Neutralizing Qaddafi: Containing Libyan Aggression

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157 November 25, 1981 MEUTRALIZIffi 0ADDAFI.k CONTAINING UBYAN
AGGRESSION INTRODUCTION Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's military
incursions into Chad and his recent forays into Sudan have finally
awakened the U.S. governmen t to its interests in North Africa and
to the ,threat which Libya poses to those interests. Washington has
always been concerned over Qaddafi's activities in Western Sahara,
North Yemen and Egypt, but the full scope of the Libyan menace was
not apparent u ntil the Colonel's Islamic Legion entered the
Chadian capital, Ndjamena, in November 1980.

Unconfirmed reports now state that Libyan forces are being
withdrawn from Chad. However, this withdrawal should not be
interpreted as a signal for Washington to relax. Qaddafi still
poses a serious threat to Sudan, regardless of the military
situation in C had. Sudan and Libya share a 125-mile border and
Libya's classic subversive techniques do not necessarily require
physical propinquity. Sudan is in a precarious economic and
political condition and could easily fall victim to a determined
Libyan effort to undermine the state. Since Qaddafi has, on several
occasions, announced his intention of overthrowing the Sudanese
government of Gaafar Muhammed Numeiri, it seems reason able to
expect that such an effort will be made. Any major outbreak in
Sudan would pr obably be severely detrimental to Western interests
since it would'lead to the encirclement of Egypt by hostile foreign
powers and to the occupation of a vital stretch of Red Sea coast by
a pro-Moscow yovernment.

In assessing the nature and extent of the L ibyan threat to. the
interests of the Western powers and their allies, this paper will
address four central questions in the private affairs of
independent nations 1. What is the full breadth and depth of Libyan
interference 2 2. Does Muammar Qaddafi poss e ss a secure home base
from 3. Are Qaddafi's armed forces truly a threat to Libya's which
to conduct his aggressive foreign policies neighbors, particularly
Egypt and Sudan 4. What measures should the U.S. and its allies
take to contain and counterbalance aggressive Libyan policies?

LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY The breathtaking profusion of Qaddafi's
foreign entanglements and the consequent dispersal of his resources
probably account for his failure to exercise a greater influence
upon world affairs.

However, ami dst all the confusion of Qaddafi's foreign policy
three broad streams of purpose can be discerned A desire to make
Libya the world's pre-eminent Arab power and, concomitantly, to
make Qaddafi primus inter pares among Arab leaders. To achieve this
end, Qad d afi must overcome Egypt, the leader of the Arab World
from World War I1 to 1978 and the newly emerged leader, Saudi
Arabia confront Iraq a country with similar ambitions 1 He may also
have to 2. An intent to expand Libya's population base. Libya is a
coun try with large revenues and few people, hence Qaddafi's dream
of an Islamic Saharan Republic.

Africa is designed to supply the Colonel with the manpower he
will require to make Libya the great power in the Arab world.

The vaunted empire stretching from Ca sablanca to Cairo (or in
his more enthusiastic moments, Baghdad) will provide Qaddafi with a
population commensurate with his revenues which he can then
mobilize militarily i A consistent policy aimed at moving
south-eastward into the Horn of Africa.

The first is to obtain control of the western bank of the Red I
Sea. Should Qaddafi or his surrogate obtain control of Sudan, he I
and his Ethiopian allies would control most of the west bank of the
Red Sea, enabling Ethiopia and its ally, South Yemen, to fur ther
tighten their grip on the straits of Bab el Mandeb a development
made all the more likely by the presence of a Soviet naval base on
Ethiopia's Dhalak archipelago.

This strategic position Kxld enable Libya, Ethiopia and South
Yemefi, which recently sig ned a triumvirate political-military
alliance, to exert increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and its ally,
North Yemen Libyan imperialism within North I 3 This policy
encompasses two primary objectives I Saudi Arabia, of late, has
been attempting to circumv e nt the The Saudis have constructed an
oil pipeline between Straits of Hormuz, a dangerous "choke pointf1
on the route of its oil e.xports the Abqaiq oilfields in eastern
Saudi Arabia and the port of 3 Yanbu on the eastern bank of the Red
Sea eventually be able to carry 3.7 million barrels of oil per
day.

However, any hostile power controlling the western bank of the
Red Sea opposite Yanbu would be in a position to interdict all Red
Sea shipping. Hence, Qaddafi is eager to obtain effective control
over Suda n's Red Sea coast while the U.S. wishes to construct
military facilities at Ras a1 Banas (see map This pipeline will
Qaddafi also plans to obtain control over the sources of the Nile.
A pro-Libyan government in Sudan could manipulate and divert the
waters of both the Blue and the White Nile, particular ly if it
enjoyed Libyan financial backing and Soviet/East German technical
assistance. Diversion of the Nile waters would bring the Egyptian
agricultural system to its knees in a very short time and would gr
e atly facilitate Qaddafils attempts to undermine the pro-Western
regime in Cairo. Qaddafi attempted to gain control over the source
of the White Nile in Uganda when he allied himself with Idi Amin
Dada assistance to the Tanzanian forces which invaded Ugand a and
overthrew Amin in 1979 was not entirely altruistic.

