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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
March 2012:
Airborne Electronic Attack:
Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming Acquisition
Challenges:
GAO-12-175:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-175, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize,
destroy, or suppress enemy air defense and communications systems.
Proliferation of sophisticated air defenses and advanced commercial
electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated appearance of
new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack
capabilities. GAO was asked to assess (1) the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities,
(2) progress made in developing and fielding systems to meet airborne
electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional actions
taken to address capability gaps. To do this, GAO analyzed documents
related to mission requirements, acquisition and budget needs,
development plans, and performance, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting
airborne electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family
of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable
aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and
weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade have identified capability
gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but budget
realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most
notably, DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services
revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These
decisions saved money, allowing DOD to fund other priorities, but
reduced the planned level of synergy among systems during operations.
As acquisition plans have evolved, capability limitations and
sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, prompting
the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls.
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address
its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats.
However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by
developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of
planned systems. Some programs, such as the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and
the Air Force’s modernized EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable
production and have completed significant amounts of testing. Other
key programs, like the Navy’s Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile,
have required additional time and funding to address technical
challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain
systems in development may offer capabilities that overlap with one
another—a situation brought on in part by DOD’s fragmented urgent
operational needs processes. Although services have shared technical
data among these programs, they continue to pursue unique systems
intended to counter similar threats. As military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate current
acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may
be hampered by DOD’s acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its
electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated,
joint entity to coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and
planned acquisitions will not fully address materiel-related
capability gaps identified by DOD—including some that date back 10
years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps.
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other
efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps.
In the near term, services are evolving tactics, techniques, and
procedures for existing systems to enable them to take on additional
mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing
systems and better position operators to complete missions with
equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend
on DOD successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and
technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long-
standing coordination shortfalls in this area, including designating
electronic warfare as a priority investment area and creating a
steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives.
These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research
priorities ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned
implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to
assess how closely component research investments are aligned with the
departmentwide priority.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD conduct program reviews for certain new, key
systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance; determine the
extent to which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take
steps to fill them; align service investments in science and
technology with the departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and
review capabilities provided by certain planned and existing systems
to ensure investments do not overlap. DOD agreed with three
recommendations and partially agreed with the two aimed at reducing
potential overlap among systems. DOD plans to assess coordination
among systems, whereas GAO sees opportunities for consolidation, as
discussed in the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-175]. For more
information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems:
Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results:
Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in
Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne Electronic Attack Systems:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Characteristics of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems in
Sustainment:
Table 2: Recent and Planned DOD Investments toward Acquiring Airborne
Electronic Attack Systems:
Table 3: DOD’s Progress Developing and Fielding New Airborne
Electronic Attack Systems:
Table 4: Potential Overlap among Communications Jamming Systems
Supporting Ground Forces:
Table 5: Primary Airborne Electronic Attack Capability Needs
Identified since 2002:
Table 6: Current DOD Science and Technology Initiatives Related to
Airborne Electronic Attack:
Table 7: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-6B Prowler,
Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Abbreviations:
AARGM: Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile:
AESA: Active Electronically Scanned Array:
ASD (R&E): Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering:
CEASAR: Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance and
Reconnaissance:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
HARM: High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile:
ICAP: Improved Capability:
IDECM: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures:
ITALD: Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy:
J-UCAS: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems:
LAIRCM: Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures:
MALD: Miniature Air Launched Decoy:
MALD-J: Miniature Air Launched Decoy--Jammer:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation:
TALD: Tactical Air Launched Decoy:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 29, 2012:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S.
military operations ranging from irregular warfare[Footnote 1] to
major combat against potential near-peer adversaries.[Footnote 2]
Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize,
destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) enemy air defense and
communications systems, either through destructive or disruptive
means. These aircraft employ a variety of mission systems and weapons
to prosecute threats, and they rely on defensive countermeasures to
provide additional protection.
Global proliferation of more sophisticated air defenses and advanced,
commercial digital electronic devices has contributed to the
accelerated appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S.
airborne electronic attack capabilities and limit U.S. access to
theaters of combat. These weapons--some held by both nation-state and
nonstate actors--vary from advanced, integrated air defense systems to
simpler, digital radio frequency memory devices. As the range of
adversary weapons increases, electronic jammers and other equipment
must respond with improved capabilities or may have to operate farther
from the battle, lessening their effectiveness.
In light of these developments, you asked us to review the Department
of Defense's (DOD) airborne electronic attack capabilities and
investment plans. In response to this request, we assessed (1) the
department's strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack
capabilities; (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to
meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements; and (3)
additional compensating actions taken by the department to address
capability gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and
procedures and investments in science and technology. In a separate
report, we plan to address the effectiveness of the department's
governance structure for overseeing its electronic warfare policies
and priorities and the relationship between electronic warfare and
cyber operations.
To assess the department's strategy for acquiring airborne electronic
attack capabilities, we analyzed documents outlining mission
requirements and acquisition needs including the 2009 Electronic
Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, service roadmaps related to
airborne electronic attack, budget documents, and program briefings.
We corroborated this information through discussions with officials
responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements and
systems, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Navy, Air Force, Army, and
Marine Corps requirements branches; U.S. Strategic Command; and the
Joint Staff. To assess progress made developing and fielding systems
to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed
materials outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes
including, capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports,
budget submissions, and program briefings. These same materials
afforded information on key attributes of individual airborne
electronic attack systems, which we used to assess potential overlap
among systems in development. Further, we identified persisting
capability gaps by reviewing DOD analyses related to airborne
electronic attack requirements. To supplement our analyses and gain
additional visibility and perspective into these issues, we conducted
numerous interviews with DOD officials charged with managing airborne
electronic attack requirements and those responsible for developing,
acquiring, and testing airborne electronic attack systems. To assess
additional compensating actions taken by the department to address
airborne electronic attack capability gaps, we reviewed service
documents outlining recent improvements and refinements to tactics,
techniques, and procedures for key airborne electronic attack
aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency announcements to understand
ongoing science and technology activities. We corroborated this
information through interviews with the user community responsible for
developing and maintaining operating procedures for airborne
electronic attack systems and with DOD airborne electronic attack
research leaders. A more detailed description of our scope and
methodology is presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD invests in electronic warfare capabilities as a means to maintain
unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum during war and
selectively deny adversary use of the spectrum. Traditionally,
electronic warfare has been composed of three primary activities:
* Electronic attack: Use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or
antiradiation weapons to attack with the intent of degrading,
neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.
* Electronic protection: Passive and active means taken to protect
personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or
enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
* Electronic warfare support: Actions directed by an operational
commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat
recognition, targeting, and planning, and the conduct of future
operations.
Airborne electronic attack--a subset of the electronic attack mission--
involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily
degrade (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems,
either through destructive or disruptive means. These capabilities are
increasingly important and complex as networked systems, distributed
controls, and sophisticated sensors become ubiquitous in military
equipment, civilian infrastructure, and commercial networks--
developments that complicate DOD's ability to exercise control over
the electromagnetic spectrum, when necessary, to support U.S. military
objectives.
Airborne electronic attack systems increase survivability of joint
forces tasked to enter denied battlespace and engage anti-access
threats or high-value targets,[Footnote 3] whether involved in major
combat operations against a potential near-peer adversary or in
irregular warfare. They also enable access to the battlespace for
follow-on operations. Aircraft executing airborne electronic attack
missions employ a variety of mission systems, such as electronic
jammers, and weapons, such as antiradiation missiles and air-launched
expendable decoys. These aircraft also rely on aircraft self-
protection systems and defensive countermeasures for additional
protection. All four services within DOD contribute to and rely upon
airborne electronic attack capabilities using a variety of different
aircraft. Each service is also separately acquiring new airborne
electronic attack systems.
Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 requires that for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and secretaries of the military departments, submit to the
congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD's electronic
warfare strategy.[Footnote 4] Each report must contain (1) a
description and overview of the department's electronic warfare
strategy and organizational structures for oversight; (2) a list and
description of all electronic warfare acquisition programs and
research and development projects within DOD; and (3) for the
unclassified programs and projects, detail on oversight
responsibilities, requirements, funding, cost, schedule, technologies,
potential redundancies, and associated capability gaps, and for the
classified programs and projects, a classified annex addressing these
topics, when appropriate.[Footnote 5] In response to this requirement,
DOD submitted its first Electronic Warfare Strategy of the Department
of Defense report in October 2010. The department produced its second
electronic warfare strategy report in November 2011.
DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems:
DOD's strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements'
including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs' centers on
acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing
aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and
related mission systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a
decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for
service investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities.
However, budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program
content. Most notably, the department canceled some acquisitions,
after which services revised their operating concepts for airborne
electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing the
department to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of
synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during operations. As
acquisition plans for these systems have evolved, operational stresses
upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have grown. These
stresses have materialized in the form of capability limitations and
sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting the department
to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate shortfalls.
Airborne Electronic Attack Acquisition Strategy Has Evolved:
Key DOD analyses completed since 2002 identified capability gaps,
provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack
systems, and supported an overarching acquisition strategy for
achieving these requirements. The department outlined its findings in
reports that included an analysis of alternatives, a capabilities-
based assessment, and initial capabilities documents. Figure 1
highlights a chronology of these analyses and identifies key airborne
electronic attack components of each report.
Figure 1: Key Analyses Underpinning Airborne Electronic Attack
Acquisition Strategy and Investments:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
2002:
Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives:
* Outlined airborne electronic attack capability needs to suppress
enemy air defenses during the 2010-2030 time frame;
* Evaluated potential new acquisition programs to augment and replace
the EA-6B;
* Documented the need for recoverable core component and expendable
stand-in jammers.
2004:
Initial Capabilities Document for Denying Enemy Awareness through
Airborne Electronic Attack:
* Evaluated Air Force's ability to fulfill need for core component
(stand-off) jammer;
* Documented a need to fund development of a B-52-based stand-off
jammer.
2008:
Electronic Warfare Capabilities-Based Assessment:
* Identified 34 Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved
capability gaps;
* Examined approximately 1,700 potential solutions for the identified
gaps;
* Determined that lack of sufficient electromagnetic spectrum
leadership is the most critical capability gap facing the DOD's
electronic warfare enterprise.
2009:
Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document:
* DOD completed this document as a follow on study to the Electronic
Warfare Capabilities-Based Assessment;
* Validated the 34 electronic warfare capability gaps-—including 15
directly related to airborne electronic attack—-and outlined taskings
related to control of the electromagnetic spectrum;
* Identified the growth of electronic warfare in irregular combat and
reemphasized the need for centralized leadership of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
2010:
Electronic Warfare Strategy of the Department of Defense report to
Congress:
* Outlined some organizational structures assigned to oversee
development of DOD electronic warfare requirements, capabilities,
programs, and projects;
* Provided cost, schedule, and technical data on electronic warfare
acquisition programs and development projects;
* Completed in response to congressional mandate (Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 1053).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.
[End of figure]
The 2002 Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives
established the primary framework by which the department began
investing in new airborne electronic attack capabilities. The analysis
focused on those capabilities needed to suppress enemy air defenses
from 2010 to 2030. The study identified two primary components
required to provide a complete and comprehensive airborne electronic
attack solution:
* Core component: A recoverable platform or combination of platforms
operating in enemy airspace. The core component provides the airborne
electronic attack detection and battle management capabilities for
reactive jamming.
* Stand-in component: An expendable air platform providing critical
capabilities against certain advanced threat emitters and employed in
threat environments not accessible to the core component.
Subsequent to this analysis, DOD developed a system of systems
strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack mission needs. A
system of systems is a set or arrangement that results when
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger, connected
and interdependent system that delivers unique capabilities during
military operations. The system of systems strategy established
specific roles and operating responsibilities among the military
services in a joint environment and expanded the basic core and stand-
in component needs into four major capability areas for airborne
electronic attack:
* Stand-off: Jamming occurring outside of defended airspace. Planned
stand-off systems included the Air Force's EC-130H Compass Call
aircraft and development of an electronic attack variant of the Air
Force's B-52.
* Modified escort: Jamming occurring inside defended airspace, but
outside of the range of known surface-to-air missiles. Planned
modified escort systems included the Navy's EA-18G Growler and EA-6B
Prowler aircraft.
* Penetrating escort: Jamming occurring inside the intercept range of
known surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on
aircraft equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radars, including the F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II aircraft to
perform this jamming function.
* Stand-in: Jamming occurring inside the "no escape range" of known
surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on development
of recoverable Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) and the Air
Force's Miniature Air Launched Decoy--Jammer (MALD-J) to provide this
function.
As time progressed, budget issues and lessons learned from operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan drove changes to the strategy and program
content. Most notably, the department canceled development of two
major components of the system of systems--the B-52 Standoff Jammer
and J-UCAS--in 2005 and 2006, respectively, citing higher-priority
needs and budget constraints. The B-52-based jamming concept was later
rejuvenated through the Air Force's Core Component Jammer initiative,
but that program was similarly canceled in 2009. Following these
developments, the department revised operating concepts and joint
service responsibilities, moving away from its system of systems plans
in favor of a family of systems strategy for airborne electronic
attack.
A family of systems is fundamentally different from a system of
systems. Under a family of systems construct, independent systems--
using different approaches--together provide capability effects to
support military operations. Unlike the synergy found in a system of
systems, a family of systems does not acquire qualitatively new
properties or necessarily create capability beyond the additive sum of
the individual capabilities of its members. The member systems may not
even be connected into a whole. In the case of airborne electronic
attack, DOD officials stated that a system of systems would have
employed a dynamic, networked capability to share data in real-time
among platforms--a concept known as electronic warfare battle
management. Under the family of systems strategy, officials stated
that this process is less automated and the parts are less connected.
Therefore, in making this strategy change, the department traded some
unique, synergistic capabilities that the system of system's
interdependent components might have provided in favor of near-term
budget savings and other priorities.
Figure 2 outlines the department's current family of systems strategy
for countering near-peer adversaries. This family of systems includes
traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, and related
mission systems and weapons.
Figure 2: Airborne Electronic Attack Family of Systems Strategy for
Countering Near-Peer Adversaries:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Depicted on the illustration:
EC-130H:
Stand-off jamming (communications);
EA-18G:
Modified jamming escort:
F-22A with AESA radar; F-35 with AESA radar:
Penetrating escort jamming.
EA-6B:
Modified escort jamming:
F-16CM: MALD.
F/a-18C/D: AARGM:
Suppression of enemy air defenses.
F/A-18E/F with AESA radar:
Suppression of enemy air defenses.
MALD-J:
Stand-in jamming.
Sources: GAO (presentation); Northrop Grumman (EA-6B); Boeing (EA-
18G); Raytheon (MALD and MALD-J); Lockheed Martin (F-35); Department
of Defense (EC-130H, F-22A, AARGM, F-16CM, F/A-18C/D, and F/A-18E/F);
Art Explosion (all other images).
[End of figure]
DOD's 2009 electronic warfare capabilities analysis identified the
growth of irregular warfare in urban areas as presenting challenges to
military operations. The analysis noted that irregular adversaries can
exploit civilian and commercial communications infrastructure to
minimize detection and subsequent attack. According to the department,
precise electronic attack planning and execution are required to
ensure that these threats are defeated while avoiding interruption to
U.S. communications capabilities.
The department has used existing airborne electronic attack systems,
such as the EA-6B and EC-130H, to meet its near-term irregular warfare
needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, officials report that these
platforms are optimized for countering high-end, near-peer threats,
and their use against irregular warfare threats is inefficient and
costly. Consequently, the department has begun investing in new, less
expensive airborne electronic attack systems tailored to counter
irregular warfare threats. These systems are fielded from both
traditional fixed-wing aircraft and from unmanned aerial vehicles.
Figure 3 illustrates operations involving these systems.
Figure 3: Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Tailored to Counter
Irregular Warfare Threats:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Depicted on the illustration:
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod:
(program canceled in fiscal year 2013 budget).
Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 2):
CEASAR:
Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 1):
U.S. Ground Forces:
Sources: GAO (presentation); Department of Defense (MQ-9 Reaper,
CORPORAL, CEASAR, and Intrepid II); Art Explosion (all other images).
[End of figure]
Existing Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Face Capability
Limitations and Sustainment Challenges:
As DOD's acquisition plans for airborne electronic attack systems have
evolved, operational stresses upon the current inventory of systems
have grown. These systems date back to the 1970s and 1980s and were
originally designed to counter Cold War era threats. Many of the
department's existing airborne electronic attack systems face
capability limitations, requiring the department to pursue
modernization efforts to increase the effectiveness of the systems or
to identify and develop replacement systems. Further, existing systems
face sustainment challenges from age, parts obsolescence, and
increased operational stresses from lengthy and sustained operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Air Force and Navy officials,
these challenges have reduced the availabilities of some systems to
warfighters. Table 1 identifies the department's existing airborne
electronic attack systems and related characteristics, including
future replacement systems identified to date.
Table 1: Characteristics of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems in
Sustainment:
System: EA-6B Prowler;
Mission description: Modified escort jamming;
Estimated end of service life: 2020;
Replacement system: EA-18G (Navy);
F-35B Lightning II (Marine Corps)[A].
System: AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System;
Mission description: Modified escort jamming;
Estimated end of service life: Mid-band: 2024; Low-band: 2026; High-
band: 2028;
Replacement system: Next Generation Jammer.
System: F-16CM;
Mission description: Suppression of enemy air defenses;
Estimated end of service life: 2024;
Replacement system: F-35A Lightning II.
System: AN/ALQ-131 and AN/ALQ-184 Pod Systems;
Mission description: Aircraft self-protection (F-16 and A-10);
Estimated end of service life: 2025;
Replacement system: Electronic Attack Pod Upgrade Program.
System: AN/ALQ-135 Internal Countermeasures Systems;
Mission description: Aircraft self-protection (F-15);
Estimated end of service life: 2035;
Replacement system: Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System.
System: AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM);
Mission description: Suppression of enemy air defenses;
Estimated end of service life: 2035[B];
Replacement system: Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM).
System: EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 0 and 1);
Mission description: Stand-off jamming (communications);
Estimated end of service life: 2053[C];
Replacement system: N/A.
System: ADM-141 Tactical Air Launched Decoy (TALD)/Improved Tactical
Air Launched Decoy (ITALD);
Mission description: Suppression of enemy air defenses;
Estimated end of service life: Unknown[D];
Replacement system: TBD[E].
System: F-22A Raptor;
Mission description: Penetrating escort;
Estimated end of service life: TBD;
Replacement system: N/A.
System: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Blocks
1 and 2;
Mission description: Aircraft self-protection (F/A-18 E/F);
Estimated end of service life: TBD;
Replacement system: IDECM Blocks 3 and 4.
Legend: N/A = not applicable; TBD = to be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] In addition to the fixed wing, airborne electronic attack
capability that F-35B Lightning II is anticipated to provide, the
Marine Corps plans to rely on its Marine Air Ground Task Force
Electronic Warfare concept to replace the warfighting capability and
capacity currently provided by the EA-6B. This concept seeks a more
holistic approach toward electronic warfare by combining both air and
ground capabilities. To date, DOD officials state that the Marine
Corps has completed a draft initial capabilities document, a concept
of operations, and various electronic warfare gap analyses in support
of its concept.
[B] This date refers to the expected service life of the Air Force's
inventory of HARM only. Air Force officials told us that retirement of
the Air Force's inventory of HARM is aligned with the expected
retirement of Block 50/52 F-16 aircraft.
[C] As of January 2012, the EC-130H program schedule showed that
center wing box replacement for the 14th Compass Call aircraft should
be complete by 2018. A program office official told us that center
wing box replacement extends the operational service life of the
aircraft an additional 35 years, suggesting an end of service life in
2053, assuming no additional improvements to the fleet.
[D] According to a Navy official, neither TALD nor ITALD has an
estimated end of service life. The Navy plans to continue providing
minimal sustainment funds for these systems, as resource availability
permits.
[E] The Navy has begun evaluating TALD/ITALD replacement options.
[End of table]
DOD is taking actions to address capability limitations and
sustainment challenges across several key systems, such as the
following:
* EA-6B Prowler: Since its introduction in the 1970s, the Navy and
Marine Corps have made significant upgrades to the EA-6B Prowler. The
latest of these upgrades--the Improved Capability electronic suite
modification (ICAP III) provides the Prowler with greater jamming
capability and is designed to improve the aircraft's overall
capability as both a radar-jamming and HARM platform. By the end of
fiscal year 2012, 32 EA-6Bs will be upgraded to the ICAP III
configuration. Navy officials told us that persistent operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have degraded the condition of EA-6B
aircraft. In addition, we have previously reported that parts
obsolescence presents the biggest challenge to the EA-6B's ability to
fulfill its mission role.[Footnote 6] We noted that although the Navy
has made several structural upgrades to the EA-6B fleet, it is
actively tracking a number of key components, including cockpit
floors, side walls, fin pods, bulkheads, actuators, engine components,
landing gear, and avionics software--all of which are at increasing
risk for costly replacement the longer the aircraft remains in service.
* HARM: According to Navy officials, even though HARM has undergone
various block upgrades to provide increased capabilities since fleet
introduction in 1983, advancements in enemy radar technology have
rendered the weapon somewhat ineffective for typical Navy targets. As
a result, the Navy is fielding a major technological upgrade to HARM
through its AARGM acquisition program. AARGM provides a new multimode
guidance section and modified control section mated with existing HARM
propulsion and warhead sections. The Air Force, similarly, is pursuing
modifications to HARM control sections on missiles in its inventory--a
process that will provide a global positioning system receiver to
those units. Air Force officials stated that they have long sought
this receiver component addition because of vulnerabilities in the
HARM targeting method. This effort is being pursued in conjunction
with other modernization efforts for Air Force F-16CM aircraft.
* TALD and ITALD: Navy officials stated that advancements in enemy
integrated air defense systems have decreased the effectiveness of
both TALD and ITALD units. According to program officials, newer
radars can discern from the TALD/ITALD flight profile that the system
is a decoy and not a valid target. The Navy has begun evaluating
TALD/ITALD replacement options under its Airborne Electronic Attack
Expendable program initiative.
* EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 0 and 1): Although the Air Force
initially fielded the EC-130H Compass Call as a communications jammer
supporting suppression of enemy air defenses, the system has evolved
to include irregular warfare missions and radar jamming. Air Force
officials told us that the Compass Call is the most utilized aircraft
within the C-130 family and has been continuously deployed since 2003
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, accelerating the need
for the Air Force to replace the center wing box on each of the 14
aircraft in the Compass Call fleet. Further, Air Force officials told
us that they are increasing the size of the fleet by one aircraft to
alleviate stress on current aircraft and to increase the availability
of airborne electronic attack capability to the Air Force. According
to a fleet viability assessment completed in 2010, the current size of
the fleet is insufficient to meet combatant commander taskings for
Compass Call.
* AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: The Navy's Low Band Transmitter
upgrade to the AN/ALQ-99 system is intended to replace three aging
legacy transmitters that suffer from obsolescence and reliability
problems. According to Navy officials, persistent use of these
transmitters in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has
exacerbated system shortfalls. Navy officials told us that they are
also identifying options for improving reliability and resolving
obsolescence issues with the mid and high bands of the AN/ALQ-99
system. However, Navy officials project that even with these
improvements, system capabilities will be insufficient to counter
anticipated evolutions in threat radars and missiles beginning in
2018. This shortfall is expected to be addressed by the new Next
Generation Jammer.
* AN/ALQ-131 and AN/ALQ-184 Pod Systems: The Air Force has identified
obsolescence issues and capability shortfalls affecting these systems,
which provide tactical aircraft self-protection. The Air Force is
pursuing a replacement/upgrades program designed to move the Air Force
to a single, self-protection pod system for its F-16 and A-10 aircraft.
Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results:
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address
its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats.
However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by
developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of
several planned systems. Some programs, including the Navy's EA-18G
Growler and the Air Force's EC-130H Compass Call modernization, are in
stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing.
On the other hand, the Navy's AARGM, the Air Force's Miniature Air
Launched Decoy (MALD), and other programs have required additional
time and money to resolve technical challenges. In addition, certain
airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer
capabilities that overlap with one another--a situation brought on in
part by the department's fragmented urgent operational needs
processes. As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease,
opportunities exist to consolidate current acquisition programs across
services; however, this consolidation may be hampered by leadership
deficiencies affecting the department's electronic warfare enterprise.
Furthermore, current and planned acquisition programs, even if
executed according to plan, will not fully address the materiel-
related capability gaps identified by the department--including some
that date back 10 years.
Investments in New Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Have Yielded
Mixed Results to Date:
DOD investments to develop and procure new and updated airborne
electronic attack systems are projected to total more than $17.6
billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2016.[Footnote 7] These systems
represent the department's planned mix of assets for (1) countering
near-peer, integrated air defense and communications systems and (2)
providing communications and radio frequency jamming against irregular
warfare threats. Table 2 outlines the department's recent and planned
investments toward developing and acquiring several of these systems.
Table 2: Recent and Planned DOD Investments toward Acquiring Airborne
Electronic Attack Systems:
Then-year dollars in millions.
Next Generation Jammer;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $2,141.5;
Current procurement cost estimate: N/A;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $402.6;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $1,738.9.
EA-18G Growler;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $1,839.4;
Current procurement cost estimate: $9,341.6;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012):
$10,032.5;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $1,148.5.
AARGM;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $631.0;
Current procurement cost estimate: $1,277.7;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $877.5;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $1,031.2.
MALD and MALD-J[A];
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $505.1;
Current procurement cost estimate: $1,339.6;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $953.8;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $890.9.
IDECM Block 4;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $254.1;
Current procurement cost estimate: $609.1;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $271.6;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $591.6.
EC-130H Compass Call Modernization;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $129.0;
Current procurement cost estimate: $957.2;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $709.9;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $376.3[B].
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $133.4;
Current procurement cost estimate: $100.3;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $53.1;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: 0.0[C].
Intrepid Tiger II;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $26.5;
Current procurement cost estimate: $50.3;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012): $43.4;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $33.4.
Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(CEASAR) pod;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $0.8;
Current procurement cost estimate: $13.0;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012):
$13.8[D];
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: 0.0.
Total;
Current research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost
estimate: $5,660.8;
Current procurement cost estimate: $13,688.8;
Total RDT&E and procurement funding (through fiscal year 2012):
$13,358.2;
Remaining RDT&E and procurement funding requirements: $5,810.8.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD budget submissions and program baselines.
Notes: Remaining funding requirements for EC-130H Compass Call
Modernization represent funding through the end of a 5-year budget
forecast. In addition, F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II (Joint
Strike Fighter) funding is excluded from this analysis because those
aircraft will provide capabilities that support several missions,
including airborne electronic attack.
[A] MALD and MALD-J figures do not include costs or appropriations
related to the previously planned MALD-J Increment II. In its fiscal
year 2013 budget submission, the Air Force canceled the Increment II
program. Prior to this cancellation, the Air Force planned to invest
$272.3 million in RDT&E funding through fiscal year 2016 to begin
developing this new capability.
