Thirty years ago this month my first year in China came to an end. What I remember most is that I returned to the United States assured I knew less about China than when I first arrived. It was a year of unlearning. The ground truth of my experience in the country did not support the narratives about China I studied in school.

Every time I return to China the unlearning continues.

[…] As always, I find it next to impossible to reconcile the descriptions of China I encounter in the United States with the reality of my personal experience in the country. U.S. academics, journalists and government officials almost always speak about China in the abstract. They tend to have neat, clean interpretations of the issues of the day ready to deliver to students, the media and Congress.

My view of the country is intimate and messy. The best advice I can give to my fellow Americans after thirty years of China watching is that the more definitive a U.S expert assessment of China appears to be, the less likely it is to be true. [Source]

Former Mexican ambassador to China Jorge Guajardo expressed frustration on Twitter in late 2013 as observers tried to unravel the implications of the Party’s 3rd Plenum. “I have said it many times, anyone who claims to understand what is happening in China is simply making it up,” he wrote. “I am not saying Xi is not [the] strongest leader ever. I am only saying we have no way of knowing. Narrative does not always equal reality.”

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/07/ground-truths-vs-abstract-narratives-on-china/feed/0The End of the Rope? Xi Turns to Confucianismhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/07/the-end-of-the-rope-xi-turns-to-confucianism/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/07/the-end-of-the-rope-xi-turns-to-confucianism/#commentsFri, 24 Jul 2015 00:09:44 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=185473The Economist examines the Party’s ongoing adoption of Confucianism alongside its own heritage as an ideological pillar:

Though the party has quietly been rehabilitating Confucius for some time, under Mr Xi the pace has quickened. In February 2014 he convened a “collective study” session of the ruling Politburo at which he said that traditional culture should act as a “wellspring” nourishing the party’s values. Official accounts of the session made no mention of Confucius, but party literature made it clear that the values Mr Xi spoke of—such as benevolence, honesty and righteousness—were those espoused by the philosopher. In September Mr Xi became the first party chief to attend a birthday party for Confucius (who turned 2,565). China, he told assembled scholars from around the world, had always been peace-loving—a trait, he said, that had “very deep origins in Confucian thinking”. In May state media reported that the link between Marxism and Confucianism, which some might consider rather tenuous, was the “hottest topic” in the study of humanities in 2014.

[…] A few scholars would like Mr Xi to go much further, by setting up a new form of government based on Confucianism. Prominent in this camp is Jiang Qing, who runs a Confucian academy in the south-western city of Guiyang. In a co-written article published by the New York Times in 2012 Mr Jiang proposed that China set up a tricameral parliament. One of the chambers would be led by a descendant of Confucius. (There are plenty of them, including roughly a quarter of Qufu’s population. This correspondent’s taxi driver boasted that he was a 77th-generation descendant.) Another chamber would be made up of “exemplary persons” nominated by scholars steeped in Confucian classics. [Source]

Some “Red Confucians” envision the dawn of a new era, repeating the momentous act of the Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, who decreed Confucianism the state ideology, shaping political and social institutions for the following two millennia. The high priest Dong Zhongshu slyly crafted an authoritarianism with religious attributes out of the Confucian cannon. The modern-day Dong wannabes point out the parallels: it took the Han dynasty some 60 years to put Confucius on a pedestal after the competing ideologies of Legalism and Taoism faded; in modern-day mainland China, after 60 years of experimenting with Marxism and the economic neo-liberalism, the time is ripe for a Confucian revival.

But Confucian intellectuals outside the mainland look at the state patronage askance. Yu Yinshi, professor emeritus of Chinese studies at Princeton, calls it a “kiss of death” because co-opted intellectuals will lose their independence and censor themselves to please their patrons. He contends that in Chinese history, Confucians touched by politics became either the persecutor or the persecuted. […]

[…] Mao Zedong foretold the dire consequences of embracing Confucianism. Despite the usefulness of a pliant conservative ideology for serving a ruling party, he warns that the revolutionary legitimacy of the Communist Party will be at stake if it flip-flops on Confucius. In a conversation with his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, he said: “If the Communist Party comes to the point when it faces overwhelming difficulty and its rule is called into question, turning to Confucius for help means you are at the end of your rope.” [Source]

The new security law covers a large spectrum of issues, including environment, defence, finance, information technology, culture, ideology, education and religion. It also defines the meaning of national security extremely broadly: it is described as the condition in which the country’s government, sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity, well-being of its people, sustainable development of its economy and society and other major interests are relatively safe and not subject to internal and external threats.

“This law raises many concerns due to its extraordinarily broad scope coupled with the vagueness of its terminology and definitions,” High Commissioner Zeid said. “As a result, it leaves the door wide open to further restrictions of the rights and freedoms of Chinese citizens, and to even tighter control of civil society by the Chinese authorities than there is already.”

National security laws need to be sufficiently precise to enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their conduct as well as to safeguard against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by authorities. “The law should clearly and narrowly define what constitutes a threat to national security, and identify proper mechanisms to address such threats in a proportionate manner,” Zeid said. [Source]

From “social contradictions” to food safety, from environmental crisis to foreign religions, from the Internet to outer space, there is hardly any realm of the country’s activity that doesn’t fall under the rubric of national security risk in the new law.

In part, this is due to the fact that the law overtly conflates maintaining the Party’s monopoly on power and protecting the “people’s democratic dictatorship” with national security.

Whereas Chinese legislation usually tries to give the appearance of leaving control with the formal state institutions – with the Party’s role limited to providing “leadership” – the new National Security Law is explicit in its ambition to protect the absolute power of the Party.

[…] Since his ascension to power in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has intensified the crackdown on activism and dissent, ramping up the suppression of civil society groups, strengthening Internet censorship and the monitoring of social media, and urging the Party to combat the influence of what it terms “Western ideas” such as rule of law and media freedom.

But this new law reaches far beyond the traditional targets of the Chinese state authoritarian streak. [Source]

Anxiety over its reach also extends to Hong Kong, according to Global Voices’ Oiwan Lam, who reports fears that activities conducted there could lead to arrest on the mainland, and unease over the new law’s possible influence on the territory’s own:

Although both Leung Chun-Ying, the Hong Kong chief executive, and Rimsky Yuen, the secretary for justice, have assured that China’s national security law will not apply in Hong Kong, Yuen also said Hong Kong is in no position to guarantee local activists’ safety in the mainland.

[…] Hong Kongers’ fear is not ungrounded. A local newspaper quoted a source close to the Beijing government that political activists advocating the independence of Hong Kong and ending single-party rule would likely be convicted if they step foot onto China’s jurisdiction. According to the source, such a reading of the law was supported by mainland Chinese legal experts.

[…] Civic groups in Hong Kong are also worried that China’s national security framework could become a model to change local legislation, specifically Basic Law Article 23. The article states that laws which safeguard national security should be proposed by the government of Hong Kong. In a joint submission handed to the National People Congress, three local and international journalist groups expressed their concern over the impact of China’s national security law in Hong Kong. […] [Source]

The law says “security” must be maintained in all fields, from culture to education to cyberspace. A draft version of the law was released in May, leading to intense discussion about its long-term impact, but the version approved Wednesday is even wider in scope — adding, for instance, that security must be defended on international seabeds, in the polar regions and even in outer space.

[…] While those two laws [the foreign NGO management and counterterrorism laws], currently in draft form, have specific details on controlling foreign groups, the national security law is a more abstract statement of principles, aimed at exhorting all Chinese citizens and agencies to be vigilant about threats to the party. Legal scholars and analysts in China say it will probably lead to the security apparatus amassing more power, and to courts employing a broad definition of national security violations. Human rights advocates expect the same and say they are worried that defendants accused of such violations will have little legal protection.

[…] A summation of ideas expressed by Mr. Xi in speeches and policy statements since he took power in late 2012, the national security law contains the widest statutory interpretation of threats to the Communist Party since the Mao era, as well as the most expansive definition of the party’s footprint across the world.

[…] Analysts say one purpose of the new law is to further indoctrinate ordinary Chinese with Communist Party ideology and the party’s perception of what constitutes an external threat. On Wednesday, Xinhua, the state news agency, posted on its microblog account that April 15 was now “national security education day” and that propaganda and education would be carried out “to enhance everyone’s awareness of national security.” [Source]

It declares both cyberspace and outer space to be part of China’s national security interest, along with the ocean depths and polar regions, where Beijing has been extending its exploratory activities.

Zheng said the internet, which is subject to strict censorship in China, was “a significant infrastructure facility of the country” and Beijing’s sovereignty over it should be “respected and maintained”.

She said the new law provided a legal foundation for “the management of internet activities on China’s territory and the resisting of activities that undermine China’s cyberspace security”. [Source]

As Beijing passed a sweeping new national security law yesterday, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying was quick to assure Hongkongers that it would not apply to the SAR, and that the government had no plans to enact the controversial Article 23 of the Basic Law.

But Leung said the city did have a responsibility to help ensure national security, which it should do by local legislation.

Pro-democracy politicians have suggested the Hong Kong government may soon attempt to resurrect national security legislation last attempted in 2003, which was shelved following massive street protests involving as many as 500,000 people.

But Leung said the passage of the mainland’s national legislation would have no impact on Hong Kong.

“It is a national law,” he said. “It doesn’t apply to Hong Kong.” […]

[…]”Naturally, Hong Kong is part of the country and has a responsibility and obligation to protect its security,” Leung said. [Source]

Chinese officials and lawmakers have defended the new law, first proposed last August, as necessary to deal with unprecedented and increasingly complex threats to national interests, ranging from cybercrime to terrorism. “China’s national security situation has become increasingly severe,” Zheng Shuna, vice chairwoman of the National People’s Congress’s legislative affairs committee, told reporters after the law’s passage

[…] Rights advocates […] have criticized the law for its vague provisions, as well as the lack of detail on what Beijing deems as offenses and what penalties would apply.

Such ambiguities that would “make it impossible for people to know what behavior is actually prohibited,” and allow authorities to prosecute anyone they deem to be a threat, said William Nee, a Hong Kong-based researcher at Amnesty International. “This time the devil is in the lack of detail.”

Ms. Zheng, the legislator, rebuffed criticisms that the law is vague. China’s definition of national interests “is very clear-cut, and isn’t any broader than those set by other countries,” she said. “We welcome all enterprises to operate lawfully and provide lawful services in China.” [Source]

“The definition of ‘national security’ under this new law is virtually limitless. The law gives a blank cheque to the government to punish and monitor anyone it does not like – human rights activists, government critics and other opposition voices,” said Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for East Asia.

“This law clearly has more to do with protecting the Communist Party’s control of the country than with national security. The leadership of the Party and its monopoly on political power is explicitly listed as being part of ‘national security’ in the law.”

“The government has long been using national security charges, such as ’inciting subversion’, ’separatism’ and ’leaking state secrets’ to suppress and imprison activists and government critics. The expansive definition given by the new law is likely to further this trend.” […] [Source]

On Twitter, Amnesty’s Nicholas Bequelin voices further concerns about the law’s wide-reach and potential to further consolidate Xi’s power:

#China new sweeping National Security Law puts all decision making power to a body that has no formal existence. In other words: Xi's hands.

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/07/china-approves-sweeping-security-law-bolstering-communist-rule/feed/0Quality Control for New Party Membershttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/quality-control-for-new-party-members/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/quality-control-for-new-party-members/#commentsWed, 01 Jul 2015 03:16:13 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=184562The Chinese Communist Party grew by 1.3% in 2014 to 87.8 million members, according to a communique released on Tuesday by the Organization Department of the Central Committee. This comprises about nearly 8% of China’s adult population and makes the Party larger than the population of Germany.

But the new image falls flat for some Weibo users, who continue to see bloat in the ranks of the Party. “Strive for 1.3 billion,” writes Yuanyulailüshi (@袁裕来律师). Better yet, recruit the whole world, suggests @bjzyh51.

Other netizens rail against the opportunism of many young recruits, who see Party membership more as a resume booster than a political affiliation. A 2014 Fudan University study found that Party members in Shanghai made up the majority of the city’s richest young adults. Despite the anti-corruption campaign’s measures to cut back on extravagant spending among cadres, many netizens still perceive Party membership as a tool for personal gain:

Youjiduiyuan79813 (@游击队员79813): There’s not one person guilty of graft who isn’t a Party member. I hope the members get more honest.

NingjingzhiyuanJIAXING (@宁静致远JIAXING): Let me just say that many of the Party members I’ve had contact with are really selfish. If it’s something good they fight over it, and their political awareness is worse than ordinary people’s. Party fees pay for trips to so-called sacred revolutionary sites or for gifts on July 1 [Party Founding Day]. I just hate them now!

Xiangjiaozhongjiezhe (@香蕉终结者): I was the class head at university, but because the head teacher and I didn’t get along, I didn’t have a chance to join the Party after I was done with classes. I may be the only class head who isn’t a Party member. For this, I am forever grateful to my teacher. [Chinese]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/quality-control-for-new-party-members/feed/0Minitrue: Three-Year-Old Can’t Put Xi Downhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitrue-toddler-cant-put-xi-down/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitrue-toddler-cant-put-xi-down/#commentsFri, 26 Jun 2015 19:36:19 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=184481The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.

Yesterday’s Inner Mongolia Morning Post carried the story on the precocious child:

Wang Chubo of Hohhot is only three and a half, but his special abilities to read President Xi Jinping’s “Governance of China” and to add, subtract, and multiply have earned him the bronze medal in the Inner Mongolia regional division of the 2015 Good Chinese Child competition. He has also decided to give all his prize money to children in poor regions. Inspired by Wang, the three winners also gave away their prizes of 7,000 yuan and a two-person trip to Hong Kong and Macau to children in need.

During the competition, the host opened “Governance of China” to a random page. Wang seemed a bit shy, but he started to read slowly, his voice growing louder with his confidence. [Chinese]

The directive is aimed at curbing snide remarks about Wang Chubo’s literary talents, comments like these from Weibo:

Sanfanhuang (@三反黄): I can’t tell whether this is a good omen, or if it means the “Governance of China” is written for three-year-olds.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitrue-toddler-cant-put-xi-down/feed/0What the West Should Know About Xi Jinpinghttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/what-the-west-should-know-about-xi-jinping/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/what-the-west-should-know-about-xi-jinping/#commentsFri, 26 Jun 2015 02:07:38 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=184472In the New Statesman, Jonathan Fenby provides a rundown of Xi Jinping’s leadership, the ways in which he has amassed power, and the challenges he is facing as he becomes a, “strongman who defends the PRC’s Leninist form of bureaucratic state capitalism”:

Projecting a folksy image domestically as “Xi Dada” (Uncle Xi), he appears popular, as a leader with ambitions that match China’s economic weight, the strongest chief of the world’s most populous nation since Mao Zedong. Like the Great Helmsman, Xi knows how to play to perfection the front-line role in his country’s political system – Leninism with Chinese characteristics. (Though paramount leader after winning the power struggle that followed Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping preferred to operate through others.) With his tenure stretching to 2022, Xi does not have to worry about elections or obstructive legislatures; what matters is controlling and strengthening the monopoly movement that has ruled the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. After taking over the Party leadership at the end of 2012, he swiftly pursued the centralisation of authority and set up four top-level national bodies under his chairmanship to add to the usual top three posts of Party general secretary, state president and chair of the Central Military Commission. He has no rivals and has ensured control of a vital power base by reshuffling top commanders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to promote generals close to him.

[…] For all his power, Xi confronts a long string of challenges; indeed, he has indicated that he feels he needs great authority because of the scale of problems facing the regime. China has major economic imbalances. The leadership has to manage slowing growth, deflation, excess industrial capacity and a mountain of debt incurred by local governments for projects unlikely ever to provide a decent return on ­capital. To ensure sustainable growth, it needs to reduce the dependence on exports and fixed asset investment and to increase domestic consumption – but the rate of consumption growth remains weak. Prices have fallen on the property market, into which many Chinese poured their savings. The recent stock-market boom has run ahead of itself and international investors showed what they thought early this month by declining to include in the benchmark global MSCI Emerging Market Index stocks that are listed on the mainland, rather than in Hong Kong. For all its adaptation of inventions from abroad, China is not good at original innovation. It also faces competition from lower-cost producers and needs to move up the value-added chain of manufacturing.

The second generation of the urban middle class, which holds the key to the PRC’s future in many ways, and which has never known anything but strong growth, is more questioning than its parents. Social media has introduced conversations that are outside the range of the official channels, and too numerous for the censors to keep track. Chinese citizens make more than 100 million trips abroad each year and see the liberties democracy can bring.

[…] The greatest problem facing the Chinese leadership is simple. What is the Communist Party of China for and where does it derive its legitimacy? That raises some very knotty issues. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/what-the-west-should-know-about-xi-jinping/feed/0Sensitive Words: Direct Appeal to Xi in Guizhouhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/sensitive-words-direct-appeal-xi-jinping-guizhou/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/sensitive-words-direct-appeal-xi-jinping-guizhou/#commentsSat, 20 Jun 2015 01:17:48 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=184377Sensitive Words highlights keywords that are blocked from Sina Weibo search results. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. Use the form at the bottom of this post to help us crowd source sensitive words. You can also browse our archive of sensitive words.

State news outlets showed enthusiastic crowds greeting President Xi Jinping as he toured the southwestern province of Guizhou this week. They carried the usual images of Mr. Xi leading his identically dressed entourage, as he shook hands and waved to well-wishing bystanders. Photos and videos seemingly shared by onlookers on Weibo, the microblogging platform, did not diverge from the script.

However, one video clip by a bystander captured a very different scene: a woman running toward the presidential convoy, quickly subdued as she yelled to get Mr. Xi’s attention. The clip, taken at Ziyin Road in the city of Zunyi on Tuesday, quickly disappeared from Weibo, but it has since been uploaded to YouTube.

Footage of citizens confronting the Chinese president is rare, as his public appearances are usually well choreographed. [Source]

In addition to removing the video footage, Sina Weibo has censored several related keywords. Guizhou + appeal (贵州＋喊冤) can no longer be searched. The phrase blocking a car (拦轿) has also been removed from search results.

By harshly punishing an activist who has tried to work within the existing political and legal system, the leadership is signaling that such efforts are futile, and that incremental change is not possible. This risks increasing the number of people who see direct confrontation and the end of one-party rule as the only solution.

Despite tight censorship, an undercurrent of resentment at Xi’s increased repression is already apparent. An initial outpouring of support for Pu (including subtle online references by entertainment celebrities) hinted at the widespread public displeasure over the attorney’s mistreatment.

The potential costs to the party’s reputation, even among its core supporters, was evident from a Weibo comment made by Zhou Zhixing, the editor of two journals read by official elites, shortly after Pu’s detention: “Joining the party used to be sacred, but it has been made profane … going to prison used to be miserable, but has been made glorious.” By arresting and prosecuting Pu, the Communist Party is reinforcing the legitimacy problem it hoped to quash.

