1. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is
unlimited.

2. Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the State.

3. When construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their
natural and ordinary meaning.

4. Statutory language is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its
language should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of
common understanding. Words in common usage are to be given their natural
and ordinary meaning in arriving at a proper construction.

5. The legislature's intent in using certain language, and the different methods
utilized to determine legislative intent, are not as important in criminal statutes as
how the average person would read and understand the language of the statute.
This is because a criminal statute needs to be clearly written so a person knows
what conduct is prohibited and what conduct is not prohibited from the statutory
language without having to research, and determine at a person's peril, what the
legislature intended.

Amelia J. McIntyre, of Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks, argued the
cause, and John S.
Sutherland, county attorney, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

Jesse T. Randall, of Mound City, argued the cause and was on the brief for
appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ABBOTT, J.: The State appeals from the trial court's decision holding K.S.A. 32-1003(g)
is unconstitutionally overbroad. K.S.A. 32-1003(g) was amended in 1997, and
there are no other cases pending at any level in the court system involving this version
of K.S.A. 32-1003(g).

"It is unlawful for any person, unless authorized by law or rules and regulations of the
secretary,
to:

"(g) throw or cast the rays of a spotlight, headlight or other artificial light on any
highway,
roadway, field, grassland, woodland or forest for the purpose of spotting, locating or taking any
animal
while having in possession or control, either singly or as one of a group of persons, any rifle,
pistol,
shotgun, bow or other implement whereby wildlife could be taken."

During oral argument, the defense counsel specifically argued that the general
use of the term "animal" in K.S.A. 32-1003(g) made the statute unconstitutional
because it did not clarify what conduct was prohibited and what conduct was
acceptable. According to the defense counsel, the defendants could have been
engaging in the constitutionally protected right of protecting their property (cows) from
coyotes by casting a spotlight on a field for the purpose of locating their cows (which
are "animals") while in the possession of a gun. Since this constitutionally protected
conduct is prohibited by K.S.A. 32-1003(g), the defense counsel claimed that the
statute was overbroad.

In response, the State claimed that the statute was constitutional. The State's
counsel argued:

"We certainly don't think it's unconstitutional. It's--the word "animals" within the--within
the statute,
itself. There's no limitation on what those animals might be. I think it's generally up to the good
conscience of the officers who are investigating; and it'd certainly be their testimony if they had
any
indication that the Defendants were just looking for cattle, there would be no interference
whatsoever."

In holding K.S.A. 32-1003(g) unconstitutional, the trial judge said:

"[O]ne of the . . . threshold issues that I have as to whether or not a statute is
constitutional or not
is whether or not the statute . . ., because of the way it is worded, would be subject to unequal
enforcement between different persons. And if the statute says any animal, last time I knew,
cattle were
animals . . . . [W]hat concerns me is your argument saying that we . . . leave it up to the good
discretion of
the law enforcement officers to decide whether or not they're doing something illegal or not.
That's the
whole point. Statutes are supposed to be abundantly clear so that we don't leave it up to the
discretion of
law enforcement to determine whether or not someone else has committed a crime. That person
needs to
know that they've committed a crime.

"The interesting thing is I think the statute is not ambiguous. It's clear. But
unfortunately, the way
it is worded, it would suggest to me that it literally would be illegal for me to shine a spotlight on
one of my
dogs in my back yard from a vehicle that I have a weapon in."

Several principles of law are applicable to this case. Interpretation of a statute is
a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. State v. Arculeo, 261 Kan.
286,
Syl. ¶ 1, 933 P.2d 122 (1997). Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the
State. State v. Lawson, 261 Kan. 964, 966, 933 P.2d 684 (1997). "When construing
a
statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary
meaning." Galindo v. City of Coffeyville, 256 Kan. 455, Syl. ¶ 5, 885 P.2d
1246 (1994).
Statutory language "is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language
should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of common
understanding. Words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary
meaning in arriving at a proper construction." Board of Leavenworth County Comm'rs
v. McGraw Fertilizer Serv., Inc., 261 Kan. 901, Syl. ¶ 2, 933 P.2d 698 (1997),
modified
on rehearing on other grounds 261 Kan. 1082, 941 P.2d 1388 (1997). The term
"animal" is a word in common usage and its natural and ordinary meaning refers to a
member of the animal kingdom, including cows. To the common man on the street, the
term "animal" includes livestock animals, and is not limited merely to wild animals.

The State argues the legislature intended "animal" to mean "wildlife." The
problem with that argument is twofold. First, the legislature uses the term "wildlife" in
K.S.A. 32-1002, K.S.A. 32-1003, K.S.A. 32-1004, and K.S.A. 32-1005 a total of 28
times. The legislature also defined the term "wildlife" in K.S.A. 32-701(u). Thus, an
average person could conclude the legislature intended by its use of the word "animal"
in K.S.A. 32-1003(g) to mean something other than wildlife.

Second, the legislature's intent in using certain language, and the different
methods utilized to determine legislative intent, are not as important in criminal statutes
as how the average person would read and understand the language of the statute.
This is because a criminal statute needs to be clearly written so a person knows what
conduct is prohibited and what conduct is not prohibited from the statutory language
without having to research, and determine at a person's peril, what the legislature
intended.

Based on these canons of statutory construction, we are satisfied that K.S.A. 32-1003(g)
is unconstitutional as an unlawful application of the State's police power. See
Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 638, 772 P.2d 758, cert.
denied 493 U.S. 976
(1989); City of Junction City v. Mevis, 226 Kan. 526, 601 P.2d 1145 (1979).

The judgment is affirmed.

LOCKETT, J. not participating.

RICHARD W. WAHL, Senior Judge, assigned.1

1REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Wahl was appointed to hear
case No. 78,820 vice
Justice Lockett pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616.