Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, where this provision, like the ADEA, makes it unlawful for employer to take adverse employment action against an employee “because”
of certain criteria, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 106 FEP Cases 833 (2009)
held that discrimination “because of” age under ADEA requires proof of “but for” causation, and there is no meaningful textual difference between Title VII provision and ADEA.

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, even though retaliation is defined by statute as “unlawful employment practice,” and motivating-factor provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), applies to unlawful employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, where this indicates Congress's intent to confine that provision's coverage to only those types of employment practices, and text of it says nothing about retaliation claims.

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, where in 1991 Congress inserted motivating-factor provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as subsection within § 2000e-2, which contains Title VII's ban on status-based discrimination and says nothing about retaliation, title of section of 1991 Act that created provision also indicates that Congress determined to address only claims of status-based discrimination, and overseas provision of 1991 Act that contains express reference to all unlawful employment actions reinforces conclusion that Congress deliberately omitted retaliation claims from §2000e-2(m).

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, even though Supreme Court decisions have generally treated bans on status-based discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation, where those cases do not support rule that every reference to race, color, creed, sex, or nationality in antidiscrimination statute is to be treated as synonym for “retaliation,” motivating-factor provision is not itself substantive bar on discrimination, and fundamental difference in statutory structure between Title VII and other discrimination statutes renders those decisions inapposite.

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, where this is proper interpretation of provision given that retaliation claims are being made with ever-increasing frequency, nearly doubling in past 15 years, lessening of causation standard could contribute to filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employers, agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment, and this would be inconsistent with structure and operation of Title VII.

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), requires proof of but-for causation, and does not permit retaliation claims to be proven under lesser motivating-factor standard, despite contention that EEOC's longstanding views to the contrary published in manual are entitled to deference, where explanations in manual lack persuasive force that is necessary precondition to deference, manual fails to address interplay among various statutory provisions, and manual's argument in support of motivating-factor standard is circular.

Syllabus

Petitioner, a university medical center (University) that is part of the
University of Texas system, specializes in medical education. It has an
affiliation agreement with Parkland Memorial Hospital (Hospital), which
requires the Hospital to offer [*2520] vacant staff physician posts to University
faculty members. Respondent, a physician of Middle Eastern descent who was
both a University faculty member and a Hospital staff physician, claimed
that Dr. Levine, one of his supervisors at the University, was biased
against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage. He complained to
Dr. Fitz, Levine's supervisor. But after he arranged to continue working at
the Hospital without also being on the University's faculty, he resigned his
teaching post and sent a letter to Fitz and others, stating that he was
leaving because of Levine's harassment. Fitz, upset at Levine's public
humiliation and wanting public exoneration for her, objected to the
Hospital's job offer, which was then withdrawn. Respondent filed suit,
alleging two discrete Title VII violations. First, he alleged that Levine's
racially and religiously motivated harassment had resulted in his
constructive discharge from the University, in violation of
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee "because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin" (referred to here as status-based discrimination).
Second, he claimed that Fitz's efforts to prevent the Hospital from hiring
him were in retaliation for complaining about Levine's harassment, in
violation of § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits employer retaliation "because [an
employee] has opposed . . . an unlawful employment practice . . . or . . .
made a [Title VII] charge." The jury found for respondent on both claims.
The Fifth Circuit vacated
as to the constructive-discharge claim, but affirmed as to the retaliation
finding on the theory that retaliation claims brought under § 2000e-3(a) —
like § 2000e-2(a) status-based claims — require only a showing that
retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse [**510] employment action, not
its but-for cause, see § 2000e-2(m). And it found that the evidence
supported a finding that Fitz was motivated, at least in part, to retaliate
against respondent for his complaints about Levine.

Held: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional
principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in §
2000e-2(m). Pp. 5-23.

(a) In defining the proper causation standard for Title VII retaliation
claims, it is presumed that Congress incorporated tort law's causation in
fact standard — i.e., proof that the defendant's conduct did in fact cause
the plaintiff's injury — absent an indication to the contrary in the statute
itself. See [***2]Meyer v. Holley, 537 U. S. 280, 285. An employee alleging
status-based discrimination under § 2000e-2 need not show "but-for"
causation. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was
one of the employer's motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful
motives for the decision. This principle is the result of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, and the ensuing Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991
Act), which substituted a new burden-shifting framework for the one endorsed
by Price Waterhouse. As relevant here, that Act added a new subsection to §
2000e-2, providing that "an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice," § 2000e-2(m).

Also relevant here is this Court's decision in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176, which interprets the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) phrase "because of . . . age,"
29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). Gross holds two insights that inform the analysis
of this case. [*2521] The first is textual and concerns the proper interpretation of
the term "because" as it relates to the principles of causation underlying
both § 623(a) and § 2000e-3(a). The second is the significance of Congress'
structural choices in both Title VII itself and the 1991 Act. Pp. 5-11.

(b) Title VII's antiretaliation provision appears in a different section
from its status-based discrimination ban. And, like § 623(a)(1), the ADEA
provision in Gross, § 2000e-3(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to take
adverse employment action against an employee "because" of certain criteria.
Given the lack of any meaningful textual difference between § 2000e-3(a) and
§ 623(a)(1), the proper conclusion is that Title VII retaliation claims
require proof that the desire
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.
Respondent and the United States maintain that § 2000e-2(m)'s
motivating-factor test applies, but that reading is flawed. First, it is
inconsistent with the provision's plain language, which addresses only race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination and says nothing
about retaliation. Second, their reading is inconsistent with the statute's
design and structure. Congress inserted the motivating-factor provision as a
subsection within § 2000e-2, which deals only with status-based
discrimination. The conclusion that [**511] Congress acted deliberately in omitting
retaliation claims from § 2000-2(m) is reinforced by the fact that another
part of the 1991 Act, § 109, expressly refers to all unlawful employment
actions. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256. Third,
the cases they rely on, which state the general proposition that Congress'
enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination statute may signal a
concomitant intent to ban retaliation against individuals who oppose that
discrimination, see, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442,
452-453; Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U. S. 474, do not support the quite
different rule that every reference to race, color, creed, sex, or
nationality in an antidiscrimination [***3] statute is to be treated as a synonym
for "retaliation," especially in a precise, complex, and exhaustive statute
like Title VII. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which contains
seven paragraphs of detailed description of the practices constituting
prohibited discrimination, as well as an express antiretaliation provision,
and which was passed only a year before § 2000e-2(m)'s enactment, shows that
when Congress elected to address retaliation as part of a detailed statutory
scheme, it did so clearly. Pp. 11-17.

(c) The proper interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its
causation standard are of central importance to the fair and responsible
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems, particularly
since retaliation claims are being made with ever-increasing frequency.
Lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of
frivolous claims, siphoning resources from efforts by employers, agencies,
and courts to combat workplace harassment. Pp. 18-20.

(d) Respondent and the Government argue that their view would be consistent
with longstanding agency views contained in an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidance manual, but the manual's explanations for its views lack
the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition to deference under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Respondent's final argument —
that if § 2000e-2(m) does not [*2522] control, then the Price Waterhouse standard
should — is foreclosed by the 1991 Act's amendments to Title VII, which
displaced
the Price Waterhouse framework. Pp. 20-23. 674 F. 3d 448, vacated and
remanded.

KENNEDY, J, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

When the law grants persons the right to compensation for injury from
wrongful conduct, there must be some demonstrated connection, some link,
between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation
[**512] between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the
principles of causation, a subject most often arising in elaborating the law
of torts. This case requires the Court to define those rules in the context
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.,
which provides remedies to employees for injuries related to discriminatory
conduct and associated wrongs by employers.

Title VII is central to the federal policy of prohibiting wrongful
discrimination in the Nation's workplaces and in all sectors of economic
endeavor. This opinion discusses the causation rules for two categories of
wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title VII. The first type is called,
for purposes of this opinion, status-based discrimination. The term is used
here to refer to basic workplace protection such as prohibitions against
employer discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring,
firing, salary structure, promotion and the like. See [***4]§ 2000e-2(a). The
second type of conduct is employer retaliation on account of an employee's
having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace
discrimination. See § 2000e-3(a).

An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need
not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the
injury [*2523] would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation
is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate
was one of the employer's motives, even if the employer also had other,
lawful motives that were causative in the employer's decision. This
principle is the result of an earlier case from this Court, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), and an ensuing statutory amendment
by Congress that codified in part and abrogated in part the holding in PriceWaterhouse, see §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The question the Court must
answer here is whether that lessened causation standard is applicable to
claims of unlawful employer retaliation under § 2000e-3(a).

Although the Court has not addressed the question of the causation showing
required to establish liability for a Title VII retaliation claim, it has
addressed the issue of causation in general in a case involving employer
discrimination under a separate but related statute, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 623. See Gross v. FBLFinancial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167 (2009). In Gross, the Court
concluded that the ADEA requires proof that the prohibited criterion was the
but-for cause of the prohibited conduct. The holding and analysis of that
decision are instructive here.

