U.S. v. MURPHY

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

November 21, 2005.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SEAN MURPHY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: GUSTAVE DIAMOND, Senior District Judge

OPINION

On February 8, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a one-count
indictment against Sean Murphy ("defendant") charging him with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Currently before the court are numerous
pretrial motions filed by the defendant.

A motions hearing was held before the court on June 8, 2005, at
which time the court ruled from the bench on several of
defendant's motions and took under advisement his motion to
suppress physical evidence. A supplemental hearing was held on
June 28, 2005, following which the parties were given the
opportunity to file supplemental briefs. These briefs have now
been filed.

For the reasons which follow, the defendant's motion to
suppress will be granted.

I. Motions Resolved at Hearings

At the hearing on June 8, 2005, the court ruled on all of the
defendant's pretrial motions except his motion to suppress.
Specifically, the court indicated it would: (1) grant in part and deny in part defendant's motion for discovery (Document No. 17)
and his motion requesting notice pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404,
405, 406, 407 & 408 (Document No. 19); (2) deny as moot
defendant's motion for notice by the prosecution of its intention
to use evidence arguably subject to suppression (Document No.
20); and, (3) grant defendant's motion for disclosure of
impeachment evidence (Document No. 21).

At the supplemental hearing held on June 28, 2005, the court
denied defendant's motion for a view (Document No. 27). The
court's rulings on motions made at both hearings hereby are
adopted as the court's formal and final rulings on those motions
for the reasons stated on the record at those hearings.
(Transcript of Motions Hearings 2-5; 175-76.)

An appropriate order will follow.

II. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence

On the night of August 28, 2004, at approximately 10:20 p.m.,
officers from the Homestead Police Department, assisted by a
number of Federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") task force
officers, initiated on Browns Hill Road near the intersection of
Beechwood Boulevard in Pittsburgh a traffic stop of a 1988
Mercedes Benz operated by defendant. The officers conducted the
stop based upon information received in a radio bulletin issued
by Officer Richard Szurlej and Trooper Michael Schmitt, who
reported that they had witnessed defendant's vehicle proceed through a
steady red traffic signal on the Homestead High-Level Bridge and
continue across the bridge weaving through traffic at a high rate
of speed.

When defendant pulled to the side of the road and stopped, his
passenger, Tarone Jones, exited the vehicle and fled on foot. The
responding officers ordered defendant from the vehicle and onto
the ground. A pat-down search of defendant resulted in the
seizure of a Taurus .45 caliber firearm, approximately $1,000 in
cash and a small bag of marijuana. Defendant then was placed
under arrest.

Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence (Document No.
18) seeks suppression of all evidence, including the firearm,
seized either from his vehicle or from his person in the course
of the August 28, 2004, traffic stop. In addition, at the June 8,
2005, hearing, the court granted defendant's oral motion to amend
his suppression motion also to seek exclusion of any statements
defendant allegedly made after the stop. (Tr. 16.) Defendant
asserts that the officers lacked probable cause to stop his
vehicle because he had not committed any traffic violation
justifying the stop and that any evidence seized as a result must
be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal stop.

Upon consideration of the testimony received at the hearings
held on June 8, 2005, and June 28, 2005, as well as the parties' briefs, the court finds that the government has failed to meet
its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
traffic stop in question was initiated upon probable cause that
defendant committed a traffic violation. Accordingly, the court
concludes that any and all evidence, physical or testimonial,
obtained as the fruit of that illegal stop must be suppressed.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasonable
searches and seizures." United States Constitution, amend. IV. It
is well-settled that the temporary detention of individuals
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for
a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996). Accordingly, an automobile
stop is subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be
"unreasonable" under the circumstances. Id.

The decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred. Id.; United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 12
(3rd Cir. 1997); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (a law enforcement officer who observes a
violation of state traffic laws is entitled to stop the vehicle
that committed the violation). In order to effectuate a lawful
stop of a vehicle, the government is not required to prove an
actual violation of Pennsylvania law, rather the government need
only prove probable cause that such a violation occurred. United States v.
Davenport, 134 Fed. Appx. 523, 525 (3d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995) (although
actual violation of vehicle code need not be established, a
reasonable basis for trooper's belief that the vehicle or driver
is in violation is required to validate stop).