[B] Total does not include funding needed to support Air Force plans
to modernize three additional EC-130H aircraft in fiscal years 2017
through 2018 because the Air Force has not yet identified these
funding requirements. However, according to Air Force officials, they
expect the 2017 and 2018 modernization budgets to each remain constant
with planned fiscal year 2016 funding of $85.5 million.
[C] In its fiscal year 2013 budget submission, the Air Force canceled
the MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod program. Prior to this
cancellation, remaining funding requirements for the program were
expected to total $180.6 million.
[D] Total excludes approximately $16.0 million in program funding from
the Operations and Maintenance, Army account, which the Army has used,
in part, to lease C-12 aircraft to host the CEASAR pod. In fiscal year
2013, the Army plans to request an additional $10.3 million in
Operations and Maintenance funding to support these activities.
[End of table]
As table 2 shows, several airborne electronic attack systems are in an
advanced stage of funding. However, under current estimates, over $6.0
billion in funding is still required to fully deliver these new
systems to the warfighter. Further, the department has not yet
identified the full amount of funding required for certain key
systems, such as the Next Generation Jammer, which could require
billions of additional dollars to field.
Correspondent to their different funding profiles, the department's
new systems are also in various stages of development, with some
progressing more efficiently than others. Table 3 identifies the
mission role(s), developmental status, and fielding plans for these
systems. In addition, appendix II provides additional details on the
status of several of these programs.
Table 3: DOD's Progress Developing and Fielding New Airborne
Electronic Attack Systems:
System: EA-18G Growler;
Mission description: Modified escort jamming;
Development status: The Navy has fielded EA-18G aircraft with limited
cost and schedule growth to date. Through fiscal year 2011, the Navy
placed 90 of the planned 114 Growler aircraft under production
contract. Operational testing identified suitability concerns, which
the Navy has addressed through software changes. In July 2011, the
system completed its first combat deployment supporting operations in
Iraq and Libya. The Navy continues to develop new software blocks to
add aircraft capability;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2009.
System: CEASAR pod;
Mission description: Irregular warfare jamming;
Development status: In September 2011, the Army initiated an
operational assessment of the CEASAR system by deploying three pods;
two contractor-owned, government-operated C-12 aircraft;
and associated operators and support personnel to Operation Enduring
Freedom. Following this authorized 1-year assessment, the Army will
make a determination on CEASAR's readiness to transition into a formal
acquisition program;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2011.
System: Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-measures (LAIRCM);
Mission description: Aircraft self-protection;
Development status: Current acquisition plans add a next generation
missile warning system to LAIRCM to provide improved detection against
infrared threat missiles. Recently, the next generation missile
warning system completed initial operational test and evaluation, and
a full rate production decision is planned for 2012;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2011.
System: IDECM Blocks 3 and 4;
Mission description: Aircraft self-protection;
Development status: IDECM Block 3 entered full rate production in
2011. IDECM Block 4 integrates significant hardware design changes to
the ALQ-214 onboard jammer component. These changes will enable the
system to operate on F/A-18C/D aircraft, while maintaining the
system's functionality on F/A-18E/F aircraft. Planned concurrency in
the Block 4 testing and production schedules increases risk of
retrofits to delivered systems;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2011 (Block 3); 2014 (Block 4).
System: AARGM;
Mission description: Suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses;
Development status: Hardware and software failures during operational
testing in 2010--and subsequent deferral of remaining testing--drove a
9-month fielding delay to the system. Manufacturing quality and
reliability concerns prompted the Navy to institute a "fly before you
buy" program to screen poor weapons prior to government acceptance.
AARGM recently resumed operational testing, but the Navy assesses
system suitability as high risk;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2012.
System: Intrepid Tiger II;
Mission description: Irregular warfare jamming;
Development status: The Intrepid Tiger II program is developing 2 pod
variants for AV-8B (variant 1) and RQ-7B (variant 2) aircraft. Variant
1 entered operational testing in 2011 ahead of planned deployment of
initial pods. Design change costs, including a radio system change,
were absorbed by reducing pod quantities (14 to 8). Variant 2 testing
under the Collaborative On-line Reconnaissance Provider/Operationally
Responsive Attack Link demonstration program concluded in April 2011.
Full performance of variant 2 pods remains unproven due to platform
(RQ-7B) unavailability and integration issues, including
susceptibility to electromagnetic interference;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2012 (Variant 1); TBD (Variant 2).
System: MALD;
Mission description: Suppression of enemy air defenses;
Development status: MALD operational testing was suspended following
anomalies and subsequent crashes of test vehicles in June 2010 and
February 2011. System design changes facilitated a return to testing,
but an August 2011 test shot also failed. Testing concluded in
September 2011;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2012.
System: MALD-J;
Mission description: Stand-in jamming;
Development status: MALD-J employs the same flight vehicle as MALD,
with slight differences to account for inclusion of a jammer. The Air
Force approved MALD-J entry into low rate initial production in
September 2011, with planned production start in May 2012. Operational
testing has been reduced from 15 to 7 months in an attempt to mitigate
program delays resulting from MALD design deficiencies. DOD states
this reflects an increase in test range priority and a decrease in
data turnaround time;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2012.
System: MALD-J Increment II;
Mission description: Stand-in jamming;
Development status: Funding shortfalls curtailed Air Force plans to
award a technology development contract in fall 2011 for MALD-J
sensitivity and jamming power improvements--key capability gains
intrinsic to Increment II. The program was later canceled In the
fiscal year 2013 budget submission;
Actual/estimated fielding date: N/A.
System: EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 2 and 3);
Mission description: Stand-off jamming (communications);
Development status: Baseline 2 modernization--currently scheduled for
8 of the Air Force's planned 15 EC-130H aircraft--adds new
capabilities including improved special purpose emitter array
transmitters and addresses aircraft obsolescence issues. Modification
work on the first of these 8 aircraft began in fiscal year 2011, with
3 more aircraft following in fiscal year 2012. The Air Force is
currently studying configuration options for Baseline 3, which
officials expect to install on 7 EC-130H aircraft;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2014 (Baseline 2); 2017 (Baseline 3).
System: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter);
Mission description: Penetrating escort;
Development status: F-35 entered low rate initial production in 2007
and has since experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays.
Development challenges caused the program to be restructured in 2010,
triggering a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.[A] GAO has repeatedly expressed
concerns about the F-35's technology maturity and design stability.
The program revised its testing plan and is making progress against a
new schedule;
Actual/estimated fielding date: TBD[B].
System: MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod;
Mission description: Irregular warfare jamming;
Development status: Prior to canceling the program in its fiscal year
2013 budget submission, the Air Force planned to integrate electronic
attack pods on Block 5 MQ-9 aircraft--the first units expected to have
sufficient power to operate the pods. Program officials stated that
electromagnetic interference caused by the pods jamming the MQ-9
command and control systems posed a key technical challenge. The
program entered technology maturation phase in 2010 and planned to
award an engineering and manufacturing development contract in 2013;
Actual/estimated fielding date: N/A.
System: Next Generation Jammer;
Mission description: Modified escort jamming;
Development status: The Navy plans to award technology development
contracts for the system in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013,
with award of an engineering and manufacturing development contract to
follow in 2015. In November 2010--based on findings from the system's
analysis of alternatives--Navy leadership directed the program to
pursue a block approach to developing capability, whereby mid-, low-,
and high-band jammers would be progressively fielded on EA-18G
aircraft and, through a later increment, F-35 aircraft;
Actual/estimated fielding date: 2020 (Mid-band); 2022 (Low-band);
2024 (High-band)[C].
Legend: N/A = not applicable; TBD = to be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] A Nunn-McCurdy cost breach occurs when a program's unit cost
exceeds certain statutory thresholds.
[B] F-35 does not currently have an approved fielding date. Prior to
the program's Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Marine Corps planned to declare
initial operational capability for the aircraft in 2012. However,
since the breach, DOD has not yet approved a new acquisition program
baseline, and the services continue to evaluate potential fielding
dates for the F-35.
[C] Dates provided reflect system fielding plans with EA-18G; fielding
dates with F-35 are undetermined.
[End of table]
Some Programs Are Progressing Well:
Some airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have reached
stable production with limited cost growth or schedule delays. Two
primary examples include the following:
* EA-18G Growler: Acquisition of the EA-18G Growler--a modified escort
jamming platform designed to carry AN/ALQ-99 and future Next
Generation Jammer pods--achieved initial capability in September 2009,
consistent with its 2007 baseline schedule. Additionally, program
costs per aircraft increased less than one-half of 1 percent from 2003
to 2010--an outcome partially attributable to quantity increases from
90 to 114.
* EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 2 and 3): Modernization of the EC-
130H Compass Call is on schedule for fielding a new increment of
capability, Baseline 2, in 2014 within available funding limitations.
Baseline 2 introduces several new capabilities, including reactive
radar response and the Joint Tactical Radio System terminal that has
been delayed because of testing challenges. However, Compass Call
program officials do not expect the radio system delay to affect the
program's fielding plans for Baseline 2 aircraft. According to the Air
Force, cost considerations are a primary criterion in developing EC-
130H capability requirements. The program office does not entertain
potential aircraft improvements unless those improvements are
accompanied by full funding. The Air Force is initiating technology
development activities for a subsequent phase of the modernization
program, Baseline 3, and plans to begin production of these aircraft
in 2014, with initial fielding scheduled for 2017.
Our previous work has shown that good acquisition outcomes are
achieved through the knowledge-based approach to product development
that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant
commitments are made.[Footnote 8] In essence, knowledge supplants risk
over time. This model relies on increasing knowledge when developing
new products, separating technology development from product
development, and following an evolutionary or incremental approach to
product development. In this approach, developers make investment
decisions on the basis of specific, measurable levels of knowledge at
critical junctures before investing more money and before advancing to
the next phase of acquisition. The good outcomes on the EA-18G and EC-
130H programs can be attributed, in part, to acquisition strategies
embodying elements of best practices.
Some Programs Are Underperforming:
Other airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have not
progressed as efficiently, however. These systems have proceeded
through product development with lower-than-desired levels of
knowledge and subsequently faced technical, design, and production
challenges, contributing to significant cost growth, fielding delays
or both. Most notably, these systems entered--or are on track to
enter--production before completing key development activities,
including achievement of stable designs. We previously reported that
concurrency in development and production activities limits the
ability of an acquisition program to ensure that the system will work
as intended and that it can be manufactured efficiently to meet cost,
schedule, and quality targets.[Footnote 9]
* MALD/MALD-J: MALD was authorized for low rate initial production in
June 2008 with an initial plan for 300 low rate initial production
units in two lots, beginning in March 2009. However, testing failures
in 2010 and 2011--coupled with a desire to avoid a potentially costly
break in production--prompted the Air Force to extend MALD low rate
initial production by two additional lots and increase total
quantities under contract to 836. In September 2011, citing
"successful completion of MALD-J engineering and manufacturing
development activities," the Air Force exercised a priced option to
upgrade 240 of its planned MALD units to the MALD-J configuration,
subsequently decreasing MALD quantities to 596. Because all future
production lots are now planned as jammer-configured decoys (MALD-J),
the 596 total represents the full MALD procurement--without the
program having ever met the criteria necessary to proceed into full
rate production.[Footnote 10] Since the MALD and MALD-J designs are
identical--except for the addition of a jammer module to MALD-J--the
absence of a proven manufacturing process for MALD introduces schedule
risk to production of MALD-J.[Footnote 11] This risk is accentuated by
continuing deficiencies affecting the MALD and MALD-J designs, which
have required the Air Force to schedule additional developmental
flight tests for each system in February 2012 to test corrective
fixes. To the extent that this retesting phase shows a need for
additional design changes, the Air Force may be forced to revisit its
planned May 2012 production start for MALD-J.
* AARGM: The Navy authorized low rate initial production of AARGM
units in September 2008 with initial deliveries scheduled to begin in
January 2010. A total procurement objective of 1,919 units was set and
an initial operational capability scheduled for March 2011. However,
as a result of intermittent hardware and software failures in testing,
the program was decertified for initial operational test and
evaluation in September 2010, and low rate initial production
deliveries were delayed until June 2011. The missile has subsequently
reentered testing, but significant concerns about the system's
reliability remain. Further, Navy officials stated that the current
program schedule is oriented toward success with virtually no margin
to accommodate technical deficiencies that may be discovered during
operational testing. In the event operational testing reveals new or
lingering major deficiencies, program officials report the planned
April 2012 fielding date will be at risk, and the Navy may be forced
to revisit its commitment to the program.
* IDECM: From December 2000 to June 2010, the Navy authorized six
different low rate initial production lots of IDECM Blocks 2 and 3,
providing system improvements to the jammer and decoy components.
Block 2 production units delivered ahead of schedule, but early Block
3 units encountered operational testing failures; later resolved,
these failures drove production delays to remaining units. In Block 4,
the Navy is introducing significant hardware design changes to the ALQ-
214 jammer component. Ground and flight testing to prove out these
design changes is scheduled concurrent with transition to production
in April 2012, increasing risk that initial Block 4 units will require
design changes and retrofits.[Footnote 12] Officials stated that this
concurrency is necessary in order to maintain an efficient production
line transition from Block 3 to Block 4 and to meet the desired June
2014 fielding date. They further noted that transition to Block 4
production will initially be for 19 systems, with production rates
increasing to as many as 40 per year following completion of testing.
Planned Systems May Offer Capabilities That Overlap, Presenting
Opportunities to Consolidate Acquisition Efforts:
Certain airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer
capabilities that unnecessarily overlap with one another. This
condition appears most prevalent with irregular warfare systems that
the services are acquiring under DOD's fragmented urgent operational
needs processes. For example, the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force
have all separately invested to acquire unique systems intended to jam
enemy communications in support of ground forces. Further, Navy and
Air Force plans to separately invest in new expendable decoy jammers--
systems intended to counter near-peer adversaries--also appear to
overlap. Declining military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan--
coupled with recent changes in the Air Force's MALD-J program--afford
opportunities to consolidate current service-specific acquisition
activities. The department's ability to capitalize on these
opportunities, however, may be undermined by a lack of designated,
joint leadership charged with overseeing electronic warfare
acquisition activities.
Potential Overlap among Irregular Warfare Systems Driven by Service-
Specific Solutions to Urgent Warfighting Needs:
DOD is investing millions of dollars to develop and procure airborne
electronic attack systems uniquely suited for irregular warfare
operations. Services are acquiring these systems under both rapid
acquisition authorities as well as through the traditional acquisition
process. These systems overlap--at least to some extent--in terms of
planned mission tasks and technical challenges to date. Yet, they have
been developed as individual programs by the different services. Table
4 highlights overlap among three of these systems.
Table 4: Potential Overlap among Communications Jamming Systems
Supporting Ground Forces:
System name: Service sponsor;
Intrepid Tiger II: Marine Corps;
CEASAR Pod: Army;
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod: Air Force.
System name: Host platform;
Intrepid Tiger II: Variant 1: AV-8B fixed wing aircraft[A];
Variant 2: RQ-7B unmanned aerial vehicle;
CEASAR Pod: C-12 fixed wing aircraft;
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod: MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle.
System name: Mission description;
Intrepid Tiger II: Communications jamming and surveillance capability
in support of ground forces;
CEASAR Pod: Denial and disruption of enemy communications systems and
improvised explosive devices in support of unit-level ground
commanders;
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod: Communications and improvised
explosive device jamming in support of combatant commander mission
needs.
System name: Technical status;
Intrepid Tiger II: Program recently completed compatibility testing
for variant 1 to identify potential electromagnetic interference
issues and reduce system fratricide. Interoperability testing will not
be completed until after the system has achieved early operational
capability (fielding). Initial testing of variant 2 revealed
electromagnetic interference with the RQ-7B's safety of flight systems
as well as aircrew system feedback and usability issues with the
electronic attack payload system interface;
CEASAR Pod: Electromagnetic Interference issues--resulting from
continuous low frequency jamming--were identified in testing,
subsequently causing impairment to aircraft navigation and
communications systems. According to Army officials, these challenges
have been overcome with solutions proven during the system's recent
2011 operational assessment;
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod: The Air Force canceled this program
in its fiscal year 2013 budget submission. Prior to cancellation,
program officials anticipated potential MQ-9 electromagnetic
interference issues caused by the jamming pod that could interfere
with the aircraft's communications link to ground station controllers.
System name: Estimated acquisition cost;
Intrepid Tiger II: $76.8 million;
CEASAR Pod: $13.8 million[B];
MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod: $233.7 million[C].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Integration and fielding on AV-8B aircraft represent minimum
(threshold) requirements for the Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 1) pod.
Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Marine Corps plans to transition
Intrepid Tiger II (Variant 1) to other fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
including the F/A-18C/D.
[B] Total excludes $26.3 million in funding from the Operations and
Maintenance, Army budget account through fiscal year 2013. The Army
uses these funds to (1) lease two C-12 aircraft to fly the CEASAR pod
and (2) fund aircraft and pod sustainment costs.
[C] Reflects estimated acquisition cost prior to program cancellation.
[End of table]
According to DOD officials, airborne electronic attack limitations in
recent operations, urgent needs of combatant commanders, and the
desire to provide ground units with their own locally controlled
assets have all contributed to service decisions to individually
develop their own systems to address irregular warfare threats. For
example, one Marine Corps official told us that his service is focused
on increasing its airborne electronic attack capacity to meet Marine
Air-Ground Task Force requirements in combat. Marine Corps systems
typically equipped to perform these tasks--especially the EA-6B
Prowler aircraft--have reached their capacity limits responding to
combatant commander taskings. Similarly, Air Force officials stated
that ground warfighter requests for airborne electronic attack
capabilities sometimes go unfulfilled or are delayed because of the
overall constrained capacity during current operations. Further, Army
and Marine Corps officials see operational benefits to providing
ground unit commanders with smaller airborne electronic attack assets--
permanently integrated within the unit--to free up Air Force and Navy
assets for larger-scale missions. In addition, the capabilities
offered by current jamming pods, such as the AN/ALQ-99, are often
overkill for the irregular warfare mission needs--such as counter-
improvised explosive device activities--facing ground unit commanders.
Requirements for several of these irregular warfare systems were
derived from DOD urgent needs processes--activities aimed at rapidly
developing, equipping, and fielding solutions and critical
capabilities to the warfighter in a way that is more responsive to
urgent requests than the department's traditional acquisition
procedures. As we previously reported, the department's urgent needs
processes often lead to multiple entities responding to requests for
similar capabilities, resulting in potential duplication of efforts.
[Footnote 13] Even under these circumstances, the services have shown
it is possible to take steps to share technical information among the
different programs and services. For instance, the Army's CEASAR pod
is derived from the AN/ALQ-227 communications jammer used on the
Navy's EA-18G--an attribute that Army officials state reduced design
risk in the program and provided opportunities for decreased
sustainment costs and reuse of jamming techniques between the two
services. Similarly, Air Force efforts to develop electronic attack
pods flown on MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (prior to that
program's cancellation) leveraged previous technology investments for
the canceled B-52-based stand-off jammer.
As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down--and the
services evaluate whether to transition their current urgent needs
programs over to the formal weapon system acquisition process--
opportunities may exist to consolidate program activities, such as the
Intrepid Tiger II and CEASAR systems that are still demonstration
programs whose transitions to formal acquisition programs have not yet
been determined.
Navy and Air Force Have Not Agreed on a Common Decoy Solution:
The potential for unnecessary overlap in efforts within the airborne
electronic attack area is not limited to irregular warfare systems.
With respect to near-peer systems, both the Air Force and Navy are
separately pursuing advanced jamming decoys--the Air Force through its
MALD-J program, and the Navy through its planned Airborne Electronic
Attack Expendable initiative.
The two services have held discussions with one another about
combining efforts toward a joint solution, including a meeting between
Navy and Air Force requirements offices and acquisition officials in
December 2010, but they have not yet reached resolution on a common
path forward. According to Navy officials, relatively minor design and
software modifications to what was a planned second increment to the
Air Force's MALD-J system could produce a system that satisfies both
services' mission requirements. However, Air Force officials stated
that accommodating the Navy's mission requirements within the system
would increase program costs and delay planned fielding of the
Increment II system, essentially rendering the planned program
unexecutable. Subsequently, Air Force officials stated that unless
Increment II, in its planned configuration, sufficiently met Navy
requirements, they did not expect the Navy to have any formal role in
the program. In July 2011, however, the Air Force suspended MALD-J
Increment II activities because of a lack of future funding
availability. In February 2012, the Air Force's fiscal year 2013
budget submission officially canceled the program.[Footnote 14] This
cancellation affords an opportunity for continued dialogue between the
two services on the potential benefits and drawbacks to pursuing a
common acquisition solution.
Leadership Deficiencies Undermine the Department's Ability to Reduce
Overlap:
In 2009, DOD completed a capabilities analysis that cited
electromagnetic spectrum leadership as the highest priority among 34
capability gaps identified. The study concluded, in part, that
leadership deficiencies, or its absence, significantly impede the
department from both identifying departmentwide needs and solutions
and eliminating potentially unnecessary overlap among the services'
airborne electronic attack acquisitions. Specifically, the department
lacks a designated, joint entity to both coordinate internal
activities and represent electronic warfare activities and interests
to outside organizations. Acknowledging this leadership gap, and its
relation to acquisition activities, the department has initiated
efforts to organize the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Coordination
Center under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command. In addition,
officials representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering stated that they are considering
actions they might take to improve leadership and oversight of
electronic warfare acquisition activities across the services. In a
separate report, we intend to evaluate planned and existing electronic
warfare governance structures within DOD.
Planned Systems Will Not Fully Address Capability Gaps:
Notwithstanding the considerable investment over the years in new and
enhanced airborne electronic attack systems and subsystems, capability
gaps, some identified a decade ago, are expected to persist, or even
increase, through 2030 as adversary capabilities continue to advance.
In a series of studies since 2002, DOD identified existing current and
anticipated gaps in required capabilities. Some have persisted for
years--for example, deficiencies in certain jamming capabilities to
provide cover for penetrating combat aircraft. The analyses found
that, in many cases, new materiel solutions were required to close
these gaps. Table 5 outlines primary findings from three major
analyses.
Table 5: Primary Airborne Electronic Attack Capability Needs
Identified since 2002:
Capabilities analysis: Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of
Alternatives (2002);
Analysis sponsor: Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Needs identified: Stand-in and core component jamming capability needs
identified. The analysis outlined 27 potential platform combinations
to address these needs.
Capabilities analysis: Initial Capabilities Document for Denying Enemy
Awareness through Airborne Electronic Attack (2004);
Analysis sponsor: Air Force;
Needs identified: Identified Air Force needs for materiel solutions to
provide stand-off and modified escort jamming, in light of the then-
pending retirement of Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft. The document also
identified penetrating escort and stand-in jamming capability needs
unique to the Air Force, while identifying potential materiel
solutions.
Capabilities analysis: Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities
Document (2009);
Analysis sponsor: U.S. Strategic Command;
Needs identified: Identified 34 electronic warfare enterprise-wide
capability gaps. Fifteen of these gaps relate directly to the airborne
electronic attack mission area. The study concluded that of these 15
gaps, 7 require new materiel solutions. Top priority is fixing
leadership shortfalls.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
The 2002 analysis identified needs for stand-in and core component
jamming capabilities and suggested numerous ways to meet these. The
2004 study revalidated these gaps and outlined 10 potential materiel
solutions to fill those gaps. It also acknowledged the existence of
both near-peer and irregular warfare threats requiring airborne
electronic attack solutions. The Army and Marine Corps requested that
the analysis address irregular warfare threats because of the growing
concern over improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan and
the suboptimal application of existing systems in the inventory to
defeat those threats. The Air Force concluded in its analysis that
fulfilling airborne electronic attack mission needs would require
developing and fielding multiple new systems.
The most recent study, U.S. Strategic Command's Electronic Warfare
Initial Capabilities Document, identified additional capability gaps
affecting airborne electronic attack. This 2009 analysis built upon a
capabilities-based assessment completed a year earlier and outlined
mitigation strategies to address these gaps instead of merely
prescribing specific platform solutions. This approach was consistent
with the analysis's charter to guide and inform the services'
acquisition programs. However, the analysis did recommend specific
capabilities and system attributes for the Next Generation Jammer
program to consider that would assist in mitigating some of the gaps
identified in the 2009 analysis. The analysis also concluded that new
systems would be needed to close nearly half of the gaps identified in
airborne electronic attack capabilities.
Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in
Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps:
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other
efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps.
In the near term, services are evolving their tactics, techniques, and
procedures for operating existing systems to enable them to take on
additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of
existing systems and better position operators to complete missions
with equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however,
depend on the department successfully capitalizing on its investments
in science and technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin
to address long-standing coordination shortfalls in this area
including designating electronic warfare as a priority area for
investment and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to
research initiatives. However, these steps do not preclude services
from funding their own research priorities ahead of departmentwide
priorities. DOD's planned implementation roadmap for electronic
warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component research
investments are aligned to the departmentwide electronic warfare
priority.
Changing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Existing Systems Can
Mitigate Gaps in the Near Term:
The refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures can position the
services to maximize the capabilities of existing systems while new
capabilities are being developed. As Navy airborne electronic attack
operators stated, when a capability gap requiring a new system is
identified, warfighters generally do not have the luxury of waiting
for the acquisition community to develop and field a system to fill
that gap. In the interim, tactics, techniques, and procedures for
existing systems must evolve to provide at least partial mitigation to
the threat being faced. Development and refinement of new ways to use
existing equipment allow the services to maximize the utility of their
airborne electronic attack systems and leave them better positioned to
complete missions with the assets they have available. The following
two systems provide examples where operator communities have refined
tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet emerging threats:
* AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: Navy officials told us that
threats encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan operations have driven
significant changes to how the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System is
employed. In essence, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the
system had to evolve to maximize the system's capabilities against
irregular warfare threats. According to Navy officials, however, these
adaptations represent only a temporary solution as their application--
coupled with increased operational activity--has caused jamming pods
to degrade and burn out at an increasing rate, subsequently increasing
maintenance requirements for the system.
* EC-130H Compass Call: According to Air Force officials, EC-130H
tactics, techniques, and procedures have rapidly evolved to encompass
dynamically changing electronic attack threats, which include
irregular warfare. These changes include modifications to both how the
operator employs the aircraft as well as to the range of threats
targeted by mission planners.
Both Navy and Air Force officials emphasized that sustained
investments in tactics, techniques, and procedures offer considerable
return on investment and can provide important, near-term solutions to
longer-term, persistent threats. According to these officials, these
investments position operators to "do more with less"--in effect,
offer them the opportunity to mitigate or counteract a threat without
the required new system. However, limits exist to the extent to which
refinements to current operating approaches for existing systems can
bridge capability gaps. For example, it is increasingly difficult to
further optimize AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods to counter advanced,
integrated air defense systems. Specifically, Navy officials stated
that the AN/ALQ-99 has reached its limit in terms of the underlying
architecture's capability to grow to counter new, sophisticated types
of threats.
