The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

Thursday, April 14, 2016

Russian columnist: Russia Withdrew From Syria Because Iran Refused To Participate In Russian Initiative To Freeze Oil Production - MEMRI

by MEMRI

An additional, but not officially acknowledged, motivating factor for the Syria
intervention, he wrote, was the need to repair the damage caused by the Ukraine
crisis, that had resulted in Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostracization
and diplomatic isolation.

In a March
21, 2016 article in the Russian independent weekly The New
Times, journalist Orkhan Jemal,
whose father is Heydar Jemal,
a leading Russian Islamic intellectual and chairman of the Islamic Committee of
Russia, presented his overview of Russia's reasons for intervening
in and then withdrawing from Syria.[1] Writing under the headline "The Conqueror's Whim," Jemal noted that
Russia's intervention in Syria had been presented to the Russian people by its leaders as a necessity so that the Islamic
State (ISIS) could be eradicated, along with any Russian ISIS fighters who might
return home to create "another Syria," and also as "a continuation
of the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, only from a distance."
An additional, but not officially acknowledged, motivating factor for the Syria
intervention, he wrote, was the need to repair the damage caused by the Ukraine
crisis, that had resulted in Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostracization
and diplomatic isolation. Russia's Syria intervention forced the world to
negotiate with Putin and to acknowledge Russia as a global player.

In Jemal's view,
Russia's gains in Syria were modest; he wrote that ISIS's losses during the six
months of the Russian military intervention could hardly be referred to as critical.
Additionally, as far as the Geneva negotiations are concerned, international
pressure could lead to the creation of a coalition government in Syria, and the
country could be divided up into "a number of territories that would remain
under the control of the forces that Russia, not so long ago, referred to as terrorist."
Jemal is convinced that Putin did not attain his objective of international acknowledgement
of Russia as a global player, since he did not manage to achieve peace "at
least in some form" in Syria. Putin's
withdrawal from Syria, he concluded, means that the operation to "force the
world and Russia back onto speaking terms" can also be considered
terminated.

Also in his
article, Jemal revealed Iran's role in Russia's military intervention, as
gleaned, he said, from an informal conversation with an unnamed Hizbullah official.
He said that Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, had apparently persuaded the Russian military to
support Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and "turn the tide in Syria."
Russia's main issue regarding its possible military intervention in Syria –
that is, who would foot the bill – was settled when Gen. Soleimani assured Russia
that Iran would compensate it for military expenses.

Since one of the Russian economy's major problems today
is the low price of oil, such compensation by Iran could have come in the form
of its agreement to join the Russian initiative for a temporary freeze in oil
production by major oil-producing countries. In February 2016, Russian Energy
Minister Alexander Novak announced that Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and
Qatar would freeze their oil production at January 2016 levels, if other
countries followed suit.[2]
Fifteen additional countries had given their potential agreement, but Iran not
only declined to join them, but planned to increase its production, with the
aim of ultimately raising its current 1.4 million bbl/d to four million bbl/d.[3]

The outcome of the Russia-Iran discussion about oil
production were officially announced on March 14, 2016 – the same day that
Russia announced that it would withdraw its air forces from Syria. Also on
March 14, following a Tehran meeting between Iranian
Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zangeneh and Russian Energy Minister Novak, Iran's
Press TV news outlet reported on Novak's
statement that an international agreement to freeze oil production could be
signed on April 17 in Doha, but that Iran would not be part of it because it
was entitled to boost its output after the lifting of years-long sanctions.[4]

Jemal wrote: "The connection between the
two events [i.e. announcements] is rather obvious. Russia ended its involvement
in the Syrian war for economic reasons. Iran's participation in the proposed
deal to decrease oil production would, in our opinion, have compensated us for
our military expenses. Iran refused to pay the bill, and we refused to continue
to participate in the war."

Following are excerpts from the
article:

Now Under Discussion: Syria's "Division Into A
Number Of Territories... Under The Control Of The Forces That Russia, Not So
Long Ago, Referred To As Terrorist"

Russian Air Force fighter plane in Syria.
(Source: Eng.syria.mil.ru)

"In late September [2015], it
was announced that we were going into Syria to destroy the Islamic State. The
destruction of this group... was deemed necessary by our leaders because many
people from the Russian Federation are members of it and, allegedly, after
gaining some military experience, may return home to create 'another Syria.'
The war in the Middle East was presented to us as a continuation of sorts of the
counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, only at a distance.

"It is obvious that the Russian air forces and their allies on the
ground did not achieve this objective. ISIS was made a little uncomfortable,
but on the whole maintained its positions [on the ground], and the losses it
suffered over the six months when Russian pilots were at work in Syria can
hardly be referred to as critical.

"[Another] Russian objective in Syria – let's call it semi-official –
is to preserve the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, who in Russia was referred to as
'the legitimate ruler of the country,' and who invited us to fight on his side 'on
legal grounds' and 'in accordance with international law.' Assad's positions [on
the ground] haven't changed much, although it is undeniable that at the start of
the Russian military intervention his regime was one step away from the
collapse, whereas at the time of our withdrawal he is much more confident.

"According to the Kremlin plan publicized last September, Russia had
to stop the civil war in Syria, and therefore had
to defeat all the terrorists (according to our views at the time, everyone who opposed
Assad was listed as such), so that once the legitimate president had regained
control over the entire territory of his country, the Syrian people could determine
their future via peaceful elections. In short, six months ago Moscow was
counting on a full and flawless victory for Assad. But the reality is that while
at the moment Assad has a formal ceasefire with some of his enemies, in
practice nobody is observing this armistice...

"Another bonus
for Assad is the freeze in the Geneva negotiations. When Russia was on the side
of 'Syria’s legitimate president,' there was still a chance, however small,
that these negotiations would lead, with the help of international pressure, to
the creation of a coalition government. Now the subject under discussion is 'Syria’s
federalization,' or, to call things by their proper names, the country's
division into a number of territories that would remain under the control of
the forces that Russia, not so long ago, referred to as terrorist. Moreover, not
only will these 'autonomies' fall under internal 'terrorist' control, they will
also be subject to external control by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey (with whom Russia
has had an ugly row), and the U.S...

"The [additional]
objective set by Russia, while never officially declared, was discussed by
practically all international affairs experts. Those who are pro-[Syrian] opposition
presented it this way: As a result of the escapade in the Crimea and the Donbass
[region of Ukraine], Putin found himself in diplomatic isolation and was, in
fact, ostracized. The West, demonstratively and rather rudely, made it clear that
it wanted nothing to do with him... Under these circumstances, he raised the
stakes, and, by entering Syria, forced the world to negotiate with him and acknowledge
that there is no solving the world's problems without Russia.

"The patriotic [Russian] experts present the same issue more
sympathetically, as if we are witnessing 'a new Yalta,'[5]
and as if Putin, like Stalin, is about to divide the world between the Russian
or American sphere of influence. That is, we are not talking about a return to
speaking terms, but about a restoration of [Russia's] superpower status – [and,
according to this depiction, Russia's intervention in] Syria is not an attempt to set right what was ruined by
the Crimea and Donbass [events], but is, in fact, its continuation: We are taking
[back] our rightful place in the world, and asking no one's permission to do
so...

"Still, it must
be acknowledged that Putin has... shown the international community that he is
capable of sudden, unexpected moves, and that his wishes (which he prefers to call
'Russia's geopolitical interests') cannot be ignored. But even here, the
success is only local: [The world] is talking to Putin only with regard to the
Syria situation – not about general matters. No Russian military presence in
Syria means there is no reason to talk to Putin as an equal partner.

