Wednesday, August 27, 2014

As part of the Islamic State’s (IS) summer offensive it has
launched more and more car bombs across the country. In the past, these series
of bombs would be separated by several days lasting sometimes up to a week. In
August there have been five car bombs waves so far with only one day in between
them showing that IS is ramping up its operations.

Aftermath of car bombing in Kirkuk Aug 23 part of the most intense VBIED waves seen in Iraq for years (EPA)

IS has used car bombs for two purposes in recent months.
Before they were just an instrument of terror aimed mostly at civilian targets
to undermine the government and stoke sectarian tensions by striking Shiite
targets in Baghdad. Those still occur today, but the Islamists are also using
them as tactical weapons to hit targets on the frontlines with the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and peshmerga. For instance, in recent weeks IS has been
attempting to take Haditha and its adjacent dam. The latter could be used to
provide electricity to its conquered territories, while also threatening the
rest of Anbar and Baghdad with flooding. On August 1
a car bomb hit a checkpoint leading into Haditha as IS began its assault upon
the town. Another vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) was used in
the fight on August 3.
Another example was when IS successful took Jalawla in Diyala it began with 3 car bombs on August 10 with another
one being deployed on August
14. At the same time, regular terrorist attacks hitting Shiite targets such
as eastern Baghdad continue. August
1, Sadr City was hit leaving 16 dead and 25 wounded. August 6, New Baghdad,
Ur, and Sadr City were struck with 47 killed and 117 injured. Sadr City was targeted
a third time on August 8
leaving 2 fatalities and 7 wounded. August 13 New Baghdad was
hit for the second time with 7 dead and 21 wounded. August
20 a VBIED went off on Palestine Street killing 1 and wounding 6. Finally
on August
26 a third car bomb detonation occurred in New Baghdad with 12 dead and 35
injured. These duel uses of VBIEDs will likely increase in the future as the
Islamic State is using them more and more.

Car Bomb Attacks In Iraq Jul 30-Aug 26, 2014

Date

Location

Dead

Wounded

Jul 30

Baghdadi, Anbar

Amin & Sadr City, Baghdad

34

57

Jul 31

Aug 1

Haditha, Anbar

Sadr City, Baghdad

16

25

Aug 2

Rawa, Anbar

Balad & Dujail, Salahaddin

8

42

Aug 3

Outside Haditha, Anbar

Aug 4

Aug 5

?, Anbar

5

Aug 6

Outside Fallujah, Anbar

New Baghdad, Sadr City x2, Ur x2, Baghdad

Aliya Rash, Ninewa

48

96

Aug 7

Kadhimiya, Baghdad

Kirkuk, Kirkuk

25

90

Aug 8

Fallujah & West of Ramadi, Anbar

Sadr City, Baghdad

2

7

Aug 9

Aug 10

Haditha, Anbar

Jalawla x3, Diyala

Aug 11

Diyala Bridge, Baghdad

Aziziya, Wasit

4

8

Aug 12

Karrada&
Zafaraniya, Baghdad

17

51

Aug 13

Amil, Baya & New Baghdad, Baghdad

18

43

Aug 14

Jalawla, Diyala

5

13

Aug 15

Ramadi, Anbar

Aug 16

Aug 17

Yusifiya, Baghdad

Aug 18

Iskandiriya x2, Babil

1

16

Aug 19

Iskandiriya, Babil

Aug 20

Husseiniya & Palestine St, Baghdad

11

30

Aug 21

Aug 22

South of Tikrit, Salahaddin

11

30

Aug 23

Baghdadi, Anbar

Karrada, Baghdad

Kirkuk, Kirkuk

16

40

Aug 24

Shula, Baghdad

5

12

Aug 25

Hillah x2, Babil

Kadhimiya x2, Baghdad

Tweij, Karbala

30

84

Aug 26

New Baghdad, Baghdad

12

35

TOTALS

52

263

684

The other change in car bombs has been their increasing
frequency. Before, there were several days in between car bomb waves. Now, that
IS is in the middle of its summer campaign there have only been one day separating
each series of VBIEDs this month. The last car bomb wave of July ended on the
30th with Baghdadi
in Anbar, and Amin
and Sadr
City in Baghdad being hit. There were no such incidents on July 31. Then
the next campaign started on August 1 until August 3 with six in Anbar,
Baghdad, and Salahaddin. Again, there was a one day reprieve on August 4, and
then 13 car bombs from August 5-8 in Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Ninewa. August
9 was the next break before the third series of the month began lasting from
August 10-16. The fourth wave came from August 17-20 hitting Babil and Baghdad.
Iraq might have just gone through the last one from August 22-26 with its peak on
August 25 when three car bombs went off in Baghdad, two in Babil, and one in
Karbala leaving 30 dead and 84 wounded. The ability of the Islamic State to set
off so many VBIEDs in quick succession shows the increasing capabilities of its
networks. Carrying out car bomb attacks requires technicians, explosives,
secure facilities, intelligence gathering, and the bribery and intimidation of
members of the security forces to get through checkpoints. The insurgents
obviously stocked up on their supplies before the summer to carry out these
attacks. At the same time, as IS swept across central Iraq it has been able to
pillage several large army bases and supply depots, which has given it access
to huge amounts of explosives. That’s probably another reason why these car
bombs are occurring so often. The Islamic State has been able to stockpile such
a large amount of explosive through its recent exploits that it will be able to
sustain these car bomb waves into the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

AIN,
"11 persons killed, injured southwestern Baghdad," 8/13/14

-
"14 civilians injured southern Tikrit," 8/2/14

-
"18 Peshmerga elements killed, injured in Diyala," 8/14/14

-
"Karrada bombing casualties hit 39 deaths, injuries," 8/23/14

Alsumaria,
"Four dead and 11 wounded in the bombing of the Amil district south of
Baghdad," 8/13/14

-
"Killing an wounding 25 people in a bomb in Utaifiyya north of Baghdad,"
8/25/14

-
"Killing and wounding at least 74 civilians in Sadr City in eastern
Baghdad," 7/30/14

-
"The outcome of the bombing of yesterday 11 dead and 30 wounded,"
8/23/14

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

When Mosul and Tikrit fell in early June 2014 there were
plenty of conspiracy theories to explain why it happened. One was that Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki let the cities be taken to make an excuse for him to hold
onto power. Another was that the Kurds and Sunni politicians worked with the
insurgents to push out the federal government forces so that they could seize territory.
The truth of the matter was much simpler and depressing. Baghdad did not take the
attack upon Mosul seriously. It turned down offers to reinforce the city, while
the commanders of the security forces there ended up leaving causing mass
desertions and the fall of the city. The federal government then fell into
disarray and shock as militants charged south from Mosul into Salahaddin.
Nothing was organized to defend Tikrit and other areas in the province, which were
quickly conquered too. It wasn’t a plot that led to the de facto division of
Iraq, but rather government incompetence in the face of a small yet determined
enemy.

Insurgents ran Mosul like a mafia long before the actual attack on the city in June 2014 (Institute for the Study of War)

Mosul was the northern base for the Iraqi insurgency. It was
the only urban center it was able to hold onto during and after the Surge. That
proved especially important because it also became the main
moneymaker for militants who ran protection rackets and oil smuggling
rings. By 2009 the Islamic State (IS) the largest remaining armed faction was
self-sufficient thanks to its lucrative illegal businesses in the city. By 2014
the insurgency had reconstituted itself and could be said to be the ones really
in control of Mosul. The local security forces were intimidated by hundreds of
attacks and assassinations, and IS was even stealing
their pay. The situation was so bad that by March the Ninewa Operations
Command set
up special flights for its personnel who lived in Baghdad to fly to and
from Mosul because the roads were too dangerous for them to take. This was all
part of IS’s Soldiers’
Harvest campaign that it announced in July 2013. Its goals were to attack
the ISF and take control of territory. It was able to establish alliances with
other insurgent groups such as the Baathist Naqshibandi over their shared
desire to overthrow the central government. This was all leading up to a big
offensive, which turned out to be far more successful than anyone expected.

The summer campaign started at the beginning of June with
raids upon Samarra, Baquba and Ramadi. On June
5, the Islamic State launched an assault on Samarra in Salahaddin early in
the morning coming from the Hamrin mountain area of Diyala. It came in a large
convoy of trucks with heavy weapons mounted on them attacking three districts
of the city simultaneously. It used bulldozers and cranes to remove concrete
barriers at the entrance of Samarra, and quickly seized five of seven
districts. The ISF fell back to defend the Askari shrine. By the middle of the
day Baghdad had sent reinforcements including helicopters and elements of the
elite Golden Division driving the militants out. The next day IS attacked
the counter-terrorism bureau in Baquba, Diyala starting with a car bomb
followed by mortars and gunfire. This was probably an attempt to free
imprisoned compatriots, which the group had been doing for over a year now to
rebuild its cadres. Finally on June 7, IS seized control of Anbar University in
Ramadi. Hundreds of students were held hostage, as others were able to escape
the facility. Like in the previous two encounters the siege was eventually
broken. These three operations all occurred in predictable locations. By the summer
the armed groups had rebuilt themselves in Salahaddin and were operating in all
of its districts. Samarra was an especially important target because of the
shrine there, which was attacked in 2006 that put the civil war into overdrive.
The fighters used their bases in the Hamrin Mountains that was one of the rural
areas that the American and Iraqi forces were never able to successfully clear.
That also explains the assault in Baquba because the province overall had seen
an increase in insurgent activity as well. Finally, there was open fighting in
Anbar starting at the very end of 2013. Militants had established themselves in
the southern regions of Ramadi, so the attack on the university was easy
logistically. Still these large operations back to back to back had not
been seen in Iraq for several years all pointing towards the rebuilt
capabilities of the militants. They were able to plan, collect intelligence, store
resources, and then carry out operations in northern, eastern, and western
Anbar literally within hours of each other. Mosul was next and should have been
expected given the level of control militants exerted there already.

