Reviewed by Brian
Martin

Military establishments spend a
vast amount of effort preparing to resist or wage aggression. They
have operational plans, for example to launch attacks on enemy troops
or facilities. They make preparations to provide supplies of all
sorts to their forces. They ensure that industry has the capacity to
produce military and related goods. And they invest in powerful
weapons systems to provide a technological edge. All this contributes
to military strategy, commonly called "defence strategy."

But defence can also be based on
nonviolent means. Compared to military preparations and investments,
the amount of effort devoted to nonviolent defence is almost
nonexistent. There have been numerous nonviolent actions, to be sure,
some of them quite spectacular, such as the Czechoslovak resistance
to the 1968 Soviet invasion, the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship
in the Philippines in 1986, the Palestinian intifada from 1987-1993
and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. But
these uses of nonviolence were largely spontaneous. Unlike military
operations, most nonviolent action so far has involved relatively
little planning of operations, logistics, social infrastructure and
technology.

Perhaps this is only to be
expected, given that the idea of nonviolent defence is fairly new.
The first full-fledged expositions date from the late 1950s, and
since then a small number of researchers have dealt with the
topic.[1]
But just as the practice of nonviolence receives little funding or
support compared to the military, there have been few incentives for
research into nonviolence, which has continued at a fairly low
level.

Robert Burrowes' book The
Strategy of Nonviolence Defense: A Gandhian
Approach[2]
is a major contribution to the field. It presents a closely argued
and highly principled perspective. A full appreciation of the book
requires considerable study. Here my aim is to outline some of its
key ideas and comment on its value.

In writing this commentary, I
cannot pretend to be neutral. I have known Robert for quite a few
years and gave him comments on a draft of his PhD thesis on which his
book is based. I admire his principled stands and leadership in
promoting nonviolence in Australia and beyond. On the other hand, we
do not agree on every point.

Robert's book canvasses a wide
range of ideas, beginning with a critique of classical ideas about
strategy and culminating in several chapters laying out the strategy
of nonviolent defence. The central message of the book is
encapsulated in a table on p. 209. It states that the political
purpose of nonviolent defence is "to create the policy, process,
structural, and systemic conditions that will satisfy human needs."
This is the general framework. Within this, there are two strategic
aims, one each for the defence and for the counteroffensive. For the
defence, the strategic aim is "to consolidate the power and will of
the defending population to resist the aggression." This includes
mobilisation of "key social groups" including worker organisations,
women's groups, religious bodies and ethnic communities.

This might sound deceptively easy
but it has significant implications. For example, in choosing whether
to hold mass rallies, the key thing is not how many people will
attend, whether there will be media coverage or whether police and
troops are likely to use violence, but whether the action will
strengthen the power and will of the population. Robert traces the
consequences of his general framework through a range of areas,
including the time frame of the struggle, communication with the
opponent, selection of nonviolent tactics, secrecy, sabotage,
maintaining nonviolent discipline and making defenders less
vulnerable in the face of an extremely ruthless opponent.

Parallel to the strategic aim of
the defence is the strategic aim of the counteroffensive: "to alter the will of the opponent elite to conduct the
aggression, and to undermine their power to do so." This has
three components. First is altering the will of the troops of the
opponent elite. In the case of the Palestinian intifada, this would
mean winning over Israeli troops or at least weakening their
commitment to serve the repression. Throwing rocks at them is less
likely to achieve this than engaging them in dialogue and
demonstrating Palestianian commitment. The second component is
altering "the will of key social groups who support the opponent
elite's act of aggression." For the intifada to be effective, it was
necessary to undermine support within Israel for the Israeli
occupation. The third component is altering the will of allies of the
opponent elite. For the intifada, this means challenging the support
given to Israel by the US government.

Robert's formulation of the
political purpose and strategic aims of nonviolent defence is built
on some important theoretical innovations. The strategic aims deal
with both power and will, of the defending population and the
opponent elite. This is no trivial matter. To begin, only a few
authors have dealt seriously with strategy for nonviolent defence.
Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, in their important book War
Without Weapons, concluded that the strategic aim is maintaining
the unity of the resistance.[3]
Gene Keyes, on the other hand, decided that the strategic aim should
be maintaining the morale of the resistance.[4]
Working out the strategic aim is important since it should be the
basis for designing campaigns, choosing tactics, building alliances
and many other aspects of the defence system.

Robert's formulation has two
components: will and power. This can be most easily understood in
relation to the counteroffensive. One component of this is altering
the commitment of opponent troops to their assigned tasks. If their
commitment or "will" can be altered, then the opponent cannot
succeed, except by bringing in other troops. But even if the troops
remain committed to their tasks, they can be nonviolently coerced.
This is the factor of "power." For example, in the 1986 "people
power" revolution in the Philippines, some soldiers were won over to
the resistance by talking with people opposed to the
dictatorship--undermining their will--whereas others were primarily
influenced by the massive demonstration--undermining their
power.

