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Friday, June 28, 2013

Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and militant, street
battle-hardened soccer fans, in a replay of the run-up to mass protests two
years ago that ousted Hosni Mubarak are positioning themselves for planned
watershed mass demonstrations for and against the government this weekend.

In a statement almost identical to the one they issued on
January 24, 2011, the eve of 18 days of protests that toppled Mr. Mubarak,
Ultras Ahlawy, the militant support group of crowned Cairo club Al Ahli SC that
played a key role in the former president’s overthrow, said this week that as
an organization it would not participate in the demonstrations on the
anniversary of Mr. Morsi’s ascendancy as Egypt’s first freely elected president,
but that its members were free to do so.

The statement insisted that that Ultras Ahlawy was a group
of soccer fans “that has nothing to do with politics.” It said the group had
decided “not to get involved in politics again after realizing that the
opposition doesn’t care about the country but simply aims to rule.”

Militant Egyptian soccer fans, who constitute one of Egypt’s
largest civic groups, have a history of publicly defining themselves as
non-political and as a group refusing to openly underwrite political protests.
Ultras leaders told their tens of thousands of followers privately two years
ago after officially declaring that they would not take part in the Tahrir
Square uprising that the protests were the litmus test they had been preparing
for and that they were free to participate.

The tactic employed by similar groups in Turkey and
elsewhere was designed to shield soccer fan groups from being exposed to
allegations that they were political organizations and as a result more
vulnerable to government attempts to suppress them. 74 members of Ultras Ahlawy
were killed last year in a politically loaded brawl in the Suez Canal city of
Port Said.

Ultras Ahlawy as well as the Ultras White Knights (UWK), the
supporters of Cairo arch rival Al Zamalek SC, and fans of two other Egyptian
clubs last weekend stormed stadiums where there clubs were playing in protests
against a ban on fans attending soccer matches. Egypt’s league that restarted
in February after a one-year suspension in the wake of Port Said has again been
suspended in advance of this weekend’s protests. Zamalek coach Jorvan Vieira
announced that he was taking extended leave because of Egypt’s mounting
volatility.

This weekend’s protests were organized by ad hoc grassroots
group Tamarud (Rebel) that hopes to commemorate Mr. Morsi’s anniversary with a
million-man march on the presidential palace. Tamarud has reportedly collected
15 million signatures, two million more than the 13 million votes the president
garnered a year ago, on a petition demanding Mr. Morsi’s resignation and new
elections.

The petition that a significant number of militant soccer
fans are believed to have signed, takes Mr. Morsi to task for his failure to
tackle the country’s economic crisis, dispel fears that he is pursuing an
Islamist agenda, and his haughty style of government that many see as a
continuation of Mubarak’s authoritarianism. It calls on the military and the
judiciary in violation of the constitution to lead the country to new elections.

In an echo of terminology used by Mr. Mubarak and more
recently Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to denounce their
detractors, Mr. Morsi said that the interior ministry had established a special
unit to combat thuggery. The ministry controls the police and the security
forces that are among Egypt’s most hated institutions because of their
execution of the Mubarak-era repression and the deaths of some 900 protesters
since the overthrow of Mr. Mubarak for which officials have yet to be held
accountable. Brutal police force turned recent smaller protests in Brazil and
Turkey into massive anti-government demonstrations much as the brutality of
security forces on Tahrir Square two years ago strengthened protesters’
resolve.

Fears of violence this weekend have been further fuelled by
the expectation that Morsi supporters will hold counter demonstrations this
weekend. Those fears were reinforced by recent attacks by Morsi supporters on
Tamarud representatives as they publicly collected signatures on street corners
and other public spaces.

Supporters and opponents of Mr. Morsi clashed earlier this
month for hours in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria. Two people were killed
and more than 200 injured this week in clashes in the Lower Egyptian cities
Mansoura and Tanta. Four Shiites were stabbed, lynched and mutilated by a mob
in a village near Cairo last Sunday in an attacked that had been motivated by
opposition by militant Sunni Muslim sheikhs to a religious feast.

The ultras in past protests in Egypt, much like like-minded
groups more recently in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, often see their role as protecting
protesters against abuse by the security forces. Their approach is rooted in a
deeply rooted sense of having been abused and mistreated for years in clashes with
security forces in stadiums. The Black Bloc emerged earlier this year as a
group of masked black clad vigilantes founded primarily by battle-steeled
soccer supporters with the aim of protecting protesters against violence by
Morsi supporters.

The sense that this weekend could mark a watershed in Egypt’s
volatile transition from autocracy to a more open society was heightened by a
statement this week by the country’s top general describing the role of the
security forces as a safety valve against political conflict. Security
officials said the military had moved troops closer to Egyptian cities in
advance of this weekend’s protest and armored vehicles appeared this week in
the streets of Cairo.

Mr. Morsi, in a carefully worded rebuke insisted he was the
commander in chief and that the army's role was solely to protect the country's
borders. Amid wild speculation of what the military may do, much rides on
whether the protesters, who see this weekend’s demonstration as a launching pad
for a second revolution, succeed in mobilizing large numbers and whether events
and to what degree they turn violent.

The last two years have demonstrated that the leaders of
violence-prone militant soccer fans are struggling to control their rank and
file which often itches for a confrontation with security forces whom they see
as the symbol of their perceived misery. Said a young militant earlier this
year: “To hell with our leaders. This is not the moment to backdown.”

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Conventional wisdom predicts that 33-year old Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad Al Thani will adhere to his father’s use of sports as a key foreign,
defense and security policy tool to embed Qatar in the international community.
Experts and pundits suggest that Sheikh Tamim at best will nibble at the fringe
of his father’s at times bold policies by expanding the government’s focus on domestic
issues.

