AMERICAN CONCERNS: CHINA RELATIONS

SERIES:
This Post is the fourth in a January series on American Concerns:
About what problems are American intellectuals and policymakers
most worried? This Post treats concerns about relations with China.
Other Posts treated short run politics (140104), mid run economy
(140111), and long run ecology (140118).

_______________________________________________________________

AMERICAN
CONCERNS: CHINA RELATIONS

140125

Recently a
new genre has emerged in which leading American and Chinese
scholars of Sino-American relations exchange letters about
particular policy domains. The letters try both to clarify areas of
disagreement between the two countries and to search for common
ground. In the process, the letters reveal what most worries each
country about the other.

An early
masterpiece in this genre was a 30 March 2012 paper by Wang Jisi
and Kenneth Lieberthal “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”
(Washington DC: Brookings, 51 pages). Wang presented American
concerns while Lieberthal presented Chinese concerns. This reversal
of roles deftly demonstrated that, no matter how much the USA and
PRC disagree, they should at least be able to understand each
other.

A current
followup is Nina Hachigian ed. 2014 Debating China: the
U.S.-China relationship in ten conversations. New York NY:
Oxford University Press, 272 pages. This new book contains ten new
exchanges between ten pairs of scholars on ten policy topics. At a
personal level, the exchanges are all polite; most are friendly,
some even cordial. However, in their policy stands, many exchanges
are uncompromising, ultimately reflecting government stands on the
two sides.

A
surprisingly high proportion of the participants professed
themselves very worried about Sino-American relations.
Nevertheless, a surprisingly high proportion of the exchanges
themselves quite confrontational. I personally found that rather
worrying, since the exchanges really do reflect current attitudes –
official and unofficial – on the two sides.

This Post
highlights some of the main concerns expressed: American concerns
about China, Chinese concerns about America, and concerns of all
participants about the state of relations between the two
countries. Most participants are optimistic that in the long run
America and China can cooperate. Nevertheless, many worry about the
short and mid runs.

This Post
groups the exchanges into the usual three policy sectors: Security,
Economy, and Identity. Disagreements are sharpest over Security.
On the Economy, disagreements are quite sharp about exchange rates,
much less sharp about prospects for cooperation on the
environment. Identity (culture, values) served more to justify
disagreement than to find common ground.

Within
sectors, we treat exchanges from supranational through national to
subnational. (Numbers in parentheses indicate chapter numbers in
the book.)

Kenneth
Lieberthal and Wang Jisi provide “An overview of U.S.-China
relations” (chapter one). Lieberthal argues that Sino-American
relations are now mature, dense, expanding, and (increasingly)
distrustful. China is particularly distrustful, despite American
efforts to cultivate trust. Lieberthal is particularly worried when
Chinese view the relationship as zero-sum, making conflict
inevitable. Actually, American and Chinese visions of the future
do not sharply conflict. However, they do assume that both
countries can successfully manage their problematic domestic
affairs, which cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, an
antagonistic relationship will be hard to avoid unless deliberate
measures are taken to reduce strategic distrust.

Wang
agrees with the analysis of Lieberthal (an old friend), but adds
some points. He worries that new circumstances in both countries
complicate decision-making. The more issues and interests,
institutions and individuals brought into the process, the greater
the strain on US-China relations. More and more issues are
multilateral, involving more and more actors. Unfortunately, more
interactions between America and China are producing not more
compromise but more conflict. Continuing change in relative power –
as measured by GDP – further strains relations. China is more
concerned with current American “interference,” the USA about the
PRC’s long-run rise. Top leaders on both sides are well-informed
and moderate, the public is neither.

Lieberthal
agrees with Wang’s additions. However, he thinks the influence of
interest groups on mutual policy is declining in America, rising in
China, which needs stronger coordination of policy. Projections of
future GDP growth are not the main – or reliable – measure of
relative power. Strategic distrust will be hard to overcome when
American military services, struggling to maintain high budgets,
launch large new programs whose only plausible target is
China.

Evidently
Wang largely agrees, but again adds new points. China is far from
guaranteed to exceed America in power. China already has better
policy coordination than Lieberthal fears, through relevant party
Leading Groups. Domestic concerns already influence PRC policy
toward the USA and may do so even more in the
future.

SECURITY

Yuan Peng
and Nina Hachigian discuss the two countries’ “Global roles and
responsibilities” (chapter five). Yuan Peng argues that China
will not quickly become the superpower that some expect, but is
already playing international roles appropriate to its actual
status as a still developing country. He worries that America will
not accept China’s rise and will not respect China’s “core
interests” (such as Taiwan), thereby preventing China from
cooperating with America on common problems. He worries that China
will not assume enough responsibility along with
America.

Hachigian
replies that, in such a now interdependent world, all countries
have to compromise their core interests. Meanwhile countries must
work together on genuinely crucial common problems (such as Iran).
She agrees that China has already become a “responsible
stakeholder” by peacefully integrating into the international
system, particularly in policy domains such as peacekeeping.
However, she worries that by now China is not just a stakeholder
but a major power. In its own interest, China should accept more
responsibilities in domains such as nonproliferation, human rights,
climate, and economic growth.

