Fifty Years of the English Constitution, 1830-1880

fail to describe that Constitution as it really is. If Sir T. Erskine May's work seems to cover the ground here alleged to be vacant, there are other objections to that work which largely reduce its value and render it of little service for the purpose of really testing the existing state of the Constitution. The work is wholly uncritical in its character and conception; it makes little selection of materials, not distinguishing what is of merely transitory and what is of lasting import; and it concerns itself more with defending modern political changes, so far as they seem to follow in the wake of a Whig theory of government, than with scrutinising the real bearing of these changes on the progress of the Constitution.

The period of fifty years intervening between the year 1830 and the year 1880 seems to present limits peculiarly suited for marking out both the essential and unchangeable elements of the Constitution—if there be any such—and also the growing and variable elements on the movements of which the future of the Constitution depends. Within these limits of time, it is necessary, in view of the purpose indicated, only to recur to those events or constitutional epochs which are of critical moment. A summary of, or even allusion to, all political facts indiscriminately would convert a constitutional analysis into a mere political history. The investigation is not concerned with the general value of legislative enactments, or the success or ill-success of Executive Governments, but with the structure of the English Government itself, and the progressive modifications, in one direction or another, which are taking place in that structure. The only questions for the constitutional inquirer are, where is the supreme

authority ultimately situated, and what practical guarantees are provided for the individual citizen against abuses of that authority. Under these general heads are, in truth, gathered up all the multiform inquiries with which a scrutiny of the constitutional condition of a modern State teems. These inquiries relate to a number of somewhat complex topics which often seem little connected with one another. Such topics are the amount, kind, and formalities of popular representation in Parliament; the control exercised by Parliament over the Executive Authority, and the mode in which that Authority is created and sustained; the relations of local to central authorities, and of Dependencies to the parent State; and, not least of all, the constitution of Courts of Justice, the nature and administration of the Criminal Law, and the degree of arbitrary authority conceded to the permanent officers who are entrusted with the preservation of the peace.

It is not an unduly patriotic vaunt to assert that, as compared with the existing constitution of all other European States, the English Constitution best secures the primary object of all good government; that is, a wide diffusion of political rights coupled with effective guarantees for personal liberty. This is no optimistic view of the English Constitution ; and the truth of it is testified not only by the treatises of accomplished foreign writers on the subject—who are commonly far deeper students of English institutions than English labourers in the same field—but by the fact that every constitutional movement in other European countries is attended either by an avowed copy of some characteristic English institution or by a tentative modification of one. Thus the movements or struggles of the
fail to describe that Constitution as it really is. If Sir T. Erskine May's work seems to cover the ground here alleged to be vacant, there are other objections to that work which largely reduce its value and render it of little service for the purpose of really testing the existing state of the Constitution. The work is wholly uncritical in its character and conception; it makes little selection of materials, not distinguishing what is of merely transitory and what is of lasting import; and it concerns itself more with defending modern political changes, so far as they seem to follow in the wake of a Whig theory of government, than with scrutinising the real bearing of these changes on the progress of the Constitution.

The period of fifty years intervening between the year 1830 and the year 1880 seems to present limits peculiarly suited for marking out both the essential and unchangeable elements of the Constitution—if there be any such—and also the growing and variable elements on the movements of which the future of the Constitution depends. Within these limits of time, it is necessary, in view of the purpose indicated, only to recur to those events or constitutional epochs which are of critical moment. A summary of, or even allusion to, all political facts indiscriminately would convert a constitutional analysis into a mere political history. The investigation is not concerned with the general value of legislative enactments, or the success or ill-success of Executive Governments, but with the structure of the English Government itself, and the progressive modifications, in one direction or another, which are taking place in that structure. The only questions for the constitutional inquirer are, where is the supreme

authority ultimately situated, and what practical guarantees are provided for the individual citizen against abuses of that authority. Under these general heads are, in truth, gathered up all the multiform inquiries with which a scrutiny of the constitutional condition of a modern State teems. These inquiries relate to a number of somewhat complex topics which often seem little connected with one another. Such topics are the amount, kind, and formalities of popular representation in Parliament; the control exercised by Parliament over the Executive Authority, and the mode in which that Authority is created and sustained; the relations of local to central authorities, and of Dependencies to the parent State; and, not least of all, the constitution of Courts of Justice, the nature and administration of the Criminal Law, and the degree of arbitrary authority conceded to the permanent officers who are entrusted with the preservation of the peace.

It is not an unduly patriotic vaunt to assert that, as compared with the existing constitution of all other European States, the English Constitution best secures the primary object of all good government; that is, a wide diffusion of political rights coupled with effective guarantees for personal liberty. This is no optimistic view of the English Constitution ; and the truth of it is testified not only by the treatises of accomplished foreign writers on the subject—who are commonly far deeper students of English institutions than English labourers in the same field—but by the fact that every constitutional movement in other European countries is attended either by an avowed copy of some characteristic English institution or by a tentative modification of one. Thus the movements or struggles of the
English Constitution at home are lifted into a region of more than merely national importance. Should the English Constitution be found, under the new conditions of European society, to fail at any important point, and to be insufficient for its ends, this must be a matter of moment to every country in the world. It is not easy to say what type of government can be proposed for the imitation of nascent or revolutionised States, if the English Constitution signally breaks down in the eyes of all men.

It has to be observed, however, that the imitation of English institutions here alluded to is at the best but partial and superficial. Trial by jury, a Second Chamber, the control of the public purse by the popular representative Assembly, the existence of some species of Cabinet, and even (if these exist anywhere out of English dominions and the United States) such securities as those afforded by the Habeas Corpus Acts, are only an insignificant portion of the fully-developed English Constitution. Those outward signs are, indeed, all that admit of being directly imitated and applied to other countries and conditions of society. But the true political constitution of any country must be, in a very large measure, the product of the peculiar social conditions and historical antecedents of that country. It is thus that it is unsafe for a foreign statesman to transplant any English institution into his own political system without studying that institution in action during a sufficiently long space of time, observing how far its success depends on the temperament of the people or on the character of statesmen, and ascertaining whether its apparent merits depend on its intrinsic value by itself, or on the presence of accompanying