Thursday, September 27, 2012

it seems that the PLAN just had another ceremony -- this time for the decommissioning of DDG 131 "Nanjing" after 35 years of service. (here). Just don't write-off the Nanjing just yet; it will be recommissioned as a civilian CMS ship after a refit.

Introducing the ‘Liaoning’: China’s New Aircraft Carrier and What it Means

By Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins
China’s first aircraft carrier, now referred to as the “Liaoning ” by
China’s Ministry of National Defense, has been officially “delivered and commissioned”
to China’s navy, according official Chinese media. The handover
ceremony, with top Chinese leaders presiding, took place on the morning
of September 25 at a naval base in Dalian, a port city in northeast
China’s Liaoning province.

Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

This photo taken on
September 24, 2012 shows China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning,
docked in Dalian, in northeast China’s Liaoning province.

Just as Liaoning the province was created when existing northeastern
provinces and municipalities were merged and integrated into a more
powerful whole in 1954-55, so too “Liaoning” the carrier integrates a
mix of building blocks into a warship that has the potential to bolster
China’s regional influence—and also to force China’s leaders to confront
perhaps the most complicated naval diplomacy questions in the PRC’s
history.
The Liaoning’s commissioning matters, both symbolically and in terms
of China’s naval power and regional influence. The largest ship to be
delivered to the Chinese navy to date, the carrier when operational
could have a significant influence on regional maritime disputes, in
particular China’s smoldering conflicts in the South China Sea.Names Matter…
Chatter about the commissioning of China’s first carrier began in
early September, when photos surfaced online showing the carrier with
the hull number “16,” followed by reports in local media that the vessel
would be named the Liaoning, after the province that contains Dalian
Naval Shipyard, where it has been refitted.
The carrier was built using the hull of an old Ukrainian carrier
called the Varyag. Rumors had long circulated among Western analysts
that the carrier would eventually be renamed the Shi Lang, after a
celebrated Qing dynasty admiral.
In July 1683, Shi Lang used 300 warships and 20,000 troops to defeat
the Zheng family, which ruled Taiwan, in a conflict known as the Battle
of Penghu. The victory enabled Taiwan’s formal incorporation into the
Qing polity, as a prefecture of Fujian Province. This was an historical first:
Neither the Ming nor any previous dynasty had ever attempted to
incorporate Taiwan directly in to official mainland administration.
Because of Shi’s aggressive efforts to bring Taiwan under mainland
administration and his allegedly corrupt and overbearing post-war
actions as an official vis-à-vis the island, naming China’s first
aircraft carrier after him would send the wrong message for cross-Strait
relations, whose stability Beijing seeks to encourage in order to
facilitate reunification.
PLA Navy (PLAN) ship naming conventions suggest that ships are
typically named after Chinese localities. The rare exceptions in which
PLAN ships are named after individuals include training vessels (Deng
Shichang and Zheng He) and research ships (Li Siguang
), but not larger combat-operations-focused vessels. Since China’s
first aircraft carrier will be its largest and most prominent warship,
it would be logical to name it after one of the largest Chinese
localities, particularly the one in which it was refitted—hence,
“Liaoning.”But Actions Speak Louder than Words…
Whatever the official nomenclature and symbolism, however, the
Liaoning is attracting the world’s attention as a prominent, if modest
and incremental in capabilities, indicator of how China will use its
growing power. As Major General Qian Lihua declared in November 2008, “The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.”
Encouragingly, China’s MND lists developing “Far Seas cooperation”
and capabilities to address non-traditional security threats as missions
for the Liaoning. At the same time, however, it mentions safeguarding
national sovereignty as another mission—presumably to address
territorial and maritime disputes closer to home.
Despite a statement by Chinese National Defense University Professor and PLA officer Li Daguang
that the timing of the Liaoning’s commissioning was designed to
demonstrate resolve regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, for
the foreseeable future the vessel cannot pose a direct threat to U.S. or
Japanese forces. Yet, even in this modest form, it already worries its
smaller South China Sea neighbors. Vietnam, in particular, has reason
for concern: It lost skirmishes with Chinese naval forces over disputed
islands in 1974 and 1988, even though those forces lacked significant
air support. With a vulnerable land border and no U.S. alliance, Hanoi
could even conceivably be at risk of suffering defeat in a third clash
as it vigorously pursues island and maritime claims vis-à-vis China—this
time against a Chinese navy with undeniable airpower from land, and
eventually from sea.
China won the Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 14 March 1988, but
quickly retreated for fear of Vietnamese air strikes and Soviet
retaliation. Rear Admiral Chen Weiwen (PLAN, ret.), commanded the PLAN’s
three-frigate force in the conflict with initiative that was
temporarily controversial but now widely acclaimed.
In a 2011 interview with Modern Ships,
Admiral Chen, who served as a commander in a 1988 conflict with
Vietnamese forces in the Spratly Islands, emphasized the difference that
an aircraft carrier could make. China had won the battle, but quickly
withdrew:

During the Spratly Sea Battle, the thing we feared most
was not Vietnam’s surface vessels, but rather their aircraft. At that
time, Vietnam had Su-22 fighter aircraft, which had a definite ability
to attack ships. The Spratlys are very far from Sanya, and at that time
we also lacked airfields in the Paracels. Flying from the nearest
airfield, Lingshui [on Hainan Island], our aircraft only had loiter time
of 4-5 minutes; in such a short time, they could not solve problems
before they had to return, or they would run out of fuel. So we felt
deeply that China must have an aircraft carrier: If during the Johnson
South Reef Skirmish, we had our own [air] cover from a nearby aircraft
carrier, we would simply not have had to fear Vietnam’s air force. Now
that the Spratlys have airfields, it is much more convenient. If China’s
aircraft carrier enters service relatively soon, and training is
well-established, this will solve a major problem. We will seize air
superiority; Vietnamese aircraft will not dare to take off.

The idea of using deck aviation to address China’s sovereignty claims
is hardly Admiral Chen’s alone. According to “Science of Campaigns,” an
authoritative volume written by scholars at China’s National Defense
University, carriers can play a crucial role by providing air cover
beyond the range of land-based air to support long-range amphibious
landing operations against small islands: “Combat in the deep-sea island
and reef region is relatively more independent, without support from
the land-based force and air force. Under this situation, an aircraft carrier is even more important in winning victory in the campaign.” In a recent interview,
Sr. Capt. Li Jie, an expert at the PLAN’s strategic think tank, was
quoted as stating that “China’s first aircraft carrier…will play an
important role in China’s settlement of islands disputes and defense of
its maritime rights and interests.”Looming Large and Making Waves?
So how might Liaoning ultimately influence Chinese naval operations
and future naval procurement? The answers to this question will
substantially shape other countries’ views concerning the strategic
course China takes.
China’s maritime neighbors in Southeast Asia, as well as Japan,
India, South Korea, Russia, Australia and the U.S. will pay especially
close attention. With Liaoning officially in the fleet, the next
questions that China’s military and civilian leaders must grapple with
are, first, how to use the ship; second, how many more carriers to
build; and third, how to protect it from the increasingly capable
anti-ship weapons being acquired by neighbors such as Vietnam, which is
due to take delivery
of its first Russian Kilo-class diesel attack submarine by the end of
2012. The Liaoning’s existence will likely impel China to develop more
advanced surface combatants and anti-submarine forces to protect the
symbolically valuable, but operationally vulnerable, asset.
At present, the Liaoning remains first and foremost an emblem of future Chinese sea power. All of its 10 sea trials
to date have occurred well within Chinese waters. Chinese naval
aircraft have not achieved the basic milestone of landing on its deck
with the help of arrestor wires, or “traps,” a process that their
American counterparts have been perfecting for decades.
Yet, while the Liaoning’s capabilities will remain modest for the
foreseeable future, it will be watched carefully as an important symbol
of Beijing’s intentions. As Rear Admiral Yang Yi wrote in a commentary
published immediately after the commissioning was made public: “In
order to counterbalance the theory that its new aircraft carrier is a
threat, China must not only continue to make clear its strategies and
policies, it must also take practical actions to convince the world that
with the development of China’s military strength, especially the
strengthening of its overseas projection capability, it will enhance its
role as a defender of regional stability and world peace.”[CORRECTION: Dalian is a port city located in Liaoning province.
An earlier version of this column mistakenly described it as the capital
of Liaoning. The capital of Liaoning is Shenyang. Thanks to a reader
for pointing out the error.]

The
report mentions that the air cushion ship, he hull of which is
probably damaged beyond repair, was the first of four ordered by China.
There is now fear that China may cancel the contract (they would be
following the Greek precedent). It adds that most of the employees of
More are engaged in St. Petersburg (obviously Almaz shipyard) and in
China, where they are building a shipyard analogous to the one in
Feodosiya (really?).

Friday, July 02, 2010

The Zubr deal has been finalized.

The last update on the Zubr deal transpired in April 2010 (here). after a prolonged negotiation, the deal seems to have finalized.

Blueprints are to be handed over to the Chinese side under the project, according to some sources

Expect a Chinese export variant coming to a trade-show soon.

(Thanks dylan for the news)

KYIV.
July 1 (Interfax-AVN) - The implementation of a contract to build
high-speed hovercrafts of the Zubr-type for China at the Morye shipyard
in Feodosia will start in September, Prime Minister of Crimea Vasyl
Dzharty said.

"The construction of the first two hovercrafts will begin in September," Dzharty said at the shipyard.

Crimea and Ukraine continue looking for new orders for Feodosia shipyards, he said.

"I think orders will come from Russia and from Ukraine," he added.

Earlier
reports said that a $350 million contract for the construction of
four high-speed amphibious hovercrafts of the Zubr-type for China was
concluded by Ukrainian arms trader Ukrspetsexport in 2009.

Two
were to be built in Ukraine and two in China with Ukrainian experts'
participation. Blueprints are to be handed over to the Chinese side
under the project, according to some sources.

Ukraine,
Russia and Greece signed a trilateral contract in January 2000 for the
delivery of four similar hovercrafts to Greece - two by Ukraine and
two by Russia, worth a total of about $200 million. The contract with
Ukraine was worth about $97 million and with Russia some $101 million.

The
high-speed amphibious hovercraft of the Zubr-type is capable of
carrying 150 tons of cargo, including up to three medium tanks, or 500
Marines. The hovercraft can develop a speed of over 60 knots (about
120 kilometers per hour) on land, water and ice. It can tackle
obstacles of up to 1.5 meters high. Zubr has five 5 hp gas turbines.

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Ever since the China navy unofficially unveiled its latest Type 052D LUYANG III-Class DDG 20 days, there has been a heated debate on the issue of its VLS arrangements.
Hopefully this photo would put the debate to rest -- It is 64, 16 more than its predecessor of the Type052C.

Thursday, August 30, 2012

Type 052D LUYANG III-Class DDG, what we do know so far

There are two under construction -- they are sporting a new 130mm main gun and a set of much larger radar arrays

According to people who have seen the ship at HSH here are the observations.

1. Main mast is slightly different on the top, similar to 054A.
2. The space between the aft mast and aft VLS is still there, indicating
no extended VLS area and probably still gonna have the two quad pack
YJ62.
3. Nothing is installed on top of the hangar, indicating it'll be HQ10 not the deck penetrating 730.
4. Aft mast is the same so it's still the good ole 517 radar.

Here is a interesting diagram showing the main gun is moved forward by a
little bit compare to the 052C, also shows how massive the new arrays
are.