When Sun-tzu Met Clausewitz

A modified and somewhat longer version of my 'long essay' for
Strategic Dimensions of Contemporary Warfare, of which the
tutor commented: 'A superb essay. You have
read both widely and deeply. You have thought through the theory
and its implications thoroughly and taken a stand in a debate amongst
the leading academic strategists of the day which I, for one, find
compelling. A great pleasure to read.'
He suggested that I publish it. So I have. It's an e-book, available
from Amazon stores worldwide
and from Apple
- Barnes & Noble
- Inktera
- Kobo
- Scribd and
- 24symbols

But take note! I have now combined this essay with the dissertation
that came out of it. The new version is now available in paperback
and digital editions under the title A Vision So
Noble. Blue skies! -- Dan Ford

Opening up the Triad

When we began our study of Strategic Dimensions of
Contemporary Warfare, I agonized over the linear nature of Carl
von Clausewitz's model, stepping so neatly from Strategy to
Planning to Tactics. Europe's greatest military thinker
(1780-1831) seemed to leave no possibility that tactics--the
outcome of that planning--might in turn influence the military's
strategy. Instead, it was a one-way trip to the Battle of
Austerlitz. Perhaps that worked for Napoleon, when the strategist
and the field commander were one and the same person, but it
hardly seems appropriate in a day when the former commandant of
the US Marines can write in all seriousness of the `strategic
corporal'. Two hundred years on, the actions of a two-stripe
noncom can reinforce or undo the intentions of the Secretary of
Defense.

In my first essay for the unit, I tried to make
Clausewitz's triad circular, by applying a Hegelian dialectic in
which the final term in each triad begins another, similar, and
more elegant round. Thus, Strategy is the thesis, Planning the
antithesis, and Tactics the synthesis, which should become the
new thesis and be met in turn by a new antithesis. In the end,
however, I punted the effort into the future, hoping that the
late John Boyd (1927-1997) and his OODA Loop might provide a way
to break out of the closed Clausewitzian triad. So it has
proved.

A fighter pilot during the Korean conflict, and afterward
an instructor at the US Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Boyd
wondered why the F-86 `Sabre' had managed to compile a 10:1
victory ratio over the MiG-15 in Korea, despite the fact that the
Russian fighter was by most measures the superior plane. It could
fly higher and farther, turn tighter, and climb and accelerate
faster than its American opponent. Boyd concluded that the F-86's
hydraulic controls, which allowed a pilot to transition more
quickly from one manoeuvre to another, also enabled him to
neutralize and overcome what should have been the MiG's technical
superiority. This conclusion led Boyd in turn to a theory of
energy as the crucial factor in aerial combat, a finding that is
now the basis of fighter pilot training throughout the world. It
also guided the development of the follow-on McDonnell-Douglas
F-15 `Eagle' and especially the small, lightweight, and
comparatively inexpensive General Dynamics F-16 `Fighting
Falcon', now flown by 25 air forces.

The American pilot also benefited from the F-86's bubble
canopy, which gave him greater situational awareness than his
adversary. Not only was his aircraft faster to react, but he was
better able to see what the other pilot was doing-an advantage
that eventually led Boyd to realize that all combat involves a
cycle of Observation, Orientation,
Decision, and Action.