This course familiarizes students with classic questions and models in industrial organization. We first cover basic models of static as well as dynamic competition with applications to competitive strategy, mergers, collusion, managerial incentives, and trade policy. The course then analyzes in depth competitive strategies of vertical relations and control (B to B contracting) and introduces the extensive literature on two-sided markets. We also briefly discuss research on pricing when consumers violate classic assumptions on consumer behavior, e.g. erroneously analyze prices or contract offers.

Course prerequisites: Students must have completed the first-year microeconomics sequence in the BDPEMS.

Grading/exams: The exact course requirements will be discussed during the first lecture as they depend on how many students participate in the class.

Literature:
We will prescribe numerous original research articles to read. Good textbooks on basic models of industrial organization are:
Tirole (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.
Belleflamme and Peitz (2009), Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies
The following textbook introduces questions of antitrust and economic models of competition that have been written to answer them:
Motta (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice
The following textbook highlights implications of various consumer biases on market outcomes:
Spiegler, Ran (2011), Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization