The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. NcNulty). Pursuant to House Resolution 136 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1455.

The Chair designates the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter], as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Mazzoli] to assume the chair temporarily.

[TIME: 1523]

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1455) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Mazzoli (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

The gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] will be recognized for 30 minutes and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].

(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in support of H.R. 1455, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991.

H.R. 1455 authorizes funds for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1991. These funds are allocated between the National Foreign Intelligence Program, which consists of those U.S. intelligence programs providing information to the President and other national decisionmakers, and the tactical intelligence and related activities programs which provide intelligence to military commanders.

I want to dispel any confusion which might exist in Members' minds about this legislation. This is an authorization for the current fiscal year, fiscal 1991. It is necessitated by the pocket veto last November 30, of S. 2834, the original fiscal year 1991 authorization measure. With the exception of the deletion of the title on congressional oversight of intelligence activities, which I will discuss more fully in a few moments, and minor technical corrections, H.R. 1455 is identical to the conference agreement on S. 2834. While the actual amounts authorized are contained in a classified schedule of authorizations incorporated by reference into H.R. 1455, and explained in a classified annex to the committee's report, those documents are available for the examination of Members in the committee's offices. I urge Members who have not already done so to review this material.

Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that appropriated funds available to intelligence agencies may be obligated or expended for intelligence or intelligence-related activities only if those funds were specifically authorized by Congress for those activities. The committee appreciated the directive issued by the President on December 5, 1990, that, during the period in which an intelligence authorization bill for fiscal 1991 was not enacted, intelligence agencies were not to exceed the spending limits in the conference agreement on S. 2834. It is important, however, that any uncertainties about the authority to obligate and expend funds on intelligence and intelligence-related activities in the current fiscal year be resolved. That resolution can be accomplished through the enactment of an intelligence authorization bill, and that is why the passage of this legislation is so important.

I want to thank the committee's ranking Republican, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] for his efforts in bringing this needed legislation to the floor. I also want to extend the appreciation of the committee to the chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services, the Judiciary, Government Operations, and Post Office and Civil Service for their help in facilitating the consideration of H.R. 1455.

As I mentioned at the outset, H.R. 1455 is substantially the same as the conference agreement on S. 2834. The one significant change is that H.R. 1455 does not include the title on the congressional oversight of intelligence activities which was contained in the vetoed bill. Two provisions in that title, the statutory definition of covert action and the reenactment of the current requirement that Congress be provided with notice about a covert action in a timely fashion in those instances in which prior notice is not provided, were objectionable to the President, and produced the pocket veto of S. 2834.

Under current law, Congress does not have the power to disapprove of a covert action before it is implemented. Congress, through the Intelligence Committees can, however, exercise a significant degree of control over covert action programs by the decision it makes on requests to continue funding for those programs. It is fundamental to the effective use of this power of the purse that the Executive and the Congress be in general agreement about what constitutes a covert action, and that Congress be certain that it will be fully informed about covert actions.

After the veto of S. 2834, numerous attempts were made to address the President's objections in a way that was sensitive to the legitimate concerns of both the executive and legislative branches of our Government. The President maintained that a sentence in the proposed definition of covert action, which would have included within the definition a request by the United States to a private citizen or foreign government to conduct a covert action on our behalf, was unclear and would hinder the business of diplomacy. We proposed a compromise designed to make certain that the same approval and congressional notification standards apply to covert actions undertaken for the United States as apply to those undertaken by the United States. That compromise, which would have made clear that covert actions directed, controlled, or induced by the United States had to be reported to Congress, was rejected.

On the issue of timely notice, the result was the same. A proposed compromise that would have distinguished the President's assertion of a constitutional right to withhold notice about a covert action for a period of his choosing from his assertion of a statutory right to do so, was rejected. At that point, because I no longer believed that it was possible to resolve these issues in a way that protected the interests of the House, I introduced H.R. 1455 without the oversight title.

I took that step with considerable regret because many of the oversight provisons in the vetoed bill, particularly those which would have significantly improved the Presidential covert action findings process, are important and worthwhile. The clear benefits of those provisions, however, could not compensate for the less than satisfactory resolution, toward which I felt we were headed, of the central issues in our dispute with the President.

At this time, I would like to briefly describe the major legislative provisons of H.R. 1455.

Title III contains provisions developed in cooperation with the Post Office and Civil Service Committee which are intended to bring the CIA's retirement systems into conformance with the retirement systems in effect at other Federal agencies. I want to note in particular the following sections:

Section 304, which will enable a retiree who failed to elect a survivor benefit before retirement to make that election for a spouse married after retirement;

Section 305, which will reduce from 60 to 55 the age before which the remarriage of a former or surviving spouse shall terminate that person's entitlement to retirement or survivor benefits; and

Section 307, which will provide for a restoration to former spouses of the benefits they lose upon remarriage should the remarriage end in death, divorce, or annulment.

Title IV contains recurring provisions which, among other things, provide that authorizations in the bill are not to be construed as providing authority for intelligence activities not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or law of the United States.

In addition, section 404 permits the Secretary of Energy to exempt from the competitive service all positions within the Department which are determined to be devoted to intelligence or intelligence-related activities; and section 405 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence in appropriate circumstances, to direct that elements of the intellgience community should, where fiscally sound, award contracts so as to maximize the procurement of products produced in the United States.

Title V contains provisions of particular relevance to the Department of Defense. I want to highlight the following sections:

Section 501, which will enable the Secretary of Defense to charge the CIA the same rate for airlift services that is charged to components of the Department of Defense;

Section 502, which was developed with the assistance of the Government Operations Committee, creates a limited exception to the Freedom of Information Act to permit the withholding from public disclosure of certain unclassified products of the Defense Mapping Agency. This exception would only apply when classification of the products is not feasible, but provision of them pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request would reveal the sources and methods by which they were produced, or military operational or contingency planning;

Section 503, which permits the Director of the National Security Agency to provide financial assistance for up to 5 years to former employees in circumstances in which the assistance is essential to avoid situations that might lead to the disclosure of classified information; and

Section 504, which will enable the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, to better protect the identity and mission of those DOD clandestine human intelligence collectors needing a commercial cover for their activities. Under current law, a DOD human intelligence collection operation may hold itself out to be a business, but may not engage in routine business activities such as establishing checking accounts, buying and selling products, or furnishing an office. This section will provide the authority for the conduct of those kinds of activities so that the necessary security for the cover operation is provided. The new authority may be used only to support intelligence collection activities conducted abroad, and the intelligence committees must be informed each time a commercial entity is established. In addition, the provision contains a 5-year sunset clause which is intended to ensure that the need for the authority, and its operation in practice, are reviewed.

As the official U.S. defense presence declines in many parts of the world, the execution of the defense intelligence mission may depend to a greater degree than in the past on the ability to gain access to a country through the use of a nonofficial cover. The committee was persuaded that a valid need existed for a reliable nonofficial cover alternative for the Defense Department's human intelligence collectors. The proposal presented by the Department was well-developed and well-coordinated within the intelligence community. The committee was persuaded that the limited use envisioned by the Department for the authorities provided will adequately address current shortcomings in nonofficial cover arrangements.