So long as Pu has not yet been sentenced, there remains a window of opportunity for China’s leaders to mitigate the damage described above. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/the-ripple-effect-of-a-chinese-lawyers-detention/feed/0Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinpinghttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/chinese-politics-era-xi-jinping/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/chinese-politics-era-xi-jinping/#commentsTue, 02 Jun 2015 03:25:35 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183919At The Guardian, Oxford professor and historian Timothy Garton Ash asks whether Xi Jinping can successfully restructure China’s economy and society in the years ahead, and discusses the effects that his failure might have on regional peace and stability.

Can Xi do it? This is the biggest political question in the world today. “Yes, Xi can,” some tell me in Beijing. “No, he can’t,” say others. The wise know that nobody knows.

[…] By now it is relatively clear what Xi is aiming to do. He is trying to steer a complex economy and society through difficult times by top-down changes, led and controlled by a purged, disciplined and reinvigorated Leninist party. He is doing this in unprecedented conditions for such a party, consciously trying to combine the “invisible hand” of the market with the “visible hand” of the party-state. The “great helmsman” Mao Zedong is clearly one inspiration, but the pragmatic reformer Deng Xiaoping is another. “To reignite a nation, Xi carries Deng’s torch,” declared a commentary from the official news agency Xinhua.

[…] If all this were to succeed as intended, western liberal democratic capitalism would have a formidable ideological competitor with worldwide appeal, especially in the developing world. For the west, there would be a silver lining: competition keeps you on your toes. I suspect the hubris of the early 2000s – both abroad, plotting regime change in Iraq, and at home, in the turbo-charged excesses of financial capitalism – had something to do with the lack of serious ideological competition.

This outcome is obviously not what I, as a liberal and a democrat, would wish for Chinese friends. But I do emphatically wish for them, and for ourselves, a China that experiences evolutionary and not revolutionary change. There are many reasons for that view, not least that most Chinese embrace it themselves. But the most important concerns nothing less than war and peace. [Source]

Q. You have analyzed all major Chinese leaders over the past 30 years. What drew you to Xi?

A. Xi is very different from previous leaders. Basically Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed Deng Xiaoping’s instructions not only to reform the economy, but to carry out some degree of institutional changes. Deng didn’t believe in Western-style reforms, but he did try major institutional reforms to prevent a second Cultural Revolution and a Mao Zedong-style tyranny. […]

But Xi Jinping so far has stood many of Deng’s principles on their heads. We have seen an excessive concentration of personal power by Xi Jinping. He’s not first among equals. He’s the big boss. He runs roughshod over the other six members of the Standing Committee, especially Premier Li Keqiang.

Q. Perhaps there is a plausible argument that he needs to concentrate power to push through reforms?

A. This is the so-called theory of neo-authoritarianism — that in a complex country like China, the ruler must have near-absolutist powers. Xi says that all the easy reforms have been tried out. He’s been left with difficult reforms that would impinge on the prerogatives of power blocs in the party — and so he needs extra powers to push through changes.

But the big question that I raise in the book is why thorough structural reforms are nowhere to be seen. I believe he is concentrating power for two purposes. One, to ensure that the Communist Party remains China’s perennial ruling party. He wants to be sure that no one else can challenge the supremacy of the party. Also that it only has one dominant faction, the inchoate Xi Jinping faction. It’s about amassing powers in his own hands — and it has very little to do with economic or political reform. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/chinese-politics-era-xi-jinping/feed/0New Laws Focus on “Ideological Security”http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/new-laws-focus-on-ideological-security/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/new-laws-focus-on-ideological-security/#commentsMon, 01 Jun 2015 06:19:13 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183914A trio of proposed laws under consideration by China’s National People’s Congress constitute, “the most expansive articulation yet of President Xi Jinping’s vision of national security, and the widest interpretation of threats to the Communist Party and the state since the Mao era,” according to Edward Wong in the New York Times. The three laws—which cover counterterrorism, management of foreign NGOs, and national security—all relate to what Wong calls “ideological security.” As he writes:

Perhaps the most interesting question is why Mr. Xi thinks he needs such laws. Existing laws already enshrine Communist Party power and criminalize any act deemed to encourage “subversion of state power.”

But the new laws provide a firmer legal framework for controlling civil society and Western organizations, scholars say.

The most ambitious of the three, the national security law, solidifies Mr. Xi’s authority over national security by placing a central organ — likely to be the National Security Commission that Mr. Xi founded — in charge of all security matters. An April 23 article in People’s Daily, the official party newspaper, said the new draft of the security law reflected “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s spirit.”

Another reason Mr. Xi wants these laws is more abstract, scholars say. Party ideology no longer plays a central role in the lives of ordinary Chinese the way it did in the Mao era, so the party needs to promote and institutionalize the ideology by whatever means it can, including by writing it into law. That is especially true under Mr. Xi, who since the day he took office in 2012 has promoted old-school party ideology in a way not seen since the aftermath of the June 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in Beijing. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/new-laws-focus-on-ideological-security/feed/0Boxun: Unified Strategy vs Hostile Rightist Forceshttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/boxun-unified-strategy-vs-hostile-rightist-forces/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/boxun-unified-strategy-vs-hostile-rightist-forces/#commentsFri, 22 May 2015 00:46:01 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183721Overseas political news website Boxun obtained a purported memo from a telephone conference of the National Security Commission describing official efforts toward a unified crackdown on politically-liberal thought and civil society. In the contemporary Chinese political context, a devotion to tenets of political liberalism—such as universal human rights values, freedom, and democracy—is referred to as “rightist” (右派). (For a helpful primer on this phraseology, easily misunderstood from a Western political perspective, see Tea Leaf Nation’s 2012 translation of an infographic “Guide to Chinese Politics.”) In this leaked correspondence, well known pro-democracy, human rights activists who have recently found themselves on trial are called “major rightists” (主要右派). Boxun’s post is translated below, and important context is noted in brackets:

New Anti-rightist Strategy Deployment:

A list of the country’s major rightists shall be compiled to National Security Commission for developing a unified plan for their management. Regional flexibility in the punishment of rightists will not be tolerated.

Search for innovative legal instruments to control, and then indict, representative individuals from that list.

Do not accept interference from international and domestic public opinion. The fight against rightist hostile forces must have theoretical and judicial confidence. [This follows on the rhetoric of the “Confidence Doctrine” (自信论), a signature political philosophy of Xi Jinping’s administration.]

Mobilize all means of propaganda and public opinion guidance to make it clear to the masses and to the international community that our crackdown on these hostile elements in necessary and just. Create strong public opinion with positive energy. [Chinese]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/boxun-unified-strategy-vs-hostile-rightist-forces/feed/0Man of the Week: Reigning Emperorhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/words-of-the-week-reigning-emperor/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/words-of-the-week-reigning-emperor/#commentsThu, 07 May 2015 19:27:18 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183420The Word of the Week comes from the Grass-Mud Horse Lexicon, a glossary of terms created by Chinese netizens and encountered in online political discussions. These are the words of China’s online “resistance discourse,” used to mock and subvert the official language around censorship and political correctness.

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/words-of-the-week-reigning-emperor/feed/0Translation: Two Ends for Xi Jinping, a Playhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/translation-two-ends-for-xi-jinping-a-play/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/translation-two-ends-for-xi-jinping-a-play/#commentsMon, 04 May 2015 22:06:20 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183327In this one-act play, New York-based writer Bi Ruxie imagines two outcomes for Xi Jinping if China went to war with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. Wang Qishan, who is in real life spearheading the Xi administration’s anti-corruption campaign, plays a crucial role in both scenarios. There is a fictional news anchor, Ms. Tian Zonghua, but all of the other characters make up the real Politburo Standing Committee.

The curtain rises on Xi Jinping’s office. There’s a large, wide desk and a big, sturdy chair; Above, there is a television monitor. Xi Jinping is sitting ceremoniously in his seat, an inscrutable smile shows across his face. A female television host, Tian Zonghua, stands stage left.

Tian Zonghua: (With microphone in hand) China Radio International, China National Radio, China Central Television, I am your host, Tian Zonghua. Right now, I am standing in the office of Xi Jinping. Today is January 1st, 2019. President Xi is about to give his 2019 New Year’s greeting to the country and the entire world. But first, let’s take a look back and the major events that transpired at the end of last year.

The overhead monitor displays the words: “The world watches as the Diaoyu Island War erupts! Through President Xi Jinping’s heroic leadership, China is completely victorious!”

Accompanied by energetic and passionate Chinese military music, the monitor shows footage of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force carpet bombing the Diaoyu Islands, marines aboard various military vessels, the Liaoning aircraft carrier breaking through the Japanese military’s last line of defense at the Diaoyu Islands, and the Chinese flag waving in the wind…)

Xi Jinping: (Asking as though he already knows the answer) Qishan, you’re looking quite pleased. Any good news?

Wang Qishan: Wonderful news! President Xi, Japan’s defeat marks China’s transformation into a superpower! As the saying goes, if the nation rises, luck must be on our side! You are the Great Liberator of the Chinese people!

Li Keqiang: (Not wanting to be left out) This is an unprecedented victory for China, reinforcing the foundations of our country! I do declare, it’s a great masterpiece!

Zhang Dejiang: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a great undertaking!

Yu Zhengsheng: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what great sentiment!

Liu Yunshan: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a great accomplishment!

Zhang Gaoli: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a great operation!

Wang Qishan: (Bombarding Xi with praise) I do declare, what great philosophy, what a great era, what a great accomplishment, what a great deed! In fact, not even Chairman Mao or Comrade Deng Xiaoping can compare to you! The masses adore you, your legacy shall be sung throughout the ages! Today, China has set foot into an era of majesty! If we don’t change our system of governance, then we cannot claim success or pass it down to the next generation! President Xi, in this reality after Japan’s defeat, the Party and the old system are no longer right for China! Changing the republic to an empire–this is historical logic!

X Jinping: (Feigning surprise) Qishan, have you been drinking?

Wang Qishan: Qishan is not drunk, but China is intoxicated! China is in the midst of a Golden Age, like the Han and Tang dynasties! President Xi, please don the emperor’s yellow robes!

Xi Jinping: (Feigning outrage) Wang Qishan is a megalomaniac! He wants to change our system! This cannot be tolerated under the law! I order Wang Qishan arrested and sent to Qincheng Prison!

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment refuses to carry out this order!

Xi Jinping: (Feigning ignorance) And why is that?

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment requests President Xi Jinping take the throne!

Xi Jinping: (Sighs) You’re trying to catch me being unjust! You just want to roast me on open fire, don’t you!

Wang Qishan: (Quietly snaps his fingers) President Xi, there’s been a mutiny! What are we to do?!

Xi Jinping: (Tacitly, pretending to be put in a hard place) Qishan, there’s been a mutiny! What are we to do?!

Wang Qishan: (Resolutely) May we respectfully request that President Xi assume the throne!

All: (Resolutely) May we respectfully request that President Xi assume the throne!

Xi Jinping: (Pretending to object) I couldn’t! I couldn’t!

Wang Qishan: By defeating Japan, you have established a stable structure of power. The heart of the Party, the heart of the people, and all Party members yearn for you to assume the role of emperor! All under heaven pay their allegiance to you! May President Xi Jinping this day become the Emperor of the Chinese Empire and take control as Great Sovereign of the Nation!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no, no. This is no small matter. We must seek the opinion of the people of the entire nation.

Li Keqiang: (Presenting a thick file of documents) President Xi, the four direct-controlled municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing; the 23 provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, and Jiangxi; the five autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Guangxi; and the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau; one after another, are all sending in their petitions, urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no, no. This is no small matter. We must seek the opinion of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Zhang Dejiang: (Presenting a thick dossier) The Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress has passed a resolution urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor!

Yu Zhengsheng: (Presenting a thick dossier) The 13th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has passed a resolution urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor!

Liu Yunshan: (Presenting a thick dossier) The intelligentsia are sending in letters urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor!

Zhang Gaoli: (Presenting a thick dossier) The Communist Youth League Central Committee, National Federation of Trade Unions, and the National Women’s Federation have all passed resolutions urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor!

Wang Qishan: The Chinese people have arrived at their moment of greatest glory, erupting into a triumphant roar!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no, no. This is no small matter. Our brothers and sisters in Taiwan would not agree.

Wang Qishan: (Raising a diplomatic cable high in the air) Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has sent a special telegram, urging President Xi to take the throne as emperor! If we appoint Tsai as governor of Taiwan, she is willing to order all Taiwanese civil and military officials to surrender. Tsai is a shrewd woman—presidents must be elected every four years, but appointed rulers hand down their power forever, from generation to generation! For her own wealth and status, Tsai is willing to sacrifice Taiwan! Soldiers on both side of the Taiwan Strait need not bloody their blades. Peaceful reunification! Chairman Mao was determined to liberate Taiwan, but he did not! Comrade Xiaoping advocated “one country, two systems” in futility! Xi Jinping the Great!

Tian Zonghua: (Aside) According to the traditions of historical TV dramas, as Xi Jinping has already refused the throne three times, he can therefore accept!

Xi Jinping: (Sighing deeply) For Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland, I have no choice but take up this burden!

Like magic, Wang Qishan takes out a piercingly yellow imperial robe, and gathers Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli around him. They place the yellow robe on Xi Jinping. Wang Qishan leads the group in kneeling to the ground before him, kowtowing three times, and loudly chanting, “Long live the Emperor.”

Xi Jinping: (Quickly assuming his new role, speaking cordially) Qishan, you and I met as commoners. We once shared the same bed and blankets in the caves of Shanbei. We know one another deeply. I shall grant you a special exemption from kneeling before me!

Xi Jinping: (Majestically) Xi Zhongxun shall be bestowed posthumously with the title of Grand Emperor, and Qi Xin shall be honored as Empress Dowager. It shall be established that Peng Liyuan is Queen, and Tian Zonghua shall be conferred the title of Head Concubine! My daughter Xi Mingze, acting as a man, will be Crown Prince of the Eastern Palace! Wang Qishan will act as Prime Minister to the Throne. Li Keqiang shall be the Supreme Military Commander. Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli shall be royal ministers!

All: Thank you, Your Majesty!

Xi Jinping: (With palpable arrogance) The People’s Republic of China, changed to the Empire of China; the year 2019, changed to the First Year of Jinping–From today forward, I am the state!

Wang Qishan: May His Majesty live for ten thousand years! Long live His Majesty! Long live His Majesty!

All: May His Majesty live for ten thousand years! Long live His Majesty! Long live His Majesty!

The finale of Johann Strauss’ “Emperor Waltz” is heard backstage.

Blackout. Xi Jinping’s office. There is a large, wide desk and a big, sturdy chair; Above, there is a television monitor. Xi Jinping is sitting ceremoniously in his seat, an inscrutable smile shows across his face. A female television host, Tian Zonghua, stands stage left.

Tian Zonghua: (With microphone in hand) China Radio International, China National Radio, China Central Television, I am your host Tian Zonghua. I am standing right now in the office of Xi Jinping. Today is January 1st, 2019. President Xi is about to give his 2019 New Year’s greeting to the country and the world. But first, let’s take a look back at the unfortunate events that transpired at the end of last year–

The overhead monitor displays the words: “The world watches as the Diaoyu Island War erupts! Because of American imperial trickery, China is defeated!”

As raucous Japanese military music plays, the screen shows the Japanese Self Defense Air Force carpet bombing the Diaoyu Islands. All kinds of People’s Liberation Army vessels–even the Liaoning–are struck with artillery and sunk. The Japanese completely occupy the Diaoyu Islands. The Japanese flag waves in the wind…

Xi Jinping: (Apprehensively) Qishan, you look gloomy. Do you have some bad news?

Wang Qishan: Extraordinarily sad news! As we have been defeated by Japan, the achievements of China’s 40 years of reform have been wiped away to nothing. The country faces extreme danger and calamity! Nothing other than sacrificing a top official could quench the people’s rage!

Xi Jinping: (With a sinister smile) Great minds think alike. This is a drastic situation, indeed. Nothing other than sacrificing a top official could quench the people’s rage! (Takes out an envelope) Please take a look at this.

Wang Qishan: (Reads the paper) Arrest me? You want to arrest me?

Xi Jinping: (Calmly) Qishan, it is with great sadness that I make this sacrifice. I have no other choice! As the saying goes, when the king is disgraced, the ministers must go down–it has been this way since ancient times.

Wang Qishan: (Smiling coldly) You wish to appease 1.3 billion people with my head? (Strangely calm) Jinping, one can know a person’s behavior, and one can know a person’s appearance, but one does not necessarily know a person’s heart. I was wrong about you!

Xi Jinping: Politics is nothing but trickery! The defeat of our military is like a mountain collapsing! The trend is clear–Jinping is for the country and the people. It must be this way! This is the last-ditch measure I must take. Qishan, you and I met as commoners. We once shared the same bed and blankets in the caves of Shanbei. We know one another deeply. After your death, I shall look after your family. I shall treat them doubly well. Take to the road in peace. One only needs to die once for all of eternity. I’m afraid the death is unavoidable, anyway!

Wang Qishan: (With great confidence) Qishan’s loyalty is not blind. I cannot follow this order! I respectfully request that President Xi take the blame for this national disgrace!

Xi Jinping: (Striking the desk) Nonsense! Central Security Regiment!

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment is here!

Xi Jinping: Wang Qishan is a megalomaniac. This cannot be tolerated under the law! I order Wang Qishan arrested and sent to Qincheng Prison!

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment refuses to carry out this order!

Xi Jinping: (A sudden shiver. He snaps back) Why?

Shouted from backstage: The Diaoyu Island War has been lost. The Central Security Regiment requests that President Xi give an explanation!

Wang Qishan: (Handing the arrest warrant back with disdain) Jinping, you are cunning and shrewd. You make all kinds of calculations, but you’ve let one slip. You have miscalculated this time!

Li Keqiang: (Not wanting to be left out) We’ve lost the Diaoyu Island War. This is largest defeat ever suffered by New China. The foundation of the nation is shaken! I do declare, what poor skill!

Zhang Dejiang: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a poor undertaking!

Yu Zhengsheng: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what poor sentiment!

Liu Yunshan: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a failure!

Zhang Gaoli: (Not wanting to be left out) I do declare, what a poor operation!

Wang Qishan: (Bombarding Xi with criticism) Jinping, you are headstrong, unable to take frank advice. You keep bad people close, yet distance yourself from your virtuous ministers. What “big philosophy,” what “big era,” what “big realization,” what “big actions?” How boastful! What blatant lies! If Chairman Mao or Comrade Xiaoping were still alive, you would have been placed in Qincheng Prison long ago! The Diaoyu Island War is lost, the economy is in decline, commodity prices are unstable, and the people’s thoughts are wandering. Rumors and danger convulse the land! The death of the nation must have its demon! You are the bane of the Chinese people!

Xi Jinping: (Sighing) You all want to make me a scapegoat!

A commotion backstage.

Wang Qishan: (Asking as though he already knows the answer) Who’s outside?

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment is here!

