CHAPTER XVIII

The Beginning of the End

When General Harrison and his associates walked out of
the tent at Panmunjom on 8 October, they neither knew when they would return
nor if they would come back at all. The possibility that the Communists would
alter their attitude toward repatriation appeared extremely unlikely at that
time and the military pressure that the U.N. Command could hope to muster gave
no promise of producing a change in the enemy's stand. Since the UNC had fallen
back upon its final negotiating position, the discussion phase and the period
of maneuvering were at an end. Until a break occurred in the adamant fronts
presented by both sides, the prospects for a settlement remained remote.

The liaison officers meanwhile continued
to meet at Panmunjom and furnished one point of contact for reflecting a shift
in the situation. The activity on the battlefield, especially during the October-November
operations, provided another. And in the air over North Korea, the Far East
Air Forces did its best to help speed up the enemy's desire to reach an agreement.
To counter the application of military pressure, the Communists reverted to
their old standbys-political and psychological warfare. But the efficacy of
either the UNC or the enemy method was doubtful, since both had been tried before
and found wanting.

The Long Recess: First Phase

The first nonmilitary attack by the
Communists in October was aimed at the UNC tactics at Panmunjom. As soon as
the Harrison team left the tent, the enemy began to charge that the UNC had
broken off the negotiations. Since the onus for ,a collapse in the talks had
always been a sensitive point to the political and military leaders in Washington,
they quickly instructed Clark not to use the term "indefinite recess" in the
UNC statements. They informed him that there was no desire to have the armistice
negotiations debated in any forum other than that of Panmunjom and that all
the efforts of the United States in the U.N. General Assembly were directed
towards facilitating an agreement at the meetings in the tents.1

As the letters flew back and forth
between the liaison officers in October, the courses adopted by the opponents
became clear. The UNC stand rested upon the conclusion that the Communists had
neither accepted any of the plans offered by the U.N. Command nor proffered
any of their own that were new or reasonable; therefore, the UNC delegation
would wait until the enemy satisfied one of the two conditions listed above
before it would reconvene. Har-

402

rison and Clark denied repeatedly that
the UNC had ended the negotiations.2

The Communists, on the other hand,
pursued two tactics. While they pressed their accusations that the UNC had ended
the truce talks, they missed no opportunity to cite UNC violations, real and
alleged, of the neutral zone around Panmunjom. And as the incidence of violence
in the prisoner of war camps started to increase again, the enemy negotiators
strongly censured the UNC for its treatment of the Communist prisoners.3

To lessen the impact of the enemy's
charges and to explain the UNC position in the negotiations to the rest of the
world, Secretary of State Acheson addressed the U.N. Political Committee on
24 October. Tracing the beginnings of the talks and the development of the issues,
he admitted that the growth of the conflict over repatriation had been "wholly
unexpected" and "surprising" to the U.N. Command.' He pointed out the inconsistencies
of the position adopted by the USSR in opposing the concept of no forced repatriation
in Korea when it had on various occasions previously upheld the right of the
prisoner of war to choose or refuse repatriation. In closing he stressed that
the UNC was ready to reconvene the meetings at
Panmunjom at any time that the Communists were willing to accept the "fundamental
principle of nonforcible return." 6

While the debates in the General Assembly
over the U.S. resolution against forcible repatriation were going on, other
suggestions and resolutions were brought forth. One of these was an informal
Canadian proposal that the UNC seek a cease-fire in Korea and leave the nonrepatriate
problem to later negotiations. Both Army and State Department staffs objected
to this procedure. To remove the threat of military compulsion would amount
to a surrender of the UNC's most potent weapon, they maintained, while, at the
same time, the Communists would keep their trump card-the UNC prisoners. The
enemy could protract the discussions on the disposition of prisoners and in
the meantime rebuild its airfields, roads, bridges and restock its supply dumps.
If the talks proved fruitless and hostilities again broke out, the Communist
military position could be greatly improved and UNC morale would be sadly depressed.6

Several weeks later when the joint
Chiefs forwarded their views on the matter to the Secretary of Defense, they
endorsed the ArmyState staff arguments. There could be no justification for
giving up the UNC air superiority in Korea, they told Mr. Lovett, unless the

403

Communists accepted the concept of
no forced repatriation.7

On 17 November the Indian delegation
presented its plan to end the Korean War to the United Nations. The Indian resolution
recognized the U.S. contention that no force should be used to prevent or effect
the return of prisoners to their homeland. Yet in deference to the Communist
stand, it suggested that a repatriation commission, composed of two Communist
and two UNC nations, be set up to receive all the prisoners in the demilitarized
zone. There they would be classified according to nationality and domicile,
as the Communists had wished, and be free to go home. Each side would have the
freedom of explaining to the prisoners their rights, and all prisoners who still
had not chosen repatriation after ninety days would be referred to the political
conference recommended in the armistice agreement. In case the four members
of the repatriation commission could not agree on the interpretation of the
details of handling the prisoners and their disposition, an umpire would be
named by the members or the General Assembly to break any deadlock.8

