Wednesday, May 29, 2013

The
uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the
uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, has not
come close to changing Bahrain’s regime into a constitutional monarchy.
However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its
campaign to achieve that goal or, at the very least greatly increased political
influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of
the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic
opportunities were not satisfied by the modest reform efforts instituted
during 1999-2010.

The government has sought dialogue with the opposition to try to address its
grievances. A “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a
few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were elevated further
by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of
Inquiry” (BICI), released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the
government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented
most of the 26 BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups
assessed that overall implementation was modest and incomplete.
Demonstrations and the government crackdown continued throughout 2012, and
both sides resumed a dialogue in February 2013. In fifteen meetings as of late
April 2013, the dialogue, by the accounts of the participants, has made little
concrete progress, but the parties have continued to attend it and the
dialogue could eventually produce incremental movement toward a solution.

The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime,
but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses, urged it to
undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow
government-opposition differences. The U.S. criticism has angered some Al Khalifa
officials but it has also dissatisfied human rights activists who assert that
the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence
on the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key
support for U.S. interests—particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting
U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed
a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major
non- NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons
systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some
Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of
armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration
announced that it would proceed with the sale of other arms sales to Bahrain
that it can only use for external defense. Consumed by its own crisis,
Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve
political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other
Persian Gulf monarchies and therefore lacks the resources to significantly
improve Shiite standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain
signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was
signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s
economy.

Date of Report: March 16, 2013
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Friday, May 17, 2013

The
use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have
unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring
countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may
wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios
involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains
dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of
President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and
blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and
missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their
agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from
open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria
continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons
precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries.
Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have
destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in
the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites
Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad
regime has secured chemical weapons, policymakers are concerned about what
could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as
diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.

Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence
showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian
government. Since then, press reports have discussed three alleged
incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. None have been confirmed by
U.S. officials. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is
negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate.

According to letters sent April 25, 2013, to Senators John McCain and Carl
Levin by Miguel Rodriguez, Assistant to the President and Director of the
Office of Legislative Affairs, the U.S. intelligence community “does
assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used
chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin.”
The Obama Administration has emphasized that the evidence is not
definitive, however, and that additional investigation is needed.

President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical
weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences,
which could possibly mean the use of military force. There is also concern
that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working
with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare
interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or
civilian populations.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would
likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat
environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria
suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities
may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or
other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation
programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an
atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border
security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may
wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in
advance.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons:
A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a
broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed
Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp
and Christopher M. Blanchard.

Date of Report: April 30, 2013
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Thursday, May 16, 2013

A
priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat
posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s
advancing nuclear program. Well before the nuclear issue rose to the
forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran, the United States had seen Iran’s
support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts
to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of
actively helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion
there.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure
on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international
community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Three rounds of
multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore
a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20%
purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for
modest sanctions relief. Further high-level talks took place on February
26-27, 2013 and April 5-6, 2013, both in Almaty, Kazakhstan. No
breakthroughs were achieved in Almaty. Iran’s Supreme Leader has not taken up U.S.
offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are
required to produce a breakthrough. And, there is an emerging consensus
that international sanctions—although severely harming Iran’s economy—have
not pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to
compromise.

The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military
action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the
point where Iran could produce a nuclear weapon relatively quickly.
President Obama Administration says the option of U.S. military action
against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open, but he has asserted that there
is still time— although increasingly limited—for diplomacy. He reiterated
this position during his March 2013 visit to Israel.

Some experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part
because of Iran’s growing international isolation and in part because of
its repression, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power
is threatened. The domestic opposition remains relatively weak and
outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the
political dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and it is likely most
of the major candidates in the presidential election, to be held on June
14, 2013, will be Khamene’i loyalists. However, there are severe tensions
in the run-up to the election as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seeks to ensure that
his close aide and protégé, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, is permitted to run. Mashai
is disliked by Khamene’i’s loyalists but his platform of easing social
restrictions has attracted popular support. The regime is likely to allow
Mashai or other moderate figures run in order to reduce these tensions and
to avoid public unrest and voter disaffection.

The 112th Congress supported additional
economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with enactment of the
FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws expand
sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and
precious metals transactions with Iran. Additional Iran sanctions bills,
such as H.R. 850, have been introduced in the 113th Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions,
by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr

Date of Report: May 3, 2013
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Friday, May 3, 2013

Prior
to the wave of unrest that has swept the Middle East in 2011, the United States
had consistently praised Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said for gradually
opening the political process in the Sultanate of Oman in the early 1980s
without evident public pressure. The liberalization allowed Omanis a
measure of representation but without significantly limiting Qaboos’ role as paramount
decision-maker. However, the modest reforms did not satisfy Omani civil society leaders
and youths. This disappointment proved deeper and broader than experts believed
when protests broke out in several Omani cities in late February 2011,
after the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The generally
positive Omani views of Qaboos, some additional economic and political
reform measures, and repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside
by the end of 2011. High turnout in the October 15, 2011, elections for the
lower house of Oman’s legislative body suggested the unrest had produced a
new public sense of activism, although with public recognition that reform
will continue to be gradual. The government also expected that first ever
municipal elections on December 22, 2012 would further the sense of political
empowerment among the electorate.

The Obama Administration did not alter policy toward Oman even though some of
the 2011-2012 protests were suppressed and activists arrested - perhaps
because Oman is a long-time U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf. Oman was the
first Gulf Arab monarchy to formally allow the U.S. military to use its
military facilities, despite the sensitivities in Oman about a visible U.S.
military presence there. It has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S.
military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980. Oman has become a
regular buyer of U.S. military equipment, moving away from its prior reliance
on British military advice and equipment. It is also a partner in U.S. efforts
to counter the movement of terrorists and pirates in the Persian Gulf and
Arabian Sea. Oman also has consistently supported U.S. efforts to achieve
a Middle East peace by publicly endorsing peace treaties reached and by
occasionally meeting with Israeli leaders in or outside Oman. It was partly in
appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade
agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its
economy to compensate for its relatively small reserves of crude oil.

Unlike most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, Oman does not perceive a
major potential threat from Iran. Sultan Qaboos has consistently
maintained ties to Iran’s leaders, despite the widespread international
criticism of Iran’s nuclear program and foreign policy. Successive U.S. Administrations
have generally refrained from criticizing the Iran-Oman relationship, perhaps
in part because Oman has sometimes been useful as an intermediary between
the United States and Iran. Oman played the role of broker between Iran
and the United States, including in the September 2011 release of two U.S.
hikers from Iran after two years in jail there. For further information on
regional dynamics that affect Oman, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns
and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

Date of Report: April 10, 2013
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