Judging the Kurdish Independence Referendum: An inside perspective on the events that led up to the 2017 Kurdistan Independence Referendum

2 years ago

Aso Mamand

Whenever a Kurdistan Regional Government official or a
leader of a Kurdish political party released a statement on Kurdish
independence and the 2017 independence referendum, I became even more convinced
of the need to defend Kirkuk and to prevent the outbreak of any conflict
between the Iraqi Federal Government and the Kurdistan Region because since
2003 I have been one of the few people that have been aware of the events in
Kirkuk from close up. In recent years as the rhetoric on a Kurdish independence
referendum and Kurdish independence ramped up I found myself on one side in
this political game.
In this account, I will reveal my inside view of the events
that led up to the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum, because since the
18th October 2017 there has been an unprecedented and persistent smear campaign
against us. I will not be responding to specific accusations or political
propaganda that has come from other political parties Instead I will try to
inform the Kurdish community across the globe on how and why the 2017
referendum was conducted. Moreover, I will reveal who was ‘for’ and who was
‘against’ the holding of the poll and the reasons behind the positions taken by
these individuals.
A significant political event, such as an independence referendum
that is designed to establish an independent Kurdistan and that includes in its
scope territory that is disputed between the Kurdistan Regional Government and
the Iraqi Federal Government, warrants a detailed discussion. For this, I would
firstly like to apologise that I could not discuss all the issues in detail
during the period of the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum. I didn't
provide details on the problems surrounding the poll as I felt that, behind the
scenes, I could better utilise my influence to protect Kirkuk and its
residents. However, numerous reasons did not allow me to succeed in this
regard.
Following the Islamic State's assault on Mosul in 2014, the
Iraqi army withdrew from Kirkuk and the disputed territories. The subsequent security
void in these areas awarded the Kurdistan Regional Government the opportunity
to control the Kirkuk oil fields. It wasn't long after the Kurdistan Regional
Government was able to control Kirkuk that it began exporting Kirkuk’s oil and
that of the Kurdistan Region directly to international buyers in international
market via the Ciyan port in Turkey.
Controlling the Kirkuk oil fields encouraged the Kurdish
political leadership, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its leader
Massoud Barzani, to strengthen their calls for a Kurdish independence
referendum so that the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan could be decided once and for
all. During this period, Massoud Barzani was President of the Kurdistan Region,
his nephew and son in law, Nechirvan Barzani, was Prime Minister of the
Kurdistan Regional Government and his son, Masrour Barzani, was the Chancellor
of the Kurdistan Region’s Security Council. These prime positions had awarded the Kurdistan Democratic Party control
of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's economy, international relations,
international policy, and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces giving the Kurdistan
Democratic Party a unique opportunity to take control of the campaign for a
Kurdish independence referendum and take it out of the hands of the Kurdish
people.
In July 2017, these factors allowed Massoud Barzani, as
President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
Islamic Union of Kurdistan and some other Kurdish political forces to set a
date for the Kurdish independence Referendum. They set the 25th September 2017
as the date of the poll in the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk.
This decision became the source of an event that would
become an enormous political issue transcending the Kurdistan Region and Iraq
to reach the capitals of regional and international states. From the onset, the
desires, aims and reasoning of each political player differed regarding
supporting the referendum or not. Hence, I had to make a quick decision on the
independence referendum, a poll that looked set to have a sizable impact on the
fate my people as well as the province of Kirkuk going forward. I did not want
to make a decision that could turn out to be a significant political mistake
