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Dpparttneni of State
bulletin
Volume 84 / Number 2085 / April 1984
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
JOHN HUGHES
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
The Secretary of State ha.s determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March 31,
1987.
Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-Y(
is published monthly (plus annual index) by the
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, I
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20402
CONTENTS
The President
1 Relations With the U.S.S.R.
2 News Conference of February 22
{Excerpts)
The Vice President
5 Trip to Europe and the U.S.S.R.
The Secretary
9 The U.S. and Africa in the 1980s
12 Question-and-Answer Session Fol-
lowing World Affairs Council
Address
15 Human Rights and the Moral
Dimension of U.S. Foreign
Policy
19 Visit to Latin America
28 Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley"
30 Interview on "The MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour"
Interview
34 Under Secretary Eagleburger's
Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley"
Africa
36 U.S., Angola, South Africa Discuss
Peace (Joint Communique)
East Asia
37
Recent Situation in the Philippines
{John C. Monjo)
Europe
39 The Transatlantic Relationship:
A Long-Term Perspective
{Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
43 Death of Soviet President
Andropov {Secretary Shultz,
Wiite House Statement)
44 Assistant Secretary Burt's Inter-
view for "Worldnet"
51 Visit of Yugoslav President (Presi-
dent Reagan, Mika Spiljak)
Human Rights
53 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1983
International Law
58 Board of Appellate Review To
Publish Decisions
Middle East
59 Defense Secretary Weinberger's
Interview on "Meet the Press"
{Excerpts)
60 U.S. Forces in Lebanon {Letter to
the Congress)
61 Lebanon Cancels Agreement With
Israel (Department Statement)
62 Visit of King Hussein of Jordan
(King Hussein I, President
Reagan)
63 President Meets With Two Arab
Leaders (King Hussein I,
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak,
President Reagan)
64 Chemical Weapons and the Iran-
Iraq War (Department State-
ment)
65 U.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to
Jerusalem (Lawrence S.
Eagleburger)
Nuclear Policy
66 Nuclear Cooperation With
EUR ATOM (Letter to the
Congress)
Science & Technology
67 U.S. International Activities in
Science and Technology (Message
to the Congress)
United Nations
68 U.S. Participation in the United
Nations (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick)
Western Hemisphere
71 Central America Initiative Pro-
posed (President Reagan)
72 Central America Democracy,
Peace, and Development Initia-
tive (Langhome A. Motley)
75 Central America Initiative Legis-
lation (Message to the Congress)
77 Elections in El Salvador
(Thomas R. Pickering)
Treaties
79 Current Actions
Chronology
81 February 1984
Press Releases
84 Department of State
Publications
84 Department of State
85 GPO Subscriptions
Index
THE PRESIDENT
Relations With the U.S.S.R.
by President Reagan
Radio address to the 7iatio7i
on February 11, 198J^.^
I'd like to speak to you about a subject
always on the minds of Americans, but
of particular interest today in view of the
death of Soviet leader Yuriy
Andropov— our relations with the Soviet
Union.
Changes of leadership have not hap-
pened often in the Soviet Union. Yuriy
Andropov was only the sixth Communist
Party leader in the 66 years since the
Russian Revolution. In recent months,
he'd been totally absent from public view
so his death did not come as a shock to
the world. Nevertheless, the importance
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes his
passing away a time for reflection on
where that relationship is heading.
The changes in Moscow are an ojjpor-
tunity for both nations to examine
closely the current state of our relations
and to think about the future. We know
that our relationship is not what we
would hke it to be. We've made no
secret of our views as to the reasons
why. What is needed now is for both
sides to sit down and find ways of solv-
ing some of the problems that divide us.
In expressing my condolences to Mr.
Andropov's family and to the Soviet
Government, I emphasized once again
America's desire for genuine cooperation
between our two countries. Together we
can help make the world a better, more
peaceful place. This was also the
message for the Soviet people in my ad-
dress on Soviet-American relations last
month. In that speech, as in my private
communications with the late Chairman
Andropov, I stressed our commitment to
a serious and intensive dialogue with the
Soviet Union, one aimed at building a
more constructive U.S.-Soviet Union
relationship.
This commitment remains firm, and
Vice President Bu.sh will lead our delega-
tion to Moscow for Mr. Andropov's
funeral. He will be accompanied by
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker
and our Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur
Hartman. I hope there will be an oppor-
tunity for the Vice President to meet
with the new General Secretary.
As we engage in discussions with
Soviet leaders, we recognize the fun-
damental differences in our values and in
our perspectives on many international
issues. We must be realistic and not ex-
pect that these differences can be wished
away. But reahsm should also remind us
that our two peoples share common
bonds and interests. We are both
relatively young nations with rich ethnic
traditions and a pioneer philosophy. We
have both experienced the terrible
trauma of war. We have fought side-by-
side in the victory over Nazi Germany.
And, while our governments have very
different views, our sons and daughters
have never fought each other. We must
make sure they never do.
Avoiding war and reducing arms is a
starting point in our relationship with
the Soviet Union.
But we seek to accomplish more.
With a good-faith effort on both sides, I
believe the United States and the Soviet
Union could begin rising above the
mistrust and ill-will that cloud our rela-
tions. We could establish a basis for
greater mutual understanding and con-
structive cooperation, and there's no bet-
ter time to make that good-faith effort
than now.
At this time of transition in the
Soviet Union, our two nations should
look to the future. We should find ways
to work together to meet the challenge
of preserving peace. Living in this
nuclear age makes it imperative that we
talk to each other, discuss our dif-
ferences, and seek solutions to the many
problems that divide us.
America is ready. We would welcome
negotiations. And I repeat today what I
have said before. We're prepared to
meet the Soviets halfway in the search
foi- mutually acceptable agreements. I
hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will
5ril 1984
THE PRESIDENT
work with us in that same spirit. I invite
them to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities at hand to establish a more
stable and constructive relationship. If
the Soviet Government wants peace,
then there v^ll be peace.
In recent days, millions of citizens in-
side the Soviet Union, the United States,
and countries throughout the world have
been brought together by one great
event— the Winter Olympics. The com-
petition is fierce, and we cheer for the
men and women on our respective teams.
But we can, and should, celebrate the
triumphs of all athletes who compete in
the true spirit of sportsmanship and give
the very best of themselves.
And when each race or event is done
and our teams come together in friend-
ship, we will remember that we are
meant to be one family of nations.
We who are leaders in government
have an obligation to strive for coopera-
tion every bit as hard as our athletes
who reach within for the greatest efforts
of their lives. If the Soviet Government
would join us in this spirit, then together
we could build a safer and far better
world for the human family, not just for
today but for generations to come.
•Broadcast from Rancho del Cielo near
Santa Barbara, Calif, (text from White House
press release). ■
News Conference of February 22 (Excerpts)
Excerpts from President Reagan 's
news conference of February 22, 198Jt.^
Q. The Marines you sent to
Lebanon 17 months ago are now being
withdrawn on your orders. Considering
their inability to achieve their peace-
keeping mission and the casualties
they suffered, has the United States
lost credibility in the region? Has
Syria won? And where do we go from
here?
A. In the first place, no, I don't
think, first of all, that you can say we
have lost as yet. I know that things don't
look bright, as bright as they have at
some times in this last year and a half
since they've been there, but I think it's
time to review a little history here and
what this mission was and is.
A year and a half or so ago, we and
some of our allies— the United Kingdom,
France, and Italy— decided on this idea
of a multinational force, all of us to con-
tribute troops to go there on a stabilizing
mission, not a combat mission at all. And
I would like to recall what the situation
was. There've been five wars in the last
36 years between Syria and Israel. Israel
had crossed the Lebanese border be-
cause of ten-orist attacks across its
northern border, attacks on its civilians,
and Israel had advanced all the way to
Beirut.
There were somewhere between
10,000 and 15,000 PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] terrorists in Beirut,
and a pitched war was being fought right
there in the streets with thousands of
casualties among civilians. Syria was also
on Lebanese soil. Since 1975 Lebanon
had been fighting a kind of civil war
among its own people. There was very
little in the way of a government in
Lebanon by this time. The PLO— finally
there was an indication that they would
be willing to depart from Lebanon, but
they were fearful of stopping fighting for
fear that they would then, if tried in an
orderly way to get out, the\- would be
massacred. This, again, was one of the
reasons for our stabilizing force going in
from the four countries.
We went in with the idea that as
they left, then the other two coun-
tries—Syria and Isi-ael— could withdraw.
Then, as a government was put in place
in Lebanon— and we helped and intended
from the beginning to help them restore
their military capability not only with
weapons but with training and all— that
then, as Lebanon with a government was
able to move out into the areas that had
been occupied by Syria and Israel and
where were the factions that had been
part of the internecine warfare, the force
put in by ourselves and the allies would
have constituted behind their advance a
stabilizing force there.
That was the mission. We w^anted to
prevent a war between Syria and Israel.
It was a part and brought about by our
proposal for an overall peace settlement
in the Middle East, where we were go-
ing to try and bring, once and for all, the
Arab nations and Israel together, to do
what Egypt before them had done.
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Great progress was made in the first ,]
year. First of all, the PLO did leave. Thr^
Israelis did start a phased withdrawal
and evidenced their intention to move
back toward theu- owii borders. Syria
then reneged— having said that it would
leave— and refused to leave, even thougl^eb «'f*
they were asked by the present Govern-
ment of Lebanon. The first President
was the brother of this present Presi-
dent. He was assassinated shortly after
he took office, and a number of his
Cabinet officials were murdered. He wai4t
elected, this President, as was his
brother, under the laws of that country.
A few months ago, late summer or
early fall, because of the progress— re-
member the talks that had started in
Geneva about broadening the base of tb
government, to take in those factions
that had been fighting against Lebanon
and bring them in to be a part of the
government, so that it was broad-based
and gave every element in the country
representation. Those meetings went on
I think there was progress in that.
The Government of Lebanon then ai
rived at an agreement with Israel for
peace between them and a withdrawal c
Israel and protection of the northern
border so that the terrorist attacks that
had prompted theii- invasion would no
longer exist. As this much success came
to be, terrorist attacks began against th
members of the multinational force on
the part of those who don't want a
peaceful settlement and who don't want
a solution to the problem. And I think
this is an indication of the success that
this stabilizing force was having, that th
efforts were made and the great traged;
took place with our Marines with the
suicide attack there.
We still have an Ambassador at
Large there who is commuting among
Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv, trying
to help wherever we can in bringing
about a peaceful settlement. I have no
hesitation in saying that I have no regre
of the fact that we went in there with
the idea of trying to bring peace to that
troubled country.
We are redeploying, because once th
terrorist attacks started, there was no
way that we could really contiibute to
the original mission by staying there as
target just hunkering down and waiting
for further attacks. So, the forces have
been moved, redeployed— ours as w^ell as
others, and ours are going to be on the
vessels offshore.
But as long as there's a chance for a
peaceful solution, we're going to try andlossi
see if there's anv contribution we can fliej,
Department of State Bulletin
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THE PRESIDENT
ake to achieving that. And as long as
at chance exists, I'm not going to give
and say, "Well, it's all over." And
e're not bugging out; we're just going
a little more defensible position.
Q. You said that the terrorist at-
icks were a factor in the withdrawal.
968 that mean that terrorist attacks
46 that can succeed in the Middle
ast and elsewhere?
A. No, I said that about those who
■ged us to simply bug out and come all
e way home, and I said that that would
an admission. But I don't think that
uply redeploying to a more defensible
sition, because terrorist attacks— no
e has still found a truly foolproof
fense against these surprise attacks,
rticularly when the attackers are will-
g to give their own lives.
So, no, we're on hand. We still will
ive Marines there defending, as is
istomary of the Marines, our Embassy
id our Embassy personnel there. And
e have been discussing with the
emayel forces sending some training
ams in that have been specializing in
ings like terrorism for further training
ivalo their forces.
Q. On February 2, you told the
^all Street Journal that if we pulled
ut of Lebanon, it would be disastrous
!sults worldwide for us. And you also
iid you weren't going to cut and run
k'en though there is a widespread
erception that that's what we're do-
ig. Do you think we will have now
isastrous results worldwide because of
lis pullout?
A. I don't think so, because I think
lat those people who make decisions
nd so forth, and who have to make
nem based on what is going on, they're
ot going to see this as cutting and run-
ing, because, as I say, they are on the
hips, and that naval task force is going
3 stay where it is. And so, I don't think
hat they're going to view this in the
isastrous way that I had— because when
was speaking then, I was talking in
eply to those who were urging us to
ust pick up and go home without any
egard to whether our allies were going
do the same thing or not. We've
tayed in consultation with them. We're
cting together and in sync with them.
Q. Under what circumstance would
'ou send the Marines back in?
A. That's a hypothetical that I don't
mow whether I could answer. Let me
ay this. If they could improve the
)Ossibility of carrying out their mission,
hen, yes, that would be a reason for
ending them in.
igrd)
etir
Q. When our Marine compound
was bombed, a lot of the parents of
those young men said that they
wondered what was the reason for the
mission, and you've tried to explain
the mission tonight. But can you say
to those parents, now that you've with-
drawn the marines to the ships, why
more than 260 young men died there?
A. I have talked to a great many of
the families— the widows, and the
parents— of the men who died there in
that one terrible holocaust, and I have
been amazed at their attitude, which was
one of complete confidence that it was a
worthwhile mission. And most of them
based that on the letters that they were
receiving from their sons and husbands,
who said they behoved in thy mission,
that they were there, that it was a
worthwhile mission. And many of them
expressed a pride in being there.
I'm sure that now some of the
younger men who are not really aware
that this is a redeployment more than a
coming home thing and have been
quoted as saying that they're sorry that
they were not able to complete their mis-
sion. I don't see their mission as being
over yet. And I don't think people
knowledgeable over there with what's
going on see it as over yet.
Q. The Secretary of State has been
one of those who is said to be very dis-
couraged and has said that in Lebanon
the light at the end of the tunnel can
be the train coming at you. Can you
tell us whether you share that dis-
couragement? And would you accept a
resignation from George Shultz, who,
some people feel, has failed in this
policy?
A. No, I wouldn't. And he has not
failed. And I have seen that talk, and I
think it's disgraceful, frankly. I think he
has done a splendid job. And I have
every confidence in the world in him.
And I hope he doesn't have any thoughts
about leaving us at this point.
The idea for the mission happened to
be mine— sitting in the Situation Room in
a meeting with all of the people who are
concerned in these affairs. And he and
our Ambassadors, beginning with Phil
Habib and then Bud McFarlane and now
Don Rumsfeld— all of these have been do-
ing a splendid job there. And we're go-
ing to continue, as I say, as long as there
is a chance.
Q. Our policy on naval shelling has
been that it's in response to attacks
against our Marines on the ground.
Now that the Marines are being with-
drawn to the safety of ships, does this
mean that there will be an end to U.S.
shelling of Lebanon?
A. There hasn't been some shelling
for quite a while. But remember, the
most recent shelling was not because of
attacks on the Marines at the ab-port; it
was because of shelling of our Embassy.
That's U.S. territory. And our Embassy
personnel for a number of days were liv-
ing in the basement. And for whatever
protection that could be— there was one
direct hit on, I think it was the
residence; I'm not sure whether it was
that or the Embassy headquarters— and
that's what we were responding to.
But we are behaving with restraint
now. We are flying reconnaissance
flights, and there have been some in-
stances of firing on them— without result,
I'm pleased to say. And we have not
responded, because we think this is a
time for restraint and for hoping to cool
things down.
Q. Did you say earlier— or suggest
earlier— that there may now be some
question about whether U.S. troops
will be sent in to train the Gemayel
government forces?
A. This has been one of the things
that we're planning. And we're watching
developments here as to when that
might be— they might be too busy right
now to be trained. We're waiting until
we can coordinate with Oiem.
Q. This week the Senate will con-
sider amendments to the Export Ad-
ministration Act. One will be to lift
the ban on the export of Alaskan oil,
allowing it to be sold to markets in the
Far East. If a change in the law were
to take place, it would reduce our
trade deficit with Japan; it would
reduce the Federal deficit by
generating some new revenues from in-
creased domestic exploration and pro-
duction; provide safer and cheaper
transportation instead of going
through the Panama Canal— and there
are many other things. Your Ad-
ministration has privately supported
this. Will you campaign aggressively
when it's being considered by Con-
gress?
A. We're still looking at and studying
this. There are still some problems about
it. And, I share the view that it would be
an asset to the United States to do this.
April 1984
Wi
THE PRESIDENT
Q. Why did you not initiate some
action sooner on withdrawing the
Marines from Beirut? And what's your
response to the people who have sug-
gested—a number of critics— that it
takes too long for you to hear the
debate between your advisers and ar-
rive at a consensus, and who ask,
therefore, whether you are, in fact,
really running things and whether you
are a full-time President? What do you
say?
A. I've read a little of the fiction
that's been going around about that,
also. I can tell you, no, there was certain
ly thorough discussion, and for a long
time, ever since the suicide bombing, as
to whether there was a way in which we
could keep our forces there, not only our
selves but, again, as I say, in sync with
the other nations' forces and that might
reduce the possibilities of and the
vulnerability from terrorist attacks.
And we were looking at eveiything.
And from the very first, one of the alter-
natives was putting them on the ships.
We held out for a while, because we
were concerned that people over there
might see that as leaving, as abandoning
the mission, and we didn't want that.
We finally did arrive in the belief
that we could do this. We talked to the
Gemayel government; we talked to our
allies; and we had made a decision that
this looked like the most logical thing to
do, a phased withdrawal to the ships,
keeping our training detachment there
that has been working with the
Lebanese Army and all. And so, it
wasn't a case of delay; it was a case of
looking at the situation and wanting to
make the right decision.
As to that other fiction about
whether I sit back and then somebody
tells me what to do: That's a lack of
understanding of how our system has
been working here. And I will admit I
don't think any Administration, to my
knowledge, has ever exactly worked
with the Cabinet and the staff the way
we have.
First of all, I think we've got one of
the finest staffs and one of the finest
Cabinets that has been in this city in
many, many years. And I want people
around me who are independent-minded.
I want to hear all sides of everything.
We have regular Cabinet meetings and
things we call the Cabinet Council
meetings, where it's a portion of the
Cabinet based on the particular issue
where it wouldn't particularly be of in-
terest to the others.
In those meetings, I hear all sides. It
could best be compared to a board of
directors or a board of regents or gover-
nors of an institution other than
business. And the debate rages, and it
isn't just limited to one Cabinet officer
who thinks that the problem is in his
particular area. I hear and get the input,
and the debate sometimes rages. It's
nice if you can get a consensus, that's
easy, but many times, I have to make a
decision in which I come down, obvi-
ously, against some of the advocates in
the Cabinet and on the side of others.
But it goes back and forth. The loser this
week may be the winner next week. But
this is the way the decisions are made.
The only difference between a board
of directors then and our Cabinet meet-
ings is, when it comes time for decision,
we don't take a vote. The decision is
mine, and I make it on the basis of the
information that I have heard. And if
they haven't given me enough infoi-ma-
tion, I make them come back again, and
we talk some more.
Q. Last week you said the Arab-
Israeli conflict must be resolved
through negotiations involving an ex-
change of territory for peace. Were
you telling Israel to reverse its settle-
ment activity in the West Bank?
A. No, from the very beginning— and
the Israelis know this— I have told them
that I thought with an effort that must
be made out there for an overall peace in
the area, that it was not helpful to go
forward with what they were doing. I
think that the peace process that we en-
vision is based on the Camp David proc-
ess, the UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
And I had never referred to them as il-
legal, as some did. But I did say that I
thought they were not helpful, because
obviously the peace process, when the
negotiations come between the Arab
States and Israel, it is going to have to
involve territorial changes in return for
secure, peaceful borders. And so, no, I
just think that we would've had a better
chance.
Q. The war between Iraq and Iran
is heating up in a rather perilous way,
and I'd like to ask what the depth of
your concerns are about the possibility
that this war would lead to the closing
of the Strait of Hormuz and cut off the
supply of oil to Japan, Western
Europe, and-ourselves, and to what
lengths you're prepared to go to keep
the strait open.
A. What you have just suggested—
Iran, itself, had voiced that threat some
time ago, that if Iraq did certain things,
they would close the Strait of Hormuz.
And I took a stand then and made a
statement that there was no way that
we— and I'm sure this is true of our
allies— could stand by and see that
sealane denied to shipping, and par-
ticularly, the tankers that are essential
to Japan, to our Western allies in
Europe, and, to a lesser e.xtent, our-
selves. We're not importing as much as
they require. But there's no way that w
could allow that channel to be closed.
And we've had a naval force for a
long time, virtually permanently sta-
tioned in the Arabian Sea, and so have
some of our allies. But we'll keep that
open to shipping.
Q. Do you have anything different ^
to say to Mr. Chernenko in Moscow f
than you had to say to his predecessor
Mr. Andropov? Anything new to en-
courage them to talk with the United
States?
A. Yes, and on the reports that the
Vice President brought back after a ver;
fruitful meeting there. We're very
hopeful in this latest announcement that
he had made that he was willing to agre^
to onsite inspection with regard to
chemical waifare. We think this is a gooi
sign, and we have let him know we want
better relations. We want to sit dowTi
and try to resolve some of the pi'oblems
that we have.
10
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 27, 1984.
Department of State Bulletin k\\
ilitlilai'•i~il::liil^lll^:^i^lilir.:^l^llil:^:mr.l^^ i'^T;..,.iiUHllll^
HE VICE PRESIDENT
Vice President's Trip
to Europe and the U.S.S.R.
Vice President Bush departed
Washington, D.C., February 10, 1984;
to visit the United Kingdom (February 11-12),
Luxembourg (February 12-13), the
Soviet Union (February 13-14), Italy
and Vatican City (February 14-15),
and France (February 15).
"Britain and America share
a common commitment to
seeking peace with the
Soviets from a position of
strength . . . to the peaceful
fostering of democratic insti-
tutions around the world . . .
to an open and stable inter-
national economic
system. ..."
London
February 12, 1984
With Prime Minister Thatcher.
photos by David Valdez)
THE VICE PRESIDENT
^
"Luxembourg is a full and proud partner in the defense of
the Western allies . . . and participates in our common deter-
mination to preserve peace through strength. ..."
Luxembourg
February 13, 1984
Standing before a portrait of Prince
Walram Von Nassau Usingen (1635-1702
in the Grand Ducal Palace are
Hereditary Grand Duke Henri, Grand
Duchess Josephine-Charlotte, Vice
President Bush, Grand Duke Jean,
Mrs. Bush, and Hereditary Grand
Duchess Maria Teresa.
r
Department of State Bulletin
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iaker,
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THE VICE PRESIDENT
'7 wish to express our condolences on the death of Chairman
Andropov . . . I have led this American delegation to Moscow
on this solemn occasion to symbolize my nation's regard for
the people of the Soviet Union and to signify the desire of the
United States to continue to work for positive relations
between our two countries."
Moscow
February 13, 1984
fitting at the left side of the table (from the
op) are U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Jnion Arthur A. Hartman, Senator Howard
Saker, Vice President Bush, and Dimitri
^rensburger, the Vice President's inter-
jreter.
'\pril 1984
Sitting at the right side of the table (from the top) are Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, a
member of the group of advisers to the General Secretary; Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko; General Secretary Konstantin U. Chemenko; Viktor Sukhodrev, the Russian in-
terpreter; and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy F. Dobrynin.
f
THE VICE PRESIDENT
HE!
"Italy's soldiers have performed their assignments in
Lebanon with restraint and with bravery, as have all
members of the multinational force. . . . After the bombing i
the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, the soldiers of Italy
and the United States worked side by side, digging feverishL
to find their comrades."
Rome
February 15, 198
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With Francesco C'ossiga, President of the
Italian Senate (top) and His Holiness Pope
John Paul H.
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"... all Americans admire
the valor of the French
troops in Beirut. French and
American soldiers have both
been the subjects of terrorist
attacks. . . . America honors
the courage of French
military men."
Paris
February 15, 1984
Left to riRht are Alec Toumayan, the Vice
President's interpreter; Vice President
Bush; Christopher Thiery, President
Mitterrand's interpreter; and President
Mitterrand.
HE SECRETARY
The U.S. and Africa in tlie 1980s
"P
iih
Secretary Shultz 's address before the
iostmi World Affairs Council on
'ehruary 1,5, 198i.^
[any Americans have images of Africa
lat are anachronistic, partial, and often
laccurate. The perception of Africa that
iost of us grew up with— unknown
nds somehow exotic and divorced from
le rest of the world— has unfortunately
srsisted in some quarters despite the
.st 25 years of Africa's independence
ad increasing presence on the world
:age. It is a misperception that ignores
impelling realities. One out of every
;ght people in the world now lives in
frica, and this proportion is growing,
frica south of the Sahara— which is my
rincipal concern this evening— is taking
n increasing importance in several
aspects.
First, we have a significant
eopolitical stake in the security of the
Dntinent and the seas surrounding it.
iff its shores lie important trade routes,
icluding those carrying most of the
nergy resources needed by our Euro-
ean allies. We are affected when
oviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to ex-
and their influence on the continent by
orce, to the detriment of both African
ndependence and Western interests.
Second, Africa is part of the global
conomic system. If Africa's economies
re in trouble, the reverberations are
elt here. Our exports to Africa have
Iropped by 50% in the last 3 years;
\.merican financial institutions have felt
he pinch of African inability to repay
loans. And Africa is a major source of
aw materials crucial to the world
'conomy.
Third, Africa is important to us
lolitically because the nations of Africa
ire now major players in world
li|il(imacy. They comprise nearly one-
bird of the membership of the United
^lations, where they form the most
ohesive voting bloc in the General
Assembly.
Finally, Africa is important to us,
Tiost of all, in human terms. Eleven per-
|;ent of America's population traces its
oots to Africa; all of us live in a society
profoundly influenced by this human and
ultural heritage. The revolution of
Africa's independence coincided with the
;ivil rights revolution in this country.
Perhaps it was not a coincidence. Both
livere among the great moral events of
etii 'April 1984
this century: a rebirth of freedom, sum-
moning all of us to a recognition of our
common humanity. Just as the continued
progress of civil rights is important to
the moral well-being of this country, so
too the human drama of Africa— its
political and economic future— is impor-
tant to the kind of world we want our
children and grandchildren to inherit.
Africa's Economic Crisis
Sub-Saharan Africa includes 45 coun-
tries with an estimated population of
nearly 400 million occupying over 9
million square miles. It is a continent of
enormous diversity. Yet today, virtually
all sub-Saharan nations are in an
economic crisis of stark proportions.
This is Africa's most urgent problem.
Per capita food production has fallen
by 20% in the last 20 years. Rapid infla-
tion has had a devastating effect. Each
African over the past 3 years has seen
his real income decrease by 2%-3% a
year. Prolonged drought has wreaked
ecological havoc across the continent,
from the western Sahel to Mozambique
in the east. Famine threatens tens of
thousands, and malnutrition debilitates
millions. Refugees number about 2
million, or one-quarter of the world's
total, with an equal number of people
displaced in their own countries by
drought, civil strife, or other hardship.
It is a vast human tragedy.
World recession has touched every
nation, but to African countries it has
dealt a body blow. Six pounds of Zam-
bian copper, for example, would buy a
barrel of oil in 1970; today it takes 43
pounds of copper per barrel. Chronic
balance-of-payments deficits— the result
of low prices for African exports coupled
with high prices for imports— have
caused mounting debt and the virtual
bankruptcy of several national treas-
uries. The skyrocketing price of oil in
the last decade distorted the economies
of the continent's few oil producers and
devastated its many petroleum im-
porters. Meanwhile, the continent's
population continues to grow at a rate of
2%-3% a year and can expect almost to
double by the year 2000.
Recovery in the United States and
other major economies will help Africa,
but it will not be enough to change the
situation fundamentally or to make
Africa less vulnerable to future buffeting
by world economic forces. This is
because some of the most important
causes of Africa's economic stagnation
are home grown. A World Bank report
states bluntly that:
The immediate and continuing economic
crisis in Africa is overwhelmingly a produc-
tion crisis. It is a crisis which has risen from
the widespead adoption of . . . inappropriate
production incentives.
Aiming at rapid development,
African countries tried to mobilize
scarce resources by relying on govern-
ment controls and state-supported indus-
trialization. But subsidies, price controls,
and other regulations have burdened na-
tional budgets and skewed the allocation
of resources. Agriculture, the backbone
of most African economies, suffered
from neglect and disincentives to expand
or to raise production. The private sec-
tor was often subjected to state inter-
ventions and, moreover, bore the brunt
of taxation to support burgeoning
bureaucracies.
In several African states, the
government payroll eats up more than
half the national budget. The cumulative
effect of an excess of government has
been stagnation instead of development.
Higher deficit spending, higher external
debt, increased urban migration, infla-
tion, and declining investment are the
results, conducive only to social and
political tensions and a deteriorating
climate for material progress.
Africa is now the weakest compon-
ent of our interdependent global
economy. Declining African markets and
growing regional insolvency are a
significant drag on global recovery, with
a particular impact on Europe. In short,
the West cannot afford— and we will not
sit idly by and watch— the accelerating
decline of Africa's economy.
The Search for Solutions
How can these awesome problems be
solved? We have to start with three
basic truths.
The first basic truth is that our
common humanity compels us to re-
spond to the specter of famine across
sub-Saharan Africa. At President
Reagan's direction, we have already pro-
vided record levels of food assistance.
We now are asking the Congress for a
supplemental $90 million in emergency
food supplies. We committed over
200,000 tons of food during the first 4
months of this fiscal year. Requests for
THE SECRETARY
an additional 150,000 tons are in hand
from African governments and requests
are expected for an equal amount this
year.
But looking to the future, there is
need to stem the long-term decline in
food production that is undermining
African economies. There is need to
boost productivity across the board.
The second basic truth, in other
words, is that nothing the United States
and other aid donors can do for Africans
will have half the impact of what
Africans can do for themselves. We will
do our part in providing assistance
where it can be effective, but without
disciplined efforts by Africans, very
little of it will be effective.
The third basic truth is just as
there are limits to what foreign govern-
ments can do, there are limits to what
national governments can do. Although
development is a complex process, the
requisites for growth are not a mystery:
Africa is likely to break out of its
stagnation only if reforms are under-
taken to restore incentives to produce.
This means allowing Africa's farmers to
receive the prices their crops command
in the market. It means letting the
private sector do what it can and con-
serving government resources for what
only it can do. It means better fiscal and
monetary management.
Fortunately, many African govern-
ments now realize both the depth of the
crisis and the sources of the problem.
Some have begun to introduce more
realistic economic policies. The Reagan
Administration intends to respond to
those who are doing so.
We have requested $1 billion for
food aid and economic assistance for
Africa in fiscal year (FY) 1985. This is a
25% increase above FY 1983. Our devel-
opment assistance programs are cast for
the long term. They are tailored to pro-
mote self-sufficiency and local initiative.
They are not designed to perpetuate on
an international scale the dependency on
government that has so added to the
problem.
New U.S. Economic Policy Initiative
Beyond this basic assistance, the Presi-
dent is proposing a new special effort:
an Economic Policy Initiative for Africa.
As we announced on January 30, we ex-
pect to ask the Congress for a 5-year,
$500-million program, beginning with
$75 milHon for FY 1985. The program
will offer tangible support for those
countries prepared to undertake the
policy reforms needed to improve pro-
ductivity. We will not allocate these
10
funds in advance, but rather we will re-
spond to constructive reforms where
and when they are undertaken.
We are asking the international com-
munity to join us. The aid-giving coun-
tries, indeed, must do a better job.
There are multiple projects and multiple
donors operating, as often as not, with
little coordination and, on occasion, ill
advisedly. More than one white elephant
plods the African landscape. We are
urging the World Bank to expand its
coordinating role among donors and to
take the lead with African governments
in evolving policy reforms.
In addition to emergency food aid,
ongoing economic assistance, and the
Economic Policy Initiative, the Adminis-
tration is planning other measures to
help Africa become a more dynamic part
of the global economic system.
• We will continue to stress private-
sector development in Africa. Where
desired, we will provide concessional
loans for African entrepreneurs; we will
offer technical assistance in adapting
laws and institutions to attract invest-
ment, preparing prefeasibility studies
for projects, and promoting awareness
of investment opportunities in Africa.
• One of Africa's greatest re-
sources—the bounty of the seas which
ring the continent— has up to now been
inadequately exploited. We plan to help
some West African countries create and
improve their fisheries management pro-
grams, including, for example, measures
to reduce the spoilage that destroys half
the fish brought ashore.
• The President has already recom-
mended to Congress that it extend the
generalized system of preferences and
exempt least developed countries from
some of the more onerous international
trade regulations. African countries
need to diversify their exports, and we
will help them do so. Trade, we hope,
will be a powerful factor for growth.
Already, the $6-billion U.S. trade deficit
with sub-Saharan Africa is acting as an
enormous contribution to African
economic expansion, far more substan-
tial than official or multilateral aid.
• We shall increase our support for
African regional economic organizations
such as the African Development Bank
and Fund.
• We will continue and expand our
multiyear food assistance programs.
These programs encourage African
governments to use the proceeds from
sales of foodstuffs to finance long-term
agricultural development, and they are
linked to policy reforms that encourage
greater local food production.
• We will participate fully in the
ICARA II conference [the second Inter-
national Conference for Assistance to
Refugees in Africa] in July of this year,
an international effort to find enduring
solutions to Africa's refugee problems.
Regional Security
Tonight, I have focused on the role we
have to play in confronting Africa's
economic crisis. But I cannot ignore the
other concerns. Africa needs stability
and an end to conflict to get on wdth the
important tasks of national develop-
ment. Many African nations face real
security' threats. New and fragile
political institutions are particularly
vulnerable. Where economies falter and
fail to provide the basics of existence
and hopes for a better future, political
instability can result. It is difficult for
democracy to flourish; authoritarian
solutions may appear more attractive
but often only serve to make problems
worse while circumscribing human and
political rights.
In this environment, outside powers
are tempted to exploit instability. There
is no excuse for some 35,000 Cuban
troops in Africa— trained, equipped,
financed, and transported by the Soviet
Union— inserting themselves into local
conflicts, and thereby internationalizing
local problems. This Soviet/Cuban med-
dling has no precedent; it distorts
Africa's nonalignment; it injects an East
West dimension where none should be,
making fair solutions harder to achieve.
We do not view Africa through the
prism of East- West rivalry'. On the othei
hand, Africa does not exist on some
other planet. It is very much a part of
today's world. Africa helps to shape the
global structure— through its economic
expansion or decline, by its weight in in-
ternational forums, through its expand-
ing web of bilateral and multilateral
links with the major powers, and
through its conflicts. At the same time,
it is shaped by the global structure— by
the shifts in the global balance of power,
by the broader marketplace of ideas and
technologies, and by the readiness of
predators and partners to contribute to
or detract from its development. We,
and Africa, ignore these facts at our
peril.
We are not the gendarmes of Africa
But to stand by and do nothing when
friendly states are threatened by our
own adversaries would only erode our
credibility as a bulwark against aggres-
sion not only in Africa but elsewhere.
Therefore, we have been ready, togetheif
Department of State Bulletir
THE SECRETARY
with others, to provide training and
arms to help our friends defend
themselves.
And we act rapidly when the situa-
tion demands. Last summer, when Chad
was again invaded by Libyan troops, we
rushed military supplies to the legiti-
mate government there and helped halt
the Libyan advance. Libya's destabiliza-
tion efforts have come to be an unfor-
tunate fact of African existence. It is an
unacceptable fact. We will continue to
work with others to help African states
resist Qadhafi's overt aggression and
covert subversion.
In West and Central Africa as well
as in the Horn— that critically important
area which sits on Africa's right
shoulder along the Red Sea— we help
our friends, and we protect our own
strategic interests. We encourage the
regional parties to seek their own
peaceful solutions to local conflicts.
We continue to emphasize, as we
should, economic and humanitarian
assistance over military aid. This year
the ratio will continue at five to one.
The Soviets, of course, provide minimal
economic assistance to sub-Saharan
Africa and rarely participate in
humanitarian relief. They seek to buy
their influence in Africa through the
provision of arms. In the past decade,
Moscow has contributed less than 1% of
Africa's foreign economic assistance but
has sold or provided 75% of its weapons.
Southern Africa
Our policy of promoting peaceful solu-
tions to regional conflicts applies, as a
priority, to southern Africa. Our
strategy in southern Africa is to work
with the parties concerned to promote
fundamental and far-reaching change in
three areas:
• To build an overall framework for
regional security;
• To bring about an independent
Namibia; and
• To encourage positive change in
the apartheid policy of South Africa
itself.
Regional security is essential
because our goals in the region are best
served by a climate of coexistence in
which the sovereignty and security of all
states are respected. Economic reform
and development, political pluralism,
removal of outside forces, peaceful
change in South Africa, and Namibian
independence are more likely to be
achieved in conditions of strengthened
security and reduced violence.
iliei
The United States has no military
bases or troops in southern Africa— and
never has. In stark contrast, Moscow
and Havana have sent nearly 25,000
Cuban troops to Angola alone, com-
pounding the problem of insecurity in
southern Africa.
Our diplomacy has not groped for
quick fixes or instant remedies to com-
plex and deeply rooted problems. Our
role is that of a catalyst, an honest
broker. We have made clear we will ex-
ert ourselves where we are welcome.
And welcome we are. Today, none of
the region's leaders— whether in Lusaka
or Pretoria, in Dar es Salaam or
Maputo— is asking that we disengage.
They all seek more, not less, American
participation in helping negotiate solu-
tions.
It is too soon to predict break-
throughs. Southern Africa today is at an
early, pioneering stage on the road of
peaceful change. The countries of the
area must build that road; no one can do
it for them. There are many bridges to
be built and deep gulfs of suspicion,
fear, and hatred to be overcome. But
there are encouraging signs. We see a
growing realism on all sides about the
risks of open-ended conflict. Military
solutions offer no hope. We detect a
welcome glimmer of recognition that
there are, indeed, common interests that
bind the states of southern Africa
together. After several years of tension
and threats, openings for peace are
being explored and developed with the
active and energetic encouragement of
the United States.
We have helped foster a dialogue,
for example, between South Africa and
Mozambique. Ours is a balanced role
whose only tilt is toward the principles
of peaceful settlement and respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty-
principles enshrined in the Charters of
the United Nations and the Organization
of African Unity. We have made clear to
both sides that our goal is to nurture
mutual security. In such a climate we
are prepared to do our part to assist in
Mozambique's development and to
bolster its chances for genuine nonalign-
ment. And we have moved swiftly to
respond to the cyclones and drought
that have repeatedly brought Mozam-
bique to the edge of disaster.
Our strengthened relationship with
Mozambique has developed against a
backdrop of concrete progress in its
dialogue with South Africa. Today,
leaders of the two countries are ham-
mering out a basis of understanding and
cooperation in the fields of security,
transport, trade, energy, and tourism.
April 1984
Let me emphasize that these are
fragile beginnings. But they symbolize
what could become a broader pattern.
We are helping to keep open existing
channels of communication or to build
new ones among other neighbors as
well— South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, and
Swaziland. We are uniquely placed to
play this facilitating role: unique among
outside powers, we are able to talk to all
the diverse elements of the region. The
broader pattern can take hold if it is
based on the perception of enhanced
security and mutual respect.
South Africa recently announced its
intent to reopen talks with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency on safe-
guard arrangements for its commercial
nuclear enrichment facilities and to
adhere to the London Supplier Group
guidelines for export of sensitive
materials. These moves flow from and
can contribute to an environment of
strengthened security. They did not hap-
pen by accident. They are the direct
result of our open and active policy of
constructive engagement.
I have mentioned our efforts to
bring about Namibian independence,
respect for borders, and the removal of
Cuban forces from Angola. These re-
main key objectives. We and our four
Western partners— Britain, France,
Canada, and Germany— working closely
with the UN Secretary General and the
parties in southern Africa have painstak-
ingly resolved, one by one, the last
issues remaining in UN Security Council
Resolution 435. That plan, when im-
plemented, will lead Namibia to in-
dependence. In parallel, we are seeking
to create conditions of greater con-
fidence and security that could trigger
the necessary decisions by Angola and
South Africa that would set the process
in motion.
Recent events suggest a clearly
positive evolution. A disengagement of
forces in southern Angola is underway.
Directly and indirectly, the key parties
are communicating ideas and proposals
to move the negotiations forward.
Having defined the agenda and served
as a catalyst, we are facilitating a step-
by-step process that could— and I em-
phasize could— \ead to further progress.
We have not yet reached a settlement.
Progress is fragile, and the situation
remains complex. Our task is to con-
solidate what has started and build
upon it in the weeks and months ahead.
This is the work of persistent, quiet
diplomacy.
11
THE SECRETARY
Our efforts for peaceful change have
not neglected South Africa's internal
policies. President Reagan has called
apartheid "repugnant." It is also a
source of tension and instability in the
whole region. Thus, we have a moral
and a practical interest in seeing the
peaceful emergence of a more equitable
system. To that end, this Administration
has sought to work with peaceful ele-
ments across the political spectrum in
South Africa in support of constructive
change.
We have not pursued this goal in a
vacuum. We have tailored our programs,
our diplomatic exchanges, and our
rhetoric to the facts. Let us be candid
with each other. Changes are oc-
curring—in black education and housing,
in labor law and trade unionism, in black
urban residency rights, in the extension
of certain political rights to the colored
and Asian communities. South Africa's
white electorate has given solid backing
to a government that defines itself as
committed to evolutionary change.
These steps are not by themselves
solutions; they reflect a series of
unilateral moves, not a process of
negotiation among South Africans. The
majority of South Africans remains
without the fundamental human right of
citizenship in their own country. Blacks
are denied national political rights and
cannot yet compete on an equal footing
in South Africa's dynamic economy. Ar-
bitrary forced removals have uprooted
long-settled communities. I could go on
with the positive and negative sides of
the balance sheet. But the fact of change
is clear.
We have no blueprint of our own for
what should replace apartheid; that is
for South Africans to work out for
themselves. But we are right to
underscore that change is imperative.
We are right to insist that all South
Africans— black, white, and colored—
participate in this process, and it is our
obligation to lend whatever support we
can to those who seek peaceful change.
And we are right to recognize that a
process of change has indeed begun,
however imperfect it may be and
however arduous it sometimes appears.
The United States has sought to
assist the process of change by en-
couraging American labor unions to
assist in the development of black labor
unions, by programs to assist black
managers and entrepreneurs, and by
promoting over $26 million in scholar-
ship assistance for young black South
Africans. We have substantially ex-
panded our support to civil and human
rights organizations. With the en-
couragement of the Congress, we are
designing new programs to strengthen
legal institutions and legal skills. And
we have backed the impressive efforts of
American businesses to provide equal
treatment and expanded opportunities
for all their workers, regardless of race.
Economic development itself is a
powerful engine for social and political
evolution. Those who advocate disinvest-
ment and economic sanctions would pull
the rug out from under those South
Africans who have taken the first con-
crete steps toward a more equal and
more equitable society.
In the West we value life, freedom,
progress, and peace; the only course
consistent with these values is to engage
ourselves as a force for constructive,
peaceful change. It is not to egg on the
forces of polarization, heightening the
tensions that could destabilize the entire
region. It is not our business to cheer
on, from the sidelines, a race war in
southern Africa— or to accelerate trends
that will inexorably bring such a conflict
about. We should recognize our limits:
we can support and encourage change,
but we cannot replace local initiative, in-
stitutions, and vision.
Tomorrow's Agenda
If I may leave you with one message, it
would be that America takes Africa and
its problems seriously. We see a direct
relationship between Africa's political
and economic stability and the health of
the Western world. We are committed
to working with our African friends, ano
with the international community, to
help Africa overcome its problems.
It is in our self-interest that we do
so. And it is morally right. It is in the
best tradition of America.
'Press release 47 of Feb. 16. 1984.
Question-and-Answer Session Following
World Affairs Council Address
Secretary Shiiltz held a question-and-
answer session with the audience at the
conclusion of his address before the
Boston World Affairs Council on
February 15, 198i.^
Q. Please share with us your personal
assessment of Mr. Chernenko and
what his incumbency will mean to
U.S. -Soviet relations, particularly with
respect to arms talks.
A. Of course, we have many write-
ups of Mr. Chernenko, but our knowl-
edge of him is limited as it is of other
Soviet leaders. He has been a part of the
Soviet leadership for a long time, has
been a part of the policies that have
evolved there, particularly in the
Brezhnev era, so the presumption is that
he is more or less in agreement with
them.
We, of course, take every oppor-
tunity—particularly one where a new
leader emerges on the scene— to express
our readiness to engage in a constructive
dialogue with the Soviet Union and to do
everything we can to solve, or at least
put into better condition, the many prob-
lems that we have between us.
The most constructive thing we can
do, I think, is to do that and be ready to
follow through on it. Our behavior, we
can have some control over. It's hard for
12
us to control theirs, but if we are there
in good faith and at the same time mind-
ful of our own interests, perhaps some-
thing worthwhile can be started.
That is the message that President
Reagan delivered himself last January,
and recognizing that there might be
some changes in the Soviet Union, he
chose to e.xpress it in a public speech so
everybody there could read it. 'That is
the message Vice President Bush took
with him to Moscow and which he
delivered in oral form and in a letter
from the President 1,0 Mr. Chernenko in
his meeting day before yesterday, I
guess it was.
Q. Why did not President Reagan
or you go to Moscow? But, beyond
that, wouldn't it be useful to have a
meeting between our President and the
Soviet leader?
A. Speaking of summitry, there was
scheduled to come to the United States
on Monday and Tuesday two of our
leading friends in the Arab world— King
Hussein of Jordan and President
Mubarak of Egypt. So the President had
to consider, among other things, whether
to engage in the rather intensive and ex-
tensive discussions we had with those
two leaders or to go to Moscow, pay his
respects, and have a 30-minute meeting,
Department of State Bulletin
i JlB
THE SECRETARY
IS it turned out, with Mr. Cheriienko. I
,hinlv the President made the right
Set :hoice.
That doesn't in any way suggest that
he isn't ready for a dialogue with the
Soviet leadership. He has expressed
himself many times as being very much
in favor of such a meeting if the work
that precedes it gives a reasonable in-
dication that something significant can be
achieved.
It is inevitable that if there is a
meeting between the President of the
United States and the Secretary General
af the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, that people's e.xpectations will be
aiK built to a very high level. I think that we
should have some idea before under-
taking such a meeting that they can be,
at least in some manner, fulfilled.
It may be very well that those condi-
tions can be created, and, if so, I'm sure
the President will have such a meeting.
He's very good at personal interaction,
and I have yet to see— I've sat in on
countless meetings with the President
and visiting heads of state— and there's a
great chaitn about President Reagan,
and also force and conviction, and he
comes across.
So if the time comes for a meeting, I
think it will be a good thing just because
of the way the President handles himself.
I might say, just in case I don't get a
question about Africa Daughter] that the
President has met with 20 heads of state
from Africa during his term of office so
far.
Q. Do you see a light at the end of
the tunnel in Lebanon? Can the pres-
ent regime of President Gemayel be
saved? And what are the expectations
of a UN force being deployed in Beirut
instead of the multinational force?
A. I hesitate, but I can't resist using
that old image that the light you see at
the end of the tunnel may be the train
coming toward you. [Laughter]
The situation in Lebanon is marked
by violence and is in no way satisfactory
and not at all what we have been trying
to help bring about. Lebanon is a coun-
try that has been beset by problems for
many, many years, magnified in the last
10 years by the presence of the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and
its terror groups and armaments,
creating a state wdthin a state. So
Lebanon is and has been a troubled land.
We hoped that there was some
chance, beginning about a year or so ago,
that something more constructive and
stable could develop, and if that were so,
then it would contribute another building
April 1984
block in the structure of stability and
peace in the Middle East. And so it was
a situation that called out for help,
literally, from them and to which we
responded.
It would be rash to say anything par-
ticularly optimistic at this point in time,
but the twists and turns in Lebanon are
such that it's very difficult to predict.
And I suppose just as you work on
things and they seem just about to jell
and then your hopes are dashed, so it is
conceivable, at least that in this unpleas-
ant juncture where we are, something
positive may develop if people just get
fed up enough with the conditions under
which they exist.
As for President Gemayel, I would
first like to pay tribute to a very
courageous individual who has under-
taken the task of presidency of a war-
torn and occupied country, where threats
to life are common and all too commonly
are effected. He's a courageous person
who is fighting hard for his country.
It is clearly important, if there is to
be a sovereign and united Lebanon, that
there be a broadened base for President
Gemayel's government, and he has been
trying to bring that about, but so far
hasn't been successful in arranging the
deals among the various leaders that
would bring this into being.
There is no question about the fact
that the violence and the strife and the
negativism, insofar as President
Gemayel's efforts, are instigated and
supported by Syria. In this sense, Syria
is the problem.
I think there are opportunities for
President Gemayel, and just in what
direction he goes and how that evolves
very much remains to be seen. It's a
tough situation. Now, your third ques-
tion?
Q. Was the replacement of the
multinational force by a UN force.
A. Our beUef is that the UN force—
and there is a force of some 6,000 or
7,000 UN troops in southern Lebanon,
basically with an inoperative mandate, a
tribute to the countries that have put up
that force that they stay with it— we
think there is an important role that the
UN force could play throughout
Lebanon. I think particularly around the
Palestinian refugee camps, because the
people in those camps are not well liked
by the surrounding population as we saw
in Sabra and Shatila. And so I think that
there's a definite role for the UN there,
and there are other things the UN force
can do in taking up positions in key posts
and so on.
Whether in that role or especially if
there is any role in Beirut, it depends
upon whether or not a situation of
stability can be created into which they
can come. It's conceivable that the
possibility that they might come can help
create that stability; nevertheless, the
UN force is not a way of eliminating it-
self but rather it's a precondition for the
UN force being able to come there.
The multinational force will un-
doubtedly be of lesser numbers on the
ground in Lebanon, in any case, as the
British have removed their forces, and
we will move our Marines onto ships,
although we have a very considerable
number of Americans who are there in
training roles and other ways of trying
to be helpful, and, of course, in maintain-
ing the security of our regular personnel
there. So there is a U.S. presence, and
that is there at this time.
Q. Does this Administration have
the courage to engage the Syrians
militarily and defeat them on the
ground in Lebanon, or will we retreat
and suffer another military defeat
[laughter].
A. Wow! The U.S. forces did not go
there to undertake a military mission.
They were not designed for that, and we
have no intention of trying to mount the
kind of military effort that it would take
to have the United States dominate
Lebanon militarily.
I don't suppose there's any doubt
that if we decided we really wanted to
do that, we could do it. But we don't
have any idea at all that that's the right
thing to do. Our forces have been there
at the urgent request of the Government
of Lebanon, originally after the
massacres at Sabra and Shatila, to
separate Beirut from the Israeli forces
and to provide some measure of security
in Beirut and around the camps in Beirut
and around the airport, and performed
that mission very well.
In recent months, it has been increas-
ingly difficult because of the factional
strife and the Syrian instigation of
violence surrounding it in which we
have, to some degree, been caught up.
But if the question is a dare, we don't
bite. It's not our intention to try to
dominate events in Lebanon or in the
Middle East by military means.
I think the history of the Middle
East is that violence— particularly the
tactics of terror that we see— have led to
nothing, only bitterness and bloodshed.
Our emphasis, on the contrary, is that it
is way past time for people to concen-
trate on political solutions and trying to
13
THE SECRETARY
work out in a peaceful way a better pat-
tern of existence for themselves. And
that is what we're trying to help out
with.
Q. President Mubarak said yester-
day we should talk to Yasir Arafat. I
think it makes sense. Don't you?
A. The conditions under which the
United States will talk to Mr. Arafat and
members of the PLO have been stated
by the President, and for that matter by
his predecessors and probably by Joe
Sisco [former Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs], many times;
namely, that if he recognizes UN Resolu-
tion 242 as the basis for a peaceful
resolution of the Palestinian issues and if
he acknowledges the right of the State of
Israel to exist, we'll be glad to talk to
him.
We share the view of Israel that it
makes no sense to talk to somebody who
states that his intention is to eliminate
the State of Israel and who has a history
of trying to employ violent means to that
end.
The United States helped bring
about the evacuation of the PLO and
Mr. Arafat from Beii-ut a little over a
year ago, and in an indirect way from
Tripoli here recently. We hear many
comments that Mr. Arafat is ready to
forego the violent solution and seek a
political action. If so, he knows what to
say in order to talk with us, and we
would welcome that kind of dialogue.
Q. What is the hope for peace in El
Salvador?
A. The fu-st hope for peace is in the
emergence of democracy and the rule (5f
law. I think those are fundamental
tenets. There is a democratically elected
Constituent Assembly, and before the
spring is over we believe there will be a
democratically elected president. At the
same time, the processes that we
associate with the rule of law have been
badly deficient in El Salvador, and in a
great many ways we have been ti-ying to
help the great majority of the people
there who want to do so construct the
basis of a judicial system that suits their
w'ays and which provides a better
measure of justice.
There have been some encouraging
signs even in recent days in this regard,
but yet there is much to be done. So I
think the first point is democracy and
the rule of law.
The second point is that there need
to be conditions under which economic
development can take place, and the bi-
partisan commission to which Henry
Kissinger gave brilliant leadership made
some vei-y potent recommendations in
that regard. That's the second thing.
I think the third thing that we must
recognize— and I know many people
don't like to recognize but it's there— you
can't have economic development, and
it's very difficult to have political reform,
when you have a guerrilla movement
supported very heavily by outside forces
trying to shoot their way in to your
government. And so I think it's essential
if we are going to place value on
democratic development and we're going
to place value and prospect on economic
development, that we also help them pro-
vide a shield of security so that these
things can flourish. And this is some-
thing that we have had great difficulty in
persuading the American people to do.
It's done not strongly enough, not with
enough certainty for those in the
Salvadoran military, but it is absolutely
essential if the main objectives that we
seek are going to be achieved. It is a
very doable proposition if we have the
clarity of view and the willpower and
strength to carry it through.
It is not in the interests of the
United States, and very much against
our vital interests, to have emerge in
Central America a system of government
akin to and allied with the Soviet Union
and Cuba. The importance of these in-
terests was stressed by the bipartisan
commission, and I think it is something
that we must take very seriously.
I know this is a very controversial
area, and I would beg of you, all of you
who are worried and interested in this,
that you take the time and the trouble to
read the report of the bipartisan commis-
sion. It's a very unusual report.
The people who made up that com-
mission started in with widely varying
views. The President didn't pick a bunch
of people who all sought the same thing;
quite the contrary. They also are people
of varying political persuasions, impor-
tant people in both the Democratic and
Republican Parties. They worked hard
on that report. Henry Kissinger really
engaged them in the process, and they
spent countless days and days on it per-
sonally. It was not a report put together
by a staff and then argued over by the
members. It was produced by the
members themselves, and they sat in the
space we allocated them in the State
Department. Many weekends I'd go
down there on a Saturday afternoon or a
Sunday morning, they'd be down there
arguing with each other. So they really
put an effort into it.
So I think given the effort they put
in and the importance of the subject, you
owe it to them to get their report and
read it.
Q. We're sponsoring a guerrilla
war against Nicaragua. The San-
dinistas have offered negotiations.
Why do we refuse to negotiate?
A. First of all, the Sandinistas have
betrayed their own revolution and have
put into place in Nicaragua a regime that
should be repugnant to us. I've had good
friends who experienced Germany in the
1930s go there and come back and say,
"I've visited many communist countries,
but Nicaragua doesn't feel like that. It
feels like Nazi Germany."
So I don't think it's any— shouldn't
be any surprise that there are a lot of
dropouts from the Sandinista revolution
who are objecting, and the Nicaraguans
are feeling the effect of their own
behavior.
Insofar as negotiations are con-
cerned, there is a negotiating process in
place. It goes under the name of the
Contadora process since it got started by
the ideas of four countries— Mexico,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama—
which met on Contadora Island, and it
engages the five Central American coun-
tries—they're all taking part— and we
think that's a good process. We think the
problem is essentially regional in nature,
and we support that process and en-
courage it, try to help it along as best we
can.
That process has produced a 21-point
set of principles, and if those principles
were adopted and made operational,
you'd have a pretty good situation. In
"the last meeting of the group, they set
out three working groups, the tasks of
which were to try to make these prin-
ciples into something operational.
Whether this process is going to
come of anything, of course, remains to
be seen, but we think that is the right
foi-um right now for these discussions to
take place among the countries con-
cerned, and we encour;jge it. Nicaragua
is part of it. and we think they ought to
engage with the others and agree to
such things as democratic pluralism,
agree to such things as having a level of
armaments that is at least half way in
keeping with defensive requii-ements and
not the huge level of armaments they
have which can only be justified if you
have offensive intentions, agi-ee to the
idea of not shipping munitions and other
supplies across borders, and so on and so
on through the 21 points. I think there's
an answer there.
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14
Department of State Bulletin
iiuummmiMaua
"''■"■""""■"""^""^
THE SECRETARY
Q. Why do we always end up on the
wrong side in Central America, in
Lebanon, in the Philippines, and else-
where in the world?
A. I think we're on the right side.
We're on the side of democracy, we're on
the side of freedom, we're on the side of
economic development. There is a fever
of democracy running through our hemi-
sphere. It's exciting. I just spent about 8
days in Central America, in South
America, in the Caribbean, and people-
particularly peopte living in countries
that have existed under dictatorship,
when you talk to them, they're so ex-
cited. Or not only in the area that I men-
tioned; take Portugal and Spain. I don't
know whether any of you have visited
and talked to people there. They're so
excited. They say, "We have freedom.
It's wonderful!"
I don't think we Americans have any
appreciation of what it means to have
freedom. It's like the air we breathe to
us, but to people who haven't had it, it's
wonderful. And by this time we can say
that in our hemisphere, there are living
under conditions of democracy or states
which are moving inexorably to democ-
racy over 90% of the population. Sticking
out like a sore thumb— Cuba, Nicaragua,
Suriname, Chile. Very different coun-
tries, but leave that to the side, it's a
pretty good picture, and we're on the
right side of these issues in sticking with
these principles.
Human Rights and the Moral
Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy
'Press release 47 of Feb. 16, 1984.
Secretary Shultz's address at the
86th annual Washington Day banquet of
the Creve Couer Club of Illinois in
Peoria on February 22, 198AJ
I would like to speak to you today about
human rights and the moral dimension
of U.S. foreign policy.
Americans have always been an in-
trospective people. Most other nations
do not go through the endless exercise
of trying to analyze themselves as we
do. We are always asking what kind of
people we are. This is probably a result
of our history. Unlike most other na-
tions, we are not defined by an ancient
common tradition or heritage or by
ethnic homogeneity. Unlike most other
countries, America is a nation conscious-
ly created and made up of men and
women from many different cultures
and origins. What unifies us is not a
common origin but a common set of
ideals: freedom, constitutional
democracy, racial and religious
tolerance. We Americans thus define
ourselves not by where we come from
but by where we are headed: our goals,
our values, our principles, which mark
the kind of society we strive to create.
This accounts in good part, I believe,
for the extraordinary vitality of this
country. Democracy is a great liberator
of the human spirit, giving free rein to
the talents and aspirations of in-
dividuals, offering every man and
woman the opportunity to realize his or
her fullest potential. This ideal of
freedom has been a beacon to im-
migrants from many lands.
We are a people that never felt
bound by the past but always had con-
fidence that we could shape our future.
We also set high standards for
ourselves. In our own society, from Jef-
ferson to Lincoln to the modern day,
there have always been keepers of our
conscience who measured our perfor-
mance against our ideals and insisted
that we do better. The revolution in civil
rights is perhaps the most dramatic re-
cent example, and it has given impetus
to other revolutions, such as in women's
rights. We are blessed with a society
that is constantly renewing and improv-
ing itself by virtue of the standards it
has set.
In foreign affairs, we do the same.
In the 19th century, when we had the
luxury of not being actively involved in
world politics, we, nevertheless, saw
ourselves as a moral example to others.
We were proud when liberators like
Simon Bolivar in Latin America or
Polish patriots in Europe invoked the
ideals of the American Revolution. In
the 20th century, since Woodrow
Wilson, we have defined our role in the
world in terms of moral principles that
we were determined to uphold and ad-
vance. We have never been comfortable
with the bare concept of maintaining the
balance of power, even though this is
clearly part of our responsibility.
Americans can be proud of the good
we have accomplished in foreign affairs.
• We have fought and sacrificed for
the freedom of others.
• We helped Europe and Japan
rebuild after World War II.
• We have given generously to pro-
mote economic development.
• We have been a haven for
refugees.
Thus, moral values and a commitment to
human dignity have been not an appen-
dage to our foreign policy but an essen-
tial part of it, and a powerful impulse
driving it. These values are the very
bonds that unite us with our closest
allies, and they are the very issues that
divide us from our adversaries. The fun-
damental difference between East and
West is not in economic or social policy,
though those policies differ radically, but
in the moral principles on which they are
based. It is the difference between
tyranny and freedom— an age-old strug-
gle in which the United States never
could, and cannot today, remain neutral.
But there has always been tension
between our ideals and the messy
realities of the world. Any foreign policy
must weave together diverse strands of
national interest: pohtical objectives,
military security, economic management.
All these other goals are important to
people's lives and well-being. They all
have moral validity, and they often con-
front us with real choices to make. As
the strongest free nation, the United
States has a complex responsibility to
help maintain international peace and
security and the global economic system.
At the same time, as one nation
among many, we do not have the power
to remake the planet. An awareness of
our limits is said to be one of the lessons
we learned from Vietnam. In any case,
THE SECRETARY
Americans are also a practical people
and are interested in producing results.
Foreign policy thus often presents us
with moral issues that are not easy to
resolve. Moral questions are more dif-
ficult to answer than other kinds of
questions, not easier. How we respond
to these dilemmas is a real test of our
maturity and also of our commitment.
Approaches to Human Rights Policy
There are several different ways of ap-
proaching human rights issues, and
some are better than others. One thing
should be clear. Human rights policy
should not be a formula for escapism or
a set of excuses for evading problems.
Human rights policy cannot mean simply
dissociating or distancing ourselves from
regimes whose practices we find defi-
cient. Too much of what passes for
friendly to us is subjected to more exact-
ing scrutiny than others; our security
ties with it are attacked; once such a
government faces an internal or external
threat, its moral defects are spotlighted
as an excuse to desert it. This is not my
view of human rights policy either.
At issue here is not so much a tac-
tical disagreement over human rights
policy but fundamentally different con-
ceptions of America and its impact on
the world. What gives passion to this
human rights debate is that it is a sur-
rogate for a more significant underlying
contest over the future of American
foreign policy.
There should be no doubt of Presi-
dent Reagan's approach— not isola-
tionism or guilt or paralysis but, on the
contrary, a commitment to active
engagement, confidently working for
There should he no doubt of President Reagan's
approach— not isolationism or guilt or paralysis but
... a commitment to active engagement, confidently
working for our values as well as our interests in the
real world, acting proudly as the champion of
freedom.
human rights policy has taken the form
of shunning those we find do not live up
to internationally accepted standards.
But this to me is a "cop-out"; it seems
more concerned with making us feel bet-
ter than with having an impact on the
situation we deplore. It is really a form
of isolationism. If some liberals advocate
cutting off relationships with right-wing
regimes— and some conservatives seek
to cut off dealings with left-wing
regimes— we could be left with practical-
ly no foreign policy at all. This is not my
idea of how to advance the cause of
human rights.
One unattractive example of this ap-
proach derives from theories of
American guilt, originating in our
domestic debate over Vietnam. There
are those eager to limit or restrain
American power because they concluded
from Vietnam that any exercise of
American power overseas was bound to
end in disaster or that America was
itself a supporter or purveyor of evil in
the world. Human rights policy was seen
by some as a way of restricting
American engagement abroad. Perverse-
ly, in this way of thinking, a government
our values as well as our interests in the
real world, acting proudly as the cham-
pion of freedom. The President has said
that "human rights means working at
problems, not walking away from them."
If we truly care about our values, we
must be engaged in their defense—
whether in Afghanistan and Poland, the
Philippines and El Salvador, or Grenada.
This is the President's philosophy: We
are proud of our country and of what it
stands for. We have confidence in our
ability to do good. We draw our inspira-
tion from the fundamental decency of
the American people. We find in our
ideals a star to steer by, as we try to
move our ship of state through the
troubled waters of a complex world.
So we consider ourselves activists in
the struggle for human rights. As the
President declared to the British Parlia-
ment on June 8, 1982: "We must be
staunch in our conviction that freedom is
not the sole prerogative of a lucky few
but the inalienable and universal right of
all human beings."
16
Goals and Techniques of
Human Rights Policy
That was philosophy. But on a daily
basis, we face practical issues and prob-
lems of human rights policy. On one
level, human rights policy aims at
specific goals. We try, for example, to
use our influence to improve judicial or
police practices in many countries— to
stop murders, to eliminate torture or
brutality, to obtain the release of
dissidents or political prisoners, to end
persecution on racial or other grounds,
to permit free emigration, and so forth.
Many American officials, including Vice
President Bush and myself, have gone to
El Salvador and denounced the death
squads not only privately but publicly-
all of which is having a positive effect.
We have sought to promote an honest
and thorough investigation of the
murder of Philippine opposition leader
Benigno Aquino.
President Reagan, during his visit to
the Republic of Korea last November,
publicly stated his belief in the impor-
tance of political liberalization. But we
have also made our thoughts on specific
cases known privately, and several of
these approaches have been successful.
In our contacts with the Soviets, we
have pressed for the release of human
rights activists and for freedom of
emigration. There are literally hundreds
of such examples of American action.
Sometimes we make progress; some-
times we do not— proving only that we
still have much to do. In this context, I
must pay tribute to your distinguished
Senator, Chuck Percy [Sen. Charles H.
Percy, R.-Ill.]. No one in the Senate has
played a more important role than
Chuck Percy in the struggle for the
right of emigration for Soviet Jewry and
other oppressed peoples, for religious
freedoms, and for the release of
prisoners of conscience.
The techniques of exerting our in-
fluence are well known. We try, without
letup, to sensitize other governments to
human rights concerns. Every year we
put on the public record a large volume
of country reports examining the prac-
tices of other countries in thorough and
candid detail— the rights of citizens to be
free from violations of the integrity of
the person and the rights of citizens to
enjoy basic civil and political liberties.
The 1984 report has just been pub-
lished—nearly 1,500 pages of facts about
human rights around the world, some-
thing no other country undertakes.
Twice each year, we also send the con-
gressional Helsinki commission a public
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
report thoroughly reviewing the record
of Soviet and East European compliance
with the human rights provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act.
Wherever feasible, we try to
ameliorate abuses through the kind of
frank diplomatic exchanges often re-
ferred to as "quiet diplomacy." But
where our positive influence is minimal,
or where other approaches are unavail-
ing, we may have no choice but to use
other, more concrete kinds of leverage
with regimes whose practices we cannot
accept.
We may deny economic and military
assistance, withhold diplomatic support,
vote against multilateral loans, refuse
licenses for crime control equipment, or
take other punitive steps. Where ap-
propriate, we resort to public pressures
and public statements denouncing such
actions as we have done in the case of
the Salvadoran death squads, Iranian
persecution of the Bahais, South African
apartheid, and Soviet repression in
Afghanistan.
Multilateral organizations are
another instrument of our human rights
policy. In the UN Commission on
Human Rights, we supported a resolu-
tion criticizing martial law in
Poland— the first resolution there
against a Communist country. The
United States has been active and
vigorous in regional conferences and
organizations, such as the Helsinki proc-
ess and the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. We regret that some
multilateral organizations have distorted
the purposes they were designed to
serve-such as UNESCO [UN Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion], which has not been living up to its
responsibility to defend freedom of
speech, intellectual freedom, and human
rights in general.
Friendly governments are often
more amenable to traditional diplomacy
than to open challenge, and we therefore
prefer persuasion over public denuncia-
tions. But if we were never seriously
concerned about human rights abuses in
friendly countries, our policy would be
one-sided and cynical.
Thus, while the Soviet Union and its
proxies present the most profound and
farreaching danger to human rights, we
cannot let it appear— falsely— that this is
our only human rights concern. It is not.
Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy
Clearly, there are limits to our ability to
remake the world. In the end, sovereign
governments will make their own deci-
sions, despite external pressure. Where
a system of government is built on
repression, human rights will inevitably
be subordinated to the perceived re-
quirements of political survival. The
sheer diversity and complexity of other
nations' internal situations, and the
problem of coping with them in a
dangerous world, are additional limits.
How we use our influence and how we
reconcile political and moral interests
are questions that call not for dogmatic
conclusions but for painstaking, sober
analysis— and no little humility.
The dilemmas we face are many.
What, for instance, is the relationship
between human rights concerns and the
considerations of regional or interna-
tional security on which the independ-
ence and freedom of so many nations
directly depend? This issue recurs in a
variety of forms.
There are countries whose internal
practices we sometimes question but
which face genuine security threats from
outside— like South Korea— or whose
cooperation with us helps protect the
security of scores of other nations— like
the Philippines. But it is also true that in
many cases a concern for human rights
on our part may be the best guarantee
of a long-term friendly relationship with
Terrorism itself is a
threat to human rights
and to the basic right to
civil peace and security
which a society owes its
citizens. We deplore all
governmental abuses of
rights, whatever the
excuse.
that country. There are countries whose
long-term security will probably be
enhanced if they have a more solid base
of popular support and domestic unity.
Yet there are also cases where regional
insecurity weakens the chances for
liberalization and where American
assurance of security support provides a
better climate for an evolution to
democracy. Human rights issues occur
in a context, and there is no simple
answer.
In the Middle East, to take a very
different example, we have no doubt of
Israel's commitment to human rights
and democratic values. It is those very
values we appeal to when we express
our concern for the human rights and
quality of life of the Palestinian people
in the West Bank and Gaza— a concern
that exists side by side with our
understanding of Israel's security needs
and our conviction that the basic prob-
lem can only be resolved through
negotiation.
Another question that arises is: Do
we know enough about the culture and
internal dynamics of other societies to
be sure of the consequence of pressures
we might bring? If we distance ourselves
from a friendly but repressive govern-
ment, in a fluid situation, will this help
strengthen forces of moderation, or
might it make things worse? Pressures
on human rights grounds against the
Shah, Somoza, or South Vietnam had
justification but may also have ac-
celerated a powerful trend of events
over which we had little influence, end-
ing up with regimes that pose a far
greater menace not only to human
rights in their own country but also to
the safety and freedom of all their
neighbors.
In some countries, harsh measures
of repression have been caused— indeed,
deliberately provoked— by terrorists,
who waged deliberate warfare not only
against the institutions of society-
political leaders, judges, administrators,
newspaper editors, as well as against
police and military officials— but against
ordinary citizens. Terrorism itself is a
threat to human rights and to the basic
right to civil peace and security which a
society owes its citizens. We deplore all
governmental abuses of rights, whatever
the excuse. But we cannot be blind to
the extremist forces that pose such a
monumental and increasing threat to
free government precisely because
democracies are not well equipped to
meet this threat. We must find lawful
and legitimate means to protect civilized
life itself from the growing problem of
terrorism.
The role of Congress is another
question. There is no doubt that con-
gressional concerns and pressures have
played a very positive role in giving im-
petus and backing to our efforts to in-
fluence other governments' behavior.
This congressional pressure can
strengthen the hand of the executive
branch in its efforts of diplomacy. At
the same time, there can be complica-
tions if the legislative instrument is too
THE SECRETARY
inflexible or heavy-handed, or, even
more, if Congress attempts to take on
the administrative responsibility for ex-
ecuting policy. Legislation requires that
we withhold aid in extreme circum-
stances. If narrowly interpreted, this
can lead us rapidly to a "stop-go" policy
of fits and starts, all or nothing— making
it very difficult to structure incentives in
thorough repression but also because of
their permanence and their global ambi-
tions. In the last decade we have seen
several military regimes and dictator-
ships of the right evolve into
democracies— from Portugal, Spain, and
Greece to Turkey and Argentina. No
Communist state has evolved in such a
manner— though Poland attempted to.
The cause of human rights is at the core of
American foreign policy because it is central to
America's conception of itself. These values are
hardly an American invention, but America has
perhaps been unique in its commitment to base its
foreign policy on the pursuit of such ideals.
a way that will really fulfill the law's
own wider mandate: to "promote and en-
courage increased respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. ..."
In the case of El Salvador, the
positive impact the Administration has
had in its recent pressures against death
squads should be a reminder that cer-
tification in its previous form is not the
only, or even the most effective, pro-
cedure for giving expression to our ob-
jectives. Sometimes a change in ap-
proach is the most worthwhile course.
We are ready to work cooperatively
with the Congress on this issue, but it
should be clear that the answers are not
simple.
Finally, the phenomenon of
totalitarianism poses special problems.
Sociologists and political theorists have
recognized for decades that there is a
difference between traditional, in-
digenous dictatorships and the more per-
vasively repressive totalitarian states,
fortified by modern technology, mass
parties, and messianic ideology. Certain-
ly, both are alien to our democratic
ideals. But in this year of George
Orwell, 1984, we cannot be oblivious to
the new 20th centrury phenomenon.
Suppression of religion because it
represents an autonomous force in a
society; abuse of psychiatric institutions
as intruments of repression; the use of
prison labor on a mass scale for industrial
construction— these and other practices
are typical of the modem Marixst-
Leninist state. Totalitarian regimes pose
special problems not only because of their
more systematic and
And the Soviet Union, most impor-
tantly and uniquely, is driven not only
by Russian history and Soviet state in-
terest but also by what remains of its
revolutionary ideology to spread its
system by force, backed up by the
greatest military power of any tyranny
in history.
I raise these issues not to assert
answers but to pose questions. These
are complexities that a truly moral na-
tion must face up to if its goal is to help
make the world a better place.
Human Rights and Democracy
The Reagan Administration approaches
the human rights question on a deeper
level. Responding to specific juridical
abuses and individual cases, as they hap-
pen, is important, but they are really the
surface of the problem we are dealing
with. The essence of the problem is the
kind of political structure that makes
human rights abuses possible. We have a
duty not only to react to specific cases
but also to understand, and seek to
shape, the basic structural conditions in
which human rights are more likely to
flourish.
This is why President Reagan has
placed so much emphasis on democracy:
on encouraging the building of pluralistic
institutions that will lead a society to
evolve toward free and democratic
forms of government. This is long-term,
positive, active strategy for human
rights policy.
It is not a Utopian idea at all. For
decades, the American labor movement
has worked hard in many countries
assisting the growth and strengthening
of free labor unions— giving support and
advice, teaching the skills of organizing
and operating. In Western Europe after
World War II, it was the free labor
unions, helped in many cases by free
unions here, that prevented Communist
parties from taking over in several coun-
tries. Today, free political parties in
Western Europe give similar fraternal
assistance to budding parties and
political groups in developing countries,
helping these institutions survive or
grow in societies where democratic pro-
cedures are not as firmly entrenched as
in our own.
The new National Endowment for
Democracy, proposed by President
Reagan and now funded with the bipar-
tisan support of the Congress,
represents an imaginative and practical
American effort to help develop the
tools of democracy. Just as our tradi-
tional aid programs try to teach
economic and agricultural skills, so our
new programs will try to transfer skills
in organizing elections, in campaigning,
in legal reform, and other skills which
we take for granted but which are basic
to free, pluralistic societies.
Through the endowment, our two
major political parties, along with labor,
business, and other private groups, will
assist countries and groups that seek to
develop democratic institutions and
practices in their own societies. The
President is also directing AID [Agency
for International Development], USIA
[U.S. Information Agency], and other
agencies to strengthen their programs
for democracy, such as support for free
labor movements, training of journalists,
and strengthening judicial institutions
and procedures. Sen. Percy also
deserves particular credit here for his
cosponsorship of the Kassebaum-Percy
Human Rights Fund for South Africa,
which will channel $1.5 million to private
and community organizations in South
Africa working for human rights.
It may not seem romantic or heroic
to train African magistrates in Zim-
babwe, provide technical help to the
Liberian Constitution Commission, help
publish a revised penal code in Zaire,
help finance the education and research
program of the Inter-American Institute
of Human Rights in Costa Rica, or help
provide international observers for free
elections in El Salvador— but these pro-
grams help create the institutional
preconditions for democracy. Democracy
and the rule of law are the only endur-
ing guarantee of human rights.
Department of State Bulletin
""■— -TB
THE SECRETARY
We should never lose faith in the
power of the democratic idea.
Democracies may be a minority in the
world at large, but it is not true that
they must always be so. Freedom is not
a culture-bound Western invention but
an aspiration of peoples every-
where—from Barbados to Botswana,
from India to Japan.
In Latin America, for example,
where the news is so much dominated
by conflict, there is, in fact, an extraor-
dinary trend toward democracy.
Twenty-seven nations of Latin America
and thf Caribbean are either democratic
or are formally embarked on a transition
to democracy— representing almost 90%
of the region's population, as compared
with some 50% less than 10 years ago.
And the trend has been accelerating.
Between 1976 and 1980, two Latin
American nations, Ecuador and Peru,
elected civilian presidents who suc-
cessfully replaced military presidents.
Since 1981, however. El Salvador, Hon-
duras, Bolivia, and most recently Argen-
tina have moved from military rule to
popularly elected civilian governments.
Brazil is far along the same path.
The people of Grenada have had
restored to them the right to be the ar-
biters of their own political future.
Uruguay has a timetable for a transition
to democracy, and its parties have
returned to independent activity.
Pressure for return to civilian rule is be-
ing felt in Chile and Guatemala. This
leaves only Cuba, a Marxist-Leninist
state; Nicaragua, which has been steadi-
ly moving in that direction; and a hand-
ful of dictatorships outside this pattern.
This trend toward democracy, which
reflects the most profound aspirations of
the people of Latin America, has re-
ceived wholehearted and effective en-
couragement from the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Dictatorship in any form,
leftist or rightist, is anathema in this
hemisphere, and all states within the
region have a responsibility to see that
dictatorship gives way to genuine
pluralist democracy.
Nor is the trend toward democracy
confined to Latin America. In the Philip-
pines, for example, the democratic tradi-
tion of that republic is evident in the
strong popular pressure for free elec-
tions and a revitalized Congress. The
government has begun to respond to
these aspirations, and we are encourag-
ing it to continue this hopeful process so
important to the long-term stability of
the Philippines. Likewise in the Republic
of Korea, we are encouraged by Presi-
dent Chun's [Doo Hwan] commitment to
April 1984
undertake in the next few years the first
peaceful, constitutional transfer of
power in Korea's modern history.
The Moral Commitment
of the United States
A policy dedicated to human rights will
always face hard choices. In El
Salvador, we are supporting the
moderates of the center, who are under
pressure from extremists of both right
and left; if we withdrew our support, the
moderates would be the victims, as
would be the cause of human rights in
that beleaguered country. The road will
be long and hard, but we cannot walk
away from our principles.
The cause of human rights is at the
core of American foreign policy because
it is central to America's conception of
itself. These values are hardly an
American invention, but America has
perhaps been unique in its commitment
to base its foreign policy on the pursuit
of such ideals. It should be an ever-
lasting source of pride to Americans
that we have used our vast power to
such noble ends. If we have sometimes
fallen short, that is not a reason to
flagellate ourselves but to remind
ourselves of how much there remains to
do.
This is what America has always
represented to other nations and other
peoples. But if we abandoned the effort,
we would not only be letting others
down, we would be letting ourselves
down.
Our human rights policy is a
pragmatic policy which aims not at strik-
ing poses but as having a practical effect
on the well-being of real people. It is a
tough-minded policy, which faces the
world as it is, not as we might wish or
imagine it to be. At the same time, it is
an idealistic policy, which expresses the
continuing commitment of the United
States to the cause of liberty and the
alleviation of suffering. It is precisely
this combination of practicality and
idealism that has marked American
statesmanship at its best. It is the par-
ticular genius of the American people.
'Press release 51 of Feb. 24, 1984.
Secretary Shultz Visits
Latin America
Secretary Shultz departed
Washington, D.C., January 31, 198Jt, to
visit El Salvador (January 31),
Venezuela (February 1-3), Brazil
(Febnmry 3-7), Grenada (Febniary 7).
and Barbados (February 7-8). He re-
turned to Washington on February 8.
Following are the Secretary's
remarks he made on various occasions
djirin.g the trip.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
SAN SALVADOR,
JAN. 31, 1984'
I wish to express my appreciation to
President Magana and his colleagues for
receiving me and for all of the informa-
tion they provided, and also for organiz-
ing the luncheon that I have just taken
part in with all six candidates for Presi-
dent. I had a chance to hear from each of
them at lunch, and I heard six eloquent
statements in support of the democratic
process, in support of the government of
El Salvador, and in support of the people
of El Salvador.
Q. Someone had asked what results
the Salvadorans [inaudible]?
A. I had a session with the Presi-
dent, the Defense Minister, and the
Foreign Minister, and we discussed the
elections, we discussed the problems of
the system of justice, the death squads.
We discussed the military situation, and
I heard about the strong efforts being
made and the improvements in the situa-
tion that seem to be taking place. We
discussed the Contadora pi'ocess, and in
the luncheon I had social conversations
with each of the candidates and then we
had a general discussion. I mentioned the
things that each candidate said— each one
spoke, and I spoke on behalf of the
United States, saying we truly believe in
the democratic process. We are not
neutral about the process; we are neutral
about the outcome. We think that the im-
portant thing is the country and that
everybody will accept whatever the ver-
dict of the people is in a fair election. We
also expressed our grief and our concern
about the recent killing of an American,
apparently by terror from the left.
19
THE SECRETARY
While in San Salvador, Secretary Shultz met with Minister of Defense Gen. Carlos Vides
Casanova (far left), President Alvaro Magana, and U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
Thomas R. Pickering (far right).
Q. Did you tell President Magana
how much money President Reagan
has [inaudible] for supplemental
military aid this year? What did the
Salvadorans say they could do with
this additional money to break the
military statement that seems to be
going on?
A. We discussed the bipartisan com-
mission and its report and the
President's support for that report,
which does project large, additional
elements of assistance to El Salvador
and other countries of Central America.
How can this be used? It is certainly
the case that a reasonable security situa-
tion is a necessary condition for economic
development, social progress, and the
emergence of the kind of political institu-
tions that everyone wants. It's a
necessary condition; those things can't
happen without security, but it isn't a
sufficient condition. And so, we support,
in our program and in our effort here, all
of those additional things that are the
essential ingredients to economic
development, and those cost money. All
elements of the program were discussed.
Q. Yesterday in Colombia, Am-
bassador Stone [Ambassador at Large
and special representative of the Presi-
dent to Central America] said that
there were problems and disagreements
with the Contadora group. What are
these disagreements, and what do they
consist of ?
A. Senator Stone is here and I looked
over at him and he shook his head, so I
think the question is on the wrong track.
Let me say, as far as the Contadora
process is concerned, we support it, we
work with it, the President supports it.
The President has appointed an out-
standing American, Senator Stone, to
help with those negotiations. We think
there is progress being made, and we
hope that that will continue and perhaps
help bring stability to this region.
Q. Did you raise the subject of the
investigation of the slayings of the
four American churehwomen and [in-
audible]?
A. We discussed those cases, and we
discussed the processes in which they
are in. Progress is being made— it is
painfully slow, but it's there. But we did
discuss each one of those cases.
Q. Are you satisfied with that
progress?
A. Of course, I would wish that
things moved faster; it's been a long
time. However, the cases are in process
and action is underway.
Q. Would it pose a problem to
American policy if Major D'Aubuisson
were elected?
20
bHHIfllililHi
A. We believe in a democratic proc-
ess, and we believe in fair and open elec-
tions. We believe that under those cir-
cumstances you accept the verdict,
whatever it may be, of the people who
do the voting.
Q. [Inaudible] of U.S. aid ending
upon the open marketplace here?
A. Are you speaking of this in-
vestigation of the 112 cases that's been
reported? I guess there are two cases in-
volved. Some AID [Agency for Interna-
tional Development] food appeared on
the marketplace yesterday and our
people went and corrected that situation
and removed it in incredibly fast action
on the part of the Ambassador.
Q. Could you describe the conversa-
tion you had with Major D'Aubuisson
today?
A. Yes, I had a perfectly straightfor-
ward discussion with him, as I did with
the other candidates, about such things
as the nature of the campaign, theii' ex-
pectations about voter turnout, and the
kind of sense of people's attitude toward
the election that they're having. In the
general session at lunch where each
Presidential candidate spoke, he as did
the others spoke in defense of the
democratic process and on behalf of the
importance of the country and its in-
terests and the interests of the people.
The United States is neutral with
respect to who wins the elections, but we
are not neutral— we are very much in
favor of the democratic process, con-
ducted in a fair and free manner, free
from coercion, open to those who choose
to run, with access by everybody to the
people, to the media, and able to express
their views and opinions and put the
issues to the voters as they choose. We
are passionately in favor of the process,
but we have no candidate in the election
as such.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
CARACAS,
FEB. 2, 1984*
Today v\e celebrate democracy in
Venezuela, mature democracy. But also,
as the President said in his stirring ad-
dress, democracy in Latin America,
democracy in our hemisphere, democracy
as a force in the world of supreme impor-
tance. The winners, of course, ai'e the
people, and I congratulate the people of
Venezuela on this great day.
Q. Do you see any role for the
United Nations in the Falklands/
Department of State Bulletin
masiiisiiiiiiaaa
THE SECRETARY
Malvinas Islands as far as the security
or replacement of the British troops in
the islands?
A. We have supported resolutions in
the United Nations and in the OAS
[Organization of American States] which
call for peaceful, negotiated solutions to
problems, including that one, and that is
our position. We hope that the parties
can work at that issue themselves.
Q. Can you tell us about the ses-
sion this morning with the four Cen-
tral American countries, what was said
in this encounter?
A. The meeting emerged sort of
spontaneously during the reception last
night as various people suggested it, and
we got it organized. Of course, that's one
of the benefits of occasions like this.
People gather together, and you have a
chance to meet and talk.
As far as the content of the discus-
sions is concerned, of course, it's up to
each country to state its own viewpoint.
I can state what I had to contribute in
the meeting, which was, first of all, the
great impression that was made on me
by the visit to El Salvador, in particular
the luncheon where I heard all six can-
didates for president give eloquent sup-
port to the democratic process. I must
say, it plays into the situation here, and
the progress of democracy in this region.
I summarized for them the way in which
the Administration is approaching the
report of the bipai-tisan commission and
our effort to encompass it together as a
package, and the plans of the President
to put this back into the process of put-
ting that package over and getting con-
gressional support for it. Of course, it is
bipartisan in its composition, the commis-
sion is, so we have good hope that it will
materialize. Of course, in the process
itself— the Contadora process— we are
now in the stage of working groups that
in a sense are seeking to transform the
general principles of the 21 points into
more operational matters, and all of the
countries which took part in the
breakfast meeting are involved in that.
We discussed that subject and its impor-
tance.
Q. Does it disturb you, does it
bother you the harder line adopted by
Saudi Arabia? Do you think that this
could erode the support that they have
for the presence of Marine troops in
Lebanon?
A. I don't know what you're talking
about. I've been busy all day and you
have been scratching around.
April 1984
Q. What happened is that the
Crown Prince spoke with a group
yesterday and said that the United
States and Israel ought to get out of
Lebanon. He said that he didn't even
know why they were there. It seems to
me that this would erode the position,
the posture of your government saying
that they need to be there to pursue
the credibility that they need to have
with the moderate Arab governments.
A. The United States is there at the
expressed urgent invitation of the
Government of Lebanon, and it stays
there at the urgent request of the
Government of Lebanon. I think it's im-
portant to remind ourselves that thei-e is
a legitimate Government of Lebanon pro-
duced out of the parliament of Lebanon
and it is that government that has asked
for our support, and we have given it.
As far as the attitudes of other coun-
tries are concerned, in the region, of
course, we've had many conversations
with the heads of government in Saudi
Arabia, .Jordan, Egypt, and so forth, and
the uniform advice we get is that we
should stay there. But we have no inten-
tion of staying there forever. We're
there to help achieve a purpose. We are
there along with the forces of many
other countries. And that purpose is to
see emerge a Lebanon that has no
foreign forces in it; no Israeli forces, not
Syrian forces, not PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] forces, not Iranian
forces, not Libyan forces, and not forces
from the MNF [multinational force].
Our objective is to create something
in Lebanon that can be peaceful and
stable, and I think that is what, from all
the indications that I've heard, the Saudi
Arabian Government wants too.
So far as the Israeli forces are con-
cerned, Israel is the one major country
with forces in the region that has ex-
plicitly agreed to withdraw totally. Now
what is needed in Lebanon is an agree-
ment for Syi'ia to withdraw as the
Government of Lebanon has asked them
to do.
Q. The Contadora group has
adopted principles that are against any
military .solution. The bipartisan com-
mission, however, has suggested that
an increase in military aid be given to
El Salvador and other countries. How
can the United States say that it con-
tinues to support Contadora?
A. The Contadora 21 principles are
comprehensive in scope just as the
recommendations of the bipartisan
Kissinger commission are comprehensive
in scope. The big point in all of this is
that there are a number of factors that
have to operate together, and if one falls
they all fall. There must be secui-ity;
there must be economic development;
there must be democi-acy and political
conditions that are humane in the way
people are treated, and access to a
legitimate judicial sy.stem. Those are the
things that are needed. If you take away
the security shield in the face of the
Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan aggression, an
effort to upset the region, then you can't
have economic development; you don't
have the kind of political system that we
are honoring here in Venzuela today; you
substitute for it a totalitarian and
repressive system. All of these things
have to go together.
Security is a necessary condition for
the objectives we seek, but it is not a
sufficient condition. We need the political
conditions, we need the economic condi-
tions that will lead to the kind of life that
people want. We must have all of these
together or else we do not achieve our
objectives.
Q. Returning to the question of the
Falklands, what is your assessment of
the suggestion made yesterday by
President Alfonsin that a UN peace
force may be sent to the islands as a
guarantee for Argentina?
A. Our position is as I stated it. We
support a peaceful resolution of disputes
of this kind, and we support a pi'ocess of
negotiations involving the British and
the Ai'gentines. As far as responses to
the suggestions that one or the other
makes, it is up to the other party to re-
spond, we will be interested observers.
Q. It is well known that the United
States supports the efforts of
Contadora in searching for peace and
stability in Central America. Would
your country agree with the idea of
having the Contadora group monitor-
ing the coming election in Nicaragua?
A. First of all, of course, there are a
lot of questions that need to be asked
about the announced elections in
Nicaragua. Under what conditions will
they be held? Will there be the kind of
structure that allows opposition political
parties to operate? Will there be freedom
of the press and access to the press by
candidates so that their positions can be
put before people? Will there be freedom
to assemble and wall political parties be
allowed to be formed and to assemble
21
THE SECRETARY
people and talk to them and urge their
support and so on? There are a whole set
of questions about the structure of any
election which are being struggled with
in other countries.
And, of course, then there is the con-
duct of the election itself, an assurance
that the election is fair, that the people
who ought to vote have the ability to do
so and that the votes are counted prop-
erly and accounted for in the proper
manner.
Whether the Contadora group as
such is a reasonable sponsoring agency
for all of these activities would be a
question mark; there are others that
have done it. But the important thing is
that if there has to be an electoral proc-
ess that it be observed not only at the
moment when people vote but also all
the preliminary aspects of it which make
an election really mean something. An
election just as an election doesn't
necessarily mean anything. There are
elections held in the Soviet Union, and
all they mean is that the idea of an elec-
tion is so powerful that even though they
don't respect it as a process, they feel
they have to use it. I think that is the
nature of the whole process that needs
observation, not just the moment of
voting.
Q. Don't you think that the deci-
sion of the United Kingdom to fortify
the Falklands/Malvinas might cause a
danger to all of Latin America, all of
South America, because the Soviet
Union might decide to respond by
building a base in Africa, on the
African coast, for example?
A. There is a dispute between the
United Kingdom and Argentina about
the Falklands. Our position is that this is
the sort of dispute that should be settled
as others, by peaceful means, and we
supported the UN and OAS resolutions
to encourage that. You can ask me that
question in any way you want, and I will
give you the same answer.
Q. There are reports in Washington
today, both from the Defense Depart-
ment and the Hill, saying that you are
the principal stumbling block in get-
ting the Marines out of Lebanon.
Would you like to comment on this?
A. The principal stumbling block in
getting the Marines out of Lebanon are
those people who seek to make it diffi-
cult to create stability in Lebanon, to im-
plement the broader governmental ar-
rangements that President Gemayel
seeks, who do not agree to withdraw
their forces and thereby thwart the idea
of a sovereign Lebanon free of foreign
forces. It is that fact that those things
haven't emerged that keeps the Marines
in Lebanon, that keeps the multinational
force in Lebanon, and we want to see
progress toward those ends. We are
there at the invitation of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to help bring that kind
of stability, and it's the opponents of the
stability that are the reason why the
MNF continues to be there and con-
tinues to seek that mission.
Q. Commander Daniel Ortega got
some big headlines yesterday saying
that besides the formal recommenda-
tions in the report, that privately the
Kissinger commission had recom-
mended an invasion of Nicaragrua and
of El Salvador by the United States in
order to protect its interests in Central
America.
A. I have been at all the meetings
that the commisioners have had with the
President; they must have been well
publicized. The allegation must be a fig-
ment of his imagination. At the same
time, there is a very important message
there. In order to keep conjuring up that
image, Mr. Ortega and his colleagues
must be worried, and if I were them, I
would be worried too. After all they are
the people who betrayed their revolu-
tion. They are the people who have
harassed the church and the Pope. They
are the people who declared an amnesty
and then found that they had to see Mis-
quito Indians leave, being harassed as
they left. They are the people who have
suppressed the press. They are the
people who have built up an armed force
that goes far beyond anything that
anyone could conceivably think is needed
for their own defense and internal secu
rity. So they have a lot to apologize for
and, as I say, as they look at what they
have done and compare it, let's say,
with what is being celebrated here in
Venezuela, it's no wonder they're wor-
ried. Thev should be.
REMARKS,
BRASILIA,
FEB. 6. 19843
We complete today the task assigned to
us just over 1 year ago by our
Presidents to explore ways of expanding
our cooperation. We have done so by
working on five areas of great impor-
tance to both countries— economic issues,
nuclear energy, science and technology,
space, and industrial/militarj' activities.
These areas are of great interest in
part because they contain issues that
have troubled our relations for some
time. Seeking an understanding on issues
that were, in some instances, a source of
persistent misunderstanding was not an
easy task. The mission we were assigned
was an ambitious one. It could have been
conceived only by leaders of vision who
would not allow themselves to be
discouraged by pessimists recalling
divergent interests and old grievances.
You and I, as cochairmen, accepted
this responsibility and launched the proc-
ess after careful preparation. We both
put able people to work. We encouraged
their efforts. In some cases, we made
hard decisions in order to ensure their
progress. Now that we have concluded
our work, I believe we can be proud of
our accomplishments.
First, the economic group: Here our
delegations approached their subject
with differing perspectives; one with the
perspective of a developing country, the
other with the perspective of an in-
dustrialized country. But both sides
recognized the seriousness of the world
economic situation. In vei-y frank and
direct discussions, they succeeded in nar-
rowing the differences and expanding
the areas of agreement. They agreed
that:
• Protectionism is harmful to both
countries and to the entii-e trading
world;
• We should seek to expand trade in
both dii'ections; and
• We must strive to reduce inflation
and interest rates and to strengthen in-
ternational financial institutions.
Our positions on a number of
economic issues still do not coincide. We
have learned, however, that our views
are less far apart than at first they
seemed. Having set a framework and
having acknowledged the importance of
harmonizing our views, we should con-
tinue to work together in a determined
effort to resolve our differences.
