Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability, Business History

In the United States, the absence of social democracy made ownership separation easier than it was anywhere else, as pro-shareholder institutions, while not every bit as strong as shareholders would ...
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In the United States, the absence of social democracy made ownership separation easier than it was anywhere else, as pro-shareholder institutions, while not every bit as strong as shareholders would always have wanted, had an easier time forming. Political pressures existed, and manifested themselves via controls on financial institutions' role inside the firm historically, and in recent decades, in dampening the frequency and ease of hostile takeovers that could disrupt employment relationships. Economic-based social conflict has been lower in the United States than elsewhere. A tradition of low government involvement meant that firms were pressed less than they otherwise would have been, even when political pressures simmered.Less

United States

Mark J. Joe

Published in print: 2006-07-20

In the United States, the absence of social democracy made ownership separation easier than it was anywhere else, as pro-shareholder institutions, while not every bit as strong as shareholders would always have wanted, had an easier time forming. Political pressures existed, and manifested themselves via controls on financial institutions' role inside the firm historically, and in recent decades, in dampening the frequency and ease of hostile takeovers that could disrupt employment relationships. Economic-based social conflict has been lower in the United States than elsewhere. A tradition of low government involvement meant that firms were pressed less than they otherwise would have been, even when political pressures simmered.

Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability, Business History

This chapter provides a background of the study on corporate governance. Part I sets out that peace precedes production. Part II explores the tension between social democracy and the diffusely owned. ...
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This chapter provides a background of the study on corporate governance. Part I sets out that peace precedes production. Part II explores the tension between social democracy and the diffusely owned. Part III tests the political hypothesis with a simple statistical inquiry. Part IV narrates the relationships between social politics and corporate governance in seven of the world's richer nations. Part V examines the direction of the causality, inquiring how corporate and economic structures can induce political backlash. Part VI discusses the fit between the political theory and a leading academic theory. Part VII unifies two political theories, holding that a democratic polity does not easily accept powerful pro-shareholder institutions.Less

Introduction

Mark J. Joe

Published in print: 2006-07-20

This chapter provides a background of the study on corporate governance. Part I sets out that peace precedes production. Part II explores the tension between social democracy and the diffusely owned. Part III tests the political hypothesis with a simple statistical inquiry. Part IV narrates the relationships between social politics and corporate governance in seven of the world's richer nations. Part V examines the direction of the causality, inquiring how corporate and economic structures can induce political backlash. Part VI discusses the fit between the political theory and a leading academic theory. Part VII unifies two political theories, holding that a democratic polity does not easily accept powerful pro-shareholder institutions.