Search This Blog

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

People vs. Lacson, G.R. 149453, October 7, 2003Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar rule be applied retroactively?HELD: The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.

Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.

ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law?

HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Republic vs. Eugenio, GR 176429, Feb 14, 2008

Lilia Cheng argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

ISSUE: Can the AMLA bank inquiry order be applied into records of transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA?HELD: No ex post facto law may be enacted, and no law may be construed in such fashion as to permit a criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post facto clause. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious dispute on that point.

Get link

Facebook

Twitter

Pinterest

Google+

Email

Other Apps

Get link

Facebook

Twitter

Pinterest

Google+

Email

Other Apps

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

FACTS:Magdalena Estate, Inc. sold to Louis Myrick lotsNo. 28 and 29 of Block 1, Parcel 9 of the San JuanSubdivision, San Juan, Rizal. Their contract of saleprovides that the Price of P7,953 shall be payable in 120equal monthly installments of P96.39 each on the secondday of every month beginning the date of execution of theagreement.

In pursuance of said agreement, the vendee madeseveral payments amounting to P2,596.08, the last beingdue and unpaid was that of May 2, 1930. By reason of this,the vendor, through its president, notified the vendee that,in view of his inability to comply with the terms of theircontract, said agreement had been cancelled, relieving himof any further obligation thereunder, and that all amountspaid by him had been forfeited in favor of the vendor. Tothis communication, the vendee did not reply, and itappears likewise that the vendor thereafter did not requirehim to make any further disbursements on account of thepurchase…

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the Senate issued invit…

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS.FEDERATION OF UNITED NAMARCODISTRIBUTORS, INC.49 SCRA 238

FACTS:On November 16, 1959, the NAMARCO and theFEDERATION entered into a Contract of Sale stipulatingamong others that Two Hundred Thousand Pesos(P200,000.00) be paid as part payment, andFEDERATION deposits with the NAMARCO upon signingof the items and/or merchandise a cash basis paymentupon delivery of the duly indorsed negotiable shippingdocument covering the same. To insure payment of thegoods by the FEDERATION, the NAMARCO acceptedthree domestic letters of credit which is an accepted draftand duly executed trust receipt approved by the PhilippineNational Bank.

Upon arrival of the goods in Manila in January,1960, the NAMARCO billed FEDERATION Statement ofAccount for P277,357.91, covering shipment of the 2,000 cartons of PK Chewing Gums, 1,000 cartons of Juicy FruitChewing Gums, and 500 cartons of Adams Chicklets;Statement of Account of P135,891.32, covering shipment ofthe 168 cartons of Blue D…