurgence is underway. AQ will target IDP
camps as well as civilians in ungoverned portions of major cities. The
Euphrates River Valley could be AQ’s main line of effort because AQ likely has latent networks there that connect to AQ
leadership in Syria.[1]

Conclusion

Preventing another Sunni insurgency, particularly one
that can be coopted by JRTN and AQ, is a necessary task for the anti-ISIS
Coalition. Both JRTN and AQ seek an outcome in Iraq that is antithetical to US
interests. Anti-ISIS operations that do not explicitly block AQ and JRTN will
instead enable them. The Coalition can prevent another Sunni insurgency if it
takes preventative measures that are both military and political. These
measures need to include three lines of effort within its current mission: the
ISF, IDPs, and Iraqi Government. The Coalition must prepare the ISF in
counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, against both the post-Mosul version of ISIS,
and resurgent insurgent groups such as JRTN and AQ. Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of Combined Joint
Force-Land Component, stated on October 24 that the ISF will start a new
training cycle on COIN to combat an insurgent-like ISIS. These efforts will
also need to inure the ISF and tribal militias against AQ and JRTN’s influence.
The Coalition will also need to ensure that the IDP camps around Mosul are
secured with proper security forces and not with Shi’a militias or compromised
ISF units, which could inflame sectarian tensions and lend weight to insurgent
ideology. Lastly, the Coalition cannot ensure the defeat of ISIS or any
insurgent group without resolving the political conditions that allow it to
take root. The Coalition must reinvigorate national reconciliation efforts that
have fallen to the wayside. ISIS found initial support from Iraq’s Sunnis
because it offered an alternative to the government which many
Sunnis saw as oppressive. JRTN and AQ will try to do the same. The Coalition
needs to ensure that its lines of effort reconcile Sunnis with the government
to the point that Sunnis will use political rather than insurgent means to
address grievances.

The U.S. will need to decide if and how it remains
involved in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which will likely occur after
President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January 2017. The Iraqi Government
may set conditions for the U.S.’s withdrawal
in Iraq after Mosul, but the U.S. and Coalition should not pursue an immediate
drawdown of military forces themselves. Doing so could result in similar
conditions that developed in 2012 and 2013 after the U.S. withdrew completely
in 2011. Instead, the U.S. should continue efforts to train and advise the ISF
in order to help prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups and maintain
Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its international partners should also ensure involvement
in resettling IDPs and mediating the reconstruction of cities and their local
governing structures. Successful resettlement and reconstruction efforts that
earn the population’s trust in the Iraqi Government can prevent Salafi Jihadi
groups from finding openings to resurge. The U.S. should also help address the
underlying issues that fueled the Sunni insurgency and remain active in shaping
Iraqi’s political reconciliation efforts and encouraging inclusive governance. The
U.S. should have the expectation that it will remain involved in some capacity
in Iraq in order to ensure that anti-ISIS gains stick and that it has resolved
the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to arise in 2013.

[1] Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s
affiliate in Syria, was active along the Euphrates River Valley southeast of
Raqqa City before ISIS seized the area in late 2014. Al Qaeda likely retains
latent influence with tribes along the Euphrates River Valley that it can use
to resurge if ISIS is defeated. These tribes straddle the Iraqi-Syrian border,
which can provide al Qaeda with cross-border access to networks in western
Iraq.