NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the preliminary print of the United States
Reports.Readers are
requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of
the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any
typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

No.
031388

DOUGLAS SPECTOR, et al., PETITIONERS
v.NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 6, 2005]

Justice Kennedy
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, IIA1, and
IIB2, an opinion with respect to Parts
IIA2, IIB1, IIB3, and
IIIB, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Souter join,
and an opinion with respect to Part IIIA, in which
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas join.

This case presents the question
whether Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 353, 42 U.S.C. §
12181et seq., applies to foreign-flag cruise ships
in United States waters. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held Title III did not apply because of a presumption,
which it sought to derive from this Courts case law,
that, absent a clear indication of congressional intent,
general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships. 356 F.3d
641, 644646 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the ADA does
apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters.
See Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d
1237 (2000). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
542 U.S. ___ (2004).

Our cases hold that a clear statement
of congressional intent is necessary before a general statutory
requirement can interfere with matters that concern a
foreign-flag vessels internal affairs and operations, as
contrasted with statutory requirements that concern the
security and well-being of United States citizens or territory.
While the clear statement rule could limit Title IIIs
application to foreign-flag cruise ships in some instances,
when it requires removal of physical barriers, it would appear
the rule is inapplicable to many other duties Title III might
impose. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the ADA is altogether
inapplicable to foreign vessels; and we remand for further
proceedings.

I

The respondent Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd. (NCL), a Bermuda Corporation with a principal place of
business in Miami, Florida, operates cruise ships that depart
from, and return to, ports in the United States. The ships are
essentially floating resorts. They provide passengers with
staterooms or cabins, food, and entertainment. The cruise
ships stop at different ports of call where passengers may
disembark. Most of the passengers on these cruises are United
States residents; under the terms and conditions of the
tickets, disputes between passengers and NCL are to be governed
by United States law; and NCL relies upon extensive advertising
in the United States to promote its cruises and increase its
revenues.

Despite the fact that the cruises are
operated by a company based in the United States, serve
predominately United States residents, and are in most other
respects United States-centered ventures, almost all of
NCLs cruise ships are registered in other countries,
flying so-called flags of convenience. The two NCL cruise
ships that are the subject of the present litigation, the
Norwegian Sea and the Norwegian Star, are both registered in
the Bahamas.

The petitioners are disabled
individuals and their companions who purchased tickets in 1998
or 1999 for round-trip cruises on the Norwegian Sea or the
Norwegian Star, with departures from Houston, Texas. Naming
NCL as the defendant, the petitioners filed a class action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas on behalf of all persons similarly situated. They sought
declaratory and injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. The
petitioners asserted that cruise ships are covered both by
Title IIIs prohibition on discrimination in places of
public accommodation, §12182(a), and by its
prohibition on discrimination in specified public
transportation services, §12184(a). Both provisions
requirecovered entities to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to
accommodate disabled individuals,
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A), and
re-quire removal of architectural barriers, and
communi-cation barriers that are structural in nature
wheresuch removal is readily achievable,
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C).

The District Court held that, as a
general matter, Title III applies to foreign-flag cruise ships
in United States territorial waters. Civ. Action No.
H002649 (SD Tex., Sept. 10, 2002), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 35a. The District Court found, however, that the
petitioners claims regarding physical barriers to access
could not go forward because the agencies charged with
promulgating architectural and structural guidelines for ADA
compliance (the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board, the Department of Transportation, and the
Department of Justice) had not done so for cruise ships. In
these circumstances, the court held, it is unclear what
structural modifications NCL would need to make. Id.,
at 36a42a. The District Court granted NCLs motion
to dismiss the barrier-removal claims, but denied NCLs
motion with respect to all the other claims. Id., at
47a.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It reasoned
that our cases, particularly Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S. A.,353 U.S. 138 (1957),
and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S.
10 (1963), stand for the proposition that general statutes
do not apply to foreign-flag vessels in United States territory
absent a clear indication of congressional intent. 356 F.3d,
at 644 ([T]o apply domestic law to foreign vessels
entering United States waters, there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed
(quoting Benz, supra, at 147 (internal quotation
marks omitted)); 356 F.3d, at 646 (Benz and
McCulloch prohibit United States courts from
applying domestic statutes to foreign-flagged ships without
specific evidence of congressional intent). As Title III
does not contain a specific provision mandating its application
to foreign-flag vessels, the Court of Appeals sustained the
District Courts dismissal of the petitioners
barrier-removal claims on this alternative ground and reversed
the District Court on the remaining Title III claims. 356
F.3d, at 650651.

The action was ordered dismissed for
failure to state a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6),
before extensive discovery. We cannot then discuss the
specific allegations in much detail but must confine our
opinion to the relevant general principles. (On November 24,
2004, the responsible agencies finally did issue draft
guidelines for large passenger vessels and a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. See 69 Fed. Reg. 69244, 69249. These developments
are not dispositive of the legal question on which we granted
certiorari, and we do not address how they might affect the
ultimate resolution of the petitioners claims.)

II

A

1

Title III of the ADA
prohibits discrimination againstthe disabled in the full
and equal enjoyment of pub-lic accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a), and public transportation services,
§12184(a). The general prohi-bitions are supplemented
by various, more specificrequirements. Entities that
provide public accommo-dations or public transportation:
(1) may not imposeeligibility criteria that
tend to screen out disabledindividuals,
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1); (2) mustmake
reasonable modifications in polices, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary
toprovide disabled individuals full and equal
enjoy-ment, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A);
(3) must pro-vide auxiliary aids and services to disabled
individ-uals, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iii),
12184(b)(2)(B); and (4) must remove architectural and
structural barriers, or if barrier removal is not readily
achievable, must ensure equal access for the disabled through
alternative methods, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)(v),
12184(b)(2)(C).

These specific requirements, in turn,
are subject to important exceptions and limitations.
Eligibility criteria that screen out disabled individuals are
permitted when necessary for the provision of the
services or facilities being offered,
§§12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1). Policies,
practices, and procedures need not be modified, and auxiliary
aids need not be provided, if doing so would
fundamentally alter the services or accommodations
being offered. §§12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)(iii).
Auxiliary aids are also unnecessary when they would
result in an undue burden,
§12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). As we have noted, moreover, the
barrier removal and alternative access requirements do not
apply when these requirements are not readily
achievable, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)(v).
Additionally, Title III does not impose nondiscrimination or
accommodation requirements if, as a result, disabled
individuals would pose a significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification
of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services, §12182(b)(3).

Although the statutory definitions of
public accommodation and specified public
transportation do not expressly mention cruise ships,
there can be no serious doubt that the NCL cruise ships in
question fall within both definitions under conventional
principles of interpretation.
§§12181(7)(A)(B),(I),(L), 12181(10). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, held that Title
III does not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in United
States waters because the statute has no clear statement or
explicit text mandating coverage for these ships. This
Courts cases, particularly Benz and
McCulloch, do hold, in some circumstances, that a
general statute will not apply to certain aspects of the
internal operations of foreign vessels temporarily in United
States waters, absent a clear statement. The broad clear
statement rule adopted by the Court of Appeals, however, would
apply to every facet of the business and operations of
foreign-flag ships. That formulation is inconsistent with the
Courts case law and with sound principles of statutory
interpretation.

2

This Court has long held that general
statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place
aboard a foreign-flag vessel in United States territory if the
interests of the United States or its citizens, rather than
interests internal to the ship, are at stake. See Cunard S.
S. Co. v. Mellon,262 U.S. 100, 127
(1923) (holding that the general terms of the National
Prohibition Act apply to foreign-flag ships in United States
waters because [t]here is in the act no provision making
it inapplicable to such ships); Uravic v. F.
Jarka Co.,282
U.S. 234, 240 (1931) (holding that general
words should be generally applied and that
therefore there is no reason for limiting the liability
for torts committed [aboard foreign-flag ships in United States
territory] when they go beyond the scope of discipline and
private matters that do not interest the territorial
power). The general rule that United States statutes
apply to foreign-flag ships in United States territory is
subject only to a narrow exception. Absent a clear statement
of congressional intent, general statutes may not apply to
foreign-flag vessels insofar as they regulate matters that
involve only the internal order and discipline of the vessel,
rather than the peace of the port. This qualification derives
from the understanding that, as a matter of international
comity, all matters of discipline and all things done on
board which affec[t] only the vessel or those belonging to her,
and [do] not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or
the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local
government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to
which the vessel belonged. Wildenhuss Case,120 U.S. 1, 12
(1887). This exception to the usual presumption, however, does
not extend beyond matters of internal order and discipline.
[I]f crimes are committed on board [a foreign-flag
vessel] of a character to disturb the peace and tranquility of
the country to which the vessel has been brought, the offenders
have never by comity or usage been entitled to any exemption
from the operation of the local laws. Ibid.

The two cases in recent times in which
the presumption against applying general statutes to foreign
vessels internal affairs has been invoked, Benz
and McCulloch, concern labor relations. The Court held
that the general terms of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151et seq., did not govern the respective rights and duties
of a foreign ship and its crew because the NLRA standards would
interfere with the foreign vessels internal affairs in
those circumstances. These cases recognized a narrow rule,
applicable only to statutory duties that implicate the internal
order of the foreign vessel rather than the welfare of American
citizens. McCulloch, 372 U.S., at 21 (holding that
the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the
internal affairs of a ship (emphasis added)); see
also Benz, 353 U.S., at 146147. The Court held
the NLRA inapplicable to labor relations between a foreign
vessel and its foreign crew not because foreign ships are
generally exempt from the NLRA, but because the particular
application of the NLRA would interfere with matters that
concern only the internal operations of the ship. In contrast,
the Court held that the NLRA is fully applicable to labor
relations between a foreign vessel and American longshoremen
because this relationship, unlike the one between a vessel and
its own crew, does not implicate a foreign ships internal
order and discipline. Longshoremen v. Ariadne
Shipping Co.,397
U.S. 195, 198201 (1970).

This narrow clear statement rule is
supported by sound principles of statutory construction. It is
reasonable to presume Congress intends no interference with
matters that are primarily of concern only to the ship and the
foreign state in which it is registered. It is also
reasonable, however, to presume Congress does intend its
statutes to apply to entities in United States territory that
serve, employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or that
affect the peace and tranquility of the United States, even if
those entities happen to be foreign-flag ships.

Cruise ships flying foreign flags of
convenience offer public accommodations and transportation
services to over 7 million United States residents annually,
departing from and returning to ports located in the United
States. Large numbers of disabled individuals, many of whom
have mobility impairments that make other kinds of vacation
travel difficult, take advantage of these cruises or would like
to do so. To hold there is no Title III protection for
disabled persons who seek to use the amenities of foreign
cruise ships would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation of
a statute designed to provide broad protection for the
disabled. §12101. The clear statement rule adopted by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, moreover, would
imply that other general federal statutesincluding, for
example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
243, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aet seq.would not apply aboard
foreign cruise ships in United States waters. A clear
statement rule with this sweeping application is unlikely to
reflect congressional intent.

The relevant category for which the
Court demands a clear congressional statement, then, consists
not of all applications of a statute to foreign-flag vessels
but only those applications that would interfere with the
foreign vessels internal affairs. This proposition does
not mean the clear statement rule is irrelevant to the ADA,
however. If Title III by its terms does impose duties that
interfere with a foreign-flag cruise ships internal
affairs, the lack of a clear congressional statement can mean
that those specific applications of Title III are precluded.
On remand, the Court of Appeals may need to consider which, if
any, Title III requirements interfere with the internal affairs
of foreign-flag vessels. As we will discuss further, however,
Title IIIs own limitations and qualifications may make
this inquiry unnecessary.

B

1

The precise content of the category
internal affairs (or, as it is variously denoted in
the case law, internal order or internal
operations) is difficult to define with precision. There
is, moreover, some ambiguity in our cases as to whether the
relevant category of activities is restricted to matters that
affect only the internal order of the ship when there is no
effect on United States interests, or whether the clear
statement rule further comes into play if the predominant
effect of a statutory requirement is on a foreign ships
internal affairs but the requirement also promotes the welfare
of United States residents or territory. We need not attempt
to define the relevant protected category with precision. It
suffices to observe that the guiding principles in determining
whether the clear statement rule is triggered are the desire
for international comity and the presumed lack of interest by
the territorial sovereign in matters that bear no substantial
relation to the peace and tranquility of the port.

It is plain that Title III might impose
any number of duties on cruise ships that have nothing to do
with a ships internal affairs. The pleadings and briefs
in this case illustrate, but do not exhaust, the ways a cruise
ship might offend such a duty. The petitioners allege the
respondent charged disabled passengers higher fares and
required disabled passengers to pay special surcharges,
Plaintiffs First Amended Original Complaint in No.
H002649 (SD Tex.), ¶32, App. 15 (hereinafter
Complaint); Brief for Petitioners 1720; maintained
evacuation programs and equipment in locations not accessible
to disabled individuals, Complaint ¶19, App. 12; Brief for
Petitioners 21; required disabled individuals, but not other
passengers, to waive any potential medical liability and to
travel with a companion, id., at 8, 1718; and
reserved the right to remove from the ship any disabled
individual whose presence endangers the comfort of
other passengers, id., at 8, 20. The petitioners also
allege more generally that respondent failed to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and
procedures necessary to ensure the petitioners full
enjoyment of the services respondent offered. Complaint
¶30, App. 15. These are bare allegations, and their truth
is not conceded. We express no opinion on the factual support
for those claims. We can say, however, that none of these
alleged Title III violations implicate any requirement that
would interfere with the internal affairs and management of a
vessel as our cases have employed that term.

At least one subset of the
petitioners allegations, however, would appear to involve
requirements that might be construed as relating to the
internal affairs of foreign-flag cruise ships. These
allegations concern physical barriers to access on board. For
example, according to the petitioners, most of the cabins on
the respondents cruise ships, including the most
attractive cabins in the most desirable locations, are not
accessible to disabled passengers. Brief for Petitioners
1718; Complaint ¶16, App. 11. The petitioners also
allege that the ships coamingsthe raised edges
around their doorsmake many areas of the ships
inaccessible to mobility-impaired passengers who use
wheelchairs or scooters. Brief for Petitioners 24. Removal of
these and other access barriers, the petitioners suggest, may
be required by Title IIIs structural barrier removal
requirement, §§12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),
12184(b)(2)(C).

Although these physical barriers affect
the passengers as well as the ship and its crew, the statutory
requirement could mandate a permanent and significant
alteration of a physical feature of the shipthat is, an
element of basic ship design and construction. If so, these
applications of the barrier removal requirement likely would
interfere with the internal affairs of foreign ships. A
permanent and significant modification to a ships
physical structure goes to fundamental issues of ship design
and construction, and it might be impossible for a ship to
comply with all the requirements different jurisdictions might
impose. The clear statement rule would most likely come into
play if Title III were read to require permanent and
significant structural modifications to foreign vessels. It is
quite a different question, however, whether Title III would
require this. The Title III requirements that might impose
permanent and substantial changes to a ships architecture
and design, are, like all of Title IIIs requirements,
subject to the statutes own specific limitations and
qualifications. These limitations may make resort to the clear
statement rule unnecessary.

2

Title III requires barrier removal if
it is readily achievable, §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
The statute defines that term as easily accomplishable
and able to be carried out without much difficulty or
expense, §12181(9). Title III does not define
difficulty in §12181(9), but use of the
disjunctiveeasily accomplishable and able to be
carried out without much difficulty or
expenseindicates that it extends to considerations
in addition to cost. Furthermore, Title III directs that the
readily achievable determination take into account
the impact upon the operation of the
facility, §12181(9)(B).

Surely a barrier removal requirement
under Title III that would bring a vessel into noncompliance
with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, [19791980], 32 U.S. T. 47, T. I.
A. S. No. 9700, or any other international legal obligation,
would create serious difficulties for the vessel and would have
a substantial impact on its operation, and thus would not be
readily achievable. This understanding of the
statute, urged by the United States, is eminently reasonable.
Brief as Amicus Curiae 2728; ADA Title III
Technical Assistance Manual III1.2000(D) (Supp. 1994),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (as
visited May 31, 2005, and available in Clerk of Courts
case file); 56 Fed. Reg. 45600 (1991). If, moreover, Title
IIIs readily achievable exemption were not to
take conflicts with international law into account, it would
lead to the anomalous result that American cruise ships are
obligated to comply with Title III even if doing so brings them
into noncompliance with SOLAS, whereas foreign shipswhich
unlike American ships have the benefit of the internal affairs
clear statement rulewould not be so obligated. Congress
could not have intended this result.

It is logical and proper to conclude,
moreover, that whether a barrier modification is readily
achievable under Title III must take into consideration
the modifications effect on shipboard safety. A separate
provision of Title III mandates that the statutes
nondiscrimination and accommodation requirements do not apply
if disabled individuals would pose a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services,
§12182(b)(3). This reference is to a safety threat posed
by a disabled individual, whereas here the question would be
whether the structural modification itself may pose the safety
threat. It would be incongruous, nevertheless, to attribute to
Congress an intent to require modifications that threaten
safety to others simply because the threat comes not from the
disabled person but from the accommodation itself. The anomaly
is avoided by concluding that a structural modification is not
readily achievable within the meaning of §12181(9) if it
would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.

