CHAPTER XXIX.

THE PHENOMENA OF THE UNIVERSE.

Accords with phenomena. LET us now suppose
that a Great Intelligent First Cause exists, and has existed from eternity; are
not all the appearances of the universe
correspondent with the existence of such a being?

Unreasonable to ask more evidence. Again we may demand of an
Atheist what other evidences of the existence of God he would require. Let him
suggest something, which, in the form of evidence, would be more satisfactory to him, and he will
not find it easy to fix on any evidence which is stronger or more suitable than
what we already possess.

Atheist challenged to propose any
stronger. It may appear strange to some that we challenge the
Atheist to demand any clearer or
234stronger evidence of the existence of a Supreme Being
than that which is already before us. But let the attempt be made to conceive of some evidence of this truth
which would be more satisfactory, and better adapted to be a standing proof
to all nations, and we have mistaken the matter, if the result will not be that
the existing evidence is as good as any which they could ask. It will be worth
while to spend a little time in considering this point, for if we cannot satisfy
the Atheist of the truth of our position, the discussion may be satisfactory
to others who have not been accustomed to view the subject in this light.

Visibility of God not requisite. It
is true we do not see God, and the reason is, he is a spirit; and a spirit,
from the very nature of the case, is invisible. We cannot
see the souls of our nearest friends; we know that they exist,
not by any direct perception of the intelligent substance, but by the actions
which they perform through the instrumentality of the body. If God were not
a spirit he could not be an active,
235intelligent, powerful, and perfect being; but
being a spirit he must be invisible. Nothing is visible but material substances,
and these only by means of light reflected from them to the eye.

Invisible existences
are believed in. It is not forgotten that most Atheists, being
materialists, deny that there is any such substance as spirit; but they do not
and cannot deny that there is something within us which thinks and feels and wills, and has
power to originate bodily motion. Call the substance, of which thought is a
property, by what name you please, still it is an invisible substance. Who can
pretend to see a thought or a volition? or who would say that he can see the
mind, and describe its shape and give its magnitude and dimensions? Let it be
supposed then that the cause of all intelligence has a nature resembling this
intelligent nature of which we are every moment conscious, but far more excellent,
as it must b supposed that every excellence exists in a higher degree in the
cause than in the effect.

236

In no way could a spiritual Being be
better revealed. Now supposing such an intelligent being to exist, call
him spiritual or material, only let him be a being of thought, will, and passion; and that he is necessarily from his nature
invisible to eyes of flesh; the question is, how could such
a being make himself known to rational minds such as ours. As we cannot by any
direct perception look into the mind of another, and as such a being cannot
make himself visible without assuming a gross body, we can conceive of no way
by which he can make himself known but by performing some act, or exhibiting
to us some work which shall contain the impress of his character. For if he
should assume a bodily shape, and thus make himself visible, it would not be
the intelligent substance which we perceived, but a body, which was no part
of his essence. If an intelligent creature could be so situated in the universe
as to have no opportunity of contemplating any work of God, such a creature
could never arrive at the knowledge of his existence. But the supposition is
impossible; for an intelligent creature
237could not exist without the consciousness of
its own thoughts; and in the mind itself, even if it were cut off from all perception
of material things, there is sufficient proof of an efficient, intelligent cause.
The impress of the divine attributes is as clearly printed on the soul as on
any of the works of God to which man has access.

The First Cause known by his works. As the First Cause, if there
is one, must be from his nature invisible, the only way by which he can be conceived
to make known his existence, is by setting before us some work, in which his wisdom, power, and goodness may be manifested;
and by the contemplation of which a rational mind may infer, that a being does
exist, to whom these properties belong. If then in the various objects in the
world, there is as much evidence of these attributes as we can conceive, and
in fact far exceeding our most enlarged conceptions, we have the best proof
of the existence of a Great First Cause, which we could have. The simple question
then is, could there be exhibited stronger evidences of wisdom than we have
in
238the structure of the body of man, and in the constitution
of his mind? Could the various species of animals in the earth, air, and sea,
be formed with more consummate wisdom than they are, in relation to the climate
in which they live, and the provision made internally and externally for their
subsistence, and the propagation of their kind. Examine also the vegetable
world. Call in the aid of glasses to inspect the concealed structure of the
vessels; contemplate the leaf, the flower, and the mature fruit, and say whether
you can conceive of contrivances more exquisite. If any man thinks that animal
and vegetable bodies could have been constructed with more wisdom, let him point
out in what respects these works of nature are deficient in wisdom But even
if it were possible to conceive of more perfect works, this could not in the
least invalidate the argument from them, for the existence of an intelligent
cause. If the question were of the degree of perfection in the wisdom exhibited,
then the skill manifested in each work would be a proper subject for consideration.
An imperfect time-piece proves the
239existence of an artist as fully as one that
is perfect.

