I don't see why not? In what way wasn't the dependence of Cuba on the USSR colonial in nature? Didn't the Soviets use Cuba both as a military base (which I think was the top priority) and also as a way to get some cheap raw materials (particularly sugar)?

Pants-of-dog wrote:This is the second time that you try to change the goalposts in this specific manner.

Again, if you wish to show that their foreign policy was so similar as to make Cuba a satellite state, please do.

On the contrary, I'm asking you to provide evidence of any relevant diplomatic clashes between Cuba and the Soviets. For instance, it's easy to see China was not a Soviet satellite at least from the 60s onwards, given their diplomatic relations at the time. I have not seen anything like that between Cuba and the USSR, and the former's stance on the Sino-Soviet split was similar to that of the Warsaw Pact members (official neutrality, broad alignment with the Soviets. Indeed, in Ethiopia for instance, Cuba clearly aligned itself with the USSR by supporting Ethiopia, while China provided some token support for Somalia when the USSR decided to pick Ethiopia).

Pants-of-dog wrote:No, this is not what I am saying at all. In fact, this would directly contradict my previous point, so it is illogical to assume I was making this point.

I see. But then, who was the representative of the Angolan people when Cuba intervened there?

Pants-of-dog wrote:Again: we were discussing how Cuban and US foreign policy were the same or different. Cuba acted bilaterally with other countries. The USA does not.

And I'm pointing out that you are using a rather... Odd definition of "acting bilaterally" here. In what way, for example, did Cuba act bilaterally with regards to Ethiopia? And how wasn't US aid, which was granted under bilateral agreements with the recipient, not an example of a bilateral policy?

Pants-of-dog wrote:I am not sure that Cuba was acting on behalf of the Soviets, or that Cuba was trying to benefit at the expense of Ethiopia.

Really? They coordinated the intervention from the beginning, and I don't see why would Cuba participate this actively if it wasn't expecting to benefit from it. Such benefit could, of course, be mainly in terms of its relations with the USSR (again, because it was a satellite) but I'd be surprised if it hadn't gained economically by (for instance) being paid by the Ethiopian government for the service provided.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Why would international media care about Cubans?

Why wouldn't it care about the only Marxist regime in Latin America, one that's next to the US for that matter? Wasn't one of the largest Cold War crisis centered on Cuba if anything? Symbolically, I see plenty of reasons for that.

Pants-of-dog wrote:So no example of Cuba using Granma to threaten another country’s sovereignty.

Do you really want me to look for Granma articles engaging on revolutionary propaganda?

Pants-of-dog wrote:Wince all of this supports the idea that the US is maintaining a posture of overt isolation, it can and probably does have a covert program of attacking Cuba.

This, in turn, provides the historical and political context through which we need to see Cuba and Us relationships.

Maybe, I'm pretty sure it would love to have the way to covertly overthrow the Cuban regime. But if such covert operation exists, it's been a failure.

Pants-of-dog wrote:...or a hostile superpower intent on ransacking your country for resources.

Propaganda will be pretty useless without the critical mass and conditions to overthrow the government as described in that post. When those conditions haven't been met, a colonial power has historically had no other option but to overtly intervene using military force, i.e. war, directly or through its allies (if any). In that case, if anything, propaganda directed at the country's population was a failure.

Pants-of-dog wrote:If you want to remove the profit motive from healthcare entirely, I would support that.

That's rather hard to do. I hate this game that those "not for profit" healthcare systems play, where everyone pretends not to care about how much they make out of it yet still make sure to extract as much rents as possible - be it done by healthcare workers through unions or licensing, or the government bureaucracy by "creative" procurement of raw materials or getting Party benefits if in a totalitarian regime.

I'm personally indifferent about profit, but I do care about both the efficacy (Does the population get the healthcare it needs?) and efficiency of the system (Are society's resources being used in the best way possible?). I don't think there's any healthcare system that is perfect in this regard.

wat0n wrote:I don't see why not? In what way wasn't the dependence of Cuba on the USSR colonial in nature? Didn't the Soviets use Cuba both as a military base (which I think was the top priority) and also as a way to get some cheap raw materials (particularly sugar)?

On the contrary, I'm asking you to provide evidence of any relevant diplomatic clashes between Cuba and the Soviets. For instance, it's easy to see China was not a Soviet satellite at least from the 60s onwards, given their diplomatic relations at the time. I have not seen anything like that between Cuba and the USSR, and the former's stance on the Sino-Soviet split was similar to that of the Warsaw Pact members (official neutrality, broad alignment with the Soviets. Indeed, in Ethiopia for instance, Cuba clearly aligned itself with the USSR by supporting Ethiopia, while China provided some token support for Somalia when the USSR decided to pick Ethiopia).

I see. But then, who was the representative of the Angolan people when Cuba intervened there?

And I'm pointing out that you are using a rather... Odd definition of "acting bilaterally" here. In what way, for example, did Cuba act bilaterally with regards to Ethiopia? And how wasn't US aid, which was granted under bilateral agreements with the recipient, not an example of a bilateral policy?

Really? They coordinated the intervention from the beginning, and I don't see why would Cuba participate this actively if it wasn't expecting to benefit from it. Such benefit could, of course, be mainly in terms of its relations with the USSR (again, because it was a satellite) but I'd be surprised if it hadn't gained economically by (for instance) being paid by the Ethiopian government for the service provided.

Why wouldn't it care about the only Marxist regime in Latin America, one that's next to the US for that matter? Wasn't one of the largest Cold War crisis centered on Cuba if anything? Symbolically, I see plenty of reasons for that.

Do you really want me to look for Granma articles engaging on revolutionary propaganda?

Maybe, I'm pretty sure it would love to have the way to covertly overthrow the Cuban regime. But if such covert operation exists, it's been a failure.

Propaganda will be pretty useless without the critical mass and conditions to overthrow the government as described in that post. When those conditions haven't been met, a colonial power has historically had no other option but to overtly intervene using military force, i.e. war, directly or through its allies (if any). In that case, if anything, propaganda directed at the country's population was a failure.

