The Problem of Natural Revelation in the Thought of Cornelius Van Til

In recent days we have seen some spirited discussion on the place of natural law and natural theology in the life of the church. One figure who stands out as an important member of the discussion about such matters, at least in Presbyterian circles, is Cornelius Van Til, especially in his essay “Nature And Scripture.” In the course of that essay, Van Til discusses two kinds of “natural theology”: that of the Westminster Confession (which he takes to be identical with scripture’s), and the kind supposedly finding its origin in Greek philosophy. In the following, I will discuss his comments on the first kind, and more particularly, his scriptural argument for his position.

The Nature of Natural Revelation

I’ll begin my discussion by noting some important comments Van Til makes about natural revelation. In connection with the “necessity” of natural revelation, Van Til says things such as the following:

To be recognized for what it was in its exceptionality, a contrast was required between it and God’s regular way of communication with man. Ordinarily man had to use his God-given powers of investigation to discover the workings of the processes of nature. Again, the voice of authority as it came to man in this exceptional manner was to be but illustrative of the fact that, in and through the things of nature, there spoke the self-same voice of God’s command…

The revelation that comes to man by way of his own rational and moral nature is no less objective to him than that which comes to him through the voice of trees and animals. Man’s own psychological activity is no less revelational than the laws of physics about him. All created reality is inherently revelational of the nature and will of God. Even man’s ethical reaction to God’s revelation is still revelational. And as revelational of God, it is authoritative…

Now if man’s whole consciousness was originally created perfect, and as such authoritatively expressive of the will of God, that same consciousness is still revelational and authoritative after the entrance of sin to the extent that its voice is still the voice of God. The sinner’s efforts, so far as they are done self-consciously from his point of view, seek to destroy or bury the voice of God that comes to him through nature, which includes his own consciousness. But this effort cannot be wholly successful at any point in history. The most depraved of men cannot wholly escape the voice of God. Their greatest wickedness is meaningless except upon the assumption that they have sinned against the authority of God. Thoughts and deeds of utmost perversity are themselves revelational, revelational, that is, in their very abnormality. The natural man accuses or else excuses himself only because his own utterly depraved consciousness continues to point back to the original natural state of affairs. The prodigal son can never forget the father’s voice. It is the albatross forever about his neck.

Further, in relation to the “clarity” of natural revelation, he writes:

We have stressed the fact that God’s revelation in nature was from the outset of history meant to be taken conjointly with God’s supernatural communication. This might seem to indicate that natural revelation is not inherently perspicuous. Then too it has been pointed out that back of both kinds of revelation is the incomprehensible God…

But this does not mean that on this account the revelation of God is not clear, even for him. Created man may see clearly what is revealed clearly even if he cannot see exhaustively. Man does not need to know exhaustively in order to know truly and certainly…

We have seen that since the fall of man God’s curse rests upon nature. This has brought great complexity into the picture. All this, however, in no wise detracts from the historical and objective perspicuity of nature. Nature can and does reveal nothing but the one comprehensive plan of God. The psalmist does not say that the heavens possibly or probably declare the glory of God. Nor does the apostle assert that the wrath of God is probably revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. Scripture takes the clarity of God’s revelation for granted at every stage of human history. Even when man, as it were, takes out his own eyes, this act itself turns revelational in his wicked hands, testifying to him that his sin is a sin against the light that lighteth every man coming into the world.

So far, then, we could sum up Van Til’s position on natural revelation:

1. Created reality as a whole, and human nature in particular, speak with God’s voice to human beings.

2. This remains true even after the fall, and the sinful suppression of this revelation is never wholly successful.

3. The fact that natural revelation is not the totality of revelation does not mean it is unclear, for human beings can see clearly without seeing exhaustively.

The Qualifications on Natural Law and Natural Theology

At this point, Van Til has said nothing that would depart from the classical Christian view on natural theology and natural law. However, he makes a few other points that may be in some tension with the position:

The natural must therefore by contrast reveal an unalleviated picture of folly and ruin. Nor would the Confession permit us to tone down the rigid character of the absolute contrast between the grace and the curse of God through the idea of “common grace.” Common grace is subservient to special or saving grace. As such it helps to bring out the very contrast between this saving grace and the curse of God. When men dream dreams of a paradise regained by means of common grace, they only manifest the “strong delusion” that falls as punishment of God upon those that abuse his natural revelation. Thus the natural as the regular appears as all the more in need of the gift of the grace of God…

And it is only when the Holy Spirit gives man a new heart that he will accept the evidence of Scripture about itself and about nature for what it really is. The Holy Spirit’s regenerating power enables man to place all things in true perspective.

Man the sinner, as Calvin puts it, through the testimony of the Spirit receives a new power of sight by which he can appreciate the new light that has been given in Scripture. The new light and the new power of sight imply one another. The one is fruitless for salvation without the other. It is by grace, then, by the gift of the Holy Spirit alone, that sinners are able to observe the fact that all nature, including even their own negative attitude toward God, is revelational of God, the God of Scripture. The wrath of God is revealed, Paul says, on all those who keep down the truth. Man’s sinful nature has become his second nature. This sinful nature of man must now be included in nature as a whole. And through it God is revealed. He is revealed as the just one, as the one who hates iniquity and punishes it. Yet he must also be seen as the one who does not yet punish to the full degree of their ill desert the wicked deeds of sinful men. All this is simply to say that one must be a believing Christian to study nature in the proper frame of mind and with proper procedure.

Here Van Til makes the following claims:

4. After the fall, nature must only reveal an “unalleviated picture of folly and ruin,” and common grace only serves to maintain this revelation of ruin, not to restrain ruin.

5. Only through the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit will human beings accept the evidence about nature for what it really is.

6. Because regeneration is a prerequisite for the acceptance of special revelation, only regenerate human beings can observe that all nature is revelational of God, the God of Scripture.

The first thing to note about these claims is that none of them are quotations of scripture. Nor do they come with proof-texts appended. So we can only guess, based on the evidence of this essay, what texts he might have in mind. However, a few further comments can be made about these arguments.

A) The fourth point seems to contradict the second. If nature only reveals unalleviated folly and ruin, and if common grace does nothing to moderate the effects of sin after the fall, how is it that the suppression of truth is not fully successful? The fourth point seems to suggest a doctrine of utter depravity, where the unregenerate are wholly without wisdom in every possible way (“unalleviated folly”), but the second point denies this is so, and affirms that the unregenerate cannot in fact blot out all wisdom (they still retain knowledge of God). So Van Til’s position seems to have a serious problem even on its own terms. In addition, however, it is difficult to imagine where this peculiarly Van Tilian version of the doctrine of common grace is taught in scripture. A doctrine of utter depravity would imply unregenerate people never do anything good in any way. They never tell the truth, they never refrain from murder, theft, adultery, or whatever sin could be imagined. But this is manifestly false, and we are uncharitable to the writers of scripture if we imagine they believed obvious falsehoods.

It is possible that Van Til was being rhetorical and exaggerating at this point, and that he would, in a more sober moment, harmonize points 4 and 2 by saying that this “unalleviated folly” is actually alleviated at various times and places. If this possibility was what he really meant, then Van Til remains within the classical tradition on this matter. However, it seems more probable, given Van Til’s own self-declared relation to the classical tradition, that he was indeed confused and self-contradictory at this point. This will be explored more below.

B) On the fifth point, Van Til seems to suggest that regeneration is necessary for acceptance of natural revelation. Now, there are two possible ways this idea could be interpreted. Firstly, Van Til could mean that unregenerate people need regeneration in order to understand all the facts of nature the way Christians do, i.e., as an order created by the God who became Incarnate in Jesus Christ, etc. This would mean that regeneration was necessary for people to attain the more detailed picture of nature that Christianity presents. It would not, however, necessarily entail that unregenerate people could have no true knowledge about nature. But in this case unregenerate people could know, for example, that nature has a Creator, even if they do not also know, for example, that that Creator became incarnate in a small town called Bethlehem. On the other hand, Van Til could mean that unregenerate people need regeneration to know any facts at all about nature. This would be a much more radical claim. It is also something never taught in scripture, and once again a manifest falsehood. Unregenerate people plainly do know some facts about nature like, e.g., that objects fall when they are dropped. And in light of this fact, there is no a priori reason to suggest they could not know that nature had a Creator, even if they do not know that that Creator was incarnated in Bethlehem. Nor is there a specifically scriptural reason to deny this; in fact Romans 1:20-21 suggests the opposite, by noting that the unregenerate do know that nature has a Creator.