I

Petitioner, the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center (University), is an academic institution within the University of
Texas system. The University specializes in medical education for aspiring
physicians, health professionals, and scientists. Over the years, the
University has affiliated itself with a number of healthcare facilities
including, as relevant in this case, Parkland Memorial Hospital (Hospital).
As provided in its affiliation agreement with the University, the Hospital
permits the University's students to gain clinical experience working in its
facilities. The agreement also requires the Hospital [**513] to offer empty staff
physician posts to the University's faculty members, see App. 361-362, 366,
and, accordingly, most of the staff physician positions at the Hospital are
filled by those faculty members.

Respondent is a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent who specializes
in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995, he was hired to work
both as a member of the University's faculty and a staff physician at the
Hospital. He left both positions in 1998 for additional medical education
and then returned in 2001 as an assistant professor at the University and,
once again, as a physician at the Hospital.

In 2004, Dr. Beth Levine was hired as the University's Chief of Infectious
Disease Medicine. In that position Levine became respondent's ultimate
(though not direct) superior. Respondent [***5] alleged that Levine was biased
against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage, a bias
manifested by undeserved scrutiny of his billing practices and productivity,
as well as comments that "`Middle Easterners are lazy.'" 674 F. 3d 448, 450
(CA5 2012). On different occasions during his employment, respondent met
with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University's Chair of Internal Medicine and
Levine's supervisor, to complain about Levine's alleged harassment. Despite
obtaining a promotion with Levine's assistance in 2006, respondent continued
to believe that she was biased
against him. So he tried to arrange to continue working at the Hospital
without also being on the University's faculty. After preliminary
negotiations with the Hospital [*2524] suggested this might be possible, respondent
resigned his teaching post in July 2006 and sent a letter to Dr. Fitz (among
others), in which he stated that the reason for his departure was harassment
by Levine. That harassment, he asserted, "`stems from . . . religious,
racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.'" Id., at 451. After
reading that letter, Dr. Fitz expressed consternation at respondent's
accusations, saying that Levine had been "publicly humiliated by th[e]
letter" and that it was "very important that she be publicly exonerated."
App. 41.

Meanwhile, the Hospital had offered respondent a job as a staff physician,
as it had indicated it would. On learning of that offer, Dr. Fitz protested
to the Hospital, asserting that the offer was inconsistent with the
affiliation agreement's requirement that all staff physicians also be
members of the University faculty. The Hospital then withdrew its offer.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed this Title
VII suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. He alleged two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a
status-based discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a). Respondent alleged
that Dr. Levine's racially and religiously motivated harassment had resulted
in his constructive discharge from the University. Respondent's second claim
was that Dr. Fitz's efforts to prevent the Hospital from hiring him were in
retaliation for complaining about Dr. Levine's harassment, in violation of §
2000e-3(a). 674 F. 3d, at 452. The jury found for respondent on both claims.
It awarded him over $400,000 in backpay and more than $3 million in
compensatory damages. The District Court later reduced the compensatory
damages award to $300,000.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and
[**514] vacated in part. The court first concluded that respondent had submitted
insufficient evidence in support of his constructive-discharge claim, so it
vacated that portion of the jury's verdict. The court affirmed as to the
retaliation finding, however, on the theory that retaliation claims brought
under § 2000e-3(a) — like claims of status-based discrimination under §
2000e-2(a) — require only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor
for the adverse employment action, rather than its but-for cause. See id.,
at 454, n. 16 (citing [***6]Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F. 3d 320, 330 (CA5 2010)).
It further held that the evidence supported a finding that Dr. Fitz was
motivated, at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his
complaints against Levine. The Court of Appeals then remanded for a
redetermination of damages in light of its decision to vacate the
constructive-discharge verdict.

Four judges dissented from the court's decision not to rehear the case en
banc, arguing that the Circuit's application of the motivating-factor
standard to retaliation cases was "an erroneous interpretation of [Title
VII] and controlling caselaw" and should be overruled en banc.
688 F. 3d 211, 213-214 (CA5 2012) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).

This case requires the Court to define the proper standard of causation
for Title VII retaliation claims. Causation in fact — i.e., proof that the
defendant's conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff `s injury-is a standard
requirement of any tort claim, see Restatement of Torts § 9 (1934)
(definition of "legal cause"); § 431, Comment [*2525]a (same); § 279, and Comment c
(intentional infliction of physical harm); § 280 (other intentional torts);
§ 281(c) (negligence). This includes
federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination. Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993) (In intentional-discrimination cases,
"liability depends on whether the protected trait" "actually motivated the
employer s decision" and "had a determinative influence on the outcome");
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 711 (1978)
(explaining that the "simple test" for determining a discriminatory
employment practice is "whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in
a manner which but for that person's sex would be different" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

In the usual course, this standard requires the plaintiff to show "that
the harm would not have occurred" in the absence of — that is, but for — the
defendant's conduct. Restatement of Torts § 431, Comment a (negligence); §
432(1), and Comment a (same); see § 279, and Comment c (intentional
infliction of bodily harm); § 280 (other intentional torts); Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 27, and
Comment b (2010) (noting the existence of an exception for cases where an
injured party can prove the existence of multiple, independently sufficient
factual causes, but observing that "cases invoking the concept are rare").
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1) (1963 and 1964) (negligence
claims); § 870, Comment [**515]l (intentional injury to another); cf. § 435a, and
Comment a (legal cause for intentional harm). It is thus textbook tort law
that an action "is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular
event would have occurred without it." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984). This, then, is
the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and
these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an
indication to the contrary in the statute itself. See Meyer v. Holley,
537 U. S. 280, 285 (2003); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257-258 (1978).

B

Since the statute's passage in 1964, it has prohibited employers [***7] from
discriminating against their employees on any of seven specified criteria.
Five of them — race, color, religion, sex, and national origin — are
personal characteristics and are set forth in § 2000e-2. (As noted at the
outset, discrimination based on these five characteristics is called
status-based discrimination in this opinion.) And then there is a point of
great import for this case: The two remaining categories of wrongful
employer conduct — the employee's opposition to employment discrimination,
and the employee's submission of or support for a complaint that alleges
employment discrimination — are not wrongs based on personal traits but
rather types of protected employee conduct. These latter two categories are
covered by a separate, subsequent section of Title VII, § 2000e-3(a).

Under the status-based discrimination provision, it is an "unlawful
employment practice" for an employer "to discriminate against any individual
. . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." § 2000e-2(a). In its 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse, the Court
sought to explain the causation standard imposed by this language. It
addressed in particular what it means for an action to [*2526] be taken "because of"
an individual's race, religion, or nationality. Although no opinion in that
case commanded a majority, six Justices did agree that a plaintiff could
prevail on a claim of status-based discrimination if he or she could show
that one of the prohibited traits was a "motivating" or "substantial" factor
in the employer's decision. 490 U. S., at 258 (plurality opinion); id., at
259 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 276 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment). If the plaintiff made that showing, the burden of
persuasion would shift
to the employer, which could escape liability if it could prove that it
would have taken the same employment action in the absence of all
discriminatory animus. Id., at 258 (plurality opinion); id., at 259-260
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 276-277 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). In other
words, the employer had to show that a discriminatory motive was not the
but-for cause of the adverse employment action.

Two years later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act),
105 Stat. 1071. This statute (which had many other provisions) codified the
burden-shifting and lessened-causation framework of Price Waterhouse in part
but also rejected [**516] it to a substantial degree. The legislation first added a
new subsection to the end of § 2000e-2, i.e., Title VII's principal ban on
status-based discrimination. See § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075. The new
provision, § 2000e-2(m), states:

"[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice."

This, of course, is a lessened causation standard.

The 1991 Act also abrogated a portion of Price Water houses framework by
removing the employer's ability to defeat liability once a plaintiff proved
the existence of an impermissible motivating factor. See Gross,
557 U. S., at 178, n. 5. In its place, [***8] Congress enacted § 2000e-5(g)(2),
which provides:

"(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under
section 2000e-2(m) of this title and [the employer] demonstrates
that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court —

"(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment. . . ."

So, in short, the 1991 Act substituted a new burden-shifting framework for
the one endorsed by Price Water-house. Under that new regime, a plaintiff
could obtain declaratory relief, attorney's fees and costs, and some forms
of injunctive relief based solely on proof that race, color, religion, sex,
or nationality was a motivating factor in the employment action; but the
employer's proof that it would still have taken the same employment action
would save it from monetary damages and a reinstatement order. See Gross,
557 U. S., at 178, n. 5; see also id., at 175, n. 2, 177, n. 3.

After Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act, considerable time elapsed before
the Court returned again to the meaning of "because" and the problem of
causation. This time it arose in the context of a different, yet similar
statute, the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. § 623(a). See Gross, supra. [*2527] Much like the
Title VII statute in Price Waterhouse, the relevant portion of the ADEA
provided that "`[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.'"
557 U. S., at 176 (quoting § 623(a)(1); emphasis and ellipsis in original).

Concentrating first and foremost on the meaning of the phrase "`because of
. . . age,'" the Court in Gross explained that the ordinary meaning of
"`because of'" is "`by reason of'" or "`on account of.'" Id., at 176 (citing
1 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966); 1 Oxford English
Dictionary 746 (1933); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
132 (1966); emphasis in
original). Thus, the "requirement that an employer took adverse action
`[**517] because of age [meant] that age was the reason' that the employer decided
to act," or, in other words, that "age was the `but-for' cause of the
employer's adverse decision." 557 U. S., at 176. See also Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63-64, and n. 14 (2007) (noting that "because
of" means "based on" and that "`based on' indicates a but-for causal
relationship"); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation,
503 U. S. 258, 265-266 (1992) (equating "by reason of" with "`but for'
cause").

In the course of approving this construction, Gross declined to adopt the
interpretation endorsed by the plurality and concurring opinions in PriceWaterhouse. Noting that "the ADEA must be `read . . . the way Congress wrote
it,'" 557 U. S., at 179 (quoting Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,
554 U. S. 84, 102 (2008)), the Court concluded that "the textual differences
between Title VII and the ADEA" "prevent[ed] us from applying PriceWaterhouse . . . to federal age discrimination claims," 557 U. S., at 175,
n. 2. In particular, the Court stressed the congressional choice not to add
a provision [***9] like § 2000e-2(m) to the ADEA despite making numerous other
changes to the latter statute in the 1991 Act. Id., at 174-175 (citing EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256 (1991)); 557 U. S., at 177,
n. 3 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247, 270 (2009)).

Finally, the Court in Gross held that it would not be proper to read PriceWaterhouse as announcing a rule that applied to both statutes, despite their
similar wording and near-contemporaneous enactment. 557 U. S., at 178, n. 5.
This different reading was necessary, the Court concluded, because Congress'
1991 amendments to Title VII, including its "careful tailoring of the
`motivating factor' claim" and the substitution of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) for
Price Water house's full affirmative defense, indicated that the
motivating-factor
standard was not an organic part of Title VII and thus could not be read
into the ADEA. See 557 U. S., at 178, n. 5.

In Gross, the Court was careful to restrict its analysis to the statute
before it and withhold judgment on the proper resolution of a case, such as
this, which arose under Title VII rather than the ADEA. But the particular
confines of Gross do not deprive it of all persuasive force. Indeed, that
opinion holds two insights for the present case. The first is textual and
concerns the proper interpretation of the term "[*2528] because" as it relates to
the principles of causation underlying both § 623(a) and § 2000e-3(a). The
second is the significance of Congress' structural choices in both Title VII
itself and the law's 1991 amendments. These principles do not decide the
present case but do inform its analysis, for the issues possess significant
parallels.

III

A

As noted, Title VII's antiretaliation provision, which is set forth in §
2000e-3(a), appears in a different [**518] section from Title VII's ban on
status-based discrimination. The antiretaliation provision states, in
relevant part:

"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter."

[1] This enactment, like the statute at issue in Gross, makes it unlawful for
an employer to take adverse employment action against an employee "because"
of certain criteria. Cf. 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). Given the lack of any
meaningful textual difference between the text in this
statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclusion here, as in Gross, is
that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate
was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. See Gross, supra,
at 176.

The principal counterargument offered by respondent and the United States
relies on their different understanding of the motivating-factor section,
which — on its face-applies only to status discrimination, discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. In substance,
they contend that: (1) retaliation is defined by the statute to be an
unlawful employment practice; (2) § 2000e-2(m) allows unlawful employment
practices to be proved [***10] based on a showing that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for — and not necessarily the
but-for factor in — the challenged employment action; and (3) the Court has,
as a matter of course, held that "retaliation for complaining about race
discrimination is `discrimination based on race.'" Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 14; see id., at 11-14; Brief for Respondent 16-19.

[2] There are three main flaws in this reading of § 2000e-2(m). The first is
that it is inconsistent with the provisions plain language. It must be
acknowledged that because Title VII defines "unlawful employment practice"
to include retaliation, the question presented by this case would be
different if § 2000e-2(m) extended its coverage to all unlawful employment
practices. As actually written, however, the text of the motivating-factor
provision, while it begins by referring to "unlawful employment practices,"
then proceeds to address only five of the seven prohibited discriminatory
actions — actions based on the employee's status, i.e., race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. This indicates Congress' intent to
confine that provision's coverage to only those types of employment
practices. The text of § 2000e-2(m) says nothing about retaliation claims.
Given this clear language, it would be improper to conclude that what
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope. Gardner
v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 93 (1829) ("What the legislative intention was, can
be derived only from the words they have used; and we cannot speculate
beyond the [*2529] reasonable import of these words"); see Sebelius v. Cloer,
569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 8).

[3] The second problem with this reading is its inconsistency with the design
and structure of the statute as a [**519] whole. See Gross, 557 U. S., at 175, n. 2,
178, n. 5. Just as Congress' choice of words is presumed to be deliberate,
so too are its structural choices. See id., at 177, n. 3. When Congress
wrote the motivating-factor provision in 1991, it chose to insert it as a
subsection within § 2000e-2, which contains Title VII's ban on status-based
discrimination, §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d), (l), and says nothing about
retaliation. See 1991 Act, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (directing that "§
2000e-2 . . . [be] further amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection . . . (m)"). The title of the section of the 1991 Act that
created § 2000e-2(m) — "Clarifying prohibition against impermissible
consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
employment practices" — also indicates that Congress determined to address
only claims of status-based discrimination, not retaliation. See § 107(a),
id., at 1075.

What is more, a different portion of the 1991 Act contains an express
reference to all unlawful employment actions, thereby reinforcing the
conclusion that Congress acted deliberately when it omitted retaliation
claims from § 2000e-2(m). See Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S., at 256
(congressional amendment of ADEA on a similar subject coupled with
congressional failure to amend Title VII weighs against conclusion that the
ADEA's standard applies to Title VII); see also Gross, supra, at 177, n. 3.
The relevant portion of the 1991 Act, [***11]§ 109(b), allowed
certain overseas operations by U. S. employers to engage in "any practice
prohibited by section 703 or 704," i.e., § 2000e-2 or § 2000e-3, "if
compliance with such section would cause such employer . . . to violate the
law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located."
105 Stat. 1077.

If Congress had desired to make the motivating-factor standard applicable
to all Title VII claims, it could have used language similar to that which
it invoked in § 109. See Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 256. Or, it
could have inserted the motivating-factor provision as part of a section
that applies to all such claims, such as § 2000e-5, which establishes the
rules and remedies for all Title VII enforcement actions. See FDA v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 160 (2000). But in writing §
2000e-2(m), Congress did neither of those things, and "[w]e must give effect
to Congress' choice." Gross supra, at 177, n. 3.

[4] The third problem with respondent's and the Government's reading of the
motivating-factor standard is in its submission that this Court's decisions
interpreting federal antidiscrimination law have, as a general matter,
treated bans on status-based discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation.
In support of this proposition, both respondent and the United States rely
upon decisions in which this Court has "read [a] broadly worded civil rights
statute . . . as including an antiretaliation remedy." CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 452-453 (2008). In CBOCS, for example, the Court
held that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 — which declares that all persons "shall have
the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens" — prohibits [**520] not only racial discrimination but also
retaliation against those who oppose it. 553 U. S., at 445. And in
Gómez-Pérez v. Potter[*2530], 553 U. S. 474 (2008), the Court likewise read a bar
on retaliation into the broad wording of the federal-employee provisions
of the ADEA. Id., at 479, 487 ("All personnel actions affecting [federal]
employees . . . who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free
from any discrimination based on age," 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a)); see also
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 173, 179 (2005)
(20 U. S. C. § 1681(a) (Title IX)); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U. S. 229, 235, n. 3, 237 (1969) (42 U. S. C. § 1982).

These decisions are not controlling here. It is true these cases do state
the general proposition that Congress' enactment of a broadly phrased
antidiscrimination statute may signal a concomitant intent to ban
retaliation against individuals who oppose that discrimination, even where
the statute does not refer to retaliation in so many words. What those cases
do not support, however, is the quite different rule that every reference to
race, color, creed, sex, or nationality in an antidiscrimination statute is
to be treated as a synonym for "retaliation." For one thing, § 2000e-2(m) is
not itself a substantive bar on discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that
establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined elsewhere
in Title VII. The cases cited by respondent and the Government do not
address rules of this sort, and those precedents are of limited relevance
here.

The approach respondent and the Government suggest is inappropriate in the
context of a statute as precise, complex, [***12] and exhaustive as Title VII. As
noted, the laws at issue in CBOCS, Jackson, and Gómez-Pérez were broad,
general bars on discrimination. In interpreting them the Court concluded
that by using capacious language Congress expressed the intent to bar
retaliation in addition to status-based discrimination. See Gómez-Pérez,
supra, at 486-488. In other words, when Congress' treatment of the subject
of prohibited discrimination was both broad and brief, its omission of any
specific discussion of retaliation was unremarkable.