Although many of the United States
allies favored the Indian proposal, at least in principle, the U.S. official
reaction was quick and adverse. Most of the objections voiced by the United
States concerned the vagueness of the duties and responsibilities that the repatriation
commission would carry out and the indefinite procedure for handling nonrepatriates.
Not only was the time limit of ninety days too
long for the interrogation period, but the U.S. still opposed turning over the
nonrepatriates to a political conference.9

But the Communist response proved to
be even stronger. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky roundly denounced the Indian
plan in the United Nations, and Chou En-lai rejected it by stating on 28 November
that the Russiansponsored proposal calling for forcible repatriation was the
only reasonable one. When it came to a vote on 3 December, the U.N. voted down
the USSR's resolution, 40 to 5, and adopted the Indian plan, 54 to 5. Only the
Communist bloc supported the Russian and opposed the Indian proposal. The latter
provided that if the peace conference did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate
in thirty days, the prisoners would be turned over to the United Nations for
disposition.10

There was small chance that the Communists
would pay much heed to the action of the General Assembly in the matter beyond
attacking it vigorously. But the bitter assault that they launched on the Indian
suggestion served two purposes: it alienated public opinion in some of the neutral
countries that had supported this solution; and it helped obscure the milder
disapproval evidenced by the United States.

The unfavorable publicity garnered
by the Communists on this score, however, was soon to be matched by the gathering
storm of unfortunate events

404

taking place in UNC prison
camps. Although the Communist prisoners had been relocated in smaller, more manageable
groups and scattered on a number of islands to lessen the threat of concerted
action, the hard-core leaders and their followers had shown no disposition toward
ending their fight in the compounds.

As already indicated, the problem of
maintaining order and discipline in the Communist enclosures was fraught with
pitfalls. A policy of leniency and laxness would allow the zealous partisans
full opportunity to control and administer the compounds as they saw fit. On
the other hand, a ruthless, hard policy with tight control and discipline meant
continual clashes and bloodshed. The Communists seemed to welcome violence and-even
more-to encourage it. For every man that the UNC was inveigled into wounding
or killing meant another propaganda advantage to the enemy. The Communist prisoners
acted therefore as a double weapon since they forced the UNC to maintain strong
guard forces in the rear and since their agitation placed the UNC constantly
on the defensive to justify its repressive measures.

When the Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group suggested in early October that the UNC Armistice Delegation
should seek to forestall Communist propaganda gains by charging the enemy with
instigation of the disturbances in the camps each time one occurred, the delegation
agreed that this approach had merit. But it pointed out that seizing the initiative
would probably neither deter the Communists from causing the disorders nor from
magnifying them to suit their purpose. The delegation felt that
if the UNC intended to accuse the enemy of fomenting trouble, concrete evidence
of such activity would have to be presented to substantiate the charges. This
would mean that intercepted orders, confessions, plans that were uncovered,
and other proof of enemy direction would have to be produced and publicized.11
The concern of the Far East Command with the enemy's techniques in exploiting
the situation in the prison camps was to produce results later on, but for the
time being nothing was done.

Meanwhile the enemy seldom attended
a meeting of the liaison officers without citing a violation of the Geneva Convention
in regard to the treatment of prisoners or an infringement of the neutral zone
around Panmunjom by UNC aircraft or ground troops. On
30 November the Communists alleged that the UNC
had wounded thirty-two prisoners at Koje-do five days earlier and then went
on to claim that during October and November a total of 542 Communist prisoners
had been killed or wounded.12 By the end of the year, General Nam
charged that the UNC had caused 3,059 casualties among the Communist internees
since July 1951 and noted that the Communists had lodged 45 protests on this
score since February 1952.13

405

The
growing toll in the prison camps caused UNC leaders a great deal of uneasiness
as December began. Direct disobedience of orders was a common occurrence and
was usually countered by direct application of force. Indications from the UNC
Prisoner of War Command pointed to considerable planning among the prisoners
for a mass breakout from the camps in early December and one of the worst trouble
spots was at the civilian internee compounds on Pongam-do, a tiny island not
far from Koje-do.14

It was difficult to understand why Pongam-do
had been chosen for a prison camp site. The island was small and compounds had
to be located on the side of a steeply terraced hill. Since the prisoners were
placed on the upper terraces and access could only be gained by proceeding level
by level up the hill, the Communist internees were given all the advantages
of terrain. For some time, the prisoners at Pongam-do had been getting bolder
and bolder. They organized and conducted military drill in defiance of UNC orders
and mounted demonstrations at will. Among the 9,000 inmates on the island were
many of the prisoners who had been participants in the February 1952 outbreak
on Koje-do. They were guarded by one ROK security

406

battalion and some U.S. administrative personnel.

On 14
December matters came to a head. Around 3,600
internees in six compounds were ordered to disband their drilling and to cease
causing a commotion. Instead they formed three ranks on the upper terrace and
locked arms. Others gathered behind this protective screen and began to hurl
rocks and debris on the ROK troops as they ascended the hill to enforce the
order. Ordinarily concussion grenades and nontoxic gas would have been used,
but, in this instance, the prisoners could throw the grenades back down the
hill and a strong crosswind ruled out the employment of gas. Thus, when orders
and warning shots were disregarded, the ROK soldiers began to take aim at the
solid, defiant ranks above them. At close range the bullets opened gaps in the
human chain and resistance collapsed. But when the melee was over, 85 prisoners
lay dead, 113
were hospitalized, and there were over 100 minor injuries. Only four ROK personnel
received major wounds.15

The affair at Pongam-do again led to
a flurry of activity on POW matters. Clark told Van Fleet to have available
one U.S. infantry battalion that could be shifted to the Korean Communications
Zone on twenty-four hours' notice and authorized General Herren to utilize one
battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division on the prisoner of war mission. When Herren
asked that helicopters be furnished so that tear gas grenades could be dropped
on rioters to disperse them without casualties, Clark approved hisrequest.16 These measures would help
to cope with the results of the prisoner agitation if not with the causes.

