Sudan Essay

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Joseph Noutch

4086866 Essay Title: To what extent did British policymakers pursue a paternalist policy in the Sudan after 1945? Student ID Number: 4086866 School: Cultures, Languages and Area Studies Module: V13247 - Suez and the End of Empire Word Count: 2990

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Joseph Noutch

4086866 The case of British involvement in the Sudan is one rife with anomaly.1 From 1899 until its independence in 1956 the Sudan held the unique position of being a colony of Egypt primarily administered by Britain. In addition, due to its unusual condominium arrangement, the Foreign Office assumed responsibility for the governance of Sudan rather than the Colonial Office.2 In order to answer this question it is first necessary to define what is meant by `paternalist policy'. Paternalist policy relates to the interference of the independence of peoples with benevolent intention towards those peoples. This essay will argue that previous to 1953, British policy in the Sudan can be seen to be notably paternalist. This was predominantly thanks to the unrelenting efforts of the Sudan Political Service who battled successfully against the influence of the Foreign Office and the diplomats in Cairo whose intent it was to pursue a policy more favourable to British strategic and economic interest. Yet, as a result of the influence of the Foreign Office, the British in Egypt and other factors such as the rise of Sudanese nationalism, there was a significant acceleration of the tutelage of the Sudanese towards self-government and self-determination during the period. Finally, however, the cession of Egypt's claim to right over Sudan effectively ended Britain paternalist influence in thtute Sudan. This essay will consider the paternalist nature of British policy in the Sudan after 1945 before examining other features of British policy in the country. This will include analysis with regards to Britain's national interest, the greater autonomy and tutelage of the Sudanese, and a look at the closing stages of British influence. Throughout its existence, the Sudanese Political Service, and therefore the Sudanese government, proved the primary influence on British policy in the Sudan. The British dominated the Sudanese government during the condominium period; `British officials routinely held all the key administrative posts' and the `pretence' of joint Egyptian rule `was almost dropped altogether' after the murder of a senior British official in the Sudan by Egyptian nationalists in 1924.3 In addition, despite the overall responsibility for the country lying with the Foreign Office, the Sudanese

4086866 government had become very much autonomous.4 This was as a consequence of a number of factors but chiefly, the lesser importance of the Sudan within the Foreign Office, the fact that Whitehall was not `organized to supervise the kind of administration needed to rule such a vast territory' and the belief amongst the British stationed in the Sudan `that Britain's priorities lay in Egypt and that London would `sell out' the Sudanese to secure a settlement to the Canal Zone dispute'.5 Over time, the Sudan Political Service had `gradually' become responsible for the `entire affairs of the country'.6 Furthermore its members had often `committed themselves to lifetime careers in the Sudan' and `developed an attachment to the land and (obtained) a knowledge of the peoples of the Sudan'.7 The end result was that the service came `to define its role as being to protect the interests of the Sudanese'.8 As a consequence of its `compact' nature (under 400 officials in all), the structure of the administration and the general strong nature of certain personalities within the service, the large effect on British policy by certain individuals within the service is noteworthy.9 Both Sir Hubert Huddlestone who was Governor-General from 1945 to 1947 and Sir James Robertson who was Civil Secretary from 1945 to 1953 `were men of outstanding quality' and dedicated themselves to the Sudanese cause.10 In particular both these men proved influential in the so called `revolt' of the Sudanese Political Service against the Bevin-Sidky protocol.11 This included pressure placed upon the Foreign Office by Huddlestone and Robertson to not acquiesce control of Sudan to Egypt and publicly voiced displeasure over the eventual wording of the Sudan Protocol.12 Collins has nevertheless found it necessary to nuance the role of the Sudan Political Service after the Second World War. He has argued that the war `had irreparably damaged ... the wisdom of British paternal rule' and that those recruited to the service after the fact were `unconsciously inclined to think that the Sudanese could

4086866 manage just as well without British officials to guide them'.13 He then however goes on to explain that only a small number of men were recruited to the service after the Second World War reinforcing the administrations paternal nature.14 Furthermore, Collins assertion agrees with this essay's argument of a modified paternalism involving greater and more intense tutelage of the Sudanese Political Service after 1945. However, despite the greater sentiment of those serving in Sudan and their belief that the British in London and Cairo did not care enough for the welfare of the Sudanese, there was paternal sentiment outside of the British policymakers within the Sudan. Indeed, the public statements of the British government give the impression that the welfare of the Sudanese was most certainly a priority.15 In 1946, Bevin stated that `His Majesty's government have no object in the Sudan other than the true welfare of the Sudanese' whilst later, in an address to the House of Commons on the 20th November 1950, the Foreign Secretary declared that `the Sudan is a really remarkable development and is an example to the world of what can be done in such territories and we would do nothing at all to set it back and leave the people at the tender mercy of others'.16 Yet, despite this rhetoric, those in London and Cairo principally attempted to pursue a policy in the Sudan shaped by British strategic interest in Africa, the Middle East, and in particular with its negotiation with Egypt. After the Second World War, whilst there was a growth in `both the fear of Soviet expansionist aspirations in the Arab world and Africa, and related uncertainties about the security of Britain's military domination of the Near East', Egypt was demanding the further removal of British military interests from their country.17 It has been traditionally argued by historians such as Balfour-Paul that Ernest Bevin was a man of great principle and distinctively refused to `sell out' the Sudan.18 This however has been subject to revision by Hanes amongst others who has argued that

4086866 `Bevin was in fact fully prepared to buy his treaty at the expense of the Sudan'.19 Whilst there is little question that Bevin's `formal recognition of the Egyptian's crowns claims to sovereignty over the Sudan' was meant to be `purely symbolic', both the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Attlee were willing to some extent to tolerate Sidky Pasha's interpretation if it meant they would get their treaty.20 Indeed, it was largely a result of the persuasion, insistence and political nous of Huddlestone and Robertson that the treaty was not eventually signed.Yet, at the same time, `Britain had effectively admitted Egyptian titular claims over the Sudan and the ultimate failure of the negotiations could not cancel out this admission' or the repercussions it had towards British integrity in the Sudan.21 It should also be noted that as well as Bevin's somewhat preparedness to relinquish the Sudan, the reasons he held for maintaining British influence in the Sudan were hardly paternalist. The Sudan had become even more important strategically for the British as if she `removes her forces from Egypt, her strategic interests make it imperative for her to station them somewhere else in the Middle East' with Sudan `regarded by experts as a possible alternative'.22 During Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Sudan protocol, in a meeting between Bevin and Sidky, the secretary of state for Foreign affairs elucidates this very point towards his counterpart explaining `now that we were withdrawn from Egypt it was very important for the whole strategic arrangement in the Middle east that Great Britain should be able to retain troops in the Sudan'.23 The third major group which affected British policy in the Sudan were the British diplomats in Cairo whose aims often coincided with those of the Foreign Office.24 Yet, while those in Cairo and Khartoum were both equally distrustful and full of dislike for the `Egyptian ruling classes and administrative integrity ... they disagreed (with the Sudan administrators) over the ordering of imperial priorities and procedures for pursuing them'.25 The diplomats in Cairo saw the Sudan

4086866 administrators as `parochial dinosaurs incapable of appreciating that Britain's strategic necessities outweighed all other considerations'.26 This clash often resulted in In addition to Britain's national strategic objectives impinging on its benevolence in the Sudan, Britain also held several economic interests in the country which contradicted with its paternalist ideal. In particular, Britain was interested in Sudanese Cotton.27 In 1925, Britain established the Gezira scheme in the Sudanese state of Al-Jazrah which had the aim of `providing cotton for textile factories ... in Great Britain'.28 In addition, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, who managed the scheme up and till 1950, was a British company and received `about 20 per cent of the net proceeds in cotton'.29 At points, there were even attempts in British parliament to stipulate that Sudanese cotton had to be sold to Britain.30 And although no such condition was ever put in place, Sudanese cotton during the period invariably went `to Great Britain and India when it was British'.31 The period after 1945 however did see a shift in British policy, largely caused by those in the Foreign Office and the British diplomats in Cairo, with acceleration in the education towards independence far more prominent than in previous times which resulted in somewhat greater autonomy for the Sudanese.32 Whilst tutelage is most certainly associated with paternal policy, the speed of its application represents a divergence with the previously highly paternalist British policy. The shift was predominantly as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute as `from 1946 until the overthrow of King Faruq in Egypt in 1952,' the British in the Sudan `were very conscious of having to keep ahead of the momentum for self-government, leading to independence'.33 The Sudan Political Service, motivated by the fear that the British Government in London would sell them out for their treaty, attempted `to keep a large section of the northern nationalist movement on their side against Egypt's claim of