C) The sixth point comes in an elaboration on a fifth point, but seems to provide a different argument. It suggests that the necessity of regeneration for the acceptance of special revelation entails the same necessity for the acceptance of natural revelation. Van Til’s statement that “It is by grace, then…” appears to suggest he was reasoning this way. There is, unfortunately, no such entailment. That is, unless Van Til is making a more restricted claim when he adds the relative clause later in that sentence: “that all nature … is revelational of God, the God of Scripture.” If Van Til here means that unregenerate people will come to accept that the Creator revealed in nature has performed the deeds recorded in scripture only by the grace of regeneration, then his entailment follows. This claim would obviously follow from his point about regeneration, because it is only by regeneration that individuals come to believe the uniquely scriptural claims about the Creator. But such a view would not require anything about what unregenerate people could know based on the facts nature entails about God. However, if Van Til is making the stronger claim, that unregenerate people can know nothing of God from nature until they already accept special revelation (by means of regeneration), then Van Til is simply reasoning fallaciously.

Conclusion

Van Til also makes an extended argument regarding the Greek philosophers and their heritage on this topic, but we will leave this issue to one side, to be addressed by others when appropriate. From the above, however, we can see that Van Til in part supports the classical tradition of natural theology and natural law, and in part departs from it. However, when he does so, he either (a) does so in a way that contradicts what he says elsewhere, or else (b) does so in an ambiguous way, which may in fact ultimately cohere with the tradition if interpreted in a certain manner. When he does appear to depart from the tradition clearly, he also is at his least biblical and rational (in appearing to affirm a doctrine of utter depravity regarding the unregenerate). In closing, I would like to repeat the words of one who is arguably Van Til’s greatest student, Prof. John Frame, who has this to say on his teacher’s problems on this subject (emphasis mine):

Van Til’s view of the “ethics of knowledge” is an area of both strength and weakness. Certainly he is right to insist that non-Christians know, but suppress, the truth of God’s revelation. In Romans 1, scripture makes that assertion quite explicitly. But Van Til seems to search for words in order to express how the unbeliever can in one sense know, and in another sense be ignorant of, the truth of God. In certain moods, he uses the language of “extreme antithesis,” suggesting that the unbeliever has no knowledge at all, that he “knows nothing truly,” and therefore no area of agreement with the believer. Other times, however, Van Til describes various senses in which the unbeliever can and does have genuine knowledge. He says, for example, that although the unbeliever seeks to think according to atheistic principles, he is not always successful in thinking according to those principles. At times, “in spite of himself,” or by ”borrowed capital,” he finds himself thinking in terms of Christian principles instead of non-Christian ones. This and other formulations produce a deep tension in Van Til’s thought. Uncharacteristically, he did admit that this was a problem in his system, one for which he did not have an adequate answer.

While it is true that all the unbeliever’s actions and thoughts are in service of his would-be autonomy, the language of extreme antithesis is highly misleading and confusing to the practical work of apologetics. It is better to say that the unbeliever’s depravity manifests itself in many varied forms, and that the non-Christian can and does utter either truth or falsehood for his purposes.

The doctrine of common grace deals with the question of how God can give good gifts to the non-elect, to the reprobate. More specifically, the question arises of how God can present the promises of the gospel to the reprobate, to those whom he has foreordained not to benefit from those promises. Van Til’s doctrine of common grace gets off to a good start, insisting on the importance of historical process. God gives blessings to the reprobate because the final judgment has not arrived. After human beings are assigned to their final destinies, there will be no more common grace. The elect will be blessed; the non-elect will be punished; and there will therefore be no blessings in common between them.

However, Van Til adds to this account the unhistorical and unbiblical notion that the free offer of the gospel is directed toward a “generality” of people, rather than actual persons. Then Van Til compounds the confusion by postulating, without biblical warrant, a continuous process in which unbelief becomes worse and worse over time.

