Iraq after ISIL: Kirkuk

ISIL’s advance on Kirkuk created opportunities for Kurdish forces to tighten control over oil resources and Kirkuk city in this most coveted part of the Disputed Territories; however, a strong (for now officially accepted) PMF presence in the south, anchored with local Turkmen PMF forces, threatens future stability once ISIL is pushed out of Hawija district.

This research summary is part of a larger study on local, hybrid and sub-state security forces in Iraq (LHSFs). Please see the main page for more findings, and research summaries about other field research sites.

ISIL’s advance on Kirkuk, the most coveted part of the Disputed
Territories, created opportunities for Kurdish forces to seize control
over oil resources and Kirkuk city. However, although Peshmerga forces
held the line when Iraqi forces fled, they could not prevent continued
ISIL security threats, nor retake the predominantly Sunni Arab areas
taken by the group in 2014. This led to an agreement in February 2015
that allowed the entry of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the
governorate. Since then, both Kurdish forces and PMF forces have
coordinated in the fight to hold off ISIL, both directly and through the
mobilization of various, local and minority forces in Kirkuk. The
strongest of these forces, drawn from Kirkuk’s Shi’a Turkmen minority,
provides an anchor for the Badr Organization
and facilitates a line of control that reaches from just south of
Kirkuk city into the adjacent Tuz Khurmatu district (“Tuz”) of Salah
ad-Din.

This research summary discusses broader LHSF trends over all in
Kirkuk, but with a particular focus and a greater number of interviews
in Kirkuk city and surrounding areas. At the time of writing, all forces
were preparing to expel ISIL from one of its last remaining strongholds
in and around Hawija district. However, the positioning of different
local and sub-state security forces (LHSFs, as this study refers to them)
within Kirkuk seemed to guarantee future rounds of conflict between the
governorate’s different ethnic, confessional, and political
stakeholders. Concerns about security and political conflicts have
resulted in significant consequences for civilians – Kurdish authorities
ejected Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkmen IDPs from the government, and
Kurdish and Shi’a Turkmen forces forcibly displaced resident Sunni Arabs
in areas under their control on the grounds of military necessity and
in acts of retaliation for ISIL attacks. Such expulsions were often
accompanied by mass property destruction and the demolition of Arab
villages. With Kirkuk’s status still unresolved, such actions carry a
whiff of ethnic gerrymandering.

Background: Historical Divisions and Demographic Politicking

Historically an important waystation along an important Ottoman trade
route, Kirkuk has long been a melting pot of different ethnic,
confessional, and political groups. Today, Kirkuk city is home to Arabs,
Kurds, Turkmen, and a variety of Islamic, Christian and other sects.
Population estimates have tended to be heavily politicized and widely
mistrusted; however, reporting by groups like the International Crisis
Group tended to estimate between 500,000 and 700,000 residents in Kirkuk
as of 2007, roughly half of the total population of the governorate.2

Kirkuk grew in regional importance when exploratory drilling near the
eternal fires of Baba Gurgur, directly northwest of Kirkuk city, led to
a spectacular gusher that flooded the area with oil in 1927. Kirkuk
governorate’s oil fields contain today an estimated 12 percent of Iraq’s
total reserves. Kirkuk’s oil resources have made it a significant bone
of contention among different national and local stakeholders since that
time, which has led to waves of significant demographic shifts as
different stakeholders and groups try to benefit from its oil revenues
or control them. Following the opening of the Baba Dome of the Kirkuk
oil field, Arab, Assyrian, and Kurdish oil workers migrated to Kirkuk,
shifting the ethnic demographics of the region. Prior to the Baath
regime, Kirkuk city had a Turkmen majority and the ethnic composition of
the governorate as a whole was roughly 48 percent Kurdish, 28 percent
Arab, and 21 percent Turkmen.3

After the Baath Party came to power in 1968, Kirkuk was increasingly
subject to “Arabization” policies, which attempted to shift the ethnic
demographics in favor of Arabs. The regime in Baghdad limited Kurdish
property ownership, expelled Kurdish civil servants from Kirkuk,
deported Kurds suspected of membership in Kurdish insurgent parties,
prevented the return of Kurdish residents who left the governorate, and
resettled hundreds of thousands of Arabs from other parts of Iraq there.4 Arabization
policies in the 1980s included the mass killing of Kirkuk’s Kurdish
residents, and the levelling of Kurdish villages.5 This reached its peak in what became known as the “Anfal” (“the Spoils”) campaign from February until September 1988.6

Locals interviewed for this study said that during this Arabization
period, the lands of (Shi’a) Turkmen groups in Turklan, Taza, Bashir and
Daquq areas were also seized and subsequently leased to Arab settlers.
These events have a direct bearing on Kirkuk’s security today. As an
official from Taza Khurmatu, a Shia Turkmen city directly south of
Kirkuk city, explained, the source of ongoing strife between Arabs and
Turkmens goes back to the forced demographic and property shifts of
Saddam’s rule.

PMF and Peshmerga role and area of control after the defeat of ISIL a potential clash point

Following
the US invasion of Iraq and the fall of the Baath regime, Kurdish
political parties finally gained a dominant influence in Kirkuk.7 Kurdish
parties, with significant international advice and support, were also
able to negotiate for the inclusion of Article 58 in the 2003 Iraqi
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which functioned as an interim
constitution.8
Article 58 called for measures to “remedy” the forced demographic
changes that had taken place under the previous regime, specifically in
Kirkuk, including the establishment of a property claims commission,
some form of compensation or alternate employment for those who lost
their jobs, and a “permanent resolution” to the status of Disputed
Territories once these restorative measures were taken. The main
provisions of Article 58 were transferred into the 2005 Iraqi
Constitution through Article 140, which required all steps of Article 58
to be completed; a referendum – to be held no later than end of 2007 –
would then determine the status of Kirkuk and other Disputed Territories
based on the “will of their populations.”9 This referendum has never been scheduled.

