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Tuesday, April 15, 2014

UN Secretary General's updated report on Western Sahara

Report
of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

Introduction

1.
The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2099 (2013), by which the
Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2014 and
requested the Secretary-General to provide a report to it on the
situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate
period. It covers developments since my report dated 8 April 2013
(S/2013/220) and describes the situation
on the ground, the status and progress of the negotiations and the
existing challenges to the Mission’s operations, as requested by
the Council in its resolution 2099 (2013).

Recent
developments

2.
The situation in Western Sahara, as it presents itself to MINURSO, is
generally calm. The ceasefire continues to hold and the people can
live without fear of a resumption of armed conflict in the medium
term.

3.
That part of Western Sahara under control of Morocco, west of the
berm marking the ceasefire line, continued to witness considerable
Moroccan investment in infrastructure and in the social and cultural
sphere. Public life proceeded peacefully, and holidays brought large
numbers of people into the streets, generally without incident. This
was at least in part due to the extensive presence of security
forces.

4.
An increased number of delegations from foreign legislatures and
diplomatic missions, as well as governmental and non-governmental
institutions and journalists, visited the western part of the
Territory. Moroccan authorities showed increased openness to and
engagement with such visits, although on occasion visitors deemed
hostile to Moroccan interests were denied access to or expelled from
the Territory.

5.
Some underlying discontent, however, remained perceptible among the
Saharan population, expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations in
Laayoune and other towns in the western part of the Territory
throughout the reporting period. These were usually small in scale,
but at times the participation of up to 300 demonstrators was
reported. These demonstrations aimed at drawing attention to human
rights concerns, socioeconomic issues and political demands,
including the right to self-determination. They were swiftly
dispersed by Moroccan security forces. On most such occasions, there
were credible reports of heavy-handedness on the part of security
forces, as well as violence, such as stone-throwing, on the part of
demonstrators. At times, the regional offices of the Moroccan
National Human Rights Council (Conseil national des droits de
l’homme) in Laayoune and Dakhla deployed observers and tried to
defuse tensions and prevent clashes.

6.
Of particular note was a demonstration that took place in Laayoune on
5 May 2013, following several days of smaller demonstrations in
Laayoune and other towns in the western part of the Territory.
Protesters expressed dissatisfaction that Security Council resolution
2099 (2013) did not include provisions
to include human rights monitoring in the mandate of MINURSO.
Although MINURSO was unable to verify the precise scale of this
protest, the authorities estimated the number of participants at
approximately 2,000, while the organizers claimed up to 10,000. As
such, it was the largest protest in the Territory since the Gdim Izik
events of November 2010 (see S/2011/249,
para. 3). Initially, both sides exercised restraint and the
demonstration proceeded peacefully, but in the end clashes erupted
between protesters and Moroccan security forces, causing injuries to
an estimated 150 people, on both sides, and a number of arrests.

7.
In October 2013, the President of the Moroccan Economic, Social and
Environmental Council presented King Mohammed VI with the Council’s
final report on a new development model for the so-called “southern
provinces”, which include Western Sahara but also extend to some
areas north of the Territory. The report is part of a broader
regionalization process launched by King Mohammed VI and followed a
critical assessment published in December 2012 (see S/2013/220,
para. 15). The underlying discontent cited earlier was confirmed in
the assessment of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council,
which highlighted feelings of frustration, impatience and injustice,
attributed among other reasons to a lack of clarity in social welfare
policies. The report advocated freeing development policy from the
constraints of security imperatives and concluded that the
development model applied in the Territory in the past had reached
its limit. The new model proposed was centred instead on the
imperatives of sustainability, participatory democracy and social
cohesion, as well as responsible governance, including respect for
human rights. Meaningful implementation of the new development model
proposed by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council will
depend on changes in the electoral framework before the 2015 local
elections.

8.
In the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, to the extent that
MINURSO and the United Nations agencies on the ground could observe,
people were able to conduct their lives in a peaceful and generally
calm atmosphere. Major public events, which at times attracted
significant numbers of foreign visitors, were held without incident.
The socioeconomic status quo, however, began to be brought into
question, including by the authorities of the Frente Popular para la
Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente
Polisario). In successive meetings with United Nations personnel and
Frente Polisario officials, it was suggested that addressing the
needs of a situation that can no longer be characterized as a short-
term emergency requires policies favouring sustainability and
increased self- reliance for the population living in the camps, even
as the search for a solution to the conflict continues.

9.
Some degree of dissatisfaction among the population in the refugee
camps was perceptible, in particular among the youth. There is
growing frustration at the lack of progress in the political field
and at the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the camps. Several
factors have contributed to the worsening conditions. External
humanitarian assistance has decreased, owing to constraints faced by
donors. The ability of Saharans to find employment in Europe and send
remittances to the camps has suffered with the economic downturn. An
additional factor has been the economic impact of the increased
security measures recently instituted along the border between
Algeria and Mauritania. A segment of the camps’ population that
depends on income from cross-border trade perceived these measures as
a limitation of freedom of movement, although the Algerian
authorities and Frente Polisario characterized them as a simple
regulation, not limitation, of movement.

10.
Small-scale demonstrations in the camps were occasionally reported,
including by Frente Polisario officials. One such demonstration was
conducted in front of a compound of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Rabouni near Frente
Polisario headquarters. Approximately 10 to 15 protesters established
a small encampment, calling for human rights in the Territory and the
refugee camps and for freedom of movement. The protest was launched
after a January 2014 incident in which two Saharans were shot dead
during an anti-smuggling operation conducted by Algerian security
forces near a border crossing between Algeria and Mauritania. The
Head of the Algeria country office of UNHCR later met with the
protesters and persuaded them to stop a hunger strike that they had
initiated.

11.
Moroccan and international investments in the part of the Territory
under Moroccan control, as well as in the territorial waters adjacent
to Western Sahara, were the subject of contention between Morocco and
Frente Polisario, given the longstanding status of Western Sahara as
a non-self-governing territory. A new protocol of the Fisheries
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of
Morocco was signed in the final quarter of 2013 and came into effect
in February 2014, following ratification by Morocco. The
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario wrote to me repeatedly to
condemn Morocco’s exploitation of the Territory’s resources and
publicly announced his intention to consider a possible judicial
appeal against the agreement. The agreement was also the subject of
some of the demonstrations cited earlier.

12.
Frente Polisario also sent me letters indicating its concern that
Morocco has renewed contracts with foreign oil companies that have
announced their intention to accelerate plans for further seismic
surveys and to drill exploration and appraisal wells in the
territorial waters and seabed areas of Western Sahara. Such contracts
were addressed by the Legal Counsel, at the request of the Security
Council, in a legal opinion dated 29 January 2002. The opinion states
that “while the specific contracts which are the subject of the
Security Council’s request are not in themselves illegal, if
further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in
disregard of the interest and wishes of the people of Western Sahara,
they would be in violation of the principles of international law
applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing
Territories” (S/2002/161, para. 25).