As a positive contrast, I will cite comments from another article, where Prof. Frame gives some suggestions as to how knowledge of natural law can be used apologetically (emphasis mine):

Therefore we can expect the unbeliever’s knowledge of God to bubble up at times through his consciousness, despite his attempts to repress that knowledge. How does that happen? In several ways: (a) Unbelievers may sometimes display explicitly quite a lot of knowledge of the true God, as the Pharisees did. (b) The non-Christian must assume that the world is not a chaos, but that it is orderly and relatively predictable, even though this assumption in turn presupposes God. (c) In ethics, non-Christians often reveal a knowledge of God’s law.Apologists like C. S. Lewis and J. Budziszewski have pointed out that principles like “Play fair,” “Don’t murder,” “Be faithful to your spouse,” and “Take care of your family” are universally recognized. Although many people violate these principles, they show they know them by making excuses or rationalizations, and by accusing others of violating the same principles.

In other words, they treat the moral law as law. Although some theorize that moral principles are mere feelings, conventions, or instincts, no one really believes that, especially when injustice is done to them. When someone treats us unfairly, we regard that unfairness as an objective wrong. But objective wrongs cannot be derived from mere instincts, feelings, conventions, evolutionary defense mechanisms, etc. Moral rights and wrongs are based on personal relationships, specifically relationships of allegiance and love. And that means that absolute moral standards must be derived from an absolute person. So develops the “moral argument for the existence of God,” q.v. But that argument is based on conscience, a sense of objective right and wrong that is universal, that exists even in those who do not formulate it as an argument. Budziszewski also points out the terrible consequences that result from violating one’s conscience. Apologists should draw on the data of the unbeliever’s conscience to lead him to that greater knowledge of God, which is eternal life in Christ.

Beyond agreeing with Prof. Frame’s (and apparently Van Til’s own) verdict that Van Til had a real problem on this subject, and agreeing with his positive suggestions for the uses natural knowledge can be put to, I am grateful for his example in thinking through these issues independently. It seems, in truth, there is no other option. For all his good intentions, Van Til left his theological descendents with a “deep tension,” a problem without an answer; he left it precisely in the place where he departed from the classical tradition on these matters, and it remains there for his more extreme followers today.

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Written by Andrew Fulford

Andrew Fulford is currently studying for a PhD in Reformation history.

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11 Comments

Hi, First thanks for the article. I found it to have many helpful features

Next, could you point to places where this discussion concerning natural revelation and natural theology and the place of such in the church is happening?

I would like to focus on B)

First, I do not believe that Romans 1 teaches that unbelievers know that nature has a creator. Also to be fair, it does not teach that they necessarily don’t/can’t know that fact either. It simply teaches that they are without excuse if they don’t know.

There is also the issue of the different ways to read the necessity of regeneration. One could say that a person could properly use natural revelation without regeneration, in the sense that there is no gun to anyone’s head to use it wrongly. However our bondage to sin, means that we are in rebellion against the revelation of God and will not use it rightly. Romans 3 speaks to this issue. Until we are regenerated, we will continue in our rebellion against God and attempt to suppress his revelation.

Lastly, there is also the issue of man gaining knowledge from Natural Revelation but then attempting to leave aside how such knowledge is tied to the revelation that there is creator. In some ways, we can think of it as the split between the two tables of the ten commandments. Men can embrace the second table, due to the need for society to function at all properly, but then attempt to suppress the first.

1. I think Rom 1:30-32, among other texts, is fairly clear that unbelievers know they ought to honour God. Paul says unbelievers “know God’s righteous decree that those who practice such things deserve to die,” and amongst the “such things” he includes being “haters of God”.

2) Even as an account of irrational behavior, Bahnsen’s account strikes me (as has his approach to exegesis, theonomy, etc.) as a bit too rationalistic. Why not just come out and say that sometimes people believe contradictory propositions? His analysis seems to me to be caught in the same kind of dynamics that prevented Plato’s Socrates from seeing the possibility of a person knowingly doing what she believes to be wrong. It took Augustine to correct this stream of Platonistic thinking. Augustine’s view of the human person was higher than Plato’s since Augustine saw us as the image of a God who was far higher, personal, and more free than Plato’s Form-of-the-Good. The greater our origin and goal, the greater our ability to fall since, according to Augustine, we were made even capable of using our freedom to turn away from the knowledge of the good and, thereby, from freedom itself. Likewise, though we are in the image of Truth himself, might we not be capable of knowingly pursuing untruth in unreason? If so, then we can’t we believe contradictions?