Articles 58 and 140 triggered a new round of demographic shifts. The
Iraqi Property Claims Commission established under Article 58, had the
authority to allocate property and land to returning Kurds. Particularly
after the announcement of compensation schemes and property
re-allocations, thousands of Kurdish families flooded into Kirkuk
district.10 Many
of the Kurdish returnees’ original homes and villages were destroyed,
so many squatted in Kirkuk city. The flood of Kurdish returnees, and
other Kurdish parties efforts to increase local political control
increased tensions with other communities, who felt their status in
Kirkuk was threatened.11

These new sources of intercommunal tension, the unresolved political
status, and the growing Sunni Arab insurgent violence in Iraq led to a
fraught security situation in Kirkuk. Much of the worst violence took
place in Kirkuk city and the district of Hawija, on the southwest border
with Salah ad-Din. According to Michael Knights, “When Baghdad was at
its worst in 2007, urban Kirkuk matched its per capita incident rate of
one attack per month per 5,000 residents.”12 He
further noted that as Baghdad’s security improved in 2010, Kirkuk’s
incident rate per capita was three times higher than the capital’s.13However,
unlike other areas wracked by Sunni insurgent violence at this time,
there was no major American counterinsurgency push in Kirkuk (with the
exception of two smaller Sahwa groups in Kirkuk city and Hawija). Due to
political sensitivities, the primary security actor in Kirkuk since
2003 has been the local police, which reports to both the Provincial
Council and the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad.14 Despite
this dual reporting structure and the multi-ethnic make-up of most
units, the local police was effectively a Kurdish-led force.15

Although local forces and political actors were dominant, both the
Baghdad-led Federal Government and the KRG maintained a security
presence in Kirkuk prior to 2014. The Iraqi Army’s 12th Division was
fully operational in 2008 and had 15,000 soldiers in 2013.16 The
PUK-led Peshmerga (Unit 70) and Kurdish Asayish forces affiliated with
the KDP and the PUK were also present, even though the presence of
Kurdish Security Forces was legally questionable in areas outside the
Kurdistan Region’s borders. The Kurdish Security Forces’ conduct led to
resentment among non-Kurdish communities, as did their construction of a
fortified barrier around Kirkuk city in 2013, which separated the city
from Sunni Arab areas but left a corridor open to the north, toward the
Kurdistan Region.17

As a result of this background, the demographic composition of
different areas is crucial to understanding the current lines of control
and conflict points in Kirkuk. The following summary (with population
estimates based on 2007 data from the United Nations) illustrates the
mixed demographic nature:18

Dibis
(ca. 40,000) – Mostly Kurdish, but a Sunni Turkmen majority in its
largest settlement, Altun Kupri; Arab villages in areas close to Kirkuk
and Hawija districts

Kirkuk district’s demographics are
strongly divided by sub-districts (* indicates sub-districts only
recognized by Kirkuk governorate and not by the Federal Government). The
following population estimates are based on 2008 Government of Iraq
data:19

ISIL Capture and Immediate Aftermath

In early June 2014, ISIL moved rapidly across Ninewa and Salah ad-Din
and began its assault on Kirkuk. ISF forces retreated from their posts
in Kirkuk, leaving large swathes of territory undefended. While the
assault on Mosul was still ongoing, ISIL captured the Arab-majority
areas of Kirkuk governorate (in Hawija, Daquq, and rural Kirkuk
districts), prompting mass displacement; many civilians fled to Kirkuk
city, Taza Khurmatu city, and other safe havens. Many Arab villagers
close to the emerging frontlines around Kirkuk city moved in the
opposite direction, toward ISIL-held Hawija town, which at the time was
easier to access than Kirkuk city. According to IOM, about 115,000
people were displaced immediately after ISIL’s advance.20

As ISIL advanced on Kirkuk city, Kurdish Security Forces deployed in
the city and surrounding areas. Having lost Mosul and Tikrit, ISF forces
were broken, demoralized, and consumed with fighting off threats in
Samarra, on the road to Baghdad. The Kurdish Security Forces took
exclusive control of Kirkuk city and its immediate environs, including
the Kirkuk oil field, and the K-1 military base, where the Iraqi Army’s
12th Division had abandoned significant amounts of military equipment.
While PUK forces seized control of the area around Kirkuk city, KDP-led
forces secured most of Kirkuk’s oil assets, including the Avaneh dome of
the Kirkuk oil field, and the Bai Hassan field in Dibis district.21 PUK-affiliated forces held on to the Baba dome of the Kirkuk field, and the Khabbaz field.22

Undermanned and ill-equipped, the Kurdish Security Forces struggled
to fend off ISIL around Kirkuk. On June 17, 2014, ISIL captured Multaqa
sub-district, west of Kirkuk city.23 The
same day, the group also took control of Taza sub-district, south of
Kirkuk city, with the exception of its capital, Taza Khurmatu. According
to locals, ISIL killed 52 Shi’a Turkmens in nearby Bashir village on
June 17, 2014, in a pattern of ethnically motivated killing similar to
the massacres the group staged in three Shi’a Turkmen villages in nearby
Tuz.24 However,
with the support of US-led Coalition air strikes and an inflow of
volunteers from other Kurdish areas, Kurdish forces managed to hold the
line there and halt ISIL’s advance.25