No doubt, Sheikh Tamim has demonstrated his interest in
sports as head of the Qatar Olympic Committee and by creating Qatar National
Sports Day, a popular annual event on February 14. That move coupled with his
chairing of the Supreme Education Council lies at the core of the suggestion
that he will focus not only on the emirate’s regional and global projection but
also on his country’s domestic affairs.

As always, the devil is in the detail. No doubt, outgoing
emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani will be remembered as a visionary who
put his tiny country on the world map, changed the Middle East and North Africa’s
media landscape with the creation of the Al Jazeera television network, offered
the Gulf an alternative vision of leadership by stepping aside to make place
for a younger generation and turned Qatar into a nation with the world’s
highest income per capita of the population.

Few Qataris will question the achievements of Sheikh Hamad,
who on Tuesday handed over power to his son, a virtually unprecedented step in
a region in which rulers hang on to power untill death even if they at times
have experienced a deterioration of health that has incapacitated them not only
physically but also mentally. A wave of demand of change sweeping the Middle
East and North Africa only serves to highlight the significance of Sheikh Hamad’s
move. “The time has come to turn a new leaf where a new generation steps
forward… Our young men have proven over the past years that they are a people
of resolve,” Sheikh Hamad said in a nationally televised address.

Sheikh Hamad’s accomplishments notwithstanding, conservative
segments of Qatari society with whom Sheikh Tamim at times appeared to
empathize have questioned some of the side effects of the emir’s policies,
including:

nHuge expenditure on a bold foreign policy that
put Qatar at the forefront of regional demands for greater freedom and change but
also earned it significant criticism;

nUnfulfilled promises of change at home that
would give Qataris a greater say in where their country is going;

nA stark increase in foreign labor to complete
ambitious infrastructure projects many of which are World Cup-related and have
exposed Qatar for the first time to real pressure for social change;

nMore liberal catering to Western expatriates by
allowing controlled sale of alcohol and pork;

nPotential tacit concessions Qatar may have to
make to non-Muslim soccer fans during the World Cup, including expanded areas where
consumption of alcohol will be allowed, public rowdiness and dress codes
largely unseen in the Gulf state, and the presence of gays.

A discussion in Qatar about possibly transferring ownership
of soccer clubs from prominent Qataris, including members of the ruling family,
to publicly held companies because of lack of Qatari interest in “the sheikh’s
club” illustrates a degree of sensitivity to popular criticism.

Sheikh Tamim has moreover enhanced his popularity by his
close relationship to Qatari tribes, his upholding of Islamic morals
exemplified by the fact that alcohol is not served in luxury hotels that he
owns and his accessibility similar to that of Saudi King Abdullah. He was also
the driving force behind last year’s replacement of English by Arabic as the
main language of instruction at Qatar University. He is further believed to
have been empathetic to unprecedented on-line campaigns by Qatari activists
against the state-owned telecommunications company and Qatar Airways. Sheikh
Hamad appeared to anticipate a potententially different tone under Sheikh Tamim
by urging Qataris “to preserve our civilized traditional and cultural values.”

Much of the criticism of Sheikh Hamad’s policies have been quietly
supported by Saudi Arabia whose relation with Sheikh Hamad, who came to power
in a bloodless coup in 1995, has more often than not been troubled. Sheikh
Tamim could well bring a different tone to Saudi-Qatari relations. Since the
eruption of the crisis in Syria, Sheikh Tamim has been the point man in coordinating
policies with the kingdom and instead of the emir greeted guests as they
arrived in March for an Arab summit in Doha.

“Sheikh Tamim will not rock the boat. He is well-versed and
immersed in Qatari vision and policy. He understands the importance to Qatar of
sports. At most, he will be more publicly embracing of traditionalism in what
remains at the bottom line a conservative society,” said a Qatari with an
inside track.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Friday, June 21, 2013

Controversial soccer matches this weekend constitute a
potential walk-up to a watershed mass anti-government demonstration on June 30 that
has Egyptians of all political stripes bracing themselves for political
violence and increased uncertainty

The soccer matches and mounting tension in advance of the
protest are likely to be seen by militant, highly politicized, violence-prone
and street battle-hardened soccer fans as an opportunity to demonstrate their sustained
mettle and resolve. The fans, one of Egypt’s largest civic groups, played a key
role in the toppling two years ago of President Hosni Mubarak 2.5 years ago and
opposition to the military and the Muslim Brotherhood-led government since.

Concern about clashes at the matches and the protest has
also sparked debate within the security forces and the military, who are widely
held responsible for the deaths of some 900 protesters since the ousting of Mr.
Mubarak, on how to deal with potential soccer-related violence as well as the
planned protest.

The interior ministry, which controls the police and
security forces, initially opposed allowing Egyptian league matches to proceed
because of threats by soccer fans to storm stadiums in protest against a ban on
spectators. The ministry feared that clashes with fans would add to already
mounting tension in advance of June 30. In an about face however, the ministry
late this week said it would permit the games to be played on Saturday and
Sunday instead of on Thursday and Friday as originally scheduled.

Security forces are nevertheless bracing for renewed clashes
with fans that in the past two years have left thousands injured and scores
dead. Fans have been largely banned from matches ever since the league resumed
in February after a year-long suspension in the wake of the deaths of 74
supporters last year in a politically loaded brawl in Port Said.

"We are giving you 48 hours; we are giving you a chance
to stop suppressing and provoking us. Either we return to the stands or … you will
know what will happen soon,” the Ultras White Knights (UWK), the militant
support group of storied Cairo club Al Zamalek SC, warned this week in a
statement.

Mr. Morsi’s Brotherhood spotlighted the importance of soccer
and the role of the militant fans in football-crazy Egypt earlier this month by
announcing that it would field candidates for the board elections of Zamalek and
other major football teams in what many see as a bid to control the politically
significant sport.

