Internet voting can be safer than e-banking. And, it can get Big Money out of politics in the USA, and increase the power of the middle class like never before. I explain how at, Internet Voting for All.
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Twitter; wjkno1

Don't you know that being able to prove one's vote opens the door to coercion, intimidation and vote selling. With a secret ballot, these all have an escape by a simple lie.

Basically the biggest problem with electronic voting is that it allows undetectable large scale fraud. A computer can be programmed to lie as intelligently as you want.

Besides, all the properties wanted for electronic voting are produced by complex algorithms and calculations that are too difficult to fully understand by most people and are unverifiable by almost everyone. Most proponents don't even seem to understand the security implications of ordinary paper ballots, which is the clearest indication why their opinion should be ignored.

Voting is the most important function of a democracy. It must be allowed to cost.

Any secure online voting system relies on reliable user identification. If a country doesn't have working e-ID framework, not to mention no ID whatsoever, there's no point in even talking about online votng.

Electronic voting is easily rigged and should be abandoned. Vote by mail makes it easy to intimidate voters and sell votes - what do you do if your manager or union steward demands to see or mail your ballot?

Marking a paper ballot in behind a curtain is the only way to preserve vote integrity.

It is difficult for me to understand the ongoing enthusiasm for high-tech methods of casting votes. Not only are these systems subject to failure in the event of an electrical outage but, because each device is relatively expensive, there are often fairly few devices at each polling place, sometimes leading to delays in being able to cast one’s votes.

In San Mateo County, California, we used to use the Scantron system. Each voter was given a cheap paper ballot and a pencil; many voters could mark their ballots at the same time. After the time-consuming ballot marking was done, the voter gave the completed ballot to an election worker who put it into a machine which quickly scanned and tabulated it. If the voter had mistakenly voted for two candidates for the same office, the machine popped out the ballot, giving the voter a chance to vote a new ballot. In case of a power outage, the ballots could still be distributed, marked by each voter and saved for later tabulation. In any case, the paper ballot would be available in case a recount was needed.

This is not intended as an endorsement of the Scantron system in particular, only to speak in favor of low tech systems for casting votes. It is fine to use elaborate systems for tabulating the votes; in case of a power outage a few hours delay would not interfere with the ability to vote, it would only delay the count.

I'm not sure why on site electronic voting machines don't provide a serial number that can be verified online after being cast. The paper receipt provides the means to challenge a vote if the online resource does not match the receipt or is missing. A hashing algorithm could be used to encrypt the voters ssn with their ballot selections in order to reduce counting errors and localized tampering.