Thursday, 6 October 2016

Iraq Situation Report: September 20 - October 3, 2016

The Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) have finalized conditions to begin the push north towards Mosul
and its environs. The ISF recaptured Shirqat on September 22, the last
ISIS-held city in Salah al-Din Province. Shirqat’s recapture extends the ISF’s
control up the Tigris River from Baghdad to Qayyarah, placing the ISF on the
doorstep of Mosul’s environs. The U.S. announced on September 28 that it would
deploy an additional 615 advisors to several bases, including Qayyarah, to
train Iraqi and Kurdish forces in preparation for the Mosul operation. The
deployment represents the third “boost” to U.S. forces in Iraq since April. The
deployment could help generate additional ISF forces, which are still needed to
retake and hold Mosul. Meanwhile, Arbil and Baghdad announced the formation of
a joint military committee on September 29 to coordinate in Mosul while the
Ministry of Peshmerga announced Popular Mobilization, tribal fighters, and
National Mobilization, a Turkish-backed Sunni militia, will participate in the
operation. The statements gives a possible distinction between Sunni tribal
fighters under the Popular Mobilization umbrella, which are acceptable to the
Coalition, and Iranian-backed Shi’a militias in the Popular Mobilization, which
are unacceptable. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi warned the Peshmerga, however,
that they should not exploit the operation to expand the boundaries of Iraqi
Kurdistan.

Iraqi officials
have rejected Turkish presence in the operation. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs renewed calls for Turkey to leave its base near Mosul after the Turkish
parliament voted to extend the mandate for Turkish troops in Syria and Iraq on
October 1. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated on October 1 that Turkey will
have a role in Mosul operations, likely in order to ensure the post-ISIS
administration of Mosul is receptive to Turkish interests and to retain
oversight of Kurdish ambitions in the region. Turkish presence could complicate
the Iraqi Government’s ability to resolve Mosul’s post-ISIS governance if
Turkey tries to influence the outcome in its favor.

ISIS has increased
its attacks in Baghdad and renewed attacks around Tikrit likely in order
detract from the ISF’s ability to deploy north to Mosul. The Coalition assessed
on September 29 that eight to twelve Iraq Army brigades would be needed to
retake the city, however an estimated half of the ISF remain in and around
Baghdad in order to secure the capital. ISIS will play on the ISF’s manpower
shortage in order to delay or weaken the ISF’s operation into Mosul. The
Coalition can reduce this vulnerability by generating and training additional
security forces.

Former
PM Nouri al-Maliki continues to unravel PM Abadi’s support base. The Council of
Representatives (CoR) voted to dismissal Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar
Zebari on September 21 in the same method in which it dismissed Defense
Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. The Reform Front, Maliki’s shadow
party, spearheaded the effort, which succeeded largely due to a fallout between
the Kurdish parties over Zebari’s survival. The Reform Front is now pushing for
the dismissal of Minister of Foreign Affairs and former National Alliance
chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Sunni Minister of Electricity, Qassim
al-Fahdawi. Maliki will continue his efforts to unseat PM Abadi’s
administration in order to set conditions for the ultimate dismissal of PM
Abadi himself. PM Abadi will face legislative obstacles in October as he needs
to present new candidates for five vacant ministries and pass crucial budget
legislation, both of which carry the risk of upsetting the status quo. He will
need to ensure foremost that the Kurds remain involved the Iraqi Government,
especially on the eve of the Mosul operation. He can do so by providing
financial assistance to the Kurdistan Region, which remains in a dire economic
crisis. Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani