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What to Expect at Copenhagen

Next month, emissaries from a hundred and ninety countries will meet in Copenhagen for the United Nations Climate Change Conference in an attempt to reach an agreement on limiting emissions. After eight years of an American Administration that showed little interest in dealing with climate change, there is more optimism than before, but there has been little progress in the preliminary negotiations. I spoke to Eileen Claussen, the president of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and a former Clinton Administration official, about the diplomacy leading up to the conference and what we can expect to happen in Copenhagen.

What emerged from Obama’s visit to China with respect to a climate deal?

The most important items to emerge from the President’s China trip were first, an agreement to work coöperatively on developing the technologies that will be necessary to move to a low-carbon economy, and second, an agreement to work together to insure that the international negotiation in Copenhagen makes important progress toward a final, legally binding agreement.

How are the international negotiations going?

It is difficult to picture the enormous room in which a hundred and ninety countries sit behind microphones and try to describe their positions on a large number of issues that will affect not only the global environment but also their individual economies. But while this represents a part of the negotiating process, much of the real discussion takes place in smaller rooms, in informal settings, where compromises are made and final agreements are reached. Unfortunately, in the negotiations leading up to the meeting in Copenhagen, little of that actual compromise and negotiation actually took place. And that is why the Copenhagen meeting will not result in a legally binding agreement.

All climate deals are built on the principle that developed countries have more responsibility and ability to curtail growth than developing countries. Can’t a deal fall apart if a big country—like India, China, or the U.S.—decides they just don’t want to go forward?

Yes, the basic principle enshrined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change talks about “common but differentiated responsibilities,” and this principle still applies today. But it is not meant that developing countries cannot take on real commitments that will limit and reduce their emissions. In fact, we cannot really address climate change unless all the major emitting countries take on real, binding commitments—and that means not only developed countries like the United States, but also the major economies in the developing world.

What is the best-case result of the Copenhagen conference? What is the likelihood of a deal coming out of a Copenhagen at all?

I think the likely outcome in Copenhagen is a “political agreement” that contains the following: commitments (but not legally binding ones) from all the developed countries on what targets they are prepared to meet; a series of actions from developing countries that they are prepared to take; and a small amount of “prompt start” financing, particularly for adaptation and forestry and capacity building. Also important would be some agreement on the framework that is needed for a legally binding agreement, which would include the nature and form of those actions and commitments—for example, whether they will be legally binding or not; the institution that would be used for financing actions of developing countries, and how that institution would function; and what process would be used to verify whether a country was meeting its commitments. I do not believe governments in Copenhagen can come to closure on these questions, but some progress is necessary if we are to move expeditiously to a legally binding treaty.

What is the environmental cost of the political constraints that have forced these compromises?

What is most important is that we move quickly. The more time we waste arguing and discussing—and not acting—the worse the problem becomes from an environmental perspective, and the more costly it becomes because of the extent of the damage that will be incurred from climate change.

How do you see the politics of Copenhagen—an international treaty forged in Scandinavia—affecting the climate-change debate in the U.S.? And how will the U.S. Senate find sixty-seven votes to ratify the treaty when a cap-and-trade bill can’t reach the floor?

Well, there is an obvious connection between what is done internationally and what we hope will happen domestically. Certainly, the more positive the outcome from Copenhagen, in other words, the more progress we make, and the easier it will be for the Senate to move with domestic legislation. We cannot negotiate a final agreement until the Senate acts.

If, on the other hand, there is a lot of handwringing and blaming the U.S. for a failure to come to a legally binding treaty in Copenhagen, this will not be helpful domestically. And quite honestly, while we are a part of the problem, after years of no action on this issue, there is plenty of blame to go around. The fact that we have not really seen any negotiating yet on key issues suggests that others are also failing to exert the political will and compromise that will be necessary to reach an agreement as important and complex as this.

Are there any big political battles over global warming in other countries that we should be watching? Or is America unique?

In some ways, I think we are unique because we are not a parliamentary democracy. Our legislative process on big issues is slow and deliberative. And even within political parties, it is very difficult to reach consensus on controversial issues. In the Senate, we clearly need a bipartisan solution—it’s a huge challenge.