Diplomacy and the Use of Force

June 22, 2014

Re “The diplomacy of force” (June 20): Roger Cohen quotes me as saying that negotiated peace settlements reflect real power balances, whereas it is armed force that can change those power balances.

This is true, but Mr. Cohen goes too far in using this as an argument for the wider use of force in American foreign policy. Sometimes the use of force can open the door to better settlements — as in Bosnia and Kosovo. More often — as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya — it just makes things worse.

David Harland, GenevaExecutive director of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue.

An answer to the Egypt question

Re “Sisi’s choices: Good and bad” (Opinion, June 16): Alaa Al Aswany explains that we will soon know whether President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt will choose to restore former President Hosni Mubarak’s autocracy or to seize the moment to implement democratic reforms.

But this question has already been answered: Under Mr. Sisi, Egypt’s oppression of its population has far exceeded Mr. Mubarak’s wildest exploits.

The Egyptian military led a coup in 2013, and since then over a thousand unarmed protesters have been killed. Hundreds of opposition members have been sentenced to death in absentia. The Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition party, has been outlawed. So has the April 6 Youth Movement, the secular coalition that helped lead the 2011 protests against Mr. Mubarak.

The real question now is how much longer the United States government will be able to continue to justify giving over $1 billion a year to Egypt’s regime.

Peter Hayakawa, Washington

Regime change and North Korea

Re “Let North Korea collapse” (Opinion, June 17): Analysts have argued for decades that North Korea is on the verge of imminent collapse. But according to some experts, the economic situation inside the country is better now than at any point in recent history. Chinese and Russian investments have hastened infrastructure and construction projects, and Pyongyang is putting greater priority on special economic zones.

Rather than elbowing Pyongyang into a confrontational stance and creating conditions for regime change, the sensible thing to do is to promote legitimate economic activity with regional partners. This gives greater incentives for Pyongyang to be accountable, and increases the quality of life for the people. Any attempts at regime change would yield unforeseen consequences that could make the status quo of the past 60 years look more preferable by comparison.

There is no easy answer to the Korean question, but the current path has only deepened the suffering of the North Korean people. The outside world should keep in place sanctions only on military technology, while encouraging Pyongyang’s efforts to develop its economy.

The region and its people would be far better off encouraging a “developmental dictatorship” in Pyongyang, rather than pursuing antagonistic regime change policies that embolden a siege mentality and encourage inter-Korean brinksmanship.