In addition, I want to note section 505, which requires the Secretary of Defense to provide any Member of Congress with access to a certain classified report concerning the operation of the Defense Department's POW/MIA office.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1455 appropriately responds to the needs of our intelligence agencies for fiscal year 1991, and I urge its adoption.

[Page: H2622]

[TIME: 1530]

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation. As my distinguished colleague and friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma and the chairman of the committee has indicated, this bill is a modified version of S. 2834, the fiscal year 1991 intelligence authorization bill which was pocket vetoed by the President. There is one substantive difference between this bill and its vetoed predecessor. The entire oversight title of last year's bill, which contained the matters of overriding concern to the President, has been dropped from the present bill.

I commend the chairman for his efforts to get this regular intelligence authorization process back on track through the introduction and reporting of this cleaned up bill.

Opinions of the Presdent's veto differ. I feel that his major points of concern were justified. In particular, I can appreciate his great concern with the report language interpreting the statutory phrase, `notice in a timely fashion.' As Members of this House may recall, during floor consideration of the conference report on the vetoed bill last year, I expressed very strong reservations about that particular language. And I was not alone in voting against the conference report at that time because of those reservations.

During the last Congress, the President thought he had an agreement with those leaders of the two intelligence committees who were proponents of the so-called 48-hour covert action notification legislation. Under that agreement, Congress would, in the oversight language in the vetoed bill, leave in place the standard in existing law which required notice in a timely fashion in those instances where prior notice is not given. That timely notice standard originated in the Hughes-Ryan amendment adopted in 1974, and until enactment of the existing 1980 oversight law was the only covert action notification standard. Under it, Congress received prior notice of nearly all covert actions. But also under the standard, President Carter, and I emphasize, a Democrat, President Carter deferred notice of two covert actions in support of the ill-fated Desert One hostage rescue mission and the covert action which successfully exfiltrated the six American diplomats given refuge by the Canadian Embassy in Tehran. Notice was deferred by President Carter, a Democrat, for several months in both cases. And indeed, we had testimony in open session from both his chief of the CIA, Admiral Turner, and his deputy, Secretary Carlucci, who indicated that there was no question but that the Canadian Government insisted that no one be informed because not only were Canadian lives involved, but American lives were involved as well.

The 1980 act clarified that prior notice is the norm, but after much debate within Congress and between the executive and legislative branches, the flexible and ambiguous language, `notice in a timely fashion,' was purposely retained to govern those rare situations in which prior notice is deferred. That ambiguity was absolutely necessary to cover the fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the executive and legislative branches over the extent of the President's constitutional authority to defer reporting of a convert action. And, yes, the Constitution, in article II, section 1, is very clear that the executive, the President, has responsibility for foreign affairs. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the transaction of business with foreign governments is executive altogether. It belonged then to the head of that department, the President of the United States.

[TIME: 1540]

In exchange for the reenactment of this existing statutory standard, rather than the inclusion of the restricted 48-hour type language that some wanted in the original fiscal year 1991 bill, the President agreed to provide these committee leaders with a letter assuring them of his intention to provide notice to Congress of covert action in a fashion sensitive to their concerns about the issue of timeliness in light of a December 1986 Justice Department opinion.

In pertinent part, the President's letter

stated:

I anticipate that in almost all instances prior notice will be possible. In those rare instances where prior notice is not approved, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period will be based upon my assertion of authority granted this Office by the Consititution.

Now, I know that is not good enough for some. There are some who would like to not only hobble our intelligence agencies, but also some who would like to hobble the President of the United States, prarticularly if he happens to be of the party of which he currently has been, and appears to continue to be for some time in the future.

There are those who would dredge up the old Iran-Contra arguments, and in fact we have heard today that the Iran-Contra scandal `nearly toppled our government.'

Well, that is wishful thinking. Now, I do not question for a moment that there are some in this body who would have to have seen our Government topped, but, of course, that never happened. It never come close. Our Government was secure through those days, and our Government is secure today.

The President was understandably dismayed by the disturbing language in the joint explanatory statement of the managers on this particular issue, which purported to be the sole authoritative interpretation of the venerable statutory phrase `notice in a timely fashion.'

Despite inconsistent legislative history from the floor debates on the 1980 act, this new interpretive report language said that notice in a timely fashion must be read in all cases without exception to permit the President to defer notification of a covert action for no more than a few days after it is first initiated.

Forget what President Carter did. Forget the situation we had in Iran during the hostage crisis. Forget our desire to protect and save those American lives. They would have hobbled us by this language.

That report language further limited the timely notice option by purporting to restrict the President's authority to defer notice for even those few days, in exigent circumstances, when a quick reaction to events was necessary.

In effect, that report language converted the agreed upon notice `in a timely fashion' bill language to the same formula as the highly objectionable 48-hour bill.

So much for what we thought was an agreement. The President was understandably unwilling to risk that this language might one day be judicially construed as new and binding legislative history, leaving him and his successors with a restricted 48-hour statutory requirement. He viewed this as infringing upon his constitutional authority.

In his veto message, the President especially singled out that part of the definition of covert action which stated that any request to a third party or private individual to conduct a covert action on behalf of the United States must be treated as a U.S. covert action. Discussions between United States and foreign officials considered to amount to such a request, however defined, would be subject to the intricate and formal requirements for the approval of a covert action. This would include obtaining a written intelligence finding, signed by the President, authorizing those discussions prior to their even commencing, and

notifying Congress of the intended discussions.

When you stop and consider it carefully, the term `request' is not that precise or informative, standing alone, in the face of the scope and complexity of foreign affairs in today's world.

The brief reference to this provision in the joint explanatory statement of managers provided very little additional guidance in determining what sorts of discussion might constitute a covert request. It merely called for a specific request. A post-passage letter to the President from the chairmen of the two intelligence committees sought to somewhat better define what discussions would not be considered requests for covert action.

Of course, the opinions of two chairmen expressed outside of and after the legislative process, which culminated in the passage of the bill in question, would have dubious value, at best, as legislative history.

After fairly lengthy consideration, the President concluded in the context of the complicated, sensitive, and confidential discussions with foreign governments, the possible breadth and vagueness of the term `request' left too much uncertainty as to when the covert action approval and reporting requirements would be invoked.

The President explained that this uncertainty could have chilling effect on the ability of our diplomats to conduct highly sensitive discussions concerning projects that are vital to our national security. Furthermore, the real existence of this provision could deter foreign governments from discussing certain topics with the United States at all.

The bottom line, he pointed out, is that consequently, this provision could seriously impair the effective conduct of our Nation's foreign relations.

It is not too difficult to envision this uncertainty at work. Consider the case of an animated confidential exchange between a United States and foreign official concerning a sensitive international threat to our two countries' mutual interests.