If Title VII had likewise been phrased in broad and general terms,
respondent's argument might have more force. But that is not how Title VII
was written, which makes it incorrect to infer that Congress meant anything
other than what the text does say on the subject of retaliation. Unlike
Title IX, § 1981, § 1982, and the federal-sector provisions of the ADEA,
Title VII is a detailed statutory scheme. This statute enumerates specific
unlawful employment practices. See §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d)
(status-based discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and training programs, respectively); § 2000e-2(l)
(status-based discrimination in employment-related testing); § 2000e-3(a)
(retaliation for opposing, or making or supporting a complaint about,
unlawful employment action); § 2000e-3(b) (advertising a preference for
applicants of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
It defines key terms, see § 2000e, and exempts certain types of employers,
see § 2000e-1. And it creates an administrative [**521] agency with both rulemaking
and enforcement authority. See §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-12.

This fundamental difference in statutory structure renders inapposite
decisions which treated retaliation as an implicit corollary of status-based
discrimination. Text may not be divorced from context. In light of Congress'
special care in drawing so precise a statutory scheme, it would be improper
to indulge respondent's suggestion that Congress [*2531] meant to incorporate the
default rules that apply only when Congress writes a broad and
undifferentiated statute. See Gómez-Pérez, supra, at 486-488 (when
construing the broadly worded federal-sector provision of the ADEA, Court
refused to draw inferences from Congress' amendments to the detailed
private-sector provisions); Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S., at 256; cf.
Jackson, supra, at 175 (distinguishing Title IX's "broadly written general
prohibition on discrimination" from Title VII's
"greater detail [with respect to] the conduct that constitutes
discrimination").

Further confirmation of the inapplicability of § 2000e-2(m) to retaliation
claims may be found in Congress' approach to the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327. In the ADA Congress provided not just a
general prohibition on discrimination "because of [an individual's]
disability," but also seven paragraphs of detailed description of the
practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination, see §§
102(a), (b)(1)-(7), id., at 331-332 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 12112). And,
most pertinent for present purposes, it included an express antiretaliation
provision, [***13] see § 503(a), 104 Stat. 370 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 12203).
That law, which Congress passed only a year before enacting § 2000e-2(m) and
which speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of retaliation,
rebuts the claim that Congress must have intended to use the phrase "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" as the textual equivalent of
"retaliation." To the contrary, the ADA shows that when Congress elected to
address retaliation as part of a detailed statutory scheme, it did so in
clear textual terms.

The Court confronted a similar structural dispute in Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U. S. 156 (1981). The question there was whether the federal-employment
provisions of the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. § 633a, provided a jury-trial right for
claims against the Federal Government. Nakshian, 453 U. S., at 157. In
concluding that it did not, the Court noted that the portion of the ADEA
that prohibited age discrimination by private, state, and local employers, §
626, expressly provided for a jury trial, whereas the federal-sector
provisions said nothing about such a right. Id., at 162-163, 168. So, too,
here. Congress has in explicit terms altered the standard of causation for
one class of claims but not another, despite the obvious opportunity to do
so in the 1991 Act.

B

[5] The proper interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its
causation standard have central importance to the fair and responsible
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems. This is of
particular significance because claims of [**522] retaliation are being made with
ever-increasing frequency. The number of these claims filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has nearly doubled in the past 15
years — from just over 16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012. EEOC, Charge
Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (as visited June
20, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Indeed, the number
of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped those for
every type of status-based discrimination except race. See ibid.

In addition lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the
filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by
employer, administrative agencies, and courts to combat [*2532] workplace
harassment. Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that
he or she is about to be fired for poor performance, given a lower pay
grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or location. To
forestall that lawful action, he or she might be tempted to make an
unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when
the unrelated employment action comes, the employee could allege that it is
retaliation. If respondent were to prevail in his argument here, that claim
could be established by a lessened causation standard, all in order to
prevent the undesired change in employment circumstances. Even if the
employer could escape judgment after trial, the lessened causation standard
would make it far more difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary
judgment stage. Cf. Vance v. Ball State [***14] Univ., post, at 9-11.
It would be inconsistent with the structure and operation of Title VII to so
raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on an employer whose
actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or retaliatory
intent. See Brief for National School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae
11-22. Yet there would be a significant risk of that consequence if
respondent's position were adopted here.

The facts of this case also demonstrate the legal and factual distinctions
between status-based and retaliation claims, as well as the importance of
the correct standard of proof. Respondent raised both claims in the District
Court. The alleged wrongdoer differed in each: In respondent's status-based
discrimination claim, it was his indirect supervisor, Dr. Levine. In his
retaliation claim, it was the Chair of Internal Medicine, Dr. Fitz. The
proof required for each claim differed, too. For the status-based claim,
respondent was required to show instances of racial slurs, disparate
treatment, and other indications of nationality-driven animus by Dr. Levine.
Respondent's retaliation claim, by contrast, relied on the theory that Dr.
Fitz was committed to exonerating Dr. Levine and wished to punish respondent
for besmirching her reputation. Separately instructed on each type of claim,
the jury returned a separate verdict for each, albeit with a single damages
award. And the Court of Appeals treated each claim separately, too, finding
insufficient evidence on the claim of status-based discrimination.

If it were proper to apply the motivating-factor standard to respondent's
retaliation claim, the University might well be subject to liability on
account of Dr. Fitz's alleged desire to exonerate Dr. Levine, even if it
[**523] could also be shown that the terms of the affiliation agreement precluded
the Hospital's hiring of respondent and that the University would have
sought to prevent respondent's hiring in order to honor that agreement in
any event. That
result would be inconsistent with the both the text and purpose of Title
VII.

In sum, Title VII defines the term "unlawful employment practice" as
discrimination on the basis of any of seven prohibited criteria: race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, opposition to employment
discrimination, and submitting or supporting a complaint about employment
discrimination. The text of § 2000e-2(m) mentions just the first five of
these factors, the status-based ones; and it omits the final two, which deal
with retaliation. When it added § 2000e-2(m) to Title VII in 1991, Congress
inserted it within the section of the statute that deals only with those
same five criteria, not the section that deals with retaliation claims or
one of the sections that apply to all claims of unlawful employment
practices. And while the Court has inferred a congressional intent to
prohibit retaliation when confronted with broadly worded antidiscrimination
[*2533] statutes, Title VII's detailed structure makes that inference inappropriate
here. Based on these textual and structural indications, [***15] the Court now
concludes as follows: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according
to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation
test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
action or actions of the employer.

IV

[6] Respondent and the Government also argue that applying the
motivating-factor provision's lessened causation standard to retaliation
claims would be consistent with longstanding agency views, contained in a
guidance manual published by the EEOC. It urges that those views are
entitled to deference under this Court's decision in Skid more v. Swift &Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944). See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v.
Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 110, n. 6 (2002).
The weight of deference afforded to agency interpretations under Skidmore
depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade." 323 U. S., at 140; see
Vance, post, at 9, n. 4.

According to the manual in question, the causation element of a
retaliation claim is satisfied if "there is credible direct evidence that
retaliation was a motive for the challenged action," regardless of whether
there is also "[e]vidence as to [a] legitimate motive." 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual § 8-II(E)(1), pp. 614:0007-614:0008 (Mar. 2003). After noting a
division of authority as to whether motivating-factor or but-for causation
should apply to retaliation claims, the manual offers two rationales in
support of adopting the former standard. The first is that "[c]ourts have
long held that the evidentiary framework for proving [status-based]
discrimination . . . also applies to claims of discrimination based on
retaliation." Id., at 614:0008, n. 45. Second, the manual states that "an
interpretation . . . that permits proven retaliation to go unpunished
[**524] undermines the purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions of maintaining
unfettered access to the statutory remedial mechanism." Ibid.

These explanations lack the persuasive force that is a necessary
precondition to deference under Skidmore. See 323 U. S., at 140; Vance,
post, at 9, n. 4. As to the first rationale, while the settled judicial
construction of a particular statute is of course relevant in ascertaining
statutory meaning, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978), the
manual's discussion fails to address the particular interplay among the
status-based discrimination provision (§ 2000e-2(a)), the antiretaliation
provision (§ 2000e-3(a)), and the motivating-factor provision (§
2000e-2(m)). Other federal antidiscrimination statutes do not have the
structure of statutory subsections that
control the outcome at issue here. The manual's failure to address the
specific provisions of this statutory scheme, coupled with the generic
nature of its discussion of the causation standards for status-based
discrimination and retaliation claims, call the manual's conclusions into
serious question. See Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U. S. 135,
149-150 (2008).

The manual's second argument is [***16] unpersuasive, too; for its reasoning is
circular. It asserts the lessened causation standard is necessary in order
to prevent "proven [*2534] retaliation" from "go[ing] unpunished." 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual § 8-II(E)(1), at 614:0008, n. 45. Yet this assumes the answer to the
central question at issue here, which is what causal relationship must be
shown in order to prove retaliation.

