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Tuesday, April 15, 2014

The concept of “Eurasia” illustrates well the problematic nature of geopolitics. “Eurasia” is one of the most important geopolitical concepts; as Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power.”[1] “Eurasia” encapsulates the problematic aspects of geopolitics, starting with semantics. Indeed, it is a portmanteau word with a slightly artificial ring to it, somewhat clumsily combining the words “Europe” and “Asia.” It is a typical geopolitical term; i.e. one whose different definitions reflect nations' different geopolitical interests.

Originally, “Eurasia” is a geographical notion: in this sense, it is simply the biggest continent; the combined landmass of Europe and Asia. However, geopolitically, the word has several different meanings, reflecting the specific geopolitical interests of each nation. In the widest possible sense, the geopolitical definition of “Eurasia” is consistent with its geographical area. This is sometimes the way the word is understood in countries located at the fringes of, or outside, this area. This is generally what is meant by “Eurasia” in political circles in the USA, Japan and India.[2] Two other, narrower definitions of “Eurasia” are also worth noting: the European one and the Russian one.

When
Western European political scientists talk about “Eurasia”, they
generally mean Russia integrated into Europe (including Ukraine of
course), economically, politically, and even militarily. At least
since Napoleon, if not since Peter the Great, European strategists
have understood the importance of allying with Russia, and the
potential consequences of failing to do so. However, the current
European view of “Eurasia” is, for obvious reasons, a far more
recent concept, having emerged only in the last two decades, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, this political entity
is about half the size, and has only 15% of the population, of the
geographical “Eurasia.” Two observations are necessary with
respect to what is assumed to be “Europe.” Firstly, in this case,
“Europe” is seen as a single economic and political entity; i.e.
the European Union.[3] Secondly,in
thiscontext of
“Eurasia,”
“Europe”
primarilymeans Germany.
Not only has Germany emerged
as the de facto leader
of Europe both economically
and politically after the
recent financial crisis, but
it also
has deeperhistorical ties with Russia
than most other nations of
the European Union. It also has a
stronger geopolitical
interest in a political and
economic integration with
Russia, than the rest of the EU.[4]

Therefore, from this Western European perspective, “Eurasia” means specifically the idea of Russia's close integration with the European Union in general and with Germany in particular (not the other way around, of course). What would this European concept of “Eurasia” mean in practice? As always, integration between nations can take place in several ways; economically, politically, militarily, and even culturally. “Eurasia” would mean at least the following, from a European point of view: at an economic level, the signing of trade agreements removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs as well as removing legal and bureaucratic hurdles to European investment in Russia; at a political level, an agreement of a EU integration model for Ukraine that is acceptable to Russia, the reduction of Russian border controls and Russian visa restrictions between the two entities, and increasing institutional collaboration; and at a military level, closer Russian alignment with the European Common Security and Defence Policy as well as, inevitably, NATO, as well as some coordination between security and military forces, and a substantial increase in procurement of European weapons by the Russian armed forces.[5] Most of these cooperation areas are already included in the concept of “Four Common Spaces” which was established in 2003 between the EU and Russia, but funded by the former.[6]

Europe's
geopolitical interest in “Eurasia”,
as
understood by European
policy-makers,is
clear and the would-be advantages
for Europe are well known.[7]However,
though
Russia would make
some gains in the long term from
such
anintegration
with
Europe, Russia's
geopolitical
interestsareclearly
not complementary
with
the European
version
of
“Eurasia.”[8]As
one of the few independent nations of the world, Russia insists on
establishing relations with
Europe,
“on a basis of equality
and mutual benefit.”[9]This
is something that Europe
neither
has the
interest, nor the obligation, to accept. Not
surprisingly,
and
often to the frustration of European policy-makers, naturally
interested
in pushing their own agenda
of further integration,Russia
has
different geopolitical
interests, as
becomes
clear
from the
Russian
definition of “Eurasia.”

The
Russian concept of “Eurasia” is very different from the European
one. It is a view that has older roots than the European one - not
surprisingly, considering Russia's geographic position. Russian
politologists traditionally view Russia itself, being both European
and Asian, as “Eurasian.” The geopolitical area of the Russian
concept of “Eurasia” corresponded initially more or less to the
land area of Imperial Russia in 1914, including parts of Eastern
Europe.[10] There is undeniably an influence of Panslavism in this
definition; originally the idea of “Eurasia” was more
romantically rooted in natural geography. It was the idea that the
people scattered across the land called “Eurasia” shared common
spiritual values due to its geographic traits, such as a flat land
with few coastlines but important rivers, a particular climate
(continental, often harshly so), and a certain landscape (steppe, taiga,
tundra). This idea was more or less realised, but with
difficulty, during the last phases of the Russian Empire and was then
realised again with the Soviet Union after 1945, though not stably
enough for enduring success.

Today,
though this Russian geopolitical interest still exists, the physical area of the Russian
“Eurasia” is now more realistically assessed. The Russian view
today is that “Eurasia” consists of the land lying between Europe
and Asia proper; namely, those made up of Western and Central Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, part of Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan.[11] Just as in the case of the European concept of
“Eurasia,” the Russian version of “Eurasia” is a geopolitical interest
that underpins foreign policy in that part of the world. Thus, it is
not surprising that today one of Russia's main geopolitical interests
lies in ever closer integration with those countries that it
considers part of “Eurasia.”

This
review of the main definitions of the concept of “Eurasia”
clearly bring forth the many different geopolitical interests that are understood by this word. The next post will treat the
concept of “Eurasia” by looking at the important tactical
aspect of geopolitics; namely the question of the realisation of the
concept of “Eurasia.”