Suppose the U.S. official says, `We know you have the capability to mount a particular covert action, which we believe might neutralize this threat on behalf of both our vital interests. Why don't you undertake that specific covert action?'

Now, is that a request which is subject to the covert action approval and reporting requirement, or is it merely seeking an explanation of our ally's policy? Reasonable minds might reach different conclusions.

But if the poor U.S. official in a faraway foreign country, attempting to represent the United States in such a situation, has to constantly worry about whether such statements might later

be determined to be an unlawful request for a third party covert action, he may well feel compelled to exercise stringent self-censorship, unconducive to the effective conduct of his foreign affairs responsibility.

Now, imagine that this hapless hypothetical individual is the Secretary of State, or the President himself, engaged in sensitive high level discussions with a foreign head of state. It does not take too much imagination to realize that there are those in this body who would like to haul these officials before this Congress in order to initiate an investigation into any such discussions.

In any event, the veto is behind us now. Hopefully the House will today put the normal authorization process back on track for the current fiscal year by passing this legislation without troublesome or disruptive amendments.

Enactment of this bill will provide authority for various agencies, which will enable them to better carry out their intelligence responsibilities, authorities which this body already approved last year. Some are potentially important, such as the commercial cover authority to provide a needed operational security for the overseas intelligence collection activities and components of the Defense Department.

Madam Chairman, in closing, I think it is important to say and emphasize that we salute those dedicated men and women in our intelligence services around the world for their contribution to freedom. Poland is free today in part because of the efforts of the men and women in our intelligence services. Eastern Europe is free today, in part because of the dedication of our intelligence services. Nicaragua is on the road to freedom. El Salvador, we hope, finally is on the road to freedom. Angola is very close to an agreement. And, yes, Desert Storm was achieved because of the tremendous competence of U.S. intelligence. In fact, the intelligence job performed by our men and women in the Persian Gulf ranks as the most extraordinary intelligence success story in the history of our country, and in the history of the world, and, as the months and years unfold, we will be able to tell in open session more of that story, which certainly needs to be told.

[Page: H2623]

[TIME: 1550]

So I urge my colleagues to support this legislation today so that we might get on with the business of protecting the national security of our Nation.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I am delighted to yield 8 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and has done an excellent job.

(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. KENNELLY. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1455, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.

I share the belief of Chairman McCurdy that it is important that an intelligence authorization bill be enacted this year. I also share his regret that the differences which produced the pocket veto of the bill sent to the White House last November could not be resolved satisfactorily.

Those differences are not new. They have their roots in a disagreement that has been going on for more than a decade about what Congress should know about covert actions, and when Congress should know it. That disagreement reached its height in the Iran/Contra affair, when the existence of a covert action, about which Congress was never notified in the manner required by law, became known. In the years since the Iran/Contra relevations, both Intelligence Committees have reported measures to codify the procedures implemented by the Reagan and Bush administrations to respond to congressional concerns about those revelations. While none of those measures has been enacted, elements of them formed the basis for the language to which the President objected last fall.

The suggestion that there should be a statutory definition of covert action was first made by the CIA. While it was agreed that both Congress and the Executive had achieved an understanding of the kinds of activities to which the notification requirements for covert action should apply, the Agency argued that a statutory definition would be useful in tying down whatever loose ends existed in those understandings. However, as I understand it, the ground rules for the negotiations on the language for the definition included an acknowledgement that nothing already considered to be a covert action would be excluded.

In 1988, the House Intelligence Committee, reported a bill which contained a definition of covert action identical to the one in the conference report sent to the President last November. While the 1988 bill was not considered on the House floor for reasons unrelated to its contents, the Reagan administration did not object to the definition. Nor, I should add, did the Bush administration when the conference report on S. 2834 was on the floor last October. It was only later that we were told that the sentenced in the definition on third-party requests was unclear and likely to have a chilling effect on diplomatic exchanges. This assertion was made in spite of the fact that preliminary contacts to determine the feasibility of covert actions have never been considered to be covered by the Presidential reporting requirements.

It makes no sense to construct an elaborate system to ensure that both the President and the Congress are aware of covert actions conducted directly by the United States if, through the use of third parties, those same activities can be undertaken indirectly by elements of our Government without the President or Congress having to be told. Any statutory definition, it seems to me, must be broad enough to include all covert actions undertaken for the United States by third parties, whether the United States contribution to the activity is used to facilitate its completion, or to induce its implementation.

The issue of `timely notice' has also been contentious. In 1980, the National Security Act was amended to require congressional notification of significant anticipated intelligence activities, including covert actions. While the statutory notification provisions clearly assume that Congress will be provided with notice of most covert actions prior to their implementation, the President's ability to defer notice is just as clearly acknowledged. When notice is delayed, however, the statute requires that it be provided `in a timely fashion.' While much of the debate in 1980 concerned those circumstances in which notice could be delayed, the term `in a timely fashion' was not defined.

In 1986, a memorandum from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, the Cooper memorandum, concluded that for a number of reasons, including powers granted his office by the Constitution and authorities conveyed by the 1980 amendments to the National Security Act, a President has `virtually unfettered discretion' to determine what constitutes timely notice. While Congress cannot affect a President's constitutional powers, I believe that Congress has the right, and the responsibility, to make clear the extent of the authorities being granted by statute.

S. 2834 sought to reenact the 1980 congressional notification requirements. The report which accompanied the Senate version of the bill, which passed in August of 1990, contained a rejection of the Cooper memorandum, and a statement that nothing in the statute authorized the withholding of notice beyond a few days. The administration never objected to this language. The conference report said substantially the same thing, and we were advised on the floor of the House last October that it would be signed. Some weeks later we learned that the effort by Congress to clarify not what a statute authorized, but what it didn't authorize, was unacceptable to the President. An offer by Chairman McCurdy several weeks ago to accept the language in the original Senate report, which had not been found wanting until then, was rejected.

Madam Chairman, I was pleased when, in a letter to the committee's former chairman, Congressman Beilenson, President Bush stated that he anticipated being able to provide delayed notice of covert actions within a few days, and on those occasions when he could not, that he would assert constitutional powers as the reason for so doing. That statement is indistinguishable from the language adopted by the Senate in its report on S. 2834, and by both Intelligence committees in the conference report on the bill. In spite of that, the administration refused to allow the report accompanying the bill now before us to contain language making the same point, through a rejection of the Cooper memorandum's conclusion.

Like Chairman McCurdy, I am disappointed that we could not reach an agreement with the administration on the oversight issues which divided us. There is much in the oversight title of S. 2834 that should be done to ensure that the oversight process will be as vigorous as it should be. But to accept as a compromise a solution which would be less than the status quo on the important issues in dispute would have been a mistake. Under the circumstances, H.R. 1455 without an oversight title is the clear choice, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1455. This is a bill that all of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle can support. I commend the leadership of the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], our new chairman, who has brought to the floor a clean bill stripped of the sections that caused the pocket veto by the President.

It is important that we enact an authorization bill in this fiscal year. The distinguished ranking minority member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] has outlined the reasons for our minority views on this bill and underscored the President's rationale for the veto of the previous legislation. I will not reiterate.

As the committee that deals with some of the Nation's most sensitive secrets, there is still relatively little we can discuss openly on the floor. There are two matters, however, that I would like to raise at this occasion.

[TIME: 1600]

This might be an appropriate point, first, to offer a commendation to the Defense Mapping Agency. That agency, scarcely known by the public, provided all of the maps for our forces operating in Desert Storm. This was a massive undertaking, but one which DMA fulfilled very admirably.

The rapid offensive movement across the barren Iraqi desert would not have been possible without adequate maps and accurate maps produced in huge quantities and on short order. I strongly commend the leadership and staff of the DMA for their outstanding contributions to our victory. It is one of the few times that you could commend these people who work so hard out of the public spotlight.

During the spring recess, this Member also had an opportunity to fly to Jamba, the capital of free Angola, where I met with Dr. Jonas Savimbi. As the Members will recall, last fall we had a long and devisive debate on Angola, which ultimately led to the adoption of the Solarz amendment by the closest of votes--207 to 206. Since that time, this Member has monitored developments in Angola. I am pleased to report that there has been substantial progress in the negotiations between President Savimbi's party, Unita, and President Dos Santos and his party, the MPLA. Much still needs to be accomplished, but prospects are bright for a cease-fire and an agreement to hold free, internationally supervised elections. President Savimbi is committed to free and fair elections, something he was denied 15 years ago. The only way this option will fail is if the MPLA turns its back on the negotiating process, as it did in February, and decides to return to the misguided option of further fighting.

Finally, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I, of course, have had an opportunity to meet with many and learn about a great many of our people in the intelligence community. They are highly motivated, partriotic Americans, and in some ways, while usually unrecognized for the specific contributions they make, they are America's first line of defense. They monitored developments before and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Despite any criticism heard, they, in fact, did a remarkable job that was decisive in the victory. As a result of their dedicated efforts and long hours of work, our policymakers were kept well informed.

General Schwarzkopf had the necessary intelligence to successfully mount the Desert Storm offense. The general described the strategic intelligence he received, when I visited with him with other Members in Saudi Arabia, that intelligence received before the land conflict, as `excellent,' while noting important deficiencies in tactical photo-reconnaissance aircraft and a few other areas. That concern and others are being carefully considered by the Intelligence Committee, and we will try to take action as necessary.

Madam Chairman, in conclusion, let me reiterate my appreciation to the leadership on our committee, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], and others.

It is my intention to vote for passage of this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], a very engaged and involved member of the Intelligence Committee.

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, my compliments to the chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] for their leadership in this committee and to the chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], for his auspicious start, very frankly addressing and respecting the view of the Congress when it comes to foreign policy and intelligence.

Madam Chairman, like others who have spoken today, I am concerned that it is necessary to reconsider the fiscal year 1991 intelligence authorization bill. When the veto of the conference agreement on S. 2834 was announced last November, I felt that the President's decision was based on bad advice. I have yet to hear a compelling justification for that decision which would cause me to reconsider my initial judgment.

Tension is always going to exist between the President and the Congress on the subject of covert action. Presidents view covert actions, like foreign policy, as their exclusive domain and, if given a choice, I'm sure they would opt for no congressional scrutiny of either. Congress, on the other hand, is properly offended when it is asked to fund covert actions about which it has little information, or when it only learns the full details of operations after they have become embarrassing failures. If Congress is not to provide prior approval for covert actions, it must at least have sufficient information in a timely manner to enable it to determine if funding for a particular operation should continue. Put more simply, if Congress is to be involved in the crash landings of unsuccessful covert actions, it should be in on the takeoffs as well.

Last fall, we sent the President a conference report which would have substantially improved our ability to oversee covert actions. In spite of assurances given on this floor that the bill would be signed, the President ultimately objected to two provisions. These provisions were not new. One, on the definition of covert action, had been around for 3 years. The other, clarifying what is meant by the term `timely notice,' had been considered and adopted on the Senate floor, without any objection from the administration, just 3 months before the veto. Despite that history, the President, at the last possible moment, was persuaded that the provisions would do great harm to the powers of his office.

It is difficult to understand why. The definition of covert action in the conference agreement sought to include those instances in which elements of our government specifically request that private citizens or foreign governments undertake a covert action for us. Why shouldn't Congress know about that? Why shouldn't we know when diplomatic concessions, or trade benefits, or foreign aid are conditioned upon another government's conducting a covert action for the United States? The administration maintains that the language was too confusing for our diplomats, and that it would inhibit their conversations with their counterparts from other nations. I believe that if we have diplomats who can't understand what was meant by the third party request sentence in the proposed definition, and the report language which amplified it, the fate of U.S. diplomacy is in questionable hands.

Just as the extent of Congress' information about covert actions is important, so too is the timing of when that information is to be provided. The law requires that, if Congress is not notified about a covert action before it starts, notice is to be provided in a timely fashion. In 1986, the Justice Department interpreted that law, and the Constitution, as leaving it up to the President alone to determine when after-the-fact notice was to be provided. Last year, we tried to register our judgment that that interpretation, at least insofar as it pertains to authorities provided by the statute, was just plain wrong. The President had acknowledged that point in a letter he sent to former Chairman Beilenson last summer. But when it came to saying essentially the same thing in the conference report, we were told that we were trampling on sacred legislative ground.

Madam Chairman, the notification issue is serious, as is the issue of how a definition of covert action should be codified. Each of these issues raises important institutional concerns for the Congress. While it is regrettable that we could not reach an agreement with the administration that adequately addressed those concerns, no agreement on these issues is better than an agreement detrimental to the interest of Congress. For that reason, I strongly support H.R. 1455.

[Page: H2625]

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Lancaster], a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

(Mr. LANCASTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LANCASTER. Madam Chairman, I rise to speak in support of the POW/MIA provision in the bill that would require the administration to provide complete access to Congress of the Defense Intelligence Agency report on United States Prisoners of War/Missing in Action in Vietnam, known as the Tighe Report. As of the middle of February of this year, 2,282 Americans remain unaccounted for in Indochina. I believe that it is important for the Congress to be made fully aware of the general's findings concerning the United States efforts to get to the bottom of our missing American servicemen. I am cochair of the Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress. My good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans], serves as chair of that coalition. It is important to continue to focus our Government's efforts on a satisfactory accounting of those missing as a result of having served in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. I feel that the loved ones of those who have served and have never returned also want as complete a report as possible of the efforts and methodology of the work of their Government.

I represent a congressional district that has numerous individuals who are active in the POW/MIA issue. Two were imprisoned in Laos for their activities. Whether you agree or disagree with their approach, the issue is the same. We, in Congress and the administration, must do whatever is necessary to make certain that we do not forget nor abandon those who have served in an unpopular war half way around the world. I join with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in supporting this provision.