Meanwhile, by end of June, the Badr Organization deployed (unclear on
whose orders, potentially their own) to rural Kirkuk and, together with
a large component of locally recruited Shi’a Turkmen fighters, mounted a
counter-offensive to retake Bashir.26 Although the operation failed at that time, it marked the entry of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into Kirkuk’s security dynamics, and the initial mobilization of
Kirkuk’s Shi’a Turkmen community and, to a lesser extent, Sunni Arab and
Kakai Kurdish communities.27 By
early 2015, a series of ISIL attacks and unsuccessful Peshmerga efforts
to stop them had led to a situation in which local Kirkuk officials,
including the governor, viewed PMF support as necessary and even tacitly
welcome.28 This
scenario led to a controversial February 2015 agreement between the
local governorate authority and the PMF, in which the latter agreed to
assist in retaking outlying areas like Hawija, while Kurdish forces
would retain control of and defend the city of Kirkuk (temporarily).29

Since then, Kurdish forces and PMF, including a range of locally
mobilized, minority forces, have jointly taken responsibility for
security and anti-ISIL operations in Kirkuk, including some joint
operations. This is perhaps best illustrated by an operation that took
place on April 30, 2016, to recapture the Shi’a Turkmen-majority village
of Bashir and surrounding Arab villages, which lie about ten kilometers
south of Taza Khurmatu. ISIL captured this area in early June 2014. In
March 2016, the group’s fighters launched 42 Katyusha rockets armed with
a mixture of mustard gas and chlorine from their position in Bashir
onto Taza Khurmatu city, which is the site of a PMF base and an
important transit point for Coalition forces. The attack wounded over
800 civilians and prompted a mass evacuation. Shortly afterwards,
Coalition air strikes struck ISIL positions in Bashir.30 On April 30, 2016, an operation to recapture Bashir and nearby Arab villages was launched.

A large coalition of forces participated and were coordinated under a
joint command that was set up for this single operation. Peshmerga
forces advanced on the right flank with support from Coalition air
strikes. The Abbas Combat Division led the left flank; its approximately
1,000 Shi’a Arab fighters arrived from Kerbala on February 4, 2016,
with the sole purpose of participating in this operation. They were
supported by Iraqi air strikes and by the eight local Turkmen PMF
regiments, 100 Shi’a Arab fighters from Karrar’s Sons regiment,31 50
Shi’a Arab fighters from the Imam Ali Brigade, 50 Shi’a Turkmen
fighters from the PMF’s 52nd Brigade in Amerli (Tuz district), and the
local police force in Taza and Bashir. (Following Bashir’s recapture, in
May 2016, ISIL fired chemical weapons onto the PMF forces stationed in
the area.32)

Since ISIL’s initial onslaught in 2014, Kurdish forces have managed
to push the group back and shift the entire frontline, which ran from
the northwestern to the southeastern corner of the governorate, a few
dozen kilometers to the south, although ISIL has made occasional inroads
on this line. In 2016, Kurdish forces erected an almost contiguous,
fortified security barrier along the frontline, akin to the one built
around Kirkuk city, which divides Sunni Arab areas from multi-ethnic and
Kurdish-majority areas throughout the governorate.33 Nonetheless,
there have been continuing ISIL attacks in areas in and around Kirkuk
city. In one such attack on October 21, 2016, as Coalition efforts to
retake Mosul were underway, ISIL launched a diversionary attack on
Kirkuk city by activating sleeper cells and orchestrating infiltration
from the outside. The group attacked multiple targets, including the
governorate building, police stations, and the headquarters of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party. The Peshmerga, the Asayish, and the local
police, which were reinforced by the Anti-Terrorism Directorate of
Sulaimani and local volunteers, could only reestablish control of the
city after 48 hours and suffered heavy casualties in the fights (this
attack unleashed retaliatory attacks by Kurdish Security Forces on Sunni
Arab and Sunni Turkmen populations; see section below).34

Divided Control

The response to the ISIL threat dramatically changed the security
dynamics in Kirkuk and created new patterns of control, which continued
to prevail at the time of writing. According to a Middle East Research
Institute mapping of pre- and post-ISIL areas of control in Kirkuk,
Peshmerga forces were not the primary security actor in Kirkuk prior to
2014 – they held a predominant influence in only small parts of Dibis
and Kirkuk districts.35 However,
following the ISIL invasion in 2014, their area of control increased to
include a significant portion of Dibis district, parts of Daquq
district, and more of Kirkuk district, including the governorate’s
capital, Kirkuk city. The February 2015 agreement mapping out lines of
control between Kurdish forces and the PMF largely still stands: the PMF
(mostly Badr) secure areas in Taza sub-district and conduct clearing
operations in Daquq district via their Turkmen proxies, while Sunni Arab
and Shi’a Arab forces of the PMF are building up their presence in the
Hamreen mountains in preparation to retake Hawija. KRG Security Forces
have retained exclusive control in all other parts of the governorate,
including Kirkuk city. ISF are not present in Kirkuk – with the notable
exception of the local police.

At the time of writing, ISIL forces continued to control or have
operating space over the vast majority of the southern half of Kirkuk,
essentially any area south of the Kurdish security barrier, and north of
the Hamreen mountains. Efforts to retake Hawija were on hold as ISF
forces finished operations in Mosul; now, they focus on retaking Tal
Afar before moving on to Hawija. The composition of forces who will
participate in the Hawija offensive remained unclear at the time of
writing.36

The below sections will discuss the patterns of control and dynamics within Kurdish and PMF areas of control separately.