III.
Activities of my Personal Envoy

13.
Yet another approach in the efforts of the United Nations to
facilitate negotiations between the parties to achieve “a just,
lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will
provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”
(see Security Council resolution 2099 (2013),
para. 7) was initiated during the current reporting period. Given
that 13 rounds of face-to-face talks on the basis of the parties’
two proposals of April 2007 have produced no result, my Personal
Envoy for Western Sahara decided to engage in a period of bilateral
consultations with the parties and neighbouring States to gauge
whether the parties are prepared to be flexible in developing the
elements of a compromise solution and how the neighbouring States can
be of assistance.

14.
This new approach was launched during my Personal Envoy’s
March-April 2013 visit to the region. By the end of the reporting
period, he had undertaken three rounds of consultations with the
parties and neighbouring States in the framework of the new approach
and had begun a series of renewed visits to the capitals of the
members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara to confirm their
support. In all these activities, and particularly in his periodic
interaction with Saharans themselves, my Personal Envoy benefited
from the reporting, insights and logistical assistance of my Special
Representative in Western Sahara and head of MINURSO and the entire
staff of MINURSO.

A.
2013 consultations in the region

15.
From 20 March to 12 April 2013, my Personal Envoy undertook a first
set of consultations in the region to obtain each party’s agreement
in principle on holding confidential bilateral discussions with him
and engaging in shuttle diplomacy as warranted. During these
consultations, he urged the parties to enter the forthcoming
discussions with as much flexibility, creativity and imagination as
possible and to move beyond their existing proposals towards a
compromise or intermediate solution. At the same time, he asked the
neighbouring States to seek ways to do more in support of his
efforts.

16.
Building on his earlier discussions with the members of the Group of
Friends and on a statement they had issued calling on the parties and
neighbouring States to intensify their support for his efforts and
show more flexibility, my Personal Envoy was able at each stop to
convey the unanimous concern of the Group’s members over the risk
of increased instability and insecurity throughout the region owing
to the ongoing conflict in Mali, as well as their strong desire that
the parties enter into genuine negotiations and that the neighbouring
countries intensify their assistance.

17.
In discussing substance with the Personal Envoy, the parties and
neighbouring States nonetheless kept to well-known positions, as
expressed at the highest level in each case. King Mohammed VI argued
for Morocco’s autonomy proposal and a confirmatory referendum. The
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz, argued for
a referendum with multiple options, including independence. The
President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, stressed Algeria’s
commitment to the principle of self-determination as expressed in a
referendum. The President of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz,
maintained Mauritania’s long-held posture of “positive
neutrality”. With regard to the new approach of bilateral
consultations and possible shuttle diplomacy to find a compromise,
Morocco responded favourably. Frente Polisario, while initially
expressing fear that the idea of compromise played in favour of
Morocco’s autonomy proposal, agreed in the end to engage on the
basis of the new approach. The neighbouring States expressed general
support, with Algeria again making it clear that it is not a party to
the conflict.

18.
During my Personal Envoy’s second visit to Western Sahara, he met
with advocates of autonomy, independence and human rights, as well as
local officials, in both Laayoune and Dakhla. My Special
Representative accompanied him for the meetings on the western side
of the Territory, which, in Laayoune, were held in MINURSO
headquarters. Saharans of all political persuasions told him that
they feel excluded from the negotiations meant to determine their
future. Among both supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal
of Morocco, a lack of trust in its implementation was evident, the
overriding concern being the need for strong guarantees to ensure
that Saharans would obtain and retain a predominant role in the
governance of the Territory. Many also felt that human rights
concerns had to be addressed immediately if the autonomy proposal was
to be credible.

19.
Following a series of bilateral consultations on the margins of the
General Assembly, my Personal Envoy returned to the region from 12 to
25 October 2013 to make the acquaintance of new interlocutors in
Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania and to confirm their readiness to
proceed with the new approach outlined during his previous
consultations. He asked the parties to name small working groups to
engage with him in this new phase and made it clear to both parties
and neighbouring States that future discussions would have to address
both of the crucial aspects of the Security Council’s repeated
guidance: first, the substance of a mutually acceptable political
solution and second, the means by which the people of Western Sahara
would exercise self-determination.

20.
In Morocco, my Personal Envoy met with the new Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Salaheddine Mezouar, the new Minister-Delegate for Foreign
Affairs, Mbarka Bouaida, the Prime Minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, the
heads of both houses of Parliament and the Board of the Economic,
Social and Environmental Council. His interlocutors confirmed their
willingness to engage on the basis of the new approach, but voiced
unease about conducting discussions outside the framework of their
autonomy proposal, whose “pre-eminence” they insisted that the
Security Council has recognized. They also expressed concern about
the sincerity of Frente Polisario and Algeria, stating their belief
that the latter should play a more direct role in the search for a
solution. My Personal Envoy emphasized that flexibility is needed
from all parties if progress is to be made, since the negotiating
process is being conducted under Chapter VI of the Charter of the
United Nations and each party is thus free to accept or reject the
proposals of the other. With regard to the role of Algeria, he
indicated that, for the United Nations, the formal parties are
Morocco and Frente Polisario, but that Algeria had signalled a
readiness to be helpful provided that the principle of
self-determination is respected.

21.
In the refugee camps near Tindouf, my Personal Envoy met with the
Secretary- General of Frente Polisario, Mohammed Abdelaziz, the
Coordinator of Frente Polisario with MINURSO, M’hamed Khaddad, the
head of the negotiating delegation of Frente Polisario, Khatri Adduh,
and other officials. His interlocutors reiterated their willingness
to engage on the basis of the new approach. At the same time, they
insisted that any negotiated solution must respect the inalienable
right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination through a
three-option referendum. My Personal Envoy replied that, while the
Security Council has identified self-determination as one of the two
core issues to be addressed, it has not specified the form that this
might take. Frente Polisario officials also noted that, regardless of
the final status of Western Sahara, solid international guarantees
for the terms of any agreement would be critical. The
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario and several others underlined
the continued interest of the organization in human rights in the
Territory and in the refugee camps and reiterated their hope that the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights would visit. More
broadly, they welcomed the increased visits of non-governmental
organizations, parliamentary delegations and journalists to Western
Sahara and the camps. In this regard, they expressed particular
interest in a visit by the Secretary-General.

22.
During his third visit to Western Sahara, my Personal Envoy, again
accompanied by my Special Representative, met once more with a broad
range of Saharans, this time in Laayoune and Smara, as well as with
local officials and with the representatives of the regional offices
of the National Human Rights Council. As had been the case following
earlier visits, he reported that it was impossible to determine the
relative strength of the pro-autonomy and pro-independence
tendencies. However, Saharans of all trends expressed renewed
frustration over what they see as the exclusion of indigenous
Saharans, whether in the Territory or in the refugee camps, from the
negotiating process, or their inadequate representation therein. Some
went so far as to express the view that neither the Government of
Morocco nor Frente Polisario truly represents their interests. Major
demands concerned not only a greater role in the negotiations, but
also the reunification of fragmented families, the preservation of
the cultural identity of the indigenous population, greater attention
to the legal aspects of resource exploitation, exploration of ways to
channel international assistance to Saharans living in the Territory
and more seminars sponsored by UNHCR. Pro-independence Saharans
called again for the empowerment of civil society by, among other
things, allowing associations that are critical of autonomy and that
champion human rights to register and function legally in the
Territory.

23.
In Mauritania, my Personal Envoy was received by the President, Mr.
Abdelaziz, who reaffirmed his country’s “positive neutrality”
in the conflict over Western Sahara, as well as its readiness to host
seminars sponsored by UNHCR in Mauritania. While in Nouakchott, my
Personal Envoy also met with several former Frente Polisario members,
who were critical of the organization’s current direction.

24.
In Algeria, my Personal Envoy held discussions with the new Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, the new Minister-Delegate for
African and Maghreb Affairs, Madjid Bouguerra, the then Prime
Minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, and diplomatic representatives of the
donor community. In his meetings with his Algerian interlocutors, he
stressed the need for Algeria’s help in pushing the parties towards
a solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In reply, they expressed a
willingness to work closely with him, as developments warranted. At
the same time, they underscored once again that Algeria will never
become a party to the negotiations and that the conflict should be
linked neither to the state of relations between Algeria and Morocco
nor to the advancement of regional integration.

25.
During the period from November 2013 to March 2014, my Personal Envoy
initiated a new series of consultations with members of the Group of
Friends, visiting successively Washington, D.C., Paris and Madrid. In
these consultations, he sought the renewed support of interlocutors
for his new approach and for his emphasis on the need for the parties
to address both the substance of a mutually acceptable political
solution and the means of exercising self-determination. He also
requested that the members of the Group join him in impressing upon
the parties the need for flexibility in the search for a compromise.
In Madrid, he also expressed his appreciation for Spain’s
continuing facilitation of his mission through its provision of a
Spanish Air Force aircraft for his travel within the North African
region.

26.
Interlocutors in all three capitals expressed their support for my
Personal Envoy’s new approach and their understanding of the need
to address both the substance of a solution and the means of
achieving self-determination. Similar visits to London, Moscow and
other capitals will be arranged on a mutually agreed schedule.

B.
2014 consultations in the region

27.
From 18 to 30 January 2014, my Personal Envoy visited the region to
take the first practical steps in the new approach by presenting a
number of questions to the parties to clarify the issues, their
positions and their readiness to be flexible. To preserve the
confidentiality of the discussions, and as agreed with the parties
and neighbouring States, he made no statements to the press.

28.
In Rabat and in Tindouf, my Personal Envoy met with the parties’
newly formed working groups to present questions tailored to each
party, on a confidential basis. These were deliberately challenging,
designed to push the parties outside their comfort zone, introduce
them to conversations different from those of the past and encourage
them to demonstrate flexibility as they begin to consider
alternatives to their initial positions and to search for elements of
compromise. In Algiers and in Nouakchott, the emphasis was on
encouraging the Governments of Algeria and Mauritania to find new
ways to assist in the search for a solution.

29.
In every encounter, my Personal Envoy made it clear that the United
Nations had, for some 30 years, used all possible means to help the
parties reach a settlement, including the negotiation of plans, the
organization of face-to-face meetings and, now, bilateral
consultations with the possibility of shuttle diplomacy. He
emphasized that options were running out for the negotiating process
and that progress needed to be made in the course of 2014, since
delays were to no one’s advantage. In this regard, his contacts
with the members of the Group of Friends revealed a growing
impatience and mounting pressure to deliver tangible results.

30.
My Personal Envoy returned to the region from 27 February to 7 March
2014 to meet with the working groups formed by Morocco and Frente
Polisario and to receive their responses to the questions put to them
during the consultations held in January 2014. He also pursued his
discussions in Algeria and Mauritania on how best they could
contribute to the search for a settlement.

31.
In agreeing to the new approach presented during previous
consultations, the parties had also agreed to a code of conduct that
imposes the rule of confidentiality on their discussions with my
Personal Envoy, except where they explicitly agree that something can
be shared more widely. This being the case, my Personal Envoy again
refrained from any statements to the press. At this early stage, he
can report only that the responses received in the first exercise
with the parties remain within the parameters of their respective
formal proposals, despite the exhortations from many quarters that
they go beyond their proposals and demonstrate flexibility in
identifying elements of compromise. There was, however, a measure of
hope that the parties may be able to take a more flexible approach in
future discussions.

C.
Next steps

32.
My Personal Envoy and his team will review the responses that the
parties provided in the most recent consultations. The briefing to
the Security Council, to be held in October, will provide an
opportunity to convey a first assessment on whether or not this new
approach is proving fruitful. To allow the parties ample
opportunities to engage, my Personal Envoy plans to hold bilateral
discussions with them and with the neighbouring States, approximately
once a month, in the intervening period. A face-to-face meeting of
the parties and the neighbouring States will be convened only if
enough progress emerges from the bilateral consultations to warrant
such a meeting.

IV.
Activities of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara

A.
Operational activities

33.
As of 6 March 2014, the military component of MINURSO stood at 225
personnel, 13 of whom are female, against the authorized strength of
231. The military component remains deployed at nine team sites and
at liaison offices in Tindouf and Dakhla. From 1 April 2013 to 31
March 2014, MINURSO conducted 9,327 ground patrols and 544 aerial
patrols, to visit and monitor units of the Royal Moroccan Army and
the military forces of Frente Polisario for adherence to the military
agreements. In the course of the patrols, MINURSO military observers
regularly monitored 570 units, 29 training areas and 316 observation
posts, as well as 355 notified operational activities by the Royal
Moroccan Army on the west side of the berm. East of the berm, the
military observers regularly monitored 93 units, eight training areas
and 38 observation posts, as well as two notified operational
activities by Frente Polisario forces. The military observers also
monitored the security situation to keep the Mission abreast of
possible illegal activities that could affect the safety of the
observers. Patrols were also conducted to monitor the demonstrations
that Frente Polisario supporters mounted at times east of the berm,
and to prevent and defuse tensions. MINURSO relations and
communications with the two parties remained positive and productive
throughout the reporting period.

34.
The demands on MINURSO military observers have increased considerably
over the years, owing to the growth in military dispositions west of
the berm and the reduction of the Mission’s air assets. I reiterate
my previous assessment and recommendation (see S/2013/220,
para. 48) to increase the military component of the Mission by 15
military observers. I further recall that adjustments to the
authorized strength over the years, most recently by the Security
Council in its resolution 1056 (1996),
have been conditioned upon the premise that they would not impair the
Mission’s operational effectiveness in the field. In my assessment,
MINURSO has now reached the point at which operational effectiveness
is being compromised by a shortage of military personnel.

