Foreign officers in the Russo-Japanese War, Hoffman is at the far left of the front row.

Grave of Max Hoffmann (1927) on the Invalidenfriedhof Berlin

Carl Adolf Maximillian Hoffmann (January 25, 1869 – July 8, 1927) was a German officer and military strategist during World War I. He is widely regarded as one of the finest staff officers of the imperial period.[citation needed]

Hoffmann attended the Berlin Staff College and graduated in 1889. He spent six months in Russia as an interpreter and five years in the Russian section of the General Staff where he became a specialist in Russian affairs and was tasked with trying to determine Russia's plan of attack in the eventuality of war between Germany and Russia. During the Russo-Japanese War, he served as Germany's military observer with the Japanese First Army in Manchuria.

In the interim, the two Russian armies had drifted so far apart that neither could come to the aid of the other if it were attacked. Hoffman knew this from intercepted radio messages. He also knew from his experience in Manchuria of the deep dislike the two Russian commanders had for each other which would further disincline them to support one another.[1] Hoffmann was then able to devise a plan for an encirclement of Alexander Samsonov's Russian Second Army in the south, which Hindenburg quickly put into action upon his arrival, leading to the Battle of Tannenberg. After destroying the Russian Second Army – it was Hoffman, seeing the propaganda value of casting the German victory as the long-awaited revenge for a medieval defeat, who suggested the engagement be named after Tannenberg when it actually took place much closer to Allenstein – the Eighth Army turned north and mauled Paul von Rennenkampf's Russian First Army at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes driving the Russians out of East Prussia for the remainder of the war.

After Hindenburg and Ludendorff returned to Berlin in 1916, Prince Leopold of Bavaria assumed command of all German armies on the Eastern front with Hoffmann (now a Generalmajor) as his chief of staff. Hoffmann was able to bring all of the forces on the Eastern front (including Austrian units) under his command.

Following the February Revolution the new Russian government under Alexander Kerensky attempted to reinvigorate Russian support for the war by attacking along a broad front. Hoffman withdrew for sixty miles, all the while urging Ludendorff, his former superior during the Tannenberg campaign and now Quartermaster-General, to shift men from the Western Front, claiming he could knock Russia out of the war. In mid-July 1917 six divisions were sent by train from Flanders; using these reinforcements, Hoffmann counter-attacked along the entire front and within a fortnight was entering Riga. This rout fatally weakened Kerensky, led to the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and thus to the collapse of Russian resistance and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In December 1918 he withdrew his forces from the Ober-Ost former frontline to Germany, thus involuntarily preparing the stage for the Polish-Soviet War.

In his post-war memoirs, Hoffmann was critical of the German High Command including Hindenburg and Ludendorff. He was resentful that his two superiors had received the credit for the victories of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes when it was really his strategy that allowed the victories to occur. A few years after the war, when touring the field at Tannenberg, Hoffmann told a group of army cadets "See - this is where Hindenburg slept before the battle, this is where Hindenburg slept after the battle, and this is where Hindenburg slept during the battle."[2]