Wu Xinbo and Michael Green debate “Regional
security roles and challenges” (chapter ten). Wu argues that
the PRC’s basic regional interest is a peaceful environment for its
own development. The USA and PRC have many common interests in the
Asia-Pacific region. However, to achieve them, the two countries
need to negotiate a new regional security architecture, replacing
the current one that is left over from the Cold War and assumes USA
leadership. The new architecture should embrace more equal
relations and eschew power politics such as “containing”
China.

Green
argues that the USA’s basic regional interest is an “open and
liberal” international order. He denies that the USA is attempting
to “contain” China, among other reasons because within the USA
there would not be majority political support for such a policy.
Regional balancing against China is far from the main priority of
the USA, which faces many global challenges on which it needs PRC
help. Meanwhile, the USA welcomes a constructive PRC role in
maintaining regional security.

In this
regional context, Christopher P. Twomey and Xu Hui debate
“Military developments” (chapter eight). As Twomey remarks,
they make a grim pair, agreeing on almost nothing and instead
pointedly challenging each other. Twomey argues that the USA and
PRC display all the signs of a “security dilemma.” Each side might
prefer de-escalation but has no way to know the true intentions of
the other side. Each fears losing an arms race and so interprets
any military strengthening by the other side as offensive not
defensive. Each side responds by increasing its own military
capabilities.

Xu both
denies any such spiral and claims that it is the fault of the USA,
which has failed to adopt the “new model of great power relations”
proposed by PRC leaders. Meanwhile, by its unprecedentedly
restrained behavior, China already exemplifies that new model.
Twomey replies that China’s recent assertion of rights over
extensive areas off its shore is viewed by most countries as the
opposite of restraint. Xu replies that the other countries upset a
longstanding and peaceful status quo by recently taking aggressive
actions – instigated by the USA!

ECONOMY

Elizabeth
Economy and Zha Daojiong discuss “Global development and
investment” (chapter seven). Economy argues that, given how
large and influential America and China are, they have both a
responsibility and an opportunity to shape global development by
adopting “best practices” in matters such as national good
governance and local corporate responsibility. Neither country is
perfect but China has further to go, and may soon find that lax
standards are counter-productive.

Zha agrees
in principle but suggests reasons why Chinese practices diverge
from American practices. China is simply acquiring the resources it
needs, like Western countries before it. (But, Economy rejoins, on
an unprecedentedly huge scale.) As a late developer, China has
“little choice” but to seek these resources in problematic places.
(Perhaps a few decades ago, Economy rejoins, but not now.) Host
local governments should protect host local interests, as Chinese
companies have learned to expect at home. (On the contrary, Economy
rejoins, what Chinese companies learned at home is that they can do
whatever they want!) China’s processing of world resources
benefits the whole world, not just China. A way forward is for
American and Chinese companies to work together.

Kelly Sims
Gallagher and Qi Ye discuss “Climate and clean energy”
(chapter six). Rather amicably, they stress opportunities for
practical joint action between the two countries by various actors
at various levels.

Gallagher
worries that global emissions continue to rise and that neither the
USA nor the PRC are doing as much as needed. In the USA, the
problem is largely political, obstruction from congressional
Republicans. In the PRC the problem is largely practical, China’s
still heavy dependence on coal. Having decided it can’t wait for
America to act, China is proceeding with green technologies.
Meanwhile, the PRC insists on negotiating with the USA through a UN
framework that requires formal congressional agreement, which is
unlikely. China should switch to less formal channels through which
more can be accomplished.

Qi argues
that the 1990s principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” remains fundamental for achieving justice – and
therefore agreement – between countries. It is true that some big
new economies have emerged, but those economies are large mostly
because their populations are large, not because of any high level
of development. In 2007, for policy making, China established a
climate Leading Group and, for policy implementation, a climate
Responsibility System. [These are institutions that China brings to
bear when it becomes serious about achieving some goal.] In 2010
China even promulgated new principles of “ecological civilization”
for itself.

Barry
Naughton and Yao Yang debate “The economic relationship”
(chapter two). Naughton observes that both America and China have
benefitted hugely from global free trade, particularly China. Yet
China now is not playing by necessary rules. It is not protecting
intellectual property rights. It is not pursuing balanced growth in
which a flexible exchange rate helps balance global economic
transactions. Recently China has been increasing its reliance on
state-owned enterprises, causing inefficiency and
corruption.

Yao agrees
about intellectual property rights and state-owned enterprises. He
agrees that China’s exchange rate is too rigid, but sees the costs
as mostly internal not external. Global imbalances result not from
PRC policy but from “structural factors” within long-run global
development. Meanwhile, Yao is concerned about a failure of
American economists to face up to structural problems within
America’s “winner takes all” version of “high capitalism.” Its too
flexible labor market creates job insecurity and helps out-source
jobs to China. Its too-large financial sector caused the global
2008 crisis and still contributes to global economic imbalances.
Its failing education system cultivates excellence at the expense
of equality.

