Thursday, June 27, 2013

More on Knowledge and Belief

3. There are items of knowledge that are not essentially tied to action.

Daniel K comments and I respond in blue:

First, as to your aporetic triad: I would like to reject (3) in one sense that I describe below, and reject (1) absolutely. Not sure where that leaves the triad. But I'd be interested in whether you think I've clarified or merely muddied the waters.

In one sense I think all knowledge is action guiding. In another sense I think it is not essentially action guiding. All pure water is drinkable (at the right temperature etc.), but drinkability is not an essential feature of water (I wonder if this works).

BV: I don't think it works. I should think that in every possible world in which there is water, it is potable by humans. Therefore, drinkability is an essential feature of water. (An essential property of x is a property x has in every possible world in which x exists.) Of course, there are worlds in which there is water but no human beings. In those worlds, none of the water is drunk by humans. But in those worlds too water is drinkable. Compare the temporal case. Before humans evolved, there was water on earth. That water, some of it anyway, was potable by humans even though there were no humans. Water did not become potable when the first humans arose.

Rejecting (3): The having of knowledge always contributes to how one acts. You give examples of a priori knowledge as counterexamples. My response: it seems to me a priori knowledge is "hinge" knowledge that opens the door for action and cannot possibly not inform action. In other words we won't find circumstances where such knowledge is not action guiding in the presuppositional sense. So, I disagree that we will find knowledge that doesn't inform action. A priori knowledge is presuppositionally necessary and occasionally practically useful (math for engineering). Empirical knowledge will be used when it is available. So, I don't think defending (3) is necessary to defend (2).

BV: Willard maintains that one can have propositional knowledge without belief, and that belief is essentially tied to action. The conjunction of these two claims suggests to me that there can be knowledge that is not essentially tied to action. And so I looked for examples of items of knowledge that are not essentially tied to action, either by not being tied to action at all, or by not being essentially tied to action. If there are such items, then we can say that the difference between belief and knowledge is that every belief, by its very nature, can be acted upon, while it is not the case that every item of knowledge can be acted upon.

Much depends on what exactly is meant by 'acting upon a proposition,' and I confess to not having a really clear notion of this.

While I grant that much a priori knowledge is 'hinge' knowledge in your sense, consider the proposition that there is no transfinite cardinal lying between aleph-nought and 2 raised to the power, alepth-nought. Does that have any engineering application? (This is not a rhetorical question.)

Now consider philosophical knowledge (assuming there is some). If I know that there are no bare particulars (in Gustav Bergmann's sense), this is a piece of knowledge that would seem to have no behavioral consequences. The overt, nonlinguistic, behavior of a man who maintains a bundle-theoretic position with respect to ordinary partiulars will be no different from that of a man who maintains that ordinary particulars have bare particulars at their ontological cores. They could grow, handle, slice, and eat tomatoes in the very same way.

(Anecdote that I am pretty sure is not apocryphal: when Rudolf Carnap heard that fellow Vienna Circle member Gustav Bergmann had published a book under the title, The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, he refused to speak to Bergmann ever again.)

It seems we should say that some, though not all, philosophical knowledge (assuming there is philosophical knowledge) consists of propositions upon which we cannot act. Here is another example. Suppose I know that the properties of ordinary particulars are tropes. Thus I know that the redness of a tomato is not a universal but a particular. Is that knowledge action-guiding? How would it guide action differently than the knowledge that properties are universals? Is the difference in ontological views a difference that could show up at the level of overt, nonlinguistic, behavior?

Admittedly, some philosophical knowledge is action-guiding. If I know that the soul is immortal, then I will behave differently than one who lacks this knowledge.

Now consider the knowledge of insignificant contingent facts. I know from my journal that on 27 April 1977 I ate hummus. Is that item of knowledge action-guiding? I think not. Suppose you learn the boring fact and infer that I like hummus. You might then make me a present of some. But if I am the only one privy to the information, it is difficult to see how that item of knowledge could be action-guiding for me. Recall that by action I mean overt, nonlinguistic behavior.