Kurdish Sphere of Control

While Kurdish forces control most of the governorate outside ISIL’s
reach, in many places they do so in alliance with, or via, local forces.
For example, in Yaychi sub-district, just outside Kirkuk city, a small,
mixed Kurdish-Turkmen tribal force supports PUK forces to control the
area.37 (There
were rumors also about a sizeable Turkmen force backed by Turkey in
Yaychi, although their presence could not be confirmed, and local
officials denied they existed.38)
In Daquq district, the Kakai minority – a Kurdish-speaking, non-Muslim
minority of about 75,000 individuals in Iraq – formed three regiments of
650 forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in 2015.39 In
Dibis district, the PUK-Peshmerga forces have reportedly held the
frontline south of Kharabrud in alliance with Iranian Kurdish fighters
who have ties to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).40

There is also a split in control of certain areas between the PUK and
KDP wings of the Kurdish forces. Generally, PUK forces control Kirkuk
city and most of the surrounding areas, while KDP forces maintain
control of the most significant oil resources, with the exception of the
Baba dome of the Kirkuk oil field.41 However,
there are overlapping areas of control and mutually contested areas.
Although the PUK-Peshmerga have the upper hand in Kirkuk city, both KDP-
and PUK-affiliated Asayish forces and Kirkuk’s local police also retain
a prominent role in security. In Daquq, both PUK- and KDP-affiliated
forces vie for the allegiance of the local Kakai fighters.

Tensions between the PUK and KDP over the control of oil resources
have deepened the divide among Kurdish leaders in Kirkuk. In August
2016, the KRG entered an agreement with Baghdad to export oil from the
fields operated by Baghdad’s North Oil Company (secured by PUK) to
Turkey through the KDP-controlled pipes, and to split the proceeds in
half.42 Although
the agreement included provisions for petrodollar payments to Kirkuk in
the range of $10 million per month, some within the PUK leadership
rejected the deal as it seemed to cement KDP interests in Kirkuk.43 Disagreement
over a tender to build a refinery has led to open confrontation. In
March 2017, PUK-affiliated Black Force special police units seized
control of a pumping facility near Kirkuk, which collects oil from North
Oil Company-operated facilities, to pressure Baghdad to increase the
share of crude refined in Kirkuk, and to pick the “right” bidder.44

PMF Areas of Operation

The Popular Mobilization Forces have a great deal of autonomy in the areas south of Kirkuk city, although the Peshmerga are also present. There is a strong demographic pattern to the areas where PMF have deployed and played a more active role, in that PMF have predominantly tried to assert areas in heavily Shi’a Turkmen areas of the governorate.45

The February 2015 power-sharing agreement allowed the PMF to establish a military base in Taza Khurmatu, a dozen kilometers due south of Kirkuk city, and Badr forces are also known to be based out of the Hamreen mountains on the southern border of the governorate. Within weeks of the agreement, the Associated Press reported that 2,000 fighters had arrived at the Taza base, and militia leaders estimated that a total of 5,000 fighters, some of whom had arrived from outside Kirkuk, were present in the governorate in February 2015.46 In June 2017, one security representative interviewed for this study estimated the total number of PMF forces present in Kirkuk governorate at 7,000, a large share of whom are locally mobilized Shi’a Turkmen.

The Turkmen forces began to be established in March 2015 and were trained (including by Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah instructors) at the Taza base.47 Most Shi’a Turkmen forces belong to the PMF’s “northern front” operations, which have clear ties to Badr.48 These forces are organized into two groups: Brigades 16 and 52. These brigades operate all the way from Taza Khurmatu to the southernmost village in Tuz district (in Salah ad-Din); Brigade 16 is most active in Kirkuk’s Taza sub-district, and Brigade 52 is engaged in the rural areas connecting Taza Khurmatu to Tuz Khurmatu.49 Although the exact force numbers fluctuate and are difficult to estimate, Brigade 16 alone has six regiments, and each of these comprises 150-300 Shi’a Turkmen forces.50 Two further Turkmen PMF regiments operate in Taza sub-district, in coordination with the “northern front” operations but independent from Badr.51

The mobilization of these local Turkmen PMF forces may be significant for future local dynamics because while each unit or brigade tends to affiliate with a larger Shi’a PMF, on a day-to-day basis, they act as semi-autonomous forces that can hold areas on their own. To better understand these dynamics, researchers for this study explored the different groups that operate in and control recently recaptured areas in Taza sub-district: the Turkmen Bashir village, which has been a flashpoint between ISIL and PMF forces, and eight nearby Arab villages (Aziziyya, Big Humayra, Small Humayra, Isteeh, Jadida, Mur’iyya, Shamsiyya, and Tali’a).52

As regards the conduct of Turkmen PMF conduct in their areas of operation, a local official in Taza Khurmatu claimed they were not well disciplined and often acted outside the remit of the law. As an example, he stated that PMF fighters intimidated and disrespected locals at security checkpoints. Making things worse, the local police is often unable to enforce the law against PMF fighters because of their powerful connections (wasta). When confronted by these allegations, an interviewed commander claimed the Turkmen PMF have very good relationships with locals because they are also part of the community. He admitted to some acts of criminality against civilians due to a “lack of discipline” among Turkmen forces, but argued these problems were not systemic and often originated in business or family conflicts.

In addition to the Turkmen forces, the PMF in Kirkuk also include two Sunni Arab forces who report to the formal PMF structure (primarily Badr)53 and whose sole aim is to liberate Hawija. These forces are based in the Hamreen mountain range, which separates Baiji and Tikrit districts in Salah ad-Din from Hawija in southern Kirkuk.54 The Hawija’s Liberation hashd is led by Wasfi al-Assi, chieftain of the Ubaid tribe. The PMF trained and equipped the group’s first two regiments of 600-700 fighters in 2015.

