In all Army commands and overseas theaters, the experience of the war years
produced very few Army-wide policies or restrictions on the job assignment of
WAC personnel. The very considerable freedom that field commands had enjoyed in
this respect seemed due in part to the small numbers of WAC personnel. Studies
for the use of a million or more Wacs all indicated that hard and fast rules
would have been required for this number, with explicit War Department
directives to the field as to exactly what categories of jobs, or what entire
organizations, would be staffed by Wacs.1 In actual practice, with never more
than 100,000 women to assign, a far more informal system remained possible, with
women merely sent as casuals to field commands, and with little limitation on
the types of jobs or organizations to which they might be assigned.

War Department regulations on the WAC allowed women to be assigned to "any
suitable noncombatant overhead positions" or even to a combat unit organized
under a Table of Organization, provided that the job itself was noncombatant and
located in a "fixed administrative headquarters or installation." No limitation
was placed upon a commander's discretion, except that men must be replaced
one-for-one, that the duties must be within the strength and endurance of "the
average woman,'" and that the environment and working conditions must be
suitable for women. Commanders were enjoined to remember that "procedures for
the utilization of Women's Army Corps personnel both in their living and working
conditions will vary from the procedure for utilization of male Army
personnel,"' especially with respect to "hours of employment . . . number of
women needed to perform heavy tasks . . . provision for safety and security . .
. general standards of discipline . . . insurance of suitable recreation,
education, and morale provisions." There was also, of course, never any wartime
relaxation of the requirement that women be assigned in units of fifty or more,
under the immediate command of a WAC officer.2

That such a lenient system was by no means inevitable was demonstrated by the
Navy's dissimilar system. Here, the Bureau of Naval Personnel reported that it
"kept full control of the detail of WAVES, enlisted as well as officer,"
primarily because it "did not have confidence that its

[543]

directives on housing and placement policies
would be observed by the District Commandants." Although the WAVES director and
field agencies desired to assign women to
any job for which they were qualified, the Bureau of Naval Personnel arbitrarily
limited assignments to certain approved jobs, noting:

The Women's Reserve had originally fought to have all rates open to women,
but the Bureau rejected this contention .... Field activities, with a
commendable desire to give the enlisted women similar opportunities for
advancement to those open to men, for a time permitted Waves to strike for a
wide variety of rates which had not been officially opened to them; and it
became necessary for the Bureau to issue firm instructions.

The Bureau also determined that certain jobs such as control tower operator
would be largely taken over by women, and trained and shipped personnel
accordingly.3

The Army's policy, on the other hand, began at the time of the conversion to
Army status with almost no limitation upon the station commander's power to
determine WAC jobs, and added restrictions
only as they were proved essential by experience. By the end of the war, the
limitations that had grown up could almost be numbered upon the fingers of one
hand.

Of these restrictions, the most important grouped themselves about the always
uncertain
distinction between military and civilian jobs, which for women appeared
to present a special problem, particularly since assignment to civilian
vacancies had been permitted in early Auxiliary days.

The issue did not, as it frequently did in the Navy, concern the replacement
of Civil Service personnel, which in the Army was absolutely forbidden, and for
which Congressional critics remained always alert even had the Army grown lax.
Paradoxically, Congress did not object to the practice in the Navy. The Bureau
of Naval Personnel noted that it secured a "gentleman's agreement" from the
Naval Affairs Committees that it might use Waves when it could not get Civil
Service personnel for jobs in the Washington area. As a result, as much as one
third of the WAVES' entire corps was assigned to civilian work in Washington,
the bureau protecting itself by certification "that civilians could not be found
to fill any given jobs for which Waves were requested by a Washington office."
Such assignment did not prove wholly satisfactory, the bureau noting later that
"use of WAVES for essentially civilian work soon became a morale problem and a
detriment to procurement .... Many of the women could see that they were not
directly replacing men."4

For the Army, the question concerned only the non-Civil Service jobs on field
stations.5 It was ordinarily forbidden to
use soldiers in civilian-operated laundries, as post exchange sales clerks, as
waiters in officers' messes (except as extra paid employment),
and in other more or less

[544]

menial tasks not essential enough to merit military personnel. Before the
conversion, however, inspectors discovered on field stations a common practice
of assigning Waacs to a station's nonmilitary work, generally of menial
character, to which soldiers could not be assigned and which civilian women
could not be persuaded to accept. In part this practice appeared to result from
the anomalous nature of the WAAC's status under its separate T/O, which seemed
half-civilian, half military, in character. In part it was ascribed to
traditional ideas of the proper work for women.

Classification survey teams noted that while this practice was not universal,
it was exceedingly widespread. At many stations
Waacs were found assigned as personal
orderlies by both Army and WAAC officers, and at several others they were used
to fill low-grade civilian jobs in laundries.
At Fort Knox, school teachers and college graduates were found assigned as
dining room orderlies, food cart pushers, and garbage rack details. At Camp Breckinridge,
Kentucky, five Negro Waacs, described as
"well-educated," were assigned to sweep out warehouses, while fifteen others
worked in the service club and thirty in a civilian-operated laundry. At Valley
Forge General Hospital, four women were assigned as unskilled orderlies
although, inspectors reported, "Two are really clerk-typists, one a graduate
cook, and one a classification specialist with an ACCT off. 3 % and college
degree."