35.
MINURSO observed and recorded six general violations of military
agreement No. 1 by the Royal Moroccan Army, a significant decrease
from the previous reporting period, when 42 such violations were
recorded. Long-standing violations remained essentially as previously
reported (see S/2013/220, para. 39). As
for Frente Polisario forces, MINURSO recorded one general violation,
with long-standing violations also remaining as previously reported
(see S/2012/197, para. 34). The
Mission’s assessment is that both parties remain fully committed to
and respectful of the ceasefire and that their observed violations do
not jeopardize it in the medium term. Rather, as has been observed in
previous reports, they have resulted in a gradual shift in the
military balance between the parties over the years.

36.
In its dialogue with MINURSO, the Royal Moroccan Army reiterated its
argument that its long-standing violations are either civilian in
nature or constituted preventive security and safety measures meant
to counter general security threats unrelated to the conflict.
MINURSO continued to insist that these security issues be addressed
within the framework of military agreement No. 1.

37.
The lack of precise ceasefire terms and differing interpretations of
the provisions in the ceasefire agreement represent a major challenge
to MINURSO monitoring operations and continue to erode the Mission’s
authority. My Special Representative has therefore initiated a
process of structured consultations with the parties to update
military agreement No. 1, on the basis of proposals forwarded by the
parties. Following his discussions on the subject with military
leadership on both sides, first meetings of working groups at the
military level were held with the Royal Moroccan Army in Agadir and
with Frente Polisario forces in Rabouni, in February and March. I
call on the parties to cooperate with my Special Representative and
the Force Commander in overcoming differences and reaching an
agreement on updating military agreement No. 1 to reflect present-day
realities.

38.
In January 2014, for the first time since its inception, MINURSO
witnessed a violation of the status-of-forces Agreement when a group
of Royal Moroccan Army soldiers gained unauthorized entry to the
Mahbas team site, in pursuit of five unarmed civilians attempting to
stage a demonstration inside the site. The five Saharan activists
were apprehended in the operation by the Moroccan soldiers. My
Special Representative protested the violation to the Moroccan
Government, receiving assurances that Morocco remains committed to
strict implementation of the status-of-forces agreement, including
respect for the inviolability of United Nations premises. He was
further assured that the incident in question was isolated and unique
and did not constitute a new practice. On two earlier occasions, in
late March and mid-June 2013, when unarmed civilians gained
unauthorized entry into MINURSO premises, for the purpose of staging
demonstrations, the Royal Moroccan Army had offered to intervene, but
the offer was declined by my Special Representative. These situations
were resolved by MINURSO with the help of local dignitaries and
legislators.

39.
During the reporting period, no immediate or specific threat to the
security of United Nations staff was reported on either side of the
berm. Still, the Mission’s area of responsibility continued to be
vulnerable to the repercussions of regional instability. Indeed,
security concerns continue to be a challenge to MINURSO operations.
Both Morocco and Frente Polisario have highlighted substantial
criminal and extremist activities in the regions adjacent to the
Territory. Operating in an area in proximity with porous borders east
of the berm, the Mission’s unarmed observers remain exposed. Some
sources have indicated that terrorist groups are actively recruiting
to consolidate their presence in neighbouring regions and expanding
their weapons supply. While neighbouring Algeria and Mauritania have
considerably increased security measures near their borders, the
geography of the region has always made it difficult to provide
complete protection against hostile elements.

40.
MINURSO has increased its alertness and capacity to gather
situational understanding and improve the security and safety of its
military observers and civilian staff alike. My Special
Representative regularly visited team sites on both sides of the berm
and the Tindouf liaison office, inter alia, to review the security
arrangements in place and consult the local representatives of the
parties on security matters. Algeria and Mauritania have considerably
strengthened border control, which is likely to mitigate the risks,
although limited capacity remains an issue on the border between
Mauritania and the Territory.

41.
West of the berm, Moroccan security forces provide security to United
Nations personnel, military observers, premises and assets, as do
Frente Polisario forces east of the berm. At the request of the
Mission, Frente Polisario also provides MINURSO observers with armed
escorts for patrols in the vicinity of the border with Mauritania.
MINURSO military observers, for their part, maintain a high level of
vigilance and regularly conduct emergency evacuation readiness
exercises. Night patrols continue to be suspended east of the berm,
for security reasons.

42.
Algeria and Frente Polisario provide security for the United Nations
presence and operations in Tindouf and the camps nearby. Through
UNHCR, the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil
Protection of the European Commission and the Spanish Agency for
International Development Cooperation, have funded additional
capacities, including an international security officer integrated
into the MINURSO security management system, to increase security for
humanitarian activities in the camps. The joint security coordination
committee, established in 2011 (see S/2013/220,
para. 62), continues to be a useful mechanism for cooperation among
the United Nations, Frente Polisario and humanitarian partners. As
the designated official for security, my Special Representative held
regular exchanges with the United Nations humanitarian agencies in
Tindouf and the nearby refugee camps. Enhancement of security is
still required in 2014 with regards to coordination, implementation
of reinforced static security measures and expansion of security
awareness/management skills training for humanitarian staff.

43.
Widespread contamination caused by landmines and explosive remnants
of war throughout Western Sahara continues to endanger the lives of
the local, nomadic and refugee populations, along with MINURSO
military observers and logistical teams. East of the berm, two
civilians were injured in a mine accident. In addition, Frente
Polisario reported a significant loss of livestock to mines,
especially in the buffer strip. The Royal Moroccan Army reported 12
accidents, in which 1 person was killed, 18 were injured and 1 was
unharmed, west of the berm. MINURSO, through its Mine Action
Coordination Centre, continues to strive to reduce the threat and
impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war and to improve
cooperation on mine action initiatives with both parties.

44.
East of the berm, humanitarian mine clearance and risk education
activities were implemented through partnerships with two
international non-governmental organizations, Action on Armed
Violence and Norwegian People’s Aid; one local non-governmental
organization, the Sahrawi Campaign to Ban Landmines; and a commercial
contractor, Mechem. Although new threat areas were discovered, the
Mine Action Coordination Centre continued to maintain a reduction
rate of 85 per cent of cluster strike areas. Between April 2013 and
March 2014, demining teams cleared 3,814,913 m2 of land and destroyed
1,720 items, including cluster bomb units, unexploded ordnance and
anti-tank mines.

45.
During the same period, the Royal Moroccan Army conducted demining
operations to the west of the berm and reported the clearance of more
than 259,140,000 m2 of land and the destruction of 1,542 items,
including anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance.