Qaddafi has never been an avowed Marxist-Leninist less, his
international strategy dovetails remarkably well with Soviet
ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa. The Soviet Union is
currently seeking to maneuver into a position from which it can
interdict the oil supply routes to Western Europe and the United
States. This policy will probably necessitate the subver sion of
the Saudi state and of other U.S. allies along the Red Sea coast.
Thus, Soviet strategy coincides dramatically with Qaddafils
ambitions. Moreover, the Soviet Union can use Libya as a valuable
staging post for the international terrorist groups which it funds,
trains and organizes in its 'Iideological war with the West. Shared
objectives have gradually drawn Qaddafi and the Kremlin closer
together, and it is now rumored that the two parties are about to
sign a formal Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Such a treaty
would probably grant the Soviet Black Sea fleet a Mediterran e an
base Egyptian military and financial Neverthe A CATALOG OF LIBYAN
INTERFERENCE Qaddafi has attempted to subvert at least twenty-eight
sovereign states. This section will attempt to list and describe
Qaddafi's illicit activities, paying particular atten tion to
primary areas of U.S. interest such as Sudan, Egypt and Chad.

The entire Sahelian region has proved to be a rich hunting
ground for Qaddafi. The area is exceptionally poor and, conse
quently, Libyan funds funnelled to subGersive groups have a major
impact. Moreover, the populations of most Sahelian states are split
ethnically between white, semi-nomadic Arabs and negroid peoples
who support themselves from farming and herding. Qaddafi has played
upon these ethnic distinctions remorselessly. 4 Chad. Qaddafi has
considered moving southward into Chad for several years beaten back
by the troops of Goukouni Oueddei, the President, and Hissene
HabrC, the Defense Minister, who were cooperating at that time He
sent his forces there in 1978 but they were The factional nature of
Chadian politics enabled Qaddafi to re-enter Chad in 1980 broken up
and President Oueddei was fighting a civil war with the private
army of Hissene Habr

6. Oueddei had gained the support of his Vice President, Colonel
Kamougue, and For eign Minister, Ahmat Acyl, both of whom boasted
their own private armies. The coalition was broadly successful but
was unable to take the capital, Ndjamena from Habr6ls forces The
government of National Unity had Oueddei was persuaded, probably by
Ahmat A c yl, to invite Colonel Qaddafi to assist him to retake the
capital On November 2, Qaddafi and Oueddei met at Faya Largeau and
shortly thereafter Libyan tanks and artillery retook Ndjamena. The
remnants of Habr6's army retreated to Ab6che in eastern Chad an
d.built forti fied positions.

Oueddei quickly discovered that he had invited the wolf into his
parlor. With his forces in Chad and a civil war still raging
Qaddafi was in a position to dictate terms. Thus, shortly after the
fall of Ndjamena, Libya annexed the mineral-rich Aozou Strip and
the two leaders announced the merger of Libya and Chad. The latter
move tricrcrered a storm of protest from members of the
Orgar,ization of-fifrican Unity, obliging Qaddafi to drop the
matter in order not to imperil his pr ospective chairmanship of the
OAU in 1982.

The Libyan forces, which were gradually augmented until they
numbered between 12,000 and 16,000, then moved eastward. They drove
Habr6's followers from AbCche and then launched air strikes against
the survivors who had fled across the Sudanese border.

The threat from Habr6's forces had been effectively negated but
Qaddafi, nevertheless, refused to withdraw his troops, which had
begun to clash wi th Oueddei's own men. Qaddafi began to swing his
support behind Ahmat Acyl, apparently in the hope of install ing
him in Oueddeils place and thus achieving the desired merger of
Chad and Libya.

Oueddei flew to Paris to request French assistance. President
Francois Mitterrand refused to intervene militarily but did begin
supplying ams to Oueddei's army and providing financial aid to the
Pan-African peacekeeping forces which the OAU had proposed to set
up in Chad. In a last desparate move, Qaddafi ordered h i s forces
to support Ahmat Acylls move into Ndjamena, probably in order to
overthrow Oueddei. Pressure seems to have been brought to bear on
Qaddafi by France and the GAU his position within 'the organization
and possible French military intervention, Qadd a fi ordered his
troops to withdraw. No reports of actual Libyan withdrawal have
been officially confirmed Fearing the loss of 5 Central African
Republic. Qaddafi has also demonstrated interest in Chad's southern
neighbor. Tripoli, for example, is the world headquarters for the
Central African Movement for National Liberation In July 1981, it
claimed responsibility for the bombing of a movie theater in the
capital, Bangui, which left four dead and thirty-two injured the
overthrow of President David Dacko and the removal of the 1,300
French paratroopers stationed in the republic.

Movement had probably hoped, Dacko reacted by banning all opposi
tion groups and thus polarizing the political situation and
broadening the underground opposition to his regime. Howev er
General Andre Kolingba, commander of the Republic's 1,800-man army,
forestalled the Movement by taking control of the government in a
bloodless coup. He now appears to be intent upon forming a broad
coalition government, including some opposition group s, and thus
averting Libyan subversion.

Ishaya Audu, asserted that Libyan agents were operating within
Nigeria's borders, making massive food purchases for the forces in
Chad and deliberately engineering local shortages. One week later,
the Nigerian govern ment annouriced that it had discovered that the
Libyan envoy to Nigeria had been forming subversive connections
with one of the country's opposition groups, the Greater Nigerian
People's Party. The Nigerian Defense Minister subsequently voiced
his suspici o n of Libyan involvement in the riots at Kano in
December 1980, which left 1,000 dead. After the fall of Ndjamena,
the authorities in Lagos dispatched an army division, an air force
squadron and artillery to Borno province to seal off the country's
border with Chad.

Shagari then severed all diplomatic relations with Tripoli.

Niger. Colonel Kountche, the head of Niger's military
government, seized power in 1974 to forestall Libyan penetration of
Niger's armed forces. He has since survived two Libyan sponsor ed
coups. Undeterred, Qaddafi has begun to stir up trouble among the
country's Touareg population, urging them to fight for
independence.

Islamic Legion. During the past year, two of Niger's French-run
uranium mines have been attacked by Touaregs armed wi th
Kalashnikov rifles. Algeria, perturbed by Libyan expansionism, has
dispatched a mobile armored division to Niger's border with Libya
to prevent Qaddafi from making any direct incursions into the area
The Movement then called for As the Nigeria. On Nove m ber 26,
1980, the Nigerian Foreign Minister President Shehu Touaregs have
been recruited and trained by Qaddafi's Upper Volta. Qaddafi gave
clandestine support to several extreme opposition groups in Upper
Volta until Novembii 1980 when Colonel Saye Zerbo , a former
foreign minister, took over the government. He suspended the
constitution to prevent further Libyan interference.

Ghana. The government of President Hilla Limann has accused
Qaddafi of buying over some of the country's opposition groups ar,d
of finncing Marxist guerrilla units within Ghana country broke all
diplomatic relations with Tripoli in November 1980 The 6 Seneqal
and Gambia. Both governments have accused Qaddafi of recruiting
young radicals in their countries, of giving them military tra i
ning in Libya and of supplying arms and financial assistance to
local Marxist opposition groups. Both countries cut diplomatic ties
wi* Libya in summer 1980 and have since accused Qaddafi of being
involved in the recent abortive coup in Banjul, the capita l of
Gambia.

Mauritania and Mali. As in Niger, Qaddafi has attempted to win
over the Touareg populations of these states, urging them to fight
for independence and eventual incorporation into his Islamic
Saharan Republic this end.

Be has proved a generous supplier of arms to Western Sahara.
Polisario guerrillas are currently contest Qaddafi has become
Polisario's ing Morocco's sovereignty over this potentially wealthy
country which Spain ceded to Morocco and Mauritania when it
relinquished the last of its African colonies primary backer,
supplying it with tanks, armored personnel carriers and
air-to-ground missiles as well as conventional small arms.

Alqeria. Libya is currently involved in a serious border dispute
with Algeria, claiming a pocket of Algerian territory which is rich
in oil and gas. Qaddafi has attempted to force Conoco to drill in
the area but his efforts have so far been repulsed.

Tunisia. At one time, Qaddafi had hoped to incorporate Tunisia
into Libya as a first step towards the creation of his Islamic
Saharan Republic An agreement was signed but, apparently Tunisia
had been more attracted by potential Libyan aid than by the
projected merger. The two parties quarrelled after a short time and
the "union broke up with considerable acrimony on both sides.

Having failed diplomatically, Qaddafi decided to move direct ly
against the Tunisian state On January 26, Libyan-trained rebels
attacked the Tunisian town of Gafsa. They seized the town's
barracks and police headqua rters but the populace did not rise to
their assistance, as their Libyan instructors had assured them.
After a single day of fighting, the government forces crushed the
outbreak and restored order.

The captured rebels swore that. they had been trained in Libya
higher paying work in Libya. After crossing the border, they had
been apprehended by Libyan security agents and offered the choice
of being handed over to Tunisian authorities or being trained as
subversives transported, to Gafsa advisors, transport aircraft and
helicopters to Tunis, along with three warships to patrol the Gulf
of Gabes They had originally left Tunisia illegally in search of
They opted for training and then were secretly In the wake of the
attack, the French government sent military Qaddafi, furious at 7
the frustration of his plans, contrived a series of anti-French
demonstrations. French diplomats asked for police protection but
they were ignored and the Tripoli embassy was sacked, as was the
consulate in Benghazi.

Sudan. Colonel Qa ddafi is no stranger to Sudanese politics
having made at least six attempts to overthrow the countryfs
president, General Gaafar Muhammed Numeixi. The Colonel has found
that Sudan's political weaknesses render it particularly covering
967,000 square miles . Its populace is ethnically diverse.

The twelve northern provinces are populated by 12 million Arabic
speaking Moslems who farm, raise cattle or camels. The three
southern provinces are inhabited by 4 million blacks who practice
animism or Christianity an d support themselves by subsistence
agriculture. The northwestern Difur region, which abuts the Chadian
border, is radically disaffected with the central govern ment and
has witnessed several major riots. susceptible to subversion. The
country is the larg e st in Africa President Numeiri has sought to
counter southern suspicion of northern Sudan and to placate other
particularist forces by granting the various provinces increasing
autonomy, giving enhanced powers to provincial governors and
creating more loc al people's councils. The departments of health,
education and welfare have all been dissolved and their
responsibilities shifted to provincial assemblies.

Unfortunately, Sudan is afflicted by all the economic problems
common to most African states. Govern ment interference in the food
and agriculture sectors has kept prices artificially low and,
consequently, has depressed domestic production. Khartoum now sees
the error of its ways, but has found the elimination of food
subsidies to be politically dangero us. In addition, Sudan pays a
rising proportion of its national income for imported oil and is
also obliged to care for one million refugees who have fled from
war-torn Ethiopia and Chad.

Sudan's economic insecurity makes it ripe for Libyan subver
sion, while the huge refugee population provides both a cover for
Qaddefils activities and the tinder to set the country alight.

Radio broadcasts from Tripoli proclaimed, after the
assassination of Anwar Sadat, that Numeiri is "next on the people's
death list.Il Qaddafi has stepped up his support for the Marxist
Sudan National Front, a guerrilla group based in Ethiopia. The
Sudanese government has already discovered 3,000 Soviet rifles
which had been smuggled into Khartoum, probably by Libyan agents
hidden among the refugees which enter Sudan from Chad at the rate
of 200 per day.

Difur. His planes have been strafing and bombing Sudanese towns
and villages along the 1,000 mile border with Chad while large
forces, supported by T-55 and T-62 tanks, have massed within 130
miles of the border Qaddafi has also been trying to exacerbate the
tensions in The fact that these Libyan air attacks have been made
primar ily by propeller craft has been taken as evidence of
Qaddafi's disinclination to escalate the situation. Recen t reports
suggest however, that he has been restrained by physical rather
than political or military considerations. Eastern Chad lacks the
macadamed airstrips capable of providing launch and landing
facilities for Libya's advanced jet fighters and bombers . Shortly
before the announced Libyan withdrawal from Chad it was discovered
that Libyan and East German engineers were building macadam
airstrips at Biltine and Ab6che, near the Sudanese border, and at
Dougia and Largeau in western and northern Chad, resp ectively.

The existence of these airstrips demonstrates that Qaddafi's
intentions to Sudan were, and probably still are, decidedly
menacing.

Somalia. The Somali Liberation Front, a guerrilla group based in
neighboring Ethiopia, currently receives generous supplies of arms
and mcney from Tripoli to assist it in its efforts to overthrow
President Siad Barre Uganda. Qaddafi supplied ex-Ugandan dictator
Idi Amin Dada 600 with arms, troops and personal bodyguards. When
Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda in 1979, Qaddafi flew 2,000 Libyan
troops to Uganda in Boeing 727's which had been purchased in the
U.S members of this expeditionary force were killed when they
encoun tered a Tanzanian column on the main highway leading into
Kampala.

The survivors were allowed to fly back to Tripoli.

Egypt. No evidence has yet been unearthed which would directly
link Qaddafi and Libya with clandestine Egyptian groups such as the
Moslem Brotherhood. Tripoli radio did, however blatantly
'fcelebrateft Anwar Sadat's assassination and made no secret of its
support for the killers. Qaddafi had repeatedly labelled Sadat as
the chief enemy of the Islamic peoples, deserv ing death.at an
assassin's had.

Lebanon. Qaddafi is supplying the Palestine Liberation
Organization and various Palesti nian splinter groups with sophis
ticated ground-to-air missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft
batteries for deployment in Lebanon. In some vital areas he is also
providing the personnel to man this equipment.

Saudi Arabia. Qaddafi has repeatedly affirmed his intention of
overthrowing the Saudi monarchy, which he believes to be a major
barrier to an Islamic revolution. Recently, he threatened to bomb
the Saudi oilfields in retaliation for Riyadh's attempts to l ower
the base price of crude oil.

North Yemen. The National Democratic Front of North Yemen
receives the bulk of its military supplies from Libya and South
Yemen. The Front, which is based in South Yemen, is dedicated to
the destruction of North Yemen's pr o-Saudi regime and the realign
ment of North Yemen with its southern, Marxist neighbor. The recent
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by Libya, 9 Ethiopia
and South Yemen was probably designed to facilitate the subversion
of the governments of No rth Yemen and Somalia.

Libya is currently funding and supplying arms to the Oman
Popular Liberation Front, a clandestine guerrilla group which is
attempting to overthrow the Sultanate of Oman Oman.

Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Irredentist guerrilla m
ovements in southern Thailand and northern Sumatra receive military
supplies from Tripoli. Qaddafi also sends funds to the Moslem
Missionary Association, which is believed to act as a cover
organization for revolutionary, fundamentalist groups.

Philippines. The irredentist Mor0 National Liberation Front has
its world headquarters in Tripoli, and obtains the bulk of its arms
and training from Libya.

Spain. Basque E.T.A. terrorists receive arms from Libya and are
trained in South Yemen at Libyan expense.

Italy. Qaddafi funds the terrorist Red Brigades and is
responsible for the murder of Libyan dissidents living in Rome.

More recently, he has threatened to bomb U.S. forces stationed
in Italy Great Britain. Over the past seven years; the provisional
wing of the Irish Republican Army received a continuous flow of
Libyan arms. In 1973, British Royal Navy vessels operating off the
Irish coast apprehended the S.S. Claudia, which was discovered to
be carrying five tons of arms from Libya, destined for the I.R.A.
The naval authorities also captured Joe Cahill, one of the
provisionals' leading lights, who was aboard the vessel. In London,
Libyan assassins have shot and killed an exiled Libyan journalist,
Mohammed Ramadan, and an attorney, Mahmoud Abbou Nafa. Libya' s
chief representative in London, Musa Kusa then announced the
impending assassinations of two more Libyan dissidents. He was
promptly expelled from Britain.

THE NUCLEAR THREAT A critical element in Libya's foreign policy
is its capacity to build and to utilize thermonuclear weapons no
secret that he has nuclear ambitions.

Qaddafi has made Shortly after overthrowing King Idris, Qaddafi
began making friendly overtures to Pakistani leader Zulfigar All
Bhutto.

Pakistan then boasted several nuclear facilities and Bhutto, who
had nuclezr ambitions of his own, was trying to obtain a reprocess
ing plant from France. Some unofficial understanding was reached,
involving the provision of Libyan funds to Pakistan and a quid pro
quo transfer of technology to Libya. T his exchange ended abruptly
in 1978 when President Zia ul-Haq executed Bhutto. 10 Libyan aid to
Pakistan was curtailed and funds were redirected to Bhutto's son,
who is leading a clandestine movement against Zia.

The movement is currently in Kabul but is expected to move to
Tripoli shortly.

