Self-Interest and the Distant Vulnerable

What interests do states have in assisting and protecting vulnerable populations beyond their borders? While some political leaders and commentators promote a circumscribed understanding of the national interest that rules out accepting substantial risks and costs for the sake of the distant vulnerable, others endorse an “enlightened” conception of the national interest that recognizes the long-term utility to be gained by helping them. However, while this notion of “enlightened” self-interest gives states reason to act in some instances, it fails to prompt action in other cases where the suffering of strangers is less strategically important. Some leaders and commentators have responded to this problem by reaching for some other, less material conception of the national interest to justify assisting the distant vulnerable, but they have often struggled to find the language they need. This article finds a solution in the debates about self-interest waged in seventeenth-century Europe. Dissatisfied both with Hobbes's narrow understanding of self-interest and Pufendorf's more “enlightened” understanding, Leibniz defended a more generous and “disinterested” conception, grounded not in considerations of material utility but in the pleasure to be derived from helping those in need. This article demonstrates two ways in which this “disinterested” conception of self-interest can be of use today. First, it provides resources for explaining why states already sometimes act in “disinterested” and altruistic ways. Second, it provides leaders with a tool for persuading people to help the distant vulnerable, even when it appears to be in neither their narrow nor their “enlightened” interests to do so.

NOTES

1 John R. Bolton, “Irresponsible: Against a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Foreign Affairs,” National Review, April 18, 2011. For a more nuanced nationalist argument that provides greater scope for duties beyond borders, see David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

2 Michael Lewis, “Obama's Way,” Vanity Fair, October 2012. For a classic realist argument that offers a more expansive vision of the moral choices available to political leaders, see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).

19 In a response to his critics, published in 1686, Pufendorf claimed that “the basic premise from which I draw the law of nature stands in direct opposition to the theory of Hobbes. For I come very close to the reasonable theory of the Stoics, whereas Hobbes serves up a rechauffé of Epicurean theories.” Quoted in Anthony Pagden, The Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 58. However, some scholars charge that Pufendorf's efforts to distance himself from Hobbes were insincere and that his theory was fundamentally much closer to that of Hobbes than he was willing to admit. See Palladini, Fiammetta, “Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The Doctrine of Socialitas,” History of European Ideas34, no. 1 (2008), pp. 26‒60.

23 For a contextualist reading of Pufendorf, see Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 140‒65.

29 Quoted in Patrick Riley, “Introduction,” in Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 19. It is worth acknowledging that the phrase “disinterested self-interest,” which I use to encapsulate Leibniz's approach to self-interest, was not one that Leibniz used. He preferred the language of “disinterested love.” However, as the quoted passage makes clear, he insisted that “disinterested love” should generate pleasure for oneself and thus was closely tied to one's own self-interest. Leibniz, Brown explains, thereby “found a way of reconciling his psychological egoism with the possibility of altruism.” Gregory Brown, “Leibniz's Moral Philosophy,” in Nicholas Jolley, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 413.

30 Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium,” in Political Writings, p. 171.

31 Leibniz, “Judgment of the Works of the Earl of Shaftesbury,” in Political Writings, p. 197.

32 Leibniz, “Felicity,” in Political Writings, p. 83.

33 For excellent works that situate Leibniz's treatment of pleasure and perfection within his broader theology, see Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 7–67; Brown, “Leibniz's Moral Philosophy”; Gregory Brown, “Happiness and Justice,” in Maria Rosa Antognazza, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

34 Leibniz, “Felicity,” p. 84.

35 Leibniz, “Considerations Relating to Peace and War,” quoted in Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, p. 257; Leibniz, “Portrait of the Prince,” in Political Writings, p. 98. For excellent overviews of Leibniz's international thought, see Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, pp. 236–60; Janneke Nijman, “Leibniz's Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal Personality: Justice and Stability or the Last Great Defence of the Holy Roman Empire,” IILJ Working Paper 2004/2 (New York: Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law, 2004); and Friedrich Beiderbeck, “Leibniz's Political Vision for Europe,” in Antognazza, Oxford Handbook of Leibniz.

36 For the idea of “universal benevolence,” see Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, p. 152. For Wolff and Vattel's works on the law of nations, see Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, vol. 2, translated by Joseph H. Drake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934); Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, edited by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2008).

37 See, for example, Vattel, The Law of Nations, II.1.3, p. 262. Vattel did, however, give some indication that, in contributing to the wellbeing and happiness of vulnerable people beyond borders, states were contributing to the perfection of themselves. See, for example, II.1.13, p. 267.

40 Interestingly, just as the pursuit of “enlightened” self-interests can produce long-term material benefits, the satisfaction of pleasure-based self-interests can produce long-term nonmaterial benefits. Consider, for example, how seventy years after the event, the people of Denmark continue to take pride in their risky and costly efforts to protect Jews from the Nazis during the Second World War. See Nicole Stokes-DuPass, Integration and New Limits on Citizenship Rights: Denmark and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 83; and Leo Goldberger, ed., The Rescue of the Danish Jews: Moral Courage Under Stress (New York: New York University Press, 1987).

62 On the potential for empathy as an antidote to fear in international relations, see Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics.” Relatedly, see Carty, Anthony, “New Philosophical Foundations for International Law: From an Order of Fear to One of Respect,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs19, no. 2 (2006), pp. 311–30.

63 For classic critiques of “the moral dignity of the national interest” arguments offered by some realists, see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Cohen, Marshall, “Moral Skepticism and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs13, no. 4 (1984), pp. 299‒346.

64 For a valuable application of such ideas to present-day thinking about international ethics, see Jeffery, Reason and Emotion in International Ethics.

* I am grateful to Alex Bellamy, Ben Day, Toni Erskine, Emma Hutchison, Andrew Ross, Wes Widmaier, Ben Zala, members of the UNSW Canberra International Ethics Research Group, three anonymous reviewers, and the Ethics & International Affairs editorial team for helpful comments and suggestions that strengthened this article.