3

Because Title III does not require
structural modifications that would conflict with international
legal obligations or pose any real threat to the safety of the
crew or other passengers, it may well followthough we do
not decide the question herethat Title III does not
require any permanent and significant structural modifications
that interfere with the internal affairs of any cruise ship,
foreign flag or domestic. If that is indeed the case, recourse
to the clear statement rule would not be necessary.

Cases may arise, however, where it is
prudent for a court to turn first to the internal affairs clear
statement rule rather than deciding the precise scope and
operation of the statute. Suppose, for example, it is a
difficult question whether a particular Title III barrier
removal requirement is readily achievable, but the requirement
does entail a permanent and significant structural
modification, interfering with a foreign ships internal
affairs. In that case a court sensibly could invoke the clear
statement rule without determining whether Title III actually
imposes the requirement. On the other hand, there may be many
cases where it is not obvious that a particular physical
modification relates to a vessels basic architecture and
construction, but it is clear the modification would conflict
with SOLAS or some other international legal obligation. In
those cases, a court may deem it appropriate to hold that the
physical barrier modification in question is not readily
achievable, without resort to the clear statement rule.

III

A

In light of the preceding analysis, it
is likely that under a proper interpretation of readily
achievable Title III would impose no requirements that
interfere with the internal affairs of foreign-flag cruise
ships. If Title III did impose a duty that required cruise
ships to make permanent and significant structural
modifications that did not conflict with international law or
threaten safety, or if the statute otherwise interfered with a
foreign ships internal affairs, the clear statement rule
recognized in Benz and McCulloch would come into
play at that point. The Title III requirement in question,
however, would still apply to domestic cruise ships, and Title
III requirements having nothing to do with internal affairs
would continue to apply to domestic and foreign ships
alike.

This application-by-application use of
the internal affairs clear statement rule is consistent with
how the rule has traditionally operated. In Benz and
McCulloch, the Court concluded that the NLRA did not
apply to labor relations between a foreign-flag ship and its
foreign crew because of interference with the foreign
ships internal affairs. In Ariadne Shipping,
however, the Court held that the NLRA does apply to labor
relations between a foreign-flag ship and American
longshoremen. Ariadne Shipping acknowledged the clear
statement rule invoked in Benz and McCulloch but
held that the considerations that informed the
Courts construction of the statute in [those cases] are
clearly inapplicable to the question whether the statute
applies to foreign ships labor relations with American
longshoremen. 397 U.S., at 199. Ariadne Shipping held
that the longshoremens short-term, irregular and
casual connection with the [foreign] vessels plainly belied any
involvement on their part with the ships internal
discipline and order.
Id., at 200. Therefore, application of the NLRA to
foreign ships relations with American longshoremen
would have threatened no interference in the internal
affairs of foreign-flag ships. Ibid. If the
clear statement rule restricts some applications of the NLRA to
foreign ships (e.g., labor relations with the foreign
crew), but not others (e.g., labor relations with
American longshoremen), it follows that the case-by-case
application is also required under Title III of the ADA. The
rule, where it is even necessary to invoke it, would restrict
some applications of Title III to foreign ships (e.g.,
certain structural barrier modification requirements), but not
others (e.g., the prohibition on discriminatory ticket
pricing).

The internal affairs clear statement
rule is an implied limitation on otherwise unambiguous general
terms of the statute. It operates much like the principle that
general statutes are construed not to apply extraterritorially,
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,499 U.S. 244, 260
(1991), or the rule that general statutes are presumed not to
impose monetary liability on nonconsenting States,
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,473 U.S. 234 (1985).
Implied limitation rules avoid applications of otherwise
unambiguous statutes that would intrude on sensitive domains in
a way that Congress is unlikely to have intended had it
considered the matter. In these instances, the absence of a
clear congressional statement is, in effect, equivalent to a
statutory qualification saying, for example,
Notwithstanding any general language of this statute,
this statute shall not apply extraterritorially; or
 this statute shall not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of nonconsenting States; or  this
statute does not regulate the internal affairs of foreign-flag
vessels. These clear statement rules ensure Congress
does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a
sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation. An
all-or-nothing approach, under which a statute is altogether
inapplicable if but one of its specific applications trenches
on the domain protected by a clear statement rule, would
convert the clear statement rule from a principle of
interpretive caution into a trap for an unwary Congress. If
Congress passes broad legislation that has some applications
that implicate a clear statement rulesay, some
extraterritorial applications, or some applications that would
regulate foreign ships internal affairsan
all-or-nothing approach would require that the entire statute,
or some arbitrary set of applications larger than the domain
protected by the clear statement rule, would be nullified. We
decline to adopt that posture.