Qaddafi then turned his attention to India, despite his supposed
pro-Moslem bias. India was awarded huge contracts in Libya for the
construction of airports, dams, power transmission lines, railways,
steel plants and ha rbors. One contract for the building of the
Tripoli power station involved $120 million.

When Iranian oil supplies were cut off from the world market
Libya offered India 2 million tons of crude at OPEC benchmark
prices, despite the fact that world spot market prices were then
much higher. Libyan shipments were, however, cut off at 300,000
tons when it became clear that the Indian government had no
intention of supplying Qaddafi with either the materials or the
technology to build a nuclear bomb.

Once more, Qaddafi turned to Pakistan A secret agreement was
reportedly signed between the two countries in April 1980.

Pakistan undertook to assist Libya with uranium enrichment and
to supply Libya with an enrichment plant of its own by 1985 return,
Qaddaf i committed $1.5 billion to the Pakistani nuclear program.
Qaddafi has already disbursed $500 million for "yellow cake"
uranium from Niger. Qaddafi is currently pressuring Pakistan to
supply him with a complete atomic weapon In Simultaneously, Qaddafi
has attempted to build up Libya's The Soviet Union is capacity to
build its own atomic weapons providing three nuclear facilities,
including a three hundred megawatt reactor which would be diverted
to produce weapons-grade uranium It should be remembered that ,
should Qaddafi obtain a nuclear weapon, he has the technical
ability to launch it. It has been reported that the Orbital
Transport and Rocket Company (OTRAG), a West German firm, has
agreed to supply Libya with long-range rockets and that Qaddafi has
sig n ed a five-year contract with the firm worth $1,500 million.
Israel has every reason to believe that, should Qaddafi obtain a
nuclear bomb it would constitute Qaddafi's primary, and probably
immediate, target THE HOMl3 BASE The Libyan Oil Industry Any exam
ination of the Libyan domestic situation must begin Some 95 percent
of its territory is desert and barren at the country's oil wells
country. rockland, cultivation being confined to a narrow coastal
strip.

Lacking other natural resources, Libya depends alm ost entirely
upon its oil revenues for its economic survival. The sale of crude
oil provides 99.4 percent of the country's foreign earnings
Superficially, Libya is not a wealthy 11 and finances its domestic
development plans, its foreign policies its mili t ary machine and
its broad range of imports (which account for approximately 30
percent of GNP would be possible economy, it is its very lifeblood
approximately 1.5 million barrels of high quality Ilsweetll crude
from the Libyan desert. The low sulphur con t ent of Libyan oil
enabled it to command 41 per barrel, the highest price on the world
market. Royalties accruing to the governing People's Congress
totalled $22 billion for the year Without oil none of these Oil is
not simply the mainstay of the Libyan Du r ing 1980, U.S. and
French oil consortia daily pumped a Despite their apparent
similarity, Libya cannot be classified in the same economic
category as other oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. Like them, Libya enjoys the fruits of its fossi l fuel
resources. Unlike them, however, Libya boasts relatively small
known reserves. Libyan reserves are currently estimated to be
one-eighth those of Saudi Arabia.

This disparity of resources leads to a disparity of
interests.

Saudi Arabia's huge reserv es and its major financial
investments in the West cblige it to consider the long-term
viability of the world oil market and the stability of the major
Western econo mies. On the other hand, Libya has no similar
interest in the long-term future cf the wor ld oil market; in fact,
it has compel ling economic reasons for charging as much for its
oil as the world market can bear, regardless of the ultimate
consequences.

Moreover, Libya has accumulated only $12 billion in foreign
assets, the bulk of its oil reve nues having been aisbursed on
development plans and military hardware. Thus, unlike Saudi Arabia,
it has no interest in the well-being of the major Western economies
International Financial Statistics provided by the IMF, September
1981 The disparity of S audi and Libyan interests has been masked
since the 1973 Yom Kippur War by a mutual hatred of Israel.

Recently, hcwever,. economic factors have begun to override this
common political interest.

For several years, the Saudis have used OPEC's annual summit
meeting to lobby for a policy of restraint in oil pricing. They did
enjoy some successes in checking the excesses of their most extreme
opponents, Libya, Algeria and Nigeria, but they consistent ly
failed to achieve their main objective, an absolute reduc tion of
the base price cjif crude.

This frustration recently led Saudi Arabia to make use of the
strongest weapon in its arsenal: its huge oil reserves.

Throughout 1981, Saudi Arabia has been deliberately flooding the
world market with cheap crude priced at only $32 per barrel, which
it is extracting at the rate of 9 to 10.5 million barrels per day
43 percent of regular OPEC output. As a result, the demand for oil
from other OPEC members has fallen dramatically arid the only
alternative open to them is pr i ce cutting. 12 Few oil producers
have been so badly mauled by Saudi policy as Libya. Before Riyadh
cut prices and stepped up output, the Libyan government demanded
$41 per barrel for its oil, as compared to the OPEC average price
of 35 per barrel. Libyan c rude, of course, is of exceptionally
high quality, but Qaddafi has also been known as one of the leaders
of the cartel's price "hawks In the face of Saudi policy, demand
for Libyan oil has dropped by almost two-thirds. In 1980,
international oil companies were extracting 1.5 million barrels per
day from Libya. Cheap Saudi crude has now reduced that demand to
600,000 barrels per day.

The companies complain that they are losing money on Libyan oil
but Colonel Qaddafi has so far refused to countenance any app
reciable price cut. He has offered a 1.50 per barrel discount but
the major oil companies are demanding an additional 4 to $5 per
barrel in cuts. Matters have been made worse for Libya by Nigeria's
recent decision to cut the price of its own high quality low
sulphur crude to $34.50 per barrel.

