WE HAVE SEEN that frontier conditions came to an end for the
Cambro-Norman society which had developed in South Wales.
Opportunities for conquest, and for increased power and
independence, diminished and in time disappeared. This society,
based ultimately upon expansion and conquest, faced a future in
which its primary function would be that of garrison duty. It was
a future in which there was little hope of rewards which would be
commensurate with the heavy task to be performed. By and large,
the society accepted its future and performed its specialized
function until such time as it, and the Welsh society it faced,
began to be absorbed into the main stream of life in Tudor
Britain.

A society, however, is made up of individuals, and, for this
reason, one should not expect any society to react
monolithically. In the Cambro-Norman society of the mid-twelfth
century, there were varied reactions to the relatively ordered
and humdrum way of life that was slowly replacing the turbulent
days of old. The old virtues and talents had no place in this new
order of things. The ambitious barons and restless knights who
would have been, a half-century earlier, in the forefront of
conquest and glory, were now failures, misfits, and
troublemakers. A peaceful and regulated society had no room for
such men. Many, no doubt, accepted their lot and lived out their
days as relatively useless anachronisms; but some refused to
adapt, and cast about for new frontiers. They found one close at
hand.

In effect, the Cambro-Norman invasion of Ireland represents the

131 The Normans in South Wales

last gasp of the Norman frontier in Wales. The closing of this
frontier squeezed out those men who found it impossible to
relinquish the ideals and attitudes which had made the frontier
what it was. They carried their way of life to a new area of
conquest, and, for a time, the Welsh frontier was reborn in the
fens of Ireland. We are fortunate that two relatively full
accounts of this period have survived. One, The Song of Dermot
and the Earl, is a chanson de geste, composed in the
mid-thirteenth century but partially based upon oral tradition
and on an earlier poem of similar character.1 The
other prime source is provided by Giraldus Cambrensis'
Expugnatio Hibernica, probably based, at least in part,
upon personal interviews with some of the principals, to whom
Giraldus was closely related.2 Both accounts are
relatively full, but their accuracy is often doubtful. What is
important is that, because of the sources upon which they
ultimately rest, the Song and the Expugnatio present this
frontier experience somewhat as the participants saw it. Although
the first generation of Cambro-Norman conquerors is silent, the
last generation does speak, and what they have to say is well
worth hearing.

The occasion for the Cambro-Norman invasion of Ireland stemmed
from the conflict between two Irish chieftains, Dermot
MacMurrough and Tiernan O'Rourke. Dermot had been successful in
extending the power of his small tribe to the point where he was
recognized as paramount king of all Leinster. This expansion
had brought him to the borders of Meath, where friction developed
between him and Tiernan, the prince of Breifne. Antagonism
between the two deepened when, in 1152, Dermot took advantage of
Tiernan's temporary absence to abduct his wife. Although the lady
was returned the following year, the event sealed a bitter enmity
between the two chieftains. Tiernan's opportunity for full
revenge came in 1166, when he was able to conclude an alliance
with the king of Connaught, who was, at that time, high king of
Ireland. The two allies attacked Dermot, and, in the face of such
powerful enemies, he was forced to flee Ireland. On August 1,
1166, he sailed from an Irish port and directed his voyage to
Bristol. This rising city had long enjoyed cordial relations with
the Dansk cities of Ireland's eastern shore, and Dermot

1The Song of Dermot and the Earl: an Old French Poem
from the Carew Manuscript No. 598 in the Archiepiscopal Library
at Lambeth Palace, ed. and trans. G. H. Orpen. Also see J. F.
O'Doherty, "Historical Criticism of the Song of Dermot and the
Earl," Irish Historical Studies, I (1938 ), 4

no doubt established contacts with some of the merchants of
BristoL The end of his voyage found him hospitably received by
Robert Fitz- Harding, the reeve of the city and a close friend of
Henry II. After a short stay in the city, Dermot departed for the
continent to seek aid from King Henry. His motives for this
action seem somewhat obscure. A more natural course would appear
to have been for him to have sought support from amongst the
Welsh as so many dethroned Welshmen had done in Ireland. It may
have been that he had learned of Henry's contemplated extension
of English power to Ireland, and had been advised by
Fitz-Harding that the king might not be adverse to espousing his
cause as an excuse for intruding into Irish affairs.3
If this were the case, Dermot was disappointed. The Irish
chieftain visited Henry's court on the continent in the winter of
1166 and made his plea for support. Whatever Henry's
intention had been earlier, his ardor for an invasion of Ireland
had by now cooled. Problems in France, and those arising from his
conflict with Becket, had involved him too deeply. He listened to
Dermot's case and, in exchange for his act of homage, simply
provided him with a letter authorizing him to recruit allies from
among the king's subjects. With this poor prize, Dermot returned
to Fitz-Harding's hospitality in Bristol.

He remained in this city for some time, attempting to arouse
interest in his proposed venture, but apparently with little
success. Finally, however, he established contact with Richard
Fits-Gilbert of Clare, earl of Strigoil, and today better known
as Strongbow. Strongbow was only too ready to listen to Dermot's
offer, since such a desperate plan seemed the only way to repair
the lost fortunes of the Clares. Richard's father, Gilbert, had
been one of the greatest lords of England. He had held large
tracts of ancestral lands in Kent and Sussex, and had greatly
extended his power under Stephen. In 1138, he had been made earl
of Pembroke by Stephen, and in the same year acquired the earldom
of Strigoil through the death of his uncle. Gilbert had broken
with King Stephen in 1147, but his son apparently continued his
allegiance to that monarch and succeeded to his fa-

3 G.H. Orpen, Ireland under the Normans, 1169, I, 79-84. Henry had contemplated an Irish conquest as early as
1155, and Pope Adrian IV had been persuaded to give official
approval to the scheme. A considerable body of literature has
grown up concerning the bull Laudabiliter which purports
to embody this approval. A good resume of this material may be
found in H. W. C. Davis, England under the Normans and
Angevins, 1066-1272, pp. 532-533.

134 The Normans in South Wales

ther's estates upon the latter's death in the succeeding year.
Little is known of Richard's activities between this date and his
conference with Dermot in 1167, but it is clear that in the
intervening twenty years his fortunes had declined
considerably.4 It is difficult to perceive the course
of the decline of the Clare fortunes, but it is probable that a
number of factors contributed. During the period of Welsh
resurgence, the great Clare estates of Wales had slipped from his
hands. Ceredigion was lost as early as 1136, Carmarthen and
Llanstephen fell in 1146, Tenby in Pembrokeshire was taken by
the sons of Gruffydd ap Rhys in 1153, and the years following
1159 saw the steady increase in the power of the Lord Rhys. By
1166, all of Ceredigion, Ystrad Tywy and a large part of Dyfed
lay in his hands, and Clare fortunes in southwest Wales were at
low ebb.

This was not the only source of Richard's troubles, however. He
had been ill advised in his continued support of Stephen and,
after the accession of Henry II, he began to experience the
consequences of his error. It is probable that his title to the
earldom of Pembrokeshire was extinguished soon after the
latter's accession, along with the other earldoms of Stephen's
making.5 More than that, that normally suspicious
monarch was exceptionally watchful and unfriendly toward Richard,
who was forced to act with the greatest circumspection in order
to avoid incurring any more active an indication of royal
disfavor. He was ill suited to be a courtier, and his warlike
proclivities were thwarted by the powerful figures of the Lord
Rhys and the suspicious King Henry. Neither England nor Wales
held any opportunity for him, and he was quite ready to try his
fortunes in another, less restricted, environment.6

Despite the attractiveness of the proposed venture, Richard
hesitated. Fearing that Henry would take advantage of any
unauthorized

4Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, Part V (Expugnatio
Hibernica), p. 247.

5See J. H. Round, "Richard de Clare, or Richard Strong
bow," in The Dictionary of National Biography, X, 390.
Round disagrees with this view, stating "It appears that he was
allowed to retain his title even after the accession of Henry II,
when so many of Stephen's earldoms were abolished." No record
exists of his possession of the title after Henry's accession,
and he certainly did not hold it in 1167. The only mention of
Richard in the intervening years is his witness of a royal
charter of January 1156. He appears on this document simply as
Richard Fitz-Gilbert. Considering the disfavor in which he found
himself, it is unlikely that the loss of his title was delayed
much after Henry's succession.

action to confiscate his few remaining estates, he stipulated
that any arrangements on his part would be conditional upon the
acquisition of proper license from the king.7 With
this stipulation understood, Richard proceeded to drive a hard
bargain with Dermot. The Irish chief was forced to promise
Richard the hand of his daughter in marriage and the eventual
succession of the throne of Leinster.8 In exchange,
Richard gave Dermot his conditional promise to gather his forces
and to come to Leinster the coming spring.

The tentative nature of these arrangements apparently left Dermot
unsatisfied, for he next directed his steps to St. David's. Here
he no doubt hoped to find more immediate support, either from
some of the triumphant followers of the Lord Rhys or from the
hemmed-in marcher barons of Pembrokeshire.9 He was
successful in this endeavor, finding some advantage in a rather
peculiar dilemma which faced one of these barons, Robert
Fitz-Stephen.

Robert was the son of the Norman castellan of Gilgerran and of
the famous Nest, daughter of Rhys ap Tewdwr. He had followed his
father as castellan of Gilgerran until it fell before the attack
of the Lord Rhys, Robert's cousin by virtue of their common
grandfather, Rhys ap Tewdwr. Robert was captured and placed in
Rhys' prison, where he remained for three years. The price of his
release was his promise to aid Rhys in the latter's struggle
against King Henry. This promise placed Robert in an intolerable
position. To honor his agreement would have meant betrayal of his
Norman heritage and betrayal of his King, and would have
ultimately led him into war against the barons of Pembrokeshire,
many of whom were his half-brothers, by virtue of their common
mother, Nest. Not to honor his agreement, on the other hand,
would have meant betrayal of his Welsh heritage and of his
kinsman who championed that heritage, and would have eventually
led him back into a Welsh dungeon. The simple fact of the matter
is that Robert was a half-breed, and had now to face the problem
of divided loyalties which have so often plagued such
men.10

Dermot's arrival offered Robert an escape from his dilemma.
Lord

7The Song of Dermot and the Earl, ll. 353-361.