"Had Putin
brought the Syrian story to a close –had he achieved peace at least in some
form – he could perhaps have moved the situation to a new level. It seemed that
the events in Syria were going to allow him to do so. However, on March 14,
Putin withdrew Russia's air forces from Syria – meaning that the operation to 'force
[Russia's] relationship with the world back onto speaking terms' may also be
considered terminated.[6] "

The IRGC Qods Force Commander "Assured His Russian Counterparts
That Iran Would Cover Their Military Expenses, One Way Or Another"

"On the whole, the outcome of [Russia's] Syrian
campaign do not allow us to say that 'we are leaving because we have achieved all
the objectives' – we must look for another reason for the military withdrawal. In
late February, on the eve of the ceasefire that was declared in Syria, this
writer spoke informally with a representative of Hizbullah, a Lebanese Shia
group whose many volunteers fight on Assad’s side. I wanted to know what Assad's
(and, therefore, Russia's) allies thought about [U.S. President Barack] Obama's
and Putin's arrangement concerning the ceasefire. I discovered that Hizbullah
was very much against the ceasefire; they thought that the time was ripe to 'press
on.' In our talk, we touched upon the role played in Syria by the well-known
Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's special forces [i.e. Qods Force]
– who, according to a popular story, came to Moscow last year and persuaded the
Russian military that it was both necessary to support Assad and possible to
turn the tide in Syria.

"According to my Hizbullah source, the real story
was not so heroic.
He said that the main issue that Soleimani discussed with the Russian
generals was 'who was going to pay for the banquet.' Apparently,
the issue was settled to everyone's satisfaction when the legendary
Iranian
general assured his Russian counterparts that Iran would cover their
military
expenses, one way or another.[7]

"I immediately recalled
this talk with the man from Hizbullah when I put together the announcement of Russia's
withdrawal from Syria and the information about the Teheran talks [i.e. about
freezing oil production] and the news that Iran would not be joining the cartel
agreement to freeze oil production. Russia's main economic problem is low oil
prices. In search of a way out of this situation, Moscow tried to reach an
agreement with leading oil-producing countries to cut back... production – thus
creating a kind of oil deficit and raising the price per barrel. In February,
Russia managed to interest Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela in this idea.
Fifteen additional oil-producing countries gave their potential agreement to
support the freeze. The Russian efforts nearly brought together the countries
responsible for three-quarters of the world's oil production. However, this
deal would be meaningless without Iran's agreement.

"The oil embargo
against our ally in the Syrian war deprived it of leadership in the world
markets. But in early 2016 the sanctions against Iran were lifted [as part of
the JCPOA], and consequently Iranian oil suppliers are ready to fill any open niche.
Therefore, it became necessary to persuade Teheran to hold off on its idea to capture
the markets.

"However, Novak's
meeting [aimed
at persuading] Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zangeneh [to do so] was a
dismal failure. Zangeneh declared that his country would not join the agreement,
and would [aim to] regain lost ground. In the next three months alone, Iran plans
to increase production by 50%, and ultimately to raise it from the current 1.4
million to four million bbl/d. Thus, the idea of raising oil prices can be
written off.

"The outcome of the Russia-Iran talks on an oil production freeze were
officially made public publicized on March 14, although it had been expected. 'Novak
never had a chance of coming to an agreement with Iran,' says Mikhail
Krutikhin, a partner in the RusEnergy consulting agency. '[Iran's] position was
clear: They never promised to freeze oil production and they announced this everywhere.'
Russia's withdrawal of its air forces from Syria was also officially announced
on March 14 – but, as mentioned, this [intention] too was an open secret.

"The connection between the
two events is rather obvious. Russia ended its involvement in the Syrian war
for economic reasons. Iran's participation in the proposed deal to decrease oil
production would, in our opinion, have compensated us for our military expenses.
Iran refused to pay the bill, and we refused to continue to participate in the
war. Putin, who had trusted the Iranians but was deceived, left the battlefield
and retreated to his tent, like an insulted Achilles. The objectives set for
the [Russian] military at the inner circle's secret meetings when Russia chose
to become involved in the Syrian war will probably remain secret...

"But from the outside, the Russian military appears to be no more than
medieval mercenaries – a parody of the famous 1521 anecdote, when French King Francis
I couldn't find the money to pay his Swiss infantry, and they calmly abandoned
the battlefield, saying pas d'argent, pas de Suisse! (No money, no Swiss!)...

[5]
At the 1945 Yalta Conference, during WWII, U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin decided to
demand Germany's unconditional surrender and began plans for the post-war
world.