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1.5 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
---------------------------
1. (C) Mr. President, you will arrive in France as Nicolas
Sarkozy begins the second year of a five-year term as
President. You will meet a Sarkozy chastened by the
experience of a first year marked by a sharp drop in his
political stock at home, but during which he nevertheless
reclaimed French leadership in Europe and moved France closer
to the U.S. Sarkozy was elected in May 2007 on a platform of
fundamental domestic reform, promising to unleash France's
economic potential and to adapt the country to globalization.
He has undertaken a range of domestic reforms but the
results have been somewhat disappointing -- to supporters who
advocated more daring implementation of a more ambitious set
of measures, and to a public that expected an immediate
positive impact in household purchasing power. Though the
public by and large continues to support Sarkozy's reform
effort, his personal popularity has plummeted, mostly as a
result of his "unpresidential" parading of his personal life
and his weakness for glitz -- an image he is now seeking to
repair.
2. (C) Sarkozy was not elected on a foreign policy platform,
but this is where he has thus far left his clearest mark,
repositioning France to work alongside the U.S. to meet
common challenges and leading Europe to its next
institutional advance in the form of the Lisbon Treaty.
While stressing France's independence of action, Sarkozy has
sought to enlarge French influence by working constructively
with the U.S., setting aside France's Gaullist vocation of
tempering the United States' "hegemonic" position in world
affairs. This "repositioning" (Sarkozy's term) vis-a- vis
the U.S. is seen most clearly in Sarkozy's articulation of
the stakes for France, NATO and the West in Afghanistan, his
commitment of more troops to NATO's stabilization efforts
there, and his declared intention to re-join NATO's
integrated military command structure in the context of an
invigorated European effort on defense. Your visit provides
an opportunity to support and give further impetus to
Sarkozy's refashioning of the U.S.-French relationship, and
to demonstrate to the French public that Sarkozy was right in
positing that a closer relationship with us increases
France's influence without undermining its independence. A
discussion of France's approach to key international issues
closes out this message. END SUMMARY.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: FRANCE
------------------------------
3. (C) It remains to be seen if Nicolas Sarkozy will prove
able to reform France economically and socially, unleash its
competitive potential, and help it embrace globalization.
Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007 on a wave of public
recognition of the need for such change and enthusiasm for
Sarkozy as the person to bring it about. After a year in
office Sarkozy has undertaken many of the across-the-board
reforms he promised, but the effect -- particularly with
regard to the critical issue of purchasing power -- has yet
to be felt by the French public. Widespread disappointment
with the meager results of reform, along with dismay at
Sarkozy's penchant for a flashy, "unpresidential" lifestyle,
has driven down Sarkozy's approval ratings, now stuck below
forty percent. Notwithstanding his personal unpopularity,
Sarkozy's reform policies still enjoy broad public support.
It remains to be seen if he can summon sufficient authority
to implement a package of reforms that will produce the
desired impact by the end of his term. Sarkozy believes he
can: You will be meeting an embattled, but determined
president, who remains primarily focused on delivering what
he promised in his campaign -- modernizing and economically
liberating France -- and who is determined to succeed,
deploying the considerable, largely unchecked powers of the
French Presidency.
4. (C) Sarkozy's first year in office is the story of how a
spectacularly successful presidential candidacy gave way to a
PARIS 00000957 002.2 OF 008
spectacularly unpopular presidency. The collusion and
antagonism between Sarkozy and the media are key, persistent
themes of this story. For the first six months of his
administration (May - October) Sarkozy enjoyed the longest
political honeymoon and best polls of any French Presidency
on record. He dominated the French political landscape,
personally driving all government policies and setting the
tone for the media's coverage of his national and
international presidential activities. Then (from November
through February), in a major miscalculation in image
management, Sarkozy paraded for media coverage his
billonaire-life-style affair with former supermodel and
current First Lady Carla Bruni-Tedeschi, whom he married
within weeks of meeting her following his divorce from his
second wife, Cecelia Sarkozy. The media that he had drawn in
to project himself as a hyper-energetic, no-nonsense reformer
dedicated to solving the problems of ordinary French people,
took its vengeance, portraying Sarkozy as a vulgar, insecure
celebrity-worshipper focused only on himself and his place in
the limelight. The ensuing, widespread sense among the
public that Sarkozy didn't really care about the problems of
ordinary people sent the president's popularity plummeting.
(His cause was not helped either by the embarrassing
week-long visit to Paris last fall by Libyan leader Qadhafi,
whose pronouncements and antics chipped away the notion that
Sarkozy's approach to such leaders and to human rights issues
would be markedly different from his predecessor's -- and
contrasted sharply with Sarkozy's earlier public
pronouncements.)
5. (C) Since March Sarkozy has sought to reassure his
partisans and the country that he remains committed to
reform, despite setbacks, and that he has drawn appropriate
conclusions concerning the visibility of his private life.
Sarkozy re-fashioned his image, hewing somewhat more closely
to public expectations for French presidents as soberly
distant, near-regal figures who officiate at civic rituals.
This return of a more traditional presidency has coincided
with Prime Minister Fillon's emergence from under the shadow
of Sarkozy as a national leader in his own right and of the
Fillon government's ministers finding firmer footing as
policymakers and implementers of reform. In a prime-time
television appearance in April, Sarkozy re-launched reform,
promising his continued, personal engagement. However, any
return to the political dominance Sarkozy once enjoyed will
be very difficult, will take time, and will depend largely on
showing results -- reforms that enhance the prosperity and
opportunities of ordinary citizens. In sum, his first year
in office has highlighted three Sarkozys who will likely
continue to co-exist through the end of his term: the
hyper-activist reformer and commanding political figure, the
self-absorbed and frenetic individual, and the statesman,
matured by the exigencies and burdens of office, who
perseveres to achieve his leadership vision.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: U.S.-FRANCE
-----------------------------
6. (C) France remains a world power and a leader of Europe.
With global military and diplomatic reach, it generates
significant economic wealth and still enjoys envied cultural
prestige. Even though he was not elected on a foreign policy
platform, Sarkozy's most significant achievement thus far is
his re-positioning of France to work alongside the U.S. to
solve problems, removing the Gaullist imperative of keeping a
critical distance from Washington. From the outset of his
presidency, Sarkozy was intent on improving relations with
the U.S. and, more broadly, bringing France back -- as he put
it in a key foreign policy address -- to full membership in
the "the West's family" of democratic nations. Sarkozy
considers the re-positioning of France alongside the U.S. --
no longer advocating alternative poles to American leadership
-- will increase France's influence as we together address
the grave challenges facing the international order. Sarkozy
identifies those challenges as religion-based political
extremism, nuclear proliferation, non-inclusion of the
world's poor in economic integration, and environmental
catastrophe. In addition, he sees bringing France and the
U.S. together as historically fitting and proper. This stems
PARIS 00000957 003.2 OF 008
both from Sarkozy's full appreciation of the significance for
France of liberation from Nazi occupation in World War II and
from his personal identification with American social values,
in particular, individual opportunity and achievement.