(Mr. CARPER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CARPER. Madam Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to follow up on what our friend from North Carolina [Mr. Lancaster] was saying, and to use this opportunity to share and exchange some thoughts with the chairman of the committee.

In my own State, several of my constituents have been to visit with me, people who served as I did in Southeast Asia. They raised concerns, disquieting concerns, about the possibility of our men still being held in Southeast Asia after almost two decades, suggesting that our Government not only does not care about them, but actively covers up their continued presence in Southeast Asia. Those are things that no Member in this body, no Member in this Congress, would like to believe.

I have tried in recent weeks to learn more about this particular issue. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Lancaster] referred to the Tighe Commission report. I have been briefed on it by the D.I.A., and I have met with State Department officials to be brought up to speed on where we are in terms of activities to recover remains in Vietnam and to recover remains in Laos. I am modestly encouraged by what I have learned. I do not think that word of these ongoing activities is being shared very well with people in this country, however.

For example, since 1983, a total of 17 excavation teams have been into Laos, a country with whom we have full diplomatic relations, and the number of excavating teams in Vietnam since 1988 is 13. We also will open an office in Hanoi in the next

several weeks to try to put greater pressure on the Vietnamese who have not been cooperative in sharing archival information and other information, so that we can better point our excavation teams to the right places to search.

I think the administration needs to do a much better job, and perhaps this committee could be helpful, in letting the American people know what has been done and what is being done to determine once and for all the status of our POW's and MIA's. Perhaps we should take the press in with the excavation teams or invite veterans groups to send observers. That is the kind of thing I think would be helpful, rather than let the American people believe little is being done and that it is a hidden, secretive sort of undertaking. Open it up. I do not think we have anything to hide. We should fully disclose the activities that are going on and make sure Americans know about them.

[Page: H2626]

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 30 additional seconds. I commend the gentleman from Delaware for his efforts, and I applaud him for his concern. I share his concern, and have in my tenure on the Committee on Intelligence had a number of opportunities to pursue this issue with the relevant agencies, and will continue to do so.

I agree that the administration has within its power the ability to better inform the public as to what is actually going on, vis-a-vis the MIA/POW issue, and it is a great concern for all Americans.

I think there is a great deal of misconception, and perhaps even some misinformation at large, but I hope we can take steps to resolve that.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I would like to enter into this debate and speak to the POW/MIA issue.

I have been involved in this POW/MIA issue since 1951, when I served in the U.S. Marine Corps. I can tell Members, speaking as a former chairman of the bipartisan POW/MIA Task Force, this is a longstanding issue. It has always been American foreign policy to never leave our soldiers overseas, to always account for them. We have done that. As a matter of fact, in 1980 when President Reagan took office, he reopened the whole POW/MIA issue from the Vietnam era. We have had a bipartisan effort, working on both sides of the aisle, dealing with this problem, which has resulted in bringing home a number of remains of our missing soldiers. Just recently, the

chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] and myself went to Korea and brought home the remains of five fallen soldiers from 40 years ago. So yes, we do want to continue this effort.

I would point out one thing that might be pending before this House, and we have heard some people mention it before. That is, a 48-hour notification rule on covert activities. In other words, the administration would be telling this Congress 48 hours in advance what we are doing to undertake as far as covert activity is concerned.

I would remind Members on both sides of the aisle that if that amendment comes up here today, and if we have covert activity right now in Southeast Asia and we find there are Americans alive over there, that we want to go get them now. We do not want to wait 48 hours, or 2 weeks, or 2 months. I hope that amendment, if it is offered on the floor, will go down to the kind of defeat that it deserves.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, just stating again for the record, the 48-hour provision, first of all, my understanding is there is not going to be an amendment offering that, but even then it would be 48 hours, it would be timely notice, after the commencement. This committee has no authority and no ability to stop a planned covert act of the President. It is a question of being notified on a timely basis, after the commencement of that operation. It is not 48 hours before. We are not trying to hold it up.

I want to state that for the record.

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the clarification. I am greatly relieved that that amendment will not be offered.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered under the 5-minute rule by title and each title is considered as read.

The amendments printed in the report to the bill are considered as having been adopted and are considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment.

The Clerk will designate section 1.

The text of section 1 is as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
That this Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991'.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1?

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

The text of the remainder of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Department of Defense.

(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The National Security Agency.

(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(6) The Department of State.

(7) The Department of the Treasury.

(8) The Department of Energy.

(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany H.R. 1455 of the One Hundred Second Congress.
(b) The Schedule of Authorizations described in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 the sum of $27,900,000, of which $6,580,000 shall be available for the Security Evaluation Office.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991, including 50 full-time personnel who are authorized to serve in the Security Evaluation Office. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[Page: H2627]

TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND RELATED PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 the sum of $164,600,000.

SEC. 302. CIA FORMER SPOUSE QUALIFYING TIME.
Section 204(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end of paragraph (4) `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.

SEC. 303. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CERTAIN CIA EMPLOYEES.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by striking out the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as and to the extent provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.

SEC. 304. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR SPOUSES OF REMARRIED, RETIRED PARTICIPANTS.
(a) Calculation of Reduction in Annuities: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5))'.
(b) Election of Reduction in Annuity: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon remarriage occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retired, a retirement participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect, by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month which begins nine months after the date of remarriage. For any remarriage that occurred before the date of the enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after such date. To the greatest extent practicable, the retired participant shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.
(c) Conforming Amendment: Section 226(d) of such Act is amended by striking out `This' and inserting in lieu thereof `Subsections (a) through (c) of this'.

(A) in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(3)(C), by striking out `age 60' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking out `age sixty' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55';

(2) in section 222--

(A) by striking out `60 years of age' each place it appears in subsections (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (b)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `55 years of age'; and

(B) by striking out `age 60' each place it appears in subsections (b)(3), (b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D), and (c)(4) and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(3) in section 232(b)(1), by striking out `attaining age sixty' in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof `attaining age 55'.
(b) Effective Date of Amendments.--(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to widows or widowers shall apply in the case of a surviving spouse's remarriage occurring on or after July 27, 1989, and with respect to periods beginning after such date.
(2) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to former spouses shall apply with respect to any former spouse whose remarriage occurs after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 306. ELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(3) A surviving spouse who married a participant after his or her retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five';

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(B), by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five'; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(2)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for a survivor annuity under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such a survivor annuity is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(b) Retirement Benefits.--Section 225 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five';

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(B)(i), by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five years of age';

(3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and

(4) by adding after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(4)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for benefits under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such benefits is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(c) Health Benefits.--Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

`(3)(A) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll or to continue enrollment in a health benefits plan under this section solely because of remarriage before age fifty-five shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.
`(B) A former spouse whose eligibility is restored under subparagraph (A) may, under regulations which the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe, enroll in a health benefits plan if such former spouse--

`(i) was an individual referred to in paragraph (1) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan as a family member at any time during the 18-month period before the date of dissolution of the marriage to the Agency employee or annuitant; or

`(ii) was an individual referred to in paragraph (2) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan immediately before the remarriage ended the enrollment.'.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect as of October 1, 1990. No benefits provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be payable with respect to any period before such date.
(e) Compliance With Budget Act.--Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.

