After
failed efforts to persuade the United
Nations Security Council to endorse the
use of force to disarm Iraq and oust the
regime of Saddam Hussein, the United
States, United Kingdom, and a coalition
of countries resolved to achieve those
aims through military action. Although
regime change—the forced elimination of
the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and
his sons from power—was initially only a
stated goal of the United States, it
became a de facto goal of all coalition
forces.

Although Iraq's military power was not
as great—and the cause not as directly
apparent as the need to expel Iraqi
forces following their brutal invasion
and occupation of Kuwait that led to the
Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991—U.S.
officials asserted that Iraq's proven
development and use of weapons of mass
destruction in the past made Iraq a
potential source of those weapons for
terrorists who could then use them
against U.S. or other Western targets.

In 2002, some Pentagon and
administration officials urged immediate
and direct action be taken by the United
States to disarm Iraq. There were also
more controversial calls for a regime
change in Baghdad as the only means to
assure Iraqi disarmament. United States
President George W. Bush decided instead
to seek international cooperation to
disarm Iraq. In September 2002, Bush
addressed the United Nations and called
for a strong resolution that, backed by
the ultimate threat of the use of
military force to disarm Iraq, would
assure that Iraq possessed no weapons of
mass destruction and assure that Iraq's
capability to develop such weapons was
destroyed.

In October 2002, the United States
Congress voted Bush the authority to use
military force to enforce UN
resolutions.

In November 2002, the United Nations
Security Council unanimously passed
resolution 1441 that reiterated Iraq's
obligations to disarm in accordance with
prior treaty and resolution obligations
and further recognized the threat that
"Iraq's non-compliance with Council
resolutions and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and long-range
missiles poses to international peace
and security." Resolution 1441 proceeded
to restate Security Council intentions
to "restore international peace and
security in the area."

U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell
stressed that the United States and its
coalition partners had "limited
patience" for continued Iraqi
noncompliance with United Nations
resolutions. President Bush and other
United States officials insisted that
Iraq was in "material breech" of UN
resolutions and that military action
could be undertaken to disarm Iraq under
the terms of existing resolutions.

In February and March of 2003, it became
apparent that the United States, United
Kingdom, and supporting countries on the
United Nations Security Council could
not reach a consensus with other
permanent members France, Russia, and
China, on the need to use immediate

military force to enforce UN
resolutions. As the diplomatic efforts
stalled, war became more likely.

In
late February 2003, a series of
political and tactical setbacks
seemingly delayed American action.
Although a measure to support American
bases in Turkey was supported by
Turkey's president and military leaders,
the Turkish parliament failed to muster
a sufficient majority to pass a
resolution allowing United States forces
to use Turkish soil as a base for a
northern front against Iraq. The
resolution would have allowed Pentagon
planners to place 62,000 American troops
and heavy tanks along the northern Iraqi
border with Turkey. It was not until
after hostilities eventually started
that Turkey allowed coalition forces
limited use of Turkey's airspace to
strike Iraq.

In the final weeks before the war,
British and American air forces that had
been patrolling the southern no-fly zone
since the end of the Gulf War began a
psychological campaign to discourage
Iraqi resistance. Aircraft began
dropping massive numbers of leaflets
near military sites that encouraged
Iraqi soldiers not to resist the
overwhelming attack to come, and
specifically warned Iraqi military
leaders that they would be held
accountable as war criminals for any use
of biological or chemical weapons. In
addition to radio broadcasts,
psychological operations (PSYOPS) also
included targeting Iraqi officials with
emails and phone calls designed to
discourage their resistance or warn them
of the consequences of war crimes.

Despite the logistical setbacks and
delays, by March 5, U.S. secretary of
defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and U.S.
general Tommy R. Franks announced that
U.S. military forces were ready to
execute an attack against Iraq upon
President Bush's order.

Diplomatic efforts continued to secure
Turkish cooperation, but military
planners set out a number of options and
alternatives for war against Iraq
without the immediate use of the U.S.
infantry divisions and airborne forces
moving southward from Turkey. One focus
of the planning involved the threat of a
sudden and massive first strike (termed
"shock and awe" warfare) that would
immediately overwhelm Iraqi defense
forces. Planners worried that a gradual
or escalating series of attacks would
risk allowing Saddam Hussein to strike
preemptively at Israel and thus
potentially widen the war.

