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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

No.
03931

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JOE ELTON
NIXON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OFFLORIDA

[December 13, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.

This capital case concerns defense
counsels strategic decision to concede, at the guilt
phase of the trial, the defendants commission of murder,
and to concentrate the defense on establishing, at the penalty
phase, cause for sparing the defendants life. Any
concession of that order, the Florida Supreme Court held, made
without the defendants express consenthowever
gruesome the crime and despite the strength of the evidence of
guiltautomatically ranks as prejudicial ineffective
assistance of counsel necessitating a new trial. We reverse
the Florida Supreme Courts judgment.

Defense counsel undoubtedly has a
duty to discuss potential strategies with the defendant. See
Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984). But when a defendant, informed by counsel, neither
consents nor objects to the course counsel describes as the
most promising means to avert a sentence of death, counsel is
not automatically barred from pursuing that course. The
reasonableness of counsels performance, after
consultation with the defendant yields no response, must be
judged in accord with the inquiry generally applicable to
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims: Did counsels
representation f[a]ll below an objective standard of
reasonableness? Id., at 688, 694. The Florida
Supreme Court erred in applying, instead, a presumption of
deficient performance, as well as a presumption of prejudice;
that latter presumption, we have instructed, is reserved for
cases in which counsel fails meaningfully to oppose the
prosecutions case. United States v.
Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 659 (1984). A presumption of prejudice is not in
order based solely on a defendants failure to provide
express consent to a tenable strategy counsel has adequately
disclosed to and discussed with the defendant.

I

On Monday, August 13, 1984, near a
dirt road in the environs of Tallahassee, Florida, a passing
motorist discovered Jeanne Bickners charred body.
Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Fla.
1990) (Nixon I); 13 Record 24642466. Bickner had
been tied to a tree and set on fire while still alive.
Id., at 2475, 24832484. Her left leg and arm, and
most of her hair and skin, had been burned away. Id.,
at 24752476. The next day, police found Bickners
car, abandoned on a Tallahassee street corner, on fire.
Id., at 2520. Police arrested 23-year-old Joe Elton
Nixon later that morning, after Nixons brother informed
the sheriffs office that Nixon had confessed to the
murder. Id., at 2559.

Questioned by the police, Nixon
described in graphic detail how he had kidnaped Bickner, then
killed her.1
He recounted that he had approached Bickner, a stranger, in a
mall, and asked her to help him jump-start his car. 5
id., at 919921. Bickner offered Nixon a ride home
in her 1973 MG sports car. Id., at 922. Once on the
road, Nixon directed Bickner to drive to a remote place; en
route, he overpowered her and stopped the car. Id., at
924, 926927. Nixon next put Bickner in the MGs
trunk, drove into a wooded area, removed Bickner from the car,
and tied her to a tree with jumper cables. Id., at
930931. Bickner pleaded with Nixon to release her,
offering him money in exchange. Id., at 928. Concerned
that Bickner might identify him, Nixon decided to kill her.
Id., at 929. He set fire to Bickners personal
belongings and ignited her with burning objects. Id.,
at 934935. Nixon drove away in the MG, and later told
his brother and girlfriend what he had done. Id., at
938, 961. He burned the MG on Tuesday, August 14, after
reading in the newspaper that Bickners body had been
discovered. Id., at 963, 982.

The State gathered overwhelming
evidence establishing that Nixon had committed the murder in
the manner he described. A witness saw Nixon approach Bickner
in the malls parking lot on August 12, and observed
Bickner taking jumper cables out of the trunk of her car and
giving them to Nixon. 13 id., at 24472448, 2450.
Several witnesses told police they saw Nixon driving around in
the MG in the hours and days following Bickners death.
See id., at 2456, 24872488; 2498; 2509.
Nixons palm print was found on the trunk of the car.
Id., at 25482549. Nixons girlfriend, Wanda
Robinson, and his brother, John Nixon, both stated that Nixon
told them he had killed someone and showed them two rings later
identified as Bickners. 5 id., at 971, 987; 13
id., at 2565. According to Nixons brother, Nixon
pawned the rings, 5 id., at 986, and attempted to sell
the car, id., at 973. At a local pawnshop, police
recovered the rings and a receipt for them bearing Nixons
drivers license number; the pawnshop owner identified
Nixon as the person who sold the rings to him. 13 id.,
at 25682569.

In late August 1984, Nixon was
indicted in Leon County, Florida, for first-degree murder,
kidnaping, robbery, and arson. See App. 1, 55. Assistant
public defender Michael Corin, assigned to represent Nixon, see
id., at 232, filed a plea of not guilty, id., at
468469, and deposed all of the States potential
witnesses, id., at 5358. Corin concluded, given
the strength of the evidence, that Nixons guilt was not
subject to any reasonable dispute. Id., at
490.2 Corin
thereupon commenced plea negotiations, hoping to persuade the
prosecution to drop the death penalty in exchange for
Nixons guilty pleas to all charges. Id., at
336338; 507. Negotiations broke down when the
prosecutors indicated their unwillingness to recommend a
sentence other than death. See id., at 339, 508.

Faced with the inevitability of going
to trial on a capital charge, Corin turned his attention to the
penalty phase, believing that the only way to save Nixons
life would be to present extensive mitigation evidence
centering on Nixons mental instability. Id., at
261, 473; see also id., at 102. Experienced in capital
defense, see id., at 248250, Corin feared that
denying Nixons commission of the kidnaping and murder
during the guilt phase would compromise Corins ability to
persuade the jury, during the penalty phase, that Nixons
conduct was the product of his mental illness. See id.,
at 473, 490, 505. Corin concluded that the best strategy would
be to concede guilt, thereby preserving his credibility in
urging leniency during the penalty phase. Id., at 458,
505.

Corin attempted to explain this
strategy to Nixon at least three times. Id., at
254255. Although Corin had represented Nixon previously
on unrelated charges and the two had a good relationship in
Corins estimation, see id., at 466467, Nixon
was generally unresponsive during their discussions,
id., at 478480. He never verbally approved or
protested Corins proposed strategy. Id., at
234238; 255; 501. Overall, Nixon gave Corin very little,
if any, assistance or direction in preparing the case,
id., at 478, and refused to attend pretrial dispositions
of various motions, Nixon I, 572 So. 2d, at 1341;
App.478. Corin eventually exercised his professional
judgment to pursue the concession strategy. As he explained:
There are many times lawyers make decisions because they
have to make them because the client does nothing.
Id., at 486.

When Nixons trial began on July
15, 1985, his unresponsiveness deepened into disruptive and
violent behavior. On the second day of jury selection, Nixon
pulled off his clothing, demanded a black judge and lawyer,
refused to be escorted into the courtroom, and threatened to
force the guards to shoot him. Nixon I, 572
So. 2d, at 1341; 10 Record 19341935. An extended
on-the-record colloquy followed Nixons bizarre behavior,
during which Corin urged the trial judge to explain
Nixons rights to him and ascertain whether Nixon
understood the significance of absenting himself from the
trial. Corin also argued that restraining Nixon and compelling
him to be present would prejudice him in the eyes of the jury.
Id., at 19181920. When the judge examined Nixon
on the record in a holding cell, Nixon stated he had no
interest in the trial and threatened to misbehave if forced to
attend. Id., at 19261931. The judge ruled that
Nixon had intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to be
present at trial. Id., at 1938; 11 id., at
2020.

The guilt phase of the trial thus
began in Nixons absence.3 In his opening statement, Corin acknowledged
Nixons guilt and urged the jury to focus on the penalty
phase:

In this case, there wont be
any question, none whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon,
caused Jeannie Bickners death . [T]hat fact
will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any doubt.

This case is about the death of
Joe Elton Nixon and whether it should occur within the next few
years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration after a
lifetime of confinement.

.....

Now, in arriving at your
verdict, in your penalty recommendation, for we will get that
far, you are going to learn many facts about Joe Elton
Nixon. Some of those facts are going to be good. That may not
seem clear to you at this time. But, and sadly, most of the
things you learn of Joe Elton Nixon are not going to be good.
But, Im suggesting to you that when you have seen all the
testimony, heard all the testimony and the evidence that has
been shown, there are going to be reasons why you should
recommend that his life be spared. App. 7172.

