The Battle of Arracourt was a World War II clash of U.S. and German armored forces near the town of Arracourt , Lorraine, France, during September 18–29, 1944. The German Fifth Panzer Army had as its objective the recapture of Lunéville and the collapse of the U.S. XII Corps bridgehead over the Moselle River at Dieulouard. Having a local superiority in troops and tanks, the German tankers foresaw a sharp defeat of the defending 4th Armored Division. Against German expectations, the 4th Armored Division thoroughly defeated two Panzer brigades and elements of two Panzer divisions.

The cause of the heavy losses for the Germans was the disjointed nature of the attack, and the poor tactical deployment of the German AFVs (Armored Fighting Vehicles) in the heavy fog and rolling terrain of the battlefield, which allowed the American tanks (mainly 75mm M4 Shermans, and a few M5A1 Stuart light tanks), M18 tank destroyers, and 155mm artillery units to maneuver and stay hidden until the German AFVs (the majority of which were Panther tanks) had closed within range. It was this tactical situation, a combination of defensive ambushes, fire and maneuver tactics, and excellent use of the terrain to establish superior firing positions, which allowed the 4th Armored Division to negate the superior armor and firepower of the German AFVs. Allied air power had also hampered the arrival of the German panzer units and disrupted close coordination between the units in the attack. Some of the panzer units originally slated to be in the counterattack never made it to the battle as they suffered heavy casualties whilst en route in separate encounters with other Allied forces.

Despite an impressive strength on paper, the German 5th Panzer Army order of battle was only 182 tanks (75 Mark IVs and 107 Mark Vs, although they had an additional 80 armored fighting vehicles such as assault guns). Although, at full strength, the 4th Armored Division would have fielded 263 tanks, 77 of these were M5 Stuart light tanks that were no match for German tanks or assault guns of 1944. The 4th Armored Division also had an attached tank destroyer battalion that at full strength would have had 36 M18 tank destroyers. Assuming the 4th Armored Division was at full strength in armored fighting vehicles, the 4th Armored Division strength as compared to the mechanized elements of the 5th Panzer Army were 1.1 to 1 in manpower, 1 to 1 in armored fighting vehicles not counting the ineffective M5 light tanks, perhaps 1 to 1 in artillery tubes and overwhelmingly in the air.

During the first few days of this battle, poor weather had prevented the use of any close air support, but starting on September 21, P-47s of the 405th Fighter Group were able to begin a series of attacks which contributed to the further destruction of the German panzer units.

Through the month of September, Patton's Third Army had continued creeping towards Germany despite orders to the contrary, but on September 22, he was informed that his fuel supplies were being restricted and he would have to shift to a defensive posture.

The final tally for the battle was as follows:

Of the 262 tanks and assault guns deployed by the German units in the week of fighting near Arracourt, 86 were destroyed, 114 were damaged or broken down, and only 62 were operational at the end of the month. The 4th Armored Division, which had borne the brunt of the Arracourt tank fighting, lost 41 M4 medium tanks and 7 M5A1 light tanks during the whole month of September, and casualties had been 225 killed and 648 wounded.
The great irony of the Battle of Arracourt is that the Germans believed, despite their heavy losses, that they had succeeded in their objective of stopping the advance of General George Patton's Third Army, as the Third Army had stopped advancing. Major General Friedrich von Mellenthin, Chief of Staff of the Fifth Panzer Army, summarized the situation:

Quite apart from Hitler's orders, our attacks on the XIIth Corps at Gremecey and Arracourt appeared to have some justification. When Balck took over Army Group G on 21 September it looked as though the Americans were determined to force their way through to the Saar and the Rhine, and General Patton might well have done so if he had been given a free hand. At that time the West Wall was still unmanned, and no effective defense could have been made there. From our point of view there was much to be said for counterattacking the spearheads of the XIIth Corps to discourage the Americans from advancing farther. Although our attacks were very costly it appeared at the time that they had achieved their purpose, and had effectively checked the American Third Army.
In fact, Patton was compelled to halt by Eisenhower's order of 22 September. The Supreme Allied Commander had decided to accept Montgomery's proposal to make the main effort on the northern flank, clear the approaches to Antwerp, and try to capture the Ruhr before winter. Third U.S. Army received categorical orders to stand on the defensive. The rights and wrongs of this strategy do not concern me, but it certainly simplified the problems of Army Group G. We were given a few weeks' grace to rebuild our battered forces and get ready to meet the next onslaught.

The Battle of Arracourt thus occurred during the time that the rapid advance of Patton's Third Army through France was stopped short of entering Germany by General Eisenhower's decision to divert Allied fuel supplies to other Allied forces north of Patton's Third Army, as well as to General Bernard Montgomery's Operation Market Garden, a mostly British attack towards the bridge over the Rhine river at Arnhem, which failed. The delay allowed the German Army to regroup for their defense of the German border at the Siegfried Line.

Hitler, however, was less than pleased with the results of the German offensive and relieved the commander of Army Group G, Johannes Blaskowitz. Since the U.S. victory at Arracourt proved to have no strategic value for the Allies, the tank-to-tank action there had long been ignored by historians or simply lumped together with the rest of Patton's campaign in the Lorraine and was not even generally known as a named battle until recent debates on the relative merits of Allied tanks versus German tanks in World War II resurrected interest in this action. The Battle of Arracourt was the largest tank battle involving U.S. forces in the Western Front until the Battle of the Bulge and has been used as an example of how the tactical situation and quality of the tank crews were far more important factors in determining the outcome of a tank battle than the technical merits of the tanks involved.

The Battle of the Bulge (also known as the Ardennes Offensive and the Von Rundstedt Offensive) (16 December 1944 – 25 January 1945) was a major German offensive (die Ardennenoffensive), launched toward the end of World War II through the densely forested Ardennes Mountains region of Wallonia in Belgium, hence its French name (Bataille des Ardennes), and France and Luxembourg on the Western Front. The Wehrmacht's code name for the offensive was Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein ("Operation Watch on the Rhine"), after the German patriotic hymn Die Wacht am Rhein. This German offensive was officially named the Ardennes-Alsace campaign by the U.S. Army, but it is known to the English-speaking general public simply as the Battle of the Bulge, the "bulge" being the initial incursion the Germans put into the Allies' line of advance, as seen in maps presented in contemporary newspapers.

The German offensive was supported by several subordinate operations known as Unternehmen Bodenplatte, Greif, and Währung. Germany's goal for these operations was to split the British and American Allied line in half, capturing Antwerp, Belgium, and then proceed to encircle and destroy four Allied armies, forcing the Western Allies to negotiate a peace treaty in the Axis Powers' favor. Once accomplished, Hitler could return his attention and the bulk of his forces to the Soviet armies in the east.

The offensive was planned with the utmost secrecy, minimizing radio traffic and moving troops and equipment under cover of darkness. Although ULTRA suggested a possible attack and the Third U.S. Army's intelligence staff predicted a major German offensive, the Allies were still caught by surprise. This was achieved by a combination of Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with their own offensive plans, and poor aerial reconnaissance.

Near-complete surprise against a weakly defended section of the Allied line was achieved during heavy overcast weather, which grounded the Allies' overwhelmingly superior air forces. Fierce resistance, particularly around the key town of Bastogne, and terrain favoring the defenders threw the German timetable behind schedule. Allied reinforcements, including General George Patton's Third Army, and improving weather conditions, which permitted air attacks on German forces and supply lines, sealed the failure of the offensive.

In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of men and equipment as survivors retreated to the defenses of the Siegfried Line. For the Americans, with about 500,000 to 840,000 men committed and some 70,000 to 89,000 casualties, including 19,000 killed, the Battle of the Bulge was the largest and bloodiest battle that they fought in World War II.

well it comprise mostly on the Third army (Gen.Patton) mostly Armored divsion was sent to battle

Operation Cobra was the codename for an offensive launched by the First United States Army eight weeks after the D-Day landings, during the Normandy Campaign of World War II. American Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's intention was to take advantage of the German preoccupation with British and Canadian activity around the town of Caen, and punch through the German defenses penning in his troops while his opponent was distracted and unbalanced. Once a corridor had been created, the First Army would then be able to advance into Brittany, rolling up the German flanks and freeing itself of the constraints imposed by operating in the Norman bocage countryside. After a slow start the offensive gathered momentum, and German resistance collapsed as scattered remnants of broken units fought to escape to the Seine. Lacking the resources to cope with the situation, the German response was ineffectual, and the entire Normandy front soon collapsed. Operation Cobra, together with concurrent offensives by the Second British and First Canadian Armies, was decisive in securing an Allied victory in the Normandy Campaign.

