Wednesday, February 7, 2018

The US [was] Aiding an al-Qaeda Emirate in Syria

[Editors Note: This report is from August 2017. It is now outdated, especially given the Syrian government's operations inside Idlib. Its main purpose was to highlight how the Western powers have been propping up an al-Qaeda safe-haven in Idlib for years, and how it got to be dominated by al-Qaeda in the first place. Hopefully this can help shed further light on the history behind the situation in Idlib, and give the proper context that can help to contextualize the media propaganda regarding it.

Apologies as well for the lack of reports. New reports will be forthcoming very soon- stay tuned :) ]

For years the Syrian province
of Idlib has been under the de-facto control of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s
official affiliate in Syria which has now rebranded as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS), and allied jihadist groups. Western governments have also been pouring
in humanitarian assistance ostensibly to support the beleaguered civilian
population.

However, these programs are
also bolstering al-Qaeda.

Despite the implications of this, press coverage has been scarce. When it is reported coverge is uncritically supportive.

As Nusra’s control becomes more
overt, donors are rethinking their efforts. Yet these organizations have
been conducting their operations for years while the same fundamental situation
was present: al-Qaeda held de-facto control, and they were helping to prop-up an Islamist emirate
with the aid of Western social and administrative assistance.

Promoting Democracy

A coalition of foreign
donors, NGOs, and humanitarian organizations are being coordinated and funded
outside of the United Nations framework by the United States, and to a smaller
extent its European allies. These have seen a steady stream of foreign support enter
into Idlib for multiple years now.

The extent and breadth of the
aid is quite enormous, ranging from necessary staples such as food and medicine
all the way down through “political stabilization assistance”, which essentially consists of US-funded and
directed governance and municipality operations which aim to set up a functional and alternate state apparatus that is independent from the Syrian government. This covers
everything from distributing subsidized aid, food, and fuel, to the setting up
of schools, clinics, and local administrative councils, the paying of municipal
salaries, etc., all the way down to garbage collection, road repairs, and
infrastructure maintenance. Essentially the social and administrative framework
for a functional 21st century industrial society.

It is important to understand
the implications of this.

During the Arab Spring
protests in Egypt it became clear that the success of the nascent uprising
depended largely on its ability to create independent spaces outside of the
control of the traditional state-system, where new ideals and values could have
room to transform into tangible societal change. If the congregation of protesters
were able to organize and administer their own incipient societies within
effectively self-governing spaces, they would have to be taken seriously by the
authorities and would hold negotiation leverage, having largely extricated
themselves from state-dependence.

The same basic principles
apply to an outside power attempting to undermine and/or overthrow the
government of another state, and such realities are of course understood by the
United States as it sets up independent structures under the influence of its
proxy militias, aid organizations, and municipality councils.

At core, this is as a modern
form of imperialism: the overtaking of another nation’s territories and extricating
them under your control. Instead of using colonial armies and viceroys however it
is done through proxy guerrillas and NGOs.

However, there is a deeper
problem inherent to all of this. Namely that Idlib has been under the military
control of al-Qaeda and other radical terror groups since it was overtaken from
government hands in 2015, and that the United States and its allies are
therefore subsidizing the civil-service apparatus of the al-Qaeda militias that
operate as the de-facto rulers of the province.

Useful Terrorists

The contemporary situation in
Idlib is the product of a joint offensive in 2015 which captured the provincial
capital and solidified the province under opposition control.

The takeover was itself the
product of an amalgamation of the various opposition factions into
tightly-organized military-command structures dominated and led by the hard-line
jihadist extremist groups. This was facilitated by the coordinated efforts of the
various backers of the opposition, the United States, Turkey, and Gulf
monarchies, and exemplifies the level of influence these state-sponsors were able to exert over
their proxies.

However, rebel commanders revealed that it was specifically the influence of the US
military operatives overseeing support to the insurgency that facilitated the
organization of the “moderates” into a military structure commanded by al-Qaeda-affiliates
and their allies. “The US-led operations room[s] in southern Turkey” and
Jordan, the commanders told Charles Lister, were “instrumental in facilitating
their [Islamists’] involvement in the operation.” Far from barring CIA-backed
groups from coordinating with al-Qaeda, as Western officials continually claimed,
the US-led operations rooms “specifically encouraged a closer cooperation with
Islamists commanding frontline operations.” However, this US-directed alliance
between al-Qaeda and the FSA was only really a more overt example of what had been going onfor years.

Commenting on this, leading political scientist Dr. Nafeez Ahmed wrote that “in other words, al-Qaeda’s official arm in Syria,
and another group closely affiliated with al-Qaeda, were among the “moderate”
vetted groups receiving arms and aid from the Gulf states and Turkey, under the
supervision of US military intelligence operatives in the field.”

The US and its allies then “dramatically increased [their] levels of assistance and
provisions of intelligence” to the opposition, including the
introduction of “gamechanging” advanced weaponry such as TOW anti-tank missiles. The British press reported the
results of this “were shocking.” The capital of Idlib fell within days.

It was noted by
knowledgeable observers that “the jihadist contribution was fundamental to
these victories… suicide bombers from JN's [Jabhat al-Nusra’s] fellow al-Qaeda
affiliate Jund al-Aqsa played a major role in opening access to the provincial
capital of Idlib city.”

Within Idlib, the extent of
who was in control from this point onward was never seriously in question: it
has been ruled by al-Qaeda’s Syria affiliate in alliance with Ahrar al-Sham.

Militarily the FSA and other armed
factions acted as mere auxiliaries of their superiors, wherein Nusra allowed vetted militias to appear as though they were
independent so that the influx of
CIA-distributed arms and supplies was maintained. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi,
Research Fellow at the Middle East Forum, says it is
arguable that “insofar as some FSA groups have been allowed to exist in the
northwest, it is only to ensure the continuation of an aid and arms flow from
which Jabhat al-Nusra and its successors have almost certainly taken a slice.” According
to Joshua Landis,
a highly respected academic specializing in Syria, “the radical militias prey
on the weaker ones. They extort arms and money from the CIA-supported
factions.”

This relationship, of course,
was known to Washington, but support was maintained due to the battlefield success
of the al-Qaeda groups. Recently the Trump administration officially ended that support, though analysts report that the “moderates” have been given a six month “grace period” to find other sources of support before the
operations rooms supplying them are completely dismantled.

Nusra and its close
affiliates, militarily dominant over the other factions, began constructing
their vision of a future Idlib.

It is not surprising then that
“the group has used brutal methods similar to those of IS,” the only
distinguishable difference being that Nusra’s are not so overtly advertised.
Meanwhile, non-Sunni’s and religious minorities were either massacred, forced
to convert (and then sometimes still massacred), or were lucky enough to have fled and became refugees.
Jihadi militants patrol the streets, routinely arresting civil-society
activists and others, “many of whom disappear.”

One of the more fortunate of
these activists was able to document a first-hand account of life under Nusra-ruled Idlib, published then by The Nation. “Masked, armed men roam the town. Whole streets are
blocked off to protect the leaders of the Islamist militia that rules here,”
they write.

Idlib city, once “known for
its mosaic of different religions and its tolerance,” now looks very different.
Nusra “created an entire apparatus to impose Sharia law,” and “Sharia courts
remain the only form of justice." The people simply saw no choice but
to accept the rules of al-Qaeda.

“When Nusra took control here
in March 2015, Idlib entered a dark tunnel of deprivation. Public education
deteriorated, the university was closed, and public debate was stifled.” They
note that the situation had improved since then (certainly in part due to the
influx of Western aid), but still the people “feel suffocated by their masks,
their guns, and their arrogant manner.”

On the subject of governance
and civil-society organizations, they are described as essentially a sham,
nobody having any real doubts about who holds power.

“Local government is a facade
for the Islamists. There is a governor, a mayor, and a Shura, or municipal
council, but the supreme body is the Committee of the Fatah Army, which has no
contact with residents. It carries out military planning, staffs the front
lines, and organizes the fighters. It directs a body called “The Executive
Force,” which carries out raids, searches for sleeper cells of the Assad regime
or the Islamic State, and generally functions as the all-powerful intelligence
agency we are familiar with from the Assad regime.”

Proponents of the humanitarian
programs argue that “Islamist
and jihadist armed groups hold power at the local level... Yet ultimate
decision-making power has typically sat with donor organizations outside the
country.” Yet “holding power at the local level” is realistically only a
euphemism for a society where terrorist-factions exercise a monopoly on the use
of force, arbitrate a totalitarian police-state, control vital infrastructure and resources, impose Sharia courts, and hold final decision-making power backed by the barrel of a
gun.

The Respectable al-Qaeda

Within this general
framework, Nusra and its partners were smart enough not to be overly aggressive
in their interference with the humanitarian aid arrangements. According to
Syria analyst Aron Lund, Nusra
has been “willing to rule with a light touch by Syrian standards, leaving local
aid and governance arrangements in place to avoid a clash with Western nations,
humanitarians, and the UN system.”

A key contingent to this was
the participation of Ahrar al-Sham, who functioned as a sort of go-between
separating Western governments and the al-Nusra militants.

This created a situation
whereby the hard-line nature of the rulers in Idlib was sanitized, the
“respectable” image of Ahrar in many ways working to balance out the more
malevolent picture associated with Nusra’s presence. Opposition supporters
pointed to Nusra’s numeric deficiency next to Ahrar to prove its diminutive
influence over Idlib, disregarding how Ahrar had historically functioned as “Jabhat al-Nusra’s main enabler and partner,” and how, despite appearances, Nusra was able to “intervene pretty much anywhere in Idlib province without much
opposition from whatever groups may be officially controlling a given village
or city.”

Al-Tamimi writes that Ahrar’s
main problem “has always been its role as an enabler of jihadists,” saying that the group had worked “to bring large
numbers of foreign jihadists into the country and undermine local councils and
civil society.” Even more strikingly, al-Tamimi says they “played a significant
part in enabling the rise of ISIS in Syria in 2013,” their “moderate” portrayal
of course only exacerbating their effectiveness in these regards.

This is important because
after the takeover of Idlib it was Ahrar that took charge of controlling the only
official border crossing with Turkey, Bab-al-Hawa, through which the
Western-backed humanitarian assistance is channeled. This arrangement helped to
distance Western governments from an appearance of collusion with al-Qaeda’s
official arm in Syria, despite the fact that all of the roads leading from the
crossing were directly controlled by Nusra.

Much like how the FSA
factions maintained a superficial degree of separation from Nusra for the
benefit of Western aid, so too was Ahrar able to portray an aura of “respectability”
which helped mask the reality that they were not really separate from Nusra and
that Western humanitarian assistance ultimately was working toward the benefit
of al-Qaeda. In terse, blunt terms, “Thus
far, JN [Nusra] has tolerated the work of foreign NGOs and the UN's Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs because it needs their social services
to help establish its political power.”

Out of Ideas

Despite their implications
these programs have enjoyed overwhelming support in the media and among intellectuals.
It is generally conceded that they are helpful, moral, and needed, with
reluctant admissions that they may have been of some minor benefit to
extremists, a point which is usually quickly brushed aside.

The prevalent consensus can
be summed up by a recent assessment made by Aron Lund,
who concludes that the program’s results “have been mixed at best, with some
support also benefiting jihadi groups. Nevertheless, political aid from the UK
and other nations has helped pro-Western and democratic strands of the
opposition survive inside otherwise inhospitable Islamist-run regions of
northwestern Syria.”

One wonders what the response
would be if it was proposed that our policy toward ISIS in Raqqa should be to
send in massive amounts of aid and set up civil society and governance
structures that bolster their control, but which also, fortunately, “help
pro-Western and democratic strands survive” within the ISIS-run enclave. Al-Qaeda
in Idlib, it must be remembered, only meaningfully differ from ISIS in the
less-advertised nature of their brutality.

There are alternatives, of course,
which are not considered. The militias and extremist factions are heavily
dependent on, and thus influenceable by, their state-sponsors, which also
happen to be the United States’ main regional allies. The US could use its
superpower status to pressure its allies to stop assisting the armed factions
and compel them to negotiate with the Syrian government and abdicate their
control of the territories. Threatening to discontinue the assistance they rely
upon to administer the province could expedite this. If they refused, intelligence
and coordination could be given for Russian and Syrian military action. It
would not take long to defeat ill-equipped militants after state-sponsorship
has dried up, as was seen with Turkish support in Aleppo, and would certainly be much less brutal and costly
to civilians than America’s siege of Mosul, for instance, which had beenshocking in
comparison to other recent military operations in the region. Priority should be given to non-violence,
the cutting off of funding and assistance channels, though eventually Idlib
would need to be relinquished to Syria.

The seizure of Idlib from the
Syrian state was an illegitimate act of aggression by hostile foreign powers
done through dependent proxies, which utilized the support of internationally-recognized
terrorist groups without whom the efforts would not have been successful.
Returning it to Syrian rule is thus the correct and legitimate option.

Almost forgotten now, under UN Security Council Resolution 2249, the US is obliged to “take all necessary measures… to prevent and
suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by… Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and
all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al
Qaeda.” And as well to “eradicate the safe haven they have established over
significant parts of Syria,” of which Idlib would certainly qualify, at least according
to the leader of the US-led coalition against ISIS, who called Idlib “the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.”

This must only be done,
however, “in compliance with international law,” i.e., not through illegal interference inside Syrian territory without the permission of the Syrian
government or approval of international law. The resolution did not, just to clarify, stipulate
the US should coordinate assistance programs to territories under the control
of al-Qaeda-official.

But the takeover does not
fundamentally transform the situation from what it was before. It is in many
ways only a superficial change. While donors are rightfully worried about Nusra siphoning revenue streams from their aid shipments, allowing Ahrar to do the same for years was equally as objectionable yet elicited no such
response. Nusra very quickly took advantage of the opportunity to reinstitute
some of their more hard-line Islamist decrees, like the banningof tobacco products, and concerns have been raised as they’ve begun to take a more heavy-handed approach toward subordinating civilian councils and controlling
administrative processes. Yet this had been happening under the surface for years. It should have been obvious that Nusra was
just tolerating the West’s social services and that it would move on them once
it felt it had become strong enough, which appears might be happening now. Government officials who are only just now becoming alarmed at this had been enabling all of it
while it had been developing for years.

This exposes the deep
cynicism and hypocrisy of US officials like Michael Ratney, the State
Department’s top official in charge of Syria policy, who described the situation as one fundamentally altered which only now requires
action. Ratney said that “everyone should know that [Nusra leader] Jolani and
his gang are the ones who bear responsibility for the grave consequences that
will befall Idlib,” describing their takeover as “one of the greatest
tragedies” to hit Syria’s north that puts the region “in great danger,” saying the
United States therefore hopes “to find channels that enable us to deliver
humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people without passing through the hands
of the Nusra Front and the crossings that have fallen into its hands.”

But “even before the July
assault,” a recent LA Times article reports, Nusra had already “demanded a portion of the aid entering its
area.” This is not a surprising, given that Nusra controlled the majority of roads and checkpoints throughout the province. The amount of aid
that had to be turned over “depends on the number of checkpoints you have to pass
and what you’re carrying,” an aid worker told the Times. “Normally for food
[Nusra] don’t take so much. They’re merciful. But medicines are highly taxed.” As
well, civil society activists have been warning that Nusra “routinely seizes aid
convoys and disrupts service provisions,” and that it had “tried to kidnap and
kill activists.”

Ahrar, Nusra’s greatest
enablers, also reportedly
were able to siphon off millions of dollars of
revenue from the aid cargos, from “commercial traffic and high-value goods like
construction material,” during their run as enforcers of the crossing. One can only
assume that the cut taken by Nusra was equally as substantial.

This all, however, is really
beside the point. The fact is that even if no revenue was being pocketed in
these illegitimate ways the influx of humanitarian aid would still crucially be
bolstering al-Qaeda and their allies. Its ultimate end-result is the maintenance
of “the largest al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11”, as well as the al-Qaeda members within it.

In a recent piece, Aron Lund
says that it is unlikely “that a Tahrir al-Sham-dominated Idlib will receive
Western-funded stabilisation and governance aid indefinitely. Neither Americans
nor Europeans are interested in bankrolling the civil service of a jihadi
emirate, and that is increasingly what Idlib looks like to them.”

Yet the province has looked
like that for a long time, and Nusra has
been dominating it; the bankrolling of a jihadi emirate is exactly what they
have been doing.

It is only now, after Nusra’s
role has become so overt as to be undeniable, that questions are being raised. What
this shows is not an honest and forthright concern on the part of the US
government about aiding terrorist organizations, or caring whether that is
objectively the truth or not, but instead only concern for the perception of having been seen to have done so.

In truth, the US government had ampleand detailed intelligence regarding the true makeup of the insurgency in Syria
going back multiple years now. They understood who was driving it and what the
implications were. It was known that in order to have any chance of success at
undermining the government in Damascus they were going to have to rely on al-Qaeda and extremist shock-troops to pave the way toward
battlefield success and the seizure of important cities and provinces, like
Idlib. It is no wonder then that the operations rooms led by the US would
instruct their FSA proxies and “encourage further cooperation with Islamists commanding
frontline operations” in order to take Idlib.

The US and its allies gave crucial
intelligence, organizational, and material support to an insurgent opposition
led by al-Qaeda-aligned extremist groups in order to wrest control of Idlib
away from Damascus. The byproduct of such a strategy was always going to be the
empowerment of those extremist groups who would of course come to hold ultimate
military control of the province afterwards, no matterhow
much influence is taken away from them by outside NGOs administering social
goods and services. The empowerment of al-Qaeda groups to the level of military
and security supremacy over an entire Syrian province was a foregone conclusion
given this set up.

Yet after the fact the continued
preservation of these forces through Western-funded social services
subsidization, as opposed to a policy of actual counterterrorism, only goes to
show the level at which the US state is willing to empower the forces of
terrorism in order to achieve imperialistic geopolitical agendas. The level at
which these actions are tolerated and/or given ideological cover by the media
and intellectual classes only exemplifies how far these have devolved into
functional propaganda for state and corporate interests.

The fact that the US has been
helping to maintain the largest contemporary safe haven for al-Qaeda, the
organization claiming responsibility for the 9/11 terror atrocity, should have
been front page news across the country and the topic of an extensive debate.
Instead, experts and important agenda-setting journals sanitize the public from
these unfortunate circumstances, and people are therefore spared from having to
look in the mirror and confront such ugly realities.

---

Steven Chovanec is an
independent journalist and analyst based in Chicago, Illinois. He has a
bachelor’s degree in International Studies and Sociology from Roosevelt
University, and has written for numerous outlets such as The Hill, TeleSur,
Mint Press News, Consortium News, and others. Follow him on Twitter @stevechovanec