To the extent that plaintiff's complaint challenges the propriety of the Agreement AFSCME and defendant entered in 1978 and the 1980 Addendum to that Agreement, plaintiff's claim is time-barred. Federal courts apply to LMRDA claims the statute of limitations that a state court within the federal court's district would apply to the most closely analogous state-law claims. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir. 1987). The Rodonich court went on to hold that union democracy claims brought under the LMRDA should be subject to the relevant state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id. at 977; see also Gilmore v. Local 295, 798 F. Supp. 1030, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that union violations of rights guaranteed by LMRDA are governed by applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions). New York's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990). This statute of limitations renders plaintiff's claims concerning the legality of the Agreement and Addendum time-barred. The Court would reach the same result even if it applied New York's six-year residuary statute of limitations. Id. § 213(1). Applying either New York statute of limitations, plaintiff has failed to state a LMRDA claim with respect to the validity of the Agreement and Addendum.

In its second standing argument, defendant contends that plaintiff is unaffected by the by-law amendment because he earns roughly $ 22,000 a year, whereas the by-law amendment only increases the dues of members who earn over $ 28,000 a year. (Stack Aff. P 22.) If that were true, plaintiff would lack standing to bring a § 411(a)(3) challenge against the delegates' vote on the by-law amendment. Section 411(a)(3) guarantees the rights of local union members not to have their local union dues increased without a majority vote by the membership.

The preliminary statement of plaintiff's amended complaint contains his response. There, plaintiff states that defendant's amended by-law increases his dues, along with all of its other members' dues. For purposes of deciding defendant's 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the Court must accept this statement as true. Thus, plaintiff has alleged that defendant's dues increase caused him a remediable injury in fact, which gives him standing to assert a claim against defendant for violating 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3). Plaintiff also claims that defendant's procedure for amending its dues by-law violated his statutorily-guaranteed equal rights. For this cause of action, based upon 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) rather than § 411(a)(3)(A), plaintiff has again alleged an injury in fact sufficient to give him standing.

Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.

Even though plaintiff has standing to assert a § 411(a)(1) claim against defendant for its alleged violation thereof, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The core of the statute's equal rights provision is the prevention of discrimination against union members and classes of union members. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 13 L. Ed. 2d 190, 85 S. Ct. 292 (1964) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction to hear § 411(a)(1) claim because "the complaining union members . . . have not been discriminated against in any way and have been denied no privilege or right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others"); Fritsch v. District Council No. 9, 493 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that "essence" of equal rights provision is "the command not to discriminate against members and classes of members in their right to vote and nominate") (citing Calhoon); Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1964) ("As long as no claim is made that provisions of the [union's] constitution and by-laws are being applied in such a way as to deny equality in voting, there is nothing in Section (411) which authorizes consideration of these documents."); see also Smith v. United Mine Workers of America, 493 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that absent claim of discrimination, district court lacks jurisdiction over 411(a)(1) claim); Keck v. Employees Independent Ass'n., 387 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that even if union division violated union's constitution and by-laws by refusing to submit to membership vote a proposed constitutional amendment, plaintiffs have no cause of action under § 411(a)(1) because they failed to allege that members or classes were discriminated against with respect to their right to vote in elections or referendums.)

Plaintiff has failed to allege that the method defendant used to amend its by-laws discriminated against him within his labor organization by denying him an equal right to nominate candidates, vote in elections or referendums, attend membership meetings, or participate in deliberations or voting upon the business discussed there. It appears that each of defendant's constituent locals
*fn1"
elected a delegate to attend the annual delegates' convention and vote on a number of issues, including the proposal to increase membership dues by amending defendant's by-laws. Plaintiff does not assert that defendant discriminated against him or his local by, for example, ignoring his delegate during the convention or counting that delegate's vote for less than other delegates' votes. See Fritsch, 493 F.2d at 1063. Section § 411(a)(1) does not give union members the right to vote on every union decision. Cleveland Orch. Comm. v. Cleveland Fed. of Musicians, 193 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Oh., E.D. 1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962).

Plaintiff argues that defendant is a local union, rather than an "intermediate body." If that is true, then defendant arguably used a statutorily forbidden procedure for amending its dues by-law. However, assuming arguendo that defendant violated § 411(a)(3) by increasing its dues at a delegates' convention, it does not necessarily follow that defendant's procedure discriminated against a union member or class of union members in violation of § 411(a)(1). Plaintiff claims neither that defendant strayed from the statutory prescriptions concerning delegate voting nor that those prescriptions conflict with the equal rights guarantees of § 411(a)(1). Although a local labor organization would arguably violate § 411(a)(3)(A) by permitting delegates to enact a dues increase proposal rather than putting the proposal to a vote of members in good standing, the Court is not prepared to hold that a violation of § 411(a)(3)(A) constitutes a per se violation of § 411(a)(1).

c. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)

The Court now turns to issue of whether plaintiff has stated a claim under § 411(a)(3) on which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has alleged that despite its de facto council status, defendant remains a local labor organization and as such, it violated his right not to have his membership dues increased in a manner other than that specified in § 411(a)(3)(A).

The LMRDA defines neither "local labor organization" nor "intermediate labor organization." Therefore, the Court must construe these terms "in light of their ordinary meaning, congressional purpose, and the deference accorded to the Secretary[ of Labor's] construction of the Act." Donovan v. National Transient Div., 736 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107, 105 S. Ct. 781, 83 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1985). At least for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 481, entitled "Terms of Office and Election Procedures," the Secretary of Labor determines whether to characterize "a particular organizational unit as a 'local,' 'intermediate,' etc.," by reference to "its functions and purposes rather than the formal title by which it is known or how it classifies itself." 29 C.F.R. § 452.11. Not surprisingly, defendant urges the Secretary's interpretation upon the Court.

Second, plaintiff claims that defendant's approximately 300 "sub-locals" have not received charters from either defendant or AFSCME. Furthermore, he contends that defendant's "sub-locals" are merely "administrative arms" of defendant; unlike "autonomous" local unions, they lack power to collect dues, discipline their members, negotiate and administer labor contracts, acquire from other sources services defendant provides, or incur debt without defendant's approval. According to plaintiff, these observations are important because they demonstrate that the nature of defendant's "sub-locals" and defendant's relationship with them conflict with the AFSCME's constitution's description of what locals and councils are and what they do.

Plaintiff refers the Court to Article IX, §§ 1-10 of the AFSCME constitution, pertaining to local unions, as well as §§ 19-23, pertaining to councils. (See Am. Compl. PP 11-12; Weinberg Aff. Ex. 1, at 67-74; Ellis Aff. Ex. 2, at 81-83.) Defendant's degree of adherence to the provisions in AFSCME's constitution regarding councils and locals is only minimally relevant to the issue at hand. Whether defendant operates in compliance with the AFSCME constitution is a question distinct from whether defendant functions as an intermediate body within the meaning of the LMRDA. To the extent, however, that compliance with the AFSCME constitution indicates a labor organization's status, defendant's functions and purposes appear consistent with those of an AFSCME council. Like an AFSCME council, defendant governs and supervises subordinate organizational units--what defendant calls "locals" and plaintiff calls "sub-locals". (See AFSCME Constitution Art. IX § 22; CSEA Const. Arts. V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X; Donohue Aff. PP 74-85; D's Mem. Opp. P's Mtn. and Supp. D's Mtn., at 14.) See Donovan, 736 F.2d at 623. Plaintiff's litany of complaints concerning how powerless defendant's locals are relative to defendant and relative to other locals within AFSCME (more of which appear in plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6-12), along with the locals' alleged lack of AFSCME or CSEA charters, has little bearing on defendant's functions or purposes.

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