Where, as here, the vehicle stop is made in reliance on a
police radio request from other officers, a finding that the stop
was reasonable is dependent on whether the officers who issued
the request had probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation had occurred, and not on whether it was reasonable for
the stopping officers to have relied on the radio request.
United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2002);
see also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971)
(although police officer may rely on representations of other
officers when making arrest, officers requesting assistance must
have sufficient information to show probable cause); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (if flyer or
bulletin is issued without reasonable suspicion, stop made in
objective reliance upon it violates Fourth Amendment).

As a general rule, the burden is on a defendant who seeks to
have evidence suppressed to prove that it was seized illegally.
Johnson, 63 F.3d at 242. However, once the defendant has
established a basis for his motion, e.g., that the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden
shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was
reasonable. Id.; see also Coward, 296 F.3d at 180
(government bears burden of proving existence of reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry traffic stop). Accordingly, the
government bears the burden of proving in this case by a
preponderance of the evidence that the stop of defendant's
vehicle was reasonable, i.e., that it was based upon probable
cause to believe that defendant committed a traffic violation.

As a preliminary matter, in his initial brief and at the
hearings, defendant indicated that the sole issue before this
court was whether the stop of the vehicle was predicated on
probable cause. However, in his supplemental brief, defendant
raised for the first time a challenge to the officers' post-stop
conduct in ordering defendant from his vehicle at gunpoint,
ordering him to the ground and then conducting a pat-down search
of his person. Based upon the testimony elicited at the
suppression hearings, the court rejects that contention and finds
that the post-stop activity of the responding officers was in
accordance with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.

Here, if the traffic stop was proper in the first instance,
no reasonable suspicion was required to order defendant out of
the vehicle, as an officer executing a traffic stop may exercise
reasonable superintendence over the car and its passengers and
may order the driver and all passengers out of the vehicle, or order
them to remain in the vehicle with their hands in the air, even
absent any particularized suspicion. United States v. Bonner,
363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the court finds nothing improper about the subsequent
pat-down search. It is well settled that an officer may pat-down
the occupants of a vehicle, and also may conduct a search of the
passenger compartment, if he has a reasonable suspicion that the
occupants might be armed or dangerous. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 216.
The test for conducting a pat-down search is whether a reasonably
prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. United
States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000).

Here, based upon the circumstances of the stop as testified to
at the hearing, the responding officers' suspicion that the
occupants of the vehicle may have been armed was not
unreasonable. The stop was made at night upon a report that the
vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and weaving through
traffic, and, upon pulling over, a passenger immediately leapt
from the vehicle and fled. Moreover, as defendant himself
testified, immediately after he stopped, he reached over into the
glove compartment, in which, by his own admission, he found a
firearm. (Tr. 94-95.) Based on these circumstances, a reasonably
prudent police officer at the scene would have been warranted in a belief
that he or others may have been in danger, justifying a pat-down
search.*fn1

As the conduct of the responding officers was proper, the sole
issue before this court is whether the officers who issued the
radio bulletin to the responding officers had probable cause to
believe that defendant committed a traffic violation. If so, the
stop was valid and the evidence seized as a result of that stop
is admissible. If, however, there is insufficient evidence that
the stop was predicated on probable cause that defendant
committed a traffic violation, then the evidence must be
suppressed, since the burden of proof is on the government.

Here, the stop of defendant's vehicle ostensibly was for his
failure to stop at a steady red traffic control signal*fn2
in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3112 (a) (3).*fn3 In order to
establish probable cause justifying the stop on that basis, the
government called Officer Richard Szurlej and Trooper Michael
Schmitt who, on the night in question, were partnered together in
an unmarked vehicle as part of a DEA multi-jurisdictional task
force. The defense called defendant and his passenger, Tarone
Jones. The testimony of these four key witnesses*fn4 is
briefly summarized as follows.

