8 Preface Preface An investment in knowledge pays the best interest Benjamin Franklin 'The Way to Wealth' (1758). There is something profoundly wrong with the way we are living today. There are corrosive pathologies of inequality all around us be they access to a safe environment, healthcare, education or clean water. These are reinforced by short-term political actions and a socially divisive language based on the adulation of wealth. A progressive response will require not only greater knowledge about the state of the planet and its resources, but also an awareness that many aspects will remain unknown. We will need a more ethical form of public decision-making based on a language in which our moral instincts and concerns can be better expressed. These are the overall aims of Volume 2 of Late lessons from early warnings. Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings was published at a time when the world was experiencing an economic slowdown, China had joined the World Trade Organization and western Europe was still a 15-member Union. Global grain production had declined for the third time in four years due mainly to droughts in North America and Australia, and the world saw major recalls of contaminated meat, foot and mouth disease and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease). Global temperatures continued to climb and many bird populations were in decline, but the United States of America had rejected the Kyoto Protocol. We were seeing ourselves through the lens of the first human genome sequence, yet we were trying to manage chemicals known to be harmful to humans and ecosystems, through international conventions and treaties such as the Basel Convention to deal with toxic waste dumping in the developing world; the OSPAR/HELCOM Conventions to reduce the discharges, emissions and the loss of hazardous substances into the sea and the Montreal Protocol, to phase out ozone depleting substances. The destruction of the World Trade Center had just happened. Since then, we have witnessed a period of extraordinary hubris. Most visibly, the financial profligacy of the first decade of the century led inexorably to the crises of whereby the major components of the international financial system were weakened to the extreme by indebtedness, mispriced products, lax monetary policies and mis engineered protection against risks and uncertainty. The world experienced more not less volatility. Political systems became silted up by vested interests and a determination by citizens to protect assets accumulated in easier times, and beneath it all lay a deeper environmental crisis epitomised by climate change and biodiversity loss. There was also a collapse of trust, not only in financial institutions but in big companies, as they abandoned staff, pensions and health care schemes. Recent evidence from social psychology has shown that despite rising levels of education and innovation in products and services, people trust only those they know and not strangers. As Stephen Green said in Good value: reflections on money, morality, and an uncertain world in 2009: 'There has been a massive breakdown of trust: trust in the financial system, trust in bankers, trust in business and business leaders, trust in politicians, trust in the media, trust in the whole process of globalisation all have been severely damaged, in rich countries and poor countries alike'. The scientific elites have also been slowly losing public support. This is in part because of the growing number of instances of misplaced certainty about the absence of harm, which has delayed preventive actions to reduce risks to human health, despite evidence to the contrary. Suddenly, our problems have grown into what Charles W. Churchman in 1967 termed wicked problems difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory and changing requirements, difficult to recognize, resistant to resolution because of the complexity of their interdependencies and needing to be tackled not by one but via many forms of social power. Solving 6

9 Preface them requires a new combination of hierarchical power, solidarity and individualism. What could this mean, for example, for the 100 thousand chemicals currently in commercial use? To begin with we have more conventions and treaties in place than a decade ago: the 2004 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure covering international trade of 24 pesticides, four severely hazardous pesticide formulations and 11 industrial chemicals; the 2004 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants to protect human health and the environment from substances which are highly toxic, persistent, bio accumulative and move long distances in the environment, such as DDT, PCBs, various industrial chemicals, and a set of unintentional chemical by-products such as dioxin. But these conventions only address the top-down hierarchical approach to power. At the same time Europe has put in place legislation to achieve a global regulatory influence including the EU Cosmetic Directive banning the use of chemicals known or strongly suspected of being carcinogens, reproductive toxins, or mutagens causing cancer, mutation or birth defects; the EU Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive, which restricts the use of hazardous materials in the manufacture of various types of electronic and electrical equipment including lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, the flame retardents polybrominated biphenyls and polybrominated diphenyl ethers, and which encourages the substitution to safe/or safer alternatives in the electric and electronic equipment industry; the closely linked 2006 EU Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive for collection, recycling and recovery of electrical goods; the 2006 Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM); and the 2007 EU Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals, widely known as REACH, to assign greater responsibility to industry to manage the risks from chemicals and to provide safety information on substances. The effects of these regulatory tools are described in different chapters, but once again point to the main economic actors rather than communities or individuals. One thing that has become clearer over the past decade is that certain chemical substances are highly stable in nature and can have long-lasting and wide ranging effects before being broken down into a harmless form. The risk of a stable compound is that it can be bio-accumulated in fatty tissues at concentrations many times higher than in the surrounding environment. Predators, such as polar bears, fish and seals, are known to bio-magnify certain chemicals in even higher concentrations with devastating consequences for both humans and ecosystems. So exposure to toxic chemicals and certain foodstuffs are at risk of causing harm, especially to vulnerable groups such as foetuses in the womb or during childhood when the endocrine system is being actively built. Even with small dose exposures, the consequences can in some instances be devastating with problems ranging from cancer, serious impacts on human development, chronic diseases and learning disabilities. Here the power to act could be more properly set by well-informed individuals and communities. The relationship between knowledge and power lies at the heart of Volume 2. In many chapters, the implicit links between the sources of scientific knowledge about pollutants, changes in the environment and new technologies, and strong vested interests, both economic and paradigmatic, are exposed. A number of authors also explore in greater depth, the short-sightedness of regulatory science and its role in the identification, evaluation and governance of natural resources, physical and chemical hazards. By creating a better understanding of these normally invisible aspects, it is hoped that this volume will enable communities and people to become more effective stakeholders and participants in the governance of innovation and economic activities in relation to the associated risks to humans and the planet. Much of what we are able to learn from the histories of past environmental and public health mistakes is also directly applicable to the better regulation and governance of global institutions and financial and economic risks. Robin G. Collingwood argued in his Autobiography (1939), that: 'History can offer something altogether different from [scientific] rules, namely insight. The true function of insight is to inform people about the present we study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act the plane on which, ultimately, all problems arise is the plane of 'real' life: that to which they are referred for their solution is history.' In this volume, we go further. Whilst still drawing lessons from such widely accepted tragedies as leaded petrol, mercury poisoning in Japan's 7

10 Preface Minamata Bay and older pesticides which sterilised many men who used it, we have ventured into the uncertainties of potential yet contested harm, from genetically modified products; nanotechnologies; chemicals such as Bisphenol A; new pesticides and mobile phones. There is also an examination of the 80 or so potential 'false positives' where there had been indications of harm but where it was subsequently claimed that there were in fact no risks to prevent: these cases too can provide information that can help to improve future decision-making about innovation and emerging technologies. A major part of effective decision-making lies in the way issues are framed. In the case of climate change, the first order question is whether it is worth worrying about at all. US Vice President Al Gore chose to make the question a matter of choice between believers and sceptics. However, problems arose when the public was asked to make a scientific decision when too few people had the qualifications to make any kind of reasoned judgement. They were in fact asked to make a false choice. Instead the question should have been framed around which areas should people and governments make decisions and which should be delegated to experts. In the end there are few certain and enduring truths in the ecological and biological sciences, nor in the economics, psychologies, sociologies and politics that we use to govern them. One, however, comes from the work of Elinor Ostrom, a late and widely missed colleague, who showed from her work on managing fisheries and ecosystems that complex problems can be solved if communication is transparent and open, visions are shared, trust is high and communities are activated to work from the bottom-up as well as from the top down. As we navigate the Anthropocene, the epoch named in recognition of our impact on the planet, we will need to encourage more people to become involved in solving the wicked problems of our times. Whether through gathering local information or becoming more aware of the many uncertainties and unpredictabilities in our surroundings, the power structures of knowledge will need to change. And if we are to respond more responsibly to the early warning signals of change, we will need to re design our style of governance to one which reflects a future defined by the local and specific rather than only the global and the average. We hope that Volume 2 of Late lessons from early warnings with its many lessons and insights can help us all meet such a challenge. Professor Jacqueline McGlade, Executive Director 8

