The CALEA statute gives the FCC authority to promulgate implementing
regulations. The FCC has a proceeding for this purpose, numbered CC Docket No.
97-213. The FCC has promulgated CALEA rules. However, the DOJ and FBI are
seeking these rules, not through a CALEA rule making, but as part of the FCC's
proceedings regarding the regulatory classification of broadband services.

The regulatory classification of broadband internet services is
important for many reasons. Different regulatory regimes applied to
different regulatory categories. For example, services that fall within the
regulatory classification of "information services" are largely unregulated. In
contrast, services that fall within the regulatory category of
"telecommunications services" are heavily regulated. They are subject to universal service
contributions, consumer privacy rules, interconnection requirements, unbundling
requirements, resale obligations, and other mandates. Certain telecommunications
services, but not information services, are also subject to the CALEA.

The FCC has already stated that "we conclude that cable modem service, as it
is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information
service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of
telecommunications service". It has also stated that "we tentatively conclude
that when an entity provides wireline broadband Internet access service over its
own transmission facilities, this service, too, is an information service under
the Act. In addition, we tentatively conclude that the transmission component of
retail wireline broadband Internet access service provided over an entity’s own
facilities is ``telecommunications´´ and not a ``telecommunications service.´´".
However, the FCC has several open NPRMs pertaining to these regulatory
classification issues.

Companies that provide DSL service over wireline facilities seek
classification as an information service, or as they put it, "regulatory parity"
with cable modem service providers. See,
TLJ story titled
"House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Classification of Broadband Services",
July 21, 2003

CALEA. The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. Congress passed the CALEA in
1994 for the purpose of allowing law enforcement authorities to maintain their
existing wiretap capabilities in new telecommunications devices. It enumerated
that wireline, cellular, and broadband Personal Communications Services carriers
must make their equipment capable of certain surveillance functions.

Section 103 (47 U.S.C. § 1002) provides, in part, that "a telecommunications carrier shall
ensure that its equipment, facilities,
or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to
originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of expeditiously
isolating and enabling the government ... intercept, to the exclusion of any
other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the
carrier within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of
a subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from
the subscriber's equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may
be acceptable to the government".

The Act also requires telecommunications carriers to ensure that its
facilities are capable of enabling the government "to access call-identifying
information".

However, the CALEA also provides that its provisions do not apply to "information
services". Subsection 103(b) provides that "The requirements of subsection (a) of this
section do not apply to -- (A) information services ..."

Subsection 102(6) (47 U.S.C. § 1001) provides that "The term ``information services'' --
(A) means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications; and
(B) includes -- (i) a service that permits a customer to retrieve stored
information from, or file information for storage in, information storage
facilities; (ii) electronic publishing; and (iii) electronic messaging services; but
(C) does not include any capability for a telecommunications carrier's
internal management, control, or operation of its telecommunications network."

Subsection 102(8) provides that "The term ``telecommunications carrier'' ...
(C) does not include -- (i) persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in
providing information services".

The CALEA also provides, in subsection 102(8)(B)(ii) that "telecommunications
carrier" includes "a person or entity engaged in providing wire or electronic
communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the
Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of
the local telephone exchange service and that it is in the public interest to
deem such a person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier for purposes of
this chapter". The DOJ and FBI's July 11 notice of ex parte communication reveals that
the DOJ and FBI rely heavily upon this subsection in their arguments, and
largely ignore the provisions that reference "information services".

FBI Request. Representatives of the FBI and DOJ held a
series of private meeting with FCC officials to make requests regarding the
applications of the CALEA to broadband internet services. That is, they did not
make their meeting at a public hearing or event, nor did they submit their
requests as written comments in these proceedings. However, the FCC, which
allows certain ex parte communications, also has ex parte rules that require
disclosure of the nature of those communications. The FBI submitted several
letters, and copy of a document titled "DOJ and FBI Ex Parte Presentation in the
FCC's Broadband Internet Access Proceedings". It appears to be an outline of an
oral presentation, rather than a complete expression of the FBI's position.