Having been delayed several times by poor weather, Operation Cobra commenced on 25 July with a concentrated aerial bombardment from thousands of Allied aircraft. Supporting offensives had drawn the bulk of German armored reserves towards the British and Canadian sector, and coupled with the general lack of men and materiel available to the Germans, it was impossible for them to form successive lines of defense. Units of VII Corps led the initial two-division assault while other First Army corps mounted supporting attacks designed to pin German units in place. Progress was slow on the first day, but opposition started to crumble once the defensive crust had been broken. By 27 July most organized resistance had been overcome, and VII and VIII Corps were advancing rapidly, isolating the Cotentin peninsula.

By 31 July, XIX Corps had destroyed the last forces opposing the First Army, and Bradley's troops were finally freed from the bocage. Reinforcements were moved west by Marshal Günther von Kluge and employed in various counterattacks, the largest of which (codenamed Operation Lüttich) was launched on 7 August between Mortain and Avranches. Although this led to the bloodiest phase of the battle, it was mounted by already exhausted and understrength units and had little effect other than to further deplete von Kluge's forces. On 8 August, troops of the newly activated Third United States Army captured the city of Le Mans, formerly the German Seventh Army's headquarters. Operation Cobra transformed the high-intensity infantry combat of Normandy into rapid maneuver warfare, and led to the creation of the Falaise pocket and the loss of the German position in northwestern France.

while having historical battles is good, gives you the player the chance to play in the battle that actually took place, and with the tactics you use in the map arena see if you can duplicate or completely change how the battle goes, but another battle format, one that might already be in the works is a World War 2 battle map. What i mean by this is implimenting all the battles that took place in World War 2 where there is one map and all the players wishing to participate in the battle can join, and each battle that takes place is based on the actual time line, with historically accurate tanks used for that particular battle. What this basically means, the tanks used in these battles will be the actual tanks used during that time, making the game a bit more challenging but at the same time very fun.
This is only a suggestion, but one i hope you will look at when and if you decide to impliment historical battles into WoT. With the mentioning of a global map for clan wars for holding territories, the map for the historical battles could be done in the same manner.

I was reminded earlier today by a coworker who also shares my interest and passion in regards to WWII era tanks and battles. One of our most frequent discussions involved the Battle of Kursk. Now, if I remember right, it was around the year 1943 when the Germans attempted to invade Russia. A stupid move on Germany's part as agreed to by the both of us. I looked up several references in regards to this battle. I'll just save the time and copy and paste it here. Let me first say that I did not write this. Alot of it I do agree sounds alot like conjecture. But one thing can be agreed on as far as historical references go. Both the Germans and the Russians, at the same time, had the plan to knock out one another's supply lines. Both sides ended up spiraling inwards towards each other. After the first few days they ceased calling in air support due to all the smoke, dust, and lack of visibility for the pilots to be able to identify who was who. Those tanks that weren't dead yet, but had run out of ammo, fuel or both, had their crews run up to the enemy tank, and either: 1. hijack the enemy tank to be used against the other side, 2. attempt to disable the tank by the use of hand grenades tossed into the crew hatches. So, I won't bore you with other meaningless details. Read on:

The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality

Spoiler

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most familiar battles of the Eastern Front. Those casually acquainted with the Second World War usually know of only two battles between the Soviets and the Germans: Stalingrad and Kursk. Unfortunately, knowledge of the Battle of Kursk is only just now being improved. Despite a growing number of good analyses available to the public, the myths of Kursk are hard to put to rest. This essay will hopefully help this cause.

Background to the Battle

The Kursk salient that the Germans hoped to surround and destroy was a result of the battles in the winter and spring of 1943. After the Soviets surrounded Stalingrad and forced the Germans out of the Caucasus, their offensive did not stop. It continued westward, taking important cities such as Rostov and Kharkov. However, the Red Army overextended itself, and was ripe for a counterattack. The riposte destroyed many of the Soviet units and cleared much of the territory they had taken. This included Kharkov, but not much of the territory north of the city. Hence the Soviet salient protruding into German lines. The overall operational idea was to pause to rest and refit the forces that had participated in Manstein's counterattacks, to wait for the development of new equipment (Panther tanks, Elefant tank destroyers, and some other weaponry), and to build up new units. Then launch the attack to destroy the salient. The code name for the operation was "CITADEL".