DOD Focusing Science and Technology Investments to Close Gaps in the
Long Term, but Coordination Remains a Concern:
Investment in the science and technology research base is a longer-
term approach DOD uses to address capability gaps in mission areas.
Electronic warfare, including airborne electronic attack, is supported
by research investments in fields such as sensors, apertures, power
amplifiers, and unmanned aircraft technology that may help address
existing capability gaps. Service components categorize research
investments differently from one another, which complicates efforts to
clearly define funding devoted to airborne electronic attack. Table 6
identifies some of DOD's current airborne electronic attack-related
research investments.
Table 6: Current DOD Science and Technology Initiatives Related to
Airborne Electronic Attack:
Agency: Office of Naval Research;
Acquisition vehicle: Long-range broad agency announcement;
Examples of funded programs/fields: Electronics, Sensors, & Network
Research; Receivers & Antennas; Power Amplifiers;
Budgeted funds: A total of $4.0 million in fiscal year 2011 for all
electronic warfare research, but new plans are to increase this amount
to approximately $24.0 million annually.
Agency: Air Force Research Laboratory;
Acquisition vehicle: Research interests of the office's broad agency
announcement;
Examples of funded programs/fields: Electro-Energetic Physics;
Materials & Metamaterials; Receiver Technology;
Budgeted funds: A total of $29.7 million in fiscal year 2011 for all
electronic warfare research, decreasing to $24.2 million in fiscal
year 2012, with plans to increase funding in fiscal year 2013.
Agency: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA);
Acquisition vehicle: Project-specific broad agency announcements;
Examples of funded programs/fields: Behavioral Learning for Adaptive
Electronic Warfare; Precision Electronic Warfare;
Budgeted funds: A total of $20.7 million in fiscal year 2011 and $18.8
million in fiscal year 2012 for these two electronic warfare research
programs.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
However, not all investments in these fields will necessarily improve
airborne electronic attack capabilities. Research officials identify
the transition to system development and procurement as one of the
primary goals of defense research programs, but acknowledge,
reasonably, that not every program will successfully develop a
transitionable product. Some acquisition programs, such as the Next
Generation Jammer and the MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod, invest
directly in research to guide the transition process and increase the
likelihood of success. But even with this direct attention, technology
maturation and development for Next Generation Jammer is expected to
last 8 to 9 years. Consequently, current science and technology
initiatives represent a long-term investment in future capabilities
and are less suited to meeting existing needs.
DOD analyses during the past decade have identified coordination
deficiencies that constrain the department's ability to capitalize on
its science and technology investments. For instance, a 2005 Naval
Research Advisory Committee report found that within the Navy,
research and development efforts were unduly fragmented, with one
laboratory or development activity often being unaware of what another
was doing.[Footnote 15] Further, this study highlighted the lack of a
long-range science and technology investment planning process within
the Navy. Similarly, in 2007, the Defense Science Board reported that
although relevant and valuable science and technology activity was
occurring, an overarching, departmentwide strategic technology plan
with assigned responsibility, accountability, and metrics did not
exist.[Footnote 16] According to the board, DOD's science and
technology activities and investments should be more directly informed
by the department's strategic goals and top-level missions--an
objective that would require a closer coupling of technologists and
users, including requirements and capabilities developers. A 2010
Naval Research Advisory Committee report[Footnote 17] built on
previous findings noted that stewardship of long-term naval
capabilities was "vague at best" and lacked specific organizational
assignment.[Footnote 18] The report recognized the Navy as having the
lead role within DOD for electronic warfare, but identified sporadic
and uncoordinated execution across the technical community--noting
little evidence of engagement among the science and technology
community at large. Further, the report advised that closer
coordination between operational and technical communities was
essential for the realization of desired long-term capabilities.
DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address these shortfalls,
including formalizing existing investment processes for several key
science and technology areas. Most notably, in April 2011 the
Secretary of Defense designated electronic warfare as one of seven
priority areas for science and technology investment from fiscal years
2013 through 2017. According to officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(ASD(R&E)), this designation carries the promise of increased research
funding and has prompted chartering of the interdepartmental
Electronic Warfare Priority Steering Council. This council is made up
of research officials from ASD (R&E), the services, and various
defense science and technology groups, such as the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, and is charged with effectively evaluating
electronic warfare capability gaps and linking them with research
initiatives necessary to fill them. To support this process, the
council is developing an implementation roadmap to guide coordination
of investments within the electronic warfare area. The council also
facilitates ASD(R&E) coordination with requirements teams and
service/external research offices to determine the specific fields of
inquiry that will be needed to support planning for future electronic
warfare capability needs. Previously, this coordination was handled
informally, whereas the new council provides authority and visibility
to the discussions and decisions made.
Notwithstanding these important steps, services may inevitably face
situations where they have to choose between funding their own,
service-specific research priorities and funding departmentwide
priorities. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering testified in 2011, DOD's seven priority areas for science
and technology investment are meant to be in addition to the
priorities outlined by individual components (i.e., service research
agencies and DARPA).[Footnote 19] In other words, departmentwide
science and technology priorities do not necessarily supplant service
priorities. Absent strategic direction, however, services have
generally been inclined to pursue their own research interests ahead
of departmentwide pursuits. DOD's planned implementation roadmap for
electronic warfare offers opportunities to assess how closely
component research investments are aligned to the departmentwide
electronic warfare priority and to coordinate component investments in
electronic warfare.
Conclusions:
The rapidity of evolving threats, together with the time and cost
associated with fielding new systems, creates a major challenge to DOD
and its capacity to fill all of its capability gaps. This dynamic
makes it imperative that the department get the most out of its
electronic warfare investments. At this point, that does not appear to
be the case. The systems being acquired have problems and will not
deliver as expected; potential overlap, to the extent that it leads to
covering some gaps multiple ways while leaving others uncovered,
drains buying power from the money that is available; and DOD
acknowledges a leadership void that makes it difficult to ascertain
whether the current level of investment is optimally matched with the
existing capability gaps.
Within the airborne electronic attack mission area, budgetary
pressures and related program cancellations prompted the department to
change its acquisition strategy from a system of systems construct--as
underpinned by the 2002 analysis of alternatives--to a potentially
less robust, but more affordable, family of systems. In addition, new
systems, including AARGM and MALD, that are designed to replace or
augment legacy assets have encountered technical challenges while in
acquisition, subsequently requiring the services to delay fielding
plans within each program. Other acquisition programs, including IDECM
and MALD-J, are structured with a high degree of concurrency between
development, production, and testing that position them for similar
suboptimal outcomes. Although individual service decisions to delay or
cancel underperforming or resource-intensive programs may be fiscally
prudent, the cumulative effect of these decisions creates uncertainty
as to when, or if, current departmentwide airborne electronic attack
capability gaps can be filled. At present, even if the department
successfully acquires the full complement of systems outlined in its
family of systems strategy, some capability gaps identified a decade
ago may persist. As such, the department can benefit from reevaluating
its capability gaps--using structures like the new Electronic Warfare
Priority Steering Council--to identify which ones are highest
priorities for science and technology investment and to determine
areas where it is more willing to accept mission risk. This analysis,
when coupled with an examination of current service-specific science
and technology investments, can position DOD to realize improved
efficiencies in its electronic warfare research activities and better
align constrained budgets with highest-priority needs. Additionally,
because underperformance in acquisition programs exacerbates existing
capability gaps, realistic assessments of higher-risk programs can
provide needed insight into what capabilities each platform is likely
to deliver and when. Shortfalls in acquisition should not be the
deciding factor on which capability gaps the department accepts.
At the same time, services continue to pursue and invest in multiple
separate airborne electronic attack systems that potentially overlap
with one another. This overlap is most evident in irregular warfare
systems, including the Marine Corps's Intrepid Tiger II and the Army's
CEASAR systems, but is also present in Air Force and Navy efforts to
develop expendable jamming decoys through their respective MALD-J and
Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives. Pursuing multiple
separate acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can
result in the same capability gap being filled twice or more, can lead
to inefficient use of resources, and may contribute to other
warfighting needs going unfilled. Leveraging resources and acquisition
efforts across services--not just by sharing information, but through
shared partnerships and investments--can simplify developmental
efforts, can improve interoperability among systems and combat forces,
and could decrease future operating and support costs. Such successful
outcomes can position the department to maximize the returns it gets
on its airborne electronic attack investments.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
* Given airborne electronic attack programmatic and threat changes
since 2002, complete the following:
- Conduct program reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and MALD-J
systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance and direct changes
within these investments, as necessary.
- Determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic
attack capability gaps can best be met--using the assets that are
likely to be available--and take steps to fill any potential gaps.
- Align service investments in science and technology with the
departmentwide electronic warfare priority, recognizing that budget
realities will likely require trade-offs among research areas, and
direct changes, as necessary.
* To ensure that investments in airborne electronic attack systems are
cost-effective and to prevent unnecessary overlap, take the following
actions:
- Review the capabilities provided by the Marine Corps's Intrepid
Tiger II and Army's CEASAR systems and identify opportunities for
consolidating these efforts, as appropriate.
- Assess Air Force and Navy plans for developing and acquiring new
expendable jamming decoys, specifically those services' respective
MALD-J and Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives, to
determine if these activities should be merged.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written
comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with
three of our recommendations and partially concurred with two
recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we
incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation to conduct program reviews
for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and MALD-J systems and direct changes
within these investments, as necessary, identifying a March 2012 Navy
review of the IDECM program and planned July 2012 Navy review of the
AARGM system. For MALD and MALD-J, DOD plans to conduct a program
review in early 2014, which will coincide with a planned full rate
production decision for MALD-J. In the interim, DOD intends to
continue low rate initial production of MALD-J units. However, because
MALD has experienced significant technical challenges within the past
2 years, and because DOD plans to invest an additional $176.9 million
toward MALD-J production through fiscal year 2014, we believe an
earlier review may be warranted. In its written comments, DOD also
stated that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic
and Tactical Systems will chair a meeting to review AARGM, IDECM,
MALD, and MALD-J with the Navy and Air Force to verify progress, but
it did not provide a timetable for this review.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation to determine the
extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic attack
capability gaps can best be met--using the assets that are likely to
be available--and take steps to fill any potential gaps. Most notably,
DOD cited plans for U.S. Strategic Command to annually assess all DOD
electronic warfare capabilities--including current requirements,
current and planned future capabilities, and the supporting investment
strategy--and present this assessment to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council. Further, DOD concurred with our third
recommendation to align service investments in science and technology
with the departmentwide electronic warfare priority, noting in its
written comments that it expects implementation roadmaps for priority
areas (including electronic warfare) will serve to coordinate
component investments and accelerate the development and delivery of
capabilities.
DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations related to
potentially unnecessary overlap among airborne electronic attack
systems, identifying through its written comments plans for the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems to
review the Intrepid Tiger and CEASAR systems with the Marine Corps and
Army to investigate the efficacy of additional coordination as future
acquisition plans are evaluated. Similarly, DOD noted that following
the expected March 30, 2012, completion of a new Air Force plan
related to developing and procuring an Increment II variant of MALD-J,
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation; and Joint Staff would review Air Force and Navy
plans and assess opportunities for coordination among the MALD-J and
Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives, should funding be
allocated for a future expendables program. However, the basis for
DOD's partial agreement on these two recommendations appears to stem
from its desire to achieve efficiencies through increased coordination
among programs--not through consolidation of systems possessing
similar capabilities. We emphasize that coordination is not a
substitute for consolidation--particularly in the current constrained
budget environment--and we encourage DOD to expand the scope of its
planned reviews to include assessments of potential unnecessary
redundancies within these two sets of systems.
Additionally, DOD commented that our draft report overstated the
acquisition duplication among airborne electronic attack systems. Most
notably, DOD pointed to its cancellations of the MQ-9 Electronic
Attack Pod and MALD-J Increment II programs, as outlined in its fiscal
year 2013 budget submission, as evidence that duplication was being
managed. These cancellations were announced after we had completed our
work and drafted the report. During the period that our draft report
was with the agency for comment, we revised our report and
recommendations, in coordination with DOD, to account for these recent
changes. Most notably, we revised our fourth and fifth recommendations
to remove the newly canceled MQ-9 Electronic Attack Pod and MALD-J
Increment II systems, respectively, as additional platforms where DOD
may identify opportunities for consolidation. DOD's written comments
were subsequently crafted in response to our revised set of
recommendations. As noted above, opportunities to reduce duplication
further remain. We also briefly introduced the Marine Air Ground Task
Force Electronic Warfare concept, in response to DOD's comments, while
further clarifying that our report did not evaluate ground-or ship-
based electronic warfare systems.
DOD also commented that our characterization of the family of systems
strategy for airborne electronic attack was misleading, stating that
the system of systems synergies envisioned in 2002 continue to be
pursued. We acknowledge that DOD is considering options to field
additional systems against high-end threats, but we believe that the
current acquisition strategy and its distributed approach is very much
in line with the definition of a family of systems, as outlined by
DOD.[Footnote 20] When DOD embarked on the system of systems strategy
in 2002, it envisioned fielding certain major systems, such as B-52
Standoff Jammer and J-UCAS, which were later canceled. Without these
planned elements, there is no evidence to suggest that the remaining
systems together possess capability beyond the additive sum of the
individual capabilities of its members--a characteristic fundamental
to a system of systems.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. In
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
This report evaluates the Department of Defense's (DOD) airborne
electronic attack capabilities and investment plans.[Footnote 21]
Specifically, we assessed (1) the department's strategy for acquiring
airborne electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made developing
and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission
requirements, and (3) additional compensating actions taken by the
department to address capability gaps, including improvements to
tactics, techniques, and procedures and investments in science and
technology.
