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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 001283
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ARP, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018
TAGS: KIRFKISLPINRPRELPTERSA
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CONTROVERSIAL SHI'A SHEIKH NIMR
AL-NIMR (C-CT7-00989)
REF: A. 08 RIYADH 1197
¶B. 08 RIYADH 1070
Classified By: CG JOHN KINCANNON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In an August 13 meeting with PolOff,
controversial Shi'a sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr sought to
distance himself from previously reported pro-Iranian and
anti-American statements, instead adopting a less radical
tone on topics such as the relationship between Iran and the
Saudi Shi'a, and American foreign policy. Arguing that he is
portrayed publicly as much more radical than the true content
of his words and beliefs, the Sheikh also espoused other
conciliatory ideas such as fair political decision-making
over identity-based politics, the positive impact of
elections, and strong "American ideals" such as liberty and
justice. Despite this more moderate tone, Al-Nimr reasserted
his ardent opposition to what he described as the
authoritarianism of the reactionary al-Saud regime, stating
he would always support "the people" in any conflict with the
government. He also continued to argue for the right of the
Saudi Shi'a community to seek external assistance if it were
to become embroiled in a conflict. The Sheikh was also
cognizant of the increased profile that his strong language
has earned him, saying that his fiery words continue to
attract interest from an increasing percentage of the Shi'a
community, particularly young people. END SUMMARY.
---------------------
Background on al-Nimr
---------------------
¶2. (S/NF) On August 13, PolOff met with Shi'a sheikh Nimr
al-Nimr at the Sheikh's Awamiyya home in the Qatif area. The
always controversial sheikh has gained extra attention over
the past months by calling in bolder-than-usual terms for an
end to anti-Shi'a discrimination in Saudi Arabia, and by
seemingly endorsing the Iranian regime, its nuclear
ambitions, and its increasingly active role in the region.
Al-Nimr is typically regarded as a second-tier political
player in the Eastern Province (EP), in large part because he
is not directly affiliated with either the Islahiyyah
movement (often called the Shirazis) or Saudi Hizbollah, the
two largest political blocs in the EP Shi'a community.
Despite this secondary status, al-Nimr is currently gaining
popularity locally, particularly with young people, as his
words appeal to those disaffected by the general economic
malaise experienced by Saudi Arabia's lower classes and a
perceived lack of sufficient SAG reform in relations with the
Shi'a community. Meanwhile, at a national and international
level, with everyone from Salafi sheikhs to regional
intelligence agencies, al-Nimr's words have gained him
increased notoriety due to fears that his words will spark
unrest and perhaps point to an Iranian hand in Saudi Arabia
(Reftel A).
¶3. (S/NF) Al-Nimr, a former follower of the late Ayatollah
Mohammad al-Husseini al-Shirazi, now follows the religious
leadership of Iraqi Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi, the
Karbala-based spiritual leader of the Islamic Action
Organization. In the meeting with PolOff, al-Nimr
complimented both Ayatollahs for being leaders in combining
the power of the mind with the power of the Quran in
determining guidance for public life. Al-Nimr described his
and al-Mudarrasi's attitude towards Islamic governance as
being something between "wilayet al-faqih," in which a
country is led by a single religious leader, and "shura
al-fuqaha," in which a council of religious leaders should
lead the state. Al-Nimr, who conducted religious studies for
approximately ten years in Tehran and "a few" years in Syria,
stated that all governance should be done through
consultation, but the amount of official power vested in the
hands of a single official should be determined based on the
relative quality of the religious leaders and the political
situation at the time.
------------------------
Al-Nimr on his Loyalties
------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) When asked by PolOff as to whether his tough talk
promoted violence or simply warned of it as a possible
repercussion of continued discontent in the Shi'a community,
al-Nimr responded that if a conflict were to occur he would
"side with the people, never with the government." He
RIYADH 00001283 002 OF 004
continued by saying that though he will always choose the
side of the people, this does not necessarily mean that he
will always support all of the people's actions, for example,
violence. Religiously, al-Nimr said that he is first a
Shi'a, then a Muslim, then a member of the Ahl al-Bayt
(literally People of the House; the phrase refers to Muslims,
Christians and Jews), and finally a member of humanity. He
quickly followed by saying that politically, he is on the
side of justice, wherever or with whomever it may preside.
He provided the example of Iraqi politics, saying that he
does not support the aspirations of any Arabs - be they Sunni
or Shi'a - or Turkomen who would aspire to power in northern
Iraq. In al-Nimr's view, as the Kurds are an undoubted
majority in the region, it would be unjust if they did not
exercise a majority of power.
----------------------------------
Al-Nimr on Iran, the United States
----------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Much of the attention recently received by al-Nimr
is due to his comments in sermons and an interview with
IslamOnline website perceived as supporting Iran, including
defending Iran's nuclear aspirations and complimenting the
people and government of Iran on their piety. In a July 26
follow-up letter to IslamOnline, Al-Nimr attempted to
distance himself from Iran, saying that piety is only God
alone, and that all nations act in their own interests. It
was this sentiment that continued in the meeting with PolOff,
as al-Nimr stated that his fundamental view of foreign powers
- including Iran - is that they act out of self-interest, not
out of piety or religious commonality. Al-Nimr said he was
against the idea that Saudi Shi'a should expect Iranian
support based on some idea of sectarian unity that supersedes
national politics.
¶6. (S/NF) In addition to supporting Iran, al-Nimr's recent
sermons have been laced with anti-American rhetoric, for
example that America "wants to humiliate the world." In this
meeting, the sheikh distanced himself from these ideas,
saying that he has great affection for the American people.
Al-Nimr stated that in his view, when compared with the
actions of nations such as Britain, the European colonial
powers, or the Soviet Union, the "imperialism" of the United
States has been considerably more benign, with better
treatment of people and more successful independent states.
Al-Nimr said that this was evident in comparing the fortunes
of West and East Germany, where the American-supported West
was clearly more successful than the Soviet-supported East.
The Sheikh also cited Japan as another case of America
properly compensating and building a nation. The Sheikh
believes that U.S. efforts in the Middle East are also better
intentioned than previous imperial powers in the region, but
that the U.S. has made tremendous mistakes in Iraq.
¶7. (S/NF) Al-Nimr also stated that Shi'a Muslims, even more
than Sunnis, are natural allies for America as Shi'a thought,
as reflected by the Imam Ali, is based on justice and
liberty, ideas central to the United States. Al-Nimr cited
as proof of his logic the fact that Sunni sheikhs regularly
issue fatwas calling for violence and defending murder in the
name of God. Meanwhile, in his view, proper Shi'a religious
leaders would never advocate such tactics, as they directly
contradict the spirit of Shi'ism. In addition to giving his
comparison Shi'a and American ideals, al-Nimr showed
significant historical knowledge of U.S. foreign policy - for
example, speaking positively of the spirit of Middle Eastern
initiatives during the Carter administration - and was
well-informed regarding the state of the U.S. Presidential
campaign.
¶8. (S/NF) Though al-Nimr moved away from Iran and spoke
somewhat positively of America in the meeting with PolOff, he
did not change course regarding his previously stated
conviction that it is the right of the Shi'a people of Saudi
Arabia to avail themselves of help from a foreign power
should they become involved in a conflict. Citing Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia employing the U.S. military to defend themselves
against a fellow Arab force from Iraq, and the people of
Darfur relying on foreign intervention to stop their
countrymen in the Sudan, al-Nimr stated that the Shi'a
community had the right to search for foreign assistance in
the case of conflict against other Saudis. Al-Nimr did not
invoke Iran in detailing where this foreign assistance might
come from, and did not delineate regarding at what point in
RIYADH 00001283 003 OF 004
hostilities foreign intervention would be justified.
------------------
Al-Nimr on the SAG
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) In addition to his unswerving belief in the right
of the Shi'a community to receive foreign assistance, al-Nimr
also unflinchingly continued to denounce the Saudi government
and its actions. One of the al-Nimr's overriding messages in
this meeting was his view of governments as reactionary
institutions. For example, al-Nimr stated that Eastern
European countries gained their independence through
agitation and Soviet failure, not due to any plan by the
Russians to offer greater liberty. This fundamental belief
affects his thinking generally and is at the foundation of
why he advocates tough talk and is not averse to tough
action. The Sheikh believes that the SAG is particularly
reactionary and has been throughout its history. Al-Nimr
stated that whether it is the Holy Mosque takeover, Iranian
Revolution and EP Shi'a uprising of 1979; the realities of
external pressure after September 11, 2001 and internal panic
after the Saudi Arabia attacks of 2003 and 2004; or the
advent of satellite television and the Internet, the Saudi
government has never introduced change but has instead always
been forced to change.
¶10. (S/NF) The examples given by al-Nimr were numerous:
increased laxity in prohibiting the entrance of religious
materials into the Kingdom is only due to current technology
making it impossible to stop access to religious information;
minor freedoms recently gained by the Shi'a of Qatif - for
example, greater ability to celebrate Ashura - are a result
of tensions building due to rising Shi'ism in both Iraq and
Iran; municipal councils are a response to America's talk of
supporting democracy and liberty over stability in the Middle
East. Al-Nimr also cited a very personal story, saying that
when he was detained in 2006 by the Saudi Mabahith, he was
beaten by authorities and treated quite poorly. The people
of Awamiyya, per the Sheikh's account, received no response
to letters and formal pleas to the EP Governor for leniency.
It was only when citizens began to advocate community
demonstrations and a "no fear" attitude toward the SAG that
al-Nimr says the authorities' abuse ended, and he was
eventually released from detention.
¶11. (S/NF) With regards to specific SAG policies, the Sheikh
believes that the Interfaith Dialogue initiative is a sham, a
public relations exercise for audiences external to the
Kingdom. He cited as evidence the crackdown against EP Shi'a
that accompanied the high-level talk of dialogue (Reftel B).
Additionally, he believes that the early June anti-Shi'a
statement issued by 22 Salafi sheikhs was published with the
consent of SAG officials. In the opinion of al-Nimr, many of
the 22 are too close to the SAG for the statement to have
been issued without government knowledge or approval. When
asked by PolOff if he considered some members of the royal
family to be truly committed to greater tolerance, al-Nimr
responded that he does not distinguish between different
members of the al-Saud, but only judges the government by its
actions within the Kingdom, which he feels belie any sign of
greater moderation or openness. He did, however, mention
that there is a small amount of hope that younger
generations, as they continue to study abroad in larger
numbers and are exposed to more tolerant societies, will
bring more tolerant attitudes back to the Kingdom.
¶12. (S/NF) While supportive of the idea of elections as a
positive development in Saudi society, al-Nimr dismissed
municipal councils as non-political, ineffective institutions
with purview over only basic functions, and an inability to
exercise authority over even those issues. He cited the fact
(unconfirmed by post) that Diriyah, the ancestral home of the
al-Saud, receives a larger municipal budget than Qatif
despite Qatif having several times the population of Diriyah,
as proof that municipal governance is simply another area in
which the regime's discriminatory policies manifest
themselves.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (S/NF) Al-Nimr's private remarks were consistent with his
previous public statements in their disregard for the SAG,
RIYADH 00001283 004 OF 004
their support of foreign intervention on behalf of the Saudi
Shi'a, and their inferences that the Sheikh at the very least
will not denounce the idea of violent uprising. On the
sensitive topic of Iran, however, the Sheikh eagerly
attempted to divorce himself from the image of being an
Iranian agent. Likewise, the Sheikh was much more
complimentary of the U.S. - perhaps even somewhat disarming
in his recounting of U.S. foreign policy in World War II, the
Cold War, and the Carter administration - than he has been
previously portrayed. Though it is certainly possible that
al-Nimr changed his tune on these issues for the company of a
U.S. diplomat, the pace, passion and certainty with which he
spoke seemed to reflect true belief, and not cold political
calculation or manipulation. In any case, his ideas seem to
be internally contradictory. While it might be possible at a
theoretical level to distance himself from Iran while also
arguing the right of Saudi Shi'a to seek foreign assistance,
at the de facto level Iran is certainly the only country at
this time that might work with the Saudi Shi'a to undermine
SAG control - a future Shi'a Iraq being the only other actor
of any possibility. It is perhaps this reality that leads
some local analysts to believe that al-Nimr would not
hesitate to join Iranian agents in a possible uprising.
¶14. (S/NF) Also notable for the purpose of predicting
al-Nimr's future behavior was his recognition of his own
growing popularity, an observation supported by many in the
community. Post contacts have described al-Nimr as someone
who in previous years was largely an apolitical religious
figure, and is still a secondary player in local politics.
These contacts point to the death of Ayatollah Shirazi as the
moment when al-Nimr began to take more political stances, his
politicization a product of desire for greater community
influence. Assuming al-Nimr's primary goals are greater
rights for Shi'a and greater personal influence, it would
seem his plan will be to continue forcefully calling for
reform and creating unrest, endearing him to the disaffected,
and fitting with his vision of instability as being the only
catalyst for real change in the Kingdom.
(APPROVED:JKINCANNON)
GFOELLER