Kenya: Elections Ready or Not, 1

Editor's Note

The experience of the primary elections in late January,
commented Kenya Human Rights Commission chair Makau
Mutua, "made one thing crystal clear. Kenya is illprepared
to conduct free and fair elections in March."
The elections, he argued, should be postponed and the
electoral authorities accelerate plans to manage the
election and the government prepares to contain possible
violence.

Such a postponement seems highly unlikely, despite
warnings by Kenyan and international commentators of the
risks. Ready or not, the elections are coming soon.
Kenyan civil society and the international community, as
well as the government and political parties, will be
under intense pressure to maximize the changes of a
peaceful election rather than a repeat of the 2007-2008
experience. On February 5, President Barack Obama issued
his own call for peace in a youtube video addressed to
Kenyans (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgmVLJXS2x4).

One ominous trend, charted by the Daily Nation
(http://elections.nation.co.ke/), is that
both of the two leading presidential candidates, Raila
Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, have much higher negative than
public opinion ratings.

There is no shortage of well-informed commentary. I have
picked several for today's AfricaFocus Bulletins, for
their clarity and provision of background accessible for
a general audience (those who are neither Kenyans nor
Kenya specialists).

I have also listed below a set of sources I have found
useful. I am sure there are many I am unaware of, and can
add additional sources to the list in the web version of
this Bulletin.

Another AfricaFocus Bulletin released today, available on
the web at http://www.africafocus.org/docs13/ken1302b.php, but not
sent out by e-mail, contains a statement by Makau Mutua,
chair of the non-governmental Kenya Human Rights
Commission; the press release on a new report by Amnesty
International on Police Reform in Kenya ; and the summary
of a pre-election report from the International Crisis
Group.

Electoral Violence in Kenya

Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 17

Author: Joel D. Barkan, Professor Emeritus of Political
Science, University of Iowa, and Senior Associate, Africa
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

January 2013

Introduction

Kenya is at risk of repeating the violence that marred
its 2007 presidential election, during which 1,133 died
and nearly 600,000 were displaced from their homes.
Political order in Kenya nearly collapsed. Ending the
crisis required two months of negotiations mediated by
former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and supported by
the United States and its partners. The negotiations
resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the two
adversaries in the election, President Mwai Kibaki and
Raila Odinga. Known as the National Accord, the deal
elevated Odinga to the post of prime minister and
provided for the writing of a new constitution to address
the causes of the conflict.

Kenya's next elections, to be held on March 4 and April
11, 2013, are arguably the most important and complex
since the country's return to multiparty politics two
decades ago. If the elections are largely peaceful and
viewed as "free and fair," they will bring Kenya's new
constitution, adopted in 2010, fully into force and
advance the country's progress toward becoming a modern
democratic state. Conversely, if the elections are marred
by widespread violence and perceived as illegitimate by
the Kenyan public, they are likely to plunge the country
into a renewed period of political instability and set
back Kenya's democratic advance. A breakdown in the
electoral process will also do serious harm to Kenya's
economy, which has been performing well in recent years.

Since Kenya is the "anchor state" of East Africa, a
prolonged political and economic crisis will also harm
neighboring countries. In particular, two major U.S.
foreign policy goals in the region—preventing Somalia
from becoming a safe haven for terrorists and nurturing
peace between Sudan and South Sudan—could be compromised.
The United States, therefore, should work expeditiously
with all parties concerned to ensure that the forthcoming
elections are peaceful, free, and fair.

The Contingencies

Six factors make the prospects for electoral violence
particularly high in the run-up to and in the immediate
aftermath of the 2013 elections:

As in prior elections, the leading presidential
candidates are mobilizing voters along ethnic lines. This
is resulting in a polarized electorate and outbreaks of
violence between the members of rival ethnic groups.
Kenyan politics have historically been contests in which
the leaders of the country's largest ethnic groups form
ethnic coalitions among themselves and with the leaders
of smaller groups to dominate their rivals. Ethnic fault
lines run deep because the country is divided into five
large groups that constitute 68 percent of the
population—the Kikuyu and related groups (21 percent),
the Luhya (14 percent), the Kalenjin (13 percent), the
Kamba (10 percent), and the Luo (10 percent). Interethnic
violence between unemployed youth hired by rival
politicians is already occurring in nearly a dozen areas.

