There is a very successful campaign going on to reform the law of libel.

Jack Straw has already promised that the government will do something – what isn’t quite clear, but in reality the only way that the law can be changed is by an Act of Parliament. One of the major reasons put forward for the need for reform is the assertion that libel tourists – nasty foreign terrorists, fraudsters, politicians and despicable celebrities – are now using the English courts to sue for libel in order to suppress uncomfortable truths, scientific debate and legitimate criticism or comment. They are able to do this, it is said, because our libel laws are draconian compared with defamation law elsewhere in the world. The English law of libel therefore has a chilling effect on freedom of speech and must be changed.

The arguments put forward are summarised in the report “Freedom of Speech Is Not For Sale” by English PEN and the Index on Censorship. This report is an interesting document. I may as well say straight away that (having done quite a bit of research for this post – I’m not a media lawyer) I am in favour of some reform of the law of libel. It must be wrong that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that his defamatory statement is true (as opposed to the claimant having to show that it is false). That should be changed. I also think that there should be some kind of specific protection for genuine scientific debate (although this will be quite difficult to achieve – see later on in this post). There also need to be some changes to the way legal costs are dealt with. This is actually nothing to do with libel – it applies to litigation generally – and in fact a review is already under way (again, see later).

However, having said all that, I do find the report quite surprising in a number of respects – some relating to the importance of backing up your factual assertions with the evidence and some relating to a very odd assumption that seems to permeate the whole document. I find it irritating to be hit with a blunt instrument, even if it doesn’t actually hurt that much and the motive behind the bashing is one with which I completely agree. I also think it is really, really important not to oversell and simplify the situation just because that seems to create a more marketable campaign.

In the first part of my posts on this topic, I set out some points that might make you – not change your mind, exactly (because I’m assuming we all want maximum possible freedom of speech) – but, maybe, just begin to wonder whether, actually, it’s a bit more complicated than that.

Does libel tourism even exist?

Eady J doesn’t think so. He’s the Judge who tries a lot of the defamation cases in the London courts. He said in the Guardian in December 2009:

“I believe the suggestion is that there is a large queue of people, loosely classified as ‘foreigners’, waiting to clog up our courts with libel actions that are without merit and which have nothing to do with our jurisdiction… [This] is not a phenomenon we actually come across in our daily lives.”

This got a sharp response from John Kampner, chief executive of Index on Censorship (who produced the report linked to above). He said,

“Eady’s remarks appear to fly in the face of all the evidence.”

Well, only one of them is right. Either there are lots of foreigners trying to take advantage of our libel laws in our courts, or there are not. I thought I might try to find out.

The Ministry of Justice and the Department for Constitutional Affairs publish all kinds of interesting statistics as to the cases which come before the English courts. In 2004, there were 267 defamation claims issued (pg 39). In 2005, there were 252 (pg 38). In 2006, there were 213 (pg 44). The 2007 report is randomly missing. In 2008, there were 259 (pg 47). The figures for 2009 are not yet available. So the total number of defamation actions does not appear to have gone up – which it would, right, if lots of new foreign defendants were issuing writs all over the place? Almost all cases settle before they get to trial. In 2008 there were only 8 trials. By the end of 2009 there had only been 13 (para 6.2 of pg 328 – this report gets a bit more discussion below – it’s really important). (I can’t find the data for the number of trials in previous years.) But a small increase in full trials is probably neutral and on any view doesn’t support the hypothesis that the defendants are all being crushed by the power of the evil claimants, now does it?

I tried and failed to find any statistics at all dealing with the identities of the various parties to the defamation actions.

Why doesn’t she just look in the report, I hear you ask. Well, I have. And sure enough the report asserts, in terms (pg 6), that:

“Over the last decade, increasing numbers of foreign claimants have brought libel actions in the English courts, often against defendants who are neither British citizens nor resident in this country.”

There’s no reference to any evidence, or even the source for the assertion. Wait a second. I’ll just say that again. There’s no reference for this assertion.

That is, in my view, pretty rubbish. It wouldn’t stand up in court. And it’s better, isn’t it, if people show you on what they are basing their statements, so that you can see for yourself whether it is true.

