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To: skunk-works-digest@mail.orst.edu
Subject: Skunk Works Digest V5 #571
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Skunk Works Digest Friday, 15 December 1995 Volume 05 : Number 571
In this issue:
Re: A-12 geneology (long)
Skunk Works Secrecy Memo
Re: A-12 geneology (shorter)
Re: Waverider [NASP]
re: grounding of SR-71s
re: grounding of SR-71s
Re: Waverider [NASP]
re: grounding of SR-71s
See the end of the digest for information on subscribing to the skunk-works
or skunk-works-digest mailing lists and on how to retrieve back issues.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Paul Adams
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 1995 06:37:17 -0600
Subject: Re: A-12 geneology (long)
"Art Hanley" writes:
> It is also
> known that some of the problems were in fact concealed from DoD. The
> final straw came when soon after a major management review where DoD
> seemed assured that that had good cost and schedule figures and so
> briefed Congress, it surfaced that the plane would experience another
> delay and an additional $1 billion would be needed for R&D to meet
> spec.
I remember this well as I worked at McDonnell Douglas at that time.
Secretary of Defense Cheney briefed Congress that everything with the
A-12 was fine. Then it surfaces that there are problems with the
aircraft. This basically makes Cheney look like he was lied to by
those under him. I have no doubt that this embarrassment played a
part in getting the A-12 cancelled. (Nor do I blame him, though I liked
the flying Dorito.)
> Meanwhile, back in court, the A-12 team and the Government were
> suing each other. ***snip*** So Far, the courts have tended to rule
> in favor of the contractors, but everybody is appealing everything
> (you're not surprised, are you?).
Considering this all happened just a few years ago, the litigation
should continue for the next decade or so. This is one of those
situations were the lawyers (who never work on a fixed price contract)
*really* win big.
Great article Art.
Paul
\ ___ / Paul Adams
\ /___\ / paul@erc.msstate.edu
____________\___/__.__\___/____________ YF-22
\ \ / /
\__/\___/\__/
------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 08:12:29 cst
Subject: Skunk Works Secrecy Memo
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Subject: Skunk Works Secrecy Memo
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Lockheed Martin Skunk Works
1011 Lockheed Way
Palmdale, CA 93599
Ms. Joan Vail
Counsel for Security Policy
2201 C Street, NW
Room 225, SA-44
Washington, DC 20522-4402
Dear Ms. Vail:
Thank you for the opportunity of presenting my thoughts to your
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Attached are
my comments on each of the four requested areas: classification,
declassification, personnel security, and information security.
For more than fifty years, the Skunk Works has worked on highly
classified efforts. We are unique in the fact that ninety percent of our
work is classified. This presents us with particular problems. For
example, the inability to clear and/or access an individual to a
contract or program means that the individual will more than likely lose
his/her job.
A problem that continues to plague the Skunk Works is the vast
difference in security requirements between our customers. These
differences subject the Skunk Works continually to inspections by
multiple customers utilizing different criteria. The new National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual is attempting to solve
these problems. However, a lot must change before true savings can be
achieved by the present attempts at standardization.
I believe the government needs to evaluate each contractor on its
performance. I stand behind the Skunk Works record of secrecy. Our
success is evident in the security attached to such programs as the F-
117, U-2 and SR-71. Their very existence was unknown for years. I feel
that security should be included as a criteria for fee awards on
contracts. This would not only provide an incentive for efficient, cost
effective security, but allow security to become a revenue producer as
opposed to an expense.
We are headed in the right direction. Commissions such as yours are
fostering government and industry cooperation which will result in
better security at lower costs.
Sincerely,
J.S. Gordon, President
Lockheed Martin Skunk Works
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lockheed Martin
POINT PAPER
RESPONSE TO
COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
13 September 1995
LOCKHEED MARTIN SKUNK WORKS
Division of Lockheed Martin Corporation
1011 Lockheed Way
Palmdale, CA 93599
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. BACKGROUND
As requested, we are responding to the Commission's request for
information on our thoughts and comments on the impact of preserving the
secrecy of sensitive projects. We concur with the Commission's efforts
to make comprehensive proposals for reform designed to reduce the volume
of information classified and thereby strengthen the protection of
legitimately classified information. The economic environment is such
that every effort must be made to assure the adequacy of protection
within the constraints of a security system that is simplified, more
uniform and more cost-effective.
In the ever-changing environment in which we work, a lot has evolved
since the Commission was formed. The current system for classifying,
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information is
contained with Executive Order 12958, dated April 1995. This order
prescribes all pertinent details concerning classification standards,
levels, categories, and authority. This order further defines the
duration of classification and declassification/ downgrading. The
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) further
promulgates these regulations, and flows derivative classification
authority and guidance to the contractor community. In short, the
Government Contracting Authority is the classification authority and
issues classification guidance to the contractor in the form of
classification specification and security guides. The contractor role is
to classify, based on this guidance (derivative classification), and
challenge what it believes to be improperly classified information.
Implementation of these measures on a consistent basis will go a long
ways to drive down the cost of security.
2. ISSUES IN PRESERVING SECRECY
2.1 Extent of Classification/ Consequences of Overclassification
In original classification, the government has often relied on outdated
perceptions concerning the value of the information, the whims of an
overzealous classification official or, if all else fails, the status
quo. Special access program managers have always had the power to
independently set security policy within their program. This culture of
secrecy often contributes to initially classifying more information than
required, over- classification of information, and not downgrading or
declassifying information in a timely manner. Often times this promotes
empires and limits oversight. The consequence of this action directly
relates to added cost affecting the bottom line of industry and
inflating procurement costs to the government.
* Overclassifying technology inhibits information exchange between
programs and leads to "reinventing the wheel."
* Classifying contractual and financial data within a corporation, which
in today's environment should rarely be classified, inhibits accurate
forecasting, limits oversight, and could eventually lead to an erosion
in shareholder value based on unavailab ility of information for
analysis.
* From a legal standpoint, classifying unnecessary paperwork can put the
company and the customer in jeopardy of union actions and lawsuits.
Issues that we experience daily pit an overzealous need to limit access
against the rights of a bargaining unit employee of employment based on
seniority.
* For larger programs, massive declassification would not only eliminate
unneeded protection for older information but would also have the
potential for decreasing the amount of classified areas that are
dedicated to storage.
Most information is perishable. A rational government-wide standard of
classification should serve as a guide for all classification decisions.
It is the duty of the classification official and the program to do a
uniform and realistic risk assessment that defines not only what
information is classified, but how long it can be reasonably assumed to
require that protection. If a declassification date cannot be
established, a reasonable review date should be set up and adhered to.
It is evident that any unnecessary restriction to information flow will
create added cost and inefficiencies in an organization. One method of
avoiding this is to address proper classification up front.
* Our recent Tier III Minus program is a good example of cost avoidance in
this area. Early in the program, Lockheed and ARPA worked diligently to
establish realistic security guidance geared to the program goals-- a
compressed schedule and roll out ni ne months later. The result was the
ability to do a job without unnecessary restraints while protecting the
technological capabilities. This was an acknowledged special access
program.
* Unfortunately, unacknowledged special access programs do not always work
as well since they are at the mercy of the program managers and numerous
security guides. These programs usually involve long lead technologies
that are oftentimes classified on generalities and do not address review
cycles for downgrading or declassification. This results in multiple
customers applying multiple security requirements. A fallout of this is
the fact that inspections are now comprised of multiple agencies, multip
le programs within agencies, and a cast of inspectors continually
inspecting the same items within the contractor facility. This
repetition adds both time and money to the government and contractors.
Eliminating this redundancy within nspections (e.g., e very customer
checking the alarm systems, plant protection response times, government
security files, visitor control procedures, etc.) would create less
intrusive inspections and save time all around. The bottom line is
inspecting the common criteria on ly once.
To eliminate the added cost of secrecy requires cooperation of
government and industry. We need to work together to establish the
realistic classification guideline and properly identify exactly what
information requires protection, while at the same time keeping program
goals in mind. Also, proper oversight and management of a recognized and
timely declassification review process is required to eliminate
unnecessary security protection and allow effective flow of information.
2.2 Personnel Security
Personnel security, the cornerstone of the security system, is only as
good as the trustworthiness of the people in possession of (or
responsible for) classified information.
* Personnel Security Clearance: The granting of a clearance means the
individual has been screened and met the criteria for clearance in such
areas as: financial stability, immoderate alcohol/ illegal drug use,
foreign involvement/ connections, arrest records, psychological/ mental
counseling.
* Periodic Re-evaluation: Each cleared employee needs to be periodically
re-evaluated to assess his/her ability to continue to safeguard
classified information and five- to seven-year periodic reviews should
be continued.
* Periodic reviews would be more effective if they consisted of a standard
Counter Intelligence (CI) scope polygraph for contractor personnel.
* A set of three to five questions dealing with trustworthiness (e.g.
"Have you sold information to another country?"), rather than lifestyle
questions, should be the standard for the polygraph.
* Adverse Information Reporting: Adverse reporting is very important
because it can trigger a new background investigation.
* Every American convicted of espionage might have been stopped, if
identifiable adverse information had been reported.
* A strong security education program is required to motivate our
employees to be responsible citizens and to report behavior that calls
into question the integrity or trustworthiness of a cleared employee.
* The greatest threat to a defense contractor does not come from outside
sources. Historically, it has been someone from within that is most
likely to commit espionage.
The personnel security system has recently become easier for
contractors.
* The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) agents and the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) have adopted a user-
friendly and helpful perspective towards industry.
* The advent of computers has enabled contractors to process Personnel
Security Questionnaires (PSQs) in a timely manner. Modern technology has
allowed us to process and store information with a great deal of
efficiency.
* On-line capabilities have alleviated the seven-day delay in waiting for
mail deliveries for Letters of Consent. This permits employees on lay-
off or in holding tanks to report to their work stations expeditiously.
* The NISPOM relaxed the need for extensive paperwork for reinstatement/
revalidation/ transfer. It is now possible to utilize a one-page form
for these purposes.
* DIS has granted a waiver to transfer clearances within all Lockheed
Martin companies, to easily merge and reorganize the new corporation.
* DIS is transitioning into more of a partnership with industry. An
example of this partnership is the amount of time needed to clear an
individual from "hire" to "start date." The ISM [the old Industrial
Security Manual] gave only 30 days. At the Skunk Works most employees
must possess a final clearance before they can start work. A final
clearance takes between 3 months to 6 months on an average-- and as long
as one year in some instances. We requested a waiver from this 30-day
requirement and asked instead for 120 days processing time. The waiver
was granted, and the NISPOM, which replaced the Industrial Security
Manual (ISM), changed the processing time to 180 days.
* This partnership is a reality-- especially at the local level. DIS
representatives visit the facility and know what is going on. They have
adopted a "teamwork" approach (e.g. sharing information, solving
problems, etc.) rather than behaving like a policing agency looking for
problems.
The future offers a more timely and less expensive personnel security
system.
* Beginning late this year, a new standard form will be utilized for all
clearance requests, i.e. Top Secret, Secret and Confidential clearances.
* The Privacy Portion on the new form will be easier for employees to
complete due to the fact that most of the questions will address only
the last seven years.
* Eventually, all forms will be on-line to DISCO, including the new PSQ,
User Agency endorsement letters, and fingerprint cards. Contractors
cannot accomplish transmission if any of the required data is missing
from forms, which will eliminate time-consuming rejections.
The personnel security system needs even more refinement.
* The new personnel security Executive Order, requiring a financial
disclosure, is poor "risk management"; it speaks more towards "risk
avoidance." If someone makes the decision to commit espionage, he/she
would not hesitate to lie on a financial disclosure statement. Financial
disclosure would also have a negative effect on our industry by keeping
good people from becoming involved in an industry that invades their
privacy.
* Contractors are required to complete a local file check-- which
encompasses a review of personnel files, Government Security files,
payroll (wage garnishments), etc., and a supervisor certification for a
Top Secret clearance at the time a request for clearance has been
initiated. When Defense Investigative Service (DIS) agents arrive to
investigate, they perform exactly the same file checks. This is a time-
consuming task and a duplication of effort.
* Change the requirement to report traffic violators to a certain number
with a certain time-span. Increase dollar amount on traffic citations to
be reported as adverse information (not to include alcohol or drugs).
* The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals needs to make more timely
decisions of whether to grant or deny an employee a security clearance.
In some cases, it takes six months to a year for a decision.
