The Limits of Presidential Immunity

TimesMachine is an exclusive benefit for home delivery and digital subscribers.

With its 9-to-0 ruling yesterday allowing Paula Corbin Jones to proceed with her sexual-harassment lawsuit against President Clinton, the Supreme Court ended the suspense surrounding one of this term's most highly publicized cases with a historic ruling reinforcing a basic constitutional principle. No American, not even an incumbent President, is beyond the law's reach.

Ms. Jones, a former secretary in the Arkansas Statehouse, filed suit three years ago alleging that in 1991, when Mr. Clinton was the state's Governor, he made sexual advances to her in a Little Rock hotel room. Mr. Clinton has denied the charge and has said he does not recall meeting his accuser.

The merits of Ms. Jones's charges were not before the Court. The question for the justices was whether the Constitution shields a sitting President from having to defend civil lawsuits unrelated to his official duties. Supported by the Justice Department and citing the demands of the Presidency, Mr. Clinton's personal lawyers had asked the Court to recognize a limited new brand of Presidential immunity from liability, requesting a delay in all proceedings until Mr. Clinton leaves office.

In 1982 the Court recognized a Presidential immunity from civil liability for official acts committed as President. The Court mainly based its decision on the need to allow Presidents to act courageously in discharging their official White House duties by removing the threat of lawsuits. But this rationale, the Court said yesterday, is not applicable to unofficial conduct of the sort alleged by Ms. Jones. Moreover, the Court found that the separation-of-powers doctrine, which apportions authority among the three branches of government, does not prevent the Federal courts from adjudicating personal claims against ''the individual who happens to be President.''

Nor did the Court buy exaggerated assertions by Mr. Clinton's lawyers that deciding in Ms. Jones's favor would risk inundating the White House with frivolous lawsuits and necessarily place an unmanageable burden on the President's time.

''We assume that the testimony of the President, both for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the White House at a time that will accommodate his busy schedule, and that, if a trial is held, there would be no necessity for the President to attend in person, though he could elect to do so,'' wrote Justice John Paul Stevens in the majority opinion.

Only Justice Stephen Breyer, in a separate concurring opinion, expressed skepticism that courts could manage cases like this one without unduly impinging on the President's handling of his official duties.

While not recognizing Mr. Clinton's innovative constitutional claim to immunity, or settling the question of whether a judge can compel a President's appearance at a set time or place, the Court nonetheless showed due respect for the burdens of the office by instructing the trial judge to accommodate the President's schedule as much as possible. That leaves room for granting delays upon a reasonable showing that interference with Presidential duties would, in fact, occur.

The decision does not mean a prompt trial, since the President and his lawyers are likely to raise other legal issues beyond the immunity question. A settlement is also a possibility. The political ramifications for Mr. Clinton are still unclear. But in what is sure to be remembered as a high point of the current term, the Court, speaking with welcome unanimity, has resisted the notion of an imperial White House and decisively rejected an unwarranted expansion of Presidential immunity.

We are continually improving the quality of our text archives. Please send feedback, error reports, and suggestions to archive_feedback@nytimes.com.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 20 of the National edition with the headline: The Limits of Presidential Immunity. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe