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The Iraq-Kurdistan Issue

Shafaq News /
The President of Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani announced on Saturday, that
the US President , Barack Obama pledged to provide all possible support
to Peshmarga forces,

pointing out that the self-determination and independence project is a
natural right of the Kurdish people hoped to be achieved in the near
future.

Barzani's remarks came during an interview with American CNN network,
followed by Shafaq News, as he said that when he met Obama , Biden and
other officials in the United States, he thanked them for their support
and asked them to understand the suffering of the Kurdish people,
pointing out that they understood well and pledged to support Kurds.

In response to a question about pledges to provide Kurds with greater
quantities of arms , directly or indirectly? Because Peshmarga are
fighting in the front lines against ISIS and do not have sophisticated
weapons, Mr. Barzani responded by saying that Obama had a good
information about Peshmarga, praised their role , pledged their support
and sending arms to them.

About the way of weapons arrival to Kurdish forces , will it be
directly or through Baghdad, Barzani noted to the Kurds desire and
sending arms directly, but he also said that the most important thing is
for Peshmarga to receive weapons.

On the strategy of eliminating ISIS terrorist organization, Barzani
pointed out that the strategy of the war against "ISIS" is strengthening
positions and expanded them in terms of arms, financial situation and
combat ability.

Talking about the date of war liberation and the possibility of
liberating Mosul, Barzani pointed out that the liberalization of Mosul
is very important; stressing that there must be a good study and a deep
plan and focused cooperation with Mosul's residents backed by Peshmarga.

He added that this battle will begin in the coming months, stressing
that Peshmarga , the Iraqi army and the United States will be able to
eliminate ISIS and end it.

Barzani said that Peshmarga will achieve victory, stressing that they
have liberated more than 20 000 square kilometers of land from the
control of "ISIS".

About the dream on independence and later achieve it whether this
year or next year, Barzani replied that independence is a process and
they began it and will continue with it, pointing out that it is a
natural right of the Kurdish nation, adding he cannot set a date as to
whether this will be achieved in the current or next year.

Barzani hoped independent to be in the near future.

President of Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani is visiting the United States
of America is on an official invitation from President , Obama and the
US administration as held a series of meetings with senior officials and
attended a number of research and strategic institutes , explaining the
political and security situation in Iraq and the Middle East.

The security situation in Iraq has significantly declined over the
last week. Mosul and Tikrit fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS), an al-Qaeda off-shoot, and Tal Afar, in the Nineveh
province, was seized on Monday.

Additionally, Baquba, only 37 miles from Baghdad, was briefly
over-run by the militants. ISIS have engaged the Iraqi army in Diyala
and Salahuddin provinces and reportedly now control up to 75% of the
Baiji oil refinery, the largest in Iraq. This oil refinery is 210 km
north of Baghdad and should the militants follow-through on their threat
to cut off domestic oil supplies, an already fragile domestic situation
will be exacerbated.

The Kurds have benefitted from this security vacuum and the Iraqi
army’s inability to secure the country. They have moved their peshmerga
forces into areas claimed to historically be part of Iraqi Kurdistan and
are unlikely to withdraw. The presence of the peshmerga is undoubtedly
securing oil-rich Kirkuk and the Mosul dam, which provides Baghdad with
its water supply, however, some critics identify this move as
opportunistic.

The deteriorating security environment in Iraq has also bolstered the
Kurdish region’s position with regards to its’ revenue-sharing
agreement with Baghdad. The Kurdish region has been eager to identify
export routes for its crude oil and on 5th June Turkey and Kurdistan
signed a 50 year oil export deal. With Baghdad facing more pressing
security concerns, the Kurdish region is unlikely to face the usual
backlash entailed in acting without the authorisation of the federal
government.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has actively sought export
routes for its crude oil and its latest oil export deal with Turkey
meets this objective. Kurdistan has proven oil reserves of 45 billion
barrels, with production capacity quickly rising and expected to reach 1
million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015, compared to the current level of
400,000 bpd.

Until this year, oil exports from Kurdistan to Turkey occurred
through road truck deliveries at a rate of 50,000 bpd. Construction was
completed in late 2013 for a new pipeline linking the Kurdish Taq Taq
field with Ceyhan port in Turkey. In November 2013 Turkey and Kurdistan
solidified their relationship with an agreement which would allow the
export of oil via this pipeline to Ceyhan port, commencing on 2 January.
Baghdad and Erbil failed to reach a revenue-sharing agreement on this
and on 23 May 2014 over 1.5 million barrels of oil was exported via
tanker from Ceyhan port. This was followed by a second tanker on 10th
June.

