pilgrim wrote:The insistence that we all adhere to the good book may be applicable if Buddhism is a religion of faith. But it is not. We use the texts not as an item of faith but as a manual for our application.

I've already addressed this concern in my previous reply to you:

Ñāṇa wrote:If we approach the Abhidhammapiṭaka as a prescriptive and descriptive aid to help clarify practice and textual interpretation of suttas, and not as a closed system of ultimate truth which marginalizes the suttas as being of lesser importance, then this combination of canonical Vinayapiṭaka, Suttapiṭaka, and Abhidhammapiṭaka offers us a very workable and valuable set of teachings to guide our practice.

Vossaga wrote:For example, if one follows only the suttas, what school or designation is that?

The term Dhammavinaya would make a useful designation, except that it infers following the Vinaya (which unless you're a bhikkhu, neither of us follow).

Pre-sectarian is another alternative.

Metta,Retro.

"When we transcend one level of truth, the new level becomes what is true for us. The previous one is now false. What one experiences may not be what is experienced by the world in general, but that may well be truer. (Ven. Nanananda)

“I hope, Anuruddha, that you are all living in concord, with mutual appreciation, without disputing, blending like milk and water, viewing each other with kindly eyes.” (MN 31)

I think the yardstick you applied to determine what makes a "vada" is perfectly legitimate, ie you frame the issue from the contents of its canon.

Equally legitimate would be the approach taken by "orthodox" Theravadins, that the measure is not limited to the contents of the canon, but the interpretive/exegetical understanding plays a vital role (if not even more vital, as some obviously believe) to what makes a vada. Were this not a legitimate yardstick, then it becomes meaningless to eg speak of Asanga as a Yogacarin, since his exegesis of earlier material is what makes for the character of his understanding of Yogacara.

If I grant that both frameworks have legitimacy, I can see no valid reason to artificially draw a line to keep out the text-critical approach which focusses on a limited body of the canon, whether or not the exegetical material are consulted and discussed. I don't think you would disagree on this, I hope.

Sylvester wrote:If I grant that both frameworks have legitimacy, I can see no valid reason to artificially draw a line to keep out the text-critical approach which focusses on a limited body of the canon, whether or not the exegetical material are consulted and discussed. I don't think you would disagree on this, I hope.

I wouldn't disagree. I'm in favor of a text-critical approach, but one that is inclusive of the entire Tipiṭaka, as well as the commentaries, and non-Pāḷi Sthaviravāda sources. One example would be some of Ven. Anālayo's writings. Another would be the methodology of our fellow DW member Dmytro.

I have to admit that I am still not getting it.What I seem to understand is that there is a scholastic argument about who takes what scriptures into account on what basis. Fair enough, it appears to me, to take different stances on that.

Then it moves into labelling these differing stances. Ok, to quote Goethe' Faust "Name ist Schall und Rauch" (= what's in a name?). And now we are moving into the territory of "if you are not/do not, you don't belong"?

Why does it matter, really, what label we carry and where differences lie,considering we are all different anyway? Labels can be useful, if they serve a purpose. What purpose is served here?

As I wrote in the first post, I'm trying to come to terms with this new Australian movement.Since for me, it's obviously not Theravada, I would like to understand better this new phenomenon, discussing it with fellow practitioners.

Study of Chinese Agamas indeed brings a fresh perspective on the teachings of the Buddha.But evidently, in this particular case, such study is largely a political tool, to establish a new and unique group identity.

As far as I can gather, the main practice of that movement is based on the personal experience of Brahmavamso, which he later justified by Theravadin terms.AFAIK, the study of Chinese Agamas in this movement isn't used to further the meditative practice, but instead to justify the Brahmavamso's approach.

The Chinese versions are indeed interesting, and I'm looking forward for researchers who would implement them in meditative practice. I feel that would be possible in straightforward and honest setting, with no political games involved, and no need to grasp the popular labels like "Theravada" or whatever.

Analayo's work is indeed quite interesting in this regard. I sincerely hope he'll not get involved in Buddhist politics.

Still, to perceive, for example, Analayo as a monastic, I need a clarification of his lineage and identity.

Dmytro wrote:The historical dogmatics in Brahmavamso's group is handled by Sujato.

Sujato about preferring the Sarvastivada, and Mula-Sarvastivada in particular:

"Sometimes i think it's just that Sarv is a bit stale andordinary and Mula-S is a sexier theory! Of course, it is not at allunlikely that within one school there may be several differentversions of the canon. After all, even within the arch-orthodoxTheravadins the Burmese Tipitaka today differs substantially fromthe Sinhalese and Thai. Even within the four Nikayas we witness themovement of the Maha Satipatthana Sutta from the Digha to theMajjhima, probably in the fifth (Burmese) council."

Sujato on inauthenticity of Pali Satipatthana sutta, in comparison with Chinese versions and Mahayana sutras:

"These philosophical suppositions, inherited from the tradition and largely unexamined, underlie and inform the major schools of contemporary Theravāda meditation. Meditators practice precisely in order to see the elements of ‘ultimate reality’. The prime source text for this approach is the ‘Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta’, which we suggest would be better called the ‘Piltdown Sutta’. Is it too much to hope that the revelation that this is one of the latest and least authentic of all the texts in the Nikāyas will cause such meditation schools to question their own assumptions and methods?"

"I suggest that the abhidhamma is most profitably considered, not as a psychology or as a philosophy, but as a mystical cult."

"It's time"by Sujato:

"It’s time. We need a new paradigm. Buddhism is suffering from schizophrenia; there is a split in consciousness between the historical and the mythic conceptions of the origin of the Dhamma. For 2500 years Buddhism has been constantly changing, adapting, evolving; yet the myths of the schools insist that the Dhamma remains the same. All existing schools of Buddhism justify their idiosyncratic doctrines mythologically; this is what all religions do. Thus the Theravada insists that the Abhidhamma was taught by the Buddha in Tavatimsa heaven during his seventh rains retreat. The Mahayana claims that the Mahayana sutras were written down in the time of the Buddha, preserved in the dragon world under the sea, then retreived by Nagarjuna 500 years later. Zen claims authority from an esoteric oral transmission outside the scriptures descended from Maha Kassapa, symbolized by the smile of Maha Kassapa when the Buddha held up a lotus. All of these are myths, and do not deserve serious consideration as explanations of historical truth. Their purpose, as myths, is not to elucidate facts, but to authorize religious convictions."

hello Dmytro

i have a tendency to agree with your label "historical dogmatics". Ajahn Sujato at times does tend to write in a way as though his 'historical theories' are actually true. i too have tended to find Sujato's style of writing heavily dogmatic & somewhat overly insistent.

However, for me, your choice of examples possibly does not offer much support for criticism. Personally, I must admit I agree with every academic point Sujato has made above (but not his emotional & collective pleas, such as "we need a paradigm"). In other words, I agree with Sujato's personal interpretation but not his insistent call to dogma.

It is difficult to argue against the viewpoint the Mahayana stories are myths. The Vinaya, in my understanding, forbids the destruction of plant life. Thus how could the Buddha uproot a lotus from a pond?

I have heard the contentious Majjhima Nikaya Sutta 135 is not in the Chinese. It can be argued the rigid determinism found in Sutta 135 contradicts other suttas about kamma. It also can be argued the compassionate Buddha would not teach something that can serve as a foundation for a rigid & unchangeable "caste system" void of social compassion.

As for the Satipatthana Sutta, Sujato's opinions to me are obvious. The impression I have of the Satipatthana Sutta is of a loose collection of stuff bundled up together. This is in contrast to the character of the Buddha's teachings, which are for the most part, if not always, taught in sequential order of fruition. However, Sujato has certainly not offered anything original in questioning the Satipatthana Sutta. What I sense as an aggressive & adversarial dogmatism is probably not really necessary. For example, the critique of the Satipatthana Sutta found in Appendix B of this Bhikkhu Buddhadasa work is, for me, probably much more practical & helpful.

Still, to perceive, for example, Analayo as a monastic, I need a clarification of his lineage and identity.

What do you mean with a clarification o his lineage and identity?. He recieved his Upasampada in the Sri Lankan Shwegyin Nikaya (and the Shwegyin Nikaya is part of the Amarapura Nikaya lineage) with the Venerable Phemasiri Thera as his monastic teacher:

My going forth etc. is a lit­tle com­plex. I orig­i­nally went forth in 1990 in Thai­land in a monastery near Huahin (after an inspir­ing med­i­ta­tion retreat at Wat Suan Mokh, the monastery of Ajahn Bud­dhadāsa). This was, how­ever, orig­i­nally only planned to be for the vassa, which I wanted to spend med­i­tat­ing in a cave close by the sea­side. I stayed on in robes for two years, in the end, since I found it was the most mean­ing­ful thing to do. How­ever, try­ing to keep the rules strictly com­bined with my Ger­man per­fec­tion­ism had cre­ated some prob­lems in my mind (stiff­ness, arro­gance towards those who are less strict etc.). I any­way had to go back to Ger­many to set­tle things, since orig­i­nally I had not left with the idea of liv­ing in Asia, so I went down to anagārika, did what I had to do in Ger­many, and in 1994 came to Sri Lanka, where in 1995 I took pab­bajā again, under Ven. Balan­goda Ananda Maitreya.

“My main ref­er­ence point for the sub­se­quent period was Bhikkhu Bodhi, whom I con­sider as my teacher, as he guided me in Pāli etc. and we were through­out in reg­u­lar con­tact. In order to keep out of dāna oblig­a­tions and other things, and also out of my ear­lier expe­ri­ence with the rules of higher ordi­na­tion, I stayed samaṇera for 12 years. Thus it was only in 2007, after repeat­edly being urged to do so by Bhikkhu Bodhi, that I took higher ordi­na­tion, in the Swe­jin Nikāya, with Ven. Pemasiri of Sumath­ipala Aranya as my monas­tic teacher.”

All the world is on fire, All the world is burning, All the world is ablaze, All the world is quaking. That which does not quake or blaze, That to which worldlings do not resort, Where there is no place for Mara:That is where my mind delights. (SN 5.7)

By degrees, little by little, from moment to moment,the wise purify themselves, as a smith purifies silver. —Dhammapada 239

vidar wrote:What do you mean with a clarification o his lineage and identity?. He recieved his Upasampada in the Sri Lankan Shwegyin Nikaya (and the Shwegyin Nikaya is part of the Amarapura Nikaya lineage) with the Venerable Phemasiri Thera as his monastic teacher:

Brahmavamso conflates "Nirodha" as the epithet of Nibbana with Nirodha-samapatti:

I'm not sure if the error was Ajahn Brahm's or yours, since you seem to have mistaken his statements about "nirodha" with Nirodha-samapatti. The contexts of his statements should be amply clear that he was speaking of the gradual cessation of contact with the kama (pl), of sankhapa, of the different types of vedana etc in each stage of progression through the Jhanas.

Nirodha as an epithet of Nibbana is the cessation of suffering (dukkha-nirodha), the cessation of all defilements (sabba-kilesa-nirodha). This cessation of suffering does not require any shutting off of experience, but can be experienced in an awake and present state.

In this sense "The Buddha would also very often equate Nibbāna and nirodha, cessation", and not in any other.

However Brahmavamso clearly conflates this epithet of Nibbana with Nirodha-samapatti:

"The Buddha would also very often equate Nibbāna and nirodha, cessation. Even though it is not true Nibbāna, it is close. Why is it close? It is close because a lot of cessation has already occurred. In these very refined states a lot has ceased, by ceasing it has ended, disappeared, finished. That is why it is very close to Nibbāna."

"This cessation is the ending of everything. Sometimes people get afraid. It is bleak, thinking of Nibbāna as cessation, ending! Whether we like it or not, that’s just what happens. We don’t have any say in it."

"Nirodha-samāpatti, the end of all perception and feelings. Nibbāna here and now. To actually see the ‘doer’ and the ‘knower’ in the mind as just arising and falling, as insubstantial, instead of entities which exist by themselves."

But in any event, if Nirodha-samapatti is nothing more a synonym for sanna-vedayita-nirodha samapatti, I thought Ven Sariputta praised Nibbana because the cessation of feelings is pleasant?

"I have heard that on one occasion Ven. Sariputta was staying near Rajagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrels' Feeding Sanctuary. There he said to the monks, "This Unbinding is pleasant, friends. This Unbinding is pleasant."

When this was said, Ven. Udayin said to Ven. Sariputta, "But what is the pleasure here, my friend, where there is nothing felt?"

...

Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters & remains in the cessation of perception & feeling. And, having seen [that] with discernment, his mental fermentations are completely ended. So by this line of reasoning it may be known how Unbinding is pleasant."

Here Ven. Sariputta describes the pleasure of Unbinding as the ending of mental leaks (āsavakkhaya), and one of the roads to it - via the disembodied attainments (arupa-samapatti). However this is just one of the roads, given here as an illustration.

The problem with the Mahavihara Buddhists is simply this - the Commentarial insistence on lokiya/lokuttara attainments empowers them to say that Nirodha-samapatti is also subject to the lokiya/lokuttara distinction. According to the Commentaries, lokiya Nirodha-samapatti leads to rebirth as an asanna brahma. This is not in line with the plain sutta presentation about the inevitable result of experiencing Nirodha-samapatti.

The Sutta (for example, AN 9.34 quoted above) clearly states that Nirodha-samappati is a step away from Nibbana, and one has to achieve the ending of taints (āsavakkhaya) through the development of wisdom, to attain Nibbana from there.

As for the attachment to Jhana, I think we've discussed the plain meaning of MN 44, versus the Commentarial exegesis.

We discussed this issue, and I have given you quotations from several suttas, which clearly show that Buddha acknowledged the possible attachment to Jhana, and discouraged it:

I'm not sure if you've over-stated how Ajahn Brahm characerises the Jhanas as "cessations". He's certainly been careful to qualify those statements as pointing to the proximity of the jhanas to Nibbana, but I don't see him actually stating that the Jhanas are Nibbana.

So, I am not sure why you say -

However Brahmavamso clearly conflates this epithet of Nibbana with Nirodha-samapatti:

If you pluck out one quote in isolation, off course the statement made by Ajahn Brahm looks uncanonical. But elsewhere, he makes clear that the cessations that are Jhana are temporary.

While "nirodha" is an epithet of Nibbana, "nirodha" is also an epithet for the Jhanas and the formless attainments as attested here in AN 9.(30?) -

"Well spoken, monk, well spoken! While three feelings have been taught by me, the pleasant, the painful and the neutral, yet I have also said that whatever is felt is within suffering. This, however, was stated by me with reference to the impermanence of (all) conditioned phenomena. I have said it because conditioned phenomena are liable to destruction, to evanescence, to fading away, to cessation and to change. It is with reference to this that I have stated: 'Whatever is felt is within suffering.'

"I have further taught, monk, the gradual cessation of conditioned phenomena (anupubbasaṅkhārānaṃ nirodho). In him who has attained the first meditative absorption, speech has ceased. Having attained the second absorption, thought-conception and discursive thinking has ceased. Having attained the third absorption, joy has ceased. Having attained the fourth absorption, inhalation and exhalation have ceased. Having attained the sphere of the infinity of space, perception of form has ceased. Having attained the sphere of the infinity of consciousness, the perception of the sphere of the infinity of space has ceased. Having attained the sphere of no-thingness, the perception of the sphere of infinity of consciousness has ceased. Having attained the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the perception of the sphere of no-thingness has ceased. Having attained the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have ceased. In a taint-free monk greed has ceased, hatred has ceased, delusion has ceased.

These cessations, according to DN 9 come about as training, as part of how the Buddha envisaged abhisaññānirodha in His teaching -

"Seeing that these five hindrances have been abandoned within him, he becomes glad. Glad, he becomes enraptured. Enraptured, his body grows tranquil. His body tranquil, he is sensitive to pleasure. Feeling pleasure, his mind becomes concentrated.

"Quite withdrawn from sensual pleasures, withdrawn from unskillful mental qualities, the monk enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. His earlier perception of sensuality ceases, and on that occasion there is a perception of a refined truth of rapture & pleasure born of seclusion. On that occasion he is one who is percipient of a refined truth of rapture & pleasure born of seclusion. And thus it is that with training one perception arises and with training another perception ceases. (etc etc for the other attainments, before we reach Nirodha Samapatti....

"Now, when the monk is percipient of himself here, then from there to there, step by step, he touches the peak of perception. As he remains at the peak of perception, the thought occurs to him, 'Thinking is bad for me. Not thinking is better for me. If I were to think and will, this perception of mine would cease, and a grosser perception would appear. What if I were neither to think nor to will?' So he neither thinks nor wills, and as he is neither thinking nor willing, that perception ceases and another, grosser perception does not appear. He touches cessation (So nirodhaṃ phusati). This, Potthapada, is how there is the alert step-by step attainment of the ultimate cessation of perception.

I agree with you when you say-

Nirodha as an epithet of Nibbana is the cessation of suffering (dukkha-nirodha), the cessation of all defilements (sabba-kilesa-nirodha). This cessation of suffering does not require any shutting off of experience, but can be experienced in an awake and present state.

But judging from the suttas above, it seems that the Buddha Himself was sometimes apt to use "nirodha" to describe the stages of the path. I think that when the Buddha Himself used "nirodha" loosely, the point was to encourage the listener, and not fret overly on the technical sense.

Both senses are valid - they just function differently, at different times.

As for the citations you furnished for your belief that one can be attached to the Jhanas, let's look at them-

MN 36 -

"I entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. But the pleasant feeling that arose in this way did not invade my mind or remain."

I don't get your point. Are you suggesting that because the Buddha said the above, the possibility of the opposite could be true? I don't believe that to be the case, since there is no logical apparatus by which one can validly infer that because the Bodhisatta was unaffected by jhanic sukha, the possibility exists that jhanic sukha could affect a jhanalabhi. The context of the Bodhisatta's re-acquaintance with the 1st Jhana was preceded by his recollection of his childhood experience -

"I thought: 'I recall once, when my father the Sakyan was working, and I was sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, then — quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful mental qualities — I entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. Could that be the path to Awakening?' Then following on that memory came the realization: 'That is the path to Awakening.' I thought: 'So why am I afraid of that pleasure that has nothing to do with sensuality, nothing to do with unskillful mental qualities?' I thought: 'I am no longer afraid of that pleasure that has nothing to do with sensuality, nothing to do with unskillful mental qualities, but that pleasure is not easy to achieve with a body so extremely emaciated.

As for MN 111, it's the same logical non-sequitor as above. Just because Ven Sariputta remained unattracted and unrepelled to those jhanic states, does not imply that someone could be attracted or repelled. Is there some logical maneuver here which I'm not au fait with?

I agree with MN 106. It's either bhavatanha or vibhavatanha at work. But the attachment seems to take place outside of Jhana, where the clinging is to equanimity as a feeling that flows from thoughts. We're still having a debate in the other thread about the place of "thoughts" in the jhanas.

In Sāmañña-vagga in the Nines of Aṅguttara-nikāya jhānas and formless attainments are called sandiṭṭhikanibbāna, nibbāna, parinibbāna, tadaṇganibbāna, diṭṭhadhammanibbāna with a sequel (pariyāyena). Cessation of perception and feeling is called the same (i.e. sandiṭṭhikanibbāna, etc.) but without a sequel (nippariyāyenā).

Sylvester wrote:Leaves one to wonder why there is this irrational fear that "Cessation of perception and feeling" leads to rebirth as an asaññasatta.

Not irrational at all. Non-apperceptive absorptions are states wherein there is no possibility of development. If one isn't already at a very advanced stage then by entering non-apperceptive absorptions one is arresting any possibility of development. Thus, it is very prudent to heed the commentarial tradition's advice and extinguish as many levels of fetters as possible before engaging in any non-apperceptive samādhi.

As far as I can tell from Ajahn Brahm's dessanas and published works, the only "fully" non-apperceptive absorption that he mentions is Nirodha-Samapatti. And that's praised in the suttas, in contrast to the Commentarial admonitions that it leads to an asaññasatta rebirth.

All the other absorptions that he teaches are strictly in line with Anupubbanirodha schema from the suttas.

I wonder how the accusation has surreptitiously evolved from attacking Ajahn Brahm's kāmasaññanirodha teaching of 1st Jhana (as uncanonical) to become an insinuation that he teaches sabbasaññanirodha for the jhanas.