46.
With the support of MINURSO, Frente Polisario established the Sahrawi
Mine Action Coordination Office in September 2013, with the aim of
eventually assuming coordination of mine action activities to the
east of the berm. MINURSO intends to support this office with
technical assistance.

B.
Substantive civilian activities

47.
During the reporting period, my Special Representative enjoyed
regular and positive contact with the parties and their respective
coordination offices, maintaining a fruitful dialogue on issues
related to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate. MINURSO
received an increasing number of visits by foreign delegations and
diplomatic officials at its Headquarters in Laayoune and its liaison
office in Tindouf. My Special Representative established regular
contact with the regional human rights offices in Laayoune and Dakhla
and sporadic contacts with local elected officials and tribal
sheikhs. Similarly, MINURSO political affairs officers travelled on
occasion to Smara and Dakhla for consultations with local authorities
as part of the regular dialogue established between the Special
Representative and Moroccan authorities.

48.
However, the Special Representative was able to meet with civil
society representatives and human rights activists in the Territory
only in the presence of my Personal Envoy during his visits in
Laayoune, Dakhla and Smara. The inability of my Special
Representative to have independent contact with civil society means
that the ability of MINURSO to form its own picture of the situation
in Western Sahara for the purpose of operational awareness and
reporting to the Secretariat and the Security Council remains
limited. The underlying reason for this challenge to MINURSO
operations is Morocco’s interpretation of the MINURSO mandate as
strictly limited to ceasefire and military matters, and not extending
to matters related to civil society.

49.
East of the berm, and with regard to the refugee camps near Tindouf,
good working relations with Frente Polisario were maintained through
the MINURSO liaison office in Tindouf. Good contacts were established
with the newly created Sahrawi Committee for Human Rights. The
personnel of United Nations agencies and the staff of the liaison
office were able to move freely. My Special Representative met on
several occasions with civil society organizations, which were
generally supportive of the main policy lines of Frente Polisario.
Reports of more critical perspectives within civil society in the
camps could not be verified, with the occasional exception, as in the
case of the aforementioned demonstration in front of UNHCR premises
in Rabouni.

50.
The issues related to the placement of Moroccan flags around MINURSO
premises and the issuance of number plates have now been largely
resolved through pragmatic solutions agreed upon with the Moroccan
authorities. The former issue had already been resolved in April 2013
and all but one of the Moroccan flags around the perimeter of MINURSO
headquarters have now been removed. As for the number plates, as
agreed between my Special Representative and the Moroccan
authorities, a gradual replacement of the Moroccan plates with plates
chosen by the United Nations will be starting soon. Once that process
is completed, the perception of MINURSO neutrality will no longer be
affected by the negative impact of the flag and number plate issues.

V.
Humanitarian activities and human rights A. Persons unaccounted for
in the conflict

51.
The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to work with
the parties and families concerned in pursuing the question of
persons still unaccounted for in relation to the conflict. An
exhumation of a mass grave near the Mehaires team site, east of the
berm, by Spanish forensic experts allowed eight Saharan families to
recover the remains of relatives missing since 1976. MINURSO
observers attended their burial ceremony, on humanitarian grounds.
Findings were corroborated by interviews of relatives and
eyewitnesses and published in a report on 10 September 2013. The team
stated that it is aware of additional mass graves in the area.

52.
In a letter addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the Moroccan National Human Rights Council stated that,
like other unsolved cases, the eight cases concerned had been the
subject of exchanges between the Government of Morocco, the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Advisory Council
on Human Rights, the National Human Rights Council and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The National Human Rights
Council stressed that it was ready to receive any formal information
that would help achieve progress in establishing the truth. It had
committed to contacting the families of the eight persons referred to
in order to gather new information, “bearing in mind that these
cases can always be tried through Moroccan courts, according to
Moroccan law and international law”.

53.
Further to conflicting accounts on those disappearances, from Amnesty
International and Morocco’s Instance Equité et Réconciliation,
several non-governmental organizations called for investigations to
be re-opened into cases of enforced disappearance. Non-governmental
organizations further called for the preservation of evidence of
these and other mass graves.

B.
Assistance to and protection of Saharan refugees

54.
In accordance with its mandate, UNHCR continued to provide
international protection and, together with its partners, basic
life-saving assistance to the refugees in the camps near Tindouf.
This included the implementation of multisectoral activities in
water, sanitation, health, nutrition, shelter and non-food items.
Through the four additional field units established in 2012, UNHCR
implemented its mandated responsibilities in protection monitoring
and improved communication with refugees through regular field
visits. Pending the registration of the refugees in camps near
Tindouf, humanitarian assistance provided by UNHCR and the World Food
Programme (WFP) continued to be based on a population planning figure
of 90,000 vulnerable refugees, with WFP giving an additional 35,000
food rations to people with poor nutritional status in the camps.

55.
UNHCR and its partners covered up to 60 per cent of the needs in the
refugee camps by providing consumables and reagents for X-rays,
laboratories, dental care services, incentives for health-care staff,
support for medical doctors’ commissions, and nursing training. The
main health concerns were diabetes, high blood pressure, anaemia,
heart disease and hepatitis B. The main gap faced in providing health
care was replacing old and outdated medical equipment. UNHCR also
supported multidisciplinary medical commissions, mainly to surgeons,
in order to provide specialized consultations to the refugees in the
camps on a quarterly basis. During 2013, more than 4,000 specialist
consultations were carried out, with some 48 per cent of patients
being women.

56.
Supplementary feeding was provided to some 10,000 refugees, focusing
on reducing chronic malnutrition and anaemia for all children below
the age of 5 and for lactating and pregnant women. It also provided
incentives for medical staff, therapeutic food supplements, such as
Plumpy’nut and F-100/F-75 therapeutic milk formula, and behaviour
change communication activities. In addition, capacity- building for
staff and refugees focused on infant and young child food practices,
food habits and nutrition. Gaps remain in the infant and young child
food programme for breastfeeding and food diversification.

57.
All refugee children aged between 6 and 14 had access to primary and
lower- secondary education in schools in the camps. UNHCR and its
partners covered incentives for some 1,765 refugee teachers in the
camps, carried out trainings for teachers and enhanced school
management. It also provided essential school materials and books to
teachers and students. Water tanks were installed in 16 schools to
ensure clean water, which supported the school feeding programme of
WFP.

58.
In 2013, UNHCR and its partners distributed 8 months’ worth of
cooking gas per family, covering 66 per cent of the needs. Two
thousand tent materials and accessories were also provided to
vulnerable refugee families. The gap remains high given the sharp
decrease in bilateral funding (13,176 tents are still required,
representing 70 per cent of the total need). UNHCR provided adequate
potable water to all refugees in the camps (17-20 litres per person
per day). It also maintained the existing water network, provided
family water storage for some refugee households, improved water
quality and provided incentives and training for staff. Ten water
trucks were replaced between 2011 and 2013. Gaps remain in providing
additional water tankers and constructing two wells. Hygienic kits
were distributed to 38,450 women and girls of reproductive age. UNHCR
and partners also supported a soap-making workshop and a bleach
factory, and implemented waste management projects in the camps and
in Rabouni. The assistance gap remains at 66 per cent.