Wang Qishan: (Asking as though he already knows the answer) What is it you want?

Shouted from backstage: The Central Security Regiment wants an explanation from Xi Jinping!

Wang Qishan: (Quietly snaps his fingers) President Xi, there has been a mutiny. What are we to do?!

Xi Jinping: (Not yet calm) You can know a person’s behavior and appearance but be blind to his true nature. Qishan, I was wrong about you!

Wang Qishan: Politics is nothing but trickery! The defeat of the army is like a mountain collapsing! The trend is clear. Qishan is for the nation and the people. It must be this way!

Xi Jinping: (Smiling) You wish to appease 1.3 billion people with my head?

Wang Qishan: The public good comes above all else; the king’s personal interest is not what matters. This is historical logic! Your myriad mistakes–in your personal work, in shouldering responsibility, in your sentiment, in your goals, in your philosophy, in presiding over a time of decline, in results, in actions–have shaken the foundation of this country!

Beat.

Wang Qishan: (Resolutely) I firmly request that President Xi comply with the wishes of the Party, the people, and the Party members, by taking the blame and resigning!

All: (Resolutely) We firmly request that President Xi comply with the wishes of the Party, the people, and the Party members, by taking the blame and resigning!

Wang Qishan: The Chinese people have arrived at their most critical juncture. Everyone must let out their last roar of defiance!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no. This is no small matter. We must seek the opinion of the people.

Li Keqiang: (Presents a thick dossier) President Xi, the four direct-controlled municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing; the 23 provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, and Jiangxi; the five autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Guangxi; and the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau; one after another, are all sending in their petitions, urging to take the blame and resign!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no. This is no small matter. We must seek the opinion of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Zhang Dejiang: (Presents a thick dossier) The Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress has passed a resolution urging President Xi to take the blame and resign!

Yu Zhengsheng: (Presents a thick dossier) The 13th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has passed a resolution urging President Xi to take the blame and resign!

Liu Yunshan: (Presents a thick dossier) The intelligentsia are sending in petitions urging President Xi to take the blame and resign!

Zhang Gaoli: (Presents a thick dossier) The Communist Youth League Central Committee, National Federation of Trade Unions, and the National Women’s Federation have all passed resolutions urging President Xi to take the blame and resign!

Xi Jinping: (Shaking his head) No, no. This is no small matter. Our brothers and sisters in Taiwan would not agree.

Wang Qishan: (Raising a diplomatic cable high in the air) Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has sent a special cable, urging President Xi to take the blame and resign! Or else, Taiwan will immediately declare independence! Tsai Ing-wen is a hauty woman–she has sent a special envoy to deliver a dress and cooking utensils, for you to dress up as a woman, get in the kitchen, wash your hands and make some soup!

Tian Zonghua: (Aside) According to the traditions of historical TV dramas, Xi Jinping has refused three times, and now has no choice but to accept!

Xi Jinping: (Resigned to defeat) Qishan, it has already come to this. I agree to take the blame and resign! I agree to accept my dress and cooking utensils, to dress as a woman, take to the kitchen, wash my hands, and make soup!

Wang Qishan: (Gaining an inch, taking a mile) You start war with ease, and then lose to Japan! A loosed arrow never returns! The sword is out of its sheath. Japan has not been killed, so you must be the one to die! If the country is defeated, the emperor must die. It has been this way since ancient times.

Xi Jinping: (Bitterly) Qishan, I forged you into a sharp sword to strike political opponents. I never imagined this sword would come back to strike me in the end. Brothers in arms becoming mortal enemies! Justice! Justice!

Tian Zonghua: (With a vague sense of longing, yet a quavering voice) Are you asking me to interview him up close?

Wang Qishan: No. You are the assassin.

Tian Zonghua: (Baffled) I’m the assassin?

Wang Qishan: You are the assassin. Kill President Xi, then finish off yourself! And in doing this, realize your self worth!

Tian Zonghua: (Her whole body shaking) Kill President Xi?

Wang Qishan: (Snaps his fingers softly, a fierce-looking grin on his face) Corday murdered Marat, Kaplan assassinated Lenin, and now Tian Zonghua will assassinate Xi Jinping! Right in the same line of succession! You’ll go down in history!

Xi Jinping: (Pacing in place, helplessly) Ms. Tian, just come stand over here. Don’t you know the saying, “I’d rather see the King of Hell than face Wang Qishan”?

Host: (Taking small, quick steps toward Xi Jinping, tearfully) –“I’d rather see the King of Hell than see face Wang Qishan!”

Xi Jinping: (Looking up, sighs deeply) I’ve stirred chaos, and I only have myself to blame. I have been spurned by the people. I’ve lost all credibility! I’ve gained so much, but in the end I will lose my life! The glamor has dissipated. Bad things happen when one is most happy! No medicine exists in this world that could cure my regret! I just want to be an average citizen again–or even a cross-dressing housewife–but no chance for that now!

Wang Qishan: (Laughing out loud with great satisfaction) Ms. Tian, you’re about to die on the exact same day, month, and year as President Xi! There’s nothing you can do to change it!

Beat.

Wang Qishan: Jinping, why don’t you get on your way. You and I met as commoners. We once shared the same bed and blankets in the caves of Shanbei. We knew one another deeply. I will plan for a grand state funeral for you.

Xi Jinping: (Without a trace of cowardice) Enough, enough, enough! The power lies with me, it is mightier than life itself! Qishan, why don’t you take the both of us.

Wang Qishan: (Sharply) President Xi, to die, nominally, by the hand of a beautiful woman–this is the best possible way for your curtain to fall!

Wang Qishan: (Each word a crushing weight) Jinping, Why don’t you get on your way. I will plan a grand state funeral for you.

Xi Jinping: (Fearless in the face of death, breaking into a smile) Qishan, you ruthless vermin! We’ll see who ends up on top in the next life!

Led by Wang Qishan, the group encircles Xi Jinping and Tian Zonghua. The lights go out. In the dark, Xi Jinping lets out an anguished scream, then Tian Zonghua lets out a cry of despair. There are sounds of choking and struggle. Then, silence.

The lights come back on. Xi Jinping and Tian Zonghua are gone. Wang Qishan sits ceremoniously in Xi Jinping’s former position. Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli stand in a line behind him, all with solemn expressions on their faces.

Wang Qishan: (Deeply grieved) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Central Military Commission, and the State Council hereby announces to the entire Party, military, and all citizens: Our beloved President Xi has been assassinated by female CCTV television host Tian Zonghua! Afraid to face the repercussions for her crime, the murderer has already committed suicide!