8The value of this promise is somewhat dubious, since,
in theory at least, Irish monarchies were elective.

9It must he remembered that Strongbow was
well-acquainted with this area and had many supporters there. It
is quite possible that Dermot's actions were done at Richard's
request.

10Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, Part V
(Expugnatio Hibernica), p. 229.

136 The Normans in South Wales

Rhys was not adverse to the suggestion that his cousin be
released from his promise and be allowed to accompany Dermot. In
the first place, Rhys had less need of Robert now, since the
danger which had faced the Welsh in 1166 had disappeared with
Henry's growing involvement in the controversy with Becket.
Secondly, Rhys foresaw that such an expedition would attract the
attention of many of the more adventurous of Robert's Norman
kinsmen, and Pembroke would be weakened by the loss of its best
warriors. Under license from the Lord Rhys a bargain was quickly
struck between Dermot and Robert. Robert was joined by his
half-brother Maurice Fitz-Gerald in his decision to escape the
confining atmosphere in Wales and to seek his fortune in a land
where the strength of the enemy was the only limitation upon
success. Their resolve earned them the promise of the city of
Wexford and the two cantrefs adjoining it.11 Robert
and Maurice began their preparations to embark for Ireland in the
coming spring.

Thus, by the summer of 1167, Dermot had achieved the promise of
substantial aid. Evidently, however, the prospect of waiting a
year for the recovery of his position was too much for the Irish
chieftain. After concluding his agreement with Robert
Fitz-Stephen, he immediately contacted Richard Fitz-Godebert, a
Fleming from near Haverford who apparently commanded a small body
of mercenaries. At any rate, Dermot and Fitz-Godebert and his
small body of troops sailed from St. David's in August, and
landed in Leinster. Dermot and his allies were attacked by a
large army under the leadership of O'Conor of Connaught and
Tiernan O'Rourke. Dermot's force was overwhelmed in the skirmish
that followed, but the victors were generous. Dermot was allowed
to retain the chieftainship of his own small tribe, and retired
to Ferns. The small mercenary band returned to
Wales,12 where they no doubt spread the word of
Dermot's defeat and the terms of the peace he had accepted.

The spring of 1168 came and went, and none of the Cambro-Normans
who had prepared to sail made a move to leave. Dermot remained in
Ferns, licking his wounds and making no effort to re-

11As in his agreement with Strongbow, Dermot granted
what was not his to give. Wexford, like the other Dansk towns,
was independent. Surely Robert and Maurice knew this.

12The Song of Dermot and the Earl, II. 414.
Here it is stated that this force did not remain in Ireland long.
The most reasonable time for their departure was after Dermot's
defeat, since such a mercenary force, however small, would have
been of some value to Dermot in battle.

The Cambro-Norman Reaction 137 assure his foreign allies.
Apparently his grandiose plans had been abandoned. With the
coming of winter, however, his energy and ambition returned.
Dispatching Morice Regan, his personal interpreter to Wales,
Dermot had him circulate an appeal to mercenaries, and to the
poor and land-hungry of that country.

In response to this appeal, Robert Fitz-Stephen began organizing
an expedition which was to embark in the following spring, 1169.
The make-up of this small force deserves considerable attention
in that it illustrates the character of the other Cambro-Norman
contingents which were to follow. Also, Fitz-Stephen's group
represents in miniature the type of military machine which the
marchers had developed to meet the rather stringent requirements
which a century of frontier life had laid upon them.
Fitz-Stephen's force, like the smaller group of Fitz-Godebert
before him, was tripartite in character. According to The Song
of Dermot, the contingent was composed of "Chevalers,
archers, e serianz,"14 Giraldus Cambrensis states
that the group consisted of milites, arcarii or
sagitarii, and loricati.15 The identity
of these men is clear, but some further discussion of the terms
is desirable.

The milites, it must be understood, were not "knights" in
the more restricted sense of the term. Their very number on this
small expedition makes this obvious. Fitz-Stephen numbered thirty
such milites in his contingent, drawn mainly from his
kinsmen and their retainers. These men were not necessarily
members of the nobility, but were rather the fully armored
horsemen who performed the "knight-service" which formed the
basic obligation of feudal land-tenure. One commentator states
that "this class of military men represented what we should now
call the landed gentry of the country; a class

below barons and knights but of sufficient substance to provide
themselves with a war horse and complete armour."16
The milites formed a company of heavy cavalry which
represented the core of Fitz-Stephen's organization. Included
within this group were three of Fitz-Stephen's nephews, all
members of the Geraldine clan: Miles Menevensis, Meiler
Fitz-Henry, and Robert of Barri.17

The milites each possessed two or three retainers, mounted
but more lightly armed, who formed a supporting light cavalry
corps.18 These were the loricati, of whom
Fitz-Stephen was able to field sixty. The nature of their armor
is difficult to establish. One commentator suggests that the
loricati were "half-armoured,"19 but this term
seems scarcely definitive. It must suffice to say that the
loricati represented a light cavalry force, usually about
double the number of the heavy cavalry group with which it
operated.

