Is Anyone Ready to Actually Lead Egypt?

By Thanassis Cambanis

The Muslim Brotherhood is inflexible and exclusive, the military power-hungry and self-interested, liberals are in disarray, and a country that badly needs cooperation is once again plagued by division.

CAIRO, Egypt -- The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi appears to have won
Egypt's first contested presidential election in history, a mind-boggling
reversal for the underground Islamist organization whose leaders are more
familiar with the inside of prisons than parliament. Whether or not Morsi is
certified as the winner on Thursday -- and there is every possibility that loose-cannon
judges will award the race to Mubarak's man, retired General Ahmed Shafiq -- the
struggle has clearly moved into a new phase that pits political forces against
a military determined to remain above the government.

The ultimate battle, between revolution and revanchism, will
remain the same whether Morsi or Shafiq is the next president. It's going to be
a mismatched struggle, one that will require unity of purpose, organization, and the sort of
political muscle-flexing that has escaped civilian politicians for the entire
18-month transition process. If they can't marshal a strong front on behalf of a
unified agenda, they are likely to fail to wrestle the most important powers
out of the military's stranglehold.

After a year and a half in direct control, Egypt's ruling
council of generals (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF) appears to have
grown fond of its power. As the presidential vote was being counted, SCAF
issued a new temporary constitution that gives it almost unlimited powers, far
greater than those of the president. It can effectively veto the process of
drafting the new permanent constitution, and it retains the power to declare
war.

"We want a little more trust in us," a SCAF general said in
a surreal press conference on Monday. "Stop all the criticisms that we are a
state within a state. Please. Stop."

In fact, all the military's moves, right up to the
last-minute dissolution of parliament and the 11th-hour publication
of its extended, near-supreme powers, give Egyptians every reason to distrust
it. Sadly, the alternatives are not much more reassuring.

Shafiq, the old regime's choice, mobilized the former ruling
party with an unapologetic, fear-driven campaign, drumming up terror of an
Islamic reign while promising a full restoration to Mubarak's machine. If he
ends up in the presidential palace, he could place the secular revolutionaries
and the Muslim Brotherhood in harmony for the first time since the early days
of Tahrir Square.

Morsi, meanwhile, is known as an organization enforcer, not
as a gifted politician or negotiator -- which are the skills most in need as
Egypt embarks on its high-risk struggle to push aside a military dictatorship
determined to remain the power behind the throne.

The Muslim Brotherhood's candidate has few assets in his
corner. He represents the single best-organized opposition group but doesn't
control it. Revolutionary and liberal forces are in disarray. Mistrust, even
hatred, of the Muslim Brotherhood has flared among groups that should be the
Brotherhood's natural allies against the SCAF. And the Brotherhood itself has
wavered between cutting deals with the military and confronting it when the
military changes the terms. Many secular liberals say they relish the idea of
the dictatorial military and the authoritarian Islamists fighting each other to
exhaustion.

All this division promises a chaotic and difficult
transition for Egypt after 18 months of direct military rule. If officials
honor the apparent results (an open question, since the elections authority is
run by SCAF cronies), Morsi will head an emasculated, civilian power center in
the government that will have little more than moral suasion and the bully
pulpit with which to face down the SCAF.

While the military's legal coup overshadows the election
results, it doesn't render them meaningless. The presidency carries enormous
authority; managed successfully, it's the one institution that could begin to
counter and undo the military's evisceration of law and political life.

The example of parliament is instructive. Some observers
said from the beginning that a parliament under SCAF would have no real power.
But that didn't turn out to be the problem with the Islamist-controlled
parliament. It had symbolic power, and it could pass laws even if the SCAF then
vetoed them. What made the parliament a failure was its actual record. It
didn't pass any inspiring or imaginative laws, it repeatedly squashed
pluralism within its ranks, and it regularly did SCAF's bidding. That's what
discredited the Brotherhood and its Salafi allies and led to their dramatic,
nearly 20 percent drop in popularity between the parliamentary elections and
the first round of presidential balloting five months later.

It would be greatly satisfying if the corrupt, arrogant, and
authoritarian machine of the old ruling party were turned back, despite what appears to have been hints of an old-fashioned vote-buying campaign and a slick
fear-mongering media push, backed by state newspapers and television. On
election day, landowners in Sharqiya province told me the Shafiq campaign was
offering 50 Egyptian pounds, or about $8.60, per vote.

But it would be greatly unsatisfying for that victory to
come in the form of a stiff and reactionary Muslim Brotherhood leader who
appears constitutionally averse to coalition-building and whose political
instincts seem narrowly partisan, at a time when Egypt's political
class is locked in death-match with the nation's military dictators.

Egypt's second transition could last, based on the current political calendar, anywhere from six
months to four years. A new constitution will have to be written and approved, likely
with heavy meddling from the military and with profound differences of
philosophy separating the Islamist and secular political forces charged with drafting it. A new parliament will have to be
elected. And then, possibly, the military (or secular liberals) could force
another presidential election to give the transitional government a more permanent footing.

Meanwhile, during this turbulent period, Egypt will have to
contend with the forces unleashed during the recent, bruising electoral fights.

Shafiq's campaign brought into the open the sizable
constituency of old regime supporters (maybe a fifth of the electorate, based on how they did in recent votes) and
Christians terrified that their second-class status will be grossly eroded
under Islamist rule.

Liberals will have to explain and atone for their stands on
the election. Many of them said they would prefer the "clarity" of a Shafiq victory
to a triumphalist Islamic regime under Morsi, and cheered when parliament was
dissolved -- appearing hypocritical, expedient, and excessively tolerant of military
caprice.

The Brotherhood still hasn't made a genuine-seeming effort to placate
and include other revolutionaries, spurning entreaties to form a more inclusive
coalition. It attempted, twice, to force through a
constitution-writing assembly under its absolute control. Yet, once more, the
Brotherhood has a chance to save itself. So far, at each such juncture it has
chosen to pursue narrow organizational goals rather than a national agenda. It would be great for Egypt if the
Brotherhood now learned from its mistakes, but precedent doesn't suggest
optimism.

Partisans of both presidential candidates told me they expected a big pay-off when their man won: cheaper fertilizer, free seeds, a flood of
affordable housing, jobs for all their kids, better schools. None of these
things is to be expected in the near future under any regime in Egypt.
Disappointment is sure to proliferate as everyone realizes how difficult
Egypt's long slog will be.

There's much hand wringing among Egyptians about the
last-minute power grab by the military through the sweeping constitutional
declaration it published on Sunday. In a land of made-up law and real power, why the obsession
with power-mad generals, co-opted judges, and the arbitrary declarations they
publish? SCAF's decisions only matter because of its raw power, tied to the
gunmen it has deployed on the streets and its willingness to use them against
unarmed civilians. This inequity will only change with a shift in actual power,
not because of a clever and just redrafting of laws. An elected president, or a
defenestrated parliament for that matter, could issue its own, better
constitution and declare it the law of the land, and enter a starting contest
with SCAF. Authority belongs to whomever claims it and can make it stick.