The Appendix to the report cites 16 examples of defamation actions. These cases date from 1984 to 2009. You will appreciate that over that period there were probably between 5,000 and 6,250 defamation actions issued. Even if all 16 of the cases in the Appendix were between foreign parties, it wouldn’t demonstrate anything. As it is, only 11 involve a foreign element and some of those are plainly not being cited as examples of libel tourism but of other problems (such as the Matthias Rath claim against Ben Goldacre, which plainly should have been dealt with by the UK courts because the relevant articles appeared in the Guardian which has a UK audience – the problem with that action is the attempt to stifle scientific debate of Mr Rath’s claims about his vitamin pills). Further, the authors of the report haven’t given any references even for those cases. Again, this is important so that one can check that the case is being accurately summarised. It would also have been very very easy – most judgments are available online, for free, at the brilliant site BAILLI. And one assumes that the authors had a hard copy of the judgment in front of them when they wrote the report. They could easily have put that online.

So, at best, the jury’s out (sorry). If anyone can point me in the right direction to some proper hard evidence that demonstrates that foreign libel claims have increased (NB – as opposed to just examples of foreign libel claims: that won’t prove anything), I’d be very interested to see it. Especially as Mr Kampner says that the evidence exists.

Even if it does exist, does it matter?

Just calm down and think about it. Assuming English libel law is right, why are we bothered if foreigners want to come and use the English courts to protect their reputations? After all, if English law is correct in the balance it strikes between protecting freedom of speech and protecting reputation, surely it is only something to be proud of that people are able to rely on it for protection in this country and not in their own.

In commercial litigation, it is very frequently the case that one or both sides in a dispute are foreign (either individuals or foreign companies). They are quite often not only foreign but resident in a tax haven. The reason that they are in the English courts is because we have a reputation for having the fairest, most commercially sensible laws and the most unbiassed and uncorruptible judiciary in the world. Yes – if you live in the UK, you have two things to be proud of. The NHS, and the legal system. So what international businessmen do is make English law the law of their contract, and they agree in the contract that the dispute will be resolved in the English courts.

This is a very, very good thing. It brings revenue to the UK because all these businesses and individuals pay UK lawyers to conduct their disputes. It makes London even more of an international trade hub than it already is.

So why are we so bothered if some foreigners want to come and use our courts for their defamation actions? They will, after all, also have to pay. The only logical reason to object is because we think that the law itself is wrong, so that these claimants are enabled by our law to obtain judgments that they shouldn’t be able to get – not because they are foreign, but because that judgment shouldn’t have been granted against anyone.

So the real issue must be (of course) whether the law is right or wrong. Before I go on to consider this (in Part 2 of this post), there is one further point that seems to me pretty important.

Hang on – what if the claimants are right?

In all of the discussion of these issues in the English PEN report in particular but in the media generally both online and old style, it seems to be assumed in every case that the defendants’ defamatory remarks were in fact true. This is despite the fact that in several cases, there is a judgment which finds that they were not true or the defendant itself has retracted the comment and even apologised. What if, in some of these cases, the claimant is right to complain about what was said?

Now please do not say that this does not matter because anyone should be allowed to say anything they like because we all have a human right to freedom of speech. This is plainly not right. The fact that the human right to freedom of speech is qualified by a number of factors is recognised by the Conventions themselves: the European Convention of Human Rights provides at Article 10 (in full):

Article 10 – Freedom of expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. [My emphasis]

So I assume we all agree that the protection of reputation is important. And, therefore, we agree that the more serious the allegation, the more harm it can do to a person’s reputation and the more important it is that the person can put that harm right. In short, preventing a person making a scandalous and untrue allegation is not an infringement of their freedom of speech. It is part of the balance of rights and responsibilities that ought to exist in a civilised democracy.

The most serious allegations might be something like paedophilia. Or war crimes. Or, perhaps, terrorism.

Which brings me on to the paradigm case which is always referred to in this context: Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz & others v Dr Rachel Ehrenfeld. You can read Mr Justice Eady’s (yes, him again) judgment in full here. I really recommend that you do – it is quite short and extremely interesting.

Dr Ehrenfeld wrote a book called Funding Evil in which she said that Khalid Bin Mahfouz and his two sons were involved in various respects with funding terrorism (there is a very good account of the book, the English litigation and the US litigation brought by Dr Ehrenfeld on Wikipedia). 23 copies of the book were sold in the UK via Amazon and the first chapter was available online. The sons were the owners of a UK company. The family were well known to the UK banking world. The family owned 5 homes in the UK. It seems difficult to contend that these defendants didn’t have a reputation to protect in the UK. The fact that only 23 copies of the book were sold might go to the amount of damage to that reputation, but not to its existence in this jurisdiction.

The Bin Mahfouz family sued. Dr Ehrenfeld did not defend the action. She said she did not have the financial resources and that she would not be able to win due to the lack of protection afforded by English libel law (more on both of these issues in Part 2). The Bin Mahfouz family could have relied on the English presumption of falsity in order to obtain judgment. They did not. At paragraphs 42 to 63 of the judgment, Eady J goes through the evidence which they put forward to refute the evidence put forward by Dr Ehrenfeld (either in her book or in pre-court correspondence between the lawyers). He finds that there is no merit in any of the evidence put forward by Dr Ehrenfeld. Obviously, the investigation that he could carry out was limited since Dr Ehrenfeld was not there (and she would presumably say that she would have put forward some more evidence had she taken part), but it is pretty clear from Eady J’s review that there are some serious holes at the very least in the assertions put forward in Dr Ehrenfeld’s book: see in particular paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment. It is to be noted that later editions of Dr Ehrenfeld’s book do not attempt to deal with the points made by the Judge as to the truth of her claims. This would have been a cheap (and you might think obvious) way of putting forward her side of the story.

Eady J also records the Mahfouz family’s numerous defamation claims (leading to judgments in their favour and/or withdrawals of the various allegations) in various jurisdictions (not just England). One way of seeing this is that the Mahfouz family are using libel actions all around the world to suppress the truth about their involvement in terrorism. The other explanation is that the Mahfouz family are doing the best they can to stamp out an extremely serious and highly damaging rumour, which is simply not true. I make no comment as to which is right. I do however object to the case being discussed on the basis of an unthinking assumption that Dr Ehrenfeld must be right, simply because she has the misfortune to be the defendant in a libel action in England.

Part 2 coming soon

I therefore ask you to read Part 2 of this post (coming I hope this weekend, the day job permitting), with perhaps more of an open mind, and less of an assumption that the rights and wrongs of this issue are all one way, than you might previously have had.

Supporting the campaign and have written to my MP – Bridget Prentice. The response is a typical govt park it in a review and not deal with the issues. They are setting up a working group, but and I quote “The scope of group’s activity will extend to all aspects of substantive libel law in England & Wales….. but will exclude issues relation to costs in defamation proceedings” This last point is the massive hole. It still leave the position where the large corps can abuse the system, because they can afford to. In addition – the working group is a place to park this and forget it until after the election. This government never deals with things unless some political capital in it. There has been a blip in awareness and now they are tyring to hide it under the carpet. Need to up anti.

I applaud an evidence-baed approach, but how will you address evidence which is not published?

In a recent Charon podcast the interviewee stated that he knew personally of several hundred self-vanishing (super-) injunctions, which cannot therefore be published, but which could – at least until the trafigura embarrassment – be obtained seemingly almost at the drop of a hat.

Do these count as defamation actions? They certainly count as a priori gaggings of the press whether for alleged defamation or alleged privacy concerns.

I think there is also a major issue with the quality of secret injunctions – the Tiger Woods one was almost self-satirical.

And a second area is with bullying that is made possible by the *threat* of libel action. One example there is the attempt by Schillings to prevent the publication of a Craig Murray book, and occurs regularly on blogs. Murray published both the C&D letter and the book.

An example of after the fact bullying is with news which can be reported elsewhere but not in the UK – for example Nadhmi Auchi weeding unfriendly articles from the British press, including forcing the New Statesman to remove a list of previously removed articles.

I’ll be interested to see your approach to the “shadow” of defamation law, cast outside the courts.

As I see it, the evidence of other States seeking to protect their citizens against the effect of our laws is a strong part of the evidence.

Obituary of Khalid bin Mahfouz. Private Eye September 2009
So farewell then Sheikh Khalid bin Mahfouz. The funder of al-Qaeda, sponsor of the most corrupt bank of the late 20th century and greaser of the wheels of politics died of a heart attack in Jeddah last month at 60 years of age.

If the legal profession had a shred of gratitude, a procession of sobbing solicitors led by a bereft Mr Justice Eady would carry his body to the grave. For the world will remember the plutocrat for the enriching English lawyers by using our absurd libel laws to stifle debate about his exotic corruptions.

The United Nations and international human rights groups condemned the libel tourism he came to exemplify as a global threat to free speech. The United States was so outraged by the judgements Eady gave in his favour, its Congress began passing a law to protect American citizens from English libel verdicts.

How was it, asked protesting foreigners, that bin Mahfouz could go to court in England and claim that journalists were damaging his “good name” when by any reasonable standard, he had no good name worth protecting in the first place? It was a fair question. Bin Mahfouz was the owner of the National Commerce Bank of Saudi Arabia, and as such was up to his eyebrows in the shady dealings of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. In 1992, after BCCI’s spectacular collapse, the New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau issued an indictment against him. Bin Mahfouz, was a principal shareholder and director in the BCCI Group, it stated. He then secretly withdrew his investment, an action which resulted “in a gross misstatement of the true financial picture of the bank,” as Morgenthau put it. Luckless investors and depositors, who did not realize that bin Mahfouz had got out before the balloon went up, suffered “larger losses when BCCI’s worldwide Ponzi scheme finally collapsed”. Morgenthau described the BCCI scam as a “rent-a-sheikh” scheme. And although Sheikh Bin Mahfouz denied all allegations, he agreed to pay an enormous fine of $225 million, and accept a ban from any further activities in the American banking system.

In addition to his dubious past, naïve foreigners thought that for a litigant seeking to protect his “reputation” in the English courts bin Mahfouz suffered from the further disability that he was not, in fact, English. Nor somewhat surprisingly, was he a Saudi. In 1990, the billionaire acquired – or, rather, bought –Irish passports for himself and 10 members of his family over a convivial lunch at the Shelbourne hotel Dublin with then Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey. Bin Mahfouz promised to invest in the country. Haughey promised him and his loved ones citizenship. The subsequent Cole Inquiry found that Haughey and his cronies breached statutory procedures in the interest of pleasing bin Mahfouz.

Such was the man before whom the English legal establishment prostrated itself. Time and again, bin Mahfouz used the law or the threat of legal action to ban books which mentioned his links to al Qaeda. It was not that he denied that he denied links to al Qaeda. He admitted that he had given bin Laden money, but he insisted, he only when al Qaeda was fighting the Soviets. Equally, he did not deny that money to extremist groups may have passed through his bank or charity, he just said he had no knowledge of them. Writers seeking to test his assertions, and see if there were grounds for the relatives of the dead of 9/11 naming him in their lawsuits or the US Treasury department treating him with suspicion, were clobbered. The serial suer did not allow any reference to him, however hedged with laywerly caveats, to escape unpunished.

In April 2006, Cambridge University Press, about the must most reputable publisher in Britain, released Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, by the equally reputable J. Millard Burr, a former USAID relief coordinator in Sudan, and Robert O. Collins, a history professor. It pointed out that Mahfouz’s charity Muwafaq (“Blessed Relief”) Foundation, was accused in October 2001 by the US treasury department of having transferred funds to al-Qaeda. The authors noted that it was Khalid bin Mahfouz who founded the charity in the early 1990s and provided most of its $20m endowment – but, they also noted, that this did not mean that he knowingly sponsored terrorism, and printed his statement that he “was not involved in the running of the charity”. No good did their care do them. Cambridge University Press pulped the book and issued a groveling apology, which, pointedly, Burr and Collins refused to endorse.

The hapless publisher could not fight a libel case and not only because the law in England notoriously favours the plaintiff. The extortionate costs of defamation actions in England are 140 per cent above the European average, a recent study by Oxford University found, and an academic house operating on tight margins could not risk a potentially crippling bill.

Bin Mahfouz exploited the rich man’s law for all it was worth. Profile books pulped Matthew Carr’s Unknown Soldiers: How Terrorism Transformed the

Modern World, after receiving threatening letters from bin Mahfouz’s lawyers. In March 2004, following a similar threat, Pluto Press agreed to pulp Michael Griffin’s Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in

Afghanistan. At the same time, Mahfouz’s lawyers persuaded Random House to abandon its plan to publish Craig Unger’s American bestseller House of Bush, House of Saud. Random House’s deputy chairman, Simon Master, complained at the time that the expense of fighting a libel suit would be “vastly more than the publisher could hope to earn from the book”.