59.
UNHCR supported the running costs of a mechanical workshop for the
repair and maintenance of vehicles and provided better fleet
management for over 100 vehicles and generators.

60.
The quality of sexual and gender-based violence response was improved
through the implementation of a comprehensive strategy of referral
mechanisms for cases of sexual and gender-based violence. UNHCR also
provided incentives and transport for psychologists and gave support
to victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

61.
To examine the growing socioeconomic pressures on the refugee
population in more detail (see para. 9), my Personal Envoy met with
the representatives of the various United Nations agencies working in
the refugee camps. All agreed on the need to rethink the humanitarian
aid programme in such a way as to encourage a shift away from
protracted care and maintenance assistance. Acknowledging the growing
dissatisfaction, especially among camp youths, who have known no
other life, as well as the possible security threats that might
arise, Frente Polisario officials for their part called for urgent
action to create economic opportunities in the camps, as well as
renewed efforts to achieve concrete progress towards a solution to
the conflict over Western Sahara. In meetings with United Nations
interlocutors, those officials cautioned that any development
activities should not come at the expense of the humanitarian
assistance programme.

62.
In December 2013, UNHCR organized a high-level donor mission to visit
the refugee camps, together with WFP and the United Nations
Children’s Fund. The Foreign Ministry of Algeria participated in
the mission, along with representatives from key donor countries. The
mission participants spent a full day in the camps to look at the
assistance provided to refugees, their living conditions and the
remaining assistance gaps. They were briefed about the activities of
UNHCR and partners in the camps and expressed their support.

63.
During the high-level mission of UNHCR in September 2013, discussions
took place with the concerned authorities on the pending issue of
refugee registration in the camps. UNHCR agreed with these
authorities to send a registration expert, in the second quarter of
2014, to discuss the modalities for conducting registration in the
camps.

C.
Confidence-building measures

64.
In conformity with its mandate and its principles, and with the
cooperation of the Government of Morocco and Frente Polisario, UNHCR
continued to implement the confidence-building measures programme to
facilitate contact and communication between Saharan refugees in the
camps near Tindouf and their families in the Territory. Family
visits, cultural seminars and the coordination meetings in Geneva
between the two parties (Morocco and Frente Polisario) and the two
neighbouring countries (Algeria and Mauritania) are the three
fundamental components of the updated plan of action, of January
2012, for the confidence- building measures programme. MINURSO
supports the programme by providing medical staff and police officers
to facilitate preparations, serves as security escorts and provides
joint presence with UNHCR at destinations.

65.
To date, a total of 19,702 persons (57 per cent women and 43 per cent
men) have benefited from the family visits programme, since 2004. In
November 2013, UNHCR, in cooperation with both parties, undertook a
confidence-building measures registration exercise in the refugee
camps and the four towns in the western part of the Territory
(Laayoune, Boujdour, Smara and Dakhla) to allow qualified and
interested families to take part in the programme. This exercise
included verification of previously registered families to complete
and update their information. A total of 5,669 persons were newly
registered (2,739 in the Territory and 2,930 in the camps). Around
28,500 persons from both sides are currently waiting to benefit from
the family visits programme and for the resumption of flights, which
had been suspended since June 2013 but are to be resumed on 17 April
2014 as a result of intensive negotiations by UNHCR with the parties.

66.
A fourth cultural seminar, linking Saharan refugees in the camps with
their communities in the Territory, took place in the Azores from 28
October to 3 November 2013. The event was organized by UNHCR with the
support of the Government of Portugal. It gathered a total of 42
participants from both sides and was facilitated by three independent
professors from Mauritania. Coordinators from the Government of
Morocco and Frente Polisario were also present. A total of four
seminars have been conducted since September 2011 and a fifth seminar
took place in the Azores in March 2014 to bring together all the 145
participants of the previous four seminars, in order to consolidate
the good practices and lessons learned.

67.
In June 2013, following engagement with the parties, UNHCR chaired
its fifth coordination meeting in Geneva to review the
confidence-building measures programme with the two parties and the
two neighbouring countries. All participants reiterated their full
support for UNHCR and their encouragement to continue with its
humanitarian activities. An extraordinary meeting took place in
Geneva in December 2013, with the same participants, with the sole
purpose of discussing the resumption of the family visit flights,
which had been suspended at the end of June 2013 and are to resume in
April 2014.

68.
In June 2013, the Policy Development and Evaluation Service of UNHCR,
together with the Middle East and North Africa Bureau of UNHCR,
conducted an independent evaluation of the confidence-building
measures programme in order to review its management and operations,
as well as to assess the humanitarian impact of the programme. The
conclusion of the evaluation report was generally positive,
particularly with regard to the humanitarian impact of the family
visits and the importance of the cultural seminars. The report
recommended an increase in family visits and the continuation of
cultural seminars. It also recommended that donors should increase
their financial support for the confidence-building measures CBM
programme, given its humanitarian objective of linking families
divided by the conflict.

69.
In September 2013, UNHCR organized a high-level mission to the region
led by the Chef de Cabinet of the High Commissioner, together with
the Head of the North Africa Unit of the Middle East and North Africa
Bureau, to review the implementation of UNHCR mandated
responsibilities in the camps, as well as its confidence-building
measures programme. A number of meetings were held with senior
interlocutors in Algiers, Tindouf, Rabouni, Rabat, Laayoune and
Nouakchott. In addition, the delegation met with diplomatic and
non-governmental organization representatives, including members of
civil society and the media, as well as refugees. In meetings with
MINURSO, cooperation in the confidence-building measures programme
and security questions were discussed. UNHCR received full support
and cooperation from all its interlocutors, with a strong message to
continue with its humanitarian work under its mandate and as
stipulated in successive Security Council resolutions. During the
mission, the assistance gaps for 2013 were addressed, resulting in an
increase of the overall UNHCR budget for 2013 from $10 million to $13
million.

D.
Human rights

70.
During the reporting period, the two parties continued to trade
allegations on a wide variety of human rights violations. However,
positive developments relating to the protection of human rights also
occurred. These included the announcement of the establishment and
reinforcement of human rights organizations, steps to reform judicial
procedures and increased visits by international representatives and
observers.

71.
To reinforce the role and effectiveness of the work of the Moroccan
National Human Rights Council and its regional offices in Laayoune
and Dakhla, the Moroccan Government announced on 13 March 2014 that
henceforth it would respond to all complaints submitted by these
bodies within a three-month period. At the same time, focal points
will be identified within the relevant ministries to facilitate their
interaction with the National Human Rights Council and accelerate the
examination of complaints.