The DOJ and FBI argue that "the Commission has not yet ruled that CALEA covers
broadband telephony
(otherwise known as ``IP telephony,´´ ``Internet telephony,´´ or VoIP´´), there is no
safe-harbor CALEA solution for broadband telephony, and broadband telephony
involves packet-mode communications, which are more difficult to intercept than
circuit-mode communications."

They further state that "The need for CALEA-standardized broadband intercept capabilities is
especially urgent in light of today’s heightened threats to homeland security
and the ongoing tendency of criminals to use the most clandestine modes of
communication."

The DOJ and FBI conclude that "The Commission should rule that CALEA applies
to any transmission used by
wireline or cable modem Internet access providers for services such as broadband
telephony".

Moreover, "The Commission should specifically rule that for purposes of CALEA, wireline
and cable modem Internet access providers are ``telecommunications carriers´´ but
have no CALEA obligations insofar as they are engaged in providing information
services".

The DOJ and FBI document does not address how government interception would
obtain only packets that contain "voice", as opposed to other packets.

Classifying broadband internet access services as "telecommunications" would
have broad consequences for service providers, and consumers. However, the DOJ
and FBI appear to argue for an FCC determination that broadband can be
classified as "telecommunications" for the purpose of CALEA, but as
"information" for the purposes of interconnection, unbundling, resale, and other
things. Their notice of ex parte communications includes the statement that
"Broadband services would still be subject to minimal regulation
because CALEA coverage would not force the Commission to impose any other
regulatory mandates."

FCC's Broadband Classification Proceedings. The DOJ and
FBI have approached the FCC to rule within the context, not of its CALEA
proceeding, but rather, two of its broadband classification proceedings.

This NPRM addresses the legal classification and the appropriate regulatory
framework for broadband access to the Internet over cable system facilities. It
states that "we conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered,
is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable
service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service.
In addition, we initiate a rulemaking proceeding to determine the scope of the
Commission's jurisdiction to regulate cable modem service and whether (and, if
so, how) cable modem service should be regulated under the law ..."
(Parentheses in original.)

Second, there is the FCC's Wireline Broadband NRPM. This is Docket 02-33,
95-20 and 98-10. The FCC adopted this
NPRM
[58 pages in PDF] at its February 14, 2002 meeting. See also, the FCC's
notice in the Federal Register. This NPRM pertains to the appropriate
regulatory framework for broadband access to the Internet over wireline
facilities.

This NPRM states that "we examine the appropriate classification for wireline
broadband Internet access service. As discussed more fully below, we tentatively
conclude that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the provision of
wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service. In
addition, we tentatively conclude that when an entity provides wireline
broadband Internet access service over its own transmission facilities, this
service, too, is an information service under the Act. In addition, we
tentatively conclude that the transmission component of retail wireline
broadband Internet access service provided over an entity’s own facilities is
``telecommunications´´ and not a ``telecommunications service.´´ We seek comment
on these tentative conclusions and ask additional questions with regard to the
proper classification of wireline broadband Internet access service."

Nevertheless, the FCC did mention the CALEA in one paragraph of this 58 page
NPRM. The NPRM states, at paragraph 55, on page 26, that "We ask commenters
to discuss how our tentative conclusion that
wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service will
affect the scope of the CALEA assistance capabilities that telecommunications carriers must
offer to law enforcement authorities. Commenters should address what effect, if any, the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 may have on an entity that provides information services. While section
222 of the USA PATRIOT Act states that "nothing in this Act shall impose any
additional technical obligation or requirement on a provider of wire or electronic communication
service or other person to furnish facilities or technical assistance," commenters
may wish to discuss how the expansion of surveillance authority to electronic communications under
various provision of the USA PATRIOT Act might affect providers of wireline broadband
Internet access service if these services were classified as information services. More
generally, we ask for comment on how designating wireline broadband Internet access service as an
information service may affect other national security or emergency preparedness obligations
applicable to service providers and their networks." (Footnotes omitted.)