Notes:

[1]Z. Brzezinski, highly influential National
Security Adviser under US President Jimmy Carter. The quote is from
his book “The Grand Chessboard” (Basic Books), p. xiii. Further:
“A power that dominates
“Eurasia” would control two of the world’s three most advanced
and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also
suggests that control over “Eurasia” would almost automatically
entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and
Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent.
About 75 per cent of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, and
most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its
enterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for about
three-fourths of the world’s
known energy resources.” (p.31)

[2]
For instance, this is
the way Zbigniew
Brzezinski sees ”Eurasia”,
naturally taking the US position.

[3]
Indeed, both Ukraine
and Turkey have their own very specific historical, economic, and
geopolitical relationship with Russia. And as for “Europe”
meaning the EU in this case, this is not to say that the EU is not
still quite farfrom being such a “single
economic and political entity.”

[4]
This
is all the more true
today since Germany in the
financial crisis has further increased its economic and political
domination
of the European Union. At
the same time, the British
are probablydistancing themselves
from the EU, if not de
jure yet, at least
rhetorically, and France has
deep structural problems of its own, preventing it from driving the
EU project together with Germany like it has
in the past. Germany
export-oriented industry is perfectly suited to address the Russian
market, and at the same time
it needs Russia's resources.Further, Germany has already
got the
most developed economic ties with
Russia of any major nation.

[6]
At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003,
the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by creating,
in the long term, four common spaces in the framework of the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997: a common economic
space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of
co-operation in the field of external security; and a space of
research, education, and cultural exchange.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations#The_Four_Common_Spaces[7]
Main advantages: The
wealthy but struggling
economies
of the
European Unioncould
certainly benefit from
tighter integration
withthe
Russianeconomy for
the resources the
latter has to offer. These
include both the human
and natural resources
of Russia. There
is an obvious interest in getting close
access to a large,
low-wage
and relatively well-educated
population.It
would bring energy security
to Europe by removing once
and for all the political
and bureaucratic obstacles to the cheap and
joint use of Russia's
rich natural
resources (gas
and oil, but not only).
Economically, the
realisation of this concept of “Eurasia”
would mean that European
companies would gain direct access to the huge investment
needs of Russiansociety.
From a
military perspective, a closer collaboration with Russia would add
precisely the element of “hard”
power that Europelacks
in order to fulfil its
geopolitical interest of dominating
the world once
again. It
would also close
once and for all the security issue
that Europe perceives
in having an independent
Russia so
close to its eastern
borders, as
the adherence to NATO of many Eastern European countries show.

[10]
ThisRussianconcept of
“Eurasia” can trace its
origin to certain
Russian émigrés
in the
1920s Berlin, Prague
and Sofia. For more details
regarding the entire paragraph above,
see История
евразийского движения,
at:www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/nart/04.php

Tuesday, April 1, 2014

In the previous posts, two essential though often overlooked aspects of geopolitics have been presented. These two important distinctions – between geopolitical interests and the realisation of these interests, and between the interests of the state and the interests of the people – are rarely taken into account in geopolitical discourse. From the point of view of the general public, which should always be the reference in a representative system, geopolitics is not only incomplete but also morally ambiguous without these two distinctions. Only by taking them into account can geopolitics be seen in the right light.

The first of these distinctions makes it evident what should be the focus of geopolitical studies: it is the realisation, or attempts at realisation, of geopolitical interests that should be monitored, analysed, and lauded or criticised, as the case may be. Geopolitics should therefore be more practical than theoretical in its approach. What should be of critical importance to the people are not the geopolitical interests of the state as such, though they should be more widely known, but the waste of public resources – human, financial, material – for the realisation of geopolitical interests that are not shared by the public.

The second of these distinctions goes even further in this direction; for it naturally raises the question of the moral position that should be adopted by the expert in geopolitics. Should he support the realisation of geopolitical interests of the state he serves, directly or indirectly, even though he knows, or should know, that they are not only not in the interest of the people, but actually contrary to the interest of the people? In a democracy, the answer should be obvious. Perhaps subjects like ethics and political philosophy should become a more important part of the curriculum of students in geopolitics. Optimally, a different type of education in geopolitics could even be undertaken along these lines, by independent seats of learning.

When these two distinctions are considered together, it becomes clear that geopolitics is fundamentally incompatible with democracy. For every nation that is looking to realise its geopolitical interests, a people is not democratically represented. In a truly democratic system, in which the interests of the people reign supreme, only geopolitical interests of a lower level would be realised. The states of such nations would then realise only the fundamental geopolitical interests of security and defence, leaving the rest of their geopolitical interests unfulfilled. More space would then be created between nations, both physically and politically, which would not be occupied or controlled by any nation in particular (but for instance by independent organisations or a community of nations, such as a reformed United Nations). In such a world, all other interests would be commercial interests, which national governments would not need to get involved with, and which would be managed internationally between individuals, corporations and international organisations.

Individuals often have conflicts of interests, but in a environment of rule of law they have shown that they are able to resolve them consensually, at the negotiating table. For nations, a system of rule of law – i.e. blind and enforced – may not become reality even in the long term. Geopolitical conflicts will thus continue to simmer around the world, until they are settled by coercive methods rather than by consensual ones. The complete acceptance by the public itself of the current geopolitical language is a sign that geopolitics will likely continue to dominate international relations for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, the nations of the world have been slowly surrendering sovereignty in the current international context. Not only are geopolitical interests progressively losing in importance, but nations are also having more difficulties than before to realise them. Though this may not directly give more power to the people over international affairs, it still represents a small step towards a more democratic world.