Attempts by soccer fans to gain access to stadiums this
weekend could be a foretaste of what may happen on June 30, the first
anniversary of Mohammed Morsi’s inauguration as Egypt’s first freely-elected
post-revolt leader. Ad hoc group Tamarud (Rebel) hopes to commemorate his
anniversary with a million-man march on the presidential palace. Tamarud has
reportedly collected 15 million signatures, two million more than the 13
million votes the president garnered a year ago, on a petition demanding Mr.
Morsi’s resignation and new elections.

The petition that a significant number of militant soccer
fans are believed to have signed, takes Mr. Morsi to task for his failure to
tackle the country’s economic crisis, dispel fears that he is pursuing an
Islamist agenda, and his haughty style of government that many see as a
continuation of Mubarak’s authoritarianism. It calls on the military and the
judiciary in violation of the constitution to lead the country to new
elections. Youth groups and soccer fans see Tamarud’s mobilization success and the
June 30 march as an opportunity to reinvigorate their movement and launch a
second revolution.

Fears of violence have been fuelled by attacks by Morsi
supporters on Tamarud representatives as they publicly collected signatures on
street corners and other public spaces. Supporters and opponents of Mr. Morsi
clashed for hours last week in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria.

To ensure the authenticity of its petition, Tamarud has
insisted that signatories identify themselves and register their identity
document. Irrespective of whether or not the soccer matches and the June 30
march produce the kind of violence that could shift Egypt’s political paradigm,
they indicate just how deeply divided Egypt is and the degree of lack of
confidence in Mr. Morsi among a significant segment of the population.

Concern that violence could prevail was reinforced by some
Islamist groups calling for counter demonstrations on June 30 as well as the
expectation that soccer fans and the Black Bloc, a vigilante group founded by
militant soccer enthusiasts, will act as a protective and potentially provocative
force during the anti-government march. Attempts by cooler heads within Mr.
Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to avert what could prove
to be a game-changing outpour of anger against the government by reaching out
to opposition groups have so far failed.

The mounting tension has further thrown the spotlight on Mr.
Morsi’s troubled relationship with the security forces witness the interior
ministry’s dithering on the soccer matches as well as an initial statement that
police would stay away from the Tamarud demonstration that was later withdrawn.
Security officials fear that the police, which is widely despised because of
its enforcement of repression in the Mubarak era and its subsequent at times
deadly clashes with protesters, will be seen as being supportive of a Morsi
government it distrusts if it comes to clashes with protesters this weekend and
on June 30.

Hossam Ghali, the captain of crowned Zamalek rival Al Ahli
SC, reflected Egyptians’ worries about where there country is heading by
deciding this week to postpone a decision on whether to extend his contract
until after the June 30 march. "I'm now considering leaving Egypt because
of the ongoing political turmoil, which is seriously affecting Egyptian football.
It will be difficult to continue in Egypt under such circumstances," Al
Ahli’s website quoted him as saying.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Monday, June 17, 2013

Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and his flailing Muslim
Brotherhood have turned to foreign policy and soccer to improve their battered
image in advance of a planned mass anti-government protest at the end of this
month and mounting calls for his resignation.

In a bid to distract attention from his domestic woes, curry
favor with the United States and Gulf countries and restore Egypt to a
leadership position in the Middle East and North Africa, Mr. Morsi chose a
Cairo stadium to announce to his rallied supporters that he was cutting
diplomatic ties with the regime of embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The president’s ruling Muslim Brotherhood at the same time
said it would field candidates for the board elections of storied Cairo soccer
club Al Zamalek SC and other major football teams. The move is an effort to gain
control of clubs in a soccer-crazy country whose huge fan base played a key
political role in and since the toppling of Hosni Mubarak two years ago.

The fans, one of the largest civic groups in Egypt, are
likely to participate in a mass opposition Tamarod (Rebel) march on the
presidential palace scheduled for June 30, the first anniversary of Mr. Morsi’s
inauguration as Egypt’s first freely-elected post-revolt leader, to demand his
resignation and early elections. Egyptian media report that a petition calling
for Mr. Morsi’s resignation has so far attracted 15 million signatures, two
million more than the 13 million votes the president garnered a year ago. A
significant number of militant soccer fans are believed to be among the
signatories.

Criticism of Mr. Morsi has mounted in the past year as a
result of his failure to halt Egypt’s stark economic decline, his haughty
leadership style that many believe harks back to Mr. Mubarak’s authoritarianism
and his perceived efforts to Islamize Egyptian society.

Militant, highly politicized, well-organized and street
battle-hardened soccer fans have in the last year played a key role in protests
against Mr. Morsi. The conviction to death of soccer fans and perceived
leniency towards security personnel in a trial earlier this year against those
responsible for the death last year of 74 fans in Port Said in a politically
loaded brawl sparked a popular uprising in Suez Canal cities and violent protests
in Cairo.

Prominent Egyptian artists, writers, actors, filmmakers and
intellectuals camped out in front of the culture ministry in Cairo to demand
the resignation of Minister Alaa Abdel-Aziz because of his alleged efforts to
force the arts to conform to Islamic conservatism called last week on the
militant soccer fans to protect them against attacks by supporters of Mr.
Morsi.

The Brotherhood’s intention to increase its influence in
soccer clubs, many of which are financially troubled as the result of long
suspensions sparked by Egypt’s political turmoil since 2011, is the movement’s
latest effort to come to grips with the country’s most popular pastime.
Brotherhood officials initially toyed with the creation of their own soccer
clubs but then opted for a promise to clean the sport of corruption, including
the replacement of Mubarak-era officials.

Zamalek coach Jorvan Vieira warned last month that “despite
not getting their salaries, the players do their best in the matches. The
management must solve the problem as I can't ask them to play while they are
losing their concentration."

