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Behavioral and personnel economics

Articles in behavioral economics discuss the emotional and cognitive factors that influence the decisions of actors, in particular employers and employees. Personnel economics analyzes the internal organizational strategy of the firm and the human resource management practices chosen to pursue that strategy.

The efficacy of hiring strategies hinges on a
firm’s simultaneous use of other policies

When an employer fills a vacancy with one of
its own workers (through promotion or horizontal transfer), it forgoes the
opportunity to fill the position with a new hire from outside the firm.
Although firms use both internal and external hiring methods, they
frequently favor insiders. Internal and external hires differ in observable
characteristics (such as skill levels), as do the employers making the
hiring decisions. Understanding those differences helps employers design and
manage hiring policies that are appropriate for their organizations.

Despite major efforts at equal pay legislation,
gender pay inequality still exists—how can this be put right?

Despite equal pay legislation dating back 50
years, American women still earn 18% less than their male counterparts. In
the UK, with its Equal Pay Act of 1970, and France, which legislated in
1972, the gap is 17% and 10% respectively, and in Australia it remains
around 14%. Interestingly, the gender pay gap is relatively small for the
young but increases as men and women grow older. Similarly, it is large when
comparing married men and women, but smaller for singles. Just what can
explain these wage patterns? And what can governments do to speed up wage
convergence to close the gender pay gap? Clearly, the gender pay gap
continues to be an important policy issue.

Studies from countries with laws against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation suggest that gay and
lesbian employees report more incidents of harassment and are more likely to
report experiencing unfair treatment in the labor market than are
heterosexual employees. Both gay men and lesbians tend to be less satisfied
with their jobs than their heterosexual counterparts. Gay men are found to
earn less than comparably skilled and experienced heterosexual men. For
lesbians, the patterns are ambiguous: in some countries they have been found
to earn less than their heterosexual counterparts, while in others they earn
the same or more.

Incentivized measures are considered to be the
gold standard in measuring individuals’ risk preferences, but is that
correct?

Risk aversion is an important factor in many
settings, including individual decisions about investment or occupational
choice, and government choices about policies affecting environmental,
industrial, or health risks. Risk preferences are measured using surveys or
incentivized games with real consequences. Reviewing the different
approaches to measuring individual risk aversion shows that the best
approach will depend on the question being asked and the study's target
population. In particular, economists’ gold standard of incentivized games
may not be superior to surveys in all settings.

Greater representation of women may better
represent women’s preferences but may not help economic performance

Women's representation on corporate boards,
political committees, and other decision-making teams is increasing, this is
in part because of legal mandates. Evidence on team dynamics and gender
differences in preferences (for example, risk-taking behavior, taste for
competition, prosocial behavior) shows how gender composition influences
group decision-making and subsequent performance. This works through
channels such as investment decisions, internal management, corporate
governance, and social responsibility.

Increased competition affects the pay incentives
firms provide to their managers and may also affect overall pay
structures

Deregulation and managerial compensation are two
important topics on the political and academic agenda. The former has been a
significant policy recommendation in light of the negative effects
associated with overly restrictive regulation on markets and the economy.
The latter relates to the sharp increase in top executives’ pay and the
nature of the link between pay and performance. To the extent that
product-market competition can affect the incentive schemes offered by firms
to their executives, the analysis of the effects of competition on the
structure of compensation can be informative for policy purposes.

CEO pay, often contentious, is the product of
many forces

The escalation in chief executive officer (CEO)
pay over recent decades, both in absolute terms and in relation to the
earnings of production workers, has generated considerable attention. The
pay of top executives has grown noticeably in relation to overall firm
profitability. The pay gap between CEOs in the US and those in other
developed countries narrowed substantially during the 2000s, making top
executive pay an international concern. Researchers have taken positions on
both sides of the debate over whether the level of CEO pay is economically
justified or is the result of managerial power.

Happiness is key to a productive economy, and a
job remains key to individual happiness, also under robotization

Measures of individual happiness, or well-being,
can guide labor market policies. Individual unemployment, as well as the
rate of unemployment in society, have a negative effect on happiness. In
contrast, employment protection and un-employment benefits or a basic income
can contribute to happiness—though when such policies prolong unintended
unemployment, the net effect on national happiness is negative. Active labor
market policies that create more job opportunities increase happiness, which
in turn increases productivity. Measures of individual happiness should
therefore guide labor market policy more explicitly, also with substantial
robotization in production.

A good boss can have a substantial positive
effect on the productivity of a typical worker. While much has been written
about the peer effects of working with good peers, the effects of working
with good bosses appear much more substantial. A good boss can enhance the
performance of their employees and can lower the quit rate. This may also be
relevant in situations where it is challenging to employ incentive pay
structures, such as when quality is difficult to observe. As such, firms
should invest sufficiently in the hiring of good bosses with skills that are
appropriate to their role.

Gender quotas for women on boards of directors
improve female share on boards but firm performance effects are mixed

Arguments for increasing gender diversity on
boards of directors by gender quotas range from ensuring equal opportunity
to improving firm performance. The introduction of gender quotas in a number
of countries has increased female representation on boards. Current research
does not justify gender quotas on grounds of economic efficiency. In many
countries the number of women in top executive positions is limited, and it
is not clear from the evidence that quotas lead to a larger pool of female
top executives, who are the main pipeline for boards of directors. Thus,
other supplementary policies may be necessary if politicians want to
increase the number of women in senior management positions.