That's rather hard to do. I hate this game that those "not for profit" healthcare systems play, where everyone pretends not to care about how much they make out of it yet still make sure to extract as much rents as possible - be it done by healthcare workers through unions or licensing, or the government bureaucracy by "creative" procurement of raw materials or getting Party benefits if in a totalitarian regime.

I'm personally indifferent about profit, but I do care about both the efficacy (Does the population get the healthcare it needs?) and efficiency of the system (Are society's resources being used in the best way possible?). I don't think there's any healthcare system that is perfect in this regard.

1. Please quote the definition of colonialism, and then show Cuba and the USSR had a colonial relationship.

2. Also provide evidence showing how Cuba’s foreign policy was controlled by the Soviets.

3. When I say that Cuba acted bilaterally, I am using the exact words used by (I believe) a source you already presented in this thread.

4. If you have evidence showing that Cuba had a colonial relationship with Ethiopia, or using Granma to interfere in the politics of another country, please present it

5. Western media rarely discusses issues in Latin America, or the developing world in general.

6. Yes, there must be a reason why continued US covert action has not worked. It would work if there were a large portion of the population who wanted to get rid of socialism.

Pants-of-dog wrote:1. Please quote the definition of colonialism, and then show Cuba and the USSR had a colonial relationship.

Sure, here's a few from Wikipedia:

Wikipedia wrote:Collins English Dictionary defines colonialism as "the policy and practice of a power in extending control over weaker peoples or areas".[7] Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary defines colonialism as "the system or policy of a nation seeking to extend or retain its authority over other people or territories".[1] The Merriam-Webster Dictionary offers four definitions, including "something characteristic of a colony" and "control by one power over a dependent area or people".[8] Etymologically, the word "colony" comes from the Latin colōnia—"a place for agriculture".

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy uses the term "to describe the process of European settlement and political control over the rest of the world, including the Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa and Asia". It discusses the distinction between colonialism, imperialism and conquest and states that "[t]he difficulty of defining colonialism stems from the fact that the term is often used as a synonym for imperialism. Both colonialism and imperialism were forms of conquest that were expected to benefit Europe economically and strategically.", and continues "given the difficulty of consistently distinguishing between the two terms, this entry will use colonialism broadly to refer to the project of European political domination from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries that ended with the national liberation movements of the 1960s".[9]

In his preface to Jürgen Osterhammel's Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Roger Tignor says "For Osterhammel, the essence of colonialism is the existence of colonies, which are by definition governed differently from other territories such as protectorates or informal spheres of influence."[10] In the book, Osterhammel asks, "How can 'colonialism' be defined independently from 'colony?'"[11] He settles on a three-sentence definition:

Colonialism is a relationship between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced of their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule.[12]

Which of these definitions are you using? Certainly, the USSR didn't quite invade Cuba and set its own government up. But the relations between both could most certainly fall into the Collins Dictionary definition, and into the neocolonialism label.

Pants-of-dog wrote:2. Also provide evidence showing how Cuba’s foreign policy was controlled by the Soviets.

How much control would satisfy you? I recall I said Cuba was a Soviet satellite, and even those had small divergences from the Soviet policy.

Pants-of-dog wrote:3. When I say that Cuba acted bilaterally, I am using the exact words used by (I believe) a source you already presented in this thread.

But just because an action is bilateral, it doesn't mean it's necessarily voluntary or that there may not be an asymmetry in power involved.

Pants-of-dog wrote:4. If you have evidence showing that Cuba had a colonial relationship with Ethiopia, or using Granma to interfere in the politics of another country, please present it

You could check the following MS thesis for both. If you just want to see things from a narrow economic perspective, then you can refer back to the payment by Angola for the Cuban intervention - it may not be Ethiopia, but it's an example of that sort of relations.

Pants-of-dog wrote:5. Western media rarely discusses issues in Latin America, or the developing world in general.

But when something important happens there, like successful major events of sabotage, it most certainly discusses the current affairs.

Pants-of-dog wrote:6. Yes, there must be a reason why continued US covert action has not worked. It would work if there were a large portion of the population who wanted to get rid of socialism.

Even if that were the case, a government with a good counterintelligence system would be able to foil attempts at sabotage. Cuba does have such a system.

Which of these definitions are you using? Certainly, the USSR didn't quite invade Cuba and set its own government up. But the relations between both could most certainly fall into the Collins Dictionary definition, and into the neocolonialism label.

How much control would satisfy you? I recall I said Cuba was a Soviet satellite, and even those had small divergences from the Soviet policy.

But just because an action is bilateral, it doesn't mean it's necessarily voluntary or that there may not be an asymmetry in power involved.

You could check the following MS thesis for both. If you just want to see things from a narrow economic perspective, then you can refer back to the payment by Angola for the Cuban intervention - it may not be Ethiopia, but it's an example of that sort of relations.

But when something important happens there, like successful major events of sabotage, it most certainly discusses the current affairs.

Even if that were the case, a government with a good counterintelligence system would be able to foil attempts at sabotage. Cuba does have such a system.

1. For your arguments concerning Cuba being a vassal state of the Soviet Union, having a foreign policy controlled by the Soviets, that Cuba had a colonial relationship with either Angola or Ethiopia, or used Granma to threaten another country’s sovereignty, please quote the evidence. We can then discuss these things in a factual manner.

To be honest, some of these claims contradict each other. The claim that Cuba was colonised by the UsSR while it also colonised Angola and Ethiopia is implausible. Since Cuba and Ethiopia (or Angola) are developing countries, Cuba did not have the overwhelming power needed to establish such a relationship. If it did have such power, it could not possibly be a colony of the Soviets. Since you are the one who made the claim, please use whichever definition you wish. Just let e know which.

2. Regarding western media and sabotage in the developing world:

The western media does not care about dead Latinos. The CIA could release all sorts of bio weapons with symptoms that look like tropical viruses, and they would not even notice. They sometimes forget to mention it when we actually die.

3. So let us clarify the argument here:

The USA uses soft power against Cuba, trying to overthrow the Cuban government.

This soft power has so far proven ineffective despite a supposed large portion of the populace that is willing to overthrow the current government.

This has been ineffective because the Cuban counter-intelligence is so good as to defeat the CIA, a far larger and better funded organization.

Pants-of-dog wrote:1. For your arguments concerning Cuba being a vassal state of the Soviet Union, having a foreign policy controlled by the Soviets, that Cuba had a colonial relationship with either Angola or Ethiopia, or used Granma to threaten another country’s sovereignty, please quote the evidence. We can then discuss these things in a factual manner.

To be honest, some of these claims contradict each other. The claim that Cuba was colonised by the UsSR while it also colonised Angola and Ethiopia is implausible. Since Cuba and Ethiopia (or Angola) are developing countries, Cuba did not have the overwhelming power needed to establish such a relationship. If it did have such power, it could not possibly be a colony of the Soviets. Since you are the one who made the claim, please use whichever definition you wish. Just let e know which.

OK, that's fair, and it would be a lot easier if we begin by drawing distinctions between some related (but not equivalent) terms.

I will draw a distinction between following a colonialist (or neocolonialist) policy and actually owning a colony: Relations between independent states can take a form of dependence such that a state can be politically independent from another, yet be subservient in such a way to it that it's a satellite rather than a colony (since colonies were not formally independent states). This is what the Left likes labeling with terms such as "imperialism", "colonialism" or "neocolonialism" (at least when capitalist countries do it), and so I'll just use their terms (I think just calling those "satellite states" or even "aligned states" is a lot more accurate, but lacks the emotional appeal of using terms like "vassals", "colonialism" or "imperialism").

What I did say is that, although Cuba was a Soviet satellite, this doesn't mean it didn't want to or was unable to have its own satellites in Africa, at least not as long as this didn't contradict Soviet interests. The MPLA would have been a candidate for Cuban satellitehood: The dependence on Cuba on economic and (most importantly) military matters during the Cuban intervention was such that it's extremely unlikely Angola under its rule would have pursued a foreign policy contrary to Cuban interests, in the same way that Cuba wouldn't follow a foreign policy fundamentally at odds with Soviet ones. This remains the case even if Cuba and the USSR could have had some minor tactical disagreements (e.g. on China, with Cuba and some Warsaw Pact members preferring an outwardly neutral position on Sino-Soviet relations even if they were aligned with the USSR on pretty much all other matters) or if Angola and Cuba had them on some African affairs. The only issue in this case is that Cuba eventually left Angola before the MPLA managed to finally defeat UNITAS for good - which is not all too different from the relations between the US and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and not too different from how the US fared there.

Cuban behavior on Ethiopia, on the other hand, would be a lot closer to actually acting as a Soviet satellite, particularly since both countries' positions were essentially the same and changed at roughly the same pace. But even in this case, I would guess that the Soviets would have also allowed Cuba to (at least) get the Ethiopians to pay them for their services.

Pants-of-dog wrote:2. Regarding western media and sabotage in the developing world:

The western media does not care about dead Latinos. The CIA could release all sorts of bio weapons with symptoms that look like tropical viruses, and they would not even notice. They sometimes forget to mention it when we actually die.

Usually depends on the case. Events like Trump's policies on Mexican illegal immigrants are quite widely reported.

Pants-of-dog wrote:3. So let us clarify the argument here:

The USA uses soft power against Cuba, trying to overthrow the Cuban government.

Yes, or at least keep its influence contained.

Pants-of-dog wrote:This soft power has so far proven ineffective despite a supposed large portion of the populace that is willing to overthrow the current government.

Indeed, and there can also be another large portion of the populace that stands by the government.

To show how, let's trade Cuba for Chile under Pinochet and you'll get your answer: A large portion, even a majority, of the population wanted the military to step down from government from (at least) 1982 onwards, but they still managed to get a 17-year long dictatorship up (and 8 years from 1982 onwards). Why? Because they were quite good at counterintelligence and building the necessary repressive apparatus to retain power, at least as long as the military had enough internal cohesion, and because another large portion of the population stood with it (even if it was a large minority from 1982 onwards).

Pants-of-dog wrote:This has been ineffective because the Cuban counter-intelligence is so good as to defeat the CIA, a far larger and better funded organization.

That seems to be what you arguing.

It's far easier to defeat foreign agencies when you play in your own turf. I don't see anything special about it: The Cuban government exercised effective military control over the island (sans Guantanamo), and it's easier to collect intelligence on territory under your control (hence the term counterintelligence).

wat0n wrote:OK, that's fair, and it would be a lot easier if we begin by drawing distinctions between some related (but not equivalent) terms.

I will draw a distinction between following a colonialist (or neocolonialist) policy and actually owning a colony: Relations between independent states can take a form of dependence such that a state can be politically independent from another, yet be subservient in such a way to it that it's a satellite rather than a colony (since colonies were not formally independent states). This is what the Left likes labeling with terms such as "imperialism", "colonialism" or "neocolonialism" (at least when capitalist countries do it), and so I'll just use their terms (I think just calling those "satellite states" or even "aligned states" is a lot more accurate, but lacks the emotional appeal of using terms like "vassals", "colonialism" or "imperialism").

Sure. Terminology is not a big deal.

What I did say is that, although Cuba was a Soviet satellite, this doesn't mean it didn't want to or was unable to have its own satellites in Africa, at least not as long as this didn't contradict Soviet interests. The MPLA would have been a candidate for Cuban satellitehood: The dependence on Cuba on economic and (most importantly) military matters during the Cuban intervention was such that it's extremely unlikely Angola under its rule would have pursued a foreign policy contrary to Cuban interests, in the same way that Cuba wouldn't follow a foreign policy fundamentally at odds with Soviet ones. This remains the case even if Cuba and the USSR could have had some minor tactical disagreements (e.g. on China, with Cuba and some Warsaw Pact members preferring an outwardly neutral position on Sino-Soviet relations even if they were aligned with the USSR on pretty much all other matters) or if Angola and Cuba had them on some African affairs. The only issue in this case is that Cuba eventually left Angola before the MPLA managed to finally defeat UNITAS for good - which is not all too different from the relations between the US and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and not too different from how the US fared there.