At the first hearing on June 8, 2005, the government called
Officer Richard Szurlej, a narcotics officer with the Borough of
McKees Rocks Police Department who has been deputized as a
Federal DEA task force officer. (Tr. at 31-49.) Officer Szurlej
testified that on August 28, 2004, at approximately 10:20 p.m.,
he and Trooper Michael Schmitt, who were involved in task force
operations in Homestead, observed and began to follow a "Mercedes
Benz, light in color" (he could not recall specifically the color
of the vehicle) with tinted windows traveling on Route 837 (a/k/a
8th Avenue in Homestead) which subsequently turned right onto
the Homestead High-Level bridge. (Tr. 32.)

Officer Szurlej could not specifically recall why they had
followed the vehicle, but suggested that it may have been the
tinted windows.*fn5 He testified that the officers' vehicle
was "maybe three cars behind [defendant's] vehicle" when they
turned onto the bridge. (Tr. 33.)

He further testified that defendant drove directly through a
standing red light at the first traffic signal on the High-Level
bridge which allows traffic from the Waterfront complex onto the
bridge. (Tr. 34). Either he or Trooper Schmitt, he could not
recall which, radioed to the other units that they had just
witnessed a motor vehicle violation. (Id.) He also testified
that after the vehicle ran the light, it proceeded at a "very,
very high rate of speed" across the bridge. (Id.). He indicated
that he and Trooper Schmitt "attempted to catch up" after they
got through the light and that they arrived after the stop near Beechwood Boulevard. (Tr. 35.)

On cross-examination, Officer Szurlej indicated that he did not
remember if defendant had been traveling behind the police
vehicle and passed them after they had pulled over, or if they
had been sitting and defendant drove by. (Id.). In either
event, he reiterated that defendant ended up "about two, three
cars in front of us." (Id.)

Officer Szurlej again reiterated that he could not specifically
recall why they had begun following defendant's vehicle, but
indicated that there "was probably something more to it" than
just the tinted windows, but he did not know what. (Tr. 36.) He
did not report the incident. (Id.) He could not recall whether
there were other cars stopped at the light in question, but noted
that there was other traffic on the bridge although he did not
make a notation of traffic. (Tr. 37.) He also could not recall if
he saw the license plate number of the vehicle (Tr. 39.)

Officer Szurlej also testified that traffic was "bottle necked"
as he and Trooper Schmitt attempted to make their way in pursuit
of defendant's vehicle and later noted that there were cars "in
front of us and cars behind us." (Tr. 40.) He later clarified
that he had meant that traffic was bottle necked at the top of
the hill where the stop was in progress. (Tr. 41.)

Upon examination by the court, Officer Szurlej again noted that
defendant had accelerated through the red light and across the bridge at such a high rate of speed that he did not think
that defendant would be caught. (Tr. 44.). He reiterated that he
was unsure if there was "something else" about defendant's
vehicle that raised his suspicion beyond the tinted windows. (Tr.
46.) He also testified that although he witnessed the traffic
offense, he did not have any authority to enforce Pennsylvania
traffic violations, although Trooper Schmitt did. (Tr. 46-47.)

Also at the hearing on June 8, 2005, the defense called
defendant to the stand to testify as to the events of August 28,
2004. (Tr. at 85-115.) Defendant testified that on the evening in
question he was driving a 1988 Mercedes Benz owned by his mother.
(Tr. 88.) Around 10:00 p.m. or 10:15 p.m. that evening, he picked
up the vehicle at the home of his son's mother, Jackie Brown, who
had borrowed the car earlier that day. (Id.) He testified that
he had driven a rental car to Jackie Brown's to pick up the
Mercedes because he wanted to go out that evening in a nice car.
He was accompanied by his cousin, Tarone Jones, whom he had
picked up prior to the vehicle exchange, (Tr. 89,) and that he
and Jones had planned to go to Art's Tavern in the Strip
District. (Tr. 90.)

