Subcommittee Hearings at the Cape

NASA's budget went to Congress in February 1962. A month later, the
House began hearings. Before the end of March, Congressman Olin E.
Teague (D.-Tex.) decided to take his Subcommittee for Manned Space
Flight of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics to Florida for
on-the-spot hearings on 23 March. Teague wanted to "educate the
subcommittee's members" and to "attempt to justify the money
that's spent here before Congress."14 Headquarters and Houston
representatives also attended the hearings, along with officers of the
Air Force Missile Test Center.

After Debus outlined the Launch Operations Directorate's organization,
mission, and operational concepts, Petrone described the FY 1963 funding
requirements, together with total facility requirements for the manned
lunar landing program. The initial reaction of the subcommittee was that
LOD should spread its budget requests over several fiscal years. Some
subcommittee members questioned the basis for LOD's budget figures.
"You've got a great big ball of money, and it is very easy for
someone to come along and cut it, really cut it," one unidentified
congressman observed.15

The subcommittee members deliberately asked pointed and critical
questions to fortify themselves so that they could justify the budget
before the appropriations committee later on. In the day-long
conference, the subcommittee stressed saving money, and the Directorate
emphasized precise scheduling. "I'm sure the Doctor [Debus] feels
that we are friendly," Chairman Teague justifiably remarked, for he
was one of the most influential friends the space program had in
Congress. "We don't want to delay this program one minute. . . . If
you can give us your program timing . . . I think we can pave a smooth
road to the appropriations committee." But he added, "If we
don't take any action, I think the appropriations committee
will."16

Cost of launch complex 39, as of November 1964. Authorizations (by
Act of Congress) are on the left line. NASA obligations (contracts,
purchase orders, etc.) are on the right, with the latter half being
predicted.

The estimated total cost for LC-39, including FY 1963 and later
increments, Petrone told the subcommittee, was $432 million. LOD was
trying "to evaluate, not sell," the program. The budget
figures were honestly arrived at. "We've got to live with them for
years to come," Petrone declared.17 Program timing was based on
schedules that had to be met for the manned lunar landing program and
had to be responsive to NASA Headquarters schedules. To the men of LOD,
time was critical. To the congressmen, however, the amount of money
spent in fiscal 1963 was the critical issue.

Debus explained that the LOD budget was made out against scheduled
facility completion dates and launch schedules. These provided a little
leeway for some slippage, but on requirements that were pressing,
slippage "would hurt very, very much." They wanted launch
complex 39 ready by January 1965, Petrone said, since they hoped to
launch the first Saturn C-5 in March or April of that year. As an
example of facility scheduling, Petrone said that LOD expected the
erection of steel for the VAB to begin in March 1963.18

The programming of funds tied in so closely to the scheduling of
facilities that a slippage in one resulted in a slippage of the other,
and the hard fact was that Congress rarely appropriated funds in time
for use at the beginning of the fiscal year. In response to a
subcommittee question as to when LOD began receiving funds after the
fiscal year started, Petrone answered that in the preceding year it had
been October. Drawing upon his long experience in construction, Colonel
Bidgood added that he had never seen money "hit the market before
the first of October." Contingency authority from the
Appropriations Committee helped little in new or increased programs,
since such authority permitted expenditures only for normal operating
costs at constant rates. LOD had to have funds on hand before awarding
construction contracts.

The subcommittee asked for a comparison of relative costs between mobile
and fixed facilities. As against the $432 million for a mobile complex
with four pads and a launch rats of 36 per year, Petrone said, fixed
facilities would require nine pads costing $900 million. Additionally,
mobile facilities made possible significant savings in manpower costs
both in LC-39 and in the industrial area, even with a launch rate of
only 24 per year. The biggest savings came in the reduction in the
number of supervisors and other personnel at the higher grade levels.
Dollar savings in manpower, the subcommittee observed, were the
strongest argument for mobile facilities.

Subcommittee members then mentioned the possible impact of new
developments, such as the atomic rocket motor, on the design of LC-39
facilities. Rather than sink a lot of money into this complex, might it
not be better to wait and see what the future held in the next five
years, and thereby save money in FY 1963? Debus explained that one of
the basic decisions made early in the planning stages was to base the
design on "the state-of-the-art and its most likely
development." One of the basic presumptions was the use of liquid
propellants. LOD had to be ready by 1965 and could not wait on the
possibility of new developments. With the existing state-of-the-art, LOD
could be ready in 1965. The subcommittee's view was that no decision
should be so binding as to deny LOD flexibility to take advantage of new
technology.19

In response to a question about the Department of Defense's role in
funding the manned lunar landing program support facilities, Debus
explained that LOD was limiting its funding to the new Merritt Island
area and to LC-34 and LC-37 on the Cape. NASA Headquarters and the
Department of Defense would coordinate downrange stations, including
ships. LOD was coordinating other support requirements for the Merritt
Island area with the officials of the Air Force Missile Test Center. Two
of these support items - utility installation in the new area
(causeways, roads, water, and power) and launch-phase range
instrumentation - although in effect Air Force requirements, were
included in LOD's budget. The range instrumentation that LOD would fund,
in agreement with AFMTC, extended to a radius of 105 kilometers. NASA
Headquarters would fund data acquisition and tracking requirements
beyond that distance. So far as cost-sharing for maintenance and
operations of the two areas was concerned, LOD was to handle funding on
Merritt Island and the Air Force on the Cape.

When Dugald Black of the Manned Spacecraft Center presented facility
requirements for checking out and testing the Apollo spacecraft, members
of the subcommittee interrupted his presentation several times with
questions regarding quality control and the overlap of functions and
facilities. The MSC representatives explained that MSC would develop the
spacecraft at Houston, but would check and test it at Merritt Island.
Just as the Mercury and Gemini programs had overlapped in some
instances, so the Gemini program would overlap Apollo. Facilities to
support the Apollo and Gemini spacecraft had to be available
simultaneously. The scheduling of the operations and checkout building,
for example, was extremely tight. It had to be finished early enough to
install and inspect equipment before the spacecraft arrived in October
or November 1963.20

The scope and expense of the checking and testing requirements for the
spacecraft led one member of the subcommittee to question the program,
at least momentarily. Debus reminded him that "this is a research
and development facility and is only slightly operational." This
prompted Chairman Teague to observe:

That doesn't take away the argument that this entire operation is an
expensive one. It gets more expensive with the buildings and personnel,
and everything swelling in size. Perhaps we are trying to do too much in
too much of a hurry. If we are subject to so many changes in so many
places so that we are watching every nut and bolt right up to the time
we are ready to shoot . . . .21