To strengthen his hand against further
outbreaks in the prison camps, Clark pressed anew for authority to establish
a U.N. military commission to try prisoners charged with postcapture offenses.
His urgings in July and August had elicited no positive action, despite the
support of General Collins, but with the example of Pongam-do fresh in the news,
Clark reminded his superiors that the lack of appropriate judicial machinery
weakened the disciplinary powers of the camp commanders.17 In view
of the legal and political complications involved in conducting trials of prisoners
of war, the U.S. political and military leaders had been reluctant to use this
weapon in the past, but Clark's plea reopened the matter. Speedy action approving
such authority, however, appeared to be out of the question, since the JCS intended
to have the entire POW problem reviewed at the highest level.18 This meant consideration by the new President
and his advisors and would take time.

Pongam-do produced protests from the
Communists and criticism by the International Committee of the Red Cross of
the methods used by the U.N. Command. The latter complaint was more difficult
to cope with, for the ICRC was highly regarded throughout the non-

407

Communist world. In answer to the Red
Cross allegation that the UNC control of prisoners had been overly strict and
the members of the security forces had been unnecessarily harassing the prisoners,
Clark issued a statement defending the UNC actions and attacking the Communist
prisoners' behavior. He reminded the ICRC representatives that the UNC had voluntarily
observed the Geneva Convention while the Communists had ignored it. When it
came to deliberate disobedience, marked by mutiny, riots, or refusal to carry
out orders, on the one hand, and terrorism in the camps, on the other, the UNC
had used force, but only after all other methods had been tried. Clark pointed
out that the UNC had constantly sought to improve the physical facilities and
supply procedures for the camps and that only the pro-Communist enclosures,
whose inmates had never accepted their nonbelligerent status as prisoners, had
turned to organized violence.19

Despite the voluminousness of the enemy's
protests during the latter part of 1952, Clark did not believe that the Communists
had any intention of terminating the negotiations. The continuous barrage of
enemy grievances seemed designed, in his opinion, to play upon the fears of
the United States' allies and to create sympathy for the Communist position
on prisoners of war.20

Nevertheless, the Far East commander
took steps to lessen the opportunities of the prisoners
to incite unrest. To eliminate the necessity for visiting the latrines at night,
the prison command installed facilities in each barracks. In the corridors between
the compounds guards were armed with shotguns so that prisoners moving around
in disobedience to the camp curfew could be identified by the buckshot they
absorbed, but not killed or seriously injured.21

In early January, the Department of
the Army and the Far East Command decided that the time had come to expose the
Communist methods and techniques of stirring up trouble in the prison camps.
The Military Intelligence Section, G-2, of the FEC was assigned the task of
compiling a report on the organization, control, and methods used by the enemy
to exploit their faithful followers and to demonstrate the problems facing the
U.N. Command as it attempted to deal with the matter. The end result was the
study entitled The
Communist War at POW Camps, published in late
January.22 The press reaction in the United States to the release
of this report was highly favorable, but complete copies were not available
there and full advantage of the study could not be attained.23

The enemy seemed to hold the upper
hand in the battle of indirect pressures as 1953 began. However, the UNC still
retained several weapons that it had not

408

used.
In mid-December, Col. Charles W. McCarthy, senior UNC liaison officer, had urged
that the UNC strike back. In a letter to the joint Strategic Plans and Operations
Group he pointed out that the UNC pilots were allowing the Communists to utilize
the PyongyangKaesong road for convoys to the truce area every day. In effect,
what this meant, McCarthy continued, was that the enemy had a main supply route
open all day despite the fact that the negotiations were in recess. He proposed
that the UNC cut back the number of convoys permitted the enemy to three or
less a week and require the Communists to adhere to a tight timetable for each
trip allowed. Such action would strike a blow at the enemy and perhaps let the
people back home know that the UNC was not adopting a passive approach to the
Communists' behind-the-scenes tactics.24

Thus, when the liaison officers met
on 15 January, Colonel McCarthy's successor, Col. William B. Carlock, informed
Col. Ju Yon, who had recently taken Colonel Chang's place, of the new UNC policy.
Starting on 25 January, the Communists would be allowed to run only two convoys
a week as long as the negotiations were in recess. One would leave P'yongyang
and the other Kaesong every Sunday morning; both would be required to finish
their journeys by 2000. To the protest by the Communists that the UNC could
not unilaterally break the agreement of November 1951, Colonel Carlock informed
Ju that there was no "agreement" on the immunity granted the Communists, since the enemy had not extended any like consideration
to the UNC.25

The Republicans Take Over

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President
of the United States on 20
January, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean Acheson as Secretary of State and
Charles E. Wilson became Secretary of Defense. Yet, as noted above, there was
no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as the Korean War was concerned. The
new administration had no panacea for ending the conflict expeditiously and
no intention of expanding the military pressure to force a settlement upon the
Communists. On the whole the Republicans adopted the policy of watchful waiting
pursued by the Truman administration.