The remaining group, the sagitarii, constituted perhaps
the most distinctive feature of the marcher contingents.
Certainly the attachment of a body of archers to a basically
cavalry force was no innovation in Norman warfare.20
The innovation lay rather in the character of the force, its
skill, and the close coordination with which it was employed. The
body of sagitarii which accompanied Fitz-Stephen numbered
three hundred, a number in accordance with the normal
Cambro-Norman ratio of ten archers for each miles. The most
surprising thing about Fitz-Stephen's archer force is that they
were Welsh. Giraldus describes the group as "de electa Gualliae
iuventutae."21 This says much for their skill. The bow
had long been the national weapon of the men of South Wales, and
they had developed their equipment and techniques through over a
century of frontier skirmishes and ambushes. The arrows of the
Welsh could penetrate three-inch oak slabs and could inflict
mortal wounds through the

17Miles was the son of David Fitz-Gerald, bishop of
St. David's. Robert of Barri was the brother of Giraldus
Cambrensis. Meiler Fitz-Henry was not, properly speaking, a
member of the Geraldine clan, but was the illegitimate son of
Nesta by Henry I.

18These men were possibly similar to the servientes
francigenae often encountered in Domesday Book.

19Giraldus Cambrensis, The Historical Works of
Giraldus Cambrensis, p. 203.

20This is amply illustrated by the Bayeux Tapestry.
Also see R. Glover, "English Warfare in 1066," The English
Historical Review, LXVII (1952), 1-18.

21Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, Part V (Expugnatio
Hibernica), p. 230.

The Cambro-Norman Reaction 139

armor of the heavily armored cavalryman.22 It is only
natural that the Norman marcher lords adapted this peculiarly
effective weapon to their own purposes. It is most probable that
this process of assimilation began quite early, and that the seal
of Earl Gilbert of Clare (d. 1148), which depicts him holding an
exaggerated arrow, was intended as a tribute to his proficiency
with the national arm of South Wales. Indeed, considering the
invaluable role which this weapon played in the endemic strife of
the Welsh frontier, it is likely that Welsh "friendlies" were
employed at a date much earlier than the redoubtable earl. At any
rate, by 1170, Welsh archers appear to have been thoroughly
integrated into the Cambro-Norman military organization, and
their longbows were recognized as an essential element for
military success.

These archers provided the key to the impressive victories which
the Cambro-Normans achieved in the difficult terrain which was
characteristic of Leinster. The rational use of flexible
contingents of cavalry and archers in combination uniformly
proved too powerful even for Irish levies of overwhelmingly
superior numbers. The Irish were foot soldiers, disdaining
armor, and employing spears, javelins, and the battle-axe which
they had borrowed from the Dansk warriors of the coastal towns.
Only when hard pressed would they employ slingers as missile
troops. Although their impetuous tactics, characteristic and
obligatory for lightly armed troops, served them well in broken
country, they were no match for cavalry in open terrain. Hence,
when possible, the Irish would choose broken and forested terrain
in which to fight their battles. In their chosen terrain,
however, the Irish now had to face the undoubted superiority of
the Welsh archers. Throughout the Cambro-Norman campaigns in Ireland, archers and cavalry were combined, and with devastating results.23

The core of the invading force, however, was still the heavy
cavalry so basic to the typical Norman plan of battle. Here, too,
the Cambro-Normans had developed special characteristics which
better enabled them to wage successfully the type of warfare with
which they were faced. Giraldus contrasted the Anglo-Norman and
Cambro-Norman milites at great length. His analysis was
clouded in some measure by his desire to exalt the role which his
kinsmen had played, and in the future could resume, in the
subjugation of the Irish. In some

measure, too, his comments no doubt reflected the natural
antagonism which the Cambro-Norman "pioneers" must have felt
toward the recently arrived Anglo-Norman royal "regulars." The
essence of Giraldus' remarks is worthy of consideration, however.
He pointed out that the conditions of warfare in France, and in
Wales and Ireland, were vastly different, and that each set of
conditions had developed its own type of warrior.

Warfare in France consisted of massive battles fought in open
country between closely marshalled bodies of heavily armored
horsemen. In such battles, the best warrior was the one who was
the most heavily armored, had the firmest seat, and was the most
skilled in close fighting. The equipment and training of the
Anglo-Norman knights were designed to secure exactly these
qualities. On the marches of Wales, however, warfare consisted of
sudden attacks launched or suffered under a variety of
conditions, interspersed with long periods of uneasy quiet. The
primary virtue of the marcher warrior, therefore, lay in his
flexibility. As conditions warranted, he must needs be a mounted
knight, an archer, or a light infantryman. These stringent
requirements were reflected in his lighter armor and his peculiar
saddle.24

These differences in equipment and tactics were paralleled by an
equally great difference in psychology. Warfare in France was
normally restricted to a definite season; campaigns proceeded
along previously determined lines; there was little element of
surprise; and the troops were usually well supplied. Between
campaigns, there was generally the security and luxury of the
winter months. The Anglo-Norman troops in Ireland preferred to be
stationed near administrative and supply centers, not only where
they could enjoy plenty and hope of advancement, but where there
was some measure of collective security and
camaraderie.25 The marchers, on the other hand, were
well accustomed to the decentralized and desultory nature of
frontier warfare. They were prepared to undergo the privations
and boredom which attended frontier service, because this was
their way of life. In effect, the Cambro-Norman warriors were
willing to face the hard, dull, and brutal facts of frontier
warfare in a way the Anglo-Normans could not. There was little
honor, less glory, and no sportsmanship here; fighting was
neither a profession nor a mystique on

24Ibid., p. 386. Giraldus notes that this enabled him
to mount and dismount unaided and more quickly.

25Ibid.. pp. 394

The Cambro-Norman Reaction 141

the Welsh frontier - it was a necessity made into a way of
life.26 Such was the character of the small force
which Robert Fitz- Stephen landed on the coast of Ireland near
the town of Wexford in May of 1169. The next day the 400
Cambro-Normans were joined by two additional contingents.
One, led by Maurice of Prendergast, consisted of a body of about
150 Flemings from Wales, probably mercenaries with whom Dermot
had reached a special arrangement.27 It was maintained
as a separate corps, and The Song of Dermot and the Earl
generally accords Maurice equal dignity with Fitz-Stephen. To
these forces, were added 500 native Irish who arrived under
Dermot himself. The allied force, numbering less than 1,100 men,
marched immediately upon the town of Wexford.

The Cambro-Norman assault upon Wexford reflected little credit
upon their ability, for they were quickly beaten off. The Dansk
of Wexford, however, were sufficiently impressed to avoid a
second attack, and came to terms with Dermot. The Irish chief
immediately fulfilled his promise to Fitz-Stephen by granting him
the town. At the same time, he granted two nearby cantrefs to
Hervey of Montmorency, a knight who had accompanied Fitz-Stephen.
Montmorency's role in the expedition is difficult to ascertain,
but the size of the grant indicates that Dermot considered him of
some importance. Since he was an uncle of Richard Fits-Gilbert,
and since Giraldus terms him an "explorator," and states that he
acted "ex parte Ricardi comitis,"28 it seems likely
that he was Strongbow's official representative. In any event,
Hervey was, like most of the others, a failure at home quo que
fugitiuus facie fortunae, inermis et inops..."29

With the capture of Wexford, the Cambro-Normans had secured a
port which assured them a safe haven for reinforcements and
supplies, and a possible route of escape if misfortune befell
them. Their numbers were swelled by the Dansk axemen of the town
and by the growing number of Irish who chose to support a
successful cause. Under Dermot's direction, they expanded their
range of operations, especially inland, into the kingdom of
Ossory, ruled by an old foe of

26 Ibid., p. 396.
27This assumes that Maurice's force was similar in make-up to that of Fitz-Stephen. Maurice commanded ten milites. This would mean twenty loricati and one hundred archers.

Dermot. A massive raid was organized which spread wide
destruction in the heart of the little kingdom. As the
Cambro-Normans returned through the heavily forested highlands
lying above the river Barrow, they were set upon by the armies of
MacGillipatrick, king of Ossory. Here the Irish first experienced
the devastating effects which the Cambro-Normans could achieve
through the coordinated use of cavalry and archers. Hard-pressed
by the Irish, Maurice of Prendergast posted his small force of
archers in the cover lying along the pass leading into the
uplands and then ordered a feigned retreat by the cavalry down
into the valley floor.30 The Irish were completely
deceived and pursued in disorder. They found themselves
completely unable to cope with the regrouped cavalry on the
valley floor and equally unable to regain the uplands in the face
of the sharp-eyed archers. Caught between the two forces, the
army of Ossory broke, and the Dansk and Irish axemen finished the
bloody work. That evening, over two hundred heads were piled
before an exultant Dermot.

Flushed with this success, Dermot began directing his army in
similar raids which extended throughout Leinster, apparently with
uniform success.31 Soon, however, the Cambro-Normans
were faced with a more formidable opponent than the local levies
of the small kingdoms of Leinster. The men of Connaught under the
high king, Rori O'Conor, joined with the armies of Tiernan
O'Rourke and Dermot O'Melaghlin, and with the Dansk of Dublin,
and marched into northern Leinster. This was the same combination
of enemies that had toppled Dermot in 1166, and now, as then, his
supporters rapidly began to fall away from him. Numbered among
these deserters was Maurice of Prendergast and his Fleming
contingent. For some time now Dermot had been pursuing a
program based upon raids directed against the primitive kingdoms
of the Irish inland. Such a policy could not have been very
popular with the mercenary troops whom Maurice led. These areas
held little promise of plunder commensurate with the dangers and
difficulties which such operations entailed. To their
dissatisfaction was now added the news of the approach of an
immense host bent upon their destruction. About two hundred men,
or one-third of the Cambro-Norman force, left for Wexford, where
they intended to embark for Wales. Dermot,

30For Maurice's tactical dispositions, see The Song
of Dermot and the Earl, ll. 664-703.

31For details of these raids, see ibid., ll. 864.

The Cambro-Norman Reaction 143

with whom Maurice had parted on bad terms,32 sent word
to Wexford that Maurice was not to be allowed passage. Maurice
quickly reacted by offering to sell his services to
MacGillipatrick, king of Ossory. Having had ample demonstration
of the worth of these Cambro-Norman troops, MacGillipatrick
quickly accepted, and Maurice began the march inland to join his
forces to those of Dermot's enemies. Dermot was forced to deplete
his own forces yet further by dispatching five hundred men to
obstruct Maurice's passage into Ossory, an attempt which
completely failed. The Cambro-Normans under Robert
Fitz-Stephen now found themselves in desperate straits. The
armies of their Irish ally were sadly depleted by defections and
by the ill-fated expedition against Maurice, and their own forces
had been reduced greatly by the withdrawal of the Flemings.
Advancing on them from the north was a vast host led by O'Conor,
and to the west lay the men of Ossory, now strengthened by the
addition of a dangerous Cambro-Norman force under a skilled
leader. Fitz-Stephen and Dermot withdrew to a position of some
natural defensive strength near Ferns, and, under the former's
direction, the Cambro-Normans constructed additional defenses
while they awaited the advent of O'Conor's host.

The events that followed were exhaustively described by Giraldus
Cambrensis.33 His handling of the events, however, is
rather confusing, for his Cambro-Norman bias led him to misjudge
completely the significance of what was occurring. And yet, his
account is not without a peculiar worth. His materials and
prejudices were drawn mainly from the actual participants, no
doubt including his uncle, Robert Fits-Stephen himself. He
received uncritically, and perhaps embellished a little, the
memories which these old warriors proudly treasured of the
critical time of the conquest. What Giraldus wrote in these
passages was not history; it was the earliest stages of
a frontier epic, a legend in the making.

He described a time when the small group of original settlers
waited in their rough fortifications as an entire nation in arms
marched against them. Though they were few, the far-sighted
O'Conor, high king of Ireland, had seen that they were but the
advance guard of the whole Cambro-Norman race. If they
were to be stopped, it must be

then. O'Conor first made an attempt to separate the settlers from
their barbarous but loyal ally. A message sent to Fitz-Stephen
offering rewards and safe-conduct if he were to abandon Dermot,
was curtly refused. A second message was sent to the latter,
offering him the kingdom of Leinster if he were to abandon his
allies, and help exterminate these dangerous foreigners. True to
his faith, Dermot refused, even with defeat and death confronting
him. O'Conor realized that only battle would solve the issue, and
so called his troops together, and called upon them to embark on
a national crusade, saying, in part:

Wherefore, defending our country and liberty, and
acquiring for ourselves eternal renown, let us by a resolute
attack and the extermination of our enemies, though they are but
few in number, strike terror into many, and by their fate forever
deter foreign nations from such nefarious
attempts."34

On the other side, Fits-Stephen also made a speech to his
Cambro-Norman troops. His words, as reported by Giraldus, probe
deeply into the mentality of these early conquerors, the "old
warriors," then in their youth. He made it clear that the
Cambro-Normans considered themselves a special, and superior,
breed of men, when he said:

We derive our descent, originally, in part from the
blood of the Trojans, and partly we are of the French race. From
the one we have our native courage, from the other the use
of armour. Since, then, inheriting such generous blood on both sides,
we are not only brave, but well armed.35

It is clear from these words that the archers and men-at-arms of
this Cambro-Norman expedition had developed a sense of
nationality, an amalgam of Norman and Welsh traditions created in
the peculiar conditions on the frontier in South Wales. But the
frontier was gone, and their talents no longer found any scope
there. These were men for whom conditions in Wales had grown too
restrictive; they were losers at home. Fits-Stephen made this
clear, not only in his own life, but when he stated, "we have
left behind in our native land ample patrimonies which we lost
through domestic frauds and intestine mischief."" But it was not
adversity at home that had caused

34Ibid., p. 240; translation from The Historical
Works of Giraldus Cambrensis, p. 199.

