Considered
and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Wright, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Appellant Shawn Michael Hayes
challenges the district court’s decision to grant sole physical custody of the
parties’ minor children to respondent and its finding that the court-appointed
custody evaluator’s credibility and impartiality were compromised during the
custody evaluation. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Our review of custody decisions is
narrow and “limited to whether the [district] court abused its discretion by
making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the
law.” Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (citation omitted). District courts make custody determinations
based on the best interests of the children, and balance 13 factors enumerated
in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (2006).
The district court must make detailed written findings regarding its
consideration of the best-interest factors.
Id. The law “leaves scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests
considerations.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000).

We will sustain a district court’s
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. We view the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s findings of fact. Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d at 474. “That the record
might support findings other than those made by the [district] court does not
show that the court’s findings are defective.”
Id. When there is conflicting evidence, we defer
to the district court’s determinations of credibility. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 52.01; Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). Here, the district court made
findings on each element of the best-interests standard and awarded respondent
sole physical custody of the parties’ minor children.

Appellant argues that the district court
abused its discretion by choosing not to award the parties joint physical
custody. “There is neither a statutory
presumption disfavoring joint physical custody, nor is there a preference
against joint physical custody if the district court finds that it is in the
best interest of the child and the four joint custody factors support such a
determination.” Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn.
App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 2 (2006). But when the
difficulties between the parents are so significant and pervasive as to
preclude cooperation, awarding joint physical custody is an abuse of
discretion. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.
2(a); Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 396
N.W.2d 68, 73-74 (Minn.
App. 1986).

Here, the district court
specifically found that the parties would be unlikely to agree on parenting
issues. In order to justify an award of
joint physical custody, the district court would have been required to make a
finding regarding “the ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their
children.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 2(a). The district court decided that it could not
make such a finding and instead found that they could not agree. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court properly determined that joint physical custody is not appropriate in
this case.

Appellant argues that the district
court abused its discretion by awarding sole physical custody to respondent
based on the inappropriate “tender years” doctrine. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a)(3) (2006) (stating that no parent should be a
preferred custodian on the basis of sex).
Appellant notes the district court’s statement that, “given the age of
the children, it is in their best interest that [respondent] have sole physical
custody of the children with [appellant] having very liberal parenting
time.” But the record indicates that the
district court provided detailed findings regarding the best interests of the
children and its award of sole physical custody to respondent is supported by
its findings. Thus we cannot conclude
that the district court improperly relied on the tender years doctrine in
making its decision.

We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole physical custody of the parties’
children to respondent.

II.

Appellant argues that the district
court clearly erred by finding that the court-appointed custody evaluator’s
credibility and impartiality were compromised during the custody evaluation and
abused its discretion by relying on this finding to disregard the evaluator’s
recommendation.

In reviewing a district court’s
order, this court will reverse the determination only if it is based on an
error of law or on an abuse of discretion that results in a conclusion that is
against logic and the facts on record. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Minn. 1984). A district court’s findings “shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A finding is “clearly erroneous” when this
court has “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d at 472 (citation omitted).
When determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, this court
views the record in the light most favorable to the findings. Id.

Appellant argues that the district
court did not base its finding regarding the custody evaluator’s credibility on
sufficient evidence. But the district
court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of a witness and we
defer to the district court’s credibility determination. SeeMinn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01.

Moreover, even if the district
court’s finding is error, it is only reversible error if it prejudiced
appellant. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61. And the district court has discretion whether
to follow a custody recommendation. See Minn. Stat. § 518.167, subd. 1
(2006); Rutanen v. Olson, 475 N.W.2d
100, 104 (Minn.
App. 1991) (“[a]s an exercise of [ ] discretion, the [district] court may
refuse to accept the study’s recommendation for custody”). A district court need not reach the same
conclusion as a custody evaluator, provided that the district court’s detailed
findings support the conclusion that its custody determination is in the best
interests of the children. Id.

Here, the district court made
detailed, independent findings regarding the best-interest factors that support
its decision to grant respondent sole physical custody of the parties’ children. Thus, the district court’s finding regarding
the impartiality of the custody evaluator, even if erroneous, is not reversible
error.