Very few stations were entirely free from such practices. For example, in the
Fourth Service Command alone, inspectors found Waacs waiting on officers in
clubs and messes at Camp Forrest, Forts McClellan, Jackson, and Benning; Waacs
were replacing civilians as post exchange
clerks at Fort Jackson and at the Charleston Port of Embarkation; Waacs at Fort
McClellan were performing "menial tasks far below their highest ability." The
women so assigned included radio operators,
cryptographers, dietitians, linguists, and
others with useful skills.

Soon after the conversion to Army status, General Faith's Field Inspection
Service brought in repeated evidence to the effect that female military
personnel was still being considered especially suitable for assignments in post
exchanges, laundries, canteens, service clubs, restaurants, and officers' clubs
and messes. General Faith noted that all such assignments which did not result
in filling a military job were "not very successful," and invariably caused
resentment and low morale.6

As a result, in August of 1943 and again in October, Colonel Hobby
recommended publication of a regulation specifically forbidding
assignment of Wacs to jobs not authorized for soldiers. She added:

The sole source of personnel for the Women's Army Corps is by voluntary enlistment.
Applicants are informed by recruiting officers that they will release soldiers
for combat. The use of women, so recruited;
as sales clerks in post exchanges and as laundresses leads not only to
dissatisfaction but to reduced numbers of
recruits. No objection is offered to the use of enlisted women in administrative
[military] positions in Post Exchanges and laundries.

Over the Army Service Forces' objections, G-1 Division therefore placed a
restriction in the first WAC Regulations
against the use of Wacs in any civilian jobs, but with specific prohibition only
of jobs in

[545]

restaurants or cafeterias in service clubs, guest houses, and officers' clubs
or messes.

Shortly afterward, Director Hobby again appealed for a more specific
prohibition on jobs in laundries and post exchanges. She also asked a written
definition of the basis by which Wacs might be employed as orderlies, since
"abuses in the field" had caused her to believe that Wacs should not be assigned
as personal orderlies to male officers, even when, as rarely, a military
allotment was provided, and that they should not even be permitted to accept
off-duty paid employment as orderlies except with female officers. Again the
Army Service Forces objected, concurring only in specific prohibition of
nonmilitary assignment in laundries. This was published in late 1943. Nothing
specific was ever published on the subject of employment in post exchanges or as
orderlies, with the implication that such assignment was permissible if a
military allotment could be contrived.7

Although inspection teams arriving before these publications found many women
in unmilitary work and service commands most reluctant to remove them, teams
arriving after publication found that many stations had just reassigned Wac
waitresses and cooks from officers' clubs and messes. Other stations did not
comply with the circulars until they heard that the teams were coming; still
others agreed to make the corrections on the spot while teams were at the
station.8

These prohibitions, however, did not actually constitute restrictions on the
use of Wacs other than those already placed on the use of soldiers; the only
difference was that the prohibitions were specifically restated for women as a
result of numerous abuses.

A similar problem concerned the assignment
to kitchen police (KP) duty, which was authorized for military personnel,
but not as a permanent job. It was considered unsuitable to use the duty for
punishment or to assign any soldier to perform
it continuously. WAC inspectors therefore expressed some surprise in discovering
that this rule was more frequently ignored for women than for men, with a few
Wacs at a number of stations being assigned
the duty on a permanent basis. Upon investigation, the violation was readily
understood: the number of men at any station was ordinarily so great that the
duty could be handled on a roster basis without falling too frequently upon any
one individual, while in a unit of 150 women the duty occurred once or twice a
month. The difficulty was redoubled when Wacs began to receive ratings, since by
Army custom noncommissioned officers and key office personnel were exempt from
the KP roster. In the small WAC

[546]

company such exemption caused the duty to fall even more frequently to the remainder
of the women, sometimes as often as every two or three days. The reaction of
Army section chiefs was almost unanimous. As
one staff director reported, "The Army officers said it was impossible to let
them do KP. Offices had let men go and could not spare the girls even for a halfday.9 The usual field solution was to assign a few members of the company on a
permanent basis to do KP and other menial roster duty for the office workers.

This solution was not acceptable to Director Hobby, who noted:
With the new standards for recruiting, it would be unfair to have permanent
kitchen police .... From now on we are not going to get the people who are
suited for permanent KP's unless there is selective service for women.

Even if low-grade personnel was accidentally
admitted, it was her opinion that American citizens who were induced to
volunteer for military work should not find themselves forced to perform menial
nonmilitary services for other volunteers. The Director stated:

We are in danger of building up a caste system in the WAC, whether we like it
or not . . . . [It] is undemocratic and unfair to the women.

This view was supported by Deputy Director
Rice:
We need to build in the company a spirit of respect for the job no matter
what the job is. Everyone should take her turn at KP.10

The Navy reported art identical problem
among the WAVES, and attempted to solve it by recruiting women as seamen
(utility) expressly for this work, but this failed when "morale was chronically
poor . . . too few would volunteer to enlist therein and those who did became dissatisfied when they discovered the nature
of the work." Finally the seaman rating had to be dropped, and the work returned
to a roster basis.11

As the only remaining solution, Director Hobby therefore asked publication of
a circular requiring WAC; noncommissioned officers, who were ordinarily exempt,
to share KP with the other women in order that no woman would be too frequently
absent on this duty. This recommendation was not favorably considered by
Military Personnel Division, ASF, since "The privates cease to regard the
noncoms with the respect which they are due if the noncoms are forced to work in
the kitchen side by side with them."12 General Dalton's opinion was not concurred
in by the Director, who held the view that, except for the few command cadre
positions, there was no reason why a truck driver should regard a stenographer
with respect, or one member of the company be afforded more privileges than
another on the grounds of superior education
or skills. British services had entertained
the same opinion, and had gone so far as to make a training film in which a
rated office worker was reprimanded by

[547]

her company commander for a snobbish attitude toward a scrubwoman, and was
informed that in winning the war the contribution
of every member was equally important.