(3) Couldn’t the belief that not-p be equally well described (and, in some cases, better described) in some other fashion? Such as: Cases of accepting not-p as a working hypothesis by resolving to act as if not-p were true. Cases of taking a policy of action to bring oneself to believe that not-p. Simply asserting that not-p, despite underlying belief to the contrary. Aligning oneself with others who are committed to not-p. None of these cases would count as full-blown belief that not-p (and thus would not count as cases of holding contradictory beliefs), but they might look very much like it. And yet none of these cases necessarily involve Bahnsen’s third condition, that S believe that he not believe that p. Moreover, since Bahnsen seems to allow a distinction between full belief and mere “acceptance” in his first condition (i.e., belief does not entail assent), his account already contains the resources to provide alternative accounts.

The short of it being, sin and disobedience to natural revelation can work out in ways other than rejection of the proposition that there is a creator. It can even be expressed in partial obedience and partial disobedience to that revelation, which would explain why we find varying degrees of goodness outside of the company of the regenerate (rather than simply pure and total evil).

3. I agree with your “lastly” point. I would only add that it’s not necessary that people deny there is a Creator in order for them to dishonour him. The Devil does exactly this according to James, for example.

Hermonta Godwin

5 years ago

Andrew,
1)verses 30-32 are the end of the passage beginning at vs. 21.

v. 21 Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.

The following verses speak of actions WHEN they KNEW God, not that everyone knows God currently. Romans 1 is present tense about the created order revealing God clearly but it is past tense concerning the knowing of God. Paul is not claiming current universal knowledge that god is creator etc.

2. Now looking at your quote from Joel Garver:

“2) Even as an account of irrational behavior, Bahnsen’s account strikes me (as has his approach to exegesis, theonomy, etc.) as a bit too rationalistic. Why not just come out and say that sometimes people believe contradictory propositions?”

Well I am not sure what Bahnsen would say but I would say that people cannot believe contradictory propositions. Such is not simply wrong in some sense, but instead impossible. To believe/think such would require one to set aside the Law of non contradiction (however temporarily it may be). But that law is the presupposition of all meaning. If a proposition or a set of propositions is/are not in conformity to this law, then it is meaningless. If you dont believe such, then just try to do such and maintain meaning.

“His analysis seems to me to be caught in the same kind of dynamics that prevented Plato’s Socrates from seeing the possibility of a person knowingly doing what she believes to be wrong. It took Augustine to correct this stream of Platonistic thinking. Augustine’s view of the human person was higher than Plato’s since Augustine saw us as the image of a God who was far higher, personal, and more free than Plato’s Form-of-the-Good. ”

Augustine was really awesome, but that doesnt imply all that he believed or taught was correct or was an improvement on those who came before him. I agree with Socrates (and others on this point). I think Socrates’ position is easier to defend than the “weakness of the will” position.

“The greater our origin and goal, the greater our ability to fall since, according to Augustine, we were made even capable of using our freedom to turn away from the knowledge of the good and, thereby, from freedom itself. Likewise, though we are in the image of Truth himself, might we not be capable of knowingly pursuing untruth in unreason? If so, then we can’t we believe contradictions?”

Why is it in fact necessary to believe that we knowingly pursue untruth in unreason? What exactly rests on such a belief.

“(3) Couldn’t the belief that not-p be equally well described (and, in some cases, better described) in some other fashion? Such as: Cases of accepting not-p as a working hypothesis by resolving to act as if not-p were true. Cases of taking a policy of action to bring oneself to believe that not-p. Simply asserting that not-p, despite underlying belief to the contrary. Aligning oneself with others who are committed to not-p. None of these cases would count as full-blown belief that not-p (and thus would not count as cases of holding contradictory beliefs), but they might look very much like it. And yet none of these cases necessarily involve Bahnsen’s third condition, that S believe that he not believe that p. Moreover, since Bahnsen seems to allow a distinction between full belief and mere “acceptance” in his first condition (i.e., belief does not entail assent), his account already contains the resources to provide alternative accounts.”