There is also modal knowledge to consider. I might have been sleeping now. I might not have been alive now. I might never have existed at all. These are modal truths that, arguably, I know. Suppose I know them. How could I act upon them? I am not sleeping now, and nothing I do could bring it about that I am sleeping now. Some modal knowledge would seem to without behavioral consequences. Of course, some modal knowledge does have such consequences, e.g. the knowledge that it is possible to grow tomatoes in Arizona.

It seemed to me in your post that you took the truth of (2) as giving support to (3). If belief is essentially action guiding and knowledge is not essentially believing, then there should be knowledge that is not action guiding.

But again, I would like to affirm that in the sense you mean it in the post all knowledge is action guiding: either presuppositionally or consciously/empirically. For instance, the law of noncontradiction is action guiding in the sense that I cannot act if essential to that action is that the object has characteristic X, but I affirm that the object is both X and not-X. [. . .]

BV: Consider an example. I cannot eat a bananna unless it is peeled. My affirming that it is both peeled and unpeeled (at the same time, all over, and in the same sense of 'peeled') would not, however, seem to stand in the way of my performing the action. Clearly, I know that nothing is both peeled and unpeeled. It is not clear to me how one could act upon that proposition. If I want to eat the bananna, I can act upon the proposition that it is unpeeled by peeling the bananna. But how do I act upon the proposition that the bananna is either peeled or unpeeled? What do I do?

Rejecting (1): So, what if both knowledge and belief are in one sense "action guiding" (rejecting 3)? Does it imply that we have no reason to think that belief is not an essential component of knowledge (accepting 2 and rejecting 1)? I think we still do have a good reason for thinking belief is not essentially a component of knowledge. When Willard says that belief is not essential to knowledge I take him to be distinguishing between the irrelevance of being concerned with action in the act of knowing and the universal appeal of knowledge for action.

Forget the terms "knowledge" and "belief" for a moment. Distinguish between the following states:

One is in a state (intentional?) (Y) to object (X) iff one has a true representation of X that was achieved in an appropriate way (Willard's account of knowledge). Notice that there is nothing in the description that essentially involves a readiness to act. That is not a part of its intentional character or directedness of state (Y). It is directed purely at unity, period.

Alternatively, one is in an intentional state (Z) to object (X) iff one has a representation of reality that is essentially identified by its being a ground for action. Here, essential to (Z) is its providing a ground for action.

(Y) is not a state that essentially involves action guidance but (Z) is. So, the achievement of (Y) does not involve essentially the achievement of (Z). That is, the achievement of (Y) is the achievement of a kind of theoretical unity with (X) while the achievement of (Z) is the achievement of a motivator for acting in certain ways regarding (X). Response: but Daniel, you've already said that all knowledge is action guiding! Yes, but it is not an essential feature of the state of knowing. Analogy: all water is drinkable. But drinkability is not an essential feature of water.

I'm going to stop there. I'd appreciate any comments you have. That is my effort, thus far, to make sense of both Willard's suggestion and your aporetic triad.

BV: I do appreciate the comments and discussion. Let's see if I understand you. You reject (1), the orthodox view that knowledge entails belief. Your reason seems to be that, while belief is essentially action-guiding, knowledge is not essentially action-guiding, but only accidentally action-guiding. You deny what I maintain, namely, that some items of knowledge (some known propositions qua known) are not action-guiding. You maintain that all such items are action-guiding, but only accidentally so. Perhaps your argument is this:

4. Every believing-that-p is essentially action-guiding.

5. No knowing-that-p is essentially action-guiding.

Ergo

6. It is not the case that, necessarily, every knowing-that-p is a believing-that-p.

But (6) -- the negation of (1) -- doesn't follow from (4) and (5). (6) is equivalent to

6*. Possibly, some knowings-that-p are not believings-that-p.

What follows from (4) and (5) is

7. No knowing-that-p is a believing-that-p.

(7) is the thesis I am tentatively proposing.

This is a very difficult topic and we may be falling into de dicto/de re confusion.

