Gunboat Diplomacy and the Ghost of Captain Mahan

Amid the intense coverage of Russian cyber-maneuvering and North Korean missile
threats, another kind of great-power rivalry has been playing out quietly in
the Indian and Pacific oceans. The U.S. and Chinese navies have been repositioning
warships and establishing naval bases as if they were so many pawns on a geopolitical
chessboard. To some it might seem curious, even quaint, that gunboats and naval
bastions, once emblematic of the Victorian age, remain even remotely relevant
in our own era of cyber-threats and space warfare.

Yet if you examine, even briefly, the central role that naval power has played
and still plays in the fate of empires, the deadly serious nature of this new
naval competition makes more sense. Indeed, if war were to break out among the
major powers today, don’t discount the possibility that it might come from a
naval clash over Chinese bases in the South China Sea rather than a missilestrike against North Korea or a Russian cyber attack.

The Age of Empire

For the past 500 years, from the 50 fortified Portuguese portsthat
dotted the world in the sixteenth century to the 800
U.S. military bases that dominate much of it today, empires have used such enclaves
as Archimedean levers to move the globe. Viewed historically, naval bastions
were invaluable when it came to the aspirations of any would-be hegemonic power,
yet also surprisingly vulnerable to capture in times of conflict.

Throughout the twentieth century and the first years of this one, military
bases in the South China Sea in particular have been flashpoints for geopolitical
change. The U.S. victory at Manila Bay in 1898, the fall of the British bastion
of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942, America’s withdrawal from Subic Bay in
the Philippines in 1992, and China’s construction of airstrips and missile launchers
in the Spratly Islands since 2014 – all have been iconic markers for both geopolitical
dominion and imperial transition.

Indeed, in his 1890 study of naval history, that famed advocate of seapower
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, arguably America’s only original strategic thinker,
stated that "the
maintenance of suitable naval stations…, when combined with decided preponderance
at sea, makes a scattered and extensive empire, like that of England, secure."
In marked contrast to the British Navy’s 300 ships and 30 bases circling the
globe, he worried that U.S. warships with "no foreign establishments, either
colonial or military… will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their
own shores. To provide resting-places for them… would be one of the first
duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the
nation at sea."

So important did Captain Mahan consider naval bases for America’s defense
that he argued
"it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy that no European
state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles
of San Francisco" – a span that reached the Hawaiian Islands, which Washington
would soon seize. In a series of influential dictums, he also argued that a
large fleet and overseas bases were essential to both the exercise of global
power and national defense.

Although Mahan was read as gospel by everyone from American President Teddy
Roosevelt to German Kaiser Wilhelm II, his observations do not explain the persistent
geopolitical significance of such naval bases. Especially in periods between
wars, these bastions seem to allow empires to project their power in crucial
ways.

Historian Paul Kennedy has suggested
that Britain’s "naval mastery" in the nineteenth century made it "extremely
difficult for other lesser states to undertake maritime operations or trade
without at least its tacit consent." But modern bases do even more. Naval
bastions and the warships they serve can weave a web of dominion across an open
sea, transforming an unbounded ocean into de facto territorial waters. Even
in an age of cyberwarfare, they remain essential to geopolitical gambits of
almost any sort, as the United States has shown repeatedlyduring its
tumultuous century as a Pacific power.

America as a Pacific Power

As the U.S. began its ascent to global power by expanding its navy in the 1890s,
Captain Mahan, then head of the Naval War College, argued that Washington had
to build a battle fleet and capture island bastions, particularly in the Pacific,
that could control the surrounding sea-lanes. Influenced in part by his doctrine,
Admiral George Dewey’s squadron sank the Spanish fleet and seized the key harbor
of Manila Bay in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898.

In 1905, however, Japan’s stunning victory over the Russian Baltic Fleet in
the Tsushima Strait (between southern Japan and Korea) suddenly revealed the
vulnerability of the slender string of bases the U.S. then possessed, stretching
from Panama to the Philippines. Under the pressure of the imperial Japanese
navy, Washington soon abandoned its plans for a major naval presence in the
Western Pacific. Within a year, President Theodore Roosevelt had removed the
last Navy battleship from the region and later authorized the construction of
a new Pacific bastion not in distant Manila Bay but at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii,
insisting that "the Philippines form our heel of Achilles." When the
Versailles settlement at the end of World War I awarded Micronesia in the Western
Pacific to Japan, the dispatch of any fleet from Pearl Harbor to Manila Bay
became problematic in time of war and rendered the Philippines essentially indefensible.

It was partly for this reason, in mid-1941, that Secretary of War Henry Stimson
decided that the B-17 bomber, aptly named the "Flying Fortress," would
be the wonder weapon capable of countering the Japanese navy’s control of the
Western Pacific and sent 35 of these new aircraft to Manila. Stimson’s strategywas, however, a flight of imperial fantasy that condemned most of those
planes to destruction by Japanese fighters in the first days of World War II
in the Pacific and doomed General Douglas MacArthur’s army in the Philippines
to a humiliating defeat at Bataan.

As bomber ranges tripled during that global conflict, however, the War Department
decided in 1943 that the country’s postwar defense required retaining forward
bases in the Philippines. These ambitions were fully realized in 1947 when the
newly independent republic signed the Military Bases Agreement granting the
U.S. a 99-year lease on 23 military installations, including the Seventh Fleet’s
future homeport at Subic Bay and the massive Clark Air Base near Manila.

Simultaneously, during its postwar occupation of Japan, the U.S. acquired more
than a hundred military facilities that stretched from Misawa Air Base in the
north of that country to Sasebo Naval Base in the south. With its strategic
location, the island of Okinawa had 32 active U.S. installations covering about
20% of its entire area.

As the Cold War came to Asia in 1951, Washington concluded mutual defense pacts
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia that made the Pacific
littoral the eastern anchor for its strategic dominion over Eurasia. By 1955,
the early enclaves in Japan and the Philippines had been integrated into a global
network of 450 overseas bases aimed largely at containing the Sino-Soviet bloc
behind an Iron Curtain that bisected the vast Eurasian continent.

After surveying the rise and fall of Eurasian empires for the past 600 years,
Oxford historian John Darwin concluded
that Washington had achieved its "colossal Imperium… on an unprecedented
scale" by becoming the first power to control the strategic axial points
"at both ends of Eurasia" – in the west through the NATO alliance
and in the east via those four mutual security pacts. During the later decades
of the Cold War, moreover, the U.S. Navy completed its encirclement of the continent,
taking
over the old British base at Bahrain in 1971 and later building
a multibillion-dollar base at the epicenter of the Indian Ocean on the island
of Diego Garcia for its air and naval patrols.

Among these many bases ringing Eurasia, those along the Pacific littoral were
of particular strategic import before, during, and after the Cold War. As the
geopolitical fulcrum between the defense of one continent (North America) and
control of another (Asia), the Pacific littoral has remained a constant focus
in Washington’s century-long effort to extend and maintain its global power.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, as Washington elites reveled in their role
as leaders of the world’s sole superpower, former national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski, a master of Eurasia’s unforgiving geopolitics, warned
that the U.S. could preserve its global power only as long as the eastern end
of that vast Eurasian landmass did not unify itself in a way that might lead
to "the expulsion of America from its offshore bases." Otherwise,
he asserted with someprescience, "a potential rival to America
might at some point arise."

In fact, the weakening of those "offshore bases" had alreadybegun in 1991, the very year the Soviet Union imploded, when the Philippines
refused to extend the U.S. lease on the Seventh Fleet’s bastion at Subic Bay.
As Navy tugs towed Subic’s floating dry docks home to Pearl Harbor, the Philippines
assumed full responsibility for its own defense without actually putting any
more of its funds into air or naval power. Consequently, during a raging typhoon
in 1994, China was able to suddenly occupy
some shoals in the nearby Spratly Islands that went by the name of Mischief
Reef – and that would turn out to be just its first step in a bid to control
the South China Sea. Without the ability to launch its own air and navy patrols,
in 1998 the Philippine military, in an attempt to reassert its claim to the
area, grounded a rusting U.S.-surplus ship on nearby Ayungin Shoal as a "base"
for a squad of barefoot soldiers who were forced to fish for their rations.

In the meantime, the U.S. Navy suffered its own decline with a 40%
reduction in surface warships and attack submarines from 1990 to 1996. Over
the next two decades, the Navy’s Pacific posture weakened further as the focus
of naval deployments shifted to wars in the Middle East, the service’s overall
size shrank
by an additional 20% (to just 271 ships), and crews strained under the pressure
of ever-extending deployments – leaving the Seventh Fleet ill-prepared to meet
China’s unexpected challenge.

China’s Naval Gambit

After years of seeming compliance with Washington’s rules for good global citizenship,
China’s recent actions in Central Asia and the continent’s surrounding seas
have revealed a two-phase strategy that would, if successful, undercut the perpetuation
of American global power. First, China is spending a trillion
dollars to fund a vast transcontinental
grid of new railroads, highways, and oil and natural gas pipelines that
could harness Eurasia’s vast resources as an economic engine to drive its ascent
to world power.

In a parallel move, China is building a blue-water navy and creating its first
overseas bases in the Arabian and South China seas. As Beijing stated in a 2015
white paper, "The
traditional mentality that land outweighs the sea must be abandoned… It is
necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate
with its national security." Though the force it contemplates will hardly
compete with the U.S. Navy’s global presence, China seems determined to dominate
a significant arc of waters around Asia, from the horn of Africa, across the
Indian Ocean, all the way to Korea.

Beijing’s bid for overseas bases began quietly in 2011 when it started investing
almost $250 million in the transformation
of a sleepy fishing village at Gwadar, Pakistan, on the shores of the Arabian
Sea, into a modern commercial port only 370 miles from the mouth of the Persian
Gulf. Four years later, President Xi Jinping committed another $46 billion to
the building
of a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of roads, railways, and pipelines stretching
for 2,000 miles from western China to the now-modernized port at Gwadar. It
still avoided any admission that military aims might be involved so as not to
alarm New Delhi or Washington. In 2016, however, Pakistan’s Navy announced
that it was indeed opening a naval base at Gwadar (soon strengthened with two
warships donated by China) and added that Beijing was welcome
to base its own ships there as well.

That same year, China began building a major military
facility at Djibouti on the Horn of Africa and, in August 2017, opened its
first official overseas base there, giving its navy access to the oil-rich Arabian
Sea. Simultaneously, Sri Lanka, located at a midpoint in the Indian Ocean, settled
a billion-dollar debt to China by ceding it a strategic
port at Hambantota, creating a future potential for dual military use there,
too – in effect, the Gwadar stealth strategy revisited.

As controversial as these enclaves might be (at least from an American point
of view), they paled before China’s attempts to claim an entire ocean. Starting
in April 2014, Beijing escalated its bid for exclusive territorial control over
the South China Sea by expanding
Longpo Naval Base on its own Hainan Island into a homeport for its four nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines. Without any announcement, the Chinese also began
dredging seven artificial atolls in the disputed Spratly Islands to create military
airfields and future anchorages. In just four years, Beijing’s armada of dredges
had sucked up countless tons of sand from the ocean floor, slowly transforming
those minimalist reefs and atolls into active military bases. Today, China’s
army operates
a jet runway protected by HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile batteries on Woody Island,
a radar base on Cuareton Reef, and has mobile missile launchers near runways
ready for jet fighters at three more of these "islands."

While fighter planes and submarines are pawns in China’s opening gambit in
the contest for the South China Sea, Beijing hopes one day to at least check
(if not checkmate) Washington with a growing armada of aircraft carriers, the
modern dreadnaughts in this latter-day game of empires. After acquiring an unfinished
Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier from Ukraine in 1998, the naval dockyard
at Dalian retrofitted the rusting hulk and launched it in 2012 as the Liaoning,
China’s first aircraft carrier. That hull was already 30 years old, an age that
would normally have assured such a warship a place in some scrap metal yard.
Though not combat capable, it was a platform for training China’s first generation
of naval aviators in landing speeding jets on heaving decks in high seas. In
marked contrast to the 15 years needed to retrofit this first ship, the Dalian
yards took just five years to construct,
from the keel up, a much-improved second carrier capable of full combat operations.

The narrow hulls and ski-jump prows that limit these first two carriers to
just 24 "Flying Shark" fighter planes won’t hold for the country’s
third carrier, now being
built from indigenous designs in Shanghai. When launched next year, it will
be able to carry on-board fuel reserves that will give it a longer cruising
range and a complement of 40 aircraft, as well as electromagnetic systemsfor faster launches. Thanks to an accelerating tempo of training, technology,
and construction, by 2030 China should have enough aircraft carriers to ensure
that the South China Sea will become what the Pentagon
has termed a "Chinese lake."

Such carriers are the vanguard of a sustained naval expansion that, by 2017,
had already given China a modern
navy of 320 ships, backed by land-based missiles, jet fighters, and a global
system of surveillance satellites. Its current anti-ship ballistic missiles
have a range of 2,500 miles and so could strike U.S. Navy vessels anywhere in
the Western Pacific. Beijing has also made strides in mastering
the volatile technology for hypersonic missiles with speeds of up to 5,000 miles
per hour, making them impossible to stop. By building two new submarines every
year, China has already assembled
a fleet of 57, both diesel- and nuclear-powered, and is projected to reach
80 soon. Each of its four nuclear submarines carries 12 ballistic missiles that
could reach anywhere in the western United States. In addition, Beijing has
launched dozens of amphibious
ships and coastal corvettes, giving it naval dominance in its own waters.

Within just five years, according to the U.S. Office
of Naval Intelligence, China "will complete its transition" from
the coastal force of the 1990s to a modern navy capable of "sustained blue
water operations" and "multiple missions around the world," including
full-spectrum warfare. In other words, China is forging a future capacity to
control its "home" waters from the East China Sea to the South China
Sea. In the process, it will become the first power in 70 years to challenge
the U.S. Navy’s dominion over the Pacific basin.

The American Response

After taking office in 2009, President Barack Obama came to the conclusion
that China’s rise represented a serious threat and so he developed a geopolitical
strategy to counter it. First, he promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a
12-nation commercial pact that would direct 40% of world trade toward the United
States. Then, in March 2014, after announcing a military "pivot to Asia"
in an address to the Australian parliament, he deployed a full battalion of
Marines to a base at the city of Darwin on the Timor Sea. A month later, the
U.S. ambassador to the Philippines signed an enhanced defense cooperation agreement
with that country allowing U.S. forces to be stationed at five of its bases.

Combining existing installations in Japan with access to naval bases in Subic
Bay, Darwin, and Singapore, Obama rebuilt America’s chain of military enclaves
along the Asian littoral. To make full use of these installations, the Pentagon
began planning
to "forward base 60% of [its] naval assets in the Pacific by 2020"
and launched its first regular "freedom of navigation" patrols in
the South China Sea as a challenge to the Chinese navy, even sending in full
carrier strike groups.

President Trump, however, cancelled the Trans-Pacific Partnership right after
his inauguration and, with the endless war on terror in the Greater Middle East
grinding on, the shift of naval forces to the Pacific slowed. More broadly,
Trump’s unilateral, America-first foreign policy has damaged relations with
the four allies that underpin its line of defense in the Pacific: Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Moreover, in his obsessive courtship
of Beijing’s help in the Korean crisis, the president even suspended, for five
months, those naval patrols into the South China Sea.

The administration’s new $700 billion defense budget will fund
46 new ships for the Navy by 2023 (for a total of 326), but the White House
seems incapable, as reflectedin its recentNational Security Strategy, of grasping the geostrategic importance of
Eurasia or devising an effective scheme for the deployment of its expanding
military to check China’s rise. After declaring Obama’s "pivot to Asia"
officially dead,
the Trump administration has instead offered
its own "free and open Indo-Pacific" founded on an unworkable alliance
of four supposedly kindred democracies – Australia, India, Japan, and the United
States.

While Trump stumbles from one foreign policy crisis to the next, his admirals,
mindful of Mahan’s strategic dictums, are acutely aware of the geopolitical
requisites of American imperial power and have been vocal about their determination
to preserve it. Indeed, China’s naval expansion, along with advances in Russia’s
submarine fleet, have led the Navy to a fundamental strategic
shift from limited operations against regional powers like Iran to full-spectrum
readiness for "a return to great power competition." After a sweeping
strategic review of his forces in 2017, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John
Richardson reported that
China’s "growing and modernized fleet" was "shrinking" the
traditional American advantage in the Pacific. "The competition is on,"
he warned, "and pace dominates. In an exponential competition, the winner
takes all. We must shake off any vestiges of comfort or complacency."

In a parallel review of the Navy’s surface force, its commander, Vice Admiral
Thomas Rowden, proclaimed
"a new age of seapower" with a return to "great power dynamics"
from "near-peer competitors." Any potential naval attack, he added,
must be met with a "distributed lethality" capable of "inflicting
damage of such magnitude that it compels an adversary to cease hostilities."
Summoning the ghost of Captain Mahan, the admiral warned: "From Europe
to Asia, history is replete with nations that rose to global power only to cede
it back through lack of seapower."

Great Power Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century

As such rhetoric indicates, there is already a rising tempo of naval competition
in the South China Sea. Just last month, after a protracted hiatus in freedom-of-navigation
patrols, the Trump administration sent the supercarrierUSS Carl Vinson, with its full complement of 5,000 sailors and 90 aircraft,
steaming across the South China Sea for a symbolic visit to Vietnam, which has
its own long-running dispute with China over oil rights in those waters.

Just three weeks later, satellite
imagery captured an extraordinary "display of maritime might"
as a flotilla of some 40 Chinese warships, including the carrier Liaoning,
steamed through that same sea in a formation that stretched for miles. Combined
with the maneuvers
it staged in those waters with the Cambodian and Russian navies in 2016, China,
like empires past, is clearly planning to use its gunboats and future naval
bases to weave a web of de facto imperial control across the waters of Asia.

Naysayers who dismiss China’s challenge might remind us that its navy only
operates in two of the metaphoric "seven seas," a pale imitation of
the U.S. Navy’s robust global posture. Yet China’s rising presence in the Indian
and Pacific oceans has far-reaching geostrategic implications for our world
order. In a cascading series of consequences, China’s future dominance over
significant parts of those oceans will compromise the U.S. position on the Pacific
littoral, shatter its control over that axial end of Eurasia, and open that
vast continental expanse, home to 70% of the world’s population and resources,
to China’s dominion. Just as Brzezinski once warned,Washington’s failure
to control Eurasia could well mean the end of its global hegemony and the rise
of a new world empire based in Beijing.