Cuban behavior on Ethiopia, on the other hand, would be a lot closer to actually acting as a Soviet satellite, particularly since both countries' positions were essentially the same and changed at roughly the same pace. But even in this case, I would guess that the Soviets would have also allowed Cuba to (at least) get the Ethiopians to pay them for their services.

Again, we can discuss these claims after looking at evidence.

Usually depends on the case. Events like Trump's policies on Mexican illegal immigrants are quite widely reported.

This was a case of Trump doing something monumentally stupid and evil within the USA. Western media ignores this when it is done in Latin America.

Indeed, and there can also be another large portion of the populace that stands by the government.

To show how, let's trade Cuba for Chile under Pinochet and you'll get your answer: A large portion, even a majority, of the population wanted the military to step down from government from (at least) 1982 onwards, but they still managed to get a 17-year long dictatorship up (and 8 years from 1982 onwards). Why? Because they were quite good at counterintelligence and building the necessary repressive apparatus to retain power, at least as long as the military had enough internal cohesion, and because another large portion of the population stood with it (even if it was a large minority from 1982 onwards).

You are, again, completely ignoring or forgetting the role of hostile superpowers. The US supported Pinochet in a myriad of ways, and Pinochet was not fighting a foreign intelligence at all.

It's far easier to defeat foreign agencies when you play in your own turf. I don't see anything special about it: The Cuban government exercised effective military control over the island (sans Guantanamo), and it's easier to collect intelligence on territory under your control (hence the term counterintelligence).

Pants-of-dog wrote:Again, we can discuss these claims after looking at evidence.

I've cited from both a book on the Angolan issue and a thesis on the Ethiopian case. You are free to consult both, in the latter check the chapter on the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia.

Pants-of-dog wrote:This was a case of Trump doing something monumentally stupid and evil within the USA. Western media ignores this when it is done in Latin America.

Does it, though? I recall that the media covered US participation in events like the toppling of Noriega and the like. Granted, they rarely cover more subtle issues (say, US denying loans to a Latin American government) but those things get little coverage within Latin America itself as well.

Pants-of-dog wrote:You are, again, completely ignoring or forgetting the role of hostile superpowers. The US supported Pinochet in a myriad of ways, and Pinochet was not fighting a foreign intelligence at all.

No, Pinochet wasn't fighting the CIA (wouldn't be so sure about Cuban or Soviet intelligence, though they had little chance of toppling the military anyway). But I would not say that the virtual halt in aid for Chile in the second half of the '70s would be a case of "US supporting the Pinochet government in a myriad of ways". Indeed, the US even had rather poor relations with Pinochet over the Letelier case - a natural consequence of using a car bomb in Washington DC.

Pants-of-dog wrote:I find this very implausible.

Why? Effective military control makes intelligence gathering way, way harder. Even more so when it's paired with a relatively competent repressive apparatus. And yet even more if, yes, a substantial part of the population supports the government (it doesn't even need to be a majority, a large minority can be enough).

I've cited from both a book on the Angolan issue and a thesis on the Ethiopian case. You are free to consult both, in the latter check the chapter on the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia.

No.

You provided a link.

Please quote the relevant text. Thank you.

Does it, though? I recall that the media covered US participation in events like the toppling of Noriega and the like. Granted, they rarely cover more subtle issues (say, US denying loans to a Latin American government) but those things get little coverage within Latin America itself as well.

We are discussing covert actions, not overt large scale operations.

No, Pinochet wasn't fighting the CIA (wouldn't be so sure about Cuban or Soviet intelligence, though they had little chance of toppling the military anyway). But I would not say that the virtual halt in aid for Chile in the second half of the '70s would be a case of "US supporting the Pinochet government in a myriad of ways". Indeed, the US even had rather poor relations with Pinochet over the Letelier case - a natural consequence of using a car bomb in Washington DC.

There is no evidence to suggest that the CIA and the USA halted support for Pinochet at any time.

So you are effectively comparing a counterintelligence system designed to oppress locals with the help of a hostile superpower, to a counterintelligence system designed to stop locals from being oppressed by a hostile superpower.

Why? Effective military control makes intelligence gathering way, way harder. Even more so when it's paired with a relatively competent repressive apparatus. And yet even more if, yes, a substantial part of the population supports the government (it doesn't even need to be a majority, a large minority can be enough).

The aid in 1975-1976 was mostly coming from the US Department of Agriculture and from USAID itself, and was basically humanitarian aid. For 1974, the figure was essentially locked in beforehand since the coup occurred on September 11, 1973 and the 1974 FY began on October 1, 1973 - giving no time to the US government or lawmakers to reassess commitments.

You can clearly see the effect of Letelier's Assassination from 1978 onwards - when it became clear Chile was not going to cooperate in the investigation.

Pants-of-dog wrote:So you are effectively comparing a counterintelligence system designed to oppress locals with the help of a hostile superpower, to a counterintelligence system designed to stop locals from being oppressed by a hostile superpower.

The required infrastructure - namely, having the surveillance capabilities - is the same for both. And in Cuba's case, there's definitely a case of oppressing locals as well.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Because there is no other historical example of this working.

Other historical examples of a developing country foiling US intelligence operations in their soil? Should I look for that sort of information?

The aid in 1975-1976 was mostly coming from the US Department of Agriculture and from USAID itself, and was basically humanitarian aid. For 1974, the figure was essentially locked in beforehand since the coup occurred on September 11, 1973 and the 1974 FY began on October 1, 1973 - giving no time to the US government or lawmakers to reassess commitments.

You can clearly see the effect of Letelier's Assassination from 1978 onwards - when it became clear Chile was not going to cooperate in the investigation.

So this excludes military aid, direct economic aid, and other forms of support.

The required infrastructure - namely, having the surveillance capabilities - is the same for both. And in Cuba's case, there's definitely a case of oppressing locals as well.