From these plans, it is clear that CITADEL was purely operational. Even a complete German success would not have fundamentally changed the strategic situation on the East Front. At most, it would have delayed subsequent Soviet offensives, but it is hard to argue that a German success would have prevented them, or created some sort of long-term stalemate to allow the Germans to turn and defeat the Western Allies (the US and the UK). It simply was not big enough, although it surely represented the largest operation that the German Army could have launched. In fact, once launched it became clear that even CITADEL was outside the scope of what the Germans could accomplish.

Myths of CITADEL

There is a tremendous amount of misunderstanding about how CITADEL progressed. This misunderstanding is fueled by oft-repeated, but false, de​sc​ri​ptions of the combat that took place. Perhaps no other author has contributed as much to these myths as Martin Caiden. His book, The Tigers are Burning was published in 1973 and quickly became a bestseller, and was a "selection of the month" for various book clubs. Due to its popularity it was reprinted in 1980. It is fairly safe to say that the main, if not only, source of information on CITIDEL for western readers was Caiden's book. This is unfortunate, because although his book is exciting to read (it ranks with Tom Clancy's best thrillers), it is almost entirely wrong. It is so wrong, that I have seen it stocked in the "fiction" section of used book stores, which is entirely appropriate.

Caiden's book is the product of Soviet propaganda. With no access to Soviet archives, and since he did no archival work in the (accessible) West German archives, it was inevitable that Caiden would be fooled. Indeed the predicable result was a foolish book. Why did Soviet propaganda need to inflate the significance of the Battle of Kursk? Why did it need to inflate the scope of the battle and the losses the Germans took? Because at the tactical level, the Red Army suffered greatly. Some units were almost completely wiped out. In order to justify the losses they took, particularly in the battle in front of Prokhorovka, the Soviets inflated the size, power, and losses of the German forces. Caiden, unable and unwilling to filter this deception out, simply spiced up the de​sc​ri​ptions and inserted the Soviet figures directly into his book. Only lately, in the last 10 years or so, have we been able to gain a balanced analytical perspective on CITADEL. As a result, it is time to do some "myth busting".

Myth #1: CITADEL was one distinct battle, primarily between tank forces of both sides. Wrong! CITADEL was gigantic, both in terms of the forces involved and the areas fought over. And while the armored units of both sides did much of the glamorous fighting, ultimately the operation was won and lost by infantry divisions. Most of the division-sized units employed by both sides were infantry, not armored. Regarding the size of the operation, the "front lines" of CITADEL stretched for hundreds of miles, and the territory fought over spanned thousands of square miles. While some areas saw rather high concentrations of troops, CITADEL hardly follows the popular picture of units wedged together, with no room to maneuver. The size of the operation ensured that CITADEL was not "one battle". Considering that the Germans used three armies, one on the north portion, two on the south, it is baffling to think that some people envision CITADEL as a tactical fight.

Myth #2: The battle at Prokhorovka was the largest tank battle in history. This is probably the most-repeated claim about CITADEL. It is also misleading and almost certainly wrong. The typical claim is that the battle at Prokhorovka was massive, involving two thousand tanks. While a significant battle, it was nowhere near as large as the myth supposes. One way people arrive at inflated numbers is to assume that all three SS Panzergrenadier divisions participated. In fact, only one, the Liebsstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) fought this battle. The other two were on the flanks of the LSSAH (Totenkopf on the left, and largely across the Psel River, and Das Reich on the right) and were fighting their own separate battles. At the time of the battle, LSSAH had already been in combat for about a week and was substantially depleted. By July 11th and 12th, the two main days of the battle, LSSAH was down to about 100 tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers (not including observation tanks). The Soviet units that participated in the battle at Prokhorovka were the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, along with a separate detachment under General Trufanov. These units combined were able to field about 421 tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers. So, contrary to the popular claims of "thousands" of tanks fighting it out in front of Prokhorovka, we have about 517, of which 455 were actually "tanks". I have provided data for the number of on-hand (that is, ready to fight) armored fighting vehicles for July 10, 11, and 12. Note that these numbers fluctuate for a variety of reasons: temporary losses due to damage, permanent losses due to destruction, and returns from repair shops.

