The objects of this government as expressed in the preface
to it, are "to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty"--These include every object for which government
was established amongst man, and in every dispute
about the powers granted, it is fair to infer that the
means are commensurate with the end--and I believe we
may venture to assert, that a good judge would not hesitate
to draw this inference, especially when supported by
the undefined powers granted by the 8th. section of the
1st. article and the construction that naturally arises from
the prohibition against the creation of a nobility, a power
which would otherwise appear to be neither expressly or
impliedly granted.

I am sensible, it may be said, that the state governments
are component parts of the general government and
therefore that of necessity their existence must be preserved
and that the Constitution has guaranteed to them a
republican form[;] but this, on the least reflection, will appear
to be too feeble a security to be relied on, when they [Volume 1, Page 291]
are divested of every resource for their own support and
the terms too indefinite to afford any security to the liberties
of the people, as it includes in it the idea of an arbitrary
aristocracy as well as of a free government--The
form may exist without the substance. It will be remembered
that this was the case in Rome when under a despotism--The
Senate existed as formerly--Consuls, Tribunes
etc. were chosen by the people--but their powers
were merely nominal, as they were ruled by the will of the
reigning Tyrant--and the most arbitrary ministers and
judges generally preserve the forms of law, while they disregard
its precepts and pervert them to the purposes of
oppression.

From these observations, it is evident, that the general
government is not constructed upon federal principles,
and that its operations will terminate in a dissolution of the
States--That even if this should not be the case, they will
be so enfeebled as not to afford that effectual security to
the rights and liberties of the people, against the undue
and extensive powers vested in the general government, as
its advocates have led them to expect. This being the case,
the objections which have been stated against the system,
must appear to well founded--and it therefore becomes
our indispensable duty to obviate them by suitable amendments
calculated to abridge and limit the powers to general
objects. The evils pointed out in the system are now
within our power to remedy--but if we suffer ourselves to
be influenced by specious reasoning unsupported by example
to an unconditional adoption of an imperfect government,
the opportunity will be forever lost, for history
does not furnish a single instance of a government once
established, voluntarily yielding up its powers to secure the
rights and liberties of the people.