In December 2001,
the intelligence community assessed that Iraq did not appear to have
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

(2)

The October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon
or sufficient material to make one, and that without sufficient fissile
material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon
until 2007 or 2009.

(3)

On October 6,
2002, the Central Intelligence Agency advised the White House to remove
references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from a Presidential speech,
citing weak evidence.

(4)

In November 2002,
the United States Government told the International Atomic Energy Association
that reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are
fragmentary at best..

(5)

On March 7, 2003,
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Association reported to
the United Nations Security Council that inspectors had found no
evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in
Iraq..

(6)

On
March 11, 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency stated that it did not dispute
the International Atomic Energy Association conclusions that the documents on
Iraq’s agreement to buy uranium from Niger were not authentic.

(7)

President George W.
Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and urgency of
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by making repeated, unqualified assertions
about an Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by available
intelligence, including—

(A)

on March 22, 2002,
President George W. Bush stated that [Saddam] is a dangerous man who
possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons.;

(B)

on August 26, 2002,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that [m]any of us are convinced
that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.;

(C)

on September 8,
2002, Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that [w]e do know, with
absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the
equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear
weapon.;

(D)

on September 20,
2002, Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that we now have
irrefutable evidence that he has once again set up and reconstituted his
program, to take uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it
will function as the base material as a nuclear weapon.;

(E)

on October 7,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [f]acing clear evidence of
peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in
the form of a mushroom cloud.;

(F)

on December 31,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [w]e don't know whether or
not [Saddam] has a nuclear weapon.;

(G)

on January 28,
2003, President George W. Bush stated that [t]he British government has
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa.; and

The October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Baghdad for now appears to
be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or
CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would
provide Washington a stronger cause for making war and that Iraq
probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the United States Homeland
if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were
imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge..

(2)

President George
W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney made misleading statements, that
were not supported by the available intelligence, suggesting that Saddam
Hussein sought weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an unprovoked,
offensive attack, including—

(A)

on August 26, 2002,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that … there is no doubt that
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is
amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against
us.;

(B)

on August 26,
2002, Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that [t]hese are not
weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the
purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam can
hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or
beyond.; and

(C)

on October 2,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that On its present course, the
Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We know the treacherous history of
the regime. It has waged a war against its neighbors, it has sponsored and
sheltered terrorists, it has developed weapons of mass death, it has used them
against innocent men, women and children. We know the designs of the Iraqi
regime..

(c)

Saddam’s alleged
links to al Qaeda and 9/11

The House of Representatives finds the
following:

(1)

Before the war,
the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Saddam has viewed Islamic
extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his regime since its
inception has arrested and executed members of both Shia and Sunni groups to
disrupt their organizations and limit their influence, that
Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural
partners, and that assessments about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on
a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying
reliability..

(2)

President George
W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein by making unqualified assertions that were not supported by
available intelligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda had a
relationship and that Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weapons of
mass destruction for purposes of an offensive attack against the United States,
including—

(A)

on September 25,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [Y]ou can’t distinguish
between al Qa’ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on
terror.;

(B)

on September 26,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [t]he dangers we face will
only worsen from month to month and from year to year. … Each passing day could
be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day
a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally.;

(C)

on October 14,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [t]his is a man that we know
has had connections with al Qa’ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would
like to use al Qa’ida as a forward army.;

(D)

on November 7,
2002, President George W. Bush stated that [Saddam is] a threat because
he is dealing with al Qaida … [A] true threat facing our country is that an al
Qaida-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack America and not
leave one fingerprint.;

(E)

on January 31,
2003, President George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein would like
nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no
fingerprints behind.;

(F)

on March 16, 2003,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that we also have to address the
question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction,
chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons? And Saddam Hussein
becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his past track record and
because we know he has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities,
chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s used chemical weapons. And we
know he’s reconstituted these programs since the Gulf War. We know he’s out
trying once again to produce nuclear weapons and we know that he has a
long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the
al-Qaeda organization.;

(G)

on March 17, 2003,
President George W. Bush stated that The danger is clear: using
chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of
Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or
hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any
other.;

(H)

on May 1, 2003,
President George W. Bush stated that [t]he liberation of Iraq … removed
an ally of al Qaeda.;

(I)

on September 14,
2003, Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that the Iraqi
intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al Qaeda that developed
throughout the decade of the 90’s. That was clearly official
policy.;

(J)

on September 14,
2003, Vice President Richard B. Cheney stated that [i]f we’re successful
in Iraq … we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if
you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault
now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.; and

(K)

on March 21, 2006,
President George W. Bush said at a press conference, But we realized on
September the 11th, 2001, that killers could destroy innocent life. And I'm
never going to forget it. And I'm never going to forget the vow I made to the
American people that we will do everything in our power to protect our people.
Part of that meant to make sure that we didn't allow people to provide safe
haven to an enemy. And that's why I went into Iraq..

