Central banks maintain accounts for, and extend credit to, commercial banks and, in most instances, their sponsoring governments, but they generally do not do business with the public at large. Because they have the right to issue fiat money, most central banks serve as their nations’ (or, in the case of the European Central Bank, several nations’) only source of paper currency. The resulting monopoly of paper currency endows central banks with significant market influence as well as a certain revenue stream, which is known as seigniorage, after the lords or seigneurs of medieval France who enjoyed the privilege of minting their own coins. (See alsodroit du seigneur.)

Contemporary central banks manage a broad range of public responsibilities, the first and most familiar of which is the prevention of banking crises. This responsibility involves supplying additional cash reserves to commercial banks that risk failure due to extraordinary reserve losses. Other responsibilities include managing the growth of national money stocks (and, indirectly, fostering economic stability by preventing wide fluctuations in general price levels, interest rates, and exchange rates), regulating commercial banks, and serving as the sponsoring government’s fiscal agent—e.g., by purchasing government securities.

The concept of central banking can be traced to medieval public banks. In Barcelona the Taula de Canvi (Municipal Bank of Deposit) was established in 1401 for the safekeeping of city and private deposits, but it was also expected to help fund Barcelona’s government (particularly the financing of military expenses), which it did by receiving tax payments and issuing bonds—first for Barcelona’s municipal government and later for the larger Catalan government. The Taula was not permitted to lend to any other entity. During the 1460s, however, excessive demands for lending caused the Taula to suspend the convertibility of its deposits, and this led to its liquidation and reorganization.

The success of later public banks generally depended upon the extent to which their sponsoring governments valued long-term bank safety over loan flexibility. During the 17th and 18th centuries the Amsterdamsche Wisselbank was an especially successful example. The bank’s conservative lending policy allowed it to maintain reserves that fully covered its outstanding notes and thereby rendered it invulnerable even to the major panic provoked by Louis XIV’s unexpected invasion of the Netherlands in 1672. Although the Wisselbank had not been required to maintain 100 percent backing for its notes prior to 1802, its reserves shrank and its reputation suffered after it granted large-scale loans to the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch government.

The Bank of England, founded in 1694 for the purpose of advancing £1.2 million to the British government to fund its war against France, eventually became the world’s most powerful and influential financial institution. It was the first public bank to assume most of the characteristics of modern central banks, including acceptance, by the late 19th century, of an official role in preserving the integrity of England’s banking and monetary system (as opposed to merely looking after its own profits). By 1800 the Bank of England had become the country’s only limited-liability joint-stock bank, its charter having denied other banks the right to issue banknotes (then an essential source of bank funding). Its size and prestige encouraged deposits from other banks and thereby streamlined the process of interbank debt settlement and confirmed the Bank of England’s status as the “bankers’ bank.”

The Colonial Office in the Bank of England, unsigned watercolour by one of Sir John Soane's draftsmen, c. 1818; in Sir John Soane's Museum, London.Courtesy of the trustees of Sir John Soane's Museum, London; photograph, R.B. Fleming

There were cracks, however, in the Bank of England’s near-monopoly power. Although private banknotes had ceased to circulate in London by 1780, they survived in the provinces, where the Bank of England was prohibited from establishing branches. Following the Panic of 1825, a sharp economic downturn associated with a steep decline in commodities prices, dozens of county banks risked insolvency and failure. The government responded by rescinding the prohibition on joint-stock banking, though only for banks located at least 65 miles (105 km) from the centre of London. The same reform also allowed the Bank of England to set up provincial branches, but this last measure did not prevent the establishment of almost 100 joint-stock banks of issue between 1826 and 1836. The Bank of England’s monopoly was thus partially infringed. Two further measures, however, ultimately served to enhance its power, causing other banks to rely upon it as a source of currency for their routine needs as well as during emergencies. An 1833 act made Bank of England notes legal tender for sums above £5, which strengthened the tendency for the nation’s metallic reserves to concentrate in one place; and Peel’s Act of 1844 (formally known as the Bank Charter Act) in turn awarded the Bank of England an eventual monopoly of paper currency by fixing the maximum note issues of other banks at levels outstanding just prior to the act’s passage while requiring banks to give up their note-issuing privileges upon merging with or being absorbed by other banks.

In England the passage of Peel’s Act marked a practical victory for proponents of currency monopoly over those who favoured “free banking”—that is, a system in which all banks were equally free to issue redeemable paper notes. The free bankers maintained that Peel’s Act allowed the Bank of England to exercise an unhealthy influence upon the banking system and deprived other banks of the strength and flexibility they needed to tide themselves through financial crises. Proponents of currency monopoly, on the other hand, favoured having one bank alone bear ultimate responsibility both for preserving the long-term integrity of the currency and for preventing—or at least containing—financial crises. Although he himself favoured free banking, Walter Bagehot, then editor of The Economist magazine, played a key role in shaping the modern view of central banks as essential lenders of last resort. In the book Lombard Street (1873), he outlined the critical responsibilities of monopoly banks of issue (such as the Bank of England) during episodes of financial crises, and he emphasized the need for such banks to put the interests of the economy as a whole ahead of their own interests by keeping open lines of credit to other solvent but temporarily illiquid banks. These concepts of central banking led to the establishment of similar institutions in France, Germany, and elsewhere.

Modern developments

In the United States, state banking laws prohibiting branch banking and Civil War-era restrictions on note issuance rendered the banking system vulnerable to periodic crises. The crises eventually gave rise to a banking reform movement, the ultimate outcome of which was the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 and the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.

After 1914 central banking spread rapidly to other parts of the world, and by the outbreak of World War II most countries had adopted it. The exceptions were the European colonies, which tended to rely on alternative currency arrangements. When they achieved independence after the war, however, most of them adopted central banking. After the 1970s several nations that had experienced recurring bouts of hyperinflation chose to abandon their central banking arrangements in favour of either modified currency-board-like systems or official “dollarization” (that is, the use of Federal Reserve dollars in lieu of their own distinct paper currency).

The worldwide spread of central banking during the 20th century coincided with the worldwide abandonment of metallic monetary systems, meaning that central banks effectively replaced gold and silver as the world’s ultimate sources of base money. Central banks are therefore responsible for supplying most of the world’s circulating paper currency, supplying commercial banks with cash reserves, and, indirectly, regulating the quantity of commercial bank deposits and loans.

Influence of central banks

The chief feature that distinguishes central banks from commercial banks is their ability to issue irredeemable or “fiat” paper notes, which in most nations are the only available form of paper currency and the only form of money having unlimited legal-tender status. Besides being held by the general public, central bank notes also serve, together with central bank deposit credits, as the cash reserves of commercial banks. It is the central banks’ monopoly of paper currency and bank reserves that allows them to exercise control over the total supply of money (including commercial bank deposits) available in the economies over which their monopoly privileges extend. By altering national money stocks, central banks indirectly influence rates of spending and inflation and, to a far more limited extent, rates of employment and the production of goods and services. Central banks also can influence the fate of individual banks, and indeed the stability of the banking industry as a whole, by granting or refusing emergency assistance in their role as lender of last resort. Finally, central banks typically take part in the regulation of commercial banks. In this capacity they may enforce a variety of rules governing such things as cash reserve ratios, interest rates, investment portfolios, equitycapital, and entry into the banking industry.

Monetary control

Central banks can control national money stocks in two ways: directly, by limiting their issues of paper currency, and indirectly, by altering available supplies of bank reserves and thereby influencing the value of the deposit credits that banks are capable of maintaining. Generally speaking, however, control is secured entirely though the market for bank reserves, with currency supplied to banks on demand in exchange for existing reserve credits.

In most industrialized nations the supply of bank reserves is mainly regulated by means of central bank sales and purchases of government securities, foreign exchange, and other assets in secondary or open asset markets. When a central bank purchases assets in the open market, it pays for them with a check drawn upon itself. The seller then deposits the check with a commercial bank, which sends the check to the central bank for settlement in the form of a credit to the bank’s reserve account. Banking system reserves are thus increased by the value of the open-market purchase. Open-market asset sales have the opposite consequence, with the value of checks written by securities dealers being deducted from the reserve accounts of the dealers’ banks. The principal merit of open-market operations as an instrument of monetary control is that such operations allow central banks to exercise full control over outstanding stocks of basic money.

Minimum reserve requirements

Two other instruments of monetary control of considerable importance are changes in mandated bank reserve requirements (minimum legal ratios of bank cash reserves to deposits of various kinds) and changes in the discount rate (the interest rate a central bank charges on loans made to commercial banks and other financial intermediaries). Changes in reserve requirements work not by altering the total outstanding value of bank reserves but by altering the total value of deposits supported by available cash reserves.

The role of discount-rate changes is frequently misunderstood by the general public. Instead of purchasing assets on the open market, a central bank can purchase assets directly from a commercial bank. Traditionally such direct purchasing was known as “discounting,” because assets were acquired at a discount from their face or maturity value, with the discount rate embodying an implicit rate of interest. Today central bank support to commercial banks often takes the form of outright loans, even in systems (such as that of the United States) in which official central bank lending rates continue to be referred to as “discount” rates.

Confusion arises because it is often the case that, in setting their own discount rates, central banks are able to influence market lending rates. In practice, most central banks supply relatively little base money through their discount windows, often restricting their discount or lending operations mainly to troubled banks but even denying funds to some of those. Consequently, there may be no connection at all between the rates central banks charge commercial banks and other (including commercial-bank) lending rates. Some central banks have contributed to misunderstandings by using changes in their discount rates as a means of signaling their intention either to increase or to reduce the availability of bank reserves, with the actual easing or tightening of bank reserve market conditions being accomplished, more often than not, by means of open market operations.