Respondent's final argument, in which he is not joined by the United
States, is that even if § 2000e-2(m) does not control the outcome in this
case, the standard applied by Price Waterhouse should control instead. That
assertion is incorrect. First, this position is foreclosed by the 1991 Act's
amendments to Title VII. As noted above, Price Waterhouse adopted a complex
burden-shifting framework. Congress displaced this framework by enacting §
2000e-2(m) (which adopts the motivating-factor standard for status-based
discrimination claims) and § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (which replaces employers'
total defense with a remedial limitation). See Gross, 557 U. S., at 175, n.
2, 177, n. 3, 178, n. 5. Given the careful balance of lessened causation and
reduced remedies Congress struck in the 1991 Act, there is no reason to
think that the different balance articulated by Price Waterhouse somehow
survived that legislation's passage. Second, even if this argument were
still available, it would be inconsistent with the Gross Court's reading
(and the plain textual meaning) of the word "because" as it appears in both
§ 623(a) and § 2000e-3(a). See Gross, supra, at 176-177. For these
reasons, the rule of Price Waterhouse is not controlling here.

V

The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff
making a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by [**525] the
employer. The University claims that a fair application of this standard,
which is more demanding than the motivating-factor standard adopted by the
Court of Appeals, entitles it to judgment as a matter of law. It asks the
Court to so hold. That question, however, is better suited to resolution by
courts closer to the facts of this case. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.,
makes it an "unlawful employment practice" to "discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). Backing up that core
provision, Title VII also makes it an "unlawful employment practice" to
discriminate against any individual "because" the individual has complained
of, opposed, or participated in a proceeding about, prohibited
discrimination. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). This form of discrimination
is commonly called "retaliation," although Title VII itself does not use
that term. The Court has recognized that effective protection against
retaliation, [***17] the office of § 2000e-3(a), is essential to securing "a
workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status." Burlington N. & S. F. R.Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 63 (2006) (Burlington Northern). That is so
because "fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent"
about the discrimination they have encountered [*2535] or observed. Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 U. S. 271, 279
(2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Similarly worded, the ban on discrimination and the ban on retaliation
against a discrimination complainant have traveled together: Title VII
plaintiff's often raise the two pro visions in tandem. Today's decision,
however, drives a wedge between the twin safeguards in so-called
"mixed-motive" cases. To establish discrimination, all agree, the
complaining party need show only that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was "a motivating factor" in an employer's adverse action;
an employer's proof that "other factors also motivated the [action]" will
not defeat the discrimination claim. § 2000e-2(m). But a retaliation claim,
the Court insists, must meet a stricter standard: The claim will fail unless
the complainant shows "but-for" causation, i.e., that the employer would not
have taken the adverse employment action but for a design to retaliate.

In so reining in retaliation claims, the Court misapprehends what our
decisions teach: Retaliation for complain ing about discrimination is
tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from it.
Indeed, this Court has explained again and again that "retaliation in
response to a complaint about [proscribed] discrimination is discrimination"
on the basis of the characteristic [**526] Congress sought to immunize against
adverse employment action. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167,
179, n. 3 (2005) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court shows little regard for the trial judges who will be obliged to
charge discrete causation standards when a claim of discrimination "because
of," e.g., race is coupled with a claim of discrimination "because" the
individual has complained of race discrimination. And jurors will puzzle
over the rhyme or reason for the dual standards. Of graver concern, the
Court has seized on a provision, § 2000e-2(m), adopted by Congress as part
of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turned it into a measure
reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.

I

Dr. Naiel Nassar is of Middle Eastern descent. A specialist in the
treatment of HIV/AIDS, Nassar was a faculty member of the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) from 1995 until 2006, save for a
period during which he left his employment to continue his education. UTSW
is affiliated with Parkland Hospital and, like other faculty members at the
University, Nassar also worked as a physician at the Hospital. Beginning in
2001, Nassar served as Associate Medical Director of the Hospital's Amelia
Court Clinic.

Until 2004, Dr. Phillip Keiser, Medical Director of the Clinic, was
Nassar's principal [***18] supervisor. In that year, UTSW hired Dr. Beth Levine to
oversee the Clinic and to supervise Keiser. Before Levine commenced her
employment at UTSW, she interviewed her potential subordinates. Meeting with
other Clinic doctors for only 15 to 20 minutes, Levine spent an hour and a
half with Nassar, engaging in a detailed review of his resume and reading
from a list of prepared questions. Record 2926-2928.

Once Levine came on board, she expressed concern to Keiser about Nassar's
productivity and questioned his work ethic. Id., at 2361-2362. According to
Keiser, Le-vine "never seemed to [be] satisf[ied]" with his assurances that
Nassar was in fact working harder than other physicians. Id., at 2362.
Disconcerted by Levine's [*2536] scrutiny, Nassar several times complained about it
to Levine's supervisor, Dr. Gregory Fitz, Chair of Internal Medicine. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 4.

In 2005, Levine opposed hiring another physician who, like Nassar, was of
Middle Eastern descent. In Keiser's presence, Levine remarked that "Middle
Easterners are lazy." Id., at 3. When that physician was hired by Parkland,
Levine said, again in Keiser's presence, that the Hospital had "hired
another one." Ibid. See also Record 2399-2400. Keiser presented to Levine
objective data
demonstrating Nassar's high productivity. Levine then began criticizing
Nassar's billing practices. Her criticism did not take into account that
Nassar's salary was funded by a federal grant that precluded billing for
most of his services. App to Pet. for Cert. 3.

Because of Levine's hostility, Nassar sought a way to continue working at
the Clinic without falling under her supervision. To that end, Nassar
engaged in discussions with the Hospital about dropping his affiliation with
UTSW and retaining his post at Parkland. Although he was initially told [**527] that
an affiliation agreement between UTSW and Parkland obliged Parkland to fill
its staff physician posts with UTSW faculty, talks with the Hospital
continued. Eventually, Parkland verbally offered Nassar a position as a
staff physician. See App. 67-71, 214-216, 326-330.

In July 2006, Nassar resigned from his position at UTSW. "The primary
reason [for his] resignation," Nassar wrote in a letter to Fitz, "[was] the
continuing harassment and discrimination . . . by . . . Dr. Beth Levine."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ac cording to
Keiser, Nassar's letter shocked Fitz, who told Keiser that, because Levine
had been "publicly humiliated," she should be "publicly exonerated." App.
41. Fitz's opposition to Parkland's hiring Nassar prompted the Hospital to
withdraw the offer to engage him. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5-6.

After accepting a position at a smaller HIV/AIDS clinic in Fresno,
California, Nassar filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).The agency found "credibl[e] testimonial evidence," that
UTSW had retaliated against Nassar for his allegations of discrimination by
Levine. Brief for Respondent 8 (citing Pl. Trial Exh. 78). Nassar then filed
suit in District Court alleging that UTSW had discriminated against him, in
violation of Title VII, on [***19] the basis of his race, religion, and
national origin, see § 2000e-2(a), and had constructively discharged him.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6; Complaint ¶ 23. He further alleged that UTSW had
retaliated against him for complaining about Levine's behavior. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 6.

On the retaliation claim, the District Court instructed the jury that
Nassar "[did] not have to prove that retaliation was [UTSW's] only motive,
but he [had to] prove that [UTSW] acted at least in part to retaliate." Id.,
at 47. The jury found UTSW liable for both constructive discharge and
retaliation. At the remedial phase, the judge charged the jury not to award
damages for "actions which [UTSW] prove[d] by a preponderance of the
evidence . . . it would have taken even if it had not considered . . .
Nassar's protected activity." Id., at 42-43. Finding that UTSW had not met
its proof burden, the jury awarded Nassar $438,167.66 in backpay and
$3,187,500 in compensatory damages. Id., at 43-44.[*2537][fn1]

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part.[fn2]
Responding to UTSW's argument that the District Court erred in instructing
the jury on a mixed-motive theory of retaliation, the Fifth Circuit held
that the instruction conformed to Circuit precedent. 674 F. 3d 448, 454, n.
16 (2012) (citing Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F. 3d 320, 330 (2010)).[fn3]

II

This Court has long acknowledged [**528] the symbiotic relationship between
proscriptions on discrimination and proscriptions on retaliation.
Antidiscrimination provisions, the Court has reasoned, endeavor to create a
workplace where individuals are not treated differently on account of race,
ethnicity, religion, or sex. See Burlington Northern, 548 U. S., at 63.
Antiretaliation provisions "see[k] to secure that primary objective by
preventing an employer from interfering . . . with an employee's effort to
secure or advance enforcement of [antidiscrimination] guarantees." Ibid. As
the Court has comprehended, "Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the
cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as
witnesses." Id., at 67. "`[E]ffective enforcement,'" therefore, can "`only
be expected if employees . . . [feel] free to approach officials with their
grievances.'" Ibid. (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U. S. 288, 292 (1960)). See also Crawford, 555 U. S., at 279.

Adverting to the close connection between discrimination and retaliation
for complaining about discrimination, this Court has held, in a line of
decisions unbroken until today, that a ban on discrimination encompasses
retaliation. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237
(1969), the Court determined that 42 U. S. C. § 1982, which provides that
"[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property," protected a white man who suffered
retaliation after complaining of discrimination against his black tenant.
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education elaborated on that holding in the
context of sex discrimination. "Retaliation against a per son because [he]
has complained of sex discrimination," the Court found it inescapably
evident, "is another form of intentional sex discrimination."
544 U. S., at 173. As the
Court explained:
[***20]

"Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form
of `discrimination' because the complainant is being subject to
differential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is discrimination `on
the basis of sex' because it is an intentional response to the
nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination." Id.,
at 173-174 (citations omitted).

Jackson interpreted Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,
20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). Noting that the legislation followed three years
after Sullivan, the Court found it "not only appropriate but also realistic
to presume that Congress [*2538] was thoroughly familiar with Sullivan and . . .
expected its enactment of Title IX to be interpreted in conformity with it."
544 U. S., at 176 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U. S. 474 (2008), was similarly reasoned. The
Court there held that the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a), barring
discrimination "based on age," also proscribes retaliation.
553 U. S., at 479-491. "[**529] What Jackson said about the relationship between
Sullivan and the enactment of Title IX," the Court observed, "can be said as
well about the relationship between Sullivan and the enactment of the ADEA's
federal-sector provision." Id., at 485. See also CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 447-457 (2008) (retaliation for race
discrimination constitutes discrimination based on race under
42 U. S. C. § 1981). There is no sound reason in this case to stray from the
decisions in Sullivan, Jackson, Gómez-Pérez, and CBOCS West.

III

A

The Title VII provision key here, § 2000e-2(m), states that "an unlawful
employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice." Section 2000e-2(m) was
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII,
along with other federal antidiscrimination statutes. See 105 Stat. 1071.
The amendments were intended to provide "additional protections against
unlawful discrimination in employment," id., § 2(3), and to "respon[d] to a
number of . . . decisions by [this Court] that sharply cut back on the scope
and effectiveness" of antidiscrimination laws, H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt.
II, pp. 2-4 (1991) (hereinafter House Report Part II) (citing, inter alia,Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U. S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900
(1989)).

Among the decisions found inadequately protective was Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989). A plurality of the Court in that case held
that the words "because of" in § 2000e-2(a) encompass claims challenging an
employment decision attributable to "mixed motives," i.e., one motivated by
both legitimate and illegitimate factors. See id., at 240-242.[fn4] A Title
VII plaintiff, the plurality concluded, need show only that a prohibited
factor contributed to the employment decision — not that it was the but-for
or sole cause. Id., at 240-244. But see id., at 281-282 (KENNEDY, J.,
dissenting). An employer would not be liable, however, if it could show by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action
absent the illegitimate [***21] motive. Id., at 244-245.
[*2539]

Congress endorsed the plurality's conclusion that, to be actionable under
Title VII, discrimination must be a motivating factor in, but need not be
the but-for cause of, an adverse employment action. See House Report Part
II, at 18. Congress disagreed with the Court, however, insofar as [**530] the PriceWaterhouse decision allowed an employer to escape liability by showing that
the same action would have been taken regardless of improper motive. House
Report Part II, at 18. See also H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. I, pp. 45-48
(1991) (hereinafter House Report Part I). "If Title VII's ban on
discrimination in employment is to be meaningful," the House Report
explained, "victims of intentional discrimination must be able to obtain
relief, and perpetrators of discrimination must be held liable for their
actions." House Report Part II, at 18.

Superseding Price Waterhouse in part, Congress sought to "restore" the
rule of decision followed by several Circuits that any discrimination
"actually shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the
subject of liability." House Report Part II, at 18. See also House Report
Part I, at 48. To that end, Congress enacted § 2000e-2(m) and §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The latter provides that an employer's proof that an
adverse employment action would have been taken in any event does not shield
the employer from liability; such proof, however, limits the plaintiff `s
remedies to declaratory or injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs.

Critically, the rule Congress intended to "restore" was not limited to
substantive discrimination. As the House Report explained, "the Committee
endors[ed] . . . the decisional law" in Bibbs v. Block, 778 F. 2d 1318 (CA8
1985) (en banc), which held that a violation of Title VII is established
when the trier of fact determines that "an unlawful motive played some part
in the employment decision or decisional process." Id., at 1323; see House
Report Part I, at 48. Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
Bibbs had been applied to retaliation claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. LegalServs. of Arkansas, Inc., 813 F. 2d 893, 900 (CA8 1987) ("Should the court
find that retaliation played some invidious part in the [plaintiff `s]
termination, a violation of Title VII will be established under Bibbs.").
See also EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F. 2d 1555, 1560 (CA10 1989).

Notably, when it enacted § 2000e-2(m), Congress did not tie the new
provision specifically to §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d), which proscribe [***22] discrimination
"because of" race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Rather,
Congress added an entirely new provision to codify the causation standard,
one encompassing "any employment practice." § 2000e-2(m).

Also telling, § 2000e-2(m) is not limited to situations in which thecomplainant's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin [*2540] motivates the
employer's action. In contrast, Title VII's [**531] substantive antidiscrimination
provisions refer to the protected characteristics of the complaining party.
See §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2),(c)(2) (referring to "such individual's"
protected characteristics); §§ 2000e-2(b), (c)(1), (d) (referring to "his
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Congress thus knew how to
limit Title VII's coverage to victims of status-based discrimination when it
was so minded. It chose, instead, to bring within § 2000e-2(m) "any
employment practice." To cut out retaliation from § 2000e-2(m)'s scope, one
must be blind to that choice. Cf. Jackson, 544 U. S., at 179, n. 3 (omission
of reference to the complaining party's sex in Title IX supports the
conclusion that the statute protects a male plaintiff from retaliation in
response to complaints about sex discrimination against women).

C

From the inception of § 2000e-2(m), the agency entrusted with
interpretation of Title VII and superintendence of the Act's administration,
the EEOC, see § 2000e-5, has understood the provision to cover retaliation
claims. Shortly after Congress amended Title VII to include the
motivating-factor provision, the EEOC issued guidance advising that,
"[a]lthough [§ 2000e-2(m)] does not specify retaliation as a basis for
finding liability whenever it is a motivating factor for an action, neither
does it suggest any basis for deviating from the Commission's longstanding
rule that it will find liability . . . whenever retaliation plays any role
in an employment decision." EEOC, Revised Enforcement Guidance on Recent
Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, p. 20, n. 14 (July 14, 1992)
(hereinafter EEOC Guidance), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/disparat.html (as visited June 21, 2013, and
in Clerk of Court's case file). As the EEOC's initial guidance explained,
"if retaliation were to go unremedied, it would have a chilling effect upon
the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment
discrimination." Ibid.

In its compliance manual, the EEOC elaborated on its
conclusion that "[§ 2000e-2(m)] applies to retaliation." 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual § 8-II(E)(1), p. 614:0008, n. 45 (May 20, 1998) (hereinafter EEOC
Compliance Manual). That reading, the agency observed, tracked the view,
widely held by courts, "that the evidentiary framework for proving
employment discrimination based on race, sex, or other protected class
status also applies to claims of discrimination based on retaliation." Ibid.
"[A]n interpretation of [§ 2000e-2(m)] that permit[ted] proven retaliation
to go unpunished," the EEOC noted, would "undermin[e] the purpose of the
anti-retaliation provisions of maintain ing unfettered access to the
statutory remedial mechanism." Ibid.

The position set out in the EEOC's guidance and compliance manual merits
respect. [***23] See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); FederalExpress Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399 (2008) ("[EEOC's] policy
statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives . . .
reflect a body of experience and informed judgment. . . . As such, they are
entitled to a measure of respect under the less deferential Skidmore
standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the breadth of §
2000e-2(m) can be deemed ambiguous (although I believe its meaning is
plain), [**532] the provision should be construed to accord with the EEOC's
well-reasoned and longstanding guidance.

IV

The Court draws the opposite conclusion, ruling that retaliation falls
outside [*2541] the scope of § 2000e-2(m). In so holding, the Court ascribes to
Congress the unlikely purpose of separating retaliation claims from
discrimination claims, thereby undermining the Legislature's effort to
fortify the protections of Title VII. None of the reasons the Court offers
in support of its restrictive interpretation of § 2000e-2(m) survives
inspection.

A

The Court first asserts that reading § 2000e-2(m) to encompass claims for
retaliation "is inconsistent with the provision's plain language." Ante, at
12. The Court acknowledges, however, that "the text of the motivating-factor
provision . . . begins by referring to unlawful employment practices," a
term that undeniably includes retaliation. Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevermind that, the Court continues, for § 2000e-2(m) goes on to
reference as "motivating factor[s]" only "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." The Court thus sees retaliation as a protected activity
entirely discrete from status-based discrimination. Ibid.

This vision of retaliation as a separate concept runs up against
precedent. See supra, at 6-7. Until today, the Court has been clear eyed on
just what retaliation is: a manifestation of status-based discrimination. As
Jackson explained in the context of sex discrimination, "retaliation is
discrimination `on the basis of sex' because it is an intentional response
to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination."
544 U. S., at 174.

The Court does not take issue with Jackson's insight. Instead, it
distinguishes Jackson and like cases on the ground that they concerned laws
in which "Congress' treatment of the subject of prohibited discrimination
was both broad and brief." Ante, at 15. Title VII, by contrast, "is a
detailed statutory scheme," that "enumerates specific unlawful employment
practices," "defines key terms," and "exempts certain types of employers."
Ante, at 16. Accordingly, the Court says, "it would be improper to indulge
[the] suggestion that Congress meant to incorporate [in Title VII] the
default rules that apply only when Congress writes a broad and
undifferentiated statute." Ibid.

It is strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress homed in on
retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress
meant protection
against that unlawful employment practice to have less force than the
protection available when the statute does not mention retaliation. It is
hardly surprising, then, that our jurisprudence [***24] does not support the Court's
conclusion. In Gómez-Pérez, the Court construed the federal-sector provision
of the ADEA, which proscribes "discrimination based on age,"
29 U. S. C. § 633a(a), to bar retaliation. The Court did so mindful that
another part of the Act, the list of forbidden employer practices."
[**533]Gómez-Pérez, 553 U. S., at 486-487 (citing 29 U. S. C. §§ 623(a) and (d)).

The Court suggests that "the la[w] at issue in . . . Gómez-Pérez [was a]
broad, general ba[r] on discrimination." Ante, at 15. But, as our opinion in
that case ob serves, some of the ADEA's provisions are brief, broad, and
general, while others are extensive, specific, and detailed.
553 U. S., at 487. So too of Title VII. See ibid. ("The ADEA federal-sector
provision was patterned directly after Title VII's federal-sector
discrimination ban . . . [which] contains a broad prohibition of
`discrimination,' rather than a [*2542] list of specific prohibited practices."
(some internal quotation marks omitted)). It makes little sense to apply a
different mode of analysis to Title VII's § 2000e-2(m) and the ADEA's §
633a(a), both brief statements on discrimination in the context of larger
statutory schemes.[fn5]

The Court's reliance on § 109(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
105 Stat. 1077,[fn6] and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
104 Stat. 327, is similarly unavailing. According to the Court, Congress'
explicit reference to § 2000e-3(a) in § 109(b) "reinforc[es] the conclusion
that Congress acted deliberately when it omitted retaliation claims from §
2000e-2(m)." Ante, at 13. The same is true of the ADA, the Court says, as
"Congress provided not just a general prohibition on discrimination `because
of [an individual's] disability,' but also seven paragraphs of detailed
description of the practices that would constitute the prohibited
discrimination . . . [a]nd . . . an express antiretaliation provision."
Ante, at 17.

This argument is underwhelming. Yes, Congress has sometimes addressed
retaliation explicitly in antidiscrimination statutes. When it does so,
there is no occasion for interpretation. But when Congress simply targets
discrimination "because of" protected characteristics, or, as in §
2000e-2(m), refers to employment practices motivated by race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, how should courts comprehend those
phrases? They should read them informed [**534] by this Court's consistent holdings
that such phrases draw in retaliation, for, in truth, retaliation is a
"form of intentional [status-based] discrimination." See Jackson,
544 U. S., at 173, described supra, at 6-7. That is why the Court can point
to no prior instance in which an antidiscrimination law was found not to
cover retaliation. The Court's volte-face is particularly imprudent in the
context of § 2000e-2(m), a provision added as part of Congress' effort to
toughen protections against workplace

B

The Court also disassociates retaliation from status based discrimination
by stressing that the bar on the latter appears in § 2000e-2, while the
proscription of retaliation [*2543] appears in a separate provision, § 2000e-3.
Section 2000e-2, the Court asserts, "contains Title VII's ban on
status-based discrimination . . . and says nothing about retaliation." Ante,
at 13. Retaliation, the Court therefore concludes, should not [***25] be read into §
2000e-2(m). Ante, at 13-14.

The Court's reasoning rests on a false premise. Section 2000e-2 does not
deal exclusively with discrimination based on protected characteristics. The
provisions stated after §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d) deal with a variety of matters,
some of them unquestionably covering retaliation. For example, § 2000e-2(n),
enacted in tandem with and located immediately after § 2000e-2(m), limits
opportunities to collaterally attack employment practices installed to
implement a consent judgment. Section 2000e-2(n) applies beyond the
substantive antidiscrimination provisions in § 2000e-2; indeed, it applies
beyond Title VII to encompass claims "under the Constitution or [other]
Federal civil rights laws." § 2000e-2(n)(1)(A). Thus, if an employee sues
for retaliatory discharge in violation of § 2000e-3(a), and a consent
judgment orders reinstatement, any person adversely affected by that
judgment (e.g., an employee who loses seniority as a result) would generally
be barred
from attacking the judgment if she was given actual notice of the proposed
order and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. That Congress
placed the consent-judgment provision in § 2000e-2 and not in § 2000e-3 is
of no moment. As the text of the provision plainly conveys, § 2000e-2(n)
would reach consent judgments settling complaints about retaliation, just as
it would cover consent judgments settling complaints about status-based
discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(g) is similarly illustrative. Under that provision, "it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discharge [an] individual" if she fails to fulfill any requirement imposed
in the interest of national security. Because § 2000e-3(a) renders
retaliation an "unlawful employment practice," § 2000e-2(g)'s exemption
would no doubt apply to a Title VII retaliatory discharge claim. Given these
provisions, Congress' placement of the motivating-factor provision within §
2000e-2 cannot bear the weight the Court places on it.[**535][fn7]

C

The Court gives no deference to the EEOC's longstanding position that §
2000e-2(m) applies to retaliation because, the Court charges, the agency did
not "address the particular interplay among the status-based
antidiscrimination
provision (§ 2000e-2(a)), the antiretaliation provision (§ 2000e-3(a)), and
the motivating-factor provision (§ 2000e-2(m))." Ante, at 21. Not so.

In its compliance manual, the EEOC noted that some courts had concluded
that § 2000e-2(m) does not cover retaliation, citing as an example Woodson
v. Scott Paper Co.[*2544], 109 F. 3d 913 (CA3 1997). In that decision, the Third
Circuit acknowledged it was "given pause by the fact that . . . courts have
generally borrowed from discrimination law in determining the burdens and
order of proof in retaliation cases." Id., at 934. One could therefore say,
the Third Circuit continued, that "Congress knew of the practice of
borrowing in retaliation cases, and presumed that courts would continue this
practice after the 1991 Act." Ibid.

While Woodson rejected that argument, the EEOC found it sound. See EEOC
Compliance Manual, at 614:0008, n. 45 ("Courts have long held that [***26] the
evidentiary framework for proving employment discrimination based on race,
sex, or other protected class status also applies to claims of
discrimination based on retaliation."). See also EEOC Guidance, at 20, n. 14
(while § 2000e-2(m) does not explicitly refer to retaliation, nothing in the
provision calls for deviation from the longstanding practice of finding
liability when a plaintiff demonstrates that retaliatory intent motivated an
adverse employment decision). By adverting to Woodson, the EEOC made clear
that it considered the very argument the Court relies on today. Putting down
the agency's appraisal as "generic," ante, at 22, is thus conspicuously
unfair comment.

The Court's second reason for refusing to accord deference to the EEOC
fares no better. The EEOC's conclusion that "the lessened causation standard
is necessary in order to prevent proven retaliation' from `go[ing]
unpunished,'" the Court reasons, "is circular" because it "assumes the
answer to the central question at issue here,
which is what causal relationship must be shown in order to prove
retaliation." Ibid. That reasoning will not wash. Under the
motivating-factor test set out in § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff prevails if she
shows that proscribed conduct "was a motivating factor" for the adverse
employment action she encountered, "even though other factors also motivated
the [action]." She will succeed, although the relief to which she is
entitled may be restricted. See supra, at 9. Under the Court's view, proof
that retaliation was a factor motivating an adverse employment action is
insufficient to establish liability under § 2000e-3(a). The [**536] Court's but-for
causation standard does not mean that the plaintiff has failed to prove she
was subjected to unlawful retaliation. It does mean, however, that proof of
a retaliatory motive alone yields no victory for the plaintiff. Put
otherwise, the Court's view "permits proven retaliation to go unpunished,"
just as the EEOC recognized. See EEOC Compliance Manual, at 614:0008, n. 45.

The Court held in Gross that, in contrast to Title VII, § 623(a) of the
ADEA does not authorize any age discrimination claim asserting mixed
motives. Explaining that uniform interpretation of the two statutes is
sometimes unwarranted, the Court noted in Gross that the phrase "because of
. . . age" in § 623(a) has not been read "to bar discrimination against
people of all ages, even though the Court had previously interpreted because
of . . . race [or] sex' in Title VII to bar discrimination against people of
all races and both sexes." 557 U. S., at 175, n. 2. Yet Gross,
which took pains to distinguish [*2545] ADEA claims from Title VII claims, is
invoked by the Court today as path marking. See ante, at 2 ("The holding and
analysis of [Gross] are instructive here.").

The word "because" in Title VII's retaliation provision, § 2000e-3(a), the
Court tells us, should be interpreted [***27] not to accord with the interpretation
of that same word in the companion status-based discrimination provision of
Title VII, § 2000e-2(a). Instead, statutory lines should be crossed: The
meaning of "because" in Title VII's retaliation provision should be read to
mean just what the Court held "because" means for ADEA-liability purposes.
But see Gross, 557 U. S., at 174 ("When conducting statutory interpretation,
we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a
different statute without careful and critical examination.'"(quoting
Holowecki, 552 U. S., at 393)). In other words, the employer prevailed in
Gross because, according to the Court the ADEA's anti discrimination
prescription is not like Title VII's. But the employer prevails again in
Nassar's case, for there is no "meaningful textual difference," ante, at 11,
between the ADEA's use of "because" and the use of the same word in Title
VII's retaliation provision. What sense can one make of this other than
"heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses"?

It is a standard principle of statutory interpretation that identical
phrases appearing in the same statute — here, Title VII — ordinarily bear a
consistent meaning. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.,
551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007). Following that principle, Title VII's retaliation
provision, like its status-based discrimination provision, would permit
mixed-motive claims, and the same causation standard would apply to both
provisions.
[**537]

B

The Court's decision to construe § 2000e-3(a) to require
but-for causation in line with Gross is even more confounding in light of
Price Waterhouse. Recall that Price Waterhouse interpreted "because of" in §
2000e-2(a) to permit mixed-motive claims. See supra, at 8. The Court today
rejects the proposition that, if § 2000e-2(m) does not cover retaliation,
such claims are governed by Price Water-house's burden-shifting framework,
i.e., if the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating factor in
an adverse employment action, the defendant may escape liability only by
showing it would have taken the same action had there been no illegitimate
motive. It is wrong to revert to Price Waterhouse, the Court says, because
the 1991 Civil Rights Act's amendments to Title VII abrogated that decision.

This conclusion defies logic. Before the 1991 amendments, several courts
had applied Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting framework to retaliation
claims.[fn8] In the Court's view, Congress designed § 2000e-2(m)'s
motivating-factor standard not only to exclude retaliation claims, but also
to override, sub silentio, Circuit precedent applying the Price Waterhouse
framework to such claims. And with what did the 1991 Congress replace the
Price Water-house burden-shifting framework? With a but-for causation
requirement Gross applied to the ADEA 17 years after the 1991 amendments to
Title VII. Shut from the Court's sight is a legislative record replete with
statements evincing Congress' intent to strengthen antidiscrimination laws
and thereby hold employers accountable for [*2546] prohibited discrimination. See
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071; House [***28] Report Part II, at 18.
It is an odd mode of statutory interpretation that divines Congress' aim in
1991 by looking to a decision of this Court,
Gross, made under a different statute in 2008, while ignoring the
overarching purpose of the Congress that enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
see supra, at 8-10.

C

The Court shows little regard for trial judges who must instruct juries in
Title VII cases in which plaintiff's allege both status-based discrimination
and retaliation. Nor is the Court concerned about the capacity of jurors to
follow instructions conforming to today's decision. Causation is a
complicated concept to convey to juries in the best of circumstances. Asking
jurors to determine liability based on different standards in a single case
is virtually certain to sow confusion. That would be tolerable if the
governing statute required double standards, but here, for the reasons
already stated, it does not.

VI

A

The Court's assertion that the but-for cause requirement it adopts
necessarily follows from § 2000e-3(a)'s use of the word "because" fails to
convince. Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 5-6, the word
"because" does not inevitably demand but-for causation to the exclusion of
all other causation formulations. When more than one factor contributes to a
plaintiff `s [**538] injury, but-for causation is problematic. See, e.g., 1
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 27, Comment a, p. 385 (2005) (noting near
universal agreement that the but-for standard is inappropriate when multiple
sufficient causes exist) (hereinafter Re statement Third); Restatement of
Torts § 9, Comment b, p. 18 (1934) (legal cause is a cause that is a
"substantial factor in bringing about the harm").

When an event is "overdetermined," i.e., when two forces create an injury
each alone would be sufficient to cause, modern tort law permits the
plaintiff to prevail upon
showing that either sufficient condition created the harm. Restatement Third
§ 27, at 376-377. In contrast, under the Court's approach (which it
erroneously calls "textbook tort law," ante, at 6), a Title VII plaintiff
alleging retaliation cannot establish liability if her firing was prompted
by both legitimate and illegitimate factors. Ante, at 18-19.

Today's opinion rehashes arguments rightly rejected in Price Waterhouse.
Concurring in the judgment in that case, Justice O'Connor recognized the
disconnect between the standard the dissent advocated, which would have
imposed on the plaintiff the burden of showing but-for causation, see
490 U. S., at 282, 286-287 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and the common-law
doctrines on which the dissent relied. As Justice O'Connor explained:

"[I]n the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent's
`but-for' standard of causation is derived, . . . the law has long
recognized that in certain `civil cases' leaving the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff to prove `but-for' causation would be
both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in
the concept of duty of care. Thus, in multiple causation cases,
where a breach of duty has been established, the common law of torts
has long shifted the burden of proof to . . . defendants [***29] to prove
that their negligent actions were not the `but-for' cause of the
plaintiff `s injury." Id., at 263-264 (concurring in judgment)
(citing Summers v. Tice[*2547], 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-87, 199 P. 2d 1, 3-4
(1948)).

Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was even less solicitous of the
dissent's approach. Noting that, under the standard embraced by the dissent
in Price Waterhouse, neither of two sufficient forces would constitute cause
even if either one alone would have led to the injury, the plurality
remarked: "We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we
interpret a statute." 490 U. S., at 241.

B

As the plurality and concurring opinions in Price Water house indicate, a
strict but-for test is particularly ill suited to employment discrimination
cases. Even if the test is appropriate in some tort contexts, "it is an
entirely different matter to determine a `but-for' relation when . . .
consider[ing], not physical forces, but the mind-related characteristics
that constitute motive." Gross, 557 U. S., at 190 (BREYER, J., dissenting).
When assessing an employers multiple motives, "to apply `but-for' causation
is to engage in a [**539] hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer s thoughts and other circum stances had been different." Id., at
191. See also Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at 264 (opinion of O'Connor, J.)
("`[A]t . . . times the [but-for] test demands the impossible. It challenges
the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable
state of affairs.'" (quoting Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan.
L. Rev. 60, 67 (1956))).

This point, lost on the Court, was not lost on Congress. When Title VII
was enacted, Congress considered and rejected an amendment that would have
placed the word "solely" before "because of [the complainant's] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." See 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837-13838
(1964). Senator Case, a prime sponsor of Title VII, commented that a "sole
cause" standard would render the Act "totally nugatory." Id., at 13837. Life
does not shape up that way, the Senator suggested, commenting "[i]f anyone
ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different
kind of animal from any I know of." Ibid.

* * *

The Court holds, at odds with a solid line of decisions recognizing that
retaliation is inextricably bound up with status-based discrimination, that
§ 2000e-2(m) excludes
retaliation claims. It then reaches outside of Title VII to arrive at an
interpretation of "because" that lacks sensitivity to the realities of life
at work. In this endeavor, the Court is guided neither by precedent, nor by
the aims of legislators who formulated and amended Title VII. Indeed, the
Court appears driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims
filed against employers. See ante, at 18-19. Congress had no such goal in
mind when it added § 2000e-2(m) to Title VII. See House Report Part II, at
2. Today's misguided judgment, along with the judgment in Vance v. BallState Univ., post, p. 1, should prompt yet another Civil Rights Restoration
Act.

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.

[fn1] The District Court reduced compensatory damages to $300,000, the
statutory cap under Title VII. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).

[fn2] The Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to support the
claim of constructive discharge and reversed the District Court's judgment
to that extent. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 8-10. That ruling is not
contested here.

[fn5] The Court obscures the inconsistency between today's opinion and
Gómez-Pérez by comparing § 633a to all of Title VII. See ante, at 16
("Unlike Title IX, § 1981, § 1982, and the federal-sector provisions of the
ADEA, Title VII is a detailed statutory scheme."). That comparison is inapt.
Like Title VII, the ADEA is a "detailed statutory scheme." Ibid. Compare
ibid. (citing Title VII provisions that proscribe status-based
discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and
training programs; bar retaliation; prohibit advertising a preference for
certain protected characteristics; define terms; exempt certain employers;
and create an agency with rulemaking and enforcement authority), with
29 U. S. C. §§ 623(a)-(e) (proscribing age discrimination by employers,
employment agencies, and labor unions; barring retaliation; prohibiting
advertising a preference for employees of a particular age), § 628 (granting
rulemaking authority to the EEOC), and § 630 (defining terms). Thus, § 633a
is just like § 2000e-2(m) in the relevant respect: both are single
provisions comprised within a detailed scheme.

[fn6] Now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-1(b), § 109(b) provides: "It shall
not be unlawful under § 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 . . . for an employer . . . to
take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section
would cause such employer . . . to violate the law of the foreign country in
which such workplace is located." The provision was framed to accord with
this Court's decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244
(1991).

[fn7] The Court's assertion that we "confronted a similar structural dispute
in Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981)," ante, at 17, assumes its own
conclusion. As the Court explains, in Nakshian, the plaintiff argued that §
633a of the ADEA afforded the right to trial by jury. 453 U. S., at 157. An
amendment to the private-sector provision, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 626(c),
granted that right to plaintiff's suing private employers, as well as state
and local governmental entities. But no one argued in Nakshian that the
private-sector amendment applied to the federal-sector provision. Hence,
Nakshian's holding that the ADEA does not permit a federal-sector plaintiff
to try her case before a jury is relevant only if the Court is correct that
§ 2000e-2(m) does not cover retaliation claims.