The Views Expressed By The Author Are Personal

Friday, 25 April 2014

The term ‘hate
hag’, used to describe “women supporters of Narendra Modi” in an Outlook Magazine article recently gained
currency, especially on social media. Vrinda Gopinath, who authored the
article, clearly referred to three women—Madhu Kishwar, Tavleen Singh, and
Sandhya Jain—as ‘Modi’s mausis’
(Modi’s aunts). Describing these women as what“Libs call Hate Hags or
Hacks”, she states that they:

“have
swung into the national debate ever since the media’s imbalance in promoting
Modi tilted favourably towards him, feverishly affirming their faith on
television, Twitter, Facebook and in their columns. They dismiss contrarian,
inquiring views as archaic and wimpy; and club those who question them as com­m­unists,
feminists, and socialists. They’d love to be hailed as right-wing reactionaries
but are now famously known as Modi’s Mausis.”

She further explains how Kishwar—dubbed as ‘Madhu
Mausi’—“has taken her Modimania to newer heights of emotional fervour”; how
Singh “constructs ‘secularism’ as a dirty word”; and finally, Jain, who “apart
from covering [Modi’s] rallies and quoting every pearl that rolls off his
tongue…endorses Modi’s views on population control and religious demography,
and chants with Modi on ‘Third Front, Third Rate’ and other mantras”. Perhaps,
I am too quick to judge her piece (given that ‘a longer version’ of the article
appears in print). However, even by the standards of criticisms
levelled against Kishwar, or other apologists for the Sangh Parivaar,
Gopinath’s pieces resonates with the crass tone one would normally find in an
amateur, anonymous handle-led blog, and certainly not in a publication
like Outlook (However, given Manu Joseph’s equally crass piece
on the Tarun Tejpal sexual assault case, it is perhaps not so unsurprising).

While
there’s no problem in writing a sarcastic article on these women, what I found
more disconcerting was the over-judicious appropriation and usage of the term
‘hate hag’ by the anti-Modi and anti-BJP voices on social media to target
women, especially on Twitter, who are either sympathetic to the BJP and Modi,
or themselves are BJP workers. This attack on women—irrespective, or in this
case, because of their political
ideologies—I argue, is unprecedented, crass and unbecoming. In using the term
‘hate hag’ the risk is in reaffirming a notion of ‘ideal’ woman, whose
political views have to be in full agreement
with so-called liberal, secular (or religious, fundamentalist) ideal. This is
not to say that there are no contradictions whatsoever in women’s support for
the BJP, RSS, and the Sangh Parivaar—indeed, these contradictions, I think, are
irreconcilable. However, there is a difference in expressing ones disagreement
with these, and using a term that is inherently sexist, misogynistic and
demeaning to women.

In
this essay I critique the term ‘hate hag’ through three broad arguments: first,
I argue the term ‘hate hag’ is inherently sexist and misogynistic, and in using
the term to ‘shame’ women because of their political ideology, we reinstate
another form of a the medieval witch-hunt. Second, I look at the irreconcilable
contradictions in the ‘women’s question’ and the Political Right, especially in
light of the Janus-faced patriarchy that the BJP and the Sangh Parivaar
represent. Here I underscore the role played by real, symbolic and semiotic
violence that is directed against women’s bodies and ‘honour’. Finally, I
present the idea that the term ‘hate hag’ conforms to the same form of semiotic
violence that the Political Right and conservatives use to ‘shame’ women to
reaffirm a patriarchal politics. This, I argue, is creates the Orwellian Woman
as the ‘other’—that is, the notion that “some women are more equal than other
women”, when it comes to being objects of such attacks.

“‘Hate hags’? So what’s the problem? Don’t these women
deserve to be shamed anyway?”

As
expected, since its introduction, the term ‘hate hag’—not so much ‘Modi’s
Mausis’—was widely discussed, shared, and was met with both opposition and
appropriation over social media. The way this unfolded, at least on Twitter,
was interesting. On the one hand, we had the ardent anti-BJP, anti-Modi (or
pro-Congress crowd), who, quite unproblematically, appropriated the term, and
used it to deride well-known women BJP-Modi supporters on Twitter (besides the
three mentioned in Gopinath’s article). Said this Congress spokesperson:

“Hate
Hags perfect term coined by Outlook magazine for NaMo’s women supporters on
social media. Sue me now for saying this.”

Several other anti-BJP/Modi counter-propagandists have
celebrated the usage of the term because of its “shock value”. Here’s another
example:

Some have argued that “such behaviour must be shamed”
(a line of thought which could give the Khaps a run for their money).

“Attach Shame”

These counter-propagandists, it would seem, see a war
coming. “Political correctness”, they say, is of little use when “the dogs of
war are here”.

‘The Dogs of War/Political Correctness'

For these counter-propagandists, it is a case of
fighting fire with fire; of fighting hatred with hatred; countering one act of
shaming with another. They speak of “shaming” women supporters of the BJP, but
fail to see their own language as unbecoming, uncivil, and, ultimately,
regressively patriarchal. I lack the space here to undertake an archaeology of
the term ‘hate hag’. But let’s rely on the dictionary meaning of the term
‘hag’. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘hag’ as:

1. An ugly, slatternly, or evil-looking old woman;

2. Archaic

a: a female demon,

b: an evil or frightening spirit;

3. Witch

‘Cucking Stool, used in the “trial” of witches’ (Source: Wikimedia
Commons)

Thus, by its very constitution the term ‘hate hag’ is
demeaning to women, and is inherently sexist (Although,
many supporters of Modi are quite proudly, and sardonically, wearing the title
of ‘hate hag’—as was with the term ‘slut’, which led to numerous Slut Walks). By underscoring the ‘internal/external’ ugliness
(of women), people who support the term are supporting a perverted logic that
assigns ‘value’ on womanhood based on a notion of beauty/ugliness and
purity/pollution. This underscores an import point about the insidious function
of discipline/punish that’s embedded in the notion of shame and honour (I will
discuss this point in detail in the concluding segment).