4086866 continued sovereignty over the Sudan' with progress towards independence.34 In particular, this became far more pertinent after the Protocol `debacle' as Bevin himself stated he was `all in favour of intensifying Sudanisation', the process in which Sudanese would replace British administrators.35 Thus the origin from the Foreign Office was twofold; not only had they sent the Political Service into action with the threat of handing over Sudan to Egypt but both the Foreign Office and those in Cairo demanded greater Sudanisation themselves in the hope that this would mean the replacement of those in the Sudan Political Service who often stood in the way of British strategic interest. Either way, as the Cabinet stipulated, it had now become the explicit aim of the British `to enable the Sudanese to attain self-government at the earliest practicable opportunity'.36 The Sudanese Political Service response was to create new administrative bodies which were largely inconsequential in an effort to give the appearance of acceleration to both the Sudanese Nationalists and the Foreign Office whilst maintaining parental control.37 Amongst measures undertaken was the establishment of an Advisory Council and later on, in 1948, the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council were created. Yet, as much as the Political Service made sure the `civilising mission was not rushed' and the fact `very little legislation was ever produced by these two bodies, noteworthy progress was in fact made.38 The reversal of British Southern Policy also demonstrated an acceleration of tutelage in a way which was detrimental to British paternalism. Throughout the condominium period southern Sudan was administered in a very different way to the North of the country. The southern provinces of the country were isolated from the outside world.39 This `administrative pattern', which was confirmed in the Civil Secretary's statement on Southern Policy in 1930, was `justified' by the British `by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to the modern world'.40 In June 1947, at the Juba conference, Robertson `in a decisive statement of policy' however reversed the Southern Policy partly

4086866 as a result of `Egyptian and northern Sudanese nationalist insistence on a united Sudan'.41 Robertson concluded that the `South must be administered as an integral part of a united Sudan' despite objections from his colleagues in the South who feared `Northern domination and infiltration'.42 Whilst Britain's intent was to further the Sudanese progress into statehood, it had at the same time left vulnerable the less educated southerners to the more politically aware northerners and abandoned the policy in the south which had promoted `impeccable justice' thanks to the `paternal British administrators'.43 The Egyptian Revolution of the summer of 1952 proved decisive for British influence in the Sudan. The new regime in Egypt relinquished their claim to sovereign rights over the country and instead set about making agreements with the Sudanese political parties ensuring Sudanese self-determination. `On 12 October 1952 an agreement was reached between Naguib and Umma Party... this was followed by another, signed on 10 January1953 by all leading Sudanese parties'.44 The new President of Egypt Naguib had `outmanoeuvred' his British counterparts and gave the British no choice but to accept the path to Sudanese independence devised by Neguib and the Sudanese political parties. This effectively signalled both the conclusion of any real semblance of British paternal policy in the Sudan and any ability in which the British could use the Sudan for its own national interest. `A new Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was consequently reached in short order'.45 Ultimately, British policy in the Sudan was a combination of paternalism and national interest with relation to economic and strategic interests specifically in Egypt. It should be noted thought that the Sudan Political Service, much to the dismay of the Foreign Office and the British diplomats in Cairo, managed to prolong British paternalist policy in the Sudan for years after World War Two. Whilst many within the service contributed to this policy, mention should be given to Governor-General Huddlestone and Civil Secretary Robertson who fought passionately to prevent the British from

4086866 handing over the Sudan to Egypt for their treaty. Yet, as a result of numerous factors but in particular the threat of a treaty with the Egyptians and the insistence of the Foreign Office and British Diplomats in Cairo, the speed in which the Sudanese were educated towards self-government was increased and the supposed timeframe for eventual independence shortened. The revolution in Egypt however prematurely signalled the concluding stages of British influence in the Sudan. Thanks to Naguib's tactics, the independence of Sudan was no longer in control of the Sudan Political Service and the Foreign Office any leverage over the Egyptians in their ongoing negotiations.