To assess the department's strategy for acquiring airborne electronic
attack capabilities, we analyzed DOD's documents outlining mission
requirements and acquisition needs, including the 2002 Airborne
Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives, 2004 Initial Capabilities
Document for Denying Enemy Awareness through Airborne Electronic
Attack, 2008 Electronic Warfare Capabilities-Based Assessment, 2009
Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, and 2010 Electronic
Warfare Strategy of the Department of Defense report to Congress. We
also reviewed platform-specific capabilities documents, service
roadmaps related to airborne electronic attack, and budget documents
to understand how the family of systems construct evolved over time.
To identify capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing
current airborne electronic attack systems, we reviewed program
briefings and acquisition documentation related to these systems. To
further corroborate documentary evidence and obtain additional
information in support of our review, we conducted interviews with
relevant DOD officials responsible for managing airborne electronic
attack requirements and overseeing the related family of systems,
including officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director,
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition;
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations--Information Dominance and Air
Warfare directorates; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Plans, and Requirements--Electronic Warfare division;
Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Plans, and Training--Electronic Warfare division;
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare; U.S. Strategic
Command; and Joint Staff. We also held discussions with DOD officials
responsible for sustaining current airborne electronic attack systems,
including officials in (1) Navy program offices for Airborne
Electronic Attack, Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection Systems,
Direct and Time Sensitive Strike, and Aerial Target and Decoy Systems
and (2) Air Force offices, including the F-22A Raptor and F-16CM
program offices and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center.
To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet
airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed documents
outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes,
including capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports,
budget submissions, system acquisition reports, and program briefings.
These same materials afforded information on key attributes of
individual airborne electronic attack systems, which we used to assess
potential overlap among systems in development. Further, we identified
persisting airborne electronic attack capability gaps by reviewing the
2009 Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, along with
earlier analyses related to airborne electronic attack requirements,
and compared the capability needs identified in those documents with
current DOD investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities. To
supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility into these
issues, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD officials
responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements,
including officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations--
Information Dominance and Air Warfare directorates; Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements--
Electronic Warfare division; Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training--
Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic
Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and Joint Staff. We also held
numerous interviews with DOD officials primarily responsible for
developing, acquiring, and testing airborne electronic attack systems,
including officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation; Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition; Navy program offices for Airborne Electronic Attack, F/A-
18 and EA-18G, Direct and Time Sensitive Strike, and Advanced Tactical
Aircraft Protection Systems; Army Rapid Equipping Force; and Air Force
program offices for MALD/MALD-J and MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod.
To assess additional compensating actions taken by the department to
address airborne electronic attack capability gaps, we reviewed
service documents outlining recent improvements and refinements to
tactics, techniques, and procedures for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft.
We corroborated this information through interviews with officials
from the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and Air Force Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements--
Electronic Warfare division charged with refining tactics, techniques,
and procedures for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft. We also reviewed broad
agency announcements to understand ongoing science and technology
activities related to airborne electronic attack. We supplemented this
documentation review with discussions with officials engaged in
science and technology work tied to airborne electronic attack,
including officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, Office of Naval Research, Air
Force Research Laboratory, and Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne Electronic Attack Systems:
This appendix provides analyses of 10 selected airborne electronic
attack systems. Figures 4 through 13 show images of each system;
tables 7 through 16 provide budget data on each system.
Figure 4: EA-6B Prowler:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Northrup Grumman.
[End of figure]
Estimated end of service life: 2020:
Mission description: The primary mission of the Prowler is the
suppression of enemy air defenses in support of strike aircraft and
ground troops by interrupting enemy electronic activity and obtaining
tactical electronic intelligence within the combat area. The EA-6B
uses the AN/ALQ-99 radar jamming pod for non-lethal protection by
jamming air defense systems and its AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation
Missile for lethal physical attack of air defense systems.
Status: In 2010, we reported that the Navy had started replacing its
EA-6B aircraft with EA-18G Growlers and expected all Prowlers to be
out of its inventory by 2012. However, the Navy projects Prowlers to
remain in service until 2016 to further meet the joint expeditionary
need. According to the Navy, this is subject to additional change
contingent on the fiscal year 2013 budget. The Marine Corps plans to
retire its Prowlers by 2020. In addition, the most recent upgrade
program for the EA-6B--the third Improved Capability electronic suite
modification (ICAP III)--is nearing completion. ICAP III provides the
Prowler with greater jamming capability, including the ability to
perform selective reactive jamming.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 7: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-6B Prowler,
Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $20.222;
FY 2013: $19.728;
FY 2014: $19.931;
FY 2015: $20.280;
FY 2016: $20.252;
FY 2017: $20.632;
Total: $121.045.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $27.734;
FY 2013: $30.062;
FY 2014: $18.600;
FY 2015: $14.099;
FY 2016: $10.068;
FY 2017: $10.285;
Total: $110.848.
Total;
FY 2012: $47.956;
FY 2013: $49.790;
FY 2014: $38.531;
FY 2015: $34.379;
FY 2016: $30.320;
FY 2017: $30.917;
Total: $231.893.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: RDT&E funding is limited to electronic warfare counter response.
[End of table]
Figure 5: AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: NAVAIN PMA-234.
[End of figure]
Estimated end of service life:
Mid-band: 2024;
Low-band: 2026;
High-band: 2028:
Mission description: The AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System is an
airborne electronic warfare system carried on the EA-6B and EA-18G to
support the suppression of enemy air defenses. The system is capable
of intercepting, automatically processing, and jamming received radio
frequency signals.
Status: Obsolescence issues and advances in adversary technology have
reduced the AN/ALQ-99's ability to counter emerging threats. The Navy
is developing its Next Generation Jammer program to replace the AN/ALQ-
99 and plans to begin fielding the system in 2020. In the interim, the
Navy is currently replacing three aging legacy low-band transmitters
to resolve obsolescence and reliability problems.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 8: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the AN/ALQ-99
Tactical Jamming System, Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
FY 2014: [Empty];
FY 2015: [Empty];
FY 2016: [Empty];
FY 2017: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Procurement;
FY 2012: $69.665;
FY 2013: $49.799;
FY 2014: $40.078;
FY 2015: $28.892;
FY 2016: $35.963;
FY 2017: $30.945;
Total: $255.342.
Total;
FY 2012: $69.665;
FY 2013: $49.799;
FY 2014: $40.078;
FY 2015: $28.892;
FY 2016: $35.963;
FY 2017: $30.945;
Total: $255.342.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: There is no RDT&E funding associated with the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical
Jamming System in the fiscal year 2013 budget.
[End of table]
Figure 6: EC-130H Compass Call:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: 755 Maintenance Squadron, U.S. Air Force.
[End of figure]
Estimated end of service life: 2053:
Mission description: The EC-130H Compass Call is an airborne, wide
area, persistent stand-off electronic attack weapon system able to
disrupt and deny adversary use of the electronic battlespace using
offensive radio frequency countermeasures. Its primary mission is to
deny or disrupt command and control of enemy integrated air defenses,
air defense surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery
threats. Its secondary mission is to support ground and special
operations forces by denying enemy communications and defeating
improvised explosive devices.
Status: The Air Force has evolved the Compass Call since it was first
fielded in 1982 to meet modern and emerging threats, including
commercial communications, early warning radars, and improvised
explosive devices. Upgrades and modernization efforts are completed
during regularly scheduled depot maintenance. In 2003, as a response
to Operation Enduring Freedom, these upgrades transitioned from
"Block" upgrades to "Baseline" upgrades to allow for smaller and more
focused modernization efforts. Currently, the Air Force is completing
Baseline 1 upgrades, beginning Baseline 2 efforts, and developing
Baseline 3 requirements. In addition, the Air Force is also replacing
the center wing box on all 14 Compass Call aircraft, which will extend
the service life of the fleet. Compass Call has been on continuous
deployment in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since
2003; which has accelerated the need to replace the center wing boxes.
Finally, to further alleviate stress on the fleet, the Air Force plans
to procure an additional aircraft, increasing the size of the fleet to
15 aircraft by fiscal year 2016.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 9: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EC-130H Compass
Call, Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $18.509;
FY 2013: $12.094;
FY 2014: $12.222;
FY 2015: $12.559;
FY 2016: $13.047;
FY 2017: $12.989;
Total: $81.420.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $302.324;
FY 2013: $64.024;
FY 2014: $55.878;
FY 2015: $54.108;
FY 2016: $56.480;
FY 2017: $57.552;
Total: $590.366.
Total;
FY 2012: $320.833;
FY 2013: $76.118;
FY 2014: $68.100;
FY 2015: $66.667;
FY 2016: $69.527;
FY 2017: $70.541;
Total: $671.786.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
[End of table]
Figure 7: F-22A Raptor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Air Force.
[End of figure]
Estimated end of service life: Not available:
Mission description: The F-22A is the Air Force's fifth-generation air
superiority fighter that incorporates a stealthy and highly
maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise
engine. Originally developed as an air-to-air fighter, additional
capabilities will allow the F-22A to perform multiple missions
including destruction of enemy air defenses, air-to-ground attack,
electronic attack, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.
Status: The F-22A, along with the F-35, is expected to fulfill the Air
Force's requirement for penetrating escort jamming capability. The Air
Force initiated a formal F-22A modernization and reliability
improvement program in 2003 to incrementally develop and deliver
increasing capabilities over time. These increasing capabilities would
allow the F-22A to provide penetrating escort jamming, as envisioned
in the airborne electronic attack family of systems strategy. However,
fielding of these capabilities has been delayed because of reductions
in program funding. In addition, we have previously reported on
schedule delays within the modernization and reliability improvement
program and their effect on fielding additional capabilities within
expected time frames. Further delays in fielding these planned
capabilities may affect the Air Force's ability to provide sufficient
penetrating escort jamming, increasing mission risk.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 10: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-22A Raptor,
Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $571.320;
FY 2013: $511.767;
FY 2014: $503.242;
FY 2015: $387.510;
FY 2016: $430.947;
FY 2017: $463.263;
Total: $2,868.049.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $232.032;
FY 2013: $283.871;
FY 2014: $291.741;
FY 2015: $248.001;
FY 2016: $282.249;
FY 2017: $329.775;
Total: $1,667.669.
Total;
FY 2012: $803.352;
FY 2013: $795.638;
FY 2014: $794.983;
FY 2015: $635.511;
FY 2016: $713.196;
FY 2017: $793.038;
Total: $4,535.718.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: The above budget figures are only for F-22A modernization
efforts only and do not include $104.118 million in fiscal year 2012
funds for equipment, program support, and shutdown activities
necessary to preserve assets for long-term F-22A fleet sustainment.
[End of table]
Figure 8: EA-18G Growler:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Boeing.
[End of figure]
Fielding date: 2009:
Mission description: The EA-18G Growler replaces the EA-6B Prowler as
DOD's tactical electronic attack aircraft. Like the Prowler, the EA-
18G will provide full-spectrum electronic attack to counter enemy air
defenses and communication networks. The EA-18G incorporates jamming
capabilities, such as the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, and the
use of onboard weapons such as the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile,
for the suppression of enemy air defenses. The Growler is the Navy's
platform to fulfill modified escort jamming capability needs.
Status: The Growler program entered full rate production in 2009, with
a planned acquisition of 88 aircraft. However, in 2009, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to buy an additional 26
aircraft, bringing the total units to be acquired to 114. Through
fiscal year 2011, the Navy placed 90 of 114 planned EA-18G aircraft
under contract for production. Production is slightly ahead of
schedule and has incorporated the increase in total units with limited
per-unit cost growth.
In 2010, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, declared the
Growler operationally effective, but also found that the aircraft was
unsuitable for operations based on maintainability concerns. Since
then, the Navy has taken steps to improve the EA-18Gs suitability
through software fixes, and the system recently completed follow-on
operational test and evaluation. In addition, initial deployment of
the aircraft in support of operations in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan
recently concluded, and the Navy is assessing the aircraft's
performance, including the remaining challenges mitigating
electromagnetic interference with the AN/ALQ-99. Additional software
improvements are planned through fiscal year 2018.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 11: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the EA-18G Growler,
Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $17.100;
FY 2013: $13.009;
FY 2014: $15.311;
FY 2015: $16.002;
FY 2016: $16.106;
FY 2017: $16.393;
Total: $93.921.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $1,022.715;
FY 2013: $1,027.443;
FY 2014: $21.970;
FY 2015: $8.111;
FY 2016: $0.000;
FY 2017: $0.000;
Total: $2080.239.
Total;
FY 2012: $1,039.815;
FY 2013: $1,040.452;
FY 2014: $37.281;
FY 2015: $24.113;
FY 2016: $16.106;
FY 2017: $16.393;
Total: $2,174.160.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: The above budget figures do not include $34.151 million in
fiscal year 2013 for procurement of initial spares.
[End of table]
Figure 9: AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: NAVAIR PMA-242.
[End of figure]
Estimated fielding date: 2012:
Mission description: AARGM is an air-to-ground missile for carrier-
based aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled
surface-to-air defense. AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed
Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and will utilize existing HARM
propulsion and warhead sections with new guidance and modified control
sections.
Status: The Navy authorized AARGM production in September 2008, with
deliveries scheduled to begin in January 2010. A total of 1,919 units
were planned, with initial operational capability scheduled for March
2011. The program began operational testing in June 2010 after a 9-
month delay owing, in part, to concerns about the production
representativeness of test missiles. The Navy halted operational
testing in September 2010 after hardware and software deficiencies
caused a series of missile failures.
These testing challenges prompted the Navy to delay AARGM's planned
initial operational capability date and undertake corrective actions
to the system. These actions included an evaluation of the AARGM
system through laboratory, ground, and flight tests from November 2010
through June 2011. Following this testing, Navy officials concluded
that previous testing anomalies were successfully corrected but that
the system was at high risk of not meeting suitability requirements
during operational testing. The Navy found that insufficient system
reliability and manufacturing quality controls remain open
deficiencies that will likely result in an excessive number of system
failures experienced by operational units, which could prevent the
Navy from effectively executing planned missions. To address
reliability concerns, the Navy instituted a "fly before you buy"
program to screen poor weapons prior to government acceptance. As of
July 2011, one-third of missiles delivered for testing were returned
to the factory for repair.
Recently, the AARGM system resumed operational testing. The Navy now
plans to field the system beginning in April 2012 and make a full rate
production decision and contract award in June and July 2012,
respectively.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 12: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for AARGM, Fiscal Years
2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $6.684;
FY 2013: $6.995;
FY 2014: $7.426;
FY 2015: $5.470;
FY 2016: $5.142;
FY 2017: $5.028;
Total: $36.745.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $71.561;
FY 2013: $86.721;
FY 2014: $112.022;
FY 2015: $126.324;
FY 2016: $158.073;
FY 2017: $160.820;
Total: $715.521.
Total;
FY 2012: $78.245;
FY 2013: $93.716;
FY 2014: $119.448;
FY 2015: $131.794;
FY 2016: $163.215;
FY 2017: $165.848;
Total: $752.266.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: The above budget figures do not include $0.209 million in fiscal
year 2012 for procurement of initial spares.
[End of table]
Figure 10: Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and illustrations]
Photograph of FA-18E/F, with the following illustrated:
T-3F Launcher;
IDECM Block 3 ALE-55 Fiber Optic Towed Decoy (FOTD);
IDECM Block 4 ALQ-214(v)4Common OBJ;
IDECM Block 3 ALE-55 Electronic Frequency Converter (EFC).
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Estimated fielding date: 2014 (Block 4):
Mission description: IDECM is a suite of self-protection
countermeasure systems designed for the F/A-18E/F, including onboard
jamming and off-board decoy jamming capabilities. The Navy has fielded
IDECM in different blocks dating back to 2002 (Block 1), 2004 (Block
2), and 2011 (Block 3). Each block improved the system's jamming
capabilities, decoy capabilities, or both. Block 4--the phase of
production currently in development--extends IDECM onboard jamming
capabilities to F/A-18C/D aircraft.[Footnote 22]
Status: IDECM Block 4 entered development in 2009 and includes
redesign of the ALQ-214 onboard jammer from the component design used
for earlier blocks. This redesign is driven by the need to reduce
weight in order to accommodate the IDECM onboard system on F/A-18C/D
aircraft. Essentially, the new ALQ-214 will perform the same onboard
jammer function as found in IDECM Blocks 2 and 3 but with a different
form and fit. The Navy expects to transition current IDECM Block 3
full rate production to Block 4 units by April 2012. This production
transition will occur concurrent with ground and flight testing of the
Block 4 system--a strategy that could drive costly design changes,
retrofits, or both to units in production, in the event that the ALQ-
214 redesign effort does not materialize on schedule. To mitigate this
risk, Navy officials stated that Block 4 full rate production will
initially be for 19 systems, with production rates increasing to as
many as 40 per year following completion of testing. Further, DOD
officials report that Block 4 production will be executed under a firm
fixed-price contract--a strategy that DOD officials state will place
the financial burden of any retrofits on the vendor.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 13: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for IDECM, Fiscal Years
2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $62.100;
FY 2013: $29.874;
FY 2014: $14.408;
FY 2015: $13.897;
FY 2016: $2.711;
FY 2017: $2.848;
Total: $125.838.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $40.272;
FY 2013: $57.067;
FY 2014: $84.305;
FY 2015: $102.388;
FY 2016: $133.449;
FY 2017: $51.569;
Total: $469.050.
Total;
FY 2012: $102.372;
FY 2013: $86.941;
FY 2014: $98.713;
FY 2015: $116.285;
FY 2016: $136.160;
FY 2017: $54.417;
Total: $594.888.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
[End of table]
Figure 11: Next Generation Jammer:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: NAVAIR PMA-234.
[End of figure]
Estimated fielding date: 2020 (Mid-band on EA-18G):
Mission description: The Next Generation Jammer will be an electronic
warfare system to support the suppression of enemy air defenses,
replacing and improving the capability currently provided by AN/ALQ-99
Tactical Jamming System. The Navy's EA-18G will employ the Next
Generation Jammer as the electronic attack payload. In a separate
increment of capability, the Navy plans to integrate the Next
Generation Jammer onto the F-35B, which will eventually replace Marine
Corps EA-6B Prowlers. Each increment of capability will be divided
into developmental blocks--Block 1 for mid-band, Block 2 for low-band,
and Block 3 for high-band frequencies.
Status: The Next Generation Jammer is nearing completion of technology
maturation activities performed by four different contractors before
the program's entry into the technology development phase. The Navy
plans to enter the technology development phase in the third quarter
of fiscal year 2013, with an engineering and manufacturing development
contract planned for 2015. The Navy has adopted an evolutionary block
approach to fielding the Next Generation Jammer. Initial operational
capability for Block 1, on the EA-18G aircraft, is scheduled for 2020.
The Navy expects to field Blocks 2 and 3 on the EA-18G in 2022 and
2024, respectively. Fielding dates for the F-35 increment's blocks are
currently undetermined.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 14: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the Next Generation
Jammer, Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $170.910;
FY 2013: $187.024;
FY 2014: $269.916;
FY 2015: $321.817;
FY 2016: $429.390;
FY 2017: $528.777;
Total: $1,907.834.
Procurement;
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty];
FY 2014: [Empty];
FY 2015: [Empty];
FY 2016: [Empty];
FY 2017: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY 2012: $170.910;
FY 2013: $187.024;
FY 2014: $269.916;
FY 2015: $321.817;
FY 2016: $429.390;
FY 2017: $528.777;
Total: $1,907.834.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Navy fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: There is no procurement funding associated with the Next
Generation Jammer in the fiscal year 2013 budget.
[End of table]
Figure 12: Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD)/Miniature Air Launched
Decoy--Jammer (MALD-J):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Raytheon.
[End of figure]
Fielding dates:
2012 (MALD--actual) 2012 (MALD-J--estimated):
Mission description: MALD is an expendable decoy able to represent
small, medium, or large aircraft in order to saturate or degrade enemy
air defense systems. MALD-J is a variant of MALD that adds jamming
capability to the decoy and forms the stand-in jamming component for
the airborne electronic attack family of systems. The Air Force plans
to acquire a total quantity of 596 MALD and 2,404 MALD-J units.
Status: The Air Force approved MALD for low rate initial production in
2008. The Air Force expected to procure 300 MALD units in low rate
production before transitioning to full rate production. However,
following flight testing failures in summer 2010--attributable, in
part, to design issues with the fuel filter--and a later test failure
in February 2011 caused by foreign object debris in the fuel line, the
MALD system was decertified, and remaining initial operational testing
and evaluation activities were suspended. After additional corrective
actions by the program office to the MALD design, the system reentered
operational testing in July 2011, with test shots fired in late August
2011. According to Air Force testing officials, during the last test
shot in the August series (OT-8), the engine for one decoy never
started after it detached from the host aircraft, causing that MALD
unit to crash. This operational testing event was the final one
scheduled for MALD, and DOD officials report that, in January 2012,
the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center delivered the
MALD initial operational test and evaluation report assessing system
performance.
As a result of MALD's testing shortfalls, the Air Force authorized
additional low rate initial production purchases for MALD quantities--
to the extent that the Air Force will now purchase the entire 596 unit
inventory of MALD quantities under low rate initial production,
without ever authorizing or achieving full rate production. Technical
deficiencies and design changes during low rate initial production
prevented demonstration of an efficient manufacturing capability,
which in turn prevented MALD from meeting the department's criteria to
enter full rate production. DOD policy states that in order for a
system to receive full rate production approval, the system must (1)
demonstrate control of the manufacturing process and acceptable
reliability, (2) collect statistical process control data, and (3)
demonstrate control and capability of other critical processes.
[Footnote 23] Because the MALD and MALD-J designs are identical--
except for the addition of a jammer module to MALD-J--the absence of a
proven manufacturing process for MALD introduces cost and schedule
risk to production of MALD-J.
Deficiencies affecting the MALD vehicle have already contributed to
MALD-J program delays. The MALD-J low rate initial production decision
review--previously planned for September 2009--was delayed until
September 2011. Operational testing has subsequently been delayed and
is now expected to begin in May 2012. To mitigate this schedule delay,
the Air Force has moved to compress MALD-J operational testing from 15
months to 7 months, which program officials report reflects an
increase in test range priority and decrease in data turnaround time.
According to DOD officials, however, test range execution issues such
as aircraft and test equipment availability could potentially extend
MALD-J operational testing beyond the currently projected completion
date. In addition, the Air Force delayed, and later canceled, plans to
develop a second increment of capability for MALD-J--one intended to
provide more advanced jamming capabilities. Prior to these decisions,
the Air Force's fiscal year 2012 budget submission outlined plans to
budget $54.8 million in research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding to MALD-J Increment II in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD,
the Air Force is to provide a new plan for developing and procuring an
Increment II variant of MALD-J and report to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense by March 30, 2012.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 15: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for MALD/MALD-J, Fiscal
Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $14.917;
FY 2013: $0.000;
FY 2014: $0.000;
FY 2015: $0.000;
FY 2016: $0.000;
FY 2017: $0.000;
Total: $14.917.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $83.022;
FY 2013: $87.556;
FY 2014: $89.348;
FY 2015: $92.448;
FY 2016: $94.987;
FY 2017: $95.059;
Total: $542.420.
Total;
FY 2012: $97.939;
FY 2013: $87.556;
FY 2014: $89.348;
FY 2015: $92.448;
FY 2016: $94.987;
FY 2017: $95.059;
Total: $557.337.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: RDT&E data are for MALD-J Increment II only. There is no RDT&E
funding for MALD or MALD-J.
[End of table]
Figure 13: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Lockheed Martin.
[End of figure]
Estimated fielding date: To be determined:
Mission description: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a family of
fifth-generation strike aircraft to replace and complement existing
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft, such as the F-16 and the
F/A-18. The F-35, along with the F-22A, is expected to fulfill DOD's
requirement for penetrating escort jamming capability.
Status: The F-35 program entered low rate initial production in 2007,
with a planned baseline acquisition of 2,886 aircraft. The program
experienced development challenges, including delays in testing,
leading to a program-wide review. Based on this review, DOD
restructured the program in 2010, increasing the time and funding for
development. This restructure triggered a breach of the critical Nunn-
McCurdy cost growth threshold. Presently, the program plans to procure
2,457 aircraft, and the services are still reviewing scheduled plans
for operational capability and fielding.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Table 16: DOD Planned Acquisition Investments for the F-35 Lightning
II, Fiscal Years 2012-2017:
Then-year dollars in millions.
RDT&E;
FY 2012: $2,708.228;
FY 2013: $2,699.498;
FY 2014: $2,464.703;
FY 2015: $1,899.685;
FY 2016: $1,426.668;
FY 2017: $1,075.495;
Total: $12,274.277.
Procurement;
FY 2012: $6,334.916;
FY 2013: $6,149.445;
FY 2014: $6,310.537;
FY 2015: $7,786.763;
FY 2016: $9,927.117;
FY 2017: $11,207.769;
Total: $47,716.547.
Total;
FY 2012: $9,043.144;
FY 2013: $8,848.943;
FY 2014: $8,775.240;
FY 2015: $9,686.448;
FY 2016: $11,353.785;
FY 2017: $12,283.264;
Total: $59,990.824.
Legend: RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Source: DOD fiscal year 2013 budget estimates.
Note: The above budget figures do not include $31.874 million in
fiscal year 2012 RDT&E funds and $31.748 in fiscal year 2013 RDT&E
funds for the Air Force Aircraft Engine Component Improvement Program.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
March 23, 2012:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO):
441 G Street NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GA0-12-175, "Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission
Objectives Dependent on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges," dated
March 2012, (GAO Code 120942). While the GAO assessed numerous
electronic warfare programs and plans in its review, the Department
finds two significant misinterpretations in the GAO report. These
misinterpretations appear to stem from recent changes in the
Department's acquisition plans, results of the most recent President's
Budget submit, in addition to nuanced misunderstandings.
First, the Department finds the GAO's characterization of acquisition
duplication overstated. Regarding airborne expendables, GAO found a
lack of coordination between Navy and Air Force. In fact, Navy has
been investigating its concept of operations and requirements for a
new expendable and the potential of the Air Force's Miniature Air
Launched Decoy (MALD) to meet its requirements for some time. While
the MALD-Jammer (MALD-J) Increment II was canceled in the 2013 budget,
the Department is still evaluating future expendable options and the
dialogue for acquisition coordination will continue as requirements
are determined. Regarding irregular warfare systems, GAO found a lack
of coordination among irregular warfare electronic attack (EA)
systems, including Army's CEASAR pod, Marine Corps CORPORAL and
Intrepid Tiger efforts, and Air Force's MQ-9 EA Pod. On the whole, GAO
has mischaracterized these systems and acquisition plans. MQ-9 EA Pod
was to provide a high end irregular warfare capability requiring
unique development, but was canceled with the February submission of
the 2013 budget for being late to need. CORPORAL utilized the Intrepid
Tiger II v2.0 EA pod to demonstrate a service oriented architecture to
support Electronic Warfare Battle Management (EWBM) and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data sharing. Besides its focus
on developing a services oriented architecture, CORPORAL ended in
April 2011, so its inclusion as EA duplication is not applicable.
