HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events
which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the
enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the
system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is
absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its
laws. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to
their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other
constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent
members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head ....

Federalist No. 23

Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued)

Friday, December 14, 1787 [Alexander Hamilton] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York:

IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not
less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the
Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of
such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as
from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed
evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a
bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction
between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise
enough to enter into stipulations with the United States....

Federalist No. 22

Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued)

Friday, December 14, 1787 [Alexander Hamilton] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York:

IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not
less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the
Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of
such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as
from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed
evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a
bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction
between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise
enough to enter into stipulations with the United States....

Federalist No. 24

The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

Wednesday, December 19, 1787 [Alexander Hamilton] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York:

TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and
direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right,
is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace;
an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold
assertions, without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in
contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in
most of the existing constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected
that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE
authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments....