Monday, June 29, 2015

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Wednesday, June 24, 2015

After sinking to the bottom of
international football, let's continue from there. Which country was
at the very bottom in Europe hardly matters – Malta and Luxembourg
were pretty much the only countries which seemingly did not move in
any direction during the 1970s, Malta perhaps even more stagnated
than Luxembourg. The previous season a complicated championship
formula was used, but it was back to standard championship in
1979-80. The league was going to be reduced to 8 teams the next
season, so 3 teams were relegated and only one promoted.

Zurrieq was the winner of second
division, going up. Locally, good for them, but the newcomers were
not going to make any impact on the top league. Like many Maltese
clubs Zurrieq did not have a stadium of its own and played at the
national stadium in Valletta. Thus, home and away games fixtures were
such only statistically.

Given the reduction of first division,
the fight for survival was to be very important and bitter this
season. In theory. In practice, what happened only justified the
reduction: Zebbug Rangers, Qormi, and St. George's were clearly much
weaker than the other clubs and finished at the bottom: St. George's
last with 5 points, Qormi - 9th with 7, and Zebbug Rangers
- 8th with 8 points. Marsa, the club which ended 7th,
had 13 points – hardly in danger at any time during the
championship. To illustrate the pitiful performance of the relegated
clubs: their combined record would have been good for 6th
place, bellow Hamrun Spartans on worse goal-difference.

At the top of the league the title was
not exactly a big contest. Hibernians, Floriana, and Sliema Wanderers
fought large for silver and bronze. Hibernians lost the race and
finished 4th with 26 points. The other two finished with
28 points each and Sliema Wanderers clinched silver medals on better
goal-difference. Floriana ended with best defensive record in the
league – they allowed only 6 goals.

The favourites were all the usual
suspects and the winner was the most usual of them. Valletta lost
only match this season and won 14 out of 18 total matches. They
scored much more goals than any other club – 59. The second highest
scorers were Sliema Wanderers with 47. At the end Valleta finished 3
points above Sliema Wanderers and Floriana, which seems a small lead,
but this is only because the league was small and therefore the
number of matches was not big enough to provide for building big
lead. It was easy sailing for Valletta and they added one more title.

Nothing new... once again Valletta
triumphed.

If there was a disappointment this
season, it could be Hamrun Spartans.

They finished 5th with 20
points. 6 points behind Hibernians and 6 points ahead of Birkirkara.
But Hamrun Spartans should have been one of the favourites... well,
according to tradition.

The Cup did not produce big surprises
either: the traditionally stronger clubs dominated. Valletta was
unable to reach the final. Hibernians and Sliema Wanderers were the
finalists, both determined to win and compensate for the not very
successful championship.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Saturday, June 13, 2015

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

The new European champions were
different matter – they had established and new stars, very able
team, which was also young and not quite at its peak, and most
importantly West Germany returned to the right track. The changes
after the 1978 fiasco seemingly brought back the Germans to exciting
total football and they had a team playing like the fantastic team of
the first half of the 1970s. And this team was most certainly to stay
on top for many years. There were similarities with the the great
team of the early 70s and tradition was seemingly at work. Of course,
the coach was credited for that.

German tradition was the key to success
– Derwall, after years as an assistant to Schon, replaced him in
1978, just like Schon replaced Sepp Heberger in 1964, after working
as Herberger's assistant for years. Stability was obviously the key –
Derwall was only the 4th manager of the German national
team in history. Helmut Schon was assistant coach for 8 years and
Derwall was his assistant 8 years too. Like Schon, he experienced
success first as an assistant. He knew very well the ins and outs of
working with the national team. Continuation of the line was fruitful
– if Herberger waited almost 20 years for his success, Schon
achieved it in less then 10. Derwall won a title after only 2 years
at the helm. It was the first major tournament West Germany played
under his guidance – another optimistic sign. Herberger made West
Germany world champions, Schon doubled the success if his teacher,
winning the European and the world titles – Derwall, like Schon,
won the European championship first, and since he was expected to
stay as long as those before him, he was expected to outdo them after
such a start. Tradition certainly was bringing results. Tradition is
conservative, however. Derwall was no innovator, he made no radical
change of a team which obviously needed that in 1978 – instead, he
lamely continued the approach of Helmut Schon. The picture above is a
bit misleading: Derwall had the guts to include young players –
Matthaus was only 19 years old – but his exciting new team was also
a result of circumstances. In West Germany Derwall was observed
critically and rightly so: facing the need to start from scratch, he
chose to continue Schon's approach, which obviously reached a dead
end. Nigbur, Fischer, Bonhof, and Cullmann were key players for
Derwall – the survivors of Schon's team. Three 1974 world
champions... but what kind? Only Bonhof was a starter and not right
away back in 1974. Cullmann was the eternal back up player. Nigbur
hardly ever played for the national team – a total of 6 matches
during the 6 years he was included in the national team. Fischer was
not a stable first choice either. Bonhof was the prime star and also
the youngest of the quartet, but he was also part of the team which
lost the 1976 European final and crushed so badly in 1978. There is
little doubt that Derwall insisted on these players – injuries of
Nigbur and Fischer made him look for other options. Bonhof and
Cullmann were in the 1980 squad... Bonhof was out because of late
injury, Cullmann was obviously insufficient, yet, Derwall played him
as much as possible. The new team happened because Derwall did not
have his chosen stars... and he had to give up on Cullmann.
Reluctantly at that. Derwall clearly had no guts to get rid of
Schon's reserves, of second-rate players, stigmatized by staying in
the shadows of great players for many years – he was intending to
continue the line of Schon going down. It is no wonder that the big
discoveries in 1980 were exactly of players replacing the injured
'stars'. Even the only innovation Derwall made was a copy of Schon's
and it was made out of desperation. Doubts about Derwall's qualities
can be summed like this: the new German team looked like a copy of
the great West Germany of early 1970s, the team was finally shaped at
the end of Euro 1980 – a copy of the 1974 World Cup team, and
Derwall made it only because he had no other option. On the positive
side – he had the guts to select young players, his team returned
to the kind of football the Germans abandoned after 1974 – both
successful and exciting to watch, and it was team for the future,
given the age of the players. After all, the new European champions
were the only really balanced team at the finals, with plenty of
strong replacements, and the new stars – most of them defining the
1980s – came from it. Thus, unlike Belgium, the whole German team
needs closer scrutiny.

Tony Schumacher. 26 years old rival of
the other discovery that year – Pfaff. Five years ago he was almost
without future, but perseverance and character elevated him to first
choice at 1. FC Koln. He won the Bundesliga first and eventually was
invited to the national team. Becoming a starter was a bit chancy –
if Nigbur was healthy, Schumacher was to warm the bench – but he
really jumped on his chance and was one of the big discoveries at the
European finals. One big plus was that he was not stigmatized like
the unfortunate keepers, who spent most of their careers in the
shadow of Sepp Maier – Nigbur, Kleff, Kargus, Franke grew old
playing rarely for the national team and always found deficient, for
they were compared to Maier. Schumacher came in view after Mayer
retired and was much younger than the already mentioned, who were
pushing 30. The future was clearly his, he arrived – like Pfaff –
at age, when goalkeepers usually start to mature. He filled the gap
left by Maier for many years to come – it was easy to envision West
Germany with a great goalkeeper for the next 10 years. Problem
solved.

Manfred Kaltz. Already a star,
considered one of the top full backs in the world. At 27, he was at
his peak. A modern full back, reminding a bit of Breitner between
1972 and 1974. Energetic, covering large space, instrumental in
attacks, scoring, and not exactly pinned to the right side of field.
He was part of rapidly rising Hamburger SV, which was very helpful
too, for other HSV players were included in the national team and
teammates knew each other in and out. Versatile defender – he was
used as a stopper by Schon in 1978. Of course, he was a copy of
Breitner – his creativity was limited, he was not great in his
essential job – strikers often outwitted him, and he was
space-limited – unlike Breitner, roving everywhere, Kaltz largely
occupied the right side of the field. He was also more defensive
player – unlike Breitner, who rapidly evolved into playmaker.

Uli Stielike. Derwall moved him back
to be a libero – a great move, even when commanded by necessity.
The skills of Stielike were well known and he was the mover and
shaker of Real Madrid. He was also exactly what the prophets of total
football preached – versatile player, comfortable at any position:
so far, Stielike played at almost every post in attack and midfield.
Moving him back as a libero repeated the great move of Beckenbauer
years before – space was opened for Stielike to conduct the team's
play. Essentially, Derwall did what Schon did years earlier and it
was the right move. Stielike was not as ellegant as Beckenbauer, not
he was so imaginative, but he was reliable and creative. Perhaps a
bit poorer version of Beckenbauer, but only a bit – with Stielike,
German defense remained iron strong, increasing the attacking
strength in the same time. 25 years old – coming to his peak and
having many years ahead of him.

Karl-Heinz Forster. 21 years old,
coming from rising VfB Stuttgart. May be he needed some time to build
chemistry with Stielike to the point Schwarzenbeck had with
Beckenbauer, but Forster seemed better player than Schwarzenbeck
already. He was more versatile, capable of playing not only as a
sweeper and stopper, but as a left full back too. He also went into
attacks more frequently than Schwarzenbeck and, most importantly, he
was not just addition to a great and particular libero, but stand on
his own. With him, the German team had not to worry for central
defender for the next ten years. At least.

Bernard Dietz. The oldest and most
experienced player in the squad. At 32, he was not yet showing
decline. Spirited and modest left full back and captain of the team.
A modest player, never considered a big star and playing for modest
MSV Duisburg for years, Dietz was something between his predecessors
Hottges and Vogts: very stable and spirited full back. He was less
given to attack than Vogts, but more than Hottges. Disciplined
player, willing to follow coach's demands, but more conservative than
both Hottges and Vogts, who on occasion played at different side of
the pitch, and Vogts even in midfield. The age was the only problem –
he was not going to last for long and seemingly there was no other
strong enough left full back in West Germany, but either one of the
Forster brothers or Briegel were capable of playing at the left side
of defense, so the problem was not big.

Hans-Peter Briegel. 24 years old
player of 1. FC Kaiserslautern, listed as defender. He played as
full-back and at the end of the tournament he was voted in the top
eleven as a left full-back, but his proper place was more like
defensive midfielder. Difficult to pin down to particular post
really. Briegel was especially strong even for a German and players
of this kind tend to be brutes on pitch, but he was not. Of course,
he intimidated the opposition, too powerfully build to push down, too
fit to outrun him, too determined to brake him down emotionally, but
he was good player, not just a tower of muscle without skills.
Briegel solved the problem with defensive midfielder – a long
lasting one, which always called for improvisation (Wimmer, Bonhof,
Flohe, Cullmann – none of them played at this position in his club,
or, if he did, eventually moved to another role). Briegel was
particularly important discovery because he would cover either
full-back, if needed – as he did, when Dietz was injured.

Bernd Schuster. Only 20 years old
talent, playing for 1. FC Koln. Some specialists knew him already,
but Ron Greenwood was lone and even eccentric voice when he named him
one of the best before the finals started – Schuster was not a
starter: he seemed to be back-up of Bonhof. That is, essentially
defensive midfielder with play-making abilities, who, like Bonhof,
would conduct the game from deeper back, and may be even restricted
to more traditional role in the presence of Stielike. But the team
had to be reshaped during the finals and Schuster not only became a
starter, but was moved to a central paly-making role. Thus, the big
problem existing since Overath and Netzer retired was finally solved
– West Germany found at last great playmaker. Skillful,
imaginative, with great leadership qualities. With Schuster the
Germans seized to be boring marathon runners – the team suddenly
had a flair. His age brought great confidence – this guy was almost
a teenager yet. His best days were still in the future, he was surely
to be the key player of the team for the next 10 years.

Hansi Muller. 22 years old and already
a star – a young star, but a star. With Forster brothers, part of
the rising VfB Stuttgart. An attacking midfielder with strong
play-making inclination, he took the place of Uli Hoeness from the
great old West Germany. However, Muller was heavily criticized and
never fully accepted by German media: he was too technical for a
German and tended to keep the ball too long. Like Hoeness before,
Muller was a bit moody and unpredictable – often he underperformed
or at least media thought so. The last negative side, also copying
the situation of the early 1970s, was the rivalry with Felix Magath.
Helmut Schon had a problem with Overath and Netzer – there was no
way to play them both. Same was with Muller and Magath – which lead
to tensions immediately: Magath was left on the bench and he
complained to the media. Although Derwall did not give up on Muller,
he was leaning towards plainer, but more reliable Magath – just
like Schon preferred Overath over Netzer. Yet, for the moment the
midfield was completed and given the age of the regulars – it was
fantastic middle line not just for the moment, but for a long, long
time.

Compared to the other lines, attack
was shaky and unfinished – a promising, but momentary solution.
The positive outweighted the negative, though: the line needed
improvement, but it worked and given a little time will improve and
settle.

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge. At 24 already
an European star, one of the very best continental strikers at the
moment. And for the future too. Starting professional football at the
time when great Gerd Muller was still the king, relegated Rummenigge
to the right wing – to a point, it was unfortunate and may be
crippled a bit his development, but on the other hand, this
development solved problems of the national team – back in 1974
Grabowski was placed as right winger as an emergency measure. In 1980
there was no great right winger in West Germany and Rummenigge was
covering the gap. So far, so good – because of the nature of the
center-forwards at the time. The question was how long such
arrangement would work, because a player of Rummenigge's caliber
would hardly keep supportive or secondary role for long. Partly, the
answer to the question depended on the construction of the whole team
and on available strikers. Partly, it depended on personal ego and
willingness to sacrifice stardom for team success. Partly, it
depended on the authority of the coach. In real terms, the question
was simplified to decision to base a team on Hamburger SV or Bayern.
Eventually Rummenigge won – and West Germany lost – but in 1980
things looked fine. And there were options for variety precisely
because Rummenigge was not a typical winger, but a center-forward
capable of playing at the wing too.

Horst Hrubesch. The picture is
symbolic one – Keegan needed a ladder to get above Hrubesch. The
top European player was a pale shadow of himself and England – a
mediocrity at the European finals, when his ugly teammate became a
star and won the title. A Cindarella story really – Hrubesch was
included in the national team lately and reluctantly. He was not
originally a starter. If Fischer was healthy, Hrubesch may not have
been even in the squad. He was 29, he spent years playing second
division football, and although he scored a lot, he was not a star,
but rather one among similar big centers at the time, lacking great
skills and even individuality – a tank. Of course, the problem was
the shadow of Gerd Muller... since nobody could be Gerd Muller, his
replacements were always found insufficient. Dieter Muller was the
best promise, but he faded quickly. A string of heavy 'tanks' were
used – Seel, Fischer... They were good, but on club level – in
the national team they scored little and were blocked quite easily,
for their game was predictable for modern defenders. The search
continued. In itself, Hrubesch was not the solution – he was not
better or different than Fischer. The solution was in the shaping of
the new team – more creative wingers and midfielders. Defenses were
busy preventing attacks form Hansi Muller, Rummenigge, Stielike, and
were not able to read the creative directions of Schuster. Thus,
attention was not focused on Hrubesch all the time, he had more
freedom, and also he was not expected to be the sole finisher of
attacks. The other great thing was that Kaltz – and eventually
Magath – were accustomed to play with Hrubesch in front and to
create opportunities for him. Better utilization. Hrubesch scored
both German goals at the final and instantly became a hero – he
delivered when it was most important. His rapport with the wingers
was good, particularly with Rummenigge – the big forward served as
a cover for sneaking from the back Rummenigge, keeping defenders busy
with himself. At the moment, Hrubesch was the needed center-forward
and since Hamburger SV was reaching its peak, it looked like he was a
solution for the national team too – at least for the near future.
Like the other new stars, he was not stigmatized player – Fischer
was, for he was second or even third fiddle during the days of Gerd
Muller.

Klaus Allofs. The 23-years old left
winger of Fortuna Dusseldorf ended as the top scorer of European
finals, but he was also the most criticized striker of the champions.
Coming from a club which reached its peak at this time, Allofs was
considered very promising, high scoring, somewhat typical winger. To
a point, repeating Erwin Kremers of the 1972 team – limited to the
left wing, he was practically unmovable to another post. Like
Kremers, he was not always up to great performance, so looking for
another option had to continue. But he was young and there were big
hopes that he will mature in not so distant future. Scoring goals was
expected of him and he scored when it mattered – a hat-trick
against Holland. But that was all... leaving mixed feelings. In
favour of him was the realization that modern football provided few
opportunities for strikers – regular scoring was unlikely, but
scoring at particular important match was most important. Allofs
scored all goals in the difficult match with Holland – Hrubesch was
dry until the final, when he scored all German goals. Allofs did not
satisfy everybody, but was expected to develop further and as a whole
– to stay in the national team for years to come, getting better.
His moody play also helped, as strange as it may be – because
Allofs was not entirely reliable yet, other tactical options had to
be tried: using only 2 strikers, for instance. By default, West
Germany had to use different tactical variety.

Exciting European champions – West
Germany did not only come back, but had a team promising great
future. The decline was over, new stars emerged, and Derwall
seemingly had the mind and the skill to shape great team. And it was
not a team limited to handful of players either – Bernd Forster,
Felix Magath, Karl Del'Haye were eager to get a regular place. Lothar
Matthaus, only 19-years old, made his debut. Eike Immel, also
19-years old, was in the team. Not included, but expected to be were
other young talents, like Thomas Allofs. The new West Germany did not
make revolution, but returned to the abandoned track of total
football – and this was very optimistic sign, for already there was
the strong feeling that total football was perverted into physical
battle before its great possibilities were explored. West Germany
killed total football, but now West Germany restored it – there was
light again.

Monday, June 1, 2015

About Me

I am Vesselin Vesselinov, born in Bulgaria and living in Canada. Football is my hobby since childhood – not the most important part of my life, but lifelong addiction nevertheless. Playing, watching, talking and collecting football. Now I am sharing my addiction with you. Hope you enjoy it.