Riding Shotgun in the Persian Gulf

Published: March 26, 1987

The Reagan Administration and Kuwait play a clever but misleading game when they propose using American warships to protect oil tankers in the Persian Gulf from attack by Iran.

Iran should worry about American retaliation. But Iranian attack is unlikely; the American military presence is needed to reassure Kuwaitis and others against a possible Iranian victory over Iraq.

The Reagan Administration unwisely shields these larger stakes. Sooner rather than later, President Reagan will have to make his case for American action to shore up the region against Iran and Islamic fundamentalism. There must be better public understanding and support if the White House is to take new short-run risks in the gulf.

In the long run, the Administration has to work harder to reduce America's renewed dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Otherwise, the need to ride shotgun will never go away. * * *

Iran precipitated the latest gulf crisis by deploying missiles, obtained from China. Kuwait asked Moscow and Washington for protection. The Reagan team rightly resists the invitation to the Russians, at least until the two superpowers talk seriously about the Iranian threat.

The Kuwaitis and other gulf states rationalize their request in terms of defending the freedom of the seas. Who could be against that? But Administration officials acknowledge that the Iranian threat is slight, missiles notwithstanding. If anything, it is Iraq that wants to shut down Iranian shipping in the gulf, to strangle Teheran's oil-money line. Iranian incentives are all for keeping the gulf open - and avoiding confrontation with Washington.

Nonetheless, U.S. warships run risks by steaming near the war zone. The U.S. Navy minimizes these, saying that its frigates can protect themselves and others against Iranian missiles with electronic jamming. Maybe so, but such confidence has been shattered before, disastrously, once the guns began firing. And if Iranian missiles should find American targets, there is always the fateful next question: Should the United States strike back at Iran?

These dangers can be managed by careful rules of engagement for the Navy: Don't steam too far north, close to the Iran-Iraq fighting; use full power to defend - with no automatic license to retaliate against Iran.

At the moment, it's necessary to go this far. The gulf states were confounded when they discovered the White House had been secretly tilting toward Iran by providing arms and intelligence. Kuwait is particularly worried because it has been so steadfast against Islamic terrorism. Compounding all these concerns, Iran now readies yet another massive offensive against a weakened Iraq.

Iranian success would play havoc with the region, and that remains the overriding issue. Western policy makers would be totally irresponsible not to plan ahead. One choice is for the West, possibly in consultation with Moscow, to try, with additional diplomatic and military efforts, to end the war. Another is to figure out, if Iraq should fall, where and how to draw the next line of defense.

Still more important, the Administration has to move now to reverse America's growing dependence on oil from the gulf. Otherwise, the risks will become greater with each new crisis. So far, this White House has done nothing of lasting value to foster more independence. There's a larger war going on in the Persian Gulf and if the United States keeps sucking so voraciously on Middle East oil, it will lose.