This manifestation needs no amendment.
But there is here no need of this remark, for the Atheist may be defied to
conceive of any improvement in any of the works of God,
in regard to the adaptation of the means used
to the end to be accomplished; and these evidences of the wisdom of God are
scattered profusely over the whole universe. We cannot turn our eyes to the
heaven or the earth, to objects of great magnitude, or so small that they can
be seen only by the microscope, but the same admirable perfection of contrivance
is manifest in them all. The internal structure of the gnat is as wonderful
as that of the elephant; and: in the manifestation of wisdom in the creation
there is a wonderful variety. No two species are exactly alike; and the difference
is exactly such as it should be to accomplish the special end in view. The more
intricate our examination of the contrivance and evident design in the organization
of animal and vegetable bodies, the stronger will
240be our conviction, and the greater our admiration.

God is clearly manifested. The only question then is, could the evidences of intelligence in the cause,
if thus innumerable, be exhibited in a clearer and
stronger light than they are; if not, then God could not make known his existence
as an intelligent being more clearly than he has done. The number of instances
in which design appears, is far greater than can be examined, and the degree
of wisdom in the various contrivances in organized bodies, transcends our conception
how, therefore, could we have by new works, greater evidence of an intelligent
cause, than we already possess?

The evidence need not be as great as
possible. But there seems in most minds a lurking suspicion,
that the existing evidence is not as convincing as it might have been. Even if this were so, we have no right to
complain, when it cannot be denied that we have very strong evidence. God is
not obliged to give to his creatures the strongest possible evidence of his241own existence. He may choose to leave scope
for human industry, and also make the reception of the truth a part of our moral
probation; and the pleasure of discovering truth after laborious research, a
part of the reward of virtue. No doubt this is the fact in regard to some truths
of no small importance. The honest inquirer discovers them, while the proud
and prejudiced mind, though more acute, misses them, and embraces in their stead
dangerous error. In maintaining, therefore, that the evidence for the being
of God is as convincing as it could be to an impartial, rational mind, it is
not because such clearness is considered essential; but simply because the fact
appears to be as stated.

Can stronger proof be proposed? But since many may still suppose that
they can imagine much stronger proof than any which exists, let
us consider what can be alleged in favour of this opinion.

Supposition of address to the ear. Could not God speak
to us in a voice of thunder, and thus make himself known? Undoubtedly he could;
and such a voice would
242doubtless greatly terrify us; but would it be a stronger
proof of his wisdom and power than the works
of nature which we behold? If this tremendous sound were heard very often,
it would at length become familiar, and would cease to produce the same impression
as at first. If heard but seldom, it would leave a suspicion that it might have
been no more than a disordered imagination. But how could we be sure that the
voice proceeded from a being who would not deceive? The mere hearing the noise
could give us no certain evidence of the character and veracity of the speaker?

A visible glory not convincing. But perhaps it may be thought that a glorious visible appearance would place
the matter beyond all possibility of doubt. The majestic appearance of a divine person, would, it may be alleged, satisfy
every one. The same objections may be made to this species Of evidence, as to
the former; how could we know that this visible appearance was that of the Great
First Cause? Unnatural appearances prove nothing
243respecting the character of the person who
assumes them; if such apparitions were only occasionally exhibited, we should
be prone to doubt of their reality; and if frequent, we should become too much
accustomed to them to receive any impression. But whatever impression such appearances
might make, considered as evidence of an all-perfect Deity, they would not be
comparable to that which we have in the works of nature.

Miracles. But if the Supreme
Being exists, why could he not make himself known by working stupendous
miracles? Of course, if miracles might be demanded by one, all have the same
need; and the same claims and miracles would become so common, that it would
be difficult to distinguish them from natural events. And again, miracles require
no more power to produce them than is required to produce common events. In
many cases they would require no more than a cessation of the power by which
natural events are produced. The standing still of the sun, or the stopping
of the rotation of the earth, would be nothing else
244than removing the impulse by which they were originally
put in motion.

Are effects of power. In a miracle, we only see the effect of divine power. We may
infer from this, that there is a Being who can change the laws of nature; and a miracle taken by itself can prove nothing
more. But in
the works of nature, we have innumerable proofs of the wisdom and beneficence
of the Author of the Universe. And the number, variety, and wisdom of these
works are evident to every person of common sense. The proofs of a great intelligent
cause are spread out, over the heavens and the earth, the sea, and the air.
We are little affected by these objects, because they have ever been before
our eyes since our earliest infancy. But as evidences of a Divine existence
their force is not diminished by the uniformity of the laws of nature, by which
they are continually produced, but greatly increased. The different species
of animals and vegetables have successively been reproduced, according to laws
that never vary; and this shows that the plan of the Almighty is perfect, and
that He
245can accomplish all his pleasure, and has given
uniform laws to every kind of being which his wisdom and power have produced.

But add nothing to proof of power. It is not denied that miraculous displays are a decisive proof of a Great First
Cause, who is possessed of omnipotence; but what we maintain is, that the evidence of omnipotence is not greater than
in the natural effects which are constantly produced before our eyes. And as
to the character and attributes of God, they are far more clearly exhibited
in the various productions of nature, than they would be by a miraculous interposition.
If another sun were placed in the heavens, which is as great a miracle as we
can imagine, it would be a proof of mighty power, but not a stronger proof than
the existence of the natural sun; and as to the wisdom and goodness of the Deity,
there would be no comparison, for in the former case, nothing but the existence
of Omnipotence could be inferred from the miracle, for there would be no appearance
of wisdom in such a miracle. But in the existence of the natural sun, which
gives light,
246heat, motion, and life to all earthly living things,
the wisdom and goodness of the Creator are most illustriously displayed. Who
can enumerate the benefits which are derived from the influence of the sun?
and the same sun, which communicates so many blessings to our world, dispenses
blessings in the same way to other planets.

Result of the argument. If we saw
the dead raised in a thousand instances, it would be a decisive evidence of the
existence of a Being of almighty power; but the evidence is fully as strong from the formation
and vivification of innumerable animal bodies of many species. And no miracle
can be conceived, which would furnish stronger evidence of the Divine existence,
than the works of creation which are ever before our eyes and our minds. I think,
after what has been said, that we cannot wish for more convincing evidence of
the existence of a Supreme Being, than we already possess in the works of nature
spread out before us; and even if we were shut up in a dark dungeon, we have
this convincing evidence in our own
247persons, in the constitution of both our souls
and bodies.

The demand of self-evidence. The only thing which can be alleged further is, that this might
have been made a self-evident truth as much as our own existence, or the existence
of the world without us; and many formerly entertained that
opinion that the idea of God is innate, and that a speculative Atheist is a
thing impossible. Some very learned and respectable philosophers and theologians
have expressly inculcated this opinion in their writings. Now, although we do
not believe there are any innate ideas, and although the existence of God can
scarcely be said to be self-evident, yet in the proof of it, there is but a
single step of reasoning. It is a self-evident truth that every effect must
have an adequate cause; and when there is evident design in the effect, the
cause must be intelligent. The conclusion is so easily drawn from an intuitive
truth, that it is not wonderful that it should be classed among self-evident
truths. We can scarcely conceive of the state of that mind which after seriously
contemplating
248the wonderful evidences of design in the human frame,
can doubt the existence of an intelligent First Cause, and an intelligent cause
producing effects by a wise adaptation of means to a definite end, and the harmonious
operation of thousands of parts in the vital functions must, according to every
proper definition of the term, be a person.