Naughton
personally accepts many of Yao’s criticism of American capitalism.
However, he argues that currently the problem is less economic
system and more political polarization that prevents the adoption
if good economic policies.

IDENTITY

In
debating “Political systems, rights, and values,” Zhou Qi
and Andrew Nathan nominally agree on the desirability of democracy
and human rights, but disagreed on what those values should mean in
practice in China.

Qi begins
by noting that, over the past half century, interests have been
more important than values in steering US-China relations. Turning
to values, Qi complains that Americans don’t realize how
ideological they are. In particular, they are committed to the idea
of “American exceptionalism” (the USA as model and leader for the
world). Meanwhile, Americans don’t realize that PRC foreign policy,
highly ideological under Mao, is now less ideological than current
USA foreign policy. As regards human rights, Westerners hold a
Western concept of them that emphasizes procedural civil and
political rights over substantive economic and social rights.
Westerners are trying to impose that version on China. Chinese have
their own values and priorities.

Nathan
argues that China participated in drafting international human
rights conventions, agreed to them, and now should implement them
more rigorously. Affirming the importance civil and political
rights, Nathan cites cases in which the PRC has prosecuted citizens
for trying to exercise rights that the PRC government itself has
urged them to exercise, such as exposing local abuses. Objecting to
such abuses is not just a Western value but rather a universal
value, which Chinese people share. Actually, most top American
policy makers reject the idea of “American exceptionalism” in favor
of universal principles with which all countries should comply,
including America.

Wang Shuo
and Susan Shirk discuss “The media” (chapter four). As a
professional journalist in China (with Caixin!), Wang is
concerned about government restriction of reporting. He sketches
China’s media, from the official media at the center (which
self-regulate) to news outlets affiliated with that media, to
independent professional media (which the government attempts to
regulate). Surrounding all these are the new informal social media,
which focus on livelihoods, democracy, and nationalism. In China,
the public may increasingly turn to social media for their news,
because government regulation compromises the integrity all the
other media, even the independent media. It would be better if the
independent media could “anchor” the social media, whose
nationalism tends to make PRC foreign policy more populist. Wang
notes processes that tend to amplify popular Chinese nationalism,
leaving independent media only marginally able to combat it.

Shirk
agrees with Wang’s analysis, except to congratulate him and other
independent journalists for their accomplishments. She notes that
competition from commercial media and the internet has forced the
official media to become more timely, reliable, and critical [and,
one might add, lively]. Unfortunately, the information revolution
has increased the role of the propaganda bureaucracies, even though
their too-obvious efforts at censorship are ultimately
self-defeating. Social media have temporarily achieved much
independence and influence. However, they are quite useful to the
government as well, for venting discontent and identifying
dissidents. Ultimately the government has many levers for
controlling them too. Meanwhile, the official media promote
nationalism to an alarming extent.

Jia
Qingguo and Alan D. Romberg agree that “Taiwan and Tibet”
are still something to worry about (particularly Taiwan). However,
basically they repeat opposed positions of the PRC and USA that are
longstanding. Jia is adamant that Taiwan and Tibet are subnational
issues [within “one China,” as I have placed them here]. Romberg
concedes that any issues about Tibet are largely internal to China,
but maintains that Taiwan is, to some extent, a distinctive
“nation” that might deserve some sovereignty of its own.

I
personally am concerned that the two could not agree even on basic
facts. Historically, was Taiwan “integrated” into China (as
Jia claims) because it was settled by people from Fujian who were
culturally Chinese? Or was it not much “integrated” (as Romberg
claims) because the imperial government began actually to
administer Taiwan only at the end of the 1800s, not long before it
ceded the territory to Japan? Recently (1982) did the USA
promise to withdraw military support from Taiwan unconditionally
(as Jia claims), or did it promise to do so only if the PRC does
not threaten Taiwan militarily (as Romberg claims)?
Currently, do most people on Taiwan favor eventual
“unification”with the mainland (as Jia claims)? Or does a large
majority emphatically reject unification (as Romberg claims, citing
numerous surveys)?

总访问量：博主简介

韦爱德Edwin A. Winckler (韦爱德) is an American political scientist (Harvard BA, MA, and PhD) who has taught mostly in the sociology departments at Columbia and Harvard. He has been researching China for a half century, publishing books about Taiwan’s political economy (Sharpe, 1988), China’s post-Mao reforms (Rienner, 1999), and China’s population policy (Stanford, 2005, with Susan Greenhalgh). Recently he has begun also explaining American politics to Chinese. So the purpose of this Blog is to call attention to the best American media commentary on current American politics and to relate that to the best recent American academic scholarship on American politics. Winckler’s long-term institutional base remains the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University in New York City. However he and his research have now retreated to picturesque rural Central New York.