Students escaping Anbar University during the June IS assault. The attack there along with the ones on Samarra and Baquba marked the beginning of the insurgents summer offensive (EPA)

The insurgents should have never been able to take Mosul in
just a few days. They were
facing the army’s 2nd Division, the 3rd Federal Police division,
and the local police totaling 60,000
on paper. A Peshmerga
officer said that only about 1 out of 3 members of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) actually showed up to work. This was due to corruption where
officers would collect the pay of fake soldiers and police, ISF members being
on leave, and other reasons. As noted before, those at their stations or in
their bases were besieged by daily attacks meant to intimidate them by the
insurgency.

The actual assault on Mosul started June
6 in what IS dubbed the “Battle of Ninewa.” It was aided
by elements of the Baathist Naqshibandi, Ansar al-Islam, and the Mujahadeen
Army. It
began in western Mosul with 5 suicide bombers, followed by mortars on three
districts. The militants were able to overrun checkpoints on the
western periphery and moved into four sections of the city. Like in Samarra IS
quickly moved in heavy equipment to take down concrete barriers at security spots.
Despite the heavy clashes the Ninewa Operations Command actually claimed that
it had retaken some areas, but that proved false. On the first day the press
reported 105 IS fighters killed and around 20 vehicles destroyed, while the ISF
lost 10 soldiers and 14 police, along with 70 civilians. The first day just
seemed like another charge at a city like the previous attacks on Samarra,
Baquba, and Ramadi. The difference was the next day, June 7, heavy fighting
renewed in the same areas, and the Kurdish Interior Ministry and United
States got word of a large convoy of IS vehicles and fighters crossing from
Syria into Ninewa and heading towards Mosul. Some western media reports have
painted this as advanced warning of the fall of the city, but the battle was
already in its second day by then, its scope was just unknown at the time. Local
policemen told Niqash that during the second date of fighting they heard rumors that the
Federal Police and army were withdrawing, which led them to fall back to their
police stations. Later in the day Ninewa Governor Atheel Nujafi was photographed waking the
streets of Mosul with an AK-47 followed by his bodyguards checking on the
situation. June 8 was the day that the insurgents crossed over into the eastern
half of the city. The United States was hard at work to get the central
government to send in reinforcements, but to no avail. When the Americans told
Baghdad of the incoming IS fighters from Syria it said that army would be
sending in forces into Mosul, but it would take up to a week. In the meantime
the Kurds offered to deploy its Peshmerga to eastern Mosul. This started a
political battle, as Baghdad wanted to make sure that the Kurds presence would
only be temporary. The result was that nothing was done. On the ground,
insurgents were able to take a Federal Police base, and began firing at the
provincial council building with RPGs, snipers, and gun trucks. Governor Nujafi
was actually inside at that time, but was able to escape. Later in the day
militants moved on an army base, the airport, and Badush prison, while the ISF
began withdrawing from parts of the city. June 9 was when things began
collapsing. Governor Nujafi gave a televised
speech calling on the people of Mosul to form armed groups to resist the
insurgents. It doesn’t appear anyone responded. Baghdad was still in a state of
denial about the situation, and told the Americans that the fighting was under
control. Most importantly, General Abboud Qanbar al-Maliki the deputy chief of
the army, General Mahdi Gharawi the head of the Ninewa Operations Command, and
General Ali Ghidan the ground forces commander who were all in Mosul at the
time, jumped on a helicopter and left for Kurdistan. When
word spread of their departure, soldiers and police began deserting. The Islamic
State also started spreading rumors of its fighters coming from Syria to attack
Mosul as part of a psychological warfare operation to demoralize the rank and
file members of the ISF. Finally, June 10 was the end of the battle. Militants took
the Mosul airport, started freeing prisoners from various jails and Badush
prison, while orders
were issued for the ISF to withdraw, but
not where to go. Many just threw off their uniforms and joined the exodus
of civilians who were already fleeing the city. When the battle was all over
the Defense Ministry said that it would be sending
special forces, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised to retake the
city in 24
hours. In a final moment of ignominy Baghdad approved the Peshmerga moving
into Mosul at 3 am on June 11 after the city had fallen. In the end, a city of
2 million people, with approximately 20,000-30,000 on duty police, Federal Police, and
soldiers was taken by just 400
to 1,000 insurgents in
five days. The complete lack of leadership by the commanders in Mosul and in
Baghdad during the entire crisis was breathtaking, but it didn’t end there.

Discarded uniforms left behind by fleeing members of the ISF in Mosul (Independent)

As soon as Mosul fell the Islamic State and its allies
headed south towards Baghdad. Local officials in Tikrit, Salahaddin heard
that 3,000 fighters were heading their way, and would be joined by sleeper
cells within the city. Inside Tikrit were 3 police regiments of 400 each and a
SWAT force. Outside were three army brigades, attack helicopters and 700
special forces at Camp Speicher. On paper that was 10,000 members of the ISF, but
like in Mosul there were only 5,000-6,000 actually on duty. On June 9 an alert
was put out for all the police in the city to report to duty. On June 10 when
word spread that Mosul had fallen, members of the ISF began deserting not only
in Tikrit but Baiji as well. That night the latter was taken by the insurgents
with barely a fight. The militants were able to seize the army weapons depot
there after it was abandoned. June 11 the Salahaddin provincial police
commander General Juma al-Dulaimi went to Camp Speicher calling on the army to
help defend Tikrit. The Speicher commander called for help to his superior, but
received no orders. Later that day, gunmen on 30 trucks entered the city from
several directions and took Tikrit without a shot being fired. It turned out
most of the forces at Speicher surrendered. They were then taken to downtown
Tikrit and separated by where they came from and by sect. The Sunnis from
Baghdad and Shiite were executed, which was later spread on social media by the
Islamic State. Alam east of Tikrit was the only area that did not give up.
Instead it held out for two weeks. It was during this time that the adviser to
the Salahaddin governor for women’s affair Umaya Naji was killed in a gun
battle. After intense fighting the defenders of Alam were forced to give up
when IS captured some of their family members who were trying to escape and
threatened to kill them. Before that a helicopter from Baghdad arrived and took
away high level officials and ISF commanders. The insurgents kept heading south
afterward and were finally stopped outside of Samarra after half of Salahaddin
had fallen. The collapse in Salahaddin was even more devastating than Mosul.
That city held out for five days, while Baiji and Tikrit just gave up. The ISF
were simply spooked at the fall of Iraq’s second largest city, and believed
that they were facing a massive force of militants backed by local fighters. Instead
of fighting they decided to flee. Again, the local commanders failed and Baghdad
did nothing. It didn’t respond until June 27 with an ill planned attempt to
retake Tikrit.

Images like these were spread on social media by IS of their execution of the ISF members from Camp Speicher

When it was all over the Iraqi Security Forces had largely
collapsed, a large section of northern Iraq was under militant control, the
Kurds seemed initially happy, while Baghdad was in denial. Brett McGurk said
that 5 army and Federal Police divisions out of 18 had disintegrated, but the
number might have been as high as 7. The ISF, which had already turned to
militias to help with Anbar now began using them across central Iraq, because
they were so desperate for manpower. Even parties that had not been involved
before such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrists mobilized
their forces in the face of the existential threat posed by the Islamic State. Into
the void in the north stepped the Kurds who secured the disputed territories
that had been abandoned by the ISF. President Massoud Barzani gave a speech
about Article 140 finally being implemented, and there were plenty of articles
about how this might have been a victory for the Kurds, because they had gained
Kirkuk, which was another step towards independence. It would take a while, but
the IS led attack upon Jalawla in Diyala and Sinjar in Ninewa proved most of
these predictions false. In Baghdad, the government turned to propaganda to
make up for its losses. To this day the Iraqi papers are full of official releases
about victory after victory with thousands of insurgents being killed. That
didn’t make up for the fact that it did nothing during the five day battle for
Mosul, and then repeated the failure with Baiji and Tikrit. There was nothing
from the ISF generals who either fled in the middle of the battle like in Mosul,
or gave up in Baiji and Tikrit. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki must also bear a
huge amount of blame. He was more concerned with his political disputes with
the Kurds than ask for their assistance to save Mosul. More importantly he put
in political appointees as commanders throughout the security forces to coup
proof his administration. These men proved to be incompetent. It wasn’t a
conspiracy that led to the fall of Mosul, but a basic failure of leadership
that is to be blamed.

SOURCES

Abbas, Yasir and Trombly, Dan, “Inside
the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division,” War On The Rocks,
7/1/14

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com