As long as one does not accept that one can believe a contradiction, I am not too concerned about what other model, one wants to use.

“The short of it being, sin and disobedience to natural revelation can work out in ways other than rejection of the proposition that there is a creator. It can even be expressed in partial obedience and partial disobedience to that revelation, which would explain why we find varying degrees of goodness outside of the company of the regenerate (rather than simply pure and total evil).”

I think above, I showed why I don’t believe that the Bible teaches universal knowledge of God, and given such, I dont see how one can argue such without assume that the Bible does teach such.

“3. I agree with your “lastly” point. I would only add that it’s not necessary that people deny there is a Creator in order for them to dishonour him. The Devil does exactly this according to James, for example.”

I agree, and lots of false religions teach that God is the creator, but those adherents are still going to Hell.

Stewart

5 years ago

Hermonta, there is nothing necessarily wrong with some “tension” in theology.

Christianity is full of it.

Nick

5 years ago

I think Hermonta, by saying that it is impossible for people to believe in contradictory propositions, has too high view of sin. Sin is, at its core, irrational. How do you explain Satan rebelling against God? Are you going to say Satan doesn’t know more about God than even we do? We can’t explain the origin of sin precisely because it is a mystery. That is was ordained by God doesn’t make it less of a mystery — and a deeply irrational mystery at that. If God is the source of true rationality, shouldn’t we expect sin to be irrational?

As for Romans 1, I don’t believe it only applies to the past. Paul is clearly making an application in the present tense in 1:32. Romans 3 is the conclusion of the argument Paul started in Romans 1, and that argument applies to people today, not just in the past (e.g., we are all sinners).

[…] article on certain tensions in Van Til’s position, along with some comments on it. Here is that link […]

Hermonta Godwin

5 years ago

Stewart,
Where did I attack tension? One can have tension even if one is forced to conform one’s thoughts to the LNC.

Nick,
I agree that sin at its core is irrational, but how does that bear on this discussion? Just because one’s thoughts conform to the LNC does not imply that one’s thoughts are correct or rational. It is simply the case, that there are limits on what/how one thinks.

Next, Romans 1, clearly applies to the present as I said in the previous post. I specifically said that Romans 1 does not state that everyone presently knows God, but due to General Revelation, everyone is without excuse for their lack of knowledge of God and how He demands that we live.

On top of that Romans 3, fits perfectly with what I said above,

10 As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one:

11 There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God.

12 They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one
—–
People dont know God because they do not want to know God. If they sought after God, they would find and know God.

Stewart

5 years ago

Hermonta,

It seemed implied when you you said:

“Well I am not sure what Bahnsen would say but I would say that people cannot believe contradictory propositions. Such is not simply wrong in some sense, but instead impossible. To believe/think such would require one to set aside the Law of non contradiction (however temporarily it may be). But that law is the presupposition of all meaning. If a proposition or a set of propositions is/are not in conformity to this law, then it is meaningless.”

and

“As long as one does not accept that one can believe a contradiction, I am not too concerned about what other model, one wants to use. ”

Could you unpack these a bit more for me? It is possible I misunderstood you here. If I did, my apologies

Hermonta Godwin

5 years ago

Hi Stewart,
I now see what you are saying and you do have a point. I am attacking any form of tension holding that believes that one can hold two contradictory beliefs in tension. As far as they are contradictory, they cannot be held at the same time. Now if you mean tension by saying that two beliefs seem to contradict and are hard to separate, but dont actually contradict, then I can get on board with such.

Let us look at Divine sovereignty and human responsibility as an example. The two aspects seem to contradict and are contradictory to some (those who hold to hypercalvinism or libertarian free will). But if one digs down one is not forced to say that they are contradictory but instead somewhat difficult (but important) to distinguish and realize that they in fact are consistent.

Stewart

5 years ago

Hermonta, after your clarification, I’d say we are on the same page.

Hermonta Godwin

5 years ago

Stewart,
Also let me add, one cannot hold to contradictory beliefs as long as one “sees” them as contradictory. One is not only limited to holding non contradictory beliefs but also to beliefs that you can distinguish from being contradictory.