Boko Haram: Sri Lankan strategy has its pitfalls

While presenting a security briefing to their Nigerian counterparts last Tuesday, visiting Sri Lankan military chiefs led by their Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, suggested that Nigeria could borrow a leaf from the strategies the Indian Ocean Island country used to defeat terrorism on its soil. If the response of the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshall Alex Badeh, is anything to go by, the Nigerian military may be actively considering adopting aspects of the Sri Lankan war strategy that led to the defeat of Tamil Tigers after more than 26 years of civil war and militancy. It is not clear who invited the Sri Lankans to make the presentation, or whether their presentation was unsolicited. From the body language of the visitors and their Nigerian hosts, however, it seems that what caught the attention of the Nigerians is the last stage of the Sri Lankan anti-terror war that lasted between 2006 and 2009, and in particular the Sri Lankan military doctrine of “Total Security.”

The Nigerian military reacts testily to unfavourable public opinion, particularly in regards to its capability and tactics after just five years of fighting Boko Haram insurgents. Their Sri Lankan visitors fought a 26-year civil war. But testy or not, with the hint given by Air Chief Marshall Badeh that Nigeria could adopt aspects of the Sri Lankan strategy, this column would like to caution the military to reflect a little more, especially in view of its widely despised assault on civil liberties. According to a statement by the military, Air Chief Marshall Badeh had last Tuesday said: “The Nigerian military is seriously considering the counterinsurgency experience of the Sri-Lankan military with a view to identifying those areas that could be operationally beneficial to Nigeria in its battle to defeat terrorism.” Comparisons are odious, say the British. It may therefore be necessary for the Nigerian military to take a holistic view of the Sri Lankan War in order to understand its beginnings, its course and its end before embarking on adoptions and adaptations.

Some four countries are lending Nigeria a helping hand in combating terrorism and in the effort to rescue the more than 200 Chibok schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram since April 15. None of the four has made a presentation like the Sri Lankans have done. So, if the Indian Ocean country is being given a hearing by the Nigerian military, it may suggest that something may already be afoot, especially in the direction of the so-called Total Security, or in the words of President Goodluck Jonathan, Total War. But the Sri Lankan strategy portends grave danger. It must be emphasised that neither the Sri Lankans nor their Nigerian counterparts are talking about military tactics. They are talking about strategy. And as far as strategy goes, a number of elements cannot and must not be discountenanced in planning the defeat of Boko Haram, if Nigeria is not to end up complicating and worsening the anti-terror war.

Sri Lanka may have defeated the terrorist Tamil Tigers in 2009, but that country’s democratic credentials remain suspect, with no prospect for a change for the better anytime soon. In fact the consensus is that the 26-year civil war “undermined democracy and eroded the rule of law.” The United Nations (UN) estimates that some 12,000 people detained by Sri Lankan security forces have disappeared, and are presumed murdered by the state. Sri Lanka acknowledges that about half of the detainees have died. The civil war itself cost about 80,000 to 100,000 lives, about half of them civilians. The UN reckons that serious rights abuses were perpetrated by both sides in the war, abuses the world body appears set to investigate to establish war crimes.

Sri Lanka may have defeated Tamil insurgency, but it is a country with a population of less than 21 million, a little more populous than Lagos State. In addition, its demographic make-up is infinitely less complex. With more than 70 percent Sinhalese majority and less than 12 percent Tamil, the civil war was a straightforward Sinhalese versus Tamil conflict. Nigeria’s ethnic and religious pastiche is on the other hand problematically complex, a situation Boko Haram has more imaginatively exploited and aggravated. Total War or Total Security may seem sound on paper, in reality, however, the Nigerian anti-terror war calls for a much deeper understanding of the issues involved and a scientific approach to solving it. Unfortunately, like the Iraqi insurgency, every step the Nigerian government and military have taken so far has worsened the conflict.

Moreover, the Nigerian military must appreciate the causes of the Sri Lankan Civil War in order to understand whether its lessons and solutions can be adapted in any way to the Nigerian situation. The political elite of the Sinhalese majority bear the larger responsibility for the beginnings of the Tamil revolt. Like Ukraine, not only did they enact insensitive language laws (The Sinhala Only Act) and other cultural, educational and political laws that discriminated against Tamils (Policy of Standardisation and the 1978 Constitution that gave preference to Buddhism), they also ignored all avenues to make peace before the problem got out of hand. Up till now, the lessons of that war have still not been fully learnt, nor has peace led to greater freedoms and deeper democratic practices. It is however understandable why Sri Lanka inspires the Nigerian military. Given the Nigerian military’s assault on the media in the past one week, and the active connivance of the Jonathan presidency, it is clear it is as uninterested in democracy as the Sri Lankan military and government have continued to restrict civil liberties.

Before adapting the Sri Lankan strategy, it is hoped that Nigeria’s military chiefs had received full briefings from their visiting counterparts. It is hoped they understood the shifting roles India played in the war, before and after Tamils assassinated ex-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, how India, through its peace keeping force, the IPKF, changed sides in the conflict many times, including sometimes fighting on the side of the Tamils and supplying them weapons and also fighting on the side of the Sri Lankan Army when they thought it expedient. India, which has a Tamil (Nadu) State, does not of course want a Tamil country on its Southeast coast. It is hoped that the Nigerian military understands the geopolitical considerations of that war. It is also hoped that Nigeria understands that Sri Lanka’s Total Security cannot be replicated in Nigeria without dire consequences. The Boko Haram war can of course be won, but it is not by adopting the Sri Lankan strategy. For a nation of about 160 million, Nigeria would be sailing near the wind to adopt the war strategy of a country where in a base population of about 20m, 70 percent Sinhalese population, roughly speaking, faced about 11 percent Tamil population.

The Nigerian military should look inwards for explanation for the failure of its strategy in the Boko Haram war. Rather than hunt the media in an objectionable affront to the constitution, and accuse those who criticise its failure to fight a clinical war of lack of patriotism, it should ask itself why it has been unable to devise successful war tactics against insurgents it claims to have restricted to a forest of about 600 sq km. The Boko Haram insurgency resembles the Iraqi insurgency in their adoption of guerrilla tactics. The Sri Lankan conflict, notwithstanding rampant terror attacks, was mainly a conventional military/secessionist rebellion. If the Americans with all their military and technological might failed in Iraq and left the country a seething cauldron, why does Nigeria think it can use the tactics of conventional war to pulverize guerrilla insurgents? After its 2009 debacle, Boko Haram has refused to let itself be pinned down in a conventional war. Against whom, therefore, will the Nigerian military declare total war?

It is embarrassing that Nigerian commanders cannot formulate a unique, homegrown strategy that takes into consideration the country’s cultural, religious and political configurations, a strategy that promotes its latent ambition to lead Africa. By fishing for strategies and inspiration in far-flung places like Sri Lanka, Nigeria gives the depressing impression of a country in precipitous decline, one lacking in vision and ambition for the future. The Boko Haram war should be fought without eroding civil liberties, and without endangering the constitution. There should be enough first class brains in the military to forge the right mix and temper of strategies to carry out the objective. If Dr Jonathan is unable to understand this, his brilliant commanders, if he has them, should educate him.

Au contraire, if we could muster the required consensus, the Sri Lankan precedent would be very viable. Emphasis on ‘if’. As it stands, an all out breakout by Boko Haram, ala ISIS, is likely to have similar ‘melting away’ consequences.