German AFVs On-Hand and Operational

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

Pz III

11

12

12

Pz IV

42

48

32

Pz VI Tiger

4

3

3

Marder III

20

19

19

StuG III

20

10

20

Pz I

2

2

2

Pz II

4

4

4

TOTAL

109

99

92

Soviet AFVs On-Hand and Operational

18th TC

29th TC

Trufanov

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

KV I

0

0

0

1

1

2

0

0

0

Churchill

18

18

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

T-34

50

68

26

122

123

20

35

35

27

T-70

49

58

35

82

81

29

9

9

6

SU-122

0

0

0

11

12

3

0

0

0

SU-76

8

8

7

8

8

4

0

0

0

TOTAL

125

152

76

224

225

58

44

44

33

Given these numbers, it is not likely that the battle at Prokhorovka was the "largest tank battle in history". In fact, it is smaller than a battle that took place between the French and the Germans in 1940. In front of Gembloux on May 14-15, two full-strength Panzer divisions (each with about 300 tanks) squared off with two full-strength French Light Mechanized Divisions (each with about 260 tanks).

Myth #3: Russian tanks rammed German ones. This fanciful notion has Soviet tanks, knowing that their guns would be ineffective against the tough German armor, close to point-blank range and begin to ram German tanks to knock them out. Hogwash! There is in fact no evidence of this. It never appears in any reports, German or Soviet. The stories of tank ramming typically focus on KV tanks ramming Tigers. Considering there were a grand total of 1 KV tank (most certainly a command tank) and only 4 Tigers, this is incredibly unlikely. Rather, these stories are a product of embellished accounts, and propagandized Soviet versions designed to "play up" the fierceness of the battle so as to justify their losses. Note too that hardly any of the German AFVs present (just the 4 Tigers) had armor that would be able to consistently withstand Russian firepower. The only documented instance of tank-ramming I am aware of is in Normandy, when a British Sherman rammed a German Tiger.

Myth #4: Prokhorovka was the "death ride of the Panzers" because the Germans lost so many tanks.

Traditional western sources, citing propagandized Soviet accounts, place tank losses at Prokhorovka for both sides at about 1200. Considering the fact that less than half that number even participated in the battle, this number is ridiculous. If it was anything, it was the death ride of the 29th Tank Corp, which experienced a 75% drop in its number of on-hand AFVs in one day. In fact, the Germans barely noticed the effects of the battle at Prokhorovka, while the Soviets had several units rendered ineffective in a matter of hours. Simply put, the Germans put a licking on the Red Army. I have provided data for the number of "damaged" and "destroyed/abandoned" AFVs July 10, 11, and 12.

German AFVs Out Of Action Due to Damage

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

Pz III

0

0

0

Pz IV

0

12

0

Pz VI Tiger

0

0

1

Marder III

0

1

0

StuG III

2

9

0

Pz I

0

0

0

Pz II

0

0

0

Soviet AFVs Out of Action Due to Damage

18th TC

29th TC

Trufanov

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

KV I

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Churchill

18

1

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

T-34

0

2

27

1

1

45

0

0

5

T-70

4

0

17

0

1

14

0

0

0

SU-122

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

SU-76

?

?

?

?

?

?

0

0

0

German AFVs Destroyed and Abandoned

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

Pz III

0

0

0

Pz IV

0

0

4

Pz VI Tiger

0

0

0

Marder III

0

0

2

StuG III

0

1

0

Pz I

0

0

0

Pz II

0

0

0

Soviet AFVs Destroyed and Abandoned

18th TC

29th TC

Trufanov

AFV

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 10

July 11

July 12

KV I

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Churchill

0

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

T-34

0

0

18

0

0

60

0

0

3

T-70

0

0

8

0

0

28

0

0

3

SU-122

0

0

0

0

0

8

0

0

0

SU-76

?

?

?

?

?

?

