Can The Iran Crisis Be A Blessing In Disguise For Europe?

Popular protests in
Iran came at a particularly delicate time for the nuclear agreement between Iran
and the world powers, known as Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). More
than one year after the United States unilaterally withdrew and re-imposed
extraterritorial sanctions against Iran, the JCPOA is hovering precariously on a
brink of collapse. Currently, the only obvious path available for Iran and the
U.S. to avoid a direct confrontation is the French President Emmanuel Macron's initiative to
mediate between them, and to issue a $15
billion credit line to Iran to cover its basic needs.

The eruption of the protests in Iran, however, seems to have dis-incentivized
Washington from seeking to re-launch diplomacy with Tehran. Instead, the White
House and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo unambiguously sided with
the protestors. They see the
protests as evidence that their campaign of "maximum pressure" against Iran is
working. Consequently, there is no point in talking to the "theocratic regime,"
as it is, from their view, about to implode soon anyway.

This is likely to be a miscalculation. True, Iran consistently defied
expectations and serially embarrassed experts, therefore humility is in order
when assessing developments there. And the regime-imposed Internet
shutdown at the outset of the protests does not contribute to better
understanding them. Yet, any suggestion of an impending regime change in Iran
should be met with skepticism.

Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has weathered multiple crises. Current
turmoil was provoked not by the American sanctions, but by the
government-imposed 50
percent hike in fuel prices. Ironically, in implementing the measure, the
Rouhani administration followed the advice of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the very mainstay of American-led
international financial order. As an economist Esfandiyar Batmanghelidj noted,
doing so was fiscally sound, as Iran has unreasonably low petrol prices.
According to the IMF, subsidies to maintain them eat up to 1.6 percent of
Iran's GDP. These protests are fundamentally of the same nature as anti-austerity revolts
in other countries, such as, most recently, Egypt and Chile.
Neither of these countries is an object of American sanctions, nor is there any
external-promoted regime change drive.

This does not mean that there are no attempts to hijack legitimate economic
grievances for regime change purposes. The fake news machine fueled by
monarchist and Mujahedeen-e Khalk (MEK) trolls was in full swing trying to
create an impression of a revolutionary situation. In addition, reckless
statements by American officials, such as Richard
Grenell, the ambassador in Germany, and Brian Hook, the special
representative for Iran, gave credence to the hypothesis of external
manipulation.

This push, however, is unlikely to succeed, for three main reasons. First,
however alienated many Iranians feel with respect to the regime, their
experience tells them that a violent revolution usually leads to worse, not
better outcomes. Second, the fear of a bloody chaos and disintegration along the
Syrian or Iraqi lines is genuine and runs deep. Third, the security apparatus is
brutally effective in nipping any uprising in a bud and its job is being helped
by credible allegations of external interference. Coincidence or not, but the
latest wave of protests started to ebb after loud proclamations of a U.S.
support.

That leaves the nuclear clock ticking as before the protests. Absent any
negotiation and sanctions relief, Iran is likely to accelerate its own departure
from the JCPOA. The much-feared next step may be enrichment of uranium up to 20
percent, which could trigger a sanctions snapback in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). Iranians made it clear that this would lead them to abandon not
only the JCPOA, but also consider leaving
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well. All IAEA inspectors would then be
expelled from the country. That, in itself, does not inevitably imply a dash for
nuclear weapons. Iranians would be content with creating what Nasser Hadian, a
political scientist from the Tehran university, calls strategic ambiguity that
would have the world guess about their intentions.

Once the situation is pushed to that extreme, only two paths become available:
further securitization of Iran under the Article 7 of the United Nations
Charter, or new, post-JCPOA negotiations. Consistent with Iran's tactics in the
last months, more pressure would certainly invite more resistance from Iran,
both on the nuclear file and in the region. Those who like President Hassan
Rouhani and foreign minister Javad Zarif still advocate for diplomacy will have
fewer arguments to convince the ultimate decider, Ayatollah Khamenei, to back
their line. The hardliners who reject any accommodation with the West, by
contrast, will see their power increased, perhaps as soon as the next
parliamentary elections in February 2020. That would leave war as a way to break
the deadlock. President Donald Trump, however, consistently showed reluctance to
engage in a new, and assuredly disastrous, conflict in the Middle East that
could cost him re-election. A Democratic president would be even less inclined
to embark on a warpath at the beginning of his or her mandate.

Which makes a return to diplomacy at some point inevitable. The sooner it
happens, the lower the costs and risks for all involved. Once Iran is referred
to the UNSC, the likelihood of a full-blown nuclear crisis will increase-the
reluctance of U.S. presidents to engage in wars should not be taken as a
guarantee that they will never stumble into one. Likewise, some elements within
Iran, far more radical than Khamenei, might be tempted to push things to the
brink. Even if both sides will escalate merely to accumulate chips for an
eventual bargaining, the risks that the conflict will spiral out of control can
never be underestimated. And credible negotiations are more likely with the
current government of Iran than an alternative, which is another reason why
Hook's jubilation at protests is so woefully misplaced.

To prevent a nuclear crisis from materializing, Europe needs to step in and
deliver Macron's credit lines to Iran as a way of keeping it within the JCPOA.
In situations of acute security threat, the EU is capable of acting, including
by putting money where its mouth is: it happened in 2016 when the EU struck a pragmatic
deal with Turkey on migration management. Washington's reaction to the
protests in Iran leaves no space for doubts: there is simply no time left for
Europe to wait for U.S. approval of its initiatives on Iran. Macron's plan
should be implemented without any further delay.

The alternative to such a bold action for Europe would be either a war that will
directly affect its security, or negotiations at some point between the U.S. and
Iran, with Europe absent from the table. If the EU seizes the momentum now, it
has a chance of proving itself as a serious geopolitical player. In this sense,
the Iran crisis may yet prove to be a blessing in disguise. If not, Macron's stark
warning of Europe fading into irrelevance will prove to be sadly prescient.

This article reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the
opinions of the S&D Group and the European Parliament.

About the AuthorEldar Mamedov has
degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid,
Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a
diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington D.C. and Madrid. Since 2007, Mamedov
has served as a political adviser for the social-democrats in the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the EP
delegations for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, the Arabian
Peninsula, and Mashreq.