72.
The National Human Rights Council kept the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regularly informed
of the activities of its regional offices in Western Sahara. In 2013,
the regional offices received 551 complaints of alleged violations of
human rights and carried out six fact-finding missions. They also
monitored demonstrations and carried out a range of other activities,
including observations of trials, prison visits and capacity-
building initiatives for numerous stakeholders. Pursuant to an
agreement with the Ministry of the Interior, the regional offices
held a series of human rights training sessions for the police forces
of Laayoune and Dakhla.

73.
In May 2013, Morocco ratified the International Convention for the
Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. In a letter
dated 20 March 2014, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mezouar,
notified me that his Government is about to deposit the instruments
of ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.

74.
The Moroccan authorities continued to cooperate with mandate holders
of special procedures of the Human Rights Council and to facilitate
their access to Western Sahara.

75.
In June 2013, the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons,
especially women and children, visited Morocco, as well as the city
of Dakhla in Western Sahara. She expressed her appreciation for the
open and frank discussions she held with the authorities and with
civil society organizations. She also noted the willingness of the
authorities to institutionalize best practices, as seen in hospitals
and court-based approaches to gender-based violence. At the same
time, she expressed concern over the situation of irregular migrants
and domestic workers, as well as cases of child labour and sexual
exploitation. The Special Rapporteur will present her report to the
Human Rights Council in June 2014.

76.
In December 2013, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited
Morocco, as well as Laayoune in Western Sahara. During its stay, it
enjoyed the full cooperation of the authorities, was able to access
every place of detention it had indicated a desire to visit and was
able to interview detainees of its choice in private. In its
preliminary statement and its opinion No. 19/2013 (see
A/HRC/WGAD/2013/19), the Working Group
expressed concern over the number of confessions allegedly obtained
as a result of torture in the course of preliminary investigations.
The Working Group will present its report to the Human Rights Council
in September 2014.

77.
For 2014, Morocco has expressed its readiness for a follow-up visit
by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment to review implementation of the
steps Morocco has taken in this domain. In addition, Morocco has
informed me that visits of the Independent Expert on the issue of
human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment and the Special Rapporteurs on
the independence of judges and lawyers and on freedom of religion or
belief are expected in the course of 2014.

78.
Regarding civil and political rights, the United Nations continued to
receive communications alleging abuses of such rights in Western
Sahara west of the berm, particularly in the form of arrests without
warrants, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in detention,
limitations on family and advocate access to detainees, confessions
extracted under torture, violation of the right to a fair trial,
conditions that may amount to enforced disappearance and infringement
of the rights of freedom of speech, association and assembly. OHCHR
also received complaints about specific cases in which investigating
judges failed to open investigations into defendants’ allegations
of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, despite their lawyers’
requests to do so.

79.
Civil society organizations, including human rights groups active in
Western Sahara west of the berm, continue to face obstacles in
registering as non-governmental organizations, despite a judicial
decision in their favour. Such obstacles have deterred several
associations from initiating the registration process, while others
suspended their activities after the authorities allegedly refused to
receive their applications.

80.
Regarding freedom of speech, association and assembly, the United
Nations received reports that several individuals, including
children, had been arrested for participating in demonstrations in
Laayoune and Smara. Charges against these individuals included
“violence against public officials”, “participating in an armed
gathering”, “placing objects on a road obstructing traffic” and
“damaging public property”. The complaints relating to arrests
without warrants, torture and other forms of ill treatment and
repeated postponements of defendants’ hearings that were lodged by
families of alleged victims met with no response.

81.
The case involving the Saharan civilians condemned to long sentences
by the Military Tribunal in Rabat on the basis of charges brought
after the Gdim Izik events of 2010 is ongoing (S/2013/220,
para. 84). Local and international human rights organizations have
reported serious concern for the health of 17 of the 22 prisoners,
pursuant to allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment
committed by Moroccan law enforcement officials. Members of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited the prisoners at their
place of detention in Salé, in December 2013, and expressed concern
over their deteriorating health. The Working Group added its voice to
mine and to those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture in
expressing disapproval of the use of military tribunals to try
civilians.

82.
In his letter dated 20 March 2014, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
informed me that a draft law on military tribunals had been approved
by the Government Council, at a meeting presided over by King
Mohammed VI, and by the Council of Ministers, and that this law would
be submitted to Parliament for discussion and adoption during its
April 2014 session. Its provisions include prohibitions against
recourse to military tribunals for civilians accused of any offence
during peacetime, military personnel accused of common law offences,
persons accused of offences against the external security of the
State and minors. The draft law also provides for a military court of
appeals.

83.
Regarding civil and political rights in the refugee camps, Moroccan
officials and the media reported abuses, particularly in the form of
restrictions on freedom of movement and the violation of freedom of
expression, association and assembly. According to United Nations
personnel working in the camps, opportunities exist to express
discontent, particularly over deteriorating socioeconomic conditions
and the absence of any progress towards a settlement. Camp
authorities have taken no action against the protesters camped in
front of a UNHCR compound in Rabouni and within shouting distance of
the main road. With regard to freedom of movement, travel in and out
of the camps has been regulated for security reasons, particularly
since the crisis in Mali, but it is our understanding that those with
valid documents can travel freely.

84.
In several letters to me, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario
called repeatedly for “international monitoring of the observance
of human rights in both Western Sahara and the refugee camps”,
arguing that this would provide the best possible guarantee that
violations will not occur and would also constitute the best possible
confidence-building measure for the negotiating process. He also
reiterated the readiness of Frente Polisario to cooperate with the
human rights bodies of the United Nations, called for monitoring the
observance of human rights in the refugee camps, even in the absence
of an overall mechanism, and proposed that the High Commissioner for
Human Rights visit the refugee camps and Western Sahara itself for a
first-hand assessment of the situation. Furthermore, in the refugee
camps administered by Frente Polisario, the Secretary-General of the
organization announced the creation of a Sahrawi Committee for Human
Rights.

VI.
African Union

85.
MINURSO continued its cooperation with the observer delegation of the
African Union in Laayoune, led by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse
(Ethiopia), as well as its support to that delegation with logistical
and administrative assistance drawn from its existing resources.

86.
The interest of the African Union in the Western Sahara issue and the
invitation of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission,
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, to my Personal Envoy to visit Addis Ababa
were the subject of numerous letters and démarches to me and to my
Personal Envoy throughout the reporting period. Frente Polisario and
Algeria expressed support, while Morocco registered its strong
opposition, notably in a letter addressed to me by King Mohammed VI.

87.
At the request of the African Union, my Personal Envoy met with the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the margins of the
sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly. He expressed his
recognition of the important role that the Organization of African
Unity and its successor, the African Union, had played in the first
phases of the search for a settlement. That said, he noted that in
2007 the Security Council had mandated a process of direct
negotiations between the parties under the auspices of the United
Nations. A period of confidential consultations with each party was
to begin shortly, and its results would be communicated to the
Council and other stakeholders as appropriate.

88.
In December 2013, a comprehensive African Union report on the Western
Sahara issue, as well as a letter from the Chairperson of the African
Union Commission, reiterating her invitation to my Personal Envoy,
were circulated to the members of the Security Council. Frente
Polisario and Algeria reiterated their support, while Morocco
reiterated its opposition.

VII.
Financial aspects

89.
The General Assembly, in its resolution 67/283,
appropriated the amount of $58.4 million for the maintenance of
MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. Should the
Security Council approve my recommendations on the extension of the
mandate of MINURSO and the increase in authorized strength, as
recommended in paragraph 34 of the present report, the cost of
maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2014 would be limited to the
amounts approved by the Assembly.

90.
The proposed budget for MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30
June 2015 in the amount of $54.0 million (exclusive of budgeted
voluntary contributions in kind), based on the current authorized
strength for MINURSO, has been submitted to the General Assembly for
consideration during the second part of its resumed sixty-eighth
session (A/68/699). With regard to my
recommendation on the increase in the authorized strength, I will
seek additional funding from the Assembly, if necessary.

91.
As at 2 April 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special
Account for MINURSO amounted to $42.4 million. The total outstanding
assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that
date amounted to $1,746.5 million.

92.
As at 31 March 2014, amounts owed to troop contributors totalled
$600,000. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs
has been made for the periods up to October 2013 and October 2010,
respectively, owing to the insufficiency of cash in the special
account of the Mission.

VIII.
Observations and recommendations

93.
In the light of the presence of Western Sahara on the list of
Non-Self- Governing Territories since 1963, the efforts of the United
Nations, through the work of my Personal Envoy, my Special
Representative and MINURSO, will remain highly relevant until its
final status is established.

94.
As noted in the present report, my Personal Envoy has embarked on yet
another approach in the negotiating process, on the basis of
bilateral consultations and shuttle diplomacy. The briefing to the
Council in October will provide an opportunity to convey a first
assessment on whether or not this new approach is proving fruitful. I
call upon the parties to recognize the need for urgent progress and
to engage seriously on the two core issues in the Security Council’s
guidance: the content of a political solution and the form of
self-determination. I ask that the international community, and in
particular the neighbouring States and the members of the Group of
Friends, to provide support for this endeavour. If, even so, no
progress occurs before April 2015, the time will have come to engage
the members of the Council in a comprehensive review of the framework
that it provided for the negotiating process in April 2007.

95.
I am pleased that the humanitarian family visit flights, which are
aimed at uniting people separated for the past 40 years, will resume
on 17 April 2014. I congratulate the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees on its efforts and encourage it to
continue with its wider confidence-building measure activities. I am
also pleased to note the steps taken on the pending issue of
registration of refugees. In line with its mandate and principles,
UNHCR will be discussing the modalities of carrying out this exercise
with the concerned authorities, and I encourage continued progress
and full cooperation with UNHCR in this regard.

96.
I urge the international community to provide urgent funding for the
confidence-building measures programme and the programme mandate of
UNHCR in the refugee camps near Tindouf, given the existing gaps in
key areas of assistance such as protection, health, nutrition, food
security, shelter, water and sanitation. I also urge the relevant
United Nations agencies, the donor community, Frente Polisario and
the Algerian authorities to explore programmes to respond to
development needs in the camps, especially education and employment
for the youth.

97.
In the light of increased interest in the natural resources of
Western Sahara, it is timely to call upon all relevant actors to
“recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of
these territories are paramount”, in accordance with Chapter XI,
Article 73 of the Charter.

98.
I welcome Morocco’s cooperation with the special procedures of the
Human Rights Council. I note with satisfaction the steps that Morocco
has taken, such as those related to the Moroccan National Human
Rights Council and the military tribunals, as described in paragraphs
71, 72 and 84 of the present report.

99.
I also take positive note of Frente Polisario's expressed readiness
to cooperate with United Nations human rights bodies, and of its
establishment of the Sahrawi Committee for Human Rights.

100.
While welcoming these developments, I encourage both parties to
continue and further enhance their cooperation with United Nations
human rights bodies. I believe that such actions, covering both
Western Sahara and the refugee camps, would contribute to creating an
environment conducive to the initiatives taken so far, as well as to
the negotiating process. Such positive developments should contribute
to a more balanced and comprehensive monitoring of human rights. The
end goal nevertheless remains the sustained, independent and
impartial monitoring of human rights, covering both the Territory and
the camps.

101.
I believe that, as a guarantor of the stability of the ceasefire and
as visible evidence of the international community’s commitment to
achieving a resolution of the conflict, the presence of MINURSO
remains relevant (a) as an instrument of stability in the event that
the political stalemate continues; (b) as a mechanism to support the
implementation of successive Security Council resolutions relating to
the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara; and (c) to provide independent information on the
conditions on the ground to the Security Council, the Secretariat and
the international community. I therefore seek the assistance of the
Council in reasserting the mandated role of MINURSO, upholding
peacekeeping standards and United Nations neutrality and ensuring
that the conditions for the successful operation of the Mission are
met. I also call on both parties, Morocco and Frente Polisario, to
cooperate fully with MINURSO in achieving these objectives.

102.
MINURSO has helped keep the peace through its effective monitoring of
the ceasefire, as well as by reporting on the military activities of
both sides and on developments in and affecting its area of
responsibility, conducting demining activities and providing
logistical support to the confidence-building measures programme of
UNHCR. Within the constraints in which it operates, MINURSO has
maintained its ceasefire monitoring function and its presence on the
ground has played an important role in deterring the parties from
breaking the ceasefire agreement or resuming hostilities. In this
context, and in the light of the continuing efforts of my Personal
Envoy, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of
MINURSO, with a modest increase of 15 military observers to the
authorized strength, for a further 12 months, until 30 April 2015.

103.
In addition to its ceasefire monitoring function and as the only
significant international presence in Western Sahara, MINURSO is also
responsible for standard peacekeeping functions, such as monitoring,
assessing and reporting on local developments affecting or relating
to the situation in the Territory, as well as on political and
security conditions affecting the negotiating process led by my
Personal Envoy. The reporting function of MINURSO, although still
limited, is indispensable, including for my Personal Envoy. I hope
that the limitations that still exist with regard to the “free
interaction with all interlocutors” with MINURSO, as referred to by
the Security Council in its resolution 2099
(2013) can be overcome, building on the progress achieved so
far.

104.
In conclusion, I wish to thank my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara,
Christopher Ross, for his repeated engagement with the parties. I
also thank my Special Representative in Western Sahara, Wolfgang
Weisbrod-Weber, and Major General Edy Imam Mulyono of Indonesia for
their able and dedicated leadership of MINURSO. Finally, I also thank
the men and women of MINURSO for their work, in difficult
circumstances, to fulfill the Mission’s mandate.