The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East

marines (to Iran). Second, the struggle for political and religious influence in
the newly-independent Muslim states of Central Asia between Iran, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey (the latter backed by the U.S), has not yet peaked.

To conclude, the sea change in Eastern Europe may serve as a case study of
the impact of external events on the national politics of other regions. After
initial bewilderment, the affected Arab leaders concluded that their pro-Soviet orientation of the last thirty-five years was no longer opportune and that
they had to adjust their foreign policy. Assad opted for a slow rapprochement--via Egypt--to the United States. Saddam, driven by a mixture of resentment, ambition, and possibly fear, opted to challenge the United States,
which, supported by the Soviet Union, led the coalition which defeated him.
A recent statement by Saddam may serve as a fitting epitaph for decades of
Arab pro-Soviet orientation: "Linking the Arab struggle with Soviet policy
and communist doctrine was wrong."
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The widely expected domestic repercussions have, however, not yet surfaced. This could be as much the effect of political culture as of the worried
alertness of incumbent regimes, ever attentive to possible threats. In a way,
Arab rulers adjusted quicker than the opposition groups in those countries.
At the time, focusing their publics on Jewish immigration helped the leaders
to divert attention from other consequences of the events in Eastern Europe,
such as democratization and (as rightly pointed out in the already mentioned
survey of The Economist) to "maintain the fiction that their failures can be
blamed on a malcontent outside world." Arab regimes increased security
measures while spreading promises of "democratization"--elections, consultations, and constitutions. Yet, slowly seeping domestic effects (already
perceived in Kuwait) could be compounded with the repercussions of the Gulf War. Whether this will lead to an Arab "springtime of nations" is unknown, but one should expect at least some of the anarchy, repression and
instability of historical precedents.

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