You see she blames me
And it's happened before
And like the school mistress she was in her previous existence,
She's not prepared to ignore my bad manners anymore.
Something about the way she harumphs
Suggests that she thinks
That the only way for us to ensure we both get a good sleep,
Is for me to kip on the floor.

Wednesday, 11 January 2017

"How lovely to see you, mwah, mwah,
Come in, come in - blah blah blah,
I've made a little lunch, I'm a forager,
No, no, I've abandoned the pottager,
Sooooo last year, I've fried us some ceps,
They're rather retro, and a puff ball.
Do you know I haven't been to Waitrose for a week?
Of course I'm lucky,
Having such a large place in which to seek,
I barely need to shop at all,
I just open the door, take a few steps,
And there, by the wall,
Is this marvelous protein,
Did you know Amaranth's the new Quinoa?"

Wednesday, 4 January 2017

The power of sovereign states, with each other to contract, upon the international plane, has been established long. Within our United Kingdom's constitution it is now, and ever has been, governments who exercise the powers and who conduct our business on the international plane. The Government does so in exercise of its prerogative, a vital part of modern business conduct between states.

Our Kingdom's system is a DUALIST one. And sometimes Acts of government upon the international plane may then impact directly, more or less, domestic law. But treaties cannot execute themselves and obligations, individual rights, which they create, from time to time, must be allowed into domestic law, if they are to be recognised by and enforced in UK courts. It's parliament who keeps the gate and lets them in (or not).

A consequence of this position's not implicitly to bind the government, determining how it might later act, in relation to these treaties on the international plane. To implement a treaty's rights and such, by legislating in the parliament, is doing what our system needs, requires.

Our sovereign parliament might monitor, constrain an action by the government upon the international plane of law, that matter is entirely distinct from questions as to whether or to how

our parliament might choose to then allow such obligations and such rights as were created on the international plane, into the sphere of our domestic law. When parliament wishes to alter from the usual position and impose some form of prior constraint, the government's prerogative upon, impeding it from ent'ring into, or withdrawing from such treaties as exist, it makes that clear.

There is a conduit, it is an act, drawn up in AD 1972, The European Communities Act, (ECA)

Which is the means by which we give effect in the domestic sphere, in UK law, to treaty obligations and such rights, as government did enter into when 'twas acting on the international plane. But implications can't be carried here, the act sets out no thoughts about such times in future, when an action or decision's made upon that other plane, the plane

Of international law.

An individual's obligations and his rights, given effect by ECA within our own domestic law, are those existing under (as they do, from time to time) the treaties. So let us define:

Those are the rights created, made, therefore, (or altered or removed) as a result of government, when acting on it pow'rs prerogative, from time to time, upon the plane of international law.

Specific'ly, it's plain that rights referred to, may be added to, amended or diminished or removed, entirely by government, when acting on the international plane, participating in the processes: Negotiating, Voting and Agreement, which lead to changes in the EU law. The fundamental basis upon which the ECA proceeds is thus: There will be changes to the EU rights and obligations through the exercise of powers prerogative. And these will take effect within our law, to add to, or amend or to remove, such rights as might before have been existent here in law.

It follows that such rights that then exist, through conduit of ECA, contingent are, upon the alteration of those rights, (including their removal) by the government engaging in the processes described above, on changes to EU's legal regime, all of which involves the exercise

of Government - its powers prerogative.

And none of that is made subject, within the ECA: conditions there are none -

No prior authority, legislative, whenever rights existing previously are altered or removed, it would be unsustainable to try. To conclude otherwise does not make sense: Since its inception, EU law has been a shifting thing, in nature changeable.

The District Court concluded at the heart of this there lay a binding principle, an overriding principle, in play. The principle's effect was to require authority of legislature, prior to government taking such steps as they saw fit, using their prerogative pow'r. Since such steps might lead to alteration of the law, then parliament, BEFORE such steps the government might take, must legislate. The District Court takes statements which are known, uncontroversial statements such as that: A treaty cannot execute itself, the government in general cannot act

inconsistently with it, or so as to alter legislation and infers a broader new interpretation which is quite divorced from all reality of Government action on the international plane.

The true position is that government acts using the power prerogative and this does alter our domestic law, does so in various ways: specific'ly it does so consistently with legislation, as it is with the ECA. It's not consistent with the ECA and with its function in a dualist system (ours) to reason from the fact that the ECA, the conduit into domestic law, for internation'ly established rights and obligations, to a proposition that powers prerogative, to alter or withdraw from said rights thereby abrogated are.