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They Are Coming, Mr. President

President George W. Bush’s earthy simplicity was a
strength after Sept. 11. But today he seems out of touch with
foreign realities. Of Islamic militants he says, “bring ‘em
on.”

The president, cosseted by a Secret Service guard, might not
have noticed, but America’s enemies are bringing it on, killing and
wounding American soldiers every day.

The problem is not that Saddam Hussein — if he is alive — is
capable of driving out American forces and re-establishing his
dictatorship. Hatred of the Baathists is too widespread to allow
them a popular victory.

But violent opposition to American rule will make it far more
difficult to remake Iraqi society. And the occupation will require
ever-harsher tactics that will inflame resentment against
America.

Of course, the United States theoretically can withstand a
couple of casualties a day, the current rate. But already half of
the Army’s 10 divisions are committed to Iraq. Washington also is
garrisoning wealthy allied states in East Asia and Europe, policing
unstable Bosnia and Kosovo, fighting Islamist remnants in
Afghanistan, and perhaps reconstructing Liberia.

Even enlisting the Marines in garrison duty won’t yield the
troops necessary to maintain these commitments and give soldiers
time back home in America. Nor can the problem be solved by calling
up reservists. Overseas service is even harder on them, since they
must leave job as well as family.

In the short-term, of course, soldiers will obey orders to go.
But in the long-term, troops won’t re-up. And civilians won’t join.
Already troops who thought they were going over to liberate, not
garrison, Iraq are angrily demanding to go home.

Baathists are but one source of dissatisfaction with the U.S.
occupation. Sunni elites used to governing Iraq fear lost
privileges; fundamentalist Shiites resent an occupation by Western
Christians allied with Israel.

Independent Islamic terrorists, along with agents from Iran and
Syria, are looking for targets. Any attempt to re-establish central
control over Kurdish areas will anger groups that had been
America’s strongest allies.

Although most Iraqis were glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein, most
of them share the general antipathy toward the U.S. government
evident throughout the Mideast and Islamic worlds. Moreover, like
all peoples everywhere, Iraqis want to run their own affairs.

The United States proclaimed liberation, but has done little to
convince Iraqis that they will soon become masters of their own
fate. One U.S. sergeant told The Economist magazine: “You promise
freedom. They get martial law.”

Every time American troops arrest, bind and blindfold an Iraqi,
they create another Iraqi ready to demand Washington’s ouster.
Every time American troops wound or kill an Iraqi, they push family
and friendly toward a violent response.

Indeed, U.S. forces have increasingly been criticized for
shooting first and asking questions later. Even the British have
been appalled by some American practices. After learning that U.S.
troops had arrested three innocent Iraqis - whose families came to
the British for help - British Col. Steve Cox termed the Americans
“idiot” and “stupid.”

The fault is not that of U.S. soldiers. They are trained to be
warriors, to destroy an opposing military, not to be governors, to
balance competing political factions.

Expanding hostility and resentment will not necessarily result
in direct support for those killing Americans. But a simple refusal
to oppose them could make U.S. control untenable.

At Baghdad University, an American civil affairs soldier was
gunned down and the culprit escaped despite a campus full of
witnesses. If Americans are murdered without penalty, what Iraqi
will want to join with the United States? Seven Iraqi police
recruits were recently murdered for “collaborating.”

The longer Washington temporizes, the more difficult the
situation becomes. The United States must enlist local Iraqi
factions in the governing process, so they understand that they
have a stake in rebuffing the Baathists.

Washington must quickly withdraw from day-to-day governance
while preparing a decentralized federal structure with some hope of
surviving America’s departure. It should swallow its pride and
request allied assistance — which requires allied participation in
decision-making. And Washington must create a rough timetable for
pulling out, indicating that the United States is prepared to live
with any government that neither aids terrorists nor develops
weapons of mass destruction.

Some argue that it is vital that America get Iraq right. But it
will take years to do so, if that goal is even possible.

Along the way, Washington is likely to face an increasingly
costly guerrilla war and increasing hostility toward America
throughout Iraq and the Islamic world. That would mean losing the
peace.