McClellan arrived in western Virginia on June 22 to take personal command of his troops in the field. Endearing himself to the enlisted men, he issued a circular on June 25 with a flair for the dramatic: “Soldiers! I have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place myself at your head and share it with you. I fear now but one thing—that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you.”[i]

Over the following two weeks, McClellan would gather supplies and men to move on the reinforced Confederate army, now under the command of General Robert S. Garnett. Richmond had also sent Confederate reinforcements into the Kanawha Valley under former Virginia governors Henry A. Wise and John B. Floyd, against whom McClellan would detach Jacob Dolson Cox with a brigade of Ohio and Kentucky troops.

McClellan would divide his command, sending one brigade to hold in check a force of nearly 4,000 Confederates under Garnett at Laurel Hill, while McClellan himself would move three additional brigades, totaling 7,000 men, nearly two dozen miles south to attack the Confederate position at Rich Mountain, held by approximately 1,300 men under Colonel John Pegram. Though he had estimated the Confederate force at Laurel Hill to be as many as 10,000, McClellan chastised his brigadier general, Thomas A. Morris, charged with holding those Confederates in place, stating “I propose taking the really difficult & dangerous part of this work on my own hands,” threatening to relieve Morris of command should he request any further reinforcements.

McClellan’s brigades were in place near Rich Mountain July 9, and the following day were alerted by a local Unionist farmer that a pathway existed whereby the Federal troops could turn Pegram’s left flank. McClellan detached a column of 1,850 under an able but maligned Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans to make the flank assault on the morning of June 11, while McClellan would lead the remaining two brigades in a frontal assault upon hearing Rosecrans’ guns.

When hearing gunfire and artillery open later in the afternoon, McClellan waffled; cheers heard from the Confederate lines raised further doubt as McClellan called off his frontal assault, leaving Rosecrans to fend for himself on the enemy’s flank. Rosecrans would carry the Confederate breastworks on his own, sending the disorganized Confederates fleeing down the mountain and rendering Garnett’s position at Laurel Hill as untenable. Pegram and nearly half his command would surrender three days later. Garnett would evacuate his position on June 11 and would be mortally wounded two days later at the battle of Corrick’s Ford, though the majority of his column would escape.

Front page of the New York Daily Tribune – July 14, 1861

A war-hungry northern press lavished praise on McClellan, the first general to gain any semblance of victory in the young war. He would likewise receive the laudatory thanks of Congress. To be fair, he had outmaneuvered and routed all organized Confederate resistance in northwestern Virginia; had captured hundreds of prisoners and killed the highest-ranking Confederate officer in the region; had secured the Ohio border and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad for the Union; and had protected the northern panhandle city of Wheeling, where politicians from western Virginia were meeting to form a new government, ultimately resulting in the new state of West Virginia. The first campaign had been a resounding success, McClellan rattling off a telegram to the War Department: “Garnett’s forces routed—…his army demoralized—Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia. Our success is complete & secession is killed in this country.”[i]

While planning a proposed movement on the vital rail junction at Staunton, McClellan was made aware of Irvin McDowell’s advance on Manassas. After learning of McDowell’s repulse, on the morning of July 22 McClellan would receive the fated telegram calling him to Washington. After a circuitous route through Wheeling, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, McClellan was in the capital inside a week, reviewing the situation with the demoralized Union army and haphazard defenses around the city. Within a month of his arrival, he reformed the broken army he’d found into the Army of the Potomac. The press would make references to him as something of a Napoleon, a comparison McClellan couldn’t help seeing himself, remarking in a letter to his wife that “I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator or anything else that might please me.”[ii]

Regardless of your opinion of George B. McClellan, much credit must be given to what he accomplished during the second half of 1861. His engineering expertise helped to transform Washington, DC, into the most heavily fortified city in the world. He more than tripled the size of the Army of the Potomac, swelling the ranks to more than 160,000 officers and enlisted men. He reinvigorated morale in the army, making the men believe in themselves, if not their officers. The organization and reforms instituted and the confidence instilled under McClellan would help carry the men of the Army of the Potomac through some dark days and serious reverses that lay ahead. While he may not have been the man who could lead the army to victory, he was the man the army needed at that moment. His ascension to the head of the Army of the Potomac is undoubtedly a turning point in the war.

In his seminal work on the Army of the Potomac, historian Russell Beatie described McClellan as “The Enigma,” which of all the monikers attached probably comes as close to describing McClellan in 1861 as much as it does our understanding of him today.[1] In my next article we’ll look at characteristics and traits—both good and bad—that McClellan exhibited in western Virginia and carried east with him to the Army of the Potomac. We’ll do the same with his counterpart in Robert E. Lee, whose own experiences in western Virginia helped to shape some of his decisions at the helm of the Army of Northern Virginia. These early campaigns—often relegated to the backwaters of Civil War historiography —can be used as a benchmark in measuring the later successes and failures of both McClellan and Lee.

When I think of McClellan, the analogy I make is to football. There are guys who prove to be immensely talented as position coaches and/or coordinators on either side of the line of scrimmage. However, many of them fail when named head coach. McClellan had talents, and being revered by his men is no small feat in any military at any time. He proved to be very capable in logistics, i.e. providing for his men, and in training his troops. Yet his battlefield decisions belied the potential he seemed to have within him.

I actually think that analogy is “GM or Coach”. Even I, a confirmed McClellanphobe of long standing, have always believed that he would have done well in the position which went to Halleck. But there’s no way IMHO that he was suited for making “in game” decisions from the sideline. Or, as Parcells would put it, he was good at “shopping for the groceries” but not for making dinner.

To that, small thing as it is, I will say that a GM is in the office, while coaches/coordinators are actually on the field. It is in the field where Mac consistently came up short, even though he had all ‘the groceries’ anyone else could dream of. I agree that Mac would have been better suited to a position like that of Halleck, IF he would have accepted it. His genius for logistics and training certainly could have been put to use, again, IF he would have accepted such a position. And of course, we have the benefit of hindsight and all this Monday Morning QBing. LOL..

“His genius for logistics and training certainly could have been put to use, again, IF he would have accepted such a position.”

This raises an interesting point. Many people have challenged the conventional wisdom about McClellan’s generalship. Has anyone really analyzed the belief that he was a genius at organizing and supplying an army? Both sides created numerous armies from scratch in multiple theaters of operations. What set him apart from the others? Does the lack of a good intelligence operation and the poor organization of the cavalry during his tenure detract from his reputation?

Great questions The easy retort to that, as I see it, is to ask: isn’t any commander responsible for the performance of every aspect of his army? But that is also no doubt unfair. It took a few years for the Union cavalry as a whole to find its footing, both in getting adequate supplies of horses and competent commanders to lead them. The intel failures are more complicated to try to figure out. Allen Pinkerton was in charge of ALL Union intelligence for the first few years of the war. Pinkerton’s failure for the Seven Days campaign was massive. So like everyone else then, Mac had to play the cards dealt to him.

Lee had a very small staff, and that certainly played out against him and the Confederate cause over the years. Why was that? Was he constrained in how large of a staff he could field by the Confederate War Dept., or was that of his own doing? Does his reputation suffer because of that? They are all relevant questions.