‘External ugliness/internal
ugliness’

Coming back, it would seem that Gopinath’s piece, and
the so-called ‘shaming’ the counter-propagandists engage in, occupy a curious
space in this on-going tirade against women expressing their political opinion
on media. We are well aware of how journalists and activists have been
viciously abused on social media by Right-wing fanatics. A BBC Hindi report revealed
how women journalists and activists, like Sagarika Ghose, Kavita Krishnan, and
Meena Kandaswamy, who have been critical of “caste and Hindu nationalism” have
been singled out as victims of misogynistic attacks online. Ghose was abused on Twitter by right-wing chauvinists
who called her a “high-class prostitute”; Krishnan, speaking at a Rediff.com
discussion when someone with the handle @RAPIST posted abusive comments, and
asked where he could “rape her using a condom”; Kandaswamy was threatened with
“live telecasted gang-rape and being torched alive and acid
attacks”. These are among the many instances where women are abused
and humiliated online, usually by anonymous handles. While Gopinath’s piece, and the usage of the
term ‘hate hag’, does not use the abusive language of the anonymous Right-wing
troll, it still perpetuates a language of misogyny, sexism and hatred. For her
and the anti-Modi/anti-BJP crowd, these ‘Modi’s mausis’ are nothing but
apologists for the Sangh, who find fault with the “secular, liberal media” on
the one hand, and “have all been steadfastly loyal to the idea of their Hriday
Samrat, emperor of India, Narendra Modi”. Gopinath’s argument is one which
infantilizes these women for their “blind devotion” to Modi, and yet occupies
the moral high ground. But it is unclear as to what she’s based her assumptions
on. Going by her arguments, there is nothing to indicate that what people like
Kishwar, Singh and Jain write about Modi is qualitatively exceptional in its
content. Sure, Madhu Kishwar occupies a piñata-esque position, when it comes to
“Modi-worship”. Many of Singh’s columns in The Sunday Express, and
on NitiCentral are terrible excuses. And, to be honest, I
don’t know enough about Sandhya Jain to comment on her. That said, I do know
several people, of both genders, who appraise Modi—from enumerating merits in
his so-called ‘Gujarat Model’, and admire the vast and burgeoning propaganda
surrounding the man. But why single out these three women? I mean, if one is
thinking of women insofar as talking about their role in the Sangh’s
moral-political economy, there are women in the Sangh Parivaar who occupy a
more dangerous role.

The Janus-faced
patriarchy and the Women’s Question

On
the face of it, it’s not entirely inaccurate to assume that there can be
grounds for one to have sympathy with Gopinath’s piece. It is well-known that
the Political Right in India produces, harbours, and espouses misogynistic and
sexist ideologies, and, by any standard, is a text-book case of what I have
previously described
as a patriarchal moral-political economy. Women, however, occupy a more tenuous
role in this matter: Should they conform to an ideal notion of universal
feminism where they condemn all forms of misogyny and sexism?[1]
Or, does their support of individuals or ideologies put them at odds with these
so-called universal feminist ideals? Can the so-called “women’s question” be
reconciled by constructing an inner, spiritual domain, free from the trappings
of western modernity—and yet, is ‘modern’ in a more functional way?[2] If
indeed so, are Kishwar, Singh and Jain exemplary in this regard? I don’t think
so. For one, none of the three women are being castigated explicitly for
ignoring/endorsing a feminist question. In fact, Gopinath’s sole criticism
seems to be their hero-worshiping of Modi. She, it seems, couldn’t care less
about actual irreconcilable problems and contradictions between equal rights
for women, and the inherently patriarchal ideology of the Sangh Parivaar.

Before I proceed, however, let me clarify some things.
I am very definitely critical of the BJP-Sangh and Narendra Modi. I have argued
elsewhere that the BJP, RSS, and Sangh Parivaar, with Modi as its face,
represent a Janus-faced patriarchal moral-political economy, and have
underlying fascist tendencies. I have also categorically stated that apologists
for the patriarchal Sangh—and these includes women “supporters”, as well as
members of the Sangh’s women’s wing, Durga Vahini—espouse an idea that is
fundamentally inimical to the goal of achieving equal rights for women. There
are glaring contradictions in the support women give to Modi. For one, I find
it irreconcilable that one can support Modi—no matter how awesome his visions
of ‘development’ are—and not be bothered by the violence perpetrated by the Sangh
on women: be it the brutal gang-rapes of Muslim women in the 2002 post-Godhra
riots, or rapes of nuns in Kandhamal in Orissa during the anti-Christian
riots; or the Bajrang Dal’s and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s (VHP) moral
policing and beating up of women and young couples; or even the Rashtriaya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat’s claims
that “rapes happen in India, and not in Bharat”.

Thus, when Modi speaks
of the Nirbhaya case, and promises “security” for women, does he also promise
them safety from the vile, misogynistic elements within the fold of the Sangh? In
her article Gopinath doesn’t ask if we expected Modi, or his “mausis”, to speak
up after Pramod Muthalik, the Shri Ram Sene chief was inducted, and subsequently
expelled from the BJP (Muthalik and the SRS is infamous for the 2009 attack on
women in a Mangalore pub) Apparently, Muthalik
joined the BJP with the objective of “making Narendra Modi the prime
minister”. More pertinently, she does not raise any questions about other women
within the Sangh’s fold—women who do not enjoy the celebrity-like status of
Kishwar, but women who nevertheless believe in, and espouse, the ideologies of
the Sangh Parivaar, violently so, if required.

Take, for instance this clip from Nisha
Pahuja’s documentary, The World Before Her, which examines two
contrasting scapes: first, the camp of the RSS’ women’s wing, Durga Vahini, and
the assaults on women and couples in public places, and pubs (the latter by the
notorious Shri Ram Sene); and second, the selection round of the Miss India pageant.
The instructor at the Durga Vahini camp goes on record to say that women are
“biologically weaker than men”, and must, therefore, shun any hopes for gender
equality. The more shocking aspect about this “brainwashing at the VHP’s
Durga Vahini camp”, according
to Pahuja, is what Prachi, a 20 year-old trainee at the camp, has to say about
her father, (and, thus, the moral-political economy he and the RSS represent).
Says Prachi about her father:

“In
a traditional family they don’t let girl child live. They kill the child. So
this is the thing. I get angry; I have quarrels with my dad. But this thing,
when it comes in my mind, I feel like crying… he let me live. That is the best
part.”

Clearly, if we highlight the issue of women’s
rights—and, thus the contradiction of women supporting Modi and the Janus-faced
Sangh Parivaar-BJP—what Pahuja’s clip shows is more inimical to the question of
gender equality. This, evidently, is what deserves our attention, and perhaps
is worth filling column inches. Instead, what we get from Gopinath is a
pointless tirade and caricaturing of three women, who aren’t even big names in the
BJP. On Twitter itself, several counter-propagandists have highlighted several
female members/supporters of the BJP who have espoused a variety of illiberal
balderdash—from casteism, to (ironically) misogyny. Incidentally, it would
appear that the preoccupation of these counter-propagandists is to find
women who fit into the bill of the ‘hate hags’.

Before
I conclude, let me offer a clarification: While I am critical of the
contradictions between the question of violence against women perpetrated by
the Right-wing, patriarchal Hindutva organisations and the women who support
these ideologies, I am equally cautious about the risk of reducing violence
against women and misogyny to the crucible of ‘culture’. This risk is of
patronising women, and given the colonial discourse of paternalistic
intervention, there is a risk of reinstating what Gayatri Spivak has described
as “saving the brown woman from the brown man”. Anthropologist Kamala
Vishwesaran in her book Un/Common
Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference, too,
highlights this point in the case of refugee women seeking asylum to the United
States, where the lands these women come from—usually the Middle East—is seen
as inherently misogynistic, sexist and inimical to women’s freedoms. She points
that this perception draws from precisely the colonial tension Spivak
highlights, and obfuscates (if not entirely erases) the question of violence
faced by women in the west, and in United States.

Thus, to reiterate the question I asked earlier: can
there be a version of feminist thinking that emanates from the political
Right-wing Hindutva discourse that is in line with the feminist goal of equal
rights for women? By relying of the praxis of Hindutva politics in the last two
decades—and not merely on scriptures—I am inclined to say I don’t think so. I
would, very self-reflexively, say that the ideas women like Prachi and the
instructor at the Durga Vahini training camp espouse in fundamentally inimical
to the language of equal rights. They are based on an insidious logic of
demarcating, and targeting, women based on certain notions they have of the
‘other’. This is based on the double-bind disciplining function of women’s
‘emancipation’ and their ‘punishment’, which can be achieved only by conforming
to the hegemonic idea of what is deemed as appropriate in the patriarchal
moral-political economy. This is the same notion the French, and so-called
liberal western discourse has of the Muslim women. And this is at the heart of
using the term ‘hate hag’ against women supporters of Modi, and the BJP.

Conclusion: A twenty-first century witch-hunt and the
Orwellian woman

In
this essay, I have attempted to present two broad critiques of the term ‘hate
hag’, which was used target “women supporters of the BJP”. First, I argued that
the term ‘hate hag’, etymologically and discursively, is inherently sexist,
misogynistic, and demeaning to women—in this case, since it is used to target,
and ‘shame’, women because of their ideological standings. Secondly, I
stated that there are indeed several contradictions in the sexist,
misogynistic, and regressive patriarchal politics of the Sangh Parivaar, and
the RSS, and the question of equal rights for women, and their security—and,
the patina of Modi’s “development” does little to hide that fact. This also
underlines an insidious Orwellian ploy that “some women are more women than
others” and thus, the latter are more deserving of abuse, castigation, and so
on. Given these two contexts, the effect of ‘hate hags’ is exacerbated as it
functions on an insidious patriarchal logic of discipline/punishment, wherein
the woman is assigned space in the dichotomy of virtue/wickedness. In other
words, it’s perfectly alright that a particular type of woman is the object
of misogyny and sexism and violence (semiotic and/or real) since she—her
very being reduced to her appearance, or other marker (like her political
belief)—represents the other. She may be a woman, but her ‘marker’
(and that she’s casteist/sexist/bigoted etc.), makes her a less equal one.

‘The language of shaming has universal resonance in patriarchal discourse’

Admittedly, perhaps, I am overstating things,
and drawing too many conclusions. In all likelihood, like most things on
Twitter, this will probably blow over (if it hasn’t already). Unfortunately,
Vrinda Gopinath’s piece will still exist. And I will still live with the
memories of the crass, misogynistic and sexist language used by people I follow
on Twitter. Probably a good thing, too: a closet misogynist, for me, is more
dangerous than an obvious bigot.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to some
of the wonderful feminists I follow on Twitter for their interventions during
this debate; to Ketaki for a conversation we’d had long back on women and the Hindutva
Right; and, to Nolina, for her constant encouragement, love, and support. This
post originally appeared in the secular humanist website, Nirmukta.org. I would
also like to thank the editors, especially Satish, for their feedback and for
publishing it. You can access it here.

Notes

[1]
This also holds true in the case of Islam and feminism. In western liberal
circles most debates on Islam and feminism have centered round the ‘veil’, or
the hijab or burqa (these terms are used
interchangeably). However, many other scholars and academics, like Lila
Abu-Lugodh, have argued that this debate reinstates the colonial tension of
“saving the brown woman from the brown man” (to use Gayatri Spivak’s phrase),
and ignores the systemic oppression of women in Islamic regions due to
colonialism, and more recently, the ‘war on terror’. See, Lila Abu-Lugodh, ‘Do
Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological reflections on cultural
relativism and its others’, American Anthropologist104/3, 2002.
Accessed from: http://webbox.lafayette.edu/~alexya/courses/readings/Abu-Lughod_Do%20Muslim%20Women.pdf;
see also, Val Moghadam, ‘Islamic Feminism and its Discontents’, Steal This
Hijab, 8 June, 2011. Accessed from: http://stealthishijab.com/2011/06/08/islamic-feminism-and-its-discontents/

[2]
Historian and Subaltern Studies scholar Partha Chatterjee has explored this in
his essay, ‘The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question’. Chatterjee
argues that in the 19th century Bengali bourgeois nationalism,
nurtured the idea of the bhadramahila—that is, the ideal Bengali woman,
who is formally educated, but also well-versed in the traditional etiquettes of
the household. The distinction Chatterjee traces between the home and the
outside, ghar and bahir. See, Partha Chatterjee, Empire & Nation: Essential Writings
1985-2005, pp. 116-135, New
Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010.

Sunday, 26 January 2014

Note: This is an excerpt
from Ambedkar's speech made in the Constituent Assembly, on November 25th, 1949
(Constituent Assembly of India - Volume XI). The full debate can be
accessed here.

On
26th January 1950, India will be an independent country. What
would happen to her independence? Will she maintain her independence or will
she lose it again? This is the first thought that comes to my mind. It is not
that India was never an independent country. The point is that she once lost
the independence she had. Will she lose it a second time? It is this thought
which makes me most anxious for the future. What perturbs me greatly is the
fact that not only India has once before lost her independence, but she lost it
by the infidelity and treachery of some of her own people. In the invasion of
Sind by Mahommed-Bin-Kasim, the military commanders of King Dahar accepted
bribes from the agents of Mahommed-Bin-Kasim and refused to fight on the side
of their King. It was Jaichand who invited Mahommed Gohri to invade India and
fight against Prithvi Raj and promised him the help of himself and the Solanki
Kings. When Shivaji was fighting for the liberation of Hindus, the other
Maratha noblemen and the Rajput Kings were fighting the battle on the side of
Moghul Emperors. When the British were trying to destroy the Sikh Rulers, Gulab
Singh, their principal commander sat silent and did not help to save the Sikh
Kingdom. In 1857, when a large part of India had declared a war of independence
against the British, the Sikhs stood and watched the event as silent
spectators.

Will history repeat itself? It is this thought
which fills me with anxiety. This anxiety is deepened by the realization of the
fact that in addition to our old enemies in the form of castes and creeds we
are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political
creeds. Will Indian place the country above their creed or will they place
creed above country? I do not know. But this much is certain that if the
parties place creed above country, our independence will be put in jeopardy a
second time and probably be lost for ever. This eventuality we must all
resolutely guard against. We must be determined to defend our independence with
the last drop of our blood.

On the 26th of January 1950, India
would be a democratic country in the sense that India from that day would have
a government of the people, by the people and for the people. The same thought
comes to my mind. What would happen to her democratic Constitution? Will she be
able to maintain it or will she lose it again? This is the second thought that
comes to my mind and makes me as anxious as the first.

It is not that India did not know what Democracy
is. There was a time when India was studded with republics, and even where
there were monarchies, they were either elected or limited. They were never
absolute. It is not that India did not know Parliaments or Parliamentary
Procedure. A study of the Buddhist Bhikshu Sanghas discloses that not only
there were Parliaments-for the Sanghas were nothing but Parliaments – but the
Sanghas knew and observed all the rules of Parliamentary Procedure known to
modern times. They had rules regarding seating arrangements, rules regarding
Motions, Resolutions, Quorum, Whip, Counting of Votes, Voting by Ballot,
Censure Motion, Regularization, Res Judicata, etc. Although these
rules of Parliamentary Procedure were applied by the Buddha to the meetings of
the Sanghas, he must have borrowed them from the rules of the Political
Assemblies functioning in the country in his time.

This democratic system India lost. Will she lose it
a second time? I do not know. But it is quite possible in a country like India
– where democracy from its long disuse must be regarded as something quite new
– there is danger of democracy giving place to dictatorship. It is quite
possible for this new born democracy to retain its form but give place to
dictatorship in fact. If there is a landslide, the danger of the second
possibility becoming actuality is much greater.

If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in
form, but also in fact, what must we do? The first thing in my judgement we
must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and
economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution.
It means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation
and satyagraha. When there was no way left for constitutional
methods for achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of
justification for unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods
are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods.
These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are
abandoned, the better for us.

The second thing we must do is to observe the
caution which John Stuart Mill has given to all who are interested in the
maintenance of democracy, namely, not “to lay their liberties at the feet of
even a great man, or to trust him with power which enable him to subvert their
institutions”. There is nothing wrong in being grateful to great men who have
rendered life-long services to the country. But there are limits to
gratefulness. As has been well said by the Irish Patriot Daniel O'Connel, no
man can be grateful at the cost of his honour, no woman can be grateful at the
cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its liberty.
This caution is far more necessary in the case of India than in the case of any
other country. For in India, Bhakti or what may be called the path of devotion
or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the
part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in
religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or
hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.

The third thing we must do is not to be content
with mere political democracy. We must make our political democracy a social
democracy as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies, at the
base of it, social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way
of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of
life…[And] these principles…are not to be treated
as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that
to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy.
Liberty cannot be divorced from equality; equality cannot be divorced from
liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without
equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many.
Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative. Without fraternity,
liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many; without
fraternity, liberty and equality could not become a natural course of things.
It would require a constable to enforce them. We must begin by acknowledging
the fact that there is complete absence of two things in Indian Society. One of
these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India a society based on the
principle of graded inequality which we have a society in which there are some
who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty.

On the 26th of January 1950, we are
going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality
and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be
recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our
social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic
structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall
we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to
deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for
long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must
remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who
suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which
is Assembly has to laboriously built up.

The second thing we are wanting in is recognition
of the principle of fraternity. What does fraternity mean? Fraternity means a
sense of common brotherhood of all Indians – if Indians being one people. It is
the principle which gives unity and solidarity to social life. It is a
difficult thing to achieve. How difficult it is, can be realized from the story
related by James Bryce in his volume on American Commonwealth about the United
States of America.

The story is – I propose to
recount it in the words of Bryce himself – that:

“Some years ago the American
Protestant Episcopal Church was occupied at its triennial Convention in
revising its liturgy. It was thought desirable to introduce among the short
sentence prayers a prayer for the whole people, and an eminent New
England divine proposed the words `O Lord, bless our nation'. Accepted one
afternoon, on the spur of the moment, the sentence was brought up next day for
reconsideration, when so many objections were raised by the laity to the word
nation' as importing too definite a recognition of national unity, that it was
dropped, and instead there were adopted the words `O Lord, bless these United
States.”

There was so little solidarity
in the U.S.A. at the time when this incident occurred that the people of
America did not think that they were a nation. If the people of the United
States could not feel that they were a nation, how difficult it is for Indians
to think that they are a nation. I remember the days when politically-minded
Indians, resented the expression “the people of India”. They preferred the
expression “the Indian nation”. I am of opinion that in believing that we are a
nation, we are cherishing a great delusion. How can people divided into several
thousands of castes be a nation? The sooner we realize that we are not as yet a
nation in the social and psychological sense of the world, the better for us.
For then only we shall realize the necessity of becoming a nation and seriously
think of ways and means of realizing the goal. The realization of this goal is
going to be very difficult – far more difficult than it has been in the United
States. The United States has no caste problem. In India there are castes. The
castes are anti-national. In the first place, because they bring about
separation in social life. They are anti-national also because they generate
jealousy and antipathy between caste and caste. But we must overcome all these
difficulties if we wish to become a nation in reality. For fraternity can be a
fact only when there is a nation. Without fraternity equality and liberty will
be no deeper than coats of paint.

These are my reflections about
the tasks that lie ahead of us. They may not be very pleasant to some. But
there can be no gainsaying that political power in this country has too long been
the monopoly of a few and the many are only beasts of burden, but also beasts
of prey. This monopoly has not merely deprived them of their chance of
betterment, it has sapped them of what may be called the significance of life.
These down-trodden classes are tired of being governed. They are impatient to
govern themselves. This urge for self-realization in the down-trodden classes
must not be allowed to devolve into a class struggle or class war. It would
lead to a division of the House. That would indeed be a day of disaster. For,
as has been well said by Abraham Lincoln, a House divided against itself cannot
stand very long. Therefore the sooner room is made for the realization of their
aspiration, the better for the few, the better for the country, the better for
the maintenance for its independence and the better for the continuance of its
democratic structure. This can only be done by the establishment of equality
and fraternity in all spheres of life. That is why I have laid so much stresses
on them.

I do not wish to weary the House
any further. Independence is no doubt a matter of joy. But let us not forget
that this independence has thrown on us great responsibilities. By
independence, we have lost the excuse of blaming the British for anything going
wrong. If hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame except
ourselves. There is great danger of things going wrong. Times are fast
changing. People including our own are being moved by new ideologies. They are
getting tired of Government by the people. They are prepared to have
Governments for the people and are indifferent whether it is Government of the
people and by the people. If we wish to preserve the Constitution in which we
have sought to enshrine the principle of Government of the people, for the
people and by the people, let us resolve not to be tardy in the recognition of
the evils that lie across our path and which induce people to prefer Government
for the people to Government by the people, nor to be weak in our initiative to
remove them. That is the only way to serve the country. I know of no better.