Defendant further testified that after picking up the Mercedes
he was traveling down Eighth Avenue in Homestead and stopped at a
red light at Eighth and Ann, where he noticed a red SUV on his
right with officers surrounding it with weapons drawn. (Tr. 90-91.) When the light turned green, he drove to the next
intersection at Eighth and Amity, where he also stopped at a red
signal, then proceeded to the next light, where he also was
stopped by a red light. (Tr. 91.) When that light turned green,
he made a right turn onto the High Level Bridge and got into the
left-hand lane, where he got behind "two or three" cars that were
stopped at the light at the intersection with a ramp coming up
from the Waterfront Mall (Tr. 92.) He testified that when that
light changed, he followed traffic to the next light, which also
was green, then, as he approached a Wendy's restaurant, he looked
in the rear view mirror and noticed several police cars with
their lights flashing coming across the bridge. (Tr. 92.) As he
approached the light near Beechwood, he pulled over, at which
time his passenger jumped out of the stopped vehicle and ran.
(Tr. 94.)

Defendant further testified that there was "a lot" of traffic
on the bridge in both lanes that night and that he was not
traveling at a high rate of speed. (Tr. 97.) He reiterated that
he ran no red lights at any time. (Id.) The other defense
witness called at the June 8, 2005, hearing, defendant's
passenger, Tarone Jones, corroborated defendant's testimony in
all material respects. (Tr. 69-84.)

At the supplemental hearing on June 28, 2005, the government
called Trooper Michael Schmitt of the Pennsylvania State Police, who testified that he was involved in the events of August 28,
2004, as part of a multi-jurisdictional task force effort. (Tr.
140.) He stated that around 10:20 p.m. on that night he was in an
unmarked undercover car with Officer Szurlej heading westerly
when he noticed a grayish Mercedes Benz, also heading westerly,
make a right hand turn onto the High Level Bridge. (Tr. 140-41.)

He indicated that he was directly behind the Mercedes as they
turned onto the bridge and that the Mercedes proceeded directly
through a steady red light at the intersection of the ramp from
the Waterfront Mall. (Tr. 141.) He said that he radioed to marked
units ahead, giving a description of the vehicle and the license
plate number. (Id.) He testified that after running the red
light, the vehicle "proceeded then at a rather increased rate of
speed across the bridge, and changing lanes frequently from left
to right." (Tr. 142.) He indicated that defendant was in the
right hand lane when he observed the violation. (Tr. 142.) He
noted that defendant was not speeding "excessively", just quicker
than the other traffic, and repeated that he was weaving through
the other traffic on the bridge. (Tr. 143.) Later, he testified
that "[i]t was Saturday night, 10:30 in the evening; a lot of
traffic." (Tr. 144.)

Officer Schmitt testified that he first got behind defendant's
vehicle two or three blocks before they turned right onto the
bridge (Tr. 150.) and that he was right behind it, with no cars in between (Tr. 151.) He indicated that he "wasn't
following it", rather defendant just happened to be in front of
him going in the same direction. (Tr. 151.)

He further testified that he did not take defendant's license
plate number until the moment defendant ran the red light and
took off. (Tr. 152.) He testified that he did not know how fast
defendant's vehicle actually was going and that "the traffic was
heavy" on the bridge. (Tr. 153.) But he also reiterated that
defendant was able to make his way from the right lane to the
left lane and back to the right. (Tr. 154.)

He testified that the Mercedes was grayish blue and
unequivocally indicated that it was not brown or beige. (Tr.
154.) Trooper Schmitt testified that all of the windows were
closed. (Tr. 155,) and that the tinted windows aroused his
suspicion. (Tr. 155-56.) He also indicated on cross that he was
looking at the registration plate as soon as they got behind
defendant's vehicle because he always looks at the registration
plates of vehicles in front of him. (Tr. 156-57.) He reiterated
that he was directly behind defendant's vehicle and that there
were not two cars between defendant's and his. (Tr. 157.)

It is also significant to note that on cross examination,
Trooper Schmitt acknowledged that the police arrest report
from that evening reported only that defendant was driving
erratically, it made no mention of him running a red light,
although that was the purported basis for the stop and the subsequent arrest that
was being reported. (Tr. 147-48.)

The government bore the burden of proof in this matter. At the
hearings, four witnesses testified as to the events culminating
in the traffic stop at issue. Not only was the testimony of the
government witnesses and the defense witnesses in diametric
conflict, as one might expect, there were as indicated above
several significant inconsistencies within the testimony and
evidence offered by the government. The outcome of the
suppression motion, therefore, will turn on the credibility of
these witnesses, which we consider below.

The court, as finder of fact, is free to accept or reject any
or all of a witness's testimony. United States v. Conley,
859 F.Supp. 830 (W.D. Pa. 1994). Credibility determinations are to be
made in consideration of numerous factors, including the
witness's demeanor and manner while on the stand, the witness's
ability to accurately recollect the matters at hand, the manner
in which the witness may be affected by the outcome, the extent
to which the witness's testimony is either supported or
contradicted by other evidence and testimony in the case, and,
ultimately, the extent to which it withstands a common sense test
of reason and logic.

When a defendant takes the stand to testify, his credibility is
to be judged in the same way as any other witness. United States v. Morrone, 502 F.Supp. 983, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Likewise, the testimony of a witness is not to be judged more or
less credible because the witness is a law enforcement officer.
See, e.g. United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1080
(3d Cir. 1995) (viewing favorably use of jury charge instructing
that testimony of law enforcement officer not necessarily
entitled to any more, or any less, weight than any other
witness); Conley, 859 F.Supp. at 840 (government witnesses are
not per se credible or even presumed to be credible).

With these concepts in mind, the court finds Officer Szurlej's
testimony to be less than credible primarily because he appeared
to have a great deal of difficulty recalling anything but the
most general details regarding the evening in question. His
testimony was peppered with qualifications and he answered a
large number of questions with responses indicating that he could
not specifically recall or that he did not remember. For
instance, Officer Szurlej could not specifically recall the color
of defendant's vehicle, why they were following it, if it was he
or Trooper Schmitt who radioed the bulletin, whether he ever saw
the license plate number of the Mercedes, how much traffic was on
the bridge or whether there were cars in front of defendant at
the light in question.

In addition, there were inconsistencies in Officer Szurlej's
testimony which did not comport with the testimony of other witnesses, notably including Trooper Schmitt. Most glaringly,
Officer Szurlej testified that the unmarked car in which he and
Trooper Schmitt were riding was two or three cars behind
defendant's vehicle when they turned onto the bridge and at the
traffic signal in question, whereas Trooper Schmitt testified
that he and Officer Szurlej were directly behind defendant's
vehicle.

Moreover, Officer Szurlej testified that defendant proceeded
through the red light and accelerated across the bridge at "a
very, very high rate of speed", to such an extent that Officer
Szurlej believed it would not be possible to catch him.
Conversely, Trooper Schmitt, noting the heavy traffic on the
bridge, testified that defendant was not speeding "excessively",
rather he merely was moving faster than other traffic, and he
made no mention of Officer Szurlej's purported exclamation that
defendant could not be caught.

Officer Szurlej's inability to recollect so many of the most
salient factors involved in the traffic stop, as well as the
inconsistencies in his testimony, all serve to reflect negatively
on the credibility of his testimony.*fn6 Accordingly, the
court finds Officer Szurlej's testimony to be less than credible.

Conversely, the court for the most part found defendant's
testimony, particularly as it relates to the circumstances
surrounding the alleged traffic violation, to be
believable.*fn7 In rendering this determination, the court
has taken into account defendant's demeanor on the stand, his
apparently strong recollection of the night's events, the fact
that, even upon vigorous and effective cross-examination by the
Assistant United States Attorney, his version of the events of
that evening never wavered, and the fact that his testimony
regarding the events leading to the stop was corroborated in all
significant details by Tarone Jones.

The court also has considered defendant's obviously immense
interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Defendants in criminal
cases always have much riding on the outcome and that is a
legitimate matter to factor into an evaluation of the credibility
of any defendant's testimony. However, it would be manifestly unfair and highly improper for that overtly or subliminally to be
the determinative factor in judging a defendant's testimony. All
of the circumstances must be considered and a credibility
determination arrived at based on reason and logic. Based on a
consideration of all of the relevant factors before the court,
including the testimony of the officers, the traffic conditions
at the scene, the testimony of defendant's passenger and the
factors listed above, the court finds the defendant's testimony
reasonable.

Which leaves the court with the testimony of Trooper Schmitt.
On the one hand, Trooper Schmitt's recollection of the events in
question appeared to have been stronger than that of Officer
Szurlej. He was much more authoritative in his responses and
answered most of the questions unequivocally with no
qualifications. His demeanor and his ability to recollect the
events in question weigh positively on his credibility.

However, in assessing credibility, the court also is required
to look at the consistency of a witness's testimony with that of
other witnesses. In this regard, it is clear that Trooper
Schmitt's testimony was inconsistent in numerous ways, not only
internally and with that of the defendant, but also with the
testimony of other witnesses, including Officer Szurlej and one
of the responding officers.

First, Trooper Schmitt was the only one of the four witnesses present during the alleged violation to testify that defendant,
after purportedly running the red light, proceeded across the
bridge by driving "erratically", weaving in and out of traffic
and frequently changing lanes. Officer Szurlej made no mention of
erratic driving. The testimony of Trooper Schmitt and defendant
conflicted even as to which lane defendant was in when he first
turned onto the bridge, with defendant indicating he was in the
left hand lane at the light and Trooper Schmitt indicating they
were in the right hand lane. Officer Szurlej did not testify on
this point.

Trooper Schmitt's testimony as to frequent lane changes at an
increased rate of speed also seems to be somewhat inconsistent
with his later testimony that traffic on the bridge was heavy.
Finally in this regard, as observed earlier, the court also finds
it noteworthy in assessing Trooper Schmitt's credibility that the
very police arrest report he completed for the incident in
question, which one would expect at a minimum would report the
basis for the stop leading to the arrest, mentioned only erratic
driving and made no mention of a traffic signal violation.

Trooper Schmitt's testimony also was internally inconsistent on
another point. Trooper Schmitt first testified that defendant's
Mercedes caught his eye while they were both traveling westerly
on Eighth Avenue and that he followed it when it made a right
hand turn onto the bridge. The basis for his suspicion was the tinted windows. Later, on cross, however, he testified that
he was not following defendant's car, he just happened to be
behind it. Later again on cross, he then noted that he took
notice of defendant's registration plate as soon as he got behind
him, or three blocks before the bridge, which was somewhat
inconsistent with his earlier testimony that he did not take
defendant's license plate number until right at the moment that
defendant ran the red light.

Trooper Schmitt's testimony not only was at variance in certain
particulars with Officer Szurlej's and with defendant's, but also
with the testimony of the responding officers. In particular,
unlike defendant, who testified that all four windows on the
Mercedes were open, and unlike DEA Task Force Officer Thomas
Dunlevi, who testified that the driver's side window was down
(Tr. 12,) Trooper Schmitt testified that all of the windows were
closed. (Tr. 155.) While all of the foregoing inconsistencies may
appear trivial in isolation, as a whole they do influence a
determination of credibility.

In the final analysis, the court is faced with weighing the
testimony of Officer Szurlej, whose inability to recollect the
details of the stop render him less than credible; the testimony
of defendant, an interested but nevertheless credible witness
whose testimony was corroborated by Tarone Jones; and the
testimony of Officer Schmitt, whose otherwise credible testimony was diminished by contradictions and inconsistencies with the
testimony of numerous other witnesses.

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the government
has failed to meet its burden in this case to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to
believe that defendant committed a traffic violation by failing
to stop at the red light in question on the night of August 28,
2004. As a result, the court finds that the traffic stop violated
the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence seized as a result of
that unlawful stop must be suppressed pursuant to the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman,
277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2002) (exclusionary rule bars
admission of evidence seized as result of unconstitutional search
and seizure and is designed to deter police conduct that violates
constitutional rights of citizens); United States v. Herrold,
962 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1992) ("fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine requires exclusion of tangible evidence seized during an
unlawful search as well as derivative evidence, both tangible and
testimonial, acquired as a result of the unlawful search).
Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress will be granted.

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