A short line of funeral music plays from backstage.

Wang Qishan: (With great passion) The Emergency State Commission, with Wang Qishan as its leader, is hereby established! The commission members are: Wang Qishan, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli. At this extraordinary time, we must turn our pain and sorrow into power, continue the will of Xi Jinping, and realize the great ideal of the Chinese Dream!

The national anthem of the People’s Republic of China plays from backstage.

The entire group stays perfectly still, not even blinking an eye, like statues.

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/translation-two-ends-for-xi-jinping-a-play/feed/0Translation: Risks in the Anti-Corruption Campaignhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/translation-risks-in-the-anti-corruption-campaign/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/translation-risks-in-the-anti-corruption-campaign/#commentsFri, 01 May 2015 07:20:03 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=183260Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign could be causing more problems than it is solving, according to the editorial translated below, from the American-based World Journal. The piece is fueled by rumors of assassination attempts—and successes, though the alleged victims are not named. It claims that President Xi Jinping and anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan have been the targets of several assassination attempts, and that former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer Gu Junshan, under investigation for graft, has twice escaped death. While none of these claims has been substantiated, the article shows how Xi’s drive to catch both “tigers” and “flies” has stoked paranoia and fueled the rumor mill. In a special December report for Reuters, David Langue wrote that Wang Qishan’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) “openly encourages a climate of fear,” a point reiterated in a more recent report by James Palmer at Vice. The World Journal also points out another potential effect of constant, high-profile graft busting: the growing sense among the public that no one is clean.

The Spread of Assassination and Suicide: Dangers in Anti-Corruption Campaign Are Everywhere

Since 2012, when Xi Jinping took highest position in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), he has cracked down on corruption with an iron fist, and the effects are there for all to see. As the anti-corruption campaign continues, its scope is ever widening, and the dangers are ever increasing. 2015 has been called a crucial year for the CCP anti-corruption campaign. Apart from the imminent trials of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang and some fellow “big tigers,” former Central Military Commission vice-chair Guo Boxiong and several other “big tigers” are expected to be sacked at any moment. These people for years wielded much power in the Party, and they have numerous henchmen in the Party, government, and military. With even the slightest incaution, they will “bite the tigers who failed to suppress them.” Recently there has been a constant murmur about assassination plots against Xi Jinping and anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan, while stories of officials committing suicide continue to pour in. Both indicate that this campaign is at a critical juncture that won’t be ending anytime soon.

The ultimate goal of Party’s iron-fisted drive against corruption is undoubtedly to protect the long-term stability of “single party rule.” There doesn’t seem to be any argument on this point within the Party. But when the anti-corruption hammer falls on your own head, nobody lies down without a fight. Some quickly transfer their assets, send their children overseas, and wait for an opportunity to flee. Others look for new patrons and hope to bide their time in peace. And then there are those cornered dogs who tackle the anti-corruption campaigners head-on, fighting to the brink of death.

Early on, when political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Logistics Department Liu Yuan toppled deputy logistics chief Lt. General Gu Junshan by reporting him for corruption, he was twice nearly killed by Gu’s assassins. Government officials neither confirmed nor denied this rumor. But at the “Two Sessions” on March 5, Liu told the Hong Kong media, “There is an underworld, and there are issues, but there is no such thing as this plot. Do you think the PLA is afraid of this?” It seems that the rumors were far from baseless.

The most recent assassination rumor focused on Wang Qishan, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Hong Kong media say that Wang has struck such terror in the hearts of corrupt officials that this year he has narrowly escaped a number of plots in Shanxi, Tianjin, and Henan. Hong Kong media have quoted internal Party documents stating “a recent central Party circular revealed that since 2013, primary CCDI officers have suffered more than 40 violent attacks, assassinations or other incidents. Among these, 12 were directed at Wang Qishan.”

The corrupt bloc within the Party have targeted officials, even the most senior leaders, for assassination and revenge. While this is difficult to confirm, judging by the shadows cast from the paper lantern surrounding the Beijing PLA command and the Central Security Bureau, the high CCP officials sense that the anti-corruption campaign has shoved them into the hostile embrace of vested interests. They must now stay vigilant and refrain from going after the objects of their desire, or else chaos could descend on the mainland.

Now the CCP is at a crossroads. Besides potential counter-attacks from vested interests, another risk is the drift of people’s feelings about the anti-corruption campaign. One day the masses see an incorruptible official pledging his loyalty to them, and the next day his rot is exposed, his money piling to the heavens. One by one, these exposures break through the people’s mental bottom line, and the idea of the “evil official” rises further. The People’s Daily published an article the other day called “Are There No Good Officials?” that quotes the saying, “Local officials at the deputy level up who are 55 and older are all corrupt. The only difference is whether they’re ‘tigers’ or ‘flies.’” And then there’s this more ruthless one: “If you line up all the officials in front of a firing squad, there’s bound to be a few innocents who die. But if you pick them off one by one, some of the guilty will surely slip away.”

The People’s Daily commentary points out that officialdom is losing its credibility. When people hear that an official has committed suicide, they think he must have been avoiding punishment for his crimes. Mention that a female official was promoted, and they suspect there’s some unspoken rule. If they see a luxury car in an accident, they connect it to the “governing second generation” and the “rich second generation.” Add to this the visual impact of “corrupt officials every day” who are “caught without fail” and you further prove the theory that “there are no clean officials.”

The People’s Daily reflects on whether the CCP should continue the anti-corruption campaign, and whether corrupt officials should ask for amnesty; it also reflects on the heel-dragging of “tigers” and the difficulty of carrying out the campaign. There are overseas reports that say the Politburo Standing Committee once held a vote on amnesty for corrupt officials, and that only Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Wang Qishan were opposed. Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po quoted Gao Bo, assistant secretary of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Center for Clean Government: “When Wang Qishan was recently asked about the possibility of amnesty for corrupt officials, he took a deep sigh and said, ‘It isn’t time yet.’”

The CCP stresses that the anti-corruption campaign is “forever in progress.” They must face the risk of inertia or imperceptible movement within the bureaucracy. Assassination, retaliation, and counter-attacks have created a big variable in fighting corruption and maintaining stability. Step by step, risks and opportunities emerge for Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan’s own safety, and even for how they’ll fend off revenge after retirement. Whether this is a power struggle or a cleanup of government, and where this process sits between right and wrong, is impossible for an outsider to know. [Chinese]