Saturday, 18 January 2014

I
was walking past Azad Maidan on my way to CST when I saw something that caught
my eye. It was, as most things at Azad Maidan are, a protest. But the nature of
the protest is what intrigued me: it was a “protest against homosexuality”,
organised by Jammat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), which appraised the Supreme Court
verdict of December 11th, 2013, which effectively criminalized
consensual same-sex between adults under the archaic Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code. This wasn’t surprising since Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) has been
very vocal in its support of the Supreme
Court verdict. Against my better judgement, I decided to stay there
for a few moments, and try to understand what this “protest” was really about.
Never before, have I been in an atmosphere that was so intolerant and venomous.
I sat amidst JIH volunteers holding placards like: “GAY: God Abhors You!”,
“Homosexuals are selfish”, and “Gay rights are not human rights!” It was, also,
an atmosphere fraught with fallacies, hatred and misinformation.

Before I proceed with an overview, and criticism of the JIH “protest”,
let me clarify a few things: firstly, I write as a student of gender studies,
so my views are more concerned with JIH as representing a patriarchal ideology,
than they are as a religious organisation. There are homophobic and irrational
views across the political and religious spectrum—and most of them are as
worse, if not more, than the others. In this case, as it just so happens,
Jamaat is an Islamic organisation. In fact, they had even roped in a sadhu to
speak out against homosexuality. Secondly, in this article, my argument is
against the misinformation, lies and inaccuracies about homosexuality that the
JIH presented. Finally, this article attempts to examine how differing
ideologies (religious, political) coalesce under patriarchy and, in that
respect, it also presents a critique of such pervasive patriarchal structures.

“Homosexuality
is a Western idea; it is against Indian culture; it will lead to population
decline”

First
of all, there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that homosexuality made its
way from the West to India—even during colonialism. That India has its own
legacy of homoerotic representations in literature and art, and that there are
prominent queer themes in Hinduism, too, is entirely (and purposefully) absent
in their discourse. As Devdutt Patnaik writes:

“…homosexual activities – in some form – did exist in ancient India…its
existence was acknowledged but not approved. There was some degree of tolerance
when the act expressed itself in heterosexual terms.”

Indian “culture”, therefore, for organisations like Jamaat and the
political Right, exists purely in a rhetorical space, and is divorced from
historical facts. Their limited and myopic reading of history of the West also
fails to see the moral panic over homosexuality, even in the United States and
Britain, and Europe. As Abhay Kumar points out:

“The argument is made in such a way that Indians – both Hindus and
Muslims – are opposed to homosexuality, while Indian culture is painted as
morally sound and Western culture is morally repulsive and corrupt. The
difference between Hindus and Muslims, seen as the source of perennial
‘Hindu-Muslim’ conflicts, suddenly disappears.”

Thus, events like the persecution of homosexuals by the Third Reich, the
Stonewall riots, the assassination of Harvey Milk, Proposition 8, and the
present-day persecution of homosexuals in Russia—to state a few examples—cannot
at all figure in their interpretation of the “West”. It, like their definition
of an “Indian culture”, is an empty category to be used for political
mobilisation. In fact, what both Jamaat and the sadhu forgot
was that Section 377 is an explicitly colonial legislation, based
on Victorian morality and control over sexuality. To put it simply, had it not
been for the West and British colonialism, there would be no Section 377, and
by extension, there would be nothing for Jamaat to protest against.

Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that it is
homosexuality that’s affecting population growth in the West; and the same
would hold true for India. An examination of the population growth and total
percentage of homosexuals in the United States of America, for instance, lends
no credibility to the claims of the JIH. The population
of the USA in 1970 was 205.1 million, and in 2012 it was 313.8 million—a
population rise of approx. 65.3% in 42 years. At the same time, according
to a study
conducted by the Williams Institute in 2011, an estimated 3.5% of adults in the
USA identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual. On the other hand, as of 2013,
the contraceptive
prevalence rate in the USA is 76.4%. This, coupled with factors like
increased costs of livings, declining family size, capital-intensive labour,
and so on, have possibly contributed to a slower growth rate – and, most
definitely, not homosexuality.

“Homosexuality
is a disease; it causes AIDS; it can be cured”

As
with their earlier claims of homosexuality being a factor causing population –
and thereby, civilizational – decline, these claims of the JIH, too, are
untenable. First of all, in 1973, the American Psychological Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II) eliminated ‘homosexuality’
as a mental disorder. Through this elimination, argues Dr Robert Spitzer, who
authored the paper:

“…we will be removing one of the justifications for the denial of civil
rights to individuals whose only crime is that their sexual orientation is to
members of the same sex.”

Clearly, then, homosexuality per se is not a deviance,
or a disorder, and much less a disease (However,
the ASA’s usage of the term ‘Sexual Orientation Disturbance’, too, is extremely
problematic. But that’s an argument for another discussion). Further, questioning the givenness of gender and sexual
identities, anthropologists have presented compelling cases wherein several
indigenous cultures (and, even biology) do not conform to the binary model of
gender. Anne Fausto-Sterling, for instance, has presented a historical
overview of “intersex” identities and argues for a need to think of five
sexes, and not two. Sharyn Graham, studying the Bugis in Indonesia, too, presents a case
for five genders, as well as a ‘meta-gender identity’.

Their arguments on HIV and AIDS, too, are ill-founded. The human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is transmitted by only four means—of which,
homosexuality can account for only one, i.e., unprotected sexual
intercourse with an infected partner. It is estimated that 85 to 87% of all HIV
transmission is through unprotected sex. And while anal sex does increase the
chances of HIV transmission, it is difficult to estimate exactly how
much of it is through homosexual sex. Thus, homosexuals who have sex
without using condoms would be at no more, or less, risk of contracting HIV,
than heterosexuals who do the same.

According to the Supreme Court verdict, HIV prevalence among MSM (Men
who have sex with men) is approximately 7%, and that there are about 25 lakh
MSM in India presently. This, however, is a contested figure, as the
category of MSM does not just include gays, but also men who are married, and
do not identify themselves as homosexuals. According to the Behavioural
Sentinel Surveillance (BSS) report in 2006, “three percent” of all respondents
“indulged in sex with males in the last one year”. And, in the states with high
awareness on the issue “the involvement was also reported to be the highest”;
among these, “only one-fifth used condoms during the last occasion of sex with
a male partner” (BSS, 2006: p. xix). The BSS 2006 report on MSM further
estimates that, on an average, consistent condom use among MSM is approximately
between 35 to 36% (this includes both, with commercial and non-commercial
partners, in 10 Indian cities) (ibid, p. 42).

Thus, on a practical note, the dynamic (and dangerous) nature of HIV
transmission makes it extremely difficult to chart out an exact statistical
figure of risks. Instead, it is more feasible to understand the notion of
“risk” through vulnerabilities—that is to say: communities that are socially,
economically and culturally vulnerable are at a greater risk of contracting
HIV. By forcing the question of AIDS on only homosexuals, we run the risk of misunderstanding
how it affects other marginalised groups, like drug users, female sex
workers, AIDS widows and orphans. Furthermore, as Shivananda Khan of Naz
Foundation (one of the petitioners in the SC) argues,
factors like stigma, discrimination, violence etc. are responsible for driving
the disease underground, and these seriously harm intervention efforts that are
trying to address issues like transmission, prevention and building support
systems for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs). This persecution of
homosexuals—and, those who work on health issues of MSM—is, thus, framed under
the misguided assumption that social ostracism can deal with AIDS.

In fact, JIH wants these people to hide, and be underground—to
live in khauf (fear), as one of their speakers put it.They
said, that after the 2009 verdict, gays “came out on the street and marched
fearlessly”. This, for the JIH, is in absolute contravention of patriarchal
norms. Homosexuals, further to being persecuted, must also be deeply shamed for
being who—and, what—they are. More to the point, not only is this attitude
being deeply dehumanizing, it is, I argue, also one that seeks to entrench them
in the worldview of the dominant patriarchal discourse.

The questions that I have raised above, however, are of no concern to
the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, and other patriarchal ideologies. They are resistant
to viewing social reality, and problems, as complex; for them, the force of
their arguments comes from simplifying issues of sexuality, reducing it to a
notion of patriarchal control over bodies, and stems from the concern—or
obsession, more correctly—over control of sexuality and property rights. For
instance, their supposed “cure” for homosexuality is early marriage. In older
days, they said, people were married off precisely because this “prevented them
from getting homosexual desires”. So, for people to get these “desires” in the
first place, would not the homosexual desire be “natural” in all of us?—which
must, then, be “prevented”?

Further, they claimed: “If we legalise homosexuality today, then
tomorrow will we also legalise crime, rape, sodomy, bestiality, incest, and so
on?” Once again, the Jamaat speakers displayed their ineptitude at
understanding Section 377. In cases of rape and sodomy, insofar as there is
evidence to indicate that it was non-consensual and/or coercive, Section 377
can, in theory, be applied—and the victims of such sexual assaults could be
women, minors and even other men.The merit of the Delhi High Court verdict was
that it presented such a nuanced reading. But nuances, for Jamaat, and other
like-minded organisations, are almost incomprehensible, it would appear. In
fact, they would rather cite the “historical evidence” of the destruction of
Sodom and Gomorrah, to justify their view that homosexuality is a sin, that it
is immoral, and so on. I won’t even try providing any credible references to
refute these claims because that would only insult my intelligence, and that of
the readers’. Their entire “protest” was rife with such logical inaccuracies.
This evidently demonstrates that the JIH did not have the first clue about what
homosexuality actually entails; theirs was, from the beginning, a prejudiced
view—nothing more, nothing less. However, the crux of Jamaat’s protest, I
suspect has more to do with their desire to portray themselves as a masculine,
chauvinistic outfit, than one actually concerned with religion.

“The
government must not amend Section 377, or they will lose our votes”

I
confess, they did not use the exact same words; but, their sentiments were
apparent. Indeed, this was their primary reason for holding the “protest”. They
said, Congress ministers who are supporting the amendment of Section 377, and
thereby “decriminalising homosexuality”, should think twice about it, given the
2014 General Elections are only a few months away. There was also a vague, and
snide, speculation over Rahul Gandhi’s (prolonged) bachelorhood, and the
Congress’ desire to amend the said Section. Jamaat’s criticism of the Congress,
thus, was an implicit projection of their support for the BJP (as if the
presence of the sadhu was not enough)—whose president, Rajnath
Singh, “welcomed the Supreme Court verdict”, making their stance on
homosexuality quite clear.

Jamaat-e-Islami Hind’s intolerance of homosexuality, and its alignment
with the Hindutva Right on this, therefore, is much less a coincidence, than it
is an indication of a condition that gives them power and legitimacy in the
dominant patriarchal nature of politics in India. This kind of political
machismo and parochialism aims to ’emasculate’* a certain
section of the population, and is perhaps the most prevalent form of power-mongering
in Indian politics—the MNS’ tirade against the “north Indian migrant”; Shri Ram
Sene’s and the VHP’s assaults on women in pubs and public spaces; the violence
directed on individuals by the Khap Panchayats in the form of “honour
killings”; and, now, this renewed persecution of homosexuality. These are, all
of them, indicative of a masculine politics of domination in a system of the
patriarchal moral-political economy. Patriarchy, more than being a redundant
concept, is widespread in contemporary society, institutions, and politics in
renewed and pervasive forms. It functions on the subordination and persecution
of sexualities (and other caste, religious etc. identities), and aims to punish
the transgression of patriarchal norms.

Moreover, what I found particularly infuriating was one speaker’s
reference to Ambedkar, and how, he added, the constitution must “prevent
homosexuality from spreading”. As an admirer of Ambedkar, this statement was
offensive to me personally, and it also undermined and insulted Ambedkar’s
legacy, and all that he stood for. Ambedkar was a revolutionary—if not the most
revolutionary—thinker of 20th century India. Besides his
struggles against Brahmanical hegemony, it was Ambedkar’s Hindu Code Bill that
not only challenged Brahmanical patriarchy, but also gave civil liberties to
Hindu women, such as rights over property, divorce, and so forth (see Sharmila
Rege’s Against the Madness of Manu,
Navyana, 2013, pp. 204-243). As with the championing for the rights of
marginalised communities, the legacy of Ambedkarite political thought
underscores the contemporary struggles against the homophobia and sexism of
(patriarchal) organisations like Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, and the Hindutva
Right-wing. Homosexuality—as with giving property rights to women—is precisely
the target of such masculine politics of domination, because it deeply
unsettles the notion of power that comes to be defined in terms of, and gains
privilege from, a hegemonic masculinity.

By the end of the “protest”, I wanted to speak out, and question their
claims.

But, to be really honest, I could not take that suffocating and venomous
atmosphere anymore. I left. And then, I Tweeted this whole incident—a pointless
exercise, really. Not entirely because I failed to say this to the JIH
“protestors”; but because they—like other organisations are trying to assert a
patriarchal moral superiority—did not possess the acumen or sophistication to
engage in any kind of debate, especially one that would undermine their
masculine imagery. Their attack on homosexuals is an empty exercise to gain
masculine capital in a patriarchal moral-political economy. To conclude,
therefore, Jamaat’s “protest” was no more than a self-congratulatory exercise;
a desperate bid to keep itself—and its sense of morality and
patriarchy—relevant in a charged political scenario.

This post first appeared in the
secular humanist website, Nirmukta.org, under the title ‘Jamaat-e-Islami Hind’s
Homophobia.’ I am thankful to the editors for their feedback on the post, and
for publishing it on their platform. You can read the original post here.

Notes

* The
term “emasculation” is used here very specifically. In case of analysing
violence against homosexuals, and especially gay men, it is important to see
how entrenched patriarchal and homophobic attitudes work insidiously to deny
them a “gay” masculinity—because, that would mean the constitution of a
masculinity outside of the hegemonic and patriarchal moral-political context.
‘Masculinity’ is a reified category precisely because it is such reification
that gives it power in certain contexts. Thus, something as ubiquitous as using
the term “gay” or “faggot” as an insult, seeks to undermine (and, in more
serious cases, deny) masculinity to even (presumably) straight men, until they
conform to the notion of hegemonic masculine identity. I have explained this in
detail in an academic research paper on masculinity in the critically acclaimed
TV show, The Wire. Access it here.

Friday, 13 December 2013

There’s a line from the moviePhiladelphiathat I recollect every time I’ve
discussed homosexuality, the AIDS epidemic, legality and so on. In the movie,
as those who’ve seen it are aware, there’s ascene
in the courtroomwhere Denzel
Washington, in his cocksure, charismatic charm, says:

“Everybody’s
thinking about sexual orientation, sexual preference...whatever you want to
call it. Who does what to whom and how they do it. So let's get it out in the
open. Let's get it out of the closet. Because this case is not just about AIDS,
is it? So let's talk about what this case is really all about: The general
public's hatred, our loathing...our fear of homosexuals.”

377.Unnatural Offences: Whoever
voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man,
woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation: Penetration is
sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offense
described in this section.

The Delhi High Court’s judgement, in
decriminalizing consensual same-sex relations, thus, was truly bold and
revolutionary; and it is pertinent to quote its verdict at length:

“130. If there is
one constitutional tenet that can be said to be underlying theme of the Indian
Constitution, it is that of ‘inclusiveness’. This Court believes that Indian
Constitution reflects this value deeply ingrained in Indian society nurtured over
several generations. The inclusiveness…is manifest in recognising a role in
society for everyone. Those perceived by the majority as ‘deviants’ or
‘different’ are not on that score excluded or ostracised.”

“131. Where society can
display inclusiveness and understanding, such persons can be assured of a life
of dignity and non-discrimination…It cannot be forgotten that discrimination is
antithesis of equality and that it is the recognition of equality which will
foster the dignity of every individual.”

“132. We declare that
Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in
private, is violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution…[and] by
‘adult’ we mean everyone who is over 18 years of age and above.”

It added that the
provisions of Section 377 continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal
sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors (those below 18 years of age)
as they “would be presumed to not be able to consent to a sexual act.” This
clarification, the High Court held, will hold until Parliament chooses to amend
the law, and enact the recommendation of the172nd
Law Commission Reportwhich sought
to decriminalize homosexuality [see Section 1.2.1.Part I, (3)].

The two-member bench of
the Supreme Court, however, ruled that:“Section
377 IPC does not suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality [and]…that the
said section [377] does not suffer from constitutional infirmity.” It thus
concludes that declaration made by the Division Bench of the High court is
“legally unsustainable”, and puts the ball firmly in the legislature’s
[Parliament’s] court, stating: “Notwithstanding this verdict, the competent
legislature shall be free to consider the desirability and propriety of
deleting Section 377 IPC from the statute book or amend the same.”

It further argues that
“even after 60 years of independence, Parliament has not thought it proper to
delete or amend Section”, the section, therefore, remains valid. The Additional
Solicitor General, P.P. Malhotra, in an affidavit by the Ministry of Home
Affairs, which:

“…had opposed
decriminalisation of homosexuality and…recommended retention of Section 377 IPC
because thesocietal
disapproval thereof was very strong. [And] that the legislature, which
represents the will of the people, has decided not to delete and it is not for
the [Delhi High] Court to import the extra-ordinary moral values and thrust the
same upon the society”

It must, here, be
remembered that the Delhi High Court decriminalized homosexuality specificallywithinthe Section 377, upholding it in cases
of sexual assault – against women, children and men. However, this
‘severability’ is something which the Supreme Court didn’t agree with (read
the full judgement here).

II

Of course, in light of the Supreme Court’s
judgement, Denzel Washington’s quote fromPhiladelphiais exceedingly significant; especially
since many have dubbed the Supreme Court’s ruling as “procedural homophobia”. Others, too, have criticised it for being “regressive”
and taking us back to the 19thcentury.

My criticisms of the
Supreme Court judgement, however, are different: they are concerned with the
judgement being situated in the larger discourse of what I’ve argued is thepatriarchal moral-political economy. Although the Supreme Court’s concern is, largely,
constitutional and legal, constitutionality isnot a textual problem;it’s also a socio-political one.
The Delhi High Court verdict was revolutionaryprecisely because it helped a
social group articulate its political and social rights– and, that this social group is not
necessarily a “sexual minority”. My other concern is that there are several
logical fallacies riddled in the judgement, through which, the Supreme Court effectively
sanitizes and, thus, absolves itself of this responsibility from the larger
political movement of gender rights.

I shall elaborate on
these arguments throughout the course of this essay – and its follow up.

The Supreme Court ruling which reinstates Section
377 of the Indian Penal Code, and thereby criminalizes “voluntary” same-sex
relations between consenting adults is, to say the very least, regressive. Now,
I use the term ‘regressive’ in a very specific way: not in terms of the
judico-moral discourse of human rights, or anything, but especially as huge
setback to:

(a) The consistent work
being done by organisations in HIV/AIDS outreach activities, especially among
what is called ‘MSM’ (men who have sex with men), such as the petitioners, Naz
Foundation; and, (b) The vocal LGBT community, and other allied
organisations and social groups, like transgender communities, hijras,
and so forth, who suffer from police brutality, irrespective of the question of
law, who are equal stakeholders in this struggle.

The Supreme Court verdict
also, apart from these specific concerns, seriously undermines the women’s
movement, and the question of gender rights and equality, when it states that:

“In its anxiety to
protect the so-called rights of LGBT persons…the [Delhi] High Court has
extensively relied upon the judgments of other jurisdictions….we feel that they
cannot be applied blindfolded for deciding the constitutionality of the law
enacted by the Indian legislature.”

This is, perhaps, one of
the most regressive points in the entirety of the 98-page document – “so-called
rights”? Would the Supreme Court say that rights of women, Dalits, religious
and linguistic minorities are “so-called” rights? This violates the entire
legacy of Feminist, Dalit and other politics – and of groups, much like the
LGBT community, who have invested their faith in the judiciary; and it is this
hope which has been betrayed. My argument, thus, is that the Supreme Court
bench fails to situate the Delhi HC’s verdict in the broader context of the
gender rights; subsequently, it betrays the spirit of the makers of the
Constitution – chiefly, that of B.R. Ambedkar – who sought to include
marginalised sections of the population under the protection proffered by the
Constitution, and were given respective rights. This becomes more baffling,
seeing that the bench observed: “…in last more than 150 years less than 200
persons have been prosecuted…for committing offence under Section 377 IPC…”,
there is nothing inherently unconstitutional in the law itself (42; p. 83); and
the precedent is on the Legislature to repeal/amend the section (56.;
pp.97-98).

I will, however, keep the
above problems on the legislature, and the state, in the follow up post. In
this essay, I attempt to put the Supreme Court’s logic to the test, especially
on the concept which of “against the order of nature”, which is a predominant
theme in the court's judgement. The conceptual clarity that I seek to proffer
on this condition is embedded in the whole discourse surrounding Section 377,
which is, as Washington puts it, “our fear of homosexuals”.