7. (C) Sarkozy's leadership in reinvigorating the bilateral
relationship was marked both by powerfully symbolic gestures
and concrete actions. Sarkozy's trips to the U.S., including
a vacation in New Hampshire last August and an official visit
in November, clearly signaled the renewal of trust and
friendship between the U.S. and France. Sarkozy said, in the
opening of his November 7 speech before a joint session of
Congress, "Friendship, first and foremost means being true to
one's friends" and France and the U.S. are friends that "have
always stood side by side, supported one another, helped one
another, fought for one another's freedom." Figuring
prominently among Sarkozy's gestures that signaled a new
French understanding of key U.S. policies were the dispatch,
after your meeting with him in Kennebunkport, of his foreign
minister to Iraq and his own Christmas Eve visit to
Afghanistan.
8. (C) At the Bucharest Summit, when you last met with him,
Sarkozy repeated his intention to "renovate" France's
relationship with NATO and to increase its commitment of
troops under NATO command in Afghanistan. He was vague,
however, as to the exact timing of NATO re-integration, and
he understated the size of the French reinforcement for
Afghanistan, announcing only the 700-person battalion that
will be sent to RC-East. He did not publicly mention the
additional 300-350 troops France will send to Kabul in July
when it assumes RC-Capital command there (or the possibility
of dispatching special operations forces sometime later).
Sarkozy's public caution on NATO and Afghanistan reflects his
sensitivity to recent criticism that he is aligning France
across the board with the U.S. It also demonstrates how his
current unpopularity has weakened his ability to brave the
opprobrium of the Gaullist conservatives, including many in
his own administration. Sarkozy's commitment to a more
Altanticist France is not in question. But he does have to
factor in the political caution of many around him (including
Prime Minister Fillon) and the continuing strength of the
Gaullist consensus among the public at large. Finally, a
largely powerless Socialist Party-led opposition has found a
voice criticizing Sarkozy over Afghanistan and NATO, even if
it does not have the political muscle to throw him off
course.
WHAT WE CAN DO FOR HIM
-------------------------
9. (C) You and Sarkozy have brought about an important shift
on the world scene: France and the U.S. are acting together
in a way they were not before his election on May 6, 2007.
Giving Sarkozy full credit for his leadership and bolstering
his stature as a world leader of vision and consequence,
would be the best way to solidify France's new orientation.
We have sought French Government support on a range of issues
over the year since Sarkozy became President. The French
have responded more positively than in the past, consistent
with the Sarkozy-directed shift to a closer and more
harmonious working relationship. Your visit would be the
best opportunity to show the French we value that
relationship and wish to build on it in such a way that it
serves our collective and individual interests. Your praise
of France's efforts to improve the relationship will have
greatest impact if it is coupled with an acknowledgment of
its legitimate role in the resolution of the issues that
matter most to the French -- beginning with Lebanon,
Palestinian-Israeli peace, Iran and Kosovo. The greater the
specificity in describing a French role, the greater the
impact. This would also be an opportunity to express your
support for Sarkozy's vision of an effective Europe, as you
did in Bucharest, by endorsing the further development of the
EU's defense capabilities alongside NATO -- demonstrating
that closeness to the U.S. and sensitivity to U.S. priorities
pay off and result in more, not less, influence for France.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
PARIS 00000957 004.2 OF 008
------------------------
10. (U) Discussion follows of France's approach to key
international issues and how the visit might be used to
advance our bilateral cooperation toward the achievement of
our policy objectives.
11. (S/NF) IRAN: The French are the most tough-minded of
our allies, and Sarkozy has more than erased the doubt in
France's position stemming from Chirac's ill-advised public
equanimity about a likely Iranian nuclear capability.
Sarkozy's hard line has negatively impacted on France's
bilateral relationship with Tehran, and France has paid a
commercial price, although the Iranians, more than the
French, are the ones seeking to preserve some sort of
discreet channel between Paris and Tehran. France has
hammered away at other EU countries concerned about
protecting their economic interests to implement measures to
enforce UN sanctions and complementary EU sanctions. Despite
the overall positive French position on Iran, they were very
upset over what they considered our maladroit handling of the
release of the NIE last fall on Iran's nuclear program.
This, in their view, greatly complicated the P-5 plus 1's
efforts to pass UNSCR 1803 and maintain a solid front in the
face of Iranian intransigence. The French share our
skepticism about ElBaradei and the IAEA. Given an unchanged
French estimate of Iran's nuclear capabilities (perhaps more
influenced by Israel's), Sarkozy will listen carefully to
your views on the way forward with Iran. He and many other
French policymakers share our concerns about the regional
threat Iran poses in the Gulf, Iraq, and Lebanon.
12. (C/NF) NATO: President Sarkozy,s closest advisors have
made clear that he has already made the decision for France
to rejoin NATO,s integrated military command. However, he
faces opposition and reluctance, including from within his
own party, as many prominent French policy makers cling to
the self-image of an independent France as symbolized by its
singular position in NATO. The grand bargain -- a full
return to NATO in return for a U.S. embrace of an enhanced EU
role in European defense ) is viewed as essential to make
the move politically palatable to the broader French public.
For this reason, President Sarkozy was deeply grateful for
your support at Bucharest. French officials are preparing to
make European defense a priority of the EU presidency in the
second half of this year, and are tentatively citing the 60th
anniversary NATO summit as the target date for a French
announcement on reintegration. As noted above, a further
statement during the visit of U.S. support for a strengthened
European defense would be welcome as Sarkozy seeks to move
forward on NATO. The French continue to doubt Georgia's and
Ukraine's readiness for MAP, but have not completely closed
the door to a NATO Ministerial decision granting MAP to one
or both of them in December.
13. (C) AFGHANISTAN: At the Bucharest NATO summit, Sarkozy
publicly announced 700 new troops for Afghanistan, a
supplemental battalion for RC-East. As noted, in July France
will also be adding some 300-350 troops to bolster the French
presence in Kabul, as France assumes command of RC-Central
beginning this summer. Finally, a deployment of Special
Forces may also still be on the table, although not before
the July reinforcement of France's command presence in Kabul.
