BEFORE THE FIFTH
DISTRICT--SECTION III SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

IN THE MATTER OF
STEVEN MARK FREI, ESQ.
VSB Docket No. 00-053-2732

AGREED DISPOSITION

Pursuant to the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, ( IV, (13(G)(1)(c)(3), the Virginia
State Bar, by Assistant Bar Counsel Seth M. Guggenheim, and the Respondent,
Steven Mark Frei, Esquire, hereby enter into an Agreed Disposition arising out
of the above-referenced matter.

Both parties affirm that the proposed
Subcommittee Determination of a Public Reprimand, a true copy of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference, reflects the stipulated facts,
violations, and disposition for the above-referenced matter.

Respondent understands that should
the Subcommittee accept this agreed disposition by unanimous vote, the Subcommittee
Determination will be signed by the Chair or Chair Designate and thereafter
mailed without the necessity of any hearing or further notice to the parties.
Further, it is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that should the Subcommittee
refuse the agreed disposition neither party shall be bound by the stipulations
or findings contained therein and this matter shall be heard by the full Committee.

Pursuant to the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, ( IV, ( 13(G)(1)(c)(3), the duly convened
Subcommittee of the Fifth District--Section III Committee of the Virginia State
Bar hereby accepts the Agreed Disposition in this matter.

Date: __________ _________________________________

Date: __________ _________________________________

Date: __________ _________________________________

V I R G I N I A :

BEFORE THE FIFTH
DISTRICT--SECTION III SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

IN THE MATTER OF
STEVEN MARK FREI, ESQ.
VSB Docket No. 00-053-2732

SUBCOMMITTEE DETERMINATIONPUBLIC REPRIMAND

On September 22, 2003,
a meeting in this matter was held before a duly convened Fifth District--Section
III Subcommittee consisting of Joyce Ann N. Massey, Esq., James G. Moran, lay
member, and E. Allen Newcomb, Esq., presiding.

Pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, ( IV, ( 13(G)(1)(c)(3),
the Fifth District--Section III Subcommittee of the Virginia State Bar hereby
serves upon the Respondent the following Public Reprimand, as set forth below:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times relevant
hereto Steven Mark Frei, Esq., (hereafter (Respondent() was an attorney licensed
to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

2. On or about January 3, 1996, Ms.
Kathleen T. Green (hereafter (Complainant() retained the Respondent to represent
her in a personal injury premises liability claim arising from
an injury sustained by the Complainant in a slip and fall incident which occurred
on January 9, 1994.

3. On or about January 5, 1996, the
Respondent filed suit on Complainant(s behalf in the Arlington County, Virginia,
Circuit Court.

4. The litigation initially progressed
in the customary manner, which included the taking of Complainant(s deposition
on behalf of the defendant in the action. A trial date was originally scheduled
for a date in February of 1997, but the trial date was continued to October
2, 1997.

5. As the October trial date approached,
the Respondent and Complainant discussed problems with Complainant(s claim respecting
liability and the fact that a treating physician had moved away from the area.
The Respondent agreed to press for a settlement of the claim.

6. Hearing nothing further from the
Respondent following the discussion mentioned above, the Complainant began leaving
messages for the Respondent in November of 1997, to which he did not respond.
She thereafter wrote a letter to the Respondent on or about February 26, 1998,
to which he did not respond. She thereafter left another message for the Respondent
on or about April 7 and 28, 1998, to which he did not respond. On May 20, 1998,
the Complainant left another message for the Respondent, referring in her message
to her February letter and her calls placed in April. The Respondent did not
respond to this latter message.

7. On March 15, 2000, the Complainant
telephoned the Respondent again, and was told that the Respondent had changed
law firms and had taken her case with him. The Complainant then called the Respondent
at his new law firm, and left a message which was not returned.

8. A few days following her March
15, 2000, call to the Respondent, the Complainant called the Arlington County,
Virginia, Circuit Court, and learned that her case had been dismissed in January
of 2000.

