The Political Economy of International Development
and Pro-Poor Livestock Policies:
A Comparative Assessment

What are the political measures that might
be taken to advance the interests of poor livestock producers
in developing countries given the political economy context
within which the policies that affect them are being shaped?
To answer this question a team of researchers from the University
of California, Berkeley carried out a series of six case studies
in Bolivia, Ethiopia, India, Senegal, Vietnam and (as an example
of the effects of the “global north”) the European
Union.

Patron-client Systems

Peasant livestock producers are particularly disadvantaged
internationally and within their national systems because
their political participation tends to be mediated through
patron-client ties. The consequence is that poor producers
most often trade their collective interests for very modest
individual (or village) benefits. These patron-client networks
are now being extended internationally, generally making them
still less advantageous. Eventually poor livestock producers
will address their interests through political associations
(i.e. horizontal groupings of peers) rather than clientage
(which is vertical in orientation). In the meantime, however,
without outside help they are unlikely to engage in effective
proactive political action on issues related to their collective
interests as producers.

Given the prominence of market failure and the politicised
environment surrounding the agricultural sector, a move from
the traditional analysis of the animal healthcare market based
on welfare economics towards one based on the 'public choice'
school of thought, which acknowledges that governments are
not free in their choices but depend on powerful interest
groups, might provide a more suitable approach to the pressing
need of improving service delivery, particularly to poor livestock
keepers. Given that policy-makers' choices and behaviours
cannot be separated from the interests affected by the decisions
taken, the public choice school has a strong focus on 'process'
efficiency, i.e. issues concerning co-ordination and governance.

Political Organization and Action

Long term investments by NGOs and donors (international and
local; religious and secular; political and apolitical) in
the capacity of poor livestock producers and other peasants
for political organization ultimately will have great benefits
for the poor. International NGOs also offer a different and
positive patronage link into the 'global north', which can
be used to counter the industrial country attempts to co-opt
local elites. Networks of NGOs and peasant organizations that
extend from the local through the national to the international
level add extra leverage.

A crucial weakness of poor producers is their lack of information
on how the larger political system works and the kinds of
policies that are possible and would help them. Helpful measures
in addressing this information gap include: General education;
Leadership experience in promoting change at relevant levels
of government; and Information and analyses on national and
international market and technology trends and on national
policy opportunities.

Given the general weakness of peasants in their political
systems, progressive policy reform at the national level also
depends on the identification of elite allies whose interests
are coordinate with those of poor livestock producers at the
moment. There is a similar need for identification of intra-elite
conflicts that might lead one party to take initiatives that
would have pro-poor side effects. The possibilities of building
pro-poor alliances are likely to vary by level and function
of government, although in different ways in each country.
Different societal groups will be dominant in different political
arenas and thus there will be differences between geographical
units as to whose interests are being best served.

Although decentralization has the advantage of being capable
of developing different policies for the highly varied conditions
of the peasantry, by no means is it always advantageous to
the poor. Much depends on what types of interests dominate
the local political systems. In evaluating decentralization
schemes it also is important to focus not only on the local
distribution of political forces but also on the actual, not
the formal (legal) distributions of powers, for these often
are quite different. Further it is essential to assure that
there is a 'good fit' between the ways in which livestock
producers are organized and the manner in which government
is structured for the delivery of services that are relevant
to them.

Policy Analysis and Action

The ever-widening impact of neo-liberalism on public policy
presents major problems for pro-poor initiatives but it offers
subtle opportunities as well. Interventions to improve the
efficiency of markets fit well with neo-liberal theories and
therefore are more likely to attract donor support. By no
means do neo-liberal policies always benefit the poor but
when they can be shaped to do so, it makes political sense
to steer within rather than paddle against the current of
donor opinion.

For poor livestock producers, access to services is a much
bigger issue than price, and subsidies are therefore better
applied to the former than the latter. Access is a consequence
of physical distance, administrative overheads, and ability
to compete on a level playing field with the rich. Services
provided at prices below those of the existing private market
will attract the rich and powerful and force out the poor.

Poor livestock producers also frequently suffer from imperfect
markets. In our case studies we encountered some instances
in which the absence of quality regulation and certification
is hurting poor livestock producers. Reducing transaction
costs in the livestock markets used by the poor also can be
a critical determinant in their ability to survive in the
rapidly changing markets for livestock products.

The neo-liberal critique in support of poor producers is
at least as important in international trade as it is within
the boundaries of developing countries. Since the magnitude
of the effects of OECD distortions are known to be very large
and therefore potentially very damaging to the poor, we believe
that this is an area in which substantial, careful research
needs to be done. Even if the effects on the poor are as yet
unclear, the political forces shaping world trade in agriculture
are not protecting them and the consequences are huge. Those
who are concerned for the welfare of poor livestock producers
in developing countries must follow the lead of the European
international NGOs and learn how to be effective in the policy
fora that shape industrial country agricultural policies and
trade. There is a strong need for sophisticated and detailed
analyses of the international trade measures that would most
advantage the least developed countries and the poor within
them; current studies are at too high a level of generality
to serve as an adequate guide to action by individual countries.