Benjamin and Charlotte Blumberg sued to recover damages
for personal injuries which she assertedly sustained when she
fell in the lobby of a downtown office building in San Francisco.
Their appeal from an adverse judgment challenges the ruling of
the trial court granting the property owner's motion for a nonsuit.

According to the settled statement, about
two hours after a dinner with
Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Isaacs, the Blumbergs accompanied their friends
to see Mr. Isaacs' office. The accident occurred after they returned
to the ground floor. Mrs. Blumberg testified in
part: ". . . I remember taking a few steps and then all of a
sudden . . . there was a feeling as though something held me
down and right with that simultaneously my head was hitting this
terrazzo floor and someone called out. It was all in one, this
blow here; I just remember going down and cracking my head."
When asked whether there was "any sensation as if your foot had
slipped?" she replied: "Oh, no." She gave the same answer to
the question: "Was there any sensation of your ankle having turned?"
In further explanation of her injuries, she said that she fell
on a large mat in front of the elevators while walking with head
erect, watching her way. As described by her, she fell toward
the lobby door, with her head striking the bare floor and her
legs on the mat. After the accident, her right stocking bore
the imprint of the mat.

Mrs. Isaacs testified that, after the two couples descended in the
elevator, the men preceded their wives across the lobby. Mrs.
Blumberg followed them. Mrs. Isaacs, walking slightly
behind the three, saw Mrs. Blumberg fall ". . .
absolutely straight as though she had had something hold her
or pull her . . . She fell in one straight piece . . . her knees
didn't go down first, her arms didn't go down first. . . ." Mrs.
Isaacs added that, immediately prior to the accident, Mrs.
Blumberg's manner of walking was normal. She was not running,
and the witness did not see her slip.

The record
shows that the mat mentioned in the evidence was constructed
of small pieces or strips of rubber or similar material held
together in a row, running in both directions at right angles,
with open spaces of varying sizes up to, but not greater than,
1-1/16th of an inch by 5/8ths of an inch. A witness familiar
with the shoe business testified that the left shoe worn by Mrs.
Blumberg on the night of the accident was made with
a medium spike heel
of the type worn on the street by about
60 per cent of the women in San Francisco. The usual measurement
across the base of heels of this type, he added, is from 11 to
12/16ths of an inch. However, Mrs. Blumberg's heel
had been shortened on a trimmer and measured 14/16ths of an inch
across the front of the base and 13/16ths of an inch from front
to rear. Upon cross-examination, he declared that a small cap
at the base of the heel had been put on by a repair shop; that
the shoe was a regular street shoe rather than an evening shoe;
and that there is no such thing as a standard heel.

As justifying
a reversal of the judgment on the ground that this evidence would
support a verdict and judgment in their favor, the Blumbergs
contend that the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding
that Mrs. Blumberg's left heel became wedged in
one of the interstices in the mat. Their theory is that, although
her heel was too large to enter any one of the spaces squarely,
it must have entered and become wedged in one of the 1-1/16th
of an inch by 5/8ths of an inch spaces when brought down at an
angle with toe raised, in the manner common to women walking
in high-heeled shoes. The evidence also indicates, they argue,
that the accident could not have happened in any other manner,
since she did not slip, trip or turn her ankle, and there was
no foreign matter on the mat. As the basis of liability, it is
said that the size of the openings was inherently dangerous for
the San Francisco women who wear such heels for street use, and
the property owner knew, or should have known, of such danger.
Finally, it is said, the Blumbergs were invitees, and the property
owner owed a duty to maintain the lobby in a safe condition or
to give warning of any danger.