The race for the presidency is likely to be extremely
close. Under its new constitution, Kenya has adopted a
two-round runoff procedure to ensure that whoever is
elected president will have received a majority of the
vote. The current contest began with five major
candidates campaigning for the post. Three have already
dropped out after concluding that they would be
eliminated in the first round scheduled for March 4. They
have allied themselves with one of the present frontrunners:
Prime Minister Raila Odinga, a Luo and head of
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and Deputy Prime
Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and the leader of the
National Alliance party (TNA). Both seek victory in the
first round, but the presence of a half-dozen minor
candidates may force a runoff election.

Kenya's forthcoming elections will be the most complex
in its history, because of an expanded number of
electoral positions. In addition to electing a president,
Kenyans will directly elect 384 members of a new
bicameral legislature, plus 47 governors and 47 county
assemblies. The new county system of subnational
government, which creates a quasi-federal governing
process, could mitigate Kenya's long history of ethnic
conflict by providing all groups, large and small, with a
measure of power and resources. However, devolution also
multiplies the arenas of electoral competition and the
prospects for election-related violence in the near term,
especially in counties with multiethnic populations.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
(IEBC) will be unable to prepare for the elections so
that Kenyans can go to the polls with confidence. Due to
delays in the procurement of required equipment and
technical issues, the commission completed voter
registration two months behind schedule. Moreover, the
commission registered only 14.4 million, or 69 percent,
of the more than 21 million Kenyans eligible to vote. The
IEBC also faces major challenges with respect to the
recruitment and training of up to 120,000 temporary
workers to staff 29,000 to 40,000 polling stations, and
the procurement and distribution of essential supplies
such as ballots and ballot boxes. The IEBC is also
responsible for educating voters on what will be a
complex ballot, since Kenyans will be voting for six
offices for the first time. Most important, the
commission must address the principal failure of the 2007
elections by carrying out an accurate transmission and
tabulation of the votes from thousands of polling
stations to its results reporting center in Nairobi and
by making a timely announcement of the results. Any
further delays or missteps in meeting these challenges
could force a postponement and/or undermine the
legitimacy of the elections. Unfortunately, personal
disagreements between the chair and the chief operating
officer of the IEBC have also compounded its problems.

Ongoing proceedings of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) could complicate the presidential election and its
outcome. One of the two leading candidates for president,
Uhuru Kenyatta, and his running mate, William Ruto, the
most prominent Kalenjin leader, have been indicted by the
ICC for perpetrating interethnic violence between Kikuyus
and Kalenjins following the 2007 elections. Their trials
are scheduled to begin on April 10 and April 11, 2013,
respectively, but neither is likely to travel to The
Hague if they emerge victorious in the first round or are
finalists in the second. Indeed, one major purpose of
their alliance is to avoid trial. Their alliance also,
ironically, raises the prospects for peace during this
election cycle between their respective ethnic groups,
the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus, who viciously attacked
each other in 2007. The election of Kenyatta and Ruto,
however, would most likely result in the United States,
European Union states, and others that support the ICC
process shunning them diplomatically. This could invoke a
potentially hostile response from Kenyatta and Ruto and
ultimately lead to Kenya's increased international
isolation.

Kenya lacks an adequate number of trained police. Kenya
has approximately 70,000 police, or roughly 160 per
100,000 residents, which is less than three-quarters of
the 220 per 100,000 recommended by the United Nations.
Kenya's police are also widely regarded as corrupt and
prone to human rights abuses. They were unable to contain
the violence following the 2007 elections, and may not be
sufficiently improved to deal with the challenges this
time. Because there will be between 29,000 and 40,000
polling stations to which at least one officer must be
deployed, the police will be stretched to the limit. This
reality, coupled with the likelihood of violence in more
areas than in the past, could create a situation in which
the Kenya Defence Force is required to augment the police
to maintain order. Such involvement would be the
military's first deployment to maintain domestic order
since independence.

Three broad scenarios, each with its own variations, are
presently conceivable for the 2013 elections:

The IEBC conducts credible elections on March 4, and
one of the presidential candidates, most likely Raila
Odinga or Uhuru Kenyatta, wins or prevails in the runoff
round scheduled for April 11. Outbreaks of violence are
limited to rural areas and associated mainly with
elections at the county level. Though this scenario was
plausible a year ago, it is much less likely today. Raila
Odinga remains the leading candidate, but he has lost
popularity among ethnic groups other than his own. At the
same time, Uhuru Kenyatta has gained popularity and could
beat Odinga in a runoff, according to some recent public
opinion polls. If the past is any guide, a close election
is likely to be accompanied by violence between Kikuyus,
who will mostly vote for Kenyatta, and Luos, who will
mostly vote for Odinga.

