Discord Skewed Benghazi Response

Divergent Views, Agency Infighting Slow White House Efforts to Address the Cause of Deadly Strike on Consulate in Libya

By

Adam Entous,

Carol E. Lee,

Siobhan Gorman and

Evan Perez

October 5, 2012

WASHINGTON—New details are emerging of discord among federal agencies that has complicated the Obama administration's response to last month's deadly attack on the American consulate in Libya, creating intense political pressure for the White House just weeks ahead of the presidential election.

More than three weeks after the attack on Sept. 11, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents finally reached the scene in Benghazi on Thursday—amid an emerging picture of confusion and competing narratives within the administration and intelligence community about what happened there.

ENLARGE

The scene outside the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, on Sept. 11 that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.
Reuters

Shifting views within the intelligence community have further complicated the administration's ability to firm up its conclusions about the attack. White House officials were initially aware of intelligence reports that suggested a possible connection to al Qaeda, administration officials said.

But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence discounted those reports in its initial statements about the attack, and the White House stuck to those conclusions, making it appear, at least to the public, like it was behind the curve.

Critics of that response paint a picture of a White House preoccupied with the president's re-election campaign and determined to take the most cautious approach possible. White House officials strongly reject suggestions that politics were at play in its response to the crisis.

On Friday, the administration continued to face criticism that those initial statements were misleading, including comments on Sept. 16 by Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, that the attack was a spontaneous uprising prompted by an inflammatory video.

"Elements of the intelligence community apparently told the administration within hours of the attack that militants connected with al Qaeda were involved, yet Ambassador Rice claims her comments five days later reflected the 'best' and 'current' assessment of the intelligence community," Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz) said Friday. "Either the Obama administration is misleading Congress and the American people, or it is blaming the entire failure on the intelligence community."

U.S. Government Reaction to the Benghazi Attack

For days after the Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, Libya, intelligence officials and the Obama administration said it was likely the outgrowth of protests sparked by an anti-Islamic video made in the U.S. Follow some of the administration statements on the Libya attack. Source: WSJ research

Two weeks after the incident, which led to the first killing of a U.S. ambassador in a generation, the administration called it an organized attack by terrorists with links to al Qaeda affiliates or sympathizers.

After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. overhauled the way it collects and analyzes intelligence to ensure contrary views are considered and assessments from across the government properly aired.

Among the post-2001 changes was the creation of the DNI to oversee the 16 U.S. spy agencies. The office is responsible for collating agencies' intelligence and reaching a consensus view to present to the president.

The DNI contended with dueling positions after the Benghazi attack. Within 48 hours, some military and intelligence analysts started briefing lawmakers about what they saw as evidence suggesting al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, was involved in the assault.

Earlier

These analysts pointed to intercepted conversations between militants involved in the attackon the U.S. Consulate and a nearby annex that was used for intelligence programs. The Central Intelligence Agency produced a similar document citing AQIM links.

Other officials, including those at the DNI and FBI, were more cautious about AQIM's involvement, calling the early information inconclusive. At least some of the communications were members of AQIM bragging about their roles after the attack, officials said. One official said such boastfulness is commonplace and isn't proof of involvement.

The DNI presented to the White House its view that the assault grew out of a spontaneous protest over the anti-Islamic video produced by a provocateur in California. DNI analysts then thought that "at best, al Qaeda sympathizers" were involved, playing down communications pointing to AQIM, according to a senior intelligence official.

White House officials were aware of the reports of AQIM communications from the start, according to administration officials, but they relied on the DNI's assessment. Officials said the White House treated those communications as classified.

Based on those early DNI assessments, intelligence agencies developed unclassified talking points, and provided them to members of Congress of both parties, among others. The White House said the information was developed at the request of lawmakers.

On Sept. 14, White House spokesman Jay Carney described the unrest that unfolded across the Middle East, including most notably at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, as a "response to a video that is offensive."

Amb. Rice used CIA talking points, which were updated on Sept. 15, when she was dispatched to appear on a round of news programs on Sunday, Sept. 16, officials said. Meanwhile, Republican lawmakers had been hearing the more aggressive interpretation from intelligence officials—and weighed in with their own assessments, charging the administration had failed to provide sufficient security and missed signs of the impending terrorist attack.

Intelligence that suggested possible al Qaeda involvement also surfaced in comments by other public officials and in news reports, but the administration didn't change its line.

"It's not a matter of the intelligence they were given," Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Mich.), House intelligence committee chairman, said of the administration. "It is a matter of how they interpreted the intelligence."

After the Benghazi attacks, intelligence officials developing the talking points on the incident said they didn't believe the information at the time was sufficient to draw a clear connection to AQIM or any other group, so the talking points didn't specify the involvement of a specific group and instead pointed more generally to extremists.

"In the absence of clear datapoints that determine culpability, it makes sense not to speculate on specific culprits," a U.S. intelligence official said. "If the suggestion is wrong, the resulting circular reporting is likely to reinforce false assumptions."

There were concerns about drawing firmer conclusions before the FBI, which had yet to reach Benghazi, was able to complete its investigation, officials said.

Officials say no evidence has been found yet that AQIM's leadership was directly involved in the attack. Shawn Turner, spokesman for DNI, said "individual shards of information don't always tell the whole story." He added: "The comprehensive assessments we produce are rarely developed overnight."

A senior U.S. official critical of the administration's response said the DNI system was a problem. "The president doesn't have the luxury of waiting three weeks for them to come up with a final assessment," the official said of DNI analysts.

Not until Sept. 19 did an administration official, U.S. Counterterrorism Director Matthew Olson, say that the raid on the Benghazi facilities represented "a terrorist attack" and that U.S. intelligence agencies were investigating possible links to AQIM.

Nine days later, the DNI issued a revised statement "to reflect new information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists," adding that "some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al Qaeda."

Disagreements over how to interpret the early intelligence spilled over into disagreements over how to handle the burned, looted and unsecured consulate offices in Benghazi.

The FBI dispatched a team of lab technicians and agents a day after the attack, but they first went to Germany to interview survivors who had been evacuated from Benghazi. What was supposed to be a short stopover in Germany ended up lasting nearly a week because the State Department and the Libyan government were then slow to secure visas for their entry to Libya and the agents arrived in Tripoli after a week, officials said. FBI officials requested access to the crime scene as soon as security conditions permitted, a U.S. law enforcement official said.

In the meantime, news reports showed looters, locals and multiple news crews had easy access to the compound. The scene diminished in value to the investigation as a result, a U.S. law enforcement official said.

The delay securing the site in Benghazi exposed more rifts within the administration. Senior U.S. officials said the State Department's preference was to first try to reach a deal with the Libyans to provide the security. Talks with the Libyans dragged on, stoking frustration within the FBI and Justice Department. It wasn't until late last week that the FBI and the State Department agreed to formally ask Pentagon officials to come up with a plan to secure the site.

White House National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and counterterrorism adviser John Brennan intervened on Sept. 28 to break the impasse between the agencies, according to a senior administration official.

A senior U.S. official critical of the White House's handling of the matter said the White House exercised too little control as the efforts to get the FBI to Benghazi dragged on. "Where was the White House coordination?" another senior U.S. official critical of the response asked.

White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said the White House held several meetings a day to coordinate the response immediately after the attack and continued to closely oversee the effort.

A senior administration official said the State Department urged the Libyans from the start to secure the Benghazi site but it became "rapidly clear that they were either unable or unwilling to do that."

Once it was decided to send the FBI to the site with protection from U.S. military personnel, "the operation needed to be prepared, planned, resourced and we needed permission from the Libyans. All of those steps took some time."

Without the benefit of access to the site, investigators had to rely on intercepted communications and video feeds.

"This thing is going to get solved, but from other stuff we're doing, not from the crime scene," ae U.S. law enforcement official said.

An FBI team finally arrived in Benghazi for the first time on Thursday, for a 12-hour visit, under joint U.S.-Libyan protection.

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