(d)

Inadequate
planning and insufficient troop levels

The House of
Representatives finds the following:

(1)

The intelligence
community judged in January 2003 that [t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant policy challenges for
whoever assumes responsibility for governing Iraq including
political transformation, controlling internal strife, solving economic
and humanitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent foreign policy and
security concerns..

(2)

The intelligence
community judged in January 2003 that a post-Saddam authority would face
a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would
engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented
them from doing so..

(3)

These judgments
were delivered to the White House and Office of the Vice President.

(4)

Then Army Chief of
Staff General Shinseki testified on February 25, 2003, that something on
the order of several hundred thousands soldiers would be needed to
secure Iraq following a successful completion of the war.

(5)

General Abizaid,
then-CENTCOM commander, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
November 15, 2006, that General Shinseki was right that a greater
international force contribution, United States force contribution and Iraqi
force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat
operations..

(6)

After President
George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there were
insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of violence and lawlessness that
contributed to the flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of
thousands of Iraqis.

(7)

The Government
Accountability Office provided testimony to the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, on March 22, 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United States
forces were unable to secure conventional weapons stockpiles in Iraq that
continue to pose a threat to American servicemembers.

(8)

President George W.
Bush failed to ensure that plans were prepared and implemented to address the
challenges that the intelligence community predicted would occur after the
ouster of Saddam Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that there were
sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after major combat operations ended to
maintain security and secure weapons stockpiles.

(e)

Strain on
military and undermining homeland security

The House of
Representatives finds the following:

(1)

Retired Major
General John Batiste, former commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq,
testified before the House Committee on International Relations on June 27,
2007, that [o]ur Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at a time
in history when we need a strong military the most. The cycle of deployments is
staggering. American formations continue to lose a battalion’s worth of dead
and wounded every month with little to show for it. The current recruiting
system falls drastically short of long-term requirements and our all-volunteer
force can not sustain the current tempo for much longer. The military is
spending over $1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch effort to
keep the force together. Young officers and noncommissioned officers are
leaving the service at an alarming rate..

(2)

Extended
deployments of 15 months, and insufficient time to rest and train between
deployments, have undermined the readiness of the Army.

(3)

The Army National
Guard reported as early as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying
units had largely exhausted its inventory of more than 220 critical
items, including some items useful to nondeployed units for training and
domestic missions..

(4)

The Government
Accountability Office found, in September 2006, that [a]mong the items
for which the Army National Guard had shortages of over 80 percent of the
authorized inventory were chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination
equipment and night vision goggles.

(5)

President George
W. Bush’s policies in Iraq have undermined homeland security by depleting the
personnel and equipment needed by the National Guard.

(f)

Insurgency in
Last Throes

The House of Representatives finds the
following:

(1)

Multi-National
Force-Iraq reports indicate that the number of attacks on coalition forces has
increased since the beginning of military action.

(2)

The Government
Accountability Office, in March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised
explosive devices continued to increase between 2005 and July 2006.

(3)

On June 23, 2005,
General John Abizaid, in his capacity as head of Central Command, testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the state of the insurgency
that [i]n terms of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of foreign
fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters coming into Iraq than there
were 6 months ago. In terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I'd say
it's about the same as it was..

(4)

President George
W. Bush’s Initial Benchmark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states that
[a]s a result of increased offensive operations, Coalition and Iraqi
Forces have sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad,
Diyala, and Salah ad Din..

(5)

Vice President
Richard B. Cheney made misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq was in
its last throes, including—

(A)

on May 30, 2005,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney said, The level of activity that we see
today from a military standpoint, I think, will clearly decline. I think
they're in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.; and

(B)

on June 19, 2006,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still supported the
comment he made in 2005, regarding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq was in
its last throes, to which he responded I
do.

2.

Censure by the
House of Representatives

The
House of Representatives censures President George W. Bush and Vice President
Richard B. Cheney for—

(1)

misleading the American people about the
basis for going to war in Iraq;

(2)

failing to plan adequately for the
war;

(3)

pursuing policies in Iraq that have
strained our military and undermined our homeland security; and