They have been fighting in the local area but have also been deployed in support of PMF operations in nearby areas, including areas in Salah ad-Din. A new round of recruitment opened in September 2016 to expand the force to up to eight regiments (approximately 2,500 fighters).55 The second group is under the supervision of the Nu’aym tribe’s chief, Sufyan Omar al-Ali an-Nu’aymi, who announced in July 2016 the establishment of the Southwest Kirkuk hashd. According to news reports, this Sunni Arab force includes 1,000 fighters,56 but this research could not confirm their deployment.57

Although the power-sharing agreement permitted PMF operations in
areas south of Kirkuk, it is not a division of labor that excludes
Peshmerga activities and influence in areas carved out for PMF
operations; for example, the campaign to retake Bashir involved
significant Peshmerga forces (see above). An interesting example of
Kurdish presence is the Free Iraq Division, a 1,500-strong group of
largely Sunni fighters of mixed ethnicity (about 50% are Kurds, 30% are
Arabs, and 20% are Sunni Turkmen) who are active in the PMF area of
operations near Bashir.58 Although this unit was launched in 2014 as part of the popular mobilization against ISIL,59 its
status remains ambiguous. It has not been formally incorporated within
the PMF and its fighters receive neither salaries nor official
recognition. The group has strong ties to the KRG leadership, and many
view it as an attempt to balance the Shi’a PMF presence in Kirkuk
governorate.60

Blocked Return, Forced Displacement, and Ethnic Gerrymandering

The ISIL invasion of 2014 presented the KRG with the prospect of
achieving their long-held political goal of making Kirkuk an official
Kurdish territory. “I saw it in an opportunistic way,”61 said
KRG President Masoud Barzani when asked about the Iraqi Army’s
inability to secure Kirkuk. The side-effects of this geopolitical
expansion were felt particularly harshly by the governorate’s Arab
population, who were subject to multiple rights violations.
PUK-Peshmerga and Asayish security forces have forcibly displaced Arab
IDPs and resident population, conducted unlawful arrests, razed
villages, and blocked returns. The Turkmen PMF have also harassed,
abused, and destroyed the property of Arab residents in their areas of
operations, but their area of operations, and so the impact of such
abuses, has been more limited.

Human Rights Watch documented the widespread destruction of homes in
60 Sunni Arab villages between August 2014 and May 2016 along the
shifting frontline with ISIL (on both sides of the security barrier)(see
HRW’s map below).62 These
acts were committed to punish alleged cooperation with ISIL or to
reverse the demographic changes of the Baathist “Arabization.” Several
villages lie further from the frontlines but close to key oil
infrastructure.63 Based
on satellite imagery, site visits, and interviews with locals, Human
Rights Watch alleged that the Kurdish Security Forces were responsible
for the partial and often complete destruction of these villages, a few
of which had never been captured by ISIL.64 The KRG denied most of these allegations, claiming that the damage resulted from fighting or demining.65 Return to these villages has been restricted, and many residents live in IDP camps today.66 KRG
President Masoud Barzani told Human Rights Watch in July 2016 that the
KRG would not allow Sunni Arabs to return to villages that had been
“Arabized” by former President Saddam Hussein.67

KRG
forces and officials have tended to argue that these attacks were
motivated by security threats. Many of the attacks on Kirkuk’s Arab
communities and limitations on their rights have appeared to also be
motivated by revenge for attacks on the Peshmerga. Throughout 2016,
there have been a series of attacks on Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk city
and other areas, presumably instigated by ISIL sleeper cells among the
Sunni Arab population in the city. For example, the October 21, 2016
attack in Kirkuk city triggered widespread retaliation by the Kurdish
Security Forces against Arabs throughout the governorate.68 Political
officials blamed Arab IDPs in Kirkuk for instigating the attack, and in
response, at least 250 IDPs from outside Kirkuk were expelled,69 more
than 100 homes in informal settlements in Kirkuk city were razed, and
the populations of two Arab villages (comprising at least 150 families)
in Dibis were forcibly displaced.70 Local
media also reported that the Kurdish Security Forces completely emptied
Qarah Tabah village in Yaychi sub-district, thought to be a source of
ISIL infiltration for the assault on Kirkuk.71 At
the time of research, reports still had not confirmed the return of
IDPs to the two villages in Dibis, but some residents were permitted to
return to Qarah Tabah in March 2017, according to local news reports.72

The expulsion of IDPs from other governorates following the October
2016 incident fit within a larger pattern of discrimination against and
expulsion of Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkmen IDPs from outside Kirkuk. A
total of 12,000 people were expelled in September 2016 alone.73 Sunni
Turkmen IDPs who were expelled told Human Rights Watch that the orders
were implemented due to a perception that Sunnis had ties to ISIL.74 The
IDPs who were forcibly expelled were primarily from areas where ISIL
had already been forced out. However, many of those areas were
controlled by PMFs that were hostile to returning populations (e.g., in Tuz).75 This situation continued as of the time of writing.

