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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000698
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PGOVPHUMTU
SUBJECT: MINORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN TURKEY: A
QUESTION OF APPROACH ON PROPERTY ISSUES
REF: (A) ISTANBUL 202 (B) 2002 ISTANBUL 1627
Classified By: Consul General David L. Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent legal changes in property rights for
minority foundations have elicited varied responses from
different religious communities in Turkey. The history of
Turkish and Ottoman minority communities plays into their
respective views on pastoral concerns, political connections,
property issues, and outside audiences. Each community's
pragmatic calculation of its own best interest accounts for
differences in minority community relations with the Turkish
Government. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------
The Unbending Greek Position
----------------------------
¶2. (C) The Ecumenical Patriarch has the difficult task of
occupying the universally acknowledged, but often
disregarded, Patriarchal throne of Constantinople and New
Rome, recognized as ecumenical outside Turkey, but deprecated
by the Turkish state. First among the Patriarchs of all
Orthodoxy, his pastoral duties include ministering to
millions of diaspora Greeks in the United States (as well as
other countries), and a tiny group (around 3,000) of aging
Greeks in Istanbul. His flock, which at the turn of the
twentieth century numbered over 500,000 in Istanbul alone
(and millions throughout Turkey), once owned vast areas in
and around Istanbul, including all of Heybeliada, the island
which still houses Halki Seminary, currently not permitted to
function by the Turkish State.
¶3. (C) Given the small size of the Greek Orthodox community
in Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarch is not heavily encumbered
with local pastoral obligations. American Greeks, from whom
he derives much respect, outside support, and funding,
encourage him to remain firm in his insistence on (1)
recognition from the Turkish State of his ecumenical status;
and (2) reopening Halki Seminary. In a recent submission of
lost property to the General Directorate for Foundations,
Metropolitan Meliton said the Patriarchate submitted claims
for 1,374 disputed properties (other sources say they
submitted close to 2,000). In contrast, Armenians submitted
less than 400, Jews four, and Chaldeans three.
¶4. (U) NOTE: Radikal newspaper reported May 5 that 1593
applications have been submitted to the General Directorate
for Foundations so far. Of those, 574 (or 36 percent) of the
applications were rejected. Of those property claims
rejected, 302 were Greek, 232 Armenian (the article does not
differentiate between Armenian Catholic and Orthodox claims),
and 13 Jewish. END NOTE.
¶5. (C) Additionally, the Ecumenical Patriachate is
considerably less concerned with angering the GoT by voicing
objections to outsiders than the Jews or Armenians. After
the First World War, Greeks transferred some community
properties into the names of private individuals in order to
avoid expropriation. The door, however, was closed behind
them. Until the most recent spate of legal reforms, a
religious community could not make use of these
nominally-private properties. In one case, an orphanage was
tranferred into private hands but could not be further used
by the community. Additionally, Turkish law forbade the
religious minority communities from gaining property through
inheritance, except under special circumstances as determined
by the General Directorate for Foundations. To the knowledge
of ConGen Istanbul, no community has ever received permission
to gain property by inheritance.
¶6. (C) With these memories still haunting the Patriarch and
his supporters, post believes an unwritten decision was taken
not to pursue any legal loopholes in the future. Rather, the
Patriarchate has consistently pressed for explicit legal
recognition of their various property claims (reftel). To
date, this has not borne fruit. However, with a
steadily-shrinking local community and a supportive overseas
flock, the Ecumenical Patriarch has considerably less to lose
than other religious minorities in confronting the GoT.
------------------------
Flexible Jewish Policies
------------------------
¶7. (C) The Jewish community in Turkey numbers approximately
25,000 people, the vast majority of whom are in Istanbul.
The community maintains property primarily on the European
side of the city, with a synagogue and other properties also
on Buyukada (an island in the Sea of Marmara). Despite the
community's size, few legal problems exist, largely due to
the flexible approach the community has taken in maintaining
its properties.
¶8. (C) First, the community tranfers ownership when necessary
to avoid expropriation or other loss. While the Chief
Rabbinate has had a historically close relationship with U.S.
and Israeli diplomats, it avoids adversarial relations with
the Turkish Government. The community avoids formalisti=QQdealing with
he General Directorate for Foundations (which
all communities assess is not favorably disposed to Jewish or
Christian needs to begin with), opting instead to approach
elected officials who can bring pressure on the General
Directorate's bureaucrats from above. Poloff pointed out to
Chief Rabbinate's Lay Vice President Lina Filiba that the
community has a history of finding a modus vivendi within
Turkish law ("and sometimes outside it," she said) to achieve
their goals, while other communities were less flexible.
Filiba said that meeting the spiritual needs of their
community come first, and the means by which this is
accomplished are less important.