Although still the largest increase announced at Bucharest,
Sarkozy understated France's additional contribution in the
face of rising public and political opposition. (Most
polling shows only a minority of the French public supports
increased deployments to Afghanistan, and there is little
public appreciation of the stakes involved.) To increase
support for Afghanistan, the French government is co-hosting
the Afghanistan support conference, to take place on the eve
of your visit. The conference will follow up on the 2006
London donor,s conference and address broader questions of
counter-narcotics, effective distribution of aid, good
governance and anti-corruption efforts. Your public
statements need to address the widespread perception that the
international effort in Afghanistan is failing and explain
why success there must be a European imperative.
PARIS 00000957 005.2 OF 008
14. (C) IRAQ: French reluctance to commit military troops
to Iraq remains a constant, as does France's hesitation to
increase bilateral assistance or engagement as long as the
security situation and prospects for national reconciliation
are seen as fragile. The French have, however, begun to
re-engage, opening an embassy office in the Kurdish city of
Irbil (which they have suggested would be used as a national
center for training and assistance). FM Kouchner
participated in the last two "neighbors" meetings as a means
of encouraging Arab states to shore up diplomatic and other
relations with Baghdad. France staunchly backs UNAMI and the
idea of the UN leading international reconstruction in Iraq.
The French have not, however, had much success achieving a
significant change of view within the EU and may use their
upcoming presidency to push harder. Commercial ties are
growing, but only slowly. The French are eager to talk about
Iraq, but we need to do more by way of a sustained and
realistic dialogue. Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield
started such a dialogue last December, but we should consider
intensifying it and making it more of an interagency
undertaking, with State and DoD in the lead. French concerns
about Iran's role in radicalizing Shi'a elements in Iraq and
elsewhere is something we should factor into these
discussions.
15. (C) LEBANON/SYRIA: They French Presidency learned its
lesson from its failed attempt to work with Syria late last
year to secure election of a new president in Lebanon.
France has resisted repeated Syrian appeals to resume that
effort or start a new one and the French have publicly blamed
Syria for the continued impasse. However, they are out of
ideas as far as how best to move things forward and have
adopted the public line that the only diplomatic initiative
in play is the one the Arab League (with Syria's assent)
adopted. The recent fighting in Lebanon saw the French at
once eager to work with us but determined to seek as a
priority the minimum necessary to calm the situation and
resume dialogue among the parties; the safety of their UNIFIL
contingent weighed heavily in their policy deliberations.
The current crisis has underscored a key divergence in the
French approach from ours, i.e., the degree to which it
supports the majority March 14 movement as well as the
Lebanese government. Repeatedly, the French have asserted
that they support the government led by PM Siniora but do not
accept that the movement behind him, which they see as one
unstable faction among many, deserves the same full support.
Maintaining a channel to Hizballah, which Sarkozy and
Kouchner have called a terrorist organization despite French
reluctance to designate it as such, is another reason the
French refuse to "take sides" in a way that would put
pressure on Hizballah despite their firm view that March 8
and the Syrians are responsible for Lebanon's political
stalemate. Despite frequent tactical disagreements at the
UN, we and the French largely share the same view that it is
vital that the UN investigation into the many political
assassinations in Lebanon lead as rapidly as possible to
indictments and prosecution. Your visit offers an important
opportunity for policy coordination.
16. (C) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE: As always, France
remains eager to play an important role in bringing peace
between Israel and the Palestinians. Under Sarkozy, the
French needling of the U.S. and Israel has largely
disappeared from the government's daily script. The French
hope that Sarkozy's warm embrace of Israel (unprecedented
over the past fifty years), and his strategic rapprochement
with the U.S., have increased its credibility as a partner in
peace-making. It was in this context that the French offered
to follow up the Annapolis conference with a donors
conference in Paris. Sarkozy, who is an unabashed admirer of
Israel but keen that Palestinians are treated justly, will
listen carefully to what you have to tell him about your
recent visit to the region and how his own Middle East trip
at the end of June can reinforce your message to the parties.
17. (C) KOSOVO: France recognized Kosovo,s independence
immediately, but is hesitant about full implementation due to
the potentially destabilizing role of Serbia (and Russia) in
PARIS 00000957 006.2 OF 008
the region. It is important to reassure Sarkozy that, while
we must proceed with full implementation of the Ahtisaari
plan, we agree with France on the importance of Serbia in
maintaining regional stability, and that U.S. policies will
remain consistent with our vision for Euro-Atlantic
integration of the entire Western Balkans, including both
Serbia and Kosovo.
18. (C) EU PRESIDENCY: France will chair the European Union
from July to December 2008. As President of the European
Council, Sarkozy will be the most visible face of the EU and
will have a major opportunity to advance French policy
priorities. Sarkozy's goals for France's presidency include
strengthening European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in
which he will seek to increase European defense capabilities
in parallel with normalizing France's role in NATO.
Sarkozy's other priorities include building a European
consensus on energy and environment, immigration, and
agricultural policy, as well as developing the Union for the
Mediterranean. France seeks to create a comprehensive,
cohesive European energy policy, promoting energy security
along with environmental aims such as reduction of greenhouse
gases and promotion of renewable energies. Similarly, a
common European pact on immigration would help EU
member-states present a consistent front to those seeking
asylum or immigrant visas. Sarkozy also wants to set the
stage for a revision of the EU Common Agricultural Policy,
which provides French farmers with important subsidies. The
French EU presidency will also inherit ongoing initiatives,
such as the internal process of ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon, or simplified EU treaty, for which Sarkozy takes
credit. France will also during its presidency help shape EU
responses to crises or other foreign policy issues that may
emerge. The presidency will thus raise Sarkozy's global
visibility, increase his influence, and give him an
opportunity to improve his image as a statesman both overseas
and domestically. We enjoy good communication with the
French on their EU presidency preparations, and such openness
will remain key during their presidency. Transparency
regarding defense capabilities is particularly important as
we seek, with other NATO allies, to ensure that ESDP
development is carried out in harmony with NATO. Sarkozy
continues to oppose Turkey's entry into the EU, in line with
French public opinion, but he has not sought to bring the
issue to a head. France will seek to use its influence as EU
President to break through the Turkey-Cyprus impasse on
NATO/EU cooperation.
19. (C) UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: This new organization,
Sarkozy's brainchild, will be established at a Paris summit
meeting on July 13. Built on existing cooperative
structures, it is intended to bring the EU member-states
together with countries from around the Mediterranean basin
to work on concrete economic, environmental and
infrastructure projects. The focus on specific projects is
likely to be a productive approach, for which we can signal
our interest and support. Though the U.S. would not be
eligible, nor seek to join the Union for the Mediterranean,
we could eventually participate in specific projects or work
in tandem with them. Sarkozy significantly revised his
initial vision for the Union to allay the concerns of Germany
and other European partners that a new cooperative body could
split or otherwise weaken the EU. The linkage of the Union
for the Mediterranean to pre-existing structures that have by
most accounts proven ineffective, coupled with a lack of
public-sector funds for the new initiative, may mean the new
organization's impact will be less than intended.
20. (C) TERRORISM: Fighting terrorism remains among the
GOF,s top priorities. France is one of the few countries in
Europe that &gets it,8 and remains dedicated to increasing
its capabilities ) in both defense and intelligence. France
has been a target of terrorism for decades and is Al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) number one foreign target. The
improvement of our bilateral relationship over the past year
has meant more substantive discussions on many of our common
threats. The visit is an opportunity to signal to Sarkozy
that the U.S. appreciates our increased C/T cooperation and
PARIS 00000957 007.2 OF 008
would like to see that collaboration expand further.
21. (C) FARC HOSTAGES/BETANCOURT: Sarkozy raised the
profile of the Betancourt issue during the election campaign
and over the first year of his Presidency, hoping to accrue
political credit for succeeding where his predecessors had
failed. Instead he has only raised the Betancourt's value to
the FARC as a prisoner. The French continue to search for
possible options to negotiate a release of Franco-Colombian
hostage Ingrid Betancourt (and other hostages). In an
attempt to increase international concern over Betancourt,s
health and possibly secure a hostage release, the French
Government sent a medical mission to Colombia in early April.
The FARC rejected this effort, saying that any release would
have to be coordinated in advance with them. Foreign
Minister Kouchner visited Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at
the beginning of May in an effort to find new solutions to
the hostage issues; however, Kouchner told journalists after
his return that he is not optimistic that Betancourt will be
released. The French believe the Colombian airstrike on
March 1 which killed senior FARC member Paul Reyes may have
derailed ongoing efforts to free Betancourt. Sarkozy may
raise his concern that the Colombian military might undertake
additional operations -- that could threaten the safety of
Betancourt -- and he may well seek your assistance in
securing Betancourt's release given perceived U.S. influence
with President Uribe.
22. (U) CLIMATE CHANGE: Ninety percent of the French public
considers climate change as one of the gravest issues facing
mankind and many still cannot understand why the U.S. failed
to accept the Kyoto Protocol. When Sarkozy was elected
President, he challenged the U.S. to assume a leadership
role. Over the past year, the French have begun to
appreciate our active engagement on this issue. Following
the U.S. proposal for a Major Economies Meeting process to
further the UN climate process, the French at first expressed
a mixture of skepticism and interest. They are now fully on
board, with France hosting the third Major Economies Meeting
(and the first to be held overseas) in mid-April, where
Sarkozy made a major address. France anticipates additional
productive MEM sessions leading up to the summer's Leaders
Meeting. This does not mean that the French share all U.S.
positions in the MEM. For example, they thought our
medium-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction target
(capping emissions at 2025 levels) much too modest. France
will seek strong language on climate change in the upcoming
G-8 statement, in addition to the language on climate change
in the Leaders Statement under the MEM process. This would
be an opportunity to sensitize Sarkozy and the GOF further to
the seriousness and breadth of U.S. efforts.
23. (C) DARFUR/AFRICA: Sarkozy came to office in 2007 with
an ambitious agenda for Africa, including an international
conference on Darfur that the French hosted shortly after he
became president. The French have focused on stabilizing
Chad and the Central African Republic as their response to
the broader Darfur problem. They were responsible for
obtaining European approval of the French-proposed EU
peacekeeping mission in those countries, intended to
complement UN peacekeeping in Darfur. The French provided
essential support to our Embassy in Chad and to Americans
in-country during the rebel attacks in February 2008.
Concurrently, the French have been working to modernize
relations with Africa, seeking to develop a more
business-like model free of the trappings of the colonial and
immediate post-colonial eras. Their reflexive suspicion of
U.S. competition in Africa has diminished, especially as
China's presence and influence has increased.
24. (C) CHINA: Sarkozy has tried to balance domestic
political pressure to take a tough stand on Chinese human
rights violations with competing economic interests and a
strategic approach to China that favors engagement, over
isolation or alienation. He has yet to rule out boycotting
the opening ceremonies of the Olympics and has said that as
France will hold the EU Presidency during the Olympics he
will consult with EU partners on the decision. While France
PARIS 00000957 008.2 OF 008
continues to support lifting the EU arms embargo against
China, it is unlikely that it will press this issue as there
is little EU support, which the Tibet/Olympics controversy
has only further dampened.
25. (C) RUSSIA: Sarkozy has been decidedly pragmatic in his
relations with Russia, though his advisors say he enjoys a
good personal rapport with Prime Minister Putin. The Sarkozy
government has consistently been firmer than its immediate
predecessor in criticizing Russian international provocations
(CFE, Georgia) as well as domestic human rights abuses. That
said, Sarkozy continues to see his relationship with Moscow
through the prism of needed cooperation with Russia on Iran
and other major international issues, and the French are
sensitive to the energy security concerns of Germany and
other European partners. We should assure Sarkozy that we
are equally conscious of Russia,s critical role in certain
areas, but stress that it is not in our collective interest
to submit to deal-making with an increasingly authoritarian
and unpredictable regime in Moscow.
26. (C) International Economy: Elected on a platform of
economic reform, President Sarkozy has taken steps to make
France,s labor market function more efficiently and to
create a more auspicious policy environment for business.
But Sarkozy,s economic instincts are Gaullist and populist,
rather than free-market. While the French government has
generally been a helpful interlocutor during recent global
financial turmoil, Sarkozy has blasted &financial
capitalism8 and speculators, insisting on a need for the
&moralization8 of capitalism. He has shown a willingness
to defend French national corporate champions, most recently
letting it be known that French bank Societe Generale would
not be for sale to foreigners in the wake of a large-scale
trading scandal. His minister of agriculture has used the
recent spike in global food prices to call for the
strengthening -- not liberalization -- of administrative
oversight of food markets through the EU,s Common
Agricultural Policy. He speaks enthusiastically about
defending EU &community preferences8 and mentions the Doha
round only in terms of defending agricultural interests
(despite the considerable potential gains for the
service-oriented French economy). And he allows populist
views to prevail on agricultural biotechnology by maintaining
a WTO-inconsistent ban on MON810 corn. The French are
extremely concerned about exchange rates and their
competitiveness with a weak dollar. When Prime Minister
Fillon visited Washington in May he was fishing with FRB
Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson for any hints that
the USG might agree to some sort of exchange rate management
or intervention. Our message to President Sarkozy should
underscore that reducing market distortions and maintaining
open economies will be essential to meeting common economic
challenges and fostering long-term growth.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON

Raw content

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000957
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR STAPLETON
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018
TAGS: ECON, FINR, KPAL, NATO, OVIP, PGOF, PREL, PTER, SENV,
AF, CH, CO, FR, IR, IS, IZ, LE, LG, RS, SR, SU, YI
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 14-16 VISIT TO PARIS
PARIS 00000957 001.2 OF 008
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
---------------------------
1. (C) Mr. President, you will arrive in France as Nicolas
Sarkozy begins the second year of a five-year term as
President. You will meet a Sarkozy chastened by the
experience of a first year marked by a sharp drop in his
political stock at home, but during which he nevertheless
reclaimed French leadership in Europe and moved France closer
to the U.S. Sarkozy was elected in May 2007 on a platform of
fundamental domestic reform, promising to unleash France's
economic potential and to adapt the country to globalization.
