Wikia is not accessible if you’ve made further modifications. Remove the custom ad blocker rule(s) and the page will load as expected.

The neutrality of this article needs to be checked. This article is largely or entirely based on text from public domainUnited States government sources. This article may express the point of view of the United States government or may contain an unbalanced critical assessment. It may require editing to put it in compliance with Wikipedia's neutral point of view policy. (December 2009)

Contents

Identity

Captive 215 was identified as Fahd Al Sharif on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 September 2004.[2]

Captive 215 was identified as Fahd Umr Abd Al Majid Al Sharif on the Summary of Evidence memos prepared for his first and second annual Administrative Review Board, on 31 October 2005 and 3 October 2006, and on seven official lists of captives' names published by the Department of Defense.[1][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]

Captive 215 was identified as Fahd Umar Abdulmajid Al Shareef on a court order arising from his writ of habeas corpus.[11]

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror.[12]
This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahd Al Sharif's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 September 2004.[2]
The memo listed the following allegations against him:

Transcript

Al Sharif chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[13]
On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order, the Department of Defense published a twelve page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Testimony

Administrative Review Board

Captives whose CSRT labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to judge whether the captive still posed a threat if repatriated to their home country.[14]

First annual Administrative Review Board

This Casio F91W is in daily alarm mode. This watch is set to beep its buzzer and flash its light at 7:30 am.

Al Sharif's name was alleged to have been found on a computer that was associated with Al Qaida and was seized during joint raids with other foreign agency [sic] services.

Al Sharif was allegedly recognized as someone who had "provided administrative support at the guesthouse in Kandahar".

Transcript

Captive 215 chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[15]
In the Spring of 2006 the Department of Defense published a nineteen page summarized transcript from captive 215's first annual Board hearing. It also published an eight page memo, that contained point by point responses captive 215 prepared prior to his hearing.[16]

Captive 215 acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan for Jihad. He acknowledged receiving military training in Afghanistan, and subsequently manning the Taliban's front line near the Gharband mountains. He acknowledged being present in Tora Bora during the American aerial bombardment.

Captive 215 clarified that his training at the Khalden training camp was a four month infantry course, not a six month course. He acknowledged telling his interrogators that Khalden offered more advanced training courses, but he clarified he had not been enrolled in those courses. He acknowledged briefly attending an infantry training session at the al Farouq training camp.

Captive 215 acknowledged owning a digital watch. He couldn't remember the model number, and had no idea whether it was a Casio F91W. He had no knowledge as two whether bomb-makers liked to build time-bombs around Casio F91W
watchers, and asserted that he only used his watch to tell the time of day.

Captive 215 disputed meeting Osama bin Laden, or accepting money from him. He disputed ever having any contact
with al Qaida. He disputed being a member of the Taliban. He was a volunteer who served on their front lines, not
a member.

Captive 215 acknowledged that he had been ready to be a martyr. He tried to explain a distinction between being
martyred through normal combat, and purposely putting one's self in jeopardy in order to seek martyrdom. He regarded the former as legitimate and the latter as illegitimate.

Captive 215 said that during the time he manned the Gharband front line, prior to 9-11, he didn't remember ever firing his weapon. He disputed ever being trained on, or firing anti-aircraft weapons. He disputed ever firing any rifles at US aircraft during the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahd Umr Abd Al Majid Al Sharif's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 October 2006.[4]
The three page memo listed twenty primary factors favoring continued detention and one factor favoring release or transfer.

In September 2007 the Department of Justice published dossiers of unclassified documents arising from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals of 179 captives.[17]
The documents arising from Al-Shareef v. Bush were not among those the Bush administration has published.

Repatriation

On November 25, 2008 the Department of Defense published a list of when captives left Guantanamo.[18]
According to that list he was repatriated to Saudi custody on November 9, 2007, with thirteen other men.
The records published from the captives' annual Administrative Reviews show his repatriation was not the outcome of the formal internal review procedures.[19][20][21]
The records show his detention was not reviewed in 2007.

At least ten other men in his release group were not repatriated through the formal review procedure.[19][20][21]