The new President quickly changed one
of the procedures followed by Mr. Truman during his term of office. No longer
were all the important messages concerning the Korean War routed across his
desk for final approval. This task now fell largely to the Secretaries of State
and Defense and Mr. Dulles' role in the making of Korean policy increased during
the early months of 1953.

In one substantive respect, too, President
Eisenhower swiftly divorced himself from the course followed by his predecessor.
In his State of the Union message to Congress on
2 February, Mr. Eisenhower revealed that he had
decided to end the U.S. naval blockade of Taiwan.

409

No longer would the U.S. Seventh Fleet
serve as a screen for the Chinese Communists and prevent Chiang Kai-shek from
attacking the mainland, the President affirmed. As might be expected, reaction
to this shift was loud and varied. General MacArthur, Senator Robert A. Taft
of Ohio, Chiang Kai-shek, and President Rhee all supported the rescinding of
the restriction, while leading Democrats and prominent newspapermen in Great
Britain and India immediately voiced their concern lest the act provoke an extension
of the war into the Taiwan area. Backers of the President hailed the "unleashing"
of Chiang's forces and praised Eisenhower for having seized the initiative in
the battle with communism. But if it were true that the enemy might be confused
and forced to guess at the next move that the United States might make, it was
also fair to state that the sword was two-edged. It was also conceivable that
the Communist Chinese might attack Taiwan.

British Foreign Secretary Eden was
quite cool to the "unilateral" decision taken by the new government without
consultation with its allies and warned that the move might "have very unfortunate
political repercussions without compensating military advantages." In India,
one newspaper accused the President of "hunting peace with a gun."
26

Despite the excitement generated by
this announcement, there was no sudden outbreak of operations in the Taiwan
sector. The Nationalist Chinese forces had but few landing craft and only a
small number of their troops were amphibiously trained. Without greater support
in equipment from the United States and the preparation of more divisions for
assault landings, the Nationalist threat could become little more than a threat.
The principal result of the "unleashing" was to stir up the political and diplomatic
waters of the world, while those about Taiwan remained militarily serene. As
the historian of the Far East Naval Forces remarked: "Despite internal uneasiness
over the decision, it did not have the immediate strategic significance expected,
and, tactically, had no effect on the operation of the Formosa Patrol." 27

Gradually the Eisenhower administration
became more familiar with the problems in Korea and began to consider what positive
steps could be taken within the accepted political framework to break the impasse.
Once again the concept of unilateral release of the nonrepatriates and the presentation
to the Communists of a fait accompli was revived and Clark was asked to comment
on this approach. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, Clark sent a member
of his staff, Lt. Col. Arthur W. Kogstad, to Washington to present his views.
Meeting with Washington officials in early March, Kogstad informed the group
that Clark was fully in favor of releasing the Korean nonrepatriates and did
not think that such a move would have an appreciable effect upon the UNC's prospects
for an armistice in Korea. As for the Chinese nonrepatriates, their disposition
would require careful attention, since it would have political implications.
Kogstad later reported that the tenor of opinion among the

410

conferees attending the meeting had
been favorable to Clark's recommendation, but other factors were at work. Mr.
Dulles, who had a major hand in making policy in Mr. Eisenhower's administration,
was busy with the U.N. General Assembly and unable to devote his time to the
POW question in early March. Then, too, the sudden demise of Joseph Stalin of
a cerebral hemorrhage on 5 March had injected any number of new elements into
the world political picture, and time was required to assess them before bold
ventures were embarked upon.28 At any rate time overtook the concept
of unilateral release insofar as the U.N. Command was concerned and the next
time it reared its head, it bore the visage of Syngman Rhee.29

The rash of incidents in the prison
camps meanwhile continued unabated. Clark decided in February to sound out the
new political chiefs on the old question of trial of prisoners for their postcapture
offenses. Pointing out that the publication of the study of the Communist prisoners
had raised questions among the press and his own troops as to why no disciplinary
action had been taken against the prison leaders, Clark requested immediate
consideration for this pressing problem.30

The Far East commander received some
solace in late February. In cases of flagrant attack against UNC security personnel,
the JCS told him, Clark might bring the offenders to justice, but
no undue publicity would be given to the trials. This was only a halfway measure.
Clark immediately protested, since most of the violence had been directed at
fellow prisoners rather than at the U.N. Command. In the face of this reclama,
the JCS secured authority for the UNC to try prisoners charged with offenses
committed after June 1952 against other prisoners.31

Despite this apparent victory, events
conspired to delay the trial and punishment of the Communist troublemakers in
the prison camps. Before the Far East Command brought the first cases to court,
the State Department wanted to line up judicial support and participation in
the trials from the United States' allies in Korea. By the end of March, however,
only four nations had agreed to serve on military commissions.32
This reluctance to share the responsibility for trying prisoners of war for
postcapture offenses and the swift flow of developments on the negotiating front
in late March seemed to offer small hope that the ringleaders of violence would
ever come to trial.

