"On October 21, 2010, the Agency [State of Texas] received a 'Notice of reciprocity' from Berthold Technologies. The notice stated that a Berthold Technologies service representative would be replacing the shutters on two gauges at the licensee's (International Paper Company) facility on October 22, 2010. The Agency contacted the licensee and asked to speak with the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The Agency was forwarded to the RSO's voicemail box and left a message. The Agency then contacted one of the licensee's employees whose information was obtained from the 'Notice of Reciprocity.' The employee then reported that the licensee had experienced a shutter failure.

"The licensee stated that on Monday, October 18, 2010, another licensee properly authorized by the Agency [State of Texas] to remove the gauges came to the licensee's facility to remove the gauge from the pipe it was fixed to. The gauge was manufactured by Berthold Technologies (Model: LB7440; Serial Number: 1335) and it houses a 30 milliCurie Cesium (Cs) 137 source (Serial Number: 1335- 5-89). The gauge was removed so that the licensee could perform maintenance on the pipe. The licensee stated that the shutter was hard to turn at that time, but the shutter properly closed prior to the authorized person removing the gauge. On Wednesday, October 20, 2010, the authorized person returned to reattach the gauge and attempted to open the shutter, and the shutter would not open. The licensee then stated that they contacted Berthold Technologies to repair the shutter that failed, as well as another shutter on different gauge that was difficult to operate. The shutters are scheduled to be repaired on Friday, October 22, 2010. The RSO was later contacted and he agreed to submit a written report to the Agency within thirty days."

A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

"This report is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as a condition resulting in a serious degradation of the Containment liner. During a visual inspection on 10/22/10, corrosion was found in the containment sump liner on Unit 3, A more detailed inspection was performed on 10/24/10 after the corroded area was cleaned. Evaluation of the inspection results has determined that the corrosion is greater than allowed by the ASME Code, including through wall areas, and requires repair. At this time, it is not known whether any leakage caused by the through-wall condition would have resulted in exceeding the containment allowed leakage limit. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 5 preparing to return to service following refueling. The corroded areas will be repaired prior to entering Mode 4."