This quarterly monitoring, published by GRIP since 2011 is part of a project named “Contributing to improve human security, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law in Sub-Saharan countries” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

It aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border crime and trafficking.

Since 2010, the Indonesian government has embarked on an ambitious journey of « revitalizing » and developing its defence industry. Between economic optimism, political opportunities and constraints, strategic issues and operational challenges, the ascent of Indonesia’s defence industry raises many questions. Transpiring from this development are the sheer complexity of a country’s “emergence”, and the strategies of its leaders. This note offers an entry point to an issue that is necessarily multifaceted, but also critical for the future of Indonesia’s place and role in the global arms market, and equally key to a seemingly ever more fragile regional stability.

This article could be summarised by a question mark, which will only find an answer in November 2015, when the transition in Burkina Faso will lead to presidential, legislatives and local elections. A courageous but still enigmatic transition, which raises hope as much as concern. In such an uncertain environment, the European Union, traditional partner of African democratic processes, is called to proceed cautiously and prudently. It is like a bull in a china shop.

As the security situation deteriorates in the Sahara-Sahel area as a consequence of the Libyan crisis, the border areas have been the subject of different security approaches by regional and extra-regional actors. In the Sahara-Sahel, two visions are facing each other. One considers the border as a fixed line which is supposed to be strictly controlled: it is the vision conveyed by the Sahel region states and their extra-regional partners. The other vision considers the Sahara-Sahel areas, in particular the border areas, as open and dynamic spaces: this vision is shared by the local people, nomads, migrants, irregular armed groups and even some state actors.

The Lebanese political and security scene gathers different stakeholders who are engaged in influence peddling feeding the chronic instability from which the Land of Cedar suffers. In this context, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintain complex relations, oscillating between complementarity, collusion and subordination, according to the circumstances. By focusing on a few key questions, this Note intends to highlight the ongoing balances of power in order to evaluate the risks of arms diversion in Lebanon.

Until 1998, the Indonesian armed forces were granted an institutionalized « dual function » (dwifungsi) in state operations. Through this, they had a role in the country’s security, but also politics and economy. Since Suharto’s fall, the processes of democratization and decentralization have led the civilian ship to regain the upper hand. However, the armed forces have maintained some power of influence which may question the functionality of Indonesia’s democracy. The election of Jokowi in July 2014 paved the way to new reforms that his predecessor failed to implement. Jokowi’s relation to military staff will therefore be a major stake of his term, and its evolution will be pivotal in Indonesia’s capacity to raise to the challenge of its emergence.

Many cases of violations of sanctions on Iran have been identified, which underpins the thesis that arms embargoes are not perfect instruments to counter the proliferation of weapons. There is evidence that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are a hub for the smuggling of weapons and other military equipment to Iran. Proliferation networks use different bypass techniques that make the detection of illegal shipments more and more difficult. This trade represents a danger to both the Gulf region and the entire world. This note aims at providing an overview of the mechanisms of diversion of sanctions against Iran in the UAE and the country’s efforts to fight against it.

Methamphetamine is becoming the most used illegal drug in the world, after cannabis. This synthetic drug, whose use and trafficking are expanding rapidly, has the peculiarity of being the only drug to be produced in Western Africa, with cannabis. Originally intended for export, mostly to Asia, its low cost and its effects, allowing for instance to forget hunger and fatigue, are fostering the development of its consumption in the Western African sub-region. If – so far – dismantled production laboratories all lie in Nigeria, strong suspicions surround its possible manufacturing in other countries of the subregion.

This quarterly monitoring is part of a three years project (2014-2016) on “Contributing to improve human security, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law in Sub-Saharan countries” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. It aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border crime and trafficking.

In 2012, EU Member States started reviewing the EU Common Position defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. While the process is still ongoing, this note takes stock of what Member States have agreed to review and suggests avenues for further improving the Common Position and its implementation. To do so, it draws upon an analysis of Member States’ practices which highlights not only inconsistent interpretations of the Common position’s criteria but also contradictions between some export licensing decisions and the spirit and letter of the European instrument. Therefore, and in spite of EU Member States having decided to carry out a limited review, this note calls for a thorough review and a progressive revision of the Common Position and its User’s Guide. When lives are at stake, proactive processes offer the options that reactive approaches deny.

Over the past ten years, the European Union has started to negotiate and sign Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with third states, in order to have them participate in the various CSDP missions. The EU has recently signed an FPA with South Korea and has approached Japan to negotiate one, going beyond its usual area of cooperation and engaging partners with which it has very little experience. Yet, the rationale underlying this trend has to be figured out. It appears that what prevails is rather the symbolic value of recognising and being recognised as a relevant international security actor, both for the EU and its Asian partners. It does matter that the EU set a foot on the security map in East Asia, while it is equally important for Japan and South Korea to appear as key security players through partnerships.

In the Sahel, there are threats and natural resources. So many reasons that lead some states to rush to the area and to engage in economic competition. But it's mostly security concerns and the urgent need to create a real dynamic of development and resilience in populations that led some European States to increase their presence and to encourage the EU to mobilize its broad ranges of tools in all fields of actions. Because they are well aware that their bilateral actions are no longer sufficient, EU Member States organize themselves with the partners’ assistance who are ready to financially or logistically support their actions in Sahel countries. But the EU remains the primary driver of EU Member States’ actions because of the efficiency it is supposed to generate.

This Note is adapted from the book "Europe has an idea, et alors ?" from Sven Biscop andAlexander Mattelaer, published in December in the series "The Ashgate Research Companion to the Foreign Policies of Europe"

(Crédit photo: ecdpm.org) The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel – An indicator for the future of EU External Action

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a review mechanism settled for and by African countries. 34 countries on 54 voluntarily joined the APRM. Its aim is to assess state practice of governance in four areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socioeconomic development. It allows for a self-assessment, an external assessment and a peer review, and so creates two-folded dialog opportunity: between state and its civil society and between states themselves.

The French Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) faces a tricky political and budgetary situation, between an increasingly competitive international business environment, a European Defence project in the doldrums, and the persistence of significant pressures on the State’s finances. This note provides a snapshot of the situation. It analyzes the trajectory of the French BITD since the end of the Cold War and then focuses on its current fragilities. It also proposes avenues for reflection about the future trajectory of this BITD, taking into account the possible impacts on the French and European military-industrial landscape.

Coordination, Coherence, Effectiveness, Sustainability are challenges that Brussels and Delegations face to give life to the constantly evolving European concept of comprehensive approach. The European Strategy for development and security in the Sahel is the first European External Action Service strategy of comprehensive approach for a region. The EU has a wide range of policies, tools and instruments to simultaneously address the issues of security and development at the regional level.

Matters relating to the proliferation of dual use goods in favor of Iran regularly make the headlines. Suan Zhang, Parviz Khaki, Nicholas Kaïga ... If unfamiliar these names played at one time or another, a crucial role in the pursuit of Iran's nuclear program. The latter, and its possible military dimension, have been at the heart of intense negotiations between Tehran and the international community for nearly a decade. The suspicions of international negotiators are regularly renewed by the discovery of proliferation networks supplying the Iranian program in dual use goods, prohibited for export to Iran. This note aims to present the main existing means of struggle against the proliferation and the methods used by networks to circumvent international sanctions.

Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, South Libya has become the meeting point of numerous armed groups under a background of global breakdown of the State and community and region fragmentation. Involved in a struggle for gaining the control over resources and power monopoly, active militias and brigades have gradually meddled with transborder trafficking, and disturb frontier countries, which fear a spread of conflict and tension to the sub-region as a whole.

West African waters, rich in fishery resources, are currently the target of organized ocean floor pillaging, an activity which endangers the nutritional security of populations in the sub-region for whom nutritional balance greatly depends on the products of fishing. Many foreign ships, generally European or Asian, fish in West African Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) without authorization and without any consideration for the marine flora and fauna, thereby adding to the already serious overexploitation of the marine zone. Illegal fishing is more prevalent in West African waters than anywhere else in the world, representing an annual economic loss for the sub-region estimated between 828 million and 1,6 billion US dollars. In order to confront this issue, governments and organizations both local and international are working to improve national legislation and surveillance systems while reinforcing regional cooperation.

The European Union (EU) has a valuable tool for conflict prevention and resolution, which is neither its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), still at an embryonic stage after more than fifteen years, nor the painful crisis management missions its deploys in this framework. The EU has another asset, this time more discreet: the Electoral Observation Missions (EOMs), partly sent in post-conflict situation or in unstable countries (mainly in Africa). As a post-national actor, the Union disposes here of a real lever in the field of foreign policy, one which traditional European diplomacies cannot even aspire to. An evident value-added for the EU… which is also troubling for its member States, still so jealous about their national sovereignty.

Since December 2013, Abe Government has revised Japan’s defense policy, with the creation of a National Council Security (NSC), the adoption of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that results from the NSS. Moreover, in April 2014, Abe Government also revised the principles ruling arms exports. Abe Government affirms it wants to strictly respect the constitutional pacifism as defined in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and to give Japan the appropriate means to be a “proactive contributor to peace”. Nevertheless, on 1st July 2014, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet recognized the right to collective self-defense as constitutional.