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[ For Public Release ]
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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Solaris Solstice AdminSuite Vulnerabilities
June 25, 1997 21:00 GMT Number H-75
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Vulnerabilities exist in AdminSuite releases 2.1 and 2.2.
PLATFORM: AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2
DAMAGE: Local users may gain root access.
SOLUTION: Apply vendor patches or use workaround as described in Section
5.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Sun strongly recommends application of patches or workarounds
ASSESSMENT: until release of AdminSuite 2.3.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Sun Microsystems Advisory
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Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00145
Date: June 25 1997
Cross-Ref:
Title: Vulnerabilities with Solaris Solstice AdminSuite
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Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin, so long
as the Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun
Microsystems. Portions may also be excerpted for re-use in other
security advisories so long as proper attribution is included.
Any other use of this information without the express written consent
of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly
disclaims all liability for any misuse of this information by any
third party.
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1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris Solstice
AdminSuite (AdminSuite) releases 2.1 and 2.2.
Sun strongly recommends that you install the patches listed in
section 4 immediately on every affected system.
Sun also strongly recommends that you apply the additional
measures listed in section 5 to correct permission problems that
may exist with your NIS+ passwd table and NIS (YP) map source
file.
2. Who is Affected
Vulnerable: Sites using AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2
The problems are fixed in AdminSuite 2.3.
3. Understanding the Vulnerabilities
AdminSuite is a package which provides graphical user interfaces
to perform various system administration tasks such as managing
users, groups, and hosts.
3.1 Problems with AdminSuite 2.1
AdminSuite 2.1 uses excessive permissions when adding new users to
the NIS+ passwd table. This allows users to change their password
table entries to become root. This problem has been fixed in
AdminSuite 2.2.
AdminSuite 2.1 incorrectly changes the permissions on the source
file used to build the NIS (YP) passwd map. As a result, it may
be possible for any user to edit the /etc/passwd file. This
problem has been fixed in AdminSuite 2.2.
AdminSuite 2.1 creates temporary files in an insecure manner when
updating a NIS (YP) database. As a result, it may be possible to
manipulate AdminSuite into over-writing arbitrary files on the
system including the NIS (YP) map source file. This problem has
been fixed in AdminSuite 2.2.
3.2 Problems with AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2
AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 creates lock files insecurely which may be
exploited to gain root access.
AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 Database Manager "save" option executes
under setgid bin privileges for non-privileged users. This may be
exploited by non-privileged users to gain root access.
4. List of Patches
The vulnerabilities relating to AdminSuite 2.1 and 2.2 are fixed
by the following patches:
AdminSuite version Patch ID
------------------ --------
2.1 (sparc) 103235-08
2.1 (x86) 103236-08
2.2 (sparc) 103502-04
2.2 (x86) 103503-03
5. Additional measures
5.1 AdminSuite 2.1 uses excessive permissions when adding new users to
NIS+. The patch listed in section 5 fixes this problem. However,
users that were created prior to the application of this patch may
have excessive permissions. Therefore you should check the passwd
table for entries with excessive permissions with a program such
as the following:
# awk program to check for NIS+ entries with excessive
# permissions
function readNlines(n)
{
for (i = n; i > 0; i--)
getline
}
/Access.+ ....rmcd/ {
readNlines(6)
print substr($5, 2, length($5) - 2)
}
Put the program in a file and run it with the following command
pipeline:
% niscat -o '[]passwd.org_dir' | nawk -f
and the name field of each passwd table entry with excessive
permissions will be printed one per line on stdout.
Note that the program only checks for the type of excessive
permissions generated by the AdminSuite 2.1 problem described
above.
If the program above reveals entries with excessive permissions,
then you can take a look at them with the following command:
% niscat -o '[name=user]passwd.org_dir'
One line of the output will look similiar to the following:
Access Rights : ----rmcdr---r---
^^^^
This allows the owner to read, modify, change, and delete
information.
The rights at this level should be more restrictive and they
should be changed. To restore the permissions to what they were
intended to be for one entry, do the following (you must have
table modify permissions):
% nischmod o=r,ngw-rmdc '[name=user]passwd.org_dir'
Or for each entry in the whole table at once, do the following:
% nischmod o=r,ngw-rmdc '[]passwd.org_dir'
This sets the owner permissions to r (read) and removes all
permissions from nobody, group, and world.
Please note this will only change the permissions on a per-entry
basis and will not change the table or column permissions.
5.2 AdminSuite 2.1 also incorrectly changes the permissions on the
source file used to build the NIS (YP) passwd map. The patch
listed in section 4 fixes this problem, but after installing the
patch, you should verify that the passwd map source file has a
file mode of 644 (or more restrictive, depending on your
preferences), and is owned by root.
6. Checksum Table
The checksum table below shows the BSD checksums (SunOS 5.x:
/usr/ucb/sum), SVR4 checksums (SunOS 5.x: /usr/bin/sum), and the
MD5 digital signatures for the above-mentioned patches that are
available from:
These checksums may not apply if you obtain patches from your
answer centers.
File Name BSD SVR4 MD5
- ---------------- ---------- --------- --------------------------------
103235-08.tar.Z 56327 3360 46627 6719 B2B8E921C50311737EF53C1C9C47DFD2
103236-08.tar.Z 04175 2027 10154 4054 7FC98A5F8BFA44B884A55A1BED826BA3
103502-04.tar.Z 24231 954 10762 1907 CFE2B561C3D382A121F4E064635695D7
103503-03.tar.Z 32779 331 45751 662 1B80A52FC690FB7EA7D6E23524E65849
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Sun acknowledges, with thanks, AUSCERT and Marko Laakso (University of
Oulu, Finland) for their assistance in the preparation of this
bulletin.
Sun and AUSCERT are members of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit the FIRST
web site at .
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APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers via
World Wide Web at:
Customers with Sun support contracts can also obtain patches from local
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[ End Sun Microsystems Advisory
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
AUSCERT & Marko Laakso (University of Oulu, Finland) for the information
contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
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