Second, the nuclear working group
found new possibilities for cooperation in
nuclear energy. Our experts found a
means to eliminate the longstanding fric-
tion surrounding the resupply of fuel for
ANGRA 1 and agreed on a procedure to
rework defective fuel elements that had
been stored for some years in Brazil.
They also enumerated several projects of
mutual interest on which Brazilian and
American experts could work together.
Most importantly, the discussion im-
proved our understanding of each other's
22
jT^BUHmjumimmnimni
THE SECRETARY
nuclear objectives. The personal relations
established in the process and the joint
efforts to be undertaken will lead to a
major increase in contacts during the
coming months.
Third, the industrial/military group
reached an understanding that creates a
basis for greater cooperation between
our industrial sectors. This understand-
ing will facilitate the inter-governmental
consideration of technology transfers
and, thereby, facilitate the binational
programs.
Fourth, the working group on science
and technology negotiated a new agree-
ment that will:
• E.xpand private sector industrial
cooperation in research and development;
• Strengthen cooperation between
government agencies in agriculture,
health, oceanography, natural resources,
basic sciences, environment, engineering,
and industrial technology; and
• Lead to the creation of a bilateral
commission to oversee a general expan-
sion of science and technology coopera-
tion between the United States and
Brazil.
Fifth, and finally, the space group
outlined a program for practical activities
vital to modern life— weather forecasting,
remote sensing, and atmospheric science.
A Brazilian payload specialist is expected
to perform experiments with Brazilian
equipment aboard our space shuttle
before the end of the decade. The hope
President Reagan expressed during his
visit 14 months ago will be realized.
With the work accomplished so far,
we believe the way has been opened to
move rapidly from a broad policy of
cooperation to specific projects of benefit
to both countries. We could foresee, for
example, technical cooperation in
oceanographic exploration, including
deep ocean drilling. Brazil last fall
became a consultative party to the
Antarctic Treaty, and we are looking for-
ward to cooperative research in the
Antarctic. The United States and Brazil
are currently defining the terms of
reference for cooperation in mapping,
charting, and geodesy. We are also in-
terested in joint energy technology
research, particularly in coal gasification.
The industrial/military understanding
opens new fields for joint endeavor.
Where it will lead depends on the in-
genuity of those in our two governments
and in our private sectors who have long
wanted to explore possibilities of
cooperation.
April 1984
In trade and finance, we are working
closely to harmonize and expand our
relations. Because the United States is
already the largest market for Brazilian
exports, I am convinced that Brazil will
expand its sales to the United States,
particularly now that our economy is
again steadily expanding. Similarly, we
e.xpect that tj.S. exports to Brazil will
also begin to expand once more. Trade
must flow in both directions if it is to
have a firm basis.
In finance, we and many others are
cooperating to support Brazil's efforts to
overcome its short-term liquidity crisis.
Considering the good judgment and
responsible attitudes I have seen from
everyone concerned, I am confident that
Brazil will find a satisfactory solution to
its financial difficulty.
We all can take satisfaction in the
completion of our task. The ac-
complishments of the working groups
will serve both countries. More impor-
tant, for the longer term, we have
proved that President Figueiredo was
right when he said in 1982 that our coun-
tries, though at different positions in the
international order, can engage in con-
structive dialogue. The United States
and Brazil, he correctly judged, know
how to take into account each other's
situation, realistically harmonizing their
respective interests and objectives.
I congratulate everyone who par-
ticipated in the working groups and hope
their spirit and skill will help us all to
build on the ground they have broken.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
ST. GEORGE'S,
FEB. 7, 1984^
I'd like to express my appreciation to the
Governor General and the chairman of
the Advisory Council and members for
what they are doing and the quick effort
they are making to rearrange the situa-
tion here in Grenada and to move this
country forward in a democratic manner
and give it a chance for economic vitality
and the kind of progress that this lovely
setting certainly deserves. I felt it a
privilege to meet with them and hear
their comments, not only about what
they plan to do but about their ex-
periences, particularly the Governor
General went through in his own ordeal
in bringing the situation to its present
spot. He expresses, as others did, great
appreciation to the United States, to the
President, and they did so with elo-
quence and great sincerity and meaning.
But I had to say for my part that I ap-
preciated very much all that they have
done and are doing.
Q. Can you tell us what discussion
you've had regarding the feasibility of
making the airport here of a greater
degree of implement role of the United
States?
A. The question of completion of the
airport is very much on everyone's mind
and it was discussed everywhere I went.
The situation is that a study team has
In Brasilia, the Secretary held discussions
with President Joao Figueiredo.
23
THE SECRETARY
been here and has evaluated what needs
to be done and its costs and the potential
of it. That report is now cii-culating in
the Office of Management and Budget
and the White House. It was done under
AID direction, and we expect we would
come to a conclusion about it. I must say,
from my own standpoint having landed
there and looked around a little, it's cer-
tainly a facility that is needed here in
one way or another and I'm sure it will
be completed.
Q. Thirty-six Americans have been
evacuated from Beirut. Do you expect
to evacuate any more Americans?
A. Dependents have left— almost all
left. I think the problem is not so much
their— certainly isn't at all —concern
about risk to them but I think in the at-
mosphere in Lebanon right now, wath
the tactics of terror against individuals
that the presence of dependents just of-
fered the opportunity for hostages, and
we felt it was an opportunity we just
didn't want to [inaudible].
Q. Will there be any more evacua-
tions?
A. No. That has taken place for the
reason that I described.
Q. What would your thinking be
about a Caribbean and East Caribbean
security force, a collective security
force? Would Grenada be a member or
should it?
A. Grenada, of course, has been a
member of the East Caribbean group
that formed their own treaty organiza-
tion into which we responded, so I
presume that Grenada would be a part of
whatever emerges. It is, I think, clear
that it's difficult for a small island,
smaller than Grenada, to form their own
security force, and so it makes sense that
what you can't do alone perhaps you can
do on a collective basis. But precisely
what the details of that should be and
how it should work is primarily up to the
people of this region. Certainly the
United States will be a very interested
part of the discussion, and we want to be
helpful.
Q. How much money has the
United States [inaudible] in Grenada?
A. I don't have a number off the top
of my head on that. If you spoke of it
comprehensively, you would have to in-
clude the cost of the rescue operation
and then the funds that have gone into
immediate aid, and then there are some
substantial funds that are uncommitted
at this point. But it will be [inaudible] I
In Grenada Secretary Shultz is .shown the Point Salines airport by U.S. Ambassador
Charles A. Gillespie, Jr.
guess. I don't have a number in my head
but it certainly is in the many millions of
dollars.
Q. Will the United States maintain
a military presence here after the elec-
tions are held?
A. All the combat forces of the
United States have long since left and
the number of U.S. personnel is down to
280 on the ground. "Then thei-e is a Coast
Guard contingent adding another 100—75
to 100— and they are on the ground but
they are in the vicinity, if you can catch
them or not. But that's the number that
are here. Their primary mission is to
help maintain security conditions on the
island. Our desire is not to stay here in
that posture. The sooner we can be
replaced by people from other islands
nearby or from other countries or as
time goes on by Grenadians trained in
police-type work, the better. And we
want to see that take place as promptly
as possible. I don't have an estimate on
when that would be.
Q. The same Marine unit that
landed in north Grenada and came
south is the same that's in Beirut. Do
you see our projection of an American
force, for instance this Marine unit, as
foreign policy tools that can be used in
the future such as President Reagan
[inaudible]?
A. The Marines, any particular unit
of Marines, have a special experience like
this one did, but I don't think that
should single out this unit as something
special. All Marines are special, including
the unit you mentioned.
Certainly the question of the use of
force is something that must be con-
sidered always very carefully. The
armed forces mission, primarily, is a mis-
sion of deterrence, and that is the
primai-y effort we make. I do think that
there are a great many situations likely
around the world where the situation is
rather ambiguous as to who the good
guys are and who the bad guys are,
where we have considerable interests
and where military capability as well as
diplomacy both have potential roles and
where the interests of our country can
be served if we are able to sustain a
coordinated effort. And I think it's one of
the questions we have to ask ourselves—
whether or not it's possible, not in large-
scale situations but in very particular
rather ambiguous situations, if we know
how to play a role. And the Marines, of
course, are among the units that would
be useful in that regard, but they would
not be the only ones by any means in the
armed forces.
Q. Did the Grenadian leadership of-
fer you any assurance concerning an
election timetable?
A. They want to have elections as
soon as it's possible to have them on a
sensible basis. The process is going for-
ward in a very impressive way. A com-
missioner has been named. There will
shortly be a process identified for regis-
tration. The registration activity itself
will be getting going probably in March,
*of'
24
i.l.».U..».HH,.«..».«....—
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
as I understand it. Of course, the process
of registration then tends to bring for-
ward political activity and, as the Gover-
nor General said, he hopes that an elec-
tion—or he stated flatly that an election
would be held before the end of the yeai-.
Precisely when that would be, I think he
feels and I would share that view, he
doesn't want to set an exact date until
he sees how the processes that are in
motion are going. But it's very clear that
he is dedicated to putting a democratic
government in place as soon as possible.
Q. Did you get an exact date as to
when the American troops will be pull-
ing out? And during the meeting which
you had today, was there any request
from Grenada to you for additional
security and how that security be car-
ried out?
A. There are no American troops
here in a combat sense. They have all
been withdrawn long since. I think in the
middle of December, they were all
withdrawn. What remains are a rela-
tively small number which are here
on request to help maintain security con-
ditions, and I said in response to the
previous question 1 don't have a date to
state as to when they will leave. It
depends on when adequate replacements
can be put in place.
Q. Many Grenadians are concerned
about the status of Bernard Coard and
other alleged people implicated. Have
you had any discussion with officials
here about what happens to them?
A. The Governor Genei-al brought up
the subject of detainees and wishes to
see that as soon as possible there are
none who are detained without charges.
There is a process under way to see that
information is developed properly that
bears upon the potential charges against
those who are being detained. And the
Governor General's desire, as he ex-
pressed it to me, is to have this process
be completed as soon as possible and at
the time to conduct it in an orderly and
careful way and that's what's going for-
ward.
Q. [Inaudible] week ago last Mon-
day the decision to keep the troops un-
til elections [inaudible].
A. The discussion we had about
security— obviously it's necessary in any
organized community to have a way of
keeping law and order. That's the first
role of government and the sooner it can
be taken over by the Grenadians
themselves the better.
As far as the United States is con-
cerned, as soon as somebody else can
assume this burden the closer to
Grenada the better— we'll be pleased
with that. We didn't discuss a date, or I
wasn't asked to make a commitment that
our current forces would stay until the
elections. It was more in terms of a com-
mon agi'eement that security is impor-
tant, and in one way or the other it will
be maintained.
Q. Grenada is a subject that a lot
of Americans read about and saw it on
television, yourself included. How does
it differ in reality from what you
imagined?
A. It's nicer; it's really a lovely place.
I suppose physically, the terrain is more
rugged than I imagined. But, of course, I
have only seen a portion of it. But it cer-
tainly is a lovely piece of real estate.
Q. The full study says [inaudible]
certainly is needed here. This seems to
conflict with the President in his "star
wars" speech accusing the airport of
having no needs other than as a
military base.
A. I think what you referred to as
the "star wars" speech dealt with a dif-
ferent subject. But he did make a speech
in which the airport was shown. The
question is not about an airport of this
sort; it's a que.stion of what it is to be
used for. And the President's statement
in the speech was that this airport was
being built for purposes of a military
base and a militai-y operation.
I think that we must all agree that when
you look at what was captured here and
the tremendous volume of armaments
and uniforms and so forth, it was clear
that wasn't designed for protecting the
security of Grenada. It was designed to
carry on aggressive action— that which
seems to me vindicates what the Presi-
dent said. Now the regime here is dif-
ferent. And there is no aggressive intent
involved. The airport is needed for the
purpose of having the kind of airplanes
that could carry tourists and others to
places like this and land— they can't land
at the other airport. So it's needed for
that pui-po.se. As I understand it, the
idea of the airport goes way back foi- this
purpose.
Q. What's the security threat at the
moment you were talking about?
A. The security problem is the same
kind of problem we have in Washington
or New York or anywhere else. An
orderly society has to have means of
maintaining law and order. So you have
to have a police force and an ability to
see that orderly conrlitions are main-
tained. I think it's just as simple as that.
I don't know of any concern that there
are people in the hills or what not that
ai'e going to attack the island or any no-
tion of an invasion or something of that
kind, although to the e.xtent that
anybody might worry about that, I sup-
pose that's one of the functions of our
Coast Guard.
Q. What are the plans of the
United States for security in the whole
Caribbean area?
A. Our plans are to discuss this issue
with the people who live here, and since
we're neighbors and we have been in-
volved, obviou.sly, in this particular
operation, we'll be very interested par-
ticipants in that discussion. I believe that
secui'ity, obviously, has a military dimen-
sion to it. But deep down security has to
do with the political condition under
which people live— whether they're free,
whether they're able to express
themselves and live a life that they want
to, and whether or not they're able to
realize the opportunities and abilities
that they have. Political conditions and
economic conditions are essential
elements in security as well as what im-
mediately comes to mind— namely the
military side of it.
LUNCHEON TOAST,
BRH)GETOWN,
FEB. 8, 19845
The spirit and the content of our
meeting this morning should ring
throughout the hemisphere. Democracy
and the rule of law, economic develop-
ment and well-being for our countries
and peoples, security and a shield
against aggression— these objectives
were our agenda. They are very much
the agenda throughout the Americas.
I came here to address these issues
in a spirit of partnership. I found
strength, leadership, and hope. I found
you to be genuine partners, as you were
in our joint rescue mission for Grenada.
Good partners make good neighbors.
President Reagan is determined that the
United States will be a good partner
here in the Caribbean and in every part
of this hemisphere.
Each of our countries is unique, but
there is a powerful sense in which our
problems are common and their solu-
tions related. We all must coordinate
our actions and help each other if we are
to make progress.
THE SECRETARY
Today is the culmination of a trip
that took me to Central and South
America and now to the Caribbean. Dur-
ing the last 8 days, I have met with
political leaders and businessmen, with
journalists and military men, and with
all of our ambassadors to Central and
South America.
I would like to share with you some
reflections on where the hemisphere
stands today and what lies ahead.
Democracy
My first thought goes to the importance
of democracy. Two years ago, address-
ing the Organization of American States
to announce the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative, President Reagan said that if
they work together:
. . . our many nations can live in peace,
each with its own customs and language and
culture but sharing a love for freedom and a
determination to resist outside ideologies that
would take us back to colonialism.
I want to emphasize the President's
last phrase: "sharing a love for freedom
and a determination to resist outside
ideologies that would take us back to
colonialism." If there is one thing that
all the nations of the hemisphere have in
common, it is that every single country
in this hemisphere was at one time a
colony. When Latin Americans fought
for independence in the 19th century,
the United States, remembering its own
revolution, felt a sense of solidarity with
them. And as the island nations of the
Caribbean have earned their independ-
ence over this past generation, that
solidarity has been renewed.
We have learned that independence
does not automatically bring democracy
and freedom in its wake. Our own na-
tion, like many others in the Americas,
tolerated slavery for almost a century.
But we also know that a society that
guarantees all its citizens equality under
the law, civil rights, social justice, and
human dignity can fulfill the promise of
national independence.
We can take pride in the fact that
today more than 90% of all the people of
this New World live under democracies
or under regimes in transition to
democracy. The recent elections in
Argentina were a dramatic reconfirma-
tion of this general trend.
Yet the job of building democracy is
not finished. We must strengthen
freedom, expand economic well-being,
and defend ourselves against the new
colonialism of communism. I tell you
now that the success of the democratic
enterprise in this hemisphere is not a
26
BHIiilililiiiiiiliieiBiiiiayill
matter of indifference to the United
States. Democracy is at once the founda-
tion and the objective of our coopera-
tion.
All of us in this room share the bond
of democratic solidarity. We all live it.
And we all know that without democ-
racy, our cooperation in Grenada, and all
that it means for regional security,
would have lacked the popular support it
receives in each of our countries.
Nor is democracy's appeal limited to
those who already have it. It remains
the standard even when the struggle for
it is most arduous. In El Salvador last
week, I found that the yearning of de-
cent people for democracy is strong and
their spirit unbroken. I found a country
and a government that want democracy
and are committed to achieving it. The
candidates for the presidency of El
Salvador all told me how they have been
campaigning throughout the country and
working to achieve the fullest and
widest participation possible.
The United States supports open
elections without reservation. We want
in Central America what we want
here— peace guaranteed by democracy.
We want to see every citizen free to par-
ticipate in the political life of his or her
country, without fear, threat, or in-
timidation.
In support of this principle, the
Government of El Salvador, before the
1982 Constituent Assembly elections, of-
fered automatic legal registration to the
political parties associated with the
guerrillas. Before scheduling next
month's presidential elections, the
Government of El Salvador renewed the
offer to discuss with the political front
of the different guerrilla groups the
terms and conditions of their participa-
tion.
Will the Salvadoran guerrillas and
Nicaragua's comandantes finally stop
their violence and submit to the verdict
of the people? Will the comandantes
abandon the menacing military buildup
that threatens both Nicaraguans and
their neighbors? Will they be as bold as
El Salvador and place the decision of
who is to govern genuinely in the hands
of the people? Will they cast off the
cynical alliances that have injected the
East-West conflict into the region?
To ensure peace and economic prog-
ress. Central America needs democracy.
What happened last fall here in the
eastern Caribbean is telling. In Grenada,
a system comparable to Nicaragua's
ultimately proved so unstable and so
divisive that it led to the murder of the
Prime Minister by a military faction
loyal to the Deputy Prime Minister.
Both factions were antidemocratic; both
sought power without legal limit or
popular consent. Enamored of power
and blinded by the illusions of a false
revolution and false alliances, the New
JEWEL Movement imposed an alien dic-
tatorship.
It is in everyone's interest that this
not happen in Nicaragua. It is in
Nicaragua's own interest to keep the
pledges made to the Organization of
American States (OAS) in 1979 and to
give practical force to the 21 substantive
objectives they agreed to negotiate in
the Contadora process.
The history of Venezuela, a founder
of Contadora, confirms that Central
America can build democracy. Venezuela
forged its democracy in a long and
courageous struggle against extremists
of both right and left. Throughout the
1960s, Venezuela held elections while
under assault by armed guerrillas sup-
ported by Cuba. But Venezuelans were
not intimidated. Just as they had thrown
off dictatorship, they resisted Cuban
subversion. They elected a succession of
democratic leaders and made Venezuela
a leader of democracy throughout the
Americas.
We in the United States support
every nation in the hemisphere that
struggles for freedom. And we are confi-
dent that, as in Venezuela yesterday and
Argentina today, those who work for
democracy will prevail— in Grenada, in
El Salvador, in Nicaragua, and
throughout the hemisphere.
Economic Development
My second set of observations concerns
economic development. The enemies of
democracy often point to underdevelop-
ment and economic hardship as argu-
ments to justify violence and dictator-
ship. But they've got it backward.
Violence destroys development. And ex-
perience around the world teaches that
totalitarian solutions are bankrupt-
economically as well as morally. It is the
democratic and open societies that are
the success stories of the developing
world.
The challenges of development are
formidable. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
hemisphere's developing countries grew
faster than either the United States or
Europe. Important gains were regis-
tered despite rapid population growth.
Today, however, the recession has hit
most countries in the hemisphere very
hard. It has made debt service an
onerous burden. And in just a few years
it has begun to eat away many of the
social gains of decades of growth.
Department of State Bulletin'
THE SECRETARY
In my discussions of economic
issues, I found both concern and
realism— concern that economic ad-
justments will have serious social conse-
quences and that no country can sustain
austerity indefinitely; realism that ad-
justments are, nevertheless, unavoidable
and that policies must be economically
sound.
Increased investment in productivity
is a need that everyone— from govern-
ments to bankers— must keep in mind.
Equity investment is a good counter-
balance to debt in meeting the overall
capital aeeds of growth.
The United States is committed to
helping to manage the debt crisis effec-
tively and equitably. And we are confi-
dent that the global economic recovery,
now clearly underway, will help carry
many countries out of their current dif-
ficulties. The continued openness of
the U.S. market— in spite of trade
deficits— is contributing importantly to
stability abroad. The strong recovery
now apparent in the United States will
provide additional strength to our
neighbors.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative gives
us all fresh tools and opportunities to at-
tack the problems of development. The
Central America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative should signifi-
cantly increase the resources available in
defense of development in Central
America, where it is now most acutely
threatened. And together we must show
similar imagination and realism in pur-
suit of development here in the eastern
Caribbean. Democratic solidarity means
we cannot be indifferent to the economic
problems of our neighbors. The United
States will be a good partner.
Collective Security
Economic progress depends on an en-
vironment of security and confidence.
This brings me to a third set of reflec-
tions—on the need for collective
security.
The enemies of democracy and
development are the same throughout
the hemisphere. They are the violent ex-
tremes—the violent left, subservient to
Cuba and international totalitarianism,
and the violent right, with its futile
resistance to modern progress. The far
left depends on outside arms, training,
and propaganda; the far right depends
on secrecy, intimidation, and abuse of
power.
The National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America underscored its con-
viction that indigenous revolution is no
threat to the United States. The threat
from Cuba and the Soviet Union is the
perversion of revolution, a betrayal of
democracy that is rooted in intimidation
and force. We have nothing to fear from
honest political or economic competition,
least of all from Cuba or the Soviet
Union. But, as Grenada demonstrated,
we must defend ourselves against the
organized violence of communism, which
preaches pluralism for others while im-
posing a single party state and censor-
ship at home.
In building our defenses, we must all
take care to strengthen democracy and
to minimize any diversion of resources
from development. We must all nego-
tiate differences and show mutual
restraint. But we must also maintain
professional security forces that are
capable of protecting our peoples and
the rule of law from the enemies of
democracy. And we must all see to it
that our cooperation in behalf of collec-
tive security is adjusted to fit our
respective needs and capabilities.
Our Commitment
Yesterday, I had the pleasure of joining
in the celebration of the 10th anniver-
sary of Grenada's independence. My
talks with the Governor General and
members of the interim government,
and the memorable and moving welcome
we received from ordinary citizens,
made clear that the changes that have
come about since our joint action are
widely and enthusiastically supported.
We owe it to the people of Grenada to
follow through: to help them to turn
their hopes for democracy and freedom
into a lasting reality.
In Grenada and throughout the
hemisphere, the United States wants to
be a good partner. We want our
assistance to foster self-reliance, not a
new dependence. We will help, not im-
pose solutions.
Once again, the key is democracy.
Foreign Minister Guerreiro of Brazil
rightly pointed out this week that
"Democratic principles do not require
the imposition of a standard uniformity
or unanimity." As he said, what they do
require is mutual respect and solidarity.
On the political front, we must con-
tinue to nurture the habits and pro-
cedures of democracy. Democracy in-
creasingly describes the present. We
must perfect and protect it so that it
will endure. The National Endowment
for Democracy, recently established in
the United States, provides a new
means for strengthening solidarity
among democratic forces in the
hemisphere.
In economic matters, we must all
keep our markets open. Freedom of
economic choice and enterprise are
natural regulators and natural liberators
of talent, ability, and progress. And we
must persevere in our cooperation for
development. We in the United States
must ensure that our assistance matches
real needs and that once we undertake
policies for the long term, we carry
through without interruptions or neglect.
Above all, we must together main-
tain our resolve in the defense of
democracy. The vocation of this
hemisphere is to prove that the New
World can produce a unique civilization
based on peace, freedom, and justice. It
is this vision that unites us. Our solidari-
ty can make it a reality for all the
peoples of the Americas.
'Press release 32 of Feb. 6, 1984,
^Press release 33 of Feb. 6.
^Pre-ss release 37 of Feb. 15.
■•Press release 40 of Feb. 8.
^Made at a luncheon attended by the
leaders of Barbados, Jamaica, and the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(press release 49 of Feb. 17). ■
April 1984
27
THE SECRETARY
Secretary's Interview on
"This Week With David Brinkley"
Secretary Schidtz was interviewed on
ABC-TVs "This Week With David
Brinkley" on Jarmary 22, 198J,, by
David Brinkley and Sam Dofialdson,
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC
Neivs Analyst.^
Q. You heard Mr. Brzezinski
[Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national
security adviser to President Carter], a
minute ago, say in his opinion the
Russians didn't really want any
substantial arms agreement. Do you
agree with that?
A. It all depends on what area of
discussion you're talking about. We have
pretty good discussions going on now on
the "hotline;" that's a form of arms
agreement. Mr. Gromyko, when I met
with him in Stockholm, suggested that
we resume the discussions of the MBFR
[mutual and balanced force reductions],
that is, the troop level discussions in
Vienna— conventional forces. We resume
on March 16th, and we have examined
that from our standpoint. We've let them
know that we think that date for
resumption is agreeable.
The conference we both attended in
Stockholm is a kind of arms control con-
ference and that's going on. The con-
ference in Geneva on chemical weapons
is taking place. They made a proposal
which we don't think is a very good pro-
posal, but nevertheless we responded to
it. We have some further things to say.
In the field of nuclear arms, they
have declined to set a date for resump-
tion of the strategic arms talks and have
said they have left the intermediate-
range talks. It depends on what kind of
arms control you're talking about.
Q. The answer then is yes and no, I
gather?
A. I think that's the answer kind of
across the board. There are some
positive things; there are some negative
things. It's kind of a mixed picture.
Q. There's a rumor going around
that the Reagan .Administration is so
eager to get some kind of arms control
agreement that it's going to retreat
from a position held by other Ad-
ministrations with regard to the
MBFR talks, that is, an insistence on
data on manpower deployments from
the Soviet Union before manpower
agreements, new levels, are agreed
upon.
.\nd people say it is particularly
necessary, because we now have all
this evidence of Soviet cheating. Man-
power agreements are very hard to
verify. And right now, we say the
Soviet Union has 220,000 more forces
than the Soviet Union admits. Are you
going to insist on data prior to a man-
power agreement?
A. How we will conduct those
negotiations, of course, will emerge in
Vienna. But I would say that the key in
that negotiation, as in the othei'S, is ade-
quate measures to verify that what is
undertaken actually does take place. I
think that the most important thing in all
of these agreements is reasonably ac-
curate verification, and that vvoukl be a
key. Obviously, linked to that is the
question of an ability to determine how
many forces there actually are; that is,
data.
Q. You seemed to surprise a lot of
people, including those in the Ad-
ministration, with your proposal in
Stockholm about a worldwide ban on
chemical weapons. .\nd a number of
people in this .Administration seem to
feel that's about as hard to verify as
anything. How would you begin to
verify that?
A. There are certain things that you
can verify and certain things that are dif-
ficult. You can verify whether or not
known stockpiles of chemical weapons
are abolished. You can do a certain
amount of verification of theii- movement
around and so on.
There are verification measures that
can be taken. Insofar as chemical
weapons are concerned, I think, number
one, the regional approach that the
Soviet Union proposed— a Europe-free
chemical weapons zone— in effect, doesn't
meet the test because chemical weapons
are easily moved.
Second, verification is hard and is a
key, as I said before, and there's a cer-
tain amount that can be done.
Q. The Administration's theory
about the INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] and perhaps the START
[strategic arms reduction talks] talks
all along has been that this country
needed to build up its strength and
needed to deploy along the two-track
system that N.\TO agreed on, the
Pershing and the cruise missiles. .And
when we did that, the Soviets would
understand that they needed to deal
with us seriously. They would reach
agreements with us that were
equitable.
Is that still your theory, and, if so,
when will the Soviets come back to the
table?
A. No, the theory of the alliance was
different.
Q. I mean the Reagan .Administra-
tion's theory about building up our
defenses.
A. There was a decision made in 1979
by the North Atlantic alliance, and the
Reagan Administration has basically pur-
sued that decision. The observation, first
of all, was that the Soviets were deploy-
ing inteiTnediate-range missiles aimed at
Europe in great numbers and then
subsequently intermediate-range missiles
aimed at China and Japan and elsewhere.
So the alliance said, "We can't just
sit here and have that happen. We have
to provide ourselves with an adequate
deterrent capability." We set out to do
that, but while we're doing that, we
should do everjlhing we can to negotiate
an acceptable equal level in these. A
negotiation was started, having that in
mind. As it turned out, it wasn't
possible— at least hasn't been so far— to
arrive at any conclusion.
But the theory wasn't to do
something in order to get an agreement.
The theory always has to be that you
have to equip yourself with a deterrent
capability to look after your interests,
and no doubt it's true that if you do that,
you're more likely to get a reasonable
agreement than if you don't.
Q. I muddied the water by bringing
in the two-track system. Let me ask
my question directly in terms of Presi-
dent Reagan's theory about rearming
America. He said in a speech just the
other day—
A. It's not a theory, it's an objective.
Q. All right, he said the other day
that we've done it. Now we are
prepared— I paraphrase but I think ac-
curately—now we are in the position
and prepared to deal with the Soviet
Union from the standpoint of arms
reductions. Do you feel you are and
will the Soviets come back to the
table? -And if so, when?
A. We feel we're in a much better
position now than we were a few years
ago. We have confirmed and have on
track all the major weapons systems that
have been set out, and there's a much
better feel in the whole defense
28
■HHHHBH
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
establishment and bipartisan support for
it, even though there ai'e lots of
arguments about the level of the budget.
That's a much stronger position from
which to talk than one in which there is
a great deal of uncertainty about our
defense capabilities and world power.
Q. Will the Soviets come back to
the table and, if so, when?
A. I pointed out that they are at the
table along a number of fronts, and they
are not at the table on the nuclear arms
talk.
Q. May I just press for an answer
and if you care not to answer, I will
accept that; will they come back to the
INF and START negotiations and. if
so, when?
A. I don't know whether they'll come
back or not. That's something that they
have to determine. We can take care of
our position, and our position is to be
realistic about what they're doing, to be
strong in our own capabilities, and to be
ready to engage in a reasonable negotia-
tion. And that's what we can control.
Q. But why do we care? The SALT
process— the strategic arms proc-
ess—began about 15 years ago at a
time when the strategic balance was in
the U.S. favor. In the intervening 15
years, the Soviet Union has deployed
7,000 more modern warheads, and
there's a general agreement, particu-
larly in your Administration, that the
strategic balance has shifted against
us. After 15 years of this, punctuated
by the documentation of the cheating,
why do we care so much about arms
control talks?
A. It's a subject that we should pur-
sue, and it's something from which we
can attain some constructive results. But
I think the lesson that is brought out by
the comments you made— both the addi-
tions to their arsenal and the problems of
adhering to agreements— is that you do
have to have clear and, I think, rela-
tively simple agreements. You have to
have strong measures for verification,
and you can't put your ultimate depend-
ence on arms control. You have to put
your ultimate dependence on your own
ability to take care of yourself.
Q. I would like to ask you a ques-
tion that weighs heavily on the minds
of the American people and,
understandably so, the fear of nuclear
war. During the political campaign,
which we are already in, there will be
a great deal of discussion about the
cold war, the colder relations with the
Soviet Union, which will be frighten-
ing to people. What would be your
response to that? You're not running
for office, I understand, but if you
were, what would you say about it?
A. Just what President Reagan .said
the other day in his address; that
because we are strong we are safer. And
because we are strong, we're bettei- able
to try to work out reasonable agree-
ments with the other side. And because
we're strong, we're able to be
reasonable. All of these things add uj) to
a situation from which, I think, the
American people should take some heart.
Q. In your view, the threat of
nuclear war is diminished?
A. Yes, I think so. I think that deter-
i-ent strength diminishes the temptation
of somebody to use their strength
against you.
Q. Another way that foreign policy
is entering the campaign with regard
to Lebanon, do you think it was a
mistake in the summer of 1982 for us
to encourage, to put it politely, the
Israelis to stop before, as some people
say, the Israelis finished the job, chas-
ing the Syrians out of Lebanon?
A. The situation was that you had
the city of Beirut being shelled. You had
a tremendous number of civilians-
Lebanese— being killed. And I think that
situation in Lebanon, in Beirut, cried out
for help and the United States was able
to provide some heljD in that situation.
For that matter, Israel did stop its offen-
sive in Lebanon.
You remember that the original an-
nouncement of the Israelis was that they
were going in, which they did, against
our advice, as I understand it. I was not
around at the time. But they would only
go in so far. However, they just kept
right on going and nobody knew quite
where they were going to wind up.
Q. This weekend, Walid Jumblatt,
the Druze leader, said that he will not
accept Amin Gemayel as the President
of Lebanon, that he must go. What
does that do to the possibility of a suc-
cessful peace settlement there?
A. He traveled to Moscow, he came
back to Syria, and he made a statement
calling for the resignation of President
Gemayel. I think you put those things
together and you see where he's coming
from. President Gemayel was put there
by the legitimate process in Lebanon of
election through a Parliament, and he
represents the legitimate government
there. I think that the efforts that he's
making and that we would like to see
others participate in to broaden the base
of that government are an important ele-
ment in this picture.
Q. Are we going to support
Gemayel all the way down the line? Is
our allegiance to Gemayel, or is our
allegiance to a process which may turn
up someone else?
A. Our allegiance is to the legitimate
Government of Lebanon, produced by a
process that's been there. We have
counselled with him about the broaden-
ing of the ba.se of his government, which
he would like to do. That process would
make Lebanon a more governable place.
Q. Is Jumblatt speaking with
Syrian acquiescence? Does this tell us
something about the Syrian interven-
tion here?
A. He spoke from Damascus after
returning from Moscow, so it looks as
though those well-known influences on
him are having an impact. This is their
progi-am and no doubt his as well.
Q. As you know, there is a rising,
not to say, feverish course of demand
in Congress, elsewhere, from both par-
ties, in fact, that it's time to take the
Marines out of Lebanon. What is your
view on that?
A. There is a chorus to some extent,
and certainly you can read about it in the
papers every day. It was interesting to
me to see Senators Tower and Warner,
who went to the Middle East, as they
said, skeptical. And they came back con-
vinced that it was very important for the
United States to continue to resolve and
to maintain its presence in Lebanon and
in the Middle East. There may be some
swing in the pendulum coming in the
other direction. It remains to be seen.
Q. The Syrians have every reason
to believe that the United States,
however, won't be hard to outwait in
this regard. What incentive—
A. They've said that quite a lot. In
fact, [Syrian Foreign Minister] Khaddam
has said to our negotiators, "The United
States is short of breath. You can always
wait them out." And he remembers some
of our earlier times.
Q. Is it part of the Reagan Ad-
ministration's plan to show that we're
not short of breath, and does that
mean leaving them in for a long time
just to show that?
A. It's important to show the world
that we have resolve. But we also have
to pay attention primarily to our objec-
tives there. And our objectives are to
make what contribution we can mainly
April 1984
29
THE SECRETARY
through our diplomacy but also through
the presence of our forces along with the
forces of other countries for the emer-
gence of a more stable and sovereign
Lebanon. That's what we're there for.
Q. On Friday, several Administra-
tion officials pointed to the danger of a
kamikaze-type attack on our forces-
planes run by, maybe, Iranian-trained
pilots. Islamic fundamentalists, the
terrorist groups. And at least one
senior official suggested we might be
considering— if we see that attack just
about to take place— making a preemp-
tive strike to safeguard our forces. Is
that something we might do?
A. Yes. I think we have to be very
conscious of the rise of terrorism, not
only in Lebanon but around the world.
And the fact that it is increasingly evi-
dent, that it has a base in a state, it isn't
some random crazy group, it's something
that's organized, systematic; people
getting trained for it. And in the case of
Lebanon, we see increasingly these
things originating in Iran. We see them
taking place, necessarily with the ac-
quiescence of Syria. We see who this
group is. There's Syria, there's Iran,
there's Libya, and there's the Soviet
Union.
And I think the emergence of terror
as a kind of weapon of war by states is
something that we have to be very con-
cerned about. An example in another
part of the world was the North Korean
assault on the South Koi-ean Government
in a third country— in Rangoon— where
they murdered a large portion of the
South Korean Government.
Q. Yes, but in that case, we asked
South Korea to show some restraint
from the standpoint of any precipitous
strike military action. If we use our
forces to make a preemptive strike on
these terrorist bases to safeguard our
forces, what will you say to people
who say that we are involving our-
selves to a deeper extent in the Middle
Eastern war?
A. It's not involving ourselves deeper
in a Middle Eastern war to defend
ourselves and our citizens against these
tactics of terrorism. These tactics ai'e
aimed at America generally. We had the
tragic murder of the President of
American University of Beijrut the other
day, a person who literally has given his
life to the betterment of the Middle
East. It is going to individuals and it's
going to organized governments. It in-
volves not just us but others, and it's an
attack on civilization.
'Press release .31 of Feb. 4, 1984.
Secretary's Interview on
"The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
the Public Broadcasting System's "The
MacNeil/Lehrer Neivs Hour"
on Febrttary 23, 198i. by Charlene
Hunter-Gait and Robert MacNeil.^
Q. Last night President Reagan
said in his news conference that the
Marines would still have a role to play
in Lebanon, even though they were be-
ing redeployed to the ships offshore.
What exactly is that role?
A. They are there— offshore— and
they represent a continuing U.S.
presence. They support our policy of try-
ing to bring about, as best we can, the
removal of all foreign forces from
Lebanon and the emergence of a
sovereign Lebanon in charge of its own
territory and with arrangements that en-
sure the security of Israel's northern
border.
Q. How can they do that kind of
support if they are confined to the
ships and presumably not firing?
A. They're not there to undertake a
military mission, but they're there in the
event that something happens that will
make it desirable for them to be used in
a manner such as they were used in the
fii'st place.
You remember that they came back
in the second time— they went in the
first time to provide the conditions under
which the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization] could be gotten out of
Beirut. They accomplished that mission
successfully, along with the other
members of the multinational force.
They came in the second time to pro-
vide a division of the forces present and
to set up conditions around Beirut for
stability and protection around the Sabra
and Shatila camps. What may happen in
Lebanon, we don't know, but it may be
that there will be a good purpose of that
kind which the Marines will be called
upon to serve.
Q. The President did say specifi-
cally that the Marines might go back
into Beirut if the possibility of improv-
ing their chances of fulfilling their
mission were to reoccur. What specif-
ically was he talking about in terms of
the mission?
A. He was basically just saying, as
I've said here that there are a lot of dif-
ferent possible things that may happen,
and in order to be helpful you have to be
Johnny-on-the-spot, and that's the Ma-
rines' I'ole, I might say typically, I don't
think people are aware of this, that we
do have a deplojonent in the Mediterra-
nean and the Marine amphibious unit
that's there is deployed and has been for
a long time around in the Mediterranean.
It's now lying offshore Lebanon.
Q. There tended to be, over a time,
a lot of confusion about just what the
mission there was. I mean, do you
understand the reason for that confu-
sion, and can you shed any light on
that?
A. The problem, I suppose, is that
you have to start with a large pictui'e of
our interests in the Middle East which
are very great. These have tended to get
focused, to a certain extent, on Lebanon
in recent times, and the Marines are
there to support our objectives in
Lebanon.
The anomaly occurs because we think
of Marines as "gung-ho, bring in the
Marines," and they have an offensive
military mission, but that has not been
their mission in this case. It's been a
mission to help ensui'e stability and
peace in that area, and it succeeded in
very considerable part, although in re-
cent months, with the rise of violence,
they've been caught up in it, and we
have found that a better place for them
to be deployed is on ships.
Q. You said yesterday, in testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that the situation in
Lebanon was deteriorating. What do
you think it would take at this point to
rescue the country?
A. The parties to the firing— and
much of it is instigated by Syria— need to
decide they've had enough, and let's
have a cease-fire. We brought that about
at one time, and there was a cease-fire
for awhile, but it has erupted again. So
first there needs to be a cease-fire.
Second, there needs to be a broader
Government of Lebanon. President
Gemayel has been trying to bring that
30
Department of State Bulletin *pri
THE SECRETARY
about, and the various factions have been
jockeying around and as yet have not
been willing to join in that broader
government.
But, obviously, you want to broaden
the base of that government and enable
the government to take control and
maintain law and order in the areas that
aren't occupied. And then we want to
get all of the foreign forces out and let
Lebanon emerge as a sovereign state.
Q. What's your assessment of the
plan that the Saudis have proffered
and that the Syrians reportedly have
gone along with? I mean, do you think
that this is something that can bring
what you've just said about?
A. That plan has a lot of change in it
all the time. Every time we see it, it's a
little different plan, and the Saudis are
trying very hard to play a constructive
role, and it may or may not emerge as
something that is worthwhile.
Q. One of the points of it, as I
understand, involves abrogating the
May 17 security treaty between
Lebanon and Israel which the United
States has supported. Would you be in
favor of President Gemayel giving up
that agreement in exchange for peace?
A. That agreement is between Israel
and Lebanon. We witnessed it. I helped
to bring it about. I think it's a good
agreement, and it provides for security
arrangements on Israel's northern
border. It provides for total Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon, and it opens
the door to the possibility of some
reasonable relationship between Israel
and Lebanon. So I think it's a good
agi-eement. But. of course, it belongs to
Israel and Lebanon, and it's up to them
to decide what they want to do with it.
I would say only this: Those who a^:!-
vocate the abrogation of that agreement
must bear some responsibility for finding
an alternative formula for bringing about
Israeli withdrawal.
Q. What sense of personal regret do
you have about the turn of events in
Lebanon? You've invested a lot time
and energy in this situation.
A. Everyone regrets the loss of life,
the loss of American lives there— our
Marines and others— and the loss of life
of the Lebanese. So wherever you look
in the world and you see that, you're
sorry about it— I am, certainly. One of
the great things, I think, about America
is that when we see problems of that
kind, we respond. And even if we find
ourselves in a situation where the odds
are not too good, we'll still try. And I
April 1984
think we can be proud as Americans that
we've tried to bring about something
better in Lebanon.
Q. Your number two at the State
Department. Kenneth Dam. speaking
in the Far East today, said. "We've
made a courageous effort, and simply
because we've failed doesn't mean it
wasn't worth the effort." Would you
agree with that formulation of it?
A. I wouldn't say that we've failed;
we haven't succeeded, but the wheel is
still turning, and we're there. Our
diplomatic effort is represented by a
very strong Ambassador, Reg
Bartholomew, and we'll stay engaged in
the process and do what we can to help
bring about the sort of resnlt that we've
sought all along.
Q. Time magazine this week quotes
a White House official, unnamed, as
saying that George, meaning you, is
ticked off at us, meaning the White
House, because, for reasons of political
expediency, they were more willing to
see Gemayel abrogate or scuttle this
agreement with Israel than you were.
Do you have any comment on that?
A. I'm always worried about anony-
mous "theys" and the "White House." I
used to work in the White House some
years ago. I don't know how many hun-
dreds of people work there.
Q. But are you "ticked off?
A. I work for the President, and if
somebody tells me something the Presi-
dent says, I respond to that. I've had
many discussions about this with the
President, and he and I see this matter
exactly the same way. So that's the
White House, as far as I'm concerned.
Q. So you're not "ticked off?
A. I think that that agreement is a
good agreement, but it is up to the par-
ties to decide what they want to do
about it. There have been people who
have a different point of view than I
have, and we've had some arguments
about it. but that's normal. In fact, I
think it would be alarming if you had a
government where people didn't have
some diffei-ences of opinion.
Q. It just seemed that there was a
different emphasis last week. Early in
the day President Reagan came out
and said something like you're saying
now, that there was agreement be-
tween the two parties, and he seemed
rather casually to accept the in-
evitability of its being abrogated. And
then a few hours later you made a
statement at the State Department,
making a very forceful U.S. defense
and backing of the agreement. I just
wonder why that difference of em-
phasis within a few hours of each
other?
A. You have to look at the full ques-
tion that the President was asked to .see
the consistency of what we each said.
And I might say that what I said was
carefully written out and was reviewed
by the President and cleared by the
President. So I just didn't sound off on
my own; I had the President's complete
blessing on the words that I spoke.
Q. He said last night in answer to a
question at his news conference that
he hoped you weren't considering leav-
ing. Are you?
A. No.
Q. Why would he have to express a
hope like that in public? Wouldn't he
just know for sure that you weren't?
A. He does know for sure, and I
don't know where all of these rumors
about my leaving came from. They had
absolutely nothing to do with me and
nothing to do with the President. Just
the sort of thing that people tend to cook
up around Washington, but there's ab-
solutely nothing to it.
Q. Are you going to stay on if
there's a second term?
A. I have to be invited by the Presi-
dent before I can make any statement of
that kind, but I came here to serve the
President, I'm one of the President's
guys, and I will be sticking with him.
But I don't want to say anything now
that in any way precludes or prejudices
his ability to decide whatever he wants
about who should be in this great post
for a second term.
Q. But if he asked you. would you
be willing to stay on. or would you
prefer to go and do something else?
A. If I answered that question, I'd
be putting him in a spot, so I think I'd
just leave it that I'm here to serve the
President and do what he wants me to
do, and I'll just leave it at that.
Q. Some commentators have sug-
gested that because you invested so
much time and your own prestige in
helping Israel and Lebanon to negoti-
ate the May 17 agreement, that it's a
matter of personal pride to you not to
see it abrogated.
A. I did invest a lot of time in it, and
so did others in our government. But we
have to look upon it as a document of
state, and it's something between Israel
and Lebanon. I think it's a good agree-
THE SECRETARY
ment, independent of whether I had
anything to do with it or not. and I hope
that I'm grown up enough not to get
myself all entangled in some sort of ego
trip in something like that.
Q. Back in October, on the 24th.
you said, "If we are driven out of
Lebanon, radical and rejectionist
elements will have scored a major vic-
tory." Do you see that now as a
danger, to the extent that the United
States has been driven back, if not out?
Have those elements scored a major
victory, and is that the direction of
your anxiety about what may happen
this evening?
A. One of the major problems that
we see in Lebanon is the emergence of
state-sponsored terrorism, and I believe
this is something that we must take very
seriously in this country, and we really
haven't faced up to it.
We've had a number of deaths of our
Marines and other personnel in Lebanon,
but these have been dramatically punc-
tuated by two tragic acts of massive ter-
rorism. These are state- supported acts in
which large numbers of Americans lost
their lives, one in our Embassy and one
in the Marine compound.
This is a kind of warfare, really, that
is something different for us. It's not
enough, I don't believe, to defend
yourself against this form of terrorism.
We have to improve our intelligence
capability, and we have to think through
how, within the concept of the rule of
law which we hold so deai", we can take
a more aggressive posture toward what
is a worldwide and very undesirable
trend.
It, of course, is not only the two big
acts of terrorism that took place but the
murder of the President of the American
University of Beirut and many other
acts. Fore.xample, much has been made
about the fact that the Lebanese Armed
Force has been having difficulty holding
itself together, and I think under the cir-
cumstances it's held together remarkably
well. But here's the kind of thing that
happens: An officer 2 days ago received
a call from a terrorist saying. "If you
don't leave the Lebanese armed force ^
within an hour, your son will be shot."
The phone is hung up. An hour later he
gets a call from a hospital. His son has
been shot. That's terror, and people pay
attention to it.
This is one of the lessons that
emerges out of Lebanon, and I think it's
something we must think about very
much harder than we ever have before.
32
Q. Can we turn for a few moments
to events in Central America? I'd like
to get your reaction to the Nicaraguan
Government's announcement that they
were going to hold elections a year
earlier than planned— November 1984,
in fact.
A. They keep changing their minds
about when they're going to hold an elec-
tion, but I think elections are basically
good if conducted in a proper way. There
are lots of elections held in this world,
such as those in the Soviet Union, that
don't mean much, but elections in many
countries do mean a great deal, and we
favor that kind of a process.
Q. How far does this announce-
ment-at least that they're going to
hold elections, and the announcement
that they will be freeing up the press
and liberalizing other things for the
opposition— how far does that go in
satisfying U.S. concerns about the
direction of the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment?
A. The direction is fine, but the ex-
tent to which they're going is certainly
an open question whether there will be a
genuine open press situation, whether
competing candidates will have the time
and opportunity to oi-ganize political par-
ties and have the right of assembly, and
have the right of open criticism of the
government, and all of these things that
are part of life as we know it in an open
and democratic system. If those things
happen, they'll be quite a long distance
from this current situation in Nicaragua,
and I think we'll be watching very
carefully to see what does happen.
Q. To the extent that these are
among the things that the United
States has said it wants to see in
Nicaragua, I mean, would you ac-
knowledge that there is some progress
being made because of U.S. pressure?
A. Whether it's because of U.S.
pressure or not, I don't know. I think
thei-e is. particularly in South America
and in our hemisphere, a very strong
trend toward democracy, and the
Nicaraguans are feeling it. They're one
of the few isolated places now that
doesn't express a belief in democracy,
Cuba being an outstanding other
example.
So they may be feeling that trend,
but the actual conduct of a genuine elec-
tion where opposition has a chance to
organize and alternative candidates are
put forward and the process is conducted
in an orderly way and a fair way, they're
a long way from that.
Q. Are you encouraged at all about
what they have said they're going to
do?
A. If they follow through on it. If the
reality will follow the rhetoric, that's all
a plus.
Q. What would it take for the
United States to stop aiding the anti-
Sandinista insurgents, the Contras,
waging a guerrilla campaign against
the country from Honduras?
A. Of course, the problem the
Nicaraguan Government has is that
there are a lot of Nicaraguans who don't
like at all what they're doing. There are
a lot of people who participated in the
original Sandinista revolution back in
1979 who have become very disen-
chanted, and it's easy to see why that
should be so.
And so the problem of the
Nicaraguan Government is not the
United States; it's themselves and the
conditions that they're creating that are
leading people who have been
Nicaraguans and are Nicaraguans to
have the attitude that the Contras have.
Q. So the United States will con-
tinue to support the Contras until that
point?
A. I'm trying not to answer your
question in a gentle way but to point out
what the real thrust behind the Contras
is. namely, theii- dissatisfaction with the
way in which they're being treated by
the Nicaraguan Govenmient.
Q. Turning briefly to El Salvador,
just a little while ago, all of the eight
members of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee voted to tie aid to E!
Salvador to the country's progress on
human rights which you have been op-
posed to. What's your reaction to that
move, and what do you think is wrong
with that?
A. I've never been opposed to that. I
think that it's essential that we in our
foreign policy generally, as well as in El
Salvador, conduct our foreign policy in a
manner as consistent as we can with the
values that we hold as the tenets of our
own society. That must include not only
democracy" but the rule of law. proper
judicial procedures, and in El Salvador
doing something about the death squads.
Actually, over the past 3 to 4 years,
the number of killings has declined very,
very sharply, but it's still not satisfac-
tory because there are too many still go-
ing on. And we have spoken about that
very sharply, we have worked on that,
and, as a matter of fact, even in recent
months there's been some real progress.
Department of State Bulletir
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THE SECRETARY
The question isn't whether we are
for or against that— we're all against that
in this country; the question is, at a
given moment of time, what's the most
effective way to deal with it, and that's
the only argument.
Q. So are you saying that at this
point in time the most effective way is
not to tie aid to human rights prog-
ress?
A. I think it's a question of whether
you want to tie it in the sense of putting
down a certain set of dates periodically
where a decision— a yes/no type deci-
sion—is going to be made, or whether
you want to certainly tie those two
things together but provide for greater
administrative flexibility in administering
that concept. And I think that there are
times when probably set dates work, and
I think we've gotten some mileage out of
that.
But I do have a question on my mind
about whether or not a different way of
going about it wouldn't be more effec-
tive. But in the end I think we are going
to want to somehow work this around
and come to agreement and decide what
is the most effective way to implement
what we all agree on. There's no dis-
agreement about the importance of deal-
ing with human rights problems.
Q. How would you describe your
optimism about the possibilities raised
by having a new leadership in Moscow,
the possibilities of improved relations?
A. There's always some new
possibilities posed by new leadership. I
think basically we have to remember
that the new leader has been part and
parcel of the leadership of the Soviet
Union for a considerable period, and so I
think basically we can assume a certain
measure of continuity.
I think it's important for us to ex-
amine our own posture which is that we
need to be realistic all the time, don't kid
yourself— that we have to keep saying
that to ourselves, don't let the wish be
the father to the thought here. We have
to look to our strength— our military
strength, our economic strength— our
sense of purpose, reference to these
human rights concerns that we talked
about with respect to El Salvador, and
we have to be ready to talk and
negotiate. And if we can find reasonable
agreements to make, to be ready to
make them and work hard to do that.
That is the posture of the President,
and in the meetings the Vice President
and Senator Baker and our Ambassador
Hartman had with the new Soviet
leadership, it seemed that they are ex-
pressing a similar viewpoint. So now we
have to roll up our sleeves and test out
these intentions, and perhaps they feel
the same way. If both sides are able to
approach this in good faith, maybe we'll
be able to accomplish something. It re-
mains to be seen, however.
Q. When you saw Foreign Minister
Gromyko for 5 hours in Stockholm, it
was reported that you were going to
propose to him that some of the more
difficult negotiations like arms control
might be pursued in private and away
from the glare of publicity and pur-
sued, perhaps, across a broader range
of issues including human rights. Did
you, in fact, suggest that, and would
that be the forum for testing out the
new leadership?
A. First of all, we always try to keep
before the Soviet Union, in our discus-
sions with them, our full agenda of
things, which include arms control and
which, of course, there are many aspects
of that subject; which include regional
issues such as Afghanistan, Central
America, and other such places; which
include bilateral problems; and which in-
clude something that they don't like to
discuss with us at all, namely, our con-
cerns about human rights and human
treatment in the Soviet Union.
So all those things we have before
us. We think that there is a role for very
private discussions as well as the public
negotiations that we see going on in
Geneva and Vienna and Stockholm and
other places. And they go on, and in the
course of discussions between me and
Mr. Gromyko, between our Ambassadors
and respective Foreign Ministers, and in
other ways.
It certainly is true that the glare of
publicity makes it difficult to work on
some of these delicate issues, so we seek
a way to remove that.
Q. So are such talks going on now?
A. You mentioned my talk with Mr.
Gromyko. I see the Soviet Ambassador
from time to time, our Ambassador sees
Mr. Gromyko in Moscow, and we try to
have a dialogue going.
Q. How do you favor getting the
Soviets back to the nuclear arms talks,
in particular the ones on medium- or
intermediate-range missiles in Europe?
A. Those are talks in which we have
put forward strong and good negotiating
positions, both in the intermediate-range
talks and in the strategic talks. And we
are in a posture of readiness for give and
take—
Q. But is your posture just to wait?
A. And I think that for you to say
that because the Soviet Union walks
away, we should change our position and
offer them something to come back
would be— that's poor negotiating
posture.
Q. So the United States is just go-
ing to wait?
A. We will continue to be in a posi-
tion of ready for give and take and with
reasonable positions on the table-
remember, in the intermediate-range
talks, the positions we've taken are not
simply something that the United States
thought up. We're negotiating on behalf
of our allies, and the positions have been
closely coordinated with them and have
met the test of reasonableness of a lot of
other countries.
Q. I see. But you don't contemplate
new initiatives at present to get them
back to the talks?
A. We think it's a very bad idea if
somebody walks out of talks to say, "All
right, we'll change our position in order
to get you back."
'Press release 52 of Feb. 24, 1984.
INTERVIEW
Under Secretary Eagleburger's
Interview on "This Week
With David Brinkley"
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Laivretice S. Eagleburger was inter-
viewed on ABC-TV's "This Week With
David Brinkley" on February 12, 198U,
by David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson,
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC
News analyst.
Q. Do you expect any real difference in
Soviet- American relations as a result
of the change in the Kremlin, whatever
it turns out to be?
A. Basically, I think no, particularly
on the assumption that Chemenko is the
chosen—
Q. That's the story.
A. —and I think we have to assume,
on the basis of what we have now, that
that's likely, although not certain. I don't
think there's likely to be much change in
U.S. -Soviet relationships. I think,
frankly, and it's one point that I don't
think was made adequately earlier in the
program. We've seen evidence over the
course of the last year that by and large
the Soviet decisionmaking process has
been in neutral, at best. We've had
mi.xed signals from the Soviets for more
than a year now, partly I think because
Andropov was coming into power and
then became sick. I don't think, for a
while at least, that's Ukely to change. We
are in another transition.
Chernenko, if he is the man, is going
to have to take some months to solidify
his power. He comes, I think, from that
part of the governing mechanism that is
pretty cautious and conservative in
terms of change. By and large we're go-
ing to see a Soviet policy that is not
much different from what we've seen
over the last several years. And not very
well articulated.
Q. When you say "mixed signals,"
do you mean conflicting signals that
suggested there was some confusion
and di.sordcr there?
A. I couldn't say it better. I think
they have been confused and disorderly
for most of 1983. I think at one point, we
would get one set of signals that in-
dicated perhaps some things could be
done, and then very shortly thereafter
there would be a hard move to the right,
to the tougher answer.
I think they have been confu.sed, and
I think their leadership has been at sixes
34
and sevens with each other, and I sup-
pose that's not unusual, given a new
leader and then given the illness.
Q. On the one hand, we're told a
leader is not all that important
because he is a part of a collective
leadership group. If that is the case,
why couldn't they get together and
agree on what their policies are?
A. I don't agree with the point that a
leader doesn't make any difference. I
think he makes some difference. I think
in the Brezhnev era— when Brezhnev
particularly was at his height of his
powers— it was clear that Brezhnev made
a difference. I think what we've seen
thereafter is a much more collective
leadership, but a collective leadership
that does not always agree with itself
And as a consequence, the signals have
been mixed.
Q. There's an obvious political in-
centive for an American President in
an election year to have a summit
meeting, but this Administration has
set a fairly exacting standard, the
meaning of which I would like you to
clarify. It is that the summit, in order
to be held, must have a chance for
serious, substantive success. Does that
mean agreements, pieces of paper,
arms control? What does that mean,
substantively?
A. I don't think it necessarily means
that, although obviously that would be
one way to define it. I should say that
the position hasn't changed, and I don't
think that there will be any change in
the signals when the Vice President is in
Moscow for the funeral. We are clear on
where we are on a summit, and it hasn't
changed.
It doesn't necessarily mean
agreements, although obviously that's
one possible definition. What it does
mean is that if they meet, we must e.v
pect that when they finish with that
meeting that some way or another there
will have been some substantive result,
the point being, it is not in our view sen-
sible to have a summit if all you do is sit
there and talk to each other.
Q. What does the adjective
"substantive" imply? Is a change in
atmosphere substance enough?
zamm
A. No. Let me try to give you an ex-
ample, and it's just pulled out of the air.
For example, it might well be that the
two could meet and talk about southern
Africa, and if in the process they were
able to come to some conclusions on how
the United States and the Soviet Union
ought to conduct themselves in the con-
text of what's going on in southern
Afi-ica, I suppose I would call that a
substantive result, though nothing might
be written down on a piece of paper. But
talk for the sake of talk just does not
seem to us to be sensible.
Q. Is it correct that Vice President
Bush has a mandate to feel out the
Soviet leadership, or leader, if there is
one by Tuesday, on this question of a
summit?
A. The basic answer to that question
has to be no. He is going there to repre-
sent the United States, to tell the Soviet
Union that the policies that this Ad-
ministration has espoused for .3 years
continue in effect. Now I am not saying
that the Vice President may not, in the
course of conversations, talk about the
possibilities of the leaders getting
together, if it is possible to arrive at
some substantive outcome.
Q. You describe a situation in
which you expect a period of pause as
far as the Soviet ability to move for-
ward.
A. I would say a continuation of an
inability to move forward.
Q. .\11 right, but you said that if we
have a new leader, he'll have to con-
solidate his power. If it is a collective
leadership that goes on for a period of
months, you don't think there's going
to be a way for the Soviets to move
forward. So my question is this. Does
it make sense for the United States to
offer something at this point, say, in
the deployment of missiles in Europe?
We'll stop for a while until you can get
your act together and then we'll go
back to the conference table.
A. Speaking for myself I think it
makes no sense whatsoever. We have
been, for more than a yeai', really coming
to a culmination with the President's
speech several weeks ago, we have laid
out to the Soviet Union for some time a
pi'ogram for trying to deal with the ma-
jor issues that exist between the United
States and the Soviet Union. That is still
our program. We're ready to go back to
the negotiating table on INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] and
START [strategic arms reduction talks]
tomorrow moming, if that's what they
want, we're ready to move with those
steps. To offer something now to the
Department of State Bulletin
INTERVIEW
Soviet Union in addition to what we
already have on the table I think simply
gives Moscow the wTong signal. They
know what we want. They know what
we are prepared to do. I don't know
why—
Q. They are not in charge, ap-
parently, to the extent that they can
make a decision to move back from
their position.
A. It is an interesting fact that
people can argue that since they are not
in charge, we need to make more conces-
sions. I don't understand that argument
at all.
Q. There is a rumor in this town
that there is an open and active back
channel in which we are proposing and
receiving arms control proposals—
A. It's not true.
Q. Okay, flatly denied.
A. Not true.
Q. In view of the fact that the
Soviet Union's foreign policy, for
several years, has been a total failure,
from their own standpoint— expansion
into Afghanistan, Africa, trying to
separate us from our European allies,
all failed— do you see that they will
persist in this, or might they not see,
with a new leader, it's time to try
something else?
A. One has to hope that they will see
that they need to try something else.
Part of the problem I think is that
bureaucracy is so ponderous, and in the
absence of somebody who is clearly,
forcefully in charge, it is so difficult to
move it off paths that are sort of worn in
the road, if you will, I think it is unlikely
for some period of time that we will see
major changes in one direction or the
other.
Therefore, I think it is also terribly
important that the United States make
clear where we stand, make clear that
we are prepared to continue with
negotiations and that we are trying to
find solutions, but also don't get into this
panic rushing toward offering new solu-
tions to problems, because they won't
work.
Q. In a century of change and flux,
one of the few constants is the purpose
of the Soviet state and its foreign
policy. You say at one point that the
leaders have been at sixes and sevens.
What are they disagreeing about? You
say it takes a while for them to move
out of a rut. What evidence do we have
that they want to change?
A. Again, I think there's a difference
between the strategy, although even
there I think the Soviets don't have
April 1984
much of a strategy, and the tactics. I
think a lot of the debate has been, one,
whether continuing to carry out foreign
policy programs which have patently not
worked, whether that doesn't mean that
there needs to be some shifts and some
changes, with some I suppose arguing
that you need to be a little bit easier in
your dealings with the United States. I
think consistently when that argument
has taken place in 1983, the hardliners
have won the argument, but I think
thei'e ai-e probably some who say, but
we've got to shift, we've got to deal with
the United States in a different way. I
think those are where the arguments
have been, not on the long-term objec-
tive, no.
Q. There was some discussion in
Washington in the last day or two
about whether the President. Mr.
Reagan, should go to the funeral. It
was decided he would not go. What
was the thinking that went into that
decision?
A. Here again, I think, one, the rela-
tionship with the Soviets and with Mr.
Andropov over the course of the last
year have not been particularly close.
Two, the Vice President represented us
at the last funeral. It was appropriate
this time. For the President to go now
would have implied all sorts of things in
terms of the relationship with the Soviet
Union that simply aren't true, and,
therefore, it was thought by the Presi-
dent best that he stay here.
Q. It might also have seemed to
have been politically motivated.
A. Obviously that's going to be an
issue any time this year at all.
Q. Clear up a little bit of confusion
on Lebanon. Is it correct that the
Marines are coming out of Lebanon,
going to be put on those ships within a
month, except for a couple of hundred
who will have garrison duty for the
Embassy and Ambassador's residence?
A. I wish I could clear up your confu-
sion. The best I can say at this point is
that we are consulting with our MNF
[multinational force] partners. We are
consulting with the Lebanese Govern-
ment. We will try to move those Marines
from the shore to the ships with all due
and deliberate speed, but as quickly as
we can. But I cannot at this point give
you a specific timeframe.
Q. There is no timetable?
A. I'm not saying there isn't a
timetable. I'm saying we're discussing
this whole question with our allies and
with the Lebanese, and until we finish
those consultations I wouldn't want to go
any further.
Q. Is part of that discussion a
discussion over whether we can put
together a UN force? The Syrians have
suggested, I believe, that perhaps they
would now go for that.
A. Part of the discussion is not about
the question of a UN force, part of this
consultation. That isn't to say that the
question of a UN force isn't under con-
sideration and I—
Q. Is it under consideration?
A. It is under consideration, has been
for months, and I notice now that the
Syrians are talking about perhaps a UN
force would be possible. I have, myself, a
problem with that, which is that basically
I think you are going to find it difficult
to get people, countries, to contribute to
a UN force until there is a situation in
Lebanon that is stabilized. These coun-
tries are not going to want to put people
into that maelstrom, to be shot at. When
things have stabilized, I think that then
you will find that it's possible to get con-
tributors to a UN force, which doesn't go
to the question about whether or not a
UN force now might make sense. It's
simply, I'm not sure you can put one
together.
Q. You mean the Scandinavians
would not be eager to succeed us at the
Beirut Airport?
A. I think that's probably right.
Q. Last Thursday, I believe, a week
before, the President told the editors of
The Wall Street Journal that the
presence of our Marines in Lebanon
was important for the survival of
Lebanon, U.S. credibility, and the
hope for peace in the Middle East. Six
days later, the announcement is made
that they are going to come out and be
redeployed. When was that decision
made? Was it made on Sunday, on
Saturday? I mean, how close to the in-
terview?
A. First of all, I said the same thing
to a House Foreign Affairs Committee
hearing at about the same time. Without
trying to get into the exact dates— when
the President said what he said, and
when I said what I said, decisions had
not been made.
But there's a more fundamental point
here, I think, which is that we would
argue strenuously that, as [Secretary of
Defense] Cap Weinberger did earlier on
your program, that we are redeploying
those Marines from the land to the ships.
They are not leaving Lebanon. So that
our argument is that, under any cir-
cumstances, we are putting them in a dif-
ferent location, but they are still in
35
AFRICA
Lebanon and the fleet is still there;
therefore, we have not redeployed out of
Lebanon.
Q. On Saturday, the President said,
in his radio address, he was not going
to cut and run in Lebanon.
A. So did I.
Q. That's right, and your credibil-
ity has been attacked by people on
Capitol Hill, and I think one reason
was that we were told— reports at the
White House— that the decision was
made in principle to remove the
Marines, on February 1st. Was that an
untrue—
A. Don't hold me to the dates. I
think the February 1st date is, in fact,
quite wrong. But that, again, is not the
point.
Q. Then why were we told that?
Simply to be misled into thinking that
this was an orderly process that had
been gone through?
A. Why were you told what?
Q. That the decision in principle
had been made by the President on
February 1st?
A. The issue and the question of how
we might redeploy was looked at for a
fairly long period of time. There is no
argument about that at all. Decisions
were made after the President had made
his statements. But I come back to say-
ing again, you can't redefine for us what
we consider to be presence in Lebanon,
and on those ships is still presence in
Lebanon. It is not cutting and running.
Q. How far do the ships have to go
from Lebanon to be not in Lebanon?
A. I can't answer that question. They
are off the shore in Lebanon. They are
where the Marines could be put back in
a short period of time and where the
New Jersey and a lot of other ships can
fire as they have been doing.
Q. Why continue to fire at Syria
and Syria-occupied positions when, in
fact, Syria is one of the major players
necessary to put together a government
in Lebanon?
A. Until the Syrians change the en-
tire way in which they have approached
the issue of Lebanon, they are going to
have to be dealt with when they fire at
us or threaten our people in Beirut.
We're going to fire back. We've made
that clear, and I don't know why
everybody is so surprised about that.
Q. We got a statement— just came
in a minute ago from Dama.scus— from
the Syrian Foreign Minister that
Syria's patience is not unlimited. Does
U.S., Angola, South
Africa Discuss Peace
JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
FEB. 16. 1984'
On February 16, 1984, delegations of the
People's Republic of Angola, the
Republic of South Africa, and the United
States of America met in Lusaka to
discuss steps to further the process of
peace in southern Africa. The Angolan
delegation was headed by Minister of In-
terior Alexandre Rodriguez, the South
Afi-ican delegation was headed by
Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha,
and the American delegation was led by
Assistant Secretary of State [for African
Affaii-s] Chester A. Crocker. Responding
to President Kaunda's assessment that a
historic opportunity now exists to make
progress, the conference achieved the
following results:
• Creation of a joint South
African/ Angolan commission to monitor
the disengagement process in southern
Angola and to detect, investigate, and
report any alleged violations of the com-
mitments of the parties;
• The first meeting of the joint com-
mission took place in Lusaka on
February 16. Further meetings will be
held in other mutually agreed locations
at the convenience of the parties;
• It was agreed that a small number
of American representatives would par-
ticipate in the activities of the joint com-
mission at the i-equest of the parties. The
delegations agreed that the task of the
joint commission in the weeks ahead is to
facilitate the successful completion of the
disengagement process and to establish
an effective cessation of hostilities. The
delegations are aware of the many com-
plex and unresolved issues which must
still be addressed in the search for solu-
tions to the problems of the region. They
agi-ee, however, that the Lusaka meeting
constitutes an important and construc-
tive step toward the peaceful resolution
of the problems of the region, including
the question of the implementation of
UN Secui'ity Council Resolution 435.
The participants express their deep
appreciation to President Kaunda and
the Government and people of Zambia
and for the generous hospitality and ex-
cellent arrangements provided in connec-
tion with the conference.
'Released in Lusaka and made available
to news con-espondents by acting Department
spokesman Alan Romberg. ■
that frighten, startle, or upset you in
any way?
A. Mr. Khaddam is noted for his
statements, I guess, but the basic point,
I think, is that the Syrians have been,
are now, and I suspect will continue to
be for some period of time the basic
problem with finding a solution to the
tragedy of Lebanon. I don't much care
whether his patience is close to ex-
hausted or not; it is largely irrelevant.
They have been acting like a bull in a
china closet for some weeks now, and I
don't think this changes anything.
Q. One solution to the tragedy of
Lebanon is to get rid of Lebanon. That
is, granted that the President—
A. The Lebanese might not like that.
Q. They might not. but the Presi-
dent says the Syrians are bent on ter-
ritorial conquest. A principle of
American policy, not just in the Middle
East but everywhere, has been the in-
tegrity of exi.sting states.
Given the fact that Syria has an
awful lot of Lebanon, that possession
of nine-tenths of ownership, that they
claim all of Lebanon to begin with for
greater Syria, are you ruling out flatly
American acceptance of the partition
of Lebanon?
A. I am not in a position to rule it in
or out. I, myself, believe that if you look
at U.S. policy with regard to Lebanon
over the course of the last months, we
have made it clear that our objective and
certainly our desire is a Lebanon that is
free. I can't say that we're going to ac-
cept a partition of Lebanon. Clearly, our
statements and our policy has been in
another direction.
I also have to say that, you know,
there is a certain degi-ee to which we can
control events and obviously there is a
limit beyond which we cannot. I don't
know what's going to happen. I can
simply say we're not for a partitioned
Lebanon.
Q. What do we have to control
events besides the guns of the fleet?
A. Basically we have the guns of the
fleet. We have, hopefully, the ability
still-although I agree with you that
36
Department of State Bulletin
EAST ASIA
chances are slimmer— the ability of
Gemayel to put together a broader based
government, and we have obviously the
Israelis sitting there. They are not irrele-
vant to this question. And one has to
hope that as Mr. Assad and his rather
mouthy Foreign Minister look to the
future, they may recognize that Syria's
longer term interests require some sort
of accommodation.
Q. What is the Israeli relevance?
They've been irrelevant so far— 20
kilometers away from our Marines,
and of no particular relevance.
A. I don't think it's true that they
have been iri-elevant. I think the Syrians
do not consider them irrelevant. The way
in which the Israelis act and now will
react to events in Lebanon I think is
something the Syrians clearly have to
take account of.
Q. Do you anticipate that President
Gemayel will not abrogate the May
17th agreement with Israel, the
withdrawal agreement, and would we
support an abrogation of it?
A. The U.S. ixisition with regard to
the May 17th agi'eement is clear: We
helped arrive at that agreement; we sup-
port that agreement. I suppose that if
the Lebanese and the Israelis themselves
indicate a desire to change that agree-
ment or in some way to deal with it, we
are not going to stand in the way of it.
But on the other hand, as far as we are
concerned, we have said it time and
again, that May 17th agreement is
something we are associated with and
we're not going to walk away from it.
Q. The Israelis say they don't want
it abrogated. But that leaves President
Gemayel twisting in the wind, doesn't
it?
A. I don't know that it leaves Presi-
dent Gemayel twisting in the wind for
several reasons. The first of which is the
May 17th agi'eement as far as the
Syrians are concerned is in my judgment
a phony. And if there were no May 17th
agreement, Mr. Assad and Mr. Khaddam
would be looking for some other excuse.
Right now they're using the May 17th
agreement. What we need to remember
is that that May 17th agi'eement was an
attempt between Israel and Lebanon to
arrive at a settlement. And the Syrian
objection to May 17 is clearly that no
Arab state ought to sign an agreement
with Israel. Now one has to ask oneself
whether that is sensible from an
American point of view, and I happen to
think not. ■
Recent Situation in the Philippines
by John C. Monjo
Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asia and the Pacific of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee 07i
February 7, 198Jt. Mr. Monjo is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. '
I am pleased to address today the situa-
tion in the Philippines and the state of
U.S. -Philippine relations. I intend to
cover today developments since my last
appearance before the committee in
September not long after the tragic
assassination of former Senator Benigno
S. Aquino. I shall speak of political,
financial, and economic developments, in-
cluding the assassination investigation
and preparations for the May 1984
parliamentary election. I shall touch on
U.S. policies in the wake of these
developments. My presentation will also
address the major areas of interest the
committee indicated in its letter of invita-
tion.
Political Developments Since
the Aquino Assassination
Since my earlier appearance before you,
there has been a series of important
developments which have invigorated the
Philippine political scene. Appreciable
progress has been made. However, there
is still some way to go, and it is still far
from certain that the opposition will par-
ticipate in the May parliamentary elec-
tion.
Perhaps the most striking political
development in the Philippines following
the Aquino assassination is the entrance
into active politics of organized groups of
businessmen and professionals. They
have engaged in dialogue with Pi-esident
Marcos personally and with New Society
Movement (KBL) party leaders, they
deal with the opposition, and they speak
out on the issues. They organize peaceful
demonstrations. Some have helped to
oi'ganize and launch a new new^spaper,
Veritas, with ties to the Catholic Church.
These newly politicized groups have
spearheaded attempts to resolve political
problems through the give and take of
negotiations involving the government,
the opposition, and representatives of
the private sector. The negotiations seem
to be going on at several different levels
simultaneously and are aimed primarily
at clarifying the ground rules for the
May 1984 parliamentary election. In-
evitably, this involves the parametei's
governing participation in the election by
the moderate political opposition, as well
as the political strategies of both the
government and the opposition.
The negotiations began last year with
a backdrop of peaceful, frequent, well-
organized, and well-attended demonstra-
tions in urban areas, primarily in Manila,
which called for orderly political change
in the wake of the Aquino assassination.
The government has also shown
restraint and generally refrained from
using force to deal with the demonstra-
tions. To their great credit, all parties to
the political debate have avoided
violence, which they rightly recognize
would further disrupt the prospects for
restoring political and economic stability.
The Catholic Church, in paiticular, has
stressed the need for national reconcilia-
tion among the various conflicting
groups. The steady drumbeat of street
politics Philippine-style, with its
manifestations of political humor and
yellow confetti, subsided during the holi-
day season but picked up again just last
week with a very large and peaceful
demonstration in Manila led by Senator
Aquino's brother, Agapito.
Another indication of change in the
aftermath of the assassination is in the
sphere of press freedom. A significant
expansion in the limits of press freedom
has occurred since September with the
proliferation of press organs carrying
sharp criticism of government policy and
generally more balanced treatment of
issues in the major dailies. Some e.x-
am])les: Malaya, an opposition sister
publication of the closed down We
Forum, now has a larger circulation na-
tionwide than We Forum ever did.
Business Day provides independent
coverage and critical commentary to a
nationwide readership, as does the
newest newspaper, Veritas.
Meanwhile, although the communist
New People's Army (NPA) insurgency
continues its steady growth in various
pai'ts of the country, as it has for several
years, we do not view the NPA as a
serious, near-term political threat, nor do
the events ensuing from the Aquino
assassination appear in themselves to
have bolstered support for the com-
munist movement in the Philippines.
The Marcos government has re-
sponded positively to several of the im-
portant demands of the opposition and
the middle class business community.
April 1984
37
EAST ASIA
Some of these decisions were made after
vigorous intense debate within the KBL
party and after initial opposition on the
pai-t of President Marcos. These include:
• A new presidential succession
mechanism which in any future election
will restore the vice presidency;
• Province-based elections for parlia-
ment;
• Agi-eement to conduct a new voter
registration nationwide; and
• Suspension until June 1 of the issu-
ance of preventive detention orders,
which permit an-est without warrant and
allow persons to be held without bail un-
til the President orders release.
The government has agi-eed in prin-
ciple to several other measures, including
appointments of additional members to
the Election Commission upon the
recommendation of various gi-oups,
electoral code amendments, abolition of
bloc voting, allowing individuals to
change party affiliation, and accreditation
of political parties.
These conciliatory moves, which
responded to public pressure, have
helped to defuse the tense political at-
mosphere in Manila in recent months. In
particular, the new presidential succes-
sion mechanism, while it did not please
everyone, served to remove the issue
from" active contention, at least for the
time being, with apparent benefits for
the political stability of the country as
well.
The opposition's demands for political
reform are more far-reaching, however.
As a condition for their agi-eement to
participate in the parliamentary election,
leaders of key moderate opposition
groups, including some who earlier were
advocating participation, as well as those
advocating boycott, have asked President
Marcos to repeal all the presidential
decrees which bestow on the Philippine
President martial law-type powers. They
demand the outright repeal of the Presi-
dent's authority to legislate by decree,
restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, repeal of all other decrees
dealing with national security, and agree-
ment to several other measures. The op-
position leaders have stated that, if these
demands are not met by February 14,
the opposition will actively boycott the
election.
In sum. we are, therefore, in a
delicate period of negotiation involving
the government, the opposition, and the
newly politicized business leaders.
Aquino Assassination
Investigation
The Agrava board of inquiry into the
Aquino assassination appears from all in-
dications to be proceeding conscien-
tiously and expeditiously with its inquiry
and seems committed to pursuing the
evidence wherever it leads. As a result,
its reputation among Filipinos has stead-
ily improved since its composition was
announced in October 1983, and it now
appears to enjoy considerable public
credibility. The ultimate test will come,
of course, when the board completes its
hearing and reports its findings simul-
taneously to the Philippine Government
and the "public. This is not likely to hap-
pen for some time.
The United States is on record as ex-
pecting the Philippine Government to act
swiftly and vigorously to track down
Senator Aquino's murderers. We are,
therefore, following the progi-ess of the
inquiry with gi-eat interest.
Economic Developments
While there have been positive
developments in the political arena since
last I appeared before you. the economic
situation has seriously deteriorated.
As a result of the political unrest
following the Aquino assassination,
plus the growing signs that the Philip-
pine balance-of-payments deficit would
greatly exceed government estimates,
trade "financing by foreign banks began
to evaporate in the third quarter of 1983.
Fiscal and balance-of-payments problems
had been aggi-avated during all of 1982
and 1983 by low commodity prices for
Philippine "exports, high interest rates on
external borrowing, slowed export
growth, depressed domestic demand, and
reduced private investment activity.
The situation grew more acute in
October, when the Philippines was
forced further to devalue the peso, de-
clared a moratorium on payments of
private debt principal, and later sought
rescheduling of all foreign debt. Devalua-
tion placed upward pressure on prices at
home, and inflation climbed to double
digit levels at the end of 1983. Inputs are
down sharply, factories are closing or
laying off workers. Total outstanding
foreign debt as of mid-October 1983 was
$24.6 billion.
The Philippine Government clearly
faces foi-midable problems, but other
countries are facing and dealing suc-
cessfully with problems of a similar
nature. The first order of business will
be to conclude the lengthy discussions
between the Intei-national Monetary
Fund and the Government of the Philip-
pines for a standby agi'eement. This
agreement and the foreign debt resched-
uling it should make possible will likely
entail certain painful, but necessai-y,
austerity measures that are not politi-
cally welcome anywhere. However, once
the standby is in place, debt reschedul-
ing can proceed, and that will open up
the possibility for access to new foreign
commercial and government financing
that will be needed to reinvigorate the
economy. In the short terni, however,
present" economic hardships and rismg
unemplojTnent figui'es are hkely to
become major issues during the election
campaign.
Close Bilateral Relationship
Because the ties between the United
States and the Philippines are long and
deep, it is vital that we underline at the
outset the need for a policy that looks to
the longer term in our relationship. Our
bilateral ties today rest on the founda-
tion of shared history, common suffering
during wai", close people-to-people ties, a
solid record of cooperation in economic
development, and healthy trade and in-
vestment. Our close security partnership,
manifested in the existence of U.S.
military facilities at Clark and Subic and
our Mutual Defense Treaty, is another
ingredient in the relationship. Our in-
terests, shared over the years by suc-
cessive Administrations in Washington
and Manila, have taken on a new impor-
tance in the 1980's, particularly in view
of the Soviet buildup in the South China
Sea and Vietnam.
Over the past years, our security ties
with the Philippines have been excellent.
This is the principal reason we concluded
the review of our Military Bases Agree-
ment so rapidly and amicably last spring.
It behooves us to preserve the quality of
these ties with an old ally. By doing so,
we avoid having our military facilities
become a major focus of political debate
within the Philippines, always a possibil-
ity during unsettled political times but
one that we have successfully avoided
during the past months. Except among a
small minority of opposition-oriented
Filipino nationalists, anti-Americanism
has not figm-ed prominently in the
political debate of recent months.
38
'etin
^SKi
EUROPE
U.S. Policy
Throughout the difficult, even traumatic,
past 6 months of Philippine history, our
policy toward this important ally has re-
mained steadfast. With an eye toward all
of our long-term interests, we have
spoken out consistently, both publicly
and through active private diplomacy,
along the following lines.
• The United States believes firmly
that a free and fair electoral process in
which Filipinos can place their confidence
is the key to I'esolution of the political
problems left in the wake of the Aquino
assassination. A fail- election will do
much to bind the political wounds that
are still open. We trust that responsible
Philippine leaders from the govei-nment,
the opposition, and the private sector
will make those extra efforts needed to
make this electoral process a genuine
milestone in the political normalization
process. If this election is successful, it
could be the vehicle for bringing into
democratic political life a whole new
generation of office holders.
• The United States looks forward
with keen interest to the outcome of the
work of the Agrava board, as it con-
tinues resolutely in its investigation of
the Aquino assassination. The board has
already established a sound record of ac-
complishment. We believe its work has
contributed significantly to lowering the
political temperature of the country over
the past months. We e.xpect it to pursue
its investigation vigorously to its logical
conclusion.
• We are keenly aware that no
amount of political reform can prosper in
an atmosphere of severe economic dislo-
cation—and the reverse is also true.
Economic distress can only assist radical
elements inimical to our fundamental in-
terest in a stable Philippines. For that
reason, we have attempted to respond to
the Philippines' economic needs by seek-
ing, within the limits of U.S. law and
resources, to make available to the
Philippine economy the liquidity needed
to resolve the immediate crisis. We have
done this through accelerated economic
support fund disbursements, provision of
U.S. E.xport-Import Bank lines of in-
surance guarantees to facilitate sales of
industrial pi-oducts and agricultural com-
modities, and provision of Commodity
Credit Corp. credits to finance agricul-
tural trade. We intend to do more, par-
ticularly after the IMF concludes its ne-
gotiations with the Philippine Govern-
ment.
• Finally, we continue to engage in
active diplomacy in human rights. Our
annual human rights report indicates
that the human rights situation in the
Philippines remains mixed, with con-
tinued problems, particularly with tor-
ture and summary executions which take
place largely in areas where the in-
surgency is active, and marked improve-
ment in the areas of press freedom and
political activity.
We remain convinced that the
Philippines has a depth of talent in all
sectors capable of dealing with its
political and economic difficulties. The
country is blessed with abundant natural
resources, a favorable geographic loca-
tion in a part of the world that has
registered enormous progress in recent
years, and an industrious and hardwork-
ing labor foi-ce. Filipinos must continue
to make hard decisions to restore con-
fidence, to resolve the current problems,
and to enable economic growth to
resume. U.S. policy will be to assist the
Philippines in this effort to the extent
that we can, as Filipinos determine for
themselves the political and economic
future of their countrv.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.H
The Transatlantic Relationship:
A Long-Term Perspective
by Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Address as prepared for delivery
before the National Newspaper Associa-
tion on March 7, 198i. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.
A few weeks ago I made what some
would describe as the mistake of think-
ing aloud before an audience about some
of the challenges the transatlantic rela-
tionship will face through the rest of the
20th century. Press reports then charac-
terized my extemporaneous remarks as
critical of our West European allies,
which in turn led to a host of adverse
comment on my intelligence, judgment,
and paternity by any number of high-
ranking European officials and even an
opposition leader or two. In one of the
kinder comments, Le Monde remarked
that I didn't "even have the excuse of
being one of the Califomians. ..."
So I am here today to try again. My
purpose is to examine the challenges—
and I believe there are some— to the con-
tinuance of a strong transatlantic rela-
tionship over the course of the remainder
of the 20th century-. It is not my thesis
that the North Atlantic alliance is now
in crisis. It is my contention that the
final 15 years of the 20th century will be
years of substantial— perhaps profound-
change, and that it is time, now, for
those who believe as I do that a strong
transatlantic partnership will remain
essential to the maintenance of peace and
stability, to begin to examine together
what is likely to change and how best to
adjust to those changes.
The problem as I see it is this: the
Atlantic alliance is and will remain our
most important political and security in-
terest. Yet in the course of the next
decades, our global foreign policy im-
peratives will increasingly demand our
attention, our time, and our imagination.
We can, I believe, assume the continu-
ance of an unwavering American commit-
ment to the defense of Europe. We can,
as well, assume a continuation of a Euro-
pean commitment to our alliance partner-
ship. But what we cannot— or at least
should not— assume is that governments
on either side of the Atlantic will always
readily adjust to changing circumstances.
An adjustment will be made, but its ade-
quacy and the ease of the transition will
depend heavily on how soon the West
imderstands— collectively— that we face
new times.
M^or Changes
Let me start by describing a few of the
major changes I see taking place in the
coming years. Some are simply and
readily apparent, others neither so
simple nor so clearly perceived. Demo-
graphic changes in the United States, for
example, are easily understood. We have
April 1984
EUROPE
had a Pacific coast since 1819, and since
our first census our demographic center
has been shifting westward— a process
that will continue and carry with it a
continuing shift in our political center of
gravity as well. Yet even this fact does
not fully illustrate the importance of our
west coast. California, for example,
would have one of the world's largest
gross national products were it an in-
dependent nation. Growing, dynamic
cities such as Los Angeles and San
Diego, the San Francisco Bay area,
Seattle, and Portland challenge or sur-
pass the east coast cities of New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore as
commercial centers.
Equally clearly, it is logical that our
west coast's economic and commercial
growth would increase the importance to
us of a part of the world that, with to-
day's communications, lies virtually at
our doorstep. Yet the recent history of
Pacific economic dynamism is by no
means simply an American phenomenon.
Asia's economies are today among the
world's most prosperous. Japan's auto-
mobiles, steel, and electronic goods are
sold throughout the world. Dynamic
market economies in the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] countries, in South Korea, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong produce quality products
at prices that assure their ability to com-
pete in world markets. China offers a
vast potential as it opens its economy to
the world.
It is little remarked, but nonetheless
a remarkable fact, that since 1978 we
have traded more with the Pacific Basin
than vdth Europe; in 1982 the difference
amounted to about $13 billion. The
American and Japanese economies ac-
count for about one-third of the world's
total gross national product. Last year,
Japan was the second largest buyer of
American products (after Canada)— and
yet only one of several increasingly im-
portant Asian trading partners.
Moreover, the United States and
Japan are emerging— for the immediate
future, at least— as the two most sig^iifi-
cant players in the field of high-technol-
ogy development— a field that is Ukely to
define fast-paced economic development
and prosperity in the years ahead. As we
enter the 21st century, the United States
and Japan are likely to be either the
world's major economic competitors or
important economic partners.
We will face in the coming years the
challenge of creating and maintaining in-
stitutional links with Asian friends ap-
propriate to their needs and to ours.
Those links will not be identical to those
we forged with our European friends, as
they will reflect the differences in the
relationships. Closer ties with Asia, for
example, cannot duphcate our broad,
historical relationship with Europe. But
our increasingly shared economic,
poUtical, and security concerns in Asia
vdll almost certainly bring with them the
creation of new institutional arrange-
ments for dealing more effectively with
those concerns.
I remarked earlier that some
changes, such as the demography of the
United States, are easily seen and their
consequences readily understood. Others
are not so readily apparent. The nature
of the transatlantic relationship over the
next 15 years, for example, can, at this
point, be only dimly perceived.
The NATO alliance, which next
month celebrates its 35th birthday, has
assured more than a generation of peace
in Europe— itself a rare occurrence in
Europe's 20th century history— by re-
minding friends and adversaries alike
that we will consider an attack on them
as an attack on ourselves. President
Reagan has recently reaffirmed our com-
mitment by deploying— in concert with
our allies— a new generation of inter-
mediate nuclear missiles that will com-
plete the chain of deterrence and ensure
that Western Europe's security will re-
main coupled to our own.
I need, here, to underline that
American recognition that defending
Western Europe is also the defense of
our own country marked a revolutionary
change in our foreign policy. It was not,
at first, a premise with which Americans
were entirely comfortable. For many,
like myself, growing up in the Middle
West, it irrevocably extended our
destinies and our sense of personal and
national security far beyond our natural
frontiers. This premise has proved to be
the fundamental link between the United
States and Europe.
There have been periodic crises in
the history of the alliance over how to
enhance our mutual security; there will
assuredly be more in the future. We may
disagree with some of our European
allies on precisely how to couple or rein-
force this bond— but the essential
premise that peace in the Western world
is indivisible has never come into ques-
tion. And no installation of any weapons
system can be a substitute for that fun-
damental assumption.
Yet Europe's importance to us goes
beyond our security needs alone. We also
share a culture, a history, and several of
their languages. Ideas cross the Atlantic
so quickly in both directions that it is dif-
ficult to fathom from which side they
originated.
Finally, there is the political aspect
of our transatlantic culture. Our systems
of government may vary, but we join the
nations of Western Europe in dedication
to liberal democratic principles that en-
sure the freedom and dignity of the in-
dividual, and government on the basis of
popular consent. We inherited these
values from Western Europe, and we
have contributed heavily to their sur-
vival and viability in an often hostile
world.
Europe and Europeans have had, and
still have, a major impact on our political
thinking. Here were return to the impor-
tance of the transatlantic dialogue.
Although our diplomacy will never com-
pletely satisfy our European friends any
more than it will ever satisfy ourselves,
European influence on our foreign policy
has been far more important than is com-
monly perceived. It has, on the whole,
led over the years to a far more nuanced,
far more sophisticated approach on our
part than would have been the case were
we left strictly to our own devices. It is
an influence that has been most effec-
tively exercised behind closed doors— in
the NATO CouncO, at the annual seven-
nation summits, in the constant meetings
between American presidents and Euro-
pean leaders, and in the host of meetings
between American and European of-
ficials that take place on almost a daily
basis. It is a process that has worked
because we have operated from a basis
of shared values and objectives, common
interests and hopes, and mutual danger
and sacrifice.
This is precious capital— an unpre-
cedented resource of the transatlantic
partnership which Americans and Euro-
peans alike must seek to preserve for the
generations yet to come. And since I
believe we may run the risk, in the
decades of the 1980s and 1990s, of losing
some of that intimacy, now is the time to
look to preserving it. I say "now," since
the alliance, as I indicated earlier, is not
today in a state of crisis. Indeed, the con-
trary is true; we have survived, over-
come, and resolved most of the difficult
issues between us during the past year,
and the climate of relations today is
warm and workmanlike.
Need To Address Problems
So let me take this time of relative calm
in the alliance to tell you of the problems
I see ahead: problems which if left to
evolve, unperceived and untended, may
grow in complexity and consequence.
40
Department of State Bulletin
Thirty years ago Atlanticists foresaw
a united Europe overcoming its age-old
divisions to play a global role near if not
equal to that of the superpowers.
Western Europe's combined population
exceeded ours and that of the Soviet
Union. Its rebuilt industrial base would
underwrite its prosperity; its politicians
and intellectuals approached their prob-
lems with confidence and in a spirit of
building a new and different Europe.
Americans, although a bit wary perhaps
of this emerging giant, welcomed re-
newed West European prosperity and
the prospect of its larger involvement in
world affairs, because we knew we held
no monopoly on wisdom and because we
shared with West Europeans common
values and objectives. Much more joined
than divided us.
Today, however, we see a Europe
that has become less certain of its future,
more uncertain about the wisdom of
postwar policies, more focused on its own
problems and, therefore, less prepared to
look at the world whole. In addition, a
goodly portion of Europe's younger
generation apparently increasingly ques-
tions the utility of many of the institu-
tions and instrumentalities that have
been so fundamental to the Atlantic
alliance.
The United States has been, for more
than a generation of Europeans, the land
of dreams, of achieving the impossible. It
remains so today, for many. But it is
probably also true that there is a level of
disillusionment and bitterness— most
clearly evident amongst the young—
because neither America, in particular,
nor Western institutions in general, have
been able to fulfill all those hopes and
dreams. And perhaps most unfortunate,
this disillusionment sometimes goes
beyond the young— to not so young
leaders with enough experience to know
better.
This bitterness and disillusion is, to
some degree, true on both sides of the
Atlantic. Too often political parties out of
office tend to take political stances on
foreign policy that throw into the peren-
nial debate the question of consistency
on one side of the Atlantic or the other.
It is, however, some consolation to
realize that when political "outs" become
the political "ins," they have tended to
come to grips vrith reahty and reaffirm
the overriding imperatives of the
Atlantic alliance.
While it can, therefore, be argued
that my concerns about the attitudes of
European youth and the vagaries of op-
position political leaders can be over-
April 1984
done— since the process of aging and the
responsibilities of power tend to change
perspectives— it is less easy to put aside
concerns about what I see as changing
transatlantic perceptions of the world
scene.
I have often discussed with Euro-
pean friends the different requirements
for a nation with global responsibilities
to those with more regional concerns.
And the use of the word global is not
meant in any arrogant fashion. Nor is it
to deny the interests that several Euro-
pean nations retain in areas of the world
beyond their continent. But the sheer
scope of American interests engages us
in a different set of perspectives and im-
peratives. I am persuaded that despite
periodic inconsistencies (mainly on our
part) and even more frequent crises of
policy disagreement (emanating fre-
quently from the European side),
members of the alliance can still forge a
strong consensus on most issues of im-
portance. As the Warsaw Pact so clearly
demonstrates, partnership without visi-
ble differences is not a partnership of
equals; nor is it a partnership that
possesses the dynamic qualities so
necessary to making the required ad-
justments to changing circumstances.
But an alliance in which there is an ero-
sion of understanding of the reasons for
those differences— including most par-
ticularly a tolerance of the necessities of
geography and responsibility— cannot be
counted upon to retain today's vigor in
the face of tomorrow's challenges.
U.S. Policy Framework
Europeans often argue— and their point
is well taken— that detente has been
largely successful in its European con-
text. And it is certainly clear to
Americans that tensions in the heart of
Europe— with Berlin as but one ex-
ample—have lessened significantly. Nor
can we lightly ignore European efforts to
bridge the economic, political, and
cultural division of Europe— and how
crucial they believe these efforts to be to
their long-term vision of the security of
Western Europe.
But these considerations are, and
must be, only some of the elements in
the American policy framework. We see
East- West rivalry in a broader context.
Even a cursory study of recent events in
Afghanistan, the Middle East, southern
Afi-ica, or Latin America persuades us
that detente has not been a success in
areas outside of Europe. From our
perspective, the Soviet role in these
areas has not, to put it mildly, con-
tributed to stability.
EUROPE
From the many conversations I have
had with Europeans discussing our
respective views of, and relations viath,
the Soviet Union, I have not found them
to be ignorant of, or prepared to ignore,
the nature of the Soviet system. There is
often, however, a broad gap in our
evaluation of the Soviet threat. There is
basic agreement within the alliance on
the avoidance of war; there are different
and differing voices in and vrithin the
European members of the alliance, on
precisely how to reduce the level of ten-
sions. These disagreements can serve
either to polarize our positions or as an
example of how alliance differences can
be contained within a unified policy. If
they are to serve the latter purpose it
will be necessary for both Europeans
and Americans to recognize that there
are legitimate reasons of geography and
responsibility that will often require
nuanced differences of approach toward
the same general goals.
Other kinds of transatlantic dif-
ference, unfortunately, leave more
bruised feelings— and perhaps demon-
strate the degree to which we and our
European allies have begun to diverge
on basic issues. Two years ago the
British effort to regain the Falkland
Islands posed for the United States a
more difficult choice than most Euro-
peans yet recognize. Yet we made our
choice. A few months ago I had reason
to remember that decision when we
learned, with profound regret, that as
our Marines landed in Grenada, our
European friends moved swiftly and
publicly to condemn the action. That
Europeans view the liberation of
Grenada with less enthusiasm than
Americans or Grenadians do, is, I admit,
fully within the normal and acceptable
range of alliance differences. But where,
at that moment, was the alliance solidar-
ity that had meant so much to us a year
earlier? Where was the recognition that
the United States might be justified in
moving to protect what it believed to be
its national interests? At the very least,
could not our fi-iends have suspended
judgment until the emerging situation
became clearer?
In the case of Grenada we moved in
concert with Caribbean nations who
recognized the threat to their own
security that the regime in Grenada
posed. The United States has, since the
close of World War II, grown increas-
ingly conscious of that curse of all great
powers— unilateralism— and has sought to
resist its temptations. We long ago
discovered that there is a very fine line
between unilateralism on the one hand
41
'i';n'iiji
EUROPE
I
and leadership on the other and have
tried very hard to avoid the one and em-
brace the other. But the distinction
becomes increasingly hard to maintain
when our principal friends and allies do
not recognize that the breadth of our m-
terests sometimes leads us to a different
evaluation of threats to those interests
than is held by others.
The Prime Minister of the youngest
democracy in Europe, Felipe Gonzalez of
Spain, recently touched upon another,
related, problem that has come to con-
cern some Americans of late. "Some-
times," he said, "we, the Sparash, have
the feeling that we trust more m the
destiny of Europe than other countries
ab-eady integrated into the group ot __
European institutions." "The fact is, he
added, "that to a large extent Europe to
day remains obsessed with its own prob-
lems. This is something that needs to be
overcome."
The danger with this growmg ten-
dency to look inward is that it may rem-
force the potential negative consequences
that can result from the changing trans-
atlantic perceptions of the world that 1
have earlier described. Either tendency,
by itself, can be difficult enough to
counter; both, moving together, each ex-
acerbating the other, could prove to be a
wicked brew indeed.
This absorption with its mtemal con-
cerns is in great measure a consequence
of current economic conditions m Europe
and therefore hopefully will dimmish as
prosperity returns. But the tendency to
lav the blame for recession largely at the
door of the United States and our high
interest rates presents another kind of
problem. What must be avoided m this
transatlantic dialogue over economic
issues is a too facile resort to the blame
America first" syndrome. For to do so is
to obscure more fundamental failmgs
that stand in the way of economic
recovery. In the end, Europeans,
possessing collectively a gross national
product larger than that of the United
States, need to ask themselves whether
it can really be true that their economic
recovery depends, in the main, on the
prime rate in the United States.
I have cited these problems because
I deeply believe they need to be dis-
cussed between friends while they are
still manageable issues. I do not believe
they demonstrate a fundamental rift be-
tween the two sides of the Atlantic. Nor
do I believe they are insurmountable. In
fact, the manner in which we were able,
together, to put our disagreement over
pipeline sanctions behind us demon-
strates the contrary. Rather, I cite them
because I fear that left unchecked, these
trends plus our own increasing concern
with our affairs in other parts of the
world-Central America, the Pacific, the
Middle East, to name but a few-can
over time, diminish the character of the
transatlantic relationship. And that
would be a tragedy, for a strong alliance
is now, and will continue to be for
decades to come, the keystone of our
own-and the West's-security and
stsbilitv
Thus, now may well be the appropri-
ate moment for all of us, Europeans and
Americans, to take a new look at where
we should be going together and how we
should get there. Perhaps, as was re-
cently indicated in the Wall Street
Journal, we might forego the traditional
choices between less and more involve-
ment and direct ourselves instead to a
"smarter" involvement. The two pillars
of a "smarter" relationship, in my opm-
ion, are: increasing respect for the dif-
ferences in our alliance, and a more coor-
dinated approach-across the board-to
all political, economic, and security issues
with our European allies.
Third. How can the developed worid
cope more effectively with the large,
urgent, and as yet unmanageable ques-
tions of development in the less devel-
oped countries?
Fourth. How can we overcome the
increasing pressures toward protec-
tionism on both sides of the Atlantic and
in Japan? More constructively, how can
the world's major trading nations reduce
the barriers to a ft-eer trade between us.'
These are but a few of the many
questions that we should be workmg on
iointly. But whatever our agenda, its
purpose ought to be to bring the two
sides of the partnership together to
resolve problems, reverse trends that
left unchecked will pull us apart, and-m
the last analysis-move both sides of the
Atlantic toward greater equality of ef-
fort, outlook, and strength. To quote
again from the Wall Street Journal: A
genuine superpower doesn't need
hegemonic influence with a weak set of
client states, but a true aUiance with
other great nations."
The greatness is there, on both sides
of the Atlantic. It is our job to find the
means, together, to let it flourish. ■
Alliance Agenda
I will be the first to admit that I have no
magic formula for resolving the strams
that will surely bear down on all of us in
the coming decades. But I do believe
that beginning the dialogue is the key to
the eventual discovery of answers. 1 he
agenda must be broad: the fora m which
that agenda could be discussed are
many And if I were asked to suggest
some of the subjects that might be con-
sidered I would propose:
First. How can we enhance trans-
atlantic cooperation in the development
of high technology? Painful and costly as
it may be, we must recognize that if any
pari, of our alliance lags seriously behmd
another in this field for any period of
time, it will seriously diminish our over-
all effectiveness.
Second. The importance of moving
now to the broadening of alliance defense
procurement policies. The United
States-pari^icularly the Congress-has,
for too long, asked its allies to share
more of the burden of the common
defense without, at the same time,
recognizing that European mdustry
must, if this is to be the case, pari;icipate
fully in the manufacture of defense
items.
42
Department of State Bulletin
■WBimUHk
EUROPE
Death of Soviet President Andropov
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
FEB. 10, 1984'
The President has sent a message ex-
pressing his condolences to Mr.
Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of
State, on the death of Chairman
Andropov. In his message the President
emphasized to the people and Govern-
ment of the U.S.S.R. his desire for
cooperation between the two countries in
the search for a more peaceful world.
As the President reaffirmed in his
addi-ess of January 16, the United States
has sought and will continue to seek a
constructive and realistic dialogue with
the Soviet Union aimed at building a
more productive and stable relationship.
Our objective is not dialogue for its own
sake, but a dialogue that produces real
solutions to the many concrete problems
that divide us.
There are, to be sure, fundamental
differences between the American and
Soviet systems and our respective
political beliefs. But the American and
Soviet peoples have a common interest in
the avoidance of war and the reduction
of arms. It is this need to preserve and
strengthen the peace that is at the heart
of U.S. policy.
The President's policy towai-d the
Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress
in three broad areas: developing ways to
eliminate the use and the threat of force
in international relations; significantly
reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the
world, particularly nuclear weapons; and
establishing a better working relation-
ship with Moscow, characterized by
greater cooperation and understanding
and based on mutual restraint and
respect.
At this time of transition in the
Soviet Union, our two nations should
look to the future in order to find ways
to realize these goals. In the nuclear age,
there is no alternative to dialogue.
The United States hopes that the
Soviet leader will work with us in this
si)irit and take advantage of the oppor-
tunities at hand to find common ground
and establish a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship.
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT.
FEB. 10, 19842
The President has expressed his per-
sonal condolences to the Soviet leader-
ship on the death of Chairman An-
dropov, and I have sent a similar
message to Foreign Minister Gromyko.
At this time of transition in Moscow,
let me reaffirm the basic principles of
our policy toward the Soviet Union. We
remain ready for a constructive and
realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union.
In this nuclear age, the United States
will work to build a more stable and
more positive relationship. As the Presi-
dent has stressed, we seek to tlnd solu-
tions to real problems, not just to im-
prove the atmosphere of our relations.
This applies, in particular, to the task of
reaching equitable and verifiable
agreements for arms reduction and
reducing the risk of war.
The President has made clear to the
people and Government of the Soviet
Union his desire for constructive
cooperation in the search for peace. We
invite the Soviet leadership to work with
us to that end. There are opportunities
at hand. Let us find common ground, and
let us make the world a safer place.
Q. Will President Reagan lead the
U.S. delegation to Moscow?
A. We have received no word from
the Soviet Union as yet as to the time or
arrangements for the funeral, and the
President will make his decision after we
receive that information.
Q. What effect, do you think the
death of Mr. Andropov could have in
altering the relations— the current
chilly relations— between the two coun-
tries?
A. We can reaffirm, with the great-
est seriousness of purpose, our own
readiness to engage with the Soviet lead-
ership in solving problems and develop-
ing those things that are needed to make
the world a safer place. We invite their
response and we hope very much that
whoever emerges as the new leader, or
leadership group, will want to respond in
kind.
Q. Do you think the President
should invite a meeting with the new
leader at the right time?
A. The President will decide about
whether he will attend the funeral,
depending upon the arrangements that
they suggest; and he has had the posi-
tion all along that he's prepared to meet
with the Soviet leadership if there is a
reasonable opportunity for some substan-
tive accomplishment. No doubt that re-
mains his position now.
President Reagan went to the Soviet Em-
bassy after the death of President Andropov
to sign the condolence book.
April 1984
EUROPE
Q. Are you concerned that a pos-
sible power struKKle in the Kremlin
will further slow down progress on
arms negotiations, other major issues,
between the United States and the
Soviet Union?
A. We have no information about the
process of selecting a new leader. That is
something the Soviet Union will do.
From our standpoint, we have our
strength, we have our detei-mination to
defend our interests and our values, and
we are prepared to deal constructively
with the leadership that is put forward
by the Soviet Union. Their own proc-
esses will determine who they will put
forward.
Q. Do you think that President
Reagan should, in fact, go, as some
have suggested, as a signal of
readiness to reopen a dialogue with the
Kremlin leadership?
A. The President has been and is
prepared to continue and expand the
dialogue with the Soviet leadership.
There is a very extensive dialogue right
now, but it needs to be expanded, if
possible, and made more productive, and
the President is prepared to do that.
Q. Do you anticipate that with the
change of leadership in the Soviet
Union it would be even possible to
resume serious arms negotiations dur-
ing 1984?
A. First of all, there are serious arms
negotiations going on right now.
Q. INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] talks?
A. Insofar as the intermediate-range
and sti-ategic nuclear weapons are con-
cerned, there is nothing going on, and I
see no reason why those talks couldn't
be resumed. Certainly, we are prepared
to do so if the Soviet leadership comes
forw-ard with an equal willingness.
Q. You've said that the President's
decision may hinge on whether some
substantive accomplishment could be
achieved by his going to Moscow. Does
that mean, in fact, that the Soviets
will have to have chosen a new^ leader
in order for the President to go, that
he would go only if he could have a
substantive discussion with that
leader?
A. There are two separate things
floating around here, and let's distin-
guish them. One is the question of
whether or not the President would go
to the funeral, and, of cour.se, on such an
occasion, there would undoubtedly be a
meeting but not an opportunity for an
extended and full discussion of anything.
44
As I said, we have had no infoi-ma-
tion as yet on the funeral ari'angements
and what the Soviet Union intends to do
about it, and .so the President will not
make any statement about that until he
has those arrangements.
The other question was, at some time
in the future would the President be
willing to meet with the Soviet leader-
ship, and I think I'll just restate my
answer, and it is that, yes, certainly,
gladly. But it's important that the
ground be prepared in such a way that
there would be chance for a significant
result from the meeting.
Q. Did the Soviet Union inform this
government ahead of the formal an-
nouncement of the death of Mr.
.Andropov?
A. No.
Q. Because the Soviets have not
chosen a leader, is the world a more
tense place right now because of that
uncertainty?
A. We don't know whether they've
chosen a leader or not. They may have
and as yet not announced the leader, so
we'll see about that. But as far as we are
concerned, we deal with the Foreign
Ministry and the Soviet Union is a func-
tioning government.
Q. Are you planning on going to
the Soviet Embassy?
A. Yes, indeed, when they have a
book of condolences, and I will go when
they are prepared. Insofar as I know
they're not ready for that.
Q. So you have no plans to see Mr.
Dobrynin [Soviet .\mbassador to the
United States] immediately?
A. I have called Ambassador
Dobrynin and expressed my condolences
to him personally, and when they are
prejiared to receive visitors, I will go
there.
'Read to reporters assembled at the
Sheraton Hotel in Santa Bai-bara by principal
deputy press secretary to the President
Lan-y" Speakes (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Feb. 13, 1984).
^Press release 4.3. ■
Assistant Secretary Burt's
Interview for "Worldnet"
Assistant Secretary for European
and Canadian Affairs Richard R. Bu-rt
was interviewed in Paris on January 31.
198i, by news correspondents in Bonn,
Brussels, Genem, The Hague, London,
Paris, Rome, and Stockholm. The inter-
view was later broadcast on "Worldnet,"
a satellite TV program of the U.S. Infor-
mation Service.
Q. We have been having some
interesting, though mixed, signals be-
tween Washington and Moscow. It
began with statements by President
Reagan and Mr. Andropov that seemed
to be groping toward a resumption of
dialogue, and then came a harsh Soviet
allegation against the United States
for violations of arms control treaties,
following, of course, earlier U.S.
charges of Soviet violations.
And then yesterday, .Ambassador
Rowny, the chief U.S. delegate to the
strategic arms reduction talks (START)
in Geneva, said that there was the
possibility of a breakthrough if the
talks resume because of trade-offs that
would be of interest to both powers.
My question to you is what sense
are we to make of this? How do you
sum it up?
A. I think the situation in the
U.S.-Soviet relationships now is genu-
inely complicated. It cannot be summed
up with a few words, whether we call it
"confrontation" or "detente." It is clear
that we have some important differences.
You mentioned the issue of arms control
compliance. As you know, the President
has sent a report to the Congress detail-
ing some violations, or probable viola-
tions, that the Soviets have committed.
At the same time, we have dif-
ferences with the Soviets on regional
issues. For example, there are Soviet
military advisers in the Middle East— in
Syria. We disagree with Soviet human
rights policies. And we very much think
the Soviet Union should come back to
the negotiating table.
While we have these differences, we
also believe that it's important to talk.
The Secretary of State, when he was in
Stockholm recently, both in the speech
he gave publicly and in the private
meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko,
made it very clear that we are prepared
to talk, that we're prepared to meet the
Soviets halfway. Whether or not the
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
Soviets are prepared, it is difficult to say
at this stage. We will have to see.
Q. Do you foresee any fixed date
between now and the presidential elec-
tions in November for talks with the
Soviet Union?
A. If you are asking me whether I
think the Soviet Union will return to the
START or INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] negotiations between now
and the presidential elections, of course I
have to say I do not know. We are
prepared to begin those negotiations
right away. What the Soviets are
prepared to do is not clear. We have
seen some recent statements that sug-
gest the Soviet Union is toning dowTi its
rhetoric somewhat, that they, like the
President, are supporting the notion of
dialogue.
There are some people who suggest
that the Russians would not want to
come back to the table because this
might aid the President's reelection ef-
fort. Thei-e are other suggestions that
say that the Soviet Union will recognize
that it is in Its interest to return to the
negotiating table.
What is important for us right
now— speaking as a U.S. official but also
as an alliance official— is not to try to
speculate about future Soviet behavior;
rather just make very clear our position.
That is, we are prepared to begin those
negotiations as soon as possible, and if
we can sit down behind the negotiating
table, we are prepared to engage in the
neceessary trade-offs that could open up
new opportunities for an agreement.
Q. In 1976, when the SS-20s started
to be deployed, you wrote in a paper
about new weapons technology,
"Debate and Direction," that improved
conventional defense by new weapons
technology might lead to reduced
pressure on the United States for ex-
tended deterrence. But new weapons
technology and conventional ar-
maments have only had a small impact
compared with the nuclear debate.
Since nuclear weapons still deter-
mine the strategic thinking, what kind
of impact would the vision of the
future, the development of ballistic
missile defense have? Will it be incre-
mental, as in the conventional new
weapons technology field? Or revolu-
tionary? What kind of NATO involve-
ment could you foresee, and what
likely Soviet reaction at the
negotiating table?
A. First of all, let me say that I am
pleased that at least one person read
that paper that I wrote many years ago.
And let me say a word, though, about
conventional defense. Your question is
correct in talking about the importance
of nuclear weapons and the continuing
importance of a sti'ategy of detei-rence.
It's true that nuclear weapons alone
are not sufficient for adequate deter-
rence, and the alliance must look at new
technologies in the conventional area to
bolster deterrence. Conventional defense
is as important as nuclear deterrence in
protecting the security of the alliance.
Your question went on, then,- to ad-
dress the issue of ballistic missile
defense. The President of the United
States has stated that the United States
needs to launch a research and develop-
ment effort in the area of advanced
ballistic missile defense concepts, in part
because the Soviet Union is spending a
great deal of money on this subject. And
we must protect against any break-
through that the Soviet Union might
make.
But also, looking toward the future
into the 21st century, we have to in-
vestigate the possibilities that all of our
countries could be less vulnerable to
nuclear attack. But I want to emphasize
that this is a research and development
effort. There has been no change in U.S.
deterrence strategy, no planned changes
in alliance strategy, and all of the ac-
tivities that the United States is now
undertaking are consistent with the 1972
ABM Treaty [Antiballistic Missile
Treaty].
Q. Do you think the Soviet Union
should be more involved in the search
for a settlement in the Middle East
—and more specifically in Lebanon
—in view of its connection with Syria?
Do you think it would be wiser to con-
tinue the past American policy of keep-
ing the Soviets at arm's length in the
Middle East?
A. That's a very interesting question,
and I think the answer has to focus
always on the issue of whether or not
the Soviet Union has a constructive,
responsible role to play in the Middle
East. Unfortunately, that has not been
the case in recent months.
You mentioned the Soviet involve-
ment in Syria. We've seen the shipment
of advanced weapons to Syria, and we've
seen the presence in Syria of substantial
numbers of Soviet military advisers.
That has been a destabilizing develop-
ment. It has not made the process of the
withdrawal of foreign forces from
Lebanon any easier. And it has not made
the process of the reconciliation of the
various factions within Lebanon any
easier.
We would hope that the Soviet Union
would use whatever influence it has with
Syria to play a constructive role, to pro-
vide for the withdrawal of its forces as
the Israelis have agreed with the
Lebanese Government to do.
We are prepared to discuss questions
like the Middle East with the Soviet
Union. But we are yet to see the Soviet
Union willing to play the responsible role
that is necessary for it to be brought into
the process itself
Q. Knowing that the Soviets would
rather see somebody else in the White
House than Mr. Reagan, do you
foresee any worsening of the relations
between the United States and the
Soviet Union now that Mr. Reagan has
announced that he will be a candidate
for the next presidential election?
A. Fh-st of all, you say that we know
that the Soviets would rather see some-
one else in the White House. I am not
sure that is entirely correct. Certainly no
Soviet official has made that statement
to me.
It is difficult to say too much about
what is Soviet thinking about American
domestic politics. I would just point out
that the Soviet Union, in the past, has
not been terribly sophisticated in making
political predictions about American
politics or West European politics. For
example, the Soviet Union made several
comments about the German election in
the spring of 1983, which tended to
backfire for Soviet interests. And for all
we know, the Soviet Union may have
already decided that Ronald Reagan will
be reelected, and if that is the case, then
they would certainly make judgments on
policy in a very different light than if
they hope someone else is elected.
So it's dangerous. We don't try to
base our policy on the internal machina-
tions of developments in the Soviet
Union. For one thing, we don't know too
much about them. And I tend to doubt
that the Soviet Union itself does. What
we have to do in our policy toward the
Soviets is recognize that they have a
government, that they are making deci-
sions. We have to think about what their
options are and try to engage them on
issues that appear to us to meet their in-
terests.
Q. When do you think the Soviets
will propose the merging of the Geneva
talks-START and INF-and if nothing
takes place, could it mean the taking
April 1984
45
EUROPE
into account of French and British
nuclear forces, as asked by the
Soviets?
A. I am glad that you raised the sub-
ject of merger, because there has been a
great deal written about that subject. I
think it is time that we clarified at least
the U.S. position on the subject.
To begin with, nobody has pro-
posed—either the United States or the
Soviet Union— the merger of the START
and INF negotiations. And again looking
toward the future, of course, we don't
know what the Soviets might propose.
They have told us they are reviewing
their positions on the two negotiations,
and we are ready and waiting to hear
what theu" views are. But so far, we
have not received any formal proposal
along those lines.
The U.S. position is that we think
the current framework for negotiating
nuclear arms control— that is a separate
INF negotiating and a separate START
negotiation— is perfectly adequate for dis-
cussing these issues. We do not believe
that a merger would necessarily be a
panacea to the arms control problem.
The fundamental obstacles that have
blocked agreement in those two negotia-
tions would remain; in the INF negotia-
tion, the fact the Soviet Union has not
accepted the right of U.S. missile deploy-
ment, and in the START negotiation, tlie
fact that the Soviet Union has been un-
willing to cut back its ballistic missile
forces to the extent we think would be
stabilizing. A merger would not neces-
sarily address those problems.
If the Soviet Union has new ideas,
new ideas about the relationship of
START and INF, we will, of course, be
prepared to discuss them with it. But a
merger right now is not on the
U.S.-Soviet agenda. It is not a topic for
discussion.
Certainly the whole question of
British and French forces is one that we
have been clear on all along. British and
French forces are not substitutes for
U.S. forces in Europe, and in any
bilateral negotiation, we will not discuss
limitation on those forces.
Q. The last ministerial session in
December, the Foreign Ministers, in-
cluding of course Mr. Shultz, agreed
on releasing, apart from the final com-
munique, the Brussels declaration. [In-
audible] was to explore systematically
or to announce that the NATO
ministers were ready to explore all
channels that could lead to an im-
provement of East- West relations, thus
to a revival of detente.
A. I am not too sure what the ques-
tion was. But what I will say is I think
you have had a systematic effort by the
governments of the alliance to improve
the character and the quality of the
East-West dialogue. You mentioned the
Brussels declaration at the NATO
ministerial in December. That was
followed up, of course, by a speech by
President Reagan where he stated his
desire to have a more genuine dialogue
with the Soviet Union.
Secretary of State George Shultz, in
Stockholm, struck the same theme in his
address at the CDE conference [Con-
ference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disannament in
Europe]. And then, of course. Secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko
had a 5-hour meeting.
I think that the alliance is postured
where it should be. That i§, we are
continuing with the policies that are
necessary to protect our safety. But at
the same time, we are on the offensive
with the Soviets. We are telling the
Soviet Union that we are ready to
negotiate, we are ready to talk, and we
are urging the Soviet Union to return to
the negotiating table. I think this is
precisely the policy that the majority of
the Western public wants and is getting.
Q. The Soviets have stated again
recently that the French and British
nuclear forces have to be counted
against the SS-20s. We know it is a
negotiating device. But we also know
from official sources that the French
and British nuclear programs foresee a
total of about 2,000 nuclear weapons
when they are completed in a number
of years. This will be a real deterrent.
The news is making the rounds in
European circles that the French and
British deterrent might become the
future European nuclear umbrella,
replacing the American umbrella. I
feel some perplexity. How do you see it
from Paris now?
A. Of course, if we were to move to a
new system of European security and, as
your question suggested, French and
British nuclear forces would take over
from the U.S. strategic deterrent, the
job of deterring an attack against
Europe, then the arms control equation
would radically be changed.
But that is certainly not the policies
of either the Governments of France or
Britain right now, and into the
foreseeable future those forces are
designed to be a deterrent against a
direct strike against Britain or France.
They do not play an extended deterrent
role. They do not provide the nuclear
umbrella that U.S. forces do.
Thus, trying to see British and
French forces as a substitute or as the
same in a negotiation between U.S.
Pershings and cruise missiles and the
British and French forces is a major er-
ror. Those U.S. forces provide the
necessary link between the secwity of
Europe and the American strategic
deterrent. British and French forces do
not play that role.
For the foreseeable future we cannot,
then, negotiate over these forces,
because they do not provide the same
function. As your question itself
i-ecognized, it is not so much that the
Soviet Union seems concerned about the
growth of British and French nuclear
capabilities. All along in the negotiations,
the Soviet Union has never insisted— in
INF— that Britain or France reduce the
size of their nuclear arsenals. In fact, it
is said that those arsenals could grow.
Really what the Soviet Union has done
has pointed at or signaled out the British
and French forces as an excuse to argue
that the United States should not deploy
a single missile in Europe. And this is, of
course, what we have objected to in the
negotiations. What has emerged in the
negotiations as the single most important
obstacle— what President Reagan has
called the half-zero option— is the fact
that the Soviet Union wants to retain a
substantial force of SS-20 missiles
du-ected against Europe, while the
United States would not be permitted to
deploy a single system.
Q. President Reagan has recently
announced that he will seek a second
term. In the past presidential election
campaigns, they have had an impact
on American foreign policy. Do you
think we Europeans have a reason to
expect any kind of flip-flopping this
year in U.S. foreign policy?
A. Absolutely not. I think that is a
President who has learned, who believes
very strongly, that the best way to get
reelected, the best politics, is being a
good President. And I do not believe
that you ai'e to see any fundamental
modifications of U.S. policy, any flip-
flops, or inconsistencies designed for
reelection purposes. I think that the ma-
jority of the American people support
the President, support his policies, sup-
port the arms control policies and his
security policies, and I think he will see
those policies through to the November
election.
46
■rniHMiwMiiiM
Department of State Bulletin
Q. You have already mentioned the
meeting in Stockholm between Mr.
Shultz and Mr. Gromyko. and you, of
course, were in that meeting. Could
you mention any specific steps that
might stem from it?
A. We have already seen one step
which, as you know, was the agi-eement
by the NATO countries to resume
negotiations with the Soviet Union on
March 16th in Vienna on conventional
force reductions.
That was an issue that came up in
that session, and we were encouraged
that in the non-nuclear arms control
area, the Soviet Union now has agreed
to negotiate actively, not only in Vienna
but in the Stockholm negotiations. The
Soviet Union has also said that it is
prepared to discuss chemical weapons
arms control, although we have dif-
ferences there. Those are negotiations
that are going ahead.
As the Secretary of State has said,
the Soviets did not come forward with
any new ideas or proposals on the
nuclear negotiations. We are, thus, in a
position of waiting for the Soviets to
make up their minds on how they want
to pursue these talks, and we will be
ready to sit down and talk about that.
But I think the most important out-
come of the meeting between the
Secretary of State and the Soviet
Foreign Minister was the fact that they
had an opportunity to listen to one
another talk about important issues and
to exchange views. Very often in these
kinds of U.S. -Soviet discussions, one gets
a sterile repetition of arguments that you
can read in the newspapers. It is fair to
say that on subjects like arms control
and on regional issues like the Middle
East or Afghanistan and on the bilateral
relationship that the two Foreign
Ministers were able to talk and exchange
views.
That is not to say that they agreed.
Oftentimes they did not. But we think
that at the moment in the East- West
relationship, it is very useful, even when
they do not agree, to at least have the
opportunity to explain their perspectives.
Q. There was some suggestion after
Ambassador Rowny's remarks yester-
day that he might be proposing trade-
offs between some of the subject mat-
ter of the INF talks-that is, the
deployment of cruise missiles in
Europe— for some elements of the stra-
tegic talks. Is this the correct interpre-
tation? And if not, could you tell us
something of the trade-offs you had in
mind?
A. No, I am afraid that his remarks
have been somewhat misintei-preted. As
I pointed out before, we think that the
two negotiations should be pursued
separately. We think that we should get
back to the INF negotiations and talk
about the issues within the INF spec-
trum of systems. And we should get
back to the START negotiations and talk
about those systems.
We are not at the present time en-
visaging any trade-offs, any deals, that
would lead to reductions in one area in
return for reductions in the other. We
have said that if the Soviet Union has
some ideas along these lines, we would
be prepared to listen to them. As I said
before, the Soviet Union has not given
us any ideas. It is far too premature to
talk about trade-offs between the two
negotiations or, as an earlier questioner
pointed out, a merger between the two
negotiations.
What Ambassador Rowny was dis-
cussing was trade-offs within the context
of the strategic arms negotiations them-
selves. As many of the journalists in this
group that we have assembled today
recognize, the U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces are not mere images of one
another. They are different. The Soviet
Union has certain sti-engths and advan-
tages, particularly in its large land-based
missile force, the heavy missiles, the
SS-18 missiles, SS-19 missiles, that have
a substantial number of multiple
warheads.
And the United States, for its part,
has certain advantages, in particular in
the bomber area with new bombers like
the B-1 coming into the force, and with
systems like air-launched cruise missiles.
What we are suggesting, and what
Ambassador Rowiiy was saying, is that
we are willing, in our negotiating posi-
tion, to recognize those trade-offs. That
is, if the Soviet Union is walling to accept
limitations in the area of its strength, we
will be prepared to accept limitations in
the areas of our strength. That is an im-
portant step forward, because, as you
know, we were criticized earlier on as
singling out Soviet areas of advantage.
As the President has said, most
recently in his speech on U.S.-Soviet
relations, we do think we should meet
the Soviet Union halfway. If the Soviet
Union comes back to the negotiating
table in Geneva, we think there will be
opportunities in those negotiations.
Q. Is there a prospect in the MBFR
[mutual and balanced force reductions]
talks, which, after all, have been going
on for more than a decade with little
progress? Or are both Washington and
EUROPE
Moscow regarding this as a kind of in-
sulated channel for exploring wider
dialogues?
A. No, we are certainly not looking
at the Vienna talks as an opportunity to
discuss other issues. We have other
negotiations underway. In addition to the
Vienna negotiations, which will get
underway in March, we have a new-
Stockholm negotiation, which offers a
new interesting venue for talking about
confidence-building measures, and we
have the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, where we are. among other
things, talking about chemical weapons.
The real point is that the Vienna
talks have gone on for 10 years. They
have not made much progress. And what
we would like to do is see if, after all
that time, it would not be possible to
give them some new impetus. The Soviet
Union has made some suggestions in the
area of verification. They do not go as
far as NATO would like those sugges-
tions to go, but we are prepared to talk
about them.
We would like to see if, after all this
time, we could not do something to bring
about a balanced situation in conven-
tional forces in Europe.
Q. Would you think it feasible that
if the Soviet Union could be persuaded
to dismantle a certain number of
SS-20s for a time period, say, for 3
months or for half a year, that NATO
would then interrupt its deployment
schedule correspondingly? And would
that be a possible way to reach lower
levels that have earlier been aimed at
an interim proposal? Or would you
rather think that the threat of an
uninterrupted deployment schedule is
the best way to get Moscow back to
the negotiating table?
A. Let me make a general comment.
It is useful and very important that we
think through possible negotiating steps
that could be taken to i-esult in progress
in the negotiations. But we, at the same
time, have to recognize the dangers in
the West of negotiating with ourselves.
We are constantly throwing up negotia-
tions ideas and talking about them in an
effort to see if we can't make progi-ess.
And as I say, that is a very healthy ex-
ercise. But in the final analysis, we have
to sit down and talk with the Soviets and
negotiate with the Soviets.
We believe very strongly that the
single most important incentive for the
Soviet Union to do anything about
limiting its deployment of the SS-20
missile is its clear understanding that in
the absence of any talks in Geneva, and
April 1984
47
EUROPE
in the absence of any agi-eement in
Geneva, the alliance will go ahead and
deploy all 572 of the ground-launched
cruise missUes and the Pershing lis.
The second that we indicated to the
Soviet Union that we were not going to
go forward with the progi-amed deploy-
ment on schedule, the Soviet Union
would simply have no incentive to come
back to Geneva. After all, we should all
ask ourselves, why did they leave those
negotiations? They tried, while the
negotiations were underway, to derail
the deplojTnent program. And they
failed. By leaving the negotiations, they
are clearly attempting to raise the
anxiety level in Western Europe and
elsewhere in an effort to stop that
development.
The best thing the alliance can do is
demonstrate very clearly to the Soviet
Union that there is only one way to stop
that deployment, and that is by achieving
an effective, verifiable arms control in
Geneva.
Q. What is your opinion on these
confidence-building measures Romania
has proposed in Stockholm? And in
general, Romania's position in the
Warsaw Pact?
A. The first thing I would like to say
is that the confidence-building measures
that I would like to talk about are the
confidence-building measures that NATO
has presented in Stockholm, because
they are feasible, they are concrete, and
they would do something to lessen the
risk of surprise attack in Europe. We
have focused for so long on levels of
weaponry, and that of course, is a very
appropriate subject for arms control. But
we also have to recognize [inaudible] sub-
ject for arms control. We also have to
recognize that weaponry casts a political
shadow. And how countries use those
weapons, how they move their troops in
a crisis situation, can have a decisive im-
pact on whether a war will take place or
whether it does not.
NATO has come up with some sim-
ple, verifiable, practical measures that
would go a long way to build confidence
in Europe. Those measures, focusing on
the conventional forces and the use by
countries of those forces, are the best
way to launch the CDE process.
On Romania's general foreign policy
orientation, Romania is a sovereign coun-
try. Like any other sovereign country, it
has the right to make its own foreign
policy. We respect that right, and we
woufd not interfere with its efforts to
launch initiatives in the areas of arms
control or any other area for that matter
48
Q. The Canadian Prime Minister,
Pierre Trudeau, said during a seminar
last weekend in Switzerland that the
United States might not risk using
nuclear weapons to save Western
Europe from a conventional Soviet in-
vasion. What is your comment on that?
A. I have not read a transcript of
precisely what the Prime Minister said. I
read a few Canadian press articles
earlier today. But without referring
specifically "to the Prime Minister's
remarks, I would just make the simple
statement that every U.S. President, in-
cluding the current one, has made it
very clear that the United States is
prepared to go to war to prevent a major
attack in Europe. And that remains the
U.S. policy.
The policy is one of deterrence. We
are not trying to fight a conflict in
Europe. There would never be an effort
to fight a limited conflict in Europe. But
to deter a conflict by making it very
clear, both through the presence of U.S.
forces in Europe and, if necessary,
through the presence of U.S. INF
missiles in Europe, that the United
States will be fully engaged in any con-
flict in Europe, if such a conflict were to
take place.
Q. There is one place where you ac-
tually do negotiate with the Soviet
Union and that is right here in
Stockholm. I would like to go back to
the Stockholm conference. At the con-
ference, the West and some of the
neutral countries insist that the goal
must be concrete and verifiable agree-
ments concerning confidence-building
measures. Could you foresee a situa-
tion in which such measures are traded
with more declaratory agreements that
the East wants to get an agreement?
A. It is always difficult to predict
what might happen in the future. I just
would make this simple point.
What we should try to achieve in
Stockholm, as well as in the other
negotiations and in the Geneva negotia-
tions if the Soviets come back and in the
Vienna negotiations, are agreements that
genuinely reduce the risks of conflict.
Soviet proposals calling for the non-use
of force, other proposals calling for
nuclear free zones, do nothing to actually
reduce the risk of conflict.
What we need to do is negotiate
agreements in the nuclear and the con-
ventional areas that actually have an im-
pact on the size of military forces or the
ability of countries to use those forces, or
at least the responsibilities that govern-
ments have to provide information about
their military capabilities. Those are
SBBBB
feasible, concrete, measures. Rhetorical,
declaratory measures do not reduce the
risks of conflict, but even worse, they
can suggest that somehow the risk of
war and the conflict is no longer there.
That is a very dangerous outcome. It is
an outcome which we want to avoid.
Q. Did the United States prepare
new proposals to the Soviet Union to
get the arms control talks going again?
What could those new proposals be?
A. The answer is very simple; it is
no. And that is why we, of course, are
prepared to return to the negotiating
table. We are prepared, if we get back to
the negotiating table and the Soviets are
there, to talk about ways to move the
negotiations ahead. I mentioned Am-
bassador Rowny's discussion of trade-
offs in START negotiations, looking at
their areas of advantage and ours. But
we do not believe we should make con-
cessions merely to get the Soviets back
to the negotiating table.
Why? Because it will not work. If the
Soviet Union knows that the longer they
stay away from the table, the more con-
cessions will be made by the United
States and other Western powers, they
will not come back. It is just that simple.
I think what we have to do is make it
clear to the Soviet Union that we are
ready to talk to them; we are ready to
work with them to make progress; but
we are not ready to make concessions
merely for the honor of sitting down
with them across a table.
Q. I was not speaking of conces-
sions but of proposals, which is not
quite the same.
A. We have good proposals on the
table. We think the proposals in the INF
negotiations that were made last
fall-proposals that talked about regional
limitations on INF missiles, that raised
the possibility of limiting aircraft, that
talked about reductions of the Pershing
II— all of these created good oppor-
tunities for progi-ess.
We think that the proposals we have
on the table are adequate. What we need
is to get the Soviets back to the table so
we can talk about them.
Q. The United States considers that
Europe is its ally. But can a strong
alliance be realized with economically
vulnerable partners? My question is
what then are the measures which
President Reagan intends to take to
reduce the deficit of the American
budget and to bring the dollar down to
a reasonable rate for Europe and
especially for France?
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
A. I certainly agree with the assump-
tion which is you cannot have a strong
alliance without a strong economic pro-
gram on both sides of the Atlantic.
Where we might disagree is on what are
the implications of U.S. economic policy
for Western Eurojie.
I think that a strong dollar, in some
respects, has been an advantage for the
European economies. For one thing, it
has certainly made it easier for West
European economies to compete with the
United States in third areas for e.xports.
The United States is going to run,
this year, somewhere in the area of
$70,000 million in our trade deficit. And
that money is going to be made by other
countries. To some extent, you could
argue that some of the early signs of a
recovery that we see in Gei-many and
Britain are a result of the strength of the
U.S. dollar.
Another policy area that is terribly
important is the area of protectionism.
So far both the United States and the
Europeans have avoided a debilitating,
dangerous trade war in the area of
agriculture and in other areas. It is very
important that we work to avoid such a
trade war in the future. This is the
responsibility of both sides. I understand
your concerns about the deficit. The
President of the United States shares
those concerns about the deficit, and he
wants to work with the Congress to do
something about the deficit.
Q. I have a question regarding the
CDE Stockholm conference. Does this
conference provide a new channel, a
new desk also, for negotiations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union? What is your assessment of the
Stockholm conference and its impact
on the negotiating process? Does this
conference give more weight to Euro-
pean security interests in American
politics?
A. The first thing I would say is yes,
it does. The very fact that you have a
conference focusing on European secu-
rity, from the Atlantic to the Urals, will
have an impact on American policy, and
I think a good impact. It will focus our
attention on the security problems in
that special region.
I think that already, while in its very
early days of the conference itself, we in
the United States have been struck by
the very constructive atmosphere that
exists in Stockholm. When I was in
Stockholm with the Secretary of State,
we felt a very constructive atmosphere
in the discussions among the NATO
ministers and also with the neutrals, as
well as the Eastern countries. There
seems to be a good spirit there, a
recognition that when other aspects of
the East- West relationship are somewhat
strained, that it is important that people
take a constructive attitude toward the
Stockholm conference. That is certainly
our perspective there.
That said, I just would like to make
very clear that we do not view the
Stockholm conference as a surrogate
negotiation for the Geneva talks or the
Vienna talks. We think the focus in the
Stockholm conference should be on the
confidence-building measures, and we
have asked our Ambassador there-
James Goodby— to work closely not only
with the allies but to work with his
Soviet counterpart to see if it isn't pos-
sible to make some progress in this par-
ticular negotiation.
Q. Will the United States relax its
sanctions against the Polish Govern-
ment in the near future? What are the
present requirements for that?
A. On the question of Poland, I
would say our policy has evolved
somewhat over last year. Our general
policy toward Poland has been that we
are prepared to seek an improved rela-
tionship with the authorities in Warsaw,
in response to tangible steps that they
take in dealing both with union
movements and the church and activists
who have been imprisoned. There have
been some developments, such as the
successful visit by the Pope and the
release of political prisoners, which has
enabled the President of the United
States to take a decision in principle to
begin discussions with other Western
countries on the question of debt
rescheduling.
More recently we have stated a will-
ingness to begin discussions with Poland
on the question of a fishing allocation in
U.S. waters, and we have also discussed
in princijDle the possibility of taking other
steps such as providing the Polish
charter airline access to the United
States. This is a measured policy. It is
designed on the one hand to recognize
improvements in the Polish situation but
on the other hand to make it very clear
to the Polish authorities that we do not
approve of the systematic suppression of
the Solidarity movement and the Polish
people who have sought more freedom in
their system.
Q. The double-track decision of
1979 said it expects that the INF
negotiations should be carried out in
the framework of SALT II. Why are
vou now so reluctant to merge START
and INF?
A. The INF negotiations, as dis-
cussed by the allies in 1981 and 1982,
were also addressed in the framework of
START. That language, agreed to in
1979, talked about INF in a framework.
It does not suggest a merger of the
negotiations. What it does suggest is a
recognition that in a larger sense, the
two negotiations need to be seen in the
same context, and in Geneva, they have
been seen in the same context.
For example, in Washington we ad-
dress both START and INF issues in a
way that we understand the interrela-
tionships. In Geneva, when the negotia-
tions were underway, Paul Nitze [head of
the U.S. delegation to the INF negotia-
tions] and Ed Rowny consulted closely
together. I think it is fair to say that the
INF negotiations did take place in a
START framework. That is a very dif-
ferent thing than saying that they should
be merged.
The problem is that we have two
separate negotiations. We have devel-
oped negotiating proposals for those two
separate negotiations; we think they are
good proposals. If the Soviet Union has a
different idea, a different approach, we
will be prepared to discuss it with them.
We have done a lot of work in these
two negotiations. We have made some
progi'ess. We think the current
framework is perfectly adequate to reach
agreements if the Soviet Union would
come back to the negotiating table.
Q. You have dismissed the idea
that the Franco-British nuclear um-
brella might replace the American
umbrella. What about the chemical
umbrella? The Soviets have proposed a
European zone free of chemical
weapons, and I am thinking of nerve
gases, these terrible mass destruction
weapons. The Europeans, except
perhaps the French, have no ner\'e
gases. Many think a European free
zone would be good. What do you
think of this Soviet proposal?
A. We have made our view on this
abundantly clear. We would like a global
free zone on chemical weapons. The
problem with a European free zone on
chemical weapons is really the same as
the problem with the nuclear free zone,
and that is a European free zone pro-
hibits the deplojTTient of different
weapons in that zone. It does not stop or
prohibit the ability of the Soviet Union
to launch weapons from outside that
area, in the Soviet territory, into
Europe.
mm
EUROPE
What we have said to the Soviets is
that yes, we agree on the need to ban
the protection and stockpiling of these
weapons, but let's not just limit it to
Europe. Let's do it worldwide. For one
thing, it would be easier to verify if we
could include the entire territory of the
Soviet Union, as well as the United
States.
But it is also important to recognize
that in the chemical weapons area verifi-
cation will be a very, very difficult prob-
lem We are working on that problem at
the Conference on Disarmament m
Geneva, and we are hoping, as Secretary
of State Shultz made clear in Sweden,
that in the near future, we will table a
draft treaty which will lay out the details
for how we would go about banning
chemical weapons on a worldwide basis.
Q. A NATO report yesterday said
that the rate of growth of Soviet
militarv spending declined over the
last half of the 1970s to around 2%.
from hetween 4% and m over the first
half of that decade. Do you have any
indications that that slowdown in
Soviet military spending has continued
into the 1980s, and, if so, how does this
change, and how do you expect this to
change U.S. perceptions of Soviet
militarv might and intention?
A. Let me say first of all that I have
not had the opportunity to look at this
specific NATO report. I suspect that it is
based on reports that were done by the
American intelligence community about a
year ago and received some publicity at
that time. , .^ *v.
Basically the feelings were that the
Soviet Union was beginning to spend
slightly less on the procurement of
weapons systems, mainly as it spent
more on research and development. Ihat
is the basic pattern we see in the Soviet
defense effort; that they are ending, at
this phase, a phase of procurement of a
whole family of weapons systems in dil-
ferent areas, and they are beginning to
look toward the future and investing
more in the research and development
area. ,
We do not see any fundamental
change in the overall thrust of the Soviet
defense effort. Even if Soviet growth in
spending declines to 2% per year, in real
terms, I would want to point out that
during the 1970s, for example, the U.S.
defense effort declined 1% in real ternis.
What we see is a steady pattern of
Soviet growth. It is difficult to
predict-to look too far into the
future-but I think that the American in-
telligence community has concluded that
there will certainly be real constraints on
Soviet defense spending, given the prob-
lems of the Soviet economy, that the
Soviet military will still be able to count
on an increased level of spending year
after year during the decade of the
1980s!
Q. How imperative-if we go back
to INF-is Geneva as the negotiating
place, and how imperative is any
specific negotiating place? In other
words, that the whole field of
geographical, technical problems, and
definition matters must have been
covered there in the last 2 years. But if
we think about that in the course of
1984, a sort of direct diplomatic and
political negotiations between
Washington and Moscow would start,
especiallv since that would not compel
the Soviet Union to return physically
to Geneva and accept a loss in
prestige.
A. I don't know precisely what you
have in mind, but I think it is important
to recognize that we do discuss these
issues in other channels. The Secretary
of State, for example, sees Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington.
Our Ambassador in Moscow, Am-
bassador Hartman, regularly sees Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko. Earlier this
afternoon we discussed the recent 5-hour
meeting between Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Gromyko. There could
conceivably be future meetings between
these two "later in the year. We do have
venues for talking about these issues.
High-level political discussion is impor-
tant to encourage progress in the
negotiations. .
But they certainly do not substitute
for the negotiations themselves. It is im-
portant, after all, to discuss these _
technical issues. In arms control, as m a
lot of other very complex areas, the devil
is in the details. And it is important if
we are going to make progress in the
negotiations not only that senior political
officials discuss these issues and talk
about them but it is also important that
the negotiators themselves get back to
the table.
Q. At a recent experts' meeting
within NATO in Brussels, there was a
discussion about a neutralization
of West European countries. The term
"Swedenization" was used. Could you
comment on this?
A I don't comment on "Swedeniza-
tion," "Finlandization," or "Americaniza-
tion."
Q. You have talked about the im-
portance of conventional defense, or
the improvement of it, in Europe. One
of the problems that arises, particu-
larly for Europeans and particularly in
the "light of the strong dollar, is that
they have to produce so many of their
new weapons from the United States.
Can you talk to us about what plans
the Administration has to enable Euro-
peans to have access to U.S. advanced
technology in new weapons and to
share the costs of procuring these
weapons for the alliance?
A. It is a problem that a lot of time
and effort have been spent talking
about-the so-called two-way street, the
desii-e of our European allies to have
greater access to the American arms
market. It is absolutely correct that not
enough progi-ess has been made in the
recent past in this area.
We are looking at this problem now.
As you may know, our new Ambassador
to NATO, David Abshire, is very in-
terested in the whole NATO resource
problem, and he is talking not only to
NATO officials but to Members of Con-
gress about this issue.
We are making some progress. For
example, in many major weapons system
purchases now-the European purchases
from the United States-there are offsets
where a good portion, if not all, of the
money that government spends to ac-
quirea new conventional weapons
system is spent in the country that is
making the purchase.
An example of this was a recent deal
for the conventional Patriot air defense
system in Germany. These kinds of
developments offset payments- seekmg
ways to encourage a greater two-way
street in the defense market-these are
developments that should be encouraged.
They will have to be encouraged if our
European allies are going to continue to
spend more and do what is necessary to
maintain a strong conventional defense.
Q. We know there is a rather inten-
sive and critical discussion of NATO
strategy here in this country, which
centers, to a large extent, on the first-
use threat of nuclear weapons by
NATO. If we could establish a stable
conventional balance in Europe, do
you think that NATO could renounce
the first-use threat?
A. NATO strategy is that we will not
use nuclear weapons first. NATO
strategy is that the Soviet Union cannot
rule out the possibility that in the event
of a large-scale conventional attack that
nuclear weapons would be used.
50
noDUi
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
With that clai-ification, what you
have to ask yourself is, would announc-
ing a no first-use policy strengthen or
weaken deterrence? You are correct that
if we could do more to enhance our con-
ventional capabilities and create a con-
ventional balance in Europe, and this is a
worthy objective— the cost of that might
surprise some people— there is still, of
course, the real possibility of Soviet
nuclear blackmail.
1 think that what we need to do now
is recognize that we have a strategy of
deterrence, based now on the need to
maintain a strong conventional capability
and a credible nuclear capability. That
strategy has worked for 30 years.B
Visit of Yugoslav President
President Mika Spiljak of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
made an official working visit to
Washingtoti, D.C., January 31-
February 2, 198U, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following are remarks made by
President Reagan and President Spiljak
after their meeting on February 1.^
President Reagan
It's been a great pleasure for me and for
all of us to be able to welcome President
Spiljak of Yugoslavia and to confer with
him on issues of importance to both our
countries.
Relations between Yugoslavia and
the United States are good. President
Spiljak' s visit follows a long and well-
established tradition of consultation and
cooperation. The United States strongly
supports Yugoslavia's independence,
unity, and territorial integrity. Further,
we respect its policy of nonalignment.
Further, we respect this man who has
done so much in these recent years for
his country.
Despite understandable differences,
consultations between us provide a
unique and valuable perspective, and to-
day's meeting was no exception. I ex-
pressed to the President our continued
support for his government's efforts to
meet its serious economic challenges.
We'll do our part to help in cooperation
with other Western governments, inter-
national financial institutions, and com-
mercial banks. Vigorous economic
recovery in the United States will itself
help Yugoslavia by creating new oppor-
tunities for mutually beneficial commer-
cial activity and the strengthening of
bilateral trade.
Yugoslavia, like other nations of
Europe, hopes for progress in arms con-
trol negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union. I conveyed
to President Spiljak our deeper commit-
ment to reach equitable, verifiable
agreements with the Soviet Union. Such
agreements would be in our interest, the
Soviet Union's interest, and in the in-
terest of all mankind. We're flexible and
realistic in pursuit of this goal and share
the President's hope that the negotia-
tions will resume in the near future.
Today, we also discussed the serious
menace of international terrorism and
underscored our intention to cooperate in
opposing it wherever it occurs and for
whatevei- reasons. The United States
deplores all ten-orist attacks against
Yugoslav diplomatic counsellor and other
representatives, and we will not tolerate
such attacks on our territory.
The American people join me in con-
veying our best wishes to the people of
Yugoslavia for the success of this year's
Winter Olympic Games, which will begin
next week in Sarajevo. Like our Los
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee,
the Yugoslav Olympic Committee has in-
vested tremendous human and material
resources in putting the games together.
As the two host countries for the 1984
games, we have reason to be proud of
these endeavors.
It's especially fitting that in this
Olympic year, we're signing a
U.S.-Yugoslav tourism agreement. We
hope that the agreement to be signed
tomorrow will lead to an increase in
tourism and good will between our two
countries.
President Spiljak has been an espec-
ially welcome guest, and I look forward to
frequent consultations with him. And I'm
confident that our bilateral relations will
continue to grow and flourish. It's been
good to have you here.
President Spiljak^
First of all, I would like to express my
pleasure with the opportunity to visit the
United States of America and exchange
views with President Reagan on the
possibilities for promoting further our
bilateral cooperation and on some impor-
tant international issues.
April 1984
EUROPE
I would like to point out that the
talks with President Reagan were held
in a friendly and candid atmosphere of
full, mutual respect which characterizes
the relations between our two countries
and peoples. President Reagan and I
share the view that a practice of dialogue
in meetings between the highest repre-
sentatives of our two countries, regard-
less of the well-known diffei-ences in our
positions and views in some international
issues, continues to greatly contribute to
a bettei" mutual understanding and stable
cooperation in all fields of mutual in-
terest. The principles of equality, in-
dependence, and noninterference as a
mutually accepted basis for bilateral rela-
tions and cooperation were reaffirmed in
our talks today.
I'm glad to note that our talks con-
firmed once again that the overall
Yugoslav-American relations have been
developing successfully and that there
exist ample possibilities for their even
more comprehensive promotion in the
long run.
As President Reagan displayed the
interest, I briefed him on the essence of
the Yugoslav long-term program for
economic stabilization. The achievement
of our targets will offer a broader basis
for an overall economic cooperation with
all countries and in which the United
States of America is one of the most
significant partners. In this context, I
would like to emphasize that we attach
great importance to the results achieved,
as well as to the prospects to develop
further mutual, economic cooperation in
all areas. In this respect, special atten-
tion should be devoted to industrial,
technological, financial cooperation, as
well as joint ventures.
President Reagan reiterated the
resolve of the U.S. administration to pre-
vent the terrorists and other hostile ac-
tivities against Yugoslavia which are, at
the same time, directed against the good
Yugoslav-American relations and
cooperation.
I had a very useful exchange of
views with President Reagan on press-
ing international issues. Thus we
acquired a greater knowledge of, and
gained a better insight in, the positions
and activities of our two countries on the
international scene. We share the con-
cern over the present dangerous
developments and further deterioration
of the situation in the world.
We agreed that the policy of the
release of intemational tensions in
negotiation has no alteraative. We, for
our part, pointed in particular to the
need for strengthening international con-
fidence and creating an atmosphere
Yugoslavia— A Profile
People
Noun and adjective: VuK<islav(s|. Population
(IHiSl est.): TZA million. Annual growth
rate: \"/i<. Clearly defined ethnic groups:
Serli.s .Sti'!';,, Croats Lid'!:!. Bosnian MusHnis
y'Ki. Macedonians fi%, Slovenes 8%. Alba-
nians H%. Montenegrin Serbs 3'Ki.
Hunjjarians 2%. Turks d..")"^.. Religions:
Kastern Orthodox (Serbian ami Macedonian).
Koniaii t'atholie, Muslim. Languages: Serbo-
Croatian. Slovenian. Macedonian. Albanian,
Hungarian. Education: .4 //f-y/i/'nirr — !l!l'S, m
primary scIkioI (1979). Lilcniri/—H:^"/.,.
Health: hijiinl morhilili/ /vj/i — li^.S/l .(KHI
(19S1). Lij'i- I'Xjit'cldiirfi — men <W yrs.. women
73 yrs. Work force (.5,786.000): Aijnnil-
liiri — 3(»'R.. hi(liistry—lU%.
Geography
Area: 2.56.409 s(). km. (99,001) sq. mi.); aliout
two-thirds the size of California. Cities:
r„/„/„/ — Belgrade (pop. 1,300.000). Other
.■/7/r.v— Zagreb (700.000), Sk(>|)je (44().()00).
Sarajevo (400,000), Ljubljana (3()(),000). Ter-
rain: One-third lowland hills and plains, with
remainder mostly mountainous. Climate:
Ciiiisl — hot m summer, rainy and mild in
winter. Inhnid — warm in summer, cold in
w inter.
Government
Type: Federal republu Independence:
Dec-ember 1. 191,s, Constitution: February
197-4,
Branches: Ej-cculiti- — president of the
Presideniv (chief of stati'. rotated annually
from among the collective l)ody). (ireniier
(lieail of government and president of the
Federal Kxecutive Council. 4-vr Icnnl.
/,i7rs7.//(/r —bicameral /Xssemlily (30,s
delegates). Federal Kxecutive Council
(cabinet; As.semlily's executive arm).
.Iiiiliciiil — Constitutional Court. Federal
Supreme Court.
•Administrative subdivisions: (i re|iublics.
- autononiou.-. pro\iiices.
Political party: Lea^iie of Communists of
Yujioshuia. Suffrage: Cniversal overage 18.
Defense expenditures (1983 est.): 'k'>"/«
ulCNl'
Economy
GNP (1981): .$.■>!. .5 billion. Annual tiNF
growth rate (1981-82): 2.2'^. Per capita
GNP (1981): .$2,300. .\vg. inflation rate
(1982): 40'^..
Natural resources: Coal, copper, bauxite,
timber, iron, antimony, chromium, lead, zinc,
asbestos, mercury.
Agriculture (13'!^, of (d)!'): L<n,il—{WV„
arable. .33'K, of which is plowlaml. Prml-
iirls — corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets,
livestock.
Industries (37% of CD!'): VVoo.l. proc-
es.sed food, nonferrous metals, machinery,
textiles.
Trade (1982): AV/,„w.s— $10.2 billion:
agricultural products (including proi-essed
meats), wooden furniture, leather goods and
shoes, textiles. shi|)S. mineral ores, metal
jiroducts. and tobacco. A/</./o/- wnrkcls—
I SSK. ItaK. FKC. Czechoslovakia. //»-
pitrls — .Si:i.3 billion: machinery and metal
proiUicts, chemicals, iron, [letroleum. coking
coal, steel, and agricultural products. . \//;yoc
,,.„„, -/..s—l SSK. FKC. ItaK. IS.
Taken from the Background Notes of June
1983, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. Editor:
.J. Darnell Adams. ■
favorable for the renewal of dialogue as a
precondition for the settlement of the
acute international political and economic
problems.
I also informed President Reagan of
our assessments of the East-West rela-
tions, the situation in Europe, and of our
deep concern over the continuation of the
arms race, in particular. We presented
our views on the problems of the rela-
tions between the developed and the
developing countries, as well as our
assessments of some acute hotbeds of
crisis such as the Middle East and Near
East, southern Africa, and others. We
find it to the need of i-esolving them by
peaceful means in compliance with the
principles and purposes of the Charter of
the United Nations. In this context, we
pointed to the activities and initiatives of
the nonaligned countries at solving the
outstanding international problems.
I'm confident that my visit and the
fruitful and meaningful talks I had with
President Reagan will give a fresh boost
to an even more comprehensive develop-
ment of cooperation between our two
countries, thus contributing to interna-
tional understanding in general.
'Made to repoiters assembled at the
South Portico of the White House (text from
Weeklv Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Feb. 6, 1984).
^Pi'esident Spiljak read the opening and
closing portions of his statement in Serbo-
Croatian; his inteipreter read the complete
statement in English. ■
Department of State Bulletin
HUMAN RIGHTS
Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1983
FoUoiving is the introduction from
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1983, which was prepared by the
Department of State and submitted to the
House Foreign Affairs Committee and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in February 198\.
DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
For the last two years the introduction
has contained an exposition of United
States human rights policy as for-
mulated in the Reagan Administration.
The relationship between democracy and
human rights is at the core of that
human rights policy. The purpose of the
present introduction is to examine that
relationship in greater depth.
The Experience of
Human Rights Work
Over the past three years, the United
States Government has employed a
broad range of instruments and tech-
niques in responding to specific cases of
human rights violations. In dealing with
friendly governments, we have engaged
in the kind of frank diplomatic ex-
changes often referred to as "quiet
diplomacy." Where diplomatic ap-
proaches have not availed, or where our
influence with a foreign government is
minimal, we have dissociated ourselves
from odious human rights practices by
denying economic and military assist-
ance, voting against multilateral loans,
and denying diplomatic support. Where
appropriate, we have distanced
ourselves from human rights violators
by public pressures and statements de-
nouncing their actions. In most cases,
we have employed a mixture of tradi-
tional diplomacy and public affirmation
of American interest in the issue.
The success of these efforts has
varied with the degree of leverage we
have in a given country, the political en-
vironment, and the energy and skill of
our diplomatic representatives.
Diplomatic exchanges on behalf of
dissidents, and other victims of human
rights abuse, are by their very nature
confidential. Although we cannot public-
ly claim credit, American representa-
tions have often been instrumental in
halting human rights violations against
dissidents by governments with whom
we enjoy some common interests.
Perhaps the phrase "quiet diplomacy"
does not fully convey either the intensity
of American efforts, or the depth of our
concern, on behalf of human rights vic-
tims, yet in many cases, this kind of in-
tercession has proven an effective
response to human rights violations. Let
us be clear that "quiet diplomacy" refers
only to confidentiality of the diplomatic
channels we use, rwt to the intensity of
our representations.
Compassion requires us to intervene
in specific cases. When we have done so,
we have often had successes. Such suc-
cesses are important because they
relieve suffering; in a few cases they can
also have a major symbolic impact on a
country and serve as a precedent for
future improvements. But it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the frustrations of
this kind of work. All too often, the best
efforts of any government can secure
the release of a political prisoner only to
see another political prisoner arrested;
they can persuade a government to sus-
pend the practice of torture only to see
it renewed later on; they can secure per-
mission for someone to leave his country
only to see the next citizen who seeks to
leave denied this right. We intervene,
knowing very well that our interventions
may fail to prevent new violations of the
same type.
In this regard, the human rights
work traditionally done by the State
Department differs from most other
kinds of work undertaken in foreign
policy. In other areas, diplomatic effort
frequently culminates in major trans-
formations: an arms control treaty, a
treaty resolving a major conflict, an
alliance between ourselves and another
country, a diplomatic opening to a
heretofore hostile country, a successful
Copies of the Report
The complete volume documents human
rights practices in more than 160 countries of
the world. It may be purchased for $23.00
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. Remittance must accompany
order. ■
military action in defense of our friends,
a new aid program. These are actions
that may change the international
system. Our case-by-case human rights
work, in its very specific nature, cannot
effect such changes. Of all the areas of
traditional human rights work, it is
perhaps only in the international
organizations, where we can sometimes
obtain a vote publicly identifying a ma-
jor human rights violation, that our
work is most marked by spectacular
events similar to those that can take
place in other areas of foreign policy.
Thus, the criteria of success in human
rights work are inherently less clear,
and human rights work is inherently
more frustrating for those doing it than
other branches of diplomacy.
Democracy and Human Rights
For this reason, the Reagan Administra-
tion has developed a two-track human
rights policy. The first track is embodied
in the way we oppose specific human
rights violations over the short term.
Thus, to take only public activities, we
have spoken out against such gross af-
fronts to human rights as the incarcera-
tion of Soviet dissidents in psychiatric
wards and the resurgence of officially
sponsored anti-Semitism in the Soviet
Union; the barbaric persecution of
adherents of the Baha'i faith in Iran; the
institutionalization of racial injustice by
the apartheid system in South Africa;
the destruction of the free trade union
movement, Solidarity, in Poland; the ac-
tivities of the "death squads" in El
Salvador; the persecution of the Miskito
Indians in Nicaragua; and the use of
outlawed toxic weapons by Soviet forces
in Afghanistan and by Vietnamese
forces in Kampuchea. In these and other
cases of human rights abuse, we have
made use of such influence as we
possess to help individual victims.
At the same time, we have ad-
dressed the long range need to create a
system of government which institu-
tionalizes the protection of human
rights. For just as the creation of an
economic system which promotes
growth and prosperity is a better long
term solution to the problem of poverty
than repeated acts of charity, so, too,
the creation of a system of government
which safeguards human rights is a bet-
ter long range response to the problem
of human rights abuse than repeated,
case-by-case diplomatic representations.
This, then, is the second track of
United States human rights policy: the
long term development of democratic
governments, which are the surest
April 1984
HUMAN RIGHTS
safeguard of human rights. President
Reagan has made the encouragement of
democracy throughout the world a cen-
tral goal. Too often our human rights
policy has been simply reactive, respond-
ing to violations after they have oc-
curred rather than working to prevent
them. The President has sought to go
beyond this to an active, positive human
rights policy.
He outlined his conception in a
speech to Parliament in London in June,
The impetus behind the second track
of our human rights policy is the
recognition that a close connection exists
between a democratic form of govern-
ment and respect for human rights. As
both the State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, and
the reports of independent human rights
groups, such as Freedom House, have
repeatedly demonstrated, most democ-
racies have excellent human rights
records. Nor is this merely a coin-
. . /'quiet diplomacy" refers only to confidentiality
of the diplomatic channels we use, not to the inten-
sity of our representations.
1982, when he announced that the
chairmen of the national Republican and
Democratic parties were initiating a
study to determine how the United
States could best contribute to the
global campaign for democracy. That
study has now been completed, and its
recommendations have been supported
by Congress. The result has been the
establishment of a National Endowment
for Democracy, which will greatly ex-
pand the involvement of our two major
political parties, as well as labor,
business and other private institutions,
in programs designed to promote demo-
cratic institutions and practices abroad.
Such programs will be insulated from
United States Government control, and
will respond to the needs of men and
women working for democracy in their
own societies.
Even before funding the National
Endowment for Democracy, Congress
had established one human rights pro-
gram on the positive side. Section 116(e)
of the Foreign Assistance Act provides
Agency for International Development
(AID) funding for programs and ac-
tivities which encourage or promote in-
creased adherence to civil and political
rights in countries eligible for United
States bilateral assistance. In Fiscal
Year 1983 AID funded 51 activities
totalling $1,853,466. Activities included
support for the development of guide-
lines for election observers, support for
human rights education and training
programs, and support for programs
aimed at assisting government and
private legal institutions abroad.
cidence. Democracy, after all, is a form
of government which is based on the
freely given consent of the governed.
But consent can only be freely given if
the means for the free expression of
consent, or of dissent, exist; such means
include freedom of speech, freedom of
press, freedom of assembly and associa-
tion, an independent judiciary, and free
elections. Thus, respect for human
rights is built into the very foundations
of the democratic form of government.
All this is not to say that serious
human rights violations can never take
place in a democracy. But because free,
competitive and periodic elections make
the government accountable for its ac-
tions to the electorate, such violations as
do occur tend to be self-correcting over
time. As Thomas Jefferson pointed out
in his First Inaugural Address, free elec-
tions are "a mild and safe corrective of
abuses which are lopped off by the
sword of the revolution where peaceable
remedies are unprovided." In its ca-
pacity to initiate a thorough-going proc-
ess of peaceful reform, democracy dif-
fers fundamentally from all other forms
of government. Democracy is therefore
the nearest thing we have to a guar-
antee of human rights.
Moreover, democratic government is
also a precondition to the achievement
of social justice. Recent events in Poland
vividly confirm this. A basic grievance
voiced by Solidarity was that members
of the Polish Communist Party had
ready access to the best food stores, the
best medical care, and the best shops,
while the ordinary Polish worker had ac-
cess to none of these things. The Com-
munist ruling class in Poland, aided and
abetted by the Communist ruling class in
the Soviet Union, responded to this
grievance by imposing martial law,
outlawing Solidarity, and holding its
leader, Lech Walesa, incommunicado for
many months. Today, Poland remains
bitterly divided between the rulers and
the ruled. That this has occurred in a
self-proclaimed "Workers' State" only
serves to underscore the absolute
necessity of making the government ac-
countable to the governed. For, to quote
Jefferson once more, "Every govern-
ment degenerates when trusted to the
rulers of the people alone."
Democracy and Minority Rights
It is so true that democracy guarantees
human rights that it requires an effort
to bring to mind the apparent excep-
tions. Minority rights are the greatest of
these. For long periods in the United
States, as in other democracies, the
rights of minorities were systematically
violated by the majority. It is no acci-
dent that this is the greatest exception
to the effectiveness of democracy as a
guarantee of human rights. If democ-
racy makes the government responsible
to the will of the majority, it can, in
theory, also become the vehicle whereby
the majority disenfranchises the minori-
ty. To prevent this from happening, a
means must be devised to reconcile ma-
jority rule with minority rights. As
James Madison warned in Federalist
Paper No. 10, the democratic form of
government might enable a majority "to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of
other citizens. To secure the public good
and private rights against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government, is then the great
object" of the authors of the Con-
stitution.
In the understanding of American
statesmen who wrestled with this prob-
lem, two elements of democratic political
life can be brought into play against the
deprivation of minority rights. The first
is equality. Democratic political life im-
plies natural equality, and this is
ultimately incompatible with the subor-
dination of minorities. Abraham Lincoln
thus regarded equality as the central
principle of American democracy:
Public opinion, on any subject, always has
a "central idea," from which all its minor
thoughts radiate. That "central idea" in our
political public opinion at the beginning was,
and until recently has continued to be, "the
ai
Department of State Bulletin
HUMAN RIGHTS
equality of men." And although it has alv> ays
submitted patiently to whatever of inequality
there seemed to be as a matter of actual
necessity, its constant working has been a
steady progress toward the practical equality
of all men.
The second democratic guard
against the loss of minority rights is
more practical. In order to secure
minority rights against an overbearing
majority, the makers of the American
Revolution set out to encourage what
James Madison called "a multiplicity of
interests" throughout the United States.
When society consists of a "great variety
of interests, parties, and sects," wrote
Madison in Federalist Paper No. 51, "a
coalition of the majority of the whole
society could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and
the general good." With society "broken
into so many parts, interests and classes
of citizens," Madision concluded, "the
rights of individuals, or of the minority,
will be in little danger from interested
combinations of the majority." In short,
the security of minority rights depends
on the diversity of interests in society:
the greater the diversity, the more
secure the rights.
This diversity tends to guarantee
human rights in another and even more
practical way. Democracy works by
making respect for human rights not
only a matter of principles but of in-
terests. A free press has a natural in-
terest in securing freedom of opinion, as
free churches have in securing freedom
of religion. Lawyers who are accus-
tomed to independence are naturally in-
sistent on the right to a fair trial.
Teachers who are accustomed to pro-
fessing their own opinions are likely to
insist on academic freedom.
This, then, is the formula devised by
the framers of the American democratic
constitution to reconcile majority rule
with minority rights: democratic govern-
ment in the political sphere, diversity
and pluralism in the social sphere, both
operating under the principle of equality.
With this situation we should com-
pare minority rights under communism.
The principles of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion were thoroughly internationalist
and egalitarian, but the greatest real
equality between the nationalities of the
Soviet Union existed in the 1920's. Since
then minority rights have been sys-
tematically, even brutally, eroded.
In the early years of Soviet history
the party organizations in many of the
national republics were dominated by
local people, and were able in certain
cases to work out indigenous versions of
April 1984
communism. At the national level, there
were strict restraints on "Great Russian
chauvinism," and many of the Soviet
leaders in Moscow were neither Rus-
sians nor Slavs. Subsequently, there
were massive purges of the local Com-
munist parties, together with the purg-
ing of many indigenous elements from
the national literatures and from the
languages themselves. Today the Rus-
sian people are given a special status
above the others, and any expression of
national distinctiveness is potentially
open to criticism as "bourgeois na-
tionalism." The national republics have
Russian Second Secretaries to assure
their fidelity to central policy, and it is
taken for granted that the General
Secretary must be a Russian or at least
a Slav.
This fact presents a vivid contrast to
the position of minority rights in
democratic countries, where the original
principles of equality have again and
again been restored. Abraham Lincoln
did not discover his opposition to slavery
as something new, but rediscovered the
implication of the Declaration of In-
dependence when it declared that all
men are created equal.
Indeed, the principles of equal rights
were not only restored again and again,
but restored in a more exact form. At
the time of the American Revolution,
women and most blacks did not share in
voting. But their right to do so was
somehow latent in the principle that all
men are created equal. It took about a
hundred and fifty years for women to be
admitted to democratic self-governance
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact
that in the Soviet Union the realization
of political principles is entrusted entire-
ly to a central government. And that
central government organizes and
directs all activity within the country.
Thus there can be no writers who freely
point out the oppression of minorities,
no civil rights groups to point out the
forgetting of the founding principles of
the regime, no new party founded— as
the Republican Party was founded dur-
ing the 1850's— to challenge injustice to
minorities. There are, in the Soviet
order, no groups, factions, and organiza-
tions which themselves interpret, resort
to, and reassert the political ideals of the
regime. In the absence of such diversity
the interpretation of the regime's found-
ing principles is the interpretation given
by the central government. Of course, as
time passes that government will be
pressed by various tactical necessities to
compromise its original principles. Hav-
ing compromised its principles for tac-
tical reasons, a government which is the
authoritative interpreter of national
tradition will be compelled to reinterpret
and corrupt that tradition to conform to
its tactical needs.
It is different when the society, and
not the government, is the guardian of
the country's principles. Independent
organizations, groups, and factions are
free to reassert the founding principles,
such as equality or religious freedom, in
a pure form. It is then for the demo-
cratic political process to compromise
among these statements of principles
when they conflict, and not for the
. . . today democracy has seized the imagination of
the world to such an extent that even the most
despotic regime feels obliged to refer to the people
as the source of its legitimacy, and to hold periodic
elections, however bogus.
in the United States. It took a century
to resolve the question of black suffrage
constitutionally, and nearly two cen-
turies for full voting rights to be
guaranteed. But these changes were
made, and they were made by returning
to the principles of natural equality
enunciated at the founding. What is the
reason for this evident contrast between
two systems, one in which the founding
principles were progressively eroded and
compromised, the other in which they
unfolded and developed?
government to do so. Thus the historical
fact— the vitality and growth of the
founding principles in democracies and
their erosion in totalitarian regimes-
should not be so surprising. It follows
from the diversity of the society, which
Madison recommended and which
modern democracies embody in practice.
The measure of its success may be
gauged by the fact that whereas before
the American Revolution, democratic
government was held in such disrepute
that Madison felt obliged to rescue it
55
HUMAN RIGHTS
"from the opprobrium under which it has
so long labored," today democracy has
seized the imagination of the world to
such an extent that even the most
despotic regime feels obliged to refer to
the people as the source of its
legitimacy, and to hold periodic elec-
tions, however bogus.
Diversity and Human Rights
In framing its current human rights
policy, the United States Government
has tried to draw on the tradition of
democratic thinking. Thus, one of the
goals of our democracy initiative is to
encourage diversity and pluralism in
non-democratic societies. We believe
that once a "multiplicity of interests"
begins to flourish in the economic
sphere, the educational sphere, the
religious sphere, the cultural sphere, and
the social sphere, it becomes increasing-
ly difficult for non-democratic govern-
ments to exclude a similar degree of
diversity in the political sphere.
Democratic legitimacy— the notion that
"the people" must somehow rule— is a
powerful force in the modern world, but
it will never be effectively embodied in
institutions until there is a "great va-
riety of interests, parties and sects."
Looking around the world, there are
some grounds for the generalization that
democracy has been more successful in
abandonment of diversity in the political
sphere never led to the abrogation of
diversity in the social sphere— would
seem to confirm the accuracy of this
view. By encouraging social diversity,
the United States is now helping to pro-
mote the transformation of non-demo-
cratic regimes into democratic ones.
Unfortunately, not all dictatorships
are prepared to tolerate a measure of
diversity in the non-political sphere. The
twentieth century has witnessed a new
phenomenon, the emergence of totali-
tarian dictatorship, in its Communist
and Fascist varieties. Totalitarian
regimes, besides maintaining a monopoly
on political activity, also claim the
authority to direct all economic, social
and cultural developments towards the
attainment of a Utopian image of man's
future. In Communist or Fascist states,
society is not permitted to exist in its
diversity as an autonomous entity,
capable of exerting pressure on the
regime. After the Second World War ex-
tinguished the Fascist totalitarian
regimes. Communist regimes remain the
most hostile to internal diversity. It is
no coincidence, then, that while a
number of non-Communist dictatorships
have evolved into democratic regimes,
the world has yet to witness the
peaceful transformation of a single Com-
munist dictatorship into a democracy.
Poland— an apparent exception to this
generalization— is the only Soviet bloc
. . . there are some grounds for the generalization
that democracy has been more successful in estab-
lishing itself in countries where there were multiple
centers of power than in countries where social ac-
tivity was organized from a center that dominated
the whole life of the nation.
establishing itself in countries where
there were multiple centers of power
than in countries where social activity
was organized from a center that
dominated the whole life of the nation.
For example, democracy has tended to
be more successful in countries that had
a tradition of feudalism than in those
where absolute monarchy was impor-
tant: more successful in Japan than in
China, in Nigeria than in Uganda. The
return to democratic government in re-
cent years in Spain, Portugal, Greece
and Argentina— countries where the
56
state without a system of collectivized
agriculture, as well as the one with the
strongest independent church.
This distinction between Communist
and non-Communist dictatorships has
obvious implications for human rights
policy. All dictatorships— both on the left
and the right— engage in serious human
rights violations. All human rights viola-
tions, in turn, deserve to be condemned.
But while non-Communist dictatorships
are capable, to varying degrees, of
evolving into democracies, Communist
dictatorships are singularly resistant to
democratization. Because Communist
and non-Communist dictatorships differ
so radically in their potentialities for the
future, it follows that preventing Com-
munist dictatorships from establishing
themselves ought to be an especially
high priority of any realistic and serious
human rights policy.
This is not to say that similar human
rights violations by Communist and non-
Communist governments ought to be
treated differently. But in a situation of
instability, where a government such as
Somoza's or the Shah's may shatter and
be succeeded by another very different
form of government, these distinctions
become relevant. When we take our
bearings not only by the human rights
symptoms but by their causes, the dif-
ference between types of political
systems can become crucial.
Why It Is Not Futile
To Support Democracy
Thus the experience of practical human
rights work strengthens the analysis
that leads us from human rights case
work by itself, toward addressing
underlying systemic problems. It shows
that if we are going to produce major
changes in human rights conditions, we
can only do so by changing political
systems— by encouraging democracy.
The preceding analysis does not in itself
show that the encouragement of democ-
racy is a feasible undertaking. To see
why it is, we need to look beyond our
own times. When we seek, on top of
eliminating human rights violations in
specific cases, to change entire systems,
it might seem that we go beyond the dif-
ficult to the truly Utopian. Such a conclu-
sion would be absolutely correct if we
ignored the difference between the long
term and the short term. At any par-
ticular time in the past it was indeed
Utopian to believe that absolute mon-
archy, slavery, or serfdom could be
abolished. But all these things were
abolished. If we see only our particular
moment in history, things will seem im-
pregnable that are already being eroded
by unseen but vast tides of history. In
fact, any efforts we make on behalf of
democracy, small as they may be, are
sustained by democracy's gradual expan-
sion since the days of the American
Revolution. In 1790, there existed only
two democratic republics: the United
States and part of Switzerland. By 1909,
there were a number of constitutional
monarchies, but the tenacity of the old
order was shown by the fact that there
were still only three republics outside
the Western Hemisphere: France, Swit-
Department of State Bulletin
HUMAN RIGHTS
itse'J
zerland and Liberia. Today, there are
fifty genuine democracies, comprising
about a third of the world's population,
and enjoying both the full panoply of
political and civil liberties and— taken as
a group— the world's highest standard of
economic well-being.
Whenever a non-democratic country
embarks upon a process of political
reform, democracy is always on the
agenda. Today, with the exception of a
handful of remote monarchies, all
governments claim to base their
legitimacy on the consent of the gov-
erned. Democracy confers the most
powerful form of legitimacy in the
modern world. Our times display a
remarkable paradox: the victory of
democracy is virtually complete in prin-
ciple, but still limited in practice. This
paradox should teach us something both
about the weakness of democracy and
about its strength.
The only alternative to democracy as
a contemporary system of legitimacy is
Marxism-Leninism. Developing coun-
tries, when they choose their institutions
and officers, choose either the forms of
democracy or those of Marxism-
Leninism. They have either a President
or a General Secretary, either a Parlia-
ment or a Central Committee, or some
combination. While democracy em-
powers the people through the operation
of free institutions, Marxism-Leninism
empowers a tiny elite; while democracy
welcomes and encourages social diversi-
ty, Marxism-Leninism seeks to eradicate
it; while democracy stresses the in-
alienable rights of its citizens, Marxism-
Leninsim emphasizes their duties— par-
ticularly their duty not to engage in
■ whatever activity the Party deems
'counter-revolutionary." Yet even while
Marxism-Leninism departs so fundamen-
:ally from democratic theory and prac-
tice, it, too, has been compelled by the
strength of the democratic idea to adopt
;he rhetoric of democracy and pretend
;hat it responds to the popular will.
It follows that the task of believers
n democracy is not to impose democ-
racy on a world bitterly opposed to it,
3ut rather to help fulfill the expectations
;hat every people acknowledges for
tself. These expectations are contained
n such documents as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, pro-
laimed by the General Assembly of the
Jnited Nations in 1948, "as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples
ind all nations." No people knowingly
•esigns the right to choose its own
iestiny. No one would voluntarily choose
JO be deprived of his or her human
S«*
rights. Yet despite these self-evident
truths, there are a number of wide-
spread fallacies about democracy which
often make us misunderstand its appeal,
and misjudge its possibilities.
Three Fallacies About Democracy
Perhaps the most widely held fallacy
about the democratic form of govern-
ment is that it is an exclusively North
Atlantic phenomenon. The facts, of
course, are otherwise. Neither India nor
Japan, Costa Rica nor Botswana,
Senegal nor Fiji belong to the North
Atlantic constellation of states; all are
thriving democracies.
cuse for reluctance to affirm their own
democratic principles.
A related fallacy about the demo-
cratic form of government is that it can
only take hold in wealthy societies. Yet
when Switzerland and the United States
established democratic governments,
both were poor agrarian countries. To-
day, while many democracies are ad-
vanced industrial states, some are not.
That democracy issues from great
wealth would surprise Indians or Bar-
badians or Botswanans! By freeing un-
tapped social energies and providing op-
portunities for their exercise, democracy
often facilitates the creation of wealth.
Perhaps the most widely held fallacfiesj about
the democratic form of government is that it is an
exclusively North Atlantic phenomenon. . . . that it
can only take hold in wealthy societies . . . that its
promotion is incompatible with peace, because ad-
vocacy of democracy means interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries.
Nor is democracy in such countries
necessarily an import from the North
Atlantic area. Many peoples have some
form of democracy as part of their
heritage. In 1700 there were more ex-
tensive areas of democracy in Africa
than in Europe, because the societies
called "primitive" by colonialism carried
on their decision making by democratic
means. Conversely, there was probably
never as great a loss of human freedom
in a short period of time as in the years
1884 to 1900, when these societies came
under colonial administration from out-
side. Yet the tenacity with which the
thesis about the North Atlantic nature
of democracy is held suggests that it is
based on an underlying presupposition:
the relativist assumption that freedom's
appeal does not derive from something
inherent in human nature, but is merely
the result of a particular form of
cultural conditioning. The fact, however,
that so many people from different
cultures have taken enormous risks to
escape from closed societies to free
societies makes this notion difficult to
sustain. Perhaps this idea has as its
ultimate source, not the observation of
the world but the self-doubt of the North
Atlantic democracies, which seek an ex-
Nothing indicates, however, that a
wealthy society is an absolute precondi-
tion for the establishment of democracy.
A third fallacy about democracy is
that its promotion is incompatible with
peace, because advocacy of democracy
means interference in the internal af-
fairs of other countries. In fact, it is not
the advocacy of human rights, but the
denial of human rights that is the
greater source of tension in world
politics. As Secretary of State George
Shultz recently stated.
In Europe, as elsewhere, governments
that are not at peace with their own people
are unlikely to be on good terms with their
neighbors. The only significant use of
military force on the continent of Europe
since 1945 has been by the Soviet Union
against its East European "allies." As long as
this unnatural relationship continues between
the USSR and its East European neighbors,
it is bound to be a source of instability in
Europe.
How many wars have begun at the
hands of armies of occupation, how
many have begun due to the denial of
self-determination to peoples, to failures
to accord citizens the right to govern
themselves? In our time, at least,
democracies have been less aggressive,
April 1984
INTERNATIONAL LAW
less oriented toward military power than
other systems. The most stable zones of
the world— Western Europe and North
America— are zones of democracy.
History has also shown that alliances
with democracies tend to be more stable,
because a single man does not have the
power to reverse long-standing relation-
ships embedded in a wider social reality.
Thus, a democratic international en-
vironment is more stable and predict-
able, and produces fewer tensions and
crises. Like all the other aims of foreign
policy, the encouragement of democracy
can, of course, become a source of ten-
sion and danger if it is sought too quick-
ly or by the wrong means. Precisely
because it is a whole system, any at-
tempt to impose democracy all at once
on a society where its foundations do
not exist would be a profound mistake.
Likewise, the creation of democracy
must be a gradual process; the very
reason for turning human rights efforts
in this direction is the inadequacy of
what we can achieve in the short term.
A Time of Choice for
Democratic Nations
These widespread fallacies may be large-
ly responsible for the fact that one of
the most hopeful developments in recent
years— the march of democracy in Latin
America— has gone largely unnoticed.
The recent inauguration of President
Alfonsin of Argentina is only the latest
in a series of victories for democracy in
Latin America. Apart from Cuba,
Suriname, Haiti, Guyana and Paraguay,
the other twenty-seven nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean are either
basically democratic, or at least nominal-
ly embarked on the transition to full
democracy. This process has accelerated
over the last three years. Between 1976
and 1980, only one Latin American na-
tion, Ecuador, elected a civilian presi-
dent to replace the military. Since 1980,
however, nine Latin American nations
have either held free elections, or
declared their intention of doing so soon:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru
and Uruguay. Even the Government of
Nicaragua, having reneged on earlier
promises to hold free elections, now
claims to be planning them for 1985.
While the honor for this achieve-
ment belongs entirely to the people of
Latin America, the United States has
played a constructive role in this proc-
ess. Given the influence which the
United States has in its hemisphere, it is
less likely that many military govern-
ments would have embarked on a transi-
58
tion to democracy if the United States
had been urging caution in this course.
In fact. United States policy over the
last three years has been the precise op-
posite. In countries which had set
timetables for transition to democracy,
the United States has consistently urged
adhering to these timetables or ac-
celerating them. In countries where
fragile democratic governments have
been established and there have been
rumors or initiatives of coups against
democracy, the United States has
mobilized its diplomatic influence to sup-
port democratic continuity. The
heightened concern of the United States
for hemispheric security in the last three
years has not hindered, but rather
helped, movement toward democracy in
Latin America. Transition to democracy
invariably involves uncertainty and risk,
as seen from the standpoint of those
who are relinquishing power. Such fears
are likely to be aggravated by a United
States that seems inconsistent, unpredic-
table, inclined to abandon its friends to
Soviet or Cuban pressure. On the other
hand, the risks and uncertainties are
diminished by an American foreign
policy that makes it clear that the
United States can be counted on to pro-
tect its interests and its friends.
The United States is not alone, of
course, in its efforts to foster democ-
racy. As President Reagan stated in his
address to the Members of Parliament in
London, "Over the past several decades,
Western European and other Social
Democrats, Christian Democrats, and
leaders have offered open assistance to
fraternal, political, and social institutions
to bring about peaceful and democratic
progress. Appropriately, for a vigorous
new democracy, the Federal Republic of
Germany's political foundations have
become a major force in this effort."
The United States has now joined
many of its allies in an effort to realize
our common goal. We recognize that
such an effort necessarily contains many
unresolved dilemmas, but one point is
unarguable: if the United States and its
allies can encourage the growth of
democracy, we will strengthen our-
selves. Conversely, American strength
and self-confidence are crucial precondi-
tions to an effective human rights policy.
The democratic world is presented, not
by its own will, but by events in the
areas that are not yet democratic, with
a choice about what its attitude toward
democracy is going to be. We can either
stand aside, and allow the conflicts rag-
ing in that part of the world to take
their course, or we can choose to act in
defense of our deepest values and com-
mitments. The decision is ours to
make. ■
Board of Appellate Review
To Publish Decisions
The Department of State on January 30,
1984, announced that selected decisions
of the Board of Appellate Review on ap-
peals from administrative determinations
of the Department of State of loss of na-
tionality and denials of passport facilities
will henceforth be published as a matter
of public record.
Publication will commence with the
board's decision of January 11, 1984, in
the matter of R. J. Mc C, wherein the
board affirmed the Department's detei'-
mination of loss of appellant's nationality.
The Board of Appellate Review, a
quasijudicial, autonomous body, hears
and decides appeals taken by individuals
from administrative determinations made
by the Department of State in cases in-
volving loss of U.S. nationality; the
denial, restriction, or refusal of passport
facilities on grounds other than nonciti-
zenship; certain contract cases; and such
other cases as may be refeiTed to the
board by the Secretary of State. It was
created essentially to provide a final ad-
ministrative review procedure consistent
with the requu'ements of due process.
The board's decisions are final within
the Department and ai'e not subject to
further administrative review by any of
its officials.
The board considers and deteiTnines
each appeal on its pai'ticular facts and
circumstances. The board's decisions,
therefoi'e, are not, as a rule, considered
precedential.
A person who has been the subject of
an adverse decision of the board in an
appeal from an administrative determina-
tion of loss of nationality or denial of a
passport on grounds other than nonciti-
zenship may institute proceedings in a
U.S. District Court where the matter is
heard de novo.
The board e.xists by virtue of Part 7
of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.
For administrative purposes it is located
in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State.
Departnnent of State Bulletir
MIDDLE EAST
Since its establishment, the board
has heard almost exclusively appeals
taken from determinations of loss of na-
tionality. Under law, the Secretary of
State is responsible for the determina-
tion of U.S. nationality of a person out-
side the United States and for the is-
suance of passports. An essential re-
quirement in the perfonnance of these
responsibilities is due process. The board
thus provides an administj-ative remedy
in the form of a quasijudicial heai-ing or
review to one who was the subject of an
adverse determination on nationality or
restrictive action with respect to a
passport.
The board consists of two regular
members, one of whom, Alan G. James,
is chaii-man, and eight ad hoc members
who are senior officials of the Depart-
ment of State and who serve on the
board in addition to their regularly as-
signed duties. All members are required
to be attorneys in good standing, ad-
mitted to practice in any state, the
District of Columbia, or any territory or
possession of the United States. By
regulation, all members of the board are
designated by the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State. In considering and
deciding an appeal, a three-member
panel constitutes the board.
In conformity with the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. 552a, and Section 51.33 of
Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, in-
formation identifying the appellant or
other private persons associated with an
appeal will be excised prior to publica-
tion of the decisions. In all material
respects, the published decisions will be
as rendered by the board. The decisions
will be issued in loose-leaf form.
All decisions, appropriately excised in
the intei-ests of privacy, that have been
rendered by the board are available for
inspection by appellants and interested
counsel in the board's offices.
Copies of the board's decision of
January 11, 1984, and decisions published
subsequently, may be obtained by calling
or writing to the Public Information
Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room
4827A, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520. Telephone (202)
632-6575.
Inquiries about the role of the board
and its procedures may be directed to
the Chairman, Alan G. James, State
Annex-1, Room W-115, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Defense Secretary Weinberger's
Interview on "IVIeet the Press"
Press release 24 of Jan. .30, 1984.
April 1984
Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on
Februanj 12. 1984, by Bill Monroe, Jack
Reynolds, and John Dancy, NBC News;
Bruce W. Nelan, Time; and Carl T.
Rowan, the Chicago Sun-Times. Follow-
ing are excerpts from that interview.
Q. When will the Marines begin com-
ing out of their positions near Beirut?
A. The first few have already been
moved over to the ships, the ones who
had no direct operational duties in con-
nection with the perimeter positions.
And, again, depending on the final deci-
sions, and these can only come after con-
sultation with the other members of the
multinational force (MNF), substantial
numbers .should be out by the end of this
month, and probably it's perfectly feasi-
ble that the entire operation can be com-
pleted within less than 30 days. But the
actual date depends on consultations
with the other members of the multi-
national force.
Q. It's possible that they will all be
out within 30 days?
A. It can be done, oh, yes. There's no
logistical or operational problem that
would prevent that.
Q. Would you like to see them all
out in 30 days?
A. I think there's no question about
that, yes. I think they would be a much
more effective and in a much safer posi-
tion for them on the ships— a place from
which they could be a lot more effective
in trying to carry out the basic mission
for which they entered about 16 months
ago.
Q. What will happen about protec-
tion of that airport?
A. That's one of the things we're
discussing with the other members of
the multinational force and the Lebanese
armed force. The Lebanese armed force
is an effective force. They have had some
defections in the last few days, but it is
still an effective army, and they could
substitute for the Marines around the
ail-port.
The principal mission of the Marines
is not to safeguard the airport. The
Lebanese Armed Forces themselves
have been participating in that in the
last few months.
Q. Would you comment on what
[House] Speaker Tip O'Neill said about
the new policy of U.S. Navy guns shell-
ing positions in Syrian-controlled terri-
tory? He said that it was absolutely
not compatible with the congressional
resolution passed a few months ago.
A. I have to say we just think he's
plain wrong, because we think that the
congressional mandate is that we should
protect the multinational force and cer-
tainly protect the Marines and that we
should protect American lives and
American interests in that whole area.
The shelling was coming dh-ectly in on
the Ambassador's residence, on the Em-
bassy area, and on the multinational
force position. And these are not new
rules with respect to the shelling. This is
shelling that we do in retaliation or to
try to silence the shelling that is coming
from Syrian-controlled positions that falls
on the Marines or falls on the Embassy,
falls on American positions, endangers
American or multinational force lives.
And that's not only not a new position;
it's a position that I would hope and
assume all of us would want to have
followed.
Q. How badly has our failure in
Beirut hurt us in the eyes of the Arabs
in the area, the moderate Arabs that
we'd like to influence?
A. I don't think you can classify the
activities that we've undertaken in
Beirut as a failure at all, nor is the mat-
ter over. We still have basically the same
objectives. Our first objective was to get
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion] out of Beirut and avoid that kind of
house-to-house fighting within the city.
That was accomplished about almost a
year-and-a-half ago, and it was accom-
pUshed in less than 30 days. After that,
there were assassinations of the suc-
ceeding president in Lebanon, and there
were a tremendous number of riots and
all kinds of massacres that took place in
the refugee camps. There have been a
great many changes in the ground situa-
tion. I wouldn't classify our activities
there as a failure at all.
I think that we still have the hopes
of getting some kind of a relatively
unified and strong Lebanese govern-
ment, which, in turn, could be a major
factor at trying to maintain peace in the
entire Mideast. It takes steadfastness
and it takes a great deal of patience.
1
MIDDLE EAST
But you have to look at the alter-
natives. And the alternatives would be to
have the Soviet-controlled enclave
throughout the whole of Lebanon, and I
don't think anyone believes that would
be a good thing for any of us.
Q. But isn't it true that you and
the informed chiefs advised against
putting the Marines back in on the
second go-round?
A. There are various ways of accom-
plishing many of these policies, and I
don't discuss" the advice that I've given
to the President.
But what we have now is a situation
in which the ground situation has
changed, the basic ideas for which the
multinational force went in have
changed, but the objectives remain the
same. And the objectives can best be
served by having a Marine force onboard
ship where the power of the American
fleet can lend a great deal of credence to
the importance of seeking a unified, un-
occupied Lebanon. And it is, again, much
better to try to do it now than to sit by
passively and let the alternative occur,
which would be a completely Soviet-
dominated enclave right in Lebanon at a
critically important part of the world.
Q. The Syrians dominated that
country for about 7 years before the
Israelis invaded, and we didn't find
that the Syrian presence was in-
tolerable. Now we do. Why is that?
A. I think very simply, because the
Syrian presence is now enormously com-
plicated by, or worsened by, the Soviet
domination of Syria. You have to bear in
mind that there is a large number of
Soviet troops in Syria. They have resup-
plied them for all of the weapons that
were destroyed in Syria's war with
Israel. And they are now in a situation
that is, I think, perhaps more Soviet-
dominated than even Egypt was a few
years ago before President Sadat turned
the Soviets out of Egypt.
Q. You say you are redeploying the
Marines back to the ships where they
can be more effective. More effective
doing what?
A. You have to bear in mind the
basic, original reason for the multina-
tional force to go in. The multinational
force did not go in to fight a war for
Lebanon or anything of the kind. It went
in for a very limited purjioso of pro-
viding a stabilizing interi)osition force
between the troops that we hoped and
expected would be withdrawing; that is,
the Syrian forces, the Israeli forces, and
the PLO.
60
Now the PLO is out and pretty well
broken as a military force. What it is is
just an adjunct of the Syrian Army now.
The Israelis signed an agreement to
leave. The Syrians did not. The multi-
national force was never designed mili-
tarily to defeat the Syrians or to fight
the Israelis or anything else. It was de-
signed to try to give confidence that
withdrawing forces could withdraw and
the agi-eement would be kept.
Q. But my question has not been
answered. What is it the Marines will
do more effectively once they're back
on those ships?
A. The normal position for the
Marine amphibious units is onboard ship.
And when the conditions are available
again, when the condition should arise
that if we can get an agreement by
Syria— and many people are working on
that now— to withdraw and the Israelis
continue to adhere to their agi-eement to
withdraw, then, at that time, there will
again be a necessity for an interposition
of a neutral peacekeeping force. And if
the conclusion is that the multinational
force should be used again for that pur-
pose, the Marines will be available for
that.
U.S. Forces in Lebanon
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
FEB. 14, 1984'
I am providing herewith a further report with
respect to the .situation of Lebanon and the
participation of the United States Armed
Forces in the Multinational Force. This
report, prepared by the Secretaries of State
and Defense and covering the period from
December 12, 1983 to February 13, 1984, is
consistent with Section 4 of the Multinational
Force in Lebanon Resolution. This report also
includes the infomiation called for by the
House version of the Resolution and is sub-
mitted consistent with its more restrictive
time limits.
Congressional support for our continued
participation in the Multinational Force re-
mains critical to peace, national reconciliation,
and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Lebanon. We will continue to keep you in-
formed as to further developments with
respect to this situation.
Sincerely,
Ronald Re.^can
'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, .Jr., Speaker of the House of
Reijresentatives, and Strom Thuniiond. Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Feb. 20, 1984). ■
Q. When Deputy Secretary of State
Dam went up to the Senate the other
day, he was asked can you conceive of
circumstances where you'll send those
Marines back into Beirut. He didn't
have an answer. Now you're telling me
that you do conceive of sending them
back.
A. I told you under the very limited
circumstances that I described, which
were the exact circumstances under
which they went in in the fir.'^t place
about 16 months ago. But the ground
conditions and all of the other assump-
tions that everybody hoped would occur
have not. And those assumptions were
that the Syrians would do what they
said, that "they wanted to withdraw, that
they would agree, that the Israelis would
agree, and that the PLO would be out.
The PLO is out, practically speaking; the
Syrians have not agreed. But this isn't to
say that they can't. If and when they do,
there will be a need for a force to give
confidence to the withdrawing of troops
that these agreements would be kept. At
that time, why then you would need
some neutral force, and it could well be
the Marines as part of it. It could well be
fourth or fifth or sixth countries; we
don't know yet. But they will be there
and they will be available should they be
needed, and the Sixth Fleet will be
there. The United States is not leaving
the area in any sense. When you have
one battleship, two carriers, and 2.3 com-
batant vessels, you haven't left the area.
Q. However long it takes, they're
going to stay there, is that it?
A. You're asking me to make predic-
tions about the most unpredictable part
of the world that there is. All I'm saying
is that the policy and the necessities re-
main the same. How we achieve them
may, indeed, differ from time to time,
and different policies may have to be
adopted. But the basic thing that we've
got to keep our mind on is that we don't
want to have a spot as volatile, as
troubled, and as likely to break out into
a major conflict as Lebanon without try-
ing our best to do something to ease that
whole problem, and that's what we are
going to continue to do.
Q. Could you clear-up some confu-
sion about the strategy behind the use
of that naval gunfire, which has been
enormous. We were told first it was to
protect the Marines, then it was to in-
clude the multinational force, then
there was shelling on the Embassy and
the Ambassador's residence, and it was
in retaliation for that. Is there a
broader context in which that's being
used?
BBliiiiiiiiiiiUiiiliiiiiiBBiiBIillieiiiiilil
■BBBBBBDOBDm
Department of State Bulletin
MIDDLE EAST
A. No. The way you phrase it, it
sounds as if this was a whole series of
different decisions. Actually, it's the
same basic decision. What happened was
that thei-e was increasing use of Syrian-
based gunfire— gunfire from Syrian-
controlled areas that attacked, first, the
Marine position, then other multinational
force positions, the Ambassador's
residence, and then portions of Beirut
where there were American citizens and
American interests.
As these changing conditions were
met, the same rules were applied, but
they did require that we use gunfire that
we hoped would silence the Syrian ar-
tillery positions in Syrian-controlled
areas of Lebanon. And thus far, they do
seem to be considerably more silent than
they were before the New Jersey and
the others fired.
Q. But is the concept also to sup-
port the Gemayel government, in terms
of that?
A. The concept is to support a
regularly, legitimately elected govern-
ment of Lebanon. We have constantly
and consistently urged President
Gemayel to broaden the base of his
government, to include several of these
different factions that are involved. The
army, for example, doe-sn't do that. The
army is the only truly multiconfessional
[sic] unit in Lebanon. And we've con-
stantly urged that President Gemayel
broaden his own government so that he
can have a broader base of support.
What we seek is the support of a
legitimate government that can, indeed,
produce peace and an unoccupied,
sovereign condition for Lebanon.
The firing, however, is not in support
of any particular governmental unit or
faction. The firing is just as I said, to try
to silence fire that is endangering
Marines, multinational forces, American
interests in Beirut.
Q. When the Marines first went in
to Beirut, you were roundly criticized
for giving them such a broad mandate
that they could not possibly carry it
out; that is, to support the Gemayel
government there. Do you think, in
retrospect, that that was a mistake?
A. That, I don't believe, was their
mandate. Their mandate, as I remember
it, was that they were to go in and serve
with the other three nations as an inter-
position force, to give some confidence to
the withdrawing forces of Syria and
Israel, as we hoped; that the agreements
would be kept; and that they could, in-
deed, withdraw. When you're locked
together in military combat, as those
countries were, you're very vulnerable if
you start to withdraw and if one side
doesn't keep the agreement.
The force was designed to do that,
and it was designated to give some tem-
porary breathing space to a government
—a new government— that had come in
following the assassination of the present
President's brother. They didn't have
any mandate that they were to go in and
defend that government. They didn't
have any mandate that they were to go
in and clear Lebanon of foreign forces. If
they had a mandate like that, they would
have had to be at least 15 to 20 times as
large as they are now. There was never
any suggestion that they should do that.
And moving them from shore back to
ships will enable them, as I've mentioned
earlier, sometime if the withdrawal
agreements are ever secured, to resume
that original mission.
Now it's very difficult for them to do
that because the ground conditions have
changed so and all of these tremendous
number of factions have come up and
turned practically every street corner in-
to an armed battle.
Q. Now that we're withdrawing our
forces from Beirut, what military role
do we want the Israelis to play in that
part of the world?
A. I don't have any agenda for the
Israelis, and I don't know of anybody
else who has. I think what we want most
is to have the foreign forces out of
Lebanon, all completely, and the Israelis
did agree to go when the Syrians left.
And that, I think, is the thing that we
desii-e most. Again, we've all sort of
overlooked in the rush of events the pur-
pose of all of this. The pui'pose was to
get Lebanon cleared and sovereign and
free of conflict so that we could go on to
the broader a.spects of the President's
Mideast peace initiative, which was to
deal with the very difficult problems of
the West Bank, and recognition and
security for Israel's borders, and the im-
portance of trying to get a peaceful at-
mosphere after some 2,000 years of con-
tinual strife that has been, in effect,
almost the seed of wars for too long.
Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAR. 5, 1984'
The Government of Lebanon has said it
has cancelled the Cabinet decision which
approved the unratified May 17 agree-
ment [with Israel] and, thereby, removed
the authority of President Gemayel to
exchange the instruments for the
ratification of the agreement.
The United States regrets this deci-
sion. The United States played a facilitat-
ing role in the negotiations that produced
that accord and was a witness to its
signature. That proposed agreement still
represents the only agreed formula for
ensuring both Israel's withdrawal from
Lebanon and Israel's legitimate security
interests in a manner consistent with
Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon needs
peaceful, coojierative relations with all
its neighbors. Those who were responsi-
ble for the rejection of the agreement
must now bear the responsibility to find
an alternative negotiated formula to bring
about Israeli withdrawal.
At the same time, the LInited States
does not intend to abandon the people or
the legitimate Government of Lebanon.
Diplomacy continues, with the aim of
ending the fighting and reaching a
political solution to Lebanon's conflicts.
We will contribute to this process.
Similarly, we stand ready to continue
appropriate economic and military assist-
ance, but decisions on these issues will
be taken as the situation unfolds. In any
event, we will continue to take all ap-
propriate measures to ensure that U.S.
personnel and property are fully pro-
tected.
Our long-term goals remain— the
restoration of a sovereign, independent,
unified Lebanon; the removal of all
foreign forces; and the security of
Israel's northern border. We oppose the
partition of Lebanon, which could only
lead to even greater instability.
The Middle East is a region of vital
importance to the United States and our
friends and allies. The United States will
continue to be deeply concerned and in-
volved in efforts to resolve the Arab-
Israeli problem and other critical issues
in the Middle East, including the crisis in
the gulf.
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■
April 1984
61
•I :!'i'lt;'!!";'|(;'"HJII
MIDDLE EAST
Q. You're not seeking some form of
strategic cooperation, to coin a phrase,
in which the Israelis might deal mili-
tarily with the Syrians and any PLO
who might be headed south?
A. I think what we are seeking is
just what I said. It is a peaceful, unoc-
cupied, sovereign Lebanon that will
enable us to go and deal with the
broader, even thornier issues of the
Mideast. We don't ask anybody to fight
anybody else, or anything of the kind.
Quite the contrary. We would like to see
the forces that are in Lebanon do exactly
what theii- governments have said.
All of the Syrian statements have
always been that they wanted to with-
draw. The Israeli statements have been
that they wanted to withdraw. PLO,
when it was still a force, said that, and ^
they're no longer a military force, I don't
think, of any consequence. But the im-
portant thing is to pursue those objec-
tives, and I don't think you're going to
solve those by asking one side to fight
another side.
Q. When you and others went up
on the Hill last week, there was so
much frustration that Representative
Trent Lott, the Republican Whip, said,
"You people are out of touch with
reality." Isn't it a reality that there is
no way those Marines can go back into
Lebanon as peacemakers, that the only
way they can go back is as combat
fighters?
A. No, they would not go back as
combat fighters, because they never
went in as combat fighters. They went in
as part of a multinational force, and the
confusion that Mr. Lott was speaking
about-and I have high respect for
him— was simply the problem that we
are not able, as a member of a multina-
tional force, to go up and announce on a
particular day that we're going to do
something within a given time period
without having had the consultations
that take time and effort with three
other nations-Britain, Italy, and France.
They are our partners in this. They have
suffered grievous losses, too, and they
deserve and have a need to be consulted,
and that's required if we want to have
continuing future relationships with
those countries, which we clearly have to
do. So there wasn't any confusion. As
I've said earlier, there's no mechanical or
logistical problem. The Marines can be
out in a few days, but it is essential that
we work out arrangements for others to
hold the airport and work out arrange-
ments that our partners would find
satisfactory in the multinational foi-ce.
Visit of King Hussein
of Jordan
His Majesty King Hussein I of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an
official working visit to Washington,
D.C., February 12-U, 198J,, to meet mth
President Reagan and other government
officials.
FoUomng are remarks made by
President Reagan and His Majesty after
their meeting on February 13.^
President Reagan
King Hussein and I met today in the
spirit of good will and cooperation that
characterizes the relationship between
the United States and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. Cooperation between
us is increasingly vital in the face of the
tragic violence in Lebanon, a growing
terrorist threat, and the ominous cloud of
war that hovers over much of the Middle
East.
Today we witness bloodshed and con-
flict between Iran and Iraq, in Chad, in
the Western Sahara, and Lebanon. And
now, as never before, it behooves people
of good will to work together for peace
and stability.
King Hussein has led Jordan with
strength and wisdom these last three
decades. He's an experienced statesman,
and his insights are valuable to us as
well as to the people of Jordan. His
Majesty was an important force behind
the UN Resolution 242, which continues
to be the starting point for tangible
Middle East peace efforts, including my
own peace initiative of September 1,
1982.
King Hussein has proven himself a
responsible leader and a reliable friend
on many occasions. His support for
friends "in the gulf region has demon-
strated his capacity for deeds as well as
words. The economic progress of his
people, the political equality, and the
religious tolerance found in Jordan are a
tribute to the benevolence of his reign,
and I am grateful for his counsel.
His Majesty's visit strengthens the
bonds of friendship that link Jordan and
the United States. America's commit-
ment to help Jordan meet its security
needs remains firm and unwavering.
Today we spoke of a number of
bilateral "concerns, but the focus of our
meeting was on the issues affecting
regional peace. We both believe that
while the challenges remain formidable,
the opportunities for a broader peace are
still present. We also agree that ter-
rorism cannot be tolerated and that the
leaders of all states must stand together
against this new barbarism that
threatens civilization.
States that condone terrorism under-
mine their own legitimacy. In these
times of trial, disillusionment would be
easy. But my meeting today with King
Hussein has" reaffirmed to me that the
good and decent people of this world can
and will work together and that progi-ess
can be made toward the perplexing prob-
lem of peace in the Middle East.
King Hussein
Once again it's a privilege and a pleasure
for me to have the opportunity to meet
with vou as the leader of the United
State's of America, as a man I respect
and admire, as a friend. And I would like
to say that these feelings are shared by
my government and my people-the feel-
ings'of pride in the fact that our goals
and aims are one and the same; our
ideas, our principles, our belonging to
the family of free people throughout the
world.
The challenges before us are, indeed,
tremendous, but the determination is
there to strive for a better tomorrow.
This is a cause to which we are
dedicated in Jordan-the cause of a
stable area, the cause of establishing,
eventually, a just and lasting peace in
the area, "the cause of a better future for
generations to come.
On all subjects that you were kind
enough to address, I could not in all
honesty sav that I could have presented
my vie"ws any differently. I thank you
for the opportunity and the chance to
discuss problems of the moment and to
share with you the vision of the future
and to reaffirm our commitment to our
common goals of a better future within
our area and within the world and for
the establishment of a just and durable
peace.
We are proud of our friendship, and
we will do all we can to see it grow and
flourish in every way and in every area.
Thank you once again for the wonderful
opportiinity of meeting with you. God
bless you, "and thanks again for all your
kindnesses to me.
•Made to reporters assembled on the
South Portico of the White House (text fi-om
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Feb. 20, 1984). ■
62
IBHE
of State Bulletin
MIDDLE EAST
►resident Meets With Two Arab Leaders
His Majesty King Hussein I of
Jordan and President Mohamed Hosni
Mubarak met with President Reagan at
the Wiiite House on February U. 1981,.
Following are remarks made by the
three leaders at the conclusion of that
meeting.^
President Reagan
I have been honored today to welcome
and confer with King Hussein and Presi-
dent Mubarak. Theii" visit highlights the 2
friendship between the United States £
and the two important countries they |,
lead. Our countries share common in- £
terests in developing practical solutions g
to the problems of the Middle East. The s
good will and trust between us promise a |
solid foundation for overcomng the for- J
midable obstacles to peace and progress |
in the region. ^
Our discussions today have reaf- I
firmed that Egyjjt and Jordan will re-
main leaders in efforts to bring peace
and security to the Middle East. King
Hussein and President Mubarak have
demonstrated foresight, realism, and
resolve, which are essential if the peace
process is to succeed.
We discussed in detail the oppor-
tunities for progress in the Middle East.
Recent events in the area make it even
more urgent to keep the broader peace
process moving. The tragic events in
Lebanon show that the occupation of ter-
ritory by outside forces does not lead to
peace but rather to continued conflict
and turmoil. I wish today, therefore, to
reaffirm my commitment and that of our
government to the principles I set forth
in September of 1982, and in particular
to the principle that the Arab-Israeli con-
flict must be resolved through negotia-
tions involving an exchange of territory
for peace.
The Egyptian-Israeli treaty proves
what can be accomplished when states
have the will to take risks for peace. And
I'm confident that further steps toward
peace in the Middle East are possible.
For our part, the United States is ready
to do all it can to keep the process mov-
ing forward.
King Hussein, President Mubarak
are men I greatly admire, and I'm grate-
ful to them for having come here to
speak as friends and to reconfirm our
common purposes in the enduring
struggle for peace.
April 1984
King Hussein
I'd like to thank you for your great kind-
ness in enabling me and my brother,
President Mubarak, to meet with you to-
day and to discuss all aspects of the
problems which we face in our area of
the world; and our common goals and ob-
jectives for a better future for all in that
area— of establishment of a just and com-
prehensive peace for greater stability
and for a better life for generations to
come.
I'm very grateful for the opportunity
to have had this chance to hear your
views and the views of President
Mubarak on all matters and to contribute
what I could for the purpose of achieving
better understanding of oui" respective
positions as we move ahead with hope
and determination and with a commit-
ment to do our utmost for a better
future in the area from which we come
and for a just and comprehensive peace.
I will carry back with me, the impres-
sions I gained of your determination and
that of the United States to contribute
its full share to help all concerned
achieve their objectives.
We are pi-oud of our friendship. It is
of long standing. We are hopeful that
this friendship will develop and evolve
and that, based on trust and confidence
and with determination, we shall over-
come what appear and have appeared to
be for a long period of time insurmount-
able obstacles. After all, the cause we
are striving to serve is the cause of
people, their future, their rights, human
dignity, and, at the same time, their
freedom and a better life, which is theu-
right.
I thank you once again for many
kindnesses, and I thank you, my brother.
President Mubarak, and wish you every
continued success. And I would like to
say that this has been a visit I shall
always remember. I'll treasure the
memories of this visit and the wonderful
opportunity it has given me to meet with
you both. Thank you very, very much in-
deed for your many courtesies and kind-
nesses and the warmth of youi- welcome.
President Mubarak
I was very pleased to meet once again
with our good friend. President Reagan
and discuss with him issues of great con-
cern to our nations. We did so in the
spu-it of friendship and cooperation that
dominates the relationship between
Egypt and the United States.
I find it most rewarding to consult
regularly with President Reagan and ex-
change views with him on matters of
mutual interest. He is a statesman of
great courage and wisdom. He has a pro-
found sense of mission and responsibility.
Our bilateral relations constitute a shin-
ing model for understanding and the
cooperation among nations. We are
63
MIDDLE EAST
determined to strengthen the bonds of
friendship that link our peoples. The
talks we held today will ceilainly add to
this evergrowing friendship and mutual
understanding.
I would like to seize this opportunity
to thank the American people for
cooperating with us in the vigorous ef-
forts we are e.xerting to improve the
quality of life for our masses. We are
striving to refonn our economic system
and increase production and productiv-
ity. We are struggling to restore security
and stability to the Middle East and
Africa, Egypt has a pivotal role to play
and a mission to fulfill. It is determined
to do so with vigor and dedication. We
are devoted to strengthening the struc-
ture of peace in our region and through-
out the world.
The situation in Lebanon today is in-
tolerable. The escalation of violence and
the bloodshed is a threat to us all. Every
nation is called upon to help. The peace-
keeping role of the United Nations must
be expanded and reinforced. The parti-
tion of this war-torn country should be
prevented at any cost. The Lebanese
people have a right to live and prospei-
like all other nations.
The key to a viable solution is the
prompt and unconditional withdrawal of
Israeli forces. The Israeli invasion is the
root and the cause of the present sad
situation in the area. No problem can be
solved through foreign intervention and
the use of force.
The Lebanese crisis is a stark
reminder of the centrality of the Pales-
tinian problem. That question must be
addressed frontally and without delay.
Our purpose is to create the necessary
conditions for coexistence and the mutual
recognition between the Palestinians and
the Israelis. This coexistence must be
based on justice and the recognition of
rights. Fu'st and foremost, the right of
the Palestinian people's self-
determination should be honored and ex-
ercised. This is the clue to peace and
security for all nations, including Israel.
The Palestinian people are entitled to
your support and understanding. There
is no substitute for a direct dialogue with
them through their chosen represen-
tative, the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization]. Such dialogue will im-
mensely serve the cause of peace to
which we are both committed. Mr.
Arafat is a responsible leader who has
demonstrated tremendous courage under
the most difficult circumstances. A
dialogue with him would reassure the
Palestinian people and rekindle their
hope for a better future.
64
No other nation can speak for the
Palestinians. No other entity has a man-
date to lay out theii- requirements for
peace, and no other nation is more quali-
fied than the American people, lending
their support and backing.
The war between Iran and Iraq is
another sad chapter in the history of the
Middle East. We should spare no effort
to bring it to an end immediately. No
one can possibly benefit from the
continuation of bloodshed between
peoples who are linked together through
the strongest cultural and spiritual
bonds. To restore peace between these
neighbors, certain concrete steps should
be taken by those who are genuinely
concerned. The mere expression of good
will is no help in the face of continued
fighting and escalated tension.
I came here also to plead the case for
Africa. The African people need your at-
tention and understanding. They are
struggling against formidable odds.
Economic crises and natural disasters
are strangling their efforts for develop-
ment and social transformation. Helping
them is not only a moral obligation; it is
a practical necessity for building a better
world in which all nations live in peace
and cooperate for their common good.
We are seeking your help in order to
secure the unconditional independence of
Namibia. The continuation of the present
situation is unacceptable to all African
nations. The minority regime of South
Africa must know that the United States
cannot support its policy of aggression
and violation of human rights.
It was a happy coincidence that I
met here with His Majesty King Hussein
and pursued with him our ongoing con-
sultation. We believe that Jordan has an
impoitant role to play in solidifying the
stiaieture of peace. It is an element of
stability and security in the Middle East.
Therefore, we support the dialogue be-
tween Jordan and the PLO. This is a
positive step toward peace. In the
months ahead, we will be intensifying
our contents with our partners in the
peace process with a view of accelerating
progress.
I have extended an invitation to
President Reagan to visit Egypt at the
earliest possible date. This will give our
people an opportunity to demonstrate
the depth of their sentiments toward the
President and evei'v Ameiican.
'Made to reporters assembled in the East
Room of the White House (te.xt from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Feb. 20. 1984). ■
Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAR. 5, 1984'
The United States has concluded that
the available evidence indicates that Iraq
has used lethal chemical weapons. The
United States strongly condemns the
prohibited use of chemical weapons
wherever it occurs. There can be no
justification for their use by any country.
The United States has been working
for many years with other nations to
establish a treaty banning production
and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitat-
ing chemical weapons in order to
strengthen the present international pro-
hibitions against their use. The use of
chemical weapons in recent conflicts, in-
cluding the Iran-Iraq war, only adds to
the urgency of this undertaking.
While condemning Iraq's resort to
chemical weapons, the United States also
calls on the Government of Iran to ac-
cept the good offices offered by a num-
ber of countries and international
oi-ganizations to put an end to the blood-
shed. The United States finds the pres-
ent Iranian regime's intransigent refusal
to deviate from its avowed objective of
eliminating the legitimate government of
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with
the accepted norms of behavior among
nations.
The United States deplores the
tragic and needless loss of both Iranian
and Iraqi lives, especially through at-
tacks on civilian populations. We urge
both states to respect their obligations
under international conventions designed]
to mitigate the human suffering of war-
fai-e, particularly those banning the use
of chemical weapons and requiring the
humane treatment of prisoners of war
and protection of civilians.
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman John Hughes. ■
Department of State Bulletir
■^mBBBaaaaa
Viitj
MIDDLE EAST
U.S. Opposes Moving
Embassy to Jerusalem
by Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Statement before the Setmte Foreign
Relations Committee on February 23,
IQSJf. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under
Secretary for Political Affairs.^
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
with the committee the Administration's
position on S. 2031. As you know, this
bill provides for the U.S Embassy and
Ambassador's residence in Israel to be
moved to the city of Jerusalem.
This committee has already received
Secretary Shultz's letter expressing the
strong opposition of the Administration
to this bill. Before I outline the reasons
for our opposition, let me take a few
moments to provide the context in which
this proposal arises.
The United States has been and re-
mains Israel's staunchest supporter. In
1948 when Israel proclaimed its indepen-
dence, the United States was the first
country to extend it recognition. We
quickly established diplomatic relations
and e.stablished our embassy at Israel's
seat of government, Tel Aviv. There our
embassy has remained, during the Ad-
ministrations of eight Presidents. Dating
from well before the establishment of the
State of Israel, we have maintained a
consulate general in Jerusalem which
reports directly to the Department. This
is in accord with arrangements in special
circumstances elsewhere, such as Hong
Kong.
Why has it been consistent with U.S
policy, during Democratic and
Republican Administrations, to retain
our embassy in Tel Aviv? In short,
because the location of our embassy is in-
timately related to the efforts of the
United States to secure a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. In this
regard, U.S. efforts have stressed peace
through negotiations. Our willingness to
resist attempts to settle the Arab-Israeli
conflict through force or through uni-
lateral actions has preserved our ability
to play a coiisti'uctive role in settling the
conflict. Moving our embassy to
Jerusalem would inevitably convey a
message that the United States accepted
the position of one party to the issue,
when, in fact, a resolution of that issue-
that is, a resolution of the issue that can
stand the test of time— can only be found
in the framework of a final settlement
reached through negotiations.
The status of Jerusalem is an integi-al
part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While
we fully understand the depth of attach-
ment of Israelis to the city of Jerusalem,
we have a responsibility to bear in mind
the special significance which the city
holds as well for Jews, Moslems, and
Christians throughout the world. That is
a compelling fact that cannot be lightly
put aside. We would not have achieved
the Camp David accords if the United
States had adopted the position of either
party on the question of Jerusalem. This
explains President Carter's separate let-
ter attached to the Camp David accords
which reaffirmed the U.S. position that
the status of Jerusalem be resolved
through negotiations. That position con-
tinues to be U.S. policy today.
Our policy on this issue has been
resolute for more than three decades. In
1949, when the IsraeHs began moving
their government to Jerusalem, we in-
formed them that we could not accept a
unilateral claim to the city. Again, in
1960, we informed Jordan of our opposi-
tion to its intention to make the eastern
part of the city Jordan's second capital.
And in 1967, when Israel occupied the
eastern sector, we opposed Israeli ac-
tions to place all of Jerusalem under
Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administra-
tion. Most recently, President Reagan
stated in his September 1, 1982, Middle
East peace initiative that ". . . we remain
convinced that Jerusalem must remain
undivided, but its final status should be
decided through negotiations."
A change in the U.S. position on the
status of Jerusalem would seriously
undermine our ability to play an effective
role in the Middle East peace process.
Indeed, moving our embassy to
Jerusalem would widely be perceived as
an effort by the United States to pre-
empt negotiations altogether by pre-
judging a crucial issue. In short, to move
our embassy to Jerusalem now would
almost certainly gravely damage the
prospects for a negotiated settlement; at
a minimum, it would seriously com-
promise the ability of the United States
to continue to play a constructive role in
bringing the parties to the negotiating
table.
In addition, the proposed legislation
would be a direct interference in the
President's constitutional authority to
conduct foreign affairs. As stated in
Secretary Shultz's letter, we are con-
cerned that, regardless of its merits, the
bill raises serious constitutional questions
of a sejjaration of powers nature. The
President historically has been respon-
sible for conducting diplomatic relations
on behalf of the United States, including
the determination of where and through
what means to conduct such relations.
Legislation directing him to relocate an
embassy would be in direct conflict with
this principle. By further seeking to com-
pel him to recognize all of Jerusalem as
part of Israel, it would impair his ability
to determine the recognition policy of the
United States. In seeking to force the
President's hand, the proposed legisla-
tion, in our view, would exceed the
proper scope of legislative action.
I am told, although I find it hard to
credit, that some have argued that in re-
taining our embassy in Tel Aviv, we
raise doubts concerning American
recognition of Israel as a sovereign state.
That argues in the face of too many
years of history to be taken seriously.
The United States and Israel have, since
1948, shared a special friendship, special
closeness— a special relationship, if you
will— that is known as such throughout
the world. There cannot be any doubt
about our commitment to Israel.
Some proponents of this legislation
appai'ently also argue that U.S. policy is
not in accord with reality, that Jerusalem
is Israel's capital, and that by failing to
locate our embassy there we are denying
Israel a sovereign prerogative. But this
begs the fundamenal question, at least
from the perspective of the United
States. It is the essence of the Jerusalem
issue— or at least America's decades-old
position thereon— that it should not be
resolved by the unilateral actions of any
party.
It has also been suggested that con-
ducting diplomatic relations through our
embassy in Tel Aviv imposes practical
impediments, since many Israeli Govern-
ment offices are now located in
Jerusalem. That is, no doubt, true. But
we have been able to manage and will
continue to be able to do so. In any
event, I doubt that even the strongest of
S.203rs proponents would argue that
their principal purpose for putting the
legislation forward is to improve the effi-
ciency of our diplomatic establishment in
Israel.
NUCLEAR POLICY
I have spoken here on behalf of the
Administration of which I am a part. But
were I speaking simply on my own
behalf, I would take no different a line.
It is because I care about my country's
relationship with Israel and my country's
ability to continue to play a crucial role
in the search for that which the people of
Israel so richly deserve— peace— that I
oppose this legislation.
I cannot deny the frustration many
Americans and most Israelis must feel
because of our position. Nor do I, or this
Administration, take this frustration
lightly. We regi-et it.
But in the last analysis, it is a just
and lasting peace for Israel that will
bring with it a solution to this vexing
problem of the status of Jerusalem. It is
the calling, and the commitment, of the
United States to help bring about that
just and lasting peace. Indeed, I believe
we are indispensable to the achievement
of such a result. And, therefore, I must
oppose passage of S.2031.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
FEB. 23, 1984'
The United States has been engaged in
nuclear cooperation with the European Com-
munity for many years. This cooperation was
initiated under agreements concluded over
two decades ago between the United States
and the Eui'opean Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) which extend until'December
31, 1995. Since the inception of this coopera-
tion, the Community has adhered to all its
obligations under those agi-eements.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish
a new nuclear e.xport criteria, including a re-
quirement that the United States have a right
to consent to the reprocessing of fuel ex-
ported from the United States. Our present
agreements for cooperation with EURATOM
do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupt-
ing cooperation with EURATOM, a proviso
was included in the law to enable continued
cooperation until March 10, 1980, and negotia-
tions concerning our cooperation agreements.
The law also provides that nuclear coopera-
tion with EURATOM can be extended on an
annual basis after March 10, 1980, upon deter-
mination by the President that failure to
cooperate would seriously prejudice the
achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security and after notification to
the Congress. President Carter made such a
determination four years ago and signed Ex-
ecutive 12193, permitting continued nuclear
cooperation with EURATOM until March 10,
1981. I made such determinations in 1981, 1982
and 1983 and signed Executive Orders 122905,
12351 and 12409 permitting continued nuclear
cooperation through March 10, 1984.
The United States has engaged in five
rounds of talks with EURATOM regarding
the renegotiation of the US-EURATOM
agi-eements for cooperation. These were con-
ducted in November 1978, September 1979,
April 1980, .January 1982 and November 1983.
The European Community is now considering
U.S. proposals relating to our cooperation
agreements, and progress in the talks appears
to be possible.
I believe that it is essential that coopera-
tion between the United States and the Com-
munity continue and likewise that we work
closely with oui- Allies to counter the threat
of nuclear explosives proliferation. A disi-up-
tion of nuclear cooperation would not only
eliminate any chance of progi-ess in oiu- talks
with EURATOM related to our agreements,
it would also cause serious problems in our
overall relationships. Accordingly, I have
detei-mined that failure to continue peaceful
nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would
be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States nonproliferation objectives and
would jeopardize the common defense and
security of the United States. I intend to sign
an Executive Order to extend the waiver of
the application of the relevant export
criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
for an additional twelve months from March
10, 1984.
Sincerely,
Rox.ALD Reag.^n
'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and George Bush, President
of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Feb. 27,
1984). ■
66
Department of State Bulletin
■■.^^■»M,»..T' 1 [.I I
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
U.S. International Activities
In Science and Technology
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
FEB. 17, 1984'
In accordance with the requirements of Title
V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1979 (Public Law 95-426), I
am transmitting the 1983 annual report on the
United States Government's international ac-
tivities in the fields of science and technology.
As in the past, this report has been prepared
by the Department of State in collaboration
with other concerned agencies of the Federal
government.
I would like to take this opportunity, first
of all, to express again my personal regret on
the passing of Congi-essman Clement J.
Zablocki. As Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and of the Subcommittee
on International Security and Scientific Af-
fairs, Congi-essman Zablocki made many
significant contributions to this Nation's pur-
suit of foreign relations spanning several ad-
ministrations. None of these, however, was
more important than his tireless efforts to see
that scientific progress toward economic
growth both for our Nation and others across
the globe and incoiporated that understand-
ing into the Title V legislation of which he
was the prime architect. On behalf of the
people of the United States, I want to ex-
press the gratitude of the Nation for his many
years of distinguished service.
Science and technology have been key to
the economic and social development of the
United States. Political liberty and free enter-
prise provide a fertile environment to
American scientists and engineers who have
given us a standard of living unequaled in the
history of the world. We are certain that
science and technology offer similar hope to
all nations committed to the pursuit of
realistic and sustained economic development.
The United States has increasingly made
cooperative scientific and technological ar-
rangements important to our developmental
assistance efforts to Third World countries
and of strengthened bilateral relations with
other industrialized nations.
During 1983 we were successful in our ef-
forts to encourage inteniational science and
technology cooperation. There were many
positive developments which are set out in
detail in this report. Of particular importance,
though, are several of our bilateral relations.
It is important to develop a strong bilateral
relationship with the People's Republic of
China while maintaining our friendship with
the democratic nations of Asia. Broad-based
science and technology agreements are a vital
part of our efforts to build this relationship.
The role of science and technology plays a
similar role in Latin America This is particu-
larly true in our bilateral relations with Brazil
and Mexico. I am certain that these nations
attach as much importance to scientific and
technology cooperation as we do. We will con-
tinue to pursue the opportunities for in-
creased cooperation.
Perhaps the most disturbing development
of 1983 in the field of science and technology
has been our reluctant, but necessary, deci-
sion to give notice of our intent to withdraw
from participation in UNESCO. Our persis-
tent efforts over the past three years to con-
vince the UNESCO bureaucracy in Paris to
address the Agency's serious problems of ad-
ministrative and fiscal mismanagement and to
reorient its direction to pursue once again
only the mission envisioned in its charter
have failed. We see no viable option but to
sever our ties with this Agency if its overt
hostility to American values and its increasing
substantive impotence and procedural abuse
are not satisfactorily corrected. We will strive
to minimize any significant adverse effect on
beneficial science and technology activities at
UNESCO by making alternative arrange-
ments for U.S. participation in such pro-
grams.
Our scientific and technological relations
with the Soviet Union and Poland have been
adversely affected by disappointing Soviet at-
titudes and actions. In our Title V Report for
1982, I made it clear that cooperation depends
upon the steps the Soviet Govenmient takes
to comply with recognized nonns of interna-
tional behavior. Soviet behavior still falls far
short of this standard, and our position re-
mains unchanged. We will continue to care-
fully observe Soviet behavior and adjust our
science and technology cooperation ac-
cordingly.
In the overall international arena, we can
be proud of our scientific leadership. It can go
a long way in helping the cause of freedom and
economic growth around the world. The inter-
national programs described in this report
benefit our Nation and our cooperative part-
ners, and are a source of good will around the
world.
Ronald Reagan
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 20, 1984.
April 1984
67
UNITED NATIONS
U.S. Participation in the United Nations
by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreiffn Operations of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee on March 2,
198Jf Ambassador Kirkpatrick is U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations.^
As always, it is a great pleasure and a
pi-ivilege for me to testify before this
committee with regard to U.S. participa-
tion in the United Nations. Today is a
particularly auspicious occasion since it
marks the first congi-essional inquii-y
relative to implementation of Section
101(b) of the continuing resolution of
November 14, 1983, as well as Section 117
of the State Department Authorization
Act for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The
continuing resolution requires that the
U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations furnish to Congress
country-by-country reports on voting pat-
terns and practices at the United Nations
during the previous year; the State
Department Authorization Act calls upon
the Secretary of State to furnish annual
reports regarding the policies which each
member country of the United Nations
pursues in international oi'ganizations of
which the United States is a member.
I want to make clear that I welcome
and endorse fully these reporting re-
quirements. Indeed, I firmly believe
that, as regularly applicable provisions of
law governing the functions of the State
Department and the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations,
these legislative enactments will provide
an important tool for Congress in the
fulfillment of its oversight respon-
sibilities concerning the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations.
It would be difficult to overstate the
importance of close and continuing atten-
tion by Congress to events at the United
Nations. After all, through their repre-
sentatives in Congress, the American
people contribute over 1.5 billion ta.x
dollars annually toward the UN budget,
and they contribute additional billions an-
nually in various forms to many of the
nations who play important roles in the
activities of the United Nations. Our
financial support of the United Nations
and the assistance we provide to other
nations symbolize not only our continuing
commitment to the principles of the UN
Charter but our dedication to world
peace and the improvement of the qual-
ity of life in nations less fortunate than
ours. Congress' role in the decisions
governing this formulation of the policies
and allocation of these monies is of
necessity very large.
It goes without saying that it is of
paramount importance that congressional
decisions regarding UN funding and
financial support to other countries be
well-informed judgments and that they
reflect the wishes of an informed elec-
torate. These principles are not peculiar
to matters of foreign relations; they are
fundamental to our democratic form of
government.
To an extent greater than often
realized, what occurs at the United Na-
tions involves central issues of world
politics and frequently touches upon vital
U.S. national goals and interests. It
therefore is obvious that the conduct of
other UN members with regard to these
goals and interests is very important to
us. It constitutes a significant dimension
of our relations with other countries to
be considered with the utmost
seriousness and gravity.
Annual reviews of UN voting pat-
terns and practices provide this commit-
tee, as well as the electorate in general,
with a reliable, systematic basis for
assessing the attitudes, the policies, and
the decisions of UN members on the
salient questions of our time that come
before the UN General Assembly and
Security Council for consideration and
action. Here we have the hard evidence
of what has happened on issues of impor-
tance to us. From it, we can make
judgments concerning those whose
values and views are harmonious with
our own, and whose policies are opposed
to ours, and those who fall in between.
Beyond views, of course, come interests
—often vital interests. So it is important
that we take due note of actions which
comport with, or are opposed to, what
we regard as vital interests.
The United Nations is a complex
arena whose dynamics differ significantly
fi-om relations in other arenas. Distinc-
tive patterns of international politics
have developed in UN arenas which
often seem to have little relation to our
bilateral relations. Often, far too often,
only casual, intermittent, and inadequate
efforts have been made to integrate U.S.
policies and relations with other nations
inside the United Nations to U.S.
policies and relations with those same na-
tions outside the United Nations. Yet,
UN interactions and decisions have im-
portant effects on our ability to achieve
our goals outside the United Nations.
Often, relations in the UN fora shape the
context and limit the options available to
the United States in the world.
In examining the voting record of
member states in the United Nations it
should be borne in mind that relations in
the United Nations are only one dimen-
sion of our relations with other countries
and often are not the most important
aspect of these relations. Economic,
strategic, and moral factors may be and
often are more important to U.S. in-
terests, policy, and pohcymakers than a
country's behavior inside the United Na-
tions. However, at the same time, if a
given country's relations inside the
United Nations are not all important, or
even the most important factor in our
relations with it, neither can relations in-
side the United Nations be considered
trivial.
If the decisions and policies of the
key bodies of the United Nations matter,
then the votes of member nations mat-
ter. If UN decisions make little or no dif-
ference to our interests, then the United
States should surely devote less money
and enei-gy to our UN participation.
Votes in the General Assembly and
the Security Council provide mandates
and guidance to the Secretary General
and the Secretariat, and the diverse
worldwide operations of its subgroups.
UN decisions allocate funds, call con-
ferences, and authorize programs.
Since the UN system has a combined
budget of over $4 billion and it employs
over 50,000 individuals, decisions
concerning the use of these worldwide
resources are significant indeed.
UN voting practice data require
analysis to be useful. Merely because a
country votes with us on some issues
does not necessarily signify friendship or
shared objectives. Countries with a low
incidence of compatible votes are not
necessarily foes. Indeed, on some issues
of importance to us, our treaty allies and
those with whom we hold strategic and
other objectives in common may vote
against us. We must not ignore the full
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Department of State Bullet!
'I
UNITED NATIONS
weight of the contextual circumstances in
which any vote is cast. Nevertheless,
with all these caveats in mind, significant
patterns of political conduct and at-
titudes do emei'ge from these data.
Votes Focus World Attention
The agendas of the principal UN bodies
have a unique influence on the percep-
tion of global problems because, to an e.x-
tent not appreciated in the United
States, discussions, debates, and votes in
the United Nations are followed in the
world press. Subjects discussed in majoi-
UN fora come to be widely i-egarded as
important. Because of this capacity to
focus attention on some subjects and ig-
nore others, the agendas of major UN
Drganizations influence the definition of
what is and what is not important in the
world; what is a problem, what is a prob-
lem worthy of "world" attention. For ex-
ample, Cuba has worked hard to have
Puerto Rico on the agenda of past
General Assemblies as a problem of
decolonization" to embarrass the
United States and to create a problem
where none exists. For the reverse
reasons, the Soviet Union and its
associated states try to keep off the
agenda subjects such as the repression in
Poland, the Libyan invasion of Chad, the
lowning of the Korean airliner, the
Rangoon bombing.
When, year after year. Security
Council resolutions focus on Israeli
'practices" as violations of the fourth
Geneva convention and ignore greater
violations of other countries, there is a
powerful tendency for many to come to
believe that Israel is especially guilty of
gross human rights abuses. Progres-
sively, Israel comes to be perceived as a
pariah. Continuing focus of UN bodies on
the Palestinian question has kept Pales-
tinian problems higher on the agenda of
world politics than the plight of more
numerous refugee populations and has
won more generous financial support than
for other refugee populations.
Votes Define "World Opinion"
on Major Issues
The decisions of the United Nations are
widely interpreted as reflecting "world
opinion" and are endowed with substan-
tial moral and intellectual force. The
cumulative impact of decisions of UN
bodies influence opinions all over the
world about what is legitimate, what is
acceptable, who is lawless and who is
repressive, what countries are and are
not capable of pi'otecting themselves anri
their friends in the world body.
Each year large majorities of the
General Assembly put on record their
disapproval of the occupation of
Afghanistan and Kampuchea and their
request for withdrawal of all foreign
forces. Even though these resolutions do
not name the occupying power, their
meaning is clear and it is understood by
everyone. It makes clear that the major-
ity of member states understand what
has happened and is happening in those
two countries, that they disapprove, and
that Soviet influence in the United Na-
tions, though indubitably great, is not
always large enough to prevent the ex-
(jression of general disapproval.
UN bodies can damage a country's
reputation. The determined effort to
make Israel a pariah state reflects the
conviction of her adversaries that such
delegitimization would be damaging.
When resolutions are passed by the
Security Council that make demands in-
compatible with a nation's basic in-
terests, they will almost surely be
ignored. But refusal to respect a Secur-
ity Council resolution leaves a country
open to the charge that it is an "interna-
tional outlaw," "not a peaceloving
nation," and, therefore, eligible for fur-
ther sanctions. Thus, Isi-ael, having been
requested by Security Council action to
withdraw all its troops from Lebanon, is
"guilty" of noncompliance, while Syria is
"not guilty" because thei'e were never
enough votes in the Security Council to
demand Syria's withdrawal. The fact of
noncompliance becomes yet another
ground for censuring Israel in the
United Nations regardless of the fact
that Israel agreed to a timetable foi' joint
withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon
and actually began a withdrawal which
Syria refused even to discuss.
When the Soviet Union is able to
protect itself against being criticized by
name— no matter how flagrant its viola-
tions of the UN Charter— it establishes
itself as skillful, effective, and influential,
a power to be reckoned with in what is
regularly called the international com-
munity. When its client states and allies
ai-e able to escape criticism— no matter
how flagrantly they violate the UN
Charter— the Soviets are judged to be in-
fluential, useful friends. Soviet success
and influence in the United Nations then
becomes an additional incentive for sen-
.sitivity to Soviet views and for associa-
tion with the Soviet bloc. Conversely,
when the United States and its friends
are subjected to harsh and often unfaii-
attack, the Lfnited States appears to be
devoid of influence and association with
it becomes undesirable if not dangerous.
LIN votes affect both the image and the
reality of power in the UN system and
beyond it.
What UN Votes Tell Us About
the Countries Who Cast Them
Thei-e is much votes cannot tell us. The
votes of a congressman do not necessar-
ily tell us where and how he stands
within his party or within the Congress,
nor what he cares most deeply about,
nor about his relation with his peers, nor
about the views of his constituency or
his legislative assistant. A vote does not
even tell us to which party a con-
gressman belongs. A congressman may
argue even that his votes do not ac-
curately reflect his true values and
preferences but, instead, the pressures
in an election year of his constituency,
his party, the financial pressures on him,
and the issues he was forced to vote on.
But cumulatively a congressman's votes
tell us in a general way about where he
stands on various kinds of issues, what
he stands for, and whom he stands with.
Similarly in the United Nations, a
country's votes do not tell us many
things. Votes may not depend just on
the country's objective position and
needs, nor its subjective values and
identifications, but on what some
authoritative person decided was in his
own best interest or his country's best
interest in a particular place, at a par-
ticular time. The cumulative record,
however, tells us what a government
judges to be in its best interest. When
an African government votes with the
majority of Africans, or with the majoi--
ity of the nonaligned government group,
for a resolution that is unfairly critical of
the United States for violating the South
African arms embargo, for example, that
African state is not necessarily express-
ing its hostility to the United States; it
may simply believe there will be more
unpleasant (personal or official) conse-
quences for voting no than voting yes.
Over time, however, a country's
votes reflect its choices about values and
priorities.
There are certain interesting paral-
lels between the country-by-country
reports on human rights practices under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the UN voting practice reports, as re-
quired by last year's legislative enact-
ment. Both reflect an effort by Congress
to take account in its consideration of
foreign assistance decisions the policies
April 1984
UNITED NATIONS
and practices of other countries with
regard to the moral and poUtical goals
which guide U.S. policy. Both provide
data which must be evaluated with sen-
sitivity and understanding. Like the
human rights reports, the data on UN
voting practices the reports provide can
be quite valuable in contributing to bet-
ter informed, more intelligent decisions.
Congress, as always, will be free to
decide to grant or withhold. But in
reaching its decisions. Congress will
have, by virtue of the UN voting
reports, the assistance of information
which may be highly relevant in any
given case. The public will similarly have
an understandable basis for judgments
that are more reliable than generalized
impressions.
As I have indicated, these reports
are not very different in their purpose
than data supplied to Congress in a host
of domestic contexts, as part of the
legislative process. There is nothing
unique in Congress' quest for the en-
lightenment provided by relevant infor-
mation. If any country feels that the
reports do not faithfully reflect its
policies, attitudes, and decisions, it is, of
course, free to speak out as it sees fit.
Our nation has never been mean or
vindictive in its conduct of foreign rela-
tions. It has, on the contrary, been
generous to a fault and understanding in
the extreme. That has been the
American style. I believe it will continue
to be so— though perhaps with greater
sensitivity and closer attention to the
hard realities of the world in which we
live. These reports should be a helpful
adjunct in that process.
Some Generalizations and Conclusions
First, the U.S. weakness in UN arenas
is of longstanding duration. It dates back
to the 1960s and apparently is rooted in
the transformation of UN membership
by the influx of many new nations, many
of which are not democratic, and the
failure of the United States to take part
in the developing "party system" inside
the United Nations. It also reflects a
U.S. habit of acting as though another
country's behavior toward our values
and interests inside the United Nations
were not relevant to their relationship
with us.
Second, the position of the United
States in the United Nations is not
nearly as strong as our economic and
military strength might suggest. That is
another way of saying U.S. strength and
resources in the world have not been
translated into influence inside the
United Nations.
70
Third, rising Soviet influence has ac-
companied declining U.S. influence inside
UN fora. This has been achieved by in-
tegration of Soviet influence with the
major blocs (through their client states)
and in the UN permanent bureaucracy
and weak coordination among the person-
nel and policies of the democracies and
prodemocratic forces.
Fourth, the strength of the Soviet
Union inside the United Nations is based
on the transfer into the United Nations
of power relations outside the United
Nations. Soviet dominance of Eastern
Europe is translated into a solid bloc of
votes in the United Nations. Soviet
client states always support Soviet posi-
tions and strategies inside the United
Nations.
Conclusions from the experience of
the past 3 years suggest that it should
be possible to enhance U.S. abUity to
maximize democratic values and the prin-
ciples of the UN Charter and to protect
our interests and reputation in UN
arenas providing:
• The United States and its represen-
tatives are clear and make clear to
others that we take a serious interest in
decisions in these arenas and no longer
are willing to shrug off UN interactions
as without importance;
• That we integrate regular com-
munication on UN affairs into our normal
bilateral relations with other countries;
• That we take special measures to
infoiTTi other countries about issues of
special concern to us; and
• That we make clear inside the
United Nations that we are prepared to
respect our friends' and associates' basic
values and interests but expect that such
respect should be mutual.
The foreign policy of the United
States, in the United Nations as out of
it, should affirm our commitment to
sti-engthening international peace, to pro-
moting democratic values including
respect for human rights, to encouraging
development, and to strengthening in-
stitutions that provide for the peaceful
resolution of conflict.
When the United States is weak and
without influence in international arenas,
the possibilities of promoting these
values in those arenas are diminished.
When the United States and the other
democracies are influential, democratic
values and institutions are strengthened
as well. It is not enlightened or generous
or responsible for the United States to
be or seem to be indifferent to what
transpires in gi'eat international fora. It
is not genei-ous or responsible to act as
though we did not cai-e about decisions
in international bodies. It is our duty to
try in all appropriate ways to strengthen
freedom and human rights and to pro-
mote the values of the UN Charter— the
reason for our initial sponsorship of, and
present membership in the United Na-
tions.
•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Department of State Bullet
"3
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Central America Initiative Proposed
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
FEB. 3, 1984'
In the coming days, we'll send legislation
to the Congi-ess based on a remai'kable
bipartisan consensus of the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. And I urge prompt congi-es-
sional action and support.
Last April, in an address to a joint
session of the Congress, I spoke to the
American people about what is at stake
in Central America and asked for bipar-
tisan cooi)eration in our efforts to help
make a better life for the people of that
region. Shortly after that speech, the
late Senator Henry Jackson called for
the appointment of a bipartisan commis-
sion to chart a long-term course for
democracy, economic improvement, and
peace in Central Amei'ica. And as Scoop
Jackson so rightly observed, "Whatever
policy options might be available to us,
ignoring threats to the stability of
Central America and refusing to engage
ourselves in the problems of the region
are not among them."
It was against this background that I
did establish the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America. Its mis-
sion was to recommend a long-teiTn pol-
icy appropriate to the economic, social,
political, and military challenges to the
region.
The distinguished Americans who
served on that commission have per-
formed a great service to all Americans.
All of us— when I say all Americans— «//
of us from Point Barrow to Tierra del
Fuego. Henry Kissinger and the commis-
sion members and senior counselors: My
appreciation for a tough job well done.
Our proposed legislation, the Central
America Democracy, Peace, and Devel-
opment Initiative Act, is based on the
commission's analysis and embodies its
recommendations, and it's in the spirit of
Senator Jackson who first proposed the
idea of a bipartisan commission and
sei'ved until his death as one of its senior
counselors. He represented something
very special in American politics. Scoop
Jackson stood for national security and
human rights because he knew that one
without the other is meaningless. He
said what he believed and stuck to it
with vision, integrity, and grace.
The legislation does not offer a quick
fix to the crisis in Central America;
there is none. Our plan offers a com-
prehensive program to support demo-
April 1984
President Reagan with (left to right) Richard McP^arland, national security adviser; Robert
Strauss, a member of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America; and Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger, chairman of the national commission.
cratic development, improve human
rights, and bring peace to this troubled
region that's so close to home.
The approach is right. It includes a
mix of developmental, political, diplo-
matic, and security initiatives, equitably
and humanely pursued. We either do
them all, or we jeopardize the chance for
real progress in the region. The plan
i-esponds to decades of inequity and in-
difference through its support of
democracy, reform, and human freedom.
It responds to the economic challenges of
the region.
The legislation calls for $400 million
in supplementary economic assistance for
fiscal year 1984. And during the next 5
years, economic assistance will amount to
$5.9 billion in appropi-iated funds and $2
billion in insurance and guarantees.
To support the security of the
region's threatened nations, the legisla-
tion will provide $515 million over the
next 2 years. At the same time, it will
require semiannual reports to the Con-
gress assessing El Salvadoran policies
for achieving political and economic
development and conditions of security.
To support dialogue and negotiations
both among the countries of the region
and within each country, the legislation
provides guidance for cooperation with
the Central American countries in
establishing, then working with, the Cen-
tral American Development Organiza-
tion.
Our plan is for the long haul. It won't
be easy, and it won't be cheap. But it
can be done. And for strategic and moral
reasons, it must be done. I ask the Con-
gress to study the commission report
and to give our legislative proposal its
urgent attention and bipartisan support.
It is not an impossible drearii. We have
the resources to do it. This initiative
serves the interest of the Western
Hemisphere. The beleaguered people in
Central America want our help. Our
enemies, extremists of the left and the
right, would be delighted if we refused
to give it. And if we don't help now,
we'll surely pay dearly in the future.
With the support of the Congress, we
will not let down all those in Central
America who yearn for democracy and
peace. And in so doing, we'll not let
ourselves down.
'Made in the East Room of the White
House to Members of Congress, members of
the diplomatic community, and Administration
officials (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 6, 1Q84). ■
71
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Central America Democracy, Peace,
and Development Initiative
by Langhome A. Motley
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
February 21, 198i. Ambassador Motley
is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs.'
I am pleased to appear before you to
testify on the vitally important Central
America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative Act of 1984.
The exhaustive study made by the
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen-
tral America has enabled us to prepare a
comprehensive response to the many-
sided crisis in Central America. The Ad-
ministration and the Congress are now
in a position to forge a complete pro-
gram of action that meets both im-
mediate operational needs and the re-
quirements of a long-term strategy.
The bill the President has just
transmitted to the Congress embodies
those recommendations made by the
bipartisan commission which cannot be
implemented without legislation. As you
know, the President will implement by
executive action those commission
recommendations that do not require
new legislation. He urges prompt con-
gressional action and support for this
bill.
This legislative package will help to
stabilize economies and societies plagued
by injustice and violence. At the same
time, it will enable us to take the offen-
sive against poverty and to foster
democratic development, to increase
respect for human rights, and to help
bring lasting peace to this troubled
region so close to the United States.
This prepared statement addresses:
• The report of the bipartisan com-
mission;
• The major elements of the legisla-
tion; and
• Some questions of policy and im-
plementation.
The Report of the Bipartisan
Commission
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the
commission's report is its honesty— its
candor in facing up to the complexities
of Central America. The commission
could have focused superficially on one
72
or two "critical issues" which, if ad-
dressed in isolation, might have created
the illusion of a broader solution.
To its credit, the commission refused
to oversimplify. It acknowledged that
Central America's problems are com-
plex, severe, and deeply rooted, con-
cluding flatly that they add up to a
"seamless web" from which no quick
fixes or shortcuts will free us. The U.S.
interests involved, it pointed out, are
both moral and strategic. And they are
threatened by human rights abuse and
by economic misery as well as by Cuban
and Soviet intervention.
The commission's recommendations
are as comprehensive and direct as its
analysis. It could have insisted on its
mandate to deal with long-term issues
and avoided the difficult questions we
face now. It could have summarized the
policies already being pursued by the
Administration and given us credit for
being on the right track. And it could
have simply praised the peace efforts of
the Central American countries and the
central importance of negotiations
like those underway in the Contadora
process.
But the commission was both
unanimous and unambiguous in con-
cluding that the long term will be far
less manageable if we fail to deal with
existing challenges. It called for U.S.
support for regional efforts like Con-
tadora but said that the United States
also has a special responsibility to con-
tribute actively to the creation of
economic, security, and political condi-
tions required for peace. It concluded
that we are not doing enough and
recommended that the Administration
and the Congress cooperate to ensure
that we provide the resources we and
our Central American friends need to
work successfully together to attain a
lasting peace built solidly on democracy
and development.
The commission refused to accept
precooked judgments and conventional
platitudes. Bipartisan in composition and
nonpartisan in mandate, the commission
approached its task with total in-
dependence. Mr. Chairman [Michael D.
Barnes], you and I can both testify to
the commission's thoroughness and in-
dependence. We were both asked many
questions. We were asked to identify the
problems and to explain what we
thought was needed to deal with them.
But we were never asked whether this
or that recommendation would "sell."
We were never asked to compromise our
views for reasons of political or ad-
ministrative expediency.
The commission's discussions with
Central and Latin American leaders
eliminated the screens created by
distance, paperwork, and partisan
preconceptions and exposed its members
to the region's realities. They saw for
themselves what is happening in El
Salvador and in Nicaragua and
throughout the isthmus.
From these experiences the commis-
sion developed a perspective on Central
America that combines:
• An enlightened understanding of
the capacity of social and economic
frustration to undermine stability and
feed on itself to create yet more un-
happiness and more instability;
• A technical knowledge of how
world economic developments can in-
fluence, and at times devastate, strug-
gling economies and an equally informed
insight into how those economies can
renew their growth;
• A sophisticated understanding of
the tactics and tools of the Soviet Union
and Cuba, who would exploit these
vulnerabilities and ultimately threaten
us; and lastly,
• A truly American insight for
responding to the economic and political
realities of Central America in a way
that conforms to our neighbors' aspira-
tions for peace, democracy, and pros-
perity.
As a result, what emerges from the
commission's report is the Central
American dynamic itself. It is a dynamic
in which communism, violence, and dic-
tatorship feed on misery, injustice, and
an unfortunate past. It is a destructive
dynamic that oppresses the people of
Central America and will, unless altered,
increasingly endanger the rest of the
hemisphere.
The Central America Democracy,
Peace, and Development Initiative
Act of 1984
To break this destructive dynamic will
require action in support of democratic
self-determination, economic and social
development that fairly benefits all, and
cooperation in meeting threats to the
security of the region. That is the con-
sensus of the bipartisan commission. It
is the basis of the legislative package
now before you.
Department of State Bulletin
■ tim ii H i i— WW
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Specifically, this is what the Presi-
dent proposes to implement the recom-
^ mendations of the bipartisan commis-
sion.
Economic Assistance. Recognizing
that economic deterioration aggravates
social and political unrest, the commis-
sion recommended an additional $400
million this year for emergency stabiliza-
tion to set the stage for long-term
development.
Our supplemental request for FY
1984 is for $400 million in emergency
funds to halt sharp declines in gross
•■! domestic product (GDP), per capita in-
come, and employment. During the last
several years, per capita GDP has fallen
Dy 35% "in El Salvador, 23% in Costa
Rica, 14% in Guatemala, and 12% in
Honduras. In 4 years. El Salvador has
ost 15 years of economic development.
The commission recommended
ilmost doubling our projected economic
lid to roughly $8 billion over the next 5
years. This amount, which looks large
antil compared to the region's needs,
»vould support a comprehensive strategy
to promote democratization, economic
growth, human development, and
security.
Our implementation plan for fiscal
year (FY) 1985-89 calls for a total of
$5.9 billion in appropriated funds and
off-budget guarantee authorities to allow
for $2 billion in insurance and guar-
antees, the latter including housing in-
vestment guarantees and a trade credit
insurance program to be administered by
the Export-Import Bank.
For FY 1985, we propose a program
involving $1.1 billion in appropriated
funds and $600 million in insurance and
guarantees. Depending on country per-
formance, we estimate that the major
beneficiaries of direct, bilateral aid in
FY 1985 would be El Salvador ($341
million), Costa Rica ($208 million), Hon-
duras ($139 million), and Guatemala ($96
million). El Salvador, which has suffered
over $800 million in guerrilla destruc-
tion, would be the largest single re-
cipient. Two other countries, however,
would receive more on a per capita
basis.
From a functional standpoint, this
FY 1985 proposal includes:
• About $550 million in balance-of-
payments support to finance the import
of critical goods by the private sector;
• $120 million in Public Law 480
food assistance, with local currency pro-
ceeds used to reinforce programs in, for
example, education and health;
April 1984
• Major labor-intensive construction
of infrastructure and housing;
• Significantly increased support for
education, including literacy and teacher
corps training and scholarships;
• Major funding to develop commer-
cial agriculture, the backbone of the
Central American economies, including
assistance to broaden ownership pat-
terns and to increase the availability of
credit;
• Increase funding for activities in
Central America by the private National
Endowment for Democracy;
• Funds to strengthen the adminis-
tration of justice in the region as the
surest way to safeguard individual liber-
ties and human rights; and
• Support for the Central American
Common Market and its companion Cen-
tral American Bank for Economic In-
tegration to revitalize intraregional
trade and restore economic production
and employment.
Military Assistance. Peace is essen-
tial to economic and humanitarian prog-
ress in Central America. Without securi-
ty, the best economic programs and the
wisest diplomacy will be unable to stop
the opponents of democracy.
The commission recommended sig-
nificantly increased levels of military aid
to El Salvador, warning specifically
against providing "too little to wage the
war successfully."
The President's proposal is as
follows:
• For El Salvador: $178.7 million in
FY 1984 supplemental assistance and
$132.5 million for 1985. Added to the
$64.8 million available under this year's
continuing resolution, the FY 1984-85
program for El Salvador would total
$376 million. This program would be
concentrated in FY 1984 in order to
break the military stalemate and provide
as soon as possible a firmer basis for
economic recovery and democratic na-
tional reconciliation in El Salvador.
• For the rest of Central America:
$80.35 million in FY 1984 supplemental
military assistance and $123.4 million
for FY 1985. The lion's share would be
allocated to Honduras, a democracy that
still faces frequent violations of its na-
tional territory by Salvadoran guerrillas
seeking refuge and using Honduras as a
supply route, as well as by Honduran
guerrillas infiltrated from Nicaragua.
Honduras also faces a direct military
threat from Nicaragua, which has built
up armed forces at least five times
larger than Somoza's National Guard
and has received some $250 million in
military assistance from the Soviet bloc
since 1979.
The commission recommends that
military aid to El Salvador should,
through legislation requiring periodic
reports, be made contingent upon
demonstrated progress toward human
rights objectives, including free elections
and reduction in death-squad activities.
There is agreement among the ex-
ecutive, the Congress, and the commis-
sion that human rights progress is
essential in El Salvador to ensure a suc-
cessful outcome of war and to protect
U.S. security and moral interests. There
is also a consensus that U.S. assistance
should actively be used to achieve these
objectives.
As this committee knows, the ex-
ecutive branch and the Congress have
not always seen eye to eye on how best
to achieve this shared goal. My ex-
ecutive branch colleagues and I are firm-
ly convinced that a statutory formula re-
quiring determinations at arbitrary pre-
set intervals on an "all-or-nothing" basis
is not an effective approach. Experience
shows that such a formula may actually
trigger hostile action by guerrilla forces
and focus attention on the certification
process rather than on the underlying
problems and their remedies.
We must find a means to condition
our assistance in ways that work. This
requires the flexibility to respond to
specific circumstances as they exist at a
given moment. Recent advances, which
have taken place in the absence of a
legislated certification requirement,
demonstrate that alternatives do exist.
We are ready to work closely with
the Congress to ensure continuing
human rights progress while preserving
the President's ability to pursue an ef-
fective foreign policy.
Central American Development
Organization (CADO). The commission
recommended creation of a Central
American Development Organization to
give multilateral form and substance to
economic development efforts.
In line with the commission's recom-
mendation, the proposed legislation sets
forth principles to guide the negotiations
for establishing this new institution in
conjunction with the Central American
countries and other donors.
The President has indicated that he
intends to respect the principles set
forth in the legislation, both in his
negotiations and in subsequent U.S. par-
ticipation in CADO. In line with these
principles:
73
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
• CADO would provide an effective
forum for an open dialogue on Central
American political, economic, and social
development, and a continuous review of
local policies and of the uses to which
foreign assistance is put.
• Participation would be open to the
United States, other donors, and those
Central American countries that commit
themselves to, among other things,
peace and mutual security, maintaining
or making progress toward human
rights development, building democracy,
and encouraging economic growth
through policy reforms. CADO would in-
clude representatives from both the
public and private sectors, from labor
and business, and be supported by a
small professional staff.
• CADO would make recommenda-
tions on political, economic, and social
development objectives; mobilization of
resources and external resource needs;
and economic policies and structures.
CADO would evaluate country perform-
ance and progress in meeting objectives.
• In this regard, disbursement of
25% of economic assistance funds
authorized under this act and allocated
for each Central American country
would be deferred until both the United
States and CADO have approved. Con-
sistent with the Constitution, ultimate
control of U.S. aid funds would remain
with Congress and the President.
Multiyear Funding. To ensure ef-
fective planning and predictability, the
proposed economic assistance departs
from the conventional practice of seek-
ing authorizations for 1 or 2 years. We
are seeking an authorization that will go
beyond FY 1985 and extend through FY
1989. In addition, we are requesting that
appropriations under this authorization
be made available beyond a single fiscal
year.
The reason for this innovation is
that the bill represents a 5-year pro-
gram. This is what was developed by the
commission, and it is supported by our
own analysis. This approach has the fun-
damental virtue of enabling everyone
concerned— both in the United States
and in Central America— to know what
could become available if performance
standards are met.
Policy and Implementation
Many questions have arisen about this
program.
• Are we asking for too much?
• Will our assistance be used effec-
tively?
• Are we seeking a military solution
in El Salvador?
• Shouldn't increased assistance
follow a regional settlement?
• Will these additional resources
solve the problem?
Let me take each in turn.
Are we asking for too much? No.
In fact, the sums are modest in relation
to need. As the bipartisan commission
underlined, the need for external
assistance is enormous. Physical in-
frastructure has been damaged, health
and education systems need expansion,
and investment in productive capacity is
essential to employ the region's growing
labor force.
There are those who counsel that we
should provide less economic assistance.
But is less than 15% of our proposed
global economic aid budget for FY 1985
too large a price to pay to alleviate suf-
fering and serve our interests in Central
America?
Others advocate a reduction in
military assistance. Yet there is no
reduction in the arms, training, and
other support flowing to the other side,
a side that has rejected democracy and
pluralism and utilizes violence as its
chosen means to power.
Still others recommend that we
withdraw altogether, because the situa-
tion is supposedly too tough for us,
because regional forces of moderation
and democracy are allegedly too weak,
or because they discount the manifest in-
tentions of the antidemocratic forces at
work. The United States cannot, how-
ever, afford to withdraw and abandon
Central America to poverty and com-
munism.
Lastly, there are those who are will-
ing to do something to help, but not
enough. They don't want to shoulder the
political consequences if those we sup-
port lose, but they are not willing to
concede the assistance needed for them
to win. They refused to make a genuine
commitment and continue to seek "quick
fixes" that fail to address the fundamen-
tal issues of peace, democracy, security,
and honest reform. The commission
rightly singles out this approach as the
most pernicious.
Assistance of $8 billion over 5 years
would be equivalent to about 5% of the
gross domestic product of the region.
This is less than the aid previously made
available to some other parts of the
world.
Another useful measure of the abili-
ty of Central America to absorb these
proposed levels of assistance is the
shortfall in export earnings from coffee
and sugar due to lower prices, plus
higher costs for imported oil. This net
hard currency loss amounts to about
$1.5 billion per year— the same general
magnitude as the proposed assistance.
Moreover, considerable excess
capacity could quickly and easily be
brought back into play, generating in-
creased employment and output. Private
firms need only working capital and im-
ported inputs; in the public sector, high-
priority investment programs that have
been suspended or cut back because of
austerity programs lack only financial
support to be reactivated.
Will the assistance be used effec-
tively? In the near term, the bulk of our
resources will go to private-sector ac-
tivities, not expansion of government
bureaucracies. In the longer term, we
will also be providing the institution-
building help, training, and technical
assistance that will allow our neighbors
to carry out larger scale programs more
efficiently.
Local policy reform will be required
to receive and ensure effective use of
our funds. We will not subsidize ineffi-
ciency and will strive to create oppor-
tunities and incentives for private-sector
investment. We hope that CADO will be
an effective mechanism to this end. A
key objective of CADO will be to consult
the private sector to identify activities
that will most increase productivity:
neither government bureaucracy nor
handouts but the cutting edge of local
production.
Capital flight was a serious problem
for 3-4 years beginning about 1979. |
More recently, however, the central
banks of the region have recognized the
seriousness of the problem and are suc-
cessfully working to prevent capital
flight.
Our AID [Agency for International
Development] missions also are pro-
viding useful advice and technical
assistance to help Central American
monetary authorities meet the challenge
As a result, outflows have been greatly
reduced.
Are we seeking a military solution
in El Salvador? No. As President
Reagan said last March, "the real solu-
tion can only be a political one," with th
Salvadoran people deciding their own
destiny through free and fair elections.
That is not a "military solution." The
military assistance we are requesting
would provide the wherewithal for the
Salvadoran Armed Forces to break the
current stalemate and take and sustain
Department of State Bulletin
uaaaam
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Central America Initiative Legislation
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
FEB. 17, 1984'
I herewith transmit proposed legislation that
embodies the consensus arrived at by the Na-
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. Its unifying thread is the spirit of
the late Senator Henry M. Jackson— to ad-
vance the twin purposes of national security
and human development.
Peace and individual betterment are
universal purposes. They are at the heart of
the American dream. Yet, today in Central
America these goals are not realized. Poverty
and violence are widespread. As a conse-
quence, democratic forces are not able to
flourish, and those who seek to disrupt
freedom and opportunity threaten the heai-t
of those nations.
Throughout our history, our leaders have
put country before party on issues in foreign
affairs important to the national interest. The
Commission identifies the situation in Central
America as this kind of issue. The 12 Commis-
sioners—Democrats and Republicans
alike— conclude "that Central America is both
vital and vulnerable, and that whatever other
ci-ises may arise to claim the nation's atten-
tion, the United States cannot afford to turn
away from that threatened region."
We face an inescapable reality: we must
come to the support of our neighbors. The
democratic elements in Central America need
our help. For them to overcome the problems
of accumulated historical inequities and im-
mediate armed threats will take time, effort,
and resources. We must support those efforts.
As the Commission recommends, our
policy must be based on the principles of
democratic self-determination, economic and
social improvement that fairly benefits all,
and cooperation in meeting threats to the
security of the region.
Accordingly, I propose the "Central
America Democracy, Peace and Development
Initiative Act of 1984." This act calls for an
increased commitment of resources beginning
immediately and extending regularly over the
ne.xt five years. This assistance is necessary
to support the balance of economic, political,
diplomatic, and security measures that will be
pursued simultaneously.
I propose authorization for an $8 billion,
five-year reconstruction and development pro-
gram for Central America, composed of $6
billion in direct appropriations and $2 billion
in insurance and guarantee authority. For
fiscal year 1985 the figures are SLlbillion
and $600 million, respectively. In addition, the
plan calls for $400 million in supplemental ap-
propriations for an emergency economic
stabilization program for fiscal year 1984.
These resources will support agricultural
development, education, health services, ex-
port promotion, land reform, housing,
humanitarian relief, trade credit insurance,
aid for small businesses, and other activities.
Because democracy is essential to effective
development, special attention will be given
to increasing scholarships, leadership training,
educational exchanges, and support for the
growth of democratic institutions.
Regional institutions such as the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and the
Central American Bank for Economic Integra-
tion (CABEI) made a major contribution to
the region's economic growth in the 1960's
and early 70's. I am proposing a substantial
assistance program to revitalize these institu-
tions and thereby stimulate intra-regional
trade and economic activity.
To enable the countries of Central
America to paitidpate directly in the plan-
ning of these efforts, I shall explore the crea-
tion of a Central American Development
Organization (CADO). This would enable
political and private leaders from both the
United States and Central America to review
objectives and progress, and make recommen-
dations on the nature and levels of our
assistance efforts. The organization would, in
effect, help to oversee and coordinate the ma-
jor efforts that must be made. The legislation
I am proposing sets out a series of principles
to guide the negotiations for the establish-
ment of this new regional institution. I intend
to respect those principles in these negotia-
tions and in our subsequent participation in
CADO. As the Commission recognized, the
ultimate control of aid funds will always rest
with the donors. Consistent with the Con-
stitution and this precept, final disposition of
funds appropriated under this legislation will
be subject to the ultimate control of the Con-
gress and the President.
The National Bipartisan Commission
specifically recommends significantly in-
creased levels of military aid to the region,
especially El Salvador. In the words of the
report, "the worst possible policy for El
Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep
the war going, but too little to wage it suc-
cessfully." I propose authorization for the
region for fiscal year 1984 and a $256 million
program for fiscal year 1985.
U.S. military assistance is vital to shield
progress on human rights and democratization
against violence from extremes of both left
and right. I shall ensure that this assistance is
provided under conditions necessary to foster
human rights and political and economic
development, and our Administration will con-
sult with the Members of the Congress to
make certain that our assistance is used fairly
and effectively.
No new laws are needed to carry out
many of the Commission's recommendations.
There is, for example, a consensus on an in-
tegral part of our strategy in Central
America: support for actions implementing
the 21 Contadora objectives to help bring
about peace. The Contadora objectives are in
Central America's interest and in ours.
Similarly, we are urging other nations to in-
crease their assistance to the area.
I believe it is no accident that the Com-
mission reached many of the same conclusions
about comprehensive solutions to Central
America's problems as have the participants
in the Contadora process. As Dr. Kissinger
noted in his January 10 letter to me, "the
best route to consensus on U.S. policy toward
Central America is by exposure to the
realities of Central America."
The National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America has done its work. Now it is
our turn. Unless we act— quickly, humanely,
and firmly— we shall face a crisis that is much
worse for everyone concerned. We owe it to
our children to make sure that our neighbors
have a chance to live decent lives in freedom.
I, therefore, ask that the enclosed legisla-
tion be given your urgent attention and early
and favorable action.
Ronald Reagan
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 20, 1984.
'.pril 1984
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
the initiative to provide a stronger shield
for protecting political and economic
development. This would increase the in-
centives for the FDR/FMLN [Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front/Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front] to enter into
serious discussions with the Salvadoran
Peace Commission about participation m
elections. We doubt this will happen un-
til the FDR/FMLN becomes convinced it
cannot prevail militarily. Passage of our
proposed assistance package, however,
could be a deciding factor in ensuring
participation of important elements ot
the far left in the 1385 municipal and
legislative elections.
Though the amount of proposed mili-
tary assistance is larger than that pro-
vided previously, we should bear m mind
that the current military stalemate may
be partly due to the inadequacy and
uncertainty of past assistance. To con-
tinue an inadequate level of assistance
may be tantamount to prolonging the
war.
The amount of military assistance
for El Salvador should also be kept in
perspective: total FY 1984 military
assistance for El Salvador (that provided
in the continuing resolution plus the
supplemental request) is 3.6% of our
worldwide military assistance, and the
FY 1985 request for El Salvador is 2.1%
of the global figure. The bipartisan com-
mission stated that "there is ... no
logical argument for giving some
[military] aid but not enough." We can
afford the amount we are requesting,
whether in terms of our important in-
terests in Central America or of our
worldwide responsibilities.
Shouldn't increased economic aid
accompany or follow an overall
regional settlement? The economic
assistance which we are requesting is
essential support for any negotiated
settlement. If we want to give peace a
chance, we must begin now to rebuild
the economies of Central America to
create the climate for peace.
At some point in the future, if all
the parties are ready for settlement, the
peace process could proceed very rapid-
ly With our full support, Contadora has
already prepared the groundwork for an
agreement in its excellent 21-point Docu-
ment of Objectives. But successful
negotiations must reflect operational
realities. The economies of Central
America, fragile from the beginning,
have been subjected to the stress of
economic crisis and violence. If a
regional peace agreement is signed, even
with the best intentions of all the par-
&
ties, it will not succeed if the nations of
the region are suffering from economic
collapse.
Will these additional resources
solve the problem? Resources alone will
not solve the Central American crisis.
But resource predictability can enable
our diplomacy to take more effective ad-
vantage of the interplay between dif-
ferent policy instruments to channel
events toward peaceful solutions, in-
cluding negotiated solutions wherever
possible. ,
What is needed, in addition to the
provision of adequate levels of economic
and military assistance, is demonstration
by the U.S. of a long-term commitment;
the adoption by Central American
governments of appropriate economic,
political, and social policies/reforms; and
an active and long-term diplomacy tor
peace.
Conclusion
This comprehensive policy will require
considerable effort and sacrifice. There
are those who are inclined to support
only economic assistance. There are
others who are inclined to support only
military assistance. There is. however
no realistic alternative to the balanced
approach in the proposals before you.
The crisis is acute. Our neighbors m
Central America urgently need the help
of the only country capable of making
the difference. We have a responsibility.
U S. moral and strategic interests are
both engaged in an area in which we
have historically been involved. Doing
nothing or doing too little are not
responsible alternatives.
Our initiative is based on sound
analysis. It is rooted in the consensus
judgment that the area's problems have
both indigenous and extraregional
causes. „, . ,
Our goals are realistic. The region s
most progressive, democratic forces
strongly believe that we can work
together successfully to strengthen the
moderate center in Central America.
These same people are convinced that
our active participation will serve both
to defeat communism and to bolster
respect for human freedom in this
critical part of our hemisphere.
The approach is right. There is
broad agreement that effective action
must include a mix of developmental,
political, diplomatic, and security
elements and that these elements must
be pursued simultaneously, equitably.
and humanely. There is no such thing as
a wholly "economic," a wholly "political,"
or a wholly "military" solution to Central
America's problems. Economies must be
protected as well as developed. Govern-
ments must be worth defending. Home-
grown poverty and Cuban-directed guer-
rilla warfare are allies of each other; our
policies must take aim at both.
The approach proposed by the bipar-
tisan commission and adopted by the
President does call for greater U.S. in-
volvement in the region, but it is a con-
structive involvement that will eventual-
ly enable Central Americans to stand on
their own and live at peace with one
another. This kind of involvement now
will eliminate the need for greater in-
volvement later.
What the bipartisan commission and
the President propose is not impossible.
It is a realistic and humane response to
a real crisis in a particularly troubled
setting. We have the resources to do it.
The people in Central America want us
to do it. Our enemies— extremists of the
left and the right-will be delighted if
we hesitate.
I hope that your consideration of the
bill will be infused by the bipartisan
commission's unanimous conclusion, a
conclusion that guided its preparation
and which is worth quoting in full:
The Commission has concluded that the
security interests of the United States are
importantly engaged in Central America; thai
these interests require a significantly larger
program of military assistance, as well as
greatly expanded support for economic
growth and social reform; that there must be
an end to the massive violation of human
rights if security is to be achieved in Central
America; and that external support of the m-
surgency must be neutralized for the same
purpose.
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'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent ot
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402. ■
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Elections in El Salvador
by Thomas R. Pickering
Address before the Corporate Round
Table of the World Affairs Council on
March 1, 1981,- Mr. Pickering is U.S.
Embassador to El Salvador.
:n 25 days El Salvador will hold direct
lections for a president and a vice presi-
ient. Under pressures of a civil war,
frave economic difficulties, major efforts
,0 deal with a crisis in human rights, and
in economy which has suffered a 25%
iecline in 4 years, this will be no easy
ask.
These elections will tax El Salvador's
;apacity to evolve as a democracy. Many
lave seen the problems; few have looked
it the potential and the possibilities. To-
lay I want to talk with you about the
lections, why El Salvador is holding
hem, the timing of those elections, the
ireparations for the process, and how
he Salvadorans themselves will conduct
his effort.
These elections will be not only im-
ortant for the future of El Salvador—
hey will determine its next president
nd its course for the next 5 years. They
/ill also set a standard by which other
Central American elections will be
udged.
Nicaragua has announced elections
'or November; Guatemala is considering
ilections in mid-summer.
In El Salvador, all parties are
j^uaranteed free access to the media. In
El Salvador, all those who wish to par-
ticipate, including the guerrillas, have
Deen invited to join the democratic proc-
ss. In El Salvador, the government has
;aken major steps to open the door to all
:iualified voters in an internationally
observed process with clear and careful
steps to prevent fraud.
Nicaragua, in contrast, has come only
Dart way in the process. Salvadorans are
;ertain that the standards that they have
jstablished can meet the careful scrutiny
jf the entire outside world. Let us hope,
too, that the Nicaraguans will develop a
process that will be equally free, fair,
3pen, and democratic.
The United States has made clear
that it supports— indeed, applauds— the
holding of elections in El Salvador. At
the same time, it has declared its full
neutrality with regard to the parties and
the candidates. Finally, the United
States has stated that it will accept the
April 1984
results of a free and fair democratic elec-
tion in El Salvador. The United States
will gauge and develop its policies with
respect to the winner of the Salvadoran
elections— whomever he may be— accord-
ing to the policies he puts into action.
The United States will not support a
president or govei'nment or party in this
process which is not willing to be held
accountable through succeeding- free and
fair elections. In our judgment all parties
currently competing in the Salvadoran
elections meet this test.
Why Elections?
The leader of the jjolitical wing of the
guerrillas, Guillei-mo Ungo, has said that
"elections will not be a solution, but will
instead worsen the situation, because
they respond to the interests of the U.S.
Administration and not to the interests
of the Salvadoran people."
Elections have been a difficult point
for the guerrillas to accept. If the voters
freely express their will, how can the
voters lose? The guerrillas have been
free and are still free to participate in
Salvadoran elections. The fact is and has
been that the guerrillas have been em-
barrassed by theii' opposition to the 1982
elections and have openly admitted that
embarrassment in recent statements— a
backhanded admission of the importance
which the El Salvador electoral process
has achieved in the eyes of the world.
Already some guerrilla factions and
military groups are expressing doubts
and disagreements with Guillermo Ungo.
One group has issued a declaration foi--
bidding four villages in El Salvador to
participate in the polling.
The clear fact is that the guerrillas
know that they are unlikely to win any
significant percentage of the vote.
Among the guerrillas and their key
leaders are many militants who would
prefer to continue to fight and to kill
rather than to accept this popular
verdict.
The basis for guerrilla opposition to
the elections is clear. But what are the
reasons for believing that elections in El
Salvador can make for constructive
change?
The first point is that, while elections
of and by themselves will not solve all
problems, they are another important
step forward on the difficult path toward
democracy. Just as the United States
strongly supports and advocates elec-
tions in Chile, in Nicaragua, and in
Guatemala, so too we support the exer-
cise of popular democracy in El Salvador.
We know of no better way to achieve
that objective than having the people
choose their next president and vice
president.
This process in El Salvador has been
a long and difficult road. For over 50
years the winner of El Salvador's
presidential elections was knovra in ad-
vance. When the reforming group of
military officers took over the govern-
ment in 1979, the old process collapsed.
In its place the new military leaders, in
accord with the Christian Democratic
Party, carried out elections in 1982. The
purpose of those elections was to choose
a body to write a new constitution, ap-
point a government, and enact necessary
laws. At the time of those elections,
Salvadoran leaders pledged themselves
to democratic elections within 2 years.
The new elections carry out that pledge.
The elections will mark another step
in separating the military from the
political process in El Salvador. A new,
popularly elected president will become
commander in chief. The military are
pledged not to interfere in the electoral
process, to protect and defend that proc-
ess, and to accept its results. Thus far
they have given every indication that
they are doing so, and we expect that
they will carry out their pledge.
Finally, elections now will select a
man who can provide a platform and a
program for El Salvador for the future.
This approach will mark a distinct
change from the present transitional
government in which the president was
appointed by the Legislative Assembly.
The new Constitution of El Salvador re-
quires that the president be selected by
clear majority. 'This requirement means
that he can justifiably claim to have a
popular mandate for his programs and
policies, something that has not been
known in El Salvador for quite a few
years.
Some have suggested that they
should "postpone" elections in El
Salvador. Others have indicated an in-
terest in "power sharing" with the guer-
rillas. In my experience in El Salvador, I
have found very few who support these
suggestions. The elections of 1982 were
extremely popular, enjoying an 80% turn-
out; it is too early to predict what the
results might be this year. However, all
of the political parties tell us that their
members indicate that there will be a
large turnout again in the 1984 elections.
Those who want to postpone, delay or
engage in power sharing take
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
heavy responsibility on their shoulders in
trying to deny to a very large percent-
age of the Salvadoran people their right
to vote and to choose their future.
El Salvador aspires to and clearly is
entitled to the kind of government to
which we also believe we are entitled. It
is an expression of some intolerance, and
perhaps even worse, to claim that we can
ignore the will of the Salvadoran people
because we know what is best for El
Salvador.
Elections in El Salvador wall not be
risk free. Neither I nor the U.S. Govern-
ment favors a party or a candidate. We
don't know how they are going to come
out; indeed, at this date it is a very close
race. The candidates are each very dif-
ferent. Their programs provide for a
wide range of choices. The present
government is not running for reelection.
Elections themselves could give a can-
didate the authority to pursue a more
vigorous dialogue with the left, seeking
their participation in the elections to be
held next year for a new national
assembly and for mayors.
Why Now?
I've already indicated the commitment of
past and present governments to hold
elections on a regular basis. One of the
hallmarks of democracy is knowing that
after a time the people will once again
have an opportunity to select a new
government. El Salvador is now ready to
take this important step.
The elections themselves will add
another base for establishing the rule of
law in El Salvador. They will adhere to
standards established in the nation's new
Constitution and to the recently passed
electoral law. We believe they can and
will be conducted in a free, fair, and im-
partial manner.
Observers from many countries have
been invited, as in 1982, to view and
verify the conduct of these elections. El
Salvador is ready for it and welcomes
careful international scrutiny of its elec-
toral process. El Salvador also welcomes
the fact that many hundreds of reporters
and other journalists will be present in
their country to see the electoral process
unfold; in 1982 even some of the most
skeptical journalists admitted the
fairness of the process.
No one makes the claim that this will
be an easy process nor that it will be
trouble free. The fact that the army will
actively have to engage itself to protect
the elections is a clear indication that the
guerrillas, whatever they say, are ex-
pected to conduct an increasingly
punishing level of military activity at
election time.
The time is right for El Salvador and
its people to demonstrate that they are
not prepared to allow a small group of
armed guerrillas, supported by less than
the 5% of the people— according to the
guerrillas' claim— to veto their
democratic development.
How Are the Elections
Going To Be Conducted?
The presidential election campaign is in
full swing. Americans would be at home
with the rhetoric, the enthusiasm, the
fanfare, and even the invective
characteristic of a tough political battle.
Press, radio, and television coverage is
extensive. Advertising is widespread.
Posters and painted party emblems ap-
pear on the walls, on the streets, and on
the electric light poles. The candidates
are in the countryside and in the cities
with rallies of up to 15,000 supporters.
The independent Central Elections
Council is putting together El Salvador's
first valid electoral registry. The United
States has provided $3 million in
assistance for the computer equipment
and software to do this. The Salvadorans
themselves have launched a massive ef-
fort to get the registry in shape by elec-
tion day.
The registry is based on the national
identity card system. Over 2.4 million
identification card entries have been put
into the system. Over the last several
months, over 600 people have been work-
ing 24 hours a day photocopying,
microfilming, and entering municipal
birth and death records into the com-
puter to check the identity card informa-
tion and remove invalid entries. Simi-
larly, an effective program has been used
to weed out duplicate identification
cards. It is expected that somewhere
between 1.5-2 million Salvadorans will
be eligible to go to the polls on March 25.
The registry will be used to check their
eligibOity. By assigning voters to voting
places, the register should help to reduce
the waiting time and long lines of 1982.
It will also be available should a second,
run-off election be required and for the
elections scheduled for 1985.
On voting day each voter will be told
in advance where he is to vote. The Elec-
tion Council, the parties, and local of-
ficials will see to that. Special arrange-
ments will be made for those large
numbers of Salvadorans who wish to
vote away from their home districts.
M
At the polls the voter's name will be
checked against the register. His finger
and identity card will be marked with a
special visible and indelible ink to pre-
vent double voting. The voter will be
given a ballot displaying the various par
ty symbols. He will mark an "X" across
the party symbol of the party of his
choice. He will then fold the ballot and
put it in a box made of hard, transparent a^
plastic. Although he will mark the ballot nfic
in secret before it is folded, the rest of
the process will take place in full view of Jievelo
the poll watchers of the various parties.
Their duty is to verify on behalf of their
party that the registered voter receives
only one ballot, casts only one vote, and
that the vote is placed in the ballot box.
Except for the use of the registry
and the visible ink, this is the same proc-
ess that worked so well in 1982.
Similarly, the counting and transmis-
sion of official results will follow a strict
procedure. After the polls close, at
sunset where there is no electricity and
at 6 p.m. where there is, the sealed
ballot boxes will be broken open by the
poll watchers. The box cannot be opened
without physically damaging its sides.
The poll watchers will count the ballots
in each other's presence, draw up an of-
ficial report, and agree to and sign the
report. Each party poll watcher wall hav'
his own copy.
The reports from each ballot box will
be sent up the line to the Central Elec-
tions CouncO for computation and final
tallying. Each of the steps will be carriei
out under the eyes of the party poll
watchers. In case of a challenge, the poll jjelau
watchers' copies of the official report wil
be consulted. If copies conflict, the ma-
jority rules.
It is a system designed to be simple Ijctdfj
and at the same time to prevent fraud;
to inspire confidence and to avoid being
unwieldy.
I have already mentioned the invita-
tions to international observers and the
fact that El Salvador will welcome the
press. We expect that they and the
observers will carefully probe for
vulnerabilities in the process as they did
in 1982. I am told that there were more
than 1,500 journalists from all over the
world covering the 1982 elections.
Although I was not there at the time,
many people who were there have
assured me that the massive turnout am |ir
the high standard of honesty of those
elections were impressive to all. So, too,
has been the absence of any substan-
tiated charges of electoral malfeasance o
fraud.
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Vhat About Other Problems?
•roviding security for the elections will
le as important and as difficult as ensur-
ig that they are honest and free of
raud.
On January 25, Mario Aguinada, a
lierrilla spokesman, said in Bogota that,
vhi[e the guerrillas would not militarily
arget the elections, the war would con-
inue— "some bridges may fall, or some
raffic may be stopped." As they did in
982, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have
leveloped an effective plan to deal with
his threat. In 1982 election returns were
ecorded from 90% of the 261 municipali-
ies of El Salvador, and those for which
etums were not recorded constituted
nly a tiny percentage of the registered
oters. These security precautions will
equire intense activity by the
alvadoran military at a time when all of
ur military assistance has been obli-
ated. Especially if a second round of
oting is required, the Salvadoran
lilitary will have to carefully husband
heir munitions and equipment in order
ensure that the voting takes place in
s free an environment as possible.
The guerrillas, despite their
tatements, have intensified their attacks
n civilians, including the recent murder
f two deputies to the Legislative
tof Lssembly. A guerrilla communique called
he first murder "a response" to the
oming elections. Military commanders
ave been ordered to guarantee the
ecurity of the elections, to be responsive
the legitimate concerns of the political
arties, and to offer full support within
he law to keep the process "free, legiti-
liiate, and pure."
The military themselves, as a sign of
heir own effort to avoid influencing the
lectoral process, have decided not to ex-
rcise their constitutional right to vote.
Conclusion
n closing, I would like to leave with you
few key thoughts. No country is ever
eally "ready" for an election in the
lind of all of its citizens. One attribute
f fair elections is that they take place
espite the idea of "readiness" which
ould be used to distort the process.
El Salvador is bravely entering this
rocess in the midst of a heated civil
far. One hundred and twenty years ago
ti ur own country faced a similar chal-
;nge. There was hot debate over
ostponing the elections. After the elec-
ions were held, the winner stated:
TREATIES
...Lf the rebellion could force us to forego
or postpone a national election, it might fairly
claim to have already conquered and ruined
us. . . . But the election, along with its in-
cidental and undesirable strife, has done good
too. It has demonstrated that a people's
government can sustain a national election in
the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it
has not been knowTi to the world that this
was a possibility.
The speaker of course was Abraham
Lincoln, reelected president during our
nation's greatest crisis. A man who
emerged as one of our greatest healers.
A man generous in victory with a vision
of a reunited nation.
We often forget that democracy re-
quires heros— the silent heros who
believe that ballot boxes, not bullets,
resolve issues and stand the test of time.
El Salvador will face a serious and im-
portant test on March 25. Our own faith
in democracy should lead us to believe
that, in spite of all the challenges El
Salvador will emerge stronger, surer,
and reconfirmed in its determination to
advance the course of peace and
democracy. ■
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington Dec.
1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961.
TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Hungary,
.Jan. 27, 1984.
Recommendations relating to the futherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June
20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978 for
VIII 6-8 and 10-4; Sept. 1, 1980 for VIII 3-4.
TIAS 10486.
Acceptance deposited : F.R.G.,
Jan. 26, 1984 for VIII-9.
Atomic Energy
Agreement between the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Governments of
Canada, Jamaica, and the United States of
America concerning the transfer of enriched
uranium for a low power research reactor,
with annexes and exchange of notes. Signed
at Vienna Jan. 25, 1984. Entered into force
Jan. 25, 1984.
Aviation
Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal
Sept. 30, 1977." Acceptance deposited:
Turkey, Feb. 23, 1984.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1983, with an-
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
Entei-ed into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983.
Ratification deposited: Honduras, Dec. 28,
1983; Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Dec. 30, 1983.
Commodities— Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.'
Ratification deposited: Comoros, Jan. 27,
1984.
Customs
Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
caniets, with annexes, as amended. Done at
Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force
Mar. 20, 1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited: Israel, Feb. 14, 1984.
Finance— African Development Bank
Agreement establishing the African Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Khartoum
Aug. 4, 1963, as amended at Abidjan May 17,
1979. Entered into force May 7, 1982; for the
U.S. Jan. 31, 1983.
Acceptance deposited: Spain, Feb. 13, 1984.
Accession deposited: Portugal, Dec. 15, 1983.
Nuclear Weapons— Nonproliferation
Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar.
5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Sao Tome & Principe,
July 20, 1983.
Patents— Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recogni-
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the
puipose of patent procedure, with regulations.
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into
force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768.
Ratification deposited: Austria, Jan. 26, 1984.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.'
Signature : U.K. Aug. 25, 1983.
Property— Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of in-
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised.
Done at Stockholm Julv 14, 1967. Entered in-
to force Apr 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5,
1970, except for Arts. 1-12 entered into force
May 19, 1970, for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973.
TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notification of accession: Rwanda, Dec. 1,
1983.
Trade
Protocol of provisional application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Concluded at Geneva Oct. 20, 1947. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
De facto application: Brunei, Dec. 31, 1983.
TREATIES
Arrangement regarding international trade in
textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 1973.
Entered into force Jan. 1. 1974. TIAS 7840.
Accession deposited : China, Jan. 18, 1984.
Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done at
Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Jan.
1, 1982. TIAS 10323.
Accession deposited: China, Jan. 18, 1984.
Approval deposited: Yugoslavia, Sept. 26,
1983.
United Nations
Convention on the privileges and immunities
of the United Nations. Adopted at New York
Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17,
1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, Feb. 16, 1984.
Wheat
1983 protocol for the further extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered in-
to force July 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited : Algeria, Spain, Feb.
14, 1984; U.K., Feb. 22, 1984.^
Accessions deposited : Ecuador, Dec. 29, 1983;
Syrian Arab Rep., Jan. 30, 1984.
1983 protocol for the further extension of the
food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). Done
at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into
force July 1, 1983.
Ratifications deposited : Spain, Feb. 14, 1984;
U.K., Feb. 22, 1984.3
Wine
Agreement for the creation, in Paris, of an In-
ternational Wine Office. Done at Paris Nov.
29, 1924. Entered into force Oct. 29, 1927.
Notification of accession deposited : U.S., Jan.
25, 1984; effective July 25, 1984.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981.''
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Feb. 1, 1984.
World Health Organization
Amendments to Arts. 24 and 25 of the Con-
stitution of the World Health Organization
(TIAS 1808). Adopted at Geneva May 17,
1976, by the 29th World Health Assembly.
Acceptances deposited : Canada, Jan. 20, 1984;
Malaysia, Jan. 25, 1984.
Entered into force: Jan. 20, 1984.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Antigua & Barbuda,
Nov. 1, 1983.
BILATERAL
Algeria
Memorandum of understanding concerning
cooperation and trade in the field of
agriculture, with annex. Signed at Algiers
Feb. 2, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 2, 1984.
Belgium
Agreement concerning the status of forces of
the U.S. ground-launched cruise missile unit.
Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels
Feb. 13, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 13,
1984.
Brazil
Agreement relating to industrial and military
cooperation, with memorandum of under-
standing. Effected by exchange of notes at
Brasilia Feb. 6, 1984'. Entered into force Feb.
6, 1984.
Canada
Agi-eement relating to the AM broadcasting
service in the medium frequency band, with
annexes. Signed at Ottawa Jan. 17, 1984.
Entered into force Jan. 17, 1984.
Supersedes: Agreement of Mar. 31 and June
12, 1967, as amended (TIAS 62(58, 6626).
China
Arrangement relating to a visa system for ex-
ports to the United States of cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Feb. 16, 1984. Entered into force
Feb. 16, 1984.
Dominican Republic
Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Sept.
28, 1977 (TIAS 8944). with memorandum of
understanding. Signed at Santo Domingo Jan.
13, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1984.
Memorandum of understanding concerning
cooperation in geological sciences. Signed at
Santo Domingo Jan. 23, 1984. Entered into
force .Jan. 23, 1984.
Egypt
First amendment to the grant agreement of
Aug. 19, 1981 (TIAS 10242), for basic educa-
tion. Signed at Cairo Nov. 10, 1983. Entered
into force Nov. 10, 1983.
Third amendment to the grant agreement of
Aug. 29, 1979 (TIAS 9699) as amended, for
Alexandria w-astewater system expansion.
Signed at Cairo Nov. 10, 1983. Entered into
force Nov. 10, 1983.
International express mail agreement with
detailed regulations. Signed at Cairo and
Washington Dec. 3 and 22, 1983. Entered into
force Feb. 1, 1984.
Honduras
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Tegucigalpa Dec. 16, 1983.
Entered into force Dec. 16, 1983.
80
Hungary
Program of cooperation and exchanges in
culture, education, science, and technology for
1984 and 1985, with annex. Signed at
Budapest Dec. 12, 1983. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1984.
Memorandum of understanding for scientific
and technical cooperation in earth sciences.
Signed at Reston and Budapest Jan. 6 and 20,
1984. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1984.
Indonesia
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct.
13 and Nov. 9, 1982 (TIAS 10580), relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex-
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Jakarta Jan. 24 and 27,
1984. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1984.
Israel
Grant agreement to support the economic and
political stability of Israel. Signed at
Washington Dec. 29, 1983. Entered into force
Dec. 29, 1983.
Memorandum of understanding for coopera-
tion in the fields of social sciences and human
development. Signed at Washington and
Jerusalem Jan. 12 and 16, 1984. Entered into
force Jan. 16, 1984.
Italy
Memorandum of understanding on cooperatior
in earth sciences. Signed at Reston and Rome
Nov. 7 and Dec. 1, 1983. Entered into force
Dec. 1, 1983.
Liberia
Agreement relating to the agreement of Aug.
13, 1980, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities (TIAS 9841). Signed at Monrovia
Dec. 15, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 15,
1983.
Macao
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
letters at Hong Kong and Macao Dec. 28,
1983, and Jan. 9, 1984. Entered into force
Jan. 9, 1984; effective Jan. 1, 1984.
Mexico
Agreement on the development and facilita-
tion of tourism. Signed at Mexico Apr. 18,
1983.
Entered into force: Jan 17, 1984.
Supersedes: Agreement of May 4, 1978 (TIAS
9468).
Agreement for cooperation on environmental
programs and transboundary problems.
Signed at La Paz (Mexico) Aug. 14, 1983.
Entered into force : Feb. 16, 1984.
Supersedes: Agreement of June 14 and 19,
1978 (TIAS 9264).
Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by e.\-
change of letters at Mexico Jan. 4, 1984.
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1984.
Department of State Bulletin
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Morocco
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran-
teed by, or insured by the U.S Government
and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at
Rabat Dec. 30, 1983. Entered into force
Feb. 10, 1984.
Agreement relating to agreement of May 17,
1976, for sale of agricultural commodities
(TIAS 8309), with memorandum of under-
standing. Signed at Rabat Feb. 2, 1984.
Entered into force Feb. 2, 1984.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the project loan agree-
ment of May 23, 1983 (TIAS 10724), for rural
electrification. Signed at Islamabad Dec. 19,
1983. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1983.
Philippines
Agreement amending the memorandum of
consultation of the agreement concerning air
transport services of Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS
10443). Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila Nov. 23, 1983 and Jan. 23, 1984.
Entered into force Jan. 23, 1984.
Portugal
Agreement relating to economic and militai-y
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at
Lisbon Dec. 13, 1983. Entered into force Feb.
4, 1984.
Agreement relating to the continued use of
facilities in the Azores by U.S. forces under
the agreement of Sept. 6, 1951, as amended
TIAS 3087, 7254, 10050). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Lisbon Dec. 13, 1983.
Entered into force Feb. 4, 1984.
Singapore
Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Singapore June 25, 1982, and Mai-. 9,
1983. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1983.
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Singapore Sept.'l, 1983, and Jan. 16, 1984.
Entered into force Jan. 17, 1984.
Switzerland
Memorandum of consultation concerning in-
terim measures on air transport services,
with annex. Signed at Washington Feb. 1,
1984. Enters into force when confirmed by
diplomatic note.
Togo
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or
^aranteed by the U.S. Government through
the Export-Import Bank. Signed at Lome
Nov. 29, 1983,
Entered into force: Jan. 31, 1984.
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Yugoslavia
Agreement on cooperation in the field of
tourism. Signed at Washington Feb. 2, 1984.
Enters into force on the date of last note by
which the contracting parties inform one
another that their internal procedures have
been satisfied.
Zambia
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of ceitain debts owed to or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Lusaka
Dec. 19, 1983. Entered into force Feb. 10,
1984.
'Not in force.
^Applicable to Bailiwicks of Guemsey and
Jersey, Isle of Man, Bermuda, British Virgin
Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat,
St. Helena, and dependencies.
'Applicable to Bailiwick of Guernsey.
"Not in force for the U.S. ■
February 1984
February 1
President Reagan offers no comment on a
House Democrats draft resolution pressing
him to begin "prompt and orderly
withdrawal" of U.S. Marines from Beirut.
Deputy White House spokesman Larry
Speakes says the resolution "could encourage
intransigence on the part of the Syrians and
clearly undermine the peace process." Any
statement indicating a "lack of solidarity" in
the United States, he asserts, "can encourage
the Syrians to dig in and hold on."
February 2
In response to a congressional call for the
"prompt and orderly" withdrawal of troops
from Beirut, State Department officials say
that such action would embolden "the forces
of radicalism and extremism" in the Middle
East. The resolution could also lead to the
commitment of more American troops in the
region "in even more dangerous cir-
cumstances," asserts Under Secretary
Eagleburger.
In Beirut, heavy fighting erupts between
Lebanese army troops and Druze and Shia
Muslim militiamen. The fighting occurs during
a deadlock in efforts to get the Lebanese
Government, the Druze and Shia opposition,
and the Syrians to agree on a security plan to
separate the warring factions and begin mov-
ing toward reconciliation. State Department
officials report that there were no incidents
that day involving U.S. Marines and call on
"all parties to respect the cease-fire" and to
"spare innocent civilian lives."
February 2-3
U.S. -Netherlands representatives meet in The
Hague to discuss recent developments in in-
ternational communications. Topics include
international and regional organizations in-
volved in telecommunications and information
issues; international satellite issues; and
developments in telecommunications policy.
U.S. delegation is headed by Ambassador
Diana Lady Dougan, Coordinator for Interna-
tional Communication and Information Policy.
February 3
President Reagan says his proposed legisla-
tion on Central America, implementing the
bipartisan commission's recommendations,
will offer "a comprehensive program to sup-
port democratic development, improve human
rights, and bring peace to this troubled region
so close to home." In remarks to Members of
Congress, the diplomatic community, and Ad-
ministration officials at the White House, the
President, urging prompt congressional action
and support for the initiative, says it "serves
the interest of the United States and of the
Western Hemisphere." The legislation calls
for $400 milUon in supplementary economic
assistance for FY 1984. Dui-ing the next 5
years, economic assistance will amount to $5.9
billion in appropriated funds and $2 billion in
insurance and guarantees.
February 5
Lebanon's Muslim Prime Minister, Shafig al-
Wazzan, and his cabinet resign. President
Gemayel accepts the resignation and an-
nounces an eight-point program for national
reconciliation.
February 6
U.S.-Brazil sign a new bilateral science and
technology agreement. In scientific coopera-
tion, the agreement covers oil and gas
surveys, evaluation of coal resources and
water-data exchange; in space cooperation,
ongoing projects such as geodynamics, at-
mospheric, and space science research, remote
sensing, environmental observations,
technology utilization research and rescue
satellites, and advance communications and
planned Brazilian use of the space shuttle, are
covered.
The 40th session of the UN Human
Rights Commission opens in Geneva. The ses-
sion focuses on allegations of human rights
violations worldwide and addresses such con-
cerns as the human rights situation in Central
America, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and
Poland as well as Soviet abuse of psychiatry.
Richard Schifter, U.S. representative to the
Human Rights Commission, heads the U.S.
delegation.
Political and military situation worsens in
Beirut as intense fighting erupts following a
curfew imposed at 1 p.m. Beirut time. Deputy
White House spokesman Larry Speakes con-
finns reports that the U.S. Marine contingent
comes under hostile fire from small arms and
mortar. Marines return fire and are supported
April 1984
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by naval gunfire from ships offshore.
Acting State Department spol<esman Alan
Romberg says the Syrians are responsible for
the current deterioration in Lebanon but
declines to assign "specific weight" to that
responsibility. The U.S. ".shares the goals"
announced in President Gemayel's eight-point
plan which includes:
• Political and administrative reforms;
• Reconvening the political reconciliation
talks in Geneva on Feb. 28;
• Acceptance of Prime Minister Wazzan's
resignation;
• Formation of a government of national
unity;
• Preparation for Lebanese Armed Forces
deployment to the south and the north;
• Comprehensive and total cease-fire with
an obser\'er committee;
• Intensified Lebanese-Syrian consulta-
tions; and
• Complete withdrawal of all foreign
forces.
"Deploring the continued shelling of inno-
cent civilians," President Reagan calls on the
Syrian Government to "cease this activity."
The President also welcomes Gemayel's ef-
forts to "stop the fighting and to resume the
talks in Geneva" and reiterates the U.S. com-
mitment to the "unity, independence, and
sovereignty of Lebanon" and continued sup-
port to its government and people.
State Depaitment officials say the U.S.
was informed "early last week" that four
American officers serving with the U.S. Em-
bassy in Ethiopia were asked to leave that
country. The four Americans are Eniest
Brant, First Secretary; Paul Bradley, Second
Secretary; Timothy Wells, Commercial Of-
ficer; and Robert Kragie, Vice Consul.
Department Deputy Spokesman Romberg
says, "We told the Ethiopians they would
have to withdraw two of their diplomats in
Washington. One [Belay Tsadik] has left. The
other [Gelagay Zawde] has severed his con-
nections with the Ethiopian Government and
has asked to remain in the LTnited States."
February 7
President Reagan announces the following
decisions on U.S. policy in Lebanon.
• Under the e.xisting MNF mandate, he
authorizes [announced Feb. 6] U.S. naval
forces to provide gunfire and air support
"against any units firing into greater Beirut
from parts of Lebanon controlled by SjTia, as
well as against any units directly attacking
American or MNF personnel and facilities."
• When the Lebanese Government
becomes a "broadly based representative
government," the U.S. will "vigorously ac-
celerate the training, equipping, and support
of the Lebanese Armed Forces" by "speeding
up delivery of equipment, improving the flow
of information to help counter ho.stile bom-
bardments, and intensifying training in
counterterrorism."
• A plan for redeployment of the Marines
from Beirut airport to their ships offshore will
begin "shortly" and "proceed in stages." U.S.
military personnel will remain on the ground
to train and equip the Lebanese Army and to
protect remaining personnel. Naval and
Marine forces offshore will continue to "pro-
vide support for the protection of American
and other MNF personnel. ..."
February 8
State Department issues a travel advisory
warning that "the situation in Lebanon re-
mains hazardous" and advises that "all
Americans should avoid travel to Lebanon at
this time." It continues that "in view of the
worsened security situation, dependents of
U.S. Government employees have left the
country, but the embassy in Beirut remains in
operation."
Department Deputy Spokesman Alan
Romberg says a drawdown of U.S. personnel
in Beirut is continuing, and 191 U.S. Govern-
ment employees, including 106 temporary
duty military trainers, remain in the city. He
says that on Feb. 7, 41 Americans departed
Beirut for Cyprus. Of those, 24 were U.S.
Government employees, and 17 were
dependents. Forty-nine Americans left on
Feb. 8. Romberg estimates that approxi-
mately 1,350 U.S. citizens are in Beirut.
He also confirms that the battleship
U.S.S. New Jersey fires 16-inch guns at
SjTian-controUed targets.
February 9
State Department releases fourth set of
Grenada documents relating to the following
subjects:
• "Minutes of key organizational units of
the National Jewel Movement;"
• "Economic, technical and military
assistance and educational and cultural ex-
change involving Grenada and such nations as
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R.,
Libya, and the Soviet Union;"
• "Several churches on Grenada;" and
• "SociaUst International."
February 10
Soviet leadership officially announces the
death of Yuriy V. Andropov. President
Reagan, in his message of condolence to Mr.
Kuznetsov, the acting Soviet chief of state,
emphasizes to the people and Government of
the U.S.S. R. his desire that the two countries
cooperate in the search for a more peaceful
world. Secretarj' Shultz sends a similar
message of condolence to Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko reaffirming the basic prin-
ciples of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.
President Reagan designates Vice President
Bush to lead the U.S. delegation to the
funeral.
State Department releases 1983 annual
report on human rights. The report em-
phasizes two goals of the Reagan Administra-
tion policy:
• Improving "human rights practices in
numerous countries— to eliminate torture or
brutaUty, to secure religious freedom, to pro-
mote free elections. . . ." and
• Seeking a "pubUc association of the
United States with the cause of liberty."
February 10-11
Some 350 U.S. citizens and almost 600 citizens)
of other nations are evacuated from Beirut.
The U.S. Embassy announces that "because
of the unsettled conditions in Lebanon" it
would evacuate any Americans or Lebanese
who are in the process of taking up American
citizenship.
February 10-15
Vice President Bush makes an official work-
ing visit to Europe which includes visits to
the United Kingdom (Feb. 11-12), Luxem-
bourg (Feb. 12-13), the Soviet Union (Feb.
13-14) where he heads U.S. delegation attend-
ing Andropov's funeral, Italy and the
Vatican (Feb. 14-15), and France (Feb. 15).
February 11-14
Eg\iJtian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak
makes an official working visit to Washington
D.C., to meet with President Reagan and
other government officials.
February 12-14
His Majesty King Hussein I of Jordan makes
an official w-orking visit to Washington, D.C.,
to meet \\ith President Reagan and other
government officials.
February 13
Communist Party's Central Committee
chooses Konstantin U. Chemenko to succeed
Yuriy V. Andi-opov as its General Secretary.
President Ricardo de la Espriella of
Panama resigns. He is replaced by Vice Presi
dent Jorge lUueca.
February 14
Responding to the Panamanian President's
resignation. State Department spokesman
John Hughes says the U.S. is pleased that thi
Panamanian elections will be held as planned
on May 6, President lUueca, Hughes says,
"reaffirmed the Panamanian Government's
commitment to hold the elections as sched-
uled. We have no reason to doubt that it will
be done. We are gratified that the electoral
process, to which we place great importance
in all countries in the region, will proceed."
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February 15
In a letter to the Congress (Feb. 14), Presi-
dent Reagan forwards a further report on th<(
situation in Lebanon. The report, prepared b;j
the Secretaries of State and Defense and
made public Feb. 15, covers the period
Dec. 12, 1983, to Feb. 13, 1984.
Department of State Bulleti
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Morti
tative.^
iilatiom
lioftde
cilBi permit;
• "To respond to those who attack or
threaten the safety of our personnel; and
• "To redeploy our Marine detachment
onto ships."
The Secretary reiterates continued U.S.
support for "withdrawal of all foreign forces"
as well as for the May 17 agreement between
Lebanon and Israel.
Leamon Hunt, retired Foreign Service of-
ficer and Director General of the multina-
tional force and observers in the Sinai, is
assassinated in Rome. Secretai-y Shultz con-
demns the terrorist attack in the strongest
terms saying "his sacrifice must inspire us to
rededicate ourselves to the cause of peace and
to defiance of forces of terror."
■tenca
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CHRONOLOGY
Secretary Shultz says that "Syrian-
sponsored violence against the Government
[of Lebanon] has presented us with difficult
choices in view of the legislative and other
constraints under which our forces are
operating. We are nonetheless proceeding:
• "To provide materiel support to the
Lebanese Armed Forces as circumstances
February 16
Lebanese President Gemayel reportedly .
agrees to an eight-point plan said to be spon-
sored by Saudi Arabia which includes abroga-
tion of the May 17 peace agreement with
Israel. Acting State Department spokesman
Alan Romberg reiterates U.S. support for the
May 17 agreement.
Speaking during an urgent meeting of the
UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick says the U.S. supports "authen-
tic, international peacekeeping efforts in
Lebanon" and will support a "reasonable pro-
posal" for a UN role in easing the situation.
The U.S. is ready to enter into serious discus-
sion, without preconditions, concerning "the
composition and deployment of UN forces,
preferably throughout Lebanon," she asserts.
February 17
Lebanese opposition leaders and Syria
reportedly reject the Saudi eight-point plan
presented by Lebanese President Gemayel
and insist on the prior, unconditional abroga-
tion of the May 17 agi-eement between
Lebanon and Israel. President Reagan,
asserting it is "unfair" to say his Lebanon
policies had failed, accuses Syria of being the
"stumbling block" to a settlement in
Lebanon.
White House announces the resignation of
Richard Stone, the President's special envoy
and Ambassador at Large for Central
America. Harry Schlaudeman, former Am-
bassador to Venezuela, is named his suc-
cessor.
President Reagan transmits the Central
America Democracy, Peace and Development
Initiative Act of 1984 to the Congress. The
legislation would implement the recommenda-
tions of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America. The legislation proposes
$400 million in FY 1984 supplemental
economic assistance and $1.12 billion in FY
1985 assistance. Military assistance is $259
million in additional assistance in FY 1984 and
$256 million in FY 1985.
President Reagan gives final approval to
the redeployment of U.S. Marines from
Beirut to U.S. ships offshore. White House of-
ficials say (Feb. 16) that the first Marines
would begin redeploying within 2-3 days, and
all of the Marines in the U.S. contingent
would be back on the ships within 30 days.
February 21
U.S. Marine contingent in Beirut begins for-
mally moving to U.S. Sixth Fleet vessels off-
shore.
U.S. submits new evidence of the use of
chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and
Afghanistan to the United Nations. Since sub-
mitting its last report in August 1983, the
U.S. has continued to analyze and review the
reports of attacks and to analyze samples as
well. The 4-page report says that while there
appears to have been a sharp decrease of at-
tacks in Afghanistan and a decrease in the
lethality of attacks in Laos and Kampuchea,
evidence shows continued use of an uniden-
tified, nonlethal agent or agents in Laos and
Kampuchea.
February 22-25
New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Robert C.
Muldoon makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C., to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
February 23
State Department denounces the Feb. 22
bomb attack against a housing complex of the
Soviet Union's mission to the United Nations.
"This disgraceful, cowardly attack brings
disrepute upon the United States" says
Department spokesman John Hughes. Hughes
continues that "if it was, in fact, committed
by a group which purports to support Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union, the group
is doing a disservice to that cause." The U.S.
Government has "long supported and con-
tinues to support the right of Soviet Jews to
emigrate to the country of their choice" and
"condemns this act of terrorism against the
Soviet UN mission complex," he asserts.
Hughes also says that administrative sup-
port staff has arrived in Windhoek, the
capital of Namibia, to open a Ll.S. liaison of-
fice. The office will be headed by William
Twaddell, formerly Charge d'Affaires
(1980-83) at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo,
Mozambique. "Our role," he says, "will be
limited to assisting with the disengagement of
forces now under way in southern Angola." A
Department of State operation, the office's
sole purpose is "to be a presence between the
Angolans and the South Africans as need be
for the passing of messages. . . ."
President Reagan announces the follovring
individuals as members of the U.S. delegation
who will attend the independence celebrations
of Brunei:
• Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam to
head the delegation;
• Dr. Alfred Balitzer, Claremont, Cal.;
• Mary Davis, Los Angeles, Cal.;
• John C. Fitch, Houston, Tex.;
• John H. Schoettler, Parker, Colo.;
• William R. Sutton, Fair Oaks, Cal.
February 27
State Department spokesman John Hughes
confirms that U.S. Marines turned over con-
trol of Beirut's International Airport Feb. 26
to units of the Lebanese Army. While the
Marines have been redeployed, he notes,
"there are still U.S. military and diplomatic
personnel and facilities in Lebanon that we
still must protect." Some 150 Marines remain
to protect the U.S. Embassy and the Am-
bassador's residence along with about 25
State Department employees and about 80
U.S. Army military trainers.
February 27-March 5
Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger
makes a state visit to the United States, and
to Washington, D.C., Feb. 27-29, to meet
with President Reagan and other government
officials.
February 28-March 2
Moroccan Prime Minister Mohamed Karim-
Lamrani, accompanied by five members of the
Moroccan Cabinet, including the Ministers of
Information, Economic Planning, Finance,
Commerce, and Agriculture, makes an official
working visit to Washington, D.C., to meet
with President Reagan and other government
officials.
February 29
Soviet Union vetoes a French proposal in the
LTN Security Council which would have
authorized an international contingent to
replace the American and European troops of
the multinational force in Beirut. The vote
was 13 to 2 (the Ukraine also voted against).
Syrian President Assad and Lebanese
President Gemayel meet in Damascus to
discuss Lebanon. Department of State
spokesman John Hughes, responding to ques-
tions concerning possible cancellation of the
May 17 agreement, says, "I think the fact of
the matter is that President Gemayel is in
Damascus and we, like you, will have to wait
to see what developments ensue. We have
consistently thought this was a good agi'ee-
ment and are aware of discussions and sug-
gestions and reports that one side might
abrogate that treaty. That would be a reality.
It doesn't alter our analysis, our feeling that
it was and is a good agreement."
State Department announces appointment
of Ambassador Loren E. Lawrence as the
new U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Grenada. He
replaces Charles A. Gillespie, Jr.
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
announces a decision to resign. ■
PRESS RELEASES
PUBLICATIONS
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
*28 2/2
*m
2/2
31
2/4
32
2/6
33
2/6
*-M
2/6
*35
2/7
*36
2/9
37
2/15
*38
2/8
*39
2/8
40
2/8
*41
2/10
*44
*45
2/14
2/15
49
2/17
*50
2/22
51
2/24
Subject
U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT),
study group B, Feb. 23.
Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCO, Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on radio com-
mimications, Feb. 28.
1984 foreign fishing allocations.
Shultz: interview on "This Week
with David Brinkley," Jan. 22.
Shultz: news conference, San
Salvador, Jan. 31.
Shultz: news conference,
Caracas, Feb. 2.
Shultz: arrival statement,
Brasilia, Feb. 5.
Shultz: remai-ks. Brasilia, Feb. 6.
Shultz: toast, Brasilia. Feb. 6.
Shultz: remai'ks, Brasilia, Feb. 6.
Shultz: news conference,
Brasilia, Feb. 6.
Shultz: anival statement,
Bridgetown, Feb. 7.
Shultz: news conference, St.
George's, Feb. 7.
Program for the official working
visit to Washington of Egyptian
President Mohamed Hosni
Mubarak, Feb. 11-14.
Program for the official working
visit to Washington of
Jordanian King Hussein L
Feb. 12-14.
Shultz: statement and news
briefing on the death of
Soviet President Andropov.
West Coast Pacific salmon
negotiations,
sec. National Committee for
the Prevention of Marine
Pollution, Mar. 6.
Shultz: statement and question-
and-answer session on
Lebanon.
Shultz: address and question-
and-answer session on Africa,
World Affairs Council,
Boston, Feb. 15.
Program for the official working
visit to Washington of
New Zealand Prime Minister
Muldoon, Feb. 22-25.
Shultz: toast, Bridgetown,
Feb. 8.
Shultz: news conference,
Bridgetown, Feb. 8.
Shultz: address before the
Creve Coeur Club of Illinois
on human rights, Peoria,
Feb. 22.
^■flHHHHHHU
*54 2/24
*55 2/24
*56 2/27
*57 2/27
*58 2/27
*59 2/27
*60 2/27
*62 2/27
*63 2/28
Shultz: interview on "The
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour,"
Feb. 23.
Thomas W.M. Smith sworn in
as Ambassador to Nigeria,
Feb. 17 (biographic data).
CCITT, modem working party
of study group D, Mar. 8.
U.S. Organization for the
International Radio Consulta-
tive Committee (CCIR), study
group 1, Mar. 14.
Progi-am for the state visit
to the U.S. of Austrian
President Kirchschlaeger,
Feb. 27-Mar. 5.
Program for the official work-
ing visit to Washington of
Moroccan Prime Minister
Mohamed Karim-Lamrani,
Feb. 28-Mar. 2.
sec, SOLAS, working gi-oup
on standards of training and
watchkeeping. Mar. 28.
CCITT, study group A,
Mar. 27.
Advisory Committee on
International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Mar. 22
Fine Arts Committee, Mar.
17.
sec, SOLAS, Mar. 26.
Progi-am for the official
working visit to Washington
of West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, Mar. 3-6.
Regional foreign policy
conference, Birmingham,
Mar. 22.
*Not printed in the Bulletin.
Department of State
Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State Publications are available from
the Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Free multiple copies may be obtained by
writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and
Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Secretary Shultz
Democratic Solidarity in the Americas, lunch-
eon remarks to leaders of Barbados,
Jamaica, and the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States, Bridgetown, Feb. 8,
1984 (Current Policy #550).
The U.S. and Africa in the 1980s, Boston
World Affairs Council, Feb. 15, 1984
(Current Policy #549).
Foreign Aid and U.S. Policy Objectives,
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 9
1984 (Cun-ent Policy #548).
Canada
U.S.-Canada Relations (GIST, Feb. 1984).
East Asia
U.S. -Japan Relations in Perspective,
Deputv Secretary Dam, Japan Society,
New York, Feb. 6, 1984 (Cun-ent Policy
#.547).
The U.S. and Korea: Auspicious Prospects,
Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Asia
Society, New York, Jan. 31, 1984
(Current Policy #543).
Economics
International Economic Issues, Under
Secretary Wallis, Joint Economic
Committee of Congress, Feb. 7, 1984
(Current Policv #545).
U.S. Trade Policy (GIST, Feb. 1984).
Controlling Transfer of Technologv (GIST,
Feb. 1984).
Europe
The Atlantic Relationship, Assistant
Secretary Burt, Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle East, House Foreign
Affau-s Committee, Feb. 7, 1984
(Current Policy #.544).
Food
World Food Security (GIST, Feb. 1984).
Middle East
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon, L'nder
Secretary Eagleburger, House Foreign
Affairs Committee. Feb. 2, 1984
(Current Policy #542).
U.S. Interests in Lebanon, Assistant
Secretary Muiphy, Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Jan. 26, 1984
(Current Policy #540). ■
pos
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Department of State Bulletir
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NDEX
Vpril 1984
Volume 84, No. 2085
frica. The U.S. and Africa in the
1980s(Shultz) 9
merican Principles
ountrv Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1983 53
uman Rights and the Moral Dimension
of U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15
ngola. U.S., Angola, South Africa Discuss
Peace {joint communique) 36
rms Control
ssistant Secretary Burt's Interview
for "Worldnet"" 44
ecretary's Interview on "This Week
With David Brinkley" 28
razil. Secretary Shultz Visits Latin
America 19
ongress
entral America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative (Motley) 72
entral America Initiative Legislation
(message to the Congress) 75
entral America Initiative Proposed
(Reagan) 71
auntry Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1983 ,53
uman Rights and the Moral Dimension of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15
iclear Cooperation With EURATOM
(letter to the Congress) 66
ecent Situation in the Philippines
(Monjo) 37
.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the
Congress) 60
S. International Activities in Science
and Technology (message to the
Congress) 67
.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to Jerusalem
(Eagleburger) ' 65
S. Participation in the United Nations
(Kirkpatrick) 68
epartment and Foreign Service. U.S.
C)j:)poses Moving Embassy to Jerusalem
(Eagleburger)
65
conomics
sistant .Seoi-etarv Burt's Intei-\'iew for
"Wuiidnet" 44
le U.S. and Africa in the 1980s(Shultz) 9
gypt. President Meets With Two Arab
(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63
I Salvador
lections in El Salvador (Pickering) 77
jestion-and- Answer Session Following
World Affairs Council Address (Shultz) . . 12
cretary Shultz Visits Latin America 19
cretarv's Interview on "The MacNeiVLehrer
News Hour" .30
urope
- ssistant Secretary Burt's Interview for
"Worldnet" 44
le Transatlantic Relationship: A Long-Term
Perspective (Eagleburger) 39
ice President's Trip to Europe and
theU.S.S.R 5
areign Assistance
- antral America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative (Motley) 72
antral America Initiative Legislation
(message to the Congi'ess) 75
antral America Initiative Proposed
(Reagan) 71
cretary Shultz Visits Latin America 19
renada. Secretary Shultz Visits
Latin America 19
Human Rights
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1983 53
Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15
International Law. Board of Appellate-
Review To Publish Decisions 58
Iran. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq
War (Department statement) 64
Iraq. Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq
War (Department statement) 64
Israel
Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel
(Department statement) 61
U.S. Opposes Moving Embassy to Jerusalem
(Eagleburger) " 65
Jordan
President Meets With Two Arab Leaders
(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63
Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (Hussein,
Reagan) 62
Lebanon
Defense Secretary Weinberger's Interview
on "Meet the Press" (e.xcerpts) ,59
Lebanon Cancels Agreement With Israel
(Department statement) 61
President's News Conference of February 22
(e.xcerpts) ! . . . 2
Question-and-Answer Session Following World
Affairs Council Address (Shultz) 12
Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/
Lehrer News Hour" 30
Secretary's Interview on "This Week
With David Brinkley" 28
Under Secretary Eaglehurger's Interview on
"This Week With David Brinkley" 34
U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the
Congress) 60
Middle East
Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of
U.S. Foreign Policv (Shultz) 15
President Meets With Tw^o Arab Leaders
(Hussein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63
President's News Conference of
February 22 (excerpts) 2
Military Affairs
Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War
(Department statement) 64
Defense Secretary Weinberger's Interview on
"Meet the Press" (excerpts) .59
President's News Conference of February
22 (excerpts) 2
Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour" 30
Nicaragua
Question-and-Answer Session Following World
Affairs Council Address (Shultz) 12
Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeiL/Lehrer
News Hour" ,30
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The
Transatlantic Relationship: A Long-Tei-m
Per.spective (Flagleburger) 39
Nuclear Policv. Nuclear Cooperation With
EURATOM (letter to the Congress) ... .66
Passports. Board of Appellate Review To
Publish'Decisions 58
Philippines. Recent Situation in the
Philippines (Monjo) 37
Presidential Documents
Central America Initiative Legislation
(message to the Congress) 75
Central America Initiative Proposed 71
Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM (letter
to the Congress) 66
President Meets With Two Arab Leaders
(Hus.sein, Mubarak, Reagan) 63
President's News Conference of February 22
(e.xceriDts) '. . . .2
Relations With the U.S.S.R. (Reagan) 1
U.S. Forces in Lebanon (letter to the
Congress) 60
U.S. International Activities in Science and
Technology (message to the Congress). . .67
Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (Hussein,
Reagan) 62
Visit of Yugoslav President (Reagan,
Spiljak) 51
Publications
Department of State 84
GPO Subscriptions 85
Science and Technology. I'.S. International
Activities in Science and Technology
(message to the Congress) 67
Security Assistance
Central America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative (Motley) 72
Central America Initiative Legislation
(message to the Congress) 75
Central America Initiative Proposed
(Reagan) 71
South Africa. U.S., Angola, South Africa
Discuss Peace (joint communique) 36
Terrorism
Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15
Secretary's Interview on "This Week With
David Brinkley" 28
Trade. President's News Conference of
February 22 (excerjjts) 2
Treaties. Current Actions '79
U.S.S.R.
Assistant Secretary Burt's Interview for
"Woridnet" 44
Death of Soviet President Andropov (Shultz,
White House statement) 43
President's News Conference of February 22
(excerpts) 2
Question-and-Answer Session Following
World Affairs Council Address
(Shultz) 12
Relations With the U.S.S.R. (Reaean) 1
Secretary's Interview on "The MacNeil/
Lehrer News Hour" 30
Secretary's Interview on "This Week
With David Brinkley" 28
Under Secretary Eagleburger's Interview on
"This Week\Vith David Brinkley" 34
Vice President's Trip to Europe and the
U.S.S.R 5
United Nations. U.S. Participation in the
United Nations (Kirkpatrick) * 68
Venezuela. Secretary Shultz Visits Latin
America 19
Western Hemisphere
Central America Democracy, Peace, and
Development Initiative (Motley) 72
Central America Initiative Legislation
(message to the Congress) 75
Central America Initiative Proposed
(Reagan) 71
Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Shultz) 15
Yugoslavia. Visit of Yugoslav President
(Reagan, Spiljak) 51
Name Index
Burt, Richard R 44
Bush, Vice President 5
Eagleburger, Lawrence-S^ 34,39,65
King Hussein 1 62,63
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 68
Monjo, John C 37
Motley, Langhorne A 72
Mubarak, Mohamed Ho.sni 63
Pickering, Thomas R 77
Reagan, President 1,2,51,60,62,63
66,67,71,75
Shultz, Secretary 9,12,15,19,28,30,43
Spiljak, Mika 51
Weinberger, Caspar W 59
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The Official Montinly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 84 / Number 2086
May 1984
■ ■m i i])i n L i ini i , i ii i i i i i ii iii i iiii i ii J i ] i i PPPii H Pl>^^^MWI ^^ ^W WH > PIPHilliitimn illlM p Mtl>l l1
Cover:
President Reagan
Secretar>- Shultz
Dppartntpnt of Sin it*
bulletin
Volume 84/ Number 2086/May 1984
The Department OF State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
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issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
JOHN HUGHES
A.ssistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public t'omniunication
NORMAN HOWARD
Chief Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
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CONTENTS
The President
1
11
American Foreign Policy
Challenges in the 1980s
Democratic Ideals and
U.S. -Israel Relations
News Conference of April 4
(Excerpts)
Central America
The Secretary
12
15
17
22
37
40
Power and Diplomacy in the
1980s
FY 1984 Supplemental and FY
1985 Authorization Requests
Foreign Aid and U.S. Policy
Objectives
International Security and
Cooperation Development Pro-
gram (Report to the Congress)
News Conference of March 20
Interview on "Meet the Press"
Africa
43 FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for Sub-Sahara Africa
(Princeton Lyman)
Arms Control
49 Security Policy and Arms Con-
trol (Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
50 MBFR Talks Resume
(President Reagan)
East Asia
52 FY Assistance Requests for
East Asia and the Pacific
(Paul D. Wolfowitz)
Europe
59 FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for Europe (Richard R. Burt)
Foreign Assistance
62 FY 1985 Request for Economic
Assistance Programs (M. Peter
McPkerson)
Middle East
66 FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for the Middle East
(Richard W. Murphy)
68 U.S. Forces in Lebanon (Letter
to the Congress)
Military Affairs
71 Strategic Defense Initiative
(Department of Defense Fact
Sheet)
Narcotics
FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for Narcotics (Clyde D. Taylor)
72
Pacific
74 Administration Urges Approval
of Compact of Free Association
(Message to the Congress)
Security Assistance
75 FY 1985 Security Assistance
Requests (William
Schneider, Jr.)
South Asia
77 FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for South Asia (Howard B.
Schaffer)
82 Afghanistan Day, 1974
(Secretary Shultz,
Proclamation)
United Nations
83 FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for Organizations and Programs
(Gregory J. Newell)
Treaties
87 Current Actions
Chronology
89 March 1984
Press Releases
93 Department of State
Publications
93 Department of State
94 Background Notes
Index
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THE PRESIDENT
American Foreign Policy
Challenges in the 1980s
by President Reagan
Address before the
Center for Strategic
and International Studies
on April 6, 1981^.'^
I'd like to address your theme of bipar-
tisanship with a view toward America's
foreign policy challenges for the 1980s.
IDEALISM AND REALISM
Two Great Goals
All Americans share two great goals for
foreign policy: a safer world and a world
in which individual rights can be re-
spected and precious values may flourish.
These goals are at the heart of
America's traditional ideahsm and our
aspirations for world peace. Yet, while
cherished by us, they do not belong ex-
clusively to us. They're not "made in
America." They're shared by people
everywhere.
A Troubled World
Tragically, the world in which these fun-
damental goals are so widely shared is a
very troubled world. While we and our
allies may enjoy peace and prosperity,
many citizens of the industrial world con-
tinue to live in fear of conflict and the
threat of nuclear war. And all around the
globe, terrorists threaten innocent people
and civilized values. And in developing
countries, the dreams of human progress
have, too often, been lost to violent rev-
olution and dictatorship.
Quite obviously, the widespread
desire for a safer and more humane
world is— by itself— not enough to create
such a world. In pursuing our worthy
goals, we must go beyond honorable in-
tentions and good will to practical means.
Key Principles
We must be guided by these key prin-
ciples.
Realism. The world is not as we
wish it would be. Reality is often harsh.
We will not make it less so if we do not
first see it for what it is.
Streng:th. We know that strength
alone is not enough, but without it there
can be no effective diplomacy and ne-
gotiations; no secure democracy and
peace. Conversely, weakness or hopeful
passivity are only self-defeating. They in-
vite the very aggression and instability
that they would seek to avoid.
New Economic Growth. This is
the underlying base that ensures our
strength and permits human potential to
flourish. Neither strength nor creativity
can be achieved or sustained without
economic growth— both at home and
abroad.
Intelligence. Our policies cannot be
effective unless the information on which
they're based is accurate, timely, and
complete.
Shared Responsibility With Allies.
Our friends and allies share the heavy
responsibility for the protection of
freedom. We seek and need their part-
nership, sharing burdens in pursuit of
our common goals.
Nonaggression. We have no terri-
torial ambitions. We occupy no foreign
lands. We build our strength only to
assure deterrence and to secure our in-
terests if deterrence fails.
Dialogue With Adversaries. Though
we must be honest in recognizing fun-
damental differences with our adver-
saries, we must always be willing to
resolve these differences by peaceful
Bipartisanship at Home. In our
two-party democracy, an effective
foreign policy must begin with bipar-
tisanship, and the sharing of responsibili-
ty for a safer and more humane world
must begin at home.
AMERICAN RENEWAL
Restored Deterrence: "American
Leadership Is Back"
During the past 3 years, we've been
steadily rebuilding America's capacity to
advance our foreign policy goals through
renewed attention to these vital prin-
ciples. Many threats remain, and peace
may still seem precarious. But America
is safer and more secure today because
the people of this great nation have re-,
stored the foundation of its strength.
We began with renewed realism— a
clear-eyed understanding of the world
we live in and of our inescapable global
responsibilities. Our industries depend on
the importation of energy and minerals
from distant lands. Our prosperity re-
quires a sound international financial
system and free and open trading mar-
kets. And our security is inseparable
from the security of our friends and
neighbors.
I believe Americans today see the
world with realism and maturity. The
great majority of our people do not
believe the stark differences between
democracy and totalitarianism can be
wished away. They understand that
keeping America secure begins with
keeping America strong and free.
When we took office in 1981, the
Soviet Union had been engaged for 20
years in the most massive military build-
up in history. Clearly, their goal was not
to catch us but to surpass us. Yet, the
United States remained a virtual specta-
tor in the 1970s, a decade of neglect that
took a severe toll on our defense capabil-
ities.
With bipartisan support, we em-
barked immediately on a major defense
rebuilding program. We've made good
progress in restoring the morale of our
men and women in uniform, restocking
spare parts and ammunition, replacing
obsolescent equipment and facilities, im-
proving basic training and readiness,
THE PRESIDENT
and pushing forward with long-overdue
weapons' programs.
The simple fact is that in the last half
of the 1970s we were not deterring, as
events from Angola to Afghanistan made
clear. Today we are, and that fact has fun-
damentally altered the future for millions
of human beings. Gone are the days when
the United States was perceived as a rud-
derless superpower, a helpless hostage to
world events. American leadership is
back. Peace through strength is not a
slogan, it's a fact of life. And we will not
return to the days of handwringing,
defeatism, decline, and despair.
We have also upgraded significantly
our intelligence capabilities— restoring
morale in the intelligence agencies and in-
A Stark Contrast
Our principles don't involve just rebuild-
ing our strength; they also tell us how to
use it. We remain true to the principle of
nonaggression. On an occasion when
the United States, at the request of its
neighbors, did use force— in Grenada—
we acted decisively but only after it was
clear a bloodthirsty regime had put
American and Grenadian lives in danger
and the security of neighboring islands in
danger. As soon as stability and freedom
were restored on the island,
we left. The Soviet Union had no such
legitimate justification for its massive in-
vasion of Afghanistan 4 years ago. And
today, over 100,000 occupation troops re-
main there. The United States, by stark
Challenge number one is to reduce the risk of
nuclear war and to reduce the levels of nuclear ar-
maments in a way that also reduces the risk they
will ever be used.
creasing our capability to detect, analyze,
and counter hostile intelligence threats.
Economic Recovery
Economic strength, the underlying base
of support for our defense buildup, has
received a dramatic new boost. We've
transformed a no-growth economy, crip-
pled by disincentives, double-digit infla-
tion, 21.5% interest rates, plunging pro-
ductivity, and a weak dollar, into a
dynamic growth economy, bolstered by
new incentives, stable prices, lower in-
terest rates, a rebirth of productivity, and
restored our confidence in our currency.
Renewed strength at home has been
accompanied by closer partnerships with
America's friends and allies. Far from
buckling under Soviet intimidation, the
unity of the NATO alliance has held fiiTn,
and we are moving foi-ward to modernize
our strategic deterrent. The leader of
America's oldest ally, French President
Francois Mitterrand, recently reminded
us that: "Peace— like liberty— is never
given ... the pursuit of both is a continual
one. ... In the turbulent times we live in,
solidarity among friends is essential."
contrast, occupies no foreign nation, nor
do we seek to.
Though we and the Soviet Union dif-
fer markedly, living in this nuclear age
makes it imperative that we talk with
each other. If the new Soviet leadership
truly is devoted to building a safer and
more humane world, rather than e.xpand-
ing armed conquests, it will find a sympa-
thetic partner in the West.
In pursuing these practical principles,
we have throughout sought to revive the
spirit that was once the hallmark of our
postwar foreign policy— bipartisan
cooperation between the executive and
the legislative branches of our govern-
ment.
Much has been accomplished, but
much remains to be done. If Republicans
and Democrats wUl join together to con-
front four great challenges to American
foreign policy in the 1980s, then we can
and will make great strides toward a
safer and more humane world.
FOUR GREAT CHALLENGES
Challenge Number One
Challenge number one is to reduce the
risk of nuclear war and to reduce the
levels of nuclear armaments in a way that
also reduces the risk they will ever be
used. We have no higher challenge, for a
nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought. But merely to be against
nuclear war is not enough to prevent it.
For 35 years, the defense policy of the
United Stales and its NATO allies has
been based on one simple premise: we do
not start wars. We maintain our conven-
tional and strategic strength to deter ag-
gression by convincing any potential ag-
gressor that war could bring no benefit,
only disaster. Deterrence has been and
will remain in the cornerstone of our na-
tional security policy to defend freedom
and preserve peace.
But, as I mentioned, the 1970s were
marked by neglect of our defenses, and
nuclear safety was no exception. Too
many forgot John Kennedy's warning
that only when our arms are certain
beyond doubt can we be certain beyond
doubt they will never be used. By the
beginning of this decade, we faced three
growing problems: the Soviet SS-20
monopoly in Europe and Asia; the vul-
nerability of our land-based ICBM [inter-
continental ballistic missile] force; and the
failure of arms control agreements to slow
the overall growth in strategic weapons.
The Carter Administration acknowledged
these problems. In fact, almost everj'one
did.
There is a widespread, but mistaken,
impression that aiTns agreements auto-
matically produce arms control. In 1969,
when SALT I [strategic arms limitation
talks] negotiations began, the Soviet
Union had about 1,500 strategic nuclear
weapons. Today, the Soviet nuclear
arsenal can grow to over 15,000 nuclear
weapons and still stay within all past
arms control agreements, including the
SALT I and SALT II guidelines.
The practical means for reducing the
risks of nuclear war must, therefore,
follow two parallel paths— credible deter-
rence and real arms reductions with ef-
fective verification. It is on this basis that
we've responded to the problems I just
described. This is why we've moved for-
ward to implement NATO's dual-track
decision of 1979, while actually reducing
the number of nuclear weapons in
Europe. It is also why we have sought
bipartisan support for the recommenda-
tions of the Scowcroft commission and the
"build-down" concept, and why we've
proposed deep reductions in strategic
forces as the strategic arms reduction
talks (START).
Without exception, every arms con-
trol proposal that we have offered would
reverse the aiTns buildup and help bring a
more stable balance at lower force levels.
Department of State Bulletin
THE PRESIDENT
At the START talks, we seek
to reduce substantially the number of
ballistic missile warheads, reduce the
destructive capacity of nuclear missiles,
and establish limits on bombers and
cruise missiles below the levels of
SALT II: at the talks on intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF), our
negotiators have tabled four initiatives to
address Soviet concerns and improve pros-
pects for a fair and equitable agreement
that would reduce or eliminate an entire
class of such nuclear amis. Our flexibility
in the START and INF negotiations has
been demonstrated by numerous
modifications to our positions. But they
have been met only by the silence of
Soviet walkouts.
At the mutual and balanced force
reduction talks in Vienna, we and our
NATO partners presented a treaty that
would reduce conventional forces to par-
ity at lower levels. To reduce the risks of
war in time of crisis, we have proposed
to the Soviet Union important measures
to improve direct communications and in-
crease mutual confidence. And just re-
cently, I directed Vice President Bush to
go to the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva to present a new American in-
itiative: a worldwide ban on the produc-
tion, possession, and use of chemical
weapons.
Our strategic policy represents a
careful response to a nuclear agenda
upon which even our critics agreed.
Many who would break the bonds of bi-
partisanship, claiming they know how to
bring greater security, seem to ignore
the likely consequences of their own pro-
posals.
Those who wanted a last-minute
moratorium on INF deployment would
have betrayed our allies and reduced the
chances for a safer Europe; those who
would try to implement a unilateral
freeze would find it unverifiable and de-
stabilizing, because it would prevent
restoration of a stable balance that keeps
the peace; and those who would advocate
unilateral cancellation of the Peacekeeper
missile would ignore a central recommen-
dation of the bipartisan Scowcroft report
and leave the Soviets with little incen-
tive to negotiate meaningful reductions.
Indeed, the Soviets would be rewarded
for leaving the bargaining table.
These simplistic solutions, and others
put forward by our critics, would take
meaningful agreements and increased
security much further from our grasp.
Our critics can best help us move closer
to the goals we share by accepting prac-
tical means to achieve them. Granted, it
is easy to support a strong defense; it's
much harder to support a strong defense
May 1984
I^HQBBBBBBBBaBB
budget. And granted, it is easy to call for
arms agreements; it's more difficult to
support patient, firm, fair negotiations
with those who want to see how much
we will compromise with ourselves first.
Bipartisanship can only work if both
sides face up to real-world problems and
meet them with real-world solutions.
Challenge Number Two
Our safety and security depend on more
than credible deterrence and nuclear
arms reductions. Constructive regional
development is also essential. Therefore,
our second great challenge is strengthen-
ing the basis for stability in troubled and
strategically sensitive regions.
Regional tensions often begin in long-
standing social, political, and economic
inequities and in ethnic and religious dis-
putes. But throughout the 1970s, in-
creased Soviet support for terrorism, in-
surgency, and aggression, coupled with a
perception of weakening U.S. power and
resolve, greatly exacerbated these ten-
sions.
The results were not surprising: the
massacres of Kampuchea followed by the
Vietnamese invasion; the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan; the rise of Iranian ex-
tremism and the holding of Americans
hostage; Libyan coercion in Africa; So-
viet and Cuban military involvement in
Angola and Ethiopia; their subversion in
Central America; and the rise of state-
supported terrorism.
aid, security assistance, and diplomatic
mediation tailored to the needs of each
region.
It is also obvious we alone cannot
save embattled governments or control
terrorism. But doing nothing only en-
sures far greater problems down the
road. So we strive to expand cooperation
with states who support our common in-
terests, to help friendly nations in dan-
ger, and to seize major opportunities for
peacekeeping.
Perhaps the best example of this
comprehensive approach is the report
and recommendations of the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. It is from this report that we
drew our proposals for bringing peaceful
development to Central America. They
are now before the Congress and will be
debated at length.
I welcome a debate. But, if it's to be
productive, we must put aside mythology
and uninformed rhetoric. Some, for ex-
ample, insist that the root of regional
violence is poverty but npt communism.
Well, three-fourths of our request and of
our current program is for economic and
humanitarian assistance. America is a
good and generous nation. But, eco-
nomic aid alone cannot stop Cuban and
Soviet-sponsored guerrillas determined
to terrorize, bum, bomb, and destroy
everything from bridges and industries
to electric power and transportation.
And neither individual rights nor eco-
. . .our second great challenge is strengthening the
basis for stability in troubled and strategically sen-
sitive regions.
Taken together, these events defined
a pattern of mounting instability and
violence that the United States could not
ignore. And we have not. As with de-
fense, by the beginning of the 1980s,
there was an emerging consensus in this
country that we had to do better in deal-
ing with problems that affect our vital in-
terests.
Obviously no single abstract policy
could deal successfully with all problems
or all regions. But as a general matter,
effective regional stabilization requires a
balanced approach— a mix of economic
nomic health can be advanced if stability
is not secured.
Other critics say we shouldn't see the
problems of this or any other region as
an East- West struggle. Our policies in
Central America and elsewhere are, in
fact, designed precisely to keep East-
West tensions from spreading, from in-
truding into the lives of nations that are
struggling with great problems of their
own. Events in southern Africa are
showing what persistent mediation and
an ability to talk to all sides can ac-
complish. The states of this region have
been poised for war for decades, but
BiiuHuuiiuHiiiiuiiiiuiiiiimiimi
mumimmmuum
THE PRESIDENT
there is new hope for peace. South Af-
rica, Angola, and Mozambique are im-
plementing agreements to break the cy-
cle of violence. Our Administration has
been active in this process, and we will
stay involved, trying to bring an inde-
pendent Namibia into being, end foreign
military interference, and keep the
region free from East-West conflict. I
have hope that peace and democratic
reform can be enjoyed by all the peoples
of southern Africa.
In Central America we've also seen
progress. El Salvador's presidential
elections express that nation's desire to
govern itself in peace. Yet the future of
the region remains open. We have a
choice: either we help America's friends
defend themselves and give democracy a
chance or we abandon our responsibil-
ities and let the Soviet Union and Cuba
shape the destiny of our hemisphere. If
this happens, the East-West conflict will
only become broader and much more
dangerous.
In dealing with regional instability,
we have to understand how it is related
to other problems. Insecurity and re-
gional violence are among the driving
forces of nuclear proliferation. Peace-
keeping in troubled regions and strength-
ening barriers to nuclear proliferation are
two sides of the same coin. Stability and
safeguards go together.
our friends, can help stop the spread of
violence. I have said, for example, that
we will keep open the Strait of Hormuz,
the vital lifeline through which so much
oil flows to the United States and other
industrial democracies. Making this clear
beforehand— and making it credible-
makes such a crisis much less likely.
We must work with quiet persistence
and without illusions. We may suffer set-
backs, but we must not jump to the con-
clusion that we can defend our interests
without ever committing ourselves. Nor
should other nations believe that mere
setbacks will turn America inward again.
We know our responsibilities, and we
must live up to them.
Because effective regional problem
solving requires a balanced and sus-
tained approach, it is essential that the
Congress give full, not piecemeal, sup-
port. Indeed, where we have foundered
in regional stabilization, it has been
because the Congress has failed to pro-
vide such support. Halfway measures-
refusing to take responsibility for means-
produce the worst possible results. I'll
return to this point when I discuss the
fourth challenge in just a few minutes.
Challenge Number Three
Expanding opportunities for economic
development and personal freedom is our
Expanding opportunities for economic develop-
ment and personal freedom is our third great
challenge.
No one says this approach is cheap,
quick, or easy. But the cost of this com-
mitment is bargain basement compared
to the tremendous sacrifices we will have
to make if we do nothing or do too little.
The Kissinger commission warned that
an outbreak of Cuban-type regimes in
Central America will bring subversion
closer to our ovra borders and the
specter of millions of uprooted refugees
fleeing in desperation to the north.
In the Middle East, which has so
rarely known peace, we seek a similar
mix of economic aid, diplomatic media-
tion, and military assistance and coopera-
tion. These will, we believe, make the
use of U.S. forces unnecessary and make
the risk of East- West conflict less. But
given the importance of the region, we
must also be ready to act when the
presence of American power, and that of
third great challenge. The American con-
cept of peace is more than absence of
war. We favor the flowering of economic
growth and individual liberty in a world
of peace. And this, too, is a goal to which
most Americans subscribe. Our political
leaders must be judged by whether the
means they offer will help us to reach it.
Our belief in individual freedom and
opportunity is rooted in practical experi-
ence: free people build free markets that
ignite dynamic development for every-
one. And in America, incentives, risk
taking, and entrepreneurship are re-
awakening the spirit of capitalism and
strengthening economic expansion and
human progress throughout the world.
Our goal has always been to restore
and sustain noninflationary worldwide
growth, thereby ending for good the
stagflation of the 1970s, which saw a
drastic weakening of the fabric of the
world economy.
We take our leadership responsibil-
ities seriously, but we alone cannot put
the world's economic house in order. At
Williamsburg, the industrial countries
consolidated their views on economic
policy. The proof is not in the communi-
que; it's in the results. France is reduc-
ing inflation and seeking greater flexibil-
ity in its economy; Japan is slowly, to be
sure, but steadily— we will insist— liber-
alizing its trade and capital markets;
Germany and the United Kingdom are
moving forward on a steady course of
low inflation and moderate, sustained
growth.
Just as we believe that incentives are
key to greater grovrth in America and
throughout the world, so, too, must we
resist the sugar-coated poison of protec-
tionism everywhere it exists. Here at
home, we're opposing inflationary, self-
defeating bills like domestic content. At
the London economic summit in June, I
hope that we can lay the groundwork for
a new round of negotiations that will
open markets for our exports of goods
and services and stimulate greater
growth, efficiency, and jobs for all.
And we're advancing other key initia-
tives to promote more powerful world-
wade growth by expanding trade and
investment relationships. The dynamic
growth of Pacific Basin nations has made
them the fastest growing markets for
our goods, services, and capital. Last
year, I visited Japan and Korea, two of
America's most important allies, to forge
closer partnerships. And this month I
will visit the People's Republic of China,
another of the increasingly significant
relationships that we hold in the Pacific.
I see America and our Pacific neighbors
as nations of the future, going forward
together in a mighty enterprise to build
dynamic growth economies and a safer
world.
We're helping developing countries
grow by presenting a fresh view of de-
velopment—the magic of the market-
place—to spark greater growth and par-
ticipation in the international economy.
Developing nations earn twice as much
from exports to the United States as
they received in aid from all the other
nations combined.
And practical proposals Uke the Car-
ibbean Basin Initiative wall strengthen
the private sectors of some 20 Caribbean
neighbors, while guaranteeing fairer
treatment for U.S. companies and na-
tionals and increasing demand for
American exports.
Department of State Bulletin
THE PRESIDENT
We've recently sent to the Congress
i new economic policy initiative for Af-
rica. It, too, is designed to support the
jrowth of private enterprise in African
ountries by encouraging structural eco-
nomic change and international trade.
We've also asked the Congress to in-
srease humanitarian assistance to Africa
to combat the devastating effects of ex-
treme drought.
In building a strong global recovery,
jf course, nothing is more important
han to keep the wheels of world com-
Tierce turning and create jobs without
enewing the spiral of inflation. The In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) is a
inchpin in our efforts to restore a sound
vvorld economy and resolve the debt
Droblems of many developing countries.
With bipartisan support, we imple-
■nented a major increase in IMF re-
sources. In cooperation with the IMF,
ive're working to prevent the problems
Df individual debtor nations from dis-
rupting the stability and strength of the
ntire international financial system. It
ivas this goal that brought nations of
aorth and south together to help resolve
:he debt difficulties of the new demo-
ratic Government of Argentina.
Because we know that democratic
governments are the best guarantors of
human rights, and that economic growth
will always flourish when men and
women are free, we seek to promote not
just material products but the values of
faith and human dignity for which Amer-
ica and all democratic nations stand-
values which embody the culmination of
5,000 years of Western civilization.
When I addressed the British Parlia-
ment in June of 1982, I called for a bold
and lasting effort to assist people strug-
gling for human rights. We've estab-
lished the National Endowment for De-
mocracy, a partnership of people from all
walks of life dedicated to spreading the
positive message of democracy. To suc-
ceed, we must oppose the doublespeak of
totalitarian propaganda. And so we're
modernizing the Voice of America and
our other broadcasting facilities, and we
are working to start up Radio Marti, a
voice of truth to the imprisoned people of
Cuba.
Americans have always wanted to
see the spread of democratic institutions,
and that goal is coming closer. In our
own hemisphere, 26 countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean are either
democracies or formally embarked on a
democratic transition. This represents
90% of the region's population, up from
under 50% a decade ago.
Trust the people, this is the crucial
lesson of history and America's message
to the world. We must be staunch in our
conviction that freedom is not the sole
possession of a chosen few, but the uni-
versal right of men and women every-
where. President Truman said, "If we
should pay merely lip service to inspiring
ideals, and later do violence to simple
justice, we would draw down upon us
the bitter wrath of generations yet un-
sequent second guessing about whether
to keep our men there severely under-
mined our policy. It hindered the ability
of our diplomats to negotiate, encouraged
more intransigence from the Syrians, and
prolonged the violence. Similarly, con-
gressional wavering on support for the
Jackson plan, which reflects the recom-
mendations of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America, can
only encourage the enemies of democracy
who are determined to wear us down.
. . .our fourth great challenge [is to] restore bipar-
tisan consensus in support of U.S. foreign policy.
bom." Let us go forward together, faith-
ful friends of democracy and democratic
values, confident in our conviction that
the tide of the future is a freedom tide.
But let us go forward with practical
means.
Challenge Number Four
This brings me to our fourth great chal-
lenge: we must restore bipartisan con-
sensus in support of U.S. foreign policy.
We must restore America's honorable
tradition of partisan politics stopping at
the water's edge. Republicans and
Democrats standing united in patriotism
and speaking with one voice as responsi-
ble trustees for peace, democracy, in-
dividual liberty, and the rule of law.
In the 1970s we saw a rash of con-
gressional initiatives to limit the presi-
dent's authority in the areas of trade,
human rights, arms sales, foreign assist-
ance, intelligence operations, and the dis-
patch of troops in time of crisis. Over 100
separate prohibitions and restrictions on
executive branch authority to formulate
and implement foreign policy were
enacted.
The most far-reaching consequence of
the past decade's congressional activism
is this: bipartisan consensus building has
become a central responsibility of con-
gressional leadership as well as of execu-
tive leadership. If we're to have a sus-
tainable foreign policy, the Congress
must support the practical details of pol-
icy, not just the general goals.
We have demonstrated the capacity
for such jointly responsible leadership in
certain areas. But we have seen setbacks
for bipartisanship, too. I believe that
once we established bipartisan agree-
ment on our course in Lebanon, the sub-
To understand and solve this prob-
lem of joint responsibility, we have to go
beyond the familiar questions as to who
should be stronger, the president or the
Congress. The more basic problem is: in
this "post-Vietnam era," Congress has
not yet developed capacities for coher-
ent, responsible action needed to carry
out the new foreign policy powers it has
taken for itself. To meet the challenges
of this decade, we need a strong Presi-
dent and a strong Congress.
Unfortunately, many in the Congress
seem to believe they're stUl in the
troubled Vietnam era, with their only
task to be vocal critics and not respon-
sible partners in developing positive,
practical programs to solve real prob-
lems.
Much was learned from Vietnam— les-
sons ranging from increased appreciation
of the need for careful discrimination in
the use of U.S. force or military assist-
ance to increased appreciation of the
need for domestic support for any such
military element of policy. MUitary force,
either direct or indirect, must remain an
available part of America's foreign pol-
icy. But, clearly, the Congress is less
than wholly comfortable with both the
need for a military element in foreign
policy and its own responsibility to deal
with that element.
Presidents must recognize Congress
as a more significant partner in foreign
policymaking, and, as we have tried to
do, seek new means to reach bipartisan
executive-legislative consensus. But leg-
islators must realize that they, too, are
partners. They have a responsibility to
go beyond mere criticism to consensus
building that will produce positive, prac-
tical, and effective action.
May 1984
■WilHIIimilllHIIilllllJUIIIII
THE PRESIDENT
Bipartisan consensus is not an end in
itself. Sound and experienced U.S. for-
eign policy leadership must always
reflect a deep understanding of funda-
mental American interests, values, and
principles.
Consensus on the broad goals of a
safer and more humane world is easy to
achieve. The harder part is making pro-
gress in developing concrete, realistic
means to reach these goals. We've made
some progress. But there is still a con-
gressional reluctance to assume responsi-
bility for positive, bipartisan action to go
with their newly claimed powers.
We've set excellent examples with
the bipartisan Scowcroft commission, bi-
partisan support for IMF funding, and
the bipartisan work of the Kissinger
commission. But it's time to lift our ef-
forts to a higher level of cooperation;
time to meet together, with realism and
idealism, America's great challenges for
the 1980s.
We have the right to dream great
dreams, the opportunity to strive for a
world at peace enriched by human dig-
nity, and the responsibility to work as
partners, so that we might leave these
blessed gifts to our children and to our
children's children.
We might remember the example of
a legislator who lived in a particularly
turbulent era, Henry Clay. Abraham
Lincoln called him "my beau ideal of a
statesman." He knew Clay's loftiness of
spirit and vision never lost sight of his
country's interest, and that, election year
or not. Clay would set love of country
above all political considerations.
The stakes for America for peace and
for freedom demand every bit as much
from us in 1984 and beyond— this is our
challenge.
iText from White House press release. I
Democratic Ideals and
U.S.-lsrael Relations
Excerpts from President Reagan 's
remarks before the Young Leadership
Conference of the United Jevrish Appeal
on March 13, 198i.^
In your lives, you must overcome great
challenges. I know you draw strength and
inspiration from the well of a rich
spiritual heritage, from the fundamental
values of faith and family, work,
neighborhood, and peace.
Two centuries ago those values led
Americans to build democratic institu-
tions and begin their Constitution with
those courageous and historic words,
"We, the people . . . ." And today our
democratic institutions and ideals unite all
Americans, regardless of color or creed.
Yet as we enjoy the freedom that
America offers, we must remember that
millions on Earth are denied a voice in
government and must struggle for their
rights. They live under brutal dictator-
ships or communist regimes that
systematically suppress human rights.
Under communism, Jews, in par-
ticular, suffer cruel persecution. Here in
our own hemisphere, the communist San-
dinista regime in Nicaragua has used
threats and harassment to force vh-tually
every Nicaraguan Jew to flee his country.
In the Soviet Union Jews are virtually
forbidden to teach Hebrew to their chil-
dren, are limited to a small number of
synagogues, and cannot publish books of
Hebrew liturgy. Emigration of Jews from
the Soviet Union has been brought to a
near standstill. Prominent Jews like losif
Begun have been arraigned in mock trials
and given harsh sentences. Hebrew
scholars like Lev Furman have seen their
teaching materials robbed and their
homes ransacked. And Jewish dissidents
like Anatoli Shcharanskiy have been put
in mental wards or thrown in jail. We
must support Soviet Jews in their strug-
gle for basic rights, and I urge all
Americans to observe the International
Day of Concern for Soviet Jews this
Thursday, day aftei- tomorrow, March
15th.
To promote our democratic ideals
abroad, we must also meet great
challenges, and I see three that are para-
mount.
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First, we must keep America strong.
During the 1970s the United States made
a conscious choice to restrict its military
development, fervently hoping the
Soviets would respond in kind. During
those 10 years, our spending on defense
dropped over 20% in real terms. We
canceled major weapons programs, re-
duced our nuclear stockpile to its lowest
level in 20 years, and slackened in the
training of our armed forces. Between
1968 and 1978, we cut our navy— the
fleet— by more than half.
But" far from responding to om- good
intentions with restraint, the Soviets
launched the most massive military
buildup in world history. From 1974 to
1980, they outproduced us in practically
every category of weapons: 3 times more
tanks, twice as many tactical combat aii--
craft, 5 times more ICBM's [intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles], and 15 times
more ballistic missile submarines. By 198(i
total Soviet military investment was more
than IV2 times ours.
President Carter's Secretary of
Defense, Harold Brown, put it very well.
He acknowledged a bitter lesson about
Soviet practice in saying, "When we
build, they build. When we don't build,
they buUd."
Since taking office, our Administra-
tion has made significant headway in
rebuilding our defenses and making
America more secure. Perhaps you
remember the 29th Psalm in which King
David said, "The Lord will give strength
to His people; the Lord will bless His peo-
ple with peace." Today America once
again recognizes that peace and strength
are inseparable.
But we've only begun to repaii- past
damage. Make no mistake: If we heed
those who would cripple America's
rebuilding program, we will undermine
our own security and the security of our
closest friends, like Israel, and I am not
prepared to let that happen. After two
decades of military expansion by the
Soviet Union and a decade of neglect by
the United States, we're struggling not tO'
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THE PRESIDENT
regain the superiority we once enjoyed
but simply to restore the military
equivalence we need to keep the peace.
A second great challenge is to defend
and pi-omote human rights throughout
the world. Aleksandi- Herzen, the great
Russian writer, warned, "To shrink from
saying a word in defense of the oppressed
is as bad as any crime. . . ." We who are
blessed by the fruits of liberty have a per-
sonal responsibility and a moral obligation
to speak out in defense of our brothers
and sisters. We must not and we will not
remain silent.
Our Administration has repeatedly
and vigorously protested the persecution
of Jews and others in the Soviet Union
and other communist nations. We're also
using our influence with countries that
receive American assistance to give
human rights firm support. In El Sal-
vador, we're insisting that the leaders
take steps to end human rights abuse.
And although El Salvador is far from
perfect, we've seen marked progress.
In the United Nations, Iran's
representative once called Israel, "a
cancerous growth," and Libya's
representative has referred to the people
of Israel as "the most vile people upon
Earth." This so-called anti-Zionism is just
another mask for vicious anti-Semitism,
and that's something the United States
will not tolerate.
As I wi-ote last month to Stanley
Blend, the president of the Jewish
Federation of San Antonio, ". . . the
lesson of history is overwhelmingly clear.
Silence is never an acceptable response to
anti-Semitism."
UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick is
our leader on this. And let me assure you
of one thing about Jeane: She is a very
tenacious woman. She has defended
Israel and stood up for human rights with
persistence and courage. But just so no
one gets any ideas, I will be bhmt: If
Israel is ever forced to walk out of the
UN, the United States and Israel will
walk out together.
Standing steadfast with our allies in
support of greater economic growth and
of peace with freedom is our third great
challenge. Our Administi-ation is working
hard to do just that. In Europe we and
our NATO allies have shown the Soviets
our willingness to negotiate and our un-
shakable resolve to defend Western
Europe. In the Far East, we are
strengthening our ties to the Asian
democracies and developing our relations
with China. In Central America we have
supported democracy and fostered
economic development. And in the Middle
East we have strengthened our relations
with a nation close to your heart and
mine— the State of Israel.
Let me take a moment to describe our
relations with Israel and our efforts in the
Middle East. Israel and the United Stales
are bound together by the ties of friend-
ship, shared ideals, and mutual interests.
We're allies in the defense of freedom in
the Middle East. The United States was
the first nation to recognize the State of
Israel, and ever since, om- support for
Israel has remained unflinching. Today,
when even our NATO allies vote with us
in the United Nations only some six out of
ten votes, the alliance between the
United States and Israel is so strong that
we vote together more than nine times
out of ten.
Since I took office, the U.S.-Israeli
relationship has grown closer than ever
before in three crucial ways.
First, the U.S.-Israeli strategic rela-
tionship has been elevated and formal-
ized. This is the first time in Israel's
history that a formal strategic relation-
ship has existed. The new American-
Israeh Joint Political-Military Group is
working to decide how the United States
and Israel can counter the threat that
growing Soviet involvement in the Middle
East poses to our mutual interests. Our
cooperation adds to deterrence and im-
proves and protects the prospects for
peace and security. The negotiations have
been positive, and they're moving for-
ward.
Second, we're negotiating to establish
a free trade area between the United
States and Israel, and this will launch a
new era of closer economic relations be-
tween our countries. By substantially
eliminating duties and nontariff barriers
between our nations, we will enable
American producers to sell and compete
in Israel while providing Israeli manufac-
turers unimpeded access to the free
world's largest market.
Third, the United States will soon be
giving Israel military aid on a grant, not a
loan, basis. We have re.structured our
1985 foreign aid package, and Israel v\ill
now receive economic aid totaling $850
million and a military grant of some $1.4
billion. This will ensure that Israel main-
tains its qualitative military edge.
All in all, the friendship between
Israel and the United States is closer and
stronger today than ever before. And I
intend to keep it that way.
In the Middle East, as a whole, the
United States has three aims.
First, we must deter the Soviet
threat. As the crossroads among three
continents and the source of oil for much
of the industrialized world, the Middle
East is of enormous strategic importance.
Were the Soviets to control the region—
and they have expanded their influence
there in a number of ways, notably, by
stationing 7,000 troops and advisers in
Syria— the entire world would be
vulnerable to economic blackmail. Their
brutal war against the Afghan people con-
tinues with increasing ferocity. We must
not allow them to dominate the region.
Second, we must prevent a widening
of the conflict in the Persian Gulf which
could threaten the sealanes carrying
much of the free world's oil. It could also
damage the infrastructure that pumps the
oil out of the ground, and we must not
permit this to happen.
Third, we seek to go on promoting
peace between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. In response to the growth of
Syrian power and the rise of the Iranian
threat, we must help to protect moderate
Arabs who seek peace from the radical
pressures that have done such harm in
Lebanon.
Syria is trying to lead a radical effort
to dominate the region through terroi'ism
and intimidation aimed, in paiticular, at
America's friends. One such friend we
continue to urge to negotiate with Israel
is King Hussein of Jordan. Today Jordan
is crucial to the peace process, and for
that very reason, Jordan, like Israel, is
confronted by Syria and faces military
threats and terrorist attacks.
Since the security of Jordan is crucial
to the security of the entire region, it is in
America's strategic interest, and I believe
it is in Israel's strategic interest, foi- us to
help meet Jordan's legitimate needs for
defense against the growing power of
Syria and Iran. Such assistance to Jordan
does not threaten Israel, but enhances
the prospects for Mideast peace by reduc-
ing the dangers of the radical threat.
This is an historic moment in the Mid-
dle East. Syria must decide whether to
allow Lebanon to retain control over its
own destiny or condemn it to occupation.
Syria forced the Lebanese Government to
renounce the May 17th agreement with
Israel precisely because it was a good
agreement. Those who hsve chosen this
course will have to find other ways to
secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
Arab governments and the Palestinian
Arabs must decide whether to reach
peace with Israel through direct negotia-
tions. And if Arab negotiators step for-
ward, Israel must decide if it will take the
risks necessary to attain the real security
May 1984
THE PRESIDENT
thai comes only with genuine peace. I
have no doubt thai given thai choice, the
Israelis will once again have the courage
to choose peace.
I'm convinced that the initiative that I
presented on September Isl, 1982, re-
mains the best option for all the parties.
It is squarely based on the Camp David
framework and UN Security Council
Re.<olution 242. It is lime for the Arab
world to negotiate directly with Israel
and to recognize Israel's righl to exist.
We hope that the Government of
Israel will understand that continued set-
tlement activity in the West Bank and
Gaza will make the peace process more
difficult. Peace can only come about
through the give-and-take of direct
negotiations. These negotiations will deal
with many issues, including the status of
Jerusalem, voting rights, land use, and
security. If there's to be any hope for
these negotiations, however, we must
preserve our credibility as a fairminded
broker seeking a comprehensive solution.
Only the United States can advance this
process. And we must not undermine our
role.
And permit me to reaffirm a
longstanding American commitment: So
long as the PLO [Palestine Libei-ation
Organization] refuses to recognize Israel's
right to exist and to accept Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the
United States will neither recognize nor
negotiate with the PLO.
Only 2 weeks ago, terrorists planted
hand grenades outside a store on a
crowded street in Jerusalem. When they
exploded, 21 shoppers and passersby
were injured, some seriously. Yasir
Arafat, on behalf of the PLO praised the
attack on innocent civilians. He had the
gall to call it a "military operation." Ter-
rorism, whether by government or in-
dividuals, is repulsive, and peaceful coex-
istence can never come from in-
discriminate violence.
If I could leave you with one thought
today it would be this: Even though in
the Middle East and elsewhere the world
seems hostile to democratic ideals, it's the
free men and women on this Earth who
are making history.
Here in the United Stales we've only
seen the beginning of what a free and a
brave people can do. Today America is
leading a revolution even more sweeping
than the Industrial Revolution of a cen-
tury ago. It's a revolution ranging from
tiny microchips to voyages into the vast,
dark spaces of space; fi-om home com-
puters that can put the great music, film,
and literature at a family's fingertips to
new medical breakthroughs that can add
years to our lives, even helping the lame
to walk and the blind to see.
In Israel free men and women are
every day demonstrating the power of
courage and faith. Back in 1948 when
Israel was founded, pimdits claimed the
new country could never survive. Today,
no one questions that Israel is a land of
stability and democracy in a region of
tyranny and unrest.
This Sunday, as Jews the world over
observe Purim, they'll celebrate not only
the ancient deliverance of Jews from the
wicked but a modem joy as well— the
miracle of the State of Israel.
• Made at the Washington Hilton Hotel
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Mar. 19, 1984).H
News Conference of April 4 (Excerpts)
Excerpts from Presidejiis Reagan's
news conference of April k. 198Jt}
In 2 weeks, I will send Vice President
Bush to Geneva to present to the 40-na-
tion Conference on Disarmament a bold,
American initiative for a comprehensive
worldwide ban on chemical weapons. Our
proposal would prohibit the production,
possession, and use of chemical weapons.
The short cdHiings of early chemical
weapons treaties have been made
tragically clear in recent years. Chemical
weapons have been used against
defenseless peoples in Afghanistan, in
Southeast Asia, and in the conflict be-
tween Iran and Iraq. The use of the terri-
ble weapons also has serious implications
for our own security.
The Soviet Union's e.xtensive arsenal
of chemical weapons threatens U.S.
forces. It requires the LInited States to
maintain a limited retaliatory capability of
its own until we achieve an effective ban.
We must be able to deter a chemical at-
tack against us or our allies. And without
a modern and credible deterrent, the
prospects for achieving a comprehensive
ban would be nil.
Our comprehensive treaty proposal
can bring the day closer when the world
will prohibit all chemical weapons. But
verification of a chemical weapons ban
won't be easy. Only an effective monitor-
ing and enforcement package can ensure
international confidence in such an agi-ee-
ment. The United States is, therefore,
developing bold and sound verification
procedures.
This latest initiative reflects my
continuing strong commitment to arms
control. Our Administration seeks to
move forward in several areas. I'm
pleased, for example, that the United
Stales is also participating in a promising
new multilateral negotiation dealing with
confidence-building measures in Europe
and, in the recently resumed East-West
talks, in reducing conventional forces in
Europe.
We're working closely with our
NATO allies to try to make progress in all
these areas. I can't report these promis-
ing developments, however, without ex-
pi'essing my deep, personal regret that
the Soviet Union still has not returned to
the two negotiations on nuclear arms
reductions— the START [strategic reduc-
tion talks] and the INF [intermediate-
range nuclear forces] talks which it
walked away from late last year.
The United States and many othei-
countries have urged repeatedly that the
Soviets return to these talks. So far they
have ignored the will of the world. I hope
that the Soviet leadership will respond to
our new initiatives, not only by
negotiating seriously on chemical
weapons but also by joining us in the
urgent task of achieving real reductions
in nuclear arms. The Vice President's
mission is a vital one, and we wish him
Godspeed.
Q. The Secretary of State, George
Shultz, is advocating a wider, greater
use of military force, a show of force,
around the world and, also, preemptive
strikes against potential terrorists. If
you slam the door on negotiations for
killer satellites, which could lead to a
arms race in space, my question is, how
do these moves ser\e the cause of peace
and do you think that the country is
really ready for wider involvement,
military involvement, around the
world?
A. I don't think that George meant to
imply anything of that kind or that we're
going to get more militant or anything. I
think he was trying to express to those
people who have been so concerned about
arms and whether there's an arms race,
and that is that your military strength is
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a definite part of diplomacy and I think
this is what he was ti-ying to explain.
With regard to the space weapons,
this is a situation in which the Soviet
Union is ahead of us and already has and
has in place such a weapon. We'are still in
the stage of studying such a thing. The
great problem that we have— and we're
very willing to enter into a treaty with
regard to outlawing such weapons, except
that it so far seems almost impossible to
verify such a weapon, if not actually im-
possible. And if that's true, then we,
again, must have a deterrent.
Q. You're one who always says
nothing is impossible, and you're going
to try on chemical weapons. Why don't
you on the killer satellites?
A. In both of them, we are trying, but
as we say, we have to face the reality that
before you can place any confidence "in
such a treaty, you must be confident that
you have the one thing that the Soviets
have been the most reluctant to give in
any treaties that we've ever had, or that
we have with them, and that is verifica-
tion procedures.
Q. With regard to your proposal to
ban chemical weapons, isn't this pro-
posal another way to get Con-
gress-what they've failed to do for the
last 3 years which is appropriate money
for chemical weapons? And what do we
say if our adversaries accuse us of talk-
ing peace but preparing for war?
A. I don't think the accusation would
stand up if they said that. The situation is
that we haven't produced any such
weapons for 15 years. The Soviet Union
has a massive arsenal and is ahead of us
in many areas having to do with chemical
warfare.
If there is ever one example or one
place where there is an example of the
power of a deterrent force, it is in the
field of chemical weapons. And I hand you
World War II when all the nations had
them and no one used them, even in the
most desperate moments when defeat
was staring at them because they knew
that the others had them and could use
them in return.
The second thing is if we're going to
have a chemical warfare ban or a treaty
banning them, you've got to have
something to bargain with. And, there-
fore, it's just the same as it is with the
other weapons. They must know that the
alternative to banning them is to then
face the fact that we're going to build a
deterrent.
^^gv/ 1QQ/!
Q. Last October you said the
presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon
was central to our credibility on a
global scale. And now you've with-
drawn them and terminated our
presence in the MNF [multinational
forces], to what extent have we lost
credibility—
A. We may have lost some with some
people. The situation's changed. It was
true when I said that, but I can, I think,
explain. I'll try to make it as brief as I can
what the situation, or what the change
was.
We and three of our allies— our four
governments-decided that in an effort to
straighten out the situation that was so
out of control in Lebanon, that we would
send in a combination force, a multiple
force not to participate in a war but to be
on hand to help provide stability while the
Lebanese were allowed then to create a
government.
You will remember, a civil war had
been going on there for about 10 years.
And at the time this was decided, the
Israelis were at the border of Beirut;
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion]- 10,000- 15,000 of them were fighting
from within the heart of Beirut; the
Syrians were also involved.
The idea was that if a government
could be created in Lebanon and then we
could help them recreate their military
and the foreign forces withdraw, then as
their military moved out into the areas
previously occupied by the foreign
powers to hopefully pacify the internecine
fighting groups, the militias that were
fighting each other as well as the official
forces of Lebanon— that the multinational
force would be a kind of stable peacekeep-
ing force behind keeping order while they
went out to do that job because they
wouldn't have the manpower to do both.
This was the task. The first success
was the leaving of Lebanon of some
10,000-15,000 PLO who up until then
were unwilling to surrender, even though
they faced defeat, because they feared a
massacre at the hands of those who were
fighting them. So with the multinational
force there to guarantee against that,
they were ushered out.
The government was formed, of
Lebanon. The same government that to-
day is negotiating and has been holding
meetings in Geneva and elsewhere to
bring about a peaceful settlement.
We did train— and there was no atten-
tion paid to this. Our army had a unit in
there training the Lebanese military and
equijjping them and made a vei-y capable
military. What did happen-the deterioi-a-
tion when Syria insisted on staying in and
backing some of the rebel radical forces
there, was that with religious and ethnic
differences, some units of the army re-
fused to take up arms against some of
their same ethnic background or religious
background. The Government of Lebanon
went forward then in trying to bring
together the kind of a consensus govem-
ment-the radical elements and all-and
take them into a broadened based govern-
ment. In the meantime, because the
multinational force had been successful,
to that extent, it was determined by those
who don't want that kind of a solution in
Lebanon that they had to put the
pressure on to get our forces and the
others out.
And with the terrorist attacks that
brought such tragedy, our forces dug in,
but once dug in, while this was offering
security to them from the kind of attacks
they'd been subjected to, they were no
longer visible as the kind of force they
were supposed to be. And so, with agree-
ment with our allies, we redeployed; some
of them redeployed to other areas. But
then, as these efforts went forward on
their own for peace, it was agreed that
there was no longer any point in the four
governments keeping their forces there.
And we withdrew.
We are still engaged diplomatically
with anything we can do to help. And'
there are those in the area who say that
they doubt that there can be any solution
or peace without our help. And "so we'll do
that.
Q. You began your answer by say-
ing we lost some credibility. Are you to
blame for that? Or, like Secretary
Shultz. do you blame Congress?
A. I have to say this, and then I'll
move on to another subject. I have to say
that this was one of the things— and they
must take a responsibility. When you're"
engaged in this kind of a "diplomatic at-
tempt, and you have forces there, and
there is an effort made to oust them, a
debate as public as was conducted here
raging with the Congress demanding—
"Oh, take our, bring our men home, take
them away." All this can do is stimulate
the terrorists and urge them on to further
attacks because they see a pos.sibility of
success in getting the force out which is
keeping them from having their way. It
should be understood by everyone in
government that once this is committed,
you have rendered them ineffective when
you conduct that kind of a debate in
public.
...,.„„,»^x„.JBHHIIWIIIIUWIIIM
THE PRESIDENT
Q. The Senate today unanimously
adopted a proposal to withdraw U.S.
military aid from El Salvador if the
(Tovernment there is overthrown by a
military coup. Some people have sug-
gested that that might happen if Mr.
Duarte is elected. Do you support the
proposal that passed the Senate today?
And would you veto it if it came to your
desk?
A. I'm not going to talk about
whether to veto or not. but I think here
again, this is not helpful in what we're
trying to accomplish, and I think it's
something that— I just don't think they
should be doing it at this time.
Q. Does that mean you don't sup-
port it?
A. No.
Q. Secretary of State Shultz says
one of the problems in Lebanon is the
War Powers Act and Congress is always
meddling in foreign policy, that neither
our foes nor our friends know who's in
charge. How much of a problem do you
have with the War Powers Act and
would you like to see a Supreme Court
test whether or not it's constitutional?
A. There's been no talk of such a test
or doing anything of that kind, but I do
have to say this. In the last 10 years, the
Congress has imposed about 1.50 restric-
tions on the President's power in interna-
tional diplomacy, I think that the Con-
stitution made it pretty plain way back in
the beginning as to how diplomacy was to
be conducted, and I just don't think that a
committee of 535 individuals, no matter
how well-intentioned, can offer what is
needed in actions of this kind or where
there is a necessity.
Do you know that prior to the Viet-
namese war, while this country had only
had four declared wars. Presidents of this
country had found it necessary to use
military forces 125 times in our history?
Q. People do cite Vietnam where a
President waged an undeclared war for
years, and they say without the War
Powers Act that's going to continue.
A. I'll tell you, this is the time for me
to say " I told you so." For a long time,
and even before I became governor, I was
saying that the war in Vietnam had
reached a position or a state in which we
should have asked for a declaration of war
and called it a war.
Q. Recently the U.S.-backed op-
ponents of the Sandinista regime have
gone beyond their warfare on land to
mining ports off the Nicaraguan coast.
Are you concerned that these mines
there, which neutral freighters or
others could hit, run a risk of widening
the war in Central America? And do
you think there's any point in which we
ought to try to call a halt to the ac-
tivities of the Contras?
A. No, our interest in Nicaragua, I'm
not going to comment on that one way or
the other or the tactics that are used in a
war of that kind. Our interest in Nica-
ragua is one and one only. The present
Government of Nicaragua is exporting
revolution to El Salvador, its neighbor.
and is helping, supporting, arming, and
training the guei-rillas who are trying to
overthrow a duly elected government.
And as long as they do that, w-e're going
to try and inconvenience that Govern-
ment of Nicaragua until they quit that
kind of action.
Q. We are training troops down
there in Honduras. Do you see, from
your perspective, a danger of a wider
war in Central America at this point?
A. No, I think these maneuvers are
something we've done before. They're not
something unusual or aimed at anyone
down there. They are combined exercises
that we hold with our owni units and we
have— one unit goes through some of
these and gets the training, we send
another one down to do the same thing.
And that's all they are is war games.
Q. Until recently your Administra-
tion had handled trade disputes with
Japan with relatively little public fan-
fare. But over the last few days, three
of your Cabinet members and several
other Administration officials have
spoken out publicly and firmly in
criticizing Japan. Why the change in
strategy?
A. It's not a change in strategy. It's
just talking frankly about what's going
on. It's like any government with its
various interests and its bureaucracies
and so forth. We're not making as much
progress as we would like to make with
regard to the things that I had discussed
in Japan with Prime Minister Nakasone
and here at the Williamsburg summit. I
know where he stands. And I know that
he sincerely and honestly wants better
trade relations and some of the obstacles
removed that are impairing free and fan-
trade between us. But then there are
other elements, and they're subject to
political pressure and public opinion
pressure the same as we are in our own
country. And I think what you've been
hearing are some complaints about those
who are trying to negotiate these things.
10
Q. You've been saying recently that
you're trying to encourage moderate
Arab leaders to join the Middle East
peace process. Yet King Hussein, the
key moderate Arab, seems to have shut
the door rather firmly. In view of that,
what is your future course for guiding
your 1982 peace plan, and how do you
intend to try to remove the obstacles on
that course?
A. That continues to be our plan, and
I believe that King Hussein still feels and
believes that he w-ould have to be an im-
portant part, being the next-door
neighbor to Israel, in bringing about such
negotiations. And I continue to believe in
this. This is the answer. It's what started
us from the very beginning in the Middle
East to continue the Camp David process
to persuade other nations to do w'hat
Egypt did in making that peace.
At the present moment, you have a
group of Arab nations that have never
retreated from that Israel does not have a
right to exist as a nation, and we're try-
ing to persuade them that we can be
even-handed and that we're not tr\ing to
dictate any peace of any kind. We simply
want to be of help if we can; an in-
termediary in bringing about a negotia-
tion that will erase the issues and the
problems that have kept them apart so
that they can settle back and live in peace
together. And we're going to continue to
try to do that.
Q. The Soviet Union is currently
engaged in perhaps its largest military
exercise ever in the Atlantic Ocean. An
exercise that involves some 40 vessels,
including submarines, destroyers, and a
nuclear powered battle cruiser. I
wonder if you could tell us what you
think the Soviet Union is up to in all of
this?
A. I think it's spring in Russia as well
as the United States, and that's when you
have war games and maneuvers. We've
been having some of our owti. We always
tell when we're going to have them. We
wish they'd tell us.
But I think this is nothing more than
that. Your war games are actually—
whoever's conducting them— based on
your ovni thoughts as to what contingen-
cies could arise that would find you in an
emergency situation, and so you set out to
train or practice for that.
Some 40 ships, I know, sounds like an
awful lot, but when you stop to think
we're talking about a navy of almost 1,000
ships, it kind of comes down in size a little
bit. No, I think these are regular and
routine maneuvers that usually begin in
the spring of the year for most of us.
Department of State Bulletin
THE PRESIDENT
Q. So you don't think that the
Soviet Union is trying to send us any
particular signal?
A. No, I really don't. Nor are we try-
ing to send them a signal with our own
war games.
Q. Getting back to your earlier
statement that you felt for some time
that we should have declared war dur-
ing the Vietnam period, against whom
would we have declared war, and if we
had done so, wouldn't that have wid-
ened the war and gotten us stuck into
an even greater quagmire?
A. I can only say with regard to
that— I said that at a time when it was go-
ing on because of what was going on here
in our country, in which none of the rules
of warfare could apply with regard to
lending comfort and aid to the enemy.
Who we would have declared war against
would have been a country— North Viet-
Central America
President Reagan's radio address to
the nation on March 2i, 198U^
Tomorrow is an historic day for the
beleaguered nation of El Salvador. Scores
of international obsei-vers will watch as
the people of El Salvador risk their lives
to exercise a right we take for
granted— the right to vote for their Presi-
dent.
This right of choice is not something
that is common in all of Central America.
It contrasts shaiply, for example, with
Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas staged
a revolution in 1979 promising free elec-
tions, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion. Despite these promises, the San-
dinistas have consistently broken their
word, and the elections that they've an-
nounced for November seemed designed
only to consolidate their control.
Unlike El Salvador, the Nicaraguans
don't want international oversight of their
campaign and elections. When the mem-
bers of the National Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Central America visited
Nicaragua, the Sandinista dictators
briefed them with Soviet intelligence and
said the United States is the source of all
evil.
In El Salvador the members heard ap-
preciation for our country's efforts to pro-
mote peace, democracy, and development.
El Salvador is an emerging democracy
plagued by a communist insurgency and
nam. The settlement of French Indochina
created two nations— South Vietnam and
North Vietnam. They were two separate
nations. In fact back through history,
they had pretty much been separate coun
tries before. You say that because of the
situation of the time. Whether I would
still feel the same way or not— I know
that there was great concern about the
possibility of a war widening, just as
there was in Korea that prevented us
from allowing General MacArthur to lead
us to a victory in Korea. Evei\vone
thought that if you— you have to fight a
war without winning it, or you might find
yourself in a bigger war. Maybe General
MacArthur was right. There is no
substitute for victory.
'Text from White House press release.
human rights abuses which must stop,
but a nation which is sti'ongly pro-
American and struggling to make self-
government succeed.
Nicaragua is a communist dictatorship
armed to the teeth, tied to Cuba and the
Soviet Union, which oppi'esses its people
and threatens its neighbors.
The stability of our Latin friends—
indeed, the security of our own
borders— depends upon which tyjje of
society prevails— the imperfect
democracy seeking to improve or the
communist dictatorship seeking to ex-
pand.
The bipartisan commission warned
that new communist regimes could be ex-
pected to fall into the same pattern as
Nicaragua; namely, expand their armed
forces, bring in large numbers of Cuban
and Soviet bloc advisers, and increase the
repression of their own people and the
subversion of their neighbors. And the
commission warned that a rising tide of
communism would likely produce
refugees, perhaps millions of them, many
of whom would flee to the United States.
These tragic events are not written in
stone, but they will happen if we do
nothing or even too little. Based on the
recommendations of the commission, I
sent the Congress in February a proposal
to encourage democratic institutions, im-
prove living conditions, and help our
friends in Central America resist com-
munist threats Three-fouiths of our re-
quest is for economic and humanitarian
assistance.
And that brings me to an important
point: The people who argue that the root
of violence and instability is poverty, not
communism, are ignoring the obvious.
But all the economic aid in the world
won't be worth a dime if communist guer-
rillas are determined and have the
freedom to terrorize and to burn, bomb,
and destroy everything from bridges and
industries to power and transportation
systems. So in addition to economic and
humanitarian assistance, we must also
provide adequate levels of security
assistance to permit our friends to protect
themselves from Cuban and Soviet sup-
ported subversion.
Military assistance is crucial right
now to El Salvador. The Salvadoran peo-
ple repudiated the guerrillas when they
last voted in 1982, but continued Soviet-
Cuban-Nicaraguan support for the guer-
rillas, combined with the failure of our
Congress to provide the level of military
aid I've requested, have put El Salvador
in an extremely vulnerable position. The
guerrillas have been seizing the identifica-
tion cards that allow citizens to vote. One
of El Salvador's principal guerrilla com-
manders has pledged an all-out effort to
disrupt the elections. And, should there
be a need for an election run-off in late
April or May, these same guerrillas, who
have already assassinated elected con-
gressmen in El Salvador, will do every-
thing they can to disrupt that election as
well.
We're looking at an emergency situa-
tion. So I've asked Congress to provide
immediate security assistance for El
Salvador while the comprehensive bipar-
tisan legislation makes its way through
the Congress over the next several
months.
This is the moment of truth. There is
no time to lose. If the Congress acts
responsibly, while the cost is still not
great, then democracy in Central
America will have a chance. If the Con-
gress refuses to act, the cost will be far
greater. The enemies of democracy will
intensify their violence,' more lives will be
lost, and real danger will come closer and
closer to our shores. This is no time for
partisan politics.
' Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 2, 1984.1
May 1984
,i.«»imimiuuiniiwuiiu«......uu»»iiwiiiuiiiii— — IP
JIHI
THE SECRETARY
Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s
Secretary Shultz's address before the
Trilateral Commission on April 3, 198^.^
Over 20 years ago, President John
Kennedy pledged that the United States
would "pay any price, bear any burden,
meet any hardship, support any friend,
oppose any foe, in order to assure the
survival and the success of liberty." We
know now that the scope of that commit-
ment is too broad— though the self-confi-
dence and courage in those words were
typically American and most admirable.
More i-ecently, another Administration
took the view that our fear of commu-
nism was "inordinate" and that there
were very compUcated social, economic,
religious, and other factors at work in
the world that we had little ability to af-
fect. This, in my view, is a counsel of
helplessness that substantially underesti-
mates the United States and its ability
to influence events.
Somewhere between these two poles
lies the natural and sensible scope of
American foreign policy. We know that
we are not omnipotent and that we must
set priorities. We cannot pay any price
or bear any burden. We must discrimi-
nate; we must be prudent and careful;
we must respond in ways appropriate to
the challenge and engage our power only
when very important strategic stakes are
involved. Not every situation can be
advance them. Thus we as a nation are
perpetually asking ourselves how to
reconcile our morality and our practical
sense, how to pursue noble goals in a
complex and imperfect world, how to
relate our strength to our purposes— in
sum, how to relate power and diplomacy.
We meet this evening amid the ex-
citement of America's quadrennial exer-
cise of self-renewal, in which we as a
country reexamine ourselves and our in-
ternational objectives. It is an unending
process— almost as unending as the presi-
dential campaign season. But there are
some constants in our policy, such as our
alliance with the industrial democracies,
as embodied in the distinguished gather-
ing. This partnership— the cornerstone of
our foreign policy for 35 years— itself
reflects our ability to combine our moral
commitment to democracy and our prac-
tical awareness of the crucial importance
of maintaining the global balance of
power. So I consider this an appropriate
forum at which to shai-e some thoughts
on the relationship between power and
diplomacy in the last two decades of the
20th century.
The World We Face
By the accident of history, the role of
world leadership fell to the United
States just at the moment when the old
Americans, being a moral people, want their
foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a
nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also
want their foreign policy to be effective.
salvaged by American exertion even
when important values or interests are
at stake.
At the same time, we know from his-
tory that courage and vision and deter-
mination can change reality. We can af-
fect events, and we all know it. The
American people expect this of their
leaders. And the future of the free world
depends on it.
Americans, being a moral people,
want their foreign policy to reflect the
values we espouse as a nation. But
Americans, being a practical people, also
want their foreign policy to be effective.
If we truly care about our values, we
must be prepared to defend them and
12
international order had been destroyed
by two world wars but no new stable
system had developed to replace it. A
century ago, the international system
was centered on Europe and consisted of
only a few major players. Today, in
terms of military strength, the dominant
countries are two major powers that had
been, in one sense or another, on the
edge or outside European diplomacy. But
economic power is now widely dispersed.
Asia is taking on increasing significance.
The former colonial empires have been
dismantled, and there are now more than
160 independent nations on the world
scene. Much of the developing world it-
self is torn by a continuing struggle be-
tween the forces of moderation and
forces of radicalism. Most of the ma-
jor international conflicts since 1945
have taken place there— from Korea to
Vietnam to the Middle East to Central
America. Moreover, the Soviet Union
continues to exploit nuclear fear as a
political weapon and to exploit instabil-
ities wherever they have the opportunity
to do so.
On a planet grown smaller because of
global communications, grown more
turbulent because of the diffusion of
power— all the while overshadowed by
nuclear weapons— the task of achieving
stability, security, and progress is a pro-
found challenge for mankind. In an age
menaced by nuclear proliferation and
state-sponsored terrorism, tendencies
toward anarchy are bound to be a source
of real dangers.
It is absurd to think that America
can walk away from these problems.
This is a world of great potential danger.
There is no safety in isolationism. We
have a major, direct stake in the health
of the world economy; our prosperity,
our security, and our alliances can be af-
fected by threats to security in many
parts of the world; and the fate of our
fellow human beings will always impinge
on our moral consciousness. Certainly
the United States is not the world's
policeman. But we are the world's
strongest free nation, and, therefore, the
preservation of our values, our prin-
ciples, and our hopes for a better world
rests in great measure, inevitably, on our
shoulders.
Power and Diplomacy
In this environment, our principal goal is
what President Reagan has called "the
most basic duty that any President and
any people share— the duty to protect
and strengthen the peace." History
teaches, however, that peace is not
achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble
aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim
must always be to shape events and not
be the victim of events. In this fast-
moving and turbulent world, to sit in a
reactive posture is to risk being over-
whelmed or to allow others, who may
not wish us well, to decide the world's
future.
The Great Seal of the United States,
as you know, shows the American eagle
clutching arrows in one claw and olive
branches in the other. Some of you may
have seen the Great Seal on some of the
china and other antique objects in the
White House or in the ceremonial rooms
on the eighth fioor of the State Depart-
ment. On some of the older items, the
Department of State Bulletin
iBV other wi
THE SECRETARY
eagle looks toward the arrows; on others,
toward the olive branches. It was Presi-
dent Truman who set it straight: he saw
to it that the eagle always looked toward
the olive branches— showing that America
sought peace. But the eagle still holds
onto those aiTOWS.
This is a way of saying that our fore-
fathers understood quite well that power
and diplomacy always go together. It is
even clearer today that a world of peace
md security will not come about without
nuiiiiy exertion or without facing up to some
tough choices. Certainly power must
it ilways be guided by pui-pose, but the
lard reality is that diplomacy not backed
Dy strength is ineffectual. That is why,
for example, the United States has suc-
ceeded many times in its mediation when
■nany other well-intentional mediators
lave failed. Leverage, as well as good
ivill, is required.
Americans have sometimes tended to
;hink that power and diplomacy are two
iistinct alternatives. To take a very re-
cent example, the Long commission
"eport on the bombing of our Marine
Darracks in Beirut urged that we work
larder to pursue what it spoke of as
'diplomatic alternatives," as opposed to
'military options." This reflects a fun-
damental misunderstanding— not only of
3ur intensive diplomatic efforts through-
out the period but of the relationship be-
tween power and diplomacy. Sometimes,
regrettable as it may be, political con-
lict degenerates into a test of strength.
It was precisely our military role in
Lebanon that was problematical, not our
diplomatic exertion. Our military role
ivas hamstrung by legislative and other
nhibitions; the Syrians were not in-
;erested in diplomatic compromise so
ong as the prospect of hegemony was
lot foreclosed. They could judge from
Dur domestic debate that our staying
power was limited.
In arms control, also, successful
[legotiation depends on the perception of
military balance. Only if the Soviet
leaders see the West as determined to
modernize its own forces will they see an
incentive to negotiate agreements estab-
lishing equal, verifiable, and lower levels
of armaments.
The lesson is that power and diplo-
macy are not alternatives. They must go
together, or we will accomplish very lit-
tle in this world.
The relationship between them is a
complex one, and it presents us with
both practical and moral issues. Let me
address a few of those issues. One is the
variety of the challenges we face. A sec-
ond is the moral complexity of our
response. A third is the problem of man-
aging the process in a democracy.
The Range of Challenges
Perhaps because of our long isolation
from the turmoil of world politics, Ameri-
cans have tended to believe that war and
peace, too, were two totally distinct
phenomena: we were either in a blissful
state of peace, or else (as in World
Wars I and II) we embarked on an all-
out quest for total victory, after which
not engage in military conflict without a
clear and precise military mission, solid
public backing, and enough resources to
finish the job. This is undeniably true.
But does it mean there are no situations
where a discrete assertion of power is
needed or appropriate for limited pur-
poses? Unlikely. Whether it is crisis
management or power projection or a
... in the 1980s and beyond^ most likely we will
never see a state of total war or a state of total peace.
we wanted to retreat back into inward-
looking innocence, avoiding "power
poUtics" and all it represented. During
World War II, while single-mindedly
seeking the unconditional surrender of
our enemies, we paid too little heed to
the emerging postwar balance of power.
Similarly, since 1945 we have experi-
enced what we saw as a period of clear-
cut cold war, relieved by a period of
seeming detente which raised exagger-
ated expectations in some quarters.
Today we must see the East-West rela-
tionship as more complex, with the two
sides engaging in trade and pursuing
arms control even as they pursue incom-
patible aims. It is not as crisis prone or
starkly confrontational as the old cold
war; but neither is it a normal relation-
ship of peace or comfortable coexistence.
Thus, in the 1980s and beyond, most
likely we will never see a state of total
war or a state of total peace. We face in-
stead a spectrum of often ambiguous
challenges to our interests.
We are relatively well prepared to
deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on
our West European and Japanese allies;
that's why these are the least hkely con-
tingencies. But, day in and day out, we
will continue to see a wide range of con-
flicts that fall in a gray area between ma-
jor war and millennial peace. The coming
years can be counted upon to generate
their share of crises and local outbreaks
of violence. Some of them— not all of
them— will affect our interests. Terror-
ism—particularly state-sponsored terror-
ism—is already a contemporary weapon
directed at America's interests,
America's values, and America's allies.
We must be sure we are as well pre-
pared and organized for this interme-
diate range of challenges.
If we are to protect our interests,
values, and allies, we must be engaged.
And our power must be engaged.
It is often said that the lesson of
Vietnam is that the United States should
show of force or peacekeeping or a
localized military action, there will
always be instances that fall short of an
all-out national commitment on the scale
of World War II. The need to avoid no-
win situations cannot mean that we turn
automatically away from hard-to-win
situations that call for prudent involve-
ment. These will always involve risks;
we will not always have the luxury of be-
ing able to choose the most advantageous
circumstances. And our adversaries can
be expected to play rough.
The Soviets are students of
Clausewitz, who taught that war is a
continuation of politics by other means.
It is highly unlikely that we can respond
to gray-area challenges without adapting
power to poUtical circumstances or on a
psychologically satisfying, all-or-nothing
basis. This is just not the kind of reality
we are likely to be facing in the 1980s, or
1990s, or beyond. Few cases will be as
clear or as quick as Grenada. On the con-
trary, most other cases will be a lot
tougher.
We have no choice, moreover, but to
address ourselves boldly to the challenge
of terrorism. State-sponsored teiTonsm
is really a form of warfare. Motivated by
ideology and political hostility, it is a
weapon of unconventional war against
democratic societies, taking advantage of
the openness of these societies. How do
we combat this challenge? Certainly we
must take security precautions to protect
our people and our facilities; certainly we
must strengthen our intelligence
capabilities to alert ourselves to the
threats. But it is increasingly doubtful
that a purely passive strategy can even
begin to cope with the problem. This
raises a host of questions for a free soci-
ety: in what circumstances— and how-
should we respond? When— and how-
should we take preventive or preemptive
action against known terrorist groups?
May 1984
■llllllllWIWimilHWHHiiyilillllJWHIHWIIIII.»HIHIIIMIIHHHII^
||»Hlf~|I|
13
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'ith'ii'ii'ii'.i-tii'M'in'a
THE SECRETARY
What evidence do we insist upon before
taking such steps?
As the threat mounts— and as the in-
volvement of such countries as Iran,
Syria, Libya, and North Korea has
become more and more evident— then it
pend on us be subjugated by brute force
if we have the capacity to prevent it.
There is, in addition, another ugly
residue of our Vietnam debate: the no-
tion, in some quarters, that America is
the guilty party, that the use of our
. . . any use of force involves moral issues.
American military power should be resorted to only
if the stakes justify it, if other means are not
available, and then only in a manner appropriate to
the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest.
is more and more appropriate that the
nations of the West face up to the need
for active defense against terrorism.
Once it becomes established that ter-
rorism works— that it achieves its
political objectives— its practitioners will
be bolder, and the threat to us will be all
the greater.
The Moral Issues
Of course, any use of force involves
moral issues. American military power
should be resorted to only if the stakes
justify it, if other means are not
available, and then only in a manner ap-
propriate to the objective. But we cannot
opt out of every contest. If we do, the
world's future will be determined by
others-most likely by those who are the
most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and
the most hostile to our deeply held prin-
ciples. The New Republic stated it well a
few weeks ago:
[T]he American people know that force
and the threat of force are central to the
foreign policy of our adversaries, and they ex-
pect their President to be able to deter and
defeat such tactics.
As we hear now in the debate over
military aid to Central America, those
who shrink from engagement can always
find an alibi for inaction. Often it takes
the form of close scrutiny of any moral
defects in the friend or ally whom we are
proposing to assist. Or it is argued that
the conflict has deep social and economic
origins which we really have to address
first before we have a right to do
anything else.
But rather than remain engaged in
order to tackle these problems— as we
are trying to do— some people turn these
concerns into formulas for abdication,
formulas that would allow the enemies of
freedom to decide the outcome. To me, it
is highly immoral to let friends who de-
power is a source of evil and, therefore,
the main task in foreign policy is to
restrain America's freedom to act. It is
inconceivable to me that the American
people believe any of this. It is certainly
not President Reagan's philosophy.
Without being boastful or arrogant,
the American people know that their
country has been a powerful force for
good in the world. We helped Europe
and Asia-including defeated enemies-
rebuild after the war, and we helped pro-
vide a security shield behind which they
could build democracy and freedom as
well as prosperity. Americans have often
died and sacrificed for the freedom of
others. We have provided around $165
billion in economic assistance for the
developing worid. We have played a vital
facilitating role in the Middle East peace
process, in the unfolding diplomacy of
southern Africa, as well as in many other
diplomatic efforts around the globe.
We have used our power for good
and worthy ends. In Grenada, we helped
restore self-determination to the people
of Grenada, so that they could choose
their own future. Some have tried to
compare what we did in Grenada to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We
welcome such comparison. Contrast, for
example, the propsects for free elections
in the two countries. In Grenada, they
will be held this year; in Afghanistan,
when? Contrast the number of American
combat troops now in Grenada 5 months
after the operation with the number of
Soviet troops in Afghanistan 55 months
after their invasion. The number in
Grenada is 0; the number in Afghan-
istan is over 100,000.
More often, the issue is not the direct
use of American military power but
military assistance to friends to help
them defend themselves. Around the
world, security support for friends is a
way to prevent crises; it bolsters our
friends so they can deter challenges. And
14
it is a way of avoiding the involvement of
American forces, because it is only when
our friends' efforts in their own defense
are being overwhelmed that we are faced
with the agonizing decision whether to
involve ourselves more directly. Security
assistance is thus an essential tool of
foreign policy. It is an instrument for _
deterring those who would impose their
will by force and for making political
solutions possible. It gets far less sup-
port in this country than it deserves.
Central America is a good example.
The real moral question in Central
America is not do we believe in military
solutions, but do we believe in ourselves?
Do we believe that our security and the
security of our neighbors has moral
validity? Do we have faith in our own
democratic values? Do we believe that
Marxist-Leninist solutions are an-
tidemocratic and that we have a moral
right to try to stop those who are trying
to impose them by force? Sure, economic
and social problems underlie many of
these conflicts. But in El Salvador, the
communist guerrillas are waging war
directly agamst the economy, blowing up
bridges and power stations, deliberately
trying to wreck the country's economy.
The conflict in Central America is not
a debate between social theorists; it is
one of those situations I mentioned
where the outcome of political competi-
tion will depend in large measure on the
balance of military strength. In El
Salvador, the United SUtes is support-
ing moderates who believe in democracy
and who are resisting the enemies of
democracy on both the extreme right
and the extreme left. If we withdrew our
support, the moderates, caught in the
crossfire, would be the first victims-as
would be the cause of human rights and
the prospects for economic development.
And anyone who believes that military
support for our friends isn't crucial to a
just outcome is living in a dream world.
And anyone who believes that military
support can be effective when it's given
on an uncertain installment plan is not
facing reality.
Accountability Without Paralysis
The third issue I want to mention is the
question of how this country, as a
democracy, conducts itself in the face of
such challenges.
Over the last 35 years, the evolution
of the international system was bound to
erode the predominant position the
United States enjoyed immediately after
Worid War II. But it seems to me that
in this disorderiy and dangerous new
world, the loss of American predomi-
nance puts an even greater premium on
consistency, determination, and
Departnnent of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
coherence in the conduct of our foreign
policy. We have less margin for error
than we used to have.
This change in our external cir-
cumstances, however, coincided histori-
cally with a kind of cultural revolution at
home that has made it harder for us to
achieve the consistency, determination,
and coherence that we need. The last 15
years left a legacy of contention between
the executive and legislative branches
and a web of restrictions on executive ac-
tion embedded permanently in our laws.
At the same time, the diffusion of power
within the Congress means that a presi-
dent has a hard time when he wants to
negotiate with the Congress, because
congressional leaders have lost their
dominance of the process and often can-
not produce a consensus or sometimes
even a decision.
The net result, as you well know, is
an enormous problem for American for-
eign policy— a loss of coherence and re-
curring uncertainty in the minds of
friend and foe about the aims and con-
stancy of the United States.
Particularly in the war powers field,
where direct use of our power is at
issue, the stakes are high. Yet the war
powers resolution sets arbitrary 60-day
deadlines that practically invite an adver-
sary to wait us out. Our Commander in
Chief is locked in battle at home at the
same time he is trying to act effectively
abroad. Under the resolution, even inac-
tion by the Congress can force the Presi-
dent to remove American forces from an
area of chaUenge, which, as former Presi-
dent Ford has put it, undermines the
President even when the Congress can't
get up the courage to take a position.
Such constraints on timely action may
only invite greater challenges down the
road. In Lebanon our adversaries'
perception that we lacked staying power
undercut the prospects for successful
negotiation. As the distinguished Major-
ity Leader, Senator Howard Baker, said
on the floor of the Senate 4 weeks ago:
[W]e cannot continue to begin each
military involvement abroad with a prolonged,
tedious and divisive negotiation between the
executive and the legislative branches of
government. The world and its many
challenges to our interests simply do not
allow us that luxury.
I do not propose changes in our con-
stitutional system. But some legislative
changes may be called for. And I pro-
pose, at a minimum, that all of us, in
both Congress and the executive branch,
exercise our prerogatives with a due
regard to the national need for an effec-
tive foreign policy. Congress has the
right, indeed the duty, to debate and
criticize, to authorize and appropriate
funds and share in setting the broad
lines of policy. But micromanagement by
a committee of 535 independent-minded
individuals is a grossly inefficient and in-
effective way to run any important
enterjjrise. The fact is that depriving the
President of fiexibility weakens our coun-
try. Yet a host of restrictions on the
President's ability to act are now built
into our laws and our procedures. Surely
there is a better way for the President
and the Congress to exercise their
prerogatives without hobbling this coun-
try in the face of assaults on free-world
interests abroad. Surely there can be ac-
countability without paralysis. The sad
truth is that many of our difficulties over
the last 15 years have been self-imposed.
The issue is fundamental. If the pur-
pose of our power is to prevent war, or
injustice, then ideally we want to
discourage such occurrences rather than
have to use our power in a physical
sense. But this can happen only if there
is assurance that our power would be
used if necessary.
A reputation for reUabUity becomes,
then, a major asset— giving friends a
sense of security and adversaries a sense
of caution. A reputation for living up to
our commitments can, in fact, make it
less likely that pledges of support will
have to be carried out. Crisis manage-
ment is most successful when a favorable
outcome is attained without firing a shot.
Credibility is an intangible, but it is no
less real. The same is true of a loss of
credibility. A failure to support a friend
always involves a price. Credibility, once
lost, has to be reeamed.
Facing the Future
The dilemmas and hard choices will not
go away, no matter who is president.
They are not partisan problems. Anyone
who claims to have simple answers is
talking nonsense.
The United States faces a time of
chaUenge ahead as great as any in recent
memory. We have a diplomacy that has
moved toward peace through negotiation.
We have rebuilt our strength so that we
can defend our interests and dissuade
others from violence. We have allies
whom we value and respect. Our need is
to recognize both our challenge and our
potential.
Americans are not a timid people. A
foreign policy worthy of America must
not be a policy of isolationism or guilt
but a commitment to active engagement.
We can be proud of this country, of what
it stands for, and what it has accom-
phshed. Our morality should be a source
of courage when we make hard decisions,
not a set of excuses for self-paralysis.
President Reagan declared to the
British Parliament nearly 2 years ago:
"We must be staunch in our conviction
that freedom is not the sole prerogative
of a lucky few but the inalienable and
universal right of all human beings." As
long as Americans hold to this beUef, we
will be actively engaged in the world.
We will use our power and our
diplomatic skill in the service of peace
and of our ideals. We have our work cut
out for us. But we will not shrink from
our responsibility.
' Press release 97.1
FY 1984 Supplemental and FY 1985
Authorization Requests
Secretary Shultz 's statement before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
State, and Judiciary of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee on March 28,
It is a pleasure to appeal" before you to
present the Department of State's re-
quest for 1984 supplemental appropria-
tions and the budget for 1985.
During the past year, the worldwide
environment for the Department has
become dangerous, costly, and difficult to
support. In this complex and all too often
hostile setting, the Depai-tment must seek
increases in the resources required to
carry out the di])l()matic and consular
responsibilities of the United States. The
President's I'ecjuest foi- much needed in-
creases for the Department recognizes
the vital role foreign policy plays in con-
tributing to our national security.
This request will continue operations
of the Department of State at existing
levels and jarovifle limited growth in vital
substantive and support areas. It was
developed in conjunction with other
foreign affairs agencies, is based on an in-
tensive resource review, and represents a
cost = effective approach to meeting this
country's foreign policy and national
security goals.
Total Budget Request
For 1985 the Department is requesting
appropriations totaling $2,338,951,000.
This represents an increase of
May 1984
■BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
THE SECRETARY
$235,057,000 and 497 positions above the
1984 appropriations, after adding pro-
posed supplementals totaling 238 posi-
tions and $49,587,000. Most of our re-
quested increases are required to con-
tinue programs supported by this commit-
tee in previous years.
About 52'?^' of the total increase for
the Department's 1985 operating budget
is needed to continue operations at 1984
levels. This increase is first needed to
keep pace with higher overseas operating
costs where inflation often exceeds that in
the United States. Other increases are
workload related such as for passport and
consular activities, overseas adminis-
trative support to other foreign affairs
agencies, cost increases required to sup-
port our domestic-based employees, and
continuation of previously approved
foreign buildings projects.
The remaining 48% of the Depart-
ment's requested increase is for programs
which will continue to renew our opera-
tional capabilities and strengthen several
areas of crucial importance to our global
capability. Failure to make these in-
vestments not only jeopardizes the effec-
tive conduct of foreign affairs but also in-
creases the size of such necessary in-
vestments in the future.
Two of the most important issues fac-
ing the Department are the reporting and
analysis of foreign affairs information and
the security of our people and properties
abroad. Our request contains major ini-
tiatives in both of these areas.
First, the budget will strengthen our
reporting and analysis of foreign political
and economic events. This is our most
essential function. For this purpose, we
are requesting 146 positions and $9
mill'on in a 1984 supplemental appropria-
tion and an additional eight posi^'ons and
$800,000 as part of the 1985 request. We
must improve our ability to report and
analyze the significanc; of foreign political
and economic events and how they relate
tu American national security interests.
Indeed, the crucial relationship of the
Department's information collection and
analysis program to this country's foreign
policy decision process was a central ele-
ment in our budget review process with
the President. To this end, the Depart-
ment's request is needed to meet im-
mediate specific needs for additional
reporting and analysis. These needs were
identified through exhaustive internal
and interagency executive branch review
of available information and the national
security requirements for additional infor-
mation.
Our conclusion is that we must im-
prove the foreign affairs information and
16
analysis available to the Department, the
National Security Council, and the Presi-
dent.
Second, in conjunction with the other
security-related projects contained in this
request, we plan two major security im-
provement initiatives, one immediate and
one longer range. First we are reassess-
ing our priorities to accelerate the im-
plementation of improved security
measures in the Persian Gulf. Second, I
will convene a high-level advisory panel to
conduct a comprehensive examination of
our worldwide security strategy.
We must continue to improve, with
your assistance, the security of our people
and property overseas. The recent series
of vehicle bombings in the Middle East
represents a serious escalation in the
security threat— in addition to the wide
spectrum of existing concerns— to U.S.
personnel and facilities overseas. In 1983
alone, three such suicide bombings
against U.S. installations— the U.S. Em-
bassies in Beirut (April) and Kuwait
(December) and the Marine Corps head-
quarters at the Beirut airport (October)—
accounted for over 300 deaths and scores
of injuries. The most recent intelligence
estimates offer no reason to believe that
this threat will diminish. On the contrary,
we can only assume that the overall
threat level against our overseas ac-
tivities, particularly in the Middle East
region, wUl grow even further, fueled by
such events as the continuing civil conflict
in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war. An ad-
ditional and extremely disturbing de
velopment is the recent assassination of
MFO [multinational force and observers]
Director General Hunt in Rome and the
evidence that suggests a connection be-
tween a revived Red Brigade in Italy and
the role of the United States in Middle
Eastern affau's.
Other important initiatives are
needed to:
• Improve the security, reliability,
and cost-effectiveness of the Depart-
ment's communications systems;
• Provide new office and housing
facilities where needed and continue to
upgrade and restore our inventory of
overseas property valued at an estimated
$5 billion; and
• Expand the Department's
worldwide information processing capa-
bility.
1984 Supplemental Appropriations
The proposed 1984 supplemental ap-
propriations total 238 positions and $50.1
million and are requu-ed for the following
urgent unbudgeted needs:
• 146 positions and $9 million to fund
135 reporting and analysis and 11 interna-
tional communications policy positions.
These resources form the basis of our ma-
jor initiative to strengthen political and
economic reporting and analysis efforts;
• 49 positions and $4.2 million to han-
dle unanticipated increases in passport
workload levels. In 1982 and 1983, the ex-
traordinary strength of the dollar pro-
duced significant increases in the demand
for passports, well beyond budgeted
rates, the cumulative impact of these
unanticipated passport workload in-
creases is a severe shortfall in the
resources needed to process the projected
passport workload during 1984;
• $10.5 million for urgent security re-
quirements;
• 36 positions (including 20 local na-
tionals) and $5.1 million to open a mission
in Grenada. The mission will be headed
by a charge and will include a small staff
to assist as appropriate the economic
development of Grenada;
• $10.4 million to fund the January
1984 Federal pay raise;
• $1.8 million to modernize the Coor-
dinating Committee for Multilateral
Security Export Controls (COCOM)
facilities in Paris so that COCOM can im-
prove its capabilities in line with the in-
creased emphasis on strategic trade con-
trols;
• 7 positions and $1.5 million to sup-
port the U.S. delegation to the Con-
ference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) in Stockholm and fulfill the
President's commitment to support fully
the Helsinki nuclear disarmament proc-
ess;
• $2.5 million to handle unanticipated
increases in protective security and com-
munications support for the 1984 Summer
Olympics in Los Angeles; and
• $4.6 million to finance the unfunded
liability of the Foreign Service retirement
fund created by the January 1984 Federal
salary increase.
Major Components of
the 1985 Funding Request
After including these proposed sup-
plementals, our 1985 request, as I in-
dicated above, reflects a net increase of
$235,057,000 and 497 positions over 1984.
The 1985 request reflects changes in
four major operating areas.
First, in the salaries and expenses ap-
propriation, there is a net increase of
$162.6 million. This increase is requested
primarily to cover overseas wage and
price inflation, workload increases, built-
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
in security cost increases, and critical im-
provements for the Department's opera-
tions in the areas of security, reporting
and analysis, consular activities, profes-
sional development, post openings, infor-
mation systems, communications, and ad-
ministrative support.
Second, the regular and special cur-
rency foreign buildings appropriations in-
clude a total net increase of $50.2 million.
In addition to new development and con-
struction projects, the 1985 foreign
buildings budget includes the .second in-
stallment in a multiyear renewal program
to maintain the Department's worldwide
inventory of property. Included in the
basic program level of these appropria-
tions are resources to fund initial develop-
ment and or construction of office and
housing facilities in nine countries.
Third, we are proposing two new ap-
propriations requiring budget authority
of $14.5 million as follows:
• $9.5 million to provide reim-
bursements, in case of extraordinary
need, to state and local governments and
to secure services of private firms for in-
creased protection of foreign missions and
officials in the United States; and
• $5 million to provide research opjjor-
tunities, through gi'ant support, in
specialties of high interest to the profes-
sional Soviet-East European studies com-
munity and to U.S. policymakers.
Fourth, there is a total net increase
of $7.8 million among all other appropria-
tions. This growth results from increases
for contributions to international orga-
nizations ($6.8 million), international con-
ferences and contingencies ($2.3 million),
international commissions ($3.7 million),
and other appropriations ($1.3 million) off-
set by adjustments to buying power
maintenance ( -$4.6 million) and the pay-
ment to the Foreign Service retirement
and disability fund (-$1.7 million).
In addition, this request includes a
one-time off-budget appropriation of $110
million of U.S. -owned Indian rupees. This
appropriation will establish a binational
U.S.-India fund for cooperative scientific,
educational, and cultural activities. The
fund will provide an effective means of
furthering long-term cooperation and
friendly relations between the United
States and India.
Major Components of
the Position Request
The Department's 1985 request totals
17,324 positions, a net increase of 497
positions over the 1984 level.
Of the 497 positions inci'ea.se, 301 posi-
tions are for built-in changes, largely for
consular and passport workload as well as
administrative support requirements.
The remaining 196 positions are
needed for new initiatives including:
• 48 positions for opening six
po.sts— Wuhan, People's Republic of
China; Windhoek, Nambia; Luanda,
Angola; Moroni, Comoros; and resident
representative offices in Ponape and Ma-
juro, Micronesia, along with an associated
office of Micronesian Affairs in
Washington, D.C.
• 8 positions to strengthen the
substantive reporting and analysis
capability of the Department;
• 11 positions to improve consular and
passport activities;
• 17 ])ositions for expanded profes-
sional development;
port;
' 28 positions for communications sup-
• 27 po.sitions for information systems;
and
• 57 positions for security, legal sup-
port, the development of a new property
management system for our facilities
abroad, and for support of air pollution
studies on the Canadian border.
Last fall I ui-ged the President to
make a commitment, in a difficult budget
situation, to a stronger Department of
State and Foreign Service. He agreed,
and the result is the budget before you. I
ask you and your subcommittee to give it
your strongest support.
> Press release 91 of Mar. 29, 1984. The
complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.B
Foreign Aid and
U.S. Policy Objectives
Secretary Shultz's statement before
the Hmise Fwreiffti Affairs Committee on
February 9, 198Jt.^
Last year when I met with you, I sought
to demonstrate how U.S. assistance to
developing countries serves our national
interests. In the intervening months,
two commissions of citizens and
Members of Congress have examined
our overseas programs. The Commission
on Security and Economic Assistance,
headed by Frank C. Carlucci, reviewed
our total foreign assistance program.
The National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America, headed by Henry A.
Kissinger, reviewed our national goals
and needs for assistance in Central
America. More than two dozen Members
of Congress served with these two com-
missions as members, ex officio
members, or senior counselors.
We are indebted to these members
and all commission participants for their
excellent work. We are particularly
gratified that these citizens— Republi-
cans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives,
businessmen, labor leaders, and aca-
demics—reached a clear consensus on
the importance of foreign assistance.
The Carlucci commission concluded:
"The instrumentalities of foreign assist-
ance are potent and essential tools that
advance our interests. ... On balance, it
May 1984
is the judgment of the Commission that
U.S. assistance programs make an indis-
pensable contribution to achieving
foreign policy objectives."
Both commissions concluded that
economic and military assistance are
equally servants of our national in-
terests. The Carlucci commission notes
that rising standards of living in the
Third World are vital to internal stabili-
ty and external defense. Conversely,
threats to stability impede development.
In a similar vein, the bipartisan com-
mission characterizes the problems of
Central America as a "seamless web"
which can't be defined solely in
economic, political, social, or security
terms.
Both commissions believe that cur-
rent levels of foreign aid are inadequate.
According to the Carlucci commission,
"in real terms . . . U.S. assistance ex-
penditures over the last five years have
averaged some 21 percent below those
of a comparable period ten years ago."
The commission states: "To meet U.S.
foreign policy objectives, significant in-
creases in real levels of assistance will
be required." The bipartisan commission,
having focused on the problems of one
region, also concludes that significantly
more resources are needed to meet our
national interests there.
17
maBaaam
THE SECRETARY
In my testimony today, I want to
build on the foundations laid by these
two commissions. Our foreign assistance
program serves four U.S. interests:
• Our interest in a growing world
economy which enhances the well-being
of citizens in both the developing and
the industrialized world;
• Our interest in security— protect-
ing our vital interests abroad, strength-
ening our friends, contributing to
regional stability, and backstopping our
diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions
to regional problems;
• Our interest in building democracy
and promoting adherence to human
rights and the rule of law; and
• Our humanitarian interest in
alleviating suffering and easing the im-
mediate consequences of catastrophe on
the very poor.
A world of stability and progress
cannot be built by the United States
alone. Therefore, strengthening our
friends must be a central component of
our foreign policy in both the economic
and security dimensions. There is always
the temptation to cut corners here and
there in the aid budget. It is unwise to
give in to this temptation; it is penny-
wise and pound foolish. Strengthening
our friends is generally an effective way
to avoid major problems down the
road— problems that could end up
costing us much more in resources and
sacrifice.
assistance will be distributed geographic-
ally in FY 1985.
In military assistance, we have made
a significant change so that we can
lower interest rates on military assist-
ance loans to poor or debt-burdened
countries. Over the past decade military
assistance has increasingly been provid-
ed as "off-budget" loans with interest
rates at cost of money to the [Depart-
ment of the U.S.] Treasury. As a result,
the Carlucci commission reports that the
21 countries receiving substantial
military and economic assistance in 1982
received an effective interest rate— in-
cluding both grants and loans— of
approximately 9% for military assistance
and 1% for economic assistance. This
discrepancy has meant that in some
countries military assistance repayments
have become or threaten to become a
large fraction of total debt service. For
others, repayment of military assistance
loans takes up foreign exchange needed
for economic growth.
In response, we have moved all mili-
tary assistance "on budget"— a step
which Congress has long urged. By so
doing, we are able to provide military
assistance loans either at a concessional
rate or at the cost of money to the
Treasury depending on the economic
situation of individual countries. You
will note on Chart C how we have in-
creased the concessionality of military
assistance in FY 1985 compared to
previous years. This decision is a key
step toward one of our critical goals—
the more effective integration of our
military and economic assistance.
Central America, the Caribbean,
and South America
The National Bipartisan Commission [on
Central America] concluded its study
"persuaded that Central America is both
vital and vulnerable and that whatever
other crises may arise to claim the na-
tion's attention, the United States can-
not afford to turn away from that
threatened region. Central America's
crisis is our crisis."
The commission emphasized that the
countries of Central America— our
neighbors— are in mid-passage from the
predominantly authoritarian societies of
the past to what— with determination
and help— can become predominantly
pluralistic, democratic societies in the
future. That passage is marked today by
warfare, poverty, and political turmoil,
which breed extremism and violence
from the left and the right. It creates
conditions which Cuba and the Soviet
Union seek to exploit for their own
strategic and political purposes.
The United States has a profound in-
terest in helping the people of Central
America move from these travails to a
future of greater economic and social
justice. Our interests will be served by
Overview of 1985 Budget
and 1984 Supplemental
The foreign assistance program for
FY 1985 totals $15.8 billion, of which
$1.5 billion is multilateral aid and $14.3
billion is bilateral aid. This includes $9.4
billion in economic assistance and $6.4
billion in military assistance. Chart A [see
p. 31] shows the relative proportions of
economic and mOitary assistance in the
foreign aid program since 1974.
For FY 1984, we are seeking supple-
mental funds of $1.1 billion, including
$400 million for emergency economic
assistance to Central America and $259
million for military aid to the region.
Our economic aid in FY 1985 will
focus on increasing food production and
reducing hunger; improving health,
especially reducing infant and child mor-
tality; slowing population growth rates;
spreading education and literacy; and
improving host-country financial struc-
tures. Chart B shows how our economic
Chart B
A.I.D. Economic Assistance
By Region
FY 1985
I Development Assistance
WM Economic Support Fund
\ Z\ PL 480 Title I
I I PL 480 Title II
Asia Latin AiTiencan Nea
& Caribbean & Eui
East Central
rope Programs
16
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
Chart C
other
Concessional
2.6%
Military Assistance Concessionality
1981 Actual
1983 Actual
Non-Concessionnl
81.4%
Noil Concessional
71.5%
Non-Concessionai
33.5%
helping alleviate economic grievance in
the region. We have a vital interest in
helping our friends block the Soviet
Union from consolidating a foothold in
Central America. And most basically,
progress in this hemisphere means the
advancement of our most basic values:
democracy and the rule of law. This is
the kind of world we want our children
to inherit.
President Reagan last week quoted
Sen. Henry Jackson when he recom-
mended establishment of the bipartisan
commission: "Whatever policy options
might be available to us, ignoring
threats to the stability of Central
America and refusing to engage
ourselves in the problems of the region
are not among them."
The bipartisan commission recom-
mended, and we concur, that our
engagement in the region should be
comprehensive: a mix of developmental,
political, diplomatic, and security
measures. Because many of Central
America's problems are rooted in pover-
ty, our largest commitment of resources
will be for economic reconstruction and
revitalization.
Of the supplemental funds we are
requesting for Central America in FY
1984, $400 million-or 61%-is for
emergency economic assistance. In addi-
tion, we are proposing a 5-year $8 billion
program for economic stabilization,
reconstruction, and long-term develop-
ment. This includes $6 billion in direct
appropriations and $2 billion in in-
surance and guarantee authority. These
funds will support agricultural develop-
ment, education, health services, export
promotion, land reform, housing, and
humanitarian relief, as well as trade
credit insurance and aid for small
businesses.
We endorse the commission's pro-
posal to establish a Central American
development organization composed of
representatives from the Central
American countries themselves. Its in-
dependent recommendations will affect
our determinations on the level and
structure of our economic assistance.
We will also follow through vigor-
ously on the commission's conclusion
that the United States must support th(
strengthening of democracy in the
region. We are proposing aid to
democratic, educational, and cross-
cultural institutions, as well as increased
funding for scholarships, leadership
training, and educational exchange.
The commission also recognizes that
in the case of El Salvador, economic aid
and support for democracy are not by
themselves sufficient. It recommends
significantly increased military aid for
El Salvador. To see only indigenous
social upheaval in that country, for ex-
ample, is as shortsighted as to recognize
only the role of Cuba and the Soviet
Union. Our aid supports the moderate
center against extremists of both the
left and right. If we give inadequate
help, it is the moderates who will be the
victims. In the words of the commission
report; "the worst possible policy for El
Salvador is to provide just enough aid to
keep the war going, but too little to
wage it successfully."
At the same time, the commission
concludes, and we agree, that without
continued progress on human rights and
democratic reform in El Salvador, as
well as elsewhere in Central America,
our policies will not succeed. We agree
that U.S. military assistance should be
conditioned on this progress. Salvadoran
leaders have been made aware of this
fact repeatedly; we are submitting
periodic reports to the Congress on the
human rights situation in that country.
We also believe, however, that any
legislation which imposes absolute and
inflexible restrictions on the President's
ability to protect national security in-
terests would jeopardize our efforts to
bring about lasting improvement in the
observance of human rights.
Finally, there is a consensus be-
tween the commission and the Adminis-
tration on another integral part of our
strategy in Central America: support for
the efforts of the Contadora countries to
bring peace to the region. The Con-
tadora objectives are in Central
America's interest and in ours. The
President's program for Central
America is ambitious and comprehen-
sive—consistent with the challenges we
face. We urge your support.
I have talked at length today about
Central America. But it would be truly
wrong to ignore the same kinds of in-
terplay between economic growth,
security, and democracy elsewhere in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
WTiat we found in Grenada, for ex-
ample, demonstrates how indigenous
grievances can be misappropriated for
strategic ends and turned against the
people. Earlier this week, I had the
pleasure of joining the celebration of the
10th anniversay of Grenada's independ-
ence. It was joyful— a rebirth of freedom
and economic hope. It underscored that
freedom and economic progress depend
on an environment of security. The
enemies of democracy and development
are the violent extremes of the left and
right. The task of blunting these ex-
tremes takes not only efforts to
strengthen democracy and promote eco-
nomic growth but also requires profes-
sional security forces and a system of
collective security which can protect peo-
ple and the rule of law. Our security
assistance— as our economic assist-
ance—is vital to building a hemisphere
May 1984
19
BBBBBBBBBmBDE
SBBDCBBBBBnBBDmBB
THE SECRETARY
which is self-reliant and able to fulfill the
aspirations of its people. Your support
for these programs serves the fun-
damental interests of all the citizens of
this hemisphere— our neighbors' and our
own.
Africa
I turn now to Africa, which faces a
much different, although perhaps equally
serious, crisis. Drought is widespread.
As some Members of Congress— most
recently Sen. Danforth [John C.
Danforth, R.-Mo.]-have eloquently
reported, starvation stalks the continent.
In response, the United States has com-
mitted nearly 200,000 tons of food from
our emergency Title II reserve.
But we now have requests from
African governments for an additional
150,000 tons, and expect further re-
quests for 130,000 more tons this year.
We are, therefore, requesting Congress
to approve an additional $90 million in
PL 480, Title II for Africa for FY 1984.
WTien people are dying, common decen-
cy compels us to respond.
Drought may be the immediate
cause of the food crisis, but Africa's dif-
ficulties have deeper origins. Food pro-
duction per capita has fallen by over
20% since the 1960s. During the past
decade, 15 countries had negative
growth rates. Export earnings are
down, and import prices are up; ex-
cessive debt burdens many African coun-
tries.
There are many reasons for Africa's
economic problems, but a primary cause
lies in Africa itself. Briefly put, many
African countries have followed policies
which don't produce growth. Pervasive
state controls, bloated state enterprises
and bureaucracies, overvalued curren-
cies, and disincentives for agriculture
have all had the effect of stifling the
private sector and individual initiative.
The requisites for economic growth
in Africa are many. But Africa needs to
replace policies that won't work with
those that will. There is increasing
recognition of this fact in Africa, and a
number of countries are undertaking
policy reforms.
To encourage this process, the Presi-
dent is proposing beginning in FY 1985,
an economic policy initiative for Africa.
This effort has three components.
First, we are proposing a 5-year,
$500 million program, beginning with
$75 million for 1985, as a new fund
specifically to assist African countries
establish and implement growth-oriented
economic policies. We will give par-
ticular attention to reforms which in-
crease food production.
Second, we are working with other
donors— particularly the Worid Bank-
to coordinate our aid efforts better and
provide more unified support for policy
reform in Africa.
Third, we will continue to direct our
ongoing development assistance to help-
ing build the skills and institutions need-
ed to carry out better policies effective-
ly-
Continued economic crisis in Africa
can generate or amplify security prob-
lems. Libya continues its efforts to
subvert governments and install puppet
regimes in Chad and elsewhere. There
are the continuing conflicts in southern
Africa which we and our allies are seek-
ing to resolve through negotiations.
However, unlike Central America,
the security problems in Africa to date
require only modest military assistance
from the United States. The prime need
there is to reinvigorate economic
growth. There is no reason to despair
about the future. Several African coun-
tries have made progress. With more ef-
fective policies and continued investment
by Africans, the United States, and
other donors, Africa can resume the
progress which marked its first years of
independence.
The Middle East and Surrounding
Regions and Southern Europe
We now turn our attention toward an
area where security has become the
predominant concern. A line on the map
from Spain and Portugal in the west to
Pakistan in the east passes through or
near the Straits of Gibraltar, the
Mediterranean, Libya, the Suez Canal
and Egypt, the State of Israel, the Per-
sian Gulf oil fields, and the southwestern
border of the Soviet Union.
This is an unparalleled braid of in-
terests vital to the United States,
Western Europe, Japan, and the free
worid. Yet, there is no area so pregnant
with threats to peace— not just regional
peace but world peace. Peace is not yet
achieved between Israel and all its
neighbors; Iran and Iraq remain at war;
the Soviet Union is occupying Afghan-
istan. About half of our total FY 1985
foreign assistance request is slated for
this broad area.
Our highest priority continues to be
a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East. Israel and Egypt, at peace now
for almost 5 years, have thus far been
our principal partners. Our programs
with these two states have three aims:
nourishing the economic growth which
underpins their security; sustaining the
military forces they need for defense;
and in the process, providing the con-
fidence and security they need to con-
tinue their support for the peace
process.
We have made significant changes in
the military assistance programs for
Israel and Egypt this year. To reduce
the debt service burden associated with
heavy defense requirements, we are
recommending that all military
assistance to these two countries be
grants, not loans. Because grants are
more valuable than loans and because of
the cash flow requirements of these pro-
grams, we have reduced our military
assistance requests for both countries
below the levels made available in recent
years. We have discussed these pro-
posals thoroughly with Israel and Egypt,
and there is general agreement that
these levels and terms support our
mutual goals.
In Lebanon, as the President said on
Tuesday [Feb. 7], the bloodshed we have
witnessed over the last several days has
demonstrated the length to which the
forces of violence and intimidation are
prepared to go to prevent a peaceful
reconciliation process from taking place.
The measures the President has
outlined reorient U.S. political and
military resources in Lebanon in a way
that will strengthen our ability to do our
job we set out to do and to sustain our
efforts over the long term. The United
States will remain fully engaged. We
will continue our efforts to bring all
sides to the bargaining table. We will
continue to press the Lebanese Govern-
ment and the opposition alike to move
toward political accommodation.
Consistent with our policy, we will
focus on ways to strengthen the govern-
ment's armed forces as a key element in
a stable Lebanon. The funds we have re-
quested in the current budget are part
of that continuing program. Depending
on the progress we make and the
capabilities of the armed forces, we may
have to request additional funds later in
the year.
Our program for the Middle East
focuses also on Jordan, whose role will
be crucial in taking the next major step
toward peace. Most of the funds we pro-
pose for Jordan in FY 1985 will go for
military assistance to help that country
meet its defense needs. The Kingdom of
Jordan is a moderate Arab government
that has long been a friend of the United
States. It now faces a severe challenge
from Syria and other radical forces,
precisely because of its constructive
policies.
20
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
The oil-producing states in
Southwest Asia are xoiJnerable to out-
side threats and internal subversion by
externally supported elements. Nearby
in Africa, Sudan and Somalia face also
the threats of instability which arise
from poverty. Our programs in these
areas seek to counter these pressures
and instabilities. At the same time, we
are supporting countries that provide
access to the facilities which our forces
would need in order to operate in the
area should that ever be necessary.
There is no disputing the importance
of Persian Gulf oil to Western economic
and strategic interests. The best way to
protect these interests is to work with
countries in the region to help them
build their economies and to support
their efforts to provide for their own
security.
Europe
Our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] allies Turkey, Greece,
Spain, and Portugal provide a shield
both for the Mediterranean and the
southern flank of Europe, as well as a
bridge to the Middle East and South-
west Asia. U.S. security assistance is
essential if these countries are to meet
their alliance responsibilities. Turkey's
strategic position is central. There has
been encouraging progress in that coun-
try. The infusions of aid from the United
States and Europe in the past few years
have helped Turkey recover from its
near bankruptcy in the late 1970s. The
Ozal government has announced reforms
to encourage market forces and competi-
tion to increase exports. These should
further enhance Turkey's prospects. Our
interest lies in continuing to support
Turkey's growth, and we propose $175
million in ESF [economic support funds]
for FY 1985.
In addition, we propose in 1985
about $1.8 billion to support ongoing
military modernization programs in
Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
Greece and Turkey lag behind other
NATO countries in military strength and
urgently need modernization. U.S. rights
to use critical Portuguese facilities in
the Azores were extended in Decem-
ber 1983. The Azores base is pivotal if
the United States is to react effectively
to military challenges in Europe or to
threats to Western security from outside
NATO.
Our principal objectives in the
security assistance program for Portugal
are to support the continuing consolida-
tion of its democratic institutions, to
help Portugal modernize its military.
and to assist Portugal as it confronts
continuing economic problems. Spain, a
NATO ally since 1982, also provides the
United States access to air and naval
facilities. By contributing to Spanish
military modernization, U.S. assistance
encourages the depoliticization of the
Spanish armed forces as well as their
modernization.
Asia
The pictures I have been painting in this
rapid tour around the globe brighten
when we turn to Asia. Despite oil
shocks, inflation, and recession, growth
in Southeast Asia continued in the
1970s. Thailand, the Philippines, and In-
donesia all grew in the 6%-7% range
during the decade. For some 20 years,
the East Asian countries have sustained
higher growth rates than any other part
of the world, although all countries have
been affected by the recession.
South Asia, where the majority of
the world's poor live, has also seen
reasonable improvements, particularly in
agricultural production. There are some
dark spots. In recent years, the Philip-
pines has increased its external debt and
growth has lagged. Sri Lanka suffered a
setback in 1983 following communal
violence. But, assuming continued in-
flows of capital, sound policies, and a
good "pull" from restored economic
health in the West, economic growth will
continue in Asia.
And what do we learn from this
record of progress? We learn that
growth improves well-being for those at
the low end of the income distribution
spectrum. For instance, according to a
World Bank estimate, absolute poverty
in Thailand has dropped from 57% in
the early 1960s to 30% in the mid-1970s.
Moreover, available evidence suggests
that where economic growth is rapid,
the lowest 40% of income earners have
moderately increased their share of total
income over time.
The Asian experience provides
lessons for countries in Africa and other
parts of the world. We have found the
benefits to lower-income groups from
growth to be greatest where the follow-
ing conditions obtain.
• Growth is broadly based and
agricultural prices favor producers
rather than consumers.
• Productive investment is labor-
intensive.
• Government interference in
markets and prices is minimized.
• Population growth rates are low,
and educational attainment levels are
better than average.
And we have also learned how rapid
growth in Third World countries
benefits us both as producers and con-
sumers. The East Asian countries now
account for about one-sixth of world
trade. U.S. investment in the region
now exceeds $26 billion and is growing.
The population of Asia— even ex-
cluding China— exceeds that of Africa,
the Near East, and Latin America com-
bined. Continued growth there will be an
enormous contribution to world pros-
perity and stability. Our aid programs in
Asia are concentrated in South Asia and
Indonesia. They emphasize technical
assistance in fields such as agriculture
research. Whether we speak of this aid
as simply an investment in the future or
more pointedly as an investment in an
immense future market, we will reap
great returns from continuing to assist
growth in the region.
Precisely because the stakes are so
high both in economic and strategic
terms and because serious threats re-
main, we continue to provide military
assistance in the region. Our aid to
Thailand and Korea deters direct
military threats to these countries from,
respectively, Vietnam, which now has
the world's third largest standing army,
and North Korea, which spends over
20% of its GNP on its military. Our
assistance to the Philippines helps main-
tain the U.S. bases there which
undergird our strategic position in the
Pacific. Our relationship with ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] is an important pillar of stability
in Southeast Asia.
Multilateral Development Banks
(MDBS)
In FY 1983, lending by the World Bank
and its regional counterparts totaled
$20.4 billion, up from $16.8 billion in
FY 1982. That this lending program was
sustained with a paid-in contribution
from the United States of $1.5 billion
testifies to the advantages of using the
MDBs to share the burden of providing
aid. The MDBs are also leaders in pro-
viding advice on sound market-oriented
economic policies.
We consider our participation in the
MDBs as a crucial part of our assistance
policy. I want to stress in particular the
important role played by the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) in
promoting development in the poorest
countries. We have just completed
negotiations for the seventh replenish-
ment of IDA'S resources. In our judg-
ment, this replenishment provides a
basis for a strong IDA program in sub-
Saharan Africa to work in conjunction
May 1984
21
mnmnauaa
THE SECRETARY
with our Africa initiative. We are re-
questing the final $150 nnillion for IDA
VI in our FY 1984 supplemental pro-
posal and $750 million for IDA VII in
our P"Y 1985 budget proposal. Our
pledge to IDA VII has been widely
discussed in the Congress and should
enjoy broad support here.
Conclusion
You and the other members of the
Carlucci commission concluded that the
foreign aid program is vital to our na-
tional interests. I have tried to show
why this is so region by region.
You also recommended improve-
ments in the program, particularly more
effective integration of military and
economic assistance and development of
means to speak to the Congress about
the program as a whole rather than its
individual parts. I have reviewed all
your recommendations and have asked
for immediate followup on most. Many
were already on this Administration's
agenda of improvements.
I did not agree with the commis-
sion's recommendation for a new mutual
development and security administration
because I felt that the commission's
main aims— better integration of our
assistance programs and a more unified
voice in representing these programs to
the Congress— could be achieved within
our existing structure and without the
disruptions of a major reorganization. I
have asked the appropriate offices to
prepare a plan for doing this by early
March.
The Carlucci commission produced a
bipartisan consensus as to the value of
our foreign assistance program. We will
do our part to improve the program as
recommended. We hope Congress will
respond in kind by supporting and pass-
ing the budget requests which we have
made.
International Security and
Development Cooperation Program
' Press release 67 of Mar. 8. 1984. The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Go\-ernment Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■
Transmittal Letter
TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES:
The Program for International Security
and Development Cooperation presented
here constitutes the predominant portion
of what is, in effect, the foreign policy
budget of the United States. It is that
portion of the total Federal budget which
directly protects and furthers U.S. na-
tional interests abroad. These interests
run the gamut from situations in which
we contribute to the military capabilities
of a friendly or allied country against a
common threat to circumstances in which
we act to assure the maintenance of a
strong, stable international economic
system.
America's stake in a stable interna-
tional political and economic environ-
ment, which has always been large, con-
tinues to grow. For e.xample, our exports
of goods and services as a percentage of
our gross national product grew from
6.5% in 1972 to 11.3% in 1982. The impor-
tance of our trade with developing coun-
tries has grown even more quickly, so
that by 1980 developing countries were
purchasing 40% of U.S. exports— more
than those bought by Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and
China combined. Today 1 of every 20
workers and 1 of every 5 acres of our
farmland produce for 'Third World mar-
kets. More than 40% of our imports are
supplied by developing countries. As
part of this total, those countries supply
more than half of our supplies of some 14
strategic materials, including bauxite,
tin, and cobalt.
The means available to us to promote
and maintain the kind of stable interna-
tional environment we need are varied,
ranging from keeping our market open
to developing-country exports to projec-
ting a strong U.S. defense posture to
help deter acts of adventurism by our
adversaries. Some of the most effective
means we have to promote stability are
the varied programs of foreign assistance
we have developed, ranging from direct
military aid to pay for training or
weapons, to short-term economic
stabilization support, to long-term
development assistance. Each country's
assistance package is carefully designed
to meet the specific problems— in many
cases, the threats— faced by our friends
and allies. In most cases, the assistance
we give today is designed to avoid the
development of a more serious prob-
lem—with a more expensive solu-
tion—tomorrow.
Effectively protecting and advancing
American interests, particularly in the
poorer countries, takes considerable
resources— for technical assistance and
training, for the modem technology of
production, for the human investment
which will pay off in a growing economic
pie. It serves our own interests, further-
more, to help ensure their military' com-
petence, thus helping them to resist
hostile encroachments without our hav-
ing to send American forces. Our adver-
saries will rarely choose to pose their
challenges in places where we are
strong. But they will challenge us where
weak links in the chain exist. It is in our
clear national interest to help strengthen
those links, and to do so requires
resources.
It is these resources which the Presi-
dent's International Security and Devel-
opment Cooperation Program for FY
1985 proposes to the Congress. The link
between U.S. national interests and the
proposed resources is established in the
way in which the Administration
assembles and reviews this program.
There are three essential elements.
• At the outset we develop and pro-
mulgate a statement of our current
foreign policy priorities— the major na-
tional objectives around which our
foreign policy is focused.
• The appropriate bureaus and agen-
cies then prepare country and program
proposals which, in their view, are
needed to support our foreign policy
priorities.
• Those programs are then assem-
bled and undergo rigorous high-level
State Department and interagency
review prior to their presentation to the
President for his approval.
This process is designed to en-
sure—insofar as is possible— that our
scarce resources are allocated as effi-
ciently as possible to our highest priority
22
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
foreign policy goals. Those priorities,
with respect to this budget proposal,
should by now be well known and well
understood.
In the Middle East and Southwest
Asia, we seek to further the peace proc-
ess and enhance the security of free-
world access to the region's oil. Since
both of these objectives concern the
same part of the world and engage the
interests of many of the same countries,
they are, in large part, intertwined.
Thus, our programs in many, if not most,
countries in the Middle East— from
North Africa to Southwest Asia— are to a
significant degree important or even
crucial to both of our objectives.
In the Central American region, we
seek to protect our political, security,
and economic interests by furthering the
development of democratic institutions
and free-market economic institutions
which will ensure the establishment and
protection of civU liberties and human
rights. We are convinced that this is in
the demonstrable interest of the people
in the region, as well as of the United
States and the Western world. It is
clear, however, that there are countries
and political movements which seek to
exploit legitimate domestic grievances
for opposite goals— totaUtarianism in the
political sphere and state monopoly in
the economic sphere. This opposition is,
of course, not limited to peaceful political
methods, hence the need for a major ef-
fort to bolster the military capacities of
friendly countries in the region. Most of
our assistance to this region, however, is
economic aid designed to help overcome
major obstacles to the resumption of sus-
tainable equitable growth.
Our Central American and Caribbean
region program in FY 1984, including
our supplemental requests, is 74% eco-
nomic assistance, and our FY 1985 re-
quest—which reflects not only the Ad-
ministration's preferences but also the
recommendations of the National Bipar-
tisan Commission on Central America— is
more than 84% economic. The smaller
military assistance proportion does not
imply, however, that it is any less impor-
tant. Economic stabilization and recovery
depend upon the existence of an effective
military shield against military aggres-
sion and subversion.
Our principal foreign policy goal in
Europe pertinent to this resource pro-
posal is to continue to strengthen
NATO's southern flank. Most of our
NATO allies are fully industrialized coun-
tries and do not require U.S. assistance
of the kind provided for in this budget
request. However, some of the southern
flank countries— which provide critical
bases and transit rights for U.S. forces
and which requii-e our help so that they
can better fulfill theu- alliance responsi-
bilities—do need such support. Their pro-
grams are among our highest priorities.
It is also important that we continue
to strengthen our alliances and friend-
ships along the periphery of Asia, from
the Republic of Korea in the north to our
ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] friends in the south, some
of whom face hostile military forces on
their borders.
As I made clear in presenting the FY
1984 program, our resource needs for the
conduct of foreign policy remain
modest— less than 2% of the Federal
budget— yet there should be no doubt as
to their importance. In many areas these
programs are very cost-effective substi-
tutes for much larger direct U.S. defense
expenditures. In other areas they effec-
tively complement our direct military ef-
forts, helping to sustain the economies of
important friendly countries. In all cases,
these programs contribute to the well-
being of the American people, as our eco-
nomic intercourse with many of these
countries and the regions within which
they are located continues to grow.
The President's FY 1985 Interna-
tional Security and Development Co-
operation Program is prudent, closely tai-
lored to our most urgent foreign and
security policy priorities, and deserves
the concurrence of the Congress and the
full support of the American people.
George P. Shultz
Introduction
This over/iew presents the President's
proposed FY 1984 supplemental request,
the FY 1985 International Security and
Development Cooperation Program, and
the foreign and national security strategy
and priorities which shape these requests.
More detailed congressional presentations
for the security, development, and
multilateral cooperation programs are
submitted to the Congress separately.
As in previous presentations, this Ad-
ministration has sought to integrate the
various programs— bilateral and
multilateral, economic and military— into
an effective and efficient instrument of
U.S. national policy and interests. That
process is now in its fourth year and has
produced its third full International
Security and Development Cooperation
Program request.
The essential elements of this budget
preparation process include:
• The foreign policy framework
established by the Secretary of State,
which sets forth the foreign poUcy priori-
ties which are to guide the preparation
of the budget;
• The preparation of specific country
programs to support our pursuit of the
above priorities;
• 'The integration of all proposed pro-
grams within a review process involving
full interagency participation and final
approval by the Secretary of State;
• The presentation of the Secretary's
proposed program for review by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, by the
Budget Review Board, and ultimately by
the President;
• The submission of the President's
proposed program to the Congress.
This process has again produced a
prudent and carefully designed program
tailored to support our highest foreign
policy priorities and the continuing re-
quirement for restraint in this period of
continuing fiscal stringency.
FY 1984 Supplemental
Request
As has been the case for the past several
years, funds provided in last November's
Continuing Resolution do not meet all of
the requirements of our foreign policy.
Therefore, the President requests some
urgent additions to the FY 1984 pro-
gram, which the Congress approved.
The report of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America pro-
poses, and the President concurs, that
the United States provide significantly
larger amounts of assistance to promote
democratization, economic growth, hu-
man rights, and security in the isthmus.
Our largest commitment of resources will
be devoted to the reconstruction and
revitalization of Central America's
economies. Our proposal for economic
assistance requests a total amount for
FY 1984 that would nearly double the
level ah-eady authorized by the Continu-
ing Resolution. It reflects the immediate,
urgent needs identified in the commis-
sion's analysis. This magnitude of as-
sistance is needed in the near term to
prevent further decline in living stand-
ards in the region and over the medium
term to enable the region to achieve per
capita economic growth on the order of
about 3% per year by the end of the
decade.
May 1984
BBBflB&£!!r:
23
•nmmrmrm
:':''i!™
THE SECRETARY
On the military side, the commission
recommended significant increased as-
sistance for El Salvador and other Cen-
tral American countries. It did not
specify precise amounts, but it noted the
estimate by the Department of Defense
that approximately $400 million is
needed for FY 1984-85. Our FY 1984
supplemental request of $259 million is
consistent with the commission's think-
ing; recipients, in addition to El Salva-
dor, will be Honduras, Costa Rica, Pan-
ama, and the Regional Military Training
Center.
TABLE 1
Supplemental Request for Central
America, FY 1984
(Appropriated Funds, $ millions)
Functional Development
Assistance
73.0
Economic Support Fund
290.5
PL 480
25.0
AID Operating Expenses
2.5
U.S. Information Agency
7.0
Peace Corps
2.0
Subtotal— Economic
400.0
MAP
259.05
Subtotal— Military
259.05
TOTAL
659.05
Africa faces a food-supply crisis
which began in 1982-83 when drought
and insects caused extensive crop dam-
age. Disruption of farming activities and
transport links due to internal strife has
meant substantially reduced food produc-
tion in the face of continuing population
growth. Urgent assistance from the in-
ternational donor community is required
to avoid widespread human suffering.
The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) estimates that 700,000 metric tons
are needed immediately to help alleviate
this situation. The FAO estimates that
the total food aid gap for the emergency
is 1.7 mDlion metric tons. As a prudent
but essential contribution to this urgent
humanitarian effort, the President has
requested a supplemental of $90 million
for PL 480 Title II.
The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) is the central instrument
in the international effort to restrain the
spread of nuclear weapons and is, there-
fore, a critical element in support of U.S.
nonproliferation policy. The Continuing
Resolution cut $3.7 million from the U.S.
contribution which supports the critical
safeguards and technical assistance pro-
grams of the agency. A reduction of this
magnitude (about 20% of the U.S. contri-
bution) raises real questions about the
depth of the U.S. commitment to non-
proliferation, particularly as we approach
the 1985 review conference on the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. We request restora-
tion of $3.7 million to the FY 1984 pro-
gram and approval of the full request for
FY 1985.
The Continuing Resolution for FY
1984 also reduced the operating expense
account of the Agency for International
Development (AID) by some $17 million.
This account pays the necessary adminis-
trative costs of the development assist-
ance program, the economic support
fund, and the PL 480 programs. Only
limited cuts could be made here before
the programs themselves would be af-
fected. The congressional action resulted
in a thorough executive branch review of
this issue, which produced some $5.5
million in management efficiencies, defer-
rals, and cancellations of some planned
activities which could be absorbed short
of serious negative impact upon the
authorized programs themselves. There-
fore, the Administration requests the
restoration of $11 million of the FY 1984
congressional reduction.
Our participation in the multilateral
development banks (MDBs) continues to
be a crucial part of our assistance policy.
The MDBs are leaders in providing sohd
advice on— and in tailoring their assist-
ance for support of— sound market-
oriented economic policies. The MDBs
provide an efficient mechanism for shar-
ing among the free world's donor nations
a part of the burden of providing eco-
nomic assistance to developing countries.
For these reasons, our support for the
MDBs must continue to be strong. The
FY 1984 Continuing Resolution passed in
November has left significant shortfalls
in funding our current commitments to
these important institutions. Our request
for an additional $319.6 million in the FY
1984 supplemental request will substan-
tially close those gaps and reaffirm our
commitment for continued strong, but
prudent, lending programs by these
institutions.
For migration and refugee assistance,
the Continuing Resolution level of $323
million left the Department unable to
respond to new requirements totaling
$14.65 million. These requirements in-
clude program cost increases for Thai-
Kampuchean border relief, African as-
sistance programs of the United Nations
TABLE II
Supplemental Request (Including
Central America), FY 1984
($ millions)
Multilateral Banks
319.6
International Organizations
and Programs
3.7
Development Assistance
87.9
PL 480
115.0
Economic Support Fund
290.5
Peace Corps
2.0
Refugees
14.7
Military Assistance Program
259.1
TOTAL
1,092.4
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the emergency situation in
Lebanon, and Central American pro-
grams for refugees and displaced per-
sons. These funds are necessary for the
United States to continue to meet for-
eign policy commitments and to address
urgent human needs.
FY 1985 Program
The International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Program consists of
several different types of programs
authorized under the law for particular
purposes.
Multilateral programs provide a vehi-
cle through which the United States can:
• Share equitably with other donors
the burden of providing concessional
assistance to developing countries; and
• Influence the allocation of these
resources toward recipients and in sup-
port of policies consistent with U.S. pur-
poses and interests.
Bilateral programs— that is, those
based upon direct relations between the
United States and particular recipient
countries— support U.S. objectives more
directly. They can provide either military
support (training, technical assistance,
and construction or the financing of
weapons and military equipment pur-
chases) or economic support either by
funding specific economic development
programs (in areas such as health, edu-
cation, training, and food production) or
by providing essential budgetary support
in critical circumstances, permitting the
continuation of essential government pro-
grams.
This mix of programs provides, in ef-
fect, a variety of instruments that can be
used in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy
24
Departnnent of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
objectives. Fcr any particular country,
we try to shape a mix of programs most
efficiently tailored to that country's most
urgent needs. The overall program con-
stitutes the principal concrete instrument
of U.S. foreign policy.
Table III (page 26) shows the pro-
gram proposed to the Congress for FY
1985, along with the President's requests
for the first 3 years of his Administra-
tion.
Virtually aU of the funds which are
allocated bilaterally to the procurement
of goods and services are required by
law or policy to be expended in the
United States. They clearly contribute
directly to American economic activity
and provide jobs to American workers.
Most of the funds that are allocated
to the payment of salaries and other
personnel-related costs in this program,
are paid to American citizens, again
directly contributing to American
economic activity.
A large proportion of the assistance
under these programs is in the form of
loans to be repaid, with interest, to the
U.S. Treasury.
The International Security and De-
velopment Cooperation Program, there-
fore, is not only the principal tangible in-
strument of U.S. foreign policy but also a
program with substantial favorable im-
pact upon the U.S. economy.
FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK
Our major resource demands abroad
are predominantly in regions of crisis
and areas where we face crises which
threaten U.S. and free-world interests.
Middle East and Southwest Asia
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia
we continue to pursue the twin objec-
tives of furthering the Middle East peace
process and working to secure un-
impeded access for all to the petroleum
of the Persian Gulf. These goals are, of
course, intertwined as the result of geog-
raphy, since from North Africa to South
Asia many of the same countries are
critical to our pursuit of both objec-
tives—whether by providing or helping
us to provide a deterrent military pres-
ence or by themselves playing active and
important roles in the search for peace in
the region. The importance of these twin
goals is attested to by the' fact that our
programs directed toward these goals ac-
count for almost 40% of the proposed FY
1985 program.
Our highest priority continues to be
to bring a just and lasting end to the
May 1984
l^BDBBBBBaBBSBBBSaBBraB
conflict and turmoil which has disturbed
the Middle East for so long. There are
no quick and easy solutions for peace in
the region. However, we will persevere
with our efforts and with the President's
Middle East peace initiative of Septem-
ber 1, 1982. Our assistance plays an im-
portant role in furthering the peace
process.
Ten years ago we helped negotiate
the disengagement of Egyptian and
Israeli Armed Forces. They have not
clashed since. Five years ago a peace
treaty ended 30 years of war between
Egypt and Israel. Israel and Egypt re-
main our principal partners in the quest
for a wider peace, and these two nations
are the largest recipients of our proposed
foreign assistance for FY 1985. This
assistance is aimed at ensuring their
security and strengthening their
economies, which are essential to their
continuing on the path to a larger peace
settlement.
Similar, although smaller programs,
are planned for Lebanon and Jordan, also
important participants in our quest for a
Middle East peace. Lack of progress
toward a more peaceful, stable Lebanon
vrill erode the chances for peace and
stability elsewhere in the region. In its
quest for reconciliation, Lebanon needs
our support, both moral and material.
Jordan requires our continued support to
build the necessary confidence to join the
peace process. Our program also seeks to
improve the quality of Palestinian life in
the West Bank and Gaza and to encour-
age economic and social cooperation in
the region.
The Persian Gulf region, a critical
source of energy to the free world, is
simultaneously threatened by Soviet en-
croachment through Afghanistan and by
radical forces from within. About 25% of
the free world's oil imports originate in
the Persian Gulf. Through our assistance
we help to improve the security of these
countries and to maintain the availability
of these vital oil supplies. Certain of our
programs are directed at supporting
those countries in the region which pro-
vide important access to mOitary
facilities and transit rights into the
region for U.S. forces to be used in time
of crisis. In addition to the security con-
cerns which these countries face, some of
them, e.g., Morocco and the Yemen Arab
Republic, have very serious economic
problems.
Central America and the Caribbean
In the Central American and Caribbean
region, we find a growing challenge to
emerging democratization from insur-
gency and terrorism encouraged and sup-
ported from outside the region and
through regional proxies. Thus, our ef-
forts, while remaining overwhelmingly
economic, must nevertheless include mili-
tary resources adequate to provide a
shield behind which the processes of de-
mocratization and the reestablishment of
economic stability and ultimately growth
can continue.
National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America. The crisis in this re-
gion and the controversy over the U.S.
response led the President to appoint the
National Bipartisan Commission on Cen-
tral America under the chairmanship of
the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger.
That commission was charged by the
President with developing recommenda-
tions on a long-term U.S. policy that
would best respond to the challenges of
social, economic, and democratic develop-
ment in the region and to internal and
external threats to its stability. Earlier
this year the commission presented its
report to the President, who has ac-
cepted, in principle, all of its recommen-
dations. The Administration conducted a
thorough analysis of the report and has
developed proposals for a comprehensive
program to meet the acute crisis of Cen-
tral America, based upon the commis-
sion's work.
The bipartisan commission found, as
it studied the region and its crisis, that
the long-term challenge also requires
short-term actions. In many respects the
crisis is so acute, and the time for
response so limited, that immediate ac-
tions are a necessary element of any
long-term policy.
Although the roots of the crisis are
indigenous— poverty, injustice, and closed
political systems— worldwide economic
recession and Cuban/Soviet/Nicaraguan
intervention have brought Central
America to a crisis level. The United
States must address this crisis im-
mediately and simultaneously in all its
aspects. An ultimate solution will, of
course, depend on economic progress and
social and political reform. But insurgen-
cies must be checked if lasting progress
is to be made on these fronts.
Indigenous reform, even indigenous
revolution, is no threat to the United
States. But the intrusion of outside
powers exploiting local grievances for
political and strategic advantage is a
serious threat. The United States has
25
i't'MPWM'P'PWfWPPPP
( :i"! !H
THE SECRETARY
fundamental interests at stake: Soviet/
Cuban success and the resulting collapse
in Central America would substantially
increase the military threat to us and
others within this hemisphere. It would,
thus, compel a substantial increase in our
security concerns along our southern
borders or the redeployment of forces to
the detriment of vital interests else-
where. We have a deep and historic in-
terest in the promotion and presen'ation
of democracy. Pluralistic societies are
what Central Americans want and are
essential to lasting solutions. In this case
our ideals and our strategic interests
coincide. Although there is an urgent
need for action, quick solutions are
unlikely. We must be prepared for a
lengthy effort.
Strengthening NATO's Southern Flank
The southern flank of NATO is im-
portant to its overall defense posture
against the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat to
continental Europe. However, as the
facts of geography make clear, the na-
tions from Portugal to Turkey along the
northern shore of the Mediterranean are
equally important to defense against
Warsaw Pact/Soviet threats in the Medi-
terranean region and the Middle East.
The importance of these countries,
however, is coupled with the fact that
they are among the economically weaker
and less developed of our NATO part-
ners. Thus, there is an urgent need
for support from their more economi
cally developed partners if these key
southern-tier countries are to meet their
NATO responsibilities effectively.
Moreover, helping finance military
modernization in these countries is
clearly in the common interest. Our ac-
cess to bases in Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
and Greece constitutes an integral ele-
ment of our capacity to deploy and sus-
tain forces in Europe and Southwest
Asia. Just as important are the military
missions the forces of each country per-
form in the NATO alliance. Our support
for their effective contribution to
NATO's military posture is thus among
the most cost-effective national security
investments which we can make, from
the standpoint not only of our European
interests but from the clear standpoint of
our interests in North Africa, the Middle
East, and the entire Mediterranean
region.
TABLE III
International Security and Development Cooperation
Program Requests, FY 1982-85'
(Budget Aulhojity, $ millions)
International Security Assistance
Economic Support Fund
Grant Military Assistance Program and
Foreign Military Sales Financing
Program^
Foreign Military Sales (off-budget
guaranteed loans)
International Military Education and Train-
ing, Peacekeeping Operations, and
Antiterrorism Assistance
FMS Guarantee Reserve Fund
Offsetting Receipts
Subtotal
Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance
Development Assistance Program
PL 480 Food Programs
Multilateral Development Banks
Other'
Offsetting Receipts
Subtotal
Total Budget Authority
Total Off-Budget Financing
TOTAL PROGRAM
927
1,652
2,084
6,024
(3.320)
(4,163)
(4,401)
(0)
189
-194
77
-155
108
-126
115
274
-117
3,486
4,590
5,252
9,734
1,711
1,000
1,262
823
-327
4,529
1,840
1,028
1,537
823
-430
4,798
2,022
1,167
1,644
830
-460
5,203
2,267
1,355
1,236
1,068
-463
5,463
8,015
(3,320)
11,335
9,388
(4.163)
13,551
10,455
(4,401)
14,856
15,197
(0)
15,197
'The President's revised requests. Figures may not total due to rounding.
^For FY 1985 all military financing is proposed to be on budget, approximately 80%
to be at nearmarket rates.
'Includes migration and refugee assistance, Peace Corps, international organiza-
tions and programs, narcotics control program, miscellaneous minor programs, and, for
FY 1985, the Micronesia Compact.
Protecting Pacific Interests
The Pacific region is of major political,
strategic, and economic importance to
the United States. We have important
treaty relationships with Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and our
ANZUS partners, Australia and New
Zealand. We also have important and
growing economic and commercial inter-
ests in the area, with petroleum both
originating in and passing through the
region. U.S. trade with this region now
surpasses that with Western Europe by
an ever-increasing margin.
In Northeast Asia a significantly
strengthened North Korea must be mili-
tarily balanced by the Republic of Korea
in order to continue to deter war. To the
south, a Soviet-supported, 180,000-man
Vietnamese Army remains in Kam-
puchea and threatens Thailand's secu-
rity. Apart from our Manila Pact commit-
ment, it is essential to maintain our sup-
port for this front-line ASEAN state.
Our assistance to Thailand is viewed as
the litmus test of American support by
all the ASEAN states.
The Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaysia are located astride strategic
sealanes vital to U.S. and Western in-
terests. Indonesia is an important source
of petroleum. The Philippines provides
the United States with essential military
facilities. All three play a major role in
ASEAN. Our security and economic
assistance contributes to their stability,
economic progress, and political develop-
ment. Furthermore, our refugee pro-
gram, including support for the resettle-
ment of large numbers of refugees who
have fled to these countries, is also
especially important in this area.
Pursuing U.S. Interests in Africa
Africa in 1984 is a continent troubled
from within and threatened from with-
out. It is beset by severe food shortages
and malnutrition, by falling export reve-
26
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
nues and rising import bills, and by
crushing burdens of debt service. Many
African nations are targets of subversion
by Soviet-, Cuban-, and Libyan-
supported dissidents— as the current Lib-
yan invasion of Chad so vividly demon-
strates. Our policy approach to Africa
must address each of these unpleasant
realities, for each directly affects our
policy interests in the continent.
For this fiscal year $90 million in ad-
ditional PL 480 Title II authority is re-
quested for Africa. The President and
Members of Congress have discussed
why that assistance is desperately
needed to confront the tragic effects of
drought. People are dying now for want
of adequate food. The United States can,
and must, help.
The immediate food crisis, however,
is but one symptom of a much larger
problem. Africa's economic crisis is of
such dimensions that it now impinges on
every aspect of our relations in the area.
Underlying Africa's inability to cope
with the many economic setbacks now
confronting it is a generally poor system
of economic policies not oriented toward
producer incentives and growth. Produc-
tion in Africa— including food produc-
tion—is not keeping pace with population
grow^th. Nearly 20 countries in Africa
have resorted to assistance by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) to avoid
economic collapse, and many of these
same countries have also required large
debt rescheduling.
Economic Policy Initiative. The
key to restoration of economic stability
and growth in Africa is increased reli-
ance on the private sector. State control,
state corporations, and state farms have
proven to be millstones. To undertake
such fundamental redirections of policy
as divestiture of state corporations, de-
control of prices, restoration of reason-
able exchange rates, and incentives for
private enterprise will be difficult. Over
the long term, however, such reform is
essential. Our regular economic assist-
ance programs, including vital economic
support fund (ESF) programs, have
already been recast to promote this goal,
and some African countries are now
ready to take the necessary measures.
However, they will require extra assist-
ance if they are to do this successfully.
The Economic Policy Initiative for
Africa is a framework to provide that
assistance. Through close cooperation
with other donors, and with vigorous
leadership from the World Bank, the ini-
tiative envisages providing additional
support for selected countries where
significant reforms are a real possibility.
We intend to provide $500 million over 5
years as a catalyst to energize African
governments, other donors, and the
World Bank toward a joint effort using
new resources to make possible new and
major economic reforms. The first U.S.
contribution we seek toward this plan is
$75 million for FY 1985.
Countries to be included in the initia-
tive have not been preselected. The in-
tention is to begin this new effort in a
small number of countries which can
establish a comprehensive policy frame-
work for reform. Success in those coun-
tries would demonstrate to others what
can be accomplished through a coopera-
tive effort.
Other Assistance. The southern
Africa region— stretching from Zaire to
South Africa— is threatened by both in-
ternal and external instability. Our
security assistance for this region is de-
signed to help friendly African nations
cope with the economic and military
threats to their security. Border conflict
and internal subversion in these mineral-
rich and key states threaten the stability
of the entire region and give the Soviet
bloc and others targets ripe for exploita-
tion. The peaceful Namibian transition to
independence is at the heart of our
southern Africa policy. While we work
with the nations directly involved in this
process, we must also work with and
support the nations on the periphery,
primaiily Botswana and Zaire, in order
to help them cope with their economic
and military threats. A reawakening of
dormant conflicts such as Shaba or an
escalation of the border skirmishes be-
tween southern African states would
provide significant opportunities for the
Soviets and Cubans in that region.
Severe economic depression con-
tinues to endanger every nation in West
Africa. Even the once-prosperous nations
of Nigeria and the Ivory Coast have
been hard hit by the recent worldwide
recession. These nations also are faced
with external subversion, notably overt
and covert Libyan attempts to destabi-
lize or actually overthrow governments
in the region. We continue to provide
modest international military education
and training (IMET) funds to virtually all
of the countries in West Africa while
concentrating our equipment programs
in Liberia, Senegal, Niger, Cameroon,
and Chad— countries where we have im-
portant interests or which are directly
threatened by Libya.
Because of the fiscal plight of our
African friends, we have undertaken a
restructuring of our African military as-
sistance from loan foreign military sales
(FMS) to grant military assistance pro-
gram (MAP), despite the tight fiscal con-
straints on MAP. This includes our pro-
grams in the Horn and East Africa,
where substantial U.S. interests related
to Persian Gulf access are at stake in
Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan.
Assisting Economic Growth in
Low-Income Developing Countries
The low-income developing countries are
characterized by widespread poverty and
limited economic infrastructure. As a
result, they have little ability to obtain
or service financial flows from the inter-
national private sector. They depend
upon concessional assistance to support
their development efforts. The United
States and other donors, therefore,
direct the bulk of their development and
food aid to the world's poorer countries.
At Cancun, President Reagan committed
the United States to maintaining assist-
ance levels to these nations.
The promotion of economic develop-
ment serves our economic, commercial,
political, security, and humanitarian ob-
jectives. Many less developed countries
possess important agricultural and min-
eral resources. By improving the skills of
their people and the effectiveness of
their institutions, our assistance im-
proves the prospects for mutually advan-
tageous trade and investment. The devel-
oping world already constitutes a large
and growing market for U.S. goods and
services. From a political perspective,
the poorer countries are often an impor-
tant voice in world forums, and some are
strategically located near important sea-
lanes, lines of communication, or other
important U.S. friends and allies.
Other Considerations in U.S.
Assistance Planning
One of the most important challenges our
nation faces is the need to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. The success
of our efforts depends in large part upon
our abUity to enhance regional and global
stability and thus reduce those security-
related incentives that can lead countries
to seek nuclear-weapons capabilities.
U.S. assistance can contribute to pre-
venting the spread of nuclear weapons
by helping recipients address specific
security concerns, as well as by enhanc-
ing U.S. influence with recipients. A
critical component in this effort involves
the International Atomic Energy Agency
because of its ongoing effort to extend
and facilitate international safeguards
May 1984
^MBBiBBBBBBBnmaawa
THE SECRETARY
against misuse of civilian nuclear power
programs throughout the world.
High-priced oil imports remain a ma-
jor constraint on economic development
for many countries. While oil prices have
stabilized generally, the fact that they
are denominated in dollars increases the
burden for countries whose currency is
decreasing in value vis-a-vis the dollar.
The resulting threat to the economic
stability of these nations makes it impor-
tant that we continue our efforts to de-
crease their reliance on oil imports
through development and application of
suitable alternative energy technologies.
Protecting the global environment is
another important concern for the
United States and clearly requires the
cooperation of other nations. U.S. bilat-
eral assistance, to the extent feasible,
helps developing countries to maintain
the quality of the air, water, and land
and to sustain the integrity of the
natural resource base on which their
long-term economic development
depends.
In general, U.S. programs of coopera-
tion also consider the extent of democ-
racy and freedom in each country, the
effectiveness of each country's ovra
development efforts, its policies toward
the United States, its record of support
for the United States in the United Na-
tions and other international organiza-
tions, its human rights record, its efforts
to control illegal narcotics, and, of
course, available U.S. resources.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
International security assistance pro-
grams are vital instruments of U.S. na-
tional security and foreign policy, serving
to strengthen alUed and friendly coun-
tries where the United States has special
security concerns. Through these pro-
grams, the United States assists other
countries in acquiring, training for, and
using the modem military equipment
necessary for their defense and promotes
economic and political stability through
balance-of-payments support and project
assistance.
For FY 1985 the President is re-
questing $9.7 billion in security assist-
ance-related budget authority. The shift
of the FMS financing program from "off
budget" to "on budget" is the principal
reason for the $4.5-billion increase in
budget authority over the FY 1984 re-
quest.
Moving the FMS Progrram On Budget
In the wake of the American withdrawal
from Southeast Asia in the early 1970s,
it appeared that the growing economic
capabilities of many countries receiving
U.S. military financing coupled with a
lessened U.S. security requirement for
military assistance in the Third World
would permit the gradual shift from
grant military assistance to credit and
ultimately cash arms sales where U.S.
security interests dictated that they
continue.
That optimistic view of world stabil-
ity and security proved to be off the
mark. Third World economic growth suf-
fered a sharp reversal as a result of the
oil price spiral of the 1970s and the paral-
lel worldwide recession of more recent
years. A number of our key friends and
allies in the Third World, as well as in
more economically advanced regions, face
very severe debt-burden problems that
prevent adequate common security ef-
forts without more concessional military
financing, not to mention extraordinary
financial and economic support. The
challenge we face is to sustain the min-
imal necessary military modernization ef-
fort—and in virtually all the key cases it
is just that, since many military estab-
lishments are shrinking— without con-
tributing further economic burdens.
These circumstances clearly require an
urgent response, as the Congress now
well understands. Yet Administration
requests for increased grant levels have
met with relatively limited success.
The bipartisan Commission on Secu-
rity and Economic Assistance took note
of this growing problem and strongly
recommended a growth in concessional
military assistance.
For FY 1985, the Administration pro-
poses two initiatives in this regard:
• Placing the entire FMS financing
program on budget, thus requiring
authorization and appropriation of funds
for the entire program; and
• Providing, in addition to forgiven
credits for Israel and Egypt, $538.5
million of the total program at conces-
sional interest rates to 16 countries.
The proposed concessional credits
will minimize further exacerbation of the
debt problems in certain critical coun-
tries whose security is important to U.S.
interests. Economic need and the ability
to repay are the primary criteria in
determining the allocation of concessional
assistance. These initiatives will provide
the flexibility to tailor security assistance
programs to the economic situation of
recipient countries by providing an ap-
propriate mix of grant, concessional, and
market-rate financing.
The total FMS credit request for FY
1985 is $5.1 billion for 26 countries, in-
cluding the $538.5 million in concessional
interest rate credits, and $1.4 and $1,175
billion in forgiven credits for Israel and
Egypt respectively. The entire FMS pro-
gram for Israel and Egypt would be in
the form of forgiven credits. While the
total program for both countries is lower
than that in FY 1984, the "all-forgiven"
FY 1985 programs will provide signifi-
cantly better long-term economic benefits
to both countries.
Israel will receive 27% of the total
request. Egypt, the second largest recipi-
ent, will receive 23%. An additional 30%
of the program is requested for the five
countries with which the United States
currently has formal defense cooperation
agreements (i.e., Greece, Philippines,
Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). The re-
maining 20% (about $1 billion) is re-
quested for 19 other countries, including
those which provide access to important
facilities (e.g., Oman, Kenya, and Morocco)
and countries with hostile neighbors pos-
ing a military threat (e.g., Thailand, Jor-
dan, Tunisia, El Salvador, Yemen Arab
Republic, Pakistan, and South Korea).
Proposed recipients of concessional
credits include Turkey, Jordan, Domin-
ican Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Indo-
nesia, PhOippines, Botswana, Cameroon,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama,
Guatemala, and El Salvador.
Summary of Programs
The foreign military sales (FMS) fi-
nancing program enables eligible foreign
governments to purchase defense ar-
ticles, services, and training. For FY
1985 $5.1 billion is being requested, a net
decrease of $616 million from the FY
1984 level. More than half the total is
allocated to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey.
The military assistance program
(MAP) provides grant financing for
defense articles, services, and training to
eligible foreign governments. The Presi-
dent's request for FY 1985 includes $924
million in budget authority for the mili-
tary assistance programs of which $107
million is for reimbursement for section
506a drawdowns from Defense Depart-
ment stocks and for general costs. More
than 75% of the remainder goes to the
following countries: Turkey, Portugal, El
Salvador, Sudan, Honduras, Morocco,
and Somalia.
28
Department of State Bulletin
mm
THE SECRETARY
The economic support fund (ESF)
program provides flexible economic
assistance including balance-of-payments
support, infrastructure assistance, and
development projects of direct benefit to
the poor, on a grant or loan basis, to
countries of special political and security
interest to the United States. The ESF
program is administered by the Agency
for International Development. For FY
1985 the Administration requests $3,438
billion— $254 million more than the Presi-
dent's revised FY 1984 request. Of this
total, almost 50% is proposed for Israel
and Egypt. Some 70% of this total goes
to these two plus eight other countries
primarily in Central America and the
Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region.
The international military education
and training (IMET) program provides
professional military training and educa-
tion in the United States and overseas to
foreign military personnel. It also ac-
quaints them with U.S. social, economic,
and political institutions, including our
human rights concerns. Proposed grants,
totaling $61 million in budget authority,
are requested in 1985. The President's
request would allow the training of per-
sonnel from 95 countries. The largest 10
programs are in Turkey, Spain, Portugal,
Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Jordan,
South Korea, the Philippines, and Kenya,
accounting for almost $25 million or 40%
of the total.
Peacekeeping operations enable the
United States to participate in the multi-
lateral operations necessary to help avoid
international conflict. Currently, the
United States provides voluntary contri-
butions to the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai as part of the
Camp David agreements, the UN Force
in Cyprus, and the Caribbean peace
force in Grenada. Total budget authority
proposed for these peacekeeping pro-
grams in 1985 is $49 million. The Ad-
ministration also proposes legislation pro-
viding for $25 million in emergency
drawdovra authority for peacekeeping
operations.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Foreign economic and financial assistance
supports the foreign policy interests of
the United States by promoting eco-
nomic development aimed at meeting
basic human needs in many Third World
countries. The United States provides
such assistance both bilaterally and
through multilateral institutions.
Bilateral Assistance
Bilateral development assistance is ad-
ministered by the Agency for Interna-
tional Development. This assistance
seeks to promote U.S. interests in the
developing world through the promotion
of long-term equitable grovki;h in the
developing countries. Within the frame-
work of the existing legislative mandate
on foreign assistance, the President has
established the following policies to guide
the formulation of country programs:
• Implementation of effective and ef-
ficient economic policies by the devel-
oping countries;
• Strengthening of the indigenous
private sector in the development
process;
• Creating and strengthening the in-
stitutional and technological capacities of
the developing countries; and
• Encouraging diffusion of technol-
ogy and the expansion of research and
development, particularly through
cooperative efforts between U.S. and
developing-country scientists.
This approach stems from the recog-
nition that the economic performance of
the developing countries is critically
dependent upon their own economic
policies. The greatest strides toward self-
sustaining growth have occurred in those
countries that have relied to the greatest
extent on market forces and have
enough private initiative and sufficiently
viable institutions to develop and apply
technology to their development effort.
Development assistance helps
foreign nations to meet basic human
needs through sustained, broadly based
economic growth. Grant and loan funds
are provided for goods and services,
mostly American, in key development
fields of food production, education and
training, and population and health,
where the United States has a compara-
tive technical advantage and expertise.
Those areas also have the greatest
potential for long-term development to
benefit the poor in recipient countries.
The program reflects the Administra-
tion's emphasis upon policy dialogue,
private enterprise, technology transfer,
and institutional development, and com-
plements nonassistance measures such as
trade, investment, private bank financ-
ing, and other forms of nonconcessional
support for development. The FY 1985
proposal of $2,267 billion represents an
increase of $245 million over the revised
FY 1984 request.
Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)
Title I concessional food sales permit a
flexible response to the pressing eco-
nomic needs of recipient countries.
Title II provides food on a grant basis.
These programs also provide support in
times of natural disasters, support
market development for U.S. agricultural
products, and provide leverage for
agricultural self-help measures. Greater
emphasis is being placed on integrating
these humanitarian programs, aimed at
the serious food-deficit countries, with
our overall economic development, mar-
ket development, and other foreign pol-
icy objectives. Title III provides support
for longer term programs in agricultural
and rural development. The President's
PL 480 request is for $1.36 billion.
Migration and refugee assistance
comprises both refugee assistance over-
seas and resettlement to the United
States. In FY 1985 the Administration
seeks $341 million, an increase of about
$4 million over the FY 1984 adjusted re-
quest. The program continues to focus on
both humanitarian and foreign policy con-
siderations associated with refugee pop-
ulations and movements.
The Administration wall continue to
support major assistance programs in
such politically important areas as South-
east Asia, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa,
Central America, and the Middle East.
Most assistance is provided through
multilateral channels such as the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross,
and the Intergovernmental Committee
for Migration. U.S. funding for these pro-
grams helps meet basic human needs
while seeking longer term solutions such
as voluntary repatriation, resettlement in
the country of asylum, or resettlement in
third countries.
The Administration seeks to resolve
refugee problems without resort to large
programs for resettlement to the United
States but will continue to provide re-
settlement opportunities to maintain first
asylum for refugees and to aid refugees
with links to the United States. The Ad-
ministration also seeks to encourage
other nations to assume a greater level
of responsibility for resettlement of refu-
gees. Refugee resettlement in this coun-
try is expected to be 72,000 persons in
FY 1984 and the same level in FY 1985.
Narcotics control assistance aims to
control the flow of illicit narcotic and
other dangerous drugs through bilateral
and multOateral assistance programs.
The control strategy emphasizes eradica-
tion of narcotic drugs at their source
May 1984
29
THE SECRETARY
with assistance also directed toward im-
proving law enforcement. The Adminis-
tration proposes $50.2 million for FY
1985. While reinforcing important proj-
ects to control heroin production and
trafficking in Mexico, Pakistan, Burma,
and Thailand, and trafficking in Turkey,
this budget level also permits increased
emphasis upon control of cocaine and
marijuana from South America and in-
cludes the U.S. contribution to the UN
Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
The Inter-American Foundation
(lAF) was established by Congress in
1969 as an autonomous government cor-
poration. It extends grants to local
private groups in the Caribbean and
Latin America, particularly those tradi-
tionally outside the mainstream of U.S.
development assistance programs. The
lAF promotes more equitable, respon-
sive, and participatory approaches to
development and foreign assistance in
the region through grants supporting
self-help projects.
The Peace Corps embodies the
American spirit of self-reliance, volun
tarism, and personal initiative. By help-
ing others to help themselves, by pro-
viding targeted technical assistance with
lasting impact, and by serving as a
catalyst in the development process,
Peace Corps volunteers personify this
Administration's approach toward devel-
oping nations. By utilizing the voluntary
service of individual Americans, it is also
one of the least costly and most visible
ways to provide direct technical assist-
ance to developing countries. The Ad-
ministration proposes $124 million in
1985, an increase of some 5% over the re-
vised FY 1984 request.
Multilateral Assistance
Multilateral assistance enables us to
multiply the impact of our bilateral pro-
grams with contributions from other
donors. Donor contributions are further
leveraged in hard loan windows through
multilateral development bank (MDB)
borrowing on capital markets. Multi-
lateral institutions also can encourage
policy reforms and projects in areas that
may be too sensitive for bilateral discus-
sion and can encourage global or regional
approaches to problems that do not lend
themselves to bilateral solutions.
Multilateral Development Banks
Multilateral development bank programs
are an important complement to U.S.
bilateral assistance. For example:
30
• In 1983, the MDBs provided $584.3
million to three important Caribbean
Basin countries— Jamaica, Guatemala,
and Honduras— more than double the
U.S. economic and military assistance;
• Five key countries near the Per-
sian Gulf— Kenya, Pakistan, Mauritius,
Seychelles, and Sudan— received over $1
billion from the MDBs in 1981 and $835.7
million from U.S. bilateral programs; and
• MDBs provided assistance of more
than $1.5 billion to five countries where
the United States maintains basing ar-
rangements—Kenya, Somalia, Oman,
Thailand, and the Philippines— about
three times our $516 million bilateral
program.
While the Administration decided to
honor existing U.S. commitments to
multilateral institutions in order to
preserve credibility abroad, it has not
adopted a "business-as-usual" approach
to the MDBs. The President decided not
to enter into new replenishment agree-
ments until a comprehensive assessment
of the extent and nature of U.S. partici-
pation in the banks had been completed.
The assessment was completed in
1982 and concluded that the MDBs can
make an important and cost-effective
contribution to growth and stability by
promoting a market-oriented interna-
tional economic system. Therefore, a
leading U.S. role in these banks is
justified by our fundamental interest in
a more stable and secure world.
The assessment recommended that
the United States should begin to reduce
our participation in the soft loan win-
dows in real terms and phase down the
level of paid-in capital in hard loan
windows. The Administration has been
successfully pursuing this objective in
replenishment negotiations. We also are
implementing recommendations to en-
courage more emphasis on private initia-
tives, increased cofinancing with com-
mercial banks and other private
investors, more effective policy condi-
tionality, a greater concentration of
concessional resources on the poorest
countries without access to alternative
sources of funds, and a more consistent
maturation/graduation policy aimed at
gradually moving countries out of the
ranks of those needing assistance.
International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) finances
lending operations— $11.3 billion in FY
1983— primarily from borrowing in the
world capital markets and from retained
earnings and loan repayments. Loans are
repayable over 20 years or less, including
a 5-year grace period. The IBRD interest
rate is based on its own cost of borrow-
ing. Loans are directed toward countries
at the relatively more advanced stages of
economic development, generally re-
ferred to as middle-income developing
countries.
International Development Associa-
tion (IDA) lends only to the poorest
developing countries, those with an an-
nual per capita income of $805 or less in
1982 doUars; 93% of IDA funds went to
countries with per capita incomes below
$410 in 1983. IDA loans have 50-year
maturities including a 10-year grace
period. They carry no interest, but there
is a minimal annual service charge.
Inter- American Development Bank
(IDE) provides development assistance
to Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries. Like other multilateral develop-
ment banks, the IDB provides resources
on both market-related and concessional
terms. The IDB's hard loan window
utOizes capital-market borrowings to
fund the majority of its lending program.
The Fund for Special Operations pro-
vides concessional financing. Each dollar
of the U.S. contribution is matched by
about $2 from other donors.
Inter-American Investment Cor-
poration (IIC). The Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) is proposing
the creation of an investment corpora-
tion, along the lines of the International
Finance Corporation of the World Bank.
The purpose of the IIC would be to pro-
mote the economic development of the
regional developing members by en-
couraging the establishment, expansion,
and modernization of private enterprises
and of market-oriented mixed enterprises
controlled by the private sector, giving
priority to small- and medium-scale
enterprises. IDB management seeks to
fund the IIC at a minimum of $200
million, of which the United States would
provide $50-$60 million over 4 years
beginning in FY 1985.
The Asian Development Bank
(ADD) supports development in the
countries of Asia and the Pacific. The
ADB, particularly through its conces-
sional window, the Asian Development
Fund (ADF), has placed increased em-
phasis on lending for projects intended
to meet the needs of the poorest people
in these countries. Projects for agricul-
ture and agroindustry have recently ac-
counted for approximately one-third of
all ADB and ADF lending, with energy
comprising about one-quarter. The
largest borrowers from the ADB and
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
ADF are Indonesia, Philippines, South
Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh.
African Development Bank and
Fund (AFDB, AFDF) were founded in
1963 and 1973, respectively. The United
States joined the fund, the concessional
lending affiliate of the African Develop-
ment Bank, in 1976. The AFDF lends to
the poorest African countries. During
FY 1983, this amounted to $238 million
distributed among 18 African nations.
Late in 1982, membership in the bank
was opened to non-African states, and
the United States became a member on
February 8, 1983.
International Organizations
find Programs
International organizations and pro-
grams support certain voluntarily funded
development, humanitarian, and scientific
assistance programs of the United Na-
tions and the Organization of American
States (OAS). U.S. contributions provide
the basis for U.S. efforts to improve the
effectiveness and influence the direction
of these important multilateral programs.
U.S. contributions to these programs are
important for maintaining U.S. influence
in the United Nations and the OAS
regarding others matters as well.
More than 80% of the requested
funds are for three major UN pro-
grams—the UN Development Program,
UN Children's Fund, and the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment. U.S. contributions to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, UN
Environment Program, UN Capital
Development Fund, smaller UN pro-
grams, and OAS development assistance
programs represent significant but more
specialized assistance funded by this ac-
count. Funding is requested for one new
initiative in the account, the Investment
Promotion Service Office of the UN In-
dustrial Development Organization in
New York, whose purpose is to train in-
vestment promotion officers from devel-
oping countries and to support their ef-
forts to attract commercial investors.
The International Fund for Agrri-
cultural Development (IFAD) provides
concessional agricultural loans and grants
in member developing states to help ten-
ant and small farmers expand food pro-
duction, improve nutrition, and combat
rural poverty. The loans are often
cofinanced with multilateral banks, UN
agencies, and bilateral donors including
OPEC countries. Almost all IFAD loans
have been allocated to countries with an-
nual per capita incomes of under $500 (in
1978 dollars). Countries pay interest
charges reflecting their levels of per
capita income. Negotiations on IFAD's
first replenishment (IFAD I) were com-
pleted in 1982 with members of OPEC
and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development agreeing
to share the same relative burden as
they did in the institution's initial fund-
ing. The U.S. pledge under IFAD I is
$180 million. The United States has
already paid $90 million of this pledge
and $50 million more toward the pledge
is requested for FY 1985.
The UN Development Program
(UNDP), which provides technical assist-
ance to some 15() countries and terri-
tories, exercises leadership within UN
specialized agencies and programs to
bring a mix of resources and technical
help to bear upon economic development
programs. The activities of the UNDP
are financed entirely through voluntary
contributions.
The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
focuses on delivering basic services to
mothers and children of the Thu-d World.
UNICEF's current programs in 110
countries are financed entirely through
the voluntary contributions of member
states and from private sources.
The Organization of American
States (OAS), which is not part of the
UN system, conducts programs that sup-
port technical cooperation contributing to
the economic and social development of
Latin America and the Caribbean. In re-
cent years, several Latin American coun-
tries have become net contributors to
OAS development programs.
The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) fulfills an important role
for U.S. nonproliferation interests by
operating the international safeguards
system against nuclear-weapons prolifer-
ation and by providing technical assist-
ance in the peaceful development of
nuclear energy.
Report of the Commis-
sion on Security and
Economic Assistance
On February 22, 1983, the Secretary of
State announced the formation of the
Commission on Security and Economic
Assistance, under the chairmanship of
the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, to
review the goals and activities of United
States foreign assistance efforts. This
commission was broadly bipartisan and
included a wide representation from both
Houses of Congress as well as from the
private sector. It was cochaired by
Joseph Lane Kirkland, Lawrence H.
Silberman, and Dr. Clifton R. Wharton,
U.S. Foreign Economic and
Military Assistance, FY 1974-85
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1 '18 1
Fiscal Year
1983 1984 1981
May 1984
mWBBHmmilllllLIUllllLlllilUH
THE SECRETARY
Jr. The commission presented its report
to the Secretary in November 1983.
After reviewing it's recommendations,
the Secretary of State presented the
report to the President in February
1984.
The commission recognized at the
outset that the United States, through
its support of the economic and security
capabilities of friendly countries, seeks to
further free, humane, and open societies
in a secure, prosperous world. American
efforts abroad are directed toward assur-
ing our national security, promoting the
democratic rights and ideals upon which
our society is based, and fostering our
diplomatic, economic, and commercial
interests.
The commission recognized, however,
that concerns about the lack of popular
and legislative support, real resource
levels which have stagnated if not de-
clined over the years, and skepticism
regarding program effectiveness— factors
which led to the creation of the commis-
sion—all imposed serious limits upon the
effectiveness of our assistance programs
as instruments of U.S. foreign and
security policy. The commission's
charter, therefore, was to examine all
aspects of U.S. foreign assistance pro-
grams and to propose ways in which
these programs could make a greater
contribution to meeting U.S. national
objectives.
The commission found that support
for foreign assistance had broken dovra
and polarized, as advocates for military
or economic programs tend to oppose
rather than support each other. Budget-
ary limitations forcing difficult trade-offs
among domestic and international pro-
grams have further exacerbated the
problem. Widespread misunderstanding
regarding the nature and objectives of
specific foreign assistance programs
means that the general public no longer
perceives these efforts as coherently
serving valid U.S. national interests.
Program management has become in-
creasingly encumbered by legislative re-
quirements, while recent efforts to inte-
grate security and economic assistance
policy and programs should be continued.
The keystone to the Carlucci commis-
sion's recommendations is the conclusion
that economic and military assistance
must be closely integrated since eco-
nomic growth and rising standards of liv-
ing are vital to internal stability and ef-
fective external defense. Conversely,
threats to stability impede economic
development and prosperity. The future
effectiveness of the foreig^i assistance
program rests on the concept that secu-
Economic Assistance as a Percentage of Total
Foreign Assistance, FY 1946-85
j—i—i Ill
I I I I i—i I I I I
1965
iscal Year
rity and growth are mutually reinforcing
and that both are fundamental to the ad-
vancement of U.S. interests. On balance,
the commission determined that U.S.
assistance programs make an indispen-
sable contribution to achieving U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
U.S. foreign assistance as a whole
has been declining. In real terms (when
adjusted for inflation), U.S. assistance
expenditures over the last 5 years have
averaged some 21% below those of a
comparable period 10 years ago. Mihtary
assistance, especially in terms of its
"grant element," has fallen dispro-
portionately. Although the trend has
changed in recent years, in 1975 the pro-
portion of concessional economic and mili-
tary assistance was roughly equal. By
1983, five dollars of economic assistance
was given on concessional terms for
every dollar of grant military assistance.
Excluding support to Israel and Egypt,
most of our military assistance in recent
years has been provided at the cost of
money to the U.S. Treasury, yet there
are friendly countries with legitimate
security needs that simply cannot afford
to borrow for necessary military equip-
ment and services on these terms.
The commission recognized that the
balance between economic and security
assistance continues to be one of the
most divisive issues affecting the foreign
assistance program. That debate has
become sterile and unproductive at best
and damaging to U.S. interests at worst.
The commission returned repeatedly to
the conclusion that the optimum mix of
programs could only be reached on a
country-by-country basis where local con-
ditions and U.S. interests would deter-
mine requirements.
The countries of the world are highly
interdependent and continue to become
more so. In this setting, the commission
concluded, the United States cannot
escape the importance of international
lending, trade relations, collective secu-
rity, and foreign assistance. Because our
foreign assistance efforts must respond
to a changing environment that
threatens American security and pros-
perity in every part of the world, the
commission offered, among others, the
following recommendations:
• The commission urged that the
congressional leadership and the Presi-
dent jointly endorse the conclusion that
foreign security and economic coopera-
tion programs are mutually supportive
and constitute an essential instrument of
the foreign policy of the United States
and that they broaden efforts to inform
the American public of the importance of
our foreign assistance programs.
• It also made clear that to meet
U.S. foreign policy objectives, significant
increases in real levels of assistance will
be required, particularly in regions such
32
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
as sub-Saharan Africa and Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean where special
challenges face the United States in the
forseeable future.
• The commission endorsed the posi-
tion that programs should contribute to
the evolution of policies that will result
in open, self-sustaining, and democratic
societies. While human resource develop-
ment and institution-building are essen-
tial to development and security, greater
emphasis also should be given to science
and technology-related development as-
sistance that also could be available, on a
mutually cooperative basis, to middle-
income and newly industrialized
countries.
• The commission also endorsed the
use of bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tion programs to encourage the growth
of indigenous private sectors and U.S.
private-sector contributions to the devel-
opment process. The commission called
for maintenance of the flexibility of the
ESF program and, in the administration
of the development assistance account, to
ensure that long-term development needs
are met in ways consistent with the
short-term economic and financial con-
straints that are facing many developing
countries. Whenever possible, PL 480
resources should be used in connection
with other forms of economic assistance
to maximize development impact.
• The commission concluded that
greater concessionality was needed in
military assistance in order to reduce the
debt repayment burden of poorer countries
facing serious security requirements.
The Administration fully endorses
the overall approach and general conclu-
sions of the commission and has incor-
porated most of the specific recommenda-
tions into the President's Security and
Development Cooperation Program for
FY 1985. ■
May 1984
APPENDIX A
Foreign Economic and Military Assista
nee, FY 1984 and 1985'
($ millions)
FY 19B4
FY 1984
FY 1984
Continuing
Supplemental
Revised
FY 1985
Resolution
Request
Request
Request
ECONOMIC
Multilateral
Multilateral Banks
1,324.4
319.6
1,644.0
1,235.6
International Organizations and Programs
314.2
3.7
317.9
241.8
Subtotal
1,638.5
323.3
1,961.8
1,477.4
Bilateral
Development Assistance
1,934.2
87.9
2,022.1
2,267.5
PL 480
1,052.0
115.0
1,167.0
1,355.0
Economic Support Fund
2,893.3
290.5
3,183.8
3,438.1
Peace Corps
115.0
2.0
117.0
124.0
Refugees
323.0
14.7
337.7
341.5
Narcotics
41.2
41.2
50.2
Micronesia Compact
295.5
Antiterrorism
2.5
2.5
5.0
Peacekeeping
56.2
56.2
49.0
Other (including African Development
Foundation and Inter-A.nerican
Foundation)
16.0
6,433.3
16.0
6,943.4
15.0
Subtotal
510.0
7,940.7
TOTAL (ECONOMIC)
MILITARY
8,071.9
833.3
TOTAL (GROSS)
Offsetting Receipts
Agency for International Development
Foreign Military Sales
TOTAL (NET)
586.5
-460.5
- 126.0
13,763.2
586.5
- 460.5
- 726.0
'Figures may not total due to rounding.
8,905.2 9,418.1
Foreign Military Sales Guarantees
Off Budget
(4,401.3)
(4,401.3)
(0)
On Budget
Concessional
Forgiven
Market
1,315.0
0.0
1.315.0
0.0
1,315.0
0.0
1.315.0
0.0
5,100.0
53S.5
2,575.0
1.986.5
Military Assistance Program
International Military Education
and Training
Guarantee Reserve Fund
510.0
51.5
6,277.8
259.1
769.1
51.5
6,536.8
924.5
60.9
274.0
TOTAL (MILITARY)
259.1
6,359.4
14,349.7 1,092.4 15,442.0 15,777.5
580.1
-463.1
-117.0
1,092.4 14,855.6 15,197.4
33
THE SECRETARY
APPENDIX B
FY 1985 Bilateral Assistance Program Requests
(Budget Authority. $ millions)
Develop-
Conces-
Market-
ment
sional
Rate
Assist-
ance
PL 480
ESF
IMET
MAP
FMS
Loans
FMS
Loans
Title 1
Title II
TOTAL
Middle East and Southwest Asia
Egypt
_
225.000
18.349
750.000
2.000
1,175.000
2,170.349
Israel
—
—
—
850.000
—
—
1,400.000
—
2,250.000
Jordan
—
—
0.087
20.000
2.000
—
47.500
47.500
117.087
Lebanon
—
—
—
20.000
0.800
—
_
15.000
35.800
Regional Middle East
3.000
—
2.288
15.000
—
—
—
—
20.288
Algeria
—
—
—
—
0.050
—
—
—
0.050
Djibouti
—
—
1.046
3.500
0.100
2.500
—
—
7.146
Kenya
30.000
10.000
5.139
55.000
1.800
23.000
—
—
124.939
Madagascar
2.000
6.000
2.312
—
0.050
—
—
—
10.362
Mauritius
—
3.500
0.233
2.000
—
—
—
—
5.733
Morocco
19.000
40.000
12.504
15.000
1.700
40.000
10.000
—
138.204
Oman
—
—
—
20.000
0.100
—
—
45.000
65.100
Pakistan
50.000
50.000
3.996
200.000
1.000
—
100.000
225.000
629.996
Seychelles
—
—
0.292
2.000
0.050
—
—
—
2.342
Somalia
22.000
20.000
1.830
35.000
1.250
40.000
—
—
120.080
Sudan
28.000
50.000
2.451
120.000
1.700
69.000
—
—
271.151
Tunisia
—
5.000
0.854
3.000
1.700
15.000
25.000
25.000
75.554
Yemen
30.000
5.000
0.067
—
1.500
10.000
—
—
46.567
Total
184.000
414.500
51.448
2,110.500
15.800
199.500
2,757.500
357.500
6,090.748
Central America and the Caribbean
Belize
6.000
Costa Rica
20.000
El Salvador
80.000
Guatemala
40.000
Honduras
45.000
Panama
19.800
Regional Organization
for Central American
Programs
62.000
Regional Military
Training Center
—
Bahamas
_
Dominican Republic
30.000
Eastern Caribbean
32.000
Guyana
—
Haiti
24.000
Jamaica
28.000
Suriname
—
Trinidad & Tobago
—
Total
386.800
—
—
4.000
0.100
0.500
_
28.000
—
160.000
0.200
9.800
_
44.027
7.073
210.000
1.500
116.000
15.000
16.047
5.353
35.000
0.300
—
10.000
15.135
3.865
75.000
1.200
61.300
_
—
0.488
20.000
0.600
14.400
5.000
—
—
—
0.050
22.000
2.895
45.000
0.750
—
0.130
20.000
0.300
—
0.048
—
0.050
15.000
10.081
5.000
0.450
30.000
0.100
70.000
0.250
—
—
—
0.080
—
—
—
0.050
70.209
30.033
780.600
5.880
20.000
3.000
5.000
0.300
5.000
235.300
5.000
35.000
10.600
218.000
473.600
106.700
201.500
60.288
198.600
20.000
0.050
108.645
57.430
0.098
54.831
133.350
0.080
0.050
— 1,643.822
Europe and NATO's Southern Flanl<
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Greece
Iceland
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Total
3.000
0.060
—
0.060
—
—
1.700
—
—
0.025
—
80.000
3.000
70.000
12.000
3.000
—
75.000
4.000
230.000
—
0.150
—
250.000
250.000
—
0.060
—
3.000
—
0.060
500.000
501.700
—
0.025
55.000
208.000
400.000
415.000
275.000
934.000
—
0.150
1,230.000 2,061.995
34
Department of State Bulletin
■tHHHH
"""■■'"■
THE SECRETARY
APPENDIX B— Continued
Develop-
meni
Assist-
ance
Pacific/Asia
Asian Region
19.500
Brunei
—
Burma
15.000
Fiji
—
Indonesia
65.000
South Korea
—
Malaysia
—
Papua New Guinea
—
Philippines
39.000
Singapore
—
Solomon Islands
—
South Pacific
6.000
Thailand
27.000
Tonga
—
Conces-
sional
FMS
Loans
Market-
Rate
FMS
Loans
TOTAL
19.500
—
0.030
—
15.300
—
0.080
20.000
155.441
230.000
232.000
10.000
11.000
—
0.050
30.000
230.959
—
0.050
—
0.030
—
7.000
98.000
137.400
—
0.030
388.000
808.870
9.959
Total
171.500
—
0.030
—
—
0.300
—
—
0.080
—
_
2.700
—
_
2.000
—
—
1.000
—
—
0.050
—
5.000
2.000
25.000
—
0.050
—
—
0.030
—
1.000
—
—
5.000
2.400
5.000
—
0.030
—
)1.000
10.670
30.000
50.000
South Asia
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Sri Lanka
Total
82.000
87.000
75.000
22.873
0.605
125.034
15.000
41.500
26.000
1.106
6.114
225.500
101.000
155.732
0.250
0.300
0.025
0.100
0.150
0.825
180.123
0.6.05
212.334
0.025
16.206
73.764
483.057
South America
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
South American Region
Mexico
Pan American College
of the Americas
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total
20.000 11.941
— 0.071
10.000
21.500
30.000
73.500
2.000
20.000 13.887
40.000 26.693 2.000
0.050
0.100
0.050
0.050
0.900
0.700
0.250
6.000
0.050
0.850
0.060
0.050
9.110
3.000
_
—
0.050
—
—
47.041
_
_
0.121
_
_
0.050
4.000
4.000
8.900
2.000
2.000
15.494
_
—
23.500
-
-
0.250
6.000
—
—
0.050
5.000
5.000
74.737
—
—
0.060
—
—
0.050
3.000 11.000 11.000
May 1984
35
THE SECRETARY
APPENDIX B— Continued
DwMlop-
Conces-
Market
mem
sional
Rate
Aulst-
anc«
PL 480
ESF
IMET
MAP
FMS
Loans
FMS
Loans
TOTAL
Thlel
Thie II
Africa
Southern Africa
Angola
_
0.194
—
—
_
—
_
0.194
Botswana
—
—
2.015
10.000
0.300
4.000
5.000
—
21.315
Lesotho
10.300
—
7.189
—
—
—
—
—
17.489
Malawi
10.000
—
0.348
—
0.200
1.000
—
—
11.548
Southern African Region
—
—
—
37.000
—
—
—
—
37.000
Swaziland
7.900
—
0.442
—
0.050
—
—
—
8.392
Tanzania
—
—
1.272
—
0.075
—
—
—
1.347
Zaire
12.000
15.000
1.079
15.000
1.400
15.000
—
—
59.479
Zambia
—
10.000
—
20.000
—
—
—
—
30.000
Zimbabwe
15.000
—
—
15.000
0.150
—
—
—
30.150
West Africa
Cameroon
20.400
_
0.821
_
0.200
—
5.000
_
26.421
Cape Verde
2.000
—
3.680
—
0.060
—
—
—
5.740
Chad
5.000
—
0.909
10.000
0.150
5.000
—
—
21.059
Congo
1.000
—
—
—
0.050
—
—
—
1.050
Equatorial Guinea
1.000
—
0.676
—
0.060
—
—
—
1.736
Gabon
_
_
—
—
0.100
—
—
—
0.100
Gambia
4.000
_
1.099
—
0.060
—
—
—
5.159
Ghana
1.000
—
7.142
—
0.325
—
—
—
8.467
Guinea
2.600
6.000
0.304
—
0.100
3.000
—
—
12.004
Guinea-Bissau
2.000
_
0.804
—
0.075
—
—
—
2.879
Ivory Coast
_
—
—
—
0.075
—
—
—
0.075
Liberia
14.500
16.000
0.109
45.000
1.200
15.000
—
—
91.809
Niger
18.000
_
0.379
7.000
0.200
5.000
—
—
30.579
Sao Tome
_
—
0.163
—
—
—
—
—
0.163
Senegal
17.000
8.000
5.618
15.000
0.500
3.000
—
—
49.118
Togo
3.000
—
2.803
—
0.075
—
—
—
5.878
Upper Volta
7.000
—
10.177
—
0.150
—
—
—
17.327
Otf}er Programs
Africa Civic Action
_
_
_
—
—
5.000
—
—
5.000
Africa Regional
51.499
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
51.499
Economic Policy Initiative
75.000
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
75.000
Benin
—
_
1.869
—
0.050
—
—
—
1.919
Burundi
4.300
—
2.067
—
0.090
—
—
—
6.457
Central African Republic
2.000
—
0.167
—
0.100
—
—
—
2.267
Comoros
0.400
—
0.413
—
—
—
—
—
0.813
Ethiopia
_
_
3.711
—
—
—
—
—
3.711
Mall
10.000
_
2.481
—
0.125
—
—
—
12.606
Mauritania
3.500
_
6.221
—
0.050
—
—
—
9.771
Rwanda
5.500
_
4.088
—
0.060
—
—
—
9.648
Sahel Region
31.000
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
31.000
Sierra Leone
1.300
4.000
1.644
—
0.050
—
—
—
6.994
Uganda
10.000
—
—
—
0.100
—
—
—
10.100
Total
348.199
59.000
69.884
174.000
6.180
56.000
10.000
723.263
36
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
News Conference of March 20
Secretary Shultz held a news con-
ference at the Department of State on
March 20, IQSJ,.''
In San Salvador a few weeks ago, I
minced no words in saying that death
squads and terror have no place in a
democracy. The time has come to be
equally blunt about what needs to be
done here in Washington to prevent new
Cubas in Central America.
This Administration, the last Ad-
ministration, and a 12-member bipartisan
commission, which studied Centi-al
America for 5 months, have all concluded
that important U.S. interests are at
stake. If regimes responsive to Moscow
and Havana, and hostile to the United
States, are installed in Central America,
we will pay a high price for a long, long
time.
The irony is that the price to avoid
new Cubas is still relatively small and
that we can still pay it by supi)orting a
pohcy that is fully consistent with our
ideals and with a search for political solu-
tions.
The people of El Salvador vote Sun-
day for president and vice president. The
choices are real, and the balloting will be
fair. The outcome is not a foregone conclu-
sion. Whoever takes office in June will
have the legitimacy of proven support
from the people of El Salvador. We and
everyone else will have to recognize that
fact in evaluating our policies and in-
terests.
The election, however, is not being
fought just among candidates who have
agreed to support the voters' decision. It
is being violently opposed by a guerrilla
minority that refuses to put its program
to the test of the ballot box. The guer-
rillas have pulled some spectacular raids,
but the army has been doing what
counts— protecting the cities, the harvest,
and the people's right to choose. Despite
an upsurge of guerrilla terrorism against
elected officials, civilian deaths from all
political causes for the month of February
were the lowest in several years— less
than one-third those of February a year
ago and one-tenth those of 3 to 4 years
ago.
There is nothing unexpected about
the need for more aid to El Salvador. We
knew, and the Congress knew, that the
assistance authorized last fall would run
out this spring. It was understood that
we would reevaluate our needs after the
bipartisan commission had made its find-
ings.
In January, the bipartisan commission
recommended unanimously that we pro-
vide El Salvador "significantly increased
levels of military aid as quickly as possi-
ble" [emphasis in original report]. In
February the President sent Congress a
supplemental request for El Salvador as
part of his comprehensive progi-am to im-
plement the bipartisan commission's
recommendations. It is now obvious that
Congress will not act on this legislation
before June at the earliest, and deliveries
will take time after that.
Events in Central America simply
will not wait that long. There is a gap
between what is needed on the ground
and the pace of the legi-slative calendar.
So we identit"ied what is needed now to
help El Salvador continue on its chosen
path to democracy and to keep the
pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate.
The national interest is clear. I call
upon the Congress to approve the $93
million in emergency security assistance
for El Salvador so that its armed forces
can protect the people and the leaders
they choose. And I also call upon the Con-
gress to recognize the validity of the
struggle of those Nicaraguans who are
resisting totalitarianism. To delay these
funds is to hinder prospects for peace and
negotiations, to prolong suffering, and to
strengthen the hand of our adversaries.
Q. Do you intend to go through with
the Jordan Stinger sale in light of King
Hussein's recent remarks?
A. First of all, on the question of Jor-
danian security, we support the impor-
tance of security for Jordan and our other
friends in the Middle East. In making
that effective, of course, the President
takes his position, and we have to
mobilize congressional support for any
position on that subject. And we will con-
tinue to work with the Congress to find,
in every way we can, the means of help-
ing Jordan make itself as secure as possi-
ble in the region. Just how that will play
itself out remains to be seen, but our ob-
jective will be to help King Hussein and
the Jordanians provide for their security.
Q. Do you think his views are, in
any way, symptomatic of other coun-
tries' views about U.S. Middle East
policy, other countries such as Saudi
Arabia?
A. I think that, obviously, as we have
not achieved the results that we sought in
Lebanon, there is a tendency to question
us, no doubt about it.
I would say, insofar as Lebanon is
concerned, that the wheel continues to
turn. We don't put a period after
Lebanon. We're there; we intend to re-
main engaged. I'd say we put a comma
there or maybe a semicolon. The United
States has been an important factor in the
region for a long time because we have
important interests there and because we
have been a factor for peace and because
we have been concerned about the secu-
rity interests of all states in the region.
So I would expect that while, of
course, people are constantly looking
around and questioning this, that, and the
other factor, that in the end the essential-
ity of the U.S. role will be apparent to all.
Q. King Hussein says American
policy in the Middle East has failed
because the United States has allegedly
taken Israel's side in conflicts with the
Arabs. He says he won't participate in
the Reagan peace initiative as a result.
Is the Administration planning any new
initiative to bring Hussein into the
talks, including possibly putting more
pressure on Israel to stop settlements
activity?
A. I think it has to be clear to every-
body that from the U.S. point of view, we
care about stability and peace and secu-
rity in the region. And we are prepared
to help, and we have expended a lot of
energy to help. But primarily it is up to
the parties in the region to find their way
to security and peace and, for that mat-
ter, better quality of life goals that
everyone seeks. We're there to help
them.
Somehow or other we have to get
over this notion that every time things
don't go just to everybodys' satisfaction
in the Middle East, il's the U.S. fault or
it's up to the United States to do
something about it.
We are active. We will help. But
others must come forward as well. In the
end any solution that works will work
primarily because the parties to it were
out there, are involved in it, and are
determined to make it work.
Q. Do you share to any degree the
view that Henry Kissinger expressed
last Sunday, that perhaps this is the
right time for the United States and the
Middle East to do nothing?
A. We don't do nothing. We will con-
sult with our friends. We are, of course,
active in providing security assistance
and economic assistance to countries in
the region. So we will be doing those
things.
King Hussein has obviously said that
he doesn't intend to step forward and
May 1984
37
mmmmuuummtnm
THE SECRETARY
start a process of negotiation with Israel
in the near future, so he said that. We ac-
cept that. On the other hand, we will con-
tinue to be engaged, and we'll be pre-
pared to be helpful as the situation
evolves.
Q. As you know. King Hussein was
central to the President's Middle East
peace plan. What, if anything, is left of
the Reagan plan now, and what hopes,
if any, do you have for building a wider
peace in the region?
A. Obviously, if security and stability
and peace in the Middle East are to be at-
tained, it is necessary that the countries
there and their leaders somehow in the
end sit down with each other and work
out the conditions under which those ob-
jectives will be achieved.
As far as the President's proposals
are concerned, they depend upon every-
body, in a sense. They depend upon there
being a process of negotiation. But the
proposals themselves, in their own terms,
are as valid today as they were when the
President spelled them out. And so
they're there, and when people start talk-
ing about an agenda for a greater sense of
stability and peace in the area, I suspect
they're going to come back and talk about
these same ideas.
Q. What hopes, if any, do you have
now for seeing the development of a
wider peace in the region?
A. There doesn't seem to be any im-
mediate—like this month, this week— op-
portunity for things to move forward in a
genuinely strong way, and perhaps for a
longer time than that.
Nevertheless, as I already said, we'll
continue to be there. We work through
our Ambassadors. We have important
security and economic assistance pro-
grams. We'll be engaged in whatever
develops in Lebanon. Our Ambassador
there is contacted by everybody, and so
on. So in that sense we will just have to
see what happens, and we'll be prepared
for it as it comes.
Q. It's not clear to me just exactly
what it is you're going to do or not go-
ing to do in connection with the Jorda-
nian military aid package. You say
you'll have to continue to work with
the Congress and see how it will play
itself out. Are you or are you not plan-
ning to proceed with the Stinger sale,
for example?
A. The President's proposals are
before the Congress. There are a variety
of other issues that have been raised in
the Congress that have to do with sta-
bility and developments in the Middle
East, particularly the proposal that the
U.S. Embassy should be moved to
Jerusalem. All these things are there, and
they're being discussed.
My point is that the President has
been, and remains, committed to be
helpful to helping Jordan in its security
interests. He's put forward a proposal. I
think it's fail' to say, with respect to the
Stinger that you asked about, that the
President was ready to put on a major ef-
fort to get that approved. There's no
que.stion about the fact that King
Hussein's statements constitute a very
serious setback to the chances of congres-
sional approval of that.
Nevertheless, we'll continue to work
on the security interests and all of these
proposals and try to bring about a result
that does as much as possible to achieve
the result we seek.
Q. You mentioned moving the em-
bassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If the
Senate voted to do that do you think
that would be damaging or threatening
to U.S. interests in the Middle East?
A. Yes, I think it would be very
damaging. The question of Jerusalem, of
course, involves the old city of Jerusalem
and it involves the deep religious sites
and connotations of that city. When you
touch that, you touch a raw nerve run-
ning across the Muslim world and, for
that matter, something that is way
beyond political matters and goes into
deep religious roots.
So I think that it's a question that we
would do well to stay away from. And so
the President opposes that. I oppose that
strongly, as does the President, and we
hope that in the end the Congress won't
vote that way.
I might take note of the fact that as a
constitutional question, this is not the
main point; but as a constitutional ques-
tion, there certainly is an issue about
whether or not it is the prerogative of
Congress to say where an embassy will
be located.
Q. You have been urged by a
number of European leaders to do
something to resume the arms control
dialogue with the Soviet Union. You
have also had reports of meetings be-
tween your Ambassador in Moscow and
your meetings with Ambassador
Dobrynin here. Are there any signs now
that the arms control negotiations will
resume?
A. First of all, there are many arms
control negotiations that are very much in
process. The MBFR [mutual and balanced
force reductions] talks started up again on
March 16. The meeting in Stockholm, the
CDE [Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe], is going forward and
those discussions are very much under-
way. There are meetings in Geneva, par-
ticularly focusing on the use of chemical
weapons. We think that's a very impor-
tant subject, and we intend to put for-
ward, the President intends to put for-
ward, a treaty on the subject. It's a mat-
ter of great significance.
There ai-e things that are on the
periphery of arms control, such as the
Hot-Line discussion that are going for-
ward and there are others. So my point is
that when you talk about arms control
discussions, there are many of them.
I presume you're speaking of the
discussions of intermediate-range nuclear
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.
With respect to those, the United States
has strong proposals on the table, forth-
coming. Our negotiators have been there
in a spirit of give-and-take, and we're
prepared to resume those talks at any
time. I have no indication that the Soviet
Union is prepared to return to those
talks.
Q. Have you had a chance to study
the communique that came out of
Havana last night between the Angolan
President and Fidel Castro, and
whether that seems to move forward
the chances for bringing about a solu-
tion to the problems in southern Africa?
A. That communique seems to in-
dicate, fu-st of all, that the Cubans and
the Angolans were discussing the right
subject, namely, Cuban troop withdrawal.
I think that's a positive development if
that gets underway.
Certainly, it's connected, as they said
in their communique, with the issue of
Namibian independence, which we seek.
We have been very much in favor of the
moves going on in the region in which
South Africa has been pulling back in a
general kind of disengagement. And I
think also most significantly the agree-
ment between South Africa and Mozam-
bique last Friday was a historic event.
So there are some very positive signs
in Southern Afi'ica. And if the outcome of
the Angolan/Cuban talks is that there is
progi-ess being made toward Cuban troop
withdrawal, I think that's positive.
Q. There are some obser\'ers who
think that the most imminent threat to
stability lies in the Iran-Iraq war and
the possibility now that Iran may
simply overwhelm Iraq. Do you share
that view? Secondly, as I recall, you
once indicated that this was an area
where the Soviet Union and the United
38
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
States might have a common interest.
Are you pursuing the opportunity or, if
there is any, to deal with the Soviet
Union on trying to limit the effects of
that war?
A. First of all, on the Iran-Iraq wai-, it
is a huge tragedy for both countries with
tremendous losses, really just a slaugh-
ter, and you can only weep for the people
involved.
Second, insofar as containing it, we
and others have worked in the United
Nations and in other diplomatic ways to
keep the war from spreading itself, so to
speak, into third countries and into the
gulf itself, as has sometimes been
threatened.
The United States and our friends are
determined that the international water-
ways will remain open. Insofar as the
Soviet Union is concerned, various
statements have been made, coming out
of TASS and other places, about what our
intentions are, and, of course, we have let
the Soviet Union know directly what our
objectives are and the limits of them.
Going beyond that, it is our opinion, in
view of the basic difficulty of closing the
strait, that in one way or another, even if
an effort is made, it will be manageable.
It will not be possible to cause a genu-
inely long-term disruption in the flow of
oil supplies.
Second, that we now have on hand,
and so do others in other countries, very
large stocks deliberately put there as a
matter of national policy, so that we're
much better able to cope with any short-
term interruption that may come about,
and to see to it that that doesn't result in
a major explosion in the oil markets and a
major disruption of our own economy.
The point is, from our standpoint and
the standpoint of the West generally,
we're working hard to keep this problem
in manageable proportions.
Q. I would like to ask about El
Salvador. The armed forces are con-
tinually on the defensive against guer-
rilla troops. There continue to be
charges that the officials are linked to
the death squads there. In Nicaragua
the continued resistance still has made
only what the State Department calls
"tactical changes" in the Sandinista's
behavior. What evidence do you have
that additional money will be spent
more effectively or will achieve the
goals you have in mind for that region?
A. I think the Salvador Armed Forces
are effective and have been basically do-
ing a better and better job. One recent
piece of evidence of a different sort than
is usually cited is that of .some 260, I think
it is, municipalities where ballot bo.xes
will be placed for the election; for awhile
it was thought that there were 70 places
where you couldn't guarantee the secu-
rity of those, due to guerrilla activity.
That estimate is now scaled down to
around 20, due to the efforts of the armed
forces to secure security for this election.
And I might say those 20 are in lightly
populated areas and provisions ai"e being
made so that people there can vote.
But I think it is the case that the
Salvador Armed Forces are giving a
credible account of themselves and will do
better and better if they get our support.
We have to recognize that, granting all of
the difficulties they have, it's still the case
that we have a process here in our sup-
port for them of creating a kind of max-
imum of uncertainty in their minds about
what the flow of resources is going to be,
and that causes great difficulties in plan-
ning. And take the situation right now—
they have to make a choice. Do we take
the resources we have and operate at a
very meager, low level so as to stretch
them out, or do we say we have to go all
out to protect this election and spend
what we've got to do it and take the
chance on simply running out? And that's
not a good position to place them in.
I think they're giving a much better
account of themselves than the nature of
your question implied.
Q. If the Congress refuses to act in
a timely fashion on the Admini-
stration's request, is the Administra-
tion prepared to use its emergency
powers— .506 determination. Section
21(d)— in order to provide aid for the
Salvadoran military?
A. Our effort is to get the Congi'ess to
vote for this money— it's needed— and
that is our concern, and I think that it is
something that the Congress ought to
step up to and step up to promptly, and
that's where we're going to place our em-
phasis. And we will proceed in a fashion
in which we expect to get favorable votes
on that money.
Q. Over the weekend the United
States sent some AW ACS planes to the
area of the Sudan, and it's reported
that a warning has been sent to Libya
regarding the activities in the Sudan.
Could you tell us if there was such a
warning, what were they warned about,
and how do you see the situation? Is it
in your view, the Sudan, part of some
broader attack, perhaps by Ethiopia
and Libya, as has been claimed? Is it
evidence of some Libyan activism?
What do you expect to happen there?
A. We have sent AWACS to the
region at the request of the countries
there. It is a fact that Libya did attack in
the Sudan, unprovoked aggressive behav-
ior. It's also a fact that Libya apparently
managed an act of terror in London, or at
least the British authorities expelled
some Libyans for that, and perhaps a
related attack took place in Chad re-
cently.
We see a pattern of behavior on the
part of Libya that is outside the pale of in-
ternationally acceptable behavior. We
have sent our AWACS to the region at
request, and they are there in a support-
ive role, and we have wanted the Libyans
and others to know that fact and to know
what their role is.
Q. Did the United States send a
warning to Libya?
A. The Libyans should know that
those planes are there, and they should
not be interfered with.
Q. Is the political campaign in the
United States now affecting the im-
plementation of foreign policy? .4re you
fmding out, for example, that countries
such as the Soviet Union, countries in
the Middle East or Central America,
wherever, are adopting a wait-and-see
attitude to see the outcome in
November before they commit them-
selves and, in fact, you yourself are be-
ing thrust into a holding pattern?
A. At first when you started, I was
going to say, "What political campaign?"
I thought you were talking about the one
in El Salvador, and there does seem to be
a tendency in the Congress to want to
know about the outcome of that election.
I think the important thing is to focus
on the electoral process itself— that's
what we support— and I think all the can-
didates ought to be in a position of sup-
porting whoever does get elected.
In terms of our own election, people
ai-e debating foreign policy, and that's all
right. But I hope that as it proceeds, the
broad and fundamental thrust of Ameri-
can foreign policy, which has great
elements of continuity in it, will wind up
having general support with some debate
around the edges.
The purpose of the bipartisan commis-
sion was in part to find a bipartisan state-
ment on the subject of Central America,
just as one of the purposes of the Scow-
croft commission was -to find bipartisan
support for the modernization of the triad
of forces and for the arms control ini-
tiatives with the Congress and in con-
sultation with our allies, as the case may
be.
We will continue to work at it that
way and hope that partisan considera-
tions don't wind up playing a part in our
own elections.
May 1984
39
BBBBnBBDSBBBBlin
THE SECRETARY
Q. Are you finding that the
Kremlin, in fact, is holding off on INF
and strategic arms negotiations-
holding off a resumption— because they
do not, from their point of view, want
to help the President achieve a break-
through in arms control?
A. Of course, I don't know what the
considerations in the Kremlin are about
these matters, although from statements
that are made, it's pretty clear that
Ronald Reagan is not their candidate for
President. But what their considerations
are in holding off and whether they will
decide to come back to the negotiating
tables remains to be seen.
What we do know is that we will be
there, that we will be reasonable, that we
will continue to have an attitude of good
faith and give-and-take in these negotia-
tions as we have before.
'Press release 82.1
Secretary's Interview on "Meet the Press"
Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on April 1,
198Jt, by Marvin Kalb and Bill Monroe,
NBC News; Leslie Gelb, The New York
Times; Karen DeYoung, The Washington
Post; a7id John Wallach, Hearst
newspapers.^
Q. The Senate is expected to pass a
$62 million emergency military aid bill
for El Salvador, but there is talk that
the House could delay consideration of
it until mid-May, until after the runoff
election in El Salvador. Would that
seriously bother you, a 5- or 6-week
delay?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. Why?
A. Because the money is needed. The
money supports the effort of the Salvador
Government to attain a secure election
and to protect the efforts they're making
for political reform and economic develop-
ment. So we should provide those funds,
and additional funds, and do it promptly.
Q. Delaying those funds would
jeopardize the runoff election?
A. Of course, because they are close
to the end of the resources they have, and
if you're in that situation as a military
operation, you have a choice. Do you just
spend everything and then faU off a cUff,
or do you piece it out on a smaller scale
and then you know you're not going to be
as effective as you could be.
We have a stake in those elections.
We have a stake in political reform in El
Salvador. We have a stake in economic
development in that country, and we
ought to be willing to step up to it.
Q. Your critics say that the
Salvadoran Government still refuses to
prosecute any political murderers, that
no matter who is elected, the army is
going to stay in control, and that after
3 years left-wing guerrillas are stronger
than ever. They are saying, in effect,
that U.S. policy is failing and that more
aid would be wasted. What is your
answer to that?
A. Those statements are just false,
across the board. The election itself is one
fact that is hard to get around, and the
fact that the election was held under
relatively secure conditions. Certainly
there is guerrilla warfare going on in El
Salvador, but the situation is better than
it has been. Certainly there are problems
insofar as the system of justice is con-
cerned, but it is better than it was, and
things are happening. There are always
some setbacks. There was one just here
yesterday that we don't like. So there are
setbacks, but there is also a lot of prog-
res.s.
Q. You have been very critical in re-
cent weeks of the role of Congress in
handling foreign policy, saying that it
is making it virtually impossible for the
Administration to pursue a consistent
course. Congress has a constitutional
responsibility and right to declare war
and be involved in other ways. If you
were a senator who strongly disagreed
with Administration policy, how would
you want to express your differences?
A. I would say so, and I think that ob-
viously there— the problem is what is the
right interaction between the President
and the Congress in the conduct of
foreign policy? Both are naturally vitally
concerned with a topic of this kind. So it
is appropriate to have a way to debate,
and certainly in our democracy people
will criticize. But it is also important that
we have a capacity to be decisive and
then to carry through on the decisions
that we make, so that we have a chance to
be consistent and have a constancy to
what we do. And the situation that we're
in right now, I don't say that it is imposs-
ible, but I think it makes it difficult
because there is very little capacity to be
decisive. And you have to be decisive if
you're going to manage anything well.
Q. When Congrress expresses its
view by a majority you get one view, for
example, on the importance of civil
rights in Central .America. This Ad-
ministration has been very inconsistent
on many policies too, just like Congress
has. Why is the Administration in-
herently more right in what it wants to
do in Lebanon or Central America than
Congress' approach?
A. I don't think the Administration
has been inconsistent, but that is not
really what I'm driving at. What I'm driv-
ing at is to have a capacity to make a deci-
sion, and then have that decision stick
and have a chance for it to work and to be
carried through. That's the problem.
Q. Going back to Central America
directly for just a moment, there ap-
peared to be some confusion last week
in Administration statements over the
extent to which U.S. military aid was
falling into the hands of leftist rebels
there and also the extent to which U.S.
military advisers were involved in com-
bat situations. Could you perhaps
clarify how much of our military aid is
going to the rebels in El Salvador?
A. Hardly any, in proportionate
terms, of the aid that we provide falls into
the hands of the guerrillas. On the other
hand, in terms of the materiel that they
have at hand, a portion of it is captured.
The confusion came from a statement that
was made about, I think, 50% of the arms
that the guerrillas had coming from what
was captured, or otherwise obtained.
That statement reflected only a very
small period of time in a segment of El
Salvador.
As the facts are as I understand
them, and nobody can know precisely, but
only a fraction of the arms that the guer-
rillas have comes from what is captured,
and a very small fraction, like probably
less than 10%, of the supplies come from
that. That is, the ammunition and the pro-
visions, and so forth.
Q. Mr. Ikle [Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle], in his
testimony I think said more than 40%
of the arms that the guerrillas had
came from—
A. Yes, that's what I said. That state-
ment was a description of what was found
out over a very small period of time in a
40
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY
small part of El Salvador and is not
characterization of the overall situation,
which is as I've tried to describe it.
Q. Could you make a percentage
characterization of the overall situa-
tion?
A. It's hard to give a number. 1 said
in terms of the essential flow right now,
which is ammunition and supplies of one
kind or another, as far as I know the
number is less than 10%. The weapons
and things of that kind, mostly they have
those. So that is not as much of a problem
for them.
Q. Former President Nixon, who is
hardly a left-wing critic of this Ad-
ministration, yesterday said that
without a new relationship with the
Soviet Union, there is no chance for
peace to survive in the world. The im-
passe between the United States and the
Soviets is as big as ever. If you could sit
down with Foreign Minister Gromyko
today what would you tell him?
A. I've sat down with Foreign
Minister Gromyko quite a few times, and
we've had a sometimes tempestuous,
sometimes straightforward, and here and
there reasonably constructive discussions
across a broad range of issues. I think it
is very important for the United States to
continue to do what it is doing, namely, to
be careful that we keep our strength, not
only our military strength but our
economic strength, and our resolve and
strength of purpose, but also to be in a
posture of reasonableness and to be
testing and probing all the time to find
substantive areas of significance that the
Soviet Union may want to work out prob-
lems with us on.
Q. Your critics charge that precisely
in that order, you put the priority on
building America's defense and you
relegate to a lower priority improving
relations with the Soviets. Substan-
tively, is there anything that the United
States could do or should do now to
prove that it really wants a more mean-
ingful dialogue with the Soviets?
A. Let me comment first about the
importance of paying close attention to
our own national security interests. The
day we decide that, that those interests
have a low priority, is the day we go
down the drain. We have to be ready to
defend ourselves, and make no mistake
about it.
As far as the priorities are concerned,
I think it is kind of an artificial thing in a
sense, because the two things go to-
gether, without a doubt. It is the fact that
we're strong that gives us a chance to
deal effectively with the Soviet Union. If
we were weak, there would be very little
going for us in any negotiations, so the
two things go together.
Q. But isn't the problem that this
Administration hasn't dealt with the
Soviet Union? As the Democrats in one
of their ads point out, showing every
President since General Eisenhower,
this is the first Administration that
hasn't reached an arms control agree-
ment with the Russians.
A. One of the greatest mistakes you
can make in any negotiation is to get
yourself in a position where the other side
can see that you need an agreement and it
doesn't, and as soon as they've got you
there, they'll squeeze you to death. So I
think the President has been absolutely
right to keep his cool, be calm about it but
also to be reasonable. The positions we
have on the table aci-oss the board of a
vei-y wide range of things we're discuss-
ing with the Soviet Union are reasonable
positions, and we're there in a spirit of
give and take. But we're not there in a
spirit of give away the store, and that's
what you have to be careful about.
Q. Two or 3 months ago, you, the
President, and the entire Administra-
tion were saying that the presence of
Armed forces in Lebanon was the key
to stability in Lebanon, as well as the
key to peace in the Middle East. Now
the United States has ended its involve-
ment with the multinational force.
Were you wrong 2 months ago and right
now, right then, wrong now? It's hard
to imagine both.
A. I think it is correct to say that
what has happened in Lebanon is a disap-
pointment to us. We have important in-
terests there and important interests in
the Middle East. I think those interests
would have been advanced had we been
able to bring about, or help others bring
about with our help, the sort of objectives
that we sought. We'll continue to seek
those objectives. They're just as impor-
tant now as they have been, but we'll
have to change our tactics.
Q. Change tactics, but isn't it a
radical step to put such a tremendous
emphasis just a few short weeks ago on
the presence of the Marines there, and
the importance of that presence, and to-
day to make the absence of the Marines
seem almost a virtue?
A. We're not making it a virtue. I
think that the existence of U.S. staying
power and forcefulness was an important
ingredient, and if we could have main-
tained it in a strong fashion, perhaps the
results would be different than they are
today.
Q. So the pulling out of the forces
indicated a lack of resolve? What is the
other side of the coin then?
A. I don't know what you mean by
the other side of the coin.
Q. If the presence would have
demonstrated credibility and consist-
ency in policy, what does it mean to
pull the forces out? A lack of credibil-
ity, a lack of consistency?
A. There is a lack of credibility in pull-
ing the forces out, or an apparent lack of
credibility, and we have suffered a lot for
that in the Middle East. Now, what we
set out to do was to redeploy the Marines,
and I think it was a very sensible move,
to redeploy the Marines, putting them on
ships, and at the same time to take even
further measures to help the Lebanese
Armed Force develop itself and also,
given the way the situation in Beirut was
shifting, in which terrorism was rising as
a threat to everybody, including
ourselves, to put much more emphasis on
training and efforts to deal with the ter-
rorist threat.
As that process was unfolding, the
situation in Lebanon sort of deteriorated.
So the redeployment that we had in mind
never really quite matei-ialized. But it is a
problem to have a terrorist act pei'-
petrated against the United States and
then to have all of this second guessing
and changing of mind on the part of the
Congress, no doubt reflecting many
people's views, and having the Marines
then leave. We've got to be clear with
ourselves about that.
Q. Thirty-seven senators, 211 con-
gressmen. Senator Gary Hart, former
Vice President Mondale, all favor a
shift in the U.S. Embassy in Israel from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The President
has suggested, but he has not made it
entirely clear, that he would veto any
legislation requiring such a shift.
Would he, in fact, veto it?
A. I think the main point is that those
who are advocating that shift I can't
believe have really thought the matter
over very cai-efully. It would not serve
the intei-ests of the United States to move
our embassy. It would be a gigantic ag-
gravation to important religions, par-
ticularly the Muslims, the Islamic
religion, and it would thereby damage the
interests of the United States. It would
damage our ability to be effective in the
peace process, and so I think in a general
way would be a mistake; a bad move to
make. That is the point, and I'm glad to
say that the President has kept his head
about him in all this and is staying with
that position.
May 1984
mmmummuumnmmmfmnu. mm
THE SECRETARY
Q. Would the President veto legisla-
tion requiring such a shift?
A. I can tell you that the President is
very much opposed to it and will not
move that embassy. What he will do in a
particular piece of legislation, I don't
think it is wise for me to predict, but I
know that he'll oi)pose that move. He has
said so publicly, and he also said it to me
in our private conversations.
Q. Even if such legislation passes,
whether or not there is a veto, he would
find a way not to move the embassy.
A. I think first of all it would be very
bad for the United States if such legisla-
tion passes, even if it doesn't become law,
even if the President vetoes it, even if he
refuses to move the embassy. It's a very
bad signal across the world if something
like that takes place. And my impression
is that people in the Congi-ess are more
and more having second thoughts about
this and looking around for some way in
which they might defuse this issue.
Q. You said a moment ago that it
was Congress that changed its mind on
Lebanon. But isn't it also true that
there were changes of mind within the
Administration itself, condemning
people who wanted to call for
withdrawal in Congress and then
deciding on withdrawal of the Ad-
ministration itself? And didn't you.
yourself, oppose this precipitous kind of
withdrawal?
A. There are many views within the
Administration on most topics, and I
think that's healthy, that there's a good
strong debate. By the time the President
made the decision he made, the situation
itself had changed a lot. One of the
reasons why it changed was that it was
perfectly apparent to the Syrians, by
reading our newspapers and watching our
television reporting accurately on what
was taking place in the Congress, that all
they had to do was keep pushing and
pretty soon the United States would, as
they said, be short of breath and would
drop out. And that changed the situation,
that perception.
Q. This raises a broader and more
fundamental question. Presidents for
the last two decades have been com-
plaining about Congress— Democratic
Presidents and Republican Presidents.
What's the problem here? Is it with the
product, the policy itself? Or the proc-
ess? Is the process fundamentally
flawed ?
A. I think there will be tension, and
that was the objective of having a system
of checks and balances that's built into
our Constitution. And 1 think it's good.
And we should debate these things. I do,
however, beheve that there has to be in
this process, in the end, a capacity for
decisiveness. And once a decision is made,
to allow that decision to be implemented
and carried forward in a consistent way.
We can't be always creating the
image, "Well, we decided this today, but
a week from now maybe we'll have
another vote and have a different out-
come.
Q. Did the Administration show
decisiveness in Lebanon just because
there were newspaper articles in the
press and some questioning in Con-
gress? Why didn't you stick it out
anyway?
A. We did stick it out until it was ap-
parent that the situation had changed to
the point where the kind of redeployment
I described a moment ago was the sensi-
ble way to proceed. However, over the
preceding months, as one could see by
following the negotiations going on, it was
the uncertainty created by the situation
in the United States that helped. I don't
say it was totally responsible, but helped
to change the situation.
Q. Under the general subject of
chemical weapons, a prominent scien-
tist last week claimed that he had
gathered material in Southeast Asia
proving, as far as he was concerned,
that what the Administration had
claimed was yellow rain used against
people in Southeast Asia was, in fact,
bee excrement. Is there any possibility
that any of the samples originally col-
lected by the Administration were, in
fact, bee excrement?
A. This keeps coming up from time to
time from various scientists; these points
have been investigated very thoroughly.
This has been gone into in great detail.
It's been examined by our NATO allies,
by people all around the world, and I
don't think there is any real question
about the fact that chemical warfare was
used in Southeast Asia, it has been used
in Afghanistan, and that's a tragedy. We
see that it is also being used in the Iran-
Iraq war, and I don't think there's any
question about that. So the problem of the
use of chemical weapons is a very serious
problem. And we shouldn't trivialize it
with this kind of nickel and diming of
what are validated, firm findings. And
we'd better concentrate on doing every-
thing we can to keep this problem under
control.
Q. I know you're deeply concerned
about the issue of state-supported ter-
rorism, particularly the kind that Iran
and Syria exported to Lebanon. The
United States has tried to cover up but,
I guess, made not much of a secret of
the provision of mines to the rebels
fighting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
In fact, also providing maps of the
depths and channels of the ports. Isn't
that the same thing? Isn't that state-
supported terrorism?
A. As far as Nicaragua is concerned,
Nicaragua has a problem, because it has
stolen its own revolution. It has not been
true to what it set out to do. So it has
created, within its own country, people
who are bitterly disappointed at what is
happening in that country. They've also
been persecuting people, like the Meskito
Indians. There are refugees— there are
100,000 of them in Costa Rica. vSo they've
created a problem for themselves and a
reaction. And they're having to live with
it.
Q. What do you think about Senator
Hart's suggestion that the United
States should pull out of Central
America?
A. It's ridiculous. My gosh, this is an
area of vital significance to the United
States. It's an area where we're on the
right side of things, where we are
supporting democracy, where we're sup-
porting the rule of law, where there are
lots of people whom we want to help in
their economic development, and we'd
better stick with it.
' Press release 108 of Apr. 9, 1984.1
42
Department of State Bulletin
■BHHI
AFRICA
FY 1985 Foreign Assistance Requests
for Sub-Sahara Africa
by Princeton Lyman
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on February 7, 198i. Mr.
Lyman is Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs. '
I am pleased to have this opportunity to
present to this committee the underlying
philosophy and objectives of the Ad-
ministration's proposals for assistance to
Africa in FY 1985 and for the FY 1984
supplemental request for additional food
aid to Africa.
Overview
Our Africa policy is an activist one, based
on an appreciation of the importance of
the continent to the United States. We
are involved in joint efforts with others—
our allies, international financial institu-
tions, and, most importantly, African
states themselves— to promote Africa's
development and progress. We do not
delude ourselves into believing that we
are the only actor on this stage. Rather
we are aware that we must work with
others in cooperative ventures. In fact, as
you know, the United States is not the
principal bilateral donor to Africa. We
rank behind France and the Federal
Republic of Germany. The World Bank
contributes more than we do. All of this
places a high priority on donor coordina-
tion, a principal focus of the Economic
Policy Initiative (EPI) which we are pro-
posing in this budget and which I will ex-
plain further in a few moments.
Our activities are multifaceted. We
are prepared to use our diplomatic skills,
where possible, to lessen regional ten-
sions in Africa, tensions which can be ex-
ploited by our own adversaries for their
own purposes and to the detriment of
peace in Africa. Our efforts within the
contact group to bring Namibia to in-
dependence under the terms of UN
Security Council Resolution 435, to pro-
mote peace among the states of southern
Africa, and to enhance the possibilities for
peaceful change within South Africa are
important examples of our diplomatic ap-
proach.
We also realize, as does this commit-
tee, that tangible resources must be com-
mitted by the United States to promote
development and stability in Africa. Our
assistance efforts cover a broad spectrum
from short-term emergency food and
disaster relief to longer range develop-
mental programs, from economic assist-
ance to security assistance. We see all of
these efforts as part of a unified approach
which recognizes the interrelatedness of
Africa's developmental concerns.
A principal focus of our concern and
efforts is the economic situation which ex-
ists today in Africa. While the word
"crisis" is often overutilized, it is not an
exaggeration to talk about an African
economic crisis which has profound
political and social impacts on all Africans.
This is not solely the view of the United
States Government. It is equally the view
of the Organization of African unity
(OAU), the statement of African leaders
in the Lagos plan of action, the African
Development Bank, the World Bank,
other major donors, and, most important
of all, virtually are, to be sure, shadings of
emphasis and different stresses on what
should be done but none question the
seriousness of the situation and the need
for major changes in policy. We do not
claim to have the ultimate answers, but
we are determined to play a constructive
and activist role in searching for solu-
tions.
Numbers sometimes have a deaden-
ing effect on real perceptions, and nothing
has a greater impact than seeing
something personally. I have spent the
past 20 years working on development,
the last 12 on African problems, have
lived there and visited frequently. The
contrast between what is taking place in
Africa and elsewhere in the world is pro-
foundly disturbing and the situation
shows little sign of improving. During the
decade of the 1970s, a time of boom for
many, per capita income in almost all
African countries declined. At the end of
the decade, average per capita income
was $411, and for the low income coun-
tries it was much less. Food production
per capita declined by 10% over the
decade. The 1980s have begun no better.
In 1981 and 1982, GDP in sub-Saharan
Africa, excluding Nigeria, grew by
less than 2%. If one includes Nigeria, the
growth rate was about zero. This means
that per capita income is still dropping in
the 1980s and in some cases plummeting.
Food production continues to stagnate
and food imports to grow, but the latter is
no solution in the absence of adequate
foreign exchange to pay for imports.
In a report issued last year, the
Economic Commission for Africa stated
that: "The picture that emerges from the
analysis of the perspective of the African
region by the year 2008 under the
historical trend scenario is almost a
nightmare."
It is always appealing to search for a
single "villain, " just as it is natural to
look for a signal panacea, but both rarely
exi.st, and they certainly don't apply to
Africa. Drought, world recession, high in-
terest rates, and deteriorating terms of
trade have all contributed to the current
crisis, and there is the temptation to
blame calamities on outside forces. The
truth is probably more blurred. Certainly
external factors have had a major impact
though world economic recovery will help
in this regard. However, the key to
change in Africa remains the domestic
economic policy framework in each coun-
try.
I agree with the World Bank which
characterized the African economic crisis
overwhelmingly as a production crisis. To
quote: "It is a crisis which has arisen
from the widespread adoption of struc-
tures of prices and incomes which have
provided inappropriate production incen-
tives. In particular they have provided in-
adequate incentives to agricultural pro-
ducers and this has been aggi-avated by
the development of costly and inefficient
marketing systems for both inputs and
outputs."
None of this is intended to minimize
the extent of the inherent difficulties
Africans face in the task of national
development. Africa is diverse and vast.
It is a region of Balkanized economics
almost all with vei-y limited internal
markets, with unbalanced resource bases
which can often only be linked by very
high-cost transport.
Measured by the balance of payments,
debts, production levels, and other
economic indicators, 1983. probably pro-
duced few positive signs. However, we do
see significant though gradual changes in
attitudes and policies which, we believe,
hold great hope for the future. Whether
one is talking about Somalia, Senegal,
Sudan, Guinea, Zambia, Ghana, Zaii-e, or
Mali; to name only a few, there is a search
May 1984
AFRICA
for new and pragmatic policies which are
less ideological and more effective. This is
reflected in more realistic exchange rates,
changes in pricing policies to allow
greater income for farmers and other pro-
ducers, cutbacks in government expen-
ditures which do not advance develop-
ment, and many other actions, all de-
signed to change the economic situation.
The process is slow and painful, and it
takes great political courage for many
governments to initiate these changes.
This is particularly true because Africa's
present economic problems are cumula-
tive and complex. The process is, none-
theless, underway in many African coun-
tries, and it is one to which we should
lend support
Economic Assistance
Our specific economic and security
assistance proposals are carefully con-
structed to complement each other to the
degree possible and to respond to Africa's
most pressing needs. Thus our food pro-
grams address immediate, often emer-
gency, requirements, but local currencies
which some of these programs generate
are used for economic development, and
policy reform requirements are tied to
certain of the non-emergency programs.
We are requesting separately a $90
million supplemental for this fiscal year
for emergency food assistance for Africa.
It is our judgment that this is sufficient to
meet our share of pending requests.
Development assistance in Africa is a
major instrument for progress and for im-
proved economic management. Economic
support funds (ESF) are used both for
long-term development and for shorter-
term support to countries of particular
importance to the United States. Military
equipment and training programs foster
stability and security in threatened
friendly countries. Five of every six
dollars of aid we give to Africa is
economic rather than military. This is not
to suggest that the security assistance is
less relevant but rather that the conti-
nent's needs are overwhelmingly
economic.
In PL 480 for FY 1985, we are re-
questing $148.5 million for the Title I con-
cessional sales program and $83.2 million
for Title II humanitarian food aid (plus
emergency food aid). These levels repre-
sent an increase of 12% in Title I and a
decrease in Title II from the much higher
levels emerging for 1984 as the full scope
of Africa's immediate food crisis emerges.
We are hopeful that the drought will
break by FY 1985. If it does not, we ex-
pect to be back for additional Title II
resources at that time.
Our FY 1985 request for development
assistance for sub-Saharan Africa totals
$355.2 million, including the Sahel pro-
gram. This is a 12.5% increase over the
1983 level and a 2.5%. increase over the
current year. This figure does not include
the $75 million of development assistance
requested as initial year funding for the
Economic Policy Initiative for Africa.
We are requesting $391.5 million in
economic support funds for FY 1985, an
increase of 47% over 1983 and of 16% over
the current year level. As Africa's
economic crisis grows deeper, the need
for flexible assistance gi'ows greater. In
Africa, ESF is generally used to deter
critical economic deterioration in coun-
tries of particular importance to the
United States. Depending on the country
context, ESF can be used for direct finan-
cial support, for commodity imports, or
for developmental activities.
For instance, our ESP support in
Djibouti, which is of strategic interest to
us and to our Western allies, funds
development activities in fisheries, skills
training, health, nutrition, and housing.
In Sudan our ESF purchases essential
commodity imports to help Sudan over-
come a foreign exchange crisis, provide
inputs for local production, and support
economic reforms within the context of an
agreed international progi-am coordinated
by the World Bank. In Senegal ESF
finances commodity imports and a rural
roads maintenance progi-am. In Liberia it
provides support to the Liberian Govern-
ment as it copes wdth severe financial
problems and as it proceeds along the
path to a restoration of constitutional rule
ne.xt year. In Zambia our ESF supports
development activities in agricultural
training and institutional development
and provides essential commodity im-
ports.
Economic Policy Initiative (EPI)
A major new element of our proposal for
this fiscal year is the Economic Policy Ini-
tiative. What is it and how is it similar to
and different from our other assistance
programs? The essential structure of our
request to Congress is that we expect to
seek $500 million over a 5-year period,
with a $75 million request in FY 1985.
Unlike other assistance funding, these ap-
propriations would not be allocated in
advance to specific countries or specific
activities. While we have reached no deci-
sions on any specific prospective
recipient, we plan to limit the total
number of recipients to a few countries
each year. There is no magic number, but
a large number would tend to dissipate
the purpose of the initiative.
As I noted earlier, many African
countries are in the process of attempting
to introduce significant economic policy
reforms. Each country's problems are dif-
ferent, and we do not seek to impose rigid
guidelines. Given the overwhelmingly
agricultural nature of Africa, one could
expect most EPI activities to be in this
sector. We might wish to support a
government's decision to turn existing
centrally controlled and inefficient
cooperatives into true cooperatives con-
trolled by their members. In such a case,
we might offer to finance technical
assistance or provide inputs, spare parts,
etc. Or, where a country decided to in-
troduce more realistic pricing policies
which should induce greater agricultural
production but faiTn-to-market roads and
transport had disintegrated, we might
contribute to their rehabilitation. Our
assistance, therefore, would usually be
sector directed.
I would stress that we are under no il-
lusions that our $75 million will solve the
problems of Africa or even of selected
countries. They will, however, be syn-
chronized with our aid efforts which are
ten times the size of the EPI. Moreover,
and key to the success of the initiative, is
its multilateral dimension. The World
Bank and many major donors share our
view on the need for policy reform in con-
nection with outside assistance. We
already have multilateral groups in about
20 African countries, but theii- effec-
tiveness varies wadely. We only give
10-15% of total assistance to Africa-
somewhat more if multilateral contribu-
tions are considered— and so we must
work with others more effectively if prog-
ress is to be made. We shall take their
views into consideration and be prepared
to adjust our activities, as we hope others
will also be prepared to do. The EPI can
only serve its intended catalytic purpose
if the community of donors works closely
together and with the African countries
which become involved. We have not
preselected those countries. Theii" selec-
tion will be based on criteria such as the
climate for effective reform, the commit-
ment to such reforms of the political
leadership, and the probability that coor-
dinated donor support and some in-
cremental donor resources could create
an environment within which the reforms
envisaged can be achieved. The World
Bank has agreed to play a leading role in
donor coordination; other donors with
which we have discussed the initiative in
general terms are supportive.
To summarize the EPI is both similar
to and different from other forms of
assistance. Its uniqueness is its flexibility.
44
Department of State Bulletin
AFRICA
potential responsiveness to African
needs, and multilateral character. Yet it
is an extension of and ingredient of our
overall effort. It would be the capstone to
efforts already underway in some African
countries to implement reforms to reduce
the role of the state, increase incentives
to production, and begin the difficult
process of i-estructuring. I hope that you
will find it as positive as and stimulating
as have the Africans and other govern-
ments with which we have consulted.
Refugee Relief
No discussion of Africa can ignore the
question of refugees. As in past years, the
tJ.S. Government will be a major con-
tributor to the solution of refugee prob-
lems in Africa in FY 1985. The State
Department budget request includes a
total of approximately $60 million for
refugees in Africa; to that should be
added the estimated $10 million which the
Agency for International Development
(AID) e.xpects to spend in refugee food
assistance and money remaining from the
previous special authorizations for
refugee resettlement, which will depend
on actual expenditures during the re-
mainder of FY 1984. The funding now
planned is sufficient, in combination with
the efforts of other donors, to meet relief
needs, absent any new, large, refugee
movements.
In most cases (the major exceptions
being the recent movement of Banyar-
wandan refugees from Uganda into
Rwanda and Tanzania and the recently in-
creased flows of Ethiopians into Sudan)
the refugee situation in Africa has
stabilized somewhat and has passed the
stage of emergency relief. Our efforts
must focus more on enhancing the pros-
pects for voluntary repatriation and on in-
tegrating refugee programs into the
overall development needs of the coun-
tries of first asylum, where prospects for
repatriation are poor.
The coordination of a multidonor
response and a focus on infrastructure
and development in countries of asylum
are major elements of the upcoming sec-
ond International Conference on
Assistance to Refugees in Africa
(ICARA II).
Security Assistance
Just as Africa's economy is an integral
part of the global system, Africa's
political stability is affected both by inter-
nal problems and by non- African in-
fluences. Dangerous security threats con-
tinue to affect African nations already
hard hit by the adverse climate and
economic conditions.
Our efforts and those of our allies and
friends to help African nations to over-
come their economic problems do not
exist, in a political vacuum. Where serious
security problems exist, they, too, must
be addressed effectively or else there is
little point in pursuing economic
recovery. Our balanced approach to
assisting our African friends recognizes
this reality. We consult with them and
our allies to detennine how best to meet
threats of e.xtemal aggression, and in
several cases externally instigated
subversion, with the least disruption to
the human and material resources being
mobilized for economic recovery and
development.
Our FY 1985 security assistance re-
quests reflect this carefully balanced ap-
proach rather dramatically.
Fii'st, our military assistance requests
are heavily concentrated in the areas of
greatest strategic concern, mainly
eastern and southern Africa, for which we
have made over 80% of our military
assistance program (MAP) requests.
Second, in a few countries— Sudan,
Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia— we play a
prominent security assistance role, but in
most countries we supplement largei-
security assistance programs provided by
our allies, such as in Chad, Niger,
Senegal, and Zaire.
Third, in FY 1985 we completed the
sharp switch from foreign military (FMS)
loan to MAP grant assistance begun in
FY 1983 in response to the deep financial
crisis our African friends face. In FY 1983
we sought $37.7 million in FMS loans for
eight countries, in FY 1984 we have $29.5
million in FMS loans for six countries,
while for FY 1985 we seek only $10
million total FMS loans for just two coun-
tries. In effect, MAP has now replaced
FMS loans.
Fourth, our foreign assistance re-
quests remain overwhelmingly economic
($1,053 billion; 83.3%) over military
($211.63 million; 16.7%), with a ratio of
more than 5 to 1 in FY 1985.
As with economic assistance,
however, our Western allies cannot bear
the African security assistance burden
alone. The security assistance portion of
our assistance is a basic part of the foun-
dation of cooperation on which rests the
larger, combined Western effort to help
Africa survive economically.
We are also careful as to the tj-pe of
equipment provided and the need for
basic defensive capabilities, not offensive
weaponry. In Sudan, Somalia, Kenya,
Zaire, Liberia, and elsewhere on the con-
tinent, American assistance has helped
African armies in the crucial areas of
training and logistics. We are encouraged
by progress in the longstanding problems
with the F-5 squadron in Kenya and the
C-130 program in Zaire. Significant im-
provements in the logistical and main-
tenance procedures of the Somali Army
are another area of positive change
brought about by our programs.
Two 1985 initiatives waiTant mention.
First, recognizing the important role that
African armies can play in national
development— by providing engineering,
construction, disaster relief, and health
services to the civilian population— we are
proposing a modest program of civic ac-
tion activities.
Included within the civic action ini-
tiative is a program to assist African na-
tions to patrol and protect their fishing
grounds. As we all know, many African
coastal states do not have the necessary
facilities to protect their ow^^ exclusive
economic zones from poaching and over-
fishing by others, notably Soviet bloc na-
tions. A limited amount of funds will be
directed toward assisting these nations to
improve their patrolling and enforcement
capabilities. This program will be coor-
dinated with developmental assistance ef-
forts designed to give the same nations
greater ability to take advantage them-
selves of their own ocean resources.
The other 1985 initiative, as I men-
tioned earlier, is placing the majority of
our security assistance in the form of
grant aid under the MAP and less under
FMS credits. In conjunction with this
switch to MAP is an Administration pro-
posal to put a portion of FMS credits on
budget, thereby allowing the Administra-
tion to offer concessional credits to those
countries which can afford to repay loans,
but not high market interest rates.
An analysis of the Administration's
request for military assistance for Africa
reveals that, with the exception of inter-
national military education and training
(IMET), our request has actually declined
from FY 1983. In 1983 we requested $234
million in military assistance; we received
$117 million. In 1984 we requested $201.5
million and received $149 million, an in-
crease over 1983 but still short of the re-
quested level. Nevertheless an important
feature of the 1983 progi-am was that we
began to make the switch to MAP grants
from FMS credits. This trend continued
in 1984, and in 1985 we are requesting
almost all grant assistance. For 1985 we
have proposed $109.5 million in MAP and
$10 million in FMS concessional credits.
This total is actually $1 million less than
the 1984 requests; it is, however, an in-
crease of approximately $51 million over
the actual 1984 allocation.
May 1984
mmmmmmi
AFRICA
The exception to this trend is in the
IMET account. In 1983 we requested $8.7
million and received $7.3 million; in 1984
we requested $9.8 million and received
$8.8 milion. We are requesting $11.1
million for 1985. We continue to feel very
strongly that IMET is our most valuable
tool in dealing with the African military
establishments. Not only do we have a
chance to interact with and train officers
and noncommissioned officers in the
United States, but we are able to field
mobile training teams to go out to in-
dividual countries to train a large number
of military in the basic skills required to
organize and maintain an ai-med force.
This training reduces the costs of the
military establishments and adds to then-
sen.se of pride and professionalism. We
have received nothing but praise in Africa
for the IMET program. We hope that
Congi-ess will continue to fund the pro-
gram at the request level.
Sub-Regional Perspective
The congressional presentation docu-
ments for development and security
assistance provide you with overview
summaries for Africa and descriptions of
individual country programs. Since,
however, sub-Saharan Africa is so large
and involves so many countries, it might
be useful now to look at some key fea-
tures of these programs from the perspec-
tive of the subregions of western, central,
eastern, and southern Africa. My brief
overview will highlight our security
assistance goals and progi-ams in conjunc-
tion with the underlying goals of our
economic assistance. We should also bear
in mind that in most African countries our
assistance programs supplement larger
ones provided by our allies, the World
Bank and IMF, and several major Arab
donors.
West Africa. West Africa is an area
of endemic poverty and political instabil-
ity whose continued deterioration could
have serious consequences for our in-
terests. Major U.S. objectives in the area
are to:
• Assi.st in long-temi development
and the immediate crisis of hunger when
it occurs;
• Promote regional political stability
by helping governments to resist exter-
nal—mainly Libyan— adventurism and de-
stabilization;
• Foster our continued access to im-
portant raw materials and markets (e.g.,
Nigeria, which is both an important and
relatively secure major source of oil and
an important locus of U.S. investments;
Guinea with its important bauxite
reserves); and
• Continue our access to important
sea and air sites and facilities.
While the American presence and aid
levels in the 16 countries of West Africa
generally are not large compared with
other Western and Arab donors, they are
significant. In Senegal, for example, our
progi-ams are designed to bolster a
friendly democratic government. In addi-
tion to providing Senegal the largest
amount of U.S. development assistance in
francophone Africa, we are using ESF to
assist Senegal to meet balance-of-
payments and cuiTent account deficits
consistent with Senegal's IMF standby
perfoiTnance. Our assistance programs,
which have also been coordinated with
France, Senegal's largest donor, are
designed to enable the Senegalese to
undertake significant economic reforms,
particularly in the agi-icultural sector. We
also seek to continue a modest but highly
valued $3 million MAP program in FY
1985 to augment Senegal's capability to
resist Libyan subversion. Our highly suc-
cessful IMET progi'am trains about 30 of
ficers of Senegal's apolitical, professional
aiTned forces in the United States. We
believe that this mix of programs in FY
1985 will assist this friend of the United
States to initiate policy reforms and to
preserve stability in the key area in
Africa.
In Liberia, where the United States is
by far the largest aid donor, our ESF,
development assistance, and MAP pro-
grams have enabled the government to
withstand serious deflationary pressure
caused by a precipitous fall in demand for
its major exports. Our assistance pro-
grams to Liberia are part of a carefully
balanced approach aimed at promoting
economic recovery and political stability
in a nation that has close ties with the
United States. Our ESF is disbursed in
close cooperation with the IMF.
U.S. and IMF assistance on the
economic front has also allowed the
Liberian Government to make progress in
its goal of returning the country to
civilian, constitutional government by
April 1985. An elections timetable has
been announced and a new constitution
drafted. The United States and other
Western nations are assisting this effort
through technical and financial assistance.
Through the MAP-funded military hous-
ing construction program, we hope to
eliminate a grievance that contributed to
the 1980 coup and encourage the retuni
to civilian rule.
Our other development assistance
programs are concentrated in food pro-
duction programs designed to induce
needed policy reforms and reduce the
need for food imports. Evidence of impor-
tant policy reform can be seen in coun-
tries such as Senegal, Mali, and Niger and
the beginnings of policy reform in such
countries as Sierra Leone and Guinea
Bissau.
In Ghana, where strained political
relations necessitated a suspension of aid
programs, the government has now im-
plemented difficult economic reforms in
cooperation with the IMF. Our recently
reinstated aid program is providing im-
portant assistance in food production, and
U.S. emergency food aid is playing a ma-
jor role in averting widespread, drought-
induced famine. Emergency food aid is
also playing a major role in Mauritania,
Senegal, and elsewhere in the Sahel.
In all of the examples cited there is a
common thread— of helping poor people
and vulnerable governments to better
help themselves by undertaking needed
policy reform, concentrating development
efforts on increased food production, and
providing, where needed, military assist-
ance to help resist outside efforts at
destabilization.
Central Africa. Our security and
political objectives in the central African
region are to:
• Help maintain political stability and
foster friendly relations;
• Assist governments to resist Soviet
and Libyan destabilization, particularly in
Chad; and
• Provide key countries vnth security
assistance needed for legitimate self-
defense.
Our economic objectives are to assist
governments in pursuing effective
economic and development poUcies, en-
courage food production, and provide
emergency food aid where needed.
The United States has a major policy
stake in ensuring an independent Chad in
the face of direct Libyan aggression.
Libyan occupation of Chad in 1980-81
created serious fears throughout the
region and led to strong African reaction.
Unfortunately, Libya entered Chad again
in force in 1983 threatening the recog-
nized government. Our security
assistance support for Chad is designed to
complement the efforts of France, which
has the primary role in assisting Chad's
security. Because of its shattered
economic base, Chad needs fast disburs-
ing ESF to restore civilian services and
46
Department of State Bulletin
development activity, as well as MAP to
strengthen its capabilities to face con-
tinued Libyan-sponsored attacks.
On the security front, Zaire has been
a firm friend and has supported United
States policies; it contributes substan-
tially to stability in central Africa. It cur-
rently has troops in Chad to help that
nation defend itself from the Libyan inva-
sion. The visits to Zaire of Israeli Presi-
dent Herzog last month and Egyptian
President Mubarak this month attest to
Zaire's valued support for the Camp
David peace process. A neighbor of
conflict-ridden Angola, Zaire is equally a
critical country in the search for peaceful
resolution of southern African conflicts.
Zaire's military has long been under-
funded, and our MAP program is de-
signed to get Zaire programs back on
their feet, particularly in the key airlift
area.
Zaire has taken major steps to reform
its economy. The marketing of copper and
cobalt has been reorganized to ensure
that the state mining enterprise,
Gecamines, receives the revenues from
its exports so that it can rebuild its
capital base and undertake new in-
vestments. Early last year Zaii-e's an-
ticorruption campaign resulted in the
dismissal of a number of civil servants. In
1983 Zaire also successfully implemented
several key reforms sought by the IMF.
These include an 80% devaluation of the
Zaire and a floating e.xchange rate de-
signed to prevent the Zaire from becom-
ing overvalued again, controls on wage in-
creases, and the liberalization of price
controls. The budget deficit has been
brought under control in spite of low ta.x
revenues because of severely depressed
copper and cobalt prices. The success of
these reforms led the IMF to approve
$350 million in new drawings for Zaire
and official creditors to reschedule Zaire's
debt in December. Later in December the
World Bank sponsored a consultative
group on Zaire during which it urged
donors to lend more support to the prog-
ress being made.
Now that Zaire has taken these steps
to help itself, our FY 1985 request is to
help Zaire to continue to meet its reform
goals. By doing so, we help prevent the
refoiTn effort from stalling and lay the
groundwork for longer term and more
equitable economic development.
Cameroon provides the example of
building on success. It is one of the few
countries in sub-Saharan Africa which is
self-sufficient in food production. Its
policies have been conducive to sound
development programs, including em-
phasis on the private sector and active en-
couragement of foreign investment.
Cameroon's petroleum resources have
contributed in large measure to the coun-
try's relative prosperity, but since its
petroleum reserves are limited,
Cameroon's long-term economic viability
rests on agriculture. Thus, we have
targeted our development assistance in
Cameroon to ensuring continued self-
sufficiency in food production. Projects
are focused on two related sectors-
agriculture and rural education.
With a proposed budget of $20 million
in FY 1984 and $21.42 million in FY 1985,
our economic aid emphasis is on the con-
struction of an agricultural university and
the design of its programs, as well as
work in primary education with children
who will be staying in the rural areas
rather than migi-ating to the cities and
seeking higher education there.
Our FY 1985 security assistance pro-
gram is modest ($5 million FMS loans,
$200,000 IMET) aimed at technical train-
ing and ground transport vehicles.
Cameroon borders on Chad, and seeks to
impi'ove the mobility and efficiency of its
modest defense forces.
IMET progi-ams in most of the central
African countries are designed to provide
United States examples, training, and
skills to key military leaders.
East Africa. East Africa plays an in-
tegral part in our security cooperation ar-
rangements for the protection of U.S. in-
terests in Southwest Asia. The continuing
support of the countries of this region is
critical for the success in meeting our
strategic objectives.
Our economic and security assistance
is programmed to strengthen the growth
and internal stability of East African
countries and improve their ability to de-
fend themselves against external aggres-
sion. A number of countries— including
Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Madagas-
car—have undertaken tight, much needed
economic adjustment progi-ams to
establish a stronger basis for self-
sustaining growth. Two coun-
tries—Somalia and Madagascar— are in
the process of correcting severe economic
distortions under socialized regimes. This
month, for example, Somalia announced
plans to switch to free market production
and pricing for agriculture. Our
assistance is crucial to assuring the suc-
cess of these reforms in promoting longer
term economic recovery. It relies, in
several cases, on quick-disbursing ESF
grants which close balance-of-payments
gaps and provide the catalysts for finan-
cial assistance from other donors as well
AFRICA
as assistance complementary to that from
international organizations such as the
IMF and Worid Bank.
Our progi-am in Sudan is an excellent
example of how U.S. assistance, as part of
a concerted international effort, is effec-
tively meeting immediate needs while
promoting longer term economic reform.
For the last 2 years, the United
States has played a leading role in an ex-
traordinary international effort, both
among official donors in the World Bank-
chaired consultative group and among
bilateral creditors in the Paris Club,
which has mobilized resources to enable
Sudan to meet recurring payments for im-
ports essential to development and other
obligations. Through quick-disbursing
commodity import program funds and,
when necessary, cash grants, we have
played a central role in helping Sudan
closely manage its economic resources
within the guidelines of its IMF and con-
sultative group programs. Our ESF and
PL 480 assistance has been conditioned
on the Sudanese undertaking basic
economic reforms to expand opportunities
and competitiveness in the private sector,
liberalize commodity pricing, and provide
incentives for export production.
Our development assistance projects,
meanwhile, have addressed the problem
of expanding productivity, especially in
the agricultural sector, and improving
public sector management to strengthen
leadership skills for longer term growth.
In response the Sudanese Government
has removed budget subsidies on con-
sumer commodities and devalued the of-
ficial exchange rate 45%. Farm gate
prices on government-operated irrigation
were increased substantially and cost
distortions eliminated to stimulate cotton
production, the major export crop. The
government's strict adherence to a World
Bank-approved investment program has
focused public investment in essential
areas. These are major short- and long-
term structural reform accomplishments
for the country which, in terms of propor-
tional magnitude of debt, is the African
equivalent to Brazil or Mexico in Latin
America. Our FY 1985 requests build on
these achievements. They enable us to
continue to play a leading role in the in-
ternational effort to assist Sudan to come
back from the abyss of banki-uptcy and
default to undertaking the long and dif-
ficult road to recovery.
Continual instability and external
threats in the region increase the
pressure on East African countries to
develop effective defensive forces. Sudan
continues to be threatened by subversion
from within and without by forces and
May 1984
^mmmmmm
47
:i ':".U: ';'!(;', i't-^f'/:.
'M
AFRICA
elements supported by Libya. The grow-
ing security problem on two borders and
in the south— by dissidents and ban-
dits—exacerbates the internal political
tasks of the government. Our security
assistance in 1985 is vital for Sudan to
control its borders and manage its own
destiny.
Somalia is still engaged in an active
border conflict with Ethiopia. Ethiopian
troops still occupy two Somali villages,
Ethiopians recently bombed a Somah
town, and tensions remain great. Our
assistance to Somalia is no threat to other
countries but essential to Somalia in
covering its long borders and deterring
insurgent and external attacks.
Kenya occupies an important position
on the Indian Ocean in proximity to world
energy sources in Southwest Asia. Our
national security objective is to ensure
our continued access to the region in time
of crisis. To do this, we must continue to
contribute to Kenya's economic develop-
ment, stability, and military prepared-
ness. Kenya permits U.S. Navy ships ac-
cess to its port facilities, the only modern
working port between Durban and Port
Said. This access provides our vessels
with fuel, provisions, repair facilities, and
crew liberty and has made a major con-
tribution toward the continued deploy-
ment of our naval forces in the western
Indian Ocean.
In contrast to many African nations,
Kenya has a mixed economy, and its
governmental traditions are patterned
after the Western democratic model.
Kenya, like most other African countries,
however, is struggling through a severe
economic crisis, brought on by the world-
wide recession coupled with Kenya's own
serious economic structural weaknesses.
Kenya has taken tough measures to cure
its critical balance-of-payments and
foreign exchange deficits through devalu-
ation, import reductions, and budget cuts.
Fortunately, assistance from the World
Bank, the IMF, and the world donor com-
munity in support of Kenya's short- and
long-term reform efforts is proving suc-
cessful, as affirmed in the recent con-
sultative group meeting.
Southern Africa. Southern Africa is
of substantial strategic and economic im-
portance to the United States. We are
engaged there in a major diplomatic effort
to bring about the independence of
Namibia under UN Secui-ity Council
Resolution 435 and a situation of peace
among countries suffering from a cycle of
violence. We have seen progress in these
objectives and in our relationships with
all the countries of the region aimed at
achieving this objective. But we have still
major efforts ahead of us. The area has
vast development potential. However,
this potential can never be achieved as
long as the problem of war, economic
disruption, racism, and foreign interven-
tion persist. Our objectives in the region
are designed to address these problems
through enhanced regional security,
economic development, peaceful change,
and a movement in South Africa away
from apartheid and toward a system of
governance based on the consent of all
the governed. Our assistance programs
are targeted at achieving these goals and
allowing the area to resolve its difficulties
and develop without outside interference,
especially from Soviet bloc nations.
In Zambia the government has under-
taken a series of difficult economic re-
forms necessitated by the depressed
world mineral prices and the decline in
other sectors such as agriculture. Om*
proposed aid program for FY 1985 would
continue to assist Zambia's economic
recovery through the commodity import
program and development of the
agricultural sector.
In Zimbabwe, our aid is helping this
new country to recover from a lengthy
war and to stay on a sound economic
footing. Our efforts are focused on the
private sector, where an invaluable com-
modity import program has alleviated
balance-of-pajTnents and foreign ex-
change limitations that otherwise would
have stalled industrial and commercial
recovery.
In Mozambique we are beginning an
assistance program through our regional
program and deepening our involvement
in combatting the famine from drought
and cyclone. Mozambique has become one
of the largest recipients worldwide of
U.S. emergency assistance.
Our security assistance program in
Botswana is helping to build a small, effi-
cient, and mobile defense force capable of
maintaining territorial integrity by con-
trolling movement across its long
borders.
Throughout the region we are helping
the majority-ruled nations of the area to
improve regional economic integration by-
developing better infrastructure.
In South Africa we will continue to
focus our efforts on human development
and the provision of educational oppor-
tunities for those who have been disad-
vantaged by apartheid. These projects
cuiTently include scholarships for aca-
demic training in-country and in the
United States, managerial and trade
union training, and significant self-help
and human rights projects. We also are
considering other possible programs
aimed at the same important goals.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published bv the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
48
Department of State Bulletin
ARMS CONTROL
Security Policy
and Arms Control
by Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Address before a regional foreign
policy conference in Birmingham on
March 22, 198U- Ambassador
Eagleburger is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs.
Security policy and arms control are
complex, difficult, and often extremely
boring subjects. You have undoubtedly
read the numbers and seen the graphs
and clever illustrations in newspapers,
magazines, and on television that try to
explain these numbers. But numbers and
graphs inevitably fail to explain that in
arms control negotiations we often com-
pare apples and oranges, or more pre-
cisely, planes, missiles, and submarines;
that we are negotiating the well-being
and perhaps even the survival of inde-
pendent nations; and that in doing so we
encompass very real human hopes and
fears.
Arms control negotiations— indeed,
armaments levels as a whole— are basi-
cally a reflection of the broader reality of
relations between nations, rather than
the determinant of those relations. They
reflect the way in which we view our
place in the world, as well as our percep-
tion of how world events and trends af-
fect us now or may affect us in the
future. Although there is a tendency to
compartmentalize arms control and al-
though its newsworthiness has made it a
premier object of our attentions, we
should not make the mistake of confus-
ing it with the totality of foreign policy.
Rather, arms control is but one com-
ponent—albeit an important one— of a
broadly based policy that must encom-
pass not only our bilateral relations vdth
a competing superpower but our global
interests as well.
Today, I would like to leave the
numbers and the graphs to the technical
experts and speak about the principles
which shape our approach to security
policy, and how those principles are re-
flected in some specific positions of this
Administration. I will focus on nuclear
issues, because these are understandably
of greatest public concern.
In doing so, I cannot stress too
strongly that arms control is not an
alternative to modernizing our nuclear
forces. Rather, maintaining adequate
nuclear forces on the one hand— and this
includes replacing older, obsolete technol-
ogies—and achieving sound arms control
agreements on the other are mutually
dependent and mutually reinforcing
policies. Sound, verifiable arms control
agreements can make force planning
more predictable, and, therefore, help us
make better decisions about what kinds
of weapons we need. Yet a clear commit-
ment on our part to match Soviet force
improvements is a necessary incentive to
Soviet seriousness in arms control nego-
tiations. The experience of massive
Soviet buildups during a period of U.S.
restraint in the late 1960s and early
1970s makes all too clear that Moscow
will seize unilateral advantage if possible.
Principles Shaping U.S. Policy
Let me now come to the principles I
promised.
The first is that military power is
an essential part of diplomacy. This is
always a difficult principle for us as
Americans to accept. One hears— for in-
stance, from critics of our Middle East
policy— that we must look for diplomatic
rather than military solutions to interna-
tional problems. But we must get it
through our heads that history has long
since taught that diplomacy does not and
cannot exist in isolation from national
power. Power, of course, takes several
forms— economic, political, social, moral,
and military— and diplomacy at its best
entails the most effective use of aU of
these factors in combination. But mili-
tary power is an inescapable part of the
equation.
The actual use of military force must,
of course, be a last resort for the United
States. But it must be clear to all that
we are prepared, under certain circum-
stances, to use that force. Our own vul-
nerability to nuclear blackmail, the sus-
ceptibility of our friends to intimidation,
the image of U.S. strength, and the per-
ception of U.S. commitments, all rest in
part on the credibility of U.S. military
forces.
This is especially so given the nature
of the Soviet Union, whose economy is
weak and faltering; whose society sets an
example for virtually no one in our con-
temporary world; and whose moral be-
havior will win it no peace prizes except
the ones it has invented for itself.
Because of such limitations, military
force— whether actually applied, as in
Afghanistan and Eastern Europe by the
Soviet Union and elsewhere by its prox-
ies, or merely threatened— play an over-
whelming role in Soviet diplomacy. Thus
in a world in which the Soviet Union is
one of the two most powerful actors,
military force continues vitally to shape
international politics.
The second, and for Americans
most fundamental, principle of secu-
rity policy, is that our purpose is to
prevent war, and especially nuclear
war, from occurring. As President
Reagan has said time and again, a nu-
clear war cannot be won and must never
be fought.
Preventing war is every bit as much
the goal of our force modernization pro-
grams as of our arms control efforts. The
policy of deterrence— of maintaining
forces which make clear to any potential
aggressor that the cost to him of starting
a war would be far greater than any-
thing he could hope to gain— has not
changed throughout the postwar period.
However uncomfortable the balance
of terror may make us, we should never
forget how well it has worked. As Henry
Kissinger recently reminded a group of
Western leaders, it has been no accident
that all wars in the nuclear age have oc-
curred where there were no American
nuclear weapons. Since 1945 the
American deterrent has helped prevent
direct conflict between ourselves and the
Soviet Union and brought Europe the
longest period of peace in the 20th cen-
tury. If the avoidance of nuclear war is a
moral imperative, and if the maintenance
of a nuclear deterrent is in large mea-
sure responsible for the fact that we
have not had to fight a nuclear war, then
how is it possible for some to argue that
nuclear deterrence is an immoral policy?
This brings me to my third princi-
ple and to one of the great ironies of
security policy: that to preserve peace
we must continually improve our war-
fighting capability. One hears a good
deal of talk these days about nuclear
"overkill" and invidious' comparisons be-
tween the most powerful strategic
nuclear weapons which deter war and
more limited nuclear weapons allegedly
intended for actually fighting one. Such
comments seem to reflect a conviction
that aU we need to ensure deterrence is
a few nuclear weapons— perhaps on
bombers or submarines— which could sur-
vive a Soviet attack and then reach
Moscow.
May 1984
■UUUiHIIIUIIIIIIIIUJIIIIIM
1
ARMS CONTROL
Clear U.S. nuclear superiority
through the 1960s did lend credibility to
our threat to use our strategic nuclear
forces in response to any aggression
against ourselves or our allies. But as
the Soviet Union attained nuclear equal-
ity across the board-and some impor-
tant advanteges-it became less credible
to threaten massive U.S. nuclear reta,lia-
tion in response to a relatively limited
Soviet conventional or even nuclear
probe against U.S. forces or allies
anywhere around the globe. Thus
deterrence-preventing war-has come to
require a range of nuclear and conven-
tional forces-warfighting forces, if you
wnll-whose possible use would seem
credible in the variety of situations we
might face.
The fourth principle which guides
U.S. security policy is that the present
and projected levels of nuclear
weapons are profoundly unsatisfac-
tory. There is, I deeply believe, no
sound alternative, in the nuclear age, to
a poUcy of deterrence. We cannot dism-
vent nuclear weapons or make them go
away with slogans. But we can, with pa-
tience and skill, negotiate mutual reduc-
tions in their members while maintammg
credible deterrence.
Nuclear Deterrence
When the Reagan Administration took
office, the Soviet Union was engaged in a
sustained and impressive mUitar>- buUd-
up far surpassing any legitimate defen-
sive needs. Moscow seemed bent on go-
ing beyond overall parity with U.S.
forces to acquire a measure of superior-
ity. Substantial quantitative and qualita-
tive increases in Soviet strategic
weapons raised the possibility that a
Soviet first strike might destroy the
large majority of U.S. land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
This obviously posed a major challenge
to the fundamental principle of deter-
rence: that neither side should be able to
deprive the other of the ability to retali-
ate for a nuclear attack. Equally worry-
ing to our European allies was Soviet
deployment of the SS-20 missile-a
highly accurate mobile weapon which can
reach all of Western Europe from sanc-
tuaries within the Soviet Union.