During its case in chief, the State
introduced the tape of Nixons confession, expert
testimony on the manner in which Bickner died, and witness
testimony regarding Nixons confessions to his relatives
and his possession of Bickners car and personal effects.
Corin cross-examined these witnesses only when he felt their
statements needed clarification, see, e.g., 13 Record
2504, and he did not present a defense case, 20 id., at
3741. Corin did object to the introduction of crime scene
photographs as unduly prejudicial, 13 id., at 2470, and
actively contested several aspects of the jury instructions
during the charge conference, 11 id., at 20502058.
In his closing argument, Corin again conceded Nixons
guilt, App. 73, and reminded the jury of the importance of the
penalty phase: I will hope to argue to you and
give you reasons not that Mr. Nixons life be spared one
final and terminal confinement forever, but that he not be
sentenced to die, id., at 74. The jury found
Nixon guilty on all counts.

At the start of the penalty phase,
Corin argued to the jury that Joe Elton Nixon is not
normal organically, intellectually, emotionally or
educationally or in any other way. Id., at 102.
Corin presented the testimony of eight witnesses. Relatives
and friends described Nixons childhood emotional troubles
and his erratic behavior in the days preceding the murder.
See, e.g.,id., at 108120. A psychiatrist
and a psychologist addressed Nixons antisocial
personality, his history of emotional instability and
psychiatric care, his low IQ, and the possibility that at some
point he suffered brain damage. Id., at 143147;
162166. The State presented little evidence during the
penalty phase, simply incorporating its guilt-phase evidence by
reference, and introducing testimony, over Corins
objection, that Nixon had removed Bickners underwear in
order to terrorize her. Id., at 105106.

In his closing argument, Corin
emphasized Nixons youth, the psychiatric evidence, and
the jurys discretion to consider any mitigating
circumstances, id., at 194199; Corin urged that,
if not sentenced to death, Joe Elton Nixon would [n]ever
be released from confinement, id., at 207. The
death penalty, Corin maintained, was appropriate only for
intact human being[s], and Joe Elton Nixon is
not one of those. Hes never been one of those. He never
will be one of those. Id., at 209. Corin
concluded: You know, were not around here all that
long. And its rare when we have the opportunity to give
or take life. And you have that opportunity to give life. And
Im going to ask you to do that. Thank you.
Ibid. After deliberating for approximately three hours,
the jury recommended that Nixon be sentenced to death. See 21
Record 4013.

In accord with the jurys
recommendation, the trial court imposed the death penalty.
NixonI, 572 So. 2d, at 1338. Notably, at
the close of the penalty phase, the court commended
Corins performance during the trial, stating that
the tactic employed by trial counsel was an
excellent analysis of [the] reality of his case. 21
Record 4009. The evidence of guilt would have persuaded
any jury beyond all doubt, and [f]or trial
counsel to have inferred that Mr. Nixon was not guilty
would have deprived [counsel] of any credibility during the
penalty phase. Id., at 4010.

On direct appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court, Nixon, represented by new counsel, argued that
Corin had rendered ineffective assistance by conceding
Nixons guilt without obtaining Nixons express
consent. NixonI, 572 So. 2d, at
13381339. Relying on United States v.
Cronic,466
U.S. 648 (1984), new counsel urged that Corins
concession should be presumed prejudicial because it left the
prosecutions case unexposed to meaningful
adversarial testing, id., at 658659. The
Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
whether Nixon consented to the strategy, see App. 216217,
but ultimately declined to rule on the matter, finding the
evidence of Corins interactions with Nixon inconclusive.
Nixon I, 572 So. 2d, at 1340.

In a motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (1999),
Nixon renewed his Cronic-based presumption of
prejudice ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.4 After the trial
court rejected the claim, State v. Nixon, Case
No. 842324 (Cir. Ct., Oct. 22, 1997), App. 389390,
the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a further hearing on
Nixons consent to defense counsels strategy.
Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 625
(Fla. 2000) (Nixon II). Corins concession,
according to the Florida Supreme Court, was the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea in that it
allowed the prosecutions guilt-phase case to proceed
essentially without opposition. Id., at 622624.
Under Boykin v. Alabama,395 U.S. 238,
242243 (1969), a guilty plea cannot be inferred from
silence; it must be based on express affirmations made
intelligently and voluntarily. Similarly, the Florida Supreme
Court stated, a concession of guilt at trial requires a
defendants affirmative, explicit acceptance,
without which counsels performance is presumptively
inadequate. Nixon II, 758 So. 2d, at 624. The
court acknowledged that Nixon was very disruptive and
uncooperative at trial, and that counsels
strategy may have been in Nixons best interest.
Id., at 625. Nevertheless, the court firmly declared
that [s]ilent acquiescence is not enough,
id., at 624; counsel who concedes a defendants
guilt is inevitably ineffective, the court ruled, if the
defendant does not expressly approve counsels course,
id., at 625.

On remand, Corin testified that he
explained his view of the case to Nixon several times, App.
479480, and that at each consultation, Nixon did
nothing affirmative or negative, id., at
481482; see also id., at 486487. Failing to
elicit a definitive response from Nixon, Corin stated, he chose
to pursue the concession strategy because, in his professional
judgment, it appeared to be the only way to save
[Nixons] life. Id., at 472. Nixon did not
testify at the hearing. The trial court found that
Nixons natural pattern of communication with
Corin involved passively receiving information, and that Nixon
consented to the strategy through his behavior.
State v. Nixon, Case No. R842324AF (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Sept. 20, 2001), p. 13, 2 Record 378.

We granted certiorari, 540 U.S. 1217
(2004), to resolve an important question of constitutional law,
i.e., whether counsels failure to obtain the
defendants express consent to a strategy of conceding
guilt in a capital trial automatically renders counsels
performance deficient, and whether counsels effectiveness
should be evaluated under Cronic or Strickland.
We now reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

II

An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to
consult with the client regarding important
decisions, including questions of overarching defense
strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688. That
obligation, however, does not require counsel to obtain the
defendants consent to every tactical
decision. Taylor v. Illinois,484 U.S. 400,
417418 (1988) (an attorney has authority to manage most
aspects of the defense without obtaining his clients
approval). But certain decisions regarding the exercise or
waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they
cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. A defendant,
this Court affirmed, has the ultimate authority to
determine whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify
in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.
Jones v. Barnes,463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983); Wainwright v. Sykes,433 U.S. 72, 93, n. 1
(1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring). Concerning those
decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and
obtain consent to the recommended course of action.

A guilty plea, we recognized in
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969),
is an event of signal significance in a criminal proceeding.
By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives constitutional
rights that inhere in a criminal trial, including the right to
trial by jury, the protection against self-incrimination, and
the right to confront ones accusers. Id., at 243.
While a guilty plea may be tactically advantageous for the
defendant, id., at 240, the plea is not simply a
strategic choice; it is itself a conviction,
id., at 242, and the high stakes for the defendant
require the utmost solicitude, id., at 243.
Accordingly, counsel lacks authority to consent to a guilty
plea on a clients behalf, Brookhart v.
Janis,384 U.S.
1, 67 (1966); moreover, a defendants tacit
acquiescence in the decision to plead is insufficient to render
the plea valid, Boykin, 395 U.S., at 242.

The Florida Supreme Court, as just
observed, see supra, at 9, required Nixons
affirmative, explicit acceptance of Corins
strategy because it deemed Corins statements to the jury
the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
Nixon II, 758 So. 2d, at 624. We disagree with
that assessment.

Despite Corins concession,
Nixon retained the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal
trial. Cf. Boykin, 395 U.S., at 242243, and n. 4
(a guilty plea is more than a confession which admits
that the accused did various acts, it is a
stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need be
advanced). The State was obliged to present during the
guilt phase competent, admissible evidence establishing the
essential elements of the crimes with which Nixon was charged.
That aggressive evidence would thus be separated from the
penalty phase, enabling the defense to concentrate that portion
of the trial on mitigating factors. See supra, at 4, 7.
Further, the defense reserved the right to cross-examine
witnesses for the prosecution and could endeavor, as Corin did,
to exclude prejudicial evidence. See supra, at 6. In
addition, in the event of errors in the trial or jury
instructions, a concession of guilt would not hinder the
defendants right to appeal.

Nixon nevertheless urges, relying on
Brookhart v. Janis, that this Court has already
extended the requirement of affirmative, explicit
acceptance to proceedings surrender[ing] the right
to contest the prosecutions factual case on the issue of
guilt or innocence. Brief for Respondent 32. Defense
counsel in Brookhart had agreed to a prima
facie bench trial at which the State would be relieved of
its obligation to put on complete proof of guilt or
persuade a jury of the defendants guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 384 U.S., at 56. In contrast to
Brookhart, there was in Nixons case no
truncated proceeding, id., at 6, shorn of
the need to persuade the trier beyond a reasonable
doubt, and of the defendants right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses. While the prima facie
trial in Brookhart was fairly characterized as the
equivalent of a guilty plea, id., at 7, the full
presentation to the jury in Nixons case does not resemble
that severely abbreviated proceeding. Brookhart, in
short, does not carry the weight Nixon would place on it.

Corin was obliged to, and in fact
several times did, explain his proposed trial strategy to
Nixon. See supra, at 4, 9. Given Nixons constant
resistance to answering inquiries put to him by counsel and
court, see Nixon III, 857 So. 2d, at 187188
(Wells, J., dissenting), Corin was not additionally required to
gain express consent before conceding Nixons guilt. The
two evidentiary hearings conducted by the Florida trial court
demonstrate beyond doubt that Corin fulfilled his duty of
consultation by informing Nixon of counsels proposed
strategy and its potential benefits. Nixons
characteristic silence each time information was conveyed to
him, in sum, did not suffice to render unreasonable
Corins decision to concede guilt and to home in, instead,
on the life or death penalty issue.

The Florida Supreme Courts
erroneous equation of Corins concession strategy to a
guilty plea led it to apply the wrong standard in determining
whether counsels performance ranked as ineffective
assistance. The court first presumed deficient performance,
then applied the presumption of prejudice that United
States v. Cronic,466 U.S. 648 (1984),
reserved for situations in which counsel has entirely failed to
function as the clients advocate. The Florida court
therefore did not hold Nixon to the standard prescribed in
Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668 (1984),
which would have required Nixon to show that counsels
concession strategy was unreasonable. As Florida Supreme Court
Justice Lewis observed, that courts majority
misunderstood Cronic and failed to attend to the
realities of defending against a capital charge. Nixon
III, 857 So. 2d, at 180183 (opinion concurring
in result).

Cronic recognized a narrow
exception to Stricklands holding that a defendant
who asserts ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
not only that his attorneys performance was deficient,
but also that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
Cronic instructed that a presumption of prejudice would
be in order in circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect
in a particular case is unjustified. 466 U.S., at 658.
The Court elaborated: [I]f counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment
rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively
unreliable. Id., at 659; see Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 696697 (2002) (for Cronics presumed
prejudice standard to apply, counsels failure must
be complete). We illustrated just how infrequently the
surrounding circumstances [will] justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness in Cronic itself. In that case,
we reversed a Court of Appeals ruling that ranked as
prejudicially inadequate the performance of an inexperienced,
under-prepared attorney in a complex mail fraud trial. 466
U.S., at 662, 666.

On the record thus far developed,
Corins concession of Nixons guilt does not rank as
a fail[ure] to function in any meaningful sense as the
Governments adversary. Ibid.5 Although such a concession
in a run-of-the-mine trial might present a closer question, the
gravity of the potential sentence in a capital trial and the
proceedings two-phase structure vitally affect
counsels strategic calculus. Attorneys representing
capital defendants face daunting challenges in developing trial
strategies, not least because the defendants guilt is
often clear. Prosecutors are more likely to seek the death
penalty, and to refuse to accept a plea to a life sentence,
when the evidence is overwhelming and the crime heinous. See
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299,
329 (1983).6
In such cases, avoiding execution [may be] the best and
only realistic result possible. ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases §10.9.1, Commentary (rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31
Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1040 (2003).

Counsel therefore may reasonably
decide to focus on the trials penalty phase, at which
time counsels mission is to persuade the trier that his
clients life should be spared. Unable to negotiate a
guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence, defense counsel
must strive at the guilt phase to avoid a counterproductive
course. See Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes
Death Different?, 42 Mercer L. Rev. 695, 708 (1991) (It
is not good to put on a he didnt do it
defense and a he is sorry he did it mitigation.
This just does not work. The jury will give the death penalty
to the client and, in essence, the attorney.); Sundby,
The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell L. Rev.
1557, 15891591 (1998) (interviews of jurors in capital
trials indicate that juries approach the sentencing phase
cynically where counsels sentencing-phase
presentation is logically inconsistent with the guilt-phase
defense); id., at 1597 (in capital cases, a
run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the
prosecutions case for failing to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt can have dire implications for the
sentencing phase). In this light, counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for attempting to impress the jury with his candor
and his unwillingness to engage in a useless
charade. See Cronic, 466 U.S., at 656657,
n. 19. Renowned advocate Clarence Darrow, we note, famously
employed a similar strategy as counsel for the youthful,
cold-blooded killers Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold.
Imploring the judge to spare the boys lives, Darrow
declared: I do not know how much salvage there is in
these two boys. I will be honest with this court as I
have tried to be from the beginning. I know that these boys
are not fit to be at large. Attorney for the Damned:
Clarence Darrow in the Courtroom 84 (A. Weinberg ed. 1989); see
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4041 (Darrows clients did
not expressly consent to what he did. But he saved their
lives.); cf. Yarborough v. Gentry,540 U.S. 1, 910
(2003) (per curiam).

To summarize, in a capital case,
counsel must consider in conjunction both the guilt and penalty
phases in determining how best to proceed. When counsel
informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in
the defendants best interest and the defendant is
unresponsive, counsels strategic choice is not impeded by
any blanket rule demanding the defendants explicit
consent. Instead, if counsels strategy, given the
evidence bearing on the defendants guilt, satisfies the
Strickland standard, that is the end of the matter; no
tenable claim of ineffective assistance would remain.

***

For the reasons stated, the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice took no part in the
decision of this case.

Notes

1. Although Nixon initially stated that he
kidnaped Bickner on August 11, the kidnaping and murder in fact
occurred on Sunday, August 12, 1984. 20 Record 37683770.

3. Except for a brief period during the
second day of the trial, Nixon remained absent throughout the
proceedings. See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d
1336, 13411342 (Fla. 1990); Brief for Petitioner 6,
n. 8.

4. Nixon contended in the alternative that
Corins decision to concede guilt was unreasonable and
prejudicial under the generally applicable standard set out in
Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668 (1984).
App. 385, 389; see supra, at 12. Nixon also
raised several other challenges to his conviction and sentence.
See App. 378384; 390392.

5. In his brief before this Court, Nixon
describes inconsistencies in the States evidence at the
guilt phase of the trial. See Brief for Respondent 1322.
Corins failure to explore these inconsistencies,
measured against the Strickland standard, 466 U.S., at
690, Nixon maintains, constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Florida Supreme Court did not address the alleged
inconsistencies and we decline to consider the matter in the
first instance.

6. As Corin determined here, pleading
guilty without a guarantee that the prosecution will recommend
a life sentence holds little if any benefit for the defendant.
See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases §10.9.2, Commentary
(rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1045
(2003) (If no written guarantee can be obtained that
death will not be imposed following a plea of guilty, counsel
should be extremely reluctant to participate in a waiver of the
clients trial rights.). Pleading guilty not only
relinquishes trial rights, it increases the likelihood that the
State will introduce aggressive evidence of guilt during the
sentencing phase, so that the gruesome details of the crime are
fresh in the jurors minds as they deliberate on the
sentence. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 299, 331 (1983); supra, at 7, 11.