The article seeks to challenge the standard accounts of how to view the difference between Husserl and Frege on the nature of ideal objects and meanings. It does so partly by using Derrida's deconstructive reading of Husserl to open up a critical space where the two approaches can be confronted in a new way. Frege's criticism of Husserl's philosophy of mathematics (that it was essentially psychologistic) was partly overcome by the program of transcendental phenomenology. But the original challenge to the prospect of a fulfilled intuition of idealities remained and was in fact encountered again from within the transcendental analysis by Husserl himself in his last writings on geometry and language. According to the two standard and conflicting accounts, Husserl either changed his earlier psychologistic program as a result of Frege's criticism, or he was in fact never challenged by it in the first place. The article shows instead how Husserl continued to struggle with the problem of the constitution of ideal objects, and how his quest led him to a point where his analyses anticipate a more dialectical and deconstructive conclusion, eventually made explicit by Derrida. It also shows not only how this development constitutes a philosophical continuity from the original dispute with Frege, but also how Frege's critique in a certain respect could be read as an anticipation of Derrida's deconstructive elaboration of Husserl's phenomenology.

The essay recapitulates the decisive steps in Heidegger's development of the problem of human freedom. According to some readers, Heidegger's thinking is a philosophy of freedom throughout; according to others his "turning" implies abandoning the idea of human freedom as a metaphysical remnant. The essay seeks an intermediate path, by following his explicit attempts to develop an ontology based on the concept of freedom in the earlier writings, showing how this is the central theme in his confrontation and also his final break with German idealism, with Kant and with Schelling in particular, and with the prospects for a system of freedom. However, this break does not terminate his preoccupation with the problem of freedom, which is then transformed into the idea of thinking as a practice of freedom, as a way of reaching into "the free".

Questions about the temporality and historicity of knowledge have gained new urgency in the human sciences in recent decades. New modes of critical theorizing, coupled with a reshaping of the historical space of Western culture following the unification of Europe and intensified political and technological globalization, have highlighted the necessity of understanding the formation of historical consciousness from new angles. The "uses of history", the commodification of the past, the pathologies of memory, the chronological framework of historical narrative, and the technological forms of representing and maintaining tradition all now require cross-disciplinary interpretation. This volume gathers a wide range of researchers from philosophy, history, archeology, and the aesthetic and social sciences in a collaborative effort to critically explore historical consciousness as time, memory, and representation.

The present text discusses the problems concerning the translation and the non-translation of the thinking word Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Assuming that for Heidegger Dasein is transcendence and this as an infinitive translation from a substantive and substantial meaning of being to a verbal one, it becomes necessary to translate the word Dasein in Sein und Zeit above all within the German language itself. The task of translating the thinking word Dasein is therefore the one of making possible the work of thought in which the destruction of the substantialistic meaning of being can take place always anew. Showing the verbal temporality of the thinking word Dasein as the internal and aspectual temporality of a Währenden, the article explains the translating choices made in my translation of Sein und Zeit into Portuguese.

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Schuback, Marcia Sá Cavalcante

Södertörn University College, School of Culture and Communication, Philosophy.

The aim of the present article is to reflect upon comparative procedures at stake in the acknowledgment of differences, following some paths of Husserl's and Heidegger's views on “comparative examination” (vergleichende Betrachtung). Although using the same expression as Husserl, Heidegger presents in this concept, rather, a phenomenology of correspondence. The encounter with otherness is described as correspondence to the immensity of the event of the world in Dasein. From out of a “destruction” of comparative examinations, it becomes possible to seize the a-subjective and ek-static structure of Dasein and claim a corresponding way of encountering otherness. In this corresponding way, the Other appears first as non-otherness, beyond a dialectics of selfhood and otherness.

Using abstract art as a paradigm, this paper attempts to think, in a provisional manner, the parameters of what the author calls 'abstract hermeneutics'-a way of thinking capable of responding to the withdrawing, or abstracting, movement of Being. Such abstract thinking which is an abstracting thinking of the abstract aims to step beyond objectivity precisely in order to return to phenomenological concreteness. Through an engagement with Heidegger's understanding of the formal indicative role of the human being as sign (Zeichen), the affinity, between the abstracting gestures of abstract art, and the absenting characteristic of human existence, is explored.