Event Information

On June 26, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement hosted a culminating event to look back on over 20 years of ground-breaking accomplishments and identify future challenges for working on issues of internal displacement. This is a remarkable story of how international law was made and the humanitarian world changed through the collaboration between an independent U.N. expert and a U.S. think-tank, supported by international lawyers, governments, NGOs, and academics. Speakers included key actors in putting internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the international agenda, including Francis Deng, Walter Kälin, and many others.

Martin Indyk, executive vice president of the Brookings Institution, provided opening remarks. Roberta Cohen, nonresident senior fellow and founding co-director of the Project on Internal Displacement moderated the first panel and Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, moderated the second panel.

Event Information

On June 26, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement hosted a culminating event to look back on over 20 years of ground-breaking accomplishments and identify future challenges for working on issues of internal displacement. This is a remarkable story of how international law was made and the humanitarian world changed through the collaboration between an independent U.N. expert and a U.S. think-tank, supported by international lawyers, governments, NGOs, and academics. Speakers included key actors in putting internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the international agenda, including Francis Deng, Walter Kälin, and many others.

Martin Indyk, executive vice president of the Brookings Institution, provided opening remarks. Roberta Cohen, nonresident senior fellow and founding co-director of the Project on Internal Displacement moderated the first panel and Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, moderated the second panel.

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Transcript

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/06/24-isis-intervention-brookings-debate?rssid=indykm{21E25528-C7C2-44A4-84BC-C3D6EBAB2D24}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/97538594/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Brookings-Debate-Should-the-US-put-boots-on-the-ground-to-fight-ISISBrookings Debate: Should the U.S. put boots on the ground to fight ISIS?

ISIS (aka Islamic State or ISIL) forces continue to hold large swaths of western Iraq and portions of Syria. Although some of the gains made by ISIS fighters last year have been rolled back over the past few months, the recent museum attack in Tunisia and the pledge of allegiance from Nigeria’s Boko Haram group show their ideological reach now extends across the world.

Americans have been wary of another war in the Middle East, but opinion polls show that more than 50 percent of Americans still support sending U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS. But many key questions must be answered before the president and Congress make any decision to engage ISIS directly:

What threat does the self-declared caliphate pose to the region, the U.S., and the world? Is the current U.S. response, and that of regional players such as Jordan, Iraq, and Iran, adequate to combat the threat? Is ISIS merely a distraction from other important matters in the region, such as the Syrian civil war, Iran’s nuclear program, and Israeli-Palestinian relations? Is the current approach of tactical airstrikes enough to drive ISIS out of key areas in the region?

On Wednesday, June 24, experts presented both sides of the case and had a lively discussion over the question of the night: “Should the U.S. deploy ‘boots on the ground’ to fight ISIS?”

ISIS (aka Islamic State or ISIL) forces continue to hold large swaths of western Iraq and portions of Syria. Although some of the gains made by ISIS fighters last year have been rolled back over the past few months, the recent museum attack in Tunisia and the pledge of allegiance from Nigeria’s Boko Haram group show their ideological reach now extends across the world.

Americans have been wary of another war in the Middle East, but opinion polls show that more than 50 percent of Americans still support sending U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS. But many key questions must be answered before the president and Congress make any decision to engage ISIS directly:

What threat does the self-declared caliphate pose to the region, the U.S., and the world? Is the current U.S. response, and that of regional players such as Jordan, Iraq, and Iran, adequate to combat the threat? Is ISIS merely a distraction from other important matters in the region, such as the Syrian civil war, Iran’s nuclear program, and Israeli-Palestinian relations? Is the current approach of tactical airstrikes enough to drive ISIS out of key areas in the region?

On Wednesday, June 24, experts presented both sides of the case and had a lively discussion over the question of the night: “Should the U.S. deploy ‘boots on the ground’ to fight ISIS?”

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Audio

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/06/05-testimony-iran-regional-implications-indyk?rssid=indykm{0E2CC546-3D01-4F68-8722-516456DB102C}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/94307368/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~The-regional-implications-of-a-nuclear-deal-with-IranThe regional implications of a nuclear deal with Iran

Editor’s Note: On June 3, Brookings’ Executive Vice President Martin Indyk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the regional implications of a nuclear deal with Iran. The full text of his testimony is available here. A summary is below.

In the coming months, Congress is likely to have to make a choice: either endorse an agreement that removes sanctions but should ensure a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least ten-to-fifteen years; or reject the agreement, which would leave Iran three months from a nuclear weapon under eroding sanctions. In making that choice, Congress will need to take into account that the Iranian nuclear deal will have profound ripple effects across the troubled Middle East region. The nuclear agreement was never intended to deal with the likely consequences of the sanctions relief—namely a monetary windfall for the government in Tehran. There is every reason to believe that at least some of this windfall will enhance the capacity of problematic Iranian forces such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and problematic proxies like Hezbollah, the Assad regime and Shia militias in Iraq.

But the possible regional implications of the deal are not sufficiently negative to justify opposing it. Indeed, given the turmoil now engulfing the Middle East, ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least a decade—and tight monitoring of its nuclear program for much longer than that—will help remove a primary source of tension and may foster greater cohesion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability there. In the end, the agreement buys a breathing space of at least ten years. That's worth having as long as the inspection, monitoring and snap-back provisions are credible and the time is used effectively to contain and roll-back Iran's nefarious hegemonic ambitions.

Moreover, whatever its other negative implications, the deal is not likely to trigger a nuclear arms race. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will actually embark on building an enrichment capability with its requirements for a significant scientific establishment. For thirty years, while Iran developed its ambitious nuclear program unconstrained, its Saudi arch-rival did not feel any need to do the same. Why would it do so now when serious constraints will be placed on Iran’s nuclear program? Egypt and Jordan are certainly talking about starting nuclear programs, but they are both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All three Arab states would have to submit to the same intrusive inspections that Iran has accepted if they are to get the nuclear cooperation they will need. The UAE has signed a 123 agreement, in which it commits never to acquire enrichment capacity. And Turkey, as a NATO ally, already enjoys the cover of an American nuclear umbrella under Article 5 of the Treaty.

But even if nuclear proliferation is not among the negative consequences, the President and Congress will need to take account of the regional implications of the deal. The United States should develop a parallel regional security strategy to complement the nuclear deal, one that is designed to counter and neutralize Iran’s regional mischief. President Obama has already taken the first step in this effort through the Camp David summit he hosted with America’s Gulf Arab allies last month. The two sides agreed on a new strategic partnership that would “fast-track” arms transfers and enhance security cooperation, but those words will need to be translated into concrete actions, culminating in a new regional security framework.

Israeli concerns should also be addressed as part of the effort to provide strategic reassurance. Certainly, Israel has good reason to be concerned about the intentions of the Iranian regime. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at least one year away from a breakout capability for the next ten-to-fifteen years, Israel has no reason to preempt for the time being. Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is determined to scuttle the deal because he believes that it paves the way for Iran to get the bomb in fifteen years’ time. In this context, it will be important for the United States to take steps to provide strategic reassurance to Israel by strengthening its ability to defend itself from, and therefore deter, any potential Iranian nuclear threat. Such measures could include completing the negotiations on a new 10-year agreement to provide military assistance to Israel at an increased level to provide greater defensive anti-missile capabilities as well as enhanced deterrence.

Finally, to take care of the likely increasing nervousness among our regional allies as some of the more severe constraints on Iran's nuclear agreement approach their expiration date ten-to-fifteen years from now, the United States needs to begin to lay the groundwork for establishing a nuclear umbrella over all of them. This form of extended deterrence will be an important element in an American-sponsored regional security framework. Neither Israel nor America’s GCC allies are prepared to consider that at the moment, nor is it likely that Congress would approve a new nuclear commitment for any regional ally in the Middle East except Israel. But if the policy of strategic reassurance is pursued consistently by this president and his successors, it is possible that all sides may come to see the virtue of a nuclear security guarantee that will effectively deter Iran, render an Israeli preemptive strike unnecessary, and remove any incentive for the Arab states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

A credible nuclear agreement will nevertheless raise many concerns in the Middle East about Iran’s destabilizing behavior that the United States cannot address in the agreement itself but will have to address outside the agreement. That is not a justification for opposing the agreement, which will provide an all-important ten-to-fifteen year breathing space. It is rather a reason for complementing the agreement with a robust effort to promote a regional security strategy that takes advantage of the respite to begin to rebuild a more stable order in this chaotic but still vital region.

Authors

Editor’s Note: On June 3, Brookings’ Executive Vice President Martin Indyk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the regional implications of a nuclear deal with Iran. The full text of his testimony is available here. A summary is below.

In the coming months, Congress is likely to have to make a choice: either endorse an agreement that removes sanctions but should ensure a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least ten-to-fifteen years; or reject the agreement, which would leave Iran three months from a nuclear weapon under eroding sanctions. In making that choice, Congress will need to take into account that the Iranian nuclear deal will have profound ripple effects across the troubled Middle East region. The nuclear agreement was never intended to deal with the likely consequences of the sanctions relief—namely a monetary windfall for the government in Tehran. There is every reason to believe that at least some of this windfall will enhance the capacity of problematic Iranian forces such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and problematic proxies like Hezbollah, the Assad regime and Shia militias in Iraq.

But the possible regional implications of the deal are not sufficiently negative to justify opposing it. Indeed, given the turmoil now engulfing the Middle East, ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least a decade—and tight monitoring of its nuclear program for much longer than that—will help remove a primary source of tension and may foster greater cohesion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability there. In the end, the agreement buys a breathing space of at least ten years. That's worth having as long as the inspection, monitoring and snap-back provisions are credible and the time is used effectively to contain and roll-back Iran's nefarious hegemonic ambitions.

Moreover, whatever its other negative implications, the deal is not likely to trigger a nuclear arms race. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will actually embark on building an enrichment capability with its requirements for a significant scientific establishment. For thirty years, while Iran developed its ambitious nuclear program unconstrained, its Saudi arch-rival did not feel any need to do the same. Why would it do so now when serious constraints will be placed on Iran’s nuclear program? Egypt and Jordan are certainly talking about starting nuclear programs, but they are both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All three Arab states would have to submit to the same intrusive inspections that Iran has accepted if they are to get the nuclear cooperation they will need. The UAE has signed a 123 agreement, in which it commits never to acquire enrichment capacity. And Turkey, as a NATO ally, already enjoys the cover of an American nuclear umbrella under Article 5 of the Treaty.

But even if nuclear proliferation is not among the negative consequences, the President and Congress will need to take account of the regional implications of the deal. The United States should develop a parallel regional security strategy to complement the nuclear deal, one that is designed to counter and neutralize Iran’s regional mischief. President Obama has already taken the first step in this effort through the Camp David summit he hosted with America’s Gulf Arab allies last month. The two sides agreed on a new strategic partnership that would “fast-track” arms transfers and enhance security cooperation, but those words will need to be translated into concrete actions, culminating in a new regional security framework.

Israeli concerns should also be addressed as part of the effort to provide strategic reassurance. Certainly, Israel has good reason to be concerned about the intentions of the Iranian regime. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at least one year away from a breakout capability for the next ten-to-fifteen years, Israel has no reason to preempt for the time being. Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is determined to scuttle the deal because he believes that it paves the way for Iran to get the bomb in fifteen years’ time. In this context, it will be important for the United States to take steps to provide strategic reassurance to Israel by strengthening its ability to defend itself from, and therefore deter, any potential Iranian nuclear threat. Such measures could include completing the negotiations on a new 10-year agreement to provide military assistance to Israel at an increased level to provide greater defensive anti-missile capabilities as well as enhanced deterrence.

Finally, to take care of the likely increasing nervousness among our regional allies as some of the more severe constraints on Iran's nuclear agreement approach their expiration date ten-to-fifteen years from now, the United States needs to begin to lay the groundwork for establishing a nuclear umbrella over all of them. This form of extended deterrence will be an important element in an American-sponsored regional security framework. Neither Israel nor America’s GCC allies are prepared to consider that at the moment, nor is it likely that Congress would approve a new nuclear commitment for any regional ally in the Middle East except Israel. But if the policy of strategic reassurance is pursued consistently by this president and his successors, it is possible that all sides may come to see the virtue of a nuclear security guarantee that will effectively deter Iran, render an Israeli preemptive strike unnecessary, and remove any incentive for the Arab states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

A credible nuclear agreement will nevertheless raise many concerns in the Middle East about Iran’s destabilizing behavior that the United States cannot address in the agreement itself but will have to address outside the agreement. That is not a justification for opposing the agreement, which will provide an all-important ten-to-fifteen year breathing space. It is rather a reason for complementing the agreement with a robust effort to promote a regional security strategy that takes advantage of the respite to begin to rebuild a more stable order in this chaotic but still vital region.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/06/03-us-policy-middle-east-iran-nuclear-deal-indyk?rssid=indykm{CCC4F37C-183D-4291-AB0D-6C89E25B869F}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/94178472/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~US-policy-in-the-Middle-East-after-a-nuclear-deal-with-IranU.S. policy in the Middle East after a nuclear deal with Iran

On June 3, 2015, Martin Indyk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on U.S. policy in the Middle East after a nuclear deal with Iran, arguing that Congress's choice whether nor not to endorse an agreement to remove sanctions on Iran must take into account regional implications for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Read the full text of Indyk's testimony below.

In the coming months, Congress is likely to have to make a choice: either to endorse an agreement that removes sanctions on Iran but should ensure that it remains nuclear weapons-free for at least ten-to-fifteen years; or to reject the agreement, which would leave Iran three months from a nuclear weapon under eroding sanctions. In making that choice, Congress will need to take account, among other things, of the regional implications of the deal and what would need to be done to ameliorate the negative fallout. That is what I have endeavored to address in this written testimony.

In the end, each Senator will have to make a judgement based on the credibility of the deal itself and on its likely implications for American interests in the Middle East and for the broader global issues that will be impacted. In my view, if the arrangements currently being negotiated for inspection and monitoring, together with the mechanism for the “snap-back” of sanctions, are robust enough to deter and detect Iranian cheating, the deal will be worth
upholding. In other words, the likely regional implications of the deal are not sufficiently negative to justify opposing it. Indeed, given the state of turmoil engulfing the Middle East, ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least a decade will help remove a primary source of tension and may foster greater cohesion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability there.

The completion of the Iran nuclear deal and its endorsement by the Congress would represent a major development for U.S.-Iranian relations and would likely have profound ripple effects across the troubled Middle East region. It will impact the security of our allies from Egypt, to Israel, Jordan, the Gulf Arab states, and Turkey at a time of heightened insecurity because of the collapse of state institutions and the rise of jihadist forces on all their borders. It might trigger a regional nuclear arms race or a preemptive Israeli strike. And it could give a turbo-boost to Iran’s conventional military capabilities and its destabilizing activities in the region.

If these potential consequences are so great, why haven’t they been addressed in the nuclear deal itself? There are good reasons. The Iranians were keen to include regional issues in the negotiations because they believed it would be advantageous to them to offer the United States a “grand bargain,” exchanging regional cooperation in Syria and Iraq, for example, in return for lowering American requirements for curbs on their nuclear program. The American
negotiators wisely rejected this attempt at linkage. In addition, our Gulf Arab allies feared that their regional interests would be sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and insisted that the United States had no business discussing regional issues with their strategic adversary when they were not represented in the negotiations. Consequently, there is nothing in the agreement itself that constrains Iran’s regional behavior. But by the same token there is nothing in the agreement that constrains the United States and its regional allies from taking steps to contain and roll-back Iran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and counter its nefarious activities there. Ten-to-fifteen years of an Iran under intense scrutiny and constrained from acquiring nuclear weapons provides a significant breathing space for its regional opponents, backed by the United States, to build an effective counterweight.

Will our regional allies choose to use that time to build their own nuclear programs, thereby fueling a nuclear arms race that the agreement with Iran was supposed to prevent? To be sure, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington and former intelligence chief, has declared, “Whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same.” But it seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia will actually embark on building an enrichment capability, one that would require them to establish or acquire a significant scientific establishment that they currently lack. For thirty years, while Iran developed its ambitious nuclear program unconstrained, its Saudi arch-rival did not feel any need to do the same. Why would it do so now when serious constraints will be placed on Iran’s nuclear program?

Moreover, “wanting the same” actually means that Saudi Arabia – and any other regional state that seeks to match Iran’s capabilities – would have to accept the same intrusive inspections and monitoring that the Iranians are in the process of accepting. Some suggest that Saudi Arabia would simply acquire a bomb off the Pakistani shelf. But if this option is a real one – and Pakistan’s refusal to join Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen raises significant doubts – it has existed for decades and does not in itself fuel a nuclear arms race as long as the bomb stays on the Pakistani shelf.

While Egypt is building a nuclear power plant and Jordan is talking about establishing an enrichment capacity, they are both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and will have to submit to the NPT’s Additional Protocol of intrusive inspections that Iran has accepted if they are to get the nuclear cooperation they will need. The UAE has signed the 123 agreement, which prevents it from ever acquiring enrichment capacity and requires it to sign the Additional Protocol. In any case, these countries have made clear in their statements and behavior that they are far more concerned by Iran’s unconstrained efforts to promote sectarian strife in their neighborhoods than they are about what will become a heavily constrained Iranian nuclear program.

Meanwhile Turkey, as a NATO ally, already enjoys the cover of an American nuclear umbrella under Article Five of the Treaty and therefore has little reason to head down the costly nuclear weapons road itself.

What about Israel? Its leadership is alarmed by the deal-in-the-making; Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared that it represents an existential threat to the Jewish state. Certainly, Israel has good reason to be concerned about the intentions of the Iranian regime since its leaders declare at regular intervals that their objective is to wipe Israel off the map. Israel’s leaders have the duty to take those threats seriously and they have invested a vast fortune, with the considerable assistance of the United States, in ensuring that Israel’s Defense Forces have the ability to deter Iran or, if necessary, preempt it from acquiring nuclear weapons. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at least one year away from a breakout capability for the next ten-to-fifteen years, Israel has no reason to preempt for the time being. If it did, it could only hope to set back Iran’s nuclear program by some two years – far less than provided for in the nuclear deal. And it would in the process free Iran of all its obligations under the agreement and earn Israel the opprobrium of the other powers that support the deal.

Israel’s concern is greatest when it comes to what happens at the end of the fifteen-year period when Iran will have a full-fledged nuclear program rendered legitimate by its compliance with this agreement and therefore not subject to sanctions. But we will also by then have much greater visibility into Iran’s nuclear program, much greater ability to detect any attempt to switch from a civil to a military nuclear program, and an American president will have all the current military capabilities and much more by then to deal with an Iranian breakout should they attempt one. Indeed, time is not neutral in this situation. The United States, Israel and Iran’s Arab adversaries can do much during this long interval both to encourage Iran to abandon its destabilizing and threatening regional activities, and to contain and deter it if it refuses to do so.

Taking up that challenge will be essential because of the potential impact of sanctions relief on Iran’s regional behavior. Once sanctions are removed, Iran will be the beneficiary of the unfreezing of some $120 billion of assets; its oil revenues are likely to increase by some $20-24 billion annually. It is reasonable to assume that a good part of that windfall will be used to rehabilitate Iran’s struggling economy and fulfill the expectations of Iran’s people for a better life. But it is an equally safe bet that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), and the Iranian Armed Forces will be beneficiaries too. It’s true that punishing sanctions have not prevented these extensions of the Iranian revolution from exploiting the upheavals in the region and the collapse of state institutions to build positions of considerable influence across the Sunni Arab world from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq and now Yemen. Nevertheless, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions are likely to be boosted by the availability of more resources. For example, the Assad regime in Syria is struggling to survive economically at the same time as it is losing control of more territory to opposition forces; a timely infusion of cash and arms might help it cling to power. Similarly, Iraq’s Shia militias, which are armed and trained by Iran, could be boosted at a time when the United States is struggling under Iraqi government constraints to arm and train Sunni militias and Kurdish forces.

Iran will also have money to procure weapons systems for its armed forces, using the extensive Western arms sales to its Arab adversaries as justification. Iran will still be subject to curbs on its ability to acquire some types of sophisticated military equipment, but with money to spend it will probably find a way around those sanctions. Russia’s high profile announcement that it would proceed with the sale of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems, even before the nuclear deal is signed, represents the harbinger of future sales of sophisticated weapons. Indeed, rather than focusing on a nuclear arms race in the region, we should be more concerned about a conventional arms race.

The nuclear agreement with Iran was never intended to deal with these likely consequences of the sanctions-relief that is the quid-pro-quo for Iran’s acceptance of meaningful and extensive curbs on its nuclear program. That puts a particular burden on the United States to develop a regional security strategy to complement the nuclear deal, one that is designed to counter and neutralize these unintended consequences. In doing so, the United States will need to send a clear and consistent message to Iran that if it chooses to abandon its nefarious regional activities and become a responsible partner to the United States and its allies, it will be welcomed into the community of nations in good standing. But if it decides to take advantage of its newly available resources to wreak further regional havoc, the United States will lead a concerted effort to oppose it.

President Obama has already taken the first step in this effort through the Camp David summit he hosted with our Gulf Arab allies last month. That was an important first step in providing them with the necessary strategic reassurance in the face of the uncertain consequences of the nuclear deal on Iran’s behavior in their neighborhood. In the joint communiqué, the President reiterated a U.S. “unequivocal” commitment to “deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners in the Gulf.” The two sides also agreed on a new strategic partnership that would “fast-track” arms transfers, enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense, and develop rapid response capabilities to regional threats. The communiqué and its annex provide all the understandings necessary for laying the foundations of an effective regional security architecture. However, those words will need to be translated into concrete actions at a time when the regional turmoil is generating competing priorities and interests. The GCC states are not united in their approach to the region’s problems and they will continue to fear an American-Iranian rapprochement at their expense no matter how reassuring the President’s words. Nevertheless, the combination of the nuclear deal, a potentially more potent Iranian adversary, and rising instability on their borders, should concentrate their minds and therefore could create the necessary conditions for an effective strategic partnership with the United States that was called forth at Camp David. If they are willing to get their acts together, we should certainly be willing to respond with a determined effort.

Providing strategic reassurance to our Gulf Arab allies is but the first step. The United States will also need to build more effective strategic partnerships with Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, our other traditional regional allies who wield much greater capabilities and influence than most of the GCC states. For a variety of justifiable reasons, the Obama Administration is at loggerheads with each one of these regional powers: with the government of Israel because of its unwillingness seriously to pursue the two state solution or freeze settlement activity; with the Egyptian regime because of the treatment of its own people; and with the Turkish president because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the United States against ISIS. But at this
sensitive moment, reassuring each one of them is essential if they are to be enlisted in the effort to lay the groundwork for a regional security framework that begins to reestablish order in this troubled region and prevents Iran from further exploitation of the chaos.

Just having the conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu is proving exceedingly difficult since he is so determined to scuttle the Iran nuclear deal that he does not want to give any hint that he might be prepared to compromise on his opposition for the sake of strategic reassurances from the United States. Nevertheless, if the deal goes through, it will be important for the United States in the immediate aftermath to take a series of steps to strengthen Israel’s ability to defend itself from, and therefore deter, any potential Iranian nuclear threat. Such measures could include completing the negotiations on a new 10-year agreement to provide military assistance to Israel at an increased level (this is something that Congress could initiate in coordination with the Administration). The funding could be used to cover the purchase of additional F-35s and the development and deployment of the full array of air defense systems from Iron Dome to Arrow III to protect Israeli civilians from Hezbollah and Hamas rockets all the way up to Iranian ballistic missiles. Additional funding could also be used to strengthen Israel’s deterrent capabilities, including the purchase of additional submarines.

Finally, to take care of the likely increasing nervousness among our regional allies as the nuclear agreement approaches its expiration date ten-to-fifteen years from now, the United States needs to begin to lay the groundwork for establishing a nuclear umbrella over all of them. This form of extended deterrence will be an important element in an American-sponsored regional security framework. Neither Israel nor our GCC allies are prepared to consider that at the moment, nor is it likely that Congress would approve such a commitment for any regional ally in the Middle East except Israel (ironically, Turkey already has such a commitment through NATO). But if the policy of strategic reassurance is pursued consistently by this president and his successors, it is possible that all sides may come to see the virtue of a nuclear and conventional security guarantee that will effectively deter Iran, render an Israeli preemptive strike unnecessary, and remove any incentive for the Arab states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

Mr. Chairman, a credible nuclear agreement will provide an extended breathing space for the United States and our regional allies free from the threat of a nuclear Iran that should last beyond the next administration and probably the one after that. It will nevertheless raise many concerns in the Middle East about Iran’s destabilizing behavior and hegemonic ambitions that the United States cannot address in the agreement itself but will have to address outside the agreement. In my view, that is not a justification for opposing the agreement. It is rather a reason for complementing the agreement with a robust effort to promote a regional security strategy that takes advantage of the respite to begin to rebuild a more stable order in this chaotic but still vital region.

Authors

On June 3, 2015, Martin Indyk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on U.S. policy in the Middle East after a nuclear deal with Iran, arguing that Congress's choice whether nor not to endorse an agreement to remove sanctions on Iran must take into account regional implications for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Read the full text of Indyk's testimony below.

In the coming months, Congress is likely to have to make a choice: either to endorse an agreement that removes sanctions on Iran but should ensure that it remains nuclear weapons-free for at least ten-to-fifteen years; or to reject the agreement, which would leave Iran three months from a nuclear weapon under eroding sanctions. In making that choice, Congress will need to take account, among other things, of the regional implications of the deal and what would need to be done to ameliorate the negative fallout. That is what I have endeavored to address in this written testimony.

In the end, each Senator will have to make a judgement based on the credibility of the deal itself and on its likely implications for American interests in the Middle East and for the broader global issues that will be impacted. In my view, if the arrangements currently being negotiated for inspection and monitoring, together with the mechanism for the “snap-back” of sanctions, are robust enough to deter and detect Iranian cheating, the deal will be worth
upholding. In other words, the likely regional implications of the deal are not sufficiently negative to justify opposing it. Indeed, given the state of turmoil engulfing the Middle East, ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least a decade will help remove a primary source of tension and may foster greater cohesion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability there.

The completion of the Iran nuclear deal and its endorsement by the Congress would represent a major development for U.S.-Iranian relations and would likely have profound ripple effects across the troubled Middle East region. It will impact the security of our allies from Egypt, to Israel, Jordan, the Gulf Arab states, and Turkey at a time of heightened insecurity because of the collapse of state institutions and the rise of jihadist forces on all their borders. It might trigger a regional nuclear arms race or a preemptive Israeli strike. And it could give a turbo-boost to Iran’s conventional military capabilities and its destabilizing activities in the region.

If these potential consequences are so great, why haven’t they been addressed in the nuclear deal itself? There are good reasons. The Iranians were keen to include regional issues in the negotiations because they believed it would be advantageous to them to offer the United States a “grand bargain,” exchanging regional cooperation in Syria and Iraq, for example, in return for lowering American requirements for curbs on their nuclear program. The American
negotiators wisely rejected this attempt at linkage. In addition, our Gulf Arab allies feared that their regional interests would be sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and insisted that the United States had no business discussing regional issues with their strategic adversary when they were not represented in the negotiations. Consequently, there is nothing in the agreement itself that constrains Iran’s regional behavior. But by the same token there is nothing in the agreement that constrains the United States and its regional allies from taking steps to contain and roll-back Iran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and counter its nefarious activities there. Ten-to-fifteen years of an Iran under intense scrutiny and constrained from acquiring nuclear weapons provides a significant breathing space for its regional opponents, backed by the United States, to build an effective counterweight.

Will our regional allies choose to use that time to build their own nuclear programs, thereby fueling a nuclear arms race that the agreement with Iran was supposed to prevent? To be sure, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington and former intelligence chief, has declared, “Whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same.” But it seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia will actually embark on building an enrichment capability, one that would require them to establish or acquire a significant scientific establishment that they currently lack. For thirty years, while Iran developed its ambitious nuclear program unconstrained, its Saudi arch-rival did not feel any need to do the same. Why would it do so now when serious constraints will be placed on Iran’s nuclear program?

Moreover, “wanting the same” actually means that Saudi Arabia – and any other regional state that seeks to match Iran’s capabilities – would have to accept the same intrusive inspections and monitoring that the Iranians are in the process of accepting. Some suggest that Saudi Arabia would simply acquire a bomb off the Pakistani shelf. But if this option is a real one – and Pakistan’s refusal to join Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen raises significant doubts – it has existed for decades and does not in itself fuel a nuclear arms race as long as the bomb stays on the Pakistani shelf.