While Mr. Morsi’s breaking off of relations with Syria strikes
a popular cord among Egyptians who are largely abhorred by Mr. Al-Assad’s
brutal crackdown on his opponents, his attempt to gain control of soccer clubs risks
backfiring against the backdrop of mounting calls for his resignation.

Islamists hardly endeared themselves to soccer fans by recently
suggesting that their rivalries were a Zionist plot to destabilize Egypt. Al
Hafiz TV, a Salafi television station critical of Morsi that promotes a return
to the 7th century lifestyle of the Prophet Muhammad and his
immediate successors made the insinuation by airing a video portraying an alleged
ultra-Orthodox Jew as advocating the instigation of strife between various
groups in Egypt, including soccer fans.

Gamal Abdallah, a member of the Brotherhood’s sports
committee, announced the movement’s intention to gain control of clubs on the
website of the group's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party. "The
group is considering fielding candidates or endorsing certain contenders in
some posts during Zamalek's board of directors election… The group also intends
to take part in all club elections in the coming period," Mr. Abdallah
said.

The Brotherhood is likely to back Mortada Mansour, a lawyer
and Brotherhood supporter, who is challenging incumbent Zamalek chairman Mamdouh
Abbas, a wealthy businessman, in elections scheduled for September.

Militant Zamalek fans last month interrupted a news
conference by sports minister El-Amry Farouk intended to announce new
regulations for clubs and unveil his development plans because of his dismissal
of Mr. Abbas and imposition of a temporary board in advance of the September
elections. The fans have since demonstrated and blocked roads to demand the
release of militants detained during the storming of the minister’s conference.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Monday, June 10, 2013

With four days left in the run-up to Iran’ presidential
election, Supreme Leader Sayed Ali Khamenei has more to worry about than
ensuring that a sufficiently malleable candidate emerges as winner. A crucial
victory on Tuesday in Iran’s 2014 World Cup qualifier could bring thousands
into the streets in celebrations that have in the past turned into
anti-government protests.

The risks mount if none of the eight presidential candidates
wins 50 percent. A second round on June 21 would follow on the heels of the
Iranian national team’s final qualifier against South Korea on June 18. An
Iranian victory in that game would provide Iranians two opportunities to
celebrate: on match day and when the victorious team returns to Tehran shortly
thereafter.

If the past is any yardstick, World Cup soccer victories are
volatile moments in Iran. This time round, a soccer victory could prove to be
particularly volatile. Discontent in the Islamic republic is bubbling at the
service. While the elections as a result of the disqualification of former
president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who is seen as a reformer, are less likely to
provoke mass protests as they did in 2009 against a poll that was perceived to
have fraudulently returned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a second term in
office, soccer could provide the spark.

The strength of a desire for change among a significant segment
of the public is reflected in the emergence of Hassan Rohani, a cleric who was
Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator in the early 2000s, as a reformer and potential
frontrunner. The importance of sports in general and soccer in particular is
highlighted by the fact that political interference has become an important
theme in the election campaign.

Presidential candidate and former foreign minister Ali Akbar
Velayati vowed in one of three televised debates among the candidates that he
would ensure that sports management is shielded from interference by the
government and the Revolutionary Guards by returning it to professionals. By
the same token, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baker Qalibaf, widely viewed as a
conservative, prepared for his candidacy by using his municipality and its bank
to sponsor clubs.

Mr. Qalibaf’s move is in line with the growing influence of
the Revolutionary Guards and other security officials in the management of the
country’s major soccer clubs by either taking over ownership or ensuring that
they play an influential role in management. This includes clubs like
Persepolis, Iran’s most popular club that has its roots in the left and
historically catered to Iran’s lower social classes, and Traktor Sazi. Based in
Tabriz, the capital of the predominantly Azeri province of Eastern Azerbaijan, Traktor
Sazi has emerged as a symbol of an Azeri national identity. Its stadium has
been the scene of environmental and nationalist protests in recent years.

The potential of World Cup qualifiers to create opportunity
for protest in Iran was demonstrated in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2006. When Iran’s 1997
victory against Australia qualified it for the first time in two decades for
the World Cup finals, public celebrations quickly turned into protests. They
erupted barely a month after the election of Mohammed Khatami as president held
out the promise of a less restricted society. Men and women honked their car
horns, waved Iranian flags and danced in the streets together to blacklisted
music and sang nationalist songs as they did six months later when Iran
defeated the United States. Some chanted, “Death to the Mullahs.” Some 5,000 women stormed Teheran’s Azadi
stadium where the team was being welcomed in protest against their banning from
attending soccer matches in defiance of calls in the media for them to watch
the ceremony on television at home.

Bahrain’s defeat of Iran four years later in a World Cup
qualifier sparked mass protests against a backdrop of mounting disappointment
with Mr. Khatami’s failure to implement change. Shouting anti-government
slogans, soccer fans attacked banks and public offices and clashed with
security forces. Khatami’s younger brother, the then deputy speaker of
parliament, warned that the protests reflected popular frustration with
unemployment and low standards of living and a rejection of the regime’s
“excessive interference in people’s private lives.” The protests ignited heated debate in parliament
and on the pitch about where the Islamic republic was heading.

Like in 1998, women celebrated soccer victories in 2002 and
2006 by discarding their veils and mixing with the opposite sex. When Iran’s
chances were dashed by Bahrain, rumors abounded that the match had been fixed
to ensure a loss so that people would not take to the street. Journalist Nicole
Byrne, who attended a match against Ireland in Tehran’s Azadi Stadium days after
Iran’s loss reported that “under an enormous mural of the late Ayatollah
Khomeini, Iranians ripped out and set fire to seats, tore down banners
depicting images of the country's senior mullahs and trashed the windscreens of
several hundred cars outside.”