Another important theoretical
innovation concerns the idea of "human needs." It is built into the
statement of the political purpose of nonviolent defence: "to create
the policy, process, structural, and systemic conditions that will
satisfy human needs." Robert cites a number of theorists who argue
that all humans have certain innate needs, such as for response,
security, recognition and stimulation (to pick a few from one
theorist). These needs may be modified by socialisation but cannot be
eradicated. Denying fundamental human needs leads to social
pathologies, including aggression and repression. The human needs
perspective is a rejection of the idea of innate human evil or
violence, which is used by elites to explain conflict (such as
blaming Hitler for Nazism). Instead of this, human needs theory
concludes that conflicts can be resolved by satisfying the needs of
those involved. In other words, conflict is not inevitable, but is
the outcome of inappropriate social structures that obstruct the
satisfaction of human needs.

Compared to other works dealing
with the subject, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense is
distinctive in its sustained Gandhian approach. The most common
approach in the field relies on a pragmatic conception of
nonviolence, namely that nonviolent methods are more effective than
violent methods. The Gandhian approach has been presented many times,
of course, not least by Gandhi himself, but seldom applied to the
strategic problems of defence. Gandhi's approach included personal
nonviolence as a way of life, constructive work and the use of
nonviolence against direct and structural violence. His approach to
conflict included a belief that means cannot be separated from ends
(good goals do not justify bad methods), a belief in the unity of all
life, and a willingness to suffer for one's beliefs.

Approaches to nonviolence can be
divided along two axes: principled versus pragmatic and revolutionary
versus reformist. Gandhi's nonviolence was principled and
revolutionary. Many other writers on nonviolent defence, such as Gene
Sharp, are better described as pragmatic and reformist. They justify
nonviolence on the basis of its consequences--the pragmatic
approach--and they see nonviolent defence primarily as a way to
defend society as it exists--the reformist approach. Robert strongly
criticises non-Gandhian approaches. He criticises Sharp's approach of
civilian-based defence for being based on a faulty strategic theory
(the indirect approach of Liddell Hart, subject of a critique earlier
in the book), for relying on a conception of society oriented to
elites, and for failing to focus on satisfying human
needs.

Robert's approach is principled
and revolutionary, and perhaps his sort of principled nonviolence is
inevitably revolutionary. Although the title of the book uses the
word "defence," this is not national defence the way most people
think of it. It is more akin to nonviolent revolution.

While distinguishing his position
from non-Gandhian nonviolence theorists, Robert also spends plenty of
time challenging arguments for violence. His most caustic comments
come when addressing the problem of severe repression: "Violence is
grossly dysfunctional. For example, ... it cannot resolve conflict or
satisfy human needs. And whenever it has been used in the service of
major political goals, it has led to suffering and death, often on a
massive scale. Critics of nonviolence often overlook these points--a
reflection, in part, of the pervasiveness of an ideological
perspective shaped by elites who benefit from the use of violence" (p. 239).

So far I've tried to give an idea
of the thrust of the book. It is impossible in a short article to
give an outline of all its arguments. A flavour can be obtained by
looking at the topics covered in the chapters.

* 1. The strategic theory of
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, including its serious
limitations.

* 2. Basil Liddell Hart's views on
strategy and other conceptions of strategy.

* 3. Conceptions of society,
covering a range of theories.

* 4. Human nature and human
needs.

* 5. Conceptions of conflict and
how to resolve them, including John Burton's problem-solving
approach.

* 6. Theories of power, arguing
for a modification of the consent theory of power to include
structural theory.

* 7. Approaches to nonviolence,
especially Gandhi's approach.

* 8. A summary and codification of
the key elements of theory presented in earlier chapters.

* 9. Perspectives on security from
feminism, indigenous peoples, the South and deep ecology.

* 10. A summary of the strategic
theory of nonviolent defence along with a critique of civilian-based
defence.

The origins of the book in a PhD
thesis are apparent in its logical progression and surveys of the
literature in the early chapters. These chapters cover areas that are
intellectually important, such as Clausewitz's conceptions of
strategy, and will be of interest to those who want to savour all the
thinking that lies behind nonviolence defence strategy. The early
chapters serve the purpose of clearing the intellectual ground, by
summarising important areas of thinking and showing their value and,
more commonly, limitations for the purpose of developing a Gandhian
approach to nonviolent defence. These chapters are written quite
clearly. Nevertheless, many readers may want to skip the
preliminaries and go straight to the guts of the book. Chapter 8
gives a convenient summary of previous chapters, and it would be
possible to go on from there. Alternatively, one could start with
chapter 10 or 11 and then, if desired, go back to earlier chapters. I
found the later chapters more engaging partly because they are more
practical and partly because they give more examples from nonviolent
struggles such as Gandhi's campaigns, the intifada, the Chinese
pro-democracy movement, and struggles in South Africa and
Burma.

The Strategy of Nonviolence
Defense is impressive, but it does not answer all questions. For
example, in chapter 7 on the Gandhian conception of nonviolence,
Robert criticises the pragmatic and reformist approaches. His
argument seems to be that the pragmatic approach is less effective
than the Gandhian approach, for example when he says that "recent
psychological studies indicate that Gandhi's conception of
nonviolence is likely, from the opponent's perspective, to generate
the minimum degree of psychological resistance and to increase the
rationality of seeking creative outcomes" (p. 115). The implication
in this section is that principled nonviolence is more effective in
the long term. Robert never clearly spells out criteria for comparing
approaches to nonviolence. Is long-term effectiveness a criterion?
Should principled nonviolence be used even if less effective in the
long term? Or does a pragmatic approach which takes into account
human needs and the long term become equivalent to a principled
approach? Robert mostly gives abstract statements about Gandhi's
approach and thus his discussion is too general to work out clear-cut
answers to such questions.

Along the same lines, Robert makes
a distinction between the Gandhian view of the unity of ends and
means and non-Gandhian view that ends and means are separated. But is
this distinction really so crisp? Surely in most cases the means
influence the ends but do not determine them. What are the conditions
and implications of linkages between means and ends?

As noted before, Robert's
framework is built on human needs theory. This theory is certainly
not accepted by all scholars, especially given the popularity of
poststructuralism with its rejection or neglect of attempts to link
human behaviour to biology. Although Robert has made human needs
theory a central plank of his framework, I suspect that it would be
possible to derive most of his conclusions using different
assumptions about human nature. It would be undesirable to build such
a comprehensive intellectual edifice that could be toppled by some
new scientific findings concerning "human needs."

The human needs perspective begins
to look shaky when it becomes necessary to talk of numerous "distorting" factors that obstruct satisfying the human needs of an
opponent. For example, as Robert notes, members of the Israeli
government may have a distorted view of their own needs due to
propaganda, religion, ideology, role defence and culture, and their
behaviour may be influenced by things such as nonrational emotions
and perceptions that are distorted in various ways (p. 248). If
biological "needs" can be socially "distorted" in so many ways, then
it may be more useful to focus on the social construction of
needs.

If some human needs are mainly or
entirely socially constructed, Robert's strategic theory is still
relevant. As well as attempting to alter the opponent's will by
satisfying needs, another option would be to transform those needs
or, in other words, to socially construct them in a different
fashion. This opens up a further terrain for nonviolent
struggle.

The Strategy of Nonviolence
Defense lays out the elements of a Gandhian approach to strategy.
For those who subscribe to a Gandhian approach and who are concerned
about nonviolent defence, this is the place to develop one's
understanding of strategy. But there is one important thing missing.
The book says little about the practical task of building a movement
to bring about nonviolent defence. It is more in the nature of an
advanced text for leaders in a nonviolent defence system, who are
concerned about planning, education, communication, tactics and the
like. But at the moment there are relatively few groups around the
world even interested in nonviolent defence. How are they to build
widespread support for it? How can they foster commitment to the
nonviolent discipline that is necessary for success? In particular,
how can activists get others to support nonviolent defence and a
Gandhian perspective in particular?

The few pages of the conclusion to
the book give some hints about making the change to nonviolent
defence. Robert says an appeal to elites will not work and that a
suitable approach will include local nonviolent campaigns, building
of nonviolent communities, reflecting on and learning from
experiences, nonviolence education, nonviolence networks and personal
change. But he elaborates only on personal change. There is little
guidance for action at the level of groups.

This is not a criticism of this
book, since it does not pretend to be a manual for building a
nonviolent defence movement. Furthermore, it is not obvious that it
is possible to write such a manual now. Without knowing the social
foundation for a nonviolent defence movement, it is difficult to say
how it should proceed. This would be like writing about how to go
about building a workers' movement or a feminist movement before
these movements got going. It is possible to write about nonviolent
defence strategy because there have been major nonviolent struggles
from which to draw insights. But there have not yet been major
movements, even unsuccessful ones, to implement nonviolent defence.
(Groups promoting nonviolent defence have been active in a number of
countries such as France, Italy and the Netherlands. It is not a
critical reflection on their important efforts to say that so far
they have not become major social movements.)

So here is a substantial book
giving guidance for how to run nonviolent defence against aggression,
sitting on shelves waiting to be read. Two things are needed to bring
it off the shelves and into active use. The first is a major
constituency for nonviolent defence, as just described. The second is
more accessible, popular, easy-to-read, digestible treatments. Robert
writes clearly but nevertheless many nonviolent activists will find
the book heavy-going.

A good way to deal with this
difficulty is for groups to read and discuss the book, relating it to
their own experiences and plans. One section or chapter could be
dealt with at a time, perhaps starting with later chapters. This
approach to the book is quite compatible with its theme. Strategic
insights need to be collectively developed and applied. It is no use
relying on one or two individuals to give directions on a campaign. A
successful nonviolent defence must be built on widespread commitment,
and this should include a practical grasp of strategy and the
principles and reasoning behind it. Groups of activists are in the
best position to "translate" theory into something that has popular
appeal and meaning in people's lives. That is surely part of a
Gandhian approach to nonviolent defence strategy.