NINE DAYS AFTER HANDING OVER on the Arno-Tiber Front, Tenth
Indian Division moved forward through torrential rains, over mud-soup
roads, to the relief of Fourth Indian Division on the line of
the Rubicon. For a week well-nigh impassable tracks hampered troop
movements and delayed the take-over. The men waited under the
inclement elements with no more shelter than bivouac sheets provided.
The effect of the weather on offensive operations is often emphasized
in this narrative; it should be remembered that what hampers wheels
and tracks can affect bodies as well. Only the highest discipline
and assurance can sustain morale during comfortless days and nights
in which nothing happens. It says much for Indian troops that
during such periods they remained in good heart and in good health.

On October 3rd, 25th Indian Brigade took over from 7th Indian
Brigade at Borghi, on the edge of the Rubicon Valley. 20th Brigade
relieved 11th Brigade on the Montebello Ridge just north of the
Marecchia. The Divisional front therefore ran north and south,
with a sag in the centre. At its nearest point the Indian troops
were little more than ten miles from the sea. Their mission was
to thrust into the west in order to widen Eighth Army's battlefield.
The countryside lacked the substance of the Tiber landscape. The
hills were little more than bare, sharp ridges, slashed by precipitous
ravines. The area was heavily populated; everywhere solidly built
villages and farmsteads provided the enemy with ready-made pill-boxes
and strongpoints. The village church with its observation tower
and the high, thick walls of the village cemetery, supplied the
nodal points of such defences. As Allied artillery and aircraft
were loath to attack consecrated ground, the Germans established
their headquarters in sanctuary and enjoyed a measure of immunity
during the early stages of any battle.

Once in the line, Tenth Indian Division lost no time in getting
down to business. On the night after taking over, King's Own clashed
with a German patrol near Borghi, killing two scouts dressed in
civilian clothes. The bodies identified One Hundred and Fourteenth
Jaeger Division, old opponents from the Tiber basin, as on this
front. Within forty-eight hours of arrival, a two-brigade assault
went in. 20th Brigade struck from the Montebello positions for
Sogliano, five miles to the west on the Rubicon. Starting four
hours later, 25th Brigade also drove down the line of the Rubicon
to clear San Martino. These attacks were destined to converge
but not to meet, as the capture of either point would be sufficient
to squeeze out resistance east of the Rubicon.

On the right of the Divisional front, King's Own, using artificial
moonlight, went over to the attack at 0300 hours on the morning
of October 5th. Skirting San Martino they swung left-handed and
advanced from the south. Against fierce opposition the leading
company burst into the village. Out of the darkness a heavy counterattack
surged. The British troops were thrown back, losing fifty men.
A company in close support refused to give ground, and throughout
the day counter-attack after counter-attack broke down. That evening
a troop of North Irish Horse tanks arrived, and King's Own smashed
at San Martino again. By 2100 hours the village was in their grip.
Before daylight 1st Durhams from 10th Brigade arrived up to strengthen
the battle line.

On the left, 2/3 Gurkhas with tanks of North Irish Horse in
support, led the thrust on Sogliano. After easy initial gains,
stubborn fighting ensued at a cross-roads which offered the only
breakaway route for the defenders. The Gurkhas stormed this position,
and leaving a Mahratta company in garrison turned into the south,
along the approaches to Sogliano. On arrival at the village the
hillmen found themselves forestalled by fighting patrols of 1/2
Punjabis, their left flank neighbours, who on being held up on
the approaches to Strigara, turned north and established themselves
in Sogliano, afterwards exploiting into the north-west along a
road which descends seven hundred feet with seventeen hairpin
bends in less than a mile. This quick thrust served a notable
end by seizing intact two important bridges across the Fiumicino
River.

Early in the morning of October 6th, in thick fog and pouring
rain, 1/2 Punjabis attacked Strigara anew. The abominable weather
contributed its meed to the tenacious resistance of the garrison.
The attack was suspended during daylight, but resumed immediately
after dark, when the Punjabis were reinforced by two companies
of 4/10 Baluchis. The Indians would not be denied, and after ninety
minutes' fighting Strigara was captured.

Thus in two days Tenth Indian Division had cleared the line
of the Rubicon on a front of approximately five miles. The axis
of advance now turned into the north-west towards Monte Farneto,
where a triangle of precipitous and difficult terrain confronted
the assault brigades. Its apex was at Cesena, eight miles to the
north. It was bounded to the north-west by Route 9 from Rimini
to Casena. To the east the valley of the Savio divided these bad
lands from the equally rugged foothills of the Apennines. These
blunt upland capes thrust into the path of Eighth Army; until
they were secured substantial forces could not find elbow room
for battle, nor fan out on to the northern plains. These ten square
miles of broken ground were held in strength and a major battle
loomed.

Facing the left of the Indian front, two high bare hills stood
sentinel. On the right Monte Farneto, sixteen hundred feet high,
was protected by a maze of deep-cut watercourses, impassable to
vehicles and in wet weather next to unscalable by men. More than
two thousand yards to the west of Farneto stood Montecodruzzo.
This abrupt buttress rose thirteen hundred feet above the plain,
with steep and trackless slopes. Its crest marked the beginning
of a long ridge arching into the north, which gradually fell away
into hillocks towards Cesena. Along the summit of this ridge the
hamlets of Montecodruzzo, Monte Del Erta, Monteguzzo and Monte
Chicco possessed the natural defences of precipitous slopes, deep
ravines on either side, and difficult approaches along a razor-backed
crest. Behind Monte Farneto a similar system of ridges worked
into the north in higgledy-piggledy fashion by way of Monte Spaccato,
Monte Leone, and Monte Reale. Standing a few hundred feet above
the flourishing town of Cesena, Aquarola represented the northern
extremity of these features.

Tenth Indian Division was now confronted with its sternest
test. The flexible tactics which had won ground at low cost in
the Arno and Tiber valleys were no longer of avail. Two German
divisions, strong and full of fight, held these ridge systems.
Only a frontal assault could dislodge them, and that assault must
go in against every obstacle that the terrain, the weather and
the enemy could impose.

It was a mountaineers' battlefield, and at this juncture Tenth
Division had the good fortune to inherit 43rd Gurkha Lorried Brigade.
This acquisition allowed General Reid to commit a strong force
to the attack. On the night of October 6th, 20th Brigade opened
the offensive. At 2000 hours. 2/3 Gurkhas and 3/5 Mahrattas trudged
off on a long night march into the north. In the early hours they
closed up on Monte Farneto. The pelting rain and the impenetrable
night served well, for the enemy apparently had decided that hostilities
were impossible in such weather. His forward positions were unmanned,
and the two battalions swept over their objectives with little
loss. At dawn the chug and roar of tanks announced the arrival
of North Irish Horse, only an hour behind the infantry---a magnificent
performance for tracked vehicles over such terrain.

The enemy was dumbfounded and disorganized. It was only at
noon that the routine counter-attack mustered in the north. By
this time the Divisional artillery had ranged; when an enemy force
of battalion strength struck at Monte Farneto, it was thrown back.
As a second counter-attack developed, the Air weighed in with
fighter-bomber attacks. That evening Northumberland Fusilier machine-gunners
backed the infantry in smashing a third assault. All night and
all next day counter-attacks of varying strength proved equally
fruitless. A forward section of Mahrattas was destroyed in the
mortar barrage which preceded one rush. Another section under
Lance Naik Keshav Shinde disappeared in the melee as their enemies
swept over them, but they emerged battling to clear their post
with bomb and bayonet. An enemy order picked up on the battlefield
instructed the Germans that they must regain Monte Farneto or
perish in the attempt.

On the evening of October 7th, 25th and 10th Brigades went
into action against a ridge taking off from Monte Farneto into
the north. Within seventy-five minutes of leaving their start
lines 3/18 Garhwalis beat down opposition and swept over Monte
Gattona and San Lorenzo. Thirty-eight killed and fourteen prisoners
were the trophies of this sharp encounter, which cost the Garhwalis
less than a dozen casualties. To the south-west of the Garhwalis,
3/1 Punjabis ran into almost impassable ground, with deep nullah-like
watercourses and gradients too steep to be searched by gun fire.
A church on the left flank had been strongly fortified. Attempts
to reach it failed. A similar situation confronted 2/4 Gurkhas
of 10th Brigade, who attacked between the Punjabis and Monte Farneto.
They had been directed on San Paolo, situated on a road junction
to the left flank rear of Roncofreddo, one of the bastions of
the enemy defences. The Gurkhas closed on the village to encounter
another Mozzagrogna. House by house the hamlet was cleared, but
as the battling hillmen fought forward fresh enemies sprang up
behind them. As usual the cemetery and the church became the chief
centres of resistance; among the tombstones ferocious fighting
ensued. Dawn brought no cessation, for in the last hours of darkness
the Germans managed to infiltrate reinforcements into the northern
fringe of San Paolo. Throughout the day fighting flared up again
and again. In the end the series of quick deadly clashes proved
too much for the enemy, who withdrew the remnants of his garrison
during the next night.

10th Brigade had despatched 4/10 Baluchis to seize ground on
the approaches to Montecodruzzo. In an advance along slopes slashed
by innumerable ravines, the Baluchis encountered heavy going.
Whereupon 43rd Brigade, was ordered to concentrate on this flank,
and to devote itself to the assault on the western ridge system.

On the right of the Divisional battlefield 3/1 Punjabis, thwarted
in their first assault, succeeded brilliantly on the night of
October 9/10th. In an attack on Roncofreddo, they swept through
the town in dashing style. Unfortunately Lieut.-Colonel Clifford
was killed next day, the second commander of this battalion to
fall in Italy.

No rest was vouchsafed the enemy. When, after fanatical resistance,
he relinquished San Paolo, the Durhams of 10th Brigade passed
through at once to attack Monte Spaccato, on the next ridge to
the north. As at Monte Farneto the miserable weather was turned
to good account. During a period of ground mist the Durhams, who
were no mean woodsmen, found a number of gaps in the enemy's defences
and filtered through. When the sun broke out, the Germans, going
about their morning chores, found "C" Company of the
North Countrymen embedded in their midst. Fierce hand-to-hand
fighting followed. All company officers became casualties, but
the Durhams clung to their positions. Two bodies could not occupy
one space so the enemy, throwing in a counter-attack as a screen
for his purpose, fell back to a reserve line of defence.

By the evening of October 10th Tenth Indian Division was master
of the forelands of the peninsula of high ground which blocked
the way to the plains. Only on the extreme left, where 4/10 Baluchis
had encountered tough going, did the enemy hold ground below the
main crests. 43rd Brigade now entered the battle. On the night
of October 11th, although neither tracks nor wheels nor animals
could negotiate the greasy rain-soaked slopes of Montecodruzzo,
three companies of the 2/6 Gurkhas made their way up the hillsides.
One company walked into an outpost of the Twentieth German Air
Force Division. The, sentries slept. Three were killed and six
captured without alarm. At first light the hillmen stood on the
crest of Montecodruzzo, having seized the hamlet and the large
square church. It is difficult to understand how the enemy, at
a time when he was rising to frenzy in his attempts to regain
Monte Farneto, should have allowed its companion ridge system
to have been virtually unguarded. Indeed of the two features Montecodruzzo
was of greater importance, as it ran at right angles to the crests
against which the other brigades of Tenth Division were launched,
and so constituted a flank menace to successive enemy defence
positions. Yet for the two days 2/6 Gurkhas continued to consolidate
and to prepare for the next phase with little interference from
the enemy.

On the afternoon of October 12th, after a long and arduous
march, 2/10 Gurkhas arrived at Montecodruzzo. Two companies immediately
pushed forward towards Monte Del Erta. Once again Germans on outpost
were found asleep, and fifteen prisoners taken. Tenacious resistance
from enemy-held houses slowed down the progress along the narrow
ridge, but after bitter fighting, in which elements of two German
divisions were identified in successive counter-attacks, the Gurkhas
established themselves in the Monte Del Erta. From Montecodruzzo,
2/6 battalion moved up to leap-frog their comrades and to push
through to Monte Chicco, the last high knoll and dominating position,
which stood above the river Savio where the triangle of high ground
approached its apex.

On account of the importance of the Chicco position, it had
been decided to synchronize its assault with a similar attack
on the parallel ridge system to the east, where Monte del Vacche
occupied a similar knoll at the northern extremity of the high
ground. To expedite this operation, Durham Light Infantry lost
no time in exploiting their success at Monte Spaccato. On October
12th a daylight patrol worked across the Soara Valley, on to the
forward slopes of the rising ground to the north. "A"
company followed up, and after a sharp fight, in which twenty-three
prisoners were taken, established a firm grip upon the crest of
the ridge. Simultaneously, on the left, 2/4 Gurkhas moved against
Monte Bora , situated on a subsidiary spur of the main saddleback.
When the leading company was held up, Major Scott brought forward
a second company to attack from flank. His men were caught in
the open by enemy tanks which raked them with high explosive and
machine-guns. Major Scott was wounded but remained with his men.
At dawn next morning both Gurkha companies dashed at the objective.
Major Scott's men thrust directly against the centre of the German
resistance, a thick-walled farmhouse with out-buildings, which
spat fire in all directions. The company was pinned down but their
commander snatched a Bren gun from a dead man and raced in, firing
as he ran. Struck again, he went down, but was on his feet at
the head of his Gurkhas when he fell riddled within ten yards
of the enemy. His men surged over the farmhouse and wiped out
the garrison. A heavy enemy shoot compelled a temporary withdrawal,
but other companies immediately moved up and retook the position.

The stage was now set for the master assault on Monte Chicco.
At 2200 hours on October 13th, 2/6 Gurkhas passed their start
line with "D" Company leading. The tiny hamlet of Monteguzzo,
built on a knife-edged ridge, was overrun after a stiff resistance.
"B" and "C" Companies pushed through, and
savage fighting developed among the bare hummocks of the narrow
crest.

Swept from the crown of the hill, the Germans rallied and infiltrated
along the slopes clinging tenaciously to every yard of ground.
Bomb squads crept up to toss grenades into groups battling their
way forward on the summit above them. For a mile behind the fighting
enemy artillery searched the ridge top, so that supplies and reinforcements
ran the gauntlet of incessant shellfire. By dawn, 216 Gurkhas
had reached Monte Chicco, to be held up by furious assaults from
three sides. Both 2/8 and 2/10 battalions sent companies forward,
and the struggle mounted in bitterness throughout the day. Fighter
bombers from the Corps "Cab-rank" intervened with well-timed
and accurate dive attacks on enemy mortar teams. Major C. W. P.
Head, artillery liaison officer, followed the thick of the battle.
As the day wore away, he embodied more and more artillery in his
fire plan. By evening all the Divisional gunners were enrolled
in a box barrage programme which protected the flanks and front
of the heavily engaged hillmen. When night fell a heavy shoot
by spandaus and mortars seemed to presage a continuation of the
tense struggle, but it turned out to be deception fire, under
cover of which the Germans withdrew. By dawn the fighting had
died away, and the Gurkhas walked freely along the high ground
above the deep valley of the Savio.

On the parallel ridge system, 4/10 Baluchis, who had been held
up in front of the Soara Valley, likewise found their front empty
next morning. They pushed on until at Monte Reale they could see
above the diminishing ridges the spires and turrets of Cesena,
less than three miles away. Cesena by now was almost in the grasp
of the Forty-Sixth British Division, advancing from the south-east
in the plain below. On the night of October 16th a Baluchi assault
at battalion strength sent the last enemy rearguards scurrying
from Monte Reale. A few hours later 3/1 Punjabis passed through
and seized Aquarola, a mile nearer Cesena. The battle was not
yet over. In San Demetrio, on a lower and intermediate ridge,
the enemy stood at bay. For fourteen hours the battle ebbed and
flowed around the church and square. Two platoons of Punjabis
infiltrated during the night, and having established themselves,
beat back assault after assault. A German tank moved up and shelled
them at point blank range. Even then the panzer grenadiers could
not close. At dawn the Punjabis emerged from their battered refuges
to find the Germans gone.

Tenth Indian Division had accomplished its mission. In this
skilful and bitter fighting it had doubled the width of the front
through which Eighth Army might advance on to the plains. Its
next directive called for an abrupt change of direction. With
British troops converging on its immediate front at Cesena the
axis of advance wheeled from north into the west, where beyond
the Savio Valley the enemy lay entrenched in a series of strong
hill positions. Even before the close of the Monte Chicco-Monte
Reale fighting, patrols of both 25th and 43rd Brigades had explored
the eastern banks of the Savio, mopping up rearguards and selecting
crossings. There were no roads leading from the ridges into the
valley below, and the main lateral road (Route 71) followed the
enemy's side of the river. It was essential that the Savio should
be crossed at once. As ostentatiously as possible (in order that
the enemy might be led to believe that the full strength of the
Indians was arrayed on the eastern bank), 2/6 Gurkhas, from 43rd
Brigade, and 3/18 Garhwalis from 25th Brigade, sent strong fighting
patrols to probe the river line. The Garhwalis effected a lodgement
on the far bank at San Carlo, five miles south of Cesena, and
the Gurkhas with less difficulty crossed some three miles further
up the river.

The careful reader may have noted that 20th Brigade disappeared
from this narrative after relief at Monte Farneto. During the
bitter fighting on the saddlebacks, Central India Horse had been
exploring the upper Savio in search of fords. At Cella, well to
the south of Montecodruzzo, a shallows was discovered. On October
20th, 20th Brigade with three field regiments under command, unobtrusively
and without opposition crossed the stream at this point and turned
into the north. Moving rapidly through the hills, by the evening
of October 21st the patrol screen was approaching Monte Cavallo.
the first of the fortified positions west of the Savio. The Brigade
was ordered to attack three hours after a similar assault was
launched by 25th Brigade upon Tessello, two miles further north.

At 1700 hours on October 21st, 25th Brigade began to cross
the Savio through San Carlo. King's Own in the lead immediately
deployed, and moved up a broad spur leading into the hills. 3/18
Garhwalis infiltrated on to high ground along a narrow re-entrant,
while 2/4 Gurkhas headed directly up the slopes towards Formignano,
a village prominently perched on the crest of the ridge. Concurrently
20th Brigade closed up from the south against Monte Cavallo, less
than a half-mile south of Formignano. 2/3 Gurkhas led the latter
advance, with 3/5 Mahrattas in close support.

The night was dark and weather conditions appalling. Everywhere
the dogged infantry slogged through squelching mud. Before midnight
all five leading battalions were committed to stubborn fighting.
Situation reports at dawn showed no objectives gained. King's
Own and Garhwalis had been thrown back by a savage counter-attack
from a newly arrived assault battalion. 2/4 Gurkhas were no more
than halfway to Formignano. On the slopes of Monte Cavallo 2/3
Gurkhas and 3/5 Mahrattas were pinned down.

An episode during the counter-attack on the Garhwalis deserves
to be recorded. The Indians ran out of ammunition and the over-bold
enemy closed in for the kill. Naik Trilok Singh, with his section's
last round spent, told his men to sit tight. He would go and fetch
an enemy machine-gun. He stalked a spandau crew as they crept
forward, killed them in hand-to-hand fighting, and brought back
gun and ammunition in time to beat off the next counter-attack
single-handed. Unfortunately this fine soldier died later in the
day while covering the withdrawal of his section.

During October 22nd 1/2 Punjabis moved up to reinforce the
fighting line, while 2/6 and 2/10 Gurkhas crossed the Savio to
fill the gap between 20th and 10th Brigades. That evening for
the first time in Italy, 20th Brigade staged a set piece attack
behind a heavy shoot. 10,000 shells were cast on the enemy positions;
a general assault went in all along the line. On the slopes of
Monte Cavallo, 2/3 Gurkhas crept forward; a swift rush out of
the dark won home everywhere. Strong parties of the enemy were
mopped up; a havildar engaged in clearing houses flushed nineteen
Germans with smoke grenades and took all prisoner. 3/5 Mahrattas
passed through the hillmen and after bitter and confused fighting
closed upon the crest of Monte Cavallo. The defenders struck back
in reckless counter-attacks, during which the Mahrattas held their
fire until the Germans were silhouetted on the skyline above them.
At first light on October 23rd Monte Cavallo was captured. The
exhausted Germans for once failed to muster sufficient strength
for the customary counter-attack.

Indian Sappers and Miners working at top speed had thrown two
Bailey bridges over the Savio. Supplies and support weapons now
reached the fighting men in the hills. 43rd Brigade retrieved
the two battalions loaned to 20th Brigade, and began to leap-frog
into the north-west. 20th Brigade thrust in the same direction
on a slightly different axis, and likewise made ground rapidly.
25th Brigade turned due north, to cleanse the broken ground above
the west bank of the Savio. By the sad irony of war, in the course
of an advance in which little except bickering occurred, three
outstanding personalities of Tenth Indian Division were killed.
The O'Neill, commanding North Irish Horse, was struck by a shell.
Major Anandrao Kadam, a highly esteemed Mahratta company commander
and athlete, who had risen from the ranks, fell, together with
Captain "Tim" Hodge of 68 Field Regiment, one of-the
best-known artillery officers in the Division.

The enemy had dropped back everywhere to the line of the Ronco,
which paralleled the Savio ten miles further west. The river was
in spate, a turbulent torrent twelve feet deep. The weather had
broken completely, and every valley bottom was aswirl with storm
water. 43rd Brigade on the night of October 25/26 closed up on
the Ronco to the north of Meldola, and pushed a patrol across.
Simultaneously

Naba Akhal Infantry, which had rejoined 20th Brigade on October
23rd, reached the river, about the same distance south of Meldola.
Two companies crossed and seized a position on the western bank.
Here they were isolated, without support weapons; but they immediately
despatched strong fighting patrols which contacted groups of 15th
Polish Cavalry Regiment, thus closing the front.

Although resistance along the Ronco was spotty, the enemy was
known to hold substantial forces in the neighbourhood of Forli,
a few miles away. The Divisional sappers at once set to work to
bridge the river. An aerial ropeway was slung over a two hundred
foot gap, and the remainder of Nabha Akals rode in slings to the
west bank. Next day 43rd Brigade discovered a damaged aqueduct
to the north of Meldola, which was made into a bridge by knocking
down the side walls of the channel. The Gurkhas crossed and consolidated
a shallow bridgehead. Tenth Division established advanced companies
for two and a half miles on either side of Meldola, and the forward
brigades immediately despatched strong forces to deepen the perimeter.
On October 28th Nabha Akals drove enemy rearguards off the height
of land between the Ronco and the Rabbi, the next river to the
west. A rapid stroke by 43rd Brigade followed. In a thrust into
the north 2/6 and 2/10 Gurkhas advanced across the open fields
towards Forli. Both battalions after sharp fighting broke through
the enemy defensive cordon, taking forty-five prisoners and killing
many more. By now the Germans had had enough. On October 30th
a wireless intercept revealed them to be retreating everywhere.
Forty-Sixth British Division, Tenth Indian Division and Third
Carpathian Division were all converging on the Forli airfields,
and the Indians in the centre were squeezed out of their front.
First the Gurkha Brigade, then 20th Brigade was withdrawn. Finally
25th Brigade handed over to British troops, and the Indians went
back to well-earned rest.

These operations among the eastern spurs of the Apennines revealed
Tenth Indian Division in its most adept role. Concealment, unobtrusive
infiltration, followed by a violent pounce upon enemies taken
unawares---so ran the tale of attack after attack. General Reid's
slogans inculcated his division with a dominant idea in terms
sufficiently simple to be understood, sufficiently explicit to
serve as a standing guide and instruction. With vile terrain and
abominable weather fighting half the enemy's battle, the Division
refused to be held up, or even slowed down, in its relentless
march across ridges and rivers. As has been pointed out elsewhere,
the narrative must follow the fortunes of the infantry, and it
is only on occasion that a "Shabash" can be given to
the other half of the Division---the gunners, sappers, and men
of miscellaneous services who shared in full the rigours of every
occasion. The lot of artillery in mountain warfare is not a happy
one, yet the British gunners throughout found means of intervening
effectively on every call. Their losses were commensurate with
their activities: during the advance along the Tiber Valley, 68
Field Regiment had more casualties than some of the infantry units
which it supported. The sappers likewise were full partners in
every enterprise. Without their clever improvisations and endless
hours of work in the mud and rain, the enemy could not have been
brought to battle. Colonel Datt's medical units achieved an astonishing
level of efficiency, not only in the handling of casualties, but
in field hygiene and in the prevention of ordinary illnesses.
The anti-tank and antiaircraft regiments, in lieu of regular employment,
became maids of all work. In the course of the advance 13 Anti-Tank
Regiment raised mines, manned mortars, maintained smoke-screens,
built Bailey bridges, and provided crews for field guns and howitzers.
Between the Savio and the Ronco this regiment had rafted their
guns, had winched them up cliffsides, had slung them across ravines
on aerial ropeways, hand-hauled them through shallows, and towed
them with oxen across the hills. 30 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
had been equally versatile: a field poet catalogued its enterprises
in a blithe parody of "IF", the last stanza proclaiming:

If you can drive a tractor in the darkness,
Along a road that winds both up and down,
If you can winch a Bofors up the starkness
Of some foul mountain feature without frown;
If you can lay a line, or spot a mortar,
Or organize the traffic on its way,
If you know how to be a ration porter
Then you'll know why you joined the Light A.A."

It was the spirit behind this versatility that broke the Nazi
grip on Italy.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

EIGHTH DIVISION---FIFTH ARMY'S FLYING
SQUAD

THE NARRATIVE must now retrace its steps, both in place and
in time, and cross the mountains to Florence in mid-August. With
order restored and public services functioning, Eighth Indian
Division was again available for sterner employment.

After 21st Indian Brigade had been relieved in the city, the
Division moved twelve miles to the east, into the Pontasseive
area. Here the River Sieve flows down in a great bend along the
foothills of the Apennines. Within this bend the enemy held a
series of high spurs which constituted the outworks of the Gothic
Line, barring entry into the narrow valleys by which the main
roads climb over the crests of the mountains. Due east of Florence
the first contours of this high ground are rounded and gracious,
tree-clad and heavily cultivated; but as the ridges fuse into
the foothills they tend to become sharp, rugged and irregular.
The Indian front covered the intermediate stage of this transformation,
in which thickly wooded hills rose about thirteen hundred feet
above the river, and in which the rolling countryside had begun
to yield to narrow summits and little crooked valleys.

The Supreme Commander had planned that when the attack upon
the Gothic Line had been launched by Eighth Army, and the expected
withdrawal in the Adriatic sectors had begun, Fifth Army would
mount a massive assault across the Apennines with Bologna and
the Po Valley as its objectives. Should, this stroke succeed,
all German forces south of the Po would be trapped against the
Adriatic Coast. The main Fifth Army attack was deputed to Second
U.S. Corps, while Thirteenth British Corps protected the right
flank of the Americans and conformed with their advance over the
mountain. Thirteenth Corps at this time consisted of First British
Infantry Division, Sixth British Armoured Division, and Eighth
Indian Division, and was deployed with the Indians in the centre
of the Corps area.

Beyond the intermediate high ground on Eighth Division's front
stood the great wall of the San Benedetto Alps, whose crests rose
to more than five thousand feet above the valley of the Arno.
This barrier the Indians must penetrate. From a height of land
not more than thirty miles to the north-east of Florence, a profusion
of streams flowed down to the Adriatic bearing through parallel
valleys into the northeast. The roads naturally followed these
valleys, and for the advance over the mountains a number of alternative
routes diverged from the great centre of Florence. For convenience
these roads will be described in this narrative by their code
names, and the graph on page 124 will show their relationship
to each other. Route 67, a main highway which followed the Arno
to the east before turning north-east along the valley of the
Sieve, was known as Star Route. It debouched from the mountains
at Forli. The second main road from Florence to the Adriatic followed
a parallel course to the crest of the Apennines at Marradi from
whence it forked into the valleys of the Lamone and the Senio.
Sword Route lay in the Lamone Valley and Arrow Route in the Senio
Valley, five miles further west. The grain of the ground was such
that lateral roads were almost non-existent on the eastern slopes
of the Apennines, and this circumstance was responsible for the
early committal of Eighth Indian Division to battle. Less than
fifteen miles above Pontassieve the only cross-road in the mountains
linked Dicomano on Star Route with Borgho San Lorenzo on Arrow
Route, and further west, both these routes with the main Florence-Bologna
highway. This lateral road permitted the enemy to move his reserve
troops from one sector to another, and afforded him alternative
lines of communications through the mountains. It traversed the
Sieve valley immediately under the outworks of the Gothic Line,
and was regarded by both adversaries as a military property of
first importance.

On arrival at Pontassieve, General Russell was warned by the
Commander of Thirteenth Corps that Eighth Indian Division probably
would be called upon to establish a bridgehead over the Arno.
Investigations began immediately. 17th Brigade deployed in the
hills south of the river, and fighting and sapper patrols began
their search for approaches, shallow fords, and exits on the northern
bank surmountable by vehicles. The river rose rapidly after rain
storms, sometimes by as much as five feet in a night. This circumstance
made it difficult to decide upon suitable crossings. On August
21st, 47 Field Park Company, after several unsuccessful attempts
by other units, succeeded in raising the sluice gates at Le Sieve,
which controlled the level of the river. This operation was carried
out under enemy mortar and small arms fire.

The next move was to bring 19th Brigade further east in order
to organize a Divisional front. By August 24th Eighth Division
was disposed south of the Arno on a sector of not more than two
and a half miles, with 17th Brigade on the right, 19th Brigade
on the left, and 21st Brigade in reserve. It was a tight fit,
and General Russell's greatest need was elbow-room. The enemy
fortunately solved his problem. During the night of August 23/24,
Royal Fusiliers heard transport moving to the north-east along
Star Route. It was the first indication of enemy withdrawal from
outpost positions north of the Arno. On the following night, patrols
reported the ridges above the northern bank to be clear. On August
26th both brigades forded the stream, establishing a bridgehead
five miles broad and three miles deep. 7 and 69 Field Companies,
Indian Engineers, went to work at once on bridges. 26 Light A.A.
Regiment, which in the absence of the Luftwaffe devoted themselves
to a miscellany of duties, laid down a smoke screen to cover the
sites and the sappers. By August 27th in spite of incessant shelling,
three bridges had been completed. Thereafter the supply services
functioned without interruption. Beyond the river mule trains
came forward to give the infantry freedom of manoeuvre and assurance
of supplies across the broken ground and over the trackless spurs.

Both forward brigades now began to probe into the hills. The
countryside was not unlike many parts of India, and the sepoys,
accustomed from early childhood to hill climbing and a strenuous
open air life, were completely at home. Sometimes by day, and
always after dark, British, Indian, and Gurkha patrols worked
forward through the narrow cobbled streets of the hilltop villages.
Perhaps the enemy was gone, and the villagers, creeping cautiously
from their cellars, would encounter strange men who gave them
friendly grins and enquired after the Boche in queerly-accented
but quite comprehensible Italian. Elsewhere a sharp challenge
and a crackle of tommy gun fire might break the silence of the
night before the German rearguards disappeared into the darkness.
Sometimes sad tragedies awaited the liberators, as in the hamlet
of Pervecchia, where a Royal Fusiliers patrol found the bodies
of thirteen hostages who had been shot as reprisal for the killing
of a German anti-aircraft gunner by the Italian partisans.

Early opposition was encountered near Tigliano, about six miles
north of the Arno. Here a battalion of Seven Hundred and Fifteenth
German Infantry Division occupied a ridge and showed no disposition
to leave. The commander of 17th Brigade sent forward 1/5 Gurkhas
with instructions to secure Point 526, south-east of the German
position. Thereafter Royal Fusiliers would pass through and working
along the crest would clear the ridge. At 2100 hours on August
28th, "A" Company of the Gurkhas crossed the start line,
closely followed by "B" Company. Two hours later both
companies silently closed on the enemy's first positions. Under
heavy fire the Gurkhas overran the outposts, killing the garrison
and sweeping through to the battalion objective. The Germans counter-attacked
immediately, and fierce hand to hand fighting followed. A platoon
of "A" Company, under Major Benskin, who had been hit
three times, was forced back, but its comrades dourly held on
in spite of raking fire and lack of cover. The left forward company
had barely beaten back one assault when the next rush came. Out
of ammunition, the Gurkhas in traditional fashion leapt with their
knives to meet the enemy. Lance-Naik Raimansingh Rana found himself
confronted with three adversaries. He struck down the first, but
the blade of his kukri stuck in his opponent's skull. He snatched
a spade from the ground and slew a second German. Two instant
deaths unnerved the third Boche, who dropped his machine-gun and
fled into the darkness, with the Lance-Naik in close pursuit,
spade in hand.

By 0530 hours on August 29th, the Gurkhas firmly held all objectives.
Royal Fusiliers passed through, and with them a squadron of 44th
Canadian Armoured Regiment. By 1600 hours, the enemy had been
chased from their positions in disorder. The British infantry's
story is that the Canadian armour did the job. Firing at trees
in order to obtain air bursts over the slit trenches, and setting
fire to the woods by means of incendiary shell, the tanks hunted
the Germans from their bolt-holes until the position was seized
with only slight losses.

1/12 Frontier Force Regiment thereafter took up the running,
and at first light on August 30th passed through Royal Fusiliers.
During the preceding night the Germans had reoccupied a number
of positions, and early in the day the Frontiersmen were pinned
down by heavy machine-gun fire. As dark fell a heavy enemy shoot
crashed down, followed by a counter-attack approximately a half-battalion
in strength. The weight of the drive overran the Indian outposts,
and for forty-five minutes confused fighting followed. The Germans
were first held and then ejected. When morning broke, quiet reigned
with no enemies in the neighbourhood. Whereupon the Frontiersmen
advanced and occupied Poggio Cerrone, an intermediate ridge snuggling
against the haunches of Monte Giovi, which towered to a height
of 3,000 feet to the north-east.

On the left, 19th Brigade also had been busy. When morning
broke on September 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had worked
up to the village of San Brigida, a little more than a mile west
of Poggio Cerrone. As the Argylls moved towards the thickly wooded
slopes, the quiet of the pastoral scene was shattered by the fierce
staccato of machine-guns. The Scotsmen were pinned down. 6/13
Frontier Force Rifles came forward on the left in an endeavour
to turn the position. Monte Calvana, commanding Arrow Route and
protected by twin escarpments with precipitous approaches, barred
the way. Thick groves of oak and walnut afforded excellent cover
to the defenders. Before the Piffers could close, artillery fire
caught them at a crossroads. The battalion mule train encountered
a heavy concentration shoot which caused substantial casualties
and consequent disorganization.

At first light on September 2nd, two companies of Argylls began
to work their way through the thick undergrowth on the right flank
of the position where they had been pinned down. A blaze of machine-gun
fire greeted them; as they bored in, they were met by a billowing
curtain of flame from a flamenwerfer. No further advance was possible.
Similarly, on the opposite flank, 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles found
obstinate and unyielding enemies blocking the way to Monte Calvana.
The day's fighting yielded no gains. That night 3/8 Punjabis advanced
to their start line through heavy shell fire. (One of the casualties
was Major Wright, who will be remembered for his adventures in
crossing the Gari.) A thunderstorm broke, and rain poured in torrents.
Wireless communications broke down; in the undergrowth sections
and platoons lost touch. Individual groups which adhered to the
line of advance found themselves at dawn in contact with the enemy's
main positions, but without the strength to attack. Reorganization
became necessary. At 0800 hours the gunners laid a smoke screen
behind which the Punjabis withdrew.

This tenacious resistance changed Thirteenth Corps role from
auxiliary to partner in the main attack. Instead of conforming
to the American advance on the left, orders were now issued for
an individual attack on the Gothic Line. The immediate objective
for Eighth Indian Division was the most prominent mountain in
sight-Monte Giovi---which stood half-way between Star and Arrow
Routes, dominating both valleys. Three thousand feet in height,
the steeply rising upper slopes of the mountain were bare, with
open grassland upon which sheep grazed. A winding path offered
the only track to the crest. The planners turned to their maps
and began to arrange dispositions to deal with this formidable
obstacle, but before the attack could be launched the enemy obligingly
settled the matter. The fierce resistance in front of Monte Giovi
had been a temporary manoeuvre designed to protect the lateral
road during a period in which German forces were being regrouped
to meet Eighth Army's offensive on the Adriatic front. When the
trans-Apennine transfers of troops had been completed, Wehrmacht
High Command decided to abandon all terrain ahead of the main
battle positions of the Gothic Line. On September 8th, civilian
refugees reported that the enemy had left Monte Giovi, after driving
back all available cattle and sheep. Patrols pushed forward from
both Indian brigades, and confirmed the news. The front was open.

21st Brigade now closed up on the right of 17th Brigade, and
the Divisional front moved forward, covering the oblong between
Arrow and Star Routes. By September 11th patrols from 1/5 Mahrattas
had crossed the Sieve on its western reaches. Without pause the
Indians continued to work up against the ever-rising ground broken
by innumerable small valleys feeding down to the Sieve. Three
miles north of. the river, strongly wired and entrenched positions
were found abandoned. Immediately behind stood a series of imposing
heights which barred the way-high defiant crests which proclaimed
that here was the real thing at last---the Gothic Line itself.

The mountains basked in the summer sunshine, and save for the
endless streams of mules and jeeps which stumbled and bumped along
the mountain tracks, the scene denied the imminence of battle.
As the troops went by, Italian husbandmen paused as they trained
their vines, and their women leaned on their hoes to scan the
columns. On the unscarred slopes, cattle and sheep grazed peacefully.
(The imperturbability of cows while fighting raged about them
was a subject of endless controversy among the troops. Some said
cows had no hearing; some said they had no nerves; all agreed
that they had no sense.) The groves and the cloak of undergrowth
showed no scar, yet carefully collated intelligence had reported
these summits to be raddled with trench systems, revetted and
camouflaged, studded with elaborate bunkers and strongpoints.
Trees had been felled unobtrusively to give better fields of fire.
Concrete machine-gun posts were roofed and casemented. Soil from
the trenches had been carried away lest the fresh earth betray
the positions to aircraft. Headquarters were deep underground,
with buried cables radiating to forward sectors. Belts of concertina
wire, ten yards and more in width, skirted the accessible approaches.
Mines were sown everywhere.

On Eighth Indian Division's front, three principal bastions
barred the way. Le Scalette on the left, Alpe di Vitigliano in
the centre and Femina Morta on the right, stood high above the
countryside, approached only by bare, rocky spurs, with narrow
crests and precipitous slopes. Following the grain of the ground
from south-west to northeast, these spurs joined up with the parent
features well below their crowns, so that any attack along the
ridges would be completely commanded from the summits. The crests
were trackless, with rocky winding footpaths as the only means
of communication and supply.

General Russell planned to lead off with 21st Brigade in an
assault upon Monte Citerna and Monte Stiletto, two feeder ridges
intruding into the Alpe di Vitigliano buttress. 1/5 Mahrattas
were briefed to seize the approach ground, with 3/15 Punjabis
passing through to secure Monte Citerna. Thereafter the Mahrattas
would push on to the north-west against Monte Verruca.

At dusk on September 12th the Punjabis began their arduous
advance. Just before dawn they made contact with the enemy at
Point 632, south-west of Monte Citerna. Day broke upon a thunderous
bombardment which ran for miles along the Apennines, as Thirteenth
and Second U.S. Corps moved to the assault. Punjabi Mussalmans
under Major Nairne scaled an almost vertical cliff and cut through
a belt of wire. Machine-gun fire pinned them down on two occasions,
but thrusting with splendid dash they swept over Monte Citerna
and destroyed the garrison. Without pause the battalion drove
for the central buttress of Alpe di Vitigliano, and shortly after
noon, after climbing always along the reverse slope of the spur,
Lieut.-Colonel Macnamara's men, in a great-hearted effort, routed
the garrison on Point 1015, about half-way between Citerna and
the main objective. The Punjabis had climbed one thousand feet
since dawn and had stormed two positions. They were now halted
by concentrated fire from Monte Stiletto on their right rear and
Le Scalette on their left front. It was impossible to run the
gauntlet of two flanking fires by daylight so the doughty Indians
dug in and waited for night. An officer wrote truly: "The
Punjabis have opened with a magnificent innings."

During the same hours 1/5 Mahrattas had swung to the left,
for the assault on Monte Verruca. The attack was led by "C"
Company under command of Major N. J. M. Pettingell, M.C., and
was watched by General Russell from a vantage point on a spur
1,000 yards below. Major Pettingell, who has been met previously
in this narrative, had reconnoitred his line of attack intimately,
and had arranged an ingenious artillery programme in support of
his assault. It was impossible to deploy more than two sections
of infantry at a time, and therefore it was necessary to draft
a detailed time-table for each individual objective. The leading
platoon crossed the start line at 1620 hours, and headed for a
pin-pointed nest of machine-guns. The Canadian tanks gave close
fire support on a system of pre-arranged signals, and plastered
the first objective until the Indians were within fifteen yards
of the strong-point. As the last shell fell the Mahrattas leapt
in, killing four and capturing fifteen defenders. On the tick
the next platoon passed through, to be held up short of their
objective by machine-guns dug in in defilade, where the tank cannons
could not reach them. Naik Nathu Dhanuwade dived into the scrub,
clambered like a chamois, and reappeared above the German redoubt,
upon which he showered grenades until resistance ceased. The third
platoon followed through as though upon exercise. Divisional artillery
wreathed smoke over Monte Verruca to blind the defenders, and
a sniping gun which had been manhandled up the mountain smashed
the German emplacements with direct hits. Once again with the
blast of the shells the Mahrattas sprang to the close, finishing
off an operation carried out in text-book fashion. The Divisional
Commander was thrilled. "I wish His Majesty had been here
to see it," he said. As soon as night fell a strong fighting
patrol climbed to the crest of Monte Verucca. Only a handful of
enemies remained and they scuttled away as "A" Company
reached the summit. A German captured three days later carried
an unmailed letter which read:

"September 13th was my birthday, and I shall never forget
this one. Tommy attacked and I had a hairsbreadth escape. from
capture. I have never run so fast as I did then, and up a mountainside.
I had received two parcels from home, but everything was left
behind. . . ."

From Monte Verruca the Mahrattas bore into the north-east for
the climb to Le Scalette. A bitter struggle was anticipated, but
fortune smiled. For some reason that is yet unknown, this extremely
strong position which might have defied a brigade fell with only
scattered resistance. By noon on September 14th the first of the
Gothic Line strongholds was the prize of the hard-fighting Mahrattas.
Even better news was to come. After bitter resistance on the lower
slopes of Alpe di Vitigliano 3/15 Punjabis had spent the day in
reorganization. The assault was renewed at 2230 hours that evening.
Enemy artillery and mortar fire searched their line of advance,
and when they closed up on their objective at midnight it was
in anticipation of a grim struggle. The narrow approach compelled
attack on a single company frontage. As the leading platoons clambered
towards the black skyline they were greeted by heavy small arms
fire. Dauntlessly they flung themselves at the crest. A few enemies
remained to die in the weapon pits, but more scuttled to safety
in the dark. The emplacements were mopped up, and a second bastion
of the Gothic Line had fallen.

Of the three main objectives on the Indian front, only Femina
Morta remained in enemy hands. On September 16th, 1/12 Frontier
Force Regiment passed through the 3/15 Punjabis' positions on
Vitigliano. A Gurkha officer had carried out a daring and skilful
reconnaissance, and had found a path up the side of a precipice.
This narrow footway was too precarious to negotiate by night,
so the attack went in at first light. Two companies scaled the
cliff and took the Germans completely by surprise. The garrison
was destroyed and fifteen prisoners taken. The enemy for the first
time in the Gothic Line battle struck back---fiercely and swiftly---but
the ridge was so narrow that only twenty to thirty men could join
in the assault. The Frontiersmen broke every rush. On September
17th they pushed on and mopped up Point 1084, an adjacent razor-backed
ridge which had been selected as start line for the assault on
Femina Morta.

Simultaneously 3/15 Punjabis had sallied from Alpe di Vitigliano
to do some useful tidying up. Pushing into the north, two ridges
on the western approaches of Femina Morta were cleared of the
enemy. This operation gave 1/5 Gurkhas, who came forward to pass
through 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment for the main attack, a secure
western flank. At noon on September 18th the gunners plastered
Femina Morte with a concentration shoot which pinned down the
defenders. Under cover of a smoke screen the Gurkhas scrambled
ahead over rough rising ground. For nearly three hours they forged
slowly upwards against heavy harassing fire. As they drew towards
the summit, opposition weakened, and at 1500 hours the bastion
was won. Twenty-five German bodies were found, and forty-seven
prisoners winkled out of dug-outs and emplacements. The garrison
had been substantial, but the flank threat, together with the
artillery programme and the unrelenting approach of the hillmen,
led to half-hearted defence and early flight.

In seven days Eighth Indian Division had broken through the
Gothic Line. It is no detraction from the superb leadership and
outstanding fighting ability of the Indian soldiers to record
that the case with which this defensive zone was pierced. came
as a surprise to everybody. It is difficult to understand why
positions of such strength, fortified with such care, should have
been entrusted to such meagre garrisons. The German troops did
not fight particularly well, but they were much too thin on the
ground to make an effective stand against well-mounted attacks.
Captured officers attributed the disaster to loss of contact between
Tenth and Fourteenth German Armies, which were heavily engaged
on both sides of the Indians. Other German prisoners stated that
battle reserves were on their way forward and had not arrived.
It seems possible that the real answer lay in the paucity of lateral
communications and that with the Air completely under Allied control
the enemy found it impossible to move reinforcements into the
threatened area.

The brief, bright record of the assault troops is by no means
the full story of Eighth Indian Divisions' assault on the Gothic
Line. Behind the indomitable infantry that clambered and won the
peaks, the entire Division worked in high gear. The smoothness
of the ancillary services was the yardstick of the speed of the
attack. Next to the battle line, both literally and in priority,
came the mule trains, the patient animals and the indefatigable
drivers who followed wherever the fighting men went. They fetched
food, water, ammunition and blankets, and took back litters of
wounded. Day by day Indian sappers drove jeep-head deeper into
the hills. Winding up the mountain slopes for mile after mile,
the narrow tracks looked like threads of cotton against the brown
mountainsides. The Divisional provosts in an unbroken tour of
duty policed these routes in order that the traffic might flow
steadily and without jam. Signallers laid hundreds of miles of
cable; no sooner had the infantry dug in than the telephones began
to buzz. At vehicle-head the stretcher-hearers lifted the wounded
from the litter mules and laid them carefully on specially fitted
jeeps which edged cautiously down the mountain side. The "Q"
Services worked twenty-four hours in each day, replenishing sub-dumps
from main dumps apportioning and delivering supplies by jeep,
mule, and man pack. In a general order General Russell summarized
these exceptional performances.

"To-day, the 24th of September, the Division completes
a year in Italy. Much has happened during this period. The Division
has reason to feel proud of its achievements. Our major battles
have been concerned with river crossings. We can cut notches
for the Biferno, Trigno, Sangro, Moro, Rapido and Arno rivers.
There are more ahead. Between these obstacles, led by our reconnaissance
unit, our success has been largely due to rapid reduction of
transport, maintaining pressure by skilful patrolling and by
hitting really hard when an attack was necessary. Junior leaders
have played a great part in preparing for the kill. Our artillery,
machine guns and mortars have always made it possible for our
infantry and armour to administer the coup de grâce.

"Sappers, Signallers and Services have played an important
part in maintaining the momentum of the advance. The untiring
efforts of Sappers and Miners, bridge-building, mine-laying,
improvising, have ensured our place well up in the hunt. Without
the very high standard of communications, maintained with such
cheerful energy, little could have been done. Those who worked
behind the scenes in the Services tending our sick and wounded,
fitting and replenishing, maintaining and recovering our hard-worked
transport, have had a great share in this successful year.

"Many have performed tasks for which they are not primarily
intended. Ack-ack Gunners have made excellent traffic control
police, and as a smoke-producing unit they have saved many casualties
at considerable risk to themselves. Anti-tank gunners have performed
valuable pioneer work. The spirit of 'Is there anything we can
do to help?' makes it easy for a commander.

"This retrospect is pleasant, the prospect is inspiring.
Keep right on to the end of the road."

In the opinion of many who fought in this battle, the decisive
contribution was that of the Air. Never have the Allied air forces
intervened in greater strength and with greater effectiveness.
All day long the sky above the mountain peaks was filled with
the thunder of aircraft, sallying and returning, with never an
enemy machine to challenge them. Along the narrow valleys, as
on the bare crests, the fighter bombers, the mediums and the heavies,
struck devastating blows. The enemy lived like a beast in this
hole, in terror of what awaited him. By day he dared not move.
After dark when his horse-drawn transport dashed along the roads,
with urgent supplies, the night bombers swooped with destruction
in their maws. As prisoners marched back they often glanced overhead,
where the sky traffic roared ceaselessly. Bitter words came to
their lips and they cursed Hermann Goering as the author of their
downfall.

Everywhere Fifth Army's assault had gone well. The American
attack in front of Florence, under a massive air umbrella, had
broken through the Giogi Pass and was thrusting for Firenzuola,
twelve miles northwest of Marradi. First British Division on the
Indians' left had made good gains against heavy opposition. On
the extreme right flank of the attack Sixth British Armoured Division
had stormed Monte Peschiena, a key position in the Gothic Line,
and the tank men were working up Star Route as rapidly as demolitions
and road blows would permit.

Eighth Indian Division now inherited the thankless task of
bifurcating into two flank guards, and of continuing its march
over the trackless mountains between the two main roads. These
moves represented little in blood and danger, but in terms of
transport the new duties imposed a critical strain upon the Division.
Two brigade groups each requiring two thousand vehicles and five
hundred mules were obliged to operate on diverse axes, using roads
and tracks crammed with the vehicles of the flanking divisions.

During the Femina Morte fighting, 19th Brigade had moved up
on the right of 17th Brigade to cover the flank of Sixth British
Armoured Division. Led by 1st Jaipur Infantry, a recently arrived
states forces unit, the Brigade turned into the east and occupied
a commanding height above the village of San Benedette in Alpe,
from whence a lateral road, now fallen into disuse, had led across
to Marradi. It was necessary quickly to restore this track to
working order. To cover the road sappers 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles
pushed off on a long march through the heart of the mountains
and seized commanding ridges near Monte di Gamogna, to the north-east
of Marradi.

In similar fashion 17th Brigade began to work from peak to
peak above Star Route, the main axis of advance of First British
Division. On September 2nd, 1/5 Gurkhas left the Lamone valley
and followed a rough track up the hillside on to the high ground
to the east. After a sharp clash with a rearguard at Monte Scarabattole,
Royal Fusiliers passed through and thrust against Monte Castelnuevo,
where two German battalions were found to be in garrison. 1/12
Frontier Force Regiment came forward to reinforce the Fusiliers.
Castelnuovo was a strong position, but the enemy preferred not
to fight on even terms, and withdrew. With this height secure,
Marradi was not longer menaced, and the reconstruction of the
much needed lateral road proceeded apace.

A gradual shifting into the west began. After the storming
of Monte Battaglia on September 27th, the American advance veered
from north-east into the north, in a drive for Bologna. To conform,
First British Division took over more ground to the west, and
Eighth Indian Division followed suit. By October 1st, 17th Brigade
was deployed to the west of Sword Route north of Marradi, with
responsibility as far as Arrow Route in the valley of the Senio.
On the right flank, 19th Brigade was similarly spread out over
a sea of mountains as far as Star Route. This increase in frontage
coincided with the arrival of the fresh and vigorous Three Hundred
and Fifth German Infantry Division, which included many men who
wore the eidelweiss badge awarded only to accomplished mountaineers.
But no matter what front or what opponents General Russell's instructions
were to continue offensive operations with the utmost vigour.
Over the mountain crests on stilly nights came the sullen grumble
of guns as Eighth Army smashed its way across flaming ridges on
the enemy's left flank rear. Sooner or later, the Germans would
be compelled to relinquish their grip on the mountains. The task
of the Indians was to speed that hour.

During the first days of October a fresh advance began. On
the right flank, 3/8 Punjabis immediately detected new mettle
in the enemy. Attempts to occupy a nearby feature, Monte L'Alto,
led to brisk scrimmaging, in which Jemadar Anant Ram and his men
dashed across the open against spandau fire and destroyed a number
of outposts. Two days later Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
fought their way up Monte Cavallara, and hurled the enemy from
its summit. The way was open for a bid for Monte Casalino, a steep
tree-clad hill a mile to the north-east. This height barred the
way to Monte Gaggiolo, three miles further north, which rose above
the gut of high ground where Sword and Star Routes converged to
within five miles of each other.

On October 7th, 3/8 Punjabis established two companies on the
lower slopes of Monte Cassalino. Two nights of intensive probing
preceded the assault. Soon after first light on October 10th "B"
Company smashed at the German positions. Heavy fighting followed
and the resistance proved to be beyond a company's strength to
break. When the Punjabis fell back the enemy followed down the
slopes, launching a heavy attack in the middle of the forenoon.
After a grim struggle the Germans in turn abandoned the battle
and returned to their strongholds on the crest of Monte Casalino.

To the west of Sword Route, 21st Brigade, on the evening of
October 13th, found a similar obstacle in its path. Monte Pianoereno
rose to two thousand three hundred feet, almost exactly between
Sword and Arrow Routes, and dominating both highways. The only
approach lay along a narrow ridge which tapered into the north,
barren and windswept, with rocky knolls and huge boulders punctuating
its crest. At 2030 hours on October 17th, a heavy shoot was laid
down on the approach spur. 3/15 Punjabis advanced and after two
hours' hard fighting had swept the enemy from Point 711. Two companies
then turned against Croce Daniele; after two repulses, in which
serious casualties were sustained, a third furious charge won
home. Another company pushed through Point 711 towards Point 768,
but were beaten back three times with heavy losses. The Mahrattas
closed up in close support to continue the assault, but once again
the Germans had had enough and disappeared when darkness fell.

Beyond Monte Pianoereno enemy groups continued to hold clusters
of farmhouses covering Monte Romano. Before dawn on October 20th
two companies of Royal West Kents went forward to deal with these
detachments. The first company to attack was pinned down, and
had to be extricated under cover of a smoke screen; but Major
Gunsey by a clever manoeuvre worked his men into the rear of the
German positions, destroyed the garrison, and took thirty prisoners.
Another smoke screen was laid, this time over Monte Romano. Behind
it the 3/15 Punjabis raced up the slopes. Again. the gallant Indians
encountered furious fire which halted them, and again under cover
of night, the Germans slipped away.

This time the enemy withdrawal was fairly general along Eighth
Army's front. The Americans had smashed through to Monte Grande,
a key position of which more will be heard, only seven miles south-east
of Bologna. On the Adriatic front, Forty-Sixth British Division
had entered Cesena. The enemy could feel the breath of one Army
on his right cheek, of another behind his left ear. Yet the obstinate
foe dare not weaken his mountain positions since they constituted
the hinge on which his front swung both to east and to west. The
withdrawal in front of Eighth Indian Division was more of a realignment
than a retirement, and patrols found the enemy to be in strength
on a series of buttresses between Star Route and Arrow Route,
which commanded strong lay-back and covering positions. There
was now elbow room for deployment and for the first time in the
Gothic Line fighting, all three brigades of Eighth Indian Division
could be brought into the battle line. On the right the Jaipurs
closed up on Monte Campaccio, the southernmost bastion of the
new positions. Next door 1/5 Gurkhas after three attempts ejected
the enemy from Monte Casalino, where the Punjabis had been held
up for two weeks. 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment moved on Monte
Gaggiolo, covering the key buttress of Budrialto. Royal Fusiliers
carried the line down to Maragnano, on Sword Route. 19th Brigade
worked up the Lamone valley along the main axis of Sword Route.
Further west 21st Brigade was deployed with 3/15 Punjabis facing
Monte Giro, and the Mahrattas opposite Monte Colombo. To the joy
of the Indians their old friends of 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment
came barging up the roads into close support, on the first tankable
terrain encountered since the mountain battle began.

The advance had no more than been resumed when such appalling
weather supervened that the commander of Fifth Army ordered the
offensive to be suspended. Regrouping of American forces led to
another Divisional shift. 21st Brigade side-slipped across country
to take over a sector astride Arrow Route. In turn the other brigades
widened their fronts until Indian responsibilities extended over
ten miles of mountainside. The peaks and high ridges were now
behind; on the eastern slopes of the Apennines, the uplands swelled
in softer contours, with vegetation and patches of shrubs replacing
bare rocks and heavy timber.

No sooner had General Russell deployed his men to the west
than they were needed in the east. Second Polish Corps had moved
up through the gorges of the Apennines into the gap between the
Adriatic and the Central Italian sectors, much in the same manner
as Fourth Indian Division had come forward to open the Gothic
Line battle. The left flank of the newcomers rested on the broken
and precipitous ground to the right of Star Route, where Sixth
British Armoured Division had been relieved. In the No Man's Land
between the Indians and the Poles, a high ridge stood to the west
of Star Route, between two roads converging at Modigliano, a pleasant
mountain resort some miles ahead of the battle line. 17th Brigade
therefore was obliged to sideslip to the east, much as 21st Brigade
had extended to the west, for the purpose of dealing with this
high ground on the flank of the Polish advance. Three crests,
Mosignano in the south, Pompegno in the middle, and Monte Bartolo
in the north, marked the summits of this ridge system.

On the night of November 5/6th, 1/5 Gurkhas raided Montsignano
to test the defences. A sharp clash followed,. but next morning
the Germans were gone. By the evening of November 10th the Gurkhas
had closed up on Pompegno, and once again the enemy, perhaps because
of Polish pressure from the east, did not stay to fight. 17th
Brigade was now only two miles short of the last obstacle, the
small grassy knoll of Monte Bartolo. General Russell regarded
this feature as no more than another crest which the enemy in
due course would evacuate. The Polish commander, however, rated
it more highly, declaring that his attack could not be launched
until this ground was secured. General Russell immediately assured
his colleague that there would be no delay, and deployed 17th
Brigade against Monte Bartolo.

On the afternoon of November 11th a Gurkha fighting patrol,
investigating the lie of the land, detected a group of Germans
well dug in on the slopes of this position. Ahead of the patrol
moved two scouts, one of whom was Rifleman Thaman Gurung. By skilful
fieldcraft these scouts worked their way unseen into the midst
of the Germans. Thaman Gurung spotted a nest of German machine-gunners
in the act of swinging their weapons on to the main body of the
fighting patrol. He sprang to his feet and charged. Taken by surprise
the Germans surrendered. The intrepid Gurkha then crawled upwards
to the lip of the ridge, and from there engaged other well dug-in
posts on the reverse slopes. From flank positions German machine-gunners
brought fire to bear on the fighting patrol. Standing in full
view, this lone figure on a bullet-swept hilltop held back the
enemy single-handed until his comrades had extricated themselves.
He then fell mortally wounded, and in death joined the immortal
band of heroes who have earned the Victoria Cross.

Other fighting patrols probed Monte Bartolo to encounter a
similar reception, but each brought back something to be fitted
into the general picture of the enemy's dispositions. On November
13th, artillery searched the knoll with harassing fire throughout
the day, while a troop of Canadian tanks worked forward on the
left flank. As it grew dark, the eerie glow of artificial moonlight
cut through the gloom, and two companies of Gurkhas advanced to
the assault. Enemy machine-guns clattered into action, and a group
of spandaus near a white farmhouse on the summit seemed invulnerable.
For six hours the Gurkhas edged forward cannily, avoiding casualties
but never giving ground. By midnight the investment of the knoll
neared completion and the garrison was in straits. Before dawn
the Germans melted away into coverts in the broken ground below
the ridge. Twenty-four hours later, 6th Lancers entered Modigliano.

While 17th Brigade tidied the right flank, the weather worsened.
Driving rains, turning to snow storms on the summits, pelted the
mountain sides. Thick mists followed, reducing visibility to nil,
and limiting the usefulness of patrols. The ground hardened in
the grip of sharp frosts. Life in the open resolved into a series
of miserable failures to keep either dry or warm. Roads collapsed,
jeep and mule tracks became impassable; sappers worked night and
day. Supply lorries were never off the roads except when they
were in the ditches. The enemy was in better case, for the foul
weather grounded the Allied Air Force, and so gave respite from
incessant attack; moreover, on the crumbling mountain roads horse
transport functioned better than wheels. In the face of such inclemency
it was well-nigh impossible to seize new ground, and completely
impossible to provision and munition further advances. The attack
gradually slowed to a standstill.

During this lull, organization for the battle to come continued
apace. Once again Eighth Indian Division was asked to widen its
front in order to allow heavier concentrations elsewhere. Repeated
sideslips had carried the Divisional flank west of Sword Route.
A further extension now took 21st Brigade across Arrow Route.
By November 19th, 3/15 Punjabis were guarding the western flank
of the Division at Monte Battaglia---the scene of fierce fighting
by U.S. Second Corps at a time when Eighth Indian Division held
a lesser frontage than that now held by 21st Brigade.

On November 26th, the enemy forces began to give ground on
the right flank. 17th Brigade conformed to a turning movement
by Second Polish Corps, and the axis of advance veered into the
north-west. Far across at Arrow Route the same movement was in
progress; behind a screen of rearguards the enemy dropped back
on Veno Del Gesso escarpment---a peculiar earth fault which rears
a high chalk ridge so precipitous on its southern face that only
a trained mountaineer can negotiate it. The Senio and Santerno
rivers cut narrow gorges through this barrier. Should the enemy
elect to stand this sheer wall provided an unequalled rampart
for defence. 21st Brigade with Punjabis and Mahrattas leading
began to clear the ground up to this formidable obstacle.

The advance had scarcely begun when fresh complications arose.
19th Brigade was last reported as moving up Sword Route in the
Lamone Valley. Progress had been slow, less because of enemy resistance
than because of the weather and the difficulties of deployment.
The western swing of the Polish corps now promised to reach the
Lamone further to the north, making 19th Brigade's operation unnecessary.
At this juncture new and urgent employment emerged for Brigadier
Dobree and his men. On December 1st, General Russell was ordered
to despatch a brigade with all speed to reinforce First British
Division on Monte Grande, ten miles to the north-west of the Divisional
flank at Monte Battaglia. Here a mountain buttress towers to a
height of two thousand feet above the valley of the Sillaro River.
Route 9, the main lateral highway of Northern Italy, passes less
than five miles to the north; on a clear day the towers and domes
of Bologna can be clearly seen.

Monte Grande had been the scene of bitter fighting during the
American drive, and the enemy had never acquiesced in its loss.
A sure sign of its importance was the appearance in this sector
of First German Parachute Division---the men of Cassino. These
fanatical and highly trained troops were never entrusted with
holding roles. Wherever they stood, they struck. As soon as the
paratroopers appeared, First British Division was the recipient
of unwelcome attention. Savage raiding thrusts tested sensitive
sectors, and revealed the enemy to be conversant with the weaknesses
of the position. As the resumption of Fifth Army's offensive depended
on possession of this key sector, it was wisely decided to strengthen
the garrison.

For 19th Brigade to travel fifteen miles as the crow flies
necessitated a two days' journey. The weather was windy, wet and
cold. Skidding and sliding, the troop carriers negotiated the
wintry mountain roads: over the crest of the snow-girt peaks,
down the multiple switchbacks along the western slopes, thence
to turn back uphill at Borgho San Lorenzo, to grind slowly forward
over the summits again, and along a second class track into the
valley of the Sillaro. On steep inclines it was sometimes necessary
to winch uphill, while the troops warmed their chilled and cramped
limbs by pushing behind. Only a mule track led from the Sillaro,
to the battle positions on Monte Grande; in its mudholes even
the seldom-beaten jeeps bogged down. Trudging doggedly, the Indians
clambered upwards and by December 6th, 19th Brigade had relieved
2nd British Infantry Brigade. All three battalions were covering
the main Monte Grande positions. On the right, the Argylls held
Frasinetto Ridge; in the centre Frontier Force Rifles occupied
Monte Cerere; on the left 3/8 Punjabis were astride Monte Grande
itself. In each position the crest was narrow, and defence in
depth impossible. Anywhere a sudden rush might win home, and sudden
rushes were the speciality of the paratroopers.

An Argylls officer in a private letter gave a description of
this ominous sector.

"I know how my grandfather felt at Majuba Hill. We had
the high ground and it was of little use to us. Our positions
were under constant observation. We had to sit tight all the
time, just like old Bill in Flanders. A bitter wind whistled
up the valley and curled over the crests, adding one more misery
to sitting in a slit trench all day and all night, with a drizzle
gradually soaking clothing and blankets, and freezing the bones.
A heavy mist would come down; if the paraboys could not see us,
neither could we see them. It was rather eerie this being hunted
through the fog, and we grew very quick on the trigger."

The only positions for artillery and dumps lay in the Sillaro
valley, under intimate enemy observation. The fog which the Argylls
officer mentions was a blend of natural elements and smoke from
the canisters, released to screen traffic movements and gun positions
on the lower ground. Short of the impossible, supply difficulties
achieved on all-time nadir. The journey from jeephead to Frontier
Force Rifles, a distance of under two miles, occupied five hours.
Even the surefooted mules sometimes failed to negotiate the slimy
mud of the hillsides, crashing to death on the rocks below, with
wounded men in their litters.

The enemy was spoiling for trouble. The quiet of the day was
broken regularly by the weird moans of the nebelwerfers, heralding
short fierce mortar shoots on the advanced Indian positions. At
night men slipped from their holes to patrol forward, to lay traps
and ambushes, to stalk on sound and to kill the unwary. The Argylls
were no sooner in position than they were assailed. On the night
of December 6th a fighting patrol of paratroopers sprang out of
the darkness, and after a savage melee managed to snatch three
prisoners. On the same night after vicious mortaring forty Germans
closed from all sides on a house which sheltered a combined post
of Punjabis and Gordon Highlanders, at the junction of the British
and Indian positions. Setting fire to the building with a bazooka,
the paratroopers sought to flush the garrison into the open. The
Punjabis blew back the rush after suffering twelve casualties;
the Gordons lost an officer and eight men as prisoners.

These scrimmages were prelude to the main assault on Monte
Grande. On the morning of December 12th, after a half hour's intensive
mortar and artillery fire, the enemy laid a smoke screen over
Argyll and Frontier Force positions at Frasinetto and Monte Cerere.
Behind this cover a battalion of paratroopers, surged to the close.
On the right of the assault, the Argylls were waiting and as one
of the men put it,. "gave them everything". The attack
disintegrated. On the inner flank of the Frasinetto position,
the Argylls were caught on the wrong foot, half-way between their
day and night stations. Leaping through the smoke and fog, the
adversaries grappled in deadly hand to hand fighting. No quarter
was asked or given. The impetus of their rush carried the Germans
over the advanced posts and the Scotsmen were overrun, save for
two bonny fighters---Lieutenant and Sergeant Reid---who dived
into a ditch and in Wild West shooting matches accounted for a
number of enemies before scrambling to safety in the fog.

In the centre of the position the paratroopers thrust with
equal vehemence against Frontier Force Rifles. The right forward
platoon was overrun, and the Germans burst into the main battle
positions. A reserve company of Frontiersmen doubled into action,
and their weight decided the melee; the paratroopers sullenly
gave ground. Whereupon the storm troopers who had won ground from
the Argylls decided to join the fray. It was their last and worst
decision; as they raced from flank across a hundred yards of open
ground, the Mahratta machine-gunners caught them at point blank
range. Within seconds the hillside was strewn with dead and dying
Germans. Few escaped.

Everywhere except on the inner flank of the Argyll position,
19th Brigade had broken the assault. At 1100 hours First British
Division picked up a disparing enemy intercept, pleading for reinforcements.
This good news stimulated the Argylls, who prepared to put paid
to the remaining intruders. After a half-hour's bombardment with
every available weapon, the Scotsmen charged. They swept over
the lost ground, and by noon were re-established in their original
positions. Under cover of a Red Cross flag German stretcher bearers
moved amongst them, picking up many dead and wounded.

Thirteen prisoners were taken---surly ruffians all, and bitterly
garrulous over their failure. Much interesting information was
proffered. These statements were implemented when an extremely
drunken paratrooper, sent forward on a one-man patrol to ascertain
the fate of his comrades, was snared in front of the Indian positions.
This old sweat declared the assault to have been planned by the
battalion commander against the advice of his officers. "He
was set on fighting," said the tosspot, "because of
the tickling of his throat." The startled interrogation officer
was about to enquire further into this interesting subject of
thirsts, when he remembered the Wehrmacht idiom. The battalion
commander had wished to feel the ribbon of an Iron Cross upon
his neck.

By December 23rd the threat had passed. 19th Brigade was relieved
and set out to rejoin Eighth Indian Division. This time it meant
more than going down one mountain road and up another. A far call
had come for Fifth Army's flying squad, and Eighth Division was
on its way far across Italy. But before relating the diverting
episode of Serchio, it is necessary to return to the Divisional
front between Star and Arrow Routes, where 21st and 17th Brigades
battled forward slowly and precariously against tenacious rearguards,
abominable weather and all but unsurmountable terrain.

The wheel of the Polish attack into the west continued to constrict
the front and to limit the responsibilities of 17th Brigade between
Star and Sword Routes. As a result Royal Fusiliers were loaned
on December 10th to Seventy-Eighth British Division. They migrated
in their troop carriers to a ruined uplands village south of Monte
Grande in the Sillaro Valley. On December 17th the remainder of
17th Brigade crossed to Arrow Route and relieved 21st Brigade,
in order to slog towards the cliffs of Veno Del Gosso. The Poles
had in plan an operation against the eastern extremity of that
barrier. Eighth Indian Division were folded into this scheme,
and its role defined as penetration of the Senio gorge in the
chalk escarpment, thereafter wheeling left in line with the Polish
attack, and seizing the watershed between the Senio and Santerno
rivers. Patrols began to search the eastern cliffsides for scaleable
chimneys, only to find the enemy exceedingly alert. On Christmas
Eve heavy snow fell. A bitter wind swept across the crests, and
the roads were blocked with drifts. The Polish attack, originally
timed for December 29th, was set back, and the Indian brigades
settled down to routine duties in a most uncomfortable locality.

During this wait, events took shape elsewhere. Ninety miles
to the west, in the sectors adjacent to the Gulf of Genoa, there
had been little serious fighting. Both the enemy and Fifth Army
held wide stretches of the Tuscany uplands with sparse forces.
Yet the area was of vital importance to American formations, which
drew most of their material from Leghorn, a port less than forty
miles behind the loosely held front. From Pisa the supply route
turned inland, running eastwards to the picturesque walled city
of Lucca in the Serchio valley, fifteen miles behind the battle
zone. A comparatively limited advance by the enemy in this Sector
might disrupt the main American communications.

In early December intelligence reports revealed an undue muster
of enemy forces in the upper Serchio valley. From this concentration
area, it was possible either to strike down the coastal roads
towards Pisa, or across the equally easy terrain of the Serchio
valley towards Lucca. The latter sector was guarded by comparatively
weak forces of Ninety-Second American (Negro) Division. Early
appreciations did not cause anxiety, but later information suggested
that something was afoot. On the evening of December 22nd, an
urgent instruction flashed to General Russell's headquarters in
the Apennines. Eighth Indian Division, less one brigade, must
move with all haste to Lucca.

Fifty-two miles of winding icebound roads, with two high passes
deep in snow, separated Eighth Indian Division from the Arno valley.
Another fifty miles must be traversed before concentration at
Lucca. To gather up a Division scattered for miles on peaks and
in canyons, and to start all units on an organized trek to another
front, called for feverish staff work. By Christmas Eve marching
orders were out and the Indians under way. As late as Christmas
morning Fifth Army professed to view the move as precautionary;
but Brigadier Dobree, arriving at headquarters of U.S. Fourth
Corps that afternoon, was informed that an enemy attack down the
Serchio valley would be launched within twenty-four hours. As
General Russell had not yet arrived, he was entreated to take
charge, and to organize a support line. As rapidly as Indian units
arrived, they were deployed in defensive positions.

The Serchio valley is wide, easy and well cultivated. A railway
and two highways follow the line of the river, a quiet stream
which averages one hundred feet in width. The area is heavily
populated, with clusters of farmhouses and small hamlets scattered
along the roads and in the glades among the beech woods. The countryside
exhibited no signs of devastation, and the gracious contours and
pleasant expanses delighted the Indians, fresh from a nightmare
existence in the gale-swept valleys of the winter Apennines.

One Hundred and Forty-Eighth German Division, reinforced by
elements of three Italian Fascist Divisions, held the front between
the Serchio valley and the seacoast. All were troops of second
quality. The German division contained many Poles and other impressed
groups of non-German birth, who had lost any enthusiasm which
they might once have had for the Fuehrer. The morale of the Italian
divisions was even lower, with an average desertion rate of forty
daily.

Nevertheless, U.S. Fourth Corps had correctly assessed the
situation. Early on Boxing Day three battalions of 286th German
Infantry Regiment, after a short bombardment, launched an attack
down the Serchio valley. It succeeded beyond all expectations.
The front crumbled and two parallel enemy columns thrust into
the south. Mobile artillery in close support pumped a few shells
here and there and the infantry stolidly followed up and took
possession. By noon it was evident that the line was open, and
that Ninety-Second Division was not competent to offer organized
resistance.

General Russell arrived to find 19th Brigade deployed as a
blocking force. Making the best of his handfulls, Brigadier Dobree
arrayed his men in the localities least easy to by-pass. Slightly
south of Barga, 3/8 Punjabis found a strong position, dug in,
and waited. On their left, 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles covered
the winding road, and prepared to take the shock. South of the
river, under cover of some wooded spurs, Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders spread out and scanned the north for first sight of
the advanced elements of the enemy.

They never came. Either the Germans were too surprised by their
success to exploit it, or the operation had been no more than
a bluff. By the morning of December 27th, General Russell, who
at the request of the American corps had taken command of all
troops in the Serchio valley, felt the situation to be under control,
and proceeded to tidy up. The negro battalions were withdrawn
through 19th Brigade, and the flood of Italian refugees diverted
on to side roads and into the fields.

On December 28th, 21st Brigade arrived and came up on the right
of 19th Brigade. Next day 6th Lancers threw an armoured car screen
across the valley and began to probe forward. The first patrols
into Bagno di Lucca found the Union jack flying, and a Scottish
UNRRA officer, who had hidden under his bed for a few days, nonchalantly
reorganizing his work. A certain amount of outpost bickering followed,
but it was apparent that the Germans had bolted back to their
start line. By New Year's Eve the operation had reached a sufficiently
light-hearted stage to allow a company of Frontier Force Rifles
to relieve the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, in order that
the Scotsmen might celebrate with all due ritual their sacred
occasion of Hogmanay.

After the rigours and deadly encounters of the mountains, this
excursion into the west had proved to be something of a frolic.
It was a different enemy and a different sort of war. When all
ground had been regained, General Russell's mind turned to 17th
Brigade, which had missed the fun. He suggested to the American
corps commander that if granted his full division, he would be
pleased to chase the Boche for any stated distance. But something
even better was in store. Early in January a general relief began,
and the Division dispersed at rest in the Pisa area.

So ended a remarkable tour of duty, which began with a static
role for Eighth Indian Division between two assaulting armies;
to be followed by commital to battle in the critical task of breaking
into the Gothic Line; thereafter a steady extension of responsibilities,
with aid first to the Poles at Monte Bartolo and afterwards to
First British Division at Monte Grande; finally, a long jaunt
into the west and a bit of light relief in the way of war.

HIGH APENNINES

GURKHA SNOW PATROL
(GURKHA PATROL IS FROM THE PAINTING BY CAPTAIN HARRY SHELDON)