While it is a view that philosophy has
largely ignored since Gilbert Ryle's work in the 20th century, we ought to recognize that
explanatory knowledge serves a valuable role in expert behavior. With developments that
arise in the 20th century, we experience a radical shift in understanding expertise that
would have us believe explanatory knowledge, and propositional knowledge generally, simply
does not play a role in skilled performance. According to the contemporary literature, while
having explanatory knowledge may be relevant to the novice person who is acquiring a skill,
having such knowledge in no way manifests in behavior that we generally distinguish as being
expert. Only until very recently, many philosophers have come to agree that explanatory
knowledge is merely inoperative as it relates to skilled performance, and while considering
such knowledge may be useful to a beginner who is learning a new skill, such knowledge is in
no way operative once the person has become well-acquainted with the skill. However, simply
because philosophers have concentrated on examples involving expertise in which explanatory
knowledge does not occupy a central role, we ought to deny the premature conclusion being
made that would have us believe explanatory knowledge is always a mere aside to a person's
displaying expertise. Ultimately, in analyzing cases involving expertise where explanatory
knowledge makes an essential contribution to a person’s displaying expert behavior, we ought
to see why exactly the Rylean account of skilled behavior is inadequate, and in what ways
explanatory knowledge is in fact valuable and is made manifest in a person’s displaying
expertise.