Section 222 of the PATRIOT Act, which is
referenced in the FCC's NPRM, was originally offered as an amendment to the bill
during the House Judiciary Committee's
markup on the night of October 3, 2001. The legislative history is
noteworthy. It was offered by
Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA) and
cosponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte
(R-VA) and Rep. Chris Cannon (R-UT),
three of the leading technophiles in the House. Rep. Boucher and Rep. Goodlatte
are co-chairs of the Internet Caucus. Rep. Goodlatte and Rep. Boucher both
explained their reasons for offering this amendment, during the markup, and
outside the hearing room. They were concerned about the history of the
implementation of the CALEA. They explained that the Congress passed this Act in
1994 to enable law enforcement authorities to maintain their existing wiretap
capabilities in new telecommunications devices. The Congress had cell phones in
mind, and expressly excluded the internet. The Act provides that wireline,
cellular, and broadband PCS carriers must make their equipment capable of
certain surveillance functions. However, the FBI has since sought an
implementation of CALEA that expands surveillance capabilities beyond those
provided in the statute. Moreover, the FCC, which adopted implementing rules,
has largely backed the FBI. This has imposed considerable burdens and costs upon
service providers, and their customers. This amendment was adopted by unanimous
voice vote. Later that night, the Committee approved the bill by a vote of 36-0.
See, story titled "No Technology Mandates", and other stories about the markup
of the PATRIOT Act, in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 279, October 4, 2001.

The FBI submitted a
comment [16 pages in PDF] in the cable broadband proceeding, No. 02-52, on
June 17, 2002, in which it argued that the FCC should require in its rules that
the CALEA applies to "cable modem service".

The FBI submitted a
comment [15 pages in PDF] in the wireline broadband proceeding, Nos. 02-33,
95-20, and 98-10, on April 15, 2002, in which it argued that the FCC should
require in its rules that the CALEA applies to "DSL and other forms of wireline
broadband Internet access".

More About the Ex Parte Communications. The key document that is a
part of the FCC record is the DOJ and FBI's document titled "DOJ and FBI Ex Parte
Presentation in the FCC's Broadband Internet Access Proceedings", which is
attached to its July 11 notice of ex parte communication.

In addition, the DOJ and FBI submitted a July 15
ex parte communication [PDF] that states that "The Department of Justice (the
``DOJ´´) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the ``FBI´´) hereby submit an
addendum to their July 11, 2003 Notice of Ex Parte Presentation in the
above-referenced proceedings to add the names of the individuals who represented
the above parties at the ex parte presentation.

"Michael Stawasz and Scott McIntosh represented the DOJ. Martin
J. King, Ken Coon, Joel M. Margolis, and the undersigned counsel appeared on
behalf of the FBI."

Also, on July 23, the DOJ and FBI submitted another
notice of ex parte communication [PDF] that states describes another ex
parte meeting on July 22. It provides this description: "The law enforcement
representatives at
the meeting were John Pignataro, Deputy Superintendent of the Maryland State
Police, Joel M. Margolis, a contract attorney for the FBI's Electronic
Surveillance Technology Section (``ESTS´´), Dawn Dohrmann, another ESTS
contractor, and the undersigned ESTS Unit Chief. The Commission official in
attendance was Daniel Gonzalez, Senior Legal Advisor to Commissioner Kevin J.
Martin. The FBI stated that Internet access providers should be deemed
telecommunications carriers for purposes of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act. In support, the FBI summarized the arguments already placed
on the record in its July 11, 2003 Notice of Ex Parte Presentation in the
instant proceedings."

