Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

Abstract

Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of
Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians?
We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how both
are at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyists
follow politicians they were initially connected to when those
politicians switch to new committee assignments. In support of the
expertise view, we show that there is a group of experts that even
politicians of opposite political affiliation listen to. However, we find
a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise.
(JEL D72, D82)

Citation

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi.
2014."Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process."American Economic Review,
104 (12):
3885-3920.DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3885