[Posted With Permission From The Author.]
On The Net Column
Monday, Sept. 11, 1995
Peter H. Lewis
In terms of its ability to raise the nation's blood pressure, the
debate over data encryption has not yet reached the same levels as gun
control.
But last week the Clinton Administration appeared to set the stage for
an equally divisive national debate over the rights of businesses and
individuals to keep secrets when using telephones, computers and other
forms of electronic communications.
In effect, the Administration drew a line in the virtual sands of
cyberspace, signaling that it is willing to permit Americans to put
stronger cryptographic locks on their electronic data only if a spare
key to those locks is made available on demand to law enforcement
agencies.
There looms the conflict. Although the current debate is about export
controls on an esoteric form of software that most Americans do not
use, the "export" issue is ultimately irrelevant in today's era of
global electronic voice and data networks, where passwords, not
passports, are checked at the gates. Simply placing a common privacy
program on an Internet-connected computer in Austin, Tex., is
effectively no different from sending a shrink-wrapped copy of the
program to Moscow.
The real issue is how much privacy the Government is willing to allow
its own citizens, and the latest word from the Clinton Administration
is that the right to electronic privacy, like the right to bear arms,
is not absolute.
***
Cryptography is the science of secret writing. In this digital era,
secret writing applies not just to notes handed from one spy to
another, but also to telephone calls between individuals, funds
transfers between banks, bank and credit card records, electronic
mail, faxes, and an endless variety of computer files.
The Clinton Administration has been clear and consistent in outlining
its basic position on cryptographic systems. The goal is to allow
American citizens and companies to use the strongest possible
cryptographic technology, while at the same time preserving the
ability of law enforcement agencies to perform court-authorized
wiretaps as part of the effort to catch drug dealers, terrorists,
child pornographers and other miscreants.
In other words, it favors strong cryptography, but not too strong.
One way to measure the strength of cryptographic software is the
length of the software key necessary to encode and decode a message.
The longer the key, in terms of digital bits, the harder it is for an
unauthorized user to decipher the message.
In recent years, the Government has generally permitted Americans to
export cryptographic software with key lengths up to 40 bits. Experts
say that 40-bit keys are secure from casual snooping, but will fall
quickly to a determined codebreaker. The fact that the Government
allows 40-bit encryption systems to be exported is a pretty good
indication that the National Security Agency can break them easily.
There are literally hundreds of stronger cryptography programs readily
available outside the United States, and these stronger programs are
attractive to businesses that want to safeguard their data from
Internet bandits and corporate and government spies.
Last week, after more than a year of intense analysis of the software
export controls issue, the Government unveiled what it said was the
best possible compromise.
Under the new policy, companies can export encryption algorithms using
64-bit keys, which are much more secure, but only if spare keys are
made available to law enforcement agents under standard legal
procedures. Otherwise, the 40-bit limit continues to apply.
The "spare key" technology, officially known as key escrow, is
anathema to many privacy advocates who fear Government abuses. The
Government first proposed a key escrow system with its so-called
Clipper Chip, a technology that failed to win acceptance even as a
voluntary standard.
Unlike Clipper, which was based on a classified algorithm called
Skipjack that only a few people outside the Government were allowed to
examine, the new policy allows people to use any algorithm they choose
-- as long as it uses a key no larger than 64 bits, and as long as the
keys are entrusted to a domestic third party accessible to the
Government, and as long as the key escrow mechanisms cannot be readily
altered or bypassed.
Also unlike Clipper, which required a special tamper-proof
microprocessor that would have added cost, complexity and extra power
requirements to communications devices, the new proposals can be
implemented entirely in software.
Key escrow systems make a lot of sense for most American companies, at
least for internal use. Having a spare set of keys lessens the risk of
a disgruntled employee or saboteur locking up vital company files.
But key escrow is also unpopular with American computer and software
companies, who say it prevents them from competing against foreign
companies that have no similar constraints, and with many
multinational corporations, who say it prevents them from working with
foreign companies that don't especially care for the idea of Uncle Sam
holding the keys to their data banks.
"If this was intended to be any sort of compromise, I don't think it
achieved its end," said Whitfield Diffie, a Distinguished Engineer at
Sun Microsystems who attended the meetings. "I didn't see anybody who
was enthusiastic."
***
Raymond G. Kammer, deputy director of NIST, suggested that the
hearings last week were intended to elicit public comment, and that
the Administration's final position on cryptographic policy are still
under analysis.
However, the emergence of key escrow issues at the NIST proceedings
suggest that key escrow is emerging as a non-negotiable demand by some
factions of the Clinton Administration, especially the Justice
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, led by Louis
Freeh. Mr. Freeh sincerely believes that data encryption is a weapon,
and has publicly called for domestic restrictions on civilian
cryptography.
"If this fails," said one observer familiar with the Administration's
thinking on the proposed change in cryptographic policy, "it's going
to lead to a very devisive debate. And the irony, for libertarians who
oppose key escrow, is that if it fails, I am convinced that Louis
Freeh cannot be true to his job without proposing domestic controls on
data encryption."
"He's not going to give up without a fight, and neither is the Justice
Department," said the observer, who spoke on the condition he not be
identified.
Others say they do not think the Clinton Administration has yet
arrived at a concrete position, even after more than a year of study
and debate. "I don't think it's a final offer," said John Gilmore, a
member of the board of directors of Cygnus Support Inc., a computer
company in Mountain View, Calif. "It looks to me like a weak strawman,
a first offer, a proposal to dance."
The question is whether American citizens and businesses have the
patience to wait for the music to start. And the issue may be moot,
anyway.
"The Internet Architecture Board has specifically decided to ignore
export controls in designing the security infrastructure for the next
generation of Internet protocols," Mr. Gilmore said. "The Internet of
1998 will provide automatic, secure, and fully private communication,
without key escrow, internationally. The protocols will be implemented
independently in a dozen different countries."
In other words, the international Internet community is already
planning to jump over the new line in the sand drawn last week by the
Clinton Administration. Cryptography that is stronger and better than
the Government's proposed system will become an integral part of the
Internet, and American companies and individuals would be foolish not
to use it.
At that point, millions of Americans will come in direct conflict with
Government policy, and the popular gun-control bumper sticker may be
replaced by one that says, "If cryptography is outlawed, only outlaws
will have cryptography."