0

0

0

This hardly reveals a "death ride" for the Panzers. The LSSAH permanently lost a grand total of 7 AFVs. A further 25 were damaged and sent to repair shops, only 1 of which was a Tiger (note that no Tigers were destroyed). The Soviets, on the other hand, permanently lost at least 134 AFVs, more than 19 times the losses of the Germans. A further 125 were temporarily lost due to damage. Therefore total AFV losses due to combat at Prokhorovka come out to 32 German against 259 Soviet. It is no wonder the Soviets had to inflate the size and losses of the German force; they were beaten badly.

Myth #5: The weather at Prokhorovka was clear and dry. Most popular accounts of the battle at Prokhorovka feature swirling tank battles kicking up enormous clouds of dust. Nothing could be further from the truth. We already know that there were no swirling tanks battles at point blank range. Nor was there dust. The ground was waterlogged, and the weather during the battle featured occasional thunderstorms. According to the reports of LSSAH, July 9th was "dreary and rainy" and July 10th featured "heavy showers which hampered [the] division's movements". For July 11 and 12, the division reported that there were "heavy downpours which severely hampered combat operations" and that the roads were "in very poor shape". These are hardly the conditions that would allow for huge clouds of dust to be kicked up!

Myth #6: German forces were heavily supplied with Panthers, Tigers, and Elefant tank destroyers. While the Germans did decide to delay their attack so that more new weapons, such as the Panther and the Elefant, would be available, these weapons were not present in large numbers. A grand total of 119 Panthers went into battle with the Gross Deutschland Division (GD) on July 5th. After 65% of those went out of action, either damaged or destroyed, on the first day they ceased to play a crucial role in the remaining week's worth of combat. Note that there were absolutely no Panthers available to any other unit besides GD. The paintings and drawings of Panthers in battle at Prokhorovka are absolutely wrong: none of the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions used Panthers at Kursk. A total of 90 Elefants were available, and all of them were used by the 9th Army to help its divisions crack through the defensive lines on the north face of the Kursk salient. Despite the Soviet accounts which have Elefants participating in practically every battle on the north and south faces, Elefants were used only by the 9th Army, and only on the north face (primarily in the German assault on the town of Ponyri). Most of them were lost in the first few days of the fighting. Tiger tanks were equally rare. On the entire south face of the salient, only 89 Tigers started the battle. About half of these were in the heavy battalions of the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions and the GD. These four divisions started with 12 to 15 Tigers each, but by the second or third day of fighting, they were down to about 4 to 6 operational Tigers each. This situation remained until the end of the fighting. Popular drawings and paintings of waves of Tigers rolling toward the Russians are pure fantasy. The battle where Tigers are supposedly present in droves, at Prokhorovka, featured just 4.

Myth #7: Hitler called off CITADEL because the Americans and British landed on Sicily and the Germans needed to shift forces to the western front. This component of the overall myth of Kursk is undoubtedly due to western authors trying to increase the otherwise paltry contributions of the western allies in 1943. In actual fact, the German units on the southern face of the Kursk salient received new orders to renew their attacks several days after the landing on Sicily. Hitler called off CITADEL not because a couple of British and American divisions were attacking a strategically insignificant island in the Mediterranean, but because the Soviets had (1) blunted and stalled the German CITADEL offensive, and (2) launched their own massive offensives on the flanks of the German attack. These attacks soaked up reserves the Germans had planned on using to complete the destruction of the Kursk salient. Without them, the Germans were too weak to continue CITADEL and they began withdrawing their units.

While Prokhorovka offered the Germans a tactical victory, operationally it was a death knell for CITADEL. The 9th Army's advance had already stalled several days earlier. And even though it was defeated in the space of two days, the arrival of the 5th Guards Tank Army signaled the fact that the Russians were committing their armored reserves, and that from July 11 on the Germans would have to content with these. It is doubtful that the Germans could have continued to defeat these reserves, given the context of the problems with the rest of the operation. Even if a few more tactical battles were won, to what end? CITADEL, as an operation, had failed before the battle at Prokhorovka; there was no way that the north and south face could meet to encircle the Soviet forces. Continuing to attack would have wasted resources.