¶9. (C) Unlike the Greeks, the Jewish Community has a younger
generation as well as a series of wealthy entrepreneurs who
can assist when financial problems come up. Jak Kamhi
(Chairman of Profilo Holding), the Garih and Alaton families
(founders of Alarko Holding), and others can be depended upon
to assist when necessary. Thus, fighting tooth-and-nail for
one or two small properties that can bring little monetary
compensation at a significant political cost is not their
normal practice.
--------------------------
Tending the Armenian Flock
--------------------------
¶10. (C) Patriarch Mesrob II finds himself in a delicate
position: as head of the Armenian Orthodox community in
Turkey, he must tend to the needs of his sizeable community
(estimated at 65,000 to 70,000 people, now the largest of the
Lausanne Treaty minorities) by working with the Turkish
Government on practical matters such as minority education
policy, church maintenance, and reconstruction of the
patriarchate building. At the same time, his working
relationship with the GoT often comes under criticism from
the Armenian Orthodox Church and the sizeable Armenian
diaspora in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. Reflecting on
the question of whether the tragic events that befell
Armenians in the closing days of the Ottoman Empire should be
called a "genocide" or not, Mesrob has said that the more
important work is to focus community energy on healing,
building bridges between Turks and Armenians, and moving
forward.
¶11. (C) Mesrob has elected to work publicly with the
Government of Turkey. He was the only Patriarch to travel to
Copenhagen to voice support for Turkey's EU aspirations in
the run-up to the most recent accessions. Publicly voicing
pride in his Turkish citizenship, Mesrob has sought to
consolidate the position of his community by adopting a
non-threatening approach. Recently, when asked by poloff
what concerns he had about property issues, Mesrob said that
while there were some continuing concerns, the Armenian
Orthodox community had no intention of airing the problems
publicly, or relying on outside assistance. However, the
Patriarch and others have leveled complaints about property
issues and complications in working with the General
Directorate for Foundations; these complaints are similar to
those of other communities.
¶12. (C) Criticism of GoT policies is balanced with pragmatic
interest in cooperation to improve Armenian community
cohesion. For example, in a recent discussion with poloff,
Armenian Patriarchal Chancellor Tatul said the community
remains interested in recent mother-tongue language laws, and
is considering an Armenian-language radio station (if
forthcoming regulations permit) in addition to their
community newspaper, "Lraper."
----------------------
Unrecognized Suriyanis
----------------------
¶13. (C) Like other sizeable minority communities in Turkey,
the Syrian Orthodox were offered Lausanne Treaty status as
minorities. Reflecting a spirit of patriotism toward the
fledgling Turkish Republic, the Patriarch (then seated in
Antakya, biblical Antioch) said that Suriyanis were Turkish
citizens, and had no need of minority status, as the
constitution would ensure their rights to freedom of
religion. Though both the Suriyanis and the GoT may have
meant well, this left the community in limbo: not protected
by Lausanne, not Muslim, and not foreign nationals. As such,
there is effectively no protection for the Syrian Orthodox
Church.
¶14. (C) In the years since Lausanne, much Suriyani church
property was expropriated by the GoT. The Tur Abdin area of
Southeast Turkey, once home to a huge Suriyani community that
emigrated starting in the 1960's owing to hostility on the
part of Turkish officials, now has a series of abandoned
monasteries and churches where property ownership is in
question; perhaps only 400 Suriyanis remain in Tur Abdin.
The Patriarch eventually left Turkey for Damascus, leaving
behind two Metropolitans (effectively Archbishops), in
Istanbul and Midyat, to serve the still-sizeable community.
Both Metropolitans show great appreciation for any attention
paid to their community and its plight. Seeing the problems
that resulted from an effective non-status for many years,
they quickly recount the past occasions on which foreign
dignitaries and Turkish officials paid them a visit, or even
sent letters of congratulations on religious holidays. In
Istanbul, Metropolitan Yusuf Cetin speaks with admiration for
President Sezer's willingness to visit their church two years
ago (the only President of Turkey to do so).
¶15. (C) Regarding property issues, the Suriyanis claim that
much of what has happened in the past is now beyond the scope
of the current law. Key monsteries and churches remain in
their possession, yet abandoned or expropriated ones have no
congregants. Migrations to Syria, Europe and the U.S., and
Istanbul have emptied much of their population from the
Southeast. Midyat Metropolitan Samuel Aktas says that core
concerns of the community are largely met--worship, Aramaic
classes, and continued functioning of monasteries. However,
when the Suriyanis need to deal with the GoT, they are
usually given unwritten approval for requests. Such tacit
(versus official) acceptance reflects the Suriyanis'
still-unclear status under Turkish law.
ARNETT