He has undertaken a range of domestic reforms but the
results have been somewhat disappointing -- to supporters who
advocated more daring implementation of a more ambitious set
of measures, and to a public that expected an immediate
positive impact in household purchasing power. Though the
public by and large continues to support Sarkozy's reform
effort, his personal popularity has plummeted, mostly as a
result of his "unpresidential" parading of his personal life
and his weakness for glitz -- an image he is now seeking to
repair.
2. (C) Sarkozy was not elected on a foreign policy platform,
but this is where he has thus far left his clearest mark,
repositioning France to work alongside the U.S. to meet
common challenges and leading Europe to its next
institutional advance in the form of the Lisbon Treaty.
While stressing France's independence of action, Sarkozy has
sought to enlarge French influence by working constructively
with the U.S., setting aside France's Gaullist vocation of
tempering the United States' "hegemonic" position in world
affairs. This "repositioning" (Sarkozy's term) vis-a- vis
the U.S. is seen most clearly in Sarkozy's articulation of
the stakes for France, NATO and the West in Afghanistan, his
commitment of more troops to NATO's stabilization efforts
there, and his declared intention to re-join NATO's
integrated military command structure in the context of an
invigorated European effort on defense. Your visit provides
an opportunity to support and give further impetus to
Sarkozy's refashioning of the U.S.-French relationship, and
to demonstrate to the French public that Sarkozy was right in
positing that a closer relationship with us increases
France's influence without undermining its independence. A
discussion of France's approach to key international issues
closes out this message. END SUMMARY.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: FRANCE
------------------------------
3. (C) It remains to be seen if Nicolas Sarkozy will prove
able to reform France economically and socially, unleash its
competitive potential, and help it embrace globalization.
Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007 on a wave of public
recognition of the need for such change and enthusiasm for
Sarkozy as the person to bring it about. After a year in
office Sarkozy has undertaken many of the across-the-board
reforms he promised, but the effect -- particularly with
regard to the critical issue of purchasing power -- has yet
to be felt by the French public. Widespread disappointment
with the meager results of reform, along with dismay at
Sarkozy's penchant for a flashy, "unpresidential" lifestyle,
has driven down Sarkozy's approval ratings, now stuck below
forty percent. Notwithstanding his personal unpopularity,
Sarkozy's reform policies still enjoy broad public support.
It remains to be seen if he can summon sufficient authority
to implement a package of reforms that will produce the
desired impact by the end of his term. Sarkozy believes he
can: You will be meeting an embattled, but determined
president, who remains primarily focused on delivering what
he promised in his campaign -- modernizing and economically
liberating France -- and who is determined to succeed,
deploying the considerable, largely unchecked powers of the
French Presidency.
4. (C) Sarkozy's first year in office is the story of how a
spectacularly successful presidential candidacy gave way to a
PARIS 00000957 002.2 OF 008
spectacularly unpopular presidency. The collusion and
antagonism between Sarkozy and the media are key, persistent
themes of this story. For the first six months of his
administration (May - October) Sarkozy enjoyed the longest
political honeymoon and best polls of any French Presidency
on record. He dominated the French political landscape,
personally driving all government policies and setting the
tone for the media's coverage of his national and
international presidential activities. Then (from November
through February), in a major miscalculation in image
management, Sarkozy paraded for media coverage his
billonaire-life-style affair with former supermodel and
current First Lady Carla Bruni-Tedeschi, whom he married
within weeks of meeting her following his divorce from his
second wife, Cecelia Sarkozy. The media that he had drawn in
to project himself as a hyper-energetic, no-nonsense reformer
dedicated to solving the problems of ordinary French people,
took its vengeance, portraying Sarkozy as a vulgar, insecure
celebrity-worshipper focused only on himself and his place in
the limelight. The ensuing, widespread sense among the
public that Sarkozy didn't really care about the problems of
ordinary people sent the president's popularity plummeting.
(His cause was not helped either by the embarrassing
week-long visit to Paris last fall by Libyan leader Qadhafi,
whose pronouncements and antics chipped away the notion that
Sarkozy's approach to such leaders and to human rights issues
would be markedly different from his predecessor's -- and
contrasted sharply with Sarkozy's earlier public
pronouncements.)
5. (C) Since March Sarkozy has sought to reassure his
partisans and the country that he remains committed to
reform, despite setbacks, and that he has drawn appropriate
conclusions concerning the visibility of his private life.
Sarkozy re-fashioned his image, hewing somewhat more closely
to public expectations for French presidents as soberly
distant, near-regal figures who officiate at civic rituals.
This return of a more traditional presidency has coincided
with Prime Minister Fillon's emergence from under the shadow
of Sarkozy as a national leader in his own right and of the
Fillon government's ministers finding firmer footing as
policymakers and implementers of reform. In a prime-time
television appearance in April, Sarkozy re-launched reform,
promising his continued, personal engagement. However, any
return to the political dominance Sarkozy once enjoyed will
be very difficult, will take time, and will depend largely on
showing results -- reforms that enhance the prosperity and
opportunities of ordinary citizens. In sum, his first year
in office has highlighted three Sarkozys who will likely
continue to co-exist through the end of his term: the
hyper-activist reformer and commanding political figure, the
self-absorbed and frenetic individual, and the statesman,
matured by the exigencies and burdens of office, who
perseveres to achieve his leadership vision.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: U.S.-FRANCE
-----------------------------
6. (C) France remains a world power and a leader of Europe.
With global military and diplomatic reach, it generates
significant economic wealth and still enjoys envied cultural
prestige. Even though he was not elected on a foreign policy
platform, Sarkozy's most significant achievement thus far is
his re-positioning of France to work alongside the U.S. to
solve problems, removing the Gaullist imperative of keeping a
critical distance from Washington. From the outset of his
presidency, Sarkozy was intent on improving relations with
the U.S. and, more broadly, bringing France back -- as he put
it in a key foreign policy address -- to full membership in
the "the West's family" of democratic nations. Sarkozy
considers the re-positioning of France alongside the U.S. --
no longer advocating alternative poles to American leadership
-- will increase France's influence as we together address
the grave challenges facing the international order. Sarkozy
identifies those challenges as religion-based political
extremism, nuclear proliferation, non-inclusion of the
world's poor in economic integration, and environmental
catastrophe. In addition, he sees bringing France and the
U.S. together as historically fitting and proper. This stems
PARIS 00000957 003.2 OF 008
both from Sarkozy's full appreciation of the significance for
France of liberation from Nazi occupation in World War II and
from his personal identification with American social values,
in particular, individual opportunity and achievement.
7. (C) Sarkozy's leadership in reinvigorating the bilateral
relationship was marked both by powerfully symbolic gestures
and concrete actions. Sarkozy's trips to the U.S., including
a vacation in New Hampshire last August and an official visit
in November, clearly signaled the renewal of trust and
friendship between the U.S. and France. Sarkozy said, in the
opening of his November 7 speech before a joint session of
Congress, "Friendship, first and foremost means being true to
one's friends" and France and the U.S. are friends that "have
always stood side by side, supported one another, helped one
another, fought for one another's freedom." Figuring
prominently among Sarkozy's gestures that signaled a new
French understanding of key U.S. policies were the dispatch,
after your meeting with him in Kennebunkport, of his foreign
minister to Iraq and his own Christmas Eve visit to
Afghanistan.
8. (C) At the Bucharest Summit, when you last met with him,
Sarkozy repeated his intention to "renovate" France's
relationship with NATO and to increase its commitment of
troops under NATO command in Afghanistan. He was vague,
however, as to the exact timing of NATO re-integration, and
he understated the size of the French reinforcement for
Afghanistan, announcing only the 700-person battalion that
will be sent to RC-East. He did not publicly mention the
additional 300-350 troops France will send to Kabul in July
when it assumes RC-Capital command there (or the possibility
of dispatching special operations forces sometime later).
Sarkozy's public caution on NATO and Afghanistan reflects his
sensitivity to recent criticism that he is aligning France
across the board with the U.S. It also demonstrates how his
current unpopularity has weakened his ability to brave the
opprobrium of the Gaullist conservatives, including many in
his own administration. Sarkozy's commitment to a more
Altanticist France is not in question. But he does have to
factor in the political caution of many around him (including
Prime Minister Fillon) and the continuing strength of the
Gaullist consensus among the public at large. Finally, a
largely powerless Socialist Party-led opposition has found a
voice criticizing Sarkozy over Afghanistan and NATO, even if
it does not have the political muscle to throw him off
course.
WHAT WE CAN DO FOR HIM
-------------------------
9. (C) You and Sarkozy have brought about an important shift
on the world scene: France and the U.S. are acting together
in a way they were not before his election on May 6, 2007.
Giving Sarkozy full credit for his leadership and bolstering
his stature as a world leader of vision and consequence,
would be the best way to solidify France's new orientation.
We have sought French Government support on a range of issues
over the year since Sarkozy became President. The French
have responded more positively than in the past, consistent
with the Sarkozy-directed shift to a closer and more
harmonious working relationship. Your visit would be the
best opportunity to show the French we value that
relationship and wish to build on it in such a way that it
serves our collective and individual interests. Your praise
of France's efforts to improve the relationship will have
greatest impact if it is coupled with an acknowledgment of
its legitimate role in the resolution of the issues that
matter most to the French -- beginning with Lebanon,
Palestinian-Israeli peace, Iran and Kosovo. The greater the
specificity in describing a French role, the greater the
impact. This would also be an opportunity to express your
support for Sarkozy's vision of an effective Europe, as you
did in Bucharest, by endorsing the further development of the
EU's defense capabilities alongside NATO -- demonstrating
that closeness to the U.S. and sensitivity to U.S. priorities
pay off and result in more, not less, influence for France.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
PARIS 00000957 004.2 OF 008
------------------------
10. (U) Discussion follows of France's approach to key
international issues and how the visit might be used to
advance our bilateral cooperation toward the achievement of
our policy objectives.
11. (S/NF) IRAN: The French are the most tough-minded of
our allies, and Sarkozy has more than erased the doubt in
France's position stemming from Chirac's ill-advised public
equanimity about a likely Iranian nuclear capability.
Sarkozy's hard line has negatively impacted on France's
bilateral relationship with Tehran, and France has paid a
commercial price, although the Iranians, more than the
French, are the ones seeking to preserve some sort of
discreet channel between Paris and Tehran. France has
hammered away at other EU countries concerned about
protecting their economic interests to implement measures to
enforce UN sanctions and complementary EU sanctions. Despite
the overall positive French position on Iran, they were very
upset over what they considered our maladroit handling of the
release of the NIE last fall on Iran's nuclear program.
This, in their view, greatly complicated the P-5 plus 1's
efforts to pass UNSCR 1803 and maintain a solid front in the
face of Iranian intransigence. The French share our
skepticism about ElBaradei and the IAEA. Given an unchanged
French estimate of Iran's nuclear capabilities (perhaps more
influenced by Israel's), Sarkozy will listen carefully to
your views on the way forward with Iran. He and many other
French policymakers share our concerns about the regional
threat Iran poses in the Gulf, Iraq, and Lebanon.
12. (C/NF) NATO: President Sarkozy,s closest advisors have
made clear that he has already made the decision for France
to rejoin NATO,s integrated military command. However, he
faces opposition and reluctance, including from within his
own party, as many prominent French policy makers cling to
the self-image of an independent France as symbolized by its
singular position in NATO. The grand bargain -- a full
return to NATO in return for a U.S. embrace of an enhanced EU
role in European defense ) is viewed as essential to make
the move politically palatable to the broader French public.
For this reason, President Sarkozy was deeply grateful for
your support at Bucharest. French officials are preparing to
make European defense a priority of the EU presidency in the
second half of this year, and are tentatively citing the 60th
anniversary NATO summit as the target date for a French
announcement on reintegration. As noted above, a further
statement during the visit of U.S. support for a strengthened
European defense would be welcome as Sarkozy seeks to move
forward on NATO. The French continue to doubt Georgia's and
Ukraine's readiness for MAP, but have not completely closed
the door to a NATO Ministerial decision granting MAP to one
or both of them in December.
13. (C) AFGHANISTAN: At the Bucharest NATO summit, Sarkozy
publicly announced 700 new troops for Afghanistan, a
supplemental battalion for RC-East. As noted, in July France
will also be adding some 300-350 troops to bolster the French
presence in Kabul, as France assumes command of RC-Central
beginning this summer. Finally, a deployment of Special
Forces may also still be on the table, although not before
the July reinforcement of France's command presence in Kabul.
