22. Hast thou faith? In order to conclude, he shows in what consists the advantage of Christian liberty: it hence appears, that they boast falsely
of liberty who know not how to make a right use of it. He then says, that liberty really understood, as it is that of faith,
has
properly a regard to God; so that he who is endued with a conviction of this kind, ought to be satisfied with peace of
conscience before God; nor is it needful for him to show before men that he possesses it. It hence follows, that if we offend
our weak brethren by eating meats, it is through a perverse opinion; for there is no necessity to constrain us.

It is also plainly evident how strangely perverted is this passage by some, who hence conclude, that it is not material how
devoted any one may be to the observance of foolish and superstitious ceremonies, provided the conscience remains pure before
God. Paul indeed intended nothing less, as the context clearly shows; for ceremonies are appointed for the worship of God,
and they are also a part of our confession: they then who tear off
faith from confession, take away from the sun its own heat. But Paul handles nothing of this kind in this place, but only
speaks of our liberty in the use of meat and drink.

Happy is he who condemns not himself, etc. Here he means to teach us, first, how we may lawfully use the gifts of God; and, secondly, how great an impediment ignorance
is; and he thus teaches us, lest we should urge the uninstructed beyond the limits of their infirmity. But he lays down a
general truth, which extends to all
actions, — “Happy,” he says, “is he who is not conscious of doing wrong, when he rightly examines his own deeds.” For
it happens, that many commit the worst of crimes without any scruple of conscience; but this happens, because they rashly
abandon themselves, with closed eyes, to any course to which the blind and violent intemperance of the flesh may lead them;
for there is much difference between insensibility and a right judgment. He then who
examines things is happy, provided he is not bitten by an accusing conscience, after having honestly considered and weighed
matters; for this assurance alone can render our works pleasing to God. Thus is removed that vain excuse which many allege
on the ground of ignorance; inasmuch as their error is connected with insensibility and sloth: for if what they call good
intention is sufficient, their examination, according to which the Spirit of
God estimates the deeds of men, is superfluous.
434434 The version of Calvin is, “Beatus qui non judicat seipsum in eo quod examinat,” μακάριος ὅ μὴ κρίνων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ᾦ δοκιμάζει; the latter part is rendered by Beza, and Piscator, “in eo quod approbat — in that which he approves;” by Doddridge, “in the thing which he alloweth;” by Macknight, “by what he approveth.” The reference is no doubt to the strong, who
had “faith,” who believed all meats lawful. The verb means to try, to examine, as well as to approve; but the latter
seems to be its meaning here. To approve and to have faith appears in this case to be the same: then to have faith and not
to abuse it by giving offense to a brother was to be a happy man, who did not condemn himself. The meaning then most suitable
to the passage is this, “Happy the man! who condemns not himself by what he approves,” that is, by eating meat to the annoyance
and
stumbling of the weak. — Ed.

23. But he who is undecided, etc. He very fitly expresses in one word the character of that mind which vacillates and is uncertain as to what ought to be done;
for he who is undecided undergoes alternate changes, and in the midst of his various deliberations is held suspended by uncertainty.
As then the
main thing in a good work is the persuasion of a mind conscious of being right before God, and as it were a calm assurance,
nothing is more opposed to the acceptance of our works than vacillation.
435435 The Greek is ὁ διακρινόμενος, “he who discerns,” that is, a difference as to meats; so Doddridge, Macknight, and Chalmers regard its meaning.
Beza has “qui dubitat — who doubts,” and so our version. The word used by Calvin is dijudicat, which properly means to judge between things, to discern, but
according to his explanation it means to judge in two ways, to be undecided. The verb no doubt admits of these two meanings; it is used evidently in the sense of making or putting a difference, but only,
as some say, in the active voice. There are indeed two places where it seems to have this meaning in its passive or middle
form, James 2:4, and Jude
1:22. But as Paul has before used it in this Epistle, Romans 4:20, in the sense of hesitating, staggering, or doubting, we may reasonably suppose that it has this meaning here, and especially
as in every place where he expresses the other idea, he has employed the active form. See 1 Corinthians 4:7;
1 Corinthians 11:29,31; etc. — Ed.
And, oh! that this truth were fixed in the minds of men, that nothing ought to be attempted except what the mind feels
assured is acceptable to God, men would not then make such an uproar, as they often do now, nor waver, nor blindly hurry onward
wherever their own imagination may lead them. For if our way of living is to be confined to this moderation, that no one is
to touch a morsel of meat with a doubting conscience, how much greater
caution is to be exercised in the greatest things?

And whatever is not from faith, etc. The reason for this condemnation is, that every work, however splendid and excellent in appearance, is counted as sin, except
it be founded on a right conscience; for God regards not the outward display, but the inward obedience of the heart, by this
alone is an estimate made of our works.
Besides, how can that be obedience, when any one undertakes what he is not persuaded is approved by God? Where then such
a doubt exists, the individual is justly charged with prevarication; for he proceeds in opposition to the testimony of his
own conscience.

The word faith is to be taken here for a fixed persuasion of the mind, or, so to speak, for a firm assurance, and not that of any kind,
but what is derived from the truth of God. Hence doubt or uncertainty vitiates all our actions, however specious they may
otherwise be. Now, since a pious mind can never
acquiesce with certainty in anything but the word of God, all fictitious modes of worship do in this case vanish away,
and whatever works there may be which originate in the brains of men; for while everything which is not from faith is condemned,
rejected is whatever is not supported and approved by God’s word. It is at the same time by no means sufficient that what
we do is approved by the word of God, except the mind, relying on this persuasion, prepares itself cheerfully to do its work.
Hence the first thing in a right conduct, in order that our minds may at no time fluctuate, is this, that we, depending
on God’s word, confidently proceed wherever it may call us.

434 The version of Calvin is, “Beatus qui non judicat seipsum in eo quod examinat,” μακάριος ὅ μὴ κρίνων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ᾦ δοκιμάζει; the latter part is rendered by Beza, and Piscator, “in eo quod approbat — in that which he approves;” by Doddridge, “in the thing which he alloweth;” by Macknight, “by what he approveth.” The reference is no doubt to the strong, who
had “faith,” who believed all meats lawful. The verb means to try, to examine, as well as to approve; but the latter
seems to be its meaning here. To approve and to have faith appears in this case to be the same: then to have faith and not
to abuse it by giving offense to a brother was to be a happy man, who did not condemn himself. The meaning then most suitable
to the passage is this, “Happy the man! who condemns not himself by what he approves,” that is, by eating meat to the annoyance
and
stumbling of the weak. — Ed.

435 The Greek is ὁ διακρινόμενος, “he who discerns,” that is, a difference as to meats; so Doddridge, Macknight, and Chalmers regard its meaning.
Beza has “qui dubitat — who doubts,” and so our version. The word used by Calvin is dijudicat, which properly means to judge between things, to discern, but
according to his explanation it means to judge in two ways, to be undecided. The verb no doubt admits of these two meanings; it is used evidently in the sense of making or putting a difference, but only,
as some say, in the active voice. There are indeed two places where it seems to have this meaning in its passive or middle
form, James 2:4, and Jude
1:22. But as Paul has before used it in this Epistle, Romans 4:20, in the sense of hesitating, staggering, or doubting, we may reasonably suppose that it has this meaning here, and especially
as in every place where he expresses the other idea, he has employed the active form. See 1 Corinthians 4:7;
1 Corinthians 11:29,31; etc. — Ed.