Counting army, navy, marine corps, air
force and special operations forces,
U.S. General Tommy Franks commanded a
force of approximately 225,000 American
and 25,000 British soldiers from the
Central Command

post in Qatar. As with the Gulf War, the
United States utilized a special reserve
of commercial aircraft chartered
specifically to transport forces to the
region. An estimated 110,000 army and
marine corps troops were located in
Kuwait. Although the force was large,
ground forces were approximately half
the numbers used in the Gulf War.

Naval forces in the coalition centered
upon five U.S. naval aircraft carriers
located either in the Persian Gulf or
eastern Mediterranean that remained
within striking range of targets in
Iraq. The carriers hosted air wings
capable of delivering ordnance or in
maintaining air superiority. In addition
to the carriers, fleet forces consisted
of more than two dozen missile ships and
submarines—most capable of firing
Tomahawk cruise missiles.

In addition to the naval air forces,
more than 500 combat aircraft—including
B–52s stationed in England, F117 stealth
fighters, and B–2 stealth bombers—formed
a powerful coalition air arsenal. For
the first time in United States military
history, some B–2 bombers were "forward
deployed" to a base in Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean. Special climate
controlled protective hangers were
constructed to maintain the
sophisticated stealth capabilities of
the bombers.

Without a northern front with supply
bases in Turkey, U.S. tactical plans
called for the launching of a massive
attack from Kuwait, with the insertion
of lighter forces (e.g., airborne
paratroopers) into northern Iraq to
secure the oil fields and other critical
infrastructure in that region. Without
the support of the heavy artillery of
the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division, which
was stalled offshore near Iraq, the
lighter forces would need to take on the
well-equipped and entrenched Iraqi
Republican Guard units defending the
northern approaches to Baghdad. U.S.
leaders were also concerned that troops
prevent rival Kurdish groups located in
the north from starting a civil war or
launching raids against Turkish forces
that would further destabilize the
region.

Options to open a second front without
Turkish cooperation included the use of
forces from the 82nd Airborne Division
in Kuwait, the 173rd Airborne brigade in
Italy, Army Ranger units, and elements
of the 101st Airborne Division
assembling in the region.

U.S. and British air strikes against
Iraqi targets in the northern and
southern no-fly zones increased and
expanded from simple retaliation against
Iraqi air defense installations that
routinely fired upon U.S. and British

Events
moved to a diplomatic breaking point in
early March. France, Germany, Russia,
and China staunchly opposed military
enforcement of UN resolution 1441 and
threatened veto of any United Nations
resolution that might—even
indirectly—authorize the United States
and United Kingdom to lead forces to
disarm Iraq. The United States, United
Kingdom, and Spain put forth a
resolution that simply declared Iraq in
material breech of 17 prior UN
resolutions. President Bush openly
declared that he would force countries
to "show their cards" with regard to
Iraq. In a press conference on March 6,
President Bush asserted that Saddam
Hussein posed a direct and immediate
danger to the security of the United
States and, with regard to the United
Nations and pending debate and
resolutions, asserted that "diplomacy
has failed" and that the "we really
don't need anybody's permission" to
defend the United States.

With war seemingly imminent, the United
States, United Kingdom, and Spain
amended a final resolution that set
March 17, 2003, as a final deadline for
the council to certify Iraqi compliance
with prior resolutions. Although a
threat of force was not contained within
the resolution, there was little doubt
that should Iraq fail to meet the
deadline, the United States and United
Kingdom would lead a multinational
coalition to militarily disarm Iraq. The
United States also sought and promised
to depose Saddam Hussein and allow the
Iraqi people a chance for democratic
government.

With the UN Security Council deadlocked,
the probable votes of the nonpermanent
members hotly disputed, and the deadline
at hand, the U.S., U.K. and Spain
allowed their new proposal to die
without a vote. Although he had once
promised to call for a vote, President
Bush stated that France "had shown their
cards" and administration officials
declared the "diplomatic window closed."
Although France, Russia, and China
declared that any U.S.-and U.K.-led
coalition action against Iraq would be
illegitimate and in violation of the UN
charter, U.S. and U.K. officials rested
on existing UN resolutions (one reason
some experts claimed that another vote
was not sought), Iraq's violation of the
treaty that ended the Persian Gulf War,
and assertions of the right of self
defense to legitimize military action.