B

Our holding that the clear statement
rule operates only when a ships internal affairs are
affected does not implicate our holding in Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. ___ (2005). Martinez held
that statutory language given a limiting construction in one
context must be interpreted consistently in other contexts,
even though other of the statutes applications,
standing alone, would not support the same limitation.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). This was simply a rule of
consistent interpretation of the statu-tory words, with no
bearing on the implementation of a clear statement rule
addressed to particular statutory applications.

The statute in Martinez,
8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), authorized detention of aliens pending their
removal. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
696699 (2001), the Court had interpreted this statute to
impose time limits on detention of aliens held for certain
reasons stated in the statute. The Court held that an
alternative interpretation, one allowing indefinite detention
of lawfully admitted aliens, would raise grave constitutional
doubts. Having determined the meaning of
§1231(a)(6)s text in Zadvydas, we were
obliged in Martinez to follow the same interpretation
even in a context where the constitutional concerns were not
present. Martinez, 543 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at
59). As already made clear, the question was one of
textual interpretation, not the scope of some implied
exception. The constitutional avoidance canon simply informed
the choice among plausible readings of §1231(a)(6)s
text: The canon of constitutional avoidance,
Martinez explained, comes into play only when,
after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute
is found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and
the canon functions as a means of choosing between them.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (emphasis deleted).

Martinez gives full respect to
the distinction between rules for resolving textual ambiguity
and implied limitations on otherwise unambiguous text. Indeed,
Martinez relies on the distinction to reconcile its
holding with two cases which did involve a clear statement
rule, Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,534 U.S. 533 (2002),
and Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
Raygor had held that the tolling provision in the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1367(d), does not apply to nonconsenting States because the
statute lacks the required clear statement that States are
within its coverage. Later, in Jinks, we held that the
§1367(d) tolling provision does apply to suits against
counties. The counties were not protected by a clear statement
rule analogous to the one applicable to States. See
Martinez, 543 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 1112, and
n. 6); see also id., at ___ (slip op., at 68)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). This progression of
decisions, we held in Martinez, does not
remotely establish that §1367(d) has two different
meanings, equivalent to the
unlimited-detention/limited-detention meanings of
§1231(a)(6) urged upon us here. They hold that the single
and unchanging disposition of §1367(d) does not
apply to claims against States that have not consented to be
sued in federal court. Id., at ___ (slip op., at
12). The distinction between Zadvydas and
Martinez, on the one hand, and Raygor and
Jinks, on the other, is the distinction between a canon
for choosing among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute
and a clear statement rule that implies a special substantive
limit on the application of an otherwise unambiguous
mandate.

The internal affairs clear statement
rule is an implied limitation rule, not a principle for
resolving textual ambiguity. Our cases, then, do not compel or
permit the conclusion that if any one application of Title III
might interfere with a foreign-flag ships internal
affairs, Title III is inapplicable to foreign ships in every
other instance.

***

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag
ships in United States waters. This Courts cases,
however, stand only for the proposition that general statutes
are presumed not to impose requirements that would interfere
with the internal affairs of foreign-flag vessels. Except
insofar as Title III regulates a vessels internal
affairsa category that is not always well defined and
that may require further judicial elaborationthe statute
is applicable to foreign ships in United States waters to the
same extent that it is applicable to American ships in those
waters.

Title IIIs own limitations and
qualifications prevent the statute from imposing requirements
that would conflict with international obligations or threaten
shipboard safety. These limitations and qualifications, though
framed in general terms, employ a conventional vocabulary for
instructing courts in the interpretation and application of the
statute. If, on remand, it becomes clear that even after these
limitations are taken into account Title III nonetheless
imposes certain requirements that would interfere with the
internal affairs of foreign shipsperhaps, for example, by
requiring permanent and substantial structural
modificationsthe clear statement rule would come into
play. It is also open to the court on remand to consider
application of the clear statement rule at the outset if, as a
prudential matter, that appears to be the more appropriate
course.

We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.