III

Firstly, the cases the judgement cites, wherein
Section 377 IPC has been used to prosecute offences, were indeed brutal cases
(pp. 69-70). There’s no doubt about that: women, children, and even other men
can be, and are, victims of sexual assaults. But, a closer reading of these
verdicts reveals that the offence is not so much against the bodily integrity
of the victim, as it is against the “order of nature”.

For instance, in the
Khanu v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 286 (p. 69), wherein the accused is said to “be
guilty of having committed the sin of Gomorrah coitus per os with a certain
little child”, the case reads:

“…Is the act here
committed one of carnal intercourse? If so, it is clearly against the order of
nature,because the natural
object of carnal intercourse is that there should be the possibility of
conception of human beingswhich
in the case of coitus per os is impossible.”

Further to it, in the
Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. The State AIR 1968 Guj 252 (p. 70), the accused
had sexually assaulted the victim boy, by subjecting him to anal and oral sex:

“The question that arose
for consideration thereinwas
as to whether the insertion of the male organ by the second accused into the
orifice of the mouth of the boy amounted to an offense under Section 377 IPC.”

This verdict, based on a
definition of “reciprocity” – “the enveloping of a visiting member by the
visited organism” – which intercourse connotes, therefore was that “the act in
question amounted to an offense punishable under Section 377.” The verdict
cites other cases – one in which a boy was sexually assaulted and murdered, and
the other where oral sex was forced upon a six year old girl – and in all of
them, the prerogative was to establish is the offence “was against the order of
nature”.

In all cases cited, it is
sufficient to say that very grave and violent crimes were committed against
children. And, by all means, it is the prerogative of the courts to ensure that
the accused are given maximum punishment under the valid laws. But, does that
validate the archaic definitions embedded in Section 377 – such as
‘reciprocity’, ‘orifice’, and ‘order of nature’? Clearly, from these cases, it
would appear that the courts were more interesting in defining what exactly
constitutes offence “against the order of nature” – there is no explicit
mention of the crime violating the bodily integrity of the victim in question.
Even in its own conclusion, the Supreme Court bench observes that, despite the
idea of sexual intercourse meant for procreation being outdated, at the same
time (p. 71):

“…it could be said
without any hesitation of contradiction that the orifice of mouth is not,
according to nature, meant for sexual or carnal intercourse. Viewing from that
aspect, it could be said thatthis
act of putting a male-organ in the mouth of a victim for the purposes of satisfying
sexual appetite would be an act of carnal intercourse against the order of
nature.”

Thus, even sexual
stimulation gained by “intercourse between the thighs” is against the order of
nature (p. 73). In other words, forced oral or anal sex (viz. sexual assault)
is not a grave crime insofar as we would seek to define it in terms of
physically harming the bodily and mental integrity or personhood of the victim;
it is a crime becauseeven
if it is consensual,it
is against the order of nature.

The judgement, however,
does concede that the cases refer “to non-consensual, coercive situations…and
the keenness of the court in bringing about justice cannot be discounted while
analysing the manner in which the section has been interpreted.” However, this
justification is difficult to fathom when the court holds that (p. 77):

“Section 377 IPC does not
criminalize a particular people or identity or orientation. Itmerely identifies certain acts
which, if committed could constitute an offence. Such a prohibition regulates
sexual conduct regardless of gender identity and orientation.”

In an absence of cases
where consent can be established, the Court functions merely on the presumption
that there is a form of sexual intercourse that is normal, and not against the
“order of nature”, and sexual activity that contravenes this normalcy is, by
law, illegal and punishable. In other words, as long as people who identify as
homosexuals do not engage in sex, they cannot be criminalized – the absence of
proof (of consensual same-sex), constitutes, for the judgement,the proof of its absence.The absurdity of “the order of nature”
is foundation stone of the patriarchal moral-political economy. One of the
processes through which the moral-political economy sustains unequal relations
between and within genders, is by its definition of the dominant (hegemonic)
form of masculinity. Furthermore, as Michel Foucault argues inThe History of Sexuality, this
“new persecution of peripheral sexualities entailedan incorporation of perversionsanda
new specification of individuals…sodomy was a category of forbidden acts;
their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them” (1978:
pp. 42-43, tr. Robert Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books).

IV

There is, however, some truth to the arguments
made by the counsel – who represented the Hindu, Christian and Muslim
organisations, and the Delhi Child Rights Commission – opposing the Delhi High Court verdict,
saying that Section 377 is gender neutral, and “covers voluntary acts of carnal
intercourse against the order of natureirrespective
of the gender of the persons committing the act” (p. 22). Further:

“…[and that in] carnal
intercourse between man and man, man and woman, and woman and woman…[there is]
no constitutional right that vests in a person to indulge in an activity which
has the propensity to cause harm and any act which has the capacity to cause
harm to others cannot be validated.”

Thus, going by the above logic, Section 377 does not criminalize
only homosexuals – itcriminalizes
any individual who has it in them to indulge in desire, and pleasure outside of
heteronormative norms– thus,
rendering people as a “new specification of individuals”, as Foucault put it.
It rests on a fallacious concern for human dignity, safety and morality; but is
silent on the factthat a
great deal of violence is perpetrated on women when they are raped, in many
cases, by their own husbands,in
accordance “to the order of nature”–
which, ironically, still isn’t a crime in the law books (more on that later).
Perhaps, then, it is important for those in the gender rights movement to
articulate our unregulated right to fuck – not just the “miniscule population”
of gays, lesbians, and transgender people, but even straight, heterosexuals,
and – who knows, maybe even “thigh-fetishists”?

The arguments concerning
“against the order of nature”, thus, firmly seek to entrench patriarchal
structures. Referring back to the notion of the moral-political economy, it is
not sufficient for it to merely define the dominant category, or signifier, of
the masculine; there is a concerted need to define the intimacy of subjects so
as constitute the masculine in a sexualised process. The “order of nature” –
and this conclusion, I concede, comes rather late –is this the order of the
patriarchal moral-political economy.

V

In the next post, I shall continue my criticisms
of the Supreme Court judgement on Section 377 of the IPC, by situating them in
the broad context of gender identities, the gender rights movement, and present
a critique of the Parliament . Therein, I will attempt to unravel the
contradictions of the Supreme Court’s judgement, by arguing that reinstating
Section 377 points out the fallacies of the Indian State’s commitment to
preserving the rights of marginal groups – both, women, and the LGBT community,
have been at the receiving end of the Indian State’s apathy; and by suggesting
that the very same state legislate on Section 377, the Supreme Court’s verdict
is a historical blunder, and fails its own legacy. Moreover, the clarity I
argued for in the case against “against the order of nature”,
is pertinent in the follow up post, where I shall situate my argument,
alongside the critiques of the state, and structures of legality, in what could
be called a “politics of desire”.