Attributes of God. All the
arguments by which the being of God is proved, involve the proof of some of his
attributes. If the marks of design in creatures prove the existence of a Creator,
it is by showing that he must be possessed of wisdom to cause so many wonderful
contrivances as we behold in the world. As the operation of any cause is the
exertion of power, so the creation of the world is the action of omnipotence.
A greater power than that which brings something out of nothing cannot be conceived:
this indeed we cannot comprehend, and, therefore, some who admit that the world
is the work of God, as far as relates to the organization and moulding of matter,
yet cannot be persuaded that omnipotence
249itself can give existence where there was none
before. But if God did not create the matter that is in the world, whence came
it? There are but two suppositions; one is, that matter existed from eternity,
and is, therefore, self-existent and independent; the other, that it is an emanation
of the divine essence. The first is inadmissible; it supposes two eternal beings
independent of each other, and the latter leads to pantheism, or that all things
are a part of God; as whatever emanates from him must be a part of his essence,
for this is immutably the same. Though wisdom and power are the attributes which
are first observed, they are not the only attributes of which we may learn something
by studying the works of nature. For when we attentively consider the nature
of the end, to accomplish which the innumerable contrivances are adapted, we
cannot but observe that this end is beneficent. All the parts of animals are
connected with the vitality, enjoyment, and preservation, of the animal or species.
The goodness of God is therefore as manifest in the creation, as his wisdom.
There is not a part in
250any animal body which can be shown to be without its
use. Every species is fitted by the bodily structure, and by the instincts and
passions with which it is endued, to enjoy in the most perfect degree that kind
of life to which it is destined. Even the minutest animalculæ have bodies organized
with as exquisite skill as those of the larger species. No living creature exists
for which food is not provided, suited to the appetite and nourishment of the
species, and which it has the means of procuring. So every species is endowed
with the instinctive ability to provide for itself and its progeny suitable
places of residence; and there are insects which, though they undergo a remarkable
metamorphosis and change of appetites, are still able by their instinct to find
the nourishment which is agreeable and necessary. And what is still more wonderful
and indicative of far-seeing wisdom in the Creator is the fact, that these insects
which were once in the chrysalis state, and afterwards assume the form and instincts
of butterflies, are led by an invariable propensity to deposit their eggs on
plants
251necessary for the young grubs, but on which
they themselves never feed. Were it not for this wise provision for the young,
they would all perish. Between the animal and vegetable world there is a beautiful
harmony; the latter to a large extent supplies food for the former. It may be
thought that the constitution of things by which one animal preys upon another,
is an argument against the goodness of God; but these animals are only intended
for a transitory existence, and as they all must die, and are tormented with
no apprehensions in regard to the future, and the pain indeed is momentary,
if they enjoy much more pleasure than pain during their existence, there seems
to be no solid objection against this law of nature.

Objections from existence of pain. It has often been alleged
as an atheistical objection against the goodness, and by consequence, against
the existence of God, that pain or misery has a place among his works. This perhaps is the most plausible of all objections
which infidels have ever produced; and yet it has no certain principles on which
to rest. With a
252system such as the present, where there is a gradation
of sensitive beings, it is impossible for us to conceive how all pain could
be excluded. As far as we can see, the susceptibility of pleasure carries with
it a liableness to some degree of pain. What if the pain which animals endure
arise out of the principle of self-preservation, and from the appetites, in
the gratification of which consists their enjoyment? Without desire and appetite
there could be no animal enjoyment, and when the safety of the animal requires
it, it is wisely ordered that by uneasiness or pain it should be stimulated
to seek its necessary food, or flee from danger.

Miseries of the human race. And as to man, while in the
present world we cannot conceive how he could have any enjoyment, unless he was
also subject to such feelings of uneasiness
human race. as rendered him capable of relishing his enjoyments. This remark
relates to pains which cannot be avoided, such as the pain of hunger and thirst,
and the pain arising from contact with some injurious body. The surface of man’s
body is the chief seat of pain, because
253danger commonly approaches him from without.
It does not appear, therefore, possible that such a system of creatures as exist
in the world could be constituted so as to be exempt from all un easy feelings.
To make creatures whose constitution would exempt them from all liableness to
pain, would, as far as we can see, exempt them from all susceptibility to pleasure.
And as to those evils which men bring upon themselves by imprudence, intemperance,
injustice, or by disobeying the voice of conscience within them, they must be
attributed to themselves and not to the constitution of the world. And as God
is not obliged to make every creature as great and as happy as it could be made,
it may seem to exhibit his wisdom and power to produce beings in whose existence
there is a mixture of natural good and evil.

Moral perfections of the First Cause.
It appears clear, then, that the Author of this universe is powerful, wise, and
beneficent; but how does it appear that he is possessed of a moral character? that he loves moral excellence, and disapproves
of moral evil? This appears
evidently
254from the moral constitution of man. The law interwoven
in his constitution proves that his Maker approves of moral excellence. Again,
it would be absurd to suppose that the creature could possess an excellence,
and one superior to all natural endowments, of which there was no prototype
in the Great First Cause. We may lay it down as a maxim, that whatever perfection
we can conceive of must exist in the most perfect degree in the Creator, for
all our ideas of perfection are derived from the contemplation of creation;
and whatever excellence there is in the creation must exist in the Creator.

Divine approbation of virtue. Besides, by the laws of nature, virtuous conduct is generally productive of pleasure and peace of mind; and immoral conduct
is generally a source of misery. These laws of nature are the laws of God, and
manifest his approbation of virtue and disapprobation of vice.