Director Hobby therefore made a third appeal for a written prohibition on
permanent KP for Wacs, which would force station commanders to set up the work
on a roster basis. Again General Dalton objected, stating that men were never
used on permanent kitchen police and that there was no need to restate the
prohibition for women. However, the General Staff supported the Director's
request in view of reports of numerous violations of the rule, and the policy
was published in the first and all later WAC Regulations.13

From the standpoint of the physical well-being of women, the solution to the
KP problem achieved by many field stations,
even on a roster basis, was doubtful. Desiring to cut absences from the office
to a minimum, station authorities frequently elected to put women on one long
detail, from before dawn until late at night, rather than to permit two shorter
absences which disrupted work on two days instead of one.

In 1944 Director Hobby requested the major commands to check on this
practice, since "letters to this office, some of them Congressional inquiries,
have indicated that there has been an increasing tendency in WAC units to make
schedules for KP duty so that individuals draw long hours and sometimes arduous
continuous details.
14 Investigations revealed some cases of 14-hour details without
rotation from heavier to lighter tasks. Many Wacs were found to prefer one long
day of KP rather than several partial ones, although admitting that the
resulting aches, pains, and strains caused additional loss of time from the office. Inspectors at every opportunity
questioned the practice, but it was difficult to alter.

Even selective service for women did not appear to offer a solution to the
problem, since under this system the Army
did not sanction permanent kitchen police for a soldier. In overseas theaters, a
solution was achieved by the use of civilian labor, thus permitting key office
personnel to work as steadily as section chiefs desired. Since funds did not
permit this practice in the United States, some stations gave thought to the use
of prisoners of war-a system which was informally discouraged after the first
Wac was court-martialed and discharged for becoming engaged to one.15 Under the
circumstances, it could only be hoped that section chiefs would eventually cease
to protest at allowing Wacs to fulfill their military roster duties as did other
military personnel.

While the WAC always ran its own messes, it never attempted to take over
those of men's units. This system had not been the Corps' original intent.
Women's civilian monopoly in the fields of cooking and home economics strongly
suggested that the Army's entire food supply and service system, with the
exception of combat units, might eventually
benefit by acquiring a feminine staff: WAC advisers reported that many Army men
felt that "there is nothing that the WAC might do

[548]

that would give it greater popularity with the Army or make itself more
useful in the war effort."16 This conjecture was supported
by the precedent of the British women's services, which entirely staffed most
officers' messes and many general messes.

For the American WAAC's first year, Director Hobby and her advisers therefore
contemplated the eventual formation of mess companies, although deferring these
in order to meet the shipment schedule for the standard Table of Organization
companies. As late as June of 1943 WAAC Headquarters went on record as approving
the establishment of WAC mess companies to operate men's messes. The action in
fact appeared essential at this time, since the collapse of recruiting plans had
left the WAC with a surplus of cooks, trained to staff WAC companies that had
failed to materialize. However, before this personnel could be organized into
mess companies, a requisition was received from the Army Air Forces to assign
the cooks to its hospital diet kitchens to prepare food for patients. Since the
need of the sick appeared worthy of priority, the women-some 700 in all-were
assigned to the Air Forces and, under its flexible assignment system, added to
existing WAC units at stations having hospitals large enough to require them.17

With the establishment of higher recruiting
standards, no such surplus of cooks ever again accumulated. The number
of recruits skilled as cooks and home economics specialists was never greater
than could be employed in WAC units and hospital diet kitchens. At the same
time, several developments convinced the War Department that no steps should be
taken to stimulate the enlistment of WAC mess personnel. One important consideration
was the working environment, which appeared unsuitable except in the larger
messes where an all-WAC mess company could be employed.18

Also, many duties in an Army mess proved to be beyond a woman's strength.
Even in the small WAC unit messes, some assistance from men was often required
in unloading hundred-pound cartons or in lifting garbage and grease containers.
In the larger messes the kettles and other cooking utensils, when filled, were
sometimes too heavy for women to lift, while
few women could for many months sustain even such duties as large-scale meat-cutting
and baking. Obviously even an all WAC mess company would necessarily be confined
to skilled cooks and mess sergeants, unless troop allotments could be expanded
to allow two women for one man in heavier work. Under the circumstances. Colonel
Catron informed the War Department at the time of the conversion that priority
would be given to WAC messes and hospital messes, and consideration of running
enlisted men's messes postponed until these needs were satisfied.19

This priority was never to be reversed. Not only were recruits too few to
fill more urgent needs in offices, but the results of recruiting surveys
indicated that any public awareness of the
use of Wacs in cooking duties constituted a severe drag upon the recruiting of
skilled and capable women. Even the limited use already undertaken had shown
adverse effects, and after a receipt of one Gallup report to this effect,

[549]

Director Hobby urged staff directors to "discourage as much as possible"
pictures of women in the kitchen, particularly since these usually showed a
background of oversized ladles, monumental cooking pots, and wholesale
quantities of food.20

There was never to be any conclusive explanation of why the expectation of
cooking duties should drive recruits away by the thousands, as it was well known
to do. Classification experts were of the opinion
that women with other skills feared, in spite of all job guarantees, that they
would be forced into kitchens. Psychiatrists noted that many recruits wanted to
do a man's job, and felt that kitchen duty was not particularly military.
Possibly the best explanation came from civilian social analysts, who noted that
domestic service had been steadily dropping in popularity, with "reluctance of
workers, in the face of growing opportunities in factories and shops, to enter a
field with low standards of work and wages and inferior social status.21

This hypothesis was confirmed by the example of the British women's services,
which indicated not only that well-qualified
women would not enlist for mess work, but that they would not enlist in, and
wear the uniform of, a corps that earned a reputation for specializing in mess
management.22 In
the WAC, it was noted that "those in charge of recruiting found that it was
almost impossible to recruit office workers so long as the general public
believed that women in the armed forces were used largely as cooks, waitresses,
etc.23 Only selective service had ever enabled any women's service to get
numbers of skilled "white-collar" workers and mess personnel in the same corps.

For this reason, no recruiting campaign to organize WAC mess companies was ever sponsored. Early in 1945, Director Hobby obtained publication of a War
Department circular forbidding the assignment of Wacs to men's messes, except in
hospitals and except when Wacs ate in consolidated messes and furnished a
proportionate share of personnel.24

Thus, the only two major policies on WAC jobs ever to be adopted by the Army
centered around the decision that Wacs would perform only military duties, and
that the Corps would continue to specialize
in office work rather than food service. Of all other questions concerning
proper employment, most were satisfactorily settled at a field level; only a few
ever received War Department attention.

In the field there seemed to be some impression
that a list of other prohibited duties did exist, or should, and in its early
days WAAC Headquarters constantly received
queries concerning the maximum size of the trucks women might drive, the weights
they might lift, and similar matters. Such
inquiries continued to be so frequent that
WAAC representatives worked long and painfully with Military Personnel
Division, ASF, to compile a list of prohibited
duties, which would have included some 150 occupations such as blacksmith,
boilermaker, and bath attendant. The attempt
seemed more amusing than useful, and was finally abandoned, as it appeared

[550]

somewhat unlikely that anyone would assign
women to such work in any case.25

Furnace Firing

One minor question, which arose at many stations lacking central heating in
barracks, was whether the women could fire their own barracks furnace on roster
duty as did most men's units. Since the answer varied according to the size and
nature of both the furnace and the Wacs, the Director believed that the matter
should be left to the discretion of Army stations.

For example, the Second Service Command
reported to the Director an "acute problem" at Camp Upton, New York: the women's
health was affected because they had to fire furnaces, while Waacs at nearby
Fort Dix had such work done for them. The service command asked that the Director
set a uniform policy. In reply, WAAC Headquarters refused to try to set a
policy, stating that the matter was one of command, and that its only policy was
that Waacs should not do work that overtaxed
their strength. Colonel Clark write:

If the work of manning furnaces at Camp Upton is reasonably beyond the
physical capacity of women, manifestly they should not be required to do it. It
is believed to be purely a matter within the province of the Post Commander, who
will undoubtedly take such action as is deemed necessary, upon the request of
the WAAC Company Commander.26

In most instances local commanders solved the problem with considerable
common sense. Were one post service detail did this job for men's barracks,
the Waacs' could easily be included. If each barracks did its own, the WAC commander was usually able to arrange for the duty to be assumed by women of suitable
strength, who often preferred it to kitchen police. If the unit contained no
such strong women, or if section chiefs refused
to release office workers for the task, civilians or male service troops were
given the detail without causing any great comment.

This local-option view was not shared by the Chief of Engineers' office,
which informed the field, without consulting
the Director WAAC:

With proper training, the members of the WAAC can operate furnaces and water
heaters in the same manner as enlisted men. No change is contemplated in the
established policy that such equipment be operated by the personnel occupying
the quarters in which it is installed.27

When it was discovered that the commandant at Fort Oglethorpe was using labor
troops to fire furnaces and heaters for the whole post, rather than drawing
details from Wacs for this purpose, ASF headquarters took these men from his
allotment and stated, "War Department policy does not contemplate the use of
station complement personnel to fire small heating units.28 During the following
winter, Fort Oglethorpe was subject to severe Congressional and public criticism
for repeated cases in which recruits reported
to cold barracks, and spent much of their so-called basic training period in
firing furnaces, with a resulting high rate

The WAC was not in a position to argue with Army-wide policies on furnace
firing, but field inspectors found in some cases that any economy resulting from
Wacs doing the work was indeed doubtful. WAC office and hospital workers
suffering from sprained backs were frequently hospitalized
and absent from their duties following
furnace-firing detail. A large-scale study by the Army Air Forces showed that
respiratory disorders were increased by the duty; with corresponding loss of
time from work. Furthermore, at several stations
the heating equipment suffered expensive
damage from the unskilled ministrations of the Wacs. At one station steam
instead of water emerged from certain
fixtures in the WAC latrines, and geysers erupted on the post grounds. At one
training center, women in the latrine were quite seriously scalded in a way that
made desk work impossible for weeks.

The Army Air Forces achieved a partial solution to this problem by rescinding
directives that required unit personnel to fire their own furnaces, thus leaving
the post commander free to take any steps deemed necessary to prevent the
absence of key office personnel, male or female. :No similar Army-wide solution
was ever promulgated.30

Use of Weapons

Another minor job-assignment question was that of the use of weapons.
Although Wacs were clearly labeled noncombatants, and thus supposedly not
concerned with the use of weapons, it soon developed that in their private lives
a few were good marksmen, and that Army men took a friendly interest in instructing them and allowing them to qualify on firing
ranges. The War Department judged the matter unimportant because of the few
cases concerned. However, in this it
reckoned without the newspapers, which
shortly spread one or two pictured instances nationwide. There resulted what WAC
advisers called "a serious public relations problem," with semihysterical
accusations from many citizens (1) that the
country was in such bad shape that women were about to be sent into combat, or
(2) that Wacs were not needed and were obliged to while away their time in this
manner, or (3) that Wacs were wasting the powder which munitions workers sat up
nights to manufacture. Even a case in which Wacs were photographed
drilling with wooden guns provoked
condemnation when published in a blurred newspaper version.

Accordingly, Director Hobby requested and secured a stringent prohibition on
the use of weapons, which stated sweepingly that "no weapon or arm, nor any
replica or imitation thereof, will be used or carried
by any member of the WAC, nor will any training in the use or firing of any
weapon be afforded any member.''

Almost immediately the regulation proved hampering to field commanders
charged with assigning Wacs. Certain Air Forces women instructors had been accustomed
to use gun-shaped training devices. Fiscal
authorities protested that the ruling would require the removal of WAC officers
from duty as disbursing officers. WAC officers attending the Army Finance
School were unable to receive the same training as male students. Certain emi-

[552]

nently suitable signal and communications
duties were also jeopardized, since regulations required that a revolver be kept
in the code room. In overseas areas there were also usually regulations which
prevented taking out any vehicle without arms.

Director Hobby admitted that tier original
recommendation had been over-stringent, and
asked that the prohibition be reworded to permit women to carry such weapons as
were required by their specific assignment, if the assignment was otherwise
suitable and noncombatant, and if the women had suitable training. This request
was refused by the Director of Personnel,
Army Service Forces: "Not favorably
considered in view of War Department policy
that members of noncombatant branches will
not be trained in the use of weapons."

Since the WAC was the only noncombatant
branch assigned to duties in fiscal and other work requiring firearms, this
restriction continued to prove most unpopular
with the field, and Director Hobby, after her move to G-1 Division, continued
to ask that it be rescinded. As a result, G-1 Division soon published what was
believed to be a discreetly worded circular
which allowed commanding generals to grant
exceptions, for specifically named individuals only, provided that the duties
were suitable and the women properly qualified.

Within six months, this authority was so extensively abused by field commands
that G-1 Division rescinded it, stating that, with the circular as an excuse, "WAC
personnel are being required to drill in the use of arms and at some localities
there is wholesale participation by WA( a personnel in familiarization courses
in the use of weapons and arms." Since Colonel Hobby did not wish to impose another absolute prohibition on such
field assignments, G-1 merely rescinded the authorization, thus leaving neither
approval or disapproval in the regulations, except for a passage which stated
that "the wearing of badges representing qualification in arms by Women's Army
Corps personnel is prohibited." This also did riot prove too popular with Wacs,
who felt it peculiar that they should be allowed to qualify but not to receive
the badge. British precedent indicated an eventual solution of the problem only
if future emergencies should make home defense as acceptable a female occupation
as it had once been in pioneer days.31

Use in Public Theatricals

A more serious and frequent question was that which concerned the duty assignment
of Wacs to theatrical performances designed for public entertainment. This
question was entirely apart from that of participation in camp and company shows
and skits, which had always been encouraged,
although requests for Special Services
material for this purpose were refused by the ASF for two years. Not until July
of 1945 was there published a booklet of all girl
skits and other entertainment material suitable for WAC company parties. Such
camp shows were done on the individual's

On the other hand, many talented Wacs-writers, musicians, actresses, singers-had
obviously hoped to use their talents on a full-time basis in the war effort,
with Army sponsorship. The question of
whether or not they would be allowed to do so first arose at Daytona Beach,
where Waacs wrote and produced a show called On the Double, with dances
directed by a former Broadway teacher and costumes by a former professional
theatrical costumer. The production was such a success that firemen had to be
called to turn away hundreds of curious civilians. Posts in the surrounding area
requested that the show go on tour, and its WAAC sponsor wrote the Director, "We
feel that this show would definitely be one of the greatest recruiting factors
that the WAAC could have if it were possible for us to put it on in other places
than Daytona Beach."
33

After some consideration, Director Hobby disapproved the idea of a tour, and
asked ASF to inform the service commands that it was improper to use Wacs for
"singing and dancing in connection with any presentation put on for the public
on behalf of recruiting.34 There
was considerable indication that the value of such expensive productions to
recruiting was small, and at times actually negative. Thus, the successful
Daytona production received newspaper "praise" calling it "the Amazon's answer"
and stating, "Hold your hats, fellows-there's a striptease act so good the MP's
have to break it up."35 Even if such publicity was considered
desirable, there remained the problem of expense. In one case in which the First
Service Command tried such an experiment on its own authority, it was soon
obliged to report that recruits obtained by this means cost $1,200 more apiece
than ordinary recruits.36

Therefore, although members of the press applied some pressure on behalf of
talented WAC friends, informing the Director
that she was making a "great mistake," she
nevertheless proposed and secured publication of a War Department policy against
the use of Wacs in theatricals for the
civilian public. Wacs were allowed to appear only in those shows performed at
home stations for soldiers and their families, which did not take them off their
jobs and for which no admission was charged
except to defray costs. This rule was published in July 1943, and with minor
modifications remained the WAC's policy for the rest of its career.37

This prohibition often appeared unreasonable
to stations in the field, since male military personnel were frequently used in
traveling productions such as This Is the Army. There was every evidence
that the regulation was frequently violated. Nevertheless, no change in ruling
was ever made by the War Department. The distinction
in such assignments for men and

[554]

for women was based partly upon the opinion that

. . . members of the public, not yet convinced
of the advisability of having women in the military service, were prone to
think, if they saw women in theatrical performances, that the Army had no real
need for them.38

For men, especially where returned combat
heroes were used, there seemed to be a more favorable public impression that
singing and dancing assignments were only a brief interlude in combat. Eventually
even this tolerance was at times overstrained, and the Director's staff noted
that "the Bureau is having the same type of trouble with men participating in theatricals."39 A great many such projects for men came to be refused, "because of the
critical manpower situation and the present
need for all available military personnel.40

For the WAC, the problem continued to be one not merely of economy but of
public acceptance. Director Hobby stated, as one of the Corps' major principles:

It is contrary to policy to . . . sanction appearance in public where this
might give the impression of frivolity or lack of serious purpose or occupation
. . . . It is also contrary to policy to move WAC units over considerable
distances except for necessary and official purposes.41

As the Army's practice of fostering home-talent post shows grew, the War Department,
at the request of field stations, permitted Wacs to appear in such shows even
when they journeyed to nearby stations,
provided that their absence from home stations was not more than twelve hours
and that they were accompanied by a WAC officer. Later, at the request of Miss
Sarah Blanding of the Secretary of War's Recreational Committee, this ruling was
extended so that commanding generals might authorize a longer period of absence
from duty for performances before audiences composed entirely of patients in
Army hospitals.42

There was no equally successful solution to the demand for WAC units to
appear in civic parades and other celebrations. Military posts were accustomed
to contributing a company to grace patriotic occasions in nearby communities,
but could ordinarily divide the honor among a number of companies. Since the WAC
ordinarily had only one company at a station, and was in great demand as a
curiosity, its members were frequently forced to augment their military schedule
with long marches in local parades, often with the loss of most of a working
day. Colonel Hobby stated forcibly to WAC staff officers her opinion that "they
must not be pulled off their jobs because somebody wants to see a parade."43

Post commanders ordinarily agreed heartily and did what they could to check
the practice. Unfortunately, civilian patriotic
groups were numerous and their requests not
only incessant but difficult to refuse diplomatically. For example, in one brief
period in one city, Masonic and Eastern Star groups asked for "from 60 to 100
Wacs to participate in a pageant"; the Confederate Memorial Committee asked

[555]

for members to "display a banner in our procession"; and the American Legion
asked for "such units as may be available" for their annual convention parade.44

Refusals of such requests were frequently appealed from a post commander to a
service commander and even higher. Thus, Colonel Hobby on one occasion received
a telephoned request-which she was of course unable to grant-that she "force"
the Commanding General, Second Service Command, to ship his WAC band from New
York to Philadelphia, at Army expense, for the bond parade sponsored by the
Philadelphia War Finance Committee. In other cases, civilian groups, refused by
the commanding general of a service command, appealed to Congressmen who forced
the commanding general to yield. No reasonable compromise solution to the
problem was ever discovered.45

Travel Orders

Only one restriction was necessitated concerning transportation orders for
women. Conditions of shipment were the same for men and women-troop trains for
whole units, and travel of individuals or smaller groups by coach for short
trips and Pullman for overnight travel. In practice such standards were of
course seldom met for either men or women. WAC training centers were finally authorized
to use coaches regularly for trips up to 36 hours, with a WAC officer in charge
of each WAC shipment.

As unit shipment declined and individual
shipment as casuals increased, disturbing
reports were received concerning the shipment of mixed groups of men and
women-particularly in one case in which seven enlisted women were sent on an
overnight trip in a coach with enlisted men, with only a male corporal in charge. At this, the Director asked that
shipments of men and women not be consolidated. The Army Service Forces did not
approve or publish this request, but after the Director's move to G-1 Division a
War Department circular was published which required that, if it was necessary
to ship enlisted men and women in the same car, a ranking member of each group
would be in charge.46

Legal Restrictions on WAC Jobs

In order not to conflict with the prerogatives
of the Army Nurse Corps, the WAC was forbidden by act of Congress to perform
nursing duties. Nurses who had joined the WAAC could transfer to the Army Nurse
Corps if eligible, but as the top age limit was 45 for nurses and 50 for Wacs, a
number were not eligible and chose to continue in the WAC. Many registered
nurses in this age group apparently failed
to understand that they could not employ their skills under these circumstances,
and some complaints were received. There
was, however, no authority for discharge of such enlisted women, who ordinarily
were employed as orderlies or technicians under the supervision of younger Nurse
Corps officers. The same

[556]

prohibition applied to doctors, but as none of these were reported as
remaining in the WAC the problem of their assignment as enlisted women did not
arise.47

There was likewise no authority for transfer of members of the WAC to the
U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps for training. The Cadet Nurse Corps was a civilian organization
organized by the U.S. Public Health Service to give free nurses' training to
"cadets" who received their keep, allowances,
and attractive uniforms. It possessed considerable attraction for members of the
WAC, especially those in hospitals who were performing the duties of orderlies
and receiving little or no useful training for the future.

Unfortunately, an early bulletin of the Public Health Service gave the
impression that qualified members of the WAC might be released by the Army to
take cadet nurse training. This was soon corrected at the request of WAC
authorities, but meanwhile a number of requests for transfer had been received,
accompanied by Congressional backing. To these the WAC was obliged to reply that
there was no existing authority to transfer members from military service to
civilian groups, since this would in effect have required discharge of all
soldiers who could do better for themselves in civilian life. Nevertheless, it
was months before such inquiries ceased to come in from Wacs who felt that they
were being penalized fir their early enlistment before cadet training was
offered by the government. In general, the problem remained merely one small
facet of the larger question of national versus voluntary service for women.
48

A similar refusal was received by WAC officers and enlisted women who were
qualified as pilots or as pilot trainees and who desired to transfer to the WASP (Women Air Service Pilots). Since this organization was a civilian group,
there existed no authority for release of military personnel to accept flying
duties. While it would have been possible to accomplish the same result by
placing the WASP in the WAC, a solution agreeable to WAC leaders, this step was
rejected by the director of the WASP. Again, the problem appeared part of the
larger need for a clearer line of distinction between military and civilian
duties and status.49

Restrictions on Assignment to Washington, D. C.