It is doubtful that the Germans could have kept moving forward at all anyway. The north face had degenerated into static warfare before the Germans even got through all the defensive lines. On the south face, the Germans enjoyed some forward progress, but at a tremendous cost. Loses in AFVs, vehicles, and men were high enough to soak up a significant portion of the offensive power of the German armored divisions. Further, the attack had been launched with insufficient infantry forces. The salient that the armored units pushed forward could not be adequately protected due to a lack of infantry divisions. Thus, the German offensive was contained and stalled. Having the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions move forward after the battle at Prokhorovka would have made things worse, not better, for the Germans.

Finally, Nipe identifies the XXIV Panzer Corps as an "uncommitted reserve" that Manstein could have used to force the attack forward, at least on the south face. This is only technically true. The XXIV Panzer Corps, made up of the 17th, 23rd, and SS-Wiking Panzer divisions was theoretically available as a reserve, to be used once a breakthrough had been achieved. This force was not useable for two reasons. First, no operational breakthrough had actually been achieved. Due to the depth and flexibility of the Soviet defenses, the German attack never achieved anything close to operational maneuver, despite the fact that it steadily moved forward on the south flank. There simply was no space to commit the XXIV Panzer Corps. Second, the Soviet attacks to the south of the Kursk salient, along the Mius river, required the commitment of this reserve. As part of the overall Soviet operational plan for the Summer of 1943, the Red Army would absorb the (obvious) German attack while simultaneously launching its own attacks against the 2nd Army (to the left and behind the 9th Army on the north face) and to the south of Kharkov (to outflank the 4th Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf). Given that the German lines had been stripped to provide reinforcements for CITADEL, the XXIV Panzer Corps was committed to blunt these southern attacks. As armored units were pulled out of CITADEL, they too were committed in a defensive role along the Mius. Had CITADEL been continued with the commitment of the XXIV Panzer Corps, the German lines along the Mius would almost certainly have been decisively penetrated, leading to operational disaster for the Germans. As it was, the Soviet attacks still forced the Germans out of the Ukraine, even with the use of Panzer forces on the defensive.

Conclusion

The myth of Kursk has been surprisingly resilient. Some of this undoubtedly is due to how long it remained unchallenged. Powerful counterarguments have only been published in the last 10 years or so. Even these are somewhat inaccessible: since they've been published by specialty presses they have high price tags and do not show up on the average bookstore's shelves.

It is certain that CITADEL failed and in no way were the Germans positioned to even score a partial victory. The Germans did not fail, however, due to a defeat at Prokhorovka. There was no "death ride of the panzers" on July 11 and 12. Nor was there a very big battle on those dates. It's time to put to rest the fanciful notions of waves of Tiger and Panther tanks riding across the dry, dusty plains to do battle with Soviet tanks at point-blank range.

It just didn't happen.

Some parts of this essay (maybe even all of it) may be at odds with what you have read or heard about the battle of Kursk. As a result, you may be skeptical of what I have written. I urge you to use this as an excuse to "dig deeper" into the history of the battle. As an aid, I suggest the following reading list:

Glantz, David, and Jonathan House. 1999. The Battle of Kursk. University Press of Kansas.

Yes, I chose to include the other references here from the same page. You can find the orrigional here: http://www.uni.edu/~licari/citadel.htm
There are several others you can access as well. Either way, I believe this would make for a great battle map. If rumor serves, I heard somewhere in here that there will be a persistant world. Which would be awesome to see that included as a battle we can all participate in.

Awesome man just watched half of this episode of Greatest Tank Battles. They estimated the battle to be 5000 tanks strong with 1500 on the German side and 3000 on the Russian side. Tanks on top of tanks ramming each other, massive wall of Tigers, and even talks about how they stopped the air strikes because of all the "dust and smoke generated from the burning husks of tanks"

Thank you for enlightening Bob Dole on this battle and disproving all of those myths.

Now, if I remember right, it was around the year 1943 when the Germans attempted to invade Russia.

F34rmen00bz, on Mar 07 2011 - 20:54, said:

I think he was saying that the Battle of Kursk happened in 1943, which technically, the Germans were still trying to invade Russia then .

Stop making excuses and liberal interpretations. He wrote, as I've quoted, that the Germans attempted to invade Russia around 1943. His Vagueness does not belong in historical discussion. The facts are that the Germans did invade the USSR on 21 June 1941.

jhashi,for what it's worth and I loath to do it, go read the wikipedia entry Battle of Kursk. It's certainly better referenced than your obscure page by Licari