and that I would later come to regret.
Given that I am a member of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, a Kurdish political party that campaigns with the slogan 'Right to
Self-Determination' as one of its founding principles the decision I had to
make was incredibly difficult. I would have reached my decision easier if I had
made my choice under the influence of Kurdish nationalism or my belief in my
party’s founding principle of the right to self-determination. It would have
been easier still if we had proposed to restrict the referendum to the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq alone. In that instance, I most likely would have
backed the move, not least to use it against Baghdad to receive more
concessions. However, when Kirkuk became the focus of the referendum, I began
lobbying other Kurdish decision-makers against the decision that looked set to
thrust Kirkuk on to a long and dark path in which failure was more probable
than success.
In a meeting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Politburo,
held in early September 2017, I laid out my views on the issue to my colleagues.
I focused mainly on my opinion regarding the holding of the referendum in any
of the disputed territories. I told my PUK colleagues the following: "If
we also carry out the referendum in Kirkuk and any other Iraqi disputed
territory we would provide our adversaries with the excuse to dispossess us of
Kirkuk. They would justify such a move by arguing that we are working against
Iraq, other regional states, and the people of Kirkuk.”
Following this meeting, the meeting of the Council of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's Kirkuk Office was held, in which all of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's agencies in Kirkuk took part. In the meeting,
all attendees voted unanimously against the holding of the referendum in
Kirkuk. The assembly subsequently prepared a dispatch to the Higher Referendum
Council and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Politburo. We then began meetings
with the different peoples of Kirkuk also to get a better grasp of their views.
Once these fact-finding meetings were complete, we started our lobbying against
the Kurdish referendum in its proposed form for we had concluded that it would
result in substantial damage to the interests of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
A few days before the referendum I took part in a meeting,
which also included Massoud Barzani, Kosrat Rasoul Ali, Hama Haji Mahmoud,
Salah Dalo, Kemal Kirkuki, the KDP's Kirkuk Branch, and a number of PUK members
from PUK's offices. In the meeting, we clearly explained the risks of the
referendum, the unsatisfactory state of the Peshmerga, the power imbalance
between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army, the threats that neighbouring
countries posed, and that we believed it to be a strategic mistake to ignore
the recommendations of the United States and the European Union.
After this meeting, I met with Kirkuk’s Governor Najmadin
Karim, who had by then developed a strong bond with Massoud Barzani. In the
meeting, I said: "Dr Najmadin, for me, for the PUK, Massoud Barzani will
listen to you, I implore you, please, try your best not to hold the referendum
in Kirkuk; otherwise we will lose control of it." In response, Najmadin
Karim assured me that the referendum would not take place in Kirkuk. He
explained: "we will not announce this [that we will not hold the
referendum in Kirkuk] until two days before the referendum so that we can
pressure the United States and the European Union to improve their offer to us
[Kurds] and give us a better deal."
In mid-September 2017, the Higher Referendum Council met in
Erbil. My colleagues Kosrat Rasoul, Mullah Bakhtiar, and Sa'di Pira assured me
that in the meeting they had agreed that the referendum would not take place in
Kirkuk. "Kirkuk has been excluded from the referendum", they
said.
The following day, another meeting was held at Sari Rash
between Massoud Barzani, Kosrat Rasoul, Nechirvan Barzani, Qubad Talabani,
Pavel Talabani, Salahadin Bahadin and myself. In the meeting, Nechirvan Barzani
said to me: "Aso there is no need for you to speak, the referendum will
not be held in Kirkuk and the disputed territories". Hence, I felt I had
nothing to say in the meeting, and therefore, remained silent as I had received
my assurances from the top that the referendum would not take place in Kirkuk
and the disputed territories.