Shi’a Turkmen PMF have also engaged in similar patterns of abuse
against Sunni Arabs, although to a lesser degree. This phenomenon is
best illustrated by return patterns in and around Bashir, which is
currently under Shi’a Turkmen PMF control. Bashir itself has
traditionally been a Shi’a Turkmen village but surrounded by
predominantly Sunni Arab villages. Overall return is relatively low in
Bashir and the surrounding villages due to security reasons; the area is
within the reach of ISIL artillery, and the group has already attempted
to recapture Bashir. In addition, property damage in Bashir and
surrounding villages is significant, with many homes damaged by ISIL
artillery or booby-traps. According to a local official, 875 of the
1,875 houses were completely destroyed in Bashir.76 Roughly
the same amount of property destruction has happened in surrounding
Arab villages, according to locals. However, return has not been the
same. Of the estimated 600 families (3,880 persons) displaced from
Bashir, 150 Shi’a Turkmen families have already returned. However, not a
single displaced Arab has returned to the neighboring villages, despite
a directive from the sub-district manager (the local authority) in Taza
that they were free to do so. A mukhtar
from one of the Arab villages added that locals were very afraid of the
Turkmen PMFs due to news reports on these forces’ conduct, including,
for example, assassinations of Arabs in Tuz district.

A local official explained that the Shi’a Turkmen PMF block the
return of Arab IDPs to the liberated areas around Bashir at security
checkpoints, which they man together with the Peshmerga and the local
police. An interviewed PMF commander stated that the return of Arab IDPs
was a sensitive issue and stressed the need for detailed security
checks to weed out innocent Arab returnees from those who were
affiliated with ISIL or supported it (the PMF is part of the joint
security committees that vet returning IDPs). He also added that tribal
reconciliation efforts must precede returns to address grievances and
prevent a spiral of violence due to resentments on both sides.

The destruction of homes and evictions of the Arab population in
Kirkuk governorate have been justified on the grounds of military
necessity or described as retaliations for attacks on Kurdish or Shi’a
Turkmen forces. However, such restrictions on the rights of Arabs
effectively reverse the effects of the Baath’s “Arabization” policies
and might be understood as a tit-for-tat in the forced demographic
changes that have characterized Kirkuk over the last three decades. In
Kirkuk, the forced displacements of, and restrictions on, Sunni Arab
populations by all sides carry a distinct flavor of ethnic
gerrymandering (although this is not the argument made by most KRG
officials).

Future Control

At the time of writing, all eyes were on ISIL’s remaining stronghold
in Hawija. However, most locals assume that Hawija will not be the end
of conflict in Kirkuk, but the beginning of another cycle of it.
Assuming that the Hawija operations are led by ISF (as is anticipated to
be the case), the re-entry of Iraqi forces into Kirkuk will likely test
Kurdish control. Many also expect that political clashes over whether
PMF are allowed to participate in the Hawija operations will upset the
so far cooperative relationship between PMF and Kurdish forces. All 40
key informants interviewed for this study expected a deterioration of
inter-community relations after ISIL’s ouster from Hawija and potential
clashes between the Peshmerga and the PMF over Kirkuk city.77 The
Turkmen PMF allied with Shi’a PMF forces are growing in strength and
ambition and may be used to present a threat to Kurdish control of
Kirkuk city. Similar dynamics have already unfolded in Tuz district,
just next door to Kirkuk. In late 2015, clashes erupted in Tuz Khurmatu
city between Kurdish Security Forces and local Turkmen brigades of the
PMF after the latter moved in to control parts of the city, which had
been under Kurdish control since they held the defensive line against
ISIL there in 2014.78 Qais al-Khazali, the leader of the League of the Righteous, a feared Shi’a militia, has already threatened to invade Kirkuk,79 and
PMF forces have increasingly invested in building the capacities of the
Turkmen PMF in Kirkuk. Their overall force numbers, strength, and
positioning just south of Kirkuk city suggest a strong potential for
Kurdish-Turkmen clashes in the regional capital. Such a move would spark
serious conflict.

In addition to a potential post-Hawija stand-off, there has been a
general weakening of the rule of law and security control in the last
two years. The presence of competing Kurdish, Shi’a Turkmen, and other
forces in the last two years has increased overall criminality and
instability in Kirkuk and deepened existing fractures in local security
politics. A local monitoring organization interviewed for this study
said that they had recorded a steady increase in Kirkuk-based security
incidents since 2016. Several community stakeholders interviewed
expressed fear about criminal gangs and said they felt less safe in
Kirkuk.

Most of those interviewed, from a cross-section of Kirkuk’s
demographics, feared that the failure to keep these groups in check
would increase future conflict risks, and so most favored
demobilization. Twenty of the 40 consulted key informants, of diverse
ethnic and religious backgrounds favored the local police as the only
security actor in Kirkuk. Even a Shi’a Turkmen militia commander and a
Sunni Arab leader close to the Arab hashd suggested these forces
demobilize after ISIL’s ouster from Hawija. However, at the time of
writing there were no signs that demobilization would happen soon. These
different LHSF factions could very well play into any future rounds of
political conflict.

Once the ISIL threat is (mostly) extinguished, locals feared that the
real conflict over the long-standing political control issues in Kirkuk
would break out, with regional, national and local stakeholders all
involved.80 In
June 2017, the KRG president called for a referendum on Kurdish
independence, which was later set for September 25, 2017. The referendum
would also include other Disputed Territories controlled by Kurdish
forces. The effect of this unilateral referendum process is not clear.
Many analysts treated it as an act of political showmanship or an
attempt to increase Kurdish influence and bargaining power before the
Iraqi elections.81 Regardless
of the intent, the most likely immediate effect of the referendum is
that it is likely to escalate simmering political conflicts, between all
the different sides engaged in Kirkuk. In addition to triggering a
Baghdad-KRG standoff, or exacerbating the potential conflict between
Kurdish forces and the PMF in Kirkuk, the referendum has the potential
to worsen competition and political conflict between the KDP and PUK.
The KDP’s seizure of oil assets in Kirkuk and its grip on related
revenues have created a lingering complaint among the PUK and triggered
infighting among different PUK factions. Although for the moment this
issue has subsided, it is not over. Many expect political tensions to
increase as the September referendum approaches; it is not yet clear
whether the PUK will fully support Barzani’s referendum initiative and
what the local consequences will be if they do not.82Many
of the different local forces that have been mobilized since 2014, both
Kurdish and of other ethnic minorities, are currently aligned with
either KDP or PUK forces and could play a role in a local militarization
of that ongoing competition.