As justifying the ruling on the motion,
the respondent takes the position that
the evidence offered by the Blumbergs is insufficient to support
a verdict for them because (1) it does not show that the mat
was defective; nor (2) that it was dangerously constructed, or
different from mats generally used in office building lobbies;
nor (3) that the property owner
knew the relation between the sizes of the heel of a woman's
shoe and the openings in the mat; nor (4) that the owner knew,
or had any reason to believe, that there was danger in maintaining
the mat; nor (5) that Mrs. Blumberg's heel actually
caught in an opening in the mat. Finally, they insist, if the
mat was dangerous, its nature was obvious to Mrs. Blumberg,
who was therefore warned of its condition.

A trial
court is justified in granting a motion for nonsuit ". . . when,
and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and giving
to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference which may be
drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that
there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
(Card v. Boms,
210 Cal. 200, 202 [291 P. 190];
see, also,
Hale v. Depaoli,
33 Cal. 2d 228, 229 [201 P.2d 1];
Neel v. Mannings, Inc.,
19 Cal. 2d 647, 650 [122 P.2d 576];
Estate of Lances,
216 Cal. 397, 401 [14 P.2d 768].)
As stated in
Estate of Lances,
supra, page 400,
"Unless it can be said as a matter of law, that . . . no other
reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the
evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary
support that a reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it
upon appeal, or the trial court to set it aside as a matter of
law, the trial court is not justified in taking the case from
the jury."

As invitees of Mr. and Mrs. Isaacs,
tenants of the building, the Blumbergs
were business visitors and as to them the property owner was
obliged to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably
safe condition, or to warn them of danger. The duty was not limited
to conditions actually known by the owner to be dangerous, but
extended also to conditions which might have been found dangerous
by the exercise of reasonable care.
(Mondine v. Sarlin,
11 Cal. 2d 593, 597 [81 P.2d 903];
Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
95 Cal. App. 781, 790 [273 P. 630].)

The uncontradicted
testimony clearly shows that the floor mat upon which Mrs. Blumberg
fell had openings of sufficient size to allow a portion of the
heel of her shoe to slip into one of them, at least at an angle.
There is also evidence that the shoes of a large number of the
women in San Francisco have heels of the size worn by her. Accordingly,
the jury reasonably could have inferred that her left heel became
wedged in the mat in precisely that manner, causing her to fall.

Reasonable inquiry and inspection would have informed the
property owner that it was maintaining in
the lobby a mat with openings likely
to retain and hold the heel of a shoe such as is customarily
worn by a large number of the women in San Francisco. Moreover,
whether the nature of the mat was obvious to Mrs. Blumberg
was a question of fact for the determination of the jury. The
claim that the mat in question was widely used is no legal excuse
for the maintenance of a dangerous condition. The fact that a
negligent practice is general does not transform it into reasonable
care.

A possessor of land is not an insurer of the safety
of his business guests,
nor is he liable for harm resulting from a condition from which
no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated. He "is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural
or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he

(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain
upon the land without exercising reasonable care

(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or

(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them
to avoid the harm."
(2 Restatement, Torts, § 343, pp. 938-939.)

It was therefore incumbent on plaintiffs to present evidence
from which reasonable
men could conclude: (1) that defendants should have realized
that the mat involved an unreasonable risk to business visitors;
and (2) that defendants had no
reason to believe such visitors would realize the risk involved
therein. In my opinion there was no evidence that would warrant
either of these conclusions.

1. The evidence fails to show that the mat was
in any way different
from those in general use.
(Yearsley v. American Stores Co.,
97 Pa.Super. 275, 277.)
There was no evidence that other persons
had slipped or fallen on that mat or similar mats, which might
have given defendants reason to believe that the continued use
of the mat would be dangerous. The majority opinion states that
"The fact that a negligent practice is general does not transform
it into reasonable care." It is equally true, however, that a
practice that has been generally followed without incident is
not transformed into negligence merely by the occurrence of a
single accident not reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiffs rely upon
the testimony of a witness familiar with the shoe business that
plaintiff was wearing the type of heel that 60 per cent of the
women of San Francisco wear for street use. Even if it is assumed
that defendants were aware of this fact, it does not follow that
they should have concluded therefrom that the mat was unsafe.
There is no negligence if harm could not reasonably be foreseen.
"The standard must be one of conduct, not of consequences."
(Prosser, Torts, § 35, p. 220.)
Any accident raises the question whether
it could reasonably be foreseen, but one cannot conclude that
it could have been foreseen merely because it occurred; negligence
cannot be inferred by looking backward "with the wisdom born
of the event."
(Cardozo, C. J., in
Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.,
257 N.Y. 190, 192 [177 N.E. 416];
Dickson v. Emporium Mercantile Co., Inc.,
193 Minn. 629, 631 [259 N.W. 375].)