TITLE IV--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 402. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

[Page: H2628]

SEC. 403. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN ALIEN EMPLOYEES IN HONG KONG.
(a) Authority.--In applying the proviso of section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, in the case of an alien described in subsection (b), the Director may charge the entry of the alien against the numerical limitation for any fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1991 and ending with fiscal year 1996) notwithstanding that the alien's entry is not made to the United States in that fiscal year so long as such entry is made before the end of fiscal year 1997.
(b) Eligible Aliens.--An alien eligible under subsection (a) is an alien who--

(1) is an employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Hong Kong; or

(2) is the spouse or child of an alien described in paragraph (1) if accompanying or following to join the alien in coming to the United States.

SEC. 404. EXCEPTED POSITIONS FROM THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE.
Section 621 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7231) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(f) All positions in the Department which the Secretary determines are devoted to intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government are excepted from the competitive service, and the individuals who occupy such positions as of the date of enactment of this Act shall, while employed in such positions, be exempt from the competitive service.'.

SEC. 405. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
(a) Policy Concerning Products Produced in the United States: The Director of Central Intelligence shall direct that elements of the Intelligence Community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with the operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should award contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of products produced in the United States.

(b) Definition: For purposes of this section, the term `Intelligence Community' has the same meaning as set forth in paragraph 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, or successor orders.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.
(a) In General: (1) Chapter 157 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

`2642. Reimbursement rate for airlift services provided to Central Intelligence Agency
`(a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by a component of the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.

`(b) Definition: In this section, the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the amount charged a component of the Department of Defense by another component of the Department of Defense.'.

(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

SEC. 502. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF MAPS, ETC., PRODUCED BY DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 167 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions
`(a) The Defense Mapping Agency shall offer for sale maps and charts at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller, except those withheld in accordance with subsection (b) or those specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
`(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure any geodetic product in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense--

`(A) that was obtained or produced, or that contains information that was provided, pursuant to an international agreement that restricts disclosure of such product or information to government officials of the agreeing parties or that restricts use of such product or information to government purposes only;

`(B) that contains information that the Secretary of Defense has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal sources and methods used to obtain source material for production of the geodetic product; or

`(C) that contains information that the Director of the Defense Mapping Agency has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal military operational or contingency plans.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `geodetic product' means any map, chart, geodetic data, or related product.
`(c)(1) Regulations to implement this section (including any amendments to such regulations) shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment for a period of not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(2) Regulations under this section shall address the conditions under which release of geodetic products authorized under subsection (b) to be withheld from public disclosure would be appropriate--

`(A) in the case of allies of the United States; and

`(B) in the case of qualified United States contractors (including contractors that are small business concerns) who need such products for use in the performance of contracts with the United States.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

(b) Deadline for Initial Regulations: Regulations to implement section 2796 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment in accordance with subsection (c) of that section not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 503. POST-EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN NSA EMPLOYEES.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`Sec. 17. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of the National Security Agency may use appropriated funds to assist employees who have been in sensitive positions who are found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the Agency, or whose employment has been terminated--

`(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment,

`(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities, and

`(3) in providing necessary financial support during periods of unemployment,
if the Director determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had access. Assistance provided under this section for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report annually to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant to this section.'.

SEC. 504. USE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS COVER SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

(1) by inserting after the chapter heading the following:

`Subchapter

Sec.

`I.

--

---

`II.

--

---

---

`SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS';

and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

`SUBCHAPTER II--INTELLIGENCE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities.

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds.

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities.

`435. Limitations.

`436. Regulations.

`437. Congressional oversight.

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities
`(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of those commercial activities necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. No commercial activity may be initiated pursuant to this subchapter after December 31, 1995.
`(b) Interagency Coordination and Support.--Any such activity shall--

`(1) be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of Central Intelligence; and

`(2) to the extent the activity takes place within the United States, be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
`(c) Definitions.--In this subchapter:

`(1) The term `commercial activities' means activities that are conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practices and includes--

`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage and disposal of goods and services;

`(B) entering into employment contracts and leases and other agreements for real and personal property;

`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial business or financial institutions;

`(2) The term `intelligence collection activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.

[Page: H2629]

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds
`(a) Use of Funds.--Funds generated by a commercial activity authorized pursuant to this subchapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity. Use of such funds for that purpose shall be kept to the minimum necessary to conduct the activity concerned in a secure manner. Any funds generated by the activity in excess of those required for that purpose shall be deposited, as often as may be practicable, into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
`(b) Audits.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall assign an organization within the Department of Defense to have auditing responsibility with respect to activities authorized under this subchapter.
`(2) That organization shall audit the use and disposition of funds generated by any commercial activity authorized under this subchapter not less often than annually. The results of all such audits shall be promptly reported to the intelligence committees (as defined in section 437(d) of this title).

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) In General: Except as provided by subsection (b), a commercial activity conducted pursuant to this subchapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.

`(b) Authorization of Waivers When Necessary to Maintain Security.--(1) If the Secretary of Defense determines, in connection with a commercial activity authorized pursuant to section 431 of this title, that compliance with certain Federal laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of an authorized intelligence activity, the Secretary may, to the extent necessary to prevent such compromise, waive compliance with such laws or regulations.
`(2) Any determination and waiver by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be made in writing and shall include a specification of the laws and regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Secretary of a military department.
`(c) Federal Laws and Regulations.--For purposes of this section, Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies are only those Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the following:

`(1) The receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds.

`(2) The acquisition or management of property or services.

`(3) Information disclosure, retention, and management.

`(4) The employment of personnel.

`(5) Payments for travel and housing.

`(6) The establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities.

`(7) Foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`The submission to judicial proceedings in a State or other legal jurisdiction, in connection with a commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this subchapter, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.

`435. Limitations
`(a) Lawful Activities.--Nothing in this subchapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(b) Domestic Activities.--Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this subchapter may only engage in those activities in the United States to the extent necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(c) Providing Goods and Services to the Department of Defense.--Commercial activity may not be undertaken within the United States for the purpose of providing goods and services to the Department of Defense, other than as may be necessary to provide security for the activities subject to this subchapter.
`(d) Notice to United States Persons.--(1) In carrying out a commercial activity authorized under this subchapter, the Secretary of Defense may not permit an entity engaged in such activity to employ a United States person in an operational, managerial, or supervisory position, and may not assign or detail a United States person to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for such an entity, unless that person is informed in advance of the intelligence security purpose of that activity.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `United States person' means an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

`436. Regulations
`The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement the authority provided in this subchapter. Such regulations shall be consistent with this subchapter and shall at a minimum--

`(1) specify all elements of the Department of Defense who are authorized to engage in commercial activities pursuant to this subchapter;

`(2) require the personal approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for all sensitive activities to be authorized pursuant to this subchapter;

`(3) specify all officials who are authorized to grant waivers of laws or regulations pursuant to section 433(b) of this title, or to approve the establishment or conduct of commercial activities pursuant to this subchapter;

`(4) designate a single office within the Defense Intelligence Agency to be responsible for the management and supervision of all activities authorized under this subchapter;

`(5) require that each commercial activity proposed to be authorized under this subchapter be subject to appropriate legal review before the activity is authorized; and

`(6) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.

`437. Congressional oversight
`(a) Proposed Regulations.--Copies of regulations proposed to be prescribed under section 436 of this title (including any proposed revision to such regulations) shall be submitted to the intelligence committees not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(b) Current Information.--Consistent with title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this subchapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this subchapter. The Secretary shall promptly notify the appropriate committees of Congress whenever a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established pursuant to this subchapter.
`(c) Annual Report.--Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on all commercial activities authorized under this subchapter that were undertaken during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include (with respect to the fiscal year covered by the report)--

`(1) a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433(b) of this title;

`(2) a description of any expenditure of funds made pursuant to this subchapter (whether from appropriated or non-appropriated funds); and

`(3) a description of any actions taken with respect to audits conducted pursuant to section 432 of this title to implement recommendations or correct deficiencies identified in such audits.
`(d) Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.'.
(b) Effective Date.--The Secretary of Defense may not authorize any activity under section 431 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the later of--

(1) the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(2) the effective date of regulations first prescribed under section 436 of such title, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 505. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF A CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED FOR.
The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to the classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency commonly known as the Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure under the preceding sentence any material that in the judgment of the Secretary would compromise sources and methods of intelligence.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, section 403 of the bill provides the Director of Intelligence with the authorities needed to facilitate the entry into the United States of certain United States Government employees in Hong Kong. The section is substantially the same as a provision in the Immigration Act of 1990 which was enacted late last year.

To avoid confusion, and at the request of the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I am offering this amendment to strike section 403. I have discussed this matter with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], and I ask for the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, we concur and support the gentleman from Oklahoma's [Mr. McCurdy] amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MCEWEN

Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. McEwen: At the end of title IV (page 15, after line 26), insert the following new section:

SEC. 406. SECRECY OATHS FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

Rule XLVIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended--

(1) at the end of clause 1, by adding the following new paragraph:

`(d) At the time a Member is appointed to serve on the select committee, or within 30 days after the adoption by the House of this provision, whichever is later, the Member shall take the following oath:

`I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will not directly or indirectly disclose to any unauthorized person any classified information received in the course of my duties on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, except with the formal approval of the committee or of the House.
The oath shall be administered by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Clerk of the House of Representatives of

the One Hundred Second Congress and each succeeding Congress shall cause this oath to be printed, furnishing two copies to each Member appointed to the select committee who has taken this oath, which shall be subscribed to by the Member, who shall deliver them to the Clerk, one to be filed in the records of the House of Repesentatives, and the other to be recorded in the Journal of the House and in the Congressional Record.';

(2) at the end of clause 5, by adding the following new sentences: `Each employee of the select committee and any person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for or at the request of the select committee who is required to subscribe to the agreement in writing referred to in the first sentence of this clause shall, at the time of signing or within 30 days after the adoption by the House of this provision, whichever is later, also take the oath set out in clause 1(d) of this rule. The oath shall be administered by the chairman or by any member of the committee or of the committee staff designated by the chairman. The Clerk of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred Second and each succeeding Congress shall cause this oath to be printed, furnishing two copies to each of such persons taking this oath, which shall be subscribed by each such person, who shall deliver them to the Clerk, one to be filed in the records of the House of Representatives, and the other to be recorded in the Journal of the House and in the Congressional Record.';

(3) in clause 7(d)--

(A) by inserting `or of the oath required by clause 1(d) or by clause 5,' after `paragraph (c)'; and

(B) by adding after the last sentence the following new sentences: `The select committee may refer cases of unauthorized disclosure and violations of the required oaths to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for investigation. While a member of the committee is the subject of such a pending investigation, the select committee may determine by majority vote that the member shall not be given access to classified information.'; and

(4) by adding at the end of the clause 7(e) the following new sentence: `If the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct determines that any member of the select committee or any person on its staff who is the subject of any such investigation has violated the oath required by clause 1(d) or clause 5, such person shall be permanently expelled from membership on the select committee or have his employment in any capacity by the select committee terminated permanently, as the case may be, in addition to being subject to such other actions as the House may determine are appropriate.'.

Mr. McEWEN (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I reserve a point of order, and I intend to make a point of order, but in order to do that I would like to see a copy of the amendment.

Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, I point out to the chairman of the committee that this is indeed what is known as the Shuster amendment, that was offered in the committee, and was suggested in the Committee on Rules yesterday, and it is brought forward at this time.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his explanation, and I make a point of order against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, the amendment proposes a change in the rules of the House. Changes in House rules are outside the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee and within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules.

[TIME: 1620]

H.R. 1455 therefore contains no changes to House rules.

The amendment fails the test of committee jurisdiction under section 798(c) of the rules and practice of the House of Representatives by including matters within the jurisdiction of a committee not reporting the bill, the Committee on Rules. As a result, the amendment is not germane, and therefore it violates clause 7 of rule XVI.

Madam Chairman, I insist on my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to speak to the point of order?

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, this is the amendment which we offered in the Intelligence Committee and which was defeated on a straight party line vote. We regret that the Rules Committee yesterday while waiving many points of order chose not to waive a point of order with regard to this particular amendment.

We refer to the history dating all the way back to the Constitution which indeed in the Committees of Correspondence, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay and others provided for just such a provision in their rules when they were handling highly sensitive information. We believe it is very appropriate particularly for those Members of the Intelligence Committee who handle the Nation's most sensitive secrets to take an oath which was good enough for Ben Franklin and good enough for the Founding Fathers.

So while this may be ruled out of order today, we will continue to search for ways to bring this particular issue to the floor of the Congress. Whether one is for or against this particular provision, we believe the Members of Congress should have the opportunity to express themselves by voting on the record as to whether they are for or against members of the Intelligence Committee being required to take an oath of secrecy in order to set an example and provide a standard by which those members on the Intelligence Committee protect and preserve the most sensitive issues before our Government.

Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, if I could respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Ohio wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. McEWEN. I do, Madam Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. McEWEN. Madam Chairman, I would point out that this bill covers a myriad of responsibilities, that it comes under the jurisdiction of more than one committee, even though that jurisdiction was waived by the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, for example, that it has to do with the collection of intelligence, it has to do with retirement, it has to do with oversight, and my suggestion and the amendment before us would fall within the category of enhancing the oversight responsibilities of the Intelligence Committee and would contribute to the benefit for which this bill authorizes.