Notes

1 Erica Gaston acted as editor for this piece and contributed analysis to this report. Hana Nasser provided research support.

3 Figures from the 1957 census. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 43. International Crisis Group noted that “In
1957, before Arabisation, census figures – considered reliable –
suggested that Kurds were a plurality in the governorate, though not in
Kirkuk town, where Turkomans predominated.” International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds, 2.

6 According
to Human Rights Watch investigations in Kirkuk and other governorates
with significant Kurdish populations, the Anfal campaign, and pre-cursor
attacks in 1987, resulted in: “mass summary executions and mass
disappearance of many tens of thousands of non-combatants, including …
sometimes the entire population of villages;” “the widespread use of
chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or
Sarin, against the town of Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish
villages, killing many thousands of people, mainly women and children;”
“the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, which are described
in government documents as having been ‘burned,’ ‘destroyed,’
‘demolished’ and ‘purified’;” “arbitrary jailing and warehousing for
months, in conditions of extreme deprivation, of tens of thousands of
women, children and elderly people, without judicial order or any cause
other than their presumed sympathies for the Kurdish opposition. Many
hundreds of them were allowed to die of malnutrition and disease;”
“forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers upon the
demolition of their homes.” George Black, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds.

7
Sean Kane notes that “with the exception of nine days—March 19 to
28—during the 1991 uprising, Kirkuk has never been Kurdish administered
in modern Iraqi history.” He noted that this remained “nominally true
after 2003,” – PUK peshmerga and police units helped take control of the
city, they were then asked to withdraw and the U.S. military took
control. However, “the Arab boycott of the political process from 2003
to 2007 and the close military relationship between the U.S. and Kurdish
security services[…] allowed the Kurdish political parties to establish
control over many public institutions in the province, including
capturing twenty-six of the forty-one seats on the provincial council
during the January 2005 provincial elections.” Sean Kane, Iraq’s Disputed Territories, United States Institute of Peace, April 4, 2011, 23, https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/04/iraqs-disputed-territories. See also International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds, 8-12.

8
Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution provides, “First: The executive
authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the
implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of
the Transitional Administrative Law. Second: The responsibility placed
upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government
stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall
extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance
with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely
(normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and
other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a
date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.” Iraq Const. Art. 140.
International Crisis Group notes the influence of Kurdish leaders in
promoting this provision: “Their two leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal
Talabani, used their positions on the 25-member interim governing
Council (July 2003 to June 2004) to influence the drafting of the
interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), in
early 2004, including Article 58, which prescribed a reversal of
Arabisation […].” International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds, 7.

14 Shalaw Mohammed, “Kirkuk Governor: ‘Life in the City May Never Be Normal’,” NIQASH, May 16, 2013, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3221; Knights and Ali, Kirkuk in Transition.
The Kirkuk police also established two SWAT-like paramilitary units
(emergency support units) to undertake counter-insurgency tasks that the
Federal Police would normally assume in other governorates.

17
The Kirkuk governor ordered digging these ditches in 2013 to prevent
the entry of vehicle-bound IEDs and protect its residents. However,
Arabs and Turkmens viewed this plan with suspicion and accused the
governor of conspiring to join the city to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The semi-circular, 2-meter-wide, and 3-meter-deep trench runs for 52
kilometers and embraces the city from the south while leaving its
northern part open toward the Kurdistan Region. The trench features
several watchtowers, and its construction cost about 3 million. Shalaw
Mohammed, “Kirkuk Builds a Moat: Taking a Medieval Tack against
Terrorists,” NIQASH, July 25, 2013, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3257.
A year later, KDP-led authorities began digging another trench
separating Erbil from Kirkuk governorate, which sparked opposition from
all parties in Kirkuk. Shalaw Mohammed, “Ethnic Barriers Security Trench
between Erbil and Kirkuk Inflames Tensions,” NIQASH, May 8, 2014, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3438/security-trench-between-erbil-and-kirkuk-inflames-tensions.htm.

21
KDP expansion into Kirkuk’s oil infrastructure was significant. On July
11, KDP-affiliated forces expelled the North Oil Company, a
Baghdad-affiliated company, from the Avana dome (of the Kirkuk oil
field) and the Bai Hassan oil field, and the KRG contracted the KAR
Group, a private company close to the KDP, to operate the facilities.
(The KRG has controlled the Khurmala dome of the Kirkuk oil field since
2008). “Iraq: Kurdish Options Limited in Northern Oil Fields,” Stratfor, July 11, 2014, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iraq-kurdish-options-limited-northern-oil-fields.
Since early 2014, Kirkuk’s oil has flown through a pipeline controlled
by the KRG, because Sunni insurgents had destroyed the main Iraq-Turkey
pipeline and has threatened any engineers sent to fix it. David
Sheppard, “With New Grip on Oil Fields, Iraq Kurds Unveil Plan to Ramp
up Exports,” Reuters, June 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-kurds-oil-idUSKBN0F02KL20140625.

31
This force was established in June 2015, mostly from (university)
students in Iraq’s Babel governorate. “Establishment of Sons of Karrar
Regiment from Babel’s Residents and Students to Face ISIL,” Al Sumaria, June 14, 2015.