Commentary on Process and Transparency. The DOJ and FBI seek a
change to the CALEA and surveillance regime that is arguably legislative in nature.
That is, it rests heavily on the policy argument that law enforcement
authorities will need to be able to monitor voice over IP to be able to catch
terrorists and other criminals. This may be a meritorious policy argument. And,
while the DOJ and FBI argue that the CALEA statute requires that VOIP be
covered, the statute's language defining and exempting information services,
combined with the FCC's longstanding treatment of information services, make
such a conclusion problematic.

Crafting broad rules based upon a weighing of policy concerns is essentially
the legislative function, while drafting detailed rules to implement these
legislative mandates is essentially an administrative function. The DOJ and FBI
are asking to the FCC to perform the former, rather than the latter, function.
However, the present request is not a communication to the Congress requesting a
legislative remedy. The legislative process would entail public hearings,
debates, and the input that that would involve. Rather, the DOJ and FBI request an
administrative agency to, in effect, legislate through the rule making process.

Second, this administrative agency, the FCC, has a proceeding pertaining to
implementing the CALEA statute. It is CC Docket No. 97-213. And, the DOJ and FBI
now seek a rule that construes the CALEA. Yet, the present request
is not a petition for a rule making in that proceeding. Such a rule making would
be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which would require public
notice, opportunity to submit comments, and an opportunity to review and rebut
the comments of others.

Third, the present request has been made in an ex parte manner. That is,
representatives of the DOJ and FBI have held closed meetings with FCC
representatives. In ex parte communications, there is no notice, no public
access, no web cast, and no transcript of the proceedings.

In sum, the DOJ and FBI are pursuing a major change in the law governing the
interception of internet communications in a non-transparent manner that evades
the procedures and processes normally relied upon to
provide the public and affected companies with an opportunity to know about, and
participate in, the law making process, and in a manner that deprives the rule
makers of the benefit of the further information and arguments that would
be advanced in a more transparent process.

Rep. Eshoo
(at right) stated in a release that "In an emergency, when every second counts, most
Americans assume they can pick up their cell phone, dial 911, and get immediate
help from emergency responders ... But frighteningly, this isn't the
case. Today, only 10 percent of our nation's emergency call centers can
obtain precise location information from a wireless caller."

The House bill would require the head of the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to create
an "E-911 Implementation Coordination Office" to "facilitate coordination and
communication between Federal, State, and local emergency communications
systems, emergency personnel, public safety organizations, telecommunications
carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers and vendors involved in
the implementation of E-911 services".

The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $500 Million in
grants over five years, to be administered by the NTIA, to enhance emergency communications
services. The bill provides that the NTIA "shall require an eligible entity to
certify in its application that -- (A) in the case of an eligible entity that is
a State government, the entity -- (i) has coordinated its application with the
public safety answering points ... located within the jurisdiction of such
entity; ...".

The bill would also penalize states for redirecting E-911 funds collected
from consumer's cell phone bills. It would require the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
review twice a year fees charged to
customers for enhancing 911 services. States would be required to certify that
no E911 fees are being used for other purposes. The FCC would be required to
notify Congress of states that divert E911 funds. Finally, the NTIA would be
required to withhold grant funds to states that are found by the FCC to divert
E911 funds.

Steve Berry, SVP of Government Affairs for the
Cellular Telecommunications & Internet
Association (CTIA), stated in a
release
that "Dozens of states have taken a hammer to their E-911 piggy banks and
run-off with these vital tax-payer funds, earmarked for public safety ... This
legislation creates powerful incentives for states to end the looting and get to
work on upgrading their public safety networks."

Finally, the bill would direct the FCC to study E-911 implementation in
rural areas.

7/29. The U.S.
Court of Appeals (4thCir) issued its
opinion [13
pages in PDF] in U.S.
v. Jarrett, a case regarding the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) use of a private party to hack computers to obtain
evidence of crimes. The District Court had held that the hacker had an agency
relationship with the FBI, that there was therefore an unreasonable search by
the FBI, and that evidence seized by the government is suppressed. The Appeals Court
held there was no agency relationship, and the search by the hacker, though illegal,
did not constitute a violation of 4th Amendment rights.