An Iranian sports journalist notes that “in terms of freedom
of expression, soccer stadiums are nearly as important as the Internet in Iran
now. The protest is more secure there because the police can't arrest thousands
of people at once. State television broadcasts many matches live and the people
use it as a stage for resistance. They're showing banners to the cameras and
chanting protest songs, which is why some games are broadcast without sound
now.”

Mr. Ahmadinejad, a player and fan, who was at the forefront
of increased Revolutionary Guard influence in soccer in a bid to use soccer’s
popularity to enhance his image, visited the Iranian national team in advance
of the match against Lebanon. Unable to run for a third term and having failed
to position a presidential candidate close to him, Mr. Ahmadinejad is concerned
about his legacy and the possibility of charges of corruption and economic
mismanagement once he no longer enjoys immunity.

Lebanon’s national team coach, German-born Theo Buecker, holds
out little hope for Mr. Khamenei’s ability to avoid potential soccer-related
protest. He notes that Iran has to win on Tuesday. The match “is not important
for us,” he says, adding that he is not able to field some of his top players
because they were suspended in a match-fixing scandal. That raises the likelihood
of celebrations and increases the risk of protests on the eve of the
presidential election.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

There is a lesson to be learnt from this year’s Formula One
public relations disaster in Bahrain, trade union pressure on Qatar, controversy
over Israel’s hosting of the FIFA Under-21
finals, last year’s successful International Olympic Committee (IOC)
campaign that forced three reluctant Muslim nations to field for the first time
women athletes at a global sporting event and the recent election of a Bahraini
soccer executive as president of the troubled Asian Football Confederation :
mega-events and campaigning for office in international sports associations
empower activists and put nations at risk of reputational damage.

Formula One boss Bernie Ecclestone acknowledged as much
saying in April that Bahrain had been “stupid” to allow the Grand Prix to go
ahead because it gave a platform to thousands demonstrating against perceived
autocratic rule and lack of rights. Mr. Ecclestone’s criticism didn’t stop him however
from expressing willingness to extend his contract with Bahrain for another
five years until 2021.

Nevertheless, Mr. Ecclestone’s comment highlighted the fact
that mega events and public office are double-edged swords. They potentially
allow countries to showcase themselves, polish or improve a nation’s international
and a government’s domestic image, serve as tools to enhance soft power and
create commercial, economic and political opportunity. That is if host nations
of mega-events and office holders and their home countries understand that
winning the right to organize a major tournament or an association election
puts on display not just their best side but also their warts and at times even
existential problems.

That empowers activists, spotlights their demands amid
intense media focus and gives them the moral high ground if a country fails to
respond adequately in word and deed. The lesson learnt from recent experiences
in the Middle East is that mega events and public office give not only
countries and governments leverage but also their detractors.

Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Israel prove the point.
Their responses have failed to allow them to gain the upper hand in popular
perception and coverage in the media that are both dominated by activists
highlighting their failure to adhere to international standards of human, labor
and/or gender rights. Worse even, mega events and nominating officials for
regional and international office has reinforced the negative perceptions they
were trying to reverse. Their failure has strengthened calls for such rights to
become key criteria in the awarding of future mega-events. It has also rendered
the separation of sports and politics a fiction and focused attention on the
need to develop systems that acknowledge the relationship but eliminate
conflict of interest and ensure that it is not abused for partisan political
interests on an individual, national, regional and international scale.

For two years running, Bahrain’s Grand Prix backfired with
protesters dominating news coverage. The image that emerged in television
pictures and independent reporting of thousands protesting was not one of an
island state that has put a squashed popular uprising in 2011 behind it, but
one of a nation wracked by continued strife to which the government responds
with force.

By the same token, the newly elected AFC president, Sheikh
Salman Bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, head of the Bahrain Football Association, has
been unable to put an end to persistent questions about his alleged failure to
stand up for Bahraini national soccer team players who were arrested, publicly
denounced, tortured and charged for taking part in anti-government demonstrations
two years ago during a popular uprising that was brutally squashed. The charges
were later dropped under pressure from FIFA.

Sheikh Salman’s legalistic argument that football and
politics are separate and that he had not violated FIFA or AFC rules rather
than addressing the larger moral issues involved has resulted in persistent
media questioning, activist calls for his disqualification and a reinforcement
of the Bahraini government’s image as repressive and uncompromising. Rather
than categorically refusing to address the issue, Bahrain and Sheikh Salman,
although restricted by being a member of a royal family that is dominated by
hard liners, would have been better served by allowing the government’s own
inquiry into the suppression of the revolt that admitted to wrongdoing by
security forces, including torture, to shape his response and deflate the
criticism.

Similarly, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia have succeeded in
turning the tide of public opinion or at least establishing a degree of equity
in perception. To be fair, Saudi Arabia, which grudgingly allowed a few
underperforming expatriate Saudi women to represent it at the 2012 London
Olympics, left the field to its critics by effectively refraining from
engagement in the debate about severe restrictions imposed on women in the
kingdom. In doing so, it failed to leverage assets it could have deployed to
moderate perceptions, including the economic clout of women in the kingdom as a
result of rights enshrined in Islamic law, moves to authorize physical
education in private schools, the re-emergence of women’s health clubs, plans
to license for the first time women’s soccer clubs that currently operate in a
legal nether land and last year’s unprecedented election of a commoner as head
of the Saudi Arabian Football Federation to replace an appointed royal.

Similarly, a video on You Tube features Palestinian youth in
a village near the wall separating Israel from the West Bank tearing off their
FC Barcelona jerseys, hanging them over razor wire the Israeli military erected
around the village and setting them on fire. The protest was part of a campaign
protesting Israel’s hosting in June of the U-21 championship finals intended to
counter Israel’s increasingly tarnished image as the obstacle to settling its
long standing dispute with the Palestinians, growing objections to Israeli
policies perceived as intentionally making daily life difficult for West Bank
residents and its ever greater integration into European soccer. Israel is part
of UEFA rather than Asia because of Arab refusal to play Israeli teams as long
as a peace settlement has not been achieved.

The U-21 is the most important tournament Israel has ever
hosted and comes at a time that Israel has lost significant ground in the
global battle for hearts and minds. A hunger strike last year by a Palestinian
national soccer team player who was suspected of association with a militant
group, Islamic Jihad, but never charged proved to be costly in the global
soccer world. The player was released under pressure from FIFA, UEFA and
FIFPro, the global players’ organization amid fears that he would die as a
result of his hunger strike.

"Football is an effective vehicle for Israel
to rehabilitate its image with the international community. A large sporting
event is an ideal opportunity for Israel to present itself as a normal
country," Tamir Sorek, a University of Florida expert on Israeli soccer
told UAE newspaper, The National.

As a result, more than 60 prominent European players,
including Chelsea's Eden Hazard, Arsenal's Abou Diaby and Paris Saint-Germain's
Jeremy Menez, publicly warned that holding the U-21 in Israel would be “seen as
a reward for actions that are contrary to sporting values.” Published last year
as Israeli forces attacked Gaza, the players declared: "We, as European
football players, express our solidarity with the people of Gaza who are living
under siege and denied basic human dignity and freedom.” UEFA, denying that it was mixing sports and
politics, rebutted criticism of the awarding of the tournament to Israel by
saying that it would bring ‘people’ – Israelis and Palestinians -- together

Even Qatar, the nation that has gone the furthest in seeking
to address criticism and engage with its critics, has so far been unable to
shift the epicenter of international public opinion and perception. Its major
issue is lack of adherence to international labor standards and labor
conditions denounced by trade unions and human rights groups as modern day
slavery rather than expected Islamic restrictions on fan behavior during the
2022 World Cup, persistent unproven allegations of wrong doing in its campaign
to win hosting rights and concern about lack of a soccer tradition and extreme
summer temperatures.

Criticism of labor conditions, including the restrictive
sponsorship system that puts workers at the mercy of their employers, not only
in Qatar but in the Gulf at large, is long standing. What has changed is that
the hosting of the World Cup has shifted the playing field. The driver of
pressure for change are no longer human rights groups like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch who have at best moral power and little
ability to mass mobilize but an international trade union movement that
potentially can activate 175 million members in 153 countries.

With foreign workers constituting a majority of the
population and at least half a million more expected to swell their ranks to
work on World Cup-related infrastructure projects, Qatar has moved to improve
material working and living conditions and the 2022 organizing committee has
issued a charter of workers’ rights. The
moves fall short of union demands for the creation of independent workers’ organizations
and collective bargaining and despite talks with labor ministry officials has
put the two on a collision course with the International Trade Union
Confederation (ITUC) demanding that world soccer body FIFA deprive Qatar of its
hosting rights.

The jury is out as the battle unfolds. The outcome is likely
to demonstrate the limits of the leverage of both parties and the price they
risk paying. The unions could well succeed in reducing if not stopping the
influx into Qatar of unionized labor but are unlikely to persuade millions of
impoverished unskilled and semi-skilled Asian workers from seeking greener
pastures and a better life for their loved ones. To project success, the ITUC
has to win the buy in of its members, many of whom are preoccupied with
resolving problems arising from the global economic crisis. By the same token,
Qatar will likely have little problem retaining its hosting rights and
attracting non-unionized labor, but will continue to suffer reputational
damage, defeating one of the goals of its comprehensive sports strategy.

If reputational damage and failure to achieve a key goal is
a host nation’s primary risk, activists may see achieving that as a moral
victory. Similarly, they are likely to claim any progress such as an improvement
of workers’ material labor and living condition as a success even if they were
unable to meet their ultimate goal.

Underlying their inability, however is the
fact that in taking on Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel they were
addressing issues perceived by government to effect national security if not
their nation’s very existence. That inability highlights limitations to their
power and the uphill battle of sparking a meaningful broad-based global
campaign like the sports boycott of South Africa that ultimately was effective
only because it exploited a willingness in the international community to
confront apartheid. The international community has proven so far to have
little appetite for paying more than lip service to workers’ rights in the Gulf,
women’s rights in Saudi Arabia or Israeli policies towards the Palestinians.

At the bottom line, the message for host countries is: mega
events constitute a platform for showcasing both a country’s positive aspects
as well as its warts. The question potential hosts have to ask themselves is what
price are they willing to pay in terms of reputational risk if they are not
willing or able to address their vulnerabilities. That question is all the more
acute as international sports bodies like FIFA are under pressure to make
human, labor and women’s rights part of the criteria for awarding events. In
doing so, they are likely to raise the barrier for a country’s chance of
gaining the opportunity to host a major event.

For activists, the message is one of empowerment but
empowerment that comes with the responsibility to employ it effectively. The
trade union’s battle with Qatar over labor rights is likely to become a case
study. With nine years to go until the World Cup, the question is whether ITUC
played its trump card too early by already asking FIFA to deprive Qatar of the
World Cup.

In doing, so the ITUC has gone out on a limb. Union
officials concede privately that European unions are preoccupied with austerity
measures and stark unemployment in the Eurozone, US unions confront slow
recovery in North America and Asian unions with the exception of Japan have
demonstrated little engagement.

“What happens to the workers if Qatar loses the World Cup?
The ITUC loses its bargaining chip. Moreover, they are campaigning for taking
away the World Cup even before the bids for construction of stadiums have been
awarded. Qatar’s construction boom will continue with or without the World Cup.
Even if they lose those workers, others will come. It’s the market’s push and
pull factor. If the Nepalese don’t come, the Bangladeshis will. If the
Bangladeshis don’t come, the Vietnamese will and if the Vietnamese don’t come,
the Chinese will,” said an independent labor analyst.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog

Monday, June 3, 2013

If there is one lesson Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan should have drawn from the popular revolts that toppled four Arab
leaders and sparked civil war in Syria in the last two years, it is that police
brutality strengthens protesters’ resolve and particualrly that of militant,
street battle-hardened soccer fans.

As police on Friday unleashed tear gas and water cannons on
demonstrators opposed to the planned destruction of a historic park on
Istanbul’s Taksim Square, thousands of fans from rival clubs, united for the
first time in decades, arrived to protect the protesters and raise morale.

In a replay of events on Cairo’s Tahrir Square that toppled
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, thousands of fans took up positions, erected
barricades, counterattacked the police and threw tear gas cannisters straight
back into the ranks of law enforcement.

“It was a critical moment. Supporters of all the big teams
united for the first time against police violence. They were more experienced
than the protesters, they fight them regulalrly. Their entry raised the
protesters’ morale and they played a leading role,” Bagis Erten, a sports
reporter for Eurosport Turkey and NTVSpor said.

To be sure, Turkey is not Egypt, Taksim is not Tahrir, at
least not yet, and Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP)
is not the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey unlike Egypt has long been a pluralistic
society, albeit with warts, and had a tradition of protest. Whether Taksim
turns into Tahrir is as much dependent on the protesters’ ability to persevere
and on whether Mr. Erdogan maintains his defiant stance or listens to criticism
that is widespread rather than continueing to bank on the fact that he retains
a massive base of popular support among conservative segments of Turkish
society.

What started out as an effort to save trees has mushroomed
into the most serious challenge to Mr. Erdogan’s decade in government that
intially was marked by serious democratic reform, significant economic growth
and Turkey’s emergence as a regional powerhouse. Mr. Erdogan is Turkey’s first
prime minister in decades to have swept three elections with enough votes to
form a one-party government.

Yet Turkey outranks countries like China, Iran and Eritrea
in the number of journalists it has incarcerated. And while the gap between
secular and conservative segments of society initially narrowed under his rule,
Mr. Erdogan’s more recent hubris and haughtiness coupled with Islamist-tinted
measures has renewed secular suspicion of his true intentions.

That suspicion together with excessive police force is what
drives the mushrooming protest in a society that is more or less split between
secularists and conservatives. Some secularists wonder whether the police
intervention in Gezi Park does not have roots that go back to 1909 when that
location was where under the Ottomans the Young Turks defeated the Hunter
Brigades who were calling for the introduction of Islamic law.

What is emerging is that there are four apparent parties to
the current crisis in Turkey: the secularists, Mr. Erdogan’s Islamists, the
police and the military. Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist rival Fethullah Gulen, a
powerful, self-exiled, Pennsylvania-based cleric, who wields influence in the
police may well have seen the protests as an opportunity to undermine the prime
minister. Mr. Erdogan’s party colleague, President Abdullah Gul, is viewed as
close to Mr. Gulen. In a veiled reference to Mr. Erdogan, Mr. Gulen recently
preached against hubris. For their part, reports circulating in Istanbul say
that the military, which shares secularist suspicisions, has refused police
requests for help and that a military hospital had even handed out gas masks to
protesters.

Secularist suspicion is also what prompted militant, mostly
secular Turkish soccer fans used to fighting each other, to unite much like
they did in Cairo. The fans were driven by an instinctive dislike of the police
that makes them sensitive to excessive use of force, particularly when it is aimed
at suppressing legitimate expression of dissent.

Tension was already mounting between the police and the fans
before their entry into Taksim Square. Police last month attacked Carsi, the
militant Besiktas JK club’s support group and the most politicized of the supporters,
as they marched after a final league match to celebrate the end of the season.
The clash was sparked by the fact that the fans were getting to close to Mr.
Erdogan’s Besiktas office near the club’s stadium.

“The intensification of police control inside and outside
the stadia led the ultras to adopt a mode of military organization and a
warlike attitude against the police. As a result football hooliganism qua
social problem has to be regarded as the legacy of such policing,“ Italian
sociologists Alessandro Dal Lago and Rocco De Biasi argued already 15 years ago
in an essay about militant Italian soccer fans.

“What happened on Taksim is incredible, it is unbelievable. Two
weeks ago we were discussing how divided we were, how intolerant fans of
Galatasaray, Fenerbahce, Besiktas, Trabsonspor and others were. We felt the
culture of football was deteriorating. Occupation Gezi Park (the Taksim Square
park) has changed that,” a Turkish militant said.

On Taksim Square, the fans, taunting the police, chanted in
unision:

“You can use you tear gas bombs, you can use your tear gas
bombs,

Have courage if you are a real man,

Take off your helmet and drop your batons,

Then we’ll see who the real man is.”

The ball is in Mr. Erdogan’s court. Restraining his police
and saving trees on Taksim are unlikely to do the trick. Mr. Erdogan will have
to re-build bridges and demonstrate that he listens to those who elected him as
well as those that didn’t by among other things pursuing an agenda that is
inclusive rather than overtly Islamist.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

Almost a week of countrywide protests in Turkey have left an
indelible mark on the country’s political landscape: broad discontent with the
policies of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s policies and increasing
haughtiness bubbled to the surface; militant soccer fans thousands of whom
joined the Taksim Square protests united and were politicized; and the role
police force plays in solidifying opposition groups and resolve was highlighted.

Mr. Erdogan’s intransigence and hard-handed police attempts
to suppress the protest with tear gas and water cannons swelled the ranks of
the demonstrators and turned a demand for perseverance of a 75-year old
Istanbul park into a massive call for the prime minister’s resignation.
Thousands of militant fans of Istanbul’s three rival soccer clubs led by the
left-wing, most politicized of the support groups Carsi, the ultras’ of
Besiktas JK, joined forces for the first time in 30 years as they march to
Taksim Square. So did rival soccer fans in other cities.

Comparisons between Taksim and Cairo’s Tahrir Square that has
come to symbolize the ability of the street to topple a government are
tempting. To be sure, there are superficial similarities but these are outstripped
by the differences. The two square share the unification of rival soccer fans
with a history of fighting one another; the occupation of a main city square;
the protesters’ slogan: Erdogan, istifa! or Erdogan resign in imitation of
Egypt’s Mubarak irhal! or Mubarak leave!; the violent police crackdown; and the
ultimate at least partial government backdown.

But unlike mass demonstrations that toppled leaders in North
African nations, the protests in Turkey are against a democratically elected
leader who has won three elections with a respectable majority, presided over a
period of significant economic growth and repositioned his country as a
regional power with global ambitions. They also occurred in contrast to Arab
countries in a country that despite all its warts is democratic and has a strongly
developed, vociferous civil society.

The Taksim protests in the week that Istanbul celebrated its
capture by the Ottomans 560 years ago have sent Mr. Erdogan an unambigious
message: discontent with the prime minister’s authoritarian streak, the Turkish
government’s support of Sunni Muslim rebels in Syria, increasing government
control of large chunks of the media and attempts to stifle independent
reporting and commentary, and suspicion that he is attempting to Islamize
public life is mounting. The protests constitute a warning that maintenance of
his style of government could as yet turn Taksim into Tahrir.

A decision by the diverse, uncoordinated groups that came
together on Taksim not to occupy the square and build a semi-permanent tent
camp to press their demands for reversal of their demands for preservation of
the park that is to be replaced by a shopping mall, an apology by the police
for its heavy handed use of force and resignation of the Erdogan government has
taken the wind out of the protests. The momentum has temporarily shifted in favor
of Mr. Erdogan but to retain it Turks will have to see a real change in his
style of governing. Mr. Erdogan benefits from the fact that with no soccer
league matches scheduled for the foreseeable future, stadiums, a traditional
protest venue in a soccer-crazy country, militant soccer fans are deprived of
their natural organizing grounds.

Despite this, major questions remain that need to be addressed
and answered to prevent soccer fans and thousands of others from returning to
Taksim and other city squares across Turkey. Will Mr. Erdogan back off his
plans to redevelop Taksim that has already led to the shutting down of the
square’s historic bakery, Inci Pastanesi, and its iconic Emek Theater? Mr. Erdogan
responded to this week’s Gezi Part protest by saying the government would push
ahead with its Gezi Park plan “no matter what they do.” The prime minister warned that he could put 100 people on the street for every anti-government protester.

For much of the week, events on Taksim and in other Turkish
cities were underrreported in much of the media in Turkey, which ranks high on
the list of media-unfriendly countries according to the number of incarcerated journalists.
The government strengthened in May its grip on the media with its takeover from
financially troubled Cukurova holding television stations and Digiturk pay-tv.
The underreporting was allegedly after government phone calls to various media.

The explosion of discontent allowed secularists with the
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the lead to turn the protests
into alleged Islamization of society. Secularists point to this month’s new
restriction on the sale and consumption of alcohol and the naming of a third,
controversial Istanbul bridge that spans the Bosporus as the Yavuz Sultan Selim
or Selim the Grim Bridge in honor of the Ottoman sultan widely blamed for the
massacre of Alevis in the early 16th century. Alevis, accounting for
an estimated 20 percent of the population, although distinct from Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite community see Mr. Erdogan’s support for
Syria’s Sunni Muslim rebels has further disregard of their concerns and have
tapped into widespread popular dislike of the government’s anti-Bashar policy.

An interior ministry investigation into the police’s
crackdown on Taksim ordered by Mr. Erdogan will also have to clarify whether
the crackdown reflected the split between the prime minister and Fethullalh
Gulen, who is also opposed to unrestricted Turkish support for the Syrian
rebels. Mr. Gulen, a powerful, self-exiled, Pennsylvania-based cleric, is
believed to wield considerable influence within the police force.

The two men have clashed in the past year over measures to
prevent match-fixing after Turkey was rocked by a major match-fixing scandal.
Mr. Erdogan defeated Mr. Gulen’s attempts to ensure harsh penalties which would
have weakened the prime minister’s grip and potentially strengthened the clerics
influence in Fenerbahce FC, which has a fan base of millions.

“Erdogan is smarter than the Egyptians. He lets people
demonstrate. He caters to the rights of
the religious and the Kurds to garner votes and ignores the secularists. The
fans are largely secular. This week’s demonstrations have shown that one can
stand against the government and that soccer fans can work together. Things
will settle for a few weeks. But Erdogan is on notice,” said a soccer fan as he
marched against the government in Izmir.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer blog.

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About Me

James M DorseyWelcome to The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer by James M. Dorsey, a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa is played as much on as off the pitch. Stadiums are a symbol of the battle for political freedom; economic opportunity; ethnic, religious and national identity; and gender rights. Alongside the mosque, the stadium was until the Arab revolt erupted in late 2010 the only alternative public space for venting pent-up anger and frustration. It was the training ground in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where militant fans prepared for a day in which their organization and street battle experience would serve them in the showdown with autocratic rulers. Soccer has its own unique thrill – a high-stakes game of cat and mouse between militants and security forces and a struggle for a trophy grander than the FIFA World Cup: the future of a region. This blog explores the role of soccer at a time of transition from autocratic rule to a more open society. It also features James’s daily political comment on the region’s developments. Contact: incoherentblog@gmail.comView my complete profile