On the evening of March 17 (Washington
time) President Bush, in a televised
address carried around the world by
major news organizations, issued Saddam
Hussein and his sons (both high ranking
Iraqi officials) a 48-hour deadline to
leave Iraq or face war.

Bush urged Iraqi forces not to destroy
infrastructure or natural resources
(e.g., oil wells), and warned Iraqi
military officials that the use of
chemical or biological weapons would be
treated as a war crime.

After citing potential threats to
American security, Bush stated, "The
United States did nothing to deserve or
invite this threat, but we will do
everything to defeat it. Instead of
drifting along toward tragedy, we will
set a course toward safety." "The danger
is clear," Bush said. "Using chemical,
biological or, one day, nuclear weapons
obtained with the help of Iraq, the
terrorists could fulfill their stated
ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds
of thousands of innocent people in our
country…." President Bush also issued a
message to the Iraqi people stating,
"the day of your liberation is near" and
promised that "the tyrant [Hussein] will
soon be gone."

Citing the increased "possibility"
(indeed, some administration officials
used the term "probability") of
retaliatory terrorist strikes against
U.S. interests, Bush raised the terror
alert level to "high" (color code
orange). As of May, 2003, no such
attacks occurred.

Iraq immediately denounced the ultimatum
and promised defiance. UN weapons
inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq and
most countries withdrew diplomats and
other personnel. France called for a
ministerial level meeting of the UN
Security Council, and a meeting of heads
of state. The U.S. and U.K. ignored
further French efforts and insisted that
Hussein could only avoid war by exile.
The British Parliament voted support of
the use of U.K. forces in a military
invasion of Iraq.

Sporadic fighting flared as the deadline
approached. Hussein ignored the March 19
deadline, and approximately 90 minutes
later—near dawn in Baghdad—U.S. jets
made a strike using precision guided
bunker buster bombs on a target near
Baghdad believed to contain senior Iraqi
officials, including Hussein. Pentagon
officials subsequently said F–117
Nighthawk stealth fighter-bombers
dropped 2000-pound (900-kilogram)
satellite-guided bombs on a site where
CIA officers developed information that
Hussein might be in conference with
other Iraqi leaders. For several weeks,
the fate of Hussein would be debated,
with Iraqi television showing images of
Hussein that did not verify his
survival.

Weeks later, a similar strike on an
Iraqi leadership target occurred as U.S.
forces were preparing to enter Baghdad.
Once again, the fate of Hussein and
other leaders remained uncertain.

Coalition intelligence services and
special operations units played an
important role in identifying and in
some cases physically "painting"
targets. Target painting refers to the
process of identifying a target with a
laser or an electronic signature device
that allows weapons platforms (e.g.
airplanes, tanks, etc.) to identify
targets. Coalition special forces and
intelligence units—including CIA
units—operated inside Iraq for weeks
prior to the initial attack. In addition
to identifying targets, intelligence and
psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams
dropped tens of thousands of leaflets,
and made radio broadcasts designed to
discourage Iraqi resistance and possibly
spark a coup against Hussein. Special
efforts were made to psychologically
separate regular Iraqi units, better
trained Iraqi Republican Guard units,
and Hussein's inner circle to facilitate
the surrender of as many Iraqi forces as
possible.

Bush made a further television address
to announce the start of hostilities.
Across Iraq, U.S. forces launched
probing attacks, along with attacks to
destroy Iraqi command and control
facilities. Anti-aircraft radar and
missile facilities were the targets of
Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by
U.S. naval vessels, and U.S. aircraft
dropped precision-guided bombs against
targets.

Hours after the U.S. strikes, Iraq fired
at least four missiles into northern
Kuwait. According to American officials,
Patriot missiles intercepted at least
two missiles. Fear of chemical attacks
by Iraq forced coalition forces and
residents of northern Kuwait to
repeatedly put on protective clothing
and gas masks. Subsequent analysis of
missile remains—and others eventually
launched into Kuwait—indicated that the
missiles carried conventional, not
chemical, warheads.

Fear of the use of weapons of mass
destruction was based upon Hussein's use
of chemical weapons against Iranian
forces during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War,
and his prior use of chemical weapons
against civilians in rebellious areas of
Iraq.