Saudi Arabia has now raised its prices by 2 per barrel and has
agreed to some cutbacks in production in return for price cuts by
other'OPEC members.

Qaddafi. His efforts to bully oil compan ies into pumping more
Libyan crude while paying $39.50 per barrel have failed dismally
and may prove econcmically disastrous. Libyan oil revenues totalled
22 billion in 1980; in 1981 they are projected to reach only $7
billion. Under normal circumstances, an oil-producing nation of
only 3 million people could ride out the present drop in sales with
ease, living off its financial reserves while pressuring Saudi
Arabia to alter its course more drastically.

However, like Nigeria, Libya has overextended itself drastically
banking on the continuance of high oil prices and high western
demand. Qaddafi has already pledged to carry out a 70 billion
five-year domestic development plan and a major expansion of the
Libyan armed forces while pursuing ambitious and cos tly foreign
adventxres. The Colonel's recent speeches have dwelled upon the
need for belt tightening and restraint in the Libyan economy.

This policy will not, however, be easy to implement. Qaddafi
has, to date, sought to placate domestic opposition to hi s more
radical policies by guaranteeing the broad distribution of heavily
subsidized, expensive Western consumer goods. Many Libyans have
been willing tc tolerate the Colonel's excesses while the flow of
consumer goods lasted. Such tolerance may disappear , however
should the fount of wealth dry up.

These economic changes within Libya may prove to be the most
significant developments Iri North Africanmiddle Eastern politics
since Anwar Sadat's 1977 journey to Jerusalem. Libya has never been
a military power worthy of consideration and Saudi policy is now
depriving Qaddafi of the oce weapon which has allowed him to
exercise influence over North African and Middle Eastern politics
money These measures do not satisfy Colonel Deprived of money,
Qaddafi may well be obliged to trim his support for subversive
groups and military programs. Conversely, 13 he may adopt an even
more.hostile attitude towards Saudi Arabia seeking to topple the
government which has created his troubles.

Libyan Domestic Politics Qaddafi ca me to power in 1969 when he
and a group of young army officers overthrew the Libyan monarchy
while King Idris was in Turkey. Qaddafi and his fellow officers
subsequently directed the country s affairs through the
ltRevolutionary Command Council. I Qaddafi abolished this council
in 1977 and embarked on a long series of political, social and
economic reforms. He claims to have transformed Libya into a true
Islamic revolutionary repub1.k In 1977, the country was made
subject to "direct people's p0wer.I' All l e gislative and
executive decisions were to be made in local town and village
meetings known as 'IPeople's Congresses.'l People's Congress which
meets in Tripoli to direct national affairs These congresses return
delegates to a.Genera1 The democratic appear a nce of Libyan
government belies the Colonel Qaddafi maintains reality of the
political situation absolute control over all organs of government
through the use of revolutionary committees.lI testament, his
"Green Book,Il these committees are to fllead'l t h e local and
central congresses to "the right way Should a parti cipant in the
popular congresses speak out against Qaddafi's policies, he can be
dealt with by the committees under the guise of Ilpracticing
revolutionary violence against the enemies of the revolution.l! The
committees, Ifthe storming tools of the revolu tion,l1 constitute
the central authority which Qaddafi theoretical ly has
dissolved.

Qaddafi anu his committees have implemented a series of
development plans and reforms designed to initiat e an Islamic
cultural revolution. The Colonel I s "Green Bookll projects the
construction of a revolutionary state which will witness the
abolition of both property and money have already taken one step in
this direction by declaring that all property bel o ngs to those
who use it drivers became the owners of their vehicles and
apartment renters became apartment owners original owners In March
1981, Qaddafi struck another blow against Libya's small middle
class when he withdrew th- trading licenses of all sh o ps and
stores dealing in clothing, electrical goods, shoes and household
appliances. He subsequently announced that all private business
will be abolished by the end of the year. In the future Libyans
will be obliged to purchase all their needs at the sta t e owned
supermarkets which are being constructed in every urban center
According to Qaddafils political The revolutionary committees
Overnight, Libyan cab No compensation was offered to the 14 These
policies have spawned major problems. The transfer of re ntal
accommodation to its occupants has devastated the domestic housing
market, leaving many unable to find shelter in the cities.

The state supermarkets lack an organized distribution network
and, consequently, bottlenecks and shortages are commonplace.

Customers hoard goods which are subject to erratic supply and
thus exacerbate the situation of a much deeper:economic malaise ted
the contracting Libyan economy to huge arms purchases, broad
international aid and a $22 billion development program. Oil rev e
nues simply cannot match these outlays, particularly in the light
of declining production. Moreover, even if Qaddafi did have the
necessary funds for his projects, Libya lacks the bureau cratic
infrastructure necessary to implement them. Qaddafi's frequen t
blows at the Libyan middle class and his purges of the ranks of
government have left the country bereft of skilled administrators.
Simultaneously, Qaddafi's random domestic distri bution of Libya's
oil wealth has deprived the country of large segments of its blue
collar workforce. Qaddafi traditionally has distributed benefits
and consumer goods throughout Libyan society at heavily subsidized
rates, seeking thereby to Ifbuy off potential opposition to his
more radical policies. This policy has also had th e result of
depriving most Libyans of the impetus to work to the point where 60
percent of Libya's workforce is now foreign.

This provides a major drain on the Libyan economy and places it
at the mercy of its neighbors enormously when the effect of declini
ng oil production begins to bite and the country can no longer
afford either its huge foreign workforce or large imports of
expensive consumer goods These problems are, however, merely
superficial manifestations Qaddafi has vastly overcommit Domestic
prob l ems may mount Meanwhile, Qaddafi's attempts to expand the
Libyan armed forces are causing immediate problems. Until recently,
Libya had an army of only 42,000 men ground forces should rival
Egypt's 320,000-man army. This is truly a massive undertaking for a
country with a population of only 3 million, 1.25 million of whom
are under 15 years of age Also, it should remembered that half of
the remainder are female Qaddafi has now resolved that Libya's In
the past year, Qaddafi expanded his army to 55,000 thro u gh
ruthless conscription and pressganging. Young Libyans have been
rounded up in airports, soccer stadiums and parking lots and
conscripted for up to twelve years in the army. Even young men who
have been sent abroad to study are drafted immediately upon their
::zturn. With so many men in uniform, dependence upon foreign
workers and managers is increased.

Qaddafi's policies are provoking considerable domestic
discontent. Young men have fought with soldiers trying to press
them into the army and the rate of desertion is reported to be
high. Trouble has broken out on several university campuses where
students have beaten up Qaddafi supporters. Consequently the
revolutionary committees are trying to move campuses from the 15
major cities, such as Tripoli and Benghazi, to towns such as
Tobruk, distant from the major population centers.

Some army officers have made direct moves against the Colonel's
person. In August 1980, the commander of the Tobruk garrison almost
succeeded in taking control of the town just b efore Qaddafi was to
land at the airport where he would, presumably, have been seized.
In May 1981, Qaddafi's East German security police discovered that
certain senior army officers had arranged to have Qaddafi's plane
shot down by missiles as he returne d from Moscow.

This attempted coup led to the immediate arrest of over 300
people and, reportedly, a rash of summary executions. Given
Qaddafi's ruthless suppression of all internal dissent and his
virtual elimination of political activity outside his revo
lutionary committees, it is most likely that any further coup
attempts will continue to come from the army.

Human Rights within Libya Whether or not Qaddafi's regime is
truly threatened, the Colonel certainly perceives it to be so.
3,000 Libyans were arre sted for political reasons in 1980 alone.
Both the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Amnesty
International report that the victims of the Libyan security
services are frequently tortured others were officially
'liquidated. It Some have been to r tured to death while Possibly
the most disturbing aspect of Qaddafi's various human rights abuses
is his zealous rooting out of all exiled opponents of his regime.
Exiled Libyan dissidents are not numer ous and, more important,
they are not united. It is, therefore a measure of Qaddafi's sense
of insecurity that, in February 1980, he persuaded.the Third
Conference of the Revolutionary Councils to adopt a resolution
calling upon the revolutionary committees to liquidate "all
elements that hinder the revolut i on.Il Specifically, the
resolution stated, in somewhat garbled language that Physical
liquidation becomes the final stage in the revolutionary struggle
in its final conclusion, if by that stage the breakdown of the
economic, political and social structure s of the committee forces
had not been complete Two months later, Qaddafi invoked this
resolution when he called upon all Libyan exiles to heed his "final
warning1? and re-kirn home or be llliquidated.lt In the months
following, at least eleven Libyan diss idents living in Europe were
killed by Libyan assassins.

Colorado did a great deal to bring U.S.-Libyan relations to
their present nadir The attempted murder of a young Libyan studying
in 16 THE FUTURE COURSE -OF U.S. POLICY TOWAR D LIBYA Clearly,
Qaddafi's regime is a major threat to the safety of U.S. allies in
North Africa and the Middle East. It is, in fact a threat to the
stability of the whole region. However, as this examination has
revealed, Qaddafi's Libya has notable weak points.

The current Administration in Washington should now concentrate
upon drawing up a cohesive Libya policy which seeks to take
advantage of all of these economic, military and political weak
nesses.

Economic The State Department and the National Sec urity Council
should give serious consideration to placing a U.S. embargo on all
Libyan petroleum and all petroleum products extracted from Libyan
sources. Clearly, such an embargo would be most effective if it
were multilateral. However, even if the U.S. cannot persuade its
allies to follow its example, it is necessary that the Admini
stration demonstrate its determination to back up its anti-terror
ist and anti-Qaddafi rhetoric with substantive action U.S. oil
companies should seek to replace Libyan oil b y expanding
production elsewhere. Thus, a unilateral embargo of Libyan crude
would have the effect of restricting the market for Libyan oil and
th~s would drive down the price of Libyan crude even further,
causing Qaddafi increased economic difficulties e xtraction in
Nigeria. In August 1981, Nigeria was pumping only 640,000 barrels
of high quality crude per day, compared with an average of 2
million barrels in 19

80. Libya currently supplies the West with 600,000 barrels per
day crude could turn to Nigeria for new supplies once an embargo
was declared.

Qaddafi's aggressive foreign policies and assisting a developing
country in a time of economic difficulty Figures from African
Business, November 1981, No. 39 The administration of President
Shehu Shagari ha s already demonstrated its concern over Libyan
expansionism, so it will probably prove eager to take a course of
action which, simulta neously, will weaken Qaddafi while
strengthening the Nigerian economy. On the other hand, should
President Shagari decid e not to assist the U.S. so overtly, other
producers of light crude such as Great Britain, Norway and Algeria
will be eager to step into the gap left by Libya consult closely
with Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and other oil-producing countries before
the implement a tion of an oil embargo be made clear to these
governments that the U.S. is acting against Libya because of
Qaddafi's interventionist foreign policies, not because of his
aggressive role within OPEC. Thus, potential support for Qaddafi
will be minimized Th e loss of Libyan oil could easily be offset by
stepping up Purchasers of Libyan In doing so they would be
restricting the scope of It is however, vital that the State
Department should It must 17 It will also be necessary to withdraw
all U.S companies and t heir employees from Libya. At the moment
Washington's policy options are decidedly limited by the presence
of 2,000 U.S citizens on Libyan soil and use them to blackmail the
U.S. The State Department is currently trying to persuade U.S. oil
companies to a b andon their Libyan operations and is issuing
strict advice to all travellers and residents in Libya. They are
being warned of the dangers of the present situation and urged to
cancel all trips to Libya or to return to the U.S., whichever case
applies Qadd afi could easily seize these persons The major oil
companies involved in Libya, with the exception of Exxon, appear
reluctant to follow the Administration's advice.

Some of the companies are currently blackmailing Washington by
keeping their personnel in L ibya and thus'forcing the government
into inaction out of regard for the safety of U.S. citizens. The
Department of Justice should now devote major efforts to exploring
the legal right of the President to order U.S. companies and their
personnel out of Li b ya in such a way that the relevant executive
order will stand up to challenge in the courts has demonstrated
that withdrawal is possible and, evidently economically feasible
Exxon The Agency for International Development and other dispensors
of U.S. econo mic assistance should pay particular attention to the
needs of Libya's potential victims, Egypt, Sudan, and Niger.

These countries must be strengthened economically if they are to
continue to defend themselves from the danger of Libyan subversion
and assault.

Military The Reagan Administration should build up the military
capability of Libya's most vulnerable victims will not be free to
tackle their economic problems until they have the military
capability to stand up to interference from Tripoli. Critics of the
Administration's present aid package to Sudan have attacked its
provisions for military aid, asserting that Sudan's primary
problems are economic and that aid, therefore shmld be primarily
economic the shcrt-term aspects of Sudan's problems bors fa c e an
immediate, direct military threat; unless they have the capability
to repulse that threat, they will never have the opportunity to
address their economic problems irrigation projects will halt
Qaddafi's tanks. Moreover, no major Sudanese economic ren a issance
can be expected quickly, but only such a renaissance will suffice
to provide the country with the economic latitude to resettle its
one million refugees and thus deprive Qaddafi of the tinder with
which to set the Sudanese nation alight the need f o r self-defense
a grim reality, even in the poorest of countries These countries
This approach deliberately ignores Sudan and its neigh No number of
Qaddafi's imperialistic foreign policy has made 18 Within the
military context, U.S. policymakers should co n sider the
possibility of open warfare between Egypt and Libya. Egypt's large
population, its strategic position in the Middle East and its
leadership of the Arab world since the days of Nasser make it
Qaddafi's primary target and thus the danger of war is always
imminent In the event of such an outbreak, the U.S. should be
prepared to supply Cairo with a steady flow of spare parts. Direct
inter vention would be both undesirable and unnecessary. The value
of the Libyan arsenal and the fighting capability of its troops
have been grossly overemphasized. There is every reason-to believe
that Qaddafi's forces would fare badly at the hands of the much
larger and more experienced Egyptian army. Should the Soviet Union
intervene to save Qaddafi from a humiliating d efeat, the Egyptian
forces could withdraw from their forward positions within Libya and
leave the already overextended Soviets with the task of maintaining
their hapless client.

Political Several commentors have suggested that the U.S. should
take direct a ction against Qaddafi himself. Such a course is
grossly ill-advised. The assassination of Qaddafi would probably
provoke a violent and widespread anti-U.S. reaction, even among
those states which steadfastly oppose him. Moreover, there is no
guarantee tha t Qaddafi's successor would be any more amenable
toward the West or moderate in his foreign policies.

The U.S. and its allies could, however, consider turning
Qaddafi's tactics against him. They can promote and assist internal
dissent within Libya while pr otecting Qaddafi's opponents who are
living in exile. Thus, the frustrated elements of.Libyan society,
which will probably expand as the economic situation deteriorates
and conscription continues, will be afforded a channel through
which to express their dissatisfaction.

Washington can also weaken Libya militarily Both U.S. and
Pakistani technicians have helped to fly and to maintain sophisti
cated Soviet aircraft deployed in Chad by Libya have been unable to
utilize these weapons without their assistance.

The Administration and the Congress must now move to deprive
Qaddafi of the military expertise provided by U.S. nationals
Qaddafi would CONCLUSION Qaddafi has transformed Libya into the
primary destabilizing force in North Africa and the Middle East
enti re region will remain in doubt so long as the Colonel and his
revolutionary committees are free to pursue their foreign policies
unhindered by the United States or Western Europe. In particular
Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia can expect to encounter a risin g
tide of Libyan-funded subversive movements The security of this 19
The aggressive trend of Libyan foreign policy need not be allowed
to continue. Libya's economic future looks bleak.

Economic action by the U.S. and its allies at this stage could
do a gre at deal to deprive Qaddafi of the necessary funds for his
foreign adventures. Should the West European powers prove reluc
tant to move against Qaddafi, a unilateral U.S. embargo of Libyan
oil would have a markedly deleterious effect upon Qaddafi's politic
al and economic position.

Washington cannot shirk legislative and economic action against
Libya at this point. Appeals to pragmatism and practical- ity, at
this stage, would simply leave the U.S. open to charges of
hypocrisy, of being unwilling to match its rhetoric with substanti
ve action. Failure to act would also demonstrate to our allies that
the U.S. ultimately is unwilling to protect them from Qaddafi's
menace Ian Butterfield Policy Analyst rl a U 4 a a W CI E Y 0 0 rl
9 I ii r i 8 r L E 2 T C b n C C I I I I I i I I I }{ \f1