* It is redundant to submit a complete PSQ package for adverse information
(e.g. wage garnishments) which has already been reported and favorably
adjudicated within the past 12 to 18 months.
* Program access criteria should be standardized for SAP/SAR programs.
2.3 Information Systems Security
More attention must, by necessity, be focused on information systems
security.
* We are totally dependent upon computer systems to perform almost every
aspect of our complex classified contracts. Threats to national security
information disseminated across electronic information systems are very
real. The increased value of US technical information necessitates
balancing national policy objectives and the importance of sharing
information with the need to protect our leading edge technologies.
* The majority of incidents involving information systems are caused by
authorized individuals doing unauthorized activities. Strong technical
measures already exist to keep the outside out (encryption, firewalls,
passwords, etc.). It appears there is more benefit to information
systems security through an effective personnel security program than
arbitrary, costly physical restrictions on the computer systems.
* There is no doubt that increased connectivity creates greater
vulnerabilities. However, the advent of the NISPOM has not really
addressed implementing security requirements based on risk management
factors, but, instead, appears to be aimed at risk avoidance.
* The NISPOM, Chapter 8, "Automated Information Systems Security," above
all other chapters in the manual, requires extensive changes in our
automated information systems security program that are more restrictive
and that have significant cost impact to industry. For example:
* All procedures for our classified computer systems must be totally
rewritten to accommodate new NISPOM requirements. This is an extensive
investment of manpower for this contractor as we currently have over 150
Standard Practice Procedures for 1200 classified systems. There is a
further concern with the implementation of the NISPOM Supplement used by
our special access program customers, i.e. can the contractor come up
with a single set of procedures that can be adapted to special programs
and "white world" programs without each special access program
retreating to its own format as they have done in the past.
* A Certification Test Plan, which outlines the inspection and test
procedures to demonstrate compliance with the security requirement
associated with the mode of operation must be developed for each
classified system. As a minimum for dedicated systems, the test plan
must verify that system access controls and/or procedures are functional
and provide test results that verify the need to know controls are
implemented. This is a costly requirement. By definition, these tests
mandate highly technical personnel perform these tests. We rely on our
Information Services personnel to assist with security tests and
evaluations, but their services are charged back to programs incurred
with each test. Additionally, each contractor is conducting its own
tests on similar equipment, meaning each contractor is "reinventing the
wheel" rather than sharing test results for specific configurations.
* Storage media used for Top Secret processing may not be used for Secret
processing. It may not be declassified; destruction of the storage media
is the only acceptable method. Up until a year ago, almost without
exception, storage devices used for classified special access program
processing (regardless of classification level) were required to be
destroyed. In one instance the Skunk Work was required to destroy over
$300,000 worth of storage devices used on one of its classified
mainframe processors (we had upgraded from double- density storage
devices to triple-density storage devices). Recently, we have been
allowed to degauss or overwrite Confidential and Secret special access
program storage devices for reallocation on other special access
programs. However, Top Secret storage devices must still be destroyed.
* A bigger issue with storage devices is with the prohibition against
using Top Secret storage devices for multiple special access programs
from different User Agencies (e.g., Air Force special access programs
will not allow their devices to be used by Navy or Army special access
programs). The main impact here is with our supercomputing efforts.
Supercomputers and their storage devices are expensive; contractors
cannot afford to purchase separate storage devices for each
classification level, each program, and each agency. We appear to be
spending more dollars "protecting us from us." Economies of scale demand
that once a system is approved at the Top Secret level, it should be
available to multiple programs and agencies (with "clearing" between
processing sessions).
* The contractor must validate the functionality of security-related
software, requiring the similar technical expertise as that required for
Certification Tests. In addition, and much more costly, is the
requirement to verify all software is free of malicious code prior to
installation. This is a prime example of implementing "risk avoidance"
rather than "risk management." The expense of line code and virus checks
of every standard off-the-shelf software package used on a classified
system is not warranted. With over 1,200 classified systems in use by
the Skunk Works, the manpower required to virus check each software
revision on each system prior to installation would be untenable.
More and more, special access program customers are becoming involved in
how the Skunk Works protects its unclassified systems as well as its
classified systems.
* The Joint Security Commission report, "Redefining Security," and the
Information Infrastructure Task Force's report, "NII Security: The
Federal Role," clearly shows this interest is warranted, not only by our
customers, but by the Corporation itself. But as both of these reports
point out, there is a need to better understand what will be needed to
make our information secure enough to ensure information security and
network reliability. Until we have a better understanding of the "what,"
the government should not implement arbitrary and costly security
measures. Government contractors and computer vendors should expand the
time sharing of information system vulnerabilities and countermeasures.
3. SUMMARY
The past few years have seen great changes in the security programs in
the United States. Foremost among these changes have been the approval
of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) and Executive Order
12958. These are significant improvements in standardizing requirements
for the contractor community. As we have pointed out, they can still be
improved upon. The work of the Joint Security Commission and now the
forming of your Commission are another positive step forward. Even with
the current strides, we are still spending too much protecting us from
ourselves. We need to be more conscious of utilizing risk management
instead of risk avoidance methods in determining security requirements
in this era of diminishing assets.
I do believe we need to concentrate a large part of our efforts on
Information and Personnel Security programs. This is money well spent.
In all other areas the risk management versus risk avoidance approach
must be stringently and intelligently applied. Only continuous
meaningful Government/ Industry participation in defining the rules,
combined with the appropriate oversight will allow us to drive down the
exorbitant costs of security. We look forward to providing you with any
additional information that can be of assistance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
From: Greg Fieser
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 1995 10:07:07 -0600
Subject: Re: A-12 geneology (shorter)
Art,
Thanks for the A-12 synopsis. Here's a few more comments...
>
> I haven't seen the message that Greg was responding to...
I received an apparently private posting from a name I recognized as a
frequent contributer to the list, and automatically/inadvertently responded
to all. The post referred to the name 'Avenger", and the poster somehow had
confused the Grumman TBF-1 series with the ATA/A-12/Avenger II topic.....
happens all the time (?) :)
>
> ... one of the requirements that has been
> disclosed would have required the plane to open the weapons bay
> doors, eject the weapon(s) and close the doors in 1/2 second.
True. The internal bays featured trapeze structures similar to those seen
on the F-117 and YF-22, and an ultra-high pressure hydraulic system (again,
similar to those on the YF-22) to operate the fast-action door/trapeze weapon
mechanisms. Also, the plane was configured to carry external stores (primarily
ferry tanks). The entire store/pylon assembly was designed to be jettisoned,
with the structural pylon connection points internal to the wing, and covered
by a door assembly after store jettison to maintain stealth characteristics.
These features are present on the A-12 mockup in Ft. Worth. (you should see the
stealthy RAT (ram air turbine) contraption they came up with!!)
You can also imagine all of the stealth issues involved on an airframe with
folding wings! Also, the wingtips are so sharp/pointed (on the mockup) that
they keep styrofoam blocks stuck on them to protect the restoration workers...
>
> ... The GD-MDD team was lead by a company with no
> carrier air experience and had weight problems on previous aircraft.
An interesting side note here: LTV/Vought/insertnameofthemonthhere is
about 30 miles (as the A-7 flies) from the GD plant in Ft. Worth. About the
time the A-12 design phase was starting up, LTV/Vought had a lot of idle
engineers from the B-2 program sitting around, and the two companies worked
out an agreement where Vought engineers went to work at GD on A-12. According
to the transplanted engineers I knew, GD saw themselves as the premier designer
of modern day aircraft (F-16). This is arguable true for ALUMINUM aircraft
structures, but GD had essentially no composite structural design experience
(at the time). The LTV/Vought guys brought that experience with them from
their B-2 work, but were politely poo-poo'ed off into the corner by the "we
know how to build airplanes" GD engineers. The resulting massive composite
structural elements that resulted contributed greatly to the weight problems
on the A-12. (I understand this point may offend many GD A-12 engineers - I
admittedly have only heard one side of this story, and would welcome informed
counterpoints...)
One more comment - weight issues aside, the A-12 was a HUGE aircraft. I don't
have the published dimensions handy, but take it from someone who's seen it.
It was a "BMF" - carrier landings would have been an awesome sight to behold...
Greg Fieser
(since I am self-employed, the above views DO reflect those of my employer)
------------------------------
From: fmarkus@pipeline.com (Frank Markus)
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 1995 11:44:23 -0500
Subject: Re: Waverider [NASP]
>Steve Schaper further writes:
>>>though the object is not a manned vehicle, but long-range artillery
>>>projectiles.
>
>I have heard of waverider 'projectiles' too, although I am not aware of
>artillery applications (interesting shaped shell) being studied and
tested. I'd
>be interested in hearing more about that.
I believe that the word "waverider" is used ambiguously. One meaning is
that which has been the focus of this discussion: an aircraft that rides
its own hypersonic shock wave. A second, earlier, meaning is a system that
uses external beams to guide aircraft or projectiles to their target.
Examples of such systems date back to the Second World War bombing of
London and continue to the modern laser designators.
------------------------------
From: Mary Shafer
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 1995 13:51:28 -0500 (EST)
Subject: re: grounding of SR-71s
Er, it costs a great deal more than 35K per hour to fly the SR-71,
particularly if you're the Air Force.
Regards,
Mary
Mary Shafer DoD #0362 KotFR shafer@ursa-major.spdcc.com
URL http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/People/Shafer/mary.html
Some days it don't come easy/And some days it don't come hard
Some days it don't come at all/And these are the days that never end....
On Fri, 15 Dec 1995, Wei-Jen Su wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 14 Dec 1995 ahanley@usace.mil wrote:
>
> > The primary advantages the SR would bring would be the same that it would in
> > any situation: rapid arrival, very high survivability and the ability to
> > survey large amounts of territory in a given amount of time (the data
> > collection rate is at least four times that of a U-2, but the in-area loiter is
> > naturally less). If those abilities aren't needed, then the $35K an hour or so
> > it costs to fly the SR may not be worth it. The actual size of the whole
> > country isn't that important.
>
> Someone said: "... we might reasonably conclude that it is
> cheaper and easier to buy up the rest of the world than to conquer it by
> military force."
>
> May the Force be with you
>
> Su Wei-Jen
> E-mail: wsu02@barney.poly.edu
>
------------------------------
From: mangan@Kodak.COM (Paul Mangan)
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 13:08:24 EST
Subject: re: grounding of SR-71s
For some reason I just have this feeling that the biggest reason
to have the SR71 flying right now is to cover for testing of a
an aircraft with simular signatures to the SR71.
Paul
mangan@kodak.com
AUtomated Recon ORibtal Aircraft
------------------------------
From: neil@bedford.progress.COM (Neil Galarneau)
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 14:20:40 EST
Subject: Re: Waverider [NASP]
Frank Markus says:
> >Steve Schaper further writes:
> >>>though the object is not a manned vehicle, but long-range artillery
> >>>projectiles.
> >
> >I have heard of waverider 'projectiles' too, although I am not aware of
> >artillery applications (interesting shaped shell) being studied and
> tested. I'd
> >be interested in hearing more about that.
>
> I believe that the word "waverider" is used ambiguously. One meaning is
> that which has been the focus of this discussion: an aircraft that rides
> its own hypersonic shock wave. A second, earlier, meaning is a system that
> uses external beams to guide aircraft or projectiles to their target.
> Examples of such systems date back to the Second World War bombing of
> London and continue to the modern laser designators.
Maybe you are referring to beamriders. Beamriders have to stay within
the beam all the way to the target (some early SAMs were this way).
Laser guided bombs only need to see the laser spot.
Neil
------------------------------
From: ahanley@usace.mil
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 11:45:33 ÿÿÿ
Subject: re: grounding of SR-71s
That number came from a retired USAF general, and I was just quoting him. He
had written that in USAF service the per hour direct cost was about $50K and
the reactivated ones would run $30-40. He was basing that on the USAF having
about $750 million worth of SR-71 parts still in stock. I do not know if he
was including the "overhead" labor of the Lockheed employees that would maintan
the aircraft when it's not actually tasked with a flight. No one in USAF ever
gainsayed (I've been reading a medieval story and wanted to use that word) his
numbers, so I used them. I never thought to ask, but I'd be interested in the
direct costs to NASA to fly the SR-71. When parts are needed, does the USAF
provide them gratis or must you reimburse them through an inteagency agreement?
Art Hanley
Despite all appearances
to the Contrary, my
employers have nothing to
do with any of the above
------------------------------
End of Skunk Works Digest V5 #571
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