Although most central banks (at least those not bound by a fixed exchange-rate commitment) continue to pursue a variety of objectives, economists generally believe that their principal aim should be long-term price stability, meaning an annual rate of general price inflation that is within the range of 0 to 3 percent. While other popular monetary policy objectives, including the financing of government expenditures, combating unemployment, and “smoothing” or otherwise regulating interest rates, are not necessarily at loggerheads with this goal, failure to subordinate such objectives to that of price-level stability has often proved to be a recipe for high inflation.

It is sometimes assumed that, by setting their own discount rates, central banks are able to influence, if not completely control, general market lending rates. In truth, most central banks supply relatively little base money in the form of direct loans or discounts to commercial banks. Central banks wield the greatest influence on rates that banks charge each other for short-term, especially overnight, funds. In some countries overnight interbank lending rates (such as the Federal Funds Rate in the United States, the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR, in England, and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate, or TIBOR, in Japan) function as important indirect guides to the central bank’s monetary policy. Yet even in this respect the ability of central banks to influence inflation-adjusted interest rates is very limited, especially in the long term.

In its role as a lender of last resort, a central bank offers financial support to individual banking firms. Central banks perform this role to prevent such banks from failing prematurely and, more important, to prevent a general loss of confidence that could trigger widespread runs on a country’s banks.

Such a banking panic can involve large-scale withdrawals of currency from the banking system, which, by exhausting bank reserves, might cause the banking system to collapse, depriving firms of access to an essential source of funding while making it extremely difficult for the central bank to steer clear of a deflationary crisis. By standing ready to provide aid to troubled banks and thereby assuring depositors that at least some of the economy’s banking firms are in no danger of failing, central banks make the challenge of monetary control easier while maintaining the flow of bank credit.

Trends

Contemporary banking has been influenced by two important phenomena: deregulation and globalization, the latter having been a crucial driving force behind the former. A movement of deregulation gained momentum in the 1980s, when governments around the world began allowing market forces to play a larger role in determining the structure and performance of their banking systems. Deregulation was supported by an ideological current favouring privatization. At the same time, technological advances, especially in information processing and communications, eroded national financial-market boundaries by making it easier to obtain banking services from foreign or offshore banks, especially as offshore banking became a closer substitute for banking with domestic firms. The globalization of the banking industry soon followed in the form of cross-border bank mergers and the development of multinational banking corporations such as ABN AMRO, ING Group, and HSBC.

By the early 21st century it had become possible for almost anyone to hold offshore dollar deposits in Luxembourg, The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and elsewhere and to initiate transactions electronically. The breakdown of borders motivated banks (particularly larger banks) to base their operations in countries with minimal regulations and low taxes.

Consolidation has been a notable trend in banking, both within particular countries and across national borders. Mergers and acquisitions have reduced the number of banks worldwide, even as banking facilities and the availability of banking services have grown through ATMs, online banking, and branch banking. This trend has been especially visible in the United States, where the removal of restrictions on branch banking caused the number of banks to decline from more than 14,000 in the mid-1980s to fewer than 8,000 in the early 21st century. Beginning in the 1990s, the European Union has also witnessed a considerable degree of banking consolidation, thanks to an impressive number of bank mergers and acquisitions.

Deregulation and breakthroughs in telecommunications have also diminished the influence of conventional commercial banks relative to other kinds of financial firms. In their place, diversified financial firms (that is, firms combining conventional banking, insurance, and investment services) have gained support and regulatory favour, especially in industrialized nations. Such changes have been least apparent in Europe, where such mingling has long been practiced under the rubric of universal banking.

Banking services have also been extended to the poor, especially through the rise of microcredit associations. As developed in 1976 by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, microcredit associations have provided small loans (“microloans”) to millions of poor persons. Instead of relying upon collateral, as conventional banks do, to secure their loans, microcredit institutions rely upon their borrowers’ membership in village-based peer groups that are collectively responsible for loan repayments. Remarkably, default rates for the Grameen Bank have been far lower than those for traditional banks. In 2006 Grameen and its founder, Muhammad Yunus, were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.

The relative importance of conventional banks has also declined as a result of expanding opportunities for business firms to raise funds by issuing their own bonds (including low-grade junk bonds) and shares. Globalization has contributed to this trend by making it easier for firms to market their securities abroad—a development that was especially beneficial for firms in countries that lacked sophisticated financial infrastructure.

In response to competitive pressures, conventional banks increased their involvement in securities-related activities and began offering other nontraditional services. Some banks issued credit cards or acquired large credit-card-processing operations. Many developed facilities for online banking and for point-of-sale debit-card payments as well as for digital cash and smart cards, which could be used even by persons without bank accounts.