Intrepid Tiger II v1.0 and CEASAR both provide electronic attack, but
integrate on very different aircraft to meet Marine Corps and Army
mission needs, respectively. The Army and Marine Corps recognize there
may be opportunities to jointly leverage developments from Intrepid
Tiger II and CEASAR in addition to implementing a common EWBM
architecture, and the Department will continue investigating this.
Second, the Department finds GAO's characterization of a change in
strategy misleading. Starting in 2002, the Department outlined plans
for high-end electronic attack capabilities to address near-peer
threats, commonly referred to as the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
System of Systems (SoS). The Department continues to support a robust
investment in the AEA SoS with capabilities fielded, or in
development, across all four mission areas: Stand Off, Modified
Escort, Penetrating Escort, and Stand-In. These investments include:
expanding our EA-18G Growler fleet and improving its effectiveness
with the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), upgrading and expanding the EC-
130H Compass Call fleet, and fielding air-launched expendable
decoys/jammers, among other investments. The synergies envisioned in
the 2002 AEA Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) continue to be pursued,
but not all platforms considered have proven affordable, as noted in
the B-52 jammer and Joint-Unmanned Combat Air System cancellations.
The Department continues to consider its options to field additional
systems to meet the high-end, near peer threats. Concurrently, the
Department is taking an affordable approach to adding capabilities to
support ground operations, a different threat requiring more capacity
than the higher-end and more costly AEA SoS platforms provide. These
new systems, such as Intrepid Tiger and CEASAR, take advantage of
lower cost payloads and more efficient platforms to meet mission
needs. This approach results in significant savings.
Finally, while the Department recognizes that the GAO report was not
focused on ground Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, it feels strongly
that an introduction of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) EW
concept would serve as an invaluable reference for how the Marine
Corps plans to actively confront expected airborne electronic attack
capability gaps following the retirement of EA-6Bs. The F-35 will take
on many of the airborne EW responsibilities, but it is not capable of
meeting all of the foreseeable electronic attack requirements which is
why MAGTF EW was developed. That holistic approach toward electronic
warfare truly leverages their ground and air capabilities in a
collaborative manner to seek control of the electromagnetic
environment on the battlefield.
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed in
addition to recommended corrections to the draft report. The
Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft report
and looks forward to working with you as we continue to develop
electronic attack capabilities.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G.Ahern:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Strategic and Tactical Systems:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated March 2012:
GAO-12-175 (GAO Code 120942):
"Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Dependent On
Overcoming Acquisition Challenges"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
The GAO made five recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. The
first three recommendations are made in the context of assessing the
impact of programmatic and threat changes in airborne electronic
attack since 2002. The last two recommendations are made in the
context of assessing cost-effectiveness and duplicity of programs.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
conduct program reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and MALD-J systems
to assess cost, schedule, and performance and direct changes within
these investments, as necessary.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees these programs have
experienced challenges, and correspondingly, the Secretary's staff has
existing plans to review these programs to assess cost, schedule and
performance and direct changes, as necessary. Each program is being
addressed as follows:
Regarding AARGM, GAO states concern that the current program plan to
complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) leaves no
margin to achieve the fielding date if testing reveals deficiencies.
In response, the Department requires operational test for the express
purpose of identifying deficiencies in a weapon system prior to
fielding and has structured its acquisition process to manage the risk
of identifying deficiencies by requiring a Full Rate Production (FRP)
decision review. Since decertification from the first Operational Test
(OT) period, AARGM has been reviewed numerous times by Department
leadership. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics conducted reviews of AARGM in October 2010 and April
2011 to assess progress against corrective actions. AARGM completed
IOT&E in March 2012, with ten of ten planned live fire events and over
365 flight hours, which have utilized a stable software load and
hardware from the first lot of initial production that had the
corrective actions incorporated. The program expects the test report
within 90 days and is confident it is on track to address anomalies
identified in testing. The Joint Staff also recently reviewed the
program status and requirements at a Functional Capabilities Board,
and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) has conducted several reviews to monitor
execution and adjust plans as necessary. ASN(RDA) will conduct an FRP
review of AARGM in July 2012 to review the results of IOT&E and assess
the readiness to award full rate production.
Regarding IDECM, GAO states concern that concurrent flight test and
full rate production of IDECM Block 4 increases the risk of costly
retrofits. The Department recognized this risk and mitigated it by
negotiating a Firm Fixed Price contract with the vendor that places
the financial burden of any retrofits on the vendor. As an engineering
change proposal to IDECM Block 3, Block 4 does not have a formal
milestone, however appropriate reviews are planned and production
transitions gradually with only 23 units in the first buy. DOT&E has
coordinated with the Navy to develop a disciplined test and evaluation
schedule that informs leadership on progress and test results as Block
4 proceeds. Further, ASN(RDA) chaired the third of five In-Process
Reviews (IPR) of Block 4 on 19 March 2012 to assess production
readiness, cost, schedule, performance, test progression, adherence to
the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), and other technical performance
measures, maturity of the interfaces, and risk status. The first two
IPRs on Block 4 were conducted after the Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) to monitor the progress of this
upgrade. The last two IPR's will be informed by operational assessment
and formalized operational testing results, respectively.
Regarding MALD and MALD-J, GAO states concern that MALD did not, and
will not, complete an FRP decision review, and that concurrency
between development, production and test increases risk. In response,
the Air Force will not conduct an FRP decision for MALD because that
decision is replaced by a MALD-J FRP decision. Since deciding to add a
stand-in jamming capability to MALD, the Air Force planned to
transition all MALD production to the much more effective MALD-J, once
ready. Low rate initial production will continue until an FRP decision
is authorized. While Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantities
have increased due to issues uncovered in test, the Department
mitigated this risk through a warranty that requires the vendor to
address any design fixes uncovered in test at no cost to the
Government. The FRP decision review will be chaired by Commander, Air
Armament Center and is currently planned for 2" quarter FY 2014. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical
Systems, will chair a meeting to review AARGM, IDECM, MALD and MALD-J
with the Navy and Air Force to verify progress and investigate the
efficacy of additional coordination as future acquisition plans are
evaluated.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic
attack capability gaps can best be met using the assets that are
likely to be available and take steps to fill any potential gaps.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department already has these actions
underway, with key events recently complete and others ongoing. In
February 2012, the Department completed its review of key airborne
electronic attack capabilities in developing the fiscal year 2013
budget. In accordance with DoD priorities, adjustments were made to
the following electronic attack programs: fully funded Next Generation
Jammer; continued support for MALD-J; increased readiness for the
AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System; continued support of conversion of
one C-130 to an EC-130H Compass Call; supported the Pod-Upgrade
Program (PUP) that provides advanced electronic attack capabilities
for F-16 and A-10 aircraft; eliminated the MQ-9 Electronic Attack Pod
for being late to need as operations in Iraq ceased and Afghanistan
draws down; enhanced electronic attack test range infrastructure; and
enhanced training capabilities against electronic attack, among other
areas. Beyond these recently completed actions, in a December 1, 2011,
memorandum, the Joint Staff requested Strategic Command, as the joint
Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities advocate, present an annual
assessment of all DoD EW capabilities to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). The assessment is to include current Joint
Warfighter requirements, current fielded capabilities, planned future
capabilities, and the investment strategy needed to maintain and
achieve those capabilities.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
align service investments in science and technology with the
department-wide electronic warfare priority, recognizing that budget
realities will likely require tradeoffs among research areas, and
direct changes, as necessary.
DOD Response: Concur. The Secretary of Defense directed this action in
an April 19, 2011, memorandum, "Science and Technology (S&T)
Priorities for Fiscal Years 2013-17 Planning," which included
Electronic Warfare/Electronic Protection as one of seven priority
areas. As directed in the memo, "The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, with the Department's S&T Executive
Committee and other stakeholders, will oversee the development of
implementation roadmaps for each priority area. These roadmaps will
coordinate Component investments in the priority areas to accelerate
the development and delivery of capabilities."
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
review the capabilities provided by the Marine Corps's Intrepid Tiger
II and Army's CEASAR systems and identify opportunities for
consolidating these different efforts, as appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Intrepid Tiger II provided the
electronic attack payloads for the AV-8B Harrier (Intrepid Tiger II
v1) and Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (Intrepid Tiger II v2),
which are 85% common in hardware and 95% common in software despite
being packaged in completely different pods and form factors for the
respective platforms. The CEASAR pod leverages the EA-18G's AN/ALQ-227
Communications Countermeasure Set jammer and integrates it on a C-12
aircraft. Because of CEASAR's extremely successful combat assessments,
the two existing aircraft will remain in service indefinitely, and the
payload will be integrated onto an Army UAV for future consideration.
CEASAR exploits the payload capacity and available prime power from an
Army Division level UAV to maximize the jamming capability and best
provide the required jamming in support of the land forces. The Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems,
will chair a meeting to review Intrepid Tiger, CEASAR and EWBM plans
with the Army and Marine Corps to investigate the efficacy of
additional coordination as future acquisition plans are evaluated.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
assess Air Force and Navy plans for developing and acquiring new
expendable jamming decoys, specifically those services' respective
MALD-J and Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives, to
determine if these activities should be merged.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Navy has been evaluating the
ability to leverage the MALD vehicle to meet Navy decoy jamming
requirements through its AEA initiative, which is currently focused on
risk reduction efforts. Navy activities include a Joint Concept
Technology Demonstration, designated Countermeasure Expendable with
Replaceable Block Elements for Reactive Unmanned Systems (CERBERUS),
which utilizes the MALD vehicle and develops modular electronic attack
payloads to provide additional capabilities. In addition, the Air
Force is to provide a new plan for developing and procuring an
Increment II variant of MALD-J and report to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense by March 30, 2012. After that report is complete, the offices
of the USD(AT&L), Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and
Joint Staff will review the Navy and Air Force expendable plans and
assess opportunities for coordination, should funding be allocated for
a future expendables program.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Christopher R.
Durbin; Laura Greifner; James Kim; Scott Purdy; Sylvia Schatz; Brian
Smith; and Roxanna Sun.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and
nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric
(dissimilar) approaches, though it may employ the full range of
military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power,
influence, and will.
[2] Potential near-peer adversaries can be defined to include
countries capable of waging large-scale conventional war on the United
States. These nation-states can be characterized as having nearly
comparable diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capacity
to the United States.
[3] Anti-access threats can be defined as those that impede the
deployment of U.S. forces into the combat theater, limit the locations
from which those forces could effectively operate, or force them to
operate from locations farther from the locus of conflict than they
would normally prefer. High-value targets are persons or resources
that an enemy commander requires for the successful completion of a
mission.
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (a) (2009).
[5] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (b) (2009).
[6] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements
Is Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment
Decisions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-789]
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010).
[7] Investment total includes nearly $1.1 billion in funding for
aircraft self-protection systems, which airborne electronic attack
aircraft rely upon to conduct missions.
[8] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).
[9] GAO, Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22,
2010).
[10] Pursuant to DOD Instruction 5000.02 dated December 8, 2008, low
rate initial production phase is intended to ensure adequate and
efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum quantity
necessary to provide production or production-representative articles
for initial operational testing and evaluation. In the case of MALD,
technical deficiencies and design changes during low rate initial
production prevented demonstration of an efficient manufacturing
capability, which in turn prevented the system from meeting the
department's criteria to enter full rate production. Department policy
further states that in order for a system to receive full rate
production approval, (1) demonstrated control of the manufacturing
process and acceptable reliability, (2) the collection of statistical
process control data, and (3) demonstrated control and capability of
other critical processes must be shown.
[11] According to DOD officials, any retrofits (design fixes) are
under Raytheon (prime contractor) warranty with no additional cost to
the government.
[12] According to DOD officials, the Navy negotiated a firm fixed
price production contract for IDECM Block 4, under which cost risk
associated with retrofits is borne by the contractor, without
financial burden to the government.
[13] GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 1, 2011).
[14] According to DOD, the Air Force is to provide a new plan for
developing and procuring an Increment II variant of MALD-J and report
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by March 30, 2012.
[15] Naval Research Advisory Committee, Science and Technology for
Naval Warfare 2015-2030, NRAC-05-3 (Arlington, Va.: August 2005).
[16] Defense Science Board, 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century
Strategic Technology Vectors (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2007).
[17] Naval Research Advisory Committee, Status and Future of the Naval
R&D Establishment (Arlington, Va.: September 2010).
[18] The report characterized long-term naval capabilities as the
"Navy-After-Next." Navy-After-Next represented concepts, platforms,
and systems that had yet to be conceived, defined, or both, and for
which there was no program of record.
[19] Testimony of the Honorable Zachary J. Lemnios, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in a hearing before
the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, on March 1, 2011.
[20] Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology, Systems and Software Engineering, Systems Engineering
Guide for Systems of Systems, Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: August
2008).
[21] As agreed upon with our congressional requesters, this report
does not evaluate ground-or ship-based electronic warfare systems.
[22] The F/A-18C/D will not be equipped with IDECM's off-board jamming
components (towed decoys) because these aircraft lack the necessary
infrastructure to support these components.
[23] DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System (Dec. 8, 2008).
[End of section]
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