The agreement between Kurdistan and Turkey has been met with
condemnation by the Iraqi government, which claims that all export deals
must receive federal approval. The constitutional agreement between the
federal government and the KRG details an 83:17 sharing of resources
and national budget, however, articles 112 and 115 of the constitution
state that the KRG has exclusive authority over oil and gas extracted in
the region from fields that came into production after 2005.

The KRG claims that all of its current exports come from such fields.
Nonetheless, on 23 May the Iraqi government requested an arbitration by
the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and seeks 250 million
USD in financial damages. Recent tensions between Iraq and the KRG date
back a number of months as Iraq has consistently paid approximately 10%
instead of 17% of owed funds to the KRG.

Although the US, Israel, Germany, France and the Netherlands have all
previously imported Kurdish oil, the internal dispute between Bagdad
and Erbil has signified that neither of these tankers has been unloaded
due to potential legal consequences. The dominant area of disagreement
between Baghdad and Erbil rests in Kurdistan’s preference for Profit
Sharing contracts with foreign oil companies, which allows them up to
20% of the profits versus Iraq’s preference for Service contracts, which
only allow foreign companies 1% of the profits.

Middle East analyst, James Gavin, comments:

“In its long-running stand-off with
Baghdad, Kurdistan urgently needs to secure a viable export channel for
its crude. Turkey’s willingness to load shipments of KRG-origin oil —
the second shipment dispatched from Ceyhan port on 9th June — provides
that outlet. The recent events in Iraq, with ISIS making sweeping gains,
have left the Kurds in an even stronger position to dictate terms to
prime minister Maliki.

“Yet the legality of the sales is
still questioned, and a buyer has still not been found for the first
tanker shipment. As yet, the Kurds have not found a long-term solution
to their oil marketing problem — even if in the crude calculus of
Erbil-Baghdad relations, the Kurds are much better placed after Maliki’s
humiliation in Mosul”.

Pipeline exports to Turkey are being operated by Anglo-Turkish company Genel Energy and British Gulf Keystone Petroleum.
Relations between the KRG and Ankara have steadily increased and the
volume of trade between the two is approximately 8 billion USD, whilst
three quarters of all Kurdish consumer goods come from Turkey.

The strengthening of business relations with Kurdistan has directly
improved Turkey’s relationship with its own Kurdish population and
assisted Turkey in its goal to reduce its reliance on energy imports
from Iran and Russia. As the security situation worsens in Iraq, Ankara
will undoubtedly become increasingly nervous as it considers how Turkey
should support its ally.

James Gavin comments on Turkey’s energy needs:

“Diversifying its energy imports is
an important issue for Ankara, and it has long seen the KRG as a
strategic source of energy supply to Turkey. But the sanctioning of the
dispatch of Kurdish crude in storage at Ceyhan does not necessarily play
into this agenda; it is, though, a means for the Turkish government to
apply pressure on Baghdad, and to give its Kurdish allies material
support”.

The security situation in Iraq is extremely grave. Coupled with the
humanitarian crisis now facing Kurdistan as over 300,000 refugees have
fled there from Mosul, an emboldened Kurdistan is now in a position to
negotiate improved terms with Baghdad on the revenue-sharing agreement
of its oil exports. Given the important role its peshmerga troops are
playing in securing crucial strongholds in Iraq together with the
relative security Iraq’s citizens can hope for within its borders, the
possibility of Kurdistan acting increasingly unilaterally regarding its
crude oil exports is highly likely.

Whether this independence lays the ground-work for Kurdistan to
pursue its ambition of becoming a sovereign state in the coming months
remains to be seen.

Seeks to avoid overthrow through a tighter grip on Iraq in coordination with Iran

Asked
the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki of the Kurdistan
authorities in northern Iraq delivered Ibrahim Khalil border crossing in
the region of Zakho, the main Iraqi crossing with Turkey, subject to
its authority.

And
learned "politics" from informed sources in the Maliki government that
the latter received important signals from the party "PUK" headed by
President Jalal Talabani to accept delivery crossing Haj Omran border
between the province of Sulaymaniyah Kurdish subject to the influence of
Talabani and Iran, which angered Kurdistan leader Massoud Barzani.