33 Al Jazeera Arabic, “Is the Kurdish Trench Paving the Way for the Division of Iraq?” YouTube video, 3:22, July 28, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a02PzXkfCz4; "‘Trench of Kurdistan’ between the Motives of the Policy and Security Requirements,” Al Jazeera, June 3, 2016.

40
The group calls itself the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons. It is linked with
the military arm of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The group is led by
Hussayn Yazdan Bina, and it is not the same as the homonymous
PKK-splinter group based in Turkey, which the US designated as a
terrorist group in 2008. Shalaw Mohammed, “Ragtag Kurdish Forces Face
ISIL assaults at ‘The Kobani of Iraq’,” Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History and Religion, January 23, 2015, https://www.juancole.com/2015/01/kurdish-assaults-kobani.html; “Kurdish Sources: Tehran Wants an Excuse for the ‘Hashd’ to Attack the City to Disrupt the Referendum on Independence,” Asharq al Awsat, June 24, 2017.

48
The northern front is under the command of Yilmaz an-Najjar, commonly
known as Abu Ridha an-Najjar, who is deputy minister of municipalities.
Shalaw Mohammed, “Interview + Kirkuk Militia Spokesperson: ‘We Are Proud
to Be Supported by Iran’,” NIQASH, July 4, 2017, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5629/.

50
Each regiment is named after the recruits’ areas of origin: Bashir
Regiment, Taza Regiment, Taza Martyrs’ Regiment, Daquq Regiment,
al-Qa’im Regiment, and Regiment 90 (“90” is an historic neighborhood in
Kirkuk city). The commander of Brigade 16 is Nabeel Issa (nom de guerre:
Abu Tha’ir al-Bashiri) from Bashir village.

51
The Martyr Sadr Regiment is a Shi’a Turkmen force under PMF Brigade 15;
it was established by the Kirkuk office of the Islamic Da’wa Party (the
largest political party in Iraq that has been the source of all prime
ministers since 2006). The Haqq Regiment is composed of Sunni Turkmens;
it was established by Turhan al-Mufti, an advisor to the prime minister
on Turkmen affairs and head of the Turkmen Haqq Party.

52 Although
it was not possible for researchers to visit the Arab villages, locals
claimed that every force that took part in the operation to retake
Bashir is still present in the area as a holding force, including Shi’a
Arab forces, although parts of each force has been re-deployed to other
governorates or areas of PMF operations.

56 “Nu’aym Chieftain Calls on the Government to Arm the Tribes and Include their Fighters in the Liberation of Kirkuk,” Al Mada Press, July 10, 2016.

57 In
a recent meeting in July 2017, the PMF’s commander at the “northern
front,” Yilmaz an-Najjar, committed to training and equipping the group
to prepare them for the Hawija operation. “Arabs of Kirkuk Demand the Popular Hashd to Include Their Volunteers in the Battle of Hawija,” NRT TV, July 2017, http://www.nrttv.com/AR/Detail.aspx?Jimare=51210.

58 Two units of the Free Iraq Brigade (liwa’ ahrar al-‘iraq)
have been based in Jadida village since early 2016 – one of the Arab
villages recently recaptured close to Bashir (Taza sub-district).

59
The Free Iraq Division was formally established in 2014 by the Iraqi
Fatwa Office, a Sunni religious institution led by Mufti Mahdi bin Ahmed
al-Sumayda’i, as part of the popular mobilization against ISIL. “His
Eminence the Mufti of the Republic of Iraq Meets the Representative of
His Eminence in the Province of Basra,” Iraq Fatwa House, August 14, 2017, http://www.h-iftaa.com/.

62
HRW observed more than 60 villages that appeared to be partially or
totally destroyed via satellite imagery (see the map “Building
Demolitions in Villages, Kirkuk Governorate”). HRW further corroborated
the destruction of 17 of these sites through witness testimony and site
visits, which are described in Human Rights Watch, Marked with an “X”: Iraqi Kurdish Forces' Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/13/marked-x/iraqi-kurdish-forces-destruction-villages-homes-conflict-isis.

69 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report that hundreds of IDP families were evicted from Wahed Huzairan (June
First) and other Arab-majority and mixed-ethnicity neighborhoods of
Kirkuk city in a matter of days after the Asayish issued a verbal
warning and confiscated identity cards, which would only be returned if
the families left Kirkuk. Amnesty International, Where Are We Supposed to Go; Human Rights Watch, KRG: Kurdish Forces Ejecting Arabs in Kirkuk Halt Displacements, Demolitions; Compensate Victims (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/03/krg-kurdish-forces-ejecting-arabs-kirkuk; Human Rights Watch, Marked with an “X.”

72 “The Return of the Residents of Qarah Tabah in Parts to Their Homes South of Kirkuk,” Kirkuk Now, March 22, 2017, kirkuknow.com/arabic/.
Some reports allege that Qoshqaya and Qotan were razed after their
evacuation. “Peshmerga Official: We Have Information Confirming the
Cooperation of Some People of Qushqaya and Qutan with Daesh,” Al Sumaria, November 9, 2016.

73
For example, on September 22, 2016, 115 families were evicted from the
Laylan IDP camp, and their homes were destroyed. Several Arab IDP
families from Hawija were evicted from Kirkuk city as ISIL strengthened
its grip on Hawija district. Evictions were carried out by local
authorities, aided by the Asayish. Human Rights Watch, KRG: Kurdish Forces Ejecting Arabs.
Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkmen IDPs from outside Kirkuk reportedly
comprise the majority of the nearly 374,000 IDPs, according to some
estimates.