The Communist threat to Seoul in February,
discussed in the preceding chapter, produced several exchanges between Tokyo
and Washington concerning the neutral city of Kaesong. Under the October 1951
agreement, Kaesong was protected from UNC attack. Yet, Clark told the JCS in
early February, the

411

enemy was using the town for restaging
troops, for resupply, and as an espionage headquarters. If and when he became
convinced that a major Communist offensive was in the offing, Clark wanted authority
to abrogate the 1951
agreement and attack Kaesong. On 9 February, just two days after his initial
request, the United Nations commander asked for permission to open up Kaesong
to assault.33

When Clark's recommendation came up
for discussion in Washington, Mr. Dulles urged that the U.N. Command should
unilaterally abrogate the security agreement of 1951 as of a specific date and
remove Kaesong and Munsan, but not Panmunjom, from a neutral status, if an enemy
offensive of division size or larger seemed imminent. The JCS, in passing the
decision on to Clark, pointed out that such an action would help alleviate an
adverse military situation, while lessening the political implications that
the negotiations were being completely broken off.34 As it turned
out, the large-scale Communist offensive failed to materialize and Clark did
not have to retract Kaesong's immunity.

The Big Break

Amidst the search for ways and means
to apply pressure upon the enemy and to strengthen General Clark's hand in the
conflict, the UNC made a rather perfunctory gesture that, at the time, seemed
to offer little chance of a favorable response. Back in December, Clark had
read a news despatch from Geneva which reported that the Executive Committee
of the League of Red Cross Societies had passed a resolution on 13 December calling for the immediate exchange
of sick and wounded prisoners. Clark suggested that, although he did not think
the Communists would agree to such an exchange in the light of their previous
reaction to similar proposals, he felt that the UNC should support the resolution
for its psychological and publicity value.35

No action was taken on his suggestion
until February. Then the State Department learned that the question of an exchange
of sick and wounded would probably be raised when the U.N. General Assembly
met on 24 February.
The political advantage in having the United States propose and support a resolution
of this nature was obvious and the State Department had little difficulty in
securing the approval of the JCS and of Clark.36

On 22
February the Far East commander thus sent a letter
to Kim and Peng requesting an immediate exchange of sick and injured prisoners.
He believed they would turn it down, as they had earlier efforts along this
line.37

The matter lay fallow during the remainder
of the month and most of March. In the meantime, the enemy

412

sustained the flow of complaints on
prisoner of war incidents, infringements of the vital area by UNC aircraft,
and even resurrected the charge that the UNC was resorting to germ warfare.
On 24 February
Clark issued a statement refuting the Chinese claim that captured American personnel
had admitted the employment of germ warfare. He pointed out that Communists
evidently expected new outbreaks of disease during the spring and were trying
to cover up the inadequacy of their own health service to cope with epidemics.
In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the U.N. command had never engaged in germ
warfare in Korea.38

As March opened, events began to change
the world situation dramatically. Stalin's successor, Georgi M. Malenkov, assumed
the reins of government on 5 March and another transition period for world communism
was inaugurated. Whether the policies of the new controlling group surrounding
Malenkov would differ radically from those of Stalin was unknown, but that there
would have to be a period of consolidation to establish Malenkov and his associates
in power seemed self-evident. Under the circumstances, the United States and
its allies cautiously awaited indications of the direction that the Malenkov
regime intended to take.

Although the Communist prisoners of
war seemed little affected by Stalin's death and mounted an attack on the prison
commandant on the island of Yoncho-do on 7 March, which resulted in the death
of twenty-three prisoners and the wounding of sixty more, there were signs that
a shift in Soviet strategy might be approaching.39
On 21 March Moscow
radio, for the first time since the close of World War II, admitted that the
United States and Great Britain had played a role in the defeat of the Axis
Powers. The Russians also agreed to intervene to obtain the release of nine
British diplomats and missionaries held captive in North Korea since the outbreak
of the Korean War. In Germany, the Soviet reaction to the West German ratification
of the European Defense Community treaty was fairly mild.40 The possibility that a new Communist peace offensive
was in the making evoked a spirit of hope in diplomatic circles throughout the
non-Communist world.

The big break came on
28 March. Replying to Clark's request for the
exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, Kim and Peng said that they were perfectly
willing to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in this respect
and then went on to state: "At the same time, we consider that the reasonable
settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of both
sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth
settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an
armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing." 41

What the Communist leaders meant by
their vague reference to a "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners
of war" was a matter of conjecture, but their acceptance of the sick and wounded
exchange promoted optimism.

413

Clark immediately told the JCS that
he would go ahead with the arrangements for the sick and wounded through the
liaison officers, but would decline to resume plenary sessions until the enemy
either came forward with a constructive proposal or demonstrated willingness
to accept one of the offers that the UNC had made.42 In their reply,
his superiors suggested that Clark's letter imply that the Communists intended
to meet in substance the UNC position on prisoners if the negotiations were
reconvened. In this way the burden would be placed upon the enemy to
either agree to that assumption or admit publicly that there was no change in
their stand on repatriation. In no case, the Washington leaders concluded, would
the resumption of negotiations be tied in as a condition for the exchange of
the sick and wounded.43 Clark followed the instructions and dispatched
his response to Kim and Peng on 31 March.44

While Tokyo and Washington pondered
the significance of the Communist move, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of Communist
China, provided a measure of clarification. On 30 March he issued a statement
covering the course of the negotiations and the agreements already reached.
Chou then went on to the prisoner of war problem and offered what apparently
was the key concession, as he urged that both sides "should undertake to repatriate
immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in
their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining
prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to
the question of their repatriation." Lest the U.N. Command assume that the enemy
had surrendered its views on repatriation, Chou strongly
affirmed that the Communists believed that the prisoners of war had been filled
with apprehensions and were afraid to return home "under the intimidation and
with oppression of the opposite side." He was confident that once explanations
could be tendered to the prisoners, they would quickly decide to be repatriated.45At any rate, the Chou proposal, which was quickly seconded by Kim
Il Sung the following day, presented the brightest hope of settling the Korean
War since screening in April 1952.

The initial reaction to Chou's communication
in Washington was continued caution. While not denying that it held promise,
the U.S. leaders maintained that the Communists still had to come forward with
a detailed plan for implementing their proposal. They could foresee a
number of questions that would have to be answered such
as: What did Chou mean by a "neutral" state? Where would the neutral state take
over control of the prisoners- in or outside of Korea? Who would make the explanations?
Who would determine the final disposition of the nonrepatriates? If the Communists
went forward with the exchange of sick and wounded and produced a detailed statement
indicating their good faith in desiring a settlement of the over-all problem,
the American leaders were willing to permit

414

concurrent discussion of Chou's proposal
during the exchange.46

Clark agreed fully that the enemy must
produce a concrete plan for discussion before the plenary sessions could reconvene
and that the Communist performance in following through on the sick and wounded
trade would provide a demonstration of their good faith. In a letter to the
enemy leaders on 5 April, he proposed that the liaison officers meet the following
day and requested that Kim and Peng furnish the UNC with more particulars on
the Communist method for disposition of the nonrepatriation question.47

In preparation for the first meeting
of the liaison officers on the arrangements for the transfer of the sick and
wounded, Clark and his staff formulated a UNC plan. It contemplated that each
prisoner to be exchanged would be brought to Panmunjom, furnished with a medical
tag on his condition and treatment and given unmarked, serviceable clothing.
No incapacitated prisoner accused of postcapture war crimes would be held back
for this reason, since it did not appear probable now that war crimes trials
would ever be held. To insure that the enemy return the maximum number of UNC
personnel, Clark told Harrison to avoid the use of the term "seriously" sick
and wounded. As for the treatment of the prisoners turned back to the UNC through
the exchange, Clark wanted to permit the members of the press and
other news media to observe the whole process, but to restrict their numbers
to fifty at Panmunjom and to allow interviews only with the prisoners selected
by medical personnel as physically and mentally up to being questioned.48

Operation LITTLE SWITCH

Admiral Daniel and General Lee Sang
Cho led the liaison officers groups when they gathered at Panmunjom on 6 April.
Relieved of the task of lodging and refuting charges and complaints, the representatives
quickly got down to business and Admiral Daniel launched into an account of
the UNC proposal. The United Nations Command was ready to start immediate construction
of the facilities necessary for the delivery and receipt of the sick and wounded
at Panmunjom and to begin delivery of 500 prisoners a day within seven days
of the agreement on procedures. To expedite matters Daniel suggested that each
side turn over its lists of names and nationalities of the prisoners to be exchanged
and that officers be appointed to discuss administrative details. Lee pointed
out that the Communists wanted to repatriate all sick and
wounded eligibles under Articles 109 and 110
of the Geneva Convention.49

415

After
some hesitation, while the UNC checked the Geneva Convention carefully, Daniel
informed the Communists on 7 April that his side was prepared to repatriate
all prisoners eligible under the two articles, subject to the proviso that no
individual would be repatriated against his will. Daniel stressed that the UNC
would give the broadest interpretation possible to the term "sick and wounded."50

The effort of the United Nations Command
to encourage the enemy to return as many prisoners as possible met with a disappointing
response. When Lee announced the total on 8 April of
450 Korean and
150 non-Korean sick and wounded, Daniel called
the figure "incredibly small." Actually, considering that the enemy was returning
600 of the 12,000
prisoners under its control, or 5
percent, the figure compared favorably with that presented by the UNC. For the
latter intended to transfer 700 Chinese and 5,100
Koreans over to the enemy out of the 132,000 prisoners in its
custody and this averaged out to only about 4.5
percent. Nevertheless, Daniel again asked the
Communists to be more liberal in their classification of the sick and wounded.51
As he told Clark after the meeting, the enemy liaison officers relaxed their
strained attitudes visibly after the UNC disclosed its figures and he felt that
he should press strongly for an increase in the totals the UNC would receive.52

In the succeeding days the details
were gradually worked out. Security guards at
Panmunjom were increased to thirty for each side during the exchange period
and the UNC agreed to let the Communists move the prisoners up to the conference
area in convoys of five vehicles over routes that were clearly marked out.53

The agreement that was signed on t t April completed the
general arrangements. Within ten days the exchange at Panmunjom would begin,
with the enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500
a day in groups of
25 at a time. Rosters prepared by nationality,
including name, rank, and serial number would accompany each group and receipts
would be signed for a group as it was turned over to the other side.54

