Maneuvering Against Missile Defense

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In the 1990s, Congress decided it was time for the United States
to build a missile-defense system. This was a reasonable -- even
overdue -- step. After all, we'd been completely defenseless
against any sort of missile attack since the missile had been
invented.

But not everybody liked the idea.

For example, in 2000 the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a
report that questioned the technical feasibility of a Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense system. The report claimed it would be extremely
difficult to hit an incoming missile, especially since our enemies
would likely employ countermeasures designed to confuse our defense
systems.

"Past U.S. missile-defense tests against missiles using
'countermeasures' did not demonstrate that defenses could defeat
such countermeasures," the scientists insisted. Since "an attacker
could deploy such countermeasures before even the first phase of
the NMD system was operational," they added, "it makes no sense to
begin deployment."

To give these scientists their due, it is indeed difficult to
"hit a bullet with a bullet," which is what a mid-flight missile
interceptor must do. But what they failed to take into account was
American ingenuity.

Last month, about 75 miles above the Pacific Ocean, a "kill
vehicle" from our bare-bones missile-defense system did what these
scientists said wouldn't be possible in practice. It destroyed the
mock warhead of a long-range missile. That's especially heartening
because similar technology is used in three other missile-defense
systems. It wasn't the first time UCS experts were proven wrong.
Over the last seven years these four programs have passed their
tests -- "done the impossible" -- roughly 80 percent of the
time.

The dire predictions of the Union of Concerned Scientists have
been, well, shot down repeatedly. The system works. Not perfectly
(which is why we must keep testing and perfecting the technology),
but far better than expected.

That hasn't stopped the naysayers. They've merely shifted gears.
Instead of insisting missile defense can't work, they now declare
it works too well. You see, our missile-defense screen isn't
static. It's growing, slowly but surely. We have working outposts
in Alaska and California, and the military's Missile Defense Agency
aims to place others in Eastern Europe, to protect both our allies
and ourselves from possible missile attack.

The MDA says this proposed system wouldn't keep Russian missiles
out, but some scientists disagree. An Associated Press story last
month quoted six scientists who "are skeptical that the U.S.
missile-defense system can work." Yet, strangely, "they believe
that in terms of raw speed, U.S. interceptors in Poland could catch
a Russian ICBM launched from western Russia at any part of the
continental United States."

The question Americans ought to ask is, "Why is that a bad
thing?" These scientists are undermining their own past arguments.
They now insist this technology can protect us, even against
threats it's not intended to thwart. That would make missile
defense one of the few federal programs to deliver more than it
promised.

Many of us have insisted for decades that the United States
needs missile defense. A handful of others, including the Union of
Concerned Scientists, have long insisted that's not true.

But even they say the evidence shows the system is improving
every year. It's better than they ever thought it could be. Better,
even, than they think it should be.

Apparently they won't be satisfied unless the U.S. is
defenseless against incoming missiles. But the rest of us shouldn't
rest until a robust missile-defense system is in place. It's coming
along very well. Just ask its staunchest critics.