Belle Terre is a village on Long Island's north shore of about 220 homes
inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one square mile.
It has restricted land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging houses,
boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses. The word
"family" as used in the ordinance means, "one or more persons related by
blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding
two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though
not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute
a family." Appellees the Dickmans are owners of a house in the village
and leased it in December 1971 for a term of 18 months to Michael Truman.
Later Bruce Boraas became a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the house
along with three others. These six are students at nearby State University
at Stony Brook and none is related to the other by blood, adoption, or
marriage. When the village served the Dickmans with an "Order to Remedy
Violations" of the ordinance, the owners plus three tenants thereupon
brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an injunction and
a judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional. The District Court
held the ordinance constitutional, and the Court of Appeals reversed, one
judge dissenting, 476 F.2d 806. We noted probable jurisdiction.

This case brings to this Court a different phase of local zoning regulations
from those we have previously reviewed.... The present ordinance is challenged
on several grounds: that it interferes with a person's right to travel;
that it interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a State;
that it bars people who are uncongenial to the present residents; that
it expresses the social preferences of the residents for groups that will
be congenial to them; that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest
of government; that the restriction of those whom the neighbors do not
like trenches on the newcomers' rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful
concern to villagers whether the residents are married or unmarried; that
the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation's experience, ideology, and
self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated society.

We find none of these reasons in the record before us. It is not aimed
at transients. It involves no procedural disparity inflicted on some
but not on others. It involves no "fundamental" right guaranteed
by the Constitution, such as voting, the right of association,
the right of access to the courts, or any rights of privacy. We deal with
economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn
lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection
Clause if the law be "'reasonable, not arbitrary'" and bears "a rational
relationship to a [permissible] state objective." It is said, however,
that if two unmarried people can constitute a "family," there is no reason
why three or four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature leaves
some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion,
however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.

It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an animosity to
unmarried couples who live together. There is no evidence to support it;
and the provision of the ordinance bringing within the definition of a
"family" two unmarried people belies the charge.

The ordinance places no ban on other forms of association, for a "family"
may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes.

The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present
urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously
pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. A quiet place
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.
Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting [omitted].

Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

In my view, the disputed classification burdens the students' fundamental
rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Because the application of strict equal protection scrutiny
is therefore required, I am at odds with my Brethren's conclusion that
the ordinance may be sustained on a showing that it bears a rational relationship
to the accomplishment of legitimate governmental objectives.

I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning is a complex and
important function of the State. It may indeed be the most essential function
performed by local government, for it is one of the primary means by which
we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life.
I therefore continue to adhere to the principle that deference should be
given to governmental judgments concerning proper land-use allocation.
That deference is a principle which has served this Court well and which
is necessary for the continued development of effective zoning and land-use
control mechanisms. Had the owners alone brought this suit alleging that
the restrictive ordinance deprived them of their property or was an irrational
legislative classification, I would agree that the ordinance would have
to be sustained. Our role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board
of appeals.

But deference does not mean abdication. This Court has an obligation
to ensure that zoning ordinances, even when adopted in furtherance of such
legitimate aims, do not infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights.

When separate but equal was still accepted constitutional dogma, this
Court struck down a racially restrictive zoning ordinance. I am sure
the Court would not be hesitant to invalidate that ordinance today. The
lower federal courts have considered procedural aspects of zoning, and
acted to insure that land-use controls are not used as means of confining
minorities and the poor to the ghettos of our central cities. These
are limited but necessary intrusions on the discretion of zoning authorities.
By the same token, I think it clear that the First Amendment provides some
limitation on zoning laws. It is inconceivable to me that we would allow
the exercise of the zoning power to burden First Amendment freedoms, as
by ordinances that restrict occupancy to individuals adhering to particular
religious, political, or scientific beliefs. Zoning officials properly
concern themselves with the uses of land -- with, for example, the number
and kind of dwellings to be constructed in a certain neighborhood or the
number of persons who can reside in those dwellings. But zoning authorities
cannot validly consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how
they choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic or Jew,
Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.

My disagreement with the Court today is based upon my view that the
ordinance in this case unnecessarily burdens appellees' First Amendment
freedom of association and their constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
Our decisions establish that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
the freedom to choose one's associates. Constitutional protection
is extended, not only to modes of association that are political in the
usual sense, but also to those that pertain to the social and economic
benefit of the members. The selection of one's living companions involves
similar choices as to the emotional, social, or economic benefits to be
derived from alternative living arrangements.