On and on it went, and when bin Mahfouz lawyers issued a writ against Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It by the American author Rachel Ehrenfeld it must have seen like just another standard day’s work at the office. Boy did they make a mistake. The redoubtable Ms Ehrenfeld turned Eady’s order that she must pulp he book and pay bin Manfouz costs and damages into an international scandal. And with justice. Funding Evil had never been published in Britain or publicized in Britain, only a few copies reached Britain via Amazon sales on the Internet. Their presence was enough to allow Eady to censor. As Ehrenfeld took her case from state legislatures to Congress, American writers and publishers realized that all the constitutional protections for freedom of speech could count for nothing if a copy of a book reached Britain.

As the Labour MP Denis MacShane said under the protection of Parliamentary privilege: “It is not exactly a secret that a great deal of the money that has financed fundamentalist extremist organisations that support jihad has come from Saudi Arabia. There is no freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia, so it is the duty of others to expose what is happening,” but they could not fulfil their duty because “British courts will not uphold freedom of expression”.

Nor, it seems, will the British press. While he was alive, only the Eye and Index on Censorship braved his lawyers and described the march of foreign censorship through the courts. Corpses cannot sue – not even in England – but not one national paper reported bin Mahfouz’s death or took the opportunity to explain to its readers how he had helped make English law an object of ridicule and fear around the world. In death as in life the chilling effect continued. Even from the silence of the grave, bin Mahfouz’s reputation was enough to guarantee the silence of the lambs of the media.

I agree with Cathy on “reversing the burden of proof”. Doesn’t this reverse the very premise of accusations in law ?. An accused would have to prove their innocence rather than the prosecution proving their guilt.

I believe there needs to be considerable libel reform but that it should actually be made easier for the man in the street to protect his/her reputation. As it is ilibel law is still a law where the rich are at an advantage.

And why shouldn’t a foreigner protect their repuation from false claims in a British publication ?. If that person has an international reputation then they should have a right to the courts wherever possible.

It seems like there is a concerted smokescreen using some cases that involve genuine investigative reporting to kill of all protection. By all means reform laws but be careful off the motive.

Are you sure about reversing the burden of proof?
If I call you a paedophile and you sue me in defamation, currently I as the defendant would have the burden of proving that you were a paedophile. Unser your proposed reform, you the plaintiff would have to prove that you were not so inclined – difficult and unfair.
Suppose I accused you of a heinous act when no one was looking – and you sued – how would you ever prove you didn’t do it?
I think reversing the burden of proof in libel would create unfairness.

[…] while now, I have been urging you to sign up to the Libel Reform Campaign. I still do. However, the first part of another excellent article from Lucifee has caused me to pause and give further consideration to the issue. In it she examines […]

Your post is a thought-provoking and well-written, but I substantially disagree. There are two points in particular where I dissent.

“Eady J doesn’t think so. He’s the Judge who tries a lot of the defamation cases in the London courts.”

Just as in any other walk of life, some authorities have a professional interest in painting a rosy picture of their field. Eady makes made a lot of money from trying libel cases under current English law: it is no surprise that he describes it as a necessary and decent thing to do. I am not suggesting he is corrupt, merely that he has no reason to take any interest in critical analysis of the area.

“But a small increase in full trials is probably neutral and on any view doesn’t support the hypothesis that the defendants are all being crushed by the power of the evil claimants, now does it?”

Do you think the number of full trials and the number of out-of-court settlements are in any way correlated? I see no reason to think so. So it’s probably completely irrelevant to the hypothesis.

Thanks, Lucifee. I suppose I must once have been aware of that, but the reminder was very timely.

There is still some vestige of a point there, probably. One doesn’t hear civil servants from any department claiming that most of their work is unnecessary and could be cleverly made obsolete, or just merged into the work of some other department (even though their jobs are also at fixed salaries and might be relatively secure). I don’t suppose the judging business is any different.

In fact, it could be more true for Eady, since he has at least derived some sort of personal fame or infamy which is bound up in his work in this area.

This is an excellent post, and I’m looking forward to part two, many thanks. I was going to leave an intelligent comment here, but then I realised it might not be so intelligent once you finish your dissection, so I’ll think I’ll wait until then 🙂