After
that, there were talks between the "Kurdistan Democratic Party" headed
by Barzani and Talabani's party, where the two sides agreed on joint
coordination in taking any step relating to the affairs of the region
and to avoid taking measures unilaterally.

The
sources said that al-Maliki is trying to take advantage of the absence
of full unity between the two parts of Kurdistan, Sulaymaniyah subject
to forces PUK and the provinces of Dohuk and Erbil, which are subject to
Hezbollah forces Barzani, to impose new security reality in the region,
revealing that the secret Maliki has moved to control the crossings Haj
Omran with Iran and Abraham with Turkey, due to fears of the Barzani to
declare the independence of Kurdistan and the establishment of an
independent Kurdish state as soon as the collapse of the Syrian regime.

According
to government sources Iraqi, the Barzani believes that the fall of
Assad represents a setback great political influence and power-Maliki,
and that he should take bold steps toward independence of Kurdistan, and
the results of regional implications of the change in Syria would be
encouraging to recognize some countries near Iraq state Kurdish nascent.

The
sources expected to be Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the forefront of
countries that will recognize the state Kurdish northern Iraq, in light
of information that the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave
indicated a positive Barzani supported the independence of Iraqi
Kurdistan, and that the existence of such a state does not constitute
any serious threat to the security of the Turkish national, and Barazani
can be a reliable ally Kurdish to stop threats "PKK" rebel and put an
end to this thorny security file for the Turkish state.

For
his part, Pat Maliki convinced that the fall of the Assad regime would
lead to the formation of a new map of the region, and that the
establishment of a Kurdish state headed by Barzani would weaken Iran's
influence in Iraq, especially if the latter succeeded in ensuring that
the province of Sulaymaniyah in the confines of a "state of Kurdistan."

The
sources revealed secret talks conducted close to Barzani, including his
son Barzani happy, who heads the National Security Council of the
Kurdistan region, with Kurdish leaders of PUK, and vice president of the
region Rasool of the most prominent supporters line Barzani in this
topic, is that front opposing directions latter remain strong and
includes Talabani and his political rival Norhervan Mustafa Amin, who
heads the "Movement for Change" in the city of Sulaymaniyah.

According
to the same sources, Maliki advised Talabani personal choice away from
Barzani to take over the succession in the leadership of the "National
Union Party", and told him that Tehran believes that Rasool's assumption
of the presidency of this party is in support of the orientations
Barzani anti-owners and Iranian domination.

The sources revealed that al-Maliki's plan at some point after the Assad regime Tsttend to two vital things:

-
The first is to gain control of the central government in Baghdad led
by the Shiite alliance to fully Kurdistan and subjecting Barzani of the
policies of this government, and this is important in order to ensure
control of all border crossings between Iraq on the one hand and between
Turkey and Syria on the other hand.

-
Second concerned the control of al-Maliki on all borders between Sunni
Arab provinces, particularly Nineveh and Anbar, with Syria and Jordan.This
process is going successfully with the Baghdad government has already
succeeded in sending troops from southern Iraq, mostly Shiite forces to
these two provinces and imposed a near-absolute dominance on the border
with Syria and Jordan.

The
sources confirmed the Iraqi government said that the talks held by the
President's National Security Council Iran Saeed Jalili with his Iraqi
counterpart, Faleh al-Fayad in Baghdad and Tehran, during the past few
months, touched on the post-Assad explicitly, which means that the two
sides PATA convinced that the survival of Assad in power impossible and
that change in Syria will fall at the end of the day, so the two
officials discussed the so-called national security joint Iraqi -
Iranian.

According
to the sources, the hospitality and Jalili reached a working document
for the next period include tightening grip security forces Maliki Sunni
provinces, northern and western Iraq, which includes Anbar, Salahuddin
and Nineveh and Diyala and Kirkuk, and Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan
headed by Barzani, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk and the capital of Arbil, in
With information that the new system in Syria would exacerbate conflict
influence between Iran and Iraq on the one hand and between Turkey and
Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on the other hand, and
that of the main dangers of this conflict end the rule of al-Maliki and
the formation of a new political alliance with Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites
are far from Iran to lead Iraqi political system.