Violence by Kikuyu and Kalenjins against Luo breaks
out after the Kenyan government arrests Uhuru Kenyatta
and William Ruto to send them to the ICC. Because
President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, firmly controls Kenya's
security forces, such arrests are unlikely. Indeed, the
arrests are only plausible if Kibaki and other senior
Kikuyu political and business leaders conclude that their
interests are best served by backing Musalia Mudavadi, a
Luyha, whom they view as a benign, non-Kikuyu vehicle to
defeat Odinga. These leaders face a difficult choice
between maintaining their loyalty to a fellow Kikuyu by
shielding Kenyatta from the ICC or forsaking him to avoid
the international sanctions that will be levied on Kenya
or selected members of its political class if Kenyatta is
elected president or if the government of Kenya fails to
honor its obligations under the Rome Statute. Senior
Kikuyu leaders—who arguably control Kenya's
economy—rightly worry that business and Kenya's
international stature will suffer if the country elects a
president the world shuns. Some also realize that it is
not in the interests of the broader Kikuyu community to
push for the election of a Kikuyu successor to Kibaki, as
Kenyatta would be Kenya's third Kikuyu president out of
four since independence.

The IEBC continues to stumble in its preparations for
the 2013 elections and fails to facilitate a credible
process. Since more than 30 percent of the eligible
electorate was not registered, civil society
organizations protest their disenfranchisement and bring
cases before the courts to force the continuation of
registration. The IEBC also fails to meet its remaining
challenges required for credible elections and thus is
confronted with a painful choice between two unappealing
alternatives. First, in mid-to-late February 2013, the
IEBC panics, realizing that it cannot conduct competent
elections without further preparation. It announces a
ten-day-to-one-month postponement of the elections.
Though the decision is sound from an operational
standpoint, the political blowback is instantaneous as
rival candidates accuse the IEBC of "rigging" the
elections in favor of the other. The General Services
Unit, Kenya's paramilitary police, puts down protests on
Nairobi's streets, but not until after several protesters
are killed. Second, due to fears of retribution if it
postpones the elections, the IEBC decides to muddle
through by proceeding with the elections on March 4 even
though it knows it is not adequately prepared to conduct
the process. Sporadic violence occurs in various areas as
a result, and several returning officers are killed. The
police are sent in to restore order but are unable to do
so in many areas because of insufficient personnel. Order
is restored after President Kibaki and the Kenya Defence
Force's chief of staff reluctantly conclude that the army
must be sent in to reinforce the police.

Warning Indicators

Indicators that the forthcoming elections will be marred
by violence and regarded as illegitimate by most Kenyans
are:

Continued failure by the IEBC to meet critical
deadlines to administer the elections. In addition to
registering no more than 60 to 70 percent of the eligible
electorate, the commission fails to complete one or more
of the remaining critical tasks required for credible
elections.

Outbreaks of sporadic violence as election campaigns
ramp up. Most election-related violence to date has been
associated with county-level races (e.g., for governor
and senator) rather than with presidential contests, as
occurred in 1992, 1997, and 2007. Violence at these
localized levels, though troubling, is more containable
than violence arising from the presidential race. The
likelihood that both types of violence will occur is
difficult to estimate, but is arguably as high as 50
percent depending on which contingency scenario evolves
between now and the elections.

Formation of local militias supported by local
political leaders. Armed militias are reportedly forming
across Kenya, though the exact number and their political
affiliations are unclear. Their formation is fueled by
the influx of arms, including automatic assault rifles
from Somalia and to a lesser extent Ethiopia.

Renewal of hate speech, especially by politicians. Hate
speech was a significant driver of the 2007 postelection
violence. The caustic rhetoric was disseminated by mobile
phones, especially via text messages, and encouraged by
talk show hosts on ethnic-language radio stations—two
dominant modes of communication for Kenyans. The new
constitution and communications legislation now largely
ban hate speech, and broadcasters are responsible for its
propagation. All radio stations also have delayed
broadcast devices so that hate speech can be blocked.
Hate speech via text messages, however, is far more
difficult to control, because it cannot be filtered out
by network operators. Two political leaders have been
indicted for hate speech, but neither has been convicted,
with the result that the likelihood of hate speech
continues to be a concern.

Attempted acts of terrorism to disrupt the election.
Kenya has had numerous, though isolated, terrorist
attacks over the years, including the 1980 bombing of the
famed Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, the 1998 bombing of the
U.S. embassy, and the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned
hotel in Mombasa. The arrest of Somali terrorists in the
Eastleigh area of Nairobi on September 17, 2012, which
thwarted their alleged attempt to blow up the National
Assembly, confirms the continuing threat of al-Shabab,
the Somali affiliate of al-Qaeda, beyond the Indian Ocean
coast. None of these attacks to date have threatened
Kenya's stability, nor have they been explicitly directed
at the elections, but this situation could change as the
2013 elections draw near.

Heightened tensions between the Kenyan government and
the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). The MRC is a
secessionist movement that argues that successive Kenyan
governments have marginalized the peoples on the Indian
Ocean coast. The MRC urges a boycott of the elections,
and some of its members have attacked local offices of
the IEBC. The government reimposed a ban on the MRC in
October 2012 on the grounds that it was a threat to peace
and security. However, the unbanning of the organization
coupled with its participation in the forthcoming
elections at the county level could diffuse the
situation, because the elections hold out the possibility
for more autonomy and resources from the center.

Implications for U.S. Interests

[see full report for this section]

Preventive Options

[see full report for this section]

Mitigating Options

[see full report for this section]

Recommendations

The United States should impress upon Nairobi the
importance of taking steps to prevent significant and
widespread election violence. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton's visit to Nairobi in August 2012 was a positive
first step. It should now be complemented by the
following initiatives:

Bring together like-minded states to push the Kenyan
government to make adequate preparations for credible
elections. The message from Washington and its partners
should be that further delays sow doubts about the grand
coalition government's commitment to full implementation
of the National Accord and 2010 constitution. These
communications should include a joint or complementary
message or messages from President Obama, SecretaryGeneral
Ban, and other influential world leaders who
recognize the centrality of successful elections for
Kenya's transition to democracy.

Provide unequivocal support for the continued
diplomatic efforts of the African Union's Panel of
Eminent Personalities in Kenya by encouraging the AU to
expand and reauthorize the panel through May 2013. Urge
the panel to increase the frequency of its visits to
Kenya in the run-up to the elections and pre-position the
panel in Kenya on the eve of the first vote and through
the runoff to more quickly address any breakdown in the
process.

Rapidly provide any assistance that the IEBC may
require to administer credible elections. The assistance
could include helping the IEBC with voter education
initiatives and with recruiting and training the 120,000
temporary poll workers potentially needed. It could also
come in the form of providing technical expertise or
funding and logistical support for the commission's
procurement and deployment of needed supplies, such as
ballots and ballot boxes. The need and likely impact of
such aid should be reviewed case by case.

Extend the current program by USAID OTI to strengthen
civil society efforts to prevent election-related
violence in conflict-prone areas, and integrate the new
programs by the Department of State's Bureau of Conflict
Stabilization Operations with those of OTI so that the
two agencies do not work at cross-purposes.

Encourage the United Kingdom and other countries with
greater police-training expertise and experience than the
United States to assist the Kenya police to strengthen
and perhaps expand its numbers so it is not overwhelmed
by the forthcoming elections as it was in 2007.

Authorize, fund, and initiate a robust and coordinated
international electoral observation mission to monitor
preparations for the elections, the conduct of the
elections, and the reporting of the results.

The mission, in coordination with efforts by domestic
observers, should include parallel vote tabulation, or
PVT, to increase the likelihood of an honest and timely
reporting of results. It could also monitor those
outbreaks of violence that occur before and after the
elections.

Join with like-minded governments, particularly the
United Kingdom, to impose visa bans and asset freezes on
members of Kenya's political class who incite violence
and engage in demagogic behavior.

The United States and others may have limited leverage
over Kenya's domestic politics, but they are not without
options that would significantly improve the prospects
for acceptable elections and help avert a major crisis.
However, with little more than two months before the
elections, Washington must intensify its engagement or
forsake its opportunity to make a difference.

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