The freedom of association is often inextricably entwined with the constitutionally
guaranteed right of privacy. The right to "establish a home" is an essential
part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. And the
Constitution secures to an individual a freedom "to satisfy his intellectual
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." The choice of
household companions -- of whether a person's "intellectual and emotional
needs" are best met by living with family, friends, professional associates,
or others -- involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and
quality of intimate relationships within the home. That decision surely
falls within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.

The instant ordinance discriminates on the basis of just such a personal
lifestyle choice as to household companions. It permits any number of persons
related by blood or marriage, be it two or twenty, to live in a single
household, but it limits to two the number of unrelated persons bound by
profession, love, friendship, religious or political affiliation, or mere
economics who can occupy a single home. Belle Terre imposes upon those
who deviate from the community norm in their choice of living companions
significantly greater restrictions than are applied to residential groups
who are related by blood or marriage, and compose the established order
within the community. The village has, in effect, acted to fence out those
individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from that of its current
residents.

This is not a case where the Court is being asked to nullify a township's
sincere efforts to maintain its residential character by preventing the
operation of rooming houses, fraternity houses, or other commercial or
high-density residental uses. Unquestionably, a town is free to restrict
such uses. Moreover, as a general proposition, I see no constitutional
infirmity in a town's limiting the density of use in residential areas
by zoning regulations which do not discriminate on the basis of constitutionally
suspect criteria. This ordinance, however, limits the density of
occupancy of only those homes occupied by unrelated persons. It thus reaches
beyond control of the use of land or the density of population, and undertakes
to regulate the way people choose to associate with each other within the
privacy of their own homes.

Because I believe that this zoning ordinance creates a classification
which impinges upon fundamental personal rights, it can withstand constitutional
scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary
to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. And, once
it be determined that a burden has been placed upon a constitutional right,
the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately
protect the compelling state interest and that the challenged statute is
sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seeking to justify the burden.

variety of justifications have been proffered in support of the
village's ordinance. It is claimed that the ordinance controls population
density, prevents noise, traffic and parking problems, and preserves the
rent structure of the community and its attractiveness to families. As
I noted earlier, these are all legitimate and substantial interests of
government. But I think it clear that the means chosen to accomplish these
purposes are both overinclusive and underinclusive, and that the asserted
goals could be as effectively achieved by means of an ordinance that did
not discriminate on the basis of constitutionally protected choices of
lifestyle. The ordinance imposes no restriction whatsoever on the number
of persons who may live in a house, as long as they are related by marital
or sanguinary bonds -- presumably no matter how distant their relationship.
Nor does the ordinance restrict the number of income earners who may contribute
to rent in such a household, or the number of automobiles that may be maintained
by its occupants. In that sense the ordinance is underinclusive. On the
other hand, the statute restricts the number of unrelated persons who may
live in a home to no more than two. It would therefore prevent three unrelated
people from occupying a dwelling even if among them they had but one income
and no vehicles. While an extended family of a dozen or more might live
in a small bungalow, three elderly and retired persons could not occupy
the large manor house next door. Thus the statute is also grossly overinclusive
to accomplish its intended purposes.

There are some 220 residences in Belle Terre occupied by about 700 persons.
The density is therefore just above three per household. The village is
justifiably concerned with density of population and the related problems
of noise, traffic, and the like. It could deal with those problems by limiting
each household to a specified number of adults, two or three perhaps, without
limitation on the number of dependent children. The burden of such
an ordinance would fall equally upon all segments of the community. It
would surely be better tailored to the goals asserted by the village than
the ordinance before us today, for it would more realistically restrict
population density and growth and their attendant environmental costs.
Various other statutory mechanisms also suggest themselves as solutions
to Belle Terre's problems -- rent control, limits on the number of vehicles
per household, and so forth, but, of course, such schemes are matters of
legislative judgment and not for this Court. Appellants also refer to the
necessity of maintaining the family character of the village. There is
not a shred of evidence in the record indicating that if Belle Terre permitted
a limited number of unrelated persons to live together, the residential,
familial character of the community would be fundamentally affected.

By limiting unrelated households to two persons while placing no limitation
on households of related individuals, the village has embarked upon its
commendable course in a constitutionally faulty vessel. I would find the
challenged ordinance unconstitutional. But I would not ask the village
to abandon its goal of providing quiet streets, little traffic, and a pleasant
and reasonably priced environment in which families might raise their children.
Rather, I would commend the village to continue to pursue those purposes
but by means of more carefully drawn and even-handed legislation.