9. On or about March 22, 2000, the
Complainant sent a letter to the Respondent requesting information concerning
the status of her case and stating, inter alia, that it had been over
two and one-half years since they had spoken to each other, and that she had
been unsuccessful in her attempts to reach him. The Complainant requested transmittal
of her file in the event that Respondent would be unable to contact her by March
31, 2000.

10. The Respondent sent the Complainant
a letter dated April 14, 2000, stating, inter alia, that (My records
indicate that you did not want to continue pursuit of the claim and thus I took
no further action;( that according to his (records( he had not received any
message or correspondence from the Complainant since 1997; and that he had requested
that Complainant(s file be copied and forwarded to her (under separate cover.)

11. The Respondent, in his said letter,
also stated:
This is obviously not the best of situations. If you want to continue pursuit
of your claim I would suggest that you allow me to make a filing with the court
requesting that the order entered in January was not appropriate and the case
should be reinstated to the Court( [sic] active calender [sic].
Alternatively, I could have a discussion with the defense attorney that forwarded
the order to me earlier this year as discussed above and determine if he would
agree to a new filing of your claim. This should be done as soon as possible.

12. The (order entered in January( referred to in Respondent(s letter was not
an order of nonsuit, but, rather, was an order dismissing Complainant(s case
(with prejudice.( The order itself reflected that it had been entered at the
joint request of the Respondent and opposing counsel. The order became final
as a matter of law twenty-one days following its date of entry on January 18,
2000.

13. The Complainant had not received
any file materials from the Respondent as of the time of her interview by a
Virginia State Bar investigator in 2002, nearly two years following Respondent(s
representation in his April 14, 2000, letter that the file would be copied and
sent to her.

II. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT

The Subcommittee
finds that the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rules of Professional Conduct have been violated:

DR 6-101. Competence and Promptness.

(B) A lawyer shall attend promptly
to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until the lawyer has properly
and completely withdrawn from representing the client.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which
the lawyer's services are being rendered.

(D) A lawyer shall inform his client of facts pertinent to the matter and of
communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or
resolution of the matter.

RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation

(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs
(b), (c), and (d), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.

RULE 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of
communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or
resolution of the matter.

RULE 1.16 Declining Or Terminating
Representation

(e) All original, client-furnished
documents and any originals of legal instruments or official documents which
are in the lawyer's possession (wills, corporate minutes, etc.) are the property
of the client and shall be returned to the client upon request, whether or not
the client has paid the fees and costs owed the lawyer. If the lawyer wants
to keep a copy of such original documents, the lawyer must incur the cost of
duplication. Upon request, the client must also be provided copies of the following
documents from the lawyer's file, whether or not the client has paid the fees
and costs owed the lawyer: lawyer/client and lawyer/third-party communications;
the lawyer's copies of client-furnished documents (unless the originals have
been returned to the client pursuant to this paragraph); pleadings and discovery
responses; working and final drafts of legal instruments, official documents,
investigative reports, legal memoranda, and other attorney work product documents
prepared for the client in the course of the representation; research materials;
and bills previously submitted to the client. Although the lawyer may bill and
seek to collect from the client the costs associated with making a copy of these
materials, the lawyer may not use the client's refusal to pay for such materials
as a basis to refuse the client's request. The lawyer, however, is not required
under this Rule to provide the client copies of billing records and documents
intended only for internal use, such as memoranda prepared by the lawyer discussing
conflicts of interest, staffing considerations, or difficulties arising from
the lawyer/client relationship.

III. PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Accordingly, it is the decision of
the Subcommittee to impose a PUBLIC REPRIMAND on Respondent, Steven Mark Frei,
Esquire, and he is so reprimanded.

IV. COSTS

Pursuant to Part Six, ( IV, ( 13(B)(8)(c)
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary
System shall assess costs against the Respondent.