While Egypt is building a nuclear power plant and Jordan is talking about establishing an enrichment capacity, they are both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and will have to submit to the NPT’s Additional Protocol of intrusive inspections that Iran has accepted if they are to get the nuclear cooperation they will need. The UAE has signed the 123 agreement, which prevents it from ever acquiring enrichment capacity and requires it to sign the Additional Protocol. In any case, these countries have made clear in their statements and behavior that they are far more concerned by Iran’s unconstrained efforts to promote sectarian strife in their neighborhoods than they are about what will become a heavily constrained Iranian nuclear program.

Meanwhile Turkey, as a NATO ally, already enjoys the cover of an American nuclear umbrella under Article Five of the Treaty and therefore has little reason to head down the costly nuclear weapons road itself.

What about Israel? Its leadership is alarmed by the deal-in-the-making; Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared that it represents an existential threat to the Jewish state. Certainly, Israel has good reason to be concerned about the intentions of the Iranian regime since its leaders declare at regular intervals that their objective is to wipe Israel off the map. Israel’s leaders have the duty to take those threats seriously and they have invested a vast fortune, with the considerable assistance of the United States, in ensuring that Israel’s Defense Forces have the ability to deter Iran or, if necessary, preempt it from acquiring nuclear weapons. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at least one year away from a breakout capability for the next ten-to-fifteen years, Israel has no reason to preempt for the time being. If it did, it could only hope to set back Iran’s nuclear program by some two years – far less than provided for in the nuclear deal. And it would in the process free Iran of all its obligations under the agreement and earn Israel the opprobrium of the other powers that support the deal.

Israel’s concern is greatest when it comes to what happens at the end of the fifteen-year period when Iran will have a full-fledged nuclear program rendered legitimate by its compliance with this agreement and therefore not subject to sanctions. But we will also by then have much greater visibility into Iran’s nuclear program, much greater ability to detect any attempt to switch from a civil to a military nuclear program, and an American president will have all the current military capabilities and much more by then to deal with an Iranian breakout should they attempt one. Indeed, time is not neutral in this situation. The United States, Israel and Iran’s Arab adversaries can do much during this long interval both to encourage Iran to abandon its destabilizing and threatening regional activities, and to contain and deter it if it refuses to do so.

Taking up that challenge will be essential because of the potential impact of sanctions relief on Iran’s regional behavior. Once sanctions are removed, Iran will be the beneficiary of the unfreezing of some $120 billion of assets; its oil revenues are likely to increase by some $20-24 billion annually. It is reasonable to assume that a good part of that windfall will be used to rehabilitate Iran’s struggling economy and fulfill the expectations of Iran’s people for a better life. But it is an equally safe bet that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), and the Iranian Armed Forces will be beneficiaries too. It’s true that punishing sanctions have not prevented these extensions of the Iranian revolution from exploiting the upheavals in the region and the collapse of state institutions to build positions of considerable influence across the Sunni Arab world from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq and now Yemen. Nevertheless, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions are likely to be boosted by the availability of more resources. For example, the Assad regime in Syria is struggling to survive economically at the same time as it is losing control of more territory to opposition forces; a timely infusion of cash and arms might help it cling to power. Similarly, Iraq’s Shia militias, which are armed and trained by Iran, could be boosted at a time when the United States is struggling under Iraqi government constraints to arm and train Sunni militias and Kurdish forces.

Iran will also have money to procure weapons systems for its armed forces, using the extensive Western arms sales to its Arab adversaries as justification. Iran will still be subject to curbs on its ability to acquire some types of sophisticated military equipment, but with money to spend it will probably find a way around those sanctions. Russia’s high profile announcement that it would proceed with the sale of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems, even before the nuclear deal is signed, represents the harbinger of future sales of sophisticated weapons. Indeed, rather than focusing on a nuclear arms race in the region, we should be more concerned about a conventional arms race.

The nuclear agreement with Iran was never intended to deal with these likely consequences of the sanctions-relief that is the quid-pro-quo for Iran’s acceptance of meaningful and extensive curbs on its nuclear program. That puts a particular burden on the United States to develop a regional security strategy to complement the nuclear deal, one that is designed to counter and neutralize these unintended consequences. In doing so, the United States will need to send a clear and consistent message to Iran that if it chooses to abandon its nefarious regional activities and become a responsible partner to the United States and its allies, it will be welcomed into the community of nations in good standing. But if it decides to take advantage of its newly available resources to wreak further regional havoc, the United States will lead a concerted effort to oppose it.

President Obama has already taken the first step in this effort through the Camp David summit he hosted with our Gulf Arab allies last month. That was an important first step in providing them with the necessary strategic reassurance in the face of the uncertain consequences of the nuclear deal on Iran’s behavior in their neighborhood. In the joint communiqué, the President reiterated a U.S. “unequivocal” commitment to “deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners in the Gulf.” The two sides also agreed on a new strategic partnership that would “fast-track” arms transfers, enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense, and develop rapid response capabilities to regional threats. The communiqué and its annex provide all the understandings necessary for laying the foundations of an effective regional security architecture. However, those words will need to be translated into concrete actions at a time when the regional turmoil is generating competing priorities and interests. The GCC states are not united in their approach to the region’s problems and they will continue to fear an American-Iranian rapprochement at their expense no matter how reassuring the President’s words. Nevertheless, the combination of the nuclear deal, a potentially more potent Iranian adversary, and rising instability on their borders, should concentrate their minds and therefore could create the necessary conditions for an effective strategic partnership with the United States that was called forth at Camp David. If they are willing to get their acts together, we should certainly be willing to respond with a determined effort.

Providing strategic reassurance to our Gulf Arab allies is but the first step. The United States will also need to build more effective strategic partnerships with Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, our other traditional regional allies who wield much greater capabilities and influence than most of the GCC states. For a variety of justifiable reasons, the Obama Administration is at loggerheads with each one of these regional powers: with the government of Israel because of its unwillingness seriously to pursue the two state solution or freeze settlement activity; with the Egyptian regime because of the treatment of its own people; and with the Turkish president because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the United States against ISIS. But at this
sensitive moment, reassuring each one of them is essential if they are to be enlisted in the effort to lay the groundwork for a regional security framework that begins to reestablish order in this troubled region and prevents Iran from further exploitation of the chaos.

Just having the conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu is proving exceedingly difficult since he is so determined to scuttle the Iran nuclear deal that he does not want to give any hint that he might be prepared to compromise on his opposition for the sake of strategic reassurances from the United States. Nevertheless, if the deal goes through, it will be important for the United States in the immediate aftermath to take a series of steps to strengthen Israel’s ability to defend itself from, and therefore deter, any potential Iranian nuclear threat. Such measures could include completing the negotiations on a new 10-year agreement to provide military assistance to Israel at an increased level (this is something that Congress could initiate in coordination with the Administration). The funding could be used to cover the purchase of additional F-35s and the development and deployment of the full array of air defense systems from Iron Dome to Arrow III to protect Israeli civilians from Hezbollah and Hamas rockets all the way up to Iranian ballistic missiles. Additional funding could also be used to strengthen Israel’s deterrent capabilities, including the purchase of additional submarines.

Finally, to take care of the likely increasing nervousness among our regional allies as the nuclear agreement approaches its expiration date ten-to-fifteen years from now, the United States needs to begin to lay the groundwork for establishing a nuclear umbrella over all of them. This form of extended deterrence will be an important element in an American-sponsored regional security framework. Neither Israel nor our GCC allies are prepared to consider that at the moment, nor is it likely that Congress would approve such a commitment for any regional ally in the Middle East except Israel (ironically, Turkey already has such a commitment through NATO). But if the policy of strategic reassurance is pursued consistently by this president and his successors, it is possible that all sides may come to see the virtue of a nuclear and conventional security guarantee that will effectively deter Iran, render an Israeli preemptive strike unnecessary, and remove any incentive for the Arab states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

Mr. Chairman, a credible nuclear agreement will provide an extended breathing space for the United States and our regional allies free from the threat of a nuclear Iran that should last beyond the next administration and probably the one after that. It will nevertheless raise many concerns in the Middle East about Iran’s destabilizing behavior and hegemonic ambitions that the United States cannot address in the agreement itself but will have to address outside the agreement. In my view, that is not a justification for opposing the agreement. It is rather a reason for complementing the agreement with a robust effort to promote a regional security strategy that takes advantage of the respite to begin to rebuild a more stable order in this chaotic but still vital region.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/05/15-21st-century-peacekeeping?rssid=indykm{BDA371C6-A31E-4F7B-AED3-113E5145B1CD}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/92099981/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Peacekeeping-and-geopolitics-in-the-st-centuryPeacekeeping and geopolitics in the 21st century

Event Information

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, hopes abounded for a peaceful and more stable world with the end of the Cold War. Great-power competition, it seemed, was no longer a threat. Global security efforts were focused on stabilizing smaller conflicts, in part through multinational peacekeeping efforts. Today, the tide seems to changing with the re-emergence of great-power tensions. At the same time, many in the international community are skeptical about the effectiveness of peacekeeping with some engagements now lasting more than a decade—in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan—with no immediate end in sight.

On Friday, May 15, the Project on International Order and Strategy hosted a discussion about the current state of geopolitics and international peacekeeping. The conversation, a part of the Foreign Policy program’s Order from Chaos project, featured Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former United Nations’ undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. Guéhenno discussed his new memoir "The Fog of Peace: How International Engagement Can Stop the Conflicts of the 21st Century" (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In his role as the U.N.’s lead peacekeeper, Guéhenno oversaw the largest expansion of peacekeeping missions in U.N. history. His insights into peacekeeping, international diplomacy, and great-power relations illuminated some of the challenges we face today, including the crisis in Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the accommodation of rising powers in a new world order.

Event Information

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, hopes abounded for a peaceful and more stable world with the end of the Cold War. Great-power competition, it seemed, was no longer a threat. Global security efforts were focused on stabilizing smaller conflicts, in part through multinational peacekeeping efforts. Today, the tide seems to changing with the re-emergence of great-power tensions. At the same time, many in the international community are skeptical about the effectiveness of peacekeeping with some engagements now lasting more than a decade—in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan—with no immediate end in sight.

On Friday, May 15, the Project on International Order and Strategy hosted a discussion about the current state of geopolitics and international peacekeeping. The conversation, a part of the Foreign Policy program’s Order from Chaos project, featured Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former United Nations’ undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. Guéhenno discussed his new memoir "The Fog of Peace: How International Engagement Can Stop the Conflicts of the 21st Century" (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In his role as the U.N.’s lead peacekeeper, Guéhenno oversaw the largest expansion of peacekeeping missions in U.N. history. His insights into peacekeeping, international diplomacy, and great-power relations illuminated some of the challenges we face today, including the crisis in Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the accommodation of rising powers in a new world order.

Event Information

The rise of think tanks has drawn great attention in China, particularly among the Chinese leadership. In April 2013, President Xi Jinping made the development of think tanks a national strategic priority when he called for the construction of “new think tanks with Chinese characteristics.” Earlier this year, the CCP Central Committee drew a road map for think tank development when it issued its “Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of New Types of Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics.” As China’s think tank fever has warmed progressively, domestic discussion has focused on drawing from the experience of successful think tanks abroad to not only improve the quality of government policy making, but also to increase the momentum for deepening comprehensive reform.

On April 21, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted experts from both Chinese and overseas think tanks to discuss the next steps on China's path to developing world-class think tanks. The event featured a discussion between Martin Indyk, Executive Vice President at the Brookings Institution, and LI Yang, Vice President at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Three additional panels followed addressing China’s think tank construction and international cooperation. The summit invited leading Chinese scholars to engage with Brookings scholars and other foreign experts on these issues.

Event Information

The rise of think tanks has drawn great attention in China, particularly among the Chinese leadership. In April 2013, President Xi Jinping made the development of think tanks a national strategic priority when he called for the construction of “new think tanks with Chinese characteristics.” Earlier this year, the CCP Central Committee drew a road map for think tank development when it issued its “Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of New Types of Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics.” As China’s think tank fever has warmed progressively, domestic discussion has focused on drawing from the experience of successful think tanks abroad to not only improve the quality of government policy making, but also to increase the momentum for deepening comprehensive reform.

On April 21, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted experts from both Chinese and overseas think tanks to discuss the next steps on China's path to developing world-class think tanks. The event featured a discussion between Martin Indyk, Executive Vice President at the Brookings Institution, and LI Yang, Vice President at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Three additional panels followed addressing China’s think tank construction and international cooperation. The summit invited leading Chinese scholars to engage with Brookings scholars and other foreign experts on these issues.

Transcript

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/04/09-breyer-lecture-syria-chemical-weapons?rssid=indykm{F56AE2A0-1A24-4B52-99A4-4ABFCA8712C4}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/88646866/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~The-search-for-international-consensus-on-Syria-and-beyondThe search for international consensus on Syria and beyond

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In 2013, the international community came together to protect the Syrian population by committing to the elimination of Syria’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons, a feat achieved the following year. Together, the United Nations and the Nobel-Prize winning Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are credited with achieving one of the few breakthroughs in containing the ongoing crisis in Syria. What lessons can be learned for application in other conflict areas, especially as OPCW continues its work destroying chemical weapons facilities in Syria this year?

On April 9, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and The Hague Institute for Global Justice hosted OPCW Director General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for a discussion about the process of dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and implications for peace, security, and accountability. This event marks the second annual Justice Stephen Breyer International Law Lecture, which addresses critical issues of international law and policy. Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk introduced Ambassador Üzümcü. Deputy Mayor of The Hague Ingrid van Engelshoven provided brief opening remarks, and Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, moderated the discussion. Senior fellow at the Middle East Institute Robert S. Ford (U.S. Ambassador to Syria, 2010-2014) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart joined the discussion with Ambassador Üzümcü, following his keynote address.

Event Information

In 2013, the international community came together to protect the Syrian population by committing to the elimination of Syria’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons, a feat achieved the following year. Together, the United Nations and the Nobel-Prize winning Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are credited with achieving one of the few breakthroughs in containing the ongoing crisis in Syria. What lessons can be learned for application in other conflict areas, especially as OPCW continues its work destroying chemical weapons facilities in Syria this year?

On April 9, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and The Hague Institute for Global Justice hosted OPCW Director General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for a discussion about the process of dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and implications for peace, security, and accountability. This event marks the second annual Justice Stephen Breyer International Law Lecture, which addresses critical issues of international law and policy. Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk introduced Ambassador Üzümcü. Deputy Mayor of The Hague Ingrid van Engelshoven provided brief opening remarks, and Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, moderated the discussion. Senior fellow at the Middle East Institute Robert S. Ford (U.S. Ambassador to Syria, 2010-2014) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart joined the discussion with Ambassador Üzümcü, following his keynote address.

Audio

Transcript

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/19-need-us-leadership-indyk-jones?rssid=indykm{ED4ED082-0D7E-429A-8808-32CCF80BDA60}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87529316/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Order-from-chaos-The-need-for-US-leadershipOrder from chaos: The need for U.S. leadership

The post-Cold War liberal international order is in trouble. For a quarter century, the world has experienced an era of growing global interdependence and relative peace and prosperity, brought about largely through the leadership of the United States and in the absence of genuine geopolitical competition. Now, though, several fundamental challenges to that order have emerged: in Europe, Russia seeks to undo the post-Cold War settlement through aggression; in Asia, the rise of an assertive China is generating friction; and in the Middle East, the American-led order is collapsing.

This intensification of geopolitics has been accompanied by a return to competition between democracies and autocracies. China’s rise and Russia’s recovery (at least until recently) have generated a new model of “authoritarian capitalism” at a time when the global financial crisis put a dent in the credibility of the Western economic model and the disappointments and consequences of the “Arab Spring” have led many to question the value of promoting liberal democracy. Transnational and global threats also pose deepening challenges to the United States, though also to its geopolitical competitors. Climate change, pandemic disease, and radical Islamic extremism pose shared threats, though as yet common solutions have largely eluded the powers. The digital revolution holds out the promise of a leveled playing field and increased productivity, but its disruptive impact will be felt in every corner of the globe.

All this also comes amid relative weakness in the Western alliance, characterized by political gridlock in Washington, double or even triple-dip recession in Europe, and continuing stagnation in Japan. In Asia and Europe, crises have both strengthened and strained alliances; in the Middle East, those alliances are badly frayed.

All told, we appear to be at one of history's pivotal junctures, and again, the response of the United States will be critical. For all the talk of America's relative decline, the United States retains more capacity than any other power to impact the calculations and policies of others. But America’s competitors are too powerful and their visions too different to imagine that U.S. leadership alone is a sufficient ingredient to maintain the liberal, rules-based international order that now feels so threatened by rising chaos.

In short, the task is urgent and complicated: how to reinvent the liberal international order in the face of so many centrifugal forces so that it can provide greater stability, peace, prosperity, and freedom; and how to do it in ways that encourage cooperation from other world powers, reduce friction generated by competition with them, and, if necessary, contain or constrain their ability to undermine the order.

To respond to this moment, Foreign Policy at Brookings is beginning a broad research project—“Order from Chaos” to understand the challenges to the international order and to develop strategies to deal with them. It is designed to promote a public conversation between the Foreign Policy Program's scholars, distinguished fellows, and non-resident scholars and other experts from within and outside Brookings. It will provide analyses on the dynamics, challenges, and stresses impacting today's international order. We will seek to define U.S. interests in this new era and develop specific strategies for promoting a revitalized international order. The ultimate goal of our “Order from Chaos” endeavor is to provide policy recommendations on how to develop the necessary military, economic, diplomatic, and social policies to redesign and reinforce the architecture of the international order.

The Order from Chaos project will focus on these and other critical issues, contributing to the policy debate during the 2016 U.S. presidential election process and to policy formation for the next president. It will conduct research on six major themes:

Rising and Revisionist Powers: The dynamics and interactions of those powers that seek to resist or change the international order.

Flashpoints: Unfolding or potential crises that threaten regional or international order.

Critical Leaders: Studies of key leaders whose visions of alternative forms of order will play a key role in shaping what lies ahead.

Alliance Dynamics: The interaction between the United States and its key allies, particularly in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Geo-economics and Energy: The geopolitics of economic globalization, energy and climate change.

Developing a Bipartisan Strategy for the Next U.S. President.

The “Order from Chaos” blog is part of that larger project and intended to help us debate the issues involved, with both internal and external audiences, as well as communicate our findings and views.

The name “Order from Chaos” reflects the urgency of the moment and the potential implications of failing to respond. We remain confident that the liberal international order that has been so painstakingly created over the last seventy years can persevere through the current challenges. But to so do it will have to respond and adapt. We hope in some small way through our research efforts to contribute to that important effort.

Authors

The post-Cold War liberal international order is in trouble. For a quarter century, the world has experienced an era of growing global interdependence and relative peace and prosperity, brought about largely through the leadership of the United States and in the absence of genuine geopolitical competition. Now, though, several fundamental challenges to that order have emerged: in Europe, Russia seeks to undo the post-Cold War settlement through aggression; in Asia, the rise of an assertive China is generating friction; and in the Middle East, the American-led order is collapsing.

This intensification of geopolitics has been accompanied by a return to competition between democracies and autocracies. China’s rise and Russia’s recovery (at least until recently) have generated a new model of “authoritarian capitalism” at a time when the global financial crisis put a dent in the credibility of the Western economic model and the disappointments and consequences of the “Arab Spring” have led many to question the value of promoting liberal democracy. Transnational and global threats also pose deepening challenges to the United States, though also to its geopolitical competitors. Climate change, pandemic disease, and radical Islamic extremism pose shared threats, though as yet common solutions have largely eluded the powers. The digital revolution holds out the promise of a leveled playing field and increased productivity, but its disruptive impact will be felt in every corner of the globe.

All this also comes amid relative weakness in the Western alliance, characterized by political gridlock in Washington, double or even triple-dip recession in Europe, and continuing stagnation in Japan. In Asia and Europe, crises have both strengthened and strained alliances; in the Middle East, those alliances are badly frayed.

All told, we appear to be at one of history's pivotal junctures, and again, the response of the United States will be critical. For all the talk of America's relative decline, the United States retains more capacity than any other power to impact the calculations and policies of others. But America’s competitors are too powerful and their visions too different to imagine that U.S. leadership alone is a sufficient ingredient to maintain the liberal, rules-based international order that now feels so threatened by rising chaos.

In short, the task is urgent and complicated: how to reinvent the liberal international order in the face of so many centrifugal forces so that it can provide greater stability, peace, prosperity, and freedom; and how to do it in ways that encourage cooperation from other world powers, reduce friction generated by competition with them, and, if necessary, contain or constrain their ability to undermine the order.

To respond to this moment, Foreign Policy at Brookings is beginning a broad research project—“Order from Chaos” to understand the challenges to the international order and to develop strategies to deal with them. It is designed to promote a public conversation between the Foreign Policy Program's scholars, distinguished fellows, and non-resident scholars and other experts from within and outside Brookings. It will provide analyses on the dynamics, challenges, and stresses impacting today's international order. We will seek to define U.S. interests in this new era and develop specific strategies for promoting a revitalized international order. The ultimate goal of our “Order from Chaos” endeavor is to provide policy recommendations on how to develop the necessary military, economic, diplomatic, and social policies to redesign and reinforce the architecture of the international order.

The Order from Chaos project will focus on these and other critical issues, contributing to the policy debate during the 2016 U.S. presidential election process and to policy formation for the next president. It will conduct research on six major themes:

Rising and Revisionist Powers: The dynamics and interactions of those powers that seek to resist or change the international order.

Flashpoints: Unfolding or potential crises that threaten regional or international order.

Critical Leaders: Studies of key leaders whose visions of alternative forms of order will play a key role in shaping what lies ahead.

Alliance Dynamics: The interaction between the United States and its key allies, particularly in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Geo-economics and Energy: The geopolitics of economic globalization, energy and climate change.

Developing a Bipartisan Strategy for the Next U.S. President.

The “Order from Chaos” blog is part of that larger project and intended to help us debate the issues involved, with both internal and external audiences, as well as communicate our findings and views.

The name “Order from Chaos” reflects the urgency of the moment and the potential implications of failing to respond. We remain confident that the liberal international order that has been so painstakingly created over the last seventy years can persevere through the current challenges. But to so do it will have to respond and adapt. We hope in some small way through our research efforts to contribute to that important effort.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/17-israeli-elections-rabinovich-wittes-indyk-sachs?rssid=indykm{421F73B6-8AA7-49C1-9A83-4A2D2C03F958}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87175319/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Israel%e2%80%99s-elections-what-to-expectIsrael’s elections: what to expect

The polls

Based on polling data, Sachs outlined the three most likely scenarios for Israel’s next government, including a Netanyahu-led, right-wing coalition and a Herzog-led coalition. Much would depend on what Moshe Kahlon, the chairman of the Kulanu party who is expected to be the kingmaker in these elections, decides to recommend to the president as his party’s choice for prime minister.

According to Sachs, a third possible outcome of the vote is a national unity government, if the results resemble the polls and Kahlon declines to recommend a candidate for prime minister to the president.

Wittes noted that the data indicate that the next parliament will be deeply fragmented, making governing difficult regardless of who forms the next coalition.

Whither the Palestinian issue?

Indyk remarked that the candidates seemed determined to avoid discussing Israel’s most pressing issues during the campaign—in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rabinovich explained that the Israeli electorate has shifted to the right in recent years. Rabinovich stated that the electorate’s rightward trend renders this a no-win issue for Labor chairman and Zionist Union co-leader Isaac Herzog and especially for Tzipi Livni—Herzog’s partner in the Zionist Union who is closely associated with the peace negotiations. According to Rabinovich, despite its nonappearance in the campaign, the Palestinian issue remains an underlying factor determining many voters’ attitudes.

Wittes noted that the relative silence on the Palestinian issue does not imply that the Israeli public is satisfied with the status quo. While they may not feel the day-to-day costs of the ongoing conflict, she said, the tensions in and around Jerusalem and the prospect of another war in Gaza do weigh heavily on voters. Wittes said that Israelis do not believe that a solution exists that their leadership is bold enough to grasp. For Israelis, she explained, the problem does not lie only with their own leadership; it lies with the other side—with rising instability on Israel’s borders and Israelis’ lack of faith in Mahmoud Abbas as a negotiating partner.

Moreover, Rabinovich noted that the center-left of the Israeli political spectrum has failed to produce a compelling alternative that can lead Israel towards peace and security. On the contrary, the Likud and the Jewish Home Party’s campaigns have used the issue of regional chaos to sow fear amongst the electorate.

Sachs said the 2015 campaign has really been a battle of agendas. Netanyahu prefers to focus on security issues—for instance, by arguing that a Herzog-Livni government would endanger Israel by making territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Yet, a recent poll found that 64 percent of Israelis felt that the peace process would not advance after the elections regardless of who forms the next government. In light of this sentiment, Sachs noted, many Israelis focus on socio-economic issues, allowing the opposition to capitalize on public anger against Netanyahu for Israel’s housing crisis and the cost of living.

The U.S.-Israel relationship

Indyk recalled that in previous elections, the reelection bids of incumbent candidates who mishandled Israel’s relationship with the United States suffered as a result. Yet, he noted, Netanyahu appears to have calculated that he stands to benefit from a confrontation with the Obama administration. Sachs said that although President Obama is not popular in Israel, Israelis appreciate the importance of the U.S. relationship, and do not look kindly on a prime minister who quarrels with Washington. He added that Netanyahu was criticized in Israel for his approach to the United States and, in particular, for the fallout of his recent trip to address Congress on the Iranian threat, which angered the administration.

Israel’s next government: what to expect

Indyk said that, because of the volatility among the Palestinians and the importance of the peace process to Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration remains committed to advancing peace talks, and would be willing to work with an Israeli government committed to a two-state solution. Should Israel’s next government oppose a two-state solution, Indyk predicted that the Obama administration may seek to press for a United Nations Security Council resolution outlining the basic principles of a two-state solution, in order to preserve future options while containing the potential for short-term violence.

Rabinovich stated that the European Union has found that soft power works with regard to Israel and argued that if the United States does indeed choose to internationalize the effort to resolve the conflict, some European countries may ratchet up pressure on Israel.

Wittes argued that a new Israeli initiative to revive negotiations with the Palestinians is unlikely to emerge from the election. Rather, she said, depending on who forms the next government, there may be new proposals for unilateral actions. However, given the brewing crisis in the West Bank, the dire humanitarian circumstances in Gaza, and the formalization of the Palestinians’ accession to the International Criminal Court on April 1, the new Israeli prime minister will likely face a crisis with the Palestinians early in his or her tenure.

The polls

Based on polling data, Sachs outlined the three most likely scenarios for Israel’s next government, including a Netanyahu-led, right-wing coalition and a Herzog-led coalition. Much would depend on what Moshe Kahlon, the chairman of the Kulanu party who is expected to be the kingmaker in these elections, decides to recommend to the president as his party’s choice for prime minister.

According to Sachs, a third possible outcome of the vote is a national unity government, if the results resemble the polls and Kahlon declines to recommend a candidate for prime minister to the president.

Wittes noted that the data indicate that the next parliament will be deeply fragmented, making governing difficult regardless of who forms the next coalition.

Whither the Palestinian issue?

Indyk remarked that the candidates seemed determined to avoid discussing Israel’s most pressing issues during the campaign—in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rabinovich explained that the Israeli electorate has shifted to the right in recent years. Rabinovich stated that the electorate’s rightward trend renders this a no-win issue for Labor chairman and Zionist Union co-leader Isaac Herzog and especially for Tzipi Livni—Herzog’s partner in the Zionist Union who is closely associated with the peace negotiations. According to Rabinovich, despite its nonappearance in the campaign, the Palestinian issue remains an underlying factor determining many voters’ attitudes.

Wittes noted that the relative silence on the Palestinian issue does not imply that the Israeli public is satisfied with the status quo. While they may not feel the day-to-day costs of the ongoing conflict, she said, the tensions in and around Jerusalem and the prospect of another war in Gaza do weigh heavily on voters. Wittes said that Israelis do not believe that a solution exists that their leadership is bold enough to grasp. For Israelis, she explained, the problem does not lie only with their own leadership; it lies with the other side—with rising instability on Israel’s borders and Israelis’ lack of faith in Mahmoud Abbas as a negotiating partner.

Moreover, Rabinovich noted that the center-left of the Israeli political spectrum has failed to produce a compelling alternative that can lead Israel towards peace and security. On the contrary, the Likud and the Jewish Home Party’s campaigns have used the issue of regional chaos to sow fear amongst the electorate.

Sachs said the 2015 campaign has really been a battle of agendas. Netanyahu prefers to focus on security issues—for instance, by arguing that a Herzog-Livni government would endanger Israel by making territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Yet, a recent poll found that 64 percent of Israelis felt that the peace process would not advance after the elections regardless of who forms the next government. In light of this sentiment, Sachs noted, many Israelis focus on socio-economic issues, allowing the opposition to capitalize on public anger against Netanyahu for Israel’s housing crisis and the cost of living.

The U.S.-Israel relationship

Indyk recalled that in previous elections, the reelection bids of incumbent candidates who mishandled Israel’s relationship with the United States suffered as a result. Yet, he noted, Netanyahu appears to have calculated that he stands to benefit from a confrontation with the Obama administration. Sachs said that although President Obama is not popular in Israel, Israelis appreciate the importance of the U.S. relationship, and do not look kindly on a prime minister who quarrels with Washington. He added that Netanyahu was criticized in Israel for his approach to the United States and, in particular, for the fallout of his recent trip to address Congress on the Iranian threat, which angered the administration.

Israel’s next government: what to expect

Indyk said that, because of the volatility among the Palestinians and the importance of the peace process to Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration remains committed to advancing peace talks, and would be willing to work with an Israeli government committed to a two-state solution. Should Israel’s next government oppose a two-state solution, Indyk predicted that the Obama administration may seek to press for a United Nations Security Council resolution outlining the basic principles of a two-state solution, in order to preserve future options while containing the potential for short-term violence.

Rabinovich stated that the European Union has found that soft power works with regard to Israel and argued that if the United States does indeed choose to internationalize the effort to resolve the conflict, some European countries may ratchet up pressure on Israel.

Wittes argued that a new Israeli initiative to revive negotiations with the Palestinians is unlikely to emerge from the election. Rather, she said, depending on who forms the next government, there may be new proposals for unilateral actions. However, given the brewing crisis in the West Bank, the dire humanitarian circumstances in Gaza, and the formalization of the Palestinians’ accession to the International Criminal Court on April 1, the new Israeli prime minister will likely face a crisis with the Palestinians early in his or her tenure.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/13-brookings-mena-posts-roundup?rssid=indykm{C1CBF783-06B6-4581-B2C1-616513499BF6}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86945092/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~In-case-you-missed-it-More-from-Brookings-on-the-Middle-East-just-in-time-for-the-weekendIn case you missed it: More from Brookings on the Middle East, just in time for the weekendWith so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what’s been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.

Finally, Israelis head to the polls next week. We trust you’ve been reading the excellent coverage by Natan Sachs, fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Lauren Mellinger, senior research assistant, in our Israeli Elections Series, but hope you’ll take a few minutes to listen to Sachs on Lawfare’s podcast, discussing Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress last week in Washington.

Authors

Stephanie Dahle

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Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:26:00 -0400Stephanie DahleWith so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what’s been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.

Finally, Israelis head to the polls next week. We trust you’ve been reading the excellent coverage by Natan Sachs, fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Lauren Mellinger, senior research assistant, in our Israeli Elections Series, but hope you’ll take a few minutes to listen to Sachs on Lawfare’s podcast, discussing Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress last week in Washington.

Authors

Stephanie Dahle

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/03/11-upcoming-israel-elections?rssid=indykm{DF6C2390-CE55-4C7A-83DB-35185A2E1870}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86790053/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Israel%e2%80%99s-upcoming-elections-What-to-watch-what-to-expectIsrael’s upcoming elections: What to watch, what to expect

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/10-necessity-of-choice-middle-east-indyk?rssid=indykm{259FAEA9-0C6F-4FEC-8632-EF171B861501}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86755942/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~The-necessity-of-choice-in-the-Middle-EastThe necessity of choice in the Middle East

I had a rather weird reaction to the criticism of my colleagues, Tamara Wittes and Mike O’Hanlon, to my Order from Chaos blog posts (Part 1, Part 2) about the need to choose a strategic option in the Middle East. I agreed with them! Indeed, I had in earlier times drawn the same conclusions as they did in grappling with the lessons for U.S. policy of the revolutions that have been shaking the Arab world since 2011.

As I admitted in my first blog, the pursuit of order and stability in a volatile region led the United States to back authoritarian Sunni Arab regimes that systematically failed to meet the needs of their people. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted before the Arab revolutions: “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither.”

The problem, however, is that in shifting to the pursuit of democracy, the United States begot a hell of a lot more instability than it bargained for: a sectarian, pro-Iranian, Shiite government in Iraq; a feckless Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt; an ungovernable Libya; a Hamas-ruled Gaza, etc.

Mike O’Hanlon would have us ignore that sorry record that contributed to immense human suffering and push ahead with policies based on American values, distancing ourselves in particular from Saudi Arabia and Egypt because of their human rights abuses. Tamara Wittes is a little more cautious, advocating for selective engagement, partnership with “effective local actors,” avoidance of internecine arguments, and support for those “beleaguered few” who still work for tolerance and pluralism. Tamara doesn’t say whom she’s talking about, but her criteria fit Jordan, Tunisia, and maybe Morocco. They just happen to be three of the smaller, weaker states in the region.

These approaches would be appropriate if we were debating policy towards the South Pacific, but we’re talking about the Middle East. Its geo-strategic location, its oil deposits, and its crucible of civilizations make it too important to allow us to pursue a policy of moral aloofness. We need a strategy for rebuilding order and you can’t base such a strategy on weak partners while adopting policies bound to alienate the strong ones.

The better answer would be to try to find a middle way that helps to reestablish order while not abandoning the pursuit of justice. I guess Mike O’Hanlon would go along with that. And that’s exactly what I would have recommended if I thought it had a snowball’s chance in hell of working. But in the current environment in which the old order has collapsed and the resultant chaos is being exploited by America’s Iranian and ISIS adversaries, the United States cannot afford the luxury of groping for a balanced approach. We need to prioritize order for now and pursue justice a little later. We need to choose the side that has an interest in restoring order—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the other Sunni monarchs (including Jordan and Morocco), together with Israel.

This is not an “alliance of convenience” that will quickly break down, as Tamara would have us believe; it’s a partnership based on common interests and common adversaries. Of course they have their tactical differences (e.g. how hard to squeeze Hamas, how important it is to try to resolve the Palestinian issue, whether Iran and/or the Muslim Brotherhood present more of a threat than ISIS). But they have already demonstrated their willingness to take the collective action that Tamara claims is impossible in their participation in the coalition combating ISIS. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have buried their differences in the face of the common threat from ISIS and Iran. We would find them willing to adjust their policies to our requirements and do more if we were able to overcome the mistrust that is poisoning our relations with these traditional allies of the United States.

To do that, the Obama Administration would have to downplay, for the time being, its insistence on political “inclusiveness” in Egypt. It would need to pursue a more robust effort to undermine Assad’s remaining grip on parts of Syria. And the United States would need to provide strategic reassurance to the Gulf states and Israel in the context of a potential nuclear deal with Iran that will likely leave it as a near-threshold nuclear power (one press report indicates this may already be happening).

That does not mean avoiding criticism of policies that are bound to be counterproductive (like lumping the Muslim Brotherhood together with ISIS, shooting peaceful demonstrators in the streets of Cairo, and locking up tens of thousands more). But all of these states feel deeply threatened by the chaos that surrounds them and what they perceive as an Iranian encirclement. In such circumstances they see things in black and white terms: are you with us or against us, they ask. And we should be the first to understand that insecurity, since that’s how we Americans reacted after 9/11.

So the first priority is to reassure them that we are with them. Once they feel they can rely on us again it will be easier to persuade them to adjust the policies that we have good reason to object to. In other words, this should not be “an uncritical alliance,” but it can only work as a “tough love alliance” if our putative partners first come to understand that we intend to treat them as allies but will expect the same from them.

Authors

I had a rather weird reaction to the criticism of my colleagues, Tamara Wittes and Mike O’Hanlon, to my Order from Chaos blog posts (Part 1, Part 2) about the need to choose a strategic option in the Middle East. I agreed with them! Indeed, I had in earlier times drawn the same conclusions as they did in grappling with the lessons for U.S. policy of the revolutions that have been shaking the Arab world since 2011.

As I admitted in my first blog, the pursuit of order and stability in a volatile region led the United States to back authoritarian Sunni Arab regimes that systematically failed to meet the needs of their people. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted before the Arab revolutions: “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither.”

The problem, however, is that in shifting to the pursuit of democracy, the United States begot a hell of a lot more instability than it bargained for: a sectarian, pro-Iranian, Shiite government in Iraq; a feckless Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt; an ungovernable Libya; a Hamas-ruled Gaza, etc.

Mike O’Hanlon would have us ignore that sorry record that contributed to immense human suffering and push ahead with policies based on American values, distancing ourselves in particular from Saudi Arabia and Egypt because of their human rights abuses. Tamara Wittes is a little more cautious, advocating for selective engagement, partnership with “effective local actors,” avoidance of internecine arguments, and support for those “beleaguered few” who still work for tolerance and pluralism. Tamara doesn’t say whom she’s talking about, but her criteria fit Jordan, Tunisia, and maybe Morocco. They just happen to be three of the smaller, weaker states in the region.

These approaches would be appropriate if we were debating policy towards the South Pacific, but we’re talking about the Middle East. Its geo-strategic location, its oil deposits, and its crucible of civilizations make it too important to allow us to pursue a policy of moral aloofness. We need a strategy for rebuilding order and you can’t base such a strategy on weak partners while adopting policies bound to alienate the strong ones.

The better answer would be to try to find a middle way that helps to reestablish order while not abandoning the pursuit of justice. I guess Mike O’Hanlon would go along with that. And that’s exactly what I would have recommended if I thought it had a snowball’s chance in hell of working. But in the current environment in which the old order has collapsed and the resultant chaos is being exploited by America’s Iranian and ISIS adversaries, the United States cannot afford the luxury of groping for a balanced approach. We need to prioritize order for now and pursue justice a little later. We need to choose the side that has an interest in restoring order—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the other Sunni monarchs (including Jordan and Morocco), together with Israel.

This is not an “alliance of convenience” that will quickly break down, as Tamara would have us believe; it’s a partnership based on common interests and common adversaries. Of course they have their tactical differences (e.g. how hard to squeeze Hamas, how important it is to try to resolve the Palestinian issue, whether Iran and/or the Muslim Brotherhood present more of a threat than ISIS). But they have already demonstrated their willingness to take the collective action that Tamara claims is impossible in their participation in the coalition combating ISIS. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have buried their differences in the face of the common threat from ISIS and Iran. We would find them willing to adjust their policies to our requirements and do more if we were able to overcome the mistrust that is poisoning our relations with these traditional allies of the United States.

To do that, the Obama Administration would have to downplay, for the time being, its insistence on political “inclusiveness” in Egypt. It would need to pursue a more robust effort to undermine Assad’s remaining grip on parts of Syria. And the United States would need to provide strategic reassurance to the Gulf states and Israel in the context of a potential nuclear deal with Iran that will likely leave it as a near-threshold nuclear power (one press report indicates this may already be happening).

That does not mean avoiding criticism of policies that are bound to be counterproductive (like lumping the Muslim Brotherhood together with ISIS, shooting peaceful demonstrators in the streets of Cairo, and locking up tens of thousands more). But all of these states feel deeply threatened by the chaos that surrounds them and what they perceive as an Iranian encirclement. In such circumstances they see things in black and white terms: are you with us or against us, they ask. And we should be the first to understand that insecurity, since that’s how we Americans reacted after 9/11.

So the first priority is to reassure them that we are with them. Once they feel they can rely on us again it will be easier to persuade them to adjust the policies that we have good reason to object to. In other words, this should not be “an uncritical alliance,” but it can only work as a “tough love alliance” if our putative partners first come to understand that we intend to treat them as allies but will expect the same from them.

This week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at a joint meeting of Congress. His address sparked an intense debate among U.S. and Israeli lawmakers over the protocol issues raised by the invitation to speak, which came from the Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives without consultation with the Obama White House, as well as the substance of the address — a broadside against Obama’s Iran policy — and its timing during the final days of a closely contested Israeli election.

Brookings scholars weighed in on the debate, through blog posts, op-eds and the media. These include:

Fellow Natan Sachs explained why Netanyahu’s speech was so controversial. "Israelis, by and large, don't like it when their prime minister quarrels with the United States," Sachs told Vox. "For most voters, especially in the core base on the right and I think center right, here's Bibi doing something that opposition leaders cannot do: speak the way he does with his English and this reception from Americans.” Also read Sachs' blog post on the electoral implications of the speech as well as his Haaretz op-ed with recommendations for Israeli and American strategy toward the Iran nuclear talks.

A New York Times editorial examining Netanyahu's speech discussed American public opinion on the Iran nuclear deal, and cited Telhami’s poll results “show[ing] that a clear majority of Americans — including 61 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of Democrats — favor an agreement.” Telhami also organized and moderated the annual Sadat Forum earlier this week, featuring a discussion on the Iranian nuclear issue and the Netanyahu speech with Brookings Distinguished Fellow Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jessica Matthews, and CMEP Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney.

In an op-ed on U.S. News and World Report, Maloney argued that when it comes to a deal with Iran, “The ever-present illusion of a more perfect deal is not worth risking an imperfect, but minimally sufficient, bargain.”

With the prospect of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 looking increasingly likely and with the caveat that, “as always, Iran’s future behavior is hard to predict because its motives going into the nuclear negotiations are unclear and its decision-making is always opaque,” Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack examined the possible scenarios and offered his thoughts on whether a nuclear deal would likely make Iran more or less aggressive — or neither.

Last week, William Galston, who holds Brookings' Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, wrote about the implications of Netanyahu’s speech, warning that “[t]he last thing he should want is a negative reception in the United States that fuels Israeli swing voters’ doubts about his capacity to manage Israel’s most important relationship.” And in his Washington Post column last week, Senior Fellow Robert Kagan argued that “there is no doubt that the precedent being set is a bad one” and regretted that “bringing a foreign leader before Congress to challenge a U.S. president’s policies…will be just another weapon in our bitter partisan struggle.”

And finally, for anyone wanting to see what our scholars were tweeting during Netanyahu’s speech, and reaction afterward, here’s a round-up.

Authors

This week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at a joint meeting of Congress. His address sparked an intense debate among U.S. and Israeli lawmakers over the protocol issues raised by the invitation to speak, which came from the Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives without consultation with the Obama White House, as well as the substance of the address — a broadside against Obama’s Iran policy — and its timing during the final days of a closely contested Israeli election.

Brookings scholars weighed in on the debate, through blog posts, op-eds and the media. These include:

Fellow Natan Sachs explained why Netanyahu’s speech was so controversial. "Israelis, by and large, don't like it when their prime minister quarrels with the United States," Sachs told Vox. "For most voters, especially in the core base on the right and I think center right, here's Bibi doing something that opposition leaders cannot do: speak the way he does with his English and this reception from Americans.” Also read Sachs' blog post on the electoral implications of the speech as well as his Haaretz op-ed with recommendations for Israeli and American strategy toward the Iran nuclear talks.

