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Peace Won’t Come to Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections on March 29
are rigged in favor of the incumbent leader Robert Mugabe and his
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Much ink has been
spilled on the electoral prospects of his two opponents — Morgan
Tsvangirai, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change, and
former Finance Minister Simba Makoni. But neither have a realistic
chance of winning, for Mr. Mugabe knows that the most likely
alternative to the State House in Harare is a prison cell at The
Hague.

The case against Mr. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF for crimes against
humanity would be compelling. They have turned one of Africa’s most
prosperous and relatively free nations into an Orwellian nightmare.
Since 1994, the average life expectancy in Zimbabwe has fallen to
34 from 57 for women and to 37 from 54 for men. Some 3,500
Zimbabweans die every week from the combined effects of HIV/AIDS,
poverty and malnutrition. Inflation and unemployment are at
150,000% (no misprint here) and 80%, respectively. The country has
no freedom of speech or assembly, and the government has used
violence to intimidate and murder its opponents. In the meantime,
Zimbabwe’s delusional leader rails against non-existent Western
plots supposedly concocted by George W. Bush and Tony Blair.

By right, Mr. Mugabe and
the ZANU-PF should have been voted out of office long time
ago.

By right, Mr. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF should have been voted out
of office long time ago. But one of Mr. Mugabe’s first steps after
gaining power was to root out all threats to his rule. In August
1980, newly elected Prime Minister Mugabe asked Kim Il Sung, the
North Korean dictator, for help in setting up a special army unit
devoted to quelling Zimbabwe’s internal dissent. Paradoxically, the
potential dissenters Mr. Mugabe wanted destroyed were not the tiny
minority of white Rhodesians, but his comrades in the fight for a
majority rule — the Zimbabwe African People’s Union.

A self-declared Marxist with his sights set on the creation of a
one-party state, Mr. Mugabe knew that ZAPU and its charismatic
leader Joshua Nkomo could become his only serious opposition in the
long run. In 1983, therefore, Mr. Mugabe sent his North
Korean-trained death squad into Nkomo’s stronghold in the
Matabeleland, where they killed some 20,000 civilians. This
massacre eviscerated ZAPU’s strength and sent Nkomo into exile. In
1987, he agreed to merge his party with ZANU in exchange for the
largely meaningless title of Zimbabwe’s vice president.

Mr. Mugabe’s strategy worked. With minimum opposition, he
maintained his hold on power until the birth of the Movement for
Democratic Change in 2000 following Zimbabwe’s disastrous
intervention in the Congolese civil war and the ruling party’s
gross economic mismanagement. Since then, the strength of the
opposition had forced Mr. Mugabe to adopt an array of ever-more
repressive and economically destructive measures.

Mr. Mugabe’s desperation is understandable. The moment he loses
power, he could quickly find himself in the dock. The new
government would, no doubt, come under tremendous pressure to
ensure that Mr. Mugabe stands trial for his crimes. An exile to a
friendly country, like Angola or Malaysia, had been rumored, but is
unlikely. Charles Taylor was lured out of the Liberian presidency
in 2003 with a promise of a comfortable life in Nigeria. Three
years later, he was flown to The Hague where he has been fighting
for his freedom ever since.

The candidacies of Messrs. Tsvangirai and Makoni might be
hopeless, but they are not meaningless. A fraudulent election will
further undermine Mr. Mugabe’s legitimacy. It will energize the
opposition’s local structures and allow it some representation in
Zimbabwe’s parliament.

Importantly, it will open the possibility of another five-year
term for Zimbabwe’s octogenarian leader and further economic
decline. That prospect may force the more enlightened
parliamentarians from the ZANU-PF, many of whom are quietly hoping
for Mr. Makoni’s victory, to jump ship and join the opposition.

In the event of popular protests, the attitude of the army and
the police will be crucial. Mr. Mugabe has spared no expense to buy
the loyalties of the officer class, but the rank-and-file is poor,
hungry and disillusioned. Considering that Mr. Mugabe cannot afford
to give up power, he will try to hang on. He may then find himself
in charge of a paper tiger and unable to stop a surge of public
resentment against his rule. If that takes place, let us hope it
will be fast and bloodless.