In
return, an agreement was reached, according to sources, between Turkey
and the United States to undermine the Iranian influence in the period
after the fall of the Assad regime, Washington also told Ankara that it
supports political alliance with Barzani and president of a coalition of
"Iraq" Iyad Allawi and Vice President sentenced to death Tareq
al-Hashemi, and parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, because U.S. policy
strongly supports any regional effort can eliminate the influence of
Iran in Iraq.

The
sources confirmed that Washington has sent clear messages to Ankara and
Riyadh to the effect that the fall of Assad must lead to isolate Iran
in the region, and cleanse the Iraqi arena of Iranian influence
strategic development to achieve this goal.

The
disputes between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan have led some local
politicians to call for the semi-autonomous region to secede from Iraq
and become its own country. But, as one Kurdish commentator argues, this
is far from realistic. Because now it’s all about money and oil, not
politics.

Recently there has been a lot of comment about an
independent Iraqi Kurdistan. As tensions between Baghdad and the
semi-autonomous, northern state of Iraqi Kurdistan continue, the Kurdish
have been playing the “independence card”, with local politicians and
commentators airing their views on the subject like never before.

It
is no secret that the majority of Kurds, if not in fact, all of them,
would love to see an independent Kurdistan. And the easiest way for a
Kurdish politician to become popular is to call for an independent
state.

Although the Kurdish president, Massoud Barzani, has
recently given the impression that he wants to see an independent Iraqi
Kurdistan, the political party to which he belongs, the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP), and the other major political party in the area,
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have so far resisted similar
temptations. In fact, most Kurdish politicians are still talking about a
“united Iraq” despite Kurdish public opinion against this idea.

And
they have a point. If you are a Kurdish politician and you need to
maintain diplomatic relations with your neighbours, and if you’re aware
of the economic and political realities for Iraqi Kurdistan, then it’s
very hard to call for Kurdish independence and really mean it.

It is possible that Iraqi Kurdistan is politically mature enough to
be independent – but the region is not ready for such a step in economic
or military terms. And it is true that, over time, the political
consequences of Kurdish independence have always been considered greater
than the economic consequences. But that no longer applies.

A
clear example is the Kurdish rebellion against former Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein’s regime in the early 1970s. When Hussein started to
become friendly with the Soviet Union, then-US President Richard Nixon
began to fund, and encourage, the Kurdish to fight for their
independence against Hussein, as part of a strategy to weaken Hussein’s
regime and general policy against the USSR. But just as the Kurdish
revolutionaries seemed to be succeeding, it became clear that none of
the parties supporting the Kurds actually wanted them to win their
independence – the ploy was purely political – and support was
withdrawn.

Additionally the question of Kurdish independence has
always troubled the surrounding countries; none of them have ever wanted
a Kurdish State.

But now, given Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas
potential and the benefits that could bring surrounding countries in
terms of trade, those neighbours have softened their stand on Kurdish
independence – and they’re likely to soften even further as trade ties
develop.

There are also strong economic overtones to Baghdad’s
policy toward Kurdish independence. Baghdad sees the various disputes
over revenue sharing, oil contracts and oil exports currently going on
between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan as necessary to its centralist
agenda. Partially, it is about deterring other Iraqi regions, some of
which have suggested the idea, from asking for independence to become a
region with autonomy similar to that enjoyed by Iraqi Kurdistan.

Although, given the advanced stage of the oil industry in the
Kurdistan region, Baghdad realises that their disputes with Iraqi
Kurdistan are unlikely to end in their favour, they still have to send
out a clear, centralist-flavoured message. Imagine, for example, if a
province like Basra – which currently has most of the Iraqi oil reserves
and which has the only access to ocean-going transport – achieved the
same kind of independence Iraqi Kurdistan had. Given its strategic
position, it might eventually become as powerful as the central
government.

Even for the Kurdish themselves, the main question about an independent Kurdistan comes down to economics.

Up
until now the economics of independence have always been an
afterthought; even the Kurds have subconsciously ignored them. However
in modern times, if the petro-dollars from Baghdad stopped flowing and
people started to feel the pinch in their pockets, the idea of
independence might not look so romantic after all.

This is the
reality: Iraqi Kurdistan is land locked; it is dependent upon selling
its own natural resources and importing consumables in exchange. Having
bad, or no, relations with neighbouring countries is simply not an
option for Iraqi Kurdistan.

And Iraqi Kurdistan has been operating like a state within a state, but without the duties of a state.