them to leave South Wales. They had come out voluntarily, seeking
a land where, with bravery and determination, a man could carve
out new patrimonies and find new opportunities. "Wherefore, we
are come hither not for the sake of pay or plunder, but induced
by the promise of towns and lands, to be granted to us and our
heirs forever."37 They had found their new land of
scope and opportunity. They were planting a new race in a country
in which the sky was the limit. Their sons might rule the land,
and the prophecies of their own ancestors might be fulfilled."
This was a land of promise, but they were also aware that it was
a land of danger. They might fail in their endeavor, but that
was a matter of little consequence would die with honor in a good
clean fight, and fighting was their business. "One must die,
since this is unavoidable and common to all. And yet, if you
avoid dishonor, either glory will illuminate your life or the
memory of praise will follow your death."39

Despite the speech-making, the fight never occurred. When O'Conor
found himself facing the steadfast Cambro-Normans, he began to
have second thoughts about the advisability of an attack.
Instead, he entered into secret negotiations with Dermot offering
him the possibility of an honorable peace. The latter agreed,
gave his son to O'Conor as a hostage, and recognized O'Conor's
position as high king. In return, O'Conor confirmed him as king
of Leinster, and promised him his daughter in marriage. In
pursuance of his primary objective, O'Conor extracted a secret
promise from him that he would send the Cambro-Normans back to
Wales at the earliest possible opportunity. Having achieved this
compromise, O'Conor and his force withdrew, and the danger
was past Never again would the Cambro-Normans be so weak They had
faced an entire nation in arms bent upon their destruction, and,
by steadfastness and courage, had forced their enemies to falter,
temporize, and lose their opportunity. The moment of crisis had
come and had passed.

Such at least was the legend which Giraldus Cambrensis preserved
for us. These are memories, aided by the passage of two decades,
and embellished by the rhetoric of a masterful romanticist. What
was the historical actuality? Our other Norman source, The
Song of Dermot and the Earl, is of little help, for it
chooses to ignore

the entire series of events. This in itself, however, is
indicative that Giraldus' account may be somewhat distorted.
There can be only two explanations for the Song's omission of
this episode. Either it represents an attempt to suppress an
affair which was a defeat for Dermot, the hero of the account, or
else the entire series of events was of little real significance.
Although the former interpretation appears the more likely,
either is in poor accordance with the heroic account contained in
Giraldus.

The Irish Annals of the Four Masters contains an account
of the encounter near Ferns, but with a far different emphasis.
Here was no nation in arms bent upon the destruction of the hated
foreigners, but only one of a series of expeditions which O'Conor
led into various parts of Ireland in that year. At the end of a
long passage describing the events of the year 1169, the annalist
summarized the Leinster affair as follows:

The King of Ireland... O'Conor... afterwards proceeded
into Leinster, and... [with] Tiernan O'Rourke and Dermot
O'Meaglaughlin, king of Teamhair. . . and the foreigners of Atha
Cliath Dublin, went to meet the men of Munster, Leinster, and
Osraigh; and they set nothing by the Flemings; and... Dermot
MacMurrough. . . gave his son as hostage
to...O'Conor.40

The brevity with which the annalist records the event gives some
indication of the true significance of the expedition into
Leinster and of Dermot's subsequent capitulation. Viewed as part
of the broad sweep of Irish events, the expedition against
Leinster was but a single episode in O'Conor's governmental
policy. In G. H. Orpen's opinion, O'Conor's object, primarily at
least, was not to get rid of the handful of foreigners, in his
eyes almost a negligible quantity, still less was it to expel
Dermot, but to obtain his submission, exact more important
hostages, and regularize his position in Leinster. These objects
he for the moment obtained.41

In some measure, however, the legend contains more truth than the
historical actuality. This was a critical episode, not only for
the

40Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland, by the Four
Masters, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1616..., ed.
and trans. J. O'Donovan, II, 1172. 41Orpen, Ireland
under the Normans, I, 173.

The Cambro-Norman Reaction 147

beleaguered Cambro-Normans, but for the Irish themselves. At this
moment, O'Conor could have expelled or exterminated the handful
of intruders and indefinitely postponed the massive invasions
which were to follow. Against the broad background of Irish
politics, however, it was difficult for the Irish king to gauge
the true significance of the presence of this small group. If he
had been able to do so, he would no doubt have bent every effort
to exterminate them. The Cambro-Normans were saved, but not by
their strength and determination; rather they were protected by
their weakness. Giraldus and the Cambro-Normans erred in
crediting O'Conor with a great deal more insight than
he in fact possessed.

