Why Arnie is on a hiding to nothing

By Michael Cockerill

September 9, 2006 — 10.00am

THE hair-trigger of public opinion has already shot Graham Arnold down in flames in the wake of Wednesday's demoralising loss to Kuwait. Dig deeper, though, and this was a defeat waiting to happen. Making Arnold the scapegoat solves nothing and masks everything. There are far more important lessons to be learnt.

The Socceroos are a team in transition, and an organisation without direction. Guus Hiddink got out for a lot of reasons, but one was that he could see this coming. Arnold is filling in on a match-by-match basis, and without any real support from the man who employs him, Frank Lowy. In truth, he's on a hiding to nothing.

Arnold's getting a hiding now, because of the loss in Kuwait City. Like any coach, he's accountable for results, and this wasn't a good one. He'll have to wear it, and he is. Certainly his decision not to use a third substitute was puzzling. Nick Ward on for Brett Holman might have bought a late dividend. Arnold didn't get it all right, but then neither did Hiddink. Remember Italy?

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Yet to call for his head after his first defeat in three matches as caretaker coach defies logic, and understanding. Arnold has the job because, as it stands, none of the so-called "big names" want it. At least not yet. The coaching elite are just that because they learn to read the signs, and those signs suggest the Australian job will be a better job in a year's time than it is now. So they're waiting, and that's why Arnold is filling in. And maybe being hung out to dry in the process.

It's a funny thing, the way the governing body treats its local coaches. Frank Arok once had to pay his own airfare to spy on the opposition. Frank Farina endured six years of political upheaval at board level, and was told in 2001 that he'd have to take only local players to the Oceania Nations Cup because there was no money to bring in players from abroad. No surprise, the Socceroos lost the final to New Zealand.

In between times, Terry Venables was handed a fat contract, allowed to continue living in London, and put up in a ritzy apartment at The Rocks on the few occasions he came to our shores. Venables failed, too, but public opinion was quick to forgive him.

And then Hiddink came along, allowed to stay in Holland where he coached PSV Eindhoven, given a charter plane to fly the players back from Uruguay, given everything he wanted. Hiddink was given every chance to succeed, and he did. But again, because he was a "big name" foreigner, he was treated like a king. Not like Arok, or Eddie Thomson, or Farina. And now, not like Arnold. Is it a wonder local coaches struggle for recognition when they are consistently treated like second-class citizens.

Consider this. Since the World Cup, the Socceroos have lost virtually an entire backroom staff. An assistant [Johan Neeskens], a technical director [Ron Smith], two physios [Les Gelis and Arno Phillips], a doctor [Andrew Jowett] and a strength and conditioning coach [Anthony Crea]. Some of these people had been with the national team for seven years. Now they're gone, and have not been replaced, at least not on a permanent basis.

Arnold turned up in Kuwait with a fill-in backroom staff, no assistant John Kosmina was stranded in Australia after his plane developed mechanical problems and no head of delegation. For the first time in memory, head of high performance, John Boultbee, also wasn't there.

It looked like a budget operation, and it was. The squad could easily have assembled in the Middle East a week beforehand, perhaps played a warm-up game in Bahrain, the UAE or Qatar, to get used to the oppressive conditions. But instead the players were flown into Kuwait City only three nights before the match, allowing just enough time for two training sessions. On match day, Arnold even had to do the warm-up before changing into slacks to sit on the bench. Would Hiddink have put up with all this? Not likely. Nor would he have been asked to.

As always, poor preparation equals poor results. The Socceroos patently stuggled to acclimatise to the withering heat some players lost four per cent of their body fat during the 90 minutes. John Aloisi lost three-and-a-half kilos. Nobody can say most of the players didn't push themselves to their physical limits. These aren't excuses, just facts.

There are other facts worth considering. Post-World Cup, the Socceroos are in the process of an overhaul. What that means is trial and error. Arnold picked two completely different squads for the two games against Kuwait. That's 36 players, a fair portion who had never played for their country, or played only a handful of games. It can now be said that some of these players are simply not up to it.

It's been the right time to experiment, and it should not be forgotten that Australia have still managed to qualify for the Asian Cup in the process. There are no good defeats, but the loss in Kuwait City produced more answers than questions. On and off the park. Which is a positive thing.

Perhaps the most salient point to emerge from all this is also the most obvious one Australia cannot take success in Asia for granted. Kuwait were a useful, well-coached, side. Claims that the players are amateurs are disingenuous. For amateurs, they're wealthy enough not to have to be paid for playing for their club sides. When they join the national team, they are treated like professionals and as their 10-day training camp in Turkey proved prepared like them as well. And it showed.

It may have been a tough lesson for the Socceroos, but it was a timely reminder. The depth of Asian football runs deep, and Australia will be punished for any complacency.