One other restriction on WAC assignments, which soon proved so unpopular as
to be unenforceable, was General Somervell's early order barring assignments in
the District of Columbia. Although replacement of Civil Service workers in this
or any other location was forbidden, there was a limited number of fully
military jobs in Washington, in which enlisted men were employed. In the Corps'
first month the Chief of Staff approved the use of the first group of enlisted
Waacs in the Pentagon, to monitor telephone calls for G-2 Division, but any
further use was strictly prohibited.50

In view of the stringency of these orders, the General Council was surprised
at the end of the Corps' first year when General McNarney demanded an
explanation of

[557]

why "a number of them have infiltrated into jobs here."51
Upon investigating, General Dalton was startled to discover that the ASF had
259 Waacs in Washington. He requested explanation of how they got there, since,
he said, "General S. still does not want Waacs assigned to ASF activities in
Washington."52 Actually,
all proved to be properly authorized personnel who had been approved by the
Chief of Staff from time to time, particularly in G-2, WAC Headquarters, and
later as staff directors for the administrative and technical services.53

In spite of all resolutions, Wacs continued to filter into Washington. Almost
immediately alter his protest, the manpower shortage forced General McNarney to
approve an exception for the classified message center of his own office, and
for Operations Division of the General Staff: At the same time a request from
Military Intelligence Service for Wacs to man its message center was
disapproved. Military Intelligence Service persisted, and in September of 1943
the Chief of Staff finally authorized 77 Wacs for this work; a little later it
was necessary to add 22 more.54

This concession marked the beginning of the end of the policy. In November of
1943, the ban on WAC officers in the ASF in the District was removed, with the
precaution that a report of the total be
sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff every two months. By May of 1944, a large
percentage of the enlisted personnel being
brought to Washington was female, for service at the secret Signal Corps
installation at Arlington Hall, or with the Air Forces at Bolling Field and the
Air Transport Command at Gravelly Point. By August of 1944 there were 2,045
enlisted women in the Military District of Washington alone, and the ceiling was
raised to 3,202 to permit more to enter. Just before the end of the war, the last opponent to Wacs
in Washington-the Army Ground Forces yielded to the manpower shortage and asked
permission to bring in 55 women for military jobs in Headquarters, AGE.55

By this time the War Department's policy had been entirely reversed; not only
did it permit Wacs to work in the General Staff in Washington, but it awarded
itself top priority. It was directed that War Department needs would be filled
from surplus personnel, if possible, but if not, it would receive Wacs
regardless of the branch that had been promised them when recruited. If this was
inadequate, the Air, Ground, and Service Forces would be called upon to supply
Washington's demands from field stations.56

Since all General Staff requisitions called for highly qualified personnel,
they remained unpopular with field commands, as well as with many of the
enlisted women, who preferred the more military atmosphere of an Army post. On
the other hand, since allotments often permitted top ratings, the requisitions
were more easily

[558]

filled than those of overseas theaters. Only military vacancies continued to
be filled; as a result the total employment in the Washington area remained only
about a fifth of that achieved by the Navy Department. Thus, the War Department
priority never became the problem that was reported by the Navy, where, it was
stated, "the over-riding priority given . . . cut across and upset all
principles of equitable apportionment.57

With the removal of restrictions on assignment
in Washington, there remained no type of fixed installation to which WAC
assignment was forbidden. There was, likewise, with the possible exception of
"entertainer," no noncombatant MOS to which field commanders were forbidden to
assign enlisted women, although some, like food service, were restricted to WAC
administration. The result of these lenient assignment policies was, as might
have been expected, a rapid multiplication of the number of WAC enlisted jobs
from the time of the conversion onward, limited only by the civilian skills that
women were found to possess.

Records in the Corps' second year showed that already women had been
recruited in more than 300 different civilian
occupations, from gunsmith to electrical
engineer, and from psychiatric social worker to horse-breaker. Almost every
language skill was represented, including Chinese, Finnish, Lithuanian, and Swahili.
While obviously not all of these skills could be used by the Army, by the summer
of 1943 the number of military occupational
specialties held by enlisted women was estimated at 155; by early 1944, at 239;
by May of 1944, at 274. No final count was ever reported. It did not appear likely that the estimated possible total of 408 suitable Army jobs had been
reached, but it had undoubtedly been approached within all reasonable
expectation under a voluntary recruitment system.58

Under the informal assignment system, about half of the assignments were to
administrative and office work, in which women predominated in civilian life.
Toward the end of the war a mild trend had set in away from such work in favor
of increased technical and professional assignments-at least in the United
States-but office work still took first place.59

Percent

Type of work

1943

30 Sep 44

Administrative and Office

53

45

Technical and Professional

13

18

Motor vehicle

10

9

Foods

8

9

Supply and Stock

7

8

Mechanical and Trade

5

4

Communications

2

5

Radio and Electrical

2

2

As might have been predicted from the higher WAC enlistment standards, the
average enlisted woman was found to be somewhat ahead of the average enlisted
man in aptitude as measured by the Army General Classification Test.
60

Percent

AGCT

EW

EM

Group I

4.90

6.34

Group II

37.07

31.00

Group III

39.89

30.68

Group IV

17.87

25.12

Group V

0.27

6.86

[559]

SUITABLE ARMY JOBS FOR WOMEN. Above, Wac laboratory technician conducts an
experiment at Fort Jackson Station Hospital, South Carolina. Below, two women
work at a trailer repair unit, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

[560]

SUITABLE ARMY JOBS FOR WOMEN. Above, a Wac is at work in the Ordnance Section
al Camp Campbell, Kentucky. Below, women pack a parachute, part of their duties
as riggers, Fort Benning, Georgia.

[561]

For the same reason, in educational level enlisted women appeared even more
noticeably superior to the enlisted men of the Army, with 62 percent of enlisted
women having a high school education or better as compared to 39 percent of
enlisted men.61

Percent

Educational Level

EW

EM

Grammar school only

8.99

28.6

1, 2, 3 years high school

28.62

32.6

High school graduate

42.21

27.6

1, 2, 3 years college

13.76

8.2

College graduate

5.36

2.1

Postgraduate

1.06

.9

In ratings the enlisted women were nevertheless considerably behind the men
of the Army. Obviously, under the decentralized
system of control, women had not received the ratings that would have gone with
their skills under a more formal system.
62

Percent

Grade

EW

EM

Master and 1st Sgt

0.6

1.5

Technical Sgt

0.6

2.9

Staff Sgt and Tec/3

3.5

8.1

Sgt or Tec/4

11.8

14.1

Corporal or Tec/5

19.6

21.0

Pvt 1st Class

25.4

28.1

Private

38.5

24.3

'The relative success of the decentralized and flexible system of enlisted
assignments, as contrasted with the Navy's more formalized
one, was difficult to determine. There were indications that the Navy suffered
some wastage of civilian skills by arbitrary denial to women of certain categories
of jobs, as well as what it called "misplacement and under-utilization of women,
which were to have far-reaching consequences on morale and procurement."63 However, in the Army also there was evidence that, while outright violations
of regulations were few, the standard of utilization of skills was not high.

In late 1944 a War Department personnel auditing team surveyed a large sample
of the Army's enlisted women and discovered that, of women who had specialized
civilian skills urgently needed by the Army, 23 percent were not using them. If
this sample ratio held true, almost one fourth of the Corps' skilled workers
were being underutilized through poor personnel practices. It was also found
that 22 percent of graduates of service schools were assigned to duties
unrelated to their schooling, thus indicating that almost one fourth of the
Army's specialized training of women was being wasted.64

Various inspection teams at different times also detected a notable trend
toward underutilization of the higher skills. In the Air Forces, college women
were pronounced "usually well-assigned," but
in the Army Service Forces, only about 20 percent of enlisted college graduates
were in jobs requiring their training, and 4 percent
were actually in menial jobs. One team captain reported:

Women with degrees in home economics and one to fifteen years experience in
food planning were working as Second and Third cooks. Women with years of
photographic experience were working on one
simple phase of that job. Expert linguists-German, Polish, Spanish, French,
Chinese-some of whom could take dictation in the language were not using their
language skill.65

[562]

Skilled stenographers were especially liable to malassignment, as civilians
often occupied an office's only stenographic job. Malassignments also were found
among telephone operators, typists, clerks, chauffers,
key-punch operators, dietitians, and other specialists.

Everywhere women were conscious of the lack of ratings. Surveyors noted that
"in some instances, promotions have been given to enlisted men rather than Wacs
when an opening occurs, even though the Wac may have filled the opening .... Enlisted
men resent Wacs being given ratings rather than themselves."

Survey team captains reported that the Army Air Forces generally showed a
more favorable attitude toward WAC classification.
Various teams stated: "Wars are very well received in the AAF, not only by section
chiefs but also by enlisted men"; "The type of jobs open to Wacs was more varied
in the AAF"; "AAF jobs were far more in agreement with WAC Regulations than ASF"

There was no indication that the wastage
of skills of enlisted women was worse than that among enlisted men, with two
exceptions: there was a general tendency to use women in nonmilitary work or
lower-rated jobs, and there was also a tendency to accept as normal among women
a percentage of malassignment which, for men, resulted from the necessity for
combat assignments. All inspectors continued to note that failure to use their
skills had a proportionately greater effect upon women than upon men, who expected
eventual combat. One team captain noted,
"Morale and classification seem to be almost synonymous as far as Wacs are concerned."

There was every evidence that both the Army and the Navy had pursued the correct
policy in limiting their women's corps to skilled personnel who could fill
skilled jobs. Survey teams reported that women with less than two years of high
school education had seldom progressed well in the Army, and those who had no
essential skill, particularly in the older age group, had especial difficulty in
adjusting to military life. Women's lesser
physical strength effectively prevented success of such women on those Army jobs
within their mental capacities.

In the last winter of the war, ASF's Military Personnel Division reported
itself still unable to find suitable assignments for such women, after a series
of futile attempts to train them as ward
orderlies, shoemakers, and sewing machine operators.
It therefore recommended that the women be discharged and no more recruited.
This decision obviously represented a major
reversal of the ideas of a decade before-or even a year before concerning
lowering of standards for women recruits. Both Army and Navy experience
indicated that in future planning, and particularly if selective service was
applied to women, the armed forces had good grounds for accepting only women of
a skill and aptitude somewhat above that of drafted men and of the population as
a whole.
66