The
Iraqis have continued to send 17 percent of the Iraqi federal budget to
the Kurdish (although it was delayed this year). Most of the Iraqi
federal budget is generated by oil revenues and currently, most of
Iraq’s oil is produced in southern Iraq, in places like Basra. Any
northern oil tends to come from the disputed Kirkuk region.

And with this, the federal budget is also swelling – so is Iraqi
Kurdistan’s 17 percent share. However due to disagreements over oil
policy, revenue sharing and Baghdad’s refusal to pay oil company costs,
Iraqi Kurdistan is pursuing its own oil production agenda.

However
in Iraqi Kurdistan, this sector is still largely underdeveloped. And,
due to this and aforementioned disputes, the state is not contributing
as much as it can to Iraq’s oil exports. Which is why many Iraqi
politicians have already argued that the Kurdish are getting an unfairly
large share of the country’s income even while they’re not contributing
as much.

The most obvious move for the Kurdish would be to annex
the disputed area of Kirkuk, where much of the northern oil is currently
being produced, and get full use of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

The northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk
has actually been one of the flash points of the struggle between the
Iraqis and the Kurdish over the past few decades. During former Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Kurdish population was driven out of
Kirkuk so that Arab Iraqis could control the oil rich area. Today
Kirkuk remains largely Kurdish and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan
claims it belongs to them. Although legally it belongs to Baghdad,
currently the city is, in fact, under the de-facto control of the
Kurdish government.

Even in the unlikely scenario that such an
annexation happens, in the short term Iraqi Kurdistan would still
struggle to generate as much income as Baghdad sends them. Putting the
required infrastructure into place would take time and would need the
consent of neighbouring countries, like Turkey.

The economic
consequences of losing the over US$11 billion that the Kurdish receive
from Iraq would be devastating for the region; the whole economy could
implode, which in turn would lead to many political and social problems.

Iraqi Kurdistan has other income streams and income opportunities and
the promise of a hydrocarbon pipeline to Turkey offers a life line but
in the short term, this income will not be enough to pay salaries in the
bloated public sector or to invest in rebuilding the infrastructure,
that would eventually lead to growth and an increase in oil and gas
production.

In fact it’s disputable whether Kurdish oil production
could ever match Baghdad’s current contribution. If Kirkuk and other
disputed territories are taken out of the equation, then the amount of
oil Iraqi Kurdistan could export may never match up to the 17 percent of
the budget that they’re currently getting.

So although many Kurds
yearn for independence, when the state’s finances dry up and there are
budget cuts, unemployment and a reduction in living standards, those
views may well change – and, whatever other faults they may have, almost
all Kurdish politicians can see this how this would be extremely
unpopular.

An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not just lose its
Baghdad budget, the state would also go from holding some part of the
balance of power in the Iraqi parliament – the Kurdish bloc has been
referred to as “kingmakers” because the two major opposition blocs have
fairly equal numbers in Parliament – to being a small state, surrounded
by far larger, far less friendly states in the area.

Should Iraqi
Kurdistan secede, it is not even clear whether the international
community would recognise the would-be country as a fully fledged
nation-state.

In international terms, Kurdish independence would
rely heavily on the Iraqi Kurdish relationship with Turkey. In fact,
contrary to popular opinion in both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, an
independent Kurdistan could benefit Turkey immensely.

Despite historical antipathies (Turkey is still fighting a battle
against the Kurdish population within its own borders), Turkey is the
most likely nation to support the idea simply because then they would
have greater influence over Iraqi Kurdistan – and Iraqi Kurdistan has
the potential to become a future, cheap energy source fuelling the
booming Turkish economy.

In conclusion, if it comes to a
referendum on independence – something that President Barzani has
suggested during ongoing disputes with Baghdad – Kurdish politicians
would be caught between a rock and a hard place.

On one hand, if
they advocate independence, they face not only economic hardship but
also regional isolation, a loss of influence in Iraq and increased
dependence on the goodwill of both Turkey and Iran.

On the other
hand, if they stay part of Iraq, then they must help to build the nation
for real and find solutions to outstanding, contentious issues – such
as the oil exports and the disputed territories like Kirkuk and Mosul.

Should
they decide upon the latter for the time being– and this seems most
likely and most sensible option– then Kurdistan can become more of an
assertive regional player. Eventually this would give the region a
better bargaining power when the statehood, that so many Kurdish long
for has more potential to become a reality.