Mr. McClain was hospitalized for surgery
related to diverticulitis; Dr. John Jarrard, an anesthesiologist, inserted a
lumbar epidural catheter for post-operative pain control. After surgery, McClain
experienced growing numbness in his legs and stomach and the inability to move
his lower body. Based on a CT scan and a myelogram ordered by Dr. Oliver, the
consulting neurosurgeon, surgery was done to remove an epidural hematoma caused
by the catheter piercing a blood vessel.

During his deposition, an expert witness,
Dr. Thomas A. Duc, opined that Dr. Oliver’s failure to act aggressively contributed
to McClain’s resulting injuries. Based on this testimony, McClain amended his
complaint to add Dr. Oliver and his practice, Anderson Neurological Associates
(Anderson) as defendants. In their answer, Dr. Oliver and Anderson asserted
the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations and moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted the motion.

McClain argues that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run on his cause of action against Dr. Oliver until he was
aware of facts sufficient to put him on notice that Dr. Oliver had done something
wrong. We disagree.

LAW/ANALYSIS

“Under the discovery rule, the statute does not
run from the date of the negligent act, but from the date when the injury
resulting from the wrongful conduct either is discovered or may be discovered
by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C.
512, 513, 386 S.E.2d 257, 258 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). In the medical
malpractice context, our supreme court applied the reasonable diligence analysis
under the general discovery rule set forth in Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange,
276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981). “‘[A]n injured party must act with some
promptness where the facts and circumstances of the injury would put a person
of common knowledge on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that
some claim against another party might exist.’” Strong v. Univ. of
S.C. Sch. of Med., 316 S.C. 189, 191, 447 S.E.2d 850, 852 (1994) (quoting
Snell at 303, 278 S.E.2d at 334) (emphasis added). While South Carolina
cases have allowed some latitude for discovery of an injury in the medical malpractice
context, given the expert knowledge required to ascertain an injury, we find
no case extending a similar latitude to allow adding additional defendants after
the statute of limitations has run where the plaintiff clearly knew of his injury.
In Strong, the court declined to extend the statute where the patient
clearly should have known the cause of his injury when it was noted in his medical
records.

The closest case on point is Tanyel
v. Osborne, 312 S.C. 473, 441 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1994). That case arose
out of an automobile collision at an intersection; based on a witness’ changed
recollection about the light, Tanyel sought to add another defendant, arguing
the statute did not begin to run until he discovered evidence of negligence
by that defendant. The court rejected this argument, stating: “[t]he success
or failure of his investigation is irrelevant. Undertaking such an investigation
demonstrates notice of a potential claim against the [other] driver.” Id.
at 475, 441 S.E.2d at 331. This court held Tanyel’s witnessing of the other
driver’s involvement was alone sufficient to put him on notice of a potential
claim, which triggered the statute of limitations.

We see no reason to distinguish this case
from Tanyel, nor are we persuaded that the nature of this case—medical
malpractice—removes it from the limits of common knowledge and experience.
Significantly, both McClain and his wife testified specifically that Dr. Oliver
treated him soon after the problem developed and continued to follow up. Dr.
Oliver’s involvement was known to both of them, and they discussed their concerns
with him. This is not a case where discovery disclosed the existence of a treating
doctor not mentioned in the medical records. Rather, McClain had actual knowledge
of Dr. Oliver’s treatment and that any potential claim could encompass his treatment.
As we noted in Tanyel, the notice of a potential claim against a different
defendant “triggered the statute of limitations, rather than the discovery of
evidence actually supporting the potential claim.” Tanyel at 476, 441
S.E.2d at 331.

Our supreme court refused to extend the statute
of limitations under the discovery rule in a similar situation where plaintiffs
chose to consult several lawyers and investigate fully before bringing a medical
malpractice suit against the doctor. Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354
S.E.2d 36 (1987). In that case, the Smiths raised concerns about the treatment
before leaving the hospital and consulted an attorney within days, but did not
ultimately bring suit until five years later. The court held their earlier
concerns and consultation were sufficient to trigger the running of the statute
of limitations. Id. at 425-26, 354 S.E.2d at 39-40.

Because the McClains sued Dr. Oliver and Anderson
more than three years after discovery of the injury and after the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is

AFFIRMED.

CONNOR, STILWELL, and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.