In the meeting, we also discussed the letter from Rex
Tillerson. In that regard, they revealed that the Kurdistan Regional Government
planned "to delay the revelation that the referendum would not be held in
Kirkuk and the disputed territories so that it could win more concessions and
guarantees."

When Massoud Barzani visited Sulaimani to campaign for the
'yes' vote just before the referendum, another meeting was held. In the evening
a friend and colleague from the PUK Politburo called me and said: "Aso be
careful, they want to hold the referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed
territories!"
Receiving this news forced me to resume my efforts to
prevent the catastrophe that I believed awaited the Kurdistan Region if the
referendum was carried out in Kirkuk and the disputed territories. This time we
intensified our efforts by preparing a dispatch to be sent to the PUK members
of the Kirkuk Provincial Council as well as the head of the Kirkuk branch of
the Independent Election Commission. We also attached our original dispatch to
the new one and sent it to the Higher Referendum Committee.
I am sure that you all remember that a demonstration was
organised on the Kirkuk Citadel. It was Kosrat Rasoul that had asked us to
arrange the demonstration. Before we agreed to it, I told him that we would
only organise it on the condition that the referendum does not include Kirkuk
and the disputed territories. He promised that it would not be carried out in
those territories and so based on this pledge we agreed to organise and hold
the demonstration.
On the 23rd September 2017, we selected our colleague Rasand
to meet with the Kurdish political parties to force the cancellation of the
referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed territories.
After we learned that the promises that were made to us
regarding the referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed territories would not be
upheld, we organised a meeting of the PUK leadership in Kirkuk on the evening
of 23rd September 2017, in which all leading members of the PUK in Kirkuk were
present except Najmadin Karim. Once we became sure that the referendum would
also be held in Kirkuk and the disputed territories, we prepared a statement
that stated our position on the issue explaining that we were against the
holding of a referendum in those areas. Other than Najmadin Karim, the PUK’s Kirkuk leadership, Members of
Parliament, other high-ranking members of the PUK and the agencies of the PUK
in Kirkuk all supported the statement.
During that night I received a call from Kosrat Rasoul in
which he accused me of wanting "to reignite a civil war". I responded by saying: "we have no
intention of starting a civil war. We are simply against the holding of the
referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed territories."
That same night, I also received a call from Nechirvan
Barzani in which he urged me not to release the statement. He said to postpone
it as "tomorrow [24th September 2017] […they were…] hold[ing] a meeting at
Sari Rash". Given this opportunity to convince the proponents of the
referendum to remove Kirkuk and the disputed territories from the list of
places it would be held, we agreed to postpone the release of the statement.
On the 24th September 2017, as promised by Nechirvan Barzani
another meeting was held at Sari Rash in which I, as the head of the PUK's
Kirkuk office, took part. Also present at the meeting was the Head of the KDP's
Kirkuk Branch, Rebwar Talabani - the Chairman of the Kirkuk Provincial Council,
and Mamosta Kakarash - the Head of the Higher Referendum and Election
Commission of the Kurdistan Region.
At the meeting, we once again reiterated that the referendum
must not take place in Kirkuk and the disputed territories. I reminded them
that they "had all promised me that the referendum would not include these
areas”. Nechirvan Barzani acknowledged my reminder and said: "yes we had
promised that the poll would not include Kirkuk and the disputed
territories."
After the meeting, I told them that I had to leave and would
be returning to Kirkuk. Masoud Barzani had by then understood that we were
against the holding of any Kurdish independence referendum in the current state
that included Kirkuk and the disputed territories. Hence, Massoud Barzani asked
Kosrat Rasoul to “go to Kirkuk [..to..] supervise the referendum". We
returned to Kirkuk together. As evident in my account the political pressure
exerted on us was far more significant than that which we could exert on the
proponents of the referendum. As a result, we had no choice but to take a
neutral stance between resisting the referendum in Kirkuk and accepting the
holding of the poll and the subsequent possibility of military conflict with
the Iraqi Federal Government.
We as political figures, as Peshmerga, and as a political
party have, since the beginning of the new Kurdish revolution, have had the
most sacrifices in Kirkuk. We also have the most significant impact in Kirkuk,
and the residents of Kirkuk have the most love and affection for us. The PUK
has also had the closest affinity with Kirkuk's Turkmen, Arab, Kakai, and
Christian communities.
Therefore, regarding the holding of the 2017 Kurdish
independence referendum in Kirkuk, we were well aware of the distress it caused
to the governments of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom
and the European Union. We also had documented all the details concerning the
possible successes and failures that such a referendum would bring. Regardless
of our efforts, they, the architects of the poll continued to force their will
and shortsightedness on the issue. They ignored our concern, deep understanding
of the issue and our long-term perspective. It is not possible to make a
judgment on the days the followed the referendum without first understanding on
the days that lead up to it. Only once this is done can the truth be reached
that the fall of Kirkuk was the result of the referendum and the
shortsightedness of its architects.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the KCCRC.