No, the USA had and has much better surveillance technology, which makes sense for a superpower that invests heavily in military and weaponised r&d. Even in Pinochet’s era, AT&T was directly helping the dictatorship, or at least was one of the US companies that was directly involved in Chile at the time, and wanted the coup to happen for financial reasons.

Much like Google spies for the USA now, but probably not for Cuba.

Other historical examples of a developing country foiling US intelligence operations in their soil? Should I look for that sort of information?

For decades, with a supposedly oppressed and unsupportive population. Yes.

Please tell me where in the PDF I should read. If I have any problemss, I will let you lnow.

Thanks. You could check chapter 3 (page 30 onwards).

An example of coordination is given in the last paragraph of page 33, and also in page 42. You can also find Fidel Castro justifying the Cuban intervention on Granma at the end of page 39, assuming you may consider that an example of interference in Ethiopian or Somali affairs.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Since we are discussing covert actions, we can see that western media probably will not cover it.

Probably. But this would apply to covert actions in general, whoever is behind those. Because, well, in another case they wouldn't be covert anymore

Pants-of-dog wrote:So this excludes military aid, direct economic aid, and other forms of support.

No, it includes the total amount of aid (military, economic and other aid). The following series, from the same source, is limited to military aid (as in, given by the Department of Defense) in constant 2016 US$ million:

Since those are fiscal years, FY1973 began on October 1, 1972 and ended on September 30, 1973. IIRC the decrease for 1975 was a result of the Horman case, and then the complete cutoff was due to the non-cooperation on the Letelier case.

Pants-of-dog wrote:No, the USA had and has much better surveillance technology, which makes sense for a superpower that invests heavily in military and weaponised r&d.

Right, but there are limits to surveillance and this was even more so before the advent of the internet and even the expansion of the telephone.

Pants-of-dog wrote: Even in Pinochet’s era, AT&T was directly helping the dictatorship, or at least was one of the US companies that was directly involved in Chile at the time, and wanted the coup to happen for financial reasons.

I think you are confusing it with ITT, which was caught doing this by the New York Times and was nationalized. They didn't even get US federal (OPIC) guarantees as part of the Alliance for Progress due to their interference.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Much like Google spies for the USA now, but probably not for Cuba.

But Google and internet in general, are restricted in Cuba (and other countries as well). You can't compare that with the ease with which surveillance can be carried out when you also have boots on the ground.

An example of coordination is given in the last paragraph of page 33, and also in page 42. You can also find Fidel Castro justifying the Cuban intervention on Granma at the end of page 39, assuming you may consider that an example of interference in Ethiopian or Somali affairs.

I will try to look at it tonight. As always, I am working today.

No, it includes the total amount of aid (military, economic and other aid). The following series, from the same source, is limited to military aid (as in, given by the Department of Defense) in constant 2016 US$ million:

Since those are fiscal years, FY1973 began on October 1, 1972 and ended on September 30, 1973. IIRC the decrease for 1975 was a result of the Horman case, and then the complete cutoff was due to the non-cooperation on the Letelier case.

They may have simply reduced the funding after 1975 because they already had Chile in the neo-colonial relationship they wanted, and so reduced spending.

Right, but there are limits to surveillance and this was even more so before the advent of the internet and even the expansion of the telephone.

I think you are confusing it with ITT, which was caught doing this by the New York Times and was nationalized. They didn't even get US federal (OPIC) guarantees as part of the Alliance for Progress due to their interference.

The technological limits would have applied equally to all players, but the difference in access to tech would have still been present.

ITT turned into AT&T, or so I thought. Now I see I am wrong. Regardless, the USA and its tentacles had and has access to much better tech than developing countries.

But Google and internet in general, are restricted in Cuba (and other countries as well). You can't compare that with the ease with which surveillance can be carried out when you also have boots on the ground.

Since I was not making that point, this is not a relevant criticism.

The point is that the USA has access to far more sophisticated surveillance tech than Cuba does. It is therefore implausible that Cuba is beating the CIA and other agencies at this game.

How about US propaganda and intelligence campaigns throughout the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War?

Pants-of-dog wrote:I will try to look at it tonight. As always, I am working today.

Sigh, such is life.

Pants-of-dog wrote:They may have simply reduced the funding after 1975 because they already had Chile in the neo-colonial relationship they wanted, and so reduced spending.

Not really. The spending was reduced due to Congressional refusal to appropriate funds for aid over the human rights situation in Chile, and particularly due to the mysterious disappearance of American citizens after the coup (I'm referring to the Kennedy Amendment here). This actually did piss Kissinger off, as he regarded this as hypocrisy and as acting against US interests. The Americans also told the Pinochet government (including him, personally) that if it didn't change course on the matter he'd face unequivocal Congressional opposition to anything related to arms deals (the ban was not just on military aid but sales as well) and that he'd be unable to be able to match Peru's clear superiority on the matter. We all know how that ended.

Pants-of-dog wrote:The technological limits would have applied equally to all players, but the difference in access to tech would have still been present.

Right, but back then there was much more reliance on face-to-face activities than now (and actually, those are still important sometimes). That means that the home team will inevitably have an advantage.

Pants-of-dog wrote:ITT turned into AT&T, or so I thought. Now I see I am wrong. Regardless, the USA and its tentacles had and has access to much better tech than developing countries.

True, although the ITT case is interesting too because the US was generally hostile to private sector involvement in these affairs (which is unsurprising since they were encroaching into the foreign policy realm).

Pants-of-dog wrote:Since I was not making that point, this is not a relevant criticism.

The point is that the USA has access to far more sophisticated surveillance tech than Cuba does. It is therefore implausible that Cuba is beating the CIA and other agencies at this game.

How else would you explain that attempts of sabotage and the like have been exposed and dealt with by the Cubans?

Not really. The spending was reduced due to Congressional refusal to appropriate funds for aid over the human rights situation in Chile, and particularly due to the mysterious disappearance of American citizens after the coup (I'm referring to the Kennedy Amendment here). This actually did piss Kissinger off, as he regarded this as hypocrisy and as acting against US interests. The Americans also told the Pinochet government (including him, personally) that if it didn't change course on the matter he'd face unequivocal Congressional opposition to anything related to arms deals (the ban was not just on military aid but sales as well) and that he'd be unable to be able to match Peru's clear superiority on the matter. We all know how that ended.

I think you are confusing the explanation with the cause. Congress must have known about the covert actions by the CIA et al in regards to Chile, including the human rights offences by the puppet dictatorship, if we assume oversight actually happened. And of that is the case, it was not a moral reaction against human rights abuses by Pinochet that cut the funding.

If we look at the financial aspects, it makes more sense: the CIA had accomplished its mission, brought neoliberalism to Chile, and the oppressive apparatus was in place.

Right, but back then there was much more reliance on face-to-face activities than now (and actually, those are still important sometimes). That means that the home team will inevitably have an advantage.

Not really, since there is no reason to assume that Cuba has or had any advantages when it comes to face to face discussion.

True, although the ITT case is interesting too because the US was generally hostile to private sector involvement in these affairs (which is unsurprising since they were encroaching into the foreign policy realm).

No, the US was never hostile to corporate involvement in foreign policy.

From el pulpo making banana republics to Halliburton in Iraq, it has always been about corporate interests.

How else would you explain that attempts of sabotage and the like have been exposed and dealt with by the Cubans?

With their counterintelligence systems. But having counterintelligence systems that can catch a non-zero number of sabotage attempts are not necessarily the equal of the CIA in every aspect.

Pants-of-dog wrote:I think you are confusing the explanation with the cause. Congress must have known about the covert actions by the CIA et al in regards to Chile, including the human rights offences by the puppet dictatorship, if we assume oversight actually happened. And of that is the case, it was not a moral reaction against human rights abuses by Pinochet that cut the funding.

It did, since American citizens were killed at the outset of the coup. Hence the decision to limit military aid to the Pinochet government, once it became clear it wasn't making much progress on improving the human rights situation despite the repeated requests to do so.

This isn't even an opinion, but a fact that is proven by the communications between the Chilean government and the US embassy in Chile with the latter warning the former about the need to improve on human rights or else they would face more opposition, including of the Congressional kind.

Pants-of-dog wrote:If we look at the financial aspects, it makes more sense: the CIA had accomplished its mission, brought neoliberalism to Chile, and the oppressive apparatus was in place.

That wasn't the CIA's mission and the term neoliberalism didn't even exist in the early '70s. The goal was to simply stop Chile from aligning itself with the Soviets, and if possible satisfy other military and economic American interests. Beyond this, the US didn't quite care whether the broader economic policy would change and, while it preferred Chile to be a democracy with former President Frei Montalva - who had been funded by the US as early as 1964 - being elected for a second term as a way to avoid the cost of being blamed for a military dictatorship, it preferred the dictatorship over a Marxist Chile actively hostile to US interests. Realpolitik at its finest.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Not really, since there is no reason to assume that Cuba has or had any advantages when it comes to face to face discussion.

In Cuban territory, where it can track the movements of the population?

Pants-of-dog wrote:No, the US was never hostile to corporate involvement in foreign policy.

From el pulpo making banana republics to Halliburton in Iraq, it has always been about corporate interests.

It was more than willing to try to defend their interests (as long as they didn't clash with foreign policy priorities, that is - why do you think the US government didn't have much of a reaction when one of its allies, Venezuela, nationalised its oil industry?), but it adviced corporations to stay out of their dealings with the Chilean and other governments because their interference made those a lot tougher.

Pants-of-dog wrote:With their counterintelligence systems. But having counterintelligence systems that can catch a non-zero number of sabotage attempts are not necessarily the equal of the CIA in every aspect.

They don't need to. They only need to catch and foil attempts to sabotage their infrastructure.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Please quote the relevant text. Thank you.

I'd say all the text is relevant in this case, since it includes several examples of ultimately unsuccessful US intelligence operations in the country.

wat0n wrote:It did, since American citizens were killed at the outset of the coup. Hence the decision to limit military aid to the Pinochet government, once it became clear it wasn't making much progress on improving the human rights situation despite the repeated requests to do so.

This isn't even an opinion, but a fact that is proven by the communications between the Chilean government and the US embassy in Chile with the latter warning the former about the need to improve on human rights or else they would face more opposition, including of the Congressional kind.

Again, Congress was fine with human rights abuses against us. And since they also knew about the deaths of US citizens and did not cut the funding until after the dictatorship was solidified, this explanation rings hollow.

That wasn't the CIA's mission and the term neoliberalism didn't even exist in the early '70s. The goal was to simply stop Chile from aligning itself with the Soviets, and if possible satisfy other military and economic American interests. Beyond this, the US didn't quite care whether the broader economic policy would change and, while it preferred Chile to be a democracy with former President Frei Montalva - who had been funded by the US as early as 1964 - being elected for a second term as a way to avoid the cost of being blamed for a military dictatorship, it preferred the dictatorship over a Marxist Chile actively hostile to US interests. Realpolitik at its finest.

No, the USA deliberately used Chile as an experiment in neoliberalism. In fact, Friedman’s training of the Chicago Boys is what gave us the term “neoliberalism”. This is because neoliberalism was what the USA wanted in Chile: unregulated access to labour and resources, making unions illegal, and other policies that would make Chile basically a colony.

In Cuban territory, where it can track the movements of the population?

Tracking someone is different from surveilling face to face discussions.

It was more than willing to try to defend their interests (as long as they didn't clash with foreign policy priorities, that is - why do you think the US government didn't have much of a reaction when one of its allies, Venezuela, nationalised its oil industry?), but it adviced corporations to stay out of their dealings with the Chilean and other governments because their interference made those a lot tougher.

The USA attempted a coup in Venezuela when they nationalised oil assets.

They don't need to. They only need to catch and foil attempts to sabotage their infrastructure.

That was not your original claim. The original claim was that the USA was trying to overthrown Cuba, but cannot due to the repressive government.

I'd say all the text is relevant in this case, since it includes several examples of ultimately unsuccessful US intelligence operations in the country.

No, I am already reading one text for you. You can do your homework for this one.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Again, Congress was fine with human rights abuses against us. And since they also knew about the deaths of US citizens and did not cut the funding until after the dictatorship was solidified, this explanation rings hollow.

I think it's necessary to understand the sequence of events in this regard. For starters, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 in December 1973 (I think this was introduced in October) to include the following:

SEC. 35. It is the sense of the Congress that (1) the President should request the Government of Chile to protect the human rights of all individuals, Chilean and foreign, as provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention and Protocol Relating the Status of Refugees, and other relevant international legal instruments guaranteeing the granting of asylum, safe conduct, and the humane treatment or release of prisoners; (2) the President should support international humanitarian initiatives by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross to insure the protection and safe conduct and resettlement of political refugees, the humane treatment of political prisoners, and the full inspection of detention facilities under international auspices; (3) the President should support and facilitate efforts by voluntary agencies to meet emergency relief needs; and (4) the President should request of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to undertake an immediate inquiry into recent events occurring in Chile.

This was of course a rather blatant warning to the Pinochet regime of what could they do if it didn't change course on human rights.

The warnings to Pinochet himself to change course were also stated by the US government as early as April 1974.

Congress then cut military aid in late 1974. The regime hadn't stabilized by then (let alone in late 1973), and indeed they had been requesting military aid like crazy because they were scared to death of Peru, and would still do so in 1975. They also still regarded themselves as being dealing with the remnants of the UP throughout 1974 (particularly the first half of the year). In 1975, although they told the Americans they had managed to finally suppress the communists at the beginning of the year, the economic crisis caused by the troubles in the international oil markets brought its own difficulties and the issues with Peru were still very much alive throughout the year. In that regard, it is accurate to say they preferred to engage in mass murder even if it hurt the security of the country, even after they had said themselves they were more less in control of the internal security situation, at least the most fundamental parts of it.

Only in 1976, it can be said that the regime had achieved stability, both within its borders and regarding its neighbors, which is why it felt confident enough to murder Orlando Letelier in Washington DC.

Pants-of-dog wrote:No, the USA deliberately used Chile as an experiment in neoliberalism. In fact, Friedman’s training of the Chicago Boys is what gave us the term “neoliberalism”. This is because neoliberalism was what the USA wanted in Chile: unregulated access to labour and resources, making unions illegal, and other policies that would make Chile basically a colony.

Except for the fact that the US didn't quite expect anything like that to happen. Indeed, this is the perception of the CIA on the economic policy debates within the Pinochet regime by 1974:

The government’s implementation of an economic recovery program prepared by a group of University of Chicago-trained technocrats has disturbed some military men. [4½ lines not declassified] The junta’s policy Advisory Committee, which is run by Colonel Julio Canessa, has become the focal point of military dissent from the programs advocated by the junta’s team of civilian economic advisers.

The Advisory Committee is wary of the civilians’ orthodox macroeconomic approach and has surmised that certain aspects of the recovery program are geared to benefit special interest groups rather than the nation as a whole. The committee fears that instead of stimulating output steeply higher prices could restrict demand to the point of inhibiting production. It advocates a short-term softening of the recovery program to avoid aggravating opposition to the junta among lower income [Page 434]groups. The Advisory Committee’s desire to give political and social factors more weight reflects the fact that segments of the Chilean armed forces and national police are attracted to a populist/statist approach to government and are not happy with the free enterprise orientation of the civilian advisory team.

The difference in outlook recently became apparent when the government discussed the return of the textile industry to private ownership. The Canessa committee’s proposals for state-worker control with limited owner participation were rejected and the eventual outcome was a victory for the civilian advisers. The government felt it necessary to issue a statement detailing the terms for the return, however, to dispel any notion that private firms seized under Allende were being returned to their owners unconditionally. Conditions for such returns include a pledge by the owners to abide by a yet to be issued regulation on a labor-management relations.

The struggle between the civilian economic team and the military Advisory Committee has not been definitively resolved. Pinochet seems to be somewhat disenchanted with the results of the recovery program, [3½ lines not declassified]. The military’s inclination to seek counsel within its own ranks is a plus for the Advisory Committee. The civilian economic advisers’ influence will almost certainly be reduced if Pinochet follows through on reported plans to integrate them into Canessa’s group.

On the other hand, the economic portion of the statement of goals issued by the junta after six months in power reinforces the government’s policy of reliance on free market forces. Pinochet has expressed sympathy with the lower income groups bearing the brunt of the economic recovery program and promised that this generation of workers will “reap the fruits of their sacrifices”, but he also has stressed that further privations lie ahead.

The ongoing debate over economic policy is part of maneuvering for power and influence in which personal, ideological, policy, and inter-service factors are sometimes indistinguishable. It may thus be difficult to discern who has won the contest, if and when the issue is decided. Over the next several months the economic program probably will continue to reflect the input of both groups, with the junta listening to the proposals they put forth on a given topic and making an ad hoc decision depending on the merits of the case. Time appears to be on the side of the Canessa committee, however, and eventual modification of the emphasis on free enterprise is likely.

In the end, the Chicago Boys would win but only in 1975, as the oil shock of that year was the last straw that broke the camel's back when it came to gradualism, to the point of making it materially impossible for the Chilean government to follow that road.

Pants-of-dog wrote:Tracking someone is different from surveilling face to face discussions.

But tracking is the very first step to be able to survey face to face discussions.

Pants-of-dog wrote:The USA attempted a coup in Venezuela when they nationalised oil assets.

In 1976? Not really, if anything they decided to offer them development assistance. You might be confusing it with 2002 - we will know in a couple of decades what happened in that case.

Pants-of-dog wrote:That was not your original claim. The original claim was that the USA was trying to overthrown Cuba, but cannot due to the repressive government.

Indeed, and a repressive government will often have the apparatus to be able to catch and foil those operations. Democracies can also do it, if they have the said counterintelligence infrastructure to do so - which overlaps quite a bit with having a repressive apparatus. And yes, Western democracies could materially repress their population, but the institutions are what makes the difference.

