Recently, the
movie Virunga, and concerted efforts by numerous NGOs have focused attention to
one of the main threats to the Virunga National Park: the prospect of oil exploitation within and near its borders. Yet, there
are two other, inter-related threats to the park that have received comparatively
less attention, but that must be addressed for ensuring its survival
nonetheless: first, populations trespassing on its territory, often as part of
wider contestations of its limits; and second, the presence of a multitude of
state and non-state armed actors who are commonly involved in unauthorized
resources exploitation. In this contribution, we present a brief analysis of
these phenomena, drawing on fieldwork conducted periodically between 2010 and
2015 in and around the park.

It is important
to outline that these recent ‘threats’ need to be seen in relation to the
history of the park and violent conflict in the east of the DR Congo. In 1925,
the then King of Belgium, Albert, founded the National Park first named in his
honor, and today known as Virunga National Park. As documented by several
scholars, including Paul Vikanza and Joseph Nzabandora,
the creation of the park was characterized by contestations, which partly resulted from the
displacement of populations without compensation, and several extensions of the
park without much consultation of local stakeholders. Furthermore, the park is
located in the epicenter of ongoing conflict since 1993-4, and is strongly
affected by cross-border dynamics with both Rwanda and Uganda. These regional dynamics
are entangled in complex ways with more national and locally grounded dynamics
of conflict, having turned the park into a hideout for numerous foreign and
domestic armed groups.

Ties between civilians and armed groups

Currently there
are many peasants residing illegally in the park, having been driven there by a
lack economic opportunity, land scarcity and a belief in ‘ancestral’ claims on
the land. Others sporadically enter the park to carry out illegal activities, such
as cultivation, logging, fishing, the production of makala(charcoal) and poaching. This is often made possible by the
presence of armed actors, who do not only engage in such activities themselves,
but also allow civilians to do so in exchange for protection fees. This means
that a substantial part of the population living in or around the park
currently collaborates with armed forces for ensuring a livelihood.

Armed groups and
populations are also linked through multiple other economic ties, such as
pre-financing arrangements and money lending. For example, many small-scale
shops and taxi-motos in Kiwanja
operate with armed group money. There is also collaboration in crime. The chefferie (chiefdom) of Bwisha (in
Rutshuru territory) is plagued by rampant banditry, like armed robbery and kidnappings. A
part of this crime is not directly committed by armed groups, but by local
gangs. However, these often operate under the protection of armed groups or the
security services, to whom they give part of the proceeds of their activities.
These practices demonstrate that armed groups do not only live off natural
resources exploitation, but have multiple sources of income, including
banditry, road-block taxation and income via civilian intermediaries.

The ties between
armed actors and civilians are further strengthened by political elites, who
seize upon and inflate existing antipathies towards the park. It should be
emphasized that civilians in the region have ambivalent feelings about the park. While the idea of nature
conservation is generally supported, and people are proud of the park, seeing the
wildlife as their heritage, many feel that the park has expropriated
their ancestral lands. Furthermore, many people feel unjustly deprived from the
means of earning a livelihood in the face of severe poverty. Customary chiefs
and politicians often take advantage of these sentiments as a means of
reinforcing their popularity and power. Especially in times of elections,
politicians try to gain votes by promising to revise the limits of the park. A
number of these same politicians have been documented (e.g. by the UN Group of Experts) to finance armed groups operating in
the park.

Politicians and
allied armed groups have also been instrumental in perpetuating inter-community conflicts that have a long lineage. Each round of
violence seems to revive and reinforce these conflicts. Most recently, the M23
rebellion ratcheted up tensions in Bwisha between (but also among) Nande, Hutu
and Tutsi, which have continued after the rebellion’s departure. This is partly
a result of the fact that most armed groups are tied to one community or competing
network or another, which creates local security dilemmas.

Land conflicts
can further fuel tensions between communities. For instance, there is a long-standing
conflict between on the one hand, the Banande-led Syndicat Alliance Paysanne (SAP), which mobilized farmers to cultivate
around Kahunga, in the hunting reserve of the Domaine
de Chasse de Rutshuru
(DCR) and on the other
hand, the Hutu mwami (customary
chief) of Bwisha, who blames SAP of bringing Banande from Lubero to cultivate
in his chefferie. Recently, the park
retroceded a part of the DCR to the population, which reinforced the existing
conflict between SAP and the mwami. While SAP fought for years to gain access to
the land, the mwami redistributed it mainly to his own constituency of (mostly
Hutu) politicians, associations and businesspersons. Many of the Nande but also
a few Hunde and Hutu peasants that formerly cultivated illegally in the area
feel ‘trapped’, as they are now forced now to work for large-scale land-owners
under exploitative agreements. Furthermore, in part because of the hydro-electric
plant that is currently being built in the area by the Virunga Alliance, the value of land in Bwisha is increasing.
This intensifies competition, which in the current power constellation often benefits
the rich.

The pitfalls of ICCN–FARDC cooperation

The national
armed forces are an integral part of the complex violent political economy in
and around the park. Not only are certain units, like the naval forces on Lake Edward, heavily implicated in the protection
business and other illegal revenue-generation activities, they often collude
with armed groups. Furthermore, there has been fierce competition between different units and networks
within the armed forces, pitting for instance the navy against the infantry.
These conflicts were not resolved when the infantry started to collaborate more
closely with the ICCN in mixed units in certain parts of the park––which
further drew the ICCN into the mess of Congolese army politics. Yet, in the
face of rampant insecurity, and the tendency of the Congolese army to get
involved in resources exploitation when left unchecked, there seem to be few
alternatives to this collaboration.

One of the
problems is that the parts of the army not included in the collaboration are envious
of the much better service conditions enjoyed by ICCN agents and the soldiers
in the mixed units. While part of the ICCN, the Virunga National Park is
formally managed under a public-private partnership, and its daily management
is largely in the hands of the NGO the Virunga Foundation. The latter tops up
the meager official wages of the guards with extra fees, and provides them with
three meals a day and proper health care, while also ensuring they have
sufficient equipment and transport. Most of this is financed by development aid
from the European Commission.

Another problem
with the FARDC is that the operations that it conducts against armed groups in
and around the park often exacerbate tensions. For instance, the Kimia II/Amani
Leo operations in 2009-2010 led to an upsurge in instability in Bwisha, in part because they did not manage to
cut the ties between armed groups and populations. Moreover, the FARDC sometimes
took over protection rackets ran by armed groups. The recent operations against the FDLR launched in the park seem to have a
similar fate. While the operations initially halted makala production, the trade has slowly resumed, but now under the
protection of the FARDC.

Furthermore, the
operations of the mixed units, which often target populations living and working
in the park, have at times reinforced the ties between rebels and civilians. Last
year, the park decided to destroy a number of farms located within the area of
Kibirizi (in the park), sending a mixed unit of around 30 FARDC soldiers and 9 park
guards to patrol the vacated area. The population found itself in difficulty as
many depend on cultivating in the park for their livelihood. In reaction, a
part entered even further into the park, in a zone controlled by the FDLR,
which ‘rents out’ small plots of land to civilians. The reinforced ties with
the FDLR resulting from this arrangement later hampered FARDC operations in the
area. However, the army did manage to disperse the rebels, which has contributed
to increased insecurity for civilians along the Kibirizi – Rwindi road. As a consequence,
the population has developed negative feelings towards the mixed FARDC-ICCN unit
located there, believing it only chases farmers out of the park, but does little
to protect civilians.

Beyond hoping for change

In the light of
ongoing armed group activity and violence in the Virunga park, it is somewhat
ironic that it occasionally presents itself as an “island of stability”. Unfortunately, neither the Congolese government
nor its international partners have developed a coherent policy for dealing
with the armed groups present in the park and the conflict dynamics that feed
them. This also appears to apply to the park management. In its public communications, the park commonly portrays armed group
activity as resulting primarily from the illegal exploitation of natural
resources. From this perspective, pushing them out of the park through military
operations would seem an adequate solution. Yet, the causes for armed group
activity in the Virunga park are much more complex, and are also fed by factors
such as communal conflicts, unscrupulous behavior by politicians and local
authorities feeding off animosities towards the park, the militarization of
politics, a malfunctioning security apparatus, regional interference and
long-standing social ties between populations and armed groups. Addressing
these various factors is urgent for ensuring that stability becomes more than
just a vain hope.

The park’s
current approach to conservation and development projects around appears to
have done little to mitigate conflict dynamics. For example, while the park has
toughened its approach to the illegal exploitation of natural resources ––whether
by civilians or armed actors––it has been much slower in the creation of
livelihoods for civilians. Certainly, the park promises to create many jobs through
the projects of the Virunga Alliance, although most of these have
not yet materialized. Not
only do these initiatives take time to come off the ground, they seem to be
hampered by the current situation of rampant insecurity in and around the park.

Even when jobs providing
alternatives to unauthorized resources exploitation will materialize, they
might not directly sever the links between populations and armed groups, nor
de-escalate conflict dynamics. In fact, depending on how it is managed, the
availability of jobs may actually reinforce conflicts between and within
communities and elites, as it raises their stakes. Where recruitment is
believed to benefit only certain ethnic groups, factions or networks, those
perceiving to be marginalized will protest. For example, in September 2014, youngsters
from Rutshuru demonstrated in front of the headquarters of the park in
Rumangabo, as they found that too many people from the ‘outside’ were working
in high positions for the Virunga Foundation. The manifestation was handled in
a heavy-handed manner by park guards, which created further antagonisms. In the
current climate of militarization, such discontent is dangerous, as it may draw
in the armed actors to which politicians and local authorities are often
linked, a risk that is especially elevated in the context of elections and the
ongoing decentralization process.

It would be
therefore seem important for the park to adopt a more conflict sensitive approach to conservation, which would also require a more
participatory orientation. This would demand an increased effort by the park to
improve its local communication, which has been lagging behind on its internationally
oriented publicity, although a number of recent initiatives point to
improvement in this domain. However, it is also important to realize that there
is only so much the management of the park can do to end the interlocking cycle
of conflicts and violence. Many of the solutions for Virunga’s problems are in
the hands of politicians and institutions located far away from the park’s
boundaries. It is the primary responsibility of these actors to find integrated
solutions for the different rebel groups residing in the park. Similar to other
parts of the Congo, the current emphasis on stand-alone military operations has
proven little effective up till now.