A New York Times editorial examining Netanyahu's speech discussed American public opinion on the Iran nuclear deal, and cited Telhami’s poll results “show[ing] that a clear majority of Americans — including 61 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of Democrats — favor an agreement.” Telhami also organized and moderated the annual Sadat Forum earlier this week, featuring a discussion on the Iranian nuclear issue and the Netanyahu speech with Brookings Distinguished Fellow Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jessica Matthews, and CMEP Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney.

In an op-ed on U.S. News and World Report, Maloney argued that when it comes to a deal with Iran, “The ever-present illusion of a more perfect deal is not worth risking an imperfect, but minimally sufficient, bargain.”

With the prospect of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 looking increasingly likely and with the caveat that, “as always, Iran’s future behavior is hard to predict because its motives going into the nuclear negotiations are unclear and its decision-making is always opaque,” Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack examined the possible scenarios and offered his thoughts on whether a nuclear deal would likely make Iran more or less aggressive — or neither.

Last week, William Galston, who holds Brookings' Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, wrote about the implications of Netanyahu’s speech, warning that “[t]he last thing he should want is a negative reception in the United States that fuels Israeli swing voters’ doubts about his capacity to manage Israel’s most important relationship.” And in his Washington Post column last week, Senior Fellow Robert Kagan argued that “there is no doubt that the precedent being set is a bad one” and regretted that “bringing a foreign leader before Congress to challenge a U.S. president’s policies…will be just another weapon in our bitter partisan struggle.”

And finally, for anyone wanting to see what our scholars were tweeting during Netanyahu’s speech, and reaction afterward, here’s a round-up.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/about/media-relations/news-releases/2015/0226-martin-indyk-executive-vice-president-brookings?rssid=indykm{1FF2C2C0-80E7-4E6C-9814-E603EB960F5F}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86028261/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~Martin-Indyk-Vice-President-and-Director-of-Foreign-Policy-Named-Executive-Vice-President-of-BrookingsMartin Indyk, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Named Executive Vice President of Brookings

Washington, D.C. – Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, has been appointed to the new post of executive vice president of Brookings, the Institution’s President Strobe Talbott announced today.

Indyk has been a vice president of the Institution and director of the Foreign Policy Program since 2009. Prior to that, he served at Brookings since 2001 as a senior fellow and the founding director of the Center for Middle East Policy. Under Indyk’s leadership, Foreign Policy at Brookings has grown dramatically in scope and budget, bringing the program up to 48 full-time scholars and adding foreign centers in Beijing, Delhi and Doha, as well as the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in Washington.

Indyk took a year-long leave of absence from Brookings in July 2013 to serve as Secretary Kerry’s special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. He has written extensively on Middle East politics, particularly Arab-Israeli relations. He served twice as U.S. ambassador to Israel (1995-97, 2000-01); as special assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs; and as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs. Prior to entering the Clinton administration, he was the founding executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His book, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Simon & Schuster, 2009) is a comprehensive insider's account of the peace negotiations under President Clinton.

Indyk holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from Sydney University and a doctorate in international relations from the Australian National University.

“Martin built the Middle East studies program at Brookings from the ground up, demonstrating not only talent as a scholar and a foreign policy expert, but superb leadership and fundraising ability. He then applied those skills to the Foreign Policy program as a whole, growing it into one of the largest and most influential foreign policy and security studies programs in the world,” said Talbott. “Martin is a gifted manager, a respected and effective diplomat, and a successful institution-builder. His many strengths will serve his fellow scholars and the Institution as my principal deputy, safeguarding our standards for quality and independence and enhancing our impact.”

Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones will become interim vice president and director of the Program.

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Thu, 26 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500

Washington, D.C. – Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, has been appointed to the new post of executive vice president of Brookings, the Institution’s President Strobe Talbott announced today.

Indyk has been a vice president of the Institution and director of the Foreign Policy Program since 2009. Prior to that, he served at Brookings since 2001 as a senior fellow and the founding director of the Center for Middle East Policy. Under Indyk’s leadership, Foreign Policy at Brookings has grown dramatically in scope and budget, bringing the program up to 48 full-time scholars and adding foreign centers in Beijing, Delhi and Doha, as well as the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in Washington.

Indyk took a year-long leave of absence from Brookings in July 2013 to serve as Secretary Kerry’s special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. He has written extensively on Middle East politics, particularly Arab-Israeli relations. He served twice as U.S. ambassador to Israel (1995-97, 2000-01); as special assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs; and as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs. Prior to entering the Clinton administration, he was the founding executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His book, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Simon & Schuster, 2009) is a comprehensive insider's account of the peace negotiations under President Clinton.

Indyk holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from Sydney University and a doctorate in international relations from the Australian National University.

“Martin built the Middle East studies program at Brookings from the ground up, demonstrating not only talent as a scholar and a foreign policy expert, but superb leadership and fundraising ability. He then applied those skills to the Foreign Policy program as a whole, growing it into one of the largest and most influential foreign policy and security studies programs in the world,” said Talbott. “Martin is a gifted manager, a respected and effective diplomat, and a successful institution-builder. His many strengths will serve his fellow scholars and the Institution as my principal deputy, safeguarding our standards for quality and independence and enhancing our impact.”

Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones will become interim vice president and director of the Program.

Event Information

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's founding father and great statesman, passed away on Sunday, March 22, 2015. He had been a major figure in the development of Southeast Asia and in global international relations for over half a century. From 1959 until 2011, he served consecutively as prime minister, senior minister, and minister mentor of Singapore. He led Singapore’s rise from a new post-colonial state to global prominence, was a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has been an important interlocutor for generations of world leaders. In recognition of his many contributions, in 2013 Brookings established the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies in its Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

On February 25, 2015, to honor Lee Kuan Yew's legacy, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted presentations on his ideas on governance and his approach to foreign policy by two of Singapore's most distinguished diplomats, both of whom had worked closely with him. Chan Heng Chee, Singapore's former long-serving ambassador to Washington, and Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore's Foreign Ministry, made presentations at the Brookings symposium based on contributions they made to the new book The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew(Straits Times Press, 2014). Among many attempts to describe and analyze Lee’s career, The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew is unique in that all its authors worked closely with him in diplomacy, politics, governance, and law, and provide first-hand observations from their experiences. The book illustrates Lee’s emphasis on pragmatism over ideology, and practice over theory.

Event Information

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's founding father and great statesman, passed away on Sunday, March 22, 2015. He had been a major figure in the development of Southeast Asia and in global international relations for over half a century. From 1959 until 2011, he served consecutively as prime minister, senior minister, and minister mentor of Singapore. He led Singapore’s rise from a new post-colonial state to global prominence, was a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has been an important interlocutor for generations of world leaders. In recognition of his many contributions, in 2013 Brookings established the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies in its Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

On February 25, 2015, to honor Lee Kuan Yew's legacy, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted presentations on his ideas on governance and his approach to foreign policy by two of Singapore's most distinguished diplomats, both of whom had worked closely with him. Chan Heng Chee, Singapore's former long-serving ambassador to Washington, and Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore's Foreign Ministry, made presentations at the Brookings symposium based on contributions they made to the new book The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew(Straits Times Press, 2014). Among many attempts to describe and analyze Lee’s career, The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew is unique in that all its authors worked closely with him in diplomacy, politics, governance, and law, and provide first-hand observations from their experiences. The book illustrates Lee’s emphasis on pragmatism over ideology, and practice over theory.

Transcript

Event Materials

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/18-return-to-great-game-in-middle-east-part-two-indyk?rssid=indykm{E3D3B9B8-4E34-44FC-AF3C-1A1DB93B1B36}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85523162/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~A-return-to-the-Middle-Eastern-great-game-Part-TwoA return to the Middle Eastern great game (Part Two)

Editor’s Note: In part two of this two-part essay, Martin Indyk offers his preferred solution to help stem the chaos that currently threatens the Middle East. Yesterday, in part one, he outlined the choices for the United States in the region.

Yesterday, I argued that the United States no longer has the luxury of approaching the rising Middle East chaos with a piecemeal approach. A choice needs to be made between two strategies, neither of which is particularly attractive and both of which have serious downsides. But if the United States does not want to pay the price of imposing order itself on this deeply troubled region, then it has to choose its regional partners and work with them either to rebuild the old order or construct a new one. That choice is between a "joint condominium" with Iran and a "back to the future" alliance with America's traditional partners, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

The joint condominium would only be possible if an agreement were struck to place meaningful curbs on Iran's nuclear program. Without an agreement, it is impossible to imagine cooperation with Iran on regional issues; with an agreement, collaboration on issues of common interest becomes possible, much as Obama is reported to have suggested in his November 2014 letter to Iran's Supreme Leader and much as some conservative commentators mistakenly believe is already taking place.

An understanding with Iran that encouraged it to use its influence to bolster order and stability rather than take advantage of the spreading chaos could have considerable advantages. Iran's tacit cooperation with the United States to remove Nouri al-Maliki from power in Baghdad proved critical to the viability of America's strategy against ISIS in Iraq. If Iran were similarly to join with the United States in seeking the removal of Bashar al-Assad in favor of a political reconciliation between all of Syria's communities, it could enable the United States to pursue a more effective campaign against ISIS in Syria. And if it were to constrain Hezbollah and cut its support for Palestinian rejectionists, and press the Houthis in Yemen to withdraw from Sanaa, and back the power sharing process, order in the Middle East would be greatly improved.

However, it is fanciful to imagine that the United States could convince Iran to shift from the region's most threatening revisionist power and become instead a partner in establishing a new order in the Middle East. It would require the Supreme Leader to overcome his extreme paranoia about the intentions of the United States and curb the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security—the regime's mechanisms for pursuing its regional hegemonic ambitions. Any attempt at such a condominium would earn the United States the wrath of its traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and their supporters in the Gulf Arab states and the U.S. Congress, respectively. Feeling betrayed, they would likely go their own way, acting without regard for U.S. interests.

If this strategy should therefore be ruled out because of its lack of feasibility and the high costs associated with it, how viable is the alternative? Returning to a strategy of reliance on our traditional allies would at least provide a more dependable foundation. Faced with rising chaos, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the other Arab monarchies have developed a common sense of threat from Iran, Hezbollah, Assad, Hamas, and ISIS. In response, they have found a strong common interest in countering these principle sources of instability in the region. Together they wield important capabilities: Israel has the most powerful army and air force; Egypt is the largest and most influential Arab state; Saudi Arabia's king has Islamic legitimacy as well as the wealth and influence that comes from being the largest oil exporter in the world.

However, at the moment, the United States is at loggerheads with each of them: arguing with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu over settlement activity in the West Bank and the terms of the nuclear deal with Iran; criticizing the Sisi regime in Egypt over shooting its citizens in the street and incarcerating tens of thousands of them; and differing with the Saudis over what to do with Assad in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Tehran's hegemonic advances in the Sunni Arab world. There are sound reasons for all of these differences, but they would need to be subordinated to the larger purpose of restoring order and taken up again once confidence and a semblance of order have been restored.

To pursue a renewed "pillars strategy," the United States would need to rebuild the confidence of its traditional allies in America's broader purposes while finding a way to reduce or manage the friction. In the event of a nuclear deal with Iran, the United States would need to balance this by providing a nuclear deterrent umbrella to Israel and Saudi Arabia. It would need to downplay differences with Egypt over the way the regime treats its citizens and find a way to work with Israel to resolve the Palestinian problem. It would need to distance the United States from the Muslim Brotherhood while taking a more robust stance against Assad in Syria.

What could the United States expect in return? First, it should expect more robust cooperation against the sources of disorder. Already, Jordan and Egypt have stepped up their use of force against ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Libya. With greater confidence in America's steadfastness, perhaps the Sunni states would be willing to commit ground forces with American advisers, which might help provide an important missing element in the anti-ISIS campaign.

With a greater sense of common purpose, the United States could begin to construct a regional security framework that would, for the first time, include Israel. The foundations already exist in America's bilateral security arrangements with each of the traditional allies, in the increasingly robust security cooperation between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and in the more covert security relationships between Israel and the Gulf Arabs. The viability of such a framework would depend in part on a credible initiative by Israel to resolve the Palestinian problem. But approaching this intractable problem in a regional framework, utilizing the Arab Peace Initiative, could boost its prospects.

Rolling back Iran's influence in Arab capitals and on Israel's borders is a longer-term challenge. But the effort would be advantaged by building a more coherent and credible alliance to balance it. And an agreement that prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might eventually open the door to a détente with Iran in which cooperation in some areas of tactical common interest (such as confronting ISIS and promoting a political transition in Damascus) would need to be combined with competition and containment where interests continue to diverge.

In these ways, the United States could rebuild an American-led order in the Middle East in partnership with traditional allies. They would have to step up and do their part but they could do so with greater confidence that the United States would be there to work with them rather than against them.

Authors

Editor’s Note: In part two of this two-part essay, Martin Indyk offers his preferred solution to help stem the chaos that currently threatens the Middle East. Yesterday, in part one, he outlined the choices for the United States in the region.

Yesterday, I argued that the United States no longer has the luxury of approaching the rising Middle East chaos with a piecemeal approach. A choice needs to be made between two strategies, neither of which is particularly attractive and both of which have serious downsides. But if the United States does not want to pay the price of imposing order itself on this deeply troubled region, then it has to choose its regional partners and work with them either to rebuild the old order or construct a new one. That choice is between a "joint condominium" with Iran and a "back to the future" alliance with America's traditional partners, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

The joint condominium would only be possible if an agreement were struck to place meaningful curbs on Iran's nuclear program. Without an agreement, it is impossible to imagine cooperation with Iran on regional issues; with an agreement, collaboration on issues of common interest becomes possible, much as Obama is reported to have suggested in his November 2014 letter to Iran's Supreme Leader and much as some conservative commentators mistakenly believe is already taking place.

An understanding with Iran that encouraged it to use its influence to bolster order and stability rather than take advantage of the spreading chaos could have considerable advantages. Iran's tacit cooperation with the United States to remove Nouri al-Maliki from power in Baghdad proved critical to the viability of America's strategy against ISIS in Iraq. If Iran were similarly to join with the United States in seeking the removal of Bashar al-Assad in favor of a political reconciliation between all of Syria's communities, it could enable the United States to pursue a more effective campaign against ISIS in Syria. And if it were to constrain Hezbollah and cut its support for Palestinian rejectionists, and press the Houthis in Yemen to withdraw from Sanaa, and back the power sharing process, order in the Middle East would be greatly improved.

