The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was designed with
verification in mind, and verification measures were negotiated
in parallel with other aspects. Thus, the basic structure of the
Treaty is designed to facilitate verification by national
technical means (NTM). The START Treaty contains detailed,
interlocking and mutually reinforcing provisions, which
supplement national technical means to establish an effective
verification regime. This regime provides for data exchanges and
notifications on strategic systems and facilities covered by the
Treaty, a ban on the denial of data from telemetry, twelve types
of on-site inspection and exhibitions, continuous monitoring at
mobile ICBM final assembly facilities, and cooperative measures.
These elements are outlined below.

National Technical Means (NTM)

START provides for the use of, and non-interference with,
national technical means of verification, e.g. satellites. There
are explicit provisions prohibiting interference with NTM, or use
of concealment measures that impede verification by NTM.

Telemetry

Parties are prohibited from engaging in any practice that denies
full access to telemetric information during missile flight
tests, with certain limited exceptions. Moreover, Parties are
obligated to exchange telemetry tapes, interpretative data and
acceleration profiles for every test flight.

Data Exchange and Notifications

Prior to Treaty signature, the sides will exchange data on
numbers, locations, and the technical characteristics of
START-accountable weapons systems and facilities and will provide
regular notifications and data updates thereafter.

Cooperative Measures

Seven times a year, either party may request the other to display
in the open road-mobile launchers, rail mobile launchers and
heavy bombers at bases specified by the inspecting Party.
Additional cooperative measures may be requested following an
operational dispersal.

Continuous Monitoring Activities

START establishes continuous monitoring at the perimeter and
portals of each side's mobile ICBM assembly facilities. The US
has the right to establish a monitoring facility at Votkinsk,
which is the final assembly facility for the SS-25, and at
Pavlograd, which is the final assembly facility for the SS-24.
The Soviet side has the right to monitor the Thiokol Strategic
Operations facility at Promontory, Utah, the final assembly
facility for the accountable stage of the Peacekeeper. Such
monitoring would also be established at any future facilities at
which mobile ICBM assembly takes place.