Recent Declassification Decisions

(FOUO) When a declassification decision is made, information formerly classified or protected as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY become strictly UNCLASSIFIED. NSA/CSS affiliates are reminded of their responsibility to submit for prepublication review any NSA/CSS unclassified information which they wish to release publically. For specific guidance on the release of unclassified NSA/CSS information, please refer to NSA/CSS Regulation 10-11, Release of Unclassified NSA/CSS Information and NSA/CSS Regulation 10-63, NSA/CSS Prepublication Review Procedure.

NSA Declassification Decisions (U):

1. (U) The fact of targeting Cuba and Cuban Military Forces to include Ground, Navy, and Air Force from 1959 through 1963.

2. (U) The fact of targeting the Cuban Intelligence Network from 1959 through 1963.

3. (U) The fact of targeting the Soviet Forces in Cuba from 1959 through 1963.

4. (U) The fact of SIGINT targeting of Counterintelligence, International Drug Trafficking, International Organized Crime, and Alien Smuggling.

5. (U) The fact of targeting Iraqi Communications during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, covering the period 2 August 1990 through 3 March 1991.

6. The fact of NSA's presence at Menwith Hill Station (MHS).

7. (U) NSA's alpha-numeric organizational indicators.

8. (U) The terms GAMMA, VRK and Talent-Keyhole when standing alone or in association with SIGINT. However, the GAMMA, VRK and TK information itself continues to be protected.

9. (U) NSA's association with counterterrorism.

10. (U) The fact of SIGINT targeting of terrorism.

11. (U) The fact of targeting the former Soviet Union through December 1991.

12. (U) The fact of targeting Asia, in general. Any details remain [deleted].

13. (U) The fact of targeting the former Soviet Nuclear Forces from 1964 through 1967.

14. (U) The fact of targeting the former Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces from 1964 through 1967.

15. (U) The fact that Incirlik, Turkey was a staging base for the C-130 (HERCULES) reconnaissance aircraft which was shot down in 1958.

16. (U) The fact that the 7406th Support Squadron and Detachment 1 of the 6911th Radio Group Mobile were SIGINT units in 1958.

17. (U) The fact of SIGINT airborne collection and the fact that the following historical and active airborne platforms have performed SIGINT missions:

RB-17 (FLYING FORTRESS)

RB-29 (SUPER FORTRESS)

RB-47 (STRATO JET)

RB-50 (DE HAVILLAND-7)

RC-12 (BEECHKING AIR)

E/RC-130 (HERCULES)

E/RC-135 (STRATO LIFTER)

EC-47 (SKYTRAIN)

EP-3E (ORION)

SR-71 (BLACKBIRD)

U-2 (DRAGONLADY)

PB4Y2 (PRIVATEER)

P2V (NEPTUNE)

18. (U) All UNCLASSIFIED Project Names which were previously protected with the For Official Use Only caveat.

19. (U) Effective 24 DECEMBER 1997, the fact that the following historical and active airborne platforms have performed SIGINT missions is declassified.

(U)Historical

EA-3B (SKY WARRIOR)

EC-121 (LOCKHEED CONSTELLATION)

JU-21 (UTE)

OV-1 (MOHAWK)

QB-22 (Unknown)

RB-45 (TORNADO)

RB-57 (CANBERRA)

RB-66 (DESTROYER)

RU-8D (SEMINOLE)

RU-21 (SEA FIRM)

(U) Active

EA-6B (PROWLER)

ES-3A (SHADOW)

UH-1D (HUEY)

UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)

20. (U) Effective 1 JANUARY 1998, the fact that North Korea was targeted by the SIGINT ship USS Banner in 1967 and the SIGINT ship USS Pueblo in 1968.

21. (U) Effective 1 FEBRUARY 1998, the fact of an NSA Russian Technical Library, with a collection of 21,000 unclassified Russian books (now under the control of S511, Library Services).

22. (U) The fact of the association of the U-2 aircraft with the Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance System (CARS).

23. (U) Effective 1 FEBRUARY 1998, the fact of targeting Haiti through 1963.

24. (U) Effective 2 APRIL 1998, the fact of targeting Soviet and Vietnam morse and radio-printer communications through 1975.

25. (U) The fact of the association of the U-2 aircraft with the Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance System (CARS).

26. The fact that NSA has Third party SIGINT relationships.

27. Effective 2 April 1998, the fact of targeting morse and radio-printer communications through 1975 where the target country is not identified.

NSA DECOMPARTMENTATION DECISIONS (U):

1. (U) Effective 1 October 1997, the fact that the U.S. SIGINT System targets/conducts collection operations against the communications of a specific country, or grouping of countries, is classified at the SECRET level. This information will no longer require protection in the COMINT compartment. However, details and results of the targeting will continue to require COMINT channels protection unless they meet the criteria established for collateral-level reporting.

(U) NOTE: As a result of the decompartmentation of SIGINT targeting, the classification of the use of a specific foreign language in an operational context at NSA/CSS is SECRET.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DECLASSIFICATION DECISIONS (U):

1. (U) COMINT Codewords (e.g. SPOKE, MORAY, UMBRA) when either standing alone or associated with a security classification, level or category of COMINT. However, the COMINT information itself will continue to be protected at the appropriate level. That is, only the CODEWORDS are declassified while the information protected by the CODEWORDS still receives the same level of attention.

2. (U) The fact of SIGINT Overhead Collection, to include COMINT, ELINT and FISINT [passage deleted].