Moscow's objective, through these SS-20
deployments, clearly was to create trans-
atlantic strains by posing a threat to
Europe that could only be responded to
by the use of the U.S.-based strategic
deterrent. Europeans facing this Soviet
threat would inevitably ask-and, indeed.
MBFR Talks Resume
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAR. 16, 1984>
I am pleased to note the resumption in
Vienna today of the negotiations on con-
ventional force reductions in Europe,
known as the MBFR talks. The U.S.
representative, Ambassador Morton
Abramowitz, and his NATO colleagues
will be working closely together in seek-
ing early progress toward an agreement
to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces
in central Europe to a substantially lower
and equal level.
The Western participants in MBFR
are united in theu' pursuit of positive
results. I call upon the Soviet Union and
the other nations of the Warsaw Pact to
join us in a good-faith effort to achieve
real progress.
The MBFR talks are an important
part of the East- West security and arms
control dialogue. The resumption of
MBFR coincides with the conclusion to-
day of the first round of the CDE [Con-
ference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe] talks in Stockholm, which deal
with military confidence-building
measures in Europe. Here, too, the
Western nations are working closely
together. During the initial round, we
have tabled a comprehensive package of
proposed measures to reduce the risk of
war.
I welcome these developments and
sincerely hope that General Secretary
Chernenko and other members of the new
Soviet leadership will approach these ne-
gotiations in a similarly positive spirit. I
also urge the Soviet Union to return to
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] and START [strategic arms reduc-
tion talks] negotiations, where very im-
portant work in the cause of building a
more secure and peaceful world has been
suspended by them. These crucial
negotiations can succeed if the Soviet
Union wants them to succeed. We are
certainly ready to do our part. It is in the
interest of all mankind that these vital ef-
forts be resumed now.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Mar. 19, 1984.
did ask-if the United States would be
willing to respond in such a massive way
to a Soviet attack limited to Europe.
Thus, in response to the Soviet
SS-20 deployment, NATO collectively
decided on a unique response: an offer to
negotiate mutual restraint in this new
category of weapons coupled with a firm
decision to match the Soviet buildup, if
negotiations failed, by modernizing its
own intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
The latter was not just a rhetorical
threat. Work on the missiles and prepa-
rations for their deployment in Europe
began. But, because the NATO missiles
would not be ready for 4 years, Moscow
had ample time to prevent their deploy-
ment through negotiation.
This reaction to the SS-20 threat is
representative of the Reagan Adminis-
tration's general approach to the difficult
issue of nuclear deterrence. It is a two-
fold policy:
First, a comprehensive effort to
modernize our strategic nuclear weapons
-land-based intercontinental baUistic
missiles, submarine-launched missiles,
and bombers-and to continue implemen-
tation of NATO's 1979 decision to deploy
U.S. weapons in Europe to balance
Moscow's SS-20s;
Second, offers of deep cuts m U.S.
and Soviet nuclear systems across the
board and especially in those systems
which, by seeming to threaten a first
strike are most destabilizing.
Our force improvements are designed
both to improve the survivability of our
nuclear deteirent in the face of a grow-
ing Soviet threat and to make clear to
Moscow that we will not allow it a mili-
tary advantage that could be used for
purposes of blackmail. At the same time,
we are offering Moscow relief from the
economic and other burdens of the arms
race through mutual and verifiable
reductions in all categories of nuclear
weapons, but especially those which
seem most threatening to the retaliatory
capability of each side.
We are not trying to disarm the
Soviet Union or to gain advantage over
it. Our arms control proposals would not
deprive it of any weapons that would be
useful in its defense, even if its propa-
ganda about an aggressive, war-monger-
ing United States were true. Quite the
contrary: our proposals for mutual re-
straint in the most threatening weapons
should, by enhancing the survivability of
Soviet as well as U.S. deterrent forces,
make both of us feel more secure.
In the strategic arms reduction talks,
or START, we have proposed substantial
50
.. Li^^.^^-^JMUMBi ' !
Department o* ^•-♦-
ARMS CONTROL
reductions in deployed missiles, with par-
ticular emphasis on reductions in the
most threatening or destabilizing
systems, reductions in deployed ballistic
missile warheads by one-third, and limits
below SALT II [strategic amis limitation
talks] levels on the air-launched cruise
missiles which Moscow claims to find so
threatening.
After consultations with key congres-
sional leaders, we incorporated into our
START proposal the principle of a mu-
tual, guaranteed build-down of strategic
forces. The principle of build-down is
simple. Some old weapons would have to
be withdrawn for any new ones
deployed. And the "penalty"— the num-
ber to be withdrawn— would be greater
for deployment of new weapons which
might seem to threaten a first strike at-
tack. Thus, as both the United States
and Soviet Union modernize theii"
nuclear forces, there would be a power-
ful incentive to shift to less destabilizing
new systems.
In the negotiations on intermediate-
range nuclear forces, or INF, we have
proposed scrapping Moscow's new
SS-20s and older SS-4s and 5s, in return
for scrapping NATO's actual and
planned deployments of new inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapons. This
bold proposal would have resulted in the
first-ever elimination of an entire class of
nuclear weapons from the face of the
earth. When that proved too bold for
Moscow, we offered an interim proposal
to limit both sides' INF deployments to
an equal, mutually agreed number below
NATO's planned deployments of 572.
The results to date in both INF and
START negotiations have, as you know,
been disappointing.
With regard to INF, Moscow wasted
the 4 years that elapsed between
NATO's announced intention to modern-
ize its forces if a negotiated settlement
could not be reached and the arrival of
the first new U.S. missiles in Europe. It
used this time not to negotiate seriously
but rather to play on West European
public opinion in the hope that it could
use the fear of nuclear weapons to split
the alliance and thereby prevent us from
proceeding with deployments. In the
INF talks themselves, the unifying
theme in various Soviet proposals was
that no U.S. nuclear missiles belong in
Europe, no matter what the Soviets
might do. This is part of a long-term
Soviet effort to exclude the United
States, not only from the nuclear defense
of Europe but also— since most of our air-
craft which can carry nuclear weapons
play vital conventional defense roles as
well— to push us out of Europe
altogether.
The failure of Moscow's effort led, as
we all know, to the Soviet breakoff of
the negotiations. Whether time will lead
the Soviets to a wiser course, with a
return to the negotiating table, remains
to be seen. But, in the meantime, it is
important that Western publics keep
clearly in mind that it is the Soviets who
broke off the negotiations and are con-
tinuing their wholly unnecessary INF
buildup, while it is the United States
that is prepared to return immediately to
the negotiating table.
The Soviet record in START was, for
a time, a little better. Some real, if still
limited, progress had been achieved
before Moscow interrupted those negoti-
ations, too, in protest against the be-
ginning of NATO's INF deployments.
The Soviets had acknowledged the need
for some reductions below the SALT II
levels for missiles and bombers.
Moscow's START proposals would, how-
ever, have perpetuated its advantage in
throw-weight, or destructive power, and
probably would not have required reduc-
tions in its ballistic missile warheads, as
opposed to launchers. In fact, it could
allow a great increase in the number of
warheads. But, in any event, this is, for
now, academic. The Soviets, as you
know, have not returned to the START
negotiations since they left Geneva last
year. It is, again, the United States that
seeks to continue to negotiate.
U.S.-Soviet Relations
Let me take a moment here to say some-
thing about the particular frustrations
this Administration has had in dealing
with the Soviets over the past 3 years.
During the presidency of Ronald
Reagan, we have had to contend with
three Soviet leaders. This flux in the
Kremlin has severely hampered the give-
and-take of diplomacy in general and of
our arms control negotiations in
particular.
When this Administration took office,
it found an aging and ailing Brezhnev. A
shrewd and calculating leader at his
best— these qualities are not necessarily
negative in a negotiating adversary-
Brezhnev was far from the top of his
powers in 1981 and 1982. Moreover, his
colleagues on the Politburo were well
aware of his mortality and positioning
themselves for the succession.
Andropov never took complete con-
trol of the Soviet state and was seriously
ill for much of his short tenure. Cher-
nenko has yet to establish himself, and
we may well face an interval of political
consolidation before the Kremlin is ready
to turn its full attentions to arms control
talks.
This sustained period of Soviet suc-
cession politics, in my opinion, has had a
major impact on the ability of the Soviet
Union to make decisions. Productive
negotiations require flexibility, and flex-
ibility requires leadership that is willing
to make difficult decisions and accept
responsibility for them. The Soviet
Union has not had such leadership dur-
ing the Reagan Administration. Virtually
without exception, each time the Soviets
have been faced with difficult choices we
have witnessed a period of apparent in-
ternal debate, followed, inevitably, by
hard-line decisions clearly dictated by the
most conservative elements in the
Politburo.
At the very least the past 4 years
have challenged the popular assumption
that we can put our influence to effective
use during periods of Soviet political
fluidity. Soviet politics is not likely soon
again to be as fluid as it has been during
the past 3 years; and this Administration
has worked very hard to put forward
sensible arms control proposals. Yet, for
now, at least, all we have to show for it
is a Soviet walkout from the two most
important arms control negotiations,
START and INF. The last 3 years have
indicated that, if anything, the Soviet
decisionmaking apparatus— in the ab-
sence of strong leadership that is pre-
pared to exercise its authority— is likely
to seek refuge in a bureaucratically safe
but substantively sterile hard line.
This Soviet paralysis is particularly
frustrating when we are the ones ac-
cused of not being forthcoming in arms
negotiations. The record shows that we
have responded constructively and imag-
inatively to the challenges of arms con-
trol. It is the Soviets who have shown
neither flexibility nor commitment to the
cause of reducing tensions.
Flexibility and the
U.S. Approach
When arms control negotiations resume,
and I am convinced that sooner or later
the Soviets will come to realize that they
must resume, we will give careful con-
sideration to any serious Soviet propos-
als. Indeed, one distinguishing feature of
the Reagan Administration's approach to
arms control has been its flexibility. Both
our START and our INF proposals have
evolved over time in carefully considered
response to Soviet descriptions of their
security perceptions and needs. When
May 1984
■DSmSBBOBBBBIBBBI
Ikiliikiiii
51
EAST ASIA
negotiations begin again, we will enter
them in that same spirit.
There are some things, however,
about which we will not be flexible. Let
me list them.
• One is our commitment to begin-
ning a process of substantial reductions.
I understand the appeal of calls to freeze
nuclear weapons first, then reduce them.
But I am utterly convinced that it would
not work that way. A freeze, by locking
in existing Soviet military advantages
and preventing us from modernizing our
forces, would reduce— perhaps eliminate
—Soviet incentives to negotiate. A freeze
on all nuclear weapons would, moreover,
prevent both the Soviets and the United
States from shifting to less threatening,
clearly retaliatory systems. Thus, a nu-
clear freeze would work against the very
objective its proponents espouse— a
lessening of the threat of nuclear war.
• The second point on which we will
be inflexible is in focusing on approaches
that will actually improve stability in our
strategic relationship with the Soviet
Union. We must begin to shift from more
threatening nuclear weapons to those
clearly intended only for retaliation.
• Third, we will insist on balanced
agreements which result in substantial
equality between the superpowers. In
START, where we are negotiating about
a wide variety of very different weapons
systems and where each side has its own
historical strengths and preferences, we
have repeatedly made clear our willing-
ness to consider trade-offs between areas
of U.S. and Soviet advantage. In INF,
where the weapons on the table are
more comparable to each other, we have,
in effect, told Moscow to pick a number—
the lower the better— so long as it is an
equal number for both sides. But the
principle of equal rights and limits is not
negotiable.
• Fourth, any agreements we sign
must be verifiable. Verification becomes
more difficult and complicated as nuclear
weapons grow more complex, and espe-
cially as we focus on qualitative aspects of
the arms race. But arms control is far too
important to be a matter of trust.
Winston Churchill aptly expressed a
realistic approach to arms control and
deterrence when he wrote that:
Moralists may find it a melancholy thought
that peace can find no nobler foundations than
mutual terror. But for my part I shall be con-
tent if these foundations are solid, because
they will give us the extra time and the new
breathing space for the supreme effort which
has to be made for a world settlement.
The attempt to deal with the relation-
ship between arms and human passions
has been a consuming one for our cen-
tury. We have no choice but to learn from
rather than to repeat the mistakes of the
past, for we no longer enjoy the luxury of
a broad margin for error that earlier
generations possessed. The existence of
nuclear weapons has changed aU that. We
must, today, be clear about what we seek;
equally, we must be clear about the fun-
damental differences between ourselves
and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, we may
end up by heightening tensions rather
than consolidating the peace— imperfect
as it is— that we now enjoy.
No one has expressed this irony bet-
ter than the American political philoso-
pher Walter Lippmann. Writing in
1943-as the tide of the Second Worid
War began to turn in our favor, but while
the outcome was by no means cer-
tain— Lippmann was understandably bit-
ter as he analyzed the costs of haphazard,
shortsighted Western disarmament in the
years following the First World War.
Lippmann noted that: "The genera-
tion which most sincerely and elaborately
declared that peace is the extreme end of
foreign policy got not peace, but a most
devastating war." Advocates of disarma-
ment, Lippmann wrote, were "tragically
successful in disarming the nations that
believed in disarmament." His implica-
tions were clear: only one side disarmed,
due to pressures exerted by its own
people. The other side, free of those
pressures, rearmed and thought itself
free to pursue its aggressive intentions.
Advocates of disarmament made two
tactical errors and one strategic error
during the period that Lippmann ana-
lyzed. Tactically, they led the fascist
states to believe that democracies were
unwilling, in the end, to defend their
values; and, when the democracies were
forced to act, the policies of shortsighted
disarmament forced them to act from
positions of weakness. The larger, strate-
gic mistake was ignoring the political dif-
ferences between the democracies and
their enemies, in naive belief that these
political differences would disappear once
they put down their arms. Thus, a bad
arms agreement was infmitely worse
than no agreement at aU.
Agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union will be
ultimately successful only if they take
full account of the differences between
us. Our conventional and nuclear
arsenals do not divide us; rather, they
exist because other issues divide us.
The question is not closed. We are
still committed to negotiating agree-
ments to reduce both strategic and inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapons. It is
now up to the Soviets to embrace,
sincerely, a simOar commitment. ■
FY 1985 Assistance Requests for
East Asia and the Pacific
by Paul D. Wolfowitz
Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
March 22, 198i. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assist-
ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.^
I am delighted to have this opportunity to
present our FY 1985 foreign assistance
proposal for East Asia and the Pacific.
U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
Our past investments in the economies
and security of our East Asian and Pacific
friends have paid enormous dividends.
For 20 some years. East Asian countries
have sustained higher economic growth
rates than any other part of the world.
They now account for one-sixth of world
trade, and their share is growing. Our an-
nual trade with East Asia and the Pacific
exceeds that with any other region. U.S.
investments in the region now exceed $26
billion and continue to increase. And
despite formidable challenges to their
security which persist to this day, most of
our friends have achieved a degree of in-
ternal stability and national resolve rare
in other parts of the world.
However, just as important as the
volume of trade is the extent to which
East Asian economies have come to sym-
bolize the dynamism of the free market
system. Records for the largest and
longest sustained growth rates are held
52
Department of State Bulletin
EAST ASIA
by nations from this region. Such coun-
tries span the spectrum from lesser
developed and industriaHzing to industrial
economies. It is worth noting the extent
to which they have accomplished eco-
nomic development while maintaining
political stability as well as cultural iden-
tity. These countries have accepted the
common features— positive and nega-
tive—which accompany modernization.
This is in sharj) conti-ast to the dreary,
rigid mold the neighboring command
economies have imposed on their people.
There are also pressing economic
problems to confront despite the gen-
erally bright jjicture of the past several
years. The world recession brought sharp
declines in income for the many Asian and
Pacific exporters of primary commodities,
and we have only begun to see an up-
swing in these markets. The Philippines
economy is going through a particularly
difficult period. Growth has been uneven
in several countries, and pressing politico-
economic problems remain.
We have a great stake in the pros-
perity and security of East Asian and
Pacific nations. Our FY 1985 assistance
programs are designed to protect this
stake and to expand it to those areas
which are less prosperous and less secure.
Our foreign assistance proposals have
also been developed in the context of a
disturbing buildup of Soviet military
strength over the past few years. Unable
to match the vitality and progress of our
friends in East Asia and the Pacific, the
Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam
are threatening the region with military
buildups that far exceed their defensive
needs. Huge numerical increases in land,
sea, and air foi-ces have been buttressed
with qualitative improvements which are
becoming significant during this decade.
Soviet ground forces east of the Urals
increased from 20 to over 50 divisions
since 1965, including deployments on the
Sino-Soviet border. Soviet air forces in
the four eastern-most military districts
now have more than 3,000 combat air-
craft. The Soviet Pacific fleet is now the
largest fleet in the Soviet Navy and con-
tains approximately one-thii-d of all Soviet
submarines, one-fourth of all principal
surface combatants, and one-third of all
naval aircraft.
Soviet ability to project power is fur-
ther enhanced by forward deployment in
Vietnam. Soviet surface combatants and
attack submarines normally found at Cam
Ranh, combined with aircraft deploy-
ments, present a clear and current danger
to free world sealanes.
Recent evidence demonstrates that
the Soviet buildup continued during this
past year. The Soviet Union has for the
first time deployed its Badger bombers to
Cam Ranh Bay. And following its down-
ing of the Korean airliner, it stationed
MiG-23 fighters in the Japan Northern
Territories occupied by the Soviets since
World War II. Its SS-20 intermediate
nuclear missile force in Asia has grow7i
rapidly from 99 launchers in February
last year to 135 today.
Apart from the Soviet threat, the
regional military threats have continued
to increase at a disturbing rate. Vietnam
has doubled the size of its standing army
since 1979 and now, with more than a
million men under arms, possesses the
third largest standing army in the world.
Improvements in firepower, command
and control, and weaponry have con-
tinued apace with the numerical in-
creases. In addition the Vietnamese have
assembled forces along the Thai-
Kampuchean border which suggest they
may again this year attack Kampuchean
refugee settlements on the border.
North Korea continues to spend at
least 20% of its GNP on its military forces
in an apparent effort to increase further
its numerical superiority over the South
in land and air forces. They have further-
more in Rangoon descended to barbaric
behavior against their southern coun-
trymen, which casts grave doubts over
theii- protestations of peaceful long-term
intentions and which violated the
sovereignty of a neutral country.
In view of these economic and secu-
rity challenges, we believe our resources
should be allocated to accomplish the
following objectives:
• To strengthen human rights and the
commitment to democracy and free
markets in the region;
• To reduce poverty and economic
and social inequalities which foster
violence and invite external interference;
• To assure access to the markets and
raw material of the region;
• To maintain close, cooperative rela-
tionships with countries in strategic prox-
imity to key sealanes of communication;
and
• To protect the front-line states
(Korea and Thailand), enhance our treaty
relationships (with Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand), and maintain use of
military facilities in the Philippines.
Accompanying these major goals are
a number of other important objectives
such as effectively coping with refugee
flows and reducing narcotics cultivation
and trafficking.
REGIONAL PROGRAM OVERVIEW
As has been the case since FY 1983, the
development and security assistance pro-
grams are integrated components of a
single program. All components are
directly related to U.S. interests in East
Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The FY 1985 bilateral foreign
assistance request for East Asia and the
Pacific totals approximately $793 million
and would be an increase of some 13.1%
over the FY 1984 allocations of just over
$701 million. Our total request for
economic assistance— development
assistance, PL 480, and economic support
funds (ESF)-is for $314.8 million and
would represent an increase of about 22%i
over the FY 1984 allocations of $258.1.
Our request for military assist-
ance—foreign military sales (FMS),
military assistance progi'am (MAP), and
international military education and train-
ing (IMET)— on the other hand would
total $478.6 million for FY 1985 and
represents an increase of only 8% over
the FY 1984 allocations of $443.1.
Because of the strength of the East
Asian countries themselves, the level of
effort required of us in the region is pro-
portionately a very small share of the
U.S. worldwide effort, even though the
region itself is as important to U.S. in-
terests as any other region of the world.
The East Asian share of the FY 1985
worldwide bilateral foreign assistance re-
quest is some 5.1%.
East Asia's share of the worldwide
economic and military assistance alloca-
tions for FY 1985 would be approximately
5% and 8%, respectively. Korea, facing
the most formidable regional military
threat, requires the largest allocation of
military assistance.
Perhaps more important than the
arithmetic balance between economic and
military assistance is the manner in which
we target our scarce resources to meet
those problems which are most closely
linked to our national interests.
The largest recipients of development
assistance are Thailand, a treaty ally and
front-line state; the Philippines, also a
treaty ally and the host country for im-
portant joint defense facilities; and In-
donesia, which in area and population con-
stitutes roughly half of Southeast Asia.
All of these states have shown the
capability of putting development
assistance to good use. They also sit
astride or near key sea lanes of com-
munication.
Notwithstanding our great stake in
the region, its vast size, and the for-
midable threats to its prosperity and
May 1984
iliiilBii
53
EAST ASIA
security, our FY 1985 request levels for
most program recipients are essentially
straight-lined from the FY 1984 allocation
with little or no compensation for infla-
tion. We are requesting a 6.2% increase in
Indonesia's total request level, chiefly to
augment its PL 480 program, a proposal
to increase Burma's development
assistance by $2.5 million, and modest
IMET increases in several countries.
The Philippines is the only country in
the region for which we are seeking
substantial increases. In the Philippines,
we have I'equested a total increase in
bilateral assistance programs of nearly
$80 million to bring the total program
level from $151 million in FY 1984 to
nearly $231 million for FY 1985.
This level is, as you know, in accord-
ance with President Reagan's "best-
effort" pledge to seek $900 million of
assistance over a 5-year period following
the review of our Military Bases Agi-ee-
ment last spring. These bases have im-
mense strategic value for the United
States. Moreover, the U.S. presence and
assistance can help the Philippines to
cope more effectively with its difficult
economic and security pi-oblems.
Some 92% of our securitv assistance
(FMS, MAP, IMET, ESF) request for the
region is allocated to Korea, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand. This assistance helps
to deter direct military threats to Korea
and Thailand and to enhance the U.S.
strategic posture in Asia, the Pacific, and
Indian Oceans by maintaining the use of
military bases in the Philippines.
Our FY 1985 military assistance re-
cjuest recognizes that countries with low
per capita incomes and severe debt serv-
icing problems may require some form of
concessional financing. The Philippines
fits this category, and we have, therefore,
requested that half of the FMS ci-edits
proposed for the Philippines be offered at
a concessional interest rate of 5%. Conces-
sionality for the Philippines takes into ac-
count the serious and mounting economic
difficulties it is experiencing.
In Indonesia a loss of export earnings
and a current account deficit of about $6.5
billion last year also indicates the need for
concessional financing. In addition, in an
effort to hold down our overall levels
while providing necessary assistance to a
nonaligned state with which we have a
very important relationship, we have pro-
posed reducing Indonesia's total FMS
levels by $5 million from FY 1984.
Considering the extremely heavy
military purchasing requirements forced
on South Korea by the continuing North
Korean military buildup, we are re-
questing 10/20 loan terms for South
54
LLXiMJ*
Korea. This fomi of concessionality ex-
tends the loan terms for a country to pro-
vide a 10-year grace period in which only
interest is paid followed by a 20-year
repayment period. In this way we can
demonstrate our interest in helping South
Korea deter anothei- attack by North
Korea w^hile still holding our FY 1985
FMS request level down to last year's.
Southeast Asia
Philippines. The Philippines has recently
experienced the shock of the Aquino
assassination, followed by demonstra-
tions, some political changes, and growing
economic problems. We have spoken out
clearly on these issues. The U.S. Govern-
ment has expressed its outrage over
Aquino's murder, and we have urged that
it be investigated quickly and vigorously
with a view to bringing the perpetrators
to justice. An independent board, which
has gained wide respect in the Philip-
pines, is now investigating this crime.
We have expressed our strong desire
for rapid political normalization; in par-
ticular, we have stressed the importance
we attach to the Philippines' holding free
and impartial elections in order to have a
clear expression of the public will and to
encourage the growth of a new genera-
tion of political leaders.
There has been progress in this area.
A new presidential succession mechanism
is in place. In response to opposition
demands, provinces rather than regions
will be the new geographic units for elec-
tions, and a new voter registration will
take place. A new election code, which is
acceptable to key elements of the opposi-
tion, has been approved. Many key op-
position groups are presenting candi-
dates. Additionally, President Marcos has
agreed to appoint some new independent
members on the election commission.
For FY 1985, we are placing our em-
phasis in the Philippines on ESF. We are
requesting $180 million in economic and
security assistance, of which $95 million is
in ESF. We have substantially increased
economic assistance. Our ESF request for
the FY 1985-89 period is $475 million, up
from $200 million in the previous 5-year
period. We more than doubled ESF, an
increase of 137%.
We have significantly increased our
ESF partly in recognition of the fact that
providing government services to address
the economic and social conditions in rural
areas is vitally important. This is a reality
which the Philippine Government also
recognizes. ESF takes on added impor-
tance because of the deteriorating
economy during the past year.
Discussions with the Philippine
Government concerning the use of ESF
have not yet been concluded, but we ex-
pect that half of the funds will be devoted
to a continuation of such development
projects as school consti-uction, feeder
roads, and municipal development in
areas adjacent to Clark Air Force Base,
infrastructure development in provinces
near our bases, rural energy develop-
ment, and construction of market
facilities, roads, and schools throughout
the Philippines. The other half of the FY
1985 ESF program will be devoted to a
new activity: local currency supporting
the Philippine Government's contribution
to ongoing Agency for International
Development (AID), World Bank, and
Asian Development Bank activities.
We are requesting $39 million in
development assistance and $9.75 million
in PL 480 Title II (excluding World Food
Progi-am donations of $209,000). The
global recession, with low commodity
prices and high interest rates for external
borrowing, have slowed exjDort and eco-
nomic growth. Depressed domestic
demand and investment activity have fur-
ther aggi-avated fiscal and balance-of-
payments problems. Rural areas and
poverty groups have been particularly
hard hit by the economic slowdown.
Some 4 million households in the
Philippines are considered below the
poverty line. The development assistance
program focuses on the poorer regions of
the country with emphasis on agricultural
production, rural employment generation,
and family plaiming. PL 480 assistance
also has been centered in rural areas.
These programs contribute to develop-
ment and stability in the Philippines.
The value of our military facilities in
the Philippines remains unchanged. For-
tunately throughout the recent difficul-
ties, the attitude of the Philippine people
toward the United States has i-emained
constant, and support for our military
presence continues without any signifi-
cant change.
The requested security assistance
levels for the Philippines are closely
linked to the 5-year review of the Military
Bases Agreement conducted in April-May
1983. On the day the review was suc-
cessfully completed, President Reagan, in
a letter to President Marcos, made a
"best efforts" pledge to seek $900 million
in security assistance for FY 1985-89.
Military cooperation is an integi-al
part of the U.S.-Philippine relationship
and has been so since the independence of
that nation. We use facilities which are
located on Philippine bases, work closely
with our military hosts, and enjoy
Department of State Bulletin
unhampered use of these facilities. The
Philippines has always procured the bulk
of its military equipment from the United
States.
For a number of years, the military's
share of the national budget in the Philip-
pines has been smaller than that of any
other Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) member. Although the
size of the military establishment has
gi'own in the past decade, its arsenal re-
mains very obsolete. Yet, it is the Philip-
pines, alone among ASEAN countries,
that faces serious, active insurgencies.
The communist-sponsored insurgency,
if unchecked, would inflict suffering on
the Philippine people and ultimately
threaten U.S. interests. In addition, while
the Philippines does not face any immi-
nent foreign threat, the Soviet military
presence in the region has increased, and
the Philippines does require a modest
deterrent capability.
We have significantly increased our
request for IMET to $2 miUion. Philippine
Government financial constraints have
resulted in a les.sening of the Philippines'
contribution to the program, whose value
to both countries has, if anything, grown.
In this period of change and upheaval in
the Philippines, it is more important than
ever that we strengthen the existing
close personal ties with its younger
military leaders, whose professionalism
has been one of the country's strengths.
We have included MAP in the Philip-
pine program for the first time in 4 years,
the recognition of the serious economic
situation there. We expect the Philippine
Government to request use of MAP and
FMS financing for- helicopters, trucks,
and armored vehicles; communications
and engineering equipment; new patrol
vessels; retrofitting of ships; and spare
parts for major items of equipment.
We are requesting $25 million in MAP
and $60 million in FMS. The combined
FMS/MAP total of $85 million compares
with $50 million last year. Our FY
1985-89 request is for FMS/MAP of $425
million compared with $300 million the
previous years, an increase of 42%. These
increases are less than they appear
because inflation has eroded the Philip-
pine package which had maintained con-
stant levels since 1979. Moreover, Philip-
pine needs increased significantly in in-
tervening years, and the Philippine
Government suffered severe budgetary
difficulties.
Thailand. Thailand has been a close
treaty ally for decades. Our support for
Thailand's continued development and
security is seen as a gauge of the Ameri-
can commitment to Thailand and to
ASEAN generally.
On its eastern border, Thailand faces
a strong, well-proven Vietnamese military
threat, in position there since late 1978.
This has prompted an overdue moderniza-
tion of Thailand's military forces designed
to provide a deterrent to further Viet-
namese aggression. The Thai must be ac-
corded a high priority in the allocation of
assistance to enable them to enhance
their self-reliance.
Our MAP request is $5 million, the
same as for last year. This is the only
form of concessionality in our Thai
assistance package which can go for
equipment purchases.
We are requesting $98 million in FMS
funding, an increase of $4 million over last
year's amount. These funds will go for a
long overdue upgrading of Thai Air Force
equipment; for the army's acquisition of
additional armor, radar, armored person-
nel carriers, and howitzers; and navy
missiles for new patrol craft it has
ordered.
For IMET funds, we are asking $2.4
million, an increase of $200,000 over FY
1984. These funds will cover necessary
training for newly acquired equipment.
The Thai invariably make good use of
IMET and are eager to acquire the
technical skills needed to use and main-
tain modern equipment.
The Thai economy, even while sad-
dled with heavy defense requirements,
has performed reasonably well. Social and
economic development needs are not be-
ing ignored because of defense spending.
Thailand's free market economy and open
society have thus far been able to balance
these interests skillfully. Security
assistance from the United States has
been pivotal.
Our development assistance request
of $27 million represents a modest
decrease from last year's figure of $29.3
million. It contributes, however, to
Thailand's continued emphasis on balanc-
ing necessary defense expenditures with
domestic development expenditures. Part
of this assistance will go to projects
designed to deal with rural poverty in the
northeast, where the communist in-
surgency once flourished. A new AID
strategy emphasizing science and
technology is being developed for
Thailand as well.
Thailand, with our help, is determined
not to abandon these villagers. ESF funds
also directly contribute to the upholding
of Thailand's policy of first asylum for
refugees, by assisting refugee impact on
Thai border villages.
Despite some pushoff problems, the
Thai have continued to support the
refugee program. They have granted first
EAST ASIA
asylum to over 600,000 refugees since
1975, including 80,000 boat people, and
have 132,000 in refugee camps now
awaiting resettlement, thereby con-
tributing significantly to international ef-
forts to cope with aggressive Vietnamese
policies.
The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)-Thai antipiracy pro-
gram, to which we contribute, has not
produced the results we had hoped for.
Although there is active patrolling— air
and sea— by the Royal Thai Navy, no
pirates have been apprehended since the
inception of the program. Piracy attacks
also still occur on many refugee boats but
the incidence has decreased from about
70-80% in 1982 to 50-60% in late 1983. A
UNHCR assessment team has reviewed,
the program and suggested a number of
improvements that we support. The
Royal Thai Government is considering
these proposals.
On its eastern border, Thailand faces
a strong, well-proven Vietnamese military
threat, in position there since late 1978.
This has prompted an overdue moderniza-
tion of Thailand's military forces. This
modernization, which has had our sup-
port, will not make Thailand a match for
the Vietnamese. It will, however, in con-
junction with other efforts, provide a
deterrent to further Vietnamese aggres-
sion. In order to provide a credible deter-
rent which will enable Thailand to become
more self-sufficient in an emergency, the
Thai must be accorded a high priority in
the allocation of assistance.
Indonesia. The geostrategic
significance of Indonesia's location and
size and its standing as a moderate among
nonaligned nations and in the Islamic
world add to the importance of our rela-
tionship. Development and security
assistance to Indonesia is also consistent
with our strong support for ASEAN,
which represents the best hope for peace
and stability in Southeast Asia.
A strong and moderately growing
development assistance program in In-
donesia is necessary to increase man-
power and management skills, to advance
agi'icultural research, to continue to
upgrade Indonesia's educational system,
and to promote the private sector's role in
economic development.
Development assistance of $65 million
is being requested for Indonesia for FY
1985, an increase of $1 million over the
FY 1984 allocation. An increase in PL
480, Title I assistance to $40 million is re-
quested in recognition that rice and grain
supplies have been diminished by late
rains and droughts in some areas. Food
May 1984
BBBBBBBBBBBBBni
EAST ASIA
stocks need to be maintained at accept-
able levels in order to forestall hardship
and social unrest, as well as to provide
adecjuate emergency shipments to im-
poverished areas. A PL 480, Title II re-
quest of a little over $7.7 million supports
voluntary agency pi'ograms and the
World Food Program.
The reciuested FY 1985 security
assistance progi-am for Indonesia consists
of $2.7 million in IMET funding, plus $40
million in FMS du-ect loans, half of this
amount at concessional interest rates and
half at treasury rates. This mix of conces-
sional and treasury rates is considered
necessary to assist Indonesia in recover-
ing from the effects of the worldwide
recession and serious budgetary shortfalls
due to declining oil and non-oil export
revenue in 1981-82. In addition to the
FMS credit program, Indonesia is ex-
pected to purchase some equipment
through FMS cash procedures.
Indonesia's military forces remain
critically short of ciualified technicians,
program managers, and officers. Most
U.S. training will be in technical fields
related to these shortages. The level of
funding requested should permit between
250 and 300 military students to attend
our armed forces schools in FY 1985.
IMET deserves the highest priority
support because of the important role
played by the professional military in In-
donesian society, the utility of the pro-
gram in furthering our foreign relations
objectives, and the desirability of mutual
service-to-service contacts.
Although Indonesia's recent economic
problems have caused a slowdown in
military force modernization, U.S. secu-
rity assistance has helped to sustain a
number of important programs, including
aircraft maintenance and spare parts,
ship overhaul and spare parts, im-
provements in air and sea defense
systems, the purchase of war reserve
munitions, and, most importantly, ad-
vanced professional training for the In-
donesian Army, Navy, and Au- Force.
Malaysia. U.S.-Malaysian relations
are good and were enhanced by the
January visit to Washington of Prime
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad.
Malaysia's continued political stability
and economic development are important
to peace and stability in Southeast Asia.
The Malaysians have also expressed in-
terest in continued defense cooperation
with the United States within the context
of their nonaligned status.
Strategically located on the Strait of
Malacca and faced with Soviet-backed
Vietnamese forces occupying nearby
Kampuchea, Malaysia is a responsible
member of the Islamic Conference and
Nonaligned Movement. Malaysia has
played a constructive role in international
affairs and has forcefully advanced
ASEAN's strategy to bring about a
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from
Kampuchea.
IMET plays a significant role in the
U.S.-Malaysian military relationship by
providing a framework in which mutually
beneficial professional relationships are
established. The IMET request of $1
million is a slight increase from the
$900,000 level of FY 1984. The IMET pro-
gram also provides an important means
for the Malaysian Armed Forces to meet
their training needs as they attempt to
adjust to a more conventional force struc-
ture and sophisticated weaponry.
The $10 million FMS request level for
Malaysia in FY 1985 is an increase from
the FY 1983 level of $4 million and would
restore the program to its FY 1982 level.
Although Malaysia has not in the past
made extensive use of FMS credits, addi-
tional purchases are now likely as its
economy improves and the restrictions of
the government austerity progi-am are
eased. Possible purchases include trans-
port aircraft, naval vessels capable of
patrohng its exclusive economic zone, and
weapon systems designed to enhance the
modernization of Malaysia's Armed
Forces.
Singapore. The U.S. enjoys extensive
commercial relations with Singapore,
which is the site for many U.S. business
regional headquarters. Although formally
nonaligned, Singapore shares U.S.
strategic perceptions and goals, and its
positions in international fora support in-
terests common to both our countries.
Physically a tiny city-state, Singapore
has come to play a role in Southeast Asia
completely out of proportion to its size.
Strategically located at the juncture of
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Singapore
permits valuable access for our military
forces to its modern ship and aircraft sup-
port facilities. It opposes an increased
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and
supports a continuing regional security
role for the United States as a barrier to
Soviet expansion.
For FY 1985 we are again requesting
an IMET progi-am of $50,000. This
modest amount of assistance serves to
demonstrate our continuing interest in
Singapore's security and helps ensure
that its armed forces continue to look to
the United States for training and equip-
ment purchases.
Brunei. Brunei became fully inde-
pendent January 1, 1984, and has subse-
quently become a member of ASEAN. As
ASEAN is the focus of U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia, close ties with all its in-
dividual members are important.
Oil-rich Brunei offers significant com-
mercial opportunities for U.S. business
and investment. In addition the Brunei
defense force which consists of the Royal
Brunei Malay Regiment, numbering ap-
proximately 3,000 men, has expressed in-
terest in close ties with the U.S. Armed
Forces.
Our security assistance request for
FY 1985 consists solely of $30,000 in
IMET. This is designed to furnish re-
quired training as the Bruneian Armed
Forces prepare to assume greater respon-
sibility. Further assistance will not be re-
quu'ed, but it is possible that Brunei may
in time consider FMS cash purchases.
ASEAN. The cornerstone of our
policy in Southeast Asia is support for the
Association of South East Asian Nations,
which has been a highly effective force for
stability and prosperity in the region. In
addition to the bilateral assistance pro-
grams to its six members, we have
developed a limited but high quality
cooperative regional assistance program
as a further indication of our commitment
to the organization. Focusing on areas of
special concern to ASEAN, we have
funded technical assistance activities in
watershed management, energy and plant
quarantine, as well as visits to the United
States by media leaders. We are just ini-
tiating a new program for small business
requested by ASEAN, and we will also
suppoit a U.S. private sector effort to
enhance technology cooperation with the
ASEAN business sector. We are re-
questing $4.8 million for this progi-am, a
slight inci'ease over our FY 1984 request
of $4.5 million.
Burma. Our principal objectives in
Burma are to help prevent the cultivation
and trafficking of illicit Bunnese narcotics
to international markets and to encourage
Bui-ma's evolution toward a stable, pros-
perous, and more open society which will
contribute to stability in Southeast Asia.
Burma's leadership remains commit-
ted to nonalignment, socialism, and self-
reliance. However, within that context, it
has moved toward closer cooperation with
the West, including the United
States, particularly in such areas as
development, advanced technical training,
and educational exchanges. Burma
recently broke diplomatic relations with
North Korea over the October 9, 1988,
terrorist bombing in Rangoon which was
carried out by North Korean commandos.
56
Department of State Bulletin
EAST ASIA
As part of its opening to the West, the
Burmese Government has welcomed ex-
panded bilateral cooperation with the
United States in areas such as narcotics
control, where we are assisting Burmese
efforts to suppress opium cultivation and
trafficking. Both our narcotics and our
development assistance programs have
responded to specific Burmese requests
and have led to a gradual strengthening
of our bilateral relations.
The $15 million in development
assistance proposed for FY 1985 will
enable AID to continue its support of
Burmese efforts to improve rural primary
health care, to increase the production of
food and oilseed crops, and to modernize
oilseeds processing and distribution. It
will also provide funds for a new
agricultural research and development
project.
The modest budget increase proposed
($2.5 million over the FY 1984 level) will
maintain the momentum of our recently
established AID program, assist BuiTnese
development efforts in a promising new
area, and demonstrate to the Burmese
that we are serious about helping them to
meet their development needs.
The proposed increase in IMET fund-
ing to $300,000 for FY 1985 will provide
additional training opportunities in the
United States for Burmese military of
fleers. The Burmese Ministry of Defense
attaches considerable importance to this
program and has taken pains to select its
most promising officers for training in the
United States. Since 1981 approximately
50 such officers have gained exposure to
U.S. concepts and methods by attending
courses in helicopter maintenance, field
artillery, and other subjects. Since the
military plays a central role in contem-
porary Burma, IMET training should
have a favorable long-term impact on
Burmese attitudes toward the United
States.
Laos. Bilateral developmental
assistance to Laos is at present prohibited
by the Foreign Assistance Act. The Ad-
ministration has told officials of the Lao
People's Democratic Republic that action
to lift the congressional ban on assistance
would be possible only once a pattern of
sustained cooperation had been estab-
lished toward resolving the fate of
Americans missing in Laos from the war
in Indochina.
Such a pattern of sustained coopera-
tion has not yet been established,
although we are encouraged by recent
progress on this issue, including the
December 1983 crash site survey by the
Joint Casualty Resolution Center. If
future progress develops into a pattern of
sustained cooperation, the Administration
would consult with members of Congress
on the question of lifting the ban on
assistance to Laos.
Korea
Continued peace and stability in North-
east Asia is essential to our own security.
The prevention of North Korean aggres-
sion against South Korea is indispensable
for peace and stability in the region and
the world. For the past 30 years, the
U.S.-R.O.K. alliance has been successful
in its central aim— deterring aggression
and preventing a recurrence of hostilities
on the Korean Peninsula. This absence of
hostilities— marked though it has been
from time to time by examples of North
Korean aggression such as the Pueblo in-
cident, the raid on the Blue House, or,
more recently, the North Korean attack
in Rangoon— has allowed great economic
and social progress in South Korea.
In spite of South Korea's impressive
development, the need for continued U.S.
security assistance is as strong as ever.
In the past decade. North Korea, which
we estimate spends over 20% of its GNP
on armaments, has carried out a major
force buildup which has seriously affected
the military balance on the peninsula.
North Korea has about 25% more
armed forces than the South and 2V2
times as many armored personnel car-
riers, artillery pieces, and tanks. North
Korean tanks are larger and more
modem than those of the R.O.K. The
North also maintains a 100,000-man com-
mando force, probably the largest such
force in the world. With major elements
of its forces only 35 miles from Seoul, the
North could launch an attack with very
little notice.
To counter this threat, the R.O.K. ,
which spends 6% of its GNP on defense,
is engaged in a major force improvement
program designed to increase warning
time, augment its effective firepower, and
enhance its air defense capability. The
progi'am, which includes coproduction of
the F-5 and acquisition of the F-16, TOW
missiles [tube launched, optically tracked,
wire-guided antitank missiles], and Hawk
modifications, will cost several billion
dollars during the FY 1982-86 period,
with almost half slated for procurement
from the United States.
To assist the vital efforts of this front-
line ally, we provided a total of $185
million in FMS credits in FY 1983 and
plan to provide $230 million in FY 1984. It
is worth noting in this regard that during
FY 1982, the R.O.K. paid some $254
million to the U.S. Government in prin-
cipal and interest charges for previous
loans, e.xceeding by about $88 million the
amount of new credits provided in that
year.
To ease the burden Korea faces in
maintaining a credible deterrent, we are
proposing $230 million FMS credits for
the R.O.K., the same amount it should
receive in FY 1984. We also are seeking
legislation to provide a 10-year grace and
20-year repayment terms for Korea. This
will enable Korea to devote a larger pro-
portion of each year's allocation to actual
weapons purchases, thereby permitting
the force improvement program to pro-
ceed on schedule.
Our Korean ally is doing its utmost
for its own security. It is clearly in the
American interest to help Korea meet its
force improvement goals and mutual
security objectives. We should bear in
mind that Korean combat forces, whose
capabilities are enhanced by FMS credits,
are stationed with our own forces along
the DMZ and would operate with us
under a joint command in time of war.
Thus, we have a very direct stake in the
force improvement efforts of this front-
line ally.
Pacific Islands
Since World War II, the Pacific Islands
have undergone great changes, and in the
past 20 years most have become
independent states. Our relations with
them are friendly; we share to a
remarkable degi'ee a belief in democratic
government and devotion to individual
liberties. It is in the U.S. interest to
assist island governments in their efforts
to promote economic growth.
For FY 1985 we have requested $6
million in development assistance to sup-
port a region-wide program with em-
phasis on improving agricultural rural
development and fishing techniques and
to promote regional cooperation in this
area of small populations and small
markets.
World War II also demonstrated the
importance of the Pacific Islands to our
security. These islands lie across the Hnes
of communication between the U.S. west
coast and Australia, New Zealand, and
Southeast Asia. Our military assistance
would consist of small IMET programs
with a total dollar value of $190,000.
Fiji. Fiji is a functioning democracy
and a leader in regional organizations.
Our bilateral relations are excellent. Fiji
also makes important contributions to in-
ternational peacekeeping efforts. The
May 1984
Ki ' I ''' III*
1
EAST ASIA
Royal Fiji Military Forces maintains
more troops with the Sinai multilateral
force and observers (MFO) and with the
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
than are on duty in Fiji itself.
Our $80,000 IMET pi-ogram re-
quested for FY 1985 represents no in-
crease over FY 1984's funding level. The
money would assist the Royal Fiji
Military Forces in acquii-ing needed pro-
fessional and technical skills to better
operate a small but modern defense force.
Papua New Guinea. The United
States has enjoyed friendly relations with
Papua New Guinea before and since its
independence from Australia in 1975. The
country's size, strategic location, and
resources make it a major actor in the
South Pacific.
Papua New Guinea, which maintains
the largest defense force in the Pacific
Island region, is expected to use its
IMET grant to provide training in im-
proving logistics, management, and ad-
ministrative capabilities and search and
rescue techniques. The proposed FY 1985
IMET program of $50,000 represents an
increase of $20,000 over last year's alloca-
tion.
Tonga. Tonga continues to be a
reliable friend for the United States in
the South Pacific. The Tongan Govern-
ment has welcomed port calls by the U.S.
Navy and has stated its willingness to
host'nuclear powered vessels even when
other island governments, concerned over
an upsurge in public sensitivity to nuclear
matters, have been reluctant to do so.
The proposed FY 1985 IMET funds are
expected to be used for training in
management and maintenance and repair
skills. The IMET program of $30,000
represents no increase over FY 1984.
Solomon Islands. The Solomon
Islands, independent since 1978, is the
second largest of the Pacific Islands
states in area and the third largest in
population. Its foreign policy has been
markedly pro-Western. The government
is attempting to upgrade its rudimentary
defense force with the objectives of
assisting in creating skills necessary for
effective control and maintenance of
security and management of forces. The
requested FY 1985 IMET level is $30,000
and, as a new progi-am, represents a
positive U.S. response to the expressed
interest of the Solomon Islands in obtain-
ing assistance in upgrading their military
skills.
Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. The United States has ad-
ministered the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (TTPI) since World War II
and, since 1947, under a trusteeship
agreement with the United Nations.
Since 1969 we have been negotiating with
the leadership of the TTPI for new
political relationships.
Last year two of the island govern-
ments— the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the
Marshall Islands-completed all the nec-
essary procedures to enter into a new and
unique relationship with the United
States, that of freely associated states.
The Administration is submitting the
Compact of Free Association to this Con-
gress in order to complete the process on
our side and initiate the new relationship
with the FSM and the Marshalls.
For FY 1985 we will request
$295,490,000 for the compact upon the
enactment of the necessary authorizing
legislation.
The compact will regulate the rela-
tionships between the United States and
the Marshall Islands and the FSM. Under
the compact, the United States is granted
full powers and authority for defense and
security matters, including the right to
establish military bases and support ac-
tivities, throughout the freely associated
states. The compact specifies the amounts
and attendant objectives and purposes of
U.S. grant and service assistance to each
of the freely associated states.
The overall policy goals of the United
States with regard to the compact are
based on a review of U.S. policy by the
senior interagency group on foreign
policy and were approved by the Presi-
dent'on September 21, 1981. An impor-
tant policy goal of the United States is to
see political stability in the freely
associated states. The compact also im-
plements long-term U.S. national security
requirements and provides the basis for
the accomplishment of shorter term con-
tingency basing and logistic needs. The
compact accomplishes the equally impor-
tant goal of political stability through pro-
vision of annual grant assistance.
The first year estimate exceeds by
$152.8 million the second year estimate
and exceeds by $146.2 million the average
annual budget estimate. This is due to the
inclusion of several one-time payments,
the most significant of which is a one-time
$150 million payment for the settlement
of all claims resulting from the U.S.
nuclear weapons testing program in the
Marshall Islands.
China
I now want to emphasize the importance
the Administration places on completing
action on proposed legislative changes for
China.
Our expanding economic, scientific,
and cultural ties have been mutually
beneficial and have become a very impor-
tant element of our overall relationship.
Our commercial relations are particularly
healthy and hold great promise for both
countries. Since the establishment of
diplomatic relations in January 1979,
trade with China has grown dramatically
resulting in a U.S. trade surplus of ap-
proximately $6 billion in 5 years. While
two-way trade declined in both 1982 and
1983 from the record high of $5.5 billion in
1981, we expect bilateral trade to bounce
back' to between $5.5 and $7 billion in
1984 with an anticipated increase of high
technology exports to China.
We share a broad range of official ex-
changes-over 100 Chinese delegations
visit the United States each month— and
over 10,000 Chinese students now study
in the United States. The 21 protocols
under the U.S.-China science and
technology agreement have promoted
valuable exchanges in such widely vary-
ing fields as earthquake studies,
hydropower, and health.
Our rapprochement with China over
the past decade has also made important
contributions to global and regional peace
and stability. China shares our deep con-
cern about Soviet aggression in Afghan-
istan and the Soviet-backed occupation of
Kampuchea. U.S.-China relations have
meshed well with our existing alliances
and security relationships in Asia and
Europe. The recent visit of Chinese
Premier Zhao Ziyang helped to
underscore the importance of a stable and
enduring U.S.-China relationship.
Consistent with our growing relation-
ship. The President, in June 1981, decided
to seek legislative change to laws that
link China with the Soviet bloc. I am
pleased to note that, with your assistance,
important progress was made in this ef-
fort during the past 2 years in clarifying
the provisions of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act and by
lifting the prohibition on importation of
Chinese furskins.
The proposal to eliminate the prohibi-
tion of foreign assistance to China, which
was submitted to the Congi-ess in FY
1983 and again in our 1984 authorization
bill, received favorable consideration in
both the Senate Foreign Relations and
House Foreign Affaii-s Committees.
58
rtmont nf St3tp Bulletin
EUROPE
However, in both years, the overall bill
was not passed for reasons uiii-elated to
China. We have resubmitted the proposal
concerning China in this year's foreign
assistance bill.
Amendment of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act would allow China to participate
in ongoing AID technical assistance pro-
grams, under current funding levels, in
the same manner as do most other coun-
tries. We previously provided the com-
mittee staff a paper outlining the type of
ongoing projects for which we would con-
sider China's participation. I would stress
that Chinese participation in these pro-
grams will not threaten AID programs
with other countries but will contribute to
China's development through e.xisting
AID research and training projects while
familiarizing the P.R.C. with commercial-
ly available U.S. technology.
Our motive in seeking this change is
the same as 2 years ago; the President
wants to remove an anachronism in our
laws that links China with the Soviet bloc
countries. We have no plans for bilateral
assistance programs, although some
Chinese have e.xpressed interest in low
interest loans. Any such programs would
have to be authorized and appropriated
by the Congress.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion our FY 1985 foreign
assistance request is designed to protect
and reinforce the great strides our friends
have made in bringing prosperity and
security to East Asia and the Pacific.
Although the thi'eats to this progress
have grown, we have limited our request
to levels essential to our interests.
Economic and military assistance pi'o-
grams are, we believe, well balanced and
both are targeted against economic prob-
lem areas and critical military threats.
We would most welcome this committee's
support.
FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for Europe
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published bv the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
by Richard K. Burt
StateitiCHt hcfhre the Si(bconniiittee
on Eunijiciiii mid Middle FJdst Affairx of
the Hoiisf Fiircigii Affairx Cnnntiittee on
February 6, 19,%. Mr. Burt is Assistant
Secretary for European and Canadian
Affairs.^
It is a pleasure to have this opportunity
to speak to you today on behalf of secu-
rity assistance requirements for the Eu-
ropean region in fiscal year 1985. Although
the counti'ies of the Atlantic alliance
weathered in 1983 a major challenge to
their unity, we must accept the fact that
1984 and futui-e years will bring addi-
tional challenges. Fortunately, the vast
majority of our European friends and
allies possess the capacity to fulfill their
responsibilities and help us meet these
challenges without any direct U.S.
assistance; a few, however, cannot and
need our help if they are to be able to do
their share in safeguarding U.S. and
Western interests.
The four allies which do require
special assistance are to be found along
the northern edge of the Mediterranean.
These four allies— Spain, Portugal,
Greece, and Turkey— constitute much of
NATO's southern flank. This region is
critical for the defense of the central front
and Europe more generally. At the same
time, the southern flank is uniquely im-
portant for another reason— as a bridge
across Europe linking the Atlantic to the
Middle East and Southwest Asia. As
NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers
regularly note. Western interests outside
the formal treaty area can and do affect
the well-being of every alliance member.
The countries of the southern flank, by
vLi'tue of their location along major East-
West air and sea routes, have the poten-
tial to make a special contribution to this
increasingly important dimension of
Western security. It is U.S. assistance
programs which can turn this potential
into reality.
But in speaking of the future, we
ought not overlook the accomplishments
of the recent past. Over the past decade,
each of these four countries has made a
difficult but crucial transition toward
democracy. Each has strengthened its
association with the values and institu-
tions of the West. Each has negotiated a
major base agreement with the United
States. And in each and every case, I
believe that U.S. .security assistance pro-
grams have constituted an integral part
of this evolution. Our economic and
military assistance programs have proven
to be an essential foreign policy instru-
ment.
Portugal
A charter member of NATO, Portugal is
a long-time, steadfast, and reliable ally of
the United States. The Portuguese
Government actively supports Western
policies in international fora, most notably
on Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland. Por-
tugal holds a strategic position of great
importance for NATO reinforcement and
resupply and including non-NATO con-
tingencies. The Lajes Air Base is critical
to these missions. Although concei-ned
that expanded U.S. use of their facilities
for non-NATO purposes could expose
Portugal to increased military and
economic risks, Portugal has been highly
cooperative in allowing use of its bases,
provided that theii- relatively modest
military and economic needs can be taken
into account. A new mutual defense
agreement signed in December 1983 pro-
vides the United States continued access
to the critical Lajes facilities and reaf-
firms the strength and vitality of our
security relationship.
Portugal has come a long way in
establishing a working democracy since
the 1974 revolution. Portuguese political
parties, both in government and in op-
position (with the exception of the com-
munists), are pro- Western and agree that
Portugal should make a more substantial,
active military contribution to NATO.
The country's Stalinist Communist Party,
meanwhile, has been thoroughly dis-
credited and, while controlling almost
20% of the electorate, has no chance of
participating in the government. We sup-
port Portugal's increased participation in
NATO along with other alliance partners
and want to help in the long-range Por-
tuguese military modernization effort.
Military modernization has a long way
to go, however, since until the 1974
revolution the Portuguese Armed Forces
were largely a colonial force, heavy on
foot-soldiers and light arms. The army
has been restructured to more modern
proportions, and the process of acquiring
modern equipment has begun, in accord-
May 1984
59
EUROPE
ance with NATO force goals. It is, never-
theless, clear that Portugal will not be
able to bear the burden alone. In recogni-
tion of this, we and other NATO partners
are cooperating in an ad hoc committee of
NATO to coordinate assistance efforts.
Portugal is one of the poorest NATO
members, experiencing serious economic
difficulties in the midst of a stringent
austerity program set up by agreement
with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). In addition, the country is facing a
major adjustment as it prepares to enter
the European Communities (EC). It is in
our best interest to provide increased
levels of economic support fund (ESF)
grants to support the Azores and the
mainland economies, and sufficient
amounts of military assistance program
(MAP) grant assistance to help Portugal
achieve NATO readiness and fulfill its
obligations in Europe and the Atlantic.
For FY 1985, we have requested an
ESF grant of $80 million, a MAP grant of
$70 million, and foreign military sales
(FMS) credits of $5.5 million along with $3
million international military education
and training (IMET) funds. This level
would help Portugal to obtain U.S. equip-
ment for three antisubmarine warfare
frigates (partially fulfilling our commit-
ment to help modernize the Portuguese
Navy), provide funds to complete the ac-
quisition of a second squadron of A-7P
aircraft, vital electronic warfare equip-
ment for the NATO-dedicated brigade,
and military personnel training. The ESF
is intended to provide vital budget sup-
port for the economically pressed Azores
as well as economic assistance to the
mainland. In addition, it will help finance
the establishment of a Luso- American
Development Foundation, intended to be
a clearinghouse for technical assistance to
Portugal after the phase out of current
Agency for International Development
(AID) operations.
Spain
Since the death of Franco in 1975, Spain
has successfully established a fully func-
tioning democracy, while working to in-
tegrate more fully with the West, in-
cluding membership in NATO and the
EC. In conjunction with a democratic
Portugal, Spain's remarkable progress in
establishing a free society and in reducing
the communists to only a marginal
political force has helped to secure
NATO's southern flank and enhanced
alliance strength.
The U.S. -Spanish bilateral security
relationship dates back to 1953 and has
been confirmed through a series of
agreements regarding U.S. use of
Spanish military facilities and U.S.
assistance for Spanish military modern-
ization. Since Spain's entry into NATO
and its peaceful transition to democracy,
it has also become an important alliance
partner. The basis for our security
cooperation has thus been broadened.
Modernization of the Spanish military
farces, which strengthens the common
defense as well as encourages an institu-
tional role for the military similar to that
played by the military in other Western
democracies, has gained new importance.
Our security assistance relationship has
thus become even more significant.
Following national elections in Spain
in 1982, the newly elected socialist
government, in the face of considerable
popular sentiment against NATO, "froze"
the process of military integration into
the alliance pending a popular referen-
dum. No date for a referendum has been
set, but the authorities are now evalu-
ating membership and military integra-
tion partly in terms of what benefits they
offer the Spanish military's modernization
effort. While we consider the ultimate
decision to be a matter for Spain alone to
decide, it is important that our assistance
effort make clear the value of NATO par-
ticipation.
Under the 1983 Agreement on
Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation,
Spain provides the United States con-
tinued access to vital air and naval
facilities which will be crucial in the event
of a European conflict. The agreement
also establishes an institutional
framework— the U.S.-Spanish Council and
the various committees which operate
under its aegis— for the development and
implementation of our broad political,
economic, cultural, and scientific coopera-
tion with Spain. We, in turn, are pledged
to "best efforts" in assisting Spain to
upgrade its military equipment, profes-
sionalize its forces, and bring them up to
NATO standards.
At a minimum, it is vital that we
maintain our current "best efforts" com-
mitment for FY 1985, which would be to
continue at FY 1984 assistance levels of
$400 million in FMS credits and $12
million in ESF grants, and to seek $3
million in IMET. The ESF grant would
fund scientific-cultural exchanges and pro-
grams designed to counterbalance the
large military component of our relations.
The IMET program is aimed at the pro-
fessional development of the Spanish
military. FMS guaranteed credits are
scheduled to fund air defense and missile
systems, continued funding for the pur-
chase of F-18 fighter aircraft, cargo/
transport helicopters. Harpoon missiles,
ship construction, and other weapons
systems.
Greece
The strategic importance of Greece is well
recognized. Bordering on the Warsaw
Pact, Greece would block any pact thrust
southward toward the Mediterranean
through Thrace and would join with
Turkey in resisting any Soviet effort to
seize control of the Dardanelles. At the
same time, Greece is in a position to con-
trol the sea and air lanes of the eastern
Mediterranean and is one of the several
countries controlling access to the Middle
East. Greece is thus a key ally on the
southern flank of NATO."
In addition to these strategic in-
terests, our defense relationship with
Greece must be placed in the broader con-
text of a traditional friendship which is
very important to the United States. It is
our intention to work to deepen the
understanding between our two coun-
tries. While at times we have significant
differences with Greece, these must be
considered in the larger context of rela-
tions between two democratic allies
whose perspectives can differ but also
coincide.
The most important development in
our defense relationship last year was the
conclusion of the new Defense and
Economic Cooperation Agreement. The
agreement was formally signed
September 8 and entered into force
December 20 following Greek parliamen-
tary approval. The Congi'ess helped make
this agreement possible by indicating its
willingness to increase our secuiity
assistance progi-am to Greece in the con-
text of a defense relationship reaffirmed
by conclusion of a satisfactory agreement.
This accord provides for the continuation
of the activities previously conducted in
Greece on a mutually agreeable basis. The
agreement will be valid until terminated
by written notice by either side, which
can be given at the end of 5 years or
thei-eafter. This arrangement is com-
parable to agreements we have with
other allies. We believe this agreement
strengthens NATO and benefits the
United States and Greece.
The security assistance we are re-
questing for Greece is an integi-al part of
a close defense relationship which in-
cludes our common membership in NATO
as well as U.S. use of military facilities in
Greece. U.S. assistance is needed to im-
60
s^ammaa
Department of State Bulletin
IBBBBHBIBI
prove capability to carry out its assigned
tasks under NATO. Greece has made con-
siderable pi'oiiress in recent years, utiliz-
ing its own foreign exchange resources as
well as U.S. loan guarantees. The Greek
percent of GNP devoted to military e.\-
penditures is among the highest in
NATO. However, U.S. assistance con-
tinues to be needed. Like other European
allies, Greece is suffering from inflation,
unemployment, and a balance-of-
payments problem. The repayment terms
for our military assistance loans to Greece
are the best available to any nation under
our nonconcessional FMS program.
For Greece we propose to maintain
the level of FMS funds at $500 million as
was allocated for FY 1984 to permit the
purchase of military equipment, ammuni-
tion, and spare parts— including aircraft,
communications, and radar equipment—
and missiles. We also propose $1.7 million
for IMET, which is important to the
Greek Armed Forces at both the profes-
sional and technical levels.
Turkey
Our assistance program for Turkey re-
mains one of the largest in the world,
reflecting both that country's importance
and its potential. We are proposing a pro-
gram for Turkey identical in size to last
year's proposal, but doing so recognizes
that it will leave significant shortcomings,
both in terms of Turkish needs and what
we would like to see occur there.
Nonetheless, it is a program which will
permit us to continue to assist the Turks
with major military modernization pro-
grams and provide an important element
of assistance to their imaginative
economic I'eforms.
Although Turkey's strategic impor-
tance has been reiterated many times to
this committee, I would like to mention it
once again briefly. Turkey, with both land
and sea frontiers with the U.S.S.R. and
Bulgaria and holding the key to Soviet ac-
cess to the Mediterranean, is the anchor
of the southeast flank of NATO. In addi-
tion, Turkey shares borders with Iran,
Iraq, and Syria and is exploring a new,
more active role in Islamic affairs. Given
the impact of all three countries on cur-
rent unrest in the Middle East, Turkey's
potential role takes on added significance.
Our dialogue and cooperation with
Turkey on Middle East issues has
increased significantly, based on the good
and productive bilateral relationship we
have developed. Security assistance
remains an important basis of that
relationship.
Turkey's political system is undergo-
ing a positive transformation toward full
parliamentary democracy. The govern-
ment elected in November 1983 is active-
ly developing and carrying out new and
inn(ivati\(' i)()licies. Municipal elections
scheduled for March 25 will include all
legal political parties, a further indication
that movement toward full democracy re-
mains on schedule. Having supported
Turkey during the past few difficult years
as it struggled to overcome political chaos
and economic bankruptcy, it is important
that we continue to strongly support the
new government and the return to full
democracy.
Turkey's economic recovery in recent
years is justly lauded as an e.xample of
how international cooperation and a com-
mitted country can overcome staggering
financial problems. At the same time, the
economy remains fragile and requires out-
side support for the next year to two.
This year will be especially important.
Repayment of previously rescheduled
debt will add significantly to short-term
debt service; and the important economic
reforms announced by the new govern-
ment, which ultimately *:hould increase
the economy's productivity and com-
petitiveness, will also put short-term
pressure on the balance of payments. Our
ESF assistance to Turkey has decreased
dramatically in recent years, but it is very
important that we not decrease it further
at this critical juncture.
For Turkey, our request is for $755
million in military assistance— $230 in
MAP, $250 in concessional FMS loans,
and $275 in FMS guarantees-$175 million
in ESF and $4 million in IMET funds.
Some of our military assistance will con-
tinue to provide maintenance and support
of aging equipment which cannot yet be
replaced. The greater portion will be used
for modernization of Turkish Armed
Forces' equipment. Major programs in-
clude M-48 tank upgrade, helicopter ac-
quisition, naval weapon procurement, and
continuation of the important F-16 pro-
gram begun in FY 1984. These are key
l)riigrams which will make major strides
in helping Turkey meet NATO com-
mitments which, in turn, contribute
directly to U.S. national defense. They
fall far short, however, of enabling
Turkey to overcome all of its equipment
shortcomings in a reasonable timeframe.
EUROPE
Cyprus
This Administration, from its very first
days, has placed a high priority on the
achievement of a just settlement. We are
committed to that goal, for as long as
Cyprus is divided and its status uncer-
tain, it constitutes a humanitarian concern
and remains a serious barrier to good
relations between Greece and Turkey.
The November 15 declaration of
statehood by the Turkish Cy]jriots was
unhelpful to the search for a fair and final
negotiated settlement. We condemned the
move and called for its reversal. We also
supported UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 541, passed November 18, which also
called for reversal of the Turkish Cypriot
action. In January we welcomed an-
nouncements by the Turkish Cypriots of a
group of goodwill measures and by the
Government of Turkey of their removal of
1 ,500 troops from Cyprus. We also
responded favoi-ably to President
Kyprianou's proposed framework for a
comprehensive settlement— a proposal
containing positive elements. We are now
actively encouraging both sides to react
to the other's proposals in a way which
can lead to a comprehensive solution of
the outstanding issues.
The $3 million requested for Cyprus
would be applied to the existing Cyprus-
America scholarship program which pro-
vides American university educations to
young Cypriots of both communities.
Cyprus is without universities of its own
and this program provides a very popular
alternative to Soviet bloc study. We
believe this to be a modest but significant
demonstration of continuing American in-
terest in the welfare of the people of
Cyprus; as such, it constitutes a worthy
complement to our diplomatic endeavors.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.B
May 1984
61
IHWBiiiilWifHtBlHftlllBi^^
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
FY 1985 Request for
Economic Assistance Programs
by M. Peter McPhenon
Statement before the Subcommittee
m Foreiffn/yperations of the Senate Ap-
propria tions Committee on March 8
198i Mr McPherson is Administrator of
the Agency for International Develop,
ment (AID) and Acting Director of the In-
ternational Development Cooperation
Agency GDCA).^
It is a pleasure to be here once again to
present the Administration's annual pro-
posal for foreign economic assistance 1
want to express my appreciation to the
committee for its past support of the
foreign assistance program. I look tor-
ward to our continued cooperation under
vour leadership.
Foreign assistance has been and con-
tinues to be in the best interests of the
United States. For that reason, it has
been supported by your committee and
continues to be an important part ot the
Administration's foreign policy.
The historical trend has been to
broaden the statutory mandate for
foreign assistance, since its inception with
the Marshall Plan. Successive accretions
include postwar reconstruction, food tor
peace, and basic human needs.
I have pursued an integrated ap-
proach to foreign assistance, combining
growth with equity as an operational goal.
My philosophy is to help others to help
themselves. Foreign assistance is a
limited resource. There is no substitute m
the long run for development that is
broadly based and self-sustaming. Such
development is not simply economic.
Development requires inter aha
spreading knowledge and the promotion
of flourishing institutions as well as grow-
ing economies.
We have set forth four pillars or
means to implement our programs.
• Policy Dialogue and Reform. This
brings to the fore the notion that long-
term equitable growth depends clearly on
the nature of policies followed by develop-
ing countries. We seek to achieve agree-
ment with host country governments on
the nature of key poUcy constramts to
basic development and on practical
changes that can be addressed.
• Institutional Development. We
have come to recognize that faulty institu
tional frameworks can impede develop-
ment and that increased centralization
62
and bureaucratization can be major
obstacles to progress. Our approach, thus,
has been modified to include the idea that
what is sometimes required is reducing
the size of institutions, decentrabzmg and
encouraging greater reliance o" Pn^'^te
and voluntary, rather than pubhc, institu-
tions.
. Technology Transfer. In this area,
we are seeking dramatic breakthroughs
in such areas as biomedical research,
agriculture, and family planning. Our em-
phasis is on finding solutions to age-old
problems through inexpensive methods
that can be widely disseminated. AID m-
tends to be a leader in supportmg new
technologies.
. Greater Use of the Private Sector.
We are also stressing the contributions
that the private sector can make to solv-
ing key development problems, based on
the conviction that there are many things
government cannot do or cannot do wdl.
For example, we are testing pilot efforts
for indigenous private sector involvement
in areas such as the distribution of
agricultural inputs and the manufacture
and marketing of inputs for health and
population programs.
The past 3 years have involved
change as well as continuity in our foreign
assistance. And there is progress to
report. ec.^ ^„
AID and the Department of State
have worked closely to integrate our
foreign assistance and our foreign
nolicy-to relate our assistance efforts
more directly to foreign policy interests.
This coordination is reflected not only in
the details of our budgetary requests but
also in the repori^s of the Commission on
Security and Economic Assistance
(Cariucci commission) and the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central
America. I shall say more about those
reports in later pages of this statement.
AID has followed through on the mi-
tiatives of President Reagan at the Can-
cun conference. Presidential task forces
have been sent to several countries, and
their repori^s have helped guide ensuing
poUcy dialogues. The Caribbean Basm
Initiative has been launched, and its im-
portance for our relations with that
strategic region is now widely recognized.
PL 480 has been more fully integrated
into our development programming
without diminishing its humamtanan
character. Title II commodities, for exam-
ple are being used to develop cooper-
atives in India, to promote agriculture in
Jamaica, and to help reforestation m
Congress has increased our flexibility
in responding to crises and opportunities.
Particularly noteworthy is the new
revolving fund which will allow AID to
develop new financing mechanisms and
increase its support of private sector ac-
tivities We have made a good start m
this du-ection through the authority pro-
vided to us this year.
AID'S voluntarv family plannmg pro-
grams are increasingly using private sec-
tor marketing. The market reaches out to
customers and localities which are not
reached by governmental progi-ams. The
private sector also competes successfully
with governmental progi-ams that are
free of charge, for example, m
Bangladesh. The net effects are an in-
crease in individual choice, a decrease in
governmental subsidies, and an improve-
ment in program effectiveness
AID has taken the lead m the dis-
semination of oral rehydration therapy.
This simple therapy promises to reduce
substantially the millions of deaths of in-
fants and small children. We recen ly
sponsored an international conference on
this therapy, and we are introducing it in
social marketing systems-private as well
as public-in several developmg coun-
^' "' AID continues to support research on
an antimalarial vaccine. This pioneering
effort is increasingly successful. Clinical
testing with human subjects is expected
to begin in 198.5. If all goes well, distribu-
tion should begin m 1990.
We have recognized the extraor-
dinary needs of sub-Sahara Africa and
Central America. New initiatives to meet
those needs are outlined in later pages of
this statement. Those initiatives reflect
the input of members of this commit ee as
well as the Commission on Secunty and
Economic Assistance and the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central
'"aid has broadened and deepened its
relations with corporations as well as
universities in the United States. Cor-
porate expertise has proven to be par-
ticulariv helpful in recommending
remedies for the environmental impact ot
some industries in developing countries
AID and universities are increasing their
cooperation with the new memorandum o1
Depart nnf
Bulletir
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
understanding and joint Career Corps. A
major effort is now underway to expand
the involvement of historically black col-
leges and universities in our programs.
AID has increased its ti-aining of
students fi-om developing countries in the
United States. We sponsored almost 8,000
students in FY 1982, over 9,000 in FY
1983, and over 10,000 (projected) in FY
1984. This reverses a trend of the 1970s.
A strategic planning process was ini-
tiated 2 years ago to give a sense of direc-
tion not only to our regional bureaus but
also to the entire agency. The preliminary
results of that planning process are
reflected in later pages of this statement.
The final results are to be shared in the
coming weetts with your committee.
We are establishing an early-warning
system with the international develop-
ment banks, and we are pressing in a
variety of fora for more coordination with
other donors. This effort recently bore
fi-uit with the adoption of its first
guidelines for donor coordination by the
Development Assistance Committee of
the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD).
I am pleased to have been able to
report progress in these areas. Let me
now turn to a review of the current situa-
tion.
World Economy
During the past year, there have been im-
portant developments which affect our
program for FY 1985. First, the interna-
tional economic picture is changing, with
both positive and less encouraging
aspects. Second, two major commissions
have issued reports making important
recommendations on certain aspects of
our foreign assistance effort. I would like
to address each of these points briefly.
At the time of my appearance before
this committee last year, I testified that
nations around the world, particularly
those in the Third World, were confront-
ing serious economic problems brought on
by the global recession. They had ex-
perienced a sharp decline in demand for
their e.xports, compounded by high in-
terest rates which increased the cost of
borrowing to meet their rapidly growing
balance-of-payments deficits. The result
was rising levels of debt and debt-
servicing burdens and a decline in the
level of private lending. For many of
these developing countries, problems
were aggravated by their own inap-
propriate economic policies.
Today the situation has begun to
stabilize, and some of these same coun-
tries are showing hopeful signs of
recovery. A number have undertaken ad-
justment progi-ams, often in conjunction
with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), aimed at achieving a sustainable
balance-of-payments position. For some
recovery is due in part to policy reforms
which we and other donors have helped to
put in place through policy dialogue ef-
foits in the development arena.
Several recent events offer hope of
sustained improvement in less developed
country (LDC) economic performance.
First, the developing countries them-
selves are increasingly recognizing the
value of sound economic policies and the
importance of adjustment programs to
their long-term economic prospects. Sec-
ond, economic recovery, led by the
United States and other developed coun-
tries, began to take hold during the latter
part of 1983. We can expect it to continue
and spread in 1984. Third, interest rates
have fallen significantly, world market oil
prices have declined, and LDC commod-
ity prices have experienced some in-
creases. As a result of these positive
trends, aided by a significant cutback in
LDC imports, the balance-of-payments
situation of the developing countries as a
whole improved last year. The LDCs'
total balance-of-payments deficit, though
still significant, was about one-third less
than a couple of years ago.
The worldwide economic recovery, as
it strengthens and spreads, will be impor-
tant to the economic prospects of the
developing countries— particularly the
middle and higher income developing
countries with a greater capacity to ad-
just and respond to the economic oppor-
tunity provided by the recovery in the
developed countries.
Even with the improvement in
economic conditions, though, many
developing countries, particularly the
poorest, will continue to face serious
economic difficulties and will continue to
require substantial foreign assistance.
For many of them, recovei-y has yet to
blossom. Even in those which have begun
appropriate adjustments, the first step
has often required substantial reductions
in domestic credit, in government
development expenditures, and in im-
ports needed for investment. All of this
constrains economic performance, par-
ticularly over the short run.
For the low-income countries facing
severe economic problems, with limited
capacity to attract or service private
flows, and with extremely hmited human.
physical, and institutional infrastructure
needed to address their basic develop-
ment problems, development a.ssistance
will remain critically important. Economic
assistance will also be critical in helping
countries avoid serious economic and
political disruption while needed .stabiliza-
tion and adjustment programs are being
undertaken. Indeed, the challenge we
face is to assist the developing world to
address its current economic problems
while at the same time assisting in laying
the foundation for long-term sustainable
development. In short , there is cau.se for
hope, but the job is far from over.
Assisting developing countries to con-
front these massive economic problems
effectively, with the Hmited resources
available, requires a carefully thought out
foreign assistance program and greater
suppoil from the public than has been the
case in recent years. It was for that
reason that Secretary Shultz last year
called for creation of the Commission on
Security and Economic Assistance. He
charged it with the task of reviewing the
foreign assistance program and making
recommendations for improving its focus
and administration, and for increasing its
public support.
The commission, on which you and
members of your committee served, has
served a very useful purpose in focusing
greater attention on the necessity for a
strong foreign assistance program. I need
not take time here to review in detail the
findings and recommendations of the com-
mission, since members of this committee
played a very active part in their formula-
tion. I would hke to cite, however, a few
of the ways in which we are moving to im-
plement those recommendations.
The commission called for increases in
the foreign assistance budget to help
meet our foreign policy objectives. It also
pointed out the need for carefully in-
tegrated programs in sub-Saharan Africa,
the Caribbean, and Central America. In
response to these recommendations as
well as those of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America, we are
proposing new initiatives entailing signifi-
cant increases in funding for both of these
i-egions. I will go into that in more detail
in just a moment.
Consistent with the commission's af-
firmation of the importance of a total
country approach to program develop-
ment, over the past 3 years we have
developed and improved upon an in-
tegrated budget process to allocate
resources in each country so as to ensure
the best mix of overall assistance to meet
foreign policy interests. We are following
the recommendations of the commission
May 1984
63
■mwiim«iiiwHH»w...iumiiiu«».PiHiininiwpiiiiiiiuiiiin«
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
to increase emphasis on policy refonn. in-
stitutional development, technology
ti-ansfer, and involvement of the private
sector as means of fostering development.
We also are taking steps to respond to
the commission's call to increase the flex-
ibility of the development assistance pro-
gram and to maintain that of the economic
support fund (ESF). We have also sought
to increase the use of PL 480 to meet
development objectives. And we are look-
ing at other ways in which we can follow-
up on the commission's recommendations.
Sub-Sahara Africa
Another major concern has been the
tremendous challenge to stimulate strong
growth in Africa. Measured by almost
any indicator of development— income, in-
fant mortality, literacy, malnutrition, or
life span— the situation in Africa is more
serious than elsewhere. During the past
decade the economic performance of the
region has been particularly poor— 15
countries recorded negative gi'owth rates.
Sub-Sahara Africa is the only region in
the world where per capita food produc-
tion has declined over the last 20 years.
Moreover the poor economic performance
has been exacerbated recently by severe
drought, seriously affecting food produc-
tion, causing growing food shortages con-
tinent wide, and widespread hunger and
malnutrition. The Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) has identified 24
countries which are most seriously af-
fected and in need of urgent emergency
food aid.
To help respond to the worsening
situation in Africa, we are taking several
steps. One, we are allocating a larger
share of our cun-ent year program to
African countries— to date we have pro-
vided 218,000 metric tons of PL 480, Title
II food aid valued at $85 million (including
ocean freight costs) in response to
emergency requests. Two, because of the
magnitude of the problem, we are re-
questing an FY 1984 PL 480 food aid sup-
plemental of $90 million to augment cur-
rent allocations. These steps will respond
positively to today's emergency.
We also wish to address long-term
problems. Thus as part of our FY 1985 re-
quest for the development assistance pro-
gram, we are seeking congressional ap-
proval of a new Economic Policy Ini-
tiative (EPI) for Africa. The initiative is
planned as a 5-year, $500 million fund.
For FY 1985, we are requesting an
authorization and appropriation of $75
million. The purpose of this new initiative
is to foster economic policy reforms which
are essential to any reversal of the cur-
64
rent downward trend in many African
countries. The resources of this special
fund will be used to bolster those coun-
tries which are prepared and able to
establish a comprehensive economic
policy framework conducive to growth
and long-term development. Resources
will be used to suppoi't implementation of
the reform package once promulgated.
Assistance from this fund will be tied to
major policy reform measures and fo-
cused predominantly on the agricultural
sector. We expect that such a fund will
help significantly to strengthen the policy
dialogue between donors and recipients
and to improve coordination among
donors.
Central America
Another major development has been the
recent release of the much-awaited report
by the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America, chaired by former
Secretary of State Kissinger. By now,
many of you are familiar, I am sure, with
the essentials of the commission's find-
ings, so I will touch on them only briefly
at this time.
Confirming the widely held percep-
tion of a crisis of acute proportions in a
region of fundamental importance to the
United States, the commission calls for a
program to meet basic human needs, help
achieve peace, and promote democracy. It
proposes a comprehensive approach to
economic development in the region and
reinvigoration of the Central American
Common Market, all tied to major policy
reforms. It has recommended mounting a
large-scale, long-term assistance program
to help stabilize the Central American
economies, rebuild infrastructure, provide
trade credits, and encourage rescheduling
of multilateral debt. The commission has
also proposed a new organizational struc-
ture to administer a portion of the pro-
posed program.
In response to the commission's
recommendations, we are requesting
authorization of a major new program of
assistance to Central America. The pro-
gram's strategy concentrates on four fun-
damental elements: economic stabiliza-
tion, creation of a basis for long-term
growth, promotion of equity, and
strengthened democratic institutions and
respect for human rights.
Accordingly, the program's major
goals are, first, to end the downward
spiral of production in the region by next
year. Second, over the course of the pro-
gram, we want to help the countries of
the region achieve an annual economic
growth rate of at least 6%, creating more
than 250,000 new jobs each year through
export-led growth. Third, we seek to
foster an increase in agricultural produc-
tion of 4% per year by 1989, generating
an additional 80,000 jobs and increasing
food availability and agi-oindustrial e.\-
ports. Fourth, we want to see substan-
tially greater benefits of economic growth
accrue to all sectors of the populace to
better meet theii' basic human needs— in-
creased primary school enrollment, re-
duced infant mortality, greater availabil-
ity of modem family planning services, in-
creased low-income housing, and better
access to clean water and sanitation
facilities. We also want to foster the
strengthening of democratic institutions
and progress toward participatory
democracy and legal systems which
respect human rights.
To achieve these goals, we request
authorization of an $8.3 billion program of
economic assistance and guarantees for
Central America to be made available
over the next 6 years.
For the first phase of its implementa-
tion, we are requesting a supplemental
appropriation of $400 million in FY 1984,
including $290 million in ESF, $73 million
in development assistance, $25 million in
PL 480 commodities, and $12 million for
other agencies and for increased AID
operating expenses.
For FY 1985 we are requesting an ap-
propriation of $1.12 billion, consisting of
$(>41 million in ESF. $272.8 million in
development assistance, $10 million for
housing guaranty reserves, $120 million
in PL 480 commodities, and $77 million
for other programs and AID operating
expenses, plus $600 million in guaranty
authority to support private lending to
the region.
As the bipartisan commission recom-
mended, the assistance would be provided
on a collaborative basis. Our program
would be closely tied to commitments for
economic and social reforms by the recip-
ient governments.
I know that there is a major question
in the minds of some with respect to the
capacity of the Central American coun-
tries to absorb productively the level of
assistance which we are proposing. Let
me assure the committee that this is a
matter which we have considered care-
fully in our planning, and I would like to
share with you our thinking on it.
While our program is ambitious, I am
convinced that it is both essentia! and
feasible. I believe, in fact, that a more
modest program might be undercut by
the political uncertainty, insurgency, low-
commodity prices, and economic depres-
sion that now characterize the region.
Department of State Bulletin
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
First, with respect to the overall size
of the program, the assistance we are pro-
posing for FY 1985 i-epresents less than
5% of the region's GNP and is less than
the $1.5 billion shortfall in export earn-
ings which have resulted from lower cof-
fee and sugar prices and higher costs for
imported oil. We have provided higher
levels of aid relative to GNP in other
parts of the world, like South Korea and
Taiwan, and much larger amounts during
the Marshall Plan.
On the issue of the management
capacity of the Central American govern-
ments, while we recognize that serious
deficiencies do exist, we are taking
several steps to prevent such problems
from limiting our impact. For one thing,
the largest part of the assistance will go
to the private sector rather than to
government programs. For another, as
part of our effort, we will provide
substantial technical assistance and train-
ing for government officials to streamline
opei'ations and increase efficiency. Third,
significant capacity for expansion is
already in place since government in-
vestments and social programs have been
dramatically cut back as a result of the
region's financial problems.
With regard to specific bottlenecks,
we recognize that aid expansion has been
hindered in some areas by such problems
as clogged ports or shortages of trucks to
move commodities. This is simply not the
case in Central America, where produc-
tion has artificially shrunk as a result of
economic depression. For the next
several years, considerable excess capac-
ity will exist. Over the longer term,
where we can make plans to address
potential bottlenecks before they arise,
the need for investment is enormous.
Physical infrastructure is undeveloped,
health and education systems need expan-
sion, and investment in productive capaci-
ty is essential to employ the region's
growing labor force. These all require
resources.
Finally, I would note that our own
past experience with assistance programs
in the region suggests that we can build
up a larger program, given the kind of
commitment to economic, social, and
political reform that we will seek as a
precondition to such assistance. We have
found that our programs have tended to
be implemented fairly quickly in Central
America compared with other regions of
the woi-ld. Less than 20% of our pipeline
of undi-sbursed funds was obligated more
than 3 years ago, and some of this was for
projects where long lead times were fore-
seen in project design.
I believe that the central determinant
of absorptive capacity is government
policies. Policy reforms are crucial to ef-
fective use of our funds and those of host
countries. The key is to avoid subsidizing
inefficiency and to create opportunities
and incentives for private sector invest-
ment. In agriculture, adequate prices and
access to land with secure titles will
stimulate investment and production by
the people who understand best hov\' to
do this— the individual farmers. In in-
dustry good policies will mobilize in-
dividual entrepreneurs to make the right
decisions concerning increased employ-
ment and production. The Central
American Development Organization
(CADO), which we support, can be a vehi-
cle for assuring that our assistance is, in-
deed, tied to good performance on the
whole range of policies— economic, social,
and political— essential for the success of
the Central America program.
The stakes are high in Central
America, and the success of this effort is
vital to our foreign policy interests. For it
to succeed, the proposed program will re-
quire sti-ong bipartisan congressional sup-
port. We will welcome the opportunity to
discuss with the members of this commit-
tee and others in Congress the details of
the program as they are fleshed out and
to seek your guidance as to how it can
best be implemented.
Let me now turn to the overall AID
program.
General Strategy
Our programs should be aimed at over-
coming the basic problems of hunger, il-
literacy, lack of training, disease, and pre-
mature death. We cannot, of course,
assist developing nations to achieve such
standards through our pi'ograms alone.
Indeed the principal impetus for sur-
mounting these problems must come from
the developing countries themselves. The
programs of other donors are a critical
element in achieving progress.
There are essentially six key develop-
ment areas on which we are focusing AID
resources:
• Attacking hunger;
• Addressing health problems, espe-
cially the high levels of infant and child
mortality in the Third World;
• Addressing high rates of population
growth;
• Increasing literacy, education, and
training opportunities;
• Reducing unemployment and
underemployment; and
• Improving host country financial
structures.
Many of these are a continuation of
past efforts, but we are striving to give
better focus to our efforts and to establish
a clearer vision of what this agency is,
and should be, concerned with. Moreover,
we are emphasizing as basic means of im-
plementation the four pillars of agency
policy: policy reform, technology transfer,
institutional development, and greater
use of the private sector.
Through policy dialogue, we seek to
achieve agreement with host country
governments on the nature of key policy
constraints to basic development and on
practical changes that can be made. Right
policies are essential to achieve develop-
ment progress.
Institutional development, thi-ough
which we strive to help create and im-
prove the institutional capacities of the
peoples of the developing countries, has
been part of AID's approach since its
beginnings. Over time we have come to
recognize that faulty institutional
frameworks can impede development and
that increased centralization and
bureaucratization can be major obstacles
to progress. As a result, our approach to
institutional development has been modi-
fied to include the idea that sometimes
what is required is decentralizing institu-
tions rather than centralizing them and
encouraging greater reliance on private
and voluntary— rather than public— insti-
tutions. In this regard, we will continue to
strengthen our partnership with U.S.
private and voluntary organizations and
draw on their unique capacities in such
areas as small-scale enterprise, health
delivery systems, and community
development.
We ai-e also stressing the contribution
that the private sector and the use of
market power can make to solving key
development problems. We believe there
are many things that government cannot
do, or cannot do well. In particular we
plan to test pilot efforts for private sector
involvement in areas where government
has often been unsuccessful— such as
distribution of agricultural inputs. We
will be testing the capabilities of in-
digenous private sectors to manufacture
and market inputs for health and popula-
tion programs.
In the area of technology transfer, we
hojDe to achieve dramatic breakthroughs
in such areas as biomedical research,
agriculture, and family ])lanning. "New
technologies" frequently connote com-
plex, expensive applications to solve
esoteric problems. But technology also
may be used to find solutions to age-old
problems through inexpensive methods
May 1984
^mmmwumutHmmimmmmmmm
MIDDLE EAST
that can be disseminated to people
everywhere. An example is the
breakthrough in oral rehydi-ation
therapy, which I mentioned earlier.
AID intends to be a leader in sup-
porting the development and dissemina-
tion of such new technologies. Sustained
development requii'es an indigenous
capacity to adopt, create, and apply a con-
tinuing stream of appropriate tech-
nologies to the problems of health, popu-
lation growth, hunger, illiteracy,
unemployment, and labor productivity.
Moreover their dissemination and actual
utilization requires that they be
economically and financially sound,
capable of withstanding the test of the
market.
Research thus takes on added impor-
tance, and AID intends to give greater
emphasis to it as a fulcrum of tech-
nological transfer. We have identified
four critical research areas that will
receive major AID attention in the com-
ing years: agriculture, health, family plan-
ning, and fuelwood production and utiliza-
tion.
The developments I have just out-
lined have had a major part in shaping
our proposed program for FY 198.5 and
will influence the way in which that pro-
gram is caiTied out. Let me turn now to
the details of the FY 1985 request.
Request
For FY 1985 we are proposing a program
of $8.9 billion for foreign economic
assistance, including amounts we are re-
questing as part of our overall proposal
for Central America. In addition, to re-
spond to several pressing requirements
this year, we are requesting several FY
1984 supplemental appropriations. These
include an urgent $90 million PL 480,
Title II food aid supplemental for Africa
to respond to the dire food shortage in
that region, $.320 million in supplemental
for the multilateral banks, and a $400
million supplemental for Central America.
The Central America supplemental
consists of $290.5 million for ESF, most of
which is for urgently needed balance-of-
payments support; $73 million for func-
tional development assistance; and a total
of $11.5 million for AID operating ex-
penses, the Peace Corps, and U.S. Infor-
mation Agency.
The FY 1985 request for bilateral
assistance includes $2.2 billion for
development assistance, $3.4 billion for
the ESF, $21 million for the trade and
development program, and $1.3 billion in
budget authority for the PL 480 Food for
Peace program.
66
Our development assistance request
includes $1.6 billion for the functional
development assistance accounts. Of this
amount, $20 million would be allocated to
the private enterprise revolving fund.
The development assistance request also
includes $97.5 million for the Sahel
development program, $75 million for the
new Economic Policy Initiative for Africa
which I mentioned earlier, $10 million for
support of American schools and hospitals
abroad, $25 million for the international
disaster assistance program, and $404
million for AID operating expenses. And
it includes $34 million for the Foreign
Service retirement fund, for which fund-
ing is already authorized.
I would like to point out that, with
respect to our development assistance re-
quest, we are proposing a reduction in the
minimum loan level required for allocation
within our functional accounts. This will
give us needed flexibility in the program-
ming of our resources and avoid the
possibility of having to provide loans to
any of the least developed countries such
as has been required this year in
Bangladesh as a result of the current loan
floor.
The ESF, consistent with the pro-
gram of the past several years, has over
half of its resources allocated to Israel
and Egyjjt to continue our support for the
search for peace in the Middle East. The
FY 1985 Assistance Requests
for the Middle East
request also includes expanded assistance
to the Caribbean Basin countries to
restore economic growth to this troubled
region, support for continuing efforts to
stem the spread of economic and political
disruption in Africa, and to advance our
security and development-oriented pro-
grams in Pakistan and the Philippines.
For multilateral assistance in FY
1985, we are requesting a total of $1.5
bilhon. This includes $1.2 billion for U.S.
contributions to the multilateral develop-
ment banks. The request also includes
$242 million for international organiza-
tions and programs, of which $50 million
is for support of the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IF AD) and
$192 million is for voluntary contributions
to UN development programs, including
$120 million for the UN Development
Program (UNDP) and $27 million for the
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).
I look forward to working with the
committee in carrying out our proposals.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the "Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.H
by Richard W. Murphy
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on March 15,
198U- Ambassador Murphy is Assistant
Secretary of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs.
I welcome the opportunity to testify to-
day in support of the Administration's
proposals for FY 1985 economic and
security assistance for the Near East.
The Administration's proposal
reflects the realities of our foreign policy
and national security objectives in this
vital region. In each country, our
assistance programs are intended to nur-
ture relationships of mutual interest and
trust and to assist these governments in
strengthening their security and further-
ing their economic progress.
Our programs support objectives in
the region which are vital to our own
peace, security, and well-being.
• We are actively pursuing a just
and lasting Middle East peace.
• We are engaged in maintaining
unimpeded access to the crucial oil
resources of the Persian Gulf.
• Our assistance to Lebanon aims to
help the Lebanese Government restore
peace and regain sovereignty over the
country.
• We are working with friendly
countries to safeguard our vital interests
in North Africa, Southwest Asia, and the
Persian Gulf.
• We are searching for peace in
Afghanistan which would include the
withdrawal of Soviet military forces and
the restoration of Afghanistan in-
dependence.
In our efforts to advance the Middle
East peace process and to promote the
Department of State Bulletin
MIDDLE EAST
resolution of conflicts elsewhere in the
region, we recognize that the spirit of ac-
commodation can grow more readily if
friendly states feel confident of their abili-
ty to provide for their own security and
for the economic and social needs of their
people.
An important change that the Ad-
ministration is proposing for the FY 1985
foreign assistance involves a shift of the
foreign military sales (FMS) financing
program to "on budget," thus requiring
authorization and appropriation of funds
for the entire program. We are seeking
this change so that we will be able to offer
FMS credits at a concessional rate as an
alternative to market rates to avoid ex-
acerbating the debt burden of many of
our friends. Congress has repeatedly ex-
pressed concern about the mounting debt
problems of many developing countries,
where there has been a significant rise in
recent years of the debt-servicing
burdens. An increasing number of coun-
tries are seeking debt-service relief from
both official and private creditors. In the
Middle East, Morocco rescheduled its
govemment-to-govemment debt last
October.
FMS debt service is significant in
terms of overall debt, particularly in the
case of Israel and Egypt. The increasing
burden of debt service has a negative im-
pact on both economies. For this reason,
as part of this "on budget" proposal, the
FY 1985 request would provide Israel
and Egypt all their FMS credits on a
forgiven or grant basis.
In addition, on-budget lending will
provide the Administration with greater
flexibility in adjusting the amount of con-
cessionality in individual programs of
other countries. Economic need and the
ability of a country to repay will be the
primary criteria in determining who
receives concessional FMS interest rates
just as it is in determining who receives
grant military assistance. We now plan to
provide these loans at a 5% interest rate,
to be reviewed at the time funds are
allocated. Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco
are among the 13 countries worldwide
which would receive part or all (Morocco)
of their FMS credits at concessional rates.
The levels and terms of our proposed
assistance have been carefully developed
vdthin the constraints of our budget
stringencies and the President's economic
program and are the amounts needed to
meet essential requirements of the coun-
tries to this region.
Our FY 1985 foreign assistance re-
quest for the Near East vdll fund six ma-
jor programs:
May 1984
• $2,790 mUlion in FMS credits, in-
cluding $2,575 million in forgiven credits
for Israel and Egypt;
• $65 million in grant military
assistance programs (MAP);
• $9