Anthony H. Cordesman; a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 17, 2001, The New York Times SECTION: Section A; Page 17; HEADLINE: No Choice But To Strike //VT2002acsln

America cannot afford to show any weakness in dealing with Mr. Hussein, and it will almost certainly have to follow these strikes with strikes in the future. This is not simply a matter of enforcing the no-fly zones or protecting the United States and British aircraft that enforce them. It is part of a broader strategy of military containment that ensures that Iraq remains militarily weak, does not actively threaten its neighbors and understands it cannot openly manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction.

MILITARY CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT MULTIPLE HARM SCENARIOS

Anthony H. Cordesman; a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 17, 2001, The New York Times SECTION: Section A; Page 17; HEADLINE: No Choice But To Strike //VT2002acsln

There are many reasons why such military containment is necessary. The most important reasons are strategic. The Persian Gulf has two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves and is the key source of oil exports. We cannot be indecisive in dealing with the region's most threatening dictator.

Furthermore, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are just as vulnerable to Iraqi aggression as they were in 1990, and Mr. Hussein's sons are still claiming that Kuwait should be a province of Iraq. If it were not for the American presence in the Gulf, Iraq could invade Kuwait just as quickly as it did a decade earlier.

There are tactical reasons for containment as well. Mr. Hussein is doing his best to convince the Arab world that he can be the military champion of the Palestinian cause, that he is the leader of the one government that openly challenges Israel's closest ally. At the same time, he, his sons and his closest associates continue to try to intimidate friendly regimes like King Abdullah's in Jordan and to heap verbal abuse on the leaders of important moderate states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

WITH NO WEAPONS INSPECTIONS, WE NEED MILITARY CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ

Anthony H. Cordesman; a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 17, 2001, The New York Times SECTION: Section A; Page 17; HEADLINE: No Choice But To Strike //VT2002acsln

More broadly, we have no real hope of conducting serious inspections for weapons of mass destruction. There have been no such inspections in nearly three years, and Iraq has almost certainly created many cell-like operations to develop and make missiles, as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Even a strong inspection program could only partially constrain Iraq's efforts. A strong military shield is the only way to keep Iraq from rebuilding large-scale capabilities to develop such weapons.

CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ IS A FRUSTRATING POLICY BUT IT WILL BE EFFECTIVE

Anthony H. Cordesman; a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 17, 2001, The New York Times SECTION: Section A; Page 17; HEADLINE: No Choice But To Strike //VT2002acsln

Is military containment a frustrating strategy? Of course. So, however, was four decades of containment of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. They are gone, and without a massive war or any invasions. If we are strong and persevere, Saddam Hussein's regime will inevitably face the same fate.