The CHAIRMAN (Ms. Slaughter of New York). For the reasons stated by the gentleman from Oklahoma, the Chair agrees that this amendment is not germane to the bill before the Committee, and accordingly, the point of order is sustained.

[Page: H2631]

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SOLOMON

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end of the bill, insert the following new title--

DRUG TESTING

The Congress finds that--

(1) the illegal sale, possession and use of drugs pose a pervasive and substantial threat to the social, educational and economic health of the United States;

(2) the impact of drug abuse is reflected in the criminal violence that it causes and in the disintegration of families, schools, neighborhoods, and workplace safety and efficiency;

(3) the effects of rampant illegal drug trafficking are amply illustrated by national crime statistics and prosecutions across the United States of persons at all economic and social levels, including prominent government leaders;

(4) the chronic problem of drug abuse has contributed to declining productivity levels, escalating health care costs, and the increasing inability of domestic industry to compete in the world market; and

(5) reasonable suspicion exists that the mission of the government to preserve the public health and safety, protect the national security, and maintain an effective drug interdiction program for the United States is being subverted by the possession, sale, and use of drugs by Federal personnel at all levels of government.

SEC. 2. RANDOM DRUG TESTING.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall require random drug testing of officers and employees of the Central Intelligency Agency.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of this Act--

(1) the term `drug' or `drugs' means any controlled substance as defined by the Controlled Substances Act; and

(2) the term `employee' means--

(A) an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOLOMON (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, I am sure all of us have seen the recent report indicating that violent crime is on the rise all across America, primarily because of illegal drug use. Therefore, I am once again offering an amendment which is designed to change and to expand the emphasis on the war against drugs.

I believe, and so does the majority of the American people, that to turn the tide in the drug war we need to address the problem of the casual drug user as well as the drug supplier.

Madam Chairman, let us face the facts. We could eliminate every drug lord in the world today and new ones would pop up tomorrow because of the enormous profits involved in this deadly trade. We have to eliminate the market by eliminating the

demand. This can be done by holding the casual drug user accountable. The casual drug user causes about 75 percent of the entire illegal drug trade in America.

Madam Chairman, the days of regarding these casual drug users as victims is over. If we condition Federal privileges to remaining drug free, we can begin to send a message to illegal drug users that they do have some bearing on the terrible drug problem facing our Nation today and that they are no longer immune to those consequences.

Madam Chairman, in the last Congress I introduced legislation to condition the privilege of driving with the responsibility of remaining drug free. That measure was included in the fiscal year 1991 DOT appropriations bill which became law. My amendment today continues to condition Federal benefits to the responsibility of remaining drug free by requiring the random drug testing of all CIA employees.

If we are going to get serious about user accountability, what better place to do it than right here in the Federal Government? As the Nation's largest employer, the Federal Government has a compelling interest in establishing reasonable conditions of employment. Remaining drug free is completely reasonable for all Federal agencies and particularly for the CIA, due to the nature of their business.

Now, clearly the CIA should have a random drug testing policy in effect, but it does not. We cannot afford to have the personnel of this or any other Federal agency using drugs. There is far too much at stake. That is why I intend to offer a series of amendments to every authorization bill in the 102d Congress. They will include preemployment drug testing, drug testing as a condition of employment, and random drug testing.

In other words, the job, a part of every Federal job, is going to be in carrying out the duties of submitting to a random drug test. A part of the job is going to be submitting to a random drug test.

As you may know, the courts have ruled that it is within the bounds of constitutionality to require drug tests on people who hold sensitive and security-related positions. As a result of these rulings, some people have argued that random drug testing is unconstitutional. This, of course, is not true. Under no circumstances have the courts ruled out drug testing for nonsensitive positions.

My amendment has been drafted by the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service to withstand a court challenge. I strongly feel it should be used as a test case, which is why I am introducing it today.

Once the Federal Government implements random drug testing, we could begin to urge the private sector to join in this fight. Our Armed Forces have used this idea with tremendous success. You may remember back in 1982, when 27 percent of our military were using drugs, by their own admission. That was 27 percent. Then the military instituted a policy of random drug testing. By 1988, just 5 years later, drug use dropped to 4.5 percent. That is an 82-percent reduction in 5 years.

Random drug testing works, Madam Chairman. We know the American public supports penalties for drug users. So I ask you today, support a drug-free Government. Support user accountability. If you support this amendment, you can really make a difference.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I strongly support the gentleman's amendment. Where better to apply it then to those employees employed by one of the most sensitive agencies of our U.S. Government?

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Let me respond briefly to the gentleman's amendment, although we are prepared to accept it. The amendment does deal with what I am sure we all consider to be a significant threat to national security, the drug problem. However, by mandating what may be an unnecessary and redundant program, the amendment probably does not make as much sense as it might if it were applied to other agencies of the Government.

Madam Chairman, I want Members to understand that the CIA already maintains an active drug awareness and prevention program, and is actively committed to preventing and detecting drug use among Agency employees.

The CIA's drug detection program includes background investigations of all applicants, specifically focusing on whether applicants may use or abuse drugs or alcohol. Applicants are also given medical examinations that screen urine and blood samples. Psychological assessments are made of applicants to determine behavior that could indicate abuse of drugs or alcohol. Finally, every applicant is given a polygraph examination to determine whether the applicant has abused drugs or alcohol.

The CIA's program for a drug-free workplace does not end with the acceptance of an applicant for employment. The Agency continues to be vigilant against drug abuse among its employees. Current Agency policy requires that new employees be subject to reinvestigation after 3 years. This reinvestigation includes another medical examination and another polygraph examination that specifically covers substance abuse during the time of employment at the Agency. Agency employees are also subject to periodic routine reinvestigations. A specific issue polygraph examination and/or a fitness-for-duty medical examination may be conducted at any time if there are any indications of drug abuse.

I am therefore concerned that the gentleman's amendment may be unnecessary. I am prepared to accept it, however, with the understanding that the Director of Central Intelligence would be free to fashion a reasonable program to address whatever is not addressed by the current, rigorous, Agency program directed toward detecting substance abuse.

[Page: H2632]

[TIME: 1630]

Mr. SOLOMON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for supporting the amendment. The gentleman knows that I am one of the strongest supporters of the CIA. They are one of the finest agencies we have. We are not pointing fingers at them.

As I said, this is the first authorization bill to come before the House, for which I commend the gentleman from Oklahoma for getting his work done, and that is the reason I am offering it today.

I will continue to offer it to all authorization bills all year long as they come before the House.

Again, I thank the gentleman for his support.

Mr. McCURDY. I thank the gentleman.

Madam Chairman, I can assure the gentleman will have a second shot at this in a few weeks as we bring out the authorization bills for the fiscal year 1992.

Madam Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there other amendments to the bill? If not, under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. Barnard] having assumed the chair, Mrs. Slaughter of New York, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1455) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the intelligence community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 136, she reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barnard). Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.