Critics Fault Clinton Bosnia Policy

ANALYSIS

April 13, 1994|By BERNARD D. KAPLAN Hearst Newspapers

PARIS — Some Western diplomats are calling President Clinton's failure to consult Moscow on Sunday about the Gorazde air strikes an error.

One senior diplomat said on Tuesday that Russian President Boris Yeltsin "was justified" in complaining about the United States' launching of a bombing raid last weekend against the Bosnian Serb besiegers of Gorazde without giving him warning.

"It's hard to see why he was kept in the dark," the diplomat said. "There would have been a lot of advantages in bringing in the Russians. Nothing was gained by keeping them out."

Yeltsin and other critics said Russia had the right to be consulted because of the major contribution Moscow made in getting the Serbs to end their bombardment of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, in February.

In Washington, a U.S. State Department source said the decision was deliberate. "We didn't consult Yeltsin because that would have forced him into a position of saying yes or no," the source said.

The official said that if Yeltsin had said yes, he would have been perceived as approving a NATO military operation, which would have angered nationalists in Russia. If Yeltsin had said no, that would have driven a wedge into U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Critics agreed that the United States and the Western allies technically were correct, following the rules as laid down by the U.N. Security Council, to which Russia belongs. The Security Council authorized U.N. military commanders in the war zone to order air attacks, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, if they thought U.N. personnel in Bosnia were threatened.

This was said to be the situation at Gorazde, previously declared a U.N. safe area, when Bosnian Serb forces refused to call off their assault on the Muslim-held city despite demands by the U.N. commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose.

But the overriding criticism of Washington officials was that they assumed an agreed military procedure made it unnecessary to touch base with Moscow before allowing U.S. planes to attack.

French political analyst Matthieu Soulier said that "the Russians thought that at Sarajevo they had earned the right to be regarded henceforth as major players in Bosnia. Then, in the very next crisis, the United States and its allies ignored them."

Soulier deplored what he called Washington's "confusion" over its Bosnian policy. He said internal differences in the administration about whether to use force had led to a failure to give adequate consideration to Russia's role.

"Washington has consistently underestimated the importance Russia attaches to being accepted as a significant factor in Bosnia," Soulier said. "Russia's internal weakness makes it imperative for whoever is in power in Moscow to try to wield power and influence abroad."

"The Russians remain highly sensitive to anything they suspect is an unwarranted extension of U.S. power, especially in eastern Europe," he said. "They see the lack of consultation as tending to confirm their suspicions."