11 Introduction 1 Introduction Why further late lessons from early warnings? The 2013 Late lessons from early warnings report is the second of its type produced by the European Environment Agency (EEA) in collaboration with a broad range of external authors and peer reviewers. Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle published in 2001, looked at the history of a selection of occupational, public health and environmental hazards and asked whether we could have been better at taking action early enough to prevent harm. Twelve key lessons for better decision making were drawn from cases where public policy was formulated against a background of scientific uncertainty and 'surprises' and where clear evidence of hazards to people and the environment was often ignored (see box on page 11). The 14 case studies and 12 key lessons from the 2001 report remain highly pertinent today, and underline four main reasons for a second report. The first relates to expanding the late lessons approach to consider long known, important additional issues with broad societal implications such as lead in petrol, mercury, environmental tobacco smoke and DDT, as well as issues from which lessons have emerged more recently such as the effects of the contraceptive pill on feminisation of fish and the impacts of insecticides on honeybees. The second concerns filling an acknowledged gap in the 2001 report, by analysing the issue of false positives where government regulation was undertaken based on precaution but later turned out to be unnecessary. Most of the cases examined in the Late lessons from early warnings reports are 'false negatives' instances where early warnings existed but no preventive actions were taken. The third reason is to address the rapid emergence of new society wide challenges such as radiation from mobile phones, genetically modified products, nanotechnologies and invasive alien species as well as if, how and where precautionary actions can play a role. The final reason relates to how precautionary approaches can help manage the fast changing, multiple, systemic challenges the world faces today, what new insights can be drawn in this context and how these can underpin opportunities for sustainable innovations and, supported by information technologies, greater public participation in their selection. Overall approach As for Volume 1, the approach in Volume 2 has been to include a wide range of relevant case studies produced by external authors along with chapters written by members of the report's editorial team (see acknowledgements section for details). The relevant topics for case study treatment were selected on the basis of advice from the editor, in collaboration with the editorial team and an advisory board, members of the EEA Scientific Committee and the Collegium Ramazzini ( 1 ). The chapters in Volume 2 are grouped into five parts: A. Lessons from health hazards; B. Emerging lessons from ecosystems; C. Emerging issues; D. Costs, justice and innovation; and E. Implications for science and governance. The chapters have been written by authors who, to varying degrees, have had substantial involvement in the subject area being addressed. Indeed they would not have been approached if ( 1 ) The Collegium Ramazzini is an independent, international academy founded in 1982 by Irving J. Selikoff, Cesare Maltoni and other eminent scientists. Its mission is to advance the study of occupational and environmental health issues and to be a bridge between the world of scientific discovery and the social and political centers, which must act on the discoveries of science to protect public health. 9

12 Introduction they had not already extensively studied the case that they were asked to write about. All of them, as respected experts in their fields and in line with their professional scientific training, were expected to be as objective as possible in answering the questions put to them by EEA. To support this, and to develop consistency between chapters, the authors were provided with seven structuring questions to be followed when building their chapter. The case studies have been peer reviewed by recognised experts in the respective fields who gave of their time freely and provided their feedback within a set of editorial guidelines provided by the EEA. Scope The report has been designed, structured and written in order to, inter alia, help politicians, policymakers and the public to: i ii understand better the ways in which scientific knowledge is financed, created, evaluated, ignored, used and misused in taking timely and precautionary decisions about how to reduce harms, whilst stimulating benign innovations and generating useful employment; learn from some very expensive 'mistakes' in the past so as to help societies make fewer mistakes now, and in the future, especially with some of the relatively new, largely unknown, yet already widespread technologies like nanotechnology and mobile phones; iii be aware of less visible, important factors such as the skewed ways in which the costs of actions and inactions for hazardous technologies have been estimated, and the role that some businesses have played in ignoring early warnings and in manufacturing doubt about the science supporting such warnings; iv consider how the law, or administrative arrangements, could be better used to deliver justice, to those people (and ecosystems) that have been, or could be, harmed by poorly designed, or badly deployed, innovations; v explore how best to engage the public in helping to make strategic choices over innovations, and their technological and social pathways, as well as their involvement in ecosystems management and in long term monitoring through citizen science. Part A of the report commences with an analysis of 'false positives' showing that these are few and far between as compared to false negatives and that carefully designed precautionary actions can stimulate innovation, even if the risk turns out not to be real or as serious as initially feared. The remaining nine chapters address false negatives lead in petrol, perchlorethylene contaminated water, Minamata disease, occupational beryllium disease, environmental tobacco smoke, vinyl chloride, dibromochloropropane (DBCP), Bisphenol A and dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane (DDT) from which three common themes emerge: there was more than sufficient evidence for much earlier action; slow and sometimes obstructive behaviour by businesses whose products endangered workers, the public and the environment; and the value of independent scientific research and risk assessments. Part B focuses on emerging lessons from the degradation of natural systems and their wider implications for society booster biocides, the pill and the feminisation of fish, climate change, floods, insecticides and honeybees as well as ecosystem resilience more broadly. It considers, like its predecessor, the issues of scientific evidence as the basis for action/inaction, the multiple, often complex factors and feedback loops in play, many of which are not fully understood, as well as the interfaces between science, policy and society and how all actors can move together towards necessary actions in the context of heightened systemic risks, and substantial unknowns. Part C analyses some newly emerging and large scale products, technologies and trends, which potentially offer many benefits but also potentially much harm to people and ecosystems and thereby ultimately economic development. Cases addressed include the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents; genetically modified agricultural crops and agroecology; the growing threat of invasive alien species; mobile phones and the risk of brain tumours; and nanotechnologies. There is often little science, and very little direct hindsight, to assist in the management of these emerging technologies but the lessons from the historical case studies need to be applied if hazards are to be avoided. The evidence from the chapters in Part C is that, by and large, societies are not making the most use of the costly lessons that can be gleaned from their histories. A key question is how this can be improved given the many reasons identified from the case studies why taking actions have been delayed including: the novel 10

13 Introduction and challenging nature of the issues themselves; poorly or inconsistently evaluated information; strong opposition by the corporate and scientific establishments of the day; and the tendency by the decision making institutions, practices and cultures to favour the status quo and the short term perspective. This section also illustrates the value of bottom up as well as top down approaches to innovations in ensuring that the directions of technological pathways, the equitable distributions of benefits, costs and knowledge ownership, and the diversity of locally sensitive technological options are relevant to the food, energy and ecosystems crises. The historical chapters illustrate numerous harms which for the most part have been caused by irresponsible corporations. This fact, coupled with shortcomings in how decisions are made by governments on when to act on early warnings, and in the law when it comes to compensating victims of harm, are analysed in three chapters in Part D of the report. Each chapter analyses the reasons behind prevailing practice and then goes on to offer insights, for example, on how cost calculation methods can be improved; on how insurance schemes could be used to compensate future victims of harm; and on the reasons why businesses frequently ignore early warnings. The cases in Parts A D form the basis for considering in Part E the governance implications for science, public policy and public engagement, and how current practices could be improved to enable society to maximise the benefits of innovations while minimising harms. The main insights are that science could be more relevant for precautionary decision making; that the wider use of the precautionary principle can avert harm and stimulate innovation; and that the late lessons of history and precautionary approaches are highly pertinent to today's multiple and inter connected crises such as those arising from finance, economics, the use of ecosystems, climate change, and the use and supply of energy and food. Finally, many of the historical and recent case studies illustrate the value of engaging the public in broadening the knowledge base and stimulating robust innovations. Twelve late lessons Based on the case studies of Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001), twelve key lessons for better decision making were drawn: 1 Acknowledge and respond to ignorance, as well as uncertainty and risk, in technology appraisal and public policymaking 2 Provide adequate long-term environmental and health monitoring and research into early warnings 3 Identify and work to reduce 'blind spots' and gaps in scientific knowledge 4 Identify and reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to learning 5 Ensure that real world conditions are adequately accounted for in regulatory appraisal 6 Systematically scrutinise the claimed justifications and benefits alongside the potential risks 7 Evaluate a range of alternative options for meeting needs alongside the option under appraisal, and promote more robust, diverse and adaptable technologies so as to minimise the costs of surprises and maximise the benefits of innovation 8 Ensure use of 'lay' and local knowledge, as well as relevant specialist expertise in the appraisal 9 Take full account of the assumptions and values of different social groups 10 Maintain the regulatory independence of interested parties while retaining an inclusive approach to information and opinion gathering 11 Identify and reduce institutional obstacles to learning and action 12 Avoid 'paralysis by analysis' by acting to reduce potential harm when there are reasonable grounds for concern Source: EEA, 2001, Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle , Environmental issues report No 22, European Environment Agency. 11

14 Part A Summary 2 The precautionary principle and false alarms lessons learned Steffen Foss Hansen and Joel A. Tickner Most of the cases examined in the Late lessons from early warnings reports are 'false negatives' instances where early warnings existed but no preventive actions were taken. In debates surrounding the precautionary principle it is often claimed that widespread application of the principle will lead to a large number of regulatory false positives over regulation of minor risks and regulation of non existent risks, often due to unwarranted public 'fears'. Understanding and learning from past false positives as well as false negatives is essential for improving decision making about public health and the environment. This chapter reviews incidents of 'false positives', where government regulation was undertaken based on precaution but later turned out to be unnecessary. In total 88 cases were identified to be alleged false positives, however, following a detailed analysis most of them turned out to be either real risks, or cases where 'the jury is still out', or unregulated alarms, or risk risk trade-offs, rather than false positives. The analysis revealed four regulatory false positives: US swine flu, saccharin, food irradiation, and Southern leaf corn blight. Numerous important lessons can be learned from each, although there are few parallels between them in terms of when and why each risk was falsely believed to be real. This is a lesson in itself: each risk is unique, as is the science and politics behind it and hence a flexible approach is therefore needed, adapted to the nature of the problem. The costs of the false positives identified were mainly economic, although the actions taken to address swine flu in 1976 did lead to some unintended deaths and human suffering, and diverted resources from other potentially serious health risks. Determining the net costs of mistaken regulatory action, however, requires a complete assessment of the impacts of the regulation, including the costs and benefits of using alternative technologies and approaches. Overall, the analysis shows that fear of false positives is misplaced and should not be a rationale for avoiding precautionary actions where warranted. False positives are few and far between as compared to false negatives and carefully designed precautionary actions can stimulate innovation, even if the risk turns out not to be real or as serious as initially feared. There is a need for new approaches to characterising and preventing complex risks that move debate from the 'problem' sphere to the 'solutions' sphere. By learning from the lessons in this chapter, more effective preventive decisions can be made in the future. The scarcity of genuine false positives compared to the large number of 'mistaken false positives' could partly be the result of a deliberate strategy in risk communication. Several references and leaked documents have shown that some regulated parties have consciously recruited reputable scientists, media experts and politicians to call on if their products are linked to a possible hazard. Manufacturing doubt, disregarding scientific evidence of risks and claiming over regulation appear to be a deliberate strategy for some industry groups and think tanks to undermine precautionary decision making. 12

15 Part A Summary 3 Lead in petrol 'makes the mind give way' Herbert Needleman and David Gee This chapter addresses the widespread use of lead in petrol. It focuses on the period , when leaded petrol was first widely marketed in the US and then spread to the rest of the world before being gradually phased out from the 1970s. In Europe, the Aarhus Protocol (www.unece.org/ env/pp/treatytext.html) initiated the phase out of leaded petrol in the period The neurotoxic effects of lead were recognised as far back as Roman times. And in 1925, at the 'one day trial' of leaded petrol in the US, many experts warned of the likely health impacts of adding lead to petrol. Yet, despite the availability of an equally effective alcohol additive which was assessed by experts to be cleaner, the leaded route to fuel efficiency was chosen in the US and then exported to the rest of the world. For several decades after the introduction of leaded petrol, virtually no independent research was carried out and the main source of information was industry and industry sponsored researchers. Not until the 1960s and 1970s did independent scientists from outside this group show, for example, that body burdens of lead arising from human activities were not 'normal', as industry claimed, but were hundreds of times higher than before the industrial revolution and were therefore likely to be harmful. At its peak in the mid 1970s, leaded petrol released about tonnes of lead into the atmosphere annually in both the US and Europe. Following the subsequent phase out, blood lead levels in children (the most sensitive group exposed) quickly fell, in line with the decrease in air concentrations. The lessons nevertheless remain relevant globally today. Although nearly all countries worldwide had phased out leaded petrol by 2012, lead concentrations in soils and sediments remain high. Meanwhile, electronic wastes containing lead and other contaminants also cause elevated blood lead levels. Supplementary panel texts focus on the events leading up to the US choice of leaded petrol as the primary fuel source in 1925 and more recent accounts of EU policymaking on lead in petrol and the road to phase outs in Germany and the United Kingdom. 13

16 Part A Summary 4 Too much to swallow: PCE contamination of mains water David Ozonoff PCE (perchlorethylene, also known as 'perc' or tetrachloroethylene), was used in the production of plastic linings for drinking water distribution pipes in the late 1960s and 1970s. This new and relatively untested type of distribution pipe was used in over 700 miles of New England's water distribution systems. Not until 1976 was it discovered that PCE had been leaching into the water from the pipe lining, causing widespread contamination of water supplies that still today require continuous remediation. Before the pipes were put into production there was a substantial amount of scientific information available about the potential hazards of PCE. This did not include current concerns about PCE's carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and other health consequences of relatively low level exposure upper most among today's concerns, but many early warnings suggested the need for caution in introducing PCE based mains pipe linings. PCE had been used to treat hookworm and data on side effects were in the literature, while later a variety of occupational users were studied, including aircraft workers, small companies in countries where biological monitoring was required, and dry cleaning firms. Several environmental studies were also conducted to see if drinking water contaminated with PCE or its close relative, TCE (trichloroethylene), was associated with cancer. Results were mixed and the chemical industry consistently denied that PCE was a human carcinogen. This case study explores the early (pre 1970) history researching the toxicity of the chemical. It also focuses on the failure of one manufacturer, Johns Manville Corporation, to recognise the warning signals about using a suspected toxic substance. It examines why a new product was deployed without thought to the public health consequences and why evidence of the potential hazard was ignored. The science has not been hidden. It has been ineffective in guiding and catalysing action. Whether the problem is a failed duty of care or a lack of clarity about what evidence will trigger action, the contemporary argument over how to interpret the scientific evidence is irresolvable within science itself. There are no overarching criteria from the philosophy of science that can dictate a solution. This chapter also includes two supplementary texts. A panel that analyses the differences between the conclusions of risk assessments based on the same data, focusing in particular on assessments of PCE and TCE. A further panel describes the opportunities to switch to wet cleaning technologies to reduce the current use of PCE in dry cleaning. 14

17 Part A Summary 5 Minamata disease: a challenge for democracy and justice Takashi Yorifuji, Toshihide Tsuda and Masazumi Harada Minamata disease, which can induce lethal or severely debilitating mental and physical effects, was caused by methylmercury contaminated effluent released into Minamata Bay by Chisso, Japan's largest chemical manufacturer. It resulted in widespread suffering among those who unknowingly ate the contaminated fish. This chapter documents the story in three phases. The disease first came to prominence in the 1950s. It was officially identified in 1956 and attributed to factory effluent but the government took no action to stop contamination or prohibit fish consumption. Chisso knew it was discharging methylmercury and could have known that it was the likely active factor but it chose not to collaborate and actively hindered research. The government concurred, prioritising industrial growth over public health. In 1968 Chisso stopped using the process that caused methylmercury pollution and the Japanese government then conceded that methylmercury was the etiologic agent of Minamata disease. The second part of the story addresses the discovery that methylmercury is transferred across the placenta to affect the development of unborn children, resulting in serious mental and physical problems in later life. Experts missed this at first because of a medical consensus that such transfer across the placenta was impossible. The third phase focuses on the battle for compensation. Initially, Chisso gave token 'sympathy money' under very limited criteria. In 1971 the Japanese government adopted a more generous approach but after claims and costs soared a more restrictive definition was introduced in 1977, justified by controversial 'expert opinions'. Legal victories for the victims subsequently made the government's position untenable and a political solution was reached in In 2003, the 'expert opinions' were shown to be flawed and the Supreme Court declared the definition invalid in In September 2011 there were officially recognised patients. Still, the continuing failure to investigate which areas and communities were affected means that the financial settlement's geographic and temporal scope is still not properly determined. Alongside deep seated issues with respect to transparency in decision making and information sharing, this indicates that Japan still faces a fundamental democratic deficit in its handling of manmade disasters. This chapter is followed by three short updates on the effects of mercury poisoning since Minamata; on attempts to contain it, including the 2009 global agreement to phase mercury out of economic activity; and on the need for better information about contaminant exposures to enable policymakers to make informed choices that balance the benefits of fish consumption against the assumed adverse effects of low level methylmercury exposures. 15