In an attempt to prove that Hussein had
survived the initial attack and thus
forestall possible Iraqi defections,
Iraqi television broadcast a speech
allegedly by Hussein. Western
intelligence sources could not
immediately verify that the speech was
actually made by Hussein. Intelligence
officials had long known that Hussein
had a number of body doubles—some
surgically altered to bear a closer
resemblance to the Iraqi leader.

On March 20, U.S.-led forces intensified
attacks and forces breached Iraqi
defensive positions and barriers along
the Kuwait border. Tank and mechanized
infantry units penetrated nearly 100
miles (160km) into Iraq by the end of
the first day. Embedded journalists
relayed back video of tank units racing
across the Iraqi desert toward Baghdad.
British forces raced to surround and
isolate the port city of Basra. U.S.
forces began the mechanized march to
Baghdad.

A brief lull in the aerial attacks on
Baghdad by coalition forces, along with
statements by U.S. officials regarding
the potential surrender of significant
portions of Iraq's Republican Guard
units, provided additional evidence of
special forces and intelligence unit
contact with Hussein's inner circle. The
lull in attacks against Baghdad also
fueled speculation about whether Hussein
was still alive, or in complete control
of his forces.

In a Pentagon press briefing, Rumsfeld
said, "We are in communication with
still more people who are officials of
the military at various levels, the
regular army, the Republican Guard, the
Special Republican Guard…." Offering
surrender, Rumsfeld added, "We continue
to feel that there's no need for a
broader conflict if the Iraqi leaders
act to save themselves and to prevent
such further conflict." Although there
were significant defections and
surrenders of Iraqi forces, nothing
approached the mass surrenders
anticipated by optimistic U.S.
officials.

On March 21, U.S.-led coalition forces
launched a massive aerial bombardment of
Baghdad and other targets throughout
Iraq. GPS precision guided bombs and an
estimated 300 cruise missiles targeted
Iraqi command and control facilities.
Within an hour of the start of the
attack on Baghdad, coalition forces
destroyed more than 25 major buildings
that housed Iraqi governmental offices.
Hussein's presidential palaces in and
around Baghdad were also destroyed.

The March 21 assault, designated by
Pentagon planners as "A-Day" (aerial
attack day), was the start of the "shock
and awe" pattern of precise, but massive
attacks designed to stun the Iraqis into
submission.

At a Pentagon press briefing Rumsfeld
made a special effort to address
comparisons of the coalition "A-Day"
attacks to similar massive attacks
during WWII (e.g. the firebombing of
Dresden). Rumsfeld dismissed the
comparisons as invalid because of the
use of precision weapons against
military and government targets as
opposed to the deliberate use of "dumb
bombs against broad areas."

Over the next three weeks, coalition
forces moved farther and faster than any
army in history. British forces
surrounded Basra and Umm Qasr, and
systematically took control of the
cities with minimal losses. Within days
the entire coastline of Iraq was under
coalition control, although terrorist
actions and pockets of resistance worked
to slow the promised quick delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Iraqis
falling under U.S. control.

Special forces helped secure airfields
designated H2 and H3 in the western
region of Iraq. These forces also help
control the "Scud box" area from which
Iraq had launched missiles against
Israel during the Gulf War.

On the road to Baghdad, U.S. troops
fought battles in Najaf, Kut, and waged
a pitched battle in Nasiriya before
capturing a key bridge over the
Euphrates River. U.S. forces fought
Iraqi troops, terrorist guerrillas known
as Martyrs of Saddam who engaged in
suicide bombings, and fedayeen militia
conducting suicide attacks. This was
often complicated by Iraqi use of
civilian human shields. However, the
biggest delays in the U.S. advance were
caused by a major sandstorm that
precluded helicopter operations and the
need to secure rapidly extending supply
lines from rearguard attacks by troops
and guerilla forces bypassed on the
lightening thrust toward the Iraqi
capital. U.S. forces also encountered
fierce fighting in Karbala.

Coalition forces were also slowed by the
need to wear clothing and equipment
designed to protect them against
chemical or biological weapons, although
such protection ultimately proved
unnecessary.

For a few days, American forces
conducted operations about 100 miles
south of Baghdad before resuming their
push toward the city.

The war was the most intensely covered
news event in history. Journalists
embedded with coalition forces provided
live pictures from the battlefield. In
terms of both quantity and quality of
coverage, the war was a profound event
in media history. In many cases, the
same facts were reported with vastly
differing emphasis depending on the
reporter's perspective or
political/editorial orientation of the
news agency. At other times, there were
wide discrepancies in the amount of
airtime or print space offered to
particular stories. For the first time,
several Arab television news channels,
including Al-Jazeera, provided
continuous coverage that competed with
U.S.-based news organizations, the BBC,
and European based news organizations.

While coalition forces were lauded by
reporters and commentators from some
news organizations for the use of
precision weapons that reduced civilian
casualties, other organizations
continually emphasized graphic pictures
of civilian and military casualties.
Al-Jazeera, criticized before the war by
many Western media editors for airing
biased, inaccurate, and inflammatory
anti-Western reports, drew intense
criticism from U.S. officials for
showing controversial video of coalition
POWs held or executed by Iraqis.

Although considered an almost comical
media sideshow by Western news agencies,
the farcical interviews and briefings
conducted by Iraq's minister of
information, Said Sahaf, were reported
more seriously by Arab news channels.
Even as U.S. troops raced toward
Baghdad, Sahaf continued to insist that
U.S. troops had been "slaughtered," and
"driven out of the country." When U.S.
troops were literally within blocks of
his Baghdad location, Sahaf confidently
told reporters that American troops were
not within 100 miles of Baghdad. Belief
in Sahaf's assurances and boasts about
the power of the Iraqi army (once the
third largest ground force in the world)
engendered shock and surprise among some
viewers of Al-Jazeera and other Arab
news outlets when the Iraqi government
abruptly collapsed soon afterward.

Although coalition forces ultimately
managed a quick and decisive military
victory, the effects of the differing
perspectives in news coverage may take
years to fully determine.

Given the demanding pace of
round-the-clock media coverage,
operational pauses for rest or
logistical resupply by coalition forces
often led to open speculation as to
whether coalition forces were "bogged
down." Delays caused by duststorms, and
deaths caused by suicide bombers
attacking checkpoints caused some
commentators to openly speculate that
America was getting involved in "another
Vietnam-like quagmire" or that the war
could stretch on for many months,
perhaps years.

The use of fewer troops than used in the
Gulf War also drew criticism. The war
plan was a test of a new policy of
smaller force deployments. Advocates of
the lighter force concept argued that
mobility, precision weapons, and
real-time integration of intelligence
information acted as "force
multipliers." Pentagon or war plan
critics contended that the U.S. had not
deployed adequate ground troops to
ensure maximum safety for both military
personnel and Iraqi civilian
populations.

Despite criticisms, within three weeks,
coalition forces toppled the Hussein
regime. The speed of attack also allowed
coalition forces to accomplish major
goals. Iraqi command and control was
virtually eliminated within hours of the
start of military operations. The Iraqis
could offer little organized resistance.
U.S., British, and Australian forces
secured both southern, and then
northern, oil fields before Hussein's
forces could set significant fires or
cause significant environmental damage
as they did during the Gulf war. The
Iraqi air force was totally destroyed or
immobilized and launched no sorties
against coalition forces. In the north,
a major terrorist facility was overrun
and destroyed.

In a battle on April 2, army and marine
troops routed the elite Iraqi Republican
Guard units about 20 miles of south of
Baghdad and a two-pronged assault on the
capital began. On April 4, U.S. troops
seized Baghdad's main airport located
just 10 miles from the center of the
city.

After brief preliminary incursions, on
April 9, U.S. forces advanced into
central Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's
government was symbolically toppled.
Carried live by global television
networks, Iraqis celebrating
liberation—with the technical assistance
of U.S. troops—pulled down a large
statue of Saddam Hussein located in
central Baghdad. Kurdish fighters and
U.S forces secured the northern cities
of Kirkuk and Mosul during the next
three days.

On April 15, U.S. marines captured
Tikrit, the ancestral home of Saddam
Hussein. After an intense bombardment,
U.S. forces encountered only sporadic
resistance as they captured what was
thought to be Hussein's last military
stronghold. Pentagon officials stated
that the main military fight in Iraq was
finished.

The speed of the American advance and
coalition determination not to be seen
as oppressive occupying powers
unfortunately resulted in a lack of
policing activities and resultant
looting. Iraqi looters and criminals
from other countries stole freely and
openly, in some cases taking valuable
artifacts and cultural treasures. The
looting, and perceived slowness in
restoration of water and electricity,
sparked anti-American protests in newly
liberated Iraq. Religious
fundamentalists also took the
opportunity afforded by liberation to
begin to organize anti-Western protests.

Nine weeks after the start of military
action against Iraq, the United Nations
Security Council—including France,
Russia, and China—overwhelmingly
approved a resolution lifting economic
sanctions against Iraq and gave its
backing to U.S.-led administration by
coalition forces until the situation in
Iraq stabilized.

The lack of success in finding massive
stockpiles of biological or chemical
weapons spurred charges that the CIA and
other Western intelligence agencies had
exaggerated reports of Iraqi
capabilities in this area. Even the
French government, one of the harshest
critics of U.S. war plans, had openly
accepted thatlarge stockpiles of
chemical and biological agents existed
in Iraq prior to the war. Although
French intelligence reports disagreed
with American and British assessments of
ongoing links between Iraq and al-Qaeda,
French Foreign Minister Dominique de
Villepin stated that his sources
nevertheless confirmed much of the
information regarding biological and
chemical weapons stockpiles reported by
U.S. and U.K. intelligence services. De
Villepin, however, dismissed CIA and
MI-6 information as common knowledge
among Western intelligence services and
therefore not a cause for immediate war.

As of May 2003, coalition teams were
continuing to explore for sites
containing weapons of mass destruction.
Although there were many preliminary
findings of illegal equipment that might
have been used to manufacture such
weapons, none had yet withstood careful
scientific scrutiny. U.S. officials
invited international inspectors to
examine specific finds (e.g., suspected
mobile biological weapons laboratories.)

UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix
subsequently concluded that Iraq may not
have had weapons of mass destruction—or
at least not on the scale previously
anticipated, and that Saddam Hussein's
evasive behavior with inspectors may
have resulted from his dictatorial need
to control information. U.S. officials
openly speculated about the possible
diversion of weapons to Syria and
accused Syria of harboring deposed Iraqi
leaders and of attempting to develop and
test chemical weapons. Syria denied the
U.S. allegations.

Leading administration officials claimed
that inspection efforts would take many
months and that the best hope of finding
weapons stockpiles would come from the
interrogation of captured Iraqi leaders
and scientists. Intelligence reports
leaked to the press also indicated that
there was evidence of massive smuggling
of materials (including possible weapons
shipments) into Syria. There was also
mounting evidence that during the
diplomatic infighting prior to the war
the French and Russian governments had
provided assistance to Iraqi leaders as
they attempted to conceal the extent of
their support of the Hussein regime.
British press reporters discovered
documents with Bin Laden's name covered
with correction fluid that, if
ultimately proved genuine, would provide
evidence of formal communications and
cooperation between the Hussein regime
and al-Qaeda.

Unarguable evidence concerning the
brutality of Hussein's regime was
provided with the discovery of mass
gravesites at Abul Kasib, Basra, Najaf,
al-Mahawil, Babylon, Muhammad Sakran,
and Kirkuk. Many of the graves contained
men, women, and children apparently
executed after failed uprisings against
Saddam Hussein. South of Baghdad, many
graves contained those executed
following the attempted Shia rebellion
that followed the Gulf War. Northern
mass graves contained the remains of
political prisoners and Kurds executed
during Hussein's policy of ethnic
cleansing.

As of May 2003 the whereabouts or fate
of Hussein and other top Iraqi leaders
remained uncertain. The U.S. abolished
the Baath Party and security
institutions of Saddam Hussein's former
regime. With Iraq occupied and
administered by coalition forces, the
U.S. removed Iraq from the list of
countries not cooperating with the fight
against terrorism.

Coalition goals and plans for the
postwar stabilization of Iraq asserted
that coalition forces would maintain
physical civil security, while
U.S.-administered government departments
regulate infrastructure and aid. Under
Coalition guidance, Iraqi citizens and
returning expatriates would be
encouraged to form a broad-based,
multi-ethnic interim Iraqi
administration that would eventually
become a self-governing Iraqi government
recognized by the international
community.

Information from Encyclopedia.com,
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