Although still the largest increase announced at Bucharest,
Sarkozy understated France's additional contribution in the
face of rising public and political opposition. (Most
polling shows only a minority of the French public supports
increased deployments to Afghanistan, and there is little
public appreciation of the stakes involved.) To increase
support for Afghanistan, the French government is co-hosting
the Afghanistan support conference, to take place on the eve
of your visit. The conference will follow up on the 2006
London donor,s conference and address broader questions of
counter-narcotics, effective distribution of aid, good
governance and anti-corruption efforts. Your public
statements need to address the widespread perception that the
international effort in Afghanistan is failing and explain
why success there must be a European imperative.
PARIS 00000957 005.2 OF 008
14. (C) IRAQ: French reluctance to commit military troops
to Iraq remains a constant, as does France's hesitation to
increase bilateral assistance or engagement as long as the
security situation and prospects for national reconciliation
are seen as fragile. The French have, however, begun to
re-engage, opening an embassy office in the Kurdish city of
Irbil (which they have suggested would be used as a national
center for training and assistance). FM Kouchner
participated in the last two "neighbors" meetings as a means
of encouraging Arab states to shore up diplomatic and other
relations with Baghdad. France staunchly backs UNAMI and the
idea of the UN leading international reconstruction in Iraq.
The French have not, however, had much success achieving a
significant change of view within the EU and may use their
upcoming presidency to push harder. Commercial ties are
growing, but only slowly. The French are eager to talk about
Iraq, but we need to do more by way of a sustained and
realistic dialogue. Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield
started such a dialogue last December, but we should consider
intensifying it and making it more of an interagency
undertaking, with State and DoD in the lead. French concerns
about Iran's role in radicalizing Shi'a elements in Iraq and
elsewhere is something we should factor into these
discussions.
15. (C) LEBANON/SYRIA: They French Presidency learned its
lesson from its failed attempt to work with Syria late last
year to secure election of a new president in Lebanon.
France has resisted repeated Syrian appeals to resume that
effort or start a new one and the French have publicly blamed
Syria for the continued impasse. However, they are out of
ideas as far as how best to move things forward and have
adopted the public line that the only diplomatic initiative
in play is the one the Arab League (with Syria's assent)
adopted. The recent fighting in Lebanon saw the French at
once eager to work with us but determined to seek as a
priority the minimum necessary to calm the situation and
resume dialogue among the parties; the safety of their UNIFIL
contingent weighed heavily in their policy deliberations.
The current crisis has underscored a key divergence in the
French approach from ours, i.e., the degree to which it
supports the majority March 14 movement as well as the
Lebanese government. Repeatedly, the French have asserted
that they support the government led by PM Siniora but do not
accept that the movement behind him, which they see as one
unstable faction among many, deserves the same full support.
Maintaining a channel to Hizballah, which Sarkozy and
Kouchner have called a terrorist organization despite French
reluctance to designate it as such, is another reason the
French refuse to "take sides" in a way that would put
pressure on Hizballah despite their firm view that March 8
and the Syrians are responsible for Lebanon's political
stalemate. Despite frequent tactical disagreements at the
UN, we and the French largely share the same view that it is
vital that the UN investigation into the many political
assassinations in Lebanon lead as rapidly as possible to
indictments and prosecution. Your visit offers an important
opportunity for policy coordination.
16. (C) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE: As always, France
remains eager to play an important role in bringing peace
between Israel and the Palestinians. Under Sarkozy, the
French needling of the U.S. and Israel has largely
disappeared from the government's daily script. The French
hope that Sarkozy's warm embrace of Israel (unprecedented
over the past fifty years), and his strategic rapprochement
with the U.S., have increased its credibility as a partner in
peace-making. It was in this context that the French offered
to follow up the Annapolis conference with a donors
conference in Paris. Sarkozy, who is an unabashed admirer of
Israel but keen that Palestinians are treated justly, will
listen carefully to what you have to tell him about your
recent visit to the region and how his own Middle East trip
at the end of June can reinforce your message to the parties.
17. (C) KOSOVO: France recognized Kosovo,s independence
immediately, but is hesitant about full implementation due to
the potentially destabilizing role of Serbia (and Russia) in
PARIS 00000957 006.2 OF 008
the region. It is important to reassure Sarkozy that, while
we must proceed with full implementation of the Ahtisaari
plan, we agree with France on the importance of Serbia in
maintaining regional stability, and that U.S. policies will
remain consistent with our vision for Euro-Atlantic
integration of the entire Western Balkans, including both
Serbia and Kosovo.
18. (C) EU PRESIDENCY: France will chair the European Union
from July to December 2008. As President of the European
Council, Sarkozy will be the most visible face of the EU and
will have a major opportunity to advance French policy
priorities. Sarkozy's goals for France's presidency include
strengthening European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in
which he will seek to increase European defense capabilities
in parallel with normalizing France's role in NATO.
Sarkozy's other priorities include building a European
consensus on energy and environment, immigration, and
agricultural policy, as well as developing the Union for the
Mediterranean. France seeks to create a comprehensive,
cohesive European energy policy, promoting energy security
along with environmental aims such as reduction of greenhouse
gases and promotion of renewable energies. Similarly, a
common European pact on immigration would help EU
member-states present a consistent front to those seeking
asylum or immigrant visas. Sarkozy also wants to set the
stage for a revision of the EU Common Agricultural Policy,
which provides French farmers with important subsidies. The
French EU presidency will also inherit ongoing initiatives,
such as the internal process of ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon, or simplified EU treaty, for which Sarkozy takes
credit. France will also during its presidency help shape EU
responses to crises or other foreign policy issues that may
emerge. The presidency will thus raise Sarkozy's global
visibility, increase his influence, and give him an
opportunity to improve his image as a statesman both overseas
and domestically. We enjoy good communication with the
French on their EU presidency preparations, and such openness
will remain key during their presidency. Transparency
regarding defense capabilities is particularly important as
we seek, with other NATO allies, to ensure that ESDP
development is carried out in harmony with NATO. Sarkozy
continues to oppose Turkey's entry into the EU, in line with
French public opinion, but he has not sought to bring the
issue to a head. France will seek to use its influence as EU
President to break through the Turkey-Cyprus impasse on
NATO/EU cooperation.
19. (C) UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: This new organization,
Sarkozy's brainchild, will be established at a Paris summit
meeting on July 13. Built on existing cooperative
structures, it is intended to bring the EU member-states
together with countries from around the Mediterranean basin
to work on concrete economic, environmental and
infrastructure projects. The focus on specific projects is
likely to be a productive approach, for which we can signal
our interest and support. Though the U.S. would not be
eligible, nor seek to join the Union for the Mediterranean,
we could eventually participate in specific projects or work
in tandem with them. Sarkozy significantly revised his
initial vision for the Union to allay the concerns of Germany
and other European partners that a new cooperative body could
split or otherwise weaken the EU. The linkage of the Union
for the Mediterranean to pre-existing structures that have by
most accounts proven ineffective, coupled with a lack of
public-sector funds for the new initiative, may mean the new
organization's impact will be less than intended.
20. (C) TERRORISM: Fighting terrorism remains among the
GOF,s top priorities. France is one of the few countries in
Europe that &gets it,8 and remains dedicated to increasing
its capabilities ) in both defense and intelligence. France
has been a target of terrorism for decades and is Al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) number one foreign target. The
improvement of our bilateral relationship over the past year
has meant more substantive discussions on many of our common
threats. The visit is an opportunity to signal to Sarkozy
that the U.S. appreciates our increased C/T cooperation and
PARIS 00000957 007.2 OF 008
would like to see that collaboration expand further.
21. (C) FARC HOSTAGES/BETANCOURT: Sarkozy raised the
profile of the Betancourt issue during the election campaign
and over the first year of his Presidency, hoping to accrue
political credit for succeeding where his predecessors had
failed. Instead he has only raised the Betancourt's value to
the FARC as a prisoner. The French continue to search for
possible options to negotiate a release of Franco-Colombian
hostage Ingrid Betancourt (and other hostages). In an
attempt to increase international concern over Betancourt,s
health and possibly secure a hostage release, the French
Government sent a medical mission to Colombia in early April.
The FARC rejected this effort, saying that any release would
have to be coordinated in advance with them. Foreign
Minister Kouchner visited Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at
the beginning of May in an effort to find new solutions to
the hostage issues; however, Kouchner told journalists after
his return that he is not optimistic that Betancourt will be
released. The French believe the Colombian airstrike on
March 1 which killed senior FARC member Paul Reyes may have
derailed ongoing efforts to free Betancourt. Sarkozy may
raise his concern that the Colombian military might undertake
additional operations -- that could threaten the safety of
Betancourt -- and he may well seek your assistance in
securing Betancourt's release given perceived U.S. influence
with President Uribe.
22. (U) CLIMATE CHANGE: Ninety percent of the French public
considers climate change as one of the gravest issues facing
mankind and many still cannot understand why the U.S. failed
to accept the Kyoto Protocol. When Sarkozy was elected
President, he challenged the U.S. to assume a leadership
role. Over the past year, the French have begun to
appreciate our active engagement on this issue. Following
the U.S. proposal for a Major Economies Meeting process to
further the UN climate process, the French at first expressed
a mixture of skepticism and interest. They are now fully on
board, with France hosting the third Major Economies Meeting
(and the first to be held overseas) in mid-April, where
Sarkozy made a major address. France anticipates additional
productive MEM sessions leading up to the summer's Leaders
Meeting. This does not mean that the French share all U.S.
positions in the MEM. For example, they thought our
medium-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction target
(capping emissions at 2025 levels) much too modest. France
will seek strong language on climate change in the upcoming
G-8 statement, in addition to the language on climate change
in the Leaders Statement under the MEM process. This would
be an opportunity to sensitize Sarkozy and the GOF further to
the seriousness and breadth of U.S. efforts.
23. (C) DARFUR/AFRICA: Sarkozy came to office in 2007 with
an ambitious agenda for Africa, including an international
conference on Darfur that the French hosted shortly after he
became president. The French have focused on stabilizing
Chad and the Central African Republic as their response to
the broader Darfur problem. They were responsible for
obtaining European approval of the French-proposed EU
peacekeeping mission in those countries, intended to
complement UN peacekeeping in Darfur. The French provided
essential support to our Embassy in Chad and to Americans
in-country during the rebel attacks in February 2008.
Concurrently, the French have been working to modernize
relations with Africa, seeking to develop a more
business-like model free of the trappings of the colonial and
immediate post-colonial eras. Their reflexive suspicion of
U.S. competition in Africa has diminished, especially as
China's presence and influence has increased.
24. (C) CHINA: Sarkozy has tried to balance domestic
political pressure to take a tough stand on Chinese human
rights violations with competing economic interests and a
strategic approach to China that favors engagement, over
isolation or alienation. He has yet to rule out boycotting
the opening ceremonies of the Olympics and has said that as
France will hold the EU Presidency during the Olympics he
will consult with EU partners on the decision. While France
PARIS 00000957 008.2 OF 008
continues to support lifting the EU arms embargo against
China, it is unlikely that it will press this issue as there
is little EU support, which the Tibet/Olympics controversy
has only further dampened.
25. (C) RUSSIA: Sarkozy has been decidedly pragmatic in his
relations with Russia, though his advisors say he enjoys a
good personal rapport with Prime Minister Putin. The Sarkozy
government has consistently been firmer than its immediate
predecessor in criticizing Russian international provocations
(CFE, Georgia) as well as domestic human rights abuses. That
said, Sarkozy continues to see his relationship with Moscow
through the prism of needed cooperation with Russia on Iran
and other major international issues, and the French are
sensitive to the energy security concerns of Germany and
other European partners. We should assure Sarkozy that we
are equally conscious of Russia,s critical role in certain
areas, but stress that it is not in our collective interest
to submit to deal-making with an increasingly authoritarian
and unpredictable regime in Moscow.
26. (C) International Economy: Elected on a platform of
economic reform, President Sarkozy has taken steps to make
France,s labor market function more efficiently and to
create a more auspicious policy environment for business.
But Sarkozy,s economic instincts are Gaullist and populist,
rather than free-market. While the French government has
generally been a helpful interlocutor during recent global
financial turmoil, Sarkozy has blasted &financial
capitalism8 and speculators, insisting on a need for the
&moralization8 of capitalism. He has shown a willingness
to defend French national corporate champions, most recently
letting it be known that French bank Societe Generale would
not be for sale to foreigners in the wake of a large-scale
trading scandal. His minister of agriculture has used the
recent spike in global food prices to call for the
strengthening -- not liberalization -- of administrative
oversight of food markets through the EU,s Common
Agricultural Policy. He speaks enthusiastically about
defending EU &community preferences8 and mentions the Doha
round only in terms of defending agricultural interests
(despite the considerable potential gains for the
service-oriented French economy). And he allows populist
views to prevail on agricultural biotechnology by maintaining
a WTO-inconsistent ban on MON810 corn. The French are
extremely concerned about exchange rates and their
competitiveness with a weak dollar. When Prime Minister
Fillon visited Washington in May he was fishing with FRB
Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson for any hints that
the USG might agree to some sort of exchange rate management
or intervention. Our message to President Sarkozy should
underscore that reducing market distortions and maintaining
open economies will be essential to meeting common economic
challenges and fostering long-term growth.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON