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America and Pakistan: Partners with Diverging Interests

Over the last week, widespread suspicion of Pakistan’s
complicity with al Qaeda has shined a harsh light on Washington’s
relationship with Islamabad. The outrage on Capitol Hill is
understandable, but it’s also a bit strange. After all, except for
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other tribally based militant groups,
for years it’s been an open secret that elements within the
Pakistani government do not perceive the original Afghan Taliban,
Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Network, and other specific proxy
groups as enemies, but as assets to Pakistani policy.

Consider comments made by Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head
of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Only two years ago
he defended the Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar, to the German
publication Der Spiegel:

“Shouldn’t they be allowed to think and say what they please?
They believe that jihad is their obligation. Isn’t that freedom of
opinion?”

Of course, Mullah Omar’s “freedom of opinion” exhorts militants
to pour over the border into neighboring Afghanistan and kill
infidel American troops. Pasha’s insistence that such views are
defensible encapsulates America’s enduring security challenge with
Pakistan.

Since 9/11, the Pakistani government has claimed that its
military is too ill-equipped and poorly-trained to effectively
combat its internal guerrilla insurgency. That may be true, but
it’s also clear that the militancy plaguing the region is partly a
byproduct of the Pakistani military’s self-defeating ambition to
extend its geopolitical reach into Afghanistan and throughout the
region. For this reason, until elements within the Pakistani state
make a fundamental shift in their strategic priorities, U.S. and
NATO attempts to stabilize Afghanistan remain futile. Moreover,
despite what U.S. officials would like to believe, no amount of
pressure or persuasion will make Pakistan modify its policies,
especially when it comes to reigning in extremists it’s been
nurturing for more than 30 years.

The core reality of the region is that after 9/11, rather than
restructure, Pakistan rebalanced: President and Army General Pervez
Musharraf and his army corps commanders decided to ally openly with
the United States in the “War on Terror” and preserve
their proxy assets as a hedge against Indian influence. As a
result, Pakistan is feeling the heat on both sides, with American
officials blasting Islamabad for refusing to cooperate fully, while
Islamist extremists from inside Pakistan have turned against the
government for throwing its support behind the United States.

Under such circumstances, the bilateral relationship has been
punctuated by a number of melodramatic sideshows. Remember the
recent diplomatic imbroglio over Raymond Davis, the CIA contractor
detained in January for shooting and killing two Pakistani
citizens? Or when last year Pakistan halted the flow of supply
convoys for the NATO mission in Afghanistan? Or when right after
President Obama took office U.S. officials began going into
convulsions after learning that the Pakistani Taliban was only 60
miles from Islamabad?

Despite all the feel-good talk about partnership and
cooperation, the reality is that America and Pakistan have
competing strategic interests. Clearly, the two governments are
pursuing very different and fundamentally antagonistic definitions
of “joint cooperation.”