A Comprehensive Timeline of the Iran Deal

Last week, we published our handy summary of the historic nuclear agreement reached between world powers and the Islamic Republic of Iran. As we read and reread the deal, we realized that one of the primary difficulties in understanding it was organization. Wouldn't it be useful, we thought, if someone put together a timeline of precisely what happens when? When are the various sanctions relaxed or terminated, and when do the assorted restrictions on Iran's nuclear program lapse?

So again, we live to serve. Below, you will find a detailed summary of the timing of obligations and activities triggered at each step of the Iran deal.

Finalization Day (July 14, 2015)

The day the agreement was reached and endorsed by Iran and the P5+1

The deal will be “promptly” submitted to the UNSC for endorsement

The United Nations Security Council endorses the JCPOA (July 20, 2015)

UNSC votes unanimously to:

endorse the JCPOA

“terminate” all prior UN sanctions, beginning on Implementation Day (and subject to reimposition through snapback mechanism)

After all relevant documents are submitted to Congress (July 19, 2015), both houses of the U.S. Congress will have 60 days to vote on the deal, as required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, sponsored by Senator Bob Corker (R-TN)

During this time, President Obama is prohibited from lifting sanctions on Iran

Adoption Day (October 2015)

90 days after the UNSC endorses the JCPOA, OR an earlier date mutually agreed upon by participants in the JCPOA.

The “JCPOA and the commitments in the JCPOA” come into effect

Participants in the JCPOA will begin making “necessary arrangements and preparations” to implement their commitments under the JCPOA

Implementation Day (Early 2016)

The day on which the IAEA report verifies that Iran has done the following:

Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor

that Iran has ceased pursuing construction at the existing Arak Heavy Water Reactor based on its original design

that Iran has removed existing calandria from Arak, and that the calandria have been made inoperable

that Iran is not producing or testing natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies designed for the original Arak reactor

IAEA will monitor all existing uranium pellets, until the modernized Arak reactor becomes operational at which point the the natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH

that Iran has made necessary technical modifications to the existing natural uranium fuel production process line for the modernised Arak reactor

Heavy Water Production Plant

that all excess heavy water beyond Iran’s needs for the modernized Arak research reactor are being made available for export (for 15 years)

that Iran has informed the IAEA about the inventory and production of the Heavy Water Production Plant and allows for monitoring

Enrichment Capacity

that Iran is keeping its enrichment capacity at under 5060 IR-1 centrifuges, in no more than 30 cascades in their current configuration at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (for 10 years)

that Iran has removed all additional centrifuges and infrastructure (not associated with the 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP) and placed them in Natanz under continuous monitoring:

Centrifuges Research and Development

that ongoing enrichment R&D does not accumulate enriched uranium

that enrichment R&D with uranium includes only IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing is carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8, and only one or two of each type. Iran is building or testing only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA (10 years)

that all testing of centrifuges with uranium is taking place only at the PFEP, and all mechanical testing of centrifuges is only at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (at Natanz) and The Tehran Research Center (15 years)

that Iran has adapting PFEP to the its long-term R&D plan, by removing and modifying all excess infrastructure and equipment in specified ways of Annex IIG

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

that Iran is not conducting any uranium enrichment or related R&D and has no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (for 15 years)

that Iran is maintaining no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines, that they are in one wing of the FFEP, and that have been structured in specific ways: two cascades modified for production of stable isotopes and four cascades remaining idle (for 15 years)

that Iran has removed the remaining cascades and infrastructure

(All of these will be placed them in Natanz under IAEA continuous monitoring, but somewhat strangely, the IAEA is not required to certify that at this stage.)

Other Aspects of Enrichment

that Iran is abiding by its voluntary commitments under its long-term R&D plan

The IAEA will monitor and approve annually for the duration of the plan that the nature, scope and scale of Iran’s enrichment program.

that a template for describing different centrifuge types and associated definitions, and a procedure for for measuring centrifuge performance data has been agreed on.

that all enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold and delivered on the international market

that all uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% has been fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less

that Iran is not building or operating facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF6. (for 15 years)

Centrifuge Manufacturing

that Iran is replacing broken or damaged active IR-1 centrifuges only from its stock of monitored stock of machines, and that the only centrifuges Iran is producing are to keep the store of IR-1s from dipping below 500

Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1

that Iran has notified the IAEA of its provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and full implementation Modified Code 3.1

Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency

that Iran has provided the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows is providing reports (and allowing verification) on changes in inventory

that Iran has declared all locations and equipment that are used for the production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows and permitted continuous IAEA monitoring

Simultaneously, the EU terminates the provisions of the Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspends the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP. (Member states will change national legislation to follow suit.) EU sanctions lifted include:

Financial, banking and insurance measures:

Prohibition and authorization regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran

Sanctions on:

banking activities

insurance

financial support for trade with Iran

grants, financial assistance and concessional loans

Government of Iran public-guaranteed bonds

associated services for each of the categories above

Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

Sanctions on:

the import of oil and gas from Iran

the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities

Simultaneously, the United States “ceases the application” of the following sanctions:

Financial and banking measures

Sanctions on:

transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran; Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missiles activities; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

Iranian Rial

provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran

the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including government bonds

financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions

Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer

Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above

Insurance measures

Sanctions on underwriting services and insurance

Energy and petrochemical sectors

Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold in those nations that are still permitted to purchase Iranian crude oil

Sanctions on:

investment and support for Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran

the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran

transactions with iran’s energy sector, including front companies

associated services for each of the categories above

Shipping, port, metals and automotive sectors

Sanctions on:

transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators

Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals

the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s automotive sector

associated services for each of the categories above

Designations and other sanctions listings

Removal of hundreds individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 of Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List

The United States also commits to:

allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the:

export or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft

provision of associated services, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation

And, in accordance with an earlier UN Security Council resolution, the following UN sanctions are terminated, “subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments:”

orders Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water projects

orders all states to prevent the transfer of materials, or technical or financial assistance, related to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water, the development of a nuclear weapon, and activities about which IAEA has expressed concern. Also bans their import from Iran.

reimposes the ballistic missiles and conventional arms embargos. The ballistic missile sanctions will be lifted on Transition Day, while the conventional arms sanctions will be lifted five years after Adoption Day

conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day

5 years after Adoption Day (October, 2020)

UN sanctions on conventional arms lifted

May also occur earlier, if the IAEA reaches the “Broader Conclusion” that “all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities”

Transition Day, 8 years after Adoption Day (October 2023)

UNSC sanctions on ballistic missiles are lifted

May also occur earlier, if the IAEA reaches the “Broader Conclusion” that “all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.”

Iran must seek ratification of the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards, which it signed in 2003 but has never formally “concluded.” (According to Iran, ratification by the Majlis is necessary for the Iranian government to conclude the Additional Protocol.)

The EU must lift the following sanctions:

prohibiting the supply of financial messaging services to, and freezing the assets of, designated individuals “involved in nuclear or ballistic missiles activities,” and “owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of” the Revolutionary Guard and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.”

(The JCPOA references Article 20(12) of Council Decision (EU) 2010/413/CFSP. Strangely, there is no Article 20(12); perhaps this is referencing Article 20(1-2), which would make the most sense contextually.)

requiring inspection of cargo traveling to and from Iran; prohibiting the provision of maintenance services to cargo aircraft until suspect cargo is inspected and/or seized.

prohibiting the sale or transfer or financing of nuclear related materials to Iran

prohibiting loans, credits or joint ventures with Iranian individuals or entities involved in the manufacture of materials listed in the Common Military List of the EU or technology that could contribute to nuclear enrichment or nuclear weapons delivery systems

prohibiting investments in Iran that involve uranium mining, uranium enrichment, or the manufacture of materials listed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (one, two) and Missile Technology Control Regime lists

prohibiting on buying and selling precious metals to and from the Iranian government.

(Many of these seem to be misnumbered: for instance, there are no “Articles 4e and 4f” of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, and “Articles 15a, 15b and 15c” of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 should be 15(1)a, b, and c.)

prohibiting the sale of software and “associated services” to Iran (these also appear to be misnumbered)

prohibiting the sale or transfer of “arms and related materiel,” including military or paramilitary equipment, to Iran, and the import of arms from Iran.

prohibiting technical or financial assistance related to designated materials and loans or financial relationships with with any Iranian individual involved in the manufacture of such goods

Iran’s obligation to conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium at PFEP (Natanz) and all mechanical testing of of centrifuges is only at PFEP and the Tehran Research Center ends

Iran’s commitment not to conduct any uranium enrichment or related R&D at Fordow ends

Iran’s commitment to limit the number, location and activity of IR-1 centrifuges in Fordow ends

Iran’s obligation not to engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or related R&D activity, nor to acquire hot cells or facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel ends. Iran “does not intend to thereafter” to resume these activities.

Iran’s commitment not to operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF6 ends

Iran’s formal commitment to permit the IAEA on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals, and to facilitate a long-term IAEA presence through visas, working space and an increased number of inspectors ends

Iran’s commitment to permit IAEA verification that all uranium is transferred to the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan (or to future uranium conversion facilities which Iran might eventually build) ends

Staley Smith previously was a National Security Intern at the Brookings Institution. She spent the past year studying in Jordan and Israel and will graduate from Johns Hopkins University in 2016 with a major in political science.