Pants-of-dog wrote:No, I am already reading one text for you. You can do your homework for this one.

Global Security wrote:CADROWN (formerly TPEMBER Apparat, CADRASTIC) (1952-55) was approved in 1952 as Amendment 3 to Project TPEMBER to establish a paramilitary resistance apparat in East Germany for escape and evasion and other staybehind resistance activities in case of war with the USSR. TPEMBER (later CADROIT) (1949-55) supported a campaign to expose and to prevent where possible, illegal actions, breaches of justice, and acts of inhumanity committed and tolerated by authorities in East Germany. This was effected through the League of Free Jurists in East Germany.

CADROIT (formerly TPEMBER) (1949-55) subsidized and guided the Investigative Committee of Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen (UfJ)), which developed from one person as the head of a notional committee in West Berlin to an active organization with a West Berlin Headquarters staff of 75 and about 2,000 East German covert contacts, many from the legal profession and/or East German government. The UfJ, with CIA assistance, conducted extensive propaganda campaigns in East Germany, based mainly on information from East German informants, to expose illegal actions, breaches of justice, and acts of inhumanity committed and tolerated by authorities in East Germany. An outgrowth of the UfJ-sponsored International Congress of Jurists in Berlin (1952) was the establishment of the International Commission of Jurists in The Hague, which was supported by CIA under Project QKFEARFUL. CADROIT also included CADROWN (1952-55), a paramilitary organization established in East Germany for wartime use.

CADROWN (formerly TPEMBER Apparat, CADRASTIC) (1952-55) was approved in 1952 as Amendment 3 to Project TPEMBER to establish a paramilitary resistance apparat in East Germany for escape and evasion and other staybehind resistance activities in case of war with the USSR. TPEMBER (later CADROIT) (1949-55) supported a campaign to expose and to prevent where possible, illegal actions, breaches of justice, and acts of inhumanity committed and tolerated by authorities in East Germany. This was effected through the League of Free Jurists in East Germany.

CATRANSIT (1964-69) was launched by Berlin Operations Base (BOB) and provided for the development and maintenance of a courier pool that would sustain secure communication with agents residing in East Berlin and/or East Germany. This progam was necessary because BOB's communications with most of its agents in East Berlin were severed when the Berlin Wall was erected in Aug. 1961.

DTLINEN (formerly EARTHENWARE, GRAVEYARD) (1951-60) was a CIA covert propaganda, harassment, and sabotage activity subsidizing both the overt and covert the activities of the Kampgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group against Inhumanity (KgU)) against East Germany. The KgU (CAJERSEY), an overt organization, sought to expose conditions in the USSR and Soviet Zone of Germany which were considered crimes against humanity.

HARVARD (1951-65) was designed initially to provide safehouse and operational aid facilities for CIA activities in Germany. In 1952, the HARVARD mission was expanded to include the rehabilitation and resettlement of defectors, agents, and agent-trainees.

LCCASSOCK (1954-61) was a publishing and distribution company in West Berlin that produced and covertly distributed propaganda material for East Germans, providing them with Western-oriented information and harrassing, embarrassing and exposing officials and policies of the East German regime.

wat0n wrote:I think it's necessary to understand the sequence of events in this regard. For starters, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 in December 1973 (I think this was introduced in October) to include the following:

This was of course a rather blatant warning to the Pinochet regime of what could they do if it didn't change course on human rights.

The warnings to Pinochet himself to change course were also stated by the US government as early as April 1974.

Congress then cut military aid in late 1974. The regime hadn't stabilized by then (let alone in late 1973), and indeed they had been requesting military aid like crazy because they were scared to death of Peru, and would still do so in 1975. They also still regarded themselves as being dealing with the remnants of the UP throughout 1974 (particularly the first half of the year). In 1975, although they told the Americans they had managed to finally suppress the communists at the beginning of the year, the economic crisis caused by the troubles in the international oil markets brought its own difficulties and the issues with Peru were still very much alive throughout the year. In that regard, it is accurate to say they preferred to engage in mass murder even if it hurt the security of the country, even after they had said themselves they were more less in control of the internal security situation, at least the most fundamental parts of it.

Only in 1976, it can be said that the regime had achieved stability, both within its borders and regarding its neighbors, which is why it felt confident enough to murder Orlando Letelier in Washington DC.

This does not contradict my claim.

Congress can put out whatever sound bytes it wants. It does not change the fact that Pinochet had no need of the astonishingly high levels of aid he and his ilk needed until then.

Peru was not a threat at the time, despite its large military. In 1975, the coup in Peru basically ended any threat, and it is almost certain that the CIA knew about and helped the Peruvian coup as well.

Except for the fact that the US didn't quite expect anything like that to happen. Indeed, this is the perception of the CIA on the economic policy debates within the Pinochet regime by 1974:

In the end, the Chicago Boys would win but only in 1975, as the oil shock of that year was the last straw that broke the camel's back when it came to gradualism, to the point of making it materially impossible for the Chilean government to follow that road.

So we agree that the Chilean economy at the time was a US experiment with neoliberalism.

But tracking is the very first step to be able to survey face to face discussions.

Yes, but that does not affect the argument.

In 1976? Not really, if anything they decided to offer them development assistance. You might be confusing it with 2002 - we will know in a couple of decades what happened in that case.

You did not specify which time.

The discussion was about whether the USA supported or eschewed corporate interests in foreign policy.

The fact that the USA only tried to overthrow a democracy one time (instead of both times) does not support the claim that the US refused corporate influence in foreign policy.

The original claim was that a developing country like Cuba could foil all (or almost all) CIA plans over several decades to overthrow the regime, while simultaneously oppressing the local population.

The evidence provided showed a developed country (with the help of another superpower) was unable to foil many operations. These operations (even taken together) lasted a far shorter time.

The idea that Cuba, a developing country with no help from any superpowers, could effectively all significant operations by the CIA is implausible, even if we ignore the added difficulties of a population that wants regime change.