With danger from O'Conor past, at least for the moment,
Fitz-Stephen and Dermot turned to the threat posed by the
alliance between MacGillipatrick and Maurice of Prendergast. By
the fall of the year they were successful in this area: the men
of Ossory had been thoroughly cowed and Prendergast and his
Flemings had returned to Pembrokeshire. Thus, by the close of the
year 1169, Dermot had achieved all those aims which had
originally impelled him to seek foreign aid. He had been
confirmed as king of Leinster, and all major areas of this
kingdom had been pacified. The time had now come when, according
to his agreement with O'Conor, he was to send his Cambro-Norman
allies home. Dermot's ambitions had increased, however, as he
became better aware of the power with which the possession of
these foreign troops had endowed him. He now resolved to increase
the size of his Cambro-Norman contingent as much as possible and,
through them, to seize Connaught and the monarchy of all
Ireland.42

To do this, he soon saw, he must persuade Richard Fitz-Gilbert to
end his procrastination, and to take an active part in the
expedition. According to Giraldus, he sent a letter to Strongbow,
which stated, in part, "if you come in time with a strong force,
the other four parts of the kingdom will be easily united to the
fifth....43 Needless to say, this new proposal was
extremely attractive to the earl. Dermot had promised that he
should be heir to the kingdom of Leinster; he now offered all of
Ireland. The offer also presented the earl some diffi-

42Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera, Part V
(Expugnatio Hibernica), p. 246.

43Ibid., pp. 246-247; translation from The
Historical Works of Giraldus Cambrensis, p.205.

148 The Normans in South Wales

culties, however. The original letter of patent which Henry had
granted Dermot had stipulated:

Wherefore, whosoever within the bounds of our territories
shall be willing to give him [Dermot] aid, as our vassal and
liegeman, in recovering his territories, let him be assured of
our favor on that behalf.44

Dermot's new proposal went far beyond the terms of Henry's
original grant Far from merely recovering his own territories, he
now contemplated the conquest of all Ireland. The prospect was
alluring, but it became doubly necessary for Strongbow to receive
specific permission from his monarch. It also was necessary that
he hide from Henry how favorable his prospects were. He went to
the court, assuming the role of a man driven to desperation, and
petitioned the king either to grant him those lands which were
his by right of inheritance, or to give him permission to depart
the country and seek his fortune in other realms. Apparently
Henry refused to give a direct reply, but Strongbow seized upon a
chance remark the king made and interpreted it as the permission
he had sought." He departed the court and made preparations for
an expedition to Ireland.

About the middle of August in 1170, Strongbow began to move along
the old coast road, heading for Milford and gathering recruits
along the way. In Pembrokeshire the addition of Maurice of
Prendergast's force brought his total strength to about two
hundred milites and a thousand infantry. It must
be noted that the symmetry of the earlier Cambro-Norman
contingents here breaks down. This was a more cosmopolitan group,
numbering among its members groups of javelin men and of English
infantry. Meanwhile, Henry had been reconsidering his rather
hasty words, and, even as this force was prepared to embark, a
message came from the king forbidding the
expedition.46 It was too late for Strongbow to yield,
and, on August 23, 1170, he landed his force near Waterford. On
the 25th, they moved

against the town and, after having been twice repulsed, effected
a breach in the walls. The troops entered, and a general
slaughter took place.

A few days later, Dermot arrived and, under the watchful eyes of
the Cambro-Norman garrison, consummated his alliance with Richard
Fitz-Gilbert by wedding his daughter, Eva, to the Cambro-Norman
leader. This wedding marks the high point of Cambro-Norman hopes
in Ireland. Their recognized leader was now heir to the entire
kingdom of Leinster, and was ready to lead them to the conquest
of the rest of Ireland. Great accomplishments lay behind them,
and vast opportunities lay ahead.

Even at that very time, however, their period of high hopes was
drawing to an end. Their Irish frontier was to be denied to them,
much as had been Wales. King Henry, hearing of the Cambro-Norman
successes, began to fear the effects of an independent or even
semi-independent kingdom in the hands of these turbulent and
untamed warriors. He took immediate steps to halt their progress
and to bring them to heel. An edict was issued ordering the
adventurers to return home upon pain of confiscation, and, at the
same time, Irish ports were closed to all English shipping. The
Cambro-Normans were thus cut off from their sources of supply and
reinforcement. Strongbow took the only course open to him, and
dispatched a lieutenant to the royal court, humbly offering Henry
immediate overlordship of all lands which had been
won.47

On the 18th of October, 1171, King Henry landed at Waterford, and
commenced the task of regulating and ordering the realm which he
had so easily won. The details of this process are irrelevant;
the Cambro-Normans were robbed of their frontier, and the
repressive and restrictive royal authority which they had
sought to escape had followed them across the sea. Courtiers,
sycophants, politicians, and other johnnie-come-latelys followed
in the wake of the king, and it was by these people that Ireland
was carved up and divided. The frontiersmen were forced to step
aside, and see a new order of things instituted; an order in
which they had no part. Giraldus is bitter in his denunciation of
this injustice:

... therefore we treated the old soldiers of the land, through
whose attack we gained entry into this island, as if they were
suspect, as if they were

47 Ibid., p. 259.

150 The Normans in South Wales

repudiated. Taking counsel only with newcomers, having faith
only in newcomers, we considered only newcomers worthy of
honor.48

There was no place further for the old warriors to go, and so they settled down to the thankless task of garrison duty along a frontier which no longer meant opportunity, but toil. Their frontier had come to an end. As these men passed
away, so, too, did the last generation of the Cambro-Norman conquerors.