The defendant, William Jarrett, did the crime -- manufacturing
child pormography on his PC in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
(He conditionally plead guilty.) And, following the Appeals Court decision, it
appears that he will serve time.

The significance of this case, however, is the procedure
employed by the FBI to obtain the evidence of his crime, and the precedent that
this case sets for FBI agents to use private hackers to obtain information from
individuals personal computers by illeg hacking in future cases.

The government obtained its evidence against Jarrett by
searching his PC. It was able to conduct this search because it had first
obtained a search warrant from a judge. This search warrant was obtained on the
representation by the government that an anonymous computer hacker had illegally
accessed Jarrett's PC and discovered illegal images. The FBI and court opinions
also refer to this hacker as "unknown user" and "Unknownuser", because that was
the user name in his e-mail address.

The hacker neither testified in any court proceeding, nor
provided sworn testimony. He remained an anonymous e-mail correspondent. He
provided no evidence. He provided the basis for obtaining the search warrant. The
government's evidence was the fruits of its search of Jarrett's PC. Yet, it
would not have obtained this without the hacker's search. Jarrett thus
argued that the evidence of the crime should be suppressed because it was
obtained as a result an illegal search of his computer by the hacker in
violation of his 4th Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."

The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that the 4th
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by
government officials, but not by private parties acting in a private capacity.
See, for example, Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) and
United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S.109 (1984).

The hacker searched Jarrett's computer by obtaining unauthorized
access to it. He did this by posting a photograph in a pormography newsgroup
with a trojan horse program appended. Jarrett downloaded the file, and the
appended trojan horse. The hacker was then able to access and search Jarrett's
PC via the internet. This
is illegal conduct. See,
18 U.S.C. § 1030.

If the hacker had been an FBI Special Agent, it would have been clear that the search
by the hacker was illegal, that the subpoena was based upon illegally conduct,
that the subpoena was defective, and that the evidence seized in the search
conducted pursuant to the subpoena must be suppressed. However, the hacker was not
employed by the FBI or other law enforcement authority. He was an anonymous
resident of Instanbul, Turkey. The question thus became whether there was an
agency relationship between the hacker and the FBI. If there was an agency
relationship, then the evidence must be suppressed.

The FBI asserted that there was no agency relationship. However, the District
Court found that there was an agency relationship, and suppressed the evidence
obtained by the government. The District Court relied upon e-mails exchanged by
FBI agents and the hacker.

FBI agents exchanged numerous e-mails with the hacker. He
discussed his hacking activities. The FBI thanked him for sending them the
fruits of his hacks, and encouraged him to continue, but maintained the pretext that
they were not actually asking him to hack into other people's computers.

For example, in one e-mail an FBI agent wrote, "I can not ask
you to search out cases such as the ones you have sent to us. That would make
you an agent of the Federal Government and make how you obtain your information
illegal and we could not use it against the men in the pictures you send. But if
you should happen across such pictures as the ones you have sent to us and wish
us to look into the matter, please feel free to send them to us. We may have
lots of questions and have to email you with the questions. But as long as you
are not ‘hacking’ at our request, we can take the pictures and identify the men
and take them to court. We also have no desire to charge you with hacking. You
are not a US citizen and are not bound by our laws."

An FBI agent wrote in another e-mail, "the FACT still stands
that you are not a citizen of the United States and are not bound by our laws.
Our Federal attorneys have expressed NO desire to charge you with any CRIMINAL
offense."

The FBI statement that "you are not a citizen of the
United States and are not bound by our laws" may be contrasted with the actions
of the FBI in other cases in which foreign nationals have hacked into computers
in the U.S. from abroad. For example, in U.S. v. Aleksey Vladimirovich Ivanov
(Eastern District of California), the FBI investigated, and the Department of
Justice prosecuted, a Russian who hacked computers from Russia. Of course, the
FBI had to trick him into traveling to the U.S. to be able to arrest him. Ivanov plead
guilty and was sentenced to 4 years in a U.S. prison. The
FBI's statements to the hacker also contrast with the FBI's description of his
activities in its application for a search warrant -- "illegally hacking".

The District Court concluded in an
order
that "the defendant has established that the government knew of and acquiesced
in the searches conducted by Unknownuser and that Unknownuser's actions were
motivated solely by an interest to further law enforcement efforts. Therefore,
the Court concludes that the evidenced seized from the defendant's computer by
Unknownuser was the result of an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, thus making the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant
defective, as well as the search warrant itself and all evidence seized as a
result of its execution. The defendant's motion to suppress is granted, and the
evidence will be suppressed."

The government appealed. The Appeals Court was not swayed by the long train
of e-mails between the hacker and FBI agents. However, the Appeals Court's
conclusion rested on the fact that some of the most damaging e-mails were dated
after the hacker had accessed Jarrett's computer. It reasoned that the agency
relationship had to exist at the time of the unauthorized access.

The Appeals Court wrote that "Although the Government operated
close to the line in this case, it did not (at least on the evidence before the
district court) demonstrate the requisite level of knowledge and acquiescence
sufficient to make Unknownuser a Government agent when he hacked into Jarrett’s
computer." (Parentheses in original.)

10:00 AM. The Senate
Finance Committee will meet to consider several pending
nominations, including James Jochum (to be Assistant Secretary,
Department of Commerce) and Josette Shiner (to be a Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative). Location: Room 215, Dirksen Building.

12:15 PM. The Federal Communications Bar
Association's (FCBA) Young Lawyers Committee will host a brown bag lunch.
The topic will be Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP). The speakers
will include Thomas Navin (Deputy Division Chief of the Competition Policy
Division of the Wireline Competition Bureau of the FCC). For more information,
contact Patrick Sullivan at
psullivan@willkie.com or 202
303-1164, or Ryan Wallach at
rwallach@willkie.com or 202 303-1159.
Location: Willkie Farr & Gallagher,
1875 K Street, NW, Second Floor.

Deadline to submit applications for loans or combination loans and grants
to the Rural Utilities Service (RUS)
under its FY2003 Distance Learning and Telemedicine Program. See,
notice in Federal Register, March 3, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 41, at Page 9973.

Deadline to submit comments to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in response to its
Notice of Inquiry [21 pages in PDF] in its proceeding titled "In the Matter
of Inquiry Regarding Carrier Current
Systems, including Broadband over Power Line Systems". See,
notice in the Federal Register, May 23, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 100, at Pages 28182 - 28186.
See also, story titled "FCC Announces NOI Regarding Broadband Over Powerlines"
in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 628, April 24, 2003, and story titled "FCC
Releases NOI on Broadband Over Power Lines" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 656,
May 7, 2003.This is ET Docket No. 03-104. For more information, contact Anh Wride at 202
418-0577 or anh.wride@fcc.gov.

7/29. The Department of Commerce's (DOC)
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS),
which is still also known as the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA),
published a
notice in the Federal Register stating that it is recruiting members for its
six Technical Advisory Committees (TACs). The membership of each TAC is
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, serves about four years, and meets about
four times per year. Three TACs are technology related -- Category 3
(electronics and semiconductors), Category 4 (computers), and Category 5
(telecommunications and
information security). The notice states that resumes should be sent to Lee Ann
Carpenter at Lcarpent@bis.doc.gov. The
deadline is "one year from its date of publication in the Federal Register".
See, Federal Register, July 29, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 145, at Page 44524.

7/29. President Bush signed an
executive order pertaining to homeland security information sharing.

7/24. The American Antitrust
Institute filed an
amicus curiae brief
[38 pages in PDF] with the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications v. Law Office
of Curtis V. Trinko, urging that the Court of Appeals be affirmed. See,
TLJ story
titled "Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Verizon v. Trinko", March 10, 2003.

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