April
20 was established as the date for initiating
LITTLE SWITCH,
as the U.N. Command dubbed the operation, and in the interim trucks and trains
began to transport the Communist prisoners north from Koje-do and the other
offshore islands. On 14
April, twenty-three vehicles left the North Korean prison camps with the first
contingent of UNC sick and wounded. Five days later the first trainload of enemy
prisoners set out from Pusan to Munsan. But even as the Communist invalids prepared
to go home, they sought to embarrass the UNC. Some refused a new issue of clothing
because the letter "P" for prisoner had not been stenciled on the shirts. Others
would not permit UNC personnel to dust them with DDT powder. Demonstrations
broke out, with chanting and singing, until camp authorities warned the leaders
that failure to obey orders would result in loss of their opportunity

416

for repatriation. As the prisoners
rode to the waiting LST for shipment to the mainland, they threw away their
rations of tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes with hand-printed propaganda messages
cached inside, charging the United States with "starvation, oppression and barbarous
acts against the Korean people." At Pusan they demanded the right of inspection
of hospital facilities before they debarked and had to be told they would be
forcibly removed unless they complied with instructions. Some of the Chinese
went on a hunger strike for several meals because they claimed that the food
had been poisoned. When the time came for the final train ride from Pusan
to Munsan, many of the prisoners cut off buttons, severed the half-belts of
their overcoats, and removed their shoelaces in an attempt to create the impression
that they had been poorly treated.55

As the U.N. Command gathered all of
the Communist prisoners eligible for return, it discovered that there were more
than 5,800 who could be repatriated. The question immediately arose whether
to include the additional 550 Communists in the exchange or to adhere to the
original tally. General Clark felt that the advantages of demonstrating

417

the good faith of the UNC and of possibly
spurring the enemy to increase its total of returnees outweighed the disadvantages
of introducing a new figure and his superiors agreed.56

A new element was injected into the
situation after LITTLE SWITCH
got under way on 20
April. When the UNC sick and wounded were delivered to Panmunjom they were rushed
back to Munsan for initial processing. Some were then flown to Japan for rest
and treatment preparatory to shipment home, while the ROK patients were transferred
to base hospitals in South Korea. As the press
descended upon the prisoners for accounts of their experiences while in Communist
hands, stories arose of other ill and injured prisoners still remaining in the
enemy camps. Harrison quickly suggested that the UNC use the 550 extra Communist
prisoners as a lever to pry more UNC personnel away from the enemy. But Clark
preferred that Harrison simply ask the Communists to reexamine the matter, since
many prisoners might not be in a fit condition to be moved.57

418

Whether the enemy was influenced by
the UNC revelation that it was going to turn over 550 more patients than originally
estimated, or by the uproar that the press stories of the UNC sick and wounded
reportedly still in Communist custody occasioned in the United States, was difficult
to ascertain. On 23 April, however, the Communists did announce that they would
also exceed the 600 figure that they had submitted.58

Hoping to encourage further relaxation
of the Communists' standards, the
UNC added more enemy prisoners to its list, but on 26 April General Lee abruptly
stated that his side had completed its share of the exchange. When Admiral Daniel
protested that evidence in UNC possession showed that there were still about
375 UNC sick and wounded who could be repatriated, Lee termed it a groundless
accusation and refused to consider the matter. Faced with an unyielding stand,
the U.N. Command on 3 May finished delivering the last group of Communists that
it intended to turn over.59

The final tally of deliveries
disclosed

419

that the UNC had
relieved itself of 5,194 North Korean and 1,030
Chinese soldiers and 446 civilian internees,
for a total of 6,670. Of these patients 357 were litter cases. In return the
enemy had brought 684 assorted sick and wounded, including 94 litter cases,
to Panmunjom.60

Perhaps the Communists had not been
as liberal as many had hoped, but at least they had carried out their part of
the bargain and thrown in a small bonus. In the light of this performance and
the apparent disposition of the enemy to put an end to the shooting war in Korea,
the resumption of plenary negotiations seemed to be in order.

Preparations for the Return toPlenary Sessions

While the Communists were evidencing their
sincerity in following through with the LITTLE
SWITCH exchange,
General Clark and his advisors sought to find out more about the intent and
extent of the concession that Chou had offered on 30 March. As already pointed
out, the Chinese statement had produced a mixed atmosphere of hope and caution
throughout the non-Communist world, but it had been couched in such vague terms
that it generated more questions than it answered. Clark's letter to Kim and
Peng on 5 April had asked for further details and clarification.

The response came from Nam Il
rather than his superiors on 9 April.
Repeating in essence the same line that Chou had used about the Communist desires
to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and to permit the prisoners to return
home quickly, Nam went on:

It is precisely on
the basis of this principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war that our
side firmly maintain that the detaining side should ensure that no coercive
means whatsoever be employed against all the prisoners of war in its custody
to obstruct their returning home . . . . The Korean and Chinese side does not
acknowledge that there are prisoners of war who are allegedly unwilling to be
repatriated. Therefore the question of the so-called 'forced repatriation' or
'repatriation by force' does not exist at all, and we have always opposed this
assertion. Based on this stand of ours, our side maintains that those captured
personnel of our side who are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return
home as a result of having been subjected to intimidation and oppression, should
be handed over to a neutral state, and through explanations given by our side,
gradually freed from apprehensions . . . .61

Based on Nam's reply, the problem was
quite simple-if the U.N. Command would stop trying to detain the prisoners forcibly
and would hand them over to a neutral nation, the Communists would soon convince
the so-called nonrepatriates of the needlessness of their fears and all would
be glad to go home. It was a glib attempt to save face and dismiss their concession
as only procedural and not substantive.

Although Nam's letter failed to answer
the questions that the Washington leaders had raised earlier on the identity
of the neutral nation or on the treat-

420

ment of the nonrepatriates once they
were surrendered to the neutral nation, these were details that the plenary
conference would have to settle. But to maintain the initiative, the UNC notified
Nam on 16 April that since his letter had not offered concrete proposals, it
assumed that the Communists were either ready to accept one of the UNC's earlier
plans or to offer a constructive one of their own. To prepare the enemy with
some idea of what the UNC considered constructive, Harrison cited Switzerland
as a neutral state in view of its long tradition in this respect and urged that
the neutral state take custody of the nonrepatriates in Korea itself. As for
the time limit for persuading the nonrepatriates to come back home, sixty days
appeared sufficient. In closing Harrison warned that if the plenary meetings
did not give promise of an acceptable agreement within a reasonable time, the
UNC would recess them again.62

On the eve of the
LITTLE SWITCH
Operation, Admiral Daniel proposed 23 April as
a date for the resumption of plenary conferences, but the Communist representative
preferred 25 April. Later on they postponed the opening date to 26 April.63

The few days before the first meeting
proved a busy period of last-minute preparations and instructions. Clark told
Harrison to reject the Soviet Union or any of its satellites as candidates for
the neutral state role and to insist upon the retention of the nonrepatriates
in Korea. In response to the Far East commander's
request for acceptable nominations for the neutral state, his superiors advanced
Switzerland and Sweden in that order. They felt that he could agree to a go-day
limit for the custody of the nonrepatriates by neutral nations. As a talking
point, General Collins told Clark that the U.N. Command should emphasize the
fact that it had the absolute legal right to grant asylum and was making a major
concession in permitting a neutral nation to assume control of the nonrepatriate
prisoners.64

To acquaint Clark with current policy
on a Korean settlement, the JCS forwarded some basic instructions on 23 April
for his guidance. The first two items were direct inheritances from the previous
administration and reaffirmed that it was to the interest of the United States
to obtain an acceptable armistice, yet not at the expense of a compromise on
the principle of no forced repatriation. Until proved to the contrary, the instructions
stated, the Communist proposal would be taken at its face value; however, the
United States would not countenance long and inconclusive haggling. Since the
UNC had seized the initiative through the Harrison suggestions of 16 April,
it should strive to retain this favorable position to keep the enemy on the
defensive. Any of the former plans submitted by the UNC would be satisfactory
as a basis for agreement, but it might be desirable to confine the task of processing
nonrepatriates to the Chinese and to release the

421

North Koreans without further processing,
the instructions concluded.65

Thus, in the six months of recess,
the top political personnel in the United States had been replaced, but the
politics lingered on. The new leaders had tried several minor expedients to
induce the Communists to halt the fighting in Korea and the enemy had reciprocated
with its own brand of pressure. Under ordinary circumstances, this game could
have been played indefinitely, without reaching a decision. But, with the death
of Stalin, the balance shifted to the advantage of the U.N. Command. It would
appear from Soviet actions in March and April that the removal of external distractions
such as the Korean affair with its drain on Russian resources acquired a new
sense of urgency during the period of consolidation of power. As part of the new peace offensive, or as Secretary Dulles termed
it, peace "defensive," launched after Stalin's demise, the Communists' concession
on the nonrepatriate question dangled the hope of a settlement before the eyes
of the United States and its allies.66 Based on past experience,
however, the UNC was properly cautious as it prepared to discover just what
the Communists had in mind. The brightening prospect for an armistice was tempered
by the rising tide of opposition in South Korea to any agreement that accepted
a disunited Korea. In the critical days that lay ahead the UNC might well find
it more difficult to deal with the dissension behind its lines than with the
enemy.

4 From the context it is
evident that Secretary Acheson used the term "UNC" loosely, encompassing the
political and military leadership in the U.S. and other allied U.N. countries.
As already noted, General Ridgway had had misgivings about the UNC position
on voluntary repatriation before it became the official stand. See Chapter VII,
above.

5 Department of State Publication 4771, The Problem
of Peace in Korea, a report by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, October
24, 1952 (Washington, 1952).

49
First Meeting of Liaison Group for discussing arrangement for repatriation of
sick and wounded captured personnel, 6 April 53, in G-3 file, Transcript of
Proceedings, Meetings of Liaison Group, 6 April-2 May 1953. All the meetings
of the group are in the above file and will be henceforth referred to only by
number and date.

60
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, app. I, p. 51. A breakdown of the UNC and Communist
repatriates and nonrepatriates involved in the prisoner of war exchanges in
1953-54 will be found in Appendixes B-1 and B-2.