Sanity on the basis of semantical

Sources very late in antiquity attributed to Pythagoras fl. Modern historians sometimes credit Heraclitus fl. While we have nothing of his explicitly on language, it seems likely that Heraclitus did attach philosophical significance to the puns or contradictions in terms on which some of his paradoxical remarks depend.

This is the common sense understanding of it. The conclusion of the argument is found using different words in a premise which is the definition of begging the question. By robust free will I mean the common sense, naive notion of free will that we all intuitively believe we have.

So trying to change what you want at this moment is not a very good test. So I can change what I want by simply doing something that I think may lead me to want that thing in the future.

This is all really obvious and seems to be true. Your test of trying to change what you want in the moment and not being able to is simply not an appropriate test. Galen Strawson is a notable philosopher who makes this mistake often in his arguments against free will.

The problem with the argument is that it assumes there is only ever a random act or an act determined by a prior cause. And the libertarian free will i.

So to assert there is only ever random uncaused acts or determined caused acts is to beg the question. This goes into the basic problem for any argument against robust free will.

Want to add to the discussion?

The basic problem is that it either a assumes a causal closure principle too strong to be plausible or b assumes a causal closure principle too weak to support the conclusion against robust free will.

And this problem is not ever going to be solved it seems to me because it is so embedded with other philosophical views like what does it mean to have a mind and whether or not the mind can interact with the body and whether there are psychophysical laws determining that interaction, etc.

I believe in substance dualism which is the only philosophy of mind that makes any sense to me which takes account of the evident data of experience. And it seems like for at least some of our actions there is no prior determining cause for our "willing" since our "willing" for robust free acts is merely an "agent doing" and nothing causes the agent to do that doing.

The agent simply does it. The distinction between random indeterminate acts and non-random indeterminate acts is that non-random indeterminate acts like in intentional acts by free agents is that the agent can conform to reasons to act or not. Reasons are not causes. This is another mistake people make.

They take reasons to be causes. This is called "reason internalism" and reason internalism has massive problems.

Ajdukiewicz

The fact of "reason externalism" the philosophy of action such that agents respond to reasons but are not caused by reasons is enough, in my view, to get one on the way to seeing why we do have robust free will.

There is not relevant distinction as far as this argument goes between practical and theoretical rationality. For example, if I learn that grass is usually blue by experience then I have reason to believe grass is blue.

Suppose that I use the word "green" to refer to my blue experience in conversation with others and it has never caused any issues in my life.

So I should not believe it anymore. So any argument against robust free will is a practical defeater for itself.The basis for any theory of syntactical categories is the linguistic fact that in all natural languages there are strings of (one or more) words which are mutually interchangeable in all well-formed contexts salva beneformatione —that is, with well-formedness (grammaticality, syntactical.

Sanity defense cases have a lot to do with the lawyering. In this case, it was a fair heavyweight battle with regard to the lawyering in the case. The defense had some built-in advantages.

The latest Tweets from Semblance of Sanity (@semblancebros). Two Brothers. Massive fanboys.

From to , Joshua Abraham Norton thought he was Emperor of the United States. Ann Atkin keeps /5(20). therefore, not be permitted to testify as to Ballard's sanity or lack thereof on the day of the incident, even though defense counsel argued that there was no deviation from the contents of the report, and the report did refer to Ballard's mental state on the day of the incident.