However, it is fanciful to imagine that the United States could convince Iran to shift from the region's most threatening revisionist power and become instead a partner in establishing a new order in the Middle East. It would require the Supreme Leader to overcome his extreme paranoia about the intentions of the United States and curb the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security—the regime's mechanisms for pursuing its regional hegemonic ambitions. Any attempt at such a condominium would earn the United States the wrath of its traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and their supporters in the Gulf Arab states and the U.S. Congress, respectively. Feeling betrayed, they would likely go their own way, acting without regard for U.S. interests.

If this strategy should therefore be ruled out because of its lack of feasibility and the high costs associated with it, how viable is the alternative? Returning to a strategy of reliance on our traditional allies would at least provide a more dependable foundation. Faced with rising chaos, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the other Arab monarchies have developed a common sense of threat from Iran, Hezbollah, Assad, Hamas, and ISIS. In response, they have found a strong common interest in countering these principle sources of instability in the region. Together they wield important capabilities: Israel has the most powerful army and air force; Egypt is the largest and most influential Arab state; Saudi Arabia's king has Islamic legitimacy as well as the wealth and influence that comes from being the largest oil exporter in the world.

However, at the moment, the United States is at loggerheads with each of them: arguing with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu over settlement activity in the West Bank and the terms of the nuclear deal with Iran; criticizing the Sisi regime in Egypt over shooting its citizens in the street and incarcerating tens of thousands of them; and differing with the Saudis over what to do with Assad in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Tehran's hegemonic advances in the Sunni Arab world. There are sound reasons for all of these differences, but they would need to be subordinated to the larger purpose of restoring order and taken up again once confidence and a semblance of order have been restored.

To pursue a renewed "pillars strategy," the United States would need to rebuild the confidence of its traditional allies in America's broader purposes while finding a way to reduce or manage the friction. In the event of a nuclear deal with Iran, the United States would need to balance this by providing a nuclear deterrent umbrella to Israel and Saudi Arabia. It would need to downplay differences with Egypt over the way the regime treats its citizens and find a way to work with Israel to resolve the Palestinian problem. It would need to distance the United States from the Muslim Brotherhood while taking a more robust stance against Assad in Syria.

What could the United States expect in return? First, it should expect more robust cooperation against the sources of disorder. Already, Jordan and Egypt have stepped up their use of force against ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Libya. With greater confidence in America's steadfastness, perhaps the Sunni states would be willing to commit ground forces with American advisers, which might help provide an important missing element in the anti-ISIS campaign.

With a greater sense of common purpose, the United States could begin to construct a regional security framework that would, for the first time, include Israel. The foundations already exist in America's bilateral security arrangements with each of the traditional allies, in the increasingly robust security cooperation between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and in the more covert security relationships between Israel and the Gulf Arabs. The viability of such a framework would depend in part on a credible initiative by Israel to resolve the Palestinian problem. But approaching this intractable problem in a regional framework, utilizing the Arab Peace Initiative, could boost its prospects.

Rolling back Iran's influence in Arab capitals and on Israel's borders is a longer-term challenge. But the effort would be advantaged by building a more coherent and credible alliance to balance it. And an agreement that prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might eventually open the door to a détente with Iran in which cooperation in some areas of tactical common interest (such as confronting ISIS and promoting a political transition in Damascus) would need to be combined with competition and containment where interests continue to diverge.

In these ways, the United States could rebuild an American-led order in the Middle East in partnership with traditional allies. They would have to step up and do their part but they could do so with greater confidence that the United States would be there to work with them rather than against them.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/17-return-to-great-game-in-middle-east-indyk?rssid=indykm{0162C3C4-DE6D-4AD7-83A6-11D1789B77D9}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85452506/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~A-return-to-the-Middle-Eastern-great-game-Part-OneA return to the Middle Eastern great game (Part One)

Editor’s Note: In the first part of this two-part essay, Martin Indyk outlines the choices for the United States in the Middle East: a Joint Condominium with Iran or a Back to the Future approach that relies on traditional U.S. allies. In part two, he argues for his choice.

There is no place in the world today where chaos is more prevalent and the reestablishment of order more critical than the Middle East. The “great game" between rival great powers may have originated in Central Asia but it found its most intense expression at the "crossroads of empire" in the Middle East. As long as American interests are still engaged the United States cannot desist from playing it.

The United States used to have a strategy for the Middle East. It was known as the "pillars" strategy, and it was based on working with the regional powers that were committed to maintaining the status quo—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. The challenge was to contain the revisionist powers—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—who were backed by the Soviet Union. Over time, the United States lost the Iranian pillar but gained an Egyptian one, reinforcing the Sunni Arab order, but now confronting a Shia revolutionary power in the Gulf.

In 1992, the United States became the dominant power in the region in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eviction of Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait. After that, Bush ’41 and Clinton ’42 adopted a clear, common strategy for preserving stability that involved three components:

2. Dual Containment of the two revisionist powers - Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Ayatollahs’ Iran;

3. Arab Exceptionalism - America’s authoritarian Arab partners in preserving the Middle East order were given a pass when it came to the treatment of their citizens.

In terms of maintaining order, the strategy worked fairly well for a decade. But it all fell apart in the wake of 9/11. The US abandoned containment for regime change, toppling Saddam Hussein in a reckless way that opened the gates of Baghdad to Iran. The Arab-Israeli peace process stalled and has stubbornly resisted repeated efforts to jump-start it . And Arab exceptionalism helped to produce the Arab revolutions that swept across the region.

In the process, the existing order collapsed and has been replaced by failing states, ungoverned areas, and the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS. One should not be too nostalgic for the old order: its stability was regularly punctured by conflicts and coups and purchased at the price of repression. But its collapse brought to the fore three conflicts that now fuel each other and generate acute turbulence across the region:

1. The Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict: it originated in Lebanon but has been fueled by civil war in Iraq and has spread to Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the principle protagonists with revolutionary Iran steadily gaining the upper hand in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and lately Sana'a.

2. The Sunni-Sunni intra-mural conflict: this began as a battle by Al Qaeda and, subsequently, ISIS against the Sheikhs and monarchs who are the defenders of the Sunni Arab order. But the Arab spring brought to the fore an even greater threat to embattled Arab defenders of the status quo in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood.

3. The conflict with Israel: since the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan this conflict has morphed into a chronic conflict with periodic outbreaks of intense violence between Israel and non-state actors on its borders with Gaza, Southern Lebanon, and now the Golan.

Restoring order out of this chaos would be a complicated task for any external power. But the United States has particular difficulty because its people have grown weary of fighting ground wars in the Middle East and its president is deeply committed not to start any new ones. The stakes for the United States have also decreased now that it is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil.

Yet the United States cannot simply withdraw and abandon the "great game." As the experience in Iraq shows, the vacuum will be filled by bad actors who intend to threaten the U.S. homeland. America's longstanding regional allies -- Israel and the Arab monarchs -- depend on U.S. backing for their survival and well-being. And while the United States is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil, its major trading partners in Asia, and its allies in Europe are. Disruption to the supply of oil from the Gulf will deal a blow to the struggling global economy which will rebound onto the just-recovering U.S. economy.

Unable to desist, the Obama Administration is approaching each crisis in the region piecemeal: intense negotiations to curb Iran's nuclear program; carefully calibrated kinetic actions to "degrade and defeat" ISIS in Iraq and Al Qaeda in Yemen; a half-hearted effort to contain ISIS in Syria; and a forlorn effort to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. It refuses to connect the dots for fear of being sucked back into the vortex.

What's clearly needed is a strategy that takes account of all these realities. Step one is to recognize that, given the constraints on its own use of power, the United States has to work with some coalition of regional powers to make up the difference. There are only two choices for such a coalition:

1. Joint Condominium with Iran: The essence of this approach is for the United States to concede Iran's dominance in the Gulf in return for its agreement to curb its nuclear program, reduce its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Basher al-Assad in Syria and contribute instead to the construction of a new regional American-Iranian order.

2. Back to the Future: This approach would require the United States to return to its dependence on its traditional allies in the region: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Turkey. The objective of this renewed "pillars" strategy would be to restore the old order based on the containment of Iran, the roll-back of its advances in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the curbing of its nuclear program. This same coalition of traditional allies would then have the sense of security to work more effectively with the United States against ISIS and Al Qaeda.

Readers will be quick to point out the difficulties with each approach. I can hear the howls already: to pursue the first approach would be naive; to pursue the second would be cynical. But we no longer have the luxury of criticizing from the gallery or playing whack-a-mole. A choice must be made.

Authors

Editor’s Note: In the first part of this two-part essay, Martin Indyk outlines the choices for the United States in the Middle East: a Joint Condominium with Iran or a Back to the Future approach that relies on traditional U.S. allies. In part two, he argues for his choice.

There is no place in the world today where chaos is more prevalent and the reestablishment of order more critical than the Middle East. The “great game" between rival great powers may have originated in Central Asia but it found its most intense expression at the "crossroads of empire" in the Middle East. As long as American interests are still engaged the United States cannot desist from playing it.

The United States used to have a strategy for the Middle East. It was known as the "pillars" strategy, and it was based on working with the regional powers that were committed to maintaining the status quo—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. The challenge was to contain the revisionist powers—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—who were backed by the Soviet Union. Over time, the United States lost the Iranian pillar but gained an Egyptian one, reinforcing the Sunni Arab order, but now confronting a Shia revolutionary power in the Gulf.

In 1992, the United States became the dominant power in the region in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eviction of Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait. After that, Bush ’41 and Clinton ’42 adopted a clear, common strategy for preserving stability that involved three components:

2. Dual Containment of the two revisionist powers - Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Ayatollahs’ Iran;

3. Arab Exceptionalism - America’s authoritarian Arab partners in preserving the Middle East order were given a pass when it came to the treatment of their citizens.

In terms of maintaining order, the strategy worked fairly well for a decade. But it all fell apart in the wake of 9/11. The US abandoned containment for regime change, toppling Saddam Hussein in a reckless way that opened the gates of Baghdad to Iran. The Arab-Israeli peace process stalled and has stubbornly resisted repeated efforts to jump-start it . And Arab exceptionalism helped to produce the Arab revolutions that swept across the region.

In the process, the existing order collapsed and has been replaced by failing states, ungoverned areas, and the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS. One should not be too nostalgic for the old order: its stability was regularly punctured by conflicts and coups and purchased at the price of repression. But its collapse brought to the fore three conflicts that now fuel each other and generate acute turbulence across the region:

1. The Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict: it originated in Lebanon but has been fueled by civil war in Iraq and has spread to Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the principle protagonists with revolutionary Iran steadily gaining the upper hand in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and lately Sana'a.

2. The Sunni-Sunni intra-mural conflict: this began as a battle by Al Qaeda and, subsequently, ISIS against the Sheikhs and monarchs who are the defenders of the Sunni Arab order. But the Arab spring brought to the fore an even greater threat to embattled Arab defenders of the status quo in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood.

3. The conflict with Israel: since the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan this conflict has morphed into a chronic conflict with periodic outbreaks of intense violence between Israel and non-state actors on its borders with Gaza, Southern Lebanon, and now the Golan.

Restoring order out of this chaos would be a complicated task for any external power. But the United States has particular difficulty because its people have grown weary of fighting ground wars in the Middle East and its president is deeply committed not to start any new ones. The stakes for the United States have also decreased now that it is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil.

Yet the United States cannot simply withdraw and abandon the "great game." As the experience in Iraq shows, the vacuum will be filled by bad actors who intend to threaten the U.S. homeland. America's longstanding regional allies -- Israel and the Arab monarchs -- depend on U.S. backing for their survival and well-being. And while the United States is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil, its major trading partners in Asia, and its allies in Europe are. Disruption to the supply of oil from the Gulf will deal a blow to the struggling global economy which will rebound onto the just-recovering U.S. economy.

Unable to desist, the Obama Administration is approaching each crisis in the region piecemeal: intense negotiations to curb Iran's nuclear program; carefully calibrated kinetic actions to "degrade and defeat" ISIS in Iraq and Al Qaeda in Yemen; a half-hearted effort to contain ISIS in Syria; and a forlorn effort to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. It refuses to connect the dots for fear of being sucked back into the vortex.

What's clearly needed is a strategy that takes account of all these realities. Step one is to recognize that, given the constraints on its own use of power, the United States has to work with some coalition of regional powers to make up the difference. There are only two choices for such a coalition:

1. Joint Condominium with Iran: The essence of this approach is for the United States to concede Iran's dominance in the Gulf in return for its agreement to curb its nuclear program, reduce its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Basher al-Assad in Syria and contribute instead to the construction of a new regional American-Iranian order.

2. Back to the Future: This approach would require the United States to return to its dependence on its traditional allies in the region: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Turkey. The objective of this renewed "pillars" strategy would be to restore the old order based on the containment of Iran, the roll-back of its advances in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the curbing of its nuclear program. This same coalition of traditional allies would then have the sense of security to work more effectively with the United States against ISIS and Al Qaeda.

Readers will be quick to point out the difficulties with each approach. I can hear the howls already: to pursue the first approach would be naive; to pursue the second would be cynical. But we no longer have the luxury of criticizing from the gallery or playing whack-a-mole. A choice must be made.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/01/20-transatlantic-bond-federica-mogherini?rssid=indykm{4A4D2DE4-B166-4EA9-B901-F9D80D091F64}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/83710047/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~The-Transatlantic-Bond-in-an-Age-of-ComplexityThe Transatlantic Bond in an Age of Complexity

Federica Mogherini became high representative of the EU in November 2014. As the EU foreign policy chief, she represents the EU internationally, coordinates the work of all EU commissioners in charge of external relations portfolios, and chairs the monthly councils of EU foreign affairs ministers. Previously, HR/VP Mogherini was Italy's minister for foreign affairs and a member of the Italian Parliament.

Federica Mogherini became high representative of the EU in November 2014. As the EU foreign policy chief, she represents the EU internationally, coordinates the work of all EU commissioners in charge of external relations portfolios, and chairs the monthly councils of EU foreign affairs ministers. Previously, HR/VP Mogherini was Italy's minister for foreign affairs and a member of the Italian Parliament.

Event Information

Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings Institution, delivered a public speech at Brookings-Tsinghua Center on October 27. Researcher of Division for Middle East Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Science Institute of West Asian and African studies Tang Zhichao also joined as a guest commentator. The discussion was warmly welcomed by more than 100 students, scholars and representatives from the media and the industry.

Martin Indyk began his speech with a brief review of the historical roots of Middle East issues. Indyk made three main arguments, first asserting that the modern state system in the Middle East was not established naturally in the historical process. Instead, it was derived from the artificially created borders by British and French colonists during World War I. Consequently, countries in this region suffered from complicated religious and tribal conflicts, which made it more difficult to coordinate their developments. His second argument focused on the dominant role the United States played in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. The United States, according to Indyk, chose to cooperate with Middle East monarchies for its own oil interests to ensure their rule or even repression of the local people. The region, however, ended up in chaos caused by people’s revolts. Last, Indyk argued that the U.S. war against Iraq after 9/11 exacerbated the regional instability by toppling Saddam’s regime and replacing it with a Shi'a dominated Iraqi government. The rise of ISIS, which Indyk considered to be the biggest threat in the Middle East, could also be considered an unexpected result of the war.

The three major conflicts haunting the Middle East, Indyk asserted further, were 1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 2) the religious conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'a; and 3) the Sunni internal conflict, which was mostly between the conservatives and the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, a clear strategy was in urgent need to cope with this complex situation, said Indyk. For this matter he suggested an alliance with Middle East countries including Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Egypt to restore the regional order, as such countries shared a common threat and interests on this particular issue. He deemed that stability maintenance should be the priority of the U.S.-Middle East agenda.

Finally, Indyk spotted an opportunity for China and the United States to join hands in solving Middle East problems, given China’s significant oil interests in the region. He called for China’s further involvement on Middle East issues and saw a mutual benefit from Sino-U.S. cooperation.

Tang Zhichao commented that the Middle East is at the brink of transitioning from a collapsing old order to a new one yet to be built. He agreed with Indyk’s account on the existing conflicts in the Middle East and their historical roots, adding that more attention should be taken to the Iraqi War in 2003 and its great regional impact. In addition, he argued that the Palestinian issue, the nuclear issue of Iran and the Syrian issue should be regarded as the key issues in the region, rather than the threat of ISIS. Tang noticed a limited scope for Sino-U.S. cooperation in the Middle East, as on one hand, China was not capable of filling the power vacuum in the region, while on the other hand, the potential collaboration could be restricted by the competitive relationship between the two sides.

Audience questions touched upon the latest Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, the balance of interests from multiple sides and the triangular relations among China, Russia and the United States concerning the situation in Syria.

Event Information

Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings Institution, delivered a public speech at Brookings-Tsinghua Center on October 27. Researcher of Division for Middle East Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Science Institute of West Asian and African studies Tang Zhichao also joined as a guest commentator. The discussion was warmly welcomed by more than 100 students, scholars and representatives from the media and the industry.

Martin Indyk began his speech with a brief review of the historical roots of Middle East issues. Indyk made three main arguments, first asserting that the modern state system in the Middle East was not established naturally in the historical process. Instead, it was derived from the artificially created borders by British and French colonists during World War I. Consequently, countries in this region suffered from complicated religious and tribal conflicts, which made it more difficult to coordinate their developments. His second argument focused on the dominant role the United States played in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. The United States, according to Indyk, chose to cooperate with Middle East monarchies for its own oil interests to ensure their rule or even repression of the local people. The region, however, ended up in chaos caused by people’s revolts. Last, Indyk argued that the U.S. war against Iraq after 9/11 exacerbated the regional instability by toppling Saddam’s regime and replacing it with a Shi'a dominated Iraqi government. The rise of ISIS, which Indyk considered to be the biggest threat in the Middle East, could also be considered an unexpected result of the war.

The three major conflicts haunting the Middle East, Indyk asserted further, were 1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 2) the religious conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'a; and 3) the Sunni internal conflict, which was mostly between the conservatives and the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, a clear strategy was in urgent need to cope with this complex situation, said Indyk. For this matter he suggested an alliance with Middle East countries including Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Egypt to restore the regional order, as such countries shared a common threat and interests on this particular issue. He deemed that stability maintenance should be the priority of the U.S.-Middle East agenda.

Finally, Indyk spotted an opportunity for China and the United States to join hands in solving Middle East problems, given China’s significant oil interests in the region. He called for China’s further involvement on Middle East issues and saw a mutual benefit from Sino-U.S. cooperation.

Tang Zhichao commented that the Middle East is at the brink of transitioning from a collapsing old order to a new one yet to be built. He agreed with Indyk’s account on the existing conflicts in the Middle East and their historical roots, adding that more attention should be taken to the Iraqi War in 2003 and its great regional impact. In addition, he argued that the Palestinian issue, the nuclear issue of Iran and the Syrian issue should be regarded as the key issues in the region, rather than the threat of ISIS. Tang noticed a limited scope for Sino-U.S. cooperation in the Middle East, as on one hand, China was not capable of filling the power vacuum in the region, while on the other hand, the potential collaboration could be restricted by the competitive relationship between the two sides.

Audience questions touched upon the latest Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, the balance of interests from multiple sides and the triangular relations among China, Russia and the United States concerning the situation in Syria.

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/09/23-us-policy-middle-east-indyk?rssid=indykm{A463CE4B-038B-4804-AE72-9AF6C866CAB7}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/75183811/0/brookingsrss/experts/indykm~US-Policy-in-the-Middle-EastU.S. Policy in the Middle East

In this India-U.S. Policy Memo, Martin Indyk analyzes current U.S. priorities and policies in the Middle East. He stresses that the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in stabilizing a Middle East in chaos could have serious implications for India.

As much as the Obama administration would like to disengage from the Middle East and shift its focus and energies to Asia—above all to India and China—it finds itself constantly sucked back into the vortex as the region grows ever more volatile, chaotic and dangerous. President Obama has been determined to end American involvement in the country’s two longest-running wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—and to avoid involvement in any other regional conflicts, especially the Syrian civil war. And yet, the surprising success of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in taking control of broad swathes of Syrian and Iraqi territory and the threat it poses to Baghdad in the south, Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and potentially Jordan in the west, have forced the president’s hand and led him now to order air strikes on northern Iraq. In so doing, he becomes the fourth consecutive American president to order the use of force in Iraq.

This tension between the desire to withdraw and the need to reengage has generated an ambivalence in U.S. policy at a time when the regional players are looking for strong U.S. leadership. But because strong leadership in the prevailing circumstances of widespread conflict requires the application of force, which is strongly opposed by a large majority of Americans weary of war in the greater Middle East, the Obama administration finds itself whip-sawed between these competing imperatives, dragged along by events that it no longer has the desire to shape.

These travails are compounded by a widening sectarian conflict that found its origins in the Sunni challenge to the Alawite regime in Syria but has now spread viciously to Iraq and could well spread to the Gulf where a majority Shiite population in Bahrain is controlled by a Saudi-backed Sunni monarch, and in Yemen, where Shia Houti tribesman are challenging a Sunni regime in Sana’a. Saudi Arabia—the world’s largest oil producer—now faces instability on almost all its borders.

In Egypt, the traditional leader of the Arab world, a military-backed regime has deposed and suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood party, generating an additional schism across the region between Islamist and moderate Sunnis. This tension recently spilled over into the Arab-Israeli arena where Hamas, the stepchild of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to break out of the choke-hold the Egyptian regime was applying to them in Gaza by launching rocket attacks on Israel. This latest round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has already claimed the lives of over 2,000 Palestinians and some 67 Israelis, and devastated several suburbs of Gaza. It came soon after the collapse of an intensive American-led effort to resolve the larger conflict, which raised questions about the credibility of American diplomacy.

All of these cross-currents of conflict are manifestations of the crumbling of the Middle Eastern order that had been established by Britain and France in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and had been maintained by the United States for the past six decades. It is unclear what will replace it but there are several indicators of the new order that is likely to emerge. The first is the growing alignment taking place between the three status quo regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel) and their smaller partners (Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority). Each of these regional powers is an ally of the United States but all are to some extent at loggerheads with Washington as they no longer feel obliged to pay attention to U.S. preferences because they perceive it to be disengaging from the region. The second is the counter-alignment of Turkey and Qatar, which are supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and tend to oppose the policies of the status quo powers. The third is Iran which, if it reaches an agreement with the United States to curb its nuclear program and foregoes nuclear weapons at least for the time being, could become a less threatening and more status quo-oriented regional power. However, if it fails to reach a nuclear agreement, Iran could revert to its policies of promoting instability across the region. In between are the increasingly ungoverned areas of Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Gaza, and Libya where radical Islamist extremists will have to be contained.

It remains to be seen whether the United States can adjust its policies to an off-shore balancing of the forces of chaos and a bolstering of the promoters of a new, regionally based order. Certainly, the U.S. retains the power to do so through its formidable force deployments in the Gulf and its security relationships with its traditional regional allies. And it retains the will to protect its continuing interest in the free flow of oil at reasonable prices and its allies that might be threatened by the growing anarchy (for example, the Kurds and Jordanians). In this way, while things seem to be falling apart, the center should still be able to hold.

For India, the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in stabilizing a Middle East in chaos could have serious implications. West Asia is a region of crucial significance to India as the source of employment for millions of Indians, remittances that help the Indian exchequer, defense equipment, intelligence information, terrorist security concerns, not to speak of the majority of Indian oil and natural gas imports. All of these interests could be adversely affected by a failure to contain the chaos. Second, the extent of American involvement might have direct implications for India-U.S. relations in terms of its possible impact on the time, energy, resources and attention that the senior-most U.S. policymakers can devote to nurturing the India-U.S. relationship. Third, India-U.S. differences on Middle East policy, for example on Iran, can affect the broader bilateral relationship. Fourth, given the potential impact on Indian interests and the growing desire of a war-weary United States to share the burden with like-minded countries, there may be a growing expectation in Washington that Delhi should do more to help out in the Middle East. Watch out for this item to feature on the bilateral agenda in the future.

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In this India-U.S. Policy Memo, Martin Indyk analyzes current U.S. priorities and policies in the Middle East. He stresses that the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in stabilizing a Middle East in chaos could have serious implications for India.

As much as the Obama administration would like to disengage from the Middle East and shift its focus and energies to Asia—above all to India and China—it finds itself constantly sucked back into the vortex as the region grows ever more volatile, chaotic and dangerous. President Obama has been determined to end American involvement in the country’s two longest-running wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—and to avoid involvement in any other regional conflicts, especially the Syrian civil war. And yet, the surprising success of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in taking control of broad swathes of Syrian and Iraqi territory and the threat it poses to Baghdad in the south, Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and potentially Jordan in the west, have forced the president’s hand and led him now to order air strikes on northern Iraq. In so doing, he becomes the fourth consecutive American president to order the use of force in Iraq.

This tension between the desire to withdraw and the need to reengage has generated an ambivalence in U.S. policy at a time when the regional players are looking for strong U.S. leadership. But because strong leadership in the prevailing circumstances of widespread conflict requires the application of force, which is strongly opposed by a large majority of Americans weary of war in the greater Middle East, the Obama administration finds itself whip-sawed between these competing imperatives, dragged along by events that it no longer has the desire to shape.

These travails are compounded by a widening sectarian conflict that found its origins in the Sunni challenge to the Alawite regime in Syria but has now spread viciously to Iraq and could well spread to the Gulf where a majority Shiite population in Bahrain is controlled by a Saudi-backed Sunni monarch, and in Yemen, where Shia Houti tribesman are challenging a Sunni regime in Sana’a. Saudi Arabia—the world’s largest oil producer—now faces instability on almost all its borders.

In Egypt, the traditional leader of the Arab world, a military-backed regime has deposed and suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood party, generating an additional schism across the region between Islamist and moderate Sunnis. This tension recently spilled over into the Arab-Israeli arena where Hamas, the stepchild of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to break out of the choke-hold the Egyptian regime was applying to them in Gaza by launching rocket attacks on Israel. This latest round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has already claimed the lives of over 2,000 Palestinians and some 67 Israelis, and devastated several suburbs of Gaza. It came soon after the collapse of an intensive American-led effort to resolve the larger conflict, which raised questions about the credibility of American diplomacy.

All of these cross-currents of conflict are manifestations of the crumbling of the Middle Eastern order that had been established by Britain and France in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and had been maintained by the United States for the past six decades. It is unclear what will replace it but there are several indicators of the new order that is likely to emerge. The first is the growing alignment taking place between the three status quo regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel) and their smaller partners (Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority). Each of these regional powers is an ally of the United States but all are to some extent at loggerheads with Washington as they no longer feel obliged to pay attention to U.S. preferences because they perceive it to be disengaging from the region. The second is the counter-alignment of Turkey and Qatar, which are supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and tend to oppose the policies of the status quo powers. The third is Iran which, if it reaches an agreement with the United States to curb its nuclear program and foregoes nuclear weapons at least for the time being, could become a less threatening and more status quo-oriented regional power. However, if it fails to reach a nuclear agreement, Iran could revert to its policies of promoting instability across the region. In between are the increasingly ungoverned areas of Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Gaza, and Libya where radical Islamist extremists will have to be contained.

It remains to be seen whether the United States can adjust its policies to an off-shore balancing of the forces of chaos and a bolstering of the promoters of a new, regionally based order. Certainly, the U.S. retains the power to do so through its formidable force deployments in the Gulf and its security relationships with its traditional regional allies. And it retains the will to protect its continuing interest in the free flow of oil at reasonable prices and its allies that might be threatened by the growing anarchy (for example, the Kurds and Jordanians). In this way, while things seem to be falling apart, the center should still be able to hold.

For India, the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in stabilizing a Middle East in chaos could have serious implications. West Asia is a region of crucial significance to India as the source of employment for millions of Indians, remittances that help the Indian exchequer, defense equipment, intelligence information, terrorist security concerns, not to speak of the majority of Indian oil and natural gas imports. All of these interests could be adversely affected by a failure to contain the chaos. Second, the extent of American involvement might have direct implications for India-U.S. relations in terms of its possible impact on the time, energy, resources and attention that the senior-most U.S. policymakers can devote to nurturing the India-U.S. relationship. Third, India-U.S. differences on Middle East policy, for example on Iran, can affect the broader bilateral relationship. Fourth, given the potential impact on Indian interests and the growing desire of a war-weary United States to share the burden with like-minded countries, there may be a growing expectation in Washington that Delhi should do more to help out in the Middle East. Watch out for this item to feature on the bilateral agenda in the future.