Monday, November 07, 2011

Pub: Patrick Colm Hogan, AFFECTIVE NARRATOLOGY.

Stories engage our emotions. We’ve known this at least since the days of
Plato and Aristotle. What this book helps us to understand now is how our own
emotions fundamentally organize and orient stories. In light of recent cognitive
research and wide reading in different narrative traditions, Patrick Colm Hogan
argues that the structure of stories is a systematic product of human emotion
systems. Examining the ways in which incidents, events, episodes, plots, and
genres are a function of emotional processes, he demonstrates that emotion
systems are absolutely crucial for understanding stories.

Hogan also makes a case for the potentially integral role that stories play
in the development of our emotional lives. He provides an in-depth account of
the function of emotion within story—in widespread genres with romantic, heroic,
and sacrificial structures, and more limited genres treating parent/child
separation, sexual pursuit, criminality, and revenge—as these appear in a
variety of cross-cultural traditions. In the course of the book Hogan develops
interpretations of works ranging from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina to African
oral epics, from Sanskrit comedy to Shakespearean tragedy. Integrating the latest research in affective science with narratology, this
book provides a powerful explanatory account of narrative organization.

No comments:

Post a Comment

SUBSCRIBE FOR EMAIL UPDATES

FEEDBURNER FEEDS

WHAT IS 'THEORY'?

Institutionalised philosophy has before it something called 'philosophy,' which is emphatically not philosophy, that does not follow the protocols of that discipline, that does not measure up to apparently transparent standards of logical rigour and clarity. . . . This institutionalised 'philosophy,' which is not itself, produces another paradox as well: it proliferates a second philosophy outside the boundary that philosophy itself has set, and so it seems that philosophy has unwittingly produced this spectral double of itself. It may be that what is practised as philosophy in most of the language and literature departments . . . has come to constitute the meaning of 'philosophy,' and so the discipline of philosophy must find itself strangely expropriated by a double. And the more it seeks to dissociate itself from this redoubled notion of itself, the more effective it is in securing the dominance of this other philosophy outside the boundary that was meant to contain it. (Judith Butler, "Can the 'Other' of Philosophy Speak?" 241)

I shall use the word ‘theorist’ rather than ‘philosopher’ because the etymology of ‘theory’ gives me the connotation I want, and avoids some I do not want. The people I shall be discussing do not think that there is something called ‘wisdom’ in any sense of the term which Plato would have recognised. So the term ‘lover of wisdom’ seems inappropriate. But theoria suggests taking a view of a large stretch of territory from a considerable distance, and this is just what the people I shall be discussing do. They all specialise in standing back from, and taking a large view of, what Heidegger called the ‘tradition of Western metaphysics’ – what I have been calling the ‘Plato-Kant canon.’ (Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity 96)

Everywhere I go, I find a poet has been there before me. (Sigmund Freud)

A man with one theory is lost. He needs several of them, or lots! He should stuff them in his pockets like newspapers. (Bertolt Brecht)

Something is happening to the way we think about the way we think. (Clifford Gertz, "Blurred Genres: the Refiguration of Social Thought" 20)

The history of thought is the history of its models. (Frederic Jameson, The Prison-House of Language)