Egypt's President Gamal Nasser thought that because
most of Israel's army consisted of reserves, it could not withstand
a lengthy war of attrition. He believed Israel would be unable to endure
the economic burden, and the constant casualties would undermine Israeli
morale. To pursue this strategy of slowly weakening Israel, Nasser ordered
attacks on Israel that were calibrated so that they would not provoke
an all-out Israeli war in response.

As early as July 1, 1967, Egypt
began shelling Israeli positions near the Suez Canal. On October 21,
1967, Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat, killing 47. A few
months later, Egyptian artillery began to shell Israeli positions along
the Suez Canal and ambush Israeli military patrols. This bloody War
of Attrition, as it became known, lasted three years. The Israeli
death toll between June 15, 1967, and August 8, 1970 (when a cease-fire
was declared), was 1,424 soldiers and more than 100 civilians. Another
2,000 soldiers and 700 civilians were wounded.1

MYTH

Egypt terminated the War of Attrition, and
sought to reach some accommodation with Israel, only to have Jerusalem
spurn these initiatives.

FACT

In the summer of 1970, the United
States persuaded Israel and Egypt to accept a cease-fire. This cease-fire
was designed to lead to negotiations under UN auspices. Israel declared
that it would accept the principle of withdrawal from territories it
had captured.

But on August 7, the Soviets and Egyptians deployed
sophisticated ground-to-air SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles in the restricted
32-mile-deep zone along the west bank of the Suez Canal. This was a clear
violation of the cease-fire agreement, which barred the introduction or
construction of any military installations in this area.

Time magazine observed that U.S. reconnaissance
"showed that the 36 SAM-2 missiles sneaked into the cease-fire zone
constitute only the first line of the most massive anti-aircraft system
ever created."2

Defense Department satellite photos demonstrated conclusively
that 63 SAM-2 sites were installed in a 78-mile band between the cities
of Ismailia and Suez. Three years later, these missiles provided air
coverage for Egypt's surprise attack against Israel.3

Despite the Egyptian violations, the UN-sponsored talks
resumed — additional evidence that Israel was anxious to make progress
toward peace. The talks were swiftly short-circuited, however, by UN
Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring,
when he accepted the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution
242 and called for Israel's total withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 1967,
demarcation lines.

On that basis, Egypt expressed its willingness "to
enter into a peace agreement with Israel" in a February 20, 1971,
letter to Jarring. But this seeming moderation masked an unchanging
Egyptian irredentism and unwillingness to accept a real peace, as shown
by the letter's sweeping reservations and preconditions.

The crucial sentences about a "peace agreement with
Israel" were neither published nor broadcast in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt
refused to enter direct talks with the Jewish State. Israel attempted to at
least transform the struggling Jarring mission into indirect talks by
addressing all letters not to Jarring, but to the Egyptian government.
Egypt refused to accept them.

Just after the letter to Jarring, Anwar
Sadat, Egypt's new president, addressed the Palestine National Council
(PNC) meeting in Cairo. He promised support to the PLO
"until victory" and declared that Egypt would not accept
Resolution 242.4

Five days after Sadat suggested he was ready to make
peace with Israel, Mohammed Heikal, a Sadat confidant and editor of the
semi-official Al-Ahram, wrote:

Arab policy at this stage has but two objectives. The
first, the elimination of the traces of the 1967 aggression through an
Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied that year. The
second objective is the elimination of the traces of the 1948 aggression,
by the means of the elimination of the State of Israel itself. This is,
however, as yet an abstract, undefined objective, and some of us have erred
in commencing the latter step before the former.5

MYTH

Egypt repeatedly expressed a willingness to
begin peace negotiations with Israel from 1971 to 1973. Israel's rejection
of these initiatives led to the Yom Kippur War.

FACT

With the collapse of the Jarring mission, the United
States undertook a new initiative. It proposed an Israeli-Egyptian interim
agreement, calling for the Jewish State's partial withdrawal from the Suez
Canal and the opening of that waterway.

Israel was willing to enter negotiations without preconditions,
but Sadat demanded that Israel agree, as part of an interim agreement,
to withdraw ultimately to the old 1967 lines. In effect, Sadat was seeking
an advance guarantee of the outcome of "negotiations." This
was unacceptable to Israel and suggested that Sadat was not genuinely
interested in peace.