Presuppositions of Aristotle's Politics

Aristotle's political philosophy is distinguished by its underlying
philosophical doctrines. Of these the following five principles are
especially noteworthy:

(1) Principle of teleology Aristotle begins the
Politics by invoking the concept of nature (see
Political Naturalism).
In the Physics
Aristotle identifies the nature of a thing above all with its end or
final cause (Physiscs II.2.194a28–9, 8.199b15–18). The end of a thing is
also its function (Eudemian Ethics II.1.1219a8), which is its defining
principle (Meteorology IV.12.390a10–11). On Aristotle's view
plants and animals are paradigm cases of natural existents, because
they have a nature in the sense of an internal causal principle which
explains how it comes into being and behaves (Phys.
II.1.192b32–3). For example, an acorn has an inherent tendency to grow
into an oak tree, so that the tree exists by nature rather than by
craft or by chance. The thesis that human beings have a natural
function has a fundamental place in the Eudemian Ethics II.1,
Nicomachean Ethics I.7, and Politics I.2. The
Politics further argues that it is part of the nature of human
beings that they are political or adapted for life in the city-state.
Thus teleology is crucial for the political naturalism which is at the
foundation of Aristotle's political philosophy. (For discussion of
teleology see the entry on
Aristotle's biology.)

(2) Principle of perfection Aristotle understands good and evil
in terms of his teleology. The natural end of the organism (and the
means to this end) is good for it, and what defeats or impedes this end
is bad. For example, he argues that animals sleep in order to preserve
themselves, because “nature operates for the sake of an end, and this
is a good,” and sleeping is necessary and beneficial for entities which
cannot move continuously (De Somno 2.455b17–22). For human
beings the ultimate good or happiness (eudaimonia) consists in
perfection, the full attainment of their natural function, which
Aristotle analyzes as the activity of the soul according to reason (or
not without reason), i.e., activity in accordance with the most perfect
virtue or excellence (EN I.7.1098a7–17). This also provides a
norm for the politician: “What is most choiceworthy for each individual
is always the highest it is possible for him to attain” (Pol.
VII.14.1333a29–30; cf. EN X.7.1177b33–4). This ideal is to be
realized in both the individual and the city-state: “that way of life
is best, both separately for each individual and in common for
city-states, which is equipped with virtue” (Pol.
VII.1.1323b40–1324a1). However, Aristotle recognizes that it is
generally impossible to fully realize this ideal, in which case he
invokes a second-best principle of approximism: it is best to attain perfection, but,
failing that, a thing is better in proportion as it is nearer to the
end (see De Caelo II.12.292b17–19).

Aristotle's perfectionism was opposed to the subjective relativism
of Protagoras, according to which good and evil is defined by whatever
human beings happened to desire. Like Plato, Aristotle maintained that
the good was objective and independent of human wishes. However, he
rejected Plato's theory that the good was defined in terms of a
transcendent form of the good, holding instead that good and evil are
in a way relative to the organism, that is, to its natural end.

(3) Principle of community Aristotle maintains that the
city-state is the most complete community, because it attains the limit
of self-sufficiency, so that it can exist for the sake of the good life
(Pol. I.2.1252b27–30). Individuals outside of the city-state
are not self-sufficient, because they depend on the community not only
for material necessities but also for education and moral habituation.
“Just as, when perfected, a human is the best of animals, so also when
separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all” (1253a31–3). On
Aristotle's view, then, human beings must be subject to the authority
of the city-state in order to attain the good life. The following
principle concerns how authority should be exercised within a
community.

(4) Principle of rulership Aristotle believes that the
existence and well-being of any system requires the presence of a
ruling element: “Whenever a thing is established out of a number of
things and becomes a single common thing, there always appears in it a
ruler and ruled …. This [relation] is present in living things,
but it derives from all of nature” (1254a28–32). Just as an animal or
plant can survive and flourish only if its soul rules over its body
(Pol. I.5.1254a34–6, De Anima I.5.410b10–15; compare
Plato Phaedo 79e-80a), a human community can possess the
necessary order only if it has a ruling element which is in a position
of authority, just as an army can possess order only if it has a
commander in control. Although Aristotle follows Plato in accepting
this principle, he rejects Plato's further claim that a single science
of ruling is appropriate for all (see Plato Statesman
258e-259c. For Aristotle different forms of rule are required for
different systems: e.g., political rule for citizens and despotic rule
for slaves. The imposition of an inappropriate form of rule results in
disorder and injustice. This point becomes clearer in the light of
the following corollary of the principle of rulership.

(5) Principle of the rule of reason Aristotle agrees with
Plato's dictum that, whenever a system contains a rational element, it
is appropriate for it to rule over the nonrational part, because the
rational element alone knows what is best for the whole (see
Plato Republic IV.441e). Aristotle elaborates on this
principle: observing that different individuals can expemplify
rationality in different ways and to different degrees, he maintains
that different modes of rule are appropriate for different sorts of
ruler and subject. For example, a child has a deliberative capacity,
but it is undeveloped and incomplete in comparison with an adult's, so
that a child is a fit subject for paternal rule by its father; but
paternal rule would be inappropriate between two adults who both have
mature rational capacities (see Politics I.13 and III.6). In
a political context the principle of the rule of reason also implies
that different constitutions are appropriate for different city-states
depending on the rational capacities of their citizens. This is an
important consideration, for example, in Aristotle's discussions of
democracy and the rule of law (see Politics III.11 and
15–16).

The aforementioned principles account for much of the distinctive
flavor of Aristotle's political philosophy, and they also indicate
where many modern theorists have turned away from him. Modern
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes have challenged the principles of
teleology and perfectionism, arguing against the former that human
beings are mechanistic rather than teleological systems, and against
the latter that good and bad depend upon subjective preferences of
valuing agents rather than on objective states of affairs. Liberal
theorists have criticized the principle of community on the grounds
that it cedes too much authority to the state. Even the principles of
rulership and of the rule of reason — which Aristotle, Plato, and
many other theorists regarded as self-evident — have come under fire
by modern theorists like Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek who argued that
social and economic order may arise spontaneously as if by an
“invisible hand.” Modern neo-Aristotelian political theorists are
committed to defending one or more of these doctrines against such
criticisms.

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