How the truth can make a great lie: An empirical investigation of the folk concept of lying by falsely implicating

Alex Wiegmann, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany

Pascale Willemsen, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

Abstract

Is it possible to lie despite not saying something false? While
the spontaneous answer seems to be ‘no’, there is some evidence from
ordinary language that a lie does not require what is said to be false. In this
paper, we will argue for a pragmatic extension of the standard definition of
lying. More specifically, we will present three experiments which show that
people’s concept of lying is not about the falsity of what is said, but
about what is implied by saying it that way. We test the four Gricean
conversational maxims. For each one of them we demonstrate that if a speaker
implies something misleading, even by saying something semantically true, it is
still considered lying.