Well, at least I am in the state that Plato says is characteristic of the philosopher: perplexity!

Comments

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This is helpful Bill. I give you last word on the first two points below if you have anything to say. I thought I might try again. But I think ultimately it may be most useful to figure out why my representation in the third point is off.

Three things:

First, maybe I should have spoken of intrinsic characteristics (which may be no less problematic) of water and knowing instead of possible world essentiality. It doesn't seem to me that water is intrinsically drinkable, since drinkability is relative to other beings. Water is intrinsically (presumably) H2O, drinkable or not. Similarly, knowledge is not instrinsically action guiding in the sense that if we look at what kind of state it is it is a state of grasping the truth of an object in an appropriate way and has nothing to do intrinsically with using what is grasped for further aims.

Second, I maintain that in a minimal but real sense all knowledge is action guiding. Judging, saying, writing, signing are all actions. Any knowledge should guide me in not judging, saying, writing, or signing the opposite. Or, any time I know that p I am guided to not represent -p. If I know that nothing is both peeled and not peeled, then I will refrain from acting in such a way that I represent that as so. Is this cheating? Maybe it is ad hoc, but it may invite us to specify exactly what we mean by action-guidance, but there is real constraint on action here. I of course concede that not all knowledge will help me get married, build a house, or make cupcakes, and so I guess I concede your point that not all knowledge is practically useful in this world excepting its restraint on what I might represent to be so.

Third, I can't follow the modal argument completely, but trust that it works.

It looked like it might work out in predicate logic. K=knowing, B=believing, A=action guiding.

1 (x)(Kx→-Ax) (4)
2 (x)(Bx→Ax) (5)
3 Ky→-Ay from 1
4 By→Ay from 2
5 -Ay→-By from 4
6 Ky→-By from 3 and 5
7 (x)(Kx→-Bx) or not one state is both a knowing and a believing.

Again, I think I see your point that something about the modal situation makes this fail. Am I misrepresenting (4) and (5) above? If I get your point what I really need is a characteristic that knowledge has that excludes belief, not a characteristic that belief has that excludes knowledge. Would that be a fair representation of what I need? Or is it just justifying (4) or (5) that is necessary?

>>Second, I maintain that in a minimal but real sense all knowledge is action guiding. Judging, saying, writing, signing are all actions. Any knowledge should guide me in not judging, saying, writing, or signing the opposite.<<

If you use 'action' this broadly, then you are clearly right. This is why I spoke of nonlinguistic behavior.

You deny that knowledge entails belief. What is your main reason for this denial?

I think the best course for the defender of the traditional definition of knowledge which includes (1) is to either reject (2) outright because of the counterexamples Bill cites or else revise (2) in two ways: first, the class of actions should include linguistic behavior (contra Bill's restriction); and (2) state that belief is essentially tied to dispositions to act suitably.

Though I hesitate to question its pedigree, I wonder about (1). Knowledge seems to entail belief. But what about cases in which one apparently has knowledge with no corresponding belief or behavior? For example, the sick person who knows he is sick but refuses to believe or act upon it; the compulsive gambler who knows his habit is harmful but does not really believe he is at risk; or the aging athlete who knows he can no longer compete but will not believe or act upon what he knows. Dallas Willard said somewhere that a person has knowledge when he can represent a thing as it really is based on sufficient thought and experience (paraphrase). This account holds knowledge as “justified true representation” rather than “justified true belief”, which seems to enable a conceptual separation of knowledge and belief, thereby helping to make sense of the cases above.

In these examples, the person apparently knows how reality bears on his situation but does not adopt beliefs that conform to reality. With this in mind, belief seems to be the adoption of and will to act upon justified true representation (knowledge), or the subjective adoption of and will to apply objective knowledge content. Or perhaps the person in the above cases doesn’t have genuine knowledge after all. Maybe genuine knowledge includes understanding, wisdom, and some degree of will-enabled belief. But then we would need definitions of understanding and wisdom, and a good grasp of how mind and will cooperate. Not easy tasks!