Article Title

Authors

Pages

Rights

Abstract

In his article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” Derk Pereboom presents an argument against the compatibility of libertarianism and moral responsibility. In my paper, I first symbolize his argument and present Pereboom’s support of his premises. In short, Pereboom claims that in order for libertarians to claim that moral responsibility is plausible, they must adhere libertarianism of the agent causal sort. He then presents a case, in which he contends that agent causation is shown to be no different than event causation, which leads to the denial of the plausibility of moral responsibility. Secondly, I present a case of my own which shows that the fourth premise of Pereboom’s argument is false, and thus allows a libertarian to avoid denying moral responsibility. Next, I present a response to a possible counter argument from Pereboom, or by a proponent of his theory. Finally, I present a practical reason why the compatibility of libertarianism and moral responsibility is a philosophical position worth upholding.