18 Part A Summary 6 Beryllium's 'public relations problem' David Michaels and Celeste Monforton Scores of workers employed in nuclear weapons production have been diagnosed with chronic beryllium disease (CBD), a progressive and irreversible inflammatory lung disease. This chapter presents a history of knowledge and public policy about preventing beryllium related disease, focusing primarily on the United States beryllium industry's role in shaping US regulatory policy. Over several decades increasingly compelling evidence accumulated that CBD was associated with beryllium exposure at levels below the existing regulatory standard. The beryllium industry had a strong financial incentive to challenge the data and decided to be proactive in shaping interpretation of scientific literature on beryllium's health effects. It hired public relations and 'product defence' consulting firms to refute evidence that the standard was inadequate. When the scientific evidence became so great that it was no longer credible to deny that workers developed CBD at permitted exposure levels, the beryllium industry responded with a new rationale to delay promulgation of a new, more protective exposure limit. This case study underscores the importance of considering the hazards from toxic materials throughout the entire product life cycle. While primary producers of beryllium products may be able to control exposures in their own facilities, it is unlikely that many secondary users and recyclers have the expertise, resources and knowledge necessary to prevent beryllium disease in exposed workers and residents in nearby communities. The primary lessons of this chapter are widely applicable to many environmental health controversies. In particular, it illustrates the practice of 'manufacturing uncertainty' a strategy used by some polluters and manufacturers of hazardous products to prevent or delay regulation or victim compensation. This chapter is followed by an analysis of the rationale for corporate behaviour in the regulation of beryllium. It is argued that the availability of occasional and limited opportunities for companies to change course without suffering onerous consequences would encourage them to rethink their position and create an obligation on shareholders to take the responsible course. Although this may be perceived as letting them 'get away with it', the end result may be better public policy and corporate responsibility. 16

19 Part A Summary 7 Tobacco industry manipulation of research Lisa A. Bero This chapter differs in some ways from the others in Volume 2 of Late lessons from early warnings. The history of 'second hand', 'passive' or 'environmental tobacco smoke' (ETS), to which non smokers are exposed overlaps with the history of active smoking. Those affected include the partners and children of smokers, and the bartenders and other workers who have to work in smoky environments. The focus in this chapter is on the strategies used by the tobacco industry to deny, downplay, distort and dismiss the growing evidence that, like active smoking, ETS causes lung cancer and other effects in non smokers. It does not address the history of scientific knowledge about tobacco and how it was used or not used to reduce lung cancer and other harmful effects of tobacco smoke. There is much literature on this and a table at the end of the chapter summarises the main dates in the evolution of knowledge in this area. The chapter concentrates on the 'argumentation' that was used to accept, or reject, the growing scientific evidence of harm. Who generated and financed the science used to refute data on adverse health effects? What were the motivations? What kind of science and information, tools and assumptions were used to refute data on the adverse health of tobacco? The release of millions of internal tobacco industry documents due to law suits in the US has given insights into the inner workings of the tobacco industry and revealed their previously hidden involvement in manipulating research. However, this insight is not available for most corporate sectors. The chapter discusses the possibilities of 'full disclosure' of funding sources and special interests in research and risk assessment in order to secure independence and prevent bias towards particular viewpoints. While smoking bans are now being introduced in more and more countries, other industries are drawing inspiration from tobacco company strategies, seeking to maintain doubt about harm in order to keep hazardous products in the marketplace. The chapter also includes a summary of the tobacco industry's role in shaping risk assessment in the US and Europe to serve its own interests. 17

20 Part A Summary 8 Vinyl chloride: a saga of secrecy Morando Soffritti, Jennifer Beth Sass, Barry Castleman and David Gee This chapter is about how early warnings in the 1950s and 1960s concerning the short term harm of vinyl chloride (VC) to the skin and bones of workers, and to the livers of laboratory animals, were initially hidden from other workers and regulators. This was despite some early misgivings by company experts whose advice was initially ignored by their employers. This pattern was repeated when the later, more devastating news of a rare liver cancer in workers was revealed by long term animal studies and by an attentive and concerned company physician. Unlike many other histories, however, this story features a very prompt response from the global chemical industry to the publication of the liver cancer evidence, a response that included funding cancer testing and later compliance with a large reduction in the permissible exposure limits. The case also provides early evidence of reproductive effects of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM). Other features of this story presage the later and common responses of the corporate world to heightened public awareness and pressure from non governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade unions, including greatly exaggerated estimates of the likely costs of complying with tighter pollution controls; a frequent mismatch between the position of the trade association and that of many, more progressive companies within the association; but also some relatively quick corporate responses to public, NGO and regulatory pressure. The chapter also features two legal aspects, which, though more common in the US, are also valuable for Europeans. First, the potentially positive role that judicial review of regulatory proposals can play in providing a societal judgement about the behaviour of corporations. This can embrace not just moral judgements but also judgements about the state of the science and what society should do with it. Second, the role that document discovery in legal compensation cases can play in revealing the real and until then secret activities of corporations. Any proposals to promote justice for victims of environmental and health harms via no fault administrative arrangements need to be accompanied by other measures to extract information about corporate behaviour. The chapter is followed by a panel analysing the value of animal testing for identifying carcinogens. 18

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