It is plaintiffs' theory that the heel of Mrs. Blumberg's
shoe became wedged in one of the interstices of defendants' mat
after being inserted at an angle with the toe pointed upward.
They contend that "the accident could not have happened in any
other manner." Diagram B illustrates the outline of Mrs.
Blumberg's
shoe with the heel in what plaintiffs term "the situation which
must have occurred at the moment of Mrs. Blumberg's
injury." They contend that as her toe descended and her foot
rolled forward, the back of her heel, describing an arc, wedged
against the latitudinal strip of the interstice, causing her
to fall. Even if it is assumed that the accident occurred according
to plaintiffs' theory, can it reasonably be said that it was
within the normal scope of prevision of a possessor of land?
A comparison of the sizes of the base of Mrs. Blumberg's heel
and the largest space in the mat demonstrates the
unlikelihood of a heel's wedging in the manner alleged.
Had plaintiff stepped straight down on
the mat, it would admittedly have been impossible for her heel
to enter the interstice. The accident could only have occurred,
by plaintiffs' own admission, because Mrs. Blumberg
crossed the mat at a right angle to the long side of the interstice
and the heel fell well into it. It is clear from Diagram B that
plaintiff's toe must have been raised at a relatively high angle
and at about the only angle that could prevent the heel from
swinging free as plaintiff stepped forward. The jury might have
inferred that these unusual circumstances conspired to cause
Mrs. Blumberg to fall. But the duty to anticipate
such a possibility, which became apparent only by hindsight,
cannot be said to be part of the requirement of ordinary care.
(Baran v. Reading Iron Co.,
202 Pa. 274 [51 A. 979];
Austin v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co.,
269 Mass. 420 [169 N.E. 484];
see, also,
Whiting v. City of National City,
9 Cal. 2d 163, 165, 166 [69 P.2d 990];
Baddeley v. Shea,
114 Cal. 1, 7 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56, 33 L.R.A. 747].)

2. Even if reasonable men could differ as to whether the
mat created an unreasonable risk to business visitors,
the judgment should be affirmed. Any danger inherent in the
mat was as apparent to Mrs. Blumberg as to defendants, and a reasonable
jury could not conclude that defendants had reason to believe
that she would not realize the risk involved in walking across
the mat with the type of heels she was wearing. One ordinarily
looks where one is going, and the interstices of the mat were
clearly visible. There was nothing unusual about them in size
or design, nothing defective, to trip the average walker. Actually
there was no danger in the mat lying in wait for Mrs. Blumberg.
The danger to be anticipated
was from the spiked heels, not from the mat. Those who walk on
spiked heels court danger. That is their privilege, but it is
also their responsibility to consider the consequences, to be
aware of the peculiarities of the shoes they wear. Mrs. Blumberg
not only could see everything that defendants could by looking
at the mat, over which she had walked when she entered the building,
but she knew as they did not the type of heel she was wearing.
An "owner is entitled to assume that such invitee will perceive
that which would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of his
own senses."
(Shanley v. American Olive Co.,
185 Cal. 552, 555 [197 P. 793];
Royal Insurance Co. v. Mazzei,
50 Cal. App. 2d 549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 586];
see, also,
Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co.,
4 Cal. 2d 511, 512-513 [50 P.2d 801].)