This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context.
Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome)
Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

Impartido por:

Professor Asher Susser

Senior Research Fellow

Transcripción

Another example of this developing stateness, is that of Syria. For Syria, there was a very sour taste of Arab union that hadn't worked between Syria and Egypt, between 1958 and 1961. And it was a very strong desire in Syria despite all the flare about Arab union and Arab nationalism. A very strong desire to protect their independence. From the mid 1970s the uniform fabric of Ba'ath pan-Arab ideology in Syria, started to show shades of territorial Syrian and Pan-Syrian nationalism. [SOUND] It seems that Hafiz Asad like Saddam Hussein had reached the conclusions, that since it was not realistic to expect complete Arab unity to be quickly achieved. It was necessary to satisfy the popular need for a more permanent political basis of identification than a Syrian entity that was deemed illegitimate by pan-Arab party doctrine and, as such, necessarily temporary. [SOUND] While Hafiz Assad officially remained faithful to the party's long-term vision of Arab unity, the Syrian leadership searched for a formula that would bridge the gap between party ideals of Arab unity and political reality. Just as Egypt had shifted away from the conflict with Israel, Syria was desperately in need of a new strategic alignment that would encompass Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians, and enable the Syrians to establish some kind of parity with Israel. Thus, the old motif of greater Syria was given a new lease on life by the Ba'ath regime in service of Syria's state interest. It's raison d'etat. [SOUND] In later years, it did not disappear, and actually became part of Ba'ath political thinking together with a more traditional pan-Arabism that was coupled with notions of a more narrowly defined territorial nationalism based on Syria's existing borders. Thus, archeological finds of the Roman era in Syria gave a great boost to a Syrian sense of national pride, and were presented as evidence of the pre-Islamic historical greatness of Syria. There wasn't even an effort to present these finds as part of the Arab heritage. But rather, as part of Syria's past. [SOUND] Occupation of large parts of Lebanon in 1976 by Syria, and the interstate arrangement between these two states did not bring about any change in the boundaries. Syria continued to preserve the boundary between Syria and Lebanon even though this was regarded in Ba'ath ideology as something very artificial that shouldn't really be there. And Greater Syria became a question more of strategic need, rather than an ideological conviction. It was all about serving the strategic needs of the Syrian state, and Syria had indeed become a player in its own right. It was now a stable and a powerful country. The fountainhead and beating heart of Arabism in theory. But the emphasis was on Syria far more than it was of Arabism. [SOUND] Jordan and the Palestinians have also had their development of stateness and the territorial identity each one of these in their own particular way. Palestinian-ness was quite unique. Created in the crucible of 1948, the Nochba, the defeat by Israel. And as opposed to other Arab states, searching for some kind of usable past to give a measure of historical content to their rather artificial territorial creations. For the Palestinians, it was all about the loss of territory, that served as the backbone of the cohesive collective memory. The loss of Palestine is what gave the Palestinians their territorial identity. The loss of Palestine being the backbone of their collective memory. [SOUND] As for the Jordanians, their Jordanian-ness was defined against the ultimate Palestinian Other. Especially after the civil war between the Jordanian government and the PLO in September 1970. [SOUND] Since September 1970, there has been a very deliberate promotion in Jordan of a particular Jordanian identity based on a common past even if it is a bit of a historical invention. The Jordanian identity was therefore portrayed as having existed as a separate identity in Ottoman times in the 19th century. And though this wasn't really so, it became part of the Jordanian national narrative. And therefore, if this is to be true, the foundation of the monarchy was based on self-determination of the Jordanian people that was in existent, people in the 1920s, and not a colonial fiat, as it had actually been in reality. [SOUND] Like other Arab states seeking to create a territorial identity, Jordan was also in search of a usable past. And thus, Jordan was described as a wellspring of civilization ever since the Roman conquests through the ancient Nabataeans of Jordan and the Muslim conquests of the 7th century which all became part of Jordanian history. [SOUND] Jordanian-ness was also founded on the uniqueness of the tribal, monarchical compact as the core of Jordanian national identity. The special association between the tribes and their support for the monarchical regime in Jordan. Jordan's relative cohesion, in comparison to the other Arab states of the Fertile Crescent has also contributed to its surprisingly long-term stability. No less in artificial creation than its neighbors and many would argue even considerably more so, Jordan has had a much better political record. And this better political record is definitely related to Jordan's being a homogeneous society in religious terms. More than 90% of the Jordanians are Sunni Muslim Arabs. Since 1948, it has become increasingly Palestinian. And Palestinians presently constitute a majority of just over 50% in Jordan of the East Bank alone. That is not taking into account the West Bank territory occupied by Israel since 1967. But as tense as relations are between Jordanians and Palestinians, the distinction between them are latter day 20th century ones. They are skin deep in comparison to the far more profound, sectarian fault lines such as between Sunnis and Shias that date back centuries. Tribalism among Jordan's East Bankers is a strong and very relevant social marker. The tribalism in Jordan has actually been mobilized far more in the service of the state than against it. In fact, the Jordanian state has become their political patrimony, that is the political patrimony of the Jordanian tribes, they have no other patrimony and they will fight to defend their own. [SOUND] Therefore in Jordan, it was not just a top down exercise, like in Iraq, but a bottom up one too, whereby the tribes actively adopted the Jordanian identity as their own. To the extent that they have actually become the main standard bearers of what can be termed Jordanianism. For more than a decade, Abdullah II, who has been in power since 1999, has promoted the idea of Jordan first. Jordan first being an example of the uninhibited will, willingness to advance territorial identity.